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 A TREATISE 
 
 ON THE 
 
 LAW OF EVIDENCE 
 
 WITH A 
 
 DISCUSSION OF THE PRINCIPLES AND RULES 
 
 WHICH GOVERN ITS PRESENTATION, 
 
 RECEPTION AND EXCLUSION, 
 
 AND THE 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES IN COURT. 
 
 BY 
 
 H. C. UNDERHILL, LL. B. 
 
 Ml ' 
 
 CHICAGO: 
 
 T. II. FLOOD AND COMPANY, 
 Law Book Publishers. 
 
 1894.
 
 T 
 1094 
 
 Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1894, by 
 
 H. C. UNDERBILL, 
 in the office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 
 
 STATE JOURNAL PRINTING COMPANY, 
 
 Printers and Stereotypkrs, 
 
 MADISON, wis.
 
 TO 
 MY FRIEND AND FORMER INSTRUCTOR, 
 
 C. G. TIEDEMAN, Esq., 
 
 PROFESSOR OF LAW IN THE UNIVERSITY OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
 THIS VOLUME IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED, 
 AS A 
 TRIBUTE OF THE AUTHORS APPRECIATION OF HIS LEARNING 
 AND ABILITY AS A SCHOLAR. AND HIS INTEG- 
 RITY AND KINDLINESS AS A MAN. 
 
 6*70919
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 The primary purpose of the author in the preparation of 
 this work is to present in a concise and clear narrative a rea- 
 sonably comprehensive statement of the rules and principles 
 of the existing law of evidence, for the use of students of law 
 pursuing their studies in law schools or elsewhere. Though 
 this is the main object of the work, the author is not wholly 
 without hopes that it may also be of some service to the pro- 
 fession ; and with this end in view a full citation of the most 
 recent and most important cases has been made, which, with 
 a carefully prepared topical and analytical index, will, it is 
 believed, facilitate the convenient use of the book in many, if 
 not in all, the exigencies of practice. 
 
 In order to secure conciseness it was found necessary to 
 omit the detailed discussion of many things which, though 
 interesting to the historical investigator or antiquarian, are 
 obsolete and useless to the student. The author has not 
 hesitated, however, when the occasion seemed to demand it, 
 to discuss dead or obsolete law if the discussion is essential 
 to a proper elucidation or understanding of the law of the 
 present. 
 
 The evolution of the law of evidence from a mass of arbi- 
 trary and inadequate rules, based upon the conservatism and 
 prejudice which could see nothing but good in the past, into 
 a well-reasoned and flexible system of jurisprudence adapted 
 to the demands of the spirit of a progressive age, may be 
 attributed to a variety of causes. The application of the prin- 
 ciple of logic to the law of evidence, resulting from the labors
 
 VI PREFACE. 
 
 of Bentham and his followers, doubtless had much to do in 
 exploding the theory propounded by some of the earliest writ- 
 ers, that it was not only useless but absolutely harmful to seek 
 to find a reason for any of the rules of evidence. So, too, coin- 
 cident with the process of rehabilitation and evolution which 
 has been going on in the law itself as the result of its develop- 
 ment along logical lines and the operation of public opinion 
 acting through a progressive and enlightened judiciary, may 
 be considered the express statutory changes which have been 
 made and some of which are embodied in the codes of pro- 
 cedure which exist in many of the states. 
 
 Other influences as well have been at work. The spread 
 of popular education, the vast increase in and the new uses 
 w r hich have been found for wealth, the progress of scientific 
 investigation, the application of newly-discovered scientific 
 principles to every day-affairs, and the extensive use of ma- 
 chinery for purposes of transportation and manufacture, 
 have all combined to bring about great changes in the law 
 and particularly in the law of evidence. 
 
 The result of all this is, that while the law of evidence has 
 been rendered more logical and better adapted to the de- 
 mands of a progressive social state, many questions have been 
 cast into the back-ground which fifty years ago were of the 
 utmost importance. On the other hand, other subjects and 
 questions have been brought forward for the consideration 
 of the student or attorney, and for discussion in the forum. 
 
 Accordingly it will be found that, while some matters 
 which are treated by the older authorities at some length 
 receive only cursory attention in this volume, leaving the 
 reader to pursue his investigations of the details regarding 
 them in the authorities cited, other departments of the law of 
 evidence — as, for example, expert and opinion evidence, res 
 gestae, relevancy, the statutory incompetency of interested 
 witnesses to testify to personal transactions with a decedent,
 
 PREFACE. VI 1 
 
 privileged communications to doctors, attorneys and clergy- 
 men, the inspection of persons and things by the jury, com- 
 parison of handwriting, the use of pleadings as evidence, stip- 
 ulations, objections to evidence, etc., — have received the full 
 consideration their modern importance demands. 
 
 In citing the most recent cases the author has endeavored 
 to give the citation from the state report as well as that from 
 the National Reporter s} T stem. In many cases where it was 
 not practicable to give the state report citation in the notes, 
 it will be found appended to the case in its proper place in 
 the table of cases. Where it is not given in the table of 
 cases, the reader may feel assured that the case has not 
 been reported by the state Reporter up to the time that this 
 work goes to press. 
 
 Trusting that his work may prove of value in lightening 
 the labors of practitioner and student, and that though either 
 may not find in these pages a solution for every possible or 
 conceivable problem with which he may be confronted, yet, 
 believing that what is found will neither mislead nor con- 
 fuse, the author presents his work to the indulgence of the 
 
 public. 
 
 H. C. Underbill. 
 59 Reid Ave., Brooklyn, N. Y., 
 
 September 10, 1894.
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. 
 
 Early development of law .... 
 
 Evidence defined ...... 
 
 The basis of belief ...... 
 
 Direct and circumstantial evidence distinguished 
 Nature and eifect of circumstantial evidence . 
 Reasonable doubt and the weight of evidence . 
 
 §1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 
 CHAPTER L 
 
 RELEVANCY AND PROVINCE OF JUDGE AND JURY. 
 
 Relevancy of evidence ....... 
 
 Collateral facts, how far admissible ..... 
 
 Evidence of intention, motive, good faith, etc., when relevant 
 Collateral facts bearing on character .... 
 
 Province of judge and jury ...... 
 
 Blended questions of law and fact ..... 
 
 Preliminary facts bearing on admissibility 
 
 8 
 9 
 10 
 11 
 12 
 13 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUE. 
 
 Matter of substance and of essential description 
 Formal allegations ...... 
 
 Allegations of value, quantity, time, place, etc. 
 Proof of contracts ...... 
 
 Variance in the proof of sealed instruments . 
 Substance of the issue in criminal trials . 
 Variance — Amendments . . 
 
 18 
 19 
 20 
 21 
 22 
 23 
 24 
 
 CHAPTER IIL 
 
 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE. 
 
 Primary and secondaiy evidence distinguished 
 Instruments required by law to be in writing . 
 Disputed writings ........ 
 
 Contracts and other transactions actually reduced to writing 
 Collateral writings ........ 
 
 30 
 31 
 32 
 33 
 34
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Exceptions in the case of records and appointments to office 
 Exceptions in the case of evidence of general results 
 Admissions as primary evidence ..... 
 Photographs as primary evidence ..... 
 Exhibition of articles in court ...... 
 
 35 
 36 
 37 
 38 
 39 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 HEARSAY. 
 
 Definition — Grounds for its rejection . . 
 Statements to be proved as facts 
 Expressions of bodily or mental feeling . 
 Pedigree — Oral and written declarations 
 Declarations constituting a part of the res gestae 
 Requisites ....... 
 
 Must be illustrative and connected with main transaction 
 Declarations must be contemporaneous or nearly so 
 Entries as part of the res gestce and made by third persons 
 Entries against interest and entries which are part of the res 
 distinguished ...... 
 
 A party's own books as evidence 
 Indorsements as part of the res gestce 
 
 50 
 51 
 52 
 53 
 54 
 55 
 56 
 57 
 58 
 
 59 
 60 
 61 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 ADMISSIONS. 
 
 Definition and character . . § 65 
 
 Privity as affecting admissions ....... 66 
 
 Parties whose admission is received — Joint interest, when required 67 
 
 Admissions of partners — Their effect when made after dissolution 68 
 
 Declarations of conspirators ........ 69 
 
 Assignor and assignee ......... 70 
 
 AVife's admission — When binding on husband .... 71 
 
 Admissions of inhabitants of towns ...... 72 
 
 Admissions of strangers to the record — Principal and surety — Ad- 
 missions of real parties 73 
 
 The declarations of agents ........ 73a 
 
 Admissions by attorneys of record ....... 74 
 
 Offers of compromise — Admissions under duress against interest . 75 
 
 Admissions in pleadings ......... 76 
 
 Admissions by reference ......... 77 
 
 Admissions from conduct and assumed character .... 78 
 
 Self-serving declarations ........ 79 
 
 Mode of proof — Nature of the admissions ..... 80 
 
 Weight and sufficiency of admissions ...... 81 
 
 Admissions, when conclusive — Mistake ...... 83 
 
 Estoppel defined 83 
 
 Intention of party estopped ........ 84 
 
 Admissions and communications sent and received by telephone . 85
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. XI 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 CONFESSIONS. 
 
 Definition and classification § 88 
 
 To be regarded with caution . . 88a 
 
 Voluntary character of confessions 89 
 
 Confessions, when voluntary — Inducements offered ... 90 
 
 Confessions need not be spontaneous 91 
 
 Preliminary examination 92 
 
 Extra-judicial confessions must be corroborated .... 93 
 
 Conclusive character of judicial confessions 94 
 
 Persons offering inducements 95 
 
 Confessions of persons other than defendant 96 
 
 Confessions of conspirators 97 
 
 Confessions of treason 98 
 
 CHAPTER VIL 
 
 DYING DECLARATIONS. 
 
 Definition § 100 
 
 Sense of approaching death 101 
 
 In what cases admissible 102 
 
 Form of the declaration 103 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 ANCIENT DOCUMENTS. 
 
 Definition § 105 
 
 Documents must come from proper custody 106 
 
 Execution need not be proved 107 
 
 Extent of corroboration required 108 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 GENERAL REPUTATION. 
 
 Public and general reputation distinguished — Adequate knowledge 
 
 of declarant § 110 
 
 Identity of declarant Ill 
 
 Death of declarant 112 
 
 Date of the declaration ante litem motam . . . . • 113 
 
 Evidence of reputation in the case of private rights . . . 114 
 
 Traditionary evidence regarding private boundaries . . . 115 
 
 Documents showing general reputation 116 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 STRANGERS' DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST. 
 
 Declarations of third persons and other declarations distinguished . § 117 
 
 Declarations must be against interest 118 
 
 The interest of the declarant 119 
 
 B
 
 Xll 
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 The death of the declarant § 119« 
 
 The knowledge of the declarant 1196 
 
 Statements of predecessor against interest, when evidence in behalf 
 
 of successor 119e 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 WITNESSES ABSENT OR DISQUALIFIED. 
 
 Testimony of missing witnesses 
 
 Witness need not be deceased ....... 
 
 Witnesses who have become sick, decrepit or insane 
 Cross-examination at former trial requisite — Identity of parties 
 Precise language of witness, how far requisite . . 
 
 § 120 
 121 
 122 
 123 
 124 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 PRIVATE WRITINGS. 
 
 Definition and classification § 125 
 
 Production of writing — Proof of contents by secondary evidence . 126 
 Writings obtained by fraud or deceit — Decoy letters . . . 127 
 Spoliation and alteration distinguished — Effect of material altera- 
 tions 128 
 
 Alterations — Presumptions and burden of proof to explain . . 129 
 
 Private writings lost or destroyed ....... 130 
 
 Handwriting defined — Signature by mark ..... 131 
 
 Production of writings, when necessary ...... 132 
 
 Proof by admissions of party ........ 133 
 
 When proof of handwriting may be dispensed with — Acknowledg- 
 ments 134 
 
 Who may take acknowledgments ....... 135 
 
 The certificate 136 
 
 Impeaching the certificate 137 
 
 Proof by subscribing witnesses ....... 138 
 
 Proof by witnesses acquainted with party's handwriting . . 139 
 
 Mode of examining witnesses as to handwriting .... 139a 
 
 Comparison of handwriting 140 
 
 To what expert may give evidence 141 
 
 Proof of exhibits in equity • • 142 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. 
 
 Inspection of public records 
 
 Proof of executive and legislative acts and writings 
 
 Proof of public non-judicial records 
 
 Proof of foreign laws ...... 
 
 Proof of municipal ordinances .... 
 
 Effect of public documents as evidence . . . 
 
 § 142a 
 142& 
 142c 
 
 143 
 143a 
 
 144
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Nlll 
 
 Historical and scientific publications — Almanacs and newspapers . § 145 
 
 Proof of judicial records — General rule ...... L46 
 
 Proof of records of courts of equity and of inferior courts . . 147 
 
 Proof of records of courts of other states 14tt 
 
 Proof of foreign judgments 149 
 
 Records of surrogate courts 150 
 
 Proof of returns on writs ......... 150« 
 
 The effect of judicial records as evidence 1506 
 
 The effect of judgments on those in privity with the parties . . 151 
 
 Judgment must have been final and on the merits .... 152 
 
 Judgments conclusive only as to material facts in issue . . . 153 
 
 Identity of cause of action required ...... 154 
 
 Persons affected by judgments in rem and actions fixing personal 
 
 status 155 
 
 Criminal judgments 156 
 
 Proof of judgments as facts and their use as proving ulterior facts 
 
 distinguished 157 
 
 Validity and effect of foreign judgments 158 
 
 Judgments of sister states 159 
 
 Judgments in bar need not be pleaded 160 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. 
 
 Foundation of the doctrine 
 
 Husband and wife, when competent witnesses 
 Statutory legislation — Confidential communications 
 Confidential communications between husband and wife 
 Communications to attorneys .... 
 Character and time of the communications 
 Attorney employed by both parties . 
 Permanent character of the privilege — Its waiver 
 Privileges as to documents .... 
 What communications are within the privilege 
 Privilege of police, judicial and executive officials 
 Privilege as relating to jurors .... 
 Confidential communications to clergymen 
 Communications to physicians 
 
 § 165 
 166 
 167 
 168 
 169 
 170 
 171 
 172 
 173 
 174 
 175 
 176 
 177 
 178 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. 
 
 Definition ........... 
 
 Matter of common knowledge — Opinions of non-experts, when ad 
 missible ......... 
 
 Expert evidence, when admissible ..... 
 
 Competency and examination of experts 
 Cross-examination of experts — Use of scientific books . 
 The weight and credibility of expert and opinion evidence 
 
 § 185 
 
 186 
 
 187 
 188 
 189 
 190
 
 XIV 
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Compensation of experts 
 
 Physicians as experts — Cause of death 
 
 Evidence of medical experts to show character of disease and blood 
 
 stains — Expert evidence as to autopsies and malpractice . 
 Non-expert evidence upon a person's physical condition . 
 Chemists as experts — Poisons ...... 
 
 Expert evidence where sexual crimes have been committed — Abor 
 
 tion 
 
 Expert and non-expert evidence upon insanity 
 
 Mechanical experts ......... 
 
 Expert evidence as to value 
 
 Underwriters as experts ........ 
 
 Experiments in and out of court 
 
 Physical examination of the party by experts .... 
 
 191 
 192 
 
 193 
 194 
 195 
 
 196 
 197 
 
 198 
 199 
 200 
 201 
 202 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE AS RELATED TO WRITINGS. 
 
 Parol evidence, when inadmissible .......§ 205 
 
 Interpretation and construction of writings 206 
 
 Rule applies between parties only ....... 207 
 
 Invalidity of writings — Evidence to vary or explain or show real 
 
 consideration .......... 208 
 
 Incomplete and collateral writings 209 
 
 Parol evidence to connect and explain contemporaneous writings . 210 
 
 Receipts 211 
 
 Independent parol contracts and conditions precedent . . . 212 
 
 To establish implied, resulting or constructive trusts . . . 213 
 
 Discharge, modification or extension of contract may be shown . 214 
 
 To rebut presumptions ......... 215 
 
 To show usage .......... 216 
 
 To explain technical terms 217 
 
 Abbreviations 218 
 
 The relations of the parties 219 
 
 To ascertain or explain subject-matter 220 
 
 Ambiguities defined and distinguished — Parol evidence to explain 221 
 
 Parol evidence as applicable to wills ...... 222 
 
 Parol evidence to show absolute deed a mortgage and in suits for 
 
 specific performance and reformation or cancellation . . 223 
 
 CHAPTER XVIL 
 
 PRESUMPTIONS. 
 
 Definition and classification 
 
 Presumptions of law and fact distinguished 
 Presumptions of fact — Accomplices 
 Presumptions from adverse possession and prescription 
 Presumptions from lapse of time .... 
 Presumptions from possession .... 
 
 224 
 225 
 226 
 227 
 228 
 229
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 XV 
 
 Presumptions from the usual course of trade . 
 Lawfulness — Continuity — Sanity — Insanity 
 Presumptions as to jurisdiction 
 Presumptions of life, death and survivorship . 
 Legitimacy — Innocence — Malice . . . 
 
 § 230 
 231 
 232 
 233 
 234 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
 
 Judicial notice § 236 
 
 Matter of common knowledge 237 
 
 Historical facts . 238 
 
 Geographical facts 239 
 
 Political facts — Elections 240 
 
 Scientific facts 241 
 
 Common and statutory law — Municipal ordinances and local and 
 
 foreign laws . 242 
 
 Foreign nations, seals and acts 243 
 
 Terms of court, records, rules of practice and judicial proceedings . 244 
 
 CHAPTER XIX 
 
 BURDEN OF PROOF AND RIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE. 
 
 Burden of proof defined 
 
 Burden of proof in special proceedings . 
 
 Burden of proof in criminal trials .... 
 
 Proof of negative — Facts best known to party alleging 
 
 When plaintiff may open and close .... 
 
 When defendant may open and close 
 
 Right to open and close in special proceedings 
 
 Right to open and close, when discretionary . 
 
 247 
 248 
 249 
 250 
 251 
 252 
 253 
 254 
 
 CHAPTER XX 
 
 STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
 
 Origin and nature of the statute §261 
 
 Agreements relating to interests in land 262 
 
 Partition of real property 263 
 
 Trusts in real and personal estate 264 
 
 Surrender or assignment of leases 265 
 
 Contracts required to be in writing 266 
 
 Articles of partnership . 267 
 
 Form and character of the writing 268 
 
 Wills required to be evidenced in writing ..... 269 
 Agreements not within the statute of frauds which must be evi- 
 denced by writings . . 270
 
 XVI 
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER XXL 
 
 ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES. 
 
 The attendance of witnesses at private arbitrations 
 The subpoena — Fees of witnesses 
 Fees in criminal cases ..... 
 Subpoena duces tecum ..... 
 Time and mode of serving the subpoena . 
 Recognizance to secure presence of a witness . 
 Obstructing attendance of witnesses . . 
 
 Changing venue for convenience of witnesses . 
 Failure of witnesses to attend — Continuance, when 
 Continuance in criminal trials .... 
 Non-attendance of witness — When a contempt 
 Privilege of witnesses from service of civil process 
 Privilege of witnesses from civil arrest 
 Duration of the privilege from arrest . . 
 Attendance of witnesses in custody . , 
 Attendance of witnesses before legislative bodies 
 
 granted 
 
 § 273 
 2TG 
 277 
 278 
 279 
 280 
 281 
 281a 
 282 
 283 
 284 
 285 
 286 
 287 
 288 
 289 
 
 CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 
 
 Classes of persons incompetent 
 
 Parties incompetent as witnesses at common law . . 
 Testimony of party admissible when his connection with action no 
 
 longer exists ......... 
 
 What constitutes interest in the event ..... 
 
 Exceptions to the common-law rule — The answer as evidence for 
 
 the defendant in equity ....... 
 
 Competency of parties as witnesses in equity — The employment and 
 
 effect of a bill of discovery ...... 
 
 Defendant in criminal trial — His competency as a witness 
 Statutory competency of parties as witnesses .... 
 
 Statutory incompetency of interested persons to testify as to trans 
 
 actions with deceased or insane persons .... 
 
 What are transaction with decedents ..... 
 
 Persons interested — Their statutory incompetency . 
 Incompetency of parties to negotiable instruments to impeach them 
 Competency of counsel as witnesses ..... 
 
 Competency of judges as witnesses . . . . 
 
 Incompetency of arbitrators as witnesses in an action on the award 
 Definition and form of oath and affirmation .... 
 
 Incompetency because of a lack of religious belief . . . 
 Incompetency of insane persons as witnesses .... 
 
 Deaf mutes as witnesses ........ 
 
 Children as witnesses 
 
 § 300 
 301 
 
 302 
 303 
 
 304 
 
 305 
 300 
 307 
 
 308 
 309 
 310 
 311 
 312 
 313 
 314 
 315 
 316 
 317 
 318 
 319
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. XVI I 
 
 Witnesses rendered incompetent by conviction of infamous crimes — 
 
 The effect of pardon §320 
 
 Statutory regulation of the competency of witnesses convicted of 
 
 crime 321 
 
 Statutes construed 322 
 
 Accomplices 323 
 
 Corroboration of accomplices . . . . • . . . . 324 
 
 CHAPTER XXIIL 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 Order for witnesses to withdraw from court-room . ... § 330 
 
 Direct examination and cross-examination distinguished . . 331 
 
 Refusal to testify, when a contempt — Employment of interpreter . 332 
 
 Mode of conducting direct examination 333 
 
 Questions put by the judge or by members of the jury . . . 334 
 
 Leading questions — When allowable on direct examination . . 335 
 
 Responsiveness of answers ........ 336 
 
 Witness may refresh his memory by referring to a memorandum or 
 
 writing ........... 337 
 
 Character of the writing used to refresh memory of the witness . 338 
 
 Cross-examination — Its purpose and value 339 
 
 Power of cross-examination — Its extent 340 
 
 Redirect examination 341 
 
 Recalling witnesses . 342 
 
 Receiving evidence out of court 343 
 
 Taking the view by the jury 344 
 
 *' Real evidence " — Physical examination by the jury in court — 
 
 Identification .......... 345 
 
 Right of the defendant in a criminal trial to confront the witnesses 
 
 against him 346 
 
 The accused as a witness in a criminal prosecution .... 346a 
 
 CHAPTER XXIV. 
 
 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 
 
 Party cannot impeach his own witness § 347 
 
 Exceptions to the rule that a party vouches for his own witnesses . 348 
 How the adverse witness may be impeached — General reputation 
 
 for veracity, etc. 349 
 
 Impeachment by proving contrary statements or silence of witness 
 
 on a former occasion ......... 350 
 
 Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus ....... 351 
 
 Evidence of general reputation of an impeached witness . . . 352 
 
 Privileges of witnesses — Questions disclosing pecuniary liability . 353 
 
 Questions tending to disgrace the witness 354 
 
 Questions calculated to expose the witness to a criminal charge . 354a 
 
 Bias and prejudice of the witness 3546
 
 XV111 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER XXV. 
 
 AFFIDAVITS AND DEPOSITIONS. 
 
 Affidavits and depositions defined and distinguished . . . § 355 
 
 Parties to affidavits . . 356 
 
 Formal requisites of affidavits 357 
 
 Language of the affidavit 358 
 
 Definition and character of depositions 359 
 
 Mode of procuring depositions ........ 360 
 
 Statutes construed — The certificate. . . . . . . 361 
 
 Objections to depositions 362 
 
 Use of depositions as evidence. 363 
 
 Equitable bills to perpetuate testimony 364 
 
 CHAPTER XXVL 
 
 RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE — NUMBER OF WITNESSES. 
 
 Mode of offering and objecting to evidence . . . . '. § 366 
 "Waiver of objections to evidence — Necessity for repeating objec- 
 tions 367 
 
 Motions to strike out evidence 368 
 
 The improper admission of evidence, when immaterial . . . 369 
 
 The improper exclusion of evidence, when immaterial . . . 370 
 
 Nature and use of stipulations as regards evidence .... 371 
 
 Demurrer to evidence 372 
 
 Surprise 373 
 
 Rebutting evidence — Nature and use of 374 
 
 Order of proof — Evidence offered by the party after he rests . 375 
 
 Materiality and sufficiency of newly -discovered evidence . . 376 
 
 Diligence of party offering new evidence must be shown . . 377 
 Newly-discovered evidence must not be cumulative or impeaching 
 
 merely ........... 378 
 
 "Writ of error — When employed at common law .... 379 
 
 The powers of appellate tribunals in relation to the evidence re- 
 ceived in the trial court . 380 
 
 Limitations on the number of witnesses 381 
 
 Number of witnesses necessary in trials for perjury . . . 382 
 
 Number of witnesses in trials for treason 383 
 
 Compelling the calling of the witnesses 384 
 
 Positive and negative testimony — Number of witnesses as affecting 
 
 the weight of evidence ........ 385 
 
 The discretionary power of the court — Judicial discretion defined 
 
 and considered 386
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Keferences are to sections. 
 
 Aaron v. State (31 Ga. 167), 9. 
 Abbot v. Coleman (22 Kan. 250), 132, 
 
 140. 
 Abbot v. Heath (Wis., 1893, 54 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 574), 52. 
 Abbot v. Plumbe (1 Doug. 216), 138. 
 Abbott v. Abbott (51 Me. 581), 220. 
 Abbott v. Petersburgh Granite 
 
 Quarry Co. (62 Hun, 622), 373. 
 Abbott v. Ross (62 Me. 194), 311. 
 Abele v. Brewster (58 Hun, 605), 31. 
 Abell v. Pa. M. Ins. Co. (18 W. Va. 
 
 400), 233, 237. 
 Abell v. Radcliffe (13 Johns. 297), 246. 
 Abercrombie v. Littman (77 Tex. 
 
 589), 148. 
 Aberl v. Van Gelder (33 N. Y. 513), 
 
 115. 
 Abrams v. Seale (44 Ala. 297), 83. 
 Accola v. Railroad Co. (70 Iowa, 185), 
 
 233, 237. 
 Achilles v. Achilles (137 111. 589; 28 
 
 N. E. Rep. 45), 308. 
 Adae v. Zangs (41 Iowa, 586), 339. 
 Adam v. Bald (1 Green, 188), 157. 
 Adams v. Barnes (17 Mass. 365), 151. 
 Adams v. Betts (1 Watts, 425), 146. 
 Adams v. Brown (16 Ohio St. 419), 84. 
 Adams v. Davidson (10 N. Y. 309), 69. 
 Adams v. Eames (107 Mass. 275), 80. 
 Adams v. Edwards (115 Pa. St. 211), 
 
 309. 
 Adams v. Eichenberger (Ark., 1893, 
 
 18 S. W. Rep. 853), 80. 
 Adams v. Frye (5 Mete. 109), 215. 
 Adams v. Harrington (114 Ind. 16), 
 
 239. 
 
 Adams v. Humphreys (54 Ga. 396), 
 
 73a. 
 Adams v. Jones (39 Ga. 508), 232, 
 
 233. 
 Adams v. Main (3 Ind. App. 232), 
 
 186, 226, 232, 234. 
 Adams v. Medsker (25 W. Va. 128), 
 
 135. 
 Adams v. Morgan (150 Mass. 148), 
 
 208. 
 Adams v. Morrison (113 N. Y. 152), 
 
 309. 
 Adams v. Norris (23 How., U. S., 
 
 353), 242. 
 Adams v. Pearson (7 Pick., Mass., 
 
 341), 153. 
 Adams v. People (63 N. Y. 621), 188. 
 Adams v. Power (52 Miss. 828), 267. 
 Adams v. State (28 Fla. 511), 249, 341. 
 Adams v. State (25 Ohio St. 584), 114. 
 Adams v. Swansea (116 Mass. 591), 
 
 115. 
 Adams v. Way (33 Conn. 419), 148. 
 Adams v. Wheeler (97 Mass. 67), 348. 
 Addis v. Van Buskirk (4 Zabr. 218), 
 
 22. 
 Adler v. Friedman (16 Cal. 138), 214. 
 Aedford v. McCormac (90 N. C. 151), 
 
 357. 
 JEtna Ins. Co. v. Deming (123 Ind. 
 
 415 ; 24 N. E. Rep. 86, 375), 178. 
 Agnew v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co. 
 
 (5 N. Y. S. 756), 317. 
 Ahern v. Telephone Co. (Oreg., 1893, 
 
 33 Pac. Rep. 403), 18. 
 Aikin v. Weckerly (19 Mich. 482), 
 
 231, 269.
 
 XX 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Beferences are to sections. 
 
 Ake v. State (31 Tex. 476), 97. 
 Akers v. Kirk (Ga., 1894, 18 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 366), 76. 
 Alabama Coal Co. v. Pitts (Ala., 
 
 1893, 13 S. Rep. 35), 187. 
 Alabama, etc. R. Co. v. Arnold 
 
 (Ala., 2S. Rep. 837), 50. 
 Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Hill (93 
 
 Ala. 514), 190, 202, 282, 332. 
 / Alabama Land Co. v. Kyle (Ala., 
 
 1893. 13 S. Rep. 43), 231. 
 Alaska, Tbe (33 Fed. Rep. 107), 198. 
 Albertsen v. Robeson (1 Dall., U. S. , 
 
 9), 53. 
 Albertsen v. Terry (109 N. C. 8 ; 13 
 
 S. E. Rep. 713), 11. 
 Alberti v. N. Y., L. E. & N. R. R. 
 
 Co. (118 N. Y. 77), 192. 
 Albia v. O'Hara (64 Iowa, 297), 143a. 
 Albin v. State (63 Ind. 598), 6. 
 Albright v. Lapp (26 Pa. St. 101), 
 
 332. 
 Albritten v. Huntsville (60 Ala. 486), 
 
 242. 
 Alcock, In re (12 Eng. L. & Eq. 354, 
 
 355), 166. 
 Alcorn v. Morgan (77 Ind. 184), 211. 
 Alcorn v. Railroad Co. (108 Mo. 81), 
 
 366, 369. 
 Alcott v. Strong (9 Cush., Mass., 323), 
 
 68. 
 Alderman v. Bell (9 Cal. 315), 244. 
 Alderman v. People (4 Mich. 411), 
 
 323. 
 Aiderton v. Wright (81 Mich. 244), 
 
 340. 
 Aldrich v. Aldrich (135 Mass. 153), 
 
 220. 
 Aldrich v. Jessiman (8 N. H. 516), 
 
 77. 
 Aklridge v. Midland, etc. Co. (78 
 
 Mo. 559), 73a. 
 Alexander v. Burnham (18 Wis. 199), 
 
 244. 
 Alexander v. Caldwell (55 Ala. 517), 
 
 66, 70. 
 Alexander v. Com. (105 Pa. St. 1), 
 
 10. 
 
 Alexander v. Handley (11 S. Rep. 
 
 390), 79. 
 Alexander v. Harris (4 Cranch, 299), 
 
 21. 
 Alexander v. Jonquil (71 111. 366), 
 
 188. 
 Alexander v. McNear (28 Fed. Rep. 
 
 403), 77, 314. 
 Alexander v. Mt. Sterling (71 111. 
 
 366), 188. 
 Alexander v. Penn. etc. Co. (48 Ohio 
 
 St. 623), 143. 
 Alexander v. Thompson (42 Minn. 
 
 498; 44 N. W. Rep. 534), 7. 
 Alford v. State (31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 299), 323. 
 Alfred v. State (37 Miss. 296), 89. 
 Alger v. Andrews (47 Vt. 238), 70. 
 Alkire v. Kahla (123 111. 496), 128. 
 Allegheny v. Nelson (25 Pa. St. 332), 
 
 218, 242. 
 Allan v. Allan (15 Ves. 134), 364. 
 Allen v. Bond (112 Ind. 523), 385. 
 Allen v. Carpenter (66 Tex. 138), 199. 
 Allen v. Chouteau (102 Mo. 309), 
 
 308. 
 Allen v. Clark (66 Hun, N. Y., 628), 
 
 68. 
 Allen v. Com. (Ky., 1888, 9 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 703), 330. 
 Allen v. Furbish (4 Gray, Mass., 504), 
 
 212 
 Allen v. Gray (11 Cow., N. Y., 95), 
 
 150a. 
 Allen v. Hawks (13 Pick. 70), 309. 
 Allen v. Hodge (31 Vt. 436), 83. 
 Allen v. Hunter (6 McLean, U. S., 
 
 303), 208. 
 Allen v. Kemp (29 Iowa, 452), 223. 
 Allen v. Killinger (8 Wall., U. S., 
 
 480), 77. 
 Allen v. Lenoir (53 Miss. 321), 136. 
 Allen v. Maddock (11 Moore P. C. 
 
 427, 454), 210. 
 Allen v. Mass (27 Mo. 354), 131. 
 Allen v. O'Donnell (28 Fed. Rep. 17), 
 
 306. 
 Allen v. Root (39 Tex. 589), 173.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XXI 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Allen v. Scharringhausen (8 Mo. App. 
 
 229), 223, 247. 
 Allen v. State (3 Humph., Tenn., 
 
 367), 139. 
 Allen v. State (10 Ohio St. 287), 306, 
 
 323. 
 Allen v. Thaxter (1 Blackf., Ind., 
 
 399), 148. 
 Allen v. Watson (2 Hill, S. C, 319), 
 
 143. 
 Aller v. State (55 Ala. 16), 241. 
 Ailing v. Brazee (27 111. App. 595), 
 
 60. 
 Ailing v. Wenzel (27 111. App. 516 ; 
 
 24 N. E. Rep. 551), 60. 
 Allison v. State (42 Inch 354), 230. 
 All port v. Meek (4 C. & P. 267), 140. 
 Alman v. Owens (31 Ala. 167), 233, 
 
 249. 
 Almy v. Simonson (52 Hun, 535), 
 
 242. 
 Alston, In re (1892, Prob. 142), 233. 
 Alt v. California Fig Syrup Co. (19 
 
 Nev. 18), 199. 
 Altmeyer v. Caulfield (37 W. Va. 
 
 847), 358. 
 Altschul v. San Francisco, etc. Co. 
 
 (43 Cal. 171), 223. 
 Ambler v. Whipple (139 111. 311), 
 
 159. 
 Amer. Bank Note Co. v. Man. Ry. 
 
 Co. (66 Hun, 627; 20 N. Y. S. 
 
 819), 371. 
 Amer. En. Tile Co. v. Reich (12 N. 
 
 Y. S. 927), 1S7. 
 Amer. F. Co. v. United States (2 
 
 Pet. 358, 305), 69, 97. 
 Amer. L. Ins. Co. v. Rosenagle (77 
 
 Pa, St. 507), 143. 
 Amer. Mortg. Co. v. Boyd (92 Ala. 
 
 139; 9S. Rep. 166), 151. 
 Amer. Ins. Co. v. Canter (1 Pet. 511), 
 
 242. 
 Amer. Oak L. Co. v. Standard, etc. 
 
 Co. (Utah, 1893, 33 Pac. Rep. 
 
 246), 231. 
 Amer. Steamship Co. v. Landreth 
 (102 Pa, St. 131), 73a. 
 
 Amer. S. Co. v. Thurber (121 N. Y. 
 
 655; 24 N. E. Rep. 1129), 205. 
 Amer. Tr. Co. v. Rosenagle (77 Pa. 
 
 St. 516), 53. 
 Ames v. Merriam (9 Wend. 498), 
 
 355. 
 Amey v. Long (9 East, 473), 173. 
 Ammonsv. Dwyer (78 Tex. 639; 15 
 
 S. W. Rep. 1049), 108. 
 Amory v. Fellows (5 Mass. 225), 332. 
 Amos v. State (Ala., 1893, 11 S. Rep. 
 
 424), 69. 
 Anderson v. Anderson (23 Tex. 639), 
 
 242. 
 Anderson v. Armstead (69 111. 452- 
 
 454), 84. 
 Anderson v. Dunn (6 Wheat. 204), 
 
 288. 
 Anderson v. Monroe (55 Fed. Rep. 
 
 596), 249. 
 Anderson v. O'Donnell (29 S. C. 355), 
 
 242. 
 Anderson v. Parker (6 Cal. 197), 53. 
 Anderson v. Roleson (2 Bay, 495), 
 
 130. 
 Anderson v. State (25 Neb. 550), 89. 
 Anderson v. State (104 Ind. 367 ; 6 
 
 N. E. Rep. 63), 381. 
 Andrews v. Brewster (124 N. Y. 433), 
 
 212. 
 Andrews v. Flack (88 Ala. 294; 6 S. 
 
 Rep. 907), 148. 
 Andrews v. Hayclen (88 Ky. 455 ; 1 1 
 
 S. W. Rep. 428), 140. 
 Andrews v. Mut. R. L. F. Ass'n (34 
 
 Fed. Rep. 870), 178. 
 Andrews v. Parker (48 Tex. 94), 380. 
 Andrews v. Solomon (1 Pet. C. C. 
 
 356), 169. 
 Angell v. Angell (1 S. & S. 83), 363. 
 Angell v. Hester (64 Mo. 142), 308. 
 Angell v. Hill (18 N. Y. S. S24), 369. 
 Angell v. Loomis (Mich., 1893, 55 
 
 N. W. Rep. 1008), 334. 
 Angell v. Rosenburg (12 Mich. 241), 
 
 114. 
 Angle v. Bilby (25 Neb. 595 ; 41 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 397), 74.
 
 xxn 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Anglo-Am. P. & P. Co. v. Cannon 
 
 (31 Fed. Rep. 313), 30, 32. 
 Angus v. Foster (42 111. App. 19), 
 
 380. 
 Anheuser-Busch v. Hutmacher (127 
 
 111. 657 ; 21 N. E. Rep. 626), 33. 
 Anix v. Miller (54 Iowa, 541), 244. 
 Ankersmit v. Bluxome (48 Hun, 1), 
 
 375. 
 Ankerstein v. Clarke (4 T. R. 616), 
 
 22. 
 Anonymous (Ala., 1890, 7 S. Rep. 
 
 100), 202. 
 Anshicks v. State (6 Tex. App. 527), 
 
 343. 
 Anspach v. Bast (52 Pa. St. 356), 
 
 205. 
 Anthony v. Beal (111 Mo. 637; 20 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 326), 130. 
 Anthony v. German Am. Ins. Co. 
 
 (48 Mo. App. 65), 200. 
 Anthony v. Smith (4 Bosw., N. Y., 
 
 503), 193. 
 Applegate v. Lexington, etc. Mining 
 
 Co. (117 U. S. 263), 106, 108. 
 Appollon, The (9 Wheat. 374), 239. 
 Arbuckle v. Templeton (65 Vt. 205; 
 
 25 Atl. Rep. 1095), 173. 
 Archer v. Helm (69 Miss. 730; 11 
 
 S. Rep. 3), 262. 
 Archer v. Insurance Co. (31 Fed. Rep. 
 
 660), 276. 
 Archer v. N. Y., N. H. etc. Co. (106 
 
 N. Y. 603), 38. 
 Archibald v. McLaurin (21 Can. S. C. 
 
 R. 588), 11. 
 Archibald v. State (122 Ind. 122), 101. 
 Arcia v. State (28 Tex. App. 198), 23. 
 Ardesco Oil Co. v. Gilson (63 Pa. St. 
 
 146), 185. 
 Arent v. Squire (1 Daly, 347), 231. 
 Arimond v. Green Bay, etc. (35 Wis. 
 
 41), 229. 
 Arkansas v. Bower (20 D. C. 29), 149. 
 Armour v. Spalding (Colo., 1890, 23 
 
 Pac. Rep. 789), 223. 
 Armsted v. State (22 Tex. App, 51), 
 
 69. 
 
 Armstrong v. Ackley (71 Iowa, 76 ' 
 
 32 N. W. Rep. 180), 50, 192, 193. 
 Armstrong v. Boylan (4 N. J. L. 76), 
 
 355. 
 Armstrong v. Fargo (8 Hun, 175), 
 
 139. 
 Armstrong v. St. Louis (69 Mo. 309), 
 
 205. 
 Armstrong v. State (30 Fla. 170; 11 
 
 S. Rep. 618), 197, 231, 249. 
 Armstrong v. Thurston (11 Md. 148) r 
 
 139a. 
 Arndt v. Harshaw (53 Wis. 269), 71. 
 Arnfield v. Bate (3 M. & S. 173), 19. 
 Arnold v. Arnold (20 Iowa, 273), 214. 
 Arnold v. Arnold (13 Vt. 43, 362),. 
 
 316. 
 Arnold v. Cheseborough (46 Fed. Rep. 
 
 700), 35. 
 Arnold v. Frazier (5 Strobh., S. C, Z) r 
 
 148. 
 Arnold v. State (81 Wis. 278), 334. 
 Arnson v. Spawn (S. D., 1892, 49 N» 
 
 W. Rep. 1066), 115. 
 Arrison v. Harmstead (2 Barr, 191),. 
 
 128. 
 Arthur v. Broadnax (3 Ala. 375), 114. 
 Arthur v. Gordon (67 Ga. 220), 249. 
 Arthur v. James (28 Pa. St. 236), 76. 
 Arthur v. Roberts (60 Barb., N. Y., 
 
 580), 217, 221. 
 Artz v. Chicago R. R. Co. (44 Iowa,. 
 
 284), 347. 
 Asbach v. Chicago, etc. Co. (Iowa, 
 
 1892, 53 N. W. Rep. 90), 70, 355. 
 Ashing v. Miles (16 Ind. 329), 254. 
 Ashley v. Martin (50 Ala. 537), 238. 
 Ashlock v. Linder (50 111. 159), 75. 
 Ashman v. Flint, etc. Co. (90 Mich. 
 
 567 ; 51 N. W. Rep. 645), 18. 
 Ashton v. Shepherd (120 Ind. 69; 22 
 
 N. E. Rep. 98), 20. 
 Ashworth v. Kittredge (12 Cush. 
 
 193), 145. 
 Assignees of Desbrow v. Farrow (3 
 
 Rich., S. C, 382), 139. 
 Association v. Cronin (4 Allen, 141), 
 
 188.
 
 TAIJLE OF CASES. 
 
 XX1U 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Aston v. Insurance Co. (7 Cow. 
 
 202), 217. 
 Atcheson v. Huebner (90 Mich. 643 ; 
 
 51 N. W. Rep. 634), 140. 
 Atchison v. Bartholow (4 Kan. 124), 
 
 355. 
 Atchison v. Everett (Cowp. 389, 390), 
 
 315. 
 Atchison, etc. Co. v. Betts (10 Colo. 
 
 431), 230. 
 Atchison, etc. Co. v. Brassfield 
 
 (Kan., 1893, 32 Pac. Rep. 814), 192. 
 Atchison, etc. Co. v. Howard (C. 
 
 C. A. 229), 232. 
 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Thul 
 
 (29 Kan. 466), 202. 
 Atchison R. Co. v. Miller (18 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 486; 39 Kan. 419), 188. 
 Atherton v. Atkins (139 Mass. 61), 
 
 366. 
 Atherton v. Beard (2 T. R. 610), 140. 
 Atkins v. State (69 Ga. 595), 51. 
 Atkins v. Tompkins (155 Mass. 256), 
 
 205. 
 Atkins v. Tregold (2 B. & C. 23), 67. 
 Atkinson v. Cox (54 Ark. 444; 16 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 124), 20, 24. 
 Atkinson v. Roch Printing Co. (43 
 
 Hun, 167), 199. 
 Atkinson v. Saltman (Ind., 1893, 29 
 
 N. E. Rep. 435), 355. 
 Atkinson v. Truesdell (127 N. Y. 230 ; 
 
 27 N. E. Rep. 844), 216. 
 Atlanta v. Schmelzer (89 Ga. 609), 
 
 217. 
 Atlantic Ins. Co. v. Holcomb (88 Ga. 
 
 9), 226. 
 Atlantic Ins. Co. v. Manning (3 Col. 
 
 224), 139. 
 Attaway v. State (31 Tex. Cr. Rep. 
 
 475), 283. 
 Attorney-General v. Abbott (154 
 
 Mass. 423; 28 N. E. Rep. 346), 
 
 116. 
 Attorney-General v. Briant (15 L. J. 
 
 Exch. 265), 175. 
 Attorney-General v. Hitchcock (1 
 
 Ex. 102), 354. 
 
 Attorney-General v. Ray (2 Hare, 
 
 518), 363. 
 Attorney-General v. Skinner's Co. 
 
 (8 Sim. 377), 287. 
 Atwood v. Harrison (5 J. J. Marsh. , 
 
 Ky., 329), 304. 
 Atwood v. Scott (99 Mass. 177), 276. 
 Atwood v. Welton (7 Conn. 66), 316. 
 Auerbach v. Peetsch (18 N. Y. S. 
 
 453), 244, 249, 252. 
 Augur v. Whittier (117 Mass. 451), 
 
 32. 
 Augusta v. Hafers (61 Ga. 48), 8. 
 Augusta v. Windsor (19 Me. 317), 58. 
 Augustine Kobbe, The (37 Fed. Rep. 
 
 696), 205. 
 Aultman v. Ritter (81 Wis. 395; 51 
 
 N. W. Rep. 569), 169, 379. 
 Aurora v. Cobb (21 Ind. 493), 249. 
 Ausman v. Veal (10 Ind. 355), 241. 
 Austee . v. Nelmes (1 H. & M. 225), 
 
 220. 
 Austin v. Andrews (77 Cal. 98; 16 
 
 Pac. Rep. 546), 115. 
 Austin v. Chittenden (33 Vt. 53), 
 
 73a. 
 Austin v. Day (17 Pick., Mass., 208), 
 
 150a. 
 Austin v. Holland (69 N. Y. 571, 
 
 576), 230. 
 Austin v. State (14 Ark. 555), 339. 
 Austin v. Thompson (45 N. H. 113), 
 
 127. 
 Austine v. Treat (39 N. W. Rep. 
 
 749; 71 Mich. 561), 126. 
 Austrian v. Springer (94 Mich. 343), 
 
 216. 
 Auzeriaz v. Neglee (74 Cal. 60), 217. 
 Averell v. Barber (63 Hun, 630), 288. 
 Averell v. Sec. Nat. Bank (19 D. C. 
 
 246), 151. 
 Averell v. Smith (17 Wall. 95), 158. 
 Avery v. Bowman (39 N. H. 593), 
 
 150a. 
 Avery v. Fitzgerald (7 S. W. Rep. 6 ; 
 
 94 Mo. 207), 333. 
 Avery v. Mattice (9 N. Y. S. 166), 334. 
 Avery v. Moore (133 111. 74), 343.
 
 XXIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Avery v. Railroad Co. (121 N. Y. 31 ; 
 
 24 N. E. Rep. 20). 186. 
 Avery v. Starbuck (127 N. Y. 675; 27 
 
 N. E. Rep. 1080), 32. 
 Avilla v. Nash (117 Mass. 318), 13. 
 Aver v. Getty (46 Hun, 287), 73. 
 Ayers v. Harris (77 Tex. 108), 38a. 
 Ayers v. Metcalfe (39 111. 307), 80. 
 Ayers v. Watson (137 U. S. 581), 36, 
 
 116. 
 Ayres v. State (21 Tex. App. 399), 
 
 226. 
 Ayres v. Weed (16 Conn. 291), 221. 
 Ayrey v. Davenport (2 N. R. 474), 
 
 146. 
 
 B. 
 
 Babb v. Aldrich (45 Kan. 218), 360. 
 Babcock v. People (15 Hun, N. Y., 
 
 347), 315. 
 Babcock v. People (13 Colo. 515), 350. 
 Babcock v. Utter (1 Abb. App. 27), 
 
 231. 
 Baccio v. People (41 N. Y. 265), 52. 
 Bachelder v. Nutting (16 N. H. 261), 
 
 130. 
 Backdahl v. Lodge (46 Minn. 61), 53. 
 Bacon v. Bacon (33 Wis. 147), 360. 
 Bacon v. Hanna (63 Hun, 625), 50. 
 Bacon v. Railroad Co. (131 U. S. 258), 
 
 134. 
 Bacon v. State (22 Fla. 51), 324. 
 Bacon v. Williams (13 Gray, 525, 
 
 527), 139a, 140. 
 Badcock v. Steadrnan (1 Root, Conn., 
 
 87), 212. 
 Badder v. Kiel'er (91 Mich. 611; 52 
 
 N. W. Rep. 60), 10, 332. 
 Baeder v. Jennings (40 Fed. Rep. 
 
 199), 138. 
 Badger v. Badger (88 N. Y. 336), 309. 
 Badger v. Jones (12 Pick., Mass., 371), 
 
 211. 
 Bagley v. Francis (14 Mass. 453), 143. 
 Bagley v. McMickle (9 Cal. 430), 226. 
 Bagley & Sewall Co. v. Saranac R. 
 
 P. Co. (135 N. Y. 626), 212. 
 
 Bailey v. Bailey (36 Mich. 185), 233. 
 Bailey v. Chicago M. etc. Co. (S. D., 
 
 1893, 54 N. W. Rep. 596), 366. 
 Bailey v. Cornwell (66 Mich. 107), 
 
 208. 
 Bailey v. Martin (119 Ind. 103), 148. 
 Bailey v. Taylor (11 Conn. 531), 128, 
 
 129. 
 Bailey v. Trumbull (31 Conn. 581), 8. 
 Baillie v. Jackson (17 Eng. L. & Eq. 
 
 131), 142. 
 Baily v. Baily (35 Ala. 687), 269. 
 Baily v. Kalamazoo (40 Mich. 251), 
 
 237. 
 Baily v. O'Bannon (28 Mo. App. 39), 
 
 76. 
 Baily v. Pardridge (134 111. 188), 79. 
 Baily v. State (Neb., 1894, 55 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 241), 35. 
 Baily v. State (30 Neb. 855 ; 47 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 208), 143a. 
 Baily v. Sundberg (49 Fed. Rep. 583), 
 
 155. 
 Bain v. State (61 Ala. 75), 53. 
 Bain v. Welsh (85 Me. 108), 126. 
 Baird, In re (47 Hun, 77), 67. 
 Baird v. Daily (68 N. Y. 547), 198. 
 Baird v. Evans (58 Ga. 350), 135. 
 Baker v. Chapline (12 Iowa, 204), 
 
 232. 
 Baker v. Charlton (7 Cush. 581), 82. 
 Baker v. Com. (Ky., 1892, 17 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 625), 9, 343. 
 Baker v. Davis (22 N. H. 27), 150«. 
 Baker v. Denning (8 A. & E. 94), 
 
 131. 
 Baker v. Haines (6 Whart., Pa., 284), 
 
 140. 
 Baker v. Hall (158 Mass. 361 ; 33 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 612), 220. 
 Baker v. Haskell (47 N. H. 479), 226. 
 Baker v. Magnon (9 111. App. 655), 
 
 143a. 
 Baker v. Malony (Tex., 4 S. W. Rep. 
 
 469), 56. 
 Baker v. Mygatt (14 Iowa, 131), 140, 
 
 244. 
 Baker v. Scofield (58 Ga. 1S2), 143a.
 
 TA15LE OF CASES. 
 
 XXV 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Baker v. State (30 Fla. 41), 18S. 
 Baker v. Stockpole (9 Cow., N. Y., 
 
 420), 09. 
 Baker v. Thompson (89 Ga. 486), 313. 
 Baker v. Witten (Old., 1892, 39 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 491). 71. 
 Baker's Appeal (107 Pa. St. 381), 210. 
 Balbo v. People (19 Hun, 424), 91. 
 Balch v. Smith (4 Wash. St. 497), 231. 
 Baldridge v. Faust (28 Neb. 259; 44 
 
 N. W. Rep. 110), 146. 
 Baldridge v. Penland (68 Tex. 441 ; 
 
 4 S. W. Rep. 565), 58, 60. 
 Baldridge, etc. Co. v. Calrett (75 
 
 Tex. 628), 333. 
 Baldwin v. Burrows (95 Ind. 81), 208. 
 Baldwin v. Chicago, etc. Co. (50 
 
 Iowa, 680), 198. 
 Baldwin v. Hale (17 Johns. 272), 146. 
 Baldwin v. Parker (99 Mass. 79), 168. 
 Baldwin v. Shannon (43 N. J. L. 96), 
 
 220. 
 Baldwin v. State (12 Mo. 223), 231. 
 Baldwin v. Walker (94 Ala. 314; 10 
 
 S. Rep. 891), 334. 
 Balfour v. Chew (Martin, 517), 14S. 
 Ball v. Fagg (67 Mo. 481), 143a. 
 Ballard v. Manuf. Co. (15 N. Y. S. 
 
 403), 73a. 
 Ballard v. N. Y, L. E. etc. Co. (126 
 
 Pa. St. 141), 198. 
 Ballard v. State (31 Fla. 266; 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 865), 306. 
 Ballentine v. White (77 Pa. St. 20), 
 
 141. 
 Ballinger v. Davis (29 Iowa, 512), 
 
 131. 
 Ballinger v. Elliott (73 N. C. 596), 
 
 286. 
 Ballock v. Hooper (146 U. S. 363), 76. 
 Ballon v. Ballon (110 N. Y. 402), 151. 
 Balls v. Smith (2 M. & G. 350), 358. 
 Baltimore v. Lib. Turnp. Co. (66 Md. 
 
 419; 7 Atl. Rep. 805), 186, 188. 
 Baltimore, etc. R. Co. v. Polly (14 
 
 Gratt,, Va., 447, 470), 344. 
 Baltimore & Ohio Turnp. Co. v. Cas- 
 
 sell (66 Md. 419), 194. 
 
 Baltimore & O. R. R. Co. v. Rambo 
 
 (59 Fed. Rep. 75), 194. 
 Bamford v. Iron Co. (33 Fed. Rep. 
 
 677), 368, 370. 
 Banbury v. Sheerin (S. D., 1893, 55 
 
 N. W. Rep. 723), 134. 
 Banbury Peerage Case (1 Sim. & 
 
 Stu. 153), 234. 
 Banert v. Day (3 Wash. C. C. 243), 53. 
 Banfield v. Whipple (10 Allen, Mass., 
 
 29), 9. 
 Bank v. Anderson (28 S. C. 148), 74. 
 Bank v. Bellis (10 Cush. 378), 236. 
 Bank v. Board (Ky., 18S5, 5 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 735, 739, 742), 233. 
 Bank v. Bollong (24 Neb. 825), 339. 
 Bank v. Cooper (137 U. S. 473), 209. 
 Bank v. Curran (10 Ark. 142), 244. 
 Bank v. Dandridge (12 Wheat. 69), 
 
 232. 
 Bank v. Darragh (1 Hun. 113), 73. 
 Bank v. De Bernales (1 C. & P. 569), 
 
 80. 
 Bank v. Evans (32 Iowa, 202), 147. 
 Bank v. Fitzhugh (1 Har. & G., Md., 
 
 239), 242. 
 Bank v. Gerry (5 Pet. 99-112), 304. 
 Bank v. Gidrot (19 Ga. 421), 73a. 
 Bank v. Gilmore (N. D., 1893, 54 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 1032), 377. 
 Bank v. Good (44 Mo. App. 129), 128. 
 Bank v. Harding (1 Wright, Ohio, 
 
 430). 147. 
 Bank v. Holls (11 Gray, Mass., 520), 
 
 141. 
 Bank v. Houghton (41 Mich. 709), 
 
 140. 
 Bank v. Hull (7 Mo. 273), 311. 
 Bank v. Inman (34 N. E. Rep. 21 ; 
 
 133 Ind. 287), 367. 
 Bank v. Jacobs (1 P. & W., Pa., 
 
 161, 170), 139a. 
 Bank v. Kennedy (17 Wall. 19), 56. 
 Bank v. Kortright (22 Wend., N. Y, 
 
 348), 128. 
 Bank v. Lewis (8 Pick. 113), 152. 
 Bank v. Lierman (5 Neb. 247), 139a, 
 
 140.
 
 XXVI 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Beferences are to sections. 
 
 Bank v. Machir (18 W. Va. 271), 
 
 239. 
 Bank v. McManigle (69 Pa. St. 156), 
 
 230. 
 Bank v. Marsh (46 Vt. 443), 139. 
 Bank v. Meagher (33 Ala. 622), 237. 
 Bank v. Mersereau (3 Barb. Ch. 528), 
 
 226. 
 Bank v. Mitchell (15 Conn. 206), 58. 
 Bank v. Mudgett (44 N. Y. 514), 139a. 
 Bank v. Natchez (3 Rob., La., 293), 
 
 82. 
 Bank v. Nias (16 Q. B. 717), 158. 
 Bank v. Nickell (34 Mo. App. 295), 
 
 128. 
 Bank v. Radtke (Iowa, 1893, 54 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 435), 135. 
 Bank v. Rutland (33 Vt. 414), 108. 
 Bank v. Wenzel (151 Pa. St. 142), 
 
 139. 
 Bank v. Whitehill (16 S. & R., Pa., 
 
 89), 58. 
 Bank v. Young (36 Iowa, 44), 141. 
 Bank of Middlebury v. Rutland (33 
 
 Vt. 414), 108. 
 Bank of Monroe v. Gifford (79 Iowa, 
 
 309), 120. 
 Bank of Monroe v. Gifford (70 Iowa, 
 
 580), 73. 
 Bank of Utica v. Mersereau (3 Barb. 
 
 Ch., N. Y, 528), 174. 
 Banks v. Gruben (87 Pa. St. 468), 
 
 242. 
 Banks v. Kingsley (84 Me. Ill), 233. 
 Bannon v. Aultman (80 Wis. 307), 
 
 214. 
 Barbee v. Barbee (109 N. C. 299), 208. 
 Barber, In re (W. N., 1879, p. 141), 
 
 210. 
 Barber v. Merriam (11 Allen, Mass., 
 
 322), 192, 193. 
 Barber v. Terrell (54 Ga. 146), 138. 
 Barbour v. Melendy (88 Va. 595), 
 
 282. 
 Barbour v. Watts (2 A. K. Marsh. 
 
 290), 148. 
 Barclay v. Hopkins (59 Ga. 562), 
 
 209. 
 
 Barclay v. Pursley (110 Pa. St. 13), 
 
 212. 
 Barcus v. State (49 Miss. 17), 234. 
 Bardwell v. Dewitt (42 Minn. 468), 
 
 73. 
 Bardwell v. Ziegler (3 Wash. St. 34), 
 
 216. 
 Bareda v. Silsby (21 How., U. S., 
 
 146), 207. 
 Barhyte v. Summers (68 Mich. 341), 
 
 384. 
 Barhyte v. Vack (12 Wend., N. Y., 
 
 145), 157. 
 Barker v. Bushnell (75 111. 220), 75, 
 
 76. 
 Barker v. Coit (1 Root, Conn., 225), 
 
 277. 
 Barker v. Coleman (35 Ala. 221), 194. 
 Barker v. Haskell (9 Cush., Mass., 
 
 218), 60. 
 Barker v. Hebbard (81 Mich. 627), 
 
 120. 
 Barker v. Kuhn (38 Iowa, 395), 174. 
 Barker v. McFerran (26 Pa. St. 211), 
 
 128, 150. 
 Barker v. Prentiss (6 Mass. 430), 213. 
 Barker v. State (12 Tex. 273), 233, 
 
 237. 
 Barker v. State (48 Ind. 163), 234. 
 Barley v. Barley (7 Jones, 44), 210. 
 Barley v. Woods (17 N. H. 365), 123. 
 Barlow v. Buckingham (68 Iowa, 
 
 169), 214. 
 Barlow v. State (77 Ga. 448), 23. . 
 Barnard v. Gall (43 La. Ann. 959), 
 
 240. 
 Barnard v. Henry (25 Vt. 289), 60. 
 Barnard v. Heydrick (49 Barb. 68), 
 
 131. 
 Barnard v. Macy (1 1 Ind. 536), 77. 
 Barnes v. Barnes (66 Me. 286), 138. 
 Barnes v. Bost. etc. Co. (130 Mass. 
 
 388), 262. 
 Barnes v. City (89 Ala. 602), 143a. 
 Barnes v. Denslow (9 N. Y. S. 53), 
 
 373. 
 Barnes v. Dow (59 Vt. 530), 60, 309. 
 Barnes v. Ingalls (39 Ala. 193), 199.
 
 TABLE OF CASE8. 
 
 XXVU 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Barnes v. Mawson (1 M. &S. 77), 116. 
 Barnes v. Reilly (81 Mich. 374; 45 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 1016), 332. 
 Barnes v. State (Tex., 1889, 11 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 679), 306. 
 Barnett v. Barnett (83 Va. 504), 205. 
 Barnsdale v. Lowe (2 Russ. & My. 
 
 142), 363. 
 Barnuin v. Barnuni(42 Md. 251), 362. 
 Baron de Bodes v. Reginaim (10 Jur. 
 
 217), 143. 
 Barr v. Anburn (89 III. 361), 143a. 
 Ban- v. Gratz (4 Wheat. 213, 221), 
 
 106, 107, 108, 157. 
 Bar re v. Reading City Pass. Ry. Co. 
 
 (26 Atl. Rep. 99: 155 Pa. St. 170), 
 
 186. 
 Barrelle v. Penn. Ry. Co. (4 N. Y. S. 
 
 127), 194. 
 Barrett v. Copeland (18 Vt. 67), 150a. 
 Barrett v. Dowris (9 R. I. 446), 143. 
 Barrett v. Railroad Co. (45 N. Y. 
 
 628), 74. 
 Barringer v. Bank (14 S. & R. 405), 
 • 129. 
 
 Barron v. Barron (24 Vt. 375), 246. 
 Barrow v. Rhinelander(l Johns. Ch., 
 
 N. Y, 559), 142. 
 Barry v. Coville (7 N. Y. S. 36), 157, 
 
 172. 
 Barry v. Raison (1 Kernan, N. Y., 
 
 462), 207. 
 Barry v. Stevens (69 Me. 290), 168. 
 Bartholomew v. People (104 111. 601), 
 
 322. 
 Bartholomew v. Stephens (8 C. & P. 
 
 728), 126. 
 Bartlett v. Cleavenger (35 W. Va. 
 
 719), 250. 
 Bartlett v. Delpratt (4 Mass. 702), 73. 
 Bartlett v. Gale (4 Paige, N. Y, 503), 
 
 304. 
 Bartlett v. Lee (33 Ga. 491), 205. 
 Bartlett v. Marshall (2 Bibb, Ky., 
 
 467), 70. 
 Barton v. Anderson (104 Ind. 578), 
 
 218. 
 Barton v. Govan (116 N. Y. 658), 188. 
 C 
 
 Barton v. Lynch (69 Hun, 1), 223. 
 Bassett v. Bassett (55 Me. 125), 128. 
 Bassett v. Cunningham (9 Gratt. 684), 
 
 79. 
 Bassett v. Shares (63 Conn. 39; 27 
 
 Atl. Rep. 431), 334. 
 Bassett v. Shepardson (52 Mich. 3), 
 
 309. 
 Bass Fur. Co. v. Glasscock (82 Ala. 
 
 452), 186. 
 Batcheldor v. Emery (20 N. H. 165), 
 
 73a. 
 Bates v. Ableman (13 Wis. 644), 70. 
 Bates v. Barber (4 Cush. 107), 346. 
 Bates v. Farelet (89 Mo. 121-249), 308. 
 Bates v. Holladay (31 Mo. App. 162), 
 
 346. 
 Bates v. Hurd (65 Me. 180), 246. 
 Bates v. People (8 111. 644), 139a. 
 Bates v. Preble (U. S., 1894, 12 S. Ct. 
 
 277), 60. 
 Bates v. Sabin (64 Vt. 511), 60. 
 Bates v. United States (10 Fed. Rep. 
 
 92), 127. 
 Batesen v. Hartsink (4 Esp. 43), 173. 
 Bathgate v. Haskin (59 N. Y 533), 74. 
 Bathrick v. Detroit, etc. Co. (50 Mich. 
 
 279, 652), 194, 349. 
 Baugher v. Merryman (32 Md. 185), 
 
 223. 
 Baum v. Reay (96 Cal. 462 ; 29 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 117), 60. 
 Baumbach v. Gessler (82 Wis. 231), 
 
 287. 
 Baumgardner v. Mfg. Co. (Minn., 
 
 1893, 52 N. W. Rep. 964), 338. 
 Baur v. Beal (14 Colo. 383; 23 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 345), 147, 334. 
 Bausch v. Ingersoll (61 Hun, 627), 24. 
 Baxter v. Doe (142 Mass. 558), 8. 
 Baxter v. Graham (5 Watts, 418), 
 
 203. 
 Baylis v. Chubb (16 Gratt. 284), 242. 
 Bayly v. Bryant (24 Pick., Mass., 198), 
 
 73. 
 Bays v. Trulson (Oreg., 1894, 35 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 26), 205. 
 Beach v. Elmira (58 Kan. 606), 154.
 
 XXV111 
 
 TAliLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Beach v. Pennell (50 Me. 3S7), 308. 
 Beaks v. Da Cunla (12 N. Y. S. 551 ; 
 
 58 Hun, 609; 27 N. E. Rep. 
 
 251), 8. 
 Beal v. Stevens (72 Cal. 451), 270. 
 Beale v. Brown (6 Mackey, 574), 70, 
 
 167. 
 Beale v. Thompson (6 Cranch, 70), 
 
 360. 
 Beall v. Beck (3 Har. & McC. 242), 
 
 73. 
 Beall v. Poole (27 Md. 245), 32. 
 Beall v. Shattuck (53 Miss. 253), 150a. 
 Beaman v. Russell (20 Vfc 205), 128, 
 
 129. 
 Beaman v. Whitney (22 Me. 413), 
 
 134, 135. 
 Bean v. Loryea (81 Cal. 51), 242. 
 Beard v. First Nat. Bank (41 Minn. 
 
 153), 366. 
 Beard v. First Nat. Bank (39 Minn. 
 
 547), 309. 
 Bearden v. State (44 Ark. 331), 315. 
 Beards v. Frame (85 Cal. 134), 147. 
 Beardsley v. Am. Miss. Soc. (45 Conn. 
 
 327), 222. 
 Beardsley v. Crane (Minn., 1893, 54 
 
 N. W. Rep. 740), 220. 
 Beardsley v. Hall (36 Conn. 270), 69. 
 Beardsley v. Knight (10 Vt. 185), 
 
 223. 
 Beardstown v. Virginia, etc. (76 111. 
 
 34), 250. 
 Beasley v. Bradley (2 Swan, Tenn., 
 
 180), 306. 
 Beatty v. Hatcher (13 Ohio St. 115), 
 
 249. 
 Beaty v. Knowler (4 Pet., U. S., 152), 
 
 242. 
 Beaufort v. Smith (4 Ex. 450), 116. 
 Beaumont v. Perkins (1 Phillim. 78), 
 
 141. 
 Beavan v. Carpenter (11 Sim. 22), 363. 
 Beaver v. Taylor (1 Wall., U. S., 042), 
 
 50. 
 Beavers v. State (58 Ind. 530), 344. 
 Bechtel's Appeal (133 Pa. St. 367; 19 
 
 Atl. Rep. 412), 128. 
 
 Becker v. Baumgartner (111., 1893, 32t 
 
 N. E. Rep. 786), 24. 
 Beckhaus v. Ladner (48 N. J. Eq. 
 
 152), 308. 
 Beckwith v. Windsor Co. (14 Conn. 
 
 594), 131. 
 Bedell v. L. I. Railroad Co. (44 N. Y. 
 
 367), 199. 
 Bedford v. Sherman (68 Hun, 317), 
 
 GO. 
 Bedgood v. McLain (89 Ga. 793), 129. 
 Bedlow's Will, In re (67 Hun, 408), 
 
 309. 
 Bee v. Bowman (Tenn., 1891, 14 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 481), 248. 
 Beech's Case (1 Leach's Cas. 158), 23. 
 Beeks v. Odom (70 Tex. 183), 343. 
 Beers v. Payment (Mich., 1893, 54 
 
 N. W. Rep. 886), 341. 
 Began v. Hamilton (90 Ala. 454), 362. 
 Begarly v. State (8 Baxt., Tenn., 520), 
 
 95. 
 Begg v. Beggs (56 Wis. 534), 222. 
 Begg v. Blake (6 Q. B. 126), 68. 
 Beliam v. Hendrickson (32 N. J. Eq. 
 
 441), 220. 
 Behrensmeyer v. Krietz (135 111. 591), 
 
 362. 
 Behrman v. Lind (47 Hun, 530), 217. 
 Beitman v. Hopkins (109 Ind. 178), 
 
 107. 
 Beitz v. Fuller (1 McCord, 541), 07. 
 Belcher v. Mulhall (57 Tex. 17), 205. 
 Belcher v. State (125 Ind. 419), 97. 
 Belcher v. Weaver (46 Tex. 293), 136. 
 Belden v. Allen (61 Conn. 173), 374. 
 Belfast v. Chichester (2 J. & W. 451), 
 
 363. 
 Belford, Clarke & Co. v. Scribner 
 
 (144 U. S. 488), 380. 
 Bell v. Ansly (16 East, 141), 73. 
 Bell v. Brewster (44 Ohio St. 694, 
 
 090, 097), 8, 100, 107, 129, 140, 
 
 141. 
 Bell v. Chaytar (1 C. & K. 102), 138. 
 Bell v. Goodnature (Minn., 1892, 52 
 
 N. W. Rep. 908), 84. 
 Bell v. Jamison (102 Mo. 71), 302.
 
 TABLE OF CASKS. 
 
 XXIX 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Bell v. Kendrick (Flu., 1890, 6 S. 
 
 Rep. 868), 58. 
 Bell v. Morrison (1 Pet. 367), 69. 
 Bell v. Prewitt (62 111. 362), 339. 
 Bell v. Shields (4 Harr., 19 N. J., 93), 
 
 133. 
 Bell v. State (Tex., 1893, 20 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 362), 350. 
 Bell v. State (1 Tex. A pp. 81), 237. 
 Bell v. State (78 Ga. 572), 342. 
 Bell v. Utley (17 Mich. 508), 69, 211. 
 Bell v. Woodman (60 Me. 465), 207. 
 Bell v. Woodward (46 N. H. 315), 
 
 221. 
 Belles v. Anderson (38 111. App. 126), 
 
 379. 
 Bellinger, In re (8 Wend. 595), 354. 
 Bellows v. Stone (14 N. H. 175), 223. 
 Belmont v. Warrell (69 Me. 314), 242. 
 Belote v. Wayne (7 Yerg., Tenn., 534), 
 
 69. 
 Belzhover v. Blackstock (3 Watts, 
 
 20), 174. 
 Bement v. Claybrook (5 Ind. App. 
 
 193 ; 31 N. E. Rep. 556), 206. 
 Bement v. May (Ind., 1893, 34 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 327), 79. 
 Bemis v. Vermont R. R. Co. (58 Vt. 
 
 636), 198. 
 Benaway v. Conine (3 Chand., Wis., 
 
 214), 330. 
 Benecia Works v. Estes (Cal., 1892, 
 
 32 Pac. Rep. 938), 208. 
 Benedict v. Driggs (34 Hun, 94), 230. 
 Benedict v. Hall (76 N. C. 113), 356. 
 Benedict v. Northern Pac. R. R. Co. 
 
 (49 N. W. Rep. 408), 52. 
 Benedict v. State (14 Wis. 423), 7. 
 Benedict v. State (11 N. E. Rep. 125; 
 
 44 Ohio, 679), 116. 
 Benev. Society v. Phillips (36 Mich. 
 
 22), 242. 
 Benge v. Com. (Ky., 1892, 17 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 146), 283. 
 Benjamin v. Hathaway (3 Conn. 528), 
 
 353. 
 Benjamin v. N. Y. El. R. Co. (63 
 
 Hun, 629), 334. 
 
 Benn v. Hatcher (81 Va. 34), 206. 
 Benner v. Dredging Co. (134 N. Y. 
 
 456), 367. 
 Bennet v. Paine (7 Watts, 334), 136. 
 Bennett v. Dean (41 Mich. 472), 83. 
 Bennettv. Insurance Co. (8 Daly, 471), 
 
 241. 
 Bennett v. Kroth (37 Kan. 235), 277. 
 Bennett v. Libhart (27 Mich. 489), 
 
 129. 
 Bennett v. McCaffrey (28 Mo. App. 
 
 220), 140. 
 Bennett v. Runyon (4 Dana, 422), 
 
 105. 
 Bennett v. Russell (34 Mo. 524), 77. 
 Bennett v. Shipley (82 Mo. 448), 135. 
 Bennett v. State (30 Tex. App. 341), 6. 
 Bennett v. State (28 Tex. App. 359), 
 
 347. 
 Bennett v. State (22 S. W. Rep. 684), 
 
 124. 
 Bennett v. State (24 Tex. App. 73), 
 
 322. 
 Bennett v. State (57 Wis. 69), 188. 
 Bennett v. Syndicate Ins. Co. (43 
 
 Minn. 48), 350. 
 Benninghof v. Cubbison (45 Kan. 
 
 621), 370. 
 Bennison v. Walbank (38 Minn. 313), 
 
 193. 
 Bensberg v. Harris (46 Mo. App. 404), 
 
 347. 
 Bensimer v. Fell (W. Va., 1891, 12 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 1078), 157. 
 Bensley v. Brockway (27 111. App. 
 
 410), 67, 68, 73a. 
 Benson, In re (16 N. Y. S. Ill), 178. 
 Benson v. Christian (129 Ind. 535), 
 
 244. 
 Benson v. Dean (40 Minn. 455), 21. 
 Benson v. Lundy (52 Iowa, 256), 70. 
 Benson v. McMahon (127 U. S. 467), 
 
 125. 
 Benson v. United States (146 U. S. 
 
 245), 306. 
 Bent v. Baker (3 T. R. 27), 303. 
 Bentell v. Oliver (89 Ga. 246), 150a. 
 Bentley v. Brown (37 Kan. 14), 199.
 
 XXX 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Bentley v. Cooke (3 Doug., Eng., 
 
 422), 166. 
 Bentley v. O'Brien (111 111. 53), 66. 
 Benton v. Baxley (Ga., 1893, 15 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 820), 138. 
 Benton v. Martin (52 N. Y. 570), 212. 
 Benton v. State (30 Avk. 328), 344. 
 Berbesick v. Fritz (39 Iowa, 700), 
 
 223. 
 Berg v. McLafferty (12 Atl. Rep. 460), 
 
 120. 
 Berg v. Peterson (52 N. W, Rep. 37 ; 
 
 49 Minn. 420), 139. 
 Berg v. Warner (47 Minn. 250), 71. 
 Bergen v. People (17 111. 426), 93. 
 Bergquist v. Iron Co. (49 Minn. 511; 
 
 52 N. W. Rep. 136), 186. 
 Berkely Peerage Case (4 Campb. 401- 
 
 417), 53, 113. 
 Berliner v. Waterloo (14 Wis. 378), 
 
 242. 
 Berney v. Dinsmore (141 Mass. 42), 
 
 199. 
 Bernhart v. State (82 Wis. 23), 343. 
 Berry v. Berry (24 Atl. Rep. 957; 
 
 84 Me. 541), 380. 
 Berry v. Com. (10 Bush, Ky., 15), 93. 
 Berry v. Haines (4 Wheat. 17), 128. 
 Berry v. Hall (N. M., 1893, 35 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 36), 144. 
 Berry v. Kowatsky (Cal., 1893, 30 
 
 Pac. Rep. 202), 8. 
 Berry v. Lathrop (24 Ark. 12), 68. 
 Berry v. Sawyer (19 Fed. Rep. 286), 
 
 304. 
 Berry v. Stevens (71 Me. 503), 302. 
 Berry v. Stevens (69 Me. 290), 309. 
 Berry v. United States (2 Colo. Terr. 
 
 186), 90. 
 Berry v. Whitney (40 Mich. 65), 223. 
 Bertody v. Ison (69 Ga. 317), 254. 
 Bertrand v. Taylor (32 Ark. 470), 249. 
 Berwies v. So. Pac. R. Co. (80 Cal. 
 
 415), 145. 
 Besch v. Besch (27 Tex. 390), 56. 
 Bestor v. Roberts (58 Ala. 331), 133, 
 
 140. 
 Bethune v. Hale (45 Ala. 522), 244. 
 
 Betts v. Gloversville (8 N. Y. S. 795), 
 
 138. 
 Betts v. Starr (5 Corn. 550, 553), 160. 
 Bevan v. Bank (31 N. E. Rep. 679 ; 
 
 39 111. App. 577), 139, 140. 
 Bevans v. Barnett (Ark., 1893. 22 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 160), 18. 
 Beveridge v. Parmlee (43 111. App. 
 
 459), 380. 
 Bibb v. Allen (149 U. S. 481), 7, 360. 
 Bickford v. Menier (9 N. Y. S. 775), 
 
 250. 
 Bierce v. Stocking (11 Gray, 174), 195. 
 Bierhaus v. W. U. T. Co. (Ind., 1893, 
 
 34 N. E. Rep. 581), 231. 
 Bigelow v. Copen (145 Mass. 273), 
 
 214. 
 Bigelow v. Legg (102 N. Y. 654), 216. 
 Bigelow v. Metro. Ry. Co. (48 Mo. 
 
 App. 367), 231. 
 Bigelow v. Summers (28 Fla. 759), 
 
 130. 
 Bigelow v. Winsor (1 Gray, Mass., 
 
 299, 303), 151. 
 Bigelow v. Sickles (75 Wis. 528), 168. 
 Bigham v. Coleman (71 Ga. 176), 132. 
 Bigler v. Reyher (48 Ind. 112), 174. 
 Bigoonette v. Paulet (134 Mass. 123), 
 
 52. 
 Billings v. Billings (10 Cush. 178), 
 
 212. 
 Billings v. Stark (15 Fla. 297). 226. 
 Billingsley v. Dean (11 Ind. 331), 242. 
 Binfield v. State (Neb., 1884, 19 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 607), 330. 
 Binford v. Young (115 Ind. 174), 370. 
 Bingham v. Cabot (3 Dall. 19), 144. 
 Bingham v. Hyland (6 N. Y. S. 75), 
 
 130. 
 Bingham v. Walk (12S Ind. 164; 27 
 
 N. E. Rep. 483), 173, 174, 370. 
 Binkert v. Jensen (94 111. 283), 242. 
 Binns v. State (16 Ind. 31), 6. 
 Birbeck v. Burrows (2 Hall, 51), 314. 
 Bird v. Com. (21 Gratt., Va., 800), 
 
 185, 242. 
 Bird v. Hudson (N. C, 1893, 18 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 209), 349.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XXXI 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Bird v. Hueston (10 Ohio St. 418), 
 
 166, 168. 
 Bird v. State (107 Ind. 154), 345. 
 Bird v. Styles (18 N. J. Eq. 297), 304. 
 Birdsey v. Butterfield (34 Wis. 52), 
 
 83. 
 Birmingham v. Anderson (48 Pa. St. 
 
 253), 210. 
 Birmingham F. Ins. Co. v. Culver 
 
 (126 111. 329; 18 N. E. Rep. 804), 
 
 200, 341. 
 Birmingham F. & N. Co. v. Gross 
 
 (Ark., 1893, 12 S. Rep. 36), 208. 
 Bischoff v. Schmetz (5 N. Y. S. 757), 
 
 199. 
 Biscoe v. State (67 Md. 6), 89. 
 Bishop v. Dillard (49 Ark. 285), 205. 
 Bishop v. Minton (112 N. C. 524; 
 
 17 S. E. Rep. 436), 84. 
 Bishop v. Tucker (4 Rich., S. C, 78), 
 
 123. 
 Bishop of Meath v. Marquess of 
 
 Winchester (3 Bing. N. C. 183), 
 
 106. 
 Bissell v. Adams (55 Conn. 399), 69. 
 Bissell v. Briggs (9 Mass. 462), 232. 
 Bissell v. West (35 Ind, 54), 6. 
 Bixby v. Franklin Ins. Co. (8 Pick. 
 
 86), 144. 
 Bixby v, Montpelier, etc. Co. (49 Vt. 
 
 125), 19S. 
 Bixler v. Barker (3 Bush, Ky., 166), 
 
 242. 
 Black v. Epperson (40 Tex. 178), 232. 
 Black v. Hill (32 Ohio St. 313), 220. 
 Black v. Lord Braybrook (2 Stark. 7), 
 
 149. 
 Black v. Shreeve (13 N. J. Eq. 455), 
 
 212. 
 Black v. State (1 Tex. App. 368), 249. 
 Black v. State (59 Wis. 471), 324. 
 Black v. Woodson (39 Md. 194), 124. 
 Blackburn v. Com. (12 Bush, 181), 
 
 348. 
 Blackburn v. Crawfords (3 Wall. 
 
 175), 171. 
 Blackburn v. Hargreave (2 Lew. C. C. 
 
 259), 277. 
 
 Blackburn v. State (23 Ohio St. 146), 
 
 10, 231. 
 Blackington v. Rockland (66 Me. 
 
 352), 38. 
 Blackledge v. Simpson (2 Hayw., 
 
 S. C, 30), 77. 
 Blackman v. Riley (63 Hun, 521 ; 28 
 
 Abb. N. C. 126), 134. 
 Blackman v. State (80 Ga. 785), 376. 
 Blackshire v. Pettit (35 W. Va. 547), 
 
 250. 
 Blackwell v. State (67 Ga. 76), 344. 
 Blackwell v. State (30 Tex. App. 416; 
 
 17 S. W. Rep. 1061), 38. 
 Blade v. Noland (12 Wend. 173), 226. 
 Blagen v. Thompson (Oreg., 1893, 31 
 
 Pac. Rep. 647), 199. 
 Blair v. Bnttolph (72 Iowa, 31), 212. 
 Blair v. Madison (81 Iowa, 3), 52. 
 Blair v. Pelham (118 Miss. 420, 421), 
 
 38a, 139. 
 Blair v. Railroad Co. (89 Mo. 334), 
 
 178. 
 Blair v. Wallace (21 Cal. 317), 232. 
 Blake v. Graves (18 Iowa, 312, 317), 
 
 166. 
 Blake v. Ladd (ION. H. 190), 302. 
 Blake v. People (73 N. Y. 586), 375. 
 Blake v. Russ (33 Me. 360), 126. 
 Blake v. Rourke (74 Iowa, 519; 38 
 
 N. W. Rep. 392), 197. 
 Blakeley, In re (48 Wis. 294), 222. 
 Blaker v. State (29 N. E. Rep. 1077 ; 
 
 130 Ind. 206), 11. 
 Blakeslee v. Dye (1 Colo. App. 128; 
 
 27 Pac. Rep. 881), 359. 
 Blalock v. Miland (87 Ga. 573), 30, 
 
 130. 
 Blanc Jour v. Tutt (32 Mo. 576), 70. 
 Blanchard v. Evans (55 N. Y. Super. 
 
 Ct. 543), 79. 
 Blanchard v. Tyler (12 Mich. 89), 226. 
 Blanchard v. Young (11 Cush. 341, 
 
 345), 120, 247. 
 Blane v. Rogers (49 Cal. 15), 320. 
 Blewett v. Gaynor (77 Wis. 378), 375. 
 Blewett v. Tregonning (3 Ad. & EI. 
 
 554, 565, 581, 584), 341.
 
 XXX11 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Bliss v. Brainard (41 N. H. 256), 250, 
 
 276. 
 Bliss v. Mclntire (18 Vt. 466), 128. 
 Bliss v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. 
 
 Co. (Mass., 1894, 36 N. E Rep. 65), 
 
 192. 
 Bliss v. Shuman (47 Me. 252), 277. 
 Block v. Jacksonville (36 111. 301), 
 
 143a. 
 Block v. Woodron (39 Md. 194), 124. 
 Blocker v. Burness (2 Ala. 355), 316. 
 Blodgett v. Jordan (6 Vt. 580), 148. 
 Blood v. Fairbanks (50 Cal. 420), 
 
 308. 
 Bloodgood v. James (12 Johns. 285), 
 
 288. 
 
 Osterlee (139 111. 
 
 Schrock (110 111. 
 
 Bloomington v 
 
 120), 52, 363 
 Bloomington v, 
 
 221), 189. 
 Bloomington v. Smith (23 N. E. Rep. 
 
 972), 130. 
 Blossom v. Griffin (13 N. Y. 569), 
 
 371. 
 Blount v. Kempton (155 Mass. 378), 
 
 168. 
 Blower v. Hol'lis (1 Cromp. & M. 396), 
 
 147. 
 Bloxam v. Elsie (1 C. & P. 558), 38. 
 Blum v. Davis (56 Tex. 426), 358. 
 Blum v. Manhattan Ry. Co. (1 Misc. 
 
 Rep. 119; 20 N. Y. S. 722), 199. 
 Blumhart v. Rohr (70 Md. 839), 60. 
 Blythe v. Gibbons (Ind., 1894, 35 
 
 N. E. Rep. 557), 208. 
 Blythe v. State (4 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 
 
 435), 344. 
 Boalmayer v. State (20 S. W. Rep. 
 
 1102; 31 Tex. Cr. Rep. 473), 330. 
 Board v. First Nat. Bank (24 N. Y. 
 
 S. 392), 82. 
 Board v. Misenheimer (78 111. 22), 
 
 139. 
 Boardman v. Reed (6 Pet. 328), 115. 
 Boardman v. Woodman (47 N. ■ H. 
 
 120), 188. 
 Board of Commissioners v. Diebold 
 
 S. & L. Co. (133 U. S. 473), 76. 
 
 Board of Com'rs of Franklin County 
 
 v. Bunting (111 Ind. 143), 73a. 
 Bock v. Wygant (5 III. App. 643), 
 
 350. 
 Bode v. Trimmer (82 Cal. 513), 31. 
 Boe v. Minn. Milk Co. (44 Minn. 
 
 460), 154. 
 Boehm v. Lies (18 N. Y. S. 577), 252. 
 Borran v. Hamilton (90 Ala. 354), 
 
 148. 
 Bogardus v. Clark (4 Paige, 623), 
 
 150. 
 Boggan v. Horn (97 N. C. 268), 60. 
 Boggus v. State (34 Ga. 375), 140. 
 Bohannanv. Chapman (13 Ala. 641), 
 
 73a. 
 Bohart v. Chamberlain (99 Mo. 622), 
 
 130. 
 Bohrer v. Lange (44 Minn. 281), 3(5, 
 
 310. 
 Bohrer v. Stumpf (31 111. App. 139), 
 
 7,8. 
 Bolgiano v. Lock Co. (73 Md. 132), 
 
 285. 
 Boiling v. Fannin (Ala., 1893, 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 59), 57, 58. 
 Boiling v. Teel (76 Va. 487), 262. 
 Boiling v. State (Ark., 1891, 18 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 658), 249. 
 Bollinger Co. v. McDowell (99 Mo. 
 
 632), 217. 
 Bolwar v. Nepensett (16 Pick. 241), 
 
 229. 
 Bompart v. Roderman (24 Mo. 385), 
 
 262. 
 Bond v. Ward (1 Nott & McCord, 
 
 201), 73. 
 Bonds v. Smith (106 N. C. 553), 12C>. 
 Bondur v. Le Bourne (79 Me. 21), 24. 
 Bone v. State (86 Ga. 108), 334. 
 Bonnard v. State (25 Tex. App. 173), 
 
 340. 
 Bonnelli v. Bowen (74 Miss. 142 ; 11 
 
 S. Rep. 791), 350. 
 Bonner v. Mayfield (82 Tex. 234), 
 
 198. 
 Bonner v. McPhail (31 Barb., N. Y., 
 
 106), 315.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XXXlll 
 
 Beferences are to sections. 
 
 Bonner v. People (40 111. App. 028), 
 
 270. 
 Bonnett v. Glatfeldt (120 111. 106), 
 
 60, 342. 
 Bonstead v. Cuyler (Pa., 1887, 8 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 818), 309. 
 Boogher v. Howe (99 Mo. 183), 11. 
 Bookman v. N. Y. El. R. R. Co. (137 
 
 N. Y. 302), 241. 
 Bookman v. N. Y. EI. R. R. Co. (137 
 
 N. Y. 595), 199. 
 Boon v. State (37 Minn. 126), 230. 
 Boone v. Miller (73 Tex. 564), 53. 
 Boorman v. Johnston (12 Wend. 573), 
 
 206. 
 Booth v. Pendola (88 Cal. 36 ; 23 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 200), 309. 
 Booth v. Palte (L. R. 15 App. Cas. 
 
 188), 220. 
 Boothby v. Stanley (34 Me. 515), 129. 
 Boree v. McLean (24 Wis. 225), 31. 
 Bork v. People (91 N. Y. 13), 23. 
 Born v. Rosenow (84 Wis. 62 ; 54 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 1089), 334. 
 Borough v. Brown (11 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 
 
 272), 239. 
 Borst v. Nalle (28 Gratt., Va., 423), 
 
 213. 
 Borum v. Fouts (15 Ind. 50), 168. 
 Boscowitz, Ex parte (84 Ala. 463 , 4 
 
 S. Rep. 279), 354. 
 Bose v. Solliers (6 Dow. & Ry. 514), 
 
 358. 
 Bostie v. State (94 Ala. 45), 333. 
 Bostock v. State (61 Ga. 635, 639), 344. 
 Boston v. Benson (12 Cush., Mass., 
 
 61), 128. 
 Boston I. R. Co. v. Hoit (14 Vt. 92), 
 
 158. 
 Boston, etc. Co. v. Dana (1 Gray, 
 
 Mass., 83), 37, 176. 
 Bostwick v. Leech (3 Day, Conn., 
 
 476), 262. 
 Boswell v. Com. (20 Gratt., Va., 860), 
 
 231. 
 Boteler v. Dexter (20 D. C. 26), 128, 
 
 130. 
 Bott v. Burnell (9 Mass. 96), 150a. 
 
 Bottomley v. United States (1 Story, 
 
 143), 8. 
 Boughton v. Seamans (9 Hun, 392), 
 
 314. 
 Boulden v. Mclntire (119 Ind. 574), 
 
 234.' 
 Bouldin v. Massie (7 Wheat. 122), 
 
 130. 
 Bouldin v. Phelps (30 Fed. Rep. 547), 
 
 242. 
 Boulter v. Behrend (20 D. C. 567), 
 
 358. 
 Bouman v. Norton (5 C. & P. 177), 
 
 171. 
 Bounds v. Little (79 Tex. 128), 31. 
 Bourck v. Miller (Oreg., 26 Pac. Rep. 
 
 861), 35. 
 Bourden v. Bailes (101 N. C. 612), 
 
 334. 
 Bourne v. Boston (2 Gray, 494), 126. 
 Bouton v. Linsley (84 Wis. 644; 54 
 
 N. W. Rep. 1017), 154. 
 Bovee v. Hurd (134 N. Y. 450), 222. 
 Bow v. Allentown (34 N. H. 365), 
 
 225. 
 Bowditch v. Mawley (1 Campb. 195), 
 
 22. 
 Bowen v. Bank (18 N. Y. Super. Ct. 
 
 226), 35. 
 Bowen v. Huntington (35 W. Va. 
 
 682), 188, 192. 
 Bowen v. Missouri P. etc. Co. (Mo., 
 
 1893, 24 S. W. Rep. 436), 242. 
 Bower v. O'Brien (2 Ind. 423), 140. 
 Bower v. State (5 Miss. 364), 93. 
 Bowers v. Hogau (93 Mich. 420), 199. 
 Bowers v. Overfield (10 Pa. Co. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 273), 60. 
 Bowers v. Schuler (Minn., 1893, 55 
 
 N. W. Rep. 817), 309. 
 Bowers v. Smith (8 N. Y. S. 226), 82. 
 Bowers v. State (19 N. Y. State Rep. 
 
 926), 308. 
 Bowersox v. Gitt (12 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 
 
 81), 159. 
 Bowie v. Maddox (29 Ga. 285), 6. 
 Bowker v. Delong (141 Mass. 351), 
 
 73a.
 
 XX XIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Bovvlin v. Com. (Ky., 1893, 22 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 543), 283. 
 Bowling Green v. Com. (79 Ky. 604), 
 
 324. 
 Bowman v. Griffith (35 Neb. 361), 
 
 226. 
 Bowman v. Norton (5 C. & P. 177), 
 
 169. 
 Bowman v. Patrick (32 Fed. Rep. 
 
 368), 166. 
 Bowman v. Sanborn (25 N. H. 87), 
 
 133. 
 Bowman v. Smith (Tex., 1893, 21 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 48), 31, 146. 
 Bowyer v. Martin (6 Rand., Va., 525), 
 
 221. 
 Boyce v. Auditor (52 N. W. Rep. 754 ; 
 
 90 Mich. 314), 31, 146. 
 Boyd v. Jones (60 Mo. 454), 70. 
 Boyd v. McConnell (10 Humph., 
 
 Tenn., 68), 128. 
 Boyd v. Nebraska (143 U. S. 135 ; 12 
 
 S. Ct. 375), 81. 
 Boyd v. N. E. Ins. Co. (3 La. Ann. 
 
 848), 233. 
 Boyd v. State (2 Humph., Tenn., 37), 
 
 89. 
 Boyd v. State (24 Tex. App. 570), 5. 
 Boyd v. State (14 Lea, Tenn., 161), 
 
 201. 
 Boyd v. Thompson (153 Pa. St. 78), 
 
 68. 
 Boyd v. United States (142 U. S. 87), 
 
 320. 
 Boyden v. Moore (5 Mass. 365), 82. 
 Boyle v. Chambers (32 Mo. 46), 107. 
 Boyle v. Coleman (13 Barb., N. Y., 
 
 42), 139a. 
 Boyle v. State (105 Ind. 469), 102. 
 Boyle v. State (57 Wis. 472), 189. 
 Boylston v. Giltner (3 Oreg. 118), 193. 
 Brace v. Doble (S. D., 1893, 53 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 859), 24. 
 Brackettv. Norton (4 Conn. 117), 143. 
 Bradford v. Dawson (2 Ala. 203), 136. 
 Bradford v. Floyd (80 Mo. 207), 237. 
 Bradford v. Williams (2 Md. Ch. 
 
 1-3), 71-73a. 
 
 Bradish v. Yocum (30 111. 386), 217. 
 Bradley v. Bradley (4 Wheat. 173), 
 
 233. 
 Bradley v. Merrick (91 N. Y. 293), 
 
 123. 
 Bradley v. Second Ave. R. R. Co. (8 
 
 id. 289), 188. 
 Bradley Fert. Co. v. Taylor (112 
 
 N. C. 141 ; 17 S. E. Rep. 69), 283, 
 
 332. 
 Bradly v. Bradly (2 Fairf. 267), 156. 
 Bradly v. Caswell (Vt., 1893, 26 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 956), 219. 
 Bradly v. Elsby (33 Mich. 328), 142. 
 Bradly v. West (60 Mo. 33), 229. 
 Bradly, Adm'r, v. Long (2 Strobh., 
 
 S. C, 160), 132. 
 Bradshaw v. Bennett (1 M. & Rob. 
 
 148), 138. 
 Bradshaw v. Combs (102 111. 428), 334. 
 Bradshaw v. Mansfield (18 Tex. App. 
 
 21), 242. 
 Bradshaw v. State (17 Neb. 147), 6. 
 Bradstreet v. Neptune Ins. Co. (3- 
 
 Sumn. 600), 158. 
 Brady v. Cassidy (13 N. Y. S. 824), 24. 
 Brady v. Valentine (21 N. Y S. 776; 
 
 3 Misc. Rep. 19), 370. 
 Bragg v. Bletz (7 D. C. 105), 11. 
 Bragg v. Danielson (141 Mass. 195), 
 
 379. 
 Bragg v. Massie (38 Ala. 89), 223. 
 Bragg v. Paulk (42 Me. 502). 246. 
 Bragg v. Stanford (82 Ind. 324), 208. 
 Brainard v. Buck (25 Vt. 573), 79. 
 Brainerd v. Brainerd (15 Conn. 575), 
 
 223. 
 Braly v. Henry (77 Cal. 324), 339. 
 Bramble v. Hunt (68 Hun, 204), 199, 
 
 369. 
 Bramble v. Kingsbury (39 Ark. 131), 
 
 83. 
 Bramlette v. State (21 Tex. App. 611 ; 
 
 2 S. W. Rep. 765, 875), 6, 166. 
 Branch v. Wilson (12 Fla. 543), 215. 
 Brand v. Servass (11 Mont. 86), 367. 
 Brandas v. Barnett (3 M. G. & S» 
 
 519), 242.
 
 TAKLE OF CASES. 
 
 XXXV 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Brandt v. Klein (17 Johns. 335), 173. 
 Branfoot v. Hamilton (52 Fed. Rep. 
 
 390), 191. 
 Bransen v. Kitchenman (148 Pa. St. 
 
 541), 8. 
 Brantley v. Swift (24 Ala. 390), 198. 
 Bransdale v. Lowe (2 Rus. & My. 
 
 142), 363. 
 Branstetter v. Morgan (N. D., 1893, 
 
 55 N. W. Rep. 758), 374. 
 Brassell v. State (91 Ala. 45; S S. 
 
 Rep. 679), 333. 
 Brauns v. Stearns (1 Oreg. 367), 221. 
 Brawley v. United States (96 U. S. 
 
 168), 217. 
 Bray v. Kremp (113 Mo. 552; 21 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 220), 366. 
 Brazel v. Fair (26 S. C. 370), 173. 
 Breckenridge v. Duncan (2 A. K. 
 
 Marsh. 50), 221. 
 Breen v. Moran (51 Minn. 525; 53 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 755), 216. 
 Breher v. Reese (17 111. App. 545), 
 
 265. 
 Breiseumeister v. Lodge (81 Mich. 
 
 525), 178. 
 Brelscher v. Treitske (33 Neb. 699), 
 
 385. 
 Brennan v. Hall (14 N. Y. S. 864), 157. 
 Brennan v. Security L. Ins. Co. (4 
 
 Daly, N. Y., 296), 253. 
 Brennan v. Voght (Ala., 1893, 11 S. 
 
 Rep. 893), 237. 
 Brennan v. Winkler (37 S. C. 457 ; 16 
 
 S. E. Rep. 250), 200. 
 Bressler v. People (117 111. 422), 384. 
 Bretts v. Levine (Minn., 1892, 52 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 525), 209. 
 Brewer v. Knapp (1 Pick. 332, 337), 
 
 230. 
 Brewster v. Doane (2 Hill, 537), 58. 
 Brewster v. McCall (15 Conn. 274), 
 
 222. 
 Brice v. Miller (15 S. E. Rep. 272; 35 
 
 S. C. 537), 333, 367. 
 Briceland v. Com. (74 Pa. St. 469), 
 
 249. 
 Bridge v. Eggleston (14 Mass. 245), 9. 
 
 Bridge v. Gray (14 N. Y. 61), 69. 
 Bridge Co. v. Miller (111., 1893, 28 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 1091), 202. 
 Bridges v. North London Ry. Co. 
 
 (L. R. 7 H. L. 213), 13. 
 Bridgham's Appeal (82 Me. 323), 371. 
 Bridgman v. Scott (13 N. Y. S. 338; 
 
 59 Hun, 624), 126. 
 Briel v. Buffalo (68 Hun, 219), 377. 
 Brierly v. Davol Mills (128 Mass. 
 
 291), 198. 
 Briggs v. Briggs (R. I., 1893, 26 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 198), 167. 
 Briggs v. Com. (82 Va. 554), 349. 
 Briggs v. Georgia (15 Vt. 61), 60. 
 Briggs v. Hervey (130 Mass. 187), 230. 
 Briggs v. Jones (46 Minn. 277), 366. 
 Briggs v. Minn. S. R. Co. (52 Minn. 
 
 36; 53 N. W. Rep. 1019), 188. 
 Briggs v. Morgan (3 Phil. 325), 202. 
 Briggs v. Partridge (64 N. Y. 357), 
 
 73a. 
 Briggs v. Rush (1 Tex. Civ. App. 19), 
 
 377. 
 Briggs v. Whipple (7 Vt. 15), 242. 
 Brigham v. Carr (21 Tex. 142), 73a. 
 Brigham v. Gott (3 N. Y. S. 518), 
 
 178, 309. 
 Brigham v. Palmer (3 Allen, Mass., 
 
 450), 138. 
 Brigham v. Peters (1 Gray, 139), 139. 
 Bright v. Smithers (10 Pa. Co. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 647), 159. 
 Brightman v. Hix (108 Mass. 246), 84. 
 Brinckle v. Brinckle (34 Leg. Int. 
 
 428), 114. 
 Brinckley v. State (89 Ala. 34), 186. 
 Bringer, In re (7 Blatch. 268), 234. 
 Brinkman v. Jones (44 Wis. 49S), 
 
 223. 
 Brison v. Brison (75 Cal. 525), 213. 
 Bristol v. Ontario Orphan Asylum (60 
 
 Conn. 472), 222. 
 Bristol Sav. Bank v. Stiger (Iowa, 
 
 1893, 53 N. W. Rep. 265), 208. 
 Bristow v. Sequeville (L. R. 5 Exch. 
 
 275), 143. 
 Britt v. State (21 Tex. App. 215), 352.
 
 XX XVI 
 
 TADLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Britton v. Stanley (4 Whart., Pa., 
 
 114), 128. 
 Britton v. State (115 Ind. 55), 339. 
 Broad v. Pitt (3 C. & B. 518), 177. 
 Broad Street Hotel Co. v. Weaver 
 
 (57 Ala. 26), 242. 
 Broat v. Moore'(44 Minn. 468), 377. 
 Brobston v. Cahill (64 111. 356), 140. 
 Brock v. Brock (116 Pa. St. 113), 168. 
 Brock v. Coram. (92 Ky. 183 ; 17 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 337), 102. 
 Brock v. Milligan (10 Ohio, 123, 125), 
 
 316. 
 Brock way v. Petted (Mich., 1890, 45 
 
 N. W. Rep. 64), 24. 
 Brodeck v. Hirschfield (57 Vt. 12), 24. 
 Broder v. Conklin (98 Cal. 360; 33 
 
 Pac. Rep. 211), 231, 232, 234. 
 Brogy v. Com. (10 Gratt., Va., 722), 
 
 121. 
 Brokman v. Myers (59 Hun, 623), 
 
 126. 
 Bromley v. Goff (75 Me. 213), 21. 
 Bronson, In re (67 Hun, 237), 79. 
 Bronson v. Leach (42 N. W. Rep. 
 
 174; 74 Mich. 713), 368. 
 Brook v. Chaplin (3 Vt. 281), 135, 
 
 136. 
 Brook v. Chicago, etc. Co. (81 Iowa, 
 
 504; 47 N. W. Rep. 74), 201. 
 Brook v. Clay (3 A. K. Marsh. 545), 
 
 53. 
 Brook v. Duggan (149 Mass. 396), 56. 
 Brook v. New Durham (55 N. H. 
 
 550), 74. 
 Brook v. Silver (5 Del. Ch. 7), 304. 
 Brooke v. Filer (35 Ind. 402), 238. 
 Brooke v. Townsend (7 Gill, 10), 197. 
 Brooke v. Tradesmen's Bank (68 
 
 Hun, 129), 366. 
 Brooke v. Washington (8 Gratt., Va., 
 
 24S), 267. 
 Brooken v. State (26 Tex. App. 121 ; 
 
 9 S. W. Rep. 735), 332. 
 Brookline v. Mackintosh (133 Mass. 
 
 266), 229. 
 Brookmire v. Rosa (34 Neb. 227; 51 
 
 N. W. Rep. 810), 357. 
 
 Brooks v. Byam (1 Story, 296), 305. 
 Brooks v. Weeks (121 Mass. 433), 347. 
 Brookser v. State (26 Tex. App. 593), 
 
 80. 
 Broquet v. Tripp (36 Kan. 700; 14 
 
 Pac. Rep. 227), 186, 188. 
 Brotherton v. People (75 N. Y. 159), 
 
 6, 102, 249. 
 Brotton v. Langert (1 Wash. 267), 
 
 337. 
 Brough v. Perkins (6 Mod. 81), 145. 
 Browder v. State (30 Tex. App. 614 ; 
 
 18 S. W. Rep. 197), 350. 
 Brower v. East Rome Town Co. (84 
 
 Ga. 219), 60. 
 Brown v. Baldwin Co. (13 N. Y. S. 
 
 893), 216. 
 Brown v. Bellows (4 Pick. 179), 348. 
 Brown v. Bocquin (57 Ark. 97; 20 
 
 N. W. Rep. 813), 153. 
 Brown v. Bowen (90 Mo. 184), 209. 
 Brown v. Bowen (30 N. Y. 519), 84. 
 Brown v. Brightman (11 Allen, 
 
 Mass., 226), 308. 
 Brown v. Brown (43 N. H. 25), 221. 
 Brown v. Brown (1 Hagg. 523), 202. 
 Brown v. Brown (39 Mich. 792), 252. 
 Brown v. Cabalin (3 Oreg. 45), 211. 
 Brown v. Case (23 S. C. 251), 246. 
 Brown v. Clark (77 N. Y. 360), 210. 
 Brown v. Clock (5 N. Y. Supp. 245), 
 
 309. 
 Brown v. Com. (S6 Va. 935), 80. 
 Brown v. Doubleday (61 Vt. 523; 7 
 
 Atl. Rep. 135), 187. 
 Brown v. Ed son (23 Vt. 435), 147. 
 Brown v. Farrar (3 Ohio, 140), 136. 
 Brown v. Foster (112 Mo. 237), 248. 
 Brown v. Getchell (11 Mass. 11), 286. 
 Brown v. Griffith (70 Cal. 14), 130. 
 Brown v. Insurance Co. (70 Iowa, 
 
 390), 188. 
 Brown v. Isbell (11 Ala. 1009), 213. 
 Brown v. Jewett (18 N. H. 230), 233. 
 Brown v. Kenyon (108 Ind. 284), 115. 
 Brown v. Lehigh, etc. Co. (40 111. 
 
 App. 602), 232. 
 Brown v. Lincoln (47 N. H. 368), 139.
 
 TAIJLK OF CASES. 
 
 XXXVU 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Brown v. Marshal (120 Ind. 323), 
 
 375. 
 Brown v. Metz (33 111. 339), 129. 
 Brown v. Minger (16 Vt. 12), 73. 
 Brown v. Mooers (6 Gray, 451), 352. 
 Brown v. Moore (38 Tex. 645), 135. 
 Brown v. Orr (86 Va. 935), 320. 
 Brown v. Peckard (4 Utah, 292), 76. 
 Brown v. Phelan (2 Swan, Tenn., 
 
 629), 128. 
 Brown v. Piper (91 U. S. 37), 236, 
 
 237. 
 Brown v. Prude (Ala., 1893, 11 S. 
 
 Rep. 838), 199. 
 Brown v. Purkhani (18 Pick. 172), 
 
 128. 
 Brown v. Rome, etc. R. R. Co. (45 
 
 Hun, 439), 178. 
 Brown v. Rouse (93 Cal. 257), 18. 
 Brown v. Scofield (8 Barb. 279), 239. 
 Brown v. Selby (2 Biss. 457), 231. 
 Brown v. Stark (83 Cal. 636), 116. 
 Brown v. State (1 Pickle, Tenn., 439). 
 
 286. 
 Brown v. State (72 Md. 468), 342. 
 Brown v. State (32 Tex. Cr. App. 
 . 119; 22 S. W. Rep. 596), 80, 283. 
 Brown v. State (76 Ga. 623), 350. 
 Brown v. State (32 Miss. 433), 93. 
 Brown v. State (26 Ohio St. 176), 9. 
 Brown v. Sullivan (3 Ind. App. 211), 
 
 379. 
 Brown v. Sullivan (71 Tex. 470), 20, 
 
 24. 
 Brown v. Taurick (20 N. Y. S. 369), 
 
 247, 252. 
 Brown v. Wood (17 Mass. 68), 232. 
 Brown v. Wood (121 Mass. 137), 168. 
 Brown v. Wood (6 Rich., S. C, Eq. 
 
 155), 108. 
 Brown v. Wright (Ark., 1893, 22 
 
 S. W. Rep. 1022), 230. 
 Brown's Case (9 Leigh, Va., 633), 80. 
 Browne v. Piper (91 U. S. 37), 257. 
 Brownell v. Pacific R. R. Co. (47 Mo. 
 
 250), 57. 
 Brownfield's Ex'r v. Brownfield (151 
 Pa. St. 565), 214. 
 
 Browning v. Berry (107 N. C. 231), 
 
 21. 
 Brubaker v. Taylor (76 Pa. St. 83), 
 
 346. 
 Bruce v. Crews (39 Ga. 544), 132. 
 Bruce v. Lumber Co. (87 Va. 3S1), 
 
 207. 
 Bruce v. Osgood (113 Ind. 360), 262. 
 Bruce v. Priest (5 Allen, Mass., 100), 
 
 10. 
 Bruce v. Slemp (82 Va. 352), 208. 
 Bruce v. State (21 S. W. Rep. 602), 
 
 350. 
 Brucker v. State (19 Wis. 539), 244. 
 Brugnier v. United States (1 Dak. 9), 
 
 20. 
 Brumhall v. Van Campen (8 Minn. 
 
 13), 230. 
 Brundred v. Del Hoyo (20 N. J. L. 
 
 328), 144. 
 Brune v. Rawlings (7 East, 279, 2S2), 
 
 130. 
 Bruner v. Nesbitt (31 111. App. 317), 
 
 68. 
 Bruner v. Wade (84 Iowa, 698 ; 51 
 
 N. W. Rep. 251), 8, 374. 
 Brunger v. Smith (49 Fed. Rep. 124), 
 
 168, 332. 
 Brunker v. Cummins (Ind., 1893, 32 
 
 N. E. Rep. 732), 186, 334. 
 Bruns v. Close (9 Colo. 225), 130. 
 Brusch v. St. Paul City Ry. Co. (52 
 
 Minn. 512; 55 N. W. Rep. 57), 
 
 525. 
 Bruyn v. R-ussell (52 Hun, 217), 139. 
 Brush v. Scribner (11 Conn. 407), 143. 
 Brush v. Witkins (4 Johns. Ch. 520), 
 
 143. 
 Bryan v. Harrison (76 N. C. 360), 217. 
 Bryan v. Kales (Ariz., 1893, 31 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 517), 129. 
 Bryan v. State (19 Fla. 364), 23. 
 Bryan v. Walton (20 Ga. 480), 114. 
 Bryan v. Wear (4 Mo. 106), 142. 
 Bryant v. Booze (55 Ga. 438), 67. 
 Bryant v. Hunter (6 Bush, Ky., 75), 
 
 267. 
 Bryce v. Buttler (70 N. C. 585), 69.
 
 XXXVlll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Bubster v. State (33 Neb. 663 ; 50 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 953), 89. 
 Buchanan v. Wise (34 Neb. 695 ; 52 
 
 N. W. Rep. 162), 30. 
 Buchman v. State (59 Ind. 1), 191. 
 Buck v. Ashbrook (51 Mo. 539), 168. 
 Buck v. Gage (43 N. W. Rep. 110), 
 
 31, 142. 
 Buck v. Patterson (75 Mich. 397), 309. 
 Buck v. Pickwell (27 Vt. 104), 262. 
 Buckinghouse v. Gregg (19 Ind. 401), 
 
 239. 
 Buckley v. Bentley (48 Barb., N. Y., 
 
 283), 205. 
 Buckrnan v. Alwood (71 111. 155), 223. 
 Buckman v. Barnum (15 Conn. 68), 68. 
 Buckman's Will (64 Vt. 313), 168. 
 Buckner v. Ries (34 N. Y. 344), 267. 
 Buehler v. Reich (18 N. Y. S. 115), 
 
 188. 
 Buel v. Irvin (24 Mich. 145), 136. 
 Buell v. Miller (4 N. H. 196), 214. 
 Buell v. State (72 Ind. 523), 244. 
 Buffalo, etc. Co. v. Association (126 
 
 N. Y. 450), 178. 
 Buffalo Ins. Co. v. Steamship Co. 
 
 (29 Fed. Rep. 237), 296. 
 Buffalo L. T. & S. D. Co. v. Asso- 
 ciation (N. Y, 1891, 27 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 942), 144. 
 Buffum v. Buff urn (49 Me. 108), 267. 
 Buffuui v. Harris (5 R. I. 250), 185. 
 Buford v. Shannon (Ala., 1893, 10 S. 
 
 Rep. 263), 368. 
 Buie v. Carver (73 N. C. 264), 124. 
 Bulen v. Granger (63 Mich. 311; 29 
 
 N. W. Rep. 718), 139a. 
 Bulger v. Ross (Ala., 1893, 12 S. Rep. 
 
 803), 222. 
 Bulkin v. Ehret (29 Abb. N. C. 62), 
 
 378. 
 Bulkley v. Van Wyck (5 Paige, 
 
 N. Y., 536), 300. 
 Bull v. Wagner (33 Neb. 246 ; 49 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 1130), 379. 
 Bullock v. Consumers' Lumber Co. 
 
 (Cal., 1893, 31 Pac. Rep. 367), 
 
 73a, 220. 
 
 Bullock v. Knox (96 Ala. 195; 10 S. 
 
 Rep. 339), 234. 
 Bump v. Cooper (Oreg., 1891, 26 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 848), 7. 
 Bunn v. Todd (107 N. C. 226), 209. 
 Bunnell v. Taintor (4 Conn. 568), 267. 
 Bunson v. Brooks (68 Ala. 248), 71. 
 Burdell v. Blain (66 Ga. 170), 229. 
 Burdick v. Hunt (43 Ind. 381), 176. 
 Burdin v. Trenton (Mo., 1893, 22 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 728), 367. 
 Burditt v. Hunt (25 Me. 419), 214. 
 Burford v. McCue (53 Pa. St. 427), 
 
 129. 
 Burg v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. 
 
 (Iowa, 1894, 57 N. W. Rep. 680), 
 
 189, 201. 
 Burge v. State (62 Ga. 170), 23. 
 Burger v. State (83 Ala. 36), 341. 
 Burghart v. Angastain (6 C. & P. 
 
 290), 144. 
 Burgin v. Chenault (9 B. Mon., Ky., 
 
 285), 108. 
 Burgo v. State (26 Neb. 639; 42 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 701), 231. 
 Burhans v. Norwood Park (138 111. 
 
 147; 27 N. E. Rep. 1088), 346. 
 Burke v. Cutler (78 Iowa, 299; 43 
 
 N. W. Rep. 204), 36. 
 Burke v. Miller (7 Cush., Mass., 547- 
 
 550), 341. 
 Burke v. Miltenberger (19 Wall. 519), 
 
 240. 
 Burkhalter v. Coward (16 S. C. 435), 
 
 249. 
 Burkhalter v. State (58 Pa. St. 376), 
 
 379. 
 Burlington v. Calais (1 Vt. 385), 72. 
 Burlington, etc. Co. v. Wallace (28 
 
 Neb. 179; 44 N. W. Rep. 225), 
 
 337. 
 Burnell v. Wild (76 N. Y. 103), 148. 
 Burnett v. Burkhead (21 Ark. 77), 71. 
 Burnett v. State (87 Ga. 622), 9, 89. 
 Burney v. State (87 Ala. 80), 324. 
 Burnham v. Adams (5 Vt. 313), 60. 
 Burnham v. Cleary (34 Wis. 117), 
 
 309.
 
 TABLK OF CASES. 
 
 XXXIX 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Burnham v. Davis (144 Mass. 104). 
 
 247. 
 Burnham v. Ellis (39 Me. 319), 73a. 
 Burnliam v. Gosuell (47 Mo. App. 
 
 037), 128. 
 Burnliam v. Hatfield (5 Blackf., IncL, 
 
 21), 170. 
 Burnham v. Morrissey (14 Gray, 
 
 226), 288. 
 Burnham v Sherwood (14 Atl. Rep. 
 
 714; 50 Conn. 229), 385. 
 Burnham v. Stevens (33 N. H. 247), 
 
 2S4. 
 Burnham v. Sweatt (10 N. H. 418), 
 
 00. 
 Burns v. Barenfeld (84 Ind. 43), 192. 
 Burns v. Fay (14 Peck. 8), 60. 
 Burns v. Hendrix (54 Ala. 78), 232. 
 Burns v. Scott (117 U. S. 582), 205. 
 Burns v. Thompson (91 Ind. 140), 
 
 207. 
 Burns v. Welch (8 Yerg., Tenn., 117), 
 
 198. 
 Burpenning v. Railroad Co. (48 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 444), 242. 
 Burr v. Sim (4 Whart. 150), 233. 
 Burr v. Wilson (22 Minn. 200), 0. 
 Burrows v. Klunk (70 Md. 451), 128. 
 Burr's Trial (pp. 180, 187), 175. 
 Burt v. McKinstry (4 Minn. 140), 
 
 70. 
 Burt v. Wigglesworth (117 Mass. 
 
 302), 253. 
 Burton v. Driggs (20 Wall., U. S., 
 
 136), 37. 
 Burton v. Schenck (40 Minn. 52), 
 
 150a. 
 Burton v. Tuite (80 Mich. 218), 150a. 
 Burwell v. Sneed (104 N. C. 118; 10 
 
 S. E. Rep. 152), 145, 188. 
 Bush v. Barnett (90 Cal. 202), 52. 
 Bush v. Barrow (78 Tex. 5), 154. 
 Bush v. Bush (87 Mo. 480), 51. 
 Bush v. Com. (80 Ky. 248, 250; 17 
 
 S. W. Rep. 330), 89, 310. 
 Bush v. Jones (94 Md. 223), 154. 
 Bush v. Smith (1 C. M. & R. 94), 339. 
 Bush v. Stowell (71 Pa. St. 208), 09. 
 
 Bushel v. Barrett (Ry. & M. 434), 
 
 320. 
 Bushnellv. Glessner (40 Minn. 531), 
 
 250. 
 Buswell v. Luicks (8 Daly, N. Y., 
 
 518), 51. 
 Buswell v. Pioneer (37 N. Y. 312), 
 
 211. 
 Buswell v. Trimmer (144 Mass. 350), 
 
 10. 
 Butcher v. Brownsville (2 Kan. 70), 
 
 242. 
 Bute v. Potts (18 Pac. Rep. 329; 76 
 
 Cal. 304), 193. 
 Butler v. Benson (1 Barb. 520), 337. 
 Butler v. Catling (1 Root, Conn., 
 
 310), 305. 
 Butler v. Chicago, etc. Co. (Iowa, 
 
 1893, 54 N. W. Rep. 208), 12, 186. 
 Butler v. Collins (12 Cal. 457), 9. 
 Butler v. Cornell (111., 1893, 35 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 707), 188. 
 Butler v. Insurance Co. (45 Iowa, 93), 
 
 197. 
 Butler v. Man. Ry. Co. (24 N. Y. S. 
 
 142), 52. 
 Butler v. Moore (cited in McNally, 
 
 Evid., 253, 254), 177. 
 Butler v. Mountgarret (7 H. L. Cas. 
 
 633), 52. 
 Butler v. Price (115 Mass. 578), 71. 
 Butler v. State (Ga., 1893, 16 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 894), 334. 
 Butler v. Wentworth (84 Me. 25), 
 
 320. 
 Butrick v. Allen (8 Mass. 273), 149. 
 Butrick v. Tilton (155 Mass. 461 ; 29 
 
 N. E. Rep. 1088). 53. 
 Butterfield v. Gilchrist (03 Mich. 
 
 155), 340, 374. 
 Button v. Am. Tract Soc. (23 Vt. 
 
 338), 222. 
 Butz v. Schwartz (32 111. App. 156), 
 
 308. 
 Buxton v. Edwards (134 Mass. 367), 
 
 69. 
 Buzard v. McNulty (77 Tex. 438 ; 14 
 
 S. W. Rep. 38a), 76.
 
 xl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Buzzell v. Willard(44 Vt. 44), 212. 
 Byers v. Van Deusen (5 Wend. 268), 
 
 232. 
 Byrnes v. Pac. Exp. Co. (Tex., 1891, 
 
 15 S. W. Rep. 46), 337, 339. 
 
 c. 
 
 Cable v. Cable (146 Pa. St. 451), 134. 
 Cable v. Com. (Ky., 1893, 20 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 220), 93, 97. 
 Cadwallader v. Zeb (14 S. Ct. 288, 
 
 U. S., 1894), 8. 
 Cady v. Shepard (11 Pick. 400), 69. 
 Cady v. Walker (62 Mich. 157), 171, 
 
 314. 
 Caffer v. Scheming (Ala., 1893, 13 S. 
 
 Rep. 123), 142. 
 Caffey v. State (94 Ala. 76), 6. 
 Cahill v. Colgan (Cal., 1893, 31 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 614), 18. 
 Cahill v. Murphy (30 Pac. Rep. 195 ; 
 
 94 Cal. 129), 369. 
 Cahn, In re (3 Redf. Sur. 31), 222. 
 Cahn v. Monroe (29 Fed. Rep. 675), 
 
 276. 
 Cain v. Cain (140 Pa. St. 144), 79. 
 Cain v. Cody (Cal, 1892, 29 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 778), 24. 
 Cain v. Heard (1 Coldw., Tenn., 163), 
 
 268. 
 Cairns v. Mooney (62 Vt. 172), 309. 
 Cake v. Bank (116 Pa. St. 264), 208, 
 
 212. 
 Calderon v. 0'Donahue(47 Fed. Rep. 
 
 39), 56. 
 Caldwell v. Bowen (80 Mich. 382), 
 
 339. 
 Caldwell v. Center (30 Cal. 543), 210. 
 Caldwell v. Davis (10 Colo. 481; 15 
 
 Pac. Rep. 696), 157, 172. 
 Caldwell v. Depew (40 Minn. 528), 
 
 223. 
 Caldwell v. Fulton (31 Pa. St. 849), 
 
 217. 
 Caldwell v. Garner (31 Mo. 131), 73a. 
 Caldwell v. Murphy (11 N. Y. 416), 
 
 152. 
 
 Caldwell v. Richmond, etc. Co. (89 
 
 Ga. 550), 241. 
 Calhoun v. Richardson (30 Conn. 
 
 210), 211. 
 .Callahan v. N. Y., Lake Erie & W. 
 
 R. R. (102 N. Y. 194), 186. 
 Callahan v. State (41 Tex. 439), 23. 
 Callan v. Lukens (89 Pa. St. 136), 24. 
 Callan v. McDaniel (72 Ala. 96), 76. 
 Callender v. Olcott (4 Mich. 344), 
 
 150a. 
 Calvert v. Flower (7 C. & P. 386), 
 
 126. 
 Cambreling v. Purton (56 Hun, 610; 
 
 125 N. Y. 610), 233. 
 Cameron v. Fay (55 Tex. 38), 86. 
 Cameron v. Lightfoot (2 W. Bl. 1193). 
 
 281. 
 Camoys Peerage Case (6 CI. & Fin. 
 
 789), 53. 
 Campau v. Dubois (39 Mich. 274), 75. 
 Campau v. North (39 Mich. 606), 178. 
 Campbell v. Campbell (54 N. Y. 
 
 Super. Ct. Rep. 381), 300. 
 Campbell v. Campbell (30 N. J. Eq. 
 
 415), 268. 
 Campbell v. Chase (12 R. I. 333), 168. 
 Campbell v. Com. (84 Pa. St. 187), 
 
 323. 
 Campbell v. Dalhousie (L. R. 1 H. L. 
 
 App. 462), 364. 
 Campbell v. Dearborn (109 Mass. 
 
 130), 223. 
 Campbell v. Johnson (44 Mo. 247), 
 
 207. 
 Campbell v. Juimies (3 Misc. R. 316), 
 
 11. 
 Campbell v. McArthur (2 Hawks, N. 
 
 C, 33), 128. 
 Campbell v. Morgan (68 Hun, 490), 
 
 210. 
 Campbell v. Russell (139 Mass. 278), 
 
 198. 
 Campbell v. State (30 Tex. App. 369), 
 
 334. 
 Campbell v. State (8 Tex. App. 84), 
 
 50. 
 Campbell v. State (38 Ark. 498), 10.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 xli 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Campbell v. State (Tex., 1893, 18 S. 
 
 \V. Rep. 409), 11. 
 Campbell v. State (23 Ala. 41), 186. 
 Campbell v. State (55 Ala. 80), 80. 
 Campbell v. Upshur (3 Humph., 
 
 Tenn., 185), 205. 
 Campbell v. West (44 Cal. 64G), 229. 
 Campbell v. West (86 Cal. 197), 239, 
 
 240. 
 Campbell v. Weston (3 Paige, 124), 
 
 314. 
 Campbell v. Wood (116 Mo. 196; 22 
 
 S. W. Rep. 796), 220. 
 Campbell v. Woodstock Iron Co. (83 
 
 Ala. 351), 102. 
 Campbell Banking Co. v. Cole (Iowa, 
 
 1893, 56 N. W. Rep. 441), 308. 
 Canaday v. Johnson (40 Iowa, 587), 
 
 308. 
 Candelaria v. Railroad Co. (N. M., 
 
 1892, 27 Pac. Rep. 497), 11. 
 Canfield v. Asheville, etc. Co. (Ill N. 
 
 C. 597), 385. 
 Cannon v. People (141 111. 270 ; 30 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 1077), 333, 334. 
 Canto, Ex parte (21 Tex. App. 61), 
 
 32. 
 Cantrell v. State (27 Ind. 505), 357. 
 Cape Girardeau v. Burrough (112 
 
 Mo. 559), 234. 
 Capehart v. Mills (Ala., 1893, 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 44), 129. 
 Capling v. Herman (17 Mich. 524), 
 
 149. 
 Caralier v. Insurance Co. (63 Hun, 
 
 82), 226. 
 Carberry v. Warrell (68 Miss. 573), 
 
 282. 
 Card v. Foot (57 Conn. 431), 322, 
 
 337. 
 Card v. State (109 Ind. 420), 9, 69. 
 Carden v. State (84 Ala. 417; 4 S. 
 
 Rep. 823), 80. 
 Carey v. Carey (104 N. C. 171), 309. 
 Carey v. Carey (108 N. C. 267), 171. 
 Cargain v. Everett (62 Hun, 620), 24. 
 Cargill v. Com. (Ky., 1893, 20 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 782), 343. 
 
 Carico v. Com. (7 Busb, Ky., 124), 
 
 102. 
 Carleton v. Carleton (85 N. Y. 818), 
 
 358. 
 Carley v. Railroad Co. (48 Hun, 619), 
 
 366. 
 Carlile v. Burley (3 Greenl. 250), 309. 
 Carlisle v. Carlisle (78 Ala. 542), 135, 
 
 136. 
 Carlisle v. Cooper (19 N. J. Eq. 256), 
 
 229. 
 Carllo v. State (Tex., 1893, 22 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 147), 282. 
 Carlton v. Baldwin (27 Tex. 572), 70. 
 Carlton v. Com. (Ky., 1892, 18 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 535), 330. 
 Carlyle v. Carlyle Power Co. (36 111. 
 
 App. 28), 151. 
 Carmell v. Phenix Ins. Co. (59 Me. 
 
 582), 200. 
 Carnegie v. Morrison (2 Met., Mass., 
 
 404), 143. 
 Carnright v. Gray (11 N. Y. S. 278: 
 
 27 N. E. Rep. 835). 230. 
 Carpenter v. Bailey (29 Pac. Rep. 
 
 101 ; 94 Cal. 406), 188, 197. 
 Carpenter v. Bank (119 111. 352), 254. 
 Carpenter v. Dexter (8 Wall., U. S., 
 
 513), 135, 136, 242. 
 Carpenter v. Eastern Trans. Co. (71 
 
 N. Y. 374 ; 67 Barb. 570), 198. 
 Carpenter v. Hatch (64 N. H. 573; 15 
 
 Atl. Rep. 219), 197. 
 Carpenter v. Huffsteller (87 N. C. 
 
 273), 24. 
 Carpenter v. Jamison (75 Mo. 285), 
 
 211. 
 Carpenter v. Knapp (66 Mun, 632), 
 
 373, 381. 
 Carpenter v. Strange (141 U. S. 87), 
 
 159. 
 Carpenter v. Tucker (98 N. C. 316), 
 
 124. 
 Carpenter v. Willey (65 Vt. 169; 26 
 
 Atl. Rep. 488), 13, 226, 366. 
 Carr v. Gravitt (54 Mich. 540), 267. 
 Can- v. State (10 S. E. Rep. 626; 84 
 
 Ga. 250), 89.
 
 xlii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Carr v. State (Ind., 1893, 34 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 593), 10. 
 Carrier v. Hampton (11 Ired. L., N. 
 
 G, 307), 181, 139a. 
 Carrington v. Potter (37 Fed. Rep. 
 
 767), 144. 
 Carrington v. St. Louis (89 Mo. 208), 
 
 178. 
 Carrington v. Stimson (1 Curtis C. C. 
 
 437), 360. 
 Carroll v. Com. (84 Pa. St. 107), 324. 
 Carroll v. O'Conner (Ind., 1894, 35 
 
 N. E. Rep. 1006), 205. 
 Carroll v. O'Shea (21 N. Y. S. 956), 
 
 366. 
 Carroll v. Railroad Co. (Ill Mass. 1), 
 
 84. 
 Carroll v. State (5 Neb. 31), 306, 323, 
 
 344. 
 Carroll v. State (23 Ala. 28), 188. 
 Carroll v. State (Tex., 1893, 24 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 100), 354. 
 Carroll v. Water Co. (5 Wash. St. 
 
 613), 18. 
 Carroll v. Welch (26 Tex. 147), 199. 
 Carruthers v. Town (Iowa, 1892, 53 
 
 N. W. Rep. 240), 199. 
 Carskadon v. Williams (7 W. Va. 
 
 784), 69. 
 Carson v. Gillitt (2 N. D. 255 ; 50 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 710), 73a. 
 Carson v. Smith (5 Minn. 78), 246. 
 Carson v. State (80 Ga. 170), 330. 
 Carter v. Bennett (4 Fla. 352), 151. 
 Carter v. Burnham (31 Ark. 212), 69, 
 
 73a. 
 Carter v. Carter (37 111. App. 219; 28 
 
 N. E. Rep. 948), 186. 
 Carter v. Chandron (21 Ala. 72), 106. 
 Carter v. Jackson (58 N. H. 156), 140. 
 Carter v. State (Neb., 1893, 54 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 853), 350. 
 Carter v. State (22 Fla. 553), 234. 
 Carter v. Tinicum Co. (77 Pa. St. 
 
 310), 229. 
 Carter v. West (Ky., 1892, 19 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 592), 168, 250. 
 Carthaus v. State (78 Wis. 540), 283. 
 
 Cartier v. Lumber Co. (35 111. App. 
 
 449), 226. 
 Cartlege v. Cutliff (29 Ga. 758), 304. 
 Cartwright v. Cartwright (26 W. R. 
 
 684), 143. 
 Cartwright v. Cartwright (1 Phill. 
 
 100), 231. 
 Cartwright v. Clopton (25 Ga. 85), 
 
 214. 
 Carver, In re (23 N. Y. S. 753), 129. 
 Carver v. Jackson (4 Peters, 85), 151. 
 Carwin v. Morehead (51 Iowa, 99), 30. 
 Cary v. White (59 N. Y. 336), 309. 
 Case v. Blood (71 Iowa, 632), 124. 
 Case v. Case (17 Cal. 598), 234. 
 Case v. Heely (26 Kan. 353), 147. 
 Case v. Mobile (30 Ala. 538), 24. 
 Case v. Perew (46 Hun, 57), 241. 
 Case v. Reeve (14 John. 81), 151. 
 Case v. Seger (4 Wash. St. 492), 262. 
 Casebolt v. Ackerman (46 N. J. L. 
 
 169), 69. 
 Caset v. State (40 Ark. 511), 231. 
 Casey v. O'Shaughnessy (7 Jur. 1140), 
 
 53. 
 Casey v. People (31 Hun, 528), 249. 
 Casey v. Reeves (46 Kan. 571), 239. 
 Casey v. State (20 Neb. 138), 7. 
 Cash v. Auditor (7 Ind. 227), 239. 
 Cashman v. Harrison (90 Cal. 297), 7. 
 Casseh v. Cooke (8 Serg. & R. 368), 
 
 136. 
 Cassells v. Usry (51 Ga. 621), 74. 
 Cassiano v. Straus (23 N. Y. S. 1036), 
 
 370. 
 Cassin v. La Salle County (21 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 122; 1 Tex. Civ. App. 127), 
 
 369. 
 Castell v. Millison (41 111. App. 61), 
 
 126, 375. 
 Castillo v. State (31 Tex. Cr. Rep. 
 
 145; 19 S. W. Rop. 892), 52. 
 Castner v. Richardson (Colo., 1893, 
 
 33 Pac. Rep. 163), 380. 
 Castor v. Davis (Ind., 1890, 20 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 110), 231. 
 Castor v. Fry (33 W. Va. 449; 10 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 799), 66, 208.
 
 TABLE OF CASKS. 
 
 xliii 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Cates v. Kellogg (9 Ind. 50G), 7G. 
 Cates v. Loftus (3 A. K. Marsh. 202), 
 
 129. 
 Cathcart v. Com. (37 Pa. St. 108), 10. 
 Cat heart v. Robinson (5 Pet. 263), 
 
 223. 
 Catlett v. Insurance Co. (1 Paine, 
 
 U. S. C. C. 594), 149. 
 Callin v. Harris (Wash., 1894, 35 
 
 Pac. Rep. 385), 205. 
 Catoe v. Catoe (32 S. C. 595; 10 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 1078), 211, 213. 
 Caton v. Lenox (5 Rand., Va., 31), 
 
 124. 
 Cavanaugh v. Buehler (120 Pa. St. 
 
 441), 343. 
 Cavanaugh v. Jackson (91 Cal. 580), 
 
 262. 
 Cavazos v. Trevino (6 Wall., U. S., 
 
 773), 206. 
 Ca vender v. Guild (4 Cal. 250), 242. 
 Cavendish v. Troy (41 Vt. 99), 188. 
 Caughran v. Gilman (81 Iowa, 442), 
 
 159, 242. 
 Caujolle v. Ferrie (23 N. Y. 91 ; 26 
 
 Barb. 177), 53, 234. 
 Cecil v. Beaver (28 Iowa, 240), 226. 
 Cecil v. Cecil (20 Md. 153), 215. 
 Central Bank v. Baltimore (20 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 283, Md., 1890), 242. 
 Central Bank v. Veasey (14 Ark. 671), 
 
 148. 
 Central Branch U. P. R. Co. v. But- 
 
 man (22 Kan. 446), 76. 
 Central B. Corp. v. Butler (2 Gray, 
 
 Mass., 132), 244. 
 Central R. Co. v. Attaway (1893, 16 
 
 S. E. Rep. 956), 3. 
 Central R. Co. v. 'Curtis (87 Ga. 416), 
 
 282. 
 Central R. Co. v. Hubbard (86 Ga. 
 
 623), 24. 
 Central R. Co. v. Kent (84 Ga. 351), 
 
 50. 
 Central R. Co. v. Stolmer (51 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 518), 76. 
 Central R., etc. Co. v. Ingram (9p 
 
 Ala. 152 ; 10 S. Rep. 516), 11. | 
 D 
 
 Central R. & B. Co. v. Cons. & In v. 
 
 Co. (32 S. C. 319; 33 id. 599), 
 
 249. 
 Central R. & Banking Co. v. Ingram 
 
 (Ala., 1893, 12 S. Rep. 801), 370. 
 Central W. H. Co. v. Sargent (40 III. 
 
 App. 438), 350, 351. 
 Chabbock's Case (1 Mass. 144), 89. 
 Chace v. Chace (130 Mass. 128), 246. 
 Chaddock v. Clifton (22 Wis. 115), 
 
 80. 
 Cbadsey v. Greene (24 Conn. 562), 
 
 77. 
 Chad wick v. Perkins (3 Me. 399), 
 
 246. 
 Chaffee v. Baptist Miss. Con. (10 
 
 Paige, 25), 138. 
 Chaffee v. Jones (19 Pick., Mass., 
 
 260), 287. 
 Chaffee v. Taylor (3 Allen, Mass., 
 
 598), 139. 
 Chalk v. Raine (7 Hare, 393), 142. 
 Chamberlain v. Boone (74 Tex. 659), 
 
 130. 
 Chamberlain v. Brasley (110 Mass. 
 
 88), 142. 
 Chamberlain v. Carlisle (26 N. H. 
 
 540), 160. 
 Chamberlain v. Davis (33 N. H. 12), 
 
 71. 
 Chamberlain v. Pybas (81 Tex. 511), 
 
 135. 
 Chambers v. People (105 111. 4S9), 
 
 381. 
 Chambers v. Ringsiaff (69 Ala. 140), 
 
 221 
 Chambers v. Watson (60 Iowa, 339), 
 
 220. 
 Chamble v. Martin (27 Tex. 139), 129. 
 Chambless v. State (Tex., 1894, 24 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 899), 354. 
 Chandler v. Avery (47 Hun, 9), 324. 
 Chandler v. Barron (45 Me. 534), 
 
 139a. 
 Chandler v. Beal (137 Ind. 596), 276, 
 
 339, 366, 367. 
 Chandler v. Jost (96 Ala. 596; 11 S. 
 
 Rep. 636), 248.
 
 xliv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Chandler v. Knott (53 N. W. Rep. 
 
 88), 11. 
 Chandler v. Thompson (30 Fed. Rep. 
 
 38), 198. 
 Chapel v. Washburn (11 Ind. 393), 
 
 73. 
 Chapin v. Cambria Iron Co. (145 Pa. 
 
 St. 478), 209. 
 Chapin v. Chicago, etc. Co. (79 Iowa, 
 
 582; 44 N. W. Rep. 820), 211. 
 Chapin v. Curtis (23 Conn. 3S8), 151. 
 Chapin v. Dobson (78 N. Y. 74), 209. 
 Chapman v. Chapman (48 Kan. 636 ; 
 
 29 Pac. Rep. 1074), 159. 
 Chapman v. Chapman (2 Conn. 347), 
 
 53. 
 Chapman v. Chicago, etc. Co. (26 
 
 Wis. 295), 80. 
 Chapman v. Davis (3 M. & G. 609), 
 
 284. 
 Chapman v. Ewing (78 Ala. 403), 77, 
 
 314. 
 Chapman v. Kimball (84 Me. 389), 
 
 233. 
 Chapman v. Peebles (84 Ala. 283 ; 4 
 
 S. Rep. 273), 157. 
 Chapman v. Pingry (67 Me. 198), 83. 
 Chapman v. Pollack (70 Cal. 487), 
 
 210. 
 Chapman v. Sutton (68 Wis. 657), 
 
 211. 
 Chapman v. Twitched (37 Me. 59), 77. 
 Chapped v. Missionary Soc. (3 Ind. 
 
 App. 356), 222. 
 Charles v. Marrow (99 Mo. 638), 229. 
 Charles v. Patch (87 Mo. 450), 217. 
 Charles v. State (49 Ala. 332), 50. 
 Charlesworth v. Tinker (18 Wis. 633), 
 
 123. 
 Charlotte v. Chouteau (33 Mo. 194), 
 
 143. 
 Charter Oak L. Ins. Co. v. Rodel (95 
 
 U. S. 232), 197. 
 Chase v. Debolt (7 111. 571), 124. 
 Chase v. Evoy (51 Cal. 618), 308. 
 Chase v. Fish (16 Me. 132), 287. 
 Chase v. Garretson (54 N. J. L. 42), 
 
 3C2. 
 
 Chase v. Hathaway (14 Mass. 222, 
 
 227), 150. 
 Chase v. Jones (84 Me. 107), 380. 
 Chase v. People (40 111. 352), 249. 
 Chase v. Perley (148 Mass. 289), 343. 
 Chase v. State (46 Miss. 683), 10. 
 Chase v. Stockett (Md., 1890, 19 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 761), 246. 
 Chase v. Street (10 Iowa, 593), 357. 
 Chateaugay, etc. Co. v. Blake (144 
 
 U. S. 476), 188, 216, 374. 
 Chatfield v. Simonson (92 N. Y. 209), 
 
 83. 
 Chattanooga Co. v. Clowdis (Ga., 
 
 1893, 17 S. E. Rep. 88), 56. 
 Chattanooga, etc. Co. v. Owen (Ga., 
 
 1893, 15 S. E. Rep. 853), 339, 347. 
 Chattues v. Raitt (20 Ohio, 132), 126. 
 Cheague v. Tuite (44 111. App. 535), 
 
 141. 
 Cheatham v. State (7 S. Rep. 204; 67 
 
 Miss. 335), 229, 324. 
 Cheek v. Herndon (82 Tex. 146), 366. 
 Cheever v. Congdon (34 Mich. 296), 
 
 53. 
 Cheever v. Sweet (151 Mass. 186; 23 
 
 N. E. Rep. 831), 12. 
 Cheever v. Wilson (9 Wall. 108), 242. 
 Cheltenham Co. v. Cook (44 Mo. 29), 
 
 73. 
 Chemsford Co. v. Demarest (7 Gray, 
 
 Mass., 1), 73. 
 Chenango Bank v. Lewis (63 Barb. 
 
 Ill), 58, 144. 
 Chenery v. Dole (39 Me. 164), 262. 
 Cheney v. Dunlap (20 Neb. 265), 141. 
 Cherry v. Baker (17 Md. 75), 244. 
 Cherry v. Buttler (17 S. W. Rep. 
 
 1090), 79. 
 Cherry v. State (6 Fla. 679), 176. 
 Cherry v. State (68 Ala. 29), 53. 
 Chesley v. Chesley (10 N. H. 327), 79. 
 Chester v. Armstrong (66 Md. 113), 
 
 139a. 
 Chester v. Bakersfield (64 Cal. 42), 
 
 368. 
 Chester v. State (23 Tex. App. 577), 
 
 140.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 xlv 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Chester v. Wilhelm (111 N. C. 314), 
 
 347. 
 Cheshire v. Wagon Co. (89 Ga. 249), 
 
 150. 
 Chewacla Works v. Dismukes (87 
 
 Ala. 344), 24. 
 Chicago v. Powers (42 111. 169), 8. 
 Chicago v. Edson (43 111. App. 417), 
 
 3G7. 
 Chicago Attachment Co. v. Davis 
 
 (142 111. 171 ; 28 N. E. Rep. 859), 
 
 265. 
 Chicago & A. B. Co. v. Anglo-Amer- 
 ican Packing Co. (46 Fed. Rep. 
 
 584), 159. 
 Chicago E. & B. P. Co. v. Johnson 
 
 (44 111. App. 224), 377. 
 Chicago, etc. Co. v. Behmey (48 Kan. 
 
 47), 366. 
 Chicago, etc. Co. v. Bivans (142 111. 
 
 401 ; 32 N. E. Rep. 456), 369. 
 Chicago, etc. Co. v. Brown (44 Kan. 
 
 384), 130. 
 Chicago, etc. Co. v. Bryan (90 111. 
 
 126), 252. 
 Chicago, etc. Co. v. Champion (33 
 
 N. W. Rep. 874), 237. 
 Chicago, etc. Co. v. Debanm (2 Ind. 
 
 App. 281), 366. 
 Chicago, etc. Co. v. Duffin (126 111. 
 
 100; 18 N. E. Rep. 279), 282. 
 Chicago, etc. Co. v. Emery (Kan., 
 
 1893, 32 Pac. Rep. 631), 8. 
 Chicago, etc. Co. v. Fisher (111., 1892. 
 
 31 N. E. Rep. 406), 385. 
 Chicago, etc. Co. v. George (19 111. 
 
 510). 186. 
 Chicago, etc. Co. v. Hazels (26 Neb. 
 
 364; 42 N. W. Rep. 93), 342. 
 Chicago, etc. Co. v. Keegan (31 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 550), 134. 
 Chicago, etc. Co. v. Leah, 41 111. 
 
 App. 584, 592), 344. 
 Chicago, etc. Co. v. Lewis (111., 1893, 
 
 32 N. E. Rep. 230), 227. 
 Chicago, etc. Co. v. Rolvink (31 111. 
 
 App. 596), 19. 
 Chicago, etc. Co. v. Shenk (131 III. 
 283 ; 23 N. E. Rep. 436, 332. 
 
 Chicago, etc. Co. v. Smith (Ind., 1893, 
 
 33 N. E. Rep. 241). 18. 
 Chicago, etc. Co. v. Spelker (Ind., 
 
 1893, 33 N. E. Rep. 280), 8, 52. 
 Chicago, etc. Co. v. Tuite (44 111. 
 
 App. 535), 143. 
 Chicago, etc. Co. v. Wedel (144 111. 
 
 9; 33 N. E. Rep. 547), 373. 
 Chicago, etc. Co. v. Woodward (47 
 
 Kan. 191), 336. 
 Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. Fisher (141 
 
 111. 614; 31 N. E. Rep. 406), 11. 
 Chicago, etc. Road v. Fietsam (19111. 
 
 App. 55), 31. 
 Chicago, K. & N. R. Co. v. Stewart 
 
 (47 Kan. 704), 340. 
 Chicago, K. & W. R. Co. v. Stewart 
 
 (31 Pac. Rep. 668; 50 Kan. 33), 
 
 199. 
 Chicago'R. R. Co. v. Dillon (123 111. 
 
 570), 366. 
 Chicago R. R. Co. v. Fox (41 111. App. 
 
 106), 70. 
 Chicago R. R. Co. v. Lambert (119 111. 
 
 255), 192. 
 Chicago R. R. Co. v. Mouriquand (45 
 
 1 Kan. 170), 199. 
 Child v. Ellsworth (2 D., M. & G. 683), 
 
 150. 
 Child v. Kingsbury (46 Vt. 47), 115. 
 Childress v. Cutler (16 Mo. 24), 144. 
 Childrey v. Huntington (34 W. Va. 
 
 457), 31. 
 Childs v. Dobbins (61 Iowa, 109), 208. 
 Childs v. State (Tex., 1893, 22 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 1039), 283, 346. 
 Chiniquy v. Catholic Bishop (41 111. 
 
 148), 135. 
 Chipman v. Kellogg (60 Mich. 438), 
 
 60. 
 Chirac v. Reinecker (11 Wheat. 280, 
 
 295), 157, 168. 
 Chism v. State (Miss., 1893, 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 852), 347. 
 Chittendon v. Com. (Ky., 1888, 9 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 386), 102. 
 Choate v. Huff (Tex., 1892, 18 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 87), 363. 
 Chouteau v. Allen (70 Mo. 290), 136.
 
 xlvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Chouteau v. Soulard (9 Mo. 581), 242. 
 Christensen v. Union Trunk Line 
 
 (Wash., 1893, 32 Pac. Rep. 
 
 1018), 8. 
 Christian v. Williams (35 Mo. App. 
 
 297), 285. 
 Christian Co. Bank v. Good (44 Mo. 
 
 App. 129), 128. 
 Christian v. Phillips (58 Hun, 282), 
 
 31. 
 Christmas v. Whingates (32 L. J. 
 
 Prob. 73), 129. 
 Christy v. Spring (97 Cal. 21 ; 31 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 110), 153. 
 Chubb v. Salomons (3 C. & K. 75), 
 
 175. 
 Chumasero v. Gilbert (24 111. 293), 
 
 242. 
 Church v. Chicago, etc. Co. (Mo., 
 
 1893, 23 S. W. Rep. 1056), 351. 
 Church v. Crossman (49 Iowa, 444), 
 
 232. 
 Church v. Howard (79 N. Y. 415), 67. 
 Church v. Hubbard (2 Cranch, 187, 
 
 238), 143, 243. 
 Church v. Milwaukee (31 Wis. 519), 
 
 82. 
 Church v. Mott (7 Paige, N. Y., 77), 
 
 218. 
 
 . Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (158 
 475; 33 N. E. Rep. 572), 
 
 Ruland (64 Pa. St. 432), 
 
 323. 
 54; 
 
 Church v 
 
 Mass. 
 
 198. 
 Church v 
 
 222. 
 Churchill v. Suter (4 Mass. 162), 
 Churchman v. Bowman (95 Cal 
 
 30 Pac. Rep. 770), 82. 
 Churchman v. Kansas City (49 Mo. 
 
 App. 366), 366. 
 Churchman v. Smith (6Whart. 106), 
 
 60. 
 Chute v. State (19 Minn. 271), 344. 
 Cicotte v. Cruciaux (52 Mich. 227), 
 
 237. 
 Cihak v. Klenke (117 111. 643), 8. 
 Ciley v. Van Patten (35 N. W. Rep. 
 
 831; 69 Mich. 400), 36. 
 Cilley v. Huse (40 N. H. 358), 268. 
 
 Cincinnati, etc. Co. v. Jones (21 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 192), 240. 
 Cincinnati, etc. Co. v. Roesch (126 
 
 Ind. 445), 366. 
 Cincinnati, etc. Co. v. Smith (22 
 
 Ohio St. 227), 198. 
 Ciocci v. Ciocci (29 L. T. Pr. & M. 
 
 20), 9. 
 Cist v. Ziegler (16 S. & R. 282), 160. 
 Citizens' Gaslight Co. v. Granger (19 
 
 111. App. 201), 67a. 
 Citizens* G. L. Co. v. O'Brien (118 
 
 111. 174), 208. 
 City v. Devine (1 W. N. C, Pa., 358), 
 
 356. 
 City v. Drexel (141 111. 89; 30 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 774), 371. 
 City v. Dunn (1 McCord, S. C.,333), 
 
 143a. 
 City v. Edson (43 111. App. 417), 376. 
 City v. Shawhan (9 Am. & Eng. 
 
 Corp. Cas. 556), 131. 
 City Council v. King (4 McCord, 487), 
 
 288. 
 City of Sandwich v. Dolan (31 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 416; 42 111. App. 53), 350. 
 City of St. Louis v. Missouri Pac. 
 
 R. Co. (114 Mo. 13; 21 S. W. Rep. 
 
 202), 370. 
 Claflin v. Baer (28 Hun, N. Y., 204). 
 
 252. 
 Clafy v. Farrow (18 N. Y. S. 160), 
 
 247. 
 Clancy v. Cranie (2 Dev. Eq., N. C, 
 
 363), 267. 
 Clanton v. Scruggs (Ala., 1892, 10 S. 
 
 Rep. 757), 262. 
 Clapp v. Bullard (23 111. App. 609*. 
 
 350, 351. 
 Clapp v. Collins (7 N. Y. S. 98), 128. 
 Clapp v. Engledow (82 Tex. 290), 71. 
 Clapp v. Hartford (35 Conn. GO), 212. 
 Clapp v. Herrick (129 Mass. 202', 151. 
 Clapp v. Wilson (5 Denio, N. Y., 
 
 285), 354. 
 Clapsaddle, In re (24 N. Y. S. 313), 
 
 CO, 61. 
 Clark v. Anderson (14 Daly, 464), 73a.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 xlvii 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Clark v. Bradstreet (80 Me. 456), 345. 
 Clark v. Bruce (12 Hun, 271), 141, 
 
 195, 197. 
 Clark v. Carrington (7 Cranch, 308), 
 
 73. 
 Clark v. Coffin Co. (125 Ind. 277), 217, 
 
 220. 
 Clark v. Com. (123 Pa. St. 555), 5. 
 Clark v. Culidge (8 Kan. 189), 84. 
 Clark v. Donnavant (10 Leigh, Va., 
 
 22), 138. 
 Clark v. Eckstein (22 Pa. St. 507), 
 
 129. 
 Clark v. Fairly (30 Mo. App. 335), 
 
 142. 
 Clark v. Fletcher (1 Allen, 53), 126. 
 Clark v. Freeman (25 Pa. St. 133), 
 
 139, 139a. 
 Clark v. Grant (2 Wend., N. Y., 129), 
 
 275. 
 Clark v. Hart (49 Ala. 86), 205. 
 Clark v. Hoffaker (26 Mo. 264), 68. 
 Clark v. Lancaster (36 Md. 196), 221. 
 Clark v. McNeal (114 N. Y. 289; 21 
 
 N. E. Rep. 405), 309. 
 Clark v. Miller (4 Wend. 628), 226. 
 Clark v. Owens (18 N. Y. 434), 53, 
 
 107. 
 Clark v. Rhoades (2 Heisk., Tenn., 
 
 206), 140. 
 Clark v. Ryan (Ala., 1893, 11 S. Rep. 
 
 22), 366. 
 Clark v. Sherman (5 Wash. St. 681), 
 
 20. 
 Clark v. Stansbury (49 Md. 346), 222. 
 Clark v. State (12 Ohio St. 483), 197. 
 Clark v. State (16 S. E. Rep. 96 ; 90 
 
 Ga. 448), 23. 
 Clark v. State (87 Ala. 71), 346. 
 Clark v. Thompson (47 111. 25), 232. 
 Clark v. Trinity Church (5 Watts & 
 
 S. 266), 144. 
 Clark v. Vance (15 Wend. 193), 121. 
 Clark v. Waite (12 Mass. 439), 73. 
 Clark v. Woodruff (83 N. Y. 218), 
 
 221. 
 Clark v. Zeigler (85 Ala. 154; 4 S. 
 
 Rep. 669), 353. 
 
 Clark's Ex'rs v. Cochran (3 Mart., 
 
 La., 353, 360), 133. 
 Clark's Ex'rs v. Riemsdyk (9 Cranch, 
 
 153), 76. 
 Clarke v. Bank (10 Ark. 516), 242. 
 Clarke v. Canfield (2 McCart., N. J., 
 
 119), 233. 
 Clarke v. MeAuliffe (81 Wis. 244; 51 
 
 N. W. Rep. 83), 262. 
 Clarke v. Rice (15 R. I. 132; 23 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 301), 14S. 
 Clarke v. Van Court (51 Neb. 756), 8. 
 Clarke, Ex parte (2 Dea. & Ch. 99), 
 
 287. 
 Clarkson v. Woodhouse (5 T. R. 412), 
 
 116. 
 Clary v. Clary (2 Ired., N. C, 78), 
 
 197. 
 Clavey v. Lord (87 Cal. 413), 376. 
 Clay v. Alderson (10 N. Y. 49), 140. 
 Clay v. Robinson (7 W. Va. 350), 249. 
 Clay v. State (Tex., 1893, 22 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 973), 282. 
 Clay v. Williams (2 Munf. 105, 122), 
 
 173. 
 Clayton v. Nugent (13 M. & W. 206), 
 
 218. 
 Clayton v. State (24 Atk. 16), 150a. 
 Clayton v. State (31 Tex. Crim. App. 
 
 489; 22 S. W. Rep. 404), 89, 95, 
 
 350. 
 Cleaves v. Foss (4 Greenl., Me., 1), 
 
 268. 
 Cleaves v. Lord (3 Gray, Mass., 66, 
 
 71), 21. 
 Clem v. State (33 Ind. 418), 352. 
 Clemens v. Bullen (Mass., 1893, 34 
 
 N. E. Rep. 173), 35. 
 Clemens v. Meyer (44 La. Ann. 390; 
 
 10 S. Rep. 797), 141. 
 Clements v. Hunt (1 Jones, N. C, 
 
 400), 53. 
 Clements v. McGinn (Cal., 1893, 33 
 
 Pac. Rep. 920), 317. 
 Clements v. State (21 Tex. App. 258), 
 
 23. 
 Clendenning v. Clymer (17 Ind. 155), 
 
 215.
 
 xlviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Cleveland v. Newson (45 Mich. 62), 
 
 233. 
 Cleveland, C, C. & I. Ry. Co. v. Clos- 
 
 ser (126 Ind. 348), 73a. 
 Cleveland, C, C. & I. R. R. v. 
 
 Newell (104 Ind. 269), 52. 
 Cleveland, etc. Co. v. Aherns (42 111. 
 
 App. 434), 367. 
 Cleveland, etc. Co. v. Perkins (17 
 
 Mich. 296), 30. 
 Cleveland, etc. Co. v. Wynant(Ind., 
 
 1893, 34 N. E. Rep. 569), 366, 367. 
 Clever v. Hilberry (116 Pa. St. 431), 
 
 56. 
 Cleverly v. Cleverly (124 Mass. 314), 
 
 220. 
 Click v. Hamilton (7 Rich., S. C, 65), 
 
 73a. 
 Clifford v. Mayer (Ind., 1893, 33 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 127), 23. 
 Clift v. Moses (112 N. Y. 426; 21 
 
 N. Y. State Rep. 777), 309. 
 Clifton v. Granger (Iowa, 1893, 53 
 
 N. W. Rep. 316), 10. 
 Clingman v. Irvine (40 111. App. 606), 
 
 333. 
 Clink v. Gunn (90 Mich. 135; 51 
 
 N. W. Rep. 193), 349. 
 Clinton v. Estes (20 Ark. 216), 208. 
 Clinton v. Howard (42 Conn. 294), 
 
 188. 
 Close v. Olney (1 Denio, 319), 354. 
 Close v. Samm (27 Iowa, 507), 344. 
 Close v. Stuyvesant (132 111. 607; 24 
 
 N. E. Rep. 868), 144. 
 Cloud v. Calhoun (10 Rich., S. C. 
 
 Eq., 358), 304. 
 ! Clouston v. Gray (48 Kan. 31), 282. 
 Cluff v. Mut. Ben. Ins. Co. (13 Allen, 
 
 Mass., 308), 230. 
 Cluggage v. Swan (4 Binn. 150), 58. 
 Cluverius v. Com. (81 Va. 787), 102. 
 Coal R. C. Co. v. Jones (127 111. 379 ; 
 
 20 N. E. Rep. 89), 234. 
 Coals v. Sulan (46 Kan. 341), 222. 
 Cobb v. Covenant Mut. Ben. Assoc. 
 
 (153 Mass. 176; 26 N. E. Rep. 
 
 230), 11. 
 
 Cobb v. Dortch (52 Ga. 584), 77, 314. 
 Cobb v. Johnson (2 Sneed, Tenn,, 
 
 73), 73a. 
 Cobb v. Malone (86 Ala. 571 ; 8 S. Rep. 
 
 693), 37. 
 Cobb v. O'Neal (2 Sneed, Tenn., 438), 
 
 214. 
 Coble v. State (31 Ohio St. 100), 322. 
 Coburn v. Ellenwood (4 N. H. 99), 
 
 262. 
 Cochran v. Amnion (16 Hi. 316), 306. 
 Cochran v. Bartell (91 Mo. 655: 3 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 854), 315. 
 Cochran v. Jones (85 Ga. 678; 11 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 811), 11. 
 Cochran v. Ward (Ind., 1892, 29 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 795), 141. 
 Cockerill v. Stafford (102 Mo. 57), 
 
 152. 
 Cockrill v. Hall (76 Cal. 192; 18 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 318), 313, 354. 
 Codman v. Verm. etc. Co. (17 
 
 Blatchf., U. S., 3), 376. 
 Codmon v. Caldwell (31 Me. 560), 60. 
 Coe v. Turner (57 Conn. 937), 71. 
 Cofa v. Schening (Ala., 1893, 13 S. 
 
 Rep. 123), 147. 
 Coghlan v. Railroad (12 S. Ct. 150 ; 
 
 142 U. S. 101), 242. 
 Coffee v. State (25 Fla. 501 ; 6 S. Rep. 
 
 493), 90. 
 Coffey v. Procter Coal Co. (Ky., 1892, 
 
 20 S. W. Rep. 286), 377. 
 Coffin v. Hydraulic Co. (136 N. Y. 
 
 655; 32 N. E. Rep. 1076), 250. 
 Coffin v. Jones (13 Pick. 441), 168. 
 Cogshall v. Roller Miller Co. (48 Kan. 
 
 480), 186. 
 Cogswell v. West St. & N. E. Elev. 
 
 Ry. Co. (3 Pac. Rep. 411), 374. 
 Cohen v. Cont. L. Ins. Co. (69 N. Y. 
 
 308], 178. 
 Cohen v. State (11 Tex. App. 622), 
 
 324. 
 Cohen v. State (50 Ala. 108), 6. 
 Cohen v. Teller (93 Pa. St. 123), 133. 
 Coit v. Starkweather (8 Conn. 289), 
 
 128.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 xlix 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Coit v. Tracy (8 Conn. 268), G8. 
 Colburn v. Groton (N. H., 1894, 28 
 
 Atl. Rep. 95), 75. 
 Colclough v. Nilaud (68 Wis. 309; 
 
 32 N. W. Rep. 119), 336. 
 Colclough v. Smith (15 Ir. Ch. 347), 
 
 53. 
 Cole v. Blunt (2 Bosw., N. Y., 116), 
 
 314. 
 Cole v. Clark (3 Wis. 323), 198. 
 Cole v. Cole (41 Md. 301), 262. 
 Cole v. Cole (33 Me. 542), 76. 
 Cole v. Jessup (10 N. Y. 96 ; 9 Barb. 
 
 395), 337. 
 Cole v. Lake (54 N. H. 278), 217. 
 Cole v. Luke Shore, etc. Co. (Mich., 
 
 1893, 54 N. W. Rep. 638), 193, 
 
 351. 
 Cole v. National Sch. Furn. Co. (45 
 
 111. App. 273), 380. 
 Coleman v. Com. (25 Gratt., Va., 
 
 865), 142, 317. 
 Coleman v. Ross (46 Pa. St. 180), 304. 
 Coleman v. State (111 Ind. 563; 13 
 
 N. E. Rep. 100), 168. 
 Coleman v. State (63 N. Y. 93), 240. 
 Coleman v. State (21 Tex. App. 520; 
 
 2 S. W. Rep. 859), 23. 
 Coleman v. State (44 Tex. 109), 324. 
 Coleman v. White (43 Ind. 429), 113. 
 Coleman, In re (11 N. Y. 220), 52. 
 Coler v. County (N. M., 1892, 27 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 619), 225. 
 Coles v. Brown (10 Paige, 526), 223. 
 Coles v. State (75 Ind. 511), 197. 
 Coles v.Yorks (36 Minn. 388), 115. 
 Colgan v. Philips (7 Rich., S. C, 359), 
 
 71. 
 Collar v. Collar (86 Mich. 507 ; 49 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 551), 246. 
 Collar v. Potter (88 Mich. 549), 340. 
 Collender v. Dinsmore (55 N. Y. 202), 
 
 218. 
 Collett v. Keith (4 Esp. 212), 75. 
 Collett v. Smith (143 Mass. 473), 67, 
 
 68. 
 Collier v. Mokes (2 C. & K. 1012), 75. 
 Collier v. Society (8 B. Mon. 68), 242. 
 
 Collier v. State (20 Ark. 36), 343. 
 Collier v. White (Ala., 1893, 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 385), 83. 
 Collins v. Ball (82 Tex. 259), 13, 140. 
 Collins v. Burlington, etc. Co. (83 
 
 Iowa, 346 ; 49 N. W. Rep. 848), 
 
 11. 
 Collins v. Collins (51 Miss. 511), 128. 
 Collins v. Com. (12 Bush, 271), 121. 
 Collins v. Driscoll (34 Conn. 43), 220. 
 Collins v. Elliot (1 Harr. & J. 2), 138. 
 Collins v. Gilbert (94 U. S. 753), 230. 
 Collins v. Glass (46 Mo. App. 278), 8, 
 
 374. 
 Collius v. Mack (31 Ark. 684), 167. 
 Collins v. People (98 111. 584), 324. 
 Collins v. Richart (14 Bush, Ky., 
 
 621), 361. 
 Collins v. State (24 Tex. App. 141), 
 
 89. 
 Collins v. Valleau (79 Iowa, 626; 43 
 
 N. W. Rep. 284 ; 44 id. 904), 142. 
 Collins v. Waters (54 111. 485), 52. 
 Collison v. Curling (9 CI. & Fin. 88), 
 
 221. 
 Colloway v. Cassart (45 Ark. 41), 238. 
 Colnen v. Orr (71 Cal. 43), 142. 
 Colorado Coal & Iron Co. v. United 
 
 States (123 U. S. 317), 250. 
 Colorado Mid. Ry. v. O'Brien (16 
 
 Colo. 219), 198. 
 Colquitt v. Thomas (8 Ga. 268), 73a. 
 Colson v. Bouzey (6 Greenl., Me., 
 
 474), 144. 
 Colt v. Eves (12 Conn. 243), 69. 
 Colt v. McConnell (116 Ind. 256; 19 
 
 N. E. Rep. 106), 171. 
 Coltrane v. Lamb (109 N. C. 209 ; 13 
 
 S. E. Rep. 784), 135. 
 Columbus v. Billingmeier (7 Ohio 
 
 Cir. Ct. Rep. 136), 344. 
 Columbus, etc. Co. v. Semmes (27 
 
 Ga. 283), 7. 
 Columbus, etc. v. Tillman (79 Ga. 
 
 607; 5 S. E. Rep. 135), 130. 
 Colvin v. Peabody (155 Mass. 104; 
 
 29 N. E. Rep. 59), 11. 
 Colwell v. Brower (75 111. 516), 254.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Combs v. Winchester (39 N. H. 1), 
 
 341. 
 Comfort v. Kittle (81 Iowa, 179), 
 
 230. 
 Com. Bank v. Bank (4 Hill, N. Y., 
 
 516), 142. 
 Com. Life Ins. Co. v. Union Trust 
 
 Co. (112 U. S. 254), 178. 
 Commissioners v. Glass (17 Ohio, 
 
 342), 136. 
 Commissioners v. Trustees (107 111. 
 
 489), 253. 
 Com. v. Abbott (13 Mete. 123, 124), 
 
 11. 
 Com. v. Ackert (133 Mass. 402), 90. 
 Com. v. Andrews (143 Mass. 23), 
 
 139a. 
 Com. v. Baker (29 N. E. Rep. 512; 
 
 155 Mass. 287), 323. 
 Com. v. Balken (32 Pick. 281), 147. 
 Com. v. Barry (8 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 
 
 216), 346. 
 Com. v. Beckley (3 Mete, Mass., 
 
 330), 23. 
 Com. v. Black (108 Mass. 296), 101. 
 Com. v. Bloss (116 Mass. 56), 241. 
 Com. v. Bosworth (22 Pick. 397, 399), 
 
 324. 
 Com. v. Briant (142 Mass. 463), 225. 
 Com. v. Brigbam (147 Mass. 414), 80. 
 Com. v. Brown (14 Gray, Mass., 419), 
 
 39. 
 Com. v. Brown (121 Mass. 69, 70), 39, 
 
 188, 189. 
 Com. v. Brown (149 Mass. 35), 93. 
 Com. v. Brown (150 Mass. 330), 93, 
 
 95. 
 Com. v. Brown (130 Mass. 279), 323. 
 Com. v. Buccieri (153 Pa. St. 535; 26 
 
 Atl. Rep. 228), 197. 
 Com. v. Bush (2 Duv., Ky., 264), 320. 
 Com. v. Buzzell (16 Pick. 157), 350. 
 Com. v. Byron (14 Gray, 31), 341. 
 Com. v. Call (21 Pick. 515), 79. 
 Com. v. Campbell (155 Mass. 127, 
 
 537; 30 N. E. Rep. 72), 8, 93. 
 Com. v. Caponi (155 Mass. 534; 30 
 N. E. Rep. 82), 23, 166. 
 
 Com. v. Cary (12 Gush., Mass., 246), 
 
 102. 
 Com. v. Casey (11 Cush., Mass., 417), 
 
 103. 
 Com. v. Castles (9 Gray, 121), 138. 
 Com. v. Chaney (148 Mass. 8), 333. 
 Com. v. Chase (147 Mass. 597), 324. 
 Com. v. Clancy (154 Mass. 128; 27 
 
 N. E. Rep. 1001), 337. 
 Com. v. Clark (130 Pa. St. 650; 18 
 
 Atl. Rep. 988), 93. 
 Com. v. Cleary (23 Atl. Rep. 1110; 
 
 30 W. N. C. 1 ; 148 Pa. St. 26), 
 
 346. 
 Com. v. Cleary (152 Mass. 491), 168. 
 Com. v. Coe (115 Mass. 481), 13, 139, 
 
 140. 
 Com. v. Cohen (127 Mass. 282), 127. 
 Com. v. Coy (157 Mass. 200; 32 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 4), 23, 93. 
 Com. v. Crowninshield (10 Pick. 497), 
 
 69. 
 Com. v. Cullen (111 Mass. 435), 90. 
 Com. v. Cunningham (104 Mass. 545), 
 
 186. 
 Com. v. Curran (119 Mass. 206), 250. 
 Com. v. Curtis (97 Mass. 574), 9. 
 Com. v. Dam (107 Mass. 210), 7. 
 Com. v. Damon (136 Mass. 441), 354«. 
 Com. v. Dana (2 Met. 327, 329), 127. 
 Com. v. Dance (8 Cush. 384), 322. 
 Com. v. Daniel (4 Pa. L. J. R. 49), 
 
 286. 
 Com. v. Densmore (12 Mass. 535), 79. 
 Com. v. Desmond (103 Mass. 445), 
 
 239. 
 Com. v. Dill (156 Mass. 226), 35. 
 Com. v. Dill (156 Mass. 266; 30 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 1016), 340. 
 Com. v. Donlican(114 Mass. 257), 188. 
 Com. v. Downing (4 Gray, 29, 30), 
 
 146, 323. 
 Com. v. Drake (15 Mass. 161), 177. 
 Com. v. Drake (124 Mass. 21), 324. 
 Com. v. Dudley (10 Mass. 403), 265. 
 Com. v. Dunlop (89 Va. 431 ; 16 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 273), 240. 
 Com. v. Emmons (98 Mass. 6), 345.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 li 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Com. v. Evans (101 Mass. 25), 156. 
 Com. v. Fairchell (1 Brewst., Pa., 
 
 566), 201. 
 Com. v. Feely (2 Va. Cas. 1), 281. 
 Com. v. Felch (132 Mass. 22), 51, 53. 
 Com. v. Ford (111 Mass. 394), 323. 
 Com. v. Ford (14 Gray, 399), 147. 
 Com. v. Ford (146 Mass. 131; 15 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 153), 322. 
 Com. v. Fox (1S.W. Rep. 396), 349. 
 Com. v. Gerade (145 Pa. St. 289), 
 
 231. 
 Com. v. Goodnow (154 Mass. 487), 
 
 346. 
 Com. v. Gorey (1 Gray, Mass., 463), 
 
 95. 
 Com. v. Gorham (99 Mass. 420), 322. 
 Com. v. Gould (158 Mass. 499; 33 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 656), 23, 354a. 
 Com. v. Griffin (110 Mass. 181), 80, 
 
 168. 
 Com. v. Hackett (2 Allen, Mass., 136), 
 
 57. 
 Com. v. Hall (65 Mass. 137), 176. 
 Com. v. Halley (13 Allen, 587), 337. 
 Com. v. Haney (127 Mass. 455), 101, 
 
 103. 
 Com. v. Hanley (140 Mass. 457), 346. 
 Com. v. Hanson (1 Nott & McC, 
 
 S. C, 554), 128. 
 Com. v. Harmon (4 Barr, Pa., 269), 
 
 4, 89, 90. 
 Com. v. Haskell (140 Mass. 128), 
 
 384. 
 Com. v. Hawkins (3 Gray, 463), 234. 
 Com. v. Hayes (145 Mass. 289; 14 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 151), 168. 
 Com. v. Heffron (102 Mass. 161), 108. 
 Com. v. Hersey (84 Mass. 173), 330. 
 Com. v. Hill (14 Mass. 207), 316. 
 Com. v. Hill (65 Mass. 137), 176. 
 Com. v. Hills (10 Cush. 532), 316. 
 Com. v. Holmes (127 Mass. 424), 324. 
 Com. v. Holt (146 Mass. 38), 195. 
 Com. v. Horten (9 Pick. 206), 156. 
 Com. v. Hoarigan (89 Ky. 305; 12 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 550), 340. 
 Com. v. Howe (9 Gray, 110), 91. 
 
 Com. v. Howe (2 Allen, Mass., 153).. 
 
 95. 
 Com. v. Hudson (97 Mass. 565), 9. 
 Com. v. Ingraham (7 Gray, 46), 352. 
 Com. v. Jeffries (89 Mass. 548), 230. 
 Com. v. Jones (155 Mass. 170; 29 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 467), 349. 
 Com. v. Kane (108 Mass. 423), 36. 
 Com. v. Keefe (140 Mass. 301 ; 4 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 576), 23. 
 Com. v. Kendall (113 Mass. 210), 10. 
 Com. v. Kenney (12 Mete. 235), 79. 
 Com. v. King (150 Mass. 233; 22 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 905), 145, 239. 
 Com. v. Knapp (10 Pick., Mass., 
 
 477), 323. 
 Cora. v. Knapp (9 Pick. 496), 91, 344. 
 Com. v. Kneeland (20 Pick. 239), 237. 
 Com. v. Lamon (29 N. E. Rep. 467 ; 
 
 155 Mass. 168), 346. 
 Com. v. Laughlin (11 Cush. 598), 23. 
 Com. v. Leonard (140 Mass. 470, 479; 
 
 4 N. E. Rep. 96), 10. 
 Com. v. Lesher (17 S. & R., Pa., 
 
 164), 386. 
 Com. v. Lester (129 Mass. 101), 23. 
 Com. v. Locke (114 Mass. 288), 250. 
 Com. v. Lyden (113 Mass. 452), 341. 
 Com. v. Lynch (3 Pittsb., Pa., 412), 
 
 231. 
 Com. v. Lynes (142 Mass. 577), 188, 
 
 319. 
 Com. v. Mahon (142 Pa. St. 417), 7. 
 Com. v. Malone (114 Mass. 295), 188. 
 Com. v. Marsh (10 Pick. 57), 306. 
 Com. v. Maxwell (2 Pick., Mass., 
 
 250. 
 Com. v. Marzynski (149 Mass. 68), 
 
 241. 
 Com. v. McCarthy (119 Mass. 354), 9. 
 Com. v. McDermott (123 Mass. 441), 
 
 97. 
 Com. v. McDonald (110 Mass. 545), 
 
 354. 
 Com. v. McGrath (140 Mass. 296; 6 
 
 N. E. Rep. 515), 234. 
 Com. v. McGuire (84 Ky. 57), 321. 
 Com. v. McKee (1 Gray, 62), 249.
 
 lii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Com. v. McLaughton (105 Mass. 4G0), 
 
 23. 
 Com. v. McMahon (145 Pa. St. 413), 
 
 6, 9. 
 Com. v. McManus (143 Pa. St. 64; 21 
 
 Atl. Rep. 1018), 11. 
 Com. v. Mead (12 Gray, Mass., 167), 
 
 176. 
 Com. v. Minor (89 Ky. 555 ; 13 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 5), 321. 
 Com. v. Moinehan (140 Mass. 463 ; 1 
 
 N. E. Rep. 59), 195. 
 Com. v. Morey (1 Gray, Mass., 461), 
 
 89. 
 Com. v. Morgan (107 Mass. 205), 354, 
 
 354a. 
 Com. v. Morgan (Mass., 1893, 34 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 458), 39. 
 Com. v. Morningstar (12 Pa. Co. Ct. 
 
 R. 34), 23. 
 Com. v. Morrill (62 Mass. 571), 23. 
 Com. v. Mosier (135 Pa. St. 221 ; 19 
 
 Atl. Rep. 943), 350. 
 Com. v. Mosier (4 Barr, Pa., 264), 95. 
 Com. v. Mullen (150 Mass. 394; 23 
 
 N. E. Rep. 51), 346. 
 Com. v. Mullern (97 Mass. 545), 345a. 
 Com. v. Nagle (157 Mass. 554; 32 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 861), 10. 
 Com. v. Ntfus (135 Mass. 533), 133, 
 
 139. 
 Com. v. Nichols (114 Mass. 2S5), 354a. 
 Com. v. Peckham (2 Gray, Mass., 
 
 514), 241. 
 Com. v. Penn (1 Pet. C. C. 496), 115. 
 Com. v. Phillips (11 Pick. 28), 146. 
 Com. v. Piper (120 Mass. 185, 188), 
 
 89, 192, 201. 
 Com. v. Pomeroy (117 Mass. 143), 
 
 249. 
 Com. v. Pratt (126 Mass. 462), 354. 
 Com. v. Price (10 Gray, Mass., 472), 
 
 323. 
 Com. v. Purdy (146 Mass. 138; 15 
 
 N. E. Rep. 364), 23. 
 Com v. Regan (105 Mass. 593), 354. 
 Com. v. Reynolds (14 Gray, Mass., 
 
 87), 281. 
 
 Com. v. Richards (18 Pick. 404), 124. 
 Com. v. Riggs (14 Gray, 376), 23. 
 Com. v. Robinson (146 Mass. 371), 5, 7. 
 Com. v. Rogers (7 Met., Mass., 500), 
 
 188, 231. 
 Com. v. Rowell (146 Mass. 130; 15 
 
 N. E. Rep. 151), 23. 
 Com. v. Russell (156 Mass. 196; 30 
 
 N. E. Rep. 763), 9, 95. 
 Com. v. Samuel (2 Pick., Mass., 103), 
 
 250. 
 Com. v. Saulsbury (152 Pa. St. 554; 
 
 26 Atl. Rep. 610), 9. 
 Com. v. Sego (105 Mass. 210), 95. 
 Com. v. Shaw (4 Cush. 593), 350, 354, 
 
 354a. 
 Com. v. Shepherd (2 Pa. Dist. Rep. 
 
 345), 10. 
 Com. v. Smith (2 Gray, Mass., 516), 
 
 316. 
 Com. v. Smith (9 Mass. 109), 174. 
 Com. v. Smith (119 Mass. 305), 89. 
 Com. v. Smith (6 S. & R., Pa., 567), 
 
 139. 
 Com. v. Snowden (Ky., 1892, 17 
 
 S. W. Rep. 205), 176. 
 Com. v. Stevenson (142 Mass. 146; 
 
 8 N. E. Rep. 361), 225. 
 Com. v. Strasser (153 Pa. St. 431), 10. 
 Com. v. Sturtivant (117 Mass. 122), 
 
 188, 193, 194. 
 Com. v. Sullivan (150 Mass. 315; 23 
 
 N. E. Rep. 47), 322. 
 Com. v. Switzer (134 Pa. St. 383; 26 
 
 W. N. C. 46), 38a, 145. 
 Com. v. Talbot (2 Allen, Mass., 161), 
 
 226. 
 Com. v. Taylor (5 Cush., Mass., 606), 
 
 89, 95. 
 Com. v. Taylor (132 Mass. 261), 193. 
 Com. v. Thompson (99 Mass. 444), 87. 
 Com. v. Thompson (11 Allen, Mass., 
 
 25), 233. 
 Com. v. Thompson (Mass., 1893, 23 
 
 N. E. Rep. 910), 39. 
 Com. v. Thyng (134 Mass. 191), 348. 
 Com. v. Tibbetts (157 Mass. 519; 32 
 
 N. E. Rep. 910), 39.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 liii 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Com. v. Trefethen (157 Mass. 180 ; 31 
 
 N. E. Rep. 961), 84. 
 Com. v. Vass (3 Leigh, 78G), 103. 
 Com. v. Vose(157 Mass. 393; 32 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 305), 50. 
 Com. v. Ward (157 Mass. 482; 32 N. 
 
 E. Rep. G63), 334. 
 Com. v. Webster (5 Cush. 321), 5, 6, 
 
 23, 131, 139, 344. 
 Com. v. Whitaker (131 Mass. 224), 
 
 234. 
 Com. v. White (145 Mass. 392), 9. 
 Com. v. White (147 Mass. 76), 176. 
 Com. v. Whitman (121 Mass. 361), 
 
 345. 
 Com. v. Williams (105 Mass. 62), 
 
 140. 
 Com. v. Wilson (1 Gray, 337), 145. 
 Com. v. Wright (1 Cush. 65), 22. 
 Com. v. Wright (107 Mass. 403), 381. 
 Com. v. Zelt (138 Pa. St. 615 ; 21 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 7), 250. 
 Commercial Ice Co. v. Kiefer (26 111. 
 
 App. 466), 308. 
 Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Ever- 
 
 hart (88 Va. 952 ; 14 S. E. Rep. 
 
 836), 150a. 
 Comp. v. Brown (48 Ind. 575), 252. 
 Compton v. Blexham (2 Coll. 201), 
 
 150. 
 Comstock v. Carnley (4 Blatch. C. C. 
 
 58), 32. 
 Comstock v. Hadlyme (8 Conn. 254), 
 
 254. 
 Comstock v. Smith (26 Mich. 306), 
 
 83, 129. 
 Comstock v. Smith (20 Mich. 338), 7. 
 Conde v. Wiltsie (131 N. Y. 647; 30 
 
 N. E. Rep. 866), 11. 
 Cone v. Cone (107 Mass. 285), 209. 
 Conger v. Weaver (6 Cal. 548), 238. 
 Congress, etc. Co. v. Edgar (99 U. S. 
 
 657), 198. 
 Conklin v. Boyd (46 Mich. 56), 229. 
 Conkling v. Hannibal, etc. Co. (54 
 
 Mo. 385), 199. 
 Conley v. Jennings (22 111. App. 547), 
 
 67. 
 
 Conley v. Stato (85 N. Y. 618), 389. 
 Connell v. O'Neil (154 Pa. St. 582), 
 
 366. 
 Connelly v. O'Connor (17 N. Y. State 
 
 Rep. 261), 309. 
 Conner v. State (23 Tex. App. 378), 
 
 33. 
 Connington v. Ludlow (1 Met., Ky., 
 
 295), 143a. 
 Connors v. People (50 N. Y. 240), 
 
 354a. 
 Conn. River Bank v. Albee (64 Vt. 
 
 571), 246. 
 Conolly v. Pardon (1 Paige, 291), 222. 
 Conrad v. Bank (10 Mart. 700), 140. 
 Conrad v. Ithaca (16 N. Y. 158), 198. 
 Conrad v. Mass. S. Co. (4 Allen, 
 
 Mass., 20), 77. 
 Consequa v. Willings(l Pet. 225), 242. 
 Consual v. Sheldon (35 Neb. 247 ; 52 
 
 N. W. Rep. 1104), 7, 128, 142. 
 Consumers' Coal Co. v. Schaefer (31 
 
 111. App. 364), 79. 
 Consumers' Gas Co. v. Harless (131 
 
 Ind. 446; 29 N. E. Rep. 1062), 82. 
 Continental Bank v. Bank of Com- 
 monwealth (50 N. Y. 573), 83. 
 Continental Bank v. Wells (73 Wis. 
 
 352), 242. 
 Continental Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. 
 
 (51 Fed. Rep. 884), 9, 58. 
 Converse v. Blumrich (14 Mich. 109), 
 
 73a. 
 Converse v. Hobbs (64 N. H. 42), 337. 
 Converse v. Lamghshow (81 Tex. 
 
 275), 220. 
 Converse v. Wead (142 111. 132 ; 31 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 314), 218. 
 Conway v. Vizzard (122 Ind. 266), 51. 
 Conway, In re (58 Hun, 16), 269. 
 Cook v. Barr (44 N. Y. 156), 76. 
 Cook v. Decker (63 Mo. 328), 237. 
 Cook v. Grange (18 Ohio, 526), 168. 
 Cook v. Hawkins (16 S. W. Rep. 8; 
 
 54 Ark. 423), 216. 
 Cook v. Knott (28 Tex. 85), 135. 
 Cook v. Larson (47 Kan. 70 ; 27 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 113), 282.
 
 liv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Cook v. Remington (6 Mod. 237), 
 
 304. 
 Cook v. Rice (91 Cal. 664), 151. 
 Cook v. Shorthill (82 Iowa, 277), 362. 
 Cook v. Smith (1 Vroom, 30 N. J., 
 
 387), 139. 
 Cook v. State (18 Barb., N. Y., 407), 
 
 357. 
 Cook v. State (18 S. W. Rep. 412; 30 
 
 Tex. App. 607), 330. 
 Cook v. State (Tex., 1893, 22 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 23), 89. 
 Cook v. Stearns (11 Mass. 533), 262. 
 Cook v. Stout (47 III. 530), 121. 
 Cook v. Tavener (41 Mo. App. 642), 
 
 234. 
 Cook v. United States (11 S. Ct. 268; 
 
 138 U. S. 157), 312. 
 Cooke v. Maxwell (2 Stark. 183), 175, 
 
 320. 
 Cooley v. Foltz (85 Mich. 47; 48 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 176), 178. 
 Coon v. State (13 Sm. & M. 246), 93. 
 Coon v. Swan (30 Vt. 6), 169. 
 Coonrod v. Madden (126 Ind. 197; 25 
 
 N. E. Rep. 1102), 35, 126. 
 Cooper v. Andrews (44 Mich. 94), 77. 
 Cooper v. Dedrick (22 Barb. 516), 231. 
 Cooper v. Finke (38 Minn. 2), 208. 
 Cooper t. James (79 Ga. 379 ; 4 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 916), 76. 
 Cooper v. Morrell (4 Yeates, Pa., 
 
 341), 60. 
 Cooper v. Perry (7 Pac. Rep. 946 ; 16 
 
 Colo. 436), 379. 
 Cooper v. Reaney (4 Minn. 528), 230. 
 Cooper v. Reynolds (10 Wall., U. S., 
 
 317), 155. 
 Cooper v. State (23 Tex. 336), 192, 
 
 193. 
 Copeland v. Koontz (125 Ind. 126), 
 
 308. 
 Coppv. Hollins (56 Hun, 640; 9 N. 
 
 Y. S. 57), 354. 
 Copperman v. People (56 N. Y. 
 
 591), 9. 
 Corbet t v. Gibson (16 Blatchf. C. C. 
 
 334), 284. 
 
 Corbett v. Norcross (35 N. Y. 99), 
 
 262. 
 Corbett v. State (5 Ohio Cir. Ct. 155), 
 
 97. 
 Corbin v. Sistrunk (19 Ala. 203), 208. 
 Cord as v. Morrison (23 N. Y. S. 1076), 
 
 282. 
 Corinth v. Lincoln (34 Me. 310), 57. 
 Cormack v. Walcott (17 Am. & Eng. 
 
 Corp. Cases, 309), 140. 
 Cormack v. Western White Bronze 
 
 Co. (77 Iowa, 32), 60. 
 Corn v. Rosenthal (20 N. Y. S. 632 ; 
 
 1 Misc. Rep. 168), 212. 
 Corn Exch. Bank v. Nassau Bank (91 
 
 N. Y. 74), 216. 
 Cornelius v. Smith (55 Mo. 528), 246. 
 Cornett v. Williams (20 Wall., U. S., 
 
 226), 32. 
 Corning v. Gould (16 Wend. 531), 
 
 229. 
 Corning v. Walker (100 N. Y. 550), 
 
 308. 
 Corrigan v. Peroni (48 N. J. Eq. 607), 
 
 250. 
 Cosmer's Adm'r v. Smith (36 W. Va. 
 
 788 ; 15 S. E. Rep. 977), 358. 
 Cosper v. Nesbit (45 Kan. 457), 206. 
 Costello v. Crowell (139 Mass. 588), 
 
 139, 337. 
 Costen v. McDowell (107 N. C. 546), 
 
 120. 
 Costigan v. Lunt (127 Mass. 355), 
 
 120. 
 Costigan v. Mohawk, etc. Co. (3 
 
 Denio, N. Y., 609), 247. 
 Cothran v. Forsyth (68 Ga. 560), 254. 
 Cotton v. State (87 Ala. 75 ; 6 S. Rep. 
 
 372), 5, 6, 91, 346. 
 Cotton v. Ulmer (45 Ala. 378), 231. 
 Coubrough v. Adams (70 Cal. 374 ; 11 
 
 Pac. Rep. 634), 371. 
 Coulson v. Walton (9 Pet. 62), 107, 
 
 129. 
 Coulter v. Amer. Exp. Co. (56 N. Y. 
 
 585), 347. 
 Counselman v. Hitchcock (142 U. S. 
 
 547), 381.
 
 TA1JLK OK CASKS. 
 
 \v 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Countryman's Estate, In re (151 Pa. 
 
 St. 577; 25 Atl. Rep. 146; 31 W. 
 
 N. C. 148), 369. 
 Course v. Head (4 Dall. 22; 12 S. Ct. 
 
 195), 242. 
 Courtney v. State (5 Ind. App. 356 ; 
 
 32 N. E. Rep. 335), 9. 
 Cousins v. Jackson (52 Ala. 265), 308. 
 Cousins v. Partridge (79 Cal. 224), 
 
 370. 
 Couts v. Neer (70 Tex. 468 ; 9 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 46), 381. 
 Coveney v. Tannahill (1 Hill, 33), 
 
 173. 
 Cover v. Manavvay (115 Pa. St. 345), 
 
 136. 
 Cover v. Myers (75 Md. 406 ; 23 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 856), 247. 
 Covert v. Sebern (73 Iowa, 564), 222. 
 Covey v. Campbell (52 Ind. 158), 18S. 
 Covington, etc. Road v. Ingles (15 
 
 B. Mon., Ky., 637), 73a. 
 Covington Draw. Co. v. Shepherd 
 
 (20 How., U. S., 227), 242. 
 Cowan v. Kinney (33 Ohio St. 423), 
 
 1,8. 
 Cowan v. Prowse (19 S. W. Rep. 407, 
 
 Ky., 1892), 31. 
 Cowan v. Third Ave. Ry. Co. (9 N. 
 
 Y. S. 610), 350. 
 Coward v. Clanton (79 Cal. 29), 76. 
 Coward v. Dillinger (56 Ind. 59), 357. 
 Cowden v. Reynolds (12 S. & R. 281), 
 
 347. 
 Co wen v. Eartherly (95 Ala. 324; 11 
 
 S. Rep. 195), 362. 
 Cowing v. Altmau (71 N. Y. 433), 
 
 214. 
 Cowles v. Hayes (71 N. C. 231), 343. 
 Cowley v. People (83 N. Y. 464), 38a, 
 
 188. 
 Cowman v. Rogers (73 Md. 403), 233. 
 Cox v. Com. (125 Pa. St. 103), 324. 
 Cox v. Cox (91 N. C. 256), 220. 
 Cox v. Dill (85 Ind. 334), 141. 
 Cox v. Ellsworth (26 N. W. Rep. 460; 
 
 18 Neb. 664), 233. 
 Cox v. Hart (145 U. S. 376), 282. 
 
 Cox v. Hill (3 Ohio St. 411), 353. 
 
 Cox v. Jones (52 Ga. 438), 142. 
 
 Cox v. Jones (110 N. C. 309; 14 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 782), 380. 
 Cox v. Mountford (60 Ga. 62), 150a. 
 Cox v. People (19 Hun, 340), 89. 
 Cox v.Woods (67 Cal. 317; 7 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 722), 223. 
 Cove v. Leach (8 Mete, Mass., 371), 
 
 233. 
 Coyle v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co. (11 
 
 W. Va. 94), 73a. 
 Coyne v. Manhattan Ry. Co. (62 
 
 Hun, 620), 188, 192. 
 Cozard v. Hinman (6 Bosw. 8), 20S. 
 Cozine v. Walter (55 N. Y. 304), 150a. 
 Cozzens v. Higgins(33 How. Pr. 439), 
 
 38a, 441. 
 Craig v. Alvarson (6 J. J. Marsh., 
 
 Ky., 609), 69. 
 Craig v. Brown (1 Pet. 352), 148. 
 Craig v. Gilbreth (47 Me. 416), 73a. 
 Craig v. State (18 S. W. Rep. 297, 
 
 Tex., 1892), 89. 
 Craig v. Taylor (6 B. Mon., Ky., 459), 
 
 262. 
 Crain v. Huntington (81 Tex. 614), 
 
 107, 130. 
 Cram v. Cram (33 Vt. 15, 40), 166, 
 
 197. 
 Cramer v. Burlington (4 Iowa, 213), 
 
 226. 
 Cramer v. Shriner (18 Md. 89), 35. 
 Cranan v. New Orleans (16 La. Ann. 
 
 374), 225. 
 Craudall v. Gallup (12 Conn. 565), 76. 
 Crandall v. Sterling (1 Colo. 106), 242. 
 Crane v. Dexter (5 Wash. St. 479), 
 
 132. 
 Crane v. Library Ass'n (29 N. J. L. 
 
 302), 209. 
 Crane v. Northfield (33 Vt. 126), 198. 
 Crane v. Ring (48 Kan. 61), 24. 
 Crane Lumber Co. v. Otter Creek 
 
 Lumber Co. (79 Mich. 307; 44 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 7S8), 60. 
 Crappell v. State (71 Ala. 324), 316. 
 Crary v. Sprague (12 Wend. 41), 121.
 
 lvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Crawford v. Abraham (3 Oreg. 163), 
 
 276. 
 Crawford v. Elliot (1 Houst., Del., 
 
 467), 232. 
 Crawford v. Neal (144 U. S. 585; 
 
 12 S. Ct. 759), 136. 
 Crawford v. Williams (48 Iowa, 249), 
 
 189. 
 Creamer v. Stevenson (15 Md. Ill), 
 
 214. 
 Crease v. Barrett (1 C, M. & R. 928), 
 
 116. 
 Cressena v. Sowers (26 W. N. C. 133), 
 
 136. 
 Creston v. Walker (26 Iowa, 205), 
 
 254. 
 Creswell v. State (14 Tex. App. 1), 9. 
 Crew v. Saunders (2 Str. 1005), 140. 
 Crew v. State (Tex., 1893, 22 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 973), 282. 
 Cribben v. Deall (21 Oreg. 211 ; 27 
 
 Pac. Rep. 1046), 128. 
 Crimmins v. Crimmins (43 N. J. Eq. 
 
 87), 308. 
 Crist v. State (21 Ala. 137), 141. 
 Crocker v. Agenbrod (122 Ind. 585), 
 
 347. 
 Crocker v. Duncan (6 Blackf., Ind., 
 
 278), 286. 
 Crockett v. Crockett (73 Ga. 647), 223. 
 Crodson v. Leonard (12Cranch, 433), 
 
 158. 
 Crohen v. Ewers (39 111. App. 34), 
 
 199. 
 Cromer v. Bornest (27 S. C. 436; 
 
 3 S. E. Rep. 849), 36. 
 Crommett v. Pearson (18 Me. 344), 
 
 205. 
 Cromwell v. Sac Co. (94 U. S. 351), 
 
 145. 
 Crookham v. State (5 W. Va. 510), 
 
 102. 
 Crooks v. Whitford (47 Mich. 283), 
 
 222. 
 Crosby v. Mason (32 Conn. 482), 210. 
 Crosby v. People (27 N. E. Rep. 49 ; 
 
 137 111. 325), 97. 
 Crose v. Rutledge (81 111. 266), 168. 
 
 Cross v. Bell (34 N. H. 85), 226. 
 Cross v. Cross (108 N. Y. 629; 15 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 333), 347. 
 Cross v. Cross (55 Mich. 280), 168. 
 Cross v. Kansas City (90 Mo. 13), 83. 
 Cross v. Martin (46 Vt. 14), 129. 
 Cross v. Railroad Co. (69 Mich. 363), 
 
 186, 226. 
 Cross v. Thompson (50 Kan. 627; 32 
 
 Pac. Rep. 357), 217. 
 Cross v. Williams (43 N. H. 332), 8. 
 Grossman v. Crossman (95 N. Y. 145), 
 
 30. 
 Croswell v. Labree (81 Me. 44), 128. 
 Cr others v. Acock (43 Mo. App. 318), 
 
 22. 
 Crotty v. Eagle's Adm'r (35 W. Va. 
 
 143 ; 13 S. E. Rep. 859), 74. 
 Crow v. Gleason (20 N. Y. S. 590 ; 
 
 65 Hun, 625), 371. 
 Crow v. Searcy (103 Mo. 975), 226. 
 Crow v. Watkins (48 Ark. 169), 70. 
 Crowell v. Harvey (30 Neb. 570), 
 
 370. 
 Crowell v. State (24 Tex. App. 204), 
 
 324. 
 Crumlish v, Wilmington (5 Del. Ch. 
 
 270), 77. 
 Crump v. Com. (Ky., 1893, 20 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 390), 101. 
 Crump v. Gerick (40 Miss. 765), 76. 
 Cuddy v. Brown (78 111. 415), 53. 
 Cullen v. Benim (37 Ohio St. 326), 
 
 210. 
 Cully v. Shirk (131 Ind. 70), 150a. 
 Culp v. Steare (47 Kan. 746), 24. 
 Culver v. Dwight (6 Gray, 444), 188. 
 Culver v. Marks (122 Ind. 554), 37, 60, 
 
 144. 
 Culver v. Scott, etc. Co. (55 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 552), 334. 
 Culverhouse v. Wertz (33 Mo. App. 
 
 24), 241. 
 Cumberland Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. 
 
 Giltman (48 N. J. L. 495 ; 7 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 424), 38. 
 Cumming v. Barber (99 N. C. 332), 
 
 212.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 lvii 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Oummings v. Arnold (3 Mete. 486), 
 
 214. 
 Cunimings v. Powell (116 Mo. 473; 
 
 21 S. W. Rep. 1079), 208. 
 Cummings v. Putnam (19 N. H. 5C9), 
 
 214. 
 Cunard v. Manhattan (I Misc. Rep. 
 
 151; 21 N. Y. S. 1131), 16. 
 Cundell v. Pratt (1 M. & Malk. 108), 
 
 354. 
 Cuneo v. Bessoni (63 Ind. 524), 190. 
 Cunningham v. Dwyer (23 Md. 219), 
 
 208. 
 Cunningham v. Gallegher (61 Wis. 
 
 170), 249. 
 Cunningham v. Minor (66 Ala. 522), 
 
 207. 
 Cunningham v. Railroad Co. (49 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 39), 192. 
 Cunningham v. Union Pac. R. Co. 
 
 (4 Utah, 206; 7 Pac. Rep. 795), 
 
 360. 
 Curd v. Williams (Ky., 1892, 18 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 634), 246. 
 Curnen v. Mayer (79 X. Y. 511, 514), 
 
 84. 
 Curren v. Ampersee (Mich., 1893, 56 
 
 N. W. Rep. 87), 34. 
 Currier v. Richardson (63 Vt. 617), 
 
 146. 
 Curry v. Kurtz (33 Miss. 24), 69. 
 Curry v. White (51 Cal. 530), 69. 
 Curtis v. Aaronson (7 Atl. Rep. 8S6 ; 
 
 49 N. J. L. 68), 115. 
 Curtis v. Belknap (6 Wash. 433), 
 
 138. 
 Curtis v. Chicago, etc. Co. (18 Wis. 
 
 312), 188. 
 Curtis v. Curtis (131 Ind. 489), 361. 
 Curtis v. Gano (26 N. Y. 426), 198. 
 Curtis v. Richards (1 Scott, N. R., 
 
 155), 218. 
 Curtis v. Wilson (2 Tex. Civ. App. 
 
 646 ; 21 S. W. Rep. 787), 308. 
 Cushing v. Babcock (38 Me. 452), 77. 
 Cushing v. Billings (2 Cush., Mass., 
 
 158), 375. 
 Cushing v. Rice (46 Me. 303), 205. 
 
 Cushman v. Bonfield (36 111. App. 
 
 436), 304. 
 Cuthrell v. Cuthrell (101 Ind. 375), 
 
 212. 
 Cutler v. Rathbone (1 Hill, 205), 357. 
 Cutler v. Wright (22 N. Y. 472), 2 12. 
 Cutler v. Wright (W. N. 1890, p. . 
 
 281. 
 Cutter v. Waddingham (22 Mo. 281), 
 
 216. 
 Cutting v. Carter (29 A r t. 72), 77. 
 Cutts v. United States (1 Gall. 69), 
 
 128. 
 Cuyler v. Ferrill (1 Abb., U. S., 169), 
 
 240. 
 Cuyler v. McCartney (33 Barb., N. 
 
 Y, 165), 70. 
 
 D. 
 
 Daggett v. Shaw (5 Met., Mass., 223), 
 
 115. 
 Dab! man v. Hammel (45 Wis. 460), 
 
 249. 
 Dail v. Moore (51 Mo. 5S9), 135, 136. 
 Daily v. Coons (64 Ind. 545), 75. 
 Daily v. Kinsler (31 Neb. 340 ; 47 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 1045), 246. 
 Daily v. N. Y. etc. Co. (32 Conn. 
 
 356), 139a. 
 Daily v. Sharkey (29 Mo. App. 518), 
 
 151. 
 Dainese v. Hall (91 U. S. 13), 242. 
 Dairs v. Furman (21 Kan. 131), 225. 
 Dais' Appeal (128 Pa. St. 572), 226. 
 Dale v. Livingstone (4 Wend. 558), 
 
 173. 
 Dale v. State (88 Ga. 552), 282. 
 Daley v. Hellman (62 Hun, 620), 
 
 282. 
 Dallas v. Chenault (Tex., 1891, 16 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 173), 253. 
 Dallmeyer v. Dallmeyer (Pa., 1888, 
 
 16 Atl. Rep. 72), 367. 
 Dalrymple v. Dalryrnple (2 Hagg. 
 
 115, 144), 143. 
 Dalton, Ex parte (44 Ohio St. 150), 
 
 388.
 
 Iviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sectiona. 
 
 Daly v. Bernstein (28 Pac. Eep. 764, 
 
 N. M., 1892), 30. 
 Daly v. Maguire (6 Blatchf. 137), 
 
 38a. 
 Daly v. Melende (32 Neb. 852), 333. 
 Daly v. Multnomah Co. (14 Oreg. 20), 
 
 277. 
 Daly v. Wise (132 N. Y. 306), 232. 
 Damm v. Gow (88 Mich. 99), 218. 
 Damon v. Granby (2 Pick., Mass., 
 
 345), 268. 
 Dan v. Brown (4 Cow., N. Y., 433, 
 
 438), 67, 138. 
 Dana v. Fiedler (12 N. Y. 40), 217, 
 
 218. 
 Dana v. Hancock (30 Vt. 616), 214. 
 Dana v. Newhall (13 Mass. 498), 128. 
 Dana v. Sessions (Vt., 1893, 26 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 585), 208. 
 Dane v. Tucker (4 Johns. 487), 176. 
 Danforth v. Mclntire (11 111. App. 
 
 447), 198. 
 Daniel v. Daniel (39 Pa. St. 191), 
 
 174. 
 Daniels v. Foster (26 Wis. 286), 309. 
 Daniels v. Woonsocket (11 R. I. 4), 
 
 75, 76. 
 Danielson v. Fuel Co. (55 Tex. 49), 
 
 142. 
 Danville, etc. Co. v. State (16 Ind. 
 
 456), 242. 
 Darby v. Ouseley (1 H. & N. 1), 80. 
 Darby v. Roberts (3 Tex. Civ. App. 
 
 427 ; 22 S. W. Rep. 529), 75. 
 Darby v. State (23 Tex. App. 407), 
 
 101, 102. 
 Darby v. State (92 Ala. 9), 103. 
 Darcy v. McCarty (35 Kan. 722), 144. 
 Darling v. Westmoreland (52 N. H. 
 
 401), 8. 
 Darrah v. Watson (36 Iowa, 116), 
 
 148. 
 Darry v. People (10 N. Y. 138), 234. 
 Darst v. Bates (51 111. 439), 222. 
 Darst v. Murphy (119 111. 343), 223. 
 Dart v. Walker (3 Daly, N. Y., 138), 
 
 69. 
 Dass Case (1 Gratt., Va., 557), 249. 
 
 Daub v. Engelback (109 111. 267), 76. 
 Davenport v. Gas Co. (43 Iowa, 301), 
 
 83. 
 Davenport v. Hannibal (108 Mo. 471 ; 
 
 18 S. W. Rep. 1122), 11. 
 Davenport v. Mahon (6 Kulp, Pa., 
 
 350), 146. 
 Davenport v. McKee (98 N. C. 500), 
 
 350. 
 Davey v. Lohrman (20 N. Y. S. 675), 
 
 349. 
 Daveyac v. Seiler (Ky., 1893, 20 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 375), 380. 
 Davidson v. Arledge (97 N. C. 172), 
 
 115. 
 Davidson v. Cornell (132 N. Y. 22S), 
 
 52. 
 Davidson v. Felder (2 Tex. Civ. App. 
 
 273 ; 21 S. W. Rep. 714), 371. 
 Davidson v. Murphy (13 Conn. 317), 
 
 146. 
 Davidson v. Peticolas (34 Tex. 37), 
 
 244. 
 Davidson v. Wheeler (17 R. I. 28), 
 
 370. 
 Davie v. Briggs (7 Otto, 628), 233. 
 Davie v. Davis (108 N. C. 501 ; 13 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 240), 152. 
 Davies v. Lowndes (7 Scott, N. R. 
 
 214), 113. 
 Davis v. Agnew (67 Tex. 210), 136. 
 Davis v. Beazley (75 Va. 491), 135. 
 Davis v. California Pow. Works (84 
 
 Cal. 617), 341. 
 Davis v. Colburn (128 Mass. 377), 
 
 265. 
 Davis v. Dale (1 M. & M. 514), 339. 
 Davis v. Davis (22 N. Y. S. 191 ; 2 
 
 Misc. Rep. 549), 158. 
 Davis v. Evans (102 Mo. 164), 70. 
 Davis v. Fuller (12 Vt. 178), 58. 
 Davis v. Getchell (32 Neb. 792), 8. 
 Davis v. Goodrich (45 Vt. 36), 214. 
 Davis v. Graham (2 Colo. App. 210; 
 
 29 Pac. Rep. 1007), 350. 
 Davis v. Harnbell (Tex., 1894, 24 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 972), 218. 
 Davis v. Hays (89 Ala. 563), 11.
 
 TABLE OF CASKS. 
 
 lix 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Davis v. Hopkins (18 Colo. 153; 32 
 
 Pac. Rep. 70), 369. 
 Davis v. Hudson (29 Minn. 35), 232. 
 Davis v. Jenkins (Ky., 1893, 20 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 283), 137. 
 Davis v. Kline (9 S. W. Rep. 724 ; 
 
 9G Mo. 401), 124. 
 Davis v. Mann (43 111. App. 401), 
 
 377. 
 Davis v. McEnany (150 Mass. 451), 
 
 240. 
 Davis v. Moody (15 Ga. 175), 205. 
 Davis v. New York, L. E. & W. R. 
 
 R. Co. (69 Hun, 174), 198. 
 Davis v. Rich (2 How., N. Y., 86), 
 
 357. 
 Davis v. Rochester (66 Hun, 629), 72, 
 
 73a. 
 Davis v. Sanford (9 Allen, 216), 60. 
 Davis v. Shafer (50 Fed. Rep. 74), 
 
 123, 128. 
 Davis v. Simmons (25 Pac. Rep. 535), 
 
 75. 
 Davis v. State (35 Ind. 496), 188. 
 Davis v. State (31 Neb. 247 ; 47 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 854), 317. 
 Davis v. State (78 Ind. 15), 188. 
 Davis v. State (74 Ga. 869), 5, 7. 
 Davis v. State (38 Md. 15), 192. 
 Davis v. Stern (15 La. Ann. 177), 208. 
 Davis v. Stout (126 Ind. 12; 25 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 862), 205. 
 Davis v. Whitesides (1 Dana, Ky., 
 
 177), 73a. 
 Davis v. Willis (67 Hun, 650), 333. 
 Davis, etc. Co. v. Riverside Co. (84 
 
 Wis. 262; 54 N. W. Rep. 506), 
 
 282. 
 Davy v. Faw (7 Cranch, U. S., 171), 
 
 77. 
 Dawes v. Shedd (15 Mass. 69), 73. 
 Dawley v. Ayers (23 Cal. 108), 167. 
 Daws v. Glasgow (1 Pin., Wis., 171), 
 
 356. 
 Dawson v. Coston (18 Colo. 493; 33 
 
 Pac. Rep. 189), 354a. 
 Dawson v. Landreaux (29 La. Ann. 
 
 363), 739. 
 
 Dawson v. Mayal (45 Minn. 408), 53. 
 Dawson v. Parham (55 Ark. 286), 142. 
 Dawson v. Schloss (93 Cal. 134), 79, 
 
 369. 
 Day v. Cooley (118 Mass. 524), 348. 
 Day v. Gidjum (131 Mass. 31), 168. 
 Day v. Sharp (4 Whart. 339), 8. 
 Day v. State (63 Ga. 667), 202. 
 Day v. State (21 Tex. App. 213), 249. 
 Day v. State (27 Tex. App. 143), 306. 
 Dayger, In re (47 Hun, 127), 269. 
 Dayton v. Warne (43 N. J. L. 659), 
 
 73a. 
 Dayton v. Wells (1 Nott & McC, 
 
 S. C, 409), 121. • 
 Deade v. Hancock (13 Price, 236), 
 
 114. 
 Deady v. Harrison (1 Stark. 60), 73. 
 Deakers v. Temple (41 Pa. St. 234), 
 
 69. 
 Dean v. Aveling (1 Rob. 279), 202. 
 Dean v. Com. (32 Gratt., Va., 912), 
 
 57. 
 Dean v. Dean (1 Will., Vt., 746), 138. 
 Dean v. Erskine (18 N. H. 83). 220. 
 Dean v. Fuller (40 Pa. St. 474), 138. 
 Dean v. State (29 Ind. 483), 229, 234. 
 Dearing v. Sawtelle (4 Greenl., Me., 
 
 191), 311. 
 De Arnold v. Neasmith (32 Mich. 
 
 231), 58. 
 Deartt v. Barley (9 N. Y. 371), 197. 
 Deasy v. Thurman (1 Idaho, 775), 70. 
 Debaun, In re (4 N. Y S. 342), 309. 
 De Casse Brissac v. Rathbone (6 H. 
 
 & Nor. 361), 158. 
 De Celis v. United States (13 Ct. CI. 
 
 117), 238. 
 De Cemea v. Cornell (20 N. Y S. 
 
 895), 216. 
 Deck v. Johnson (1 Abb. App. Dec, 
 
 N. Y, 497), 71. 
 Decker, Ex parte (6 Cowen, N. Y., 
 
 59), 128. 
 Dee v. Sharon Hill Acad. (2 Pa. Co. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 228), 366. 
 Deere v. Dagley (80 Iowa, 197 ; 45 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 557), 33.
 
 lx 
 
 TALiLK OK GASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Deery v. Cray (10 Wall., U. S., 263), 
 
 210. 
 De France v. Howard (4 Iowa, 524), 
 
 200. 
 Deigv. Morehead (110 Ind. 451; 11 
 
 N. E. Rep. 458), 188. 
 Dejarnotto v. Com. (75 Va. 857), 197. 
 Delacroix v. Bulky (13 Wend. 71), 
 
 214. 
 Delafield v. Hand (3 Johns. 310), 149. 
 Delafield v. Parish (25 N. Y. 9), 231. 
 Delamater v. Prudential L. Ins. Co. 
 
 (5 N. Y. S. 586), 367. 
 De La Motte's Case (21 How. St. Tr. 
 
 810), 132. 
 Delaney v. Root (99 Mass. 548), 262. 
 Delano v. Jacoby (31 Pac. Rep. 290; 
 
 96 Cal. 275), 380. 
 Delano v. Joysling (1 Litt., Ky., 
 
 117), 242. 
 De La Riva v. Berreysea (2 Cal. 195), 
 
 79. 
 Delaware, etc. Co. v. Starrs (69 Pa. 
 
 St. 36), 198. 
 Delcouuyn v. Chamberlain (48 How. 
 
 Pr., N. Y., 409), 276. 
 Delphi v. Lowery (74 Ind. 520), 8. 
 De Meli v. De Meli (120 N. Y. 492), 
 
 168, 347. 
 Dement, Ex parte (53 Ala. 389), 191. 
 Demeritt v. Meserve (39 N. H. 531), 
 
 73a. 
 Deming v. Merch. etc. Co. (90 Tenn. 
 
 306; 17 S. W. Rep. 89), 11. 
 Demonheun v. Walker (4 Baxt., 
 
 Tenn., 199), 139. 
 Den v. Johnson (18 N. J. L. 87), 166. 
 Den v. Longstreet (18 N. J. L. 414), 
 
 262. 
 Denair v. Brooklyn (5 N. Y. S. 585), 
 
 239. 
 Denham v. Bryant (139 Mass. 110), 
 
 24. 
 Denison v. Denison (35 Md. 361), 309. 
 Denmead v. Maack (2 MacArthur, 
 
 475), 243. 
 Dennie v. Williams (135 Mass. 28), 
 
 76. 
 
 Dennis v. Spencer (45 Minn. 250), 
 
 24. 
 Denson v. Hyde (6 Conn. 508), 143. 
 Dent v. Dent (3 Gill, Md., 482), 76. 
 Denver, etc. Co. v. Neis (56 Cal. 56), 
 
 80. 
 Denver, etc. Co. v. Ryan (17 Colo. 
 
 98 ; 28 Pac. Rep. 79), 250. 
 Denver & R. G. Co. v. Morrison (3- 
 
 Colo. App. 194; 32 Pac. Rep. 
 
 859), 367. 
 Denver Tramway Co. v. Reid (Colo., 
 
 1894, 35 Pac. Rep. 269), 192. 
 Depue v. Place (7 Pa. St. 428), 140. 
 Depue v. Sargeant (21 W. Va. 326)» 
 
 208. 
 Deshon v. Insurance Co. (11 Met., 
 
 Mass., 199), 209. 
 Des Moines Bank v. Hotel Co. (Iowa, 
 
 1893, 55 N. W. Rep. 67), 376. 
 De Soby v. De Laister (2 Har. & J., 
 
 Md., 19), 146. 
 Despatch Line v. Bellamy M. Co. (12 
 
 N. H. 205), 268. 
 Destrehan v. Louisiana Cypress Co. 
 
 (La., 1893, 13 S. Rep. 230), 216. 
 Detroit City Ry. Co. v. Mills (85 
 
 Mich. 634 ; 48 N. W. Rep. 1007), 
 
 346. 
 Detweiler v. Shultheis (122 Ind. 155), 
 
 229. 
 Deuser v. Walkup (43 Mo. App. 625), 
 
 171. 
 Deutman v. Kilpatrick (46 Mo. App. 
 
 624), 206. 
 Devenbaugh v. Devenbaugh (5 Paige, 
 
 N. Y, 554), 202. 
 Devere v. State (5 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 
 
 509), 37. 
 Devereux v. McMahon (102 N. C. 
 
 284; 9S. E. Rep. 635), 131. 
 Devinney v. Carey (23 N. Y. State 
 
 Rep. 208), 309. 
 Devlin v. Boyd (69 Hun, 328), 20. 
 Devlin v. New York (4 Misc. Rep. 
 
 106; 23 N. Y. S. 888), 199. 
 Devries v. Phillips (63 N. C. 53), 
 
 354a.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 lxi 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Devylyn v. Kill crease (2 McMull., 
 
 S. C, 425), 80. 
 Dew v. Downam (1 Green, 135), 339. 
 Dewey v. Dewey (35. Vt. 505), 268. 
 Dewey v. Goodenough (56 Barb. 54), 
 
 303. 
 Dewey v. Warriner (71 111. 19S), 311. 
 Dewey v. Dewey (1 Met., Mass., 349), 
 
 138. 
 Dewey v. St. Albans Co. (60 Vt. 1 ; 
 
 12 Atl. Rep. 221), 244. 
 De Witt v. Berry (134 U. S. 314), 216. 
 Dewitt v. Brisbane (16 N. Y. 508), 
 
 242. 
 Dewitt v. Yates (10 Johns. 156), 215. 
 De Wolf v. Strader (26 111. 225), 16S. 
 Dexter v. Booth (2 Allen, Mass., 559), 
 
 168. 
 Dexter v. Clemans (17 Pick. 175), 73. 
 Dexter v. Cranston (41 Mich. 448), 
 
 239. 
 Dexter v. Hall (15 Wall., U. S., 9), 
 
 188, 197. 
 Dexter v. Harrison (34 N. E. Rep. 
 
 46; 146111. 169), 373. 
 Dexter v. lvins (133 N. Y. 986), 24. 
 Dexter v. Ohlander (93 Ala. 441), 205. 
 Diamond M. Co. v. Powers (51 Mich. 
 
 145), 140. 
 Dicas v. Lawson (1 Cr., M. & R. 934), 
 
 284. 
 Dickens v. Mahana (21 How., U. S., 
 
 283), 225. 
 Dickenson v. Fitchberg (13 Gray, 
 
 546), 185. 
 Dickerman v. Aston (21 Minn. 53S), 
 
 268. 
 Dickerson v. Mathewson (50 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 73), 371. 
 Dickinson v. Clark (5 W. Va. 280), 
 
 73. 
 Dickinson v. Colegrove (100 U. S. 
 
 580), 82. 
 Dickson v. Evans (6 T. R. 57), 250. 
 Dickson v. McGraw (151 Pa. St. 98 ; 
 
 24 Atl. Rep. 1043), 309. 
 Dickson v. Peppers (7 Ired., N. C, 
 
 429), 150a. 
 
 Dickson v. Waldron (Ind., 1893, 35 
 
 N. E. Rep. 1), 317. 
 Didier v. Penn. Co. (146 Pa. St. 582; 
 
 23 Atl. Rep. 801), 11. 
 Diefendorf v. Diefcudorf (8 N. Y. S. 
 
 617), 226. 
 Diel v. Railway Co. (37 Mo. App. 
 
 454), 226. 
 Dietrich v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co. (58 
 
 Md. 347), 73a. 
 Dietz v. Fourth Nat. Bank (69 Mich. 
 
 287 ; 37 N. W. Rep. 220), 140. 
 Diffenbach v. Vogeler (61 Md. 370), 
 
 83. 
 DifTenderfer v. Scott (Ind., 1S93, 32 
 
 N. E. Rep. 87), 351, 352. 
 Digby v. People (113 111. 125), 101. 
 Digby v. Steel (3 Campb. 115), 38. 
 Dillard v. State (58 Miss. 368), 193, 
 
 342. 
 Dilleber v. Home L. Ins. Co. (87 
 
 N. Y. 79), 188. 
 Dilleber v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. (69 
 
 N. Y. 256), 178. 
 Dilley v. Love (61 Md. 607), 309. 
 Dillingham v. Flack (63 Hun, 629), 
 
 370. 
 Dillon's Case (4 Dall. 116), 89. 
 Dills v. State (59 Ind. 15), 191. 
 Dilworth v. Curts (29 N. E. Rep. 861 ; 
 
 139 111. 508), 371. 
 Dimick v. Downs (82 111. 570), 349. 
 Dines v. People (39 111. App. 565), 
 
 244. 
 Dishazer v. Mariland (12 Leigh, Va., 
 
 524), 108. 
 Di Sora v. Phillips (33 Law J. Ch., 
 
 H. L. Cas. 129), 149. 
 Disque v. State (49 N. J. L. 249 ; 8 
 
 Atl. Rep. 281), 346. 
 District v. Armes (107 U. S. 519), 8, 
 
 317. 
 District v. Wash. Gas Co. (20 D. C. 
 
 39), 124. 
 Diven v. Johnson (117 Ind. 512), 
 
 208. 
 Divine v. Mitchum (4 B. Mon., Ky., 
 
 4S3), 268.
 
 lxii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Dix v. Atkins (128 Mass. 43), 126. 
 Dixon v. Ely (4 Edw., N. Y., 557), 
 
 286. 
 Dixon v. Niccolls (39 111. 373), 237. 
 Dixon v. Sinclair (4 Va. 354), 152. 
 Dixon v. State (86 Ga. 754; 13 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 87), 347. 
 Dixon v. State (13 Fla. 636), 9, 52, 101, 
 
 234, 249. 
 Dobbin v. Bryan (5 Tex. 267), 238. 
 Dobson v. Cathron (34 S. C. 518), 35. 
 Dobson v. Kuhula (66 Hun, 627), 67, 
 
 216. 
 Dockterman v. Elder (27 Weekly 
 
 Law Bui. 195), 262. 
 Dodd v. Scott (46 N. W. Rep. 1057 ; 
 
 81 Iowa, 319), 153. 
 Dodge v. Freedman, etc. Co. (93 U. S. 
 
 579), 69. 
 Dodge v. Gallatin (130 N. Y. 117; 29 
 
 N. E. Rep. 107), 146. 
 Dodge v. Stanbope (55 Md. 121), 309. 
 Dodson v. State (86 Ala. 60; 5 S. 
 
 Rep. 485), 93. 
 Doe v. Barnes (1 M. & R. 386, 389), 
 
 144. 
 Doe v. Campbell (10 Johns., N. Y., 
 
 475), 107. 
 Doe v. Davies (10 Q. B. 314), 13, 
 
 113. 
 Doe v. Davis (11 Jur. 607). 53. 
 Doe v. Deakin (3 Carr. & P. 402), 
 
 105. 
 Doe v. Griffin (15 East, 293), 232. 
 Doe v. Hilder (2 B. & Aid. 793), 242. 
 Doe v. Keeling (11 Q. B. 884; 36 
 
 Leg. Obs. 312), 106. 
 Doe v. Lindsey (24 Ga. 225), 232. 
 Doe v. Miles (1 Stark. 181), 38. 
 Doe v. Ries (7 Bing. 724), 126. 
 Doe v. Riley (28 Ala. 161), 240. 
 Doe v. Roe (31 Ga. 593), 106. 
 Doe v. Sisson (12 East, 62), 116. 
 Doe v. State (40 Ark. 454), 120. 
 Doe v. Tarver (Ry. & M. 141, 142), 
 
 114. 
 Doe v. Tbomas (14 East, 323), 115. 
 Dogge v. State (27 Neb. 272), 307. 
 
 Dolan v. Armstrong (35 Neb. 339; 
 
 53 N. W. Rep. 132), 249. 
 Dole v. Johnson (50 N. H. 454), 185, 
 
 188. 
 Dole v. Wilson (16 Minn. 472), 242. 
 Dole v. Wooldridge (142 Mass. 184; 
 
 7 N. E. Rep. 83~ 340. 
 Doll v. Mundine (84 Tex. 315), 282. 
 Doll v. People (111., 1893, 34 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 413), 373. 
 Donaldson v. Everhart (50 Kan. 718; 
 
 32 Pac. Rep. 405), 71. 
 Donaldson v. Jude (2 Bibb, 60), 146. 
 Donell v. Jones (13 Ala. 490), 334. 
 Donelly v. Smith (7 R. I. 12), 166. 
 Donkt v. Tbelluson (8 C. B. 812), 
 
 143. 
 Donlin v. Daeglin (80 111. 60S), 209. 
 Donnell v. Clark (12 Kan. 154), 73a. 
 Donnell v. James (13 Ala. 490), 333. 
 Donahue v. Mills (41 Ark. 421), 316. 
 Donohue v. Brannuni (1 Overton, 
 
 328), 148. 
 Donohue v. People (6 Park. C. C, 
 
 N. Y, 120), 139. 
 Donohue v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co. (91 
 
 Mo. 360), 370. 
 Donohue v. Whitney (61 Hun, 620 ; 
 
 15 N. Y. S. 632), 113, 115, 116. 
 Doolittle v. State (93 Ind. 272), 192. 
 Dooly Block v. S. L. Rap. T. Co. 
 
 (Utah, 1S93, 33 Pac. Rep. 229), 
 
 3S0. 
 Doon v. Donaher (113 Mass. 151), 126. 
 Doran v. Mullen (78 111. 342), 334. 
 Dorev. Thornburgh (90 Cal. 64; 27 
 
 Pac. Rep. 30), 149. 
 Doren v. Jeliffe (20 N. Y. S. 636), 367. 
 Dorlarque v. Cress (71 111. 3S0-382), 
 
 84. 
 Dorman v. State (56 Ind, 454), 244. 
 Dome v. Southwork Manuf'g Co. (11 
 
 Cush., Mass., 205), 73a. 
 Dorr v. Fenno (12 Pick. 521), 23. 
 Dorsey v. Hagard (5 Mo. 420), 208. 
 Doster v. Brown (25 Ga. 24), 199. 
 Doty v. Smith (68 Hun, 199 ; 22 N. 
 
 Y. S. 840), 60.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 lxiii 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Doud v. Guthrie (in Bradw., 111., 653), 
 
 344. 
 Douglas v. Carmean (49 Kan. 674; 31 
 
 Pac. Rep. 371), 135. 
 Douglas v. Saunderson (2 Dall. 116), 
 
 53. 
 Douglass v. Anthony (45 Kan. 439; 
 
 25 Pac. Rep. 853), 377. 
 Douglass v. Fullerton (7 111. App, 
 
 102), 307. 
 Douglass v. Mitchell (35 Pa. St. 440), 5. 
 Dove v. Royal Ins. Co. (Mich., 1894, 
 
 57 N. W. Rep. 30), 188. 
 Dow v. Jewell (18 N. H. 380), 129* 
 
 262. 
 Dow v. Smith (7 Vt. 465), 286. 
 Dow v. State (31 Tex. Cr. Rep. 278), 
 
 283. 
 Dowel v. Watson (105 N. C. 476), 233. 
 Dowdell v. State (58 Ind. 333), 240. 
 Dowden v. Junker (48 N. J. Eq. 584), 
 
 284. 
 Dowdy v. Georgia R. R. Co. (88 Ga. 
 
 726), 188. 
 Dowell v. Guthrie (99 Mo. 653), 8, 
 
 250. 
 Dower v. Church (21 W. Va. 57), 343, 
 
 376. 
 Dowling v. Hennings (20 Md. 186), 
 
 229. 
 Downer v. Rowell (24 Vt. 343), 337. 
 Downey v. Hendrie (46 Mich. 498), 
 
 237. 
 Downie, In re (42 Wis. 66), 236. 
 Downing v. Diaz (80 Tex. 436; 16 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 49), 142. 
 Downing v. Iron Co. (93 Ala. — ), 
 
 262. 
 Downs v. Beldon (46 Vt. 674), 69, 71. 
 Dows v. McMichael (1 Paige, 139), 
 
 160. 
 Dow's Ex'rs v. Spinney's Ex'rs (29 
 
 Mo. 386), 133. 
 Doyle v. Beaupre (63 Hun, 624), 341. 
 Doyle v. Church (118 N. Y. 678; 23 
 
 N. E. Rep. 928), 50. 
 Doyle v. Eye & Ear Infirmary (80 N. 
 
 Y. 601), 193. 
 
 Doyle v. Kansas City Ry. Co. (113 
 
 Mo. 280; 20 S. W. Rep. 970), 367. 
 Doyle v. Manhattan Ry. Co. (59 
 
 Hun, 625), 194. 
 Drake v. Seaman (97 N! Y. 230), 268. 
 Drake v. State (23 Tex. 293). 103. 
 Drake v. State (75 Ga. 413), 10. 39. 
 Draper v. Hatfield (124 Mass. 53), 76. 
 Dravo v. Fable (132 U. S. 487; 10 S. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 170), 347. 
 Drennon v. Smith (3 Head, Tenn., 
 
 389), 70. 
 Drew v. Drum (44 Mo. App. 25), 
 
 366. 
 Drew v. Prior (5 M. & G. 264), 139. 
 Drew v. Simmons (58 Ala. 403), 309. 
 Drew v. Swift (46 N. Y. 209), 220. 
 Drexel v. Berney (122 U. S. 253), 83. 
 Drinkhouse, In re (24 Atl. Rep. 1083; 
 
 151 Pa. St. 294), 35. 
 Drown v. Forrest (63 Vt. 557), 20. 
 Drummond v. Magruder (9 Cranch, 
 
 122), *48. 
 Drumright v. State (29 Ga. 430), 84. 
 Drury v. Midland R. R. Co. (127 
 
 Mass. 571), 115. 
 Dryden v. Stephens (19 Mass. 1), 
 
 238. 
 Dryer v. Brown (52 Hun, 391), 141. 
 Dublin v. Chadbourne(16 Mass. 433), 
 
 150. 
 Dubois v. Baker (30 N. Y. 355), 140, 
 
 141. 
 Dubois v. Mason (127 Mass. 37), 231. 
 Dubois v. Perkins (21 Oreg. 189 ; 27 
 
 Pac. Rep. 1044), 50. 
 Ducan v. Beard (2 N. & McC, S. C, 
 
 400), 137. 
 Duchess of Kingston's Case (11 Harg. 
 
 St. Tr. 243), 178. 
 Ducker v. Whitson (112 N. C. 44; 16 
 
 S. E. Rep. 854), 309, 333. 
 Dudley v. McCluer (65 Mo. 241), 10. 
 Dudley v. McCord (65 Iowa, 671 ; 22 
 
 N. W. Rep. 920), 353, 355. 
 Dudley v. Maley (43 Fed. Rep. 407), 
 
 153. 
 Dudley v. Vose (114 Mass. 34), 217.
 
 lxiv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 ■Duff v. Duff (71 Cal, 
 
 Rep. 570), 75. 
 Duffield v. Hue (129 Pa. St. 94), 206. 
 Dugan v. Mahoney (11 Allen, Mass., 
 
 572), 337. 
 Dugger v. McKesson (100 N. C. 1 ; 6 
 
 S. E. Rep. 746), 115. 
 Dugger v. Taylor (46 Ala. 320), 205. 
 Duke of Buccleugh v. Board (L. R. 
 
 5 H. L. Cas. 418; 8 Moak's Eng. 
 
 448), 314. 
 Duke of New Castle v. Braxtowe (4 
 
 B. & Ad. 273), 116. 
 Dulaney v. St. Louis S. R. Co. (42 
 
 Mo. App. 65), 9, 11. 
 Dulaney v. Walshe (3 Tex. Civ. App. 
 
 174; 22 S. W. Rep. 131), 37. 
 Dulin v. Prince (29 111. App. 209), 
 
 154. 
 Dumas v. State (62 Ga. 58), 101. 
 Dunagan v. Dunagan (38 Ga. 554), 
 
 211. 
 Dunbar v. Marden (13 N-. H. 311), 
 
 138. 
 Dunbar v. McGill (69 Mich. 297; 37 
 
 N. W. Rep. 285), 354. 
 Duncan v. Beard (2 Nott & McCord, 
 
 S. C, 400), 106. 
 Duncan v. Duncan (2 Yeates, Pa., 
 
 302), 221. 
 Duncan v. Hughes (1 McCord, 239, 
 
 240), 138. 
 Duncan v. State (88 Ala. 31), 232. 
 Duncan v. State (10 S. Rep. 815 ; 29 
 
 Fla. 439), 370. 
 Dundas v. Hitchcock (12 How., U. S., 
 
 256), 136. 
 Dunham v. Carson (37 S. C. 269 ; 15 
 
 S. E. Rep. 960), 152. 
 Dunham v. Gannett (124 Mass. 151), 
 
 220. 
 Dunklec v. Goodenough (65 Vt. 257), 
 
 60. 
 Dunlap v. Hearn (37 Miss. 471, 474), 
 
 106. 
 Dunlap v. Walls (6 N. H. 450), 148. 
 Dunlop v. Dunlop (94 Mich. 11), 308. 
 Dunn v. Amos (14 Wis. 106), 208. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 513; 12 Pac 
 
 Dunn v. Lewis (05 Hun, 020), 282. 
 Dunn v. Packwood(ll Jur. 242), 312. 
 Dunn v. People (109 III. 635), 230. 
 Dunn v. People (29 N. Y. 529), 350, 
 
 375. 
 Dunn v. Pipes (20 La. Ann. 276), 
 
 211. 
 Dunn v. Whitney (10 Me. 9), 60. 
 Dunnenbaum v. Schram (59 Tex. 
 
 281), 358. 
 Dunns v. Rogers (43 111. 260), 150a. 
 Dunraven v. Llewellyn (15 Q. B. 791 ; 
 
 15 Ad. &E1. 791), 115. 
 Dunston v. Higgins (63 Hun, 631), 
 
 158. 
 Dunton v. Keel (Ala., 1892, 10 S. 
 
 Rep. 333), 234. 
 Duntzy v. Van Buren (5 Hun, 648), 
 
 194. 
 Dupeyster v. Gagoni (84 Ky. 403 ; 1 
 
 S. W. Rep. 652), 150. 
 Dupree v. Dupree (45 Ga. 415-442), 
 
 138. 
 Dupree v. State (33 Ala. 380), 10, 
 
 123. 
 Dupree v. Woodruff (Tex., 1S92, 19 
 
 S. W. Rep. 469), 83. 
 Durch v. Chippewa (00 Wis. 227), 
 
 242. 
 Dure v. Eady (6 Dowl. P. Cas. 615), 
 
 358. 
 Durfee v. Abbott (61 Mich. 471), 144. 
 Durfee v. Knowles (50 Hun, 601 ; 2 
 
 N. Y. S. 466), 353. 
 Durham v. Shannon (116 Ind. 403; 
 
 19 N. E. Rep. 190), 57. 
 Durkee v. Cent. P. Ry. Co. (69 Cal. 
 
 533), 57. 
 Durkee v. Leland (4 Vt. 612), 174. 
 Durkee v. Railroad Co. (29 Vt. 127), 
 
 33. 
 Durkin v. Cobleigh (156 Mass. 108; 
 
 30 N. E. Rep. 474), 212. 
 Durnellv. Sowden (5 Utah Rep. 516; 
 
 14 Pac. Rep. 335), 140. 
 Durrett v. State (62 Ala. 434), 334. 
 Dursly v. Fitzhardiug (6 Ver. 257), 
 
 303.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 lxv 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Durst v. Masters (L. R. lOProb. Div. 
 
 373-378), 38a. 
 Dury v. Hervey (126 Mass. 517), 79. 
 Duryea v. Granger (G6 Mich. 593 ; 33 
 
 N. W. Rep. 730) 309. 
 Duryea v. Vosburgh (121 N. Y. 57; 
 
 24 N. E. Rep. 308), 73a. 
 Dusenbury v. Hoadly (63 Hun, 629; 
 
 SON. Y. S. 911), 60. 
 Dutch, etc. Co. v. Mooney 12 Cal. 
 
 585), 242. 
 Duttenhofer v. State (34 Ohio St. 91), 
 
 174. 
 Dutton v. Wordman (9 Cush. 225), 
 
 153. 
 Duval v. Covenhoven (4 Wend., 
 
 N. Y, 561), 77. 
 Dwelly, In re (46 Me. 477, 480), 166. 
 Dwiggins v. Cook (71 Tnd. 579), 150a. 
 Dwinell v. Pottle (3 Me. 167), 60. 
 Dwinelle v. Rowland (1 Abb. Pr., 
 
 N. Y, 87), 359.. 
 Dwinnell v. Larrabee (33 Me. 464), 
 
 126. 
 Dworak v. More (41 N. W. Rep. 777 ; 
 
 25 Neb. 735, 741), 148. 
 
 Dwyer v. Bassett (1 Tex. Civ. App. 
 
 513), 9, 57, 120. 
 Dwyer v. Brenham(65 Tex. 526), 242. 
 Dwyer v. Dunbar (5 Wall., U. S., 
 
 318), 32. * 
 Dwyer v. Rippetoe (72 Tex. 520), 124, 
 
 366. 
 Dye v. Young (55 Iowa, 433), 67. 
 Dyer v. Dyer (87 Ind. 13), 222. 
 Dyer v. Fredericks (63 Me. 173), 30. 
 Dyer v. Irving (2 Dem. 160), 129. 
 Dyer v. Last (51 111. 179), 244. 
 Dyer v. Smith (12 Conn. 384), 143. 
 Dyson v. Wood (3 B. & C. 449, 451), 
 
 147. 
 
 E. 
 
 Eager v. Crawford (76 N. Y. 97), 210. 
 Eagle v. Emmett (4 Bradf., N. Y, 
 
 117), 233. 
 Eakins v. Eakins (Ky., 1S93, 20 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 285), 231. 
 
 Eakle v. Clark (30 Md. 322), 67. 
 Eames v. Eames (41 N. II. 176), 231. 
 Earl v. Camp (16 Wend., N. Y, 562), 
 
 150a. 
 Earl v. People (73 111. 329)), 324. 
 Earl v. Tupper (45 Vt. 275), 52. 
 Earl Spencer v. Peek (L. R. 3 Eq. 
 
 415), 363. 
 Earl of Suffolk v. Green (1 Atk. 450), 
 
 363. 
 Early v. Com. (86 Va. 921; 11 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 795), 95. 
 Early v. Lake Shore, etc. Co. (30 
 
 Atn. & Eng. R. Cas. 163), 8. 
 Early v. State (9 Tex. App. 476), 141. 
 Easley v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (113 
 
 Mo. 236; 20 S. W. Rep. 107), 375. 
 Eason v. Chapman (21 111. 35), 349, 
 
 350. 
 Eastern Lum. Co. v. Gill (9 Pa. Co. 
 
 Ct. R. 630), 347. 
 Eastern Trans. Co. v. Hope (95 U. S. 
 
 297), 198. 
 Eastman v. Crosby (90 Mass. 206), 
 
 242. 
 Eastman v. Martin (19 N. H. 152), 
 
 53. 
 East Tenn. etc. Co. v. Davis (8 S. 
 
 Rep. 349; 91 Ala. 615), 36. 
 East Tenn. etc. Co. v. Fleetwood 
 
 (Ga., 1893, 15 S. E. Rep. 778), 
 
 252. 
 East Tenn. etc. Co. v. Hesters (90 
 
 Ga. 11; 15 S. E. Rep. 828), 374. 
 East Tenn. etc. Co. v. Markins (13 
 
 S. E. Rep. 855; S8 Ga. 60), 11. 
 East Tenn. etc. Co. v. Turvaville 
 
 (Ala., 1893, 12 S. Rep. 63), 369, 
 
 370. 
 East Tenn. etc. Co. v. Watson (90 
 
 Ala. 41 ; 7 S. Rep. 813), 188. 
 East Tenn. etc. Co. v. Wright (76 
 
 Ga. 532), 198. 
 East Tenn. Iron Co. v. Gaskell (3 
 
 Lea, 742), 238. . 
 East Tenn., V. & G. R. Co. v. Arnold 
 
 (89 Tenn. 107; 14 S. W. Rep. 
 
 439), 362.
 
 lxvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 East Term., V. & G. R. Co. v. Maloy 
 
 (77 Ga. 237), 50, 73a. 
 Eaton v. Alger (47 N. Y. 451), 247. 
 Eaton v. Avery (83 N. Y. 31), 242. 
 Eaton v. Badger (33 N. H. 228), 232. 
 Eaton v. Cook (25 N. J. Eq. 55), 265. 
 Eaton v. Tallmadge (24 Wis. 217), 
 
 53. 
 Eaton v. Telegraph Co. (68 Me. 63), 
 
 76, 82, 83. 
 Ebersole v. Rankin (102 Mo. 488; 15 
 
 S. W. Rep. 422), 130. 
 Ebert v. Ebert (5 Md. 353), 234. 
 Eborn v. Zimpleman (47 Tex. 519), 
 
 38a. 
 Ecker v. Bank (64 Md. 292 ; 1 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 849), 237. 
 Eckert v. Rule (51 Kan. 703; 32 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 657), 380. 
 Eckert v. Triplett (48 Ind. 174), 66. 
 Eckford v. Eckford (Iowa, 1893, 53 
 
 N. W. Rep. 345), 222. 
 Eckles v. Bate3 (26 Ala. 655), 192. 
 Eckstein, In re (24 Atl. Rep. 63; 3 
 
 W. N. C. 59 ; 10 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 
 
 41), 354a. 
 Eddy v. Lowry (Tex., 1894, 24 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 1076), 336. 
 Eddy v. McCall (71 Mich. 497; 39 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 734), 50. 
 Eddy v. Newton (Tex., 1893, 22 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 533), 376. 
 Ede v. Johnson (15 Cal. 53), 240. 
 Edelin v. Sanders (8 Md. 118), 141. 
 Edgar v. Ricbardson (33 Obio St. 
 
 581), 38. 
 Edgerly v. Emerson (23 N. H. 555), 
 
 211. 
 Edie v. E. I. Co. (2 Burr. 1226), 242. 
 Edington v. Mut. L. Ins. Co. (67 
 
 N. Y. 186), 178. 
 Edison Elec. Co. v. United States 
 
 Elec. Co. (44 Fed. Rep. 294), 173. 
 Edmansen v. Andrews (35 111. App. 
 
 223), 8. 
 Edmonston v. Henry (45 Mo. App. 
 
 346), 140. 
 Edso v. Munsell (10 Allen, 557), 229. 
 
 Edwards v. Crenshaw (30 Mo. App. 
 
 510), 347. 
 Edwards v. Ford (2 Bailey, S. C, 
 
 461), 80. 
 Edwards v. Osmond (84 Tex. 656; 
 
 19 S. W. Rep. 868), 31. 
 Edwards v. State (21 Ark. 512), 234. 
 Edwards v. Sullivan (8 Ired., N. C. f 
 
 302), 354&. 
 Edwards v. Tracy (62 Pa. St. 374), 
 
 38, 69. 
 Edwards v. Tyler (141 111. 454; 31 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 312), 71. 
 Edwards v. Wall (79 Va. 321), 223. 
 Edwards v. Watertown (59 Hun, 
 
 620 ; 13 N. Y. S. 309), 56. 
 Egan v. Murray (80 Iowa, 180; 45 
 
 N. W. Rep. 563), 139. 
 Egery v. Buchanan (5 Cal. 56), 150a. 
 Eggers v. Eggers (57 Ind. 461), 190. 
 Egler v. People (56 N. Y. 642), 192. 
 Egleton v. Gutteridge (11 M. & W. 
 
 468), 128. 
 Egleton v. Knickerbocker (6 Barb., 
 
 N. Y, 458), 211. 
 Eble's Will, In re (41 N. W. Rep. 627 ; 
 
 73 Wis. 445), 233. 
 Ehrisman v. Scott (5 Ind. App. 596; 
 
 32 N. E. Rep. 867), 339. 
 Eichelberger v. Sifford (27 Md. 320), 
 
 131, 134. 
 Eichenlaub v. St. Joseph (21 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 8;- 113 Mo. 395), 143. 
 Eidam v. Finnegan (48 Minn. 53 ; 50 
 
 N. W. Rep. 933), 371. 
 Eidt v. Cutter (127 Mass. 523), 201. 
 Eiland v. State (52 Ala. 322), 93, 102. 
 Eisenlord v. Clum (67 Hun, 518; 22 
 
 N. Y. S. 574), 11. 
 Eisenlord v. Clum (126 N. Y. 552; 27 
 
 N. E. Rep. 1024). 53. 
 Eisenlord v. Eisenlord (2 N. Y. S. 
 
 123), 309. 
 Eisfield v. Dill (71 Iowa, 442), 141. 
 Ekinton v. Brick (44 N. J. Eq. 154), 
 
 197. 
 Elberfeldt v. Waite (79 Wis. 284), 
 
 124.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 lxvii 
 
 Heferences are to sections. 
 
 Elberson v. Richards (42 N. J. L. 70), 
 
 23. 
 Eld v. Gorham (20 Conn. 8), 141. 
 Elder v. Oliver (30 Mo. App. 575), 
 
 354. 
 Eldon v. Burlingame (G2 Iowa, 32), 
 
 143a. 
 Elgin v. Hall (82 Va. 680), 129. 
 Elgin v. Welch (23 111. App. 185), 
 
 124. 
 Eliot v. Eliot (10 Allen, 357), 138. 
 Elizabethtown v. Lefler (23 111. 90), 
 
 143a. 
 Elizando v. State (31 Tex. Crim. Rep, 
 
 237), 323. 
 Elkhart v. Whitman (122 Ind. 538), 
 
 341. 
 Ellen v. Lewison (88 Cal. 253; 26 
 
 Pac. Rep. 109), 7. 
 Ellerman v. Stockyards (49 N. J. Eq. 
 
 217; 23 Atl. Rep. 257), 250. 
 Ellice v. Roupell (32 Beav. 299), 363. 
 Elling v. Thextcn (7 Mont. 330; 16 
 
 Pac. Rep. 931), 239. 
 Ellingwood v. Bragg (52 N. H. 488), 
 
 141. 
 Elliot v. McClelland (71 Ala. 206), 
 
 143. 
 Elliott v. Pearl (10 Pet. 412), 114. 
 Elliott v. Pearsoll (1 Pet. 328), 53, 
 
 136. 
 Elliott v. State (34 Neb. 48 ; 51 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 315), 316. 
 Elliott v. Van Buren (33 Mich. 49), 
 
 188, 194. 
 Elliott v. Wanamaker (155 Pa. St. 
 
 67; 25 Atl. Rep 826), 11. 
 Ellis v. Bank (7 How. U. S., 294), 
 
 214. 
 Ellis v. Bristol (1 Gray. Mass., 370), 
 
 140. 
 Ellis v. Burrel (60 Me. 209), 6. 
 Ellis v. Dempsey (4 W. Va. 126), 69. 
 Ellis v. Eastman (32 Cal. 447), 212. 
 Ellis v. Ellis (33 Mass. 469), 222. 
 Ellis v. Houston (L. R. 10 Ch. Div. 
 
 236), 222. 
 Ellis v. Park (8 Tex. 205), 233, 239. 
 
 Ellis v. Reddin (12 Kan. 306), 210. 
 Ellis v. Rompell (32 Beav. 299), 363. 
 Ellis v. State (65 Miss. 44), 89. 
 Ellis v. State (25 Fla. 702 ; 6 S. Rep. 
 
 768), 337. 
 Ellis v. State (Tex., 1893, 24 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 894), 114, 197. 
 Ellis v. Stewart (Tex., 1894, 24 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 585), 308. 
 Ellis v. Ward (137 111. 509), 380. 
 Ellison v. Wilson (36 Vt. 67), 134. 
 Ellmaker v. Ellmaker (4 Watts, Pa., 
 
 89, 221. 
 Ellsworth v. Insurance Co. (105 
 
 N. Y. 624), 30. 
 Ellsworth v. Nelson (81 Iowa, 57), 
 
 239. 
 Elrnborg v. St. Paul C. R. Co. (51 
 
 Minn. 70; 52 N. W. Rep. 639), 
 
 378. 
 Elmendorf v. Taylor (10 Wheat. 
 
 152), 242. 
 Elmer v. Marsh (3 Ind. App. 558), 
 
 366. 
 Elmer v. Mut. Ben. L. Ass'n (19 N. 
 
 Y. S: 289), 250. 
 Elmore v. State (Ala., 1893; 13 S. 
 
 Rep. 427), 80. 
 Elrod v. Alexander (4 Heisk. 342), 
 
 237. 
 Elsas v. Second Av. R. R. Co. (9 N. 
 
 Y. S. 210; 56 Hun, 161), 192. 
 Elting v. Dayton (63 Hun, 629; 17 
 
 N. Y. S. 849), 18. 
 Elting v. Scott (2 Johns., N. Y., 157), 
 
 176. 
 Elting v. United States (27 Ct. CI. 
 
 158), 288. 
 Elwood v. Deifendorf (5 Barb. 498), 
 
 67, 76. 
 Elyton L. Co. v. McElrath (53 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 763), 231. 
 Emeri'c v. Alvaredo (61 Cal. 529), 234. 
 Emanual v. Gates (53 Fed. Rep. 772), 
 
 142. 
 Emerson v. Fisk (6 Greenl. 200), 126. 
 Emerson v. Lowell G. L. Co. (6 
 
 Allen, 148), 208.
 
 fxviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Emerson v. Mills (83 Tex. 385), 226. 
 Emery v. Bos. Marine Ins. Co. (138 
 
 Mass. 398), 216. 
 Emery v. Fowler (39 Me. 326), 124, 
 
 151. 
 Emley v. Drum (36 Pa. St. 123), 150a. 
 Emmons v. Oldham (12 Tex. 18), 218. 
 Empire Manuf. Co. v. Stuart (46 
 
 Mich. 482), 139, 139a. 
 Empire Pass. Ry. Co., Appeal of (19 
 
 Atl. Rep. 629 ; 26 W. N. C. 26), 
 
 140. 
 Enders v. McDonald (5 Ind. App. 
 
 297; 31 N. E. Rep. 1056), 233. 
 Engle v. Smith (82 Mich. 1 ; 46 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 21), 8. 
 Engles v. Bruington (4 Yeates, Pa. , 
 
 345), 131. 
 English v. Sprague (33 Me. 440), 147. 
 Engraving Co. v. Hoke (30 Fed. Rep. 
 
 444), 241. 
 Ennis v. Smith (14 How., U. S., 400). 
 
 143, 242. 
 Ennor v. Hodson (28 111. App. 445), 
 
 139. 
 Ennor v. Thompson (46 111. 215), 136. 
 Enos v. Garrett (2 Pa. Dis. Co. R. 86), 
 
 332. 
 Enos v. St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins. 
 
 Co. (S. D., 1894, 57 N. W. Rep. 
 
 919), 192, 199, 226. 
 Ensign v. McKinney (30 Hun, N. Y., 
 
 249), 108. 
 Eppert v. Hall (133 Ind. 417; 31 
 
 N. E. Rep. 74), 350. 
 Epping v. Mockler (55 Ga. 376), 205. 
 Epps v. State (102 Ind. 539), 188, 190. 
 Epps v. State (19 Ga. 102), 343. 
 Equator M. & S. Co. v. Gunella (18 
 
 Colo. 548 ; 33 Pac. Rep. 613), 200, 
 
 209. 
 Equitable M. Co. v. Kempner (84 
 
 Tex. 102), 136. 
 Equitable Mut. Life Ace. Ass'n v. 
 
 McCluskey (1 Colo. App. 473, 29 
 
 Pac. Rep. 383), 52. 
 Ericksen v. Schuster (44 Minn. 441), 
 
 20. 
 
 Erickson v. Brant (Minn., 1893, 55 
 
 N. W. Rep. 62), 208. 
 Erickson v. Draskowski (94 Mich. 
 
 551), 199. 
 Erie & Pac. Des. v. Stanley (123 111. 
 
 158; 14 N. E. Rep. 212), 144. 
 Ervin v. Bevil (80 Tex. 332), 362. 
 Ervin v. Ervin (18 Civ. Pro. Rep. 11), 
 
 309. 
 Erwin v. English (61 Conn. 502 ; 23 
 
 Atl. Rep. 753), 58. 
 Eskridge v. Railroad Co. (89 Ky. 367 ; 
 
 12 S. W. Rep. 580), 186. 
 Eskridge v. State (25 Ala. 30), 91. 
 Espey v. Comer (76 Ala. 501), 69. 
 Estes v. Fry (94 Mo. 266), 214. 
 Estill v. Taul (2 Yerger, 467, 470), 
 
 152. 
 Estman v. St. Anthony, etc. Co. (43 
 
 Minn. 60; 44 N. W. Rep. 882), 
 
 217. 
 Ethredge v. Hobbs (77 Ga. 251), 330. 
 Etowah G. M. Co. v. Exter (Ga., 
 
 1893, 16 S. E. Rep. 991), 377. 
 Euless v. McAdams (108 N. C. 507), 
 
 222. 
 Eureka Ins. Co. v. Robinson (56 Pa. 
 
 St. 256), 50. 
 Eureka Vinegar Co. v. Gazette (35 
 
 Fed. Rep. 570), 237, 244. 
 Evans v. Eaton (7 Wheat. 356), 303. 
 Evans v. Evans (155 Pa. St. 572; 20 
 
 Atl. Rep. 755), 71. 
 Evans v. Getting (6 C. & P. 586), 145. 
 Evans v. Grissom (40 N. J. L. 549), 
 
 222. 
 Evans v. Hettich (7 Wheat. 453), 303, 
 
 317. 
 Evans v. Montgomery (Mich., 1893, 
 
 55 N. W. Rep. 362), 79. 
 Evans v. Phelps (12 Mich. 27), 194. 
 Evans v. Railroad Co. (5 Phila. Rep. 
 
 512), 242. 
 Evans v. Rees (12 Ad. & El. 55), 
 
 280. 
 Evans v. Roberts (5 B. & C. 836), 262. 
 Evans v. State (Ark., 1893, 22 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 1026), 57, 101.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 lxix 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Evanston v. Gunn (99 U. S. GCO), 
 
 III. 
 Evansville, etc. Co. v. Fettig (130 
 
 Intl. 61), 188. 
 Evansville, etc. Co. v. Maddox (Ind., 
 
 1893, 34 N. E. Rep. 511), 232. 
 Evansville, etc. Co. v. Weikle (Ind., 
 
 1893, 33 N. E. Rep. 639), 380. 
 Evarts v. United States M. Ace. Ins. 
 
 Co. (61 Hun, 624), 24. 
 Everett v. Lowdhaui (5 C. & P. 91), 
 
 330. 
 Everett v. State (62 Ga. 65), 52. 
 Everett v. State (18 Tex. App. 682; 
 
 18 S. W. Rep. 674), 174. 
 Everett v. Tidball (34 Neb. 803), 361. 
 Eversole v. Rankin (102 Mo. 488), 31. 
 Everson v. Mayhew (85 Cal. 1 ; 21 
 
 Pac. Rep. 431), 31. 
 Ewing v. Bailey (36 111. App. 191), 
 
 316. 
 Ewing v. Gay (12 Ind. 64), 70. 
 Ewing v. Smith (132 Ind. 205), 208. 
 Ewing v. State (16 S. W. Rep. 872), 
 
 58. 
 Ewing v. Wilson (132 Ind. 223; 31 
 
 N. E. Rep. 64), 132. 
 Express Co. v. Aldine Press (126 Pa. 
 
 St. 347), 129. 
 Eysamen, In re (113 N. Y. 62), 309, 
 
 367. 
 Eyster v. Hathaway (50 111. 522), 137. 
 
 F. 
 
 Fabyan v. Russell (38 N. H. 84), 244. 
 Fain v. Cornett (25 Ga. 1S8), 374. 
 Fairbanks v. Erwin (15 Colo. 366), 
 
 247. 
 Fairbury v. Rodgers (98 111. 554), 198. 
 Falk v. Gast Lith. Co. (54 Fed. Rep. 
 
 890), 62. 
 Fairchild v. Basconib (35 Vt. 308, 
 
 415), 188, 197. 
 Faircbild v. Dennison (4 Watts, 278), 
 
 60. 
 Fairfax F. M. Co. v. Cbambers (Md., 
 
 1893, 23 Atl. Rep. 1024), 19. 
 
 Fairly v. Fairly (38 Miss. 280), 105. 
 Faivre v. Daley (93 Cal. 663), 8. 
 Fall v. Glover (34 Neb. 522 ; 52 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 168), 208. 
 Fall v. Roper (3 Head, Tenn., 285), 
 
 130. 
 Fallin v. State (83 Ala. 5), 350. 
 Falls Land Co. v. Chisolm (71 Tex. 
 
 523; 9S. W. Rep. 479), 141. 
 Fallman v. B. & O. R. Co. (45 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 156), 150a. 
 Falvey v. Richmond (87 Ga. 99), 343. 
 Falvey v. Jackson (132 Ind. 176), 368. 
 Fant v. Sprig (50 Md. 551), 207. 
 Farkas v. State (60 Miss. 847), 123. 
 Farley v. Deslonde (69 Tex. 458), 217. 
 Farmer v. Grove (24 Cal. 169), 223. 
 Farmers' Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. 
 
 (40 Minn. 152), 311. 
 Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bair 
 
 (87 Pa. St. 124), 334. 
 Farncombv. Stern (18 Colo. 279; 32 
 
 Pac. Rep. 612), 13. 
 Farnswith v. Brigg (6 N. H. 561), 
 
 150. 
 Farrar v. Bolles (55 Tex. 193), 244. 
 Farrar v. Farrar (4 N. H. 191), 265. 
 Farrar v. Stackpole (6 Greenl. 154), 
 
 216. 
 Fairell v. Bean (10 Md. 217), 208. 
 Farrell v. Ladweli (21 Wis. 182), 106. 
 Farrell v. Weitz (Mass., 1S94, 35 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 783), 79. 
 Farrington v. Hayes (65 Vt. 153; 25 
 
 Atl. Rep. 1091), 58. 
 Farris v. Com. (Ky., 1890, 1 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 729), 231. 
 Fathere v. Lawrence (33 Miss. 622), 
 
 138. 
 Faulkner v. Faulkner (84 Ga. 73), 
 
 190. 
 Faulkner v. Territory (N. M., 1S93, 
 
 30 Pac. Rep. 96), 6, 38, 249. 
 Faulkner v. Williman (Ky., 1891, 16 
 
 S. W. Rep. 352), 232. 
 Faw v. Meals (65 Ga. 711), 73a. 
 Fawcett v. Linthecum (7 Ohio Cir. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 141), 280.
 
 Ixx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Faxon v. Folvey (110 Mass. 392), 
 
 246. 
 Faxon v. Hollis (13 Mass. 427), 60. 
 Fay v. Harlan (12S Mass. 244), 52. 
 Fay v. Swan (44 Mich. 544), 192. 
 Fearn v. West Jersey Ferry (143 Pa. 
 
 St. 122), 363. 
 Feather v. Reading (155 Pa. St. 187), 
 
 341. 
 Fechheimer v. Trounstine (13 Colo. 
 
 386), 208. 
 Fee v. Taylor (83 Ky. 264), 9, 140. 
 Feeley v. Steinmetz (22 Pa. St. 437), 
 
 355. 
 Feeney v. L. I. R. R. Co. (116 N. Y. 
 
 380), 178. 
 Felder v. State (5 S. W. Rep. 145; 23 
 
 Tex. App. 477), 80, 102. 
 Fell v. Young (63 111. 106), 107. 
 Fellows v. Menasha (11 Wis. 558), 
 
 242. 
 Fellows v. Smith (130 Mass. 78), 66, 
 
 115. 
 Fellows v. Williamson (1 M. & M. 
 
 306), 56, 69. 
 Felsenthal v. State (30 Tex. App. 
 
 075), 10. 
 Felter v. Mulliner (2 Johns. 181), 
 
 146. 
 Felts v. Clapper (69 Hun, 373), 249. 
 Fenlon v. Dempsey (50 Hun, 131 ; 21 
 
 Ahb. N. C. 291), 231, 288, 332. 
 Fenner v. London & S. E. Ry. Co. 
 
 (L. R. 7 Q. B. 767), 168. 
 Fennimore v. Childs (1 Halst, N. J., 
 
 386), 79. 
 Fenton v. Miller (94 Mich. 204), 134. 
 Fenton v. State (100 Ind. 90), 241. 
 Fenwick v. Bell (1 C. & K. 312), 
 
 198. 
 Fenwick v. Ratcliffe (6 T. B. Mom, 
 
 Ky., 154), 208. 
 Ferbrach v. Martin (Idaho, 1893, 32 
 
 Pac. Rep. 252), 51. 
 Ferdinand v. State (39 Ala. 706), 
 
 238. 
 Ferguson v. Harwood (7 Cranch, 
 
 408), 18, 148. 
 
 Ferguson v. Hubbell (97 N. Y. 507), 
 
 199. 
 Ferguson v. McBean (91 Cal. 63), 
 
 174. 
 Ferguson v. Wright (N. C, 1894, 18 
 
 S. E. Rep. 691), 114. 
 Ferrari v. Murray (152 Mass. 496), 7. 
 Ferrers v. Shirley (Fitzgibbon, 195), 
 
 139. 
 Ferris v. Hard (135 N. Y. 354), 76, 
 
 208. 
 Ferry v. Sampson (112 N. Y. 415), 
 
 232. 
 Fesenmyer v. Adcock (16 M. & W„ 
 
 449), 218. 
 Fesler v. Simpson (58 Ind. 83), 210. 
 Fetrill v. Fetrill (5 Jones' Eq. 61), 
 
 208. 
 Fiedler v. Stone (6 Cush., Mass., 
 
 340), 21. 
 Field v. Com. (Va., 1893, 16 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 835), 376. 
 Field v. Holland (6 Cranch, 8), 76. 
 Field v. Munson (47 N. Y. 221), 371. 
 Field v. United States (9 Pet., U. S., 
 
 183), 150a. 
 Fields v. State (32 N. E. Rep. 780), 
 
 10. 
 Fife v. Com. (29 Pa. St. 429), 3, 89. 
 Fifield v. Richardson (34 Vt. 410), 
 
 57. 
 File v. Springel (132 Ind. 312), 33. 
 Filer v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. (49 N. Y. 
 
 42), 193. 
 Filer, etc. Co. v. Johnson (63 Wis. 
 
 118), 358. 
 Filley v. Angell (102 Mass. 167), 50. 
 Finch v. Galligher (25 Abb. N. C. 
 
 404), 285. 
 Finch v. Gridley's Ex'rs (25 Wend., 
 
 N. Y.,469), 139. 
 Finelite v. Finelite (68 Hun, 82), 
 
 376. 
 Fink v. Hey (42 Mo. App. 295), 308. 
 Finley v. Bogan (20 La. Ann. 443), 
 
 207. 
 Finley v. St. Louis Ref. Co. (99 Mo. 
 
 559), 10.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 lxxi 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Finn v. Frink (84 Me. 201), 51. 
 Finn's Case (5 Rand., Va., 701), 121. 
 Finnegan v. Dugan (14 Allen, 197), 
 
 345. 
 Finnegan v. Fall River Gas Works 
 
 (Mass.. lt>93, 34 N. E. Rep. 523), 
 
 193. 
 Finney v. Callender (8 Minn. 41), 145. 
 Finney v. State (15 S. W. Rep. 175; 
 
 29 Tex. App. 1S4), 23. 
 Fire Ass'n v. Fleming (78 Ga. 733; 
 
 3 S. E. Rep. 420), 157. 
 Fire Ass'n v. Wickham (141 U. S. 
 
 564), 209. 
 ■First Church v. Holyoke M. Ins. Co. 
 
 (33 N. E. Rep. 572; 158 Mass. 
 
 475), 310. 
 First Nat. Bank v. Burkhardt (100 
 
 U. S. 692), 216. 
 First Nat. Bank v. Carson (60 Mich. 
 
 82), 128. 
 First Nat. Bank v. Clark (134 N. Y. 
 
 368), 374. 
 First Nat. Bank v. Cornell (41 Ohio 
 
 St. 401), 310. 
 First Nat. Bank v. Cunningham (48 
 
 Fed. Rep. 515), 159. 
 First Nat. Bank v. Doty (12 Pa. Co. 
 
 Ct. R. 287), 285. 
 First Nat. Bank v. Forest (44 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 246), 363. 
 First Nat. Bank v. Lowrey (Neh., 
 
 1893, 54 N. W. Rep. 568), 247. 
 First Nat. Bank v. McConnell (17 N. 
 
 Y. S. 422), 241. 
 First Nat. Bank v. North (S. D., 51 
 
 N. W. Rep. 96), 362. 
 First Nat. Bank v. William Ruehl 
 
 Co. (33 111. App. 121), 378. 
 Fischer v. Insurance Co. (35 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 544), 322. 
 Fischer v. King (53 Pa. St. 3), 128. 
 Fish v. Farvvell (33 111. App. 242), 
 
 276. 
 Fisher v. Fisher (131 Ind. 462), 124. 
 Fisher v. Fisher (129 N. Y. 654), 178. 
 Fisher v. Porch (10 N. J. Eq. 243), 
 
 304. 
 
 Fisher v. Railroad Co. (22 Oreg. 533), 
 
 186. 
 Fisher v. State (30 Tex. App. 502), 
 
 249. 
 Fisher v. Tucker (1 McCord, 175), 69. 
 Fisher's Appeal (132 Pa. St. 488), 
 
 223. 
 Fist v. Fist (3 Colo. App. 273; 32Pac. 
 
 Rep. 719), 378. 
 Fitch v. Bogue (19 Conn. 285), 130. 
 Fitch v. KennarJ (19 N. Y. S. 468), 
 
 350. 
 Fitch v. Pinckard (5 111. 78), 143a. 
 Fite v. Black (Ga., 1893, 17 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 349), 76. 
 Fitler v. Shotwell (7 W. & S. 14), 
 
 144. 
 Fitzgerald v. Brandt (36 Neb. 683; 
 
 54 N. W. Rep. 992), 377. 
 Fitzgerald v. Hart (17 S. W. Rep. 
 
 369), 11. 
 Fitzgerald v. Williams (148 Mass. 
 
 462), 50. 
 Fitzgibbons v. Brown (43 Me. 169), 
 
 10. 
 Fitzsimons v. Johnson (90 Tenn. 416), 
 
 159. 
 Fitzwater Peerage Case (10 CI. & 
 
 Fin. 193), 139. 
 Flack v. Andrews (86 Ala. 395), 146. 
 Flagg v. Mason (141 Mass. 64), 220. 
 Flagg v. People (40 Mich. 706), 95. 
 Flagler v. Wheeler (40 Hun, 125), 70. 
 Flanagan v. People (52 N. Y. 467). 
 
 231. 
 Flanagin v. Champion (1 Green Ch., 
 
 N. J., 51), 68. 
 Flanders v. Fay (40 Vt. 316), 214. 
 Flanigan v. Phelps (42 Minn. 186), 
 
 128. 
 Flannigan v. Neal (67 Tex. 629), 150a. 
 Flato v. Mulhall (72 Mo. 522), 230, 
 
 231. 
 Fleischner v. Kubli (20 Oreg. 323), 79. 
 Fleming v. Latham (48 Kan. 773), 13, 
 
 36. 
 Fleming v. McClure (1 Brev. 428), 
 
 242.
 
 Ixxii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Fleming v. Richardson (13 La. Ann. 
 
 414), 136. 
 Fleming v. Shepherd (83 Ga. 338), 
 
 368. 
 Fleming v. Stearns (Iowa, 1890, 44 
 
 N. W. Rep. 376), 68. 
 Fletcher v. Braddyle (3 Stark. 64), 
 
 230. 
 Fletcher v. Fuller (120 U. S. 534, 551, 
 
 552), 226. 
 Fletcher v. Memsur (5 Ind. 267), 128. 
 Fletcher v. State (Ga., 1893, 17 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 100), 6. 
 Flinn v. McGonnigle (9 W. & S., Pa., 
 
 75), 130. 
 Flint v. Clinton (12 N. H. 430), 131. 
 Flint v. Kennedy (33 Fed. Rep. 820), 
 
 337. 
 Flint v. Sheldon (13 Mass. 443), 223. 
 Flint's Estate, In re (Cal., 1893, 34 
 
 Pac. Rep. 863), 178. 
 Flood v. Mitchell (68 N. Y. 507), 337. 
 Flora v. Lee (5 111. App. 629), 143a. 
 Flower v. State (39 Ark. 209), 250. 
 Floyd v. Hamilton (33 Ala. 235), 74. 
 Floyd v. Ricks (14 Ark. 286), 142, 
 
 237. 
 Fluharty v. Beatty (22 W. Va. 698), 
 
 77. 
 Flynn v. Coffee (12 Allen, Mass., 
 
 133), 232. 
 Flynt v. Bodenhamer (80 N. C. 205), 
 
 142. 
 Fogal v. Page (59 Hun, 625), 309. 
 Fogal v. Perio (10 Bosw., N. Y., 100), 
 
 107. 
 Fogg v. Child (13 Barb., N. Y., 246), 
 
 73a. 
 Fogg v. Dennis (3 Humph., Tenn., 47), 
 
 131-139a. 
 Folger v. Mitchell (3 Pick., Mass., 
 
 396). 262. 
 Folk v. Vara (9 Rich. Eq. 303), 226. 
 Follansbee v. Walker (72 Pa. St. 230), 
 
 312. 
 Follett v. Jeffereyes (1 Price, N. S., 3), 
 
 174. 
 Folsom v. Cressy (73 Me. 270), 146. 
 
 Folsom v. Freeborn (13 R. I. 205), 
 
 229. 
 Fonda v. Burton (63 Vt. 353), 207. 
 Fontaine v. Sav. Inst. (57 Mo. 552), 
 
 226. 
 Foot v. Beecher (78 N. Y. 155), 66. 
 Foot v. Silliman (77 Tex. 208), 130. 
 Foote v. Bently (44 N. Y. 166), 30. 
 Footman v. Prendergast (2 Strob. 
 
 Eq.,S. C, 317), 166. 
 Forbes v. Darling (94 Mich. 621), 220. 
 Forbes v. Howard (4 R. I. 364), 188, 
 
 199. 
 Forbes v. McHaffle (32 Neb. 742), 
 
 150. 
 Forbes v. Wale (1 W. Bl. 532), 304. 
 Forbes v. Willard (37 How. Pr. 193),. 
 
 354a. 
 Force v. Dutcher (22 N. J. Eq. 453), 
 
 308. 
 Ford v. Cunningham (87 Cal. 409), 
 
 30, 130. 
 Ford v. Finney (35 Ga. 258), 262. 
 Ford v. Ford (7 Humph. 92), 349. 
 Ford v. State (Ga., 1893, 17 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 687), 354. 
 Fordyce v. McCants (51 Ark. 509), 50. 
 Fordyce v. Withers (1 Tex. Civ. App. 
 
 540; 20 S. W. Rep. 766), 8. 
 Forehand v. State (51 Ark. 553; 11 
 
 S. W. Rep. 766), 343. 
 Forehand v. State (13 S. W. Rep. 
 
 728 ; 56 Ark. 46), 239. 
 Foreman v. Weil (Ala., 1893, 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 815), 83. 
 Forrester v. Parker (14 Daly, 208), 
 
 134. 
 Forsuith v. State (21 N. H. 424), 232. 
 Forsyth v. Doolittle (120 U. S. 73), 
 
 188. 
 Fort Smith Oil Co. v. Slover(Ark., 
 
 1894, 24 S. W. Rep. 106), 57, 73a. 
 Fort Wayne v. Coombs (107 Ind. 75), 
 
 • 185. 
 Forth Worth, etc. Co. v. Greathouso 
 
 (82 Tex. 104), 188, 198. 
 Fort Worth, etc. Co. v. Hurd (Tex.. 
 
 1894, 24 S. W. Rep. 995), 199.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 lxxiii 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Fort Worth, etc. Co. v. Thompson 
 
 (Tex., 1893, 21 S. W. Rep. 137], 
 
 198. 
 Fort Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Wil- 
 son (24 S. W. Rep. 68G ; 3 Tex. 
 
 Civ. App. 583), 19S. 
 Fort Worth R. R. Co. v. Bank (84 
 
 Tex. 369). 220. 
 Foscue v. Lyon (55 N. Y. 621), 238. 
 Foss v. Heinkel (Cal., 1890, 25 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 762), 116. 
 Fossack v. Moody (39 111. App. 17). 
 
 211. 
 Foster v. Beals (21 N. Y. 247), 214. 
 Foster v. Dickinson (64 Vt. 233 ; 24 
 
 Atl. Rep. 253), 98, 188, 222, 348, 
 
 371. 
 Foster v. Hall (12 Pick. 89, 92), 168, 
 
 174. 
 Foster v. Neilson (2 Pet. 314), 242. 
 Foster v. Pierce (11 Cush. 438, 439), 
 
 354. 
 Foster v. Shaw (7 S. & R. 163), 124. 
 Foster v. State (Miss., 1893, 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 822), 344. 
 Foster v. Thrasher (45 Ga. 517), 69. 
 Foster v. Worthington (146 Mass. 
 
 607), 350. 
 Foster's Will (34 Mich. 237), 38a. 
 Fountain v. Menard (Minn., 1893, 55 
 
 N. W. Rep. 601), 262. 
 Fotheringham v. Adams Ex. Co. (34 
 
 Fed. Rep. 646), 176. 
 Foundry v. Hovey (21 Pick. 453), 
 
 288. 
 Fourth Nat. Bank v. Francklyn (120 
 
 U. S. 751), 242. 
 Fowler v. Insurance Co. (6 Cow., 
 
 N. Y., 673), 10. 
 Fowler v. Merrill (11 How., U. S., 
 
 375), 361. 
 Fowler v. Parks (48 Fed. Rep. 789), 
 
 241. 
 Fowler v. Richardson (32 111. App. 
 
 252), 211. 
 Fowler v. Savage (3 Conn. 90), 157. 
 Fowler v. Schafer (69 Wis. 23; 32 
 
 N. W. Rep. 292), 58. 
 
 Fowler v. Smith (153 Pa. St. 639), 
 
 214, 309. 
 Fowler v. Stimpson (79 Tex. 611), 
 
 115. 
 Fowler v. Strawberry Hill (74 Iowa, 
 
 ii I 1 ; 38 N. W. Rep. 521), 342. 
 Fox v. Baltimore Co. (34 W. Ya. 
 
 466), 35, 37. 
 Fox v. Com. (Ky., 1891, 1 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 396), 349. 
 Fox v. Jones (7 B. & C. 732), 140. 
 Fox v. McComb (63 Hun, 63:3), 207. 
 Fox v. Norton (9 Mich. 207), 69. 
 Fox v. Penin. W. L. & Color Works 
 
 (92 Mich. 243; 52 X. W. Rep. 
 
 623). 194, 195, 198. 
 Fox v. Railroad Co. (52 N. W. Rep. 
 
 623; 92 Mich. 243), 341. 
 Fox v. Reid (3 Johns. 477), 138. 
 Fox v. Spring L. Co. (89 Mich. 387), 
 
 11. 
 Foxv. Whitney (16 Mass. 118), 311. 
 Foxcroft v. Nevins (4 Greenl. 72), 
 
 73. 
 Foy v. Blackstone (31 111. 538), 205. 
 Foye v. Patch (132 Mass. 105), 139. 
 Frace v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. Co. 
 
 (22 N. Y. S. 958), 200. 
 Fraedrich v. Flieth (64 Wis. 184), 
 
 344. 
 Fraley v. Bentley (1 Dak. 25), 208. 
 Franceston v. Deering (41 N. H. 443), 
 
 246. 
 Francis v. Kirkpatrick Co. (52 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 824), 231. 
 Francis v. Ocean Ins. Co. (6 Cowen, 
 
 429), 143. 
 Francis v. Roosa (151 Mass. 532), 342. 
 Francisco v. Benepe (6 Mont. 243), 
 
 373. 
 Frank v. Reuter (22 S. W. Rep. 812), 
 
 31. 
 Frank v. Riggs (93 Ala. 252), 262. 
 Frankfort v. Anderson (3 A. K. 
 
 Marsh. 932), 131. 
 Franklin v. Baker (48 Ohio St. 296), 
 
 250. 
 Franklin v. State (69 Ga. 42), 38a.
 
 Ixxiv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Franklin Sav. Bank v. Taylor (23 
 
 N. E. Rep. 397), 151. 
 Franz Falk Brew. Co. v. Hirst (78 
 
 Tex. 192), 151. 
 Frary v. Gusha (59 Vt. 257), 222. 
 Fraser v. Marsh (2 Stark. 41), 73. 
 Frayes v. Worms (10 C. B. 149), 
 
 158. 
 Frazer v. Phelps (3 Sandf., N. Y., 
 
 741), 315. 
 Frazer v. State (19 S. W. Rep. 838; 
 
 56 Ark. 242), 351. 
 Frazier v. Railroad (38 Pa. St. 104), 
 
 10. 
 Frazier v. State (56 Ark. 242), 351. 
 Frear v. Evertsen (20 Johns. 142), 70, 
 
 288. 
 Frederick v. Case (28 111. App. 215), 
 
 199. 
 Freel v. Market St. etc. Co. (Cal., 
 
 1893, 31 Pac. Rep. 730), 178. 
 Freeland v. Herron (7 Cranch, 147), 
 
 79. 
 Freeman v. Adderson (119 U. S. 187), 
 
 157. 
 Freeman v. Britton (2 Harr., N. J., 
 
 191), 311. 
 Freeman v. Fogg (82 Mo. 408), 7. 
 Freeman v. Grant (132 N. Y. 32), 24. 
 Freeman v. Person (106 N. C. 251), 
 
 135. 
 Freeman v. Phillips (4 M. & S. 486, 
 
 497), 113, 114. 
 Freeman v. Thayer (33 Me. 76), 218. 
 Freeman v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (144 
 
 Mass. 572; 12 N. E. Rep. 372), 
 
 198. 
 Freeport v. Penrod (53 N. W. Rep. 
 
 74 ; 35 Neb. 273), 355. 
 Freer v. Williams (7 Baxt. 550, 556), 
 
 348. 
 French v. McGinnis (69 Tex. 19), 107, 
 
 232. 
 French v. Wade (35 Kan. 391), 73a. 
 French v. Ware (Vt., 1893, 26 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 1096), 168. 
 French v. Wilkinson (93 Mich. 322 ; 
 
 53 N. W. Rep. 530), 354. 
 
 Frezinski v. Newborg (43 111. App. 
 
 406), 186. 
 Frick v. Mill Co. (Kan., 1893, 32 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 1103), 214. 
 Frieberg v. Donovan (23111. App. 62), 
 
 77. 
 Frieden v. Lahens (2 Abb. App. Dec. 
 
 Ill), 362. 
 Friedman v. Railway Co. (7 Phila. 
 
 203), 102. 
 Friess v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. Co. 
 
 (67 Hun, 205), 354. 
 Frisk v. Reigelman (43 Minn. 137), 
 
 150a. 
 Fritch v. State (Ga., 1893, 16 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 102), 234. 
 Fritz v. Hathaway (19 Atl. Rep. 
 
 1011; 26 W. N. C. 273), 355. 
 Fritzler v. Robinson (70 Iowa, 300), 
 
 223. 
 Frizzell v. State (Tex., 1891, 16 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 751), 39. 
 Frost v. Blanchard (97 Mass. 155), 
 
 212. 
 Frost v. Cattle Co. (81 Tex. 505), 136, 
 
 210. 
 Frostburg, etc. v. Brace (51 Md. 508), 
 
 136. 
 Fruin v. Railroad (89 Mo. 397), 217. 
 Fruin Bambrick Co. v. Geist (37 Mo. 
 
 App. 509), 112. 
 Fry v. Bennett (28 N. Y. 324), 254. 
 Fry v. Com. (82 Va. 334), 10. 
 Fry v. Man. Trust Co. (23 Civ. Pro. 
 
 Rep. 520), 359. 
 Fryer v. Patrick (42 Md. 51), 222, 
 Fryer v. Rockefeller (63 N. Y. 268), 
 
 136. 
 Fuchs v. Fuchs (48 Mo. App. 18), 
 
 309. 
 Fuhrman v. London (13 S. & R. 386), 
 
 135. 
 Fulcher v. State (13 S. W. Rep. 750; 
 
 28 Tex. App. 465), 101, 346. 
 Fulham v. Hours (4 Atl. Rep. 652 ; 
 
 60 Vt. 351), 141. 
 Fulkerson v. Holmes (117 U. S. 389, 
 
 397), 53, 108.
 
 TABLE OF OASES. 
 
 lxxv 
 
 Beferences are to sections. 
 
 Fulkcrson v. Thornton (68 Mo. 4G8), 
 
 308. 
 Fulka v. St. Louis, etc. Co. (Ill Mo. 
 
 335; 19 S. W. Rep. 818), 250. 
 Fullenwider v. Fullenwider (53*Mo. 
 
 439), 237. 
 Fuller v. Carny (29 Hun, 47), 345. 
 Fuller v. Hampton (5 Conn. 416), 
 
 76. 
 Fuller v. Jackson (92 Mich. 197), 188. 
 Fuller v. Jamestown, etc. Co. (26 
 
 N. Y. S. 1078), 340. 
 Fuller v. Linzee (135 Mass. 468), 232. 
 Fuller v. State (30 Tex. App. 559 ; 17 
 
 S. W. Rep. 1108), 350. 
 Fulton v. Hood (34 Pa. St. 365), 
 
 141. 
 Furbush v. Godwin (25 N. H. 425), 
 
 207, 340. 
 Furnis v. Durgin (119 Mass. 500), 9. 
 Furst v. Second Ave. R. Co. (72 N. Y. 
 
 542), 73a. 
 Furst v. State (47 N. W. Rep. 1116; 
 
 31 Neb. 403), 93. 
 Furton v. N. Y. Recorder (22 N. Y. 
 
 S. 766; 3 Misc. Rep. 314), 186. 
 Futch v. State (90 Ga. 472; 16 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 102), 341. 
 
 G. 
 
 Gablick v. People (40 Mich. 292), 
 
 226. 
 Gadbois v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. 
 
 R. Co. (75 Iowa, 530), 341. 
 Gaddis v. State (Ga., 1893, 16 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 931), 376. 
 Gadsden v. Whaley (14 S. C. 210), 
 
 265. 
 Gady v. State (83 Ala. 51), 233. 
 Gaffield v. Scott (40 111. App. 380), 
 
 71. 
 Gage v. Smith (27 Conn. 7), 229. 
 Gainard v. Rochester City R. R. Co. 
 
 (2 N. Y. S. 470), 368. 
 Gaines v. Catron (1 Humph., Tenn., 
 
 514), 136. 
 Gaines v. Russ (20 Fla. 157), 304. 
 F 
 
 Gairiesworth v. Caldwell (81 Ga. 76), 
 
 317. 
 Gaiftsey v. Rhodes (63 Hun, 632), 79. 
 Galbraith v. Gallivan (78 Mo. 452), 
 
 135. 
 Galbraith v. McLain (84 III. 379), 
 
 73a. 
 Galbreath v. Cole (61 Ala. 139), 73a. 
 Galbreath v. Newton (45 Mo. App. 
 
 312), 23. 
 Galceran v. Noble (66 Ga. 367), 73a. 
 Gale v. People (26 Mich. 157), 339. 
 Galpin v. Page (18 Wall. 350), 234. 
 Gall, In re (9 N. Y. S. 426), 35. 
 Gall v. Gall (114 N. Y. 109), 368. 
 Gallagher v. Kilkeary (29 111. App. 
 
 415), 138. 
 Galland v. Jackman (26 Cal. 85), 129. 
 Gallaher v. State (28 Tex. App. 247), 
 
 234, 345. 
 Galle v. Tode (26 N. Y. S. 633), 174. 
 Gallegher v. Association (Pa., 1892, 
 
 24 Atl. Rep. 115, 138. 
 Galliams v. Kilfoy (94 Cal. 86), 150a. 
 Gallon v. Van Wormer (Tex., 1893, 
 
 21 S. W. Rep. 547), 11. . 
 Galveston City R. Co. v. Hewitt (67 
 
 Tex. 478), 12. 
 Galveston, etc. Co. v. Daniels (1 Tex. 
 
 Civ. App. 695), 129. 
 Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. 
 
 Smith (Tex., 1894, 24 S. W. Rep. 
 
 668), 336. 
 Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. 
 
 Wesch(Tex., 1893, 22 S. W. Rep. 
 
 957), 199. 
 Galvin v. Meridian Nat. Bank (129 
 
 Ind. 439), 247. 
 Galvin v. State (93 Ind. 650), 226. 
 Gamble v. Ross (44 111. App. 291), 380. 
 Gaudy v. State (23 Neb. 436 ; 40 N. 
 
 * W. Rep. 302), 281. 
 Gannon v. Stevens (13 Kan. 447), 
 
 124. 
 Gannon's Wills, Iu re (2 Misc. Rep. 
 
 329), 366, 369. 
 Gantier v. State (Tex., 1893, 21 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 255), 56.
 
 lxxvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Garber v. State (4 Cold., Tenn., 161, 
 
 165), 9. 
 Gardner v. Frieze (16 R. I. 640), 51. 
 Gantt v. Gantt (6 La. Ann. 667), 267. 
 Garden v. Cresvvell (2 M. & W. 319), 
 
 284. 
 Gardiner v. Miller (47 Cal. 570), 229. 
 Gardiner v. State (N. J. L., 1892, 
 
 26 Atl. Rep. 30), 6, 254. 
 Gardner v. Benedict (27 N. Y. S. 3), 
 
 226. 
 Gardner v. Col. Ins. Co. (7 Johns., 
 
 N. Y., 511), 149. 
 Gardner v. Eberhart (82 111. 316), 30. 
 Gardner v. Gardner (L. R. 2 App. 
 
 Cases, 723, 724), 225. 
 Gardner v. Minea (47 Minn. 295), 176. 
 Gardom v. Woodward (44 Kan. 
 
 758), 9. 
 Gardt v. Brown (13 111. 475), 217. 
 Garfield v. Knight's Ferry, etc. Co. 
 
 (14 Cal. 35), 73a. 
 Garland v. Denver (11 Colo. 534), 242. 
 Garling v. Van Allen (55 N. Y. 31), 
 
 240. 
 Garmon v. State (66 Miss. 196), 330. 
 Garn v. Working (Ind., 1893, 31 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 821), 232. 
 Garner v. Myrick (30 Miss. 448), 76. 
 Garner v. State (28 Fla. 113), 9. 
 Garrigan v. Dickey (1 Ind. App. 421, 
 
 27 N. E. Rep. 713), 371. 
 Garside v. Watch Case Co. (17 R. I. 
 
 691), 343. 
 Garth v. Caldwell (72 Mo. 622), 237. 
 Gartrell v. Stafford (12 Neb. 545), 139. 
 Gartside v. Outram (26 L. J. Ch. 113), 
 
 174. 
 Garvey v, Wayson (22 Md. 17S), 157. 
 Garvin v. State (52 Miss. 207), 345. 
 Garvin v. Wells (8 Iowa, 286), 242. 
 Gas Co. v. O'Brien (118 111. 174), 192. 
 Gastrell v. Phillips (64 Miss. 473), 
 
 120, 121. 
 Gates v. Chicago, etc. Co. (44 Mo. 
 
 App. 488), 188. 
 Gates v. Fleischer (67 Wis. 504 ; 30 
 
 N. W. Rep. 674), 193. 
 
 Gates v. Johnson (30 Tex. 144), 238. 
 Gates v. Salmon (46 Cal. 461), 262. 
 Gunl v. Willis (26 Pa. St. 259), 311. 
 Gaunt v. State (50 N. J. L. 491), 345. 
 Gauntlet v. Carter (17 Beav. 590), 
 
 150. 
 Gay v. Bates (99 Mass. 263), 75. 
 Gay v. Lloyd (1 Greene, Iowa, 78), 
 
 147. 
 Gay v. Palmer (1 Esp. 135), 68. 
 Gayheart v. Patten (Ky., 1893, 20 
 
 S. W. Rep. 912), 380. 
 Gayle v. Perryman (Tex., 1894, 24 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 850), 31. 
 Gaynor v. Old Colony R. R. (100 
 
 Mass. 208), 12. 
 Gazam v. Royce (78 Ga. 512), 356. 
 Gee y. Culver (13 Oreg. 598), 10. 
 Gee v. Gee (32 Miss. 190), 246. 
 Gee v. Seott (48 Tex. 510), 160. 
 Gehr v. Fisher (143 Pa. St. 311), 53. 
 Gelston v. Hoyt (3 Wheat. 246), 158. 
 Genet v. Lawyer (61 Barb. 21), 309. 
 Gentry v. State (5 S. W. Rep. 660; 
 
 24 Tex. App. 80), 89. 
 George v. Joy (19 N. H. 544), 337. 
 George v. Pilcher (28 Gratt, Va., 
 
 299), 352. 
 Georgia, etc. Co. v. Miller (Ga., 
 
 1893, 16 S. E. Rep. 939), 20. 
 Georgia, etc. Co. v. Strickland (80 
 
 Ga. 776; 6 S. E. Rep. 27), 130. 
 Gerard v. Cowperthwait (21 N. Y. S. 
 
 1092), 212. 
 Gerbig v. Railroad Co. (22 N. Y. S 
 
 21 ; 67 Hun, 649), 193. 
 Gerding v. Walter (29 Mo. 426), 220. 
 Gerlach v. Turner (89 Cal. 446), 84. 
 German Ins. Co. v. Penrod (35 Neb. 
 
 273), 282. 
 Gernan v. Navigation Co. (66 Hun, 
 
 633; 21 N. Y. S. 371), 231. 
 Geron v. Felder (15 Ala. 304), 148. 
 Gerry v. Post (13 How. Pr., N. Y., 
 
 118), 232. 
 Gerry v. Stimpson (60 Me. 186), 213. 
 Gertz v. Fitchburg (137 Mass. 77), 
 
 322.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 lxxvii 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Gerz v. Weber (151 Pa. St. 396), 309. 
 Getts v. Watson (18 Mo. 274), 129. 
 Getzlaff v. Seliger (43 Wis. 297), 173. 
 Gibbons v. Gentry (20 Mo. 4G8), 135. 
 Gibbons v. Pickett (31 Fia. 147; 12 
 
 S. Rep. 17), 150a. 
 Gibbs v. Phillipson (1 R. & My. 19), 
 
 287. 
 Giboney v. German Ins. Co. (48 Mo. 
 
 App. 185), 366. 
 Gibson v. Com. (87 Pa. St. 253), 166. 
 Gibson v. Foote (40 Miss. 788), 246. 
 Gibson v. Gibson (24 Mo. 227), 51. 
 Gibson v. Manuf. Co. (144 Mass. 83), 
 
 143. 
 Gibson v. Mut. Ins. Co. (37 N. Y. 
 
 584), 316. 
 Gibson v. Peebles (2 McCord, 418), 
 
 60. 
 Gibson v. State (23 Tex. App. 414), 
 
 10, 52. 
 Gibson v. Stevens (9 How., U. S., 
 
 384), 242. 
 Gibson v. Trowbridge (96 Ala. 357 ; 
 
 11 S. Rep. 365), 139, 140. 
 Giddings v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (90 Mo. 
 
 272), 205. 
 Gidney v. Logan (79 N. C. 214), 70. 
 Gifford v. Corrigan (117 N. Y. 257), 
 
 226. 
 Gifford v. Thomas (62 Vt. 34; 19 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 1088), 309. 
 Gilbert v. Anthony (1 Yerg. 69), 128. 
 Gilbert v. Duncan (29 N. J. L. 133, 
 
 521). 210. 
 Gilbert v. McGinnis (114 111. 48) 216. 
 Gilbert v. Simpson (6 Daly, 34), 139a. 
 Gilbert v. Thompson (9 Cush. 358), 
 
 350. 
 Gilbert v. West End St. Ry. Co. (36 
 
 N. E. Rep. 60), 39. 
 Gilbraith v. Gallivan (78 Mo. 452), 
 
 136. 
 Gilchrist v. Bate (8 Watts, 355), 52. 
 Gildersleeve v. Atkinson (27 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 477, N. M., 1891), 11. 
 Gildersleeve v. Caraway (10 Ala. 
 . 260), 124. 
 
 Cildorsleeve v. Mahoney(5Duer, 383), 
 
 80. 
 Giles v. Hunter (103 N. C. 194), 223. 
 Giles v. Vandiver (17 S. E. Rep. 115, 
 
 Ga., 1893), 79, 366. 
 Gill v. Ward (23 Ark. 16), 357. 
 Gilleland v. Martin (3 McLean, 490), 
 
 166. 
 Gillespie v. Moon (2 Johns. Ch. 585), 
 
 223. 
 Gilliam v. Parkinson (4 Rand., Va., 
 
 325), 131. 
 Gilliam v. State (1 Head, 38), 350. 
 Gillim v. Daviws Co. (Ky., 1890, 14 
 
 S. W. Rep. 838), 153. 
 Gillis v. Wilmington R. Co. (13 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 11), 130. 
 Gilman v. Sheets (43 N. W. Rep. 299), 
 
 231. 
 Gilman v. Stafford (50 Vfc. 723), 188. 
 Gilmanton v. Ham (38 N. H. 108), 
 
 345. 
 Gilmer v. Marks (46 Fed. Rep. 333), 
 
 152. 
 Gilmer v. Stone (120 U. S. 586), 222. 
 Gilmore v. Bangs (55 Ga. 403), 205. 
 Gilmore, In re (154 Pa. St. 523), 220. 
 Gilmore, In re (81 Cal. 240), 222. 
 Gilpin v. Daly (58 Hun, 610), 359. 
 Gilson v. Powell (13 Miss. 712), 77. 
 Gilston v. Hoyt (3 Wheat. 246), 158. 
 Gilyard v. State (Ala., 1893, 13 S. 
 
 Rep. 891), 350. 
 Gindrat v. People (138 111. 103; 27 
 
 N. E. Rep. 1085), i 9. 
 Ginterman v. People (111., 1892, 28 
 
 N. W. Rep. 1067), 249. 
 Girard v. Kalamazoo -(92 Mich. 610: 
 
 52 N. W. Rep. 1021), 186. 
 Gitchell v. Ryan (24 111. App. 372), 
 
 140. 
 Givens v. State (Tex., 1893, 21 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 44), 283. 
 Glande v. Post (43 La. Ann. 865), 
 
 158. 
 Glass v. Blackwell (48 Ark. 55), 151. 
 Glass v. Hulburt (102 Mass. 42), 222. 
 Glassell v. Mason (32 Ala. 719), 130.
 
 lxxviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Beferences are to sections. 
 
 Gleason v. Hamilton (138 N. Y. 353), 
 
 158. 
 Glenn v. Ligett (4? Fed. Rep. 472), 
 
 50. 
 Glenn v. Rogers (3 Md. 312), 127. 
 Glines v. Iron Hall (22 Civil Pro. R. 
 
 437; 20 N. Y. S. 275), 150a. 
 Globe Printing Co. v. Stahle (23 Mo. 
 
 App. 451), 233. 
 Glover v. Holliday (109 Mo. 108), 38. 
 Glover v. Thomas (75 Tex. 500), 32. 
 Goble v. Grant (2 Green Ch. 629), 
 
 231. 
 Goddard v. Gardner (28 Conn. 172), 
 
 168. 
 Goddard v. Gloninger (5 Watts, Pa., 
 
 209), 139. 
 Goddard v. Hill (33 Me. 582), 205. 
 Goddard v. Ingram (3 Q. B. 839), 69. 
 Godding v. Orcutt (44 Vt. 54), 60. 
 Godfrey v. Godfrey (17 Ind. 6), 242. 
 Godfrey v. Knodle (44 111. App. 638), 
 
 366. 
 Godfrey v. Templeton (2 Pickle, 
 
 Tenn., 161; 6 S. W. Rep. 47), 
 
 308. 
 Godwin v. Francis (1 L. R. C. P. 
 
 293), 33. 
 Goetz v. Kansas City Bank (119 U. 
 
 S. 318; 7 S. Ct. 318), 73a. 
 Goff v. Bank (47 N. W. Rep. 190 ; 78 
 
 Wis. 106), 57. 
 Goff v. State Bank (84 Wis. 369; 54 
 
 N. W. Rep. 732), 60. 
 Goldberg v. Wolff (10 N. Y. S. 544), 
 
 50. 
 Golden v. State (25 Ga. 527), 80. 
 Golden Gate Min. Co. v. Yuba Co. 
 
 (65 Cal. 187), 234. 
 Colder v. Mueller (22 111. App. 527), 
 
 77. 
 Goldman v. State (75 Md. 621; 23 
 
 Atl. Rep. 1097), 11. 
 Gold mark v. Metro. Opera H. Co. 
 
 (67 Hun, 652), 362. 
 Goldsmith v. Bane (8 N. J. L. 87), 
 
 139. 
 Goldsmith v. Picard (27 Ala. 142), 10. 
 
 Goldsmith v. Sawyer (46 Cal. 209), 
 
 242. 
 Goldsmith v. State (Tex., 1893, 23 
 
 S. W. Rep. 405), 283, 315. 
 Goldstein v. Black (50 Cal. 462, 465), 
 
 140. 
 Goldstone v. Davidson (19 Cal. 41), 
 
 147. 
 Goldstrohm v. Steiner (15 Pa. St. 28), 
 
 386. 
 Gommersol v. Cren (10 N. Y. S. 231), 
 
 75. 
 Goneding v. Hammond (49 Fed. Rep. 
 
 443), 206. 
 Gonring v. Railroad Co. (47 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 18; 78 Wis. 16), 282. 
 Gonzales v. State (30 Tex. App. 203), 
 
 283. 
 Gonzalia v. Bartelsman (143 111. 634; 
 
 32 N. E. Rep. 532), 139. 
 Gooch v. Bryant (13 Me. 386), 73a. 
 Good v. Knox (23 Atl. Rep. 520; 64 
 
 Vt. 97), 347. 
 Goodbutv. Scheeler(3Ind. App. 318), 
 
 22. 
 Goode v. State (32 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 505; 24 S. W. Rep. 102), 347. 
 Goodheart v. Ransley (28 Wkly. L. 
 
 Bui. 227), 231. 
 Goodhue v. Bartlett (5 McLean, 186), 
 
 139a, 360. 
 Goodhue v. Clark (37 N. H. 525), 
 
 222. 
 Gooding v. Underwood (89 Mich. 
 
 187), 82. 
 Goodman v. Kennedy (10 Neb. 270), 
 
 340. 
 Goodrich v. Tracy (43 Vt. 314), 71. 
 Goodrich v. Weston (102 Mass. 362), 
 
 30. 
 Goodright v. Mass (2 Cowp. 591), 
 
 113. 
 Goodsell v. Taylor (41 Minn. 207). 187. 
 Goodtitle v. Clayton (4 Burr. 3224), 
 
 328. 
 Goodwin v. Appleton (22 Me. 453), 
 
 239. 
 Goodwin v. Fox (129 U. S. 601), 202.
 
 TAI1I.K OF CASES. 
 
 1 xxi x 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Goodwin v. Goodwin (59 N. TI. 548), 
 
 211. 
 Goodwin v. Jack (62 Me. 416), 106. 
 Goodwin v. Monds (100 N. C. 448), 
 
 150a. 
 Goodwin v. O'Brien (6 N. Y. S. 239; 
 
 53 Hun, 637), 60. 
 Goodwin v. Smith (67 Ind. 101), 276. 
 Goodwin v. State (12 Miss. 520), 23. 
 Goodwin v. State (96 Ind. 550), 9. 
 Goodwin v. State (60 Ga. 509), 166. 
 Goodwin Company's Appeal (117 Pa. 
 
 St. 537), 171. 
 Goodyear v.Vosburgh (63 Barb. 154), 
 
 141,195. 
 Goodykoontz v. Olsen (54 Iowa, 174), 
 
 135. 
 Gordon, In re (N. J., 1893, 26 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 268), 141. 
 Gordon v. Bank (144 U. S. 97), 128. 
 Gordon v. Hobart (2 Sumn. 401), 242. 
 Gordon v. Leech (81 Ky. 229), 135, 
 
 136. 
 Gordon v. Parmlee (15 Gray, Mass., 
 
 413), 37. 
 Gordon v. Preston (1 Watts, Pa., 
 
 385), 131. 
 Gordon v. Price (10 Ired. L., N. C., 
 
 385), 139. 
 Gordon v. Ritnour (87 Mo. 54), 70. 
 Gordon v. Tweedy (74 Ala. 232), 237. 
 Gorev. Lewis (109 N. C. 539; 15 
 
 S. E. Rep. 909), 216. 
 Gore v. State (52 Ark. 285), 346. 
 Gorgas v. Hertz (150 Pa. St. 538), 127, 
 
 130. 
 Gorham v. Canton (5 Me. 266), 56. 
 Gorham v. Carroll (3 Litt., Ky., 121), 
 
 311. 
 Gorman v. Stanton (5 Mo. App. 585), 
 
 136. 
 Gormly v. Bringam (138 N. Y. 623), 
 
 24, 242. 
 Gorsuch v. Rutledge (70 Md. 272), 
 
 366. 
 Goshen v. England (119 Ind. 368), 80, 
 
 194. 
 Goss v. Turner (21 Vt. 437), 248. 
 
 Gough v. St. John (16 Wend., N. Y., 
 
 646), 10. 
 Gould v. Combs (1 C. B. 543), 218. 
 Gould v. Conway (59 Barb., N. Y., 
 
 355), 58. 
 Gould v. Jones (1 W. Bl. 384). 139. 
 Gould v. West (32 Tex. 338), 82. 
 Gould ing v. Hoyt (34 N. H. 148), 
 
 158. 
 Gove v. Downer (59 Vt. 139), 233. 
 Gove v. State (58 Ala. 391), 97. 
 Gower v. Emery (6 Shepl., Me., 79), 
 
 157. 
 Gower v. Stearnes (2 Whart, Pa., 
 
 75), 223. 
 Grace v. Lynch (80 Wis. 166), 214. 
 Grace v. Nesbitt (109 Mo. 3), 67. 
 Gracie v. Morris (22 Ark. 415), 30. 
 Grady v. Gosline (48 Ohio St. 665), 
 
 150a. 
 Grafton v. Reed (34 W. Va. 172), 142. 
 Graham v. Anderson (42 111. 514), 
 
 244. 
 Graham v. Gautier (21 Tex. 112), 249. 
 Graham v. Graham (23 W. Va. 36), 
 
 222. 
 Graham v. Graham (10 Ired. 219), 
 
 269. 
 Graham v. Larimer (83 Cal. 173; 23 
 
 Pac. Rep. 286), 341. 
 Graham v. McReynolds (90 Tenn. 
 
 673), 333, 341, 366. 
 Graham v. Selover (59 Barb., N. Y., 
 
 313), 69. 
 Graham v. Thompson (55 Ark. 296), 
 
 83. 
 Graham v. Whiteley (2 Dutch., N. J., 
 
 254), 158. 
 Gramm v. Boener (56 Ind. 497), 193. 
 Grand R. etc. Co. v. Huntley (38 
 
 Mich. 537), 52, 198. 
 Grand Trunk, etc. Co. v. Richardson 
 
 (91 U. S. 470), 229. 
 Granger v. Batcheldor (54 Vt. 348), 
 
 74. 
 Grant v. Hughes (96 N. C. 177 ; 2 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 339), 157. 
 Grant v. Levan (4 Pa. St. 393), 142.
 
 lxxx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Grant v. McLachlin (4 Johns. 34), 
 
 158. 
 Grant v. Oliver (91 Cal. 158), 30, 136. 
 Grant v. State (15 S. E. Rep. 488 ; 89 
 
 Ga. 393), 330. 
 Grant v. Thompson (4 Conn. 203), 
 
 197. 
 Grantier v. Austin (06 Hun, 157), 6. 
 Grass v. Hurlbert (102 Mass. 24, 41), 
 
 223. 
 Grattan v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. 
 
 (80 N. Y. 281, 297), 478. 
 Gratz v. Gratz (4 Rawle, Pa., 411), 
 
 262. 
 Grau v. Spangenberg (Minn., 1893, 
 
 54 N. W. Rep. 933), 254. 
 Graves v. Battle Creek (95 Mich. 266; 
 
 54 N. W. Rep. 757), 202, 211. 
 Graves v. Blondell (70 Me. 90), 84. 
 Graves v. Davenport (50 Fed. Rep. 
 
 881), 347. 
 Graves v. Dudley (20 N. H. 76), 211. 
 Graves v. Griffith (3 Wash. St. 742), 
 
 378. 
 Graves v.' Merchants', etc. Bank (82 
 
 Iowa, 637; 49 N. W. Rep. 65), 
 
 234. 
 Graves v. People (18 Colo. 170; 32 
 
 Pac. Rep. 63), 6, 54, 101, 102. 
 Graves v. Safford (41 111. App. 659), 
 
 309. 
 Graves v. Santway (6 N. Y. S. 892; 
 
 52 Hun, 613), 342. 
 Gray v. Daus (27 Conn. 447), 146. 
 Gray v. Kauffman (82 Tex. 65), 136. 
 Gray v. McLoughlin (26 Iowa, 279), 
 
 52. 
 ; Gray v. Pentland (2 S. & R. 23), 
 
 175. 
 Gray v. Pingrey (17 Vt. 419), 160. 
 Graybeal v. Gardner (146 111. 337; 34 
 
 N. E. Rep. 528), 248. 
 Grayson v. Brooks (64 Miss. 410), 
 
 208. 
 Grayson v. Buchanan (88 Va. 251 ; 
 
 13 S. E. Rep. 457), 376. 
 Greathouse Case (2 Abb., U. S., 382), 
 
 240. 
 
 Great W. R. R. Co. v. Bacon (30 111. 
 
 347), 250. 
 Great W. R. R. Co. v. Haworth (39 
 
 111. 349), 198. 
 Greasons v. Davis (9 Iowa, 219), 142. 
 Greaves v. Hunter (2 C. & P. 477), 
 
 139. 
 Green v. Abraham (43 Ark. 420), 
 
 135. 
 Green v. Armstrong (1 Denio, 550), 
 
 262. 
 Green v. Batson (71 Wis. 57), 208. 
 Green v. Beckney (3 Ind. App. 39), 
 
 128, 378. 
 Green v. Casilk (16 Md. 556), 337. 
 Green v. Cawthorne (4 Dev. L., N. 
 
 C, 409), 80, 334. 
 Green v. Edick (56 N. Y. 696), 308. 
 Green v. Godfrey (44 Me. 25), 136. 
 Green v. Gould (3 Allen, Mass., 465), 
 
 374. 
 Green v. Green (145 111. 264 ; 33 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 941), 269. 
 Green v. Mill (60 Vt. 442), 60. 
 Green v. Mumper (138 111. 434; 28 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 1075), 115. 
 Green v. North Buffalo (56 Pa. St. 
 
 110), 73a. 
 Green v. Pratt (11 Conn. 205), 60. 
 Green v. Sherrod (105 N. C. 197), 
 
 223. 
 Green v. State (88 Ga. 516), 89. 
 Green v. Vardiman (2 Blackf., Ind., 
 
 324), 304. 
 Greene v. Phenix Ins. Co. (134 111. 
 
 310), 346. 
 Greene v. State (Tex., 1891, 12 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 872), 352. 
 Greenfield v. People (85 N. Y. 75), 
 
 10. 
 Greening v. Keel (84 Tex. 326), 361. 
 Greenleaf v. Dubuque R. R. Co. (30 
 
 Iowa, 301), 53. 
 Greenleaf v. Quincy (12 Me. 11), 69. 
 Greenpugh v. Cass (64 N. H. 326), 
 
 222. 
 Greenough v. Greenough (11 Pa. St. 
 
 489), 138.
 
 TABLE OF OASES. 
 
 lx.xxi 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Greenough v. Guskell (1 My. & K. 
 
 98), 174. 
 Greenwich Ins. Co. v. Waterman (54 
 
 Fed. Rep. S39), 216. 
 Greer v. Covington (Ky., 1887, 2 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 323), 24. 
 Greer v. Greer (58 Hun, 251), 168, 
 
 171. 
 Greer v. Higgins (20 Kan. 420), 350. 
 Greer v. Louisville, etc. Co. (Ky., 
 
 1893, 21 S. W. Rep. 649), 145. 
 Gregg v. Mallett (111 N. C. 74; 15 
 
 S. E. Rep. 936), 226, 376. 
 Gregory v. Coleman (3 Tex. Civ. 
 
 A pp. 166; 22 S. W. Rep. 181), 
 
 370. 
 Gregory v. Walker (38 Ala. 26), 266. 
 Grey v. McDaniel (6 Bush, Ky., 480), 
 
 232. 
 Grider v. Mortgage Co. (Ala., 1893, 
 
 12 S. Rep. 775), 139. 
 Gridley v. College (137 N. Y. 527), 
 
 232. 
 Griel v. Lomax (94 Ala. 641), 11. 
 Griesheiuier v. Tanenbaum (8 N. Y. 
 
 S. 582: 55 Hun, 604), 60. 
 Griffen v. Griffen (125 111. 430; 17 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 782), 226, 309. 
 Griffin v. O'Neill (47 Kan. 116), 373. 
 Griffin v. Rice (1 Hilt., N. Y, 184), 
 
 216. 
 Griffin v. Salmon (6 Daly, 531), 218. 
 Griffin v. Smith (45 Ind. 366), 168. 
 Griffin v. State (26 Tex. App. 157; 
 
 20 S. W. Rep. 552), 283, 349. 
 Griffin, etc. Co. v. Joannes (80 Wis. 
 
 601), 11. 
 Griffing v. Harris (9 Port., Ala., 225), 
 
 311. 
 Griffith v. Avery (11 A. & E. 322), 
 
 139a. 
 Griffith v. Furry (30 111. 251), 221. 
 Griffith v. Happersberger (86 Cal. 
 
 605), 151. 
 Griffith v. Sauls (77 Tex. 630; 14 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 230), 80. 
 Griffith v. State (26 Tex. App. 157), 
 
 352. 
 Griffith v. Williams (1 T. R. 710), 74. 
 
 Griffith v. Williams (1 M. & R. 133), 
 
 140. 
 Grignon's Lessee v. Astor (2 How., 
 
 U. S„ 319), 232. 
 Grimmel v. Chicago, etc. Co. (73 
 
 Iowa, 93), 198. 
 Grimmer v. Carlton (93 Cal. 189), 76. 
 Grimnan v. Dean (62 Tex. 218), 83. 
 Grim wood v. Barrit (6 T. R. 460), 20. 
 Grinnell v. Deuison (12 Wis. 402), 
 
 276. 
 Griswold v. Gebbie (126 Pa. St. 353), 
 
 93. 
 Griswold v. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co. 
 
 (14 Daly, 484), 33. 
 Griswold v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co. 
 
 (115 N. Y. 61), 192. 
 Griswold v. Pitcairn (2 Cow. 85), 
 
 149. 
 Griswold v. State (24 Wis. 144), 199. 
 Groom v. State (23 Tex. App. 82), 23. 
 Gross v. Drager (66 Wis. 150), 208. 
 Gross v. Reddy (45 Pa. St. 406), 166. 
 Grover, etc. Co. v. Polhemus (34 
 
 Mich. 247), 73a. 
 Groves v. State (76 Ga. 808), 23. 
 Grub v. Simpsou (6 Heisk., Tenn., 
 
 92), 267. 
 Grunn v. Howeth (35 Ala. 144), 146. 
 Grunn v. Peakes (36 Minn. 177), 148. 
 Grusenmeyer v. Logansport (76 Ind. 
 
 549), 239. 
 Guardians v. Greene (5 Binn. 558), 
 
 220. 
 Guedel v. People (43 111. 226), 23. 
 Guertin v. Momblen (144 111. 32; 32 
 
 N. E. Rep. 49), 129. 
 Guetig v. State (66 Ind. 91), 249. 
 Guidery v. Green (95 Cal. 650), 208, 
 
 212. 
 Guion v. Williams (7 N. Y. S. 786 ; 
 
 55 Hun, 605), 246. 
 Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Patter- 
 son (Tex., 1894, 24 S. W. Rep. 
 
 349), 199. 
 Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Wright 
 
 (1 Tex. Civ. App. 102), 199. 
 Gulf. etc. Co. v. Ellis (54 Fed. Rep. 
 
 481), 226.
 
 lxxxii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Gulf, etc. Co. v. Hepner (83 Tex. 70 ; 
 
 18 S. W. Rep. 441), 7. 
 Gulf, etc. Co. v. Johnson (83 Tex. 
 
 628; 19 S. W. Rep. 151), 18. 
 Gulf, etc. Co. v. Norfleet (78 Tex. 
 
 321 ; 14 S. W. Rep. 703), 202. 
 Gulf, etc. Co. v. Ross (Tex., 1891, 16 
 
 S. W. Rep. 536), 253. 
 Gulf, etc. Co. v. York (74 Tex. 364 ; 
 
 12 S. W._ Rep. 151), 18. 
 Gulick v. Gulick (39 N. J. L. 516), 171. 
 Gunn v. Ohio, etc. Co. (37 W. Va. 
 
 421), 344. 
 Gunn v. Peakes (36 Minn. 177), 142. 
 Gunn v. Wade (65 Ga. 537), 121. 
 Gunn, In re (50 Kan. 125), 288. 
 Gunn, In re (50 Kan. 155), 284. 
 Gunnison v. Gunnison (41 N. H. 121), 
 
 276. 
 Gunter v. State (83 Ala. 96), 350. 
 Gunter v. Watson (4 Jones' N. C. L. 
 
 455), 340. 
 Gunther v. Bennett (72 Ind. 384 ; 19 
 
 Atl. Rep. 1048), 309. 
 Gutchess v. Gutchess (66 Barb., N. Y., 
 
 483), 73a. 
 Guthrie v. Anderson (48 Kan. 381), 
 
 262. 
 Gutsch v. Mcllhargey (69 Mich. 377; 
 
 37 N. W. Rep. 303), 341. 
 Gutzell v. Pennie (95 Cal. 598), 231. 
 Guy v. Hull (3 Murph., N. C, 150), 
 
 311. 
 Guy v. Manuel (89 N. C. 83), 76. 
 Guy v. Mead (22 N. C. 462), 60. 
 Guy v. Metcalf (83 Tex. 37), 282. 
 Guyette v. Bolton (46 Vt. 228), 139a. 
 Guyot v. Butts (4 Wend. 582), 2. 
 Gvvyn v. Butler (17 Colo. 114), 380. 
 Gwyn v. State (64 Miss. 324), 2S0. 
 G v. G (L. R. 2 P. & D. 287), 
 
 202. 
 
 H. 
 
 Habout v. Jones (5 Wash. St. 385), 
 
 359. 
 Hackett v. Collender (32 Vt. 97), 79. 
 Hackett v. Martin (8 Greenl., Me., 
 
 77), 70. 
 
 Hackley v. Patrick (3 Johns. 536), 69. 
 Haddock v. Wilmarth (5 N. H. 187), 
 
 311. 
 Hadgo v. Gooden (13 Ala. 718), 352. 
 Hadley v. Howe (46 Vt. 112), 115. 
 Hadrick v. Heslop (12 Jur. 600), 302. 
 Haff v. Spicer (3 Paige, N. Y., 190), 
 
 357. 
 Hagan v. Insurance Co. (81 Iowa, 
 
 321), 250. 
 Haggin v. Haggin (35 Neb. 575), 231. 
 Hagnes v. Porter (45 111. 318), 142. 
 Hahn v. Guardian Assur. Co. (Oreg., 
 
 1893, 32 Pac. Rep. 683), 200. 
 Hahn v. Schmidt (64 Cal. 284), 51. 
 Hahn v. State (13 Tex. App. 383), 
 
 132. 
 Haight v. Proprietors (4 Wash. C. C. 
 
 601, 606), 356. 
 Haights v. Arnold (48 Md. 512), 358. 
 Haile v. Palmer (5 Mo. 403), 144. 
 Haines v. Dennett (11 N. H. 180), 
 
 311. 
 Haines v. Hanrahau (105 Mass. 480), 
 
 242. 
 Haines v. Sairers (93 Mich. 440), 13, 
 
 336. 
 Haines v. Territory (3 Wyo. 166), 
 
 330. 
 Haines v. Thompson (21 N. Y. S. 
 
 991 ; 2 Misc. Rep. 385), 366, 370. 
 Haines v. Watts (N. J., 1893, 26 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 572), 308. 
 Haish v. Payson (107 111. 365), 188. 
 Halbeck v. Boyleston (117 Mass. 469), 
 
 144. 
 Halbert v. Skyler (1 A. K. Marsh. 
 
 368), 242. 
 Halcomb v. Stubblefield (76 Tex. 
 
 310), 150a. 
 Hale v. Everett (53 N. H. 55), 316. 
 Hale v. Huse (10 Gray, Mass., 99), 77, 
 
 314. 
 Hale v. Merrill (27 Vt. 738), 276. 
 Hale v. Smith (6 Greenl., Me., 416), 
 
 303. 
 Hale's Ex'rs v. Ard (48 Pa. St. 22), 60. 
 Half v. Curtis (68 Tex. 640; 5 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 541), 188.
 
 TATiI.E OF OASES. 
 
 lxxxiii 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Halfin v. Winkleman (18 S. W. Rep. 
 
 433 ; 83 Tex. 385), 20, 226. 
 Hall v. Aitkin (25 Neb. 360), 142. 
 Hall v. Brackctt (62 N. H. 509), 73. 
 Hall v. Brennan (19 N. Y. S. 623 ; 64 
 
 Hun, 394), 76. 
 Hall v. Chicago R. Co. (52 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 247), 340. 
 Hallv. Com. (89 Va. 171; 15 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 517), 13, 101. 
 Hall v. Costello (48 N. H. 176), 143. 
 Hall v. Davis (36 N. H. 569), 217, 220. 
 Hall v. Eaton (139 Mass. 217), 220. 
 Hall v. Glidden (39 Me. 445), 60. 
 Hallv. Houghton (37 Me. 411), 347. 
 Hall v. Kintz (13 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 
 
 24), 358. 
 Hall v. Leonard (1 Pick. 31), 222. 
 Hall v. McKay (78 Tex. 248), 148. 
 Hall v. Railroad Co. (51 N. W. Rep. 
 
 150; 84 Iowa, 311), 348. 
 Hall v. Rankin (Iowa, 1893, 5 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 217), 188. 
 Hall v. Roberts (63 Hun, 473), 24. 
 Hall v. Solomon (61 Conn. 476), 208. 
 Hall v. State (31 Fla. 176; 12 S. Rep. 
 
 449), 97. 
 Hall v. State (132 Ind. 317), 10. 
 Hall v. State (31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 565), 9, 52. 
 Hall v. Vanier (6 Neb. 85), 314. 
 Hall v. Van Vranken (64 How. Pr. 
 
 407), 140. 
 Hall v. Williams (6 Pick., Mass., 237), 
 
 146. 
 Hall v. Young (37 N. H. 134), 246. 
 Hall, Inre(l Wall. Jr., U. S., 85), 232. 
 Halladay v. Hart (30 N. Y. 474), 205. 
 Hallam v. Corlett (71 Iowa, 446), 223. 
 Hallam v. Post (55 Fed. Rep. 456), 
 
 10. 
 Halley v. Gregg (82 Iowa, 622; 48 
 
 N. W. Rep. 974), 10. 
 Halley v. Webster (21 Me. 461), 231. 
 Halliday v. Martinett (20 Johns., 
 
 N. Y., 168), 58. 
 Hallock v. Kinney (91 Mich. 57; 51 
 
 N. W. Rep. 706), 10. 
 
 Ilallowell v. Hallowell (88 Ind. 251), 
 
 269. 
 Hallum v. Dickenson (49 Ark. 126), 
 
 146. 
 Halpin v. Stone (78 Wis. 183; 47 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 177), 208. 
 Halsey v. Sinsebaugh (15 N. Y. 485), 
 
 337. 
 Halstead v. Seamon (52 How. Pr., 
 
 N. Y, 415), 77. 
 Haltenhof v. Haltenhof (44 111. App. 
 
 135), 231. 
 Hamberger v. Root (6 W. & S., Pa., 
 
 431), 67. 
 Hamburg v. Wood (18 S. W. Rep. 
 
 623, Tex., 1892), 208. 
 Hamilton, In re (12 N. Y. S. 708), 35. 
 Hamilton v. Buchanan (112 N. C. 
 
 463; 17 S. E. Rep. 159). 246. 
 Hamilton v. Coal Co. (61 Hun, 624), 
 
 247. 
 Hamilton v. Hulett (51 Minn. 208; 
 
 53 N. W. Rep. 364), 341. 
 Hamilton v. Iowa Co. (Iowa, 1S93, 
 
 53 N. W. Rep. 496), 73a. 
 Hamilton v. Manhattan Ry. Co. (9 
 
 N. Y. 313), 344. 
 Hamilton v. Marsden (6 Binn. 45), 
 
 138. 
 Hamilton v. Northwood (86 Mich. 
 
 315 ; 49 N. W. Rep. 37), 38. • 
 Hamilton v. Patrick (62 Hun, 74), 76. 
 Hamilton v. People (29 Mich. 173), 
 
 323, 349. 
 Hamilton v. Pitcher (53 Mo. 354), 
 
 135. 
 Hamilton v. Rich Hill Coal Mining 
 
 Co. (108 Mo. 364; 18 S. W. Rep. 
 
 977), 370. 
 Hamilton v. Ross (23 Neb. 630), 366. 
 Hamilton v. Smith (30 Mich. 229), 
 
 234. 
 Hamilton Buggy Co. v. Iowa Buggy 
 
 Co. (Iowa, 1893, 55 N. W. Rep. 
 
 496), 375. 
 Hamlin v. Seers (82 N. Y. 327), 83. 
 Hammatt v. Emerson (27 Me. 308). 
 
 73a.
 
 lxxxiv 
 
 TABLE OF CASKS. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Hamrnel v. State (90 Ala. 577), 101. 
 Hammerquist v. Swenson (44 111. 
 
 App. 627), 206. 
 Hammers v. Dole (61 111. 307), 135. 
 Hammill v. Sup. Council (152 Pa. St. 
 
 537), 309. 
 Hammond v. Beeson (112 Mo. 190), 
 
 79. 
 Hammond v. Dike (42 Minn. 273), 
 
 350. 
 Hammond v. Freeman (9 Ark. 62), 
 
 356. 
 Hammond v. Hammond (90 Ga. 527; 
 
 16 S. E. Rep. 265), 158. 
 Hammond v. Varian (54 N. Y. 398), 
 
 133, 139. 
 Hammond v. Wolf (78 Iowa, 227; 
 
 42 N. W. Rep. 778), 140. 
 Hammond's Case (2 Greenl. 33; 11 
 
 Am. Dec. 39), 132. 
 Hamon v. Huntley (4 Cowen, N. Y., 
 
 493), 67. 
 Hanawalt v. State (64 Wis. 84), 345. 
 Hanby, In re (25 W. R. 427), 232. 
 Hance v. Hair (28 Ohio St. 349), 69. 
 Hancock v. Am. L. I. Co. (62 Mo. 
 
 26), 232, 233. 
 Hancock v. Flynn (8 N. Y. S. 133; 
 
 54 Hun, 638), 60, 144. 
 Hancock v. Kelly (81 Ala. 36S), 60. 
 Hancock v. Leggett (115 Ind. 546), 
 
 52. 
 Hancock v. Moody (39 111. App. 17), 
 
 211. 
 Hancock v. O'Rourke (6 N. Y. S. 
 
 549), 141. 
 Hancock v. Worcester (62 Vt. 106; 
 
 18 Atl. Rep. 1041), 244. 
 Hancock v. Yunker (83 111. 208), 
 
 73a. 
 Hancock's Appeal (112 Pa. St. 532), 
 
 222. 
 Hand v. Swann (1 Tex. Civ. App. 
 
 241), 75. 
 Hand v. Weidner (115 Pa. St. 302), 
 
 136. 
 Handlin's Estate v. Law (34 111. App. 
 
 84), 354. 
 
 Hanking v. Grimes (13 B. Mon., Ky., 
 
 257), 141. 
 Hankins v. State (29 Fla. 554; 10 S. 
 
 Rep. 822), 334. 
 Hankinson v. Page (3 Fed. Rep. 186), 
 
 125. 
 Hanley v. Donoghue (116 U. S. 4), 
 
 242. 
 Hanlon v. Doherty (109 Ind. 37), 171. 
 Hanlon v. Wilson (10 Neb. 138), 254. 
 Hann v. State (13 Tex. App. 383), 
 
 139a. 
 Hanna v. Barrett (39 Kan. 446; 18 
 
 Pac. Rep. 497), 346. 
 Hanna v. Davis (112 Mo. 599), 138. 
 Hanna v. Hanna (Tex., 1893, 21 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 720), 52. 
 Hanners v. McClelland (74 Iowa, 
 
 318), 322, 354. 
 Hanoff v. State (37 Ohio St. 178), 
 
 346. 
 Hanover F. I. Co. v. Lewis (23 Fla. 
 
 193; IS. Rep. 863), 127. 
 Hanscom v. Burmood (35 Neb. 504), 
 
 350. 
 Hansen v. Hale (44 111. App. 174), 21. 
 Hanson v. Hoit (14 N. H. 56). 74. 
 Hanson v. Weber (40 Me. 194), 77. 
 Harbison v. Lemon (3 Blatchf. 51), 
 
 208. 
 Hard v. Ashley (117 N. Y. 606; 23 
 
 N. E. Rep. 600), 50, 171, 308. 
 Hard v. Brown (18 Vt. 87), 114. 
 Hardee v. State (31 Tex. Criui. Rep. 
 
 289), 52. 
 Hardenbrook's Case (8 Abb. Pr., 
 
 N Y., 416), 286. 
 Hardesty v. Com. (88 Ky. 587), 283. 
 Harding v. Bank (81 Iowa, 499), 129. 
 Harding v. Butler (156 Mass. 34), 69. 
 Hardy v. Cheny (42 Vt. 417), 73a. 
 Hardy v. Chesapeake Bank (51 Md. 
 
 590), 308. 
 Hardy v. Merrill (56 N. H. 227), 194, 
 
 197. 
 Hardy v. Summers (10 Gill & J., 
 
 Md., 310), 304. 
 Hare v. Mahoney (00 Hun, 576), 341.
 
 TABLE OF CASKS. 
 
 lxxxv 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Hargrave v. Hargravo (2 C. & K. 
 
 701), 53. 
 Hargrove v. Adcock (111 N. C. 16C), 
 
 21. 
 Harlan v. Howard (79 Ky. 373), 108. 
 Sarland v. Lilienthal (53 N. Y. 438), 
 
 189. 
 Harnickell v. Copper Mining Co. (5 
 
 N. Y. S. 112; 52 Hun, 610), 334. 
 Harpendiug v. Church (16 Pet. 455), 
 
 242. 
 Harper v. Burrow (6 Ired. 30), 123. 
 Harper v. Lexington R. Co. (2 Dana, 
 
 Ky., 227), 344. 
 Harper v. Morse (114 Mo. 317; 21 
 
 S. W. Rep. 517), 11. 
 Harper v. Perry (28 Iowa. 63), 208. 
 Harrell v. Culpepper (47 Ga. 635), 70. 
 Harrell v. Zinipleman (66 Tex. 292), 
 
 216. 
 Harriman v. Sampson (23 111. App. 
 
 161), 168. 
 Harriman v..Stowe (57 Mo. 93), 57. 
 Harrington v. Chambers (3 Utah, 94), 
 
 69. 
 Harrington v. Fish (10 Mich. 415), 
 
 136. 
 Harrington v. Hamburg (Iowa, 1892, 
 
 52 N. W. Rep. 201), 307. 
 Harrington v. Harrington (154 Mass. 
 
 517), 369. 
 Harrington v. Samples (36 Minn. 
 
 200), 215. 
 Harrington v. State (31 Tex. Grim. 
 
 Rep. 577), 283. 
 Harrington v. State (36 Ala. 236), 
 
 323. 
 Harrington v. Worcester, etc. Co. 
 
 (157 Mass. 579; 32 N. E. Rep. 
 
 955), 176, 343. 
 Harris v. Barnhart (97 Cal. 546 ; 32 
 
 Pac. Rep. 589), 152. 
 Harris v. Burton (4 Harr., Del., 66), 
 
 135. 
 Harris v. Clinton (31 N. W. Rep. 425 ; 
 
 64 Mich. 447), 198. 
 Harris v. Dinkins (4 Desaus., S. C, 
 
 60), 221. 
 
 Harris v. Dougherty (74 Tex. 1 ; 1 1 
 
 S. W. Rep. 921), 157. 
 Harris v. Harris (23 Gratt. 737), 20b. 
 Harris v. Herman (78 Mo. 623), 238. 
 Harris v. Holmes (30 Vt. 352), 7. 
 Harris v. Hoskins (2 Tex. Civ. App. 
 
 486; 32 S. W. Rep. 251), 106. 
 Harris v. Lester (80 111. 311), 355. 
 Harris v. McArthur (90 Ga. 216; 15 
 
 S. E. Rep. 758), 371. 
 Harris v. Nation (79 Tex. 409), 362. 
 Harris v. Oakey (130 N. Y. 1), 115. 
 Harris v. Railroad Co. (36 N. Y. 
 
 Sup. Ct. 373), 199. 
 Harris v. Railroad (78 Ga. 525), 50. 
 Harris v. Schuttler (Tex., 1894, 24 
 
 S. W. Rep. 989), 199. 
 Harris v. So. Mfg. Co. (8 R. I. 133), 
 
 77. 
 Harris v. State (6 Tex. App. 97), 93. 
 Harris v. Story (2 E. D. Smith), 234. 
 Harris v. Wilson (7 Wend. 57), 350. 
 Harris, Ex parte (4 Utah, 5), 332. 
 Harrisburg Car. Mfg. Co. v. Sloan 
 
 (120 Ind. 156; 21 N. E. Rep. 
 
 1088), 173. 
 Harrison v. Bank (17 Wis. 310), 211. 
 Harrison v. Bishop (131 Ind. 161), 
 
 248, 253. 
 Harrison v. Blades (3 Campb. 458), 
 
 123. 
 Harrison v. Charlton (42 Iowa, 573), 
 
 120. 
 Harrison v. Com. (79 Va. 374), 10. 
 Harrison v. Harrison (4 Moore P. C. 
 
 96), 202. 
 Harrison v. Kiser (79 Ga. 588 ; 4 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 320), 226. 
 Harrison v. Rowan (3 Wash. C. C. 
 
 580), 150. 
 Harrison v. Simmons (55 Ala. 510), 
 
 136. 
 Harrison v. State (79 Ala. 29), 52. 
 Harrison's Appeal (100 Pa. St. 458), 
 
 222. 
 Harrow v. Brown (76 Iowa, 179), 309. 
 Hart v. Bait. etc. Co. (6 W. Va. 
 
 336), 1.
 
 lxxxvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Hart v. Hudson R. B. Co. (84 N. Y. 
 
 56), 188. 
 Hart v. Kendall (82 Ala. 144), 58. 
 Hart v. State (17 8. W. Rep. 421, 
 
 Tex., 1891), 232. 
 Hart v. State (55 Ind. 599), 238. 
 Hart v. Teneyck (12 Johns. Ch. 62, 
 
 108), 226. 
 Hartford Bank v. Hart (3 Day, 
 
 Conn., 495), 67. 
 Harter v. Hopkins (83 Wis. 309), 
 
 13. 
 Hartley v. Brooks (6 Whart. 189), CO. 
 Hartley v. Carloy (150 Pa. St. 23), 
 
 129, 250. 
 Hartley v. Cataract, etc. Co. (19 N. 
 
 Y. S. 121 ; 64 Hun, 634), 337. 
 Hartley v. Fresh (6 Tex. 208), 137. 
 Hartley v. Mathews (96 Ala. 224; 11 
 
 S. Rep. 542), 76. 
 Hartman v. Camman (10 N. J. Eq. 
 
 128), 217. 
 Hartman v. Cin. etc. Co. (4 Ind. 
 
 App. 370; 30 N. E. Rep. 930), 
 
 373. 
 Hartman v. Evans (W. Ya., 1894, 18 
 
 S. E. Rep. 810), 9. 
 Hartman v. Keystone Ins. Co. (21 
 
 Pa. St. 466), 200. 
 Hartman v. Rogers (69 Cal. 643), 341. 
 Hartshorn v. Dawson (79 111. 108), 
 
 136. 
 Hartsock v. Mort (76 Md. 281), 18, 
 
 362. 
 Hartze v. FihreCo. (44 Md. 648), 151. 
 Harvard v. Gare (15 Pick. 372), 56. 
 Harvey v. Chouteau (14 Mo. 587), 
 
 210. 
 Harvey v. Lumber Co. (39 Mo. App. 
 
 214), 209. 
 Harvey v. State (21 Tex. App. 178), 
 
 283. 
 Harvey v. Tebutt (1 J. & W. 197), 
 
 276. 
 Harvey v. Thornton (14111. 217), 232, 
 
 233. 
 Harvey v. Tyler (2 Wall., U. S., 328), 
 
 232. 
 
 Harvey v. Walden (23 La. Ann. 163), 
 
 238. 
 Harvey v. West (87 Ga. 553), 84. 
 Ilawbrouck v. Baker (10 Johns. 248), 
 
 38. 
 Haskeli v. Henry (74 Me. 197), 308. 
 Haskins v. Warren (115 Mass. 514), 
 
 250. 
 Hass v. Marshall (Pa., 1888, 14 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 421), 185, 195. 
 Hastings v. L. I. Co. (138 N. Y. 473), 
 
 220. 
 Hastings v. Rider (99 Mass. 625), 197. 
 Hatch v. Blisset (2 Stra. 986), 287. 
 Hatch v. Douglas (48 Conn. 116), 217. 
 Hatch v. Elkins (64 N. Y. 489). 73. 
 Hatch v. Fuller (131 Mass. 574), 52. 
 Hatch v. Hatch (9 Mass. 307), 128. 
 Hatch v. Perignet (64 Barb. 189), 309. 
 Hatch v. Potter (2 Gilm., 111., 725), 
 
 ' 80. 
 Hatcher v. Rochelaw (18 N. Y. 87), 
 
 129, 244. 
 Hatchett v. Conner (30 Tex. 104), 
 
 142. 
 Hathaway v. Haskill (9 Pick., Mass., 
 
 42), 67. 
 Hathaway v. Tinkham (148 Mass. 
 
 85), 366. 
 Hatt v. Nay (144 Mass. 186), 8. 
 Hatton v. Robinson (14 Pick. 422), 
 
 166. 
 Haugen v. C, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. 
 
 (S. D., 1893, 53 N. W. Rep. 769), 
 
 11. 
 Haughton v. Maurer (55 Mich. 323), 
 
 73a. 
 Haven v. Brown (7 Me. 421), 73a. 
 Haven v. Foster (9 Pick. 130), 143. 
 Havens v. Sea Shore Railroad (47 
 
 N. J. Eq. 365 ; 20 Atl. Rep. 497), 
 
 107. 
 Haver v. Schuyhart (48 Mo. App. 
 
 20), 375. 
 Haverstick v. State (Ind., 1893, 32 
 
 N. E Rep. 785), 283. 
 Haviland v. Man. R. Co. (61 Hun, 
 
 626; 131 N. Y. 630), 366.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Lwxvii 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Hawes v. Humphrey (9 Pick. 357), 
 
 138. 
 Hawes v. Merchant (1 Curt. C. C. 
 
 144), 82. 
 Hawes v. N. E. Ins. Co. (2 Curt, 
 
 C. C. 229), 200. 
 Hawes v. State (88 Ala. 68), 169, 
 
 339. 
 Hawey v. Donelly (8 Paige, N. Y., 
 
 415), 359. 
 Hawey v. Foster (64 Cal. 296), 150a. 
 Hawk v. Applegarth (37 Mo. App. 
 
 32), 73a. 
 Hawkins v. Church (23 Minn. 256), 
 
 83. 
 Hawkins v. Gardiner (2 Sin. & Gif. 
 
 441), 265. 
 Hawkins v. Garland (76 Va. 149), 
 
 222. 
 Hawkins v. Grimes (13 B. Mon., Ky., 
 
 257, 264), 140. 
 Hawkins v. Harding (37 111. App. 
 
 564), 226. 
 Hawkins v. Lee (8 Lea, Tenn., 42), 
 
 209. 
 Hawkins v. Sanby (48 Minn. 69), 4. 
 Hawkins v. State (27 Tex. App. 273), 
 
 319. 
 Hawkins v. Thomas (3 Ind. App. 
 
 399), 239. 
 Hawks v. Baker (6 Greenl., Me., 72), 
 
 315. 
 Hawksworth v. Brammel (5 M. & 
 
 Cr. 281), 77. 
 Hawley v. Dawson (16 Oreg. 344), 
 
 373. 
 Hawley v. Donnelly (8 Paige, N. Y., 
 
 415), 357. 
 Haworth v. Norris (28 Fla. 763), 212. 
 Hawthorne v. State (61 Miss. 749), 
 
 102. 
 Hayden v. Ewing (1 B. Mon. 113), 
 
 222. 
 Hayden v. Grillo (42 Mo. App. 1), 
 
 *308. 
 Hayden v. Westcott (11 Conn. 129), 
 
 136. 
 Hayes v. Burkam (67 Ind. 359), 67. 
 
 Hayes v. Case (10 How. St. Tr. 312), 
 
 141. 
 Hayes v. Fine (91 Cal. 391), 254. 
 Hayes v. Foskoll (31 Me. 112), 232. 
 Hayes v. Jackson (37 Cent. L. J. 298), 
 
 268. 
 Hayes v. Seaver (7 Greenl. 237). 73. 
 Hayes v. White (66 Me. 305), 140. 
 Haynes v. Ledyard (33 Mich. 319), 
 
 339. 
 Haynes v. McRae (Ala., 1893, 11 S. 
 
 Rep. 270), 226. 
 Haynes v. Mosher(15 How. Pr. 216), 
 
 191. 
 Haynes v. Rowe (40 Me. 181), 362. 
 Haynes v. Thomas (7 Ind. 38), 139. 
 Hays v. Com. (Ky., 1890, 14 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 833), 103. 
 Hays v. Miller (70 N. Y. 112), 200. 
 Hays v. State (Tex., 1893, 20 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 361), 333. 
 Haywood v. Collins (60 111. 328), 232. 
 Haywood v. Thacher (19 N. Y. S. 
 
 882), 151. 
 Hazard v. Spencer (17 R. I. 561; 23 
 
 Atl. Rep. 729), 247. 
 Hazzard v. Vickory (78 Ind. 64), 140. 
 Head v. Head (1 Sim. & Stu. 150), 
 
 234. 
 Head v. Thompson (77 Iowa, 263), 
 
 168. 
 Headen v. Womack (88 N. C. 468), 71. 
 Headly v. Renner (130 Pa. St. 542), 
 
 222. 
 Heady v. Vevay Turnpike Co. (52 
 
 Ind. 117), 344. 
 Heald v. Thwing (45 Me. 396), 185, 
 
 197. 
 Healey, In re (53 Vt. 694), 285. 
 Healey v. Simpson (Mo., 1893, 20 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 881), 373. 
 Healey v. Terry (9 N. Y. S. 519), 349. 
 Healey v. Bauer (65 Hun, 621 ; 19 
 
 N. Y. S. 989), 58. 
 Heane v. Rogers (9 B. & C. 597), 82. 
 Heath v. Missouri R. Co. (83 Mo. 
 
 624), 150a. 
 Heath v. State (7 Tex. App. 464), 3o0.
 
 lxxxviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASKS. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Heath v. Voge (60 Pa. St. 108), 146. 
 Hecker v. Hopkins (16 Abb. Pr., N. 
 
 Y., 301), 249. 
 Heckman v. Green (Mo., 1893, 22 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 455), 174. 
 Heddles v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 
 
 (46 N. W. Rep. 115; 71 Wis. 288), 
 
 194, 350. 
 Hedger v. Ward (15 B. Mon., Ky., 
 
 106), 106, 135. 
 Heermance v. Vernoy (6 Johns. 5), 
 
 303. 
 Hegard v. Insurance Co. (Colo., 1890, 
 
 11 Pac. Rep. 594), 239. 
 Hefron v. State (8 Fla. 73), 249, 254. 
 Heffron v. Gallupe (55 Me. 563), 176, 
 
 343. 
 Heidekoper v. Cotton (3 Watts, Pa. , 
 
 56), 176. 
 Heilman v. Lazarus (90 N. Y. 672), 
 
 250. 
 Heldt v. State (20 Neb. 492; 30 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 626), 2. 
 Helfenstein's Estate (135 Pa. St. 293), 
 
 145. 
 Heller v. Petterson (3 N. Y. S. 257; 
 
 18 N. Y. State Rep. 928), 371. 
 Helm v. State (7 S. Rep. 487; 67 
 
 Miss. 562), 322. 
 Helmsley v. Loader (2 Canipb. 450), 
 
 133. 
 Helton v. Alabama M. Ry. Co. (Ala., 
 
 1893, 12 S. Rep. 276), 9. 
 Helwig v. Laschowitz (82 Mich. 619), 
 
 354. 
 Hemenway v. Kundsen (67 Hun, 
 
 648). 359. 
 Hemenway v. Smith (28 Vt, 701), 
 
 174. 
 Hemingway v. Garth (51 Ala. 530), 
 
 348. 
 Hemminger v. West. Ass'n(95 Mich. 
 
 355; 54 N. W. Rep. 949), 21, 339. 
 Hempstead v. Read (6 Conn. 480), 143. 
 Henderson v. Anderson (3 How., U. 
 
 S., 73), 311. 
 Henderson v. Bank (1 Ala. 855), 
 
 139a. 
 
 Henderson v. Bonar (Ky., 1890. 11 
 
 S. W. Rep. 809), 232. 
 Henderson v. Evans (14 Barb., N. Y., 
 
 15), 150a. 
 Henderson v. Miller (36 111. App. 
 
 262), 11. 
 Hendrickson v. People (10 N. Y. 13), 
 
 93. 
 Hendrickson, Ex parte (6 Utah, 3; 21 
 
 Pac. Rep. 396), 166. 
 Heneke v. Floring (114 111. 554), 246. 
 Henessy v. Murdock (137 N. Y. 317), 
 
 249. 
 Henley v. Com. (1 Bush, Ky., 11), 
 
 23. 
 Henly v. State (29 Ark. 17), 343. 
 Hennell v. Lyon (I B. & A. 182), 147. 
 Henry v. Allen (82 Tex. 35), 159. 
 Henry v. Bishop (2 Wend. 575), 138. 
 Henry v. Bradshaw (20 Iowa, 355), 
 
 226. 
 Henry v. Deetrich (7 N. Y. S. 505), 
 
 24. 
 Henry v. Diviney (101 Mo. 378), 130. 
 Henry v. Leigh (3 Camp. 499, 502), 
 
 127. 
 Henry v. Sanson (2 Tex. Civ. App. 
 
 150; 21 S. W. Rep. 69), 153. 
 Henry v. Tilton (19 Vt. 447), 150a. 
 Henry v. Wead (4 Law Bull., N. Y., 
 
 10), 359. 
 Henry v. Whitaker (82 Tex. 5), 30. 
 Henry v. Willard (73 N. C. 35), 68. 
 Henry Buggy Co. v. Pratt (73 Iowa, 
 
 485; 35 N. W. Rep. 587), 348. 
 Hensel v. Chicago, etc. Co. (37 Minn. 
 
 87). 230. 
 Henshaw v. Foster (9 Pick. 318), 125. 
 Henthorn v. Doe (1 Blatch. 157), 242. 
 Herbert v. Berrier (81 Ind. 1), 231. 
 Herbert v. Duffur (Oreg., 1893, 32 
 
 Pac. Rep. 502), 366. 
 Herbert v. Keck (35 Neb. 508), 380. 
 Herbst v. Vacuum Oil Co. (68 Hun, 
 
 222), 371. 
 Herd v. Herd (71 Iowa, 497), 282. 
 Hermes v. Chicago, etc. Co. (80 Wis. 
 
 590), 56.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 lxxxix 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Hernandez v. State (22 S. Rep. 972), 
 
 18. 
 Herndon v. Reed (82 Tex. 647), 135. 
 Herrick v. Malin (22 Wend. 38S), 129. 
 Herrick v. Svvomley (56 Md. 139), 
 
 124, 139. 
 Herring v. Goodson (43 Miss. 392), 
 
 234. 
 Herrington v. Winn (14 N. Y. S. 
 
 612; 60 Hun, 235), 178, 308. 
 Herster v. Herster (122 Pa. St. 239), 
 
 51. 
 Hess' Appeal (26 W. N. C. 121), 129. 
 Hess v. Lake Shore & M. Co. (7 Pa. 
 
 Co. Ct. Rep. 565), 202. 
 Hess v. Lowry (122 Ind. 233), 189, 
 
 340. 
 Hess v. Morgan (3 Johns., N. Y., 84), 
 
 284. 
 Hester v. Com. (85 Pa. St. 139), 320. 
 Hestres v. Brennan (50 Cal. 217), 
 
 379. 
 Heught v. Proper (4 Wash. C. C. 661), 
 
 306. 
 Heuston v. Simpson (17 N. E. Rep. 
 
 261: 115 Ind. 162), 178. 
 Hewelette v. George (68 Miss. 703), 
 
 363. 
 Hevvett v. Eisenbart (36 Neb. 794 ; 55 
 
 N. W. Rep. 252), 52, 56. 
 Hewitt v. Carey (150 Mass. 445), 350. 
 Hewitt v. Morgan (Iowa, 1893, 55 
 
 N. W. Rep. 478), 136. 
 Hewlett v. Cock (7 Wend. 371, 374), 
 
 105, 106. 
 Hewthorn v. Doe (1 Blackf., Ind., 
 
 159), 239. 
 Hey ward v. Knapp (22 Minn. 5), 
 
 344. 
 Hey wood v. Reed (4 Gray, Mass., 
 
 574), 70. 
 Hickman v. Jones (9 Wall., U. S., 
 
 201-2), 11. 
 Hickman v. Quinn (6 Yerg., Tenn., 
 
 96), 223. 
 Hickman v. State (38 Tex. 191), 197. 
 Hicks v. Lovell (64 Cal. 14), 124. 
 Hicks v. Sharp (89 Ga. 311), 51, 333. 
 
 Hicks v. State (Ala., 1893, 13 S. Rep. 
 
 375), 346. 
 Hier v. Grant (47 N. Y. 278), 309. 
 Higbee v. Dresser (103 Mass. 523), 
 
 174. 
 Higbie v. Guardian L. I. Co. (52 
 
 N. Y. 603), 188, 194. 
 Higginbotham v. Campbell (85 Ga. 
 
 638), 11. 
 Higgins v. Dellinger (22 Mo. 397), 19. 
 Higgins v. Dewey (107 Mass. 494). 
 
 200. 
 Higham v. Ridgeway (10 East, 109), 
 
 58. 
 Higham v. Vanosdol (101 Ind. 160), 
 
 70. 
 Highton v. Dessau (19 N. Y. S. 395), 
 
 217. 
 Higman v. Hood (3 Ind. App. 456), 
 
 18. 
 Hilburn v. Harris (Tex., 1893, 21 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 572), 376. 
 Hildebrand v. Fogle (20 Ohio, 147), 
 
 221. 
 Hildreth v. Aldrich (15 R. I. 63), 
 
 348. 
 Hildreth v. Martin (3 Allen, Mass., 
 
 371), 79. 
 Hiles v. La Flesh (59 Wis. 465), 136. 
 Hill v. Blake (97 N. Y. 216), 214. 
 Hill v. Bub (35 Neb. 524), 130. 
 Hill v. Com. (88 Va. 633 ; 14 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 330), 385. 
 Hill v. Crary (7 Ark. 536), 305. 
 Hill v. Durand (58 Wis. 160), 211. 
 Hill v. Froehlick (14 N. Y. S. 610; 
 
 60 Hun, 580), 347. 
 Hill v. Hilert (19 W. R. 250), 53. 
 Hill v. Lafayette (2 Md. 476), 200. 
 Hill v. Miller (76 N. Y. 32), 200. 
 Hill v. Packard (5 Wend. 387), 146. 
 Hill v. Perry (82 Ind. 128), 249. 
 Hill v. Portland, etc. Co. (55 Me. 
 
 438), 198. 
 Hill v. Roderick (4W.&S,, Pa., 221), 
 
 67. 
 Hill v. State (91 Tenn. 521; 19 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 674), 350.
 
 -XC 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Hill v. State (43 111. 177), 237. 
 Hillv. State (9 Yerg., Tenn., 357), 
 
 218. 
 Hill v. State (64 Miss. 431), 93. 
 Hill v. Wand (47 Kan. 240), 82, 83. 
 Hill v. Whidden (158 Mass. 267; 33 
 
 N. E. Rep. 526), 208. 
 Hillesum v. City of New York (4 N. 
 
 Y. S. 506), 336. 
 Hillman v. Schwenk (68 Mich. 293), 
 
 350. 
 Hills v. Barnes (11 N. H. 395), 129. 
 Hills v. Case (2 Gratt. 594), 102, 234. 
 Hills v. Ludwig (24 N. E. Rep. 596; 
 
 46 Ohio St. 513), 66. 
 Hilton v. Bender (69 N. Y. 75), 218. 
 Hilton v. Railroad Co. (Ala., 1893, 
 
 12 S. Rep. 276), 7, 12. 
 Hilts v. Colvin (14 Johns. 182), 322. 
 Himes v. Krehl (154 Pa. St. 190), 343. 
 Tfimrod v. Bolton (44 111. App. 516), 
 
 140. 
 Hine v. Corn. (Ky., 13 S. W. Rep. 
 
 445), 102. 
 Iline v. Hine (39 Barb. 507), 215. 
 Hinzie v. Moody (1 Tex. Civ. App. 
 
 26), 358. 
 Hirschfeld v. Williamson (18 Nev. 
 
 66), 71. 
 Hirth v. Graham (Ohio, 1893, 33 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 90), 254. 
 Hitchcock v. Davis (87 Mich. 629), 
 
 250. 
 Hitchcock v. Moore (70 Mich. 112), 
 
 168, 354&. 
 Hitchcock v. Thayer (32 Neb. 477; 
 
 49 N. W. Rep. 374\ 11. 
 Hitchings v. St. Louis Transp. Co. 
 
 (68 Hun, 33), 73a. 
 Hitchins v. Eardley (L. R. 2 P. & M. 
 
 248), 53. 
 Hitchins v. Frostburg (68 Md. 100), 
 
 343. 
 Hitt v. Jenks (123 U. S. 301), 136. 
 Hix v. Hix (25 W. Va. 481), 238. 
 Hix v. Whittemore (4 Met. 545), 231. 
 Hoare v. Silverlock (12 Jur. 695), 237. 
 Hobart v. Hobart (62 N. Y. 80), 309. 
 
 Hobart v. Jones (5 Wash. St. 385). 
 
 358. 
 Hobbrook v. Turrell (9 Pick. 105), 
 
 265. 
 Hobbs v. State (133 Ind. 404 ; 32 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 1019). 350. 
 Hobby v. Dana (17 Barb. Ill), 200. 
 Hodge v. State (26 Fla. 11 ; 7 S. Rep. 
 
 593), 319, 334. 
 Hodge v. State (Ala., 1893, 10 S. Rep. 
 
 164), 6. 
 Hodge v. Thompson (9 Ala. 131), 70. 
 Hodges v. Carvill (44 N. J. L. 456), 
 
 308. 
 Hodges v. Hodges (9 Mass. 320), 232. 
 Hodges v. Hodges (106 N. C. 374), 
 
 53, 113. 
 Hodges v. Nash (43 III. App. 638), 
 
 282. 
 Hodges v. Percival (152 111. 53; 23 
 
 N. E. Rep. 423), 8. 
 Hodges v. St. Louis, etc. Co. (71 Mo. 
 
 50), 12. 
 Hoefiing v. Hambleton (84 Tex. 617; 
 
 19 S. W. Rep. 689). 38. 
 Hoff v. State (Ga., 1893, 16 S. E. Rep. 
 
 99), 11. 
 Hoffman v. Fitchburg R. Co. (67 
 
 Hun, 581), 386. 
 Hoffman v. Newell (20 N. Y. S. 432). 
 
 159. 
 Hoffman v. State (28 Tex. App. 174). 
 
 346. 
 Hofman v. Smith (1 Caines, 157), 16*. 
 Hogaboom v. Herrick (4 Vt. 131), 77. 
 Hogan v. Corinth (19 Fla. 84), 107. 
 Hogan v. Shuart (11 Mont. 498), R66. 
 Hogan v. State (36 Wis. 296), 249. 
 Hogansv. Caruth (18 Fla. 587), 135. 
 Hoge v. Fisher (1 Pet. C. C. 163), 
 
 250. 
 Hoge v. Hoge (1 Watts, 163, 213), 
 
 222. 
 Hogel v. Lindell (10 Mo. 483), 223. 
 Hogg v. Orgill (34 Pa. St. 344), 69. 
 Hoghten v. Hoghten (15 Beav. 321?. 
 
 75. 
 Hogle v. Lowe (12 Nev. 286), 268.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XU 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Hogue v. Williamson (Tex., 1893, 22 
 
 S. W. Rep. 7G2), 247. 
 Hoitt v. Moulton (21 N. H. 586), 
 
 139. 
 Holbrook v. Burt (22 Pick., Mass., 
 
 546), 208. 
 Holbrook v. Gay (6 Cush. 215), 60. 
 Holbrook v. Jackson (7 Cush. 136), 
 
 37. 
 Holbrook v. New Jersey Zinc Co. 
 
 (57 N. Y. 624), 134. 
 Holbrook v. Nichol (36 111. 161), 136. 
 Holcomb v. Cornish (8 Conn. 375), 
 
 147. 
 Holcomb v. Holcomb (28 Conn. 177), 
 
 317. 
 Holcomb v. Holcomb (95 N. Y. 325), 
 
 309. 
 Holcomb v. Mooney (13 Orcg. 513), 
 
 217. 
 Holcomb v. State (28 Ga. 66), 33. 
 Holdane v. Colespring (21 N. Y. 474), 
 
 84. 
 Holdridge v. Lee (S. D., 1893, 52 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 265), 341. 
 Holdridge v. Marsh (30 Mo. App. 
 
 352), 148. 
 Holker v. Parker (7 Cranch, 436), 74. 
 Holland v. Farthing (Tex., 1893, 21 
 
 S. W. Rep. 67), 246. 
 Holland v. State (31 Tex. Cr. Rep. 
 
 345), 283. 
 Hollander v. 4 Hiill (58 Hun, 604), 2S5. 
 Hollen v. Davis (59 Iowa, 444), 221. 
 Hollenback v. Fleming (6 Hill, 304;, 
 
 138. 
 Holley v. Holley (12 Am. Dec. 342), 
 
 242. 
 Holliday v. Jackson (30 Mo. App. 
 
 263), 69. 
 Holliday v. McKinnie (22 Fla. 153), 
 
 309. 
 Hollingsworth v. Holbrook (45 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 561 ; SO Iowa, 151), 128. 
 Hollingsworth v. State (53 Ark. 387), 
 
 350. 
 Hollingsworth v. State (4 S. E. Rep. 
 
 560; 79 Ga. 605), 342. 
 G 
 
 Hollingsworth v. Walker (13 S. Rep, 
 
 6), 220. 
 Hollis v. Harris (Ala., 1893, 10 S. 
 
 Rep. 377), 128. 
 Hollister v. Cordero (76 Cal. 649), 
 
 232. 
 Hollister v. Young (41 Vt. 556), 308. 
 Holloway v. Frick (Pa., 1893, 24Atl. 
 
 Rep. 201). 214. 
 Holloway v Railroad Co. (23 Tex. 
 
 465), 242. 
 Holman v. Kimball (22 Vt. 555), 169v 
 Holmes v. Anderson (59 Tex. 481), 
 
 209. 
 Holmes v. Broughton (10 Wend., N. 
 
 Y., 75), 230. 
 Holmes v. Budd (11 Iowa, 186), 68. 
 Holmes v. Crowe! 1 (73 N. C. 613), 
 
 84. 
 Holmes v. Goldsmith (147 U. S. 150), 
 
 56, 139a, 140, 219. 
 Holmes v. Gratz (50 Fed. Rep. 869). 
 
 159. 
 Hoist v. State (23 Tex. App. 1). 310. 
 Holt v. Miers (9 C. & P. 191), 127. 
 Holt v. Moore (37 Ark. 148). 128. 
 Holt v. Pie (120 Pa. St. 425), 84. 
 Holt v. Spokane R. Co. (Idaho, 1894, 
 
 35 Pac. Rep. 39). 73a. 
 Holton v. Carter (90 Ga. 299; 15 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 819). 71. 
 Holyoke, etc. Co. v. Ambden (55 
 
 Fed. Rep. 593), 285. 
 Homan v. State (23 Tex. 212), 277. 
 Home v. Bentinck (2 Brod. & Bing. 
 
 130), 175. 
 Home v. McKenzie (6 C. & F. 628), 
 
 339. 
 Home Ins. Co. v. Bethel (42 111. App, 
 
 475), 24. 
 Home Ins. Co. v. B. W. Co. (93 U. S 
 
 548), 75. 
 Home Ins. Co. v. Maple (Ind., 1890, 
 
 27 N. E. Rep. 633), 220. 
 Home Ins. Co. v. Myers (93 111. 271), 
 
 304. 
 Home Ins. Co. v. Weide (11 Wall., 
 
 U. S., 438;, 199.
 
 XCll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Homo Lumbnr Co. v. Hartman (45 
 
 Mo. A pp. 6L7), 10. 
 Homer v. Cilley (14 N. H. 85), 108. 
 Horner v. Wallia (11 Mass. 309), 138. 
 Homeyer v. N. J. S. & W. Co. (06 
 
 Hun, 626), 127. 
 Hommedieu v. Railroad Co. (120 Ind. 
 
 435). 366. 
 Hon v. Hon (70 Ind. 135), 265. 
 Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking 
 
 Co. v. Cooper (114 N. Y. 388). 
 
 371. 
 Hood v. Pioneer M. & M. Co. (95 
 
 Ala. 461; 11 S. Rep. 10), 21. 
 Hood v. Tyner (3 Ind. App. 51). 76. 
 Hook v. Kenyon (55 Hun, 598), 199. 
 Hook v. vStovell (26 Ga. 704), 192. 
 Hooker v. Axford (33 Mich. 453), 
 
 222. 
 Hoope v. State (81 Ala. 51), 89. 
 Hooper v. Taylor (39 Me. 224), 79. 
 Hooper v. W. W. Co. (37 Hun, 568), 
 
 107. 
 Hoover v. Hoover (129 Pa. St. 201), 
 
 213, 248. 
 Hope v. Sawyer (14 111. 254), 135. 
 Hopkins v. Albertson (2 Bay, 484), 
 
 138. 
 Hopkins v. Banks (7 Cow. 650), 69. 
 Hopkins v. Bovvers (108 N. C. 298), 
 
 308, 374. 
 Hopkins v. Bowers (111 N. C. 175), 
 
 373. 
 Hopkins v. Coburn (1 Wend., N. Y., 
 
 292), 286. 
 Hopkins v. Com. (50 Pa. St. 9), 9. 
 Hopkins v. De Graffenreid (2 Bay, 
 
 187), 138. 
 Hopkins v. McCrillis (158 Mass. 97; 
 
 32 N. E. Rep. 1026), 84. 
 Hopkins v. Megguire (35 Me. 78), 
 
 139. 
 Hopper v. Ashley (15 Ala. 457), 139. 
 Hopps v. People (31 III. 385), 10. 
 Hopt v. People (7 S. Ct. 614; 120 
 
 U. S. 431), 6. 
 Horbach v. State (43 Tex. 242), 102. 
 Horn v. Cole (51 N. H. 287), 83, 84. 
 
 Horn v. Haverhill (113 Mass. 344), 
 
 360. 
 Horn v. State (Ala., 1893, 13 S. Rep. 
 
 329), 332. 
 Horn v. State (Tex., 1893, 13 S. Rep. 
 
 329), 11, 249. 
 Horn v. State (1 Kan. 42), 6. 
 Home v. Bank (108 N. C. 100), 84. 
 Home v. Williams (23 Ind. 37), 124. 
 Horner v. Stillwell (35 N. J. L. 307), 
 
 205. 
 Hornish v. People (142 111. 620; 32 
 
 N. E. Rep. 677), 231. 
 Hornsby v. State (10 S. Rep. 522; 94 
 
 Ala. 50), 39, 89, 234. 
 Hosmer v. McDonald (Ark., 1892, 19 
 
 S. W. Rep. 963), 206. 
 Hotchkiss v. Gen. Ins. Co. (5 Hun, 
 
 N. Y, 101), 350. 
 Hotchkiss v. Hunt (56 Me. 252), 
 
 150a. 
 Hotchkiss v. Lyon (2 Blackf. 222), 
 
 73. 
 Hough v. Barton (20 Vt. 455), 73. 
 Houghton v. Jones (1 Wall., U. S., 
 
 702), 134. 
 Houlton v. Manteuffel (51 Minn. 185; 
 
 53 N. W. Rep. 541), 53. 
 Housch v. People (66 111. 178), 232. 
 House v. Beak (43 111. App. 615; 14.1 
 
 111. 290), 79. 
 House v. Greensburg (93 Ind. 533), 
 
 242. 
 House v. Metcalf (27 Conn. 632), 8, 
 
 24. 
 House v. Montgomery (19 Mo. App. 
 
 170), 226. 
 Houston v. Jordan (82 Tex. 352), 
 
 129. 
 Hovey v. Elliot (21 N. Y. S. 1083), 
 
 159. 
 Howard v. American, etc., Soc. (49 
 
 Me. 288), 221. 
 Howard v. Brewer (37 Ohio St. 402), 
 
 168. 
 Howard v. Lock (Ky., 1893, 22 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 332), 129. 
 Howard v. Moot (61 N. Y. 2G2), 238.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XClil 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Howard v. Patrick (38 Mich. 795), 
 
 121. 
 Howard v. Patrick (42 Mich. 121), 
 
 139a. 
 Howard v. Skillwell (139 U. S. 199), 
 
 362. 
 Howard v. State (23 Tex. A pp. 255), 
 
 102. 
 Howard v. State (50 Ind. 192), 249. 
 Howard v. Thompson (12 Ohio St 
 
 201), 205. 
 Howard v. Walker (90 Tenn. 452 ; 21 
 
 S. W. Rep. 897), 216. 
 Howard v. Zimpelman (Tex., 1890, 
 
 14 S. W. Rep. 59), 309. 
 Howe v. Howard (158 Mass. 278; 33 
 
 N. E. Rep. 528), 8. 
 Howe v. Sch wernberg (4 Misc. Rep. 
 
 73), 341. 
 Howell v. Bowman (Ala., 1892, 10 
 
 S. Rep. 640), 339. 
 Howell v. Dilts (Ind., 1892, 30 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 313), 386. 
 Howell v. Howell (47 Ga. 492), 70. 
 Howell v. Moores (127 111. 86), 208. 
 Howell Lumber Co. v. Campbell 
 
 (Neb., 1894, 57 N. W. Rep. 383), 
 
 351. 
 Howes v. Rucker (94 Ala. 166), 151. 
 Howes v. State (88 Ala. 37), 141. 
 Howie v. Edward (Ala., 1893, 11 S. 
 
 Rep. 748), 
 Howser v. Com. (51 Pa. St. 338), 
 
 346. 
 Hoxey v. Green (37 How. Pr. 97), 
 
 252. 
 Hoxsie v. Empire Lumber Co. (41 
 
 Minn. 548), 199. 
 Hoy v. Morris (13 Gray, 519), 168. 
 Hoyt v. Hannekin (14 How. 346), 
 
 361. 
 Hoyt v. Hoyt (112 N. Y. 513), 171, 
 
 178. 
 Hoyt v. Newbold (45 N. J. L. 319), 
 
 233. 
 Hoyt v. People (140 111. 588), 346. 
 Hroneck v. People (134 111. 139; 24 
 
 N. E. Rep. 861), 316. 
 
 Hubbard v. Alexander (3 Ch. D. 738). 
 
 222. 
 Hubbard v. Greeley (84 Me. 340), 212. 
 Hubbard v. Hubbard (7 Oreg. 42), 
 
 330. 
 Hubbard v. Johnson (77 Me. 139), 
 
 309. 
 Hubbard v. Marshall (50 Wis. 322), ' 
 
 205. 
 Hubbell v. Hubbell (22 Ohio St. 208), 
 
 308. 
 Huber v. Beck (Ind., 1893, 33 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 985), 199. 
 Huckabee v. Abbott (87 Ala. 409), 
 
 309. 
 Huckabee v. Shepherd (75 Ala. 342), 
 
 212. 
 Hudson v. Applegate (Iowa, 1893, 54 
 
 N. W. Rep. 462), 123. 
 Hudson y. Chicago Ry. Co. (59 Iowa, 
 
 581), 8. 
 Hudson v. Daily (13 Ala. 722), 148. 
 Hudson v. Hudson (90 Ga. 581 ; 16 
 
 S. E. Rep. 349), 20, 334. 
 Hudson v. Puett (86 Ga. 341), 138. 
 Hudson v. Roos (76 Mich. 180), 121, 
 
 344. 
 Hudson v. State (28 Tex. App. 323), 
 
 350. 
 Hudson v. White (17 R. I. 519), 213, 
 
 246. 
 Hudson v. Yost (13 S. E. Rep. 836), 
 
 153. 
 Hudspeth v. Mears (Ga., 1893, 17 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 837), 343. 
 Hudspeth v. State (55 Ark. 323), 378. 
 Hueston v. Hueston (2 Ohio St. 488), 
 
 67. 
 Huet v. Lemesurier (1 Cox, Eq. 275), 
 
 144. 
 Huetteman v. Viesselmann (48 Mo. 
 
 App. 582), 75. 
 Huff v. Bennett (4 Sandf., N. Y., 
 
 120), 124, 139. 
 Huff v. Latimer (33 S. C. 255; 11 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 758), 342. 
 Huff v. Nims (11 Neb. 363), 139a. 
 Hughbanks, In re (44 Kan. 105), 279.
 
 xciv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Hughes v. Boone (102 N. C. 43), 173. 
 Hughes v. Budd (8 Dovvl. 315), 127. 
 Hughes v. Detroit (81 N. W. Rep. 
 
 603; 63 Mich. 10), 317. 
 Hughes v. Ward (38 Kan. 452), 341, 
 
 367. 
 Hughes v. Wilkinson (37 Miss. 482). 
 
 135. 
 Hughes v. Wilkinson (35 Ala. 453). 
 
 220. 
 Hughey v. Eichelberger(ll S. C. 36), 
 
 300. 
 Hulbert v. Carver (37 Barb. 62), 237. 
 Hull v. Blake (13 Mass. 155), 152. 
 Humason v. Lobe (76 Tex. 512), 151. 
 Huuibard v. State (21 Tex. App. 200), 
 
 23. 
 Humes v. O'Brien (74 Ala. 64), 68. 
 Humphrey v. Cande (2 Cow., N. Y., 
 
 509), 357. 
 Humphrey v. Cumming (5 Wend., 
 
 N. Y M 90), 287. 
 Humphreys v. Burnside (4 Bush, 
 
 215), 238. 
 Humphreys v. Guillow (13 N. H. 
 
 385), 129. 
 Humphreys v. Railroad Co. (13 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 985), 212. 
 Humphreys v. Railroad Co. (88 Va. 
 
 431), 212. 
 Humphreys v. State (78 Wis. 569; 
 
 47 N. W. Rep. 836), 342, 376. 
 Humphries v. Johnson (20 Iud. 190), 
 
 190. 
 Hunnicut v. Peyton (102 U. S. 363), 
 
 66. 
 Hunnicutt v. Railroad Co. (11 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 580; 85 Ga. 195), 370. 
 Hunscom v. Hunscom(15 Mass. 184). 
 
 316. 
 Hunsinger v. Hofner (110 Ind. 390), 
 
 339. 
 Hunt v. Adams (6 Mass. 519), 128. 
 Hunt v. Adams (7 Mass. 518), 188. 
 Hunt v. Blackburn (9 S. Ct. 125; 128 
 
 U. S. 461), 171. 
 Hunt v. Cassidy (7 U. S. App. 124), 
 
 249. 
 
 Hunt v. Lowell Gas Co. (8 Allen, 
 
 Mass., 170), 188. 
 Hunt v. Lyle (8 Yerg. 142), 148. 
 Hunt v. Order of Chosen Friends (61 
 
 Mich. 671), 58, 144. 
 Hunt v. Strew (33 Mich. 85). 71. 
 Hunt's Case (4 Dall. 387). 286. 
 Hunt, In re (L. R. 3 P. & D. 250), 
 
 222. 
 Hunter v. Bilyeu (30 111. 228), 223. 
 Hunter v. Burlington, etc. Co. (76 
 
 Iowa, 490), 123. 
 Hunter v. Lanius (82 Tex. 677), 208. 
 Hunter v. New York, O. & W. R. R. 
 
 Co. (HON. Y. 622), 237, 241. 
 Hunter v. Riley (36 Pa. St. 509), 355. 
 Hunter v. State (29 Fla. 486), 6. 
 Hunter v. Whitehead (42 Mo. 524), 
 
 267. 
 Hunting v. Finch (3 Ohio, 445), 129. 
 Huntington v. Attrill(118 N. Y. 365), 
 
 7, 8. 
 Huntington v. Atwell (146 U. S. 
 
 657), 159. 
 Huntington v. Charlotte (15 Vt. 46), 
 
 232. 
 Huntington v. Conkey (33 Barb., N. 
 
 Y., 218), 249, 252. 
 Huntington v. Schultz (Harp., S. C, 
 
 452), 286. 
 Huntley v. Huet (22 Atl. Rep. 34 ; 59 
 
 Conn. 102), 151. 
 Huntley v. Huntley (114 U. S. 394), 
 
 267. 
 Huntsville v. L. S. & M. S. R. Co. 
 (Ala., 1893, 12 S. Rep. 295), 186, 
 341. 
 Hurd v. Bovee (134 N. Y. 596; 31 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 624), 217. 
 Hurlbut v. Hurlbut (128 N. Y. 420), 
 
 11. 170. 
 Hurlbut v. Hurlbut (63 Vt. 667), 366. 
 Hurley v. Lockett (72 Tex. 262), 66, 
 
 7!. 
 Hurley v. Sullivan (137 Mass. 86), 
 
 249. 
 Hurst v. Beaver (50 Mich. 612), 223. 
 Hurst v. Jones (1 Wall. Jr. 373), 53.
 
 TABLE OF CA8E8. 
 
 XCV 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Hurst, Ex parte (1 Wash. C. C. 18G), 
 
 2*7. 
 Hurt v. Evans (49 Tex. 311), 300. 
 Hurt v. McCartney (18 111. 129), 
 
 136. 
 Hussey v. Kirkwood (95 N. C. 63), 
 
 139a. 
 Hussey v. State (87 Ala. 121), 166. 
 Hussman v. Wilkie (50 Cal. 250), 
 
 207. 
 Hust v. Mellinger (73 Tex. 189), 150. 
 Huston v. Ticknor (99 Pa. St. 238), 
 
 138. 
 Hutchings v. Castle (48 Cal. 152), 70. 
 Hutchings v. Corgan (59 111. 70). 124. 
 Hutchins v. Adams (3 Greenl. 174), 
 
 20. 
 Hutchins v. Corn'i'S (16 Minn. 13), 
 
 150a. 
 Hutchins v. Hutchins (98 N. Y. 56), 
 
 11. 
 Hutchinson v. Ainsworth (63 Cal. 
 
 286), 136. 
 Hutchinson v. Boltz (35 W. Va. 
 
 754), 5. 
 Hutchison v. Cleary (N. D., 1893, 55 
 
 N. W. Rep. 729), 309. 
 Hutchison v. State (19 Neb. 263), 
 
 345. 
 Hutton v. Weber (17 N. Y. S. 463), 
 
 136. 
 Hutzler v. Hubbard (26 Tex. 537), 
 
 68. 
 Huxley v. Harrold (62 Mo. 616), 136. 
 Hyatt v. Pugsley (23 Barb., N. Y., 
 
 285), 221. 
 Hyburn v. State (26 Tex. App. 668), 
 
 283. 
 Hyde v. Shank (93 Mich. 535), 247. 
 Hyde v. Woolfolk (1 Iowa, 159), 140, 
 
 166, 185. 
 Hyden v. State (31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 401), 283, 350. 
 Hydrick v. Burke (30 Ark. 124), 220. 
 Hynes v. McDermott (82 N. Y. 41), 
 
 139. 
 H v. P (L. R 3 P. & D. 
 
 126), 202. 
 
 I. 
 
 Iasigi v. Rosenstein (65 Hun, 591), 216. 
 Idaho, etc. Co. v. Bradbury (132 U. 
 
 S. 509), 7. 
 Idaho Ford Co. v. Firemen's Ins. Co. 
 
 (Utah, 1893, 29 Pac. Rep. 826), 
 
 73a. 
 111. Cent. R. R. Co. v. People (111., 
 
 1893, 33 N. E. Rep. 173). 186. 
 111. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Ruffin (Miss., 
 
 1888, 3 S. Rep. 578), 50. 
 111. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Sutton (42 
 
 Mich. 438), 52, 192. 
 Imrie v. Castrigue (8 C. B., N. S., 
 
 406), 158. 
 Ince v. Beekman (16 La, Ann. 352), 
 
 233. 
 Independence v. Trovvville (15 Kan. 
 
 70), 143a. 
 Indiana, etc. Co. v. Cook (102 Ind. 
 
 113), 253. 
 Indianapolis v. Scott (72 Ind. 196), 
 
 343. 
 Indianapolis Cabinet Co. v. Herr- 
 
 man (Ind., 18 l J3, 34 N. E. Rep. 
 
 579), 330. 
 Indianapolis, etc. Co. v. Stout (53 
 
 Ind. 543), 123. 
 Indianapolis Ry. v. Boetcher (131 
 
 Ind. 82; 28 N. E. Rep. 551), 8. 
 Ingalls v. State (48 Wis. 647), 324. 
 Ingersoll v. Stiger (46 N. J. Eq. 511), 
 
 304. 
 Ingle v. Jones (43 Iowa, 286), 246. 
 Ingraham v. Hutchison (2 Conn. 
 
 584), 229. 
 Ingram v. State (27 Ala. 17), 244. 
 Insurance Co. v. Forchheimer (86 
 
 Ala. 541), 242. 
 Insurance Co. v. Hazen (110 Pa. St. 
 
 537), 10. 
 Insurance Co. v. Lane (46 N. J. Eq. 
 
 316), 50. 
 Insurance Co. v. Morey (96 U. S. 
 
 544), 83. 
 Insurance Co. v. Mosley (8 Wall., U. 
 
 S., 397), 52, 57.
 
 XCV1 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Insurance Co. v. Sheppard (85 Ga. 
 
 751), 57. 
 Insurance Co. v. Slowitch (55 N. Y. 
 
 Super. Ct. 452), 334. 
 Insurance Co. v. Throop (22 Mich. 
 
 146), 217. 
 Insurance Co. v. "Weide (11 Wall., 
 
 U. S., 441), 225. 
 International Co. v. Ragsdale (67 
 
 Tex. 27), 76. 
 International, etc. Co. v. Kuehn 
 
 (Tex., 1893, 21 S. W. Rep. 58), 
 
 50, 52. 
 International, etc. Co. v. Underwood 
 
 (64 Tex. 464), 202. 
 International R. R. Co. v. Dyer (76 
 
 Tex. 156), 341. 
 Investment Co. v. Elridge (2 Pa. 
 
 Dis. Ct. Rep. 394), 140. 
 Irby v. State (23 Tex. App. 103), 101. 
 Irish v. Smith (8 S. & R. 573), 180. 
 Irvin v. Bail (80 Tex. 352), 362. 
 Irvin v. Howard (37 Ga. 23), 358. 
 Irving v. Campbell (56 N. Y. Super. 
 
 Ct. 224), 130. 
 Irving v. Edrington (41 La. Ann. 
 
 671), 356. 
 Irwin v. Phillips (5 Cal. 140), 238. 
 Irwin v. West (81 Pa. St. 157), 67. 
 Isaacson v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co. 
 
 (94 N. Y. 278), 242. 
 Isenhour v. Isenhour (64 N. C. 640), 
 
 309. 
 Isley v. Boon (109 N. C. 555), 30. 
 Ives v. Kimball (1 Mich. 308), 136. 
 Ives v. Quinn (27 N. Y. S. 251), 199. 
 Ives v. Williams (50 Mich. 100), 205. 
 Ivory v. Town of Deer Park (116 N. 
 
 Y. 476), 186. 
 
 J. 
 
 Jaccard v. Anderson (37 Mo. 91), 
 
 123. 
 Jackson v. Allen (120 Mass. 64), 83. 
 Jackson v. Beneham (15 Johns., N. 
 
 Y., 226), 53. 
 Jackson v. Birton (11 Johns. 64), 83. 
 
 Jackson v. Boncham (15 Johns. 226), 
 
 142, 222. 
 Jackson v. Cairns (20 Johns., N. Y., 
 
 300), 130. 
 Jackson v. Cbristman (4 Wend., N. 
 
 Y., 277), 107. 
 Jackson v. Clopton (66 Ala. 29). 75. 
 Jackson v. Com. (19 Gratt. 656), 101. 
 Jackson v. Cooly (8 Johns. 128, 131), 
 
 52, 53. 
 Jackson v. Crilly (16 Colo. 103), 123. 
 Jackson v. Crissey (3 Wend., N. Y., 
 
 251), 123. 
 Jackson v. Fairbanks (2 H. Bl. 340), 
 
 69. 
 Jackson v. French (3 Wend. 337), 
 
 1G8. 
 Jackson v. Gager (5 Cow., N. Y., 
 
 383), 314. 
 Jackson v. Gardner (8 Johns. 404), 
 
 265. 
 Jackson v. Jackson (47 Ga. 99), 32. 
 Jackson v. Jones (74 Tex. 104), 308. 
 Jackson v. LaGrange(19 Johns. 336), 
 
 138. 
 Jackson v. Lamb (7 Cow., N. Y., 
 
 431), 108. 
 Jackson v. Laroway (3 Johns. Cas. 
 
 283), 106, 108. 
 Jackson v. Lawson (15 Johns. 544), 
 
 123. 
 Jackson v. Litch (62 Pa. St. 451), 
 
 341. 
 Jackson v. Lodge (36 Cal. 28), 223. 
 Jackson v. Luquere (5 Cow. 221), 
 
 105, 108, 138. 
 Jackson v. Marford (7 Wend., N. Y., 
 
 62), 225. 
 Jackson v. McVey (18 Johns. 330), 
 
 173. 
 Jackson v. Nelson (6 Cow. 248), 303. 
 Jackson v. Osborn (2 Wend. 555), 
 
 129. 
 Jackson v. Parker (13 Conn. 352), 
 
 311. 
 Jackson v. Plumb (8 Johns. 295), 
 
 242. 
 Jackson v. Russell (4 Wend. 543), 53.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XCV1) 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Jackson v. Seager (2 D. & L 13), 284. 
 Jackson v. State (54 Ark. 243), 283. 
 Jackson v. State (1 Ind. 185), 315. 
 Jackson v. State (88 Ga. 787), 23. 
 Jackson v. Swope (Ind., 1893, 33 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 909), 350. 
 Jackson v. Tatebo (3 Wash. St. 456), 
 
 250. 
 Jackson v. Times (152 Pa. St. 40G), 
 
 11. 
 Jackson v. Winchester (4 Dall. 206), 
 
 123. 
 Jackson v. Wood (3 Wend. 27). 157. 
 Jackson v. Wood worth (3 Paige, 136), 
 
 356. 
 Jacksonville, etc. Co. v. Pen. Trans. 
 
 Co. (27 Fia. 157; 9 S. Rep. 661), 
 
 73a, 373. 
 Jacksonville, etc. Co. v. Southworth 
 
 (32 111. A pp. 307), 363. 
 Jacobi v. Order of Germania (26 N. 
 
 Y. S. 318), 58. 
 Jacobs v. Duke (1 E. D. Smith, N. Y., 
 
 271), 10. 
 Jacobs v. Hester (113 Mass. 157), 
 
 168. 
 Jacobs v. Shorey (48 N. H. 100), 69. 
 Jacobs' Case (5 Jones, N. C, 259). 
 
 345. 
 Jacoway v. Gault (20 Ark. 190), 136. 
 Jacqua v. Witham (106 Ind. 515), 
 
 218. 
 James v. Bligh (11 Allen, Mass., 4), 
 
 211. 
 James v. Farnell (1 Turn. & R. 417), 
 
 138. 
 James v. Ford (9 N. Y. S. 127), 8. 
 James v. James (81 Tex. 373), 158. 
 James v. Mickey (26 S. C. 270), 351. 
 James v. Walrath (8 Johns. 410). 23. 
 James v. Weigbtnian (Fla., 1893, 12 
 
 S. Rep. 526), 159. 
 James v. Work (24 N. Y. S. 147), 9, 
 
 20. 
 Jameson v. Drinkard (12 Moore, 148), 
 
 198. 
 Jameson v. Emerson (82 Me. 309), 
 
 223. 
 
 Jameson v. Snyder (79 Wis. 2S6; 48 
 
 N. W. Rep. 261), 130. 
 Jamieson v. Ind. etc. Co. (46 N. Y. 
 
 421), 241. 
 Jamison v. Ludlow (3 La. Ann. 492), 
 
 214. 
 Jamison v. People (145 111. 357; 34 
 
 N. E. Rep. 46S), 6, 84. 232. 
 Janeway v. Skerritt (30 N. J. L. 97). 
 
 74. 
 Janney v. Brown (36 La. Ann. 118), 
 
 214. 
 Jardine v. Sheridan (2 C. & K. 24), 
 
 168. 
 Jarrell v. Jarrell (27 W. Va. 743), 
 
 223. 
 Jarrett v. Jarrett (11 W. Va. 562). 
 
 250. 
 Jasper v. Porter (2 McLean, 579), 242. 
 Jassv. Mohn (R. I., 1893, 26 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 787), 308. 
 Jauncy v. Thorne (2 Barb. Ch. 40), 
 
 138. 
 Jeans v. Wheedqn (2 M. & Rob. 484). 
 
 93. 
 Jefferds v. Alvord (151 Mass. 95), 9. 
 Jefferds v. People (5 Park. C. R. 547). 
 
 91. 
 Jefferson v. New York EI. R. Co. 
 
 (132 N. Y. 483), 366. 
 Jefferson v. State (80 Ga. 16), 334. 
 Jefferson ville, etc R. Co. v. Bowen 
 
 (40 Ind. 545), 344. 
 Jeffersonville, etc. Co. v. Lanham 
 
 (27 Ind. 171). 198. 
 Jeffries v. Jeffries (39 Ala. 655), 238. 
 Jenkins v. Collard (145 U. S. 546). 
 
 240. 
 Jenkins v. Lykes (19 Fla. 148), 217. 
 Jenkins v. Meagher (46 Miss. 84), 77. 
 Jenkins v. Railroad Co. (110 N. C. 
 
 438), 344. 
 Jenkins v. State (Fla., 1893, 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 677), 229, 337. 
 Jenkyns v. Gaisford (32 L. J. Prob. 
 
 122), 269. 
 Jenner v. Joliffee (6 Johns. 9), 38, 80. 
 Jennings v. Bank (8 Mich. 181), 114.
 
 XCV111 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Jennings v. Moore (83 Mich. 231; 47 
 
 N. W. Rep. 127), 205. 
 Jennings v. Railroad Co. (97 N. Y. 
 
 438), 220. 
 Jennison v. Citizens' Sav. Bank (83 
 
 N. Y. 540), 359. 
 Jennison v. Hapgood (10 Pick. 77), 50. 
 Jennison v. Mosely (Miss., 1S92, 10 
 
 S. Rep. 582), 249. 
 Jenson v. McCorkle (154 Pa. St. 353), 
 
 220. 
 Jerman v. Tenneas (44 La. Ann. 020), 
 
 370. 
 Jesse v. Davis (34 Mo. App. 341), 00. 
 Jesse v. Parker (0 Gratt. 57), 131. 
 Jewel v. Jewel (1 How., U. S., 219), 
 
 57. 
 Jewell v. Centre (25 Ala. 498), 242. 
 Jewell v. Jewell (17 Pet. 213), 53. 
 Jilmer v. Schell (35 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 
 
 67), 60. 
 Jim v. State (4 Humph., Tenn., 289), 
 
 343. 
 Jinks v. Lewis (89 Ga. 787), 373. 
 Jobbins v. Gray (34 111. App. 208), 
 
 376. 
 John Morris Co. v. Burgess (44 111. 
 
 App. 27), 341. 
 Johnson v. Armstrong (Ala., 1893, 
 
 12 S. Rep. 12), 222, 231. 
 Johnson v. Bradstreet (81 Ga. 425), 
 
 COG* 
 
 Johnson v. Broadway R. R. Co. (0 
 
 N. Y. S. 112), 192. 
 Johnson v. Brown (130 Ind. 61), 360. 
 Johnson v. Buckle (05 Hun, 001), 
 
 358. 
 Johnson v. Clarkson (3 Rich. Eq. 
 
 305), 210. 
 Johnson v. Clements (25 Kan. 370), 
 
 121. 
 Johnson v. Com. (Ky., 1894, 23 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 507), 283. 
 Johnson v. Crippen (02 Miss. 597), 
 
 304. 
 Johnson v. dotty (22 N. Y. S. 753), 
 
 180. 
 Johnson v. Culver (116 Ind. 278), 60. 
 
 Johnson v. Daverne (19 Johns. Ch. 
 
 134), 139. 
 Jobnson v. Day (2 N. D. 295), 129. 
 Johnson v. Day (17 Pick., Mass., 
 
 108), 150a. 
 Johnson v. Delaney (35 Tex. 42), 246. 
 Johnson v. East Tenn., Va. & P. Ry. 
 
 Co. (90 Ga. 810; 17 S. E. Rep. 
 
 121), 109. 
 Johnson v. Hart (82 Ga. 767), 311. 
 Johnson v. Heald (33 Md. 352), 300. 
 Johnson v. Howes (2 Stew., Ala., 
 
 27). 148. 
 Johnson v. Johnson (65 Tex. 87), 254. 
 Johnson v. Johnson (114 111. Gil), 
 
 Johnson v. Josephs (75 Me. 544), 
 
 249. 
 Johnson v. Kelleher (115 Mass. 125; 
 
 29 N. E. Rep. 200), 12. 
 Johnson v. Kettler (84 111. 315), 232. 
 Johnson v. Mar. B. R. (28 Neb. 492), 
 
 129. 
 Johnson v. Marsh (2 La. Ann. 772), 
 
 09. 
 Johnson v. Maxwell (87 N. C. 18), 
 
 249. 
 Johnson v. Merithew (80 Me. 115), 
 
 232. 
 Johnson v. Merry, etc. Co. (53 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 569), 366. 
 Johnson v. Miller (82 Iowa, 693), 151. 
 Johnson v. Mills (31 Neb. 524), 282. 
 Johnson v. N. Pac. R. Co. (47 Minn. 
 
 430), 192. 
 Johnson v. Parrotte (34 Neb. 26; 51 
 
 N. W. Rep. 290), 176. 
 Johnson v. People (140 111. 350; 29 
 
 N. E. Rep. 895), 11. 
 Johnson v. Phifer (6 Neb. 401), 208. 
 Johnson v. Powers (40 Vt. 611), 124. 
 Johnson v. Railroad Co. (51 Iowa, 
 
 25), 362. 
 Johnson v. Railroad Co. (90 Ala. 505), 
 
 130. 
 Johnson v. Ridir (Iowa, 1892, 50 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 36), 11. 
 Johnson v. Roberts (31 Md. 476), 233.
 
 TABLE OE CASES. 
 
 XC1X 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Johnson v. Russell (144 Mass. 409), 
 
 76. 
 Johnson v. Sherwin (3 Gray, Mass., 
 
 374), 71. 
 Johnson v. State (59 Ala. 37), 93. 
 Johnson v. State (86 Ga. 90), 93. 
 Johnson v. State (61 Ga. 305), 95. 
 Johnson v. State (85 Ga. 561), 282. 
 Johnson v. State (27 Fia. 245), 343. 
 Johnson v. State (21 Tex. App. 36S), 
 
 52. 
 Johnson v. State (27 Tex. App. 135), 
 
 166. 
 Johnson v. State (29 Tex. App, 150), 
 
 8, 234. 
 Johnson v. State (47 Ala. 9), 102. 
 Johnson v. State (18 Tex. App. 385), 7. 
 Johnson v. State (30 La. Ann. 881), 
 
 89. 
 Johnson v. State (17 Ala. 618). 102. 
 Johnson v. Taylor (60 Tex. 360), 136. 
 Johnson v. Timmons (50 Tex. 521), 
 
 107. 
 Johnson v. Waknilla (9 S. Rep. 690; 
 
 28 Fla. 720), 146. 
 Johnson v. Wallace (53 Miss. 331), 
 
 139a. 
 Johnston v. Allen (100 N. C. 131), 366. 
 Johnston v. Markle Paper Co. (153 
 
 Pa. St. 189), 380. 
 Johnston v. Oregon S. L & U. N. Co. 
 
 (1893, 31 Pac. Rep. 283), 186. 
 Johnston v. State (94 Ala. 35), 334. 
 Johnston v. Todd (5 Beav. 600, 602), 
 
 350. 
 Johnston Hard. Co. v. Muller (72 
 
 Mich. 265), 354. 
 Joliet R. Co. v. Caul (42 111. App. 41), 
 
 202. 
 Jones v. Arterborn (11 Humph. 97), 
 
 138. 
 Jones v. Brooklyn (3 N. Y. S. 353), 
 
 178, 319. 
 Jones v. Charlotte, etc. (S. C, 1893, 
 
 17 S. E. Rep. 698), 13. 
 Jones v. Chicago, etc. Co. (43 Minn. 
 
 279), 188. 
 Jones v. Crow (32 Pa. St. 398), 229. 
 
 Jones v. Duchow (87 Cal. 109), 10. 
 Jones v. Foxall (15 Beav. 338), 75. 
 Jones v. Gale's Adm'r (4 Martin, 635), 
 
 240. 
 Jones v. Harris (1 Strobh., S. C, 
 
 160), 320. 
 Jones v. Hays (4 McLean, 521), 242. 
 Jones v. Hough (77 Ala. 437), 131. 
 Jones v. Hoyt (10 Abb. N. C, 324), 
 
 359. 
 Jones v. Hnggins (1 Dev. L., N. C, 
 
 223), 139. 
 Jones v. Jones (63 Hun, 630), 248. 
 Jones v. Jones (120 N. Y. 389), 73a. 
 Jones v. Jones (45 Md. 148), 345. 
 Jones v. Jones (36 Md. 447), 53. 
 Jones v. Kennedy (11 Pick. 125), 247. 
 Jones v. Knauss (31 N. J. Eq. 609), 
 
 226, 286. 
 Jones v. Laney (3 Tex. 342), 242. 
 Jones v. Lanier (2 Dev., S. C, L. 
 
 480), 353. 
 Jones v. Ludlow (6 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 
 
 57), 151. 
 Jones v. Lumber Co. (Ark., 1893, 23 
 
 S. W. Rep. 679), 350. 
 Jones v. Marks (47 Cal. 242), 268. 
 Jones v. Mason (2 Stra. 833), 138. 
 Jones v. Mason (5 Rand., Va., 577), 
 
 215. 
 Jones v. Moore (7 Binn. 573), 69. 
 Jones v. Neale (1 Hughes C. C. 268), 
 
 361. 
 Jones v. O'Farrell (1 New 354), 68. 
 Jones v. Perkins (54 Me. 393), 205. 
 Jones v. Pitcher (3 S. & R, 135), 144. 
 Jones v. Porter (59 Miss. 628), 135. 
 Jones v. Portland (88 Mich. 598), 52. 
 Jones v. President, etc. Portland (88 
 
 Mich. 598), 188. 
 Jones v. Reardon (3 Md. Ch. 57), 135. 
 Jones v. Reeves (6 Rich., S. C, 132), 
 
 254. 
 Jones v. Roberts (37 Mo. App. 163), 
 
 51. 
 Jones v. Rose (11 Jur. 379), 287. 
 Jones v. Slate Co. (16 How., N. Y., 
 
 129), 357.
 
 TABLE OF CASKS. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Jones v. Smith (31 S. C. 527), 268. 
 Jones v. Snyder (117 Inch- 229), 199. 
 Jones v. St. Louis, etc. Co. (Ark., 
 
 1890, 13 S. W. Rep. 416), 7. 
 Jones v. State (Miss., 1893, 12 S. Rep. 
 
 411), 102. 
 Jones v. State (57 Miss. 684), 5. 
 Jones v. State (65 Miss. 179; 3 S. Rep. 
 
 379), 174, 350. 
 Jones v. State (71 Ind. 66), 57. 
 Jones v. State (31 Tex. Or. Rep. 177), 
 
 283. 
 Jones v. State (Tex., 1893, 22 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 404), 322. 
 Jones v. State (52 Ark. 345), 102, 
 Jones v. Stevens (3(5 Neb. 849 ; 55 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 251), 341. 
 Jones v. Swank (Minn., 1893, 53 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 634), 249. 
 Jones v. Tucker (41 N. H. 546), 13, 
 
 193. 
 Jones v. Turpin (6 Heisk., Tenn., 
 
 181), 176. 
 Jones v. United States (137 U. S. 
 
 202). 240. 
 Jones v. White (11 Humph., Tenn., 
 
 268), 192, 193. 
 Jordan v. Circuit Court (69 Iowa, 
 
 177), 244. 
 Jordan v. Corey (2 Ind. 3S5), 136. 
 Jordan v. Hubbard (26 Ala. 433), 71. 
 Jordan v. Loftin (13 Ala. 547), 212. 
 Jordan v. Miller (75 Va. 442), 267. 
 Jordan v. Osgood (109 Mass. 457), 9. 
 Jordan v. State (81 Ala. 20), 101. 
 Jordan v. State (16S.-W. Rep. 543; 
 
 29 Tex. A pp. 449), 346. 
 Jordan v. Stewart (23 Pa. St. 244). 
 
 129. 
 Jcsephi v. Mady Clothing Co. (Mont., 
 
 1893, 33 Pac. Rep. 10), 160. 
 Josey v. Davis (55 Ark. 318), 82. 
 Joy v. Diefendorf (130 N. Y. 6), 
 
 247. 
 Judd v. Gibbs (3 Gray, Mass., 530), 
 
 76. 
 Judge v. Jordan (81 Iowa, 519), 351. 
 Judson v. Lake (3 Day, 318), 150. 
 
 Juillard v. Chaffee (92 N. Y. 535), 
 
 212. 
 Jurner v. Cate (Ga. f 1893, 16 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 971), 151. 
 
 K. 
 
 Kabok v. L. I. Ins. Co. (51 Hun, 639; 
 
 4 N. Y. S. 718), 58. 
 Kahn v. Insurance Co. (Wyo., 1894, 
 
 34 Pac. Rep. 1059), 75. 
 Kain v. Bare (Ind., 1892, 31 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 205), 247. 
 Kain v. Larkin (131 N. Y. 300), 33. 
 Kaiser v. State (35 Neb. 704), 5. 
 Kalbrier v. Leonard (34 Ind. 497), 239. 
 Kane v. Tarbitt (23 111. App. 311). 70. 
 Kane v. Troy (48 Hun, 619), 56. 
 Kankakee, etc. Co. v. Horan (131 111. 
 
 288; 23 N. E. Rep. 621), 76. 
 Kansas City, etc. R. R. Co. v. Mc- 
 Donald (51 Fed. Rep. 278 ; 2 C. C. 
 
 A. 153), 374. 
 Kansas City, etc. Co. v. Philips (Ala., 
 
 1893, 13 S. Rep. 65), 237, 368, 377. 
 Kansas City, etc. Co. v. Stouer (51 
 
 Fed. Rep. 649; 2 C. C. A. 437), 
 
 192. 
 Kansas City, etc. Co. v. Webb (Ala., 
 
 1893, 11 S. Rep. 888), 216. 
 Kansas, etc. Co. v. Miller (2 Colo. 
 
 Ter. 442), 232. 
 Kansas, etc. Co. v. Richardson (25 
 
 Kan. 391), 12. 
 Kansas, etc. Co. v. Ryan (49 Kan. 
 
 1), 11. 
 Kansas, etc. Co. v. Smith (90 Ala. 
 
 25 ; 8 S. Rep. 43), 38a, 58. 
 Kant v. Kessler (114 Pa. St. 003). 171. 
 Karney v. Paisley (13 Iowa, 89), 166. 
 Karney v. State (68 Miss. 233; 8 S. 
 
 Rep. 292), 231. 
 Kaufman v. Schneider (35 III. A] p. 
 
 256), 152. 
 Kaufman v. Springer (38 Kan. 730), 
 
 50. 
 Kay v. Thomson (10 Am. L. Reg., 
 
 N. S., 594), 193.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CI 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Kaywood v. Barnett (3 Dev. & B. 
 
 91), 53. 
 Kean v. Rice (12 S. & R. 203, 208), 143. 
 Keaton v. Mayer (71 Ga. 649), 75. 
 Keaton v. McGirier (24 Ga. 217), 136. 
 Keator v. Colorado, etc. Co. (Colo., 
 
 1893, 32 Pac. Rep. 857), 371. 
 Keegan v. Carpenter (47 Ind. 597), 
 
 73. 
 Keeler v. Shears (6 Wend. 540), 24. 
 Keely v. Oliver (N. C, 1893, 18 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 698), 212. 
 Keen v. South St, Louis Co. (40 Mo. 
 
 19), 200. 
 Keener v. State (18 Ga. 194), 102. 
 Keesey v. Gage (Tex., 1893, 21 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 397), 380. 
 Keeveny v. Ottman (26 Wkly. L. 
 
 Bui. 65), 370. 
 Kegg v. State (7 Ohio St. 79), 210. 
 Keidan v. Winnegar (95 Mich. 430; 
 
 54 N. W. Rep. 901), 219. 
 Keifer v. Carnsi (7 D. C. 156), 73. 
 Keisling v. Readle (1 Ind. App. 240), 
 
 377. 
 Keith v. Knoche (43 111. App. 161), 
 
 355, 378. 
 Keith v. Lathrop (10 Cush., Mass., 
 
 553), 139. 
 Keith v. New Haven & N. R. Co. 
 
 (140 Mass. 175), 345. 
 Keith v. Wells (23 Pac. Rep. 991 ; 14 
 
 Colo. 321), 333. 
 Keithe v. Kibbe (10 Cush., Mass., 35), 
 
 60. 
 Kellar v. Moore (51 Ala. 340), 240. 
 Keller v. Nutz (5 S. & R. 251), 53. 
 Keller v. Railway Co. (27 Minn. 178), 
 
 71. 
 Keller v. State (123 Ind. 110; 23 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 138), 385. 
 Kelley v. People (55 N. Y. 565), 69. 
 Kelley v. Saltmarsh (146 Mass. 585), 
 
 205. 
 Kelley v. State "(55 N. Y. 565), 80. 
 Kellogg v. Thompson (142 Mass. 76), 
 
 207. 
 Kelly v. Carter (55 Ark. 112), 212. 
 
 Kelly v. Harrison (69 Miss. 456), 150a. 
 Kelly v. People (17 Colo. 130), 6. 
 Kelly v. People (55 N. Y. 505), 68. 
 Kelly v. McGuire (15 Ark. 555). 53. 
 Kelly v. Insurance Co. (82 Iowa, 137), 
 
 370. 
 Kelly v. Kelley (80 Wis. 490), 232. 
 Kelly v. Owens (Cal., 1893, 30 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 59G), 9, 250. 
 Kelly v. People (17 Colo. 130; 29 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 805), 324. 
 Kelly v. Railroad Co. (58 Ala. 4S9), 
 
 242. 
 Kelly v. Rosenstock (45 Md. 389), 
 
 136. 
 Kelly v. Rowane (33 Mo. App. 440), 
 
 199. 
 Kelly v. Story (6 Heisk. 202), 238. 
 Kelm v. Briggs (46 Me. 467), 150a. 
 Kelsey v. Busch (2 Hill, N. Y., 440), 
 
 80. 
 Kelsey v. Hanmer (18 Conn. 311), 
 
 130, 138. 
 Kelsey v. Murphy (20 Pa. St. 78), 
 
 69. 
 Kelsoe v. State (47 Ala. 573), 9. 
 Kemble v. Lull (3 McLean, 272), 217. 
 Kemp v. Donhan (5 Har., Del., 417), 
 
 166. 
 Kendall v. Field (14 Me. 30), 60. 
 Kendall v. Powers (4 Neb. 533), 147. 
 Kendrick v. Central R. R. Co. (89 
 
 Ga. 782), 186. 
 Kendrick v. Latham (6 S. Rep. 871 ; 
 
 28 Fla. 819). 33. 
 Kendrick v. State (10 Humph. 479), 
 
 120. 
 Kendrick v. Turbell (26 Vt. 416), 77. 
 Kenerson v. Henry (101 Mass. 152;, 
 
 108. 
 Kenezleber v. Wahl (92 Cal. 202), 
 
 373. 
 Kennard v. Kennard (63 N. H. 308), 
 
 143. 
 Kennedy v. Currie (3 Wash. St. 442), 
 
 7, 360. 
 Kennedy v. Doyle (10 Allen, 161), 
 
 20.
 
 en 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Kennedy v. Holladay (16 S. W. Rep. 
 
 688; 105 Mo. 34), 176. 
 Kennedy v. People (39 N. Y. 245), 
 
 187, 192. 
 Kennedy v. State (Fla., 1893, 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 85S), 5. 
 Kennedy v. State (39 N. Y. 50), 23. 
 Kennedy v. Upshaw (66 Tex. 442), 
 
 248, 253, 334. 349, 352. 
 Kennegar v. State (120 Ind. 176), 23. 
 Kenosha Co. v. Shedd (48 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 933; 82 Iowa, 540;, 81, 244. 
 Kent v. Garvin (1 Gray, Mass., 148), 
 
 60. 
 Kent v. Insurance Co. (N. D., 1892, 
 
 50 N. W. Rep. 85), 232. 
 Kent v. Lincoln (32 Vt. 591), 8. 
 Kent v. State (42 Ohio, 429), 359. 
 Kent v. White (27 Ind. 390), 247. 
 Kenton v. First Nat. Bank (Ky., 
 
 1892, 19 S. W. Rep. 841), 82, 371. 
 Kentucky v. I. Cent. Co. (Ind., 1892, 
 
 30 N. E. Rep. 802), 76. 
 Kentucky Cent. Ry. Co. v. Smith 
 
 (Ky., 1892, 20 S. W. Rep. 392), 344. 
 Kentzler v. Kentzler (3 Wash. St. 
 
 166), 36, 148. 
 Kenyon v. Luther (4 N. Y. S. 498), 9. 
 Kenyon v. Pierce (17 R. I. 794), 308. 
 Keppel v. Petersburg R. Co. (Chase's 
 
 Dec. 167), 238. 
 Kermot v. Ayer (11 Mich. 181), 237. 
 Kern v. Van Phul (7 Minn. 426), 205 
 Kernam v. Bah ana (13 S. Rep. 155, 
 
 La., 1893), 220. 
 Kernan v. State (65 Md. 253), 9. 
 ■Kernin v. Hill (37 111. 209), 140. 
 Kernitz v. L. I. City (50 Hun, 428), 
 
 239. 
 Kerper v. Wood (29 N. E. Rep. 501 ; 
 
 48 Ohio St. 613), 69. 
 Kerr v. Hill (27 W. Va. 576), 223. 
 Kerr v. Hodge (39 111. App. 546), 351. 
 Kerr v. Love (1 Wash. St. 172), 60. 
 Kessel v. Albetis (56 Barb. 362), 242. 
 Ketchum, In re (5 N. Y. S. 566), 232. 
 Kettering v. Jacksonville (50 111. 39), 
 143a. 
 
 Key v. Dent (14 Md. 86), 151. 
 Keyes v. State (122 Ind. 527), 346. 
 Key ton v. Brawford (5 Gratt. 39), 
 
 223. 
 Kibbe v. Bancroft (17 111. 18), 60. 
 Kidder v. Blaisdell (45 Me. 461), 244. 
 Kidder v. Horrobbin (72 N. Y. 169), 
 
 220. 
 Kidder v. Vandersloot (114 111. 130), 
 
 18, 208. 
 Kidd's Adra'r v. Alexander (1 Rand., 
 
 Va., 456), 134. 
 Kid n ell v. Larson (Tex., 1893, 22 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 534), 11. 
 Kil bourn v. Latta (7 Mackey, 80), 
 
 250. 
 Kilbourn v. Thompson (105 U. S. 
 
 168, 181,205), 288. 
 Kilburn v. Bennett (3 Met., Mass., 
 
 199), 231. 
 Kilgore v. Stanley (90 Ala. 523), 130. 
 Kilgour v. Gockley (83 111. 109), 232. 
 Kilgour v. Miles (6 J. & J., Md., 274), 
 
 145. 
 Killebrew v. Murphy (3 Heisk. 546), 
 
 238. 
 Kilmer v. St. Louis, Ft. S. & W. R. 
 
 Co. (37 Kan. 84; 14 Pac. Rep. 
 
 465), 282. 
 Kilpatrick v. Com. (31 Pa. St. 198), 
 
 244. 
 Kilpatrick v. Dean (4 N. Y. S. 708), 
 
 367. 
 Kilrow v. Com. (89 Pa. St. 480), 323. 
 Kimball v. Chappell (27 Abb. N. C. 
 
 437), 222. 
 Kimball v. Saguin (Iowa, 1892, 53 
 
 N. W. Rep. 116), 376, 380. 
 Kimball v. Walker (30 111. 511), 208. 
 Kimberly v. Arms (129 U. S. 512), 
 
 258. 
 Kimtsen v. Davis (51 Minn. 363; 53 
 
 N. W. Rep. 646), 150a. 
 Kindall v. White (3 Me. 245), 150a. 
 King, In re (29 W. N. C. 426), 84. 
 King v. Chase (15 N. H. 8), 160. 
 King v. Donahue (110 Mass. 155), 
 
 139a.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cm 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 King v. Enterprise Ins. Co. (45 Ind. 
 
 43), 883. 
 King v. Iowa Midland R. Co. (34 
 
 Iowa, 458), 844. 
 King v. J&cobson (58 Hun, CIO), 
 
 250. 
 King v. King (42 Mo. App. 454), 56, 
 
 168. 
 King v. Little (4 Cash. 438), 218. 
 King v. Luff (8 East, 193), 241. 
 King v. Merritt (34 N. W. Rep. 689; 
 
 67 Midi. 194), 106. 
 King v. Peakman (20 N. J. Eq. 316), 
 
 349. 
 King v. Railroad Co. (27 N. Y. S. 
 
 973). 334. 
 Kingv. Rea (21 Pac. Rep. 1084; 13 
 
 Colo. 69), 128. 
 King v. Sears (Ga., 1893, 18 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 830), 107. 
 King v. Second Ave. R. R. Co. (26 
 
 N. Y. S. 973), 192. 
 King v. State (44 Ind. 285), 23. 
 King v. State (91 Tenn. 617), 103, 
 
 878. 
 King v. State (9 Fla. 617), 231. 
 King v. State (77 Ga. 734), 350. 
 King v. Woodruff (23 Conn. 56), 208. 
 King v. Worthington (73 111. 161), 30. 
 Kingen v. State (50 Ind. 537), 71. 
 King-freed v. Pullen (54 Me. 398), 
 
 276. 
 Kingman v. Cowles (103 Mass. 283), 
 
 148. 
 Kingman v. Paulsen (126 Ind. 507), 
 
 159. 
 Kingman v. Sparrow (12 Barb. 201), 
 
 229. 
 Kingory v. United States (44 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 669), 337. 
 Kingsbury v. Moses (45 N. H. 222), 
 
 35. 
 Kingston v. Kincaid (1 Wash. , TJ. S., 
 
 448), 77. 
 Kinnear v. Mackey (85 111. 96), 82. 
 Kinney v. Berra'n (6 Cush. 304), 5. 
 Kinney v. Farnsworth(l7Conn. 355), 
 
 82. 
 
 Kinney v. Springfield (35 Mo. App. 
 
 297), 202. 
 Kinney v. United States (54 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 312), GO. 
 Kinsey v. Bennett (37 S. C. 319; 15 
 
 S. E. Rep. 905), 246. 
 Kip v. Brigham (6 Johns. 158), 15!). 
 Kirby v. State (5 S. W. Rep. 165; 23 
 
 Tex. App. 13), 90, 93. 
 Kirk v. Hamilton (102 U. S. 68), 
 
 83. 
 Kirk v. Kirk (33 N. E. Rep. 552; 137 
 
 N. Y. 510), 151. 
 Kirkland v. Smith (2 Martin, N. S., 
 
 497), 148. 
 Kirksey v. Kirksey (41 Ala. 626), 
 
 139a. 
 Kiser v. Dannenburg (88 Ga. 541), 
 
 67. 
 Kiser v. Randleman (5 Jones' L. 42S), 
 
 241. 
 Kissam v. Forrest (25 Wend. 651), 
 
 324. 
 Kitchen v. State (29 Tex. App. 45), 
 
 382. 
 Kitner v. Whitlock (88 111. 513). 247. 
 Kittridge v. Russell (114 Mass. 67), 
 
 80. 
 Kleiman v. Geiselman (45 Mo. App. 
 
 497), 33. 
 Klein v. Landman (29 Mo. 259), 234. 
 Klein v. McNamara (54 Miss. 90), 
 
 223. 
 Klein v. People (113 III. 596), 6. 
 Klepsch v. Donald (4 Wash. St. 436), 
 
 344. 
 Kley v. Healy (127 N. Y. 555; 2 N. Y. 
 
 231), 232, 276. 
 Kline v. Baker (99 Mass. 254), 143. 
 Kline v. Baker (106 Mass. 161), 23. 
 Kling v. Kansas Cit} r (27 Mo. App. 
 
 231), 178. 
 Klink v. People (16 Colo. 467), 232. 
 Knapp Case (9 Pick. 496), 95. 
 Knapp v. Baily (9 Me. 195), 223. 
 Knapp v. Maltby (13 Wend. 587), 
 
 128. 
 Knapp v. Marlboro (29 Vt. 282), 205.
 
 CIV 
 
 TAHLK OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Knnpp v. Runals (37 Wis. 135), 253. 
 Knapp v. Warner (57 N. Y. 668), 221. 
 Kneeland v. Luce (141 U. S. 437), 
 
 371. 
 Knick v. Knick (75 Va. 12), 220. 
 Knight v. Clements (8 A. & El. 215), 
 
 129. 
 Knight v. Dyer (57 Me. 176), 210. 
 Knight v. Packard (3 McCord, 71), 
 
 811. 
 Knighton v. Smith (1 Oreg. 276), 136. 
 Knode v. Williams (17 Wall. 588), 
 
 349. 
 Knoll v. State (55 Wis. 249), 193. 
 Knott v. Knott (6 Oreg. 142), 267. 
 Knower v. Haines (31 Fed. Rep. 513), 
 
 242. 
 Knox, In re (31 Pa. St. 220), 269. 
 Knox v. Barbee (3 Bibb, Ky., 526), 
 
 211. 
 Knox v. Bowersox (6 Ohio Cir. Ct. 
 
 275), 232. 
 Knox v. Clark (123 Mass. 216), 198. 
 Knox v. Jenks (7 Mass. 488), 226. 
 Knox v. Knox (95 Ala. 495; 11 S. 
 
 Rep. 204), 248. 
 Koetler v. Man. Ry. Co. (59 Hun, 
 
 623), 56. 
 Kollenberger v. People (9 Colo. 233), 
 
 90. 
 Kolsky v. Loveman (Ala., 1892. 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 720). 249. 
 Koontz v. Owens (109 Mo. 1; 18 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 928), 168, 375. 
 Koppert v. Nagg(37 111. App. 23), 149. 
 Korwitz v. Wright (37 Tex. 82), 60. 
 Kouhn v. Schroth (44 111. App. 513), 
 
 380. 
 Kramer v. Com. (87 Pa. St. 299), 9. 
 Kranich v. Sherwood (92 Mich. 397), 
 
 208. 
 Krebs v. State (8 Tex. App. 1), 103. 
 Krekeler v. Ruther (62 N. Y. 372), 
 
 160. 
 Kreps v. Carlisle (Pa., 1893, 27 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 741), 309. 
 Kreuzberger v. Wingfield (96 Cal. 
 
 251), 209. 
 
 Krey v. Schlusner (62 Hun, 620), 336. 
 Kriel v. Com. (5 Bush, Ky., 362), 231. 
 Krummer v. Christopher & Tenth 
 
 St. R. Co. (2 Misc. Rep. 298), 
 
 380. 
 Kruse v. Chester (06 Cal. 353), 141. 
 Kruse v. Wilson (79 111. 233), 357. 
 Kuehler v. Adler (78 N. Y. 287), 220. 
 Kuh v. Michigan Bank (93 Mich. 
 
 511), 60. 
 Kuhl v. Mayer (23 N. J. Eq. 84, 85), 
 
 84. 
 Kuhns v. Chicago, etc. Co. (65 Iowa, 
 
 528; 22 N. W. Rep. 661), 189. 
 Kunde v. State (22 Tex. App. 65), 69. 
 Kurz v. Fish (58 Hun, 602), 281. 
 Kux v. Central M. Sav. Bank (93 
 
 Mich. 511;, 60. 
 Kyburg v. Perkins (6 Cal. 674), 142. 
 Kyle v. Frost (29 Ind. 398), 166. 
 
 L. 
 
 Labaree v. Klesterman (49 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 1102; 33 Neb. 150), 73, 337. 
 Labor v. Crane (56 Mich. 585), 124. 
 Lacas v. Railroad Co. (92 Mich. 412), 
 
 52. 
 Lachance v. Loblein (15 Mo. App. 
 
 460), 140. 
 Lacon v. Higgins (3 Stark. 178), 143. 
 Lacon v. Lacon (W. N. 1891, p. 25), 
 
 215. 
 Ladd v. Blunt (4 Mass. 402), 146. 
 Ladow v. Groom (1 Denio, N. Y., 
 
 429), 357. 
 Lafayette Bank v. Metcalf (29 Mo. 
 
 App. 384), 252. 
 Lafayette, etc. Co. v. Elman (30 Ind. 
 
 83), 73a. 
 Lafferty v. Moore (33 N. Y. 658), 84. 
 Lagan v. Glover (77 Tex. 448), 142. 
 Lahn v. Gustafson (73 Iowa, 633 ; 35 
 
 N. W. Rep. 660), 366. 
 Laidley v. Cummings (83 Ky. 606, 
 
 607), 141, 242. 
 Laidley v. Rogers (67 Hun, 653), 359. 
 Laing v. Rush (66 Hun, 635), 376.
 
 TATU.K OF CASE? 
 
 cv 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Laing v. United States N. J. R. Co. 
 
 (54 N. J. L. 57(5), 8, 190. 
 Like v. Gray (35 Iowa, 462), 208. 
 Lake v. Ranney (33 Barb., N. Y., 50, 
 
 68), 234. 
 Lake Erie, etc. Co. v. Hatch (6 Oiiio 
 
 Cir. Ct. 230), 241. 
 Lake Erie, etc. Co. v. Mora in (29 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 809; 36 111. App. 862), 
 
 341, 3.10. 
 Lake Ont. etc. Co. v. Judson (122 N. 
 
 Y. 278), 247. 
 Lake Shore, etc. Co. v. Brown (123 
 
 111. 162), 381. 
 Lake Shore, etc. Co. v. Herrick (29 
 
 N. E. Rep. 1032; 49 Ohio St. 25), 
 
 56. 
 Lake Shore, etc. Co. v. Hundt (140 
 
 111. 525), 18, 20. 
 Lakens v. Hazlett(37 Minn. 441). 339. 
 Lally v. Rossman (82 Wis. 147; 51 
 
 N. W. Rep. 1132), 871. 
 Lalor v. McDonald (44 Mo. App. 439), 
 
 380. 
 Lamance v. Byrnes (17 Nev. 197), 7, 
 
 375. 
 Lamar v. Pearce (90 Ga. 377; 17 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 92), 50, 76, 80, 142. 
 Lamb v. Davenport (1 Sawy., U. S., 
 
 609), 238. 
 Lamb v. State (66 Md. 285), 217. 
 Lambert v. People (6 Abb. N. C. 
 
 181), 77. 
 Lambert v. Smith (1 Cranch, U. S., 
 
 361), 67. 
 Lambert's Estate, In re (10 Pa. Co. 
 
 Ct. R. 10), 210. 
 Lamberty v. Roberts (9 N. Y. S. 607 ; 
 
 56 Hun, 649), 82. 
 Lamoure v. Caryl (4 Den. 170), 199. 
 Lamphire v. Cowan (39 Vt. 420), 232. 
 Lamphire v. Slaughter (61 How. Pr., 
 
 N. Y., 36), 212. 
 Lampton v. Haggard (3 Mon. 146), 
 
 237. 
 Lanahan v. Lawton (50 N. J. Eq. 
 
 276; 23 Atl. Rep. 476), 363. 
 Lanbach v. Mires (141 Pa. St. 447), 130. 
 
 Lancaster v. Collins (1 15 U. S. 222), 
 
 254. 
 Lancaster v. Lane (14 111. 242), 147. 
 Lancaster v. State (9 Tex. App. 400), 
 
 23. 
 Lancaster v. Washington I. Co. (62 
 
 Mo. 121), 232. 
 Landa v. Obert (79 Tex. 33), 156. 
 Landaff's Petition (34 N. H. 164), 72. 
 Land Co. v. Calhoun (16 W. Va. 362), 
 
 244. 
 Lander v. Lander (5 Ir. C. L. Rep. 
 
 27), 333. 
 Landlord v. Jones (18 Oreg. 307), 
 
 347. 
 Landin v. Anderson (76 Ala. 403), 
 
 244. 
 Lindis v. State (70 Ga. 651), 6. 
 Landsberger v. Gorham (5 Cal. 450), 
 
 168. 
 Landt v. Mayor (Colo., 1893, 31 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 524), 250. 
 Lane v. Farmer (13 Ark. 63), 226. 
 Lane v. Harris (16 Ga. 217), 242. 
 Lane v. Innes (43 Minn. 157). 150a. 
 Lane v. Johnson (.59 Vt. 237), 211. 
 Lane v. Lane (21 S. W. Rep. 99; 113 
 
 Mo. 504), 369. 
 Lane v. L. E. R. Co. (23 N. Y. 29), 
 
 242. 
 Lane v. Marshall (65 Vt. 85). 304. 
 Lane v. Morse (6 How., N. Y., 394), 
 
 357. 
 Lane v. Union Bank (29 N. E. Rep. 
 
 613), 216. 
 Lane v. Wilcox (55 Barb., N. Y., 
 
 615), 195. 
 Lang v. Sanger (76 Wis. 71 ; 44 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 1085), 8. 
 Langan v. Langan (89 Cal. 186; 26 
 
 Pac. Rep. 794), 208. 
 Langdon v. Astor (16 N. Y. 34), 215. 
 Langdon v. Keith (9 Vt. 299), 223. 
 Langdon v. People (133 III. 382; 24 
 
 N. E. Rep. 874). 5, 378. 
 Langer v. Merritt (120 N.Y.I 14), 142. 
 Langer v. Meservey (80 Iowa, 158; 
 
 45 N. W. Rep. 732), 223.
 
 CVl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Langford v. Jones (18 Oreg. 307), 190. 
 Langworthy v. Green (88 Mich. 207), 
 
 18G. 
 Lanier v. Foust (81 Tex. 186; 10 
 
 S. W. Rep. 904), 208. 
 Lapham v. Atlas Ins. Co. (24 Pick., 
 
 Mass., 1), 198. 
 Laras v. Com. (84 Pa. St. 208), 188. 
 Large v. Passmore (5 S. & R., Pa., 
 
 51), 815. 
 Larimore v. Bobb (Mo., 1893, 21 
 
 S. W. Rep. 922), 279. 
 Larkin v. Railroad Co. (Iowa, 1892, 
 
 52 N. W, Rep. 480), 141, 143a. 
 Larkins v. Riddle (21 Ala. 252), 223. 
 Larkins v. Rhodes (5 Port., Ala., 
 
 195), 267. 
 Larman v. Knight (140 111. 132), 213, 
 
 246. 
 Larrowe v. Lewis (58 Hun, 601), 216. 
 Larson v. Johnson (42 111. App. 198), 
 
 216. 
 Larson v. Lombard Inv. Co. (51 
 
 Minn. 141 ; 53 N. W. Rep. 179). 
 
 186, 379. 
 Larten v. Gilliam (2 111. 577), 141. 
 La Rue v. St. Anthony & D. Ele- 
 vator Co. (S. D., 1893, 54 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 806), 73. 
 Lasater v. Van Hook (77 Tex. 650), 
 
 20. 
 Las Caygas v. Larionda (4 Mart., 
 
 La., 283), 149. 
 Lash v. Rendall (72 Ind. 475), 83. 
 Lassiter v. State (67 Ga. 739), 330. 
 Lassone v. Boston & L. R. Co. (N. H, 
 
 1890, 24 Atl. Rep. 902), 58. 
 Latham v. Brown (48 Kan. 190), 199. 
 Latham v. Shipley (Iowa, 1892, 53 
 
 N. W. Rep. 342), 198. 
 Lathrop v. Adkinson (87 Ga. 389), 
 
 124. 
 Lathrop v. Foster (51 Me. 367), 212. 
 Latimer v. Elgin (4 Desaus. 26, 32), 
 
 143. 
 Latley v. Emery (59 Hun, 237), 11. 
 Lauderdale v. State (Tex., 1892, 19 
 
 S. W. Rep. 670), 89. 
 
 Lauer v. Kuder (111., 1893, 34 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 484), 247, 250. 
 Laughlin v. Street R. R. Co. (03 
 
 Mich. 220), 198. 
 Lauter v. Simpson (2 Ind. App. 293), 
 
 362,. 366. 
 Lavette v. Sage (29 Conn. 577), 208. 
 Lavin v. Mutual Aid Soc. (74 111. 
 
 349), 58, 144. 
 Law v. Merrill (6 Wend. 268, 277), , 
 
 81. 
 Law v. Scott (5 Har. & J. 438), 175. 
 La whom v. Carter (11 Bush, Ky., 7), 
 
 60. 
 Lawless v. Quele (8 Ir. L. 3S2), 38. 
 Lawlor v. Fritcher (54 Hun, 586), 9. 
 Lawrence v. Barker (5 Wend. 305), 
 
 347. 
 Lawrence v. Guaranty Co. (51 Kan. 
 
 222; 32 Pac. Rep. 816), 83. 
 Lawrence v. Hunt (10 Wend. 83, 84), 
 
 160. 
 Lawrence v. Minturn (17 How., 
 
 U. S., 100), 226. 
 Lawrence v. Myrieman Marble Co. 
 
 (1 Misc. Rep. 105), 187. 
 Lawrence v. Tennant (64 N. H. 532), 
 
 108, 115. 
 Lawrence v. Wilson (Mass., 1891, 
 
 35 N. E. Rep. 858), 66. 
 Lawson v. Conaway (37 W. Va. 159), 
 
 194. 
 Lawson v. Kelly (83 Tex. 497), 151. 
 Lawson v. Lawson (117 111. 98), 213. 
 Lay v. Neville (25 Cal. 545). 175. 
 Lay Grae v. Peterson (2 Sandf. , 
 
 N. Y.. 338), 71. 
 Layman's Wills (40 Minn. 372), 171. 
 Lazard v. Mer. & Min. Co. (Md., 
 
 1S93, 26 Atl. Rep. 897), 336. 
 Lazare v. Jacques (15 La. Ann. 599), 
 
 208. 
 Lazarus v. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co. 
 
 (69 Hun. 190), 199. 
 Lazear v. Union Bank (52 Md. 78), 
 
 £05. 
 Lazier v. Westcott (26 N. Y. 146), 
 
 243.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CVll 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Leach v. Linde (24 N. Y. S. 170), 141. 
 Leach v. Shelby (5S Miss. 681), 208. 
 Leache v. State (22 Tex. App. 279), 
 
 231. 
 Leagel v. Railroad Co. (83 Iowa, 320), 
 
 145. 
 Leahey v. Marsh (155 Pa. St. 458), 
 
 12, 50. 
 Leakey v. Gunter (25 Tex. 400), 213. 
 Lear v. Durgin (64 N. H. 618), 205. 
 Learmouth, Ex parte (6 Madd. 113), 
 
 124. 
 Learned v. Hall (133 Mass. 417), 7. 
 Lears v. Rice (65 Mich. 97), 70. 
 Leary v. Leary (18 Ga. 690), 9. 
 Leath v. Baker (82 Me. 28), 362. 
 Leathers v. Wrecking Co. (2 Woods, 
 
 682), 38. 
 Leatherwood v. Sullivan (81 Ala. 
 
 45S), 242. 
 Leavitt v. Baker (82 Me. 28). 362. 
 Leavitt v. Dodge (61 Hun, 627), 11. 
 Leavitt v. Windsor Land & Invest- 
 ment Co. (54 Fed. Rep. 459), 206. 
 Le Ban v. Vanderbilt (3 Redf., N. Y., 
 
 384), 67. 
 Le Baron v. United States (4 Wall. 
 
 642), 21. 
 Le Bean v. People (35 N. Y. 223), 52. 
 Le Carpentierv. Delery (4 Mart., La., 
 
 451), 140. 
 Leckraan v. Harding (65 111. 505), 136. 
 Ledbetter v. State (23 Tex. App. 247), 
 
 101. 
 Leddy v. Barney (139 Mass. 394), 205. 
 Lee v. Baldwin (10 Ga. 208), 304. 
 Lee v. Brown (21 Kan. 458), 73. 
 Lee v. Church (52 Barb., N. Y., 110), 
 
 215. 
 Lee v. Shivers (70 Ala. 288), 222. 
 Lee v. State (21 Ohio St. 151), 322. 
 Lee v. State (56 Ark. 4; 19 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 6), 346. 
 Lee, Adni'r, v. Hill (87 Va. 497), 121, 
 
 123. 
 Leeds v. Amherst (14 Sim. 357), 276. 
 Leeds v. Marine Ins. Co. (2 Wheat., 
 
 U. S., 380), 67, 76. 
 
 Lees v. Lamprey (43 N. H. 13), 69. 
 Leese v. Clarke (29 Cal. 661), 32. 
 Lee Silver Co. v. Engelbach (IS Colo. 
 
 106; 31 Pac. Rep. 771), 7. 
 Lefavour v. Yandes (2 Blackf. 240), 
 
 69. 
 Lefevre v. Lefevre (59 N. Y. 434), 
 
 222. 
 Legatt v. Tollervey (14 East, 202), 
 
 127. 
 Legendre v. N. O. Brew. Co. (La., 
 
 1893, 12 S. Rep. 837). 140. 
 Legg v. Bloomington (40 111. App. 
 
 185), 8. 
 Leggat v. Leggat (Mont., 1893, 33 
 
 Pac. Rep. 5). 66. 
 Legge v. Edmonds (25 L. J. Ch. 125), 
 
 73. 
 Lego v. Medley (79 Wis. 211), 222, 
 Lehigh v. Railroad Co. (41 N. J. Eq. 
 
 187), 309. 
 Leibe v. Hebersmith (3 S. Rep. 283), 
 
 138. 
 Leiber v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 
 
 (84 Iowa, 97 ; 50 N. W. Rep. 547), 
 
 11, 350. 
 Leideman v. Schultz (24 Eng. L. & 
 
 Eq. 305), 217. 
 Leidlein v. Mayer (95 Mich. 586; 55' 
 
 N. W. Rep. 367), 38a. 
 Leigh, In re (1892, Prob. 82), 128. 
 Leigh v. Everheart (4 T. B. Mon., 
 
 Ky., 379), 305. 
 Leigh v. Hind (17 E. C. L. 774), 277. 
 Leighton v. Sargent (11 Fost., N. H., 
 
 120), 193. 
 Leiter v. Day (35 111. App. 248), 21. 
 Leland v. Wilkinson (6 Pet. 317), 242. 
 Lcmert v. Shafer (Ind., 1893, 31 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 112S), 232. 
 Lenahan v. People (5 T. & C. 265), 
 
 239. 
 Lenhart v. Allen (32 Pa. St. 312), 67. 
 Lennig's Estate, In re (154 Pa. St. 
 
 209; 25 Atl. Rep. 1009), 222. 
 Leonard v. Allen (11 Cush. 241), 10. 
 Leonard v. German F. Ins. Co. (23 
 
 N. Y. S. 684), 373.
 
 CV1U 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Beferences are to sections. 
 Railway Co. (21 Oreg 
 
 Leonard v. 
 
 655), 39. 
 Leonard v. So. P. Ry. Co. (21 Oreg. 
 
 555), 8, 201. 
 Leonard v. Territory (2 Wash. Ter. 
 
 381), 5, 7. 
 Leonard v. Tillotson (97 N. Y. 8), 80. 
 Lepla v. Minn. Tribune Co. (35 Minn. 
 
 311), 168. 
 Leport v. Todd (32 N. J. L. 124), 
 
 234. 
 Leslie v. Leslie (110 Mo. 31), 362. 
 Lester v. State (32 Ark. 727, 93. 
 Levi v. Black well (35 S. C. 511), 380. 
 Levi v. Welsh (45 N. J. Eq. 867), 208. 
 Levison v. State (54 Ala. 520), 93. 
 Levy v. Cadet (17 S. & R. 127), 69. 
 Levy v. Mitchell (6 Ark. 138). 73a. 
 Levy v. State (28 Tex. App. 203), 
 
 350. 
 Lewars v. Weaver (121 Pa. St. 268), 
 
 367. 
 Lewin v. Russell (42 N. Y. 251), 309. 
 Lewis v. Adams (61 Ga. 549), 66. 
 Lewis v. Alkire (32 W. Va. 504), 
 
 376. 
 Lewis v. Bacon (3 H. & M. 89), 355. 
 Lewis v. Bruton (74 Ala. 317), 240. 
 Lewis v. Fish (40 Mo. App. 372), 362. 
 Lewis v. Hadrnon (56 Ala. 1S6), 33. 
 Lewis v. Hitchcock (10 Fed. Rep. 7), 
 
 19. 
 Lewis v. Kramer (3 Md. 265), 58. 
 Lewis v. Lewis (5 La. Ann. 388), 150. 
 Lewis v. Lewis (26 Tex. App. 115), 
 
 150r/. 
 Lewis v. McClure (8 Oreg. 273). 242. 
 Lewis v. Meginnia (30 Fla. 419), 58, 
 
 60, 67, 309. 
 Lewis v. Merritt (113 N. Y. 388), 308. 
 Lewis v. Pallin (48 Mo. App. 657), 
 
 380. 
 Lewis v. Roberts (103 E. C. L. 29), 30. 
 Lewis v. Roulo (93 Mich. 475), 120. 
 Lewis v. Sapio (1 M. & W. 39), 139. 
 Lewis v. Smith (107 Mass. 334), 8. 
 Lewis v. State (15 S. E. Rep. 697 ; 90 
 
 Ga. 95), 23, 234, 334. 
 
 Lewis v. State (Ga., 1893, 16 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 986), 350. 
 Lewis v. State (Tex., 1893, 24 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 903), 239. 
 Lewis v. United States (92 U. S. 621), 
 
 206. 
 Lewis v. Wintrebe (76 Ind. 13). 244. 
 Lewke v. D. D. E. B. etc. Co. (46 
 
 Hun, 283), 57. 
 Lexington v. Headley (5 Bush, Ky., 
 
 508), 143a. 
 Liddell v. Fisher (48 Mo. App. 449), 
 
 24. 
 Liddon v. Hodnett (22 Fla. 442), 142c. 
 Life Ins. Co. v. Norris (31 N. J. Eq. 
 
 583-585), 84. 
 Lift v. Lingane (17 R. I. 420; 22 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 942), 176. 
 Liggett v. Glenn (51 Fed. Rep. 381), 
 
 173. 
 Lighthouse v. Railroad Co. (S. D. , 
 
 1893, 54 N. W. Rep. 320), 386. 
 Lilienthal's Tobacco v. United States 
 
 (97 U. S. 237, 266), 249. 
 Lillis v. Erin Ditch Co. (95 Cal. 553), 
 
 76. 
 Lilly v. Wagoner (27 111. 395), 231. 
 Limb^rger v. Tidwell (104 N. C. 506), 
 
 136. 
 Lime Rock Bank v. Hewitt (52 Me. 
 
 531), 73a, 121. 
 Linck v. Litchfield (141 111. 469; 31 
 
 N. E. Rep. 123), 239, 356. 
 Lincoln, In re (19 Fed. Rep. 460), 24. 
 Lincoln v. Bartells (6 Wend. 475). 
 
 143, 243. 
 Lincoln v. Taunton Co. (9 Allen, 
 
 Mass., 122). 195. 
 Lind v. Lind (Minn., 1893, 54 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 934), 231. 
 Lindley v. Sullivan (133 Ind. 588; 33 
 
 N. E. Rep. 361), 250. 
 Lindsay v. Chicago (115 111. 120), 
 
 143a. 
 Lindsay v. Garvin (31 S. C. 259), 205. 
 Lindsay v. Miller (2 Pet, 660), 229. 
 Lindsay v. People (63 N. Y. 143), 7, 
 
 193, 323.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 C1X 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Lindsay v. Reilly (50 N. J. L. 636; 15 
 
 Atl. Rep. 679), 150.. 
 Linecum v. State (29 Tex. App. 328), 
 
 10. 
 Linfield v. Old Colony R. R. Co. (10 
 
 Cash. 570), 360. 
 Link v. Sheldon (64 Hun, 633; 18 
 
 N. Y. S. 815), 188, 193, 336, 307. 
 Linn, Boyd, etc. Co. v. Terrill (13 
 
 Bush, Ky., 463), 268. 
 Linsley v. Brown (13 Conn. 192), 208. 
 Linton v. Allen (154 Mass. 432), 32, 
 
 366. 
 Linton v. Com. (46 Pa. St. 294), 312. 
 Linton v. Hurley (14 Gray, Mass., 
 
 191), 193. 
 Lipe v. McClery (41 111. App. 29), 220. 
 Lippitt v. Kelly (46 Vt. 523), 210, 
 
 217. 
 Lipscombe v. Holmes (2Campb. 441), 
 
 82. 
 List v. Kortpeter (26 Ind. 27), 250. 
 Lister v. Smith (33 L. J. Prob. 29), 
 
 222. 
 Listman v. Hickey (65 Hun, 8; 19 
 
 N. Y. S. 880), 24. 
 Little v. Com. (25 Gratt, Va., 921), 
 
 176. 
 Little v. Downing (37 N. H. 355), 
 
 229. 
 Little v. Herndon (10 Wall. 31), 129. 
 Little v. Keon (1 N. Y. Code R. 4), 
 
 312. 
 Little v. Lischkoff (Ala., 1893, 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 429), 199, 339. 
 Little v. Thompson (2 Greenl. , Me., 
 
 228), 250. 
 Little Pittsburg Con. Mining Co. v. 
 Little Chief Cons. Mining Co. (11 
 
 Colo. 223), 226. 
 Little Rock v. Railroad Co. (56 Ark. 
 
 495), 366. 
 Little Rock Trust Co. v. Martin (21 
 S. W. Rep. 468; 57 Ark. 277), 
 128. 
 Littlehale v. Dix (11 Cush. 265), 361. 
 Littler v. Thompson (2 Beav. 129), 
 281. 
 
 Litton v. Wright (1 Ind. App. 92; 27 
 
 N. E. Rep. 329), 187. 
 Liverpool, etc. G. W. Co. v. Phenix 
 
 Ins. Co. (129 U. S. 464), 242. 
 Livingston, Appeal of (63 Conn. 68; 
 
 26 Atl. Rep. 58), 67, 248. 
 Livingston Case (14 Gratt., Va., 592), 
 
 52. 
 Livingston v. Metro. R. R. Co. (1? 
 
 N. Y. S. 203), 186. 
 Livingston v. Tompkins (4 Johns., 
 
 N. Y., Ch. 415), 305. 
 Llewellyn's Case (13 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 
 
 126), 332. 
 Lloyd v. Davis (2 Ind. App. 170), 
 
 174. 
 Lloyd v. Farrell (48 Pa. St. 73), 205. 
 Lloyd v. Hollenback (98 Mich. 203 ; 
 
 57 N. W. Rep. 110), 308. 
 Lloyd v. Thompson (5 111. App. 90), 
 
 339. 
 Lobdell v. Lobdell (36 N. Y. 327), 
 
 309. 
 Locke v. Moulton (96 Cal. 21), 223. 
 Locke v. Railroad Co. (46 Iowa, 112), 
 
 38a. 
 Locke v. Rowell (47 N. H. 461), 217. 
 Lockwood v. Lockwood (51 Hun, 
 
 337), 150. 
 Lockwood v. Rose (125 Ind. 588), 
 
 373. 
 Loder v. Whelpley (111 N. Y. 245), 
 
 169, 178, 309. 
 Loeb v. Richardson (74 Ala. 311), 
 
 237. 
 Loeffner v. State (10 Ohio St. 599), 
 
 231. 
 Loftus v. Maloney (89 Va. 576; 16 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 749), 208. 
 Logan v. United States (144 U. S. 
 
 263; 12 S. Ct. 617), 307, 320. 
 Logansport v. McMillen (49 Ind. 
 
 495), 199. 
 Lohman v. State (81 Ind. 151), 237. 
 Lohman v. Stocke (94 Mo. 672), 120. 
 Lohmer v. Insurance Co. (121 Mass. 
 
 439), 73o. 
 Lohr v. People (132 111. 504), 351.
 
 ex 
 
 TABLE OF OASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Lonergan v. Whitehead (10 Watts, 
 
 Pa., 249), GO. 
 Long v. Aroisby Co. (43 Mo. App. 
 
 253), 216. 
 Long v. Campbell (37 W. Va. 6G5), 
 
 24, 129. 
 Long v. Drew (114 Mass. 77), 12G. 
 Long v. Georgia, etc. Co. (82 Ga. 
 
 628). 107. 
 Longv. Hartwell (34 N. J. L. 116), 
 
 268. 
 Long v. Johnson (24 N. H. 302), 205. 
 Long v. Kee (44 La. Ann. 309 ; 10 S. 
 
 Rep. 854). 83. 
 Long v. Langsclale (56 Ark. 239), 380. 
 Longv. Little (119 III. 600), 139. 
 Long v. Long (44 Mo. App. 141). 220. 
 Longv. Mast (11 Pa. St. 189), 231. 
 Long v. Milford (137 Pa. St. 122). 11. 
 Long v. People (34 111. App. 481), 
 
 283. 
 Long v. People (135 111. 535), 283. 
 Long v. State (86 Ala. 36), 93, 323. 
 Long v. Straus (124 Ind. 84; 24 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 664), 8, 220. 
 Longenecker v. Hyde (6 Binn., Pa., 
 
 1), 74. 
 Longes v. Kennedy (2 Bibb, Ky., 
 
 607), 237. 
 Longnecker v. Shields (1 Colo. 261 ; 
 
 28 Pac. Rep. 659), 282. 
 Loomis v. Insurance Co. (81 Wis. 
 
 386; 51 N. W. Rep. 561), 200. 
 Loomis v. Loomis (26 Vt. 198), 69. 
 Loomis v. Mowry (8 Hun. 311), 199. 
 Loomis v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co. (159 
 
 Mass. 39 ; 34 N. E. Rep. 30), 73a, 
 
 350. 
 Loomis v. Pingree (43 Me. 299), 220. 
 Loomis v. Wadham (8 Gray, Mass., 
 
 557), 38. 
 Looney v. Rankin (15 Ores:. 617), 209. 
 Lord v. Bigelovv (124 Mass. 185), 74. 
 Lord v. Col Yin (3 De G., M. & G.), 
 
 142. 
 Lord v. Lord (58 N. H. 7), 131. 
 Lord Melville's Case (29 How. St. 
 
 Trials, 683), 353. 
 
 Lord Stafford's Case (7 How. St. Tr. 
 
 1527), 383. 
 Loring v. Palmer (118 U. S. 321), 246. 
 Loring v. Steineman (1 Mete, Mass., 
 
 204), 232. 
 Lorrillard v. Clyde (55 N. Y. Super. 
 
 Ct. 308), 154. 
 Lott v. King (79 Tex. 292), 33, 359. 
 Lotto v. Davenport (50 Minn. 99 ; 52 
 
 N. W. Rep. 130), 249, 250. 
 Lotz v. Scott (103 Ind. 155), 198. 
 Loud v. Merrill (45 Me. 516), 220. 
 Loughry v. Wait (34 111. App. 523), 
 
 124. 
 Louis v. Easton (50 Ala. 470), 308. 
 Louisville v. Board (83 Ky. 219), 232. 
 Louisville C. Jour. v. Weaver (Ky., 
 
 1892, 17 S. W. Rep. 1018), 249. 
 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Atkins (2 Lea, 
 
 Tenn., 248), 133. 
 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Barker (Ala., 
 
 1893, 10 S. Rep. 453), 342. 
 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Berry (Ind , 
 
 1891, 35 N. E. Rep. 565), 82. 
 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Chaffin (84 Ga. 
 
 519), 186. 
 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Crayton (69 
 
 Miss. 152), 374, 378. 
 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Donegan(lll 
 
 Ind. 179), 198. 
 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Dulavey (43 
 
 111. App. 297), 32. 
 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Falvey (104 
 
 Ind. 409, 416), 52, 192. 
 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Foley (Ky., 
 
 1893, 21 S. W. Rep. 866), 73a. 
 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Hays (11 Tenn. 
 
 £82), 229. 
 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Hurt (Ala.. 
 
 1893, 13 S. Rep. 830), 18, 348. 
 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Kenley (Tenn., 
 
 1893, 21 S. W. Rep. 326), 380. 
 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Neafus (Ky., 
 
 1892, 18 S. W. Rep. 1030), 208. 
 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Orr(10S. Rep. 
 
 107; 94 Ala. 602), 232. 
 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Parish (Ind.. 
 
 1893, 33 N. E. Rep. 122), 148.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXI 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Shires (108 111. 
 
 017), 143a. 
 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Stommel (120 
 
 Ind. 35), 11. 
 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Wood (113 Ind. 
 
 548), 345. 
 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Wright (115 
 
 Ind. 378), 70. 
 Louisville, N. A. etc. Co. v. Fraw- 
 
 ley (110 Ind. 20), 352. 
 Louman v. Aubrey (72 111. 019), 308. 
 Love v. Dickinson (85 N. C. 5), 252. 
 Love v. McAlister (42 Ark. 183), 350. 
 Lovejoy v. Hart (Minn., 1894, 57 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 57), 186. 
 Lovejoy v. Lovett (124 Mass. 2"0), 
 
 220, 222. 
 Lovelock v. Gregg (14 Colo. 53). 60. 
 Lovett v. State (30 Fla. 142), 6. 234. 
 Lovett v. State (00 Ga. 257), 93. 
 Loving v. Warren Co. (14 Bush, Ky., 
 
 310), 142. 
 Low v. Burrows (12 Cal. 181), 148. 
 Low v. Conn. etc. R. Co. (45 N. H. 
 
 370), 73a. 
 Low v. Greenwood (30 111. App. 184), 
 
 11. 
 Low v. Hanson (72 Me. 104), 240. 
 Low v. Perkins (10 Vt. 532), 72. 
 Low's C:ise (4 Me. 439), 170. 
 Low's Estate (Myrick's Prob., Cal., 
 
 143), 168. 
 Lowder v. Schluter (78 Tex. 103), 53. 
 Lowdermilk v. Bostick(98N. C. 299), 
 
 205. 
 Lowe v. Bliss (24 111. 108), 237. 
 Lowe v. Thompson (S6 Ind. 503), 21 1. 
 Lowell v. Payne (30 La. Ann. 511), 
 
 250. 
 Lowenstein, In re (2 Misc. Rep. 323), 
 
 178. 
 Lower v. Conyers (7 Cow., N. Y., 
 
 263), 20. 
 Lowery v. Caldwell (139 Mass. 88), 
 
 150a. 
 Lowman v. State (SI Ind. 151), 237. 
 Lowry v. Harris (12 Minn. 255), 32, 
 
 73a. 
 
 Lowther v. State (4 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 
 
 522), 107. 
 Lucas v. Brooks (18 Wall., U. S., 
 
 436), 166. 
 Lucas v. De Cour (1 M. & S. 249), 
 
 68. 
 Lucas v. Hunt (91 Ky. 279; 15 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 781), 250. 
 Lucas v. State (27 Tex. App. 322), 
 
 343. 
 Luce v. Dorcb. M. F. I. Co. (105 Mass. 
 
 497), 200. 
 Lucker v. Cora. (4 Bush, Ky., 440), 
 
 242. 
 Luco v. United States (23 How. 541), 
 
 38a. 
 Lucre v. State (7 Baxter, Tenn., 14S), 
 
 323. 
 Ludlow v. Van Rensselaer (1 Johns. 
 
 95), 242. 
 Ludlow v. Warshing (108 N. Y. 520), 
 
 141. 
 Luke v. Calhoun Co. (52 Ala. 115), 
 
 38a, 241. 
 Luker v. Com. (Ky., 1887, 5 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 354), 101, 103. 
 Lum v. Scarborough (Tex., 1893, 24 
 
 S. W. Rep. 846), 107. 
 Lumo v. Scott (44 Minn. 110), 154. 
 Lumpkin v. State (68 Ala. 56), 324. 
 Lunay v. Vantyne (40 Vt. 501), 71. 
 Lundas v. Lansing (75 Mich. 502), 
 
 52. 
 Lunday v. Thomas (26 Ga. 538), 208. 
 Lurren v. Crawford (4 S. & R. 3, 5), 
 
 60. 
 Lursher v. Com. (26 Gratt. 963), 101. 
 Lusk v. Parsons (39 111. App. 380), 
 
 366. 
 Lutes v. Reed (13S Pa. St. 191), 226. 
 Lycoming Ins. Co. v. Ward (90 111. 
 
 5), 73a. 
 Lyddy's Will, In re (3 N. Y. S. 636), 
 
 188. 
 Lyerly v. Wheeler (12 Ired., N. C, 
 
 290), 226, 304. 
 Lyles v. Com. (88 Va. 390; 13 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 802), 351.
 
 cxu 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Lyman v. Philadelphia (56 Pa. St. 
 
 488), 349. 
 Lyman v. State (14 Allen, Mass., 
 
 329), 200. 
 Lynch v. Doran (95 Mich. 395 ; 54 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 882), 24S. 
 Lynch v. Grayson (N. M... 1893, 32 
 
 Pac. Rep. 149), 380. 
 Lynch v. Livingston (6 N. Y. 433), 
 
 135. 
 Lynch v. Peabody (137 Mass. 93), 7. 
 Lynde v. Judd (3 Day, Conn., 499), 
 
 146. 
 Lynn v. Lyerle (113 111. 134), 171. 
 Lynn v. Morse (76 Iowa, 665), 130. 
 Lyon v. Batz (42 Mo. App. 606), 366. 
 Lyon v. Lyman (9 Conn. 55), 131, 
 
 139a, 140. 
 Lyon v. Marine (55 Fed. Rep. 964), 
 
 241. 
 Lyon v. Miller (24 Pa. St. 392), 2U5. 
 Lyon v. Prouty (154 Mass. 488), 168. 
 Lyons v. Holmes (11 S. C. 429), 131. 
 Lyons v. People (137 111. 602), 6. 
 Lyons v. Pyatt (N. J. L , 1893, 26 
 
 Atl. Rep. 334), 67. 
 Lytle v. Bond (40 Vt. 618), 309. 
 Lyts v. Keevy (5 Wash. St. 606), 11, 
 
 186. 
 
 M. 
 
 Mach. Co. v. Barry (2 Misc. Rep. 
 
 264), 128. 
 Mack v. Bensley (83 Wis. 80), 217. 
 Mackey v. Armstrong (84 Tex. 159; 
 
 19 S. W. Rep. 463), 371. 
 Mackey v. Baltimore, etc. Co. (19 D. 
 
 C. 282), 142. 
 Mackin v. O'Brien (33 111. 474), 79. 
 MacCready v. Schenck (41 La. Ann. 
 
 456), 73. 
 MacDonough v. Knight (25 Q. B. D. 
 
 1), 145. 
 Macy v. Williams (55 Hun, 489), 246. 
 Maddox v. Maddox (114 Mo. 35; 21 
 
 S. W. Rep. 499), 248. 
 Magee v. People (139 111. 138; 2S N. 
 
 E. Rep. 1077), 352. 
 
 Magee v. Scott (9 Cush., Mass., 150), 
 
 229. 
 Magee v. Scott (32 Pa. St. 539), 147. 
 Magee v. Troy (1 N. Y. S. 24; 48 
 
 Hun, 383), 8. 
 Magers v. Dunlap (39 111. App. 618), 
 
 128. 
 Magie v. Chadoine (30 Tex. 644), 238. 
 Magie v. Herman (50 Minn. 424 ; 52 
 
 N. W. Rep. 909), 33. 
 Magnay v. Burt (5 Q. B. 394), 281. 
 Magness v. Arnold (31 Ark. 103), 136. 
 Magoun v\ N. E. Ins. Co. (1 Story, 
 
 157), 158. 
 Mahan v. McMahan (13 Pa. St. 376), 
 
 262. 
 Mahaney v. McLean (26 Minn. 415), 
 
 73a. 
 Mahaney v. Railway (108 Mo. 191; 
 
 18 S. W. Rep. 895), 8. 
 Maher v. People (10 Mich. 212), 384. 
 Mahon v. Mahon (2 Irish Eq. 440), 
 
 287. 
 Mahony v. Aurecocha (51 Cal. 429), 
 
 237. 
 Mahurin v. Bickford (5 N. H. 9), 
 
 150a. 
 Maier v. State (Tex., 1893, 21 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 974), 241. 
 Mainard v. Beider (2 Ind. App. 115; 
 
 28 N. E. Rep. 196), 168. 
 Maine v. People (9 Hun, 113), 102. 
 Maine v. Ryder (84 Pa. St. 217), 131. 
 Mair v. Beck (2 Atl. Rep. 218, Pa. 
 
 St., 1886), 69. 
 Maitland v. Bank (40 Md. 540), 350. 
 Maley v. Shattuck (3 Cranch, 488), 
 
 158. 
 Malachi v. State (89 Ala. 134), 227. 
 Mallory v. Ohio Farm. Ins. Co. (90 
 
 Mich. 112), 140. 
 Malloy v. Bruden (88 N. C. 251), 
 
 226. 
 Malone v. Gates (66 Tex. 22), 117. 
 Maloney v. Duff (72 Md. 283), 350. 
 Maltby v." Kirkland (48 Fed. Rep. 
 
 760), 73a. 
 Mam lock v. White (20 Cal. 598), 68.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CX111 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Manchester v. Brodner (107 N. Y. 
 
 849), 209. 
 Manchester v. Manchester (24 Vt. 
 
 649). 166. 
 Manchester v. Moore (19 N. H. 564), 
 
 302. 
 Mandeville v. Parker (31 N. J. Eq. 
 
 242), 269. 
 Maness v. Henry (96 Ala. 454; 11 S. 
 
 Rep. 470), 123. 
 Manguni v. Webster (7 Gill, 78), 244. 
 Manistee Bank v. Sprague (64 Mich. 
 
 59), 76. 
 Mankin v. Emmons (47 Mo. 306), 134. 
 Manley v. Staples (65 Vt. 370; 26 
 
 Atl. Rep. 630), 231. 
 Mann v. Godbold (3 Bing. 292), 30. 
 Mann v. Mann (1 Johns. Ch. 231), 
 
 221. 
 Mann'v. Mann (14 Johns. 1), 214. 
 Mann v. State (46 Ind. 383), 134. 
 Manning v. Hancock Mut. Life Ins. 
 
 Co. (100 U. S. 698), 226. 
 Manning v. Purcell (24 L. J. Ch. 
 
 523), 150. 
 Mansfield v. Rab (21 N. Y. S. 65; 66 
 
 Hun, 631), 380. 
 Mansfield v. Sherwin (181 Me. 365), 
 
 223. 
 Manson v. Lanley (84 Me. 389), 61. 
 Mantonya v. Hierter (35 111. App. 27), 
 
 282. 
 
 Manufg. Ace. Indemnity Co. v. Dor- 
 
 gan (58 Fed. Rep. 945), 186, 192, 
 
 193. 
 
 Many v. Titcomb (19 Ind. 136), 242. 
 
 Mapes v. Seales (27 Tex. 345), 105, 
 
 139a. 
 Maples v. State (3 Heisk. 408), 90. 
 Mapp v. Phillips (32 Ga. 72), 73a. 
 Marabitti v. Bagolan (21 Oreg. 299), 
 
 380. 
 Marable v. Meyer (78 Ga. 60). 138. 
 Marcey v. Shultz (29 N. Y. 548), 
 
 337. 
 March v. State (44 Tex. 64), 343. 
 Marcum v. Com. (Ky., 1890, 1 S. W. 
 Rep. 727), 102. 
 
 Marcy v. Amnzeen (61 N. H. 133), 
 
 309. 
 Marcy v. Barnes (16 Gray, 163), 38a. 
 Mariner v. Saunders (5 Gilm., 111., 
 
 113), 130. 
 Mark v. Hastings (Ala., 1893, 13 S. 
 
 Rep. 297), 51. 
 Markel v. Evans (47 Ind. 326), 232. 
 Markley v. Hull (49 N. W. Rep. 1050 ; 
 
 51 Iowa, 109), 380. 
 Marks v. Beifus (25 Q. B. Div. 494), 
 
 175. 
 Marks v. Lahee (3 Bing. N. C, 408), 
 
 117. 
 Marks v. Societie (22 Civ. Pro. Rep. 
 
 201), 285. 
 Marlatt v. Warwick (18 N. J. Eq. 
 
 108), 308. 
 Marler v. State (67 Ala. 55), 121. 
 Marmaduke, Ex parte (91 Mo. 228, 
 
 251), 288. 
 Marmet v. Archibald (37 W. Va. 
 
 778). 282. 
 Mars v. Virginia Home Ins. Co. (17 
 
 S. C. 514), 73a. 
 Marse v. Rice (Neb., 1893, 54 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 308), 211. 
 Marsh v. Bellew (45 Wis. 39), 214. 
 Marsh v. Colnett (2 Esp. 665), 107. 
 Marsh v. Cramer (Colo., 1891, 27Pac. 
 
 Rep. 169), 250. 
 Marsh v. Davis (24 Vt. 363), 56. 
 Marsh v. Hand (35 Md. 123), 30. 
 Marsh v. Jones (21 Vt. 378), 124 
 Marsh v. Mitchell (26 N. J. Eq. 497), 
 
 136, 137. 
 Marsh v. Pier (4 Rawle, 288, 289), 
 
 160. 
 Marsh v. Potter (30 Barb., N. Y , 
 
 506), 166. 
 Marshal v. Thompson (39 Minn. 137), 
 
 223. 
 Marshal v. Yougler (10 S. & R. 161), 
 
 128. 
 Marshall v. Adams (11 111. 37), 76. 
 Marshall v. Brown (50 Mich. 148), 
 
 188. 
 Marshall v. Cliff (4 Camp. 133), 74.
 
 CX1V 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Keferences are to sections. 
 
 Marshall v. Green (33 L. T. Rep., 
 
 N. S., 404), 262. 
 Marshall v. Hancock (80 Cal. 82), 120. 
 
 123. 
 Marshall v. Harkenson (84 Iowa, 
 
 117; 50 N. W. Rep. 559), 3G8. 
 Marshall v. Peck (91 111. 187), 202, 
 
 308. 
 Marshall v. State (31 Tex. 471), 23. 
 Marshall v. State (5 Tex. App. 273), 
 
 89. 
 Martin v. Ashland Mill Co. (49 Mo. 
 
 27), 21G. 
 Martin v. Aultman (80 Wis. 150), 240. 
 Martin v. Bowie (37 S. C. 102; 15 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 736), 33, 138. 
 Martin v. Clarke (8 R. I. 389), 208. 
 Martin v. Cope (3 Abb. Dec. 182). 
 
 124. 
 Martin v. Insurance Co. (Iowa, 1893, 
 
 52 N. W. Rep. 534), 73a, 79. 
 Martin v. Morris (62 Wis. 418), 268. 
 Martin v. Martin (1 Misc. Rep. 1S1), 
 
 80. 
 Martin v. Martin (118 Itid. 227), 308. 
 Martin v. Mott (12 Wheat. 19), 232. 
 Martin v. Root (17 Mass. 222), 69. 
 Martin v. Rutt (127 Pa. St. 380), 71. 
 Martin v. State (28 Ala. 71), 281. 
 Martin v. State (90 Ala. 602; 8 S. 
 
 Rep. 858), 93. 
 Martin v. State (28 Tex. App. 364), 
 
 23. 
 Martin v. State (21 Tex. App. 1), 226. 
 Martin v. Stubbings (126 111. 387), 
 
 208. 
 Martin v. Thayer (37 W. Va. 38), 222. 
 Martin v. Victor, etc. Co. (19 Nev. 
 
 180), 8. 
 Martindale v. Follett (1 N. H. 95), 
 
 128. 
 Marts v. State (26 Ohio St. 162), 10. 
 Marx v. McGlynn (88 N. Y. 357), 51. 
 Marx v. Strauss (90 Ala. 453), 350. 
 Marzetti v. Da Jouffroy (1 Dowl. 
 
 41), 358. 
 Mask v. Buffalo (N. Y., 1893, 13 N. 
 E, Rep. 251), 191. 
 
 Mask v. State (32 Miss. 405), 69. 
 Mason v. Atl. Ave. R. R. Co. (4 
 
 Misc. Rep. 291), 12. 
 Mason v. Eldred (6 Wall. 235), 154. 
 Mason v. Fuller (45 Vt. 29), 53. 
 Mason v. Lawrason (1 Cranch, 190), 
 
 148. 
 Mason v. Ryus (26 Kan. 464), 221. 
 Mason v. Seitz (36 Ind. 516), 262. 
 Mason v. State (20 S. W. Rep. 564 : 
 
 31 Tex. Crim. App. 306), 9. 
 Massey v. Colville (45 N. J. L. 119), 
 
 285. 
 Massy v. Farmers' Bank (104 II!. 
 
 327), 139a. 
 Masters v. Marsh (19 Neb. 458), 362. 
 Masters v. Troy (50 Hun, 485), 8. 
 Masterson v. Boyce (6 N. Y. S. 65 ; 58 
 
 Hun, 630), 171. 
 Masterson v. Little (73 Tex. 6S2), 
 
 151. 
 Masterson v. Mathews (60 Ala. 260), 
 
 244. 
 Masterson v. Todd (Tex., 1893, 24 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 682), 106. 
 Matherly v. Com. (Ky., 1892, 19 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 977), 102. 
 Mathes v. Robinson (8 Met. 269), 60. 
 Mathews v. AlswoVth (La., 1893, 12 
 
 S. Rep. 578), 83. 
 Mathews v. Coalter (9 Mo. 705), 129. 
 Mathews v. Colburn (1 Strobh. 25S), 
 
 123. 
 Mathews v. Culbertson (83 Iowa, 
 
 434; 50 N. W. Rep. 201), 83. 
 Mathews v. Hoagland (48 N. J. Eq. 
 
 455), 169, 173, 174. 
 Mathews v. Mathews (53 Hun, 244 ; 
 
 6 N. Y. S. 589), 368. 
 Mathews v. Morgan (Iowa, 1893, 55 
 
 N. W. Rep. 478), 83. 
 Mathews v. Tappan (6 Mo. 276), 19. 
 Mathews v. Ward (10 Gill & J. 143), 
 
 232. 
 Mathews, Adm'r, v. Furness (91 Ala. 
 
 157), 248. 
 Mathews' Estate (4 Am. Law Jour. 
 
 356), 169.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXV 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Mathews' Estate (5 Pa. L. J. Rep. 
 
 149), 173. 
 Matley v. Long (71 Md. 585), 217. 
 Matson v. Frazer (48 Mo. App. 302), 
 
 13, 362. 
 Mattes v. Frankel (65 Hun, 203), 
 
 84. 
 Matteson v. N. Y. etc. R. Co. (35 
 
 N. Y. 487; 62 Barb., N. Y., 364), 
 
 52, 192, 193. 
 Mattocks v. Lyman (18 Vt. 98), 80. 
 Mattocks v. Wheaton (10 Vt. 493), 
 
 276. 
 Mattoon v. Young (45 N. Y. 696), 
 
 308. 
 Mattox v. United States (146 U. S. 
 
 140), 103. 
 Mauer v. Ferguson (17 N. Y. S. 349), 
 
 1S6. 
 Maughan v. Burns (26 Atl. Rep. 583), 
 
 199. 
 Maurice v. Warden (57 Md. 510; 54 
 
 Md. 233), 142, 262. 
 Mauro v. Piatt (62 111. 450), 81. 
 Maury v. Van Armin (1 Hill, N. Y., 
 
 370), 357. 
 Maxey v. Strong (53 Mo. 280), 69. 
 Maxfield v. Patchen (29 111. 39), 223. 
 Maxwell v. Harrison (8 Ga. 61), 368. 
 May v. Boston (158 Mass. 21 ; 32 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 902), 8. 
 May v. Little (3 Ired. L., N. C, 27), 
 
 71. 
 May v. People (8 Colo. 210), 10. 
 May v. Prendergast (12 Pa. Co. Ct. 
 
 R. 220), 263. 
 May v. Shumway (16 Gray, 86), 277. 
 May v State (90 Ga. 793 ; 17 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 108), 9. 
 Maye v. Bradlee (127 Mass. 414), 51. 
 Maye v. Friedman (69 N. Y. 608), 
 
 262. 
 Mayer v. Stone (21 Neb. 717), 350. 
 Mayes v. State (64 Miss. 329), 57. 
 Maynard v. Cedar County (51 Iowa, 
 
 431), 277. 
 Maynard v. Frederick (7 Cush. 247), 
 
 315. 
 
 Maynard v. Maynard (10 Mass. 456), 
 
 229. 
 Mayo v. Wright (63 Mich. 40), 52. 
 Mayor v. Brooklyn F. I. Co. (3 Abb. 
 
 App. Dec. 251), 205. 
 Mayor v. Butler (1 Barb. 325), 314. 
 Mays v. Deaver (1 Iowa, 260), 80. 
 McAdam v. State (5 S. W. Rep. 826, 
 
 Tenn., 1886), 283. 
 McAdory v. State (62 Ala. 154), 90, 
 
 95. 
 McAfee v. Arline (83 Ga. 645), 210. 
 McAleer v. McMurray (58 Pa. St. 
 
 120), 5. 
 McAnulty's Appeal (135 Pa. St. 210), 
 
 60. 
 McBee v. Bowman (89 Tenn. 132), 
 
 249. 
 McBride v. Railroad Co. (60 Hun, 
 
 585), 380. 
 McBride v. Wallace (62 Mich. 451), 
 
 335. 
 McCabe v. Com. (Pa., 1887, 8 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 45), 91. 
 McCabe v. Raney (32 Ind. 309), 81. 
 McCafferty v. Heritage (5 Houst., 
 
 Del., 220), 140. 
 McCall v. Moscowitz (14 Daly, 10), 
 
 37. 
 McCall v. United States (1 Dak. 321- 
 
 328), 125. 
 McCalla v. State (60 Ga. 346), 324. 
 McCandless v. Warner (26 W. Va. 
 
 754), 246. 
 McCarlin v. Traphagan (45 N. J. Eq. 
 
 265), 308. 
 McCarney v. People (83 N. Y. 408), 2. 
 McCarthey v. Gallegher (4 Misc. Rep. 
 
 18S), 7. 
 McCarthy, In re (59 Hun, 626), 168, 
 
 171, 174. 
 McCarthy, In re (65 Hun, 624), 309. 
 McCarthy v. Com. (Kj»., 1893, 20 
 
 S. W. Rep. 229), 188. 
 McCarty v. Leary (118 Mass. 509), 10. 
 McCarty v. People (51 111. 231), 10. 
 McCaskin v. Lake Shore R. R. Co. 
 
 (93 Mich. 553), 20.
 
 CXV1 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 McCaskle v. Amarine (12 Ala. 17), 
 
 133. 
 McCausland v. Fleming (63 Pa. St. 
 
 36), 115. 
 McClackey v. State (5 Tex. App. 
 
 320), 197. 
 McClafferty v. Phelps (151 Pa. St. 86), 
 
 51. 
 McClain v. Com. (110 Pa. St. 263, 
 
 209), 11, 89, 91, 333. ■ 
 McClaine v. People (I Atl. Rep. 45; 
 
 110 Pa. St. 263), 354o. 
 MeCIaskey v. Barr (47 Fed. Rep. 
 
 363), 7, 107, 337. 
 McClaskey v. State (Tex., 1892, 13 
 
 S. W. Rep. 999), 6. 
 McClellan v. McClellan (65 Me. 500), 
 
 169. 
 McClellan v. Osborne (51 Me. 118), 24. 
 McClelland v. McClelland (42 Mo. 
 
 App. 32), 229. 
 McClelland v. Rush (11 Pa. Co. Ct. 
 
 R. 188), 265. 
 McCleneghan v. Reid (34 Neb. 472; 
 
 51 N. W. Rep. 1037), 7. 
 McClory v. Wright (10 Ir. Law, 514), 
 
 321 
 McCloskey v. McCormiek (44 111. 336), 
 
 223. 
 McClure v. Campbell (25 Neb. 57; 40 
 
 N. W. Rep. 595 ), 130. 
 McClure v. Com. (81 Ky. 448), '334. 
 McClusky v. Klosterman (20 Oreg. 
 
 108; 25 Pac. Rep. 366), 216. 
 McCollum v. State (14 S. W. Rep. 
 
 1020; 29 Tex. App. 102), 93. 
 McComb v. Insurance Co. (48 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 1038 ; 83 Iowa, 247), 376. 
 McConnell v. Bondry (4 T. B. Mon. 
 
 394), 239. 
 McConnell v. Carey (48 Pa. St. 430), 
 
 262. 
 McConnell v. Kitchens (20 S. C. 430), 
 
 262. 
 McConnell v. McConnell (Neb., 1893, 
 
 55 N. W. Rep. 292). 249. 
 McConnell v. State (Tex., 1893, 18 
 
 S. W. Rep. 645), 324. 
 
 McCorkle v. Doby (1 Strobh., S. C, 
 
 396), 68. 
 McCormiek v. Fitzmorris (39 Mo. 34), 
 
 128, 129. 
 McCormiek v. Garrett (5DeG.,M. & 
 
 G. 278), 143. 
 McCormiek II. Co. v. Burandt (20 
 
 N. E. Rep. 588; 136 III. 170), 24. 
 McCormiek M. Co. v. Burandt (,37 
 
 111. App. 588), 188. 
 McCormiek M. Co. v. Snell (23 111. 
 
 App. 79), 76. 
 McCoy v. Galloway (3 Ohio, 283), 
 
 115. 
 McCoy v. New York (46 Hun, 268), 
 
 230. 
 McCoy v. Tucker (121 Ind. 292), 8. 
 McCrae v. Robinson (2 Murph., N. C, 
 
 127), 79. 
 McCraven v. McGuire (23 Miss. 100), 
 
 135. 
 McCrawej r v. Remsen (19 Ala. 430), 
 
 82. 
 McCrea v. Purmort (10 Wend., N. Y., 
 
 473; 30 Am. Dec. 103), 208. 
 McCreary v. Turk (29 Ala. 244), 30. 
 McCrillis v. Millard (17 R. I. 724), 
 
 61. 
 McCulloch v. Dobson (30 N. E. Rep. 
 
 641; 133 N. Y. 114), 8. 
 McCullough v. Ashbridge (155 Pa. 
 
 St. 100), 210. 
 McCully v. Malcolm (9 Humph., 
 
 Tenn., 187), 133. 
 McCune v. McCune (29 Mo. 117), 67. 
 McDaniel v. Needham (01 Tex. 209), 
 
 130. 
 McDaniel v. King (90 N. C. 597). 222. 
 McDaniel v. State (16 Mass. 401), 10. 
 McDaniel v. State (8 Sm. & M. 401), 
 
 102. 
 McDaniel v. State (Ala., 1S83, 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 241), 346. 
 McDaniel v. State (0 Ala. 306), 249. 
 McDaniell v. State (76 Ala. 1), 234, 
 
 241. 
 MeDermaid v. Russell (41 111. 490), 
 
 357.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXV11 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 McDermot v. U. S. Ins. Co. (3 S. & 
 
 R., Pa., 604), 221. 
 McDermot v. Hannibal, etc. Co. (73 
 
 Mo. 516), 73a. 
 McDermott v. Barnum (19 Mo. 204), 
 
 147. 
 McDermott v. Chicago, etc. Co. 
 
 (Wis., 1893, 55 N. W. Rep. 79), 
 
 375. 
 McDermott v. McCormack (4 Harr., 
 
 Del., 543), 131. 
 McDonald v. Carnes (90 Ala. 147), 
 
 57. 
 McDonald v. Caryell (Ind., 1893, 34 
 
 N. E. Rep. 7), 377. 
 McDonald v. Dana (154 Mass. 152), 
 
 222. 
 McDonald v. Eggleston (26 Vt. 154), 
 
 69. 
 McDonald v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 
 
 (Iowa, 1893, 55 N. W. Rep. 102), 
 
 333. 
 McDonald v. Mallory (77 N. Y. 547), 
 
 230. 
 McDonald v. State (80 Wis. 407), 240. 
 McDonough v. Loughlin (20 Barb. 
 
 238), 269. 
 McDowell v. Thomas (4 Neb. 542), 77. 
 McDuffie v. State (Ga., 1893, 17 S. E. 
 
 . Rep. 505), 6. 
 McElreath v. Midclleton (14 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 906 ; 89 Ga. 356), 74. 
 McElroy v. Braden (152 Pa. St. 78), 
 
 362. 
 McElvoy v. Ludlum (32 N. J. Eq. 
 
 828), 67, 76. 
 McElwee v. Trowbridge (68 Hun, 
 
 28), 73a, 75. 
 McEwen v. Biglow (40 Mich. 215), 
 
 188. 
 McEwen v. Portland (1 Oreg. 300), 
 
 234. 
 McFadden v. Ellmaker (52 Cal. 348), 
 
 66, 70. 
 McFadden v. Railway Co. (92 Mo. 
 
 313), 210. 
 McFadden v. Reynolds (Pa., 1887, 
 
 11 Atl. Rep. 638), 354a. 
 
 McFadden v. State (28 Tex. App. 
 
 241), 346. 
 McFarland v. Ford (32 III. App. 173), 
 
 347. 
 McGarvey v. Ford (N. M., 27 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 415), 232. 
 McGaun v. Hamilton (58 Conn. 69), 
 
 198. 
 McGee v. State (16 S. W. Rep. 422 ; 
 
 29 Tex. App. 596), 320. 
 McGee v. Wells (37 S. C. 365; 16 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 89), 11. 
 McGennis v. Allison (10 Serg. & R., 
 
 Pa., 197), 138. 
 McGeorge v. Hoifman (19 Atl. Rep. 
 
 413; 133 Pa. St. 381), 226. 
 McGerr v. Sell (60 Ind. 249), 83. 
 McGill v. Hawks (95 Mich. 153; 54 
 
 N. W. Rep. 707), 3d0. 
 McGinnis v. State (24 Ind. 500), 244. 
 McGinnis v. State (Wyo., 1893, 31 
 
 Pac. Rep. 978), 306. 
 McGoon v. Irvin (1 Pinney, Wis., 
 
 526), 53. 
 McGooney v. State (20 Ohio St. 93), 
 
 205. 
 McGowen v. Amer. Press. Tan Bark 
 
 (121 U. S. 575), 199. 
 McGrath v. Mongels (20 N. Y. S. 
 
 869), 209. 
 McGrath v. Seagrave (4 Allen, 443), 
 
 147. 
 McGravy v. Durnell (134 111. 367), 
 
 159. 
 McGraw v. Com. (Ky., 1893, 20 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 879), 9, 69. 
 McGregor v. Brown (10 N. Y. 117). 
 
 263. 
 McGrewv. M. Pac. R. R. Co. (109 
 
 Mo. 582 ; 9 S. W. Rep. 53), 7. 
 McGuire v. Manuf. Co. (156 Mass. 
 
 324), 339. 
 McGuire v. People (44 Mich. 286), 
 
 319. 
 McGuire v. Railroad Co. (43 Mo. 
 
 App. 354), 11. 
 McGuire v. Stevens (42 Miss. 474), 
 
 209.
 
 cxvm 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 McGuirk v. Mut. L. Ins. Co. (6G Hun, 
 
 628), 58, 144. 
 McHugh v. Railroad Co. (65 Hun, 
 
 619), 380. 
 Mclntire v. Costello (6 N. Y. S. 397; 
 
 53 Hun, 636), 71. 
 Mclntire v. Mancius (16 Johns. 592), 
 
 354. 
 Mclntire v. Oliver (2 Hawks, 209), 
 
 69. 
 Mclntire v. Velte (153 Pa. St. 350), 
 
 128. 
 Mcintosh v. Lee (57 Iowa, 356), 237. 
 Mcintosh v. Mcintosh (79 Mich. 198; 
 
 44 N. W. Rep. 592), 330. 
 Mclvor v. Humble (19 East, 169), 
 
 144. 
 McKay v. Lasher (42 Hun, 270), 140. 
 McKay v. Russell (3 Wash. St. 378), 9. 
 McKee v. Hamilton (33 Ohio St. 7), 
 
 67, 68. 
 McKee v. State (82 Ala. 32), 6. 
 McKeefrey v. ConnellsvilleCoke Co. 
 
 (56 Fed. Rep. 470), 216. 
 McKelvey v. Railway Co. (39 W. Va. 
 
 500), 198. 
 McKenzie v. Oregon Imp. Co. (5 
 
 Wash. St. 409). 370. 
 McKenzie v. State (24 Ark. 636), 306, 
 
 323. 
 McKeon v. Barnes (108 Mass. 344), 
 
 139. 
 McKesson v. Sherman (51 Wis. 303), 
 
 208. 
 McKiesick v. State (26 Tex. 673), 
 
 343. 
 McKinney v. State (3 Wyo. 719), 283. 
 McKinney v. State (Fia., 1892, 11 S. 
 
 Rep. 732), 2J4. 
 McKinnie v. Harvey (38 Minn. 18), 
 
 211. 
 McLain v. Com. (99 Pa. St. 86), 123, 
 
 193. 
 McLain v. State (Neb., 1885, 7 Crim. 
 
 L. Mag. 199), 229. 
 McLane v. Piaggo (3 S. Rep. 823; 24 
 
 Fla. 71), 279. 
 McLane v. State (30 Tex. App. 482), 8. 
 
 McLaughlin v. Gilmore (1 111. App. 
 
 563), 108. 
 McLaughlin v. McLaughlin (91 Pa. 
 
 St. 462), 71. 
 McLellon v. Cox (36 Me. 95), 67. 
 McLellon v. Crofton (6 Greenl. 307), 
 
 60. 
 McLeod v. Ginter (80 Ky. 403), 56. 
 McLeod v. Lee (17 Nev. 103), 50. 
 McLeod v. Railway Co. (71 Iowa, 
 
 138), 343. 
 McLeod v. Skiles (81 Mo. 595), 212. 
 McLeod v. State (31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 331), 197, 249. 
 McLeon v. State (16 Ala. 672), 330. 
 McManus v. Freeman (2 Pa. Dist. R. 
 
 144), 168. 
 McManuss v. London (Minn., 1893, 55 
 
 N. W. Rep. 139). 216. 
 McMasters' Appeal (55 N. W. Rep. 
 
 149, Wis., 1893), 169. 
 McMasters v. Blaik (29 Pa. St. 298), 
 
 231. 
 McMeen v. Com. (114 Pa. St. 300), 6. 
 McMicken v. Com. (58 Pa. St. 213), 
 
 205. 
 McMillan v. McDill (110 111. 47), 67. 
 McMullen v. Egan (21 W. Va. 244), 
 
 137. 
 McMullin v. Carsen (48 Kan. 263 ; 29 
 
 Pac. Rep. 317), 11. 
 McMurrin v. Rigby (80 Iowa, 322), 52. 
 McNair v. Com. (26 Pa. St. 388), 139, 
 
 1 39a. 
 McNamara v. Corp. of New Melle- 
 
 ray (Iowa, 1893, 55 N. W. Rep. 
 
 322), 370. 
 McNamara v. Logan (Ala., 1894, 14 
 
 S. Rep. 175), 198. 
 McName v. Morland (26 Iowa, 96), 
 
 226. 
 McNeale v. Kraun (21 Oreg. 218), 
 
 361. 
 McNear v. McComber (18 Iowa, 7), 
 
 206. 
 McNeely v. Duff (50 Kan. 488), 337. 
 McNemey v. Reading '150 Pa. St. 
 
 611; 30 W. N. C. 534), 348.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CX1X 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 MoNichols v. Pac. Ex. Co. (12 Mo. 
 
 App. 401), 237. 
 MeNight v. Bell (26 W. N. C. 28), 
 
 154. 
 McNutt v. McNutt (1 If. Ind. 545), 376. 
 McPlierson v. Bridge Co. (20 Oreg. 
 
 486: 26 Pac. Rep. 560). 18. 
 McPlierson v. Seguine (3 Dev., N. 
 
 C, 154), 262. 
 McPlierson v. Weston (85 Cal. 90), 
 
 205. 
 McQueen v. People's Nat. Bank (111 
 
 N. C. 509). 282. 
 McQueen v. State (94 Ala. 50 ; 10 S. 
 
 Rep. 433), 89, 101. 
 McRae v. State (71 Ga. 9C), 67, 70. 
 McRea v. Insurance Bank (16 Ala. 
 
 755), 74. 
 McReynolds v. Railroad Co. (106 111. 
 
 152), 199. 
 McShane v. Bank (73 Md. 135), 73. 
 McShane v. Braender (66 How. Pr., 
 
 N. Y., 294), 252. 
 McSweeney v. McMillan (96 Ind. 
 
 298), 70. 
 McTyler v. State (Ga., 1893, 18 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 140), 350. 
 McVey v. Durkin (136 Pa. St. 418), 
 
 58. 
 McWhirter v. Allen (1 Tex. Civ. 
 
 App. 649), 105. 
 Meacham v. Meachaui (Tenn., 1892, 
 
 19 S. W. Rep. 757), 262. 
 Mead v. Black (22 Wis. 232), 76. 
 Mead v. Husted (52 Conn. 56), 6. 
 Mead v. N. W. Ins. Co. (3 Selden, 7 
 
 N. Y., 530), 198. 
 Mead v. Parker (111 N. Y. 259), 215. 
 Mead v. Parker (115 Mass. 413), 220. 
 Meade v. Carolina Bank (26 S. C. 
 
 608), 186. 
 Meagley v. Hoyt (125 N. Y. 771), 
 
 229. 
 Mealer v. State (32 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 102; 22 S.W. Rep. 142), 311, 349. 
 Means v. Kimball (35 Neb. 693), 130. 
 Means v. Means (7 Rich., S. C, 533), 
 
 139. 
 
 Mears v. Cornwell (73 Mich. 78), 346. 
 Mechanics' Bank v. Gibson (7 Wend. 
 
 460), 237. 
 Mechanics' Bank v. Levy (3 Paige, 
 
 N. Y.. 606l, 305. 
 Mechanics' Bank v. Lynn (1 Pet., 
 
 U. S., 376), 305. 
 Mech. & Trad. Nat. Bank v. Wynant 
 
 (49 Hun, 607), 380. 
 Meconce v. Mower (7 Wend. 315), 
 
 73a. 
 Medlin v. Steele (75 N. C. 154), 262. 
 Medlin v. Wilkins (1 Tex. Civ. App. 
 
 465), 374. 
 Medomack v. Curtis (24 Me. 36). 215. 
 Meegan v. Boyle (19 How., U. S., 
 
 130), 146. 
 Meeker v. Meeker (74 Iowa, 352; 37 
 
 N. W. Rep. 773), 197. 
 Meekins v. Smith (1 H. Bl. 636), 286." 
 Meely Hee v. Hudson (21 S. VV. Rep. 
 
 175), 241. 
 Meentz v. Reiken (42 111. App. 17), 
 
 250, 380. 
 Meeteer v. Man. R. R. Co. (63 Hun, 
 
 533), 307. 
 Mehan v. State (7 Wis. 670), 250. 
 Meier v. Morgan (82 Wis. 289), 346. 
 Meikel v. Savings Institution (36 Ind. 
 
 355). 128. 
 Meiss v. Gill (44 Ohio St. 258), 160. 
 Meixell v. Feezor (43 111. App. 180), 
 
 335. 
 Melcher v. Derkum (44 Mo. App. 
 
 650), 79. 
 Melcher v. Flanders (40 N. H. 139), 
 
 138. 
 Melius v. Houston (41 Miss. 59), 148. 
 Mellen, In re (63 Hun, 623), 172, 
 
 174. 
 Mellon v. Reed (114 Pa. St. 647), 262. 
 Mellor v. Missouri P. R. Co. (105 
 
 Mo. 455; 16 S. W. Rep. 849), 
 
 178. 
 Melvin v. Bullard (35 Vt. 368), 8. 
 Melvin v. Whiting (7 Pick. 79), 123. 
 Melvin v. Whiting (13 Pick. 190), 
 
 276.
 
 cxx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Memphis, etc. Co. v. Benson (1 Pick. 
 
 027), 30, 33. 
 Memphis, etc. R. Co. v. Cock (04 
 
 Miss. 713), 73a. 
 Mendenhall v. Parish (8 Jones' L 
 
 108), 208. 
 Mentze v. Tuteur (77 Wis. 236; 46 
 
 N. W. Rep. 123), 349. 
 Mercer v. Vose (40 N. Y. Super. Ct. 
 
 218), 188, 199. 
 Mercer v. Whall (5 Ad. & EL, N. S., 
 
 447), 249. 
 Merchant v. Howell (Minn., 1893, 55 
 
 N. W. Rep. 131), 216. 
 Merchants' Bank v. Harrison (39 Mo. 
 
 433), 136. 
 Merchants' Bank v. Spalding (9 N. Y. 
 
 53), 242. 
 Merchants' Dis. Co. v. Leysor (89 111. 
 
 48), 362. 
 Merchon v. Duer (40 N. J. Eq. 333). 
 
 246. 
 Meredith v. Footner (11 M. & W. 
 
 202), 71. 
 Meriam v. Harsen (2 Barb. 232), 216. 
 Meriwether v. State (81 Ala. 74; 1 
 
 S. Rep. 5C0). 167. 
 Merscheim v. Mus. M. P. Union (24 
 
 Abb. N. C. 252), 154. 
 Merrill v. Eastern R. Co. (139 Mass. 
 
 252), 250. 
 Merrill v. Floyd (2 C. C. A. 58), 367. 
 Merrill v. Mary (10 Allen, Mass., 416), 
 
 " 343. 
 Merritt v. Day (38 N. J. L. 32), 69. 
 Merritt v. Pollys (16 B. Mon., Ky., 
 
 355), 69. 
 Merritt v. Straw (33 N. E. Rep. 657), 
 
 140. 
 Merritt v. White (31 Mass. 438), 150a. 
 Mersman v. Werges (112 U. S. 141), 
 
 229. 
 Mertz v. Detweiler (8 W. & S., Pa., 
 
 376), 73, 193. 
 Meskimen v. Day (35 Kan. 46), 
 
 . 136. 
 M. E. Church v. Jaques (1 Johns., 
 
 N. Y., Ch. 65), 305. 
 
 Metropolitan Nat. Bank v. Rogers 
 
 (3 C. C. A, 666; 53 Fed. Rep. 
 
 776), 380. 
 Metropolitan St. R. Co. v. Johnson 
 
 (Ga., 1893, 18 S. E. Rep. 816), 
 
 334. 
 Meyer v. Cadwalader (40 Fed. Rep. 
 
 32), 343. 
 Meyer v. Campbell (20 N. Y. S. 705 ; 
 
 1 Misc. Rep. 283\ 350. 
 Meyer v. Gassett (38 Ark. 377), 136. 
 Meyer v. Gullinan (105 111. 272), 304. 
 Meyer v. Houck (Iowa, 1892, 52 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 235), 11. 
 Meyer v. Roth (51 Cal. 582), 121. 
 Meyer v. Sefton.(2 Stark. 274), 37. 
 Meyers v. Standart (11 Ohio St. 39), 
 
 69. 
 Miami, etc. Co. v. Baily (37 Ohio St. 
 
 104), 202. 
 Michael v. Crescent Pipe Line Co. 
 
 (Pa., 1893, 28 Atl. Rep. 204),* 199. 
 Michael v. Foil (100 N. C. 189), 171. 
 Michael v. Mace (137 111. 485), 150a. 
 Michels v. Olmstead (14 Fed. Rep. 
 
 219), 212. 
 Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Carrow (73 
 
 111. 34S), 73a. 
 Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Gowgar 
 
 (55 111. 503), 73a. 
 Michigan, etc. R. Co. v. Barnes (44 
 
 Mich. 222), 344. 
 Michigan Ins. Bank v. Eldred (143 
 
 U. S. 293), 7. 
 Michigan Sav. Bank v, Butler (98 
 
 Mich. 381 ; 57 N. W. Rep. 253), 
 
 308. 
 Mickelson v. Reves (94 N. C. 559), 
 
 205. 
 Middleditch v. Williams (45 N. J. 
 
 Eq. 726), 51. 
 Middleton v. Melton (10 B. & C. 317), 
 
 117. 
 Middleton v. State (52 Ga. 527), 324. 
 Midland R. Co. v. Island Coal Co. 
 
 (126 Ind. 384), 371. 
 Milbank v. Jones (17 N. Y. S. 464), 74. 
 Miles v. Miles (32 N. H. 147), 304.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXX1 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Miles v. 0'Hara(4 Binn., Pa., 108), 
 
 124. 
 Milford v. Powner (126 Ind. 328), 110. 
 Milford v. Veazie (Me., 1888, 14 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 730), 126. 
 Milfree v. State (13 Tex. App. 340), 
 
 233. 
 Millay v. Butts (35 Me. 139), 229. 
 Miller's Appeal (31 Pa. St. 337), 215. 
 Miller v. Avery (2 Barb. Ch. 582), 
 
 142. 
 Miller v. Eldridge (26 Ind. 461), 22. 
 Miller v. Fechtborn (31 Pa. St. 252), 
 
 208. 
 Miller v. Fletcher (27 Gratt., Va., 
 
 403), 205. 
 Miller v. Indianapolis (123 Ind. 196), 
 
 142. 
 Miller v. Insurance Co. (1 Abb. N. 
 
 C. 470), 216. 
 Miller v. Johnston (27 Md. 6), 140. 
 Miller v. Jones (32 Ark. 337), 140. 
 Miller v. Knapp (26 W. N. C. 29). 
 
 147. 
 Miller v. Miller (2 Bing. N. C. 76), 138. 
 Miller v. Montgomery (¥8 N. Y. 285), 
 
 309. 
 Miller v. Motter (35 Md. 428), 309. 
 Miller v. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. (31 
 
 Iowa, 216), 200. 
 Miller v. Neimerick (19 111. 172), 69. 
 Miller v. Powell (53 Mo. 252), 136. 
 Miller v. Railway Co. (58 Wis. 310), 
 
 356. 
 Miller v. Russell (7 Mart., N. S., 266), 
 
 122. 
 Miller v. Saunders (17 Ga. 92), 303. 
 Mdler v. Shackelford (4 Dana, Ky„ 
 
 264), 150a. 
 Miller v. Shay (145 Mass. 162), 60. 
 Miller v. State (68 Miss. 221), 8, 93. 
 Miller v. State (IS Tex. 232), 9. 
 Miller v. Stevens (100 Mass. 518), 217. 
 Miller v. Union Switch & Signal Co. 
 
 (59 Hun, 624), 153. 
 Miller v. Williams (5 Esp. 19, 21), 82. 
 Miller v. Windsor W. Co. (30 W. N. 
 
 C. 85; 148 Pa. St. 429), 8, 368. 
 
 Miller v. Wood (44 Vt. 378). 80. 
 Miller Ins. Co. v. Kinneard (35 III. 
 
 App. 105), 212. 
 Millet v. Marston (63 Me. 477), 209. 
 Millott v. N. Y. & N. E. R. Co. (19 
 
 N. Y. S. 122; 64 Hun, 634), 11. 
 Mills v. Davis (113 N. Y. 243). 309. 
 Mills v. Husson (63 Hun, 632), 377. 
 Mills v. Lee (4 Hill, 549), 302. 
 Mills v. Oddy (6 C. & P. 728), 173. 
 Mills v. Railroad Co. (41 N. J. Eq. 1), 
 
 83. 
 Milw. etc. Co. v. Johnson (35 Neb. 
 
 554), 216. 
 Milw. etc. Co. v. Kellogg (94 IT. S. 
 
 469), 186, 200. 
 Minims v. State (16 Ohio St. 221), 9. 
 Minis v. Schwarz (37 Tex. 13), 242. 
 Minchin v. Minchin (32 N. E. Rep. 
 
 164; 157 Mass. 265). 212. 
 Miner v. Atherton (35 Pa. St. 528), 
 
 215. 
 Miner v. Baron (131 N. Y. 677), 374. 
 Mines v. Perry (113 Mass. 274), 139. 
 Minet v. Morgan (L. R. 8 Ch. 361), 
 
 174. 
 Ming v. Foote (9 Mont. 201 ; 23 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 515), 38, 45. 
 Minn. M. Co. v. Minn. etc. Ry. Co. 
 
 (51 Minn. 304; 53 N. W. Rep. 
 
 639), 121. 
 Minnesota S. Ag. Soc. v. Swanson 
 
 (48 Minn. 231), 369. 
 Minor v. Kirkland (Tex., 1893, 20 
 
 S. W. Rep. 932), 220. 
 Minor v. Powers (Tex. Civ. App., 
 
 1894, 24 S. W. Rep. 710), 217, 
 
 220. 
 Minor v. Stone (1 La. Ann. 283), 244. 
 Minor v. Tillotson (7 Pet. 100), 30. 
 Minter v. People (29 N. E. Rep. 45; 
 
 39 111. App. 438), 354a. 
 Minzenheimer v. Heinze (74 Tex. 
 
 254), 357. 
 Mishler v. Baumgardner (1 Am. L. 
 
 J. 304), 312. 
 Mississippi, etc. Co. v. More (15 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 714, Tex., 1891), 58, 83a.
 
 CXX11 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Missouri, etc. Co. v. Baier (Neb., 
 
 1893, 55 N. W. Rep. 913), 56. 
 Missouri, etc. Co. v. Bond (Tex., 1893, 
 
 20 S. W. Rep. 930), 56. 
 Missouri, etc. Co. v. German (84 Tex. 
 
 41), 33. 
 Missouri, etc. Co. v. Heidenheimer 
 
 (82 Tex. 195), 151. 
 Missouri Glass Co. v. Grigg (Tex., 
 
 1890, 16 S. W. Rep. 174), 148. 
 Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Pierce (39 
 
 Kan. 391), 368. 
 Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Sherwood (84 
 
 Tex. 125), 73a. 
 Mitchell v. Bradstreet Co. (116 Mo. 
 
 226 ; 22 S. W. Rep. 724), 369. 
 Mitchell v. Cochran (10 N. Y. S. 545; 
 
 57 Hun, 589), 308. 
 Mitchell v. Judge (53 Mich. 541), 
 
 285. 
 Mitchell v. Mitchell (15 S. W. Rep. 
 
 705; 80 Tex. 101), 168. 
 Mitchell v. Sheriff (7 Abb. Pr. 96). 
 
 288. 
 Mitchell v. State (71 Ga. 123), 124. 
 Mitchell v. State (94 Ala. 68 ; 10 S. 
 
 Rep. 518), 346, 349, 350. 
 Mitchell v. State (58 Ala. 418), 194. 
 Mitchinson v. Cross (58 111. 366, 369), 
 
 166. 
 Mitchmerv. Holmes (Mo., 1893, 20 
 
 S. W. Rep. 1070), 136. 
 Mithoff v. Byrne (20 La.' Ann. 363), 
 
 221. 
 Mittnacht v. Slevin (67 Hun, 315), 
 
 205, 220. 
 Mix v. Osby (62 111. 193), 73a. 
 Mix v. Shattuck (50 Vt. 421), 69. 
 Mix v. Staples (63 Hun, 631), 189. 
 Mixter Coal Co. v. Smith (152 Pa. St. 
 
 395), 8. 
 Mizer v. Bristol (30 Neb. 138), 249. 
 Moale v. Buchanan (11 Gill & J. 314), 
 
 223. 
 Mobile Bank v. McDonnell (89 Ala. 
 
 434), 70, 311. 
 Mobile, etc. Co. v. Blakely (59 Ala. 
 471), 198. 
 
 Mobile, etc. Co. v. George (94 Ala. 
 
 199; 10 S. Rep. 145), 24. 
 Mobile, etc. Co. v. Klein (43 111. App. 
 
 63), 73a. 
 Mobile, etc. Co. v. Ladd (9 S. Rep. 
 
 169; 92 Ala. 287), 145. 
 Mobile, etc. Co. v. Whitney (39 Ala. 
 
 468), 242. 
 Mobile, etc. Co. v. Worthington (95 
 
 Ala. 598; 10 S. Rep. 839), 8. 
 Mobile L. Ins. Co. v. Walker (58 Ala. 
 
 290), 185. 
 Mobile Sav. Bank v. McDonnell (89 
 
 Ala. 434; 8 S. Rep. 137), 208. 
 Mockabee v. Com. (78 Ky. 380), 101. 
 Modern Woodmen v. Sutton (38 111. 
 
 App. 327), 250. 
 Moett v. People (85 N. Y. 373). 351. 
 Moffatt v. Terney (30 Pac. Rep. 348 ; 
 
 IT Colo. 189), 347. 
 Moffett v. Witherspoon (10 Ired. L. 
 
 185), 74. 
 Moline Wagon Co. v. Preston (35 111. 
 
 App. 358), 353. 
 Molyneux v. Collier (13 Ga. 406), 
 
 114. 
 Monkton v. Attorney-General (2 R. 
 
 &M. 147, 160), 113. 
 Monroe v. Snow (131 111. 126), 60. 
 Monroe's Estate, In re (23 Abb. N. 
 C. 83; 5N. Y. S. 552), 194, 201. 
 Monroe's Will, In re (20 N. Y. S. 82; 
 
 2 Con. Sur. 395), 169. 
 Monroe Cattle Co. v. Becker (147 U. 
 
 S. 47), 304. 
 Monselle v. Bacon (66 Hun, 628), 380. 
 Montague v. Stoltz (S. C, 1893, 15 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 868), 380. 
 Montezuma v. Wilson (Ga., 1889, 9 
 
 S. E. Rep. 17), 21. 
 Montgomery v. Bevans (1 Sawy. C. 
 
 C. 653), 233. 
 Montgomery v. Com. (88 Ky. 509), 
 
 231. 
 Montgomery v. Con. Bridge Co. (110 
 
 Pa. St. 54), 7. 
 Montgomery v. Deeley (3 Wis. 623), 
 242.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXX111 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Montgomery v. Maguire(25 111. App. 
 
 31), 57. 
 Montgomery v. Perkins (2 Met., Ky., 
 
 418), 269. 
 Montgomery v. Pickering (116 Mass. 
 
 227), 174. 
 Montgomery v. Scott (34 Wis. 333), 
 
 194, 198. 
 Montgomery v. State (11 Ohio, 421), 
 
 124. 
 Montgomery v. State (80 Ind. 338), 
 
 102. 
 Montrose v. Wanamaker (57 Hun, 
 
 590), 154. 
 Montross v. Eddy (53 N. W. Rep. 
 
 916; 94 Mich. 100), 369. 
 Moody v. Rowell (17 Pick., Mass., 
 
 490), 139, 139a, 140, 141, 341. 
 Moody v. Smith (70 N. Y. 598), 268. 
 Mooers v. Bunker (29 N. H. 42), 53. 
 Mooney v. Holconib (15 Oreg. 639), 
 
 229. 
 Mooney v. Hough (84 Ala. 80), 343. 
 Mooney v. Olsen (22 Kan. 69), 151. 
 Moore v. Bunner (31 111. App. 400), 
 
 146. 
 Moore v. Butler (48 N. H. 161), 73. 
 Moore v. Com. (92 Ky. 630 ; 18 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 833), 249. 
 Moore v. Dulsen (79 Ga. 456), 309. 
 Moore v. Green (73 N. C. 394), 286. 
 Moore v. Jackson (4 Wend., N. Y., 
 
 59), 218. 
 Moore v. Knott (14 Oreg. 35), 60. 
 Moore v. McDonald (68 Md. 321), 
 
 368. 
 Moore v. MoKee (13 Miss. 238), 166. 
 Moore v. Moore (39 Iowa, 461), 124. 
 Moore v. Pickett (62 111. 138), 246. 
 Moore v. Robertson (62 Hun, 623), 
 
 361. 
 Moore v. Spier (80 Ala. 130), 269. 
 Moore v. State (17 Ohio St. 321), 193. 
 Moore v. State (79 Ga. 498), 319. 
 Moore v. United States (91 U. S. 270), 
 
 140. 
 Moore v. United States (17 Ct. of CI. 
 
 17), 222. 
 
 Moore v. Voss (1 Cranch, C. C. 179), 
 
 205. 
 Moore v. Wilkins (10 N. H. 455), 56. 
 Moore v. Worth (2 Duv., Ky., 308). 
 
 240. 
 Moore v. Wright (90 111. 470), 80, 207. 
 Moore wood v. Wood (14 East, 330), 
 
 112. 
 Moors v. Albro (129 Mass. 9), 129. 
 Moran v. Hayes (1 Johns. Ch. 339), 
 
 246. 
 More v. Wood (14 East, 327), 140. 
 Moreland v. Bernhardt (44 Tex. 275), 
 
 223. 
 Morgan v. Atlanta (77 Ga. 662), 242. 
 Morgan v. Burrows (45 Wis. 211), 
 
 220. 
 Morgan v. Cree (46 Vt. 786) ; 242. 
 Morgenthau v. Walker (21 N. Y. S. 
 
 936), 351. 
 Morin v. Multnomah Co. (18 Oreg. 
 
 163; 22Pac. Rep. 490), 277. 
 Morneno v. State (Tex., 1893, 21 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 924), 4. 
 Morning Journal v. Jones (123 N. Y. 
 
 207), 10. 
 Morrell v. Kelly (157 Mass. 126; 31 
 
 N. E. Rep. 755), 380. 
 Morrill v. Foster (33 N. H. 379), 53. 
 Morrill v. Tegarden (19 Neb. 534), 188. 
 Morris v. Atl. Ave. R. R. Co. (116 N. 
 
 Y. 556), 350. 
 Morris v. Cain (39 La. Ann. 712; 1 
 
 S. Rep. 879), 172. 
 Morris v. Callanan (105 Mass. 129), 
 
 115. 
 Morris v. Columbian Iron Works & 
 
 D. D. Co. (Md., 1893, 25 Atl. Rep. 
 
 417), 336, 337. 
 Morris v. Davidson (49 Ga. 361), 242. 
 Morris v. Davies (3 C. & P. 215), 250. 
 Morris v. Davis (5 C. & Fin. 163), 234. 
 Morris v. Harmes' Heirs (7 Pet. 558), 
 
 14. 
 Morris v. Morris (119 Ind. 343), 172, 
 
 178. 
 Morris v. Morton (Ky., 1893, 20 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 287), 60, 222.
 
 CXX1V 
 
 TABLE OF CASKS. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Morris v. Morton's Ex'rs (Ky., 1892, 
 
 20 S. W. Rep. 287), 7. 
 Morris v. Nixon (1 Ho\v.,U. S., 118), 
 
 67, 70. 
 Morris v. Peckham (51 Conn. 128), 
 
 267. 
 Morris v. Patchin (24 N. Y. 394), 148. 
 Morris v. State (31 Tex. App. 597), 
 
 10. 
 Morris v. State (2 Tex. App. 502), 
 
 357. 
 Morris v. Stokes (24 Ga. 552), 80. 
 Morris v. White (36 N. J. Eq. 324), 
 
 304. 
 Morrison v. Chapin (97 Mass. 76), 337. 
 Morrison v. Leonard (3 C. & P. 127), 
 
 316. 
 Morrison v. Porter (35 Minn. 425), 
 
 140. 
 Morrison v. Railroad (Iowa, 1892, 57 
 
 N. W. Rep. 75), 344. 
 Morrison v. White (16 La. Ann. 100), 
 
 135. 
 Morrow v. Ostrander (13 Hun, 219), 
 
 335. 
 Morse v. Bellows (7 N. H. 549), 69. 
 Morse v. Hewett (28 Mich. 481), 242. 
 Morse v. Stearns (131 Mass. 3S9), 220. 
 Morss v. Moras (11 Barb. 310), 313. 
 Mortimer v. Chambers (17 N. Y. S. 
 
 552), 140. 
 Mortimer v. Met. E. R. Co. (129 N. Y. 
 
 84), 362. 
 Morton v. Barrett (19 Me. 109), 53. 
 Morton v. Dean (13 Met., Mass., 388), 
 
 268. 
 Morton v. Nelson (111., 1893, 32 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 916), 262. 
 Morvant, Succession of (45 La. Ann. 
 
 207), 139. 
 Mosely v. Davis (11 Price, 162), 112. 
 Mosely v. Martin (37 Ala. 216), 220, 
 
 237. 
 Moses v. Penquit (82 Ala. 370), 60. 
 Mosley v. Insurance Co. (55 Vt. 142), 
 
 241. 
 Mosley v. Martin (37 Ala. 216), 237, 
 
 242 
 
 Moss v. Cent. Park R. R. Co. (23 N. 
 
 Y. S. 23), 176. 
 Mossman v. Forrest (27 Ind. 233), 
 
 239. 
 Moulton v. Bowker (59 N. Y. 533), 
 
 74. 
 Moulton v. Harri3 (94 Cal. 420), 262. 
 Moundsville v. Velton (13 S. E. Rep. 
 
 373), 242. 
 Mounett v. Mounett (46 Ohio St. 30), 
 
 220. 
 Mount joy v. State (78 Ind. 172), 357. 
 Mount Vernon v. Brooks (39 111. App. 
 
 426). 339, 340. 
 Moursund v. Priess (Tex., 1892, 84 
 
 Tex. 554; 19 S. W. Rep. 775), 
 
 150. 
 Moy v. Hoydun (30 Miss. 110). 141. 
 Muckle v. Rendle (16 N. Y. S. 208), 
 
 199. 
 Muckleroy v. Bethany (27 Tex. 551), 
 
 128. 
 Mudd v. Suckermore (5 A. & E. 703; 
 
 31 E. C. L), 139. 
 Mueller v. Relhan (94 111. 142), 66, 
 
 69. 
 Mugge v. Adams (76 Tex. 448), 130. 
 Muldowney v. 111. Cent. R. Co. (36 
 
 Iowa, 472), 186. 
 Mulhado v. Brooklyn, etc. Co. (30 
 
 N. Y. 370), 345. 
 Mulhall v. Keen (18 Wall., U. S., 342), 
 
 144. 
 Mulhearn v. Press Pub. Co. (53 N. J. 
 
 L. 153), 285. 
 Mullaly v. Walsh (I. R. 6 C. L. 314), 
 
 233. 
 Mullaney v. Duffy (145 111. 559 ; 33 
 
 N. E. Rep. 250), 110, 115. 
 Mullen v. Morris (2 Pa. St. 85), 143. 
 Mullen v. Railroad (21 N. Y. S. 101), 
 
 11. 
 Mullins v. Com. (Ky., 1893, 20 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 1035), 93. 
 Mullis v. Cairns (5 Blackf., Ind., 77), 
 
 134. 
 Munde v. Lambre (125 Mass. 367), 
 
 343.
 
 TAIH/K OF CASES. 
 
 CXXV 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Mundhenk v. Central Iowa R. Co. 
 
 (57 Iowa, 718), 75. 
 Munn v. Burch (25 111. 21). 242. 
 Munn v. Owens (2 Dill. 477), 308. 
 Munroe v. Napier (52 Ga. 388), 308. 
 Munroe v. Perkins (9 Pick. 298), 214. 
 Munshower v. State (55 Md. 11), 1-15. 
 Munson v. Atwood (30 Conn. 102), 6. 
 Munson v. Wickwire (21 Conn. 513), 
 
 68. 
 Murchie v. Cook (1 Ala. 41), 212. 
 Murdock v. Summer (22 Pick. 158), 
 
 199. 
 Murdock v. Union Bank (2 Rob. 112), 
 
 230. 
 Murieta v. Wolfhagen (2 C. & K. 
 
 744; 61 E. C. L.), 139. 
 Murphy v. Collins (121 Mass. 6), 230. 
 Murphy v. Com. (IS N. Y. S. 353; 28 
 
 Abb. N. C. 207), 350. 
 Murphy v. Com. (23 Gratt., Va., 960), 
 
 350. 
 Murphy v. Hagerman (Wright, Ohio, 
 
 293, 297), 140. 
 Murphy v. Hendricks (57 Ind. 593). 
 
 242. 
 Murphy v. Hiebert(16 Pa. St. 50), 71. 
 Murphy v. May (19 Bush, Ky., 33), 
 
 73a. 
 Murphy v. People (9 Colo. 435), 10. 
 Murphy v. People (37 111. 447), 234. 
 Murphy v. Railroad Co. (62 Hun, 
 
 587), 12, 
 Murphy v. St. Louis Type Foundry 
 
 (29 Mo. App. 541), 76. 
 Murphy v. State (Tex., 1893, 21 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 45), 282, 
 Murray v. Chase (134 Mass. 92), 74. 
 Murray v. Elston (23 N. J. Eq. 212), 
 
 288. 
 Murray v. G. W. Ins. Co. (25 N. Y. 
 
 S. 414), 340. 
 Murray v. Gregory (5 Wels. & H. 
 
 468), 38. 
 Murray v. Milner (L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 
 
 845), 53. 
 Murray v. Murray (6 Oreg. 17), 232. 
 Murray v. Sells (53 Ga. 257), 82. 
 
 Murray v. State (6 S. Rep. 498), 90. 
 Murray v. State (25 Fla. 528 ; 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 453), 89, 249. 
 Murray, In re (41 La. Ann. 1109), 
 
 144. 
 Murrell v. Mandlebaum (Tex., 19 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 880), 262. 
 Murtaugh v. Murphy (30 111. App. 
 
 59), 351. 
 Mussey v. Beecher (3 Cush., Mass., 
 
 517), 73a. 
 Musson v. Fales (16 Mass. 335), 323. 
 Mutual Benefit L. I. Co. v. Ruse (8 
 
 Ga. 530), 205. 
 Mutual, etc. Co. v. Tillman (84 Tex. 
 
 31), 50, 52. 
 Mutual Ins. Co. v. Carey (54 Hun, 
 
 493; 135 N. Y. 326), 135, 157. 
 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Anthony (50 
 
 Hun, 101), 121. 
 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Thompson 
 
 (Ky., 1893, 22 S. W. Rep. 87), 375. 
 Myers v. Kinzie (26 111. 36), 70. 
 Myers v. Munson (65 Iowa, 423), 210. 
 Myers v. State (46 Ohio St. 473; 22 
 
 N. E. Rep. 43), 244. 
 Myers v. State (7 Tex. App. 640), 424. 
 
 N. 
 
 Nadau v. White Lumber Co. (76 
 
 Wis. 120; 43 N. W. Rep. 1035), 79. 
 Nagee v. Osborne (32 N. Y. 669), 139a. 
 Nalle v. Gates (20 Tex. 315), 69. 
 Nash v. Gilkerson (5 S. & R. 352), 10. 
 Nash v. Hall (4 Ind. 444), 250. 
 Nash v. Town (5 Wall. 698), 373. 
 Nashau, etc. Co. v. Boston, etc. Corp. 
 
 (31 N. E. Rep. 1060; 157 Mass. 
 
 268), 215. 
 Nashville Life Ins. Co. v. Mathews 
 
 (8 Lea, Tenn., 299), 221. 
 National Bank v. Dunn (106 Ind. 
 
 110), 198. 
 National Bank v. Richardson (2 N. Y. 
 
 S. 804), 229. 
 National Bank v. Scriven (63 Hun, 
 
 375), 349.
 
 CXXV1 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 National Bank v. Stephenson (82 
 
 Tex. 435), 20. 
 National Bank v. Wood (19 N. Y. S. 
 
 81), 247. 
 National Harrow Co. v. Hanby (54 
 
 Fed. Rep. 493), 231, 250. 
 National State Bank v. Richardson 
 
 (2 N. Y. S. 804), 230. 
 National S. S. Co. v. Tugman (143 
 
 U. S. 23), 355. 
 National Syrup Co. v. Carlson (42 
 
 111. App. 178), 347. 
 National Ulster Co. Bank v. Madden 
 
 (114 N. Y. 280), 60. 
 Nations v. Johnson (24 How., U. S., 
 
 195), 232. 
 Navarro v. State (24 Tex. 378 ; G S. 
 
 W. Rep. 542), 194, 355. 
 Nave v. Kilter (41 Ind. 301), 357. 
 Nay v. Curley (113 N. Y. 575), 230, 
 
 308. 
 Neaderheuser v. State (28 Ind. 257), 
 
 239. 
 Neal v. Dealing (21 S. W. Rep. 1066), 
 
 368. 
 Neal v. Reams (88 Ga. 29S), 222. 
 Neal v. Wilding (2 Str. 1151), 53. 
 Neally v. Greenough (5 Foster, N. H., 
 
 325), 126. 
 Nearpass v. Gihnan (104 N. Y. 507), 
 
 309. 
 Neely v. State (27 Tex. App. 324), 89, 
 
 95, 323. 
 Neff v. Cincinnati (32 Ohio St. 215), 
 
 253. 
 Neil v. State (79 Ga. 779), 368. 
 Neill's Estate (7 N. Y. S. 197), 178. 
 Neland v. Murphy (73 Wis. 326), 
 
 50. 
 Nelins v. Buckell (1 Hay w. 19), 138. 
 Nelson v. Graff (44 Mich. 433), 136. 
 Nelson v. Harrington (72 Wis. 591 ; 
 
 40 N. W. Rep. 228), 346. 
 Nelson v. Ladd (54 N. W. Rep. 309, 
 
 S. D., 1893), 244. 
 Nelson v. M. Ins. Co. (71 N. Y. 453), 
 
 188. 
 Nelson v. Nelson (66 Hun, 633), 282. 
 
 Nelson v. New York (131 N. Y. 4), 
 
 60. 
 Nelson v. State (2 Swan, Tenn., 237). 
 
 330. 
 Nelson v. State (33 Fla. 244; 13 S. 
 
 Rep. 861), 10, 349. 
 Nelson v. State (1 Tex. App. 41), 23. 
 Nelson v. Sun Ins. Co. (71 N. Y. 453), 
 
 185. 
 Nelson v. Wallace (48 Mo. App. 193), 
 
 10, 249.. 
 Nesbit v. Greenville (69 Miss. 22; 10 
 
 S. Rep. 452), 12. 
 Nesbitt v. Cavendar (27 S. C. 1), 223. 
 Nesbitt v. Riverside (144 U. S. 610), 
 
 145. 
 Newberry v. Robinson (36 Fed. Rep. 
 
 841), 242. 
 Newberry v. Sheffly (89 Va. 286; 15 
 
 S. E. Rep. 548), 145. 
 Newberry v. State (26 Fla. 334 ; 8 S. 
 
 Rep. 445), 11. 
 Newcomb v. Wood (7 Otto, U. S.. 
 
 581), 315. 
 Newcomb v. Jones (37 Mo. App. 475), 
 
 80, 82. 
 Newcomb v. Presbury (8 Met. 406), 
 
 84. 
 Newell v. Homer (120 Mass. 277), 
 
 34S. 
 Newell v. Newell (9 Paige, N. Y., 26), 
 
 202. 
 Newell v. Nichols (12 Hun, N. Y., 
 
 644; 75 N. Y. 78), 233. 
 New England, etc. Co. v. Farming- 
 ton, etc. Co. (8 W. & S. 229), 142. 
 New England Glass Co. v. Lovell (7 
 
 Cush. 319), 19S. 
 New England Mon. Co. v. Johnson 
 
 (144 Pa. St. 61), 30. 
 New England Mortg. Co. v. Gay (33 
 
 Fed. Rep. 636), 208. 
 Newhall v. Appleton (114 N. Y. 143), 
 
 216. 
 Newhall v. Holt (6 M. & W. 662), 
 
 80. 
 Newhall v. Jenkins (2 Gray, 562), 76. 
 Newhan v. Aurora (14 111. 364), 143a.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXXVll 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 New Haven Co. Bank v. Mitchell (15 
 
 Conn. 206), 138, 230. 
 New Jersey v. Yard (95 U. S. 112), 
 
 242. 
 New Jersej' Mat. L. I. Co. v. Baker 
 
 (94 U. S. G10), 208. 
 Newland v. Douglas (2 Johns. 62), 
 
 314. 
 Newman v. Greenville (7 S. Rep. 
 
 403 ; 67 Miss. 770), 231. 
 Newman v. McComas (43 Md. 70), 
 
 69. 
 Newman v. Samuels (17 Iowa, 528), 
 
 136. 
 New Mexican R. R. Co. v. Hen- 
 dricks (N. Mex., 1893, 30 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 901), 199. 
 New Milford v. Sherman (21 Conn. 
 
 101), 56. 
 New Portland v. King (55 Me. 172), 
 
 36. 
 Newsom v. Bufferton (1 Dev. Eq. 
 
 383), 223. 
 Newson v. Dodson (61 Tex. 91), 52. 
 Newton v. Belcher (12 Q. B. 921), 82. 
 Newton v. Harland (9 Dowl. 16), 
 
 276. 
 Newton v. Mut. Ben. L. Ins. Co. (2 
 
 Dill. C. C. 154), 57. 
 Newton v. Newton (46 Minn. 33; 48 
 
 N. W. Rep. 450), 250. 
 Newton v. Seamen's Fr. Soc. (130 
 
 Mass. 91), 210. 
 Newton v. State (Miss., 1893, 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 560), 11. 
 Newton v. State (42 La. Ann. 33), 52. 
 New York City v. Second Av. R. R. 
 
 Co. (102 N. Y. 579), GO. 
 New York L. Ins. Co. v. Aitkins 
 
 (125 N. Y. 560), 159. 
 New York Phar. Ass'n v. Tilden (14 
 
 Fed. Rep. 740), 134. 
 New York Smelting Co. v. Lieb (4 
 
 N. Y. S. 545; 56 Super. Ct. Rep. 
 
 308), 309. 
 Ney v. Dubuque, etc. Co. (20 Iowa. 
 
 347), 205. 
 Ney v. Mumme (66 Tex. 268), 31. 
 
 Ney v. Troy (50 Hun, 604 ; 3 N. Y. S. 
 
 679), 192. 
 Nichols v. Brunswick (3 Cliff., U. S. 
 
 C. C, 88), 276. 
 Nichols v. Burch (128 Ind. 324; 27 
 
 N. E. Rep. 737), 208. 
 Nichols v. Goldsmith (7 Wend. 360), 
 
 758. 
 Nichols v. Howe (43 Minn. 181), 130. 
 Nichols v. Johnson (10 Conn. 192), 
 
 128. 
 Nichols v. Jones (32 Mo. App. 657), 
 
 74, 76. 
 Nichols v. Parker (14 East, 331), 
 
 114. 
 Nichols v. Webb (8 Wheat. 326), 58, 
 
 60. 
 Nichols v. Wentworth (100 N. Y. 
 
 455) 226. 
 Nicholson v. State (38 Md. 140), 89. 
 Niederluck v. State (21 Tex. App. 
 
 320), 90. 
 Nies v. Broadhead (27 N. Y. S. 52), 
 
 38a. 
 Nilan v. Kalish (Neb., 1893, 55 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 295), 167. 
 Nipper v. Jones (27 Mo. App. 558), 
 
 60. 
 Nixon v. McKinney (105 N. C. 23), 
 
 50, 308. 
 Nixon v. Palmer (10 Barb. 175, 178), 
 
 231. 
 Nixon v. Porter (34 Miss. 697), 108, 
 
 115. 
 Nixon v. State (31 Tex. Crim. App. 
 
 205), 9. 
 Nobles v. Hogg (36 S. C. 322), 362. 
 Noftsger v. Smith (Ind., 1893, 32 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 1024), "62. 
 Noftsinger v. State (7 Tex. App. 301), 
 
 10. 
 Nolan v. Bolton (25 Ga. 352), 215. 
 Nolan v. Pelham (77 Ga. 262), 31, 
 
 126. 
 Norcross v. Weldon (59 Vt. 50), 18. 
 Nordans v. Hubbard (48 Fed. Rep. 
 
 921), 216. 
 Norelli v. Rossi (2 Bradw. 757), 158.
 
 GXXVlll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Beferences are to sections. 
 
 Norfolk Nat. Bank v. Wood (33 Neb. 
 
 113), 71. 
 Nork v. Beach (129 N. Y. 621), 139, 
 
 208. 
 Norman v. Morrell (4 Ves. 769), 218. 
 Norman, In re (33 N. W. Rep. 374; 
 
 72 Iowa, 84), 22. 
 Norris v. Beach (2 Johns. 294), 286. 
 Norris v. Harris (15 Cal. 226), 231. 
 Norris v. Moody (84 Cal. 143), 226. 
 Norris v. State (Tex., 1893, 22 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 592), 283. 
 Norris v. Stewart (105 N. C. 455), 
 
 168. 
 Norsler v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 
 
 (73 Iowa, 268), 304. 
 North v. People (28 N. E. Rep. 966 ; 
 
 139 111. 81), 36, 101, 283. 
 North Brookfield v. "Warren (16 
 
 Gray, 174), 53. 
 North Carolina University v. Harri- 
 son (90 N. C. 385), 233. 
 North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Cotting- 
 
 ham (44 III. App. 46), 348. 
 North Chicago, etc. Co. v. Hudson 
 
 (44 111. App. 60), 8. 
 North Mfg. Co. v. Chambers (58 
 
 Mich. 381), 241. 
 Northern Bank v. Lewis (78 Wis. 
 
 475), 219. 
 Northern Mich. Lumber Co. v. Lyon 
 
 (95 Mich. 584; 55 N. W. Rep. 
 
 438), 84. 
 Northern Mich. Lumber Co. v. Mc- 
 
 Alister (40 Mich. 84), 210. 
 Northern Pac. R. R. Co. v. Charless 
 
 (51 Fed. Rep. 562; 2 C. C. A. 
 
 380), 333. 
 Northern P. etc. Co. v. O'Brien 
 
 (Wash., 1890, 21 Pac. Rep. 32), 
 
 24. 
 Northrop v. Hale (76 Me. 309), 53. 
 Northrop v. Wright (24 Wend. 221), 
 
 105. 
 Northrup v. Jackson (13 Wend. 80), 
 
 126. 
 North Stonington v. Stonington (31 
 
 Conn. 412), 51. 
 
 Northwestern Bank v. Nelson (1 
 
 Gratt., Va., 108), 305. 
 Norton v. Atchison (30 Pac. Rep. 
 
 585 ; 97 Cal. 388), 208. 
 Norton v. Bank (50 Ark. 59), 250. 
 Norton v. Conner (14 S. W. Rep. 
 
 193, Tex., 1892), 105. 
 Norton v. Doherty (3 Gray, Mass., 
 
 372), 151. 
 Norton v. Moore (3 Head, Tenn., 
 
 482), 98. 
 Norton v. Norton (17 N. Y. St. Rep. 
 
 487), 230. 
 Norton v. Paxton (110 Mo. 456; 19 
 
 S. W. Rep. 807), 248. 
 Norvell v. McHenry (1 Mich. 227), 
 
 244. 
 Norwegian Plow Co. v. Hanthorn 
 
 (71 Wis. 529; 37 N. W. Rep. 825), 
 
 341. 
 Nott v. Thomson (35 S. C. 461 ; 14 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 940), 343. 
 Nowlen v. Lyon (41 N. W. Rep. 496; 
 
 73 Mich. 434), 150. 
 Nowlin v. Burwell (75 Va. 551), 108. 
 Noyes v. Pugin (2. Wash. St. 258), 
 
 380. 
 Noyes v. State (40 N. J. L. 429), 
 
 323. 
 Noyes v. White (19 Conn. 250), 57, 
 
 116. 
 Nuckols' Adm'r v. Jones (8 Gratt., 
 
 Va.. 267), 132. 
 Nudd v. Burrows (91 U. S. 439), 11. 
 Numrich v. Supreme Lodge (3 N. Y. 
 
 S. 552), 178. 
 
 o. 
 
 Oakland v. Rye (52 Cal. 270), 83. 
 Oakley v. State (40 Ala. 392), 211. 
 Oaks v. Weller (16 Vt. 71), 225. 
 Oaksmith v. Johnson (92 U. S. 343), 
 
 226. 
 O'Bannon v. Vigus (32 111. App. 473), 
 
 80. 
 Oberman Brew. Co. v. Adams (35 
 
 111. App.' 540). 80.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXX1X 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Obernalte v. Edgar (28 Neb. 70 ; 44 
 
 N. W. Rep. 82), 333. 
 O'Blenis v. State (47 N. J. L. 279), 10. 
 O'Brien v. Com. (6 Bush, Ky., 503), 
 
 123. 
 O'Brien v. McCann (58 N. Y. 373), 
 
 231. 
 O'Brien v. Weiler (G8 Hun, 64), 309, 
 
 375. 
 O'Bryan v. Allen (95 Mo. 68; 8 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 225), 330. 
 Ocean Ins. Co. v. Francis (2 Wend. 
 
 64), 242. 
 Ochoa v. Wilier (59 Tex. 461), 149. 
 O'Connell v. Main Hotel Co. (90 Cal. 
 
 515), 362. 
 O'Connell v. O'Brien (87 N. Y. 577), 
 
 249. 
 O'Connell v. People (87 N. Y. 377), 
 
 374. 
 O'Conner v. Ice Co. (56 N. Y. Super. 
 
 Ct. 410), 334. 
 O'Connor v. Andrews (81 Tex. 28), 
 
 18, 373. 
 O'Connor v. Curtis (18 S. W. Rep. 
 
 953, Tex., 1892), 363. 
 O'Connor v. Delaney (Minn., 1893, 
 
 51 N. W. Rep. 1108), 67. 
 Odel v. Culbert (9 W. & S. 66), 60. 
 Odell v. Koppel (5 Heisk. 88), 316. 
 Odell v. Montrose (68 N. Y. 499), 223. 
 Odell v. Solomon (4 N. Y. S. 440), 
 
 124. 
 Odell, In re (6 Dern. Sur. 344), 332. 
 Odiorne v. Wade (8 Pick. 518), 288. 
 Ogden v. Lund (11 Tex. 688), 238. 
 Ogden v. Parsons (23 How., U. S., 
 
 167), 198. 
 Oglesby v. Farman (77 Tex. 647), 142. 
 O'Hara v. Ring (52 111. 303), 140. 
 O'Hare v. Duckworth (4 Wash. St. 
 
 470), 51. 
 Ohio v. Sweeney (43 La. Ann. 1073), 
 
 232. 
 Ohio, etc. Co. v. Cullison (40 111. App. 
 
 67), 57. 
 Ohio, etc. Co. v. Kleinsmith (38 111. 
 App. 45), 11. 
 
 Ohio, etc. Co. v. Levy (Ind., 1893, 32 
 
 N. E. Rep. 815), 355. 
 Ohio, etc. Co. v. Trapp (Ind., 1892, 
 
 30 N. E. Rep. 812), 276. 
 Ohio & M. Ry. Co. v. Levy (34 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 245), 73a. 
 Ohio & M. Ry. Co. v. Stein (133 Ind. 
 
 243; 31 N. E. Rep. 180), 73a. 
 Ohio & M. Ry. Co. v. Walker (113 
 
 Ind. 196), 362. 
 Ohio Val. Ry. Co. v. Watson's Adm'r 
 
 (Ky., 1893, 21 S. W. Rep. 244), 8. 
 Ohlsen v. Terrero (L. R. 10 Ch. App. 
 
 127), 341. 
 Ohm v. San Francisco (Cal., 1890, 25 
 
 Pac. Rep. 155), 244. 
 O'Hogan v. Dillon (76 N. Y. 170), 
 
 335. 
 O'Kane v. Miller (3 Ind. App. 136), 
 
 250. 
 Oldsv. Marshall (93 Ala. 138; 8 S. 
 
 Rep. 284), 13. 
 Olive v. State (11 Neb. 1), 324. 
 Olmstead v. Bad (Md., 1893, 25 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 243), 145. 
 Olmstead v. Thompson (8 S. Rep. 
 
 755), 244. 
 Olsen v. Peterson (33 Neb. 358), 75. 
 Olson v. Gyertsen (42 Minn. 407), 190. 
 Omaha v. Ayres (32 Neb. 375), 250. 
 Omaha v. Jansen (35 Neb. 68; 52 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 833), 13. 
 Omaha Coal, etc. Co. v. Fay (Neb., 
 
 1S93, 55 N. W. Rep. 211), 362. 
 Omaha, etc. Co. v. Beeson (36 Neb. 
 
 361 ; 54 N. W. Rep. 557), 38, 367. 
 Omaha, etc. Co. v. Walker (17 Neb. 
 
 432), 253. 
 O'Malia v. Glynn (42 111. App. 51), 
 
 152. 
 O'Mara v. Com. (75 Pa. St. 424), 193. 
 Omichund v. Barker (Willes, 545, 
 
 547), 315. 
 O'Neill v. Howe (9 N. Y. S. 746), 
 
 333. 
 O'Neill v. Murray (6 Dak. 107), 173. 
 O'Neill v. Railway Co. (129 N. Y. 
 
 125), 198.
 
 cxxx 
 
 TABLE OF CASE8. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Opdyke v. Marble (18 Abb. N. C. 
 
 375), 358. 
 Opdyke v. Weed (18 Abb. Pr. 223), 
 
 249. 
 Oppenheim v. Henry (9 Hare, 802), 
 
 150. 
 Oppenheimer v. Wright (106 Pa. St. 
 
 569), 136. 
 Ordway v. Conrow (4 Miss. 45), 148. 
 Oregon Short, etc. Co. v. N. P. Ry. 
 
 Co. (51 Fed. Rep. 465), 216. 
 Oregon S. S. Co. v. Otis (100 N. Y. 
 
 45), 230. 
 Orleans v. Chatham (2 Pick. 29), 246. 
 Orman v. State (22 Tex. App. 604), 
 
 174. 
 Ormsby v. People (53 N. Y. 472), 69. 
 Orne v. Townsend (4 Mason, 544), 
 
 144. 
 Orr v. Hadley (36 N. H. 575), 123. 
 Orr v. Hance (44 Mo. App. 461), 262. 
 Orr v. Lacey (2 Doug. 230), 310. 
 Orr v. Orr (35 S. C. 275), 50. 
 Orr v. Rode (101 Mo. 387), 309. 
 Orr Water Ditch, etc. Co. v. Jones 
 
 (19Nev. 60), 8. 
 Orser v. Orser (24 N. Y. 51), 348. 
 Ort v. Fowler (31 Kan. 478), 140. 
 Ortiz v. State (30 Fla. 256), 38a. 
 Osbiston v. Kaufman (29 Pac. Rep. 
 
 748 ; 1 Colo. App. 333), 340. 
 Osborn v. Bell (62 Mich. 218), 8. 
 Osborn v. Bell (5 Denio, 370), 123. 
 Osborn v. Blackburn (47 N. W. Rep. 
 
 175), 230. 
 Osborn v. Com. (Ky., 1893, 20 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 223), 91, 93. 
 Osborn v. Robins (37 Barb., N. Y., 
 
 481), 70. 
 Osborn v. Stringham (S. D., 1894, 57 
 
 N. W. Rep. 776), 211. 
 Osborn v. Sutton (108 Ind. 443), 232. 
 Osborn v. United States Bank (9 
 
 Wheat. 866), 386. 
 Osborne v. Detroit (32 Fed. Rep. 36), 
 
 201. 
 Osgood v. Bauder (82 Iowa, 171 ; 47 
 
 N. W. Rep. 1001), 362. 
 
 Osgood v. Bringolf (32 Iowa, 265), 
 
 73a. 
 Osgood v. Davis (18 Me. 146), 205. 
 Osgood v. Pacey (23 111. App. 116), 
 
 73a. 
 Oskaloosa College v. Western U. T. 
 
 Co. (Iowa, 1893, 54 N. W. Rep. 
 
 152), 343. 
 Oslin v. Jerome (93 Mich. 186), 186. 
 Ostrander v. Snyder (26 N. Y. S. 263), 
 
 209. 
 Otis v. Conway (114 N. Y. 113), 371. 
 Otis v. Yan Storch (15 R. I. 41), 73, 
 
 219. 
 Ottumwa v. Schaub (52 Iowa, 515), 
 
 142a. 
 Oughterson v. Clark (65 Hun, 624), 
 
 60, 61. 
 Outram v. Morewood (5 T. R. 123), 
 
 117. 
 Over v. Schifling (102 Ind. 191), 77, 
 
 362. 
 Overand v. Menczer (83 Tex. 122), 
 
 130, 210. 
 Overby v. Chesa. & Ohio Ry. Co. (37 
 
 W. Va. 524), 185, 187, 368. 
 Overlook v. Young (81 Me. 318), 345. 
 Overly v. Thrasher (47 Ga. 10), 77. 
 Overton v. State (60 Ala. 73), 239. 
 Owen v. Boyle (15 Me. 147), 242. 
 Owen v. Miss. Pac. R. Co. (38 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 571), 344. 
 Owens v. Gentry (30 S. C. 490), 370. 
 Owens v. Kansas City (95 Mo. 169), 
 
 194. 
 Owens v. State (10 S. Rep. 669; 94 
 
 Ala. 97), 9. 
 Owens v. State (Tex., 1893, 20 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 558), 23. 
 Owens v. State (74 Ala. 401), 51. 
 Owens v. Williams (114 Ind. 179), 
 
 346. 
 Owensby v. State (82 Ala. 63; 2 S. 
 
 Rep. 764), 96. 
 Owings v. Hull (9 Pet., U. S., 624), 
 
 242. 
 Owings v. Speed (5 Wheat. 423), 
 
 303.
 
 TABLK OF CASES. 
 
 CXXXl 
 
 Beferences are to sections. 
 
 P. 
 
 Pace v. Com. (Tex., 1893, 20 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 762), 93, 95, 97. 
 Pace v. Lanier (Fla., 1893, 13 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 363), 362. 
 Pacific R. R. Co., In re (32 Fed. Rep. 
 
 251-253), 288. 
 Pack v. Geofroy (19 N. Y. S. 583), 
 
 356. 
 Packard v. Bergen Neck R. Co. (54 
 
 N. J. L. 533), 8. 
 Packard v. Hill (2 Wend. 411), 143. 
 Packard v. Hill (7 Cow. 434), 149. 
 Packard v. Putnam (57 N. H. 43), 
 
 246. 
 Packard v. Richardson (17 Mass. 
 
 122), 268. 
 Packer v. Vandevender (13 Pa. St. 
 
 31), 229. 
 Packet v. State (1 Sneed, Term., 
 
 355), 233. 
 Paddock v. Con. Ins. Co. (104 Mass. 
 
 521), 198. 
 Page v. Carter (8 B. Mon. 192), 252. 
 Page v. Einstein (7 Jones, N. C, 
 
 147), 215. 
 Page v. Kirby (63 Hun, 629), 263. 
 Page v. Page (15 Pick. 368), 130, 304. 
 Page v. State (61 Ala. 16), 188. 
 Page v. Svvanton (39 Me. 400), 67. 
 Paige v. Chedsey (20 N. Y. S. 899), 
 
 176, 343. 
 Paige v. Kelly (5 Hill, 603), 199. 
 Paige v. Paige (71 Iowa, 318), 268. 
 Paige v. Sherman (6 Gray, 511), 208. 
 Paine v. Aid rich (30 N. E. Rep. 725), 
 
 7, 51, 197. 
 Paine v. Parsons (14 Pick. 313), 215. 
 Paine v. Schenectady (11 R. I. 411), 
 
 242. 
 Paine v. Tilden (5 Wash. C. C. 554), 
 
 355. 
 Paine v. Trask (56 Fed. Rep. 233), 
 
 367. 
 Painer v. Hodge (71 N. Y. 598), 60. 
 Pallitz v. Trust Co. (53 Ind. 210), 
 
 151. 
 
 Pallman v. Smith (135 Pa. St. 188; 
 
 19 Atl. Rep. 891), 760. 
 Palmer v. Fogg (35 Me. 368), 361. 
 Palmer v. Hamilton (Ky., 1894, 24 
 
 S. W. Rep. 613), 9. 
 Palmer v. Poore (121 Ind. 165), 128. 
 Palmer v. Rowan (21 Neb. 452), 285. 
 Palmerston v. Territory (3 Wyo. 
 
 333), 6. 
 Pal more v. State (29 Ark. 248), 102. 
 Palson v. State (Ind., 1893, 35 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 907), 335. 
 Panama, etc. Co. v. Johnson (63 
 
 Hun, 629), 247, 250. 
 Pandjiris v. McQueen (59 Hun, 625), 
 
 178. 
 Pangburn v. Insurance Co. (62 Mich. 
 
 638), 126. 
 Panton v. Holland (17 Johns. 92), 20. 
 Parcell v. McReynolds (71 Iowa, 621; 
 
 33 N. W. Rep. 139), 309. 
 Parent v. Wamsley's Adm'r(20 Ind. 
 
 82), 242. 
 Parhan v. Moran (4 Hun, 717), 309. 
 Paris v. Railroad Co. (28 Fla. 251), 
 
 232. 
 Paris, etc. Co. v. Greiner (84 Tex. 
 
 443), 18. 
 Park v. Hopkins (2 Bailey, S. C, 408), 
 
 68. 
 Park v. Wooton (35 Ala. 242), 71. 
 Parke v. Smith (4 Watts & S. 287), 
 
 310. 
 Parker v. Amazon Ins. Co. (34 Wis. 
 
 363), 139. 
 Parker v. Carter (4 Munf. 273), 169. 
 Parker v. Chancellor (11 S. W. Rep. 
 
 503; 73 Tex. 475), 105, 106, 107. 
 Parker v. Crittenden (37 Conn. 148), 
 
 82. 
 Parker v. Enslow (i02 111. 272), 202. 
 Parker v. Foote (19 Wend. 309), 226. 
 Parker v. Foy (43 Miss. 260), 208. 
 Parker v. Handy (24 Pick. 246), 2. 
 Parker v. Kane (22 How. 1), 220. 
 Parker v. State (39 Ala. 365), 23. 
 Parker v. State (Ind., 1893, 35 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 1105), 346.
 
 exxxn 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Parker v. Way cross, etc. Co. (81 Ga. 
 
 387), 105. 
 Parkhurst v. Berdell (110 N. Y. 386), 
 
 167. 
 Parkhurst v. Ketchaua (6 Allen, 406), 
 
 231. 
 Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt (1 Johns. 
 
 Ch. 273), 246. 
 Parkins v. Havvkshaw (2 Stark. 
 
 1239), 169. 
 Parkinson v. Atkinson (31 L. J., N. 
 
 S., C. P. 199), 191. 
 Parkinson v. Trousdale (3 Scam., 
 
 111., 367), 305. 
 Parks v. Boston (12 Pick., Mass., 
 
 209), 344. 
 Parks v. Dunlap (86 Cal. 189), 15& 
 Parks v. Richardson (35 Mo. App. 
 
 192), 154. 
 Parlin v. Stone (48 Fed. Rep. 808), 
 
 84. 
 Par melee v. Raymond (43 IU. App. 
 
 609), 199. 
 Parmer v. Parmer (88 Ala. 545), 223. 
 Parmetary v. State (105 N. Y. 154), 
 
 154. 
 Parris v. McNeal (55 N. W. Rep. 222 ; 
 
 36 Neb. 727), 308. 
 Parroski v. Goldberg (80 Wis. 399), 
 
 134. 
 Parrott v. Baker (82 Ga. 364), 66. 
 Parrott v. Swain (29 111. App. 266), 
 
 186. 
 Parsons v. Hughes (62 Hun, 621), 18. 
 Parsons v. Man. etc. Co. (16 Gray, 
 
 Mass., 463), 198. 
 Parsons v. New York Cent. R. R. Co. 
 
 (112 N. Y. 355), 362. 
 Parsons v. Phipps (4 Tex. 341), 310. 
 Parsons v. State (2 S. Rep. 854; 81 
 
 Ala. 577), 231. 
 Parsons v. Stockbridge (42 Ind. 121), 
 
 358. 
 Parsons v. Thornton <82 Ala. 308), 
 
 219. 
 Partee v. State (67 Ga. 570). 324. 
 Partridge v. Russell (2 N. Y. S. 529 ; 
 
 50 Hun, 601), 113, 115. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Pasachane Water Co. v. Standarfc 
 
 (Cal., 1893, 32 Pac. Rep. 532), 
 
 198. 
 Pasadena v. Stimson (27 Pac. Rep. 
 
 604), 242. 
 Paschal v. State (89 Ga. 303; 15 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 322), 335. 
 Pashall v. Railroad Co. (66 Hun, 633), 
 
 39. 
 Patapsco Ins. Co. v. Southgate (5 
 
 Pet, U. S., 602), 361. 
 Patch v. White (1 Mackey, D. C, 
 
 468), 221. 
 Patchen v. Brooklyn (2 Wend., N. 
 
 Y., 377), 344. 
 Patrick v. Crowe (15 Colo., 543), 75. 
 Patrick v. Skoman (Colo., 1892, 29 
 
 Pac. Rep. 21), 11. 
 Patten v. Messenger (25 Pa. St. 393), 
 
 73a. 
 Patten v. Ryan (4 Rawle, 408), 60. 
 Patten v. Tallman(27 Me. 17, 29), 138, 
 
 150. 
 Patten v. U. L. & Ace. Ins. Co. (61 
 
 Hun, 627), 178. 
 Patterson v. Boston (20 Pick., Mass., 
 
 159), 199. 
 Patterson v. Choate (7 Wend. 441), 
 
 69. 
 Patterson v. Com. (86 Ky. 313), 93. 
 Patterson v. Gaines (6 How. 550), 
 
 304. 
 Patterson v. Insurance Co. (3 Har. & 
 
 J., Md., 71), 355. 
 Patterson v. McCausland (3 Bland, 
 
 Md., 69), 237, 241. 
 Patterson v. Scott (142 111. 138; 31 
 
 N. E. Rep. 433), 304. 
 Patterson v. State (86 Ga. 70). 334. 
 Patterson v. Tucker (4 Halst. 322), 
 
 339. 
 Patterson v. Winn (5 Pet. 240), 304. 
 Patton v. Ash (7 Serg. & R. 116), 
 
 230. 
 Patton v. Beecher (62 Ala. 579), 246. 
 Paugh v. Paugh (40 111. App. 143), 
 
 220. 
 Paul v. Paul (37 N. J. Eq. 25), 350.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXXXlll 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Pavy v. Pavy (30 Ohio St. 600), 140. 
 Pavy v. Wintrode (87 Ind. 379). 73a. 
 Pawling v. United States (4 Cranch, 
 
 221), 373. 
 Pawnee Ditch Co. v. Adams (1 Colo. 
 
 App. 250; 28 Pac. Rep. 602), 176. 
 Pawtucket v. Brtllou (15 R. I. 58), 
 
 138, 276. 
 Paxton v. Marshall (18 Fed. Rep. 
 
 361), 125. 
 Paxton v. Paxton (W. Va., 1894, 18 
 
 S. E. Rep. 765), 308. 
 Payne v. Billingharu (10 Iowa, 360), 
 
 150a. 
 Payne v. Dicus (Iowa, 1893, 55 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 483), 367. 
 Payne v. Hathaway (3 Vt. 319), 262. 
 Payne v. Kerr (66 Hun, 636), 309. 
 Payne v. State (21 Tex. App. 184), 
 
 229. 
 Payne v. State (61 Miss. 161), 102. 
 Payne v. State (60 Ala. 350), 350. 
 Payne v. Taylor (34 111. App. 491), 
 
 147. 
 Payne v. Tread well (16 Cal. 221), 238, 
 
 242. 
 Payne v. Troy, etc. Co. (83 N. Y. 
 
 572), 12. 
 Payson v. Lampson (134 Mass. 593), 
 
 210. 
 Peak v. State (50 N. J. L. 222), 101. 
 Pearce v. Hawkins (61 Tex. 435), 
 
 358. 
 Pearsall v. McCartney (28 Ala. 110). 
 
 249. 
 Pearse v. Pearse (1 De G. & Sm. 28), 
 
 169. 
 Pearsman v. Gould (42 N. J. Eq. 4 ; 
 
 8 Atl. Rep. 285), 276. 
 Pearson v. Uarrington (32 Ala. 227), 
 
 237. 
 Pearson v. McDaniel (62 Ga. 100), 
 
 139. 
 Pearson v. Pearson (46 Cal. 609), 53. 
 Pearson v. Sabin (10 N. H. 205), 80. 
 Peart v. Price (152 Pa. St. 277), 220. 
 Pease v. Cole (53 Conn. 71), 247. 
 Pease v. Peck (18 How. 595), 141. 
 
 Pease v. Phelps (10 Conn. 62), 67. 
 Pease v. State (Ga., 1893, 16 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 113), 282, 378. 
 Peavey v. Tilton (18 N. II. 152), 229. 
 Peck v. Callahan (95 N. Y. 73), 140. 
 Peck v. Cary (27 N. Y. 9), 348. 
 Peck v. Crouse (46 Barb., N. Y., 151), 
 
 70. 
 Peck v. Hutchison (Iowa, 1893, 55 
 
 N. W. Rep. 511), 369. 
 Peck v. Ritchie (66 Mo. 114), 73a. 
 Peck v. Parchen (52 Iowa, 46), 32. 
 Pecke v. Hunter (86 Va. 768), 304. 
 Pecks v. Simis (22 N. E. Rep. 313), 
 
 237. 
 Peckham Iron Co. v. Harper (41 Ohio 
 
 St. 100), 76. 
 Pecquet v. Pecquet (17 La. Ann. 201), 
 
 242. 
 Peden v. Mail (18 Ind. 560), 68. 
 Pedrosena v. Hotchkiss (95 Cal. 636), 
 
 362. 
 Peek v. Boone (Ga. , 1893, 17 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 66), 169. 
 Peek v. Detroit Novelty Works (29 
 
 Mich. 312), 73a. 
 Peekard v. Baily (6 Foster, N. H, 
 
 152), 148. 
 Peeler v. Lathrop (48 Fed. Rep. 780), 
 
 304. 
 Pejepscot v. Ransom (14 Mass. 145), 
 
 218. 
 Pellum v. State (89 Ala. 28), 176. 
 Peltier v. State (23 Tex. App. 366), 
 
 321. 
 Pelzer Manuf. Co. v. Sun Fire Office 
 
 of London (36 S. C. 213; 15 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 562), 200. 
 Pemigewasset Bank v. Rogers (18 
 
 N. H. 255), 73a. 
 Pence v. Waugh (Ind., 1893, 34 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 860), 340. 
 Pendery v. Crescent (21 La. Ann. 
 
 410), 33. 
 Pendill v. Neuberger (31 N. W. Rep. 
 
 177; 64 Mich. 220), 309. 
 Pendleton v. Smissaert (1 Colo. App. 
 
 508; 29 Pac. Rep. 521), 250.
 
 CXXX1V 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Penhryn Slate Co. v. Meyer (8 Daly, 
 
 N. Y., 61), 249. 
 Pennell v. Delta Co. (94 Mich. 217), 
 
 216. 
 Pennell v. Meyer (8 C. & P. 470), 80. 
 Pennington v. Gibson (16 How. 65), 
 
 242. 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Conlan (101 111. 
 
 93), 186, 198. 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Dolan (32 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 802), 18, 108. 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Horton (132 Ind. 
 
 189), 862. 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Newmeyer (129 
 
 Ind. 401 ; 28 N. E. Rep. 860), 11)0, 
 
 340. 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Swan (37 111. 
 
 App. 83), 188. 
 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Friend 
 
 (Ind., 1892, 30 N. E. Rep. 1116), 
 
 186. 
 Pennsylvania, etc. Co. v. Cook (123 
 
 Pa. St. 170), 367. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Frana (13 111. 
 
 App. 91), 237. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Lyons (18 
 
 Atl. Rep. 759; 129 Pa. St. 113). 
 
 57. 
 Penny v. Brink (15 N. C. 68), 276. 
 Pennypacker v. Leary (65 Iowa, 220), 
 
 267. 
 Penruddock v. Hammond (11 Beav. 
 
 59), 174. 
 Penwick v. Kennedy (153 Pa. St. 
 
 179), 145. 
 People v. Abbott (Mich., 1893, 56 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 862), 349. 
 People v. Ah Fat (48 Cal. 61), 355. 
 People v. Ah Yute(56 Cal. 119), 124. 
 People v. Augsburg (97 N. Y. 501), 
 
 188. 
 People v. Baker (96 N. Y. 340), 9. 
 People v. Baker (3 Abb. Pr. 42 ; 3 
 
 Park. Crim. Rep. 181), 277. 
 People v. Barber (115 N. Y. 475), 197, 
 
 231. 
 People v. Barker (00 Mich. 277), 89. 
 People v. Barrett (56 Hun, 351), 284. 
 
 People v. Barton (19 Cal. 632), 89. 
 People v. Beckwith (108 N. Y. 67), &. 
 People v. Bell (10 Johns. 95), 306. 
 People v. Bemmerly (87 Cal. 117; 25 
 
 Pac. Rep. 266), 101, 103. 
 People v. Bemmerly (Cal., 1893, 33 
 
 Pac. Rep. 263),* 249. 
 People v. Bezy (67 Cal. 223), 10. 
 People v. Board of Columbia Co. (31 
 
 N. E. Rep. 322; 134 N. Y. 1), 191. 
 People v. Boggs (20 Cal. 432), 343. 
 People v. Bollinger (71 Cal. 17), 323. 
 People v. Bonny (19 Cal. 426), 344. 
 People v. Brady (72 Cal. 490), 103. 
 People v. Brewer (53 Hun, 217), 178. 
 People v. Briggs (60 How. Pr. 17), 
 
 17.6. 
 People v. Brogle (88 N. Y. 585; 10 
 
 Abb. N. C. 300). 346. 
 People v. Brooklyn (7 N. Y. S. 327), 
 
 140. 
 People v. Brooks (131 N. Y. 321 ; 30 
 
 N. E. Rep. 189), 840. 
 People v. Brotherton (47 Cal. 388), 
 
 195. 
 People v. Brown (46 Hun, 320), 284. 
 People v. Brown (67 111. 435), 83. 
 People v. Brown (53 Midi. 531), 188. 
 People v. Brown (72 N. Y. 571), 346. 
 People v. Buddenseeck (103 N. Y. 
 
 500), 38a, 202. 
 People v. Bush (71 Cal. 602), 234, 
 
 344. 
 People v. Bushton (80 Cal. 161), 348. 
 People v. Callaghan(4Utah, 49), 101, 
 
 103. 
 People v. Canvasser (20 N. Y. S. 829), 
 
 357. 
 People v. Carolan (71 Cal. 195), 322, 
 
 354. 
 People v. Carpenter (102 N. Y. 238), 
 
 192. 
 People v. Carr (64 Mich. 7G2; 31 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 509), 354. 
 People v. Cassiday (133 N. Y. 612), 89, 
 
 93. 
 People v. Cassidy (14 N. Y. S. 349\ 
 
 89.
 
 TABLE OF CASKS. 
 
 cxxxv 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 People v. Chadvrick (25 Pac. Rep. 
 
 737), 327. 
 People v. Chapleau (121 N. Y. 266; 
 
 24 N. E. Rep. 469), 850. 
 People v. Cheeker (61 Cal. 404), 145. 
 People v. Chegaray (18 Wend., N. Y., 
 
 642), 166. 
 People v. Chin (51 Cal. 597), 100. 
 People v. Clung (78 Cal. 389), 335, 
 
 350. 
 People v. Chung (57 Cal. 567), 124, 
 
 346. 
 People v. Cline (44 Mich. 290), 140. 
 People v. Clark (33 Mich. 112), 196. 
 People v. Clough (73 Cal. 348; 15 
 
 Pac. Rep. 5), 324. 
 People v. Cochran (61 Cal. 548), 343. 
 People v. Cole (43 N. Y. 508), 310. 
 People v. Collins (64 Cal. 293), 97. 
 People v. Collins (53 Cal. 185), 127. 
 People v. Collins (7 John. 549), 140. 
 People v. Com. (87 Ky. 487 ; 9 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 509), 101. 
 People v. Cooper (39 111. 461 ; 29 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 872), 371. 
 People v. Copsey (71 Cal. 548), 316. 
 People v. Coughlin (35 N. W. Rep. 
 
 72; 67 Mich. 466), 93. 
 People v. Courtney (28 Hun, 589), 
 
 324. 
 People v. Cowgill (93 Cal. 596), 11. 
 People v. Cox (21 Hun, 47), 50. 
 People v. Cronin (34 Cal. 191), 381. 
 People v. Cronise (51 Hun, 489), 362. 
 People v. Crowley (102 N. Y. 234), 
 
 381. 
 People v. Crowley (Cal., 1893, 35 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 84), 354. 
 People v. Davis (50 N. Y. 96), 102. 
 People v. Deacons (109 N. Y. 374), 
 
 89, 193. 
 People v. Devine (46 Cal. 225), 121. 
 People v. Dohring(59N. Y. 374), 313. 
 People v. Dowdigan (67 Mich. 95), 
 
 332. 
 People v. Downs (123 N. Y. 558), 249. 
 People v. Doyell (48 Cal. 85), 350. 
 People v. Doyle (58 Hun, 535), 346. 
 
 People v. Drake (65 Hun, 331), 9. 
 People v. Druse (103 N. Y. 665), 10 
 People v. Durfee (62 Mich. 487), 231 
 
 232, 369. 
 People v. Elliott (106 N. Y. 288), 324 
 People v. Etter(Sl Mich. 570; 45 N 
 
 W. Rep. 1109), 384. 
 People v. Everhart (104 N. Y. 591 
 
 11 N. E. Rep. 62), 315, 324. 
 People v. Farmer (77 Cal. 1 ; 18 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 800), 102. 
 People v. Fernandez (35 N. Y. 49, 
 
 64), 39. 
 People v. Fine (77 Cal. 147), 88. 
 People v. Finley (38 Mich. 482), 231. 
 People v. Fish (125 N. Y. 126), 346. 
 People v. Fleming (14 N. Y. S. 200). 
 
 334. 
 People v. Foley (27 Weekly Dig., N. 
 
 Y., 217), 345. 
 People v. Fong Ah Sing (70 Cal. 8), 
 
 102. 333. 
 People v. Foote (93 Mich. 38), 346. 
 People v. Formosa (131 N. Y. 478; 
 
 30 N. E. Rep. 492), 10, 23, 343. 
 People v. Fox (24 N. E. Rep. 923 ; 3 
 
 N. Y. S. 359), 89. 
 People v. Foy (34 N. E. Rep. 396; 
 
 138 N. Y. 664), 231. 
 People v. Frindel (58 Hun, 482), 319. 
 People v. Gallagher (75 Mich. 512), 
 
 89, 172, 321. 
 People v. Garbutt (17 Mich. 9), 9. 
 People v. Garcia (25 Cal. 531), 74. 
 People v. Gardner (32 Pac. Rep. 880 ; 
 
 9.8 Cal. 127), 346. 
 People v. Gastro (75 Mich. 127), 89. 
 People v. Geiger (49 Cal. 643), 70. 
 People v. Gibbons (43 Cal. 557), 93. 
 People v. Gibbs (93 N. Y. 473), 9. 
 People v. Gilon (18 Civ. Pro. R. 109), 
 
 171. 
 People v. Glenn (10 Cal. 32), 103. 
 People v. Goldenson (76 Cal. 328), 
 
 189, 340, 345. 
 People v. Gonzalez (35 N. Y. 49), 39, 
 
 193. 
 People v. Graney (91 Mich. 646), 234.
 
 CXXXV1 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 People v. Croon (99 Cal. 564; 34 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 231), 315. 
 People v. Green (1 Park. Cr. Cas. 11), 
 
 80. 
 People v. Green (1 Denio, N. Y., 614), 
 
 166. 
 Peopie v. Greenfield (30 N. Y. Sup. 
 
 Ct. 462 ; 85 N. Y. 75, 83), 193. 
 People v. Hanifan (Mich., 1893, 56 
 
 N. W. Rep. 1048), 311. 
 People v. Harris (95 Mich. 87; 54 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 645), 10. 
 People v. Harris (136 N. Y. 423), 178, 
 
 188. 
 People v. Harris (4 Denio, N. Y., 150), 
 
 281. 
 People v. Harrison (53 N. W. Rep. 
 
 725; 93 Mich. 594), 350, 354. 
 People v. Hayes (24 N. Y. S. 194), 
 
 382. 
 People v. Haynes (11 Wend., N. Y., 
 
 565), 23. 
 People v. Hennessy (15 Wend. 147), 
 
 93. 
 People v. Hess (85 Mich. 128 ; 48 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 181), 346. 
 People v. Hibernia Sav. Bank (84 
 
 Cal. 634), 116. 
 People v. Hilhouse (80 Mich. 580), 
 
 340. 
 People v. Hinchman (75 Mich. 587), 
 
 93. 
 People v. Hite (Utah, 1893, 33 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 254), 354. 
 People v. Holbrook (13 Johns. 90), 
 
 35. 
 People v. Holfelder (5 N. Y. Crim. 
 
 R. 179), 186. 
 People v. Honey man (3 Den., N. Y., 
 
 121), 23. 
 People v. Hong (93 Cal. 41 ; 27 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 1096), 378. 
 People v. Hope (62 Cal. 291), 202. 
 People v. Howes (81 Mich. 396; 45 
 
 N. W. Rep. 961), 89. 
 People v. Hughes (41 Cal. 234), 23. 
 People v. Hulbut (4 Denio, N. Y., 
 
 133), 176. 
 
 People v. Hull (86 Mich. 449), 334. 
 People v. Irwin (77 Cal. 494), 93. 
 People v. Jaehne (7 N. E. Rep. 290; 
 
 108 N. Y. 182), 324. 
 People v. Johnson (N. Y, 1893, 35 
 
 N. E. Rep. 604), 39. 
 People v. Johnson (41 Cal. 452), 90. 
 People v. Judge (41 Mich. 726), 275. 
 People v. Kelley (47 Cal. 125), 93. 
 People v. Kelly (24 N. Y. 74), 332, 
 
 354a. 
 People v. Kemmler (119 N. Y. 585), 
 
 178. 
 People v. Kent Circuit Judge (41 
 
 Mich. 722), 150a. 
 People v. Kenyon (93 Mich. 19). 384. 
 People v. Kern (Utah, 1893, 30 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 988), 6. 
 People v. Kerr (6 N. Y. S. 674), 69. 
 People v. Kerr (6 N. Y. Crim. R. 
 
 406), 6. 
 People v. Kerrigan (14 Pac. Rep. 566; 
 
 73 Cal. 222), 231. 
 People v. Kline (83 Cal. 374), 232. 
 People v. Knapp (26 Md. 112), 102. 
 People v. Lake (12 N. Y. 358), 197. 
 People v. Lange (90 Mich. 454), 333. 
 People v. Langtree (64 Cal. 256), 323. 
 People v. Lee (49 Cal. 37), 280. 
 People v. Lee Chuck (74 Cal. 30; 15 
 
 Pac. Rep. 322), 102. 
 People v. Lem You (97 Cal. 224 ; 32 
 
 Pac. Rep. 11), 124. 
 People v. Levire (85 Cal. 39; 24 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 631), 201. 
 People v. Levy (71 Cal. 618), 188, 197. 
 People v. Loui (27 Pac. Rep. 295; 90 
 
 Cal. 377), 378. 
 People v. Lowrey (70 Cal. 193), 344. 
 People v. Mahoney (77 Cal. 529), 343, 
 People v. Man. Co. (9 Wend. 351), 
 
 231. 
 People v. Marseilles (70 Cal. 98), 188, 
 
 277. 
 People v. Mather (4 Wend. 257, 258), 
 
 349, 354. 
 People v. Matteson (2 Cowen, 433, 
 
 473), 316.
 
 TABLE OK CASKS. 
 
 CXXXVJ1 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 People v. Matterson (17 III. 167), 140. 
 People v. McCann(l6 N. Y. 66), 247. 
 People v. McCarthy (110 N. Y. 309), 
 
 249. 
 People v. McCormack (135 N. Y. 663), 
 
 846. 
 People v. McCoy (45 How. Pr., N. Y„ 
 
 216), 202. 
 People v. McCrea (32 Cal. 93), 52. 
 People v. McDonell (17 Cal. 131), 231. 
 People v. McGIoin (91 N. Y. 241), 93. 
 People v. McGonegal (136 N. Y. 62). 
 
 196, 323. 
 People v. McGuire (135 N. Y. 639), 
 
 323. 
 People v. McKellar (53 Cal. 65), 344. 
 People v. McLean (84 Cal. 480), 11. 
 People v. McLean (71 Mich. 309), 10. 
 People v. McNair (21 Wend. 608), 
 
 319. 
 People v. McNamara (94 Cal. 509), 
 
 341. 
 People v. McQuade (110 N. Y. 284), 
 
 769. 
 People v. McQuaid (S5 Mich. 123; 48 
 
 N. W. Rep. 161), 187. 
 People v. Mead (50 Mich. 228), 8, 
 
 202. 
 People v. Millard (53 Mich. 63), 7, 
 
 194. 
 People v. Millard (5 Crim. L. Mag. 
 
 588), 188. 
 People v. Miller (2 Park. Cr. Cas. 
 
 25), 313. 
 People v. Mills (94 Mich. 630), 10, 
 
 350. 
 People v. Minaugh (131 N. Y. 563), 
 
 11. 
 People v. Mining Co. (66 Cal. 138), 
 
 239. 
 People v. Mitchell (94 Cal. 550), 89. 
 People v. Mitchell (55 Cal. 236), 229. 
 People v. Molaspina (57 Cal. 628), 6. 
 People v. Molins (10 N. Y. S. 130), 
 
 323. 
 People v. Mondon (103 N. Y. 214), 93. 
 People v. Monroe (Cal., 1893, 33 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 776), 336. 
 
 People v. Montgomery (13 Abh. Pr.. 
 
 N. S., 207, 240), 191. 
 People v. Monteith (73 Cal. 7), 186. 
 People v. Morrow (60 Cal. 142), 5. 
 People v. Murphy (45 Cal. 137), 124, 
 
 166. 
 People v. Murphy (135 N. Y. 450; 32 
 
 N. E. Rep. 138), 139a. 
 People v. Murray (123 N. Y. 160), 
 
 140. 
 People v. Murray (57 Mich. 396), 
 
 143a. 
 People v. Murray (52 Mich. 388), 102, 
 
 340. 
 People v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. (29 N. 
 
 Y. 431), 386. 
 People v. N. Y. Hospital (3 Abb. 
 
 N. C. 229), 317. 
 People v. Noelke (94 N. Y. 137), 
 
 127. 
 People v. Northey (77 Cal. 618), 334. 
 People v. Nyce (34 Hun, 298), 250. 
 People v. O'Brien (Mich., 1893, 56 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 72), 354. 
 People v. O'Brien (96 Cal. 171), 9, 
 
 349. 
 People v. O'Brien (60 Mich. 8), 324. 
 People v. Ogle (104 N. Y. 511), 88. 
 People v. Oliver (4 Utah, 460), 384. 
 People v. Olmstead (30 Mich. 435), 
 
 100, 102. 
 People v. O'Neil (109 N. Y. 251), 322, 
 
 324, 351. 
 People v. O'Neill (48 Hun, 36), 324. 
 People v. O'Sullivan (104 N. Y. 493), 
 
 752. 
 People v. Oyer & T. (83 N. Y. 436). 
 
 335, 354a. 
 People v. Packenham(115 N. Y. 200), 
 
 197. 
 People v. Page (1 Idaho, 194), 374. 
 People v. Pallister (138 N. Y. 601), 6, 
 
 234. 
 People v. Parker (67 Mich. 222; 34 
 
 N. W. Rep. 720). 140. 
 People v. Parton (49 Cal. 632), 342. 
 People v. Paton (20 N. Y. 195), 11. 
 People v. Pearsall (50 Mich. 233), 6.
 
 CXXXVlll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Beferences are to sections. 
 
 People v. Pease (27 N. Y. 45), 231, 
 
 250. 
 People v. Penhallow (42 Hun, 103), 
 
 346. 
 People v. Perini (94 Cal. 573), 249. 
 People v. Perryman (72 Mich. 184; 
 
 40 N. W. Rep. 425), 190. 
 People v. Petmecky (99 N. Y. 415), 
 
 351. 
 People v. Pine (2 Barb. 566), 11. 
 People v. Potter (35 Cal. 110), 242. 
 People v. Powell (87 Cal. 348), 88. 
 People v. Pyper (6 Utah, 160; 21 
 
 Pac. Rep. 722), 277. 
 People v. Ramirez (73 Cal. 403), 101. 
 People v. Reggel (8 Utah, 21 ; 28 
 
 Pac. Rep. 955), 176. 
 People v. Rice (10 N. Y. S. 270), 332. 
 People v. Robinson (2 Park. Cr. Cas. 
 
 236), 195. 
 People v. Robinson (26 How. Pr. 90), 
 
 356. 
 People v. Rodrigo (69 Cal. 601), 322, 
 
 354. 
 People v. Rogers (21 Wend., N. Y., 
 
 518), 356. 
 People v. Rogers (18 N. Y. 9), 89. 
 People v. Rohl (138 N. Y. 616), 11. 
 People v. Ryan (28 Hun, 568), 324. 
 People v. Ryan (55 Hun, 214), 349. 
 People v. Samario (84 Cal. 484), 101. 
 People v. Sam Lung (70 Cal. 516), 
 
 330. 
 People v. Sare Bo (72 Cal. 623), 101. 
 People v. Sliney (137 N. Y. 570), 178. 
 People v. Smalling (94 Cal. 112), 88a. 
 People v. Scoggins (37 Cal. 683), 10. 
 People v. Schuyler (106 N. Y 298, 
 
 303), 178, 197. 
 People v. Sessions (58 Mich. 594), 
 
 192. 
 People v. Shattuck (6 Abb. N. C. 33), 
 
 176. 
 People v. Shaw (63 N. Y. 40), 103. 
 People v. Sheriff (29 Barb. 622), 174. 
 People v. Sherman (61 Hun, 623; 133 
 
 N. Y. 349), 337. 
 People v. Sligh (48 Mich. 54), 124. 
 
 People v. Smith (104 N. Y. 491), 101, 
 
 102, 362. 
 People v. Smith (98 Cal. 218; 33 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 58), 324. 
 People v. Smith (94 N. Y. 649), 323. 
 People v. Snyder (41 N. Y. 397), 229, 
 
 238, 239. 
 People v. Soto (49 Cal. 69), 89. 
 People v. Spies (122 III. 1), 346. 
 People v. Stanley (17 Cal. 113), 68, 
 
 69. 
 People v. Stewart (28 Cal. 395), 10. 
 People v. Stewart (75 Mich. 21), 91. 
 People v. Stewart (97 111. 123), 240. 
 People v. Stewart (97 Cal. 238 ; 32 
 
 Pac. Rep. 8), 52. 
 People v. Suppiger (103 111. 434), 
 
 239. 
 People v. Sweethand (77 Mich. 53), 
 
 89, 142. 
 People v. Taylor (59 Cal. 640), 101. 
 People v. Taylor (93 Mich. 638), 89. 
 People v. Taylor (138 N. Y. 398), 202, 
 
 249. . 
 People v. Teague (11 S. E. Rep. 665; 
 
 106 N. C. 576), 354a. 
 People v. Thomas (92 Cal. 506), 340. 
 People v. Thompson (85 Cal. 598), 96, 
 
 359. 
 People v. Thornton (74 Cal. 48), 343. 
 People v. Tice (131 N. Y. 651), 346. 
 People v. Tiley (84 Cal. 651), 354. 
 People v. Townsend (5 How. Pr., 
 
 N. Y, 315), 315. 
 People v. Travers (83 Cal. 238), 249. 
 People v. Turcott (65 Cal. 126), 334. 
 People v. Tyler (35 Cal. 553), 349. 
 People v. Urquidas (96 Cal. 239), 
 
 378. 
 People v. Vanderhoof (39 N. W. Rep. 
 
 28; 71 Mich. 158), 189. 
 People v. Van Houter (38 Hun, 168), 
 
 234. 
 People v. Van Tassell (64 Hun, 444), 
 
 284. 
 People v. Vedder (98 N. Y. 630), 196. 
 People v. Vellarde (59 Cal. 457), 110. 
 People v. Vernon (35 Cal. 49), 57.
 
 TAT.I.K OF CASES. 
 
 CXXXIX 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 People v. Warner (51 Hun, 53), 832. 
 People v. Warner (5 Wend. 273), 22. 
 People v. Webster (N. Y., 1893, 34 
 
 X. E. Rep. 730), 350, 354. 
 People v. Weldon (111 N. Y. 569), 
 
 229, 367. 
 People v. Whipple (9 Cowen, 707), 
 
 323. 
 People v. White (62 Hun, 111), 227. 
 People v. White (14 Wend., N. Y., 
 
 Ill), 367. 
 People v. Willard (92 Cal. 4S2), 334. 
 People v. Williams (18 Cal. 187), 340. 
 People v. Williams (64 Cal. 87), 30, 
 
 239. 
 People v. Wilson (62 Hun, 61S), 141. 
 People v. Wilson (109 N. Y. 345), 192. 
 People v. Wong (10 Pac. Rep. 275; 
 
 69 Cal. 180), 6. 
 People v. Wood (126 N. Y. 219; 27 
 
 N. E. Rep. 362), 167, 334. 
 People v. Wood (131 N. Y. 617), 
 
 239. 
 People v. Wreden (59 Cal. 392), 197. 
 People v. Wright (90 Mich. 362), 39, 
 
 384. 
 People v. Young (31 Cal. 568), 176. 
 People v. Yut Ling (74 Cal. 569), 344. 
 People's Nat. Gas Co. v. Braddock 
 
 Wire Co. (155 Pa. St. 22; 25 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 749), 206. 
 People's Nat. Gas Co. v. Fidelity Tit. 
 
 & Trust Co. (150 Pa. St. 8; 24 
 
 Atl. Rep. 339), 206. 
 Peoria, etc. Co. v. Rice (144 111. 227; 
 
 33 N. E. Rep. 951), 202. 
 Peoria, etc. Co. v. Scott (116 III. 401), 
 
 242. 
 Pepper v. Barnett (22 Gratt, Va., 
 
 405), 139. 
 Perego v. Purdy (1 Hilton, 269), 80. 
 Perine v. Grand Lodge A. O. U. W. 
 
 (Minn., 1893, 53 N. W. Rep. 367), 
 
 250. 
 Perishable Freight T. Co. v. O'Neill 
 
 (41 111. App. 423), 350. 
 Perkins v. Augusta Ins. Co. (10 Gray, 
 
 812), 198. 
 J 
 
 Perkins v. Burnett (2 Root, Conn., 
 
 30), 70. 
 Perkins v. Concord Road (44 N. II. 
 
 223), 71. 
 Perkins v. Graham (18 Ala. 822), 71. 
 Perkins v. Perkins (39 N. II. 163), 
 
 231. 250, 253. 
 Perkins v. Plunkett (74 Me. 328), 
 
 24. 
 Perkins v. Rogers (35 Ind. 124), 238. 
 Perkins v. State (132 Mass. 217), 188. 
 Perkins v. State (4 Ind. 222), 170. 
 Perkins v. Stickney (132 Mass. 217), 
 
 188. 
 Perkins v. Woodfolk (8 Baxt. 411), 
 
 240, 241. 
 Perrin v. Wells (155 Pa. St. 299), 
 
 122. 
 Perrine v. Cooley (39 N. J. L. 449), 
 
 209. 
 Perritt v. Couch (5 Bush, 201), 237. 
 Perry v. Binney (103 Mass. 153), 210. 
 Perry v. Boomhauer (17 N. Y. S. 
 
 890), 282. 
 Perry v. Gerbeau (5 Mart,, N. S., 18, 
 
 19). 81. 
 Perry v. Gibson (1 Ad. & El. 48), 
 
 339. 
 Perry v. Jensen (21 Atl. Rep. 866; 28 
 
 W. N. C. 126), 187. 
 Perry v. Scott (109 N. C. 374), 220. 
 Perry v. Simpson Mfg. Co. (40 Conn. 
 
 313), 74. 
 Perry v. State (87 Ala. 30), 6. 
 Perry v. State (94 Ala. 25), 10. 
 Perse v. Perse (5 H. L. Cas. 671), 
 
 2S7. 
 Person v. Grier (66 N. Y. 124), 286. 
 Pete v. State (44 La. Ann. 14), 52. 
 Peterman v. Laws (6 Leigh, Va., 
 
 523), 149. 
 Peters v. Bourneau (22111. App. 177), 
 
 11. 
 Peters v. Jones (35 Iowa, 412), 82, 
 
 83. 
 Peters v. Lawson (66 Tex. 336), 74. 
 Peters v. Porter (60 How. Pr. } N. Y., 
 
 422), 222.
 
 cxl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Peters v. Warren Ins. Co. (3 Sumn. 
 
 389). 158. 
 Petersen v. Siglinger (S. D., 1893, 52 
 
 N. W. Rep. 10G0), 343. 
 Peterson v. Grover (20 Me. 463), 223. 
 Petrie v. Fitzgerald (1 Daly, N. Y., 
 
 401), 287. 
 Petrie v. Petrie (6 N. Y. S. 831 ; 53 
 
 Hun, G38), 309. 
 Petrie v. Railway Co. (29 S. C. 303; 
 
 7S. E. Rep. 815), 121. 
 Petrie v. Williams (68 Hun, 589), 
 
 67. 
 Pettit v. May (34 Wis. 666), 242. 
 Peugh v. Davis (96 U. S. 332), 223. 
 Peyroud v. Howard (7 Pet. 342), 239. 
 Peyser v. Myers (63 Hun, 634), 56. 
 Pharo v. Beadleston (21 N. Y. S. 
 
 989), 370. 
 Phelps v. Foot (1 Conn. 387), 51. 
 Phelps v. George's Creek (60 Md. 
 
 536), 73a. 
 Phelps v. James (Iowa, 1893, 53 
 
 N. W. Rep. 74), 73a. 
 Phelps v. Railroad Co. (94 111. 548), 
 
 83. 
 Phelps, In re (98 N. Y. 267), 2C9. 
 Phenix Ins. Co. v. Bowersox (6 Ohio 
 
 Cir. Ct. 1), 199. 
 Phenix Ins. Co. v. Copeland (86 Ala. 
 
 551). 199. 
 Phettiplace v. N. Pac. R. Co. (84 
 
 Wis. 412; 54 N. W. Rep. 1092), 
 
 20. 
 Phifer v. Erwin (100 N. C. 59; 6 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 672), 350. 
 Philadelphia v. Newcumet (11 Pa. 
 
 Co. Ct. Rep. 504), 150a. 
 Philadelphia, etc. Co. v. Henrice (92 
 
 Pa. St. 431), 13. 
 Philadelphia, etc. Co. v. Hickman 
 
 (28 Pa. St. 318), 133. 
 Philadelphia, etc. Co. v. Howard (13 
 
 How.,U. S., 307), 123. 
 Philadelphia, etc. Co. v. Stimpson (4 
 
 Peters, 461), 350. 
 Philadelphia R. Co. v. Lehman (56 
 
 Md. 209), 237. 
 
 Philips v. Elwell (14 Ohio St. 240), 
 
 150a. 
 Phillips v. Chappell (16 Ga. 16), 215. 
 Phillips v. Huntington (35 W. Va. 
 
 406), 33. 
 Phillips v. Kingfield (1 Appleton, 
 
 375), 349. 
 Phillips v. Marblehead (148 Mass. 
 
 329), 340. 
 Phillips v. McGrath (62 Wis. 124), 
 
 309. 
 Phillips v. McNab (9 N. Y. S. 526), 
 
 199. 
 Phillips v. Smith (110 Mass. 61), 76. 
 Phillips v. State (22 Tex. App. 229), 
 
 384. 
 Phillips v. Terry (3 Abb. Dec, N. 
 
 Y., 607), 198. 
 Phillips v. Trow. Fur. Co. (86 Ga. 
 
 699), 130. 
 Philpot v. Taylor (75 111. 309), 69. 
 Phipard v. Phipard (55 Hun, 433), 
 
 246. 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. of London v. Freed- 
 
 man (Tex., 1893, 19 S. W. Rep. 
 
 1010), 369. 
 Piatt v. United States (22 Wall. 496), 
 
 215. 
 Pickard v. Baily (6 Fost., N. H., 152), 
 
 143. 
 Pickard v. Bryant (52 N. W. Rep. 
 
 788; 92 Mich. 430), 337, 340, 348. 
 Pickering v. Fisk (6 Vt. 102), 242. 
 Pickering v. Pickering (50 N. H. 349), 
 
 221. 
 Pickett v. Abney (81 Tex. 645; 19 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 859), 35. 
 Pickett v. Ferguson (45 Ark. 177), 
 
 205. 
 Pickett v. Nelson (79 Wis. 9), 220. 
 Pidcock v. Potter (68 Pa. St. 342), 
 
 192. 
 Pierce v. Andrews (6 Cush. 4), 84. 
 Pierce v. Brewer (43 Vt. 292), 208. 
 Pierce v. Goldsberg (35 Ind. 317), 79. 
 Pierce v. Indseth (106 U. S. 555), 143, 
 
 212. 
 . Pierce v. Jacobs (7 Mackey, 498), 53.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cxli 
 
 Beferences are to sections. 
 
 Pierce v. Newton (13 Gray, 528), 350. 
 Pierce v. Northey (14 Wis. 9), 139a. 
 Pierce v. Pierce (60 N. H. 355), 77. 
 Pierce v. Roberts (57 Conn. 40), 68. 
 Pierce v. State (Tex., 1893, 22 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 587), 6. 
 Pierce v. Stevens (30 Me. 184), 212. 
 Pierce v. Ted well (81 Ala. 299), 212. 
 Pierce v. Traver (13 Nev. 526), 223. 
 Pierce v. Wood (23 N. H. 579), 69. 
 Pierson v. Conley (Mich., 1893, 55 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 387), 153. 
 Pierson v. Hooker (3 Johns., N. Y., 
 
 68), 69. 
 Pierson v. People (79 N. Y. 424), 172, 
 
 202. 
 Pike v. Gage (9 Fost., N. H„ 461), 
 
 79. 
 Pike v. State (49 N. H. 399), 186. 
 Pillsbnry v. Locke (33 N. H. 96), 217. 
 Pilcher v. Kerr (7 La. Ann. 244), 70. 
 Pilcher v. Ligon (91 Ky. 228), 154. 
 Pinson v. Ivey (1 Yerg. 296), 222. 
 Piper v. True (36 Cal. 60G), 222. 
 Pinney v. Cahill (48 Mich. 584), 189. 
 Pinney v. Will (27 Minn. 280), 197. 
 Pittman v. State (Ga., 1893, 17 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 856), 9, 332. 
 Pitton v. Walter (1 Stra. 162), 146. 
 Pitts v. Brown (49 Vt. 83), 126. 
 Pitts v. Emmons (92 Mich. 542), 126. 
 Pitts v. Lewis (81 Iowa, 51 ; 46 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 739), 124. 
 Pitts, In re (Wis., 1893, 55 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 149), 169. 
 Pittsburgh, etc. Co. v. McGrath (115 
 
 111. 172), 123. 
 Pittsburgh, etc. Co. v. Reich (101 
 
 111. 157), 198. 
 Pittsburgh & L. S. Iron Co. v. Kirk- 
 
 patrick (92 Mich. 252), 73a. 
 Plake v. State (121 Ind. 433), 231. 
 Planet, etc. Co. v. Railroad Co. (115 
 
 Mo. 613; 22 S. W. Rep. 616). 83. 
 Plank-road Co. v. Wetsel (21 Baib. 
 
 56), 128. 
 Piano Co. v. Root (N. D., 1893, 54 
 
 N. W. Rep. 924), 234. 
 
 Piano Mfg. Co. v. Frawley (08 Wis. 
 
 577; 32 N. W. Rep. 768), 170. 
 Plant v. Condit (22 Ark. 454), 208. 
 Plant v. McEwen (4 Conn. 544), 73. 
 Platner v. Plainer (78 N. Y. 90), 66. 
 
 70. 
 Piatt v. Munroe (34 Barb., N. Y., 
 
 293), 386. 
 Platto v. Gettelman (Wis., 1893, 55 
 
 N. W. Rep. 167), 82. 
 Plaxton v. Dare (10 B. & C. 17), 116. 
 Pleasant v. State (15 Ark. 624), 330. 
 Pledger v. State (77 Ga. 242), 332. 
 Plumer v. Currier (53 N. H. 287), 76. 
 Plummer v. Gould (92 Mich. 1), 210. 
 Plunkett v. Cobbett (29 How. St. Tr. 
 
 71, 72), 175. 
 Plyer v. German Am. Ins. Co. (121 
 
 N. Y. 689), 351. 
 Poe v. State (10 Lea, Tenn., 673), 5. 
 Poignard v. Smith (8 Pick. 278), 301. 
 Pole v. Rogers (3 Bing. N. C. 780), 
 
 359. 
 Polk v. Butterfield (9 Colo. 325), 242. 
 Polk v. State (36 Ark. 117), 195. 
 Pollard v. Seybourn (1 Hagg. 75), 202. 
 Polleys v. Ocean Ins. Co. (14 Me. 
 
 141), 73a. 
 Pollock v Glassell (2 Gratt. 439), 210. 
 Pollock v. Warwick (104 N. C. 638), 
 
 223. 
 Poison v. State (Ind., 1893, 35 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 907), 168. 
 Polston v. See (46 Iowa, 30), 6. 
 Pomeroy v. Bailey (43 N. H. 118), 
 
 208. 
 Pomeroy v. Com. (2 Va. Cas. 343), 
 
 23. 
 Pool v. Gramling (88 Ga. 653), 232. 
 Pool v. Morris (29 Ga. 374), 67. 
 Poole v. East Tenn. etc. Co. (Ga., 
 
 1893, 17 S. E. Rep. 267), 56. 
 Poole v. Richardson (3 Mass. 330), 
 
 197. 
 Poor v. Oakman (154 Mass. 316), 262. 
 Poorman v. Miller (44 Cal. 269), 31. 
 Pope v. Allen (90 N. Y. 298), 309. 
 Pope v. Allis (115 U. S. 363), 76.
 
 cxlii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Pope v. Harrison (16 Lea, Term., 82), 
 
 232. 
 Pope v. Negus (14 Civ. Pro. Eep. 
 
 406), 285. 
 Porter v. Christian (88 Va. 730), 382. 
 Porter v. Ferguson (4 Fla. 103), 130. 
 Porter v. Nelson (121 Pa. St. 640), 
 
 309. 
 Porter v. Sherman Co. Banking Co. 
 
 (36 Neb. 271 ; 55 N. W. Rep. 231), 
 
 380. 
 Porter v. Seiler (23 Pa. St. 424), 9. 
 Porter v. State (76 Ga. 658), 324. 
 Porter v. State (2 Ind. 435), 330. 
 Porter v. State (55 Ala. 93), 6, 90. 
 Porter v. Still (63 Miss. 357), 254. 
 Porter v. Waring (69 N. Y. 250), 242. 
 Porter v. Wilson et al. (13 Pa. St. 
 
 641), 132. 
 Posey v. Patton (109 N. C. 455), 343. 
 Potter v. Baldwin (133 Mass. 427), 51. 
 Potter v. Deyo (19 Wend. 361), 250. 
 Potter v. Luther (3 Johns. 431). 244. 
 Potter v. Merchants' Bank (28 N. Y. 
 
 641), 199. 
 Potter v. Ware (1 Cush. 519, 524), 
 
 312. 
 Potter's Appeal (53 Mich. 106), 222. 
 Potts v. House (6 Ga. 324), 197. 
 Potts v. Jones (110 Pa. St. 48), 11. 
 Potts v. Mayer (86 N. Y. 302), 308. 
 Potts v. State (26 Tex. App. 663; 14 
 
 S. W. Rep. 446), 93. 
 Potwin v. Johnson (108 111. 70), 242. 
 Poucher v. State (98 N. Y. 422), 230. 
 Pound v. State (43 Ga. 88), 10. 
 Powell v. Brunner (86 Ga. 531), 67. 
 Powell v. Manson (3 Mason, 347), 215. 
 Powell v. Railroad Co. (77 Ga. 192), 
 
 193. 
 Powell v. State (25 Ala. 28), 197. 
 Powell v. Turner (139 Mass. 97), 373. 
 Powell v. Waters (17 Johns. 176), 
 
 237. 
 Powers v. Braley (41 Mo. App. 556), 
 
 229. 
 Powers v. McKenzie (80 Tenn. 167), 
 
 346. 
 
 Powers v. People (42 111. App. 427), 
 
 56. 
 Powers v. Presgroves (38 Miss. 227), 
 
 10. 
 Powers v. Savin (28 Abb. N. C. 463), 
 
 60. 
 Powers v. Sheperd (21 N. H. 60), 360. 
 Powers v. State (80 Ind. 77), 348. 
 Powers v. State (87 Ind. 144), 101. 
 Powers v. State (44 Ga. 209), 324. 
 Prairie Sch. Tp. v. Haselen (N. D., 
 
 1893, 55 N. W. Rep. 938), 211. 
 Prather v. Johnson (3 Har. & J., Md., 
 
 487), 142. 
 Prather v. Wilkins (68 Tex. 187), 33. 
 Pratt v. Andrews (4 Comst., N. Y., 
 
 493), 10. 
 Pratt v. California M. Co. (24 Fed. 
 
 Rep. S69), 222. 
 Pratt v. Elkins (b0 N. Y. 198), 309. 
 Pratt v. King (1 Oreg. 49), 148. 
 Pratt v. White (132 Mass. 477), CO. 
 Prell v. McDonald (7 Kan. 446), 
 
 143a, 242. 
 Prendible v. Conn. R. R. Co. (Mass., 
 
 1893, 35 N. E. Rep. 675), 198. 
 Prentiss v. Bates (88 Mich. 567), 188, 
 
 222. 
 Prentiss v. Bates (93 Mich. 234), 248. 
 Prentiss v. Parks (65 Me. 559), 232. 
 Prescot v. Ganser (34 Iowa, 175), 140. 
 Presley v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (22 
 
 Atl. Rep. 554), 8. 
 Prest v. Mersereau (10 N. J. L. 268), 
 
 60. 
 Preston v. Hall (23 Gratt., Va., 600), 
 
 268. 
 Preston v. Harvey (2 H. & M. 55), 
 
 160. 
 Prewet v. Coopwood (30 Miss. 369), 
 
 67. 
 Prewet v. Land (36 Miss. 495), 67. 
 Prewitt v. Lambert (Colo., 1893, 34 
 
 Pac. Rep. 684), 309. 
 Price v. Archuleta (17 Colo. 288; 29 
 
 Pac. Rep. 460), 249. 
 Price v. Conn. M. L. Ins. Co. (48 Mo. 
 
 App. 281), 237.
 
 TATiLE OF CASES. 
 
 CX.lll 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Price v. Grover (40 Md. 202), 222. 
 Price v. Hartson (44 N. Y. 94), 193. 
 Price v. Kane (112 Mo. 412), 246. 
 Price v. Littlewood (3 Camp. 288), 
 
 114. 
 Price v. Page (24 Mo. 05), 239. 
 Price r. People (131 III. 223), 283. 
 Price v. Perkins (2 Dev. Eq., N. C, 
 
 250), 315. 
 Price v. Powell (3 N. Y. 322), 198. 
 Price v. Richmond & D. R. Co. (S. C, 
 
 1893, 17 S. E. Rep. 732), 198. 
 Price v. State (72 Ga. 441), 102. 
 Pride v. Lunt (19 Me. 115), 220. k 
 Priest v. State (10 Neb. 393), 93, 97. 
 Prigden v. Green (80 Ga. 737 ; 7 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 97), 108. 
 Prill v. Denhead (8 Sim. 279), 158. 
 Primm v. Stewart (7 Tex. 178), 53. 
 Prince v. Sanio (7 Ad. & El. G27), 
 
 341. 
 Prince v. Skellin (71 Me. 361), 238, 
 
 240. 
 Prince v. Smith (4 Mass. 455), 60. 
 Prince v. State (72 Ga. 441), 102. 
 Printup v. Mitchell (17 Ga. 558), 129. 
 Printz v. People (42 Mich. 144), 199. 
 Prior v. State (Ala., 1893, 13 S. Rep. 
 
 681), 346. 
 Pritchard v. Norwood (155 Mass. 
 
 539), 35. 
 Pritchard v. Pritchard (69 Wis. 373), 
 
 309. 
 Pritchard v. Smith (77 Ga. 463), 128. 
 Probert v. McDonald (S. D., 1892, 51 
 
 N. W. Rep. 212), 250. 
 Probert v. Phipps (149 Mass. 258), 201. 
 Procter v. Cole (66 Ind. 576), 205. 
 Proctor v. Old Colony R. Co. (154 
 
 Mass. 251), 74. 
 Proctor v. Snodgrass (6 Ohio Cir. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 547), 206. 
 Propeller Commerce, In re (1 Black, 
 
 580), 158. 
 Proper v. State (Wis., 1893, 53 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 1035), 335. 
 Propson v. Lathem (80 Wis. 608), 8. 
 Prouty v. Ruggles (2 Story, 199), 360. 
 
 Prov. etc. Co. v. Worcester (155 
 
 Mass. 35), 8. 
 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Fredericks (41 
 
 111. App. 19), 73. 
 Pryor v. Roburn (16 Ark. 671). 160. 
 Publishers' Ass'n v. Fisher (95 Mich. 
 
 274 ; 54 N. W. Rep. 759), 60. 
 Pucci v. Barney (21 N. Y. S. 1099), 
 
 216. 
 Puget Sound R. Co. v. Ingersoll (4 
 
 Wash. St. 675), 380. 
 Pugh v. Ayres (47 Mo. App. 490), 
 
 367. 
 Pugh v. Good (19 Oreg. 85; 23 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 827), 276. 
 Pugh v. Little Rock (35 Ark. 75), 
 
 143a. 
 Pugh v. State (2 Head, 227), 244. 
 Pullen v. Pullen (43 N. J. Eq. 139), 
 
 322, 341, 356. 
 Pulley v. Hilton (12 Price, 625), 142. 
 Pulliam v. State (6 S. Rep. 839; 88 
 
 Ala. 1). 101. 
 Pullman v. Corning (14 Barb. 174; 9 
 
 N. Y. 93), 199. 
 Pullman v. Smith (79 Tex. 468), 52. 
 Pureed v. Miner (4 Wall. 517), 262. 
 Purdy v. Delavan (1 Caines, 304), 77. 
 Puryear v. Com. (83 Va. 51), 320. 
 Puryear v. State (63 Ga. 692), 124. 
 Putnam v. Bond (100 Mass. 58), 217. 
 Putnam v. Wadley (40 111. 346), 139. 
 Puyar v. Reese (46 Tenn. 21), 197. 
 Pyburn v. State (84 Ga. 193), 283. 
 Pye v. Bakke (Minn., 1893, 55 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 904), 339, 340. 
 
 Q, 
 
 Quackenbush v. Railroad Co. (73 
 
 Iowa, 458), 145. 
 Quaife v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. (48 
 
 Wis. 513), 52, 192. 
 Queen v. Bell (22 N. Y. S. 398), 377. 
 Queener v. Morrow (1 Coldw., Tenn., 
 
 123), 71. 
 Queen Ins. Co. v. Studebaker (117 
 
 Ind. 416), 334.
 
 cxliv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Queen's Case (2 Brod. & Bing. 281), 
 
 315. 
 Querry v. White (1 Bibb, Ky., 271), 
 
 211. 
 Quigley v. De Hass (93 Pa. St. 292), 
 
 217. 
 Quigley v. Turner (150 Mass. 108), 
 
 322. 
 Quimby v. Boyd (8 Cat. 194), 135. 
 Quin v. State (46 Ind. 459), 234. 
 Quinland v. State (16 S. W. Rep. 258; 
 
 29 Tex. App. 401), 89. 
 Quinland v. Utica (74 N. Y. 603), 8. 
 Quinn v. Roath (37 Conn. 16), 223. 
 Quinn v. Halbert (57 Vt. 178), 124. 
 Quinn v. Higgins (63 Wis. 664), 188, 
 
 193. 
 Quinn v. People (15 N. E. Rep. 46; 
 
 123 111. 333), 346. 
 
 R. 
 
 Rabsuhl v. Lack (35 Mo. 316), 208. 
 Rackleff v. Norton (19 Me. 274), 136. 
 Radcliff v. Insurance Co. (7 Johns. 
 
 38), 144. 
 Ragan v. Kansas City & S. E. R. 
 
 Co. (Ill Mo. 456), 199. 
 Ragland v. Wynn (37 Ala. 32), 240. 
 Rabin v. Deig (121 Ind. 283), 73a. 
 Raiford v. French (11 Rich., S. C, 
 
 367), 73a. 
 Railing v. Com. (113 Pa. St. 37), 
 
 101. 
 Railroad Co. v. Chenoa (43 III. 209), 
 
 242. 
 Railroad Co. v. Clowdis (90 Ga. 258; 
 
 17 S. E. Rep. 88), 56. 
 Railroad Co. v. Davis (1 Gray, 88), 
 
 350. 
 Railroad Co. v. Farmer (Ala., 1893, 
 
 12 S. Rep. 86), 24. 
 Railroad Co. v. Finlay (38 Kan. 550 ; 
 
 16 Pac. Rep. 951), 185. 
 Railroad Co. v. Hickman (28 Pa. St. 
 
 318), 139. 
 Railroad Co. v. Johnson (Ga., 1893, 
 
 16 S. E Rep. 49), 143a. 
 
 Railroad Co. v. Levy (Ind., 1893, 32 
 
 N. E. Rep. 815), 73a. 
 Railroad Co. v. Martin (112 111. 16), 
 
 193. 
 Railroad Co. v. Owen (90 Ga. 265; 15 
 
 S. E. Rep. 853), 250. 
 Railroad Co. v. Plumas Co. (37 Cal. 
 
 354), 242. 
 Railroad Co. v. Randall (85 Ga. 297), 
 
 341. 
 Railway Co. v. Rhea (44 Ark. 258, 
 
 264), 249. 
 Railroad Co. v. Selby (47 Ind. 471), 8. 
 Railroad Co. v. Shornter (12 La. Ann. 
 
 136), 148. 
 Railroad Co. v. Ward (35 111. App. 
 
 423), 73a. 
 Railsback v. Patton (34 Neb. 490 ; 52 
 
 N. W. Rep. 277), 225. 
 Rainey v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co. (23 
 
 N. Y. S. 80; 68 Hun, 495), 308. 
 Rains v. State (88 Ala. 91), 6, 354a. 
 Ralfe v. Dart (2 Taunt. 521), 146. 
 Ralston v. Miller (3 Rand., Va., 44), 
 
 115. 
 Ralston v. Moore (83 Ky. 571), 136. 
 Rambler v. Tryson (7 S. & R. 90), 
 
 197. 
 Ramsbottom v. Phelps (18 Conn. 
 
 278), 69. 
 Ramsey v. Hurley (72 Tex. 1194), 
 
 50. 
 Ramson v. Adams (17 Johns., N. Y., 
 
 130), 229. 
 Ranch v. N. Y, L. & W. R. R. Co. 
 
 (2 N. Y. S. 108), 199. 
 Rand v. Hanson (154 Mass. 88; 28 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 6), 148. 
 Randall v. Baird (66 Mich. 312; 33 
 
 N. W. Rep. 506), 24. 
 Randall v. Gurney (3 B. & A. 252), 
 
 286. 
 Randall v. Lynch (2 Camp. 352, 357), 
 
 82. 
 Randall v. Packard (20 N. Y. S. 716), 
 
 199, 373. 
 Randall v. State (32 N. E. Rep. 305; 
 
 132 Ind. 539), 340, 349.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cxlv 
 
 Beferences are to sections. 
 
 Randegger v. Ehrhardt(51 III. 101), 
 
 70. 
 Randell v. Burtis (57 Tex. 362), 148. 
 Randell v. Hodges (3 Bland, 47), 150. 
 Randolph v. Adams (2 W. Va. 519), 
 
 198. 
 Raner v. Tiinerson (51 Barb. 517), 
 
 84. 
 Rank v. Grote (110 N. Y. 12), 213, 
 
 268, 309. 
 Rankin v. Bell (19 S. W. Rep. 874, 
 
 Tex., 1892), 229. 
 Rankin v. Hannan (38 Ohio St. 438), 
 
 308. 
 Rankin v. Wallace (Ky., 1890, 14 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 79), 208. 
 Ranson v. State (40 Ark. 176). 321. 
 Raper v. Birkbeck (15 East, 17), 12S. 
 Rapley v. Klugh (S. C, 1894, 18 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 680), 220. 
 Rapple, In re (66 Hun, 558), 222. 
 Raridan v. Railroad (69 Iowa, 527), 
 
 237. 
 Rash v. State (61 Ala. 89). 192, 194. 
 Rates v. Robinson (8 Iowa, 318), 357. 
 Rathburn v. Acker (18 Barb. 375), 
 
 279. 
 Rattarre v. Chapman (79 Ga. 574), 
 
 349. 
 Ravisies v. Alston (5 Ala. 297), 12S. 
 Rawls v. Am. L. Ins. Co. (36 Barb. 
 
 357; 27 N. Y. 282), 194, 200. 
 Rawson v. Knight (73 Me. 340), 309. 
 Ray v. Ray (98 N. C. 566), 188. 
 Ray v. Simmons (11 R. I. 266), 265. 
 Ray v. State (1 Greene, Iowa, 316), 
 
 323. 
 Ray v. Stewart (105 N. C. 472), 142. 
 Raymond v. Coffey (5 Oreg. 132), 
 
 220. 
 Raymond v. Cottier (3 Pick. 293, 
 
 296), 143. 
 Raymond v. Krauskopf (Iowa, 1893, 
 
 54 N. W. Rep. 432), 214. 
 Raymond v. Raymond (10 Cash., 
 
 Mass., 134), 214. 
 Raynes v. Bennett (114 Mass. 425), 
 
 68. 
 
 Raynham v. Canton (3 Pick. 233), 
 143. 
 
 Ray nor v. Norton (3 Mich. 210), 337. 
 Rea v. Scully (76 Iowa, 343), 148. 
 Read v. Hurd (7 Wend., N. Y., 408), 
 
 225. 
 Read v. Woodruffe (24 Beav. 421), 
 
 305. 
 Reavis v. Co well (56 Cal. 583), 356. 
 Reber v. Herring (115 Pa. St. 599; 8 
 
 Atl. Rep. 800), 193. 
 Record v. Village (46 Hun, 418), 178. 
 Redell v. Railroad Co. (44 N. Y. 367), 
 
 188. 
 Redd v. Murray (24 Pac. Rep. 341 ; 93 
 
 Cal. 48), 210. 
 Redden v. Teft (48 Kan. 302 ; 29 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 157), 350. 
 Reddick v. State (21 Tex. App. 267), 
 
 322. 
 Redding v. Wright (49 Minn. 322), 
 
 67, 199. 
 Red f earn v. Douglas (35 S. C. 569), 
 
 382. 
 Red field v. Redfield (110 N. Y. 674), 
 
 309. 
 Redford v. Peggy (6 Rand., Va., 316), 
 
 139a. 
 Redman v. Graham (80 N. C. 231), 
 
 83. 
 Redstrake v. Insurance Co. (44 N. J. 
 
 Eq. 294), 24. 
 Reed v. Dick (8 Watts, Pa., 479), 198. 
 Reed v. Kemp (16 111. 445), 128. 
 Reed v. New (39 Kan. 727), 369. 
 Reed v. Newcomb (19 Atl. Rep. 367), 
 
 82. 
 Reed v. Penn. Ry. Co. (56 Fed. Rep. 
 
 184), 192. 
 Reed v. Stapp (52 Fed. Rep. 641 : 3 
 
 C. C. A. 244; 9 U. S. App. 34), 
 
 369. 
 Reed v. State (16 Ark. 499), 114. 
 Reed v. State (16 S. W. Rep. 819; 54 
 
 Ark. 621), 229. 
 Reed v. Wilson (61 Hun, 623), 159. 
 Reed v. Wilson (41 N. J. L. 29), 145, 
 
 242.
 
 cxlvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Reed v. Walters (3 M. & W. 577), 
 
 106. 
 Reese v. Coffey (Ind., 1893, 32 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 720), 362. 
 Reese v. Harris (27 Ala. 301), 230. 
 Reese v. Murnane (31 Pac. Rep. 1027 ; 
 
 5 Wash. St. 372), 117. 
 Reese v. Reese (90 Pa. St. 89), 139a. 
 Reeves v. Townsend (2 Zab., N. J., 
 
 39), 232. 
 Reg. v. Adderburg (5 Q. B. 187), 72. 
 Reg. v. Arnold (8 C. & P. 622), 90. 
 Reg. v. Atwood (5 Cox, C. C. 322), 
 
 90. 
 Reg. v. Baldy (16 Jar. 599), 89. 
 Reg. v. Bate (11 Cox, C. C. 686), 90. 
 Reg. v. Bedingfield (14 Cox, C. C. 
 
 341), 57. 
 Reg. v. Bird (17 Cox, C. C. 387), 24. 
 Reg. v. Boulter (16 Jur. 135), 382. 
 Reg. v. Braithwaite (8 Cox, C. C. 
 
 254), 382. 
 Reg. v. Burke (8 Cox, 44), 354. 
 Reg. v. Butler (2 Car. & Kir. 221), 
 
 93. 
 Reg. v. Chappie (9 C. & P. 355), 281. 
 Reg. v. Child (5 Cox, C. C. 197), 124. 
 Reg. v. Farler (8 C. & P. 106), 324. 
 Reg. v. Garbott (1 Demo, C. C. 236), 
 
 354. 
 Reg. v. Garner (12 Jur. 944), 89. 
 Reg. v. Garside (2 Lew. C. C. 38), 
 
 323. 
 Reg. v. Hill (15 Jur. 470), 317. 
 Reg. v. Holmes (1 C. & K. 248), 90. 
 Reg. v. Jarvis (L. R., 1 C. C. R, C. 
 
 B. 96), 89. 
 Reg. v. Jones (1 Den. Cr. Cas. 166), 
 
 173. 
 Reg. v. Kitson (20 Eng. L. & Eq. 
 
 509), 126. 
 Reg. v. Lay ton (4 Cox, C. C. 149, 155), 
 
 231. 
 Reg. v. Martin (L. R. 1 Cr. Cas. Res. 
 
 378), 344. 
 Reg. v. Moore (61 Law J. Mag. 80; 
 
 17 Cox, C. C. 458), 315. 
 Reg. v. Perkins (9 C. & P. 395), 102. 
 
 Reg. v. Richardson (3 F. & F. 693), 
 
 175. 
 Reg. v. Shaw (10 Cox, C. C. 66), 382. 
 Reg. v. Sloman (1 Dowl. 618), 284. 
 Reg. v. Sparks (1 F. & F. 388), 323. 
 Reg. v. Steele (12 Cox, C. C. 168), 101. 
 Reg. v. Still (30 U. C. C. P. 30), 196. 
 Reg. v. Young (19 Cox, C. C. 371), 
 
 324. 
 Reherd v. Clem (86 Va. 374), 309. 
 Reich v. Berdel (120 111. 499; 11 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 913), 30. 
 Reid v. Hodgson (1 Cranch, TJ. S., 
 
 491), 139. 
 Reid v. Louisiana, etc. Co. (29 La. 
 
 Ann. 388), 69. 
 Reid v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co. (145 N. 
 
 Y. 574), 52. 
 Reid v. State (50 Ga. 536), 249. 
 Reifsnyder v. Meter Co. (Iowa, 1894, 
 
 57 N. W. Rep. 692), 198. 
 Reigard v. O'Neill (38 111. 400), 222. 
 Reiley v. Haynes (38 Kan. 259), 367. 
 Reily v. Com. (Ky., 1893, 22 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 222), 9, 10. 
 Reineman v. Blair (96 Pa. St. 155), 
 
 74. 
 Reinhart v. Lugo (86 Cal. 395), 150a. 
 Reinhold v. State (130 Ind. 467), 334. 
 Reis v. Grafman (56 Mo. 434), 83. 
 Reiter v. Miller (86 N. Y. 507), 231. 
 Remer v. Long Island R. Co. (1 N. 
 
 Y. S. 124; 48 Hun, 352), 340. 
 Remington v. Dougherty (81 N. Y. 
 
 474), 135. 
 Remy v. Mun. No. 2 (12 La. Ann. 
 
 500, 503), 344. 
 Renaud v. Abbott (116 U. S. 277), 
 
 242. 
 Renier v. Hurlburt (50 N. W. Rep. 
 
 783; 81 Wis. 24), 159. 
 Renihan v. Dennin (103 N. Y. 577), 
 
 178. 
 Renolds v. Rowley (2 La. Ann. 890), 
 
 73a. 
 Rent v. Church (136 N. Y. 10; 32 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 704), 151. 
 Renz v. Stoll (94 Mich. 377), 246.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cxlvii 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Repp v. Wiles (3 Iml. App. 1G7; 29 
 
 N. E. Rep. 441), 74. 
 Reppert v. Colvin (48 Pa. St. 248), 69 
 Republic Bank v. Darragh (.30 Hun, 
 
 N. Y., 29), 314. 
 Respublica v. Cribbs (3 Yeates, 429), 
 
 354. 
 Respublica v. Davis (3 Yeates, 128), 
 
 73. 
 Respublica v. McCarthy (2 Dall. 86, 
 
 88), 93. 
 Reuber v. Crawford (Neb., 1893, 54 
 
 N. W. Rep. 549), 380. 
 Revett v. Braham (4 T. R. 497), 140. 
 Rex v. Aickles (1 Leach, Cr. Cas. 435), 
 
 144. 
 Rex v. Baker (2 M. & Rob. 53), 102. 
 Rex v. Baldry (2 Den. C. C. 430), 90. 
 Rex v. Benson (Camp. 508), 147. 
 Rex v. Brangan (1 Leach, Cr. Cas. 
 
 32), 140. 
 Rex v. Castell Careinion (8 East), 320. 
 Rex v. Clewes (4 C. & P. 221), 90. 
 Rex v. Cotton (3 Campb. 444, 446), 
 
 113. 
 Rex v. Court (7 C. & P. 486), 91. 
 Rex v. Criswell (3 T. R. 721), 122. 
 Rex v. Davis (6 Mod. 74), 320. 
 Rex v. Deeley (1 Moody, Cr. Cas. 
 
 303), 23. 
 Rex v. Derrington (2 C. & P. 418), 
 
 91. 
 Rex v. Dunn (4 C. & P. 543), 96. 
 Rex v. Fletcher (1 Stra. 633), 323. 
 Rex v. Fuller (Russ. & Ry. 30>), 229. 
 Rex v. Gillis (11 Cox, C. C. 69), 323. 
 Rex v. Green (6 C. & R 655), 91. 
 Rex v. Hard wick (11 East, 579), 72, 
 
 96. 
 Rex v. Hardy (24 How. St. Tr. 451, 
 
 753), 69, 175. 
 Rex v. Harrington (4 M. & S. 353), 
 
 13S. 
 Rex v. Harvey (8 Cox, C. C. 103), 313. 
 Rex v. Hayes (2 Cox, C. C. 226), 53. 
 Rex v. Hebdon (2 Stra. 1109), 151. 
 Rex v. Hind (8 Cox, C. C. 300), 102. 
 Rex v. Hunt (3 B. & A. 566), 36. 
 
 Rex v. Inhabitants (3B. & Al 1. 586 
 
 38. 
 Rex v. Inhabitants (1 B. & C. 573), 
 
 107. 
 Rex v. Jarvis (2 M. & R. 40), 324. 
 Rex v. Jenkins (L. R. 1 Cr. Cas. 
 
 187), 101. 
 Rex v. Leefe (2 Campb. 134, 140), 20. 
 Rex v. Lewis (4 Esp. 225), 354. 
 Rex v. Lewis (6 C. & P. 101), 93. 
 Rex v. Lloyd (6 C. & P. 893), 91. 
 Rex v. London (2 Lev. 231), 2S8. 
 Rex v. Mayhew (6 C. & P. 315), 382. 
 Rex v. Mayor (5 T. R. 66), 151. 
 Rex v, Mead (2 B. & C. 605), 102. 
 Rex v. Mellor (Staff. Sum. Assize, 
 
 1833;, 323. 
 Rex v. More (2 Den. C. C. 522), 96. 
 Rex v. Morris (2 Burr. 1189), 147. 
 Rex v. Mosely (1 Mood. 97), 101. 
 Rex v. Noakes (5 C. & P. 326), 324. 
 Rex v. Onslow (12 Cox, 356), 281. 
 Rex v. Reason (1 Str. 499, 500), 103. 
 Rex v. Sadler (4 C. & P. 218), 277. 
 Rex v. Scaife (1 Mood. & R. 551). 
 
 102. 
 Rex v. Simmons (6 C. & P. 540), 91. 
 Rex v. Slaney (5 C. & P. 213; 24 E. 
 
 C. L. 1832), 139. 
 Rex v. Slaughter (8 C. & P. 784). m. 
 Rex v. Spencer (7 C. & P. 776), 96. 
 Rex v. Spilsbury (7 C. & P. 188). 93. 
 Rex v. Walter (7 C. & P. 267), 93. 
 Rex v. Walters (7 C. & P. 250), 23. 
 Rex v. Watson (2 Stark. 136), 175. 
 Rex v. Wedge (5 C. & P. 298), 53. 
 Rex v. Weller (2 Car. & K. 223), 93. 
 Rex v. Wild (1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 452), 
 
 91. 
 Rex v. Woburn (10 East, 395), 288. 
 Rex v. Woodcock (2 Leach, Cr. Cas. 
 
 567), 100, 166. 
 Rexford v. Comstock (3 N. Y. S. 876), 
 
 60. 
 Rexford v. Miller (49 Vt. 319), 231. 
 Reynders v. Hindman (88 Ga. 314), 
 
 74. 
 Reynolds v. Adams (90 111. 134), 222.
 
 cxlviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Reynolds v. Franklin (47 Minn. 145), 
 
 362. 
 Reynolds v. Greenbaum (80 111. 416), 
 
 851. 
 Reynolds v. Jordan (6 Cal. 109), 217. 
 Reynolds v. Reynolds (45 Mo. App. 
 
 622), 262. 
 Reynolds v. Robinson (64 N. Y. 389), 
 
 188, 199. 
 Reynolds v. Robinson (82 N. Y. 103), 
 
 215. 
 Reynolds v. Rowley (3 Rob., La., 261), 
 
 173. 
 Reynolds v. United States (98 U. S. 
 
 155), 120, 121. 
 Reynolds, Ex parte (87 Ala. 138), 
 
 240. 
 Rhine /. Ellen (36 Cal. 362), 208. 
 Rhines v. Baird (41 Pa. St. 356), 
 
 223. 
 Rhode v. Louthain (8 Blackf., Ind., 
 
 413), 268. 
 Rhodes v. Lovvry (54 Ala. 4), 73a. 
 Rhodes v. Metropolis (36 111. App. 
 
 123), 153. 
 Rhodes v. Pray (36 Minn. 395), 309. 
 Rice v. Daly (66 Hun, 62S), 308. 
 Rice v. Hassenpflug (13 N. E. Rep. 
 
 655; 45 Ohio St. 477), 315. 
 Rice v. Keith (63 N. C. 319), 166. 
 Rice v. Mead (22 How. Pr. 440), 237. 
 Rice v. Montgomery (4 Biss. 75), 239. 
 Rice v. Pennypacker (5 Del. Ch. 33), 
 
 246. 
 Ricev. Rice (47 N. J. Eq. 559; 19 
 
 Atl. Rep. 736), 202, 288, 235. 
 Rice v. Shook (27 Ark. 137), 238. 
 Rich v. Flanders (39 N. H. 304), 67, 
 
 68. 
 Rich v. Jones (9 Cush., Mass., 326), 
 
 186. 
 Rich v. Minneapolis (40 Minn. 84), 76. 
 Richard v. Williams (7 Wheat. 59), 
 
 226. 
 Richards' Appeal (122 Pa. St. 547; 15 
 
 Atl. Rep. 903), 36. 
 Richards v. Bassett (10 B. & C. 657), 
 113, 114. 
 
 Richards v. Bostor (90 Ala. 352), 24. 
 Richards v. Crocker (66 Hun, 629), 
 
 205. 
 Richards v. Day (63 Hun, 635), 212. 
 Richards v. Green (Ariz., 1893, 32 
 
 Pac. Rep. 266), 24. 
 Richards v. Howard (2 Nott & McC. 
 
 474), 60. 
 Richards v. Humphreys (15 Pick. . 
 
 139), 215. 
 Richards v. Knight (Iowa, 1892, 42 
 
 N. W. Rep. 584), 237. 
 Richards v. State (36 Neb. 17 ; 53 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 1027), 52. 
 Richards v. State (82 Wis. 172; 51 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 652), 103, 348. 
 Richards v. Wedemeyer (75 Md. 10), 
 
 11. 
 Richardson v. Beede (43 Me. 161), 
 
 211. 
 Richardson v. Eureka (96 Cal. 443), 
 
 232. 
 Richardson v. Hooper (13 Pick. 446), 
 
 214. 
 Richardson v. Huggins(23N. H. 106), 
 
 232. 
 Richardson v. Milburn (17 Md. 67), 
 
 30. 
 Richardson v. Palmer (38 N. H. 218), 
 
 220. 
 Richardson v. Stringfellow (Ala., 
 
 1894, 14 S. Rep. 283), 186. 
 Richardson v. Williams (2 Port., 
 
 Ala., 239), 239. 
 Richardson, etc. Co. v. Jones (92 Ala. 
 
 218; 9S. Rep. 276), 138. 
 Richmond v. Sundborg (77 Iowa, 
 
 258), 354. 
 Richmond v. Thomaston (38 Me. 232), 
 
 56. 
 Richmond, etc. Co. v. Burnett (88 
 
 Va. 538), 380. 
 Richmond, etc. Co. v. Farmer (Ala., 
 
 12 S. Rep. 86), 18. 
 Richmond, etc. Co. v. Farquar (8 
 
 Blackf., Ind., 89), 221. 
 Richmond, etc. Co. v. Garner (Ga., 
 
 1893, 16 S. E. Rep. 110), 7.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cxlix 
 
 Beferences are to sections. 
 
 Richmond, etc. Co. v. Hammond 
 
 (93 Ala. 181 ; 9 S. Rep. 577), 56. 
 Richmond, etc. Co. v. Hissong(Ala., 
 
 1893, 13 S. Rep. 209), 145. 
 Richmond, etc. Co. v. Kerler (88 Ga. 
 
 39), 81. 
 Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Vance (93 
 
 Ala. 144), 342. 
 Richmond R. & E. Co. v. Dick (8 
 
 U. S. App. 99 ; 52 Fed. Rep. 379), 
 
 282. 
 Rick v. Neitzy (1 Mackey, D. C, 21), 
 
 304. 
 Ricketts v. Gurney (7 Price, 699), 
 
 287. 
 Riddis v. James (0 Binn. 321). 143. 
 Riddle v. Hill (51 Ala. 224), 238. 
 Rideout v. Newton (17 N. H. 71), 
 
 139a. 
 Riderhour v. Kansas City Cable Ry. 
 
 Co. (102 Mo. 270), 20, 319. 
 Rid-ely v. Howard (3 Har. & McH., 
 
 Md., 321), 136. 
 Ridgely v. Johnson (11 Barb., N. Y., 
 
 527), 108. 
 Ridgway v. Bowman (7 Cush. 268), 
 
 212. 
 Rifener v. Bowman (53 Pa. St. 318), 
 
 128. 
 Rigdon v. Conley (31 111. App. 630), 
 
 126, 339. 
 Rigdon v. Jordan (81 Ga. 668), 252. 
 Riggs v. Myers (20 Mo. 239), 220. 
 Riggs v. Powell (142 111. 453; 32 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 482), 139, 140. 
 Riggs v. State (30 Miss. 635), 9, 52. 
 Riggs v. Tayloe (9 Wheat. 486), 130. 
 Right v. Price (Doug. 241), 276. 
 Riley v. Com. (Ky., 1893, 32 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 222). 10. 
 Riley v. Gerrish (9 Cush. 104), 219. 
 Riley v. Gregg (16 Wis. 666), 219. 
 Riley v. Martinelli (97 Cal. 575; 32 
 
 Pac. Rep. 579), 79. 
 Riley v. Minor (29 Mo. 439), 268. 
 Riley v. State (88 Ala. 93), 330, 342. 
 Riley v. Suydam (4 Barb., N. Y., 
 222), 71. 
 
 Ping v. Ashworth (3 Iowa, 452), 223. 
 Ringgenburg v. Hartman (102 Ind. 
 
 537), 282. 
 Ringgold v. Tyson (3 Har. & J. 172), 
 
 310. 
 Ringold v. Edwards (7 Ark. 86), 
 
 150a. 
 Riordan v. Guggerty (74 Iowa, 688 ; 
 
 39 N. W. Rep. 107), 141. 337, 340. 
 Ripley v. Paige (12 Vt. 353), 205. 
 Ripon v. Bittel (30 Wis. 614), 189. 
 Risk v. State (19 Ind. 153), 345. 
 Ritchie v. Pease (114 III. 353), 205. 
 Ritter v. First Nat. Bank (30 Mo. 
 
 App. 652), 8. 
 Rivard v. Walker (39 111. 413), 229. 
 Rivers v. State (10 Tex. App. 177), 
 
 320. 
 Rizzolo v. Com. (126 Pa. St. 54>, 90. 
 Roach v. Bannon (57 Miss. 490), 83. 
 Robb v. Hackley (23 Wend. 50), 350. 
 Robb v. Schmidt (35 Mo. 290). 70. 
 Robbins v. City of Fond du Lac (82 
 
 Wis. 340), 380. 
 Robbins v. Diggins (78 Iowa, 521 ; 43 
 
 N. W. Rep. 306), 18, 24. 
 Robbins v. Spencer (121 Ind. 594), 
 
 340. 
 Robbins v. State (8 Ohio St. 131), 102. 
 Robbins v. State (Tex., 1893, 20 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 358), 283. 
 Robb's Case (11 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 442), 
 
 332. 
 Roberts' Appeal (26 Pa. St. 102), 67. 
 Roberts' Case (1 Dev. 259, 264), 90, 96. 
 Roberts v. Boston (149 Mass. 346), 
 
 199. 
 Roberts v. Burgess (85 Ala. 192). 368. 
 Roberts v. Com. (Ky., 1893, 22 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 895), 330, 354. 
 Roberts v. Conell (71 Tex. 11), 36, 
 
 150. 
 Roberts v. Davis (72 Ga. 819), 83. 
 Roberts v. Dixon (50 Kan. 436), 126. 
 Roberts v. Donovan (70 Cal. 113), 
 
 309. 
 Roberts v. Kendall (3 Ind. App. 339), 
 
 67.
 
 cl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Roberts v. Johnson (58 N. Y. 613), 
 
 193. 
 Roberts v. Johnstown Bank (14 N. 
 
 Y. S. 432; CO Hun, 576), 370. 
 Roberts v. McGee (15 Barb. 449), 80. 
 Roberts v. Medbury (132 Mass. 100), 
 
 69, 70, 115. 
 Roberts v. People (9 Colo. 474), 225. 
 Roberts v. Preston (100 N. C. 243), 
 
 115. 
 Roberts v. Railroad Co. (1 Brew., 
 
 Pa., 538), 356. 
 Roberts v. Roberts (Cab, 1893, 31 
 
 Pac. Rep. 941), 150a. 
 Roberts v. Roberts (55 N. Y. 275), 220. 
 Roberts v. Spencer (123 Mass. 397), 
 
 126. 
 Roberts v. State (5 Tex. App. 141), 
 
 102. 
 Roberts v. Trawick (13 Ala. 68), 67. 
 Roberts v. Wills (8 Paige, 446), 143. 
 Robertson v. Barbourne (6 B. Mon. 
 
 527), 150. 
 Robertson v. Brost (83 111. 116), 71. 
 Robertson v. Coates(l Tex. Civ. App. 
 
 664), 362. 
 Robertson v. Craver (Iowa, 1892, 55 
 
 N. W. Rep. 492), 333. 
 Robertson v. Jones (8 Mass. 536), 158. 
 Robertson v. Knapp (35 N. Y. 91 ; 33 
 
 How. Pr., N. Y., 309), 188. 
 Robertson v. Reed (38 Mo. App. 32), 
 
 60. 
 Robertson v. Robertson (Ky., 1893, 
 
 20 S. W. Rep. 543), 249. 
 Robertson v. State (17 S. W. Rep. 
 
 1068 ; 30 Tex. App. 496), 88. 
 Robertson v. Van Cleave (129 Ind. 
 
 217; 26 N. E. Rep. 899), 151. 
 Robin v. King (2 Leigh, 142), 168. 
 Robinson v. Adams (62 Me. 369), 197, 
 
 231. 
 Robinson v. Arnet (15 La. 262), 133. 
 Robinson v. Brewster (140 111. 649), 
 
 222. 
 Robinson v. Brown (82 111. 279), 244. 
 Robinson v. Chambers (94 Mich. 
 
 471), 280. 
 
 Robinson v. Evans (3 S. C. 335), 211. 
 Robinson v. Gallier (2 Wood, C. C. 
 
 178), 233. 
 Robinson v. Gould (26 Iowa, 93), 229. 
 Robinson v. Kanawba, etc. Co. (8 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 683), 74. 
 Robinson v. Marino (3 Wash. 434), 
 
 192. 
 Robinson v. Mulder (81 Midi. 75), 00, 
 
 209. 
 Robinson v. Parks (76 Md. 118), 145. 
 Robinson v. Reed (46 Iowa, 220), 127. 
 Robinson v. Robinson (22 Iowa, 247), 
 
 70. 
 Robinson v. Robinson (20 S. C. 567), 
 
 139a. 
 Robinson v. State (82 Ga. 535). 334. 
 Robinson v. State (1 Lea, Tenn., 673), 
 
 362. 
 Robinson v. State (124 111. 336), 350. 
 Robinson v. State (84 Ga. 674), 226. 
 Robinson v. Trull (4 Cush. 249), 277. 
 Robinson v. Wheeler (25 N. Y. 252), 
 
 229. 
 Robinson Con. Coal Co. v. Johnson 
 
 (22 Pac. Rep. 459; 13 Colo. 258), 
 
 69. 
 Robinson Consolidated Mining Co. v. 
 
 Craig (4 N. Y. St. Rep. 478), 139. 
 Robsen v. State (83 Ga. 166; 9 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 610), 284. 
 Robson v. Kemp (4 Esp. 235), 170. 
 Roch v. George's Adm'r (Ky., 1893, 
 
 20 S. W. Rep. 1039), 265. 
 Roche v. Beldam (119 111. 320), 205. 
 Roche v. Ware (71 Cal. 375), 60. 
 Rochelle v. Harrison (8 Port., Ala., 
 
 351), 71. 
 Rochester, etc. Co. v. Budlong (10 
 
 How. Pr., N. Y., 289), 187. 
 Rockey's Estate, In re (155 Pa. St. 
 
 453; 26 AtJ. Rep. 656; 32 W. N. 
 
 C. 434), 140. 
 Rockford v. Hollenbeck (34 111. App. 
 
 40), 20. 
 Rockland v. Morrill (71 Me. 455), 233. 
 Rockwell v. Brown (54 N. Y. 213), 
 
 208.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cli 
 
 References are to sections 
 Finnegan (43 Md. 490), 
 
 Roddy v 
 
 Eodee v. Detroit F. & M. Ins. Co. (26 
 
 N. Y. S. 242), 199. 
 Rodemacher v. Green. Ins. Co. (27 
 
 N. Y. S. 155), 199. 
 Roderigues v. Bank (63 N. ; Y. 460), 
 
 233. 
 Rodes v. Elevator Co. (49 Minn. 370), 
 
 73a. 
 Rodman v. Hoops (1 Dall. 85), 160. 
 Rodriquez v. State (22 S. W. Rep. 
 
 998 ; 32 Tex. Cr. Rep. 259), 145. 
 Roe v. Cutter (4 Wash. St. 611), 18. 
 Roe v. Davis (7 East, 362), 30. 
 Roe v. Day (7 C. & P. 705), 80. 
 Roe v. Ferrais (2 B. & P. 548), 80. 
 Roe v. Roe (40 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1), 140. 
 Roe v. Strong (107 N. Y. 356), 145. 
 Roebke v. Andrews (26 Wis. 311), 69. 
 Roehl v. Hanmesser (114 Ind. 311), 
 
 130. 
 Rogers v. Adams (66 Ala. 600), 136. 
 Rogers v. Bullock (2 Pen., 3N. J. L., 
 
 517), 286. 
 Rogers v. Burns (27 Pa. St. 525), 232. 
 Rogers v. Clements (92 N. C. 81), 69. 
 Rogers v. Coal Co. (Ala., 1893, 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 81), 53. 
 Rogers v. Grain (30 Tex. 284), 52. 
 Rogers v. French (19 Ga. 316), 215. 
 Rogers v. Kneeland (10 Wend. 219), 
 
 371. 
 Rogers v. Ritter (12 Wall., U. S., 
 
 317), 139. 
 Rogers v. Rogers (87 Mo. 257), 246. 
 Rogers v. State (50 Ala. 102), 23. 
 Rogers v. State (11 Tex. App. 608), 
 
 139. 
 Rogers v. State (90 Ga. 463 ; 16 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 205), 23. 
 Rogers v. Tillman (72 Ga. 479), 142. 
 Rogers v. Tyley (144 111. 642; 32 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 693), 139, 140, 141. 
 Rohrer v. Morningstar (18 Ohio, 579), 
 
 310. 
 Rohrig v. Pearson (12 Colo. 127), 337. 
 Rollins v. Clement (25 S. C. 601), 8. 
 
 Rollins v. Menager (22 W. Va. 461), 
 
 136. 
 Rollins v. United States (23 Ct. CI. 
 
 106), 57. 
 Romanes v. Frazier (16 Grant, U. C, 
 
 97), 135. 
 Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Ship- 
 man (69 Cal. 586), 151. 
 Romans v. Hay (12 Iowa, 270), 168. 
 Romer v. Center (Minn., 1893, 54 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 1052), 374. 
 Ronkendorf v. Taylor (4 Peters, 349), 
 
 142. 
 Ronnebaum v. Mt. Auburn Ry. Co. 
 
 (29 Wkly. Law Bui. 338), 67. 
 Rooker v. Perkins (14 Wis. 557), 226. 
 Roosa v. Boston Loan Co. (132 Mass. 
 
 439), 52. 
 Roosevelt v. Marks (16 Johns. Ch. 
 
 266). 69. 
 Roosevelt v. Railroad Co. (66 Hun, 
 
 633), 3S«. 
 Root v. Borst (65 Hun, 622), 350. 
 Root v. King (7 Cow., N. Y., 617), 
 
 144. 
 Rose v. Bank (91 Mo. 399), 139a, 140. 
 Rose v. Chapman (44 Mich. 312). 73. 
 Rose v. Otis (31 Pac. Rep. 493; 18 
 
 Colo. 59), 350. 
 Roseboom v. Billington (17 Johns. 
 
 182), 61. 
 Rosebrough v. Ansley (35 Ohio St. 
 
 107), 84. 
 Rosenberg v. Claflin (Ala., 1893, 10 
 
 S. Rep. 521), 357. 
 Rosenfeld v. Case (87 Mich. 295), 
 
 121. 
 Rosen field v. Fortier (94 Mich. 34), 
 
 83. 
 Rosenthal v. Bilger (Iowa, 1893, 53 
 
 N. W. Rep. 255), 335. 
 Rosenthal v. McMann (29 Tac. Rep. 
 
 121; 93 Cal. 505), 362. 
 Rosenthal v. Walker (111 U. S. 185), 
 
 230. 
 Roseville v. Gilbert (24 111. App. 334), 
 
 231. 
 Ross v. Bedell (5 Duer, 462), 231.
 
 clii 
 
 TARLK OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Ross v. Bos well (60 Ind. 233), 237. 
 Ross v. Bruce (1 Day, Conn., 100). 
 
 35. 
 Ross v. Brusie (70 Cal. 465), 60. 
 Ross v. Buhler (2 Mart., N. S., La., 
 
 312), 313. 
 Ross v. Faust (54 Ind. 471), 239. 
 Ross v. Goodwin (88 Ala. 390), 130. 
 Ross v. Malone (Ala., 1892, 12 S. Rep. 
 
 182), 20. 
 Ross v. McQuiston (45 Iowa, 145), 
 
 222. 
 Ross v. Sagbeer (21 Wend. 106), 208. 
 Ross v. State (67 Md. 286), 89. 
 Rosson v. Stehr (23 Tex. App. 287), 
 
 320. 
 Roswell v. State (63 Ala. 307), 231. 
 Roten v. State (31 Fla. 514; 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 910), 10, 102. 
 Roth v. State (10 Tex. App. 7), 23. 
 Eothrock v. Gallaher (91 Pa. St. 108), 
 
 121, 309. 
 Rottenburgh v. Fowl (N. J., 1893, 26 
 
 Atl. Rep. 338), 208. 
 Rottman v. Wasson (5 Kan. 552), 
 
 268. 
 Roughton v. Rawlings (88 Ga. 819), 
 
 262. 
 Rounds v. Rounds (64 Vt. 432), 52. 
 Rounds v. State (57 Wis. 45), 124. 
 Rountree v. Lane (32 S. C. 160), 262. 
 Rountree v. State (88 Ga. 457), 226, 
 
 324. 
 Rousey v. Wood (47 Mo. App. 465), 
 
 239. 
 Rousseau v. Blen (31 N. Y. 177), 169. 
 Rowe v. Brenton (8 B. & C. 737; 3 
 
 Man. &R. 267), 117, 362. 
 Rowe v. Canney (139 Mass. 41), 176. 
 Rowe v. Hasland (1 W. B. L. 404), 
 
 233. 
 Rowe v. Ware (30 Ga. 278), 268. 
 Roweil v. Fuller (59 Vt. 688), 38, 
 
 140. 
 Roweil v. Klein (44 Ind. 290), 73a. 
 Rowland v. Ashby (Ry. & M. 231), 
 
 93. 
 Rowland v. Boozer (10 Ala. 690), 09. 
 
 Rowland v. McCowan (20 Orog. 53S; 
 
 20 Pac. Rep. 853), 58. 
 Rowland v. Rowland (40 N. J. Eq. 
 
 281), 310. 
 Rowley v. Ball (3 Cowen, 303), 130. 
 Rowley v. Howard (23 Cal. 401), 
 
 150a. 
 Rowley v. Merlin (6 Jur., N. S., 
 
 1165), 129. 
 Royal Ins. Co. v. Schuring (87 Ky. 
 
 410: 9 S. W. Rep. 242), 254. 
 Royce v. Burt (42 Barb., N. Y., 339), 
 
 205. 
 Royce v. Cazan (76 Ga. 79), 139. 
 Rozet v. Harvey (26 111. App. 558), 
 
 24. 
 Ruan v. Perry (3 Caines, N. Y., 120), 
 
 10. 
 Ruberts v. Com. (Ky., 7 S. W. Rep. 
 
 401), 89. 
 Ruby v. Van Valkenburg (72 Tex. 
 
 450), 167. 
 Ruch v. Rock Island (97 U. S. 693), 
 
 120. 
 Rucker v. Reid (36 Kan. 470), 363. 
 Rudd v. Robinson (7 N. Y. S. 535; 
 
 54 Hun, 339), 60. 
 Rudd v. Rounds (64 Vt. 432), 56. 
 Rudolph v. Davis (35 Neb. 157; 52 
 
 N. W. Rep. 841), 380. 
 Rudy v. Austin (50 Ark. 73), 304. 
 Rugg v. Ward (23 Atl. Rep. 726; 64 
 
 Vt. 402), 220. 
 Rule v. Maupin (84 Mo. 587), 222. 
 Rulken v. Reid (36 Kan. 470), 363. 
 Ruloff v. People (45 N. Y. 224), 38a, 
 
 346. 
 Ruloff v. People (18 N. Y. 179), 93. 
 Rumph v. State (Ga., 1893, 16 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 104), 139, 139a. 
 Rumsey v. Boutwell (01 Hun, 165), 
 
 11. 
 Rumsey v. N. Y. & N. J. Tel. Co. 
 
 (49 N. J. L. 323), 60. 
 Rundle v. Foster (3 Tenn. Ch. 658), 
 
 170. 
 Ranger v. Holtzclaw (112 Mo. 519), 
 
 209.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cliii 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Rank v. Ten Eyck (24 N. J. L. 750), 
 
 73r/. 
 Runnels v. State (2S Ark. 121), 323. 
 Rupert v. Penner (35 Neb. 587 ; id. 
 
 803; 53 N. W. Rep. 892), 210, 
 
 367. 
 Rusling v. Rusling(36 N. J. Eq. 726), 
 
 51. 
 Rush v. French (1 Ariz. 99), 130. 
 Rusa v. Wabash W. Ry. Co. (112 Mo. 
 
 45), 188. 
 Russell v. Bradley (47 Kan. 438), 20. 
 Russell v. Coffin (8 Pick.. Mass., 
 
 143), 139. 
 Russell v. Com. (78 Va. 600\ 5. 
 Russell v. Crittenden (53 Conn. 564), 
 
 188. 
 Russell v. De Grand (8 R. I. 389). 
 
 208. 
 Russell v. Hallett (22 Kan. 276), 233. 
 Russell v. Irwin (41 Ala. 292), 219. 
 Russell v. Jackson (15 Jur. 1117), 
 
 172, 174. 
 Russell v. Jackson (22 Wend. 276), 
 
 238. 
 Russell v. Kearney (27 Ga. 96), 148. 
 Russell v. Longmore (29 Neb. 209, 
 
 286), 128, 129. 
 Russell v. Martin (15 Tex. 23S), 257. 
 Russell v. Nail (79 Tex. 644 ; 15 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 635), 378. 
 Russell v. Place (94 U. S. 608), 154. 
 Russell v. Rider (6 C. & P. 416), 337. 
 Russell v. Russell (64 Ala. 500), 205. 
 Russell v. Sargent (7 111. A pp. 98), 
 
 240. 
 Russell v. Seminary (75 111. 337), 136. 
 Russell v. Stanbyn (16 Moak's Eng. 
 
 818), 215. 
 Russell v. State (11 Tex. App. 268), 
 
 10. 
 Russell v. Stockton (8 Conn. 230), 
 
 114. 
 Russell v. Svvitzer (63 Ga. 711), 246. 
 Ruston's Case (I Leach's Cr. Cas. 
 
 408), 316. 
 Rutherford v. Morris (77 111. 397), 
 
 197. 
 
 Rutherford v. Scliattman (119 N. Y. 
 
 604), 69. 
 Rutledge v. Hudson (80 Ga. 266), 38. 
 Ryan v. People (79 N. Y. 594), 354. 
 Ryan v. State (84 Wis. 368), 9. 
 Ryan v. State (83 Wis. 486), 88, 97, 
 
 229, 334. 
 Ryder v. Roberts (48 Mo. App. 132), 
 
 232. v 
 
 Ryno v. Darby (20 N. J. Eq. 31), 223. 
 
 s. 
 
 Sabariego v. Maverick (124 TJ. S. 
 
 295), 226. 
 Sabler v. Sheffield S. Co. (87 Ala. 
 
 305), 310. 
 Sabre v. Smith (62 N. H. 663), 309. 
 Sackett v. Spencer (29 Barb. 180), 
 
 337. 
 Sackville v. Ayleartt (1 Vern. 103), 
 
 363. 
 Saders v. Giddings (90 Mich. 50), 31. 
 Saenger v. Nightingale (48 Fed. Rep. 
 
 708), 79. 
 Sage v, Jones (47 Ind. 122), 205. 
 Sage v. State (27 Ind. 15; 26 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 067), 124. 
 Sage v. Suite (91 Ind. 141), 197. 
 Sager v. Dorr (4 N. Y. S. 568), 309. 
 Sahlien v. Bank (90 Tenn. 221), 216. 
 Sahlinger v. People (102 111. 241), 229. 
 St. George v. St. Margaret (1 Salk. 
 
 123), 234. 
 St. Louis v. Arndt (94 Mo. 275 ; 7 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 15), 50. 
 St. Louis v. Miss. P. R. Co. (Mo., 
 
 1893, 21 S. W. Rep. 202), 210. 
 St. Louis v. San Francisco R. R. Co. 
 
 (35 Kan. 426), 242. 
 St. Louis Bridge Co. v. Miller (138 
 
 111. 465), 202. 
 St. Louis, etc. Co. v. Am. T. I. Co. 
 
 (33 Mo. App. 348), 241. 
 St. Louis, etc. Co. v. Bradley (54 
 
 Fed. Rep. 630), 198. 
 St. Louis, etc. Co. v. Insurance Co. 
 
 (33 Mo. App. 348), 237.
 
 cliv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 St. Louis, etc. Co. v. Olive (40 .111. 
 
 A pp. 82), 232. 
 St. Louis, etc. Co. v. Weaver (35 
 
 Kan. 412), 230, 242. 
 St. Louis Gas Co. v. American F. I. 
 
 Co. (33 Mo. App. 348), 190. 
 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Lyman 
 (57 Ark. 512 ; 22 S. W. Rep. 170), 
 187. 
 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Spanu 
 (57 Ark. 127; 20 S. W. Rep. 914), 
 380. 
 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Sweet 
 (57 Ark. 287 ; 21 S. W. Rep. 587), 
 350. 
 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Taylor 
 (Ark., 1893, 20 S. W. Rep. 1083), 
 249. 
 Sairs v. Sexton (35 111. App. 307), 
 
 154. 
 Salado College v. Davis (47 Tex. 
 
 131), 73a. 
 Salas v. State (31 Tex. Crim. R. 485), 
 
 93. 
 Salazar v. Taylor (18 Col. 538; 33 
 
 Pac. Rep. 839), 139. 
 Salem Bank v. Gloucester (17 Mass. 
 
 27), 81. 
 Salina v. Tuspar (27 Kan. 544), 343. 
 Salladay v. Doclgeville (Wis., 1893, 
 
 55 N. W. Rep. 696), 8. 
 Salmon v. Miles (4 U. S. App. 101), 
 
 357. 
 Salmon Bank v. Leyser (116 Md. 51 ; 
 
 22 S. W. Rep. 504), 24. 
 Salomon, etc. Co. v. Jones (34 Kan. 
 
 443), 74. 
 Salte v. Thomas (3 B. & P. 188), 144. 
 Sammons v. Havvver (25 W. Va. 
 
 678), 252. 
 Sample v. Frost (10 Iowa, 266), 169. 
 Samson v. Overton (4 Bibb, 409), 148. 
 Sanders v. Bagwell (S. C, 1893, 16 
 
 S. E. Rep. 770), 128, 339. 
 Sanders v. Palmer (55 Fed. Rep. 217), 
 
 12. 
 Sanders v. Reister (1 Dak. Ter. 151), 
 52. 
 
 Sanders v. State (94 Ind. 147), 190. 
 Sanders v. Stokes (30 Ala. 43), 7. 
 Sandford v. Chase (3 Cow., N. Y., 
 
 381), 286. 
 Sandford v. Newark (37 N. J. L. 1), 
 
 222 
 Sandford v. Oberlin College (31 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 1088; 50 Kan. 342), 152. 
 Sandford Tool Co. v. Mullen (Ind., 
 
 l8 r J0, 27 N. E. Rep. 448), 24. 
 Sandidge v. Hunt (5 S. Rep. 55; 40 
 
 La. Ann. 766), 230. 
 Sandifer v. Howard (59 111. 246), 70. 
 Sands v. Robison (12 Smed. & M., 
 
 Miss., 854), 170. 
 Sanford v. Chase (3 Cow., N. Y., 381), 
 
 275. 
 Sanford v. Ellithorpe (95 N. Y. 48), 
 
 309. 
 Sanford v. Gates (38 Kan. 405), 282. 
 Sanford v. Peck (Conn., 1894, 27 
 
 Atl. Rep. 1057), 8. 
 Sanford v. Rawlings (43 111. 92), 217. 
 Sanford v. Rowley (93 Mich. 119), 10. 
 San Gabriel Wine Co. v. Behlow (94 
 
 Cal. 10S), 380. 
 Sanger v. Flow (48 Fed. Rep. 152 ; 4 
 
 U. S. App. 32), 249. 
 Sanger v. Merritt(131 N.Y. 614), 262. 
 Saugster v. Daiton (Ark., 1890, 12 
 
 S. W. Rep. 202), 50. 
 San Joaquin v. Beecher (Cal., 1894, 
 
 35 Pac. Rep. 349), 205. 
 Sanscraint v. Torongo (87 Mich. 69), 
 
 79, 110. 
 Santa Clara v. Enright (95 Cal. 105), 
 
 188. 
 Santissima Trinidad, In re (7 Wheat. 
 
 273, 335), 243. 
 Sapp v. King (66 Tex. 570), 279. 
 Sargeant v. Marshall (38 III. App. 
 
 642), 124. 
 Sargeant v. Sargeant (18 Vt. 371), 73. 
 Sargent v. Hampden (38 Me. 581), 
 
 169. 
 Sarle v. Arnold (7 R. I. 582), 188. 
 Sartor v. Bullinger (59 Tex. 411), 
 
 139a.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 civ 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Sartorius v. State (24 Miss. 602), 330. 
 Saser v. Bank (4 Md. 420), 145. 
 Sasser v. Herring (3 Dev., N. C, 340), 
 
 115. 
 Sasser v. Sasser (73 Ga. 275), 246. 
 Satchel 1 v. Doram (4 Ohio St. 542), 
 
 231. 
 Satter white v. Davenport (10 Rich., 
 
 S. C, Eq. 305), 306. 
 Satterwhite v. Rosser (61 Tex. 166), 
 
 225. 
 Satterwhite v. Shirley (25 N. E. Rep. 
 
 1100), 151. 
 Sauber v. Collins (40 111. App. 426), 
 
 11. 
 Sauer v. Union Oil Co. (9 S. Rep. 
 
 5G6 ; 43 La. Ann. 699), 229. 
 Sauls v. State (30 Tex. App. 496 ; 17 
 
 S. W. Rep. 1066), 88. 
 Saunders v. Bridges (67 Tex. 93), 
 
 252. 
 Saunders v. Hendrix (5 Ala. 224), 
 
 168. 
 Saunders v. People (38 Mich. 222), 
 
 127. 
 Saussy v. So. Flor. R. Co. (22 Fla. 
 
 327), 355. 
 Sauter v. Carroll (11 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 
 
 292), 60. 
 Savage v. Balch (8 Greenl. 27), 73. 
 Savage v. O'Neill (44 N. Y. 298), 231. 
 Savage's Case (84 Va. 582), 240. 
 Savannah, etc. Co. v. Collins (77 Ga. 
 
 376), 217. 
 Savannah, etc. Co. v. Flanagan (82 
 
 Ga. 579), 121. 
 Saveland v. Green (40 Wis. 431), 33. 
 Savings, etc. Co. v. Philips (Ga., 
 
 1893, 17 S. E. Rep. 82), 12. 
 Sawyer v. Baldwin (11 Pick. 494), 
 
 142. 
 Sawyer v. Grandy (N. C, 1893, 18 
 
 S. E. Rep. 79), 309. 
 Sawyer v. Harmon (136 Mass. 414), 
 
 150a. 
 Saxton v. Johnson (14 Johns. 418), 
 
 21. 
 Saxton v. Nirnmis (14 Mass. 320), 142. 
 
 Say and Sele, In re (1 H. L. Cas. 
 
 507), 234. 
 Sayles v. Baker (5 R. I. 457), 215. 
 Sayre v. Burdick (47 Minn. 367), 208. 
 Scammon v. Scamnion (33 N. H. 52), 
 
 279. 
 Scanlan v. Hodges (52 Fed. Rep. 
 
 354), 18. 
 Scattergood v. Wood (79 N. Y. 263), 
 
 198. 
 Schaben v. Ott (6 Ct. CI. 230), 146. 
 Schackleford v. State (33 Ark. 539), 
 
 121. 
 Schafer v. Schafer (93 Ind. 586), 124. 
 Schaser v. State (36 Wis. 429), 9, 341. 
 Schenck v. Warner (37 Barb. 258), 
 
 117. 
 Schermerhorn v. Schermerhorn (1 
 
 Wend. 119), 302. 
 Scheutze v. Baily (40 Mo. 69), 268. 
 Schill v. Plumb (55 N. Y. 592), 145. 
 Schilling v. Territory (2 Wash. Ter. 
 
 283), 239. 
 Schindler v. Rail Co. (87 Mich. 400), 
 
 28, 123. 
 Schlaf v. Railroad Co. (Ala., 1893, 14 
 
 S. Rep. 105), 198. 
 Schlemmer v. State (51 N. J. L. 29), 
 
 56. 
 Schlencker v. State (9 Neb. 241), 197. 
 Schmertzell v. Oshkosh (55 Wis. 
 
 490), 143a. 
 Schmidt v. Durnham (Minn., 1S92, 
 
 52 N. W. Rep. 277), 347. 
 Schmidt v. Garfield (64 Hun, 294), 
 
 10. 
 Schmidt v. Keen (10 N. Y. S. 267), 
 
 74. 
 Schmidt v. Packard (31 N. E. Rep. 
 
 944; 132 Ind. 398), 79, 117. 
 Schneider v. Haas (14 Oreg. 174), 
 
 330. 
 Schneider v. Manning (121 111. 376; 
 
 12 N. E. Rep. 267), 222. 
 Schneider v. Patterson (Neb., 1894, 
 
 57 N. W. Rep. 398), 220. 
 Schneider v. Tombling (34 Neb. 661), 
 
 362.
 
 clvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Schnier v. People (23 111. 17), 332. 
 Schoenberger v. Hackman (37 Pa. 
 
 St. 425), 135. 
 Schoerkin v. Swift (19 Blatch., U. S M 
 
 209), 243. 
 Scholes v. Hilton (10 M. & W. 1G), 
 
 284. 
 Scholl v. Bradstreet (Iowa, 1892, 52 
 
 N. W. Rep. 500), 70. 
 Schoolcraft v. People (117 111. 271), 
 
 52. 
 School Dist. No. 1 v. Lyford (27 
 
 Wis. 506), 242. 
 Schooner Mersey (Blatchf. Prize 
 
 Cas. 187), 238. 
 Schott v. Blanchard (8 Martin, 302), 
 
 148. 
 Schott v. Youree (142 111. 233; 31 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 591), 374. 
 Schram v. Gentry (63 Tex. 283), 136. 
 Schramm v. O'Connor (98 111. 539), 
 
 208. 
 Schreiner v. Order of Foresters (35 
 
 111. App. 576), 156. 
 Schroeder v. Frey (114 N. Y. 266), 
 
 371. 
 Schroeder v. Railway Co. (47 Iowa, 
 
 375), 202, 345. 
 Schroepel v. Syracuse Plank Road 
 
 (7 How. Pr., N. Y, 94), 73a. 
 Schubkagel v. Dierstein (131 Pa. St. 
 
 53), 169. 
 Schuckman v. Winterbottom (9 N. 
 
 Y. S. 733), 60. 
 Schuchardt v. Aliens (1 Wall. 359), 7. 
 Schuble v. Cunningham (14 Daly, 
 
 404), 199. 
 Schuler v. Eckert (90 Mich. 165), 380. 
 Schuler v. Third Ave. R. Co. (1 Misc. 
 
 R. 351), 52. 
 Schull's Appeal (115 Pa. St. 141), 68. 
 Schultz v. Lindell (30 Mo. 310), 198. 
 Sebum an v. Pilcher (36 111. App. 43), 
 
 376. 
 Schunior v. Russell (83 Tex. 83 ; 18 
 
 S. W. Rep. 484), 107, 361. 
 Schurreger v. Raymond (105 N. Y. 
 
 648), 198. 
 
 Schurtz v. Kerkon (85 Cal. 277), 35, 
 Schusler v. State (29 Ind. 391), 6, 7. 
 Schuster v. State (80 Wis. 107; 49 
 
 N. W. Rep. 30), 333. 
 Schwab v. Heindel(16 Daly, 164), 79. 
 Schwartz v. Atkin (12 Pa. Co. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 373), 120. 
 Schwartz v. Wood (21 N. Y. S. 1053; 
 
 67 Huu, 638), 194, 375. 
 Schwersenski v. Vineberg (19 Can. 
 
 S. C. R. 243), 211. 
 Scobey v. Walker (Ind., 1888, 15 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 674), 229. 
 Scotland Co. v. Hill (112 TJ. S. 183), 
 
 362. 
 Scott v. Blanchard (8 Martin, 303), 
 
 148. 
 Scott v. Clare (3 Campb. 236), 38, 80. 
 Scott v. Donovan (153 Mass. 378), 
 
 345. 
 Scott v. Gallagher (11 S. & R. 347), 
 
 136. 
 Scott v. Harris (127 Ind. 520), 309. 
 Scott v. Hooper (14 Vt. 535), 316. 
 Scott v. Iron Co. (Ky., 1892, 18 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 1012), 232. 
 Scott v. Lilienthal (9 Bosw. 224), 199. 
 Scott v. Lloyd (12 Pet. 149), 288. 
 Scott v. Metro. El. R. Co. (21 N. Y. S. 
 
 631), 367. 
 Scott v. People (63 111. 508), 101, 102. 
 Scott v. People (141 111. 195 ; 30 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 329), 375. 
 Scott v. Pinkinton (2 B. & S. 11), 38. 
 Scott v. Ratcliffe (5 Pet. 81), 233. 
 Scott v. Scott (95 Mo. 300), 229. 
 Scott v. United States (7 Ct. CI. 457), 
 
 320. 
 Scott v. Wood (81 Cal. 398, 400), 231, 
 
 247. 
 Scovill v. Baldwin (27 Conn. 316), 
 
 229. 
 Scraggs v. Hill (W. Va., 1893, 17 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 185), 221. 
 Scruggs v. Scruggs (46 Mo. 271), 150a. 
 Scruggs v. State (15 S. W. Rep. 1074), 
 
 10. 
 Seaman v. Ward (1 Hilt. 52, 55), 231.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clvii 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Searcy v. State (28 Tex. App. 513), 
 
 89. 
 Searight v. Craighead (1 Penn. 125), 
 
 69. 
 Searles v. State (6 Ohio Cir. Ct. 331), 
 
 89, 96, 97. 
 Searles v. Thompson (18 Minn. 316), 
 
 80. 
 Sears v. Dillingham (12 Mass. 358), 
 
 138. 
 Sears v. Mason's Adrn'r (Va., 1890, 
 
 10 S. E. Rep. 529), 301. 
 Sears v. Starbird (78 Cal. 225), 362. 
 Searsmont v. Lincolnville (83 Me. 
 
 75), 382. 
 Seattle, etc. Co. v. Gilchrist (4 Wash. 
 
 St. 509), 8. 
 Seaver v. Boston, etc. Co. (14 Gray, 
 
 Mass., 466), 198. 
 Seavy v. Dearborn (19 N. H. 351), 
 
 347. 
 Second Nat. Bank v. Wenzel (151 
 
 Pa. St. 142), 350. 
 1 Secor v. Bell (18 Johns., N. Y., 52), 
 
 287. 
 Seebrock v. Fedawa (46 N. W. Rep. 
 
 650 ; 30 Neb. 424), 248. 
 Seekell v. Norman (73 Iowa, 254; 43 
 
 N. W. Rep. 190), 346. 
 Seers v. So. R. Co. (Mo., 1891, 18 
 
 S. W. Rep. 1007), 80. 
 Segar v. Babcock (R. I., 1893, 26 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 257), 220. 
 Seiler v. Mohn (37 W. Va. 507), 246. 
 Seiple v. Seiple (25 W. N. C. 488), 250. 
 Seldner v. Bank (66 Md. 88), 69. 
 Seligraan v. Rogers (113 Mo. 642; 21 
 
 S. W. Rep. 94), 351. . 
 Selma v. Perkins (68 Ala. 145), 242. 
 Selph v. State (22 Fla. 537), 384. 
 Selvvyn's Case (3 Hagg. 748), 232, 
 
 233. 
 Seminary v. Calhoun (25 N. Y. 422), 
 
 348. 
 Semple v. Glenn (91 Ala. 245), 159. 
 Senger v. Senger (81 Va. 687), 222. 
 Senn v. Southern Ry. Co. (18 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 1007; 108 Mo. 142), 188. 
 
 Sessions v. Gilbert (1 Vt. 75), 211. 
 Setchers v. Keigwin (57 Conn. 573), 
 
 60. 
 Settle v. Alison (8 Ga. 201), 105. 
 Seven Bishops' Case (12 How. St. Tr. 
 
 183, 306), 140. 
 Severson v. Severson (68 Iowa, 657), 
 
 222. 
 Sewell v. Mead (Iowa, 1892, 52 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 227), 250. 
 Sewell v. Price (32 Ala. 97), 223. 
 Sewell v. Robbins (139 Mass. 164), 
 
 363. 
 Sexton v. Windell (23 Gratt. 534), 
 
 217. 
 Seymour v. Baily (76 Ga. 338), 249, 
 
 252. 
 Seymour v. Matteson (42 How. Pr., 
 
 N. Y., 496), 73. 
 Shaack v. Meily (136 Pa. St. 161 ; 26 
 
 W. N. C. 569), 309. 
 Shafer v. Stonebraker (4 G. & J. 
 
 345), 160. 
 Shaffer v. Hahn (111 N. C. 1), 134. 
 Shafter v. Evans (53 Cal. 32), 12. 
 Shahan v. Swan (Ohio, 1892, 26 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 222), 376. 
 Shailer v. Corbett (61 Hun, 626), 384. 
 Shall v. Miller (5 Whart, Pa., 156), 
 
 313. 
 Shamburg v. Commagere (5 Martin, 
 
 La., 9), 310. 
 Sbaply v. Abbott (42 N. Y. 443), 84. 
 Shapt v. Wyckoff (39 N. J. Eq. 376), 
 
 214. 
 Sharey v. Hursey (32 Me. 579), 348. 
 Sharon v. Morrisr(39 Kan. 377), 199. 
 Sharon v. Sharon (79 Cal. 633), 170, 
 
 376. 
 Sharp v. Blankenship (79 Cal. 411), 
 
 115. 
 Sharp v. Hamilton (12 N. J. L. 109), 
 
 136. 
 Sharp v. Johnson (22 Ark. 75), 231. 
 Sharp v. Kansas, etc. Co. (Mo., 1892, 
 
 20 S. W. Rep. 93), 197. 
 Sharp v. Knox (48 Mo. App. 109), 
 
 231.
 
 clviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Sharp v. Sharp et al. (2 Leigh, Va., 
 
 249), 139. 
 Sharp v. State (51 Ark. 147), 354. 
 Shaver v. Ehle (16 Johns., N. Y., 
 
 201), 133. 
 Shaw v. Barnhart (17 Ind. 183), 249. 
 Shaw v. County Court (30 W. Va. 
 
 488 ; 4 S. E. Rep. 430), 373. 
 Shaw v. State (Tex., 1893, 22 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 588), 93. 
 Shea v. Manky Co. (8 N. Y. S. 333), 
 
 147. 
 Sheahan v. National S. S. Co. (66 
 
 Hun, 48), 374. 
 Shear v. Van Dyke (10 Hun, 528), 
 
 335. 
 Shearer v. Middleton (88 Mich. 621), 
 
 24. 
 Shedden v. Patrick (2 Sw. & Tr. 
 
 170), 52. 
 Sheehan v. Bradford, etc. Co. (15 
 
 Civ. Pro. Rep. 429), 285. 
 Sheehan v. Loler (36 Mo. App. 224), 
 
 82. 
 Sheehy v. Mandeville (7 Cranch, 
 
 208), 20. 
 Sheetz v. Sweeney (136 111. 336), 220. 
 Sheffield v. Clark (73 Ga. 92), 232. 
 Sheldon v. Benham (4 Hill, N. Y., 
 
 129), 218. 
 Sheldon v. Berry (39 Tex. App. 154), 
 
 362. 
 Sheldon v. Booth (50 Iowa, 209), 198. 
 Sheldon v. Ferris (45 Barb., N. Y, 
 
 124), 233. 
 Sheldon v. Rivett (110 N. C. 408), 357. 
 Sheldon v. Sheldon (58 Hun, 601), 
 
 170. 
 Sheldon v. Warner (45 Mich. 638), 
 
 141, 195. 
 Sheldon, In re (18 N. Y. S. 15), 189. 
 Shelton v. Barbour (2 Wash. 64), 122. 
 Shelton v. Dearing (10 B. Mon. 405), 
 
 128. 
 Shenandoah V. R. v. Griffith (76 Va. 
 
 912), 24. 
 Shepard v. Newhall (54 Fed. Rep. 
 306), 24. 
 
 Shepard v. Rinks (78 111. 188), 262. 
 Shepard v. Stockham (45 Kan. 244), 
 
 153. 
 Shepard, In re (18 Blatcli. 266), 288. 
 Shephard v. Railway Co. (85 Mo. 
 
 629), 202. 
 Shepherd v. State (31 Neb. 389), 334. 
 Shepley v. Waterhouse (22 Me. 497), 
 
 69. 
 Shepp v. State (31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 349), 80. 
 Sheppard v. Yocum (10 Oreg. 410), 
 
 347. 
 Sherer v. Ingerman (110 Ind. 442), 
 
 308. 
 Sheridan's Case (31 How. St. Tr. 
 
 672), 36. 
 Sherman v. Atkins (4 Pick. 283), 58. 
 Sherman v. Buick (93 U. S. 209), 208. 
 Sherman v. Crosby (,11 Johns. 70), 58. 
 Sherman v. Gundlach(37 Minn. 118,, 
 
 2S5. 
 Sherman v. Kortright (52 Barb., 
 
 N. Y., 267), 8. 
 Sherman v. Lanier (39 N. J. Eq. 253), 
 
 309. 
 Sherman, In re (24 N. Y. S. 283), 380. 
 Sherwood v. Baker (105 Mo. 472; 16 
 
 S. W. Rep. 938), 150. 
 Sherwood v. Burr (4 Day, 244), 226. 
 Sherwood v. Chicago, etc. Co. (88 
 
 Mich. 108), 11. 
 Sherwood v. Merritt (83 Wis. 233), 
 
 128. 
 Sherwood v. Titman (55 Pa. St. 77), 
 
 374. 
 Shewalter v. Williamson (125 Ind. 
 
 373), 376. 
 Shield v. Smith (104 N. C. 57; 10 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 76), 310. 
 Shields v. Smith (37 Ark. 47), 83. 
 Shifflet v. Morell (4 S. W. Rep. 483 ; 
 
 68 Tex. 382), 186. 
 Shiner v. Abbie (77 Tex. 1), 79. 
 Shinn v. Hicks (68 Tex. 277), 106. 
 Shipley v. Fox (69 Md. 572), 11. 
 Shirley v. Dewey (17 Ohio, 156), 
 130. •
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clix 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Sholly v. Dillar (3 Rawle, Pa., 147), 
 
 343. 
 Shoms v. Ziegler (10 Phila., Pa., 315), 
 
 343. 
 Short v. Kinzie (80 Ind. 500), 140. 
 Short v. Lee (2 Jac. & W. 477), 117. 
 Short v. N. Pac. EI. Co. (45 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 706; 1 N. D. 150), 757. 
 Short v. State (63 Ind. 376), 345. 
 Shotwell v. Harrison (22 Mich. 410), 
 
 134. 
 Shotwell v. Humblen (25 Miss. 156), 
 
 150a. 
 Shotwell v. McElhenny (101 Mo. 
 
 677), 373. 
 Shotwell v. Struble (21 N. J. Eq. 31), 
 
 305. 
 Shotwell, In re (11 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 444), 
 
 269. 
 Show v. Barr (29 Iowa, 296), 148. 
 Showalter v. Bergman (23 N. E. Rep. 
 
 686), 10. 
 Showman v. Lee (80 Mich. 556), 7. 
 Shradski v. Albright (93 Mo. 42), 223. 
 Shrewsbury Peerage Case (7 H. L. C. 
 
 26), 53. 
 Shrimpton v. Philbrick (Minn., 1893, 
 
 55 N. W. Rep. 551), 367. 
 Shroeder v. Webster (Iowa, 1893, 55 
 
 N. W. Rep. 569), 129, 367. 
 Shroyer v. Miller (3 W. Va. 158), 10. 
 Shulse v. McWilliams (104 Ind. 512), 
 
 249. 
 Shultz v. Andrews (54 How. Pr. , 
 
 N. Y., 380), 287. 
 Shultz v. Moore (1 McLean, U. S., 
 
 520), 136. 
 Shultz v. State (5 Tex. App. 390), 
 
 335. 
 Shutesbury v. Hadley (133 Mass. 
 
 242), 142. 
 Siberry v. State (133 Ind. 677; 33 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 681), 39, 201. 
 Sibley v. Waffle (16 N. Y. 180), 169. 
 Sibley v. Young (26 S. C. 415), 69. 
 Sicard v. Peters (6 Pet. 136), 134. 
 Sickles v. Look (93 Cal. 600), 232. 
 Sidwell v. Birney (69 Mo. 144), 135. 
 
 Siebert v. People (143 111. 571 ; 32 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 431), 6, 39, 195, 381. 
 Silberman v. Clark (96 N. Y. 522), 
 
 218. 
 Silberstein v. Houston, W., St. & P. 
 
 F. R. Co. (4 N. Y. S. 843; 52 
 Hun, 611), 368. 
 
 Sill v. Reese (47 Cal. 294), 139. 
 Sillar v. Brown (9 C. & P. 601), 188. 
 Silver Lake v. Harding (5 Ohio, 545), 
 
 148. 
 Silver Mining Co. v. Willis (127 U. S. 
 
 480), 23. 
 Silvers v. Potter (48 N. J. Eq. 539), 208. 
 Silvey v. Hodgdon (52 Cal. 3G3), 265. 
 Simcox, Iii re (11 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 445), 
 
 253. 
 Simfield v. Barlows (33 Neb. 785), 
 
 150a. 
 Simis v. Davidson (54 N. Y. Super. 
 
 Ct. 235), 82. 
 Simis v. Railway Co. (20 N. Y. S. 179), 
 
 216. 
 Simmons v. Haas (56 Md. 153), 80. 
 Simmons v. Havens (101 N. Y. 427), 
 
 341. 
 Simmons v. Johnson (14 Wis. 526), 
 
 210. 
 Simmons v. Partridge (154 Mass. 
 
 500), 79. 
 Simmons v. Spratt (26 Fla. 449), 382. 
 Simmons v. Spratt (20 Fla. 495), 124, 
 
 142. 
 Simmons v. State (Ala., 1893, 13 S. 
 
 Rep. 896), 354. 
 Simmons v. Trumbo (9 W. Va. 358), 
 
 238, 242. 
 Simms v. State (22 S. W. Rep. 876 ; 
 
 32 Tex. Cr. Rep. 277), 24. 
 Simms v. Todd (72 Mo. 288), 244. 
 Simon v. Ash (1 Tex. Civ. App. 202; 
 
 20 S. W. Rep. 719), 126. 
 Simons v. Cooks (29 Iowa, 324), 14S. 
 Simonsen v. Dolan (Mo., 1893, 21 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 510), 129. 
 Simpson v. Dix (131 Mass. 179), 221. 
 Simpson v. Montgomery (25 Ark. 
 
 365), 136.
 
 clx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Simpson v. Pearson (31 Ind. 1), 82. 
 Simpson v. Pegram (112 N. C. 541; 
 
 17 S. E. Rep. 430), 11. 
 Simpson v. State (78 Ga. 91), 3546. 
 Sims v. Kitchen (5 Esp. 46), 279. 
 Sims v. Sims (75 N. Y. 466), 321. 
 Sinclair v. Stevenson (1 C. & P. 582), 
 
 126. 
 Sing Chung Co. v. Young Wing (59 
 
 Conn. 535), 360. 
 Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rook (84 Pa. St. 
 
 442), 157. 
 Singleton v. O'Blenis (125 Ind. 151), 
 
 18. 
 Singleton v. St. Louis, etc. Co. (66 
 
 Mo. 63), 217. 
 Sinsheimer v. Skinner (43 111. App. 
 
 608), 360. 
 Sioux City, etc. R. Co. v. Stout (17 
 
 Wall. 663), 11. 
 Sisk v. State (28 Tex. App. 432), 336. 
 Sisson v. Baltimore (51 Md. 83), 77. 
 Sisson v. Railroad Co. (14 Mich. 497), 
 
 175. 
 Sisson v. Yost (58 Hun, 609; 12 N. 
 
 Y. S. 373), 354. 
 Sistare v. Hecksler (63 Hun, 634), 56. 
 Sistare v. Olcott (15 N. Y. State Rep. 
 
 248), 199. 
 Sivav. Wabash Ry. Co. (Mo., 1893, 
 
 21 S. W. Rep. 915), 270. 
 Sivers v. Sivers (97 Cal. 518; 32 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 571), 152, 209. 
 Sixth Ave. R. Co. v. Metropolitan R. 
 
 Co. (34 N. E. Rep. 400 ; 138 N. Y. 
 
 548), 199. 
 Sixth Ave. R. Co. v. Railroad Co. 
 
 (138 N. Y. 548), 381. 
 Skaggs v. State (108 Ind. 53), 316, 332. 
 Skates v. State (64 Miss. 644), 283. 
 Skattowe v. Railway Co. (22 Oreg. 
 
 430), 8. 
 Skeen v. Springfield Eng. & T. Co. 
 
 (42 Mo. App. 158), 145. 
 Skellie v. James (81 Ga. 419), 170. 
 Skinner v. Brigham (126 Mass. 132), 
 
 138. 
 Skinner v. Fulton (39 111. 484), 136. 
 
 Skinner v. Harrison (116 Ind. 139), 
 
 222 
 Slack v. Mass (Dud., Ga., 161), 310. 
 Slade v. State (29 Tex. App. 381), 249. 
 Slamper v. Gray (Wyo., 1890, 23 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 09), 147. 
 Slaney v. Wade (1 M. & C. 338), 113. 
 Slater v. Lawson (B. & Ad. 369), 67. 
 Slatterie v. Pooley (6 M. & W. 664), 
 
 38. 
 Slaughter v. Barnes (3 A. K. Marsh. 
 
 412), 244. 
 Slaymaker v. Gundacker (10 S. &R., 
 
 Pa., 75), 67. 
 Slaymaker v. Wilson (1 P. & W., Pa., 
 
 216), 139. 
 Sleeper v. Van Middles worth (4 
 
 Denio, 431), 349. 
 Slessinger v. Buckingham (17 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 454), 304. 
 Sleven v. Wallace (64 Hun, 288), 262. 
 Slingerland v. Slingerland (46 Minn. 
 
 100), 124. 
 Slingman v. Fiedler (3 Mo. App. 577), 
 
 237. 
 Sloan v. Torry (78 Mo. 623), 242. 
 Slocum v. Prov. St. etc. Co. (10 R. I. 
 
 112), 232. 
 Sluby v. Chaplin (4 Johns. 461), 138. 
 Slusser v. Burlington (47 Iowa, 300), 
 
 121. 
 Small v. Williams (87 Ga. 68), 56. 
 Smalley v. Appleton (70 Wis. 349; 
 
 25 N. W. Rep. 729), 194. 
 Smalley v. Fullerton (Iowa, 1893, 55 
 
 N. W. Rep. 520), 370. 
 Smathers v. State (46 Ind. 447), 229. 
 Smead v. Williamson (16 B. Mon., 
 
 Ky., 492), 66. 
 Smethurst v. Propes (148 Mass. 261), 
 
 362. 
 Smith v. Arnold (5 Mason, U. S., 
 
 414), 268. 
 Smith v. Arthur (110 N. C. 400), 262. 
 Smith v. Bennett (1 Jones, N. C, 
 
 372), 226. 
 Smith v. Blakey (36 L. J. Q. B. 95), 58. 
 Smith v. Bragg (1 John. Cas. 238), 148.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clxi 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Smith v. Brien (6 N. Y. S. 174), 168. 
 Smith v. Brown (151 Mass. 339), 30, 
 
 126. 
 Smith v. Burnham (3 Sumn. 435, 438, 
 
 439), 81, 267. 
 Smith v. Castles (1 Gray, 108), 354. 
 Smith v. Caswell (67 Tex. 567 ; 4 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 848), 139, 140. 
 Smith v. Christopher (16 Abb. Pr., 
 
 N. Y.), 332. 
 Smith v. Coleman (77 Wis. 343), 209. 
 Smith v. Com. (Ky., 1892, 17 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 68), 283. 
 Smith v. Crego (7 N. Y. S. 86), 171. 
 Smith v. Crooker (5 Mass. 538), 128. 
 Smith v. Davidson (41 Fed. Rep. 172), 
 
 76. 
 Smith v. Dittman (16 Daly, 427), 52. 
 Smith v. Dunbar (8 Pick. 246), 128. 
 Smith v. Earl Brownlow (L. R. 9 Eq. 
 
 241), 116. 
 Smith v. Elmer (47 Wis. 479), 140. 
 Smith v. Engle (44 Iowa, 265), 232. 
 Smith v. Gugerty (4 Barb. 619), 198. 
 Smith v. Holcomb (99 Mass. 553), 
 
 343. 
 Smith v. Holland (61 N. Y. 635), 211. 
 Smith v. Hutchinson (61 Mo. 83), 84. 
 Smith v. Ingraham (7 Cow. 419), 277. 
 Smith v. Insurance Co. (89 Pa. St. 
 
 287), 218. 
 Smith v. Janesville (52 Wis. 680), 
 
 242. 
 Smith v. Jones (76 Me. 138), 286, 287. 
 Smith v. Jones (6 Rand. 32), 138. 
 Smith v. Kipp (49 Minn. 119), 380. 
 Smith v. Lindsay (89 Mo. 76), 130. 
 Smith v. McGuire (67 Ala. 34), 136, 
 
 157. 
 Smith v. Milliken (2 Minn. 319), 74. 
 Smith v. Mott (65 Hun, 625), 370. 
 Smith v. Natchez S. Co. (1 How., 
 
 Miss., 479), 124. 
 Smith v. Navasota (72 Tex. 422), 145. 
 Smith v. Pelott (68 Hun, 632), 76. 
 Smith v. Perry (29 N. J. L. 74), 268. 
 Smith v. Pierce (65 Vt. 200; 25 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 1092), 309. 
 
 Smith v. Powers (15 N. H. 546), 115. 
 Smith v. Prescott (17 Me. 277), 133. 
 Smith v. Putnam (62 N. H. 369), 226. 
 Smith v. Railroad Co. (76 Tex. 63), 
 
 198. 
 Smith v. Railroad Co. (25 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. R. Cas. 546), 8. 
 Smith v. Rankin (20 111. 14), 107. 
 Smith v. Rentz (131 Pa. St. 169), 60. 
 Smith v. Rummels (94 Mich. 617), 
 
 357. 
 Smith v. Sainsbury (5 C. & B. 196 ; 
 
 24 E. C. L.), 139. 
 Smith v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co. 
 
 (2 Tenn. Ch. 599), 306. 
 Smith v. Sanford (12 Pick. 139), 60. 
 Smith v. Shackelford (9 Dana, 452), 
 
 115. 
 Smith v. Smith (52 N. J. L. 207), 35. 
 Smith v. Smith (15 N. H. 55), 230. 
 Smith v. Smith (4 Paige, 432), 231. 
 Smith v. Speed (50 Ala. 276), 238. 
 Smith v. State (Tex., 1893, 20 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 831), 10. 
 Smith v. State (53 Ala. 407), 69. 
 Smith v. State (11 Pac. Rep. 908), 
 
 379. 
 Smith v. State (29 Fla. 108; 10 S. 
 
 Rep. 894), 8. 
 Smith v. State (21 Tex. App. 277), 
 
 341. 
 Smith v. State (88 Ala. 73), 349. 
 Smith v. State (4 Lea, Tenn., 428), 
 
 330. 
 Smith v. State (Tex., 1893, 20 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 554), 350. 
 Smith v. State (28 Tex. App. 309), 
 
 324. 
 Smith v. State (42 Tex. 444), 344. 
 Smith v. State (15 S. E. Rep. 675 ; 88 
 
 Ga. 627), 89. 
 Smith v. State (2 Ohio- St. 513), 201. 
 Smith v. Stickney (17 Barb., N. Y, 
 
 489), 350. 
 Smith v. Surman (9 B. & C. 561), 
 
 253. 
 Smith v. Swan (22 S. W. Rep. 247, 
 
 Tex., 1893), 106.
 
 clxii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Beferences are to sections. 
 
 Smith v. Tebbitt (L. R. 1 P. & M. 
 
 354), 53. 
 Smith v. The Serapis (49 Fed. Rep. 
 
 393), 362. 
 Smith v. Traders' Bank (82 Tex. 368), 
 
 33. 
 Smith v. Turley (32 W. Ya. 14), 168. 
 Smith v. Utisch (Iowa, 1892, 52 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 343), 348. 
 Smith v. Walton (8 Gill, Md., 77), 
 
 139, 139a. 
 Smith v. Weed (20 Wend. 184), 128. 
 Smith v. Whittier (95 Cal. 279), 75. 
 Smith v. Williams (15 S. E. Rep. 
 
 130; 89 Ga. 9), 80. 
 Smith v. Williams (38 Miss. 48), 138. 
 Smith v. Wilson (1 Tex. Civ. App. 
 
 86), 79. 
 Smith v. Wood (Ind., 1893, 32 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 921), 209. 
 Smith v. Young (1 Campb. 439), 35. 
 Smith v. Zeigler (63 Hun, 624), 368. 
 Smith, In re (61 Hun, 101), 170, 171. 
 Smith & Keating Implement Co. v. 
 
 Wheeler (27 Mo. App. 16), 373. 
 Smythev. Caswell (67 Tex. 567), 139a. 
 Snell v. State (29 Tex. App. 296; 15 
 
 S. W. Rep. 722), 101, 103. 
 Snelling, In re (136 N. Y. 515), 188, 
 
 380. 
 Snider v. Burke (84 Ala. 53), 276. 
 Snodgrass v. Com. (89 Ya. 679; 17 
 
 S. E. Rep. 238), 342, 347. 
 Snohll v. Met. R. Co. (19 D. C. 399), 71. 
 Snow v. Allen (151 Mass. 51), 212. 
 Snow v. Railroad (6 Me. 230), 344. 
 Snow v. Starr (12 S. W. Rep. 673 ; 75 
 
 Tex. 411), 66. 
 Snowball v. Goodricke (4 B. & Ad. 
 
 541), 73. 
 Snyder v. Berkes (Ala., 4 S. W. Rep. 
 
 225), 140. 
 Snyder v. Brown (4 Watts, 132), 142. 
 Snyder v. Free (114 Mo. 360; 21 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 847), 51. 
 Snyder v. Harper (24 W. Va. 206), 24. 
 Snyder v. McKeever (10 Bradw., 111., 
 188), 139. 
 
 Snyder v. Nations (6 Blackf. 295), 
 
 316. 
 Snyder v. State (59 Ind. 109), 93. 
 Snyder v. Wolford (38 Minn. 175), 
 
 267. 
 Soaps v. Eichberg (42 111. App. 375), 
 
 21, 76, 127. 
 Society v. Young (2 N. H. 310), 218. 
 Soher, In re (78 Cal. 477), 210. 
 Solomons v. Hughes (24 Kan. 281), 
 
 143a, 242. 
 Solyer v. Romanet (52 Tex. 562), 136. 
 Somers v. Wright (114 Mass. 171), 60. 
 Somerville v. Winbush (7 Gratt. , Va., 
 
 205), 242. 
 Sommer v. Smith (90 Cal. 260; 27 
 
 Pac. Rep. 208), 18. 
 Souder v. Schechterly (90 Pa. St. 83), 
 
 70. 
 South v. State (86 Ala. 617), 306. 
 Southard v. Rexford (6 Cowen, 254), 
 
 354. 
 Southard v. Sutton (68 Me. 575), 84. 
 South Baltimore Co. v. Muhlback 
 
 (69 Md. 395), 310. 
 South Bend Iron Works v. Cottrell 
 
 (31 Fed. Rep. 256), 217. 
 Southerland v. W. & W. R. Co. (106 
 
 N. C. 100), 57. 
 South, etc. Co. v. Jeffries (40 Mo. 
 
 App. 360), 237. 
 South, etc. Co. v. Wood (74 Ala. 449), 
 
 237. 
 Southern Exp. Co. v. Thornton (41 
 
 Miss. 216), 139. 
 Southern Ins. Co. v. Wolverton Hd. 
 
 Co. (Tex., 1892, 19 S. W. Rep. 
 
 615), 159. 
 Southern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rauh (49 
 
 Fed. Rep. 696; 1 C. C. A. 416), 
 
 7, 374. 
 Southwick v. Southwick (2 Sweeny, 
 
 234), 168. 
 Sowry v. Buffington (6 W. Va. 249), 
 
 253. 
 Spahn v. People (117 111. 538), 281. 
 Spalding v. Saltill (Colo., 1893, 31 
 
 Pac. Rep. 486), 343.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clxiii 
 
 ^References are to sections. 
 
 Spalding v. Saxton (G Watts, Pa., 
 
 338), 320. 
 Spangenberg v. Charles (44 111. App. 
 
 526), 362. 
 Spangler v. Jacoby (14 111. 299), 144. 
 Sparks v. Com. (89 Ky. 644), 306. 
 Sparks v. Sparks (51 Kan. 195 ; 32 
 
 Pac. Rep. 892), 171, 250. 
 Sparks v. Texas Loan Agency (19 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 256), 83. 
 Sparrenberger v. State (53 Ala. 481), 
 
 176. 
 Spaulding v. Bliss (83 Mich. 311), 
 
 193. 
 Spanlding v. Vincent (24 Vt. 501), 
 
 143. 
 Speake v. United States (9 Cranch, 
 
 28), 128. 
 Spear v. Coate (3 McCord, S. C, 227), 
 
 115. 
 Spear v. Richardson (37 N. H. 26), 
 
 333. 
 Spears v. Burton (31 Miss. 547), 233, 
 
 234. 
 Spears v. Forrest (15 Vt. 435), 349. 
 Spears v. Ohio (20 Ohio St. 583), 89. 
 Speiden v. State (3 Tex. App. 156), 
 
 127. 
 Speight v. State (80 Ga. 512), 351. 
 Spellier, etc. Co. v. Geiger (23 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 547 ; 147 Pa. St. 399), 242. 
 Spencely, In re (1892, Prob. 142), 233. 
 Spencer v. Bill (109 N. C. 39), 356. 
 Spencer v. Carr (45 N. Y. 410), 229. 
 Spencer v. Dougherty (23 III. App. 
 
 399), 351. 
 Spencer v. Fortescue (16 N. E. Rep. 
 
 898), 76. 
 Spencer v. Fuller (68 Ga. 73), 150a. 
 Spencer v. Langdon (21 111. 192), 148. 
 Spencer v. Newton (6 Ad. & E. 623), 
 
 287. 
 Spencer v. Robbins (106 Ind. 580), 
 
 309. 
 Spencer v. State (31 Tex. 64), 97. 
 Spencer, In re (96 Cal. 448), 222. 
 Sperb v. Railroad Co. (57 Hun, 588), 
 
 371. 
 
 Sperry v. Willard (1 Wend., N. Y., 
 
 32), 287. 
 Spicer v. State (69 Ala. 159), 202. 
 Spiegel v. Hays (118 N. Y. 660), 322. 
 Spies v. People (122 111. 1 ; 3 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 320 ; 9 Cr. L. Mag. 829), 10, 
 
 69, 70, 381. 
 Spies v. Price (91 Ala. 166), 246. 
 Spiller v. Scribner (36 Vt. 247), 210, 
 
 220. 
 Spitz's Appeal (56 Conn. 184 ; 14 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 776), 167, 168. 
 Spofford v. Spofford (10 H. H. 254), 
 
 77. 
 Spohn v. Mo. R. R. Co. (116 Mo. 617; 
 
 22 S. W. Rep. 690), 350. 
 Spragins v. White (108 N. C. 449), 206. 
 Spraguev. Bond (113 N. C. 551; 18 
 
 S. E. Rep. 701), 79, 310. 
 Sprague v. Luther (8 R. I. 252), 276. 
 Sprigg v. Moale (28 Md. 497), 233. ' 
 Springer v. Bien (!0 N. Y. S. 530; 27 
 
 N. E. Rep. 1076). 153. 
 Springer v. Chicago (37 111. App. 206; 
 
 135 111. 532), 344. 
 Springer v. Hall (83 Mo. 93), 140. 
 Springfield v. Dalboy (139 111. 34; 29 
 
 N. E. Rep. 860), 341, 344. 
 Springfield v. Vivian (03 Mich. 681), 
 
 216. 
 Springfield R. Co. v. Rhea (44 Ark. 
 
 258), 253. 
 Springs v. Schenck (106 N. C. 153), 
 
 60, 142. 
 Springsteen v. Sampson (32 N. Y. 
 
 703), 371. 
 Spring Valley, etc. Co. v. Drinkhouse 
 
 (92 Cal. 528), 253. 
 Spurrier v. Front St. Ry. Co. (3 Wash. 
 
 St. 659), 250. 
 Stackpole v. Arnold (11 Mass. 31), 
 
 205, 208. 
 Stafford v. Morning Journal (68 Hun, 
 
 467), 7. 
 Stafford v. Rice (5 Cowen, 23), 310. 
 Stafford v. State (55 Ga. 592), 89. 
 Stallings v. Gottschalk (Md., 1893, 26 
 
 Atl. Rep. 524), 58, 214.
 
 clxiv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Stall ings v. Hallum (79 Tex. 421), 
 
 58. 
 Stallinga v. Whitaker (55 Ark. 494), 
 
 129. 
 Stamford v. Hornitz (49 Ind. 525), 
 
 309. 
 Standard Oil Co. v. Tierney (Ky., 
 
 1892, 17 S. W. Rep. 1025), 8. 
 Stanfell v. Lesvellyn (Ky., 1893, 22 
 
 S. W. Rep. 645), 380. 
 Stanley v. Montgomery (102 Ind. 
 
 102), 11, 168. 
 Stanley v. McElrath (86 Cal. 449), 
 
 244. 
 Stanley v. Stanley (112 Ind. 143; 13 
 
 N. E. Rep. 261), 168. 
 Stanton v. Ellis (16 Barb., N. Y., 319). 
 
 356. 
 Stanton v. Hodges (6 Vt. 64), 150a. 
 Staples v. State (14 S. W. Rep. 603; 
 
 S9 Tenn. 231), 346. 
 Stapleton v. Crofts (18 Ad. & E. 367, 
 
 369), 166. 
 Stapleton v. King (33 Iowa, 28), 211. 
 Stapylton v. Clough (2 El. & Bl. 933), 
 
 58. 
 Star Brick Co. v. Redsdale (36 N. J. 
 
 L. 220), 242. 
 Stark v. Canaday (3 Litt. 399), 215. 
 Starkey v. People (17 111. 21), 102. 
 Staser v. Hogan (21 N. E. Rep. 911), 
 
 309. 
 State v. Abbott (8 W. Va. 741), 102. 
 State v. Adams (40 La. Ann. 213), 
 
 166. 
 State v. Adams (20 Kan. 311), 344. 
 State v. Adamson (43 Minn. 196), 
 
 322, 354. 
 State v. Ah Clung (14 Nev. 79), 39, 
 
 345. 
 State v. Ah Lee (8 Oreg. 214), 100, 
 
 344. 
 State v. Aldrich (50 Kan. 666), 101. 
 State v. Alexander (30 S. C. 74), 231. 
 State v. Alexander (66 Mo. 148), 234. 
 State v. Alexis (La., 1893, 13 S. Rep. 
 
 394), 354. 
 State v. Alien (107 N. C. 105), 354a. 
 
 State v. Allen (57 Iowa, 451), 324. 
 State v. Aired (115 Mo. 471; 22 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 363), 283. 
 State v. Ames (64 Me. 386), 281. 
 State v. Anderson (10 Oreg. 448), 5. 
 State v. Anderson (86 Mo. 309), 6. 
 State v. Anderson (8 S. Rep. 1, Fla., 
 
 1890), 152. 
 State v. Appleby (25 S. C. 500), 77. 
 State v. Ariel (S. C, 1893, 16 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 779), 237. 
 State v. Armstrong (106 Mo. 395 ; 16 
 
 S. W. Rep. 604), 11. 
 State v. Armstrong (4 Minn. 335), 
 
 166. 
 State v. Arnold (13 Ired., N. C, 184), 
 
 345. 
 State v. Avery (113 Mo. 475; 21 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 193), 4, 340. 
 State v. Baber (74 Mo. 292), 197. 
 State v. Babtiste (26 La. Ann. 134), 
 
 320. 
 State v. Bailey (16 Ind. 46), 242. 
 State v. Baker (33 W. Va. 379), 39. 
 State v. Baker (Oreg., 1893, 32 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 161), 343. 
 State v. Baldwin (36 Kan. 17, 18), 9, 
 
 188, 337, 340, 350. 
 State v. Baldwin (45 N. W. Rep. 
 
 297), 102. 
 State v. Bailer (26 W. Va. 90), 281. 
 State v. Bank (10 Mo. App. 482), 71. 
 State v. Banks (40 La. Ann. 736), 
 
 324. 
 State v. Bannister (35 S. C. 290; 14 
 
 S. E. Rep. 678), 101. 
 State v. Barber (36 U. S. 313), 241. 
 State v. Barrows (76 Me. 401), 306, 
 
 323. 
 State v. Bartlett (47 Ind. 396), 146. 
 State v. Bartlett (55 Me. 200), 354a. 
 State v. Bassett (34 La. Ann. 1108), 
 
 23. 
 State v. Baxter (82 N. C. 602), 384. 
 State v. Bayonne (23 La. Ann. 78), 
 
 324. 
 State v. Beasley (84 Iowa, 83; 50 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 570), 249.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clxv 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 State v. Beaucleigh (92 Mo. 490), 351. 
 State v. Belcher (13 S. C. 459), 166. 
 State v. Bener (64 Me. 267), 335. 
 State v. Bennett (31 Iowa, 24), 166. 
 State v. Bergen (34 N. J. L. 439), 242. 
 State v. Berkley (92 Mo. 41), 277, 
 State v. Bernard (45 Iowa, 234), 167. 
 State v. Bertin (24 La. Ann. 46), 344. 
 State v. Best (12 S. E. Rep. 907; 111 
 
 N. C. 638), 23, 53, 110, 176. 
 State v. Birdwell (36 La. Ann. 859), 9. 
 State v. Bishop (51 Vt. 287), 229. 
 State v. Black (42 La. Ann. 861 ; 8 
 
 S. Rep. 594), 102, 334. 
 State v. Blackburn (80 N. C. 474), 
 
 101. 
 State v. Blalock (Phill., N. C, 242), 
 
 320. 
 State v. Blemis (24 Mo. 402), 123. 
 State v. Block (42 La. Ann. 861), 101. 
 State v. Blunt (91 Mo. 503), 6. 
 State v. Bohan (15 Kan. 407), 102. 
 State v. Boswell (2 Dev., N. C, 200, 
 
 210), 350. 
 State v. Bourne (21 Oreg. 218), 276. 
 State v. Bowman (78 N. C. 509), 195. 
 State v. Boyd (34 Neb. 435; 51 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 964), 240, 242. 
 State v. Bradley (64 Vt. 466), 52. 
 State v. Branch (112 Mo. 661), 210. 
 State v. Brecht (41 Minn. 50), 234. 
 State v. Brewer (98 N. C. 607), 5. 
 State v. Bronson (49 Kan. 758), 9. 
 State v. Brooks (29 Mo. App. 286), 5, 
 State v. Brooks (92 Mo. 542 ; 5 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 257). 91. 
 State v. Brooks (99 Mo. 137; 12 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 633), 11. 
 State v. Brookshire (2 Ala. 303), 330. 
 State v. Broughton (7 Ired. L., N. C, 
 
 96), 176. 
 State v. Brownlee (84 Iowa, 473; 51 
 
 N. W. Rep. 25), 323. 
 State v. Buck (62 N. H. 670), 281. 
 State v. Buckles (26 Kan. 237), 23. 
 State v. Buell (89 Mo. 595), 346. 
 State v. Burpee (65 Vt. 1; 25 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 964), 11. 
 
 State v. Byers (100 N. C. 512), 234, 
 
 249, 3546. 
 State v. Byrd (94 N. C. 624), 131. 
 State v. Cain (20 W. Va. 177), 384. 
 State v. Cain (20 W. Va. 679), 102. 
 State v. Cain (9 W. Va. 559), 53. 
 State v. Calligan (41 La. Ann. 574), 
 
 350. 
 State v. Campbell (1 Rich. , S. C. , 
 
 224), 123. 
 State v. Carden (84 Ala. 217), 351. 
 State v. Cardoza (11 S. C. 195), 341. 
 State v. Carlisle (57 Mo. 102), 89. 
 State v. Carlos (S. C, 1893, 16 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 832), 376. 
 State v. Carpenter (20 Vt. 9), 281. 
 State v. Carroll (51 N. W. Rep. 1159, 
 
 Iowa, 1892), 89. 
 State v. Carroll (30 S. C. 85), 88, 89. 
 State v. Carroll (38 Conn. 449), 240. 
 State v. Carson (36 S. C. 524; 15 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 588), 13, 89. 
 State v. Carter (35 Vt. 378), 168. 
 State v. Carver (22 Oreg. 602; 30 
 
 Pac. Rep. 315), 234. 
 State v. Case (24 N. J. L. 416), 142. 
 State v. Cassidy (Iowa, 1892, 52 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 1), 10. 
 State v. Cecil (54 Md. 426), 123. 
 State v. Chamberlain (89 Mo. 129), 
 
 346, 354a. 
 State v. Chambers (39 Iowa, 179), 90. 
 State v. Chambers (45 La. Ann. 36), 
 
 89. 
 State v. Chambers (43 La. Ann. 1108; 
 
 10 S. Rep. 247), 37A 
 State v. Chisnell (W. Va., 1892, 15 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 412), 346. 
 State v. Choy (84 Cal. 276), 11. 
 State v. Christian (44 La. Ann. 950), 
 
 349. 
 State v. Chyo Chiagk (92 Mo. 395), 
 
 315. 
 State v. Claire (41 La. Ann. 1067), 
 
 374. 
 State v. Clark (15 S. C. 403), 192. 
 State v. Clawson (30 Mo. App. 139), 
 
 349.
 
 clxvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 State v. Clayton (34 Mo. App. 465), 
 
 140. 
 State v. Cleveland (80 Mo. 108), 239. 
 State v. Coella (3 Wash. St, 99), 89, 
 
 354. 
 State v. Coffey (44 Mo. App. 455), 
 
 349, 350. 
 State v. Colclough (31 S. C. 156), 23. 
 State v. Cole (63 Iowa, 695), 190. 
 State v. Coleman (20 S. C. 444), 249. 
 State v. Collins (72 N. C. 144), 23. 
 State v. Collins (20 Iowa, 85), 167. 
 State v. Colwell (8 R. I. 132), 337. 
 State v. Condry (5 Jones' L., N. C, 
 
 418), 323. 
 State v. Cook (23 La. Ann. 347), 312. 
 State v. Cook (17 Kan. 394), 195. 
 State v. Cooper (101 N. C. 684), 242. 
 State v. Corcoran (38 La. Ann. 949), 
 
 52. 
 State v. County (89 Mo. 237), 239. 
 State v. Covington (2 Bailey, S. C, 
 
 569), 80. 
 State v. Crabtree (Mo., 1892, 20 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 7), 101. 
 State v. Crane (110 N. C. 530), 6. 
 State v. Crawford (S. C, 1893, 17 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 199), 11. 
 State v. Crawford (33 Am. L. Reg. 
 
 21), 249. 
 State v. Crenshaw (32 La. Ann. 406), 
 
 192. 
 State v. Crow (107 Mo. 341 ; 17 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 744), 39, 350. 
 State v. Crowson (98 N. C. 595), 95. 
 State v. Cummins (76 Iowa, 133), 335. 
 State v. Curren (51 Iowa, 112), 10. 
 State v.Dana (59 Vt. 614; 10 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 727), 324. 
 State v. Danforth (48 Iowa, 43), 345. 
 State v. Daniel (31 La. Ann 91), 101. 
 State v. Darnell (1 Houst. C. C, Del., 
 
 321), 91, 95. 
 State v. Daugherty (17 New 376), 57. 
 State v. Davenport (S. C, 1893, 17 
 
 S. E. Rep. 37), 5. 
 State v. Davis (48 Kan. 1), 330. 
 State v. Davis (29 Mo. 391), 350. 
 
 State v. Dayton (25 N. J. L. 54), 355. 
 State v. De Graff (113 N. C. 688; 18 
 
 S. E. Rep. 507), 140. 
 State v. Demareste(41La. Ann. 617), 
 
 93. 
 State v. Depoister (Nev., 1891, 25 
 
 Pac. Rep. 1000), 178. 
 State v. Dickinson (41 Wis. 299), 102. 
 State v. Didy (72 N. C. 325), 89, 95. 
 State v. Dilley (15 Ore?. 70), 342. 
 State v. Dodson (16 S. C. 453), 320. 
 State v. Dodson (4 Oreg. 64), 102. 
 State v. Donellon (12 La. Ann. 1292), 
 
 140. 
 State v. Donelon (La., 1893, 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 922), 97. 
 State v. Doris (40 Conn. 145), 58. 
 State v. Dorr (82 Me. 212), 23. 
 State v. Dorsey (40 La. Ann. 739), 
 
 343. 
 State v. Downs (91 Mo. 19), 10, 102. 
 State v. Duffy (57 Conn. 525), 313, 
 
 340. 
 State v. Dufour (31 La. Ann. 804), 
 
 93. 
 State v. Dumphy (4 Minn. 438), 10. 
 State v. Duncan (Wash., 1893, 35 
 
 Pac. Rep. 117), 354. 
 State v. Duncan (116 Mo. 288; 22 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 690), 39, 88, 96, 339. 
 State v. Duncan (6 Ired. L, N. C, 
 
 236), 96. 
 State v. Dunlop (24 Me. 77), 23. 
 State v. Dunnell (3 R. I. 127), 239. 
 State v. Dusenberry (112 Mo. 277), 
 
 176, 283. 
 State v. Dyer (59 Me. 503). 166. 
 State v. Eckler (106 Mo. 585), 10. 
 State v. Edwards (109 Mo. 318), 6. 
 State v. Effinger (44 Mo. App. 81), 
 
 241. 
 State v. Elkins (101 Mo. 344; 14 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 116), 101. 
 State v. Elliott (45 Iowa, 386, 486), 
 
 100, 102. 
 State v. Elwood (17 R. I. 763), 10, 39, 
 
 340. 
 State v. Erb (74 Mo. 199), 197.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clxvii 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 State v. Ervien (N. J., 1888, 12 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 136), 265. 
 State v. Falconer (70 Iowa, 418), 
 
 283. 
 State v. Farley (Iowa, 1893, 53 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 1089), 336. 
 State v. Farmer (84 Me. 436), 316, 
 
 354. 
 State v. Farnhaiu (10 S. Rep. 531), 
 
 357. 
 State v. Farrington (Iowa, 1894, 57 
 
 N. W. Rep. 606), 339. 
 State v. Fassett (16 Conn. 468), 176. 
 State v. Feites (51 Iowa, 495), 91, 93, 
 
 197. 
 State v. Finch (70 Iowa, 316), 199. 
 State v. Fitzsimmons (30 Mo. 236), 
 
 330. 
 State v. Flack (48 Kan. 146), 23. 
 State v. Flanagan (25 Ark. 92), 88. 
 State v. Fletcher (Oreg., 1893, 33 
 
 Pac. Rep. 575), 96, 101, 201. 
 State v.Flint (60 Yt. 304; 14 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 178), 350. 
 State v. Foley (15 Nev. 64), 320. 
 State v. Foot Yon (Oreg., 1S93, 33 
 
 Pac. Rep. 537), 102. 
 State v. Fox (25 N. J. L. 256), 23. 
 State v. Frazier (1 Houst., Del., 176), 
 
 57, 102, 103. 
 State v. Freeman (5 Conn. 34S), 176. 
 State v. Fruge (28 La. Ann. 657), 343. 
 State v. Gafberg (12 La. Ann. 265), 
 
 23. 
 State v. Garrett (71 N. C. 95), 38a. 
 State v. Garvey (25 La. Ann. 191), 
 
 93. 
 State v. Gay (94 N. C. 814), 139. 
 State v. Gayette (11 R. I. 592), 241. 
 State v. Geddis (42 Iowa, 268), 197. 
 State v. Geclicke (43 N. J. L. 86), 192. 
 State v. Georgia, etc. Co. (109 N. C. 
 
 310), 6. 
 State v. Gibbs (10 Mont. 213), 384. 
 State v. Gibson (10 S. E. Rep. 58; 
 
 33 W. Va. 97), 244. 
 State v. Gilleck (10 Iowa, 9S), 343. 
 State v. Gilman (51 Me. 306), 93. 
 
 State v. Ginger (80 Iowa, 574), 192, 
 
 377. 
 State v. Glahn (97 Mo. 579), 89. 
 State v. Glynn (51 Vt. 577), 350. 
 State v. Gordet (7 Ired., N. C, 210), 
 
 23. 
 State v. Gott (44 Md. 341), 208. 
 State v. Gould (26 W. Va. 258), 241. 
 State v. Grace (18 Minn. 398), 280. 
 State v. Gracly (84 Mo. 220), 176. 
 State v. Graham (41 N. J. L. 15), 
 
 323. 
 State v. Graham (74 N. C. 646), 39, 
 
 202. 
 State v. Gramelspacher (126 Ind. 
 
 398), 240. 
 State v. Grant (Iowa, 1893, 53 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 120). 6, 69, 97. 
 State v. Grant (22 Me. 171), 89. 
 State v. Grate (68 Mo. 23), 10. 
 State v. Graves (95 Mo. 510), 346. 
 State v. Gray (29 Minn. 144), 23. 
 State v. Green (15 N. J. L. 88), 357. 
 State v. Green (1 Houst. C. C, Del., 
 
 217), 9. 
 State v. Gryder (44 La. Ann. 962), 
 
 24. 
 State v. Gurnee (14 Kan. Ill), 30. 
 State v. Guyer (6 Iowa, 263), 167. 
 State v. Hack (Mo., 1893), 23 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 1089), 354. 
 State v. Hall (79 Iowa, 674 ; 44 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 914), 345. 
 State v. Hambleton (22 Mo. 452), 
 
 237. 
 State v. Hamilton (42 La. Ann. 1204), 
 
 346. 
 State v. Hamilton (8 S. Rep. 304; 55 
 
 Mo. 520), 50, 249. 
 State v. Hammet (12 Ind. 448), 244. 
 State v. Hanley (34 Minn. 430), 188. 
 State v. Harmon (Del., 3 Harr., 567), 
 
 89. 
 State v. Harper (35 Ohio St. 78), 102. 
 State v. Harris (34 La. Ann. 118), 
 
 343. 
 State v. Harrison (5 Jones, N. C, 
 
 115), 7.
 
 clxviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 State v. Harrison (15 S. E. Rep. 982; 
 
 36 W. Va. 729), 231, 283. 
 State v. Harrod (102 Mo. 590), 52. 
 State v. Hartman (46 Wis. 478), 343. 
 State v. Hastings (53 N. H. 452), 140. 
 State v. Havelin (6 La: Ann. 107), 69. 
 State v. Hawkins (100 Mo. 666), 324. 
 State v. Hawkins (18 Oreg. 476; 23 
 
 Pac. Rep. 475), 11. 
 State v. Hayden (51 Vt. 296), 197. 
 State v. Haynes (71 N. C. 79), 90. 
 State v. Head (S. C, 1893, 16 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 892), 93. 
 State v. Heed (57 Mo. 252), 384. 
 State v. Henderson (Iowa, 1893, 50 
 
 N. W. Rep. 758), 9, 227. 
 State v. Henderson (29 W. Va. 147), 
 
 140. 
 State v. Hendrix (La., 1893, 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 621), 378. 
 State v. Hendrix (98 Mo. 374), 142. 
 State v. Hennessy (55 Iowa, 299), 324. 
 State v. Hennings (54 N. W. Rep. 
 
 537, S. D., 1893), 355. 
 State v. Higgins (13 R. I. 330), 250. 
 State v. Hillstock (La., 1893, 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 352), 284. 
 State v. Hinchman (27 Pa. St. 479), 
 
 242. 
 State v. Hinkle (6 Iowa, 380), 195. 
 State v. Hirsch (45 Mo. 429), 250. 
 State v. Hoblitzelle (85 Mo. 620), 140. 
 State v. Hockett (70 Iowa, 442; 30 
 
 N. W. Rep. 742), 10, 231. 
 State v. Hodge (50 N. H. 510), 11, 229. 
 State v. Hogue (6 Jones, N. C, 381), 
 
 10. 
 State v. Holden (44 N. W. Rep. 123; 
 
 42 Minn. 350), 89. 
 State v. Holland (83 N. C. 624), 324. 
 State v. Holt (84 Me. 509), 281. 
 State v. Hooper (2 Bailey, S. C, 37), 
 
 139. 
 State v. Hopkins (50 Vt. 316), 330. 
 State v. Hopper (7 1 Mo. 425), 343. 
 State v. Home (9 Kan. 119), 348. 
 State v. Horner (Del., 1893, 26 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 73), 281. 
 
 State v. Hornsby (8 Rob., La., 554), 
 
 277. 
 State v. Horton (100 N. C. 443), 345. 
 State v. Houx (109 Mo. 654), 354. 
 State v. Howard (32 Vt. 380), 52. 
 State v. Howard (S. C, 1892, 14 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 481), 89, 339. 
 State v. Howard (Mo., 1893, 24 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 81), 316. 
 State v. Hoyt (46 Conn. 330), 52, 231. 
 State v. Hoyt (47 Conn. 518), 9. 
 State v. Huff (76 Iowa, 200), 342. 
 State v. Hulse (106 Mo. 41), 8. 
 State v. Humble (34 Mo. App. 343), 
 
 23. 
 State v. Hunsaker (16 Oreg. 497), 375. 
 State v. Hunter (50 Kan. 302), 5. 
 State v. Hurley (1 Houst. Cr. Cas., 
 
 Del., 28), 231. 
 State v. Hyer (39 N. J. L. 598), 324. 
 State v. Hymer (15 Nev. 49), 9, 52. 
 State v. Ice (34 W. Va. 244; 12 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 695), 346. 
 State v. Ihrig (106 Mo. 267), 381. 
 State v. Isham (1 Hawkes, 185), 140. 
 State v. Jackson (44 La. Ann. 160; 
 
 10 S. E. Rep. 600), 350. 
 State v. Jackson (106 Mo. 174), 226, 
 
 306, 324. 
 State v. Jackson (30 Me. 29). 23. 
 State v. Jackson (9 Mont. 458), 93. 
 State v. Jacobs (106 N. C. 695), 335. 
 State v. James (34 S. C. 579), 172. 
 State v. Jansen (22 Kan. 98), 127. 
 State v. Jennett (88 N. C. 605), 229. 
 State v. Jerome (82 Iowa, 749 ; 48 
 
 N. W. Rep. 722), 52. 
 State v. Jobnson (29 La. Ann. 717), 
 
 333. 
 State v. Johnson (67 N. C. 58), 202. 
 State v. Johnson (94 Ala. 35), 9. 
 State v. Johnson (34 N. W. Rep. 177; 
 
 72 Iowa, 396), 101, 346. 
 State v. Johnson (30 La. Ann. 884), 89. 
 State v. Johnson (41 La. Ann. 574), 
 
 277. 
 State v. Johnson (12 Nev. 124), 123. 
 State v. Johnson (37 Minn. 493), 5, 6, 7.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clxix 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 State v. Jolly (3 Dev. & Bat. 110), 
 
 168. 
 State v. Jones (50 N. H. 370), 249. 
 State v. Jones (54 Mo. 478), 90. 
 State v. Jones (13 S. E. Rep. 325), 172. 
 State v. Jones (41 Kan. 309), 201. 
 State v. Jones (44 La. Ann. 1120), 11. 
 State v. Jones (29 S. C. 201), 352, 
 
 354. 
 State v. Jones (50 N. H. 3G9), 231. 
 State v. Josey (64 N. C. 56), 6. 
 State v. Justus (11 Oreg. 170), 201. 
 State v. Keeland (90 Mo. 237), 22. 
 State v. Keith (63 N. C. 140), 320. 
 State v. Kellerinan (13 Kan. 135), 
 
 324. 
 State v. Kelly (73 Mo. 608), 229. 
 State v. Kelsey (44 N. J. Law, 34), 
 
 125. 
 State v. Keuion (R. I., 1893, 26 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 199), 10. 
 State v. Kibling (63 Vt. 636). 1 1. 
 State v. Kilgore (70 Mo. 546), 23. 
 State v. Kinder (96 Mo. 548), 89. 
 State v. King (37 Iowa, 462), 143a. 
 State v. King (86 N. C. 603), 122, 123. 
 State v. Klinger (46 Mo. 229), 197. 
 State v. Knapp (45 N. H. 148), 196, 
 
 229. 
 State v. Knight (43 Me. 1), 193, 234. 
 State v. Knowles (48 Iowa, 593), 39. 
 State v. Koontz (5 S. E. Rep. 32S), 
 
 139a. 
 State v. Kriechbaum (81 Iowa, 633; 
 
 47 N. W. Rep. S72), 250. 
 State w.Lantz (23 Kan. 728), 343. 
 State v. Laque (41 La. Ann. 1070), 
 
 122. 
 State v. Larkin (49 N. H. 39), 69. 
 State v. Lautenschlager (22 Minn. 
 
 514), 23. 
 State v. Lawhorne (66 N. C. 638), 
 
 90. 
 State v. Leabo (89 Mo. 247), 188. 
 State v. Lefaivre (53 Mo. 470), 217. 
 State v. Lehman (S. D„ 1891, 49 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 31), 197. 
 State v. Lentz (45 Minn. 377), 8. 
 
 State v. Leuth (5 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 
 
 94), 93. 
 State v. Libby (84 Me. 461), 23. 
 State v. Liquor (73 Me. 278), 242. 
 State v. Litchfield (58 Me. 267), 324. 
 State v. Littlefield (3 R. I. 124), 76. 
 State v. Lockwood (58 Vt. 378), 330. 
 State v. Long (37 W. Va. 266), 140. 
 State v. Lopez (15 Nev. 407), 344. 
 State v. Loughlin (20 Atl. Rep. 981, 
 
 N. H., 1890), 142. 
 State v. Lowry (74 N. C. 121), 241. 
 State v. Lucas (Oreg., 1893, 33 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 5-18), 334. 
 State v. Lund (49 Kan. 580), 283. 
 State v. Lurch (12 Oreg. 99), 346. 
 State v, Lyon (81 N. C. 600), 323. 
 State v. Magoon (50 Vt. 333), 374. 
 State v. Maguire (Md., 1893, 21 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 212), 381. 
 State v. Mali an (32 Vt. 241), 93. 
 State v. Maher (74 Iowa, 77), 375. 
 State v. Maier (36 W. Va. 757), 188, 
 
 197, 231. 
 State v. Malloy (31 Fed, Rep. 19), 190. 
 State v. Manceaux(42La. Ann. 1164), 
 
 283. 
 State v. Marshall (Mo., 1893, 22 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 45), 9. 
 State v. Martin (15 S. W. Rep. 529; 
 
 103 Mo. 50S), 757. 
 State v. Martin (N. J., 3 Cr. L. Mag. 
 
 44), 231. 
 State v. Martin (74 Mo. 547), 9. 
 State v. Mason (112 Mo. 374), 57. 
 State v. Massey (104 N. C. 877), 277. 
 State v. Mathes(90Me. 571), 101, 102, 
 
 103. 
 State v. Mathews (98 Mo. 125), 306, 
 
 334, 346. 
 State v. Mathews (78 N. C. 523), 10. 
 State v. Maylook (9 Oreg. 54), 143. 
 State v. Mayor (11 Humph. 217), 242. 
 State v. McCafferty (63 Me. 233), 241. 
 State v. McCanon (57 Mo. 160), 102. 
 State v. McClain (49 Kan. 730), 153. 
 State v. McCarthy (43 La. Ann. 541), 
 
 277.
 
 €1XX 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 State v. McCord (8 Kan. 161), 167. 
 State v. McCoy (111 Mo. 517), 102. 
 State v. McDonald (43 N. J. L. 591), 
 
 168. 
 State v. McDowell (N. C, 7 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 7S5), 211. 
 State v. McFarlain (41 La. Ann. 686), 
 
 340, 3546. 
 State v. McGahey (N. D., 1893, 55 
 
 N. W. Rep. 753), 340, 341. 
 State v. McGee (46 N. W. Rep. 764 ; 
 
 81 Iowa, 17), 97. 
 State v. McGuff(88 Ala. 151), 319. 
 State v. McGuire (87 Mo. 642), 129. 
 State v. McGuire (15 R. I. 23), 346, 
 
 354. 
 State v. Mcintosh (S. C., 1893, 17 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 446), 11. 
 State v. McKean (36 Iowa, 343), 323. 
 State v. McKenzie (102 Mo. 620), 97. 
 State v. McNeil (33 La. Ann. 1332), 
 
 123. 
 State v. Medlecott (9 Kan. 257), 101. 
 State v. Merriman (S. C, 1891, 12 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 619), 354. 
 State v. Mewherter (47 Iowa, 88), 
 
 176. 
 State v. Michael (37 W. Va. 565), 
 
 319. 
 State v. Middleham (62 Iowa, 150), 
 
 384. 
 State v. Miller (47 Wis. 530), 140. 
 State v. Miller (35 Kan. 328), 93. 
 State v. Miller (42 La. Ann. 186), 89. 
 State v. Miller (100 Mo. 606), 3G7, 322, 
 
 382. 
 State v. Miller (93 Mo. 263), 340, 350. 
 State v. Milling (35 S. C. 16; 14 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 284), 5, 334. 
 State v. Mills (91 N. C. 581), 101. 
 State v. Milton (18 Mo. 417), 150a. 
 State v. Mims (S. C, 1893, 17 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 850), 97. 
 State v. Minnick (15 Iowa, 123), 240. 
 State v. Minor (Mo., 1893, 22 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 1085), 226, 306, 346. 
 State v. Minton (22 S. W. Rep. 808 ; 
 
 116 Mo. 605), 78. 
 
 State v. Mitchell (Phill., N. C., L. 
 
 447), 97. 
 State v. Mitchell (57 W. Va. 565), 
 
 113. 
 State v. Moelschein (53 Iowa, 310), 
 
 10, 382. 
 State v. Moncla(39La. Ann. 368), 88. 
 State v. Moore (11 Ired. L., N. C., 
 
 160), 232. 
 State v. Moore (101 Mo. 316), 229. 
 State v. Moore (Mo., 1893, 22 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 1086), 57. 
 State v. Moorman (27 S. C. 22), 89. 
 State v. Moran (34 Iowa, 453), 324. 
 State v. Moran (35 W. Va. 260), 884. 
 State v. Mordecai (68 N. C. 207), 39. 
 State v. Morphy (33 Iowa, 270), 250. 
 State v. Morrill (2 Dev., N. C, L. 
 
 269), 710. 
 State v. Morris (109 N. C. 820), 350. 
 State v. Morrison (3 Dev. 299), 250. 
 State v. Mounts (106 Mo. 226), 4. 
 State v. Mowry (37 Kan. 369; 15 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 282), 231. 
 State v. Moxley (14 S. W. Rep. 969 ; 
 
 15 id. 556 ; 102 Mo. 374), 39, 346. 
 State v. Mulkern (85 Me. 106), 4. 
 State v. Muilins (101 Mo. 514), 88, 93. 
 State v. Murdy (81 Iowa, 88), 102. 
 State v. Murfreesboro (11 Humph., 
 
 Tenn., 217), 242. 
 State v. Murphy (55 Vt. 449), 720. 
 State v. Murphy (La., 1893, 13 S. 
 
 Rep. 229), 346. 
 State v. Myers (82 Mo. 558 ; 22 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 382), 376. 
 State v. Nance (25 S. C. 168), 101. 
 State v. Neil (6 Ala. 685), 106. 
 State v. Nelson (101 Mo. 464), 102. 
 State v. Nett (50 Wis. 524), 710. 
 State v. Nettlebush (20 Iowa, 257), 
 
 102. 
 State v. Newhouse (38 La. Ann. 862 ; 
 
 2 S. Rep. 799), 101. 
 State v. New York, etc. Co. (N. J. 
 
 L., 1890, 8 Atl. Rep. 290), 33. 
 State v. Norris (9 N. H. 101), 315. 
 State v. Ober (52 N. H. 459), 354a.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clxxi 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 State v. O'Brien (7 R. I. 336), 189. 
 State v. O'Brien (40 N. W. Rep. 752 ; 
 
 81 Iowa, 88), 102, 124, 354. 
 State v. Owsley (111 Mo. 450), 229. 
 State v. Oxford (30 Tex. 428), 176. 
 State v. Packer (80 N. C. 439), 241. 
 State v. Pagels (92 Ma 300), 231, 277. 
 State v. Parker (96 Mo. 382), 350. 
 State v. Parks (109 N. C. 813), 10. 
 State v. Parrish (Busb. Law, 239), 93. 
 State v. Parrott (79 N. C. 615), 166. 
 State v. Patterson (45 Vt. 30S), 103, 
 
 249. 
 State v. Patterson (74 N. C. 157), 354. 
 State v. Pearce (15 Nev. 188), 10. 
 State v. Peelle (124 Ind. 515; 24 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 440), 36. 
 State v. Penn. (13 Bank. Reg. 464), 
 
 51. 
 State v. Perigo (45 N. W. Rep. 399 ; 
 
 80 Iowa, 37), 102. 
 State v. Perkins (06 N. C. 126), 350. 
 State v. Peters (107 N. C. 876), 384. 
 State v. Pettaway (3 Hawks, S. C, 
 
 523), 234. 
 State v. Pfefferlee (36 Kan. 90), 322, 
 
 354. 
 State v. Phair (48 Vt. 366), 144, 185. 
 State v. Pike (65 Me. Ill), 193. 
 State v. Place (32 Pac. Rep. 736 ; 5 
 
 Wash. St. 773), 9. 
 State v. Plum (49 Kan. 679), 11, 176. 
 State v. Poll (1 Hawks, 444), 102. 
 State v. Porter (La., 1893, 12 S. Rep. 
 
 832), 9. 
 State v. Porter (10 Rich., S. C, 145), 
 
 23. 
 State v. Pose (33 La. Ann. 932), 242. 
 State v. Postlewait (14 Iowa, 446), 
 
 244. 
 State v. Potter (42 Vt. 495), 324. 
 State v. Potter (108 Mo. 424), 378. 
 State v. Potts (Iowa, 1892, 49 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 845), 378. 
 State v. Powers (51 N. J. L. 432; 17 
 
 Atl. Rep. 969), 316. 
 State v. Prater (26 S. C. 198 ; 2 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 108), 324. 
 
 State v. Pratt (88 N. C. 639), 80. 
 State v. Pratt (98 Mo. 482), 323, 376. 
 State v. Price (12 Gill & J. 260), 237. 
 State v. Pritcher (101 N. C. 067), 346. 
 State v. Rachoe (37 Minn. 372), 140. 
 State v. Rainsbarger (71 Iowa, 746; 
 
 31 N. W. Rep. 865), 166. 
 State v. Ramsay (82 Mo. 133), 102. 
 State v. Ramsay (Mont., 1892, 28 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 258), 276. 
 State v. Rash (12 Ired., N. C, L> 
 
 382), 9. 
 State v. Raven (115 Mo. 419; 22 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 376), 350. 
 State v. Raymond (29 Pac. Rep. 732; 
 
 12 Mont. 226), 8. 
 State v. Raymond (53 N. J. L. 200, 
 
 528), 334, 343. 
 State v. Raymond (46 Conn. 345), 
 
 229. 
 State v. Reader (00 Iowa, 527), 239. 
 State v. Reed (62 Iowa, 40), 6. 
 State v. Reed. (62 Me. 129), 10, 88, 
 
 350. 
 State v. Reed (89 Mo. 168), 341. 
 State v. Reid (45 La. Aim. 162), 31. 
 State v. Reidel (Del., 1888, 14 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 550), 231. 
 State v. Renfrew (111 Mo. 589), 381. 
 State v. Richardson (34 Minn. 118), 
 
 357. 
 State v. Rights (82 N. C. 675), 356. 
 State v. Riley (42 La. Ann. 995; 8 
 
 S. Rep. 469), 93. 
 State v. Roberts (03 Vt. 159), 39. 
 State v. Robinson ( — La. Ann. 340), 
 
 102. 
 State v. Rogers (108 Mo. 202; 18 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 976), 349. 
 State v. Rogers (112 N. C. 874; 17 
 
 S. E. Rep. 297), 89. 
 State v. Rose (92 Mo. 201), 320. 
 State v. Row (Iowa, 1892, 46 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 872), 36. 
 State v. Rowe (98 N. C. 629 ; 4 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 506), 350. 
 State v. Ruff (Ind., 1893, 33 N. • E. 
 
 Rep. 724), 151a.
 
 clxxii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections 
 
 State v. Runnels (28 Ark. 121), 323. 
 State v. Rush (95 Mo. 199), 307. 
 State v. Russell (32 Pac. Rep. 854), 
 
 101. 
 State v. Samuels (28 Mo. App. 649). 
 
 7G. 
 State v. Sandars (106 Mo. 188), 6, 
 
 249, 346. 
 State v. Sanders (68 Mo. 202), 343. 
 State v. Sasse (72 Wis. 3), 344. 
 State v. Sauer (42 Minn. 238), 351. 
 State v. Saunders (12 Pac. Rep. 441 ; 
 
 14 Oreg. 300), 102. 
 State v. Schaefer (Mo., 1893, 22 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 447), 249. 
 State v. Schleagel (50 Kan. 235), 10. 
 State v. Schmidt (73 Iowa, 469; 35 
 
 N. W. Rep. 5D0), 101, 103. 
 State v. Scott (109 Mo. 226; 19 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 89), 229. 
 State v. Secrest (80 N. C. 450), 193. 
 State v. Seiner (17 Mo. App. 39). 237. 
 State v. Senn (32 S. C. 392; 11 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 292), 93. 
 State v. Severson (79 Iowa, 653), 319, 
 
 332. 
 State v. Shafer (Oreg., 1893, 32 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 545), 101, 102. 
 State v. Shelton (2 Jones' N. C. L. 
 
 360;, 102. 
 State v. Sherman (42 Mo. 210), 242. 
 State v. Shinbone (46 N. H. 497), 132. 
 State v. Slagle (83 N. C. 630), 195. 
 State v. Slingerland (19 Nev. 135), 
 
 8, 381. 
 State v. Smith (77 N. C. 488), 234. 
 State v. Smith (73 Iowa, 32), 5. 
 State v. Smith (54 Iowa, 104), 345. 
 State v. Smith (32 Me. 369), 23. 
 State v. Smith (25 La. Ann. 457), 88. 
 State v. Smith (6 R. I. 33), 343. 
 State v. Smith (49 Conn. 376), 201. 
 State v. Smith (32 Mo. 370), 196. 
 State v. Smith (4 Phill., N. C, 302), 
 
 196. 
 State v. Snowden(l Brews., Pa., 218), 
 
 244. 
 State v. Sopher (70 Iowa, 494), 89. 
 
 State v. Sorter (Kan., 1893, 34 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 1036), 348. 
 State v. Spalding (34 Minn. 361), 102. 
 State v. Spencer (30 La. Ann. 302), 
 
 101. 
 State v. Spenser (21 N. J. L. 196), 
 
 249. 
 State v. Spillman (43 La. Ann. 1001), 
 
 283. 
 State v. Stair (S7 Mo. 268), 139, 139a. 
 -State v. Stark (1 Strobh., S. C, L. 
 
 479), 231. 
 State v. Starling (6 Jones, N. C., L. 
 
 366), 231. 
 State v. Steifel (106 Mo. 129), 305, 
 
 323. 
 State v. Sterritte (68 Iowa, 731), 10. 
 State v. Stiee (Iowa, 1893, 55 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 17), 9. 
 State v. St. Louis S. F. R. Co. (29 
 
 Mo. App. 361), 38. 
 State v. Stowe (2 Wash. St. 206), 378. 
 State v. Stubbs (13 S. E. Rep. 90; 
 
 108 N. C. 774), 8. 
 State v. Sullivan (28 N. E. Rep. 381; 
 
 114 111. 24), 346. 
 State v. Sullivan (51 Iowa, 142), 102, 
 
 103. 
 State v. Swain (68 Mo. 605), 348. 
 State v. Swanze (30 La. Ann. 1323), 
 
 234. 
 State v. Swift (69 Ind. 505), 240 
 State v. Tall (43 Minn. 273), 354. 
 State v. Tanner (38 La. Ann. 307), 
 
 343. 
 State v. Tatro (50 Vt. 483), 91. 
 State v. Taylor (20 S. W. Rep. 239; 
 
 111 Mo. 538), 5. 
 State v. Taylor (1 Houst. Cr. Cas., 
 
 Del., 436), 249. 
 State v. Taylor (44 La. Ann. 783; 11 
 
 S. Rep. 132), 9, 10. 
 State v. Taylor (Mo., 1893, 24 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 449), 354. 
 State v. Taylor (Mo., 1893, 22 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 806), 88, 354. 
 State v. Teipner (36 Minn. 535), 191. 
 Gtate v. Teissedre (30 Kan. 484), 241.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clxxiii 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 State v. Tenison (22 Pac. Rep. 429; 
 
 42 Kan. 302), 346. 
 State v. Terrell (12 Rich., S. CL, 321), 
 
 102, 195. 
 State v. Thomas (111 Ind. 516; 13 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 85), 330. 
 State v. Thomason (1 Jones, N. C. 
 
 Law, 274), 102, 350. 
 State v. Thorn pkins (71 Mo. 63), 343. 
 State v. Thompson (83 Mo. 257), 343. 
 State v. Tibeau (30 Vt. 100), 97. 
 State v. Tilghman (Ired., N. C, Law, 
 
 573), 101. 
 State v. Tooney (26 Minn. 262), 242. 
 State v. Trounce (Wash., 1893, 32 
 
 Pac. Rep. 750), 232, 284. 
 State v. Turlington (102 Mo. 642), 
 
 101, 283. 
 State v. Turner (110 Mo. 196), 6, 
 
 346. 
 State v. Turner (15 S. E. Rep. 603; 
 
 36 S. C. 534), 334, 349, 350. 
 State v. Uhrig (106 Mo. 267), 354a. 
 State v. Ulrich (110 Mo. 350), 166, 
 
 244. 
 State v. Underwood (44 La. Ann. 
 
 852), 281, 346. 
 State v. Van Winkle (80 Iowa, 15), 
 
 229, 356. 
 State v. Vari (35 S. C. 175; 14 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 892), 330. 
 State v. Vincent (1 Houst., Del., 1), 
 
 93. 
 State v. Vincent (24 Iowa, 570), 234, 
 
 249. 
 State v. Von Sachs (30 La. Ann. 942), 
 
 89. 
 State v. Vorback (66 Mo. 168), 23. 
 State v. Walker (77 Me. 490), 56. 
 State v. Walker (Mo., 1888, 9 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 646), 323, 324, 346. 
 State v. Waller (88 Mo. 402), 23. 
 State v. Walsh (44 La. Ann. 1122), 
 
 9, 346. 
 State v. Walters (7 Wash. 246; 34 
 
 Pac. Rep. 938, 1098), 350. 
 State v. Ward (39 Vt. 225), 140. 
 State v. Ward (61 Vt. 179), 330. 
 
 State v. Watson (7 S. C. 63), 6. 
 State v. Watson (31 Mo. 361), 324. 
 State v. Weasel (30 La. Ann. 919), 97. 
 State v. Weaver (101 N. C. 758), 232. 
 State v. Weddington (103 N. C. 364), 
 
 346. 
 State v. Welch (79 Me. 99), 315. 
 State v. Weldon (S. C, 1893, 17 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 688), 316. 
 State v. Wells (111 Mo. 533), 6, 346. 
 State v. Wells (48 Iowa, 671), 234. 
 State v. Wentworth (65 Me. 234), 
 
 354a. 
 State v. Wentworth (37 N. H. 196), 
 
 52, 91. 
 State v. West (45 La. Ann. 14; 13 S. 
 
 Rep. 173), 96. 
 State v. West (1 Houst., Del., 371), 
 
 93, 249. 
 State v. Westfall (49 Iowa, 328), 102. 
 State v. Whisenhurst (2 Hawks, 458), 
 
 315. 
 State v. White (19 Kan. 445), 174. 
 State v. Whitfield (109 N. C. 876), 
 
 89. 
 State v. Whiton (111 N. C. 95), 6, 9. 
 State v. Wieners (66 Mo. 13), 345. 
 State v. Williams (67 N. C. 12), 102. 
 State v. Willingham (33 La. Ann. 
 
 537), 339. 
 State v. Willis (Iowa, 1889, 44 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 699), 277. 
 State v. Wilner (40 Wis. 304), 231. 
 State v. Wilson (23 La. Ann. 559), 
 
 102. 
 State v. Wilson (40 La. Ann. 757), 
 
 343. 
 State v. Wilson (24 Kan. 189), 101. 
 State v. Wilson (39 Mo. App. 114), 
 
 250. 
 State v. Wilson (111 N. C. 695), 
 
 103. 
 State v. Wingo (66 Mo. 181). 249. 
 State v. Wise (33 S. C. 382), 283. 
 State v. Withan (72 Me. 531), 354a. 
 State v. Wolf (8 Conn. 93), 316, 
 State v. Wood (53 N. H. 484), 176, 
 
 189, 196.
 
 clxxiv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 State v. Woodruff (67 N. C. 89), 344, 
 
 345. 
 State v. Woods (49 Kan. 237 ; 30 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 520), 35. 
 State v. Woodward (Iowa, 1892, 5 
 
 N. W. Rep. 885), 5. 
 State v. Workman (S. C, 1893), 16 
 
 S. E. Rep. 770), 378. 
 State v. Workman (15 S. C. 540, 546), 
 
 166. 
 State v. Wright (75 N. C. 439), 350. 
 State v. Wright (41 La. Ann. 600), 
 
 166. 
 State v. Wright (70 Iowa, 152; id. 
 
 759), 233. 
 State v. Young (1 Winst., N. C, L., 
 
 No. 1, 126), 93. 
 State v. Young (105 Mo. 634), 334. 
 State v. Zellers (7 N. J. L. 220), 93. 
 State v. Zimmerman (47 Kan. 242), 
 
 140. 
 State v. Zoun (22 Oreg. 591 ; 30 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 517), 231. 
 Staunton v. Parker (19 Hun, 55), 
 
 178. 
 Stavinow v. Home Ins. Co. (43 Mo. 
 
 App. 513), 337. 
 Stayner v. Joyce (Ind., 1889, 22 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 89), 121. 
 Stead v. Corse (4 Cranch, 403), 218. 
 Stead v. Worcester (150 Mass. 241), 
 
 198. 
 Steageld v. State (24 Tex. 287 ; 3 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 771), 178. 
 Steagels v. State (22 Tex. App. 464), 
 
 93. 
 Stearns v. Hall (9 Cush., Mass., 31), 
 
 214. 
 Stearns v. Jones (12 Allen, 582), 226. 
 Steele v. Prickett (2 Stark. 463, 466), 
 
 110. 
 Steele v. Shafer (39 111. App. 185), 79. 
 Steele v. Stuart (1 Phil. Ch. 471), 169. 
 Steele v. Ward (30 Hun, 355), 309. 
 Steen v. State (20 Ohio St. 333), 167. 
 Stein v. Bowman (13 Pet. 221), 166. 
 Stein v. Swenson (49 N. W. Rep. 55 ; 
 
 46 Minn. 360), 121, 122, 124. 
 
 Stoiner v. Ellis (7 S. Rep. 803, Ala., 
 
 1890), 230. 
 Steirle v. Kaiser (12 S. Rep. 839, La., 
 
 1893), 219. 
 Stephen y. State (11 Ga. 225), 237. 
 Stephens v. Allen (11 Oreg. 18S), 223. 
 Stephens v. McCormick (5 Bush, 
 
 181), 231. 
 Stephens v. Vroman (16 N. Y. 301), 
 
 80. 
 Stephenson v. Arnold (28 Ind. 278), 
 
 345. 
 Stephenson v. Richardson (45 Mo. 
 
 App. 544), 229. 
 Stephenson v. State (110 Ind. 358), 
 
 101. 
 Stepp v. Nat. L. & Mut. Ass'n (37 
 
 S. C. 417; 16 S. E. Rep. 134), 186. 
 Stepp v. State (31 Tex. Crim. App. 
 
 349), 197. 
 Sterling v. Buckingham (46 Conn. 
 
 464), 05. 
 Sterling v. Callahan (94 Mich. 536), 
 
 334. 
 Stern v. Herren (101 N. C. 516), 276. 
 Stern v. Isman (51 Hun, 224), 309. 
 Sterne v. State (20 Ala. 43), 237. 
 Stetson v. Freeman (35 Kan. 523), 
 
 115. 
 Stevens v. Castel (63 Mich. 118), 57. 
 Stevens v. Dennett (51 N. H. 324), 
 
 83, 84. 
 Stevens v. Hampton (46 Mo. 104), 
 
 136. 
 Stevens v. Ludlum (46 Minn. 100), 
 
 84. 
 Stevens v. Minneapolis (42 Minn. 
 
 136; 43 N. W. Rep. 842), 199. 
 Stevens v. Van Cleve (4 Wash. C. C. 
 
 262), 131. 
 Stevenson v. Gelsthorpe (10 Mont. 
 
 503), 193. 
 Stevenson v. Gunning (25 Atl. Rep. 
 
 697; 64 Vt. 601), 370. 
 Stevenson v. Marony (6 Ind. 330), 
 
 247. 
 Stevenson v. Reeves (8 S. Rep. 695), 
 
 141.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clxx* 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Stevenson v. Smith (28 N. H. 12), 
 
 286. 
 Stevenson v. Wallace (27 Gratt., 
 
 Va., 77), 226. 
 Steward v. Clinton (79 Mo. 604), 143a. 
 Stewart v. Armstrong (56 Fed. Rep. 
 
 167), 83. 
 Stewart v. Chadvvick (8 Iowa, 463), 
 
 50. 
 Stewart v. Cincinnati, etc. Co. (89 
 
 Mich. 315), 344. 
 Stewart v. De Loach (86 Ga. 729), 32. 
 Stewart v. Kip (5 Johns. 256), 303, 
 
 309. 
 Stewart v. Munford (91 111. 158), 83. 
 Stewart v. Preston (1 Fla. 10), 128. 
 Stewart v. Railroad Co. (86 Mich. 
 
 315), 344. 
 Stewart v. Register (108 N. C. 588), 
 
 363. 
 Stewart v. Smith (23 111. 397), 217. 
 Stewart v. State (62 Md. 412), 23. 
 Stewart's Will (1 Con. Sur. 86), 232. 
 Stice^ Ex parte (70 Cal. 51). 332. 
 Sticker v. Groves (5 Whart. 386), 
 
 276. 
 Stickney v. Stickney (131 U. S. 227, 
 
 237), 167, 168. 
 Stier v. Oscaloosa (41 Iowa, 353), 
 
 242. 
 Stierle v. Kaiser (La., 1893, 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 839), 355. 
 Stiff v. Ashton (155 Mass. 130; 29 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 303), 82. 
 Stiles v. Giddens (21 Tex. 783), 208. 
 Stiles v. Probst (69 111. 382), 128. 
 Stiles v. Stewart (12 Wend. 473), 244. 
 Stiles v. Western R. Co. (8 Met., 
 
 Mass. , 44), 73a. 
 Still v. Tompkins (154 Pa. St. 43), 
 
 212. 
 Stillings v. Timmins (152 Mass. 147; 
 
 25 N. E. Rep. 50), 205, 208. 
 Stillwater Co. v. Coover (26 Ohio St. 
 
 520), 198. 
 Stillwell v. Archer (18 N. Y. S. 888; 
 
 64 Hun, 169), 11, 249. 
 Stillwell v. Farwell (61 Vt. 286), 346. 
 
 Stillwell v. Patton (18 S. W. Rep. 
 
 1075; 108 Mo. 353), 129. 
 Stillwell & B. Mfg. Co. v. Phelps" 
 
 (130 U. S. 520), 199. 
 Stimpson v. Brooks (3 Blatchf. 436), 
 
 359. 
 Stinch field v. Emerson (52 Me. 465), 
 
 233. 
 Stinchfield v. Milliken (71 Me. 567), 
 
 223. 
 Stinde v. Goodrich (3 Redf. Sur. 87), 
 
 232. 
 Stirnes v. Schofield (Ind., 1892, 31 
 
 N. E. Rep. 411), 249. 
 Stocking v. St. Paul Trust Co. (39 
 
 Minn. 40), 37. 
 Stockman v. Brooks (27 Pac. Rep, 
 
 746), 142a. 
 Stockton v. Johnson (6 B. Mon., Ky., 
 
 409), 69. 
 Stockton v. Williams (1 Doug., Mich., 
 
 570), 50. 
 Stockton Sav. Bank v. Staples (98 
 
 Cal. 189; 32 Pac. Rep. 936), 84. 
 Stoddard v. Buxton (41 Iowa, 583), 
 
 229. 
 Stoddard v. Hill (S. C, 1893, 17 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 138), 139, 139a. 
 Stoddard v. Sloan (65 Iowa, 680), 
 
 242. 
 Stoddard v. Town (32 N. E. Rep. 
 
 948), 188. 
 Stodolka v. Novotus (111., 1893, 33 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 534), 136. 
 Stokeley v. Gordon (8 Md. 496), 222. 
 Stokoe v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. 
 
 (40 Minn. 546), 173. 
 Stokes v. People (53 N. Y. 164), 234. 
 Stokes v. State (5 Baxt., Tenn., 619), 
 
 202. 
 Stollenmalck v. Thacher (115 Mass. 
 
 224), 73a. 
 Stondennie v. Harper (81 Ala. 242), 
 
 336. 
 Stone v. Byron (4 Dowl. & L. 393), 
 
 312. 
 Stone v. Chicago, etc. Co. (66 Mich. 
 
 76; 33 N. W. Rep. 24), 190.
 
 clxxvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Stone v. Geyser, etc. Co. (52 Cal. 315), 
 
 225. 
 Stone v. Hubbard (7 Cush. 595), 141. 
 Stone v. Hunt (114 Mo. 66; 21 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 454), 308. 
 Stone v. Railroad Co. (S. D., 1893, 53 
 
 N. W. Rep. 189), 282. 
 Stone v. Thomas (12 Pa. St. 269), 139. 
 Stone Cattle Co. v. Boon (73 Tex. 
 
 158), 142. 
 Stoner v. Devilbiss (70 Md. 160), 341. 
 Stonesifer v. Kilburn (94 Cal. 33), 
 
 373. 
 Stooksberry v. Swan (Tex., 1893, 21 
 
 S. W. Rep. 694), 106. 
 Stoops v. Smith (100 Mass. 63), 232. 
 Storer v. Gowen (18 Me. 174), 80. 
 Storey v. Flanigan (57 Tex. 649), 107. 
 Storm v. United States (94 U. S. 84), 
 
 208. 
 Stout v. Slattery (12 111. 162), 357. 
 Stover v. People (56 N. Y. 316), 229, 
 
 354a. 
 Stowe v. Bishop (58 Vt. 498), 186. 
 Stratton v. Hawks (43 Kan. 541), 126. 
 Stratton v. Upton (36 N. H. 581), 276. 
 Strauss v. Abraham (32 Fed. Rep. 
 
 210), 351. 
 Strauss v. Gross (Tex., 1893, 21 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 305), 214. 
 Strawbridge v. Spain (8 Ala. 820), 
 
 73a. 
 Stribling v. Atkinson (79 Tex. 162), 
 
 105. 
 Strickland v. Hudson (55 Miss. 235), 
 
 123. 
 Stringer v. Frost (116 Ind. 477), 382. 
 Stringham v. Insurance Co. (4 Abb. 
 
 App. Dec, N. Y., 315), 73a. 
 Strode v. Churchill (2 Litt., Ky., 75), 
 
 148. 
 Strode v. MacGowan (2 Busb, Ky., 
 
 621), 234. 
 Strohm v. Railroad Co. (96 N. Y. 
 
 305), 192. 
 Strong v. Bradley (13 Vt, 9), 147. 
 Strong v. Case (Kirby, Conn., 345), 
 140. 
 
 Strong v. State (Tex., 1893, 22 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 680), 9. 
 Strong v. Stevens (62 Wis. 255), 188. 
 Strong v. Stewart (9 Heisk., Tenn., 
 
 137), 75, 76. 
 Strong v. Strong (126 111. 301), 223. 
 Strong v. Wilson (1 Morris, Iowa, 
 
 84), 310. 
 Stroud v. Springfield (28 Tex. 649), 
 
 115. 
 Stroud v. Tilton (4 Abb., N. Y., 324), 
 
 60. 
 Stroudsburg v. Brown (11 Pa. Co. 
 
 Ct. R. 272), 239. 
 Struthers v. Drexel (122 U. S. 487 ; 
 
 7 S. Ct. 1293), 18. 
 Struthers v. Fuller (45 Kan. 735), 282. 
 Struyer v. Johnson (110 Pa. St. 21), 
 
 151. 
 Stuart v. New Haven (17 Neb. 211), 
 
 202. 
 Stuart v. People (42 Mich. 255), 6, 
 
 229. 
 Stubbs v. State (53 Miss. 437), 244. 
 Stuckslager v. Neel (123 Pa. St. 60), 
 
 60. 
 Stump v. Napier (2 Yerger, Tenn., 
 
 35), 310. 
 Sturdivant v. Hull (59 Me. 172). 73a. 
 Sture v. Sture (5 Johns. Ch. 1), 215. 
 Sturge v. Buchanan (2 M. & R. 90), 
 
 80. 
 Sturm v. Jeffers (2 C. & K. 442), 126. 
 Suesenbach v. Wagner (41 Minn. 
 
 108), 148. 
 Suiter v. Park Nat. Bank (35 Neb. 
 
 372), 247. 
 Sullivan v. Davis (29 Kan. 28), 83. 
 Sullivan v. Kelly (3 Allen, Mass., 
 
 148), 234. 
 Sullivan v. Latimer (S. 0., 1893, 17 
 
 S. E. Rep. 701), 309. 
 Sullivan v. O'Leary (146 Mass. 322), 
 
 340. 
 Sullivan v. People (122 111. 385), 239. 
 Sullivan v. People (114 111. 24), 354a. 
 Sullivan v. State (93 Pa. St. 285), 
 
 201.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clxxvii 
 
 Keferences are to sections. 
 
 Sullivan v. State (6 Tex. App. 319), 
 
 121. 
 Summer v. Mitchell (29 Fla. 179), 
 
 135, 136. 
 Summer v. State (5 Tex. App. 365), 
 
 191. 
 Summers v. Bergner & Eng. Co. 
 
 (143 Pa. St. 114), 11. 
 Summers v. Mosely (2 C. & M. 477), 
 
 339. 
 Sumner v. Peeble (5 Wash. St. 471), 
 
 231. 
 Sumner v. Williams (5 Mass. 144), 51. 
 Sumpterv. State (11 Fla. 217), 324. 
 Sunderland, In re(l P. & D. 198). 210. 
 Supples v. Lewis (37 Conn. 56S), 35. 
 Surles v. State (89 Ga. 167), 351. 
 Suter v. Bank (35 Neb. 372), 252. 
 Sutherland v. Ross (140 Pa. St. 379; 
 
 21 Atl. Rep. 354; 28 W. N. C. 
 
 17). 309. 
 Sutherland v. Stand. L. Ins. Co. 
 
 (Iowa, 1893, 54 N. W. Rep. 453), 
 
 250. 
 Sutor v. Woo'd (76 Tex. 403), 340. 
 Sutton v. Com. (85 Va. 128), 346. 
 Swain v. Comstock (18 Wis. 463), 
 
 242. 
 Swain v. Grangers' Union (69 Cal. 
 
 176), 217. 
 Swain v. Humphreys (42 111. App. 
 
 370), 169, 170. 
 Swales v. Grubb (126 Ind. 106), 237. 
 Swan v. State (26 Tex. App. 115), 
 
 332. 
 Swazey v. Ames (79 Me. 483), 309. 
 Sweeny v. Easter (1 Wall. 166), 310. 
 Sweet v. Parker (22 N. J. Eq. 455), 
 
 308. 
 Sweet v. Stevens (7 R. I. 375), 212. 
 Swennerton v. Columbian (37 N. Y. 
 
 174), 238. 
 Swett v. Parker (22 N. J. Eq. 453), 
 
 223. 
 Swett v. Shumway (102 Mass. 365), 
 
 217. 
 Sweat v. State (90 Ga. 315; 17 S. E. 
 Rep. 278), 378. 
 
 Sweat v. State (4 Tex. App. 617), 23. 
 Sweeney v. Easter (1 Wall. 166), 312. 
 Sweeney v. Girolo (154 Pa. St. 609;, 
 
 150a. 
 Sweigart v. Richard (8 Barr, Pa., 
 
 436), 140. 
 Swift v. Stevens (8 Conn. 431), 130. 
 Swift Elec. L. Co. v. Grant (90 Mich. 
 
 469; 51 N. W. Rep. 539), 375. 
 Swigart v. State (109 111. 372), 5. 
 Swigart v. Weare (37 111. App. 253), 
 
 128. 
 Swink v. French (11 Lea, SO), 53. 
 Swisher v. Com. (2oGtatt., Va., 963), 
 
 102. 
 Switzer v. Claflin (82 Tex. 513), 24. 
 Sykes v. Bates (26 Iowa, 522), 308. 
 Sykes v. Lewis (17 Ala. 261), 73. 
 Sykes v. People (132 111. 32; 23 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 391), 23. 
 Sylvester v. Crapo (15 Pick., Mass., 
 
 92), 70. 
 Sylvius v. Kosek (117 Pa. St. 67), 
 
 223. 
 Symmons v. Knox (3 T. R. 65), 19. 
 Syracuse, The (36 Fed. Rep. 830), 
 
 276. 
 
 T. 
 
 Tabb v. Cabell (17 Gratt., Va., 160), 
 
 76. 
 Tabor v. Judd (62 N. H. 288), 350. 
 Tabor v. N. Y. E. R. Co. (58 N. Y. 
 
 Super. Ct. 579), 8. 
 Taft v. Com. (158 Mass. 526; 33 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 1046), 188. 
 Taft v. Fiske (140 Mass. 250), 276. 
 Talbott v. Hedges (32 N. E. Rep. 788, 
 
 Ind., 1S93), 139a. 
 Talbott v. Hines (32 N. E. Rep. 788), 
 
 139. 
 Talbot v. Houser (12 Bush, Ky., 408), 
 
 135. 
 Talbot v. McGee (4 B. Mon., Ky., 
 
 377), 74. 
 Talbot v. Seaman (1 Cranch, U. S., 
 
 12, 38), 143, 212.
 
 clxxviii 
 
 TAP.LE OF CASKS. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Talcott v. Harris (93 N. Y. 567, 571), 
 
 80. 
 Taliaferro v. Goudelock (82 Tex. 521), 
 
 79. 
 Taliaferro v. Lee (Ala., 1893, 13 S. 
 
 Rep. 125), 367. 
 Talkin v. Anderson (Tex., 1892, 19 
 
 S. W. Rep. 350), 07. 
 Tallmadge v. Press (14 N. Y. S. 331; 
 
 60 Hun, 579), 249. 
 Tall man v. Early (13 N. Y. S. 805), 
 
 24. 
 Tallman v. Tallman (3 Misc. Rep. 
 
 465), 222. 
 Tarns v. Bullix (35 Pa. St. 30S), 7. 
 Taney v. Kemp (4 H. & J. 348), 353. 
 Tangway v. O'Tonnell (132 Ind. 62), 
 
 151. 
 Tankersley v. State (31 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 595), 283. 
 Tappan v. Kimball (30 N. H. 136), 
 
 69. 
 Tarbell v. Farmers' Ins. Co. (44 Minn. 
 
 471), 205, 211. 
 Tarbox v. Shuegrue (36 Kan. 225), 
 
 50. 
 Tarsney v. Turner (48 Fed. Rep. 818), 
 
 347. 
 Tate v. Fashee (117 Ind. 322), 262. 
 Tate v. Penne (Mart., La., 548), 234. 
 Tatham v. Ramey (S2 Pa. St. 120), 24. 
 Tatum v. Colvin (9 S. Rep. 747; 43 
 
 La. Ann. 755), 3S0. 
 Tavener v. Barrett (21 W. Va. 658), 
 
 135. 
 Taussig v. Glenn (51 Fed. Rep. 409), 
 
 33. 
 Taylor v. Alexander Bank (5 Leigb, 
 
 Va., 471), 143. 
 Taylor v. Arnold (17 S. W. Rep. 361, 
 
 Ky., 1892), 24. 
 Taylor v. Association (68 Ala. 229), 
 
 73a. 
 Taylor v. Barclay (2 Sim. 213), 243. 
 Taylor v. Beavers (4 E. D. Smith, 
 
 215), 218, 221. 
 Taylor v. Beck (3 Rand., Va., 216), 
 
 310. 
 
 Taylor v. Biggs (1 Pet. 591), 355. 
 Taylor v. Boardman (25 Vt. 581), 242. 
 Taylor v. Brily (130 Ind. 484; 30 
 
 N. E. Rep. 369), 232. 
 Taylor v. Brydon (8 Johns. 173), 159. 
 Taylor v. Bunker (Mich., 1888, 36 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 166), 308. 
 Taylor v. Carryl (20 How., U. S., 583), 
 
 155. 
 Taylor v. Chicago, etc. Co. (80 Iowa, 
 
 431), 371. 
 Taylor v. Com. (18 Atl. Rep. 588; 109 
 
 Pa. St. 270), 93, 231. 
 Taylor v. Com. (18 S. W. Rep. 852, 
 
 Ky., 1892), 346. 
 Taylor v. Com. (Va., 1893, 17 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 81), 6, 355. 
 Taylor v. Cook (8 Price, 650), 116, 
 
 139. 
 Taylor v. Cort (32 Neb. 30), 150a. 
 Taylor v. Cresswell (45 Md. 422), 231. 
 Taylor v. Crowninshield (5 N. Y. 
 
 Leg. Obs. 209, 223), 141. 
 Taylor v. Davis (82 Wis. 455; 52 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 756), 60. 
 Taylor v. Dominick (36 S. C. 368), 
 
 370. 
 Taylor v. Dusterberg (109 Ind. 165), 
 
 308. 
 Taylor v. Forster (2 C. P. 195), 169. 
 Taylor v. Glenn (29 S. C. 292), 110, 
 
 115. 
 Taylor v. Hatch (12 Johns. 340), 356. 
 Taylor v. Judd (62 N. H. 288), 115. 
 Taylor v. Kilgore (33 Ala. 214), 148. 
 Taylor v. Lawson (3 C. & P. 543), 
 
 330. 
 Taylor v. Luther (2 Sumn., U. S., 
 
 238), 223. 
 Taylor v. Peck (21 Gratt., Va., 11), 
 
 38. 
 Taylor v. People (12 Hun, 212), 323. 
 Taylor v. Railroad (48 N. H. 309), 52. 
 Taylor v. Roe (4 Hawks, 116), 115. 
 Taylor v. Sayre (24 N. J. L 647), 205, 
 
 217. 
 Taylor v. State (22 Tex. App. 753; 3 
 ' S. W. Rep. 753), 319.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clxxix 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Taylor v. State (29 N. E. Rep. 41.3; 
 
 130 Ind. 66), 330. 
 Taylor v. State (52 Miss. 84). 343. 
 Taylor v. State (83 Ga. S47 ; 10 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 442), 354a. 
 Taylor v. Taylor (26 Abb. N. C. 360), 
 
 145. 
 Taylor v. Taylor (79 Tex. 104), 11. 
 Taylor, In re (154 Pa. St. 1S3), 309. 
 Teacher v. Strauss (47 Miss. 358), 221. 
 Teachout v. People (41 N. Y. 8), 93. 
 Teal v. Barton (40 Barb., N. Y., 137), 
 
 200. 
 Tebbetts v. Haskins (16 Me. 283), 198, 
 
 199. 
 Teel v. Yart (128 N. Y. 387), 159. 
 Tees v. Huntingdon (23 How. 11-13), 
 
 349. 
 Teeter v. Teeter (20 N. Y. S. 259 ; 65 
 
 Hun, 623), 380. 
 Teft v. Size (10 111. 432), 143a. 
 Telephone Co. v. Thompson (112 Pa. 
 
 St. 3 IS), 73a. 
 Temple v. Com. (75 Va. 892), 354. 
 Temple v. State (15 Tex. App. 405), 
 
 242. 
 Temple, Ex parte (2 Ves. & B. 391), 
 
 287. 
 Ten Eyck v. Runk (26 N. J. L. 513), 
 
 70. 
 Ten Eyck v. Witbeck (69 Hun, 450), 9. 
 Tennant v. Banigan (1 Dak. 432), 6. 
 Tennessee, etc. Co. v. Danforth 
 
 (Ala., 1893, 13 S. Rep. 51). 33. 
 Tennessee Riv. Transp. Co. v. Kava- 
 
 naugh (Ala., 1893, 13 S. Rep. 
 
 283), 370. 
 Tenney v. East Warren, etc. Co. (43 
 
 N. H. 343), 131. 
 Tenney v. Evans (13 N. H. 462), 176. 
 Tennis v. Railroad Co. (43 Kan. 503; 
 
 25 Pac. Rep. 876), 57. 
 Tenny v. Simpson (37 Kan. 353), 268. 
 Ternes v. Dunn (7 Utah, 497), 18. 
 Terpening v. Holton (9 Colo. 30), 
 
 130. 
 Terre Haute v. Hudnut (18 Am. & 
 . Eng. Corp. Cas. 302), 198. 
 
 Terre Haute v. Rodel (89 Ind. 128), 
 
 83. 
 Terre Haute, etc. Co. v. Clem (123 
 
 Ind. 15), 8. 
 Terre Haute, etc. Co. v. Pierce (95 
 
 Ind. 496), 239. 
 Terre Haute, etc. Co. v. Stockwell 
 
 (118 Ind. 102), 6. 
 Territory v. Big Knot on Head (6 
 
 Mont. 242), 50. 
 Territory v. Chaves (N. M., 1893, 30 
 
 Pac. Rep. 903), 6. 
 Territory v. Clayton (8 Mont. 1), 350. 
 Territory v. Edie (N. M., 1893, 30 
 
 Pac. Rep. 581), 52. 
 Territory v. Godfrey (6 Dak. 46), 52. 
 Territory v. Hanna (5 Mont. 248), 
 
 384. 
 Territory v. Jones (6 Dak. 85), 343. 
 Territory v. McKern (Idaho, 1890, 26 
 
 Pac. Rep. 123), 91. 
 Territory v. Rehberg (6 Mont. 467; 
 
 13 Pac. Rep. 132), 339. 
 Terry v. Danville, etc. Co. (91 N. C. 
 
 236), 208. 
 Terry v. Rodahan (79 Ga. 278), 38. 
 Tetes v. Volmer (58 Hun, 1), 130. 
 Tevis v. Collier (84 Tex. 638; 19 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 801), 81. 
 Tewksbury v. Schulenberg (41 Wis. 
 
 584), 239. 
 Texas Cent. R. Co. v. Burnett (80 
 
 Tex. 536 ; 16 S. W. Rep. 320), 
 
 192. 
 Texas, etc. Co. v. Barron (78 Tex. 
 
 421), 57, 373. 
 Texas, etc. Co. v. Hall (83 Tex. 675), 
 
 282. 
 Texas, etc. Co. v. Morin (66 Tex. 133), 
 
 250. 
 Texas, etc. Co. v. Robertson (82 Tex. 
 
 657), 57. 
 Texas M. L. Ins. Co. v. Davidge (51 
 
 Tex. 244). 211. 
 Thalheimer v. Klapetzy (59 Hun, 
 
 619), 347. 
 Tharpe v. Gisburne (2 C. & P. 21, 12 
 
 E. C. L.), 139.
 
 cuxxx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Thatcher v. Morris (11 N. Y. 437), 
 
 242. 
 Thatcher v. Powell (6 Wheat. 119). 
 
 232. 
 Thayer v. Grossman (1 Mete. 416), 
 
 310. 
 Thayer v. Finton (108 N. Y. 397), 
 
 220. 
 Thayer v. Thayer (101 Mass. Ill), 9. 
 Thayer v. Wellington (9 Allen, 283), 
 
 210. 
 Theisen v. Dayton (82 Iowa, 74; 47 
 
 N. W. Rep. 891), 170. 
 Theodorsen v. Ahlgren (37 111. App. 
 
 140), 3G9. 
 Third Nat. Bank v. Owen (101 Mo. 
 
 558), 337. 
 Thistle v. Buford (50 Mo. 278), 82. 
 Thistlethwait v. Thistlethwait (13 
 
 Ind. 355), 119, 309. 
 Thomas v. Barnes (156 Mass. 581), 
 
 209. 
 Thomas v. Chicago, etc. Co. (49 Mo. 
 
 App. 110), 380. 
 Thomas v. Com. (Ky., 1893, 20 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 226), 18. 
 Thomas v. Com. (17 S. E. Rep. 788, 
 
 Va., 1893), 240. 
 Thomas v. England (71 Cal. 458), 226, 
 
 241. 
 Thomas v. Griff en (Ind., 1890, 27 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 754), 173. 
 Thomas v. Hargrove (Wright, Ohio, 
 
 595), 71. 
 Thomas v. Herrall (18 Oreg. 546), 57. 
 Thomas v. Horlocker (1 Dall., Pa., 
 
 14), 139. 
 Thomas v. Jenkins (1 N. & P. 588), 
 
 115. 
 Thomas v. Lewis (89 Va. 1; 15 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 389), 79. 
 Thomas v. Loose (114 Pa. St. 170), 
 
 212. 
 Thomas v. Miller (151 Pa. St. 482), 
 
 340, 363. 
 Thomas v. Musser (1 Dall. 458), 14. 
 Thomas v. Newton (1 M. & M. 48). 
 
 354a. 
 
 Thomas v. People (67 N. Y. 218). 10. 
 Thomas v. Rutledge (67 111. 212), 73a. 
 Thomas v. State (29 Ga. 287), 3:30. 
 Thomas v. State (84 Ga. 613; 10 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 1016), 89. 
 Thomas v. State (67 Ga. 460), 193. 
 Thomas v. State (103 Ind. 419), 139, 
 
 139a, 140. 
 Thomas v. Stigers (5 Pa. St. 480), 238. 
 Thomas v. Tanner (6 T. B. Mon. 152), 
 
 148. 
 Thomas v. Thomas (16 Neb. 555). 233. 
 Thomas v. Truscott (53 Barb., N. Y., 
 
 200), 222. 
 Thompson v. Bell (37 Ala. 438), 208. 
 Thompson v. Blanchard (2 Iowa, 44), 
 
 77. 
 Thompson v. Brandt (98 Cal. 155; 33 
 
 Pac. Rep. 890), 282. 
 Thompson v. Brannin (Ky., 1S93, 21 
 
 S. W. Rep. 1057), 186. 
 Thompson v. Bullock (1 Bay, S. O, 
 
 364), 108. 
 Thompson v. Burhans (61 N. Y. 52), 
 
 357. 
 Thompson v. Com. (88 Va. 45), 283. 
 Thompson v. Davitt (59 Ga. 472), 
 
 131. 
 Thompson v. Deprez (96 Ind. 67), 
 
 198. 
 Thompson v. Gregor (11 Colo. 531), 
 
 350. 
 Thompson v. Haskell (21 III. 215), 
 
 240, 244. 
 Thompson v. Ish(12 S. W. Rep. 510; 
 
 99 Mo. 160), 178, 188. 
 Thompson v. Johnson (84 Tex. 548), 
 
 136. 
 Thompson v. Judge (54 Mich. 237), 
 
 358. 
 Thompson v. Knickerbocker Ice Co. 
 
 (6 N. Y. S. 7), 188. 
 Thompson v. Locke (65 Iowa, 429), 
 
 214. 
 Thompson v. Mason (4 Bradw., 111., 
 
 452), 149. 
 Thompson v. McCormack (136 111. 
 
 135; 26 N. E. Rep. 373), 151.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 References are to sections. 
 
 clxxxi 
 
 Thompson v. Newlin (8 Ired. Eq. 32), 
 
 231. 
 Thompson v. Norwood (64 Hun, 630), 
 
 281a. 
 Thompson v. Penn. R. Co. (15 Atl. 
 
 Rep. S33; 51 N. J. L. 42), 187. 
 Thompson v. Poor (67 Hun, 653), 
 
 262. 
 Thompson v. Railroad Co. (45 Minn. 
 
 13), 362. 
 Thompson v. Railroad Co. (82 Cal. 
 
 497), 220. 
 Thompson v. Railroad Co. (91 Mich. 
 
 255), S. 
 Thompson v. Ray (Ga., 1S93, 18 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 59), 333. 
 Thompson v. Richards (14 Mich. 172), 
 
 67. 
 Thompson v. Richardson (96 Ala. 
 
 4S8; 11 S. Rep. 728), 124. 
 Thompson v. State (38 Ind. 89), 350. 
 Thompson v. State (Me., 13 Atl. Rep. 
 
 892). 140. 
 Thompson v. State (30 Tex. App. 
 
 325), 384. 
 Thompson v. Stewart (3 Conn. 171), 
 
 149. 
 Thompson v. Stewart (92 Ind. 246), 
 
 147. 
 Thompson v. Thompson (92 Ala. 545 ; 
 
 8S. Rep. 419), 371. 
 Thompson v. Thompson (Ky., 1893, 
 
 20 S. W. Rep. 373), 79. 
 Thompson v. Thompson (77 Ga. 692), 
 
 229. 
 Thompson v. Thompson (88 Cal. 110), 
 
 376. 
 Thompson v. Thompson (13 Ohio St. 
 
 356), 67. 
 Thompson v. Williams (30 Kan. 114), 
 
 211. 
 Thompson, In re (53 Hun, 608), 187. 
 Thompson's Case (122 Mass. 248), 286. 
 Thompson's Case (1 Leach, 325), 95, 
 
 260. 
 Thompson-Houston Electric Co. v. 
 
 Palmer (52 Minn. 174 ; 53 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 1137), 33. 
 
 Thomson v. Beal (48 Fed. Rep. 614), 
 
 210. 
 Thorndike v. Boston (1 Met. 242), 
 
 56. 
 Thorne v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (80 Pa. 
 
 St. 15), 208. 
 Thornton v. Blaisdell (37 Me. 190), 
 
 302. 
 Thornton v. Britton (144 Pa. St. 126), 
 
 122. 
 Thorp v. Adams (58 Hun, 603), 285. 
 Thorp v. Philbin (2 N. Y. S. 732), 33. 
 Thorpe v. Barber (5 M., G. & S. 675), 
 
 302. 
 Thorson v. Peterson (9 Fed. Rep. 
 
 517), 239. 
 Tin-all v. Lathrop (30 Vt. 307), 84. 
 Thrasher v. Ballard (33 W. Va. 285), 
 
 142. 
 Thrasher v. Overly (51 Ga. 91), 77, 
 
 314. 
 Throckmorton v. Throckmorton (15 
 
 S. E. Rep. 289), 304. 
 Thurf jell v. Witherbee (24 N. Y. S. 
 
 278), 281a. 
 Thurman v. Blankenship-Blake Co. 
 
 (79 Tex. 171), 67. 
 Thurman v. Cameron (24 Wend., 
 
 N. Y., 91), 135. 
 Thurman v. Morrison (14 B. Mon. 
 
 296), 239. 
 Thurston v. Luce (61 Mich. 292), 
 
 142. 
 Thurston v. Masterson (9 Dana, Ky., 
 
 285), 108. 
 Tibbals v. Jacobs (31 Conn. 428), 70. 
 Tibbetts v. Flanders (18 N. H. 284), 
 
 124. 
 Tibbetts v. Sternberg (66 Barb., N. 
 
 Y., 201), 339. 
 Tidmarsh v. Wash. F. & M. Ins. Co. 
 
 (4 Mason, 439), 250. 
 Tierney v. Corbett (2 Mackey, 264), 
 
 71. 
 Tierney v. Railroad Co. (24 Am. L. 
 
 Reg. 669), 194. 
 Tilden v. Barnard (43 Mich. 376), 
 
 73a.
 
 clxxxii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Tilley v. Damon (11 Cush., Mass., 
 
 247), 7G. 
 Tillinghast v. Champlin (4 R. 1. 173), 
 
 268. 
 Tillinghast v. Nourse (14 Ga. 641), 
 
 73a. 
 Tillman v. Fletcher (78 Tex. 673), 
 
 282. 
 Tillon v. Insurance Co. (7 Barb. 564), 
 
 129. 
 Tillotson v. Mitchell (111 111. 518), 
 
 83. 
 Tillotson v. Race (22 N. Y. 127), 124. 
 Tillotson v. Weber (Mich., 1893, 55 
 
 N. VvT. Rep. 837), 142. 
 Tilly v. Tilly (2 Bland Ch., Md., 
 
 444), 233. 
 Tilman v. Traver (Moody & Ryan, 
 
 141), 140. 
 Tilton v. Cofield (93 U. S. 166), 3S6. 
 Timberlake v. Brewer (59 Ala. 10S), 
 
 240. 
 Timberlake v. Parish (5 Dana, 346), 
 
 215. 
 Timms v. Sherman (19 Md. 296), 212. 
 Tingly v. Cowgill (48 Mo. 201), 51, 
 
 168. 
 Tinkham v. Arnold (3 Me. 120), 226. 
 Tinkler v. Walpoli (14 East, 226), 
 
 144. 
 Tinkler's Case (1 East, P. C. 354), 101. 
 Tinnern v. Hinz (38 Hun, N. Y., 
 
 465), 67. 
 Tinsley v. Dowell (Tex., 1894, 24 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 928), 220. 
 Tipton v. Norman (72 Mo. 380), 143a. 
 Tipton v. State (17 S. W. Rep. 1097; 
 
 30 Tex. App. 530), 352. 
 Tipton v. Warner (47 Kan. 606), 232. 
 Tisch v. Utz (21 Atl. Rep. 808; 142 
 
 Pa. St. 186; 28 W. N. C. 55), 67. 
 Tischler v. Apple (30 Fla. 132), 370, 
 
 ' 380. 
 Tisdale v. Insurance Co. (26 Iowa, 
 
 170), 233. 
 Tisdale v. State (17 Tex. App. 444), 
 
 324. 
 Tison v. Smith (8 Tex. 147), 237. 
 
 Titford v. Knott (2 Johns. Ch., N. 
 
 Y, 211), 136. 
 Titterington v. Trees (78 Tex. 567), 
 
 115. 
 Tittman v. Thornton (107 Mo. 000), 
 
 373. 
 Titus v. Ash (54 N. H. 319), 21. 
 Tobey v. Bristol (3 Story, 800), 275. 
 Tobey v. Leonard (2 Wall. 403), 304. 
 Tobin v. Shaw (45 Me. 331), 229. 
 Tobin, In re (4 N. Y. S. 59), 233. 
 Todd v. Dibble (6 Dem. Sur. 35), 309. 
 Todd v. Jones (22 Iowa, 146), 136. 
 Todd v. Roberts (1 Tex. Civ. App. 8), 
 
 220. 
 Todd v. Stafford (1 Stew., Ala., 199), 
 
 310. 
 Tognini v. Kyle (17 Nev. 209), 24. 
 Toledo, etc. Co. v. Harnsberger (41 
 
 111. App. 494), 23. 
 Toledo, etc. Co. v. Milligan (2 Ind. 
 
 App. 578), 8. 
 Toledo, etc. R. Co. v. Dunlap (47 
 
 Mich. 456), 344. 
 Toledo, St. Louis, etc. Co. v. Baily 
 
 (145 111. 159; 33 N. E. Rep. 
 
 1089), 8. 
 Tollarson v. Blackstock (11 S. Rep. 
 
 2S4, Ala., 1892), 246. 
 Toiman v. Emerson (4 Pick., Mass., 
 
 160), 106. 
 Tomblerv. Reitz (Ind., 1893, 33 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 789), 219. 
 Tome v. Gerlach (18 N. Y. 932), 250. 
 Tome v. Railroad Co. (39 Md. 36, 37, 
 
 90), 38a, 139, 140. 
 Tomlinson v. Greenfield (31 Ark. 
 
 557), 237. 
 Tomlinson v. Lynch (32 Mo. 160), 
 
 166. 
 Tompkins v. Corinth (9 Cow., N. Y, 
 
 255), 128. 
 Tompkins v. Merriman (155 Pa. St. 
 
 440), 220. 
 Tompkins v. Tompkins (1 Story, 547), 
 
 150. 
 Tompkins v. West (56 Conn. 585), 
 
 189.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clxxxiii 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Tonnele, etc. v. Hall (4 Coiust. 145), 
 
 210. 
 Tooker v. Sloan (30 N. J. Eq. 94), 
 
 136. 
 Toomer v. Gadsden (4 Strob., S. C, 
 
 19:!), GO. 
 Toomes' Estate (54 Cal. 514), 185. 
 Toomey v. Lyman (61 Hun, 623), 
 
 229. 
 Toorle v. Smith (34 Kan. 27), 356. 
 Topeka v. Sherwood (39 Kan. 690), 8. 
 Topiitz v. Hedden (146 U. S. 252), 
 
 350. 
 Torrey v. Forbes (94 Ala. 135), 136. 
 Totten v. United States (93 U. S. 
 
 105), 175. 
 Touchard v. Crow (20 Cal. 150), 135. 
 Tourville v. Pierson (39 111. 446), 136. 
 Tow v. State (27 Tex. App. 175), 69. 
 Towle v. Blake (43 N. H. 92), 52, 192. 
 Town v. Lamphire (37 Vt. 52), 71. 
 Town v. Peebles (5 Wash. St. 471), 
 
 83. 
 Townley v. Coal Co. (59 Hun, 316), 
 
 11. 
 Townley v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (89 
 
 Mo. 31), 189. 
 Townsend v. Bush (1 Conn. 267), 
 
 323. 
 Townsend v. Graves (8 Paige, 455), 
 
 10. 
 Townsend v. State (Miss., 1893, 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 209), 354a. 
 Townsend v. Todd (47 Conn. 190), 83. 
 Townsend v. Townsend (7 Gill, 10), 
 
 231. 
 Tracy v. Atherton (36 Vt. 503), 226. 
 Tracy Peerage Case (10 C. & F. 191), 
 
 190. 
 Tracy v. Iron Works (29 Mo. App. 
 
 342), 205. 
 Traders' Bank v. Parker (130 N. Y. 
 
 415), 232. 
 Trafton v. Hawes (102 Mass. 541), 
 
 208. 
 Trahern v. Colburn (63 Md. 104), 308. 
 Trammel v. Bassett (24 Ark. 499), 
 
 80. 
 
 Trammell v. Ramage (Ala., 1893, 11 
 
 S. Rep. 916), 199. 
 Trammell v. Thurmond (17 Ark. 203), 
 
 136. 
 Transp. Line v. Hope (95 U. S. 297), 
 
 198. 
 Trapnall v. Brown (19 Ark. 48), 246. 
 Traser v. Haggerty (86 Mich. 521), 
 
 312. 
 Travellers' Ins. Co. v. Mosley (8 
 
 Wall. 40S), 56. 
 Travellers' Ins. Co. v. Sheppard (85 
 
 Ga. 751), 56, 333. 
 Travers v. Jennings (S. C, 1893, 17 
 
 • S. E. Rep. 849), 360. 
 Traverse v. Satterlee (67 Hun, 652 ; 
 
 22 N. Y. S. 118), 126. 
 Travis v. Brown (43 Pa. St. 12), 141, 
 
 185. 
 Travis v. Continental Ins. Co. (47 
 
 Mo. App. 472), 369. 
 Travis v. Pierson (43 111. App. 479), 8. 
 Trauer man v. Lippincott (39 Mo. 
 
 App. 478), 151. 
 Tread way v. Tread way (45 111. App. 
 
 478), 50. 
 Trebilcox v. McAlpine (62 Hun, 317), 
 
 159. 
 Tredwell v. Inslee (120 N. Y. 458), 
 
 226. 
 Trent v. Fletcher (100 Ind. 105), 205. 
 Trenwith v. Small wood (111 N. C. 
 
 132), 134. 
 Treon v. Brown (14 Ohio, 482), 310. 
 Trese v. State (2 S. Rep. 390), 241. 
 Trevelyan, Adin'r, v. Lofft (83 Va. 
 
 141), 282. 
 Trevor v. Wood (36 N. Y. 307), 33. 
 Trileavan v. Dixon (119 111. 551), 168. 
 Trimble v. Edwards (84 Tex. 497), 30. 
 Trimble v. Mims (Ga., 1894, 18 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 362), 309. 
 Trimbo v. Trimbo (47 Minn. 389), 
 
 250. 
 Trinity v. Lane (79 Tex. 643), 11. 
 Triplett v. Gills (7 J. J. Marsh. 433), 
 
 142. 
 Triplett v. Goff (83 Va. 784), 69.
 
 clxxxiv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Beferences are to sections. 
 
 Tripp v. Cook (26 Wend. 152), 386. 
 Troeder v. Hyaras (27 N. E. Rep. 
 
 775), 138. 
 Trotter v. Mills (6 Wend. 512), 110. 
 Truby v. Seybert (12 Pa. St. 101), 74. 
 Truesdale v. Hoyle (39 111. App. 532), 
 
 7, 8, 247, 252. 
 Truitt's Estate (10 Phila., Pa., 16), 
 
 139a. 
 Trujillo v. Territory (N. Mex., 1893, 
 
 30 Pac. Rep. 870), 330. 
 Trulick v. Peeples (1 Ga. 3), 135. 
 Trull v. Fisher (28 Me. 548), 262. 
 Trunkey v. Hedstrom (33 111. App. 
 
 397), 124. 
 Trustee, Ex parte (9 Morrell's Bank. 
 
 Cas. 116), 170. 
 Trustees v. Bledsoe (5 Ind. 133), 73a. 
 Trustees v. McKecbnie (90 N. Y. 
 
 618), 136. 
 Trustees v. Saunders (Wis., 1893, 54 
 
 N. W. Rep. 1094), 208. 
 Trustees v. Southard (31 III. App. 
 
 359), 219. 
 Trustees v. Stetson (5 Pick., Mass., 
 
 506), 205. 
 Tuck v. Olds (29 Fed. Rep. 883), 267. 
 Tucker v. Kellojjg (8 Utah. 11; 28 
 
 Pac. Rep. 870). 139, 140. 
 Tucker v. Page (69 111. 179), 314. 
 Tucker v. Peasley (36 N. II. 157), 7. 
 Tucker v. People (117 111. 91). 142. 
 Tucker v. Seamen's Aid Society (7 
 
 Mete, Mass , 188), 221. 
 Tucker v. Smith (68 Tex. 473; 3 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 671), 110, 112. 
 Tucker v. So. Kingston (5 R. I. 558), 
 
 176. 
 Tucker v. State (11 Md. 322), 244. 
 Tucker v. Tucker (113 Ind. 272; 13 
 
 N. E. Rep. 710), 214. 
 Tuckwood v. Hawthorne (30 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 705; 67 Wis. 326), 35. 
 Tuley v. Barton (79 Va. 387), 210. 
 Tullis v. State (30 Ohio St. 200), 323. 
 Tully v. Alexander (11 La. Ann. 628), 
 
 166. 
 Tunstall v. Cobb (109 N. C. 316), 13. 
 
 Tuomey v. O'Reilly (22 N. Y. S. 930; 
 
 3 Misc. Rep. 302), 367. 370. 
 Turnbull v. Lanbagh (0 Kulp, Pa., 
 
 126), 361. 
 Turnbull v. Payson (95 U. S. 218), 
 
 148. 
 Turnbull v. Richardson (69 Mich. 
 
 400; 4 S. Rep. 613), 35, 190. 
 Turner v. Boston, etc. Co. (33 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 520; 158 Mass. 261), 38a. 
 Turner v. Coffin (12 Allen, 401), 84. 
 Turner v. Connelly (105 N. C. 72), 
 
 130. 
 Turner v. Cook (36 Ind. 129), 276. 
 Turner v. Fish (28 Miss. 300), 242. 
 Turner v. Hahr (114 Mo. 335; 21 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 737), 198. 
 Turner v. Hellard (30 Ch. D. 390), 
 
 150. 
 Turner v. Holden (109 N. C. 182), 
 
 150a. 
 Turner v. Jenkins (1 H. & J., Md., 
 
 161), 80. 
 Turner v. Lord (92 Mo. 113), 231. 
 Turner v. Patten (49 Ala. 406), 238. 
 Turner v. Sav. Inst. (76 Me. 527), 
 
 222. 
 Turner v. State (50 Miss. 351, 354), 
 
 71, 160, 217. 
 Turner v. State (89 Tenn. 547), 39. 
 Turner v. State (Ala., 1893, 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 54), 19, 23. 
 Turner v. Weddington(3 Wash. 126), 
 
 148. 
 Turnipseed v. Hawkins (1 McCord, 
 
 272), 138, 139. 
 Turpin v. State (55 Md. 462, 477), 
 
 166, 167. 
 Tuttle v. Rainey (98 N. C. 513), 139, 
 
 229. 
 Tutwiler v. Munford (68 Ala. 124), 
 
 208. 
 Tuxbury v. French (41 Mich. 7), 
 
 220. 
 Twiss v. Baldwin (9 Conn. 292), 20. 
 Twombly v. Leach (11 Cush., Mass., 
 
 405), 193. 
 Tyler v. Flanders (57 N. H. 618), 53.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 olxxxv 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Tyler v. Hall (106 Mo. 313), 11, 82, 
 
 169. 
 Tyler v. Todd (36 Conn. 218), 140. 
 Tyler v. Tyler (126 111. 525), 171. 
 Tyres v. Kennedy (126 Ind. 523), 69. 
 
 U. 
 
 Udderzook v. Coin. (76 Pa. St. 340), 
 
 38a. 
 Uhe v. Chicago M. etc. Co. (S. D., 
 
 1893, 54 N. W. Rep. 601), 341. 
 Ulmer v. State (14 Ind. 52), 324. 
 Umbarger v. Chaboya (49 Cal. 525), 
 
 232. 
 Underwood v. Hart (23 Vt. 120), 74, 
 Underwood v. State. (72 Ala. 220), 23. 
 Underwood v. Wing (19 Beav. 459), 
 
 233. 
 Unger v. Mooney (63 Cal. 586), 226. 
 Union v. Plainfield (39 Conn. 563). 
 
 53. 
 Union Bldg. Ass'n v. Insurance Co. 
 
 (83 Iowa, 647), 372. 
 Union Ins. Co. v. Smith (8 S. Ct., 
 
 U. S., 534), 198. 
 Union Mat. Life Ins. Co. v. Mowry 
 
 (96 U. S. 547-48), 84. 
 Union M. Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson (13 
 
 Wall. 231), 205. 
 Union Nat. Bank v. Int. Bank (22 
 
 111. App. 652), 205. 
 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Chicago, etc. 
 
 Co. (51 Fed. Rep. 309), 375. 
 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Fray (35 Kan. 
 
 700), 73a. 
 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. O'Brien (46 
 
 Fed. Rep. 538), 333. 
 Union Pac. R. Co. v. Reese (56 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 288), 350, 367. 
 Union Stock Yards v. Gillespie (137 
 
 U. S. 411). 18. 
 Union Stock Yards Co. v. Cattle Co. 
 
 (59 Fed. Rep. 49), 205. 
 United Breth. M. A. I. Co. v. O'Hara 
 
 (120 Pa. St. 256), 194. 
 United States v. Amador (N. M., 
 
 1892, 27 Pac. Rep. 288), 35. 
 
 United States v. American (1 Woolw. 
 
 217), 238. 
 United States v. Angell(ll Fed. Rep. 
 
 41, 54), 57, 241, 346. 
 United States v. Arredondo (6 Wall. 
 
 691), 242. 
 United States v. Atherton (102 U. S. 
 
 375), 386. 
 United States v. Babcock (3 Dill., 
 
 U. S., 568), 288. 
 United States v. Bailey (9 Pet., U. S., 
 
 238), 356. 
 United States v. Barrells (8 Blatchf. 
 
 475), 341. 
 United States v. Bassett (5 Utah, 
 
 131; 13 Pac. Rep. 237), 167. 
 United States v. Beebe (17 Fed. Rep. 
 
 36). 226. 
 United States v. Beebe (2 Dak. 292), 
 
 237. 
 United States v. Bell (111 U. S. 477), 
 
 141. 
 United States v. Benner (1 Baldw. 
 
 238), 141. 
 United States v. Bennett (17 Blatchf., 
 
 U. S., 357), 384. 
 United States v. Boese (46 Fed. Rep. 
 
 917), 93. 
 United States v. Bott (11 Blatchf. 
 
 346), 127. 
 United States v. Brown (40 Fed. Rep. 
 
 457), 346. 
 United States v. Button (2 Mason, 
 
 464), 23. 
 United States v. Castro (24 How. 
 
 346). 106. 
 United States v. Chapman (4 Am. 
 
 Law J. 440), 90. 
 United States v. Clapboards (4 Cliff. 
 
 303), 9. 
 United States v. Council (54 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 994), 76. 
 United States v. Cross (20 D. C. 365), 
 
 141, 340. 
 United States v. Cushman (2 Sumn. 
 
 426), 154. 
 United States v. Cutler (19 Pac. Rep. 
 145 ; 5 Utah, 608), 166.
 
 clxxxvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 United States v. Cuttingham (2 
 
 Blatchf. 470). 127. 
 United States v. Ducourr.ac (54 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 138), 241. 
 United States v. Duff (19 Blatchf. 
 
 10), 126. 
 United States v. Durling(4 Biss. 509), 
 
 277. 
 United States v. Edme (9 S. & R., 
 
 Pa., 147), 286. 
 United States v. Ferguson (54 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 28), 804. 
 United States v. Ford (33 Fed. Rep. 
 
 861), 350, 354Z>. 
 United States v. Ford (99 U. S. 595), 
 
 323. 
 United States v. Gardner (42 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 832), 88. 
 United States v. Gates (6 Fed. Rep. 
 
 866), 822. 
 United States v. Gibert (2 Sumn. 16), 
 
 97, 144, 332. 
 United States v. Gooding (12 Wheat. 
 
 469), 97. 
 United States v. Green (6 Mackey, 
 
 562), 232. 
 United States v. Guiteau (3 dim. L. 
 
 Mag. 347), 197. 
 United States v. Hall (7 Mackey, 14), 
 
 140. 
 United States v. Hall (D. C, 53 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 352), 320. 
 United States v. Hall (44 Fed. Rep. 
 
 864), 384. 
 United States v. Hartwell (3 Cliff. C. 
 
 C. 22), 69. 
 United States v. Heath (20 D. C. 
 
 272). 101, 234. 
 United States v. Heatli (19 Wash. 
 
 Law R. 818), 101, 102. 
 United States v. Hinz (35 Fed. Rep. 
 
 723), 323, 324. 
 United States v. Howe (12 Cent. L. 
 
 J. 193), 191. 
 United States v. Howell (56 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 21), 324. 
 United States v. Hunter (1 Cranch, 
 
 446), 306, 323. 
 
 United States v. Johns (4 Dall. 42, 
 
 415), 142. 
 United States v. Johnson (2 Sawy., 
 
 U. S., 482), 239. 
 United States v. Johnson (1 Cranch, 
 
 U. S., 871), 139. 
 United States v. Jones (10 Fed. Rep. 
 
 469), 139a. 
 United States v. Jones (32 Fed. Rep. 
 
 569), 166. 
 United States v. Kee (39 Fed. Rep. 
 
 606), 281. 
 United States v. Keefer (59 Ind. 
 
 263), 237. 
 United States v. Kindred (4 Hughes, 
 
 U. S., 493), 281. 
 United States v. Kirkwood (5 Utah, 
 
 123), 90. 
 United States v. Lancaster (44 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 896), 226. 
 United States v. Larned (4 Cranch, 
 
 312), 139a. 
 United States v. Le Baron (40 Wall. 
 
 642), 22. 
 United States v. Libby (1 W. & M. 
 
 221), 242. 
 United States v. Linn (1 How. 101), 
 
 129. 
 United States v. Lucero (1 N. M. 
 
 422), 238. 
 United States v. Marcus (53 Fed. Rep. 
 
 784), 96. 
 United States v. McKee (3 Dill. C. C. 
 
 546), 69. 
 United States v. McKenzie (35 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 826), 5. 
 United States v. McLaughlin (24 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 823), 306. 
 United States v. McRae (L. R. 3 Ch. 
 
 86), 119. 
 United States v. Meagher (37 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 875), 6. 
 United States v. Mingo (2 Curt. C. C. 
 
 1), 249. 
 United States v. Moses (4 Wash. C. 
 
 C. 726), 176. 
 United States v. Mullaney (32 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 730), 346.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clxxxvii 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 United States v. Neal (1 Gall. S87), 
 
 23. 
 United States v. Newton (52 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 275), 6. 
 United States v. Noelke (17 Blatchf. 
 
 570), 56, 57. 
 United States v. Nott (1 McLean, 
 
 499), 89. 
 United States v. Palmer (3 Wheat. 
 
 610), 243. 
 United States v. Payne (2 McCrary, 
 
 C. C. 289), 242. 
 United States v. Peck (102 U. S. 64), 
 
 222. 
 United States v. Pendergast (32 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 198), 190. 
 United States v. Perot (8 Otto, 428), 
 
 242. 
 United States v. Porter (3 Day, 283, 
 
 286), 23. 
 United States v. Rapp (30 Fed Rep. 
 
 822), 127. 
 United States v. Reid (2 Blatchf. 
 
 435), 176. 
 United States v. Reynes (9 How., 
 
 U. S., 127), 242. 
 United States v. Ross (92 U. S. 281), 
 
 226. 
 United States v. Six Lots of Ground 
 
 (1 Woods, C. C. 234), 175. 
 United States v. Slenker (32 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 694), 127. 
 United States v. Smith (47 Fed. Rep. 
 
 501), 354a. 
 United States v. Spalding (2 Mason, 
 
 478), 128. 
 United States v. Sutton (21 How. 
 
 170, 175), 126. 
 United States v. Taylor (35 Fed. Rep. 
 
 484), 354. 
 United States v. Teschmaker (22 
 
 How. 392), 244. 
 United States v. Thomas (47 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 807), 281. 
 United States v. Thompson (98 U. S. 
 
 489), 226. 
 United States v. Tilden (10 Ben. 566, 
 
 570, 581), 288. 
 M 
 
 United States v. Watkins (3 Cranch, 
 
 442), 347. 
 United States v. Whittier (5 Dill., 39, 
 
 41), 127. 
 United States v. Williams (4 Biss. 
 
 302), 237. 
 United States v. Williams (6 Mont. 
 
 379), 240. 
 United States v. Wilson (7 Pet, U. S., 
 
 150), 320. 
 United' States v. Woods (14 Pet. 440), 
 
 384. 
 United States v. Workman (54 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 994), 304. 
 United States v. Ybanez (53 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 536), 3, 226, 288, 324. 
 United States Exp. Co. v. Jenkins 
 
 (73 Wis. 471), 124. 
 Univ. Fash. Co. v. Skinner (64 Hun, 
 
 293), 208. 
 Upcher v. Oberlender (31 Pac. Rep. 
 
 1080; 50 Kan. 315), 199. 
 Upchurch v. Upchurch (16 B. Mon. 
 
 102), 131. 
 Updyke v. Weed (18 Abb. Pr. 223), 
 
 252. 
 Upham v. Draper (157 Mass. 392; 32 
 
 N. E. Rep. 24), 24. 
 Upington v. Keenan (67 Hun, 648), 
 
 376. 
 Upinton v. Carrington (69 Hun, 320), 
 
 234. 
 Upton v. Catlin (17 Colo. 546), 140. 
 Urias v. Penn. R. R. Co. (152 Pa. St. 
 
 326), 380. 
 Urnston v. State (73 Ind. 175), 240. 
 Utley v. Donaldson (94 U. S. 29), 33. 
 
 V. 
 
 Vahle v. Brackenseick (111., 1893, 34 
 
 N. E. Rep. 524), 244. 
 Vail v. Judson (4 E. D. Smith, N. Y., 
 
 165), 73a. 
 Vail v. Lewis (4 Johns, 450), 18. 
 Vail v. Rice (5 N. Y. 155), 216. 
 Vail v. Smith (4 Cow. 71), 146. ; 
 
 Vail v. Strong (10 Vt. 457), 79.
 
 CIXXXV1U 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Valensin v. Valensin (14 Pac. Rep. 
 
 397; 73Cal. 106), 172. 
 Valentine v. Piper (22 Pick. 85), 229. 
 Vallaint v. Dodemead (2 Atk. 524), 
 
 169. 
 Valle v. Picton (91 Mo. 207; 3 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 860), 281. 
 Van Bokkelen v. Berdell (130 N. Y. 
 
 141), 35. 
 Van Camp v. Hart man (126 Ind. 
 
 177), 216. 
 Vance v. Fare (24 Cal. 414), 210. 
 Vance v. Wood (22 Oreg. 77), 205. 
 Vanderburg v. Campbell (.64 Miss. 
 
 89), 378. 
 Vanderlin v. Hovis (152 Pa. St. 11), 
 
 214. 
 Van Deusen v. Newcomer (40 Mich. 
 
 120), 192. 
 Vandeusen v. Young (26 N. Y. 9), 1 99. 
 Vandevelde v. Snellen (1 Keb. 220), 
 
 287. 
 Vandoren v. Baily (48 Minn. 305), 
 
 73a. 
 Vandoren v. Jeliffe (20 N. Y. S. 636), 
 
 333. 
 Vandoren v. Liebman (11 N. Y. S. 
 
 769), 230. 
 Vandyck v. Van Buren (1 Caines, 
 
 84), 226. 
 Van Epps v. Van Epps (6 Barb. 320), 
 
 231. 
 Van Etten v. Newton (8 N. Y. S. 
 
 478), 211. 
 Van Evera v. Davis (51 Iowa, 637), 
 
 205. 
 Van Fleet v. Sledge (45 Fed. Rep. 
 
 743), 205, 217. 
 Van Hoover v. Berghoff (90 Mo. 487), 
 
 193. 
 Van Horn v. Van Horn (N. J., 1892, 
 
 23 Atl. Rep. 1079), 205, 250. 
 Van Huss v. Rambolt (42 Tenn. 139), 
 
 197. 
 Van Kamen v. Roes (65 Hun, 625), 
 
 369. 
 Van Keuren v. Parmelee (2 Comst., 
 
 N. Y., 523), 69. 
 
 Van Kleck v. McClabe(87 Mich. 599), 
 
 67. 
 Vann v. State (83 Ga. 44), 334. 
 Vannatta v. Duffy (Ind., 1893, 30 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 807), 367 
 Vanness v. Bank (13 Pet. 21), 136. 
 Van Peet v. McGraw (4 N. Y. 110), 
 
 234. 
 Vanquelin v. Bovard (9 L. T., N. S., 
 
 582), 145, 158. 
 Van Sickle v. Gibson (40 Mich. 167), 
 
 53. 
 Van Storch v. Griffen (71 Pa. St. 
 
 240), 178. 
 Van Swarton v. Com. (24 Pa. St. 
 
 131), 242. 
 Vanway v. Klein (122 Ind. 416), 68. 
 Vanzant v. Jones (3 Dana, Ky., 464), 
 
 252. 
 Vary v. Godfrey (6 Cow. 587), 356. 
 Vaugh v. McElroy (82 Ga. 687), 138. 
 Vaughan v. Warnell (26 Tex. 117), 
 
 114. 
 Vaughn v. Com. (86 Ky. 431 ; 6 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 153), 101. 
 Vaughn v. Hixon (50 Kan. 773), 84. 
 Vaughn v. Strong (4 N. Y. S. 689), 
 
 60. 
 Vaughran v. State (57 Ark. 1 ; 20 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 588), 5. 
 Vaux Peerage (5 C. & F. 538), 145. 
 Vawter v. Hulse (112 Mo. 633), 360. 
 Veazey v. Brigman (93 Ala. 548), 
 
 150a. 
 Vellum v. Demerle (65 Hun, 543), 82. 
 Verdier v. Verdier (8 Rich., S. C, 
 
 135), 138. 
 Vernon v. Kirk (30 Pa. St. 218), 138. 
 Vernon, etc. Co. v. Johnson (108 
 
 Ind. 128), 276. 
 Vernon, The (36 Fed. Rep. 113), 276. 
 Verran v. Baird (150 Mass. 150), 39. 
 Vette v. Leonori (42 Mo. App. 217), 
 
 18. 
 Vicknair v. Trosher (La., 1893, 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 486), 208. 
 Vickroy v. Skelly (14 S. & R., Pa., 
 
 372), 139.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clxxxix 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Vicksburg & Meridian R. Co. v. 
 O'Brfen (119 U. S. 99, 105-6), 58. 
 Viel v. Covvles (45 Hun, 307), 178. 
 Viele v. Insurance Co. (26 Iowa, 10), 
 
 253. 
 Viele v. Judson (82 N. Y. 32-39), 83. 
 Vifquain v. Finch (15 Neb. 505), 
 
 249. 
 Village v. Record (46 Hun, 448), 178. 
 Vilrnar v. Schall (61 N. Y. 564), 362. 
 Vinal v. Burrill (16 Pick. 401, 407). 
 
 126. 
 Vinton v. Peck (14 Mich. 287), 140, 
 
 141. 
 Virginia City v. Manufacturing Co. 
 
 (2 Nev. 86), 242. 
 Vogel v. Osborne (21 Minn. 267), 76. 
 Vogler v. Spaugh (4 Biss., U. S., 288), 
 
 205. 
 Vogt v. Com. (17 S. W. Rep. 213; 92 
 
 Ky. 68), 283. 
 Voisin v. Insurance Co. (67 Hun, 
 
 365), 74. 
 Volant v. Soyer (13 Q. B. 231), 173. 
 Volkenan v. Drum (154 Pa. St. 616), 
 
 208. 
 Von Rosenberg v. Haynes(Tex., 1892, 
 
 20 S. W. Rep. 143), 107. 
 Von Stanbenzee v. Monk (32 L. J. 
 
 Prob. 21), 210. 
 VonTrothav. Bamberger (15 Colo. 1), 
 
 213. 
 Voorhis, In re (125 N. Y. 765), 269. 
 Vorebeck v. Roe (50 Barb. 305), 
 
 262. 
 Vosburg v. Thayer (12 Johns. 261). 
 
 60. 
 Vosburgh v. Putney (80 Wis. 523), 
 
 188. 
 Vose v. Morton (4 Cush., Mass., 27), 
 
 151. 
 Voss v. King (33 W. Va. 236), 309. 
 Vowels v. Com. (83 Ky. 193), 369. 
 Vowles v. Miller (3 Taunt. 137), 20. 
 Vreeland v. Vreeland (48 N. J. Eq. 
 
 56), 229. 
 Vreeland v. Williams (32 N. J. Eq. 
 754), 222. 
 
 w. 
 
 Wabash, etc. Co. v. Ferris (Ind., 
 
 1893, 32 N. E. Rep. 112), 354. 
 Wabash, etc. Co. v. McDougal (113 
 
 III. 603), 216. 
 Wabash W. R. Co. v. Friedman (41 
 
 111. App. 270), 192. 
 Wachterhaus v. Smith (10 N. Y. S. 
 
 535), 216. 
 Wadd v. Hazleton (62 Hun, 602), 
 
 169, 246. 
 Waddams v. Humphreys (22 111. 
 
 661), 166. 
 Wade v. Brighton (3 V. & B. 29), 139. 
 Wade v. Ordway (57 Tenn. 229), 343. 
 Wade v. Powell (31 Ga. 1), 77. 
 Wade v. Scott (7 Mo. 509), 253. 
 Wade v. State (10 S. Rep. 233), 23. 
 Wade v. State (7 Baxt., Tenn., 80), 
 
 124. 
 Wadsworth v. Alcott (6 N. Y. 64), 
 
 211. 
 Wagner v. Olson (N. D., 1893, 54 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 286), 249. 
 Wagner's Case (61 Me. 178), 244. 
 Wagoner v. Rupply (60 Tex. 700), 50, 
 
 140. 
 Wagonseller v. Brown (7 Pa. Co. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 663), 337. 
 Wahed v. Stein (59 Hun, 622), 126. 
 Waitv. Fairbanks (Brayton, Vt, 77), 
 
 216. 
 Waite v. Coaracy (45 Minn. 159), 232, 
 
 233. 
 Waite v. State (13 Tex. App. 169), 
 
 192. 
 Wakefield v. Day (41 Minn. 344), 130. 
 Walden v. Bolton (55 Mo. 405), 74. 
 Walden v. Sherbourne (15 Johns. 
 
 409), 69. 
 Waldon v. Purvis (73 Cal. 518), 70. 
 Waldron v. Tuttle (4 N. H. 371), 53, 
 
 108. 
 Waldron v. Waldron (45 Mich. 350), 
 
 221. 
 Walk v. Bank of Circleville (15 Ohio, 
 288, 289), 56.
 
 cxc 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Walker v. Allen (72 Ala. 456), 239. 
 Walker v. Bernstein (43 111. App. 
 
 568), 199. 
 Walker v. Camp (63 Iowa, 627), 214. 
 Walker v. Cole (Tex., 1894, 24 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 76), 66. 
 Walker v. Collins (50 Fed. Rep. 73), 
 
 199. 
 Walker v. Cook (33 111. App. 561), 
 
 277. 
 Walker v. Dunspaugh (20 N. Y. 170), 
 
 73a, 333. 
 Walker v. Fields (28 Ga. 237), 199. 
 Walker v. Forbes (25 Ala. 139), 73, 
 
 114. 
 Walker v. Herring (21 Gratt, Va., 
 
 678), 268. 
 Walker v. Leslie (Ky., 1891, 14 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 682), 153. 
 Walker v. Moors (122 Mass. 501), 
 
 114. 
 Walker v. People (88 N. Y. 81), 249. 
 Walker v. State (52 Ala. 192), 102. 
 Walker v. State (102 Ind. 502), 10. 
 Walker v. State (91 Ala. 76; 10 S. 
 
 Rep. 401), 23, 24. 
 Walker v. State (96 Ala. 53 ; 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 83), 317. 
 Walker v. State (7 Tex. App. 245), 
 
 89, 202. 
 Walker v. State (14 Tex. App. 609), 
 
 140. 
 Walker v. Taylor (43 Vt. 612), 308. 
 Walker v. Walker (2 Atk. 98), 223. 
 Walker v. Walker (3 Ga. 302), 305. 
 Walker v. Westfield (39 Vt. 246), 8. 
 Walker v. Wilmington, etc. Co. (26 
 
 S. C. 80), 214. 
 Walker v. Wmgfield (18 Ver. 443), 
 
 142. 
 Walkoff v. Tefft (12 N. Y. S. 464), 
 
 354. 
 Walkup v. Com. (Ky., 1893, 20 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 221), 283. 
 Walkup v. Pratt (5 Harr. & J. 51), 
 
 53, 67. 
 Wallace, In re (25 Atl. Rep. 260 ; 49 
 
 N. J. Eq. 539), 35, 114. 
 
 Wallace v. Bryne (17 La. Ann. 8). 
 
 356. 
 Wallace v. Harmstead (44 Pa. St. 
 
 492), 128. 
 Wallace v. Kennedy (47 N. J. L. 
 
 246), 8. 
 Wallace v. Rappleyea (103 111. 229), 
 
 262. 
 Wallace v. State (90 Ga. 117; 15 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 700), 101. 
 Wallace v. Story (139 Mass. 115), 50. 
 Wallace v. Straus (113 N. Y. 238), 
 
 309. 
 Wallace v. Uni. Pres. Ch. (Ill Pa. 
 
 St. 164), 225. 
 Waller. In re (49 Fed. Rep. 271), 276. 
 Wallers v. People (32 N. Y. 147), 249. 
 Wallich v. Morgan (39 Mo. App. 
 
 469), 24. 
 Wallis v. Randell (81 N. Y. 164), 69. 
 Walradt v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (136 
 
 N. Y. 375), 200. 
 Walrath v. Whitlekind (26 Kan. 482), 
 
 209. 
 Walsh v. ^tna L. Ins. Co. (30 Iowa, 
 
 133), 200. 
 Walsh v. Anderson (135 Mass. 65), 
 
 150a. 
 Walsh v. Dart (12 Wis. 635), 242. 
 Walsh v. People (88 N. Y. 458), 
 
 345. 
 Walsh v. Rogers (13 How. 286, 287), 
 
 S&l. 
 Walsh v. Sayre (52 How. Pr. 384), 
 
 202. 
 Walsh v. Washington, etc. Co. (32 
 
 N. Y. 427), 198. 
 Walter v. Bolman (8 Watts, 544), 60. 
 Walter v. Cronly (14 Wend., N. Y, 
 
 63), 223. 
 Walter v. Fairchild (4 N. Y. S. 559), 
 
 172. 
 Walter v. Moore (90 N. C. 41), 150a. 
 Walters v. Senf (Mo., 1893, 22 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 311), 216. 
 Walton v. Campbell (35 Neb. 173; 
 
 52 N. W. Rep. 883), 128. 
 1 Walton v. Jones (7 Utah, 462), 24, 27.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXC1 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Walton v. Kansas, etc. Co. (49 Mo. 
 
 App. 620), 3S0. 
 Walton v. Shelley (1 T. R. 296), 310. 
 Walton v. State (79 Ga. 46; 5 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 205), 101. 
 Ward v. Bartholomew (6 Pick. 409), 
 
 225. 
 Ward v. Busack (46 Wis. 407). 35. 
 Ward v. Clay (82 Cal. 502), 371. 
 Ward v. Dougherty (75 Cal. 240), 
 
 229. 
 Ward v. Gould (5 Pick. 29), 77. 
 Ward v. Hayden (2 Esp. 552), 302. 
 Ward v. Henry (19 Wis. 76), 244. 
 Ward v. Howell (5 H. & J. 60), 69. 
 Ward v. Kilpatrick (85 N. Y. 413), 
 
 198. 
 Ward v. Lewis (4 Pick. 518), 229. 
 Ward v. Patton (75 Ala. 207), 24! 
 Ward v. Sharp (15 Vt. 115), 353. 
 Ward v. State (22 Ala. 16), 237. 
 Ward v. Ward (37 Mich. 253), 50, 79. 
 Ware v. Smith (156 Mass. 186; SON. 
 
 E. Rep. 869), 83. 
 Warfield v. Booth (33 Md. 63), 220, 
 
 222. 
 Waring v. Suydani (4 Edw., N. Y., 
 
 362), 305. 
 Waring v. United States (7 Ct. CI.' 
 
 501), 320. j 
 
 Warlick v. White (76 N. C. 175), 345. 
 Warner v. Bait. & O. R. R. (31 Ohio 
 
 St. 265), 138. 
 Warner v. Hare (154 Pa. St. 548), 380.' 
 Warner v. Warner's Estate (37 Vt. 
 
 362), 63, 129. 
 Warrall v. Munn (5 N. Y. 229), 268. 
 Warren v. Com. (37 Pa. St. 45), 10. 
 Warren v. Gabriel (51 Ala. 235), 347. 
 Warren v. Jacksonville (15 111. 236), 
 
 226. 
 Warren v. Miller (38 Me. 108), 205. 
 Warren v. Press Pub. Co. (132 N. Y. 
 
 181), 167. 
 Warren v. Spencer Water Co. (143 
 
 Mass. 155), 31. 
 Warren v. State (31 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 573), 10. 
 
 Warren Co. v. State (15 Ind. 250), 
 
 140. 
 Warrick v. Hull (102 III. 280), 309. 
 Warrick v. Queen's College (40 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 785), 112. 
 Warten v. Strane (82 Ala. 311), 310. 
 Warwick v. Bruce (2 M. & S. 205), 
 
 262. 
 Washburn v. Cuddely (8 Gray, 430), 
 
 145. 
 Washburn v. Railway Co. (59 Wis. 
 
 364, 368), 344. 
 Washburn v. Ramsdell (17 Vt. 299), 
 
 70. 
 Washington v. Cole (6 Ala. 212), 
 ' 190. 
 Washington v. Finley(5 Eng., Ark., 
 
 423), 242. 
 Washington L. Insurance Co. v. 
 
 Scheible (1 W. N. C. 369), 38. 
 Wasson v. Bank (107 Ind. 206), 257. 
 Wasson v. Connor (54 Mass. 352), 135. 
 Waterman v. Chicago, etc. Co. (52 
 
 N. W. Rep. 247; 82 Wis. 613), 
 
 250, 374. 
 Waterman v. Johnson (13 Pick. 261), 
 
 220. 
 Waterman v. Peet (11 111. 648), 73a. 
 Waters v. State (30 Tex. App. 284), 
 
 382. 
 Watertown v. Cowen (4 Paige, 510), 
 
 72. 
 W T atkins v. Bowers (119 Mass. 383), 
 
 212. 
 Watkins v. Holman (16 Peters, 257), 
 
 141. 
 Watkins v. Howeth (1 Tex. Civ. App. 
 
 277), 82. 
 Watkins v. Paine (57 Ga. 50), 30. 
 Watkins v. State (89 Ala. 82). 39. 
 Watkins v. Turner (34 Ark. 663), 167. 
 Watrous v. Cunningham (11 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 811 ; 71 Cal. 30), 60, 337. 
 Watson v. Blymer Manufg. Co. (2 
 
 S. W. Rep. 353 ; 66 Tex. 558), 282. 
 Watson v. Brewster (1 Barr, 381), 53. 
 Watson v. Com. (95 Pa. St. 418), 6. 
 
 324.
 
 CXC11 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Heferences are to sections. 
 
 Watson v. Lemon (9 Colo. 200), 7G. 
 Watson v. McAllister (7 Mart. 368), 
 
 139a. 
 Watson v. Miller (82 Tex. 279), 205, 
 
 336. 
 Watson v. Moore (1 C. &Kir. 626), 80. 
 Watson v. Pinckney (18 N. Y. S. 
 
 790), 246. 
 Watson v. Race (46 Mo. App. 546), 
 
 363. 
 Watson v. Sherman (84 111. 263), 268. 
 Watson v. Tyndall (24 Ga. 494), 233. 
 Watt v. People (126 111. 9; 18 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 340), 7, 346. 
 Watt v. Womack (7 Ga. 356), 131. 
 Watts v. Bruce (10 B. & C. 446), 262. 
 Watts v. Kilburn (7 Ga. 356), 131. 
 Watts v. Territory (1 Wash. Ter. 
 
 409), 176. 
 Watzel v. State (28 Tex. App. 523), 
 
 23. 
 Way v. Butterworth (106 Mass. 75), 
 
 176. 
 Wayne v. Blun (Ga., 1893, 17 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 288), 369. 
 Wead v. Railroad Co. (64 Vt. 52), 
 
 220. 
 Weall v. King (12 East, 452), 18. 
 Weatherford v. State (31 Tex. Crim. 
 
 Rep. 530), 176. 
 Weathersley v. Weathersley (40 Miss. 
 
 462), 223. 
 Weatherwax v. Payne (2 Mich. 555), 
 
 356. 
 Weaver v. Emigrant, etc. Co. (17 
 
 Abb. N. C. 82), 246. 
 Weaver v. McElbranan (13 Mo. 89), 
 
 237. 
 Weaver v. People (132 111. 536), 6. 
 Weaver v. Shiply (127 Ind. 526), 7, 
 
 30. 
 Weaver's Estate (9 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 
 
 516), 170, 174. 
 Webb v. Alexander (7 Wend. 281, 
 
 286), 147. 
 Webb v. Gonzales (69 Tex. 455 ; 6 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 781), 135. 
 Webb v. Page (1 Carr. & K. 23), 191. 
 
 Webbv. Rice (6 Hill, N. Y., 219), 
 
 223. 
 Webb v. State (29 Ohio St. 351), 322. 
 Webb v. Taylor (1 D. & L. 676), 275. 
 Webb v. Webb (29 Ala. 606), 200. 
 Webb, In re (I. R. 5 Eq. 235), 233. 
 Webber v. Jackson (79 Mich. 175; 44 
 
 N. W. Rep. 591), 347. 
 Weber v. Kingsland (8 Bosw. 415), 
 
 212. 
 Weber v. Mackey (31 111. App. 369), 
 
 151. 
 Weber Wagon Co. v. Kehl (139 111. 
 
 644; 29 N. E. Rep. 714), 185, 333. 
 Webster v. Clark (30 Ark. 245), 73a. 
 Webster v. Daniel (47 Ark. 131), 147. 
 Webster v. Frowler (50 N. W. Rep. 
 
 1074; 89 Mich. 303), 11. 
 Webster v. Hodgkins (25 N. H. 128), 
 
 209. 
 Webster v. Mann (56 Tex. 119), 145. 
 Webster v. Stearns (44 N. H. 498), 
 
 67. 
 Webster v. Webster (1 F. & F. 401), 
 
 57. 
 Weed v. Kellogg (6 McLean, U. S., 
 
 44), 68, 73. 
 Weed v. Life Ins. Co. (70 N. Y. 561), 
 
 250. 
 Weeks v. Inhabitants (156 Mass. 2S9), 
 
 73a. 
 Weeks v. Sparks (1 M. & S. 686, 690), 
 
 110, 115. 
 Wegner v. State (28 Tex. App. 419), 
 
 128. 
 Wehle v. Spelman (1 Hun, N. Y., 
 
 1), 77. 
 Weinberg v. Kram (17 N. Y. S. 
 
 535), 8. 
 Weinberg v. Somps (Gal., 1893, 33 
 
 Pac. Rep. 341), 377. 
 Weinecke v. State (34 Neb. 14; 51 
 
 N. W. Rep. 307), 23. 
 Weitman v. Jhiot (64 Ga. 11), 106. 
 Welborn v. Atl. R. Co. (Ga., 1893, 17 
 
 S. E. Rep. 672), 372. 
 Welch v. Barrett (15 Mass. 380), 58. 
 Welch v.. County (29 W. Va. 63), 239.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXC1U 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Welch v. Edmiston (46 Mo. App. 
 
 282), 220. 
 Welch v. Horton (73 Iowa, 250), 
 
 205. 
 Welch v. Miller (32 111. App. 110), 
 
 185. 
 Welch v. Palmer (85 Mich. 310), 79. 
 Welch v. Sackett (12 Wis. 257), 225. 
 Welcome v. Batchelder (23 Me. 85), 
 
 313. 
 Welcome v. Mitchell (81 Wis. 566 ; 51 
 
 N. W. Rep. 1080), 339. 
 Weld v. Brooks (25 N. E. Rep. 719), 
 
 58. 
 Welde v. Welde (2 Lee, 580), 202. 
 Welds v. Nichols (17 Pick. 538), 7. 
 Welke v. Welke (63 Hun, 625), 351. 
 Welland Canal v. Hathaway (8 
 
 Wend. 480), 38, 80. 
 Wellington v. Boston R. R. Co. (158 
 
 Mass. 185; 33 N. E. Rep. 393), 82. 
 Wellington v. Howard (Ind., 1893, 
 
 31 N. E. Rep. 582), 18. 
 Wells v. Evans (20 Wend., N. Y., 
 
 251), 268. 
 Wells v. Jackson, etc. Co. (48 N. H. 
 
 491), 333, 341. 
 Wells v. Leveridge (20 Oreg. 168), 
 
 220. 
 Wells v. Railroad Co. (110 Mo. 286), 
 
 240. 
 Wells v. Tucker (3 Binn. 366), 168. 
 Wells v. Yarborough (84 Tex. 660), 
 
 380. 
 Welsh v. Joy (13 Pick. 477), 50a. 
 Welsh v. State (96 Ala. 92; 11 S. 
 
 Rep. 450), 6, 95. 
 Wempler v. State (28 Tex. App. 352), 
 
 115. 
 Wendlinger v. Smith (75 Va. 309), 
 
 212. 
 Wendt v. Chicago, etc. Co. (S. D., 
 
 1894, 54 N. W. Rep. 226), 73a. 
 Werely v. Persons (28 N. Y. 344), 52. 
 Werner v. Com. (80 Ky. 387), 51. 
 Werner v. Litzinger (45 Mo. App. 
 
 106), 229. 
 Wesley v. State (37 Miss. 327), 10. 
 
 Wessels v. Beeman (87 Mich. 481), 
 
 11, 82. 
 West v. Home Ins. Co. (18 Fed. Rep. 
 
 622), 50. 
 West v. Randall (2 Mason, 181), 309. 
 West v. Smith (101 U. S. 263), 75, 76. 
 West v. State (76 Ala. 98), 5, 7. 
 West v. Van Tuyl (119 N. Y. C20), 60. 
 West Boylston v. Sterling (17 Pick. 
 
 126), 361. 
 Westbrook v. Aultman (3 Ind. App. 
 
 83; 28 N. E. Rep. 1011), 341. 
 Westbrook v. State (Ga., 1893, 16 
 
 S. E. Rep. 100), 93, 249. 
 Westbrooke, In re (W. N., 1873, 
 
 p. 167), 233. 
 Westerman v. Westerman (25 Ohio 
 
 St. 500), 168. 
 Western Ins. Co. v. Tobin (32 Ohio 
 
 St. 277), 198. 
 Western Ry. Co. v. Lazarus (88 Ala. 
 
 453), 199. 
 Western Union T. Co. v. Bennett (1 
 
 Tex. Civ. App. 28), 73a, 250. 
 Western Union T. Co. v. Cline (Ind., 
 
 1894, 35 N. E. Rep. 564), 90. 
 Western Union T. Co. v. Collins (45 
 
 Kan. 88), 35. 
 Western Union T. Co. v. Shalter (71 
 
 Ga. 760), 33. 
 Western Union T. Co. v. Way (83 
 
 Ala. 542), 231. 
 Westfall v. Madison (62 Iowa, 427), 
 
 346. 
 Westman v. Krumweide (30 Minn. 
 
 313), 212. 
 Westmoreland v. Carsen (76 Tex. 
 
 619), 216. 
 Westmoreland v. Richardson (Tex., 
 
 1893, 21 S. W. Rep. 157), 152. 
 Westmoreland v. State (45 Ga. 225), 
 
 80. 
 Weston v. Brown (30 Neb. 609), 9, 
 
 336, 337. 
 Weston v. Graves (49 Vt. 507), 6. 
 Weston v. Moody (39 Fla. 169), 272. 
 Weston v. Penman (1 Mason, 506), 
 
 144.
 
 cxciv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Weston v. White (5 Md. 297), 221. 
 Westover v. JEtna L. I. Co. (99 N. Y. 
 
 57), 17S. 
 West Side Bank v. Meehan (66 Hun, 
 
 627), 376. 
 Wetherbee v. Norris (103 Mass. 565), 
 
 349. 
 Wetherill v. Sullivan (65 Pa. St. 105), 
 
 232. 
 Wetumpka v. Wharf Co. (63 Ala. 
 
 611), 242. 
 Wetzel v. Kelly (83 Ala. 440), 237, 
 
 241. 
 Weyman v. Thompson (25 Atl. Rep. 
 
 205), 67. 
 Weymouth v. Broadway, etc. Co. 
 
 (2 Misc. R. 506), 350. 
 Whalen v. Brennan (34 Neb. 129 ; 51 
 
 N. W. Rep. 759), 371. 
 Whalen v. New York (17 Fed. Rep. 
 
 72), 376. 
 Wharf v. Prescott (7 Allen, 494), 84. 
 Wharter v. McMahan (10 Paige, N. 
 
 Y, 386), 268. 
 Wharton v. Douglass (76 Pa. St. 273), 
 
 208. 
 Wheatly v. Williams (1 M. & W. 
 
 533), 170. 
 Wheaton v. Peters (8 Pet. 658), 230. 
 Wheeler v. Alderman (34 S. C. 533), 
 
 74. 
 Wheeler v. Bent (7 Pick. 61), 129. 
 Wheeler v. Billings (38 N. Y. 263), 
 
 208. 
 Wheeler v. Doolittle (3 Wash. 440), 
 
 69. 
 Wheeler v. McLoughlin (8 N. Y. S. 
 
 95), 150a. 
 Wheeler v. Nevins (34 Me. 54), 268. 
 Wheeler v. Walker (12 Vt. 427), 123. 
 Wheeler v. West (71 Cal. 126), 76. 
 Wheeler v. Wheeler (18 N. Y. State 
 
 Rep. 445 ; 2 N. Y. S. 446), 231, 
 
 309. 
 Wheeler v. Winn (53 Pa. St. 126), 
 
 379. 
 Wheelock v. Godfrey (Cal., 1894, 35 
 
 Pac. Rep. 317), 197. 
 
 Wheelwright v. Akin (Ga., 1893, 17 
 
 S. E. Rep. 610), 221. 
 Wheton v. Snyder (88 N. Y. 299), 
 
 199. 
 Whidby Land Co. v. Nye (5 Wash. 
 
 St. 501), 372. 
 Whipp v. State (34 Ohio St. 87, 89), 
 
 166. 
 Whitaker v. Galesburg(15Pick. 544), 
 
 348. 
 Whitaker v. Marsh (62 N. H. 478), 
 
 121. 
 Whitaker v. Parks (42 Iowa, 586), 
 
 189. 
 Whitaker v. Salisbury (15 Pick. 534), 
 
 138. 
 Whitaker v. State (79 Ga. 87; 3 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 403), 101. 
 Whitaker v. White (69 Hun, 288), 60. 
 Whitaker v. Williams (20 Conn. 98), 
 
 84. 
 Whitbeck v. Walters (4 C. & P. 375), 
 
 53. 
 Whitcher v. McLaughlin (115 Mass. 
 
 167), 144. 
 Whitcher v. Shattuck (3 Allen, Masn. , 
 
 545), 200. 
 Whitcomb's Case (120 Mass. 123), 
 
 288. 
 White v. Ashton (51 N. Y. 280), 83. 
 White v. Barley (10 Mich. 155), 697. 
 White v. Benjamin (138 N. Y. 623), 
 
 250. 
 White v. Connelly (105 N. C. 65), 
 
 136. 
 White v. Crew (16 Ga. 416), 268. 
 White v. Davidson (8 Md. 169), 74. 
 White v. Davis (17 N. Y. S. 548; 62 
 
 Hun, 622), 197. 
 White v. German Bank (9 Heisk., 
 
 Tenn., 473), 72. 
 White v. Graves (107 Mass. 325), 8, 
 
 157. 
 White v. Hinton (3 Wyo. 753), 150a. 
 White v. Insurance Co. (83 Me. 279), 
 
 241. 
 White v. Johnson (4 Wash. St. 113; 
 
 29 Pac. Rep. 932), 250.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXCV 
 
 Keferences are to sections. 
 
 White v. Leads (51 Pa. St. 189), 336. 
 White v. Lisle (4 Madd. 214), 114. 
 White v. Mass (75 Ala. 207), 24. 
 White v. Milw. etc Co. (61 Wis. 536), 
 
 202. 
 White v.Morgan (119 Ind. 338), 324. 
 White v. Old Dotn. S. Co. (102 N. Y. 
 
 662), 76. 
 White v. Portland (63 Conn. 18; 26 
 
 Atl. Rep. 342), 71, 282. 
 White v. State (21 Tex. App. 339), 
 
 11. 
 White v. State (52 Miss. 216), 324. 
 White v. State (30 Tex. App. 652; 18 
 
 S. W. Rep. 462), 103. 
 White v. Watkins (23 Mo. 423), 268. 
 White v. White (82 Cal. 427 ; 23 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 276), 114, 333. 
 White v. Whitney (22 Pac. Rep. 
 
 1138; 82 Cal. 163), 60, 144. 
 White's Case (2 Leach's Crim. Cas. 
 
 430), 317. 
 Whitehall v. Kellar (100 Pa. St. 89), 
 
 73a. 
 Whitehead v. Rogers (106 Mo. 231), 
 
 210. 
 Whitehead v. School District (145 
 
 Pa. St. 418), 131. 
 Whitehurst v. Com. (79 Va. 556), 
 
 123. 
 Whiteley v. Insurance Co. (72 Wis. 
 
 170; 39 N. W. Rep. 369), 232. 
 Whiteley, In re (1891, 1 Ch. 558), 
 
 314. 
 Whitelocke v. Baker (13 Ves. 514), 
 
 113. 
 White Sew. Mach. Co. v. Dakin (86 
 
 Mich. 5S1), 128. 
 Whitesides v. Hunt (97 Ind. 191), 
 
 249. 
 Whiteside's Appeal (23 Pa. St. 114), 
 
 233. ' 
 Whitford v. Clark Co. (119 U. S. 
 
 522), 361. 
 Whitford v. Laidler (94 N. Y. 155), 
 
 73a. 
 Whiting v. Miss. V. I. Co. (76 Wis. 
 
 592), 333. 
 
 Whiting v. Traynor (74 Wis. 293), 
 
 310. 
 Whitlock v. Castro (22 Tex. 108), 239. 
 Whitlow v. State (Tex., 1893, 18 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 865), 324. 
 Whitlock v. Ramsey (2 Munf. 510), 
 
 22. 
 Whitman v. Haywood (14 S. W. Rep. 
 
 166; 77 Tex. 157), 60, 115. 
 Whitmer v. Fry (10 Mo. 348), 128. 
 Whitley v. Gay lord (1 Jones' L., N. 
 
 C, 194), 139. 
 
 Whitman v. Henneherry (73 111. 109), 
 
 105, 108. 
 Whitney v. Arnold (10 Cal. 531), 136. 
 Whitney v. Bigelow(4 Pick. 110), 61. 
 Whitney v. Cotton Mills (Mass., 1890, 
 
 24 N. E. Rep. 774), 225. 
 Whitney v. Gross (140 Mass. 232), 8. 
 Whitney v. Houghton (125 Mass. 
 
 451), 50, 79. 
 Whitney v. Nicoll (46 111. 230), 233. 
 Whitney v. Phelps (33 Me. 318), 205. 
 Whitney v. Shippen (89 Pa. St. 22), 
 
 212 
 Whitney Mfg. Co. v. Richmond & 
 
 D. R. Co. (S. C, 1893, 17 S. E. 
 Rep. 147), 21. 
 
 Whitney Wagon Works v. Moore 
 
 (61 Vt, 230; 17 Atl. Rep. 1007), 75. 
 Whitridge v. Whitridge (Md., 1892, 
 
 24 Atl. Rep. 645), 250. 
 Whittier v. Dana (10 Allen, 326), 214. 
 Whittier v. Franklyn (46 N. H. 23), 
 
 185. 
 Whitwell v. Winslow (134 Mass. 343), 
 
 ' 83. 
 Whitwell v. Wyer (11 Mass. 6, 10), 
 
 80. 
 Whyte v. Arthur (17 N. J. Eq. 521), 
 
 213. 
 Wich v. Equitable F. & M. Ins. Co. 
 
 (Colo., 1893, 31 Pac. Rep. 389), 
 
 200. 
 Wichita University v. Schweiter (50 
 
 Kan. 672), 210. 
 Wickersham v. Reeves (1 Iowa, 417), 
 
 136.
 
 CXCV1 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Wickes v. Swift E. L. Co. (70 Mich. 
 
 322), 139a, 217. 
 Wicks v. State (28 Tex. App. 448), 
 
 227. 
 Wiggin v. Chicago (5 Mo. App. 347), 
 
 242. 
 Wiggins v. Burkhara (10 Wall. 129), 
 
 239. 
 Wiggins v. Leonard (9 Iowa, 194), 
 ; 69. 
 
 Wiggins v. Wallace (19 Barb. 33S), 
 
 198. 
 Wigginton v. Com. (17 S. W. Eep. 
 
 634 ; 92 Ky. 282), 93. 
 Wight v. Rindskopf (43 Wis. 349), 
 
 323. 
 Wilbur v. Eicholtz (5 Col. 240), 140. 
 Wilbur v. Seldon (6 Cowen, N. Y., 
 
 162), 121. 
 Wilbur v. Strickland (1 Rawle, 458), 
 
 96. 
 Wilbur v. Wilbur (129 111. 892), 248, 
 
 253. 
 Wilcox v. Corwin (23 N. E. Rep. 
 
 500; 117 N. Y. 500), 308. 
 Wilcox v. Greene (28 Conn. 572), 80/ 
 Wilcox v. Howell (44 N. Y. 398), 84. 
 Wilcox v. Jackson (109 111. 261), 237. 
 Wilcox v. Monday (89 Ind. 232), 
 
 150a. 
 Wilcox v. Smith (5 Wend. 231), 36. 
 Wilcox v. Wilcox (46 Hun, 32), 38a. 
 Wilcoxon v. Osborn (77 Mo. 621), 
 
 136. 
 Wilder v. Coles (100 Mass. 490), 247. 
 Wilder v. St. Paul (12 Minn. 106), 
 
 121. 
 , Wiley v. Athol (150 Mass. 430), 56. 
 Wiley v. Inhabitants (150 Mass. 426), 
 
 142. 
 Wiley v. Moor (17 S. & R. 438), 128. 
 Wiley v. Morse (30 Mo. App. 266), 
 
 308. 
 Wiley v. State (74 Ga. 840), 23. 
 Wilke v. People (53 N. Y. 525), 167. 
 Wilkerson v. Com. (88 Ky. 29), 283. 
 Wilkerson v. Schoonmaker (77 Tex. 
 
 615), 147. 
 
 Wilkersons v. Eilers (Mo., 1893J 21 
 
 5. W. Rep. 134), 341. 
 Wilkins v. State (Ala., 1893, 13 S. 
 
 Rep. 312), 381. 
 Wilkins v. Stidger (22 Cal. 231), 79. 
 Wilkinson v. Moseley (30 Ala. 562), 
 
 194. 
 Wilkinson v. Scott (17 Mass. 257), 
 
 208. 
 Wilkinson v. Ward (42111. App. 541), 
 
 367. 
 Wilkinson v. Wilkinson (59 Wis. 64). 
 
 24. 
 Willard v. Cramer (36 Iowa, 22), 
 
 135. 
 Willard v. Judd (15 John. 531), 356. 
 Willard v. Killing worth (8 Conn. 
 
 247), 143a. 
 Willard v. Ostrander (51 Kan. 481 ; 
 
 32 Pac. Rep. 1092), 152. 
 Willard v. Siegal (47 Mo. App. 1), 10. 
 Willard v. State (27 Tex. App. 386), 
 
 93. 
 Willard v. Superior Court (82 Cal. 
 
 456), 277. 
 Willett v. Rich (142 Mass. 357), 247. 
 Willey v. Portsmouth (35 N. H. 303), 
 
 193. 
 Williams y. Armory (7 Cranch, 423), 
 
 158. 
 Williams v. Baker (71 Pa. St. 476, 
 
 482), 136, 157. 
 Williams v. Baldwin (7 Vt. 506), 168. 
 Williams v. Breckell (37 Miss. 682), 
 
 33. 
 Williams v. Butcher (22 Neb. 683; 37 
 
 N. W. Rep. 586), 353. 
 Williams v. Clink (90 Mich. 297), 372. 
 Williams v. Com. (Ky., 1892, 18 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 364), 378. 
 Williams v. Com. (91 Pa. St. 493). 
 
 384. 
 Williams v. Conger (125 U. S. 397). 
 
 105. 
 Williams v. Deen (Tex., 1894, 24 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 536), 139. 
 Williams v. Dickenson (28 Fla. 90), 
 
 6, 11, 321, 354a.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXCV11 
 
 Keferences are to sections. 
 
 Williams v. Fresno Canal & Irr. Co. 
 
 (30 Pac. Eep. 961 ; 96 Cal. 14), 369. 
 Williams v. Hardee (Tex., 1893, 21 
 
 S. W. Rep. 267), 108. 
 Williams v. Hubbard (1 Mich. 446), 
 
 244. 
 Williams v. Ingell (21 Pick., Mass., 
 
 288), 203. 
 Williams v. Jones (5 B. & C. 108), 
 
 267. 
 Williams v. Kaiser (11 Fla. 234), 80. 
 Williams v. Lee (47 Mo. 321), 197. 
 Williams v. Moore (68 Ga. 585), 150a. 
 Williams v. People (54 111. 422), 102. 
 Williams v. 'Perkins (83 Mo. 379), 
 
 308. 
 Williams v. Poppleton (3 Oreg. 139), 
 
 193. 
 Williams v. Robinson (42 Vt. 678), 
 
 231. 
 Williams V. State (6 Ala. 33), 139. 
 Williams v. State (19 Ga. 402), 121. 
 Williams v. State (50 Ark. 511 ; 9 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 5), 231. 
 Williams v. State (52 Ala. 411), 76. 
 Williams v. State (12 S. W. Rep. 1103 ;' 
 
 28 Tex. App. 301), 346. 
 Williams v. State (24 Tex. App. 637), 
 
 350. 
 Williams v. State (25 Tex. App. 176), 
 
 348. 
 Williams v. State (Ala., 1893, 13 S, 
 
 Rep. 333), 354. 
 Williams v. State (Fla., 1893, 13 S. 
 
 Rep. 834), 340. 
 Williams v. State (64 Ind. 553), 238. 
 Williams v. State (Tex., 1S92, 19 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 897), 196. 
 Williams v. State (67 Ga. 260), 238. 
 Williams v. State (24 Tex. App. 17, 
 
 32; 4 S. W. Rep. 64), 88. 
 Williams v. Stevens (72 Wis. 487), 
 
 217. 
 Williams v. Taunton (125 Mass. 54), 
 
 201. 
 Williams v. Tracy (95 Pa. St. 308), 74. 
 Williams v. United States (137 U. S. 
 
 113), 376. 
 
 Williams v. Vreeland (29 N. J. Eq. 
 
 417), 222. 
 Williams v. Wager (64 Vt. 326), 336. 
 Williams v. Walbridge (3 Wend. 
 
 415), 310. 
 Williams v. Walker (2 Rich. Eq. 291), 
 
 348. 
 Williams v. Willard (23 Vt. 369), 120. 
 Williams' Ex'r v. Williams (Ky., 
 
 1890, 13 S. W. Rep. 250), 309. 
 Williams v. Williamson (6 Ired. L., 
 
 N. C, 281), 73a. 
 Williams v. Woods (16 Md. 220), 229. 
 Williamson v. State 59 Miss. 235), 
 
 308. 
 Williamson v. State (30 Tex. 330; 17 
 
 S. W. Rep. 722;, 5. 
 Williamson v. Wright (75 Me. 55), 
 
 150a. 
 Williard v. Williard (56 Pa. St. 119), 
 
 70. 
 Willis v. Barnard (8 Bing. 376), 52. 
 Willis v. Fernald (33 N. J. L. 206), 
 
 220. 
 Willis v. Kern (21 La. Ann. 749), 
 
 208. 
 Willis v. Lyman (22 Tex. 268), 356. 
 Willis v. West (60 Ga. 613), 169. 
 Willis' Case (15 How. St. Tr. 623- 
 
 625), 389. 
 Willmerding v. McGauhey (30 Iowa, 
 
 205), 217. 
 Wilmington v. Burlington (4 Pick. 
 
 174), 53. 
 Willoughby v. Dewey (54 III. 206), 7. 
 Wilson v. Betts (4 Denio, 201), 108. 
 Wilson v. Boarem (15 Johns. 286), 
 
 102. 
 Wilson v. Bowden (113 Mass. 422), 
 
 70. 
 Wilson v. Brownlee (24 Ark. 546), 53. 
 Wilson v. Bumstead (12 Neb. 1), 
 
 241. 
 Wilson v. Calvert (8 Ala. 757), 80. 
 Wilson v. Clark (1 Ind. App. 182 ; 27 
 
 N. E. Rep. 310), 9. 
 Wilson v. Cockrell (8 Mo. 7), 242. 
 Wilson v. Conine (2 Johns. 280), 147.
 
 cxcvm 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Wilson v. Donaldson (117 Ind. 356), 
 
 285. 
 Wilson v. Heath (G8 Hun, 209), 376, 
 
 378. 
 Wilson v. Horn (G5 Ala. 448), 222. 
 Wilson v. Irish (62 N. Y. 260), 140. 
 Wilson v. McCullough (23 Pa. St. 
 
 440), 333. 
 Wilson v. Powers (131 Ind. 539), 212. 
 Wilson v. Railroad (114 N. Y. 487), 
 
 372. 
 Wilson v. Railroad (31 Minn. 481), 
 
 33. 
 Wilson v. Rastall (4 T. R. 759), 172, 
 
 178. 
 Wilson v. Russell (61 N. H. 355), 309. 
 Wilson v. Sheppard (28 Ala. 623), 
 
 166. 
 Wilson v. Shipman (31 Neb. 573), 
 
 150a. 
 Wilson v. Simpson (16 S. W. Rep. 
 
 40), 100. 
 Wilson v. Spring (64 111. 18), 74. 
 Wilson v. State (Miss., 1893, 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 332), 24. 
 Wilson v. State (57 Ind. 71), 284. 
 Wilson v. State (41 Tex. 320), 193. 
 Wilson v. State (30 Fla. 234), 9. 
 Wilson v. Troup (7 Johns. Ch. 25), 
 
 73. 
 Wilson v. Tucker (10 R. I. 578), 210. 
 Wilson v. Van Leer (127 Pa. St. 371), 
 
 139, 237. 
 Wilson v. Wright (8 Utah, 215 ; 30 
 
 Pac. Rep. 754), 31. 
 Wilton v. Webster (7 Car. & P. 198), 
 
 52. 
 Wimer v. Smith (22 Oreg. 469), 229, 
 
 351. 
 Winans v. Durham (5 Wend. 47), 
 
 147. 
 Winans v. Railroad Co. (21 How., 
 
 U. S., 101), 189. 
 Winch v. Norman (65 Iowa, 186), 140. 
 Winchell v. Express Co. (61 Vt. 15), 
 
 372. 
 Winchester v. Whitney (138 Mass. 
 
 549), 68. 
 
 Windom v. Schappel (39 Minn. 35), 
 
 229. 
 Windsor v. McVeigh (93 U. S. 274), 
 
 232. 
 Wing v. Angrave (8 H. L. Cas. 183, 
 
 198), 233. 
 Wing v. Peck (54 Vt. 245), 208. 
 Winklemeier v. Daber (52 N. W. Rep. 
 
 1036; 92 Mich. 621), 282. 
 Winkler v. Schlager (19 N. Y. S. 
 
 100), 71. 
 Winn v. Chamberlain (32 Vt. 318), 
 
 209. 
 Winn v. Patterson (9 Pet., U. S., 
 
 677), 6, 30, 105, 10G. 
 Winner v. Lathrop (67 Hun, 511), 
 
 202. 
 Winnie v. Tousley(36 Hun, 190), 140. 
 Winn. Lake Co. v. Young (40 N. H. 
 
 420), 239. 
 Winona v. Burke (23 Minn. 254), 242. 
 Winship v. O'Conner (42 N. H. 341), 
 
 233. 
 Winslow v. Morrill (68 Me. 362), 343. 
 Winslow v. State (92 Ala. 78), 374. 
 Winslow v. Tulan (48 111. 145), 69. 
 Winsor v. Dillaway (4 Met. 221), 60. 
 Winter v. Burt (31 Ala. 33), 73a. 
 Winter v. Cent. Iowa R. Co. (80 
 
 Iowa, 443 ; 45 N. W. Rep. 737), 
 
 350, 351. 
 Wirt v. Dinan (44 Mo. App. 583), 
 
 353, 358. 
 Wischstadt v. Wischstadt (47 Minn. 
 
 38 ; 50 N. W. Rep. 225), 340. 
 Wisdom v. State (11 Colo. 170), 324. 
 Wise v. Ackerman (51 Md. 937), 8. 
 Wise v. Newatney (26 Neb. 88; 42 
 
 N. W. Rep. 339), 50. 
 i Wiseman v. Fleischer (10 Pa. Co. 
 
 Ct. R. 300), 128. 
 Witcher v. McLaughlin (115 Mass. 
 
 167), 58. 
 Witford v. Clark Co. (119 U. S. 522), 
 
 361. 
 Wither v. Roe (45 Me. 571), 140. 
 Withers v. Richardson (5 T. B. Mon., 
 
 Ky., 94), 84.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXCIX 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Witmer v. Schlatter (2 Rawle, 359), 
 
 157. 
 Witt v. State (6 Cold., Tenn., 5), 23. 
 Witte v. Weinberg (S. C, 1893, 17 
 
 S. E. Rep. 681), 380. 
 Witters v. Sovvles (32 Fed. Rep. 130), 
 
 175. 
 Wittier v. Gould (8 Watts, Pa., 485), 
 
 139a. 
 Witwell v. Wyer (11 Mass. 6), 80. 
 Woburn v. Henshavv (101 Mass. 193), 
 
 174. 
 Wohlgemuth v. United States (N. M., 
 
 1893, 30 Pac. Rep. 854), 24. 
 Wolf v. Arthur (N. C, 1893, 16 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 843), 185. 
 Wolf v. Foster (13 Kan. 116), 35. 
 Wolf v. Wolf (2 Har. & G., Md., 382), 
 
 005. 
 Wolf v. Wyeth (11 S. & R. 149), 124. 
 Wolfe v. Underwood (12 S. Rep. 234; 
 
 96 Ala. 329), 369. 
 Wolfe v. Washburn (6 Conn. 261), 
 
 147. 
 Wolfert v. Pittsburg R. Co. (44 Mo. 
 
 App. 330), 222. 
 Wolff v. Campbelle (110 Mo. 114; 19 
 
 S. W. Rep. 622). 11. 
 Wolff v. Mathews (39 Mo. App. 376), 
 
 130. 
 Wolford v. Farnham (47 Minn. 95), 
 
 7, 37, 372. 
 Wolverton v. State (16 Ohio St. 173), 
 
 38. 
 Wood v. Barber (90 N. C. 76), 69. 
 Wood v. Council (143 Pa. St. 467), 12. 
 Wood v. Davis (7 Cranch, 271), 151. 
 Wood v. Fisk (62 N. H. 173), 66, 110, 
 
 115. 
 Wood v. Insurance Co. (46 N. Y. 
 
 421), 241. 
 Wood v. Kinsman (5 Vt. 588), 287. 
 Wood v. State (92 Ind. 269), 102. 
 Wood v. State (58 Miss. 741), 197. 
 Wood v. State (31 Fla. 221 ; 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 539), 6. 
 Wood v. State (Ind., 1893, 33 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 903), 355. 
 
 Wood v. Wattinson (17 Conn. 500), 
 
 158. 
 Wood v. Whiting (21 Barb. 190), 
 
 211. 
 Wood v. Wood (47 Kan. 617), 343. 
 Woodard v. Spiller (1 Dana, Ky., 
 
 180), 140. 
 Woodbeck v. Keeler (6 Cow. 118), 
 
 384. 
 Woodbury v. Anoka (52 Minn. 329; 
 
 54 N. W. Rep. 187), 343. 
 Woodcock v. Woodcock (36 Minn. 
 
 217), 197. 
 Woodcock v. Worcester (138 Mass. 
 
 268), 18. 
 Woodcock's Case (2 Leach, C. C. 
 
 563), 101. 
 Woodford v. McClenahan (4 Gilm., 
 
 9 111., 85), 139. 
 Woodin v. People (1 Park. C. C, N. 
 
 Y., 464), 196. 
 Woodman v. Dana (52 Me. 9), 139. 
 Woodman v. Woodman (47 N. H. 
 
 120), 197. 
 Wood River Bank v. Dodge (36 Neb. 
 
 708 ; 55 N. W. Rep. 234), 343. 
 Woodruff v. Imperial F. I. Co. (83 
 
 N. Y. 113), 198. 
 Woodruff v. McHarry (56 111. 218), 
 
 135. 
 Woodruff v. State (31 Fla. 320; 12 
 
 S. Rep. 653), 8. 
 Woodruff v. Taylor (20 Vt. 65), 158. 
 Woodruff v. White (25 Neb. 745), 71. 
 Woods v. Bank (14 N. H. 101), 73a, 
 
 146. 
 Woods v. Bonner (89 Tenn. 411), 31. 
 Woods v. Burke (67 Mich. 674; 35 
 
 N. W. Rep. 768), 130. 
 Woods v. Com. (86 Va. 929), 226. 
 Woods v. Davis (34 N. H. 328), 286. 
 Woods v. Durette (28 Tex. 429), 24. 
 Woods v. Graves (144 Mass. 365), 76. 
 Woods v. Hilderbrand (46 Mo. 284), 
 
 128. 
 Woods v. Keys (14 Allen, 236), 124. 
 Woodson Mach. Co. v. Morse (47 
 
 Kan. 429), 247.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Woodward v. Buchanan (5 Q. B. 
 
 285), 8. 
 Woodward v. Bugsbee (2 Hun, 128), 
 
 199. 
 Woodward v. Foster (18 N. Y. S. 
 
 827), 212. 
 Woodward v. Leavitt(107 Mass. 453), 
 
 50, 176. 
 Woodward v. Railroad Co. (21 Wis. 
 
 309), 239. 
 Woodward v. Sibert (82 Va. 441), 
 
 213. 
 Woodworth v. Barker (1 Hill, 176), 
 
 130. 
 Woodworth v. Cook (2 Blatchf. 151), 
 
 223. 
 Woolen v. Wire (119 Ind. 251), 124. 
 Wooley v. Constant (4 Johns. 54), 
 
 128. 
 Woolfolk v. State (85 Ga. 69), 90, 176, 
 
 193, 283. 
 Woolsey v. Bohn (41 Minn. 237), 
 
 60. 
 Woolsey v. Jones (84 Ala. 88), 282. 
 Woolworth v. McPherson (55 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 558), 209. 
 Wooster v. Butler (13 Conn. 309), 
 
 115. 
 Wooster v. Simonson (20 Fed. Rep. 
 
 316), 208. 
 Wooten v. Burch (2 Md. Ch. 190), 
 
 305. 
 Wooten v. Wilkins (39 Ga. 223), 
 
 102. 
 Worcester v. Cheney (94 111. 430), 
 
 238. 
 Worcester v. Northborough (140 
 
 Mass. 400), 144. 
 Worden v. Van Gieston (6 Dem., N. 
 
 Y. Sur.. 237), 131. 
 Work v. Beach (129 N. Y. 651), 
 
 209. 
 Workman v. Greening (115 111. 477), 
 
 223. 
 W T orley v. Hinman (Ind., 1893, 33 
 
 N. E. Rep. 866), 74, 230. 
 Worrell v. Forsyth (111., 1892, 30 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 673), 214. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Worsham v. McLeod (Miss , 1892, 11 
 
 S. Rep. 107), 371. 
 Worth v. McConnell (42 Mich. 473), 
 
 139. 
 Worth am v. Thompson (81 Tex. 348), 
 
 82. 
 Worthington v. Mencer (Ala., 1892, 
 
 11 S. Rep. 72), 317. 
 Worthington v. Scribner (109 Mass. 
 
 . 487), 175. 
 Worthington v. Worthington (32 
 
 Neb. 334), 380. 
 Wright v. Bundy (11 Ind. 398), 136. 
 Wright v. Burritt (63 Hun, 628), 
 
 Wright v. Cane (18 La. Ann. 597), 
 
 262. 
 Wright v. Dickinson (Mich., 1890, 42 
 
 N. W. Rep. 849), 74. 
 Wright v. Douglass (10 Barb. 97), 
 
 232. 
 Wright v. Fonda (44 Mo. App. 634), 
 
 11. 
 Wright v. Hardy (22 Wis. 348), 193. 
 Wright v. Hawkins (28 Tex. 452), 
 
 239. 
 Wright v. Hazen (24 Vt. 143), 82. 
 Wright v. Hicks (15 Ga. 160), 350 
 Wright v. Maseras(56 Barb. 521), 79. 
 Wright v. McKee (37 Vt. 161), 10. 
 Wright v. Mulvaney (78 Wis. 89), 11. 
 Wright v. Samuda (2 Phil. 266, 277), 
 
 233. 
 Wright v. State (7 Tex. App. 574), 
 
 127. 
 Wright v. Stowe (4 Jones' L., N. C, 
 
 516), 124. 
 Wright v. Weimeister (87 Mich. 494), 
 
 82. 
 Wright v. Williams (47 Vt. 222), 
 
 190. 
 Wright v. Wilson (17 Mich. 192), 
 
 135. 
 Wright v. Wright (139 Mass. 177), 9, 
 
 250. 
 Wright v. Wright (7 N. J. L. 175), 
 
 128. ' 
 Wright v. Wright (5 Ind. 389), 129.
 
 TABLK OF CASES. 
 
 CC1 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Wurzbiirger v. Merie (20 La. Ann. 
 
 415), 223. 
 Wyckoff v. Remsen (11 Paige, 564), 
 
 229. 
 Wynn v. City R. R. Co. (Ga., 1893, 
 
 17 S. E. Rop. 649), 30, 334, 343. 
 Wynn v. Small (102 N. C. 33), 138. 
 Wylie v. Miss. Pac. R. Co. (41 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 623), 128. 
 Wroe v. State (20 Ohio St. 460), 102. 
 Wyatt v. People (17 Colo. 252), 284. 
 Wynne v. Glydwell (17 Ind. 446), 70. 
 
 Y. 
 
 Yadon v. Mackey (50 Kan. 630), 380. 
 Yaeger v. Henry (39 111. App. 21), 
 
 232. 
 Yale v. Comstock (112 Mass. 267), 
 
 120. 
 Yandes v. Lafavour (2 Blackf. 371), 
 
 69. 
 Yarborough v. Mass (9 Ala. 382), 80. 
 Yardley v. Culbertson (108 Pa. St. 
 
 395), 188. 
 Yard's Case (10 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 41), 
 
 288. 
 Yates v. Fraser (6 111. App. 229), 
 
 267. 
 Yates v. People (32 N. Y. 509), 5. 
 Yates v. People (38 III. 527), 343. 
 Yates v. Shaw (24 III. 367), 115. 
 Yates v. Yates (76 N. C. 142), 140. 
 Yeaton v. Fry (6 Cranch, 335), 149, 
 
 242. 
 Ycaw v. Williams (15 R. I. 20), 185, 
 
 197. 
 Yehn Jim v. Territory (I Wash. St. 
 
 63), 238. 
 Yell v. Lane (41 Ark. 53), 244. 
 Yeomans v. Petty (40 N. J. Eq. 495), 
 
 140. 
 Yerkes v. Bank (69 N. Y. 383), 242. 
 Yocum v. Barnes (8 B. Mon., Ky., 
 
 496), 73a. 
 Yordy v. Marshall (Iowa, 1893, 53 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 298), 73a. 
 York v. Conde (66 Hun, 316), 75. 
 
 York v. Fortenbury (15 Colo. 129), 21. 
 York v. Maine R. Co. (84 N. Y. 17), 
 
 11. 
 York v. Pease (2 Gray, Mass., 282), 
 
 375. 
 Yorty v. Paine (62 Wis. 154), 136. 
 Yost v. Mensch (27 W. N. C. 562), 11. 
 Yost v. Minn. Hard. Works (41 111. 
 
 App. 556), 339. 
 Young v. Bank (4 Cranch, 384), 141, 
 
 142. 
 Young v. Board of Mahoning Co. (51 
 
 Fed. Rep. 585), 56, 84. 
 Young v. Black (7 Cranch, U. S., 
 
 426), 19. 
 Young v. Brady (94 Cal. 128), 350, 
 
 374. 
 Young v. Com. (8 Bush, 366), 95. 
 Young v. Cook (15 La. Ann. 126), 
 
 211. 
 Young v. Dearborn (23 N. H. 372), 
 
 124. 
 Young v. Duval (109 U. S. 573), 136, 
 
 157. 
 Young v. English (7 Beav. 10), 276. 
 Young v. Heff ner (36 Ohio St. 232), 
 
 233. 
 Young v. Highland (9 Gratt., Va., 
 
 16). 249. 
 Young v. Johnson (123 N. Y. 226), 
 
 196. 
 Young v. Kansas City, T. S. & M. 
 
 R, Co. (39 Mo. App. 59), 110. 
 Young v. Laird (30 Ala. 571), 77. 
 Young v. Lamont (Minn., 1893, 57 
 
 N. W. Rep. 478), 250. 
 Young v. Luce (66 Hun, 631), 60. 
 Young v. Rollins (78 N. C. 485), 
 
 356. 
 Young v. State (30 Tex. App. 308), 
 
 23. 
 Young v. State (Ala., 1892, 10 S. Rep. 
 
 913), 13, 101. 
 Young v. Wright (1 Campb. 139), 74. 
 Youngberg v. Nelson (51 Minn. 172; 
 
 53 N. W. Rep. 629), 205, 219. 
 Younger v. Duffie (94 N. Y. 535), 
 
 276.
 
 ecu 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to sections. 
 
 Youree v. Territory (Ariz., 1892, 29 
 
 Pac. Rep. 894), 93. 
 Yrissari v. Clement (2 C. & P. 223), 
 
 243. 
 Yundt v. Hartranft (41 111. 9), 52. 
 
 z. 
 
 Zabel v. Nyenhuis (83 Iowa, 750), 220. 
 Zacharie v. Franklin (12 Pet. 151), 
 
 374. 
 Zebley v. Storey (117 Pa. St. 478), 
 
 350. 
 Zechtmann v, Roberts (109 Mass. 53), 
 
 83. 
 
 Zeehandelaur, Ex parte (71 Cal. 238), 
 
 332. 
 Zeininger v. Schnitzler (48 Kan. 66), 
 
 24. 
 Zepp v. Hager (70 111. 223), 232. 
 Zievernick v. Kempner (Ohio, 1892, 
 
 34 N. E. Rep. 250), 157. 
 Zimmerman v. Zimmerman (23 Pa. 
 
 St. 375), 210. 
 Zitser v. Merkel (24 Pa. St. 408), 
 
 10. 
 Zoldoske v. State (82 Wis. 580), 
 
 330. 
 Zucker v. Karpeles (88 Mich. 413), 
 
 250, 340.
 
 THE LAW OF EVIDENCE. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. 
 
 § 1. Early development of law. 
 
 2. Evidence defined. 
 
 3. The basis of belief. 
 
 4. Direct and circumstantial evi- 
 
 dence distinguished. 
 
 § 5. Nature and effect of circum- 
 stantial evidence. 
 6. Reasonable doubt and the weight 
 of evidence. 
 
 § 1. Early development of law. — All law, whatever its ul- 
 timate form, is in its origin the result of customs observed in 
 social and commercial intercourse, which often have their 
 commencement at a date long anterior to the existence of any- 
 regular form of government. Thus, long before any supreme 
 political authority exists, it is found that rules are practiced 
 regulating the famity relation, the making of contracts, the 
 rights of ownership, and the punishment of violence. 
 
 When human controversies ceased to be wholly adjusted 
 by force and came before the primitive tribunals which obtain ^ 
 in the early history of every nation, these customs, which are 
 merely a reflection or embodiment of the existing popular 
 morality, are impressed with the character of legal rules by 
 their recognition by the courts. 
 
 Early procedure is conservative and artificial. The judges^ 
 are of necessity compelled to rely on custom and precedent. 
 The private rights which grow up around and are based upon 
 the old custom which has become a rule of law demand rigid- 
 ity and unchangeableness. 
 
 Early law is always developed as a system of procedure, 
 and by rude and ignorant peoples form and substance are usu- 
 ally confounded. A blind devotion to the letter, causing 
 hardship and injustice, is the dominating character of early 
 jurisprudence. This was particularly true of the English 
 l
 
 2 INTRODUCTORY. [§ 2. 
 
 common law, as it was slowly developed by the judicial inter- 
 pretation and recognition of feudal principles and customs. 
 
 The extreme technicality of the common law regarding the 
 ownership of real property, and the framing of pleading in an 
 action, is well known. Hence it need occasion no surprise that 
 when the rules of legal evidence began to be formulated in 
 connection with the development of modern social and com- 
 mercial progress, they were based upon arbitrary principles 
 and infected with the prejudices and superstitions of a rude 
 and unlettered age. 
 
 So we find at various periods this branch of tlie law has 
 been influenced and acted upon by such arbitrary and bar- 
 barous conceptions as that a man would lie if permitted to 
 testify for himself, or that truth could be accurately ascer- 
 tained by the employment of physical torture inflicted on the 
 accused, or by compelling him. to submit to a cruel ordeal. 
 But the advance of scientific, commercial and political ideas, 
 with the progress of modern ideas bringing about legal re- 
 forms, has had a most important re-action upon the law of 
 evidence. That law is no longer harsh, technical and irre- 
 sponsive to the demands of progressive civilization, but adapt- 
 able to the needs of an age in which considerations of sim- 
 plicity and justice are paramount to forms and precedents, 
 and when the demand is not only for logical development 
 and coherence, but for flexibility to new uses and needs and 
 economy and speed in administration. 
 
 Hence, at the present day, the sole tests which should be 
 applied to ascertain the utility of a rule of evidence are, first, 
 does it, while admitting all facts which bear upon the issue, 
 tend to shorten or simplify legal proceedings; and second, is 
 it calculated to render this evidence more valuable by making 
 it more cogent and trustworthy. 
 
 § 2. Evidence defined. — The word "evidence" having been 
 so frequently defined, it is unnecessary for the author to at- 
 tempt another definition, though it may be of use to ascertain 
 what elements these definitions have in common, and what 
 idea is conveyed by all of them. It will be seen that they 
 agree that legal evidence is only a means to an end, and that 
 this end is the ascertainment of truth in the clearest and most 
 speedy manner.
 
 •] 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 The truth of any statement of fact, when ascertained, is said 
 to be proved; or, when mathematical truth is concerned, the 
 word " demonstration " is used, which excludes all possibility 
 of the existence of error. 1 
 
 In the conduct of our e very-day affairs we cann'ot expect, 
 and hence have no right to insist upon, a demonstration of 
 the truth of every statement of fact that is made. 2 We must 
 be content with evidence that will convince us beyond a rea- 
 sonable doubt and render it easier to believe that a given 
 proposition is probably true. 3 
 
 Cumulative evidence means additional evidence of the same 
 character to support the same point as other evidence already 
 given. 4 
 
 Corroborative evidence is additional evidence proving simi- 
 lar facts, or facts calculated to produce the same result as facts 
 already given in evidence. 
 
 Partial evidence is evidence of one fact in a series which 
 tends to prove the fact in issue. 5 
 
 1 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 13. 
 
 2 " Facts are the sources or mate- 
 rials of evidence; evidence is the 
 medium by which facts are present" 
 Bouv. Law Diet. 
 
 3 " Evidence means and includes, 
 first, all statements which the court 
 permits or requires to be made be- 
 fore it by witnesses in relation to 
 matters of fact under inquiry ; such 
 statements are called oral evidence. 
 Second, all documents produced for 
 the inspection of the court; such 
 documents are called documentary 
 evidence." Indian Evidence Act, § 3. 
 
 "Evidence means, first, statements 
 made by witnesses in court under a 
 legal sanction in relation to matters 
 of fact; such statements are called 
 oral evidence. Second, documents 
 produced for the inspection of the 
 court or judge; such documents are 
 called documentary evidence." Ste- 
 phen, Digest of Evidence, art. 1. 
 " The word ' evidence,' in legal ac- 
 
 ceptation, includes all the means by 
 which any alleged matter of fact, 
 the truth of which is submitted to 
 investigation, is established or dis- 
 proved." Greenleaf on Evidence, § 1. 
 
 " Evidence includes the reproduc- 
 tion before the determining tribunal 
 of the admission of parties and of 
 facts relevant to the issue. Evidence 
 is adduced only by the parties 
 through witnesses, documents or in- 
 spection." Wharton on Evidence, § 3. 
 
 The word "evidence," considered 
 in relation to law, includes all the 
 legal means, exclusive of mere argu- 
 ment, which tend "to prove or dis- 
 prove any matter of fact the truth of 
 which is submitted to judicial inves- 
 tigation." Taylor on Evidence, § 1 
 (Text-book Series). 
 
 4 People v. Supervisors, 10 Wend. 
 293 ; Guyot v. Butts, 4 id. 582 ; Par- 
 ker v. Hardy, 24 Pick, 246, 248. 
 
 SMcCarney v. People, 83 N. Y. 408, 
 414, 415.
 
 4 INTRODUCTORY. [§ 3. 
 
 § 3. Basis of belief. — It is a truism to say that most of the 
 knowledge which is possessed by any individual is derived 
 from information imparted by others. So we must recognize 
 the truth that the disposition to believe, or, in other words, to 
 rely upon what others tell us, is inherent in humanity until, by 
 repeated acts of deception practiced upon us, we become in- 
 credulous and learn to distrust the statements of other men. 
 
 Thus at a comparatively early period in life we learn by 
 experience of the falsehoods uttered in our hearing that an 
 urgent necessity exists for the use of rules and principles by 
 which the truth of what is said may be separated from that 
 which is false. 
 
 In the first place, the probability of any new fact with 
 which we become acquainted constitutes a strong, although 
 not the sole, ground for a belief in its truth. If the new fact 
 is consistent with others which we already know or believe to 
 be true, less evidence, or evidence of a less satisfactory char- 
 acter, is required to convince us of its truth than where the 
 new fact is wholly unlike anything in our experience. 
 
 The confirmation of the truth of any new fact by knowl- 
 edge already possessed will vary in proportion to the nature 
 of the fact communicated and the situation of the individual. 
 Thus a statement involving a new scientific discovery, as, for 
 example, that oral communication can be had by the telephone 
 between persons hundreds of miles apart, will be regarded as 
 extremely probable or as utterly absurd according as it is 
 made to a well-educated man or to an illiterate savage. 
 
 So, though the direct evidence of a witness is uncontra- 
 dicted, the jury may refuse to believe it, if from its inconsist- 
 ency and improbability they conclude that it is false. 1 
 
 Though we may have been repeatedly deceived by the mis- 
 representations of others, we find by experience that men, as 
 a rule, tell the truth. Where neither prejudice nor passion 
 exists, and where an individual has no private interests to ad- 
 vance by distorting truth, we may rely upon the credibility 
 of his testimony, if we believe him to be a man of intelli- 
 gence, possessing adequate powers and opportunity for acquir- 
 
 » Hawkins v. Sauby, 48 Minn. 69; jengren (Minn., 1892), 52 id. 219. See 
 50 N. W. Rep. 1015; Anderson v, Lil- 1 Greenl. on Ev., §§'7-11.
 
 § 3.] INTRODUCTORY. 5 
 
 ing knowledge. But where the testimony of persons, such 
 as police and private detectives and others engaged in the 
 detection of crime, or expert witnesses who are under pay, 1 
 who from character or position are inclined to take prejudiced 
 or distorted views is involved, it will require a high degree of 
 evidence to satisfy the mind of an impartial hearer. 3 
 
 Again, the well-recognized connection often observed be- 
 tween collateral or subordinate facts which are proved or 
 admitted and the main fact in issue frequently furnishes most 
 cogent and satisfactory proof of the existence of the latter. 
 This is only applying to the law of evidence the principles of 
 inductive reasoning, which are used, often unconsciously, by 
 all men ki the conduct of their most trivial as well as of their 
 most important affairs. It furnishes a basis for the division 
 of evidence into direct and circumstantial, while on the other 
 hand, by permitting the jury in a cause to draw inferences or 
 presumptions from the facts, it has opened the door for the 
 creation of presumptions of law. 
 
 Another incident affecting the credibility of evidence is found 
 in the frequent occurrence of undesigned coincidences, which, 
 though sometimes startling and unexpected, are unaccount- 
 able except upon the hypothesis that the narrative of which 
 they are a part is true. 3 No event stands alone. It is the 
 result of others which preceded it. It may in its turn be the 
 fruitful cause of many others which follow or relate to it. So 
 every fact or circumstance is connected with others of a col- 
 lateral nature, rendering it well nigh impossible for one to 
 concoct a narrative which on comparison w r ith other and 
 related circumstances will stand the test. 4 Even by compar- 
 ing the various parts of the story, a mind trained in the habit 
 of investigation may quickly ascertain the truth or falsehood ; 
 for in such a case the fabrication, however skilfully con- 
 structed, will crumble to pieces by reason of its inherent lack 
 of verity. 5 
 
 1 " Skilled witnesses come with such 2 Cen. R. Co. v. Attaway (Ga., 1893), 
 
 a bias on their minds to support the 16 S. E. Rep. 956. 
 
 cause in which they are embarked 3 United States v. Ybanez, 53 Fed. 
 
 that hardly any weight should be Rep. 536. 
 
 given to their evidence." In re Tracy, 4 1 Greenl. on Ev., §§ 9, 12. 
 
 10 CI. & F. 191. See post, % 188. & In Fife, Jones & Stewart v. Com.,
 
 6 INTRODUCTORY. [§ 4. 
 
 § 4. Direct and circumstantial evidence distinguished. — 
 
 By direct evidence is meant evidence of such facts as consti- 
 tute the actual and present subject of the judicial investi- 
 gation ; in other words, of those facts which are directly 
 in issue between the parties. To say that the evidence is 
 direct is equivalent to declaring that what the witness testifies 
 to as having- seen or heard is the fact or facts which are af- 
 firmed and controverted by the parties. In such a case the 
 evidence has a direct and uninterrupted bearing and applica- 
 tion to the facts to be proved. But where the facts seen or 
 heard by the witness have, when shown, no direct bearing on 
 the facts in issue, but require a course of reasoning or inference 
 before their application to the latter can be apprehended, or 
 before the truth or falsity of the latter facts can be presumed, 
 the evidence is circumstantial. 1 
 
 So where the dead body of defendant's wife is found with 
 her throat cut in a manner which could not have been self- 
 inflicted, and it is shown that defendant was seen in her com- 
 pany the evening previous ; that near the body was found a 
 razor, a walking-stick that defendant admitted was his, and a 
 cuff button; that defendant's razor was missing; that the cuff 
 button matched one in his possession, and that he had aban- 
 doned his wife, accusing her of infidelity, a chain of circum- 
 stances is forged leading irresistibly to the conclusion that ho 
 murdered her. 2 
 
 Whether the evidence be direct or circumstantial, the truth- 
 fulness of the witness may be presumed by the jury; but in 
 the latter case a further presumption is made, and the exist- 
 
 29 Pa. St. 429, 438, the court said : " It 1 " Circumstantial evidence is the 
 
 must be remembered that jurors proof of certain facts in a given case 
 
 are men, and that it is because they from which the jury may infer other 
 
 have human hearts and sympathies connected facts which usually and 
 
 iirvJ. judgments that they are selected reasonably follow, according to the 
 
 to determine upon the rights of their common experience of mankind." 
 
 fellowmen. . . . Their oaths as State v. Avery (Mo., 1893), 21 S. W. 
 
 jurors rest on their consciences as Rep. 193. 
 
 men, and as men they are accountable 2 People v. Hamilton, 137 N. Y. 531. 
 
 to God and to their country for their See, also, Moreno v. State (Tex., 1893), 
 
 verdict. Nothing more is demanded." 21 S. W. Rep. 924. 
 See 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 12,
 
 § 5.] INTRODUCTORY. 7 
 
 ence or non-existence of the facts in issue is deduced from the 
 proved existence of other facts. 1 
 
 From the nature of circumstantial evidence it follows that 
 its force wholly depends upon the fact that in each case some 
 direct evidence has been given from which the presumption 
 or inference may arise. 
 
 So in the class of cases in which fraud is alleged, or in which 
 it is said that fraud will be presumed from the circumstances 
 of the parties, direct evidence of a clear and satisfactory char- 
 acter must be adduced before the existence of fraud will be 
 presumed; and the facts and circumstances must be estab- 
 lished beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 
 
 The admissibility of circumstantial evidence depends solely 
 upon the strength and distinctness of the logical connection 
 between the facts proved and the inference which may be 
 made by the jury; in other words, whether such evidence is 
 receivable depends upon its relevancy to the fact in issue. 
 The question of relevancy is one for the decision of the judge. 
 To guide him in his decision upon the remoteness of the 
 evidence offered no general rule can be enunciated. Each 
 case must necessarily be decided on its own circumstances, 
 subject to the general qualification that all the evidence 
 offered, to be admissible, must tend to prove or disprove the 
 fact in issue. 3 
 
 §5. Nature and effect of circumstantial evidence. — Cir- 
 cumstantial evidence is divided by the authorities into that 
 which is certain and that which is uncertain. In the former 
 
 1 Cora. v. Harmon, 4 Pa. St. 269. to the inference must be distinctly 
 
 "The advantage of circumstantial and independently proved bycompe- 
 
 evidence is that, as it commonly tent evidence; and the inference 
 
 comes from different sources, a chain must be fair and natural, not forced 
 
 of circu instances is less likely to be or artificial." Webster's Case, 5 Cush. 
 
 falsely prepared and falsehood is 311. See Com. v. Howe, 132 Mass. 
 
 more likely to be detected. The dis- 259. 
 
 advantage is that the jury have not - McAleer v. McMurray, 58 Pa. St. 
 
 only to weigh the evidence of facts, 126 ; Douglass v. Mitchell, 35 id. 440 : 
 
 but to draw just conclusions from United States v. Ross, 92 U. S. 281 ; 
 
 them ; in doing which there may be Kaiser v. State, 35 Neb. 704 ; State v. 
 
 led to make hasty and false deduc- Hunter, 50 Kan. 302; Kennedy v. 
 
 tions — a source of error not existing State, 12 S. Rep. 858 (Fla., 1893); 
 
 in the consideration of positive evi- Hutchison v. Boltz, 35 W. Va. 754. 
 
 dence. Hence, each fact necessary 3 See §g 7-10.
 
 8 INTRODUCTORY. [§ 5. 
 
 class the conclusion follows necessarily where the premises 
 are established ; in the latter it may or may not follow, ac- 
 cording to the course of reasoning pursued by the jury. 1 This 
 classification, however, is of small practical value, for the 
 weight of circumstantial evidence and the power to draw in- 
 ferences from it are matters which are wholly in the hands 
 of the jury, and they are not under the necessity of being 
 convinced by any degree of circumstantial evidence, however 
 satisfactory or certain it may appear. It is the duty of the 
 judge to instruct them as to the rules regulating the subject, 
 and where the evidence is wholly circumstantial it is reversi- 
 ble error for him to refuse to do so. 2 
 
 So though the jury may, under the direction of the judge 
 as to the law, weigh the evidence and compare that which is 
 circumstantial with that which is direct, they are under no 
 sort of obligation to reject the former in favor of the latter, 
 or to ascribe to either any higher degree of probative force 
 than to the other. So the credibility of either description of 
 evidence depends on its intrinsic merit as regards truthful- 
 ness and probability. 3 A conviction of crime may be had on 
 circumstantial evidence alone, provided the jury are convinced 
 beyond a reasonable doubt. 4 In other words, the circum- 
 stances should be not only consistent with the prisoner's guilt, 
 but irreconcilable with any other rational hypothesis. 5 
 
 1 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 13a. liable than other evidence." People 
 
 2 Crowell v. State, 24 Tex. App. 404 ; v. Orquidas, 96 Cal. 239. 
 
 Boyd v. State, 24 id. 570 : Crowley v. •» Kaiser v. State, 35 Neb. 704 ; State 
 
 State, 10 S. W. Rep. 217 ; 26 Tex. App. v. Hunter, 50 Kan. 302 ; Kennedy v. 
 
 278. But where no question of cir- State (Fla., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 858. 
 
 cumstantial evidence is involved the 5 State v. Avery (Mo., 1893), 21 
 
 court need not instruct the jury upon S. W. Rep. 21 ; Nail v. State (Miss., 
 
 the rules governing it. Langdon v. 1893), 11 S. Rep. 793; State v. Dav- 
 
 People, 133 111. 382 ; 24 N. E. Rep. 874 ; enport (S. C, 1893), 17 S. E. Rep. 37 ; 
 
 Smith v. State, 28 Tex. App. 309 ; State v. Taylor, 20 S. W. Rep. 239 ; 
 
 Wampler v. State, 28 Tex. App. 352 ; 111 Mo. 538; State v. Milling, 35 
 
 Vaughan v. State (Ark., 1893), 20 S. S. C. 16 ; 14 S. E. Rep. 284 ; Williaui- 
 
 W. Rep. 588 ; Cotton v. State, 87 son v. State, 30 Tex. 330 ; 17 S. W. 
 
 Ala. 75. Rep. 722 ; State v. Woodward (Iowa, 
 
 3 People v. Morrow, 60 Cal. 142 ; 1892), 50 N. W. Rep. 885 ; People v. 
 State v. Slingerland, 19 Nev. 135; Dillwood, 94 Cal. 89; United States 
 Clark v. Com., 123 Pa. St. 555. v. McKenzie, 35 Fed. Rep. 826 ; Leon- 
 " Nothing in the nature of circum- ard v. Territory, 2 Wash. T. 281; 
 stantial evidence renders it less re- Overman v. State, 49 Ark. 364; Dean
 
 6.] 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 § 6. Reasonable doubt and the weight of evidence — Alibi 
 in criminal trials. — Where civil rights are involved, extreme 
 strictness of proof is not required, and the jury may decide 
 for either parby according to the probability and weight of 
 evidence, so long as their verdict be in favor of that litigant 
 upon whose side the evidence preponderates. 
 
 The jury in criminal cases, however, are not permitted to 
 base their verdict on a mere preponderance of proof, but are 
 required, particularly where the evidence is circumstantial or 
 contradictory, to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that 
 the accused is guilty. 1 
 
 The rule that a preponderance of evidence is sufficient in a 
 civil suit is based upon the fact that proof arrived at by the 
 verdict will only result as a judgment for pecuniary damage 
 or establish a civil right. But in a criminal trial the accused 
 starts with a presumption of innocence which must be over- 
 come in addition to the evidence which he may adduce in his 
 own behalf. So the character, and perhaps the life, of the ac- 
 
 v. Com., 32 Gratt. 912 ; Davis v. State, 
 74 Ga. 869 ; Russell v. Cora., 78 Va. 
 600; Swigar v. State, 109 111. 372; 
 Poe v. State, 10 Lea (Tenn.), 673; 
 State v. Anderson, 10 Oreg. 448; 
 State v. Smith, 73 Iowa, 32 ; Com. v. 
 Robinson, 146 Mass. 371 ; Yates v. 
 People, 32 N. Y. 509 ; Com. v. Web- 
 ster, 59 Mass. 295 ; West v. State, 76 
 Ala. 98; People v. Beckvvith, 108 
 N. Y. 67 ; State v. Johnson, 37 Minn. 
 493; People v. Reich, 110 N. Y. 660; 
 Jones v. State, 57 Miss. 684 ; State v. 
 Brewer, 98 N. C. 607. 
 
 "Perhaps strong circumstantial 
 evidence, in cases of crimes commit- 
 ted for the most part in secret, is 
 the most satisfactory of any from 
 which to draw the conclusion of 
 guilt; for men may be seduced to 
 perjury by many base motives, to 
 which the secret nature of the of- 
 fense may sometimes afford a temp- 
 tation: but it can scarcely happen 
 that many circumstances, especially 
 if they be such over which the ac- 
 
 cuser could have no control, forming 
 altogether the links of a transaction, 
 should all unfortunately concur to fix 
 the presumption of guilt on an indi- 
 vidual, and yet such a conclusion be 
 erroneous." 1 East, P. G, ch. 5, § 9. 
 i Pierce v. State (Tex., 1893), 22 S. W. 
 Rep. 587 ; State v. Johnson, 37 Minn. 
 493; Coleman v. State, 111 Ind. 563; 
 People v. Flynn, 73 Cal. 511 ; Hopt v. 
 People, 7 S. Ct. 614 ; McMeen v. Com., 
 114 Pa. St. 300; McKee v. State, 82 
 Ala. 32 ; Graves v. People (Colo., 1893;, 
 32 Pac. Rep. 63 ; Bramlette v. State, 
 21 Tex. App. 611 ; 2 S. W. Rep. 765 ; 
 State v. Blunt, 91 Mo. 503 ; Gardiner 
 v. State (N. J., 1893), 26 Atl. Rep. 30 ; 
 Gentry v. State (Tex., 1893), 20 S. W. 
 Rep. 551 ; McDuffie v. State (Ga., 1893), 
 17 S. E. Rep. 505 ; Woodruff v. State 
 (Fla., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 653; State v. 
 Grant (Iowa, 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 
 120 ; Weaver v. People, 132 111. 536 ; 
 Taylor v. Com. (Va., 1893), 17 S. E. 
 Rep. 81 ; Kelly v. People, 17 Colo. 
 130; Cross v. State, 132 Ind. 65;
 
 10 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 [§G. 
 
 cused is involved, while in civil cases the loss he may sustain, 
 however great, may be retrieved by his future efforts. 1 
 
 But where the commission of a crime is in issue in a civil 
 suit, an irreconcilable lack of harmony prevails in the decis- 
 ions. In England, 2 and in some of the states of the Union, it 
 is held that where the existence of a criminal intent is in issue 
 in a civil proceeding, the party alleging the intent must prove 
 its existence beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 But the weight of 
 the decisions is adverse to this proposition, for the great ma- 
 jority of them support the rule that an accusation of crime 
 in a civil suit may, lx*ce any other fact in issue, be proven by 
 a preponderance of evidence. 4 
 
 The meaning of the phrase " reasonable doubt " has been 
 the subject of much discussion, and many attempts have been 
 made to define it. 5 Thus it has been defined as " a doubt for 
 
 Hunter v. State, 29 Fla. 486; State 
 v. Turner, 110 Mo. 196; Palmer- 
 ston v. Ter., 3 Wyo. 333; State v. 
 Whiton, 111 N. C. 695; People v. 
 Kerr, 6 N. Y. Grim. R. 406; United 
 States v. Meagher, 37 Fed. Rep. 875 ; 
 Perry v. State, 87 Ala. 30; State v. 
 Grant (Iowa, 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 120. 
 
 1 See remarks of the court in Mut. 
 F. L Co. v. Usaw, 112 Pa. St. 89. 
 
 2 Stephen's Dig., art. 94. 
 8Polsfcon v. See, 46 Iowa, 30; 
 
 Mead v. Husted, 52 Conn. 56 ; Will- 
 iams v. Dickerson, 28 Fla. 90; Bar- 
 ton v. Thompson, 46 Iowa, 30. 
 
 4 Gordon v. Parmlee, 15 Gray 
 (Mass.), 413; Ellis v. Burrell, 60 Me. 
 209 ; Burr v. Wilson, 22 Minn. 206 ; 
 Munson v. Atwood, 30 Conn. 102 ; 
 Bissell v. West, 35 Ind. 54 ; Weston 
 v. Gravlin, 49 Vt. 507. 
 
 5 State v. Whitson, 16 S. E. Rep. 
 332; 111N. C. 695. 
 
 " As to questions relating to human 
 affairs a knowledge of which is de- 
 rived from testimony, it is impossible 
 to have the kind of certainty created 
 by scientific demonstration. The 
 only certainty we can have is a 
 moral certainty, which depends upon 
 
 the confidence placed in the integrity 
 of witnesses and their capacity to 
 know the truth. If, for example, 
 facts not improbable are attested by 
 numerous witnesses who are credi- 
 ble, consistent, uncontradicted, and 
 who had every opportunity of know- 
 ing the truth, a reasonable or moral 
 certainty would be inspired by their 
 testimony. In such case a doubt 
 would be unreasonable, imaginary 
 or speculative, which it ought not to 
 be. It is not a doubt whether the 
 party may not possibly be innocent 
 in the face of strong proof of his 
 guilt, but a sincere doubt whether he 
 has been proved guilty, that is called 
 reasonable. And even where the 
 testimony is contradictor}', so much 
 more credit may be due to one side 
 than the other and the same result 
 will be produced. On the other 
 hand, the opposing proofs may be so 
 nearly balanced that the jury may 
 justly doubt on which side lies the 
 truth. In such case the accused is 
 entitled to the benefit of the doubt. 
 As certainty advances doubt recedes. 
 If one is reasonably certain he can- 
 not at the same time be reasonably
 
 6.] 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 11 
 
 which a reason can be given;" 1 as a doubt that must satisfy 
 a reasonable mind after a full comparison and consideration 
 of the evidence ; 2 as " a doubt that has something to rest upon, 
 and such as a sensible, honest-minded man would reasonably 
 entertain;" 3 as a doubt growing out of the evidence and cir- 
 cumstances of the case, 4 having a foundation in reason; 5 a 
 substantial doubt, and not a mere possibility of innocence ; H and 
 as an honest, substantial misgiving generated by insufficiency 
 of proof. 7 But a mere whim, groundless surmise, 8 vague con- 
 jecture, 9 captious doubt or misgiving suggested by an ingen- 
 ious counsel, or arising from a merciful disposition towards 
 defendant or from sympathy for him or his family, 10 is not a 
 reasonable doubt. 11 
 
 doubtful — that is have a reasonable 
 doubt of a fact. All that a jury can 
 be expected to do is to be reasonably 
 or morally certain of the fact which 
 they declare by their verdict." By 
 Cox, J., in United States v. Guiteau, 
 10 Fed. Rep. 164 
 
 i Hodge v. State (Ala., 1893), 12 S. 
 Rep. 164; Cohen v. State, 50 Ala. 
 108. 
 
 2 Wood v. State (Fla., 1893), 12 S. 
 Rep. 539. 
 
 3 Fletcher v. State (Ga., 1893), 17 S. 
 E. Rep. 100. 
 
 * Territory v. Chavez (N. M., 1893), 
 30 Pac. Rep. 903. 
 
 5 Conrad v. State, 31 N. E. Rep. 805 ; 
 132 Ind. 254 
 
 estate v. Wells, 111 Mo. 533. 
 
 " United States v. Newton, 52 Fed. 
 Rep. 275. See, also, Siberry v. State 
 (Ind., 1893), 33 N. E. Rep. 681 ; People 
 v. Kerm (Utah, 1893), 30 Pac. Rep. 
 988; Lovett v. State, 30 Fla. 142; 
 Lyons v. People, 137 111. 602 ; Carroll 
 v. Same, 136 id. 456; Woodruff v. 
 State (Fla., 1893), 22 S. Rep. 653 ; Peo- 
 ple v. Pallister, 138 N. Y. 601. 
 
 "A reasonable doubt is such a 
 doubt as the term itself implies. It 
 is difficult to explain what a reason- 
 able doubt is. It means a doubt that 
 
 has something to rest upen; some 
 reason that it is based on; such a 
 doubt as would control you and you 
 would be governed by in your im- 
 portant business affairs. It means 
 such a doubt as a sensible, honest- 
 minded man would reasonably en- 
 tertain in an honest investigation 
 after truth ; a doubt that would 
 arise from the evidence or the want 
 of evidence in the case. It does not 
 mean a mere vague conjecture or a 
 bare possibility of the innocence of 
 the accused." Fletcher v. State (Ga., 
 1893), 17 S. E. Rep. 100. 
 
 8 Welch v. State (Ala., 1893), 11 S. 
 Rep. 450. 
 
 9 Fletcher v. State (Ga., 1893), 17 S. 
 E. Rep. 100. 
 
 w United States v. Newton, 52 Fed. 
 Rep. 275. 
 
 11 Territory v. Baningan, 1 Dak. 432 ; 
 Spies v. People (Anarchist Case), 122 
 111. 8 ; Schusler v. State, 29 Ind. 394 ; 
 Horn v. State, 1 Kan. 42; Com. v. 
 Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295 ; Com. 
 v. Harman, 4 Pa St. 209 ; Brotherton 
 v. People, 75 N. Y. 159 ; McMeen v. 
 Com., 114 Pa. St. 300; State v. An- 
 derson, 86 Mo. 309; Bradshaw v. 
 State, 17 Neb, 147.
 
 12 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 [§6. 
 
 Where the prisoner pleads an affirmative defense as an 
 alibi, or denies that any crime has been committed, the bur- 
 den of proof is on him to show the fact. He need not, how- 
 ever, prove the fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, in 
 proving an alibi, the jury should acquit if the prisoner is able 
 to show by a preponderance of evidence that he was " else- 
 where " at or about the time the crime was committed, and 
 that he was at the place alleged such a length of time that he 
 could not have committed the crime with which he is charged. 1 
 
 It is the duty of a jury to weigh the evidence, and it is not 
 for the court to place restrictions upon this power. They may, 
 where evidence is conflicting, reject that which is direct and 
 rely wholly upon that which is circumstantial. 2 So it has been 
 held error, under such circumstances, for the court to instruct 
 them that the circumstances must not be vague, indefinite or 
 uncertain, but convincing and clearly defined. 3 So a jury is 
 not compelled to draw an inference that would necessarily 
 follow upon the facts proven, but may come to any reason- 
 able and probable conclusion justified by the evidence. 4 So 
 
 i State v. Reed. 62 Iowa, 40; Peo- 
 ple v. Pearsall, 50 Mich. 233 ; Stuart 
 v. People, 42 Mich. 255 ; Landis v. 
 State, 70 Ga. 651 ; Binns v. State, 46 
 Ind. 811; Watson v. Com., 95 Pa. 
 St 418; State v. Josey, 64 N. C. 
 56; State v. Watson, 7 S. C. 63; 
 Klein v. People, 113 111. 596. In other 
 words, if the defendant by his evi- 
 dence of an alibi succeeds in creat- 
 ing a reasonable doubt that he com- 
 mitted the crime, then it is for the 
 state to overcome that doubt. In no 
 case is the prisoner compelled to sat- 
 isfy the jury beyond a reasonable 
 doubt that he did not commit the 
 crime. Bennett v. State, 30 Tex. App. 
 341; People v. Fong, 64 Cal. 253; 
 State v. Sandars, 106 Mo. 188 ; State 
 v. Edwards, 109 Mo. 318. See post, 
 § 240. The jury may be cautioned 
 that witnesses may be honestly mis- 
 taken as to times and places and 
 that an alibi may be easily fabri- 
 cated. People v. Wong (Cal.), 10 
 
 Pac. Rep. 275. But the law does not 
 regard evidence to prove an alibi with 
 any greater degree of suspicion than 
 any other sort of defense. Albin v. 
 State, 63 Ind. 598 ; Line v. State, 51 
 id. 172 ; Spenser v. State, 50 Ala. 124 
 Though a presumption is created 
 against a prisoner when he is de- 
 tected in falsely swearing to an alibi 
 (Porter v. State, 55 Ala. 95 ; Com. v. 
 McMahon, 145 Pa, St. 413), still it has 
 been held erroneous to charge that 
 an unsuccessful attempt to prove an 
 alibi is to be considered as a circum- 
 stance of great weight against the 
 accused. People v. Molaspina, 57 
 Cal. 628 ; Caffey v. State, 94 Ala. 76. 
 
 2 Bowie v. ,Maddox, 29 Ga 285 ; 
 Deland v. Dixon Nat Bank, 111 111. 
 327. 
 
 3 State v. Allen, 103 N. C. 433 ; Mc- 
 Clesky v. State (Tex., 1892), 13 S. W. 
 Rep. 997. 
 
 * 127 I1L 507.
 
 § 6.] INTRODUCTORY. 13 
 
 to warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence it has been 
 held that each fact leading up to the inference drawn must bo 
 proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and the facts thus proven 
 should be consistent with each other and with the guilt of the 
 person accused. 1 
 
 On the other hand, many cases hold, and this perhaps is the 
 better rule, that the jury need not be satisfied beyond a rea- 
 sonable doubt of the truth of every fact alleged, if upon the 
 whole evidence they are satisfied of the guilt of the accused 
 beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 
 
 iGallaher v. State, 28 Tex. App. Rep. 905; Weaver v. People, 132 111. 
 
 247 ; Rains v. State, 88 Ala. 91 ; 536 ; Siebert v. People (III., 1893), 32 
 
 Graves v. People (Cola, 1893), 32 Pac. N. E. Rep. 431; Harnish v. People 
 
 Rep. 63. See Tiramerman v. Ter., 17 (111., 1893), 32 N. R Rep. 677 ; Jamison 
 
 Pac. Rep. 624 ; Cotton v. State, 87 Ala, v. People (111., 1893), 34 N. E. Rep. 468 ; 
 
 75 ; Coleman v. State, 87 id. 14. Timmerman v. Ter., 17 Pac. Rep. 
 
 2 State v. Wells, 111 Mo. 533; 624; State v. Crane, 15 S. E. Rep. 
 
 Faulkner v. Ter. (N. M., 1893), 30 Pac. 231 ; 110 N. C. 530.
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 RELEVANCY AND PROVINCE OF JUDGE AND JURY. 
 
 § 7. Relevancy of evidence. 
 
 8. Collateral facts, how far admis- 
 
 sible. 
 
 9. Evidence of intention, motive, 
 
 good faith, etc., when rele- 
 vant 
 
 § 10. Collateral facts bearing on char- 
 acter. 
 
 11. Province of judge and jury. 
 
 12. Blended questions of law and 
 
 fact 
 
 13. Preliminary facts bearing on 
 
 admissibility. 
 
 § 7. Relevancy of evidence. — The word "relevant" means 
 that the fact to which it is applied is so related to another 
 fact tliat, according to the common course of events, either, 
 by itself or in connection with other facts, proves or renders 
 probable the existence or non-existence, past, present or future, 
 of the other. 1 
 
 The logical connection of the fact proven with the fact in 
 issue constitutes the basis for all rules bearing upon relevancy ; 
 and while it is important to appropriate some particular 
 word to point out this principle, it is useful to endeavor to 
 differentiate certain terms frequently but erroneously regarded 
 as synonymous with it. 
 
 Thus the terms "competent" and "admissible," 2 "proper" 
 and "competent," 3 "admissible" or "material" and "rele- 
 vant," are used interchangeably, little, if any, distinction being 
 made in their various shades of meaning. 
 
 The word "competent" is correctly used in the sense of 
 " qualified," to signify the capacity of a person as a witness or 
 his right to testify. On the other hand, " proper " is applicable 
 to the character of evidence, where evidence of a particular 
 description is necessary to prove certain kinds of facts. 
 
 "Material" is used in a double sense. It may express the 
 amount of weight to be given to a fact approximating to rele- 
 
 1 Stephen's Digest of Evidence, 
 Preliminary Chapter. 
 
 2 West v. Bank, 20 Hun, 408. 
 
 3 Blake v. People, 73 N. Y. 586.
 
 § 7.] KKLEVANCY AND PROVINCE OF JUDGE AND JURY. L5 
 
 vant in meaning, or it may be that certain facts in issue are 
 material, i. e., necessary to be proved. 1 
 
 " Admissible," as commonly used, has required a rather loose 
 and fluctuating meaning, in the majority of instances signify- 
 ing ''receivable" merely. 
 
 The principle of the relevancy of evidence is stated by 
 Mr. Greenleaf in his first rule, "that evidence offered must 
 correspond with the material and necessary allegations of the 
 pleadings and be confined to the point in issue." 2 
 
 This rule, by dispensing with proof of immaterial aver- 
 ments, being well designed to facilitate the labors of the jury 
 and render litigation less expensive, should be strictly ad- 
 hered to. 3 
 
 In order to possess the characteristic of relevancy a fact 
 need not always have a direct bearing upon the facts in issue; 
 but it will be relevant though it only tends to prove the latter 
 by association with others which go to form the proof ' re- 
 quired. 4 
 
 So evidence is admissible which, though apparently not 
 bearing directly on the facts in issue, yet, because it points 
 
 I Lindsay v. People, 63 N. Y. 143. Schuchardt v. Aliens, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 
 
 II Greenl. on Evid., §51. 359; Willoughby v. Dewey, 54 111. 
 3 Montgomery Co. v. Bridge Co., 266; Bibb v. Allen, 149 U. S. 481; 
 
 110 Pa. St. 54; Ferrari v. Murray, Hilton v. Railroad Co. (Ala., 1893), 12 
 
 152 Mass. 496; Ellen v. Lewison, S. Rep. 276; Grantier v. Austin, 66 
 
 88 Cal. 253; Kennedy v. Currie, 3 Hun, 157; Columbus, etc. Co. v. 
 
 Wash. St. 442 ; McGrew v. M. Pac. Semmes, 27 Ga. 283 ; Tucker v. Peas- 
 
 R. Co. (Mo., 1892), 19 S. W. Rep. 53 ; lee, 36 N. H. 157 ; Huntington v. At- 
 
 Michigan Ins. Bank v. Eldred, 143 trill, 118 N. Y. 365; Johnson v. State, 
 
 U. S. 293 ; Gulf, etc. Co. v. Hepner, 18 Tex. App. 385 ; West v. State, 76 
 
 83 Tex. 70; 18 S. W. Rep. 441; Mc- Ala. 98; Overman v. State, 49 Ark. 
 
 Dermott v. Falls Co. (Iowa, 1892), 52 364; Davis v. State, 74 Ga. 869; Watt 
 
 N. W. Rep. 181; Weaver v. Shipley, v. People (III.), 18 N. E. Rep. 340; 
 
 127 Ind. 526; Clow v. Brown (Ind., Schulser v. State. 29 Ind. 394; Com. 
 
 1892), 31 N. E. Rep. 361 ; Branson v. v. Robinson, 146 Mass. 571 ; State v. 
 
 Kitchenman, 148 Pa. St 541 ; 24 Atl. Johnson, 37 Minn. 493; Casey v. 
 
 Rep. 641: Faivre v. Daley, 93 Cal. State, 20 Neb. 138; State v. Harrison, 
 
 663; N..Chic. Ry, Co. v. Cotton, 140 5 Jones' (N. C.) L. 115; Henry v. 
 
 111. 486; 29 N. E. Rep. 899; Freeman State, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 224; Trues- 
 
 v. Fogg, 82 Me. 408. dell v. Hoyle, 39 111. App. 532 ; Dean 
 
 ^Bohrer v. Stumpf, 31 111. App. v. Com., 32 Giatt. (Va.) 912; Leon- 
 
 139; Sanders v. Stokes, 30 Ala. 432; ard v. Territory, 2 Wash. Ter. 381.
 
 16 RELEVANCY AND PROVINCE OF JUDGE AND JURY. [§ 7. 
 
 out the manner in which the case is being conducted by either 
 party, is relevant as tending to prove or disprove the truth or 
 probability of the facts in issue. 
 
 No legal presumption generally arises from the mere non- 
 production of certain witnesses. 1 But evidence that a wit- 
 ness is living who has not been produced, 2 or that a deposition 
 which has been obtained is not offered, 3 is relevant on behalf 
 of either party to prove that this testimony, if offered, would 
 have been adverse to the other. But in any case the infer- 
 ence is for the jury; while such evidence is only relevant if, 
 in the opinion of the judge, such an inference may with fair- 
 ness be drawn 4 by reasonable men. 
 
 The relevancy of evidence need not be shown when it is 
 offered 5 if it is made to appear to the satisfaction of the court 
 that counsel will subsequently produce other evidence which 
 will render it relevant. 6 So if evidence is rejected because 
 irrelevant, and proof is afterwards given showing its relevancy, 
 it may again be offered. 7 
 
 Evidence which would be relevant in rebuttal may, in the 
 discretion of the court, be admitted in chief. 8 But an offer of 
 evidence must be so explicit that the court may see whether 
 or not it is relevant. 5 
 
 i Showman v. Lee, 86 Mich. 556; Rep. 1037; Tarns v. Bullix, 35 Pa. 
 Com. v. Mahan, 142 Pa. St. 413. St 308 ; Comstock v. Smith, 20 Mich. 
 
 2 Lynch v. Peabody, 137 Mass. 93. 338. 
 
 Evidence to explain the absence of a 7 Jones v. St. Louis, etc. Co. (Ark., 
 
 witness is always relevant under 1890), 13 S. W. Rep. 416. But in 
 
 such circumstances. Richmond, etc. prosecutions for crime it is generally 
 
 Co. v. Garner (Ga., 1893), 16 S. E. Rep. required that the corpus delicti should 
 
 110; Staffords v. Morning Journal, be shown first. People v. Millard, 53 
 
 68 Hun, 467 ; So. Pac. R. Co. v. Rauh Mich. 63. 
 
 1 C. C. A. 416. 8 Easley v. M. Pac. Ry. Co. (Mo., 
 
 3 Learned v. Hall, 133 Mass. 417. 1893), 20 S. W. Rep. 1073 ; Lamance v. 
 
 4 See § 25. Byrnes. 17 Nev. 197 ; Kansas City R, 
 6 Harris v. Holmes, 30 Vt. 352. Co. v. McDonald, 51 Fed. Rep. 178 ; 
 6 Harris v. Holmes, 30 Vt. 352; Cashman v. Harrison, 90 Cal. 297. 
 
 Com. v. Dam, 107 Mass. 210; Consaul " Wolf or d v. Farnham, 47 Minn, 
 
 v. Sheldon, 35 Neb. 247; Lee Silv. Co. 95 ; Lanter v. Simpson, 2 Ind. App, 
 
 v.Englebach(Colo., 1893), 31 Pac. Rep. 293; Alexander v. Thompson, 42 
 
 771 ; Morris v. Morton's Ex'rs (Kan., Minn. 498 ; Idaho, etc. Co. v. Brad- 
 
 1892), 20 S. W. Rep. 287 ; McClene- bury, 132 U. S. 509 ; Kennedy v. 
 
 ghan v. Reid (Neb., 1893), 51 N. W. Currie, 3 Wash. St 442.
 
 § 8.] RELEVANCY AND PROVINCE OF JUDGE AND JURY. 17 
 
 §8. Collateral facts, how far admissible. — This rule of 
 relevancy does not permit the introduction of wholly collat- 
 eral facts which are not part of the same transaction and 
 throw no light upon the truth or even the probability of the 
 fact in issue, but which, if they were introduced in evidence, 
 would only distract and confuse the minds of the members of 
 the jury by withdrawing their attention from the main point 
 in issue. 1 
 
 The question whether a fact is or is not too remote, and 
 consequently irrelevant, is a preliminary question for the 
 judge, and on this subject no rule can be laid down further 
 than the very general one which in practice is of little value and 
 which is implied in the definition of the word relevant itself. 
 
 If the collateral fact introduces or will explain a fact in 
 issue 2 or a relevant fact, or will rebut or support any infer- 
 ence which may be drawn by the jury from a fact which is in 
 issue or from a relevant fact, it is admissible. 3 In every case 
 great care is demanded of the judge, that by the employment 
 of a wise discrimination he may admit as relevant all evi- 
 dence which sheds any light upon the issue, though weak and 
 uncertain, rejecting that which by its remoteness cannot be 
 connected with the facts. 4 Thus, where the value of land is 
 involved, evidence of recent sales of land under similar con- 
 ditions in the neighborhood is relevant to show the value 
 of the land in question. 5 Evidence to show that the sales of 
 land which have been proved were made under different cir- 
 
 1 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 52. Coccon, 140 111. 486 ; 29 N. E. Rep. 
 
 2 Truesdale v. Hoyle, 39 111. App. 899. If the relevancy of a fact de- 
 532 ; Clarke v. Van Court, 51 Neb. 756. pends upon the proof of another fact 
 
 3 Butler v. Cornell (111., 1893), 35 N. upon which the evidence is contra- 
 E Rep. 767; Wallace v. Kennedy, dictory, the proper course is to sub- 
 47 N. J. L. 246; Reeve v. Dennett, mit the proof of both facts to the 
 145 Mass. 23; Collins v. Glass, 46 jury. Day v. Sharp, 4 "Whart. 339. 
 Mo. App. 297. 5 Huntington v. Attrill, 118 N. Y. 
 
 4 Davis v. Getchell, 32 Neb. 792; 365; Miller v. Windsor W. Co., 30 W. 
 Cadwallader v. Zeh, 14 S. Ct 288 N. C. 85 ; Prov. etc. Co. v. Worces- 
 (U. S., 1894) ; Bransen v. Kitchenman, ter, 29 N. E. Rep. 56 ; 155 Mass. 35 ; 
 148 Pa. St. 541 ; 24 Atl. Rep. 61 ; Mo Chicago, etc. Co. v. Emery (Kan., 
 Culloch v. Dobson, 30 N. E. Rep. 641 ; 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 631 ; Cross v. Wil- 
 133 N. Y. 114; Faivre v. Daily, 93 kins, 43 N. H. 332; Sanford v. Peck 
 Cal. 664 ; Lanter v. Simpson, 2 Ind. (Conn., 1894), 27 Atl. Rep. 1057 ; Mel- 
 App. 273 ; North Chi. S. R Co. v. vin v. Bullard, 35 Vt. 368 ; Atchison 
 
 2
 
 IS RELEVANCY AND PROVINCE OF JUDGE AND JUEY. [§ 8. 
 
 cumstances is then relevant. Thus the land-owner whose 
 property is to be taken in condemnation proceedings may 
 show that his land is of a superior quality. 1 So, also, if the 
 situation and condition of the land sold, which is used as a 
 standard of comparison, be not substantially identical with 
 the land in dispute, or if the sales were not recent in point of 
 time, it may become a question for the exercise of judicial 
 discretion whether such evidence should not be rejected as re- 
 mote and hence irrelevant. 2 
 
 Under the rule above pointed out, evidence of collateral 
 facts is sometimes held to be admissible where the fact in 
 issue is the character of the result of a certain continued 
 course of action which it is alleged evinces such a lack of care 
 or skill on the part of the actor as to constitute negligence. 
 So where the question hinges upon the proper performance of 
 official or private duty in providing or caring for public struct- 
 ures or private buildings, or for machinery, or any material 
 or mechanical device requiring the exercise of personal care 
 and diligence, evidence of its condition, or of accidents which 
 occurred in its use, prior to the time when the fact in issue 
 occurred, is admissible. 3 The decisions, however, are not har- 
 monious on this point, and the cases in which such evidence 
 has been excluded as irrelevant are extremely numerous. 4 
 
 Where the issue involves negligence caused by the alleged 
 defective condition of a highway, evidence showing its con- 
 
 R R Co. v. Harper, 19 Kan. 529; McCullough v. Dobson, 133 N. Y. 
 
 Howe v. Howard, 33 N. E. Rep. 528; 114; House v. Metcalf, 27 Conn. 632; 
 
 Travis v. Pierson, 43 111. App. 479. Glasier v. Hebron, 62 Hun, 137; 
 
 i Chicago, K. & W. R Co. v. Em- Toledo, etc. Co. v. Milligan, 2 Ind. 
 
 ery (Kan., 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 631. App. 578; Chicago v. Powers, 42 III. 
 
 2 May v. Boston (Mass., 1893), 32 169 ; Presly v. Grand T. Ry. Co. (N. H., 
 N. E. Rep. 902 ; Packard v. Bergen 1892), 22 Atl. Rep. 554 ; Indianapolis 
 Neck R Co., 54 N. J. L. 533 ; Laing Ry. v. Boetcher, 131 Ind. 82 ; 28 N. E. 
 v. United N. J. R & Can. Co., 54 id. Rep. 551 ; Augusta v. Hafers, 61 Ga. 
 576 ; Seattle, etc. Co. v. Gilchrist, 4 48 ; Topeka v. Sherwood, 39 Kan. 
 Wash. St. 509. 690; Goshen v. England, 119 Ind. 
 
 3 Legg v. Blooraington, 40 III. App. 368 ; Magee v. Troy, 1 N. Y. S. 24 ; 
 185 ; Mixter Coal Co. v. Smith, 152 Masters v. Troy, 50 Hun, 485. 
 
 Pa. St. 395; Chicago, etc. Co. v. ^Fordyce v. Withers, 1 Tex. Civ. 
 
 Lewis (111., 1893), 33 N. E. Rep. 960; App. 540; Baxter v. Doe, 142 Mass. 
 
 Ohio Val. Ry. Co. v. Watson's Adm'r 558 ; Early v. Lake Shore, etc. Co., 30 
 
 (Ky., 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 244; Dar- Am. & Eng. R Cas. 163; Smith v. 
 
 ling v. Westmoreland, 52 N. H. 401 ; Railroad Co., 25 id. 546 ; Wise v.
 
 § 8.] KELEVANOY AND PROVINCE OF JUDGE AND JURY. 19 
 
 dition, and the existence of defects in it at a short distance 
 from the place in issue, 1 or evidence which shows the condi- 
 tion of the road at the point where the accident occurred a 
 short time before or after, is relevant.- The test of relevancy 
 in all such cases, and the principle upon which the decisions 
 may perhaps be reconciled, is the proximity in time or place 
 of the facts testified to, whether they relate to the condition of 
 the highway or other object causing damage or to repairs to 
 it. If the evidence, whether before or after, is too remote in 
 point of time or place, it should be rejected. 3 And evidence 
 that defendant, after the accident, repaired the place where 
 plaintiff was injured is generally irrelevant and inadmissible. 4 
 Upon the question whether, in an action alleging the negli- 
 gence of defendant, evidence that he is a man of careful and 
 prudent demeanor in that line of activity in which he is al- 
 leged to have been negligent is admissible, the authorities are 
 divided. By some of the cases it is held that evidence is rele- 
 vant to show that he is competent and skilful and that no 
 similar accident had ever before happened. 5 The contrary 
 proposition has also been held. 6 
 
 Ackerman, 51 Md. 937 ; 26 Atl. Rep. 3 Skattowe v. Railway Co., 22 Oreg. 
 
 424 ; Hudson v. Chicago Ry. Co., 59 430 ; 30 Pac. Rep. 222 ; Mahaney v. 
 
 Iowa, 581 ; Hatt v. Nay, 144 Mass. 186 ; Railway Co., 108 Mo. 191 ; 18 S. W. 
 
 North Chicago, etc. Co. v. Hudson, Rep. 895; Walker v. Westfield, 39 
 
 44 111. App. 60 ; State v. Raymond, Vt. 246 ; White v. Graves, 107 Mass. 
 
 29 Pac. Rep. 732. Where negligence 325; Sherman v. Kortright, 52 Barb, 
 
 is alleged, evidence that no accident (N. Y.) 267. 
 
 of the nature of that alleged has ever 4 Schulte v. Cunningham, 14 Daly, 
 
 before occurred is irrelevant. Lewis 404 ; Hodges v. Percival, 152 111. 53 ; 
 
 v. Smith, 107 Mass. 334. 23 N. E. Rep. 423 ; Lang v. Sanger, 
 
 i Woodcock v. Worcester, 138 Mass. 76 Wis. 71; 44 N. W. Rep. 1085; 
 268; Bailey v. Trumbull, 31 Conn. Terre Haute R. Co. v. Clem, 123 Ind. 
 581 ; Propson v. Leathern, 80 Wis. 15 ; 23 N. E. Rep. 965. 
 608 ; Leonard v. So. P. Ry. Co., 21 & Toledo, St. L. etc. Co. v. Bailey 
 Oreg. 555; Haley v. Jump River L. (111., 1893), 33 N. E. Rep. 1089; Inter- 
 Co. (Wis., 1892), 51 N. W. Rep. 321. national, etc. Co. v. Kuehn (Tex., 
 Contra, Standard Oil Co. v. Tierney 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 58 ; Railway Co. v. 
 (Ky., 1892), 17 S. W. Rep. 1025 ; For- Selby, 47 Ind. 471 ; Chicago, etc. Co. 
 dyce v. Chaney (Texas, 1893), 21 v. Spelker (Ind., 1893), 33 N. E. Rep. 
 S. W. Rep. 181 ; Thompson v. Rail- 280. 
 
 road Co., 91 Mich. 255 ; 57 N. W. Rep. « Ft. Worth, etc. Co. v. Thompson 
 
 995. (Tex., 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 137 ; Chris- 
 
 2 Salladay v. Dodgeville (Wis., 1893), teusen v. Union Trunk Line (Wash , 
 
 55 N. W. Rep. 696. 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 1018.
 
 20 
 
 KELEVANOY AND PKOVINCE OF JUDGE AND JURY. 
 
 [§9. 
 
 So, generally, collateral facts are relevant where they show 
 the situation or condition of the parties, 1 or identify them, 2 
 or explain the reason or motive that led to a relevant act, 3 
 fix the time or place of a relevant action 4 or show an oppor- 
 tunity for its commission. 5 
 
 § 9. Evidence of intention, motive, good faith, etc., when 
 relevant. — Evidence of facts which are seemingly collateral, 
 and which at first glance appear to have no relevancy to the 
 issue or direct connection with it, is receivable in many cases 
 where the party's intent, knowledge or good faith is a. mate- 
 rial element of a transaction which is proved aliunde* Thus, 
 proof of the possession or of the utterance of forged docu- 
 ments at any time is relevant on the trial of one accused of 
 forgery for the purpose of showing the guilty knowledge or 
 intent of the accused. 7 
 
 1 Woodward v. Buchanan, 5 Q. B. 
 285 ; Mobile, etc. Co. v. Worthington 
 (Ala., 1893), 10 S. Rep. 839; Schu- 
 man v. Expert (Mich., 1893), 51 N. 
 W. Rep. 198; Berry v. Kowatsky 
 (Cat, 1893), 30 Pac. Rep. 202 ; Long 
 v. Straus (Ind., 1890), 24 N. E. Rep. 
 664; Bohrer v. Stump, 31 III. App. 
 139; Com. v. Campbell, 155 Mass. 
 127. 
 
 2 James v. Ford, 9 N. Y. S. 127 ; 
 Edmansen v. Andrews, 35 111. App. 
 223 ; McLane v. State, 30 Tex. App. 
 482; Com. v. Campbell, 155 Mass. 
 127. 
 
 3 Brunei- v. Wade (Iowa, 1892), 51 
 N. W. Rep. 251 ; Weinberg v. Kram, 
 17 N. Y. S. 535; Miller v. State, 68 
 Miss. 221 ; Johnson v. State, 29 Tex. 
 App. 150 ; State v. Hulse, 106 Mo. 41 ; 
 State v. Lentz, 45 Minn. 377. '• The 
 possibility of error goes to the weight 
 of evidence and is not a ground for 
 rejecting it. The spirit of the law 
 permits a resort to every reasonable 
 source of information upon a dis- 
 puted question of fact Unless ex- 
 cluded by some positive exception, 
 everything relative to the issue is ad- 
 missible, and this is extended to every 
 
 hypothesis pertinent to the isoue." 
 Bell v. Brewster, 44 Ohio St. 696, 697. 
 * Rollins v. Clement. 25 S. C. 601 ; 
 Martin v. Victor, etc. Co., 19 Nev. 
 180; Orr Water Ditch, etc. Co. v. 
 Jones, 19 Nev. 60; Beakes v. Da 
 Cunla, 12 N. Y. S. 551 ; 58 PIuu, 609 ; 
 27 N. E. Rep. 251. Evidence of 
 events or acts which are clearly re- 
 membered, or which are notorious, 
 is always relevant to fix the date of 
 a relevant fact which has been for- 
 gotten. Ritter v. First Nat. Bank, 30 
 Mo. App. 652. 
 
 5 State v. Stubbs (N. C, 1S92), 13 S. 
 E. Rep. 90; Eugle v. Smith (Mich., 
 1892), 46 N. W. Rep. 21 ; Dowell v. 
 Guthrie, 99 Mo. 653 ; McCoy v. Tucks, 
 121 Ind. 292; Tabor v. N. Y. E. R. 
 Co., 58 N. Y. Super. Ct. 579; McCul- 
 loch v. Dobson, 133 N. Y. 114; State 
 v. Lentz. 45 Minn. 177. 
 
 6 See § 8. 
 
 7 State v. Minton (Mo., 1893), 22 S. 
 W. Rep. 808 ; Bridge v. Egglestou, 
 14 Mass. 245; Com. v. White, 145 
 Mass. 392; Bottomley v. United 
 States, 1 Story, 143, 144 ; Devere v. 
 State, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. 509 ; Smith v. 
 State (Fla., 1892), 10 S. Rep. 894;
 
 9.] 
 
 KELEVAXCV AND PROVINCE OF JUDGE AND JURY. 
 
 21 
 
 It may be well to remark in this place that the general rule 
 is that facts which are distinct from the fact in issue, but 
 which may resemble it in character, are not relevant to prove 
 or show the probability of the fact in issue. So no one is 
 presumed to bo guilty of crime because he has committed 
 similar though distinct crimes at some other time. 1 
 
 In civil cases the rule is often relaxed to let in seemingly 
 irrelevant facts to strengthen the probability 2 of some doubt- 
 ful fact by showing to the jury that the doubtful fact alleged 
 might have happened, because under circumstances somewhat 
 similar, if not identical, a similar fact actually did happen. 3 
 
 In criminal cases the rule excluding evidence of transac- 
 tions not specifically connected with the fact in issue is very 
 strictly observed. Still it has been held that evidence of other 
 distinct crimes is relevant, not for the purpose of proving di- 
 rectly the act for which the prisoner is on trial, but, that act 
 or transaction being shown by other evidence, evidence of a 
 similar crime will be received as showing or tending to show 
 that the act was done with a criminal intent on the part of 
 the accused. 4 
 
 Com. v. Russell (Mass., 1892), 30 N. 
 E. Rep. 763. Evidence that defend- 
 ant was seen to practice writing the 
 name forged is also relevant. Insur- 
 ance Co. v. Phila. Ry. Co., 11 Pa. Co. 
 Ct. Rep. 482. 
 
 i People v. O'Brien, 96 Cal. 171; 
 Com. v. Saulsbury, 152 Pa. St. 554; 
 Nixon v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. App. 
 205; People v. Drake, 65 Hun, 331; 
 State v. Bronson, 49 Kan. 758 ; State 
 v. Sterrett, 71 Iowa, 386. Cf. State v. 
 Martin, 74 Mo. 547 ; People v. Rogers, 
 71 Cal. 565 ; Kernan v. State, 65 Md. 
 253. " Proof of a general disposition 
 to do a thing is not proof of that 
 thing. Thus, proof of a habit of 
 gambling when drunk is not proof 
 that the person gambled when drunk 
 on a particular day. Nor will proof 
 of a habit of loaning money at 
 usurious interest prove that a loan 
 was made in a particular instance." 
 Thompson v. Bowie, 4 Wall. 471. 
 
 2 "If the evidence relates to the 
 transaction under consideration, or is 
 connected with it and is not too re- 
 mote, it is competent. It is relevant 
 to put in evidence any circumstance 
 that tends to make the proposition at 
 issue more or less improbable." Fee 
 v. Taylor, 83 Ky. 264. 
 
 3 Dwyer v. Bassett, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 
 513. Contra, Hartman v. Evans 
 (W. Va., 1894), 18 S. E. Rep. 810; 
 Palmer v. Hamilton (Ky, 1894), 24 
 S. W. Rep. 613. 
 
 4 Copperman v. People, 56 N. Y. 
 591 : People v. Mead, 50 Mich. 228 ; 
 State v. Myers, 82 Mo. 558 ; People 
 v. Gibbs, 93 N. Y. 473; Kramer v. 
 Com., 87 Pa. St. 299; State v. Stice 
 (Iowa, 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. 17 ; Card 
 v. State, 109 Ind. 420 ; Brown v. State, 
 26 Ohio St. 176 ; State v. Porter (La., 
 1893), 12 S. Rep. 832 ; State v. Place, 
 32 Pac. Rep. 736; 5 Wash. St. 773; 
 Courtney v. State (Ind., 1893), 32 N. E.
 
 22 
 
 RELEVANCY AND PROVINCE OF JUDGE AND JURY. 
 
 [§9- 
 
 The fact of adultery can seldom be proven by direct evi- 
 dence. For this reason proof of acts of adultery prior or 
 subsequent to the act charged, 1 or that the accused associated 
 with prostitutes, 2 is admissible to show the adulterous dis- 
 position and opportunity to commit the offense. 3 
 
 If the intent or good faith of a person is in issue in a civil 
 action, similar acts to those which are alleged may be proven 
 to show the mental state or intention — as, for example, in 
 cases of fraudulent misrepresentations. 4 
 
 The practice of permitting proof of acts or crimes of a 
 similar nature tending to prove knowledge or intention is 
 doubtless partly due to the rule of the common law by which 
 the party was debarred, because of interest, from testifying 
 in his own behalf. This rule being now almost universally 
 abrogated, a party may be called to testify to his intention 5 
 in doing a particular act, and such evidence, though perhaps 
 suspicious because of interest, is relevant and may be taken 
 by the jury for what it is worth. 6 
 
 Rep. 335 ; Mason v. State, 20 S. W. 
 Rep. 564; 31 Tex. Crim. App. 306; 
 Strong v. State (Tex., 1893), 22 S. W. 
 Rep. 680 ; State v. Winton (Mo., 1893), 
 22 S. W. Rep. 808 ; State v. Crawford 
 (S. C, 1893), 17 S. E. Rep. 799; Com. 
 v. Shepherd, 2 Pa. Disk Rep. 345; 
 Smith v. State, 29 Fla. 108 ; Com. v. 
 Russell, 126 Mass. 196. "Where guilty 
 knowledge is an ingredient of a 
 crime, evidence of the commission of 
 other kindred offenses about the same 
 time is admissible as tending to prove 
 that ingredient. Many cases of fraud 
 require the application of the same 
 principle, as fraud involves intent, 
 and intent can be deduced only from 
 a variety of circumstances. Collat- 
 eral facts, each insufficient in itself, 
 whose joint operation tends to sup- 
 port the charge or to disprove it, are 
 then receivable." United States v. 
 Clapboards, 4 Cliff. 303-5. 
 
 i Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113. 
 
 2 Ciocci v. Ciocci, 29 L. T. Pr. & M. 
 60. 
 
 3 State v. Henderson (Iowa, 1892), 
 50 N. W. Rep. 758 ; Burnett v. State, 
 22 S. W. Rep. 47 ; Owens v. State, 10 
 S. Rep. 669; 94 Ala, 97; Thayer v. 
 Thayer, 101 Mass. Ill; Com. v. Cur- 
 tis, 97 Mass. 574. 
 
 4 Continental Ins. Co. v. Insurance 
 Co., 51 Fed. Rep. 884; Kelley v. 
 Owens (Cal„ 1893), 30 Pac. Rep. 596 ; 
 McCasker v. Enright, 64 Vt 488; 
 James v. Work, 24 N. Y. S. 147 ; Dwyer 
 v. Bassett, 21 S. W. Rep. 621 ; 1 Tex. 
 Civ. App. 513; Lawlor v. Fritcher, 54 
 Hun, 586. Contra, McKay v. Rus- 
 sell, 3 Wash. St. 378. The acts must, 
 it seems, be recent Wright v. 
 Wright, 139 Mass. 177. 
 
 5 People v. Baker, 96 N. Y. 340; 
 White v. State, 53 Ind. 595. A wit- 
 ness cannot be permitted to testify 
 that another person intended to do a 
 certain act. Kenyon v. Luther, 4 N. 
 Y. S. 498 ; 10 id 951 ; Cihak v. Kleke, 
 117 111. 643. 
 
 6 Gardom v. Woodward, 44 Kan. 
 758 ; Stearns v, Gosselin, 58 Vt. 38 ;
 
 § 9.] KELEVANCY AND PROVINCE OF JUDGE AND JURY. 23 
 
 The competency of the party as a witness has, on the other 
 hand, rendered proof of surrounding circumstances to show 
 knowledge, motive or intention by inference much more im- 
 portant than formerly, in view of the tendency of an interested 
 party to color the facts in his own favor. Evidence of circum- 
 stances is relevant in every instance to show the presence of a 
 motive or of good or bad faith, or to prove that a party made 
 preparations, i. <?., intended to do any act which is itself rele- 
 vant. 1 So in prosecutions for crime the purchase or collecting of 
 murderous instruments or burglarious tools, the going to the 
 place of the crime, the disguising of oneself, and on a trial for 
 arson the prior insurance of the property, are relevant facts. 2 
 So evidence of the behavior of a party subsequent to an act is 
 relevant to show that his behavior is such as would be natural 
 under the supposition that the act had been committed. 3 Thus, 
 in a criminal trial, evidence that the accused had attempted 
 to escape, 4 or was in possession of tools to effect an escape, 5 
 or was living under an assumed name, 6 or that he told a false- 
 hood in denying the crime, 7 is relevant. But the mere fact 
 that defendant left the county is not relevant unless it appears 
 that he did so to avoid arrest. 8 Nor can it be shown that de- 
 fendant offered to surrender himself to the authorities. 9 
 
 In the trial of an indictment for murder the prosecution 
 may introduce evidence of the former altercations, previous 
 threats and menacing declarations of the prisoner against the 
 deceased, to show the former's malice, or, if long prior to the 
 killing, to show his premeditation — such evidence being rele- 
 
 Jefferds v. Alvord, 151 Mass. 95 ; 8 BanfieM v. Whipple, 10 Allen, 29 ; 
 
 Wilson v. Clark (Ind., 1892), 27 N. E. Furnis v. Durgin, 119 Mass. 500. 
 
 Rep. 310. < State v. Palmer, 65 N. H. 216 ; 
 
 i State v. Brown, 75 Me. 456 ; Cres- Baker v. Com. (Ky., 1892), 17 S. W. 
 
 well v. State, 14 Tex. App. 1 ; Aaron Rep. 625 ; Ryan v. State, 84 Wis. 368 ; 
 
 v. State, 31 Ga 167 ; Ten Eyck v. Wit- Com. v. McMahon, 145 Pa. St. 413. 
 
 beck, 69 Hun, 450; McCarthy v. 5 state v. Duncan (Mo., 1893), 22 
 
 Gallegher, 4 Misc. Rep. 188 ; Com. v. S. W. Rep. 699. 
 
 Hudson, 97 Mass. 565; Kelsoe v. e State v. Whitson, 111 N. C. 695. 
 
 State, 47 Ala. 573 ; Garber v. State, 4 ' State v. Bradley, 64 Vt 466. 
 
 Cold. (Tenn.) 161, 165; Foster v. estate v. Marshall (Mo., 1893), 22 
 
 Dickinson, 64 Vt 233 ; 24 Atl. Rep. S. W. Rep. 45. 
 
 253. 9 State v. Johnston, 94 Ala. 35 ; Peo- 
 
 2 Whart Cr. Ev., §753. pie v. Rathbun, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 518 (refusal to escape irrelevant).
 
 24 
 
 RELEVANCY AND PROVINCE OF JUDGE AND JURY. [§ 10. 
 
 vant to show the prisoner's mental state. 1 And in a prosecution 
 for homicide, evidence that after the homicide the accused 
 was nervous, excited 2 or preoccupied, 3 or was silent when 
 accused of the crime, 4 or manifested a lack of feeling at the 
 death of deceased where great sorrow would naturally be 
 expected, 5 is relevant. 
 
 § 10. Collateral facts bearing on character. — Evidence of 
 the general character or reputation of the parties is always 
 irrelevant in civil causes, except in cases where general char- 
 acter is involved in the issue on account of the peculiar nature 
 of the cause of action. 6 Even where the character for chastity 
 of a wife or daughter is concerned, in an action brought to 
 recover for her seduction, evidence of her general moral 
 character is inadmissible, though evidence of facts tending to 
 prove her previous chastity or lack thereof is relevant, 7 
 provided they occurred prior to the offense charged. 8 In a 
 
 1 Harrison v. State, 79 Ala. 29 ; State 
 
 v. Bradley, 64 Vt. 466; Hardy v. 
 State, 31 Tex. C. Rep. 289 ; Pitman v. 
 State, 22 Ark. 354; State v. Hoyt, 
 47 Conn. 518 ; State v. Green, 1 Houst. 
 Cr. Cas. (Del.) 217 ; Dixon v. State, 13 
 Fla. 636 ; Everett v. State, 62 Ga. 65 ; 
 State v. Walsh, 44 La. Ann. ^1122; 
 Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 550 ; State 
 v. McCahill, 72 Iowa, 111 ; Reily v. 
 Com. (Ky., 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 222; 
 State v. Bird well, 36 La. Ann. 859; 
 Riggs v. State, 30 Miss. 635 ; State v. 
 Partlow, 90 Mo. 608 ; State v. Hymer, 
 15 Nev. 49; Pittman v. State (Ga., 
 1893), 17 S. E. Rep. 856 ; State v. Rash, 
 12 Ired. (N. C.) L. 382; Minims v. 
 State, 16 Ohio St 221 ; Hopkins v. 
 Com., 50 Pa, St. 9 ; May v. State (Ga., 
 1893), 17 S. E. Rep. 108; Wilson v. 
 State, 30 Fla. 234 ; Benedict v. State. 
 14 Wis. 423; People v. Curtis, 52 
 Mich. 616; State v. Downs, 91 Mo. 
 19 ; State v. Taylor, 44 La. Ann. 783 ; 
 11 S. Rep. 132; Hall v. State, 31 Tex. 
 C. Rep. 565. 
 
 2 State v. Baldwin, 36 Kan. 1; 
 Miller v. State, 18 Tex. 232. 
 
 3 Noftsinger v. State, 7 Tex. App. 
 301. 
 * State v. Reed, 62 Me. 129. 
 
 5 Greenfield v. People, 85 N. Y. 75. 
 
 6 Fowler v. Insurance Co.. 6 Cowen, 
 673, 675 ; Halley v. Gregg (Iowa, 1891), 
 48 N. W. Rep. 974 ; Dudley v. Mo 
 Cluer, 65 Mo. 241 ; Home Lumber 
 Co. v. Hartman, 45 Mo. App. 647 
 McCarty v. Leary, 118 Mass. 509 
 Scruggs v. State, 15 S. W. Rep. 1074 
 90 Tenn. 81 ; Goldsmith v. Picard, 27 
 Ala. 142; Porter v. Seiler, 23 Pa. St. 
 424 ; Corning v. Corning, 6 N. Y. 97 ; 
 Thompson v. Brown, 4 Wall. 471 ; 
 Leary v. Leary, 18 Ga. 696; Wright 
 v. McKee, 37 Vt. 161. See 1 Greenl. 
 on Evid., § 54. 
 
 "State v. Curran, 51 Iowa, 112; 
 Badder v. Kiefer, 91 Mich. 611; 52 
 N. W. Rep. 60 ; State v. Eckler, 106 
 Mo. 585 ; Sho waiter v. Bergman, 23 
 N. E. Rep. 686. 
 
 s Clifton v. Granger (Iowa, 1893), 
 53 N. W. Rep. 316 ; Hallock v. Kinney 
 (Mich., 1892), 51 N. W. Rep. 706. 
 Evidence of plaintiff's adultery with 
 others than defendant is irrelevant. 
 Morris v. State, 31 Tex. App. 597.
 
 § 10.] RELEVANCY AND PROVINCE OF JUDGE AND JURY. 25 
 
 criminal prosecution for rape or for an indecent assault, the 
 prior chastity of the prosecuting witness is a material fact, and 
 evidence of previous acts of unchastity, committed with the 
 accused but with no other man, is relevant. 1 But evidence 
 that the prosecuting witness had a bad reputation for chastit} r 
 or was unchaste is irrelevant. 2 
 
 "Whether or not an allegation of fraud in a civil action to 
 recover damages for a tort puts the character of a party in 
 issue to the extent that general evidence of good character is 
 relevant depends more upon the nature of the action than 
 upon the character or form of the charge of fraud. It was 
 formerly held that where a person is charged with construct- 
 ive fraud, evidence of his good character is relevant to 
 rebut the presumption. 3 This rule is limited to cases where 
 intention is sought to be proven circumstantially, and does 
 not apply where the allegation of fraud is merely formal, or, 
 in other words, where from the nature of the action reputa- 
 tion is not actually and necessarily drawn in issue. 4 If the 
 plaintiff bases his cause of action upon an injury to his general 
 reputation or character, as he does in an action to recover 
 damages for malicious prosecution or false imprisonment, or 
 in an action of slander or libel, his reputation becomes mate- 
 rial in view of the alleged damage it has received. Then evi- 
 dence is relevant that plaintiff's general reputation was bad 
 prior to the alleged injury, and this fact, if proved, should be 
 considered by the jury in mitigation of damages. It is very 
 unlikely that a man or woman of bad reputation would re- 
 ceive the same injury as one of an unblemished life and high 
 moral standing. 5 "Where a peculiar trait of character is in 
 
 i State v. Cassidy (Iowa, 1892), 52 456. See, contra, Gough v. St. John, 
 
 N. W. Eep. 1; State v. Patrick (Mo., 16 Wend. 646; Pratt v. Andrew, 4 
 
 1892), 17 S. W. Rep. 666 ; O'Blenis v. N. Y. 493. Cf. Porter v. Seiler, 23 
 
 State, 47 N. J. L. 279 ; Com. v. Ken- Pa. St. 324. 
 
 dall, 113 Mass. 210. 4 Nash v. Gilkerson, 5 S. & R. 352 : 
 
 2 Fry v. Com., 82 Va. 334; Linecum Anderson v. Long, 10 id. 55; Porter 
 v. State, 29 Tex. App. 328 ; People v. v. Seiler, 23 Pa. St. 424 ; Zitzer v. 
 McLean, 71 Mich. 309. Merkel, 24 Pa. St. 408 ; Givens v. 
 
 3 1 Greenl. on Evid., §§ 54, 55, citing Bradley, 3 Bibb, 192; Gregory v. 
 Ruan v. Perry, 3 Caines, 120 ; Fowler Thomas, 2 id. 286, cited in 1 Greenl. 
 v. Insurance Co., 6 Cowen, 675 ; on Evid., § 55. 
 
 Townsend v. Graves, 3 Paige, 455, 5 As to malicious prosecution, see
 
 26 
 
 RELEVANCY AND PROVINCE OF JUDGE AND JURY. [§ 10. 
 
 issue, as, for example, a person's habitual disregard of his 
 financial obligations or his skill in the management of the af- 
 fairs intrusted to him, evidence of reputation bearing upon 
 these particular personal qualifications becomes relevant. 1 
 But evidence of reputation is always required, and proof of 
 particular immoral acts or any specific bad conduct cannot be 
 relevant to show character. 2 
 
 In prosecutions for crime the defendant may always give 
 or offer evidence of his previous good character and peaceable 
 disposition as relevant to rebut any presumption of criminal 
 intent which may arise from the circumstances against him. 3 
 The good character of defendant, however, cannot be attacked 
 or impeached by the state in the first instance; but where he 
 attempts to prove good character, evidence of his general bad 
 character, but not of any specific or particular vicious or crim- 
 inal act, becomes relevant in rebuttal. 4 
 
 Gee v. Culver, 13 Oreg. 598; Mclntire 
 v. Levering, 148 Mass. 546 ; Blizzard 
 v. Hays, 46 Ind. 166 ; Israel v. Brooks, 
 23 id. 575 ; Finley v. St. Louis Ref. 
 Co., 99 Mo. 559. Libel and slander, 
 see Insurance Co. v. Hazen, 110 Pa. 
 St. 537 ; Treat v. Brown, 4 Conn. 408 ; 
 Nelson v. Wallace, 48 Mo. App. 193 ; 
 Sanford v. Rowley, 93 Mich. 119; 
 Hallam v. Post, 55 Fed. Rep. 456; 
 Morey v. Morning Journal, 123 N. Y. 
 207 ; Jones v. Duchow, 87 Cal. 109. 
 
 1 Buswell v. Trimmer, 144 Mass. 
 350; Monahan v. Worcester, 150 id. 
 440; Hatt v. Nay, 144 id. 186. 
 
 -Leonard v. Allen, 11 Cush. 241, 
 245; State v. Donellon, 13 La. 1292; 
 Frazier v. Railroad, 38 Pa. St. 104; 
 Nelson v. State (Fla,, 1893), 13 S. Rep. 
 361. 
 
 3 Hindi v. State, 25 Ga. 699 ; War- 
 ren v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. App. 573; 
 Dupree v. State, 33 Ala 380 ; State v. 
 Cross, 68 Iowa, 180 ; Wesley v. State, 
 37 Miss. 327 ; Stephens v. People, 4 
 Park. Cr. Cas. (N. Y.) 396 ; People v. 
 Harrison, 93 Mich. 594; Murphy v. 
 People, 9 Colo. 435 ; McCarty v. Peo- 
 
 ple, 51 111. 231 ; Hall v. State, 132 Ind. 
 317; State v. Dumphy, 4 Minn. 438; 
 State v. Grate, 68 Mo. 22 ; Warren v^ 
 Com., 37 Pa. St. 45 ; Walker v. State, 
 102 Ind. 502 ; State v. Parks, 109 N. C. 
 813; State v. Sterritte, 68 Iowa, 761; 
 McDauiel v. State, 16 Miss. (8 Smed. 
 & M.) 40-1; State v. Schleagel, 50 
 Kan. 225 ; People v. Stewart, 28 Cal. 
 395 ; People v. Mills, 94 Md. 630 ; State 
 v. Moelschen, 53 Iowa, 310 ; People v. 
 Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9 ; Thomas v. Peo- 
 ple, 6i? N. Y. 218 ; Gibson v. State, 23 
 Tex. App. 414; Carr v. State (Ind., 
 1893), 34 N. E. Rep. 593; Cathcart v. 
 Com., 37 Pa. St. 108; Hopps v. Peo- 
 ple, 31 111. 385. The rule that a de- 
 fendant may introduce evidence of 
 good character has been sometimes 
 confined in its operation to those 
 crimes the commission of which in- 
 volves moral turpitude and not mere 
 statutory offenses not malum in se. 
 Com. v. Nagle (Mass., 1893), 32 N. E. 
 Rep. 861. 
 
 * State v. Merrill, 2 Dev. (N. C.) L 
 269 ; Spies v. People (Anarchist Case), 
 122 111. 1 ; Gibson v. State, 23 Tex.
 
 §11- 
 
 RELEVANCY AND PROVINCE OF JUDGE AM) .11 lev. 
 
 27 
 
 In a trial for homicide, evidence that the deceased was re- 
 puted to be of a peaceable disposition is irrelevant, unless in 
 rebuttal, where the defense alleges his quarrelsome character. 1 
 But evidence of the character of the deceased, to show that he 
 was quarrelsome, turbulent and vindictive, or the reverse, is 
 admissible in behalf of the prisoner under a plea of self-defense, 
 but only where the evidence as to this main fact is contradict- 
 ory and it is not conclusively shown that defendant was 
 solely in fault. 2 
 
 § 11. Province of judge and jury. — The main question in- 
 volved, so far as the evidence is concerned, where an issue of 
 
 App. 414; State v. Ellwood, 17 R. I. 
 763; Felsenthal v. State, 30 Tex. 
 App. 675. "The old rule that evi- 
 dence of the good character of the 
 defendant is not to be considered un- 
 less other evidence leaves the mind 
 in doubt has been much criticised. 
 The weight of authority is now 
 against it. If evidence of reputation 
 is admissible at all, its weight should 
 be left to be determined by the jury 
 in connection with all the other evi- 
 dence in the case. The circumstances 
 may be such that an established rep- 
 utation for good character, if it is 
 relevant to the issue, would alone 
 create reasonable doubt, although 
 without it the other evidence would 
 be convincing." Commonwealth v. 
 Leonard, 140 Mass. 470, 479. 
 
 i Pound v. State, 43 Ga. 88 ; Roten 
 v. State (Fla., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 910 ; 
 Russell v. State, 11 Tex. App. 288; 
 Thomas v. People, 67 N. Y. 218 ; State 
 v. Hockett, 70 Iowa, 442 ; People v. 
 Bezy, 67 Cal. 223; Riley v. Com. 
 (Ky., 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 222 ; State 
 v. Hogue, 6 Jones (N. C), 381 ; Chase 
 v. State, 46 Miss. 683 ; State v. Pearce, 
 15 Nev. 188 ; Bowman v. Smith (Tex., 
 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 48; Fields v. 
 State (Ind., 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 780. 
 
 2 Perry v. State, 94 Ala. 25 ; West 
 v. State, 12 Tex. App. 640 ; Bond v. 
 State, 12 Fla. 738; Roten v. State 
 
 (Fla., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 910 ; State v. 
 Graham, 61 Iowa, 608; Alexander v. 
 Com., 105 Pa. St. 1 ; Marts v. State, 
 26 Ohio St. 162; People v. Harris 
 (Mich., 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 645; 
 State v. Downs, 91 Mo. 19 ; Smith v. 
 State (Tex., 1893), 20 S. W. Rep. 831 ; 
 Reiley v. Com. (Ky., 1893), 22 S. W. 
 Rep. 222 ; State v. Mathews, 78 N. C. 
 523; State v. Pearce, 15 Nev. 188; 
 Com. v. Strasser, 153 Pa. St 431; 
 Harrison v. Com., 79 Va. 374 ; State 
 v. Nett, 50 Wis. 524 ; State v. Taylor, 
 44 La. Ann. 783 ; May v. People, 8 
 Colo. 210 ; Drake v. State, 75 Ga. 413 ; 
 State v. Kenion (R. I., 1893), 26 Atl. 
 Rep. 199. For evidence of a threat 
 made by the victim against the ac- 
 cused to be admissible, it is generally 
 but not universally held that it should 
 have been communicated to him if 
 he alleges that his actions were in- 
 fluenced by it. People v. Scoggins, 
 37 Cal. 683. But evidence of specific 
 acts of violence is not admissible. 
 Campbell v. State, 38 Ark. 498 ; Peo- 
 ple v. Druse, 103 N. Y. 655 ; Nelson 
 v. State (Fla., 1893), 13 S. Rep. 361 ; 
 Fields v. State (Ind., 1893), 32 N. E. 
 Rep. 780. So where the defense is 
 that the deceased committed suicide, 
 evidence of his melancholy disposi- 
 tion is relevant Blackburn v. State, 
 23 Ohio St 146.
 
 2S RELEVANCY AND PROVINCE OF JUDGE AND JURY. [§ 11. 
 
 fact is tried by the court without a jury, must be its weight 
 and sufficiency. Under such circumstances no question of ad- 
 missibility can arise, — the judge in any event having to hear 
 or read it. Of course the relevancy of the testimony is always 
 to be considered whether the trial is by jury or not; but 
 where a jury is present, it is the office of the judge to deter- 
 mine all questions of admissibility, basing his decision to a 
 large extent upon the relevancy of the testimony offered to 
 the point in issue. 1 
 
 The weight to be given to the evidence and the credibility 
 of the witnesses, in all cases where upon the testimony an 
 issue of fact appears to arise, are for the consideration of the 
 jury alone. 2 "But whether there is any evidence is a question 
 for the judge ; whether it is sufficient evidence is for the jury." 3 
 
 If the evidence offered by the party upon whom the burden 
 of proof rests is clear, distinct and uncontradicted, so that no 
 inference need be drawn, or where only one inference can be 
 possibly drawn by any reasonable man, and the other party 
 offers no evidence or fails to prove one or more material 
 points of his defense, it becomes the duty of the court to 
 direct the jury to find a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.* 
 
 1 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 49. brook v. Howell, 34 III. App. 571 ; 
 
 2 Campbell v. State (Tex., 1893), 18 Wessels v. Beeman, 87 Mich. 481 ; 
 S. W. Rep. 409; State v. Jones, 44 Chicago, etc. R R. Co. v. Fisher (111., 
 La. Ann. 1120; State v. Plum, 49 1892). 31 N. E. Rep. 400; Didier v. 
 Kan. 679; People v. Zormeck, 66 Penn. Co., 146 Pa. St. 582; 23 A tl. Rep. 
 Hnn, 626; State v. Mexley(Mo., 1893), 801 ; Johnson v. People, 140 111. 350; 
 22 S. W. Rep. 575; Jackson v. Times, 29 N. E. Rep. 895; Webster v. Frow- 
 152 Pa. St. 406; White v. State, 21 ler, 50 N. W. Rep. 1074; 89 Mich. 303; 
 Tex. App. 339 ; State v. Mounts, 106 East Tenn. etc. Co. v. Markens, 88 
 Mo. 226 ; State v. Kibling, 63 Vt Ga. 60 ; Kansas, etc. Co. v. Ryan, 49 
 636 ; People v. Minaugh, 131 N. Y. Kan. 1 ; 30 Pac. Rep. 108 ; Leiber v. 
 563; Blankenship v. State, 55 Ark. Chicago, M. & St. P. Co. (Iowa, 18921, 
 244 ; People v. Cowgill, 93 Cal. 596 ; 50 N. W. Rep. 547 ; Albertsen v. 
 Newberry v. State (Fla., 1890), 8 S. Terry, 109 N. C. 8; Williams v. Dick- 
 Rep. 445 ; Weston v. Brown (Neb, enson, 28 Fla. 90 ; Conde v. Wiltsic, 
 1890), 46 N. W. Rep. 826 ; Louisville, 131 N. Y. 647. See post, § 342a. 
 etc. Co. v. Stommel, 126 Ind. 35; 3 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 49. 
 Henderson v. Miller, 36 111. App. 232; 4 Sauber v. Collins, 40 111. App. 
 Stanley v. Montgomery, 102 Ind. 102; 426; Piano Mfg. Co. v. Parmenrer, 
 Davis v. Hays, 89 Ala. 563; Higgin- 39 111. App. 270; Wolff v. Campbell, 
 botlinm v. Campbell, 85 Ga. 638; Yost 110 Mo. 114; 19 S. W. Rep. 622; 
 v. Mensch, 27 W. N. C. 562 ; West- Meyer v. Houck, 52 N. W. Rep. 235 ;
 
 §11.] 
 
 RELEVANCY AND PliOVIXCK OF JL'DGK AND JURY. 
 
 20 
 
 On the other hand, where the party on whom is cast the 
 burden of proof fails to substantiate his allegations by evi- 
 dence showing that he has in law a prima facie cause of action, 
 then there is no case for the jury, and it is the duty of the judge 
 to direct a nonsuit. 1 
 
 The question of the power of the jury to determine ques- 
 tions of law, though much discussed, may now be considered 
 settled. 2 It is a proposition of almost universal acceptance 
 that in all cases, both civil and criminal (except where a con- 
 trary rule is laid down by some constitutional or statutory 
 enactment), 3 the power of the jury is confined to determining 
 the issue of fact, and that the rulings of the judge on the 
 principles and rules of law involved are to be received by 
 them as obligatory and to be implicitly followed. 4 The pre- 
 
 McMullen v. Carsen, 48 Kan. 263; 
 29 Pac. Eep. 317 ; Fitzgerald v. Hart, 
 17 S. W. Rep. 369 ; Gildersleeve v. 
 Atkinson (N. M., 1892), 27 Pac. Rep. 
 477; Schmidt v. Garfield Nat. Bank, 
 19 N. Y. S. 252 : 64 Hun. 298 ; Fox v. 
 Spring L. Co., 89 Mich. 387 ; Haugen 
 v. G, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (S. D., 1893), 
 53 N. W. Rep. 769; Eisenlord v. 
 Cluni. 67 Hun, 518. See post, §§ 247- 
 250. 
 
 1 " Where the facts are undisputed 
 their effect is for the judgment of the 
 court. Where different minds may 
 honestly draw different conclusions 
 from the facts, as where care and 
 negligence is to be inferred, the ques- 
 tion is for the jury." Sioux City, etc. 
 R. Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 663 ; Still- 
 water v. Archer, 18 N. Y. S. 888; 
 Candelaria v. Railroad Co. (N. M., 
 1892), 27 Pac. Rep. 497 ; Leavitt v. 
 Dodge, 61 Hun, 627 ; Johnson v. Ridir 
 (Iowa, 1892), 50 N. W. Rep. 36 ; Rum- 
 sey v. Boutwell, 61 Hun, 165; Col- 
 lins v. Burlington, etc. Co., 83 Iowa, 
 346 ; 49 N. W. Rep. 848 ; Central R 
 etc. Co. v. Ingram (Ala., 1892), 10 S. 
 Rep. 516. 
 
 2 For an outline of the discussion, 
 see 1 Greenl. Evid., § 49. 
 
 3 See Goldman v. State (Md., 1892), 
 23 Atl. Rep. 1097; Blaker v. State, 29 
 N. E. Rep. 1077 ; 130 Ind. 203. By 
 the constitution of many of the states 
 it is expressly provided that in prose- 
 cutions for libel the jury, under the 
 direction of the courfc, shall deter- 
 mine the law and the facts. Latly 
 v. Emeiy, 59 Hun, 237; State v. 
 Armstrong (Mo., 1891), 16 S. W. Rep. 
 604 ; State v. Burpee (Vt., 1893), 25 
 Atl. Rep. 964. 
 
 4 People v. Lem Yon (Cat, 1893), 
 32 Pac. Rep. 11; Wright v. Fonda, 
 44 Mo. App. 634 ; Sherwood v. Chi- 
 cago, etc. Co., 88 Mich. 108 ; Daven- 
 port v. Hannibal, 108 Mo. 471 : 18 S. 
 W. Rep. 1122; Richards v. Wede- 
 meyer, 75 Md. 10; Gallon v. Van 
 Wormer (Tex., 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 
 547 ; Kidwell v. Carson (Tex., 1893), 
 22 id. 534 ; Harper v. Morse (Mo., 1893), 
 21 id. 517 ; Chandler v. Knott (Iowa, 
 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 88 ; Willard v. 
 Siegel, 47 Mo. App. 1 ; Chicago Ch. 
 Co. v. Fogg, 53 Fed. Rep. 72 ; Elliott 
 v. Wanamaker, 155 Pa. St. 67 ; Camp- 
 bell v. Juimies, 3 Misc. R. 316; 
 Simpson v. Pegram (N. C, 1893), 17 
 S. E. Rep. 430. As bearing upon the 
 right of the jury to decide questions
 
 30 RELEVANCY AND PROVINCE OF JUDGE AND JURY. [§ 11. 
 
 liminary question, whether there is adequate or sufficient evi- 
 dence, where evidence is given on both sides from which an 
 inference either way may be drawn, is for the judge; and if 
 there is such evidence, no matter how contradictory on the 
 whole it may seem to him, it will be his duty to send the case 
 to the jury. 1 ]STow the inquiry, is there fit or sufficient evi- 
 dence to send the case to the jury, can only be decided by the 
 judge by the employment and application of legal rules; and 
 the main question is, are there any facts in evidence which, if 
 uncontradicted or proved, would justify men of ordinary rea- 
 son, intelligence and fairness in deciding in favor of plaintiff? 
 Though the judge may be convinced that plaintiff has not 
 proved his case, if he believes that reasonable men may enter- 
 tain a different conclusion, or draw a different inference 
 from those facts, then it is his duty to submit them to the 
 jury; and so long as the inference drawn by the jury is fair 
 and reasonable, it will be valid even though contrary to the 
 conclusion which the judge may draw. 2 But the court in 
 charging the jury should not assume facts as proved upon 
 which no evidence was offered or to which the evidence is so 
 contradictory that reasonable men may form different opin- 
 ions thereon. 3 Where, however, the fact is conceded by all 
 
 of law, see Pierce's Case, 13 N. H. be some evidence to sustain every 
 
 536; State v. Hodge, 50 N. H. 510; element of the case competent both 
 
 Com. v. McManus, 143 Pa. St. 64; in quality and quantity in law to 
 
 People v. Pine, 2 Barb. 566 ; Brown sustain it, and yet it may be met by 
 
 v. Com. (Va., 1890), 10 S. E. Rep. 745 ; countervailing proof so potent as to 
 
 Com. v. Abbott, 13 Mete. 123, 124 ; leave no reasonable doubt of the op- 
 
 Higginbotham v. Campbell, 43 Mo. posing conclusion." Metropolitan R 
 
 App. i76; Cochran v. Jones, 85 Ga. Co. v. Moore, 121 U. S. 567-569. 
 
 678. The province of the court and 2 "The jury should take the law as 
 
 jury is frequently defined by statute, laid down by the court and give it 
 
 as, for example, in Connecticut, full effect, but its application is for 
 
 Morehouse v. Remsen, 59 Conn. 392. them to determine. The court may 
 
 1 " Strictly speaking, evidence is not enter their distinctive province, 
 
 insufficient in law only when there These are the check and balance 
 
 is a total absence of such proof in which give to trial by jury its value." 
 
 quantity or kind as, in the particular Hickman v. Jones, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 
 
 case, a rule of law requires as essen- 201-2. See post, § 377. 
 
 tial to the establishment of the fact. 3 Wright v. Fonda, 44 Mo. App. 634 ; 
 
 Insufficiency in point of fact may Griel v. Lomax, 94 Ala. 641 ; Newton 
 
 exist where there is no insufficiency v. State (Miss., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 560; 
 
 in point of law ; that is, there may Patrick v. Skoman (Colo., 1892), 29
 
 § 11.] BELEVANOY AND PROVINCE OF JUDGE AND JUET. 31 
 
 parties, or, being proved, is not disputed, it is not an invasion 
 of the province of the jury for the court to state that fact as 
 true in its charge. 1 The jury must, in the rendition of their 
 verdict, determine the whole issue, involving, as it may, ques- 
 tions of law as well as of fact. In pursuance of this duty as 
 jurors, and having in view their oaths as such, they may dis- 
 regard any and all expression of opinion on the part of the 
 judge upon any questions of fact and decide adverse to such 
 opinion, provided their decision is not contrary to the evi- 
 dence. On the other hand it is not only the right, but the 
 duty, of the presiding judge to instruct the jury regarding 
 all points' of law involved, and it is the duty of the jury to 
 receive and observe these instructions and to make their ver- 
 dict conform thereto. So though the weight, sufficiency and 
 credit to be given to the evidence are exclusively a matter for 
 the jury, the court may express its opinion as regards the 
 character of the evidence, provided it is done in such a way 
 that the province of the jury as triers of the issue of fact is 
 not invaded. When, after a proper instruction as to the prin- 
 ciples and rules of law concerned, the jury wholly disregard 
 the evidence and the rules of law, the court may set their ver- 
 dict aside as against the weight of the evidence and as not 
 conformable to the law. 2 
 
 The court may call attention to the remarks of counsel in 
 connection with the evidence ; 3 may caution the jury to be 
 slow in rejecting evidence, 4 or may point out how the inten- 
 tion of a party should be proved ; 5 may call attention to the 
 gravity of the offense with which the prisoner is charged, 6 or 
 define malice, or point out the fact that a criminal intent may 
 
 Pac. Rep. 21 ; Chicago, etc. Co. v. 263 ; Taylor v. Taylor, 79 Tex. 104 ; 
 
 Remminger, 140 111. 334 ; State v. Trinity, etc. Co. v. Lane, 79 id. 648 ; 
 
 Hope, 102 Mo. 410; Hitchcock v. McGuire v. Railroad Co., 43 Mo. A pp. 
 
 Thayer, 32 Neb. 477; 49 N. W. Rep. 354; Bragg v. Bletz, 7 D. C. 105; 
 
 374; St Louis v. Trimble, 54 Ark. Long v. Milford, 137 Pa. St 122. 
 
 354; 15 S. W. Rep. 899; Potts v. 2 See post, § 377. 
 
 Jones, 140 Pa. St. 48 ; Dulaney v. St. 3 Griffin, etc. Co. v. Joannes, 80 
 
 Louis S. R. Co., 42 Mo. App. 659; Wis. 601. 
 
 Horn v. State (Tex., 1893), 13 S. Rep. 4 Lyts v. Keevey, 5 Wash. St 606. 
 
 329; Townley v. Coal Co., 59 Hun, » Tyler v. Hall, 106 Mo. 313. 
 
 646. estate v. Mcintosh (S. C, 1893), 17 
 
 i Mooney v. York Iron Co., 82 Mich. S. E. Rep. 446.
 
 52 RELEVANCY AND TROVINCE OF JUDGE AND JURY. [§ 11. 
 
 be inferred from circumstantial evidence, 1 or may suggest that 
 certain evidence is uncorroborated; 2 may suggest possible ex- 
 planations of seeming discrepancies in the evidence and show 
 how that which is inconsistent may be reconciled ; 3 may state 
 to the jury that what a party admits against his interest on 
 the witness stand may be considered as true; 4 may call atten- 
 tion to the necessity of a jury agreeing upon a verdict; 5 may 
 state a hypothetical case for the guidance of the jury and to 
 emphasize more clearly the principles of law involved. 6 But 
 to state certain facts as testified to, ignoring all others, and 
 to inform the jury that from those facts they have a right to 
 draw a certain inference, is an invasion of the province of the 
 jury. 7 On the other hand, the law does not require the in- 
 structions on the evidence to be entirely colorless, so far as 
 the opinion as to the credibility of evidence is concerned, if the 
 whole case is submitted to the jury to decide on all the facts 
 and the law is accurately stated. A mere hint of an opinion 
 upon the evidence by the court, or his evident leaning to one 
 party or the other, is not enough to warrant a new trial. 8 So 
 the court may aid the jury by recapitulating the evidence, re- 
 freshing their minds where their recollection is likely to be dim, 
 elucidating that which is complicated and involved, and so 
 advising them that they may be able to take a just and im- 
 partial view of all parts of the evidence in their true re- 
 lations. 9 
 
 1 State v. Mcintosh, supra. Y. 420 ; McGee v. Wells (S. C, 1893), 
 
 2 People v. Rohl, 138 N. Y. 616. 16 S. E. Rep. 89; Hoff v. State (Ga., 
 
 3 York v. Maine R. Co., 84 N. Y 17. 1893), 16 S. E. Rep. 99 ; State v. 
 
 4 State v. Brooks, 99 Mo. 137; 12 S. Crawford (S. C, 1893), 17 S. E. Rep. 
 IV. Rep. 633. 199. 
 
 5 State v. Hawkins, 18 Oreg. 476 ; 23 » " What is said by the court as to 
 Pac. Rep. 475. the weight of evidence is advisory, 
 
 6 Ohio, etc. Co. v. Kleinsmith, 38 in nowise intended to fetter the exer- 
 111. App. 45; People v. Rohl, 138 N. cise of the jui-or's independent iudg- 
 Y. 616; Cobb v. Covenant Ins. Co., ment. With this limitation it is the 
 153 Mass. 176; Wright v. Mulvaney, right and duty of the court to aid 
 '78 Wis. 89. them by recalling the testimony to 
 
 'i Peters v. Bourneau, 22 111. App. their recollection, by collecting its 
 
 177 ; State v. Choy, 84 Cal. 276. details, by suggesting grounds of 
 
 8 McClain v. Com., 110 Pa. St 263 ; 1 preference where there is contradic- 
 
 Atl. Rep. 45 ; People v. McLean, 184 tion, by directing their attention to 
 
 Cal. 480 ; Hurlbut v. Hurlbut, 128 N. the most important facts, by elimi-
 
 § 12.] RELEVANCY AND PROVINCE OF JUDGE AND JURY. 33 
 
 § 12. Blended questions of law and fact. — The rule that 
 pure questions of law and of fact are for the solution of the 
 judge and jury respectively is on some occasions difficult of 
 application, because of the blending of these questions in one 
 issue in such a manner that they are not easily susceptible of 
 separate determination. In an action for a malicious prose- 
 cution, the question of the existence of probable cause is for 
 the court. In other words, where the evidence is conflicting 
 it is for the court to say what particular facts constitute prob- 
 able cause, leaving it for the jury to find whether or not such 
 facts are proved by the evidence. 1 Perhaps the most impor- 
 tant subject concerning which the respective provinces of the 
 judge and the jury have been discussed is that of the reason- 
 ableness of time or of a person's care or skill under certain 
 circumstances. The correct practice in all cases where negli- 
 gence is alleged is for the judge to instruct the jury upon the 
 amount or nature of the care, diligence or skill which may be 
 ilegally incumbent upon persons in the circumstances of the 
 defendant, 2 leaving it for the jury to determine, in all cases 
 where the evidence on this point is contradictory, what the 
 circumstances were, and whether the defendant has properly 
 exercised the required care, skill or diligence. The degree of 
 reasonableness of the care is ordinarily defined in general 
 terms, and the instruction amounts usually to a mere state- 
 ment that negligence consists in doing or omitting to do an 
 act which a person of ordinary care or skill would or would 
 not do under the circumstances. 3 This instruction would be 
 
 nating the true points of inquiry, by Pa. St 458 ; Boogher v. Howe, 99 
 
 resolving the evidence, however com- Mo. 183. Contra, Low v. Greenwood, 
 
 plicated, into its simpler elements, 30 111. App. 184; Archibald v. Mc- 
 
 and by showing the bearing of its Laurin, 21 Can. S. C. R 588 ; Sanders 
 
 several parts and their combined ef- v. Palmer, 55 Fed. Rep. 217. 
 
 fects stripped of every consideration z 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 50. 
 
 which might otherwile mislead or SDeming v. Merch. etc. Co., 90 
 
 confuse them. How this duty shall Tenn. 306 ; Summers v. Bergner & 
 
 be performed depends upon the dis- Eng. Co., 143 Pa. St. 114; Millott v. 
 
 cretion of the judge. Without this N. Y. & N. E. R Co., 19 N. Y. S. 122 ; 
 
 aid, chance, mistake or caprice may Colvin v. Peabody, 155 Mass. 104; 29 
 
 determine the result." Nudd v. Bur- N. E. Rep. 59 : Mullen v. Railroad 
 
 rows, 91 U. S. 439. Co,, 21 N. Y. S. 101 ; Murphy v. Rail- 
 
 i Cheever v. Sweet (Mass., 1890), 23 road Co., 62 Hun, 587 : Gaynor v. 
 
 N. E. Rep. 831 ; Leahey v. March, 155 Old Colony R R, 100 Mass. 208; Ly- 
 3
 
 34 RELEVANCY AND PROVINCE OF JUDGE AND JUUY. [§ 13. 
 
 correct, and it has accordingly been held that if the court in- 
 structs the jury that the commission or omission of specific 
 or particular acts constitutes negligence, then he invades the 
 province of the jury by drawing inferences of fact and en- 
 deavoring to force his opinions upon them. 1 
 
 §13. Preliminary questions of fact bearing on admissi- 
 bility. — To ascertain whether evidence is admissible, certain 
 preliminary questions of fact, often of a complex nature, must 
 be considered, and these may, it is settled, be decided by the 
 court unaided by the jury. Thus it is for the judge to say 
 whether the witness is qualified to testify as an expert, 2 and 
 on what subjects he may be examined; 3 whether a dying 
 declaration is inadmissible because the declarant expected to 
 recover; 4 and to decide upon the authenticity and proper exe- 
 cution of deeds and writings generally. 5 So questions as to the 
 voluntary nature of confessions, 6 as to what is hearsay evi- 
 dence, 7 the admissibility of statements claimed to constitute a 
 part of the res gestce, 8 or to be admissible as evidence of 
 pedigree, 9 the capacity of witnesses to testify, 10 and as to 
 the admissibility of depositions where the witness cannot be 
 
 man v. Union R. R„ 114 id. 83; John- care." Galveston City R. Co. v. 
 
 son v. Kelleher, 155 Mass. 125 ; 29 N. Hewitt, 67 Tex. 478. 
 
 E. Rep. 200; Nesbitt v. Greenville * Bridges v. North London Ry. Co., 
 
 (Miss.. 1892S 10 S. Rep. 452; Wood L. R 7 H. L. 213; Avilla v. Nash, 117 
 
 v. Council, 143 Pa. St. 467 ; Butler v. Mass. 318 ; Philadelphia, etc. Co. v. 
 
 Chicago R. R. (Iowa, 1893), 54 N. W. Henrice, 92 Pa. St 431. 
 
 Rep. 208 ; Payne v. Troy, etc. Co., 83 2 See §§ 187, 188. 
 
 N. Y. 572; Hodges v. St Louis, etc. » Jones v. Tucker, 41 N. H. 546; 
 
 Co., 71 Mo. 50; Shafter v. Evans, 53 § 187. 
 
 Cal. 32; Savings, etc. Co. v. Phillips * See post, §§ 100-113; Hall v. Com. 
 
 (Ga., 1893), 17 S. E. Rep. 82; Mason (Va., 1892), 15 S. E. Rep. 517; Young 
 
 v. Atl. Av. R R Co., 4 Misc. R 291 ; v. State (Ala., 1892), 10 S. Rep. 913. 
 
 Hilton v. Ala., etc. Co., 12 S. Rep. STunstall v. Cobb, 109 N. C. 316; 
 
 276; Kansas, etc. Co. v. Richardson, Collins v. Ball, 82 Tex. 259; Com. v. 
 
 25 Kan. 391. "What facts will con- Coe, 115 Mass. 481. See § 130. 
 
 stitute that diligence which the law ''See post, § 90; State v. Carson 
 
 requires must depend upon the cir- (S. C, 1892), 15 S. E. Rep. 588. 
 
 cumstances of each case. The omis- "Harter v. Hopkins, 83 Wis. 309; 
 
 sion must be considered in relation post, §§ 50-62. 
 
 to the business in which the person 6 Post, § 54 et seq. 
 
 who is to exercise the care is en- 9 Doe v. Davies, 10 Q. B. 314 ; post, 
 
 gaged, and with reference to the per- § 53. 
 
 sons, whether adults or children, ™ Post, §§ 313-317. 
 
 who may be injured by the want of
 
 § 13.] RKLKVANOT AND PROVINCE OF JUDGE AND JURY. 35 
 
 produced, 1 are for the court. Upon these and similar questions 
 of fact his decision is final unless objected and excepted to at 
 the time and submitted to an appellate court for review upon 
 a proper bill of exceptions in which the evidence is fully set 
 forth. 2 It is discretionary with the judge, however, in case 
 the proof is not convincing, to submit the evidence on any one 
 of these preliminary questions to the jury; and where the 
 issue, as usually happens, is one of mingled law and fact, he is 
 bound to advise them as to the rules of law involved which are 
 obligator}' upon them in deciding these collateral issues. 3 
 
 1 See post, §§ 361-363 ; Omaha v. 22 S. W. Rep. 419 ; Fleming v. Latham, 
 Jensen, 52 N. W. Rep. 833 ; Schind- 48 Kan. 773 ; Farncomb v. Stern 
 ler v. Railroad Co., 87 Mich. 400. (Colo., 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 612; Jones 
 
 2 State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399 ; Mat- v. Charlotte, etc. (S. C, 1893), 17 S. E. 
 son v. Frazer, 48 Mo. App. 302 ; Rep. 698 ; State v. Mitchell, 37 W. Va. 
 Haines v. Sairers, 93 Mich. 440; Car- 565. See post, §§ 366-370. 
 
 penter v. Willey (Vt, 1893), 26 Atl. 3 See ante, § 12. 
 Rep. 488 ; Wells v. Burtz (Tex., 1893),
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUE. 
 
 18. Matter of substance and of es- 
 
 sential description. 
 
 19. Allegations of value, quantity, 
 
 time, place, etc. 
 
 20. Formal allegations. 
 
 21. Proof of contracts. 
 
 § 22. Variance in the proof of sealed 
 instruments. 
 
 23. Substance of the issue in crimi- 
 
 nal trials. 
 
 24. Variance. 
 
 § 18. Matter of substance and of essential description. — 
 
 As regards the amount of evidence which is requisite in any 
 case, it is a general rule that it is necessary only that the sub- 
 stance of the issue should be proved. 1 By the rules of plead- 
 ing at common law, matter which was essentially descriptive — 
 that is, which identifies the subject-matter on which the cause 
 of action is based — must be literally proved. Any variance, 
 however slight, between the allegation of the facts in the 
 pleading and their proof would be fatal. So in a suit to re- 
 cover damages for false imprisonment, a failure to prove that 
 plaintiff was acquitted on the precise day alleged is no vari- 
 ance if the substance of the issue — *'. e., the acquittal — is 
 proved. 2 But where it is alleged that the plaintiff was ar- 
 rested u on a charge of larceny and for stealing an ox," and 
 it is proved that the arrest was because plaintiff " did remove 
 or steal one ox from said range," the action should be dis- 
 missed because of a material variance in a matter of essential 
 description. 3 
 
 1 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 56 ; Sommer v. 
 Smith (Cal., 1892), 27 Pac. Rep. 208 ; 
 Vette v. Leonori, 42 Mo. App. 217; 
 Singleton v. O'Blenis, 125 Ind. 151; 
 Cahill v. Colgan (Cal., 1893), 31 Pac. 
 Rep. 614 ; Scanlan v. Hodges, 52 Fed. 
 Rep. 354 ; Baxter v. Chicago, R I. & 
 P. Ry. Co. (Iowa, 1893), 54 N. W. 
 Rep. 350; Wellington v. Howard 
 (Ind., 1893), 31 N. E. Rep. 852; Corn'rs 
 
 v. Lomax (Ind., 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 
 800; Hartsock v. Mort, 76 Md. 281; 
 Ahern v. Telephone Co. (Oreg.. 1893), 
 33 Pac. Rep. 403; Olds v. Marshall 
 (Ala.. 1890), 8 S. Rep. 284. 
 
 2 Vail v. Lewis, 4 Johns. 450; 1 
 Greenl. on Ev., § 56. 
 
 3 Thompson v. Richardson (Ala., 
 1893), US. Rep. 728.
 
 § IS.] SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUE. 37 
 
 JS T o general test can be given by which it can always be ac- 
 curately determined whether a given allegation is formal or 
 essentially descriptive. The question turns largely upon the 
 circumstances of each case. The strict rules of common-law 
 pleading have, however, been greatly relaxed in modern times, 
 and an extreme particularity of proof is now often dispensed 
 with, provided the opposite party is not surprised or preju- 
 diced thereby. 1 Thus, proof that the plaintiff jumped from 
 a car will sustain an allegation that he fell from one; 2 while 
 a charge that he was injured by a "rocket" is sustained if it 
 be shown that he was struck by a bomb. 3 
 
 In defining matter of essential description we must first 
 consider does the allegation narrow or limit the description 
 of something which is necessary to the cause of action. 4 Thus 
 of contracts either parol or written it is said that all particu- 
 lars of time, value, person, place, size and name are essentiallv 
 descriptive, serving to identify the contract, and they must 
 generally be precisely proved. 5 So, too, the allegation of the 
 capacity in which the plaintiff sues, or of his title, is usually 
 descriptive and must be strictly proved. 8 Proof of ownership 
 must generally correspond precisely with the allegation. 7 
 
 *See § 24. ville, etc. Co. v. Hurt (Ala.. 1893), 13 
 
 2 Gulf, etc. Co. v. Johnson (Tex., S. Rep. 130); but au allegation that 
 
 1892). 19 S. W. Rep. 151. a horse " was driven at a furious 
 
 3 Colviu v. Peabody (Mass., 1892), rate" is mere surplusage and need 
 
 29 N. E. Rep. 59. For similar cases not be proved. Robbins v. Diggins 
 
 of immaterial variance, see Carroll (Iowa, 1889), 43 N. W. Rep. 306. 
 
 v. Water Co., 5 Wash. St. 613; Proof that an injury was caused by 
 
 Bevens v. Barnett (Ark., 1893), 22 a team will not sustain an allegation 
 
 S. W. Rep. 160 ; Roe v. Cutter, 4 of injury by machinery. McPherson 
 
 Wash. St. 611; Pennsylvania Co. v. v. Bridge Co. (Oregon, 1890), 26 Pac. 
 
 Dolan, 32 N. E. Rep. 802 ; Chicago, Rep. 560. 
 
 etc. Co. v. Smith (Ind., 1893,', 33 N. . ■» 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 57. 
 
 E. Rep. 241 ; Parsons v. Hughes, 62 5 Elting v. Dayton, 63 Hun, 629.; 
 
 Hun, 621 ; Paris, etc. Co. v. Greiner, Higman v. Hood, 3 Ind. App. 456 ; 
 
 84 Tex. 443; 19 S. W. Rep. 564; Lake 29 N. E. Rep. 1141 ; Ternes v. Dunn, 
 
 Shore Ry. Co. v. Hundt, 140 111. 525 ; 7 Utah, 497 ; 27 Pac. Rep. 692 ; Brown 
 
 Ashman v. Flint, etc. Co., 90 Mich. v. Rouse, 93 Cal. 237 ; Weall v. King, 
 
 567; 51 N. W. Rep. 645; Norcross v. 12 East, 452; Ferguson v. Harwood, 
 
 Weldon, 59 Vt. 50; Struthers v. 7 Cranch, 408, 413. Con tra, Kidder 
 
 Drexel, 7 S. Ct. 1293. Wanton neg- v. Vandersloot, 114 111. 133. 
 
 ligeuce, when charged, must be 6 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 57, citing 
 
 proven strictly (Richmond, etc. Co. Moises v. Thornton, 8 T. R. 303, 308. 
 
 v. Farmer, 12 S. Rep. 86. Cf. Louis- * Galveston, etc. Co. v. Becht (Tex.,
 
 38 SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUE. [§ 19. 
 
 § 19. Formal allegations. — Regarding those allegations in 
 a pleading which are formal and technical merely, as the alle- 
 gation in trover that plaintiff lost the goods, or in assumpsit 
 that he promised to pay for them what they were worth, 1 or 
 the allegation in an indictment for homicide that death was 
 caused by some particular weapon or means, 2 it may be said 
 that though by a general denial in a civil action, or by a plea 
 of not guilty to the indictment, they are put directly in issue, 
 they are not generally regarded as essentially descriptive and 
 need not be precisely proved as alleged. 3 In trover the sub- 
 stance of the issue is the conversion by the defendant, and 
 this of course must be proved substantially as alleged. So in 
 a trial for homicide, if the killing by the defendant be proved, 
 the proof of the manner of the killing, so long as it agrees in 
 substance with that alleged, is immaterial. 4 
 
 All allegations essentially descriptive must be proved, no 
 matter what their form, while allegations not material and 
 having no bearing on the issue need not be proved, and may 
 and should be regarded as surplusage, though alleged with 
 extreme explicitness and formality. But allegations not es- 
 sentially descriptive may be made so by their connection with 
 those that are, and they must then be proved as alleged if 
 they are not pleaded with a videlicet. 5 Thus when the exact 
 price of the goods is alleged in an action for a breach of war- 
 ranty, it must be strictly proved unless alleged with a videlicet, 
 when the form of the allegation would be that the sale was for 
 a valuable consideration videlicet, to wit, for $100. 6 It should 
 
 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 971. Cf. Union » 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 60. The 
 
 Stock Yards v. Gillespie, 137 U.S. effect of this word as used in a plead- 
 
 411 ; Chicago, etc. Co. v. Rolvink, 31 ing is to show that the pleader 
 
 III. App. 596. does not undertake to prove his 
 
 1 Fairfax F. M. Co. v. Chambers allegations precisely. Stephen on 
 (Md., 1893), 23 Atl. Rep. 1024; Math- Pleading, 309; 1 Chitty on Pleading, 
 ews v. Tappan, 6 Mo. 276. 261, 262, 348. "A ' viz.' serves to give 
 
 2 2 Russell on Crimes, p. 711 ; Turner additional particulars of time or 
 v. State (Ala., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 54; place or circumstances explanatory 
 Thomas v. Com. (Ky., 1893), 20 S. W. of previous statements made in gen- 
 Rep. 226; Hernandez v. State (Tex., eral terms; it cannot render nugatory 
 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 972. previous specific averments." Lewis 
 
 « Young v. Black, 7 Cranch (U. S), v. Hitchcock, 10 Fed. Rep. 7. 
 426 ; 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 59. « 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 60, citing 
 
 * See §23. Arnfield v. Bate, 3 M. & S. 173.
 
 § 20.] SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUE. 39 
 
 not be understood that a variance may be avoided, or exact 
 proof of material allegations dispensed with, by the use of 
 the v.'ord videlicet} In pleading unnecessary averments a 
 party may sometimes, uuless he plead with a videlicet, incur 
 the burden of proving them precisely as laid. 2 
 
 § 20. Allegations of value, quantity, time, place, etc.— 
 Among allegations which are often considered immaterial, 
 and of which, therefore, strict proof is not required, are those 
 of time, 3 place, 4 value, quantity and quality. 5 So in an action 
 to recover damages for negligence, 6 or for an assault to the 
 person, the details of the time and place of its occurrence are 
 immaterial, except where, by the peculiar nature of the case, 
 time and place are rendered essential. 7 
 
 Averments of value, as, for example, of the amount of rent 
 claimed to be due, or of the value of goods taken in trover, 
 and generally of matter which is alleged solely in aggravation 
 of damages, and which does not involve the plaintiff's right 
 of action, need not be precisely proved. 8 Sometimes an allega- 
 tion of place may be material and require to be strictly proved. 
 Thus, when the declaration in an action to recover damages 
 for negligence shows that plaintiff was a passenger between 
 stations A. and B., and the proof shows that he was a pas- 
 senger from C. to D., between which stations A. and B. were 
 located, the variance will be fatal. 9 
 
 1 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 60. Nat Bank v. Stephenson, 82 Tex. 
 
 2 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 60, citing 435 : Holman v. Pleasant Grove City, 
 
 Grimwood v. Barrit, 6 T. R. 460 ; Brug- 30 Pac. Rep. 72. 
 
 nier v. United States, 1 Dak. 9 ; Twiss * Brown v. Sullivan, 71 Tex. 470; 
 
 v. Baldwin, 9 Conn. 292 ; State v. Mur- St. Louis Railway Co. v. Turner, 1 
 
 phy, 55 Vt 549 ; Panton v. Holland, Tex. Civ. App. 625 ; McCaslin v. 
 
 17 Johns. 92; Vowles v. Miller, 3 Lake Shore R. R Co., 93 Mich. 553; 
 
 Taunt 137 ; Gould on Pleadings, 58, Georgia, etc. Co. v. Miller (Ga., 1893), 
 
 Bees. 35-41. 16 S. E. Rep. 939 ; Lake Shore, etc. 
 
 3Halfin v. Winkleman, 18 S. W. Co. v. Hundt (111., 1892), 30 N. E. Rep 
 
 Rep. 443 ; Ericksen v. Schuster, 44 458 ; Rockford v. Hollenbeck, 34 I1L 
 
 Minn. 441 ; Lasater v. Van Hook, 77 App. 40. 
 
 Tex. 650 ; St Louis, etc. Co. v. Evans, 5 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 61. 
 
 78 id. 369 ; Ridenhour v. Kansas 6 See notes 3 and 4, supra. 
 
 City Cable Ry. Co., 102 Mo. 270; 1 Phettiplace v. N. Pac. Ry. Co. 
 
 Hudson v. Hudson (Ga., 1893), 16 S. (Wis., 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 1092. 
 
 E Rep. 349 ; Devlin v. Boyd. 69 Hun, 8 Hutchins v. Adams, 3 Greenl. 174. 
 
 328; James v. Work, 24 N. Y. S. 149; Cf. Ross v. Malone (Ala, 1892), 12 S. 
 
 Russell v. Bradley. 47 Kan. 438; Rep. 182. 
 
 Drown v. Forrest 63 Vt 557 ; First s Wabash, etc. Co. v. Friedman
 
 40 
 
 SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUE. 
 
 [§ 2L 
 
 § 21. Proof of contracts. — A written contract, in cases 
 not within the statute of frauds, 1 is not required to be proved 
 unless it is set out in the pleadings. 2 If a contract, whether 
 oral or written, is pleaded, it must be substantially proved as 
 alleged, particularly as to those portions by which an obliga- 
 tion is created, including all circumstances relating to consid- 
 eration, time and mode of performance. 3 Proof of an alter- 
 native or conditional contract will not support an allegation 
 of one which is absolute; 4 nor will proof of one that is abso- 
 lute sustain an averment of one in the alternative. 5 An alle- 
 gation of an implied contract will be supported by proof of 
 an express one, 6 though a declaration alleging money had and 
 received, it has been held, is not sustained by proof of a 
 promise to pay money. 7 
 
 The consideration, with all attendant details, should be 
 pleaded ; and where this is done, the party will be held to 
 prove the consideration strictly as it is alleged. 8 Accord- 
 ingly, proof of an agreement to pay a fixed and definite sum 
 will not sustain an allegation of a contract to pay merely 
 what is reasonable. 9 
 
 (111., 1892), 30 N. E. Rep. 353. See, 
 also, Montezuma v. Wilson (Ga., 1889), 
 9 S. E. Rep. 17; Whitney Mfg. Co. v. 
 Richmond & D. R. Co. (S. C, 1893), 17 
 S. E. Rep. 147 ; Hood v. Pioneer M. 
 & M. Co. (Ala., 1892), 11 S. Rep. 10. 
 A defendant is entitled to judgment 
 if he proves one of several pleas iu 
 bar, though lie fails to prove the 
 other. Leiter v. Day, 35 111. App. 248. 
 
 > See 2>ost, §g 261-270. 
 ' 2 Hemminger v. West. Ass. Co. 
 (Mich., 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 949; 
 Soaps v. Eiltberg, 42 111. App. 375 ; 
 Hansen v. Hale. 44 id. 474 ; Hargrove 
 v. Adcock, 111 N. C. 166. 
 
 8 Le Baron v. United States, 4 
 Wall. 642. A writing is admissible 
 to prove the contract alleged, though 
 not alleged to be in writing. Fiedler 
 \. Stone, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 340. 
 
 4 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 58 ; Saxton v. 
 Johnson, 14 Johns. 418; Alexander 
 v. Harris, 4 Cranch^ 299 ; Baylies v. 
 
 Fettyplace, 7 Mass. 325; Lower v. 
 Conyers, 7 Cow. 263. 
 
 5 Browning v. Berry, 107 N. C. 231. 
 An allegation of a joint loan is not 
 supported by proof of a loan to one. 
 York v. Fortenbury, 15 Colo. 129. 
 
 6 Ashton v. Shepherd (Ind., 1890), 
 22 N. E. Rep. 98. 
 
 7 Clark v. Sherman, 5 Wash. St. 
 681. 
 
 s Bromley v. Goff, 75 Me. 213; 
 Benson v. Dean, 40 Minn. 455 ; Rob- 
 inson Con. Coal Co. v. Johnson, 22 
 Pac. Rep. 459. 
 
 9 Cleaves v. Lord, 3 Gray (Mass.), 
 66, 71. Nor is an agreement to pay 
 money sustained by proof of a prom- 
 ise to deliver goods. Titus v. Ash, 
 24 N. H. 319. A landlord cannot re- 
 cover for goods furnished a tenant 
 in a suit for the rent. Atkinson v. 
 Cox (Ark., 1890), 16 S. W. Rep. 124. 
 But where a contract of hiring at a 
 stipulated rate is alleged, plaintiff
 
 § 22.] SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUE. 41 
 
 If the consideration, though containing more than one 
 promise, be entire, it must be proved as alleged. So a party 
 cannot allege that he has agreed to do one thing and recover 
 by proving that he has performed some act of a distinct 
 character. Accordingly, proof that one agreed to finish a 
 ship will not sustain an allegation that he promised to build 
 one; 1 nor will proof that he delivered spruce lumber sustain 
 a contract to deliver pine. An allegation of a note pa}'able 
 without defalcation or discount is not sustained by proving 
 one payable "without defalcation. 1 ' 2 But a plaintiff, though 
 he cannot sue in tort and recover on contract, may recover 
 for a wrong which is alleged and proved, though in the same 
 action he sue on a contract which he fails to prove. 3 
 
 § 22. Variance in the proof of sealed instruments. — Ac- 
 cording to the rules of common-law pleading, where a deed is 
 pleaded according to its tenor — that is, by setting out an 
 exact copy in full — every part so stated was regarded as 
 essentially descriptive, and it was required to be literally 
 proved in every particular. In the absence of a statutory 
 power of amendment, a variance was fatal. 4 But when a deed 
 or other instrument is pleaded according to legal effect — i. e., 
 where the purport only is set out — the same preciseness of 
 proof is not required, and proof of a deed conforming in sub- 
 stance and legal effect with the allegation will suffice, though 
 a verbal variance exists. 5 When oyer of the deed, or its 
 modern equivalent, the production of the deed or a copy of it 
 in court, is claimed, the party has a right to a verbatim copy, 
 though at this day, in consequence of the very liberal con- 
 struction of the statutes of amendment, any discrepancy not 
 going to the merits of the case would be disregarded. 6 
 
 may recover the fair value of his guson v. Harwood, 7Cranch, 408, 413; 
 
 services, though he fail to prove the Bowditch v. Mawley, 1 Campb. 195 ; 
 
 rate alleged, if a promise to pay can People v. Warner, 5 Wend. 273* 
 
 be implied from the circumstances. Sheehy v. Mandeville, 7 Cranch, 208: 
 
 Miller v. Eldrtdge, 126 Ind. 461. United States v. Le Baron, 40 Wall. 
 
 i 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 68. 642. See post, " Private writings," 
 
 2 Addis v. Van Buskirk, 4 Zabr. g 125 et seq. 
 
 218 ; 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 68. 5 Whitlock v. Ramsey, 2 Munf. 510 ; 
 
 sCrothers v. Acock, 43 Mo. App. Ankerstein v. Clarke, 4 T. R. 616. 
 
 818. 6 See post, § 126 ; Goodbub v. Schee- 
 
 4 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 69, citing Fer- ler, 3 Ind. App. 318; Glacier Mount
 
 42 SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUE. [§ 23. 
 
 § 23. Substance of the issue in criminal trials. — Whether 
 greater strictness of proof is required in criminal than in civil 
 proceedings in favor of life and liberty is a question upon 
 which a diversity of opinion is found. 1 But no variance will 
 be deemed to exist if the indictment is separable and the sub- 
 stance of the offense is proven, though certain averments 
 which are not material remain unproved. 2 Thus, where sev- 
 eral fraudulent misrepresentations are alleged in a prosecu- 
 tion for obtaining money or goods by false pretenses, it will 
 be enough to prove a material part of them. 3 So, too, it has 
 been held that larceny may be proven on the trial of an in- 
 dictment for burglary, 4 or robbery from the person. 5 
 
 All the circumstances of person, place or thing which are 
 described in an indictment with extreme or unnecessary par- 
 ticularity must be proven strictly, where by such a course of 
 pleading these details are essential to describe its identity to 
 the jury. So where one is indicted for stealing a horse which 
 is described either by color, age or brand, these averments are 
 material, and a variance is fatal. 6 In a prosecution for an as- 
 
 James v. Walrath, 8 Johns. 410; things without proof of the commis- 
 
 Silver Mining Co. v. Willis, 127 U. S. sion of the others." Bork v. People, 91 
 
 480; Dorr v. Fenno, 12 Pick. 521; N. Y. 13; State v. Gray, 29 Minn. 144. 
 Clifford v. Mayer (Ind., 1893), 33 N. 3 p e0 ple v. Haynes, 11 Wend. (N. 
 
 E. Rep. 127. Cf Toledo, etc. Co. v. Y.) 565; Beasley v. State, 59 Ala. 
 
 Harnsberger, 41 111. App. 494. 20; Com. v. Morrill, 62 Mass. 571; 
 
 1 Beech's Case, 1 Leach Cas. 158; State v. Vorback, 66 Mo. 168; State 
 United States v. Porter, 3 Day, 283, v. Dunlop, 24 Me. 77. 
 
 286, cited 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 65, 4 Barlow v. State, 77 Ga. 448. Cf. 
 
 maintain that the rules of evidence Groves v. State, 76 Ga. 808; State v. 
 
 are the same; but see, contra, 2 Rus- Colclough, 31 S. C. 156; Kennegar v. 
 
 sell on Crimes, 588 ; Roscoe's Crim. State, 120 Ind 176. 
 
 Ev. 73; United States v. Button, 2 5 State v. Keeland, 90 Mo. 237. 
 
 Mason, 464; Kline v. Baker, 106 Mass. 6 Coleman v. State (Tex., 1887), 2 
 
 161. See Walker v. State (Ala., 1893), S. W. Rep. 859; State v. Jackson, 30 
 
 10 S. Rep. 401. Me. 29 ; Wiley v. State, 74 Ga. 840 ; 
 
 2 Finney v. State, 15 S. W. Rep. 175. Sweat v. State, 4 Tex. App. 617 ; 
 " Wbere an offense may be commit- Groom v. State, 23 id 83. When a 
 ted by doing any one of several statutory distinction is *iade between 
 things, the indictment may in a sin- the species of any animal, proof of 
 gle count group them together and one is a variance if another species 
 charge the defendant with having was alleged. State v. Buckles, 26 
 committed them all, and a convic- Kan. 237 ; Marshall v. State, 31 Tex 
 tion may be had of any one of those 471. So an allegation of stealing an
 
 § 23.] 
 
 6URSTANCE OF TIIE ISSUE. 
 
 43 
 
 sauit, its date, 1 or the locality 2 where it was committed, need 
 not be precisely proved, as such facts do not constitute essen- 
 tial elements of the crime. 3 But where place or time is mate- 
 rial, as in a prosecution for selling liquor between specified 
 dates, 4 or for transporting liquors between two given points, 5 
 the particulars of time and place must be precisely proved. 
 A variance between the allegation of the name of a person 
 and the proof, whether it be that of the person upon whom 
 an assault was committed or of whose murder the accused 
 stands charged, or who was the owner of the property stolen, 
 has often been held fatal. 6 But a mere error in spelling, or 
 the use of a nickname, is not a variance ; and if the names be 
 idem sonans, or if sufficient evidence can be introduced to 
 identify the person, an immaterial variance of name will be 
 disregarded.' 
 
 animal is not supported by proof of 
 the theft of the carcass. Hunt v. 
 State, 55 Ala. 138. 
 
 i Cross v. State, 17 S. W. Rep. 1096. 
 Cf. People v. Formosa, 30 N. E. Rep. 
 492 ; 131 N. Y. 47S. Generally, unless 
 time or place is an element in the 
 nature of or is made part of the stat- 
 utory description of a crime, it need 
 not be strictly proven though alleged, 
 provided the offense is shown to have 
 been committed prior to the date of 
 the indictment and witliin the juris- 
 diction. Arcia v. State, 28 Tex. App. 
 198; State v. Dorr, 82 Me. 212; Jack- 
 son v. State, 88 Ga 787; Clark v. 
 State, 16 S. E. Rep. 96; Com. v. 
 Riggs, 14 Gray, 376; Burge v. State, 
 62 Ga. 170. Contra, Callahan v. State, 
 41 Tex. 439 (theft from a house); 
 Com. v. Lester, 129 Mass. 101; People 
 v. Honeyman, 3 Den. 121; State v. 
 Porter, 10 Rich. (S. C.) 145; Com. v. 
 Laugh lin, 11 Cush. 598, 
 
 ^ Blackvvell v. State, 30 Tex. App. 
 416; 17 S. W. Rep. 1061. 
 
 3 See Com. v. Keefe, 140 Mass. 301 ; 
 Weineck v. State (Neb., 1892), 51 N. 
 W. Rep. 307 (placing obstruction on 
 railroad track). 
 
 * Com. v. Purdy, 146 Mass. 138. 
 
 5 State v. Libbey, 84 Me. 461. 
 
 6 King v. State, 44 Ind. 285 ; People 
 v. Hughes, 41 Cal. 234 ; Underwood 
 v. State, 72 Ala. 220 ; Henley v. Com., 
 1 Bush (Ky.), 11; State v. Gafbery, 
 12 La. Ann. 265; State v. Taylor, 15 
 Kan. 420, 514; Humbard v. State, 21 
 Tex. App. 200 ; Lewis v. State (Ga., 
 1893), 15 S. E. Rep. 697 ; Owens v. 
 State (Tex., 1893), 20 S. W. Rep. 558; 
 Com. v. Morningstar, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. R 
 34 ; Clements v. State, 21 Tex. App. 
 258 ; Wade v. State, 10 S. Rep. 233 ; 
 Sykes v. People (111., 1891), 23 N. E. 
 Rep. 391. 
 
 f Kennedy v. People, 39 N. Y. 250 
 State v. Humble, 34 Ma App. 343 
 Watzel v. State, 28 Tex. App. 523 
 Martin v. State, 28 id. 364 ; State v. 
 Bain, 43 Kan. 638 ; State v. Flack, 48 
 Kan. 146 ; Young v. State, 17 S. W. 
 Rep. 413; 30 Tex. App. 308; Com. v. 
 Caponi, 155 Mass. 534 ; 30 N. E Rep. 
 82; Com. v. Beckley, 3 Mete. 330 
 ("Jr.," "Sr." or "Mrs." no part of a 
 name); State v. Best, 12 S. E. Rep. 
 907 ; Com. v. Gould (Mass., 1893), 33 
 N. E. Rep. 656 ; Rogers v. State (Ga., 
 1893), 16 S. E. Rep. 205; State v.
 
 44 
 
 SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUE. 
 
 [§23. 
 
 The substance and essence of homicide being the felonious 
 killing by means of shouting, cutting, etc., proof of a killing 
 in any manner that substantially conforms to the description 
 is sufficient, and the details or identity of the offense need not 
 be precisely proved as alleged. 1 Thus proof of killing by 
 shooting with a pistol will sustain an indictment for killing 
 with a sun: 2 and an averment that one was killed with a 
 bowie-knife is sufficiently sustained by proof that he was slain 
 with a butcher-knife. 3 An indictment for- the larceny of 
 chickens, 4 a cow, 5 or of a sheep, 6 or horse, 7 or hog, 8 will be sus- 
 tained by proof of the larceny of any variety or sex of those 
 animals. But where the allegation is that bank-notes 9 or 
 promissory notes, 10 greenbacks ll or " money " 12 were stolen, the 
 proof must correspond with the allegation, and any material 
 variance will be fatal. But an indictment for stealing $30 in 
 money is sufficiently sustained by proof that three ten-dollar 
 bills were taken. 13 Where one is indicted for perjury in court, 
 not only must the term of the court be strictly proved, 14 but 
 
 Brin, 30 Minn. 522 ; Elberson v. Rich- 
 ards, 42 N. J. L. 70. 
 
 1 " In an indictment any allegation 
 not descriptive of the identity of the 
 offense which can be omitted with- 
 out affecting the charge, and with- 
 out detriment to the complaint, may 
 be treated as surplusage and need 
 not be proved." Commonwealth v. 
 Rowell, 146 Mass. 130. 
 
 2 Turner v. State (Ala., 1893), 12 
 S. Rep. 54. Proof of strangling with 
 a scarf is sufficient where strangling 
 with the hands was alleged. Thomas 
 v. Com. (Ky., 1893), 20 S. W. Rep. 
 226 ; Rex v. Waters, 7 C. & P. 250. 
 
 ■i Hernandez v. State, 22 S. W. Rep. 
 972. C/. Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. 
 321 ; Com. v. McLaughton, 105 Mass. 
 460. See, also, Rodgers v. State, 50 
 Ala. 102; Witt v. State, 6 Cold. 
 (Tenn.) 5 ; State v. Smith, 32 Me. 369 ; 
 State v. Lautenschlager, 22 Minn. 
 514; State v. Kilgore, 70 Mo. 546; 
 State v. Fox, 25 N. J. L. 256 ; State 
 
 v. Gould, 90 N. C. 380; People v. 
 Holt, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 432 ; Goodwin v. 
 State, 12 Miss. 520. Of. Guedel v. 
 People, 43 III. 226. Allegations as to 
 place or nature of wounds are gen- 
 erally immaterial. Com. v. Coy 
 (Mass., 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 4; State 
 v. Waller, 88 Mo. 402; Nelson v. 
 State, 1 Tex. App. 41 ; Bryan v. State, 
 19 Fla. 364. 
 
 4 State v. Bassett, 34 La. Ann. 1108. 
 
 5 Parker v. State, 39 Ala 365. 
 6McCully's Case, 2 Lew. C. C. 272; 
 
 Reg. v. Spicer, 1 Den. C. C. 82. 
 
 •Davis v. State, 23 Tex. App. 210. 
 
 sState v. Gordet, 7 Ired. (N. C.) 210. 
 
 9 Pomeroy v. Com., 2 Va. Cas. 343. 
 1« Stewart v. State, 62 Md. 412. 
 ii State v. Collins, 72 N. C. 144. 
 
 12 Lancaster v. State, 9 Tex. App. 
 393. 
 
 13 Roth v. State, 10 Tex. App. 7. 
 
 « United States v. Neal, 1 Gall. 387; 
 Rex v. Leefe, 2 Campb. 134, 140.
 
 § 24:.] SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUE. 45 
 
 the title of the action, 1 and the exact time of the day, must be 
 proved with extreme particularity. 2 
 
 §24. Variance — Amendments. — Variance in the law of 
 evidence maybe defined as a disagreement between an allega- 
 tion in a pleading and the facts proved to support it which is 
 of such a nature that the claim made is not supported. 3 
 
 In order to determine whether a material variance exists, 
 the essential facts and principles constituting together the 
 proposition of law involved, and which are indispensable to 
 show the legal right of the pleader, must be ascertained. Hav- 
 ing arrived at a clear determination of the principles and facts, 
 everything else is mere surplusage and may be disregarded as 
 not needing proof. 
 
 By statute in England, and in almost all of the states of the 
 Union, the courts are vested with power to grant amend- 
 ments to the record in all cases where a variance exists be- 
 tween the allegations in the pleadings and the proof, on such 
 terms as may seem reasonable to the court, provided the 
 rights of neither party are prejudiced thereby. 4 The party 
 at fault will usually be required to pay the costs of the pro- 
 ceedings which are invalidated by the amendment. 5 The 
 
 1 Walker v. State (Ala, 1893), 11 matter which in point of law is es- 
 S. Rep. 401. Cf. Wohlgemuth v. sential to the charge or claim.*' 
 United States (N. M., 1893), 30 Pac. Anderson's Law Diet. ; House v. 
 Rep. 854. Metcalf, 27 Conn. 63S. 
 
 2 Reg. v. Bird, 17 Cox's Cr. C. 387. 4 Sandford Tool Co. v. Mullen (Ind., 
 As to variance in the crime of for- 1890). 27 N. E. Rep. 448; Dexter v. 
 gery, see Wilson v. State (Miss., 1893), Ivins, 133 N. Y. 986; Listman v. 
 12 S. Rep. 332 ; State v. Gryder, 44 Hickey, 65 Hun, 8 ; 19 N. Y. S. 880 ; 
 La. Ann. 962; Simms v. State (Tex., Evarts v. United States M. Ace. Ins. 
 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 876. Co., 61 Hun, 624; Taylor v. Arnold 
 
 3 Stephen on PL, 107, 108; House (Ky., 1892), 17 S. W. Rep. 361; Cain 
 v. Metcalf, 27 Conn. 638 ; Cent. R. Co. v. Cody (Cal., 1892), 29 Pac. Rep. 778 ; 
 v. Hubbard, 86 Ga. 623; Dennis v. Cargain v. Everett, 62 Hun, 620; 
 Spencer, 45 Minn. 250 ; Haughey v. Walton v. Jones, 7 Utah, 462 ; 27 
 Joyce, 41 Mo. App. 564; Richards v. Pac. Rep. 580; Denham v. Bryant, 
 Green (Ariz., 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 266; 139 Mass. 110. 
 
 Becker v. Baurngartner (111., 1893), 32 SBausch v. Ingersoll, 61 Hun, 627; 
 
 N. E. Rep. 786 ; Mobile, etc. Co. v. Keeler v. Shears, 6 Wend. 540 ; Woods 
 
 George (Ala., 1892), 10 S. Rep. 145 ; v. Durett, 28 Tex. 429 ; McClellan v. 
 
 Atkinson v. Cox (Ark., 1892), 16 S. W. Osborne, 51 Me. 118. No amend- 
 
 Rep. 124. "A disagreement between ment will be allowed which will add 
 
 the allegations and the proof in some or substitute a new cause of action
 
 46 
 
 SUBSTANCE OF TIIE ISSUE. 
 
 [§24. 
 
 power to allow amendments is wholly discretionary, and is 
 usually not reviewable unless in the case of its manifest 
 abuse. 1 If, however, the adverse party has been actually mis- 
 led to his prejudice 2 in maintaining the action or defense 
 upon its merits, the variance will be deemed material and the 
 court will refuse permission to amend. 3 The variance must 
 be taken advantage of by specific objection clearly pointing 
 it out at some period before final judgment that it may re- 
 ceive consideration before it shall have been aided by the ver- 
 dict. 4 Though contributory negligence should be specially 
 pleaded, if the parties proceed to a trial of the issue on that 
 point in a case where defendant does not plead it, it will be 
 deemed waived. 5 
 
 or a new defense (Wilkinson v. 
 Wilkinson, 59 Wis. 64; Ward v. Pat- 
 ton, 75 Ala. 207 ; Freeman v. Grant, 
 132 N. Y. 33; Tatham v. Ramey, 82 
 Pa. St. 120; Switzer v. Claflin, 82 
 Tex. 513; Shearer v. Middleton, 88 
 Mich. 621 ; White v. Mass, 75 Ala. 
 207; Carpenter v. Huffsteller, 87 N. 
 C. 273 ; Snyder v. Harper, 24 W. Va. 
 206 ; Shenandoah V. R. v. Griffith. 76 
 Va. 913 ; Culp v. Steare, 47 Kan. 746 ; 
 Brodeck v. Hirschfield, 57 Vt 12; 
 Galbreath v. Newton, 45 Mo. App. 
 312) ; though usually the form of the 
 action may be changed under the 
 statutes allowing amendments. Red- 
 strake v. Insurance Co., 44 N. J. Eq. 
 294. Cf. Moseley v. Richmond, etc. 
 Co., 87 Ga. 747. 
 
 i Brady v. Casidy, 13 N. Y. S. 824; 
 Gormly v. Bringam, 138 N. Y. 623 ; 
 Bondur v. Le Bourne, 79 Me. 21 ; Greer 
 v. Covington (Ky., 1887), 2 S. W. Rep. 
 323 ; Randall v. Baird (Mich., 1887), 
 33 N. W. Rep. 506. 
 
 2 That a party has been prejudiced 
 should be shown by affidavit in the 
 trial court Ridenhour v. Kansas 
 City, eta Co., 102 Mo. 270. 
 
 3 Zeininger v. Schnitzler, 48 Kan. 
 66; Hall v. Roberts, 63 Hun, 473; 
 Crane v. Ring, 48 Kan. 61 ; Crothers 
 
 v. Acock, 43 Mo. App. 318; Rozet v. 
 Harvey, 26 111. App. 558 ; Robbins v. 
 Diggins (Iowa. 1890), 43 N. W. Rep. 
 306; Northern P. etc. Co. v. O'Brien 
 (Wash., 1890), 21 Pac. Rep. 32 ; Chew- 
 acla Works v. Dismukes, 87 Ala. 344 ; 
 Brown v. Sullivan, 71 Tex. 470. 
 
 *See post, § 232; Walhch v. Mor- 
 gan, 39 Mo. App. 469 ; Henry v. Diet- 
 rich, 7 N. Y. S. 505; Richards v. 
 Bestor, 90 Ala, 352 ; O'Conner v. De- 
 lany (Minn., 1893), 51 N. W. Rep. 
 1108; McCormick H. Co. v. Burandt, 
 23 N. E. Rep. 588; Tall man v. Earley, 
 13 N Y. S. 805; Tognini v. Kyle, 17 
 Nev. 209 ; Home Ins. Co. v. Bethel, 
 42 111. App. 475; Long v. Campbell, 
 37 W. Va. 665. This is provided for 
 by statute in many of the states. 
 Salmon Bank v. Leyser, 22 S. W. 
 Rep. 504. See Brace v. Doble (S. .D., 
 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 859; Upham v. 
 Draper (Mass., 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 2; 
 Sheppard v. Newhall, 54 Fed. Rep. 306. 
 Variance cannot be shown on appeal. 
 In re Lincoln, 19 Fed. Rep. 460; 
 Wasatch Min. Co. v. Crescent Miu. 
 Co., 147 U. S. 293; Perry v. Plunket, 
 74 Me. 328 ; Liddell v. Fisher, 48 Mo. 
 App. 449. 
 
 5 Railroad Co. v. Farmer (Ala,, 
 1893;, 12 S. Rep. 86, 89, 432.
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE. 
 
 § 30. Primary and secondary evi- 
 dence distinguished. 
 
 31. Instruments required by law 
 
 to be in writing. 
 
 32. Disputed writings. 
 
 33. Contracts and other transac- 
 
 tions actually reduced to 
 writing. 
 
 34. Collateral writings. 
 
 § 35. Exceptions in the case of rec- 
 ords and appointments to 
 office. 
 
 36. Exceptions in the case of evi- 
 
 dence of general results. 
 
 37. Admissions as primary evi- 
 
 dence. 
 
 38. Photographs as primary evi- 
 
 dence. 
 
 39. Exhibition of articles in court 
 
 § 30. Primary and secondary evidence distinguished. — 
 
 The rule requiring the introduction of the best evidence has 
 reference generally to offers of oral evidence to prove tha 
 contents of a writing where the writing itself should be pro- 
 duced. 1 The rule does not require the production of the 
 strongest and most convincing evidence, so that no principle 
 of law is violated by the production of faint or weak evi- 
 dence, and the withholding of that which is stronger, more 
 cogent and convincing, so long as both are equally original. 2 
 But it is a natural inference, in the absence of explanatory 
 circumstances, that a party who is withholding the best evi- 
 dence of any fact in issue does so with a wrong motive which 
 would be defeated by its production. 3 When, therefore, evi- 
 dence is produced that presupposes the existence of other evi- 
 dence to the same facts of a more original character, which is 
 
 1 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 82. 
 
 2 Ellsworth v. Insurance Co., 105 
 N. Y. 624; Anglo-Am. P. & P. Co. 
 v. Cannon, 31 Fed. Rep. 313 ; Rich- 
 ardson v. Milburn, 17 Md. 67; Mc- 
 Creary v. Turk. 29 Ala. 244 ; Wynn 
 v. City, etc. R. R (Ga., 1893), 17 S. E. 
 Rep. 649 ; Norton v. East St. Louis, 36 
 111. App. 371. A party is not under 
 the necessity of calling a particular 
 
 witness upon the ground that his 
 testimony is the best evidence if he 
 choose to produce other evidence 
 equally original. N. E. Mon. Co. v. 
 Johnson, 144 Pa. St. 61. 
 
 3 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 82, citing 
 Taylor v. Riggs, 1 Pet 591, 596 ; Minor 
 v. Tillotson, 7 Pet. 100. Cf. Reich v. 
 Berdel, 120 111. 499; 11 N. E. Rep. 
 912.
 
 48 PKIMARY AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE. [§ 3d. 
 
 more immediate, and which lies closer to the facts which are 
 in issue, the evidence produced will be regarded as substitu- 
 tionary, and, as such, will be rejected. 
 
 The principle by which the best evidence is demanded is the 
 basis for the common division of evidence into primary and 
 secondary. 1 Primary evidence of any fact may be defined as 
 the highest or best evidence which from the nature of the fact 
 in the abstract can be procured, and which in the circum- 
 stances of the particular case affords the greatest certainty of 
 the fact or renders the probability of its existence most 
 apparent to the mind. It is such evidence as does not indi- 
 cate the existence of any other evidence which is less remote 
 to the facts to be proved. 2 Thus the primary evidence of a 
 written instrument is the writing itself, and unless it be shown 
 that the party claiming thereunder, after a diligent search, is 
 unable to produce it, no other evidence of its contents will be 
 admitted. 3 So where a letter, if producible, is primary evi- 
 dence of any relevant fact, press copies of the letter are inad- 
 missible except as secondary evidence, and after the loss or 
 destruction of the original letter has been shown. 4 If a writing 
 
 1 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 84 ■ <Krag v. Worthington, 73 111. 161 ; 
 
 2 Anderson's Law Diet. Smith v. Brown, 151 Mass. 339 ; Anglo- 
 
 3 Trimble v. Edwards, 84 Tex. 497; American P. & C. Co. v. Cannon, 31 
 19 S. W. Rep. 772; Isley v. Boon, Fed. Rep. 313; Marsh v. Hand. 35 Md. 
 109 N. C. 555; Carwin v. Morehead, 123; Goodrich v. Weston, 102 Mass. 
 
 51 Iowa, 99 ; Henry v. Whitaker, 82 362 ; Watkins v. Paine, 57 Ga. 50. See 
 Tex. 5; Daly v. Bernstein, 28 Pac. §126. "The rule that a copy of a copy 
 Rep. 764; Blalock v. Miland, 87 Ga. is not admissible evidence is correct 
 573 ; Buchanan v. Wise, 34 Neb. 695 ; in itself, when properly understood 
 
 52 N. W. Rep. 163 ; Grant v. Oliver, and limited to its true sense. The 
 91 Cal. 158 ; Taylor on Evid. 94. rule properly applies to cases where 
 " The question whether evidence is the copy is taken from a copy, the 
 primary or secondary has reference original being still in existence and 
 to the nature of the case in the ab- capable of being compared with it, 
 stract, and not to the circumstances for then it is a second remove from 
 under which the party, in the partic- the original ; or where it is a copy of 
 ular cause on trial, may be placed, a copy of a record, the record being in 
 It is a distinction of law and not of existence, it is not by the law deemed 
 fact ; referring only to the quality as high evidence as the original, for 
 and not to the strength of the proof, then it is also a second remove from 
 Evidence which carries on its face no the record. But it is quite a difficult 
 indication that better remains be- question whether it applies to cases 
 hind is not secondary but primary." of secondary evidence where the 
 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 84. original is lost, or the record of it is
 
 § 31.] ; PKIMAEY AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE. 49 
 
 is executed by all the parties in several parts or copy, each 
 part is primary evidence of the writing. 1 But where a writing 
 is executed in counterpart — that is, in duplicate — each part 
 essentially the same as the other, but being signed by one of 
 the parties, it is primary evidence only against the party sign- 
 ing it. 2 "Where a number of copies are all made by printing, 
 lithography, photography, or by any process which will secure 
 exact uniformity, each is primary evidence of all the others, 
 though when all are from a common original, none is primary 
 evidence of that original. 3 It has been held in several cases 
 where the loss of the original and of a press copy of a letter 
 was proved, that a copy of a copy of the original was admis- 
 sible where its correctness as a copy was vouched for under 
 oath. 4 
 
 § 31. Instruments required by law to be in writing. — 
 Oral or secondary evidence is inadmissible where the law 
 requires facts to be evidenced in writing, or where a party, to 
 substantiate his claims or the title upon which he relies, must 
 produce some written instrument. As examples of such writ- 
 ings may be instanced judicial and other public records, deeds 
 of conveyance and contracts not to be performed within a 
 year. 5 The requirement that such transactions should be evi- 
 denced by writing is usually statutory, and to ascertain its 
 effect and scope the statute will have to be consulted. If, 
 therefore, the law demands that written proof must in any 
 given case be produced, no oral evidence is admissible if the 
 writing is in existence and is under the control of the party 
 
 not deemed as high evidence as tli3 292 ; 1 Whart. Evid., § 74 ; Lewis v. 
 
 original, or when the copy of a copy Eoberts, 103 E. C. L. 29. See Ander- 
 
 is the highest pi'oof in existence." son's Law Diet, " Counterpart." 
 
 Winn v. Patterson, 9 Pet. (U. S.) 677. 3 Wharton on Evid., § 92 ; Foote v. 
 
 iCrossman v. Crossman, 95 N. Y. Bentley, 44 N. Y. 166; Memphis, etc. 
 
 145 ; Hubbard v.' Russell, 24 Barb. Co. v. Beuson, 1 Pick. 627 ; People v. 
 
 404; Gardner v. Eberhart, 82 111. 316 ; Williams, 64 Cal. 87; Ford v. Cun- 
 
 Cleveland, etc. Co. v. Perkins, 17 ningham, 87 Cal. 409. 
 
 Mich. 296; Dyer v. Fredericks, 63 * Goodrich v. Weston, 102 Mass. 
 
 Me. 173 ; State v. Gurnee, 14 Kan. 362 ; Winn v. Paterson, 9 Pet. (U. S.) 
 
 Ill; Weaver v. Shipley (Ind., 1891), 663; Grade v. Morris, 22 Ark. 415. 
 
 27 N. E. Rep. 146. See, also, 1 Cush. 189 ; 35 Md. 123 ; 
 
 2 Roe v. Davis, 7 East, 362 ; Anglo- 37 Conn. 555 ; 1 Whart Evid., §§ 90- 
 
 Amer. P. & C. Co. v. Cannon, 31 Fed. 100. 
 
 Rep. 313; Mann v. Godbold, 3 Bing. ssee^os^, §§ 261-270. 
 4
 
 50 
 
 PKIMABY AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§31. 
 
 claiming under it. 1 But where a party claiming under a deed 
 or other instrument required to be in writing can show to the 
 satisfaction of the court that it was executed, and that it was 
 destroyed or cannot be found after a thorough search, he may 
 prove its contents by secondary evidence. 2 
 
 The rule above outlined is chiefly applicable in the case of 
 transactions which are required by the statute of frauds to be 
 in writing, 3 and to the proof of public records required by law 
 to be kept. 4 Thus, a judgment of a court, 5 or the appoint- 
 ment of an official whose appointment is recorded, 6 or the nat- 
 uralization of an alien, 7 must be shown by the production of 
 the record or of a certified copy thereof. 
 
 In many of the states statutory provisions exist permitting 
 any instrument acknowledged and recorded to be proved by 
 a certified copy where the original is not procurable. 8 Such 
 a provision is of peculiar advantage to one who, not being a 
 party to the deed, never had it in his custody, and hence may 
 not be able to account for its absence ; 9 but it cannot be em- 
 ployed by a party to the deed where he could as easily pro- 
 duce the orioinal instrument. 10 
 
 i Buck v. Gage, 27 Neb. 306 ; Ever- 
 son v. Mayhew, 85 Cal. 1 ; Poorman 
 v. Miller, 44 Cal. 269 ; Whitehead v. 
 School District, 145 Pa. St. 418 ; Ney 
 v. Mumme, 66 Tex. 268 ; Louisville, 
 etc. Co. v. Orr (La., 1892), 10 S. Rep. 
 167 ; State v. Reid, 45 La. Ann. 162 ; 
 Bode v. Trimmer, 82 Cal. 513 ; Bounds 
 v. Little, 79 Tex. 128. 
 
 2 Eversole v. Rankin, 102 Mo. 488 ; 
 Bounds v. Little, 79 Tex. 128 ; Abele 
 v. Brewster, 58 Hun, 605. See post, 
 § 130; Nolan v. Pelham, 77 Ga. 262; 
 Gayle v. Perryman (Tex., 1894), 24 
 S. W. Rep. 850. 
 
 3 See post, § 261. 
 
 4 Childrey v. Huntington, 34 W. Va. 
 457 ; Christman v. Phillips, 58 Hun, 
 282 ; Nesbit v. Bendheim, 15 N. Y. S. 
 300. 
 
 BSee§§ 142-149. 
 
 e Boree v. McLean, 24 Wis. 225. 
 
 ■Bode v. Trimmer, 82 Cal. 513. 
 Where no record can be produced to 
 show naturalization, it may be in- 
 
 ferred from the fact that he has voted, 
 held office and exercised the rights of 
 citizenship. Such facts would then be 
 relevant to show his naturalization. 
 Cowan v. Prowse (Ky., 1892), 19 S. W. 
 Rep. 407 ; Boyd v. Nebraska, 12 S. Ct 
 375 ; 143 U. S. 135. 
 
 8 See post, §§ 134, 142c-149; Ed- 
 wards v. Osmon, 84 Tex. 656 ; 19 S. W. 
 Rep. 868 ; Saders v. Giddings, 90 Mich. 
 50 ; 51 N. W. Rep. 265 ; Tevis v. Col- 
 lier, 84 Tex. 638 ; 19 S. W. Rep. 801. 
 It has been held that a copy of a rec- 
 ord made according to law must pre- 
 vail over the oral testimony of a 
 person who, on examining the rec- 
 ord, testifies that he cannot find the 
 part certified. Boyce v. Auditor, 52 
 N. W. Rep. 754 ; 90 Mich. 314. 
 
 9 Frank v. Reuter, 22 S. W. Rep. 
 812 : Woods v. Bonner, 89 Tenn. 411 ; 
 Kenosha Co. v. Shedd, 48 N. W. Rep. 
 933. 
 
 10 Wilson v. Wright (Utah, 1893), 30 
 Pac. Rep. 754.
 
 § 32.] PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE. 51 
 
 § 32. Disputed writings. — Where the existence of a writing 
 material to the case or having an important bearing upon the 
 credibility of a witness is disputed, its contents cannot be shown 
 by the verbal testimony of witnesses. Thus where, in the case 
 of a civil action or a criminal prosecution based upon the 
 violation of a statute or municipal ordinance, it becomes nec- 
 essary to prove the fact of the existence of the written statute 
 or by-law, it cannot be done by verbal evidence. 1 As matter 
 of experience it has been found that the memory is treacher- 
 ous and unreliable. Aside from the temptation to commit 
 fraud and perjury, to prevent the commission of which this 
 rule has been adopted, 2 which would be alwa3 7 s present if the 
 terms of disputed documents were allowed to be given by oral 
 evidence, the court has a right to see the whole document, 
 which may, in its entirety, possess a meaning far different 
 from that of any detached part. Where a witness is ques- 
 tioned on cross-examination as to the contents of a letter 
 which it is alleged he has written, -with a view to impeach him 
 by bringing out contradictory statements contained therein, the 
 letter must first be read to him and he must be asked if he 
 has written it. 3 In no event would it be proper to read a por- 
 tion of the letter or to embody a part or all of it in an inter- 
 rogatory and ask the witness if he wrote a letter to that effect. 4 
 So where the witness is examined by a commission, and in 
 reply to a question gives the contents of a letter without pro- 
 ducing it, it will be stricken out, there being no method of 
 obtaining the letter itself. 5 
 
 The erroneous admission of parol evidence of a writing is 
 cured by its subsequent production 6 by the party claiming 
 under it or by his adversary. 7 A copy of an instrument may 
 
 i Ex parte Canto, 21 Tex. App. stock v. Carnley, 4 Blatchf. C. C. 58 : 
 
 61; Louisville, etc. Co. v. Dulaney, Peck v. Parchen, 52 Iowa, 46 ; Dwyer 
 
 43 111. App. 297. See post, %% 143, v. Dunbar. 5 Wall. 318; Leese v. 
 
 143a. Clarke, 29 Cal. 664 ; Lowry v. Harris, 
 
 2 Anglo- Am. P. & C. Co. v. Cannon, 12 Minn. 255. 
 
 31 Fed. Rep. 313; Cornett v. Will- « Linton v. Allen, 154 Mass. 432; 
 
 iams, 20 Wall. 226. Jones v. Tallant, 90 Cal. 386 ; Avery 
 
 3 Seeposf, § 342. v. Starbuck, 127 N. Y. 675. 
 
 * See post § 350. 1 Glover v. Thomas, 75 Tex. 506 ; 
 
 & Beall v. Poole, 27 Md. 245 ; Com- Stewart v. De Loach, 86 Ga. 729.
 
 52 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE. [§ 33. 
 
 be received to prove the contents of the writing upon con- 
 dition that its correctness as a copy shall subsequently be 
 made to appear. Any impropriety in the reception of such a 
 copy is cured by proof that it is a true copy of the original. 1 
 
 § 33. Contracts or other transactions actually reduced to 
 writing. — Where parties to a contract have reduced their 
 agreement to writing, the existence of the written obligation 
 being to a certain extent the main fact in issue, the writing 
 itself must be given in evidence, and oral evidence of its con- 
 tents will not be received unless the absence of the writing is 
 satisfactorily accounted for. 2 Though this rule is usually in- 
 voked in cases where rights under a written contract are 
 sought to be enforced, it is equally applicable in the case of 
 any writing which has expressly or by implication been agreed 
 on by the parties as a history or record of a transaction in 
 which either or both were interested. So where the exami- 
 nation of a judgment debtor in supplementary proceedings was 
 taken in writing and signed by him, oral evidence to prove 
 what he said is inadmissible. 3 
 
 In the case of a written contract it is fair to infer that, the 
 parties having embodied their transactions in writing, the 
 writing will contain the final form which their dealings may 
 have assumed, and, having given and accepted written evi- 
 dence of a contractual relationship, they are compelled to 
 
 1 Kendrick v. Latham, 6 S. Rep. shown to be in existence but beyond 
 871 ; 25 Fla. 819. After a witness the jurisdiction may be shown by 
 has been allowed without objection secondary evidence (Thomson-Hous- 
 to give oral evidence of the contents ton El. Co. v. Palmer (Minn., 1890 j, 
 of a writing which he could have 53 N. W. Rep. 1137; Tenn. etc. Co. 
 produced as the best evidence, any v. Danforth (Ala., 1S93), 13 S. Rep. 
 objection to a question put to him to 51 ; Missouri, etc. Co. v. German, 84 
 ascertain his purpose in making it or Tex. 141); as by a letter-press copy, 
 to any relevant question comes too Smith v. Traders* Bank, 82 Tex. 3G8. 
 late. See post, §§ 126, 130, 132, 148, 149. 
 
 2 Lott v. King, 79 Tex. 292 ; Mem- 3 Kain v. Larkin, 131 N. Y. 300. 
 phis, etc. Co. v. Benson, 1 Pick. 627 ; Nor can an employee of a commei- 
 Pendery v. Crescent, 21 La. Ann. 410 ; cial agency give oral evidence of a 
 
 "Kleiman v. Geiselman, 45 Mo. App. merchant's credit or rating where 
 
 497 ; Lewis v. Hadmon, 56 Ala. 186 ; such facts are recorded in books kept 
 
 Steele v. Etheridge, 15 Minn. 501 ; for that purpose and which are easily 
 
 Taussig v. Glenn, 51 Fed. Rep. 409; accessible. Deere v. Bagley, 80 Iowa, 
 
 Stebbins v. Duncan, 108 U. S. 43. 197 ; 45 N. W. Rep. 557. 
 The contents of writings which are
 
 § 33.] PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE. 53 
 
 abide by their action and are not allowed to substitute evi- 
 dence of a verbal understanding in its place. 1 So it is said 
 that here the writing is not collateral but is of the essence of 
 the contract. 2 
 
 In an action to recover rent or wages, if plaintiff relies upon 
 a written lease or contract of hiring, he must produce it or 
 account for its absence ; for the amount due can only be prop- 
 erly ascertained by an examination of the terms of the con- 
 tract as they are contained in the writing. 3 On the other 
 hand, where the relationship of landlord and tenant, or of 
 master and servant, is the sole fact in issue, then, while it 
 could be readily proved by the production of a written con- 
 tract by which it was known to have been created, yet this is 
 not indispensable. 4 
 
 "Where the facts in issue are not the relative rights and 
 duties of the parties under the written instrument, but some 
 fact collateral to the writing, the production of the instru- 
 ment as primary evidence of that fact is not necessary, and 
 the fact in issue may be proved by parol evidence under the 
 rule that if such evidence is as near the fact to be proved as 
 written evidence, then both are primary evidence of that fact. 5 
 So where the contents of a telegram or letter are essential in 
 determining the rights of the parties, it must be produced as 
 primary evidence of those rights. But where the independent 
 fact in issue and to be proved is only that a letter or telegram 
 purporting to have been sent was actually sent or received, 
 the writing need not be produced. 6 In the case of telegraphic 
 
 1 See post, § 205. legher v. Insurance Co., 30 W. N. C. 
 
 2 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 87. 105 ; Philips v. Huntington, 35 W. 
 
 3 State v. New York, etc. Co. (N. Y., Va. 406. 
 
 1890), 8 Atl. Rep. 290. 5 Thus, where the question involved 
 
 4 File v. Springel, 132 Ind. 312 ; was the rental value of premises in a 
 Martin v. Bowie (S. C, 1893), 15 S. E. suit to recover compensation for the 
 Rep. 736. So the owner of real or condemnation under the right of 
 personal property will not be re- eminent domain, the production of 
 quired to produce a writing by which the lease in writing is not necessary, 
 the ownership became vested in him, hut the rental value may be proved 
 but may testify to the fact of owner- by verbal evidence from tenants, 
 ship where he does not base his Griswold v. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 
 claim on a writing and where the 14 Daly, 484. 
 
 fact of ownership is collateral. Gal- 6 Conner v. State, 23 Tex. App. 378 ;
 
 51 
 
 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§35. 
 
 dispatches, where the receiver of the dispatch is the employer 
 of the company, the original is the writing delivered to the 
 company's operator by the sender. But where the company 
 is the agent of the sender, then the original is the written 
 message which is delivered to the addressee. 1 
 
 § 35. Collateral writings. — In circumstances where the 
 writing has no clear and direct bearing upon or connection 
 with the point in issue or any relevancy to it, but is only col- 
 lateral, no objection exists to introducing oral or second- 
 ary evidence of its contents. Thus, a report of an accident 
 made by a witness as part of his duty need not be accounted 
 for to render his oral testimony admissible. 2 So, too, in an 
 action on contract, a written offer by one party which has 
 not been accepted by the other may be proved by parol. 3 
 
 An oral communication accompanying a written transaction 
 and having the same significance and effect may be shown 
 orally as independent evidence. 4 So payment may be shown 
 
 Holcombe v. State, 28 Ga. 66 ; West- 
 ern Union Tel. Co. v. Cline (Ind., 
 1894), 35 N. E. Rep. 564. 
 
 1 Thorp v. Philbin, 2 N. Y. S. 732; 
 Utley v. Donaldson, 94 U. S. 29; 
 Saveland v. Green, 40 Wis. 431 ; Will- 
 iams v. Breckell, 37 Miss. 682 ; Magie 
 v. Herman (Minn., 1892), 52 N. W. 
 Rep. 909; Anheuser-Busch v. Hut- 
 macher, 127 111. 657; Durkee v. Rail- 
 road Co., 29 Vt. 127 ; Western Union 
 Tel. Co. v. Shatter, 71 Ga. 760 ; Trevor 
 v. Wood, 36 N. Y. 307 ; Godwin v. 
 Francis, 1 L. R. C. P. 293 ; Wilson v. 
 Railroad Co., 31 Minn. 481. Under 
 exceptional circumstances, as where 
 the original telegram has been lost, 
 it has been held that its contents 
 may be shown orally where no writ- 
 ing or copy whatever exists. Terre 
 Haute, etc. Co. v. Stockwell, 118 Ind. 
 102. Cf. McCormick v. Joseph, 83 Ala. 
 401 ; Prather v. Wilkins, 68 Tex. 187. 
 
 2 Jacksonville, etc. Co. v. Wellman, 
 7 S. Rep. 845. Cf. Daniels v. Smith, 
 130 N. Y. 696. 
 
 3 Schoenberger v. Hackman, 37 Pa. 
 
 St. 87 ; Pickett v. Abney (Tex., 1893), 
 19 S. W. Rep. 859 ; Supples v. Lewis, 
 37 Conn. 568; Tuckwood v. Haw- 
 thorn, 30 N. W. Rep. 705 ; 67 Wis. 
 326 ; Ward v. Busack, 46 Wis. 407 ; 
 Bowen v. Bank, 18 N. Y. Supr. Ct. 
 226. A parent may testify orally to 
 the birth of a child, as the entry in a 
 family bible is not the best evidence. 
 State v. Woods (Kan., 1892), 30 Pac. 
 Rep. 520 ; Dobson v. Cathron, 34 S. C. 
 518. If the action is not to enforce 
 the contract itself or to recover dam- 
 ages for its breach, but of the nature 
 of replevin or an action of claim and 
 delivery to obtain possession of the 
 instrument itself, the plaintiff is ab- 
 solved both from producing the 
 paper or accounting for its absence. 
 Ross v. Bruce, 1 Day (Conn.), 100 ; Peo- 
 ple v. Holbrook, 13 Johns. 90, cited in 
 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 88 ; Pritchard v. 
 Norwood, 155 Mass. 539; 30 N. E- 
 Rep. 80. 
 
 4 See post, % 212 ; Cramer v. Shriner, 
 18 Md. 140 ; File v. Springel, 132 Ind. 
 312.
 
 § 30.] PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE. 55 
 
 by evidence of the tender and acceptance, though a written 
 receipt has been given; 1 and an oral demand may be proved 
 though a written demand has been made. 2 So in an action to 
 recover for delay in completing a building, the owner may 
 show he has leased it without producing the lease, though it 
 was in writing. 3 
 
 A certificate, parish register, transcript of a public record, 
 or other writing is not the best evidence of the existence of 
 the marriage relation, even though it has been declared by 
 statute to be presumptive evidence of that fact. 4 Though a 
 certificate which is known to exist is not produced, the mar- 
 riage may be proved hy other evidence equally primary and 
 original.- Thus it may be shown by the witnesses who were 
 present when it was solemnized, by the declarations or ad- 
 missions of the parties, whether against interest or forming a 
 part of the res gestce, or it may be inferred or presumed from 
 reputation 5 combined with cohabitation and other circum- 
 stances and the conduct of the parties. 6 
 
 § 36. Exceptions in the case of records and appointments 
 to office. — Public records of every sort, from the general in- 
 convenience which would result from their removal from the 
 usual places of custody, may be proved by a duly authenti- 
 cated or certified copy or transcript. 7 The courts in recent 
 times have shown every disposition to extend this rule, and it 
 has been applied to the books of private corporations where 
 It was very inconvenient to produce them; 8 but in such cases 
 a reasonable effort must be shown to have been made to ob- 
 tain possession of the original. 9 Where a statutory mode of 
 
 i See post, § 211; Coonrad v. Mad- 6 In re Wallace, 25 Atl. Rep. 260; 
 
 den, 126 Ind. 197 ; Kingsbury v. 49 N. J. Eq. 539 ; Baily v. State (Neb., 
 
 Moses, 45 N. H. 222; Wolf v. Foster, 1894), 55 N. W. Rep. 241 ; In re Drink- 
 
 13 Kan. 116 ; Van Bokkelen v. Ber- house, 24 Atl. Rep. 1083 ; 151 Pa. St. 
 
 dell, 130 N. Y. 141. Cf. contra, Steed 294 ; Arnold v. Cheseborough, 46 
 
 v. Knowles (Ala., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 75. Fed. Rep. 700 ; United States v. Ama- 
 
 2 Smith v. Young, 1 Campb. 439. dor (N. M., 1892), 27 Pac. Rep. 288; 
 Cf. Wollner v. Lehman (Ala., 1888), In re Hamilton, 12 N. Y. S. 708; 
 4 S. Rep. 643 ; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Col- Smith v. Smith, 52 N. J. L. 207 ; In re 
 lins, 45 Kan. 88. Gall, 9 N. Y. S. 426. 
 
 3 Consaul v. Sheldon, 35 Neb. 247. " §§ 142, 146-150. 
 
 Cf. Schurtz v. Kerkow, 85 Cal. 277. s Fox v. Baltimore, etc. Co., 34 W. 
 
 * Com. v. Dill, 156 Mass. 226. Va. 466. 
 
 5 See § 114. 9 Bourck v. Miller, 26 Pac. Rep. 861.
 
 56 PKIMAKY AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE. [§ 36. 
 
 proving a record by a certified copy is established, it cannot 
 be proven by parol. 1 It has also been held that, where the 
 records are lost, the loss and their contents may be shown by 
 the testimony of a person having actual knowledge thereof. 2 
 Based upon the inconvenience entailed in compelling their 
 production and their general notoriety, it has been repeatedly 
 held that oral evidence may be given of the contents of reso- 
 lutions passed at public meetings and of the inscriptions upon 
 banners or flags used in public parades. 3 
 
 Another exception to the rule requiring the production of 
 written as the best evidence occurs in cases where a party is 
 called upon to prove the validity of the appointment of a 
 public officer. The writing by which the* officer was appointed 
 need not generally be produced ; but on proof that the public 
 official has acted notoriously as such, he will be presumed, in 
 collateral proceedings at least, to have been legally and prop- 
 erly appointed, and this presumption will obtain until the 
 contrary shall be made to appear. 4 It is of no importance in 
 what manner the question arises, or whether the officer be a 
 party to the action, for it is a general principle that so far as 
 his relations toward the public are concerned the appointment 
 and tenure of a de facto official are prima facie as valid as 
 those of an officer dejure? 
 
 The true basis for the admission of oral evidence or certi- 
 fied copies of the contents of records being the inconvenience 
 which would ensue if their actual production were required, 
 it follows that monuments, natural or artificial, used to mark 
 
 i Roberts v. Connelle, 71 Tex. 11 ; 8 46 N. W. Rep. 872 ; Shiver v. Bentley, 
 
 S. W. Rep. 626 ; Kentzler v. Kentzler, 78 Ga. 537 ; 3 S. E. Rep. 770 ; Burke 
 
 3 Wash. 166. v. Cutler (Iowa, 1890), 43 N. W. Rep. 
 
 2 Cilley v. Van Patten (Mich., 1888), 204. That a commission is only 
 35 N. W. Rep. 831; 69 Mich. 400; prima facie evidence of title, see 
 Richards' Appeal (Pa., 1888), 15 All. State v. Peel (Ind., 1890), 24 N. E. 
 Rep. 903 ; Turnbull v. Richardson, 69 Rep. 440. Contra, Webb Co. v. 
 Mich. 400 ; 4 S. Rep. 613. Gonzales (Tex., 1889), 6 S. W. Rep. 
 
 3 Rex v. Hunt, 3 B. & A. 566 ; Sher- 781. 
 
 idan's Case, 31 How. St Tr. 672. 5 Com. v. Kane, 108 Mass. 423 ; 
 
 * North v. People, 28 N. E. Rep. Woolsey v. Roundout, 4 Abb. (N. Y.) 
 
 966 ; Wilcox v. Smith, 5 Wend. 231 ; App. Dec. 172 ; Cromer v. Bornest, 
 
 Plymouth v. Painter, 17 Conn. 585; 27 S. C. 436; 3 S. E. Rep. 849; New 
 
 East Tenn. etc. Co. v. Davis, 8 S. Portland v. King, 55 Me. 172. 
 Rep. 349 ; State v. Row (Iowa, 1892),
 
 § 37.] PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE. 57 
 
 the boundaries of land, mural tablets, gravestones and similar 
 bulky articles need not be produced in court for the purpose 
 of proving the inscriptions upon them. So the oral evidence 
 of the surveyor who has surveyed land is admissible, not only 
 to show the original location of a boundary line, 1 and the po- 
 sition of the monuments by which it was settled, even when 
 the monuments have been destroyed, 2 but his testimony is 
 also admissible, from necessity, of the marks which were 
 blazed upon the trees along the boundary line. 3 But by 
 United States statutes, section 2390, the field-notes and plats 
 of the original surveyor are made primary evidence of the 
 original boundary of public lands. 
 
 § 37. Exception in the case of general results. — To pre- 
 vent the time of the court from being unduly occupied in the ex- 
 amination of evidence consisting of numerous and bulky books 
 and papers in order to prove a single fact or circumstance, the 
 production of such voluminous writings may be dispensed with, 
 and a witness may state verbally the general result of his ex- 
 amination of books or written instruments made out of court. 
 Here it should be noted the witness is not asked to testify to 
 the contents of the writings. He is asked to give primary 
 evidence of an independent fact within his personal knowledge 
 which he has ascertained by the use of his own powers of ob- 
 servation. 4 Thus an expert who has examined the books of 
 account bearing upon the facts in issue may testify that a cer- 
 tain general balance is due thereon; 5 and where an issue of 
 bankruptcy or insolvency is concerned, the general result of 
 an examination of the books and securities of the debtor may 
 be stated without their actual production in court. 6 But a 
 
 1 Sheetz v. Sweeney, 26 N. E. Rep. if the books are themselves in evi- 
 648. dence, it is not error to permit an 
 
 2 Bohrer v. Lange, 44 Minn. 381. expert book-keeper who has ex- 
 
 3 Ayers v. Watson, 137 U. S. 584. aminecl them to state the result of 
 4 Schroeder v. Fry, 14 N. Y. S. 71; his examination on the witness stand. 
 
 Burton v. Driggs, 20 Wall. (IT. S.) Culver v. Marks, 122 Ind. 554; 22 
 
 136 ; Boston, etc. Co. v. Dana, 1 Gray N. E. Rep. 1086. 
 
 (Mass.), 83; Holbrook v. Jackson, 7 5 Culver v. Marks, 122 Ind. 554; 
 
 Cush. 136 ; Stocking v. St. Paul Trust Wolford v. Farnham, 47 Minn. 95. 
 
 Co., 39 Minn. 40 ; 40 N. W. Rep. 365. 6 Meyer v. Sefton, 2 Stark. 274. A 
 
 Contra, Fox v. Baltimore, etc. Co., 12 debtor's liabilities can be proved by 
 
 S. E. Rep. 757 ; 34 W. Va. 466 ; McCall the verbal evidence of his creditors 
 
 v. Moscowitz, 14 Daly, 16. A fortiori without producing any written evi-
 
 58 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE. [§ 38. 
 
 witness will not be permitted to testify to the single fact that 
 a certain sale had not been made where he learns that fact 
 only from an examination of the plaintiff's books, unless the 
 books are also produced. 1 
 
 § 38. Admissions as primary evidence. — As to whether a 
 party's admission of the existence and contents of a writing will 
 render unnecessary notice to him to produce it, and whether 
 his admission can be used against him as secondary evidence 
 of the contents of the writing, the cases are divided. The ex- 
 ecution of a deed or other attested instrument must be proved 
 when it is produced, though the grantor, while denying its 
 execution, may have admitted all its statements of fact. 2 If 
 the existence or contents of a deed or other instrument which 
 is not produced be in issue, it has been held that the admis- 
 sion of the party claiming under it or of a party holding under 
 him is primary evidence of the truth of any fact which is re- 
 cited therein. 3 But there are decisions which sustain the con- 
 trary proposition ; 4 and in any event the admission of the party 
 ought to be rejected where, instead of a statement of facts 
 recited in the writing, it consists of a oonfessio juris or opinion 
 of the party upon its legal operation and effect. 5 Where the 
 admission involves a statement of facts as well as a statement 
 of the legal effect of a writing, as where the party declared 
 he was " possessed of a leasehold," 6 or had " dissolved articles 
 of partnership," ' it will be admissible as primary evidence of 
 the contents of the writing itself, in its entirety. 8 
 
 deaces of indebtedness which they 278; Edgar v. Richardson, 33 Ohio 
 
 may hold. Rutledge v. Hudson, 80 St. 581 ; Cumberland Mut. Fire Ins. 
 
 Ga. 266 ; 5 S. E. Rep. 93. Co. v. Giltmau, 48 N. J. L. 495 ; 7 
 
 i Hamilton v. Northwood (Mich., Atl. Rep. 424; Wolverton v. State, 
 
 1391), 49 N. W. Rep. 37. 16 Ohio St. 173. 
 
 -See post, § 133. 4 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 96, citing 
 
 3 Slatterie v. Pooley, 6 M. & W. Lawless v. Quele, 8 Ir. L. 382; Wel- 
 
 664 ; Murray v. Gregory, 5 Wels. & land Canal v. Hathaway, 8 Wend. 480 ; 
 
 H. 468 ; Morey v. Hoyt (Conn., 1893), Jenner v. Jolliffe, 6 Johns. 9 ; Has- 
 
 26 Atl. Rep. 127; Taylor v. Peck, 21 brouck v. Baker, 10 id. 248. 
 
 Gratt. (Va.) 11; Loomis v. Wadham, ^Bloxam v. Elsie, 1 C. & P. 558; 
 
 8 Gray (Mass.), 557 ; Hoefliug v. Scott v. Clare, 3 Campb. 236 ; Rex v. 
 
 Hambleton (Texas, 1892), 19 S. W. Inhabitants, 3 B. & Aid. 588. 
 
 Rep. 689; Edwards v. Tracy, 62 Pa. 6 Digby v. Steel, 3 Campb. 115. 
 
 St. 374; Blackington v. Rockland, 66 ?Doe v - Mil es, 1 Stark. 181. 
 
 Me. 332; Terry v. Rodahan, 79 Ga. 8 See 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 86.
 
 § 38a.] 
 
 PKIMAKY AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE. 
 
 59 
 
 § 38a. Photographs as primary evidence. — Photographs 
 are admissible as primary evidence upon the same grounds 
 and for the same purposes as are diagrams, maps and draw- 
 ings of an object or locality which is the subject of contro- 
 versy. Photographs have been received for the purpose of 
 describing and identifying the premises which are in litiga- 
 tion, 1 or to furnish a means of identifying persons, 2 to present 
 visible representation of physical injuries, 3 to supply accurate 
 facsimiles of public records which could not themselves be 
 conveniently brought into court ; 4 and enlarged photographs 
 of disputed writings emphasizing, illustrating and making 
 more prominent peculiarities of handwriting have been em- 
 ployed by experts as standards of comparison/' If the accu- 
 racy of the photograph is shown prima facie either by the 
 party taking it or by some other competent witness 6 giving 
 evidence that the photograph faithfully represents the object, 
 it should go to the jury subject to impeachment by the other 
 side by means of testimony tending to show its inaccuracy. 7 
 
 iNies v. Broadhead, 27 N. Y. S. 
 52 ; Cozzens v. Higgins, 33 How. Pr. 
 439; Blair v. Pelham, 118 Mass. 421 ; 
 Ayers v. Harris, 77 Tex. 108 ; Church 
 v. Milwaukee, 31 Wis. 519; Locke v. 
 Railroad Co., 46 Iowa, 112. 
 
 2 People v. Smith, 121 N. Y. 578; 
 Luke v. Calhoun Co., 52 Ala. 118; 
 Wash. L. Ins. Co. v. Scheible, t W. 
 N. C. 369; Wilcox v. Wilcox. 46 
 Hun, 32 ; Udderzook v. Com., 76 Pa. 
 St. 340: Ruloff v. People, 45 N. Y. 
 224. 
 
 3 Franklin v. State, 09 Ga. 42. 
 
 4 Leathers v. Salvor Wrecking Co., 
 2 Woods, 682 ; Luco v. United States, 
 23 How. 541 ; Daly v. Maguire, 6 
 Blatchf. 137. 
 
 5 Rowell v. Fuller, 59 Vt. 688 ; Buz- 
 ard v. McAnulty, 77 Tex. 438 ; Tome 
 v. Railroad Co., 39 Md. 90 ; Marcy v. 
 Barnes, 16 Gray, 163 ; Eborn v. Zim- 
 pleman, 47 Tex. 519 ; Foster's Will, 
 34 Mich. 237. See, also, Anderson's 
 Law Diet ; 20 Alb. L. J. 4-6 ; 24 id. 
 182-184 
 
 6 Roosevelt v. Railroad Co., 66 Hun, 
 633. 
 
 7 Turner v. Boston, etc. Co. (Mass., 
 1893), 33 N. E. Rep. 520 ; Leidlein v. 
 Mayer (Mich., 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. 
 367 ; Omaha, etc. Co. v. Beeson (Neb., 
 1893), 54 id. 557 ; Missouri, etc. Co. v. 
 Moore (Tex., 1891), 15 S. W. Rep. 714 ; 
 Kansas, etc. Co. v. Smith, 90 Ala. 
 25 ; Com. v. Switzer, 134 Pa. St. 383 ; 
 Ming v. Foote, 9 Mont. 201 ; Archer 
 v. N. Y, N. H. etc. Co., 106 N. Y. 603 ; 
 Cowley v. People, 83 N. Y. 464 ; Peo- 
 ple v. Buddensieck, 103 id. 500 ; Durst 
 v. Masters, L. R. 10 Prob. Div. 373, 
 378 ; Ortiz v. State, 30 Fla. 256. If a 
 party denies that he signed an instru- 
 ment a photograph of which is in- 
 troduced, it has been held that the 
 testimony of a witness who is ac- 
 quainted with his handwriting is 
 not admissible to show that the 
 photograph accurately reproduces 
 his genuine signature. Buzard v. 
 McAnulty, 77 Tex. 438; 14 S. W. Rep. 
 138. In criminal trials a photograph
 
 60 PKIMARY AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE. [§ 39. 
 
 But the photograph, plan or diagram must be relevant, and 
 its relevancy will depend on whether the scene or object 
 which it portrays is relevant. The question of relevancy as 
 distinct from the correctness of the photograph is for the 
 judge exclusively, and is to be determined upon the same con- 
 siderations which govern him where the relevancy of any sort 
 of evidence is concerned. 1 
 
 Upon the same ground that photographs, maps and plans 
 have been admitted in evidence, pencil or pen-and-ink sketches 
 will be received to identify or explain localities. Their accu- 
 racy ought, however, to be shown by the testimony of the 
 person who made them, or some other competent witness, stat- 
 ing under oath that of his own knowledge and observation 
 they faithfully represent the object depicted. 2 
 
 § 39. Exhibition of articles in court. — An article the 
 relevancy of which has been shown by being identified with 
 the subject-matter of the issue may be exhibited to the jury 
 in the court-room to enable them to understand the evidence 
 or to realize more fully its force and cogency. Thus the dis- 
 trict attorney has been permitted to exhibit to the jury an 
 instrument with which it is alleged an abortion was commit- 
 ted, 3 or a pistol or other weapon or article with which a homi- 
 cide has been committed, and a witness will be allowed to ex- 
 
 of the defendant taken shortly after 111. 474. The relevancy of photo- 
 
 or prior to his arrest is admissible to graphs is largely in the discretion of 
 
 show his appearance on or about the court, and, unless a manifest in- 
 
 that date, particularly where the evi- justice has been done, its action will 
 
 dence of his personal appearance is not be reviewed. So even where a 
 
 contradictory. State v. Ellwood, 17 party, because of personal injuries, 
 
 R. I. 763 ; Com. v. Morgan (Mass., is himself unable to be present and 
 
 1893), 34 N. E. Rep. 458. testify, it was held proper to refuse 
 
 1 Verran v. Baird, 150 Mass. 150. to receive a photograph of him made 
 
 The fact that a change had been a year before as proof of his condi- 
 
 made in the building which was tion at the date he was injured, 
 
 photographed does not render the though it was shown his condition 
 
 latter irrelevant if the change is not had not changed. Gilbert v. West 
 
 material. Glasier v. Hebron, 62 Hun, End St. Ry. Co. (Mass., 1894), 36 N. E. 
 
 137 ; Pashall v. Railroad Co., 66 id. Rep. 60. 
 
 633. A photograph taken by an 2 People v. Johnson (N. Y., 1893), 35 
 
 amateur who had never visited the N. E. Rep. 604. 
 
 place before was held inadmissible in 3 Com. v. Brown, 14 Gray (Mass.), 
 
 Cleveland, etc. Co. v. Monaghan, 140 419.
 
 § 30.] TKIMARY AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE. Gl 
 
 plain how it could have been used. 1 The clothing worn by the 
 deceased may be shown to illustrate to the jury how close 
 the defendant was to him when he was killed. 2 Under simi- 
 lar circumstances the vertebra of the deceased, if properly 
 identified, may be submitted to the inspection of the jury, an 
 objection that such a course is prejudicial to the accused as 
 calculated to excite feelings of horror in the mind of the jurors 
 being deemed without merit. 3 Portions of a body of a woman 
 on whom an abortion is alleged to have been committed, pre- 
 served in spirits, may be shown to the jury as explanatory 
 and illustrative of the evidence of the physician who con- 
 ducted the post-mortem examination. 4 The clothing of the 
 defendant may be exhibited to the jury to show that spots 
 thereon are blood-stains, though the article itself may have 
 been procured from him without his knowledge of the pur- 
 pose for which it was to be used. 5 So criminating articles 
 which are relevant may be shown on the trial, though they 
 were irregularly or illegally obtained from the defendant ; fi 
 nor does a constitutional enactment providing that no one 
 shall testify against himself hinder the use of the garments 
 or other articles belonging to the prisoner for this purpose. 7 
 Ordinarily it is necessary that the articles exhibited should be 
 connected prima facie at least with the transaction in issue. 
 Though it has been permitted, 8 the propriety and justice of 
 
 i State v. Roberts, 63 Vt. 159 ;• Si- Tex. App. 203 ; People v. Knapp, 71 
 
 berry v. State (Iud., 1893), 33 N. E. Cal. 1 ; Abb. Cr. Brief, § 586. 
 
 Rep. 681 ; Rocleriquez v. State; (Tex., 3 Turner v. State, 89 Terra. 547 ; 
 
 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 978 ; Com. v. State v. Moxley, 102 Mo. 374. 
 
 Brown, 121 Mass. 69; Hornsby v. 4 Com. v. Brown, 14 Gray (Mass.), 
 
 State, 94 Ala. 55 ; State v. Crow (Mo., 419. 
 
 1892), 17 S. W. Rep. 744 : People v. 5 State v. Baker, 33 W. Va. 379. 
 
 Gonzales, 35 N. Y. 49 ; People v. 6 Com. v. Tibbetts (Mass., 1893), 32 
 
 Fernandez, 35 id. 49, 64; State v. N. E. Rep. 910; Gindrat v. People 
 
 Mordecai, 68 N. C. 207 ; Leonard v. (111., 1893), 27 N. E. Rep. 1085 ; Sie- 
 
 Raihvay Co., 21 Oreg. 655 ; Gardiner bert v. People (111., 1893), 32 N. E. 
 
 v. People, 6 Park. Cr. Cas. (N. Y.) 157 ; Rep. 431. See post, §§ 197, 198. 
 
 State v. Graham, 74 N. C. 646. ' Drake v. State, 75 Ga. 413, 415 ; 
 
 2 People v. Wright (Mich., 1892), 50 State v. Ah Clung, 14 Nev. 79, 83; 
 
 N. W Rep. 792 ; Watkins v. State, 89 State v. Garrett, 71 N. C. 95. 
 
 Ala. 82 ; Frizzed v. State (Tex., 1891), 8 State v. Ellwood, 24 Atl. Rep. 
 
 16 S. W. Rep. 751; Levy v. State, 28 782; 17 R. I. 763; State v. Duncan 
 
 (Mo., 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 690.
 
 62 PBIMABY AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE. [§ 39. 
 
 permitting articles such as deadly weapons, lanterns, masks 
 and other tools used by burglars and similar articles which 
 are not the articles alleged or shown by any evidence to have 
 been employed by the accused to be exhibited to the jury 
 may well be doubted. Such a custom, under the guise of il- 
 lustrating and explaining the evidence, is well calculated to 
 create prejudice in the jury.
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 HEARSAY. 
 
 § 50. Definition — Grounds for its 
 rejection. 
 
 51. Statements to be proved as facts. 
 
 52. Expressions of bodily or mental 
 
 feeling. 
 
 53. Pedigree — Oral and written 
 
 declarations. 
 
 54. Declarations constituting a part 
 
 of the res gestae. 
 
 55. Requisites. 
 
 56. Must be illustrative and con- 
 
 nected with main transaction. 
 
 § 57. Must be contemporaneous. 
 
 58. Entries as part of the res gest<v 
 
 and made by third persons. 
 
 59. Entries against interest and 
 
 entries which are part of the 
 res gestce distinguished. 
 
 60. A party's own books as evi- 
 
 dence. 
 
 61. The declarations of agents when 
 
 a part of the res gestce. 
 
 62. Indorsements as part of the 
 
 res gestce. 
 
 §50. Definition — Grounds for its -rejection. — The term 
 " hearsay," as used in the law of evidence, signifies all evidence 
 which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of the 
 witness from whom it is elicited, and which consequently does 
 not depend wholly for its credibility and weight upon the 
 confidence which the jury may have in him. 1 Its value, if 
 
 1893), 11 S. Rep. 838 ; Dountain v. Con- 
 nellee (Tex., 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 856 ; 
 Befay v. Wheeler (Wis., 1893), 53 N. 
 W. Rep. 1121; Mathis v. Pridham, 1 
 Tex. Civ. App. 58 ; Atchison, etc. Co. 
 v. Parker, 55 Fed. Rep. 595; Ellis v. 
 Whitehead (Mich., 1893), 54 N. W. 
 Rep. 752. Self-serving statements — 
 i. e., statements made out of court 
 bj r a party in his own favor — are 
 hearsay if not acquiesced in by the 
 adverse party so as to operate as ad- 
 missions or b\^ way of estoppel. Whit- 
 ney v. Houghton, 125 Mass. 451 ; Siva 
 v. Wabash R. R. Co. (Mo., 1893), 21 S. 
 W. Rep. 915. But it is not hearsay for 
 a witness, whether a party or not, to 
 repeat on the witness stand his prior 
 statement made out of court. Charles 
 v. State, 49 Ala. 332. See post, § 79. 
 
 1 "Hearsay is that kind of evidence 
 which does not derive its value solely 
 from the credit to be given to the 
 witness himself, but rests also in part 
 on the veracity and competency of 
 some other person." 1 Greenl. on 
 Evid., § 99. "Hearsay is . . . 
 literally what the witness says he 
 heard another person say." Bouvier's 
 Law Diet. "Hearsay is what is 
 heard as rumored ; testimony not a 
 matter of personal knowledge with 
 the witness." Anderson's Law Diet. 
 The question, Is evidence when pre- 
 sented hearsay or original? is one in 
 the exclusive province of the court. 
 Harter Medicine Co. v. Hopkins, 83 
 Wis. 309; 53 N. W. Rep. 501. See, 
 also, Gross v. Moore, 68 Hun, 412 ; 2^ 
 N. Y. S. 1019 ; Brown v. Prude (Ala.,
 
 €4 HEARSAY. [§ 50. 
 
 any, is measured by the credit to be given to some third per- 
 son not sworn as a witness to that fact, and consequently not 
 subject to cross-examination. When the requirement is made 
 that a witness can testify to those facts only of which he has 
 some personal knowledge, 1 it is not meant that each witness 
 must have actual personal knowledge of the principal facts 
 which are in issue on the one hand, or a full knowledge of all 
 the details to which he is expected to testify on the other. 
 The utmost reasonable requirement that can be made is that he 
 should have an actual knowledge of the facts, not derived from 
 any other person's knowledge of the truth or falsity of any 
 transaction to which he is going to testify. 2 Any statement 
 made by him of anything which another person has told him 
 as to those facts is generally hearsay and inadmissible, no 
 matter how worthy of credit that person would be if called 
 as a witness. 
 
 The utility and value of cross-examination and of the sanction 
 of an oath as tests of the truth of testimony being evident 
 from long experience, it is necessary under such circumstances 
 to call the person who was the witness' informant to testify 
 to those matters which are hearsay in the mouth of any other 
 person. 3 
 
 1 The fact that a witness claims. to 115 ; Dubois v. Perkins, 21 Oreg. 1S9 ; 
 be testifying from his own personal Orr v. Orr, 34 S. C. 275 ; Glenn v. 
 knowledge is not of course con- Ligett, 47 Fed. Rep. 472 ; Corwin v. 
 elusive. He may be self-deceived ; Morehead, 51 Iowa, 99 ; Mutual, etc. 
 and what he calls his personal Co. v. Tillman, 84 Tex. 31 ; 19 S. W. 
 knowledge may consist of mental Rep. 294; McLeod v. Lee, 17 Nev. 
 impressions created by circumstances 103 (declaration of decedent) ; Hard 
 collateral to the main point in issue v. Ashley, 63 Hun, 634 ; Sangster v. 
 or stamped unconsciously upon his Dalton (Ark., 1890), 12 S. W. Rep. 
 mind by the statement of others, but 202 ; Fordyce v. McCants, 51 Ark. 
 which from lapse of time and his 509; Fitzgerald v. Williams, 148 
 unshaken belief in their truth he Mass. 462; Harris v. Railroad, 78 
 now regards as acquired through his Ga. 525 ; Tarbox v. Shuegrue, 36 
 own powers of observation. Lamar Kan. 225 ; Armstrong v. Ackley, 71 
 v. Pearce (Ga., 1893), 17 S. E. Rep. 92. Iowa, 76 ; Alabama, etc. R. Co. v. Ar- 
 
 2 West v. Home Ins. Co., 18 Fed. nold (Ala.), 2 S. Rep. 837 ; East Tenn., 
 Rep. 622, V. & G. R. Co. v. Maloy, 77 Ga. 237 : 
 
 3 1 Greenl. on Evid., §§ 98, 124, 163 ; Wagoner v. Ruply, 69 Tex. 700 ; 111. 
 
 Bacon v. Hanna, 63 Hun, 625 ; Hun- Cent. R R. Co. v. Ruffin (Miss., 1888), 
 
 ter v. Lanius, 18 S. W. Rep. 201; 82 3S. Rep. 578; Kaufman v. Springer, 
 
 •Tex. 677 ; Wallace v. Story, 139 Mass. 38 Kan. 730 ; Louisville, etc. Co. v.
 
 ■§ 50.] HEARSAY. G5 
 
 Hearsay evidence is not confined to the repetition of that 
 which is orally communicated. If information contained in 
 a writing addressed to or read by him is given in evidence, 
 not to prove the existence or to show the contents of the writ- 
 ing, but as having a direct bearing upon some fact in issue, 
 then such evidence is hearsay. 
 
 The rule requiring the production of the best evidence of 
 ?my transaction is founded upon the principle that oral evi" 
 dence of the contents of a writing is substitutionary and its 
 introduction indicative of better existing evidence which is 
 withheld. The withholding, retention or suppression of better 
 or more original evidence furnishes only a partial reason for the 
 rejection of hearsay, for hearsay evidence is intrinsically and 
 peculiarly weak at its inception. As applied to writings, the 
 rule requiring the production of the best evidence and the rule 
 rejecting hearsay are frequently confused. 1 This fact, taken 
 in connection with the vague and loose meaning of the word 
 " hearsay," as it is used, renders some further elucidation nec- 
 essary. For example, suppose the existence, but not the con- 
 tents, of a writing is inquired into. A witness may testify that 
 he has seen it, and may further relate what disposition has 
 been made of it. 2 Such evidence, as we shall see later, is not 
 secondary, nor is it hearsay, but is original primary evidence 
 of an independent fact — i. e., the visual existence of the writ- 
 ing. 3 If, however, the witness is questioned as to the con- 
 tents of a writing, its production is indispensable by the rule 
 requiring the best evidence of its contents, and oral evidence 
 will not be received until its absence is satisfactorily accounted 
 for. 4 Bat if the witness in his evidence testilies as to some 
 particular matter of fact — as, for example, the injury to the 
 plaintiff, the knowledge of which has come to him not through 
 his personal observation and presence, but from the perusal of 
 a letter written by some third person, — then his evidence is 
 
 Wood, 113 Ind. 544; St. Louis v. i See ante, § 30 et seq. 
 
 Aruot, 94 Mo. 275 ; 7 S. W. Rep. 15 ; 2 Ramsey v. Hurley, 72 Tex. 194 ; 
 
 Eddy v. McCall (Mich., 1888), 39 N. Neland v. Murphy, 73 Wis. 326 ; 
 
 W. Rep. 734; Iusurance Co. v. Lane, State v. Sterling, 41 La. Ann. 679. 
 
 46 N. J. Eq. 316 ; Central R. Co. v. 3 See § 51. 
 
 Kent, 84 Ga. 351 ; Doyle v. Church, * See post, § 130. 
 118 N. Y. 678; Nixon v. McKinney, 
 105 N. C. 23. 
 5
 
 60 UEARSAY. [§ 51. 
 
 hearsay and inadmissible. Under such circumstances the writer 
 of the letter should be called to witness to the fact in issue. 
 Thus, where it was sought to hold defendant responsible for 
 money left with him to be forwarded to A., the witness was 
 not permitted to testify that A. had never received it, his only 
 source of knowledge being letters received from A. 1 
 
 The intervention of an interpreter in an interview in which 
 the witness participated, and through whom the witness ac- 
 quired his information, does not render his knowledge of what 
 was said hearsay, as the interpreter is regarded as the agent 
 of both parties for the time being. 2 
 
 The rule by the operation of which hearsay evidence is re- 
 jected because of the facility for the commission of fraud and 
 perjury which would result from its acceptance being of gen- 
 eral application, it becomes of great importance to distinguish 
 carefully between evidence which is hearsay and that which 
 may be considered original. No general rule of differentia- 
 tion can be laid down. Whether evidence is original or hear- 
 say depends of course to a very large extent upon the nature 
 of the facts themselves — that is, whether they are within the 
 personal knowledge of the witness or not. But much depends 
 upon the circumstances of each particular case and upon the 
 facts which are sought to be proved ; so that evidence which 
 consists of the language of a third person and which under 
 some circumstances would be rejected as hearsay, will, in dif- 
 ferent circumstances, be admitted as original. The various 
 cases in which declarations or writings of third parties not 
 produced as witnesses are original evidence will now be con- 
 sidered. 
 
 § 51. Statements to be proved as facts. — In cases where 
 the truth or falsity of the statement made is immaterial, but 
 the main question is whether the statement, information or 
 advice was actually given or made, a witness may testify con- 
 cerning statements made by third persons out of court who 
 
 i Goldberg v. Wolff, 10 N. Y. S. 355. See, also, post, §§ 77, 331a. But 
 
 544. see, contra, Territory v. Big Knot 
 
 2 State v. Hamilton, 8 S. Rep. 304; on Head, 6 Mont 242; 11 Pac. Rep. 
 
 42 La. Ann. 1204 ; Wise v. Newatney, 670. See, also, 1 Whart. on Evid., 
 
 26 Neb. 88 ; 42 N. W. Rep. 339 ; Corn. § 193. 
 v. Vose (Mass., 1893), 32 N. E. Rep.
 
 § 51.] • HEARSAY. * 67 
 
 are not introduced as witnesses. Thus, if it is necessary to 
 ascertain the motives which actuated a person's conduct, the 
 information upon which he relied is important, and in sub- 
 stantiating the prudence, legality or good faith with which he 
 claims to have acted he may introduce evidence of what ad- 
 vice or information he received. For this reason, in a suit for 
 malicious prosecution, the advice or information which de- 
 fendant acted upon may be given in evidence as original evi- 
 dence tending to prove the existence of a probable cause. 1 But 
 it has been held that the declaration of one not a party to the 
 suit is not admissible to show the declarant's intention. 2 So, 
 too, where the question of a person's sanity is involved, oral 
 and written communications had with the alleged lunatic are 
 admissible to show how his mental condition was regarded 
 by those having dealings with him, but only in a case where 
 the communications, being connected with some act done by 
 him, have become a part of the res gestcz? 
 
 To prove the fact of bankruptcy, or that a bankrupt has 
 absconded, a witness may testify to what the bankrupt said 
 about his financial condition or his future intentions. 4 The 
 same rule is applicable to the statement made to persons en- 
 deavoring to serve civil process where one is alleged to be 
 avoiding its service. 5 So language used by a person, either 
 contemporaneous with or shortly before or after a certain act, 
 is admissible to show the condition of his mind, i. e., its weak- 
 ness or strength at the time of the act. But such declara- 
 tions are not admissible to show his intention where the law 
 
 1 Lcahey v. Marsh, 155 Pa. St. 458 ; person are always admissible to 
 McClafferty v. Phelp, 151 id. 86; prove or to rebut the fraudulent in- 
 Com. v. Felch, 132 Mass. 22 ; Finn v. tent. O'Hare v. Duckworth, 4 Wash. 
 Frink, 84 Me. 261 ; Mark v. Hastings St. 470 ; Ferbrache v. Martin (Idaho, 
 (Ala., 1893), 13 S. Rep. 297; Owens v. 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 252; Snyder v. 
 State, 74 Ala. 401 ; Hahn v. Schmidt, Free (Mo., 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 847 ; 
 64 Cal. 284; Atkins v. State, 69 Ga. Hicks v. Sharp, 89 Ga. 311. 
 
 595 ; Johnson v. Miller, 82 Iowa, 693. 4 O'Hare v. Duckworth, 4 "Wash. 
 
 2 North Stonington v. Stonington, St. 470 ; State v. Penn, 13 Bank. Reg. 
 31 Conn. 412. 464. 
 
 3 Paine v. Aldrich. 30 N. E. Rep. 5 Sumner v. Williams, 5 Mass. 144 ; 
 725 ; 133 N. Y. 544. So where fraud- Buswell v. Luicks, 8 Daly (N. Y.), 518. 
 ulent intent is in issue, the declara- Cf. Werner v. Com., 80 Ky. 387. 
 tions of a party or of some third
 
 68 
 
 HEARSAY. 
 
 :§ 5s 
 
 requires intention to be manifested in writing as in the case 
 of wills. 1 
 
 So, generally, if the only fact in issue is whether a certain 
 statement was or was not made by some third person, it is 
 not absolutely necessary to call that person, but the substance 
 of his language may be given in evidence by one who was 
 present and heard it. 2 
 
 § 52. Expressions of bodily or mental feeling. — Oral ex- 
 pressions of mental or physical sensations, where the declar- 
 ant's condition of body or mind is material, may be given in 
 evidence by a person who has heard them. The fact primar- 
 ily in issue under such circumstances is whether the exclama- 
 tions indicating pain, anger, malice or other passion were 
 uttered, and to this fact the witness may testify, leaving all 
 inquiry whether the feelings were feigned or real for the jury 
 to determine. So ejaculations indicating the existence of 
 pain 3 or malice 4 may be testified to by any one who heard 
 
 1 Canada's Appeal. 47 Conn. 450 ; 
 Mooney v. Olsen, 22 Kan. 69 ; Maye 
 v. Bradlee, 127 Mass. 414; Bush v. 
 Bush, 87 Mo. 480 ; Tingly v. Cowgill, 
 48 Mo. 201 ; Rusling v. Rusling, 36 
 N. J. Eq. 726 ; Marx v. McGlynn, 88 
 N. Y. 357; Herster v. Herster, 122 
 Pa. St. 239 ; Conway v. Vizzard, 122 
 Iud. 266 ; Potter v. Baldwin, 133 Mass. 
 427; Shailer v. Bumstead, 99 Mass. 
 112; Gibson v. Gibson, 24 Mo. 227; 
 Middleditch v. Williams, 45 N. J. Eq. 
 726. Where undue influence is al- 
 leged in the execution of a will, the 
 declarations of the testator are ad- 
 missible to show the state of his mind 
 and his feelings towards his relatives 
 and the beneficiaries under the will. 
 Jones v. Roberts, 37 Mo. App. 163 ; 
 Gardner v. Frieze, 16 R. I. 640. See 
 post, §g 208, 222. 
 
 -' Phelps v. Foot, 1 Conn. 387. 
 
 3 Bloomington v. Osterlee, 139 111. 
 120; Bennett v. Northern Pac. R R. 
 Co. (N. D., 1893), 49 N. W. Rep. 408; 
 Lacas v. Detroit City R. Co. (Mich., 
 1893;, 52 N. W. Rep. 745 ; Sturgeon v. 
 
 Sturgeon (Ind., 1893), 30 N. E. Rep. 
 805 ; Holly v. Bennett, 46 Minn. 386 : 
 Blair v. Madison, 81 Iowa, 313 ; Smith 
 v. Dittman, 16 Daly, 427; Grand 
 Rapids, etc. Co. v. Huntley, 38 Mich. 
 537 ; Insurance Co. v. Mosley, 8 Wall. 
 (U. S.) 397; Rogers v. Grain, 30 Tex. 
 284 ; Sanders v. Reister, 1 Dak. Ter. 
 151; Towle v. Blake, 43 N. H. 92; 
 Hanna v. Hanna (Tex., 1893), 21 S. W. 
 Rep. 720 ; Butler v. Man. Ry. Co., 24 
 N. Y. S. 142; Hatch v. Fuller, 131 
 Mass. 574 ; Livingston's Case, 14 
 Gratt. (Va.) 592 ; Stevenson v. State, 
 69 Ga. 68. 
 
 4 State v. Crawfoot (Mo., 1893), 23 
 S. W. Rep. 371 ; Hall v. State, 31 Tex. 
 Crim. Rep. 565 ; Gibson v. State, 23 Tex. 
 414; State v. Corcoran, 38 La. Ann. 
 949; Harrison v. State, 79 Ala. 29; 
 Newton v. State, 42 La. Ann. 33; Pit- 
 man v. State, 22 Ark. 354; State v. 
 Bradley, 64 Vt. 466; State v. Gainor 
 (Iowa, 1892), 50 N. W. Rep. 947: 
 State v. Hoyt, 46 Conn. 330 ; Le Beau 
 v. People, 34 N. Y. 223 ; State v. Har- 
 rod, 102 Mo. 590 ; State v. Wentworth,
 
 §52.] 
 
 n EARS AY. 
 
 CO 
 
 them. 1 This principle is applied in an action brought by a 
 wife to recover damages for the alienation of her husband's 
 affections. The husband's declarations or letters, addressed 
 to the wife or to third persons, dating prior to the alleged 
 perpetration of the wrong by defendant, are admissible as 
 original evidence of the fact that before the alienation she 
 possessed his affection. 2 
 
 The statements or declarations of a sick person, or of one 
 who has met with an accident, regarding his present pain and 
 suffering, and the nature, present symptoms and existing 
 effects of the illness or accident from which he is suffering, 
 are admissible as original evidence. 3 When the declarations 
 of the sick person are merely narrative of prior details con- 
 nected with his illness, the} r will generally be inadmissible 
 whether made to a physician or to some other person, unless, 
 being connected with the patient's present condition, they are 
 considered a part of the res gestae.* 
 
 37 N. H. 196 ; Pete v. State, 44 La. 
 Ann. 14; Dixon v. State, 13 Fla. 
 636 ; Hardee v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 289 ; Everett v. State. 62 Ga. 65 ; 
 Riggs v. State, 30 Miss. 635 ; School- 
 craft v. People, 117 111. 271 ; State v. 
 Sullivan, 51 Iowa, 142; State v. 
 Hymer, 15 Nev. 49. See post, § 189. 
 
 1 On this ground the threats made 
 by a person charged with homicide 
 are, if not too remote, admitted to 
 show his malice or premeditation. 
 
 2 Yundt v. Hartranft, 41 111. 9; 
 Rounds v. Rounds, 64 Vt. 432 ; Willis 
 v. Barnard, 8 Bing. 376 ; Gilchrist v. 
 Bale, 8 Watts, 355 ; Wilton v. Web- 
 ster, 7 Car. & P. 198; Coleman v. 
 White, 43 Ind. 429; Bigocnette v. 
 Paulet, 134 Mass. 123. 
 
 3 Helton v. Alabama M. R) r . Co. 
 (Ala., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 276; Hewett 
 v. Eisenbart (Neb., 1893), 55 N. W. 
 Rep. 252; Bush v. Barnett, 96 Cal. 
 202 ; International, etc. Co. v. Kuehn 
 (Texas, 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 58; 
 Schuler v. Third Ave. R. Co., 1 Misc. 
 R. 351 ; Brusch v. St. Paul City Ry. 
 
 Co. (Minn., 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. 57; 
 Newson v. Dodson, 61 Texas, 91 ; Fay 
 v. Harlan, 128 Mass. 244; Earl v. 
 Tupper, 45 Vt. 275; Matteson v. N. 
 Y. & R. R. Co., 62 Barb. (N. Y.) 364 ; 
 Chicago, etc. Co. v. Spilker (Ind., 
 1893), 33 N. E. Rep. 280; State v. 
 Howard, 32 Vt. 380 ; Taylor v. Rail- 
 road Co., 48 N. H. 309 ; Gray v. Mc- 
 Laughlin, 26 Iowa, 279 ; Blooming- 
 ton v. Osterle, 139 111. 120; Bennett 
 v. Railroad Co., 2 N. D. 112; Lacas 
 v. Railroad Co., 92 Mich. 412. 
 
 4 Roosa v. Boston Loan Co., 132 
 Mass. 439 ; Jones v. Portland, 88 Mich. 
 598 ; Collins v. Waters, 54 111. 485 ; 
 Davidson v. Cornell, 132 N. Y. 228 ; 
 Smith v. Stat-, 53 Ala. 486; Ashland 
 v. Marlborough, 99 id. 47 ; Mayo v. 
 Wright, 63 Mich. 40 ; Illinois Central 
 R. R. Co. v. Sutton, 42 id. 438 ; Lacas 
 v. Railroad Co., 92 Mich. 412 ; Barber 
 v. Miriam, 11 Allen (Mass.), 322; 
 Schuler v. Third Ave. R. R. Co., 20 
 N. Y. S. 683; Holly v. Bennett, 46 
 Minn. 486 ; Blair v. Madison, 81 Iowa, 
 313. Cf. post, §§ 188-190.
 
 70 HEARSAY. [§ 52. 
 
 There are many cases, however, which sustain a different 
 rule as regards declarations descriptive of past events. Thus, 
 where a physician is called to diagnose the disease or deter- 
 mine the nature of the accidental injury with a view to the 
 proper method of treating it, or to testify as an expert, it is 
 held that he may testify to language of the patient describing 
 his symptoms, condition, feelings and other details either 
 past or present. Only language which is used in the examina- 
 tion or treatment, or to enable the physician to testify as an 
 expert, is admissible. 1 The admissibility of statements of 
 physical suffering of this sort is largely due to the necessity 
 of proving facts which can only become known to others 
 through the utterances of the sufferer himself. A scream, 
 a groan, or a cry of some sort, is the natural expression of 
 intense pain in man, and testimony that a scream was heard 
 is always original evidence. Some of the courts seem to limit 
 the admissibility of testimony to mere involuntary exclama- 
 tions or ejaculations of pain, as screams, groans or sighs, 
 basing their rulings upon the fact that as the common-law 
 disability of a party as a witness no longer exists,. the sufferer 
 may and should be placed upon the stand, if living, while, if 
 deceased, his prior suffering is immaterial, as it does not con- 
 stitute an element in the damages to be recovered by his rep- 
 resentatives. 2 
 
 The competency of a party as a witness is purely statutory, 
 and the rule that statutes amendatory of or derogatory to the 
 common law should be strictly construed would doubtless 
 apply. It cannot be reasonably conceived that the legislature, 
 by adding to the rights of the party by making him compe- 
 
 i Equitable Mut. Life Ace. Ass'n v. 139 111. 120; Pullman v. Smith, 79 
 
 McCluskey (Colo., 1893), 29 Pac. Rep. Tex. 468. Contra, Abbot v. Heath 
 
 383 ; Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Tillman, 84 (Wis., 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 574 ; Jones 
 
 Tex. 31; 19 S. W. Rep. 294; David- v. Portland, 88 Mich. 598; Davidson 
 
 sou v. Cornell, 10 N. Y. S. 521 ; Quaife v. Cornell, 132 N. Y. 228. 
 
 v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co., 48 Wis. 513; 2 Stewart v. Everts (Wis., 1890), 44 
 
 Louisville, New Alb. & Chick. R. R. N. W. Rep. 1092 ; Caldwell v. Murphy. 
 
 Co. v. Falvey, 104 Ind. 416; Cleve- 11 N. Y. 416; Reid v. N. Y. C. R. R 
 
 land, Col., C. & Ind. R. R. Co. v. Co., 45 N. Y. 574 ; Werely v. Persons. 
 
 Newell, 104 Ind. 269; Chicago, etc. 28 N. Y. 344; Abbot v. Heath (Wis., 
 
 Co. v. Spilker (Ind., 1893), 33 N. E. 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 574. 
 Rep. 280; Bloomington v. Osterle,
 
 § 53.] HEARSAY. 71 
 
 tent as a witness, intended by implication to abridge his 
 rights in another direction and deprive him of the legitimate 
 advantage which he had enjoyed by having his declaration of 
 suffering, other than mere ejaculations, rendered inadmissible. 1 
 
 The fact that a victim of rape was crying, 2 or made imme- 
 diate complaint, being material evidence of such complaint, is 
 admissible as original evidence, 3 though it seems that a witness 
 will not be permitted to testify to the particular facts and 
 details of the assault as related by the complainant, 4 unless the 
 statement is so closely connected with the commission of the 
 crime in time and place as to form a part of the res gestce? 
 
 § 53. Pedigree — Oral and written declarations. — The term 
 "pedigree" includes facts relating to the descent and relation- 
 ship of an individual, to his birth, marriage and death, and to the 
 dates upon which these several events occurred. The decla- 
 rations of third persons to such facts are receivable if the de- 
 clarants are deceased, if they were related to the person whose 
 pedigree is involved or to one from whom he is descended, 
 so that they would not only have adequate means of knowing 
 but an active interest in knowing the facts. So it was held 
 at an early period that the deceased declarant must have 
 been connected by family ties, either of marriage or blood, 
 with the party whose pedigree is under investigation. 7 
 
 1 Hancock v. Leggett, 115 Ind. 546. ceived. State v. Jerome, 82 Iowa, 
 
 2 State v. Bedard, 26 Atl. Rep. 719. 749 ; 48 N. W. Rep. 722. 
 
 3 Johnson v. State, 21 Tex. App. 61 Greenl. on Evid., § 104; 1 
 368 ; Territory v. Godfrey, 6 Dak. 46. Whart. on Evid., § 208 ; Swink v. 
 
 4 Territory v. Edie (N. M., 1893), 30 French, 11 Lea, 80; Amer. Tr. Co. v. 
 Pac. Rep. 581 ; Baccio v. People, 41 Rosenagle, 77 Pa. St. 516. In Ste- 
 N. Y. 265; People v. O'Sullivan, 104 phen's Dig. Evid., §31, this rule is con- 
 N. Y. 493 ; People v. McCrea, 32 Cal. fined to cases where the pedigree is 
 98 ; People v. Stewart (Cal., 1893), 32 directly in issue, and where the pedi- 
 Pac. Rep. 8. Contra, Barnes v. State, gree while relevant is merely collat- 
 88 Ala. 204. If, however, the com- era], the evidence is excluded. Whit- 
 plaint is too long delayed, it will not beck v. Walters, 4 C. & P. 375. This 
 be admissible. Richards v. State (Neb., rule, however, has not received uni- 
 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 1027. But eon- versal support. See contra, Clark v. 
 tra, State v. Mulkern, 85 Me. 106. Owens, 18 N. Y 434 ; North Brook- 
 
 ^McMurrin v. Rigby, 80 Iowa, 322; field v. Warren, 16 Gray, 174. 
 
 Castillo v. State (Texas, 1892), 19 S. U Greenl. on Evid., § 103, citing 
 
 W. Rep. 892. The declarations of a Vowlesv. Young, 13 Ves. 140; Casey v. 
 
 child four years old have been re- O'Shaughnessy, 7 Jur. 1140; Gregory
 
 72 HEARSAY. [§ 53. 
 
 A stricter rule is adopted in the English cases, which hold 
 declarant must have been legitimately related by blood to 
 the person whose pedigree is in question, or he or she must 
 have been the husband or wife of that person. 1 However con- 
 sonant to principles of public policy this stringent rule may 
 seem, it is obviously inapplicable in a thinly-inhabited com- 
 munity whose residents are constantly changing their places 
 of domicile and where family connections and acquaintance 
 with family affairs are more or less disregarded. On this ac- 
 count the more liberal rule by which the declaration of any 
 deceased member of the family is admitted is supported by 
 the large majority of the American decisions. 2 It is for the 
 judge to decide whether the person who is quoted was a mem- 
 ber of the family ; 3 and the fact of relationship, 4 together with 
 the death of the declarant, must be shown prior to the admis- 
 sion of the declaration. 5 
 
 This rule by which the introduction of evidence of pedigree 
 is permitted is not confined to oral statements. Memoranda 
 or entries made in family bibles or other books appertaining 
 to facts of family history or pedigree are admissible as decla- 
 rations of the person making the entries if he was a member 
 of the family. 6 So, too, declarations or recitals upon matters 
 
 v. Baugh, 4 Rand. 607 ; Kay wood v. Mooers v. Bunker, 29 N. H. 42 ; Tyler 
 
 Barnett, 3 Dev. & B. 91 ; Waldron v. v. Flanders, 57 N. H. 618; Kelly v. 
 
 Tuttle, 4 N. H. 371 ; Jewell v. Jewell, McGuire, 15 Ark. 555. The declara- 
 
 17 Pet. 213; Chapman v. Chapman, tions must have been made prior to 
 
 2 Conn. 347; Boone v. Miller, 73 the inception of. the controversy, 
 
 Tex. 557. though they are not inadmissible be- 
 
 i Smith v. Tebbitt, L. RIP. & M. cause they were njade to prevent it. 
 
 354; Shrewsbury Peerage Case, 7 Com. v. Felchs, 132 Mass. 23; Cau- 
 
 H.L.C. 26; Hitchins v. Eardley, L. R. jolle v. Ferrie, 23 N. Y. 91; Hill v. 
 
 2 P. & M. 248. Hibert, 19 W. R. 250 ; Berkely Peer- 
 2 Butrick v. Tilton (Mass., 1892), 29 age Case, 4 Campb. 401-417 ; Shed- 
 
 N. E. Rep. 1088 : Boone v. Miller, 73 den v. Patrick, 2 Sw. & Tr. 170. 
 Tex. 564; Eisenlord v. Krum (N. Y., 3 Doe v. Davis, 11 Jur. 607. 
 1890), 27 N. E. Rep. 1024 ; Walkup v. 4 Thompson v. Wolf, 8 Oreg. 454. 
 Pratt, 5 Harr. & J. 51 ; Banert v. Day, 5 Greenleaf v. Dubuque R. R. Co., 
 
 3 Wash. C. C. 243 ; Cuddy v. Brown, 30 Iowa, 301 ; Northrop v. Hale, 76 
 78 111. 415 ; Backdahl v. Lodge, 46 Me. 309. 
 
 Minn. 61; Jackson v. Cooley, 8 Johns. 6 Berkley Peerage Case, 4 Campb. 
 
 (N. Y.) 128 ; Jones v. Jones, 36 Md. 401, 418 ; Jackson v. Cooley, 8 Johns. 
 
 417 ; Dawson v. Mayall, 45 Minn. 408 ; 128, 131 ; Douglas v. Saunderson, 2 
 
 Lowder v. Schluter, 78 Tex. 103; Dall. 116; Carskadden v. Poorman,
 
 § 53.] HEARSAY. 73 
 
 of pedigree contained in family charts of pedigree or in family 
 correspondence, 1 in wills, deeds of settlement or partition, 2 
 pleadings 3 and affidavits 4 are admissible. 5 The principle upon 
 which this description of evidence of pedigree is admitted 
 being that such statements evincing the prevalent belief of those 
 who had the best opportunities to acquaint themselves with the 
 facts, it follows that inscriptions upon family monuments and 
 tombstones and on family portraits, being of a semi-public 
 nature, are peculiarly within the rule. ISTor is it necessary to 
 show that these inscriptions were made by a member of the 
 family ; for though this circumstance, in connection with the 
 shortness of the period which has elapsed between the event 
 they commemorate and the date of their erection, is strongly 
 corroborative of their authenticity, their public character or 
 the assent of the family is equivalent to proof that they repre- 
 sent the opinions of all its members. 6 
 
 A declaration of a deceased parent as to the place of birth 
 of his child is not receivable, a distinction being made be- 
 tween the place of birth and the fact of the birth. 7 
 
 Evidence of general repute which prevails in a family as to 
 the death, 3 relationship 9 or birth of one of its members, proved 
 
 10 Watts, 82 ; Watson v. Brewster, 1 L. C. 1. Where an inscription on a 
 
 Barr, 381; Fulkerson v. Holmes, 117 tombstone was offered to show that 
 
 U. S. 397, cited in 1 Greenl. on Evid., a person was not the youngest son, 
 
 § 104. it was held inadmissible in the ab- 
 
 1 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 104 ; Murray sence of evidence identifying the 
 
 V. Milner, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 845; person buried. Gehr v. Fisher, 143 
 
 Scharff v. Keener, 64 Pa. St. 376; Pa. St. 311. 
 
 Pearson v. Pearson, 46 Cal. 609 ; Neal 7 Union v. Plainfield, 39 Conn. 563 ; 
 v. Wilding, 2 Str. 1151; Elliott v. Pier- Tylers v. Flanders, 57 N. H. 618; 
 soil, 1 Pet. 328; 1 Ph. Evid., 216, 217. Wilmington v. Burlington, 4 Pick. 
 2 Fort v. Clarke, 1 Russ. 601. See 174; McCarty v. Deming, 4 Lans. 
 Jackson v. Cooley, 8 Johns. 128; Jack- 444. As matter of pedigree, a moth- 
 son v. Russell. 4 Wend. 543 ; Keller v. er's language disparaging the legiti- 
 Nutz, 5 S. & R. 251; 1 Greenl. on macy of her child is inadmissible. 
 Evid., § 104. Hargrave v. Hargrave, 2 C. & K. 701. 
 s Phil. & Am. on Evid., 231, 232. » Mason v. Fuller, 45 Vt. 29 ; Ander- 
 4 Hurst v. Jones, 1 Wall. Jr. 373. son v. Parker, 6 Cal. 197. Cf. Wilson 
 5 See "Ancient Documents," § 106; v. Brownlee. 24 Ark. 546; Morton v. 
 Hodges v. Hodges, 106 N. C. 374. Barrett, 19 Me. 109 ; Jackson v. Bene- 
 & North Brookfield v. Warren, 16 ham, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 226; Morrill v. 
 Gray (Mass.), 174; Sowles v. Young, Foster, 33 N. H. 379; Primm v. Stew- 
 13Ves. 144; Eastman v. Martin, 19 art, 7 Tex. 178. 
 
 N. H. 152; Camoy's Peerage, 6 CI. & 9 Pierce v. Jacobs, 7 Mackey, 498; 
 
 Fin. 789 ; Shrewsbury Peerage, 7 H. Backdahl v. Lodge, 46 Minn. 61.
 
 74 'hearsay. [§ 54. 
 
 by the evidence of a surviving member, is admissible as a 
 matter of pedigree. 1 So a person may testify to the date of 
 his own birth according to reputation in his family, 2 though 
 evidence of family reputation as to a party's age has on the 
 other hand been rejected. 3 
 
 In the reception of traditionary evidence, caution should be 
 employed in view of the inherent fallibility of the human 
 memory, even in matters in which all men may be deemed to 
 i have a personal interest. Error being intermixed with truth, 
 by dint of constant repetition and belief becomes at last in- 
 distinguishable from it. Though this sort of evidence is 
 peculiarly subject to such disadvantages, that fact furnishes 
 no valid ground for its rejection ; but it remains for the jury, 
 under proper instructions from the court, to decide upon its 
 weight and sufficiency and to consider what credit to give to 
 the witness from whom it is elicited. 4 
 
 §54. Declarations constituting res gestae. — It is almost 
 always the case that the facts or transactions which are in 
 issue in any judicial proceeding do not stand alone and uncon- 
 nected with any other facts and circumstances. In conse- 
 quence of the intricate and involved character of all human 
 affairs, the main fact, the truth of which is sought to be sub- 
 stantiated or overthrown, may be, and usually is, either the 
 cause or effect of many others, or is collaterally connected 
 with other facts. Evidence of surrounding and connected 
 circumstances relevant to the main point in issue or growing- 
 out of it is always admissible, and it is for the jury to deter- 
 mine upon its weight and sufficiency. When the surrounding 
 circumstances are acts to which the witness is able to testify of 
 
 1 Van Sickle v. Gibson, 40 Mich. 3 Albertsen v. Robeson, 1 Dall. (U. S.) 
 ! 167 ; Morrill v. Foster, 33 N. H. 379 ; 9 ; Colclough v. Smith, 15 Ir. Ch. 
 
 Eaton v. Tallmadge, 24 Wis. 217; 347; Rex v. Wedge, 5 C. & P. 298. 
 
 Clements v. Hunt, 1 Jones (N. C), Cf. Rex v. Hayes, 2 Cox C. C. 226 ; 
 
 400. Rogers v. Coal Co. (Ala., 1893), 12 
 
 2 Bain v. State, 61 Ala. 75; State v. S. Rep. 81. Age generally must be 
 Cain, 9 W. Va. 559 ; Cherry v. State, proved, and cannot be determined by 
 68 Ala. 29 ; Cheever v. Congdon, 34 the jury from the appearance of a 
 Mich. 296 ; State v. McClain. 49 Kan. person. Stephenson v. State, 28 Ind. 
 730 ; Houlton v. Manteuffel (Minn., 272 ; State v. Arnold, 13 Ired. 184. 
 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 541; State v. ^McGoon v. Irvin, 1 Pinney (Wis.), 
 Best (N. C, 1891), 12 S. E. Rep. 907. 526.
 
 §§ 55, 5G.] HEARSAY. 75 
 
 his own knowledge, no question can arise as to the original 
 character of the evidence, and though the circumstances may 
 be only remotely connected with the main fact, yet, if rele- 
 vant at all, it cannot be objected that such evidence is hear- 
 say. 1 Upon the same principle the declarations of a person 
 are admitted as evidence because of their connection with and 
 relevancy to the principal fact by virtue of what is termed 
 the rule of the res gestce. 2 
 
 § 55. Requisites. — These declarations are not hearsay evi- 
 dence. They are original evidence connected with the main 
 facts in issue and from which the truth or untruthfulness of 
 such facts may be inferred. 3 To render such declarations 
 admissible as original evidence they must possess, besides 
 relevancy, three other characteristics, viz. : First, they must 
 have been uttered contemporaneously with and grow out of 
 the act upon which they have a bearing; second, they must 
 qualify, illustrate, explain or unfold its nature or meaning, so 
 as, thirdly, to be connected Avith it in such a way that the 
 declaration and the act will form but a single transaction. 4 
 
 § 56. Must foe illustrative of and eouuected with main 
 trausaction. — The range of events included by the term res 
 gestae varies according to the circumstances of each particular 
 case. The principle upon which these declarations are ad- 
 mitted is their spontaneous and undesigned character and 
 their explanatory or illustrative value in conjunction with 
 the main event. 5 
 
 1 See 1 Green!, on Evid., § 108. People, 42 111. App. 427 ; Beaver v. 
 
 2 Graves v. People (Colo., 1893), 32 Taylor, 1 Wall. 642 ; Hewitt v. Eisen- 
 Pac. Rep. 63. bart, 55 N. W. Rep. 252 ; Missouri, 
 
 3 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 108. etc. Co. v. Bond (Tex., 1893), 20 S. W. 
 
 4 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 108 ; Sterling Rep. 930 ; Missouri, etc. Co. v. Baier 
 
 v. Buckingham, 46 Conn. 464. (Neb., 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. 913; Poole 
 
 5 Travellers' Ins. Co. v. Sheppard, v. East Tenn. etc. Co. (Ga., 1893), 17 
 
 85 Ga. 751 ; Glass v. Bennett (Tenn., S. E. Rep. 267 ; Kane v. Troy, 48 Hun, 
 
 1890), 14 S. W. Rep. 1085 ; Bank v. 619 ; Sistare v. Hecksher, 63 Hun, 
 
 Kennedy, 17 Wall. 19, 23, 24 ; Rich- 634 ; Hermes v. Chicago, etc. Co., 80 
 
 mond, etc. Co. v. Hammond (Ala.. Wis. 590; Brooks v. Duggan, 149 Mass. 
 
 1890), 9 S. Rep. 577 ; Koetler v. Man. 396 ; Schlemmer v. State, 51 N. J. L. 
 
 Ry. Co., 59 Hun, 623 ; United States 29 ; Fellows v. Williamson, 1 M & 
 
 v. Noelke, 17 Blatchf. 570; King v. M. 306; Hunter v. State, 11 Vroom, 
 
 King, 42 Mo. App. 454; Edwards v. 495. 
 Watertown, 59 Hun, 620 ; Powers v.
 
 ?6 HEARSAY. [§ 56.. 
 
 It is impossible to lay down any general rule upon the 
 question of what declarations do or do not constitute a part 
 of the res gestae. The main points to be considered are the 
 explanatory character of the declaration under the particular 
 circumstances which are in litigation. Accordingly, where it 
 is sought to show that a certain relationship existed between 
 persons or to ascertain the feeling toward each other of those 
 who have been connected by social or other ties, evidence of 
 the declarations, spoken or written, of the parties involved is 
 admissible as a part of the res gestce. 1 But declarations form- 
 ing a part of the res gestce are only relevant where the act 
 itself is equivocal or when its nature or motive is doubtful and 
 the statements of the party are invoked to make his act or 
 intention clear and easy to be understood. 2 Thus where the 
 intention or purpose of a corporative 3 or individual act, 4 or a 
 question of domicile, 5 is involved, the resolutions of the cor- 
 poration or the declaration of the person about to change his 
 domicile, or while absent from it, if precisely contemporaneous 
 with it and explanatory of the act, are admissible. 
 
 "Where, as for example in the trial of an indictment for 
 murder, the question of malice or premeditation is raised, the 
 statements of the accused, constituting often the only evi- 
 dence procurable of his mental condition, are admissible to 
 show whether the killing was deliberate or under the sudden 
 impulse of fear or anger. 8 
 
 i Peyser v. Myers, 63 Hun, 634 ham v. Canton, 5 Me. 266 ; Travellers' 
 
 (proof of partnership). Ins. Co. v. Mosley, 8 Wall. 408. 
 
 2 Holmes v. Goldsmith, 147 U. S. »Ayer v. Weeks, 65 N. H. 248; 
 150 ; Railroad Co. v. Clowdis (Ga., Besch v. Beach, 27 Tex. 290 ; Kilburn 
 1893), 17 S. E. Rep. 88; Nutting v. v. Bennett, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 199; Jen- 
 Page, 4 Gray, 584. nison v. Hapgood, 10 Pick. 77 ; Bur- 
 
 3 Baker v. Maloney (Tex.), 4 S. W. gess v. Clark, 3 Ind. 250 ; Marsh v. 
 Rep. 469 ; Clever v. Hilberry, 116 Pa. Davis, 24 Vt. 363 ; College v. Gore, 15 
 St. 431 ; Wiley v. Athol, 150 Mass. Pick. 372 ; Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 
 430; McLeod v. Ginter, 80 Ky. 403. (U. S.) 400, 421 ; Fulham v. Howe, 60 
 
 4 Chattanooga Co. v. Clowdis (Ga., Vt. 351 ; Richmond v. Thomaston, 38 
 1893), 17 S. E. Rep. 88 ; Young v. Me. 232 ; Dupuy v. Wurtz, 53 N. Y. 
 Board of Mahoning County, 51 Fed. 556; Gilman v. Gilman, 52 Me. 165; 
 Rep. 585 ; Rudd v. Rounds, 64 Vt. 432 ; Thorndike v. Boston, 1 Met. 242. 
 Lake Shore, etc. Co. v. Herrick (Ohio, fi Gantier v. State (Tex., 1893), 21 S. 
 1892), 29 N. E. Rep. 1052; St. Louis, W. Rep. 255; Miller v. State, 31 Tex. 
 etc. Co. v. Murray, 55 Ark. 218; Cal- Crim. App. 109; §§ 51, 52; State v. 
 deron v. O'Donahue, 47 Fed. Rep. 39 ; Walker, 77 Me. 490. 
 
 Small v. Williams, 87 Ga. 681 ; Gor-
 
 § 57.] HEARSAY. 77 
 
 § 57. Declarations must be contemporaneous or nearly so. 
 
 The necessity for the contemporaneous character of the decla- 
 rations has been much discussed, but it is impossible to lay down 
 any rule which will be applicable to all cases. In one instance l 
 an exclamation uttered only a few moments after a person 
 had been assaulted, and while she was seeking to escape, was 
 held inadmissible because not contemporaneous with the main 
 transaction. 
 
 Though the majority of the American decisions, however, 
 do not require that the act and the declarations should be 
 precisely contemporaneous provided they are otherwise con- 
 nected, in many of the states the strict English doctrine is 
 adhered to. 2 Their unpremeditated and spontaneous charac- 
 ter being the main ground for their reception, it is clear on 
 the whole that, where any interval has elapsed between the 
 act and the declaration, the likelihood that the declarant has 
 taken advice or considered what he should say would have a 
 bearing on their exclusion. 3 It has been repeatedly held that, 
 when a single day had intervened, the declaration was not 
 admissible. 4 But where the declaration was made soon after 
 the event with which it was connected, it is admissible, 5 pro- 
 
 1 Reg. v. Bedingfield, 14 Cox's Cr. 75 Mich. 472 ; Durham v. Shannon, 
 
 Cas. 341. 116 Ind. 403. 
 
 3 United States v.Noelke, 17 Blatchf. 3 Goff v. Bank, 47 N. W. Rep. 190. 
 570; United States v. Angell, 11 Fed. 4 Noyes t. White, 19 Conn. 250; 
 
 Rep. 41 ; State v. Moore (Mo., 1893), Montgomery v. McGuire, 25 111. App. 
 
 22 S. W. Rep. 1086 ; State v. Mason, 31 ; Ft. Smith Oil Co. v. Slover (Ark., 
 
 112 Mo. 374; Penn. Ry. Co. v. Lyons, 1894), 24 S. W. Rep. 106; Short v. N. 
 
 129 Pa. St. 113; Levvke v. D. D. E. B. Pac. El. Co., 45 N. W. Rep. 708; 
 
 etc. Co., 46 Hun, 283; Texas, etc. Co. Southerland v. W. & W. R. Co., 11 
 
 v. Barron, 78 Tex. 421; Dwyer v. S. E. Rep. 189; 106 N. C. 100; Co- 
 
 Bassett, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 513; Evans rinth v. Lincoln, 34 Me. 310. 
 v. State (Ark., 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. ^Harriman v. Stowe, 57 Mo. 93; 
 
 1026; State v. Raven (Mo., 1893), 22 Insurance Co. v. Mosley, 8 Wall. 
 
 S. W. Rep. 376; State v. Daugherty, (U. S.) 397; Hanna v. Hanna (Tex., 
 
 17 Nev. 376; Ohio, etc. Co. v. Culli- 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 720; Chapin v. 
 
 son, 40 111. App. 67; Texas, etc. Co. Cambria Iron Co., 145 Pa. St. 478; 
 
 v. Robertson, 82 Tex. 657 ; Mayes v. Butler v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 24 N. 
 
 State, 64 Miss. 329 ; State v. Frazier, Y. S. 442 ; Miss. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Baier 
 
 1 Houst (Del.) 176 ; Jones v. State, (Neb., 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. 913 ; Ohio 
 
 71 Ind. 66; Gulf, etc. Co. v. York, & M. Ry. Co. v. Stern (Ind., 1892), 31 
 
 74 Tex. 374; 12 S. W. Rep. 68; N. E. Rep. 180; Jewel v. Jewel, 1 
 
 Wormsdorf v. Detroit City R Co., How. (U. S.) 219 ; Penn. R. Co. v.
 
 78 HEARSAY. [§ 58. 
 
 vided a period, however short, has not elapsed which would 
 give an opportunity for deliberation. 1 
 
 § 58. Entries a part of the res gestae and made by third 
 persons. — Sometimes entries made by third parties in books 
 of record or account, or letters and telegrams sent by them, 
 are original and primary evidence, even though the parties 
 themselves be not called. Entries are divided into public and 
 private. The former are those made by a public official in 
 the course of his public duties. The latter are made by pri- 
 vate persons in the exercise of their commercial or profes- 
 sional callings. 
 
 To render entries made by a third party admissible as orig- 
 inal evidence, they must possess substantially the character- 
 istics requisite in the case of verbal declarations which are 
 a part of the res gestae. 
 
 The general rule is that, whether the entry or writing be 
 one that is made in the performance of an official, professional 
 or private duty, the party must have been legally authorized 
 to make it and it must have - been made in the course of busi- 
 ness. 2 So the writing itself must be relevant to the transac- 
 
 Lyons, 18 Atl. Rep. 759 ; 129 Pa. St. of a declaration in connection with 
 
 113; Lewke v. D. D. E. B. & B. R. evidence of the principal fact, as 
 
 Co., 46 Hun, 283 ; Thomas v. Herrall, stated by Mr. Greenleaf, must be de- 
 
 18 Oreg. 546 ; Insurance Co. v. Shep- termined by the judge according to 
 
 pard, 85 Ga. 751 ; Stevens v. Castel, the degree of its relation to the fact 
 
 63 Mich. 118. and in the exercise of a sound discre- 
 
 1 Durkee v. Cent. P. Ry. Co., 69 tion; it being extremely difficult, if 
 
 Cal. 533 ; Tennis v. Railway Co. not impossible, to bring this class of 
 
 (Kan., 1891), 25 Pac. Rep. 876. "The cases within the limits of a more 
 
 modern doctrine has relaxed the an- particular description. The priuci- 
 
 cieut rule that declarations, to be ad- pal points of attention are, he adds, 
 
 missible as part of the res gestce, whether the declaration was contem- 
 
 must be strictly contemporaneous poraneous with the main fact and so 
 
 with the main transaction. It now connected with it as to illustrate its 
 
 allows evidence of them when they character." Vicksburg & Meridian 
 
 appear to have been made under the R. Co. v. O'Brien, 119 U. S. 99, 105-6, 
 immediate influence of the principal 2 Rollins v. United States, 23 Ct, 
 
 transaction and are so connected CI. 106 (official letter) ; McDonald v, 
 
 with it as to characterize or explain Carnes, 7 S. Rep. 919; 90 Ala. 147 
 
 it. "What time may elapse between State v. Martin, 15 S. W. Rep. 529 
 
 the happening of the event and the Cobb v. Malone, 86 Ala. 571 ; 8 S 
 
 time of the declaration, and the dec- Rep. 693; Boiling v. Fannin (Ala., 
 
 laration be yet admissible, must de- 1893), 12 S. Rep. 59; Webster v. Web- 
 
 pend upon the character of the ster, 1 F. & F. 401. 
 transaction itself. The admissibility
 
 § 58.] HEARSAY. 79 
 
 tion with which it is sought to be connected, and must relate 
 to and be contemporaneous with it and be illustrative of it. 1 
 It is also required that the person who is the author of the 
 entry or writing should have been in a position where he 
 would have peculiar opportunities of possessing a knowledge 
 of the occurrence to which the entrv relates, and that, having 
 such knowledge, he must also have been impartial and with- 
 out apparent motive to deceive by fabricating evidence or 
 perverting the circumstance described. 2 These requirements 
 being met, the writings are admissible as original evidence, 
 and though the party, if living and if he can be found, should 
 be called to testif} 7 ", yet his non-production or incompetency 
 as a witness 3 will not render the entries or writing hearsay 
 evidence. 4 A foundation for the introduction of the entries 
 or documents must be laid by testimony which will serve to 
 identify them and show their contemporaneous character as 
 a part of the res gestw. 5 
 
 The rule under consideration is of very extensive usefulness 
 and application. Under it not only are books of account 
 and public records kept by third persons admitted as original 
 
 1 Stallings v. Hallum, 79 Tex. 421 ; indorser has received notice of pro- 
 Baldridge v. Peuland, 68 Tex. 441 ; test for non-payment. Welch v. Bar- 
 Cont. Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co., 51 rett, 15 Mass. 380; Halliday v. Mar- 
 Fed. Rep. 884 ; Lassone v. Boston & tinett, 20 Johns. 168; Bank v. 
 L. R. Co. (N. H., 1893), 24 Atl. Rep. Mitchell, 15 Conn. 206; Nichols v. 
 902 ; Lewis v. Meginnis, 30 Fla. 419 ; Webb, 8 Wheat 326 ; Nichols v. Gold- 
 Boiling v. Fanning (Ala., 1893), 12 S. smith, 7 Wend. 360 ; Sherman v. 
 Rep. 59; Farrington v. Hayes (Vt,, Crosby, 11 Johns. 70; Sherman v. 
 1893), 25 Atl. Rep. 1091 ; Livingston's Atkins, 4 Pick. 283; Hart v. Ken- 
 Appeal (Conn., 1893), 26 Atl. Rep. dall, 82 Ala. 144, cited in 1 Greenl. 
 470. on Evid., § 114. 
 
 2 Welch v. Barrett, 15 Mass. 380 ; 3 Augusta v. Windsor, 19 Me. 317 ; 
 Bank v. Whitehill, 16 S. & R. 89 ; Nichols v. Webb, 8 Wheat 326. 
 Davis v. Fuller, 12 Vt. 178; Nichols * But see St. Louis, etc. Co. v. Hen- 
 v. Webb, 8 Wheat. 326 ; Brewster v. derson (Ark., 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 
 Doan, 2 Hill, 537 ; Hart v. Kendall, 873. 
 
 82 Ala. 144 ; Kansas, etc. Co. v. 5 Meconce v. Mower, 37 Kan. 298 ; 
 
 Smith, 90 Ala. 25 ; McVey v. Durkin, 15 Pac. Rep. 155 ; Fowler v. Schafer, 
 
 136 Pa. St. 418. Entries made by a 32 N. W. Rep. 292 ; Stallings v. Gott- 
 
 bank messenger or notary public in schalk (Md., 1893), 26 Atl. Rep. 524; 
 
 books ordinarily kept by such per- Healey v. Bauer, 65 Hun, 621 ; Liv- 
 
 sons are admissible in an action on ingston's Appeal (Conn., 1893), 26 Atl. 
 
 a promissory note to show that pay- Rep. 470 ; Farrington v. Hayes (Vt, 
 
 ment has been demanded and that the 1893), 25 Atl. Rep. 1091.
 
 SO HEARSAY. [§ 50. 
 
 evidence, 1 but private books, 2 photographs, 3 maps and surveys 
 have also been received. 4 Thus an entry made in the diary 
 of a surgeon who was present in a professional capacity at 
 the birth of a person is admissible when the exact date of 
 that event is iu issue. 5 Though a certificate of a person's bap- 
 tism is inadmissible to show the date of his birth, 6 yet his bap- 
 tism may be shown by the entry made at the time according 
 to the rules of the church by the priest who baptized him, 
 where the entry was made as a part of the ceremony, though 
 the book in which it was made was not required to be kept. 7 
 From these instances it will be seen that the rule by which 
 such entries are admitted as original evidence of the occur- 
 rence which they record and of which they form a part is not 
 confined to records of a public character. 
 
 In very many cases private entries and writings, such as 
 receipts, indorsements of service on legal process, 8 and press 
 copies of letters, have been received when the part}'' who 
 made them was dead or for other reasons could not be pro- 
 duced, and it was shown that the party was impartial, and, 
 having com patent knowledge, had made a true and accurate 
 record of the transaction. 9 
 
 § 51). Entries against interest and entries which are a 
 part of the res gestae distinguished. — Entries and writings 
 
 1 Bell v. Kendrick (Fla., 1890), 6 S. 718; Kennedy v. Doyle, 10 Allen 
 Rep. 868. See post, §g I42a-160. (Mass.), 161 ; Witcher v. McLaughlin, 
 
 2 Chenango Corp. v. Lewis, 63 115 Mass. 167; McGuirk v. Mut. L. 
 Barb. (N. Y.) 111. Ins. Co., 66 Hun, 628. The register 
 
 3 Mississippi, etc. Co. v. Moore, 15 S. of a parish kept by its priest is ad- 
 W. Rep. 714 ; Kansas, etc. Co. v. Smith, missible to prove a marriage solem- 
 90 Ala. 25 ; 8 S. Rep. 48. See § 38. nized by him if regularly kept and if 
 
 4 Ewing v. State, 81 Tex. 172 ; Row- it shows the facts which are essen- 
 land v. McCowan, 20 Oregon, 538; tial to constitute a valid marriage 
 26 Pac. Rep. 853 ; McVey v. Durkin, contract. State v. Doris, 40 Conn. 
 136 Pa. St. 416 ; Weld v. Brooks, 25 145 ; Erwin v. English, 61 id. 502 ; 23 
 N. E. Rep. 719; 152 Mass. 297. See Atl. Rep. 753; Jacobi v. Order of 
 post, § 145. Germania, 26 N. Y. S. 318. 
 
 5 Higham v. Ridgway, 10 East, 109. s See post, § 150a; Stapylton v. 
 
 6 Lavin v. Aid Society, 74 Wis. 349. Clough, 2 El. & Bl. 933. 
 
 Contra, Jacobi v. Order of Germania, 9 De Arnold v. Neasmith, 32 Mich. 
 
 26 N. Y. S. 318. 231 ; Steubing v. New York El. R. 
 
 i Hunt v. Order of Chosen Friends, Co., 19 N. Y. S. 313 ; Gould v. Con- 
 
 434 Mich. 671; 31 N. W. Rep. 576; way, 59 Barb. (N. Y.) 355; Bank v. 
 
 Kabok v. L. I. Ins. Co., 4 N. Y. S. Mitchell, 15 Conn. 206.
 
 § 60.] HEARSAY. 81 
 
 or declarations made by persons who are not parties to the 
 suit which are admissible as evidence because they are concom- 
 itant of the main transaction and form a part of it should 
 be distinguished from those which are admissible solely be- 
 cause they are against the interest of the declarant. The 
 former are original evidence forming a part of the res gestae, 
 and the fact that they were made, rather than their truth or 
 falsity, is the main fact to be shown. Hence the fact that 
 the declarant is alive or dead, or the fact that he is interested 
 or the amount of his interest in making the entry or declara- 
 tion, has no material bearing on the admissibility of such 
 statements, although his interest may be considered by the 
 jury in estimating the weight or credit which they may at- 
 tach to such entries. 1 But in the latter class of declarations 
 the primary fact that they are against interest is never to be 
 lost sight of; nor should it be forgotten that these declarations, 
 constituting not original evidence but an exception to the rule 
 rejecting hearsay, are introduced to substantiate the truth of 
 the facts asserted in them, and not merely to show that they 
 were uttered at the date of the transaction in issue. 2 
 
 § 60. A party's own books are evidence.— Upon the ques- 
 tion whether entries made in the books of a party to the suit 
 are admissible as evidence in his own favor under the proposi- 
 tion that such entries constitute a part of the res geske, the 
 cases are at considerable variance. If the entry was made by 
 an employee of the party having personal knowledge of the 
 facts, in the usual course of his employment, in books which 
 were kept for such entries, and if it was made at or near the 
 date of the transaction and is illustrative of it, then there can 
 be no objection to its admission upon the principles already 
 laid down. It is really hearsay evidence, however, because 
 the book-keeper or other person making the entry was not on 
 oath or cannot be produced, or, being produced, has wholly 
 forgotten the circumstances attending the transaction. 3 
 
 1 §g 117, 118. Ross v. Brusie, 11 Pac. Rep. 760; 
 
 2 1 GreenL on Evid., §§ 120, 147. 70 Cal. 465 ; Moore v. Knott, 14 Oreg. 
 
 3 Schuckman v. Winterbottom, 9 35 ; Lamberty v. Roberts, 9 N. Y. S. 
 
 N. Y. S. 733 ; Hancock v. Kelly, 2 S. 607 ; Griesbacher v. Tanenbaum, 8 
 
 Rep. 281; 81 Ala. 368; Brower v. id. 582; Blumbart v. Rohr, 70 Md. 
 
 East Rome Town Co., 84 Ga. 219; 339; Barnes v. Dow, 59 Vt. 530; 
 
 6
 
 82 
 
 HEARSAY. 
 
 [§ 60. 
 
 At common law, partly from the necessity of the case be- 
 cause of the incompetency of a party to testify as a witness, 
 entries made by him personally in his own books were con- 
 sidered admissible as evidence forming a part of the res gestae} 
 But to render them admissible it must be affirmatively shown 
 that the books are books of first or original entry, were regu- 
 larly kept in the course of business, and that no other books 
 of account bearing upon the same transaction were kept at 
 that time. The entries must have been made at the time 
 they purport to have been made and contemporaneously with 
 the transactions they describe or to which they refer. If the 
 entry be made by a party to the action himself, it must also 
 be shown that he had no book-keeper or clerk whose regular 
 duty it was to make such entries, and that he (the party) was 
 present at the time of the transaction. 2 The formal character 
 of the books, whether ledgers or sales-books, is immaterial so 
 far as their admissibility is concerned, if it be shown that they 
 
 Lewis v. Meginnis, 30 Fla. 419; Kuh 
 v. Michigan Bank, 93 Mich. 511; 
 Goff v. State Bank (Wis., 1893), 54 N. 
 W. Rep. 732 ; Bedford v. Sherman, 
 68 Hun, 317 ; Morris v. Morton, 20 
 S. W. Rep. 287 ; Johnson v. Culver, 
 116 Ind. 278; Culver v. Marks, 122 
 id. 554. A promise to pay for the 
 goods charged cannot be proven by 
 an entry in a party's books. Somers 
 v. Wright, 114 Mass. 171 ; Keithe v. 
 Kibbe, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 35. But a 
 credit may be proven by the party 
 giving it. Ross v. Brusie, 70 Cal. 465. 
 
 1 Entries in the diaries or account 
 books of physicians and attorneys 
 have been held competent to prove 
 the value of services rendered by 
 them. Codmon v. Caldwell, 31 Me. 
 560; Bay v. Cook, 22 N. J. L. 343; 
 Murphy v. Gates (Wis., 1892), 51 N. 
 W. Rep. 573. Contra, Hale's Ex'rs 
 v. Ard, 48 Pa. St 22; Briggs v. 
 Georgia, 15 Vt 6k 
 
 * Ailing v. Brazee, 27 111. App. 595; 
 Watrous v. Cunningham, 11 Pac. 
 Rep. 811; 71 Cal. 30; Cogswell v. 
 
 Dolliver, 2 Mass. 217 ; White v. Whit- 
 ney, 82 Cal. 163 ; Burnham v. Adams, 
 5 Vt. 313; Barnes v. Dow, 59 id. 230; 
 Prince v. Smith, 4 Mass. 455 ; Mathes 
 v. Robinson, 8 Met 269 ; Rexford v. 
 Comstock, 3 N. Y. S. 876 ; Rodman 
 v. Hoops, 1 Dall. 85 ; Setchers v. 
 Keigwin, 57 Conn. 573; Smith v. 
 Rentz, 131 Pa. St. 169; Cormac v. 
 Western White Bronze Co., 77 Iowa, 
 32 ; Roberts' Appeal, 26 Pa. St. 102 ; 
 Doty v. Smith, 68 Hun, 199. Where 
 the entries are in the handwriting 
 of a party, the delivery of the goods 
 thus charged must be shown by in- 
 dependent evidence. Baldridge v. 
 Penland, 68 Tex. 441 ; 4 S. W. Rep. 
 565. The admissibility of a party's 
 own entries is for the court Pratt 
 v. White, 132 Mass. 477. An entry 
 made personally by a party has been 
 held inadmissible to prove a debt 
 (Doty v. Smith, 68 Hun, 199), even 
 though supplemented by his oath. 
 Sauter v. Carroll, 11 Pa. Co. Ct R 
 192.
 
 § 60.] HEARSAY. 83 
 
 were fairly and honestly kept, are books of original entry, 
 and are free from material alterations, interlineations or other 
 circumstances calculated to arouse a suspicion. 1 
 
 When the books of original entry of a party are produced 
 as evidence in his favor, it is necessary that they should be 
 supplemented by his oath as to the main transaction involved. 
 Thus, if the book entry relates to a sale of goods, the party 
 will be called upon to swear that the sale was actually made 
 and the goods delivered, although the details of the transac- 
 tion — as, for example, the quantities and prices charged — 
 may have to be gathered from the written entry. 2 
 
 In a suit brought by an executor or administrator, the books 
 of the decedent are still admissible as evidence under the con- 
 ditions above outlined. Of course the absence of the oath of 
 the party who has made the entry may detract from its evi- 
 dential force, and in such circumstances his personal repre- 
 sentative should be called upon to show, so far as he knows 
 the books are the actual books of deceased, that the entries 
 are original and contemporaneous 3 and any other facts neces- 
 sary to lay a foundation for the admission of such evidence. 
 So the handwriting of the party who has made the entry 
 must be proven. 4 The same principles apply where the party 
 is a lunatic, if that fact and the identity of the handwriting 
 be shown. 5 A party's own entries are not universally admis- 
 sible in his favor at common law, and in many instances where 
 they have become admissible their admission is founded on 
 the necessity of the case and is due to a statutory modifica- 
 
 1 Lewis v. Meginnis, 30 Fla. 419 
 Goodwin v. O'Brien, 6 N. Y. S. 239 
 Rexford v. Comstock, 3 N. Y. S. 876 
 Vaugh v. Strong, 4 N. Y. S. 689 
 Ailing v. Wenzel, 27 111. App. 511 
 Churchman v. Smith, 6 Whart. 106 
 Hancock v. Flynn, 8 N. Y. S. 133 
 White v. Whitney, 22 Pac. Rep. 1138 
 
 2 Baldridge v. Pen land, 66 Tex. 441 ; 
 Dwinel v. Pottle, 3 Me. 167 ; Painer 
 v. Hodge, 71 N. Y. 598; Guy v. 
 Mead, 22 id. 462. 
 
 3 Pratt v. White, 132 Mass. 478; 
 Davis v. San ford, 9 Allen, 216. 
 
 4 Kinney v. United States, 54 Fed. 
 Rep. 312; McLellan v. Crofton, 6 
 
 82 Cal. 163. In Stuckslager v. Neel, Greenl. 307 ; Chipman v. Kellogg, 60 
 123 Pa St. 60, it was held that a Mich. 438. Contra, Bowers v. Over- 
 party's books are not admissible to field, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 273. 
 prove the sale of an article not dealt 5 Holbrook v. Gay, 6 Cush. 215. 
 in by him in the usual course of See 1 Smith's Lead. Cases, 139, note 
 business. So in Baldridge v. Pen- to case of Price v. Tarrington. 
 land, 68 Tex. 441 ; 4 S. W. Rep. 565.
 
 84 
 
 HEARSAY. 
 
 [§60. 
 
 tion of the common law, and not entirely to the fact that the 
 entries constitute a part of the res gestae. 
 
 A full discussion of the statutory rules being impossible here, 
 the reader is referred to the cases cited in the notes and to the 
 statutes of his own state for a further elucidation of the sub- 
 ject. 1 
 
 Books of account not regularly kept, or in which only a few 
 or only occasional entries are made, are not admissible. 2 But 
 the circumstance that a party's books are largely in the hand- 
 writing of some third person is immaterial. 3 Testimony of 
 this sort, in order to be admissible, must be contained in books 
 of original entry, though upon the question what shall consti- 
 tute a book of original entry the courts are by no means har- 
 monious. 4 If books are kept regularly, so that the memo- 
 randa or slips upon which the earliest entries are made are 
 immediately transcribed into the books of account, then the 
 
 1 1 Greenl. on Evict, § 118, citing 
 Vosburg v. Thayer, 12 Johns. 261; 
 Prince v. Smith, 4 Mass. 455 ; Burns 
 v. Fay. 14 Pick. 8; Richards v. How- 
 ard, 2 Nott. & McC. 474 ; Winsor v 
 Dillaway, 4 Met. 221 ; Kerr v. Love, 
 1 Wash. 172 ; Lonergan v. Whitehead, 
 10 Watts, 249 ; Newton v. Higgins, 2 
 Vt. 366; Dunn v. Whitney, 10 Me. 9; 
 Green v. Pratt, 11 Conn. 205; Prest 
 v. Mersereau, 10 N. J. L. 268 ; Gau- 
 ther v. Jenks, 76 Mich. 510; In re 
 Simpson, 5 N. Y. S. 868; Watrous v. 
 Cunningham, 71 Cal. 32; Rumsey v. 
 N. Y. & N. J. Tel. Co., 49 N. J. L. 323 ; 
 Roche v. Ware, 71 Cal. 375 ; Setchel 
 v. Keigvvin, 57 Conn. 478; Green v. 
 Mill, 60 Vt. 442; Woolsey v. Bohn, 
 41 Minn. 237; Ailing v. Wenzel, 27 
 111. A pp. 516. In Missouri a party's 
 hooks are not admissible in his favor. 
 Nipper v. Jones, 27 Mo. App. 558. 
 
 -Nat. Ulster Co. Bank v. Madden, 
 114 N. Y. 280; Kibbe v. Bancroft, 17 
 111. 18; Godding v. Orcutt, 44 Vt. 
 54 ; Korwitz v. Wright, 37 Tex. 82 ; 
 McNulty's Appeal, 135 Pa. St 210. 
 
 3 Vosburgh v. Thayer, 12 JoIids. 
 461 ; Young v. Luce, 66 Hun, 631. 
 Entries in a depositor's pass-book 
 are not admissible in a suit by the 
 bank against a third person, as the 
 book is not a book of original entry. 
 Wills Pt. Bank v. Bates, 72 Tex. 137. 
 But contra in Kux v. Central M. 
 Sav. Bank, 93 Mich. 511; Goff v. 
 Stoughton St. Bank, 54 N. W. Rep. 
 732, where the suit was by the de- 
 positor against the bank. 
 
 4 Where it is sought to prove a 
 charge or debt, mere memoranda, 
 such as would be made upon the 
 stubs of a check-book or in an order- 
 book, are not admissible. Flood v. 
 Mitchell, 68 N. Y 507; Moore v. 
 Meacham, 10 id. 207 ; Cooper v. Mor- 
 rell, 4 Yeates, 341. But a bank check 
 drawn by a decedent is admissible in 
 an action against his estate to show 
 payments made by him to the plaint- 
 iff. Jesse v. Davis, 34 Mo. App. 341. 
 If the book is mutilated it may be 
 excluded. Lovelock v. Gregg, 14 
 Colo. 53.
 
 § 60.] HEARSAY. 85 
 
 latter of course become books of original entry and are unob- 
 jectionable. 1 But where the books are written up at short 
 and regular intervals — as, for example, at the close of each 
 day's business, or on the following da} 7 — from written memo- 
 randa made at the precise time of the transaction, the books 
 cannot be rejected because of an alleged lack of originality. 2 
 The principle of law that in the case of an entry made by 
 an employee in the party's own books the employee must 
 have a personal knowledge of the facts he records has been 
 somewhat modified from necessity where numerous entries 
 involving many details are in question. Thus in large com- 
 mercial undertakings, where many laborers are employed or 
 where very many sales and deliveries of goods are made, it is 
 not possible for the book-keeper to have a personal knowl- 
 edge of every transaction, and he is compelled to rely upon a 
 fellow r -servant, as a time-keeper or salesman, for his information. 
 Such entries, made in the course of business, are admissible 
 if corroborated by the evidence of both employees to the ef- 
 fect that they made true and accurate reports and entries in 
 the course of the performance of their duty to the master. 3 
 The entry need not be a complete statement of the transac- 
 
 1 So a book into which entries were But a ledger is not a book of original 
 regularly made from way-bills by the entry. Jilmar v. Schell, 35 N. Y. 
 freight agent is admissible without Sup. Ct. 67; Lawhorn v. Carter, 11 
 producing .the bills. Robinson v. Bush (Ky.), 7. 
 
 Mulder, 81 Mich. 75. 3 New York City v. Second Av. R. 
 
 2 Walter v. Bolman, 8 Watts, 544; R. Co., 102 N. Y. 579; Nat. Ulster 
 Boggan v. Horn, 97 N. C. 268; Lur- Bank v. Madden. 114 id. 283; Bed- 
 ren v. Crawford, 4 S. & R. 3, 5; ford v. Sherman, 68 How. 312; Rudd 
 W x oolsey v. Boon, 41 Minn. 235 ; v. Robinson, 7 N. Y. S. 535 ; Young 
 Faxon v. Hollis, 13 Mass. 427 ; Taylor v. Luce, 66 How. 631 ; Morris v. Mor- 
 v. Davis (Wis., 1892), 52 N. W. Rep. ton (Ky., 1893). 20 S. W. Rep. 287; 
 756; Patton v. Ryan, 4 Rawle, 408; Taylor v. Davis (Wis., 1892), 52 N. W. 
 Hartley v. Brooks, 6 Whart. 189; Rep. 756; Nelson v. New York, 131 
 Moses v. Penquit, 82 Ala. 370; 34 N. N. Y. 4. The circumstance that de- 
 W. Rep. 445 ; Stroud v. Tilton, 4 fendant has recognized the accuracy 
 Abb. (N. Y.) App. 324 ; Jeffries v. of the books of the plaintiff in trans- 
 Urmy, 3 Houst. (Del.) 653 ; Barker v. actions with other persons is ma- 
 Haskell, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 218 ; Kent v. terial as bearing on their admissi- 
 Garvin, 1 Gray (Mass.), 148; Hall bility. West v. Van Tuyl, 119 N. Y. 
 v. Glidden, 39 Me. 445; Powers v. 620; Pub. Ass'n v. Fisher (Mich., 
 Savin, 28 Abb. N. C. 463. Contra, 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 759. 
 Robertson v. Reed, 38 Mo. App. 32.
 
 86 HEARSAY. [§ 61. 
 
 tion, for books which only contain marks, signs or figures are 
 admissible, provided there is other evidence which will ren- 
 der these entries intelligible and show their explanatory con- 
 nection with the main transaction. 1 So the fact that the ac- 
 count is kept by notches cut in a stick, 2 or is marked on a 
 slate 3 or board with a piece of chalk, 4 will not render the 
 book into which it is transferred inadmissible. So the fact 
 that a written entry is in cipher will not cause its exclusion. 5 
 
 Mere memoranda of transactions in dispute, made in books 
 or on loose papers, made for the purpose not of charging 
 either party, but merely to aid the memory of the person 
 making them, are not, it has been sometimes held, admissible 
 as independent evidence, but may be read by the witness to 
 refresh his memory. He will then be required to testify of 
 his own knowledge to the facts and transactions which are 
 contained in his memoranda. 6 
 
 § 61. Indorsements as part of the res gesta?. — Under the 
 rule of the res gestce is included the acknowledgment of a 
 partial payment indorsed by the holder of negotiable paper 
 upon the note or other security. Such an indorsement, tend- 
 ing to show payment by the creditor or maker of the negoti- 
 able paper, is admissible evidence of his acknowledgment of 
 the debt, and the effect of such part payment may be to pre- 
 vent the note from being barred by the statute of limitation. 
 If, therefore, a note so indorsed be offered in evidence, it will 
 be presumed, in the absence of circumstances to the contrary, 
 that the receipt was indorsed at the time of the payment 
 according to the ordinary and well-recognized mercantile cus- 
 tom, and that the payment was actually made. 7 The indorse- 
 
 i Miller v. Shay, 145 Mass. 162 ; 13 s Monroe v. Snow, 131 111. 126. 
 
 N. E. Rep. 468 ; Springs v. Schenck, 6 Bonnett v. Glatfeldt, 120 111. 166 ; 
 
 106 N. C. 153; Pratt v. White, 132 Baum v. Reay, 96 Cal. 642; Bates v. 
 
 Mass. 477. Sabin, 64 Vt. 511 ; Bates v. Preble 
 
 2 Kendall v. Field, 14 Me. 30. (U. S., 1894), 12 S. Ct. 277 ; Whitaker 
 
 3 Faxon v. Hollis, 13 Mass. 42; v. White, 69 Hun, 288; Cunard v. 
 Kendall v. Field, 14 Me. 30. Manhattan, 1 Misc. Rep. 151. See 
 
 * Smith v. Sanford, 12 Pick. 139; post, §§337, 338. 
 
 Pallman v. Smith (Pa., 1890), 19 Atl. "Nichols v. Webb, 8 Wheat. 326; 
 
 Rep. 891 ; Crane Lumber Co. v. Otter Whitney v. Bigelow, 4 Pick. 110; 
 
 Creek Lumber Co. (Mich., 1890), 44 Manson v. Lancey, 84 Me. 389 ; Gib- 
 
 N. W. Rep. 788 ; Barker v. Haskell, 9 son v. Peebles, 2 McCord, 418. 
 Cush. 218.
 
 § 61.] HEARSAY. 87 
 
 merit thus being a part of the res gestae, i. e. t the act of pay- 
 ment, it is admissible as original evidence for the creditor to 
 show an acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor. 1 "When, 
 however, the statute has run upon the instrument, a subse- 
 quent indorsement by the creditor purporting to show a part 
 payment by the debtor will be to so large a degree in the in- 
 terest of the former that no presumption of payment will 
 arise. Under these circumstances he will be compelled to 
 prove actual payment by evidence extrinsic to this indorse- 
 ment. 2 
 
 » McCrillis v. Millard, 24 Atl. Rep. boom v. Billington, 17 Johns. 182 ; 
 
 576; 17 R I. 724; Oughterson v. In re Clapsaddle, 24 N. Y. S. 313; 
 
 Clark, 65 Hun, 624. 4 Misc. Rep. 355. 
 
 2 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 121 ; Rose-
 
 CHAPTER Y. 
 
 ADMISSIONS. 
 
 § 65. Definition and character. 
 66. Privity as affecting admissions. 
 
 Parties whose admission is re- 
 ceived — Joint interest, when 
 required. 
 
 Admissions of partners — Their 
 effect after dissolution. 
 
 Declarations of conspirators. 
 
 Assignor and assignee. 
 
 Wife's admission — When bind- 
 ing on husband. 
 
 Admissions of inhabitants of 
 towns. 
 
 Admissions of strangers to the 
 record — Principal and 
 surety — Admissions of real 
 parties. 
 73a. The declarations of agents. 
 74. Admissions by attorneys of 
 record. 
 
 07. 
 
 08. 
 
 09. 
 
 70. 
 71. 
 
 72. 
 
 73. 
 
 §75. 
 
 76. 
 
 77. 
 
 78. 
 
 79. 
 
 80. 
 
 81. 
 
 82. 
 
 83. 
 84. 
 85. 
 
 Offers of compromise — Ad- 
 missions under duress against 
 interest. 
 
 Admissions in pleadings. 
 
 Admissions by reference — 
 Awards. 
 
 Admissions from conduct and 
 assumed character. 
 
 Self-serving declarations. 
 
 Mode of proof — Nature of the 
 admissions. 
 
 Weight and sufficiency of ad- 
 missions. 
 
 Admissions, when conclusive — 
 Mistake. 
 
 Estoppel defined. 
 
 Intention of party estopped. 
 
 Admissions and communica- 
 tions sent and received by 
 telephone. 
 
 § 65. Definition and character. — An admission is a con- 
 cession or voluntary acknowledgment made by a party of the 
 existence or truth of certain facts. 1 The reception of admis. 
 sions as evidence constitutes an exception to the rejection of 
 hearsay evidence and depends upon well-recognized principles 
 of justice and of public policy by which men are prevented 
 from taking advantage of their acts or statements intended to 
 promote their own interests without being compelled to as- 
 sume full responsibility for them so far as they control or 
 even influence the affairs of other men. The facts to which 
 the admission made by a party refers are peculiarly within 
 his own knowledge. This circumstance, with the indisposi- 
 tion of men to admit things which are against their interests, 
 lends weight and credibility to this description of evidence. 
 
 The word " admissions " is confined to statements made or 
 
 1 Bouvier's Law Diet
 
 § (50.] ADMISSIONS. 8D 
 
 conduct occurring in transactions not criminal, and, for con- 
 venience sake, they may be divided into direct, i. e., express 
 admissions, incidental admissions, and implied admissions. 
 
 In implied admissions are included all those that may be 
 inferred from the conduct or character of the party, from his 
 act or omission, or from his acquiescence and silence under 
 circumstances where it is his duty to speak or act. 1 
 
 The form of the declaration is not material if its terms are 
 clear and binding- upon the party making them or upon those 
 in privity with him. Thus, where defendant made statements 
 over a telephone, the witness was permitted to give evidence 
 of them upon his testifying that he knew and could distin- 
 guish defendant's voice. 2 
 
 § 6G. Privity as affecting admissions. — By privity is meant 
 a mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of prop- 
 erty, 3 and this relationship presupposes such an identity of 
 interest that the admission of one privy is by the law regarded 
 as the admission of all the others. 4 If a party has limited or 
 qualified his own rights of enjoyment or ownership over prop- , 
 erty, it is only just that those who enjoy those rights concur- 
 rently with him, or who succeed to them, should in accepting 
 the benefits be burdened with the disadvantages and responsi- 
 bilities. Thus the declarations of the ancestor or of a testator or 
 grantor in disparagement of the title by which he holds, made 
 during the period he is owner of the property, are binding 
 upon the heirs, executors or devisees or grantees respectively. 5 
 But the declarations of a grantor of real property, made sub- 
 sequent to the date on which he parted with his title, are 
 never admissible against subsequent purchasers, even though 
 the declarations refer to the condition and boundaries of the 
 land as it was while he was the owner of it. 6 So where a per- 
 
 i See §§ 18, 83. han, 94 111. 142 : Miller v. Ternane, 50 
 
 2 Stepp v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. App # N. J. L. 32 ; Platner v. Platner, 78 
 
 349. N. Y. 90 ; Wood v. Fisk, 62 N. H. 173 ; 
 
 s Co. Lit. 271a; 1 Greenl. on Evid.> Whitman v. Haywood, 14 S. W. Rep. 
 
 §189. 166; 77 Tex. 157; Lewis v. Adams, 
 
 * See post, §§ 68-73a. 61 Ga. 549 ; Stockwell v. Blarney, 129 
 
 5 Leggat v. Leggat (Mont., 1893), 33 Mass. 312. 
 Pac. Rep. 5 ; Snow v. Starr, 12 S. W. 8 Hills v. Ludwig, 24 N. E. Rep. 596 ; 
 
 Rep. 673; 75 Tex. 411; Pierce v. 46 Ohio St. 513; Casto v. Fry, 10 S. E. 
 
 Robert, 57 Conn. 31 ; Hughes v. Rep. 799 ; 33 W. Va. 449 ; Bentley v. 
 
 Boone, 102 N. C. 137; Mueller v. Rel- O'Brien, 111 111. 53; Taylor v. Dev-
 
 90 ADMISSIONS. [§ 07. 
 
 son admitted that he held the land as a tenant, his declaration 
 will be binding upon his heir or devisee l in an action against 
 the latter to recover the land. 
 
 The adverse and continuous character of one's possession 
 may in like manner be shown by the declaration of a grantor 
 on whose alleged title the plaintiff in ejectment founds his. 8 
 So where a question of boundary is concerned, the declara- 
 tions of a former owner, made while in possession of the land, 
 I are always admissible against a subsequent purchaser. 3 
 
 § 67. Parties Avhose admission is received — Joint inter- 
 est, when required. — The admissions of a party to the record 
 or of one identified in interest with him are receivable against 
 him, as a general rule. Though several persons may sue or 
 be sued, the admission of one, though receivable against him, 
 will not bind the others unless a joint interest or privity exists 
 between them. 4 A mere community of interest is not enough. 
 But where the required joint interest exists, the admission of 
 one of the parties, made in the prosecution of the common 
 undertaking and within its scope, is receivable in evidence 
 against any or all of his associates. 5 So, because the neccs- 
 
 erell, 43 Kan. 469; Walker v. Cole 4 Petrie v. Williams, 68 Hun, 589; 
 (Tex., 1894), 24 S. W. Rep. 76. Contra, 23 N. Y. S. 237 ; Thompson v. Rich- 
 Hart v. Randolph (111., 1893), 32 N. E. ards, 14 Mich. 172; State v. Ah Tom, 
 Rep. 517. 8 Nev. 213; Grace v. Nesbitt, 109 
 i Fellows v. Smith, 130 Mass. 78. Mo. 3 ; Burnham v. Svveatt, 16 N. H. 
 
 2 Alexander v. Caldwell, 55 Ala. 418; Bensley v. Brockway, 27 111. 
 217; Stockton v. Staples (Cal., 1893), App. 410; Dan v. Brown, 4 Cow. 
 32 Pac. Rep. 936 ; Hurley v. Lockett, (N. Y.) 483 ; Lenhart v. Allen, 32 Pa. 
 72 Tex. 262 ; Parrott v. Baker, 82 Ga. St. 312 ; McElroy v. Ludlum, 32 N. J. 
 364; Lawrence v. Wilson (Mass., Eq. 828; Morris v. Nixon, 1 How. 
 1894), 35 N. E. Rep. 858. (U. S.) 118; Redding v. Wright, 49 
 
 3 Wood v. Fiske, 62 N. H. 173 ; Whit- Minn. 322 ; Leeds v. Marine Ins. Co., 
 man v. Haygood, 77 Tex. 557. " On 2 Wheat. (IT. S.) 380 ; Kiser v. Dan- 
 
 .' a question of private boundary, deck- nenburg, 88 Ga. 541 ; Roberts v. Ken- 
 rations of a particular fact, as dis- dall, 3 Ind. App. 339 ; Thurman v. 
 tinguished from reputation, made by Blankenship-Blake Co., 79 Tex. 171. 
 a deceased person, are not admissible s See post, §§ 68, 69, 71, 73a; 
 unless it is shown that such person Collett v. Smith, 143 Mass. 473 ; 
 had knowledge of that whereof he Vankleck v. McClabe, 87 Mich. 599 ; 
 spoke, and was on the land or in 9 N. W. Rep. 872. Cf. Rich v. Flan- 
 possession of it when the declaration ders, 39 N. H. 304 ; Carson v. Gillitt, 
 was made as part of the res gestce." 2 N. D. 255 ; 50 N. W. Rep. 710 ; Web- 
 Hunnicutt v. Peyton, 102 U. S. 363, ster v. Stearns, 44 N. H. 498 ; McKee 
 364. v. Hamilton, 33 Ohio St 7 ; Peyson
 
 § 67.] 
 
 ADMISSIONS. 
 
 91 
 
 sary joint interest is lacking, it has been held that the ad- 
 mission of a tenant in common is not receivable against his 
 fellow-tenants, 1 nor of an executor, trustee or administrator 
 against those officially associated with him, 2 nor of an heir or 
 devisee to bind the other heirs or devisees. 3 So no joint 
 interest exists between successive indorsers, 4 or between a 
 promisor and an executor of a co-promisor; 5 between an ad- 
 ministrator and an heir of the intestate; 6 between remainder- 
 man and life-tenant; 7 among co-underwriters; 8 between the 
 person assured and the beneficiary, 9 or among directors 10 or 
 stockholders of a corporation u which will render the admis- 
 sion of one receivable as evidence against the others. 12 
 
 v. Meyers, 63 Hun, 634; Lewis v. 
 McGinnis, 30 Fla. 419; Mathews v. 
 Herdtfelder, 15 N. Y. S. 165. 
 
 i Bryant v. Booze, 55 Ga. 438 ; Mc- 
 Lellan v. Cox, 36 Me. 95 ; Page v. 
 S wanton, 39 Me. 400 ; Dobson v. Ku- 
 hula, 66 Hun, 627 ; Lyons v. Pyatt 
 (N. J., 1893), 26 Atl. Rep. 834 ; Ronne- 
 baum v. Mt Auburn Ry. Co., 29 
 Weekly L Bui. 338 ; Talkin v. An- 
 derson (Tex., 1892), 19 S. W. Rep. 350 ; 
 Eakle v. Clark, 30 Md. 322 ; Dan v. 
 Brown, 4 Cow. (N. J.) 483. 
 
 -Weyman v. Thompson, 25 Atl. 
 Rep. 205; Dye v. Young, 55 Iowa, 
 433; McMillan v. McDill, 110 111. 47; 
 Prewet v. Coopwood, 30 Miss. 369; 
 Thompson v. Thompson, 13 Ohio St. 
 356 ; La Bau v. Vanderbilt, 3 Redf. 
 (N. Y.) 384 ; Forney v. Terrell, 4 W. 
 Va. 729 ; Hayes v. Burkam, 67 Ind. 
 359 ; Prewet v. Land, 36 Miss. 495 ; 
 Hamberger v. Root, 6 W. & S. (Pa.) 
 431 ; Irwin v. West, 81 Pa. St. 157 ; 
 Elwood v. Diefendorf, 5 Barb. 498. 
 
 3 Roberts v. Trawick, 13 Ala. 68 
 Berden v. Allen, 10 111. App. 91 
 Church v. Howard, 79 N. Y. 415 
 O'Conner v. Madison (Mich., 1894), 57 
 N. W. Rep. 105 ; Walk up v. Pratt, 5 
 Harr. & J. (Md.) 41 ; Hueston v. Hues- 
 ton, 2 Ohio St. 488 ; Tinnern v. Hinz, 
 38 Hun (N. Y.), 465; Hamon v. 
 Huntley, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 493 ; Walker 
 
 v. Dunspaugh, 20 N. Y. 170 ; Pease v. 
 Phelps, 10 Conn. 62. The declaration 
 of a legatee who it is claimed ob- 
 tained the will by the employment 
 of undue influence is not admissible 
 in a contest to set it aside where 
 other legatees are mentioned. Liv- 
 ingston's Appeal, 26 Atl. Rep. 470 
 (Conn., 1893) ; In re Baird, 47 Hun, 77. 
 
 4 Slaymaker v. Gundackei-, 10 S. & 
 R (Pa.) 75. 
 
 5 Hathaway v. Haskell, 9 Pick. 
 (Mass.) 42 ; Slater v. Lawson, B. & Ad. 
 396 ; Atkins v. Tregold, 2 B. & C. 23. 
 
 6 Lawrence v. Wilson (Mass., 1894), 
 35 N. E. Rep. 858. 
 
 'Hill v. Roderick, 4 W. & S. (Pa.) 
 221 ; McCune v. McCune, 29 Mo. 117 ; 
 Pool v. Morris, 29 Ga. 374. 
 
 8 Lambert v. Smith, 1 Cranch(U. S.), 
 361. 
 
 9 Supreme Lodge v. Schmidt, 98 
 Ind. 374. 
 
 io Eakle v. Clarke, 30 Md. 322; Bry- 
 ant v. Booze, 55 Ga. 438. 
 
 "Hartford Bank v. Hart, 3 Day 
 (Conn.), 495. 
 
 12 The admissions of a judgment 
 debtor are not binding on the cred- 
 itor or his assignee. Tisch v. Utz, 
 21 Atl. Rep. 808 (Pa., 1890), 28 W. N. 
 C. 55. C/. 1 Addison on Cont., 78-88, 
 and 1 Pars, on Cont., 11, for test be- 
 tween joint and common interests.
 
 92 admissions. [§ 68. 
 
 §68. Admissions of partners — Their effect when made 
 after dissolution. — If individuals are associated together with 
 a common design in view, the law, presuming that the ben- 
 efits, if any, which will inure from its accomplishment will be 
 shared by all, will not permit any member of the combina- 
 tion to escape the consequences of the acts or declarations of 
 those joined with him. 1 Thus, the declarations or acts of a 
 partner made during the existence of the partnership, apper- 
 taining to its affairs and within its scope, and calculated to 
 advance the interests of the firm, will bind all his associates, 
 the law regarding each partner as the agent of all so far as the 
 firm's affairs are concerned. 2 The fact of the existence of the 
 partnership must, however, be established, at least prima 
 facie, by other evidence, or the declarations, which are ad- 
 mitted only because contemporaneous with it, will be rejected.' 
 Accordingly, where the execution of a note was in issue in an 
 action against alleged partners, the admission of its signature 
 by one was not sufficient to enable plaintiff to recover, though 
 the signature of the others had been proved, in the absence of 
 other proof of an existing partnership. 4 But by suing or de- 
 fending as partners the existence of the joint interest is in- 
 cidentally admitted, 5 and also if each individual admits in 
 turn that he is a partner with the others, such an admission, 
 
 1 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 111. See, People v. Stanley, 47 Cal. 113; Berry 
 
 also, post, § 69. v. Lathrop, 24 Ark. 12 ; Alcott v. 
 
 2 Weed v. Kellogg, 6 McLean (U.S.), Strong, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 323; Humes 
 
 44; Hunter v. Hubbard, 26 Tex. 537: v. O'Brien, 74 Ala. 64; Vanway v. 
 
 Mamlock v. White, 20 Cal. 598 ; Park Klein, 122 Ind. 416 ; Rich v. Flanders. 
 
 v. Wooton, 35 Ala. 242 ; Munson v. 39 N. H. 304 ; Cowen v. Kinney, 33 
 
 Wickwire, 21 Conn. 513; Holmes v. Ohio St. 422; Buckman v. Barnum, 
 
 Budd, 11 Iowa, 186; Collett v. Smith, 15 Conn. 68; Clark v. Hoffaker, 26 
 
 143 Mass. 473 ; Rich v. Flanders, 39 Mo. 264 ; Winchester v. Whitney, 
 
 N. H. 304 ; McKee v. Hamilton, 33 138 Mass. 549 ; Jones v. O'Farrell, 1 
 
 Ohio St. 7 ; Hutzler v. Hubbard, 26 Nev. 354 ; Henry v. Willard, 73 N. C. 
 
 Tex. 537; Peden v. Mail, 118 Ind. 35; Cowan v. Kinney. 33 Ohio St 
 
 560 ; Brunei- v. Nesbitt, 31 111. App. 423 ; McCorkle v. Doby, 1 Strobh. 
 
 517 ; Coit v. Tracy, 8 Conn. 268 ; Boyd (S. C.) 396 ; Bensley v. Brockway, 27 
 
 v. Thompson, 153 Pa. St. 78; Begg v. 111. App. 410. 
 
 Blake, 6 Q. B. 126; Schull's Appeal, * Conley v. Jennings, 22 111. App. 
 
 115 Pa. St 141 ; Pierce v. Roberts, 57 547 ; Gay v. Palmer, 1 Esp. 135. But 
 
 Conn. 40 ; Allen v. Clark, 66 Hun, see, contra, Fleming v. Stearns (Iowa, 
 
 628. 1890), 44 N. W. Rep. 376. 
 
 s Kelly v. People, 55 N. Y. 565 ; s Lucas v. De Cour, 1 M. & S. 249.
 
 § 68.] ADMISSIONS. 93 
 
 it is held, will be sufficient to establish the joint relation 
 against all. 1 
 
 It is well settled that a partner has no implied power to 
 bind the firm by any sealed instrument, 2 though a document 
 which merely releases an existing obligation without creating 
 a new one is not inoperative merely because under seal. 3 It 
 would seem logical, in the absence of an agreement to the 
 contrary, that on the dissolution of the partnership an indi- 
 vidual's declarations relating to the business of the firm would 
 be no longer binding upon those with whom he had been but 
 was not now associated. 4 But where such declaration is con- 
 nected with a firm transaction which took place before the 
 dissolution, it has been received in evidence as binding on the 
 other partners. 5 
 
 Upon the question whether an acknowledgment or part 
 payment of a debt after dissolution will revive a debt barred 
 by the statute of limitation, the cases are not altogether har- 
 monious. If the acknowledgment be regarded as a new con- 
 tract, the original debt being extinct and the cause of action 
 gone, the declaration cannot be admissible as evidence against 
 the partners, though the declarant has been intrusted with the 
 liquidation of the firm's affairs. The power to distribute the 
 effects of the firm and to settle its affairs by discharging its 
 valid debts does not confer a power to bind its members by a 
 
 1 Edwards v. Tracy, 62 Pa. St. 374. ^So a partner may, after dissolu- 
 
 2 Massey v. Pike, 20 Ark. 92; Sib- tiou, waive demand and notice on 
 
 ley v. Young, 26 S. C. 415; McDon- paper indorsed by the firm. Darling 
 
 aldson v. Eggleston, 26 Vt. 154. v. Marsh, 22 Me. 184; Seldner v. 
 
 3 Morse v. Bellows, 7 N. H. 549; Bank. 66 Md. 88. See generally, 
 Pierson v. Hooker, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) Harding v. Butler, 30 N. E. Rep. 168; 
 68; Fox v. Norton, 9 Mich. 207. 156 Mass. 34; Beitz v. Fuller, 1 Mc- 
 
 4 Hopkins v. Bank, 7 Cowen, 650 ; Cord, 541; Lefavour v. Yandes, 2 
 Curry v. White, 51 Cal. 530 : Miller Blackf. 240 ; Walden v. Sherbourne, 
 v. Neimerick, 19 111. 172; Craig v. 15 Johns. 409: Loomis v. Loom is, 26 
 Alvarson, 6 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 609 ; Vt. 198 ; Pierce v. Wood, 23 N. H. 
 Rowland v. Boozer, 10 Ala. 690; 519; Nalle v. Gates, 20 Tex. 315; 
 Johnson v. Marsh, 2 La. Ann. 772 ; Curry v. Kurtz, 33 Miss. 24 ; Meyers 
 Flanagin v. Champion, 1 Green Ch. v. Stand art, 11 Ohio St. 39. After 
 (N. J.) 51 ; Winslow v. Tulan, 48 111. dissolution a partner cannot confess 
 145; Stockton v. Johnson, 6 B. Mon. judgment against the firm (Mair v. 
 (Ky.) 409 ; Hogg v. Orgill, 34 Pa. St. Beck, 2 Atl. Rep. 218), though he may 
 344; Baker v. Stockpoole, 9 Cosv. (N. compromise the firm's debts. Can- 
 Y.) 420; Maxey v. Strong, 53 Mo. 280. non v. Wildman, 28 Conn. 472.
 
 94 
 
 ADMISSIONS. 
 
 [§69. 
 
 new promise or to charge them with new debts. 1 There are 
 some early cases which support a contrary rule upon the er- 
 roneous supposition that the acknowledgment does not create 
 a new debt but merely continues one already existing. 2 
 
 The weight of the decisions sustains the proposition that an 
 acknowledgment or part payment after dissolution before the 
 debt has become barred is not admissible to extend the time 
 of limitation, 3 though the opposite theory, that as paying 
 debts is included in the power to wind up the firm affairs, a 
 part pa}mient with partnership funds is valid to bar the stat- 
 ute as against the other partners, is not without support. 4 
 
 §69. Declarations of conspirators. — This rule by which 
 the declarations of a partner 5 or of a fellow-conspirator are 
 admitted as original evidence "binding on his associates is not 
 based upon the fact that such declarations are admissions or 
 confessions, 6 but upon the fact that they are verbal acts form- 
 
 iKerper v. Wood, 29 N. E. Rep. 
 501 ; 48 Ohio St. 613 ; Jones v. Moore, 
 7 Binn. 573 ; Story, J., in Bell v. Mor- 
 rison, 1 Pet. 367. See Levy v. Cadet, 
 17 S. & R. 127; Searight v. Craig- 
 head, 1 Penn. 125; Yandes v. La- 
 favour, 2 Blackf. 371 ; Roosevelt v. 
 Marks, 6 Johns. Ch. 266, 291; Van 
 Keuren v. Parmelee, 2 Comst. (N. Y.) 
 523; Hackley v. Patrick, 3 Johns. 
 536, cited in 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 112 ; 
 Bush v. Stowell, 71 Pa. St. 208; 
 Hance v. Hair, 25 Ohio St. 349 ; Wal- 
 lis v. Randall, 81 N. Y. 164 ; Rogers v. 
 Clements, 92 N. C. 81. 
 
 2 Martin v. Root, 17 Mass. 222; 
 Ward v. Howell, 5 H. & J. 60 ; Wheel- 
 ock v. Doolittle, 3 Wash. 440 ; Cady 
 v. Shepherd, 11 Pick. 400; Bridge v. 
 Gray, 14 id. 61 ; Fisher v. Tucker, 1 
 McCord, 175; Mclntire v. Oliver, 2 
 Hawks, 209; Bissell v. Adams, 55 
 Conn. 399 ; Buxton v. Edwards, 134 
 Mass. 567; Patterson v. Choate, 7 
 Wend. 441 ; Shepley v. Waterhouse, 
 22 Me. 497; Merritt v. Day, 38 N. 
 J. L 32 ; Hopkins v. Banks, 7 Cow. 
 650 ; Goddard v. Ingram, 3 Q. B. 839 ; 
 
 Whitcomb v. Whiting, 2 Doug. 652 
 (Eng., 1781) ; Jackson v. Fairbanks, 2 
 H. Bl. 340, cited in 1 Greenl. on Evid., 
 § 112. Sometimes a distinction has 
 been made and it has been held that 
 the admission is only admissible to 
 show non-payment, and that the 
 original debt must be established 
 otherwise. Patterson v. Choate, 7 
 Wend. 441 ; Orange v. Low, 5 Gill & 
 J. 134, and cases supra. 
 
 3 Espey v. Comer, 76 Ala. 501 ; Bis- 
 sell v. Adams, 35 Conn. 299; Mer- 
 ritt v. Pollys, 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 355; 
 Newman v. McComas, 43 Md. 70; 
 Graham v. Selover, 59 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 313; Reppert v. Colvin, 48 Pa. St. 
 248. 
 
 *Greenleaf v. Quincy, 12 Me. 11; 
 Beardsley v. Hall, 36 Conn. 270 ; Mc- 
 Clurg v. Howard. 45 Mo. 365 ; Case- 
 bolt v. Ackerman, 46 N. J. L. 169 ; 
 Wood v. Barber, 90 N. C. 76 ; Mix v. 
 Shattuck, 50 Vt. 421; Tappan v. 
 Kimball, 30 N. H. 136; Buxton v. 
 Edwards, 134 Mass. 367. 
 
 s See §68. 
 
 e See post, § 97.
 
 §69.] 
 
 ADMISSIONS. 
 
 95 
 
 ing a part of the principal transaction or res gestw. That they 
 should be against the interests of the declarant or his asso- 
 ciates is not always necessary if they possess the contempo- 
 raneous character and explanatory effect required. 1 Thus, in 
 the case of a conspiracy, it is requisite that its existence should 
 be presumptively established by evidence sufficient to go to 
 the jury ; 2 the language of one who is shown to have been en- 
 gaged in it is original evidence against his fellow-conspirators. 
 It matters not at what stage of the undertaking any one may 
 have joined, the fact of his association with it being equiva- 
 lent to ratification of what has preceded it or whatever may 
 subsequently be done or said. 3 But it is a fundamental rule 
 that the declarations or acts, including written as well as oral 
 utterances, should have occurred during the existence of the 
 criminal association, and that they were designed to aid in its 
 accomplishment. If subsequent, they are narrative simply 
 and constitute no part of the transaction. 4 
 
 1 As to confessions, see §§ 96-98. 
 
 2 Rutherford v. Schattman, 119 N. Y. 
 604; 23 N. E. Rep. 440; Foster v. 
 Thrasher, 45 Ga. 517 ; Reid v. Louisi- 
 ana, etc. Co., 29 La. Ann. 388 ; Ham- 
 ilton v. People, 29 Mich. 195 ; Holliday 
 v. Jackson, 30 Mo. App. 263 ; Wig- 
 gins v. Thrasher, 9 Iowa, 194; Com. 
 v. Crown inshield, 10 Pick. 497; 
 Ormsby v. People, 53 N. Y. 472 ; Kel- 
 sey v. Murphy, 26 Pa. St. 78 ; United 
 States v. McKee, 3 Dill. (U. S.) 546 ; 
 Moore v. Shields, 121 Ind. 267 ; Cars- 
 kadon v. Williams, 7 W. Va. 784; 
 Triplett v. Goff, 83 Va. 784 ; McGraw 
 v. Com. (Ky., 1893), 20 S. W. Rep. 279 ; 
 Amos v. State (Ala., 1893), 11 S. Rep. 
 424. The declaration may be admit- 
 ted prior to the proof of the conspir- 
 acy. Hall v. State (Fla., 1893), 12 
 S. Rep. 449; State v. Grant (Iowa, 
 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 120. 
 
 3 McRae v. State, 71 Ga. 96 ; Amer. 
 F. Co. v. United States, 2 Pet 358, 
 365 ; People v. Kerr, 6 N. Y. S. 674 ; 
 Rex v. Hardy, 24 How. St. Tr. 451 
 et seq. ; State v. McCahill, 72 Iowa, 
 
 111; Kehoe v. Com., 85 Pa. St. 127; 
 Tow v. State, 22 Tex. App. 175; 
 United States v. McKee, 3 Dill. C. C. 
 546; Smith v. State (Tex., 1893), 20 S. 
 W. Rep. 876 ; People v. Collins, 64 Cal. 
 293 ; Ryan v. State, 83 Wis. 486 ; Deak- 
 ers v. Temple, 41 Pa. St. 234 ; Smith v. 
 State, 52 Ala. 407 ; Colt v. Eves, 12 
 Conn. 243 ; Kelley v. People, 55 N. Y. 
 565; Philpot v. Taylor, 75 111. 309; 
 State v. Ross, 29 Mo. 32; Mask v. 
 State, 32 Miss. 405 ; Bryce v. Buttler, 
 70 N. C. 585 ; Lees v. Lamprey, 43 
 N. H. 13; Dart v. Walker, 3 Daly 
 (N. Y), 138. 
 
 < Spies v. People, 122 111. 1 ; State v. 
 Melrose, 98 Mo. 594; Kunde v. State, 
 22 Tex. App. 65 ; State v. Grant (Iowa, 
 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 120; State v. 
 Larkin, 49 N. H. 39; State v. Minton 
 (Mo., 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 808 ; Card 
 v. State, 109 Ind. 418 ; Searles v. State, 
 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 331 ; People v. 
 Irwin, 77 Cal. 494 ; People v. McQuade, 
 110 N. Y. 284; People v. Kief, 12 N. 
 Y. S. 896 ; 58 Hun, 337.
 
 96 ADMISSIONS. [§ 70. 
 
 So where a conspiracy was shown to exist, a book purport- 
 ing to be a treatise upon modern methods of employing ex- 
 plosives to secure a radical revolution in the social system 
 was admitted to illustrate the purpose of the conspirators 
 where several of them were tried for murder. The book was 
 distributed among the members of an association to which 
 the conspirators belonged, was commended by their newspa- 
 pers, and was constantly consulted and circulated by them. 1 
 
 § 70. Assignor and assignee. — An assignee of a chose in 
 action or chattel, with the exception of a bo?ia fide holder of 
 a negotiable instrument not yet due, is bound by the admis- 
 sions of his assignor, made prior to the assignment, disparag- 
 ing or qualifying the title by which the assignor holds. 2 But 
 declarations in disparagement of title to property, real or per- 
 sonal, in order to be valid as admissions against the grantee 
 or assignee, must be made while the grantor or the assignor 
 is in possession. 3 Thus, the admissions, made after the assign- 
 ment, of one who has made an assignment for the benefit of 
 creditors are not admissible against the assignee to set aside 
 the assignment, 4 unless it is shown that a conspiracy has been 
 
 i Spies v. People, 122 111. 1 ; 3 Am. Fovvner, 69 N. Y. 404 ; Platner v. 
 
 St. Rep. 320 ; 9 Cr. L. Mag. 829. See, Platner, 78 N. Y. 90 ; Gidney v. Lo- 
 
 also, McRae v. State, 71 Ga. 96; Ke- gan, 79 N. C. 214; Hunt v. Haven, 56 
 
 hoe v. Com., 85 Pa. St. 127; People N. H. 87; Ten Eyck v. Runk, 26 N. 
 
 v. Geiger, 49 Cal. 643 ; State v. Mc- J. L. 513 ; Williard v. Williard, 56 
 
 Cahill, 72 Iowa, 121. Pa. St. 119. 
 
 2 Alger v. Andrews, 47 Vt. 238; 3 Mobile Bank v. McDonnell, 89 
 
 Crow v. Watkius, 48 Ark. 169 ; Lears Ala. 434 ; Shipley v. Fox, 69 Md. 572 ; 
 
 v. Rice, 65 Mich. 97 ; Howell v. Crow v. Watkins, 48 Ark. 169 ; Davis 
 
 Howell, 47 Ga. 492 ; Roberts v. Med- v. Evans, 102 Mo. 164 ; Flagler v. 
 
 bury, 132 Mass. 100 ; Alexander v. Wheeler, 40 Hun, 125, 178 ; Waldou 
 
 Caldwell, 55 Ala. 517 ; Dodge v. Freed- v. Purvis, 73 Cal. 518; Harrell v. 
 
 man, etc. Co., 93 U. S. 579; Roebke Culpepper, 47 Ga. 635; Marion v. 
 
 v. Andrews, 26 Wis. 311 ; Downs v. Hoyt, 72 id. 117; Proctor v. Cole, 164 
 
 Beldon, 46 V t. 674 ; Harrington v. Ind. 373 ; Benson v. Lundy, 52 Iowa, 
 
 Chambers, 3 Utah, 94 ; McFadden v. 256 ; Randegger v. Ehrhardt, 51 111. 
 
 Ellmaker, 52 Cal. 348; McSweeney 101 ; Deasy v. Thurman, 1 Idaho, 775 ; 
 
 v. McMillan, 96 Ind. 298 ; Ramsbot- Roberts v. Medbury, 132 Mass. 100 ; 
 
 torn v. Phelps, 18 Conn. 278 ; Mueller Gordon v. Ritenour, 87 Mo. 54. 
 v. Rebhan, 94 111. 142; Robinson v. 4 Wynne v. Glydwell, 17 Ind. 446; 
 
 Robinson, 22 Iowa, 247 ; Fellows v. Burt v. McKinstry, 4 Minn. 146 ; 
 
 Smith, 130 Mass. 378; Tyres v. Ken- Frear v. Evertsen, 20 Johns. (N. Y) 
 
 nedy, 126 Ind. 523 ; Adams v. David- 142 ; Myers v. Kinzie, 26 111. 36 ; 
 
 son, 10 N. Y. 309; Chadwick v. Bartlett v. Marshall, 2 Bibb (Ky.),
 
 71.] 
 
 ADMISSIONS. 
 
 97 
 
 formed between them to defraud the creditors, when the dec- 
 larations of the assignor are admissible as a part of the res 
 (jestce. 1 The rule by which such admissions are receivable 
 against the assignee is not applicable to bind the holder of a 
 promissory note which is . taken without notice and before 
 maturity. 2 If the promissory note is transferred after it is 
 due, the declarations of the indorser, made while the note was 
 in his possession, are admissible against the indorsee to prove 
 payment or any equitable defense which may have existed 
 between him and the maker. 3 
 
 §71. Wife's admission — When binding on husband. — 
 The declarations of a wife are not to be regarded as the ad- 
 missions of the husband unless authority to make them has 
 been conferred upon her by him. 4 If they are binding it is 
 
 467; Hey wood v. Reed, 4 Gray 
 (Mass.), 574 ; Carlton v. Baldwin, 27 
 Tex. 572 ; Peck v. Grouse, 46 Barb. 
 (N. Y.) 151; Bates v. Ableman, 13 
 Wis. 644 
 
 iTibbals v. Jacobs, 31 Conn. 428; 
 Ewing v. Gay, 12 Ind. 64 ; Souder v. 
 Schechterly, 91 Pa. St 83 ; Hutchings 
 v. Castle, 48 Cal. 152; Hodge v. 
 Thompson, 9 Ala. 131 ; Boyd v. Jones, 
 60 Mo. 454 ; De France v. Howard, 4 
 Iowa, 524 ; Cuyler v. McCartney, 33 
 Barb. (N. Y.) 165 ; Perkins v. Towle, 
 59 N. H. 583. 
 
 2 Blanc Jour v. Tutt, 32 Mo. 576; 
 Hackett v. Martin, 8 Greenl. (Me.) 77 ; 
 Paige v. Cagwin, 7 Hill (N. Y), 361 ; 
 Bristol v. Daun, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 142 ; 
 Wilson v. Bowden, 113 Mass. 422; 
 Osborn v. Robbins, 37 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 481; Washburn v. Ramsdell, 17 Vt. 
 299. 
 
 3 Sandifer v. Howard, 59 111. 246 ; 
 Glanton v. Griggs, 5 Ga. 424 ; Dren- 
 non v. Smith, 3 Head (Tenn.), 389 ; 
 Miller v. Bingham, 29 Vt 82 ; Pilcher 
 v. Kerr, ? La. Ann. 244 ; Sylvester v. 
 Crapo, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 92 ; Kane v. 
 Tarbit 23 111. App. 311;Robbv. 
 Schmidt, 35 Mo. 290; McLanathan 
 v. Patten, 39 Md. 142 ; Fisher v. True, 
 
 7 
 
 38 id. 534; Hutchins v. Hutchins, 98 
 N. Y. 56 ; Sanford v. Ellithorpe, 95 
 N. Y. 48; Headen v. Womack, 88 
 N. C. 468 ; Hirschfeld v. Williamson, 
 18 Nev. 66 ; McLaughlin v. McLaugh- 
 lin, 91 Pa. St. 462 ; Downs v. Belden, 
 46 Vt. 674; Tierney v. Corbett 2 
 Mackey, 264. 
 
 * Edwards v. Tyler (111., 1892), 31 
 N. E. Rep. 312; Rochelle v. Harri- 
 son, 8 Port. (Ala.) 351 ; Perry v. Gra- 
 ham, 18 Ala. 822; White v. Portland 
 (Conn,, 1893), 26 Atl. Rep. 342; 
 Snohll v. Met. R Co., 19 D. C. 399 ; 
 Hunt v. Strew, 33 Mich. 85 ; Johnson 
 v. Sherwin, 3 Gray (Mass.). 374; 
 Evans v. Evans, 155 Pa. St. 572 ; May 
 v. Little, 3 Ired. L. (N. C.) 27 ; Gar- 
 field v. Scott, 40 111. App. 380 ; Lay 
 Grae v. Peterson, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 
 338 ; Riley v. Suydam, 4 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 222; Park v. Hopkins, 2 Bailey 
 (S. C), 408 ; Berg v. Warner, 47 Minn. 
 250 ; Winkler v. Schlager, 19 N. Y. S. 
 100; Higham v. Vanosdol, 101 Ind. 
 160; Queener v. Morrow, 1 Coldw. 
 (Tenn.) 123; Baker v. Witten (Okl., 
 1892), 39 Pac. Rep. 491 ; Norfolk Nat 
 Bank v. Wood, 33 Neb. 113; 49 N. 
 W. Rep. 958; Rose v. Chapman, 44 
 Mich. 312 ; Coryell v. State, 62 Ind.
 
 98 
 
 ADMISSIONS. 
 
 [§71. 
 
 not because of the le-ial character of the marriage relation, 
 but solely because the husband has constituted her his agent, 1 
 and given her authority to act for him. 
 
 The considerations regulating this subject are analogous to 
 those which determine the existence of the relation of prin- 
 cipal and agent, modified somewhat by the peculiar position 
 of the parties and the intimacy which usually exists between 
 them. At common law, in consequence of the merger of 
 legal identity of the wife in that of the husband, her admis- 
 sions did not bind him where he sued as her representative 
 during coverture to reduce her choses in action to possession. 2 
 In consequence, however, of the modern statutes by which 
 a married woman is enabled to carry on business and to act 
 in general with the powers of a feme sole, this rule is of minor 
 importance and of infrequent application. In any event, if 
 the existence of the relationship of principal and agent is 
 shown to exist by evidence aliunde, 2 the statements of the 
 wife relating to the business of the agency, made during its 
 continuance and within the scope of her authority, are re- 
 ceivable against the husband. 4 
 
 307 ; Goodrich v. Tracy, 43 Vt. 314 ; 
 Donaldson v. Everhart, 50 Kan. 718. 
 The declarations of the husband are 
 not, where no agency exists, admis- 
 sible in an action against the sepa- 
 rate estate of the wife. Clapp v. 
 Engledow, 82 Tex. 290; Martin v. 
 Rutt, 127 Pa. St. 380; Mclntire v. 
 Costello, 6 N. Y. S. 397; Woodruff 
 v. White, 25 Neb. 745 ; Hunt v. Poole, 
 139 Mass. 224 ; Bunson v. Brooks, 68 
 Ala. 248 ; State v. Bank, 10 Mo. App. 
 482 ; Keller v. Railway Co., 27 Minn. 
 178; Kingen v. State, 50 Ind. 537. 
 But where husband and wife claim 
 by adverse possession, his admissions 
 are binding on her solely by reason 
 of the joint interest Hurley 
 Lockett, 72 Tex. 262. Cf. Holton v, 
 Carter (Ga., 1893), 15 S. E. Rep. 819 
 
 i See § 73a. 
 
 * Turner v. State, 50 Miss. 351, 354 
 Meredith v. Footner, 11 M. & W. 202 ; 
 
 Burnett v. Burkhead, 21 Ark. 77; 
 Jordan v. Hubbard, 26 Ala. 433 ; Coe 
 v. Turner, 57 Conn. 937. 
 
 3 Butler v. Price, 115 Mass. 578; 
 Hunt v. Strew, 33 Mich. 85 ; Deck v. 
 Johnson, 1 Abb. App. Dec. (N. Y.) 
 497. The mere existence of the rela- 
 tion of husband and wife will never, 
 it is held, render the admission of 
 one binding on the other. Deck v. 
 Johnson, supra; Schmidt v. Keen, 
 10 N. Y. S. 267. 
 
 4 Chamberlain v. Davis, 33 N. H. 
 121 ; McLean v. Jagger, 13 How. Pr. 
 (N. Y.) 494; Murphy v. Hubert, 16 
 Pa. St. 50 ; Colgan v. Phillips, 7 Rich. 
 (S. C.) 359; Robertson v. Biost, 83 
 111. 116 ; Arndt v. Harshaw, 53 Wis. 
 269; Bradford v. Williams, 2 Md. 
 Ch. 1, 3 ; Lunay v. Vantyne, 40 Vt 
 501; Town v. Lamphire, 37 id. 52; 
 Thomas v. Hargrove, Wright (Ohio), 
 595.
 
 §§ 72, 73.] admissions. 90 
 
 § 72. Admissions of inhabitants of towns. — At common 
 law the admission of a parishioner or inhabitant of an incor- 
 porated political division was receivable against the corpora- 
 tion. 1 In this country this rule is repudiated. By analogy 
 to private corporations, the declarations of the residents of 
 municipal or quasi-mxmicip&l corporations as towns and coun- 
 ties are not receivable against the corporation, even under cir- 
 cumstances where the action is in form against the inhabitants, 
 and their individual property is, as in New England, subject 
 to execution on the judgment which ma} T be rendered. 2 
 
 § 73. Admissions of strangers to the record — Principal 
 and surety — Admissions of real parties. — The admissions of 
 the real parties in interest, though they may not be parties to 
 the record, are usually receivable. Thus it has been held that 
 the admissions of a debtor are receivable against the surety, 3 
 of the guarantor against his principal, 4 of the actual bene- 
 ficiary in an insurance taken in the name of another, 5 of a 
 deputy-sheriff against the sheriff, 6 of the deceased intestate 
 against the administrator. 7 So where an individual has a real 
 interest in the litigation, although he may not be an actual 
 party of record, yet, so long as the actual defendant may in 
 turn recover over against him, he is bound by the judgment, 
 which would then be evidence against him, and his admissions 
 are receivable against himself and against the nominal de- 
 fendant. 8 But this admission by the real party in interest to 
 be binding on the party to the suit must be made while he had 
 an interest, that is, during the existence of joint interest or 
 privity, and it must relate to the transaction in which both 
 
 iRex v. Hardvvick, 11 East, 579; i Keifer v. Carnsi, 7 D. C. 156. 
 
 Reg. v. Adderbury, 5 Q. B. 187. 8 Bank v. Smith 12 Allen, 243; 
 
 2 Landaff's Petition, 34 N. H. 164 ; Weed v. Kellogg, 6 McLean, 44 ; 
 Watertown v. Cowen, 4 Paige, 510 ; Bond v. Ward, 1 Nott & McCord, 
 Burlington v. Calais, 1 Vt. 385; Low 201; McShane v. Bank, 73 Md. 135; 
 v. Perkins, 10 Vt. 532; Davis v. Savage v. Balch, 8 Greenl. 27 ; Union 
 Rochester, 66 Hun, 629. See Tiede- Bank v. Edwards, 1 Swan (Tenn.). 
 man on Municipal Corporations, 208 ; Atlas Bank v. Brownell, 9 R. I. 
 § 103, 160.' 168 ; Bartlett v. Delprat, 4 Mass. 702, 
 
 3 Walker v. Forbes, 25 Ala. 139. 708 ; MacCready v. Schenck, 41 La. 
 * Chapel v. Washburn, 11 Ind. 393 ; Ann. 456 ; Bayly v. Bryant, 24 Pick. 
 
 Brown v. Munger, 16 Vt. 12. (Mass.) 198 ; Clark v. Carrington, 7 
 
 5 Bell v. Ausly, 16 East, 141. Cranch, 308, 322; Markland v. Kira- 
 
 e Snowball v. Goodricke, 4 B. & Ad. mell, 87 Ind. 566. 
 
 541.
 
 100 ADMISSIONS. [ § 73. 
 
 are concerned. 1 Thus, where it is sought to introduce the 
 admission of the principal in a suit against a surety, it should 
 be remembered that the latter is only obligated for the prin- 
 cipal's acts and not for his language. If, therefore, the ad- 
 mission does not constitute a part of the res gestce, or, in other 
 words, if it is not a verbal act, then the surety is not bound 
 thereby. 2 So where payment is guarantied for goods sold 
 and delivered, an acknowledgment by the purchaser of the 
 goods, made subsequent to the deliver}' - , that he has received 
 the goods, is not admissible in an action against the surety 
 for the price. 3 
 
 The admissions of a fiduciary official, made after an embez- 
 zlement or other breach of trust, are not competent or receiv- 
 able as admissions against his surety where an action is brought 
 on the bond to recover for the official misfeasance. 4 The ad- 
 missions of a nominal party, as of a trustee or guardian, made 
 subsequent to the bringing of the suit, are not binding on the 
 party he represents. 5 So, too, the statements of a trustee, 
 administrator 6 or guardian, made before he was appointed or 
 before the suit in which he sues in his representative capacity 
 was commenced, are not receivable as admissions against him. T 
 
 1 Chapel v. Washburn, 11 Ind. 393; 983; 42 Minn. 468; Otis v. Van 
 Brown v. Hunger, 16 Vt. 12. It has Storch, 15 R. I. 41. 
 
 been held that the admission of a 3 Longenecker v. Hyde, 6 Binn. 1. 
 
 surety is competent against the prin- 4 Dawes v. Shedd, 15 Mass. 69 ; Stet- 
 
 cipal. Chapel v. Washburn, 11 Ind. son v. City Bank, 2 Ohio St. 167, 177 
 
 393; Brown v. Munger, 16 Vt. 12; Blair v. Insurance Co., 10 Mo. 559 
 
 Brockway v. Petted (Mich., 1890), 45 Republica v. Davis, 3 Yeates, 128 
 
 N. W. Rep. 61 ; Hall v. Brackett, 62 Hotchkiss v. Lyon, 2 Blackf. 222 
 
 N. H. 509. Miller v. Stewart. 9 Wheat. 703. 
 
 2 Lee v. Brown, 21 Kan. 458 ; Dex- 5 Sykes v. Lewis, 17 Ala. 261 ; Sar- 
 ter v. Clemans, 17 Pick. 175 ; Labaree geant v. Sargeant, 18 Vt. 371 ; Dazey 
 v. Klesterman (Neb., 1892) : 49 N. W. v. Mills, 10 111. 67; Hough v. Barton, 
 Rep. 1102; 33 Neb. 150; Bank of 20 Vt. 455 ; Mayes v. Inman, 2 Swan 
 Monroe v. Gifford, 70 Iowa, 580; (Tenn.), 80. 
 
 Keegan v. Carpenter, 47 Ind. 597; 6 Prud. Ins. Co. v. Fredericks, 41 
 
 Cheltenham Co. v. Cook, 44 Mo. 29 ; 111. App. 419. 
 
 Chemsford Co. v. Demarest, 7 Gray 7 Mertz v. Detweiler, 8 W. & S. 
 
 (Mass.), 1 ; Hatch v. Elkins, 64 N. Y. (Pa.) 376 ; Plant v. McEwen, 4 Conn. 
 
 489 ; White v. German Bank, 9 Heisk. 544 ; Moore v. Butler, 48 N. H. 161 ; 
 
 (Tenn.) 473; Ayer v. Getty, 46 Hun, Fraser v. Marsh, 2 Stark. 41; Legge 
 
 287; Bank v. Darragh, 1 Hun, 113; v. Edmonds, 25 L. J. Ch. 125. 
 Bardwell v. Dewitt, 44 N. W. Rep.
 
 § 73tf.] ADMISSIONS. 101 
 
 § 73a. The declarations of agents. — The legal unity of 
 principal and agent in respect to matters growing out of the 
 agency or to which it relates is the basis for the rule that the 
 declarations or admissions of an agent, made during the ex- 
 istence of the agency and relating to its object, are binding 
 on the principal. 1 Thus, an agent to sell may by his admis- 
 sions bind his principal upon the question of the value of the 
 property; 2 and where a principal directs some third person 
 to pay money or ship goods to his agent, the acknowledgment 
 or receipt of the agent is an admission of the principal. 3 If 
 made during the period of the continuance of the agency and 
 by reason of some special or express authorization by the 
 principal to make the given admission or declaration, then the 
 words of the agent are admissible against his principal upon 
 the same grounds that the latter's own admission would be 
 evidence against him. But where no express authority is 
 given to make the declaration, and where the agent is a special 
 agent, and the only ground for claiming its admission as orig- 
 inal evidence is an implied authority to make it, derived from 
 the existence of the agency, then the declaration is admitted 
 solely as a part of the res gestae, and accordingly must be con- 
 temporaneous with and explanatory of it. 
 
 Unauthorized admissions made subsequent to the transac- 
 tion to which they relate, and merely narrative of it, are not 
 binding upon the principal,- though the relation of principal 
 and agent exists for other purposes. 4 Thus, the declarations 
 
 i Hawk v. Applegate, 37 Mo. App. Noble, 6G Ga. 367 : Adams v. Hum- 
 
 32 ; Davis v. Rochester, 66 Hun, 629 ; phreys, 54 Ga. 396 ; Pavey v. Wint- 
 
 W. U. Tel. Co. v. Bennett, 1 Tex. Civ. rode, 87 Ind. 379 ; Mix v. Osby, 62 
 
 App. 28 ; McElwee v. Trowbridge, 68 111. 193; Hitcbings v. St. Louis 
 
 Hun, 28; Loomis v. N. Y. Cent. R. Transp. Co., 68 Hun, 33; Yocum v. 
 
 R, Co. (Mass., 1893), 34 N. E. Rep. 30 ; Barnes, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 496 ; Peck v. 
 
 Mars v. Virginia Home Ins. Co., 17 Kitchie, G6 Mo. 114; Hammett v. 
 
 S. C. 514 ; Josepbi v. Mady Clo. Co. Emerson, 27 Me. 308. 
 
 (Mont, 1893), 33 Pac. Rep. 1 ; Citizens' 2 Bank v. Gidrot, 19 Ga. 421. 
 
 Gasligbt Co. v. Granger, 19 111. App. » Click v. Hamilton, 7 Rich. (S. C.) 
 
 201 ; Rowell v. Klein, 44 Ind. 290 ; 65 ; Webster v. Clark, 30 N. H. 245. 
 
 Donnel v. Clark, 12 Kan. 154; Ham- 4 Phelps v! James (Iowa, 1893), 53 
 
 ilton v. Iowa Co. (Iowa, 1893). 53 N. N. W. Rep. 74; Yordy v. Marshall 
 
 W. Rep. 496; Coyle v. Baltimore, etc. Co. (Iowa. 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 298; 
 
 R Co., 11 W. Va. 94; Bohannan v. St. Louis, etc. Co. v. Sweet (Ark., 
 
 Chapman, 13 Ala. 641; Galceran v. 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 787; Mobile, etc.
 
 102 
 
 ADMISSIONS. 
 
 [•§ T8«. 
 
 of an engineer or conductor of a train, made after an accident 
 and constituting no part of the transaction, are not receivable, 
 as he has no implied authority to make statements which will 
 be binding on his principal. 1 So a corporation is not bound 
 by the admissions of its officers, trustees, directors or stock- 
 holders unless either they have been specially authorized to 
 make the admission or it has been made as a part of some 
 authorized transaction; 2 for it is a general rule that admis- 
 
 Co. v. Klein, 43 111. App. 63 ; Louis- 
 ville, etc. Co. v. Foley (Ky., 1893), 21 
 H. W. Eep. 866; Bradford v. Will- 
 iams. 2 Md. Ch. 1 ; Phelps v. George's 
 Creek, etc. R. Co., 60 Md. 536 ; Gar- 
 field v. Knight's Ferry, etc. Co., 14 
 Cal. 35 ; Tillinghast v. Nourse, 14 Ga. 
 641 ; Chicago, etc. Road v. Fietsam, 
 19 111. App. 55 ; Board of Com'rs of 
 Franklin County v. Bunting, 111 Ind. 
 143; Dietrich v. Baltimore, etc. R. 
 Co., 5S Md. 347; Aldridge v. Mid- 
 land, etc. Co., 78 Mo. 559; Craig v. 
 Gilbreth, 47 Me. 416 ; Dome v. South- 
 work Manuf'g Co., 11 Cush. (Mass.) 
 205 ; Batcheldor v. Emery, 20 N. H. 
 165 ; Murphy v. May, 9 Bush (Ky.), 
 33; Clark v. Anderson, 14 Daly, 464; 
 Winter v. Burt, 31 Ala. 33; Michigan 
 Cent. R. Co. v. Gougar, 55 111. 503 ; 
 Union Pac. R. Co. v. Fray, 12 Pac. 
 Rep. 98; 35 Kan. 700; Osgood v. 
 Bringolf, 32 Iowa, 265 ; Hawk v. Ap- 
 plegate, 37 Mo. App. 32; Gooch v. 
 Bryant, 13 Me. 386; Lowry v. Harris, 
 12 Minn. 166; Jones v. Jones, 120 N. 
 Y. 589 ; McDermot v. Hannibal, etc. 
 R. Co., 73 Mo. 516; Burnham v. Ellis, 
 ! 39 Me. 319; Memphis, etc. R. Co. v. 
 Cock, 64 Miss. 713; Converse v. 
 Blumiich, 14 Mich. 109; Woods v. 
 Banks, 14 N. H. 101; Demeritt v. 
 Meserve, 39 N. II. 521 ; Runk v. Ten 
 Eyck, 24 N. J. L. 750; American 
 Steamship Co. v. Landreth, 102 Pa. 
 St. 131 ; Raiford v. French, 11 Rich. 
 (S. C.) 367 ; Austin v. Chittenden, 33 
 Vt. 53 ; Goetz v. Kansas City Bank, 
 119 U. S. 318, 551; Packet Co. v. 
 
 Clough, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 528; Fogg 
 v. Child, 13 Barb. (N. Y.) 246; Patten 
 v. Messenger, 25 Pa. St. 393 ; Cobb v. 
 Johnson, 2 Sneed (Tenn.), 73; Barn- 
 ard v. Henry, 25 Vt. 289. 
 
 i Fort Smith Oil Co. v. Slover (Ark., 
 1894), 24 S. W. Rep. 106; Wendt v. 
 Chicago, etc. Co. (S. D., 1894), 54 N. 
 W. Rep. 226 ; East Tennessee, etc. R. 
 Co. v. Maloy, 2 S. E. Rep. (Ga.) 941 ; 
 Furst v. Second Ave. R Co., 72 N. Y. 
 542; Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Car- 
 jow, 73 111. 348 ; Ballard v. Manuf'g 
 Co., 15 N. Y. S. 405. The printed 
 rules of a railroad company are ad- 
 missible as its admissions. Railroad 
 v. Ward, 35 111. App. 423. 
 
 2 Bullock v. Consumers' Lumber 
 Co. (Cat, 1893), 31 Pac. Rep. 307 ; Rail- 
 way Co. v. Levy (Ind. Sup., 1893), 32 
 N. E. Rep. 815 ; Ohio & M. Ry. Co. v. 
 Levy (Ind., 1893), 34 N. E. Rep. 245 ; 
 Johnson v. East Tenn., Va. & P. Ry 
 Co. (Ga., 1893), 17 S. E. Rep. 21 ; La 
 Rue v. St. Anthony & D. Elevator 
 Co. (S. D., 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 806 ; 
 Pittsburg & L. S. Iron Co. v. Kirk- 
 patrick, 92 Mich. 252 ; Van Doren v. 
 Bailey, 48 Minn. 305; Missouri Pa- 
 cific Ry. Co. v. Sherwood, 84 Tex. 
 125; Bellow v. Fuller, id. 450; Rodes 
 v. Elevator Co., 49 Minn. 370 ; Weeks 
 v. Inhabitants, 156 Mass. 289 ; Thomas 
 v. Rutledge, 67 111. 213; Jacksonville, 
 etc. Co. v. Pen. Trans. Co. (Fla., 1890), 
 9S. Rep. 661; Peek v. Detroit Nov- 
 elty Works, 29 Mich. 313 ; Lime Rock 
 Bank v. Hewitt, 52 Me. 531 ; Walker 
 v. Dunspaugh, 20 N. Y. 170 ; Abbott
 
 § 73a.] 
 
 ADMISSIONS. 
 
 103 
 
 sions or declarations of an agent which are narrative in char- 
 acter must, in order to bind the principal, be within the scope 
 of his power, whether general or special, or must relate to 
 the subject of his agency and be a part of it. 1 Accordingly 
 the principal is never bound by the admission or declaration 
 of a person made by the latter before he has become an agent 
 or after the agency has terminated. 2 
 
 As regards written admissions under seal, no particular 
 form of words is necessary to bind the principal, provided 
 the instrument is sealed with the principal's seal and signed 
 with his name by the agent for him. If the instrument does 
 not show that it is intended to be the admission of the prin- 
 cipal, it will not generally bind him, though the agent in 
 signing may have affixed his title or indicated that he signs 
 
 v. Seventy-six L. & W. Co., 87 Cal. 
 323; Pemigewasset Bank v. Rogers, 
 18 N. H. 255 ; Green v. North Buffalo, 
 56 Pa. St. 110; Salado College v. Da- 
 vis, 47 Tex. 131 ; Wellington v. Bos- 
 ton R. R. Co. (Mass., 1893), 33 N. E. 
 Rep. 393; Schroepel v. Syracuse 
 Plankroad, 7 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 94; 
 Low v. Connecticut, etc. R. Co., 45 
 N. H. 370; Cleveland, C, C. & I. Ry. 
 Co. v. Closser, 126 Ind. 348. See Res 
 Gestae, §§ 54-57. 
 
 1 Beasley v. Fruit Packing Co., 92 
 Cal. 388 ; Ohio & M. Ry. Co. v. Stein 
 (Ind., 1892), 31 N. E. Rep. 180; Straw- 
 bridge v. Spann, 8 Ala. 820 ; Phelps 
 v. James (Iowa, 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 
 274; Perkins v. Burnett, 2 Root 
 (Conn.), 30; Mobile, etc. Co. v. Klein, 
 43 111. App. 63 ; Galceran v. Noble, 66 
 Ga. 367 ; Maltby v. Kirkland, 48 Fed. 
 Rep. 760 ; Mix v. Osby, 62 111. 193 ; 
 Covington, etc. Road v. Ingles, 15 B. 
 Mon. (Ky.) 637; Idaho Ford Co. v. 
 Firemen's Ins. Co. (Utah, 1893), 29 Pac. 
 Rep. 826; Yordy v. Marshall Co. 
 (Iowa, 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 298; 
 Gutchess v. Gutchess, 66 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 483; Telephone Co. v. Thompson, 112 
 Pa. St 118; Vassar v. Knickerbocker 
 
 Ice Co., 17 N. Y. S. 182 ; Holt v. Spo- 
 kane R. Co. (Idaho, 1894), 35 Pac. 
 Rep. 39. Where the authority of the 
 agent is disputed by the principal, 
 the declarations and acts of the al- 
 leged agent are not received in favor 
 of a third party to prove the exist- 
 ence of the agency. Mussey v. 
 Beecher, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 517 ; Trust- 
 ees, etc. v. Bledsoe, 5 Ind. 133 ; Brig- 
 ham v. Peters, 1 Gray (Mass.), 145 ; 
 Dowden v. Cryler (N. J., 1893), 26 Atl. 
 Rep. 941. 
 
 2 Bensley v. Brockway, 27 111. App. 
 410; Levy v. Mitchell, 6 Ark. 138; 
 Wiggins v. Leonard, 9 Iowa, 194; 
 Haven v. Brown, 7 Me. 421 ; Stiles v. 
 Western, R. Co., 8 Met. (Mass.) 44; 
 Williams v. Williamson, 6 Ired. L. 
 (N. C.) 281; Raiford v. French, 11 
 Rich. (S. C), 367 ; Colquitt v. Thomas, 
 8 Ga. 268; Watermann v. Peet, 11 
 111. 648; Renolds v. Rowley, 2 La. 
 Ann. 890 ; Polleys v. Ocean Ins. Co., 
 14 Me. 141 ; Caldwell v. Garner, 31 
 Mo. 131; Vail v. Judson, 4 E. D. 
 Smith (N. Y. ), 165 ; Brigham v. Carr, 
 21 Tex. 142; Rahm v. Deig, 121 Ind. 
 283; Davis v. Whitesides, 1 Dana 
 (Ky.), 177.
 
 104 
 
 ADMISSIONS. 
 
 [§?4. 
 
 in a representative capacity, 1 as by inserting in some part of 
 the instrument the name of the principal. 2 
 
 Declarations of an agent are inadmissible to prove the ex- 
 istence of the agency 3 or to show that the extent of the 
 authority actually conferred was larger or smaller than is 
 alleged. 4 . 
 
 § 74. Admissions Tby attorneys of record. — The declara- 
 tions of an attorney are only binding as admissions upon his 
 client when they are formal and deliberate, as where written 
 stipulations are entered into to facilitate the prosecution of 
 the suit by dispensing with some technical rule of procedure 5 
 or agreeing upon certain proof which it is proposed to pro- 
 duce. 6 But verbal statements by the attorney in casual con- 
 
 1 Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 357; 
 Meech v. Smith, 7 Wend. 315 ; Whit- 
 ford v. Laidler, 94 N. Y. 155 : Dayton 
 v. Warne, 43 N. J. L. 659 ; Mahoney 
 v. McLean, 26 Minn. 415 ; Taylor v. 
 Association, 68 Ala. 229 ; Hancock v. 
 Yunker, 83 111. 208. 
 
 UFaw v. Meals, 65 Ga. 711 ; Robin- 
 son v. Kanawha, etc. Co., 8 N. E. 
 Rep. 683 ; Sturdivant v. Hull, 59 Me. 
 172 ; Tilden v. Barnard, 43 Mich. 376. 
 
 3 Hardy v. Cheny, 42 Vt. 417; 
 Rhodes v. Lowry, 54 Ala. 4 ; Duryea 
 v. Vosburgh (N. Y, 1890), 24 N. E. 
 Rep. 308 ; French v. Wade, 35 Kan. 
 391; Haughton v. Maurer, 55 Mich. 
 323; Lafayette, etc. Co. v. Elman, 
 30 Ind. 83 ; Seymour v. Matteson, 42 
 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 496; Osgood v. 
 Pacey, 23 111. App. 116; Bowker v. 
 Deloug, 141 Mass. 351. 
 
 4 Lycoming Ins. Co. v. Ward, 90 
 111. 545; Chicago R. Co. v. Fox, 41 id 
 106 ; Galbreath v. Cole, 61 Ala. 139 
 Stollenmaeck v. Thatcher, 115 Mass 
 224 ; Lolmer v. Insurance Co., 121 id 
 439; Mapp v. Phillips, 32 Ga. 72 
 Carter v. Burnham, 31 Ark. 212 
 Dawson v. Landreaux, 29 La. Ann 
 363 ; Grover, etc. Co. v. Polhemus, 34 
 Mich. 247 ; Stringham v. Insurance 
 Co., 4 Abb. App. Dec. (N. Y.) 315. 
 
 5 Hanson v. Hoit, 14 N. H. 56. 
 
 6 Voisin v. Insurance Co., 67 Hun, 
 365 ; McRea v. Insurance Bank, 16 
 Ala. 755; Mather v. Phelps, 2 Root 
 (Conn.), 150; Perry v. Simpson Mfg. 
 Co., 40 Conn. 313; Worley v. Hin- 
 man (Ind., 1893), 33 N. E. Rep. 866; 
 Proctor v. Old Colony R. Co., 154 
 Mass. 251; 28 N. E. Rep. 13; Martin 
 v. Capital Ins. Co., 52 N. W. Rep. 534 ; 
 Reynders v. Hindman, 88 Ga. 314. 
 Cf. Milbank v. Jones, 17 N. Y. S. 464. 
 An attorney cannot compromise a 
 suit without express authority (Maye 
 v. Cogdell, 69 N. C. 93; Repp v. 
 Wiles (Ind., 1892), 29 N. E. Rep. 441 ; 
 Holker v. Parker, 7 Cranch, 436 ; 
 Peters v. Lawson, 66 Tex. 336 ; Bar- 
 rett v. Railroad Co., 45 N. Y 628, 638 ; 
 Granger v. Batchelder, 54 Vt. 348; 
 Crotty v. Egle, 35 W. Va. 143 ; White- 
 hall v. Kellar, 100 Pa. St. 89 ; Martin 
 v. Insurance Co. (Iowa, 1893), 52 N. 
 W. Rep. 534) ; though he may submit 
 a demand to arbitration. Brooks v. 
 New Durham, 55 N. H. 559 ; McElrath 
 v. Middleton (Ga., 1893), 14 S. E. Rep. 
 906 ; Talbot v. McGee, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 
 377; White v. Davidson, 8 Md. 169; 
 Williams v. Tracy, 95 Pa. St 308.
 
 §?*.] 
 
 ADMISSIONS. 
 
 105 
 
 versation J cannot be regarded as the admissions of the client, 
 though pertaining to the subject of litigation, for the attorney 
 is the agent of the client only so far as the management of 
 the cause which has been committed to him in court is con- 
 cerned, 2 and upon general principles cannot bind his principal 
 outside of the scope of his authority. 3 
 
 Written admissions by an attorney, made either before 
 beginning suit or after its termination and referring to it, 
 are never admissible against the client unless they were ex- 
 pressly authorized by him. 4 
 
 A client is estopped by the admissions of-his attorney, in the 
 absence of gross mistake or fraud, where, relying on such ad- 
 missions, reciprocal admissions have been made by his oppo- 
 nent. 5 If the authority of the attorney to make the admis- 
 sions exists generally, his admissions, when not acted on by the 
 other side, are prima facie evidence only, their sole effect 
 being merely to relieve the adverse party from showing the 
 facts involved in them. 6 
 
 1 Angle v. Bilby, 25 Neb. 595. 
 
 2 See as to admissions of agents, 
 §73a. 
 
 3 Bank v. Anderson, 28 S. C. 148 ; 
 Perry v. Simpson Co., 40 Conn. 313 ; 
 Lord v. Bigelovv, 124 Mass. 185 ; Lewis 
 v. Duane, G8 Hun, 28 ; Underwood v. 
 Hart, 23 Vt. 120; Young v. Wright, 
 1 Campb. 139; Wright v. Dickinson 
 (Mich., 1890), 42 N. W. Rep. 849. An 
 unauthorized communication by the 
 attorney to a person against whom 
 the client intends to bring suit is not 
 binding on him. Salomon, etc. Co. 
 t. Jones, 34 Kan. 443. So the malice 
 of plaintiff in an attachment suit 
 cannot be shown by the admissions 
 of his attorney. Floyd v. Hamilton, 
 33 Ala. 235. 
 
 * Proctor v. Old Colony R. Co., 28 
 N. E. Rep. 13; Morris v. Balkham, 12 
 S. W. Rep. 970; 75 Tex. Ill; Jane- 
 way v. Skerritt, 30 N. J. L. 97 ; Mar- 
 shall v. Cliff, 4 Camp. 133 ; Walden v. 
 Bolton, 55 Mo. 405 ; Moffitt v. Wither- 
 
 spoon, 10 Ired. L. 185 : Murray v. 
 Chase, 134 Mass. 92; Reineman v. 
 Blair, 96 Pa. St. 155. If the attorney 
 is authorized to speak for his client, 
 the admission of the attorney's clerk 
 is the admission of the attorney. Tay- 
 lor v. Williams, 2 B. & Ad. 845; Grif- 
 fith v. Williams, 1 T. R. 710. An ad- 
 mission of the truth of a fact by an 
 attorney in one suit is admissible in 
 another suit only where the client 
 authorizes it by his acquiescence in 
 it. Nichols v. Jones, 32 Mo. A pp. 
 657; Morris v. Balkham, 75 Tex. 111. 
 
 5 See post, § 83 ; Wilson v. Spring, 
 64 111. 18 ; Wheeler v. Alderman, 34 
 S. C. 533 ; Smith v. Milliken, 2 Minn. 
 319. 
 
 6 See §§ 82-84; Truby v. Seybert, 12 
 Pa. St. 101; Floyd v. Hamilton, 23 
 Ala. 235; People v. Garcia, 25 Cal. 
 531; Moulton v. Bowker, 59 N. Y. 
 533; Cassels v. Usry, 51 Ga. 621; 
 Bathgate v. Haskin, 59 N. Y. 533.
 
 106 
 
 ADMISSIONS. 
 
 [§75. 
 
 § 75. Offers of compromise — Admissions under duress. — 
 
 Admissions involved in overtures for a settlement of litigation 
 or in offers of compromise understood to be without prejudice 
 will not be admissible in evidence against a party. 1 Evidence 
 of an offer to pay a sum of money to stop litigation or buy 
 peace, without reference to the justice of the demand, is al- 
 ways rejected on grounds of public policy and from the fact 
 that such evidence is usually wholly irrelevant. 2 
 
 If the admission of a collateral fact tends to admit the 
 merits of the case, it may be presumed from the circumstances 
 that the admission was confidential and without prejudice, 
 and an agreement will be implied that it was not to be used 
 against the party. 3 
 
 1 Huetteman v. Viesselmann, 48 Mo. 
 App. 582; Darby v. Roberts (Tex., 
 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 529; Hand v. 
 Swarm, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 241 ; York 
 v. Conde, 63 Hun, 316; Olson v. 
 Peterson, 33 Neb. 358 ; Smith v. Whit- 
 tier, 95 Cal. 279 ; West v. Smith, 101 
 U. S. 263 : Perkins v. Concord Road, 
 44 N. II. 22o ; Daniels v. Woonsocket, 
 1 1 R. I. 4 ; Gay v. Bates, 99 Mass. 263 ; 
 Strong v. Stewart, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 
 137; Duff v. Duff, 71 Cal. 513; Jack- 
 son v. Clopton, 66 Ala. 29 ; Gommer- 
 sol v. Crew, 10 N. Y. S. 231 ; Daily v. 
 Coons, 64 Ind. 545; Mundhenk v. 
 Central Iowa R. Co., 57 Iowa, 718; 
 Campau v. Dubois, 39 Mich. 274 ; State 
 Bank v. Dutton, 11 Wis. 271 ; Patrick 
 v. Crowe, 15 Colo. 543; Keaton v. 
 Mayo, 71 Ga. 649 ; Barker v. Bushnell, 
 75 111. 220. As to power of attorney 
 to compromise, see § 74. Contra, Mc- 
 Elwee v. Trowbridge, 68 Hun, 28. 
 Whether a payment of a claim is an 
 admission of its justice or a mere 
 purchase of peace is a question of 
 fact to be determined by the court. 
 Colburn v. Groton (N. H., 1894), 28 
 Atl. Rep. 95. 
 
 2 Davey v. Lohrman, 14 N. Y. S. 
 922; Davis v. Simmons, 25 Pac. Rep. 
 535 ; Eldridge v. Hargreaves, 30 Neb- 
 
 638 ; 46 N. W. Rep. 923 ; International 
 Co. v. Ragsdale, 67 Tex. 27 ; Barker 
 v. Bushnell, 75 111. 220; Strong v. 
 Stuart, 9 Heisk. 137 ; Williams v. 
 State, 52 Ala. 411 ; Draper v. Hatfield, 
 124 Mass. 53 ; Daniels v. Woonsocket, 
 11 R. I. 4 ; Hood v. Tyner, 3 Ind. App. 
 51; Cooper v. Jones, 79 Ga. 379; 
 Manistee Bank v. Sprague, 64 Mich. 
 59 ; Louisville, etc. Co. v. Wright, 115 
 Ind. 378; West v. Smith, 101 U.S. 
 273. An admission of an independ- 
 ent or collateral fact not involving 
 the merits of the case will be received 
 against the pari} - making the offer un- 
 less the whole offer was expressly with- 
 out prejudice. Fuller v. Hampton, 
 5 Conn. 416: Akers v. Kirk (Ga., 
 1891), 18 S. E. Rep. 366; Mayor v. 
 Howard, 6 Ga. 213; Doon v. Ravey, 
 49 Vt. 293 ; Cates v. Kellogg, 9 Ind. 
 506; Arthur v. James, 28 Pa. St. 236: 
 Church v. State, 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 
 328 ; Central Branch U. P. R. Co. v. 
 Butman, 23 Kan. 446; Plumer v. 
 Currier, 53 N. II. 287 ; Cole v. Cole, 
 33 Me. 542 ; Garner v. Myrick, 30 Miss. 
 418 : West v. Smith, 101 U. S. 273 ; 
 Home Ins. Co. v. Baltimore W. Co., 
 93 id. 548. 
 
 3 White v. Old Dom. S. Co., 102 
 N. Y. 662 ; Brice v. Bauer, 108 id.
 
 § 76.] ADMISSIONS. 107 
 
 While confessions in criminal cases must be entirely free 
 and involuntary, 1 admissions are not rejected because made 
 under compulsion or constraint. But the influence must be 
 legal, and any compulsion amounting to duress or undue in- 
 fluence either in law .or equity would render an admission so 
 obtained inadmissible. The fact that it was elicited on cross- 
 examination in reply to questions which the witness answered 
 voluntarily, but which he might have refused to answer, will 
 not render it inadmissible. 2 
 
 § 76. Admissions in pleadings.— In considering how far a 
 party is bound by statements or admissions made in plead- 
 ings, the fairest and most satisfactory criterion is the amount 
 of his actual knowledge of the contents of those documents. 
 If it appears prima facie that the pleadings were signed and 
 filed by the attorney (particularly when they are formal only), 
 and there is nothing to show that the client had personal 
 knowledge of their contents, generally he will not be bound. :t 
 This rule, while sustained by the weight of the decisions and 
 by reason and good sense, is not universal. The contrary 
 presumption, that a pleading, even though formal and signed 
 
 433 ; Home Ins. Co. v. Bait. Ware- 171 ; Newhall v. Jenkins, 2 Gray, 562 ; 
 
 house Co., 93 U. S. 548 ; Campau v. Tilley v. Damon, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 
 
 Dubois, 39 Mich. 274 ; West v. Smith, 247. 
 
 101 U. S. 263. Contra, Kahn v. Insur- 3 Eaton v. Telegraph Co., 68 Me. 
 ance Co. (Wyo., 1894), 34 Pac. Rep. 63 ; Callan v. McDaniel, 72 Ala. 96 ; 
 1059; Ashlock v. Linder, 50 111. 159; Guy v. Manuel, 89 N. C. 83; Smith 
 1 Greenl. Evid., § 192. But evidence v. Davidson, 41 Fed. Rep. 172; State 
 is admissible to show the fact of a v. Samuels, 28 Mo. App. 649; Wat- 
 compromise having been made or son v. Lemon, 9 Colo. 200; Board of 
 attempted where the question is not Com'rs v. Diebold S. & L. Co., 133 
 upon the merits, but whether a com- U.S. 473; Dennie v. Williams, 135 
 promise was attempted or effected. Mass. 28 ; Meade v. Black, 22 Wis. 
 Jones v. Foxall, 15 Beav. 338 ; Col- 232 ; Ferris v. Hard, 135 N. Y. 354 ; 
 lierv. Mokes, 2 C. & K. 1012: Whit- Delaware County v. Diebold Safe 
 ney Wagon Works v. Moore (Vt, Co., 133 U. S. 487; Pope v. Allis, 115 
 1890), 17Atl. Rep. 1007. The reply U. S. 363 ; Scholl v. Bradstreet (Iowa, 
 to a letter offering to compromise is 1S92), 52 N. W. Rep. 500 ; Kentucky 
 not receivable as an admission, v. I. Cent. Co. (Ind., 1892), 30 N. E. 
 though it may not have been marked Rep. 802; Hamilton v. Patrick, 62 
 without prejudice if the letter was Hun, 74; Grimmer v. Carlton, 93 
 so marked. Hoghten v. Hoghten, 15 Cal. 189 ; Hall v. Brennan, 19 N. Y. S. 
 Beav. 321. 623 ; Halpin v. Manny, 33 Mo. App. 
 
 i See post, § 89. 388. 
 
 1 Collett v. Keith, 4 Esp. 212 ; 4 id.
 
 108 
 
 ADMISSIONS. 
 
 [§ 76 
 
 by the attorney, and containing no specific allegation of fact, 
 was within the knowledge of the party and may be used as 
 his admission, is supported by many cases. 1 
 
 Where a party has sworn to his pleadings, 2 or if they were 
 drawn by his express directions, or where they contain matter 
 not merely formal but specifically and particularly descriptive 
 of facts which must have been within the personal knowledge 
 of the party, and which could not have been inserted by the 
 attorney acting only under general instructions, he will be 
 conclusively presumed to have been fully informed as to all 
 statements contained therein, and they will be competent as 
 his admissions. 3 
 
 As regards the admissibility of admissions contained in the 
 pleadings in the suit in which they are filed, it is a general 
 rule, confirmed by statute in some states, that the pleadings 
 are not evidence nor open to comment or criticism by counsel. 
 The pleadings are considered in the light of technical formulas, 
 not importing absolute veracity in their contents, but are meant 
 to define the issue and facilitate the labors of the jurors in ar- 
 riving at a conclusion. 4 
 
 i Smith v. Pelott. 68 Hun, 632; 
 Coward v. Clanton, 79 Cal. 29 ; Vogel 
 v. Osborne, 32 Minn. 167; Rich v. 
 Minneapolis, 40 Minn. 84; Lamar 
 v. Pearce, 17 S. E. Rep. 92 ; Soaps v. 
 Eichbevg, 42 111. A pp. 375; Ballock 
 v. Hooper, 146 U. S. 363; Crump v. 
 Gerick, 40 Miss. 785; Buzard v. 
 McAnulty, 77 Tex. 438; Kankakee, 
 etc. Co. v. Horan (111., 1890), 23 N. E. 
 Rep. 621; Baily v. O'Bannon, 28 
 Mo. App. 39; Beale v. Brown, 
 Mackey, 574 ; Wheeler v. West, 71 
 Cal. 126 ; Murphy v. St. Louis Type 
 Foundry, 29 Mo. App. 541 ; McCor- 
 mick M. Co. v. Snell, 23 111. App. 79. 
 An original pleading which has been 
 superseded by an amended one is 
 not admissible as an admission. 
 Wheeler v. West, 71 Cal. 126. Con- 
 tra, Baily v. O'Bannon, 28 Mo. App. 
 39. 
 
 2 National S. S. Co. v. Tugman, 143 
 TJ. S. 28 ; Murphy v. St. Louis Type 
 
 Foundry, supra; Cook v. Ban - , 44 
 N. Y. 156; Asbach v. Railroad Co. 
 (Iowa, 1892), 53 N. W. Rep. 90. 
 
 3 Spencer v. Fortesque, 16 S. E. 
 Rep. 898; Nichols v. Jones, 32 Mo. 
 App. 664 ; Central R. R. Co. v. Stol- 
 mer, 51 Fed. Rep. 518; Johnson v. 
 Russell, 144 Mass. 409; Eaton v. 
 Telegraph Co., 68 Me. 63; Judd v. 
 Gibbs, 3 Gray (Mass.), 539; Lillis v. 
 Erin Ditcli Co.. 95 Cal. 553; State 
 v. Littlefield, 3 R. I. 124; Buzard v. 
 McAnulty, 77 Tex. 445; Woods v. 
 Graves, 144 Mass. 365 ; Miller v. James 
 (Iowa, 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 227. 
 
 4 See Gould, Plead., pp. 4-10; Phil- 
 lips v. Smith, 110 Mass. 61 ; Taft v. 
 Fiske, 140 Mass. 250. AVhere the ad- 
 mission is contained in one clause of 
 a pleading, the party has a right to 
 claim that a clause qualifying it shall 
 be read. Spencer v. Fortescue (N. C, 
 1893), 16 S. E. Rep. 898. Cf. Parker 
 v. Lanier, 82 Ga. 216.
 
 § 77.] ADMISSIONS. 109 
 
 The answer of an administrator to interrogatories in a bill 
 in equity will not bind the estate; l nor is the answer of a de- 
 fendant in a court of equity generally admissible against his 
 co-defendants, 2 though where there is a real and joint interest 
 between the parties, or -where an actual privity of interest 
 exists, the answer of one defendant, relating to the common 
 undertaking, as in cases of partnership, is an admission by 
 which the others will be bound. 3 
 
 Declarations in an answer filed in a court of chancery are 
 admissible against a sole defendant, even though the answer 
 is withdrawn or abandoned by him, 4 or stricken out on mo- 
 tion. 5 
 
 § 77. Admissions by reference — Awards of arbitrators. 
 Where a party has referred another to a third person not in- 
 terested or in privity with either, the party referring will be 
 bound by any statements the referee shall make pertaining to 
 the subject-matter. The statement of the referee is con- 
 sidered the admission of the person referring." The state- 
 ments and replies will only be regarded as the admissions of 
 the party so far as they convey information relative to the 
 facts which constitute the subject of the inquiry. 7 
 
 This principle is applicable to awards. If a controversjr is 
 submitted to arbitrators chosen for the purpose of bringing 
 
 iCrandall v. Gallup, 12 Conn. 565; dyk, 9 Cranch, 153, 156; Hartley v. 
 
 Dent v. Dent, 3 Gill (Md.), 482; El- Mathews (Ala., 1890», 11 S. Rep. 452. 
 
 wood v. Diefendorf, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 4 Brown v. Pickard, 4 Utah, 292 ; 
 
 398; Marshall v. Adams, 11 111. 37. Daub v. Eugelback, 109 111. 267. 
 
 A demurrer to a bill in equity, in 5 Peckham Iron Co. v. Harper, 41 
 
 order to be used as an admission of Ohio St. 100 ; Fite v. Elack (Ga., 1893), 
 
 the facts stated in the bill, must have 17 S. E. Rep. 349. 
 
 been adjudged insufficient. Kanka- 6 Chapman v. Twitchell, 37 Me. 59. 
 
 kee, etc. Co. v. Horan, 131 111. 288; 23 The word "referee,*' as thus used. 
 
 N. E. Rep. 621. Cf. post, § 303. means a person to whom a voluntary 
 
 a Leeds v. Marine Ins. Co., 2 Wheat, reference is made and not one ap- 
 
 380; Field v. Holland, 6 Cranch, 8; pointed b} r the court as a substitute 
 
 Morris v. Nixon, 1 How. (S. C.) 118; for a jury. 
 
 McElroy v. Ludlum, 32 N. J. Eq. 245. "Barnard v. Macy, 11 Ind. 536; 
 
 In equity, if the complainant waives Duval v. Covenhoven, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 the respondent's oath, a sworn an- 561; Lambert v. People, GAbb. N. C. 
 
 swer has only the force of an affida- (N. Y.) 181; Allen v. Killinger. 8 
 
 vit United States v. Council, 54 Fed. Wall. (U.S.) 480; Over v. Schifling, 
 
 Rep. 994. See post, % 303. 102 Ind. 191 (master referring to 
 
 3 See ante, § 66 ; Field v. Holland, servant). 
 € Cranch, 8 ; Clark's Ex'rs v. Riems-
 
 110 
 
 ADMISSIONS. 
 
 [{ 
 
 about a fair settlement and to avoid future litigation, the re- 
 sult of the arbitration will be conclusive and will be regarded 
 as the admissions of the parties referring, unless corruption or 
 partiality or gross fraud, collusion or mistake is shown. 1 
 
 An arbitrator or referee may testify to what matters were 
 referred to him. 2 But where the award is in writing it is 
 considered as the written admission of both parties, and neither 
 will be allowed to contradict or vary its terms by the parol 
 evidence of the arbitrator. 3 On the other hand, an award 
 may be set aside if 'prima facie irregular, uncertain or lacking 
 in mutuality, 4 or if it appears upon its face to have been 
 rendered upon ex parte, improper or grossly insufficient evi- 
 dence. 5 Generally, however, an arbitrator to whom the par- 
 ties have voluntarily referred a controversy is not bound by 
 strict legal rules as to the reception of evidence. He may, in his 
 discretion, receive evidence which would be inadmissible in a 
 court, provided he keeps within the limits of the subject- 
 matter referred, and the reception by him of such evidence is 
 
 i Wade v. Powell, 31 Ga. 1 ; N. Y. 
 Lumber, etc. Co. v. Schneider, 119 
 N. Y. 475 ; Davy v. Faw, 7 Cranch 
 (U. S.), 171 ; Overly v. Thrasher, 47 
 id. 10 ; Sherfey v. Graham, 72 III. 158 ; 
 Colder v. Mueller, 22 111. App. 527; 
 Kendrick v. Turbell, 26 Vt. 416; 
 Harris v. So. Mfg. Co., 8 R. I. 133 ; 
 Carter v. Carter, 100 Mass. 309 ; State 
 v. Appleby, 25 S. C. 500 ; McDowell 
 v. Thomas, 4 Neb. 542; Cooper v. 
 Andrews, 44 Mich. 94 ; Pierce v. 
 Pierce, 60 N. H. 355 ; Sisson v. Balti- 
 more, 51 Md. 83 ; Jenkins v. Meagher, 
 46 Miss. 84 ; Crumlish v. Wilmington, 
 
 5 Del. Ch. 270; Cushing v. Babcock, 
 38 Me. 452 ; Halstead v. Seaman, 52 
 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 415; Bennett v. 
 Russell, 34 Mo. 524 ; Young v. Laird, 
 30 Ala. 371. 
 
 2 Hawksworth v. Brammel, 5 M. 
 
 6 Cr. 281; Hale v. Huse, 10 Gray 
 (Mass.), 99; Thrasher v. Overly, 51 
 Ga. 91. 
 
 3 Cobb v. Dortch, 52 Ga. 548; Aid- 
 rich v. Jessiman, 8 N. H. 516 ; Alex- 
 
 ander v. McNear, 28 Fed. Rep. 403 ; 
 Mulligan v. Perry, 64 Ga. 567 ; Kings- 
 ton v. Kincaid, 1 Wash. (U. S.) 448 ; 
 Ward v. Gould, 5 Pick. 29; Chap- 
 man v. Ewing, 78 Ala. 403. See post, 
 § 205 et seq. 
 
 4 Blackledge v. Simpson, 2 Hayw. 
 (S. C.) 30; Purdy v. Delavan, 1 
 Caines, 304; Weed v. Ellis, 2 id. 254; 
 Spofford v. Spofford, 10 N. H. 254 ; 
 Gilson v. Powell, 13 Miss. 712; Han- 
 son v. Weber, 40 Me. 194. 
 
 5 Conrad v. Mass. I. Co., 4 Allen 
 (Mass.), 20 ; Hogaboom v. Herrick, 4 
 Vt. 131 ; Fluharty v. Beatty, 22 W. 
 Va. 698 ; Thompson v. Blanchard, 2 
 Iowa, 44; Cutting v. Carter, 29 Vt 
 72. The party impeaching an award 
 upon the grounds that evidence had 
 been improperly excluded must 
 have objected at the time of its ex- 
 clusion (Patten v. Hunnewell, 8 Me. 
 19), and must show that the evidence 
 would have been pertinent and ma- 
 terial. Halsted v. Seaman, 52 How. 
 Pr. (N. Y.) 415.
 
 §§ 78, 70.] ADMISSIONS. Ill 
 
 in good faith and docs not result in any substantial injustice 
 to either of the parties. 1 
 
 Under the rule above explained, that where a party has re- 
 ferred another to a third person, the latter has power to bind 
 the party referring by his statements relating to the subject- 
 matter, is included the case of an interpreter who participates 
 in an interview between the parties. Either party may tes- 
 tify to the statements of the interpreter, which is under such 
 circumstances equivalent to the admission of the adversary. 2 
 
 § 78. Admissions from conduct and assumed character. — 
 This class of admissions is of extensive application, but in the 
 main as admissions by conduct are rather to be regarded as 
 forming a part of the law of equitable estoppel, the principles 
 upon which they are admitted as a part of the law of evidence 
 is of doubtful correctness. They will be found elsewhere 
 treated under their appropriate head. 3 
 
 § 79. Self-serving declarations.— The admissions of a 
 party, being presumably against his interest, may be given in 
 evidence by any one who heard them. But a party cannot 
 claim the same for statements made by him in his own favor. 
 Such declarations cannot be testified to by third persons as 
 substantive evidence of the facts therein stated, and if they 
 are to be produced in evidence the party himself must go 
 upon the stand. 4 If the declaration is made in the presence 
 
 > Hooper v. Taylor, 39 Me. 224; 451; Ward v. Ward, 37 Mich. 253; 
 Fennimore v. Chikls, 1 Halst. (N. J.) In re Bronson, 67 Hun, 237; Bement 
 386 ; Maynard v. Frederick, 7 Cush. v. May (Ind., 1893), 34 N. E. Rep. 327 ; 
 246; Shaifer v. Baker, 38 Ga. 135; Hammond v. Beeson, 112 Mo. 190; 
 Bassett v. Cunningham. 9 Gratt. (Va.) Smith v. Wilson, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 
 684; Campbell v. Western, 3 Paige 115; Schmidt v. Packard, 132 Ind. 
 (N. Y.), 124; Pike v. Gage, 9 Fost 398; Alexander v. Handley, 11 S. 
 (N. H.) 461 ; Chesley v. Chesley, 10 Rep. 390 ; Shiner v. Abbie, 77 Tex. 
 N. H. 327 ; McCrae v. Robeson, 2 1 ; Melcher v. Derkum, 44 Mo. App. 
 Murph. (N. C.) 127. But evidence as 650 ; Steel v. Shafer, 39 111. App. 185 ; 
 to a claim which is not legally en- Thomas, Adm'r, v. Lewis (Va., 1892), 
 forceable should be rejected by the 15 S. E. Rep. 389 ; Saenger v. Night- 
 arbitrator. De La Riva v. Berreysea, ingale, 48 Fed. Rep. 708 ; Cherry v. 
 2 Cal. 195. Butler, 17 S. W. Rep. 1090 ; Tisch v. 
 
 2 Nadau v. White River Lumber Co. Utz, 142 Pa. St. 186 ; Schwab v. Hein- 
 
 (Wis., 1890), 43 N. W. Rep. 1035. del, 16 Daly, 164 ; Welch v. Palmer, 
 
 » See post, §§ 83, 84. 85 Mich. 310 ; Baily v. Pardridge, 134 
 
 * Whitney v. Houghton, 125 Mass. 111. 188.
 
 112 ADMISSIONS. [§ 79. 
 
 and hearing 1 of the other party or of his agent, in a way 
 and under such circumstances that required him to reply, deny 
 or qualify the truth of the facts asserted, it is no longer inad- 
 missible as self-serving and hearsay, but as adopted and rati- 
 fied by the party hearing it, and is receivable as his admission. 2 
 The statement must not only have been made in the presence 
 of the party, but the language used must have been fully un- 
 derstood before his silence can be construed into an admission. 3 
 Thus, if he is a foreigner not thoroughly conversant with the 
 language, it must be shown that an interpreter was present 
 and that the meaning of the words used was explained to 
 him. 4 The circumstances of the conversation should have 
 been such as would naturally demand a denial or reply, 5 for 
 no man is called upon to enter into useless discussion or to 
 meet every vague, hasty or extravagant assertion concerning 
 his rights that is made in his hearing, whether it be addressed 
 to him or to third persons. So no man is under any sort of 
 necessity or obligation to answer questions put to him with- 
 out knowing their purpose and object; and where questions 
 seriously affecting one's own interest are put by an adversary, 
 the right of the questioner to the knowledge must be shown 
 before silence or an express refusal to answer should be con- 
 strued into a damaging admission. 7 
 
 1 In all cases of this class the pres- W. Rep. 373 ; Hunt v. Johnson, 11 S. 
 ence of the person to be affected is a Rep. 387. If a party's declarations 
 very material element. Martin v. are admitted in his own favor, they 
 Capital Ins. Co. (Iowa, 1892), 52 N. should be confined to corroboration 
 W. Rep. 534 ; Gainsey v. Rhodes, 63 alone. Sprague v. Bond (N. C, 1894), 
 Hun, 632 ; Dawson v. Schloss, 93 Cal. 18 S. E. Rep. 701. 
 
 134; Taliaferro v. Goudelock, 82 Tex. 3 Riley v. Martinelli (Cal., 1893), 32 
 
 521 ; Simonds v. Partridge, 154 Mass. Pac. Rep. 579. 
 
 500; Sanscraints v. Torongo, 87 Mich. 4 Wright v. Maseras, 56 Barb. 521. 
 
 69; Downing v. Iron Co., 93 Ala. 5 Giles v. Vandiver, 17 S. E. Rep. 
 
 262: Cain v. Cain, 140 Pa. St. 144; 115. 
 
 Farrell v. Weitz (Mass., 1894), 35 N. 6 Whitney v. Houghton, 127 Mass. 
 
 E. Rep. 783. 527 ; Siva v. Wabash Ry. Co. (Mo., 
 
 2 Des Moines Sav. Bank v. Hotel 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 915. 
 
 Co. (Iowa, 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. 67; 'Des Moines Bank v. Hotel Co. 
 
 Evans v. Montgomery (Mich., 1893), (Iowa, 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. 67 ; Brain- 
 
 55 id. 362 ; Giles v. Vandiver, 17 S. ard v. Buck, 25 Vt. 573 ; Corser v. 
 
 E. Rep. 115; Claflin v. Rodenburg Paul, 41 N. H. 24; Blanchard v. 
 
 (Ala., 1893), 13 S. Rep. 272; Thomp- Evans, 55 N. Y. Super. Ct 543; 
 
 son v. Thompson (Ky., 1893), 20 S. Pierce v. Goldsburg, 3b Ind. 317 ;
 
 § 79.] ADMISSIONS. 113 
 
 So admissions which are inferred from silence should be 
 and are received with caution, the very liberal policy as to 
 their reception which obtained in the earlier cases being no 
 longer countenanced. Subject to this precaution and having 
 in view the facility with which evil-disposed persons may 
 abuse the principle here involved by the employment of de- 
 nunciation or offensive or scurrilous language or impertinent 
 questions towards their adversary and in his hearing, admis- 
 sions implied by silence are receivable against the party. 
 
 So where a tenant receives notice to quit 1 without objec- 
 tion, or where an account is rendered to the debtor and not 
 promptly objected to by him, 2 the silence of the parties will 
 be received as an admission of the correctness of the notice 
 or account. 
 
 So where books or documents arc proved to have been in 
 the possession of a person, or where it is known that he had 
 or could have had constant access to them either personally 
 or by his agent, it will be presumed that he inspected them 
 and has acquired a knowledge of their contents. Under such 
 circumstances his silence or failure to object promptly to the 
 accuracy of the entries, so far as they affect his interest and so 
 far as the circumstances call for an objection on his part, will 
 make the statements of fact contained in the writings com- 
 petent as his admissions. 3 
 
 People v. Driseoll, 107 N. Y. 424; v. Sawyer, 15 S. W. Rep. 998; 104' 
 
 Wilkius v. Stidger, 22 Gat 231 ; Duty Mo. 36. 
 
 v. Hervey, 126 Mass. 517; Vail v. SKirwan v. Henry (Ky., 1890), 1G ' 
 
 Strong, 10 Vt. 457 • Higgins v. Del- S. W. Rep. 828 ; Fenuo v. Weston, 31 
 
 linger, 22 Mo. 397 ; Hackett v. Col- Vt. 345 ; Coe v. Hutton, 1 S. & R 
 
 lender, 32 Vt. 97; McClenkan v. 398; Corps v. Robinson, 2 Wash. 
 
 McMillan, 6 Barr, 366 ; Corn. v. Call, C. C. 388 ; McBride v. Watts, 1 Mc- 
 
 21 Pick. 515; Com. v. Kenney, 12 Cord ; 384; Allen v. Coit, 6 Hill 
 
 Mete. 235 : Hildreth v. Martin, 3 (N. Y.), 318. See 1 Greenl. on Evid., 
 
 Allen (Mass.), 371 ; Com. v. Densmore, g 197. But statements in unanswered 
 
 12 id. 535; 1 Greenl. on Evict, § 197. letters in the parties' possession, 
 
 1 Cons. Coal Co. v. Schaefer, 31 111. where no reply was reasonably re- 
 
 App. 364. quired by circumstances, cannot be 
 
 2 Freeland v. Herron, 7 Cranch, 147, received against the person ad- 
 
 151; House v. Beak, 43 111. App. 615: dressed. Waring v. U. S. Tel. Co., 
 
 141 111.290; Mackin v. O'Brien, 33 44 How. (N. Y.) 69; 4 Daly, 233; 
 
 id. 474; Fleishner v. Kubli, 20 Oreg. Com. v. Eastman, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 189; 
 
 323 ; 25 Pac. Rep. 1086 ; McCormack Richardson v. Frankum, 9 C. & P.
 
 1 1-i ADMISSIONS. [§ SO. 
 
 § 80. Mode of proof— Nature of the admission.— Admis- 
 sions by third persons in privity with the party against whom 
 they are offered may be shown by the testimony of any com- 
 petent witness who was present and has heard them. 1 The 
 main fact is rather the actual making of the declaration than 
 its truth or falsity, so that evidence is always receivable on 
 the part of the persons against whom the admission is intro- 
 duced to show either that he did not make it, or, if it was made 
 by third persons, that the statements of fact contained in it 
 are not true. 2 It is sufficient if the substance of the admission 
 be stated, 3 though in any case the whole of the declaration 
 relating to the same subject must be introduced in order that 
 its credibility may be determined by the jury after a careful 
 comparison and weighing of those parts which are favorable 
 with those that are adverse to the party. 4 
 
 In case letters forming a correspondence are introduced by 
 the plaintiff, the defendant may read his own answer to plaint- 
 iff's last letter. 5 
 
 The credibility or weight of the admissions is always a 
 question for the jury. All parts of the declaration may 
 
 221 ; Talcott v. Harris, 93 N. Y. 567, Murphy, 39 Cal. 52 ; Morris v. Stokes, 
 
 571 ; Leonard v. Tillotson, 97 N. Y. 24 Ga. 552 ; Moore v. Wright, 90 111. 
 
 8, cited in 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 197. 470 ; Withers v. Richardson, 5 T. B. 
 
 i Miller v. Wood, 44 Vt. 378 ; Wil- Mon. (Ky.) 94 ; Turner v. Jenkins, 1 
 
 cox v. Green, 28 Conn. 572; Shepp v. H. & J. (Md.) 161 ; Storer v. Gowen, 
 
 State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 349; Green 18 Me. 174; Witwell v. Wyer, 11 
 
 v. Cawthorn, 4 Dev. L. (N. C.) 409 ; Mass. 6 ; Perego v. Purdy, 1 Hilton, 
 
 Com. v. Griffin, 110 Mass. 181; Ober- 269; Bristol v. Warner, 19 Conn. 7; 
 
 mann Brew. Co. v. Adams, 35 111. Simmons v. Haas, 56 Md 153; Searles 
 
 App. 540; Seers v. So. R Co. (Mo., v. Thompson, 18 Minn. 316; Adams 
 
 1891), 18 S. W. Rep. 1007. He should v. Eames, 107 Mass. 275 ; Kelsey v. 
 
 be required to identify the person Busch, 2 Hill (N. Y), 440; Devylyn 
 
 making the admissions or declara- v. Killcrease, 2 McMull. (S. C.) 425. A 
 
 tions where their admisibility de- copy of a written statement made to 
 
 pends on their being made by a par- a witness by a party is primary evi- 
 
 ticular person. Smith v. Williams, dence of the admissions therein if its 
 
 15 S. E. Rep. 130. correctness is verified by the witness 
 
 2 C'Bannon v. Vigus, 32 111. App. who made it. Butler v. Cornell (111., 
 
 473. 1894)»35 N. E. Rep. 767. 
 
 ^Kittridge v. Russell, 114 Mass. 67. sRoe v. Day, 7 C. & P. 705. So 
 
 4 See, also, "Confessions," §§93, 94; where a letter which is alleged to be 
 
 Wilson v. Calvert, 8 Ala. 757 ; Tram- in answer to another letter is offered, 
 
 rnel v. Bassett, 24 Ark. 499 ; Barnum the latter must also be produced. 
 
 v. Barnum, 9 Conn. 242 ; People v. Watson v. Moore, 1 C. & Kir. 626.
 
 § 80.] ADMISSIONS. 115 
 
 not be equally credible, and they may refuse to believe any 
 part of it and may reject the part unfavorable to the party 
 against whom it is offered and believe that which is in his 
 favor. 1 Statements wholly distinct from the admission need 
 not be shown ; 2 nor need the witness in testifying to the ad- 
 mission be asked concerning contradictory statements which 
 have been made later. 3 
 
 Where the witness was present during only part of the con- 
 versation in which the admission was made, he may testify to 
 that part which he has heard, 4 and other parts of that con- 
 versation relating to and qualifying it may be shown by the 
 adverse party; as, by putting an admission in evidence, all that 
 was said at the time necessary to comprehend it is rendered 
 admissible. 5 
 
 Although all admissions are hearsay so far as the witness 
 himself is concerned, a distinction is made in their character 
 as viewed from the standpoint of the party who uttered them 
 and who might, if on the witness stand, be able to testify to 
 their contents of his own personal knowledge. If the admis- 
 sion assumes to be a statement of some fact, the whole of it 
 will be binding upon the part}?- in the same manner as though 
 it were an actual statement of fact, though it appears that a 
 portion of it is not in the personal knowledge of the person 
 making it, and is derived from the information of others. 
 But where the statement is expressly made on information 
 
 » Ayers v. Metcalfe, 39 111. 307 ; Li- 11 ; Edward v. Ford, 2 Bailey (S. C), 
 
 cett v. State, 23 Ga. 57 ; Pearson v. 461 ; Hatch v. Potter, 2 Gilm. (111.) 
 
 Sabin, 10 N. H. 205 ; Newcomb v. 725. See post, § 342a. 
 
 Jones, 37 Mo. App. 475 ; Mattocks v. < Williams v. Kaiser, 11 Fla. 234 ; 
 
 Lyman, 18 Vt. 98 ; Roberts v. Mc- State v. Pratt, 88 N. C. 639 ; Denver, 
 
 Gee, 15 Barb. 449 ; Brown's Case, 9 etc. Co. v. Neis, 56 Cal. 56 ; Mays v. 
 
 Leigh, 633; Yarborough v. Moss, 9 Deaver, 1 Iowa, 260; State v. Cov- 
 
 Ala. 382; Whitwell v. Wyer, 11 Mass. ington, 2 Bailey (S. C), 569; West- 
 
 6, 10. moreland v. State, 45 Ga. 225. Ad- 
 
 2 Darby v. Ouseley, 1 H. & N. 1 ; missions which are competent are 
 Sturge v. Buchanan, 2 M. & R. 90. not rendered inadmissible because 
 Cf. Lamar v. Pearce (Ga., 1893), 17 the party contradicts them. Griffith 
 S. E. Rep. 92. But an admission can- v. Sauls (Tex., 1890), 14 S. W. Rep. 
 not prevail over an agreed statement 230. 
 
 of facts. Adams v. Eichenberger 5 Moore v. "Wright, 90 111. 470; 
 (Ark., 1893), 18 S. W. Rep. 853. Giklersleeve v. Mahoney, 5 Duer, 383 ; 
 
 3 People v. Green, 1 Park. Cr. Cas. Pennell v. Meyer, 8 C. & P. 470.
 
 116 ADMISSIONS. [§§ 81, 82, 
 
 and belief, it will be inadmissible either against the party or 
 in his favor. 1 
 
 Yerbal admissions are not generally admissible to prove 
 those facts which, under the circumstances or by some rule of 
 law, can only be properly proved by written evidence, 2 unless 
 the loss of the writing be shown or its absence be accounted 
 for. 3 
 
 § 81. Weight and sufficiency of admissions. — The some- 
 what unreliable character of verbal admissions, made often 
 hastily and inadvertently or in casual conversation, has been 
 often adverted to. 4 The language used may have been mis- 
 understood, or not understood at all by the witness, or it may 
 be perverted by him who testifies through passion or preju- 
 dice or because unable to recollect the language used. For 
 several eye-witnesses to give different accounts of the same 
 occurrence which they saw is very common. Where language 
 is to be repeated, only those who are skilled in detecting the 
 niceties of meaning which attach to many words and phrases 
 will be able to narrate correctly even the substance of what 
 they have heard. So the witness may allow knowledge of 
 facts which he has subsequently ascertained to color and dis- 
 tort the meaning of the language which was employed and 
 which he heard. Upon the whole, the unsubstantial char- 
 acter of this sort of evidence is such that it is only receivable 
 from the necessity of the case and in the absence of evidence 
 of a more reliable character. 
 
 §82. Admissions, when conclusive — Mistake. — Judicial 
 admissions in the form of express stipulations by the party or 
 his attorney, which, on being filed, become a part of the rec- 
 
 1 Roe v. Ferrais, 2 B. & P. 548 (ap- land Canal Co. v. Hathaway, 8 Wend, 
 plying the rule to an answer in chan- 480; McPhaul v. Gilchrist, 7 Ired. 
 eery); Chaddock v. Clifton, 22 Wis. (N. C.) L. 169; Scott v. Clare, 3 
 115 ; Stephens v. Vroman, 16 N. Y. Campb. 236 ; Sykes v. Hayes, 5 Biss. 
 301. Of. Chapman v. Chicago, etc. 529; Newhall v. Holt, 6 M. & W. 662. 
 Co., 26 Wis. 295. See as to personal But c/. Jackson v. Dobbin, 3 Johns, 
 knowledge, § 50. 223 ; Earle v. Picken, 5 C. & P. 542. 
 
 2 Walker v. Dunspaugh, 20 N. Y. See ante, §§ 30-33, 37. 
 170; Jeuner v. Jolliffe, 6 Johns. 9; 3 See post, §§ 130, 133. 
 
 Jackson v. Miller, 6 Cow. 751, 755 ; 4 Richmond, etc. Co. v. Kerler, 88 
 Jackson v. Cary, 16 Johns. 306 ; Wei- Ga. 39.
 
 § 88.] 
 
 ADMISSIONS. 
 
 117 
 
 ords of the court, or payment of money into court, are con- 
 clusive of all the facts either directly or incidentally involved. 1 
 Thus, by payment into court, the party admits the amount of 
 the indebtedness, 2 that it is due, 3 as well as the jurisdiction of the 
 court, 4 and the capacity 5 of his adversary to sue. So the suf- 
 ficiency of the pleading is also admitted. 6 So, also, express 
 admissions of facts contained in a party's pleadings are usually 
 conclusive upon him, constituting as they do a legal estoppel 
 of record. 7 
 
 "While judicial admissions becoming a part of the record are 
 regarded as conclusive, admissions out of court are not gener- 
 ally so regarded as to the facts contained therein, unless by 
 means of the admission the conduct of some other person has 
 been so influenced that he has altered his condition to such 
 an extent that he will be damaged by allowing their falsity to 
 be shown. 8 The admission may then be regarded as working 
 an estoppel upon the party making it. 9 But estoppels differ 
 
 i See ante, §S 74-76. 
 
 2 Boyden v. Moove, 5 Mass. 365, 369. 
 
 3 Jones v. Hoar, 5 Pick. 285 ; Cons. 
 Gas Co. v. Harless (Ind., 1891), 29 N. 
 E. Rep. 1002. 
 
 * Miller v. Williams, 5 Esp. 19, 21. 
 
 5 Lipscombe v. Holmes, 2 Campb. 
 441. 
 
 6 Randall v. Lynch, 2 Camp. 352, 
 357. See, also, Baker v. Charlton, 7 
 Cush. 581. 
 
 » Bowers v. Smith, 8 N. Y. S. 226 ; 
 Simis v. Davidson, 54 N. Y. Super. 
 Ct 235; Sheehan v. Loler, 36 Mo. 
 App. 224 
 
 8 Bank v. Natchez, 3 Rob. (La.) 293 ; 
 Newton v. Belcher, 12 Q. B. 921; 
 Reed v. Newcomb (Vt, 1890), 19 Atl. 
 Rep. 367 ; Kinney v. Farnsworth, 17 
 Conn. 355 ; O'Bannon v. Vigus, 32 111. 
 App. 473; Newcomb v. Jones, 37 Mo. 
 App. 475 ; Louisville, E. & St. L Co. 
 v. Berry (Ind., 1894), 35 N. E. Rep. 
 565. An admission of payment of 
 consideration in a deed is not con- 
 clusive. See § 208. So an admission 
 contained in an alleged agreement is 
 
 not binding as an estoppel. Josey v. 
 Davis, 55 Ark. 318. 
 
 9 " To constitute such an estoppel a 
 party must have designedly made an 
 admission inconsistent with the de- 
 fense or claim he proposes to set "up, 
 and another party have with his 
 knowledge and consent so acted on 
 that admission that he will be injured 
 by allowing that admission to be dis- 
 proved." Cooley, J., in Hawes v. 
 Marchant, 1 Curt, C. C. 144. So in 
 Heane v. Rogers, 9 B. & C. 577, 586, 
 the court said : " There is no doubt 
 but that the express admissions of a 
 party to the suit or admissions im- 
 plied from his conduct are evidence 
 and strong evidence against him : 
 but we think that he is at liberty to 
 prove that 6uch admissions were 
 mistaken, or were untrue, and is not 
 estopped or concluded by them, un- 
 less another person has been induced 
 by them to alter his condition ; in 
 such a case a party is estopped from 
 disputing their truth with respect to 
 that person (and those claiming under
 
 118 
 
 ADMISSIONS. 
 
 [§ 
 
 from admissions in that the former, being a legal defense, 
 mast be specially pleaded, the facts which are to support them 
 being given in evidence; though they resemble admissions in 
 that they are binding only upon privies or upon parties among 
 or between whom a joint interest or privity exists. 1 
 
 An admission is always matter of evidence alone, and the 
 facts admitted need not be pleaded, but are for the considera- 
 tion of the jury. So, except perhaps in the case of judicial 
 admissions or extra-judicial admissions under oath or in which 
 gross fraud or crime is involved, the party may be allowed to 
 rebut the truth of the statement or show that it was made 
 under duress, or ignorantly or by mistake, or while intoxicated, 
 in all cases where, not having been acted upon, the other party 
 Will not be prejudiced. 2 
 
 § 83. Estoppel defined. — Estoppels are divided into estop- 
 pels by deed — that is, by some admission or agreement con- 
 tained in a valid sealed instrument ; by record, which shows 
 
 him) and that transaction, but as to 
 third persons he is not bound." 
 
 1 Parker v. Crittenden, 37 Conn. 
 148; Gould v. West, 32 Tex. 338; 
 Eaton v. N. E. Tel. Co., 68 Me. 63 ; 
 Wright v. Hazen, 24 Vt. 143 ; Thistle 
 v. Buford, 50 Mo. 278 ; McCrawey v. 
 Remsen, 19 Ala. 430 ; Peters v. Jones, 
 35 Iowa, 412; Kinnear v. Mackey, 85 
 111. 96 ; Simpson v. Pearson, 31 Ind. 
 1 ; Murray v. Sells, 53 Ga. 257. That 
 estoppels must be specially pleaded, 
 see Tyler v. Hall, 106 Mo. 313; Good- 
 ing v. Underwood, 89 Mich. 187; 
 Wessels v. Bleaman, 87 Mich. 481 ; 
 Vellum v. Demerle, 65 Hun, 543; 
 Churchill v. Bowman, 95 Cal. 54. 
 
 2 Kenton v. First Nat. Bank (Ky., 
 1892), 19 S. W. Rep. 841; Miller 
 Hardw. Lumb. Co. v. Wilson (Ark., 
 1892), 19 S. W. Rep. 974; Tower v. 
 Haslam, 84 Me. 84 ; Gooding v. Un- 
 derwood, 89 Mich. 187; Wortham v. 
 Thompson, 81 Tex. 348; Wright v. 
 Weimeister, 87 Mich. 494; Stiff v. 
 Ashton (Mass., 1892), 29 N. E. Rep. 
 203; Hill v. Wand, 47 Kan. 340; 
 
 Thompson v. Thompson (Ky., 1893). 
 20 S. W. Rep. 873; Hoi man v. Boyce 
 (Vt., 1893), 26 Atl. Rep. 832; Watkins 
 et al. v. Howeth, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 277 ; 
 Board v. First Nat. Bank, 24 N. Y. S. 
 392 ; Platto v. Gettelman (Wis., 1893), 
 55 N. W. Rep. 167 ; Newcomb v. Jones, 
 37 Mo. App. 475. The principles lying 
 at the foundation of the doctrine of 
 estoppel as it is now recognized both 
 in law and equity are thus admirably 
 summed up by the court in Dickin- 
 son v. Colegrove, 100 U. S. 580: "The 
 vital principle is that he who by his 
 language or conduct leads another to 
 do what he would not otherwise have 
 done shall not subject such person to 
 loss or injury by disappointing the 
 expectations upon which he acted. 
 A change of position would involve 
 fraud and falsehood. The remedy is 
 available only for protection and can- 
 not be used as a weapon of assault. 
 It accomplishes that which ought to 
 be done between man and man, and 
 is not permitted to go beyond this 
 limit."
 
 § 83.] ADMISSIONS. 119 
 
 a final adjudication of a court of competent jurisdiction, 1 and 
 estoppels in pais, or, using the modern term, equitable es- 
 toppels. 
 
 Estoppels are defined by Lord Coke as follows: "An es- 
 toppel is where a man is concluded by his own act or accept- 
 ance to say the truth." 
 
 In the case of most estoppels in law — that is, estoppels by 
 deed or record — the truth is absolutely excluded without dis- 
 criminating whether, in tne particular case, its exclusion will 
 work an injustice or not. An estoppel in pais or by conduct, 
 so far at least as it is governed by equitable principles, is only 
 allowed to exclude the truth when its assertion would be un- 
 just to the person who has relied upon the statement or con- 
 duct of the party estopped. 
 
 In the case of strictly legal estoppels in pais, such as those, 
 for example, which arise by an acceptance of rent or estate or 
 by partition, the truth is excluded partly because of maxims 
 of public policy and partly to obtain a consistent and unvary- 
 ing administration of the law. 2 
 
 In order to constitute a declaration or act an estoppel in 
 pais there must have been a material misrepresentation of 
 fact or a concealment of or silence respecting certain facts or 
 circumstances which it was the duty of the party to make 
 known. 3 
 
 1 See " Judgments," post, §§ 151- actions of law. But it does not fol- 
 156. low because equitable estoppels may 
 
 2 Horn v. Cole, 51 N. H. 287. originate legal as distinguished from 
 
 3 See Tiedeman on Equity. § 107 equitable rights, that it may not be 
 et seq. ; Eaton v. Tel. Co., 68 Me. 523 ; necessary, in particular cases, to re- 
 People v. Brown, 67 111. 435 ; Home sort to a court of equity to make 
 v. Cole, 51 N. H. 287-290; Stevens v. them available. All that can prop- 
 Dennett, 51 N. H. 324 ; Peters v. erly be said is that to justify a resort 
 Jones, 35 Iowa, 512; Continental to a court of equity it is necessary to 
 Bank v. Bank of Commonwealth, 50 show some ground of equity other 
 N. Y. 575 ; Zechtmanu v. Roberts, 109 than the estoppel itself whereby the 
 Mass. 53 ; Reis v. Grafman, 56 Mo. party entitled to the benefit of it is 
 434; Oakland v. Rye, 52 Cal. 270; prevented from making it available 
 Viele v. Judson, 82 N. Y. 32-39 ; in a court of law. In other words. 
 Hamlin v. Seers, 82 N. Y. 327 ; Com- the case shown must be one where 
 stock v. Smith, 26 Mich. 306 ; Abrams the forms of law are used to defeat 
 v. Seale, 44 Ala. 297. "The meaning that which in equity constitutes the 
 is not that equitable estoppels are right.'' Drexel v. Berney, 122 U. S. 
 cognizable only in courts of equity, 253. 
 
 for they are commonly enforced in
 
 120 
 
 ADMISSIONS. 
 
 [§83. 
 
 If one is not under any obligation to speak, or if he has no 
 reasonable opportunity to do so, his silence will not constitute 
 an estoppel. 1 Thus the circulation of a plat or map upon which 
 property is described as subdivided in blocks will not estop 
 the owner when it is done without his knowledge. 2 On the 
 other hand, where an owner of lands allows another to make 
 improvements without warning him of his title, 3 or allows 
 another person to deal with his property as his own, he will 
 be estopped against all persons who, relying upon his silence, 
 have acquired any title to the property because of a belief in 
 the validity of the title of the third person. 4 
 
 The Verbal statement of fact, in order to operate as an es- 
 toppel, must be distinct and clear, 5 and must, as a general rule, 
 pertain to some past or present event. In no case will a mere 
 expression of opinion or of future intention, unless a contract 
 be created, be binding as an estoppel. 6 
 
 i Rosenfield v. Fortier, 94 Mich. 34 ; 
 Collier v. White (Ala., 1893), 12 S. 
 Rep. 385 ; Mathews v. Alsworth (La., 
 1893), 12 S. Rep. 578; Diffenbach v. 
 Vogeler, 61 Md. 370; Terre Haute v. 
 Rodel, 89 Ind. 128 ; Veile v. Judson, 
 82 N. Y. 32 ; Bull v. Rovve, 13 S. C. 
 355 ; Bramble v. Kingbury, 39 Ark. 
 131 ; Mills v. Railroad Co., 41 N. J. 
 Eq. 1. 
 
 * Sullivau v. Davis, 29 Kan. 28. 
 
 a Ware v. Smith (Mass., 1892), 30 N. 
 E. Rep. 869 ; Planet, etc. Co. v. Rail- 
 road Co. (Mo., 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 
 616 ; Town v. Peebles, 5 Wash. St. 
 471 ; Cross v. Kansas City, 90 Mo. 13. 
 
 4 Tiedeman on Equity, § 109 ; Du- 
 pree v. Woodruff (Tex., 1892), 19 S. 
 W. Rep. 469 ; Long v. Kee (La., 1892), 
 10 S. Rep. 854; Foreman v. Weil 
 (Ala., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 815 ; Stewart 
 v. Armstrong, 56 Fed. Rep. 167; 
 Lawrence v. Guaranty Co. (Kan., 
 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 816 ; Mathews v. 
 Morgan (Iowa, 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. 
 478; Mathews v. Culbertson (Iowa, 
 1893), 50 id. 201 ; Chapman v. Pingry, 
 67 Maine, 198; Hawkins v. Church, 
 23 Minn. 256; Roberts v. Davis, 72 
 
 Ga. 819; Redman v. Graham, 80 N. 
 C. 231 ; Stewart v. Munford, 91 111. 
 158 ; Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U. S. 68. 
 
 5 Graham v. Thompson, 55 Ark. 
 296; Townsend v. Todd, 47 Conn. 
 190; Moors v. Albro, 129 Mass. 9; 
 Davenport v. Gas Co., 43 Iowa, 301 ; 
 Bennett v. Dean, 41 Mich. 472 ; Lash 
 v. Rendall, 72 Ind. 475 ; Roach v. 
 Brannon, 57 Miss. 490; Tillotson v. 
 Mitchell, 111 111. 518; Grinman v. 
 
 ' Dean, 62 Tex. 218 ; Hill v. Wand, 47 
 Kan. 240 ; Sparks v. Texas Loan 
 Agency, 19 S. W. Rep. 256. 
 
 6 White v. Ashton, 51 N. Y. 280; 
 Jackson v. Allen, 120 Mass. 64; Allen 
 v. Hodge, 51 Vt. 436 ; White v. Water, 
 31 111. 422-437 ; Whitwell v. Winslow, 
 134 Mass. 343; Insurance Co. v. 
 Morey, 96 U. S. 544 ; Birdsey v. But- 
 ter field, 34 Wis. 52 ; McGirr v. Sell, 60 
 Ind. 249; Chatfield v. Simonson, 92 
 N. Y. 209; Phelps v. Railroad Co., 
 94 111. 548 ; Shields v. Smith, 37 Ark. 
 47. " The only case in which a rep- 
 resentation as to the future can be 
 held to operate as an estoppel is when 
 it relates to an intended abandon- 
 ment of an existing right and is made
 
 §84.] 
 
 ADMISSIONS. 
 
 121 
 
 § 84. Intention of party estopped. — In order to constitute 
 an estoppel it is necessary that the misrepresentation should 
 have boon intended to influence the conduct l of some other 
 person; but it is also held that the existence of an actual in- 
 tention need not be shown, but that an intention may be im- 
 plied from circumstances which would induce others to act. 2 
 
 On the other hand, the party pleading the estoppel must 
 have relied upon the misrepresentation or silence of the party 
 estopped, so that he would sustain a loss were the latter to be 
 allowed to disprove the truth of his statement. 3 
 
 While a fraudulent intent on the part of the person estopped 
 is never absolutely required, it has been repeatedly held that 
 he must know what he says to be false or must have no 
 reasonable grounds for believing his statement to be true. 4 
 
 On the other hand, the party who claims the benefit of the 
 estoppel must prove that he was ignorant of the truth of the 
 statements he relied upon, and that he had no opportunity and 
 
 to influence others and by which 
 they have been induced to act An 
 estoppel cannot arise from a promise 
 as to future action with respect to a 
 right to be acquired upon an agree- 
 ment not yet made." Union Mut. 
 Life Ins. Co. v. Mowry, 96 U. S. 
 547-48. 
 
 i Harvey v. West. 87 Ga. 553; 
 Bishop v. Mintou (N. C, 1893), 17 
 S. E. Rep. # 436; McCabe v. Raney, 33 
 Ind. 309;*Clark v. Culidge, 8 Kan. 
 189-195; Pierce v. Andrews, 6 Cush. 
 4 ; Wilcox v. Howell, 44 N. Y. 398 ; 
 Turner v. Coffin, 12 Allen, 401 ; Kuhl 
 v. Mayer, 23 N. J. Eq. 84, 85 ; South- 
 ard v. Sutton, 68 Me. 575 ; Carroll v. 
 Railroad Co., Ill Mass. 1 ; Brown v. 
 Bowen, 30 N. Y. 519; Holdane v. 
 Colespring, 21 N. Y. 474. 
 
 2 Parlin v. Stone, 48 Fed. Rep. 808 ; 
 Mattes v. Frankel, 65 Hun, 203; 
 Stockton Sav. Bank v. Staples (Cal., 
 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 936 ; Anderson v. 
 Ar instead, 69 111. 452-454; Home v. 
 Cole, 51 N. H. 287 ; Ries v. Bruce, 49 
 Mo. 231-234; Bank v. Hazard, 30 
 
 N. Y. 226-230 ; Life Ins. Co. v. Norris, 
 31 N. J. Eq. 583-585. 
 
 'Gerlach v. Turner, 89 Cal. 446; 
 Draffiu v. Railroad Co., 34 S. C. 464 ; 
 Stevens v. Ludlum, 46 Minn. 160; 
 Home v. Bank, 108 N. C. 109 ; Hol- 
 man v. Boyce (Vt., 1893), 26 Atl. Rep. 
 632; Vaughn v. Hixon, 50 Kan. 773; 
 Hopkins v. McCrillis (Mass., 1893), 32 
 N. E. Rep. 1026 ; Curnen v. Mayer, 79 
 N. Y. 511-514 ; Stevens v. Dennett, 51 
 N. H. 324-333 ; Eaton v. Tel. Co., 68 
 Me. 63 ; Graves v. Blandell, 70 id. 190. 
 
 4 In re King, 29 W. N. C. 426 ; Bell 
 v. Goodnature (Minn., 1892), 52 N. W. 
 Rep. 908 ; Raner v. Timerson, 51 Barb. 
 517 ; Holmes v. Crowell, 73 N. C. 613 ; 
 Whitaker v. Williams, 20 Conn. 98 ; 
 Reed v. McCourt, 41 N. Y. 435 ; Thrall 
 v. Lathrop, 30 Vt. 307; Adams v. 
 Brown, 16 Ohio St. 419; Smith v. 
 Hutchinson, 61 Mo. 83 ; Lafferty v. 
 Moore, 33 N. Y. 658 ; Wharf v. Pres- 
 cott, 7 Allen, 494 ; Dorlarque v. Cress, 
 71 111. 380-382; Graves v. Blondell, 
 70 Me. 90.
 
 122 ADMISSIONS. [§ 85. 
 
 was not negligent in inquiring after the knowledge of their 
 truth. 1 
 
 § 85. Admissions and communications sent and received 
 by telephone. — A communication sent or received over a 
 telephone is a message in its legal meaning and relations, 2 
 the idea conveyed by the word "telephone" being nearly 
 equivalent to that involved in the word " telegram " — i.e., 
 information received from a distance. The message thus sent 
 may constitute an oral admission under circumstances which are 
 analogous to those rendering admissible a party's declarations 
 against him. So a conversation had over a telephone with a 
 person who is shown to have such an instrument in his place 
 of residence. or business is competent as his admission, and it 
 may be stated by the hearer without the latter identifying 
 the party at the other end of the wire. 3 Usually, however, a 
 witness who testifies to an admission or declaration heard 
 over a telephone should identify the party speaking to him. 4 
 This he must do ex necessitate rei by his recognition of the 
 voice of the speaker, and the admissibility of his testimony 
 will depend on his previous acquaintance, however slight, with 
 the party's voice. 3 If he has heard him speak but once before, 
 his evidence of identity will not be thereby rendered incom- 
 petent, though his consequent lack of familiarity with the 
 voice may be brought out to affect the value of his evidence 
 of identification. 6 The identity of the speaker may of course 
 be shown by other competent evidence than that of the wit- 
 ness who heard the statement. 7 When for any reason direct 
 communication between parties through a telephone is im- 
 possible, so that either one with the assent of the other re- 
 
 i Martin v. Martin, 1 Misc. Rep. 181 ; 33 N. W. Rep. 451 ; Wolfe v. Miss. 
 
 In re Turner, id. 58 ; Young v. Board Pac. R. Co., 97 Mo. 473 ; 11 S. W. Rep. 
 
 of Com'rs of Mahoning, 51 Fed. Rep. 49 ; Miss. Pac. R. Co. v. Heidenheimer, 
 
 585 ; Northern Mich. Lumber Co. v. 82 Tex. 195. Of. 24 Weekly L. Bui. 
 
 Lyon (Mich., 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. 438 ; 245. 
 
 Tibbie v. Anderson, 63 Ga. 41 ; Shaply 4 Stepp v. State, 20 S. W. Rep. 753 ; 
 
 v. Abbott, 42 N. Y. 443 ; Rosebrough 31 Tex. Cr. Rep. 349. 
 
 v. Ansley, 35 Ohio St. 107; Bright- 3 Stepp v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. Rep. 
 
 man v. Hix, 108 Mass. 246. 349. 
 
 2 Attorney-General v. Edison Tele- 6 People v. Ward, 3 N. Y. Crim. 
 phone Co., 43 L. T. 703, cited in An- Rep. 483, 511; Miss. Pac. R. Co. v. 
 derson's Law Diet, p. 1013. Heidenheimer, 82 Tex. 195. 
 
 3 Reed v. Burlington, 73 Iowa, 160 ; ' Davis v. Walter, 70 Iowa, 405.
 
 § 85.] ADMISSIONS. 123 
 
 quests an operator at an intermediate station to speak for 
 him, the operator becomes the agent of the speaker ; ' and as 
 each party is usually in turn speaker and receiver, the oper- 
 ator stands in the place of an interpreter, and statements 
 made by him may be regarded as the admissions of either 
 party. Such statements are admissible under the principle 
 which lets in admissions by reference. 2 
 
 Sullivan v. Kuykendall, 83 Ky. 2 Oskamp v. Gadsden (Neb.), 52 N. 
 483. W. Rep. 718. See ante, § 77.
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 CONFESSIONS. 
 
 88. 
 
 Definition and classification. 
 
 §93. 
 
 88a. 
 
 To be regarded with caution. 
 
 
 89. 
 
 Voluntary character of con- 
 fessions. 
 
 94. 
 
 90. 
 
 Confessions, when voluntary — 
 
 95. 
 
 
 Inducements offered. 
 
 96. 
 
 91. 
 
 Confessions need not be spon- 
 
 
 3- taneous. 
 
 - 97. 
 
 92. 
 
 Preliminary examination. 
 
 98. 
 
 Extra-judicial confessions 
 must be corroborated. 
 
 Conclusive character of judi- 
 cial confessions. 
 
 Persons offering inducements. 
 
 Confessions of persons other 
 than defendant. 
 
 Confessions of conspirators. 
 
 Confessions of treason. 
 
 § 88. Definition and classification. — Confessions are ad- 
 missions made at any time by a person charged with a crime 
 stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that 
 crime, 1 and they may be either judicial or extra-judicial. The 
 former, as the term indicates, are those which are made either 
 at the preliminary examination or at the trial of the accused. 
 The latter are made out of court, and include not only explicit 
 or express verbal or written admissions of guilt, but all ad- 
 missions from which the guilt of the accused may be inferred. 2 
 
 Confessions ma}^ thus be divided into express confessions 
 and those which are implied from the actions of the accused, 
 such as his resistance or avoidance of arrest, 3 his attempts to 
 escape from custody, 4 and his silence when accused of crime 
 under circumstances where he might be naturally expected to 
 speak. 5 For silence to be equivalent to confession it must be 
 shown that the accused heard and understood the specific 
 
 1 Stephen's Dig., § 421. 
 
 2 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 216. 
 
 3 State v. Taylor (Mo., 1893), 22 S. 
 W. Rep. 806; Jamison v. People (111., 
 1893), 34 N. E. Rep. 486; State v. 
 Moncla, 39 La. Ann. 368; People v. 
 Fine, 77 Cal. 147; Carden v. State 
 (Ala., 1888), 4 S. Rep. 823; Com. v. 
 Brigham, 147 Mass. 414. 
 
 4 Williams v. State, 24 Tex. App. 
 17, 32: 4 S. W. Rep. 04; People v. 
 Ogle, 104 N. Y. 511; Ryan v. State, 
 83 Wis. 468; Elmore v. State (Ala., 
 1893), 13 S. Rep. 427. 
 
 5 Com. v. Trefetheu (Mass., 1893), 
 31 N. E. Rep. 961; Bro%vn v. State 
 (Tex., 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 596 ; State 
 v. Reed, 62 Me. 129.
 
 § 88«.] CONFESSIONS. 1 25 
 
 charge which was made against him, 1 and that ho heard it 
 under circumstances calling upon him to deny it. 2 The pris- 
 oner may show that his silence or suspicious actions were 
 caused by threats, 3 or that the accusations were made in judi- 
 cial proceedings; 4 as, for example, at a coroner's inquest. 5 A 
 statement implicating the accused, made by some third per- 
 son to whom he has referred, where the information which 
 was given is responsive to the inquiry made, may be admitted 
 as his confession, if he acquiesces in it. 6 
 
 § 88a. To be regarded with caution. — Writers on evidence 
 have pointed out the necessity for caution in the reception of 
 confessions. 7 Among the facts which furnish a basis for the 
 employment of a careful scrutiny of this kind of evidence are 
 the peculiar circumstances in which the accused finds himself — 
 that is, embarrassed by a present incarceration and threatened 
 with future imprisonment or death. 8 The zeal of acute and 
 experienced police officials accustomed to dealing with crim- 
 inals and apt to regard the accused as guilty until his inno- 
 cent shall be made to appear may often lead to a wilful or 
 even an unconscious suppression of facts which indicate his 
 innocence, while exaggerating others which point to his guilt. 9 
 
 Numerous cases of false confessions are mentioned in the 
 books which are calculated to incite suspicion that the accused 
 may be endeavoring to secure some object not apparent at 
 first glance. He may be seeking to divert suspicion from some 
 other suspected person, knowing well that on his own trial he 
 will be able to establish his innocence. 10 Such cases are ad- 
 mitted, however, to be exceptional, and, while not without 
 
 ' Brown v. Com., 86 Va. 935 ; Sauls 5 The fact that the accused had im- 
 
 v. State (Tex., 1892), 17 S. W. Rep. plements in his possession with 
 
 1066; Robertson v. State, 17 id. 1068; which to attempt an escape may be 
 
 30 Tex. App. 496 ; Brookser v. State, shown against him. Slate v. Duu- 
 
 26 Tex. App. 593. can (Mo., 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 699. 
 
 '•^Felder v. State, 5 S. W. Rep. 145; « United States v. Gardner, 42 Fed. 
 
 State v. Carroll, 30 S. C. 85; Camp- Rep. 832. Cf. People v. Powell, 87 
 
 bell v. State, 55 Ala. 80 ; Drumright Cal. 318. 
 
 v. State, 29 Ga. 430; State v. Smith, U Greenl. on Evid., § 219. 
 
 35 La. Ann. 457; Keller v. State, 55 SBrister v. State, 26 Ala. 107. 
 
 N. Y. 565. See §§ 78, 79, 82-84. 9 See 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 217. 
 
 3 Golden v. State, 25 Ga. 527 ; State 10 Wills on Circumstantial Evidence, 
 v. Flanagan, 25 Ark. 92. p. 88; Phil. & Am. on Evid, 419; 
 
 4 State v. Mullins, 101 Mo. 514. Chilty, Criin. Law, vol. 1, p. 85.
 
 126 CONFESSIONS. [§ 89. 
 
 weight in estimating the true nature of this sort of evidence, 
 they should not be invoked without discrimination to im- 
 peach the general character of a confession which was made 
 under conditions which properly render it admissible. 1 So 
 the infirmities incident to all evidence which consists of the 
 reception of language used by others in the presence and hear- 
 ing of the witness and which have been adverted to in another 
 place 2 must be taken into consideration. 
 
 § 89. Voluntary character of confessions. — Whether a 
 confession is judicial or extra-judicial it must be shown that it 
 was wholly free and voluntary. 3 And a proper foundation 
 should first be laid for its reception by asking the witness 
 whether the prisoner had been informed that it would be ad- 
 vantageous for him to confess, or whether any language had 
 been used towards him which, by filling his mind with hope 
 and fear, would render his confession forced or involuntary. 4 
 If such a course has been pursued by some third person, the 
 confession will be rejected. 5 This preliminary question of the 
 voluntary character of the confession bearing upon its admis- 
 sibility as evidence is a preliminary question for the judge, 6 
 
 1 A confession is admissible though Chisenhall, 11 S. E. Rep. 518; 106 
 
 made to free another from arrest. N. C. 676 ; Johnson v. State, 76 Ga. 76. 
 
 People v. Smalling, 94 Cal. 112. * 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 219. 
 
 2 See ante, §§80-82. « People v. Taylor, 93 Mich. 638; 
 
 3 Gentry v. State, 5 S. W. Rep. 660; Cook v. State (Tex., 1893), 22 S. W. 
 24 Tex. App. 80; Collins v. State, 24 Rep. 23; State v. Chambers, 45 La. 
 Tex. App. 141 ; Ross v. State, 67 Md. Ann. 36 ; Smith v. State, 88 Ga. 627 ; 
 286 ; People v. Taylor, 93 Mich. 638 ; Craig v. State, 18 S. W. Rep. 297 ; 
 Com. v. Morey, 1 Gray (Mass.), 461 ; State v. Carson, 36 S. C. 524 ; Green 
 Spears v. Ohio, 20 Ohio St. 583. This v. State, 88 Ga. 516 ; State v. Carroll, 
 rule, does not apply to admissions of 30 S. C. 85 ; State v. Kinder, 96 Mo. 
 collateral facts not involving crim- 548; People v. Fox, 3 N. Y. S. 359; 
 inal intent State v. Knowles, 48 State v. Grant, 22 Me. 171 ; Fife v. 
 Iowa, 593 ; People v. Barton, 49 Cal. Com., 29 Pa. St 329. See post, 
 632. Contra, Marshall v. State, 5 §§ 90, 92. 
 
 Tex. App. 273 ; Quinland v. State, 16 6 Com. v. Taylor, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 
 
 S. W. Rep. 258 ; 29 Tex. App. 401. 606 ; People v. Fox, 24 N. E. Rep. 923 ; 
 
 As to the voluntary character of aff'g 3 N. Y. S. 359; Chabbock's Case, 
 
 confessions, see Stafford v. State, 55 1 Mass. 144; Thomas v. State, 84 Ga. 
 
 Ga. 592; State v. Sopher, 70 Iowa, 618; State v. Holden, 44 N. W. Rep. 
 
 494; Huberts v. Com. (Ky.), 7 S. W. 123; 42 Minn. 350; State v. Harmon 
 
 Rep. 401; Alfred v. State, 37 Miss. (Del.), 3 Harr. 567 ; People v. Sweet- 
 
 296 ; People v. Deacons, 109 N. Y. 374 ; laud, 77 Mich. 53 ; People v. Howes, 
 
 State v. Dildy, 72 N. C. 325 ; State v. 81 Mich. 396 ; People v. Barker, 60
 
 §89.] 
 
 CONFESSIONS. 
 
 127 
 
 who should on request examine into the matter out of the pres- 
 ence and hearing of the iurv. 1 Where the evidence as to the 
 voluntary character of the confession is conflicting, the ques- 
 tion may be left to the jury under judicial instructions that if 
 on all the evidence they find that it was not voluntary they 
 should reject it. 2 
 
 The burden of proof to show that the accused has been 
 unduly influenced is upon the defense. 3 A refusal to allow 
 the counsel for the prisoner to cross-examine the witness upon 
 this point is reversible error. 4 
 
 It is extremely difficult to enunciate any general rule by 
 which may be measured the amount or degree of duress or 
 improper influence which will destroy the voluntary charac- 
 ter of the confession. The mere fact that the accused was in 
 charge of an armed police official or a sheriff, or was hand- 
 cuffed, 5 or tied, 6 or in prison, 7 will not alone render his con- 
 fession involuntary. 8 Threats or promises of immunity which 
 would have no effect whatever upon a well-balanced, deter- 
 mined, courageous and experienced man would make a very 
 deep impression on a feeble woman or upon one of weaker 
 intellect or will power, or on a person of immature years and 
 lacking in experience. 9 
 
 id. 277; Com. v. Morey, 1 Gray 
 (Mass.), 461 ; Biscoe v. State. 67 Md. 6 ; 
 United States v. Nott, 1 McLean, 499 ; 
 State v. Moorman, 27 S. C. 22 ; Mur- 
 ray v. State, 25 Fla. 528. 
 
 i Ellis v. State, 65 Miss. 44 ; Carter 
 v. State, 37 Tex. 362. 
 
 2 Thomas v. State, 84 Ga. 613; 10 
 S. E. Rep. 1016; Carr v. State, 10 S. 
 E. Rep. 626; 84 Ga. 250; People v. 
 Howes (Mich., 1890), 45 N. W. Rep. 
 961 ; Com. v. Piper, 120 Mass. 185 ; 
 People v. Cassidy, 14 N. Y. S. 349. 
 
 SRufer v. State, 25 Ohio St 464; 
 People v. Cassiday, 133 N. Y. 612; 
 State v. Howard, 14 S. E. Rep. 481. 
 Contra, People v. Sweetland, 77 Mich. 
 53; 43 N. W. Rep. 779; Nicholson v. 
 State, 38 Md. 140; Barnes v. State, 
 36 Tex. 356 ; People v. Soto, 49 Cal. 
 69; Johcson v. State, 30 La. Ann. 
 881. 
 
 * State v. Miller, 42 La. Ann. 186. 
 The voluntary character of the state- 
 ment should be shown before its ad- 
 mission, though if this proof is omitted 
 it may be introduced after the con- 
 fession is received. Smith v. State, 
 15 S. E. Rep. 675 ; 88 Ga. 627. 
 
 estate v. Whitfield, 109 N. C. 876. 
 
 g State v. Rogers (N. C, 1893), 17 S. 
 E. Rep. 297. 
 
 7 People v. Gastro, 75 Mich. 127; 
 Com. v. Smith, 119 Mass. 305 ; People 
 v. Rogers, 18 N. Y. 9 ; Cox v. People, 
 19 Hun, 340. 
 
 * McQueen v. State, 10 S. Rep. 433; 
 94 Ala. 50 ; Hornsby v. State, 10 S. 
 Rep. 522 ; 94 Ala. 50 ; State v. Coella, 
 3 Wash. St. 99; Anderson v. State, 
 25 Neb. 550 ; State v. Carlisle, 57 Mo. 
 102. 
 
 & See Iloober v. State, 81 Ala. 51 ; 
 1 Grcenl. on Evid., § 219.
 
 128 
 
 CONFESSIONS. 
 
 [§90. 
 
 The statement that a confession extorted by threats or 
 promises of immunity is not voluntary, and is inadmissible, is 
 not difficult to understand. The main difficulty lies in the 
 ascertainment of what language used towards the prisoner 
 would constitute a threat or promise. 1 So where defendant 
 voluntarily testified before the grand jury his testimony is 
 admissible against him. 2 In any event, if it shall appear to 
 the court that the will of the prisoner has been overcome, it 
 matters not whether it be by threats of harm, promises 
 of favor, the fear of detection, or by flattery or trickery, it is 
 the duty of the judge to exclude the confession. 3 
 
 § 90. Confessions, when voluntary — Inducements offered. 
 When a prisoner is first cautioned that what he is about to 
 say will be taken down and may be used against him his con- 
 fession is not thereby rendered involuntary. 4 On the other 
 
 1 Thompson's Case, 1 Leach, 825 ; 
 Cass' Case, id. 328; Com. v. Harm an, 
 4 Barr, 269 ; Boyd v. State. 2 Humph. 
 37; Dillon's Case, 4 Dall. 116; Reg. 
 v. Garner, 12 Jur. 944; Canada v. 
 State (Tex., 1890), 16 S. W. Rep. 341. 
 The testimony of the accused volun- 
 tarily given as a witness in a prior 
 trial of another person for the crime 
 with which the witness is now 
 charged may be used against him. 
 See post, §§ 320, 321; Burnett v. 
 State, 87 Ga. 622; People v. Mitchell, 
 94 Cal. 550 ; People v. Gallagher, 75 
 Mich. 512;- State v. Glahn, 97 Mo. 
 579. 
 
 2 State v. Carroll, 51 N. W. Rep. 
 1159; State v. Coffee, 56 Conn. 399. 
 
 3 Regina v. Baldy, 16 Jur. 599 ; 
 Bubster v. State, 33 Neb. 663; 50 N. 
 W. Rep. 953; Lauderdale v. State 
 (Tex., 1892), 19 S. W. Rep. 679 ; Rex 
 v. Kingston, 4 C. & P. 387 ; Reg. v. 
 Jarvis, L. R. 1 C. C. R. (C. B.) 96 ; 
 McClain v. Com.. 110 Pa. St. 209. 
 A promise that the accused will be 
 used as a witness for the state (State 
 v. Johnson, 80 La. Ann. 881), or that 
 he will be helped if he confesses 
 (State v. Von Sachs, 30 La. Ann. 042), 
 
 or a declaration that a suspected per- 
 son had better pay for what he had 
 taken (Cook v. State (Tex., 1893), 22 
 S. W. Rep. 23), that he might as well 
 own up, coupled with an accusation 
 of theft (Smith v. State, 88 Ga. 627), 
 a promise to get the accused out of 
 the trouble (Searcy v. State, 28 Tex. 
 App. 513 ; Clayton v. State, 31 Tex. 
 Crim. App. 489), or a threat to kill 
 (Bush v. Com. (Ky., 1892), 17 S. W. 
 Rep. 330), advice that to own up will 
 save defendant from a heavy sen- 
 tence (Searles v. State, 6 Ohio Cir. 
 Ct. 331), that he ought to be hung 
 (State v. Carson, 36 S. C. 524), a 
 promise by the district attorney that 
 he will not be prosecuted (Neely v. 
 State, 27 Tex. App. 324), to tell the 
 truth and have no more trouble 
 (Biscoe v. State, 67 Md. 6),— have all 
 been held enough to render a con- 
 fession inadmissible because invol- 
 untary. 
 
 * Reg. v. Holmes, 1 C. &'K. 248 ; Reg. 
 v. Atwood, 5 Cox C. C. 322; Rizzolo 
 v. Com., 126 Pa. St. 54 ; United States 
 v. Kirkwood, 5 Utah, 123 ; Maples v. 
 State, 3 Heisk. 408 ; Rex v. Baldry, 2 
 Den. C. C. 430. See post, § 92.
 
 91.] 
 
 CONFESSIONS. 
 
 129 
 
 hand, while such a warning is advisable on grounds of human- 
 ity and justice, it is not, in the absence of statute, an absolute 
 prerequisite to be complied with before the confession will be 
 valid. 1 
 
 If the accused, on being apprehended, has been threatened 
 or promised immunity in order to obtain a confession, and if 
 subsequently, when these means are found ineffectual, the 
 promise or threat has been withdrawn so that he is no longer 
 inlluenced, his confession then made will be deemed to be free 
 and voluntary. 2 Even if a confession is involuntary, no valid 
 reason exists why another later and wholly distinct, volun- 
 tarily made to the same or to another person after the undue 
 influence has ceased, should not be received. It has accord- 
 ingly been held that where it is shown that the hopes or fears 
 which were attendant upon the former confession no longer 
 obtain, the later confession is admissible. 3 
 
 § 91. Confession need not be spontaneous. — It is not nec- 
 essary for a confession to be the spontaneous utterance of the 
 accused. 4 It will be received though it may have been ob- 
 tained solely by persistent questions put to him by ollicials 
 
 i Woolfolk v. State, 85 Ga. 69 ; Re- 
 gina v. Arnold, 8 C. & P. 622 ; Kirby 
 v. State, 5 S. W. R 1C5 ; 28 Tex. App. 
 13. Where by statute such a caution 
 is required, a confession of one crime, 
 made while defendant was in custody 
 charged with another, is inadmissible 
 on his trial for the former offense. 
 Niederluck v. State, 21 Tex. App. 320. 
 
 * Rex v. Clewes, 4 C. & P. 221 ; Mc- 
 Adory v. State, 62 Ala. 154; State v. 
 Chambers, 39 Iowa, 179 ; Reg. v. Bate, 
 11 Cox C. C. 686; Walker v. State, 7 
 Tex. App. 245 ; State v. Jones, 54 Mo. 
 478. 
 
 3 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 221, citing 
 Guild Case, 5 Halst. 180; Roberts' 
 Case, 1 Dev. 259, 264 ; Com. v. Her- 
 man, 4 Barr, 269. The improper 
 influence under which the prior con- 
 fession is made is presumed to con- 
 tinue until the contrary is shown 
 (United States v. Chapman, 4 Am. 
 
 Law Jour. 440; Murray v. State, 6 
 S. Rep. 498; Coffee v. State (Ala.. 
 1891i T 6 S. Rep. 493. See. also, post, 
 § 321); and the evidence which will 
 rebut the presumption of a continu- 
 ance of the influence must be clear 
 and satisfactory. Porter v. State, 55 
 Ala. 95; Com. v. Cullen, 111 Mass. 
 435 ; State v. Jones, 54 Mo. 478 ; State 
 v. Lawhorne, 66 N. C. 638; Berry v. 
 United States, 2 Colo. Terr. 186; 
 Walker v. State, 7 Tex. App. 245; 
 Kollenberger v. People, 9 Colo. 233; 
 People v. Johnson, 41 Cat 452. It is 
 for the judge to say whether the pre- 
 sumption has been rebutted (Porter 
 v. State, supra) ; and it has been held 
 that the fact that the prisoner was 
 cautioned that he need not speak is 
 sufficient to rebut the presumption. 
 Com. v. Ackert, 133 Mass. 402 ; Reg. 
 v. Bate, 11 Cox C. C. 686. 
 4 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 229.
 
 130 CONFESSIONS. [§ 91. 
 
 or private persons, even where the questions by their form 
 presuppose his guilt, 1 if in putting such assuming questions no 
 unfair advantage amounting to duress is gained over him. 2 
 In the absence of statutes rendering such communications 
 privileged, statements made to a spiritual adviser are admis- 
 sible against the prisoner. 3 
 
 A voluntary confession is not inadmissible because made 
 under a sworn promise of secrecy, 4 or procured by the promise 
 of some benefit having no connection with the crime con- 
 fessed, 5 as, for example, by a promise that the prisoner may 
 see visitors or have his shackles removed, 6 or be released from 
 a rigorous confinement. 7 So it has been held that a voluntary 
 confession is not to be rejected because it was obtained by 
 means of deception or artifice practiced on the prisoner if the 
 inducement employed did not cause him to make an untrue 
 statement. 8 Thus, confessions procured by reason of the ac- 
 cused having been made drunken have been received. 9 The 
 authorities, however, are not harmonious, and in more recent 
 cases it has been decided that confessions obtained by a per- 
 son who, falsely representing himself to be an attorney at 
 law, obtained the confidence of the prisoner, 10 or by an officer 
 who procured the intoxication of the prisoner, 11 are not ad- 
 
 i Rex v. Wild, 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 452. People, 5 Park. C. R 547 ; Com. v. 
 
 2McClain v. Com., 110 Pa. St. 259. Howe, 9 Gray, 110; State v. Feltes, 
 A voluntary confession, otherwise 51 Iowa, 495 ; Territory v. McKern 
 admissible, will not be rejected be- (Idaho, 1890), 26 Pac. Rep. 123. See 
 cause when made the accused was post, § 127. And a voluntary con- 
 unlawfully imprisoned. Balbo v. fession made to a detective who is 
 People, 19 Hun (N. Y.), 424. locked up with the prisoner for that 
 
 3 Rex v. Wild, 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 452 ; purpose, or who in the guise of a 
 Rex v. Court, 7 C. & P. 486. See friend obtains the confession, is ad- 
 post, § 177. missible despite the deception em- 
 
 4 State v. Darnell, 1 Houst. C. C. ployed. State v. Brooks (Mo., 1887), 
 (Del.) 321; Com. v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 5 S. W. Rep. 257; Heidt v. State 
 496. (Neb., 1887), 30 N. W. Rep. 626 ; Os- 
 
 5 State v. Wentworth, 37 N. H. 196 ; born v. Com. (Ky., 1893), 20 S. W. 
 Rex v. Green, 6 C. & R 655. Rep. 223. Cf. Stafford v. State, 55 
 
 e Rex v. Lloyd, 6 C. & P. 393. Ga. 392. See post, § 127. 
 
 i State v. Tatro, 50 Vt. 483. 10 People v. Stewart, 75 Mich. 21 ; 
 
 s 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 229 ; Rex v. Cotton v. State, 87 Ala. 875. 
 
 Derrington, 2 C. & P. 418. » McCabe v. Com. (Pa,, 1887), 8 Atl. 
 
 9 Lester v. State, 32 Ark. 727 ; Esk- Rep. 45. 
 ridge v. State, 25 Ala. 30 ; Jefferds v.
 
 § 92.] CONFESSIONS. 131 
 
 missible. But an) T person who overhears the remarks of the 
 prisoner made to himself or to a person such as an attorney 
 or spiritual adviser who is incompetent as a witness may tes- 
 tify to what he has heard. 1 So a confession constituting a 
 part of a prayer may be testified to by one who has overheard 
 it, though he may not have heard the whole prayer; 2 and a 
 confession made to a fellow-prisoner in the erroneous belief 
 that one criminal could not testify against another is not in- 
 admissible. 3 
 
 § 92. Preliminary examination. — The main objects of the 
 preliminary examination of an accused person are to perpetuate 
 the testimony 4 and to ascertain whether the accused should be 
 admitted to bail, and the prisoner can only be questioned 
 upon the charge against him after all the evidence incrimi- 
 nating him has been received. Not only must he be free at 
 the examination from the influences of hope or fear, but he 
 must reaMze that he is so. Hence he must not be sworn ; and 
 if by mistake his statement is taken under oath, it will be 
 inadmissible upon the ground that its free and voluntary char- 
 acter has been destroyed by adding to the existing embarrass- 
 ment of his condition the apprehension of a possible punish- 
 ment for perjury. 5 But the fact that a person who voluntarily 
 appears before a magistrate and confesses is sworn does not 
 render his confession inadmissible. 6 The signature of the ac- 
 cused, unless required by statute to his statements, which 
 have been committed to writing, is not indispensable ; but as it 
 
 i Rex v. Simmons, 6 C. & P. 540, Cal. 421 ; 24 Pac. Rep. 1006 ; Miller 
 
 and cases in last note. v. State, 62 Miss. 221 ; 8 S. Rep. 273; 
 
 2 Woolfolk v. State, 85 Ga. 69. State v. Riley, 8 S. Rep. 469 ; 42 La. 
 
 * State v. Mitchell, Phill. (N. C.) L. Ann. 995 ; State v. Jackson, 9 Mont. 
 
 447. 458. 
 
 4 So it is frequently provided by 6 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 225 ; Salas v. 
 statute that the evidence of witnesses State, 31 Tex. Crim. R 485 ; People 
 on the preliminary examination, v. Gibbons, 43 Cal. 557; Com. v. 
 when committed to writing, shall be Brown, 150 Mass. 330; State v. Gar- 
 admissible on the subsequent trial of vey, 25 La. Ann. 191 ; Hendrickson 
 the accused in case they shall be dead, v. People, 10 N. Y. 13. Cf. People v. 
 absent from the state or otherwise Kelley, 47 Cal. 125; Rex v. Lewis, 6 
 unable to testify. McCollum v. State, C. & P. 161 ; Reg. v. Owen, 9 id. 238. 
 14 S. W. Rep. 1020 ; 29 Tex. App. 162 ; 6 People v. McGloin, 91 N. Y. 241 ; 
 Potts v. State, 26 Tex. App. 663; 14 Com. v. Clark, 130 Pa, St 650; 18 
 & W. Rep. 446; People v. Nelson, 85 Atl. Rep. 988.
 
 132 CONFESSIONS. [§ 92. 
 
 is of use as a means of identification, it should be procured 
 when possible. If he signs it he makes its language his own 
 and waives all objection to its reception as evidence; 1 and this 
 is so though the writing is in a language not understood by 
 the accused, provided its contents have been translated to him. 2 
 
 The necessity that the accused should be examined without 
 being sworn is well illustrated where the prisoner has been 
 a witness at a coroner's inquest into the crime of which he 
 stands charged. If the prisoner was a witness at the coroner's 
 inquest, and if at that time he was not under arrest and not 
 charged with the crime, his sworn testimony as a witness may 
 be used against him upon his trial for the same offense, even 
 though at the date of giving his testimony at the inquest he 
 may have been strongly suspected of committing the crime. 3 
 On the contrary, where he is under arrest w T hen he testifies at 
 the inquest, he stands in the position of one accused of crime 
 and cannot be compelled to testify against himself, and is en- 
 titled to the same rights and warning, so far as his sworn 
 statement is concerned, as is a prisoner on a preliminary exam- 
 ination. 4 
 
 The examination to be admissible must be identified. If 
 the accused has signed with his mark alone, or if his signature 
 has not been obtained, it must be shown by parol that the 
 statement was read to him and that he assented thereto or 
 acquiesced in it. 5 One of the principal purposes of the prelim- 
 inary examination being to preserve the evidence against the 
 prisoner, the minutes of the examination and the statements 
 of the witnesses and of the prisoner, when committed to writ- 
 ing, are usually signed by the magistrate and transmitted to the 
 
 "Com. v. Coy (Mass., 1893), 32 N. 514. Cf. State v. Gilman, 51 Me. 306; 
 
 E. Rep. 4. Kirby v. State, 23 Tex. App. 13; 
 
 2 State v. Demareste, 41 La. Ann. Lovett v. State, 60 Ga. 257; State v. 
 
 617. Young, 1 Winst. (N. C.) L., No. 1. 126 ; 
 
 •'State v. Senn (S. C, 1890). 11 S. E. State v. Zellers, 7 N. J. L. 220; Sny- 
 
 Rep. 292. der v. State, 59 Ind. 109), his state- 
 
 4 Hendrickson v. People, 10 N. Y. ment is admissible against him. 
 
 13; Teachout v. People, 41 N. Y. 8; 5 Harris v. State, 6 Tex. App. 97; 
 
 People v. Mondon, 103 N. Y. 214. State v. Mullins, 101 Mo. 514. Cf. 
 
 See post, § 345a. But where he ap- Steagels v. State, 22 Tex. App. 464; 
 
 pears voluntarily and is properly State v. Miller, 35 Kan. 328; State v. 
 
 cautioned (State v. Leuth, 5 OhioCir. Dufour, 31 La. Ann. 804. 
 Ct. R. 94; State v. Mullins, 101 Mo,
 
 § 93.] CONFESSIONS. 133 
 
 district attorney or other officials charged with the duty of 
 prosecuting offenders. In accordance with the presumption 
 that an official has properly performed his duty, 1 the state- 
 ment as thus written is conclusive of the fact that everything 
 material that was said or done has been accurately stated, 
 and parol evidence is not admissible to show the contrary. - 
 
 When the examination has not been committed to writing, 
 or if the written examination is inadmissible because of a 
 lack of jurisdiction apparent on its face, or for any other sub- 
 stantial reason, parol evidence of what the prisoner volun- 
 tarily stated upon his examination will be received. 3 So parol 
 evidence of a confession made extrajudicially is never ren- 
 dered inadmissible by the fact that on his judicial examina- 
 tion or by the prisoner himself his confession has been taken 
 down in writing. 4 The fact that the prisoner desires to waive 
 the preliminary examination will not, if he has been properly 
 cautioned, render his statements inadmissible. 5 
 
 § 93. Extra-judicial confessions must be corroborated. — 
 A naked confession is one uncorroborated by independent proof 
 of the corpus delicti; G and the rule is that while a conviction 
 may be had upon such a confession if judicial, as, for example, 
 by a plea of guilty in open court, yet in the case of extra-judi- 
 cial confessions the corpus delicti must be proved by evidence 
 aliunde before a conviction will be warranted. 7 
 
 i See post, § 231. 5 Shaw v. State (Tex., 1893), 22 S. 
 
 s People v. Hinchman, 75 Mich. W. Rep. 588. 
 
 587 ; Rex v. Weller, 2 Car. & K. 223 ; « 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 217. 
 
 Hill v. State. 64 Miss. 431 ; 1 S. Rep. < Martin v. State (Ala., 1890), 8 S. 
 
 494; 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 230. See Rep. 858 (confession of child under 
 
 post, § 205 et seq. fourteen) ; Mullins v.Com. (Ky., 1893), 
 
 3 Jeans v. Wheedon, 2 M. & Rob. 20 S. W. Rep. 1035; Westbrook v. 
 484; State v. Vincent, 1 Houst. (Del.) State (Ga., 1893), 10 S. E. Rep. 100; 
 11 ; State v. Parrish, Busb. Law, 239. United States v. Boese, 46 Fed. Rep. 
 Parol evidence of the prisoner's state- 917; Wigginton v. Com., 17 S. "VY. 
 raent while undergoing examination Rep. 634; Willard v. State, 27 Tex. 
 is not admissible if the magistrate App. 386 : Patterson v. Com., 88 Ky. 
 returns that the prisoner refused to 313 ; Johnson v. State, 59 Ala. 37 ; 
 speak. Rex v. Walter, 7 C. & P. 267. Priest v. State, 10 Neb. 393 : People 
 
 4 State v. Head (S. C, 1893), 16 S. v. Hennessy, 15 Wend. 147 ; State v. 
 E. Rep. 892 ; Rowland v. Ashby, Ry. Keeler, 28 Iowa, 551 ; Osborn v. 
 & M. 231; Roscoe, Crim. Evid., 45; Com. (Ky., 1893), 20 S. W. Rep. 223: 
 Rex v. Spilsbury, 7C. & P. 188; State Bergen v. People, 17 111. 426; Ruloff 
 v. Leuth, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 94. v. People, 18 N. Y. 179. Of. Com. v.
 
 134 CON F K8SIONS. [§ 94. 
 
 In testifying to extra-judicial confessions it is absolutely- 
 essential that the language of the accused should be given 
 in its entirety. 1 To permit the introduction of fragmentary re- 
 marks, admitting those which indicate the prisoner's guilt and 
 suppressing others which by limiting or modifying the former 
 may establish his innocence, is inconsistent with principles of 
 justice and humanity. The whole of what the prisoner said 
 to the witness must be put in evidence and its sufficiency and 
 weight are for the jury, the prosecuting official being per- 
 mitted to contradict or impeach that portion which mav be 
 favorable to the accused, 2 and the confession, so far as it is 
 either favorable or against the prisoner, may be altogether re- 
 jected Irv the jury in case it is not believed by them. 3 
 
 If a confession is complete as to incriminating facts it will 
 not be excluded because the accused was interrupted and pre- 
 vented from stating exculpatory facts. 4 The credit to be 
 given to the confession depends wholly upon the circumstances 
 of each case. 5 A witness will not be permitted to testify that 
 the prisoner confessed to him that he had committed a crime 
 which has no connection with the offense for which he is on 
 trial. 6 
 
 § 94. Conclusive character of judicial confessions. — The 
 guilt of the accused may or may not be inferred by the jury 
 from evidence that the accused made an extra-judicial confes- 
 
 Sanborn, 116 Mass. 61; Brown v. v. State, 86 Ala. 60 ; State v. Feltes, 51 
 
 State, 32 Miss. 433 ; State v. Leuth, 5 Iowa, 495. See ante, § 80. 
 
 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 94. Where the 3 State v. Mahan, 32 Vt. 241 ; People 
 
 corpus delicti on an indictment for v. Taylor, 93 Mich. 638 ; Respublica v. 
 
 passing counterfeit money is shown McCarthy, 2 Dall. 86, 88; People v. 
 
 by proof that the counterfeit was Cassidy, 133 N. Y. 612; Com. v. 
 
 passed as genuine, the confession of Brown, 149 Mass. 35; Long v. State, 
 
 the accused that he passed the note 86 Ala. 36 ; State v. West, 1 Houst. 
 
 is corroborated. United States v. (Del.) 371 ; Griswold v. State, 24 Wis. 
 
 Marcus, 53 Fed. Rep. 784. 144 ; Furst v. State, 47 N. W. Rep. 1116; 
 
 i Berry v. Com., 10 Bush (Ky.), 15 ; 31 Neb. 403 ; Johnson v. State, 86 Ga. 
 
 Cable v. Com. (Ky., 1893), 20 S. W. 90. See, also, as to admissions, § 81. 
 
 Rep. 220; Pace v. Com. (Tex., 1893), 4 Levison v. State, 54 Ala. 520. 
 
 20 S. W. Rep. 762 ; Com. v. Goddard, 5 Coon v. State, 13 Sm. & M. 246. 
 
 80 Mass. 402 ; Real v. People, 42 N. Y. 6 Com. v. Campbell, 155 Mass. 537 ; 
 
 270 ; State v. Mack, 48 Wis. 271. 30 N. E. Rep. 72 ; Youree v. Territory 
 
 2 Taylor v. Com,, 18 Atl. Rep. 588; (Ariz., 1892), 29 Pac. Rep. 894; Reg. 
 
 People v. Irwin, 77 Cal. 494; Dodson v. Butler, 2 Car. & Kir. 221. Contra, 
 
 State v. Underwood, 75 Mo. 230.
 
 § 05.] CONFESSIONS. 135 
 
 sion, according as they believe it is corroborated as to the 
 corpus delicti But a judicial confession voluntarily made in 
 the hearing of the jury by the prisoner is, if he is of sound 
 mind, conclusive on them. On such a confession, furnishing 
 direct and original evidence of guilt, the prisoner may be con- 
 victed and sentenced to death or a term of imprisonment. 1 
 When, however, the confession of the accused is elicited in 
 the preliminary examination under the statutes 1 and 2 P. & 
 JVL, ch. 13; 7 Geo. 4, ch. 64, and similar statutory provisions 
 existing in the United States, the confession of the prisoner 
 committed to writing must be submitted with other evidence 
 to the trial jury to be weighed by them. 2 
 
 §95. Persons offering inducements. — A conclusive pre- 
 sumption that a confession is involuntary is created by the 
 circumstance that the person who has induced the accused to 
 confess by employing threats or promises was so .related to 
 him that he could exercise authority or power over him. 3 
 Thus, where the inducements proceed from the prosecuting 
 witness, 4 from the district attorney, 5 from members of the 
 coroner's jury, 6 from a police official or jailor in whose custody 
 the accused is, 7 or from a magistrate, 8 the confession will be 
 rejected. 9 
 
 Whether a confession procured by a threat or promise by 
 one having no power over the prisoner, and consequently un- 
 able to fulfill the threat or promise, creates a conclusive presum p- 
 tion of the existence of duress, the authorities are divided. 10 
 So it has been held that a threat made by any one would cre- 
 ate a conclusive presumption that the confession was not free 
 
 i Com. v. Brown, 150 Mass. C30. estate v. Carson, 15 S. E. Rep. 588. 
 
 2 A confession made before a cor- i Clayton v. State, 31 Tex. dim. R. 
 
 oner is not a judicial confession 489; Com. v. Russell, 156 Mass. 196: 
 
 which will dispense with corrobora- 30 N. E. Rep. 763 ; People v. Thom- 
 
 tion. State v. Leuth, 5 Ohio Cir. son, 84 Cal. 598 (sheriff); Com. v. 
 
 Ct, Rep. 94. Mosler, 4 Barr, 264. 
 
 »1 Greenl. on Evid., § 222. See 8 Guild's Case, 5 Halst. 163. 
 
 ante, § 89. <J Neeley v. State, 27 Tex. A pp. 324 ; 
 
 * Roberts' Case, 1 Dev. 259; Com. State v. Didy, 72 N. C. 325; State v. 
 
 v. Sego. 105 Mass. 210 ; Thompson's Crowson, 98 id. 595. 
 
 Cases, 1 Leach C. C. 325. 10 Parke, B., in Rex v. Spencer, 7 C. 
 
 sSearles v. State, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. & P. 776. 
 331.
 
 136 confessions. [§§ 96, 97. 
 
 and voluntary. 1 The contrary doctrine is maintained in some 
 of the cases, 2 which support the proposition that a threat or 
 a promise must be made by one actually in authority. 
 
 Upon general principles, the distinction made where threats 
 are made by private persons would seem without foundation, 
 inasmuch as the question, was the will of accused actually sub- 
 jugated, is one of fact, to be decided on all the circumstances 
 of each particular case. 3 But the fact that the person using 
 threats did not possess the means of carrying them into exe- 
 cution would doubtless, if known to the prisoner, detract from 
 or wholly nullify the effect calculated to be produced upon 
 his mind. 4 
 
 § 96. Confessions of persons other than defendant. — The 
 incriminating declarations of third persons that they com- 
 mitted the crime with which the prisoner is charged are 
 merely hearsay unless such persons are produced as witnesses. 5 
 13ut where the prosecution alleges that the third person was 
 an accomplice, his confession that he was the principal is ad- 
 missible upon the trial of the latter. 6 
 
 § *.)7. Confessions of conspirators. — The same principle 
 that obtains in cases of joint civil liability is applicable where 
 two or more persons are jointly indicted for the same crime. 7 
 The existence of the conspiracy or combination being satis- 
 factorily established, 8 the confession or incriminating declara- 
 tions or acts of any member made in the prosecution of the 
 enterprise are admissible against all. When, however, the com- 
 mon undertaking is consummated or abandoned, the com- 
 
 1 Rex v. Dunn, 4 C. & P. 543 ; Rex 4 Com. v. Gorey, 1 Gray (Mass.), 
 
 v. Slaughter, 8 id. 734 ; Guild's Case, 463. 
 
 5 Halst. 163; Knapp Case, 9 Pick. & Welsh v. State (Ala, 1893), 11 S. 
 
 41)6, 500, cited in 1 Greenl. on Evid., Rep. 450; State v. West, 45 La. Ann. 
 
 § 223. 14 ; 13 S. Rep. 173 ; State v. Duncan 
 
 -' Early v. Com., 86 Va. 921 ; Rex v. (Mo., 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 699 ; State 
 
 Uardwick, 6 Pet. Abr. 84; Rex v. v. Fletcher (Oreg., 1893), 33 Pac. Rep. 
 
 Moore, 2 Den. C. C. 522 ; Reg. v. 575 ; Owensby v. State, 82 Ala. 63 ; 
 
 Reeve, 12 Cox C. C, 179. 2 S. Rep. 764; State v. Duncan, 6 
 
 3 McAdory v. State, 62 Ala. 154 ; Ired. L. (N. C.) 236 ; State v. Haynes, 
 
 Cum. v. Tuckermau, 10 Gray, 190; 71 N. C. 79. 
 
 Com. v. Howe, 2 Allen (Mass.), 153; 6 p ace v . State (Tex., 1893), 20 a 
 
 Newman v. State, 49 Ala. 9 ; Johnson W. Rep. 762. See as to testimony of 
 
 v. State, 61 Ga. 305; State v. Darnell, accomplices, £§ 320, 321. 
 
 1 Houst. (Del.) 32! ; Flagg v. People, ' See ante, § 69. 
 
 40 Mich. 706; State v. Phelps, 11 Vt. sjjcGraw v. Com. (Ky., 1893), 20 
 
 114 S. W. Rep. 879.
 
 §98.] 
 
 CONFESSIONS. 
 
 137 
 
 m unity of interest no longer exists. The confession of any 
 participant in the criminal design is then only receivable 
 against himself. 1 In other words, the confession of an accom- 
 plice or participant in a criminal act is only receivable against 
 his associates when it can be connected with and is relevant 
 to acts for which the latter are responsible. 2 
 
 Where persons other than the defendant are mentioned in 
 a confession, and it is not alleged in the indictment that they 
 are implicated in the crime, the confession is admissible and 
 the court must instruct the jury to disregard this fact. 3 
 
 § 98. Confessions of treason. — In consequence of the stat- 
 utory requirement that to convict a prisoner of the crime of 
 treason the testimony of two witnesses to an overt act was 
 required, it was at one time doubted whether an extra-judicial 
 confession of treason was admissible against one charged with 
 that crime. 4 It is now the law that while no one can be con- 
 victed of the crime solely upon a confession which does not 
 assume the form of a plea of guilty in open court, yet any 
 confession, made extra-judicially, is admissible against him, its 
 weight and credibility being for the jury. It must, however, 
 be proved by two witnesses to be admissible. 5 
 
 i Pace v. State (Tex., 1893), 30 S. W 
 Rep. 762 ; Ryan v. State, 83 Wis. 486 ; 
 State v. Grant (Iowa, 1803), 53 N. W. 
 Rep. 120; Wilbur v. Strickland, 1 
 Rawle, 458 ; United States v. Gibert, 
 2 Sumn. 16; State v. Donelon (La., 
 1893), 12 S Rep. 922; Cable v. Com., 
 20 S. W. Rep. 220; Searles v. State, 6 
 Ohio Cir. Ct R 331 ; Belcher v. State, 
 125 Iud. 419; State v. McKenzie, 102 
 Mo. 620 ; McGraw v. State, 20 S. W. 
 Rep. 279; People v. Collins, 64 Cal. 
 293; United States v. Gooding, 12 
 Wheat. 469 ; Amer. Fur Co. v. United 
 States, 2 Pet. 358 ; Corbett v. State, 
 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. 155. The confession 
 or incriminating act may be given in 
 evidence prior to proof of the con- 
 spiracy on the promise of the prose- 
 cutor to establish a prima facie con- 
 spiracy later. Hall v. State (Fla., 
 1893), 12 S. Rep. 449 ; State v. Grant 
 (Iowa, 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 120; 
 State v. McGee, 46 N. W. Rep. 764. 
 
 2 Priest t. State, 10 Neb. 393 ; State 
 v. Minis (S. C, 1893), 17 S. E. Rep. 
 850; State v. Weasel, 30 La. Ann. 
 919; Crosby v. People, 27 N. E. Rep. 
 49; Gove v. State, 58 Ala. 391; 
 Spencer v. State, 31 Tex. 64 ; State v. 
 Tibeau, 30 Vt. 100 ; Ake v. State, 31 
 Tex. 476; Com. v. Thompson, 99 
 Mass. 444. The silence or failure to 
 explain of one jointly indicted with 
 others where statements incriminat- 
 ing him are made by one of his asso- 
 ciates does not, it is held, raise a 
 presumption against him. Com. v. 
 McDermott, 123 Mass. 441. 
 
 3 Rex v. Hearne, 4 C. & P. 215: 
 State v. Carr, 53 Vt. 37, 41. 
 
 * 1 East P. C. 131-133. See post, 
 §380. 
 
 *Fra-ncis r Case, 1 East P. C. 133- 
 135; 1 Burr's Trial. 196, cited in 1 
 Greenl. on Evid., § 235.
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 DYING DECLARATIONS. 
 
 § 100. Definition. i § 102. In what cases admissible. 
 
 101. Sense of approaching death. | 103. Form of the declaration. 
 
 § 100. Definition. — Another class of exceptions to the rule 
 rejecting hearsay comprises dying declarations. These decla- 
 rations may be defined as statements or declarations of some 
 material fact concerning a homicide, made by a person who 
 is the victim and who fully realizes that he is in imminent 
 danger of death, and that in a very short time. 1 The fact 
 that the speaker believes he is at the point of death, and that 
 in all probability in a very short time all that is spiritual and 
 immortal will forever forsake the body, and will encounter 
 the dread possibilities of the unknown and supernatural world, 
 is deemed to furnish a sanction equivalent to that of a solemn 
 and positive oath administered in court. 2 If, therefore, the 
 deceased was totally irreligious, so that he had no belief in a 
 state of future reward or punishment, this fact alone, while 
 not rendering his statement inadmissible, is competent to go 
 to the jury as affecting the credit to be given it. ;i 
 
 On the other hand, the fear of punishment for perjury, so 
 far as it can be administered in this world, is wholly absent, 
 and unless the dying man possesses and is controlled by a 
 vivid and conscientious feeling of accountability to the Judge 
 of all men in whose presence he expects soon to appear, it is 
 probable that his utterances may be materially influenced and 
 biased against the accused by the passions of revenge and 
 anger. But the fact that the declarant believed, as a matter 
 of religious opinion, that he may repent of any sin at any 
 
 'See 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 156; Goodall v. State, 1 Oreg. 333; State 
 
 People v. Olmstead, 30 Mich. 435. v. Elliott. 45 Iowa, 386; State v. Ah 
 
 -Rex v. Woodcock, 2 Leach Cr. Lee, 8 Oreg. 214. See post, § 313, as 
 
 Cas. 567. to the requirements of religious be- 
 
 3 Hill v. State, 64 Miss. 431: 1 S. lief of witnesses. 
 Kep. 494 : People v. Chin, 51 Cal. 597 ;
 
 § ioi.] 
 
 DYING DECLARATIONS. 
 
 139 
 
 moment before death, will not render his declaration inad- 
 missible. 1 
 
 § 101. Sense of approaching death. — The deceased person 
 when he made the declaration must have been conscious of 
 the near approach of death, and must believe that there is 
 absolutely no hope of his recovery. 2 The mental condition 
 of the declarant in this respect must therefore be shown be- 
 fore his declaration is received, and if he entertains any hopes, 
 however slight, that his injury is not mortal, his statement 
 will be rejected. 3 
 
 The statement of the dying person himself that he is dying 
 should always be received, 4 as it is the most satisfactory and 
 convincing evidence; but upon this important point no form 
 of words is necessary, nor is it the only evidence. So his 
 resignation to approaching death or his belief that he may re- 
 cover may be shown by independent evidence and may be 
 proven by the statements of those attending him or inferred 
 from the circumstances of the case. 5 Thus, where the de- 
 
 i North v. People, 28 N. E. Rep. 
 966: 139 111. 81. 
 
 -' Whitaker v. State, 79 Ga. 87 ; 3 
 S. E. Rep. 403 ; State v. Johnson, 34 
 N. W. Rep. 177; 72 Iowa, 396; Ste- 
 phenson v. State, 110 Ind. 358; State 
 v. Mathes, 90 Mo. 571 ; Darbey v. 
 State. 23 Tex. App. 407 ; Irby v. State, 
 23 id. 103 ; Peak v. State, 50 N. J. L. 
 179; 12 Atl. Rep. 701; Walton v. 
 State, 79 Ga. 46 ; 5 S. E. Rep. 205 ; 
 Vaughn v. Com., 86 Ky. 431 ; 6 S. W. 
 Rep. 153; State v. Murdy, 81 Iowa, 
 603 ; People v. Bemmerly, 87 Cal. 117 ; 
 25 Pac. Rep. 266 ; Snell v. State, 29 
 Tex. App. 236 ; State v. Turlington, 
 102 Mo. 642; Hammill v. State, 90 
 Ala. 577 ; United States v. Heath, 19 
 Wash. Law R. 818; Hall v. Com. 
 (Va., 1892), 15 S. E. Rep. 517; Young 
 v. State (Ala., 1892), 10 S. Rep. 913; 
 State v. Bannister. 35 S. C. 290 ; 14 
 S. E. Rep. 678 ; McQueen v. State, 94 
 Ala. 50 ; 10 S. Rep. 433 ; Archibald v. 
 State. 122 Ind. 122 ; Scott v. People, 
 63 I1L 508 ; Kehoe v. Com., 80 Pa. St 
 
 127: Com. v. Black, 108 Mass. 296; 
 State v. Blackburn, 80 N. C. 474; 
 State v. Daniel, 31 La. Ann. 91 ; Com. 
 v. Thompson (Mass., 1893), 33 N. E. 
 Rep. 1111; State v. Spencer, 30 La. 
 Ann. 362: State v. Schmidt, 73 Iowa, 
 469 ; Powers v. State, 87 Ind. 144. 
 
 3 See cases in last note. If the de- 
 clarant is conscious of approaching 
 death, it is not material that no one 
 told him that he was about to die. 
 Hammel v. State, 90 Ala 577. 
 
 4 Com. v. Thompson (Mass., 1893), 
 33 N. E. Rep. 1111. 
 
 5 People v. Bemmerly, 25 Pac. Rep. 
 266; 87 Cal. 117; People v. Samario, 
 84 Cal. 484 ; Fulcher v. State, 13 S. 
 W. Rep. 750 ; 28 Tex. App. 465 ; Pul- 
 liam v. State, 6 S. Rep. 839 ; 88 Ala. 
 1 ; Archibald v. State, 122 Ind. 122 ; 
 People v. Smith, 104 N. Y. 491 ; Peo- 
 ple v. Ramirez, 73 Cal. 403 ; State v. 
 Newhouse, 38 La. Ann. 862 ; 2 S. Rep. 
 799 ; Ledbetter v. State, 23 Tex. App. 
 247 ; State v. Schmidt, 73 Iowa, 469 ; 
 35 N. W. Rep. 590 ; People v. Farmer,
 
 140 
 
 DYING DECLARATIONS. 
 
 [§ 101. 
 
 ceased states that he was sure to die; ' that he never expected 
 to recover from his wound ; 2 that he knew he could not live; 3 
 that he was killed, 4 or makes use of similar expressions, it is 
 conclusively presumed that he spoke under a full sense of ap- 
 proaching death. But where the declarant merely states that 
 he has "no hope at present," 5 or says "Who knows? perhaps 
 I may get well," 6 or expresses a hope if he dies to meet one 
 in heaven, 7 his declaration not being made in apprehension of 
 approaching death, is inadmissible. 8 
 
 Though the dying statement was made while the deceased 
 was still hopeful of recovery, yet it is receivable if he subse- 
 quently ratifies it when all hope has departed. 9 So, on the 
 other hand, the fact that the dying man is afterwards encour- 
 aged to believe that he will recover will not render inadmis- 
 sible his statement previously made in immediate expectation 
 of death. 10 But the fact that death does not immediately ensue 
 
 18 Pac. Rep. 800; State v. Block, 42 
 La. Ann. 861 ; United Stat Q s v. 
 Heath, 20 D. C. 272 ; Jordan v. State, 
 81 Ala. 20 ; Dixon v. State, 13 Fla. 636 ; 
 Dumas v. State, 62 Ga. 58 ; State v. 
 Wilson, 24 Kan. 189 ; People v. Com., 
 87 Ky. 487 ; 9 S. W. Rep. 509 ; Mock- 
 abee v. Com., 78 Ky. 380; State v. 
 Mills, 91 N. C. 581 ; Railing v. Com., 
 113 Pa. St. 37. 
 
 i State v. Umble (Mo., 1893), 22 S. 
 W. Rep. 378 ; Crump v. Com. (Ky., 
 1893), 20 id. 390; State v. Aldrich, 50 
 Kan. 666; Wallace v. State (Ga., 
 1893), 15 S. E. Rep. 700; Evans v. 
 State (Ark., 1893). 22 S. W. Rep. 1026 ; 
 State v. Fletcher (Oreg., 1893), 33 
 Pac. Rep. 575 ; State v. Turlington, 
 102 Mo. 642; Pulliam v. State, 88 
 Ala. 1. 
 
 2 State v. Nance, 25 S. C. 168. 
 
 3 People v. Callaghan, 4 Utah, 49. 
 
 4 State v. Russell, 32 Pac. Rep. 854; 
 State v. Elkins, 101 Mo. 344; 14 S. 
 W. Rep. 11G; Luker v. Com. (Ky., 
 1887), 5 S. W. Rep. 354. 
 
 8 Rex v. Jenkins, L. R 1 Cr. Cas. 
 187. 
 
 6 Jackson v. Com., 19 Gratt..656. 
 
 ' State v. Medlicott, 9 Kan. 257. 
 
 s Graves v. People (Colo., 1893), S2 
 Pac. Rep. 63. 
 
 9 Reg. v. Steele, 12 Cox C. C. 168. 
 
 10 State v. Shafer (Oreg., 1893), 32 
 Pac. Rep. 545; State v. Tilghman, 
 11 Ired. (N. C.) Law, 573; State v. 
 Turlington, 102 Mo. 642; Lursher v. 
 Com., 26 Gratt. 963. Cf. Ex parte 
 Nettles, 58 Ala. 268. It is for the 
 court to determine whether the sense 
 of approaching death was present 
 (Roten v. State (Fla., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 
 890) ; and the burden of proof is upon 
 the prosecution. Peak v. State, 50 
 N. J. L. 222; Digby v. People, 113 III. 
 125 ; Wallace v. State (Ga., 1893), 15 
 S. E. Rep. 710 ; Evans v. State (Ark., 
 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 1026. A state- 
 ment made two or three minutes be- 
 fore death is admissible as a dying 
 statement, though the deceased did 
 not say he believed he was going to 
 die until after he had finished his 
 declaration. People v. Sai*e Bo, 72 
 Cal. 623; State v. Spencer, 30 La. 
 Ann. 362.
 
 § 102.] 
 
 DYING DEC r.AKATIONS. 
 
 141 
 
 furnishes no valid ground for rejecting the declaration of the 
 deceased, if when it was made it is shown he was fully im- 
 pressed with the feeling that he would die in a short time. 1 
 Thus, declarations made forty-eight hours, 2 ten days, 3 eleven 
 days 4 or six weeks 5 before the death of the declarant have 
 been received." 
 
 § 102. In what cases admissible. — The declaration of a 
 deceased person which is offered in evidence as his dying dec- 
 laration is only admissible where his death is the subject of 
 an accusation of homicide and the circumstance of that death 
 the subject-matter of the declaration. 7 
 
 1 State r. Schmidt, 73 Iowa, 469. 
 
 2 Woodcock's Case, 2 Leach Cr. Cas. 
 583. 
 
 3 Tinkler's Case, 1 East P. C. 354. 
 * Rex v. Mosely, 1 Mood. 97. 
 
 5 Fulcher v. State, 28 Tex. App. 465. 
 
 « State v. Crabtree (Mo.. 1892), 20 
 S. W. Rep. 7; State v. Bannister, 35 
 S. C. 290; 14 S. E. Rep. 678; Cora. v. 
 Hauey, 127 Mass. 455 (four days) ; 
 Kehoe v. Com., 85 Pa. St 127 (two 
 days). The law governing the ad- 
 missibility and use as evidence of 
 dying declarations is thus admirably 
 summed up by the court in People v. 
 Taylor, 59 Cal. 640: "Declarations 
 of the deceased are admissible upon 
 a trial for murder only as to those 
 things as to which he would have 
 been competent to testif}' if sworn as 
 a witness in the cause. They must 
 relate to facts only, not to mere mat- 
 ters of opinion. It is essential to the 
 admissibility of such declarations, and 
 it is a primary fact to be proved by 
 the party offering them, that they 
 were made under a sense of impend- 
 ing death. But it is not necessary 
 that they be stated at the time to be 
 so made. It is enough if it satisfac- 
 torily appears in any mode that they 
 were made under that sanction, 
 whether it be directly proved by the 
 express language of the declarant, or 
 be inferred from his»evident danger, 
 
 from the opinions of the medical or 
 other attendants expressed to him, or 
 from his conduct or other circum- 
 stances of the case. Such declara- 
 tions must relate to the circumstances 
 of the death ; they cannot be received 
 as proof when not connected as res 
 gestcc with the death." 
 
 ' 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 156; Rex v. 
 Mead, 2 B. & C. 605 ; People v. Fong 
 Ah Sing, 70 Cal. 8; Marcum v. Com. 
 (Ky., 1890), 1 S. W. Rep. 727; People 
 v. Smith, 104 N. Y. 505; State v. 
 Perigo (Iowa), 45 N. W. Rep. 399: 
 People v. Davis, 56 N. Y. 96; Hines 
 v. Com. (Ky.). 13 S. W. Rep.. 445; 
 State v. Baldwin, 79 Iowa, 714 ; 45 
 N. W. Rep. 297; United States v. 
 Heath, 19 Wash. L. R, 818; State v. 
 Shelton, 2 Jones' (N. C.) L. 360 ; State 
 v. Nelson, 101 Mo. 464 ; Com. v. Cary, 
 12 Cush. (Mass.) 246; Crookham v. 
 State, 5 W. Va. 510 ; People v. Knapp, 
 26 Mich. 113; Walker v. State, 52 
 Ala. 192. If a crime is by statute 
 declared to be murder in case the 
 person upon whom it was committed 
 dies, as, for example, committing an 
 abortion, dying declarations are gen- 
 erally inadmissible under the rule 
 stated in the text, as the party is not 
 indicted for the homicide. The fact 
 of death is not a constituent of the 
 crime, but affects the punishment 
 alone. Railing v. Com., 110 Pa. St
 
 142 DYING DECLARATIONS. [§ 102. 
 
 In this connection it may be well to distinguish clearly be- 
 tween declarations of deceased persons which are admissible 
 as original evidence as a part of the res gestte and those which 
 are wholly hearsay but which are received solely because they 
 are the dying declarations. In regard to the former it need 
 only be said here that the grounds for their admission being 
 their natural, contemporaneous and explanatory connection 
 with the main transaction, they are admitted in all cases 
 whether criminal or civil. 1 On the other hand, the declara- 
 tions of the deceased not constituting a part of the res gestcc, 
 but which are his dying declarations, are mainly admitted as a 
 matter of necessity in order that homicide may not go un- 
 punished in cases where the declarant's death is the matter of 
 a criminal investigation. Here, if no third person was present 
 at the instant of the homicide (and this, it is believed, is very 
 frequently the case), it would be practically impossible to pro- 
 cure any direct evidence upon the main fact in issue, the mouth 
 of the accused being closed by the policy of our law unless he 
 shall see fit to open it. 2 
 
 When the injured party, if living, would be a competent 
 witness against the accused, no injustice will be done by ad- 
 mitting his language, relevant to the issue, uttered under cir- 
 cumstances which are considered as equal to his being sworn. 3 
 Hence where the declarant would not have been a competent 
 witness if alive, his ante-mortem declaration will not be re- 
 
 103: People v. Davis, 56 N. Y. 95; Graves v. People (Colo., 1893), 32 Pac, 
 
 State v. Harper, 35 Ohio St. 78; Rep. 63; Eiland v. State, 52 Ala. 322; 
 
 Maine v. People, 9 Hun, 113; People Palmore v. State, 29 Ark. 248; People 
 
 v. Aiken, 15 Oregon, 137; Wooten v. v. Lee Chuck (Cal.), 15 Pac. Rep. 322; 
 
 State, 39 Ga. 223 ; Starkey v. People, Keener v. State, 18 Ga. 194 ; Williams 
 
 17 III. 21 ; Johnson v. State, 50 Ala. v. People, 54 111. 422 : State v. Elliot, 
 
 456. Contra, Montgomery v. State, 45 Iowa, 486 ; Carico v. Com., 7 Bush 
 
 80 Ind. 338; State v. Dickinson, 41 (Ky.), 124; State v. Robinson, — La. 
 
 Wis. 299 ; Com. v. Homer, 153 Mass. Ann. 340 ; State v. Spalding, 34 Minn. 
 
 343. 361 ; Hawthorne v. State, 61 Miss. 749 ; 
 
 1 See State v. Sullivan, 51 Iowa, 142 ; State v. Downs, 91 Mo. 19 ; State v. 
 
 Walker v. State, 63 Ala. 105 ; State v. Matthews, 78 N. C. 523 ; State v. Dod- 
 
 Ramsay, 82 Mo. 133; Howard v. son, 4 Oreg. 64 ; Horbach v. State, 43 
 
 State, 23 Tex. A pp. 255; Cluverius v. Tex. 242; State v. Abbott, 8 W. Va, 
 
 Com., 81 Va. 787 ; Darby v. State, 3 741 ; Wood v. State, 92 Ind. 269. See 
 
 S. E. Rep. 363. post, § 345. 
 
 2 See State v. McCoy, 111 Mo. 017; 3 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 157.
 
 102.] 
 
 DYING DECLARATIONS. 
 
 Ul 
 
 ceived. 1 Thus, statements made by the deceased which, if he 
 were on the stand, would be hearsay will not be received. - 
 So, too, the declarations must be relevant, and must con- 
 tain statements of facts and circumstances and not merely 
 conclusions, mental impressions or matters of opinion, 3 ex- 
 cept in the cases where an expression of opinion would be 
 relevant if the declarant himself were testifying in court. 4 
 So a dying declaration that the killing was intentional, 5 with- 
 out reason or provocation," or for nothing, 7 is not such an ex- 
 pression of opinion as will render it incompetent. 
 
 The admissibility of dying declarations does not depend 
 upon the small amount of evidence against the prisoner, 8 or 
 upon the plea in defense, whether it is an alibi, insanity or 
 self-defense. 9 Like all preliminary questions bearing upon the 
 admissibility of evidence, the determination whether a dying 
 declaration is to be received is for the judge upon all the facts 
 involved. 10 
 
 To obviate the creation of prejudice against the accused in 
 the minds of the jurors, it is advisable, as a matter of practice, 
 to examine the witness out of their presence and hearing. 11 It 
 
 1 Reg. v. Perkins, 9 C. & P. 395 ; 
 State v. Thomason, 1 Jones' (N. C.) 
 Law, 274 ; State v. Foot Yon (Oreg., 
 1893), 33 Pac. Rep. 537 ; North v. Peo- 
 ple, 139 111. 81. 
 
 2 Johnson v. State, 17 Ala. 618. 
 
 3 State v. Williams, 67 N. C. 12 ; 
 States Elkins, 14 S. W. Rep. 116; 
 101 Mo. 344 ; State v. Perigo, 45 N. 
 W. Rep. 399 ; 80 Iowa, 37 ; State v. 
 Saunders, 12 Pac. Rep. 441; State v. 
 Black, 42 La. Ann. 861 ; 8 S. Rep. 
 594; State v. O'Brien (Iowa, 1891), 46 
 N. W. Rep. 752; Matherly v. Com. 
 (Ky., 1892), 19 S. W. Rep. 977 ; Jones 
 v. State, 52 Ark. 345 ; Scott v. People, 
 63 111. 508; People v. Olmstead, 30 
 Mich. 431. See post, g§ 186, 187. 
 
 4 Brotherton v. People, 75 N. Y. 159 ; 
 State v. Foot Yon (Oreg., 1893), 33 
 Pac. Rep. 537. 
 
 3 Boyle v. State, 105 Ind. 470 ; State 
 v. Nettlebush, 20 Iowa, 257 : Payne 
 v. State, 61 Miss. 161. 
 
 e State v. Black, 42 La. Ann. 861 ; 
 Wroe v. State, 20 Ohio St. 460. 
 
 'Roberts v. State, 5 Tex. App. 141. 
 
 SLuker v. State (Ky., 1888), 5 S. 
 W. Rep. 354. 
 
 9 Boyle v. State, 105 Ind. 469. A 
 failure to object promptly to a dec- 
 laration as inadmissible because con- 
 sisting of opinion waives the objec- 
 tion. State v. O'Brien, 81 Iowa, 88. 
 
 ] <>State v. Baldwin, 45 N. W. Rep. 
 297; State v. Poll, 1 Hawks, 444; 
 McDaniel v. State, 8 Sm. & M. 401 ; 
 Com. v. Murray, 2 Ashm. 41 ; State 
 v. Frazier, 1 Houst. 176 ; Territory v. 
 Klehn (Wash., 1889), 21 Pac. Rep. 31 ; 
 Hill's Case, 2 Gratt. 594; Kehoe v. 
 Com., 85 Pa. St. 127 ; Roten v. State 
 (Fla., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 910. See ante, 
 § 13. Contra, Dumas v. State, 62 
 Ga. 58. 
 
 « People v. Smith, 104 N. Y. 493; 
 State v. Furney, 41 Kan. 115; 
 Swisher v. Com., 26 Gratt. (Va.) 963 ; 
 Price v. State, 72 Ga. 441.
 
 144 DYING DECLARATIONS. [§ 102. 
 
 is in the discretion of the court, however, 1 to hear the evidence 
 bearing on the admissibility of the declaration in the presence 
 of the jury, they being instructed by the court that they 
 should not allow anything then heard to influence their ver- 
 dict. 2 
 
 When it has been decided that a dying declaration is ad- 
 missible, its credibility and weight are wholly within the 
 province of the jury, 3 and the evidence contained in the dec- 
 laration is to be weighed by them by the application of the 
 same rules that are employed in the case of a living witness. 4 
 The declaration itself can be introduced in evidence not only 
 against the accused but in his favor as well. 5 In case onlv a 
 portion of the declaration is admissible it has been held that 
 the incompetent portion may be stricken out on motion; 6 but 
 generally all that the deceased said relevant to the guilt or 
 innocence of the accused and bearing upon the facts of the 
 killing should be admitted, and it is error for the court to 
 refuse to do so. 7 
 
 So it has been held that the admission of a dying declara- 
 tion does not violate a constitutional provision that the accused 
 shall be confronted with the witnesses against him and shall 
 hear the testimony against himself. 8 Dying declarations as 
 such are never admissible in civil cases, although they may be 
 admissible upon other grounds than their ante-mortem charac- 
 ter; 9 and the same principle is observed as to their admissibil- 
 
 i State v. Schafer (Oreg., 1893), 32 rejected. State t. Nelson, 101 Mo. 
 
 Pac. Rep. 545. 464. 
 
 2 People v. Smith. 104 N. Y. 498 ; « People v. Farmer, 77 Cal. 1 ; 18 
 Johnson v. State, 47 Ala. 9; State v. Pac. Rep. 800. 
 
 Cain, 20 W. Va. 679 : Prince v. State, < Mattox v. United States, 146 TJ. S. 
 
 72 Ga. 441. 140 ; People v. Beach, 87 N. Y. 508. 
 
 3 State v. McCanon, 57 Mo. 160 ; 6 State v. Saunders, 14 Oreg. 300 ; 
 State v. Mathes, 90 id. 571. Com. v. Cary, 12 Cush. 246; Camp- 
 
 * Jones v. State (Miss., 1893), 12 S. bell v. State, 11 Ga. 353; Brown v. 
 
 Rep. 444. Com., 73 Pa. St. 321; State v. Dick- 
 
 ft People v. Knapp, 26 Md. 112; inson, 41 Wis. 299; Robbins v. State, 
 
 Brock v. Com. (Ky., 1892). 17 S. W. 8 Ohio St. 131 ; People v. Murray, 52 
 
 Rep. 337 ; Rex v. Scaife, 1 Mood. & Mich. 388. 
 
 R. 551 ; Felder v. State, 23 Tex. App. * Wooten v. Wilkins, 39 Ga. 223 ; 
 
 477 ; Chittenden v. Com. (Ky., 1888), Daily v. N. Y. etc. Co., 32 Conn. 356 : 
 
 9 S. W. Rep. 386. But a declaration Friedman v. Railway Co., 7 Phila. 
 
 of the deceased that he did not want 203 ; Marshall v. Railroad Co., 48 111. 
 
 the accused to be prosecuted will be 475. Cf. Cajolle v. Ferrie, 23 N. Y. 90.
 
 § 103.] DYING DECLARATIONS. 145 
 
 ity upon the trials of indictments for all crimes when homicide 
 h not an essential and indispensable element in the nature of 
 the offense. 1 An apparent exception to this rule occurs in the 
 case of the killing of two or more persons by the prisoner for 
 the murder of one of whom he is placed on trial. Upon the 
 ground that the two deaths are merely parts of one transac- 
 tion, the dying declaration of A. has been admitted on a trial 
 for the killing of B. where it was shown that the deaths were 
 nearly identical in place or time, and the means adopted by 
 the defendant in bringing about the death of B. resulted also 
 in the death of A.* But the circumstance taken alone that 
 the declarant's death occurred in the disturbance in which the 
 person for whose homicide the prisoner was indicted was also 
 killed is insufficient to admit his declaration when it is not 
 shown that his death was directly due to some act of the de- 
 fendant. 3 
 
 § 103. Form of the declaration. — That the deceased should 
 have been formally examined or that he should be questioned 
 as though he were upon the witness stand is never required. 
 Dying declarations elicited by means of leading questions or 
 urgent and persistent solicitations are receivable. 4 The fact 
 that deceased was under the influence of a narcotic while- 
 making his statement will not render it inadmissible, 5 pro- 
 vided they are complete in themselves and nothing remains 
 to be said by the declarant which will qualify, enlarge or re- 
 strict their meaning. 6 
 
 i Johnson v. State, 50 Ala. 456 : v. People, 139 111. 81 ; 28 N. E. Rep: 
 
 State v. Bohan. 15 Kan. 407; People 866; Com. v. Haney, 127 Mass. 455; 
 
 v. Aiken, 15 Oregon, 137; Com. v. State v. Foot You (Oreg., 1893), 32 
 
 Homer, 153 Mass. 343 ; Rex v. Mead, Pac. Rep. 103. 
 
 2 B. & C. 605 (robbery) ; Wilson v. 5 Hays v. Com. (Ky., 1S90), 14 S. 
 
 Boarem, 15 Johns. 286. See ante, W. Rep. 833. And where the declar- 
 
 £ 102. ant is unable to speak he may make 
 
 - Rex v. Baker, 2 M. & Rob. 53 ; his statement by using signs, and. 
 
 State v. Terrell, 12 Rich. (S. C.) 321; however slight they may be, as, for 
 
 State v. Wilson, 23 La. Ann. 559. example, squeezing the hand, his 
 
 Contra, Brown v. Com., 73 Pa. St declaration is not inadmissible on 
 
 321. that account. Com. v. Carsey, 11 
 
 ;i State v. Westfall, 49 Iowa, 328; Cush. 417. 
 State v. Bohan, 15 Kan. 407. 6 Com. v. Vass, 3 Leigh, 787; State 
 
 4 Com. v. Vass, 3 Leigh, 786 ; Peo- v. Murdy, 81 Iowa, 88 ; People v. 
 
 pie v. Bcmiberly, 87 Cal. 117; North Brady, 72 Cal. 490; State v. Martin, 
 10
 
 146 DYING DECLARATIONS. [§ 103. 
 
 The dying declaration is customarily expressed in language, 
 but this is by no means alwaj^s necessary. The declaration 
 may be by signs, where the dying person is unable to speak ; as, 
 for example, by a pressure of the hand, a nod of the head, or 
 by pointing to visible objects or persons in response to ques- 
 tions put to him. Under such circumstances it should be 
 made to appear by independent evidence that the deceased 
 was conscious and realized his condition. 1 
 
 In all cases where the language of the deceased has been 
 committed to writing and signed by him, or where, if he is 
 physically unable to sign, a written statement has been read 
 and assented to by him in the presence of attesting witnesses, 
 the writing should be produced as the best evidence of its 
 contents. 2 
 
 When a declaration made by deceased, though committed 
 to writing, was neither read nor signed by him, its contents 
 may be shown verbally, though its absence be unaccounted 
 for. 3 So where some of the declaration is in writing and some 
 is not, that which is verbal may be received though the writ- 
 ing is not produced. 4 But testimony that the deceased made 
 contradictory verbal statements will not be received to vary 
 or qualify a writing signed and verified by him unless the 
 witness can give the substance of the statements. 5 
 
 As a general rule, the contradictory fi or untruthful char- 
 acter 7 of the dying declarations constitutes no valid objection 
 to its admission as evidence, however much it may detract 
 from the credit to be given to it by the jury. But declara- 
 
 30 Wis. 216. Cf. Mattox v. United 572 ; 51 Iowa, 142 ; Darby v. State, 
 
 States, 146 U. S. 140. A verification 92 Ala. 9. 
 
 under oath, while of great value, does 4 Rex v. Reason, 1 Str. 409, 500 ; 
 
 not strengthen it as a dying declara- State v. Schmidt. 73 Iowa, 469; Peo- 
 
 tion perse. State v. Frazier, 1 Houst. pie v. Glenn, 10 Cal. 32; Krebs v. 
 
 (Del.) 176; Turner v. State, 89 Tenn. State, 8 Tex. App. 1 ; Com. v. Haney, 
 
 297. 127 Mass. 455. 
 
 •Com. v. Casey, 11 Cush. (Mass.) sSnell v. State, 29 Tex. App. 296; 
 
 417; People v. Shaw, 63 N. Y. 40. 15 S. W. Rep. 722; State v. Schmidt 
 
 2 King v. State, 91 Tenn. 617 ; Peo- 73 Iowa, 469 ; State v. Mathes, 00 Mo. 
 
 pie v. Callaghan, 4 Utah, 49; Drake 571. 
 
 v. State, 23 Tex. App. 293. But cf. 6Rj c h ar ds v. State, 82 Wis. 172; 51 
 
 contra, State v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308 ; N. W. Rep. 652. 
 
 State v. Wilson, 111 N. C. 695. i White v. State, 30 Tex. App. 652; 
 
 * State v. Sullivan, 50 N. W. Rep. 18 S. W. Rep. 462.
 
 § 103.] DYING DECLARATIONS. 147 
 
 tions made by the deceased which contradict his dying decla- 
 rations are admissible to impeach the latter, though they are 
 not made under a sense of impending death. 1 
 
 The witness called to prove the declaration is not under the 
 necessity of repeating its exact language provided he can give 
 the substance of all statements in a connected and complete 
 form. 2 
 
 1 Morelock v. State, 90 Tenn. 528. v. People, 17 111. 17; Montgomery v. 
 
 2 People v. Chin Mock. 51 Cal. 597 ; State, 11 Ohio, 424 ; Mattox v. United 
 Roberts v. State, 5 Tex. A pp. 141 ; States, 146 U. S. 140. 
 
 McLean v. State, 16 Ala 672; Stark
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 ANCIENT DOCUMENTS. 
 
 105. Definition. 
 
 106. Documents must come from 
 
 propei" custody. 
 
 § 107. Execution need not be proved, 
 108. Extent of corroboration re- 
 quired. 
 
 § 105. Definition.— Another class of exceptions to the 
 rule rejecting hearsay evidence comprises those cases in which 
 a claim to possession is sought to be substantiated by the pro- 
 duction in evidence of what are termed ancient documents} 
 To constitute an ancient document, the deed, record or other 
 written instrument must be at least thirty years old when 
 offered in evidence, 2 and, while it is by no means necessary 
 that the documents should, in strictness of language, be shown 
 to form a part of the res gestce, these instruments are generally 
 connected collaterally with some of the facts which are in 
 issue. The law raises a very strong presumption in favor of 
 the authenticity and genuineness of such documents, and even 
 when these characteristics are impeached by affidavits which 
 assert the fraudulent nature of their contents or that the docu- 
 ment is a forgery, it is held that the party offering the ancient 
 document is not under the necessity of disproving the charge. 5 
 
 il Greenl. on Evid., § 141. 
 
 2Mapes v. Leal, 27 Tex. 345; Whit- 
 man v. Henneberry, 73 111. 109; Mc- 
 Gennis v. Allison, 10 S. & R. (Pa.) 
 197. It is not enough that the docu- 
 ment purports to be over thirty years 
 old. Fairly v. Fairly, 38 Miss. 280; 
 Whitman v. Henneberry, supra. In 
 the case of a will the thirty years 
 would in America be counted from 
 the death of the testator. Jackson v. 
 Blanshan, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 292 ; Gard- 
 ner v. Grannis, 57 Ga. 539 ; Jackson 
 v. Luquere, 5 Cow. 221, 224 ; Hewlett 
 v. Cook, 7 Wend. 374. But the Eng- 
 lish courts reckon from the date of 
 
 the will. Doe v. Deakin, 3 Carr. & P. 
 402. 
 
 3 Winn v. Patterson, 9 Pet. 675 ; 
 McWhirter v. Allen, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 
 649; Williams v. Conger, 125 U. S. 
 397; Settle v. Alison, 8 Ga. 201; 
 Parker v. Chancellor, 11 S. W. Rep. 
 503 ; 73 Tex. 475 ; Strihling v. Atkin- 
 son, 79 Tex. 162; Bennett v. Runyon, 
 4 Dana, 422 ; Norton v. Conner, 14 
 S. W. Rep. 193 ; Northrop v. Wright, 
 24 Wend. 221. Contra, Parker v. 
 Waycross, etc. Co., 81 Ga. 387. Cf. 
 Almy v. Church (R. I., 1893), 26 Atl. 
 Rep. 58.
 
 § IOC] ANCIKNT DOCUMENTS. 149 
 
 § 106. Documents must come from proper custody.— In 
 
 the case of an ancient conveyance produced to substantiate 
 the claim of one in possession, the fact of a long, continuous 
 and uninterrupted seizin by the claimant is often a very ma- 
 terial circumstance 1 in rebutting any presumption or suspicion 
 which may arise that the instrument was fabricated. The 
 fact that the deed has always been in the possession of the 
 party claiming under it does not militate against its recep- 
 tion. 
 
 In all cases, however, where ancient documents are offered 
 as proof, it is required as prima facie evidence of their gen- 
 uineness that they shall be produced from the proper custody. 2 
 In no case is it necessary that the custody in which the docu- 
 ment has been found should be the best, safest and most 
 proper repository. Of course, where such is shown to be the 
 case, all trace of suspicion as to their genuineness is removed. 3 
 
 When, however, documents are produced and it is shown 
 that they have been in the hands of those who from the cir- 
 cumstances of the case it was reasonable and probable to sup- 
 pose would naturally have had charge of them, then the 
 requirements of the law have been complied with, even though 
 a safer place of custody might have been found. 4 In other 
 
 1 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 141 ; King v. Conger, 125 U. S. 417. Contra, Har- 
 Merrill, 34 N. W. Rep. 689; Smith v, ris v. Hoskins, 22 S. W. Rep. 231. 
 Swan (Tex., 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 247 ; » As in the case of a military pay- 
 Wilson v. Simpson, 16 S. W. Rep. 40 ; roll found in the custody of the sec- 
 80 Tex. 279. See § 108. Where the retary of war. Bell v. Brewster, 10 
 authenticity of an ancient deed is N. E. Rep. 679. See, also, Whitman 
 free from suspicion, the courts follow v. Henneberry, 73 111. 109; United 
 a liberal rule as to their admission. States v. Castro, 24 How. 346 ; King 
 Doev. Keeling, 11 Q. B. 884. v. Little, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 436; Jack 
 
 2 Doe v. Roe, 31 Ga. 593 ; Goodwin v. Blanshan, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 292. 
 
 v. Jack, 62 Me. 414 ; Carter v. Chan- The question whether a deed comes 
 
 dron, 21 Ala. 72; Weitman v. Jhiot, from proper custody is for the judge. 
 
 64 Ga. 11; Bell v. Brewster, 44 Ohio Rees v. Walters, 3 M. & W. 527, 531. 
 
 St. 694; Hedger v. Ward, 15 B. Mon. But where an ancient deed is ad- 
 
 (Ky.) 106 ; Tolman v. Emerson, 4 mitted in evidence against the objec- 
 
 Pick. (Mass.) 160 ; Duncan v. Beard, tion of the grantor, who denies its 
 
 2 Nott & McCord (S. G), 400; King execution, its genuineness is for the 
 
 v. Sears (Ga, 1893), 18 S.E. Rep. 830; jury. Stooksberry v. Swan (Tex.. 
 
 Applegate v. Lexington, etc. Mining 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 694. 
 
 Co., 117 U. S. 263; Williams v. 4 Bishop of Meath v. Marquess of 
 
 Winchester, 3 Bing. N. C 183.
 
 150 ANCIENT DOCUMENTS. [§ 107. 
 
 \ 
 
 words, the proper repository or custody for an ancient docu- 
 ment is the place where papers of its kind are usually depos- 
 ited. 1 Thus, in the case of deeds conveying interests in real 
 property, the proper because usual custodian is the grantee of 
 the deed or those claiming under him by force of its opera- 
 tion. 2 So the lessor is the proper custodian of an expired lease ; 3 
 and in regard to any document the question of what is its 
 proper custody is one of law and exclusively for the consider- 
 ation of the judge. 4 
 
 § 107. Execution need not be proved. — It is never required 
 to prove ancient documents. It is a conclusive presumption 
 arising from lapse of time that the witnesses together with 
 those who might identify their writing are dead. 5 The wit- 
 nesses need not be called, 6 even though living within the ju- 
 risdiction 7 or in the court. 8 Slight irregularities appearing 
 on the face of such documents will be disregarded. 9 The ex- 
 istence of a power of attorney, 10 of capacity in the grantor, 11 
 or the authenticity of a seal attached to the writing, 13 will be 
 presumed. But a copy of an ancient document, even though 
 over fifty years old, is not admissible, unless the execution of 
 the original is proved ; 13 nor can a sheriff's deed be considered 
 
 1 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 142, citing Atl. Rep. 497 ; Crain v. Huntington, 
 
 Barr v. Gratz, 4 Wheat. 213, 221; 81 Tex. 614; Von Rosenberg v. 
 
 Winn v. Patterson, 9 Pet. 663; Jack- Haynes (Tex., 1392), 20 S. W. Rep. 
 
 son v. Laroway. 3 Johns. 383: Hew- 143; Northrop v. Wright, 24 Wend, 
 
 lett v. Cock. 7 Wend. 371, 374; Tol- 221 ; McClaskey v. Barr, 47 Fed. Rep. 
 
 man v. Emerson, 4 Pick. 160 ; Duncan 154; Parker v. Chancellor, 73 Tex. 
 
 v. Beard, 2 Nott & McC. 400 ; Shinn 475 ; Ruby v. Van Valkenberg, 72 id. 
 
 v. Hicks, 68 Tex. 277 ; Bell v. Brews- 459. 
 
 ter, 44 Ohio St. 690 ; Brown v. Simp- 6 Barr v. Gratz, 4 Wheat 213. 
 
 son's Heirs, 67 Tex. 225; Almy v. "Jackson v. Christman, 4 Wend. 
 
 Church (R. I., 1893), 26 Atl. Rep. 58. (N. Y.) 277. 
 
 Cf. Harris v. Hoskins (Tex., 1893), 22 » Marsh v. Colnett, 2 Esp. 665. 
 
 S. W. Rep. 251. 9 Johnson v. Timmons, 50 Tex. 521 ; 
 
 2 Parker v. Chancellor, 73 Tex. 475. Hogan v. Corinth, 19 Fla. 84. 
 
 The proper custodian of a deed of a 10 Storey v. Flanagan, 57 Tex. 649; 
 
 land certificate is the person who Lum v. Scarborough (Tex., 1893), 24 
 
 filed the certificate. Masterson v. S. W. Rep. 846 ; Doe v. Campbell, 10 
 
 Todd (Tex., 1893), 24 S. W. Rep. 682. Johns. (N. Y.) 475. 
 
 3 Doe v. Keeling, 36 Leg. Obs. 312. « Rex v. Inhabitants, 1 B. & C. 573. 
 
 4 Rees v. Walters, 3 M. & W. 527. 12 Hooper v. W. W. Co., 37 Hun, 568. 
 6 Winn v. Patterson, 9 Pet. 675; WSchunior v. Russell, 83 Tex. 83; 
 
 Havens v. Sea Shore Railroad, 20 18 S. W. Rep. 484.
 
 § 108.] ANCIENT DOCUMENTS. 151 
 
 an ancient document which does not recite the court or 
 county in which it was issued. 1 So, also, an unrecorded deed 
 showing neither the place of its execution nor the fact of its 
 delivery will be rejected unless its due execution is proved. 2 
 §108. Extent of corroboration required. — Some uncer- 
 tainty at one period existed as to the necessity for the intro- 
 duction of evidence tending to show acts done in reference to 
 the documents offered in evidence. Where a deed or other 
 document is extremely old, to require evidence of an act done 
 contemporaneously with its execution as a necessary prelim- 
 iiuiry to its reception as evidence would be often tantamount 
 to rejecting it. 3 If, as is conceivable, the writing is dated 
 post litem motam, a suspicion will thereby be cact upon its genu- 
 ineness and impartiality which will cause the court to demand 
 evidence of co-existing facts to dissipate. 4 So where evidence 
 of comparatively recent facts which have occurred subsequent 
 to the execution of the document is demanded, no objection 
 can with fairness be made. Thus, if the document be a deed 
 produced by the grantee who claims under it, and it is stated 
 by him to have been in his possession for a period of time 
 sufficient to give it the character of an ancient document, he 
 will ordinarily be required to give evidence showing his en- 
 joyment of the property conveyed therein, or some other 
 competent facts sufficiently corroborative. So it was at one 
 time held that in such a case proof of possession in corrobora- 
 
 1 French v. McGinnis, 69 Tex. 19. strangers they are of such character 
 See as to administrator's deed, Fell as usually accompanies transfers of 
 v. Young, Go 111. 106. title or acts of possession and pur- 
 
 2 Long v. Georgia, etc. Co., 82 Ga. port to form a part of actual trans- 
 628. See Bo}de v. Chambers, 32 Mo. actions referring to co-existing sub- 
 46; Smith v. Rankin, 20 111. 14; jects by which their truth can be 
 Fogal v. Perio, 10 Bosw. (N. Y.) 100 ; tested, and there is deemed to be a 
 Clark v. Ovvens, 18 N. Y. 434 ; presumption that they are not fab- 
 Coulson v. Walton, 9 Pet. 62, where ricated. But platting for plans and 
 proof of ancient documents was re- field-notes are memoranda only, 
 quired. which may never have been acted 
 
 3 Bristow v. Cormican, L. R. 3 App. upon." Boston Water-Power Co. v. 
 
 Cas. 641. Cf. Gardner v. Granis, 57 Hanlon, 132 Mass. 484. 
 
 Ga. 539. "The evidence of such an- 4 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 143; United 
 
 cient documents is admitted upon States v. Castro, 24 How. 316. 
 the ground that although between
 
 152 
 
 ANCIENT DOCUMENTS. 
 
 [§ 108. 
 
 tion of the deed was indispensable. 1 On the other hand, it has 
 been repeatedly held that the genuineness of a deed purport- 
 ing to be an ancient document, if coming from proper custody, 
 may be established by proof of circumstances other than pos- 
 session or acts of ownership under it. 2 Thus, a certificate of 
 registration of an ancient deed being itself more than thirty 
 years old is admissible as evidence of the antiquity and gen- 
 uineness of the deed itself. 3 
 
 Where proof of possession is required it has been held in 
 some cases that thirty years' possession was necessary, 4 while 
 other cases hold that possession for any particular period need 
 not be shown. 5 So it seems that possession of part of the 
 premises is enough," and the document may be admitted in 
 evidence without prior proof of possession. 7 
 
 1 Jackson v. Laroway, 3 Johns. Cas. 
 283; Jackson v. BlanshaD, 3 Johns. 
 293, 298. See Gardner v. Grannis, 
 57 Ga. 539 ; Thurston v. Masterson, 9 
 Dana (Ky.), 285 ; Nixon v. Porter, 34 
 Miss. 697 ; Homer v. Cilley, 14 N. H. 
 85; McGennis v. Allison, 10 Serg. & 
 R. (Pa.) 197 ; Thompson v. Bullock, 1 
 Bay (S. C), 364 ; Bank of Middlebury 
 v. Rutland, 33 Vt. 414; Dishazer v. 
 Maitland, 12 Leigh (Va.), 524. 
 
 2 Barr v. Gratz, 4 Wheat. 213 ; Wil- 
 son v. Betts, 4 Denio, 201 ; Jackson v. 
 Luquere, 5 Cow. 221 ; Hewlett v. Cock, 
 7 Wend. 371 ; Kenerson v. Henry, 101 
 Mass. 152 ; Jackson v. Lamb, 7 Cowen, 
 431 ; Prigden v. Green (Ga., 1888), 7 S. 
 E. Rep. 97 ; Lawrence v. Tennant, 64 
 N. H. 532 ; Amnions v. Dwyer, 78 Tex. 
 639; Parker v. Chancellor, 73 Tex. 
 475; Ruby v. Van Valkenburg. 72 
 Tex. 450 ; Com. v. Heffron, 102 Mass. 
 161; Fulkerson v. Holmes, 117 U. S. 
 389; Applegate v. Mining Co., 117 id. 
 255; Nowlin v. Burwell, 75 Va. 551; 
 Ensign v. McKinney, 30 Hun (N. Y.), 
 249 ; Harlan v. Howard, 79 Ky. 373 ; 
 Whitman v. Henneberry, 73 111. 109 ; 
 Brown v. Wood, 6 Rich. (S. C.) Eq. 
 155 ; Williams v. Hardee (Tex., 1893), 
 21 S. W. Rep. 267. 
 
 3 Prigden v. Green, supra. In Bris- 
 tow v. Cormican, L. R. 3 App. Cas. 
 641, Blackburn, J., said : " Inasmuch 
 as, after a long time, all the witnesses 
 who could prove such possession are 
 dead, the law permits ancient docu- 
 ments, either with or without evi- 
 dence of ancient payment of rent, to 
 be given as evidence, from which the 
 jury may properly draw an inference 
 that there was such possession. For, 
 in the ordinary course of things, men 
 do not make leases unless they acton 
 them, and lessees do not, in general, 
 pay rent unless they are in possession, 
 so that-ancient payment of rent adds 
 weight to the ancient indenture." 
 
 * Nowlin v. Burwell, 75 Va. 551 ; 
 Jackson v. Blanshan, 3 John. 292, 298 ; 
 Shaler v. Brand, 6 Binn. 439. 
 
 5 Bank v. Rutland, 33 Vt. 414; 
 Nixon v. Porter, 34 Miss. 697 ; Wald- 
 ron v. Tuttle, 4 N. H. 371 ; Ridgely v. 
 Johnson, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 527. 
 
 6 Jackson v. Luquere, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 
 221. 
 
 " Hoopes v. Burgin W. W. Co., 37 
 Hun, 568 ; Burgin v. Chenault, 9 B. 
 Mon. (Ky.) 285; Shaler v. Brand, 6 
 Binn, (Pa.) 435.
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 GENERAL REPUTATION. 
 
 § 110. Adequate knowledge of de- 
 clarant. 
 
 111. Identity of declarant. 
 
 112. Death of declarant. 
 
 113. Date of the declaration. 
 
 § 114. Evidence of reputation in the 
 case of private rights. 
 
 115. Traditionary evidence regard- 
 
 ing private boundaries. 
 
 116. Documents showing general 
 
 reputation. 
 
 § 110. Public and general reputation — Adequate knowl- 
 edge of declarant. — By reputation is meant what a com- 
 munity thinks, believes or says, and not merely the declara- 
 tion of a single person as to a particular fact not of a public 
 nature. 1 As regards subjects or rights which are of general 
 or public interest, and which, therefore, concern all or a con- 
 siderable portion of the community, evidence of declarations 
 constituting general reputation and tending to show how such 
 matters were regarded by those who were most interested is 
 admissible as an exception to the rule rejecting hearsay. If 
 the matter concerned all the citizens, as, for example, the ded- 
 ication of a public highway and its enjoyment and use by 
 the inhabitants of a town, 2 or the exercise of some franchise 
 by a public corporation or official, it is a presumption that, 
 such things being the theme of interested and widespread dis- 
 cussion, the utterances of persons who are necessarily in- 
 terested in public matters must be reliable and true. 
 
 But the admissibility of hearsay evidence of general repu- 
 tation is limited by the consideration of the question whether 
 the person whose language is quoted was in a position to pos- 
 sess and did actually have sufficient knowledge. Thus, if it 
 be a matter of public cognizance affecting a large class of 
 persons, the declarations of any of them, no matter how 
 scattered the class may be, are admissible. A distinction is 
 
 i Anderson's Law Diet., citing Hun- 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 779; Crease v. 
 nicutt v. Peyton, 102 U. S. 363. Barrett, 1 C, M. & R. 919; Lawrence 
 
 2 Albert v. Gulf, etc. Co. (Tex., v. Tennant, 64 N. H. 532.
 
 154 GENERAL REPUTATION. [§ 110. 
 
 drawn, however, by the adjudged cases and by the authori- 
 ties upon this subject between public rights or customs and 
 general rights or customs. A public right is a right which is 
 common to all the citizens of a state or of any large govern- 
 mental division, while a general right is one which is common 
 to a considerable though limited number of persons; as, for 
 example, to the residents of a parish, township or similar cir- 
 cumscribed district. 1 
 
 In the case of public rights, declarations showing reputa- 
 tions, made by persons deceased, are deemed competent with- 
 out preliminary proof that the party had full knowledge of 
 the matter involved. 2 But declarations concerning general 
 rights known only among a relatively small number of per-* 
 sons are not admissible unless it is shown that the party had 
 competent means of knowledge. 
 
 On the other hand, the declarations of persons as to gen- 
 eral reputation who have resided in a circumscribed district 
 will not be rejected on that account if it can be shown that 
 the matter upon which they have a bearing was such that 
 those persons would have been likely to possess adequate 
 knowledge. 3 In the latter case, however, evidence of reputa- 
 tion current elsewhere than the locality in question would 
 not be received. 4 
 
 It is not necessary that the main fact in issue should be of a 
 public or general nature. Though the litigation turn upon a 
 private right, evidence of public reputation is admissible to 
 show some public and general right ou-t of which it sprang or 
 with which it may be connected. 5 
 
 •Stephen's Digest, art. 30; 1 v. White, 19 Conn. 250; Dunbar v. 
 
 Greenl. on Evid., § 128; Weeks v. Mulvy, 8 Gray, 163; People v. Vel- 
 
 Sparks, 1 M. & S. 686, 690. larde, 59 Cal. 457 ; .Hodges v. Hodges, 
 
 -'Freeman v. Phillips, 4 M. & S. 486. 11 S. E. Rep. 364; 106 N. C. 374; 
 
 3 Mullaney v. Duffy (111., 1893), 33 Young v. Kansas City, F. S. & M. R 
 
 N. E. Rep. 250 ; Green v. Mumper, Co., 39 Mo. App. 59. 
 138 111. 434; Hunnicutt v. Peyton, 8 Young v. Kansas City, etc. Co., 39 
 
 102 U. S. 333; Wood v. Fiske, 62 Mo. App. 53; Weeks v. Sparke, 1 M. 
 
 N. H. 173 ; Dugger v. McKesson. 100 & S. 679 ; Sanscrainte v. Torongo, 87 
 
 N. C. 1 ; Milford v. Povvner, 126 Ind. Mich. 69; Butrick v. Tilton, 155 Mass. 
 
 528 ; State v. Best, 12 S. E. Rep. 907 : 461 ; 29 N. E. Rep. 10S8 ; Backdahl v. 
 
 Taylor v. Glenn, 29 S. C. 292. Grand Lodge, 48 N. W. Rep. 454; 
 
 *1 Greenl. on Evid., § 128; Noyes Tucker v. Smith, 3 S. W. Rep. 671;
 
 §§ 111-113.] GENERAL REPUTATION. 155 
 
 § 111. Identity of informant or declarant. — A witness 
 who is permitted to testify to statements made by a person 
 deceased upon the ground that such utterance was evidence 
 of general reputation will not be required to give the name 
 of his informant. 1 Nor is such a declaration rejected though 
 the witness' informant, had he been living, would not have 
 been a competent witness because of interest. The fact that 
 the deceased was in a position to have a full knowledge of the 
 subject and that at the date of making his declaration he was 
 seemingly impartial being the sole grounds for the admission 
 of his declaration renders it unnecessary to consider his other 
 characteristics or qualifications. 2 
 
 § 112. Death of declarant. — But it is also a rule that the de- 
 clarant should be dead or should be supposed to be so at the 
 time of trial. If such is not the case, evidence of reputation will 
 be rejected and his oral testimony will be required as original 
 evidence in conformity with the doctrine that hearsay evi- 
 dence is never received when original evidence can be ob- 
 tained. 3 It was at one time held, when title to real property 
 was in dispute, that evidence of general reputation was only 
 admissible in case the party could show actual enjoyment of 
 the property prior to its reception. 4 Such, however, is not 
 now the law, though evidence of enjoyment would have great 
 corroborative force. 5 
 
 §113. Date of the declarations ante litem motam. — In 
 considering the admissibility of such declarations as evidence 
 of common or general reputation, the date at which the dec- 
 larations were made must be considered. As common report is 
 only admitted as evidence in matters which concern the pub- 
 lic, it is valueless where it is infected with bias or partial- 
 ity because the declarant's "mind does not stand in an even 
 position without any temptation to exceed or fall short of the 
 
 Lord Dunraven v. Lewellyn, 15 Q. Tucker v. Smith, 68 Tex. 473 ; 3&W. 
 
 B. 785 ; Warrick v. Queen's College, Rep. 671. 
 
 40 L J. C. 785. *Moorevvood v. Wood, 14 East, 330. 
 
 *Mose]y v. Davis, 11 Price, 162. *Curson v. Lomax, 5 Esq. 90; 
 
 2 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 135. Steele v. Prickett, 2 Stark. 463, 466. 
 
 3 Lawrence v. Tennaut, 64 N. H. See, also, cases cited under §§ 115 and 
 
 532 ; Hodges v. Hodges, 106 N. C. 374 ; 116.
 
 156 GENERAL REPUTATION. [§ 113. 
 
 truth." ' If, therefore, the matter upon which evidence of 
 reputation is sought has become the subject of a general or 
 public controversy, so that men, having begun to arrange 
 themselves upon different sides, have thus acquired distorted 
 views and have allowed the knowledge which they possess to 
 he biased by passion or prejudice, their declarations will be 
 no longer admissible as reputation. Hence, all declarations 
 made before the suit but since the commencement of the 
 controversy, that is, since that "state of facts has arisen upon 
 which the claim in issue is based," are excluded. 2 
 
 The controversy which will render the declarations inad- 
 missible must be precisely the same as that before the court. 
 The general discussion of allied or collateral controverted 
 subjects, so long as the point litigated was not then in dispute, 
 will not bring about the rejection of evidence of general rep- 
 utation, for here the point which is on trial cannot be said to 
 have been in controversy at all. 3 The fact that the declarant 
 was wholly unaware of the existence of any controversy is 
 not enough to render admissible his utterances made subse- 
 quent to its inception. He might have known of it, and, as 
 he is always absent and usually dead when the matter is under 
 judicial consideration, it is practically impossible to prove 
 either that he did or did not. It is therefore fair to presume 
 that, the controversy being upon a subject of general interest, 
 the declarant was informed as to its existence, and that his 
 mind was not uninfluenced by it. 4 
 
 If the declarations as dated are ante litem motam, they will 
 not be inadmissible because made expressly to prevent a con- 
 troversy, 5 or directly in support of the title or right of the 
 declarant, though this fact may be considered as bearing upon 
 credibility. Neither is the fact that the declarant stood or 
 
 i Whiteloeke v. Baker, 13 Ves. 514, 7 Scott N. R. 214 ; Donohue v. Whit- 
 
 per Lord Eldon. # ney, 15 N. Y. S. 632. 
 
 2 Hodges v. Hodges, 106 N. C. 374; * Freeman v. Phillips, 4 M. & S. 
 
 Berkley Peerage Case, 4 Campb. 404 ; 486, 497 ; Stephen's Dig., art. 3. 
 
 Rex v. Cotton, 3 Campb. 444, 446; 4 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 133. 
 
 Partridge v. Russell, 2 N. Y. S. 529 ; » Goodright v. Mass, 2 Cowp. 591 ; 
 
 50 Hun, 601 ; Richards v. Bassett, 10 Monkton v. Attorney-General, 2 R. & 
 
 B. & C. 657; Butler v. Mountgarret, M. 147, 160, 164; Slaney v. Wade, 1 
 
 7 H. L. Cas. 633 ; Davies v. Lowndes, M. & C. 338. 
 
 « Doe v. Davis, 10 Q. B. 314, 325.
 
 § 114.] GENERAL REPUTATION". 157 
 
 believed that he stood in, pari jure with the party introducing 
 the declaration enough to render it inadmissible; 1 for the fact 
 that he was in, pari casu with the party would furnish him 
 with an excellent opportunity of acquiring adequate knowl- 
 edge, while it would hardly prejudice him in a party's favor 
 prior to the existence of any actual controversy. 
 
 § 114. Evidence of reputation in case of private rights. — 
 The possession of competent knowledge by the informant of 
 the witness being essential to the admissibility of evidence of 
 reputation, it follows that, as to matters wholly private, evi- 
 dence of reputation is rejected upon the presumption that he 
 did not possess such knowledge, coupled with the impossibility 
 of showing affirmatively that he did possess it. To permit 
 or require proof that a person long since deceased, whose very 
 name has been perhaps forgotten or is unknown, was prob- 
 ably informed concerning a subject-matter which related to 
 one individual alone, would open the door to fraud and per- 
 jury, and cast doubt and suspicion upon all testimony of this 
 sort. The main question in issue may be one of purely private 
 right. 2 But the question must have possessed such a public 
 or quasi-public interest as to have been the subject of discus- 
 sion by a portion of the public, however limited. 
 
 Publicity is largely relative, and matters which in one sec- 
 tion of the community are the subject of continual public dis- 
 cussion would elsewhere be disregarded by all except those 
 directly concerned. In populous cities the discussion of purely 
 private affairs is not carried on to such an extent as in sparsely 
 settled communities, where a dearth of incident renders any 
 event, however private and trivial, the subject of general if 
 not public discussion. These well-recognized facts should be 
 
 i Taylor, Ev. 565, 566; Deade v. Ellis v. State (Tex., 1893), 24 S. W. 
 
 Hancock, 13 Price, 236, 237; Free- Rep. 894; Molyneux v. Collier, 13 
 
 man v. Phillips, 4 M. & S. 486, 491; Ga. 406. Cf. Angell v. Rosenburg. 
 
 Nichols v. Parker, 14 East, 331 ; Doe 12 Mich. 241 ; Bank v. Rutland, 23 
 
 v. Tarver, Ry. & M. 141, 142. Vt. 414 ; Walker v. Moors, 122 Mass. 
 
 2 It is for this reason that a per- 501. So evidence of a general re- 
 son's insolvency or insanity, being a port that a person has changed his 
 private matter, cannot be proven residence is not admissible under the 
 by evidence of general reputation, rule admitting reputation. Ferguson 
 Walker v. Forbes, 25 Ala, 139; v. Wright (N. C, 1894), 18 S. E. Rep. 
 Vaughan v. Warnell, 26 Tex. 117; 691.
 
 158 
 
 GENERAL REPUTATION. 
 
 [§ H5. 
 
 borne in mind when evidence of reputation of matters seem- 
 ingly private is admitted. In all such cases it will be found 
 that the subject, by reason of surrounding circumstances, pos- 
 sessed at least a quast-^ubWo character and was naturally the 
 subject of discussion by those in the neighborhood. 1 
 
 It is sometimes said that the marriage of parties competent 
 to enter into the marriage contract may be inferred or proved 
 by the reputation of marriage. It is perhaps more correct to 
 say that reputation is an incident from which, in conjunction 
 with cohabitation, a valid marriage may be presumed to ex- 
 ist. In any case the reputation of marriage should be gen- 
 eral among the acquaintances and relatives of the parties. 2 
 
 § 115. Traditionary evidence regarding private bound- 
 aries. — The rule is well established that at common law evi- 
 dence of general reputation is not admissible in matters of 
 private right or interest. Hence, though the boundary lines 
 between public territorial divisions, however small, can be 
 shown by such evidence, it is not permissible to do so in the case 
 of boundaries between the adjacent lands of private owners, 
 unless the private boundary is identical with a public bound- 
 ary. 3 
 
 1 Jennings v. Bank, 8 Mich. 181 ; 
 Curtis v. Aaronson, 49 N. J. L. 68; 
 Reed v. State, 16 Ark. 499 ; Russell 
 v. Stockton, 8 Conn. 236 ; Adams v. 
 State, 25 Ohio St 584; Richards v. 
 Bassett, 10 B. & C. 657; Green v. 
 Mumper, 138 111. 434 ; Price v. Little- 
 wood, 3 Camp. 288 ; White v. Lisle, 
 4 Madd. 214; Bryan v. Walton, 20 
 Ga. 480 ; Hard v. Brown, 18 Vt. 87 ; 
 Elliott v. Pearl, 10 Pet. 412. 
 
 2 "Reputation is an incident from 
 which, being joined to cohabitation, 
 the married relation may be inferred. 
 It is essential, however, that the 
 reputation of marriage be general. 
 The conduct of the parties must be 
 such as to make almost every one 
 infer that they were married. It is 
 the reputation arising from holding 
 themselves out to the world as occu- 
 pying that relation to which the law 
 
 refers. It is not enough that an 
 opinion may exist that they ought to 
 be married from their intimacy ; it is 
 the belief that they are married which 
 constitutes the reputation of it. Their 
 acts should be inconsistent with any 
 other inference than that of mar- 
 riage to justify the repute of it, and 
 this repute should be credited by their 
 relatives, neighbors, friends and ac- 
 quaintances." Brinckle v. Brinckle, 
 34 Leg. Int. 428. See, also, Arthur v. 
 Broadnax, 3 Ala. 375 ; Whjte v. White, 
 82 Cal. 427 ; 23 Pac. Rep. 276 ; In re 
 Wallace's Estate, 25 Atl. Rep. 260; 
 49 N. J. Eq. 530. 
 
 3 Curtis v. Aaronson, 7 Atl. Rep. 
 886 ; 49 N. J. L. 68 ; Thomas v. Jen- 
 kins, 1 N. & P. 588 ; Doe v. Thomas, 
 
 14 East, 323; Weeks v. Sparke, 
 1 M. & S. 688 ; Dunraven v. Llewellyn, 
 
 15 Q. B. 791 ; 15 Ad. & EL 791 : Taylor
 
 § 115.] GENERAL REPUTATION. 159 
 
 In the United States some exceptions to this doctrine have 
 occurred. It has been held in many states that evidence of 
 declarations tending to show common reputation is admissible 
 in the case of private boundaries irrespective of the fact that 
 they do not coincide with boundaries of a public nature. 1 
 The origin of this doctrine is to be accounted for by the mode 
 in which the government, whether state or federal, or other 
 original proprietor of the land caused it to be surveyed and 
 divided preparatory to its conveyance to those who subse- 
 quently cultivated it. 
 
 In the West particularly, the public domain was by act of 
 congress surveyed and divided into townships, sections and 
 subdivisions of sections, and in making conveyances of the 
 lands to private individuals reference was made to these quasi- 
 public boundary lines. 
 
 So in the East the large domains granted by the crown had 
 been subdivided by surveyors into numerous small farms by in- 
 tersecting lines extending from one boundary of the tract to 
 the other. 
 
 Thus in both classes of cases it happened that lines of a public 
 or quasi-x>x\h\\o, nature have become absolutely identical with 
 private boundary lines, so that the exception to the rule of the 
 English common law is more apparent than real. 
 
 It has been held in many cases where private and public 
 
 v. Roe, 4 Hawks, 116; Ralston v. Wooster, 15 id. 412; Taylor v. Judd, 
 
 Miller, 3 Rand. (Va.) 44; Morris v. 62 id. 288; Wentman v. Haywood, 77 
 
 Callanan, 105 Mass. 129; Drury v. Tex. 557; Dugger v. McKesson, 100 
 
 Midland R. R. Co., 127 id. 571 ; Mul- N. C. 1 ; 6 S. E. Rep. 746; Arueson v. 
 
 lauey v. Duffy (111., 1893), 33 N. E. Spann (S. D., 1892), 49 N. W. Rep. 
 
 Rep. 250; Arnson v. Spawn (S. D., 1066; Harris v. Oakley, 130 N. Y. 1: 
 
 1892), 49 N. W. Rep. 1066; Green v. Smith v. Powers, 15 N. H. 546; Lay 
 
 Mumper, 138 111. 434; 28 N. E. Rep. v. Neville, 25 Cal. 545; Austin v. 
 
 1075. Andrews, 71 Cal. 98 ; Smith v. Shack- 
 
 JBoardman v. Reed, 6 Pet. 328; elford, 9 Dana, 452; McCoy v. Gallo- 
 
 Donohue v. Whitney, 15 N. Y. S. 622 ; way, 3 Ohio, 283 ; Partridge v. Russell, 
 
 Com. v. Penn., 1 Pet C. C. 496; Sasser 2 N. Y S. 529; Nixon v. Porter, 34 
 
 v. Herring, 3 Dev. (N. C.) 340 ; Woos- Miss. 697 ; Yates v. Shaw, 24 111. 367 ; 
 
 ter v. Butler, 13 Conn. 309 ; Stetson Roberts v. Preston, 1C0 N. C. 243 ; 
 
 v. Freem n, 35 Kan. 523; Spear v. Stroud v. Springfield. 28 Tex. 649; 
 
 Coate, 3 McCord (S. C), 227; Jackson Hunnicutt v. Peyton, 102 IT. S. 333; 
 
 v. McCall, 10 Johns. 377; Wood v. Abert v. Van Gelder, 33 N. Y. 513. 
 Fiske, 62 N. H. 173 ; Great Falls v.
 
 100 GENERAL REPUTATION. [§ 116. 
 
 boundaries were not coincident that declarations of deceased 
 persons were admissible to show private boundaries, even 
 where they are not declarations against interest or in dispar- 
 agement of the title of the declarant. 1 So the declarations of 
 a deceased or absent surveyor in the form of maps, surveys 
 or plats are received to explain ambiguous or doubtful con- 
 veyances, particularly when they are referred to therein. 2 
 Usually, however, it is said that the declarations must have 
 been made by some one in possession of the land as owner 
 at the time, though they need not then be against interest 
 when they will be admissible as part of the res gestae* But 
 the declarations of third persons not against interest who 
 have competent knowledge, made on the land, but which do 
 not range themselves under either of the above heads, will be 
 received. Thus, a verbal statement of a deceased surveyor 
 who had no interest in the land, but Avho may have surveyed 
 it, will be received, though such evidence can hardly be called 
 general reputation. 4 
 
 § 116. Writings showing general reputation. — Not only 
 are verbal statements of deceased persons received as evidence 
 of general reputation, but written instruments such as maps 
 
 i Whitman v. Haywood, 77 Tex. « Child v. Kingsbury, 46 Vt. 47; 
 557; Daggett v. Shaw, 5 Met. (Mass.) Hadley v. Howe, 46 Vt. 112; Mc- ' 
 223 ; Curtiss v. Aaronson, 49 N. J. L. Causland v. Fleming, 63 Pa. St. 36 ; 
 68 ; Adams v. Swansea, 116 Mass. 591 ; Hurt v. Evans, 49 Tex. 311 ; Donohue 
 Sharp v. Blankenship, 79 Cal. 411; v. Whitney, 15 N. Y. S. 622. In Hun- 
 Fellows v. Smith, 130 Mass. 378; nicutt v. Peyton, 102 U. S. 333, the 
 Lawrence v. Tennant, 64 N. H. 532. court says: "In questions of private 
 Contra, Titteriugton v. Trees, 78 Tex. boundaries, declarations of particular 
 567; Taylor v. Glenn, 29 S. C. 292. facts as distinguished from reputa- 
 
 2 Curtiss v. Aaronson, 49 N. J. L. tion are not admissible unless made 
 68 ; 7 Atl. Rep. 886 ; Davidson v. by persons who had knowledge of 
 Arledge, 97 N. C. 172 ; Coles v. Yorks, that whereof they spoke and who 
 36 Minn. 388; 31 N. W. Rep. 353. were on the land or in possession of 
 
 3 Roberts v. Medbury, 132 Mass. it when the declarations were made ; 
 200; Fowler v. Stimpson, 79 Tex. and these to be evidence must have 
 611; Wood v. Fiske, 62 N. H. 173; been made while the declarant was 
 Royal v. Chandler, 87 Me. 119: 21 pointing out or making the bound- 
 Atl. Rep. 842 ; Brown v. Kenyon, 108 aries or discharging some duty re- 
 Iud. 284; Harris v. Oakley, 130 N. Y. lating thereto." Cf. Royal v. Chand- 
 1; Curtiss v. Aaronson, 49 N. J. L. lev, 83 Me. 151; 21 Atl. Rep. 842; 
 75; Austin v. Andrews, 77 Cal. 98; Titteriugton v. Trees, 78 Tex. 567. 
 
 16 Pac. Rep. 546; Whitman v. Hay- 
 wood, 77 Tex. 557.
 
 116.] 
 
 cexeual imputation. 
 
 161 
 
 prepared by deceased persons, 1 deeds and leases, 2 decrees and 
 orders of court, 3 and similar evidential instruments 4 are re- 
 ceived under the rules and limitations considered in the pre- 
 ceding- sections as applicable to this class of exceptions. 5 It is 
 immaterial that the documents are private if the subject- 
 matter to which they testify is one calculated to have inter- 
 ested all or any considerable portion of the public, and if it is 
 probable that the author of the writing possessed competent 
 knowledge of the matters which are described therein. Thus, 
 it is a general rule that maps and plats showing the public or 
 quasi-ipxihUc boundary lines, or which tend to prove a dedica- 
 tion by a private owner of lands to public uses as highways or 
 parks, are admissible to show the general reputation regard- 
 ing such matters. 8 
 
 1 See §§115, 145 ; Donohue v. Whit- 
 ney, 15 N. Y. S. 622; Ayers v. Wat- 
 son, 137 U. S. 584; 11 S. Ct. 201. 
 
 2Plaxton v. Dare, 10 B. & C. 17. 
 
 3 Duke of Newcastle v. Braxtowe, 
 4 B. & Ad. 273. 
 
 * Crease v. Barrett, 1 C, M. & R, 
 928 ; Clarkson v. Woodhouse, 5 T. R. 
 412. 
 
 5 Taylor v. Cook, 8 Price, 650; 
 Barnes v. Mawson, 1 M. & S. 77; 
 Smith v. Earl Brownlow, L. R. 9 Eq. 
 241 ; Beaufort v. Smith, 4 Ex. 450 ; 
 Donohue v. Whitney, 15 N. Y. S. 622; 
 Foss v. Hinkel (Cal., 1891), 25 Pac. 
 Rep. 762. 
 11 
 
 6 Morris v. Callanan, 105 Mass. 129: 
 Los Angeles, etc. Co. v. Los AngeleB 
 (Cal., 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 240; Noyes 
 v. White, 9 Conn. 250; Attorney- 
 General v. Abbott, 154 Mass. 423; 
 Brown v. Stark, 83 Cal. 636 ; People 
 v. Hibernia Sav. Bank, 84 Cal. 634. 
 Proof of any particular instance 
 when the right was exercised is not 
 required in the case of a public or 
 private right shown to exist by writ- 
 ten evidence of common reputation. 
 Doe v. Sisson, 12 East, 62; Beebe v. 
 Parker, 5 T. R 26, 32.
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 STRANGERS' DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST. 
 
 § 1 17. Declarations of third persons 
 and other declarations dis- 
 tinguished. 
 
 118. Declarations must be against 
 
 interest. 
 
 119. The interest of the declarant 
 119a. The death of the declarant 
 
 § 119b. The knowledge of the declar- 
 ant. 
 119c. Statements of predecessor 
 against interest, when evi- 
 dence in behalf of succes- 
 sor. 
 
 § 117. Declarations of third persons and other declara- 
 tions distinguished. — The declarations of third persons who 
 are neither parties to the suit nor in privity with the parties 
 constitute another exception to the rule rejecting hearsay evi- 
 dence. To render such declarations admissible and to permit 
 the production of the declarant as a witness to be dispensed 
 with three elements must concur. In the first place it must 
 be shown affirmatively that the declarant cannot be produced 
 because he is dead, for declarations of this description are not 
 only hearsay but are secondary evidence as well. 
 
 As in the case of declarations constituting evidence of repu- 
 tation, it must also be shown that the person possessed ade- 
 quate knowledge or was in such a situation that the possession 
 of adequate knowledge may be presumed from the circum- 
 stances. And finally the declarations must have been against 
 his interest when they were made. 
 
 It may be of value to distinguish declarations which are 
 admissible on the ground just described from those which are 
 receivable as evidence of reputation and pedigree or as a part 
 of the res gestce, on the one hand, and from those which are 
 receivable because they are admissions, on the other. 
 
 The principal basis for the reception of admissions is the 
 strong presumption of their truth, arising from the fact that 
 they are declarations against interest, made by a party to the 
 suit or by some one in privity with him. The declarations 
 which are under consideration in this chapter resemble ad-
 
 §118.] STUANGERS' DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST. 1C3 
 
 missions in that they are against interest, but they differ from 
 admissions in that they are admissible not because against the 
 interest of parties to the suit or persons in privity with them, 
 but because they are against the interest of strangers, i. e., 
 third persons who had no interest in the present su'jject- 
 matter and who are not identified in any way with those who 
 are parties or privies to it. The persons who have made these 
 declarations must have been possessed of adequate knowledge 
 and must be deceased at the time of the suit, the declarations 
 in these respects resembling pedigree, 1 while in the case of 
 admissions, no such requirements exist, though on the other 
 hand a joint interest or identity of interest must be shown 
 prior to the admission of the latter. 
 
 The declarations of third parties against interest need not, 
 though they often do, constitute a part of the res gestae which 
 is in litigation, nor need they be such entries as are made in 
 the course of official or private duty, though it usualty hap- 
 pens that they often possess such characteristics in common 
 with the others which render them admissible. 
 
 The declarations of third persons against interest usually 
 consist of written entries made in books of record or account, 
 and from the circumstances of the case it frequently happens 
 that such books, aside from any question of competency, are 
 provable under the rules laid down with respect to ancient 
 documents. But in most of the cases these book-entries 
 against interest are wholly or partly admissible on other 
 grounds, i. <?., as constituting a part of the res gestae and as 
 made in the course of the performance of private or profes- 
 sional duty. 
 
 §118. Declarations must be against interest. — In the 
 first place the declarations must have been against the interest 
 of the third person at the time they were made. 2 Self-interest 
 prompts all persons to exercise a certain degree of care and 
 attention in the conduct of their own affairs and to acquire a 
 more or less intimate knowledge of what concerns themselves. 
 Based upon these considerations, a strong probability exists 
 that such declarations are true, while, on the other hand, the 
 
 1 See § 53. Hosford v. Rowe, 41 Minn. 247 ; Bla- 
 
 2 Briberg v. Donovan, 23 111. App. lock v. Miland, 87 Ga. 573. 
 62; Bartlett v. Patton, 33 W. Va. 71 ;
 
 104 STRANGERS' DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTERE3T. [§ 110. 
 
 necessity of the case requires their admission, as the only per- 
 sons who have perhaps the amplest knowledge are long since 
 deceased. 1 
 
 The question has been raised whether the declaration is re- 
 ceivable as evidence of all the facts which are contained in 
 it or only as evidence of those facts by virtue of which it is 
 opposed to the pecuniary interest of the person making it. 
 Though controverted bv the earlier cases, it is now the rule 
 that the whole declaration or entry maybe given in evidence 
 to show statements independent of and collateral to the main 
 assertion. So the written receipt of a deceased person is 
 admissible not only to show that the payment was made, 
 which is the fact against his interest, but to show also the time 
 or place of payment and the person for whose account the 
 money was paid. 2 But statements of facts collateral to the 
 fact which constitutes the entry a declaration against interest 
 are not receivable unless connected with it by reference or 
 by necessity in order to explain it. The mere fact that they 
 were contemporaneously made does not render them admis- 
 sible. 3 
 
 § 119. The interest of the declarant. — The declaration 
 must have been opposed to the pecuniary or proprietary in- 
 terest of the person making it, 4 and the adverse interest should 
 be shown by independent evidence or be inferable from the 
 circumstances of the case itself. 5 
 
 A declaration is opposed to a person's interest if a part only 
 
 •Bird v. Hueston, 10 Ohio St. 4ia * Davis v. Lloyd, 1 C. & K. 276; 
 
 2 Lamar v. Pearse (Ga., 1893), 17 Bartlett v. Patton, 33 W. Va. 71. 
 S. E. Rep. 92; Davie v. Humphreys, Cf. Thistlethwait v. Thistlethwait, 
 6 M. & W. 153 ; In re Grade's Estate 13 Ind. 355. 
 
 (Pa., 1893), 27 Atl. Rep. 1083 ; Marks v. 5 Lamar v. Pearse (Ga., 1893), 17 
 
 Lahee. 3 Biug. N. C. 408. Cf. Edward S. E. Rep. 92; Higham v. Ridgway, 
 
 v. Cook, 4 Esp. 49. 10 East, 109 ; Ivat v. Finch, 1 Taunt 
 
 3 Livingston v. Arnoux, 56 N. Y. 141; In re Grade's Estate (Pa., 1893), 
 507. Cf. Malone v. Gates, 66 Tex. 22, 27 Atl. Rep. 1083. Though the de- 
 whieh was an action to recover for clarant may be deceased, and though 
 the value of a quantity of timber, he may have had competent knowl- 
 The party who measured the timber edge, his declarations not constituting 
 being dead, it was held proper to ad- part of the res gestae are inadmissible 
 mit all his declarations as to the if not against his interest Blalock 
 manner in which he made the scale v. Miland, 87 Ga, 573. 
 
 or measure used by hi in.
 
 §§ 119«-19J.] STRANGERS' DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST. 1G5 
 
 charges him with a liability, or where other portions of the 
 book or document in which it occurs may discharge him from 
 liability in whole or in part. 1 So a declaration in the form of 
 a book entry is admissible where it is the only evidence of 
 the charge, and even where the same book shows a counter- 
 balancing or overbalancing entry, so that upon the whole the 
 declaration or entry does not charge the party and is not 
 against his interest. 2 
 
 § 110a. Death of the declarant. — To render declarations of 
 third persons against interest admissible against the parties 
 it must be shown that the declarant is deceased; 3 and it has 
 also been held in such a case that the deceased person must 
 have been competent to testify as to the declaration against 
 his interest if he had been alive at the date of the suit. 4 The 
 earlier decisions, however, support the contrary rule, that the 
 incompetency of the declarant as a witness, if living, is imma- 
 terial, basing their reasoning upon the fact that, as the declara- 
 tion is in its nature an admission or confession, it is very 
 probably true, 5 despite the disqualification of the person from 
 testifying because of interest. 
 
 § 119b. Knowledge of the declarant. — These declarations 
 of deceased persons against their interest, while differing in 
 some respects from declarations or entries made in the usual 
 course of employment, resemble them in this: that they must 
 have been made by a person who had a good knowledge of 
 the facts or whose duty and interest it was to have that 
 knowledge. 6 If the stranger was possessed of competent 
 knowledge of the transaction, it is immaterial that the entry 
 does not show that it was made on his personal knowledge. 7 
 
 1 Stepheu's Dig., art. 28. able to testify iu court or to have 
 
 2 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 151 ; Higham his deposition taken. 
 
 v. Ridgway, 10 East, 109; Rowe v. 4 Heidenheimer v. Johnston, 76 
 
 Brenton, 3 Man. & R. 2G7. Tex. 200 ; 13 S. W. Rep. 46. 
 
 3 Bartletfc v. Patton, 10 S. E. Rep. 4 ; si Greenl. on Evidence, § 153, cit- 
 33 W. Va. 71 ; Hosford v. Hosford, ing Doe v. Robson, 15 East, 32; Mid- 
 41 Minn. 245; 42 N. W. Rep. 1018; dleton v. Melton, 10 B. & C. 317; 
 Linuey v. Wood, 66 Tex. 22. In Schenck v. Warner, 37 Barb. 258. 
 Griffith v. State (Tex., 1890), 14 S. W. «CIapp v. Engledow, 72 Tex. 252; 
 Rep. 230, it was held that declara- 10 S. W. Rep. 252 ; Friberg v. Dono- 
 tions which are admissible because van, 20 111. App. 62. 
 the declarant is deceased are also ad- 7 1 Greenl. on Evid., §153, citing 
 missible where he is so physically or Crease v. Barrett, 1 Cr., M & R 219. 
 mentally incapacitated that lie is un-
 
 100 strangers' declarations against interest. [§ 119c. 
 
 Entries made in the performance of professional or private 
 duty, such as, for example, indorsements of service or the returns 
 made on writs by the officials or private persons serving them, 
 are receivable against the parties to a suit, partly because of 
 the implied agency which exists between the party against 
 whom they are introduced and the declarant, but mainly be- 
 cause the entries form a part of the res (jestce, i. e., the fact of 
 service. Such entries, however, are only available as evidence 
 so far as they consist of statements of fact which it was the 
 duty of the person to record, while the entry of a stranger 
 against his interest is evidence of all facts contained in it 
 which were actually recorded. 
 
 § 119c. Statements of predecessor against interest, when 
 evidence in behalf of successor. — The statements of a de- 
 ceased owner of property in his own favor are never admis- 
 sible evidence in behalf of those claiming the property by 
 virtue of a title derived from him, 1 except where they are a 
 part of the res gestae already in evidence, 2 or have been ac- 
 quiesced in by the adverse party or by one in privity with 
 him. 3 Neither are statements against interest made by a pred- 
 ecessor in estate admissible as evidence for his successor after 
 his decease. 4 
 
 In England one exception was made to the rule that no 
 proprietor can make evidence in favor of his successor in in- 
 terest. From the very earliest times the book entries of a 
 deceased rector or vicar were received as evidence for or 
 against his successor, but only to show the receipt of tithes or 
 other money due the church, or similar entries against the in- 
 terest of the party who made them and which from this cir- 
 cumstance were presumed to be true. 5 
 
 1 Reese v. Murnane, 31 Pac. Rep. But in White v. Chouteau, 10 Barb. 
 1027 ; 5 Wash. St. 372 ; In re Smith. 202, the declaration of the owner of 
 95 N. Y. 517; Schmidt v. Packard, 31 the goods against interest was re- 
 N. E. Rep. 944 ; 132 Ind. 398 ; Blalock ceived in favor of a surety claiming 
 v. Miland, 87 Ga. 573. under him as against the principal 
 
 2 See ante, § 115, " Boundaries." debtor. 
 
 s See§79. & 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 155, citing 
 
 <Outram v. Morewood, 5 T. R 123. Short v. Lee, 2 Jac. & W. 477.
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 WITNESSES ABSENT OR DISQUALIFIED. 
 
 § 120. Testimony of missing wit- 
 nesses. 
 
 121. Witness need not be deceased. 
 
 122. Witnesses who have become 
 
 sick, decrepit or insane. 
 
 123. Cross-examination at former 
 
 trial requisite — Identity of 
 parties. 
 
 124. Precise language of witness, 
 
 how far necessary. 
 
 § 120. Testimony of missing witnesses. — The main grounds 
 for the rejection of hearsay evidence are the absence of an 
 oath and of an opportunity to cross-examine the person who is 
 the informant of the witness. But if a witness who has given 
 testimony in a judicial proceeding cannot be produced at a 
 subsequent trial between the same parties for the same cause 
 of action, there can be no objection on this ground to receiv- 
 ing his sworn testimony in the former trial. 1 
 
 § 121. Witness need not be deceased. — It was at one time 
 doubted whether the testimony of a witness in a former pro- 
 ceeding would be admitted in his absence from a later trial 
 in case it was not shown that he was dead. So where the 
 witness had become incompetent merely, 2 or interested 3 in 
 
 iRuch v. Rock Island, 97 U. S. 
 693: Gastrell v. Phillips, 64 Miss. 
 474; Costen v. McDowell, 107 N. C. 
 546; Berg v. McLafferty, 12 Atl. 
 Rep. 460; Lohman v. Stocke, 94 Mo. 
 672 ; Marshall v. Hancock, 80 Cal. 82 ; 
 Lewis v. Roulo, 93 Mich. 475 : Dwyer 
 v. Bassett, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 513 ; Rey- 
 nolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 155; 
 Bank of Monroe v. Gifford, 79 Iowa, 
 300 ; Costigan v. Lunt, 127 Mass. 355 ; 
 Yale v. Comstock, 112 id. 267; Will- 
 iams v. Willard, 23 Vt. 369 ; Barker 
 v. Hebbard. 81 Mich. 627; Kendrick 
 v. State. 10 Humph. 479; Harrison v. 
 Charlton, 42 Iowa, 573. But the evi- 
 dence, if irrelevant, will not be ad- 
 
 mitted on the second trial, though, 
 inadvertently, its incompetency was 
 not recognized and it was not ob- 
 jected to at the earlier trial. Petrie 
 v. Railway Co. (S. C, 1890), 7 S. E. 
 Rep. 815. The testimony of one of 
 defendant's witnesses in the former 
 trial who is absent at the second trial 
 may be used by the plaintiff in his 
 own favor (Hudson v. Roos, 76 Mich. 
 173; Stayner v. Joyce, 22 N. E. Rep. 
 1889), and, if lie is present as a wit- 
 ness, to impeach his credibility. 
 Johnson v. Clements, 25 Kan. 376 ; 
 Nuzum v. State, 8S Ind. 599. 
 
 2 Lee, Adm'r, v. Hill, 87 Va. 497. 
 
 8 Chess v. Chess, 17 S. & R. 409.
 
 1G8 WITNESSES ABSENT OK DISQUALIFIED. [§ 121. 
 
 the subject of litigation, or where he was out of the state, 1 or, 
 being found, had wholly forgotten the facts of the case, 2 his 
 testimony given at a former trial has been held inadmissible. 
 But the weight of the modern cases sustains the more liberal 
 and reasonable rule by which the testimony of an absent wit- 
 ness is admitted not only in case of his death but where ho 
 has become incompetent by insanity, imbecility or sickness. 3 
 The testimony of a non-resident witness or of one who is 
 merely temporarily out of the jurisdiction 4 given at a former 
 trial, it is now well settled in England and in many of tho 
 states, is admissible in a subsequent trial of the same issue. 5 
 And if the witness is within the jurisdiction but is kept con- 
 cealed by the other party, so that it is impossible to serve him. 
 with a subpoena, the court may, in its discretion, admit evi- 
 dence of his testimony given at the prior trial." This propo- 
 sition, however, is denied by many of the cases if the witness 
 is not shown to be dead ; and a fortiori where the residence of 
 the absentee from the jurisdiction is known and his deposition 
 can be procured, it has been held elsewhere that his former 
 testimony was inadmissible, 7 and that his deposition must be 
 procured. In criminal cases, though this sort of evidence is 
 
 1 Wilber V. Selden, 6 Cowen (N. Y.), v. State, 92 Ala. 41 ; Hudson v. Roos, 
 162 ; Rosenfeld v. Case, 87 Mich. 295 ; 76 Mich. 180 ; Mailer v. State, 67 Ala. 
 Finn's Case, 5 Rand. (Va.) 701. 55 ; Howard v. Patrick, 38 Mich. 795 ; 
 
 2 Stein v. Swenson, 46 Minn. 360; Rothrock v. Gallaher. 91 Pa. St. 108; 
 Dayton v. Wells, 1 Nott & McC. (S. Rosenfield's Case, 87 Mich. 295; 
 C.)409. Whitaker v. Marsh, 62 N. H. 478; 
 
 8 Hudson v. Roos, 76 Mich. 180 ; People v. Devine, 46 Cal. 225. 
 
 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 6R e y no lds v. United States, 98 
 
 155. In New York the testimony of U. S. 155; Cook v. Stout, 47 111. 530; 
 
 a deceased witness only can be read Williams v. State, 19 Ga. 402. 
 
 in evidence in a subsequent trial. ''See post, § 359 et seq. ; Gastrell 
 
 Crary v. Sprague, 12 Wend. 41 ; Wil- v. Phillips, 64 Miss. 473; Savannah, 
 
 ber v. Selden, 6 Cow. 162 ; Mut. Life etc. Co. v. Flanagan, 82 Ga. 579; 
 
 Ins. Co. v. Anthony, 50 Hun, 101. Rosenfield's Case, 87 Miss. 295; Sul- 
 
 4 "Out of the jurisdiction" signifies livan v. State, 6 Tex. App. 319; 
 out of the reach of a subpoena. Mej-er Slusser v. Burlington, 47 Iowa, 300; 
 v. Roth, 51 Cal. 582. Stein v. Swenson, 46 Minn. 360 ; Col- 
 
 5 Omaha v. Jensen (Neb., 1892), 52 lins v. Com., 12 Bush, 271; Kellogg 
 N. W. Rep. 833; Minn. M. Co. v. v. Secord, 42 Mich. 318; Brogy v. 
 Minn. etc. Ry. Co., 53 N. W. Rep. Com., 10 Gratt. (Va.) 722 ; Gerhauser 
 639; Gunn v. Wade, 65 Ga. 537; v. North Brit etc. Co., 7 Nev. 175. 
 Dolan v. State, 40 Ark. 454; Pruitt
 
 122, 123.] WITNESSES ABSENT OK DISQUALIFIED. 
 
 Ifi9 
 
 sometimes admitted, it should not be received until a diligent 
 search has been made for the missing witness. 1 
 
 § 122. Witnesses who have become sick, decrepit or in- 
 sane.— The testimony of a witness at a former trial who has 
 since become mentally incapacitated to testify by reason of 
 insanity, 2 or who is confined to his house by illness or by 
 physical disability 3 arising from weakness or from the decrepi- 
 tude of old age, 4 may be given in a subsequent trial between 
 the same parties of the same cause of action. 
 
 § 123. Cross-examination at former trial requisite — ■ 
 Identity of parties. — In order that the testimony of a de- 
 ceased or absent witness may be admissible against a party in 
 a subsequent trial, it is absolutely essential that the party 
 should have had a full opportunity at the earlier trial of cross- 
 examining the witness. 5 If an opportunity of cross-exam ina- 
 
 i Shackelford v. State, 33 Ark. 539; 
 Sullivan v. State. G Tex. App. 319; 
 Wilder v. St. Paul, 12 Minn. 108. 
 
 2 Whitaker v. Marsh, 62 N. H. 477 ; 
 Harrison v. Blades, 3 Campb. 453; 
 Stein v. Swenson, 49 N. W. Rep. 55 ; 
 46 Minn. 360; Marler v. State, 67 Ala. 
 55; State v. King, 86 N. C. 803; Rex 
 v. Criswell, 3 T. R. 721 ; State v. Laque, 
 41 La. Ann. 1070. 
 
 3 Perriu v. Wells, 155 Pa. St. 299 ; 
 Miller v. Russell, 7 Mart. (N. S.) 266; 
 State v. King, 86 N. G 603. If it 
 seems likely that the witness will 
 
 N. W. Rep. 402 ; O'Brien v. Com., 6 
 Bush (Ky.), 563-, State v. Johnson. 12 
 Nev. 121 ; State v. O'Brien, 81 Iowa, 
 88 ; Marshall v. Hancock, 80 Cal. 82. 
 The evidence of witnesses before ar- 
 bitrators will be receivable in a sub- 
 sequent trial in court of the same 
 matter. Barley v. Woods, 17 N. H. 
 305 ; Jaccard v. Anderson, 37 Mo. 91 : 
 Bishop v. Tucker, 4 Rich. (S. C.) 78 ; 
 Osborn v. Bell, 5 Denio, 370; Orr v. 
 Hadley, 36 N. H. 575. In the trial of 
 an indictment for murder the testi- 
 mony taken at the coroner's inquest 
 
 shortly recover from his illness the held to investigate the death of the 
 
 court may, it has been held, adjourn 
 the trial. Harrison v. Blades, 3 
 Campb. 458. 
 
 4 Evidence given on a former trial 
 cannot be produced on a second trial 
 
 deceased is not admissible where the 
 witness cannot be produced (State v. 
 Campbell. 1 Rich. (S. C.) 124; Farkas 
 v. State, 60 Miss. 847 ; Whitehurst v. 
 Com., 79 Va. 556 ; State v. Cecil, 54 
 
 without calling the witness, upon the Md. 426 ; McLain v. Com., 99 Pa. St. 
 
 ground that he has forgotten par- 
 ticular facts, unless his failure to re- 
 member is the result of mental imbe- 
 cility. Stein v. Swenson, 46 Minn. 
 360 ; 49 N. W. Rep. 55. See Thornton 
 v. Britton, 144 Pa. St. 126, as to testi- 
 mony of aged witness. 
 
 5 Bradley v. Merrick, 91 N. Y. 293; 
 Hudson v. Applegate (Iowa, 1893), 54 
 
 86; Dupree v. State, 33 Ala. 380; 
 State v. McNeil, 33 La. Ann. 1332), 
 though in one case it was admitted 
 in behalf of defendant. So the testi- 
 mony of a witness at a coroner's 
 inquest is not admissible in a subse- 
 quent action to recover for the wrong- 
 ful death, though the witness is dead. 
 Pittsburg, etc. Co. v. McGrath, 115
 
 170 
 
 WITNESSES ARSENT OK DISQUALIFIED. 
 
 [§ 123. 
 
 tion has been afforded the party against whom the testimony 
 of the absent witness is subsequently put in evidence, it is not 
 always necessary that the parties to the several actions should 
 be precisely identical or that the issue should be the same on 
 both occasions. 1 Thus, if the second proceeding is between 
 those in privity with the parties to the earlier trial, the tes- 
 timony of a witness in the trial between the original parties 
 is admissible against those in privity with them, though the 
 subject-matter of the later litigation is not identical with that 
 of the earlier. 2 But though exact identity of subject-matter 
 is not generally required, yet the issue in the second proceed- 
 ing must have been so far identified and connected with the 
 subject of the former litigation that the party against whom 
 the evidence is introduced must have had a right, according 
 to the rules of evidence, to cross-examine. In other words, 
 it is required that the evidence should not be incidental, but 
 that it should be equally relevant to the issues in both trials. 3 
 It is requisite that in the former trial the court should have 
 had jurisdiction, and if the proceeding were substantially 
 regular the testimony will not be rejected subsequently on 
 account of informalities. 4 
 
 111. 172. The constitutional right of 
 the accused to meet the witnesses 
 face to face is not violated by the ad- 
 mission of the testimony of an ab- 
 sent witness taken on a former trial 
 where he had an opportunity to cress- 
 exam ine the witness. Com. v. Rich- 
 ards, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 434; State v. 
 Blemis, 24 Mo. 402. An opportunity 
 to cross-examine is not shown b} r evi- 
 dence that counsel in the pending 
 action was present at the previous 
 proceeding. Jackson v. Crilly, 16 
 Colo. 103. 
 
 i Jackson v. Crilly, 16 Colo. 103; 
 Mathews v. Colburn, 1 Strobh. 258; 
 Jackson v. Lavvsou, 15 Johns. 544; 
 Schindler v. Railroad Co., 87 Mich. 
 400; Philadelphia, etc. Co. v. How- 
 ard, 13 How. (U. S.)307; Hunter v. 
 Burlington, etc. Co., 76 Iowa, 490; 
 
 Goodlett v. Kelly, 74 Ala. 213 ; Charles- 
 worth v. Tinker, J 8 Wis. 633. 
 
 2 Lee's Adm'r v. Hill, 12 S. E. Rep. 
 1052; 87 Va. 497; Shelton v. Bar- 
 bour, 2 Wash. 64 ; Seattle, etc. Co. v. 
 Gilchrist, 4 Wash. St. 509; Yale v. 
 Comstock, 112 Mass. 267; Fisher v. 
 Monroe, 2 Misc. Rep. 326 ; Indianap- 
 olis, etc. Co. v. Stout, 53 Iud. 543; 
 Schindler v. Milwaukee, etc. Co., 49 
 N. W. Rep. 670 ; 87 Mich. 400 ; Jack- 
 sou v. Crissey, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 251 ; 
 Strickland v. Hudson, 55 Miss. 235. 
 
 3 Jackson v. Winchester, 4 Dall. 
 206; Melvin v. Whiting, 7 Pick. 79. 
 Cf. Stayner v. Joyce, 22 N. E. Rep. 
 89; Schindler v. Milwaukee, etc. Co., 
 87 Mich. 400. 
 
 4 State v. Johnson, 12 Nev. 121. 
 So where on the earlier trial the 
 witness was not sworn by consent 
 Wheeler v. Walker, 12 Vt 427.
 
 § 124.] 
 
 WITNESSES ABSENT OK DISQUALIFIED. 
 
 171 
 
 § 124. Precise language, how far requisite. — Formerly it 
 was considered essential that the person who testified to the 
 evidence of an absent witness should state the exact language 
 of the witness. 1 This rule, however, was soon relaxed, and it 
 is now the law that the exact language need not be given if 
 its substance is accurately stated in the later trial. 2 But the 
 whole of the testimony of the witness upon a particular point 
 should be repeated in language as nearry identical as possible, 
 so that the effect produced may correspond with the impres- 
 sion made upon the jury by the testimony of the witness in 
 the original trial. 3 Accordingly, the testimony of the witness 
 elicited on his cross-examination must be substantially re- 
 peated. 4 
 
 At the present time the custom of employing a court ste- 
 nographer, whose duty it is to take down the testimony of the 
 witnesses examined, is nearly universal. He is usually a sworn 
 officer of the court, and his notes or transcripts of them pos- 
 sess an official character and authenticity which render them 
 of great value in case of the subsequent death or absence 
 of a witness. 5 "Where such records exist, their production on 
 
 i 1 Greenl. on Evid.. § 165 ; Wilber 
 v. Selden, 6 Cow. 165; Montgomery 
 v. State, 11 Ohio, 421 ; United States 
 v. Wood, 3 Wash. 440; Foster v. 
 Shaw, 7 S. & R 163 ; Com. v. Rich- 
 ards, 18 Pick. 464. 
 
 - 1 State v. O'Brien, 81 Iowa, 88; 46 
 N. W. Rep. 752 ; Bennett v. State, 22 
 S. W. Rep. 284 ; Buie v. Carver, 73 N. 
 C. 264 ; Wade v. State, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 
 80 ; Gannon v. Stevens, 13 Kan. 447 ; 
 Brown v. Com.. 73 Pa. St. 321 ; Stein v. 
 Swenson, 46 Minn. 360 ; Johnson v. 
 Powers, 40 Vt. 611 ; Mitchell v. State, 
 71 Ga. 128; Home v. Williams, 23 
 Ind. 37 ; Smith v. Natchez S. Co., 1 
 How. (Miss.) 479; Lathrop v. Atkin- 
 son, 81 Ga. 339; Martin v. Cope, 3 
 Abb. Dec. 182 ; Young v. Dearborn, 
 22 N. H. 372 ; Emery v. Fowler, 39 
 Me. 326 ; Lime R Bank v. Hewett, 
 52 id. 531 ; Caton v. Lenox, 5 Rand. 
 (Va.) 31. 
 
 3 Bennett v. State, 22 S. W. Rep. 
 684. 
 
 * Wade v. State, 7 Baxt. 80; Gilder- 
 sleeve v. Caraway. 10 Ala. 260 ; Block 
 v. Woodron, 39 Md. 194; Wolf v. 
 Wyeth, 11 S. & R. 149; Woods v. 
 Keys, 14 Allen, 236 ; Puryear v. State, 
 63 Ga. 692; Marsh v. Jones, 21 Vt. 
 378; State v. O'Brien, 81 Iowa, 88; 
 Hepler v. Mt. Carm. Sav. Bank, 97 Pa. 
 St. 420; Black v. Woodson. 39 Md. 
 194; Tibbetts v. Flanders, 18 N. H. 
 284; Wright v. Stowe, 4 Jones' L (N. 
 C.) 516. The objection that the wit- 
 ness fails to remember the cross-exam- 
 ination is waived if not made im- 
 mediately. State v. O'Brien, 81 Iowa, 
 88 ; 46 N. W. Rep. 752. 
 
 5 That a stenographer's notes are 
 competent, see District v. Wash. Gas 
 Co., 20 D. C. 39 ; Hicks v. Lovell, 64 
 Cal. 14 ; Quinn v. Halbert, 57 Vt. 178 ; 
 Labor v. Crane, 56 Mich. 585; John-
 
 172 WITNESSES ABSENT OR DISQUALIFIED. [§ 124. 
 
 the subsequent trial should, it seems, be required under the 
 rule requiring the production of the best evidence. But the 
 verbal testimony of the stenographer, it has been held, in such 
 a case, given after refreshing his memory by a perusal of his 
 notes, is admissible, 1 provided the notes are shown to the op- 
 posite party and he is given an opportunity to cross-examine 
 the witness as to their accuracy. 2 A stenographer's notes 
 taken out of the jurisdiction, 3 or taken down from the lips of 
 an interpreter where the witness testifies in a foreign lan- 
 guage, 4 or when the reporter is dead, 5 or .when for any reason 
 the notes are not shown to be correct, 6 have been held inad- 
 missible to prove the testimony which a witness gave at a 
 former trial. The judge's notes also are not competent to 
 show what the witness said until it is shown that they con- 
 tain an accurate and complete account of the substance of 
 the witness' language. 7 Their incompetency is due to the 
 fact that they are no part of the record and are not made 
 within the scope of official duty or under the sanction of an 
 official oath, which would guaranty that they are complete or 
 correct. 8 So when it is sought to show, by the bill of ex- 
 ceptions, or a case on appeal, the testimony of a witness 
 at a former trial, a foundation must be laid by proving 
 that the bill does actually contain all the evidence given by 
 the witness. 9 When, however, the record is not obtainable, 
 
 son v. Spear, 82 Mich. 453; Sage v. 8 Elberfeklt v. Waite, 79 Wis. 284; 
 
 State, 27 Ind. 15; 26 N. E. Rep. 667. Ex parte Learmouth, 6 Madd. 113; 
 
 ' Rounds v. Slate, 57 Wis. 45 ; Peo- Regina v. Child, 5 Cox C. C. 197; 
 
 pie v. Chung, 57 Cal. 567 ; Hicks v. Schafer v. Schafer, 93 Ind. 586 ; Miles 
 
 Lovell, 64 Cat 14 ; Shackelford v. v. O'Hara, 4 Binn. (Pa.) 108 ; Huff v. 
 
 State, 33 Ark. 559; Moore v. Moore, Bennett, 4 Saudf. (N. Y.) 120; Sar- 
 
 39 Iowa, 461. geant v. Marshall, 38 111. App. 642. 
 
 2 People v. Lon You (Cat, 1893), 32 9 Woolen v. Wire, 110 Ind. 251; 
 
 Pac. Rep. 11. Case v. Blood, 71 Iowa, 632; Slinger- 
 
 *Herrick v. Swomley, 56 Md. 439. land v. Slingerland, 46 Minn. 100; 
 
 ^ People v. Ah Yute, 56 Cal. 119. Davis v. Kline, 9 S. W. Rep. 724; 
 
 5 Trunkey v. Hedstrom, 33 111. App. Odell v. Solomon, 4 N. Y. S. 440 ; 
 
 397. Dwyer v. Rippetoe, 72 Tex. 520; 
 
 c People v. Sligh, 48 Mich. 54. Coughliu v. Haensler, 50 Mo. 126 : St. 
 
 7 Simmons v. Spratt, 1 S. Rep. 860 ; Joseph v. Union Ry. Co. (Mo., 1893), 
 
 Thompson v. Richardson (Ala., 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 794; Fisher v. Fisher, 
 
 1 1 S. Rep. 728 ; Wade v. State, 7 Baxt. 131 Ind. 462. Cf. Elgin v. Welch, 23 
 
 (Tenu.) 80; Elberfeklt v. Waite, 79 111. App. 185. 
 Wis. 284.
 
 § 124.] WITNESSES ABSENT OR DISQUALIFIED. 173 
 
 any person who has heard the witness, as, for example, the 
 counsel of one of the parties or a juror, 1 a justice, 2 master in 
 chancery, 3 committing magistrate, 4 interpreter 5 or newspaper 
 correspondent 6 will be allowed to testify to the language of 
 an absent witness from notes taken on the former trial. 7 In 
 case counsel in the subsequent trial enter into a stipulation by 
 which they agree upon the admissibility of the witnesses' 
 notes, a verification or identification under oath may be dis- 
 pensed with. 8 But such a stipulation does not make the tes- 
 timony taken in the prior case evidence unless it is actually 
 introduced as such. 9 
 
 iHutchings v. Corgan, 59 111. 70. Davis v. Kline (Mo., 1888), 9 S. W. 
 
 2Elberfeldt v. Waite, 79 Wis. 284; Rep. 724; People v. Murphy, 45 Cal. 
 
 48 N. W. Rep. 525 ; Chase v. Debolt, 137 ; Ruch v. Rock Island, 97 U. S. 
 
 7 111. 571. 693. 
 
 3 Yale v. Comstock, 112 Mass. 267. »Nutt v. Thompson, 69 N. C. 548; 
 
 4 Wade v. State, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 80. Clark v. Vance, 15 Wend. 193; Lath- 
 
 5 People v. Ah Yute, 56 Cal. 119. rop v. Adkinson, 87 Ga. 389. 
 
 6 Moore v. Moore, 39 Iowa, 461. » Pitts v. Lewis, 81 Iowa, 51 ; 46 N. 
 * Carpenter v. Tucker, 98 N. C. 316 ; W. Rep. 739 ; United States Exp. Co. 
 
 Loughry v. Wait, 34 111. App. 523 ; v. Jenkins, 73 Wis. 471.
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 PRIVATE WRITINGS. 
 
 § 125. Definition and classification. 
 
 126. Production of writing — Proof 
 
 of contents by secondary 
 evidence. 
 
 127. Writings obtained by fraud or 
 
 deceit — Decoy letters. 
 
 128. Spoliation and alteration dis- 
 
 tinguished — Effect of ma- 
 terial alterations. 
 
 129. Alterations — Presumptions 
 
 and burden of proof to ex- 
 plain. 
 
 130. Private writings lost or de- 
 
 stroyed. 
 
 131. Handwriting defined. 
 
 132. Production of writings, when 
 
 necessary. 
 
 133. Proof by admissions of party. 
 
 § 134. When proof of handwriting 
 may be dispensed with — 
 Acknowledgments. 
 
 135. Who may take acknowledg- 
 
 ments. 
 
 136. The certificate. 
 
 137. Impeaching the certificate. 
 
 138. Proof by subscribing wit- 
 
 nesses. 
 
 139. Proof by witnesses acquainted 
 
 with party's handwriting. 
 139a. Mode of examining witnesses 
 as to handwriting. 
 
 140. Comparison of handwriting. 
 
 141. To what expert may give evi- 
 
 dence. 
 
 142. Proof of exhibits in equity. 
 
 § 125. Definition and classification. — " The word ' writing ' 
 in its broadest sense means words traced with a pen, or 
 stamped, printed or engraved, or made legible by any other 
 device." 1 Writings are divided into two classes — public and 
 private. A public writing may be defined as the written act 
 or record of the business of the people of the community 
 proceeding from the supreme executive, legislative or judicial 
 authority either of the federal government, of the government 
 of a state or foreign country, or of some public officer, court 
 or official body created by law and deriving their powers from 
 that government, including also all official records of private 
 writings. 
 
 Public writings are subdivided into four classes, viz. : Pub- 
 lic laivsj judicial records; records kept by public officials in 
 
 'Anderson's Diet ; Henshaw v. Fos- common law. 
 ter, 9 Pick. 318. A printed ticket is 127 U. S. 467. 
 a " writing " and may be forged at 
 
 Benson v. McMahon,
 
 § 120.] PRIVATE WRITINGS. 175 
 
 pursuance of statute or as a part of their official duty, and 
 public records of private writings} 
 
 All writings not comprised in any of these classes, and 
 which concern the affairs of one or more individuals only, are 
 private. 2 The words "document" and "writing" approxi- 
 mate closely in meaning and may be and are often used inter- 
 changeably with correctness. The word "instrument" has 
 perhaps a more restricted meaning; for while it is often used 
 to describe any writing, its more proper meaning is a docu- 
 ment or writing of a formal or deliberate character which 
 is intended to be used as a means of judicial evidence. Thus 
 under the words "instrument" or "written instrument" 
 would properly be included bonds, conveyances, wills and 
 other formal or solemn instruments; while on the other hand, 
 letters, accounts, memoranda and the like, the creation of 
 which was not primarily intended to create a binding obliga- 
 tion or title, could not in strictness of language be called 
 instruments. 3 
 
 §126. Production of writings — Proof of contents by 
 secondary evidence. — In the absence of statute the produc- 
 tion of private writings may be secured either by a bill of 
 discovery in chancery or by a subpoena duces tecum} By fed- 
 eral statutes and by statutes regulating practice in the states 
 which have adopted the reformed procedure it is now per- 
 mitted for the court, after notice to the other party and upon 
 motion, to grant an order for the discovery and production 
 of books and papers in his hands or to compel him to grant 
 an inspection of them and permission to take copies thereof. 
 
 The party compelled to produce papers is allowed a reason- 
 able time to do so, but if he fails to comply with the order, the 
 court may in its discretion order that the action to which the 
 document is relevant be dismissed or his pleading be stricken 
 out and judgment be rendered accordingly. The court may 
 also direct that the writing shall not be admitted in evidence 
 in favor of the party refusing to produce and may punish him 
 
 1 Abbott's Dig., vol. 3, title " Evi- 3 Abbott's Law Diet ; Hankinson 
 
 dence." See, also, McCall v. United v. Page, 3 Fed. Rep. 186 ; State v. Kel- 
 
 States, 1 Dak. 321-328. sey, 44 N. J. Law, 34 
 
 * Anderson's Law Diet, " Doeu- < See post, § 279. 
 nients."
 
 176 
 
 PRIVATE WHITINGS. 
 
 [§ 126. 
 
 for contempt, or both. 1 These statutes 2 have superseded the 
 necessity of a notice to produce; but where they do not ob- 
 tain, the common-law notice to produce is still employed, irre- 
 spective of the fact that in consequence of the statutory 
 competency of the party as a witness the production of the 
 papers may be secured by a subpoena duces tecum? 
 
 At common law, in order to lay a foundation for the introduc- 
 tion of secondary evidence of a writing where the adverse party 
 has refused to produce it, it is necessary to prove the exist- 
 ence of the writing to the satisfaction of the court, 4 and that 
 it is in the possession or control of the adverse part} 7 , 5 though 
 if the writing is in the possession of another in privity with 
 him, notice to the latter is sufficient. 6 The notice to produce 
 may be verbal, 7 but must describe the writing required with 
 reasonable precision. 8 A notice to produce a letter will re- 
 quire the production of its envelope, 9 and should be season- 
 ably served on the part}' or his attorney 10 before the com- 
 mencement of the trial. 11 Where the writing is collateral to 
 the issue, 12 or if an adverse party has b} T force or fraud ob- 
 tained possession of the papers, 13 or attempts to give second- 
 ary evidence of their contents, 14 or offers to produce them, 15 
 
 1 N. Y. Code Civ. P., 803-809. See, 
 also, Traverse v. Satterlee, 67 Hun, 
 652; 22 N. Y. S. 118; Schwartz v, 
 Atkin, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 373; Simon 
 v. Ash, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 202; 20 S. W. 
 Rep. 719 ; Gould v. McCarty, 1 Ker- 
 nan, 575; Sanchez v. Dickinson, 19 
 N. Y. S. 733. 
 
 2 See Marrone v. N. Y. Jockey 
 Club, 14 N. Y S. 199; Bridgman v. 
 Scott, 13 id. 338; 59 Hun, 624; Fro- 
 wein v. Lindheim, 11 N. Y. S. 495; 
 Wahed El Tazi v. Stein, 59 Hun, 
 622; Rigdon v. Conley, 31 111. App. 
 630. 
 
 3 Rigdon v. Conley, supra; Roberts 
 v. Dixon, 50 Kan. 436 ; Spiers v. Wil- 
 son, 4 Cranch, 398 ; Homeyer v. N. 
 J. S. & W. Co., 66 Hun. 626 ; Doon 
 v. Donaher, 113 Mass. 151; Vinal v. 
 Burrill, 16 Pick. 401,407; Northrup 
 v.Jackson, 13 Wend. 86; Pangburn 
 v. Insurance Co., 62 Mich. 638. 
 
 * Sharpe v. Lamb, 3 P. & D. 454. 
 
 5 Dix v. Atkins, 128 Mass. 43; Rob- 
 erts v. Spencer, 123 id. 397 ; Henry v. 
 Leigh, 3 Camp. 499, 502. 
 
 6 Sinclair v. Stevenson, 1 C. & P. 
 582. 
 
 "Brokman v. Myers, 59 Hun, 623. 
 
 8 Austine v. Treat (Mich., 1888), 39 
 N. W. Rep. 749. 
 
 9 United States v. Duff, 19 Blatchf. 
 10. 
 
 10 Pitts v. Emmons, 92 Mich. 542; 
 Glenn v. Rogers, 3 Md. 312; Holt v. 
 Miers, 9 C. & P. 191 ; Reg. v. Kitson, 
 20 Eng. L & Eq. 509. 
 
 "Chattues v. Raitt, 20 Ohio, 132; 
 Sturm v. Jeffers. 2 C. & K. 442 ; Em- 
 erson v. Fisk, 6 Greenl. 200 ; Hughes 
 v. Budd, 8 Dowl. 315. 
 
 "Coonrod v. Madden, 126 Ind. 197. 
 
 13 Doe v. Ries, 7 Bing. 724 ; Neally 
 v. Greenough, 5 Foster (N. H), 325. 
 
 14 Bartholomew v. Stephens, 8 C. 
 & P. 728. 
 
 15 Dwinell v. Larrabee, 38 Me. 464
 
 § 127.] PRIVATE "WRITINGS. 177 
 
 notice to produce is not necessary in order to Lay a founda- 
 tion for secondary evidence. 1 But writings which have been 
 produced upon notice are not thereby made evidence unless 
 the party demanding- their production so inspects them as to 
 become acquainted with their contents. If he does examine 
 them, to that extent they are, according to some of the de- 
 cisions, evidence for both parties to the cause. 2 
 
 If the fact of a demand and refusal to produce be left in 
 doubt, or if the existence of and the search for the writing are 
 not shown, secondary evidence of the contents of the instru- 
 ment will not be received. 3 The sufficiency of the proof that 
 the instrument cannot be produced by the party desirous of 
 proving its contents by secondary evidence is for the judge, 4 
 and his decision will not be reviewed unless it is based upon 
 an error of law. 5 
 
 § 127. Writings obtained by fraud or deceit — Decoy let- 
 ters. — The fact that documentary evidence has been obtained 
 illegitimately or irregularly, or secured by the practice of 
 deceit upon a person against whom they are introduced, will 
 not, if it is in other respects admissible, cause its rejection." 
 So documentary evidence obtained by the use of cTecoy letters 
 is admissible very often from the necessity of the case in the 
 prosecution of a person indicted for mailing obscene articles, 
 
 1 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 561. Cf. berg, 27 Mo. App. 285 ; Stratton v. 
 
 Bourne v. Boston, 2 Gray, 494 ; Hawks, 43 Kan. 541 ; Carr v. Miller, 
 
 Blanchard v. Young, 11 Cush. 341, 42 111. 179; Walker v. Schoul Dist., 
 
 345. 22 Conn. 326. 
 
 2 Calvert v. Flower, 7 C. & P. 386; » Smith v. Brown (Mass., 1890), 24 
 Long v. Drew, 114 Mass. 77; Clark N. E. Rep. 31: Bonds v. Smith, 106 
 v. Fletcher, 1 Allen, 53. Contra, N. C. 553 ; Gorgas v. Hertz, 150 Pa. 
 Blake v. Russ, 33 Me. 360 ; Austin v. St. 538 ; Bain v. Welsh, 85 Me. 108. 
 Thompson, 45 N. H. 113. Marking *l Greenl. on Evid., § 254a, citing 
 paper as an exhibit does not neces- Com. v. Dana, 2 Met. 327, 329 ; Legatt 
 sarily make a writing evidence. Cas- v. Tollervey, 14 East, 202. " Where 
 tell v. Millison, 41 Bl. App. 61. See the guilty intent to commit crime has 
 post, § 142. been formed, any one may furnish 
 
 3 Nolan v. Pelhara, 77 Ga. 262 ; opportunities or even lend assistance 
 Hanover F. I. Co. v. Lewis, 23 Fla. to the criminal to expose him. But 
 193; 1 S. Rep. 863. no court will countenance a violation 
 
 4 Milford v. Veazie (Me., 1888), 14 of positive law or contrivances for 
 
 Atl. Rep. 730; Smith v. Brown, 151 inducing a person to commit a 
 
 Mass. 339; United States v. Sutton, crime." Uuited States v. Whittier, 
 
 21 How. 170, 175 ; Lindauer v. Mey- 5 Dill. 39, 45, by Treat, J. 
 12
 
 178 PRIVATE WRITINGS. [§ 12S. 
 
 for robbing the mails, or for a violation of the postal or 
 revenue laws. The manner in which the evidence has been 
 procured will not be inquired into by the court, nor should it 
 be permitted to discredit its force in the mind of the jury. 1 
 In the case of an indictment for sending obscene literature 
 through the mails, it is immaterial that the evidence against 
 the accused consisted of certain writings sent to a detective 
 under an assumed name. 2 But it is always necessary in prose- 
 cuting for a theft of mail matter that the decoy letter should 
 have become a part thereof by deposit in the mail in some of 
 the ways provided by the postoffice department. 3 
 
 § 128. Spoliation and alteration distinguished — Effect 
 of material alterations. — The act of a stranger to the writ- 
 ing resulting in its alteration or mutilation does not change 
 its legal effect if the writing remains legible and a trace of the 
 seal can be seen where a seal is required. 4 Accordingly the 
 alteration or total destruction of a deed or other writing by a 
 stranger has no other effect upon the rights of the party claim- 
 ing under it than to compel the proof of its loss to allow the 
 introduction of secondary evidence of its contents. 5 But a 
 distinction is made between a spoliation by a stranger, fre- 
 quently done accidentally, and for which the innocent party 
 cannot justly be called upon to suffer a loss, and the deliberate 
 alteration of the writing. The word " alteration " as thus 
 used does not refer to every cancellation, interlineation or 
 
 i United States v. Slenker. 32 Fed. * 1 Greenl. Evid., § 566. 
 
 Rep. 694; Speiden v. State, 3 Tex. SQonsaul v. Sheldon, 35 Neb. 247 
 
 A pp. 156 ; Wright v. State, 7 id. 574 ; In re Leigh (1892), Prob. 82 ; Cutts v, 
 
 United States v. Rapp, 30 Fed. Rep. United States, 1 Gall. 69 ; Boyd v 
 
 818; Saunders v. People, 38 Mich. McConnell, 10 Humph. (Tenn.) 68 
 
 222 ; United States v. Cuttinghara, 2 United States v. Spalding, 2 Mason 
 
 Blatchf. 470 ; People v. Collins, 53 478 ; Boteler v. Dexter, 20 D. C. 26 
 
 Cal. 185; State v. Jansen, 22 Kan. Anthony v. Beal, 111 Mo. 637 
 
 498; People v. Noelke, 94 N. Y. 137; Marshal v. Yougler, 10 S. & R. 164 
 
 Commonwealth v. Cohen, 127 Mass. Raper v. Birkbeck, 15 East, 17 
 
 282. Nichols v. Johnson, 10 Conn. 192 
 
 2 United States v. Bott, 11 Blatchf. White Sew. M. Co. v. Dakin, 86 Mich 
 346 ; Bates v. United States, 10 Fed. 581 ; Davis v. Shafer, 50 Fed. Rep. 74 
 Rep. 92, 97-100. Contra, United Wylie v. Miss. Pac. R. Co., 41 Fed 
 States v. Whittier, 5 Dill. 39-41. Rep. 623. 
 
 3 United States v. Rapp, 30 Fed. 
 Rep. 822.
 
 § 128.] PRIVATE WRITINGS. 179 
 
 erasure made in the instrument, but is confined to those by 
 which the original legal significance of its language is changed ; 
 and usually to those changes only in which a fraudulent intent 
 exists or may be implied from all the circumstances. 1 Where 
 such an alteration is shown to have been made by a party, the 
 decisions are unanimous in supporting the rule that the writ- 
 ing, whether under seal or not, is thereby made void, upon the 
 manifestly just principle that no man shall be allowed to act 
 fraudulently without assuming the risk of losing if his fraud 
 is detected. 2 But mere memoranda made on a writing, 3 or 
 immaterial alterations by which the writing is not made to 
 convey a different meaning in any essential respect, will not 
 avoid it, provided they are innocently made. So where terms 
 are inserted by a party which the law would supply, or which 
 have no meaning, his act will not be a material alteration or 
 vitiate the whole instrument. 4 Where an alteration is fraudu- 
 lently made it has been considered to be of no importance 
 whether it is material, the presence of a fraudulent intent 
 being deemed sufficient to avoid the writing. 5 
 
 In the discussion of the alteration of writings the distinc- 
 tion between covenants and contracts which are executed and 
 
 i Express Co. v. Aldine Press, 126 7 N. Y. S. 98 ; Bank v. Wolff, 79 Cal. 
 
 Pa. St. 347 ; King v. Rea, 21 Pac. Rep. 69 ; Burrows v. Klunk, 70 Md. 451. 
 
 1084 ; Croswell v. Labree, 81 Me. 44 ; The materiality of the alteration is a 
 
 First Nat. Bank v. Carson, 60 Mich, question for the court. Pritchard v. 
 
 432. Smith, 77 Ga. 463 ; Mclntyre v. Velte, 
 
 2 Wegner v. State, 28 Tex. App. 419 ; 153 Pa, St. 350. 
 
 Hollingsworth v. Holbrook (Iowa, 3 Maness v. Henry (Ala., 1893), 11 
 
 1890), 45 N. W. Rep. 561 ; Palmer v. S. Rep. 470. 
 
 Poore, 121 Ind. 135; Flanigan v. 4 Swigart v. Weare, 37 111. App. 
 
 Phelps, 42 Minn. 186; Sanders v. Bag- 258; Reed v. Kemp, 16 111. 445; 
 
 well (S. C, 1893), 16 S. E. Rep. 770; Mach. Co. v. Barry, 2 Misc. Rep. 264 ; 
 
 Bank v. Nickell, 34 Mo. App. 295 ; Hunt v. Adams, 6 Mass. 519 ; Smith 
 
 Wiseman v. Fleischer, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. v. Crooker, 5 Mass. 538 ; Fischer v. 
 
 R. 300 ; Magers v. Dunlap, 39 111. App. King, 53 Pa, St. 3 ; Knapp v. Maltby, 
 
 618 ; Walton v. Campbell (Neb., 1892), 13 Wend. 5S7 : Green v. Beckney, 3 
 
 52 N. W. Rep. 883 ; Gordon v. Bank, Ind. App. 39 ; Bank v. Good, 44 Mo. 
 
 144 U. S. 97 ; Sherwood v. Merritt, 83 App. 129 ; Brown v. Purkham, 18 
 
 Wis. 233 ; Burnham v. Gosnell, 47 Pick. 172 ; Magers v. Dunlap, 39 111. 
 
 Mo. App. 637 ; Little Rock Trust Co. App. 618. 
 
 v. Martin, 21 S. Rep. 468 ; Croswell v. 5 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 568. See cases 
 
 Labree, 81 Me. 44 ; Clapp v. Collins, supra; Smith v. Dunbar, 8 Pick, 246.
 
 180 
 
 PKIVATE WKITINGS. 
 
 [§ 123. 
 
 those which are executory merely should not be lost sight of. 1 
 Thus in the case of a deed the grantee does not hold his title 
 by virtue of the existence of the deed, which is now only the 
 written evidence of a past transaction, and after his estate is 
 once vested he may alter or destroy the deed without destroy- 
 ing his title to the estate. 2 But the deed, where it has been 
 materially altered by him with a fraudulent intent, is no 
 longer evidence in his hands in any proceedings founded upon 
 its covenants or agreements. 3 Where the alteration is made 
 before delivery, 4 or after delivery with the consent of both 
 parties, 5 the validity of the instrument will not be affected. 
 Where a power of attorney, 6 deed 7 or custo,...s bond 8 or an 
 undertaking on appeal 9 or similar instrument is intentionally 
 executed in blank as to subject-matter, or amount or name of 
 the party, and is subsequently filled in by one of the parties, 
 the writing will be valid and will be admissible in evidence. 10 
 
 i Gleason v. Hamiltou, 138 N. Y. « Stewart v. Preston, 1 Fla. 10 ; Bos- 
 
 353. ton v. Benson, 12 Cush. (Mass.) Gl ; 
 
 - If the alteration was made before Wright v. Wright, 7 N. J. L. 175; 
 
 record, where record is necessary to Campbell v. McArthur, 2 Hawks 
 
 vest title in the grantee, the altered (N. C), 33 ; Britton v. Stanley, 4 
 
 deed, when registered, will be in- 
 operative and title will remain in the 
 grantor. Respess v. Jones, 102 N. C. 5. 
 3 Woods v. Hilderbrand, 46 Mo. 
 284 ; Wallace v. Harmstead, 44 Pa. 
 St. 492; Dana v. Newhall, 13 Mass. 
 498 ; Fletcher v. Memsur, 5 Ind. 267 ; 
 Rifener v. Bowman, 53 Pa. St 318 ; 
 Bliss v. Mclntire, 18 Vt. 466; Coit v. 
 Starkweather, 8 Conn. 289 ; Com. v. 
 Hanson, 1 Nott & McC. (S. C.) 554 ; 1 
 Greenl. on Evid., § 568; Holiis v. 
 Harris (Ala., 1893), 10 S. Rep. 377; 
 Jackson v. Gould, 7 Wend. 364 ; Rus- 
 sell v. Longmore, 29 Neb. 286 ; Arri- 
 son v. Harmstead, 2 Ban - , 191 ; 
 Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Mass. 307 ; Mcln- 
 tyre v. Velte, 153 Pa. St. 350 ; Whit- 
 mer v. Fry, 10 Mo. 348; Alkire v. 
 
 Whart. (Pa.) 114; Ravisies v. Alston, 
 5 Ala. 297. 
 
 5 Wooley v. Constant, 4 Johns. 54 ; 
 Speake v. United States, 9 Cranch, 
 28; Smith v. Weed, 20 Wend. 184; 
 Berry v. Haines, 4 Wheat. 17 ; Stiles 
 v. Probst, 69 111. 382 ; Tompkins v. 
 Corinth, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 255 ; Jack- 
 son v. Johnson, 67 Ga. 187 ; Collins 
 v. Collins, 51 Miss. 511; Bassett v. 
 Bassett, 55 Me. 125. 
 
 e Egleton v. Gutteridge, 11 M. & W. 
 468. 
 
 •Cribben v. Deal, 21 Oreg. 211. 
 
 8 Bank v. Kortright, 22 Wend. 
 348. 
 
 9 Ex parte Decker, 6 Cowen, 59. 
 
 10 Christian Co. Bank v. Good, 44 
 Mo. App. 129 ; Gordon v. Jeffery, 2 
 
 Kahla, 123 111. 496. So it has been Leigh (Va.), 410 ; Gilbert v. Anthony, 
 
 held that the grantee will not be per- 1 Yerg. 69 ; Knapp v. Maltby, 13 
 
 mitted to prove the covenant by Wend. 587 ; Plank-road Co. v. Wetsel, 
 
 parol. Martindale v. Follet, 1 N. H. 21 Barb. 56 ; Shelton v. Dealing, 10 B. 
 
 9 j, and cases supra. Mon. 405. See remarks of Mr. Jus-
 
 § 129.] PRIVATE WRITINGS. 181 
 
 Tf a person through inadvertence and negligently issues a 
 negotiable instrument in which spaces or blanks are left, af- 
 fording an opportunity for the insertion of words without 
 exciting suspicion, and the note is altered, the writing will be 
 evidence against the maker in the hands of a dona fide holder 
 for value. 1 
 
 § 129. Alterations — Presumptions and burden cf proof 
 to explain. — When an instrument offered shows alterations or 
 interlineations on its face, it may justly be regarded with 
 some suspicion and the party claiming under it should be com- 
 pelled to account for its altered condition. 2 This he may do 
 by slight evidence if upon examination the alteration is noted 
 in the attestation clause as having been made prior to or con- 
 temporaneously with its execution, or if the alteration is> 
 against his interest. 3 Whether any presumption exists as to 
 the date of an unexplained alteration in a deed or similar 
 writing the courts are divided. It has been held that, as fraud 
 will not be presumed, an alteration in an instrument inter 
 vivos will, in the absence of suspicious circumstances, be pre- 
 sumed to have been made before delivery. 4 On the other 
 hand, other decisions deny the existence of any presumption, 5 
 
 tice Johnson in Duncan v. Hughes, Bailey v. Taylor, 11 Conn. 531 ; Coul- 
 
 I McCord, 239, 240. son v. Walton, 9 Pet. 62; Russell v. 
 
 1 Brown v. Phelan, 2 Swan (Tenn.), Longmore, 29 Neb. 209 ; Zitnmer- 
 629 ; Meikel v. Savings Institution, man v. Camp, 155 Pa. St. 352. 
 
 36 Ind. 355; Bechtel's Appeal (Pa., •*Stillwell v. Patton, 18 S. W. Rep. 
 1890), 19 Atl. Rep. 412 ; Beaman v. 1075 ; 108 Mo. 353 ; Boothby v. Stan- 
 Russell, 20 Vt. 205 : Bailey v. Taylor, ley, 34 Me. 515 ; No. Riv. Meadow 
 
 II Conn. 531; McCormick v. Fitz- Co. v. Shrewsbury Church, 2 N. J. Eq. 
 morris, 39 Mo. 34; Muckleroy v. 424; Houston v. Jordan, 82 "Tex. 352; 
 Bethany, 27 Tex. 551. Dow v. Jeurl, 18 N. H. 356; Gallaud 
 
 2 Elgin v. Hall, 82 Va. 680; Hess' v. Jackman, 26 Cal. 85 ; United States 
 Appeal, 26 W. N. C. 121 ; Capehart v. Linn, 1 How. 104 ; Harding v. 
 v. Mills (Ala., 1893); Johnson v. Bank, 81 Iowa, 499 ; Bedgood v. Mc- 
 First Mar. B. R. 28 Neb. 492 ; Tillon Lain, 89 Ga. 793 ; Jackson v. Osborn, 
 v. Insurance Co., 7 Barb. 564 ; Stay- 2 Wend. 555. 
 
 ner v. Joyce, 120 Ind. 99 ; Hartley v. 5 Tiedeman on R. P., § 790 ; Wilde v. 
 
 Carboy, 150 Pa. St. 23; Newcome v. Armsby, 6 Cush. 314; Comstock v. 
 
 Presbury, 8 Met. 406; Nesbitt v. Smith, 26 Mich. 306; Knight v. 
 
 Turner, 155 Pa. St. 429. As to ex- Clement, 8 A. & E. 215 ; Herrick 
 
 pert evidence to explain alterations, v. Maliu, 22 Wend. 388 ; Beaman v. 
 
 see § 141. Russell, 20 Vt. 205 ; Bailey v. Taylor, 
 
 3 In re Carver, 23 N. Y. S. 753; 11 Conn. 531; Hunting v. Finch, 3
 
 182 
 
 PRIVATE WRITINGS. 
 
 [§ 129. 
 
 and leave it for the jury to decide where and when the altera- 
 tion occurred. 1 
 
 A will, unlike a deed, is subject to change until the death 
 of the testator. It is also customary for persons to alter their 
 wills after execution ; and for this reason, unattested altera- 
 tions are, in the absence of evidence showing when they were 
 made, presumed to have been made subsequent to execution 
 of the will 2 or codicil, if the latter does not expressly refer to 
 them. 3 >* r * 1 '*" -( 
 
 In regard to alterations in other instruments, no presump- 
 tions as to their date are generally recognized. But where it 
 is shown that a note has been altered after execution, it will 
 be presumed to have been done fraudulently 4 and without 
 the knowledge or consent of the maker ; 5 and a party pro- 
 ducing and claiming under such an instrument will have the 
 burden of proof cast upon him to explain every material al- 
 teration that would be in his favor. 6 
 
 Ohio, 445 ; Jordan v. Stewart, 23 Pa. 
 St 244. 
 
 iMcCormick v. Fitzmorris, 39 Mo. 
 34 " In the absence of proof the pre- 
 sumption is that a correction by 
 erasure in a deed was made before 
 execution. This doctrine rests upon 
 principle ; and a deed cannot be 
 altered after it is executed without 
 fraud or wrong. The cases are not 
 uniform, but the most stringent ones 
 leave the question to the jury." Lit- 
 tle v. Herndon, 10 Wall. 31. 
 
 2 Wetrhore' v. Curry, 5 Redf. 544; 
 Wright v. Wright, 5 Ind. 389 ; Dyer 
 v. Irving, 2 Dem. 160; Wheeler v. 
 Bent. 7 Pick. 61. 
 
 » Rowley v. Merlin, 6 Jur. (N. S.) 
 1165. A will found mutilated is pre- 
 sumed to have been torn after its 
 execution. Christmas v. Whingates, 
 32 L. J. Prob. 73. " To draw cross- 
 lines over the face of an instrument 
 is a common mode of showing an 
 intention thereby to make an end of 
 it. In earlier times, when few per- 
 sons could write, the mass of men 
 
 could manifest their intention with 
 pen and ink only by unlettered marks. 
 When the instrument is so marked 
 by the maker as to show clearly that 
 the act was designed to be a can- 
 celing, that act becomes effectual as 
 a revocation." Warner v. Warner's 
 Estate, 37 Vt. 362-63. 
 
 4 Robinson v. Reed, 46 Iowa, 220; 
 Shroeder v. Webster (Iowa, 1893), 55 
 N. W. Rep. 569. 
 
 5 See cases in last note; Soaks v. 
 Eichberg, 42 111. App. 375 ; Croswell 
 v. Labree, 81 Me. 44. 
 
 6 Hill v. Nelmes, 86 Ala. 442 ; Wilde 
 v. Armsby, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 314; 
 Knight v. Clements, 8 A. & El. 215; 
 Hartley v. Carboy, 150 Pa. St. 23; 
 Hills v. Barnes, 11 N. H. 395 ; Nesbitt 
 v. Turner, 155 Pa. St. 429; Hum- 
 phreys v. Guillow, 13 N. H. 385; 
 Clark v. Eckstein, 22 Pa. St. 507; 
 Printup v. Mitchell, 17 Ga. 558; 
 Mathews v. Coalter, 9 Mo. 705 ; Bar- 
 ringer v. Bank, 14 S. & R. 405; 
 Beaman v. Russell, 20 Vt. 205.
 
 § 130.] 
 
 PRIVATE WRITINGS. 
 
 183 
 
 Substantial identity of name as a rule creates a presumption 
 of identity of person, 1 which is rebuttable by slight circum- 
 stances, as by a difference of a single letter, 2 or where to sup- 
 port the presumption it is necessary to impeach the presump- 
 tive correctness of records of a court of law. 3 
 
 § 130. Private writings lost or destroyed. — Where a 
 party's right or title is founded upon a private writing, in- 
 cluding under that term deeds of release and conveyances, 
 bonds, promissory notes and other evidences of indebtedness, 
 he will be required to produce it in evidence or to account 
 satisfactorily for its absence. 4 In case it is alleged to be lost 
 or destroyed, the party will be required to show by clear 
 proof that the paper once existed, 5 and that a careful and 
 bona fide search has been made for it without success. The 
 circumstances of the search having been thus shown prima 
 facie, the oath of the party that the instrument is lost or 
 destroyed is admissible and must be introduced. 6 
 
 1 Stallings v. Whitaker, 55 Ark. 
 404; Tausig v. Glenn, 51 Fed. Rep. 
 409 ; Simonsen v. Dolan (Mo., 1893), 
 21 S. W. Rep. 510; Guestin v. Mom- 
 bleu (111., 1893), 33 N. E. Rep. 49; 
 Galv. etc. Co. v. Daniels, 1 Tex. Civ. 
 App. 695 ; State v. McGuire, 87 Mo. 
 642; People v. Rolfe, 61 Cal. 541; 
 Hatcher v. Rochelaw, 18 N. Y. 87 ; 
 Grindle v. Stone, 78 Me. 176 ; Bell v. 
 Brewster, 44 Ohio St. 690. Parties 
 named in deeds constituting a chain 
 of title are presumed to be the same 
 pei - sons who claim under it. Cross 
 v. Martin, 46 Vt. 14; Chamble v. 
 Martin, 27 Tex. 139. Of two persons 
 of the same name mentioned it is 
 presumed that the elder is meant. 
 Bennett v. Libhart, 27 Mich. 489; 
 Brown v. Metz, 33 111. 339 ; Getts v. 
 Watson, 18 Mo. 274 ; Cates v. Lof tus, 
 3 A. K Marsh. 202. 
 
 2Burford v. McCue, 53 Pa. St. 427 ; 
 Gonzalia v. Bartelman (111., 1893), 32 
 N. E. Rep. 532 ; Bennett v. Libhart, 
 27 Mich. 489 ; Howard v. Lock (Ky., 
 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 332. 
 
 3 Bryan v. Kales (Ariz., 1893), 31 
 Pac. Rep. 517. The middle name or 
 its initial is no part of a person's 
 name. Long v. Campbell, 37 W. Va. 
 665 ; Johnson v. Day, 2 N. D. 295. 
 
 * §§ 30-34. 
 
 5 Gorgas v. Hertz, 150 Pa. St. 538. 
 So it has been said that the lost in- 
 strument must be proved to have 
 been executed, though strict proof of 
 the act of execution would perhaps 
 be dispensed with if its existence as 
 a valid and binding obligation was 
 shown. Gillis v. Wilmington R. Co., 
 13 S. E. Rep. 11 ; Johnson v. Rail- 
 road Co., 90 Ala. 505 ; Kelsey v. 
 Hanmer, 18 Conn. 311 ; Porter v. 
 Ferguson, 4 Fla. 102; Wakefield v. 
 Day, 41 Minn. 344 ; Irving v. Camp- 
 bell, 56 N. Y. Super. Ct. 224. 
 
 6 Patterson v. Winn, 5 Pet. 240; 
 Bingham v. Hyland, 6 N. Y. S. 75 ; 
 Lynn v. Morse, 76 Iowa, 665; Du- 
 lany v. Walsh, 22 S. W. Rep. 131 ; 
 Riggs v. Tayloe, 9 Wheat. 486 ; Page 
 v. Page, 15 Pick. 368; Shirley v. 
 Dewey, 17 Ohio, 156 ; Chamberlain
 
 184 
 
 PRIVATE WRITINGS. 
 
 [§ 130. 
 
 "Whether the loss or destruction of the instrument is satis- 
 factorily shown is a preliminary question for the court. The 
 amount of diligence required depends largely, if not wholly, 
 upon the circumstances of each case as it arises, less diligence 
 being demanded where the document is old or where it was 
 presumed to be of little value. 1 As a rule it is necessary that 
 the loss or destruction of the instrument should be shown 
 before parol proof can be received of its contents. 2 
 
 This rule should be taken with some modification, as it is 
 usually necessary to state, though not precisely, some of the 
 contents of the instrument as descriptive of it. 3 Where the 
 lost instrument in the hands of a bona fide holder would be 
 valid against the maker though he had been compelled to pay 
 its amount, the proof of its loss or destruction must be of 
 sufficient cogency to convince the court and jury upon all the 
 circumstances that the maker will not be compelled to pay it 
 again. 4 But in modern practice the requirement that the 
 plaintiff shall give security to reimburse the defendant in case 
 
 v. Gorham, 20 Johns. 144; Bigelow 
 v. Summers, 28 Fla. 759. Of. Over- 
 and v. Menczer, 83 Tex. 122; An- 
 thony v. Beale, 111 Mo. 637. 
 
 1 Jameson v. Snyder (Wis., 1890), 
 48 N. W. Rep. 261 ; Glassell v. Mason, 
 32 Ala. 719 ; Page v. Page, 15 Pick. 
 368 ; Blalock v. Miland, 87 Ga. 573 ; 
 Bachelder v. Nutting, 16 N. H. 261 ; 
 Woodworth v. Barker, 1 Hill, 176; 
 Kelsey v. Hanmei', 18 Conn. 311 ; 
 Bruns v. Close, 9 Colo. 225 ; Bohart v. 
 Chamberlain, 99 Mo. 622. 
 
 ^McClure v. Campbell (Neb., 1888), 
 40 N. W. Rep. 595; Roehl v. Han- 
 messer, 114 Ind. 311 ; Georgia, etc. Co. 
 v. Strickland, 80 Ga. 776 ; 6 S. E. Rep. 
 27: Woods v. Burke, 67 Mich. 674; 
 35 N. W. Rep. 768 ; Columbus, etc. v. 
 Tillman, 79 Ga. 607 ; 5 S. E. Rep. 135 ; 
 Smith v. Lindsay, 89 Mo. 76 ; Cham- 
 berlain v. Boon, 74 Tex. 659 ; Nichols 
 v. Howe, 43 Minn. 181 ; Mugge v. 
 Adams, 76 Tex, 448 ; Brown v. Grif- 
 fith, 70 Cal. 14 ; Ross v. Goodwin, 88 
 Ala. 390 ; Chicago, etc. Co. v. Brown, 
 
 44 Kan. 384 ; Simpson v. Walby, 63 
 Mich. 439; Terpening v. Holton, 9 
 Colo. 306 ; Wolff v. Mathews, 39 Mo. 
 App. 376; Phillips v. Trow. Fur. Co.. 
 86 Ga. 699; Kilgore v. Stanley, 90 
 Ala. 523; Ebersole v. Rankin, 102 
 Mo. 488 ; Rush v. French, 1 Ariz. 99 ; 
 Ford v. Cunningham, 87 Cal. 209. A 
 careful search in the place where the 
 document was last seen, was usually 
 kept or is most likely to be found is 
 sufficient. Bruns v. Close, 9 Colo. 225 ; 
 Henry v. Diviney, 101 Mo. 378 ; Foot 
 v. Silliman, 77 Tex. 268. 
 
 3Flinn v. McGonigle, 9 W. & S. 
 (Pa.) 75 ; Bouldin v. Massie, 7 Wheat. 
 122, 154, 155 ; Tetes v. Volmer, 58 Hun, 
 1 ; Crain v. Huntington, 81 Tex. 614; 
 17 S. W. Rep. 243. 
 
 4 Anderson v. Roleson, 2 Bay, 495 ; 
 Rowley v. Ball, 3 Cowen, 303 ; Du- 
 laney v. Walsh, 22 S. W. Rep. 131 ; 
 Swift v. Stevens, 8 Conn. 431 ; Lan- 
 bach v. Mires, 141 Pa. St. 447 ; Boteler 
 v. Dexter, 20 D. C. 26 ; Hill v. Bub, 
 35 Neb. 524.
 
 131.] 
 
 PRIVATE WRITINGS. 
 
 1S5 
 
 an instrument lost before maturity shall be found would per- 
 haps dispense with this requirement. 1 
 §131. Handwriting defined — Signature by mark. — By 
 
 the term " handwriting" is meant not only handwriting com- 
 monly so called, but every mark made upon paper, parchment 
 or similar substance by which the mental state of the person 
 writing is revealed to others. 2 It is well settled that a mark 
 is equivalent to a signature for all purposes for which the latter 
 may be required, 3 even though the marksman is able to write.* 
 And generally, where a mark is affixed to a writing not re- 
 quiring attestation or subscription by witnesses, its execution 
 may be proved by the evidence of one who saw the party 
 write his mark or by the admission of the party himself. 5 
 
 Though a subscribing witness may prove his own signature 
 by mark, 6 ordinarily it is necessary that his signature should 
 be written by himself or some one for him ; for while the 
 handwriting of a subscribing witness may be proved in his 
 absence by ordinary methods, 7 his mark alone cannot be thus 
 
 i Means v. Kimball, 35 Neb. G93 ; 
 Bloomingtou v. Smith, 23 N. E. Rep. 
 972. 
 
 2 Lyon v. Lyman, 9 Conn. 55 ; Com. 
 v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 305 ; Rex 
 v. Cator, 4 Esp. 117. 
 
 STiedeman on R. P. 876; Wil- 
 loughby v. Moulton, 47 N. H. 205; 
 Worden v. Van Gieston, 6 Dem. (N. 
 Y. Sur.) 237 ; State v. Byrd, 93 N. C. 
 624 ; Paisley v. Snipes, 2 Brev. (S. C.) 
 200; Osborne v. Cook, 11 Cush. 532; 
 Lord v. Lord, 58 N. H. 7 ; Chappee v. 
 Baptist Miss. Con., 10 Paige, 85. The 
 seal of a corporation is at common 
 law its signature, and, in the absence 
 of statute, it is not necessary that its 
 deed should be signed with the cor- 
 porate name. Sealing and delivery 
 are the only indispensable require- 
 ments to the valid execution of a 
 conveyance by a corporation. Ang. 
 & Ames, Corp., § 225 ; City v. Shaw- 
 han, 9 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 556 ; 
 Flint v. Clinton, 12 N. H. 430 ; Gor- 
 don v. Preston, 1 Watts (Pa.), 385 ; 
 
 Osborne v. Tunis, 1 Dutch. (N. J.) 633 ; 
 Tenney v. East Warren, etc. Co., 43 
 N. H. 343; Frankfort v. Anderson, 
 3 A. K. Marsh. 932; Beckwith v. 
 Windsor Co., 14 Conn. 594. 
 
 * Baker v. Denning, 8 A. & E. 94; 
 Barnard v. Heydrick, 49 Barb. 68 ; 1 
 Whart. Evid., § 696. 
 
 5 State v. Byrd, 93 N. C. 624; 
 Thompson v. Davitt, 59 Ga. 472; 
 Jones v. Hough, 77 Ala. 437 ; Eichel- 
 berger v. Sifford, 27 Md. 320 ; Robin- 
 son v. Robinson, 20 S. C. 567 ; Fogg 
 v. Dennis, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 47; 
 Shank v. Butsch, 28 Ind. 19; Bal- 
 linger v. Davis, 29 Iowa, 512; San- 
 born v. Cole, 63 Vt. 590. 
 
 « Thompson v. Davitte, 59 Ga. 472. 
 
 7 McDermott v. McCormack, 4 
 Harr. (Del.) 543; Engles v. Bruing- 
 ton, 4 Yeates (Pa.). 345 ; Lyons v. 
 Holmes, 11 S. C. 429; Devereux v. 
 McMahan, 102 N. C. 284; Bussy v. 
 Whitaker, 2 Nott & McC. (S. C.) 374; 
 Maine v. Ryder, 84 Pa. St. 217.
 
 ISO PRIVATE WRITINGS. [§§ 132, 133. 
 
 proved, 1 and is only valid as a signature when, after having 
 made his mark, his name is affixed by some one in his presence 
 with his assent or by his request. 2 
 
 § 132. Production of writing, when necessary. — The 
 character of the evidence required in the proof of handwrit- 
 ing, the principles which govern its production and the com- 
 petency of the witnesses are essentially the same in criminal 
 and civil cases. 3 But this rule is to be considered in the light 
 of the doctrine that while a preponderance of evidence may 
 suffice in a civil cause in a prosecution for a crime, the pre- 
 sumption of innocence obtains and the prisoner must be given 
 the benefit of every reasonable doubt. 4 Under ordinary cir- 
 cumstances the document whose handwriting is in question 
 must be produced; but where its production is impossible for 
 any valid reason, it will be dispensed with, and if its existence 
 is satisfactorily proved and its absence is accounted for, the 
 handwriting may be proved by a witness who saw the party 
 write, or who being familiar with his writing has seen the lost 
 instrument. 5 
 
 § 133, Proof by admissions of party. — That mode of prov- 
 ing handwriting which is the most simple and convincing is 
 by the testimony of the writer himself upon the witness stand, 
 after he has inspected the writing. 6 If the execution of the 
 
 i Watts v. Kilburn, 7 Ga. 356 ; 60 Tex. 506. Where the original 
 
 Carrier v. Hampton, 11 Ired. L. (N. C.) writing is procurable it is error to 
 
 307 ; Gilliam v. Parkinson, 4 Rand, admit a photograph of it. Crane 
 
 (Va.) 325; Stevens v. Van Cleve, 4 v. Dexter, 5 Wash. St. 479. This 
 
 Wash. C. C. 262; Allen v. Mass, 27 rule was applied in the trial of an 
 
 Mo. 354. indictment for forgery where the 
 
 2 Jesse v. Parker, 6 Gratt. 57; Up- prosecution was unable to produce 
 church v. Upchurch, 16 B. Mon. 102 ; the writing alleged to have been 
 Lord v. Lord, 58 N. H. 7. forged. State v. Brackenridge, 67 
 
 3 De La Motte's Case, 21 How. St. Iowa, 204 ; State v. Shinbone, 46 
 Tr. 810 ; Hammond's Case, 2 Greenl. N. H. 497 ; Hahn v. State, 13 Tex. 
 33; 11 Am. Dec. 39. App. 383. 
 
 4 See §§ 5-7. 6 McCaskle v. Amarine, 12 Ala. 17 ; 
 s Abbot v. Coleman, 22 Kan. 250 ; Smith v. Prescott, 17 Me. 277 ; Mc- 
 
 Bigham v. Coleman, 71 Ga. 176 ; Cully v. Malcolm, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 
 
 Bradley's Adm'r v. Long, 2 Strobh. 187; Royce v. Gazan, 76 Ga. 79; Lef- 
 
 (S. C.) 100; Bruce v. Crews, 39 Ga. ferts v. State, 49 N. J. Law, 26. A 
 
 544; Porter v. Wilson et at, 13 Pa. witness will not be allowed to testify 
 
 St. 641 ; Nuckols' Adm'r v. Jones, 8 that the party admitted the genuine- 
 
 Gratt. (Va.) 267 ; Houston v. Blythe, ness of his signature to another writ-
 
 131.] 
 
 PRIVATE WRITINGS. 
 
 187 
 
 instrument is not denied, evidence of the genuineness of the 
 handwriting is not required, and an objection not taken at 
 the time is deemed waived and unavailable on appeal. 1 So in 
 some of the states the denial of the authenticity of the instru- 
 ment is required to be in writing 2 verified by affidavit of the 
 party. 3 If he denies that he wrote or executed the instru- 
 ment, its genuineness may be proved by the testimony of any 
 competent witness who was present and saw him write it, 4 or 
 by evidence of his extra-judicial admissions made verbally or 
 by conduct that he executed it, 5 whether made before or per- 
 haps after the action was begun." Such an admission is never 
 conclusive unless fraudulently made, or unless it was relied 
 and acted upon to the extent that it will constitute an estop- 
 pel in pais. 1 
 
 § 131. When proof of handwriting may be dispensed 
 with — Acknowledgments. — If, as is the case in many states, 
 deeds or other instruments are made by statute prima facie 
 evidence when duly acknowledged or recorded, proof of hand- 
 writing or execution by subscribing witnesses or others is 
 unnecessary. 8 
 
 iug aud that such signature is pre- 
 cisely similar to the one disputed. 
 Second Nat. Bank v. Wentzel, 151 
 Pa. St. 142. 
 
 1 Clark's Ex'rs v. Cochran, 3 Mart. 
 (La.) 353, 360 ; National Union Bank 
 of Swanton v. Marsh, 46 Vt. 443. 
 This is the statute law in many states. 
 Coler v. County (N. M., 1892), 27 Pac. 
 Rep. 619. 
 
 2 Smith v. King (Iowa, 1893), 55 N. 
 W. Rep. 88 ; Clark's Ex'rs v. Coch- 
 ran, 3 Mart. (La.) 353, 360 ; National 
 Union Bank of Swanton v. Marsh, 46 
 Vt. 443. 
 
 3 Bestor v. Roberts, 58 Ala. 331; 
 Duncan v. Brown, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 
 186 ; Smith v. Elmert, 47 Wis. 479. 
 
 4 Bayly v. Fourchy, 32 La. Ann. 
 136 ; Robinson v. Arnet, 15 La. 262 ; 
 Com. v. Nefus, 135 Mass. 533; Bank 
 v. Marsh, 46 Vt. 443; Bowman v. 
 Sanborn, 25 N. H. 87. 
 
 5 Shaver v. Ehle, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 
 201; State v. Byrd, 93 N. C. 624; 
 Glazier v. Streamer, 57 111. 91. 
 
 6 Philadelphia, etc. Co. v. Hickman, 
 28 Pa. St. 318. • 
 
 i See ante, §§ 82-84; Salem Bank 
 v. Gloucester Bank, 17 Mass. 1, 27 ; 
 Helmsley v. Loader, 2 Campb. 450; 
 Bell v. Shields, 4 Hair. (19 N. J.) 93 ; 
 Cohen v. Teller, 93 Pa. St. 123 ; Dow's 
 Ex'rs v. Spinney's Ex'rs, 29 Mo. 386 ; 
 Weed et al. v. Carpenter, 4 Wend. 
 (N. Y.) 219; Hammond v. Varian, 54 
 N. Y. 398. 
 
 8 "An acknowledgment regular on 
 its face makes the instrument evi- 
 dence without further proof. The 
 exact words of the statute need not 
 be followed; it is sufficient if the 
 meaning be clearly and fully ex- 
 pressed." Wickersham v. Reeves, 1 
 Iowa, 417; Fenton v. Miller, 94 Mich. 
 204; Parroski v. Goldberg, 80 Wis.
 
 188 
 
 PRIVATE WRITINGS. 
 
 [§ 135. 
 
 If, as is the case in this country, a deed must be properly 
 acknowledged to obtain record, one which is not so acknowl- 
 edged will not be valid as against bona fide purchasers for 
 value and without notice. But an unrecorded deed, or one 
 improperly acknowledged, is always valid, as between the 
 parties and all others having actual or constructive notice 
 thereof, 1 and may be read in evidence in any action between 
 the parties or their privies on proof by witnesses. 2 
 
 § 135. Who may take acknowledgments. — Acknowledg- 
 ments are generally taken by notaries public, commissioners 
 or other officials designated by statute. A de facto official, 3 
 or a deputy acting for and signing in the name of his princi- 
 pal, 4 and sometimes where he signs in his own name, 5 may 
 take an acknowledgment. So it has been held the fact that 
 an official who possesses statutory authority to take acknowl- 
 edgments is also an attesting witness, 6 a relative of 7 or attor- 
 ney for the grantor, 8 or is himself the grantee, 9 does not 
 
 399; Holbrook v. New Jersey Zinc 2 Shaffer v. Halm, 111 N. C. l- t 
 Co., 57 N. Y. 624; N. Y. Phar. Ass'n Trenwith v. Smallwood, 111 N. C. 
 v. Tilden, 14 Fed. Rep. 740 ; Hough- 132 ; Beaman v. Whitney, 20 Me. 413. 
 ton v. Jones, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 702. Of. 3 Woodruff v. McHarry, 56 111. 218; 
 Blackman v. Riley, 63 Hun, 521 ; 28 Hamilton v. Pitcher, 53 Mo. 354. 
 Abb. N. C. 126. A state grant under 4 Cook v. Knott, 28 Tex. 85 ; Gib- 
 seal is admissible as evidence with- 
 out acknowledgment where no stat- 
 ute requires it. Chicago, etc. Co. v. 
 Keegan, 31 N. E. Rep. 550. In the ab- 
 sence of statute an acknowledgment 
 does not dispense with proof of exe- 
 cution (Mullis v. Cairns, 5 Blackf. 
 (Ind.) 77), which may be shown by 
 the testimony of the party before 
 whom the acknowledgment was 
 made. Kidd's Adm'r v. Alexander, 
 1 Rand. (Va.) 456; Eichelberger v. 
 Sifford, 27 Md. 320. 
 
 i Bacon v. Railroad Co., 131 U. S. 
 258 ; Shotwell v. Harrison, 22 Mich. 
 410 ; Banbury v. Sheerin (S. D., 1893), 
 55 N. W. Rep. 723; Mankin v. Era- 
 mons, 47 Mo. 306 ; Ellison v. Wilson, 
 36 Vt. 67; Cable v. Cable, 146 Pa. 
 St. 451 ; Sicard v. Peters, 6 Pet. 136; 
 Forrester v. Parker, 14 Daly, 208; 
 Maun v, State, 46 Ind. 383, 
 
 bons v. Gentry, 20 Mo. 468 ; Hope v. 
 Sawyer, 14 111. 254 ; Gordon v. Leech, 
 81 Ky. 229; Emmal v. Webb, 36 Cal. 
 203; Lynch v. Livingston, 8 Barb. 
 (N. Y.) 463. 
 
 s Talbot v. Houser, 12 Bush (Ky.), 
 408; Touchard v. Crow, 20 Cal. 150; 
 McCraven v. McGuire, 23 Miss. 100 ; 
 Herndon v. Reed, 82 Tex. 647; Sum- 
 mer v. Mitchell, 29 Fla. 179 ; Coltrane 
 v. Lamb, 109 N. C. 209. 
 
 e Baird v. Evans, 58 Ga. 350. 
 
 ■ Lynch v. Livingston, 6 N. Y. 433 ; 
 Remington Co. v. Dougherty, 81 id. 
 474. 
 
 s Romanes v. Frazier, 16 Grant 
 (U. C), 97. 
 
 9 Bennett v. Shipley, 82 Mo. 448. 
 Contra, Jones v. Porter, 59 Miss. 628 ; 
 Tavener v. Barrett, 21 W. Va. 658.
 
 § 136.] 
 
 PKIVATE WRITINGS. 
 
 189 
 
 Invalidate the acknowledgment. The majority of the cases 
 hold, however, that an acknowledgment taken by an official 
 who is personally interested is invalid. 1 An acknowledgment 
 received by a notary or other official act done out of his ter- 
 ritorial jurisdiction, 2 or after his term of office has expired/ 
 is invalid. 
 
 The venue should always appear in the bod} r of the certifi- 
 cate, 4 or in its caption or notarial seal, 5 though if it is not 
 stated the defect may be remedied by a reference to the in- 
 strument itself; 6 and where no place is given, if the certificate 
 is otherwise regular and the power of the notary to take 
 acknowledgments is not disputed, it may be presumed that 
 he acted within his jurisdiction. 7 
 
 § 136. The certificate. — This, in the absence of fraud, duress 
 or a failure to obey some express statutory requirement, is 
 usually conclusive as to all facts stated in it, 8 and fraud, if 
 alleged, must be clearly shown. 9 The body of the certificate, 10 
 
 i Bank v. Radtke (Iowa, 1393), 54 
 N. W. Rep. 435 ; Davis v. Beazley, 75 
 Va. 491 ; Green v. Abraham, 43 Ark. 
 420 ; Hogans v. Caruth, 18 Fla. 587 ; 
 Hammers v. Dole, 61 111. 307 ; Was- 
 son v. Connor, 54 Miss. 352 ; Brown 
 v. Moore, 38 Tex. 645 ; Dail v. Moore, 
 51 Mo. 589. The grantor cannot take 
 his own acknowledgment. Beaman 
 v. Whitney, 22 Me. 413; Davis v. 
 Beazley, supra; Freeman v. Person, 
 106 N. C. 251. 
 
 2 Thurman v. Cameron, 24 Wend. 
 (N. Y.) 91 ; Mut Ins. Co. v. Carey, 54 
 Hun, 493; Hedges v. Ward, 15 B. 
 Mon. (Ky.) 106 ; Jones v. Reardon, 3 
 Md. Ch. 57 ; Hughes v. Wilkinson, 37 
 Miss. 482 ; Harris v. Burton, 4 Harr. 
 (Del.) 66. 
 
 a Carlisle v. Carlisle, 78 Ala. 542; 
 Quimby v. Boyd, 8 Cal. 194; Gal- 
 braith v. Gallivan, 78 Mo. 452 ; Goody- 
 koontz v. Olsen, 54 Iowa, 174. 
 
 « Willard v. Cramer, 36 Iowa, 22 ; 
 Dunlap v. Dougherty, 20 111. 397. 
 
 5 Chiniquy v. Catholic Bishop, 41 
 111. 148; Adams v. Medsker, 25 W. 
 Va. 128; Sidwell v. Birney, 69 Mo. 
 144; Wright v. Wilson, 17 Mich. 192. 
 
 STrulick v. Peeples, 1 Ga. 3; 
 Brooks v. Chaplin, 3 Vt. 281 ; Fuhr- 
 man v. Loudon, 13 S. & R 386. 
 
 "Seejwst, §§ 231, 232; Morrison v. 
 White, 16 La. Ann. 100; Sidwell v. 
 Birney, 69 Mo. 144; Carpenter v. 
 Dexter, 8 Wall. (IT. S.) 513; Douglas 
 v. Carmean, 49 Kan. 674 ; Chamber- 
 lain v. Pybas, 81 Tex. 511. 
 
 8 Oppenheimer v. Wright, 106 Pa. 
 St. 569; Hill v. Bacon, 43 111. 477; 
 Smith v. McGuire, 67 Ala. 34 ; Allen 
 v. Lenoir, 53 Miss. 321 ; Cox v. Gill, 
 83 Ky. 669 ; Tooker v. Sloan, 30 N. J. 
 Eq. 94 ; Hitt v. Jenks, 123 U. S. 301 ; 
 Young v. Duval, 109 U. S. 573. Cf. 
 Jackson v. Cairns, 20 Johns. (X. Y.) 
 300; Davis v. Agnew, 67 Tex. 210; 
 Liiosley v. Brown, 13 Conn. 192 ; 
 Marsh v. Mitchell, 26 N. J. Eq. 497 ; 
 Russell v. Seminary, 75 111. 337 ; 
 Cover v. Manaway, 115 Pa. St. 345; 
 Greene v. Godfrey, 44 Me. 25. 
 
 9 Stevens v. Hampton, 46 Mo. 104 ; 
 Meyer v. Gassett, 38 Ark. 377, and 
 cases in last note. 
 
 ^ Trustees v. McKecbnie, 90 N. Y. 
 618; Brown v. Farrar, 3 Ohio, 140; 
 Wright v. Bundy, 11 Ind. 398; Evans
 
 190 
 
 TRIVATE WRITINGS. 
 
 [§ 136. 
 
 its official seal 1 or signature 2 must show the character of the 
 official certifying to the acknowledgment, and where this ap- 
 pears he will be presumed 'to have possessed adequate author- 
 ity and to have acted within his jurisdiction. But when his 
 official character does not appear it may be shown by extrinsic 
 evidence. 3 But generally if a form or mode of acknowledg- 
 ment is prescribed by statute, a substantial, if not a strict, 
 compliance will be required to be observed both by the notary 
 and by the party executing the conveyance, 4 though the omis- 
 sion of the date, 5 or of immaterial words, 6 the insertion of 
 those which are vague and equivocal, 7 redundant and super- 
 fluous 8 or ungrammatical 9 will not vitiate a certificate other- 
 
 v. Lee, 11 Nev. 194 ; Baze v. Arper, 
 6 Minn. 220 ; Carpenter v. Dexter, 8 
 "Wall. 513 ; Belo v. Mayer, 79 Mo. 67. 
 i Harding v. Curtis, 45 111. 252. 
 Where a statute prescribes the form 
 of the official seal it must be strictly 
 followed (Holbrook v. Nichol, 36 111. 
 161; Dail v. Moore, 51 Mo. 589; 
 Hewitt v. Morgan (Iowa, 1893), 55 
 N. W. Rep. 478 ; Fleming v. Richard- 
 son, 13 La. Ann. 414 ; Buel v. Irvin, 
 24 Mich. 145 ; Pitts v. Seavey (Iowa, 
 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. 480 ; Meskimen 
 v. Day, 35 Kan. 46), or the deed will 
 not be received in evidence. Where 
 
 4 McDaniel v. Needham, 61 Tex- 
 269 ; Knighton v. Smith, 1 Oreg. 276 ; 
 Buell v. Irwin, 24 Mich. 145 ; Jaco- 
 way v. Gault, 20 Ark. 190 ; Rogers v. 
 Adams, 66 Ala. 600 ; Dewey v. Cam- 
 pau, 4 Mich. 565; Wickersham v. 
 Reeves, 1 Iowa, 413; Trammel v. 
 Thurmond, 17 Ark. 203. 
 
 5 Huxley v. Harrold, 62 Mo. 616 
 Rackleff v. Norton, 19 Me. 274 
 Kelly v. Rosenstock, 45 Md. 389 
 Yorty v. Paine, 62 Wis. 154 ; Brooks 
 v. Chaplin, 3 Vt. 281. 
 
 e Todd v. Jones, 22 Iowa, 146 ; Hiles 
 v. La Flesh, 59 Wis. 465 ; Magness v. 
 
 no special form of sealing is required, Arnold, 31 Ark. 103 ; Wilcoxon v. 
 
 its omission or the use of a scroll or 
 other informal device is not mate- 
 rial. Limberger v. Tidwell, 104 N. C. 
 506; Harrison v. Simmons, 55 Ala. 
 510; Equitable M. Co. v. Kemp- 
 
 Osborn, 77 Mo. 621 ; Solyer v. Rom- 
 anet, 52 Tex. 562 ; Harrington v. Fish, 
 10 Mich. 415 ; Hartshorn v. Dawson, 
 79 111. 108; Gorman v. Stanton, 5 
 Mo. App. 585 ; Gordon v. Leech, 81 
 
 ner, 84 Tex. 102 ; Cole v. Wright, 70 Ky. 229 ; Donahue v. Mills, 41 Ark. 
 Ind. 179; Commissioners v. Glass, 17 421. 
 
 Ohio, 342; Summer v. Mitchell, 29 
 Fla. 179 ; Mitchmer v. Holmes (Mo., 
 1893), 20 N. W. Rep. 1070. 
 
 2 Summer v. Mitchell, 29 Fla. 179 ; 
 Cassell v. Cooke, 8 Serg. & R. 368 ; 
 Johnson v. Haines, 2 Ohio, 278 ; Car- 
 lisle v. Carlisle, 78 Ala. 542. 
 
 3 Shults v. Moore, 1 McLean (U. S.), 
 520 ; Bennet v. Paine, 7 Watts, 334 ; 
 Vanness v. Bank, 13 Pet. 21 ; Scott 
 v. Gallagher, 11 S. & R 347. See 
 post, % 220. 
 
 'Gray v. Kauffman, 82 Tex. 65 
 Hurt v. McCartney, 18 111. 129 ; Bel 
 cher v. Weaver, 46 Tex. 293. 
 
 s Tourville v. Pierson, 39 111. 446 
 Bradford v. Dawson, 2 Ala. 203 
 Thompson v. Johnson, 84 Tex. 548 
 Gray v. Kauffman, 82 id. 65 ; Nelson 
 v. Graff, 44 Mich. 433; Whitney v. 
 Arnold, 10 Cal. 531. 
 
 9 Frostburg, etc. v. Brace, 51 Md. 
 508.
 
 § 13C] PKIVATE WRITINGS. 191 
 
 wise complete and regular. 1 A notary public may amend his 
 incorrect certificate, and the amendment will operate as of 
 the date of the acknowledgment. 
 
 The taking of an acknowledgment is a ministerial act, and 
 in a proper case a mandamus will lie to compel any official 
 to correct his clerical mistakes, 2 though it seems that he will 
 not be allowed to do so after he is out of office. 3 If the offi- 
 cial is dead or cannot be found, or if his term Of office has ex- 
 pired, the aid of equity may be invoked to correct the mistake 
 by reforming the certificate of acknowledgment so that it will 
 conform to the facts in the case. 4 
 
 The omission of recitals of essential facts, such as the per- 
 sonal appearance of the grantor, or his name, or the personal 
 acquaintance of the notary with him, as tending to identify 
 him, or the fact that he acknowledges or executes the deed, 
 may invalidate the certificate as evidence of execution, for 
 these data cannot be supplied by parol evidence. 5 But an in- 
 valid certificate of acknowledgment does not necessarily de- 
 stroy the value of the writing as evidence, for the defective 
 acknowledgment will then be regarded as an attestation, and 
 the officer may prove the deed as a subscribing witness. 6 On 
 
 1 See, also, Chouteau v. Allen, 70 Ark. 865 ; Gilbraith v. Gallivan, 78 
 Mo. 290 ; Durst v. Daugherty, 81 Tex. Mo. 452 ; Johnson v. Taylor, 60 Tex. 
 650 ; Sharp v. Hamilton, 12 N. J. L. 360. Contra, Miller v. Powell, 53 Mo. 
 109 ; Smith v. Williams, 38 Miss. 48 ; 352 ; Hand v. Weidner, 151 Pa. St. 
 Dundas v. Hitchcock, 12 How. (U. S.) 362 ; Stodolka v. Novotus (111., 1893), 
 256 ; Coombes v. Thomas, 57 Tex. 33 N. E. Rep. 534. ~ 
 
 321; Ives v. Kimball, 1 Mich. 308. 5 Frost v. Cattle Co., 81 Tex. 505; 
 
 So the fact that the certificate prop- Ennor v. Thompson, 46 111. 215; Rol- 
 
 erly executed is on a separate piece lins v. Menager, 22 W. Va. 461 ; Will- 
 
 of paper and pasted to the convey- iams v. Baker, 71 Pa. St. 476 ; Leck- 
 
 ance is not material. Schrani v. man v. Harding, 65 III. 505; Ridgely 
 
 Gentry, 63 Tex. 283. v. Howard, 3 Har. & McH. (Md.) 
 
 2 Hutchinson v. Ains worth, 63 Cal. 321; Hayden v. Westcott, 11 Conn. 
 286; Fall v. Roper, 3 Head (Tenn.), 129: Newman v. Samuels, 17 Iowa, 
 285 ; Ralston v. Moore, 83 Ky. 571 ; 528 ; Jacoway v. Gault, 20 Ark. 190 ; 
 Skinner v. Fulton, 39 III. 484; Jordan. Gaines t. Catron, 1 Humph. (Tenn.) 
 v. Corey, 2 Ind. 385 ; Elliott v. Peir- 514 ; Fryer v. Rockefeller, 63 N. Y. 
 sol, 1 Pet 328 ; Miller v. Powell, 53 268. And see §§ 205, 209. 
 
 Mo. 252. 6 Hewitt v. Morgan (Iowa, 1893), 55 
 
 s Gilbraith v. Gallivan, 78 Mo. 452. N. W. Rep. 478; Carlisle v. Carlisle, 
 
 * Cressena v. Sowers, 26 W. N. C. 78 Ala. 542 ; Torrey v. Forbes, 94 id. 
 
 133; Simpson v. Montgomery, 25 135; Merch. Bank v. Harrison, 39
 
 102 FEIVATE WETTINGS. [§§ 137, 13S. 
 
 the other hand, a valid certificate is intended merely to evi- 
 dence the due execution of the deed, and if the deed is inop- 
 erative because of some material deficiency, it will not be 
 validated by statements or admissions in the certificate. 1 
 
 § 137. Impeaching the certificate. — The certificate of ac- 
 knowledgment is a constituent part of the deed, and its recitals 
 are notice to and are conclusively binding upon all who may 
 have actual or constructive notice of the deed itself. 2 Between 
 the immediate parties the recitals in the certificate may be 
 impeached for fraud. 3 So if the recitals that the notary was 
 personally acquainted with the grantor, that the latter person- 
 ally appeared before him and acknowledged the deed, or, in 
 the case of a married woman's acknowledgment, that she was 
 privily examined,'* are false, actual fraud exists which will in- 
 validate the certificate as evidence in behalf of the original 
 grantor or grantee or any subsequent party having knowledge 
 of the fraud. 5 When, however, the grantor has ratified the 
 deed by the acceptance of the purchase-money, or the grantee 
 has entered into possession, either would be estopped to plead 
 the invalidity of the acknowledgment against the other or 
 against some third person who had no notice of the fraud and 
 had parted with value relying on the recitals in the acknowl- 
 edgment. 6 
 
 § 138. Proof* by subscribing witnesses. — The execution of 
 the instrument which has been attested only must be proved 
 
 Mo. 433 ; Hutton v. Weber, 17 N. Y. stitutes neither record nor notice." 
 
 S. 463; Sharp v. Hamilton, 12 N.J. See Anderson's Law Diet., under "Ac- 
 
 L. 109; Grant v. Oliver, 91 Gal. 158. knowledgment." Paxton v. Marshall, 
 
 Seej'ost, § 138. 18 Fed. Rep. 301; Young v. Duvill, 
 
 i White v. Connelly, 105 N. C. 65 ; 109 U. S. 577 ; McMullen v. Eagan, 
 
 Turner v. Connelly, 105 N. C. 72. 21 W. Va. 244. 
 
 -'Tiedeman on R. P. 810; Singer 5 Davis v. Jenkins (Ky., 1893), 20 
 
 Mfg. Co. v. Rook, 84 Pa. St. 442 ; S. W. Rep. 283 ; Eyster v. Hathaway, 
 
 Smith v. McGuire, 67 Ala. 34. 50 111. 522; Williams v. Baker, 71 Pa. 
 
 3 See post, § 208. St. 482 ; Hartley v. Fresh, 6 Tex. 208 ; 
 
 4 " In the case of a wife the certifi- Grider v. Mortgage Co. (Ala., 1893), 
 ■cate must show she was examined 12 S. Rep. 775 ; Holt v. Moore, 37 Ark. 
 separate and apart from her husband; 148; Johnson v. Wallace, 53 Miss, 
 that she was of full age ; that the 331 ; Marsh v. Mitchell, 26 N. J. Eq. 
 contents of the deed were first made 497; White v. Graves, 107 Mass. 325. 
 known to her, and that she acted of 6 Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Corey, 135 N. Y. 
 her own free will. Otherwise, though 326. 
 
 .recorded, her acknowledgment con-
 
 § 138.] PKIVATK WRITINGS. 193 
 
 by the production of the subscribing witnesses or of one of 
 them in case he can testify to the circumstances of the attesta- 
 tion and prove all necessary facts concerning execution. 1 
 
 A subscribing' witness is a witness who either was present 
 and saw the act of execution or to whom the party subse- 
 quently acknowledged the execution, and who in either case, 
 at the party's request, express or implied, attached his signa- 
 ture to attest the genuineness of the party's signature. 2 
 
 This rule is not only applicable to such writings as deeds and 
 wills which are required by statute to be acknowledged and 
 attested, 3 but is also extended to every writing that has act- 
 ually been attested. 4 So though a party is now a competent 
 witness and may testify to the genuineness of his own signa- 
 ture, the production of the subscribing witnesses is not, it 
 seems, thereby dispensed with, 5 even where the party is shown 
 to have admitted out of court that he executed the instru- 
 ment. 6 
 
 The exceptions to the rule which requires the proof of an 
 attested writing by the production of subscribing witness 
 must now be considered. In the first place, all attested writ- 
 ings over thirty years old, which are free from alterations 
 and come from proper custody, are said, because of their an- 
 tiquity, to prove themselves, and the witnesses need not be 
 produced, though living. 7 
 
 Jackson v. La Grange. 19 Johns, ardson, etc. Co. v. Jones (Ala., 1891). 
 
 336 ; Turnipseed v. Hawkins, 1 Mo 9 S. Rep. 276. 
 
 Cord, 272; Dan v. Brown, 4 Cow. 5 Brighana v. Palmer, 3 Allen. 
 
 433. (Mass.), 450. 
 
 2 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 569a; Mel- « Abbot v. Plumbe, 1 Dong. 216; 
 cher v. Flanders, 40 N. H. 139; Hus- Rex v. Harrington, 4 M. & S. 353; 
 ton v. Ticknor, 99 Pa. St. 238 ; Henry v. Bishop, 2 Wend. 575 ; Fox 
 Chaplain v. Briscoe, 19 Miss. 272; v. Reid, 3 Johns. 477. But where 
 Marable v. Me3 r er, 78 Ga. 60 ; Hollen- the execution of the writing is only- 
 back v. Fleming, 6 Hill, 304; Paw- collaterally and not directly in- 
 tucket v. Ballou, 15 R I. 58; volved, proof by subscribing wit- 
 Gallagher v. Kilkeary, 29 111. App. nesses will not be required. Curtis 
 415. v. Belknap, 6 Washb. 433; Skinner 
 
 8 Post, § 269. v. Brigham, 126 Mass. 132 ; Com. v. 
 
 4 Warner v. B. & O. R. R, 31 Ohio Castles, 9 Gray, 121. 
 St. 265 ; Hudson v. Puett, 86 Ga. 341 ; 7 See § 105 ; Jackson v. Christman, 
 
 Barber v. Terrell, 54 Ga. 146; Leibe 4 Wend. 277, 282, 283. Where both 
 
 v. Hebersmith, 3 S. Rep. 283 ; Rich- subscribing witnesses are dead, proof 
 13
 
 li>4 
 
 PRIVATE WRITINGS. 
 
 [§ 13S. 
 
 The second class of exceptions comprises those cases where, 
 on account ol physical causes or mental incapacity or subse- 
 quently-acquired interest, the subscribing witness is unable or 
 incompetent to testify. The proof by producing a subscribing 
 witness may be dispensed with if the subscribing witness has 
 become insane, 1 or has died, 2 or is shown to have left the state, 3 
 or has become disqualified because of interest 4 or infamy, 5 or 
 the party is unable to find him after a diligent search, 6 or he 
 was incompetent when he signed as a witness. 7 Other proof is 
 admissible where the witness denies or forgets that he was 
 present at the execution. 8 
 
 If it is sought to dispense with proof by subscribing wit- 
 nesses because they cannot be found, the party must satisfy 
 the court that he has made an honest and diligent search for 
 them in places where they would probably be found and has 
 inquired as to their whereabouts of acquaintances and rel- 
 atives who would most likely be best informed. 9 Where a 
 
 of execution raises a presumption 
 that all proper details were strictly- 
 complied with. Dupree v. Dupree, 
 45. Ga. 415-442; E!a v. Edwards, 
 supra; Chaffee v. Baptist Miss. Con., 
 10 Paige, 25 ; Fathere v. Lawrence, 
 33 Miss. 622 ; Eliot v. Eliot, 10 Allen, 
 357 ; Barnes v. Barnes, 66 Me. 286 ; 
 Clark v. Dounorant, 10 Leigh, 22. 
 
 1 Dewey v. Dewey, 1 Met. (Mass.) 
 349. 
 
 2 Martin v. Bowie (S. C, 1893), 15 
 S. E. Rep. 736. 
 
 3 Troeder v. Hyams, 27 N. E. Rep. 
 775; Homer v. Wallis, 11 Mass. 309; 
 Sluby v. Chaplin, 4 Johns. 461 ; Dun- 
 bar v. Marden, 13 N. H. 311. 
 
 * Hamilton v. Marsden, 6 Binn. 45. 
 
 5 Jones v. Mason, 2 Stra. 833. 
 
 6 Jackson v. Birton, 11 Johns. 64; 
 CJ-allegher v. Association (Pa, 1892), 
 24 Atl. Rep. 115. 
 
 7 Bank v. Root, 2 Met. 522; Nelins 
 v. Buckell, 1 Hayw. 19. See, also, 1 
 Greenl. on Evid.. § 572, and cases 
 cited ; 1 Whart. Evid., §§ 705-40, and 
 cases; Smith v. Junes, 6 Rand. 32; 
 
 Hawes v. Humphrey, 9 Pick. 357; 
 Jauncy v. Thorne, 2 Barb. Ch. 40; 
 Dean v. Deau, 1 Will. (Vt.) 746; 
 Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Pa. St 
 489 ; Vernon v. Kirk, 30 Pa. St. 218 ; 
 Hopkins v. Albertson, 2 Bay, 484; 
 Hopkins v. De Graffenreid, 2 Bay, 
 187 ; Collins v. Elliot, 1 Harr. & J. 2; 
 Jackson v. La Grange, 19 Johns. 288, 
 289; Sears v. Dillingham, 12 Mass. 
 358, 361, 363 ; Miller v. Miller, 2 Bing. 
 N. C. 76 ; Jones v. Arterborn, 11 
 Humph. 97; Patten v. Tallman, 27 
 Me. 29; Verdier v. Verdier, 8 Rich. 
 (S. O.) 135; Barker v. McFerran, 26 
 Pa. St. 211 ; Jackson v. Luquere, 5 
 Cow. 221. 
 
 sWhitakcr v. Salisbury, 15 Pick. 
 534; Dewey v. Dewey, 1 Met. 349; 
 New Haven Co. Bank v. Mitchell, 15 
 Conn. 206; Wynn v. Small, 102 N. C 
 133 ; Baeder v. Jennings, 40 Fed. Rep. 
 199. 
 
 9 Miller v. Miller, 2 Bing. N. C. 76; 
 James v. Farnell, 1 Turn. & R. 417; 
 Troeder v. Hyams (Mass.. 1890), 27 
 N. E. Rep. 775. Where there are sev-
 
 § 139.] PRIVATE WRITINGS. 195 
 
 writing which is alleged to have been executed by one party 
 is introduced in evidence by his adversary upon notice, proof 
 by the subscribing witnesses may be dispensed with where the 
 execution is not denied by the other, upon the ground that 
 the party demanding its introduction admits its execution and 
 validity by claiming an interest or title under it. 1 Witnesses 
 to deeds are intended merely to attest their execution, and 
 cannot, like witnesses to wills, express opinions upon the men- 
 tal capacity of the grantor. 2 
 
 § 139. Proof by witnesses acquainted with party's hand- 
 writing. — A person, even though he can neither read nor 
 write, 3 who is personally acquainted with the handwriting in 
 question, is a competent witness for or against its authentic- 
 ity. 4 In case the knowledge was acquired solely for the pur- 
 pose of testifying, then he is not a competent witness. The 
 testimony of such a person is not secondary evidence as 
 compared with the evidence of the alleged writer, nor is it 
 rendered inadmissible because the latter, being in court, denies 
 the handwriting; 5 though it is clear that such testimony, 
 unless positive and uncontradictory, would not carry much 
 weight in a reasonable mind against the declaration of the 
 party himself that the writing in dispute is not his. 
 
 The witness' acquaintance and familiarity with the writing 
 may have been acquired by seeing the party write in circum- 
 stances where he had an opportunity of observing his hand- 
 writing and becoming acquainted with the peculiarities of his 
 penmanship. Where a witness believes he can identify the 
 
 eral subscribing witnesses, the ab- Bruyn v. Russell, 52 Hun, 17 ; Salazar 
 
 sence of all must be accounted for. v. Taylor (Col., 1893), 33 Pac. Rep. 
 
 Kelsey v. Hanmer, 18 Conn. 311. 369; Succession of Marivant, 45 La. 
 
 iBradshaw v. Bennett, 1 M. & Ann. 207; Stoddard v. Hill (S.C., 1893), 
 
 Rob. 143 ; Benton v. Baxley (Ga., 17 S. E. Rep. 138 ; Board of Trustees 
 
 1893), 15 S. E. Rep. 820 ; Hanna v. v. Misenheimer, 78 111. 22 ; Tome v. 
 
 Davis, 112 Mo. 599; Bell v. Chaytor, Parkersburgh R R Co., 39 Md. 36; 
 
 1 C. & K. 162. If the party alleged Herrick v. Svvomby, 56 Md. 439, 460; 
 
 the deed to be a forgery, its execution Mudd v. Suckermore, 5 A. & E. 703 
 
 must be proved by the one claiming (31 E. C. L.) ; Snyder v. McKeever, 
 
 under it. Vaugh v. McElroy, 82 Ga. 10 Bradw. (111.) 188; Hynes v. McDer- 
 
 687. mott, 82 N. Y. 41. 
 
 2 Dean v. Fuller, 40 Pa. St. 474. » Williams v. Deen (Tex., 1894), 24 
 
 3 Foye v. Patch, 132 Mass. 105. S. W. Rep. 536. 
 * Wilson v. Van Leer, 127 Pa. St, 371 ;
 
 196 
 
 PRIVATE WRITINGS, 
 
 [§ 139. 
 
 writing lie may testify to its character, though he may have 
 seen the party write once only, 1 and that subsequent to the 
 date of the disputed writing. 2 Doubtless the circumstance 
 that a witness has often seen the party write will add to the 
 value of his evidence; but this fact and the character of the 
 occasion or period when he saw him write, though they may 
 affect the credibility and weight of his evidence, are wholly 
 immaterial as respects his competency as a witness. 3 
 
 A witness familiar with the penmanship of a party's surname 
 may testify to his full name, 4 while one unacquainted with the 
 individual signatures of the members of a firm may testify to 
 the firm signature if acquainted with it. 5 In the second place, 
 personal acquaintance with the party's handwriting may be 
 acquired by having carried on a correspondence with him. 6 
 
 >Egan v. Murray (Iowa, 1890), 45 
 N. W. Rep. 563 ; Hopper'3 Adnvr v. 
 Ashley, 15 Ala. 457; Woodford v. 
 McClenahan, 4 Gilm. (9 111.) 85; 
 Smith v. Walton, 8 Gill (Md.), 77; 
 Com. v. Nefus. 135 Mass. 533 ; North 
 v. McConnell, 42 Mich. 473; Rideout 
 v. Newton, 17 N. H 71 ; Jackson v. 
 Van Dusen, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 144; 
 McNair v. Com., 26 Pa. St. 388; 
 Means v. Means, 7 Rich. (S. C.) 533 ; 
 Demouheun v. Walker, 4 Baxfc. 
 (Term.) 199; Pepper v. Barnett, 22 
 Gratt. (Va.) 405 ; Succession of Mar- 
 vant, 45 La. Ann. 207. 
 
 2 Keith v. Lathrop, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 
 553 : Railroad Co. v. Hickman, 28 Pa. 
 St 318. 
 
 3 In these rases the witness often 
 saw the party write : Royce v. Cazan, 
 7G Ga. 79 ; Bruyn v. Russell, 52 Hun. 
 17; Long v. Little, 119 111. 600; 
 Haynes v. Thomas, 7 Ind. 38 ; State 
 v. Stair, 87 Mo. 268 ; State v. Gay, 94 
 N. C. 814 ; Cook v. Smith, 1 Vroom 
 (30 N. J.), 387 ; State v. Hooper, 2 
 Bailey (S. C), 37 ; Hopkins v. Meg- 
 guire, 35 Me. 78; Lachance v. Loeb- 
 lein, 15 Mo. App. 460 ; Hoitt v. Moul- 
 ton, 21 N. H. 586 ; Donoghue v. Peo- 
 ple, 6 Park. C. C. (N. Y.) 120 ; State v. 
 
 Anderson, 2 Bailey (S. C), 567 ; Pear- 
 son v. McDaniel, 62 Ga. 100; Sill v. 
 Reese, 47 Cal. 294 ; Salazar v. Taylor 
 (Col., 1893), 33 Pac. Rep. 839 ; Bevan v. 
 Atlanta Bank, 39 111. 577 ; Williams 
 v. Dean (Tex., 1894), 24 S. W. Rep. 
 536. 
 * Lewis v. Sapio, 1 M. & W. 39. 
 
 5 Gordon v. Price, 10 Ired. (N. C.) 
 385; Brigham v. Peters, 1 Gray 
 (Mass.), 385. 
 
 6 Gould v. Jones, 1 W. Bl. 384, by 
 Lord Mansfield, in 1761 ; Ferrers v. 
 Shirley, Fitzgibbon, 195 (in 1763). In 
 Wade v. Boughton, 3 V. & B., Lord 
 Eldon, while confirming the doctrine, 
 says the comparison of a single let- 
 ter will never do for commitment. 
 See McKeon v. Barnes, 108 Mass. 
 344; Campbell v. Woodstock Iron 
 Co., 83 Ala. 351; Pearson & Co. v. 
 McDaniel, 62 Ga. 100; Russell v. 
 Coffin, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 143; Empire 
 Manuf. Co. v. Stuart, 46 Mich. 482 ; 
 Gartrell v. Stafford, 12 Neb. 545; 
 Com. v. Smith, 6 S. & R. (Pa.) 567; 
 Clark v. Freeman, 25 Pa. St 133; 
 Atlantic Ins. Co. v. Manning, 3 Col. 
 224; Thomas v. State,- 103 Ind. 419; 
 Chaffee v. Taylor, 3 Allen (Mass.), 
 5i>8 ; Southern Exp. Co. v. Thornton,
 
 § 139.] 
 
 PRIVATE WRITINGS. 
 
 1U7 
 
 The ground upon which evidence of familiarity with hand- 
 writing acquired by a correspondence with the party is ad- 
 mitted is that the conduct of the party is equivalent to the 
 admission that the letters introduced were written by him. 
 If the party made statements or gave instructions in his letter 
 which were intended prima facie to be acted upon, and if it 
 is shown that the recipient relied upon and was induced to 
 act, and particularly if his action consists of further communi- 
 cations or of business transactions with him, and which are 
 subsequently referred to in other letters, it will be very rea- 
 sonable to presume that the documents were in the hand- 
 writing of the party. 1 The personal acquaintance may have 
 been gained by the witness having seen 2 documents which the 
 party admits to have been written by him; as when he holds 
 deeds of conveyances in which the party is a grantor. 3 
 
 Again, the acquaintance with the writing may have been 
 acquired by the witness from actual personal contact with 
 
 41 Miss. 216; Whitley v. Gaylord, 1 
 Jones' L. (N. C.) 94; United States 
 v. Simpson, 3 P. & W. (Pa.) 437; 
 Parker v. Amazon Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 
 363; Com. v. Coe, 115 Mass. 481; 
 Blair v. Pelham, 118 Mass. 420; 
 Rumph v. State (Ga., 1893), 16 S. E. 
 Rep. 104 ; Rogers v. Tyley (111., 1893), 
 32 N. E. Rep. 693. 
 
 1 Murieta v. Wolfhagen, 2 C. & K. 
 744 (61 E. C. L.); Greaves v. Hunter, 
 2 C. & P. 477 (12 E. C. L.) ; Tharpe v. 
 Gisburne, 2 C. & P. 21 (12 E. C. L.); 
 Rex v. Slaney, 5 C. & P. 213 (24 
 EC.L 1832), Drew v. Prior, 5 M. & 
 G. 264; Putnam v. Wadley, 40 111. 
 346; Mines v. Perry, 113 Mass. 274; 
 Gibson v. Trowbridge Co. (Ala., 1893), 
 11 S. Rep. 365. 
 
 445; First Nat. Bank v. Hovell, 24 
 111. App. 594; Durnell v. Sowden 
 (Utah, 1887), 14 Pac. Rep. 334; Smith 
 v. Caswell (Tex., 1887), 4 S. W. Rep. 
 848; Gordon v. Price, 10 Ired. L. 
 (N. C.) 385; Hopper v. Ashley, 15 
 Ala. 457 ; Gibson v. Trowbridge (Ala., 
 1893), 11 S. Rep. 365. Where the 
 document has not been acknowl- 
 edged, the circumstances should be 
 such that the party is estopped by it. 
 Allen v. State, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 
 367 ; Hammond v. Varian, 54 N. Y. 
 398; Talbott v. Hines, 32 N. E. Rep. 
 788; Tucker v. Kellogg (Utah, 1892), 
 28 Pac. Rep. 870 ; Berg v. Petersorj. 
 52 N. W. Rep. 37 ; 49 Minn. 420. The 
 burden of proving the acknowledg- 
 ment or estoppel is upon the party 
 
 2 It is necessary that the witness introducing the writing. Putnam v. 
 
 should have seen the papers long 
 enough to have become familiar 
 with the penmanship. United States 
 v. Johnson, 1 Cranch (U. S.), 371 ; 
 Stone v. Thomas, 12 Pa. St. 269. 
 
 3 Woodman v. Dana, 52 Me. 9 ; 
 Johnson v. Daverne, 19 Johns. Ch. 
 134; Ennor v. Hodson, 28 111. App. 
 
 Wadley, 40 111. 346 ; Bank v. Marsh, 
 46 Vt 443; Brigham v. Peters, 1 
 Gray, 139; Bank v. Wenzel. 151 Pa. 
 St. 142. The acknowledgment of an 
 attorney for the party will not suffice. 
 Goldsmith v. Bane, 8 N. J. L. 87; 
 Greaves v. Hunter, 2 C. & P. 477.
 
 198 PEIVATE WRITINGS. [§ 139tf. 
 
 I- , 
 
 him in commercial, social or professional relations. Thus, a 
 corresponding clerk or a book-keeper may testify to the hand- 
 writing- of one whose letters or books pass through his hands, 1 
 but in the ordinary course of business only. 2 One member of a 
 family is a competent witness in the case of family correspond- 
 ence. 3 An executor may testify to the handwriting of his 
 testator, 4 or an attorney to that of his client. 5 
 
 So where the authenticity of official records and documents 
 or the handwriting of officials is in question, any person who 
 has been in the habit of examining them while they were in 
 official custody and through whose hands they have passed in 
 the performance of private or official duty may testify to the 
 genuineness of the handwriting. 6 
 
 § 139a. Mode of examining witnesses as to handwriting. — 
 A witness to handwriting may be cross-examined as to the 
 source of his knowledge, and if he has any knowledge ac- 
 quired under the circumstances above outlined its deficiency 
 or inexactness, though detracting from the weight of his evi- 
 dence, is no objection to his competency. Thus, though his 
 actual belief that the writing in dispute is genuine may be a 
 material element in the credibility of his testimony, yet the 
 fact that he cannot swear from his own knowledge that he 
 believes it to be the handwriting of the party is not an ob- 
 jection. 7 If he is not cross-examined he need not state the 
 
 1 Smith v. Sainsbury, 5 C. & B. 196 6 Armstrong v. Fargo, 8 Hun, 175; 
 (24 E. C. L.); Reid v. Hodgson, 1 Rogers v. State, 11 Tex. App. 608; 
 Cranch (U. S.), 491; Titford v. Knott, Finch v. Gridley's Ex'rs, 25 Wend. 
 
 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 211 ; Murieta v. (N. Y.) 469 ; Rogers v. Ritter, 12 Wall. 
 Wolfhagen, 2 C. & K. 744 (61 E. C. L.) ; (U. S.) 317 ; Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. 
 Bruyn v. Russell, 52 Hun, 217. (Mass.) 295-301 ; Sill v. Reese, 47 Cal. 
 
 2 Assignees of Desbrow v. Farrow, 294 ; Board v. Misenheimer, 78 111. 22 ; 
 
 3 Rich. (S. C.) 382. Brown v. Lincoln, 47 N. H. 468 ; Doe v. 
 
 3 Robinson Consolidated Mining Roe, 31 Ga. 593-599 ; Ducan v. Beard, 
 Co. v. Craig, 4 N. Y. St. Rep. 478; 2 N. & McC. (& C.) 400; Goddard v. 
 Tuthill v. Rainy, 98 N. C. 513 ; Moody Gloninger, 5 Watts (Pa.), 209 ; Swei- 
 v. Rowell, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 490 ; Slay- gart, 8 Pa. St 436 ; Taylor v. Cook, 8 
 maker v. Wilson, 1 P. & W. (Pa.) 216. Price, 650 ; Jones v. Huggius, 1 Dev. 
 
 4 Sharp v. Sharp et al., 2 Leigh L (N. C.) 223; Vickroy v. Skelly, 
 (Va.), 249. 14 S. & R. (Pa.) 372; Turnipseed v. 
 
 SFitzwater Peerage Case, 10 CI. & Hawkins, 1 McC. (S. C.)272; Thomas 
 
 Fin. 193; Costello v. Crowell, 139 v. Horlocker, 1 Dall. (Pa.) 14. 
 Mass. 588; Riggs v. Powell (111., 1893), 'Foster v, Jenkins, 30 Ga. 476; 
 
 32 N. E. Rep. 482. Bernheim v. Ayer, 36 N. H. 183 ; Hop-
 
 § 139a.] 
 
 PRIVATE WRITINGS. 
 
 199 
 
 source of his knowledge; for if he actually swears that he is 
 acquainted with the handwriting it will be presumed that he 
 is competent to testify. 1 Merely to testify that the writing is 
 that of the party is not enough. He must testify that he 
 knows the handwriting of the party, 2 and if he does not know 
 it, it is within the province of the judge to reject him as incom- 
 petent. 3 
 
 A person disqualified to testify because of interest against 
 the representative of a decedent may be a witness to the hand- 
 writing of the deceased, though he cannot testify that he saw 
 deceased sign a paper which has been destroyed. 4 On the 
 other hand, the fact that a witness is interested has been held 
 to render him wholly incompetent as a witness to handwrit- 
 ing. 5 
 
 The witness, if competent, will be permitted to refresh his 
 memory before the trial, by referring to the writings from 
 which his knowledge has been acquired. 6 On the other hand, 
 
 per v. Ashley, 1") Ala. 457; Johnson 
 v. Daverne, 19 Johos. 134; Talbott v. 
 Hedges (Ind., 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 
 788 ; Massey v. Farmers' Bank, 104 111. 
 327 ; Smy the v. Caswell. G7 Tex. 567 ; 
 Lyon v. Lyman, 9 Conn. 55 ; Holmes 
 v. Goldsmith, 147 U. S. 150; Guyette 
 v. Bolton, 46 Vt. 228; Com. v. An- 
 drews, 143 Mass. 23; Nagee v. Os- 
 borne, 32 N. Y. 669; Rumph v. State 
 (Ga., 1893), 16 S. E. Rep. 104; Smith 
 v. Walton, 8 Gill (Md.), 77; State v. 
 Stair, 87 Mo. 268 ; Clark v. Freeman, 
 25 Pa St. 413. 
 
 1 Henderson v. Bank, 11 Ala. 855; 
 Moody v. Rowell, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 
 490 ; Salazar v. Taylor, 33 Pac. Rep. 
 369 (Colo., 1893): Empire Co. v. 
 Stuart, 46 Mich. 482 ; Wittier v. Gould, 
 8 Watts (Pa.), 485 ; Bank v. Lierman, 
 5 Neb. 247 ; Bulen v. Granger, 29 N. 
 W. Rep. 718 ; Goodhue v. Bartlett, 5 
 McLean, 185; Sartor v. .Bullinger, 
 59 Tex. 411 ; Stoddard v. Hill (S. C, 
 1893), 17 S. E. Rep. 138. 
 
 2 Boyle v. Coleman, 13 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 42 ; Richardson v. Stringfellow (Ala, 
 
 1894), 14 S. Rep. 283; Bate v. Peo- 
 ple, 8 111. 644 ; Kinney v. Flynn, 2 R. 
 I. 319 ; Watson v. McAllister, 7 Mart 
 368; Carrier v. Hampton, 11 Ired. L 
 (N. C.) 307 ; Mapes v. Seales, 27 Tex. 
 345; Hann v. State, 13 Tex. App. 
 383 ; Slaymaker v. Wilson, 1 T. & W. 
 216. 
 
 3 See cases supra, and Talbott v. 
 Hedges, 32 N. E. Rep. 788 (Ind., 1893). 
 
 4 Daniels v. Foster, 26 Wis. 686; 
 Hussey v. Kirkwood, 95 N. C. 63. 
 
 SRideout v. Newton, 17 N. H. 71 ; 
 Robinson v. Robinson, 20 S. C. 567 ; 
 Kirksey v. Kirksey, 41 Ala. 626 ; 
 Truitt's Estate. 10 Phila. (Pa.) 16. 
 
 6 See post, g§ 337, 338 ; United States 
 v. Larned, 4 Cranch, 312 ; Redford v. 
 Peggy, 6 Rand. (Va.) 316; McNair v. 
 Com., 26 Pa. St. 28S ; Thomas v. State, 
 103 Ind. 419 ; Chester v. Armstrong. 
 66 Md. 113; Massey v. Bank, 104 111. 
 327 ; Worth v. McConnell, 42 Mich. 
 473; Smith v. Walton, 8 Gill (Md.), 
 77; Bank v. Jacobs, 1 P. & W. (Pa.) 
 161, 179.
 
 200 PKIVATE WRITINGS. [§ 140. 
 
 other writings not relevant to the issue may be shown him, 
 and he may be asked, to test the extent and accuracy of his 
 knowledge, if they are genuine or spurious. 1 The party cross- 
 examining the expert by questioning him as to the genuineness 
 of irrelevant writings will be bound by his answer, as that is 
 a collateral and irrelevant fact. 2 A person who on the stand 
 denies the genuineness of a writing alleged to be his may, on 
 cross-examination, be asked to write his name or other word 
 for use as a standard of comparison. 3 While a party should 
 not be permitted. to fabricate evidence by being asked to write 
 his name on his direct examination when he disputes the au- 
 thenticity of a writing, 4 if he does so, another person who 
 has only the knowledge of his writing which he has gained by 
 seeing him write in court is not competent as a witness. 5 
 Where a witness, on an issue of forgery, testifies that he wrote 
 certain words in a genuine instrument not produced, he may 
 be asked to write those words for comparison with the writ- 
 ing said to be forged. 6 
 
 § 140. Comparison of handwriting. — The distinction be- 
 tween evidence of the genuineness of handwriting founded 
 upon the knowledge of the witness and that furnished by a 
 comparison of papers or writings is important and well 
 marked. " Comparison of handwriting occurs when other wit- 
 nesses prove a paper to be in the handwriting of a party and the 
 witness desires to take the papers in his hand, compare them, 
 and determine whether they are or are not the same hand- 
 writing. There the witness collects all his knowledge from 
 comparison only ; he knows nothing of himself ; he has not 
 seen the party write nor held any correspondence with him." 7 
 
 1 Armstrong v. Thurston, 11 Md. derson v. Osgood, 53 Vt. 309. But 
 148; Fogg v. Dennis, 3 Humph, see, contra. Bank v. Robert, 41 Mich. 
 (Tenn.) 47; Howard v. Patrick, 42 709; Gilbert v. Simpson, 6 Daly, 34. 
 Mich. 121 ; Bank v. Mudgett, 44 N. Y. 4 Williams v. State, 6 Ala. 33 ; King 
 514; Massey v. Bank,. 104 111. 327; v. Donahue, 110 Mass. 155; United 
 Bacon v. Williams, 13 Gray (Mass.), States v. Jones, 10 Fed. Rep. 469. 
 527 ; Rose v. Bank, 91 Mo. 399 ; Pierce Cf. State v. Koontz, 5 S. E. Rep. 328. 
 v. Northey, 14 Wis. 9; Griffiths v. 5 Reese v. Reese, 90 Pa. St. 89. 
 Avery, 11 A. & E. 322. 6 Huff v . Nims, 11 Neb. 363. 
 
 2 People v. Murphy, 135 N. Y. 450; ? Duncan, J., in Com. v. Smith, 6 
 32 N. E. Rep. 138. S. & R (Pa.) 568, 571. See Mudd v. 
 
 3 Chandler v. Barron, 45 Me. 534; Suckennore, 5 A. & E 703, 730; 
 Roe v. Roe, 40 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1 ; San- Bouv. Diet, p. 351 ; Burdick v. Hunt,
 
 § 140.] PKIVATE WKITINGS. 201 
 
 The proof of handwriting by comparison has been a much 
 litigated subject. In the eighteenth century this method of 
 proof was recognized in the English ecclesiastical courts, the 
 judges adopting the rule as it existed and was observed in the 
 Roman law. 1 The doctrine met with strenuous resistance 
 when its introduction was attempted in the courts of common 
 law. It was argued that it would be useless to submit writ- 
 ings for comparison to jurors who could neither read nor 
 write; that fraud might be practiced both in the writings in 
 dispute and in the standards with which they would be com- 
 pared ; that handwriting is variable, adapting itself to the 
 age, habits, education and mental state of the writer, to the 
 condition of his writing materials and to the haste with which 
 they are used. So the genuineness of the specimens offered 
 for comparison might be impeached, causing the introduction 
 of others with a consequential indefinite increase of collateral 
 issues. But jurors are no longer illiterate, and, so far as fraud 
 is concerned, either party may offer specimens for comparison. 
 Nor will the adverse party be subject to unfair surprise, for 
 he ought certainly to know what writings he has signed and 
 to be able to recognize and explain any and all alterations 
 in them. 2 
 
 This matter is now settled in England by statute, 3 and a 
 similar statute has been enacted in many of the states of the 
 Union. By these statutes, in the states of New York, New 
 Jersey, Wisconsin, Iowa, Georgia, Louisiana and California, 
 it is substantially provided that where the genuineness of any 
 writing is in dispute it may be compared with any writing 
 whatever proved or acknowledged to be genuine. The com- 
 parison is to be made by witnesses, who shall give their opin- 
 
 43 Ind. 381, 386; Travis v. Brown, 43 Rex v. Crosby, 12 Mod., No. 72; 
 
 Pa, St 9, 12. Seven Bishops' Case, 12 How. St. Tr. 
 
 l Wharton on Evld., vol. 1, § 711, 183, 306; More v. Wood, 14 East, 327; 
 
 and authorities cited ; Spear v. Bone, Brune v. Rawlings, 7 id. 279, 282; 
 
 cited Mudd v. Suckerrnore, 5 A. & E. Revett v. Braham, 4 T. R. 497 ; Til- 
 
 703; Beaumont v. Perkins, 1 Phil- man v. Traver, Moody & Ryan, 141; 
 
 lim. 78. Allport v. Meek, 4 C. & P. 267 ; Grif- 
 
 2 See the remarks of Patteson, J., fith v. Williams, 1 M. & R. 133, for 
 
 in Mudd v. Suckerrnore, 5 A. & E, the earlier cases. 
 
 703, 709. See, also, Hayes' Case, 10 « 17 and 18 Vict, ch. 125, § 27. 
 How. St Tr. 312 ; Buller's Nisi, p. 236 ;
 
 202 
 
 PKIVATE WRITINGS. 
 
 [§ 140. 
 
 ion, which, together with the document, shall then be sub- 
 mitted to the jury. 1 
 
 In other states the common-law rule is adhered to, and 
 while comparison, both by expert witnesses and by the jur} 7 , 
 is permitted, it must be made with writings which are rele- 
 vant to the case, or, if with other writings, their authenticity 
 must have been admitted either expressly or by conduct suf- 
 ficient to estop the party. 2 
 
 In the courts of other states, and in the United States su- 
 preme court, no irrelevant writing can be selected as a 
 standard of comparison. Comparison can only be made with 
 some writing properly constituting a part of the evidence or 
 record and the genuineness of which is acknowledged. 3 
 
 i Mortimer v. Chambers, 17 N. Y. S. 
 552; Durnell v. Sowden (Utah), 14 
 Pac. Rep. 335 ; State v. Henderson, 
 29 W. Va. 147 ; Smith v. Caswell, 67 
 Tex. 567; Clay v. Alderson, 10 id. 49; 
 Boggus v. State, 34 Ga. 375 ; Ham- 
 mond v. Wolf (Iowa, 1893), 42 N. W. 
 Rep. 778 ; Baker v. Mygatt, 14 Iowa, 
 131 ; Le Carpentier v. Delery, 4 
 Mart. (La.) 454; State v. Zimmer- 
 man, 47 Kan. 242 ; Yeomans v. Petty, 
 40 N. J. Eq. 495 ; Peck v. Callahan, 
 95 N. Y. 73; McKay v. Lasher, 42 
 Hun, 270; Winnie v. Tousley, 36 
 Hun, 190 ; State v. Miller, 47 Wis. 530 ; 
 Smith v. Elmert, 47 Wis. 479 ; Hall 
 v. Van Vranken, 64 How. Pr. 407; 
 Marshall v. Hancock, 80 Cal. 82; 
 Holmes v. Goldsmith, 145 U. S. 150. 
 
 2 Hazzard v. Vickory, 78 Ind. 64 ; 
 Short v. Kinzie, 80 Ind. 500 ; Thomas 
 v. State, 103 Ind. 419; Rogers v. 
 Tyley (111., 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 393; 
 Morrison v. Porter, 35 Minn. 425; 
 Springer v. Hall, 83 Mo. 93; Bank v. 
 Robert, 41 Mich. 709; Dietz v. 
 Fourth Nat. Bank (Mich.), 37 N. W. 
 Rep. 220 ; People v. Parker, 34 N. W. 
 Rep. 720 : State v. Henderson, 29 W. 
 Va. 147 ; Yates v. Yates, 76 N. C. 142 ; 
 Lachauce v. Loblein, 15 Mo. App. 
 460; Rose v. Bank, 91 Mo. 399; Wag- 
 
 oner v. Ruply, 69 Tex. 700 ; Walker 
 v. State, 14 Tex. App. 609; Chester 
 v. State, 23 Tex. App. 577 ; State v. 
 De Grofif (N. C, 1893), 18 S. E. Rep. 
 507; Andrews v. Hayden (Ky.), 11 
 S. W. Rep. 428. If the writing in 
 dispute has been lost, an expert who 
 has seen it may compare it with a 
 relevant writing. Abbott v. Cole- 
 man, 22 Kan. 250. Cf. Collins v. 
 Ball, 82 Tex. 259. 
 
 3 Snyder v. Berkes (Ala.), 4 S. W. 
 Rep. 225 ; Bestor v. Roberts, 58 Ala. 
 331 ; Clark v. Rhoades, 2 Heisk. (Tenn.) 
 20G; Wilbur v. Eicholtz, 5 Col. 240; 
 Bank v. Lierman, 5 Neb. 247; Miller 
 v. Jones, 32 Ark. 337; Bi'obston v. 
 Cahill, 64 111. 356; Woodard v. Spil- 
 ler, 1 Dana (Ky.), 180; McCafferty 
 v. Heritage, 5 Houst, (Del.) 220 ; Mil- 
 ler v. Johnston, 27 Md. 6 ; Moore v. 
 United States, 91 U. S. 270 ; Merritt 
 v. Straw, 33 N. E. Rep. 657 ; Bank v. 
 Houghton, 41 Mich. 709; Himrod v. 
 Bolton. 44 111. App. 516. It has been 
 recently held that haudwritiug can- 
 not be proved by comparison, in 
 Gibson v. Trowbridge (Ala., 1893), 11 
 S. Rep. 365; Riggs v. Powell (Ga., 
 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 482; Bevan v. 
 Bank, 31 N. E. Rep. 679; 39 111. App. 
 577.
 
 § 140.] PRIVATE WRITINGS. 203 
 
 A writing intended to be used as a standard must be proved 
 or admitted to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. 
 The matter is one lying- largely in his discretion, and his ac- 
 tion should not be reversed unless he has committed some 
 manifest error of law or unless his finding is totally unsup- 
 ported by the evidence adduced. 1 Where the standard of 
 comparison is an irrelevant writing and its genuineness is dis- 
 puted, it must be proved directly by the evidence of witnesses 
 who can testify of their own knowledge that it is genuine/ 
 
 In those courts which permit a comparison with irrelevant 
 writings, expert testimon}' is always admissible. So attor- 
 neys at law, 3 business men with extensive correspondence, 4 
 bank officials, 5 conveyancers, 6 book-keepers, 7 public officials, 8 
 writing teachers, 9 and other persons who from their position 
 or profession have a peculiar knowledge of the subject, may 
 testify. 1 
 
 In many cases, particularly in those states where compari- 
 son is not permitted with irrelevant writings, it has been held 
 that the testimony of experts upon handwriting is not ad- 
 
 1 State v. De Graff (N. O, 1894), 18 bois v. Baker, 30 N. Y. 355 ; Walker 
 
 S. E. Rep. 507 ; Hyde v. Woolfolk, 1 v. State, 14 Tex. App. G09. 
 
 Iowa, 159; Wilson v. Irish, 62 id. 6 Vinton v. Peck, 14 Mich. 287. 
 
 260; Tyler v. Todd, 36 Conn. 218; » State v. De Graff (N. C, 1894), 18 
 
 Thompson v. State (Me.), 13 Atl. Rep. S. E. Rep. 507 ; State v. Ward, 39 Vt. 
 
 892; Com. v. Coe, 115 Mass. 481; 225; Viuton v. Peck, supra. 
 
 People v. Cline, 44 Mich. 290 ; Con- & Eisfield v. Dill et al., 71 Iowa, 
 
 rad v. Bank, 10 Mart. 700; Hall v. 442; State v. De Graff (N. C, 1894), 
 
 Van Vranken, 64 How. Pr. 407 , 18 S. E. Rep. 507 ; State v. Phair, 48 
 
 Depue v. Place, 7 Pa. St. 428 ; Rowell Vt. 366. 
 
 v. Fuller, 59 Vt 68a Cf. Carter v. 9 Eisfield v. Dill, 7 Iowa, 442 ; 
 
 Jackson, 58 N. H. 156 ; State v. Hast- Moody v. Rowell, 17 Pick. 450 ; Bacon 
 
 iugs, 53 N. H. 452. v. Williams, 13 Gray, 525. 
 
 2 Pavey v. Pavey, 30 Ohio St. 600; i Edmonston v. Henry, 45 Mo. App. 
 
 Baker v. Haines, 6 Whart. (Pa.) 284. 346; Com. v. Williams, 105 Mass. 62; 
 
 Cf. Bell v.Brewster, 44 Ohio, 690, and Sweetzer v. Lowell, 33, Me. 446, 450; 
 
 Sweigart v. Richard, 8 Barr (Pa.), Goldstein v. Black, 50 Cal. 462,465; 
 
 436, where comparison is to be made Hyde v. Woolfolk, 1 Iowa, 159; 
 
 with writings over thirty years old. Murphy v. Hagerman, Wright (Ohio), 
 
 * State v. Phair, 48 Vt. 366. 293, 297 ; Winch v. Norman, 65 Iowa, 
 
 4 Ort v. Fowler, 31 Kan. 478 ; Ken- 186; Ort v. Fowler, 31 Kan. 478; 
 
 nedy v. Upshaw, 66 Tex. 442, 446. Mallory v. Ohio Farmers' Ins. Co., 90 
 
 &Lyon v. Lyman, 9 Conn. 55; Du- Mich. 112; 51 N. W. Rep. 18a
 
 204 
 
 PRIVATE WRITINGS. 
 
 [§ Hi; 
 
 missible and comparison is generally to be made by the court 
 or jury. 1 
 
 §141. To what expert may give evidence. — An expert 
 may testify to the characteristics of the handwriting; as, for 
 example, that it is cramped or crowded, 2 or natural and free 
 as distinguished from stiff, artificial and seemingly copied, 3 as 
 to the condition of the paper, 4 whether two writings are by 
 the same person, 5 or as to the slant 6 or other peculiarity of the 
 letters, 7 as to the size, length and position of signatures; 8 and 
 he may give his opinion upon the question whether writings 
 were or were not written at the same time by the same per- 
 son and with the same writing materials. 9 
 
 An expert may testify to the character of alterations and 
 erasures and may give his opinion as to their date and the 
 means by which they were effected. 10 
 
 1 Hawkins v. Grimes, 13 B. Mon. 
 (Ky.) 257, 264; Kernin v. Hill, 37 
 111. 209 ; Fee v. Taylor, 83 Ky. 259 ; 
 Tome v. Railroad Co., 39 Md. 37; 
 Gitchell v. Ryan, 24 111. App. 372; 
 In re Rockey's Estate, 155 Pa. St. 
 453; 26 Atl. Rep. 656; 32 W. N. C. 
 434; Tucker v. Kellogg (Utah, 1892), 
 28 Pac. Rep. 870 ; State v. Zimmer- 
 man, 47 Kan. 242. 
 
 2 Dubois v. Baker, 30 N. Y. 355. 
 
 3 Moody v. Rovvell, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 
 490 ; Ludlow v. Warshing, 108 N. Y. 
 520; Cox v. Dill, 85 lud. 334; Good- 
 year v. Vosburgh, 63 Barb. 154; 
 Wither v. Roe, 45 Me. 571. 
 
 * Hancock v. O'Rourke, 6 N. Y. S. 
 549. 
 
 5 Rogers v. Tyler (111., 1893), 32 
 N. E. Rep. 393. See upon the subject 
 of expert evidence, post, §§ 185-198. 
 
 6 Goodyear v. Vosburgh, 63 Barb. 
 (N. Y.) 154. 
 
 7 Taylor v. Crowninshield, 5 N. Y. 
 Leg. Obs. 209, 22:5. 
 
 SRiordau v. Guggerty, 39 N. W. 
 Rep. 107. 
 
 9 Bank v. Holls, 11 Gray (Mass.), 
 250; Vinton v. Peck, 14 Mich. 287; 
 
 Bank v. Young, 36 Iowa, 44 ; Sheldon 
 v. Warner, 45 Mich. 638; Reese v. 
 Reese, 90 Pa St. 89; Ellingwood v. 
 Bragg, 52 N. H. 488; Clark v. Bruce, 
 12 Hun, 271; Dubois v. Baker, 30 
 N. Y. 355 ; Fulton v. Hood, 34 Pa. St. 
 365. An expert may be permitted to 
 use a black-board (Dryer v. Brown, 
 52 Hun, 391), and as the correctness 
 of his opinion may usually be thus 
 ocularly demonstrated, his evidence 
 is of little weight, it seems, if he 
 neglects to do so. In re Gordon 
 (N. J., 1893), 26 Atl. Rep. 268. See 
 § 197. 
 
 lOKruse v. Chester, 66 Cal. 353; 
 Dubois v. Baker, 30 N. Y. 355 ; Han- 
 kins v. Grimes, 13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 
 257-264; Balleutine v. White, 77 Pa. 
 St. 20-22; Eisfield v. Dill, 71 Iowa, 
 442; Pate v. People, 8 111. 644; Moye 
 v. Hoydun, 30 Miss. 110; Vinton v. 
 Peck, 14 Mich. 287: Edelin v. Sand- 
 ers, 8 Md. 118. See as to alteration, 
 §§ 128, 129. If the date stated in the 
 writing is obscure an expert may 
 give an opinion as to the real date 
 (Stone v. Hubbard. 7 Cush. 595), or 
 he may testify to the age of the in-
 
 § 142.] PRIVATE WRITINGS. 205 
 
 In a prosecution for homicide, where the identity of tho 
 prisoner is in issue, the signature of the accused may be com- 
 pared with writings proved to have been written by the slayer, 
 or various writings alleged to have been written by him may be 
 compared with each other by an expert or in some cases by 
 the jury. 1 
 
 § 142. Proof of exhibits in equity. — An exhibit, using the 
 word in its general sense, means a document produced and 
 identified for use as evidence. 1 In its restricted sense it sig- 
 nifies writings which are proved in chancery either by the ex- 
 press admissions of the parties in the pleadings, or by failing 
 to deny their existence when alleged, or by viva voce examina- 
 tion of witnesses at the hearing. 2 So also when writings are 
 put in evidence before a referee, before a jury in open court, 
 or before a commissioner or examiner appointed to take testi- 
 mony in chancery, they should be exhibited to the witness and 
 examiner or referee to be identified b}^ the witness, after which 
 they should be marked as exhibits by the proper official. 3 In 
 modern chancery practice certain classes of documents, among 
 which are included ancient records and deeds, public records, 
 and deeds, bonds, notes, bills of exchange, letters and receipts, 
 may be proved as exhibits at the hearing after answer before 
 the chancellor, 4 by any witness who can testify to their execu- 
 tion, identity or their accuracy as copies of an original. 
 
 Usually a party who wishes to prove an exhibit on a hear- 
 ing must obtain an order to that effect, 5 though his adversary 
 has no right to an inspection of the writing prior to the hear- 
 ing. 6 
 
 strument Eisfield v. Dill, 71 Iowa, Bank of State of N. Y, 4 Hill (N. Y), 
 
 442; Clark v. Bruce, 12 Hud, 171. 516. 
 
 Contra, Cheney v. Dunlap, 20 Neb. 4 Daniell's Ch. Pr. (5th Am. ed.) 
 
 265. 881,882; Chalk v. Raine, 7 Hare, 893 : 
 
 i Crist v. State, 21 Ala. 137; Early Gtesley, Eq. Evid., 188. 
 
 v. State, 9 Tex. App. 476; Bell v. 5 Barrow v. Rhinelander, 1 Johns. 
 
 Brewster, 44 Ohio St. 690 ; 10 N. E. Ch. (N. Y.) 559 ; Miller v. Avery, 2 
 
 Rep. 679. Barb. Ch. 582. 
 
 1 Abb. Law Diet 6 Lord v. Colvin, 2 Do G., M. & G. 
 
 *Gresley, Eq. Evid., 146. 47. 
 
 * Abb. Law Diet. ; Com. Bank v.
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. 
 
 § 1505. The effect of judicial records 
 as evidence. , 
 
 Effect of judgments on those 
 in privity with the par- 
 ties. 
 
 Judgment must have been 
 final and on the merits. 
 
 Judgments conclusive only 
 as to material facts in issue. 
 
 Identity of cause of action 
 required. 
 
 Persons affected by judg- 
 ments in rem and actions 
 fixing personal status. 
 
 Criminal judgments. 
 
 Proof of judgments as facts 
 and their use as proving 
 ulterior facts distinguished. 
 
 Validity and effect of for- 
 eign judgments. 
 
 Judgments of sister states. 
 
 Judgments in bar need not 
 be pleaded. 
 
 § 142a. Inspection of public records, — From early times, 
 both at common law and by statute, the right of the individ- 
 ual to inspect public records in so far as he had personal 
 interest in them has been admitted. 1 In respect to judicial 
 records of courts of a superior jurisdiction, an inspection 
 may in the discretion of the court be compelled by mandamus, 
 though the official having the custody of the papers is a party 
 to the suit in which they are to be used. 2 But where a man- 
 damus is desired to inspect the books of an inferior tribunal 
 or official, it will generally be necessary for the applicant to 
 show affirmatively that he has some personal interest in the 
 
 ( i Scribner v. Chase. 27 111. App. 36. Fox v. Jones, 7 B. & C. 732. Cf. 
 a Rex v. Brangen, 1 Leach Cr. Cas. Colnen v. Orr, 71 Cal. 43. 
 32; Stone v. Crocker, 24 Pick. 88; 
 
 142«. 
 
 Inspection of public records. 
 
 § 1501 
 
 1426. 
 
 Proof of executive and legis- 
 
 
 
 lative acts and writings. 
 
 151. 
 
 142c. 
 
 Proof of public non-judicial 
 records. 
 
 
 143. 
 
 Proof of foreign laws. 
 
 152. 
 
 143a. 
 
 Proof of municipal ordi- 
 
 
 
 nances. 
 
 153. 
 
 144. 
 
 Effect of public documents 
 
 
 
 as evidence. 
 
 154. 
 
 145. 
 
 Historical and scientific pub- 
 
 
 
 lications — Almanacs and 
 
 155. 
 
 
 newspapers. 
 
 
 140. 
 
 Proof of judicial records — 
 
 
 
 General rule. 
 
 15G. 
 
 147. 
 
 Proof of records of courts 
 of equity and of inferior 
 courts. 
 
 157. 
 
 148. 
 
 Proof of records of courts of 
 other states. 
 
 158. 
 
 149. 
 
 Proof of foreign judgments. 
 
 159. 
 
 150. 
 
 Records of surrogate courts. 
 
 160. 
 
 150a. 
 
 Proof of returns on writs. 

 
 § 142,7.] JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. 
 
 L"7 
 
 document and that he intends to copy it for a proper pur- 
 pose. 1 
 
 When, in order to give the right of appeal, officials must 
 make a record of their action, they may be compelled to do so 
 by mandamus? and an official may be thus compelled to re- 
 cord a deed or file a paper, 3 or to correct his records, 4 o.r to 
 affix a seal to a document. 5 A public official may exercise 
 reasonable discretion in making rules to be observed by those 
 desiring to inspect the records of his office. 6 
 
 In respect to the records of a private corporation, the same 
 general principles are applicable. Such records, while public 
 so far as its officials and stockholders 7 are concerned, are pri- 
 vate as regards other persons. A stranger having no interest 
 in the corporation cannot obtain mandamus to compel an in- 
 spection of them. 8 But a stockholder has a constitutional 
 right to inspect the books of the corporation, though a refusal 
 to permit him to do so is not ground for an action for dam- 
 ages; 9 and a stockholder who is also a debtor to the corpo- 
 ration cannot obtain a mandamus to inspect its books as a 
 stockholder to aid him in his capacity of debtor. 10 
 
 1 Hayes v. White, 66 Me. 305 ; State 
 v. Hoblitzelle, 83 Me. 620; Stockman 
 v. Brooks, 27 Pac. Rep. 746 ; Diamond 
 M. Co. v. Powers, 51 Mich. 145 ; O'Hara 
 v. King, 53 III. 303; Cormack v. 
 Walcott, 17 Am. & Eug. Corp. Cases, 
 309 ; State v. Rachac, 37 Minn. 372. 
 
 2 People v. Murray. 23 N. Y. S. 160 ; 
 Bennett v. McCaffery, 28 Mo. App. 
 220 ; State v. Field, 37 id. 83 ; Warren 
 Co. v. State, 15 Ind. 250. 
 
 3 Trinity v. Lane, 79 Tex. 643; 
 United States v. Hall, 7 Mackey, 14; 
 Willflange v. McCollom, 83 Ky. 361 ; 
 People v. Collins, 7 Johns. 549; In re 
 Goodell, 14 id. 325; Strong's Case, 
 Kirby (Conn.), 345. 
 
 * People v. Brooklyn, 7 N. Y. S. 
 327; State v. Clayton, 34 Mo. App. 
 563; Ellis v. Bristol, 2 Gray (Mass.), 
 370; Bovver v. O'Brien, 2 Ind. 423; 
 People v. Matterson, 17 111. 167. 
 
 5 Prescott v. Ganser, 34 Iowa, 175. 
 See, also, Crew v. Saunders, 2 Str. 
 
 1005; Atherton v. Beard, 2 T. R 610; 
 Iasigi v. Brown, 1 Curt. C. C. 401. 
 
 «* Upton v. Catlin, 17 Colo. 546; 
 State v. Long, 37 W. Va. 266 ; Atche- 
 son v. Huebner, 90 Mich. 643. 
 
 'State v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 
 29 Mo. App. 301 ; State v. Sportsman 
 P. & C. Ass'n, 28 id. 326 ; People v. 
 United States Merc. Rep., 20 Abb. 
 N. C. 192 ; People v. Pa ton, 20 id. 195. 
 But cf. Appeal of Em p. Pass. R R. 
 Co., 19 Atl. Rep. 629 ; 26 W. N. C. 26. 
 
 estate v. Bank, 1 Rob. (La.) 470: 
 State v. May, 106 Mo. 488 ; Bank v. 
 Hilliard, 5 Cowen, 419 ; 6 id. 62 ; State 
 v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 29 Mo. 
 App. 301 ; Union Bank v. Kuapp, 3 
 Pick. 96. Cf. United States v. Hull, 
 7 Mackey, 14. 
 
 9 Legend re v. New Orleans Brew. 
 Co. (La.. 1893), 12 S. Rep. 837. 
 
 ^Investment Co. v. Eldridge, 2 Pa, 
 Dis. Ct. R. 304.
 
 208 JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. [§§ 1425, 142(?. 
 
 § 142b. Proof of executive and legislative acts by docu- 
 ments. — The extent to which the public acts, seals, statutes, 
 etc., of the various departments of the supreme government 
 will be noticed having been fully explained elsewhere in this 
 work, 1 no extended reference to the subject is necessary. 
 When, however, it is deemed necessary to prove any public 
 executive or other official act, it may be done prima facie by 
 the production of a printed copy of a proclamation, or public 
 notice or announcement, or by a newspaper, official gazette 
 or other printed document containing an account thereof * 
 which was printed according to law under governmental con- 
 trol or authorization. 2 
 
 The court will take judicial notice of the public statutory 
 and common law prevalent in its own jurisdiction, 3 though 
 private statutes or resolutions must be proved. The custom 
 of printing the legislative acts of congress and of the various 
 state legislatures is now almost universal, and as the printing 
 is done by persons under statutory authorization and subject 
 to governmental control and supervision, no objection can be 
 urged to admitting these printed statutes in evidence. 
 
 It is now the general rule, usually by judicial decision but 
 frequently by express legislative enactment, that a book pur- 
 porting to be printed by authority and to contain the stat- 
 utory law may, if duly attested as prescribed by law, be read 
 as the best evidence of any statutory law, public or private, 
 domestic or foreign. 4 
 
 § 142c. Proof of public non-judicial records. — The entries 
 in public registers or books of public record are entitled to a 
 
 i See post, §§ 240, 242. 3 See § 242. 
 
 sWhiton v. Albany, etc. Co., 109 4 Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 25; 
 
 Mass. 24; Fulham v. Howe, 14 Atl. Pease v. Peck, 18 How. 595; Tennant 
 
 Rep. 652; 60 Vt. 351; Larten v. Gil- v. Tennant, 110 Pa. St 484; Falls v. 
 
 ham, 2 111. 577 ; Young v. Bank, 4 United States Sav. S. & B. Co. (Ala., 
 
 Cranch, 388; People v. Wilson, 62 1893), 13 S. Rep. 25; Leach v. Linde, 
 
 Hun, 618; Eld v. Gorham, 20 Conn. 24 N. Y. S. 176; Chicago v. Tuite, 44 
 
 8;Larkin v. Burlington, etc. Co. 111. App. 535 ; Hawes v. State, 88 Ala. 
 
 (Iowa, 1892), 52 N. W. Rep. 480; 37 ; Cochran v. Ward (Ind., 1892), 29 
 
 Clemens v. Myer,. 44 La 390 ; 10 S. N. E. Rep. 795. Cf. Laidley v. Cum- 
 
 Rep. 797 ; Lycett v. Wolff, 45 Mo. mings, 83 Ky. 806 ; Fulham v. Howe, 
 
 App. 480 (printed copy of census). 60 Vt 351.
 
 § 1I2<?.] JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. 209 
 
 high degree of credibility as evidence though unauthenticated 
 in court by the oath of the party who made them or in whose 
 custody the books are kept. The general notoriety of the 
 matters to which such entries relate, the public and official 
 character of the books and of those who keep them, the fact 
 that the entries are made by an officer who is under oath, 
 that they are required or authorized to be made by law, or 
 else are made in the usual course of official duty without any 
 present motive to misrepresent, combine to give the evidence 
 obtained from such sources peculiar force and value. 
 
 To give an official character to a public record or register 
 it is not essential that it should have been authorized or or- 
 dered to be kept by statute. 1 It is the duty, if not the right, 
 of every official to keep a record of his public transactions 
 whenever such a practice is an appropriate and common 
 mode of evidencing them. This record, whether required to 
 be kept by statute or not, is a public record. 2 The books 
 themselves, being produced from the proper custody, should 
 be received in evidence without authentication, 3 unless it is 
 affirmatively shown that they have been negligently or ille- 
 gally kept. 4 
 
 It is obvious, however, that the actual production of public 
 records in court will be very inconvenient, if not impossible, 
 on account of their bulky character and of the constant use 
 to which they are subjected. So their proper and legal cus- 
 todian is the party who has made the entries. 5 Upon these 
 grounds, at common law and now generally by statute, the 
 contents of books of public record, such as the records of the 
 
 1 United States v. Cross, 20 D. C. 3 p u lley v. Hilton, 12 Price, 625 ; 
 365 ; Grafton v. Reed, 34 W. Va. 172 ; Oglesby v. Forman, 77 Tex. 647 ; 
 Downing v. Diaz, 80 Tex. 436 ; 16 S. Baillie v. Jackson, 17 Eng. L. & Eq. 
 W. Rep. 49; Simmons v. Spratt, 20 131. 
 
 Fla. 495. But cf. contra, Hatchett * Walker v. Wingfield, 18 Ves. 443 
 
 v. Conner, 30 Tex. 104; Jacobi v. Loving v. Warren Co., 14 Bush (Ky.) 
 
 Order of Germania, 26 N. Y. S. 318. 316 ; Sanger v. Merritt, 120 N. Y. 114 
 
 2 Succession of Short (La., 1894), 14 Chamberlain v. Baily, 101 Mass. 188 
 S. Rep. 184; Coleman v. Com., 25 Butler v. L. Ins. Co., 45 Iowa, 93 
 Gratt. (Va.) 865 ; Kyburg v. Perkins, Springs v. Schenck, 106 N. C. 153. 
 
 6 Cal. 674 ; Miller v. Indianapolis, 123 5 " The carrying of original papers 
 
 Ind. 196 ; 24 N. E. Rep. 228 ; Burton from one court to another is to be 
 
 v. Tuite, 80 Mich. 218 ; 44 N. W. Rep. disapproved." Rogers v. Tillman, 72 
 
 282. Ga. 479. 
 14
 
 210 
 
 JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. 
 
 [§ 149«. 
 
 navy 1 or treasury department, 2 county records and parish 
 registers, 3 public assessment rolls, 4 postoffice, custom-house* 
 and land-office records, 6 registers of vital statistics, 7 registers 
 of deeds, 8 of mechanics' liens 9 and of leases of public lands, 10 
 may be proved by an examined copy properly sworn to by 
 the party making it, or by a transcript properly verified and 
 certified by the official whose duty it is to keep the original. 11 
 If the form of the certificate is prescribed by statute, the 
 legal requirements must be substantially complied with, though 
 immaterial inaccuracies or informalities may be disregarded. 12 
 Thus, where the official character of the certificate is apparent 
 upon its face, it is not required that it shall state that it is a 
 
 1 Maurice v. Warden, 57 Md. 510. 
 2Mott v. Ramsay, 92 N. C. 152; 
 United States v. Bell, 111 U. S. 477. 
 3 Hall v. Aitkin, 25 Neb. 360. 
 * Clark v. Fairly, 30 Mo. App. 335. 
 s State v. Loughlin, 20 Atl. Rep. 88. 
 
 6 Stevenson v. Reeves, 8 S. Rep. 
 695; Niche v. Earle, 117 Ind. 270. 
 
 7 Shutesbury v. Hadley, 133 Mass. 
 242; Tucker v. People, 117 111. 91. 
 
 8 Chamberlain v. Brasley, 101 Mr.ss. 
 88. 
 
 9 Consaul v. Sheldon, 35 Neb. 247. 
 lOEmmett v. Lee (Ohio, 1894), 35 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 794. 
 
 n Stone Cattle & Past. Co. v. Boon, 
 73 Tex. 158 ; Buck v. Gage, 27 Neb. 
 306 ; 43 N. W. Rep. 110 ; New Eng- 
 land, etc. Co. v. Farmington, etc. Co., 
 8 U. S. 229 ; Simmons v. Spratt, 20 
 Fla. 495 ; Consaul v. Sheldon, 35 Neb. 
 247; Bryan v. Wear, 4 Mo. 106; 
 Owings v. Speed, 5 Wheat. 420; 
 Ronkendorf v. Taylor, 4 Pet. 349, 
 360; Sawyer v. Baldwin, 11 Pick. 
 494 ; United States v. Johns, 4 Dall. 
 412, 415; Jackson v. Boneham, 15 
 Johns. 226 ; Ray v. Stewart, 105 N. 
 C. 472 ; Fruin-Bambrick Co. v. Geist, 
 37 Mo. App. 509 ; Wiley v. Inhabit- 
 ants, 150 Mass. 426 ; Thrasher v. Bal- 
 lard, 33 W. Va. 285 ; Thurston v. Luce, 
 61 Mich. 292 ; Bell v. Kendrick (Fla, 
 
 1890), 6 S. Rep. 868 ; Liddon v. Hod- 
 nett, 22 Fla. 442 ; Lagow v. Glover, 
 77 Tex. 448; Emanuel v. Gates, 53 
 Fed. Rep. 772; Tillotson v. Weber 
 (Mich., 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 837; 
 Lamar v. Pearse (Ga., 1893), 17 S. E. 
 Rep. 92. Cf. State v. Cake, 24 N. J. 
 L. 516. 
 
 i-'Mackey v. Bait. etc. Co., 19 D. C. 
 282; Collins v. Ball, 82 Tex. 259; 
 Dawson v. Parham, 55 Ark. 286 ; Sax- 
 ton v. Nimms, 14 Mass. 320 ; Sanger 
 v. Merritt, 120 N. Y. 114; Good- 
 win v. Jack, 62 Me. 416; Cofer v. 
 Schening (Ala., 1893), 13 S. Rep. 123; 
 State v. Hendrix, 98 Mo. 374 ; Gunn 
 v. Peakes, 36 Minn. 177 ; Bean v. Lor- 
 yea, 81 Cal. 51. A deputy may cer- 
 tify in the name of the legal custodian 
 of the record (Hague v. Porter, 45 111. 
 318 ; Triplett v. Gill, 7 J. J. Marsh. 
 433 ; Grant v. Levan, 4 Pa. St. 393 ; 
 Greasons v. Davies, 9 Iowa, 219), 
 though not in his own name. Snyder 
 v. Brown, 4 Watts (Pa.), 132. The 
 signature of the keeper of the record 
 certifying thereto need not be proved. 
 Floyd v. Ricks, 14 Ark. 286. But its 
 forgery may, on the other hand, be 
 shown. Prather v. Johnson, 3 Har. 
 & J. (Md.) 487 ; Bryan v. Wear, 4 Mo. 
 106.
 
 § 143.] JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. 211 
 
 true copy of an official document or record. 1 "Where by statute 
 it is required that certain private writings must be recorded, 
 they are then regarded as public records, and it is often en- 
 acted that such records or exemplified or certified copies 
 thereof may be introduced as original evidence without fur- 
 ther proof. 2 A copy of a record of a conveyance made when 
 deeds were required to be stamped is not inadmissible as evi- 
 dence because it does not show that the original was stamped. 3 
 But a deed is not admissible without proof under such a stat- 
 ute where the fact in issue is the forgery of the original. 4 
 
 § 143. Proof of foreign laws. — As the courts refuse to 
 take judicial notice of foreign laws 5 it is always necessary to 
 prove them as facts before they can be applied to the facts in 
 issue. This is now customarily done in the case of a statute 
 by reading it from a printed book or copy purporting to con- 
 tain the statute in question, and duly attested as a true copy 
 by the supreme authority of the foreign government, usually 
 under its seal, or otherwise proved to have been published by 
 or under proper authority or to have been received as proof 
 of the law in the courts of the foreign state. 6 "Whether the 
 foreign statute has been satisfactorily proved is a question for 
 the jury alone; but where the proof of a foreign law consists 
 wholl} 7 of documentary evidence, the construction and legal 
 effect of this evidence are wholly within the exclusive province 
 of the court. 7 It has been held that a consul's certificate under 
 
 i Darcy v. McCarthy, 35 Kan. 722; 426 ; Pierce v. Indseth, 106 U. S. 551 ; 
 
 Collins v. Valleau (Iowa, 1889), 43 Spaulding v. Vincent, 24 Vt. 501: 
 
 N. W. Rep. 284. Church v. Hubbard, 2 Cranch, 238; 
 
 * See ante, §§ 134-136 ; How. Stat Lincoln v. Battelle, 6 Wend. 475 ; 
 
 Mich., § 5685; Iowa Code, § 3702; Packard v. Hill, 2 id. 411; Charlotte 
 
 Gen. Stat. Ind. 1881, § 462 ; Bradley v. Chouteau, 33 Mo. 194 ; Owen v. 
 
 v. Silsbee, 33 Mich. 328 ; Cox v. Jones, Boyle, 15 Me. 147. 
 52 Ga. 438. Cf. contra, as to a cer- ^Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. (U. S.) 
 
 tificate of adoption, McCollister v. 400 (Code Civil of France) ; Gibson v. 
 
 Yard (Iowa, 1894), 57 N. W. Rep. 447. Manuf. Co., 144 Mass. 83 ; McCormick 
 
 » Collins v. Valleau (Iowa, 1889), 43 v. Garrett, 5 De G, M. & G. 278 ; Uf- 
 
 N. W. Rep. 284. ford v. Spaulding, 156 Mass. 65 ; Ken- 
 
 « People v. Swetland, 77 Mich. 33 ; nard v. Kennard, 63 N. H. 308 ; In- 
 
 43 N. W. Rep. 779. surance Co. v. Wright, 60 Vt. 522 ; 
 
 b See post, § 242. Alexander v. Penn. etc. Co., 48 Ohio 
 
 « See §1 t3a; Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. St. 623 ; Hawes v. State, 88 Ala. 37.
 
 212 
 
 JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. 
 
 [§ 143. 
 
 seal that the book was authorized or recognized as an author- 
 ity is not enough as proof. 1 
 
 Under the rule that the evidence of experts is admissible in 
 matters concerning which they have peculiar knowledge or 
 skill, 2 witnesses who are learned in the statutory 3 and com- 
 mon law of a country will be permitted to testify to their 
 knowledge or opinion of what that law is. 4 Foreign unwrit- 
 ten laws, usages and customs may be ordinarily, and neces- 
 sarily must be from the circumstances of the case often proved 
 by such evidence. 5 And such persons may refresh their memory 
 by reading from text-books of authorit}^ and from reports of 
 the decisions of foreign courts, and may perhaps read these 
 authorities to the jury, 6 provided the witness is willing to 
 swear that the books are admitted as authorities by the courts 
 of the country in question. 7 
 
 The witness will be required to be an advocate or official 
 who has had actual practice in the courts of the country 
 
 i Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch, 187, 
 236. 
 
 2 See post, §§ 185-198. 
 
 3 Church v. Hubbard, 2 Cranch, 
 237. 
 
 4 Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 426; 
 Baron De Bode v. Reginam, 10 Jur 
 217; The Poweshiek, 2 Low. 142; 
 Barrows v. Dowris, 9 R. I. 446 ; Holls 
 v. Van Alstyne, 20 111. 202 ; Roberts' 
 Will, 8 Paige, 446 ; Pierce v. Indseth, 
 106 U. S. 555. 
 
 5 Dalrymples v. Dalrymple, 2 Hagg. 
 115-144; Dickerson v. Matheson, 50 
 Fed. Rep. 78; Talbot v. Seaman, 1 
 Cranch, 12-38; Denison v. Hyde, 6 
 Conn. 508; Brackett v. Norton, 4 
 Conn. 517 ; Kline v. Baker, 99 Mass. 
 253; Carnegie v. Morrison, 2 Met. 
 404 ; Haven v. Foster, 9 Pick. 130 ; 
 Bagley v. Francis, 14 Mass. 453 ; Lin- 
 coln v. Battell, 6 Wend. 482 ; Francis 
 v. Ocean Ins. Co., 6 Cowen, 429 ; Dyer 
 v. Smithy 12 Conn. 384; Brush v. 
 Wilkins, 4 Johns. Ch. 520 ; State v. 
 May Look, 7 Oreg. 54 ; Hall v. Cos- 
 tello, 48 N. H. 176 ; Kennard v. Ken- 
 
 narcl, 63 id. 308 ; Amer. L. Ins. Co. v. 
 Rosenagle, 77 Pa. St. 507. 
 
 6 See post, § 145. 
 
 7 Barrows v. Downs, 9 R. I. 4461; 
 Crogin v. Lamkin, 7 Allen, 395 ; 
 Penobscot Co. v. Bartlett, 12 Gray, 
 244; Arne v. McCamber, 124 Mass. 
 90 ; Raymont v. Colter, 3 Pick. 293, 
 296 ; Brush v. Scribner, 11 Conn. 407 ; 
 Lattimer v. Eglin, 4 Desauss. 26, 32. 
 Chancellor Kent, in speaking of the 
 sources of knowledge of the common 
 law, uses the following language : 
 " The best evidence of the common 
 law is to be found in the decisions of 
 the courts of justice contained in the 
 numerous volumes of reports which 
 crowd the lawyer's library, and in the 
 treatises and digests of learned men, 
 which have been multiplying from 
 the earliest periods of English history 
 down to the present time. The re- 
 ports of judicial decisions contain 
 the most certain evidence, and the 
 most authoritative and precise appli- 
 cation of the rules of the common 
 law," 1 Com. 440.
 
 § 143a.] JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. 
 
 213 
 
 whose law he is called upon to prove. 1 Thus, a Eoman Cath- 
 olic bishop may testify to the law of his church, 2 a student in 
 a university to the law of Germany, 3 and a French consul to 
 the law of France. 4 
 
 The states of the Union are so far foreign to each other 
 that the rule stated as defining the mode of proving foreign 
 laws, both statute and unwritten, is generally applicable to 
 them. In man} 7 of them by statute, the statute law of an- 
 other state may now be proved by reading the same from a 
 printed volume which upon its face purports to contain the 
 law of that state. 5 
 
 § 143a. Municipal ordinances. — In the absence of statutory 
 provision regulating the proof of ordinances, the proper evi- 
 dence of their existence and contents is the original record 
 containing the ordinance itself, 6 or a copy properly certified 
 or otherwise authenticated by the official having charge of 
 them. 7 Usually, however, it is enacted by the charter or a 
 
 1 See post, § 185, as to experts ; In 
 re Bonelli, L R 1 Prob. Div. 69; 
 Cartwright v. Cartwright, 26 W. R 
 684 ; Kennard v. Kennard, 63 N. H. 
 308. Cf. Donkt v. Thelluson, 8 C. B. 
 812. 
 
 '^ Sussex Peerage Case, 11 C. & F. 
 134. 
 
 3 Bristow v. Sequeville, L. R 5 Exch. 
 275. 
 
 4 Lacon v. Higgins, 3 Stark. 178. 
 See Story on Conf. of Laws, §§ 641, 
 642, aud the earlier cases there cited. 
 
 5 Mullen v. Morris, 2 Pa. St. 85; 
 Hempstead v. Read, 6 Conn. 480 ; 
 Hawes v. State, 7 S. Rep. 302; 88 
 Ala. 37 ; Falls v. United States Sav., 
 Loan & Bldg. Soc. (Ala., 1893), 13 S. 
 Rep. 25; Tennant v. Tennant, 110 
 Pa. St. 478 ; 1 Atl. Rep. 532 ; Leach v. 
 Linde, 24 N. Y. S. 176; Kean v. Rice, 
 12 S. & R 203; Greasens v. Davis, 9 
 Iowa, 219 ; Raynham v. Canton, 3 
 Pick. 293. Under a statute rendering 
 admissible printed decisions of the 
 courts of a foreign state, dissenting 
 
 opinions are not admissible. Chicago, 
 etc. Co. v. Tuite, 44 111. App. 535. 
 
 6 Railroad Co. v. Johnson (Ga., 
 1893), 16 S. E Rep. 49. 
 
 1 See post, § 242 ; City v. Dunn, 1 
 McCord (S. C), 333; Metrop. St. R 
 Co. v. Johnson (Ga., 1893), 16 S. E. 
 Rep. 49 ; Louisville, etc. Co. v. Shires, 
 108 111. 617; Baily v. State (Neb., 
 1890), 47 N. W. Rep. 208; Pugh v. 
 Little Rock, 35 Ark. 75; Black v. 
 Jacksonville, 36 111. 301; Fitch v. 
 Pinckard, 5 111. 78 ; Chicago v. Engle, 
 76 id. 317. The written records of 
 the corporation purporting to con- 
 tain the ordinances, coming from the 
 custody of the town clerk and prop- 
 erly identified as a municipal record, 
 have been received to prove ordi- 
 nances. People v. Wilson, 62 Hun, 
 612; Barnes v. City, 89 Ala. 602; 
 Tipton v. Norman, 72 Mo. 380 ; Ot- 
 tumwa v. Schaub, 52 Iowa, 515 ; 
 Stewart v. Clinton, 79 Mo. 604 ; Eich- 
 enlaub v. St. Joseph (Mo., 1893), 21 
 S. W. Rep. 8.
 
 214: JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. [§ 14:3(1. 
 
 general statute that an ordinance may be proved by reading 
 it from a printed volume published under municipal authority 
 and purporting to contain the municipal by-laws. Where 
 this is the case, the method of proving ordinances assimilates 
 closel3 r to that employed in proving foreign or private stat- 
 utes and the same principles of law are applicable. 1 
 
 Proof of the power to enact the ordinance may be re- 
 quired ; 2 and if by statute certain formalities, such as an adop- 
 tion by a majority vote, recording in books kept for the pur- 
 pose, signature by the mayor or publication are prescribed as 
 necessary to its validity, strict compliance therewith must be 
 shown. 3 Where objection is not made prior to the reception 
 of the ordinance in evidence, it will be presumed that it was 
 properly enacted. 4 A compliance with such statutory require- 
 ments must ordinarily be proved by the journal of the mu- 
 nicipal council, 5 though it has been held that, where the record 
 was silent, the fact that an ordinance had been signed could be 
 proved by the parol evidence of the official whose duty it 
 was to sign ordinances. 6 
 
 A sworn certificate of the publisher of a newspaper in 
 which an ordinance was published is satisfactory evidence of 
 publication, 7 though it has been held, in the absence of statute, 
 
 i Barr v. Auburn, 89 111. 361 ; State 48 Fed. Rep. 278 ; 54 Fed. Rep. 100 ; 
 
 v. King, 37 Iowa, 462 ; Napman v. Heller v. City of Alvarado, 20 S. W. 
 
 People, 19 Mich. 352 ; Independence Rep. 1003 ; 1 Tex. Civ. App. 409 ; 
 
 v. Trouvalle, 15 Kan. 70 ; Lindsay v. Seattle v. Doran, 5 Wash. St. 482 ; 
 
 Chicago, 115 111. 120; Prell v. Mc- Whitney v. Port Huron, 50 N. W. 
 
 Donald, 7 Kan. 446 ; Holly v. Ben- Rep. 316 ; 88 Mich. 268 ; Hutchison 
 
 nett, 46 Minn. 386. See, also, ante, v. Mount Vernon, 40 111. App. 19. 
 
 § 143. Where a written or printed * Flora v. Lee, 5 111. App. 629. 
 
 copy of an ordinance is known to 5 Lexington v. Headley, 5 Bush 
 
 exist, the ordinance cannot be proved (Ky.), 508 ; Bank v. Grenada, 54 Fed. 
 
 by parol evidence, but the writing Rep. 100 ; Ball v. Fagg, 67 Mo. 481 ; 
 
 itself must be produced as the best Covington v. Ludlow, 1 Mete. (Ky.) 
 
 evidence. Stewart v. Clinton, 79 Mo. 295 ; People v. Murray, 57 Mich, 396 ; 
 
 604; Baker v. Scofield, 58 Ga. 182. Solomon v. Hughes, 24 Kan. 211. 
 
 -Elizabethtown v. Lefler,23 111. 90. 6 Knight v. Kans. etc. Co., 70 Mo. 
 
 'Schott v. People, 89 111. 195 ; Lar- 231. 
 kin v. Railroad Co. (Iowa, 1892), 52 7 See post, § 145 ; Albia v. G'Hara, 
 N. W. Rep. 480; Willard v. Killing- 64 Iowa, 297; Kettering v. Jackson- 
 worth, 8 Conn. 247; Raker v. Ma- ville, 50 111. 39 ; Schwartz v. Oshkosh, 
 quon, 9 111. App. 155 ; National Bank 55 Wis. 490. 
 of Commerce v. Town of Grenada,
 
 § 144.] JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. 215 
 
 that publication may be shown by the evidence of a person 
 who saw a cop} 7, of the ordinance posted in some conspicuous 
 public place. 1 But such a method of publication will not bo 
 valid if publication in a newspaper is required by statute, or 
 if a newspaper is published in the town and publication could 
 have readily been made therein. 2 
 
 In conformity with the rule of construction that a statute 
 or written law has no legal existence except in the language 
 in which it was enacted, an ordinance which is required to be 
 published in a German paper must be printed in English 
 where there is no express statutory provision to the contrary. 3 
 
 § 144. Effect of public documents as evidence. — The prin- 
 ciples upon which a certified copy of a public writing is ad- 
 missible as primary evidence of the record are identical with 
 those which have been explained 4 as regulating the admission 
 of the entries of third parties when constituting a part of the 
 res gestae. The credibility of private and public entries is based 
 upon the same considerations, namely, that they were made 
 by a party whose duty it was to make them, who had compe- 
 tent knowledge of the subject-matter, that they are relevant, 
 and are within the scope of official, professional or private 
 employment. The production of the books themselves is nec- 
 essary as the best evidence of private entries. They do not 
 purport prima facie to be authentic, 5 but their original char- 
 acter and correctness must be proved by an oath of the person 
 who made them, or, if he cannot be produced, by the evidence 
 of some other competent witness. 6 
 
 As respects copies of public writings certified to by public 
 officials, it may be said that they are evidence of all the facts 
 they contain. 7 But a record is not evidence of any fact 
 
 iNewhan v. Aurora, 14 111. 364; v. Keen, 18 Wall. (U. S.)342; Whitcher 
 
 Teft v. Size, 10 id. 432; Eldora v. v. McLaughlin, 115 Mass. 167; Erwin 
 
 Burlingame, 62 Iowa, 33. v. English, 61 Conn. 502 ; Hancock 
 
 2 Raker v. Maquon, 9 111. App. 155. v. Flynn, 8 N. Y. S. 133 ; White v. 
 
 3 State v. City of Orange, 22 Atl. Whitney, 83 Cal. 163. 
 
 Rep. 804; 54 N. J. L. 111. t Falls Ld. Co. v. Chisolm (Tex., 
 
 4 §§ 58-61. 1888), 9 S. W. Rep. 479 ; Bingham v. 
 & Bradley v. Silsbee, 33 Mich. 328. Cabot, 3 Dall. 19, 23, 39-41 ; Radcliff 
 6 Chenango Bank v. Lewis, 63 Barb. v. Insurance Co., 7 Johns. 38, 51; 
 
 111 ; State v. Phair, 48 Vt. 366; Cul- Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 111. 299; Root 
 ver v. Marks, 122 Ind. 554 ; Mulhall v. King, 7 Cowen, 617 ; Darcy v. Mc-
 
 216 
 
 JUDICIAL AND OTIIER PUBLIC RECORDS. 
 
 [§ 144. 
 
 not required to be recorded by the officer who has made the 
 entry. 1 Thus, a marriage register, while admissible to prove 
 the fact and date of the marriage, cannot be used to show the 
 age of either contracting party. 2 Nor is a certificate of bap- 
 tism admissible to prove a person's age or place of birth, 
 though his age may be mentioned in it. 3 The date and fact 
 of the commitment or discharge of a prisoner may be shown 
 by the prison records, 4 and records of municipal corporations 
 and official boards are generally admissible to prove official 
 and municipal acts required to be recorded. 5 The registry of 
 a ship, being a local and municipal requirement, is not recog- 
 nized by international law as evidence of the facts which 
 it contains. It is only admissible as evidence of ownership 
 when corroborated by circumstances which will render it 
 equivalent to an admission, 6 for a legal and nominal owner- 
 ship is consistent with one equitable and real in some other 
 person. For this reason a register is never evidence in favor 
 of a person claiming ownership. 7 Log-books when required 
 
 Carthy, 35 Kan. 722 (copy of letter 
 of receiver of land office). The writ- 
 ing, whether public or private, should 
 be confined to those facts which are 
 desired to be proved by the part} 7 , 
 and his adversary cannot be allowed 
 to treat the documents as evidence 
 for all purposes and use them on 
 cross-examination for other objects. 
 Close v. Stuyvesant (111., 1890), 24 N. 
 E. Rep. 868 ; Erie & Pac. Des. v. Stan- 
 ley, 123 111. 158; 14 N. E. Rep. 212; 
 Murray v. Suen, 41 La. Ann. 1109; 7 
 S. Rep. 126. 
 
 1 McGuirk v. Mut. Ben. Life Ins. 
 Co., 20 N. Y. S. 908; 66 Hun, 628; 
 Berry v. Hull (N. M., 1893), 30 Pac. 
 Rep. 36 ; Durfee v. Abbott. 61 Mich. 
 471 ; Lavin v. Mutual Aid Society, 
 74 Wis. 349 ; Hunt v. Chosen Friends, 
 64 Mich. 671 ; Carrington v. Potter, 
 37 Fed. Rep. 767; Hall v. Aitken, 25 
 Neb. 360 ; Brundred v. Del Hoyo, 20 
 N. J. L. 328; Fitler v. Shotwell, 7 
 Watts & S. 14 ; Evanston v. Gunn, 99 
 
 U. S. 660 (signal service record) ; The 
 Maria, 32 L. J. Adm. 163. 
 
 2 Doe v. Barnes, 1 M. & R. 386, 389. 
 
 3 Clark v. Trinity Church, 5 Watts 
 & Serg. 266 ; Blackburn v. Crawford, 
 3 Wall. 189; Morrisey v. Ferry Co., 
 47 Mo. 521 ; Derby v. Salem, 30 Vt. 
 722. 
 
 4 Rex v. Aickles, 1 Lead. Cr. Cas. 
 435 ; Salte v. Thomas, 3 B. & P. 188. 
 See post, §§341-345. 
 
 5 See ante, § 143a; Worcester v. 
 Northborough, 140 Mass. 400; Ron- 
 kendorf v. Taylor, 4 Pet. 349 ; Halleck 
 v. Boylston, 117 Mass. 469. Contra, 
 Buffalo L. T. & S. D. Co. v. Associa- 
 tion (N. Y., 1891), 27 N. E. Rep. 942. 
 
 6 Merchants' N. Co. v. Amsden, 25 
 111. App. 607. 
 
 7 Bixby v. Franklin Ins. Co., 8 Pick. 
 86 ; Rexford v. Snow, 46 Hun, 570 ; 
 Tinkler v. Walpole, 14 East, 226; 
 Weston v. Penniman, 1 Mason, 306, 
 318; Colsen v. Benzey, 6 Greenl. 
 (Me.) 474; Mclver v. Humble, 16 East, 
 169, cited in 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 494.
 
 § 145.] 
 
 JUDICIAL AND OTHER rUBLIO RECORDS. 
 
 217 
 
 by statute are admissible as public records to show prima 
 facie the facts required to be recorded in them. Otherwise 
 entries in log-books are mere private entries, depending for 
 admissibility upon their character as admissions or as a part 
 of the res gestce} 
 
 § 145. Historical and scientific books and publications — 
 Almanacs and newspapers. — While the decisions are some- 
 what at variance, it may be said that books, maps or plans, 
 or publications relating to historical or scientific subjects of 
 widespread and general interest and notoriety which have, 
 from long public and general use, become recognized au- 
 thorities, will be received to prove facts treated therein. 2 
 Maps made by surveyors or published by governmental au- 
 thority have sometimes been admitted as relevant evidence in 
 case of disputed boundaries, or where distances between places 
 are in question. If the map was published by legislative au- 
 thority, it should be certified as authentic by the secretary of 
 state or other proper official. 3 Private maps and plats should 
 be verified by the testimony of the surveyor who made them 
 
 1 The Hercules, 1 Sprague, 534 
 Orne v. Townsend, 4 Mason, 544 
 United States v. Gibert, 2 Surnn. 19 
 Abbott on Shipping, p. 46S. 
 
 2 Roderiquez v. State (Tex., 1893), 
 22 S. W. Eep. 97S ; Com. v. King, 150 
 Mass. 233 ; Polhill v. Brown, 84 Ga. 
 342 (Map) ; Washburn v. Cuddihy, 8 
 Gray, 430; Morris v. Hanner, 7 Pet. 
 504. Cf. Vaux Peerage. 5 C. & F. 538 ; 
 Schell v. Plumb 55 N Y. 592 ; Com. 
 v. Wilson, 1 Gray, 337 ; Quackenbush 
 v. Railroad Co., 35 N. W. Rep. 523; 
 73 Iowa, 45S ; Ashworth v. Kittredge, 
 12 Cush. 93; Smith v. Navasota, 72 
 Tex. 422 ; Worcester v. Northborough, 
 140 Mass. 397; Ming v. Foote, 23 
 Pac. Rep. 515. See article in 26 Am. 
 Law Rev. 390. " Historical facts of 
 general and public notoriety may be 
 proved by reputation ; and that may 
 be established by historical works of 
 known character and accuracy. But 
 evidence of this sort is confined in a 
 
 great measure to ancient facts which 
 do not presuppose better evidence, 
 and where from the nature of the 
 transaction, or the remoteness of the 
 period, or the public and general re- 
 ception of the facts, a just founda- 
 tion is laid for general confidence. 
 The work of a living author who is 
 within reach of process is not of this 
 nature. He may be called as a wit- 
 ness and examined as to the sources 
 and accuracy of his information." 
 Story, J., in Morris v. Lessee of 
 Harmcr's Heirs, 7 Pet. 558 ; 1 Greenl. 
 Evid., § 497 ; 1 Whart. Evid., gg 338, 
 664. 
 
 3 Nosier v. Railroad Co., 73 Iowa, 
 268; Armendiaz v. Stillman, 67 Tex. 
 458 ; 3 S. W. Rep. 678 ; Com. v. King, 
 150 Mass. 221; 22 N. E. Rep. 205; 
 Polhill v. Brown, 84 Ga. 338 ; 10 S. E 
 Rep. 921 ; Donohue v. Whitney, 133 
 N. Y. 178; Ming v. Foote (Mont, 
 1890), 23 Pac. Rep. 513.
 
 21S 
 
 JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. 
 
 [§ 146. 
 
 or by some other competent witness who will swear to their 
 correctness. 1 
 
 In an action to recover for personal injuries or a wrongful 
 death, life and mortality tables in general use are, if identified, 
 admissible to show the expectation of life. 2 A newspaper 
 may be received in evidence to prove facts which a statute 
 provides shall be published in it, such, for example, as laws 
 passed by the legislature, notices in legal proceedings, the 
 formation and dissolution of a partnership, and the like. 3 An 
 almanac is admissible to show facts recorded therein, not 
 strictly as evidence of such facts, but rather to refresh the 
 memory of the court and jury, where they are such (e. g., the 
 rising and setting of the sun and moon) as courts are bound 
 to notice judicially. 4 
 
 § 146. Proof of judicial records. — A judicial record is an 
 accurate history of a suit from its origin to its termination, 
 including the conclusion of law thereon, drawn up by the 
 
 i Roe v. Strong, 107 N. Y. 356; 
 Com. v. Lurtzer, 19 Atl. Rep. 681 ; 
 26 W. N. C. 46 ; Donohue v. Whitney, 
 133 N. Y. 178. As to the admissi- 
 bility of field-notes of surveyors 
 where questions of boundaries are 
 involved, see Holliday v. Maddox, 39 
 Kan. 359; 18 Pac. Rep. 99; Dugger 
 v. Nickerson, 100 N. C. 1 ; 6 S. E. Rep. 
 746. A map showing an ancient 
 survey on which a more recent sur- 
 vey is based is not itself admissible 
 to corroborate the later survey, 
 though it may be relevant as evi- 
 dence of reputation to contradict it. 
 Wyatt v. Duncan (Tex., 1893), 22 S. 
 W. Rep. 665. To prove the accuracy 
 of a private survey, evidence that 
 other surveys made by the same sur- 
 veyor had been found correct is ad- 
 missible. Schunior v. Russell, 83 
 Tex. 83. But where the accuracy of 
 the map is not shown affirmatively, 
 still it may be used by a surveyor in 
 giving evidence to explain his testi- 
 mony to the jury. Griffith v. Rife, 
 72 Tex. 185 ; 12 S. W. Rep. 168 ; Dob- 
 
 son v. Whisivant, 101 N. C. 645 ; 8 S. 
 E. Rep. 126. 
 
 2 Richmond, etc. Co. v. Hissong 
 (Ala., 1893), 13 S. Rep. 209 ; 13 id. 130 ; 
 Morrison v. McAfee (Oreg., 1893), 32 
 Pac. Rep. 400 ; Greer v. Louisville, 
 etc. Co. (Ky., 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 649 ; 
 Seagel v. Railroad Co., 83 Iowa, 380; 
 Steinbrunner v. Railroad Co., 146 Pa. 
 St 504. 
 
 3 See ante, §§ 141a, 143a, 150a. 
 Price-currents have also been ad- 
 mitted to show the market value of 
 merchandise. 1 Whart. Evid., §§ 671- 
 675. 
 
 * See §§ 237, 241 ; Mobile, etc. Co. v. 
 Ladd, 9 S. Rep. 169; 92 Ala. 287 
 Munshower v. State, 55 Md. 11 
 Sisson v. Railroad Co., 14 Mich. 497 
 Kilgour v. Miles, 6 G. & J. (Md.) 274 
 People v. Cheekee, 61 Cal. 404 ; Reed 
 v. Wilson, 41 N. J. L. 29 ; Finney v. 
 Callendar, 8 Minn. 41 ; Brough v. 
 Perkins, 6 Mod. 81 ; Sprowl v. Law- 
 rence. 33 Ala. 674 ; Sascer v. Bank, 4 
 Md. 420.
 
 § 146.] JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. 219 
 
 proper officer, for the purpose of perpetuating the exact state 
 of the facts. 1 " Records are memorials or remembrances, in 
 rolls of parchment, now paper, of the proceedings and acts of 
 a court of justice, which hath power to hold pleas." 2 At 
 common law a judicial record might be proved by the record 
 itself, and this originally was the only manner of proof in a 
 plea of mil tiel record? Records might also be proved by 
 exemplified copies, or by duly authenticated copies certified 
 by an officer of the court, or by an examined copy sworn to 
 by a person who has made it or compared it with the original. 
 
 Exemplified copies are copies under the great seal attached in 
 chancery to which the record was brought up by a writ of certio- 
 rari or under the seal of the court to which the record belonged. 4 
 In America a copy exemplified under the seal of the court in 
 which the record belongs has been from an early date ad- 
 missible as evidence both at common law and by statute. 
 Such a copy is conclusive as proof even on the issue of nul 
 tiel record? 
 
 An office copy of a record is a copy authenticated by a cer- 
 tificate of an officer authorized to furnish copies, 6 and at com- 
 mon law it will be received upon his credit in the court where 
 the record belongs as of equal value to the original. If, as is 
 usually the rule throughout the United States, the court offi- 
 cer is authorized or directed by statute to furnish copies to all 
 applicants, and if his certified copy has been made primary 
 evidence of the original, then the . certified or office copy will 
 be received in any court under the same supreme jurisdiction. 7 
 
 An examined copy is one which the witness has compared 
 
 1 Davidson v. Murphy, 13 Conn, seems that if the court has no seal 
 317. none need be affixed. Com. v. 
 
 2 Coke Lit. 260a. Phillips, 11 Pick. 30; Com. v. Down- 
 it Co. Lit. 260a; 3 Bl. Com. 24, 331. ing, 4 Gray, 29. The records of the 
 
 4 Bull. N. P. 226, 227 ; 3 Inst. 173. Confederate courts are not provable 
 
 5 Boyce v. Auditor, 51 N. W. Rep. by copies. Schaben's Estate, 6 Ct of 
 457 ; 90 Mich. 314 ; Gunn v. Howell, CI. 230. 
 
 35 Ala. 144; Ladd v. Blunt, 4 Mass. 6 Bull. N. P. 229. 
 
 402; Vance v. Reardon, 2 Nott & 7 See §243; Flack v. Andrews, 86 
 
 McC. 299 ; Com. v. Phillips, 11 Pick. Ala. 395. In the absence of statute 
 
 28 ; Watrous v. Cunningham, 71 Cal. it may be presumed that the clerk 
 
 30 ; Mackey v. B. & P. Co., 19 D. C. has authority to furnish exemplified 
 
 282 ; Halluni v. Dickisou, 47 Ark. copies. Gunn v. Peakes, 36 Minn. 177. 
 126; Vail v. Smith, 4 Cow. 71. It
 
 220 
 
 JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. 
 
 [§ 146. 
 
 Avith the contents of the original record or with what the 
 officer or other person has read as such and which he is ready 
 to swear is a true copy. It is necessary, however, in proving 
 a record by an examined copy to show that the original record 
 was complete 1 and was found in the proper custody and 
 place, 2 though it is not absolutely essential for the persons 
 comparing the copies with the record to read them alternately. 3 
 
 The record itself is always admissible where a copy of it 
 would be received. 4 If the record would be inadmissible, of 
 course the copy is also inadmissible. 5 As a matter of practice, 
 however, at least in modern times, the production of the 
 records is usually dispensed with, the court being satisfied 
 with a literally exact copy of the record certified by the clerk 
 or exemplified by the court seal. 6 
 
 Where the court has power to set aside a verdict it is nec- 
 essary, in proving the verdict by a copy of the record, to show 
 what judgment was docketed by the clerk, for it may be that 
 the verdict was set aside. 7 This is not required where the 
 court has no power to set the verdict aside, 8 or in the trial of 
 
 i Heath v. Page, 60 Pa. St. 108. 
 
 2 Woods v. Banks, 14 N. H. 101 ; 
 Goodrich v. Weston, 102 Mass. 363. 
 
 3 Rolfe v. Dart, 2 Taunt. 52 : Lynde 
 v. Judd, 3 Day (Conn.), 499 ; Hill v. 
 Packard, 5 Wend. 387; Reed v. 
 Lamb, 6 Jur. 828. Cf. 1 Whart. 
 Evid., § 94; Dodge v. Gallatin, 130 
 N. Y. 117. A judgment of a court of 
 record cannot be proven by the 
 judge's minutes. Moore v. Bruner, 31 
 111. App. 400. 
 
 4 See § 142c; State v. Bartlett, 47 
 Ind. 396; Folsom v. Cressy, 73 Me. 
 270; Gray v. Davis, 27 Conn. 447; 
 Johnson v. Wakulla, 9 S. Rep. 690; 
 28 Fla. 720. 
 
 5 Meegan v. Boyle, 19 How. (U. S.) 
 130; Lamberton v. Windom. 18 
 Minn. 506 ; State v. Wells, 11 Ohio, 
 261. 
 
 6 Davenport v. Mahon (Pa., 1892), 
 6 Kulp, 350 ; State v. Orrick, 106 Mo. 
 Ill ; Cofer v. Schening(Ala., 1893), 13 
 S. Rep. 123 ; Mackey v. B. & P. Co., 19 
 
 D. C. 282. Where an issue is raised 
 upon the existence of a domestic ju- 
 dicial record, the question, though 
 one of fact, is for the court alone, on 
 the theory that the judge can exam- 
 ine the very record itself. Currier v. 
 Richardson, 63 Vt. 617; Hall v. Will- 
 iams, 6 Pick. 237 ; Carter v. Wilson, 
 1 Dev. & Bat 362. As respects for- 
 eign records provable only by copy, 
 the question, turning on the authen- 
 ticity of a paper, is for the jury. 
 Kentzer v. Kentzer, 3 Wash. St. 166; 
 Adams v. Betz, 1 Watts (Pa.), 425 ; 
 State v. Isham, 3 Hawks (S. C), 185; 
 Baldwin v. Hale, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 
 272 ; Trotter v. Mills, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 512 ; De Sobry v. De Laistre, 2 Har. 
 & J. (Md.) 191. 
 
 7 Ayrey v. Davenport, 2 N. R. 474 ; 
 Donaldson v. Jude, 2 Bibb, 60. Cf. 
 Baldridge v. Foust (Neb.), 44 N. W. 
 Rep. 110. 
 
 SFelter v. Mulliner, 2 Johns. 181.
 
 §147.] JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC BEGOBDS. 221 
 
 an issue of fact out of a court of equity, 1 or where the only 
 fact to be shown is that a verdict was rendered. 2 
 
 § 147. Proof of records of court of equity and of courts 
 of inferior jurisdiction.— The rules applicable to the proof 
 of records of a court of common law are generally recognized 
 in proving the decrees and orders of courts of equity. 3 If 
 it is only sought to prove the fact that a decree was ren- 
 dered, copies of the pleadings upon which it was based need 
 not be furnished, though, if the decree is pleaded in bar, it 
 will be necessary to show the whole record as respects the 
 matter in question. 4 
 
 An answer in equity may, in the absence of statute, be 
 proved in civil cases by an examined copy, 5 though in a pros- 
 ecution for perjury committed in an answer it is required to 
 produce the original with proof that the party was sworn. 6 
 In either case the identity of the party must be shown, and 
 this may be done by proof of his handwriting or otherwise. 7 
 
 In consequence of the looseness and lack of system with 
 which the records of inferior courts are so often kept, the 
 rigid requirements of the common law respecting the proof 
 of judicial records are relaxed as concerns them. 8 If the in- 
 ferior court is of record (and that it is will be presumed), the 
 record may be proved at common law by an exemplified or 
 certified copy. 9 
 
 1 Pitton v. Walter, 1 Stra. 162. The clerk must of necessity take 
 
 2 Barlow v. Dupuy, 1 Mart. 442. down the doings of the court iu brief 
 
 3 See ante, § 146; Blower v. Hollis, notes. This he usually does in a 
 1 Cromp. & Mees. 396; 4 Com. Dig. minute-book called the 'docket,' from 
 97, tit. "Evidence," c. 1; Cofer v. which a full, extended and intelligi- 
 Schening (Ala., 1893), 13 S. Rep. 123. ble record is afterwards to be made 
 
 4 Wiuans v. Dunham, 5 Wend. 47; up. Until they can be so made, these 
 
 Wilson v. Conine, 2 Johns. 280. Cf. short notes must stand as the rec- 
 
 Thomas v. Stewart, 92 Ind. 246. ord." Pruden v. Alden. 23 Pick. 187 ; 
 
 5 1 Story's Eq. PI., §§ 870-876. 1 Greenl. on EvkL, § 513; Holt v. 
 
 6 Rex v. Morris, 2 Burr. 1189; Rex Maverick (Tex., 1894), 24 S. W. Rep. 
 
 v. Rensen, 2 Campb. 508. 532 ; Holcomb v. Cornish, 8 Conn. 
 
 "Rex v. Morris, 5 Burr. 1189; Hen- 375; Todd v. Johnson (Minn., 1892), 
 
 nell v. Lyon, 1 B. & Aid. 182. See 52 N. W. Rep. 864 ; Baldwin v. Prouty, 
 
 § 129, " Identity." 13 Johns. 430 ; Com. v. Balkom, 3 
 
 8 Miller v. Knapp, 26 W. N. C. 29. Pick. 281; State v. Bartlett, 47 Me. 
 
 9 "The courts are to take notice how 396; Goldstone v. Davidson, 19 Cal. 
 the records of their own and of other 41; Lancaster v. Lane, 19 III. 242. 
 courts are in fact made and kept. See cases in note 3, infra, p. 227.
 
 222 JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. [§ 148. 
 
 Where the court has no seal, an exemplification may be 
 dispensed with, 1 and if there is no clerk the judge may act as 
 such. 2 Unless a strict compliance with a statutory form of 
 certification is required, any authentication affixed to a tran- 
 script of the record substantially identifying and authenticat- 
 ing it will suffice. 3 But where no record is kept, or where it 
 is incomplete or fragmentary, the proceeding in inferior courts 
 may be proven by the production of the justice's docket, 4 of 
 ■the original writ and pleadings, supplemented by the oath of 
 the justice or clerk or of some other competent witness. 5 
 
 The certification of the records of courts of justices of the 
 peace is now largely regulated by statute, which should in- 
 variably be consulted. As respects the authentication of for- 
 eign judgments of justices' courts, the prevalent requirement 
 is that the transcript of the record or the certificate of the 
 judgment or other judicial act shall be signed by the justice 
 and his clerk, if there be any, and that to this authentication 
 shall be attached a certificate of a clerk of some superior court 
 of record. certifying to the capacity of the justice himself. 5 
 
 § 148. Proof of records of the courts of other states. — 
 By the federal constitution it is enacted that "full faith and 
 credit shall be given, in each state, to the public acts, records 
 and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the con- 
 gress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which 
 
 1 Cora. v. Downing, 4 Gray, 29, 30. W. Rep. 532 ; Dyson v. Wood, 3 B. & C. 
 
 2 Statement v. Hinchman, 27 Pa. 449, 451; Strong v. Bradley, 13 Vt 9; 
 St 479 ; Case v. Huey, 26 Kan. 353. Carpenter v. Willett, 18 How. Pr. 400 ; 
 
 3 Shea v. Man. R, Co., 8 N. Y. S. 332 ; Shea v. Man. Ry. Co., 8 N. Y. S. 332. 
 Am. Emi. Co. v. Fuller (Iowa, 1892), A recital in a transcript of a record 
 50 N. W. Rep. 48 ; Mackey v. B. & of a justice's court that a party was 
 P. R. Co., 19 D. C. 282 ; Swope v. duly served is conclusive of that fact 
 Paul (Ind., 1892), 31 N. E. Rep. 42; (Payne v. Taylor, 34 111. App. 491), and 
 English v. Sprague, 33 Me. 440; Com. service may be shown by parol. Wil- 
 v. Ford, 14 Gray, 399 ; McGrath v. kerson v. Schoonmaker, 77 Tex. 615. 
 Seagrave, 4 Allen, 443; Baur v. Beal 6 Trader v. McKee, 2 111. 558; Dra- 
 (Colo., 1890), 23 Pac. Rep. 345; Stamper goo v. Graham, 9 Ind. 212; Bank v. 
 v. Gay (Wyo., 1890), 23 Pac. Rep. 69; Evans, 32 Iowa, 202; Gay v. Lloyd, 
 Webster v. Daniel, 47 Ark. 131 ; Mc- 1 Greene (Iowa), 78 ; Bank v. Hardin, 
 Dermott v. Barnum, 19 Mo. 204. 1 Wright (Ohio), 430 ; Belton v. 
 
 * Beardsley v. Brame, 85 Cal. 134. Fisher, 44 111. 32 ; N. Y. Code C. P. 
 5 Holt v. Maverick (Tex., 1894), 24 S. 939 ; Beirn v. Borst, 5 Wend. 292.
 
 § 148.] JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. 223 
 
 such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the 
 effect thereof." l 
 
 In carrying out this provision congress has prescribed that 
 " the records and judicial proceedings of the courts of any 
 state shall be proved or admitted in any other court within 
 the United States by the attestation of the clerk and the seal 
 of the court annexed, if there be a seal, together with a cer- 
 tificate of the judge, chief justice or presiding magistrate, as 
 the case may be, that the said attestation is in due form. And 
 the said records and judicial proceedings, authenticated as 
 aforesaid, shall have such faith and credit given to them in 
 every court within the United States as they have by law or 
 usage in the courts of the state from whence such records are 
 or shall be taken." 2 
 
 In construing this statute, the attestation by the clerk must 
 be in the form regularly employed in the state in which the 
 record belongs. If, as is essential, it is so certified by the 
 judge of the court, 3 the judge's certificate, which is the only 
 admissible evidence of that fact/ is conclusive. 5 , If the court 
 has a seal it must be affixed to the clerk's attestation, 6 while 
 if it has none, this fact should appear in the attestation or 
 certificate. 7 
 
 In conformity with the requirement that the copy shall be 
 attested by the clerk, an attestation by an under or deputy 
 clerk will cause the transcript to be rejected, 8 though certified 
 
 i Const U. S., art. IV, § 1. 4 Smith v. Blagge, 1 Johns. Cas. 238 ; 
 
 2 Statute U. S., May 26, 1790 (U. S. Holdridge v. Marsh, 30 Mo. App. 352. 
 
 Stats, at Large, L. & B. Ed., 122) : & Ferguson v. Harwood, 7 Cranch, 
 
 Hall v. McKay, 78 Tex. 248 ; Rand v. 408; Bean v. Loryea, 81 Cal. 151; 
 
 Hanson (Mass., 1891), 28 N. E. Rep. 6 ; Andrews v. Flack, 88 Ala. 294. 
 
 Susenbach v. Wagner, 41 Minn. 108; •> Turner v. Waddington, 3 Wash. 
 
 Rea v. Scully, 76 Iowa, 343. The pro- 126 ; Allen v. Thaxter, 1 Blackf. 399 : 
 
 ceedings of the courts of the Cher- Dunlap v. Waldo, 6 N. H. 450. 
 
 okee nation and of the territories are 7 Kirkland v. Smith, 2 Mart (N. S.) 
 
 under the operation of this provision. 497 ; Craig v. Brown, 1 Pet. 352, 353 ; 
 
 Mehlin v. Ice, 56 Fed. Rep. 12. Simons v. Cooks, 29 Iowa, 324 ; Strode 
 
 » Van Storch v. Griffin, 71 Pa. St v. Churchill, 2 Litt (Ky.) 75. 
 
 240 ; Craig v. Brown, 1 Pet C. C. 352 ; 8 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 506 ; Dono- 
 
 Burnell v. Weld, 76 N. Y. 103 ; Drum- hoo v. Brannon, 1 Overt 328 ; Sam- 
 
 mond v. Magruder, 9 Cranch, 122 ; son v. Overton, 4 Bibb, 409 ; Thomas 
 
 Shown v. Barr, 29 Iowa, 296. v. Tanner, 6 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 152 ;
 
 224; JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. [§ 148. 
 
 by the judge to be in due form, 1 unless the court has no clerk, 
 the judge discharging his duties, and these facts are stated in 
 the certificate. 2 The certificate of the judge must show that 
 he is the chief or presiding judge of the court, 3 and that he 
 was such at the time of certifying the copy of the records, 4 
 though if the court has no chief judge, a certification by all 
 the judges will not be rejected. 5 If the certificate is by the 
 "first judge" or senior judge it will be necessary to show 
 aliunde that he was the presiding or chief judge. 6 A cer- 
 tificate signed by a chief circuit judge of a certain district 
 must show on its face that the court from which the record 
 purports to issue is in his circuit and that he is the presiding 
 judge of that court. 7 The presiding judge must state that at- 
 testation is in due form, 8 and that the clerk certifying was at 
 the date thereof the clerk of the court. 9 Where the court no 
 longer exists, the clerk and presiding judge of a court with 
 which its records and powers have been consolidated may fur- 
 nish the requisite attestation. 10 
 
 This statutory mode of authenticating records is not exclu- 
 sive of any other mode which a court may deem proper. 11 In- 
 
 Schnertzell v. Young, 3 H. & McHen. 1 Elliott v. McClelland, 17 Ala. 206 ; 
 
 (Md.) 502. Randall v. Burtis, 57 Tex. 362 ; Geron 
 
 i Morris v. Patchin, 24 N. Y. 394 v. Felder, 15 Ala. 304. 
 
 Contra, Young v. Glinzer, 1 Greene 8 Ordway v. Conroy, 4 Wis. 45. 
 
 (Iowa), 196. 9 Johnson v. Howe's Adm'r, 2 Stew. 
 
 2 Cox v. Jones, 52 Ga. 438 ; Low v. (Ala.) 27. 
 
 Burrows, 12 Cal. 181; Spencer v. 10 Darrah v. Watson, 36 Iowa, 116; 
 
 Langdon. 21 111. 192; Stewart v. Scott v. Blanchard, 8 Mart 303 ; Craig 
 
 Swazey, 23 Miss. 502. The official v. Brown, 1 Pet. C. C. 352 ; Hunt v. 
 
 occupying the dual capacity must at- Lyle, 8 Yerg. 142 ; Barbour v. Watts, 
 
 test as clerk and certify as judge. 2 A. K. Marsh. 290, 293 ; Balfour v. 
 
 Melius v. Houston, 41 Miss. 59, cases Chew, 5 Mart. 517; Clarke v. Rice. 
 
 supra. 15 R I. 132; Steere v. Tenney, 50 N. 
 
 3 Moyer v. Lyons, 38 Mo. App. 635; H. 461 (Confederate court). 
 
 Von Storch v. Griffin, 71 Pa. St. 240. " Thrasher v - Ballard, 33 W. Va. 
 
 4 Settle v. Allison, 8 Ga. 201 ; 285 ; Kingman v. Cowles, 103 Mass. 
 
 Stephenson v. Bannister, 3 Bibb, 369 ; 283 ; Ex parte Povall, 3 Leigh, 816 ; 
 
 Morris v. Patchin, 24 N. Y. 394 ; Pratt Kean v. Rice, 12 S. & R, 203, 208 ; 
 
 v. King, 1 Oreg. 49 ; Central Bank v. Pepoon v. Jenkins, 2 Johns. Cas. 119 ; 
 
 Veasey, 14 Ark. 671. Davis v. Furman, 21 Kan. 131 ; State 
 
 ■■» Arnold v.Frazier,5Strobh.(S.C.) 3. v. Hunter, 94 N. C. 829; Louisville, 
 
 e Hudson v. Daily, 13 Ala. 722. Cf. etc. Co. v. Parish (Ind., 1893), 33 N. E. 
 
 Taylor v. Kilgore, 33 id. 214 Rep. 122.
 
 § 149.] JUDIdAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. 225 
 
 asmuch as the statute by its terms refers only to courts having 
 seals, clerks and a presiding judge, it is inferred that courts 
 of limited powers and jurisdiction, as courts of justices of the 
 peace and municipal courts, whose procedure is usually regu- 
 lated by statute or local usage, and. varies greatly in different 
 states, are not included in it. The copies of proceedings of 
 such courts are therefore to be authenticated in the manner 
 prescribed by the laws of the state into whose courts they are 
 introduced. 1 
 
 The statute does not apply to the authentication of copies 
 of the record of a state court for use in a federal court or 
 vice versa, 2 or of copies of the record of one federal court to 
 be used in another, 3 or of copies or exemplifications of the 
 record of a private writing, as a deed or will recorded under 
 a state statute. 4 In such case a common-law exemplification 
 under the seal of the court will suffice. 5 
 
 If the requirements of the statute are substantially com- 
 plied with, a properly certified copy will not be rendered in- 
 admissible because of mere formal and verbal irregularities, 6 
 or because it does not show the identity of the party, 7 or the 
 grounds on which the judgment was based. 8 
 
 § 149. Proof of foreign judgments. — At common law the 
 records of foreign courts could be proved by exemplified 
 copies under seal of the foreign state, by sworn and examined 
 
 i Howard v. Coon, 93 Mich. 442 
 Blackvvell v. Glass, 43 Ark. 209 
 Bryan v. Farnsworth, 19 Minn. 239 
 Mahurin v. Bickford. 6 N. H. 567 
 Silver Lake v. Harding, 5 Ohio, 545 
 
 v. Hamilton, 90 Ala. 354 ; Hallum v. 
 Dickinson, 54 Ariz. 311 ; 15 S. W. Rep. 
 775. 
 
 7 Missouri Glass Co. v. Gregg (Tex., 
 1890), 16 S. W. Rep. 174. A certified 
 
 Blodgett v. Jordan, 6 Vt. 580 ; Brown copy of an assignment of a foreign 
 
 v. Edison, 23 Vt. 435. judgment constituting a part of the 
 
 2 Turnbull v. Payson, 95 U. S. 218; record is admissible as evidence of 
 
 Adams v. Way, 33 Conn. 419. Con- the assignment. Coughran v. Gil- 
 
 tra, Grant v. Levan, 4 Pa. St 393. man (Iowa, 1891), 46 N. W. Rep. 1005. 
 
 3 Mason v. Lawrason, 1 Cranch, So a properly authenticated certifi- 
 190. cate by a clerk of a court of probate 
 
 4 Russell v. Kearney, 27 Ga. 96 ; that a person is an administrator is 
 Carlisle v. Tuttle, 30 Ala. 613. sufficient. Abercrombie v. Stillman, 
 
 5 Meuster v. Spalding, 6 McLean, 24. 77 Tex. 589. 
 
 6 Bailey v. Martin, 119 Ind. 103; s Railroad Co. v. Thornton, 12 La. 
 Dwarak v. More, 25 Neb. 735, 741 ; Ann. 736. 
 
 Gunn v. Peakes, 36 Minn. 177; Bogan 
 15
 
 226 JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC KECOKDS. [§ 150. 
 
 copies, or by copies duly certified by an official authorized by 
 the foreign court. 1 The handwriting of certifying officers 
 must be proved where their certificates are not exemplified 
 by the great seal, 2 but the certificate of a notary to its genu- 
 ineness has been held sufficient. 3 The seal of the foreign court 
 must be proved, 4 though judicial notice will be taken of the 
 great seal of the foreign government and of the seals of courts 
 of admiralty. 5 If the court has no seal a seal will not be re- 
 quired, 6 but a stricter degree of proof of the clerk's signature 
 will perhaps be necessary. 7 
 
 As a general rule in the proof and construction of foreign 
 records, 8 a court will be entitled to every aid which will place 
 it exactly in the position of a court of similar jurisdiction in 
 the foreign state. It has a right, therefore, to require an ex- 
 planation of technical terms, to examine the certified foreign 
 copy, and' to require a translation of it if necessary, and proper 
 information bearing upon any special law 9 or peculiar rule of 
 construction which obtains in the foreign state. 10 
 
 § 150. Records of surrogates' courts. — A will is not ad- 
 missible as evidence until it has been probated in due form in 
 the surrogates' courts, 11 or in some court having power and 
 
 iGurm v. Peakes, 36 Minn. 177; ling v. Herman, 17 Mich. 524; Pick- 
 Church v. Chibbart, 2 Cranch, 228; But- ard v. Bailey, 26 N. H. 152; Thomp- 
 trick v. Allen, 8 Mass. 273 ; Pickard v. son v. Mason, 4 Bradw. (111.) 452 ,- 
 Bailey, 6 Foster (N. H.), 152. Cf. Kop- Delafield v. Hand, 3 Johns. 310. 
 perl v. Nagy, 37 111. App. 23. It seems 5 Lincoln v. Battelle, 6 Wend. 484 ; 
 doubtful whether a foreign record can Thompson v. Stewart, 3 Conn. 171; 
 be proved by an office copy or by a cer- Yeaton v. Fry, 5 Cranch, 335 ; post, 
 tified copy unless the certificate it- §§ 243, 244. 
 self has been properly exemplified 6 Packard v. Hill, 7 Cow. 434. 
 under the seal of the court from "Black v. Lord Bray brook, 2 Stark, 
 which it proceeds or by the great 7 ; Thompson v. Stewart, 3 Conn. 171. 
 seal of the state. Griswold v. Pit- 8 United States v. McRae, L. R. 3 
 cairn, 2 Conn. 85; Las Caygas v. Ch. 86; Dore v. Thornburgh (Cal., 
 Larionda, 4 Mart. (La.) 283 ; Packard 1891), 27 Pac. Rep. 30. 
 v. Hill, 7 Cow. 434 ; Peterman v. 9 Arkansas v. Bowen, 20 D. C. 291. 
 Laws, 6 Leigh (Va.), 523; Catlett v. ">Di Sora v. Phillips, 33 Law J. Ch. 
 Insurance Co., 1 Paine (U. S. C. Ct.), (H. L Cas.) 129 ; In re Cliffs Trusts 
 594; Stein v. Bowman, 13 Pet. 209; (1892), 2 Ch. 229. See article in 35 
 Cavam v. Stewart, 1 Stark. 523. Cent L J. 341. 
 
 2 See cases in last note. n Kittredge v. Folsom, 8 N. H. Ill ; 
 
 3 Yeaton v. Fry, 5 Cranch, 335. Ochoa v. Miller, 59 Tex. 461 ; Mour- 
 
 4 See post, § 244; Gardner v. Col. sund v. Priess (Tex., 1892), 19 S. W. 
 Ins. Co., 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 511 ; Cap- Rep. 775.
 
 § 150^.] JUDICIAL AND OTI7ER TUr.LTC RECORDS. 
 
 227 
 
 jurisdiction over the administration of the estates of dece- 
 dents; and in nearly all the states probate is conclusive of the 
 validity and testamentary character of the writing in regard 
 to both real and personal property. 1 
 
 After probate the will itself, 2 or a properly authenticated 
 copy, may be read in proof of any matter of fact therein to 
 which it is relevant. 3 Where the fact of probate is in issue 
 the decree of the probate court, exemplified in the form which 
 is observed by courts of record in certifying to transcripts 
 from their records, is admissible as conclusive of the fact. 4 
 
 § 150a. Proof of returns on writs.— A return is a written 
 statement or certificate of a sheriff or other officer servinsr a 
 writ showing what he did, with particulars of time and place, 
 and it may be employed as primary evidence of his acts and 
 their result in executing the writ. The return should show 
 affirmatively that all the requirements of the law have been 
 strictly pursued, 5 and should state briefly the course pursued 
 by the officer in order that the court may be placed in a posi- 
 tion to decide upon its admissibility as evidence of service. 6 
 
 1 Dublin v. Chadbourne, 16 Mass. 
 433 ; Patten v. Tallman, 27 Me. 17 ; 
 Brown v. Wood, 17 Mass. 68, 72; Jud- 
 son v. Lake, 3 Day, 318; Lewis v. 
 Lewis, 5 La. 388 ; Bogardus v. Clark, 
 4 Paige, 623; Peeble's Appeals, 15 
 S. & R. 42 ; Tompkins v. Tompkins, 
 1 Stoiy, 547 ; Harrison v. Rowan, 3 
 Wash. C. C. 580 ; Darby v. Mayer, 10 
 Wheat 465. See post, § 143. See 
 contra, as to devises of real property, 
 Barker v. McFerran, 26 Pa. St. 211 ; 
 Harven v. Spring, 10 Ired. 80; Ran- 
 dall v. Hodges, 3 Bland. 47 ; Darbey 
 v. Mayer, 10 Wheat. 470; Robertson 
 v. Barbour, 6 B. Mon. 527. 
 
 2 Manning v. Purcell, 24 L. J. Ch. 
 523; Compton v. Bloxham, 2 Coll. 
 201; Child v, Ellsworth, 2 D. M. 
 & G. 683 ; Oppenheim v. Henry, 9 
 Hare, 802; Gauntlett v. Carter, 17 
 Beav. 590 ; Turner v. Hellard, 30 Ch. 
 D. 390. 
 
 s Hurst v. Mellinger, 73 Tex. 189 ; 
 Dupeyster v. Gagoni, 84 Ky. 403; 
 Lockwood v. Lockwood, 57 Hun, 337 ; 
 Nelson v. Potter. 50 N. J. L 636; 15 
 
 Atl. Rep. 375. See § 1416. In the 
 case of a foreign will it has been held 
 that it should be accompanied by a 
 copy of the order of probate. Green 
 v. Blair, 22 S. W. Rep. 256. 
 
 4 See §§ 146, 148, 149; Chase v. 
 Hathaway, 14 Mass. 222, 227 ; Judge 
 v. Briggs, 3 N. H. 309 ; Farnsworth 
 v. Briggs, 6 N. H. 561 ; Lindsley v. 
 O'Reilly, 50 N. J. L. 636 ; 15 Atl. Rep. 
 879. As to other facts in probate 
 courts, see Roberts v. Connell, 8 S. W. 
 Rep. 626; Williams v. Mitchell, 112 
 Mo. 300 (proof of order of a probate 
 court) ; Sherwood v. Baker (Mo., 1891 ). 
 16 S. W. Rep. 938 ; Simmons v. Saul 
 138 TJ. S. 439. 
 
 5 Walsh v. Anderson, 135 Mass. 65 ; 
 Sweeney v. Girolo, 154 Pa. St. 609; 
 Glines v. Iron Hall, 22 Civ. Pro. R. 
 437. 
 
 6 O'Leary v. Durant, 70 Tex. 409 ; 
 Henry v. Tilton, 19 Vt. 447 ; Merritt 
 v. White, 31 Mass. 438; Philadelphia 
 v. Newkumet, 11 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 504; 
 Tallman v. B. & O. R/ Co., 45 Fed. 
 Rep. 156; Boyle v. Whitney, 8 Pa.
 
 228 
 
 JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. [§ 150#. 
 
 In accordance with the presumption that an official has 
 properly performed his duty, 1 the courts are inclined to favor 
 the sufficiency of returns and to admit them whenever it is 
 possible to do so. 2 
 
 The signature to the return should be by the officer or in 
 his name and not by deputy. 3 The return should be indorsed 
 upon the writ, 4 in language sufficiently certain and definite to 
 enable the court to comprehend the subject-matter described 
 and the action of the officer in regard to it. Parol evidence 
 is always admissible to explain the language of the return or 
 to identify the subject-matter, though not always to vary or 
 contradict it, 5 unless fraud is alleged. 15 A return which is not 
 properly filed is invalid 7 and inadmissible because it is incom- 
 plete. Until filing, however, the power of the officer over the 
 return is absolute and he may amend it without leave of court. 8 
 After filing, the power to permit an amendment is discretion- 
 ary with the court, 9 but permission to amend will usually be 
 granted where the actual facts in the case require it on appli- 
 cation by the officer before, 10 or even after, 11 his official term 
 has expired. 
 
 Co. Ct. R. 501 ; People v. Kent Circ. 
 Judge, 41 Mich. 722. 
 • See post, §'241. 
 
 2 Verbal irregularities will thus be 
 disregarded. Galliano v. Kilfoy, 94 
 Cal. 86 ; Veazey v. Brigman, 93 Ala. 
 548; Forbes v. McEIaffle, 32 Neb. 
 742 ; Cheshire v. Wagon Co., 89 Ga. 
 249 ; Livar v. Livar, 26 Tex. App. 115. 
 
 3 Rowley v. Howard, 23 Cal. 401 ; 
 Cox v. Montford, 66 Ga. 62 (signature 
 by mark); Mitchell v. Com. (Va., 
 1893), 17. S. K Rep. 480; Simmes v. 
 Simmes, 88 Ky. 642; Emley v. Drum, 
 36 Pa. St. 123 ; Callender v. Olcott, 1 
 Mich. 344 ; Gibbons v. Pickett (Fla., 
 1893), 12 S. Rep. 17; Reinhart v. 
 Lugo, 86 Cal. 395. Contra, Kelly v. 
 Harrison, 69 Miss. 456. 
 
 4 Dickson v. Peppers, 7 Ired. (N. C.) 
 429. 
 
 5 Payne y. Dillingham, 10 Iowa, 
 360. 
 
 6 McComb v. Council Bluffs, infra; 
 Cully v. Shirk, infra. 
 
 'i State v. Melton, 8 Mo. 417 ; Beall 
 v. Shattuck, 53 Miss. 358 ; Nelson v. 
 Cook, 19 111. 440. 
 
 8 Spencer v. Fuller, 68 Ga. 73 ; Wil- 
 cox v. Monday, 89 Ind. 232; Nelson 
 v. Cook, 19 111. 440; Welch v. Joy, 13 
 Pick. 477. 
 
 9 Austin v. Day, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 
 208; Miller v. Shackelford, 4 Dana 
 (Ky.), 264; Johnson v. Day, 17 Pick. 
 (Mass.) 108; Baker v. Davis, 22 N. H. 
 27 ; Com. Union Ins. Co. v. Everhart, 
 88 Va. 952; Mills v. Howland, 2 
 N. D. 30 ; Turner v. Holden, 109 N. C. 
 182 ; Shufeldt v. Barlass, 33 Neb. 785. 
 
 io Williams v. Moore, 68 Ga. 585; 
 Hutchins v. Com'rs, 16 Minn. 13; 
 
 UBentell v. Oliver, 89 Ga. 246; Scrugs, 46 Mo. 271. Cf. Williamson 
 
 Avery v. Bowman, 39 N. H. 595; v. Wright, 75 Me. 35; Foreman v. 
 
 Keen v. Briggs, 46 Me. 467 ; Dwiggins Carter, 9 Kan. 674. 
 v. Cook, 71 Ind. 579; Scrugs v.
 
 § 150«.] JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUT5LI0 RECORDS. 
 
 229 
 
 The conclusiveness of the return as to all facts stated 
 therein, both as between the parties to the writ and their 
 privies, 1 and against the officer himself, 2 is supported by a 
 majority of the decisions. When, however, the return is 
 sought to be used as evidence by the officer in his own behalf, 
 the principle of estoppel does not apply, and its invalidity may 
 be shown or the facts stated therein may be contradicted by 
 any proper and competent evidence. 3 The same rule is appli- 
 cable where the return is introduced as evidence in an action 
 between third persons, neither parties nor privies to the writ, 
 and where the facts in the return are only collateral to the 
 main issue. 4 
 
 Service of a writ by publication may be shown by the pro- 
 duction of the writ as published in the newspaper, together 
 with the affidavit of the publisher setting forth that the same 
 was properly published, with the facts of the times and places 
 of publication as the same may be required under the statutes 
 regulating" this matter. 5 
 
 Dunn v. Rogers, 43 111. 230 ; Sawyer 
 v. Harmon, 136 Mass. 414 ; McArthur 
 v. Currie, 32 Ala. 75; Clayton v. 
 State, 24 Ark. 16 ; Mahurin v. Brack- 
 ets 5 N. H. 9. 
 
 i Cully v. Shirk, 131 Ind. 76 ; Philips 
 v. Elwell, 14 Ohio St. 240 ; Flanniken 
 v. Neal, 67 Tex. 629 ; Ex parte Dur- 
 bin, 102 Mo. 100 ; Lowery v. Caldwell, 
 139 Mass. 88 ; Barrett v. Copeland, 18 
 Vt. 67; Hotchkiss v. Hunt, 56 Me. 
 252 ; In re Ah Foy, 45 Fed. Rep. 795 ; 
 Cozine v. Walter, 55 N. Y. 304 ; United 
 States v. Gayle, 45 Fed. Rep. 107 ; Hig- 
 ley v. Pollock (Nev., 1892), 27 Pac. Rep. 
 895; Ringold v. Edwards, 7 Ark. 86; 
 Egery v. Buchanan, 5 Cal. 56 ; Heath 
 v. Missouri R Co., 83 Mo. 624. Contra, 
 Johnson v. Gregory, 4 Wash. St. 109 ; 
 Grady v. Gosline, 48 Ohio St. 665; 
 Wilson v. Shipman, 31 Neb. 573; 
 McComb v. Insurance Co., 83 Iowa, 
 247 ; Wheeler v. McLaughlin, 8 N.Y. S. 
 95; Godwin v. Monds, 106 N. C. 448; 
 Burton v. Schenck, 40 Minn. 52. 
 
 2 State v. Ruff (Ind., 1893), 33 N. K 
 Rep. 124; Hawey v. Foster. 64 Cal. 
 296 ; Walter v.. Moore, 90 N. C. 41 ; 
 Shotwell v. Hamblen, 23 Miss. 156. 
 
 s Stanton v. Hodges, 6 Vt. 64 ; Earl 
 v. Camp, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 562; Car- 
 nell v. Cook. 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 310 ; Hal- 
 comb v. Stubblefield, 76 Tex. 310. 
 
 4 Knutsen v. Davis (Minn., 1893), 53 
 N. W. Rep. 646; Allen v. Gray, 11 
 Conn. 95; Kendall v. White, 3 Me. 
 245; Field v. United States, 9 Pet 
 (U. S.) 183 ; Henderson v. Evans. 14 
 Barb. (N. Y.) 15; Bolt v. Burnell, 9 
 Mass. 96. 
 
 b See ante, § 145; State v. Georgia 
 Co., 109 N. C. 310 ; Roberts v. Roberts 
 (Colo., 1893), 31 Pac. Rep. 941 ; Lane 
 v. Iunes, 43 Minn. 137; Frisk v. 
 Reigelman, 43 id. 137 ; Wilkinson v. 
 Conaty, 65 Mich. 614 ; White v. Hin- 
 ton, 3 Wyo. 753 ; Taylor v. Coots, 32 
 Neb. 30 ; Michael v. Michael, 137 111. 
 485.
 
 230 JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. [§ 150&. 
 
 § 150b. The effect of judicial records as evidence. — Tho 
 
 conclusiveness of a judgment in a prior suit as evidence in a 
 suit between the same parties for the same cause of action is 
 based upon the legal principle that public policy demands 
 that unnecessary and perhaps endless litigation should bo 
 avoided, and that a cause once fairly tried and determined by 
 a court of competent jurisdiction should be considered forever 
 closed and settled. The judgment of a court having jurisdic- 
 tion is binding upon all the parties and upon all those in. 
 privity with them, whether in estate, in law or in blood, and 
 whether this identity of interest is successive or mutual and 
 concurrent. 1 But a stranger to the record, i. e., a person who 
 is not interested in the original litigation directly or indirectly, 
 and who could neither prosecute nor defend, offer evidence, 
 cross-examine the witnesses, or appeal from the result, and 
 who does not occupy the position of a privy, is not estopped. 
 He may therefore, when in a subsequent suit his rights or 
 title is collaterally affected by the judgment, show that it is 
 invalid and void as to him. 2 The party in whose favor the 
 judgment has been rendered and his privies are bound by it 
 to the same extent as the party against whom it was ren- 
 
 i Michaels v. Post, 21 Wall. 426 ; Jones v. Ludlow, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct Rep. 
 
 Carter v. Bennett, 4 Fla. 052; Chapin 57; Guaranty T. & Safe Dep. Co. v. 
 
 v. Curtis, 23 Conn. 388; Key v. Dent, Green Cove Spring & M. R. Co., 11 
 
 14 Md. 86 ; Emery v. Fowler, 39 Me. S. Ct. 512 ; 139 U. S. 137 ; Franz Falk 
 
 326; Daily v. Sharkey, 29 Mo. App. Brew. Co. v. Hirsch, 78 Tex. 192; 
 
 518 ; Hancock v. Flyun, 8 N. Y. S. Griffith v. Happersberger, 86 Cal. 
 
 133 ; State v. Brook, 29 Mo. App. 286 ; 605 ; Trauerman v. Lippiucott, 39 
 
 Averell v. Sec. Nat. Bank, 19 D. C. Mo. App. 478 ; Haywood v. Thacher, 
 
 246 ; Cook v. Rice, 91 Cal. 664 ; Nor- 19 N. Y. S. 882 ; Missouri R. R. Co. v. 
 
 ton v. Doherty, 3 Gray (Mass.), 372 ; Heidenheimer, 82 Tex. 195. " When- 
 
 Bigelow v. Winsor, 1 Gray (Mass.), ever any judgment is offered as evi- 
 
 299,303; Webber v. Mackey, 31 111. dence, the party against whom it is 
 
 App. 369; Glass v. Blackwell, 48 so offered may prove that the court 
 
 Ark. 55. which gave it had no jurisdiction, or 
 
 2 Vose v. Morton, 4 Cush. (Mass.) that it has been reversed, or, if he is 
 
 27, 31 ; Roman Cath. Archbishop v. a stranger to it, that it was obtained 
 
 Shipman, 11 Pac. Rep. 343; 69 Cal. by any fraud or collusion to which 
 
 586 ; Fidelity I. T. & S. D. Co., 33 neither he nor any person to whom 
 
 W. Va. 761 ; Franklin Sav. Bank v. he is privy was a party." Stephen's 
 
 Taylor, 13 111. 376 ; 23 N. E. Rep. 397 ; Digest, art. 46. 
 Masterson v. Little, 75 Tex. 682;
 
 § 151.] JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. 231 
 
 dered. The judgment is equally conclusive as an estoppel 
 upon both. 1 
 
 § 151. The effects of judgments on those in privity with 
 the parties. — The doctrine by which a judgment is deemed, 
 to be conclusive upon the parties and those who are in privity 
 with them is based on the principles that are applicable to the 
 admissions of parties in privity. 2 Thus, an heir 3 is estopped 
 by a judgment against the ancestor, and generally the same 
 rule is applicable to those who take an estate in dower, 4 by 
 the curtesy, or as a legatee, devisee, 5 grantee or mortgagee. 8 
 A judgment of ouster on a writ of quo v)arranto is conclusive 
 evidence against subordinate officials whose title is derived 
 from the official ousted. 7 A judgment against the assignor, 
 rendered while the property assigned was in his possession 
 and relating to it, is evidence against the assignee, 3 and the 
 same principle is recognized as regards an executor or admin- 
 istrator in the case of a judgment against or in favor of the 
 deceased person whom he represents. 9 
 
 Though a reversioner is not bound by a judgment against 
 his tenant unless he intervene and become an actual party to 
 the suit, 10 yet, as remainder-men derive their successive estates 
 from a common source of title, it is clear that a judgment 
 which was rendered against any one of them which overthrew 
 that title would be binding on all. 11 So a judgment rendered 
 
 1 Wood v. Davis, 7 Cranch, 271 ; 8 Adams v. Barnes, 17 Mass. 365 ; 
 Strayer v. Johnson, 1 Atl. Rep. 222 ; Chapin v. Curtis, 23 Conn. 388 ; 
 110 Pa. St. 21. Hartje v. Vulcanized Fiber Co., 44 
 
 2 Kirk v. Kirk, 33 N. E. Rep. 552; Fed. Rep. 648; Huntley v. Holt, 22 
 137 N. Y. 510 ; KeDt v. Church, 136 Atl. Rep. 34 ; 59 Conn. 102 ; Carlyle 
 N. Y. 10; 32 N. E. Rep. 704; Howes v. Carlyle W. L. & Power Co., 36 111. 
 v. Rucker, 94 Ala. 166; Lawson v. App. 28. 
 
 Kelly, 82 Tex. 497. « Clapp v. Herrick, 129 Mass. 292 ; 
 
 3 See cases in preceding note. Emery v. Fowler, 39 Me. 326 ; Park- 
 4 Tanquey v. OTonnel, 132 Ind. 62. hurst v. Berdell, 110 N. Y. 392; Key 
 'Outram v. Sherwood, 3 East, 353 ; v. Dent, 14 Md. 86 ; Ballou v. Ballou, 
 
 Turner v. Cate (Ga., 1893), 16 S. E. HON. Y. 402; Carver v. Jackson, 4 
 
 Rep. 971. Peters, 85, 86; Case v. Reeve, 14 
 
 eSatterwhite v. Shirley, 25 N. E. Johns. 81. 
 
 Rep. 1100 ; Amer. Mortg. Co. v. Boyd, 10 Thompson v. McCormick (I1L, 
 
 92 Ala. 139 ; Brown v. Bocquin (Ark., 1891), 26 N. E. Rep. 373. 
 
 1893), 20 N. W. Rep. 813. U p y ke v. Crouch, 1 Ld. Raym. 730. 
 
 " Rex v. Mayor, 5 T. R. 66, 72, 76 ; 
 Rex v. Hebron, 2 Stra. 1109.
 
 232 JUDICIAL AND OTHER FUBLIC RECORDS [§ 152. 
 
 against a trustee during the existence of the trust binds the 
 beneficiaries l and their next of kin 2 or personal representa- 
 tives. 
 
 § 152. Must be final and on the merits. — A judgment is 
 conclusive on the parties only in case it is final; that is, 
 " where it puts an end to the action by declaring that the 
 plaintiff has or has not entitled himself to the remedy for 
 which he sues." 3 Where the plaintiff is nonsuited or the suit 
 is remanded or discontinued by plaintiff, or where the suit has 
 not been prosecuted to a determination, the judgment is not 
 conclusive. 4 So also the judgment must have been rendered 
 on the merits; for if it be based on a mere technical defect, 5 
 or lack of legal capacity of either party to sue, 6 or of jurisdic- 
 tion by the court, it will not be a bar. 7 Thus, where the de- 
 fendant interposes an equitable defense which he subsequently 
 withdraws, he is not precluded from employing that defense 
 in another suit. 8 But the filing of an appeal or the giving of 
 a stay bond pending an appeal from the judgment does not, so 
 long as the judgment is final and upon the merits, operate to 
 render the judgment inadmissible as evidence in a subsequent 
 action at any time during the pendency of the appeal. 9 
 
 1 Pollitz v. Frust Co. 53 Fed. Rep. 55 Fed. Rep. 49 ; Sanford v. Oberlin 
 210 ; Robertson v. Van Cleave (Ind. College, 31 Pac. Rep. 1088 ; 50 Kan. 
 1891), 26 N. E. Rep. 899. 342. Cf. Pilcher v. Ligon (Ky., 1890), 
 
 2 In re Strant, 5 N. Y. S. 127 ; 126 N. 15 S. W. Rep. 513. 
 
 Y. 201 ; 27 N. E. Rep. 259. 5 Kern v. Wilson, 48 N. W. Rep. 
 
 3 Anderson's Law Diet. 919; McDonald v. Rainor, 8 Johns. 
 ^McGourkey v. Railroad Co., 146 442. 
 
 U. S. 536; Hull v. Blake, 13 Mass. 6j on esv. Hunter, 32 111. App. 445; 
 
 155 ; Holbert's Estate, 57 Cal. 257 ; Rudolph v. Underwood, 15 S. E. Rep. 
 
 Dunham v. Carson (S. C, 1893), 15 S. 55 ; 88 Ga. 664 ; Hemminge v. Heald 
 
 E. Rep. 960; Sivers v. Sivers (Cal., (N. J., 1893), 26 Atl. Rep. 449; Rodg- 
 
 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 571 ; Stedman v. ers v. Levy (Neb., 1893), 54 N. W. 
 
 Potterie, 139 Pa. St. 100; Gapen v. Rep. 1080; Hendricks v. Clouts (Ga., 
 
 Bretlernitz (Neb., 1890), 47 N. W. Rep. 1893), 17 S. E. Rep. 119. 
 
 918; Louisville, N. A. &C. Ry. Co. v. i Gilmer v. Morris, 46 Fed. Rep. 
 
 Wylie (Ind., 1890), 27 N. E. Rep. 333 ; Estil v. Taul, 2 Yerger, 467, 470 ; 
 
 122; Parks v. Dunlap, 86 Cal. 189; Bank v. Lewis, 8 Pick. 113; Dixon v. 
 
 State v. Anderson (Fla., 1890), 8 S. Sinclair, 4 Vt. 354; Davie v. Davis 
 
 Rep. 1 ; Hallum v. Dickinson, 47 Ark. (N. C, 1890), 13 S. E. Rep. 240. 
 
 126; Kaufman v. Schneider, 35 111. scockerill v. Stafford, 102 Mo. 57. 
 
 App. 256 (ruling on appealable order) ; 9 Willard v. Ostrauder (Kan., 1893), 
 
 Da nielson v. Northwestern Fuel Co., 32 Pac. Rep. 1092; Stevens v. Ste-
 
 § 153.] 
 
 JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. 
 
 233 
 
 § 153. Judgments only conclusive as to material facts in 
 issue, — A judgment is conclusive as an estoppel in a subse- 
 quent suit only so far as it determines those particular facts 
 which were directly in issue. 1 A part} 7 is called upon to affirm 
 or deny facts material to the issue only, and for this reason 
 the judgment record is not binding upon the parties in respect 
 to those matters which are neither material nor relevant to 
 the controversy. So the judgment is not evidence of any 
 matter of fact which was merely collateral to the issue or re- 
 motely or incidentally involved, or which can only be inferred 
 by argument, or the decision of which was not necessary to 
 the issue. 2 
 
 But while it is necessary that the fact which the judgment 
 is introduced to prove should have been material in the prior 
 cause and the issue should be substantially identical, it is not 
 essential that the issue in the earlier case should have been 
 joined upon the precise point which is in issue in the later pro- 
 ceedings, if the proof of the existence of the fact in issue in 
 the latter was necessary to the rendition of the judgment. 3 
 
 vens. 23 N. Y. S. 520 ; 69 Hun, 332 ; 
 Westmoreland v. Richardson Co. 
 (Tex., 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 167; 
 O'Malia v. Glynn, 42 111. App. 51; 
 Harris v. Barnhart (Cal., 1893), 32 
 Pac. Rep. 589. Contra, Texas I. R. 
 Co. v. Jackson, 22 S. W. Rep. 1030. 
 
 1,4 Every judgment is conclusive 
 proof, as against parties and privies, 
 of facts directly in issue in the case 
 actually decided by the court and 
 appearing from the judgment itself 
 to be the ground on which it was 
 based, unless evidence was admitted 
 in the action in which the judgment 
 was delivered which is excluded in 
 the action in which that judgment is 
 intended to be proved." Stephen's 
 Digest, art. 41. 
 
 2 De Grey, J., in Duchess of King- 
 ston's Case, 20 How. St. Tr. 538. The 
 court in this case says further : " The 
 judgment of a court of concurrent 
 jurisdiction directly upon the point 
 is a bar, or as evidence conclusive 
 
 upon the same parties, upon the same 
 matter directly in question in an- 
 other court ; secondly, that a judg- 
 ment of a court of exclusive juris- 
 diction, directly upon the point, is, in 
 like manner, conclusive upon the 
 same matter, between the same par- 
 ties, coming incidentally in question 
 in another court, for a different pur- 
 pose." Rice v. Aiken (Tex., 1893), 22 
 S. W. Rep. 101; Gillim v. Daviess 
 Co. (Ky., 1890), 14 S. W. Rep. 838 ; 
 Walker v. Leslie (Ky., 1890), 14 S. W. 
 Rep. 682; Miller v. Union Switch 
 Sig. Co., 59 Hun, 624 ; In re Holmes, 
 131 N. Y. 80; Springer v. Bien, 10 
 N. Y. S. 530; 27 N. E. Rep. 1076; 
 Dodd v. Scott, 46 N. W. Rep. 1057 \ 
 Rhoads v. Metropolis, 36 111. App. 
 123. 
 
 3 Adams v. Pearson, 7 Pick. 341 
 Duden v. Maley, 43 Fed. Rep. 407 
 Hudson v. Yost, 13 S. E. Rep. 836 
 Shepherd v. Stockham, 45 Kan. 244 
 Pierson v. Conley (Mich., 1893), 55
 
 234 
 
 JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. 
 
 [§ 154. 
 
 § 154. Identity of cause of action required. — There must, 
 however, be a real and substantial identity between the prior 
 cause of action and the present. So a judgment rendered in 
 an action, in order to be a bar in a subsequent suit between 
 the same parties, must not only relate to the same general sub- 
 ject-matter but to the same cause of action. 1 In this connec- 
 tion it should be said that a party must present to the court all 
 the grounds on which he expects a judgment. Otherwise 
 there would be no end to litigation. 2 He will not be allowed 
 to split up a single cause of action which in its nature is in- 
 divisible — as, for example, a right to recover for a total 
 breach of an entire contract — and bring a number of suits 
 thereon. 3 But where one has two causes of action for which 
 he seeks redress in a single action, a judgment rendered after 
 
 N. W. Rep. 387; Christy v. Spring 
 (Cal., 1893), 31 Pac. Rep. 110; Henry 
 v. Samson (Tex., 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 
 69 ; Fidelity Ins. F. &' S. D. Co. v. 
 Gazzam, 2 Pa. Dist. R. 569. The 
 rules governing the conclusiveness 
 of judgments are thus summed up by 
 the court in Packet Co. v. Sickles, 5 
 Wall. 592: "When the judgment 
 rendered in the former trial is used 
 as a technical estoppel, or is relied 
 upon as conclusive per se, it must ap- 
 pear by the record of the prior suit 
 that the particular controversy 
 sought to be concluded was neces- 
 sarily tried and determined. That 
 is, if the record of the former trial 
 shows that the verdict could not have 
 been rendered without deciding the 
 particular matter, it will be con- 
 sidered as having settled that matter 
 as between the parties; and where 
 the record does not show that the 
 matter was necessarily and directly 
 found by the jury, evidence aliunde 
 consistent with the record may be 
 received to prove the fact. But even 
 where it appears extrinsically that 
 the matter was properly within the 
 issue in the former suit, if it be not 
 shown that the verdict and judgment 
 
 necessarily involved its determina- 
 tion it will not be concluded." See, 
 also, Dutton v. Woodman, 9 Cush. 
 225 ; Eastman v. Cooper, 15 Pick. 
 276. 
 
 iLume v. Scott, 44 Minn. 110; 
 Dulin v. Prince, 29 111. A pp. 209; Mc- 
 Vight v. Bell, 26 W. N. C. 281 ; Cor- 
 nell v. Donovan, 14 Daly, 295 ; Mer- 
 scheim v. Mus. M. P. Union, 24 
 Abb. N. C. 252; Humason v. Lobe, 
 76 Tex. 512 ; Parks v. Richardson, 35 
 Mo. App. 192 ; Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. 
 v. Slater, 39 111. App. 69; Davis v. 
 Sexton, 35 111. App. 307 ; Montrose v. 
 Wanamaker, 57 Hun, 590. 
 
 2 Stark v. Starr, 94 U. S. 485. 
 
 SLorrillard v. Clyde, 55 N. Y. 
 Super. Ct. 308 ; 122 N. Y. 41 ; Skeen 
 v. Springfield Eng. & T. Co., 42 Mo. 
 App. 158; Beronio v. So. Pac. R. Co., 
 80 Cal. 415 ; Bowe v. Minn. Milk Co., 
 44 Minn. 460 ; Pilcher v". Ligon (Ky., 
 1890), 15 S. W. Rep. 513 ; Macdougall 
 v. Knight. 25 Q. B. Div. 1 ; Busch v. 
 Jones, 94 Mich. 223 ; McCain v. Louis- 
 ville, etc. Co. (Ky., 1893), 22 S. W. 
 Rep. 325 ; Parmentery v. State, 105 
 N. Y. 154; Olmstead v. Bael (Md., 
 1893), 25 Atl. Rep. 343.
 
 § 154.] JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. 235 
 
 litigation on one cause only does not preclude a subsequent 
 action on the other. 1 
 
 It is a general rule that where two actions are brought be- 
 tween the same parties for the same cause, the prior judgment 
 is conclusive as to every point directly involved which was or 
 might have been litigated, 2 though if the second suit is be- 
 tween the same parties for a different cause of action, the 
 judgment is conclusive only on such questions directly in- 
 volved as were actually litigated. 3 
 
 In considering the identity of the questions or causes of 
 action involved in the two suits, it is immaterial that the sub- 
 ject of the earlier suit was more extensive than that involved in 
 the latter if the present cause of action which is in contro- 
 versy was actually embraced in the judgment or verdict ren- 
 dered. The law requires a substantial identity in the nature 
 of the causes of action — not merely a formal, artificial and 
 technical identity arising solely from the fact that the two 
 transactions are co-extensive. If on an inspection of the rec- 
 ord there is any doubt whether the precise question now at 
 issue was involved or was decided in the prior suit, extrinsic 
 evidence will be received to ascertain this point and effectuate 
 the prior adjudication. 4 
 
 iBontin v. Linsley (Wis., 1893), 54 H.), 299; Wolverton v. Baker, 86 Cal. 
 N. W. Rep. 1017. 591 ; Parker v. Straat, 39 Mo. App. 
 
 Rareshide v. Enterprise Ginning 616. 
 
 & Mfg. Co. (La., 1890), 9 S. Rep. 642 
 Taylor v. Taylor, 26 Abb. N. C. 360 
 Nichols v. Murphy, 36 111. App. 205 
 Helfenstein's Estate, 135 Pa. St. 293 
 
 4 " A judgment of a court of com- 
 petent jurisdiction upon a question 
 directly involved in one suit is con- 
 clusive as to that question in another 
 
 Fidelity Ins. & S. D. Co. v. Gazzam, suit between the same parties. But 
 
 2 Pa. Dist. R. 569 ; Pennock v. Ken- it must appear from the face of the 
 
 nedy, 153 Pa. St. 179 ; Butler v. Suf. record or be shown by extrinsic evi- 
 
 Glass Co., 126 Mass. 512. dence that the precise question was 
 
 3 Cromwell v. Sac Co., 94 U. S. 351 ; raised and determined in the former 
 
 Nesbit v. Ind. District of Riverside, suit If there be any uncertainty — 
 
 144 U. S. 610 ; 12 S. Ct. 746 ; New- for example, if it appears that sev- 
 
 berry v. Sheffy (Va., 1892), 15 S. E. eral distinct matters may have been 
 
 Rep. 548 ; Robinson v. Parks, 76 Md. litigated, upon one or more of which 
 
 118; 24 Atl. Rep. 417; Smeaton v. the judgment may have passed with- 
 
 Austin, 82 "Wis. 76 ; 51 N. W. Rep. out indicating which was litigated 
 
 1090; Gilbert v. Thompson, 9 Cush. and upon which the judgment was 
 
 348,350; Potter v. Baker, 19 N. H. rendered — the whole subject-matter 
 
 166 ; Lamprey v. Nudd, 9 Foster (N. will be at large and open to new con-
 
 236 JUDICIAL AND OTITER PUBLIC RECORDS. [§' 15.K 
 
 As regards the identity of the party, it may be said that, 
 in the case of a joint and several contractual liability, a prior 
 judgment against all the co-obligors jointly is not admissible 
 in a subsequent action against one. On the other hand, a 
 former several judgment cannot be pleaded in bar in an action 
 afterwards brought against all jointly. 
 
 Any individual by entering into a joint and several contract 
 agrees, by implication, that he will be liable in a quasi-double 
 capacity. He enters into two distinct agreements, and gives 
 his obligee two different causes of action and two different 
 remedies at law against himself. He cannot, therefore, be 
 heard to claim, when he is sued in one capacity or by one 
 remedy, that the matter has been already adjudicated by or 
 in another. 1 But where a party has only one cause of action, 
 either joint or several, though he may have several remedies, 
 the judgment obtained by the employment of one of them 
 will be a bar to his employment of the others. 2 
 
 § 155. Persons affected by judgments in rem and judg- 
 ments regulating personal status. — The general rule is that 
 a judgment is not binding upon persons who are not parties 
 to it or who are not in privity with either of those who are. 3 
 An exception to this rule is recognized in proceedings in rem, 
 including under that term all suits in admiralty for the en- 
 forcement of maritime liens and contracts, and similar suits in 
 other courts for the violation of revenue laws. Judgments 
 in rem are conclusive on all persons upon the assumption that 
 the publicity attendant upon the seizure of the res and the issue 
 of the monition is notice to all persons who have any interest 
 in the property to appear and assert their rights. 4 But the 
 
 tention unless this uncertainty be 2 Weill v. Fontanel, 31 111. App. G15; 
 
 removed by extrinsic evidence show- Taylor v. Taylor, 26 Abb. N. C. 360. 
 
 ing the precise point involved and In an action to recover for trespass, 
 
 determined." Russell v. Place, 94 a judgment rendered in a previous 
 
 U. S. 608. court to enjoin the trespass is com- 
 
 1 Mason v. Eld red, 6 Wall. 235-241 ; petent evidence. Beach v. Elmira, 
 
 United States v. Cushman. 2 Sumn. 58 Hun, 606. 
 
 426,437-441; Sheehy v. Mandeville, 3 See ante, §§ 153-155. 
 
 6 Cranch, 253, 265. Contra, Mann v. *The Olive Mount, 50 Fed. Rep. 
 
 Edwards, 34 111. App. 473 ; Wilson v. 563 ; Oldham v. Stevens (Kan., 1890;, 
 
 Casey (Tex., 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 118; 25 Pac. Rep. 863; Baily v. Sundberg, 
 
 Beals v. Judge, 91 Mich. 146. 43 Fed. Rep. 81 ; 49 Fed. Rep. 583.
 
 §§ 150, 157.] JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC EPXORDS. 237 
 
 res must have been actually seized to confer jurisdiction,' 
 though if jurisdiction has once been obtained it will continue 
 until final judgment, even though the res has been removed. 2 
 
 §156. Criminal judgments. — A judgment in a prosecu- 
 tion for crime may be shown by the record to prove the fact 
 that it was rendered. Such a judgment is not admissible as 
 evidence in a civil suit to prove any fact or circumstance 
 which was found by the jury in the criminal trial. 3 Aside 
 from the rule of evidence that, in a criminal trial, the jury 
 must be convinced of the guilt of the prisoner beyond a rea- 
 sonable doubt, while in a civil action they may decide accord- 
 ing to the weight of evidence, 4 the absence of any identity of 
 the parties in the two transactions precludes the employment 
 of the criminal judgment as evidence in a subsequent civil 
 action. On the other hand, a civil judgment is upon like 
 principles inadmissible in a criminal trial. 5 A judgment ren- 
 dered iu a criminal action is competent evidence of the facts 
 determined in another prosecution of the same person for an- 
 other or for the same crime. 6 
 
 § 157. Proof of judgments as facts and their use in prov- 
 ing ulterior facts distinguished. — As already explained, a 
 judicial record is admissible to prove those matters of fact 
 recited in it only in subsequent proceedings between the same 
 parties or their representatives in privity But where only 
 the fact of the rendition of a judgment is to be proved, a 
 different rule is recognized. The record of a judgment is the 
 evidence of a public transaction, and it is conclusive evidence 
 in any subsequent proceedings between any persons whatso- 
 ever where the point in issue is, was a certain judgment rendered 
 or not. 7 So the record of the plaintiff's acquittal or convic- 
 
 1 Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. (U. S.) v. Beetle (Mass., 1890), 26 N. E. Rep. 
 883. 429. 
 
 2 The Rio Grande, 23 Wall. (U. S.) « Com. v. Evans, 101 Mass. 25 ; Den- 
 348; Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall, nis' Case, 110 id. 18. 
 
 317. • Bensimer v. Fell (W. Va., 1891), 12 
 
 3 Landa v. Obert, 14 S. W. Rep. 297 ; S. E. Rep. 1078. A judgment may 
 78 Tex. 33 ; Schreiner v. Order of be considered in evidence, though not 
 Foresters, 35 111. App. 576. formally introduced and read, where 
 
 4 See ante, §§ 5, 6. counsel admit its existence and wit- 
 
 5 Com. v. Horton, 9 Pick. 206 ; Brad- nesses testify to the facts therein 
 ley v. Bradley, 2 Fairf. 367 ; Bradley without objection by either party.
 
 238 JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. [§ 15S. 
 
 tion is admissible to show these facts in a subsequent suit 
 brought by him to recover for false imprisonment though the 
 parties are not identical. 1 Again, where the party against 
 whom the judgment was rendered is suing to be exonerated, 2 
 or when the judgment, as in the case of a certain decree in 
 chancery, partakes of the nature of a muniment of title, 3 or 
 furnishes the source of one's title acquired under a sheriff's 
 deed, 4 or the basis of a claim against an official for negligence 
 in enforcing it, 5 the existence of the judgment may be shown 
 res inter alios acta, neither the parties nor the cause of action 
 being the same. 6 
 
 § 158. Validity and ciFect of foreign judgments. — The 
 judgment in rem of a foreign court having jurisdiction of the 
 subject-matter is universally conclusive and binding if the land 
 or other property, movable or immovable, is located in its juris- 
 diction. 7 Its decision, whatever may be its nature, will be held 
 binding in every county whether the same question is directly 
 or only incidentally involved. 8 
 
 The English rule is followed in some of the states, and the 
 judgment is binding as to all facts whether directly or inci- 
 dentally decided. In others the judgment is not conclusive 
 except as to the property directly involved, and other facts 
 adjudicated may be relitigated. 9 Of course the rule as thus 
 stated is to be taken with the limitations that the cause in 
 rem has been tried and the judgment rendered bonajide, 10 that 
 the foreign judge was impartial, 11 that the decision is consist- 
 
 Zieverink v. Kempner (Ohio, 1893), 3 Sumn. 600 ; The Mary, 9 Cranch, 
 
 34 N. E. Rep. 250. 126 ; Peters v. Warren Ins. Co., 3 
 
 i Barhyt v. Valk, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) Sumn. 389 ; Propellor Commerce, 1 
 
 145 ; Garvey v. Wayson, 22 Md. 178. Black, 5S0 ; Crodson v. Leonard, 4 
 
 2 Kip v. Brigham, 6 Johns. 158; Cranch, 433; Averill v. Smith, 17 Wall. 
 Weld v. Nichols, 17 Pick. 538. 95: Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 316- 
 
 3 Barr v. Gratz, 4 Wheat. 213. 321, cited in 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 541. 
 * Jackson v. Wood, 3 Wend. 27, 34; 9 Graham v. Whitely, 2 Dutcher, 
 
 Witmer v. Schlatter, 2 Rawle, 359; 254; Robinson v. Jones, 8 Mass. 536: 
 
 Fowler v. Savage, 3 Conn. 90, 96. Maley v. Shattuck, 8 Cranch, 488 ; 
 
 5 Adams v. Balch. 5 Greenl. 188. Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246. 
 
 «Fiscusv. Guthrie, 125 Ind. 598. 1° White v. Read, 24 N. Y. S. 290; 
 
 ' See ante, § 155. Bradstreet v. Insurance Co., 3 Sumn. 
 
 s Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 600 ; Magoun v. N. E. Ins. Co., 1 Story, 
 
 187 ; Williams v. Armroyd, 7 Cranch, 157. 
 
 423; Bradstreet v. Neptune Ins. Co., u Price v. Dewhurst, 8 Sim. 279.
 
 § 158.] JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. 239 
 
 ent with the law of nations, and that all parties having any 
 interest in rem had notice and an opportunity to appear and 
 to be heard personally or by a proper representative. 1 
 
 In regard to that class of judgments which are analogous 
 to judgments in rem in that they are binding upon all persons 
 within the jurisdiction, that is to say, judgments or decrees 
 fixing the personal status of an individual, it has been held 
 that where a judgment of this sort has been rendered in a 
 foreign court or in the court of one state of the United States, 
 it ought to be binding, so far as the person is concerned, in 
 every country and in all the states of the Union. 
 
 So far as guardians, executors, administrators and others 
 occupying similar positions are concerned, the decree of the 
 court appointing them has in the United States no extraterri- 
 torial efficacy, and these ^a^-fiduciaries are regarded as 
 purely local matters. For this reason a judgment appointing 
 a person an executor, administrator, guardian or trustee in one 
 state is not evidence in the courts of another to show that he 
 possesses any power as such over property in the latter state.'- 
 
 The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction confirm, 
 ing or annulling a marriage which had been contracted within 
 its jurisdiction by residents or non-residents, or which had 
 been contracted outside of its jurisdiction by persons who 
 were at the time of the marriage or of the suit domiciled 
 within its jurisdiction, is valid everywhere. The same rule is 
 applied to a valid foreign decree granting a divorce in a suit 
 conducted oona fide by persons actually domiciled in the juris- 
 diction of the court. 3 
 
 The effect as evidence of foreign judgments in personam 
 has been much discussed from early times by the authorities 
 and in the decided cases. In spite of the contrariety of the 
 cases, it may be safely said, in the first place, that a foreign 
 judgment regular on its face, rendered in an action in 2>er- 
 
 iGelstcra v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246; s James v . James, 81 Tex. 373; 
 
 Williams v. Armroyd, 7 Cranch, 423. Glaude v. Post, 8 S. Rep. 884; 43 La. 
 
 2 Kraft v. Wickey, 4 Cr. & J. 332; Ann. 861 ; Davis v. Davis, 22 N. Y. S. 
 Dixon v. Ramsay, 3 Cranch, 319; In 191; 2Misc.R549; Hammond v. Ham- 
 re Mintzer's Estate, 2 Pa. Dist. R. 584 ; mond (Ga», 1893), 16 S. E. Rep. 265. 
 In re Johnson (Iowa, 1893), 54 N. W. 
 Rep. 69.
 
 210 JUDICIAL AND OTHEB PUBLIC RECORDS. [§ 158. 
 
 sonam in a foreign court, is conclusive evidence between the 
 parties or their privies of all facts which are directly or in- 
 directly involved. This proposition, it will be seen, leaves 
 the foreign judgment to be impeached and set aside if upon 
 the face of the record of the foreign court its decision ap- 
 pears to be grossly repugnant to natural justice, 1 or was ob- 
 tained by fraud, or if it appears that the court had no juris- 
 diction, 2 or misapprehended or refused to recognize the law of 
 the country in which the subject-matter is situated. 3 Thus, if 
 a French court, construing a contract made in England, decides 
 a question of English law which is an essential element in the 
 ultimate judgment rendered, the judgment itself will be in- 
 valid as evidence in an English court if the foreign court mis- 
 apprehends the true import of the English rule of law. 4 If 
 the foreign court has no jurisdiction, then its judgment is of 
 course invalid. 5 
 
 In some proceedings in personam the decree of the foreign 
 court is effectual to transfer the title of the property not only 
 as against the parties but against all persons, and this conclu- 
 sively. Such proceeding are analogous to proceedings in rem, 
 and a party who accepts the express or implied permission or 
 invitation to intervene and submits his claim to the court will 
 not be permitted to have the judgment re-opened in another 
 court on the plea that he only intervened to save his prop- 
 erty from forfeiture. 6 
 
 1 Boston I. R. Co. v. Hoit, 14 Vt. 92. Fogo, 6 Jur. 403 ; Woodruff v. ray- 
 s' Goulding v. Hoyt, 34 N. H. 143. lor, 20 Vt 65. In Holmes v. Gratz 
 
 3 Scott v. Pilkington, 2 B. & S. 11 ; (U. S. C. C, 1892), 50 Fed. Rep. 869, 
 8 Jur. 557 ; Crispin v. Daglioni, 9 id. the court in refusing to allow defend- 
 653 ; Simpson v. Fogo, 9 id. 403 ; ant to plead a foreign judgment as a 
 Bank of Australasia v. Nias, 16 Q. B. bar in a suit for an injunction held 
 717 ; Ricardo v. Garcias, 12 CI. & Fin. that foreign adjudications as re- 
 368 ; Dunstan v. Higgins, 63 Hun, spects torts are not conclusive, and 
 031, cited in 1 Greenl. on Evid, § 546. that, as granting an injunction de- 
 
 4 Novelli v. Rossi, 2 B. & Aid. 757. pends largely upon circumstances 
 5 Vanquelin v. Bouard, 9 L. T. which differ in each case, neither 
 
 (N. S.) 582. Cf. Wood v. Watkinson, public policy nor international com- 
 
 17 Conn. 500. ity requires that the right to the pro- 
 
 6 De Casse Brissac v. Rathbone, 6 tection of a court of equity against 
 
 H. & Nor. 301 ; Imrie v. Castrique, fraud should depend on the law of a 
 
 8 C. B. (N. S.) 406 ; Frayes v. Worms, foreign tribunal. 
 10 C. B. (N. S.) 149; Simpson v.
 
 § 159.] 
 
 JUDICIAL AND OTIIKR PUBLIC RECORDS. 
 
 241 
 
 § 159. Judgments of sister states. — By virtue of the con- 
 stitutional provision that full faith and credit shall be given to 
 the judicial proceedings of each state in the courts of every 
 other state, a judgment rendered in any state or territory will, 
 when duly authenticated, have exactly the same effect and 
 operation as a domestic judgment. 1 Still it is competent for 
 the court, in such a case, to inquire whether the judgment is 
 tainted with fraud or whether the court had jurisdiction of 
 the subject-matter or of the parties. 2 So a court of one state 
 may inquire whether a federal court situated in another state 
 had jurisdiction to render a judgment offered as evidence in 
 its courts; 3 and in New York it has been held that the va- 
 lidity of a judgment rendered in another state may be attacked 
 upon the sole ground that the cause of action was based on a 
 contract without consideration and obtained under duress, 4 or 
 that the judgment has been allowed to become dormant in the 
 other state. 5 On the other hand, the validity of a judgment 
 of another state cannot be impeached by showing that the 
 cause of action was barred by the statute of limitation, 8 or 
 that the parties were not legally served. 7 
 
 i Bright v. Smitten. 10 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 
 647 ; Fitzsimons v. Johnson, 90 Tenn. 
 416 (probate court); Caughran v. 
 Gilman, 81 Iowa, 442; 46 N. W. Rep. 
 1005; Semple v. Glenn, 91 Ala. 245; 
 9 S. Rep. 235 ; Hall v. McKay, 78 Tex. 
 248; Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U. S. 
 87 ; Chicago & A. B. Co. v. Anglo- 
 American Packing Co., 46 Fed. Rep. 
 584; McGarvey v. Darnall, 134 III. 
 367 ; 25 N. E. Rep. 1005 ; Kingman v. 
 Paulsen, 126 Ind. 507; Bowersox v. 
 Gitt, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 81 ; San n is v. 
 Wightman (Fla., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 
 526; Hammond v. Hammond (Ga., 
 1893), 16 S. E. Rep. 365. See, also, 
 ante, § 148. 
 
 2 Taylor v. Bryden, 8 Johns. 173; 
 First Nat. Bank v. Cunningham, 48 
 Fed. Rep. 515 ; Teel v. Yost, 128 N. Y. 
 387; Renier v. Hurlhurt (Wis., 1892), 
 50 N. W. Rep. 783 ; Henry v. Allen, 
 82 Tex. 35; Rand v. Hansen, 154 
 16 
 
 Mass. 87 ; 28 N. E. Rep. 6 ; Caughran 
 v. Gilman, 81 Iowa, 442; 46 N. W. 
 Rep. 1005; Bogan v. Hamilton, 90 
 Ala. 54; New York L. Ins. Co. v. 
 Aitkin, 125 N. Y. 560; Huntington v. 
 Attrill, 146 U. S. 657; Morgan v, 
 Morgan. 1 Tex. Civ. App. 315. 
 
 3 Hovey v. Elliott, 21 N. Y. S. 108; 
 Southern Ins. Co. v. Wolverton Hd. 
 Co. (Tex., 1892), 19 S. W. Rep. 615. 
 
 *Trebilcox v. McAlpine, 62 Hun, 
 317. But cf. contra, Ambler v. 
 Whipple, 139 111. 811; 28 N. E. Rep. 
 841. 
 
 5 Chapman v. Chapman, 48 Kan. 
 636 ; 29 Pac. Rep. 1074. 
 
 6 Fitzsimons v. Johnson, 90 Tenn. 
 416; Reed v. Chilson, 61 Hun, 623. 
 
 'Hail v. McKay, 78 Tex. 248; 
 Semple v. Glenn, 9 S. Rep. 265; 91 
 Ala. 245. But cf. N. Y. L. Ins. Co. v 
 Aitkin, 125 N. Y. 660; Hoffman v. 
 Newell, 20 N. Y. S. 432 ; 21 id. 913.
 
 242 JUDICIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS. [§ 160. 
 
 § 160. Judgment in bar need not be pleaded. — An estoppel 
 in pais or by deed should be specially pleaded in order to be 
 admissible and conclusive as evidence, though where there is 
 no opportunity to plead it it may be proved under the general 
 denial. 1 A former judgment, when specially pleaded in bar, 
 will operate as an estoppel in law and be binding alike on 
 court and jury. But it has been considered doubtful whether 
 a judgment not pleaded as an estoppel but given in evidence 
 under a general denial or under the general issue was binding 
 on the jury. The weight of the decisions, however, supports 
 the proposition that if a former judgment is relied upon and 
 is given in evidence as determining the whole question in- 
 volved in the pending action, it need not be pleaded but is 
 conclusive as an estoppel, and so binding as a matter of law 
 upon the jury. 2 
 
 1 Outram v. Morewood, 5 East, 346 ; Harvey, 2 H. & Mun. 55 ; Shafer v. 
 
 Adams v. Barnes, 17 Mass. 365 ; Dows Stonebraker. 4 G. & J. 345 ; Betts 
 
 v. McMichael, 6 Paige, 139; Cham- v. Starr, 5 Conn. 550, 553; King v. 
 
 berlain v. Carlisle, 26 N. H. 540; Chase, 15 N. H. 9; Lawrence v. Hunt, 
 
 Meiss v. Gill, 44 Ohio St. 258. 10 Wend. 83, 84 ; 1 Greenl. on Evid., 
 
 * Krekeler v. Ritter, 62 N. Y. 372 ; § 531. Contra, Josephi v. Mady 
 
 Marsh v. Pier, 4 Rawle, 288, 289; Clothing Co. (Mont., 1893), 33 Pac. 
 
 Gray v. Pingry, 17 Vt. 419; Cist v. Rep. 10. Cf. Dunklee v. Goodenough 
 
 Ziegler, 16 S. &; R 282; Preston v. (Vt, 1893), 26 Atl. Rep. 9S8.
 
 CHAPTER XIY. 
 
 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. 
 
 § 165. Foundation of the doctrine. 
 
 166. Husband and wife, when com- 
 
 petent witnesses. 
 
 167. Statutory legislation — Confi- 
 
 dential communications. 
 
 168. Confidential communications 
 
 between husband and wife. 
 
 169. Communications to attorneys. 
 
 170. Character and time of the 
 
 communications. 
 
 171. Attorney employed by both 
 
 parties. 
 
 172. Permanent character of the 
 
 privilege — Its waiver. 
 
 173. Privileges as to documents. 
 
 174. What communications are 
 
 within the privilege. 
 
 175. Privilege of police — Judicial 
 
 and executive officials. 
 
 176. Privilege as relating to jurors. 
 
 177. Confidential communications 
 
 to clergymen. 
 
 178. Communications to physi- 
 
 cians. 
 
 § 165. Foundation of the doctrine. — Public policy, the 
 welfare of the whole community, and indeed the best inter- 
 ests of the litigant parties themselves, demand that certain 
 evidence, or rather the evidence of certain witnesses, shall be 
 absolutely inadmissible, because any advantage which might 
 be gained in the particular case in ascertaining the truth 
 would be more than counterbalanced by the injury to society 
 as a whole. * This restriction upon the capacity of certain 
 classes of witnesses as regards the evidence which they will 
 be permitted to give is not based upon any peculiar respect 
 which the law has for their calling or character. Its design 
 is to advance the pure and unembarrassed administration of 
 law, subserve justice and to protect the innocent while pun- 
 ishing the guilty. 1 
 
 1 "The principle of the rule which 
 applies to attorneys and counsel is 
 that so numerous and complex are 
 the laws by which the rights and du- 
 ties of citizens are governed, so im- 
 portant is it they should be permitted 
 to avail themselves of the superior 
 skill and learning of those who are 
 sanctioned by the law as its minis- 
 
 ters and exponents, both in ascertain- 
 ing their rights in the country and 
 maintaining them most safely in 
 courts, without publishing those facts 
 which they have a right to keep se- 
 cret, but which must be disclosed to 
 a legal adviser and advocate to ena- 
 ble him successfully to perform the 
 duties of his office, that the law has
 
 244 
 
 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. 
 
 [§ 10 °- 
 
 § 166. Husband and wife, when competent witnesses.— A 
 husband or wife was not at common law (with a few excep- 
 tions) a competent witness for or against each other in any 
 action to which the other was a party or had any pecuniary 
 interest. 1 The absolute prohibition thus placed upon the hus- 
 band and wife was largely the logical result of the legal 
 identity of the parties to the marriage. The rule that the 
 party was not a competent witness for or against himself re- 
 quired the exclusion of the testimony of another person who 
 was simply the alter ego of the party and equally concerned 
 in the suit. 2 It was considered also that to permit a husband 
 or wife to testify for the other would put a premium on per- 
 jury, while, if either were to be recognized as a competent 
 witness against the other, the harmony between them and 
 the unbounded confidence properly accompanying the mar- 
 riage relation would be imperiled. 3 
 
 So far as the rule was intended to protect confidential com- 
 munications between husband and wife, it was analogous to 
 the rule which at common law affixed a privileged character 
 
 considered it the wisest policy to en- 
 courage and sustain the confidence 
 by requiring that on such facts the 
 mouth of the attorney should be 
 forever closed." Chief Justice Shaw, 
 in Hatton v. Robinson, 14 Pick. 422. 
 
 1 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 334 ; Bank v. 
 Mandeville, 1 Cranch, 575; Gilleland 
 v. Martin, 3 McLean, 490 ; Farrell v. 
 Ladwell, 21 Wis. 183; Pry or v. Ro- 
 burn, 16 Ark. 671; Moore v. McKee, 
 13 Miss. 238; Wilson v. Sheppard. 28 
 Ala. 623; Dawley v. Ayers, 23 Cal. 
 108; Manchester v. Manchester, 24 
 Vt. 649; Kemp v. Donhan, 5 Har. 
 (Del.) 417 ; Cameron v. Fay, 55 Tex. 
 38; Waddams v. Humphreys, 22 III. 
 061 ; Karney v. Paisley, 13 Iowa, 89; 
 Smead v. Williamson, 16 B. Mon. 
 (Ky.) 492; Gee v. Scott, 48 Tex. 510; 
 Kyle v. Frost, 29 Ind. 398; Keaton 
 v. McGivier, 24 Ga. 217; Tully v. 
 Alexander, 11 La. Ann. 628; State v. 
 Armstrong, 4 Minn. 33o; Tomlinson 
 v. Lynch, 82 Mo. 160 ; Kelly v. Proc- 
 
 tor, 41 N. EL 139; Rice v. Keith, 63 
 N. C. 319; Den v. Johnson, 18 N. J. 
 L. 87; Birdv. Husten, 10 Ohio St. 
 418; Donnelly v. Smith, 7 R I. 12; 
 Gross v. Reddy. 45 Pa, St. 406 ; Foot- 
 man v. Prendergass, 2 Strob. Eq. 
 (S. C.)317. 
 
 2 Turner v. State, 50 Miss. 351, 354. 
 
 3 Lucas v. Brooks, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 
 436, 452; In re Alcock, 12 Eng. L & 
 Eq. 354, 355; Stapleton v. Crofts, 18 
 Ad. & E. 307, 369; Tully v. Alexan- 
 der, 11 La. Ann. 628; Mitchiuson v. 
 Cross, 58 III. 366, 369; In re Dwelly, 
 46 Me. 477, 480; Blake v. Graves, 18 
 Iowa, 312, 317 ; Bradford v. Williams. 
 2 Md. Ch. 1 ; Turner v. State, 50 Miss. 
 351 ; Den v. Johnson, 18 N. J. L. 87, 
 98; Marsh v. Potter, 30 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 506; Gibson v. Com., 87 Pa. St. 253; 
 State v. Workman, 15 S. C. 540, 546; 
 Cram v. Cram, 33 Vt 15, 40; Dun- 
 lap v. Hearn, 37 Miss. 471, 474; Bow- 
 man v. Patrick, 32 Fed. Rep. 308.
 
 § 167.] PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. 245 
 
 to the communications between client and attorney, and 
 which, by statute, now regulates the relation of priest and 
 penitent or physician and patient. Thus it is said that the 
 incompetency of the husband or wife to testify for or against 
 the other in a criminal prosecution arose, not from any iden- 
 tity of interest, but solely from principles of public policy 
 growing out of respect for the confidential nature of the 
 marital relation. 1 When, therefore, the interest of justice de- 
 manded that the mouth of the husband or wife should be 
 opened, as in prosecutions of either for a crime committed on 
 the other, an exception was recognized 2 from the necessity of 
 the case, and the husband or wife was competent. 3 
 
 A woman against whose husband an indictment has been 
 found may testify for the state on the trial of another person 
 for the crime; 4 and the same rule has been applied where the 
 husband was tried jointly with another, though it is the duty 
 of the jury to consider her testimony only so far as it applies 
 to the other defendant. 5 
 
 § 167. Statutory legislation — Confidential communica- 
 tions. — The competency of a wife or husband as a witness 
 
 iTurpin v. State, 55 Md. 477; Stein » Stein v. Bowman, 13 Pet 221 ; 1 
 
 v. Bowman, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 223 ; Tur- BI. Com. 413; Bentley v. Cooke, 3 
 
 ner v. State, 50 Miss. 351 ; In re Ran- Dong. (Eng.) 422; Whipp v. State, 
 
 dall, 5 City Hall Rec. 141, 153; 34 Ohio St. 87, 89; State v. Neil, 6 
 
 United States v. Jones, 32 Fed. Rep. Ala. 685; State v. Parrott, 79 N. C. 
 
 569; State v. Wright, 41 La. Ann. 615; People v. Chegaray, 18 Wend. 
 
 600; Hussey v. State, 87 Ala. 121; (N. Y.)642; Goodwin v. State, 60 Ga. 
 
 Ex parte Hendrickson (Utah, 1889), 509; State v. Bennett, 31 Iowa, 24; 
 
 21 Pac. Rep. 396 ; Johnson v. State, State v. Dyer, 59 Me. 503 ; Turner v. 
 
 27 Tex. A pp. 135; State v.Adams, 40 State, 50 Miss. 351, 354. A wife's 
 
 La. Ann. 213. dying declarations are admissible on 
 
 2 Bramlette v. State, 21 Tex. App. a trial of her husband for her mur- 
 
 611; 2 S. W. Rep. 875; People v. der. State v. Belcher, 13 S. C. 459 
 
 Sebriug, 66 Mich. 705 ; 33 N. W. Rep. Rex v. Woodcock, 2 Leach, 563 
 
 808. In a trial of the husband for People v. Green, 1 Denio (N. Y.),614 
 
 bigamy, his letters to his lawful wife People v. Murphy, 45 Cal. 143. 
 
 are inadmissible (State v. Ulrich, 110 4 State v. Rainsbarger, 71 Iowa, 
 
 Mo. 350; Com. v. Caponi, 155 Mass. 746: 31 N. W. Rep. 865; State v. 
 
 534; Bassett v. United States, 137 Wright, 41 La. Ann. 600. 
 
 U. S. 496), though it is held elsewhere 5 State v. Adams, 40 La. Ann. 213; 
 
 that she is herself competent as a 3 S. Rep. 733. 
 witness. United States v. Cutler, 19 
 Pac. Rep. 145 ; 5 Utah, 608.
 
 24G PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. [§ 167. 
 
 for or against the other is to a large degree, if not altogether, 
 regulated by statutes in the United States. These differ 
 somewhat in details and should be consulted in every instance 
 where this question arises. The general effect of this legisla- 
 tion has been to render the husband or wife competent as a 
 witness for or against the other by removing any disqualifica- 
 tion that either may have been under on account of the 
 common-law merger of the legal personality of the wife into 
 that of the husband because of the incompetency of a party 
 to be a witness. 1 In civil cases, therefore, a husband or wife 
 is a competent witness for or against the other to the same 
 extent and with the same effect as any other person, with the 
 exception (and this exception is recognized in all the states 
 which have legislated upon this subject) that neither can 
 be permitted to disclose confidential communications which 
 passed between them during coverture. But statutes merely 
 intended to render interested persons competent as witnesses 
 do not affect the competency of husband and wife, as their 
 incompetency is founded on other grounds than interest. 2 
 
 The common-law incompetency of the husband or wife as 
 a witness in the prosecution of either for a crime committed 
 against a third party is confirmed by statute in many states; 3 
 and where the statute in general terms declares that husbands 
 and wives are competent and compellable to give evidence, 
 it has been held to apply only to civil suits and never to crim- 
 inal proceedings. 4 The credibility of a husband or wife who 
 
 > Collins v. Mack, 31 Ark. 684; v. State (Tex., 1889), 11 S. W. Eep. 
 
 Watkins v. Turner, 34 Ark. 603; 667; Lowther v. State, 4 Ohio Cir. 
 
 Spitz's Estate, 56 Conn. 185; Beit- Ct. R. 522. This privilege may be 
 
 man v. Hopkins, 109 Ind. 178; Park- claimed by the defendant instead of 
 
 hurst v. Berdell, 110 N. Y. 388; by the witness. People v. Wood, 126 
 
 Warren v. Press Pub. Co., 132 id. N. Y. 249 ; 27 N. E. Rep. 382. 
 
 181; Nilan v. Kalish (Neb., 1893), 55 * Turpin v. State, 55 Md. 462, 478; 
 
 N. W. Rep. 295; Briggs v. Briggs Wilke v. People, 53 N. Y. 525 ; Steen 
 
 (R. L, 1893), 26 Atl. Rep. 198; Beale v. State, 20 Ohio St. 333. Of. People 
 
 v. Brown, 6 Mackey, 574. v. Murphy, 45 Cal. 143; Miner v. Peo- 
 
 2 Turpin v. State, 55 Md. 462, 477. pie. 58 111. A pp. 59; State v. Sloan, 
 
 3 State v. McCord, 8 Kan. 161; 55 Iowa, 217. The statutory pro- 
 United States v. Bassett, 5 Utah, 131 ; visions of the several states regulat- 
 13 Pac. Rep. 237 ; Meriwether v. State, ing the competency of a husband and 
 81 Ala. 74; 1 S. Rep. 500; Stickney wife as witnesses for or against each 
 v. Stickney, 131 U. S. 227 ; Johnson other are cited, and the subject of
 
 § 168.] 
 
 PKIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. 
 
 247 
 
 has been made competent to testify for or against the other 
 is to be tested precisely by the same rules as any other wit- 
 ness. 1 
 § 168. Confidential communication between husband and 
 
 wife. — Where a statute expressly enacts that a husband or 
 wife is not compellable to divulge their communications, either 
 may be permitted with the consent of the other to make a 
 voluntary statement, 2 though the contrary is the rule where 
 they are declared incompetent to testify. 3 Where the communi- 
 cation is not confidential, and this will be presumed where it 
 is made to a third person by the wife or husband in the other's 
 presence, 4 or where a third person is present, it will not be 
 privileged, 5 and the third party may testify to what he has 
 heard, but sometimes it has been held that a communication 
 need not be expressly confidential; 6 as, for example, where 
 
 confidential communication between 
 them is very thoroughly discussed 
 by the editors of the fourteenth 
 edition of Greenleaf on Evidence in 
 a note to section 334 in volume 1. 
 The list here appended is condensed 
 from that note. The following stat- 
 utes may be consulted: Arkansas 
 Code, £ 2»59, cl. 4; California Code, 
 § 1881 ; Crim. Code, g 1322 : Colorado 
 Gen. Laws, § 3649; Connecticut 
 Statutes, § 1097; Florida Laws, ch. 
 101 ; § 23, Act 1891 ; § 4029 ; Georgia 
 Code, § 3854; Illinois R. S., ch. 51, 
 § 5 ; Indiana R S., § 501 ; Iowa Code, 
 §§ 3641, 3642; Kansas Gen. Stat, 
 § 5280 ; Maine R S.. ch. 134, § 19, ch. 
 82, § 93 ; Maryland Gen. Laws, art. 
 35, § 1 ; Massachusetts Pub. Stat., ch. 
 169, § 18 ; Minnesota Statutes. § 5094 ; 
 Mississippi Rev. Code, § 1601; Mis- 
 souri R S., § 8922; Montana Code 
 Civ. Pro., § 649 ; Nebraska Code Civ. 
 Pro. 328 ; Nevada Gen. Stat., § 3403 ; 
 New Jersey Rev., vol. 1, p. 378, § 5; 
 New York Code Civ. Pro.. § 828; 
 OhioR. S.,§ 5241, ch. 3; Pennsyl- 
 vania Laws 1887, ch. 89, § 2, cl. b ; 
 Texas R S., art. 2247: Vermont R 
 S., § 1005 ; Virginia Rev. Civ. Code, 
 
 2281 ; West Virginia Code, ch. 150, 
 § 22; Wisconsin Anuot., § 7072. 
 
 'State v. Collins, 20 Iowa, 85; 
 State v. Guyer, 6 id. 263; State v. 
 Bernard, 45 id. 234. 
 
 -Southwick v. South wick, 2 
 Sweeny, 234 ; Stickuey v. Stickney, 
 131 U. S. 237. 
 
 3 Baldwin v. Parker, 99 Mass. 79; 
 Brown v. Wood, 121 id. 137; Jacobs 
 v. Hesler, 113 id. 157 ; Head v. Thomp- 
 son, 77 Iowa, 263; Smith v. Turley, 
 32 W. Va. 14; Com. v. Cleary, 152 
 Mass. 491. 
 
 4 Griffin v. Smith, 45 Ind. 366; 
 Mainard v. Beider, 2 Ind. App. 115; 
 28 N. E. Rep. 196. 
 
 5 Day v. Gidjum, 131 Mass. 31; 
 Com. v. Griffin, 110 Mass. 181 ; State 
 v. Carter, 35 Vt. 378: Howard v. 
 Brewer, 37 Ohio St. £02; People v. 
 Lewis, 62 Hun, 622 ; Lyon v. Prouty, 
 154 Mass. 488; Buckman's Will, 04 
 Vt. 313. 
 
 6 Dexter v. Booth, 2 Allen (Mass.), 
 559; Raynes v. Bennett, 114 Mass. 
 425; Com. v. Haynes, 145 id. 293; 
 Lepla v. Minn. Tribune Co, 35 Minu. 
 311 ; Norris v. Stewart, 105 N. C. 455.
 
 248 
 
 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. 
 
 [§ 168. 
 
 the statute in terms refers to all communications made during 
 marriage. 1 
 
 A conversation between husband and wife is no less con- 
 fidential and private because children were present who took 
 no part in it. 2 The fact that husband and wife sue or are sued 
 jointly does not remove the privilege as respects confiden- 
 tial communications, 3 nor will the husband or wife be permit- 
 ted to testify to any communications made while the marriage 
 relation existed after its dissolution, whether by annulment, 
 divorce or death. 4 But either after the death of the other may 
 now testify to any facts which he or she learned from other 
 sources and not by reason of the marital relation, even though 
 relative to a transaction of the decedent. 5 If, however, the 
 evidence of the other party to the suit is inadmissible because 
 referring to a transaction with a decedent, the testimony of a 
 wife is also inadmissible. 6 
 
 It is sometimes provided by statute that, in the trial of any 
 allegation founded upon adultery, neither husband nor wife 
 shall be competent to testify against the other except to 
 prove the fact of marriage or to disprove the adultery. 7 So 
 in an action to recover for criminal conversation, neither hus- 
 band nor wife can testify for the other, 8 though either being 
 
 • Low's Estate. My rick's Prob. (Cat) 
 143; Campbell v. Chase, 12 R I. 333; 
 Bird v. Hueston, 10 Ohio St. 418; 
 Westerman v. Westerman, 25 id. 500 ; 
 King v. King, 42 Mo. App. 454. 
 
 2 Jacobs v. Hesler, 113 Mass. 157. 
 So business communications are priv- 
 ileged. Com. v. Hayes (Mass., 1887), 
 14 N. E. Rep. 151 ; Mitchell v. Mitch- 
 eli. 15 S. W. Rep. 705. 
 
 a Buck v. Ashbrook, 51 Mo. 539; 
 Tingley v. Couzill, 48 id. 291. 
 
 * Hitchcock v. Moore, 70 Mich. 112 ; 
 Stanley v. Montgomery, 102 Ind. 102 ; 
 Stein v. Bowman, 13 Pick. 209, 223; 
 French v. Ware (Vt., 1893), 26 Atl. 
 Rep. 1090 ; Coffin v. Jones, 13 Pick. 
 441; Robin v. King, 2 Leigh, 142; 
 Bigelow v. Sickles, 75 Wis. 528 ; Pat- 
 ton v. Wilson, 2 Lea (Term.), 10 1 ; Es- 
 tate of Lord. Myrick's Prob. (Cal.) 143 ; 
 State v. Jolly, 3 Dev. & BaL 110; 
 
 Crose v. Rufcledge, 81 111. 266 ; Barnes 
 v. Camack, 1 Barb. 392 ; Cook v. 
 Grange, 18 Ohio, 526 ; Brock v. Brock, 
 116 Pa. St. 113. When either party 
 is deceased his written communica- 
 tion to the other cannot be used by a 
 third person in a suit against the sur- 
 vivor. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 15 S. W. 
 Rep. 705; 80* Tex. 101. 
 
 5 Coffin v. Jones, 13 Pick. 445 ; Wells 
 v. Tucker, 3 Binn. 366 ; Williams v. 
 Baldwin, 7 Vt. 506 ; Saunders v. Hen- 
 drix. 5 Ala. 224 ; Galbraith v. McLain, 
 84 111. 379 ; Romans v. Hay, 12 Iowa, 
 270, cited in 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 337. 
 
 fcHarriman v. Sampson, 23 111. App. 
 161 ; Trileavan v. Dixon, 119 111. 551 ; 
 Barry v. Stevens, 69 Me. 290. 
 
 "Michigan Annot. Stat., § 7543; 
 Code N. C. 588; R. S. Ind. 1881, §501. 
 
 " Cross v. Cross, 55 Mich. 280 ; De 
 Meli v. De Meli, 120 N. Y. 492.
 
 § 169.] 
 
 rKTVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. 
 
 219 
 
 a party may testify in his or her own behalf. 1 So a married 
 woman has been permitted to testify in her own behalf to the 
 fact of the non-access of her husband,- or that her husband 
 had made certain representations to her unon the strength of 
 which she had conveyed property to him, 3 or that her hus- 
 band had been intoxicated in her presence, 4 or had communi- 
 cated to her a venereal disease. 5 
 
 §100. Communications to attorneys.— At common law 
 an attorney cannot be compelled or allowed to disclose com- 
 munications made by his client to him or his advice mven in 
 return in the course of his employment as an attorney. 6 In 
 nearly all the states this rule has been confirmed by statute, 
 and it is sometimes provided that the privilege may be waived 
 by the client. 
 
 A client may waive the privilege by conduct and by impli- 
 cation as well as by express declaration. 7 Thus, if he request 
 his attorney to act as a subscribing witness to his will ho 
 waives his -privilege to that extent, and the attorney is then 
 compellable to testify to the same facts as other subscribing 
 witnesses. 9 Such a request is tantamount to a declaration 
 that he wishes to release the attorney from the professional 
 
 i Smith v. Brien, 6 N. Y. S. 174. 
 
 2 State v. McDowell (N. C), 7 S. E. 
 Rep. 785. 
 
 3 Spitz's Appeal, 56 Conn. 1S4 ; 14 
 Atl. Rep. 776. 
 
 4 Stanley v. Stanley (Iud., 1888), 13 
 N. E. Rep. 201. 
 
 5 Poison v. State (Iud, 1893), 35 N. 
 E. Rep. 907. 
 
 6 Carter v. West (Ky., 1893), 19 S. 
 W. Rep. 592; Aultman v. Ritter, 81 
 Wis. 395 ; 51 N. W. Rep. 569 : Koontz 
 v. Owens, 109 Mo. 1 ; 18 S. W. Rep. 
 928 ; Wadd v. Hazletoo, 62 Hun, 602 ; 
 Swain v. Humphreys, 42 III. A pp. 
 370; Loder v. Whelpley, 111 N. Y. 
 220; In re Coleman. 11 N. Y. 220; 
 In re McCarthy, 65 Hud, 624; Chirac 
 v. ReinecL-er, 11 Wheat. 295; Fos- 
 ter v. Hall, 12 Pick. 89; Mathews v. 
 Hoagland (N. J.. 1890). 21 Atl. Rep. 
 1054; Alexander v. United States, 
 
 138 U. S. 353. In Pearse v. Pears?. 1 
 De Gex & Sm. 28, 29, the court says : 
 "Truth, like all other things, may 
 have loved unwisely; may be pur- 
 sued too keenly ; may cost too much ; 
 and surely the meanness and the mis- 
 chief of prying into a man's confi- 
 dential consultation with his legal 
 adviser, the general evil of infusing 
 reserve, dissimulation, meanness, sus- 
 picion and fear into those communi- 
 cations which must take place, and 
 which, unless in a condition of per- 
 fect security, must take place use- 
 lessly or worse, are too great a price 
 for truth itself." 
 
 'Willis v. West. 60 Ga. 613. 
 
 8 lure Lumb's Will, 21 Civ. Pro. 
 334; Rousseau v. Blen. 31 N. Y. 177: 
 Iu re Pitts (Wis., 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. 
 149; McMaster's Appeal, 55 id. 149; 
 In re Coleman, 111 N. Y. 220.
 
 250 
 
 TKIVILEGKD COMMUNICATIONS. 
 
 [§ 169. 
 
 privilege, and is equivalent to calling upon him to take the 
 witness stand in his behalf. 1 
 
 The communication, to bo privileged, must have been made 
 to one who was actually occupying the position of legal ad- 
 viser; but where a communication is made to an attorney 
 who has been requested to act, it will be privileged though 
 he subsequently refuses to do so. 2 The rule does not require 
 any regular retainer, or any particular form of application 
 or payment of a fee, 3 provided the attorney is consulted with 
 the actual intention of obtaining his professional services. 4 
 
 A communication made to or advice received from the 
 agent of the attorney is no less privileged than where the 
 client communicates, with the attorney directly. Thus, a 
 clerk, 5 interpreter/' or other agent 7 of the attorney will not 
 be allowed to testify to communications made to him in a 
 professional capacity by a client of his employer. But a third 
 person present at a consultation between attorney and client, 
 and who is not the medium of communication, may testify to 
 what was said; 8 and so generally any person who has been 
 consulted either in a private or professional capacity in regard 
 to any transaction may be compelled to testify if, at that time 
 and in reference to that particular matter, he did not occupy 
 the position of an attorney at law. 9 
 
 > McKinney v. Grand St. etc. R. R. 
 Co., 104 N. Y. 352. 
 
 ■i Peek v. Boone (Ga., 1893), 17 S. 
 W. Rep. 66 ; Sargent v. Hampden, 38 
 Me. 581 ; McClellan \. Longfellow, 
 32 id. 594. 
 
 3 1 Greenl. Evid., § 241. Cf. In re 
 Monroe's Will, 20 N. Y. S. 82 ; 2 Con. 
 Sur. 395. 
 
 4 Sargent v. Hampden, supra. 
 
 & Sibley v. Waffle, 16 N. Y. 180: 
 Jackson v. French, 3 Wend. 337; 
 Havves v. State.. 88 Ala. 68; Taylor v. 
 Forster, 2 C. R 195 ; Bowman v. Nor- 
 ton, 5 C. & P. 177; Jarcline v. Sheri- 
 dan, 2 C. & K. 24; Landsberger v. 
 Gorham, 5 Cal. 450. 
 
 e Parker v. Carter. 4 Munf. 273; 
 Andrews v. Solomon, 1 Pet. C. C. 
 356. 
 
 7 Parkins v. Hawkshaw, 2 Stark. 
 1239; Steele v. Stuart, 1 Phil. Oh. 
 471 ; Fenner v. London & S. E. Ry. 
 Co., L. R. 7 Q. B. 767. 
 
 s Greer v. Greer, 5S Hun, 251 ; Ty- 
 ler v. Hall, 106 Mo. 313; Goddard v. 
 Gardner, 28 Conn. 172 ; Hoy v. Mor- 
 ris, 13 Gray, 519. 
 
 9 In re Monroe's Will, 20 N. Y. S. 
 182; Matthews' Estate, 4 Am. Law 
 Jour. 356 (conveyancer); Schubkagel 
 v. Dierstein, 131 Pa. St. 53; Mc- 
 Laughlin v. Gilmore, 1 111. App. 563; 
 Bruuger v. Smith, 49 Fed. Rep. 124; 
 Holman v. Kimball. 22 Vt. 555; De 
 Wolf v. Strader, 26 111. 225; Coon 
 v. Swan. 30 Vt. 6; Borum v. Fonts, 
 15 Ind. 50; Sample v. Frost, 10 Iowa, 
 266. So communications to one's 
 confidential clerk or banker (Mc-
 
 § no.] 
 
 riilVILEGKD COMMUNICATIONS. 
 
 251 
 
 §170. Character and time of the communications. — In 
 
 all classes of privileged communications claimed to be con- 
 fidential certain elements must be present. It is only neces- 
 sary to call attention to the fact that, as the communication 
 must have been made during the existence of the confidential 
 relation, anything said before or after is not within the rule. 
 So the communication must have been made to the attorney, 
 doctor or priest, not only during the existence of the connec- 
 tion but while he was acting in a professional capacity, and 
 must have had relation to his professional employment. 1 So 
 an attorney will be allowed to divulge the name of a person 
 who retained him 2 and the date when he received a certain 
 instrument ; 3 that he drew a deed 4 for his client or paid money 
 to his client 5 or to a third person on his client's account. 
 
 So it has bean held that whenever an attorney, though acting 
 as such, obtains knowledge of any fact, not by reason of his pro- 
 fessional character, but by his power of observation as a man 
 or by means which any man in a like situation would employ, 
 the information is not privileged. 6 
 
 Manus v. Freeman, 2 Pa. Dist. R. 
 144) or steward are never privileged. 
 1 Greenl. Evid., § 248, citing Hof- 
 man v. Smith, 1 Caines, 157; Vallaint 
 v. Dodemead, 2 Atk. 524. "Where a 
 person, though not admitted to the 
 bar, lias been accustomed fur years 
 to practice before justices of the 
 peace, confidential statements made 
 to him by an accused are under the 
 rule. Benedict v. State, 11 N. E. 
 Rep. 125; 44 Ohio, 679. But the 
 mere presence of a third person will 
 not make the attorney a competent 
 witness. Blount v. Kempton, 155 
 M i: s. 378. 
 
 i Grant v. Hughes, 98 N. 0. 177 ; 2 
 S. E. Rep. 339; Piano Mfg. Co. v. 
 Frawley, 68 Wis. 577 ; 32 N. W. Rep. 
 768 ; Caldwell v. Davis, 10 Colo. 481 ; 
 15 Pac. Rep. 696 ; Sharon v. Sharon, 
 79 Cal. 633; Skellie v. James, 81 Ga. 
 419; Rogers v. Moore, 88 id. 88. 
 
 2 Brown v. Payson, 6 N. H. 443 ; 
 
 Gower v. Emery, 6 Shepl. 79; Chirac 
 v. Reinecker, 11 Wheat. 280. 
 
 3 Wheatley v. Williams. 1M.&W. 
 533. But cf. contra, Ex pirte Trustee, 
 9 Morrell's Bank. Cas. 116. 
 
 4 Barry v. Coville, 7 N. Y. S. 36; 
 Rundle v. Foster, 3 Tenn. Ch. 658; 
 Robsou v. Kemp, 4 Esp. 235. 
 
 5 Chapman v. Peebles, 84 Ala. 283; 
 4 S. Rep. 273. 
 
 e Wadd v. Hazelton, 62 Hun, 602; 
 Swaine v. Humphreys, 42 111. App. 
 370 ; Harris v. Dougherty, 74 Tex. 1 ; 
 11 S. W. Rep. 921 ; Breunan v. Hall, 
 14 N. Y. S. 864; Sheldon v. Sheldon, 
 58 Hun, 601 ; In re Smith, 61 Hun, 
 101 ; Weaver's Estate, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 
 516 ; Theisen v. Dayton, 82 Iowa, 74 ; 
 47 N. W. Rep. 891. As a corporation 
 acts only by agent, a confidential com- 
 munication by the latter to the at- 
 torney of the corporation is within 
 the rule (Fire Ass'n v. Fleming (Ga., 
 ), 3 S. E. Rep. 420), though per-
 
 252 
 
 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. [§§ 171, 172. 
 
 § 171. Attorney employed by both parties. — When an at- 
 torney is engaged by several parties to act or to advise in a 
 transaction in which all are interested, communications made 
 to him by any of them are not within the rule. lie may be 
 called to testify by any one of the parties in a subsequent 
 suit between them as to such professional communications. 1 
 Some of the cases seem to confine the operation of this excep- 
 tion to communications made where the other parties to the 
 transaction or suit were present, 2 and in such a case the at- 
 torney may testify, though at the time he was only acting for 
 one party to the suit. 3 
 
 § 172. Permanent character of the privilege — Its waiver. 
 The termination of the pending litigation or the severance of 
 the relation of attorney and client by the death of the client 
 or for any cause does not unseal the lips of the former as to, 
 communications passing between them while the connection 
 existed. 4 The privilege is designed to protect the client, and 
 he may consequently waive it. So it has been held that this 
 may be done after the death of the client by his representative, 
 but only when an application of the rule would be to the dis- 
 advantage of his estate. 5 While the client is living the priv- 
 
 haps this would not be so in the case of 
 an agent acting for a natural person. 
 So the regularly appointed attorney 
 for a municipal corporation will not 
 be compelled to divulge communica- 
 tions made to him professionally by 
 a municipal board or officer. People 
 v. Gilon, 18 Civ. Pro. R. 109. 
 
 1 Sparks v. Sparks (Kan., 1893), 32 
 Pac. Rep. 892 : Michael v. Foil, 100 
 N. C. 189; In re Bauer, 79 Cal. 312; 
 Gulick v. Gulick, 39 N. J. L. 516; 
 Cady v. Walker, 62 Mich. 157: Lynn 
 v. Lyerle, 113 111. 134; Hurlbut v. 
 Hurlbut, 128 N. Y. 420: Hanlon v. 
 Doherty, 109 Ind. 37; Tyler v. Tyler, 
 126 III. 525. 
 
 2 Hurlbut v. Hurlbut, 128 N. Y. 420 ; 
 Colt v. McConnell, 1 16 Ind. 256 ; Good- 
 win Company's Appeal, 117 Pa. St. 
 537 ; Hanlon v. Doherty, 109 Ind. 37 ; 
 Smith v. Crego, 7 N. Y. S. 86 ; Hughes 
 
 v. Boone, 102 N. C. 137; Hard v. Ash- 
 ley, 63 Hun, 634 ; Greer v. Greer, 58 
 Hun, 251. 
 
 » Carey v. Carey, 108 N. C. 267; 
 Deuser v. Walkup, 43 Mo. App. 625; 
 Greer v. Greer, supra; In re Smith, 
 61 Hun, 101; 15 N. Y. S. 425; In re 
 McCarthy, 65 Hun, 624. But in a 
 suit between strangers such com- 
 munications would doubtless be priv- 
 ileged. 
 
 ••Wilson v. Rastall, 4 T. R. 759; 
 Morris v. Cain, 39 La. Ann. 712; I S. 
 Rep. 879 ; Kant v. Kessler, 114 Pa. St. 
 603; Walter v. Fail-child, 4 N. Y S. 
 559; Barry v. Coville, 7 id. 36; 1 
 Greenl. on Evid., § 243. 
 
 5 Layman's Wills, 40 Minn. 372 ; Mor- 
 ris v. Morris, 119 Ind. 343 ; Blackburn 
 v. Crawfords, 3 Wall. 175; Russell v. 
 Jackson, 15 Jur. 1117. Contra, Loder 
 v. Whelpley, 111 N. Y. 245 ; Westover
 
 § H3. j 
 
 rRIVII.EC.KD COMMUNICATIONS. 
 
 253 
 
 ilege is wholly personal and cannot be waived by any other 
 person merely because he stands in privity with the client: 1 
 on the other hand, while he is living his agent, or after his 
 decease his personal representative, may, it seems, claim the 
 privilege by which the attorney is prohibited from testifying. 2 
 The privilege is forever waived if immediate objection is not 
 taken when the attorney or other professional person is ex- 
 amined 5 as a witness, or where the client has disclaimed the 
 existence of the relationship, 4 or has called the attorney to 
 testify to the tenor of such communications, 5 or upon the stand 
 himself discloses voluntarily the facts contained in his commu- 
 nications. 6 
 
 § 173. Privilege as to documents. — The attorney cannot 
 be compelled to produce or disclose the nature of any writing 
 which he has seen 7 or which is in his possession belonging to 
 his client. 8 He will be permitted to testify that such docu- 
 ments exist, that he has searched for them, and that they are 
 or are not in his custody, when it is sought to prove their con- 
 tents by secondary evidence." A communication to an at- 
 torney acting in the capacity of conveyancer is privileged, 10 
 
 v. Life Ins. Co., 99 id. 56. Cf. Valen- 
 sin v. Valensin, 14 Pac. Rep. 397 ; 73 
 Cat 106. 
 
 i State v. Jones, 13 S. E. Rep. 325; 
 Bouman v. Norton, 5 C. & P. 177. 
 
 2Edington v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 67 
 N. Y. 185. Cf. Pierson v. People, 79 
 N. Y. 424. 
 
 » Hoyt v. Hoyt, 112 N. Y. 513. 
 
 * In re Mellen, 63 Hun, 623. 
 
 5 Masterson v. Boyce, 6 N. Y. S. 65 ; 
 McKinney v. Grand St. etc. R. R. Co., 
 104 N. Y. 355 ; Smith v. Crego, 7 N. Y. 
 S. 86. 
 
 estate v. Tall, 43 Minn. 276 ; People 
 v. Gallagher, 75 Mich. 515 ; Hunt v. 
 Blackburn, 9 S. Ct. 125 ; 128 U. S. 464. 
 The tact that the client denies on the 
 witness stand that he made a certain 
 statement to his attorney will not 
 authorize proof thereof by the latter's 
 evidenca State v. James, 34 S. C. 
 579. 
 
 7 Arbuckle v. Templeton, 25 Atl. 
 Rep. 1093. 
 
 8 Volant v. Soyer, 13 Q. B. 231 ; 
 Mathews v. Hoagland, 48 N. J. Eq. 
 455; 21 Atl. Rep. 1054; Liggett v. 
 Glenn, 51 Fed. Rep. 381. 
 
 9 Dale v. Livingstone, 4 Wend. 558 ; 
 Jackson v. McVey, 18 Johns. 330; 
 Brandt v. Klein. 17 id. 335; Mills v. 
 Oddy, 6 C. & P. 728 ; Stokoe v. St. 
 Paul M. & M. R. Co., 40 Minn. 546 ; 
 Coveney v. Tannahill, 1 Hill, 33; 
 Allen v. Root, 39 Tex. 589 ; Harris- 
 burg Car Mfg. Co. v. Sloan (Ind., 
 1889), 21 N. E. Rep. 1088. 
 
 io Bingham v. Walk, 27 N. E. Rep. 
 483; 128 Ind. 164; Crane v. Barkdoll, 
 59 Md. 534 ; Wilson v. Troup, 7 Johns. 
 Ch. 25 ; Getzlaff v. Seliger, 43 Wis. 
 297 ; Mathews' Estate, 5 Pa. L. J. Rep. 
 149 ; O'Neill v. Murray, 6 Dak. 107. 
 But contra, In re Smith, 61 Hun, 101 ; 
 Brazel v. Fair, 26 S. C. 370; Caldwell
 
 254 
 
 PKIVILKGKD COMMUNICATIONS. 
 
 [§ 174. 
 
 though he acts for both parties to the deed of convey- 
 
 ance 
 
 § 174. What communications are within the privilege. — 
 
 In order that a communication to an attorney may be privi- 
 leged it is not essential that an}'- particular litigation, suit or 
 other legal proceeding should be pending. If the relation of 
 client and attorney exists it is sufficient; for, whatever the 
 transaction may be, and whether or not it is likely to be sub- 
 sequently litigated, the attorney will not be permitted to dis- 
 close the confidential communication or advice. 2 But a com- 
 munication made by a client to his attorney in regard to a 
 future infraction of the criminal law by the former, or advice 
 given as to the means of evading the consequence of a crimi- 
 nal or fraudulent act which he intends to commit, is not privi- 
 leged; 3 nor is the mouth of the attorney closed as to commu- 
 nications or acts arising out of a conspiracy to defraud in 
 which both attorney and client 4 are participants. And the 
 fact that the attorney is innocent of fraud, and ignorant of 
 he wrongful use which his client intends to make of his ad- 
 
 r. Davis, 10 Colo. 481; O'Neill v. 
 
 ilurray, 6 Dak. 107; Thomas v. 
 iJriffen (Inch, 1890), 27 N. E. Rep. 754. 
 Though it must be clearly shown 
 that he acted as a scrivener only. 
 
 i Clay v. Williams, 2 Munf. 105, 122. 
 It is for the court to determine in what 
 capacity and for what purpose docu- 
 ments were deposited with an attor- 
 ney (Reg. v. Jones, 1 Denio Cr. Cas. 
 166), and whether they are confiden- 
 tial and thus inadmissible. Amey v. 
 Long, 9 East, 473 ; Rey uolds v. Rowley, 
 
 3 Rob. (La.) 261 ; Batesen v. Hartsink, 
 
 4 Esp. 43 ; Hughes v. Boone, 102 N. C. 
 43. A client cannot avoid the pro- 
 duction of papers not themselves 
 privileged by depositing them with 
 his attorney. Edison El. Co. v. U. S. 
 Elec. Co., 44 Fed. Rep. 294 
 
 2 Minet v. Morgan, LR8Ch. 361 ; 
 Penruddock v. Hammond, 11 Beav. 
 59 ; Belzhover v. Blackstock, 3 Watts, 
 20; Foster v. Hall, 12 Pick. 89,92; 
 
 Pearse v. Pearse, 16 L. J. Ch. 153; 
 Bingham v. Walk, 128 Ind. 164; 27 
 N. E. Rep. 483 ; In re McCarthy, 59 
 Hun, 626. The question whether an 
 opinion rendered before a litigation 
 was begun or after it was in contem- 
 plation, but without direct reference 
 to it, or after it had been terminated 
 and while no particular action was 
 pending or contemplated, though 
 much discussed in the early cases is 
 now settled, and the privilege ex- 
 tends to all advice whenever given. 
 For a full consideration on the point 
 see 1 Greenl. on Evid., §§ 240, 240a. 
 
 t'Heckman v. Green (Mo., 1893), 22 
 S. W. Rep. 455 ; Russell v. Jackson, 
 15 Jur. 1117; Everett v. State (Tex., 
 1892), 18 S. W. Rep. 674; Bank of 
 Utica v. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch. 528 ; 
 Orman v. State, 22 Tex. App. 604. 
 
 "People v. Sheriff, 29 Barb. 622; 
 Mathews v. Hoagland, 48 N. J. Eq. 
 458 ; 21 Atl. Rep. 1054.
 
 § 175.] PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. 255 
 
 vice, 1 will deprive the interview of its professional charac- 
 ter, as full confidence is withheld by the client. To destroy 
 the privilege fraud must be clearly shown,' 2 and the test of 
 fraud in a civil suit is the issue arising from the pleadings. 3 
 An attorney may testify that one alleged to be his client made 
 no communication to him or received no advice, 4 and he may 
 repeat a statement made to him (though made while he was 
 acting in a professional capacity) by a third person to whom 
 he was referred by his client, 5 or communications by the client 
 which were intended to be imparted to other persons through 
 the attorney," or a conversation between two persons in his 
 presence, though both were his clients. 7 
 
 As this privilege is designed for the client's protection, he 
 cannot be compelled to disclose anything that passed between 
 him and his attorney when, being a party to an action, he 
 takes the witness stand in his own behalf. 8 But an accom- 
 plice turning state's evidence may be compelled to disclose 
 information which is contained in a communication to an 
 attorney, as he is conclusively presumed to have waived all 
 privileges. 9 
 
 § 175. Privilege of police, judicial and executive officials. 
 The administration of justice and the interest of society de- 
 mand that information obtained by judicial or police officials 
 in the detection or prosecution of crime should remain un- 
 divulged. 10 This principle was recognized at common law, and 
 
 iThe Queen v. Cox, L. R 14 Q. B. Bigler v. Reyher, 48 Iud. 112; Hem- 
 
 D. 153 ; Greenough v. Guskell, 1 My. enway v. Smith, 28 Vt. 701 ; State v. 
 
 & K. 98: Gartside v. Outram, 26 L, White, 19 Kan. 445; Duttenhofer v. 
 
 J. Ch. 113; Follett v. Jeffereyes, 1 State, 34 Ohio St. 91. Contra, Wo- 
 
 Sim. (N. S.) 3; Orman v. State, 22 burn v. Henshaw, 101 Mass. 193; 
 
 Tex. App. 604; Mathews v. Hoag- Montgomery v. Pickering, 116 id. 227. 
 
 land, 48 N. J. Eq. 455. Of. Durkee v. Leland, 4 Vt 612. 
 
 2 Higbee v. Dresser, 103 Mass. 523. 3 Jones v. State, 65 Miss. 179 ; 3 S. 
 
 3 Mathews v. Hoagland, 48 N. J. Eq. Rep. 379, 
 
 455 ; 21 Atl. Rep. 1054 io " Courts of justice, therefore, will 
 
 4 Daniel v. Daniel, 39 Pa. St. 191. not compel or allow the discovery of 
 8 In re Meller, 63 Hun, 632. such information either by the sub- 
 6 Ferguson v. McBean, 91 Cal. 63; ordinate officer to whom it is given, 
 
 Lloyd v. Davis, 2 Ind. App. 170; In by the informer himself or by any 
 
 re Meller, 63 Hun, 632; Galle v. Tode, other person without the permission 
 
 26 N. Y. S. 633. of the government" Per Gray, J., 
 
 'In re Weaver, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. R in Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 
 
 516. 487. 
 
 s Barker v. Kuhn, 38 Iowa, 895;
 
 250 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. [§ 1 75. 
 
 no witness was compellable to disclose the name of an in- 
 former ' or any communications which were made or act done 
 relating to the detection of a crime, any farther than was 
 needed to ascertain fairly and justly the guilt or innocence of 
 the accused. 2 But the necessity or desirability of the dis- 
 closure of the information, in order to establish the innocence 
 of the prisoner, 3 or because public interest would suffer or be 
 benefited, is one for the court to determine on all the circum- 
 stances of each particular case. 4 
 
 Official communications, consultations and transactions be- 
 tween superior and subordinate executive or legislative offi- 
 cials are also within the rule of privilege. 5 So an assessor of 
 taxes will not be permitted to disclose as a witness in a suit 
 between third persons the sworn statements made to him by 
 the owners of property; 6 nor will a witness be permitted to 
 divulge a communication between the attorney-general and a 
 United States district attorney, 7 or between a military officer 
 and his commander-in-chief, 3 or between the president of the 
 United States and the governor of a state commonwealth. 9 
 
 Whether a member of a legislative body can be compelled 
 to testify to what took place therein has been differently de- 
 cided. In England it is held he cannot, 1 " though it was held 
 that a senator of the United States may be compelled to tes- 
 tify to what took place in secret session when the senate re- 
 fused to remove the bar of secrecy therefrom. 11 
 
 1 Attorney-General v. Briant, 15 7 United States v. Six Lots of 
 
 L. J. Exch. 265. Ground, 1 Woods, C. C. 234. 
 
 2Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U. S. 811; 8 Home v. Bentinck,2Bro<l. &Bing. 
 
 Rex v. Hardy, 24 How. St. Tr. 753, 133; Cooke v. Maxwell. 2 Stark. 183. 
 
 808; Rex v. Watson, 2 Stark. 136; 9 Gray v. Pentland, 2 S. & R. 23; 
 
 United States v. Moses, 4 Wash. C. 1 Burr's Trial, pp. 186, 187. 
 
 C. 726. 10 Chubb v. Salomons, 3 C. & K. 75 ; 
 
 3 Marks v. Beifus, 25 Q. B. Div. 494. Pluukett v. Cobbett, 29 How. St. Tr. 
 
 4 Reg. v. Richardson, 5F.&F, 693. 71, 72. 
 
 This matter is now sometimes regu- u Law v. Scott, 5 Har. & J. 438. 
 
 lated by statute. Cal. Civ. Code, The rule in England is thus stated by 
 
 §1881; Colo. Act 1883, p. 289; Minn. Sir James Stephen : "No one can be 
 
 Stats., § 5094. compelled to give evidence relating 
 
 5 Totten v. United States, 93 U. S. to any affair of state or as to official 
 
 105. communications between public offi- 
 
 6 Witters v. Sovvles, 82 Fed. Rep. cers upon public affairs, except with 
 
 130. the permission of the officer at the
 
 § 176.] 
 
 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. 
 
 257 
 
 § 176. Privilege as relating to jurors. — In order to obtain 
 freedom of discussion and to prevent the flight of suspected 
 persons, the law requires that the proceedings of grand juries 
 should be kept secret, though the jurors are not sworn to 
 secrecy. 1 In the absence of statute prescribing when a grand 
 juror may testify, unless his evidence is absolutely essential 
 to protect private rights or advance public justice, he is not 
 compellable to give evidence as to what passed in the jur} T - 
 room. 2 It has been held that a grand juror may be compelled 
 to testify to the number concurring in the indictment, 3 or he 
 may be called to show that the evidence of a witness on the 
 trial is inconsistent with that given by him before the grand 
 jury; 4 to confirm the evidence of a witness, 5 to point out 
 irregularities in the indictment which are not due to miscon- 
 duct of the grand jurors, 6 or to show that the defendant was 
 not examined as a witness before the grand jury. 7 If the 
 statute enumerates the cases in which a grand juror may tes- 
 tify he will not be permitted to do so in others. 8 
 
 head of the department concerned, 
 or to give evidence of what took 
 place in either house of parliament, 
 without the leave of the house, 
 though he may state that a particu- 
 lar person acted as speaker." Ste- 
 phen's Dig. Evid., art 112. 
 
 1 People v. Reggel (Utah, 1892), 28 
 Pac. Rep. 935; Little v. Com., 25 
 Gratt (Va.) 921 ; United States v. 
 Reed, 2 Blatch. (U. S.) 435; Com. v. 
 Hall, 65 Mass. 137. 
 
 -'State v. Oxford, 30 Tex. 428; 
 State v. Hamlin, 47 Conn. 114; State 
 v. Mewherter, 47 Iowa, 88 ; Kennedy 
 v. Holladay, 16 S. W. Rep. 688 ; 105 
 Mo. 24; Creek v. State, 24 Ind. 151; 
 Watts v. Territory, 1 Wash. Ter. 409 ; 
 State v. Broughton, 7 Ired. L. (N. C.) 
 96; Jones v. Turpin, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 
 181, and cases infra. The secrecy of 
 grand jury proceedings is due to the 
 public alone, and is not a privilege 
 of the witnesses who testify before 
 it (People v. Young, 31 Cal. 568), or 
 
 17 
 
 of a person indicted. People v. Reg- 
 gel (Utah, 1893), 28 Pac. Rep. 955. 
 
 3 Low's Case, 4 Me. 439 ; Sparren- 
 berger v. State, 53 Ala. 481 ; Cherry 
 v. State, 6 Fla. 679 ; Com. v. Smith, 
 9 Mass. 109 ; People v. Shattuck, 6 
 Abb. N. C. 33. 
 
 4 Jones v. Turpin, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.)- 
 181 ; Little v. Com., 25 Gratt. (Va.) 
 921 ; Com. v. Mead, 12 Gray (Mass.),. 
 167; State v. Fassett. 16 Conn. 468; 
 United States v. Reid, 2 Blatchf. 
 435; State v. Wood, 53 N. H. 484; 
 People v. Hulbut, 4 Denio (N. Y.\ 
 133. 
 
 s Pellum v. State, 89 Ala. 28 ; Per- 
 kins v. State, 4 Ind. 222. 
 
 6 People v. Briggs, 60 How. Pr. 17. 
 
 ' Com. v. Hill, 65 Mass. 137. 
 
 8 Com. v. Snowden (Ky., 1892), 17 
 S. W. Rep. 205; Burnham v. Hat- 
 field, 5 Black. (Ind.) 21 ; Way v. But- 
 terworth, 106 Mass. 75; Burdick v. 
 Hunt, 43 Ind. 381; Heidekoper v. 
 Cotton, 3 Watts (Pa.), 56; Ex parte
 
 258 
 
 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. 
 
 [§ 177. 
 
 In regard to traverse jurors, the general principle seems to 
 be that they may testify to facts or communications referring 
 to their individual acts while separated from their associates. 1 
 So they may testify to what third persons said or did to them 
 as jurors. But the motives and reasons of the jurors and 
 the transactions and communications between them relating 
 to the subject-matter under their consideration as an official 
 body and which were made in their capacity as jurors, whether 
 in the jury-room or elsewhere, 2 are privileged, and to these 
 the testimony of a juror is neither compellable nor allowable. 3 
 
 § 177. Confidential communications to clergymen. — The 
 common law, while permitting the penitent to confess his 
 shortcomings to his spiritual adviser, protected the former 
 only to the extent that the clergyman was excused from re- 
 
 Sontag, 64 Cal. 525 ; Sands v. Robi- 
 son, 12 Smed. & M. (Miss.) 854; State 
 v. Grady, 84 Mo. 220. A state stat- 
 ute allowing grand jurors to testify 
 is binding on federal courts sitting 
 in that state. Fotheringham v. 
 Adams Ex. Co., 34 Fed. Rep. 646. 
 
 1 Harrington, etc. Co. v. Railroad 
 Co. (Mass., 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 955. 
 
 2 Com. v. White, 147 Mass. 76. 
 
 3 State v. Freeman, 5 Conn. 318 ; 
 Heffron v. Gallupe, 55 Me. 563; 
 Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 455 ; 
 Rowe v. Canney, 139 Mass. 41. Cf. 
 Tucker v. So. Kingston, 5 R. I. 558; 
 Boston, etc. Corp. v. Dana, 1 Grey, 83, 
 105; Paige v. Chedsey, 20 N. Y. S. 
 899 ; Tenney v. Evans, 13 N. H. 462 ; 
 Dane v. Tucker, 4 Johns. 487 ; War- 
 ren v. Spencer Water Co., 143 Mass. 
 155. So evidence by members of the 
 jury that they agreed upon a verdict 
 through ill-will toward a party (John- 
 son v. Parrotte, 34 Neb. 26 ; 51 N. W. 
 Rep. 290), that third persons had con- 
 versed with them in the jury-room 
 (Gardner v. Minea, 47 Minn. 295), or 
 that a chance or quotient verdict was 
 agreed on (Moss v. Cen. Park R. R 
 Co., 23 N. Y. S. 23; Crossdale v. Tan- 
 
 tum, 6 Houst. (Del.) 218), is inadmis- 
 sible. Cf. Pawnee Ditch Co. v. 
 Adams (Colo., 1892), 28 Pac. Rep. 662; 
 Lift v. Lingane, 17 R. I. 420 ; 22 Atl. 
 Rep. 942; State v. Dusenberry, 112 
 Mo. 277; State v. Plum, 49 Kan. 279; 
 Mattox v. United States, 146 U. S. 
 140; State v. Best, 111 N. C. 638; 
 Weatherford v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 530 ; Flood v. McClure (Idaho, 
 1883), 32 Pac. Rep. 254 In Wood- 
 ward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453, the 
 court says: " The proper evidence of 
 the decision of the jury is their ver- 
 dict returned by them upon oath and 
 affirmed in court, and it is essential 
 to the freedom and independence of 
 their deliberations that their discus- 
 sions should be secret and inviola- 
 ble. . . . The decisive reasons for 
 excluding the testimony of jurors to 
 the motives and influences which af- 
 fected their deliberations are equally 
 strong whether the evidence is offered 
 to impeach or sustain their verdict" 
 But a juror may testify that there 
 were blood-stains on an article wdiich 
 was shown to the jury at a former 
 trial Woolfolk v. State, 85 Ga. 69.
 
 § 178.] FKIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. 259 
 
 porting the delinquent to the magistrate. 1 A communication 
 or confession to a minister or priest was otherwise on a par 
 with one to a layman, and the former might at common law 
 be compelled to divulge any admission or confession 2 made to 
 him in his professional capacity. 3 
 
 At the present time in many states statutory provision has 
 been made by which a clergyman or minister of any religion 
 is prohibited from disclosing a confession made to him in his 
 professional character, in the course of discipline enjoined 
 by the rules or practice of the religious body to which he be- 
 longs. 4 So, too, it is often provided by statute that no person 
 authorized to practice physic or surgery shall be allowed 
 to disclose any information which he may have acquired in 
 attending any patient in a professional capacity and which 
 was necessary to enable him to prescribe for him as a physi- 
 cian or treat him as a surgeon. 5 
 
 §178. Communications to physicians. — At common law 
 a communication to a physician is not privileged, and how- 
 ever indiscreet a medical man may be in disclosing volun- 
 tary professional secrets, in a court of law he may be com- 
 pelled involuntarily to do so. 6 But this rule was never 
 regarded with favor, and it was strongly intimated in a lead- 
 ing case 7 that instances might arise when the fact that these 
 matters were not privileged would be much lamented. 
 
 Every consideration of public policy that furnishes a basis 
 
 1 Butler v. Moore, cited in McNally, braska Code, p. 672 ; Wisconsin Ann. 
 
 Evid. 253, 254. Stat., § 4074; Ohio R S., § 5241, 
 
 -'In Broad v. Pitt, 3 C. & B. 518, ch. 1. Similar statutes have been 
 
 the court says, obiter: " I, for one, passed in Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, 
 
 will never compel a clergyman to Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, 
 
 disclose communications made to Washington and Wyoming. In the 
 
 him by a prisoner, but if he chooses other states the common law still 
 
 to disclose them I shall receive them prevails, 
 
 in evidence." 5 See supra. 
 
 3 Com. v. Drake, 15 Mass. 161. 6 Duchess of Kingston's Case, 11 
 
 *N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. 833 : Calif or- Harg. St. Tr. 243 ; 20 Howell's St. Tr. 
 
 nia Civ. Code, § 1881 ; Indiana R S., 643 ; Rex v. Gibbons, 1 C. & P. 97 ; 
 
 § 497 ; Colorado Acts of 1883, p. 289 ; Broad v. Pitt, 3 C. & P. 578 ; Steageld 
 
 Michigan, Howell's Ann. St., g 7515 ; v. State, 24 Tex. 287 ; 3 S. W. Rep. 
 
 Kansas Gen. Stat., § 4418 ; Iowa Rev. 771. 
 
 Code, § 3643; Minnesota Stat, § 5094, * Wilson v. Rastall, 4 Term R 756. 
 ch. 3; Missouri R S., § 8925; Ne-
 
 2G0 PKIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. [§ 178. 
 
 for the privileged character of a communication by a client 
 to an attorney is applicable in the relation of physician and 
 patient. Aside from the protection thrown around the pa- 
 tient himself, the danger that truth will be perverted or con- 
 cealed by the physician, perhaps unconsciously, in the struggle 
 between professional honor and legal duty is entirely ob- 
 viated. 1 
 
 As by the terms of the statute only such information or 
 communications are privileged as the physician receives pro- 
 fessionally, he will be allowed to testify to facts with which 
 he has become acquainted in anon-professional capacity. 2 On 
 the other hand, by the term " matter communicated to them 
 in the course of their professional duties" is included all 
 knowledge whether gained by the physician from his obser- 
 vation or the examination of the patient or from the latter's 
 declarations. 3 So the statute cannot be construed to prevent 
 a physician from testifying to information which was not nec- 
 essary to enable him to prescribe for the patient; 4 as, for ex- 
 ample, to the fact that he attended a person, the number of 
 times he called, 5 and the persons who were present when he 
 called. 6 The privilege is so far personal that it can only be 
 waived by the patient 7 or by his agent authorized to do so. 
 
 i Patten v. U. L & Ace. Ins. Co., 133 N. Y. 450 ; Brown v. L. Ins. Co., 
 
 61 Hun, 637; Freel v. Market St. 65 Mich. 306; Numrich v. Supreme 
 
 etc. Co. (Cal., 1893), 31 Pac. Rep. 730. Lodge, 3 N. Y. S. 552 ; Cooley v. Foltz, 
 
 A partner of a physician who is 85 Mich. 47 ; 48 N. W. Rep. 176. 
 
 present at a consultation between 6 Pandjiris v. McQueen, 59 Hun, 
 
 the former and a patient will not be 625. 
 
 permitted to divulge information 7 Carrington v. St. Louis, 89 Mo. 
 
 thus acquired by him. JEtna Ins, 208: Blair v. Railroad Co., 89 id. 334 ; 
 
 Co. v. Deming, 123 Ind. 415. Valensin v. Valensin, 73 Cal. 106 ; 
 
 2 In re Sliney, 137 N. Y. 570 ; Fisher McKinney v. Railroad Co., 104 N. Y. 
 v.Fisher, 129 N. Y. 654 ; In re Lowen- 352; 118 id. 77; Record v. Village, 
 stein, 2 Misc. Rep. 323 ; People v. 46 Huu, 448 ; Jones v. Brooklyn, 3 N. 
 Schuyler, 106 N. Y. 303 ; Viel v. Y. S. 353. A waiver by the insured 
 Cowles, 45 Hun, 307 ; Brown v. Rome, binds the beneficiary. Andrews v. 
 etc. R. R. Co., 45 Hun, 439. Mut. R. L. F. Ass'n, 34 Fed. Rep. 870. 
 
 3 Heuston y. Simpson, 17 N. E. Rep. As to waiver by implication, see State 
 261; 115 Ind. 162; Kling v. Kansas v. Depoister (Nev., 1891), 25 Pac. Rep. 
 City, 27 Mo. App. 231. 1000. A certificate of death made 
 
 *Campau v. North, 39 Mich. 606; out by the attending physician and 
 
 Cooley v. Foltz, 48 N. W. Rep. 176. furnished as proof of death to an in- 
 
 6 Pattou v. Un. L. & Ace. Ass'n, surance company is not privileged.
 
 § ITS.] 
 
 PI4IVILEGKD COMMUNICATIONS. 
 
 201 
 
 After his death, in an action brought by or against his repre- 
 sentative, the privilege may be invoked by the latter and a 
 physician be prohibited from disclosing communications made 
 to him while attending the deceased. 1 On the other hand, it 
 has been held that the personal representative cannot waive 
 the privilege and place the physician upon the stand to testify 
 as regards communications made to him by the deceased. 2 The 
 courts in laying down the rule that the privilege is absolute 
 and cannot be waived by a representative of a deceased pa- 
 tient have proceeded on the supposition that the communica- 
 tion, if divulged, might tend to disgrace the memory of the 
 deceased. 3 But it has been held that communications made 
 by the deceased to his physician were admissible in a trial 
 for the murder of the patient, the disclosure in these cases 
 being demanded to protect the community from the perpetra- 
 tion of secret crime 4 and the communications containing noth- 
 ing to disgrace the deceased's memory. 5 So in probate cases, 
 
 Buffalo, etc. Co. v. Association, 126 N. 
 Y. 450. 
 
 1 Breisenmeister v. Sup. Lodge, 81 
 Mich. 525; Grattan v. Life Ins. Co., 
 80 N. Y. 281 ; Dilleber v. Mut Life 
 Ins. Co., 69 N. Y. 256 ; Cohen v. Cont 
 L Ins. Co., 69 id. 308 ; Com. Life Ins. 
 Co. v. Union Trust Co., 112 U. S. 254; 
 Edington v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 67 N. 
 Y. 185 ; Staunton v. Parker, 19 Hun, 
 55. 
 
 2 Westover v. ^tna L. I. Co., 99 N. 
 Y. 57 ; In re Flint's Estate (CaL, 1893), 
 34 Pac. Rep. 863. See, also, the re- 
 marks of Ruger, C. J., in McKinney 
 v. Grand St R R Co., 104 N. Y. 352. 
 Contra, Morris v. Morris, 119 Ind. 
 343; Thompson v. Ish, 99 Mo. 160; 
 12 S. W. Rep. 810. Where two physi- 
 cians attend a patient, the fact that 
 the latter puts one ou the stand does 
 not waive the privilege as to the 
 other. Mellor v. Missouri P. R. Co., 
 105 Mo. 455 ; 16 S. W. Rep. 849. In 
 New York the representative may 
 now by statute waive the privilege 
 except so far as communications ex- 
 
 pressly confidential are concerned 
 and facts which would disgrace the 
 memory of deceased. Laws 1891, 
 ch. 381. p. 736. Of. Gurley v. Park 
 (Ind., 1893), 35 N. E. Rep. 279. If the 
 privilege is waived at the first trial it 
 may be claimed on a subsequent trial 
 of the same issue. Breisenmeister v. 
 Lodge, 81 Mich. 525. 
 
 3 Judge Earl in Pierson v. People, 
 79 N. Y. 434. 
 
 * People v. Harris, 33 N. E. Rep. 65 ; 
 136 N. Y. 423. 
 
 8 Pierson v. People, 79 N. Y. 424 ; 
 People v. Harris, 136 N. Y 423. But 
 ef. contra, People v. Brewer, 53 Hun, 
 217. But it has recently been held 
 that as the statute was not designed 
 to protect murderers, a physician 
 might testify to the fact that he re- 
 moved a dead foetus from the de- 
 ceased, and that at that time the 
 defendant stated to him that he had 
 performed an operation on her, she 
 being his wife and he being on trial 
 for her subsequent homicide. It may 
 be observed that this testimony was
 
 2G2 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. [§ 178a. 
 
 where a question arises as to the capacity of the testator, 
 neither the proponent nor contestant of the will is permitted 
 to examine a physician who attended him professionally as 
 regards information thus acquired. 1 
 
 While the statute should receive a liberal construction, it is 
 nevertheless the true rule that any objection to the testimony 
 of the physician should be promptly interposed before his 
 reply has been elicited. 2 Where the relation of physician and 
 patient exists, it is immaterial that the former was not sum- 
 moned by the patient but by some relative, friend or by- 
 stander. 3 So, usually, it will be presumed that any informa 
 tion imparted was given for the purpose of aiding the physi- 
 cian in subscribing for the patient. 4 Where a physician is 
 sent to examine the mental or physical condition of a person 
 with a view to determining his sanity, the information thus 
 gained, exclusive of all information which he may have ac- 
 quired of the prisoner personally, is not privileged. The plry- 
 sician may testify to the condition of mind or body in which 
 he found the prisoner. 5 
 
 § 178a. Telegrams are not privileged. — Eeasoning from 
 the privileged character which has been conferred by act of 
 congress upon letters and other communications which are 
 carried in the mails, it has been suggested to and urged upon 
 the courts that a telegraph company and its employees occupy 
 a confidential relation towards the sender of the telegram, 
 
 obviously calculated to disgrace the witness to practice medicine is not 
 
 memory of the patient. People v. objected to at the trial it will be pre- 
 
 Harris, 136 N. Y. 423. sumed by the appellate court that he 
 
 1 Renihan v. Dennin, 103 N. Y. was properly licensed. Village v. 
 
 577; Loder v. Whelpley, 111 id. 245; Record, 46 Hun, 448. 
 
 Coleman's Will, 111 id. 225; Heuston 2Hoyt v. Hoyt, 112 N. Y. 513. 
 
 v. Simpson, 115 Ind. 62. Cf. In re 3 Renihan v. Dennin, 103 N. Y. 577. 
 
 Neill's Estate, 7 N. Y. S. 197 ; Hoyt <Feeney v. L, I. R R. Co., 116 N. Y. 
 
 v. Hoyt, 112 N. Y. 493 ; Herrington 380 ; Grattan v. Metropolitan L. Ins. 
 
 v. Winn, 14 N. Y. S. 612 ; Brigham Co., 80 N. Y. 281, 297 ; Renihan v. 
 
 v. Gott, 3 N. Y. S. 518, as regards tes- Dennin, 103 id. 573 ; Kling v. Kansas 
 
 timony of physician as to declara- City, 27 Mo. App. 231. 
 
 tions of testator not made to him 5 People v. Kimmler, 119 N. Y. 585; 
 
 professionally. An objection to the People v. Schuyler, 12 N. E. Rep. 783 ; 
 
 evidence of a physician must be made 7 N. Y. Crim. R. 262 ; People v. Sliney, 
 
 prior to its reception or it will be 137 N. Y. 570. Cf. In re Benson, 16 
 
 waived. Broisenmeister v. Lodge, 81 N. Y. S. 111. 
 Mich. 525, If the qualification of the
 
 § 178«.] PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. 263 
 
 and that they should not be permitted or compelled to divulge 
 any information which is contained in any message delivered 
 to them for the purpose of transmission. The statute referred 
 to is limited in its operation to mail matter alone, and could 
 not, by the most liberal construction, be held to include tele- 
 graphic dispatches. In the absence of any statutory provision 
 creating a different rule, the operator or other agent of the 
 telegraph company will be compelled by a subpoena duces tecum 
 to produce the telegrams in his possession ; l or he may be 
 compelled to testify orally to the contents of a dispatch where 
 the absence of the writing itself is satisfactorily accounted for. 2 
 
 » Ex parte Brown, 72 Mo. 83; Na- * State v# Litchfield, 58 Me. 267. 
 tional Bank v. National Bank, 7 W. 
 Va. 544
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. 
 
 185. Definition. 
 
 186. Matter of common knowl- 
 
 edge — Opinions of non- 
 experts, when admissible. 
 
 187. Expert evidence, when ad- 
 
 missible. 
 
 188. Competency and examination 
 
 of experts. 
 
 189. Cross - examination of ex- 
 
 perts — Use of scientific 
 books as evidence. 
 
 190. The weight and credibility of 
 
 expert and opinion evi- 
 dence. 
 
 191. Compensation of expert wit- 
 
 nesses. 
 
 192. Physicians as experts — Cause 
 
 of death. 
 
 §193. 
 
 194. 
 
 195. 
 196. 
 
 197. 
 
 198. 
 199. 
 200. 
 201. 
 
 202. 
 
 Evidence of medical experts 
 to show character of disease 
 and blood-stains — Expert 
 evidence as to autopsies and 
 malpractice. 
 
 Non-expert evidence upon a 
 person's physical condition. 
 
 Chemists as experts — Poisons. 
 
 Expert evidence where sexual 
 crimes have been commit- 
 ted — Abortion. 
 
 Expert and non-expert evi- 
 dence upon insanity. 
 
 Mechanical experts. 
 
 Expert evidence as to value. 
 
 Underwriters as experts. 
 
 Experiments in and out of 
 court. 
 
 Physical examination of the 
 party by experts. 
 
 § 185. Definition. — "An expert is a person who possesses 
 peculiar skill and knowledge upon the subject-matter on which 
 he is called to testify ; " x and expert evidence is evidence which 
 
 i State v. Phair, 48 Vt. 366. For 
 other cases defining the word, see 
 Dole v. Johnson, 50 N. H. 454; 
 Overby v. Chesa. & Ohio Ry. Co., 37 
 W. Va. 524; Nelson v. Sun Ins. Co., 
 71 N. Y. 453; Bird v. State, 21 Gratt. 
 (Va.) 800; Dickenson v. Fitchberg, 
 13 Gray, 546 ; Mobile L. Ins. Co. v. 
 Walker, 58 Ala. 290 ; Hyde v. Wool- 
 folk, 1 Iowa, 166; Heald v. Thwing, 
 45 Me. 394; Toomes' Estate, 54 Cal. 
 514; Travis v. Brown, 43 Pa. St. 12; 
 Buff urn v. Harris, 5 R. I. 250 ; Con- 
 gress, etc. Co. v. Edgar, 99 U. S. 657. 
 Whether study and experience are 
 
 both required, or whether either 
 alone is sufficient to constitute an 
 expert, depends upon the circum- 
 stances of the case. Ardesco Oil Co. 
 v. Gilson, 63 Pa. St. 146. In some 
 cases it has been held that a witness 
 whose knowledge was gained by 
 study alone or by conversation with 
 persons familiar with the subject 
 was not an expert. Railroad v. 
 Finlay (Kan., 1888), 16 Pac. Rep. 951 ; 
 Hass v. Marshall (Pa., 1888), 14 Atl. 
 Rep. 421; Wickes v. Light Co., 70 
 Mich. 322. Contra, Fort Wayne v. 
 Coombs, 107 Ind. 75; Fordyce v.
 
 § 180.] EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. 265 
 
 is given by such a person upon matters that are not within 
 the range of men of ordinary knowledge and observation. 
 "Witnesses, as a general rule, must testify to facts. To permit 
 them to state their opinions, or their conclusions or inferences 
 drawn from facts, is to invade the province of the jury. Many 
 exceptions to the rule are recognized where the facts, from, 
 their peculiar nature, cannot be properly described to the jury 
 or understood or appreciated by them. 
 
 §186. Matter of common knowledge — Opinions of non- 
 experts, when admissible. — Where the matter or transaction 
 under consideration is such that all the facts can be intelligibly 
 ascertained by men of average mental training or intelligence, 
 where no peculiar skill, experience or knowledge is required 
 to form an opinion, — in other words, where the facts are such 
 as come within the knowledge, observation and judgment of 
 ordinary men, — opinion evidence is not admissible. 1 In such 
 case a witness who is called to testify to facts within his own 
 knowledge should not be allowed to state his inferences, his 
 beliefs or his mental impressions which are not recollections 
 of facts, or to give his conclusions as to the legal consequence 
 of facts. 2 If, however, the witness, in testifying to a conclu- 
 
 Moore (Tex., 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 793; St. Louis, etc. Co. v. Yar- 
 235. On the other hand, experience borough, 56 Ark. 612; Stowe v. 
 in many cases being necessarily all Bishop, 58 Vt. 498; Penn. R. R. Co. 
 that can be had, is enough to make v. Conlan, 101 111. 93; Brinkley v. 
 one an expert. But the court may State, 89 Ala. 34; Milw. etc. Co. 
 refuse to hear an expert witness v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469; Avery v. 
 where, though experienced in his Railroad Co., 121 N. Y. 31. 
 profession or trade, his general in- 2 Richardson v. Stringfellow (Ala., 
 telligence is of a low order. Broquet 1894), 14 S. Rep. 283; Lovejoy v. 
 v. Tripp, 36 Kan. 700; 14 Pac. Rep. Hart (Minn., 1894), 57 N. W. Rep. 57: 
 227. Dove v. Royal Insurance Co. (Mich. . 
 i Overby v. C. & O. R. Co., 37 W. 1894), 57 id. 30; Shifflet v. Morell, 4 
 Va. 524; Bergquist v. Iron Co., 49 S. W. Rep. 483; 68 Tex. 382; John- 
 Minn. 511; 52 N. W. Rep. 136; son v. Glover, 121 111. 483; 10 N. E. 
 Man. Ace. Ind. Co. v. Dorgan, 58 Rep. 214; 12 id. 257: Half v. Curtis, 
 Fed. Rep. .945; Reeves v. State 5 S. W. Rep. 451; 68 Tex. 640; Tait 
 (Ala., 1892), 11 S. Rep. 296; Kauff- v. Hall, 12 Pac. Rep. 391; 71 Cal. 
 man v. Maier, 94 Cal. 269 ; Sappen- 449 ; Meade v. Carolina Bank, 26 S. 
 field v. Main St. etc. Co., 91 Cal. 48 ; C. 608; Barre v. Reading City Pass. 
 111. Cent. R. R. Co. v. People (111., Ry. Co., 26 Atl. Rep. 99; 155 Pa. St. 
 1893), 33 N. E. Rep. 173; Toledo, etc. 170; Lyts v. Keevey, 5 Wash. St. 
 Co. v. Jackson (Ind.. 1893), 32 id. 606; 32 Pac. Rep. 534; Larson v.
 
 2(jQ EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. [§ 186. 
 
 sion of law, also states facts which are sufficient to enable the 
 jury to draw their own conclusion, if they believe his state- 
 ments of fact to be true, the error in permitting the admission 
 of the conclusion is cured. 1 
 
 "Where the question at issue is whether a person exercised 
 reasonable diligence, care or skill, or whether machinery or a 
 building was in a safe condition, and the facts are such that 
 any man having common knowledge, experience or education 
 is capable of forming a just conclusion upon the facts as they 
 are narrated, the opinion of a witness, whether expert or non- 
 expert, is inadmissible, as the question of negligence is for the 
 jury alone. 2 
 
 On the other hand, if negligence is alleged in the use 
 of any implement, article or thing which is so far outside of 
 the knowledge of persons of ordinary intelligence that they 
 are incompetent to draw correct inferences from the facts, or 
 if the facts are such that they cannot properly be described 
 unless the opinion of the witness is also stated, then an expert 
 or non-expert witness, respectively, may give an opinion as to 
 a person's care, diligence or skill. 3 
 
 Lombard Inv. Co. (Minn., 1893), 53 Girard v. Kalamazoo (Mich., 1893), 
 
 N. W. Eep. 179; Frezinski v. New- 52 N. W. Rep. 1021; Johnston v. 
 
 borg, 43 III. App. 406. As sustain- Oregon S. L. & U. N. Co. (1893), 31 
 
 ing the proposition that conclusions Pac. Rep. 283; Kendrick v. Central 
 
 of law are not admissible as evi- R. R. Co., 89 Ga. 782; Butler v. Chi- 
 
 dence, see Thompson v. Brannin cago, etc. Co. (Iowa, 1893), 54 N. W. 
 
 (Ky., 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 1057; Rep. 208; Illinois, etc. Co. v. Blye, 
 
 Huntsville v. L. S. & M. S. R. Co. 43 111. App. 612; Fisher v. Railroad 
 
 (Ala., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 295; Wolf v. Co., 22 Oreg. 533; Brunker v. Cum- 
 
 Arthur (N. C, 1893), 16 S. E. Rep. mins (Ind., 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 732; 
 
 843; Stepp v. Nat. L. & Maturity Helton v. Alabama Midland Ry. Co. 
 
 Ass'n (S. C, 1893), 16 S. E. Rep. 134; (Ala., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 276; Nosier v. 
 
 Johnson v. Crotty, 22 N. Y. S. 753 ; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 73 Iowa, 268 ; 
 
 Cogshall v. Roller Miller Co., 48 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Chaffin, 84 
 
 Kan. 480; Tenney v. Harvey, 63 Vt. Ga. 519; Louisville, E. & St. L. Cent. 
 
 520. R. Co. v. Berry (Ind., 1894), 35 N. E. 
 
 1 Adams v. Main, 3 Ind. App. 232; Rep. 565; Mauer v. Ferguson, 17 N. 
 
 Langworthy v. Green, 88 Mich. 207; Y. S. 349; Bergquist v. Iron Co., 49 
 
 Penn. Coal Co. v. Friend (Ind., 1892), Minn. 511. 
 
 30 N. E. Rep. 1116. 3 See post, §§ 189, 194. See, also, 
 
 2 Yeaw v. Williams, 15 R. I. 20; Pullman Pal. Car Co. v. Hawkins, 
 
 Ft. Worth & D. C. R. Co. v. Thomp- 55 Fed. Rep. 932; Weber Wagon Co. 
 
 son (Tex., 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 137; v. Kehl, 139 111. 644. 
 Cross v. Railroad Co., 69 Mich. 303;
 
 § 186.] EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. 267 
 
 It is difficult at times to distinguish clearly whether a ques- 
 tion calls for an expression of opinion or for a statement of 
 fact from the witness. The form of the question or of the 
 answer is not always a reliable test. Thus, a witness may be 
 asked if he has any doubts concerning the facts of a transac- 
 tion to which lie has testified, this question not calling for an 
 expression of opinion, but merely seeking to ascertain the 
 certainty of his knowledge. 1 So, where a witness is unwilling 
 or unable to swear positively what any article was which he 
 has examined or tested — that is, if he cannot readily identify 
 it or classify it from a physical perception of its qualities, — 
 he may be asked what he thinks it was. 2 If the witness, 
 through excess of caution, qualifies his replies by expressions 
 such as "it appears tome," 3 "I think," "I believe," or "should 
 judge," his testimony, though perhaps weakened thereby, is 
 not rendered incompetent. So far as his evidence contains 
 statements of relevant facts, it is admissible though thus qual- 
 ified.* On the other hand, a witness' statement that he does 
 not think a fact is true is not an opinion, for witnesses are 
 not always required to state facts with positiveness. 5 Testi- 
 mony showing the ownership 6 or size of the subject of litiga- 
 tion, 7 or the time which elapsed between two events, 8 or the 
 opinion of the witness that a writing read by him is true, 9 is 
 not objectionable as an expression of opinion. But the opin- 
 
 1 State v. Duncan (Mo., 1893), 22 ?Oslin v. Jerome, 98 Mich. 186; 
 S. "W. Rep. 699; King v. Railroad Bass Fur. Co. v. Glasscock, 82 Ala. 
 Co., 72 Mo. 607. 452: Roraack v. Hobbs (Ind., 1893), 
 
 2 Com. v. Moinehan, 140 Mass. 463. 32 N. E. Rep. 307. "Duration, di- 
 speople v. Fanshawe, 19 N. Y. S. mension, size, velocity, etc., are 
 
 865. often to be proved only by the opin- 
 
 4 Abb. Brief on Facts, § 192, citing ion of witnesses, depending as they 
 
 Guiterman v. Steamship Co., 9 Daly do on minute circumstances which 
 
 (N. Y.), 119; Bradley v. Second Ave. cannot fully be detailed by wit- 
 
 R. R. Co., 8 id. 289; Callahan v. N. nesses." State v. Folwell, 14 Kan. 
 
 Y., Lake Erie & W. R. R., 102 N. Y. 205. 
 
 194; People v. Rolfe, 61 Cal. 540; » Campbell v. State, 23 Ala. 41; 
 
 State v. Babb, 76 Mo. 501 ; Rich v. State v. Casey, 44 La. Ann. 969. 
 
 Jones, 9 Cush. (Mass. ) 326 ; Prior v. 9 Furton v. N. Y. Recorder, 22 N. 
 
 Diggs(Cal., 1893), 31 Pac. Rep. 155. Y. S. 766; 3 Misc. Rep. 314: Lis- 
 
 * Prior v. Diggs (Cal., 1893), 31 comb v. Agate, 22 N. Y. S. 126; 67 
 
 Pac. Rep. 155. Hun, 688, 
 6 Sleuier v. Tranum, 13 S. Rep. 
 
 365.
 
 208 
 
 EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. 
 
 e 136. 
 
 ion of the witness who is not an expert as to the meaning 
 of a sign, as the shaking of the head, 1 or of an outcry, 2 or 
 generally as to the probable cause or effect of a certain rele- 
 vant act, :1 or as to the probable amount of time required for 
 its performance, 4 whether a witness could have heard a con- 
 versation, 5 or a certain signal if it had been given, 6 whether 
 an accident was more likely to occur in one place than in an- 
 other, 7 or whether a certain act was prudent, 8 is inadmissible. 
 Though non-expert witnesses are usually confined to testi- 
 f} T ing to facts, there are some cases where, from necessity, 
 their opinions are admissible upon matters of common knowl- 
 edge. 9 If the facts to which the witness is called to testify 
 are so numerous and of so peculiar a nature that they are 
 incapable of being specifically described so as to bring out 
 clearly their proper force and significance before the jury, the 
 witness may state his opinion as a short-hand characteriza- 
 tion of the facts. 10 So where a witness had adequate means 
 
 1 Roll\vagen v. Rollwagen, 3 Hun, 
 121 ; 63 N. Y. 504. 
 
 2 Mesner v. People, 45 N. Y. 1. 
 
 3 Gardner v. State (Ga., 1893), 17 
 S. E. Rep. 86; Friedenwalcl v. Balti- 
 more, 74 Md. 116; 21 Atl. Rep. 555; 
 Kendrick v. Central R. R. Co., 89 
 Ga. 782; Middlebrook v. Zapp, 79 
 Tex. 321 ; Ireland v. Cincinnati, etc. 
 Co. (Mich., 1890), 44 N. W. Rep. 426; 
 People v. Rector, 19 Wend. 569; 
 Kansas, etc. Co. v. Scott, 1 Tex. Civ. 
 App. 1. 
 
 * Dowdy v. Georgia R. R. Co., 88 
 Ga. 726; Parrott v. Swaini, 29 111. 
 App. 266. 
 
 5 People v. Holfelder, 5 N. Y. Crim. 
 R. 179. 
 
 6 Eskridge v. Railroad Co., 89 Ky. 
 387; 12 S. W. Rep. 580; East Tenn. 
 etc. Co. v. Watson, 90 Ala. 41; 7 S. 
 Rep. 813. 
 
 7 Toledo S. & S. etc. Co. v. Jackson 
 (111., 1893), 32 N. W. Rep. 793; Ivory 
 v. Town of Deer Park, 116 N. Y. 
 476; Betts v. Gloversville, 8 N. Y. 
 S. 795. 
 
 SMurtaugh v. N. Y. Cent. & H. 
 R. R. Co., 49 Hun, 456. 
 
 9 Elliott v. Van Buren, 33 Mich. 
 49; People v. Monteith, 73 Cal. 7; 
 Davis v. State. 78 Ind. 15 ; Blake v. 
 People, 73 N. Y. 586 ; Yahn v. Ot- 
 tumwa, 22 Am. Law Reg. 644; Knoll 
 v. State, 55 Wis. 249; Baltimore v. 
 Lib. Turnp. Co., 66 Md. 419; 7 Atl. 
 Rep. 805; Whittier v. Franklyn, 46 
 N. H. 23. 
 
 10 Welch v. Miller, 32 111. App. 110; 
 State v. Miller, 53 Iowa, 84; Living- 
 ston v. Metro. R. R. Co., 18 N. Y. S. 
 203; Pike v. State, 49 N. H. 399; 
 Adams v. People, 63 N. Y. 621; Car- 
 ter v. Carter, 37 111. App. -,'19; 23 N. 
 E. Rep. 948; Com. v. Cunningham, 
 104 Mass. 545; Fulcher v. State, 28 
 Tex. App. 465; East Tenn. R. Co. v. 
 Watson, 90 Ala. 41 ; 7 S. Rep. 813; 
 Atchison R. Co. v. Miller, 18 Pac. 
 Rep. 486; 39 Kan. 419; B. & O. R. 
 R. Co. v. Rambo; 59 Fed. Rep. 75; 
 Indianapolis v. Huffer, 30 Ind. 235; 
 Chicago, etc. Co. v. George, 19 111. 
 510 ; Irish v. Smith, 8 S. & R. 573 ;
 
 ISC] 
 
 EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. 
 
 260 
 
 of observing a transaction, but where it is impossible for him 
 so to reproduce it as to enable any one hearing his descrip- 
 tion to form an intelligent conclusion from what he is able 
 t» relate, the witness may, after stating the facts, be allowed 
 to state his own opinion or the conclusion he has formed from 
 the facts within his knowledge. 1 Thus, a witness may testify 
 to his understanding of a conversation; 2 that, in his opinion, 
 a certain noise which was made by running water frightened 
 a horse; 3 that a horse was gentle, 4 or appeared frightened 5 
 or tired; 6 that a person's manner in answering questions was 
 short; 7 that a man was at a certain date intoxicated 8 or was 
 a person of intemperate habits; 9 that a person looked like a 
 white woman; 10 that a man was destitute, 11 or that he was 
 sober. 12 So any witness may testify in court to the apparent 
 age 13 or to the identity of a person or thing seen by him out of 
 court. 14 
 
 State v. Babb, 76 Mo. 501; Alexan- 
 der v. Jonquil, 71 111. 366; Porter v. 
 Pequonnoc, 17 Conn. 249. 
 
 Baylor v. B. & O. R. Co., 10 S. 
 E. Rep. 29 ; 33 W. Va. 39 ; Caven- 
 dish v. Troy, 41 Vt. 99. "A variety 
 of circumstances that could only be 
 perceived, but not detailed, would 
 constitute the aggregate from which 
 the opinion might be formed. The 
 person who had witnessed the trans- 
 action could alone form any idea of 
 the subject that could be relied on 
 with safety." Stewart v. State, 19 
 Ohio, 302. 
 
 2 Garvin v. Gates, 73 Wis. 513; 41 
 N. W. Rep. 621 ; Printup v. Mitchell, 
 17 Ga. 558. But he cannot testify 
 to the legal effect of what was said. 
 Ives v. Hamlen, 59 Mass. 534. 
 
 » Yahn v. Ottumwa, 60 Iowa, 429; 
 Whittier v. Franklin, 46 N. H. 23. 
 
 4 State v. Avery, 44 N. H. 392; 
 Sydenham v. Beckwith, 43 Conn. 9. 
 
 5 Com. v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 
 132. 
 
 «State v. Ward, 17 Atl. Rep. 483 
 (Vt., 1889). 
 ' Carroll v. State, 23 Ala. 28. 
 
 8 McKillop v. Duluth St. Ry. Co. 
 (Minn., 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. 739; 
 Cole v. Bean, 1 Ariz. 377 ; People v. 
 Monteith, 73 Cal. 7 ; People v. East- 
 wood, 14 N. Y. 562; Bradley v. Rail- 
 road Co., 8 Daly (N. Y.j, 289; Mc- 
 Carthy v. Wells, 51 Hun, 171 ; Hamp- 
 son v. Taylor, 15 R. I. 83 ; State v. 
 Pierce, 65 Iowa, 85 ; People v. O'Neil, 
 113 N. Y. 355. 
 
 o Gallagher v. People, 120 111. 179; 
 United Breth. M. Aid Ins. Co. v. 
 O'Hara, 120 Pa. St. 256; 13 Atl. Rep. 
 932; Gahagan v. Railroad Co., 1 
 Allen, 187; Smith v. State, 55 Ala. 
 1 ; Tatuni v. State, 63 id. 150. 
 
 10 Hopkins v. Bowers, 111 N. C. 
 175 ; Moore v. State, 7 Tex. App. 608. 
 
 11 Antanger v. Davis, 32 Ala. 70:!. 
 
 12 People v. Packenham, 115 N. Y. 
 200. 
 
 13 Jones v. State (Tex., 1893), 22 
 W. Rep. 349 ; Carr v. State, 24 Tex. 
 App. 562; State v. Douglas, 48 Mo. 
 App. 39. 
 
 i 4 Com. v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 
 112; State v. Horr (W. Va., 1893). 17 
 S. E. Rep. 794; Brotherton v. Peo- 
 ple, 73 N. Y. 159 ; State v. Dickson,
 
 270 EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. [§ 187. 
 
 Again, a non-expert witness may testify to the disposition of 
 a person, i. e., that he is unreliable; 1 that on certain occa- 
 sions he manifested hatred or anger, 2 or affection, 3 towards 
 himself or some other person, or looked wild and excited, 4 or 
 sad, 5 or was happy and in good spirits. 6 So, also, it is allow- 
 able for a non-expert to testify that in his opinion a culvert 7 
 or a highway 8 was or was not in good repair; that a trespass 
 was committed in an insulting manner; 9 that a blow, which 
 caused a physical injury, came from a certain direction; 10 that 
 the weather was very cold; 11 that ill-feeling existed between 
 certain persons; 12 that a train was running at a specific rate of 
 speed, 13 and that liquor which he had examined was intoxicat- 
 ing. 14 
 
 § 187. Expert evidence, when admissible. — Where the 
 subject of investigation is such that persons who have not 
 made it a special study, or who have had no peculiar training 
 or experience in it, are incompetent to form accurate conclu- 
 sions or opinions regarding it, experts mi»y be called to state 
 their opinions to the jury. Where the relation of facts to each 
 other, their connection with each other, and their results or 
 the conclusions which may be drawn from them, can be de- 
 termined without any prior special experience, study or skill, 
 the opinions of experts are inadmissible. So expert evidence 
 will not be received to show that a road is necessary; 15 that 
 
 78 Mo. 438; People v. Rolfe, 61 Cal. 10 Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S. 430. 
 540; State v. Babb, 76 Mo. 501. "Curtis v. Chicago, etc. Co., 18 
 
 i Mills v. Winter, 94 Ind. 329. Wis. 312. 
 
 2 State v. Edwards (N. C, 1893), 17 U Polk v. State, 62 Ala. 237. 
 
 S. E. Rep. 521 ; State v. Shelton, 64 13 Pence v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. 
 
 Iowa, 3', 3. Co. (Iowa, 1890), 44 N. W. Rep. 686; 
 
 3 McKee v. Nelson, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) Com. v. Malone, 114 Mass. 295; State 
 355. v. Folwell, 14 Kan. 105. So it may 
 
 4 Trav. Ins. Co. v. Sheppard, 85 be shown by one witness that a train 
 Ga. 751. was running rapidly at a place not 
 
 8 Culver v. Dwight, 6 Gray, 444. too remote from the point in issue, 
 
 6 State v. Baldwin, 36 Kan. 1. and byanother witness that its speed 
 
 7 Lund v. Lynsborough, 9 C'ush. was not subsequently reduced. 
 (Mass.) 33. Louisville, New Albany, etc. Co. v. 
 
 8 Clinton v. Howard, 42 Conn. 294 ; Jones, 108 Ind. 55. 
 
 Bait. & Lib. Turnp. Co. v. Cassell, "Com. v. Donlican, 114 Mass. 257; 
 
 66 Md. 419; Alexander v. Mt. Ster- State v. Miller, 53 Iowa, 84. 
 
 ling, 71 111. 366. u Burwell v. Speed, 104 N. C. 118; 
 
 9 Raisler v. Springer, 38 Ala. 703. 10 S. E. Rep. 152.
 
 188.] EXPERT A.ND OPINION EVIDENCE. 271 
 
 the condition of machinery might necessitate an examination ; 
 how much bark or wood will shrink; 2 or to explain the injury 
 which has been done to property by smoke, noise and stench 
 caused by the running of a railroad, 3 as such matters are 
 usually within common experience. 
 
 The expert witness need not know personally anything of 
 the facts of the particular case, though perhaps his evidence 
 would be of higher value if he could testify of his own knowl- 
 edge as well as state his opinion upon facts in a hypothetical 
 question which are assumed to be proved. It must appear, 
 however, from his previous experience and study, or from his 
 business or professional avocation, that he is qualified to an- 
 swer the question more accurately than is a person who may 
 not have been called upon to study the subject or to obtain or 
 exercise any skill in it. 4 
 
 § 188. Competency and examination of experts. — Whether 
 a witness is qualified to testify as an expert is always a ques- 
 tion for the court, 5 and his competency and title to act as an 
 expert must be shown before his opinion is admissible. 6 It is 
 
 1 Goodsell v. Taylor, 41 Minn. 207. Nelson v. M. Ins. Co., 71 N. Y. 
 
 2 Brown v. Doubleday, 61 Vt. 523; 453; Broquet v. Tripp, 36 Kan. 700; 
 7 Atl. Rep. 135. Wright v. Williams, 47 Vt. 222 ; Dole 
 
 3 Thompson v. Penn. R. Co., 15 v. Johnson, 50 N. Y. 452; Flynt v. 
 Atl. Rep. 833; 51 N. J. L. 42. Bodenhamer, 80 N. C. 205; Santa 
 
 4 0verby v. C. & O. R. R. Co., 37 Clara v. Enright, 95 Cal. 105; Per- 
 W. Va. 524 ; Lawrence v. Myrieman kins v. Stickney, 132 Mass. 217; 
 Marble Co., 1 Misc. Rep. 105; St. Gates v. Chicago, etc. Co., 44 Mo. 
 Louis, I. M. & S. Co. v. Lyman (Ark., App. 488; People v. Levy, 71 Cal. 
 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 170; Alabama 618; Chateaugay O. & I. Co. v. 
 Coal Co. v. Pitts (Ala., 1893), 13 S. Blake, 144 U. S. 476. See ante, 
 Rep. 35; Muldowney v. 111. Cent. R. §§ 11, 13. 
 
 Co., 36 Iowa, 472; American En. 6 People v. Millard, 5 Crim. L. 
 
 Tile Co. v. Reich, 12 N. Y. S. 927; Mag. 588; Russell v. Crittenden, 53 
 
 Litton v. Wright, 1 Ind. App. 92; Conn. 564; Half v. Curtis, 68 Tex. 
 
 27 N. E. Rep. 329; In re Thompson, 640; 5 S. W. Rep. 541; Stennett v. 
 
 58 Hun, 608; Perry v. Jensen, 21 Penn. Ins. Co., 68 Iowa, 674; Ft. 
 
 Atl. Rep. 866; 28 W. N. C. 126; Wayne v. Coombs, 107 Ind. 75; 
 
 People v. McQuaid, 85 Mich. 123; 48 Forbes v. Howard, 4 R. I. 364 ; Penn- 
 
 N. W. Rep. 161 ; Rochester, etc. Co. sylvania Co. v. Swan, 37 111. App. 
 
 v. Budlong, 10 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 289; 83; McCormick M. Co. v. Burandt, 
 
 Kennedy v. People, 39 N. Y. 245. 37 id. 588. Cf. Taft v. Com. (Mass., 
 
 5 McEwen v. Biglow, 40 Mich. 215; 1893), 33 N. E. Rep. 1046.
 
 272 
 
 EXPERT AND OriNION EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§ 188. 
 
 not always essential that the witness should expressly claim 
 to be an expert. 1 It is usually enough if his competency ap- 
 pears prima facie, and if, on cross-examination, his utter lack 
 of qualification as an expert is shown, the jury should be in- 
 structed to reject his evidence altogether. 2 
 
 A hypothetical question in which are contained the facts 
 which are proved or claimed to be proved by either side may 
 be put to the expert for the purpose of obtaining his opinion.* 
 The facts embodied in the hypothetical question need not be 
 absolutely proved or admitted. 4 If there is any evidence 
 which tends to prove the facts, it is proper to allow the coun- 
 sel for either party to base a hypothetical question upon them, 
 leaving it to the jury to decide ultimately whether the facts 
 as stated are true. 
 
 The term "hypothetical" implies that the truth of some 
 statement of fact is assumed for a particular purpose; and if 
 such a question could be based upon undisputed facts alone, 
 it would never be asked in any case where an issue of fact 
 
 1 Mercer v. Vose, 40 N. Y. Super. 
 Ct. 218. 
 
 2 Davis v. State, 35 Ind. 496; Peo- 
 ple v. Marseilles, 70 Cal. 98 ; Redell v. 
 Railroad Co., 44 N. Y. 367 ; Washing- 
 ton v. Cole, 6 Ala. 212; Perkins v. 
 State, 132 Mass. 217; Sarle v. Ar- 
 nold, 7 R. I. 582. If a witness is 
 competent as an expert on a ques- 
 tion relating to a particular business 
 or profession, the fact that lie has 
 abandoned it and is now engaged in 
 something else is not a valid objec- 
 tion to his competency. Abbott, 
 Brief on the Facts, § 580 ; Bearss v. 
 Copley, 10 N. Y. 93; Robertson v. 
 Knapp, 35 N. Y. 91; 33 How. Pr. 
 (N. Y.) 309. In deciding upon the 
 competency of a witness to speak as 
 an expert, the court may examine 
 other witnesses for the purpose of 
 aiding it in determining whether the 
 alleged expert has the proper qualifi- 
 cations from experience or otherwise 
 
 to give an opinion as to the matter, 
 or in the trade or profession in rela- 
 tion to which he was examined. 
 Rogers, Exp. Test., $ 17; Lawson, 
 Exp. Ev. 236. In such a case the 
 witness who is examined as to the 
 qualification of the expert does not 
 give an opinion as to the value of 
 the testimony, i. e., its credibility 
 and weight, which are for the jury 
 exclusively, but merely testifies that 
 the expert posseses, in his opinion, 
 sufficient experience and knowledge 
 to entitle him to testify as such. 
 Laras v. Com., 84 Pa. St. 208; Bueh- 
 ler v. Reich, 18 N. Y. S. 115. Cf. con- 
 tra, Association v. Cronin, 4 Allen, 
 141. 
 
 3 People v. Harris, 136 N. Y. 423; 
 Strong v. Stevens, 62 Wis. 255; Dex- 
 ter v. Hall, 15 Wall. 9. 
 
 « Hall v. Rankin (Iowa, 1893), ]54 
 N. W. Rep. 217.
 
 § 188.] 
 
 EXPERT AND OPINION' KVIDKNOK. 
 
 273 
 
 arose. 1 The question should not be based on conjecture, 2 or 
 upon the opinions of other experts who have testified, 3 nor 
 should it contain conclusions and inferences, which are for the 
 jury; 4 but if it state and assume the material facts, 5 the hypo- 
 thetical question need not state all facts of which any evidence 
 has been given." It is always objectionable to put lengthy 
 hypothetical questions, containing numerous facts which re- 
 quire the witness to determine whether they have or have 
 not been proved, 7 or which are so prolix that neither he nor 
 the jury can remember or consider what they contain. 8 
 
 i Cowley v. People, 82 N. Y. 464; 
 Dilleber v. Home L. Ins. Co., 87 
 N. Y. 79; Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 
 550; Page v. State, 61 Ala. 16; 
 Yardley v. Cuthbertson, 108 Pa. St. 
 395; Quinn v. Higgins, 63 Wis. 664; 
 Deigv. Morehead, 110 Ind. 451; 11 
 N. E. Rep. 458 ; Boardnaan v. Wood- 
 man, 47 N. H. 120; Dexter v. Hall, 
 15 Wall. 9; State v. Cross, 68 Iowa, 
 180; People v. Augsburg, 97 N. Y. 
 501; Forsyth v. Doolittle, 120 U. S. 
 73; Morrill v. Tegarden, 19 Neb. 
 534; Ray v. Ray, 98 N. C. 566; Fos- 
 ters Ex'r v. Dickerson (Vt., 1892), 24 
 Atl. Rep. 253 ; Serin v. Southern Ry. 
 Co., 18 S. W. Rep. 1007; Carpenter 
 v. Bailey, 94 Cal. 406 ; Russ v. Wa- 
 bash W. Ry. Co., 112 Mo. 45; Will- 
 iams v. Brown, 28 Ohio St. 158. 
 
 2 Prentis v. Bates, 88 Mich. 567; 
 Higbie v. Guardian, etc. Co., 53 
 N. Y. 63. 
 
 3 Link v. Sheldon, 136 N. Y. 1; 
 In re Lyddy's Will, 3 N. Y. S. 636. 
 
 4 Haish v. Payson, 107 111. 365. 
 
 5 State v. Hanley, 34 Minn. 430; 
 Vosburgh v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523; 
 Thompson v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 
 6 N. Y. S. 7 ; Covey v. Campbell, 52 
 Ind. 158. He should be asked to 
 express his opinion upon certain 
 facts specifically stated and assumed 
 to be established, leaving it to the 
 jury to find whether the facts thus 
 assumed are true. Woodbury v. 
 
 18 
 
 Obear, 7 Gray (Mass.), 467. "An 
 expert may be asked his opinion 
 upon a case hypothetically stated, or 
 upon a case in which the facts have 
 been established ; but he may not 
 determine from the evidence what 
 the facts are to give an' opinion 
 upon them." Dexter v. Hall, 15 
 Wall. 9, 26. 
 
 6 Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 550; 
 Baker v. State, 30 Fla. 41 ; Bowen 
 v. Huntington, 35 W. Va. 682; Fort 
 Worth, etc. Co. v. Greathouse, 82 
 Tex. 104. 
 
 7 Stoddard v. Town, 32 N. E. Rep. 
 948. 
 
 8 People v. Brown, 53 Mich. 531; 
 Briggs v. Minn. S. R. Co. (Minn., 
 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 1019; Prentis 
 v. Bates, 88 Mich. 567. An objection 
 to the length of a question may be 
 avoided by putting it to the expert 
 in writing (Jones v. President, etc. 
 Portland, 88 Mich. 598. See Barton 
 v. Govan, 116 N. Y. 658), and the 
 court may, in its discretion, require 
 this to be done. Mayo v. Wright, 
 63 Mich. 32. The length of a hypo- 
 thetical question is never ground 
 for its exclusion, being a matter 
 discretionary with tha court, unless 
 it is shown the jurors were con- 
 fused and that they failed to under- 
 stand it. Forsyth v. Doolittle, 120 
 U. S. 73 ; Mayo v. Wright, supra.
 
 27± 
 
 EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§ 18& 
 
 Though hypothetical questions constitute the best, and in 
 some states the only, 1 method of ascertaining the opinion of 
 an expert, it has been held that he may be asked to give an 
 opinion upon the evidence if he has heard or read it, 2 and as- 
 suming it to be true, 3 or he may give an opinion based upon his 
 own personal knowledge gained by observation and examina- 
 tion of an injured person or of the subject-matter of the ac- 
 tion. 4 If, however, the evidence is very voluminous, 5 or con- 
 flicting, 6 this method would be objectionable, if not improper, 
 as usurping the office of the jury. 7 
 
 In the cross-examination of experts much latitude is al- 
 lowed. So while, on the direct examination, no hypothetical 
 question is admissible which is not within the general range 
 of the evidence, or which assumes the truth of facts which 
 are wholly unsupported by any evidence, 8 when the expert is 
 cross-examined he may be questioned to ascertain his skill or 
 experience on subjects material to the inquiry, though the 
 facts which are assumed in the questions may not have been 
 contained in the evidence. 9 
 
 1 McCarthy v. Com. (Ky., 1893), 20 
 S. W. Eep. 229 ; State v. Maier, 36 
 W. Va. 757; Reynolds v. Robinson, 
 64 N. Y. 389; In re Snelling, 136 
 N. Y. 515. 
 
 2 Gilman v. Stafford, 50 Vt. 723. 
 3Sillar v. Brown, 9 C. & P. 601; 
 
 Com. v. Rogers, 7 Met. (Mass.) 500; 
 Jones v. Chicago, etc. Co., 43 Minn. 
 279; Hunt v. Lowell Gas Co., 8 
 Allen (Mass.), 170. 
 
 * State v. Leabo, 89 Mo. 247; 
 Coyne v. Man. R. Co., 62 Hun, 620. 
 Contra, Fuller v. Jackson, 92 Mich. 
 197. See post, § 189. 
 
 5 Bennett v. State, 57 Wis. 69. 
 
 6 Guiterman v. Liverpool, etc. Co., 
 83 N. Y. 358 ; Bait. & Lift. Co. v. 
 Cassell, 66 Md. 419; Yardley v. 
 Cuthbertson, 108 Pa. St. 395; Fair- 
 child v. Bascomb, 35 Vt. 308,415; 
 Page v. State, 61 Ala. 16. 
 
 7 Gregory v. New York, L. E. etc. 
 Co., 55 Hun, 303. 
 
 8 State v. Cross, 68 Iowa, 180; Peo- 
 ple v. Augsburg, 97 N. Y. 501. 
 
 SDilleber v. Home L. Ins. Co., 87 
 N. Y. 79; People v. Augsburg, 97 
 N. Y. 501; Louisville R. Co. v. 
 Falvey, 104 Ind. 409 ; Kelly v. Erie 
 Tel. Co., 34 Minn. 321 ; Epps v. State, 
 102 Ind. 539; Brown v. Insurance 
 Co., 70 Iowa, 390; Hart v. Hudson 
 R. B. Co., 84 N. Y. 56; Foster's Ex'r 
 v. 'Dickerson, 64 Vt. 233; 24 Atl. 
 Rep. 353. An expert may give an 
 opinion upon the skill of another ex- 
 pert who has testified to show the 
 value of his evidence. Thompson v. 
 Ish (Mo., 1889), 12 S. W. Rep. 510. 
 As to the extent and efficacy of cross- 
 examination to test the knowledge 
 of a witness and the credibility of 
 his evidence, see post, §§ 339-342. 
 The court should not permit the ex- 
 pert to be asked on cross-examina- 
 tion what is the amount of his an- 
 nual professional income with a
 
 § ISO.] 
 
 EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. 
 
 275 
 
 § 189. Cross-examination of experts — Use of scientific 
 books. — While the current of the most recent decisions, in 
 the absence of statute permitting it, 1 is against allowing scien- 
 tific treatises to be read as furnishing direct evidence them- 
 selves of the opinions and facts which they contain, or as 
 supplementary to and illustrating the oral evidence of the ex- 
 pert, 2 yet a particular scientific publication rmxy be read to 
 contradict the evidence of an expert where his opinion, as it 
 was given on his direct-examination, is stated to be based upon 
 that work; 3 or it may be read to impeach him by showing 
 that he quoted it incorrectly. 4 The rule that scientific publi- 
 cations are not admissible in evidence does not of course pre- 
 vent their use as a means of ascertaining the learning and 
 competency of the expert. They may be referred to on cross- 
 examination, and the expert may be asked if he has read 
 them; if he agrees with the conclusions of their authors; and 
 questions based upon their contents may be asked him. 5 
 
 view to ascertaining his pi-ofessional 
 standing. Harland v. Lilienthal, 53 
 N. Y. 438. 
 
 i Code Iowa, § 3653. See, also, 
 Burg v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Co. 
 (Iowa, 1894), 57 N. W. Rep. 680. 
 
 2 People v. Goldenson, 76 Cal. 328 ; 
 Com. v. Brown, 121 Mass. 70; In re 
 Sheldon, 18 N. Y. S. 15; State v. 
 O'Brien, 7 R. I. 336; Bloomington 
 v. Schrock, 110 111. 221; Mix v. 
 Staples, 63 Hun, 631; Huffman v. 
 Click, 77 N. C. 55. See, also, § 145. 
 "The reasons for not admitting sci- 
 entific works to prove the statements 
 which they contain are that the au- 
 thors did not write under oath, and 
 their grounds of belief and process 
 of reasoning cannot be tested by 
 cross-examination. But an expert's 
 opinion, formed in part from read- 
 ing treatises written by persons of 
 acknowledged ability, may be given 
 in evidence, and he (the expert) may 
 refresh his own recollection by ref- 
 erence to such authorities." By the 
 
 court, in State v. Baldwin, 36 Kan. 
 17, 18. See, also, Marshall v. Brown, 
 50 Mich. 148; Boyle v. State, 57 Wis. 
 472, 478; People v. Vanderhoof 
 (Mich., 1888), 39 N. W. Rep. 28. 
 Thus, herd-books will be rejected 
 where the question of the breed of 
 animals is in issue (Crawford v. 
 Williams, 48 Iowa, 249), unless thej r 
 are shown to be accepted and re- 
 ceived as standard and well-recog- 
 nized authorities. In such a case 
 they may perhaps be used to refresh 
 the memory of an expert on the 
 witness stand. Kuhns v. Chicago, 
 etc. Co., 65 Iowa, 528; 22 N. W. Rep 
 661 ; Townley v. Missouri Pac. R 
 Co., 89 Mo. 31. 
 
 3 Pinney v. Cahill, 48 Mich. 584 
 People v. Goldenson, 76 Cal. 328 
 Conn. L. Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 89 111. 516 
 
 4 Ripon v. Bittel, 30 Wis. 614. 
 
 5 Hess v. Lowrey, 122 Ind. 233 
 State v. Wood, 53 N. H. 484; Tomp 
 kins v. West, 56 Conn. 585.
 
 276 EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. [§ 190. 
 
 § 190. The weight and credibility of expert and opinion 
 evidence. — The credibility and weight of expert and opinion 
 evidence are for the jury exclusively, 1 and they are not re- 
 quired to give any greater weight to it than to other evi- 
 dence, 2 and of course are not bound by it if they disbelieve it. 3 
 It has been held error for the court to discredit expert evi- 
 dence 4 by instructing a jury that it should be regarded with 
 caution, 5 that its value was not great, 6 or that less weight 
 should be given to the evidence of an expert whose experience 
 was limited 7 than to that of one of greater experience. On the 
 other hand, it has been held not improper for the court to de- 
 clare that this evidence is of the lowest order; that it is the 
 least satisfactory, and should not be permitted to overthrow 
 positive and credible evidence of credible witnesses who testify 
 of their own knowledge. 8 These diverse views may perhaps 
 be reconciled by remembering that expert evidence has for 
 its peculiar province matter of opinion, and facts pertaining 
 to subjects not within the scope of common knowledge. Within 
 these limits the evidence of an expert possesses very great 
 weight. If while testifying to such facts and opinions he 
 shall also testify to matters of common knowledge, his char- 
 acter as an expert does not render his testimon}'' as to those 
 matters more credible than the testimony of any other person, 
 while the fact that he is paid to testify casts a certain amount 
 of discredit upon whatever he may sa} r . 9 
 
 1 Head v. Hargrave, 105 U. S. 45; It is not error for the court to omit 
 
 Gregor v. Annell, 2 Iowa, 30; Epps to inform the jury that a witness is 
 
 v. State, 102 Ind. 529; State v. Cole, an expert where it has charged them 
 
 63 Iowa, 695. See ante, %% 11, 13. A as to what is expert testimony, 
 
 physician's neglect to call a surgeon Faulkner v. Faulkner, 84 Ga. 73. 
 
 to perform an operation which he 5 Stone v. Chicago, etc. Co. (Mich.), 
 
 was himself unable to undertake 33 N. W. Rep. 24. 
 
 should not be permitted to affect 6 Eggers v. Eggers, 57 Ind. 461. 
 
 his credibility as an expert witness. 7 Cuneo v. Bessoni, 63 Ind. 524. 
 
 Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Hill, 93 8 United States v. Pendergast, 32 
 
 Ala. 514. Fed. Rep. 198; Winans v. Railroad 
 
 2 Sanders v. State, 94 Ind. 147; Co., 21 How. (U. S.) 101; Tracy 
 Turnbull v. Richardson, 37 N. W. Peerage Case, 10 C. & F. 191 ; People 
 Rep. 499; 69 Mich. 400. v. Perry man (Mich., 1888), 40 N. W. 
 
 3 State v. Malloy, 31 Fed. Rep. 19; Rep. 425; Whitaker v. Parks, 42 
 Humphries v. Johnson, 20 Ind. 190; Iowa, 586. 
 
 Olson v. Gyertsen, 42 Minn. 407. !) St. Louis Gas Co. v. American 
 
 4 Langford v. Jones, 18 Oieg. 307. F. I. Co., 33 Mo. App. 348.
 
 § 191.] 
 
 EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. 
 
 277 
 
 §191. Compensation of experts. — An expert witness, 
 called to testify to his opinion, is entitled to compensation 
 over and above the fees allowed other witnesses by law; and 
 it has been held that a district attorney, in employing expert 
 witnesses to testify at a criminal trial, has, by implication, 
 the authority to bind the county to pay a stipulated and spe- 
 cific sum as fees. 1 If he refuse to testify unless his fee is paid, 
 he cannot be committed for contempt. But he may be in con- 
 tempt where he refuses to answer questions which call for 
 knowledge which he has acquired, not by his professional 
 reading or experience, but by means open to any one — that 
 is, by personal observation. 2 The compensation of an expert 
 cannot, in the absence of statute, be taxed as costs. 3 
 
 1 People v. Board of Supervisors of 
 Cortland* Co., 15 N. Y. S. 748; Peo- 
 ple v. Board of Columbia Co., 31 
 N. E. Rep. 322; 134 N. Y. 1. 
 
 2 State v. Teipner, 36 Minn. 535; 
 Buchman v. State, 59 Ind. 1 ; United 
 States v. Howe, 12 Cent. L. J. 193: 
 People v. Montgomery, 13 Abb. Pr. 
 (N. S.) 207, 240; Parkinson v. Atkin- 
 son, 31 L. J. (N. S.) C. P. 199; Dills 
 v. State, 59 Ind. 15. In Ex parte 
 Dement, 53 Ala. 389, and Summer 
 v. State, 5 Tex. App. 365, the right 
 to extra compensation was denied. 
 See, also, the remarks of Marie, J., 
 in Webb v. Page, 1 Carr. & K. 23. 
 
 3 Mask v. Buffalo (N. Y„ 1893), 13 
 N. E. Rep. 251 ; Haynes v. Mosher, 
 15 How. Pr. 216; Branfoot v. Ham- 
 ilton, 52 Fed. Rep. 390; 3 C. C. A. 
 155. Upon the controverted ques- 
 tion whether a witness called as 
 an expert can be punished for con- 
 tempt in refusing to testify until his 
 fees as a professional expert witness 
 are paid, the following considera- 
 tions have been urged : 
 
 As sustaining the proposition that 
 experts can be coerced into testify- 
 ing without extra compensation, it 
 is said that it is a duty that an ex- 
 pert, particularly if he belong to one 
 
 of the learned professions, owes to 
 the law which protects him in the 
 practice of his calling; that he, 
 equally with all citizens, ought to 
 contribute his aid from the necessity 
 of the case and to secure and ad- 
 vance the proper administration of 
 justice ; and that the receipt of large 
 sums as compensation is likely to 
 bias the witness and to lessen, if not 
 wholly to destroy, the value of his 
 testimony as a guide to truth. 
 
 In answer to these arguments it is 
 urged that, while a physician or 
 other expert ought to testify to those 
 facts within his knowledge which 
 he has acquired by the means that 
 are open to the ordinary witness 
 without extra pay, yet, when giving 
 a professional opinion on the witness 
 stand, he is employing professional 
 qualifications which it has taken 
 him years of study to obtain, and 
 that to compel him to divulge his 
 opinion gratis is an unjust appro- 
 priation of his property without com- 
 pensation. 
 
 Speaking of medical experts — and 
 the same principles will apply to ex- 
 perts of any sort — Mr. John Ordro- 
 naux, in Medical Jurisprudence, par. 
 114, 115, says: "But once put upon
 
 278 
 
 EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§ 192. 
 
 § 192. Physicians as experts — Cause of death. — A med- 
 ical witness may, if called as an expert, express his opinion as 
 to the health of a person founded on an examination, 1 or upon 
 the facts as stated in a hypothetical question put to him in 
 court. But a physician called to testify, not as an expert, but 
 in the capacity of an ordinary witness testifying to facts ob- 
 vious to all, cannot on cross-examination testify as an expert. 2 
 If his opinion is founded upon a physical examination of the 
 person, he may be guided in part by statements made to him 
 by the patient so far as they are not merely narrative of past 
 symptoms or transactions. 3 The opinion of a physician or a 
 surgeon upon the cause, nature and effect of wounds or other 
 physical injuries is always admissible. 4 He may testify to the 
 
 the stand as a skilled witness, his 
 obligations to the public now cease, 
 and he stands in the position of any 
 professional man consulted in rela- 
 tion to a subject on which his opin- 
 ion is sought. It is evident that the 
 skill and professional experience of 
 a man are so far his individual cap- 
 ital and property that he cannot be 
 compelled to bestow them gratui- 
 tously on any party ; neither the pub- 
 lic any more than any private person 
 have a right to extort services from 
 him in the line of his profession 
 without adequate compensation. On 
 the witness stand, precisely as in his 
 office, his opinion may be given or 
 withheld at pleasure; for a skilled 
 witness cannot be compelled to give 
 an opinion, nor be committed for 
 contempt if he refuses to do so." 
 
 1 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Falvey, 104 
 Ind. 409. 
 
 2 Enos v. St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins. 
 Co. (S. D., 1894), 57 N. W. Rep. 9*19. 
 
 3 Johnson v. N. Pac. R. Co., 47 
 Minn. 430; Kansas City, etc. Co. v. 
 Stoner, 51 Fed. Rep. 649 ; 2 C. C. A. 
 437; Barber v. Merriam, 11 Allen 
 (Mass.), 322; Towle v. Blake, 48 
 N. H. 92; Coyne v. Railroad Co., 62 
 Hun, 620; Quaife v. Chicago, etc. 
 
 Co., 48 Wis. 513; Eckles v. Bates, 26 
 Ala. 655 ; State v. Gedicke, 43 N. J. 
 L. 86 ; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Sutton, 
 42 111. 438. " A physician cannot be 
 permitted to decide on the credibil- 
 ity of witnesses nor to take into con- 
 sideration facts known to him and 
 not to the jury; but, after having 
 communicated such facts in his tes- 
 timony, he may take them into con- 
 sideration in forming his opinion." 
 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Falvey, 104 
 Ind. 409. 
 
 4 Fay v. Swan, 44 Mich. 544 ; Rob- 
 inson v. Marino, 3 Wash. St. 434; 
 Bowen v. Huntington, 35 W. Va. 
 682; Atchison, etc. Co. v. Brassfield 
 (Kan., 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 814; 
 Graves v. Battle Creek (Mich., 1893), 
 54 N. W. Rep. 757; Reed v. Renn. 
 R. Co., 56 Fed. Rep. 184. But an 
 opinion that on an unusual exposure 
 or a change in the weather some 
 pain may be suffered is inadmissi- 
 ble, as too speculative. Elsas v. 
 Second Ave. R. R. Co., 56 Hun, 161. 
 On the other hand, in Bliss v. New 
 York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. (Mass., 
 1S94), 36 N. E. Rep. 65, it was held 
 that a medical expert might testify 
 not only to the probable but to 
 the " possible " immediate effect of
 
 192.] 
 
 EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. 
 
 270 
 
 manner in which in his opinion the injury was inflicted, 1 and 
 where he has stated that it was caused by a certain weapon 
 or implement, he may in a criminal trial be shown an instru- 
 ment which has been proved to have been in the defendant's 
 hand, and may be asked if it would have caused the wound 
 or injury. 2 An expert physician may be asked what would 
 be the effect of a certain blow or other injury and whether a 
 person would be likely to recover therefrom, 3 the length of 
 time the injured person may live, 4 and whether death would 
 ensue. 5 A physician, after having described the symptoms 
 which have been observed by him, may give an opinion as to 
 their probable cause 6 and as to the nature and curability 7 of 
 the disease from which the person is suffering. 8 A physician 
 is a qualified witness upon the probable cause producing 
 
 a nervous shock which plaintiff 
 claimed he had received. 
 
 1 Texas Cent. R. Co. v. Burnett 
 (Tex., 1891), 16 S. W. Rep. 320; State 
 v. Ginger, 80 Iowa, 574; Rash v. 
 State, 61 Ala. 89; Doolittle v. State, 
 93 Ind. 272 ; Boyle v. State, 61 Wis. 
 349. Cf. Wabash W. R. Co. v. 
 Friedman, 41 111. App. 270; Egler v. 
 People, 56 N. Y. 642; Gas Co. v. 
 O'Brien, 118 111. 174; Boyd v. State, 
 14 Lea (Tenn.), 161 ; Comin v. Piper, 
 120 Mass. 188; State v. Clark, 15 
 a C. 103; Chicago R. R. v. Lambert, 
 119 111. 255. 
 
 2 Kennedy v. People, 39 N. Y. 245 ; 
 People v. Carpenter, 102 id. 238. 
 
 3Ney v. Troy, 3 N. Y. S. 679; 
 Strohm v. Railroad Co., 96 N. Y. 
 305; Cunningham v. Railroad Co., 
 49 Fed. Rep. 39 ; Reed v. Penn. R. 
 R. Co., 56 Fed. Rep. 184; Denver 
 Tramway Co. v. Reid (Colo., 1894), 
 35 Pac. Rep. 269; King v. Second 
 Ave. R. R. Co., 26 N. Y. S. 973. 
 
 ^Alberti v. N. Y., L. E. & N. R. 
 R. Co., 118 N. Y. 77; Armstrong v. 
 Ackley, 71 Iowa, 76; 32 N. W. Rep. 
 180; People v. Wilson, 109 N. Y. 345. 
 
 5 Coyne v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 62 
 Hun, 620; Reed v. Penn. Ry. Co., 
 56 Fed. Rep. 184; Davis v State, 38 
 Md. 15; State v. Crenshaw, 32 La. 
 Ann. 406; Armstrong v. Ackley, 71 
 Iowa, 76; Manufac. Ace. Ind. Co. v. 
 Dorgan, 58 Fed. Rep. 94; Griswold 
 v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 115 N. Y. 
 61 ; Johnson v. Broadway R. R. Co., 
 6 N. Y. S. 112. 
 
 6 Van Deusen v. Newcomer, 40 
 Mich. 120; Louisville, etc. Co. v. 
 Falvey, 104 Ind. 409; Robinson v. 
 Marino, 3 Wash. 434; Bowen v. 
 Huntington, 35 W. Va. 682. 
 
 7 Matteson v. N. Y. etc. R. Co., 
 35 N. Y. 487. See cases in note 3. 
 
 8 Jones v. White, 11 Humph. 
 (Tenn.) 268; Flynt v. Bodenhamer, 
 80 N. C. 205 ; Polk v. State, 36 Ark. 
 117; Hook v. Stovell, 26 Ga. 704; 
 Baltimore & Lib. Turn. Co. v. Cas- 
 sell, 66 Md. 419; Cooper v. State, 23 
 Tex. 336; Linton v. Hurley, 14 Gray 
 (Mass.), 191; Pidcock v. Potter, 68 
 Pa. St. 342; Burns v. Barenfeld, 84 
 Ind. 43.
 
 280 EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. [§ 193. 
 
 i 
 
 death, 1 and he may state when, in his opinion, death took 
 place 2 and by what weapons or instruments it was caused. 3 
 
 § 193. Evidence of medical experts to show character of 
 disease and blood-stains — Expert evidence as to autopsies 
 and malpractice. — Medical testimony is generally admissible 
 to show the ordinal duration and character of a disease, 4 its 
 cause and the proper remedy, 5 whether it is contagious, 6 and 
 whether its recurrence is probable. 7 So a physician may give 
 his opinion that the party is not simulating disease. 8 The 
 testimony of a physician otherwise competent who conducted 
 an autopsy is not inadmissible because minor statutory de- 
 tails were not observed b}^ him. 9 He may give his opinion as 
 to what tests were needed to ascertain the cause of death. 
 "Where several physicians hold an autopsy, the evidence of 
 any one of them is competent to show a fact observed by any 
 of the others at the autopsy. 10 But an expert witness, it has 
 been held, cannot be permitted to testify merely from hearing 
 the evidence that an autopsy was or was not so conducted 
 that the cause of death could be stated with any degree of 
 certainty. 11 So a physician may give his opinion of the sex 
 of a person, based upon an examination which he has made 
 of a skeleton, 12 and he may testify generally as to the cause of 
 
 1 Boyle v. State, 61 Wis. 349; Com. N. C. 205; Baltimore v. Lib. Turn' 
 v. Thompson (Mass., 1893), 33 N. E. Co., 66 Md. 419; Pidcock v. Potter, 
 Rep. 1111 ; Eggle v. People, 56 N. Y. 68 Pa. St. 344 ; Matteson v. Railroad 
 64; People v. Sessions, 58 Mich. 594. Co., 62 Barb. (N. Y.) 364; Armstrong 
 
 2 State v. Clark, 15 S. C. 403. v. Ackley, 71 Iowa, 76 ; Cooper v. 
 
 3 Waite v. State, 13 Tex. App. 169; State, 23 Tex. 336; Jones v. Tucker, 
 Banks v. State, id. 182; Manufg. 41 N. H. 546. 
 
 Ace. Indemnity Co. v. Dorgan, 58 6 Moore v. State, 17 Ohio St. 321. 
 Fed. Rep. 945. 'Filer v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 49 
 
 4 Finnegan v. Fall Riv. Gas Works N. Y. 42. 
 
 (Mass., 1893), 34 N. E. Rep. 523; 8 Railroad v. Martin, 112 111. 16. 
 
 Linton v. Hurley, 14 Gray (Mass.), Contra, Cole v. Lake Shore, etc. 
 
 191; Washington v.Cole, 6 Ala. 212; Co. (Mich., 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 
 
 Jones v. White, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 638. 
 
 268; Powell v. Railroad Co., 77 Ga. 9 Com. v. Taylor, 132 Mass. 261. 
 
 192; Willey v. Portsmouth, 35 N. H. ™ People v. Wilson, 109 N. Y. 345. 
 
 303. n Manufacturers' Ace. Ind. Co. v. 
 
 8 Anthony v. Smith, 4 Bosw. (N. Dorgan, 58 Fed. Rep. 945. 
 
 Y.) 503; Flynt v. Bodenhamer, 80 ^Wilson v. State, 41 Tex. 320.
 
 § 103.] 
 
 EXPERT AND OPINION* EVIDENCE. 
 
 281 
 
 the condition in which a body is found after death 1 or burial. 2 
 As all persons are more or less familiar with the appearance 
 of stains caused by human blood, it has been repeatedly held 
 that an ordinary witness may testify that certain stains re- 
 semble those made by human and animal blood. No peculiar 
 skill or experience is necessary to be possessed by the witness, 3 
 though if he is an expert physician or microscopist his testi- 
 mony upon this subject may be more worthy of consideration 
 and belief by the jury. 4 
 
 The opinions of medical experts are admissible in actions 
 to recover damages for malpractice committed by physicians 
 and surgeons to show whether the plaintiff was or was not 
 properly treated. 5 But such evidence is not received to show 
 the general reputation of the defendant for skill, 6 or that he 
 procured his diploma by irregular methods/ or to show the 
 
 1 State v. Pike, 65 Me. Ill ; O'Mara 
 v. Com., 75 Pa. St. 424. 
 
 2 State v. Secrest, SO N. C. 450. 
 
 3 People v. Gonzalez, 35 N. Y. 49 ; 
 Thomas v. State, 67 Ga. 460; Mc- 
 Lain v. Com., 99 Pa. St. 86; Wool- 
 folk v. State, 85 Ga. 69; People v. 
 Greenfield, 30 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 462; 85 
 N. Y. 75, 83; Dillard v. State, 58 
 Miss. 368; People v. Deacons, 109 
 N. Y. 374. 
 
 • 4 Com. v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 
 122; Knoll v. State, 55 Wis. 249; 
 State v. Knight, 43 Me. 1. Only ex- 
 perts should be allowed to testify 
 whether a certain stain was caused 
 by animal or human blood. Lindsay 
 v. People, 6 N. Y. 143. It is af- 
 firmed by many microscopists that 
 it is an easy matter to distinguish 
 human blood by the size and shape 
 of the corpuscles. The more recent 
 and perhaps better opinion is that 
 " while a skilful expert can with cer- 
 tainty distinguish between human 
 blood corpuscles and those of the 
 blood of a cow, pig or other domestic 
 animals with which it would be 
 likely to be confounded, still in a 
 
 murder trial, where human life is at 
 stake, the expert is hardly warranted 
 to swear that the blood-stain is any- 
 thing more than that of a mammal." 
 Citing Communication of John J. 
 Reese in Med. Leg. Jour., Sept.. 
 1892. See Reese, Med. Jurisprudence, 
 p. 132 (2d ed.), 1889. 
 
 5 Spaulding v. Bliss, 83 Mich. 311; 
 Boyston v. Giltner, 3 Oreg. 118: 
 Wright v. Hardy, 22 Wis. 348; Quinn 
 v. Higgins, 63 Wis. 664; Reber v. 
 Herring, 115 Pa. St. 599; 8 Atl. Rep. 
 800; Mertz v. Detweiler, 8 W. & S. 
 (Pa.) 376; Kay v. Thomson, 10 Am. 
 L. Reg. (N. B.) 594; Bennison v. 
 Walbank, 38 Minn. 313; Gates v. 
 Fleischer, 67 Wis. 504 ; 30 N. W. Rep. 
 674; Williams v. Poppleton, 3 Oreg. 
 139; Van Hoover v. Berghoff. 90 
 Mo. 487; Roberts v. Johnson, 58 N. 
 Y. 613. 
 
 6 Stevenson v. Gelsthorpe, 10 Mont. 
 503; Boydston v. Giltner, supra; 
 Gramm v. Boener, 56 Ind. 497; 
 Leighton v. Sargent, 11 Fost. (N. H.) 
 120. 
 
 "Bute v. Potts, 18Pac. Rep. 329; 
 76 Cal. 304.
 
 282 
 
 EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§ li>±. 
 
 professional standing of the medical college at which he stud- 
 ied. 1 The witness may be asked if the death of the patient 
 could be attributed to the unskilfulness or negligence of the 
 defendant, 2 and he may give his opinion upon the properties 
 and effect of the medicine or other means employed, 3 or may 
 state the customary and proper practice in similar cases. 4 
 
 § 194. Non-expert evidence upon a person's physical con- 
 dition. — A witness who, though he is not an expert, has had 
 adequate opportunities for observation, may testify to all 
 facts within his knowledge concerning the physical condition 
 of a person, where such facts do not presuppose the possession 
 of any special scientific or medical experience or training on 
 his part; 5 as, for example, to the fact that a person's leg was 
 broken, 6 or that he was unconscious on a certain date. 7 So 
 the evidence of a non-expert witness is admissible, though it 
 may consist merely of an opinion, that a person seemed to be 
 in good health or suffering from illness, 8 as to the extent of 
 the illness, 9 or that a person who had been ill had grown 
 better or worse. 10 But where a witness has testified that a 
 
 1 Leighton v. Sargent, 11 Fost. (N. 
 H.) 120. 
 
 2 Wright v. Hardy, 22 Wis. 348. 
 
 s Barber v. Merriam, 11 Allen, 322 ; 
 Mertz v. Detweiler, 8 W. & S. (Pa.) 
 376. 
 
 *Twombly v. Leach, 11 Cush. 
 (Mass.) 405; Doyle v. Eye & Ear In- 
 firmary, 80 N. Y. 601. Cf. Link v. 
 Sheldon, 18 N. Y. S. 815 ; Gates v. 
 Fleischer, 67 Wis. 504; 30 N. W. 
 Rep. 674. 
 
 5 Fox v. Penin. W. L. & Color 
 Works, 92 Mich. 243; Rawls v. Am. 
 Mut. L. Ins. Co., 27 N. Y. 282; Rash 
 v. State, 61 Ala. 89; Smalley v. Ap- 
 pleton, 70 Wis. 349; 25 N. W. Rep. 
 729 ; Navarro v. State. 24 Tex. App. 
 578; Com. v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 
 122; B. & O. Turn. Co. v. Cassell, 
 66 Md. 419; Higbie v. Guardian L. 
 I. Co., 52 N. Y. 603; Tierney v. 
 Railroad Co., 24 Am. L. Reg. 669; 
 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Rambo, 59 
 
 Fed. Rep. 75; People v. Millard, 53 
 Mich. 63. 
 
 6 Montgomery v. Scott, 34 Wis. 
 338. 
 
 ' Chicago City R. R. Co. v. Van 
 Vleck (111., 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 262; 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Newmeyer. 129 
 Ind. 401 ; 28 N. E. Rep. 860. 
 
 8 Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Van 
 Vleck (111., 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 462; 
 Lawson v. Conaway, 37 W. Va. 159; 
 Doyle v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 59 
 Hun, 625; Baltimore & O. R. R. Co. 
 v. Rambo, 59 Fed. Rep. 75; Hardy 
 v. Merrill, 56 N. H. 227; United 
 Breth. M. A. I. Co. v. O'Hara, 120 
 Pa. St. 256; Wilkinson v. Moseley, 
 30 Ala. 562; Barker v. Coleman, 35 
 Ala. 221 ; Evans v. People, 12 Mich. 
 27 ; Elliott v. Van Buren, 33 Mich. 49. 
 
 9 Heddles v. Chicago & N. W. R. 
 Co., 46 N. W. Rep. 115; 71 Wis. 288. 
 
 10 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Wood, 12 
 N. E. Rep. 572 ; King v. Second Ave.
 
 § 195.] EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. 2S3 
 
 person never had any trouble with his hearing, he will not be 
 permitted to give an opinion that the person's sight and hear- 
 ing are ordinary in character. 1 
 
 Where the symptoms of a disease are such that they are 
 perceptible and recognizable by a person of ordinary knowl- 
 elge, a non-expert witness may testify, after stating the facts, 
 that certain symptoms manifested themselves. 2 But no wit- 
 ness except an expert should be permitted to give an opinion 
 (except perhaps where the symptoms are indicative of a dis- 
 ease to the most casual inspection) 3 as to the specific medical 
 character of a disease or injury from which a person is suf- 
 fering. 4 
 
 § 195. Chemists as experts — Poisons. — Chemists and 
 toxicologists are frequently called as expert witnesses. Thus, 
 a chemist w.ho is properly qualified may testify to the result 
 of an analysis of the contents of the stomach or other bodily 
 organs, made to ascertain the presence of poison. 5 But a 
 physician, though he may give an opinion that death resulted 
 from the administration of a certain poison, 6 or may describe 
 the symptoms which are present when poison has been given, 7 
 
 R. Co., 26 N. Y. S. 973. A non- » Duntzy v. Van Buren, 5 Hun, 
 
 expert witness may give his opinion 648; Owens v. Kansas City, 95 Mo. 
 
 upon the nature of an injury where 169. 
 
 he has adequate knowledge of the 4 Where the defendant is sued to 
 
 circumstances. Goshen v. England, recover the value of a bust which 
 
 21 N. E. Rep. 977; 119 Ind. 368. he refuses to accept, claiming that 
 
 1 Barrelle v. Penn. Ry. Co., 4 N. it is not a good likeness, a witness 
 Y. S. 127. "Any witness of ordi- who has for many years been well 
 nary intelligence may be able to acquainted with the person whose 
 state that a sick or wounded person bust is in dispute may testify upon 
 has grown worse, or has improved, the question of resemblance or like- 
 without being able to give an accu- ness. Schwartz v. Wood, 21 N. Y. 
 rate description of his condition. S. 1053; 67 Hun, 638. 
 Undoubtedly the facts on which the 5 State v. Bowman, 78 N. C. 509; 
 conclusion rests may be asked for Hass v. Marshall (Pa., 1888), 14 Atl. 
 on cross-examination ; but the opin- Rep. 421 ; State v. Cook, 17 Kan. 
 ion is not incompetent merely be- 394; State v. Slagle, 83 N. C. 630; 
 cause the witness cannot state the State v. Hinkle, 6 Iowa, 3S0 ; Joe v. 
 ground on which it rests, although State, 6 Fla. 591. 
 
 the failure to do so may, perhaps, 6 Mitchell v. State, 58 Ala. 418. 
 
 weaken its probative force." Louis- 7 State v. Terrell, 12 Rich. (S. C.) 
 
 ville, etc. R. Co. v. Wood, 12 N. E. 321; Polk v. State, 36 Ark. 117; 
 
 Rep. 572. People v. Robinson, 2 Park. Cr. Cas. 
 
 2 See cases cited stqjra. 236.
 
 284 
 
 EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§ 196. 
 
 will not be permitted to state the result of a chemical analysis, 
 unless it is shown that he is experienced in chemical research. 1 
 So the identity of the subject analyzed with that involved in 
 the case, and the fact that it has not been tampered with, 
 must be shown. 2 The expert testimony of a chemist is ad- 
 missible upon the effect of poisons 3 and noxious gases, 4 to show 
 that one man can safely inhale more gas than another; 5 that 
 certain particular gases are the result of a certain process; 6 
 as to the ingredients and nature of writing or other inks; 7 to 
 the safety of oil lamps, 3 or to the quality of milk. 9 
 
 § 196. Expert evidence where sexual crimes have been 
 committed — Abortion. — A physician may testify, after an 
 examination of the person, that there has baen actual pene- 
 tration in a prosecution for rape, 10 and may give an opinion 
 upon the question whether sexual intercourse was possible, 11 
 and whether pregnancy would be likely to ensue where a 
 rape was committed. 1 -' So expert testimony is admissible to 
 show the physical strength and condition of the prosecuting 
 witness in a prosecution for rape where her ability to resist 
 
 i State v. Cook, 17 Kau. 394. Con- 
 tra, Siebert v. People, 32 N. E. Rep. 
 431. 
 
 2 State v. Cook, 17 Kan. 394; State 
 v. Hinkle, 6 Iowa, 380. 
 
 3 Fox v. Penin. W. L. Co., 92 Mich. 
 243. 
 
 ••Lincoln v. Taunton Co., 9 Allen 
 (Mass.), 122. 
 
 5 Birmingham F. & N. Co. v. Gross 
 (Ark., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 36. 
 
 6 Citizens' G. L. Co. v. O'Brien, 118 
 111. 174; Turner v. Black Warrior, 1 
 McCall, 181, Cf. Emerson v. Lowell 
 G. L. Co., 6 Allen (Mass.), 146. 
 
 7 Sheldon v. Warner, 45 Mich. 638; 
 Goodyear v. Vosburgh, G3 Barb. (N. 
 Y.) 154; In re Monroe's Estate, 23 
 Abb. N. C. 83 ; 5 N. Y. S. 552 ; People 
 v. Brotherton, 47 Cal. 388; Elling- 
 wood v. Brogg, 52 N. H. 448; Clark 
 v. Bruce, 12 Hun, 271; Allen v. 
 Hunter, 6 McLean, 303. 
 
 8 Bierce v. Stocking, 11 Gray, 174. 
 
 9 Com. v. Holt, 146 Mass. 38. A 
 witness to be qualified to testify to 
 the nature and quality of food or 
 drink need not always be a profes- 
 sional chemist or analyst. If the 
 witness possess adequate knowledge 
 of the articles in question, his tes- 
 timony is not incompetent because 
 he has not submitted them to a chem- 
 ical analysis. So a farmer or dairy- 
 man may testify whether milk was 
 diluted and whether it tasted like 
 milk and water. Lane v. Wilcox, 
 55 Barb. (N. Y.) 615. And an habit- 
 ual drinker of beer may be allowed 
 to state that a certain liquor was 
 lager beer. Com. v. Moinelian, 140 
 Mass. 463; 1 N. E. Rep. 59. 
 
 io State v. Smith, 4 Phill. (N. C.) 
 302 ; Woodin v. People, 1 Park. C. 
 C. (N. Y.) 464. Cf. Com. v. Lynes, 
 142 Mass. 577. 
 
 ii People v. Clark, 33 Mich. 112. 
 
 12 Young v. Johnson, 123 N. Y. 226.
 
 § 197.] 
 
 EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. 
 
 2S5 
 
 the prisoner is in issue. 1 A physician may testify to the time 
 required to commit an abortion; 2 that an abortion has been 
 performed, 3 and that certain drugs 4 or instruments 5 which 
 have been found in the possession of the accused were adapted 
 to produce an abortion. So a physician may be asked if, 
 under certain circumstances, any traces of an abortion would 
 remain after one had been committed or attempted. 6 
 
 § 197. Expert evidence upon insanity. — According to 
 the weight of authority, a non-expert witness who has had 
 adequate means of becoming acquainted with the mental state 
 of a person whose sanity is in issue may give his opinion 
 upon the sanity or insanity of the individual. 7 In doing so, 
 however, he will be required to state all the facts and cir- 
 cumstances within his knowledge bearing on the question 
 and on which his opinion is based. 8 The opinion of a non- 
 
 1 State v. Knapp, 45 N. H. 148. 
 
 2 People v. McGonegal, 136 N. Y. 
 62. 
 
 3 Com. v. Thompson (Mass., 1893), 
 33 N. E. Rep. 1111; State v. Smith, 
 32 Mo. 370 ; State v. Wood, 53 N. H. 
 484; Com. v. Brown, 14 Gray (Mass.), 
 411. 
 
 4 Regina v. Still, 30 U. C. C. P. 30 ; 
 Williams v. State (Tex., 1892), 19 
 S. W. Rep. 897. 
 
 5 Com. v. Brown, 121 Mass. 69; 
 People v. Vedder, 98 N. Y. 630. 
 
 6 Bathrick v. Detroit, etc. Co., 50 
 Mich. 629. 
 
 " Mull v. Carr (Ind., 1893), 32 N. E. 
 Rep. 591 ; State v. Maier, 36 W, Va. 
 757; Armstrong v. State, 30 Fla. 170; 
 State v. Lehman (S. D., 1891), 49 N. 
 W. Rep. 31 ; Conn. M. L. Ins. Co. v. 
 Lathrop, 111 U. S. 612; Cram v. 
 Cram, 33 Vt. 15; Wheelock v. God- 
 frey (Cal., 1S94), 35 Pac. Rep. 317; 
 Charter Oak L. Ins. Co. v. Rodel, 
 95 U. S. 232; Powell v. State, 25 
 Ala. 28; Norton v. Moore, 3 Head 
 (Tenn.), 482; McClackey v. State, 5 
 Tex. App. 320; Wood v. State, 58 
 Miss. 741 ; Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N. Y. 
 
 227; State v. Klinger, 46 Mo. 229; 
 Rutherford v. Morris, 77 111. 397 ; Peo- 
 ple v. Levy, 71 Cal. 618; Butler v. 
 Insurance Co., 45 Iowa, 93; Brooke 
 v. Townsend, 7 Gill (Md.), 10; Peo- 
 ple v. Wreden, 59 Cal. 392; State v. 
 Hayden, 51 Vt. 296 ; Clary v. Clary, 
 2 Ired. (N. C.) 78; State "v. Erb, 74 
 Mo. 199; Woodcock v. Woodcock, 
 36 Minn. 217; Pidcock v. Potter, 68 
 Pa. St. 342 ; Clark v. State, 12 Ohio 
 St. 483; Pinney's Will, 27 Minn. 280; 
 People v. Packenham, 115 N. Y. 200; 
 Schlencker v. State, 9 Neb. 241. 
 
 8 Armstrong v. State, 30 Fla. 170; 
 Ellis v. State (Tex., 1894), 24 S. W. 
 Rep. 894; White v. Davis, 17 N. Y. 
 S. 548; 62 Hun, 622; Sharp v. Kan- 
 sas, etc. Co. (Bio., 1892), 20 S. W. 
 Rep. 93 ; Carpenter v. Bailey, 29 Pac. 
 Rep. 101; 94 Cal. 406. But some 
 courts will not receive non-expert 
 evidence as to insanity except to 
 describe the acts or conversations of 
 the alleged insane person, though 
 the witness may further give his 
 opinion that such acts and conver- 
 sations are those of a rational or ir- 
 rational man. Paine v. Aldrich, 133
 
 2S6 EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. [§ 197. 
 
 professional witness as to insanity upon facts related to him 
 by others is not admissible. But where he has knowledge of 
 the circumstances, where he has seen the actions of the per- 
 son and conversed with him, the law considers it a matter 
 easily within the mental capacity of any ordinary man to dis- 
 tinguish and characterize the mental condition or the ap- 
 pearance and conduct of an insane person. The influence 
 which his opinions may have upon the jury will depend on 
 the intelligence he shows on his examination and upon his op- 
 portunities for acquiring the knowledge upon which he bases 
 his conclusion. So his experience and personal acquaintance 
 with the alleged lunatic, his freedom from bias or interest, the 
 absence of any finely-spun theories from his mental conception 
 of the whole matter, the fullness of the facts on which his 
 opinion is based, and the accuracy with which he recollects 
 these facts, are all elements to be regarded in estimating the 
 worth of his evidence. 1 The person whose insanity is involved 
 may have been so deranged, his mental unsoundness may have 
 been so palpably apparent from his actions, that an ordinary 
 person possessing but slight powers of observation may be as 
 well fitted to express an opinion as the most skilful and 
 learned expert. Here the insanity is a fact, and the testimony 
 of the witness, though in form an expression of opinion, 
 }'et if when giving it he narrates the minor facts from which 
 it is deduced, and after showing that he has personally known 
 the party for a long time, he details the furious acts and 
 gestures, the foolish and incoherent conversations, or the wild 
 and unnatural conduct of the party, there can be small objec- 
 tion to his testifying to the further fact which any man would 
 infer from them, i. e., that the party was insane. 2 But as to 
 
 N. Y. 544 ; 30 N. E. Rep. 725 ; Fay- stances within his personal knowl- 
 
 ette v. Chesterville, 77 Me. 28 ; Hick- edge upon which that opinion is 
 
 man v. State, 38 Tex. 191 ; State v. formed, is competent evidence. In a 
 
 Geddis, 42 Iowa, 268. substantial sense, and for every pur- 
 
 1 Cf. Armstrong v. State, 30 Fla. pose essential to a safe conclusion, 
 170; McLeod v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. the mental condition of an individ- 
 Rep. 331. ual as sane or insane is a fact, and 
 
 2 "The opinion of a non-profes- the expressed opinion of one who had 
 sional witness as to the mental con- adequate opportunities to observe 
 dition of a person, in connection with his conduct and appearance is but the 
 a statement of the facts and circuui- statement of a fact. Insanity is a
 
 197.] 
 
 EXPERT AND OriNION EVIDENCE. 
 
 287 
 
 the amount of knowledge which the witness must have, no 
 definite rule can be laid down. While the opinion of a wit- 
 ness who has a full knowledge of the life and surroundings of 
 the person would naturally possess more weight than that of 
 one who had only a meager knowledge, the question what 
 weight the opinion shall have is for the jury alone. 1 Whether 
 the non-expert witness is competent is for the court; and if it 
 shall appear that a witness did not have sufficient opportuni- 
 ties for observation, his evidence should be pronounced incom- 
 petent. The court's decision on this point, it seems, will not be 
 questioned on appeal; 2 nor is it error to charge that the evi- 
 dence of a physician who has examined the party may be 
 given more weight than that of a non-expert witness. 3 
 
 Where the insanity of a person is a question in issue, the 
 opinions of competent physicians or of expert alienists are al- 
 ways admissible. The} 7- may have obtained their opinions 
 from the consideration of facts observed by them in treating 
 or examining the party, or they may base them upon the 
 facts contained in a hypothetical question, or upon all the 
 evidence in the case, if they have heard it and if it is not con- 
 tradictory. 4 If a personal examination has been made by the 
 
 condition which impresses itself as 
 an aggregate on the observer." Con- 
 necticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. La- 
 throp, 111 U. S. 618-620. 
 
 i Com. v. Buccieri, 153 Pa. St. 535 ; 
 26 Atl. Rep. 228; McLeod v. State, 
 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 331; Armstrong 
 v. State, 30 Fla. 170; 11 S. Rep. 618; 
 Coles v. State, 75 Ind. 511; Sage v. 
 State, 91 Ind. 141; Choice v. State, 
 31 Ga. 424; McClackey v. State, 5 
 Tex. App. 320. 
 
 2Hite v. Com. (Ky., 1893), 20 S. 
 W. Rep. 217; Carpenter v. Hatch 
 (N. H., 1888), 15 Atl. Rep. 219. 
 
 3 Blake v. Rourke, 74 Iowa, 519 ; 38 
 N. W. Rep. 392. 
 
 4 Prentis v. Bates, 53 N. W. Rep. 
 153; 93 Mich. 234; Com. v. Buccieri, 
 153 Pa. St. 535; 26 Atl. Rep. 228; 
 Quaife v. Chicago Co., 48 Wis. 513; 
 Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 550 ; Board- 
 
 man v. Woodman, 47 N. H. 120; 
 State v. Feltes, 51 Iowa, 495; Fair- 
 child v. Bascomb, 35 Vt. 398 ; People 
 v. Barber, 115 N. Y. 475; Rambler 
 v. Tryson, 7 S. & R. 90 ; State v. 
 Baber, 74 Mo. 292 ; Grant v. Thomp- 
 son, 4 Conn. 203 ; Dejarnetto v. Com., 
 75 Va. 867; Conn. L. I. Co. v. 
 Lathrop, 111 U. S. 612; United States 
 v. Guiteau, 3 Crim. L. Mag. 347 ; Peo- 
 ple v. Schuyler, 106 N. Y. 298; Dex- 
 ter v. Hall, 15 Wall. (U. S.)9; Tules 
 v. Kidd, 12 Ala. 648. "The witness 
 who claims to be an expert on insan- 
 ity must have made mental unsound- 
 ness a subject of special study, and 
 must have such a practical experi- 
 ence in the care and treatment of 
 insane persons as to render him con- 
 versant with the subject and able to 
 recognize its peculiar subtle mani- 
 festations." Reese, Med. Juris.
 
 288 EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. [§ 198. 
 
 expert, he will be required to describe the circumstances and 
 symptoms which he observed to aid the jury in forming a 
 conclusion; 1 but not what the attendants said; 2 and besides 
 this, a hypothetical question may be asked him. 3 The opin- 
 ions of the subscribing witnesses to a will are always admissible 
 concerning: the mental condition of the testator at the date of 
 executing the will, the law having placed them at his side 
 partly for that purpose, and it is immaterial whether they 
 are expert or non-expert witnesses, or whether they were 
 previously acquainted with the testator or not. 4 
 
 § 198. Mechanical experts. — Opinion evidence is always 
 admissible upon matters of trade or transportation where the 
 subject of inquiry is one out of the cognizance of all those 
 not engaged in that particular calling. 5 Thus, a person who 
 has been connected for a long time with the operation of rail- 
 roads may testify as to the speed of trains, 6 how they are 
 made up and the duty of conductors; 7 within what dis- 
 tance a train may be stopped; 8 or he may state his opinion 
 why it was derailed, 9 or as to the proper manner of stopping 
 a train ; ,0 or whether brakemen were properly placed. 11 So a 
 railroad builder is a qualified witness to give an opinion upon 
 the quality of rolling-stock; 12 whether a railroad is properly 
 
 (1891), p. 19. An exception to this 6 Grand R. etc. Co. v. Huntley, 38 
 
 rule is made in the case of the fam- Mich. 537. 
 
 ily physician of the alleged lunatic. 7 Price v. Richmond & D. R. Co. 
 
 Hastings v. Rider, 99 Mass. 625. (S. C, 1893), 17 S. E. Rep. 732. 
 
 1 White v. Barley, 10 Mich. 155; s Grimmell v. Chicago, etc. Co., 73 
 
 Puyar v. Reese, 40 Tenn. 21. Iowa, 93; Freeman v. Travelers' Ins. 
 
 ^Heald v. Thwing, 45 Me. 396. Co., 144 Mass. 572; 12 N. E. Rep. 
 
 3 People v. Lake, 12 N. Y. 358; 372. 
 
 Meeker v. Meeker (Iowa, 1888), 37 9 Fort Worth Ry. Co. v. Thomp- 
 
 N. W. Rep. 773. son, 75 Tex. 501 ; Seaver v. Boston, 
 
 ^Ekinton v. Brick, 44 N. J. Eq. etc. Co., 14 Gray (Mass.), 466. 
 
 154; 15 Atl. Rep. 391; Van Huss v. 10 Mobile, etc. Co. v. Blakely, 59 
 
 Rainbolt, 42 Tenn. 139; Hardy v. Ala. 471. Cf. O'Neill v. Railway 
 
 Merrill, 56 N. H. 227; Poole v. Rich- Co., 129 N. Y. 125. 
 
 ardson, 3 Mass. 330; Deartt v. Bar- uSchlaf v. Railroad Co. (Ala.', 1893), 
 
 ley, 9 N. Y. 371; Williams v. Lee, 14 S. Rep. 105; Cincinnati, etc. Co. 
 
 47 Mo. 321; Potts v. House, 6 Ga. v. Smith, 22 Ohio St. 227; Reifsny- 
 
 324; Grant v. Thompson, 4 Conn, der v. Chic. Meter Co. (Iowa, 1894), 
 
 203; Robinson v. Adams, 62 Me. 369. 57 N. W. Rep. 692. 
 
 5 Ft. Worth, etc. Co, v. Great- 12 Jeffersonville, etc. Co. v. Lan- 
 
 house, 82 Tex. 104. ham, 27 Ind. 171.
 
 § 198.] 
 
 EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. 
 
 2S9 
 
 built; 1 whether a section of road was finished upon a certain 
 date," or whether a culvert was in good repair.* Hut gener- 
 ally a witness is not considered an expert, though possessing 
 a general knowledge of the management of railroads, unless 
 he has a special knowledge of that branch to which he is 
 called to speak. 4 A nautical expert may give an opinion that 
 a ship was properly managed 5 or the cargo properly stowed ; 6 
 that a vessel was seaworthy; 7 as to the cause of a ship being 
 stranded; 8 what is a safe cargo for a ship; 9 as to the sound- 
 ness of a cable, 10 the cause of a leak, 11 and as to the size of 
 waves which would be caused by the wind. 12 So when the 
 issue is whether a collision could have been avoided, 13 or a 
 ship could have reached port if properly managed; 14 what 
 the effect of a storm would be on the management of the ves- 
 sel ; 15 whether a jettison was necessary, 1 " or whether a deck- 
 load would render a vessel unsafe, 17 the evidence of an expert 
 is admissible. 18 
 
 i Colorado Mid. Ry. v. (TBrien, 16 
 Colo. 219. 
 
 2 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Donegan, 
 111 Ind. 179. 
 
 3 Bonner v. Mayfield, 82 Tex. 234. 
 * McKelvey v. Railway Co., 39 W. 
 
 Va. 500; Pennsylvania Co. v. Con- 
 Ian, 101 111. 93; Bixby v. Montpelier, 
 etc. Co., 49 Yt. 125: Ballard v. N. 
 Y., L. E. etc. Co., 126 Pa. St. 141; 
 Hill v. Portland, etc. Co., 55 Me. 
 43S; Baldwin v. Chicago, etc. Co., 
 50 Iowa, 680 ; Ft. Worth, etc. Co. v. 
 Thompson, 21 S. W. R?p. 737; Ft. 
 Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Wilson, 
 24 S. W. Rep. 686; 3 Tex. Civ. App. 
 583. 
 
 6 Gusterman v. Liverpool Ins. Co., 
 83 N. Y. 358; Union Ins. Co. v. 
 Smith, 8 S. Ct. 534; Delaware, etc. 
 Co. v. Starrs, 69 Pa. St. 36; Eastern 
 Trans. Co. v. Hope. 95 U. S. 297. 
 
 6 Price v. Powell, 3 N. Y. 322; 
 Leitch v. At. Mut. Ins. Co., 66 N. Y. 
 100. 
 
 "?Baird v. Daily, 68 N. Y. 547; 
 Western Ins. Co. v. Tobin, 32 Ohio 
 19 
 
 St. 277; Perkins v. Augusta Ins. Co., 
 10 Gray, 312. 
 
 8 N. E. Glass Co. v. Lovell, 7 Cush. 
 319. 
 
 11 Ogden v. Parsons, 23 How. (U. S.) 
 167. 
 
 10 Reed v. Dick, 8 Watts (Pa.). 479. 
 
 " Paddock v. Con. Ins. Co., 104 
 Mass. 521 ; Parsons v. Man. etc. Co., 
 16 Gray (Mass.), 463. 
 
 12 Smith v. Railroad Co., 76 Tex. 63. 
 
 13 Jameson v. Drinkard, 12 Moore, 
 148; Fenwick v. Bel), 1 C. & K. 312; 
 Carpenter v. Eastern Trans. Co., 71 
 N. Y. 374 ; 67 Barb. 570. 
 
 14 The Alaska, 33 Fed. Rep. 107; 
 Dolz v. Morris, 17 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 203. 
 
 15 Transp. Line v. Hope, 95 U. S. 
 297; Walsh v. Washington, etc. Co., 
 32 N. Y. 427. 
 
 is Price v. Hartson, 44 N. Y. 94. 
 
 17 Lapham v. Atlas Ins. Co., 24 
 Pick. (Mass.) 1. Contra, Schurreger 
 v. Raymond, 105 N. Y. 648. 
 
 18 Cf. East Tennesee, etc. Co. v. 
 Wright, 76 Ga. 532.
 
 29 «) 
 
 EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§ 1^8. 
 
 Persons who have had experience in operating certain 
 machinery, even though not machinists by trade, 1 may give 
 their opinion as to the value 2 of similar machinery, or that 
 machinery in suit is not well constructed, 3 or is the best 
 known, 4 or is equal to the best, 5 or has a capacity for doing 
 certain work. 6 A witness who, from long experience in using 
 a certain machine, is qualified to speak as an expert, may 
 testify to the capacity of an identical machine, though he may 
 never have seen the machine in dispute. 7 An experienced 
 mason or builder may testify to the time required for the 
 walls of a house to dry in order to render it habitable; 8 as 
 to the cause of the dampness of walls; 9 whether the defect- 
 ive operation of a mill was the result of mismanagement or 
 faulty construction; 10 as to the proper mode of removing 
 paint from the walls of buildings; 11 whether a building is a 
 "<roocl job;" 12 as to the meaning of the term "brick build- 
 ing;" 13 whether a house is worth the amount alleged, 14 and the 
 time required to alter or repair it. 15 So a skilled architect 
 may testify to the strength, construction and sufficiency of a 
 building, 16 and whether it would be safe to run up a building 
 in a specified time. 17 When, however, the facts are such that 
 
 i Sheldon v. Booth, 50 Iowa, 209; 
 Cole v. Clark, 3 Wis. 323. Cf. Fox 
 v. Peninsula W. L. Co. (Minn., 1892), 
 
 52 N. W. Rep. 623. 
 
 -'Latham v. Shipley (Iowa, 1893), 
 
 53 N. W. Rep. 342. 
 
 * Sheldon v. Booth, 50 Iowa, 209 ; 
 Curtis v. Gano, 26 N. Y. 426. 
 
 < Great W. R. R. Co. v. Haworth, 
 39 111. 349. 
 
 5 Scattergood v. Wood, 79 N. Y. 
 263. 
 
 6 Burns v. Welch, 8 Yerg. (Tenn.) 
 117; Bemisv. Vermont R. R. Co., 58 
 Vt. 636. 
 
 7 Brierly v. Davol Mills, 128 Mass. 
 291 ; National Bank v. Dunn, 106 
 Ind. 110. 
 
 8 Smith v. Gugerty, 4 Barb. 619. 
 
 9 Lotz v. Scott, 103 Ind. 155. 
 
 "> cHindler v. Thompson, 30 Fed. 
 Rep. 3ii. Where the proper method 
 
 of burning tiles is in issue, a brick or 
 tile maker is a competent expert. 
 Wiggins v. Wallace, 19 Barb. 338. 
 
 11 Church of Holyoke v. Mut. Fire 
 Ins. Co. (Mass., 1893), 33 N. E. Rep. 
 572. 
 
 i 2 Ward v. Kilpatrick, 85 N. Y. 413. 
 
 13 Mead v. N. W. Ins. Co., 3 Selden 
 (7 N. Y. ), 530. 
 
 14 Tebbetts v. Haskins, 16 Me. 283; 
 Woodruff v. Inperial F. I. Co., 83 N. 
 Y. 113. 
 
 15 Terre Haute v. Hudnut, 18 Am. 
 & Eng. Corp. Cas. 302 ; Lewis v. In- 
 surance Co., 45 N. W. Rep. 749; 
 Campbell v. Russell, 139 Mass. 278. 
 
 16 Prendible v. Conn. R. R. Co. 
 (Mass., 1893), 35 N. E. Rep. 675; 
 Turner v. Hahr (Mo., 1893), 21 S. W. 
 Rep. 737. 
 
 17 Chamberlain v. Dunlap, 8 N. Y. 
 S. 125.
 
 199.] 
 
 EXP1.UT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. 
 
 231 
 
 ordinary persons are fully capable of forming an opinion 
 thereon, and there is at the same time direct evidence of facts 
 and circumstances from which, if they believe them to be 
 true, the jury may infer negligence in the construction of 
 buildings, expert evidence should be dispensed with as unnec- 
 essary. 1 The opinion of a surveyor is admissible to identify 
 monuments employed as boundaries, 2 or to estimate how 
 much land would be flooded on a certain date. 3 The testi- 
 mony of an expert is admissible to show that a defect exists 
 in a sewer 4 or highway; that a road is in a dangerous condi- 
 tion; 5 but not that an old road has been abandoned, 6 or that 
 a new road would be of use to the public. 7 So, too, a miner 
 of long experience may give his opinion whether the width 
 of a cross-section in a mine is sufficient to secure the safety 
 of those employed therein. 8 
 
 § H)9. Expert evidence as to value. — An expert may tes- 
 tify as to the value of labor or services, 9 merchandise, 10 ani- 
 
 i Turner v. Hahr(Mo., 1893), 21 S. 
 W. Rep. 737; Gerbigv. Railroad Co., 
 22 N. Y. S. 21 ; Davis v. New York, 
 L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 69 Hun, 174. 
 
 2 McGaun v. Hamilton, 58 Conn. 
 69 ; Knox v. Clark, 123 Mass. 216. 
 
 3 Phillips v. Terry, 3 Abb. Dec. 
 (N. Y.) 607. Cf. Brantley v. Swift, 
 21 Ala. 390; St. Louis, etc. Co. v. 
 Bradley, 54 Fed. Rep. 630; Schultz 
 v. Lindell, 30 Mo. 310; Randolph v. 
 Adams, 2 W. Va. 519; Pasachane 
 Water Co. v. Standart (Cal., 1893), 
 32 Pac. Rep. 532. 
 
 4 Stead v. Worcester, 150 Mass. 241. 
 s Harris v. Clinton, 31 N. W. Rep. 
 
 425; Stillwater Co. v. Coover, 26 
 Ohio St. 520; Laughlin v. Street R. 
 R. Co., 62 Mich. 220; Baltimore, etc. 
 
 Co. v. Cassell, 66 Md. 419; Fairbury 
 v. Rogers, 98 111. 554. Contra, Con- 
 rad v. Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 158; Yean v. 
 Williams, 15 R. I. 20 ; Crane v. North- 
 field, 33 Vt. 126; Montgomery v. 
 Scott, 34 Wis. 345. 
 
 6 Pittsburgh, etc. Co. v. Reich, 101 
 111. 157. 
 
 7 Thompson v. Deprez, 96 Ind. 67. 
 8 McNamara v. Logan (Ala., 1891), 
 
 14 S. Rep. 175. 
 
 9 Brown v. Prude (Ala., 1893), 11 
 S. Rep. 838 : Head v. Hargrave, 105 
 U. S. 45 ; Mercer v. Vose, 67 N. Y. 
 56; Carruthers v. Town, 53 N. W. 
 Rep. 240; Reynolds v. Robinson, 64 
 N. Y. 589. The witness must know 
 the usual rate of compensation for 
 such services at the time and place 
 
 if Wheton v. Snider, 88 N. Y. 299; 
 Printz v. People, 42 Mich. 144: State 
 v. Finch, 70 Iowa, 316; Berney v. 
 Dinsmore. 141 Mass. 42; Walker v. 
 Bernstein, 43 111. App. 568; Mc- 
 Gowan v. Amei\ Press. Tan Bark, 
 121 U. S. 575; Muckle v. Rendle, 16 
 N. Y. S. 208; Walker v. Collins, 50 
 
 Fed. Rep. 737; Allen v. Carpenter, 
 66 Tex. 13S; Latham v. Brown, 48 
 Kan. 190; Redding v. Wright (Minn., 
 1892). 51 N. W. Rep. 1056; Huber v. 
 Beck (Ind., 1893), 33 N. E. Rep. 985; 
 Blagen v. Thompson (Oreg., 1893), 
 31 Pac. Rep. 647.
 
 292 
 
 EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§ 199. 
 
 mals 1 or land, 2 where he has peculiar experience or informa- 
 tion and where the subject of inquiry is not within common 
 knowledge. 3 But while weight should be given to his evi- 
 dence, his opinion is only conclusive on the jury as far as it is 
 reasonable and consistent with general knowledge and with 
 the facts which are proved in the case. 4 The question of 
 damages is for the jury. Hence the opinion of a witness is 
 not receivable upon this point; 5 nor can an expert be asked 
 
 where the services were rendered. 
 Schuhle v. Cunningham, 14 Daly, 
 404; Alt v. California Fig Syrup Co., 
 19 Nev. 118; Stevens v. Minneapolis 
 (Minn., 18S9), 43 N. W. Rep. 84 i 
 (services of attorney); Kelly v. 
 Rowane, 33 Mo. App. 440; Lamoure 
 v. Caryl, 4 Den. 170. The expert 
 who testifies to the value of personal 
 services should possess some prac- 
 tical knowledge or experience in the 
 line of the services rendered, either 
 by having rendered such services 
 himself or by having had frequent 
 occasion to pay for them. Doster v. 
 Brown, 25 Ga. 24; Walker v. Fields, 
 28 id. 237; Scott v. Lilienthal, 9 
 Bosw. 224; Tebbetts v. Haskins, 16 
 Me. 283. If he has a competent 
 knowledge of the business in which 
 the services were rendered, it is not 
 necessary that he should have been 
 himself engaged in it. Pullman v. 
 Corning, 14 Barb. 174; 9 N. Y. 98; 
 Carroll v. Welch, 26 Tex. 147; 
 Barnes v. Ingalls, 39 Ala. 193. So a 
 physician may testify to the value 
 of a nurse's services. Woodward v. 
 Bugsbee, 2 Hun, 128. 
 
 1 Bowers v. Hogan, 93 Mich. 420; 
 Conkling v. Hannibal, etc. Co., 54 
 Mo. 385; Harris v. Railroad Co., 36 
 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 373. 
 
 2 Blass v. Copley, 10 N. Y. 93; 
 Patterson v. Boston, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 
 159; Phenix Ins. Co. v. Bowersox, 6 
 Ohio Cir. Ct. 1; Muighan v. Burns, 
 26 Atl. Rep. 5^3. An ordinary real- 
 
 estate agent is not competent as an 
 expert upon land values (Laing v. 
 United, etc. Co., 54 N. J. L. 576), 
 unless he has resided in the place for 
 some time and has had charge of 
 property near the land in question. 
 Ragan v. Kansas City & S. E. R. 
 Co., Ill Mo. 456. As to rental value, 
 see Ives v. Quinn, 27 N. Y. S. 251. 
 
 3 A farmer may testify as to the 
 value of crops. Chicago R. Co. v. 
 Mouriquand, 45 Kan. 170. 
 
 4 Bramble v. Hunt, 68 Hun, 204 ; 
 Head v. Hargrave, 105 TJ. S. 45. In 
 regard to the value of household 
 furniture, wearing apparel, etc., any 
 person may testify, as all persons 
 are presumed to know the value of 
 articles in common use. Parmelee 
 v. Raymond, 43 111. App. 6^9 ; Erick- 
 son v. Draskowski, 94 Mich. 551. 
 Cf. Rodemacher v. Greenwich Ins. 
 Co., infra; Murdock v. Summer, 22 
 Pick. 158; Randall v. Packard, 20 
 N. Y. S. 716; Bentley v. Brown, 37 
 Kan. 14. 
 
 5 Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. 
 Wright, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 102; Lo- 
 gansport v. McMillen, 49 Ind. 495; 
 Vandeusen v. Young, 26 N. Y. 9; 
 McReynolds v. Railroad Co., 106 111. 
 152; Trammed v. Ramage, US. Rep. 
 916; Crohen v. Ewers, 39 111. App. 
 34; Galveston, H. & S. A. Co. v. 
 Wesch (Tex., 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 
 957; Sharon v. Morris, 18 Pac. Rep. 
 230; 89 Kan. 377; Upcher v. Ober- 
 lender, 81 Pac. Rep. 1080; 50 Kan.
 
 § 199.] EXPKET AND OPINION EVIDENCE. 293 
 
 what would be the future value of property 1 or the effect of 
 an injury to it. 2 A housekeeper of experience is a competent 
 expert witness to the value of board and lodging 8 or house- 
 hold furniture or goods; 4 and one who, though not a dealer, 
 has attended man}' sales of second-hand furniture, may give 
 an opinion as to the value of such merchandise. 5 But a per- 
 son is not an expert who has no knowledge of the market 
 value of goods, 6 or who has acquired his knowledge by buying 
 goods from parties not in the trade. 7 The fact that the wit- 
 ness bases his opinion of value upon an exceptional demand 
 for the merchandise in question, while it may affect the 
 weight, is no objection to the admissibility of his evidence. 8 
 
 Based upon the grounds of the speculative character of any 
 opinion which may be given in regard to their value, another 
 exception is made in cases where the value of choses in action 
 is concerned. A witness will not be allowed to give an 
 opinion as to the value of a contract or the possible or prob- 
 able amount of profit it might have yielded if it had not been 
 broken. 9 So in the case of negotiable instruments which are 
 presumed to be worth their face value, 10 opinions are not ad- 
 missible as to their value, the proper elements of which, i. e., 
 the solvency of the parties and the validity of the instruments, 
 are for the consideration of the court and jury. 11 It seems, 
 
 315; Chicago. K. & W R. Co. v. 603; Allen v. Stout, 51 N. Y. 668; 
 
 Stewart, 31 Pac. Rep. 668; 50 Kan. Ranch v. N. Y., L. & W. R. R Co., 
 
 33; New Mexican R. R. Co. v. Hen- 2 N. Y. S. 108. 
 
 dricks (N. Mex., 1893), 30 Pac. Rep. 3 Hook V- Kenyon, 55 Hun, 598. 
 
 901; Sixth Ave. R. Co. v. Metropol- 4 Rodemacher v. Green. Ins. Co., 
 
 itan R. Co., 34 N. E. Rep. 400: 138 27 N. Y. S. 155. 
 
 N. Y. 548; Blum v. Manhattan Ry. » Phillips v. McNab, 9 N. Y. S. 526. 
 
 Co., 1 Misc. Rep. 119; 20 N. Y. S. 6 Frederick v. Case, 28 111. App. 
 
 722. 215. 
 
 'Devlin v. New York, 4 Misc. 7 Campbell v. Campbell, 54 N. Y. 
 
 Rep. 106; 23 N. Y. S. 888; Bookman Super. Ct. 381. 
 
 v. New York El. R. Co., 137 N. Y. 8 Western Ry. v. Lazarus, 88 Ala. 
 
 595; Lazarus v. Metropolitan El. Ry. 453. 
 
 Co., 69 Hun, 190; Little v. Lisch- 9 Devlin v. City of New York, 4 
 
 koff (Ala., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 429; Misc. Rep. 106. 
 
 Trammel] v. Raniage (Ala., 1893), 11 10 Looinis v. Mowry, 8 Hun, 311. 
 
 S. Rep. 916. " Potter v. Merchants' Bank, 28 N. 
 
 2 Ferguson v. Hubbell, 97 N. Y. Y. 641 ; Atkinson v. Roch Printing 
 
 507; Bedell v. L. I. R. R. Co., 44 Co., 43 Hun, 167. 
 N. Y. 367; Paige v. Kelly, 5 Hill,
 
 204: EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. [§ 200. 
 
 however, that expert evidence may be received of the value 
 of non-speculative financial securities having a well-recognized 
 market value. 1 It is no objection that the knowledge of the 
 witness was acquired wholly from an inspection of bills of the 
 goods, 2 from market reports, 3 or from personal inquiries made 
 by him. 4 His evidence is not thereby rendered inadmissible 
 if the witness is otherwise qualified by experience and has 
 examined the goods or premises in question. 5 The plaintiff 
 has been permitted to give his opinion of the value of his 
 goods which were damaged, where he was also able to state 
 the facts on which the opinion was based. 6 Where the pro- 
 duction of an article is impossible because of its loss or de- 
 struction, its value may be proved by comparison. It is neces- 
 sary first to prove the resemblance of the lost article to one 
 which can be produced, and this can be done by a witness 
 who is not an expert. 7 The value of the latter article may 
 then be shown by expert testimony, and on the evidence of 
 both witnesses thus connected the jury may base their verdict 
 as to the value of the missing article. 8 
 
 §200. Underwriters as experts. — There is a seeming 
 confusion in the decisions upon the question of the admissibility 
 of expert evidence in actions which are brought upon policies 
 of insurance. Where the increase of risk or breach of con- 
 dition is such that any ordinary person would be able to form 
 a conclusion; as, for example, whether leaving a dwelling- 
 house unoccupied for a considerable length of time is an in- 
 
 iSistare v. Olcott, 15 N. Y. State 130 U. S. 520; Harris v. Schuttler 
 
 Rep. 248. (Tex., 1894), 24 S. W. Rep. 989; 
 
 2Enos v. St. Paul F. & Marine Bischoff v. Schmetz, 5 N. Y. S. 757; 
 
 Ins. Co. (S. D., 1894), 57 N. W. Rep. Roberts v. Boston, 149 Mass. 346; 
 
 919. Michael v. Crescent Pipe Line Co. 
 
 3 Rodee v. Detroit Fire & Mar. Ins. (Pa., 1893), 28 Atl. Rep. 204. 
 
 Co., 26 N. Y. S. 242; Hoxsie v. Em- 6 Rodee v. Detroit F. &M. Ins. Co., 
 
 pire Lumber Co., 41 Minn. 548 ; Gulf, 26 N. Y. S. 242. As to the necessity 
 
 C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Patterson (Tex., of experts stating their means of 
 
 1894), 24 S. W. Rep. 349. knowledge, see Ft. Worth, etc. Co. 
 
 4 Jones v. Snyder, 117 Ind. 229; v. Hurd(Tex., 1894), 24 S. W. Rep. 
 Phenix Ins. Co. v. Copeland. 86 Ala. 995. 
 
 551 ; Griswold v. Gebbie, 126 Pa. St. " B'erney v. Dinsmore, 141 Mass. 42. 
 353; Forbes v. Howard, 4 R. I. 301. 8 Home Ins. Co. v. Weide, 11 Wall. 
 
 5 Still well & B. Mfg. Co. v. Phelps, (U. S.) 438.
 
 § 200.] 
 
 EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. 
 
 295 
 
 crease of risk, the evidence of an expert is not admissible. 1 
 Bat where the question is whether in a certain case a higher 
 premium would have been charged, the evidence of an insur- 
 ance expert is admissible to show that fact, under the rule 
 which permits the introduction of evidence of usage. Here the 
 evidence of the expert is not his opinion, but evidence as to 
 the fact or usage, and the inferences therefrom are for the 
 jury. 2 So expert evidence is inadmissible as to the quantity 
 of goods burned, based upon the amount of the debris, 3 as to 
 the origin of a fire, 4 or whether the use of an engine without 
 a spark-arrester is likely to cause fires. 5 A physician may 
 testify in an action on a life insurance policy that a certain 
 habit, disease or injury may cause death; 6 but, generally, 
 where the question is, Was the person a good risk or insurable, 
 or were there material misrepresentations? the opinion of an 
 expert will not be received. 7 
 
 1 Halinv. Guardian Assur. Co. (Or., 
 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 683; Milwaukee 
 v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 649; Anthony 
 v. German Am. Ins. Co., 48 Mo. App. 
 65; Walradt v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 136 
 N. Y. 375; Carmell v. Phenix Ins. 
 Co., 59 Me. 582; Luce v. Dorch. M. 
 F. I. Co., 105 Mass. 497; Jefferson 
 Ins. Co. v. Cotheal, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 72; Hill v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 2 Md. 
 476; Hartford Pro. Ins. Co. v. Har- 
 mer, 2 Ohio St. 452. 
 
 2 Rawls v. Araer. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 
 27 N. Y. 282; First Church v. Hol- 
 yoke M. Ins. Co., 33 N. E. Rep. 572 
 (Mass., 1893); Hawes v. N. E. Ins. 
 Co., 2 Curt. C. C. 229; Luce v. In- 
 surance Co., 105 Mass. 297; Hartman 
 v. Keystone Ins. Co., 21 Pa. St. 466; 
 Loomis v. Insurance Co., 81 Wis. 366; 
 51 N. W. Rep. 564; Lyman v. State 
 Ins. Co., 14 Allen (Mass.), 329; Pelzer 
 Manuf. Co. v. Sun Fire Office of 
 London, 36 S. C. 213; 15 S, E. Rep. 
 562; Cornish v. Farm Bid. Ins. Co., 
 74 N. Y. 275; Hobby v. Dana, 17 
 Barb. Ill: Keen v. South St. Louis 
 Co., 40 Mo. 19. A witness cannot 
 
 be asked, where the question in issue 
 is, Was a misrepresentation or con- 
 cealment material? whether he con- 
 sidered it so, or would he have taken 
 the risk if the fact concealed had 
 been made known, or what influ- 
 ence the fact concealed would have 
 had if known. But he may be asked 
 what effect it actually had. Ab- 
 bott's Trial Ev., 494, citing Walsh v. 
 Mtna L. Ins. Co., 30 Iowa, 133. 
 
 3 Birmingham F. Ins. Co. v. Pul- 
 ver, 27 III. App. 17; 126 111. 329. 
 
 4 Cook v. Johnston, 58 Mich. 437. 
 
 5 Teal v. Barton, 40 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 137. Of. Hays v. Miller, 70 N. Y. 
 112; Higgins v. Dewey, 107 Mass. 
 494; Frace v. N. Y, L. E. & W. R, 
 Co., 22 N. Y. S. 958. 
 
 6 Miller v. Mut. Ben. L. Ins. Co., 
 31 Iowa, 216. 
 
 i Rawls v. Am. L. Ins. Co., 36 Barb. 
 357: 27 N. Y. 282; Wich v. Equitable 
 F. & M. Ins. Co. (Colo., 1893), 31 Pac, 
 Rep. 389; Pelzer Manuf. Co. v. Ger- 
 man Ins. Co. of New York, 36 S. C. 
 213.
 
 296 
 
 EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§ 201. 
 
 § 201. Experiments in and out of court. — The witness, if 
 he is not an expert, will not be permitted to testify to the re- 
 sult of experiments which have been made out of court. 1 But 
 where the circumstances or conditions existing or alleged to 
 exist in the case at trial and surrounding the subject-matter are 
 reproduced at the time of the experiment, a witness who is an 
 expert may state his opinion together with the result of an 
 experiment made by him out of court. 2 An expert may bo 
 allowed to conduct an experiment in court to illustrate or 
 emphasize his testimony, provided it is shown by independent 
 evidence that the exact conditions alleged to have existed are 
 reproduced before the jury. 3 Thus, where a machine was 
 alleged to be defective, the defendant was allowed to operate 
 it before the jury to show that the reason of its defective 
 operation was the unskilfulness or physical weakness of the 
 plaintiff. 4 So, too, an expert may be allowed to subject a 
 writing purporting to be a will to a test with chemicals to 
 ascertain the character of the ink and whether the instrument 
 had been tampered with. 5 Comparisons may also be made 
 by expert witnesses in court. So where the quality of an ar- 
 
 1 State v. Justus, 11 Oreg. 170; 
 Com. v. Fairchell, 1 Brewst. (Pa.) 
 566. 
 
 2 Williams v. Taunton, 125 Mass. 
 54; Sullivan v. State, 93 Pa. St. 285; 
 Eidt v. Cutter, 127 Mass. 523 ; Com. v. 
 Piper, 120 id. 188; Burg v. Chicago, 
 R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (Iowa, 1894), 57 
 N. W. Rep. 680 ; Boyd v. State, 14 
 Lea (Tenn.), 161 ; Brook v. Chicago, 
 etc. Co. (Iowa. 1891), 47 N. W. Rep. 
 74; State v. Jones, 41 Kan. 309. 
 That the adverse party was not 
 present in person or by his agent 
 when the experiment was made is 
 immaterial. Burg v. Chicago, R. I. 
 & Pac. Ry., 57 N. W. Rep. 680 (Iowa, 
 181)4). In a criminal trial, the state 
 being permitted to prove experi- 
 
 3 State v. Smith, 49 Conn. 376; 
 Siberry v. State (Ind., 1893),, 33 
 N. E. Rep. (381; State v. Fletcher 
 (Oreg., 1893), 33 Pac. Rep. 575; In re 
 Monroe's Est., 1 Con. Sur. 496; 23 
 Abb. N. C. 83; Leonard v. Southern 
 Pac. R. Co., 21 Oreg. 555; People v. 
 Hope, 62 Cal. 291 ; Osborne v. De- 
 troit, 32 Fed. Rep. 36. 
 
 4 Nat. etc. Co. v. Southern Pac. R. 
 Co., 85 Mich. 255; Probert v. Phipps, 
 149 Mass. 258. As to articles in 
 court, see ante, §§ 38, 39. Where 
 the experiment will consume some 
 time, it is not an abuse of judicial 
 discretion for which a Dew trial 
 will be granted for the court to re- 
 fuse to permit the experiment to 
 be made in open court. People v. 
 
 ments, it is reveisible error to refuse Levire, 85 Cal. 39; 24 Pac. Rep. 631. 
 the defendant the right to introduce 5 In re Monroe, 1 Con. Sur. 496; 5 
 the same sort of evidence in re- N. Y. S. 552 ; 23 Abb. N. C. 83. 
 buttal. Smith v. State, 2 Obio St. 
 513. 
 
 •
 
 § 202.] 
 
 EXl'KRT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. 
 
 297 
 
 tide or its adaptability to a certain purpose is in issue, a 
 sample of the article in question may be shown to the jury 
 together with a sample of a similar article which the witness 
 has testified was of good quality or was well adapted for the 
 purpose required, and the jury may be allowed to compare 
 thorn to ascertain the points of difference, if any. 1 
 
 § 202. Physical examination of the party by experts. — 
 The question whether the court in civil cases can compel the 
 plaintiff to furnish evidence by submitting to a physical ex- 
 amination by a physician has been differently decided. The 
 affirmative is supported by a majority of the cases, which 
 maintain that the courts have an inherent power to do this, 
 basing their reasoning upon the necessity for the inspection, 2 
 though there are other cases sustaining the proposition that, 
 while such an inspection may be allowed, it cannot in the ab- 
 sence of a statute be compelled. 3 
 
 Where the annulment of a marriage is asked for by one of 
 the parties thereto upon the ground of the impotency of the 
 other, the court may compel him or her to submit to an ex- 
 amination by a competent physician or midwife.' 1 In such a 
 
 1 People v. Buddensieek, 103 N. Y. 
 498; 5 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 69. 
 
 2 Graves v. Battle Creek (Mich., 
 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 757; Winner v. 
 Lathrop, C7 Hun, 511; International, 
 etc. Co. v. Underwood, 64 Tex. 4G4; 
 Kinney v. Springfield, 35 Mo. App. 
 297; White v. Milw. etc. Co., 61 
 Wis. 536; A., T. & S. F. R. Co. v. 
 Thul, 29 Kan. 466; Walsh v Sayre, 
 52 How. Pr. 384 ; Terre Haute, etc. 
 Co. v. Brincker, 128 Ind. 542; Miami, 
 etc. Co. v. Baily, 37 Ohio St. 104; 
 Shephard v. Railway Co., 85 Mo. 
 629; Schroeder v. Railway Co., 47 
 Iowa, 375. The necessity for the ex- 
 amination must be affirmatively 
 shown (Bridge Co. v. Miller (III., 
 1893), 28 N. E. Rep. 1091 ; Joliet R. 
 Co. v. Caul, 42 111. App. 41), and the 
 selection of the physician is within 
 the discretion of the court (Alabama, 
 etc. Co. v. Hill, 94 Ala. 514); though 
 if the plaintiff is willing to be ex- 
 
 amined by any disinterested person, 
 a physician need not be appointed. 
 Gulf, etc. Co. v. NorfleetfTex., 1891), 
 14 S. W. Rep. 703. As a means of 
 exposing malingering and of ascer- 
 taining the exact character and ex- 
 tent of a local physical injury, such 
 an examination, if properly and 
 fairly conducted, would seem unob- 
 jectionable upon either ethical or 
 legal grounds. It should be promptly 
 applied for before the plaintiff has 
 testified, unless from his evidence it 
 appears that he is feigning. Gales- 
 burg v. Benedict, 22 111. App. 111. 
 
 3 Hess v. Lake Shore & M. Co., 7 
 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 565 ; Stuart v. New 
 Haven, 17 Neb. 211; Parker v. En- 
 slow, 103 111. 272 ; Shephard v. Rail- 
 way Co., 85 Mo. 629; Peoria, etc. Co. 
 v. Rice (111., 1893), 33 N. E. Rep. 951 ; 
 St. Louis Bridge Co. v. Miller, 138 
 111. 4)5.- 
 
 4 Anonymous (Ala., 1890), 7 S. Rep.
 
 29S 
 
 EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§ 202. 
 
 delicate matter the feelings of the party who is to be exam- 
 ined ought to be respected so far as is consistent with a due 
 administration of justice. So a physical examination in the 
 case of alleged im potency being justified solely by the neces- 
 sity of the case should only be ordered when the need for it is 
 positively and affirmatively shown. 1 If the party resists the 
 appointment of a physician or refuses to be examined, a re- 
 buttable presumption of his or her im potency will be created 
 thereby, 2 which it is then incumbent on him or her to over- 
 come. 
 
 Under the rule that an accused person is not compellable to 
 furnish evidence against himself, a court, it has been held, has 
 no power to compel a prisoner to submit to an examination 
 by an expert. 3 Accordingly, evidence which has been pro- 
 cured by a compulsory comparison of the shoes of the defend- 
 ant with footprints observed near the locality of the crime 
 should be rejected. 4 Where the mental and physical condi- 
 tion of the accused is voluntarily put in issue by him by a plea 
 of insanity, no injustice will result in his being compelled by 
 the court to submit to a physical examination b} 7 a competent 
 physician, and this, accordingly, may be done. 5 So the court 
 may compel a party in a civil suit to unveil in order that she 
 may be identified by a witness in court. 6 
 
 100; Brown v. Brown, 1 Hagg. 523; 
 Newell v. Newell, 9 Paige (N. Y.), 26 ; 
 Dean v. Aveling, 1 Rob. 279; Deven- 
 baugh v. Devenbaugh, 5 Paige, 554; 
 Wekle v. Welde, 2 Lee, 5S0 : Briggs 
 
 v. Morgan, 3 Phil. 325; H v, 
 
 P , L. R. 3 P. & D. 126; G 
 
 v. G , L. R, 2 P. & D. 287. 
 
 l Newell v. Newell, 9 Paige, 26. 
 
 - Harrison v. Harrison, 4 Moore 
 
 P. C. 96; H v. P , L. R. 3 
 
 P. & D. 126; Pollard v. Seybourn, 1 
 Hagg. 75. 
 
 » State v. Johnson, 67 N. C. 58; 
 People v. McCoy, 45 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 210. 
 
 4 Day v. State, 63 Ga. 667 ; Stokes 
 v. State, 5 Baxt. (Tenn.)619; People 
 v. Mead, 50 Mich. 228. Contra, 
 State v. Graham, 74 N. C. 646; 
 "Walker v. State, 7 Tex. App. 245. 
 In State v. Garrett, 71 N. C. 85. and 
 Spicer v. State, 69 Ala. 159, physi- 
 cians were permitted to testify to 
 the result of the examination of the 
 accused. 
 
 ^Pierson v. People, 79 N. Y. 424; 
 People v. Taylor, 138 N. Y. 398. 
 See ante, § 178; post, § 351. 
 
 «Rice v. Rice (N. Y., 1891), 19 
 Atl. Rep. 736.
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE AS RELATED TO WRITINGS. 
 
 205. 
 206. 
 207. 
 208. 
 
 209. 
 210. 
 
 211. 
 212. 
 
 213. 
 
 Parol evidence, when inad- 
 missible. 
 
 Interpretation and construc- 
 tion of writings. 
 
 Rule applies between parties 
 only. 
 
 Invalidity of writings — Evi- 
 dence to vary or explain or 
 show real consideration. 
 
 Incomplete and collateral 
 writings. 
 
 Parol evidence to connect and 
 explain contemporaneous 
 writings. 
 
 Receipts. 
 
 Independent parol contracts 
 and conditions precedent. 
 
 To establish implied, result- 
 ing or constructive trusts. 
 
 § 214. Discharge, modification or 
 extension of contract may 
 be shown. 
 
 215. To rebut presumptions. 
 
 216. To show usage. 
 
 217. To explain technical terms. 
 
 218. Abbreviations. 
 
 219. The relations of the parties. 
 
 220. To ascertain or explain sub- 
 
 ject-matter. 
 
 221. Ambiguities defined and dis- 
 
 tinguished — Parol evi- 
 dence to explain. 
 
 222. Parol evidence as applicable 
 
 to wills. 
 
 223. Parol evidence to show abso- 
 
 lute deed a mortgage and 
 in suits for specific perform- 
 ance and reformation or 
 cancellation. 
 
 § 205. Parol evidence, when inadmissible. — Parol evi- 
 dence is not admissible to control, add to, vary or contradict 
 the language of a valid written instrument. 1 The words 
 " written instrument," thus used, do not refer to or include 
 everything which has been committed to writing and which 
 has passed between the parties. The rule is designed to pro- 
 tect the honest, careful and prudent in their contracts and 
 business transactions against the results of fraud and perjury, 
 carelessness and inaccuracy. By it evidence of the intention 
 
 U Greenl. on Ev., § 275. By 
 parol evidence is meant oral evi- 
 dence or the statements of witnesses 
 made viva voce, as distinguished 
 from documentary evidence. Its 
 meaning is, however, sometimes ex- 
 tended so as to include preliminary 
 
 or unexecuted memoranda or notes 
 in writing which have passed be- 
 tween the parties prior to the execu- 
 tion of the deed or final written 
 contract which is in question. An- 
 derson's Diet.
 
 300 
 
 PAROL OK EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§ 205. 
 
 of the parties is furnished, which can always be produced 
 without fear of change or liability to misconstruction. 1 Such 
 documents only are within the rule which represent and con- 
 tain the deliberate intention of the parties; and the existence 
 of deliberation in making the agreement may usually and 
 justlv be inferred from the use of language which creates a 
 valid contractual obligation, the subject and extent of which 
 must be ascertained from the writing alone. 2 This rule doubt- 
 less had its origin in the once universal custom of the parties 
 to a written agreement affixing their seals, and this solemn 
 and formal act. as it was regarded from the common-law 
 standpoint, 3 impressed a fixed and unchangeable character on 
 the instrument, which demanded the exclusion not only of all 
 verbal modifications of it, but of unsealed writings as well. 4 
 With the increase in the use of writing attendant upon the 
 increase of education and the spread of commerce and manu- 
 facture in recent times, the operation of the rule was extended 
 to simple or unsealed writings. The rule has been applied to 
 court records 5 and public records generally; 6 to the written 
 awards of arbitrators; 7 to deeds of conveyance, 8 mortgages, 9 
 minutes of private corporations, 10 leases, 11 assignments, 12 con- 
 
 1 Union M. Ins, Co. v. Wilkinson, 
 13 Wall. 231. 
 
 2 See post, § 209. 
 
 3 2 Bl. Com, 305-6. 
 
 4 See the remarks of Parker, J., in 
 Stack pole v. Arnold, 11 Mass. 31. 
 
 5 Armstrong v. St. Louis, 69 Mo. 
 309; Roche v. Beldam, 119 111. 320; 
 Dagger v. Taylor, 46 Ala. 320; Royce 
 v. Burt, 42 Barb. (N. Y.) 339; Bays 
 v. Trulson (Oreg., 1894), 35 Pac. Rep. 
 26; Ney v. Dubuque, etc. Co., 20 
 Iowa, 347. 
 
 (-Williams v. Ingell, 21 Pick. 
 (Mass.) 288; McMicken v. Com., 58 
 Pa. St. 213; Crommett v. Pearson, 
 18 Me. 344; Vogler v. Spaugh, 4 Biss. 
 (U. S.) 288; Carroll v. O'Conner 
 (Ind., 1894), 35 N. E. Rep. 1006. 
 
 7 Jones v. Perkins, 54 Me. 393. 
 
 8 Kelley v. Saltmarsh, 146 Mass. 
 585; Hancock v. McAvoy (Pa., 1893), 
 
 25 Atl. Rep. 48; Lowdermilk v. Bos- 
 tick, 98 N. C. 299; Sage v. Jones, 47 
 Ind. 122; Lear v. Durgin, 64 N. H. 
 618; Miller v. Fletcher, 27 Gratt. 
 (Va.) 403; Warren v. Miller, 38 Me. 
 108; Richards v. Crocker, 66 Hun, 
 629; Ritchie v. Pease, 114 111. 353. 
 
 9 Union Nat. Bank v. Int. Bank, 
 22 111. App. 652 ; Beall v. Fisher, 95 
 Cal. 568; Whitney v. Phelps, 33 Me. 
 318: Lindsay v. Garvin, 31 S. C. 
 259; Van Evera v. Davis, 51 Iowa, 
 637. 
 
 10 San Joaquin v. Beecher (Cal., 
 1894), 35 Pac. Rep. 349. 
 
 n Welch v. Horton, 73 Iowa, 250 ; 
 Tracy v. Iron Works, 29 Mo. App. 
 342; Howard v. Thompson, 12 Ohio 
 St. 201 ; Knapp v. Marlboro, 29 Vt. 
 282; Pickett v. Ferguson, 45 Ark. 
 177. 
 
 12 Osgood v. Davis, 18 Me. 146;
 
 20C] 
 
 PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
 
 501 
 
 tracts to sell real 1 or personal propert} 7 , 2 bonds. 3 charter-par- 
 ties, 4 insurance policies, 8 negotiable instruments, 6 the indorse- 
 ments thereon, 7 guaranties, 8 licenses, 9 releases, 10 and contracts 
 in general. 11 
 
 § 200. Interpretation and construction.— If the parties 
 to a commercial transaction have committed the whole of 
 their agreement to writing, it may be presumed, according to 
 well-known commercial and social usages, that the writing 
 embodies their final contract, and that all prior or contempo- 
 raneous oral stipulations or negotiations are merged in it and 
 superseded by it. 12 The language of the writing is conclusive, 
 
 Moore v. Yoss, 1 Cranch (C. C), 179; 
 Taylor v. Sayre, 24 N. J. L. 617; Gil- 
 more v. Bangs, 55 Ga. 403. 
 
 1 Mickelson v. lteves, 94 N. C. 559 ; 
 Hubbard v. Marshall, 50 Wis. 322; 
 Lloyd v. Farrell. 43 Pa. St. 73; Rip- 
 ley v. Paige, 12 Vt. 353. 
 
 2 Union Stock Yards Co. v. Cattle 
 Co., 59 Fed. Rep. 49; Davis v. 
 Moody, 15 Ga. 175: Belcher v. Mul- 
 hall, 57 Tex. 17; Procter v. Cole, 66 
 Ind. 576; Cushing v. Rice, 46 Me. 
 303; Epping v. Mockler, 55 Ga. 376. 
 
 SBarnett v. Barnett, 83 Va. 504; 
 McGooney v. State, 20 Ohio St. 93. 
 
 4 The Augustine Kobbe, 37 Fed. 
 Rep. 696. 
 
 5M. B. L. I. Co. v. Ruse, 8 Ga. 
 536; Russell v. Russell, 61 Ala. 500; 
 Lewis v. Thatcher, 15 Mass. 431; 
 Mayor v. Brooklyn F. I. Co., 3 Abb. 
 App. Dec. 251 ; Giddings v. Phcenix 
 Ins. Co., 90 Mo. 272. 
 
 "Burns v. Scott, 117 U. S. 582; 
 Foy v. Blackstone, 31 111. 538; Cat- 
 lin v. Harris (Wash., 1894), 35 Pac. 
 Rep. 385; Anspach v. Bast, 52 Pa. 
 St. 356; Clark v. Hart, 49 Ala. 86; 
 McPherson v. Weston, 85 Cal. 90; 
 Goddard v. Hill, 33 Me. 582; Camp- 
 bell v. Upshur, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 
 185; Trustees v. Stetson, 5 Pick. 
 (Mass.) 506; Youngberg v. Nelson 
 (Minn., 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 629; 
 Long v. Johnson, 24 N. H. 302. 
 
 7 HalIaday v. Hart, 30 N. Y. 474; 
 Bartlett v. Lee, 33 Ga. 491 ; Kern v. 
 Van Phul, 7 Minn. 426; Buckley v. 
 Bentley, 48 Barb. (N. Y.) 283. 
 
 8 Lazear v. Union Bank, 52 Md. 78. 
 
 9 Ives v. Williams, 50 Mich. 100. 
 
 10 Leddy v. Barney, 139 Mass. 394. 
 
 u Amer. S. Co. v. Thurber, 121 
 N. Y. 655; 24 N. E. Rep. 1129; Mitt- 
 nacht v. Slevin, 67 Hun, 315; Davis 
 v. Stout (Ind., 1890). 25 N. E. Rep. 
 .862; Stillings v. Tinmis (Mass., 
 1890), 25 N. E. Rep. 569; Jennings 
 v. Moore (Mich., 1890), 47 N. W. Rep. 
 127; Tarbell v. Farmers' Ins. Co. 
 (Minn., 1890), 47 N. W. Rep. 152; 
 Van Horn v. Van Horn (N. J., 1892), 
 23 Atl. Rep. 1079; Watson v. Miller, 
 82 Tex. 279; Dexter v. Ohlander, 93 
 Ala. 441 ; Van Fleet v. Sledge, 45 
 Fed. Rep. 743; Chase v. Jewett, 37 
 Me. 351 ; Lyon v. Miller, 24 Pa. St. 
 392; Atkins v. Tompkins, 155 Mass. 
 256 ; Vance v. Wood, 22 Oreg. 77. 
 
 12 Pirson v. Arkenbergh, 59 N. Y. 
 Super. Ct. 574; Hardin v. Kelly (Va,, 
 1893). 15 S. E. Rep. 894; Taylor v. 
 Davis, 82 Wis. 455; Elevator Co. v. 
 Towboat Co., 155 Mass. 211; Shel- 
 mire v. Williams, etc. Co., 68 Hun, 
 196; Stull v. Thompson, 154 Pa. St. 
 43; Societe v. Sulzer, 138 N. Y. 468; 
 Beall v. Fisher, 95 Cal. 568 ; Rich- 
 mond, etc. Co. v. Shomo(Ga., 1893), 
 16 S. E. Rep. 220. Negotiations are
 
 302 TAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. [§ 206. 
 
 and the only office of the court is to interpret and construe 
 it so that its actual meaning may be effectuated. 1 Nor does 
 it lie in the discretion of the court to ascertain what secret 
 meaning rmvy have been intended, or whether the parties had 
 any meaning which is not expressed by the language of the 
 writing itself, unless upon its face it is incomplete and silent 
 as to some material fact. 2 
 
 The terms "interpretation" and " construction" are some- 
 times used interchangeably. The process of interpretation 
 usually precedes that of construction, and may be defined 
 with accuracy as the act of finding out the true sense of any 
 form of words, i. e., the meaning their author intended, and 
 of enabling others to derive from them the same idea that he 
 entertained. 3 By construction is meant the process of draw- 
 ing conclusions respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct 
 expressions of the text, from elements known from and given 
 in the text, i. e., conclusions within the spirit, though not' 
 always within the strict letter, of the text 4 of the writing. 
 
 Construction may be liberal, enlarging or restricting the 
 meaning of the literal language of the writing which is con- 
 strued, or strict, i. e., confining the application of the words 
 to such cases or objects as are clearly described by the terms 
 employed. But a liberal construction should not be such as 
 by the aid of extrinsic evidence forces words out of their 
 natural signification, or affixes a meaning to them which was 
 never intended by their author, but only such a fair, just and 
 reasonable construction as will fully effectuate the instrument 
 and carry out the intention of the parties thereto. 5 A reason- 
 able construction of an instrument, as opposed to one which is 
 forced, artificial or strained, is such a construction as will 
 
 merged in the writing the moment Hardin v. Kelly (Va., 1893), 15 S. E. 
 a stamped letter assenting to the Rep. 894. 
 terms is mailed. Darlington I. W. - See post, § 209. 
 v. Foote, 16 Fed. Rep. 645; Blake v. 3 Anderson's Law Diet., citing Lie- 
 Hamburg-Bremen F. Ins. Co., 67 ber, Herm. 23; 1 Bl. Com. 59; 2 Par- 
 Tex. 163. See ante, %% 30-39. son's Cont. (7th ed.) 491. 
 
 Culver v. Wilkinson, 145 U. S. 4 Anderson's Law Diet., Lieber, 
 
 205; National G. L. Co. v. Bixby Herm. 44, 11. 
 
 (Minn., 1892), 57 N. W. Rep. 217; 5 Lawrence v. McCalmont, 2 How. 
 
 Stover v. Rogers, 3 Wash. St. 603; 449; Crist v. Burliugame, 62 Barb. 
 
 355.
 
 § 206.] PAEOL OS EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 303 
 
 most effectually favor and bring about the apparent intention. 
 If any word or clause has two meanings, the meaning which is 
 most consonant with the intention of the parties as gathered 
 from the whole instrument, considered in its entirety, should 
 be permitted to prevail. 1 When, however, the language is 
 reasonably clear, so that the jury can readily understand the 
 meaning of the instrument, there is no room for construction. 
 " There should be no construction where there is nothing to 
 construe." 2 
 
 The interpretation and construction of writings are gov- 
 erned by legal rules and are exclusively within the province 
 of the judge. 3 So far, however, as the whole contract is 
 incapable of intelligible construction by the court from an 
 exclusive consideration of its language, that is, so far as ex- 
 trinsic evidence is necessary to explain its terms or its subject- 
 matter, to identify the parties, or to show their relations to 
 each other and the circumstances surrounding them, the mat- 
 ter is for the jury, who are of course to be guided in their 
 determination by the principles of law governing the construc- 
 tion of contracts laid down by the court, so far as these prin- 
 ciples are applicable to the actual state of facts found by the 
 jury. 4 A writing should be construed in its entirety to ascer- 
 tain its meaning and effect. If the meaning of written and 
 printed clauses is contradictory, the meaning of the former 
 will prevail over that of the latter, on the presumption that, 
 being more deliberately framed, they represent more accu- 
 rately the meaning of the parties. 5 
 
 In the construction of a contract the courts will follow the 
 construction which the parties to the contract have them- 
 selves put upon the particular agreement or upon others of a 
 similar description. If, therefore, a contract is doubtful in its 
 meaning, evidence is admissible to show how the contracting 
 parties regarded or construed the writing by pointing out their 
 
 12 Bl. Com. 296-309, 379-381; 2 « Cosper v. Nesbit, 45 Kan. 457; 
 
 Kent, 422; Tiedeman on Wills, Spragins v. White, 108 N. C. 449; 
 
 §§ 171 et seq., 205-211. Deutman v. Kilpatrick, 46 Mo. App. 
 
 2 Lewis v. United States, 92 U. S. 624. 
 
 621 ; Benn v Hatcher, 81 Va. 34. sBoorman v. Johnston, 12 Wend. 
 
 3 People's Nat. Gas Co. v. Fidelity 573 ; Webb v. Webb, 29 Ala. 605 ; 
 Tit. & Trust Co., 24 Atl. Rep. 339; DufiVld v. Hue, 129 Pa. St. 94; Mc- 
 150 Pa. St. 8. Near v. McComber, 18 Iowa, 7.
 
 304 
 
 PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. [§§ 207, 20S. 
 
 actions in relation to the subject-matter. "Where, by such ex- 
 trinsic evidence, a continued course of dealing or acting prior 
 to the execution of the contract under consideration is es- 
 tablished, it is very fair to presume that the intention of the 
 parties was to adhere to their usual and ordinary method of 
 transacting business. 1 
 
 § 207. Rule applies only between parties. — "Where a writ- 
 ing is offered in evidence in an action between persons who 
 are not parties or privies to it, the rule excluding parol evi- 
 dence does not apply; and. because it would be extremely un- 
 just to consider a person bound by language in whose selec- 
 tion he took no part, they are not prevented from showing 
 the true meaning of a writing by contradictory oral evidence. 2 
 In a suit between a party and a stranger to a writing, the 
 former may, unless estopped by his conduct, contradict the 
 writing by parol. 3 
 
 § 208. Invalidity of writing — Evidence to explain or vary 
 consideration. — The invalidity or legal insufficiency of an in- 
 strument or of a part of it may be shown by a party b}' parol. 4 
 
 1 Procter v. Snodgrass, 6 Ohio Cir. 
 Ct. Rep. 547; Goneding v. Ham- 
 mond, 49 Fed. Rep. 443; Bement v. 
 Clay brook (Ind., 1892), 31 N. E. Rep. 
 556; Davis v. Shafer, 50 Fed. Rep. 
 764; Hosmer v. McDonald (Ark., 
 1892), 19 S. W. Rep. 963; Leavitt v. 
 Windsor Land & Investment Co., 
 
 54 Fed. Rep. 459; People's Nat. Gas 
 Co. v. Braddock Wire Co. (Pa., 
 1893), 25 Atl. Rep. 749; 155 Pa. St, 
 22; Hammerquist v. Swenson, 44 
 111. App. 627; Cavazos v. Trevino, 6 
 Wall. (U. S.) 773. 
 
 2 Randolph v. Junker, 1 Tex. Civ. 
 App. 517; Burns v. Thompson, 91 
 Ind. 146 ; McMaster v. Insurance Co., 
 
 55 N. Y. 222; Sheehy v. Fulton (Neb., 
 1894), 57 N. W. Rep. 395 ; Bareda v. 
 Silsby, 21 How. (U. S.) 146: Finley 
 v. Bogan, 20 La. Ann. 443; Fant v. 
 Sprig, 50 Md. 551 ; Furbush v. God- 
 win, 25 N. H. 425; Russell v. Carr, 
 38 Ga. 459; Cunningham v. Minor, 
 
 56 Ala. 522; Fonda v. Burton, 63 
 
 Vt. 355; Bruce v. Lumber Co., 87 
 Va. 381 ; Fox v. McComb, 63 Hun, 
 633: Kellogg v. Thompson, 142 Mass. 
 76; Reynolds v. Magness, 2 lied. 26; 
 Talbot v. Wilkins, 31 Ark. 411; 
 Hnssman v. Wilkie, 50 Cal. 250; 
 Bell v. Woodman, 60 Me. 465. 
 
 3 Venable v. Thompson, 11 Ala. 
 147. So in a suit for contribution 
 between sureties either of them 
 may vary the terms of a writing to 
 which the principal is a party. 
 Thomas v. Truscotc, 53 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 200; Barry v. Raison, 1 Kernan 
 (N. Y.), 462. 
 
 * Hamburg v. Wood, 18 S. W. Rep. 
 623 (Tex., 1892); Blythe v. Gibbons 
 (Ind., 1894), 35 N. E. Rep. 557; Lun- 
 day v. Thomas, 26 Ga. 538; Benecia 
 Works v. Estes (Cal., 1892), 32 Pac. 
 Rep. 938 ; Snyder v. Jennings, 15 Neb. 
 372; Corbin v. Sistrunk, 19 Ala. 203; 
 Grayson v. Brooks, 64 Miss. 410; 
 Cummings v. Powell (Mo., 1893), 21 
 S. W. Rep. 1079; Sherman v. Buick,
 
 § 208.] 
 
 PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
 
 305 
 
 So it may be shown by parol that the execution of the instru- 
 ment, whether record, deed or simple contract, was procured 
 by fraud or duress practiced upon the party, 1 or that he had 
 been made intoxicated so that he did not fully comprehend 
 the nature of his act. 2 
 
 At common law a seal created a conclusive presumption of 
 a due and valuable consideration, and the parties were es- 
 topped from denying this, though no consideration was men- 
 tioned in the instrument. 3 Where a writing is not under seal, 
 and in equity when under seal, 4 parol evidence is admissible 
 to vary the consideration, except in the case of negotiable 
 paper which is in the hands of a bona fide holder for value. 5 
 
 93 U. S. 209 ; Davis v. Stern, 15 La. 
 Ann. 177 ; Farrell v. Bean, 10 Md. 217 ; 
 Dana v. Sessions (Vt., 1893), 26 Atl. 
 Rep. 585 ; Holbrook v. Burt, 22 Pick. 
 (Mass.) 546. A judgment may thus 
 be impeached by parol proof that a 
 party was not served. Norton v. 
 Atchison, 30 Pac. Rep. 585. 
 
 1 Kranich v. Sherwood, 52 N. W. 
 Rep. 741; 92 Mich. 397; Wharton v. 
 Douglass, 76 Pa. St. 273 ; McKesson 
 v. Sherman, 51 Wis. 303; N. J. Mut. 
 L. I. Co. v. Baker, 94 U. S. 610; 
 Cooper v. Finke, 38 Minn. 2 ; Thomp- 
 son v. Bell, 37 Ala. 438; Officer v. 
 Howe, 32 Iowa, 142; Vicknair v. 
 Trosher (La., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 486; 
 Thorne v. Trav. Ins. Co., 80 Pa. St. 
 15; Univ. Fash. Co. v. Skinner, 64 
 Hun, 293; Childs v. Dobbins, 61 
 Iowa, 109; Plant v. Condit, 22 Ark. 
 454; Evving v. Smith, 132 Ind. 205; 
 Willis v. Kern, 21 La. Ann. 749 Bald- 
 win v. Burrows, 95 Ind. 81 ; Gross v. 
 Drager, 66 Wis. 150 ; Depue v. Sar- 
 geant, 21 W. Va. 326. Parol evi- 
 dence is received to show that a deed 
 was delivered and whether the de- 
 livery was absolute or in escrow. 
 Adams v. Morgan, 150 Mass. 148. 
 
 2 Johnson v. Phifer, 6 Neb. 401; 
 Lavette v. Sage, 29 Conn. 577 ; Fet- 
 rill v. Fetrill, 5 Jones' Eq. 61; 
 Schramm v. O'Conner, 98 111. 539; 
 
 20 
 
 Harbison v. Lemon, 3 Blatchf. 51 
 Dunn v. Amos, 14 Wis. 106; Loftus 
 v. Maloney (Va., 1893), 16 S. E. Rep, 
 749; Rottenburgh v. Fowl (N. J. 
 1893), 26 Atl. Rep. 338. 
 
 STiedeman on R. P., §801; Wil 
 kinson v. Scott, 17 Mass. 257; Good 
 speed v. Fuller, 46 Me. 141 ; Rock 
 well v. Brown, 54 N. Y. 213; Men 
 denhall v. Parish, 8 Jones' L. 108 
 Kimball v. Walker, 30 111. 511 ; Wing 
 v. Peck, 54 Vt. 245; Trafton v 
 Hawes, 102 Mass. 541 ; State v. Gott 
 44 Md. 341 ; Storm v. United States ; 
 94 U. S. 84; Erickson v. Brant 
 (Minn., 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. 62 
 Harris v. Harris, 23 Gratt. 737 ; Lake 
 v. Gray, 35 Iowa, 462 ; Rhine v. El 
 len, 36 Cal. 362. 
 
 4 Levi v. Welsh, 45 N. J. Eq. 867 
 Fechheimer v. Trounstine, 13 Colo, 
 386; Lanier v. Faust, 16 S. W. Rep 
 994; Ewing v. Wilson (Ind., 1892) 
 31 N. E. Rep. 64; 132 Ind. 600. 
 
 sVolkenan v. Drum, 154 Pa. St 
 616; Stackpole v. Arnold, 11 Mass 
 27; Terry v. Danville, etc. Co., 91 
 N. C. 236 ; Silvers v. Potter, 48 N. J. 
 Eq. 539; Rabsuhl v. Lack, 35 Mo. 
 316; Tutwiler v. Munford, 68 Ala. 
 124; Rhine v. Ellen, 36 Cal. 362; 
 King v. Woodruff, 23 Conn. 56; 
 Howell v. Moores, 127 111. 86; Bragg 
 v. Standford, 82 Ind. 324; Wheeler
 
 30C 
 
 PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE 
 
 [§ 20S. 
 
 Where the validity of an instrument is impeached upon the 
 ground of fraud, the courts are disposed to grant a wide lati- 
 tude in this respect. 1 Thus, the invalidity, 2 illegality 3 or im- 
 morality 4 of the consideration may be shown by parol in an 
 action between the immediate parties to the contract. So in 
 a proceeding by the grantor to recover the purchase-money, 
 the real consideration may be shown by parol evidence/' 
 Parol evidence is admissible to show an additional or further 
 consideration to that expressed, 6 and the additional considera- 
 tion which is thus shown need not alwa} T s be consistent in 
 character with the consideration which is recited in the writ- 
 ing. 7 Where the writing is silent as to consideration, oral 
 evidence is admissible to prove that a consideration passed 
 and to show its character and extent. 8 
 
 v. Billings, 38 N. Y. 263; Fraley v. 
 Bentley, 1 Dak. 25; Bailey v. Corn- 
 well, 66 Mich. 107 ; Leach v. Shelby, 
 58 Miss. 681 ; Sayre v. Burdick, 47 
 Minn. 367; Kidder v. Vandersloat, 
 114 111. 130; Pomeroy v. Bailey, 43 
 N. H. 118; Bar bee v. Bar bee, 109 
 N. C. 299; Cake v. Bank, 116 Pa. St. 
 264; Fechheimer v. Trounstine, 13 
 Colo. 386; Louisville R. R. Co. v. 
 Neafus (Ky., 1892), 18 S. W. Rep. 
 1030; Bruce v. Slemp, 82 Va. 357; 
 Pierce v. Brew, 43 Vt. 292 ; Wooster 
 v. Simonson, 20 Fed. Rep. 316 ; Stiles 
 v. Giddens, 21 Tex. 783; Green v. 
 Batson, 71 Wis. 57; Hall v. Solo- 
 mon, 61 Conn. 476; Hunter v. La- 
 nius, 82 Tex. 677. "A considera- 
 tion is something esteemed in law 
 as of value in exchange for which a 
 promise is made." Bishop, Cont., 
 §38. 
 
 i Clinton v. Estes, 20 Ark. 216; 
 Cunningham v. Dyer, 23 Md. 219; 
 Fall v. Glover, 34 Neb. 522 ; 52 N. 
 W. Rep. 168. 
 
 2 See cases in last note. 
 
 3 Fenwick v. Ratcliffe, 6 T. B. 
 Mon. (Ky.) 154; Cozard v. Hinman, 
 6 Bo # sw. 8 ; N. E. Mortg. Co. v. Gay, 
 33 Fed. Rep. 636; Martin v. Clarke, 
 8 R. I. 389; Russell v. De Grand, 15 
 
 Mass. 35; Ross v. Sagbeer, 21 "Wend. 
 106. 
 
 4 Lazare v. Jacques, 15 La. Ann. 
 599. 
 
 5 McCrea v. Purmort, 16 Wend. 
 465 ; Rhine v. Ellen, 36 Cal. 362. 
 
 6 Penn. Co. v. Dolan (Ind., 1890), 
 32 N. E. Rep. S02 ; Hill v. Whidden 
 (Mass., 1S93), 33 N. E. Rep. 526; Fer- 
 ris v. Hard, 135 N. Y. 354; Pierce v. 
 Brew, 43 Vt. 295 ; Parker v. Foy, 43 
 Miss. 260 ; Harper v. Perry, 28 Iowa, 
 63; Paige v. Sherman, 6 Gray, 511; 
 Rabsuhl v. Lack, 35 Mo. 316; Castor 
 v. Fry, 33 W. Va. 449 ; Tiedeman on 
 R. P., § 801. 
 
 7 Bristol Sav. Bank v. Stiger (Iowa, 
 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 265; Penn. Co. 
 v. Dolan (Ind., 1893), 52 N. E. Rep. 
 802; Hill v. Whidden, siqwa; Mo- 
 bile Sav. Bank v. McDonnell (Ala., 
 1891), 8 S. Rep. 137; Martin v. Stub- 
 bings, 126 111. 387; Diven v. John- 
 son, 117 Ind. 512. Where evidence 
 of a different consideration would 
 make a new contract for the parties 
 it should be excluded. Stillings v. 
 Timmins, 152 Mass. 147; 25 N. E. 
 Rep. 50 ; Langan v. Langan, 89 Cal. 
 186; 26Pac. Rep. 794. 
 
 8 Trustees v. Saunders (Wis., 1893),
 
 § 209.] 
 
 PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
 
 507 
 
 § 209. Incomplete and collateral writings. — Where on 
 inspecting a written contract it appears incomplete, so that it 
 does not represent the final intention of the parties in lan- 
 guage chosen by them, parol evidence is admissible to supply 
 omissions and ascertain the actual intention on those particu- 
 lar points regarding which the written agreement is silent. 1 
 So parol evidence is admissible to supply a date in an ac- 
 knowledgment of a debt; 2 to show the purpose of certain 
 minor stipulations; 3 to fix the time of performance, 4 or to 
 show a parol contract or a conversation referred to in the 
 writing. 5 But an omission cannot be supplied in a writing 
 which is required by the statute of frauds. 6 And the opera- 
 
 54 N. W. Rep. 1094; Guidery v. 
 Green, 95 Cal. 630; Dorsey v. Ha- 
 gard, 5 Mo. 420; Miller v. Fecht- 
 born, 31 Pa. St. 252; Macomb v. 
 Wilkinson (Mich., 1890), 47 N. W. 
 Rep. 336 ; Finlayson v. Finlayson, 
 17 Oreg. 347; Goodwin v. Fox, 129 
 U. S. 601 ; Bruce v. Slemp, 82 Va. 
 352; Rankin v. Wallace (Ky., 1890), 
 14 S. W. Rep. 79; Halpin v. Stone, 
 78 Wis. 183; 47 N. W. Rep. 177; 
 Nichols v. Burcb, 128 Ind. 324; 27 
 N. E. Rep. 737. In McCrea v. Pur- 
 mort, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 473; 30 Am. 
 Dec. 103, Justice Cowan thus ex- 
 pounds the true rule on this subject : 
 " A party is estopped by his deed. 
 He is not permitted to contradict it 
 so far as the deed is intended to pass 
 a right, or to be the exclusive evi- 
 dence of a contract. The principle 
 goes no further. A deed is not con- 
 clusive evidence of everything it 
 may contain. For instance, it is not 
 the only evidence of the date of its 
 execution, nor is its omission of a 
 consideration conclusive evidence 
 that none passed; nor is its acknowl- 
 edgment of a particular considera- 
 tion an objection to other proof of 
 another and consistent considera- 
 tion." 
 
 i Smith v. Wood (Ind., 1833), 32 
 N. E. Rep. 921 ; Woolworth v. Mc- 
 
 Pherson, 55 Fed. Rep. 558; Mc- 
 Grath v. Mongels, 20 N. Y. S. 869 ; 
 Kreuzberger v. Wingfield, 96 Cal. 
 251 ; Chapin v. Cambria S. Co., 145 Pa. 
 St. 578 ; Ostrander v. Snyder, 26 N. 
 Y. S. 263; Edwards Co. v. Baker, 2 
 N. D. 289; Bretts v. Levine (Minn., 
 1892), 52 N. W. Rep. 525; Work v. 
 Beach, 129 N. Y. 651; Crane v. Li- 
 brary Ass'n, 29 N. J. L. 302 ; Barclay 
 v. Hopkins, 59 Ga. 562; Bank v. 
 Cooper, 137 U. S. 473; Brown v. 
 Bowen, 90 Mo. 184; Webster v. Hodg- 
 kins, 25 N. H. 128; Winn v. Cham- 
 berlain, 32 Vt. 318: Equator M. & S. 
 Co. v. Gunella (Colo., 1893), 33 Pac. 
 Rep. 613; Holmes v. Anderson, 59 
 Tex. 481 ; Donlin v. Daeglin, 80 111. 
 608; Sivers v. Sivers (Cal., 1S93), 33 
 Pac. Rep. 571 ; Hawkins v. Lee, 8 
 Lea (Tenn.), 42. The question 
 whether the contract is complete is 
 for the jury. Thomas v. Barnes, 31 
 N. E. Rep. 683; 56 Mass. 581. 
 
 2 Manchester v. Brodner, 107 N. Y. 
 349. 
 
 3 Equator Co. v. Gunella (Colo., 
 1893), 33 Pac. Rep. 613. 
 
 * Sivers v. Sivers (Cal., 1893), 32 
 Pac. Rep. 571. 
 
 sNork v. Beach, 129 N. Y. 621. 
 
 H Runger v. Holtzclaw, 112 Mo. 
 519. See post, § 214.
 
 308 PAROL OK EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. [§ 210. 
 
 tion of this rule is strictly confined to unintentional omissions, 
 and does not permit the introduction of parol evidence to ef- 
 fectuate a writing which is wholly void because of uncer- 
 tainty. 1 JSTor is parol evidence admissible if the writing can 
 by construction be given a reasonable meaning though some 
 words have been omitted. 2 So it has been held that the oral por- 
 tion of the contract is only admissible if the writing describes 
 the subject-matter with binding force, and the oral part re- 
 fers to collateral matters alone. 3 The existence of a memo- 
 randum of a transaction, as a bill of parcels, will not exclude 
 parol evidence of the real contract where the memorandum 
 is not meant to be regarded as a contract containing the com- 
 plete intention of the parties. 4 
 
 § 210. Parol evidence to connect and explain contempo- 
 raneous writings. — Two or more instruments evidencing the 
 same transaction should be construed together. To enable 
 the court to do this, parol evidence is admissible to show 
 which was adopted as binding by the parties, 5 or to connect 
 them if the connection does not appear upon their face; 6 and 
 particularly if they are contradictory in terms, 7 or if on com- 
 parison of the instruments certain clauses are found to be 
 omitted 8 from either. If a writing clearly refers to another, 
 the latter will be admissible to explain it. The earlier deed 
 or instrument by such reference becomes incorporated in the 
 later to the same extent as though inserted in the subsequent 
 
 1 McGuire v. Stevens, 42 Miss. 474; 5 Hill v. Miller, 76 N. Y. 32; Nor. 
 Walrathv. Whitlekind, 26 Kan. 482; M. Co. v. McAlister, 40 Mich. 84. 
 Harvey v. Lumber Co., 39 Mo. App. 6 1 Greenl. Ew, §283; Wichita 
 214. University v. Schweiter, 50 Kan. 
 
 2 Looney v. Eankin, 15 Oreg. 617. 672 ; Thomson v. Beal, 48 Fed. Rep. 
 3 Chapin v. Dobson, 78 N. Y. 74. 614; Myers v. Munson, 65 Iowa, 423; 
 4 Deshon v. Insurance Co., 11 Met. Tuley v. Barton, 79 Va. 3S7; Lee v. 
 
 (Mass.) 199 ; Perrine v. Cooley, 39 N. Church, 52 Barb. (N. Y.) 116; Gilbert 
 
 J. L. 449; Kreuzberger v. Wing- v. Duncan, 29 N. J. L. 133, 521; 
 
 field, 96 Cal. 251 ; Thomas v. Barnes, Eager v. Crawford, 76 N. Y. 97; 
 
 156 Mass. 581; Robinson v. Mulder, Cullen v. Benim, 37 Ohio St. 326. 
 81 Mich. 75; Chapin v. Cambria 7 Payson v. Lampson, 134 Mass. 
 
 Iron Co., 145 Pa. St. 478; Millet v. 593. 
 
 Marston, 62 Me. 477; Cone v. Cone, « Holt v. Pie, 120 Pa. St. 425 
 
 107 Mass. 285; Smith v. Coleman, 77 Deery v. Cray, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 263 
 
 Wis. 343. Wilson v. Tucker, 10 R. I. 578 
 
 Maxted v. Seymour, 56 Mich. 129.
 
 § 211.] 
 
 PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
 
 309 
 
 deed. 1 The same principle is applicable to a deed containing 
 references to maps or plats, which must be consulted and are 
 admissible to ascertain the location of the monuments which 
 constitute the boundaries of the land conve3 r ed. 2 In the case 
 of documents referred to in wills, which are required to be 
 attested, it has been held that to admit their incorporation in 
 the will they must be referred to as in existence when the will 
 is executed? and the document may then be shown by parol 
 evidence to be identical with that referred to. 4 
 
 ■§ 211. Receipts. — "A receipt may be defined as such a 
 written acknowledgment by one person of his having received 
 money or goods from another as will be prima facie evidence 
 of that fact in a court of law." 5 Parol evidence is generally 
 admissible to explain or vary the meaning or purpose of a 
 simple written receipt. 6 If the writing, however, constitutes 
 
 i Tiedeman on R. P., g 841 ; White- 
 head v. Rogers, 106 Mo. 231 ; Camp- 
 bell v. Morgan, 68 Hun, 490; Perry 
 v. Binney, 103 Mass. 153; Vance v. 
 Fare, 24 Cal. 444; Overend v. 
 Menezer, 83 Tex. 152; McAfee v. 
 Arline, 83 Ga. 645; Knight v. Dyer, 
 57 Me. 176; Lippitt v. Kelly, 46 Vt. 
 523 ; Rupert v. Penner, 35 Neb. 587. 
 The deed referred to need not be re- 
 corded. Simmons v. Johnson, 14 
 Wis. 526; Caldwell v. Center, 30 Cal. 
 543. 
 
 2 Tiedeman on R. P., § 841 ; Cham- 
 berlain v. Bradley, 101 Mass. 191 ; 
 St. Louis v. Miss. P. R. Co. (Mo., 
 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 203; Fox v. 
 Union Co., 109 Mass. 292; Bohier v. 
 Lange, 44 Minn. 281 ; Redd v. Murry, 
 24 Fae. Rep. 341; 93 Cal. 48: White- 
 head v. Ragan, 106 Mo. 231; Bir- 
 mingham v. Anderson, 48 Pa. St. 
 253; Plummer v. Gould, 92 Mich. 1 ; 
 Spiller v. Scribner, 36 Vt. 247: Chap- 
 man v. Polack, 70 Cal. 487 ; Frost v. 
 Cattle Co., 81 Tex. 505. 
 
 3 Newton v. Seamen's Fr. Soc, 130 
 Mass. 91 ; Brown v. Clark, 77 N. Y. 
 360 ; Baker's Appeal, 107 Pa. St. 381 ; 
 
 Tonnele, etc. v. Hall, 4 Comst. 145; 
 In re Soher, 78 Cal. 477; Chambers 
 v. McDaniel, 3 Rich. Eq. 305 ; Harvey 
 v. Chouteau, 14 Mo. 587; Johnson v. 
 Clarkson, 3 Rich. Eq. 305 ; Thayer v. 
 Wellington, 9 Allen, 283; In re Lam- 
 bert's Estate, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 10; 
 In re Sunderland, 1 P. & D. 198; 
 Allen v. Maddock, 11 Moore P. C. 
 427, 454 ; Von Stanbenzee v. Monck, 
 32 L. J. Prob. 21 ; In re Barber, W. 
 N. 1879, p. 141. 
 
 4 Pollock v. Glassell, 2 Gratt. 439; 
 Barley v. Barley, 7 Jones, 44; Zim- 
 merman v. Zimmerman, 23 Pa. St. 
 375; Crosby v. Mason, 32 Conn. 482; 
 Fesler v. Simpson, 58 Ind. 83. 
 ■ 5 Grimke, J., in Kegg v. State, 7 
 Ohio St. 79. As to the conclusive- 
 ness of receipts per se as evidence, 
 see State v. Branch, 112 Mo. 661. 
 
 G Schwersenski v. Vineberg, 19 Can. 
 S. C. R. 243; Osborn v. Stringham 
 (S. D., 1894), 57 N. W. Rep. 776; 
 Oakley v. State, 40 Ala. 392; Han- 
 cock v. Moody, 39 111. App. 17 ; State 
 v. McDonald, 43 N. J. L. 591 : Bus- 
 well v. Pioneer, 37 N. Y. 312; Fire 
 Ass'n v. Wickham, 141 TJ. S. 564;
 
 310 
 
 TAKOL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§21! 
 
 or contains a complete contract, as when it contains stipula- 
 tions prescribing how the money is to be expended, parol evi- 
 dence is inadmissible to vary its terms, so far as it is a con- 
 tract, 1 though it may assume the form of a receipt. 2 
 
 §212. Independent parol contracts and conditions pre- 
 cedent. — These generally may be shown by parol when con- 
 temporaneous and consistent with the writing, and founded 
 on a distinct consideration, 3 or when the consideration of the 
 oral collateral contract is the performance of the written one. 4 
 
 Richardson v. Beede, 43 Me. 161 ; 
 Lane v. Johnson, 59 Vt. 237; Hill v. 
 Durand, 53 Wis. 160; Prairie Sch. 
 Twp. v. Haselen (N. D., 1893), 55 N. 
 W. Rep. 938; Bell v. Utley, 17 Mich. 
 508; Chapman v. Sutton, 68 Wis. 
 657; Catoe v. Catoe, 32 S. C. 595; 
 Lowe v.' Thompson, 86 Ind. 503; 
 Texas M. L. Ins. Co. v. Davidge, 51 
 Tex. 214; McKinnie v. Harvey, 38 
 Minn. 18; Dunn v. Pipes, 20 La. 
 Ann. 276; Badger v. Jones, 12 Pick. 
 (Mass.) 371; McFadden v. Railway 
 Co., 92 Mo. 343; Chapin v. Chicago, 
 etc. Co. (Iowa, 1890), 44 N. W. Rep. 
 820; Marse v. Rice (Neb., 1893), 54 
 N. W. Rep. 308 ; Dunagan v. Duna- 
 gan, 38 Ga. 554; Calhoun v. Rich- 
 ardson, 30 Conn. 210; Knox v. Bar- 
 bee, 3 Bibb (Ky.), 526; Edgerly v. 
 Emerson, 23 N. H. 555. Whether 
 the receipt is an official acknowledg- 
 ment or a receipt under seal, as in a 
 deed of conveyance, is immaterial. 
 Brown v. Cabalin, 3 Oreg. 45. 
 
 1 Smith v. Holland, 61 N. Y. 635. 
 
 2 Fossack v. Moody, 39 111. App. 
 17; Thompson v. Williams, 30 Kan. 
 114; Carpenter v. Jamieson, 75 Mo. 
 285; Alcorn v. Morgan, 77 Ind. 184; 
 Tarbell v. Farmers' Mut. El. Co., 44 
 Minn. 471; Goodwin v. Goodwin, 59 
 N. H. 548; Van Etten v. Newton, 8 
 N. Y. S. 478; Young v. Cook, 15 La. 
 Ann. 126; James v. Bligh, 11 Allen 
 (Mass.), 4; Fowler v. Richardson, 32 
 
 111. App. 252; Harrison v. Bank, 17 
 Wis. 340; Wood v. Whiting. 21 
 Barb. 190; Egleston v. Knicker- 
 bocker, G Barb. 458 ; Graves v. Dud- 
 ley, 20 N. Y. 76; Querry v. White, 1 
 Bibb (Ky.), 271 ; Sessions v. Gilbert, 
 1 Vt. 75. Thus, for example, a re- 
 ceipt for goods on storage or depos- 
 ited as collateral for a loan, consti- 
 tuting a contract of bailment, cannot 
 be varied by parol. Wads worth v. 
 Alcott, 6 N. Y. 64; Stapleton v. King, 
 33 Iowa, 28. 
 
 3 Michigan M. L. Ins. Co. v. Will- 
 iams, 155 Pa. St. 405; Bagley & 
 Sewall Co. v. Saranac R. P. Co., 135 
 N. Y. 626 ; Guidery v. Green, 95 Cal. 
 630; Babcock v. Deford, 14 Kan. 
 408 ; Whitney v. Shippen, 89 Pa. St. 
 22; Andrews v. Brewster, 124 N. Y. 
 433; Buzzell v. Willard, 44 Vt. 44; 
 Lamphire v. Slaughter, 61 How. Pr. 
 (N. Y.) 36; Snow v. Allen, 151 Mass. 
 51. This exception is thus stated by 
 Sir James Stephen: "The existence 
 of any separate oral agreement as to 
 any matter on which a document is 
 silent, and which is not inconsistent 
 with its terms, may be shown, if 
 from the circumstances of the cate 
 the court infers that the parties did 
 not intend the document to be a 
 complete and final statement of the 
 whole of the transaction between 
 them." See Dig. Ev., art. 90. 
 
 * Kelly v. Carter, 55 Ark. 112.
 
 § 212.] 
 
 PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Thus, a verbal warranty in connection with a sale in writing; l 
 an agreement to pay a commission for procuring a sale of 
 land, 2 or for obtaining a charter for a vessel; 3 or a condition 
 that a written agreement shall not go into effect unless a cer- 
 tain event shall happen, 4 or that a policy taken in a party's 
 name was only a security for a debt ; 5 a verbal contract to re- 
 build in connection with a written lease; 6 an agreement that 
 a mortgagor ma) 7 continue in possession under a chattel mort- 
 gage, 7 or an agreement by the obligee in a deed to receive in 
 payment a note of a third party, 8 or an agreement by a grantor 
 to grade a street, 9 may all be shown by parol where such in- 
 dependent oral contract does not contradict the language of 
 the written agreement. But where the effect of the collateral 
 parol agreement is to make an entirely new contract out of 
 the written contract, parol evidence is not admissible. 10 But 
 a contemporaneous independent parol contract, the perform- 
 ance of which is a condition precedent to the creation of a 
 binding obligation under a written agreement, may be shown. 11 
 
 i Collette v. Weed, 68 Wis. 428. 
 2 Huckabee v. Shepherd, 75 Ala. 
 342. 
 
 3 Weber v. Kingsland, 8 Bosw. 415. 
 
 4 Humphreys v. Railroad Co., 88 
 Va. 431. 
 
 a Zabel v. Nyenhuis, 83 Iowa, 750. 
 6 Curmning v. Barber, 99 N. C. 
 332. 
 
 • Pierce v. Stevens, 30 Me. 184. 
 
 8 Murchie v. Cook, 1 Ala. 41. 
 
 9 Durkin v. Cobleigh, 30 N. E. Rep. 
 474. 
 
 10 Miller Ins. Co. v. Kinneard, 35 
 111. App. 105 ; Blair v. Buttolph, 72 
 Iowa. 31 ; Timms v. Sherman, 19 
 Md. 296; Keeley v. Oliver (N. C, 
 1893), 18 S. E. Rep. 698 ; Hubbard v. 
 Greeley, 84 Me. 340 ; Gerard v. Cow- 
 perthwait, 21 N. Y. S. 1092; Lathrop 
 v. Foster, 51 Me. 367 ; Still v. Tomp- 
 kins, 154 Pa. St. 43; Richards v. 
 Day, 63 Hun, 635 ; Haworth v. Nor- 
 ris, 28 Fla. 763; Frost v. Blanchard, 
 97 Mass. 155 ; Woodward v. Foster, 
 18 N. Y. S. 827; McLeod v. Skiles, 
 
 81 Mo. 595; Trent v. Fletcher, 100 
 Ind. 105; Bishop v. Dillard, 49 Ark. 
 285; Barclay v. Pursley, 110 Pa. St. 
 13. So oral evidence will not be re- 
 ceived to attach a condition to an 
 absolute promise to pay in writing. 
 Allen v. Furbish, 4 Gray, 504 ; Bil- 
 lings v. Billings, 10 Cush. 178, 182; 
 Ridgway v. Bowman, 7 Cush. 268. 
 ii Corn v. Rosenthal (N. Y., 1893), 
 1 Misc. Rep. 168 ; Black v. Shreve, 13 
 N. J. Eq. 455; Badcock v. Steadman, 
 1 Root (Conn.), 87; Ilnmphreys v. 
 Railroad Co., 13 S. E. Rep. 985; Ben- 
 ton v. Martin, 52 N. Y. 570 ; Juillard 
 v. Chaffee, 92 N. Y. 535 ; Michels v. 
 Olmstead, 14 Fed. Rep. 219; Pierce 
 v. Ted well, 81 Ala. 299; Jordan v. 
 Loftin, 13 Ala. 547; Minchin v. 
 Minchin (Mass., 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 
 164; Watkins v. Bowers, 119 Mass. 
 383; Wilson v. Powers. 131 id. 539; 
 Westman v. Krumweide, 30 Minn. 
 313; Sweet v. Stevens, 7 R. I. 375; 
 Cuthrell v. Cuthrell, 101 Ind. 375; 
 Robinson v. Evans, 3 S. C. 335;
 
 312 PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. [§§ 213, 214. 
 
 § 213. To establish implied, resulting or constructive 
 trust. — By statute it is a universal rule that express trusts 
 in real property must be evidenced by some writing, 1 though 
 it should not be understood that the trust must be created by 
 a written instrument. The writing is only needed for its 
 proof, and is regarded simply as an admission of its existence. 
 Parol evidence will not be received to supply what has been 
 omitted from the writing. This rule, however, applies only 
 to express trusts. Implied, constructive and resulting trusts 
 in real property may be created by parol. 2 So where a deed 
 is absolute upon its face, parol evidence is admissible, though 
 it should be clear and satisfactory, 3 to show that the consid- 
 eration was paid by a person other than the grantee, and to 
 establish a resulting trust in favor of the party paying the 
 consideration. 4 But a grantor in an absolute deed will not be 
 permitted to show that a trust was intended in his favor, 
 though a third party paying the consideration may do so. 5 
 
 § 214. Discharge, modification or extension of contract 
 may he shown. — A writing under seal cannot be discharged 
 or satisfied by an instrument of an inferior character. 6 But 
 a simple contract may be orally rescinded or dissolved if no 
 breach of its conditions has occurred, and this oral discharge 
 or rescission may be shown by extrinsic evidence, 7 even where 
 
 Wencllinger v. Smith, 75 Va. 309. v. Brison, 75 Cal. 525. In a few 
 
 But the evidence of such parol agree- cases parol evidence has been ad- 
 
 ment must be clear, precise and sat- mitted to establish an active result- 
 
 isfactory. Thomas v. Loose, 114 Pa. ing trust. Barker v. Prentiss, GMass. 
 
 St. 45; 114 id. 170; Cake v. Potts 430; Brown v. Isbell, 11 Ala. 1009. 
 
 Bank, 116 id. 270. 5 Lawson v. Lawson, 117 111.98; 
 
 1 See post, § 264. Gerry v. Stimpson, 60 Me. 186; 
 
 2 Tiedeman on Equity, §§ 308-312, Whyte v. Arthur, 17 N. J. Eq. 521. 
 and post, § 264. 6 As to what constitutes a seal and 
 
 3 Green v. Dietrich, 114 111. 636; its necessity, see Tiedeman on R. P., 
 Woodward v. Sibert, 82 Va. 441 ; § 808, where the authorities are fully 
 Catoe v. Catoe, 32 S. C. 595; 10 S. E. cited; 2 Bl. Com. 305-6. 
 
 Rep. 1078; Hoover v. Hoover, 129 7 Brownfield's Ex'r v. Brownfield, 
 Pa. St. 201. 151 Pa. St. 565; Whitcher v. Shat- 
 *Borst v. Nalle, 28 Gratt. (Va.) tuck, 3 Allen (Mass.), 545; Marsh v. 
 423; Von Trotha v. Bamberger, 15 Bellew, 45 Wis. 39; Davis v. Good- 
 Colo. 1; Leakey v. Gunter, 25 Tex. rich, 45 Vt. 36; Page v. Einstein, 7 
 400; Hudson v. White, 17 R. I. 519: Jones (N. C). 147; Tucker v. Tucker 
 Larman v. Knight, 140 111. 132; (Ind., 1887), 13 N. E. Rep. 710; Estes 
 Rank v. Grote, 110 N. Y. 12; Brison v. Fry, 94 Mo. 260; Sessions v. Peay,
 
 § 214.] PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 313 
 
 t 
 
 '<• 
 
 a writing is by the statute of frauds made essential to the 
 validity of the original agreement. 1 Not on\y may the express 
 annulment or abandonment of a written contract be thus 
 orally shown, but a subsequent oral contract founded on a fresh 
 consideration, operating either as a modification or limitation 
 of the former written contract or as a substitute for it, may 
 be shown by parol. 2 Under this rule parol evidence has been 
 received to show that the parties have consented to a change 
 in the time, place and manner of performance; that a new 
 or different consideration has been agreed upon, and that the 
 promisor has agreed to do something wholly different from 
 what was mentioned in the writing. 3 If a written contract 
 has been lost its contents ma} 7, be proved by parol when a 
 new and different parol contract has been made in its place.* 
 An oral extension of the time of performance made prior to a 
 breach of the contract may be shown, and it is immaterial 
 whether the writing was sealed 5 or not, or whether it w r as a 
 contract within the statute of frauds. 6 But oral evidence is 
 never admissible to show a subsequent material verbal modi- 
 fication of the terms of any agreement which under the stat- 
 
 21 Ark. 400; Harrington v. Samples Cobb v. O'Neal, 2 Sneed (Tenn.), 
 
 36 Minn. 200- Arnold v. Arnold, 20 438; Holloway v. Frick (Pa., 1893), 
 
 Iowa, 273; Medomack v. Curtis, 24 24 Atl. Rep. 201; Worrell v. Forsyth 
 
 Me. 36; Fowler v. Smith, 153 Pa. St. (111., 1892), 30 N. E. Rep. 673; Flan- 
 
 639 (satisfaction of judgment). ders v. Fay, 40 Vt. 316; Thompson 
 
 iBuell v. Miller 4 N. II. 196; v. Locke, 65 Iowa, 429 ; Bannon v. 
 
 Cummings v. Arnold, 3 Mete. 486; Aultman, 80 Wis. 307; Cartwright 
 
 Vanderlin v. Hovis, 152 Pa. St. 11. v. Clopton, 25 Ga. 85. 
 
 2 Frick v. Mill Co. (Kan., 1893), 32 3 Shapt v. Wyckoff, 39 N. J. Eq. 
 
 Pac. Rep. 1103; Richardson v. Hooper, 376; Mead v. Parker, 111 N. Y. 259; 
 
 13 Pick. 446 ; Delacroix v. Bulkley, Walker v. Camp, 63 Iowa, 627; 
 
 13 Wend. 71; Nashua, etc. Co. v. Cummings v. Putnam, 19 N. H. 569; 
 
 Boston, etc. Corp., 31 N. E. Rep. Danforth v. Mclntire, 11 111. App. 
 
 1060 (Mass., 1893); Munroe v. Perk- 417, and cases supra. 
 
 ins, 9 Pick. 298; Raymond v. Kraus- 4 Walker v. B. Wilmington, etc. 
 
 kopf (Iowa, 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. Co., 26 S. C. 80. 
 
 432; Vanderlin v. Hovis, 152 Pa. St. 5 Branch v. Wilson, 12 Fla. 543. 
 
 11; Strauss v. Gross (Tex., 1893), 21 6 steams v. Hall, 9 CuSh. (Mass.) 
 
 S. W. Rep. 305; Stallings v. Gotts- 31; Mead v. Parker, HI N. Y. 259; 
 
 chalk (Md.. 1893), 26 Atl. Rep. 524; Grace v. Lynch, 80 Wis. 166; Bige- 
 
 Janney v. Brown, 36 La. Ann. 118; low v. Capen, 145 Mass. 273 (renewal 
 
 Piatt v. United States, 22 Wall. 490; of note). 
 Creamer v. Stevenson, 15 Md. Ill;
 
 314 PAROL OK EXTEINSIC EVIDENCE. [§ 215. 
 
 ute of frauds is required to be in writing, as a new verbal 
 contract under such conditions would be inoperative. 1 The 
 date of the execution of an instrument when inserted in the 
 writing is always open to explanation, unless the date of exe- 
 cution is an essential element of the contract itself, when to 
 show a different date would be to make a new parol contract 
 for the parties. 2 The date as given is presumed to be correct 3 
 until the contrary is shown. 4 So, too, a date which has been 
 omitted may be supplied by parol. 5 
 
 § 2 1 5. To rebut presumptions. — If a presumption of law is 
 customarily drawn from certain language employed in a writ- 
 ten instrument, parol evidence is admissible to rebut this pre- 
 sumption by showing that in this particular instance the inten- 
 tion of the party was that the usual inference should not follow. 
 So it is presumed where two legacies of the same amount are 
 bequeathed to one person for the same purpose that the tes- 
 tator does not intend that they shall be cumulative. Under 
 such circumstances parol evidence is admissible, not to vary 
 the will, but to show that the testator intended that the earlier 
 legacy should not be satisfied by the later, and that the ben- 
 eficiary should take both. In other words, extrinsic evidence 
 is admitted to show that the will as it stands speaks the true 
 intent of the testator. 6 So parol evidence is admissible to 
 rebut a resulting trust which arises in favor of the heirs of 
 the testator, on the failure or lapse of a devise, 7 and to 
 
 x Dana v. Hancock, 30 Vt. 616; John v. Am. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 2 
 
 Low v. Treadwell, 12 Me. 441 ; Hill Duer (N. Y.), 415. 
 
 v. Blake, 97 N. Y. 216; Whittier v. ^Burditt v. Hunt, 25 Me. 419. 
 
 Dana, 10 Allen, 326; Jamison v. 6 Clendouning v. Clyrner, 17 Ind. 
 
 Ludlow, 3 La. Ann. 492; Adler v. 155; Paine v. Parsons, 14 Pick. 313; 
 
 Friedman, 16 Cal. 138; Marsh v. Bel- Dewitt v. Yates, 10 Johns. 156; Cecil 
 
 lew, 41 Wis. 39; Hill v. Blake, 97 v. Cecil, 20 Md. 153; Hine v. Hine, 
 
 N. Y. 216. Thus, parol evidence 39 Barb. 507 ; Russell v. Stanbyn, 16 
 
 of a general warranty is not admis- Moak's Eng. 818; Sims v. Sims, 2 
 
 sible to vary the terms of a deed Stockton Ch. 152; Jones v. Mason, 
 
 containing a limited warranty only. 5 Rand. (Va.) 577; Timberlake v. 
 
 Raymond v. Raymond, 10 Cush. Parish, 5 Dana, 348. 
 
 (Mass.) 134. ?McCure v. Evans, 29 Beav. 422; 
 
 2 Draper v. Snow, 20 N. Y. 331; Powell v. Manson, 3 Mason, 347; 
 Ellis v. Bank, 7 How. (U. S.) 294 ; Bar- Stark v. Canady, 3 Litt. 399 ; Mann 
 low v. Buckingham, 68 Iowa, 169. v. Mann, 14 Johns. 1 ; Reynolds v. 
 
 3 Cowing v. Altman, 71 N. Y. 433. Robinson, 82 N. Y. 103; Sture v. 
 
 4 Foster v. Beals, 21 N. Y. 247 ; St. Sture, 5 Johns. Ch. 1.
 
 § 215.] TAKOL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 315 
 
 show that a legacy by a parent to a child is not in satisfac- 
 tion of a portion due him. 1 Where a parent or other person 
 standing in loco parentis makes a pecuniary provision for a 
 child either in land or money, which is not made for the pur- 
 pose of providing for the education of the latter or which is 
 not a mere gift to him, the law will presume that it was in- 
 tended as an advancement pro tanto of what the child would 
 take on the death of the person either by the statutes of de- 
 scent or distribution or by devise from the latter. If the ad- 
 vancement is to be deducted from a devise by will, then parol 
 evidence is admissible, including the declarations of the tes- 
 tator, to rebut the presumption that the gift was an advance- 
 ment and that the devise is thereby satisfied.' 2 If, on the 
 other hand, the person in loco parentis dies intestate, parol 
 evidence may be received to rebut this presumption where 
 the gift or advancement consisted of land the transfer of 
 which is evidenced by a writing, 3 or where a note or other 
 evidence of indebtedness is given by the child to the parent, 4 
 or where the advancement to the child is entered in the books 
 of the parent in the form of a charge against the former. 
 The presumption of delivery 5 by the grantor or of accept- 
 ance by the grantee 6 which arises when a properly executed 
 deed is found in the latter's possession may be rebutted bv 
 parol evidence that the deed was not intended to be deliv- 
 ered or that the grantee was ignorant of the conveyance. 7 
 
 i Smith v. Condor, 9 Ch. D. 170; Lamb, 12 N. J. Eq. 116; Little v. 
 
 Lacon v. Lacon. W. N. 1891, p. 25; Gilson, 39 N. H. 505: Morris v. Hen- 
 
 Hine v. Hine, 39 Barb. 507 May v. derson, 37 Miss. 501 ; Faulkner v. 
 
 May, 28 Ala. 141 ; Rogers v. French, Adams, 126 Ind. 459 ; Mayor v. Todd, 
 
 19 Ga. 316; Nolan v. Bolton, 25 id. 84 Mich. 85; Ford v. James, 2 Abb. 
 
 352; Langdon v. Astor, 16 N. Y. 34; Pr. 162; Wolverton v. Collins, 34 
 
 Richard v. Humphreys, 15 Pick. 139 ; Iowa, 238. 
 Miner v. Atherton, 35 Pa. St. 528. 6 Peavey v. Tilton, 18 N. H. 152; 
 
 2 See cases in last note. Tompkins v. Wheeler, 16 Pet. 119; 
 
 3 Phillips v. Chappell, 16 Ga. 16; Fonda v. Sage, 46 Barb. 109; St. 
 Sayles v. Baker, 5 R. I. 457 ; Miller's Louis, etc. Co. v. Ruddell (Ark., 
 Appeal, 31 Pa. St. 337; Scott v. Scott, 1890), 13 S. W. Rep. 418; Dikeman 
 1 Mass. 527. v. Arnold, 78 Mich. 455 ; 44 N. W. 
 
 4 Tillotson v. Race, 22 N. Y. 127. Rep. 407. 
 
 5 Tiedeman on R. P., g 812; Adams ' See Tiedeman on Real Property, 
 
 v. Frye, 5 Mete. 109; Roberts v. §g 812, 813. 
 Jackson, 1 Wend. 478; Black v.
 
 316 
 
 PAKOL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§ 210. 
 
 § 216. To show usage. — The general and uniform doing 
 of a certain act is denominated usage. Though the word is 
 sometimes employed as synonymous with "custom," a distinc- 
 tion in meaning mav be noted. " Usa^e is the fact: custom 
 the law. There may be usage without custom ; there can be 
 no custom without usage to precede it. Usage consists in a 
 repetition of acts; custom arises out of this repetition." 1 
 Well-recognized, long-established usages and customs preva- 
 lent in the locality where a contract is made or a will or deed 
 executed are presumed to be known to the parties and to be 
 present in their minds when the instrument is executed. 2 
 Where no express direction to the contrary exists, parol evi- 
 dence of usage is admissible to ascertain the intention of the 
 parties or explain the nature and subject-matter of the instru- 
 ment or the meaning of its terms, wherever ambiguity or obscu- 
 rity exists upon these subjects. 3 On the other hand, where the 
 language is clear and free from doubt, and no ambiguity or 
 uncertainty is found, parol evidence of custom is not to be 
 received to control or vary the stipulations of the instrument. 4 
 
 1 Cutter v. Waddingham, 22 Mo. 
 284: Power v. Bowdle (N. D., 1893), 
 54 N. W. Rep. 410, citing Wharton 
 on Evid., 410. 
 
 2 Howard v. Walker (Term., 1893), 
 21 S. W. Rep. 897; Austrian v. Sprin- 
 ger, 91 Mich. 343 ; Pennell v. Delta 
 Co., 94 Mich. 247; McManus v. Lon- 
 don (Minn., 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. 139; 
 McCullough v. Ashbridge, 155 Pa. 
 St. 160. In the case of a particular 
 custom not of general observance 
 and notoriety, actual knowledge must 
 be brought home to the parties. 
 Milw. etc. Co. v. Johnson, 35 Neb. 
 554. 
 
 a Brown v. Baldwin Co., 13 N. Y. 
 S. 893; McClusky v. Klosterman, 20 
 Oreg. 108; 25 Pac. Rep. 366; Atkin- 
 son v. Truesdell, 127 N. Y. 230 ; 27 N. 
 E. Rep. 844; Long v. Armsby Co., 
 43 Mo. App. 253 ; Thompson v. Bran- 
 nin (Ky., 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 1057; 
 Pucci v. Barney, 21 N. Y. S. 1099; 
 Destrehan v. Louisiana Cypress Co. 
 
 (La., 1893), 13 S. Rep. 230; Merchant 
 v. Howell (Minn., 1S93), 55 N. W. 
 Rep. 131 ; Kansas City, etc. Co. v. 
 Webb (Ala., 1893), 11 S. Rep. 888; 
 Harrell v. Zimpleman, 66 Tex. 292; 
 Sahlien v. Bank, 90 Tenn. 221. See 
 also, Tiedeman on R. P., § 611. "A 
 general usage may be proved in 
 proper cases to remove ambiguities 
 and uncertainties in a contract or to 
 annex incidents, but it cannot de- 
 stroy, contradict or modify what is 
 otherwise manifest. Where the intent 
 and meaning are clear, evidence of 
 usage to the contrary is irrelevant. 
 Usage cannot make a contract where 
 there is none." First Nat. Bank v. 
 Burkhardt, 100 U. S. 692. The cus- 
 tom need not be pleaded. Breen v. 
 Moran, 53 N. W. Rep. 755. 
 
 •»The Reeside, 2 Sumn. 567; Cook 
 v. Hawkins, 16 S. W. Rep. 8 ; 54 Ark. 
 423 ; Van Camp v. Hartman, 126 Ind. 
 177; Larrowe v. Lewis, 58 Hun, 601 ; 
 De Cemea v. Cornell, 20 N. Y. S. 895 ;
 
 § 216.] PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 317 
 
 But a custom must be generally known and uniformly and 
 continuously observed where the contract is made, or in the 
 profession or trade to which the parties belong; for if it be 
 conlined to a limited class of persons, it is not presumptively 
 binding, and parol evidence of its existence is inadmissible. 1 
 The courts have adverted to the danger of allowing the in- 
 troduction of parol evidence of custom to modify or limit the 
 general application of the common law and the law merchant 
 to the liabilities and obligations of parties. The present trend 
 of the cases is perhaps restrictive in this respect; and while 
 evidence of general and notorious customs is always admis- 
 sible to explain a writing, evidence of customs which are lim- 
 ited in their operations should only be received after it is 
 shown that the parties contracted with express reference 
 thereto. 2 So, though parol evidence of general usage is ad- 
 missible whether the instrument under consideration be a cor- 
 porative charter, or other statute or deed or simple contract, 3 
 yet proof of custom will not be admissible to enlarge the 
 statutory authority of officials, 4 or to establish a different rule 
 of law from that laid down by a statute. 5 
 
 1 Misc. Rep. 399; Dobson v. Kuhula, 2 See remarks of Justice Story in 
 
 66 Hun, 627; Iasigi v. Rosenstein, 65 Schooner Reeside, 2 Sumn. 567; Nor- 
 
 id. 591; Sitnis v. Railway Co., 20 N. dans v. Hubbard, 48 Fed. Rep. 921. 
 
 Y. S. 179; Gilbert v. McGinnis, 114 3 Farrar v. Stackpole, 6 Greenl. 
 
 111. 48; Newhall v. Appleton, 114 N. 154;. Meriam v. Harsen, 2 Barb. 233. 
 
 Y. 143; De Witt v. Berry, 134 U. S. * Walters v. Senf (Mo., 1893), 22 S. 
 
 314; Emery v. Bos. Marine Ins. Co., W. Rep. 311. 
 
 138 Mass. 398; Bigelow v. Legg, 102 5 Gore v. Lewis, 109 N. C. 539; 
 N. Y. 654. Corn Exch. Bank v. Nassau Bank, 
 i Pennell v. Delta Co., 94 Mich. 247 ; 91 N. Y. 74. The evidence of a sin- 
 Martin v. Ashland Mill Co., 49 Mo. — ; gle witness is, if unimpeached, suf- 
 Larson v. Johnson, 42 111. App. 198; ficient to prove usage. Miller v. In- 
 Greenwich Ins. Co. v. Waterman, surance Co., 1 Abb. N. C. 470; Vail 
 54 Fed. Rep. 839 ; McCullough v. v. Rice, 5 N. Y. 155 ; Robinson v. 
 Ashbridge, 155 Pa. St. 166; Oregon United States, 13 Wall. 363. See, 
 Short, etc. Co. v. N. P. Ry. Co., 51 also, Abbott's Brief on Facts, §3 727- 
 Fed. Rep. 465 ; McKeefrey v. Con- 735. He need not be an expert if he 
 nellsville Coke Co., 56 Fed. Rep. 470; knows the usage. Griffin v. Rice, 1 
 Dobson v. Kuhula, 66 Hun, 627; Hilt. (N. Y.) 184. But his testimony 
 Bard well v. Ziegler, 3 Wash. St. 34; to specific acts is incompetent as 
 Chateaugay, etc. Co. v. Blake, 144 U. proof of a usage. Springfield v. 
 S. 476. The custom need not be co- Vivian, 63 Mich. 681 ; Abbott, Brief 
 extensive with the state. Lane v. on Facts, § 732. 
 Union Bank, 29 N. E. Rep. 613.
 
 318 
 
 PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§ 217. 
 
 § 2 1 7. Technical terms. — Where language has an accepted 
 popular, 1 commercial or scientific meaning, 2 the court will 
 take notice of its significance and will not receive evidence to 
 affix a different meaning, 3 upon the presumption that the 
 parties employed the words in their accustomed sense. 4 But 
 where commercial or scientific terms which are peculiarly 
 technical are used, or where ordinary words are used in a 
 technical sense, i, e., a sense peculiar to a particular locality or 
 trade, a latent ambiguity arises where these words are viewed 
 in relation to the subject-matter or to extrinsic circumstances, 
 and. under such circumstances, where their meaning is not 
 clear, parol evidence is always admissible. 5 But the witness 
 
 iKemble v. Lull, 3 McLean, 272; 
 Sexton v. Windell, 23 Gratt. 534; 
 Brawley v. United States, 96 U. S. 
 168; Bradish v. Yocum, 130 111. 386. 
 
 2 Hart man v. Camman, 10 N. J. 
 Eq. 128. 
 
 3 " When parties engaged in a par- 
 ticular business use terms which 
 
 (Shickle v. Chouteau Ry., 84 Mo. 
 161) " payment " (Van Fleet v. 
 Sledge, 45 Fed. Rep. 743), " a reason- 
 able time " (Jenkins v. Lykes, 19 
 Fla. 148), "timber" (Pillsbury v. 
 Locke, 33 N. H. 96), "lumber" 
 (Williams v. Stevens, 72 Wis. 487), 
 "store goods" (Taylor v. Sayre, 4 
 
 have acquired a well-defined mean- Zab. 647), will be rejected. 
 
 ing in that business, the supposition 
 is that they intended the terms to 
 have their ordinary technical mean- 
 ing." South Bend Iron Works v. 
 Cottrell, 31 Fed. Rep. 256; Chilberg 
 v. Jones, 3 Wash. St. 530; Cole v. 
 Lake, 54 N. H. 278 ; Caldwell v. Ful- 
 
 5 Bryan v. Harrison, 76 N. C. 360; 
 Silberman v. Clark, 90 N. Y. 524; 
 Clark v. Coffin Co., 125 Ind. 277; 
 Hall v. Davis, 36 N. H. 569; Charles 
 v. Patch, 87 Mo. 450; Mack v. Bens- 
 ley, 63 Wis. 80; Estman v. St. An- 
 thony, etc. Co., 43 Minn. 60; 44 N. 
 
 ton, 31 Pa. St. 849; Cross v. Thorn p- W. Rep. 882; Highton v. Dessau, 19 
 
 son, 50 Kan. 627; Gardt v. Brown, 
 113 111. 475; Holcomb v. Mooney, 13 
 Oreg. 513 ; Bradish v. Yocum, 130 111. 
 386; Van Fleet v. Sledge, 45 Fed. 
 Rep. 743; Matley v. Long, 71 Md. 
 585; Lippett v. Kelly, 46 Vt. 516; 
 
 N. Y. S. 395 ; Putnam v. Bond, 100 
 Mass. 58; Wabash, etc. Co. v. Mc- 
 Dougal, 113 111. 603; Atlanta v. 
 Schmelzer, 89 Ga. 609; Westmore- 
 land v. Carson, 76 Tex. 619 ; Bollinger 
 Co. v. McDowell, 99 Mo. 632. So 
 
 Fruin v. Railroad, 89 Mo. 397; In- parol evidence has been received to 
 surance Co. v. Throop, 22 Mich. 146 ; explain the meaning of such terms 
 
 Willmering v. McGauhey, 30 Iowa, 
 205. 
 
 4 So parol evidence to explain well- 
 known words, as "lower" and 
 
 as "fur" (Astor v. Insurance Co., 7 
 Cow. 202), " barrel " (Mill* v. 
 Stevens, 100 Mass. 518), " terms, two 
 months" (Hurd v. Bovee, 134 N. Y. 
 
 "south" (Farley v. Deslonde, 69 596; 31 N. E. Rep. 624), "mason 
 
 Tex. 458), " breeder and foal-getter " 
 (Cross v. Thompson, supra), " present 
 and future " (Swain v. Grangers' 
 Union, 69 Cal. 176), " more or less" 
 
 work " (Highton v. Dessau, 19 N. Y. 
 S. 395). "horn chains" (Swett v. 
 Shumway, 102 Mass. 365), " head- 
 right " (Minor v. Powers (Tex. Civ.
 
 § 218.] 
 
 PAROL OK EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
 
 119 
 
 who is called to explain the meaning of the terms should be 
 confined to his legitimate office and should not be allowed to 
 affix a construction to the instrument. 1 
 
 §218. Abbreviations. — These may, where they occur in 
 writing, be explained by parol evidence 2 of usage, if consist- 
 ent with the language of the contract, 3 though if they have 
 acquired a recognized legal or popular meaning parol evidence 
 to show they are used in another sense will be rejected. 4 The 
 letters " I. O. IT." constitute a valid acknowledgment of a 
 debt due, 5 and a written "I. O. U." is presumptive evidence 
 of an account stated. 6 The meaning of the letters "C." and 
 "J. P." after the signatures on a writ may be explained by 
 parol as meaning " constable" and "justice of the peace." 7 
 
 App., 1894), 24 S. W. Rep. 710), 
 " homestead farm " (Locke v. Row- 
 ell, 47 N. H. 46), "on margin" (Hatch 
 v. Douglas, 48 Conn. 116), "un- 
 settled " (Auzeriaz v, Neglee, 74 Cal. 
 60), "equal to Corliss" (Wickes v. 
 Swift Co., 70 Mich. 322), "product" 
 (Stewart v. Smith, 23 111. 397), "reg- 
 ular turn of loading " (Leideinan v. 
 Schultz, 24 Eng. L. & Eq. 305), 
 " care of R. R. Ag't" (Saw, etc. Co. 
 v. Collins, 77 Ga. 376), "season" 
 (Wachterhaus v. Smith. 10 N. Y. S. 
 535), " crop of flax " (5 Lans. (N. Y.) 
 230), " cold storage " (Behrman v. 
 Lind, 47 Hun, 530), " payable in 
 trade " (Dudley v. Vose, 1 14 Mass. 
 34), "spitting of blood" (Singleton 
 v. St. Louis, etc. Co., 66 Mo. 63), 
 "proposition" (Lamb v. State, 66 
 Md. 285), "flood-dams cribbed, 
 sparred, etc." (Quigley v. De Hass, 
 98 Pa. St. 292), " bought 12J, 6 mos." 
 (Dana v. Fiedler, 12 N. Y. 40), 
 "good custom cowhide" (Wait v. 
 Fairbanks, Brayt. (Vt.) 77), "good 
 breeder" (Connable v. Clark, 26 Mo. 
 App. 192), "merchantable hay" 
 (Fitch v. Carpenter, 43 Barb. 40), 
 "advertising chart when published" 
 (Stoops v. Smith, 100 Mass. 63). 
 1 Reynolds v. Jordan, 6 Cal. 109 ; 
 
 State v. Lefaivre, 53 Mo. 470; Arthur 
 v. Roberts, 60 Barb. (N. Y.) 580; 
 Reynolds v. Jordan, 6 Cal. 109; 
 Sanford v. Rawlings, 43 III. 92. 
 
 2 Hill v. State, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 357 ; 
 Converse v. Weed (111., 1892), 31 N. 
 E. Rep. 314; Jacqua v. Witham, 106 
 Ind. 515; Griffin v. Salmon, 6 Daly, 
 531; Sheldon v. Benham, 4 Hill 
 (N. Y.), 129; Datum v. Gow, 88 
 Mich. 99 ; Taylor v. Beavers, 4 E. D. 
 Smith, 215; Collender v. Dinsmore, 
 55 N. Y. 200. In wills, Chambers 
 v. Watson, 60 Iowa, 339 ; Goblet v. 
 Beechy, 3 Sim. 24; Norman v. Mor- 
 rell, 4 Ves. 769; Clayton v. Nugent, 
 13 M. & W. 206; Kell v. Charmer, 
 23 Beav. 195; Barton v. Anderson, 
 104 Ind. 578; Smith v. Insurance Co., 
 89 Pa. St. 287. 
 
 3 Collender v. Dinsmore, 55 N. Y. 
 202; Dana v. Fiedler, 12 N. Y. 40. 
 
 4 Silberman v. Clark, 96 N. Y. 522. 
 
 5 Kinney v. Flynn, 2 R. I. 319. 
 6 Fesenmyer v. Adcock, 16 M. & 
 
 W. 449; Curtis v. Richards, 1 Scott 
 N. R. 155 ; Gould v. Combs, 1 C. B. 
 543. 
 
 ~ Davis v. Ham bell (Tex., 1894), 24 
 S. W. Rep. 972. "In declaring on 
 an instrument containing abbrevi- 
 ated terms, extrinsic averments may
 
 320 
 
 PAROL OB EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. [§§ 219, 220. 
 
 § 211). The relations of the parties. — Parol evidence is 
 inadmissible to show that a person who signs as principal was 
 an agent, 1 or that one who signs as indorser was a surety. 2 
 But parol evidence is often admissible to identify the parties, 3 
 or to show the relations of the parties, as that a person who 
 signed a note as payer did so as a surety, 4 or in his represent- 
 ative capacity, 5 or that an indorser is not the assignee but the 
 payee of a note, 6 or that a person who writes his name on the 
 back of a note did so as a witness and not as an indorser. 7 
 
 § 220. To ascertain or explain subject-matter. — The 
 term "subject," as here used, may be defined as the persons 
 or things to which the writing relates. Parol evidence will 
 be admitted to identify or ascertain the subject of the instru- 
 ment or to explain its nature when, from the circumstances of 
 the case, no light is obtainable from a careful consideration of 
 the context. 8 Thus, where property, whether real or personal, 
 
 be used to make them intelligible; 
 and evidence of the sense in which 
 the parties were in the habit of using 
 the abbreviations and of their con- 
 ventional meaning is admissible, but 
 not to show the intention of one 
 party in using them. Gener-ally, in 
 indictments, common words are to 
 be used. Abbreviations of terms 
 employed by men of science or in 
 the arts will not answer without full 
 explanation of their meaning in com- 
 mon language. The use of ' A. D.,' 
 because of its universality, consti- 
 tutes an exception. Arabic figures 
 and Roman letters have also become 
 indicative of numbers as fully as 
 words. Their general use makes 
 them known to all. But unexplained 
 initials, referring to public land sur- 
 veys, etc., may not be employed in 
 an indictment." Jacqua v. Witham 
 & Co., 106 Ind. 547-48. 
 
 iSteirle v. Kaiser, 12 S. Rep. 839; 
 Hunt v. Adams, 7 Mass. 518; Cream 
 City G. Co. v. Friedlander, 54 N. W. 
 Rep. 28. 
 
 * Riley v. Gerrish, 9 Cush. 104. 
 
 3 Parsons v. Thornton, 82 Ala. 308. 
 
 4 Riley v. Gregg, 16 Wis. 666; 
 Trustees v. Southard, 31 111. App. 
 359 ; Otis v. Storch, 15 R. I. 41 ; Brad- 
 ley v. Caswell (Vt., 1893), 26 Atl. 
 Rep. 956. 
 
 5 Russell v. Irwin, 41 Ala. 292; 
 Northern Bank v. Lewis, 78 Wis. 
 475; Keidom v. Winegar (Mich., 
 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 901. 
 
 6 Holmes v. Goldsmith, 147 U. S. 
 150. 
 
 fTombler v. Reitz (Ind., 1893), 33 
 N. E. Rep. 789. Parol evidence is 
 not admissible to show that one who 
 indorses "without recourse" is a 
 surety. Young v. Nelson (Minn., 
 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 629. 
 
 8 " In order to ascertain the relation 
 of the words of a document to facts, 
 every fact may be proved to which 
 it refers or may probably have been 
 intended to refer, or which identifies 
 any person or thing mentioned in it. 
 Such facts are called the circum- 
 stances of the case." Stephen's Dig. 
 of Ev., art. 91.
 
 § 220.] 
 
 TAROL OK EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
 
 321 
 
 is conveyed, its condition or extent at that time is usually re- 
 ferred to, and any evidence necessary to place the court in 
 the position of the parties themselves in order to ascertain 
 the sense of the words employed is admissible. 1 Where a 
 description is ambiguous parol evidence is admissible to show 
 the extent and character of a grantor's possession. 2 Thus, 
 where a farm or house is conveyed, parol evidence, while not 
 admissible to vary or contradict the boundaries stated in the 
 deed, 3 is admissible to ascertain the identit} 7 or the location of 
 the monuments where they are lost or have been moved, or 
 where doubt exists concerning what objects are intended as 
 monuments. 4 
 
 Whenever something extrinsic is referred to as the subject- 
 matter of a writing, as the family or property of a grantor or 
 a testator, evidence of the facts and circumstances is necessary 
 to identify it unless, as rarely happens, the writing itself fur- 
 nishes a means of identification. Thus, where a testator or 
 grantor refers to his estate in Westchester, or known as B.', 
 
 •Schneider v. Patterson (Neb., 
 1894), 57 N. W. Rep. 398; In re Gil- 
 more, 154 Pa. St. 523; Mounett v. 
 Mounett, 46 Ohio St. 30; Richardson 
 v. Palmer, 38 N. H. 218; Hughes v. 
 Wilkinson, 35 Ala. 453; Welch v. 
 Eduaiston, 46 Mo. App. 282; Abbot: 
 v. Abbott, 51 Me. 581 ; Peart v. Price, 
 152 Pa. St. 277; Long v. Long, 44 
 Mo. App. 141; Baker v. Hall (Mass., 
 1893;, 33 N. E. Rep. 612; Roberts v. 
 Roberts, 55 N. Y. 275; Thompson v. 
 Railroad Co., 82 Cal. 497; Clark 
 v. Coffin Co., 125 Ind. 277 ; Ft. Worth 
 R. R. Co. v. Bank, 84 Tex. 369; 
 Perry v. Scott, 109 N. C. 374 ; Paugh 
 v. Paugh, 40 111. App. 143; Minor 
 v. Powers (Tex., 1894), 24 S. W. Rep. 
 710. 
 
 '-' Bell v. Woodward, 46 N. H. 327; 
 Baker v. Hall (Mass., 1893), 33 N. E. 
 Rep. 612; Booth v. Palte, L. R. 15 
 App. Cas. 188; Tinsley v. Dowell 
 (Tex., 1894), 24 S. W. Rep. 928. 
 
 :i Pride v. Lunt, 19 Me. 115? Par- 
 ker v. Kane, 22 How. 1; McCoy v. 
 21 
 
 Galloway, 3 Ohio, 283; Thayer v. 
 Finton, 108 N. Y. 397 ; Segar v. Bab- 
 cock (R. I., 1893), 26 Atl. Rep. 257; 
 Drew v. Swift, 46 N. Y. 209; Dean 
 v. F-skine, 18 N. H. 83- Spiller v. 
 Scribner, 36 Vt. 247; Hall v. Eaton, 
 139 Mass. 217: Kernarn v. Baham, 
 13 S. Rep. 155; Beardsley v. Crane 
 (Minn.. 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 740. 
 
 4 Waterman v. Johnson, 13 Pick. 
 20 1; Segar v. Babcock (R. I., 1893), 
 26 Atl. Rep. 257 ; Beardsley v. Crane 
 (Minn., 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 740; 
 Minor v. Kirkland (Tex., 1S93), 20 S.- 
 W. Rep. 932; Campbell v. Wood 
 (Mo., 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 796; Wead 
 v. Railroad Co., 64 Vt. 52; Sheetz v. 
 Sweeney, 136 111. 336; Flagg v. 
 Mason 141 Mass. 64; Converse 
 v. Lamghshow, 81 Tex. 275; Pickett 
 v. Nelson, 79 Wis. 9; Rapley v. 
 Klugh (S. C, 1894), 18 S. E. Rep. 
 680; Wells v. Leveridge, 20 Oreg. 
 168; Baldwin v. Shannon, 43 N. J. 
 L. 96; Tiedeman on R. P., § 832.
 
 322 TAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. [§ 220. 
 
 or occupied b}' a certain person, parol evidence is immediately 
 required to show that he owned an estate such as is described. 1 
 Again, suppose the testator bequeathes his " money " or " house- 
 hold furniture," or all " his property " or "estate," using words 
 which have a common and well-recognized meaning in a pe- 
 culiar, vague and confusing manner. No ambiguity, latent 
 or patent, can be said to exist until evidence has been received 
 which would tend to ascertain or identify the subject-matter. 
 For the words, while not technical or unusual, are employed 
 by the writer in a general and vague sense, and the meaning 
 which he wishes to convey cannot possibly be apprehended 
 on an inspection of the instrument alone. If extrinsic evidence 
 were not receivable in such a case, the intention of the person 
 executing the instrument could not be effectuated. 2 In such 
 cases of doubt and uncertainty, "when the language in its 
 primary meaning is insensible with reference to extrinsic cir- 
 cumstances," 3 extrinsic evidence is admissible of all facts and 
 circumstances appertaining to the persons or things which 
 are mentioned that will make the intention of the testator 
 more clearly appear. But the rule should not be carried too 
 far. Thus, in the case of wills or other transactions which 
 the law requires to be in writing, parol evidence of the decla- 
 rations of the intention of the testator either prior or sub- 
 sequent to or contemporaneous with the execution of the 
 instrument is not admissible, unless in the case of a latent 
 ambiguity arising from the fact that there are two or more 
 persons or things answering substantially to the description 
 of the writing. 4 
 
 J Mead v. Parker, 115 Mass. 413; ham v. Gannett, 124 Mass. 151; 
 
 Aldrich v. Aldrich, 135 Mass. 153; Raymond v. Coffey, 5 Oreg. 132. 
 
 Knick v. Knick, 75 Va. 12; War- 2 Where a testator devises the 
 
 field v. Booth, 33 Md. 63; Willis v. house he lives in, parol evidence is 
 
 Fernald, 33 N. J. L. 20G; Collender admissible to identify it. Beham v. 
 
 v. Dins-more, 55 N. Y. 200; Collins Hendrickson, 32 N. J. Eq. 441; 
 
 v. Drisooll, 34 Conn. 43; Rugg v. Chambers v. Watson, 60 Iowa, 339. 
 
 Ward, 23 Atl. Rep. 726; Riggs v. » Taylor, Ev., § 1109; Wigrarn on 
 
 Myers, 20 Mo. 239 ; Austee v. Nelmes, Wills, 67-70. 
 
 1 H. & M. 225 ; Cleverly v. Cleverly, 4 Mosely v. Martin, 37 Ala. 216; 
 
 124 Mass. 314; Maguire v. Baker, 57 Morse v. Stearns, 131 Mass. 389; 
 
 Ga. 109; Tuxbury v. French, 41 Lovejoy v. Lovett, 124 id. 270 ; Hall 
 
 Mich. 7 ; Black v. Hill, 32 Ohio St. v. Davis, 36 N. H. 569 ; Morgan v. 
 
 313; Cox v. Cox, 91 N. C. 256; Dun- Burrows, 45 Wis. 211 ; Mittnacht v.
 
 § 221.] PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 323 
 
 §221. Ambiguities defined and distinguished — Parol evi- 
 dence to explain. — An ambiguity in a written instrument is 
 any indistinctness, duplicity or uncertainty of meaning aris- 
 ing from the word? having no definite sense or a double mean- 
 ing. 1 A writing is not ambiguous merely because the court 
 cannot understand its meaning on account of the technical 
 language in which it is couched. 2 So language may be in- 
 accurate without being ambiguous, and ambiguous though 
 strictly accurate. So where by rejecting that portion of a 
 description which is inaccurate as surplusage the intention of 
 the writer can be ascertained, no ambiguity can be said to exist. 3 
 On the other hand, the words " indistinctness," "uncertainty ; ' 
 and " obscurity " are much broader in meaning. They in- 
 clude ambiguities, but they also include all cases of language 
 which is devoid of sense or which does not have any clear or 
 precise meaning. 
 
 Ambiguities are divided into those which are patent and 
 those which are latent. 4 The former class includes those 
 which appear upon the face of the writing itself, whether will 
 or deed, before the words are applied to any extrinsic subject 
 
 Slevin, 67 Hun, 615; Bullock v. ambiguous merely because the court 
 Consumers' Lumber Co. (Gal., 1893), which is called upon to explain 
 31 Pac. Rep. 367 ; Todd v. Roberts, them may be ignorant of a particu- 
 1 Tex. Civ. App. 8 ; Forbes v. Dar- lar art, fact or science which was fa- 
 ling, 94 Mich. 621; Tompkins v. miliar to the person who used the 
 Merriman, 155 Pa. St. 440; Scraggs words, and a knowledge of which 
 v. Hill (W. Va., 1893), 17 S. E. Rep. is necessary to a right understand- 
 185. ing of the words he has used. If 
 
 1 Bouvier, Law. Diet. ; Ellmaker v. this be not a just conclusion it must 
 Ellmaker, 4 Watts (Pa.), 89. follow that the question whether a 
 
 2 Wigram, in his treatise on Ex- will is ambiguous might be depend- 
 trinsic Evidence, sections 200 and ent not upon the propriety of the 
 201, says in a passage which has been language the testator has used, but 
 repeatedly cited with approbation: upon the degree of knowledge, gen- 
 " A written instrument is not am- eral or even local, which a particular 
 biguous because an ignorant and un- judge might happen to possess; nay, 
 informed person is unable to inter- the technical precision and accuracy 
 pret it. It is ambiguous only if of a scientific man might occasion his 
 found to be of uncertain meaning intestacy — a proposition too absurd 
 when persons of competent skill and for an argument." 
 
 information are unable to do so. 3 Wigram, §§ 200-205. 
 
 Words cannot be ambiguous because * 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 297: Bacon's 
 
 they are unintelligible to a man who Maxims, Reg. 23; Tiedeman, R. P., 
 
 is unable to read ; nor can they be § 386.
 
 324: 
 
 PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§ 221. 
 
 or object, as when a sum of money or the name of a person 
 is differently stated in different parts of the writing. 1 Latent 
 ambiguities occur where the writing itself is clear and con- 
 sistent, but where, in the language of Lord .Bacon, " some 
 collateral matter out of the deed breedeth the ambiguity." 
 Thus, in a devise of a house at A., a latent ambiguity will 
 occur if the testator owned two or more houses in that place. 
 
 The general rule is that parol evidence is inadmissible to 
 explain a patent ambiguity, and the writing is, to the extent 
 it is ambiguous, void and inoperative. 2 But the court has a 
 right to every aid which is within its power in construing any 
 instrument. 3 And so in the case of a patent ambiguity, some 
 exceptions have been made to the general rule. 4 
 
 Latent ambiguities, which arise when the language of the 
 instrument is ambiguous or meaningless as applicable to ex- 
 trinsic circumstances, may always be explained by extrinsic 
 evidence. 5 They may be divided into two classes: First, where 
 
 1 Thus, a devise " to one of the 
 sons of A." is a good example of a 
 patent ambiguity. Strode v. Rus- 
 sell, 2 Vera. 624. 
 
 2Brauns v. Stearns, 1 Oreg. 367; 
 Brown v. Brown, 43 N. H. 25; 
 Scraggs v. Hill (W. Va., 1893), 17 S. 
 E. Rep. 185; Pickering v. Pickering, 
 50 N. H. 349; Pitts v. Brown, 49 Vt. 
 86 ; Patch v. White, 1 Mackey (D. C), 
 468 ; Mann v. Mann, 1 Johns. Ch. 231 ; 
 Griffith v. Furry, 30 111. 251 ; Hyatt 
 v. Pugsley, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 285; 
 Waldron v. Waldron, 45 Mich. 350; 
 Hollen v. Davis, 59 Iowa, 444 ; Tucker 
 v. Seamen's Aid Society, 7 Mete. 
 (Mass.) 188; Ayres v. Weed, 16 Conn. 
 291 ; Horner v. Stillwell, 35 N. J. L. 
 307; McDermot v. U. S. Ins. Co., 3 
 S. & R. (Pa.) 604; Richmond, etc. Co. 
 v. Farquar, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 89; 
 Clark v. Lancaster, 36 Md. 196; Bow- 
 yer v. Martin, 6 Rand. (Va.) 525; 
 Campbell v. Johnson, 44 Mo. 247; 
 Harris v. Dinkins, 4 Desnus. (S. C.) 
 60; Chambers v. Ringslaff, 69 Ala. 
 140; Duncan v. Duncan, 2 Yeates 
 
 (Pa.), 302 : 2 id. 295 ; Weston v. White, 
 5 Md. 297 ; Mithoff v. Byrne, 20 La. 
 Ann. 363 ; Peacher v. Strauss, 47 Miss. 
 358 ; Nashville L. I. Co. v. Mathews, 
 8 Lea (Tenn.), 299; Breckinridge v. 
 Duncan, 2 A. K. Marsh, 50; Brennan 
 v. Winkler (S. C, 1893), 16 S. E. Rep. 
 190. But parol evidence is always 
 admissible to explain illegible words 
 or symbols. Taylor v. Beavers, 4 
 E. D. Smith, 215; Arthur v. Roberts, 
 60 Barb. 5,0. 
 
 3 Abbott, Brief on Facts, §§ 148, 149. 
 
 * Collison v. Curling, 9 CI. & Fin. 
 88. " The rule forbidding extrinsic 
 evidence to cure a patent ambiguity 
 is not applicable except the writing 
 is required' by a statute which the 
 ambiguity prevents the writing from 
 satisfying." Abbott, Brief on Facts, 
 § 152. 
 
 &Hildebrand v. Fogle, 20 Ohio, 147 ; 
 Mason v. Ryus, 26 Kan. 464; How- 
 ard v. American, etc. Soc, 49 Me. 
 288; Wheelwright v. Akin (Ga., 
 1893), 17 S. E.- Rep. 610; Bell v. 
 Woodward, 46 N. H. 315; McAnulty
 
 §221.] 
 
 PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
 
 325 
 
 the description of the subject-matter, i. e., the property or 
 person mentioned, is clear and certain upon the face of the 
 instrument itself, but it is found by extrinsic evidence that 
 there is more than one estate or subject-matter or more than 
 one person whose description corresponds with legal certain ty 
 to the terms of the instrument. Thus, when the testator de- 
 vises land to a person by name or description and the land is 
 claimed by more than one person, all of whom answer to the 
 name or other description, parol evidence, including the testa- 
 tor's declarations of intention, is admissible to identify the per- 
 son whom the testator intended to benefit. 1 Second, where 
 
 v. Urban, 25 N. Y. S. 274; Wolfert 
 v. Pittsburg R. Co., 44 Mo. App. 
 330; Bovee v. Hurd, 134 N. Y. 456; 
 Knapp v. Warner, 57 id. 668; Clark 
 v. Woodruff, 83 id. 218; Neal v. 
 Reams, 88 Ga. 298 ; Bell v. Boyd, 53 
 id. 643: Coals v. Sulan, 46 Kan. 341 ; 
 McDonald v. Dana, 154 Mass. 152; 
 Simpson v. Dix, 131 id. 179; Love- 
 joy v. Lovett, 124 id. 270; Goff v. 
 Roberts, 72 Mo. 570; Brewster v. 
 McCall, 15 Conn. 274; Altschul v. 
 San Francisco, etc. Co., 43 Cal. 171: 
 Begg v. Beggs, 56 Wis. 534; Peters 
 v. Porter, 60 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 422; 
 Thomas v. Truscott, 53 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 200 ; Sandford v. Newark, 37 N. J. L. 
 1; Wilson v. Home, 65 Ala. 448; 
 Warfield v. Booth, 33 Md. 63 ; Fryer 
 v. Patrick, 42 Md. 51; Hawkins v. 
 Garland, 76 Va. 149; Piper v. True, 
 36 Cal. 606 ; Moore v. United States, 
 17 Ct. of CI. 17; Pratt v. California 
 M. Co., 24 Fed. Rep. 869; United 
 States v. Peck, 102 U. S. 64; Lumey 
 v. Wood, 66 Tex. 22 ; Lego v. Med- 
 ley, 79 Wis. 211; Euless v. Mc- 
 Adams, 108 N. C. 507. A devise to 
 "my children" raises a latent am- 
 biguity when the testator has illegit- 
 imate or adopted children, and parol 
 evidence will be received to explain 
 whom should be included by the 
 term. Ellis v. Houston, L. R. 10 
 Ch. Div. 236; Brower v. Bowers, 1 
 
 Abb. App. Dec. 214; In re Cahn, 3 
 Redf. (N. Y.)31. "The distinction 
 between latent and patent ambiguity 
 as respects the admissibility of parol 
 evidence lies in the rule that the in- 
 tention must be gathered from the 
 will itself. If it is a patent ambi- 
 guity the will does not express any 
 certain intention and it is therefore 
 void for uncertainty. But if the 
 ambiguity is latent, i. e., discovered 
 dehors the will, there would be no 
 ambiguity as to intention if the in- 
 vestigation was confined to the will 
 itself. The ambiguity arising from 
 extraneous facts may be explained 
 away." Tiedeman, R. P., § 884. 
 
 i Patch v. White, 117 U. S. 210 
 Connolly v. Pardon, 1 Paige, 291 
 Gilmer v. Stone, 120 U. S. 586; Dun 
 ham v. Averill, 45 Conn. 61, 68 
 Hawkins v. Garland, 76 Va. 149 
 Goodhue v. Clark, 37 N. H. 525 
 Skinner v. Harrison, 116 Ind. 139 
 Matter of Cahn, 3 Redf. Sur. 31 
 Beardsley v. Am. Miss. Soc, 45 Conn 
 327 ; Stokeley v. Gordon, 8 Md. 496 
 Smith v. Smith, 4 Paige, 271 ; Hall 
 v. Leonard, 1 Pick. 31 ; Jackson v. 
 Boneham, 15 Johns. 296; Pinson v. 
 Ivey, 1 Yerg. 296; Button v. Am. 
 Tract Soc, 23 Vt. 338; Haydon v. 
 Ewing, 1 B. Mon. 113. Cf. Eckford 
 v. Eckford (Iowa, 1S93), 53 N. W. 
 Rep. 345 ; Hinckley v. Thatcher, 139
 
 326 
 
 PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§ 222. 
 
 the description is clear, but partly applicable and partly inap- 
 plicable as applied to some property or person that is al- 
 leged to be intended; as, for example, in cases of misnomer 
 or misdescription of property or persons. In such cases, where 
 the description is untrue in some particular (which fact can 
 only be ascertained by extrinsic evidence), that part of the 
 description which is false will be repudiated, and the re- 
 mainder, if sufficient to identify the person or thing, will be 
 permitted to go into effect. 1 If the description is wholly in- 
 applicable to the object said to be intended, evidence is inad- 
 missible to show what its author really intended to describe. 
 § 222. Parol evidence to explain wills. — By the statute 
 of wills which has been enacted in all the states of the Union, 
 wills, with the exception of those termed nuncupative, are re- 
 quired to be in writing, properly authenticated, and parol evi- 
 dence is inadmissible to control, vary or contradict the lan- 
 guage used. 2 The principles and rules of law applicable to 
 
 Mass. 477; Lefevre v. Lefevre, 59 
 N. Y. 434; Evans v. Giissom, 40 N. 
 J. L. 549. 
 
 1 Bristol v. Ontario Orp. Asylum, 
 60 Conn. 472; Faulkner v. National 
 S. Home, 155 Mass. 458; 29 N. E. 
 Rep. 645; Chappell v. Missionary 
 Soc, 3 Ind. App. 356; 29 id. 924; 
 Kimball v. Chappell, 27 Abb. N. C. 
 437; Tallman v. Tallman, 3 Misc. 
 Rep. 465; In re Lennig's Estate, 154 
 Pa. St. 209 ; 25 Atl. Rep. 1069. But 
 in such cases the declarations of the 
 writer or grantor are inadmissible. 
 
 2 See post, § 269 ; In re Gilmore, 81 
 Cal. 240; Vreeland v. Williams, 32 
 N. J. Eq. 734; Turner v. Sav. Inst., 
 76 Me. 527; Greenough v. Cass, 64 
 N. H. 326; Lee v. Shivers, 70 Ala. 
 288; Foster v. Dickinson, 64 Vt. 253; 
 Graham v. Graham, 23 W. Va. 36; 
 Crooks v. Whitford, 47 Mich. 283; 
 In re Gordon (N. J., 1893), 26 Atl. 
 Rep. 268 ; McDaniel v. King, 90 N. C. 
 597; Senger v. Senger, 81 Va. 687; 
 Hancock's Appeal, 112 Pa. St. 532; 
 Robinson v. Brewster, 140 111. 649; 
 
 Magee v. McNeal, 41 Miss. 17. Thus, 
 for example, a blank in a will can- 
 not, be filled b} r parol evidence show- 
 ing what words the testator meant 
 to have inserted, as to permit this 
 would be equivalent to making an 
 oral disposition of property where 
 the law requires a writing. Tuckers 
 v. Seamen's Aid Soc, 7 Mete. (Mass.) 
 205; Clayton v. Nugent, 13 M. & W. 
 200; Baylis v. A. G., 2 Atk. 239; 
 Hunt v. Hart, 3 Bro. C. C. 311, cited 
 8 Bing. 254. On this subject Vice- 
 Chancellor Wigram says : " If, then, 
 a testator's words, aided by the light 
 derived from the circumstances with 
 reference to which they were used, 
 do not express the intention ascribed 
 to him, evidence to prove the sense 
 in which he intended to use them 
 is, as a general proposition, inadmis- 
 sible ; in other words, the judgment 
 of a court in expounding a will must 
 be simply declaratory of what is in 
 the will." Wigram, Extrinsic Ev., 
 §87.
 
 § 222.] PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 327 
 
 the interpretation of wills are, it has been said, 1 the same as 
 where other writings are concerned. It is evident, however, 
 that certain elements enter into the consideration of the ques- 
 tion how far is extrinsic evidence admissible in relation to 
 wills that are not present where other writings are under 
 consideration. In reply to any demand for an assimilation 
 of contracts and wills in this particular, it may be said that 
 the former instruments possess a mutuality of character and 
 imply a reciprocity of benefits or disadvantages which furnish 
 strong reasons for refusing to allow contracts to be varied by 
 evidence of parol declarations of intention. But the benefit 
 conveyed by a will is voluntary and unilateral. The contents 
 of the instrument itself, unlike a contract or writing between 
 parties, are usually a secret in the keeping of the testator or of 
 his confidential adviser, and this circumstance alone is suffi- 
 cient to cast some suspicion upon any public oral declara- 
 tions of the testator as to his intention. The law encourages 
 this secrecy, and, by consistently refusing to regard the secret 
 testamentary act or writing as other than revocable, enables 
 the testator "to baffle with equivocation or misrepresentation 
 the importunities of the expectant and the inquisitiveness of 
 the curious." 2 So, on general principles, it is manifestly ab- 
 surd to accept hearsay evidence, which must often necessarily 
 be given by persons who by social connections or by ties of 
 kinship have or imagine they have some moral or legal claims 
 upon the bounty of the testator, to show that the latter, whose 
 lips are now forever sealed by death, meant something other 
 than his intention solemnly and formally committed to writ- 
 ing and authenticated in the express mode prescribed by stat- 
 ute. So, despite the fact that wills are frequently executed 
 under circumstances very unfavorable to mental clearness, or 
 to the lucid expression of intention, and despite the tend- 
 ency of the courts to favor, so far as is possible, the exercise 
 of the testamentary power so that it may with truth be said 
 that the law prefers that a man should not die intestate, the 
 modern cases construing wills restrict to a greater extent than 
 formerly the admission of parol evidence in relation thereto. 
 At the outset also it is necessary to distinguish carefully be- 
 
 1 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 287. 2 Abbott, Trial Ev., p. 131.
 
 328 PAROL OK EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. [§ 222. 
 
 tween extrinsic evidence to show or establish the intention 
 directly, which is never admissible, and extrinsic evidence to 
 explain the intention or to ascertain what it was as expressed 
 by the language of the will, or to show that the will does 
 actually express the testator's intention or that he never in- 
 tended the writing as testamentary. 
 
 So under the general rule that the invalidity of an instru- 
 ment may be shown, parol evidence is always admitted to 
 show that a paper purporting to be the will of the testator is 
 not his will and does not contain his testamentary intention 
 because it was executed by mistake, 1 in order to effect some 
 non-testamentary object, 2 or as a duplicate of an earlier writ- 
 ing. 3 So parol evidence is always admissible to show that the 
 testator was mentally incapacitated on account of imbecility 
 or insanity. 4 If a testamentary gift is procured by a promise 
 to hold the same for the benefit of another person, this prom- 
 ise may be shown by parol and it will be deemed to create a 
 constructive parol trust. 5 Where it is alleged that a will was 
 executed under undue influence, extrinsic evidence is admitted 
 to show the surrounding circumstances of the testator at the 
 moment of execution, his private history and that of his fam- 
 ily, 6 and other facts necessary to enable the court to ascertain 
 
 i In re Hunt, L. R. 3 P. & D. 250; In re Spencer, 96 Cal. 448; Morris v. 
 
 In re Gordon (1892), P. 228; Covert Morton (Ky., 1893), 20 S. Rep. 287. 
 v. Sebern, 73 Iowa, 564; Severson 5 Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 42 
 
 v. Severson, 68 id. 657. Hooker v. Axford, 33 Mich. 453 
 
 2 Lister v. Smith, 33 L. J. Prob. 29. Headley v. Renner, 130 Pa. St. 542 
 
 3 Hubbard v. Alexander, 3 Ch. D. Church v. Ruland, 64 id. 432 ; Dowd 
 738. v. Tucker, 41 Conn. 197; Hoge v. 
 
 4 Ross v. McQuiston, 45 Iowa, 145; Hoge, 1 Watts, 163, 213: "Williams 
 Ellis v. Ellis, 133 Mass. 469; Dyer v. v. Vreeland, 29 N. J. Eq. 417. 
 Dyer, 87 Ind. 13; Rule v. Maupin, 6 Clark v. Stansbury, 49 Md. 346; 
 84 Mo. 587; In re Blakely, 48 Wis. Reynolds v. Adams, 90 111. 134; Pot- 
 294; Harrison's Appeal, 100 Pa. St. ter's Appeal, 53 Mich. 106; Canada's 
 458; Frary v. Gusha, 59 Vt. 257; 9 Appeal, 47 Conn. 450. Where in- 
 Atl. Rep. 549; Schneider v. Man- sanity is alleged it may be shown by 
 ning, 121 111. 376; 12 N. E. Rep. 267; parol that he never was mentally in- 
 In re Norman, 33 N. W. Rep. 374 ; capacitated or that he had recovered 
 72 Iowa, 84; Prentis v. Bates, 93 or that the will was executed in a 
 Mich. 234; Johnson v. Armstrong lucid interval. In re Rapple, 66 
 (Ala., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 72; Bulger Hun, 558; Shanley's Appeal (Conn., 
 v. Ross (Ala., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 803; 1893), 25 Atl. Rep. 245; In re Spen-
 
 § 223.] IUROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 329 
 
 whether or not such influence existed. So, generally, where 
 the will is written in a foreign language, or where it contains 
 technical words, or common words used in a peculiar sense, or 
 technical, scientific or legal words used in a non-technical 
 sense, or clerical mistakes obvious on its face, or where a 
 devisee is ambiguously described or inaccurately named, parol 
 evidence is admissible under the rules and principles elabo- 
 rated in this chapter, not to show the intention, but to enable 
 the court to place itself in the position occupied by the testator 
 when he executed the will and to ascertain the intention from 
 the testamentary writing applied to extrinsic objects and 
 read in the light thus derived from surrounding and explana- 
 tory circumstances. 1 
 
 § 223. Parol evidence to show absolute deed a mortgage — 
 In suits for specific performance, reformation and cancella- 
 tion. — It is a rule of general acceptance that parol evidence 
 is admissible in equity to show that a deed absolute on its 
 face was intended as a mortgage, whenever fraud, accident 
 or mistake is alleged in its execution or in the use to which 
 it is put by the grantee. 2 The tendency at the present day 
 is to afford relief even in the absence of actual fraud or mis- 
 take in the execution of the deed, whenever the circumstances 
 are such that the use of the writing as a deed would be in- 
 equitable, or where the intention to create a mortgage is shown. 3 
 
 cer, 96 Cal. 448; Martin v. Thayer, Beach, 115 Ind. 413; Knapp v. Bailey, 
 
 37 W. Va. 38; Preutis v. Bates, 93 79 Me. 195; Biggars v. Byrd, 55 Ga. 
 
 Mich. 234. 650; Green v. Sherrod, 105 N. C. 
 
 1 For a very clear elucidation of 197; Price v. Grover, 40 Md. 202; 
 the somewhat contradictory rules Hurst v. Beaver, 50 Mich. 612 ; Mar- 
 regulating the reception of parol shal v. Thompson, 39 Minn. 137; 
 evidence in connection with wills, Weathersley v. Weathersley, 40 
 the reader is referred to Abbott's Miss. 462; Shradski v. Albright, 93 
 Trial Evidence, pp. 129-150. Mo. 42: Pierce v. Traver, 13 Nev. 
 
 2 First Nat. Bank v. Kreig (Nev., 526; Odell v. Montross, 68 N. Y. 499; 
 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 641; Locke v. Stephens v. Allen, 11 Oreg. 188; 
 Moulton. 96 Cal. 21; Peugh v. Davis, Berbesick v. Fritz, 39 Iowa, 700; 
 96 U. S. 332; Campbell v. Dearborn, Kinports v. Boy ton, 120 Pa. St. 306; 
 109 Mass. 150; Harman v. May, 40 Kerr v. Hill, 27 W. Va. 576; Hick- 
 Ark. 146; First Nat. Bank v. Ash- man v. Quinn, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 96; 
 mead, 23 Fla. 379; Workman v. Edwards v. Wall, 79 Va. 321; Nes- 
 Greening, 115 111. 477- Darst v. bitt v. Cavendar, 27 S. C. 1. 
 Murphy, 119 id. 343* Moreland v. 3 The evidence must be clear, con- 
 Bernhardt, 44 Tex. 275; Rogers v. vincing and free from doubt in order
 
 530 
 
 PAROL OK EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§ 223. 
 
 Under this rule may be shown the existence of a parol agree- 
 ment of defeasance, the relation of the parties and the decla- 
 rations of either, the possession of the premises by complainant, 
 a loan to him by the grantee and his payment of interest, the 
 value of the property as compared with the consideration paid, 
 the needs of the grantor and any agreement to repay. 1 The 
 statute of frauds does not prevent the reception of such evi- 
 dence, which is introduced not to vary but to invalidate a writ- 
 ing. 2 The current of authority is decidedly in favor of the 
 
 that the deed may be deemed a mort- 
 gage. Ganceart v. Henry (Cal. , 1893), 
 33 Pac. Rep. 92 ; Parmer v. Parmer, 
 88 Ala. 545; Fisher's Appeal, 132 
 Pa. St. 488; Pollock v. Warwick, 
 104 N. C. 638 ; Franklin v. Ayers, 22 
 Fla. 644; Langes v. Meservey, 45 
 N. W. Rep. 732; Armor v. Spalding 
 (Colo., 1890), 23 Pac. Rep. 789; Jame- 
 son v. Emerson, 82 Me. 309 ; Strong 
 v. Strong, 126 111. 301; Barton v. 
 Lynch, 69 Hun, 1 ; Baird v. Rein- 
 inghaus (Iowa, 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 
 148. " In considering the nature 
 and sufficiency of the evidence re- 
 quired to convert a deed absolute on 
 its face into a mortgage, we should 
 never lose sight of the rules and 
 practice of the court of equity at the 
 time it was established by that court 
 that parol evidence could be received 
 for that purpose. . . . The same 
 and no less convincing proofs were 
 required that are necessary to au- 
 thorize the reformation of a written 
 contract on the ground of mistake. 
 If the proofs are doubtful and un- 
 satisfactory and the mistake is not 
 made entirely plain, equity will with- 
 hold relief upon the ground that the 
 written paper ought to be treated as 
 a full and correct expression of the 
 iutent until the contrary is estab- 
 lished beyond reasonable contro- 
 versy." Kent v. Lasley, 24 Wis. 
 651. See, also, Clay burgh v. Good- 
 child, 19 Atl. Rep. 1015; 135 Pa. St. 
 
 421. And compare Poullain v. Poul- 
 lain, 76 Ga. 420, in which it was 
 held that proof beyond a reasonable 
 doubt is not required in cases of 
 mistakes alleged to exist in written 
 instruments. 
 
 1 Swett v. Parker, 22 N. J. Eq. 453; 
 Farmer v. Grove, 24 Cal. 169. 
 
 2 Walker v. Walker, 2 Atk. 98; 
 Campbell v. Dearborn, 109 Mass. 130; 
 Reigard v. O'Neill, 38 111. 400; Sewell 
 v. Price, 32 AJa. 97; Klein v. Mc- 
 Namara, 54 Miss. 90; CaiT v. Carr, 
 52 N. Y. 251 ; Taylor v. Luther, 2 
 Sumn. (U. S.) 238. For a full dis- 
 cussion of the equitable doctrine on 
 this subject, see Tiedeman on Equity, 
 § 199. In Campbell v. Dearborn, 109 
 Mass. 130, the court, by Wells, J., 
 said : " We do not regard the stat- 
 ute of frauds as interposing any in- 
 superable obstacles to the granting 
 of relief in such a case, because re- 
 lief, if granted, is attained by setting 
 aside the deed, and parol evidence is 
 availed of to establish the equitable 
 grounds for impeaching that instru- 
 ment and not for the purpose of 
 setting up some other or different 
 contract to be substituted in its place. 
 If proper grounds exist and are shown 
 for defeating the deed, the equities 
 between the parties will be adjusted 
 according to the nature of the trans- 
 action and the facts and circum- 
 stances of the case, among which 
 may be included the real agreement.
 
 § 223.] 
 
 TAROL OK EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
 
 331 
 
 rule that such evidence is not admissible at law, except per- 
 haps in those states where the distinction between legal and 
 equitable procedure has been abrogated by the modern codes. 1 
 A third person having a claim against the grantor may show 
 by parol that the deed is a mortgage. 2 But when the grantee 
 in an absolute deed has reconveyed to an innocent purchaser 
 without notice of the true agreement between the parties, such 
 parol evidence will not be received. 3 
 
 Where specific performance of a contract is asked, the 
 defendant is permitted to show by parol evidence that the 
 written contract does not, either because of fraud or mistake, 
 represent the real intention of the parties. 4 On the other 
 hand, where the plaintiff asks for a reformation of the con- 
 tract on the grounds of mistake and its specific performance 
 as reformed, the cases are at variance. The American cases 
 hold that reformation and specific performance may be ob- 
 tained in one action by the introduction of parol evidence 
 by the plaintiff, irrespective of the performance by him of 
 the parol portion of the contract. 5 The English cases hold 
 
 It does not violate the statute of 
 frauds to admit parol evidence of 
 the real agreement as an element in 
 the proof of fraud or other vice in 
 the transaction which is relied on to 
 defeat the written instrument." 
 
 1 Brainerd v. Brainerd, 15 Conn. 
 575; Bragg v. Massie, 88 Ala. 89; 
 Hogel v. Lindell, 10 Mo. 483; Flint 
 v. Sheldon, 13 Mass. 443; Brinkman 
 v. Jones, 44 Wis. 498 ; Jackson v. 
 Lodge, 36 Cal. 28 ; Webb v. Rice, 6 
 Hill (N. Y.), 219; Stinchfield v. Milli- 
 ken, 71 Me. 507. 
 
 -'Walter v. Cronly, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 63; Allen v. Kemp, 29 Iowa, 452. 
 
 SMaxfield v. Patchen, 29 111. 39; 
 Baugher v. Merryman, 32 Md. 185; 
 Rhines-v. Baird, 41 Pa. St. 356. In 
 Buckman v. Ahvood, 71 111. 155, the 
 court said : " It will be perceived 
 that in none of these cases did the 
 court attempt to range the jurisdic- 
 tion to turn an absolute deed into a 
 mortgage by parol evidence under 
 
 any specific head of equity, such as 
 fraud, accident or mistake, but the 
 rule seems to have grown into rec- 
 ognition as an independent head of 
 equity. Still it must have its founda- 
 tion in this: that where the transac- 
 tion is shown to have been meant as 
 a security for a loan, the deed will 
 have the character of a mortgage 
 without other proof of fraud than is 
 implied in showing that a convey- 
 ance taken for the mutual benefit of 
 both parties has been appropriated 
 solely to the use of the grantee." 
 
 4 Quinn v. Roath, 87 Conn. 16; 
 Coles v. Brown, 10 Paige, 526; Berry 
 v. Whitney, 40 Mich. 65; Wood- 
 worth v. Cook, 2 Blatchf. 151 ; Ryno 
 v. Darby, 20 N. J. Eq. 31 ; Cathcart 
 v. Robinson, 5 Pet. 263 ; Mansfield v. 
 Sherwin, 81 Me. 365; Ring v. Ash- 
 worth, 3 Iowa. 452; Caldwell v. De- 
 pew, 40 Minn. 528. See, also, Tiede- 
 man on Equity, § 198. 
 
 3 Bellows v. Stone, 14 N. H. 175;
 
 332 
 
 PAROL OK EXTHINSIC EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§ 223. 
 
 that this cannot be done unless there has been a part per- 
 formance of the parol portion. 1 But where cancellation or 
 reformation only is asked, it is well settled that parol evi- 
 dence is admissible to establish the fraud or mistake as a 
 basis for the relief demanded. 2 
 
 Grass v. Hurlbert, 102 Mass. 24, 41 ; 
 Hunter v. Bilyeu, 30 111. 228; Quinn 
 v. Roath, 37 Conn. 16; Gillespie v. 
 Moon, 2 Johns. Ch. 585; Beardsley 
 v. Knight, 10 Vt. 185; Gower v. 
 Sterner, 2 Whart. 75 ; Moale v. Bu- 
 chanan, 11 Gill & J. 314; Newsom 
 v. Bufferton, 1 Dev. Eq. 383; Mur- 
 phy v. Rooney, 45 Cal. 78; Mosby v. 
 Wall, 23 Miss. 81; Hallam v. Corlett, 
 71 Iowa, 446. 
 
 iTiedeman on Equity, § 108, citing 
 cases. 
 
 2 McCloskey v. McCormick, 44 111. 
 336; Wurzburger v. Merie, 20 La. 
 Ann. 415; McCann v. Letcher, 8 B. 
 
 Mon. 320; Keyton v. Brawford, 5 
 Gratt. 39; Larkins v. Biddle, 21 Ala. 
 252; Peterson v. Grover, 20 Me. 463; 
 Langdon v. Keith, 9 Vt. 299 ; Vree- 
 land v. Bramhall, 28 N. J. Eq. 85; 
 Sylvius v. Kosek, 117 Pa. St. 67; 
 Jarrell v. Jarrell, 27 W. Va. 743; 
 Cox v. Woods, 67 Cal. 317 ; Smith v 
 Butler, 11 Oreg. 46; Crockett v. 
 Crockett, 73 Ga. 647; Jackson v. 
 Maybee, 21 Fla. 622; Bond v. Dorsey, 
 65 Md. 310; Giles v. Hunter, 103 
 N. C. 194; Fritzler v. Robinson, 70 
 Iowa, 500. See, also, Tiedeman on 
 Equity, § 193, where this subject is 
 fully discussed.
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 PRESUMPTIONS. 
 
 ?j 224. Definition and classification. 
 
 225. Presumptions of law and fact 
 
 distinguished. 
 
 226. Presumptions of fact. 
 
 227. Presumptions from adverse 
 
 possession and prescription. 
 
 228. Presumptions from lapse of 
 
 time. 
 
 229. Presumptions from posses- 
 
 sion. 
 
 § 230. Presumptions from the usual 
 course of trade. 
 
 231. Lawfulness — Continuity — 
 
 Sanity — Insanity. 
 
 232. Presumptions as to jurisdic- 
 
 tion. 
 
 233. Presumptions of life, death 
 
 and survivorship. 
 
 234. Legitimacy — Innocence — 
 
 Malice. 
 
 §224. Definition and classification. — Presumptions, as 
 they are employed in the law of evidence, are divided into 
 presumptions of law and presumptions of fact, while the 
 former are subdivided into those which are conclusive and 
 those which are rebuttable. A conclusive, or, as it is some- 
 times called, an absolute or imperative presumption of law, 
 may be defined as a rule of law by which, upon the produc- 
 tion of certain evidence, or upon the proof of a certain fact, 
 the judge is bound by law to regard some other fact as proved, 
 to instruct the jury to that effect, and to exclude any evidence 
 to the contrary, however satisfactory or convincing it may be. 
 
 A presumption of law is rebuttable or disputable when its 
 effect is to compel the court to draw a particular inference 
 from a particular fact, or from particular evidence (i. e., to 
 consider some other fact as proved), unless and until the cor- 
 rectness of such inference is disproved. 1 It will be seen that 
 the effect of the operation of presumptions of law is to take 
 the case out of the hands of the jury by forbidding or dis- 
 pensing with evidence to controvert or disprove the facts 
 which are presumed to be true. This result always occurs in 
 the case of conclusive presumptions, and for this reason this 
 
 i Sir Fitz James Stephen, in his v. Guild, 5 Heisk. (Tenn.) 182; Ul- 
 Digest of Evidence, art. 1. See Lyon rich v. Ulrich, 136 N. Y. 120.
 
 334: PRESUMPTIONS. [§ 225. 
 
 class of presumptions, for all practical purposes, is hardly dis- 
 tinguishable from positive legal rules. Indeed it may be cor- 
 rectly said that a conclusive presumption of law is only a rule 
 of substantive law stated in terms of the law of evidence, 
 which, like all rules of law, is to be determined and ex- 
 pounded by the court alone, the judicial exposition and in- 
 struction being in every case obligatory on the jnry. Thus, 
 the presumption of law that a boy under the age of fourteen 
 years is incapable of the crime of rape is a positive maxim of 
 the common law, and would apply whenever a person is ac- 
 cused of that crime, even though no evidence is introduced 
 to show that he did or did not commit it. 1 So generally is 
 this recognized, that indisputable or conclusive presumptions 
 are now seldom regarded by the courts solely as rules of 
 evidence. 
 
 The common-law conclusive presumptions have been so far 
 superseded by statutes of limitation that in the modern codes 
 of evidence it has not been considered necessary to recognize 
 their existence as rules of evidence. 2 
 
 § 225. Presumptions of law and of fact distinguished. — 
 A presumption of fact is an inference or a deduction which 
 any sensible man who is possessed of average reasoning pow- 
 ers may draw from certain facts coming under his considera- 
 tion, provided those facts are not disproved by evidence of the 
 same sort as that by which they are supported. 3 
 
 Direct evidence of a fact in issue is always desirable. But 
 this is often impossible to obtain. So if some other fact is 
 proved which is a concomitant circumstance usually attendant 
 upon the fact in issue according to the experience of average 
 men, a presumption of the existence of the latter fact, or, to 
 use a short term, a "presumption of fact," arises which is 
 valid until it is rebutted by proof of a contradictory fact. 
 
 The doctrine regulating presumptions of fact is largely the 
 
 1 McKinney v. State (Fla., 1892), 11 town, 34 N. H. 365; Oaks v. Weller, 
 S. Rep. 732. 16 Vt. 71; Hilton v. Bender, 69 N. 
 
 2 In the following cases presump- Y. 75; Cranan v. New Orleans, 16 
 tions are defined and discussed: In- La. Ann. 374. 
 
 surance Co. v. Weide, 11 Wall. 3 Gardner v. Gardner, L. R. 2 App. 
 (U. S.) 441 ; Jackson v. Marford, 7 Cases, 723, 734. 
 Wend. (N. Y.) 62; Bow v. Allen-
 
 § 225.] tkesumptions. 335 
 
 basis for the rules governing the admissibility and sufficiency 
 of circumstantial evidence. In the first place, it may be said 
 that a presumption of fact derives its main, if not its only, 
 value and force from its probability and from the closeness 
 and clearness of the logical connection which exists between 
 the fact or facts which have been proved and the inference 
 which is drawn. In other words, it is an inference "of a fact 
 from a fact," and the test is the relevancy of the facts proved 
 which constitute the premises to the doubtful but probable 
 fact which has been inferred and which is the conclusion of 
 the syllogism thus created. 1 
 
 It should not be considered, however, that all presumptions 
 of law are illogical and arbitrar}\ though they do not all by 
 any means possess equal logical validity. Thus, it is clear that 
 many which are conclusive and which are now embodied in 
 statutes of limitation were originally adopted from considera- 
 tions of expediency 2 to protect vested rights and prevent the 
 mischievous stirring up of controversies supposed to be settled. 3 
 So also rebuttable presumptions are not wholly exempt from 
 the criticism that they are improbable and illogical, as for 
 examples the common presumption that an accused person is 
 innocent till he is proved guilty, or the veiy numerous mod- 
 ern class of rebuttable presumptions which have been created 
 by statute. Again, the two classes are distinguished by the 
 fact that presumptions of law, both rebuttable and conclusive, 
 are applied to classes of objects, and they have been subjected 
 to and are governed by well-settled rules, thus forming a part 
 of an intricate and systematic department of jurisprudence. 
 
 Presumptions of fact are invariably permissible, never ob- 
 ligatory on the jury. They may or they may not be drawn 
 by the jury from the circumstances, according as the jurors 
 believe or disbelieve the facts which are produced before 
 them and which are claimed to be proved by direct evidence. 
 
 1 In Roberts v. People, 9 Colo. 474, * See Welch v. Sackett, 12 Wis. 
 
 the court, by Beck, C. J., defines a 257. 
 
 presumption of fact as "an infer- 3 " Prescription is a legal fiction to 
 
 ence of the existence of a certain quiet ancient possession." Folsom 
 
 fact arising from its necessary and v. Freeborn, 18 R. I. 205. 
 usual connection with other facta 
 which are known."
 
 336 PRESUMPTIONS. [§ 225. 
 
 If, therefore, no presumption of law has arisen on the evidence 
 as introduced, it is error for the court to instruct the jur}' that 
 "a presumption arises on certain evidence," meaning thereby 
 only a presumption of fact, or that the evidence is sufficient 
 to justify a presumption of fact; for whether a presumption 
 of fact arises or not, and the sufficiency of the evidence to 
 support it, are questions for the jury to decide upon the evi- 
 dence before them. 1 When made they do not arise by the 
 direct employment of legal rules, but according to the reason- 
 ing process and experience of average men, being the most 
 probable inferences from the facts of the case. 2 
 
 A presumption of law is binding on the court and must be 
 drawn by it whenever certain evidence is given, and, whether 
 conclusive or not, the law, regarding it as law, is binding on 
 the jury if they believe the basic facts are proved. If it is 
 a conclusive presumption of law the judge has no power to 
 admit, or the jury to consider, any evidence to the contrary; 
 but if it is rebuttable, then it is only obligatory upon the 
 jury, provided no evidence to contradict it is offered sufficient 
 to remove the particular case under consideration out of the 
 class in which by law it is prima facie presumed to be in- 
 cluded. 
 
 "Facts which are presumed by the jury are proved as 
 effectually as facts of which direct evidence is given." 3 But, 
 as has been elsewhere explained in the analogous case of cir- 
 cumstantial evidence, the foundation fact from which the 
 inference is made must be supported by some direct evidence 
 sufficient to furnish a basis in the minds of reasonable and 
 intelligent men for the presumption of fact. In some depart- 
 ments of scientific investigation and intellectual activity it is 
 permissible to infer a series or system of facts in a logical 
 
 1 Stone v. Geyser, etc. Co., 52 Cal. be considered imports that there 
 315; Allison v. State, 42 Ind. 354; may be a presumption of fact. But 
 Read v. Hurd, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 408. generally it must be left to the jury 
 
 2 In Com. v. Briant, 142 Mass. 463, to say whether there is one, and in 
 the court said: "The proposition many cases that is the main ques- 
 that there is evidence for the jury tion they have to decide." See, 
 to consider is not identical with the also, Com. v. Stevenson, 142 Mass. 
 proposition that evidence if believed 146. 
 
 raises a presumption of fact. The 3 Dickens v. Mahana, 21 How. (U. 
 proposition that there is evidence to S.) 283.
 
 § 226.] PRESUMPTIONS. 337 
 
 sequence or connection based upon one or two facts of which 
 alone direct proof has been given. Inferences are deduced 
 from inferences; the intervening facts, which should be proved 
 to secure the validity of the hypothesis or final inference, being 
 taken for granted, upon the theory of the experienced invari- 
 ability and uniformity of the laws of the physical universe. 1 
 JJut where the springs of human action and the motives which 
 prompt men in their conduct towards their fellows are con- 
 cerned, no inferences are allowed to be drawn from other 
 inferences, and any presumption of fact must be an immediate 
 inference or conclusion from facts directly proved. So, too, 
 the jury should not be allowed to presume certain material 
 facts of which no evidence has been given, merely from a re- 
 buttable presumption of law with which the facts have only a 
 remote connection if any. 2 Thus, if money is alleged to have 
 been misappropriated by a fiduciary wbose duty it was to pay 
 the money to some third person, the jury have no right to 
 presume that the money has been properly paid over where 
 the only basis for this presumption of fact is the rule that 
 everyone is presumed innocent until proved guilty and that 
 private and public officials are presumed to have done their 
 duty. 
 
 The legislature has the power, within constitutional limits, 
 to establish statutory presumptions of law both conclusive 
 and rebuttable. This power has been repeatedly exercised in 
 the enactment of criminal statutes, and, if properly executed, 
 is calculated to enlarge the scope of the power of the jury by 
 creating; an issue of fact to be submitted to them which, were 
 there no presumption, would probably be taken from them 
 upon the ground that the evidence is insufficient. 
 
 § 226. Presumptions of fact — Accomplices. — Though pre- 
 sumptions of fact cannot with strictness of language be said 
 to form a part of the law of evidence, 3 }^et it is an almost uni- 
 versal custom for the judge, in his discretion, to suggest to 
 the jury certain rules which they may employ in weighing- 
 evidence, and to point out certain inferences of fact which 
 
 1 Sabariego v. Maverick, 124 U. S. Ins. Co., 100 U. S. 69S ; Grand Trunk, 
 295. etc. Co. v. Richardson, 91 U. S. 470. 
 
 2 United States v. Ross, 92 U. S. 3 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 44. 
 283 ; Manning v. Hancock Mut. Life 
 
 22 •..
 
 338 PRESUMPTIONS. [§ 227. 
 
 they may, but need not necessarily, 1 draw therefrom. If evi- 
 dence is submitted, it is for them exclusively to say whether 
 they will draw any inference therefrom, and this they may 
 do unaffected by motives of expediency and concerned only 
 to ascertain the truth. 
 
 ]STo presumption of law exists against the testimony of an 
 accomplice, and the jury may, in the absence of a statute, 
 convict upon his uncorroborated testimony alone, if they are 
 satisfied of its truth beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 An acces- 
 sory after the fact is not an accomplice. 3 But judges have 
 been so long accustomed to instruct that the testimony of an 
 accomplice should be received with caution, or should be cor- 
 roborated by satisfactory evidence from some witness not im- 
 plicated, that a failure to do so would generally be reversible 
 error. 4 
 
 § 227. Presumptions from adverse possession and pre- 
 scription. — A common class of presumptions which are in 
 many cases positive rules of the statute law is that which in- 
 cludes those arising from the adverse possession of real prop- 
 erty or from the fact that an obligation either of the nature 
 
 1 See § 226. be had upon the uncorroborated tes- 
 
 2 See post, %§ 324, 325; Jenkins v. timony of an accomplice, but which, 
 State (Fla., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 677; at the same time, allows the court 
 State v. Minor (Mo., 1893), 22 S. W. to charge in the most absolute terms 
 Rep. 1085 ; State v. Jackson, 106 Mo. that his testimony must be corrob- 
 
 174; Rountree v. State, 88 Ga. 457; orated, the court in Collins v. People, 
 
 Woods v. Com., 86 Va. 929; United 98 111. 584, said: "In many, prob- 
 
 States v. Lancaster, 44 Fed. Rep. ably in most, cases the evidence of 
 
 896 ; Robinson v. State, 84 Ga. 674 ; an accomplice, uncorroborated, . . . 
 
 Cheatham v. State, 7 S. Rep. 204. will not satisfy the honest judgment 
 
 3 State v. Umble (Mo., 1893), 22 S. beyond a reasonable doubt, and then 
 W. Rep. 380. it is clearly insufficient to authorize 
 
 * United States v. Ybanez, 53 Fed. a verdict of guilty. But there may 
 
 Rep. 536 ; Martin v. State, 21 Tex. App. frequently occur other cases, where, 
 
 1; People v. "White, 62 Hun, 114; from all the circumstances, the hon- 
 
 State v. Jackson, 106 Mo. 174; State est judgment will be as thoroughly 
 
 v. Henderson, 50 N. W. Rep. 758; satisfied from the evidence of the 
 
 Malachi v. State, 89 Ala. 134; Peo- accomplice of the guilt of the de- 
 
 ple v. Chadwick, 25 Pac. Rep. 737 ; fendant as it is possible it could be 
 
 "Wicks v. State, 28 Tex. App. 448; satisfied from human testimony ; and 
 
 Bernhard v. State, 76 Ga. 613. In in such case it would be an outrage 
 
 considering the rather anomalous upon the administration of justice to 
 
 rule which permits a conviction to acquit."
 
 § 227.] PRESUMPTIONS. 339 
 
 of a simple contract or of a writing under seal has been cre- 
 ated and the disseizee or obligee has neglected to enforce his 
 right. The tortious possession of a disseizor may create a 
 conclusive presumption of title either by the existence of the 
 disseizin for the period required by the statute of limitations 
 or by estoppel. By the statute of limitation of real actions 
 of 21 Jac. 1, the period of limitation for the recovery of real 
 property was fixed at twenty years from the date that the 
 right of action accrued. In the United States the same period 
 has been generally adopted, though in many of the states it 
 has been reduced to ten. 1 The provisions of the various stat- 
 utes of limitation should in each case be consulted, and as 
 these statutes vary widely it is impossible to discuss them at 
 length in this place. It may be said, however, that, in the 
 absence of express provision, they do not run against the 
 United States or against a state commonwealth, 2 or against 
 persons who are under the disabilities of infancy or of in- 
 sanity when the right of action accrues. 3 
 
 It was a rule of the common law that the continuous and 
 uninterrupted enjoyment of an incorporeal hereditament or 
 easement for a period beyond the memory of man would create 
 a title by prescription, upon the legal fiction that a valid grant 
 had been made but that the grant had been lost. 4 In con- 
 sequence of the adoption of statutes of limitation the courts 
 now apply the same period of limitation to incorporeal as to 
 corporeal hereditaments; 5 but as this application rests solel} r 
 
 1 Angell on Limitations, 1-6, 65 - Lindsey v. Miller, 2 Pet. 660 
 
 et seq. ; Tiedeman on Real Property, United States v. Thompson, 98 U. S 
 
 ch. XX, §§ 713-717; Detweiler v. 489; Gardiner v. Miller, 47 Cal. 570 
 
 Shultheis, 122 Ind. 155; Charles v. Oaksmith v. Johnson, 92 U. S. 343 
 
 Morrow, 99 Mo. 638; 12 S. W. Rep. Kingman v. Sparrow, 12 Barb. 201 
 
 903; Norris v. Moody, 84 Cal. 143. United States v. Beebe, 17 Fed. Rep 
 
 The adverse possession and disseizin 36 ; Ward v. Bartholomew, 6 Pick 
 
 must have been continuous and un- 409. 
 
 interrupted during the statutory 3 Miller v. Texas, 132 U. S. 662 ; 
 
 period. Malloy v. Bruden, 88 N. C. Gage v. Smith, 27 Conn. 74; Little 
 
 251 ; Bradley v. West, 60 Mo. 33 ; v. Downing, 37 N. H. 355 ; Edso v. 
 
 Satterwhite v. Rosser, 61 Tex. 166 ; Munsell, 10 Allen, 557. 
 
 McName v. Morland, 26 Iowa, 96; 4 2 Bl. Com., §§ 263, 266. 
 
 Unger v. Mooney, 63 Cal. 586 ; Tiede- 5 Tiedeman on Real Property, § 599 ; 
 
 man on Real Property and cases Richard v. Williams, 7 Wheat. 59; 
 
 cited. Stearns v. Jones, 12 Allen, 582 ; Wat-
 
 340 
 
 PRESUMPTIONS. 
 
 [§ 227. 
 
 upon analogy, the lapse of the period has been held by some 
 courts in the case of easements to create a disputable presump- 
 tion, or a presumption of fact which can be rebutted by evi- 
 dence that there never had been any grant. 1 The majority 
 of the cases, however, sustains the proposition that the presump- 
 tion of an original grant, arising from the uninterrupted and 
 continuous enjoyment of an incorporeal hereditament, is con- 
 clusive. 2 
 
 kins v. Peck, 13 N. H. 360; Burdell 
 v. Blain, 66 Ga. 170; Jones v. Crow, 
 32 Pa. St. 398 ; Carlisle v. Cooper, 19 
 N. J. Eq. 256 ; Nichols v. Wentworth, 
 100 N. Y. 455 ; Folsoni v. Freeborn, 
 13 R. I. 205; Smith v. Putnam, 62 
 N. H. 369 ; Wallace v. Uni. Pres. Ch., 
 Ill Pa. St. 164; McKenzie v. Elliott 
 (111., 1890), 24 N. E. Rep. 965. 
 
 x See cases cited supra; Tinkham 
 v. Arnold, 3 Me. 120 ; Parker v. Foote, 
 19 Wend. 309; Brookline v. Mackin- 
 tosh, 133 Mass. 226; Sherwood v. 
 Burr, 4 Day, 244 ; Thomas v. Eng- 
 land, 71 Cal. 458 ; Tredwell v. Iuslee, 
 120 N. Y. 458. 
 
 2 Ingraham v. Hutchison, 2 Conn. 
 584; Carter v. Tinicum Co., 77 Pa. 
 St. 310 (right of fishery); Whitney 
 v. Cotton Mills (Mass., 1890), 24 N. E. 
 Rep. 774; Rooker v. Perkins, 14 Wis. 
 557; McGeorge v. Hoffman (Pa., 
 1890), 19 Atl. Rep. 413; Bolivar v. 
 Nepensett, 16 Pick. 241; Ricard v. 
 Williams, 7 Wheat. 109; Corning v. 
 Gould, 16 Wend. 531; Campbell v. 
 West, 44 Cal. 646; Stevenson v. Wal- 
 lace, 27 Gratt. (Va.) 77 ; Arimond v. 
 Green Bay, etc., 35 Wis. 41 ; Dowling 
 v. Hennings, 20 Md. 180 ; Louisville, 
 etc. Co. v. Hays, 11 Tenn. 382 ; Conklin 
 v. Boyd, 46 Mich. 56 ; Smith v. Ben- 
 nett, 1 Jones (N. C), 372 ; Warren v. 
 Jacksonville, 15 111. 236; Carlisle v. 
 Cooper, 19 N. J. Eq. 256; Benton 
 v. Robbins, 71 N. C. 388; Tracy 
 v. Atherton, 36 Vt. 503. In the 
 
 case of easements no presumption 
 arises in favor of the public against 
 a private owner of lands. War- 
 ren v. Jacksonville, 15 111. 236; 
 Pearsall v. Post, 20 Wend. 121; 22 
 id. 440; Curtis v. Kessler, 14 Barb. 
 511: Johnson v. Duer (Mo., 1S93), 21 
 S. W. Rep. 800. "The statutes (of 
 limitation) confer no right of action. 
 They restrict the period within which 
 the right, otherwise unlimited, might 
 be asserted. They are founded upon 
 the general experience that claims 
 which are valid are not usually al- 
 lowed to remain neglected. The 
 lapse of years, without any attempt to 
 enforce a demand, creates, therefore, 
 a pi-esumption against its original 
 validity or that it has ceased to sub- 
 sist. The presumption is made by 
 these statutes a positive bar; and 
 they thus become statutes of repose, 
 protecting parties from prosecution 
 of stale claims, when by loss of the 
 evidence by the death of some wit- 
 nesses and the imperfect recollection 
 of others, or the destruction of doc- 
 uments, it might be impossible to es- 
 tablish the truth. Their policy is to 
 encourage promptitude in the pros- 
 ecution of remedies. For this pur- 
 pose they prescribe what is supposed 
 to be a reasonable period." Field, J., 
 in Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. 
 Co., 7 Wall. 390, cited in Anderson's 
 Law Diet., p. 629.
 
 § 228.] PRESUMPTIONS. 341 
 
 § 228. Presumptions from the lapse of time.— In certain 
 
 transactions which are not of record, a presumption of regu- 
 larity is held to be created by the lapse of time and the silence 
 or the actions of the parties. The presumption thus created 
 is largely the result of the application of the principles of 
 estoppel in pais and of the statute of limitations. Accordingly, 
 where a sale of land is authorized either by statute 1 or by 
 license or a judgment of a court, it will be presumed 'prima 
 facie from the lapse of time that all the required formalities 
 and details have been observed. The power to act being 
 proved or admitted, it will be inferred that all the usual pre- 
 cautions were taken necessary to a valid execution of the 
 power. And this inference is strengthened by the silence of 
 the parties who are concerned and the hardship of requiring 
 the production of written proof of minute details of transac- 
 tions of which no record is usually made. 
 
 The length of time which will create this presumption varies 
 according to the circumstances of the case; for although the 
 lapse of thirty years has been required in some cases, other 
 cases hold that a much shorter period will suffice. 2 
 
 Where an estate was vested in trustees it may be presumed 
 that they have faithfully performed their duties and executed 
 a conveyance or surrender to the beneficiary on the termina- 
 tion of the trust. 3 Again, where possession of real property 
 has been long, continuous and uninterrupted, so that it is under 
 the statute of limitation prima facie lawful, and the things 
 done and omitted to be done in respect thereto by the parties 
 for long periods can be explained satisfactorily only upon the 
 hypothesis of the existence of a deed, the execution of a deed 
 may be presumed. 4 
 
 1 Stead v. Corse, 4 Cranch, 403; 3 Moore v. Jackson, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 Hilton v. Bender, 69 N. Y. 75, apply- 59 ; Church v. Mott, 7 Paige (N. Y.), 
 ing this rule to tax sales. 77; Mathews v. Ward, 10 Gill & J. 
 
 2 King v. Little, 1 Cush. 436; Pe- 443. 
 
 jepscot v. Ransom, 14 Mass. 145; Em- i Fletcher v. Fuller, 120 U. S. 534, 
 
 mons v. Oldham, 12 Tex. 18 ; Society 551, 552 ; Valentine v. Piper, 22 Pick, 
 
 v. Young, 2 N. H. 310; Cobleigh v. 85 ; Van Dyck v. Van Buren, 1 Caines, 
 
 Young, 15 id. 493; Allegheny v. Wil- 84; Knox v. Jenks, 7 Mass. 488. Cf. 
 
 son, 25 Pa. St. 332; Freeman v. House v. Montgomery, 19 Mo. App. 
 
 Thayer, 33 Me. 76. Cf. Hilton v. 170. 
 Bender, supra.
 
 342 PRESUMPTIONS. [§ 229. 
 
 § 229. Presumptions from possession. — As respects per- 
 sonal property, a presumption of ownership arises from evi- 
 dence that a person has exercised acts of possession over it. 1 
 This presumption is slight, and is rebutted by facts tending 
 to show, for example, that the goods were stolen. A contrary 
 presumption is then created which, if not rebutted by the 
 party in whose possession the stolen goods have been found, 
 may result in fastening the theft upon him. 2 
 
 Upon the general question whether the possession of the 
 fruits of crime, as of a forged writing, of counterfeit money, 
 or goods taken from a house where a burglary had been com- 
 mitted, causes any presumption of guilt to attach to their 
 possessor, the courts are divided. It was at one time held, 
 nor is this rule without the support of modern cases, that a 
 presumption of law was created that a person in whose pos- 
 session the results of crime recently committed were found 
 was prima facie concerned in the crime committed. 3 The 
 most recent decisions, however, repudiate this doctrine that 
 any presumption of law arises; and doubtless the true mod- 
 ern rule is that the presumption, if any, is one of fact. In 
 other words, the fact of possession is now considered as merely 
 a circumstance to be submitted to and weighed by the jury 
 in determining the guilt of the accused. 4 "While the effect of 
 such evidence is for the jury, whether it is admissible depends 
 largely upon the shortness of the time which has elapsed 
 
 1 Rankin v. Bell, 19 S. W. Rep. S74 ; 3 state v. Kelly, 73 Mo. 608 ; People 
 
 National Bank v. Richardson, 2 N. Y. v. Weldon, 111 N. Y. 5G9; Rex v. 
 
 S. 804; Powers v. Braley, 41 Mo. Fuller, Russ. & Ry. 308; Stover v. 
 
 App. 556; Gregg v. Mallett, 15 S. E. People, 56 N. Y. 316; State v. Ows- 
 
 Rep. 936; 111 N. C. 74; Magee v, ley, 111 Mo. 450; McLain v. State 
 
 Scott, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 150; Millay v. (Neb., 1885), 7 Crim. L. Mag. 199. 
 
 ] Butts, 35 Me. 139; Fish v. Scut, 21 i State v. Rights, 82 N. C. 675; 
 
 Barb. 33; Stoddard v. Buxton, 41 State v. Raymond, 46 Conn. 345; 
 
 Iowa, 582. The possession of a house Ayres v. State, 21 Tex. App. 399; 
 
 raises uo presumption of ownership Ryan v. State, 83 Wis. 486; Sah- 
 
 of personalty contained in but not linger v. People, 102 111. 241; State 
 
 annexed to it. Caraher v. Insurance v. Hodge, 50 N. H. 510; State v. 
 
 Co., 63 Hun, 82. Bishop, 51 Vt. 287; People v. Mitch- 
 
 * State v. Moore, 101 Mo. 316; ell, 55 Cal. 236; Stuart v. People, 42 
 
 State v. Van Winkle, 80 Iowa, 15; Mich. 255; Galvin v. State, 93 Ind. 
 
 Reed v. State (Ark., 1891), 16 S. W. 550. 
 Rep. 819.
 
 § 229.] TKESUMPTIONS. 343 
 
 since the commission of the crime and the actual knowledge 
 of the prisoner that the goods were in his possession. 1 
 
 While the wilful mutilation or destruction of written evidence 
 raises a prima facie presumption of law that it was not done 
 innocently and that its production intact would have been 
 injurious to the interest of the person who is guilty of de- 
 stroj'ing or mutilating it, 2 the mere invention of verbal evi- 
 dence or false testimony on the witness stand creates no pre- 
 sumption of law, but is a circumstance to be considered by 
 the jury 3 bearing on the credit they will give the witness. 
 If, however, the perjury is deliberate and upon material facts, 
 the jury may infer, under the maxim falsus in uno falsus in 
 omnibus* that the testimony of the witness is wholly unworthy 
 of belief, though not compelled to do so by any rule of law. 
 
 Under peculiar and special circumstances the suppression 
 of evidence or a refusal to produce it may raise a presumption 
 that its tenor and effect would be unfavorable to the persons 
 in whose possession it is known to be. 5 So, if a wrong or in- 
 jury which is inflicted not only substantially damages a party, 
 but at the same time deprives him of the means of showing 
 the nature and extent of his damage, the law will endeavor 
 to supply the loss and the resulting insufficiency of proof by 
 raising all reasonable presumptions against the evil doer and 
 in favor of the injured person. 6 But generally the fact that 
 
 i Gablick v. People, 40 Mich. 292; Co. Ct. Rep. 31; Cross v. Bell, 34 
 
 Com. v. Talbot, 2 Allen (Mass.), 161 ; N. H. 85 ; Carpenter v. Willy, 26 
 
 Payne v. State, 21 Tex. App. 184; Atl. Rep. 4S8; Gulf, etc. Co. v. 
 
 State v. Scott (Mo., 1892), 19 S. W. Ellis, 54 Fed. Rep. 481 ; Werner v. 
 
 Rep. 89; State v. Owsley, 111 Mo. Litzinger, 45 Mo. App. 106; Toomey 
 
 450; Smathers v. State, 46 Ind. 447; v. Lyman, 61 Hun, 623; Atl. Ins. 
 
 Sahlinger v. People, 102 111. 241; Co. v. Holcomb, 88 Ga. 9 ; Wimer v. 
 
 State v. Jennett, 88 N. C. 605. Smith, 22 Oreg. 469; Bagley v. Mc- 
 
 2 See ante, % 129 ; Blade v. Noland, Mickle, 9 Cal. 430. 
 12 Wend. 173; 1 Kent's Com. 157; 6 Little Pittsburg Con. Mining Co. 
 
 Mersman v. Werges, 112 U. S. 141. v. Little Chief Cons. Mining Co., 11 
 
 See § 129; Tobin v. Shaw, 45 Me. Colo. 223; 7 Am. St. Rep. 226; Hart 
 
 331. v. Ten Eyck, 2 Johns. Ch. 62, 108; 
 
 »1 Greenl. on Ev., §37; Wills Clark v. Miller, 4 Wend. 628. If by 
 
 on Cir. Ev. 113. See, also, post, statute a witness is precluded from 
 
 § 342a; State v. Knapp, 45 N. H. testifying, e. g., a wife in an action 
 
 148. brougbt by the husband for her se- 
 
 4 See § 342a. duction, her failure to testify of 
 
 5 Packer v. Vandevender, 13 Pa. course creates no presumption.
 
 344 
 
 PRESUMPTIONS. 
 
 [§ 229. 
 
 a party produces no witnesses, or, having produced them, fails 
 to examine them, 1 or fails to produce any particular witness, 2 
 will not justify the jury in drawing any inference that the 
 evidence of his opponent is true if, upon the facts of the case, 
 they are not satisfied with its credibility. 3 So, generally, the 
 non-production of books or papers does not necessarily create 
 the presumption that they contain entries which would prove 
 injurious to the party in whose possession they are and who 
 has been notified to produce them. 4 But where certain docu- 
 ments of a series constituting muniments of title were sup- 
 pressed b} r their admitted holder, it was held that an inference 
 of fact might be drawn in the absence of clear evidence of 
 their contents that, had they been produced, they would have 
 proved unfavorable to him. 5 If a note, bond or similar se- 
 curity be found in the hands of the maker or obligor after 
 maturity, it will be presumed to have been paid, 6 and this 
 
 Adams v. Maine, 3 Ind. App. 232; 
 29 N. E. Rep. 792. See ante, § 166. 
 But where one is charged -with 
 fraud, his failure to testify (Conn. 
 Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Smith (Mo., 
 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 623), or to pro- 
 duce documents in his possession, 
 creates a presumption against him. 
 Clifton v. United States, 4 How. 
 (U. S.) 242. A refusal to produce 
 property claimed by another raises 
 a presumption that its value is as 
 stated by the claimant. Sutton v. 
 Davenport, 27 L. J. C. P. 54. 
 
 i Haynes v. McRae (Ala., 1893), 11 
 S. Rep. 270. 
 
 ^Scovill v. Baldwin, 27 Conn. 316; 
 Cramer v. Burlington, 49 Iowa, 213 ; 
 Gardner v. Benedict, 27 N. Y. S. 3. 
 
 3 Enos v. St. Paul, etc. Co. (S. D. , 
 1893), 57 N. W. Rep. 919; Meagley 
 v. Hoyt, 125 N. Y. 771; Sauer v. 
 Union Oil Co., 9 S. Rep. 566; Cross 
 v. Lake, etc. Co., 69 Mich. 363; 37 
 N. W. Rep. 361; Mooney v. Hol- 
 comb, 15 Oreg. 639; 16 Pac. Rep. 
 716; Diel v. Railway Co., 37 Mo. 
 App. 454. 
 
 4 Thompson v. Thompson, 77 Ga. 
 692; Cartier v. Lumber Co., 35 111. 
 App. 449 ; Harrison v. Kiser, 79 Ga. 
 588; 4 S. E. Rep. 320; Jennings v. 
 Railroad Co., 97 N. Y. 438; Reavis 
 v. Overinshaw, 105 N. C. 369. 
 
 5 Jones v. Knauss, 31 N. J. Eq^ 
 609 ; Thompson v. Thompson, 9 Ind. 
 323. 
 
 « Porter v. Nelson, 121 Pa. St. 628; 
 Lindsay v. McCormick, 5 S. E. Rep. 
 834; Turner v. Turner, 80 Cal. 141; 
 Hollenberg v. Lane, 47 Ark. 394; 
 Weidner v. Schweigert, 9 S. & R. 
 385. A note found among the papers, 
 of the maker after his death will be 
 presumed to have been in his pos- 
 session during his life-time. Potts v. 
 Coleman, 86 Ala. 94. Though the 
 circumstance of the debtor's ability 
 to pay does not alone create a pre- 
 sumption of payment (Morrison v. 
 Collins, 127 Pa. St. 28), it may be 
 sufficient in connection with the 
 fact that the creditor had abundant 
 opportunity to collect his debt. Bank 
 v. Howes, 33 Mo. App. 214.
 
 § 220.] PRESUMPTIONS. 345 
 
 presumption, though usually rebuttable, 1 has been held con- 
 clusive where the evidence was otherwise irreconcilable. 2 
 
 A prima fade presumption of payment or delivery is also 
 created by the possession by the drawee of an order for money 
 or for the delivery of personal property. 3 That a deed has 
 been delivered will be presumed from the fact that it is found 
 in the possession of the grantee or of one claiming under him, 
 properly executed and acknowledged, 4 although this presump- 
 tion may be rebutted by the fact that it was not recorded 
 until after the death of the grantor. 5 So a deed will be pre- 
 sumed to have been executed and delivered on its date, 6 though 
 it was acknowledged 7 or recorded 8 subsequent!}'. "Where 
 several documents are of even date they will be presumed to 
 have been executed in the order that will effectuate the ob- 
 ject intended. 9 But it has been held that the delivery will be 
 presumed to have been made on the day the deed was ac- 
 knowledged, 10 and this is necessarily the rule where the deed 
 itself is undated. 11 This presumption of delivery on the date 
 of execution may be rebutted by showing a subsequent act- 
 ual delivery. 12 ISTo presumption is created by delivery to a 
 stranger, and in such a case the intention to deliver must be 
 
 1 Hawkins v. Harding, 37 111. App. 782 ; Windom v. Schappel, 39 Minn. 
 564. But see, contra, Emerson v. 35; 38 N. W. Rep. 757; Tuttle v. 
 Mills, 83 Tex. 3S5; Halfin v. Wem- Rainey, 98 N. C. 513; Ward v. 
 pieman, 83 id. 385; Stephenson v. Dougherty, 75 Cal. 240; 17 Pac. Rep. 
 Richardson, 45 Mo. App. 544. 193; Crowder v. Searcy, 103 Mo. 97; 
 
 2 Hawkins v. Harding, 37 111. App. Vreeland v. Vreeland, 48 N. J. Eq. 
 564. 56. 
 
 3 Lane v. Farmer, 13 Ark. 63 ; Kin- 5 Scott v. Scott, 95 Mo. 300. 
 caid v. Kincaid, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 6 See cases in note 4, supra. 
 
 17 ; Ramson v. Adams, 17 Johns. 7 People v. Snyder, 41 N. Y. 397. 
 (N. Y.) 130. 8 Robinson v. Wheeler, 25 N. Y. 252. 
 
 *Gifford v. Corrigan (N. Y.), 11 9 Williams v. Woods, 16 Md. 220. 
 N. E. Rep. 498; Meech v. Fowler, 10 Fontaine v. Sav. Inst., 57 Mo. 
 
 14 Ark. 29; Lyerly v. Wheeler, 12 561; Blanchard v. Tyler, 12 Mich, 
 
 lied. 290; Darst v. Bates, 51 111. 439; 339; Loomis v. Pingree, 43 Me. 299, 
 
 Billings- v. Stark, 15 Fla. 297; Tiede- 308; Henry v. Bradshaw, 20 Iowa, 
 
 man on R. P., § 812 ; Ward v. Lewis, 355. 
 
 4 Pick. 518 ; Dais' Appeal, 128 Pa. n Bank v. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch. 
 
 St. 572; Scobey v. Walker (Ind., 528. 
 
 1S88), 15 N. W. Rep. 674; Criffen v. 12 Wyckoff v. Remsen, 11 Paige, 
 
 Griffen, 125 111. 430; 17 N. E. Rep. 564; Abb. Tr. Ev. 695.
 
 346 
 
 PRESUMPTIONS. 
 
 [§ 230. 
 
 express. 1 Delivery and acceptance are concurrent acts, and 
 a 'prima facie presumption of acceptance by the grantee will 
 usually be created from his knowledge of the delivery and 
 from the benefit derived by him thereby. 2 And in the case 
 of a grantee under disabilities, this presumption of acceptance 
 will be conclusive even if the grantee is ignorant of the con- 
 veyance and delivery. 3 The ownership of goods named in a 
 bill of lading is prima facie presumed to be in the consignee, 4 
 while his possession of that document creates a presumption 
 that the merchandise was properly delivered to the carrier 
 and that he assented to its terms. 5 
 
 § 230. Presumptions from the usual course of trade. — 
 Every one is presumed to take proper care of his own affairs 
 and not to act against his own interests. From this principle, 
 and keeping in view th.3 care, promptness and diligence with 
 which men pursue the objects of their ambition, various prima 
 facie presumptions have been recognized growing out of the 
 course of trade. So a check, note or bond properly signed 
 will, in the hands of a bona fide holder, be presumed to have 
 been delivered completely executed to the payee, 6 even though 
 in the case of a bank-note the signature has been obliterated. 7 
 So it is a general rule that a party who produces a note will 
 be prima facie presumed to be its bona fide holder and to have 
 
 1 Maynard v. Maynard, 10 Mass. 
 456 ; Folk v. Vara, 9 Rich. Eq. 303 ; 
 Cecil v. Beaver, 28 Iowa, 240 ; Lutes 
 v. Reed, 138 Pa. St. 191; Tiedeman 
 on R. P., § 814. 
 
 2Gifford v. Corrigan, 117 N. Y. 
 257; Bowman v. Griffith, 35 Neb. 
 361 ; Robinson v. Gould, 26 Iowa, 
 93 ; Baker v. Haskell, 47 N. H. 479. 
 
 * Tiedeman on R. P., § 814; Spen- 
 cer v. Carr, 45 N. Y. 410; Cecil v. 
 Beaver, 28 Iowa, 241 ; Peavey v. 
 Tilton, 18 N. H. 152; Gregory v. 
 Walker, 38 Ala. 26 ; Bank v. Bellis, 
 10 Cush. 378; Rivard v. Walker, 39 
 111. 413; Diefendorf v. Diefendorf, 8 
 N. Y. S. 617. 
 
 4 Lawrence v. Minturn, 17 How. 
 (U. S.) 100. 
 
 5 Boorman v. Express Co., 21 Wis. 
 152. 
 
 6 Hensel v. Chicago, etc. Co., 37 
 Minn. 87. So, too, consideration in 
 such a case will be presumed and 
 need neither be expressed in the in- 
 strument, pleaded or given in evi- 
 dence. Carnright v. Gray, 11 N. Y. 
 S. 278; 27 N. E. Rep. 835; McClel- 
 land v. McClelland, 42 Mo. App. 32 ; 
 Benedict v. Driggs, 84 Hun, 94 ; 
 Conger v. Armstrong, 3 John. Cas. 
 5; Norton v. Norton, 17 N. Y. St. 
 Rep. 487. 
 
 7 Murdock v. Union Bank. 2 Rob. 
 112; Smith v. Smith, 15 N. H. 55.
 
 § 230.] PBESUMPTTONS. 347 
 
 obtained it before maturity and for full value. 1 Landlords 
 being usually prompt in collecting rent due them, the exist- 
 ence of a rent receipt for last month in the possession of the 
 tenant creates a prima facie presumption that all prior rent 
 has been paid; 2 and a settlement between parties having con- 
 tinuous dealings is presumed to cover all accounts between 
 them. 3 On the other hand, payment by check or in money, 
 unaccompanied by explanatory circumstances, will raise the 
 presumption not that a loan has been made, but that the payor 
 has liquidated a debt or paid to the payee funds belonging to 
 the latter. 4 If, however, it is shown that no debt existed, then 
 a loan will be presumed, as the law will not in such a case 
 presume a gift. 5 
 
 Comprised in this class of presumptions from the usual course 
 of business are those created by the well-recognized regularity 
 and promptness with which business is conducted in public 
 offices. 6 So it is said that a postmark furnishes a presumption 
 that a letter was in the mail at the time marked. 7 A pre- 
 sumption which is sometimes considered merely a presumption 
 of fact, 8 that a letter has promptly reached its destination, 
 arises on proof that it was duly addressed and mailed, post- 
 paid, to the addressee where he was living and received his 
 mail. 9 So a message shown to have been delivered to a tele- 
 
 i Collins v. Gilbert, 94 U. S. 753; i Fletcher v. Braddyle, 3 Stark. 64; 
 
 Kidder v. Horrobbin, 72 N. Y. 169 ; New Haven Co. v. Mitchell, 15 Conn. 
 
 National State Bank v. Richardson, 206. Cf. Boon v. State, 37 Minn. 
 
 2 N. Y. S. 804. 426. 
 
 2 Hodgson v. Wight, 36 Me. 326; 8 Oregon S. S. Co. v. Otis, 100 N. 
 
 Brewer v. Knapp, 1 Pick. 332, 337. Y. 45. 
 
 3 Long v. Strauss., 24 N. E. Rep. 9 Rosenthal v. Walker, 111 U. S. 
 
 664. Payment of rent by a tenant 185; Van Doren v. Liebman, 11 N. 
 
 raises a presumption that he occu- Y. S. 769 ; Jensen v. McCorkle, 154 
 
 pied the premises. Bishop v. How- Pa. St. 353; Briggs v. Hervey, 130 
 
 ard, 2 B. & C. 100. Mass. 187; McCoy v. New York, 46 
 
 * Patton v. Ash, 7 Serg. & R. 116, Hun, 268 ; Bank v. McManigle, 69 Pa. 
 
 125; Seiple v. Seiple, 25 W. N. C. St. 156; Steiner v. Ellis, 7 S. Rep. 
 
 488; Gerding v. Walter, 29 Mo. 426; 803; Loud v. Merrill, 45 Me. 516; 
 
 Kuehler v. Adler, 78 N. Y. 287; Austin v. Holland, 69 N. Y.-571, 576. 
 
 Poucher v. State, 98 id. 422. See contra, Home Ins. Co. v. Maple 
 
 5 4 Nay v. Curley, 113 N. Y. 575; (Iud., 1890), 27 N. E. Rep. 633 ; Hast- 
 
 Grey v. Grey, 47 id. 552. ings v. L. I. Co., 138 N. Y. 473. 
 
 6 Worley v. Hineman (Ind., 1893), This presumption is confirmed by 
 
 33 N. E. Rep. 260. proof that a request to return if not
 
 JiS 
 
 PKESUMFTIONS. 
 
 [§ 230. 
 
 graph company will be prima facie presumed to have been 
 delivered by the latter. 1 
 
 Though the courts of one state commonwealth do not take 
 judicial notice of the statutory or common law of another 
 state, or of a foreign country, 2 it will be presumed, till the 
 contrary is shown, that the general rules of the common 
 law of England modified by statute prevail in all states ex- 
 cept in those such as, for example, Texas and Louisiana, 3 
 whose jurisprudence is founded upon the Eoman civil law; 4 
 while so far as the statutory law is concerned, though the au- 
 thorities are not harmonious, the weight of the decisions main- 
 tains the proposition that the statute law of any state will be 
 presumed prima facie to be the same as that of the place of 
 trial. 5 
 
 delivered was attached. Hedden v. 
 Roberts, 134 Mass. 38. If in order 
 to obtain a record a deed must be 
 properly stamped, it will be pre- 
 sumed that a. deed recorded was 
 duly stamped though the record 
 does not show this fact. Collins v. 
 Valleau (Iowa, 1889), 44 N. W. Rep. 
 904. See, also, as to certification of 
 judgments, Bailey v. Winn (Mo., 
 1890), 12 S. W. Rep. 1045; Woolery 
 v. Grayson, 110 Ind. 149. See, also, 
 ante, §§ 146, 148, 149. 
 
 1 Oregon Co. v. Otis, 100 N. Y. 
 451 ; Com. v. Jeffries, 89 Mass. 548. 
 
 2 See post, § 242. 
 
 3 Brown v. Wright (Ark., 1893), 22 
 S. W. Rep. 1022. 
 
 4 Cooper v. Reaney, 4 Minn. 528; 
 Lipe v. McClery, 41 111. App. 29; 
 Sandidge v. Hunt, 5 S. Rep. 55; 
 Holmes v. Broughton, 10 Wend. 
 (N. Y.) 75 ; Guardians v. Greene, 5 
 Binn. 558 ; Flato v. Mulhall, 72 Mo. 
 522; Reese v. Harris, 27 Ala. 301; 
 Wheatop v. Peters, 8 Pet. 658 ; Hyd- 
 rick v. Burke, 30 Ark. 124; Hickman 
 v. Alpaugh, 21 Cal. 225; Bollinger 
 v. Gallagher, 142 Pa. St. 205; Cluff v. 
 Mut. Ben. Ins. Co., 13 Allen (Mass.), 
 308; Mortimer v. Marder, 93 Cal. 
 
 172; Atkinson v. Atkinson, 75 La. 
 Ann. 491 ; Brown v. Philada. etc. 
 Co., 9 Fed. Rep. 185 ; Com. v. Kenny, 
 120 Mass. 387. "The common law of 
 England can be made part of our fed- 
 eral system only by legislative adop- 
 tion. The United States has no com- 
 mon law. Each state may have its 
 own local customs and common law. 
 The power of the United States is 
 expressed in the constitution, laws 
 and treaties. The English common 
 law was adopted by the original 
 thirteen colonies only so far as it 
 suited their conditions, from which 
 circumstances what is common law 
 in one state is not so considered 
 in another. The judicial decisions, 
 the usage and customs of the respect- 
 ive states determine to what extent 
 the common law has been intro- 
 duced into each state." Wheaton v. 
 Peters, 8 Pet. 658-59. 
 
 5 McDonald v. Mallory, 77 N. Y. 
 547; Brumhall v. Van Campen, 8 
 Minn. 13; Osborn v. Blackburn, 47 
 N. W. Rep. 175; St. Louis, etc. Co. v. 
 Weaver, 35 Kan. 412; Murphy v. 
 Collins, 121 Mass. 6 ; Hewitt v. Mor- 
 gan, 55 N. W. Rep. 478; Atchison, 
 etc. Co. v. Betts, 10 Colo. 431. Con-
 
 § 231.] PRESUMPTIONS. 319 
 
 "With respect to foreign law, excepting the systems of juris- 
 prudence of those countries where the English common law 
 prevails, no presumptions are recognized; and where the ques- 
 tion of extra-territorial law arises, the court will apply the 
 lex fori in all cases where the foreign law is not pleaded and 
 proved by the party. 1 
 
 As the principles of the law merchant are recognized and 
 prevail in all civilized states, it will be presumed that the law 
 of a foreign state on any matter of commerce is identical with 
 the law of the place of trial. 2 
 
 § 23 1. Lawfulness — Continuity — Sanity and insanity. — 
 It is generally presumed that the law has been obeyed and 
 that public officials have done their duty. 3 Not only are offi- 
 cials presumed to have observed the law which they have been 
 sworn to execute or interpret, but private persons 4 are also 
 presumed, in the absence of contrary proof, in their business 
 and social relations, to have observed the rules of law and 
 equity and the principles of moralit} r . 5 So where a written 
 instrument purports to be executed by the officers of a private 
 corporation, it will be presumed that they possessed the power 
 to execute it, and that its execution was actually authorized 
 by the corporation. 6 
 
 tra, as to foreign country. West. (Tex., 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 984. This 
 
 U. T. Co. v. Way, 83 Ala. 542. See, presumption obtains only between 
 
 supporting text, Amer. Oak. L. Co. third parties. It cannot be invoked 
 
 v. Standard, etc. Co. (Utah., 1893), in behalf of the officer himself. 
 
 33 Pac. Rep. 246 ; Haggin v. Haggin, O'Brien v. McCann, 58 N. Y. 373. 
 
 85 Neb. 575 ; Bierhaus v. W. U. T. 4 Arent v. Squire, 1 Daly, 347. 
 
 Co. (Ind., 1893), 34 N. E. Rep. 5S1. sr ss v. Bedell, 5 Duer, 462; Peo- 
 
 i Flato v. Mulhall, 72 Mo. 522 ; pie v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 45 ; Thompson 
 
 Savage v. O'Neill, 44 N. Y. 298; v. Newlin, 8 Ired. Eq. 32; Roseville 
 
 Norris v. Harris, 15 Cal. 226. As to v. Gilbert, 24 111. App. 334; Fenlon v. 
 
 the proof of foreign laws, see § 143. Dempsey, 50 Hun, 131 ; Wheeler v. 
 
 2 Dubois v. Mason, 127 Mass. 37. Wheeler, 2 N. Y. S. 496. It seems, 
 Cf. §§ 148, 149, ante. however, that no presumption ob- 
 
 3 Sumner v. Peeble, 5 Wash. St. tains that a physician is reasonably 
 471 ; Gridley v. College of St. Fran- skillful (Columbus v. Strasner (Ind., 
 cis, 137 N. Y. 327 ; Broder v. Conklin 1893), 34 N. E. Rep. 5), or that a 
 (Cal., 1893), 33 Pac. Rep. 211 ; Eakins mere private servant has performed 
 v. Eakins (Ky., 1893), 20 S. W. Rep. his duty. Bigelow v. Metro. Ry. Co., 
 285; Brown v. Selby, 2 Biss. 457; 48 Mo. App. 367. Cf. Turner v. Lord, 
 Nat. Harrow Co. v. Hanby, 54 Fed. 92 Mo. 113. 
 
 Rep. 493; Francis v. Kirkpatrick 6 Gutzell v. Pennie, 95 Cal. 598; 
 Co., 52 Fed. Rep. 824; Saul v. Frame N. E. E. L. etc. Co. v. Farmington,
 
 350 
 
 PRESUMPTIONS. 
 
 [§ 231. 
 
 Despite the extreme liability of all human affairs to change, 
 some presumptions exist which are based upon the relative 
 permanency or continuit}' which is frequently observed to 
 exist in certain lines of human activity. So a personal con- 
 nection, relationship or state of affairs, or a person's existence 
 once shown in evidence, will be presumed to continue un- 
 changed as long as it is usual for a thing of its peculiar nat- 
 ure to endure, unless the contrar} 7 be affirmatively proved. 1 
 If it be shown that a corporation, 2 partnership, 3 agency, mar- 
 riage, 4 an adulterous connection, 5 or a similar relation existed, 
 it is presumed that it continued to exist until its discontinu- 
 ance is shown. 6 An existing agency will be presumed to be 
 a general agency. 7 A person shown to have resided in a place 
 will be presumed to have continued to do so, 8 and a presump- 
 tion of the continuance of a lawful seizin in one will obtain 
 until it is overthrown by proof of facts inconsistent there- 
 with. 9 
 
 But the most important presumption based upon the con- 
 tinuity of human conditions is the presumption that all men 
 
 etc. Co., 84 Me. 284 ; Gorder v. Platts- 
 mouth, etc. Co. (Neb., 1893), 54 N. 
 W. Rep. 830. A recital in a deed 
 that it was executed under seal will 
 be presumed to be true though the 
 seal, which had been affixed, has 
 wholly disappeared. Rensens v. Sta- 
 ples. 52 Fed. Rep. 91 ; Macey v. Stark, 
 21 S. W. Rep. 1088 (Mo., 1893). 
 
 i Scott v. Wood, 81 Cal. 398 ; New- 
 man v. Greenville, 7 S. Rep. 403; 
 Breman Bank v. Branch, etc. Co., 
 16 S. W. Rep. 209; Redding v. Good- 
 win, 44 Minn. 355 (presumption of 
 bankruptcy); Gernan v. Navigation 
 Co.. 66 Hun, 633; Parkhurst v. 
 Ketcham, 6 Allen, 406; Satchell v. 
 Doram, 4 Ohio St. 542, holding that 
 a public highway shown to exist is 
 presumed to continue. 
 
 2 People v. Man. Co. ,.9 Wend. 351. 
 
 3 Eames v. Eames, 41 N. H. 176. 
 
 4 Gilinan v. Sheets, 43 N. W. Rep. 
 299. 
 
 ft Smith v. Smith, 4 Paige, 432; 
 
 Van Epps v. Van Epps, 6 Barb. 
 320. 
 
 6 1 Greenl. Ev., § 42; Seaman v. 
 Ward. 1 Hilt. 52, 55; Haltenhof v. 
 Haltenhof, 44 111. App. 135 (desertion 
 during divorce proceedings); Eames 
 v. Eames, 41 N. H. 177; Leport v. 
 Todd, 32 N. J. L. 124; Cooper v. 
 Dedrick, 22 Barb. 516; Smith v. 
 Smith, 4 Paige, 432. 
 
 7 Sharp v. Knox, 48 Mo. App. 169. 
 SRexford v. Miller, 49 Vt. 319; 
 
 Nixon v. Palmer, 10 Barb. 175. 178 ; 
 Kilburn v. Bennett, 3 Met. (Mass.) 
 199. 
 
 9 Hollings worth v. Walker, 13 S. 
 Rep. 6; Long v. Mast, 11 Pa. St. 
 189; Babcock v. Utter, 1 Abb. App. 
 27; Stephens v. McCormick, 5 Bush. 
 181; Lind v. Lind (Minn., 1893), 54 
 N. W. Rep. 934 ; Alabama. Land Co. 
 v. Kyle (Ala., 1893), 13 S. Rep. 43; 
 Balch v. Smith, 4 Wash. St. 497; 
 Elyton L. Co. v. McElrath, 53 Fed. 
 Rep. 7G3.
 
 § 231.] PRESUMPTIONS. 351 
 
 are of sane mind, competent to manage their own affairs, 1 and 
 responsible for their criminal acts. If acts be proved suffi- 
 cient to establish a condition either of imbecility or lunacy as 
 existing at any particular time, it will be presumed that the 
 condition has continued.' 2 
 
 The question of the presumptions of sanity and insanity 
 becomes of the greatest importance in the trial of criminal 
 causes, and especially in the trial of those accused of homi- 
 cide where insanity is urged as a defense. This being so, it 
 is greatly to be regretted that the courts are not altogether 
 harmonious as respects the amount or quality of the proof 
 that is required to overcome the prima facie presumption of 
 sanity which is said to exist in the case of every man. The 
 modern tendency of the cases is to give the prisoner who 
 pleads insanity as a defense to crime every opportunity to 
 secure his acquittal on that plea if he can, by the aid of the 
 results of modern scientific investigation into the domain of 
 mental diseases, prove that fact to the jury. He need not 
 prove- his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt, for if he but 
 succeed in raising a doubt in the minds of the jury on this 
 point, then it is for the state to convince them beyond a 
 reasonable doubt that he is sane upon all the evidence. 3 The 
 accused must prove, however, according to the majority of 
 the cases, that " he was laboring under such a defect of reason 
 from disease of the mind as not to know (i. e., as not to have 
 sufficient mental capacity to know) the nature and quality of 
 the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not 
 know he was doing wrong." 4 
 
 i Baxter v. Abbott, 7 Gray, 71, 83; rison v. Rowan, 3 Wasb. C. C. 586; 
 Delafield v. Parish, 25 N. Y. 9 ; Aikin Reiter v. Miller, 86 N. Y. 507 ; Grouse 
 v. Weckerly, 19 Mich. 482; Day v. v. Holman, 19 Ind. 30 ; Lilly v. Wag- 
 Day, 2 Green Oh. 549 ; Cotton v. Ul- oner, 27 111. 395. 
 mer, 45 Ala. 378 ; Perkins v. Perkins, 3 See post, Burden of Proof in 
 39 N. H. 163 ; Blackburn v. State, 23 Criminal Trials, § 249, and the cases 
 Ohio St. 146; Herbert v. Berrier, 81 there cited. 
 
 Ind. 1; Robinson v. Adams, 62 Me. 4 This is the rule laid down in Mc- 
 
 369; Tingley v. Cowgill, 48 Mo. 291 ; Naghten's Case in 1S43, 10 CI. & F. 
 
 Williams v. Robinson, 42 Vt. 678. 200, and followed by many cases in 
 
 2 Halley v. Webster, 21 Me. 461 ; England and America. In that case 
 
 State v. Wilner, 40 Wis. 304; Town- the court said: "The jurors ought 
 
 send v. Townsend, 7 Gill, 10; Har- to be told in all cases that every man
 
 352 
 
 PRESUMPTIONS. 
 
 [§ 231. 
 
 This rule has been followed by the majority of the cases in 
 America, and may now be considered to be the law as re- 
 gards the amount and quality of the mental derangement 
 which must'be shown in a criminal trial to rebut the presump- 
 tion of sanity. 1 Sometimes, however, the courts have de- 
 parted from this test of the capacity to know the nature and 
 moral character of the act and have laid down the broader 
 
 is presumed to bo sane and to pos- 
 sess a sufficient degree of reason to 
 be responsible for his crimes until 
 the contrary be proved to their 
 satisfaction, and that to establish a 
 defense on the ground of insanity it 
 must be clearly proved that at the 
 time of the commitment of the act 
 the party accused was laboring 
 under such a defect of reason from 
 ■disease of the mind as not to. know 
 the nature and quality of the act he 
 was doing, or if he did know it that 
 he did not know he was doing what 
 was wrong." Again, in Moett v. 
 People, 85 N. Y. 375, 380, the court, 
 by Earl, J., said : " The laws of God 
 and the land are the measure of 
 every man's act, and make it right 
 or wrong, and it is right or wrong 
 as it corresponds with these laws. 
 When it is said that a prisoner must 
 at the time of the alleged criminal 
 act have sufficient capacity to dis- 
 tinguish between right and wrong 
 with respect to such act, it is im- 
 plied that he must have sufficient 
 capacity to know whether such act 
 is in violation of the law of God or 
 of the land or both. It is not the 
 duty of the trial judge to present the 
 matter to the jury in every possible 
 phase and in every form of lan- 
 guage which the ingenuity of coun- 
 sel can devise." 
 
 1 Parsons v. State, 2 S. Rep. 854 ; 
 81 Ala. 577; State v. Hockett, 30 
 N. W. Rep. 742; 70 Iowa, 442; State 
 v. Pagels, 92 Mo. 300; 4 S. W. Rep. 
 •931; Leache v. State, 22 Tex. App. 
 
 279; State v. Mowry, 15 Pac. Rep. 
 282; 37 Kan. 369; Farris v. Com. 
 (Ky., 1890). 1 S. W. Rep. 729 ; Giebel 
 v. State, 28 Tex. App. 151 ; 12 S. W. 
 Rep. 591 ; State v. Zoun (Oreg., 1892), 
 30 Pac. Rep. 517; Com. v. Gerade, 
 145 Pa. St. 289; 28 W. N. C. 261; 
 State v. Alexander, 30 S. C. 74; 
 State v. Harrison, 15 S. E. Rep. 982; 
 36 W. Va. 729 ; State v. Maier, 36 
 W. Va. 757; Dunn v. People, 109 
 111. 635; Hornish v. People (111., 
 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 677 ; Maxwell 
 v. State, 89 Ala. 150; People v. Foy, 
 34 N. E. Rep. 396; 138 N. Y. 664; 
 Karney v. State (Miss., 1891), 8 S. 
 Rep. 292. For cases of homicide 
 in which this presumption of sanity 
 was removed, see Reg. v. Layton, 4 
 Cox C. C. 149-155 ; Roswell v. State, 
 63 Ala. 307; State v. Hoyt, 46 Conn. 
 330; State v. Martin (N. J.), 3 Cr. L. 
 Mag. 44 ; Com. v. Rogers, 48 Mass. 
 (7 Mete.) 500; Armstrong v. State, 
 30 Fla. 170; Boswell v. Com., 20 
 Gratt. (Va.) 860; State v. Starling,. 6 
 Jones' (N. C.) L. 366; State v. Hur- 
 ley, 1 Houst. Cr. Cas. (Del.) 28; 
 King v. State, 9 Fla. 617; People v. 
 McDonell, 47 Cal. 134; State v. 
 Stark, 1 Strobh. (S. C.) L. 479; Peo- 
 ple v. Finley, 38 Mich. 482; Caset v. 
 State, 40 Ark. 511 ; Kriel v. Com., 5 
 Bush (Ky.), 362; Baldwin v. State, 
 12 Mo. 223; Loeffner v. State, 10 
 Ohio St. 599; Jamison v. People (111., 
 1894), 34 N. E. Rep. 48; Com. v. 
 Lynch, 3 Pittsb. (Pa.) 412; Mont- 
 gomery v. Com., 88 Ky. 509; Flana- 
 gan v. People, 52 N. Y. 467.
 
 § 232.] 
 
 vKi-.srMi-rioNS. 
 
 353 
 
 rule that though the defendant may have known or had ca- 
 pacity to know the difference between right and wrong in 
 the particular case, yet, if facts are shown from which the 
 jury may infer that he was acting under some uncontrollable 
 impulse or influence which prevented him from making :i 
 choice between the right and wrong, the presumption of his 
 sanity is rebutted and it becomes the duty of the jury to ac- 
 quit the ace used. 1 
 
 The presumption of the continuance of a given condition 
 of mental derangement depends entirely upon the nature of 
 the mental malady itself. Thus while in the ca?e of congen- 
 ital mental infirmity as idiocy, or habitual or fixed insanity, it 
 may require very clear evidence to rebut the presumption, in 
 the case of a delirium which is the result of physical disease, 
 it is doubtful if it can be said that a legal presumption of con- 
 tinued insanity exists at all. 2 There is no presumption of 
 law that once insane always so, but the circumstances of each 
 case should be considered to ascertain how far the same men- 
 tal condition may be presumed to exist at an earlier or later 
 period. 3 
 
 § 232. Presumptions as to jurisdiction. — It is a general 
 rule that a court of superior or general jurisdiction will be 
 presumed to have acted regularly and within its powers where 
 
 1 This is the doctrine of moral in- 
 sanity as distinguished from mere 
 mental disease per se, or from hal- 
 lucinations or delusions constituting 
 mania. See 3 Law Quar. Eev. 339; 
 Taylor v. Com., 109 Pa. St. 270; 
 Plake v. State, 121 Ind. 433; People 
 v. Durfee, 62 Mich. 487; People v. 
 Kerrigan, 14 Pac. Rep. 566; 73 Cal. 
 222. rejecting the doctrine of moral 
 insanity. See, also, generally, State 
 v. Reidel (Del., 1888), 14 Atl. Rep. 
 550; Williams v. State, 50 Ark. 511 ; 
 9 S. W. Rep. 5 ; Burgo v. State (Neb., 
 1889), 42 N. W. Rep. 701; People v. 
 Barber, 15 N. Y. 475. Cf. State v. 
 Jones. 50 N. H. 369 ; Leache v. State, 
 22 Tex. Cr. App., p. 279; 3 S. W. 
 Rep. 539; Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 
 577; 2 S. Rep. 851; Dacey v. People, 
 23 
 
 116 111. 555; 6 N. E. Rep. 165, in 
 which the subject of emotional or 
 moral insanity is further considered. 
 
 2 Johnson v. Armstrong (Ala., 
 1893), 12 S. Rep. 72; Manley v. 
 Staples (Vt., 1S93). 26 Atl. Rep. 630; 
 Prentice v. Bates, 93 Mich. 234. 
 
 3 Schouler on Wills, § 187, citing 
 Goble v. Grant, 2 Green Ch. 629; Cart- 
 wright v. Cartwright, 1 Phill. 100; 
 Good heart v. Ransley, 28 Wkly. L. 
 Bui. 227; Hix v. Whittemore. 4 Met. 
 545; Halley v. Webster, 21 Me. 461; 
 Staples v. Wellington, 58 Me. 453; 
 McMasters v. Blair, 29 Pa. St. 298; 
 Taylor v. Cresswell, 45 Md. 422; 
 Townsend v. Townsewi, 7 Gill, 10; 
 Castor v. Davis (Ind., 1890), 20 N. E. 
 Rep. 110.
 
 351 
 
 PRESUMPTIONS. 
 
 [§ 232. 
 
 the record is silent and until the contrary is shown; 1 and for 
 this reason, whenever the validity of its judgment is attacked 
 collaterally, it will be presumed, where the record of the judg- 
 ment is silent on these points, that both the subject-matter 
 and the parties were within its jurisdiction. 2 If jurisdiction 
 has once been acquired it will be presumed to continue until 
 final judgment. 3 When any fact or statement appears upon 
 the record its correctness will be presumed,' 1 and all the nec- 
 essary steps which are requisite to give the court jurisdiction 
 will be presumed to have been taken in conformity there- 
 with, even where the minor details appertaining thereto are 
 not set forth in the record. 5 Thus it will be presumed that 
 pleadings have been properly amended or filed where amend- 
 ment or filinir was needed; 6 that the rulings of the trial court 
 
 1 State v. Trounce, 5 Wash. St. 
 804 ; Ryder v. Roberts, 48 Mo. App. 
 132; Cape Girardeau v. Burrough, 
 112 Mo. 559; Gal-pin v. Page, 18 
 Wall. 350; Black v. Epperson, 40 
 Tex. 178; Nations v. Johnson, 24 
 How. (U. S.) 195; Slocum v, Prov. 
 St. etc. Co., 10 R. I. 112. By some of 
 the cases this presumption is based, 
 not on the superior power of the court 
 at common law, but upon the fact 
 that a court has a record on which 
 all its proceedings are inscribed. 
 Davis v. Hudson, 29 Minn. 35. 
 
 2 See §§ 152-155, ante; Pope v. 
 Harrison, 16 Lea (Tenn.), 82; Doe v. 
 Lindsey, 24 Ga. 225; Huntington v. 
 Charlotte, 15 Vt. 46; Taylor v. Brily 
 (Ind., 1892), 30 N. E. Rep. 369; Yaeger 
 v. Henry, 39 Bl. App. 21 ; Markel v. 
 Evans, 47 Bid. 326; Linton v. Allen, 
 154 Mass. 432; Emeric v. Alvaredo, 
 64 Cal. 529; Knox v. Bowersox, 6 
 Ohio Cir. Ct. 275; Carter v. State, 
 22 Fla. 553; United States v. Green, 
 6 Mackey, 562 ; People v. Kline, 83 
 Cal. 374; State v. Weaver, 101 N. C. 
 758. 
 
 3Housch v. People, 66 111. 178; 
 Osborn v. Sutton, 108 Ind. 443. 
 
 4 Kley v. Healy, 127 N. Y. 555; 
 
 Sickles v. Look, 93 Cal. 600; Mc- 
 Garvey v. Ford (N. M.), 27 Pac. Rep. 
 415; Kent v. Insurance Co. (N. D., 
 1892), 50 N. W. Rep. 85; Parish v. 
 Railroad Co., 28 Fla. 251 ; Scott v. 
 Iron Co. (Ky., 1892), 18 S. W. Rep. 
 1012; Traders' Bank v. Parker, 130 
 N. Y. 415; Louisville, etc. Co. v. 
 Orr, 10 S. Rep. 167: 94 Ala. 602; 
 Duncan v. State, 88 Ala. 31 ; Garn 
 v. Working (Ind., 1893), 31 N. E. 
 Rep. 821. 
 
 sGridley v. College, 137 N. Y. 527; 
 Rogers v. Burns, 27 Pa, St. 525; 2 
 Head, 253; Wright v. Douglass, 10 
 Barb. 97; Golden Gate Min. Co. v. 
 Yuba Co., 65 Cal. 187; Wetherill v. 
 Sullivan, 65 Pa. St. 105; Grignon's 
 Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. (U. S.) 319. 
 Where the party appears and defends 
 it will be presumed that he was 
 legally served. Martin v. Mott, 12 
 Wheat. 19 ; Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 
 462;Broder v. Conklin (Cat., 1893), 
 33 Pac. Rep. 211. 
 
 6 Tipton v. Warner, 47 Kan. 606; 
 Miss. etc. Co. v. Smith (Tex., 1892), 
 19 S. W. Rep. 509: Dove v. Com- 
 monwealth, 82 Va. 301 ; Evansville, 
 etc. Co. v. Maddox(Ind., 1893), 34 N. 
 E. Rep. 511. ,
 
 § 232.] 
 
 PRESUMPTIONS. 
 
 are correct in the absence of exceptions thereto on the record, 1 
 and that the verdict was justified by the evidence if the record 
 is silent. 2 But these presumptions are not conclusive. 3 These 
 presumptions are rebutted where the record shows that the 
 court did not obtain jurisdiction because of the non-appear- 
 ance, a failure to serve one of the parties, or for any other rea- 
 son. 4 Though in the case of inferior courts jurisdictional facts 
 must appear of record, where they do so appear the court will 
 be presumed to have properly acquired jurisdiction, and all 
 subsequent proceedings will be presumptively regular. 8 
 
 The rules governing the presumptions of the regularity of 
 
 1 Adams v. Main, 29 N. E. Rep. 792 ; 
 3 Ind. App. 232; Dunton v. Keel 
 (Ala., 1892), 10 S. Rep. 333; Brown 
 v. Lehigh, etc. Co., 40 111. App. 602; 
 Kelly v. Kelley, 80 Wis. 490; Klink 
 v. People, 1G Colo. 467; Crawford v. 
 Neal, 144 U. S. 585; People v. Dur- 
 fee, 62 Mich. 487; Pool v. Gramling, 
 88 Ga. 653 ; Richardson v. Eureka, 
 96 Cal. 443 ; Wilson v. Nelson, 40 111. 
 App. 209. See § 367 et seq. 
 
 2 Ohio v. Sweeney, 43 La. Ann. 
 1073; Atchison, etc. Co. v. Howard, 
 C. C. A. 229; Daly v. Wise, 132 N. Y. 
 306. 
 
 3 The correct view is not that the 
 law presumes a record is always cor- 
 rect, but if on its face it is complete 
 and regular, the party producing it 
 is not compelled to prove it until its 
 fa'sity is shown, Whart. on Ev., 
 § 1302. 
 
 4 Gray v. Hawes, 8 Cal. 562 ; Mur- 
 ray v. Murray, 6 Oreg. 17; Baker v. 
 Chapline, 12 Iowa, 204; Kilgour v. 
 Gockley, 83 111. 109. The correctness 
 of a return of personal service may 
 be contradicted by parol. Zepp v. 
 Hager, 70 111. 223. 
 
 5Lemert v. Shafer(Ind., 1893), 31 
 N. E. Rep. 1128; Church v. Cross- 
 man, 49 Iowa, 444; Brown v. Wood, 
 17 Mass. 68; Smith v. Engle, 44 Iowa, 
 265; Reeves v. Townsend. 2 Zab. 
 (,N. J.) 39. "Presumptions as to the 
 
 judgments of superior courts only 
 arise with respect to jurisdictional 
 facts concerning which the record is 
 silent. Presumptions are only in- 
 dulged to supply the absence of evi- 
 dence or averments respecting the 
 facts presumed. They have no place 
 for consideration when the evidence 
 is disclosed or the averment is made. 
 When, therefore, the record states 
 the evidence or makes an averment 
 with reference to a jurisdictional 
 fact, it will be understood to speak 
 the truth on that point; and it will 
 not be presumed that there was other 
 or different evidence or that the fact 
 was otherwise than as averred. Were 
 this not so it would never be pos- 
 sible to attack collaterally the judg- 
 ment of a superior court, although 
 a want of jurisdiction might be ap- 
 parent upon its face. The answer 
 to the attack would always be that 
 notwithstanding the evidence or the 
 averment the necessary facts to sup- 
 port the judgment are presumed. 
 These presumptions are also limited 
 to jurisdiction over persons within 
 the territorial limits of the courts, 
 who can be reached by their process, 
 and also to proceedings which are in 
 accordance with the course of the 
 common law." Bank of United 
 States v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 69. 
 70.
 
 356 
 
 PRESUMPTIONS. 
 
 [§ 233. 
 
 judicial proceedings as above stated are subject to some limit- 
 ations as respects superior courts exercising special statutory 
 powers. Where the statutory or extraordinary judicial pow- 
 ers are to be exercised according 1 to the usual common-law or 
 chancery proceedings, the above prima facie presumptions of 
 jurisdiction and of the conclusiveness of the judgment will ob- 
 tain. When, however, judicial powers are to be exercised 
 summarily or in a special manner not in conformity with the 
 common law, no presumptions will be created, and the facts 
 necessary to give jurisdiction must be shown by the record 
 before a judgment or decree rendered in such statutory pro- 
 ceedings can be sustained. 1 
 
 A person to whom a matter is submitted for arbitration 
 must strictly confine himself in making his award within the 
 limits of the submission, and if he shall exceed the authority 
 delegated to him the award will be void. A presumption of 
 law always exists that he has not exceeded his authority as 
 arbitrator, and the burden of proof is upon the person seeking 
 to set aside the award. 2 
 
 § 233. Presumptions of life, death and survivorship. — 
 A man is presumed to be alive until his death is shown. 3 If 
 a man is absent and is not heard from for seven years by 
 those who would naturally have heard from him if he were 
 alive, he will be presumed to be dead. 4 A failure to hear 
 
 i Haywood v. Collins, 60 III. 328; Firman, 29 111. 90 : Hodges v. Hodges. 
 State v. Trounce (Wash., 189?.), 32 9 Mass. 320: Lamphire v. Cowan, 39 
 Pac. Eep. 750; Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Vt. 420; Sheffield v. Clark, 73 Ga. 92. 
 
 Wall. (U. S.) 328; Umbarger v. 
 Chaboya, 49 Cal. 525; Gray v. Steani- 
 
 3 In re Hall, 1 Wall. Jr. (U. S.) 85; 
 Montgomery v. Beavans, 1 Sawy. 
 
 boat, 6 Wis. 59; Prentiss v. Parks, (U. S.) G60: Watson v. Tyndall. 24 
 
 65 Me 559; Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 
 350; Johnson v. Kettler, 84 III. 315: 
 
 Ga. 494 ; Whitesides' Appeal, 23 Pa. 
 St. 114; Bradley v. Bradley, 4 Wheat. 
 
 Thatcher v. Powell, 6 Wheat. 119; 173; Eagle v. Emmett, 4 Brad. Sur. 
 
 Clark v. Thompson, 47 111. 25; Wind- (N. Y.) 117; Stinchfield v. Emerson, 
 
 sor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274 ; Kansas, 52 Me. 465; Brown v. Jewett, 18 
 
 etc. Co. v. Campbell, 62 Mo. 585; N. H. 230; Com. v. Thompson, 11 
 
 Eaton v. Badger, 33 N. H. 228. Allen (Mass.), 25 ; Grey v. McDaniel, 
 
 2 Hayes v. Foskoll, 31 Me. 112; 6 Bush (Ky.), 480. 
 Ebert v. Ebert, 5 Md. 353; Burns v. * In re Miller, 9 N. Y. S. 639; 
 
 Hendrix, 54 Ala. 78; Byers v. Van Mathews v. Simmons, 49 Ark. 468; 
 
 Deusen, 5 Wend. 268; Richardson v. French v. McGinniss. 69 Tex. 129; 
 
 Huggins, 23 N. H. 106; Blair v. Stockbridge v. Stockbridge, 145 
 
 Wallace, 21 Cal. 317; Hubbard v. Mass. 517; Badeau v. McKenny, 7
 
 § 233.] 
 
 PRESUMPTIONS. 
 
 357 
 
 from a person who is absent but who had a fixed abode is not 
 enough to raise this presumption unless inquiry had been 
 made for him in the place where he was known to be located. 
 In some cases he will be presumed to have died at the end of 
 the seven-year period, 1 though as a general rule the date of 
 his death should be left to the jury to decide on all the cir- 
 cumstances. 2 If the absence is accompanied by other facts, 
 a person's death may be presumed from absence lasting a 
 much shorter period. Thus, where a person who is absent 
 was physically infirm from old age, 3 or if he had attempted 
 suicide, 4 or if he had sailed in a ship which was long overdue, 5 
 and particularly if, the vessel not having been spoken, the 
 insurance had been paid, 6 his death would be presumed after 
 a shorter period. 7 
 
 So far as any presumption that a person left issue is con- 
 
 Mackey, 268 ; Crawford v. Elliott, 1 
 iloust. (.Del.) 4(57; la re Spencely 
 (1892), Prob. 142; Hoyt v. Newbold, 
 4.1 N. J. L. 219; Tilly v. Tilly, 2 
 Bland Oh. (Md.) 444; Adams v. 
 Jones, 39 Ga. 508; Spears v. Burton, 
 ;J1 Miss. 547; N. C. University v. 
 Harrison, 90 N. C. 385 ; Hancock v. 
 Am. L. I. Co., 02 Mo. 26; Thomas 
 v. Thomas, 16 Neb. 555; Winship v. 
 O'Conner, 42 N. H. 341 ; Holmes v. 
 Johnson, 42 Pa. St. 149 ; Wambaugh 
 v. Schenck, 1 Penn. (N. J.) 229; 
 Stinchfield v. Emerson, 52 Me. 465; 
 Whitney v. Nicoll, 46 111. 230. 
 
 i Smith v. Knowlton, 11 N. H. 191 ; 
 Montgomery v. Be vans, 1 Sawy. C. 
 C. G53; Forsuith v. State, 21 N. H. 
 424; Clarke v. Canfield, 2 McCart. 
 (N. J.) 119; Davie v. Briggs, 7 Otto, 
 0-28; Eagle v. Emmett, 4 Bradf. 
 (N. Y.) 117; Rockland v. Morrill, 71 
 Me. 455; Young v. Heffner, 36 Ohio 
 St. 2o2; Packet v. State, 1 Sneed 
 (Tenn.), 355; Hancock v. Insurance 
 Co., 62 Mo. 26. 
 
 2 Johnson v. Merthen, 80 Me. 115; 
 Smith v. Knowlton, 11 N. H. 191; 
 Burr v. Sim. 4 Whart. 150; Bradley 
 v. Bradley, 4 id. 173; Whiteley v. In- 
 
 surance Co., 72 Wis. 170; 39 N. W. 
 Rep. 309; Henderson v. Benar (Ky., 
 1890), 11 S. W. Rep. 809; In re To- 
 bin, 4 N. Y. S. 59 • Waite v. Coaracy, 
 45 Minn. 159; Cambrelingv. Purton, 
 58 Hun, 610; 125 N. Y. 610; Davie 
 v. Briggs, 97 U. S. 628 ; Hancock v. 
 Insurance Co., 62 Mo. 26. 
 
 3 In re Bucknam's Will, 5 N. Y. S. 
 565. In this case the party was ab- 
 sent and unheard from a few months 
 only. 
 
 4 In re Ketchum, 5 N. Y. S. 566. 
 
 5 Johnson v. Merithew, 80 Me. 115; 
 Stewart's Will, 1 Con. Sur. 83. 
 
 6 Sprigg v. Moale, 28 Md. 497. 
 
 ' Cox v. Ellsworth, 26 N. W. Rep. 
 (Neb.) 460; Johnson v. Johnson, 114 
 111. 611; Lancaster v. Wash. I. Co., 
 62 Mo. 121; Stouvenal v. Stephens, 
 2 Daly (N. Y.), 319; Sheldon v. Fer- 
 ris, 45 Barb. (N. Y.) 124; Gerry v. 
 Post, 13 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 118; State 
 v. Moore, 11 lied. L. (N. O.) 160; 
 Tisdale v. Insurance Co., 26 Iowa, 
 170; Boyd v. N. E. Ins. Co., 3 La. 
 Ann. 848; Davie v. Briggs, 7 Otto, 
 628; Loring v. Steineman, 1 Mete. 
 (Mass.) 204.
 
 358 PRESUMPTIONS. [§ 233. 
 
 cerned, it has been held that when he was unmarried when last 
 heard from no presumption will arise that upon his death he 
 left any surviving issue, 1 widow 2 or heirs. 3 In some of the states 
 statutory provisions exist by which the presumption of death 
 after seven years' absence from the state is made conclusive 
 if there is no proof that the absentee is alive. Such statutes 
 do not exclude presumption of death in a case where it is un- 
 known whether the person has left the state, and in such cases 
 the common-law presumption applies. 4 The presumption of 
 death arising from absence from one's domicile may be rebut- 
 ted by evidence of a general report that the missing person is 
 alive and is domiciled at some foreign place, 5 and a fortiori 
 by direct proof that he is alive. 6 On the other hand, a per- 
 son's death cannot be proved by evidence of a general report 
 that he is dead, prevalent in the neighborhood where he was 
 last known to reside, such evidence being hearsay and incom- 
 petent. 7 
 
 The question of a presumption of survivorship, in cases in- 
 volving the succession of estates, has been much discussed. In 
 an early case in which a father, having bequeathed legacies 
 to his children, perished with one of the latter in a shipwreck, 
 the court denied that any presumption for or against survivor- 
 ship could be entertained, and directed the issue to be sub- 
 mitted to a jury. 8 The English ecclesiastical court adopted 
 the presumption that both parties died simultaneously, and 
 that consequently there was no presumption of survivorship. 9 
 
 1 Sprigg v. Moale, 28 Md. 497 ; Chap- 4 Louisville v. Board, 83 Ky. 219. 
 man v. Kimball, 84 Me. 389; In re ^Dovvd v. Watson, 105 N. C. 476. 
 Taylor, 66 Hun, 626; In re Webb, e Flynn v. Coffee, 12 Allen (Mass.), 
 I. R. 5 Eq. 235; Mullaly v. Walsh, 133. Cf. Roderigues v. Bank, 63 N. 
 I. R. 6 C. L. 314; Doe v. Griffin, 15 Y. 460; Wentworth v. Wentworth, 
 East, 293; In re Hanby, 25 W. R. 71 Me. 72; Bailey v. Bailey, 36 Mich. 
 427. 185 ; Norris v. Edwards, 90 N. C. 383. 
 
 2 In re Westbrooke, W. N. 1873, ? Johnson v. Johnson, 114 111. 611; 
 
 p. 167; Rowe v. Hasland, 1 W. Bl. Scott v. Ratcliffe, 5 Pet. 81; State v. 
 
 404. Wright, 70 Iowa, 152 ; id. 759 ; Mil- 
 's Bank v. Board, 5 S. W. Rep. 735, free v. State, 13 Tex. App. 340. 
 
 739, 742; Ferry v. Sampson, 112 N. « 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 30; Mason v. 
 
 Y. 415. But a presumption of issue Mason, 1 Mer. 308. 
 
 arises where the absentee was mar- 9 Wright v. Samuda, 2 Phil. 266, 
 
 ried when last heard from. Faulk- 277 ; Taylor v. Diplock, 2 id. 261, 278, 
 
 ner v. Williman (Ky.), 16 S. W. Rep. 280; Selwyn's Case, 3 Hagg. 748, 
 
 352; Harvey v. Thornton, 14 111. 217. cited in 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 40.
 
 § 234.] TKESUMPTIONS. 359 
 
 The modern rule seems well settled that, in the absence of 
 statutory provision regulating- this matter, 1 where several per- 
 sons perish in the same calamity, no presumption exists from 
 ago or sex that any of them survived the others or that all 
 died at the same moment; 2 but that in any event the ques- 
 tion of survivorship is to be decided, like any other question 
 of fact, upon all the circumstances of the case; as, for exam- 
 ple, the character of the disaster and the age, physical condi- 
 tion, sex and manner of death of those who perished; 3 the 
 supposed superior strength (from sex or age) being a circum- 
 stance proper to be taken into consideration, but not enough 
 alone to create any presumption. The burden of proof of 
 establishing survivorship is said to be on him who claims 
 through a survivorship. 4 
 
 § 234. Legitimacy — Innocence — Malice. — InEnghmd the 
 issue of husband and wife living together was conclusively 
 presumed to be legitimate, and this was true though the wife 
 had been shown to be unfaithful; 5 though where the parties 
 did not cohabit at the date of the conception the presumption 
 was rebuttable. 6 It may now be laid down as a general rule 
 that the presumption of legitimacy of a child born during the 
 existence of a marriage is not conclusive," even where. there 
 is a valid marriage and where the parties continue to cohabit. 8 
 
 1 See Civil Code of Louisiana, arts. 4 See, also, Russell v. Hallett, 23 
 930-933; California Code C. P., Kan. 276; Coye v. Leach, 8 Mete. 
 § 1963; Hollister v. Cordero, 76 Cal. (Mass.) 371; Smith v. Croon), 7 Fla. 
 619; 18Pac. Rep. 855. 144; Newell v. Nichols, 12 Hun (N. 
 
 2 In re Alston (1892), Prob. 142; Y.). 644; 75 N. Y. 78. 
 Underwood v. Wing, 19 Beav. 459; 5 St. George v. St. Margaret, 1 Salk. 
 4 De G., M. & G. 633, 657; Wing v. 123; Banbury Peerage Case, 1 Sim. 
 Angrave, 8 H. L. Cas. 183, 198 ; John- & Stu. 153. 
 
 son v. Merrithew, 80 Me. Ill ; 13 Atl. 6 Morris v. Davis, 5 C. & Fin. 163. 
 
 Rep. 132; Kans. etc. Co. v. Miller, 7 Van Aernam v. Van Aernam, 1 
 
 2 Colo. Ter. 442; Stinde v. Ridg- Barb. Ch. 375; Cross v. Cross, 3 
 
 way, 55 How. Pr. 301; Cowman Paige Ch. 139. 
 
 v. Rogers, 73 Md. 403; Stinde v. 8 Bullock v. Knox (Ala., 1893). 10 
 
 Goodrich, 3 Redf. Bur. 87; Robinson S. Rep. 339; Cross v. Cross, 3 Paige, 
 
 v. Gallier, 2 Wood C. C. 178; Corye 139; Sullivan v. Kelly, 3 Allen 
 
 v. Leach, 8 Met. 371 ; In re Ridgway, (Mass.), 148; Dean v. State, 29 Ind. 
 
 4 Redf. 226; Fuller v. Linzee, 135 483; Pittsford v. Chittenden, 58 Vt. 
 
 Mass. 468. 51 ; Strode v. MacGowan, 2 Bush 
 
 » In re Ehle's Will, 41 N. W. Rep. (Ky.), 621; Herring v. Goodson, 43 
 
 627 ; 73 Wis. 445. Miss. 392 ; Caujolle v. Ferrie, 28
 
 360 
 
 PRESUMPTIONS. 
 
 [§ 234. 
 
 A fortiori if the fact of non-access, caused by the prolonged 
 absence of the husband from the country, be established, the 
 presumption of legitimacy is supplanted by an irresistible con- 
 clusion that a child born to the wife is illegitimate. 1 So, 
 while the marriage may legitimatize a child, there is no pre- 
 sumption that a man who marries the mother of a bastard is 
 its father. 2 But a marriage once proved, the law raises a 
 strong presumption that it is a legal one, which can only be 
 rebutted by the clearest proof. 3 
 
 The rule that every one is presumed to be innocent 4 until 
 his guilt is shown is based on the fact that men generally observe 
 the rules of the criminal law and upon the impossibility of 
 obtaining and the injustice of requiring affirmative proof that 
 the accused has done so. This presumption, which is always 
 rebuttable, 5 bat which, if it is not rebutted, accompanies the 
 accused through the trial, is merely stating in a concise form 
 the well-recognized rule of law that any party, whether it be 
 the state, or an individual seeking redress for a civil injur\ r , 
 
 Barb. 177; State v. Pettaway, 3 
 Hawks (S. C), 523; Tate v. Penne, 7 
 Mart. (La.) 548; Dean v. State, 29 
 Ind. 483. 
 
 1 Pittsford v. Chittenden, 58 Vt. 51 ; 
 Cross v. Cross, 3 Paige, 139; In re 
 Say and Sele, 1 H. L. Cas. 507. Sex- 
 ual intercourse is presumed from ac- 
 cess (Head v. Head. 1 Sim. & Stu. 150) ; 
 and if access is shown no evidence is 
 admissible to rebut the presumption 
 of intercourse except direct evidence 
 that it did not take place. If the 
 husband had access, evidence of an 
 adulterous intercourse alone, it has 
 been held, is not relevant to prove 
 illegitimacy in view of the strong 
 presumption of legitimacy. Abb, 
 Trial Evidence, p. 89. 
 
 2 McDonald's Appeal, 30 W. N. C. 
 170. 
 
 3 Boulden v. Mclntire, 119 Ind. 
 574; Coal R. C. Co. v. Jones, 127 
 111. 379; State v. Brecht, 41 Minn. 50. 
 
 4 Case v. Case, 17 Cal. 598; Mc- 
 Eweu v. Portland, 1 Oreg. 300; Gal- 
 
 laher v. State, 28 Tex. App. 247; 
 Edwards v. State, 21 Ark. 512; 
 Johnson v. State (Tex., 1893), 20 S. 
 W. Rep. 368; People v. Graney, 91 
 Mich. 646. 
 
 5 Van Peet v. McGraw, 4 N. Y. 
 110; United States v. Heath, 20 D. C. 
 372; People v. Pallister, 38 N. Y. 
 601; Gardner v. State (N. J., 1893), 
 26 Atl. Rep. 30; Woodruff v. State 
 (Fla., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 053; Reid v. 
 State, 50 Ga. 556; Barcus v. State, 
 49 Miss. 17; McDaniell v. State, 76 
 Ala. 1 ; People v. Bush, 71 Cal. 602; 
 Dixon v. State, 13 Fla. 636; Murphy 
 v. People, 37 111. 447; State v. Vin- 
 cent, 24 Iowa, 570; State v. Knight,' 
 43 Me. 11 ; Com. v. Webster, 59 Mass. 
 (5 Cush.) 295; State v. Alexander, 06 
 Mo. 148; State v. Byers, 100 N. C. 
 512; Perry v. State, 44 Tex. 473; 
 Hill's Case, 2 Graft. (Va.) 594; Peo- 
 ple v. Coughlin (Mich.), 32 N. AV. 
 Rep. 905; Goodal v. State, 1 Oreg. 
 333.
 
 § 234.] presumptions. 8G1 
 
 who seeks the aid of a court of law, has the burden of proof 
 to show affirmatively the existence or non-existence of the 
 facts he affirms or denies. Thus, in the case of a trial for 
 the crime of seduction, the plaintiff's previous chastity, being 
 material, must be proved. 1 The character and strength of the 
 presumption of innocence demand that, even where wrong- 
 doing can be proved by negative evidence alone, such proof 
 must be given by the party alleging the wrong, contrary to 
 the general rule, by which the burden of proof is cast on the 
 one maintaining the affirmative. 2 
 
 So where both the presumption of the continuance of life 
 and the presumption of innocence are involved, the latter will 
 prevail and the existence of the person will have to be shown. 3 
 
 Every man possessed of a sound mind is presumed to intend 
 and contemplate the necessary and even the probable natural 
 consequences of his deliberate acts. 4 The presumption may 
 in some cases be conclusive, as where the consequences neces- 
 sarily follow the act. This occurs, for example, where a per- 
 son deliberately points and fires a pistol at a vital part, of 
 another person's body. Here, if the latter is killed, the former 
 cannot be heard to say that he did not intend to kill him. 
 The intention to kill is conclusively presumed. If the conse- 
 quences do not naturally follow the act, that is if they only 
 probably follow it, the presumption is rebuttable. 5 A person 
 who knowingly and voluntarily signs an instrument is prima 
 facie presumed to have read it or to have otherwise informed 
 himself as to its contents. 6 But this presumption is always 
 rebuttable by proving that the party was deceived through 
 
 1 Com. v. Whitaker, 131 Mass. 224; must be proven guilty beyond a rea- 
 
 State v. Wells, 48 Iowa, 671. sonable doubt is not enough alone, 
 
 2 Quin v. State, 46 Ind. 459; Piano for the maxim of law regarding rea- 
 
 Co. v. Root (N. D., 1893), 54 N. W. sonable doubt is by no means syn- 
 
 Rep. 924; Cook v. Tavener, 41 111. onymous with the proposition that a 
 
 App. 642. man is presumed innocent until his 
 
 3 Com. v. McGrath, 140 Mass. 296; guilt is shown. People v. Van 
 
 Spears v. Burton, 31 Miss. 547; Houter, 38 Hun, 168; Barker v. 
 
 Klein, v. Landman, 29 Mo. 259; State, 48 Ind. 163. 
 
 Sharp v. Johnson, 22 Ark. 75. The 4 Reynolds v. United States, 98 
 
 accused is entitled to a separate and U. S. 167. 
 
 distinct instruction that his inno- 5 In re Bringer, 7 Blatch. 268. 
 
 cence is presumed until his guilt is 6 Harris v. Story, 2 E, D. Smith, 
 
 proved. An instruction that he — .
 
 362 
 
 PRESUMPTIONS. 
 
 [§ 234. 
 
 his own ignorance or the fraud of others, or that he signed 
 the document by mistake or under duress. 1 
 
 In the case of the deliberate use of a deadly weapon caus- 
 ing death, when it is shown that the killing was done by the 
 defendant and no other evidence is offered on either side, 
 malice will be presumed, and the act will constitute murder. 2 
 If, as is usually the case, other circumstances are presented in 
 the evidence in connection with the killing, which is admitted 
 or proved and which is not claimed to be excusable, then it is 
 for the jury to say, upon all the evidence, whether malice was 
 present or not, and this question they must decide upon all the 
 facts in the case. 3 In other words, a rebuttable presumption of 
 malice arises as soon as the homicide is proved. This may be- 
 come a conclusive presumption binding on the jury in case no 
 defense is made. On the other hand, the presumption may be 
 rebutted by other evidence of the state, while if such is not 
 the case the accused may offer evidence to show that he did 
 the killing in self-defense or while insane and thus remove the 
 presumption of malice. 
 
 As regards minor crimes of which a criminal or malicious 
 
 i Lake v. Ranney, 33 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 50, 68. 
 
 2 Com. v. Hawkins, 3 Gray, 463; 
 Lewis v. State (Ga., 1893), 15 S. E. 
 Rep. 697; Fritch v. State (Ga., 1893), 
 
 16 S. E. Rep. 102. Implied malice, 
 i. e., a presumption of malice, exists 
 where mischief is intentionally done 
 without just cause or excuse. Darry 
 v. People, 10 N. Y. 138. 
 
 s State v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308; 
 State v. Ariel (S. C, 1893), 16 S. E. 
 Rep. 779; Young v. State (Ala., 
 1892), 10 S. Rep. 913; Hart v. State, 
 
 17 S. W. Rep. 421 ; 21 Tex. App. 163; 
 Hornsby v. State (Ala., 1892), 10 S. 
 Rep. 522; State v. Carver (Oreg., 
 1892), 30 Pac. Rep. 315; People v. 
 Knapp, 71 Cal. 1 ; People v. Tidwell, 
 4 Utah, 506; Powell v. State, 28 Tex. 
 App. 393; People v. Odell, 46 N. W. 
 Rep. 601 ; 1 Dak. 197; State v. Whit- 
 son, 111 N. C. 695; Hawthorne v. 
 
 Sftate, 58 Miss. 778; State v. Swayze, 
 30 La. Ann. 1323; State v. Smith, 77 
 N. C. 488; State v. Knight, 43 Me. 
 12; Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y. 164; 
 Thomas v. People, 67 id. 218. Cf. 
 Lovett v. State, 30Fla. 142. " When- 
 ever a homicide is shown to have 
 been committed without lawful au- 
 thority and with deliberate intent, 
 it is sufficiently proved to have been 
 with malice aforethought. It is not 
 necessary to prove that any special 
 or express hatred or malice was en- 
 tertained by the accused toward the 
 deceased. It is sufficient to prove 
 that the act was done with deliber- 
 ate intent as distinct from an act 
 done under the sudden impulse of 
 passion in the heat of blood and 
 without previous malice." United 
 States v. Guiteau, 10 Fed. Rep. 162, 
 165.
 
 § 234.] 
 
 TRESUMPTIONS. 
 
 3C3 
 
 motive or intent is a constituent part, no presumption of mal- 
 ice is created where no statutory provision exists making the 
 act criminal per se. If a malicious intent or motive is neces- 
 sary it will have to be proved by the party on whom is cast 
 the burden of proving the essential elements of the transac- 
 tion in litigation. But this rule does not of course require 
 direct evidence of malice, though such evidence may often be 
 easy to procure in the shape of the express declarations of the 
 accused. It is usually sufficient if facts are shown which 
 evince a malevolent, or spiteful, or reckless disposition, and 
 from these facts the jury may decide as a presumption or in- 
 ference of fact that malice existed in the case. 1 
 
 1 " Thus in malicious prosecutions 
 the term is quite comprehensive and 
 includes many phases of wrong mo- 
 tive and conduct. There may be ill- 
 will, malevolence, spite, a spirit of 
 revenge or a purpose to injure with- 
 out cause, but it is not necessary 
 there should be. If the prosecution 
 
 is wilful, wanton or reckless, or 
 against the prosecutor's sense of duty 
 and right, or for ends he knows or is 
 bound to know are wrong and 
 against the dictates of public policy, 
 it is malicious." Hamilton v. Smith, 
 30 Mich. 229.
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
 
 236. Judicial notice. 
 
 237. Mattex- of common knowl- 
 
 edge. 
 
 238. Historical facts. 
 
 239. Geographical facts. 
 
 240. Political facts — Elections. 
 
 241. Scientific facts. 
 
 § 2-42. Common and statutory law — 
 Municipal ordinances and 
 local and foreign laws. 
 
 243. Foreign nations, seals and 
 
 acts. 
 
 244. Terms of court, records, rules 
 
 of practice and judicial pro- 
 ceedings. 
 
 § 236. Judicial notice. — The doctrine of judicial notice, 
 i. e., the knowledge which a court or judge will take officially 
 of the truth of certain classes of facts without requiring 
 proof thereof to be offered, is based upon the necessity for a 
 speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. The time 
 of the courts should not be taken up, nor should the parties to 
 litigation be put to needless expense in taking evidence to 
 prove facts which are merely collateral to the point in issue 
 and which are within the knowledge of all persons of average 
 education and intelligence. Of such facts the courts will take 
 judicial notice. The primary effect of judicial notice is to 
 dispense with the proof of some fact. To the extent that this 
 is clone the power of the jury as triers of fact is limited and 
 circumscribed, and the power of the court to decide upon the 
 existence of a fact as a matter of law, and by its decision to 
 bind the jury, is correspondingly enlarged. To permit the 
 court to take judicial notice of obvious or familiar facts is 
 equivalent to enunciating a rule of law that such facts are to 
 be considered by the jury as conclusively proved and as obli- 
 gatory on them. This view of the matter is confirmed by the 
 consistent practice of the courts in refusing not only to per- 
 mit the introduction of evidence to prove the fact, but of evi- 
 dence to disprove its truth as well. 
 
 But the amount of information which is required to consti- 
 tute a man of average or ordinar} 7 education and intelligence
 
 § 237.] 
 
 JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
 
 305 
 
 will vary greatly. Many facts may be notorious in one sec- 
 tion of a large country which would not be known to well- 
 informed persons in another. The general rules, therefore, in 
 regard to the facts which the courts will notice judicially are 
 sometimes modified by the circumstances of the particular 
 case to which it is sought to apply them. 1 
 
 §237. Matter of common knowledge. — The courts will 
 take judicial notice of the meaning of English words and 
 phrases, 2 abbreviations, 3 and of legal expressions in common 
 use. 4 So, courts will take judicial notice of the recurrence of 
 public holidays; 5 of the natural and artificial subdivisions of 
 time ; 6 of the coincidence of the days of the month and week ; 7 
 of the incidents of railroad travel; 8 of the use of the telephone 
 as a means of communication; 9 of billiard tables for gaming 
 purposes; 10 of the nature and value of the circulating medium 
 
 1 " Courts should exercise this 
 power with caution ; care must be 
 taken that the requisite notoriety 
 exists, and every reasonable doubt 
 should be promptly resolved in the 
 negative." Swayne, J., in Browne v. 
 Piper, 91 U. S. 37. 
 
 2 Lohman v. State, 81 Ind. 151-; 
 Power v. Boudle (N. D., 1893), 54 N. 
 W. Rep. 404; Baily v. Kalamazoo P. 
 Co.. 40 Mich. 251 ; Elrod v. Alexanda, 
 4 Heisk. 342 (meaning of " contra- 
 band ") ; Barker v. State, 12 Tex. 273 ; 
 Fullenwider v. Fullenwider, 53 Mo. 
 439; Hill v. State. 43 111. 177; State 
 v. Kambleton, 22 Mo. 452; Com. v. 
 Kneeland, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 239. 
 
 3 Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 37 ; Mose- 
 ley v. Martin, 37 Ala. 216 ; Wasson 
 v. Bank, 107 Ind. 206; Weaver v. 
 McElbreuan, 13 Mo. 89 ; Stephen v. 
 State, 11 Ga. 225; United States v. 
 Keefer, 59 Ind. 263 ("C. O. D."). 
 Contra, Johnston v. Roberts, 31 Md. 
 476 (abbreviations used by printers 
 and newspaper publishers) ; Ellis v. 
 Park, 8 Tex. 205; Accola v. Railroad 
 C,o., 70 Iowa, 185 ; Hulbert v. Carver, 
 37 Barb. 62 ; Collender v. Diusmore, 
 
 55 N. Y. 200; Russell v. Martin, 15 
 Tex. 238; McNichoIs v. Pacific Ex. 
 Co., 12 Mo. App. 401. See ante, §218. 
 
 4 Eureka Vinegar Co. v. Gazette, 35 
 Fed. Rep. 570; Com. v. Kneeland, 
 20 Pick. 239; Hoare v. Silverlock, 12 
 Jur. 695 ; Lenahan v. People, 5 T. & 
 C. 265 ; South, etc. Co. v. Jeffries, 
 40 Mo. App. 360 ; Slingman v. Fiedler, 
 3 Mo. App. 577; Ward v. State, 22 
 Ala. 16; Sterne v. State, 20 Ala. 43. 
 
 5 Mechanics' Bank v. Gibson, 7 
 Wend. 460 ; Rice v. Mead, 22 How. 
 Pr. 440. 
 
 6 Upinton v. Carrington, 69 Hun, 
 320. 
 
 ? Swales v. Grubb, 126 Ind. 106; 
 Brennan v. Voght (Ala., 1893), 11 S. 
 Rep. 893; Wilson v. Von Leer, 137 
 Pa. St. 371 ; Banks v. Kingsley, 84 
 Me. Ill ; Ecker v. Bank, 64 Md. 292; 
 Alman v. Owens, 31 Ala. 167; Phila. 
 R. Co. v. Lehman, 56 Md, 209; Mc- 
 intosh v. Lee, 57 Iowa, 356. 
 
 8 Downey v. Hendrie, 46 Mich. 
 498. 
 
 9 Globe Printing Co. v. Stahle, 23 
 Mo. App. 451. 
 
 io State v. Price, 12 Gill & J. 260.
 
 3GG 
 
 JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
 
 [§ 237. 
 
 irrespective of its legal-tender character; 1 of legal weights 
 and measures; 2 and that a litigant is an alien enemy. 3 But 
 the value of foreign currency unless fixed by act of congress,' 
 of a particular commodity, 5 or of a person's services; 6 the 
 rates of exchange between cities; 7 that "policy" is a game 
 of chance; 8 local rules for the measurement of grain; 9 the 
 habitual use 10 and location of city streets and plats, 11 and other 
 similar matters of limited and local notoriety, must be affirma- 
 tively shown. 12 
 
 It has been held that though courts will take judicial no- 
 tice of the natural expectation of life, as it is shown by mor- 
 tality tables, 13 they will not notice the present value of a life 
 insurance policy which is ascertainable onW after an intricate 
 computation and the consideration of extrinsic circumstances. 14 
 
 Facts of natural and uniform recurrence, such as the return 
 of the seasons, 15 the planting, 16 growth, condition 17 and matu- 
 
 1 Larnpton v. Haggard, 3 Mon. 146; 
 Gady v. State. 83 Ala. 51 ; State v. 
 Grant, 55 Ala. 201 (coin); Bank v. 
 Meagher, 33 Ala. 622; Perritt v. 
 Couch, 5 Bush, 201 (value of United 
 States treasury notes). 
 
 2 Pecks v. Simis, 22 N. E. Rep. 313. 
 3 Ince v. Beekman, 16 La. Ann. 
 
 352. The federal courts will take 
 notice of the organization and ex- 
 istence of national banks. United 
 States v. Williams, 4 Biss. 302. 
 4 Kermott v. Ayer, 11 Mich. 181. 
 
 5 Cook v. Decker, 63 Mo. 328. 
 
 6 Pearson v. Darrington, 32 Ala. 
 227. 
 
 i Lowe v. Bliss, 24 111. 168. 
 
 8 State v. Seiner, 17 Mo. App. 39. 
 
 9 South, etc. Co. v. Wood, 74 Ala. 
 449. 
 
 10 Cleveland v. Newsom, 45 Mich. 
 62. 
 
 11 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Frana, 13 
 III. App. 91 ; Allen v. Scharring- 
 hausen, 8 Mo. App. 229; Cicotte v. 
 Cruciaux, 52 Mich. 227. 
 
 12 Longes v. Kennedy, 2 Bibb(Ky.), 
 607 (local custom); Russell v. Hoyt, 
 
 4 Mont. 412; Bell v. State, 1 Tex. 
 App. 81 (location of hotels) ; Tison v. 
 Smith, 8 Tex. 147 ; Wilcox v. Jack- 
 son, 109 111. 261 ; Perkins v. Rogers, 
 35 Ind. 124; St. Louis, etc. Co. v. In- 
 surance Co., 33 Mo. App. 348 ; Rich- 
 ards v Knight (Iowa, 1892), 42 N. W. 
 Rep. 584 (maturity of crops) ; Endere 
 v. McDonald (Ind., 1893), 31 N. E. 
 Rep. 1056; Chicago, etc. Co. v. 
 Champion, 33 id. 874; Bradford v. 
 Floyd. 80 Mo. 207. 
 
 13 Kans. etc. Co. v. Phillips (Ala., 
 1893), 13 S. Rep. 65 ; Abell v. Pa. M. 
 Ins. Co., 18 W. Va. 400 ; Gordon v. 
 Tweedy, 74 Ala. 232. 
 
 1 4 Price v. Conn. M. L. Ins. Co., 48 
 Mo. App. 281. 
 
 15 Floyd v. Ricks, 14 Ark. 286, 292 ; 
 58 Am. Dec. 374; Raridan v. Rail- 
 road, 69 Iowa, 527; Patterson v. Mc- 
 Causland, 3 Bland (Md.), 69; Tom- 
 linson v. Greenfield, 31 Ark. 557; 
 Hunter v. New York, O. & W. R R. 
 Co., 116 N. Y. 622. 
 
 16 Wetzel v. Kelly, 83 Ala. 440; 
 Loeb v. Richai'dson, 74 Ala. 311. 
 
 i" Ross v. Bos well, 60 Ind. 235.
 
 § 233.] 
 
 JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
 
 JG7 
 
 rity of crops, 1 and other natural phenomena which are noto- 
 rious and with which the majority of fairly well educated 
 persons are presumed to be conversant, need not be proved. 
 
 §238. Historical facts.— Important facts of history of 
 general and public notoriety which have exerted an influence 
 on the development of affairs affecting either the welfare of 
 the whole people or reacting upon the forms of the constitu- 
 tion and government will be noticed judicially, 2 though it has 
 been held advisable, if not actually necessary, to call the 
 court's attention to the facts involved. 3 Thus, in America, 
 the courts will not require proof that at a given period the 
 nation was engaged in foreign 4 or civil 5 war, or that the latter 
 was widespread and involved particular states or sections.' 5 
 So, too, it has been held that the abolition of slavery, 7 or the 
 nature 8 or extinguishment of Indian titles, need not be shown. 9 
 
 As a part of the sum of historical knowledge in the posses- 
 sion of the court, notice will be taken that during and after 
 the civil war the operation of the civil law was suspended; 10 
 that an order of a military commander was law; 11 that gold 
 was not in circulation, but that in all parts of the country a 
 paper currency was in use, 12 with reference to which contracts 
 were made, and whose value was greatly depreciated. 13 
 
 i Garth v. Caldwell, 72 Mo. 622; 
 Dixon v. Niccolls, 39 111. 373; Tom- 
 linson v. Greenfreed, 31 Ark. 557; 
 Gordon v. Tweedy, 74 Ala. 232; 
 Mahony v. Aurecocha, 51 Cal. 429. 
 Contra, Gove v. Downer, 59 Vt. 139. 
 
 2 Foscue v. Lyon, 55 N. Y. 621 ; 
 Magie v. Chadoine, 30 Tex. 644; 
 Smith v. Speed, 50 Ala. 276; Payner 
 v. Treadwell, 16 Gal. 220; Harris v. 
 Herman, 78 Mo. 623; Simmons v. 
 Trumbo, 9 W. Va. 358; Prince v. 
 Skellin, 71 Me. 361; Williams v. 
 State, 64 Ind. 553 ; MeKinnon v. Bliss, 
 21 N. Y. 206; Ashley v. Martin, 50 
 Ala. 537 ; Colloway v. Cassart, 45 
 Ark. 41; Yehn Jim v. Territory, 1 
 Wash. 63 (Indian war). 
 
 3 MeKinnon v. Bliss, 21 N. Y. 206. 
 
 4 Ogden v. Lund, 1 1 Tex. 688. 
 
 5 Perkins v. Rogers, 35 Ind. 124; 
 Brooke v. Filer, 35 Ind. 402; Wor- 
 cester v. Cheney, 94 111. 430; Swen- 
 nerton v. Columbian, 37 N. Y. 174. 
 
 6 Jeffries v. Jeffries, 39 Ala. 655 
 (martial law); Hix v. Hix, 25 W. 
 Va. 481 (extent of Confederate lines l ; 
 Dryden v. Stephens, 19 id. 1 ; United 
 States v. Greathonse, 2 Abb. (U. S.) 
 364. Contra, Kelly v. Story, 6 
 Heisk. 202. 
 
 7 Ferdinand v. State, 39 Ala. 706. 
 
 8 United States v. Lucero, 1 N. M. 
 422. 
 
 9 People v. Snyder, 41 N. Y. 397. 
 10 Killebrew v. Murphy, 3 Heisk. 
 
 546. 
 
 " Gates v. Johnson, 36 Tex. 144. 
 
 12 Morris v. Morris, 58 Ala. 443; 
 United States v. American, 1 Woolw. 
 
 13 Ashley v. Martin, 50 Ala. 537. See cases in last note.
 
 308 
 
 JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
 
 [§ 239. 
 
 So, generally, any minor incident which forms a part of 
 some greater event, or which is a factor in bringing about a 
 condition of affairs which will be judicially noticed, need not 
 be proved. 1 Thus, it has been held that the agreement of 
 William Penn with Lord Baltimore, fixing the boundaries 
 between the provinces of Maryland and Pennsylvania,' 2 and 
 the details of the history of Indian tribes resident in New 
 York, 3 form a part of the history of these states and need not 
 be shown in their courts. 4 
 
 §231). (Geographical facts. — Courts are bound to notice 
 the extent and subdivisions of the territory over which the 
 government of which they are a part exercises its functions. 
 Thus, courts will take notice of the existence and location of 
 the legal divisions of the state, as towns and counties, 5 and of 
 the representative districts into which a state is divided." But 
 
 217; Hart v. State, 55 Ind. 599; Sim- 
 mons v. Trurnbo, 9 W. Va. 358; 
 Keppel v. Petersburg R Co., Chase's 
 Dec. 167 ; Harvey v. Walden, 23 La. 
 Ann. 163; Riddle v. Hill, 51 Ala. 224. 
 
 1 Schooner Mersey, Blatchf. Prize 
 Cas. 187 ; Williams v. State, 67 Ga. 
 230; East Tenn. Iron Co. v. Gaskell, 
 2 Lea, 742 (suspension of statute of 
 limitation); Turner v. Patton, 49 
 Ala. 406; Humphreys v. Burnside, 
 4 Bush, 215; Hix v. Hix, 25 W. Va. 
 481; Rice v. Shook, 27 Ark. 137; 
 Conger v. Weaver, 6 Cal. 548 : Dob- 
 bin v. Bryan, 5 Tex. 267 (opening of 
 land office) ; Lamb v. Davenport, 1 
 Sawy. (IT. S.) 609 (facts pertaining 
 to the settlement of Oregon); De 
 Celis v. United States, 13 Ct. CI. 117; 
 Conger v. Weaver, 6 Cal. 548; Irwin 
 v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140; Russell v. 
 Jackson, 22 Wend. 276 (facts of ped- 
 igree in Debrett's Peerage). 
 
 2 Thomas v. Stigers, 5 Pa. St. 480. 
 
 3 Howard v. Moot, 64 N. Y. 282. 
 
 4 The court may refresh its mem- 
 ory by consulting standard and well- 
 known historical and scientific 
 works. See ante, § 145. 
 
 6 Campbell v. West, 86 Cal. 197; 
 Casey v. Reeves, 46 Kan. 571 ; 
 
 Adams v. Harrington, 114 Ind. 66; 
 Forehand v. State, 53 Ark. 46 ; 3 S. 
 W. Rep. 728: Borough v. Brown, 11 
 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 272 ; People v. Wood, 
 131 N. Y. 617; Linck v. Litchfield, 31 
 N. E. Rep. 123: Winn. Lake Co. v. 
 Young. 40 N. H. 420; Goodwin v. 
 Appleton, 22 Me. 453 ; State v. Dun- 
 nell, 3 R. I. 127 ; Com. v. Desmond, 
 103 Mass. 445; Overton v. State, 60 
 Ala. 73; State v. Reader, 60 Iowa, 
 527; Dexter v. Cranston, 41 Mich. 
 448? Schilling v. Territory, 2 Wash. 
 Ter. 283; Lewis v. State (Tex., 1893), 
 24 S. W. Rep. 903; People v. Sup- 
 piger, 103 111. 434; Terre Haute, etc. 
 Co. v. Pierce, 95 Ind. 490; Sullivan 
 v. People, 122 111. 385. Contra, 
 Grusenmeyer v. Logan sport, 76 Ind. 
 549. The area of counties need not 
 be proved (Buckingdiouse v. Gregg, 
 19 Ind. 401 ; Wright v. Hawkins, 28 
 Tex. 452), though the date of their 
 organization must be shown. Ells- 
 worth v. Nelson, 81 Iowa, 57 ; Rousey 
 v. Wood, 47 Mo. App. 465 ; State v. 
 Cleveland, 80 Mo. 108. 
 
 6 United States v. Johnson, 2 Sawy. 
 (U. S.) 482 ; United States v. Beebe, 
 2 Dak. 292.
 
 § 239.] 
 
 JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
 
 560 
 
 it has been held that the courts of a state cannot know judi- 
 cially of the existence of counties, towns or cities located out of 
 that state, and their existence and location will have to be 
 proved. 1 
 
 Judicial notice will be taken of the general natural geo- 
 graphical features of the United States; 2 of the condition and 
 capacity of its rivers and waters, whether navigable or not; 3 
 of the boundaries of the states ; 4 that a portion of one state 
 had been separated from s or ceded to another," or to the federal 
 government ; " of the location and character of mountain ranges, 8 
 the distances between places, 9 and their population as shown 
 by the census. 10 
 
 Though the courts are not bound to take notice of the time 
 it requires for the mails between places, 11 they may do so.' 2 
 
 1 Richardson v. Williams. 2 Port. 
 (Ala.) 239; Woodward v. Railroad 
 Co., 21 Wis. 309; Riggin v. Collier, 
 C Mo. 568; Ellis v. Park, 8 Tex. 205; 
 Whitlock v. Castro, 22 id. 108. 
 
 2Mossman v. Forrest, 27 Ind. 233; 
 Stroudsburg v. Brown, 11 Pa. Co. 
 Ct. R. 272. 
 
 * Brown v. Scofield, 8 Barb. 279; 
 People v. Mining Co., 60 Cal. 138; 
 Com. v. King, 150 Mass. 221; Cash 
 v. Auditor, 7 Ind. 227; Walker v. 
 Allen, 72 Ala. 456; Ross v. Faust, 
 54 Ind. 471 : Tewksbury v. Schulen- 
 berg, 41 Wis. 584; Neaderheuser v. 
 State, 28 Ind. 257; Thurman v. Mor- 
 rison, 14 B. Mon. 296. 
 
 *The Appollon, 9 Wheat. 374: 
 Peyroud v. Howard, 7 Pet. 342; 
 Thorson v. Peterson, 9 Fed. Rep. 
 517; Ogden v. Lund, 11 Tex. 688; 
 Harrold v. Ai rington, 64 Tex. 233. 
 
 5 Bank v. Machir, 18 W. Vai 271. 
 
 6 People v. Snyder, 41 N. Y. 397. 
 
 • Hewthorn v. Doe, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 
 159. 
 
 8 Casey v. Reeves, 26 Pac. Rep, 
 951 ; 46 Kan. 571 ; Price v. Page, 24 
 Mo. 65. 
 
 9 Pearce v. Langft, 101 Pa. St. 511 ; 
 Mut. Ben. L. I. Co. v. Robison, 58 
 
 24 
 
 Fed. Rep. 723; McConnell v. Boudry, 
 4 T. B. Mon. 394; Rice v. Mont- 
 gomery, 4 Biss. 75; Hegard v. In- 
 surance Co. (Colo., 1890), 11 Pac. Rep. 
 594. 
 
 10 Denair v. Brooklyn, 5 N. Y. S. 
 585; Forehand v. State, 13 S. W. 
 Rep. 728; 56 Ark. 46: People v. 
 Williams, 64 Cal. 87; State v. Bras- 
 camp, 54 N. W. Rep. 532; Welch v.. 
 County, 29 W. Va. 63; State v. 
 County, 89 Mo. 237; Hawkins v. 
 Thomas, 3 Ind. App. 399 ; 29 N. E. 
 Rep. 157; Kalbrier v. Leonard, 34' 
 Ind. 497. A court will notice the 
 fact that many persons of foreign 
 birth reside in a certain locality. 
 Kernitz v. L. I. City, 50 Hun, 428; 
 3 N. Y. S. 144. Courts are not 
 bound to take notice of the loss in- 
 curred by a railroad company be- 
 cause an Indian reservation had been 
 located within the boundaries of its 
 land. Elling v. JThexton, 16 Pac. 
 Rep. 931. 
 
 11 Wiggins v. Burkham, 10 Wall. 
 129; Rice v. Montgomery, 4 Biss. 75. 
 
 •2 Pearce v. Langfit, 101 Pa. St. 507. 
 It may be remarked that placing a 
 letter in a street letter-box or hand- 
 ing it to a carrier or collector is
 
 370 JUDICIAL NOTICE. [§ 240. 
 
 § 240. Political facts — Elections. — The existence and 
 political and executive acts of the supreme authority to which 
 the court is subordinate will be judicially noticed, particularly 
 if its existence has been the result of statutory enactment or 
 where its acts have assumed the form of laws regularly pro- 
 mulgated. Thus, the proclamations of the president of the 
 United States, 1 the messages 2 and commissions of the gov- 
 ernor of the state, 3 the regulations settled by the heads of ex- 
 ecutive departments for carrying on business, 4 together with 
 the authenticity of the signatures and seals attached to such 
 documents, need not be shown by evidence. 5 The courts will 
 also take judicial notice of the date of the appointment or 
 accession to office of an executive official, 6 of his public acts, 7 
 and of the date upon which his term expires by death or limita- 
 tion. 8 So it has been held that the courts will notice the days 
 of holding general elections; 9 that an election has been held, 10 
 the whole number of votes cast, and the result of the voting, 11 
 together with the fact that the result is contested by the de- 
 feated candidate. 12 
 
 Judicial notice will be taken, in all collateral proceedings 
 not involving the title to the office, that certain persons are 
 
 mailing. Abb. Brief on Facts, g 517; 6 Heizer v. State, 12 Ind. 350; 
 
 Pearce v. Langflt, supra. State v. Boyd, 31 Neb. 435; 51 N. 
 
 i The Greathouse Case, 2 Abb. (U. W. Rep. 964. 
 
 S.) 382; Cuyler v. Ferrill, 1 Abb. (U. 7 Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 
 
 S.) 169. 202; Prince v. Skillen, 71 Me. 361 ; 
 
 2Dowdell v. State, 58 Ind. 333; State v. Gramelspacher, 126 Ind. 
 
 Wells v. Railroad Co., 110 Mo. 286; 39S; Campbell v. West, 86 Cal. 197. 
 
 19 S. W. Rep. 530; Jenkins v. Col- 8 Cincinnati, etc. Co. v. Jones, 21 
 
 lard, 145 U. S. 546. S. W. Rep. 192; Doe v. Riley, 28 
 
 3 State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449. Ala. 164; Martin v. Aultman, 80 
 
 4 Burke v. Miltenberger, 19 Wall. Wis. 150; Ragland v. Wynn, 37 Ala. 
 519; Garling v. Van Allen, 55 N. Y. 32. 
 
 31; Low v. Hanson, 72 Me. 104; s>State v. Minnick, 15 Iowa, 123; 
 
 United States v. Williams, 6 Mont. Himmelman v. Hoadley, 44 Cal. 213; 
 
 379. Contra, Moore v. Worth, 2 Ellis v. Reddin, 12 Kan. 306. 
 
 Duv. (Ky.) 308. 10 Urnston v. State, 73 Ind. 175. 
 
 5 Com. v. Dunlop (Va., 1893), 16 Contra, Ex parte Reynolds, 87 Ala. 
 S. E. Rep. 273 ; Jones v. Gale's Adm'r, 138. 
 
 4 Martin, 635; State v.Boyd, 34 Neb. " Thomas v. Com., 17 S. E. Rep. 
 
 435; 57 N. W. Rep. 964; State v. 788; State v. Swift, 69 Ind. 505; 
 
 Barrett, 40 Minn. 65 ; Davis v. Mc- Savage's Case, 84 Va. 582. 
 
 Enany, 150 Mass. 451. 12 Lewis v. Bruton, 74 Ala. 317.
 
 § 241.] 
 
 JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
 
 371 
 
 actually the incumbents of the various subordinate offices, 
 state and federal, which they purport to hold, and for these 
 reasons their official character need not be affirmatively 
 shown. 1 So courts will notice the place and time established 
 by law for the meeting 2 and adjournment of congress and 
 the legislature, 3 the contents of their journals, 4 the usual mode 
 of proceeding and the constitutional and statutory privileges 
 of their members. 
 
 § 241. Scientific facts. — Courts will take notice of scien- 
 tific facts of an axiomatic character, but not of those upon 
 which there is a disagreement of opinion among men of emi- 
 nence in that line of research. 5 Thus, it is not necessary to show 
 that kerosene 6 or natural gas is explosive; 7 that unoccupied 
 buildings are exposed to damage from fire; 8 that whisky, gin, 9 
 rum, 10 wine u and beer are intoxicating liquors ; 12 that beer is a 
 malt liquor; 13 that the sun 14 or moon 15 sets or rises at a cer- 
 
 1 Kellar v. Moore, 51 Ala. 340 (com- 
 missioner of deeds); Thompson v. 
 Haskell, 21 111. 215 (sheriff); Tim- 
 berlake v. Brewer, 59 Ala. 108; Cole- 
 man v. State, 63 id. 93 (justice of 
 the peace); Ede v. Johnson, 15 Cal. 
 53 ; Russell v. Sargent, 7 111. App. 98. 
 Cf. Davis v. McEnaney, 150 Mass. 
 451. 
 
 2 Perkins v. Woodfolk, 8 Baxt. 411. 
 
 3 Perkins v. Woodfolk, 8 Baxt. 411. 
 * McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407 ; 
 
 id. 414; Barnard v. Gall, 43 La. Ann. 
 959; People v. Stewart, 97 111. 123. 
 
 5 St. Louis, etc. Co. v. Am. T. I. 
 Co., 33 Mo. App. 348; Com. v. 
 Marzynski, 149 Mass. 68; Luke v. 
 Calhoun, 52 Ala. 115; Lyon v. 
 Marine, 55 Fed. Rep. 964; Cozzens 
 v. Higgins, 1 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 
 451 ; Eureka, etc. Co. v. Gazette, 35 
 Fed. Rep. 570; Trese v. State, 2 S. 
 Rep. 390 ; State v. Barber, 36 U. S. 
 313. 
 
 6 Wood v. Insurance Co., 46 N. Y. 
 421. 
 
 7 Jamieson v. Ind. etc. Co., 46 N. 
 Y. 421. Contra, as to the inflam- 
 mable nature of gin and turpentine, 
 Mosley v. Insurance Co., 55 Vt. 142. 
 
 8 White v. Insurance Co., 83 Me. 
 279. 
 
 9 Com. v. Peckham, 2 Gray, 514. 
 
 w United States v. Angell, 11 Fed. 
 Rep. 54. 
 
 11 Kizer v. Randleman, 5 Jones' L. 
 428: State v. Packer, 80 N. C. 439. 
 
 i 2 State v. Effinger, 44 Mo. App. 81 ; 
 State v. Teissedre, 30 Kan. 484; 
 Wetzler v. Keely, 83 Ala. 444; 
 Thomas v. Com. (Va., 1893), 17 S. 
 E. Rep. 788; Maier v. State (Tex., 
 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 974. 
 
 13 United States v. Ducournac, 54 
 Fed. Rep. 138.; Aller v. State, 55 Ala. 
 16 ; State v. Gayette, 1 1 R. 1. 592 ; Wat- 
 son v. State, 55 Ala. 158 ; Fenton v. 
 State, 100 Ind. 90. Whether a par- 
 ticular sort of beer is an intoxicating 
 drink was left to the jury in Com- 
 monwealth v. Bloss, 116 Mass. 56; 
 State v. McCafferty, 63 Me. 233. So 
 
 14 Lake Erie, etc. Co. v. Hatch, 6 
 Ohio Cir. Ct. 230. 
 
 15 Case v. Perew, 46 Hun, 57.
 
 372 
 
 JUDICIAL NOTICE,, 
 
 [§ 242. 
 
 tain hour; that a railroad is a common carrier, 1 or that its 
 operation on a city street increases traffic; 2 that a mule is a 
 domestic animal; 3 that a fracture of the skull may produce 
 death; 4 the length of the period of gestation; 5 that no man 
 was ever known to be nine feet high, 6 and that tobacco is 
 neither a drug nor medicine. 7 
 
 Courts will not take notice of facts to be found only in en- 
 cyclopedias and similar works or of facts which do not form 
 a part of the general stock of scientific information. 8 Thus, 
 the courts will not take notice that each concentric circle in a 
 cross-section of timber marks a year's growth; 9 that kerosene 
 is refined coal oil; 10 that oleomargarine is or is not unwhole- 
 some, 11 or that a certain crime is physically impossible of com- 
 mission. 12 
 
 §242. Common and statutory law — Municipal ordi- 
 nances and local and foreign laws. — The rules, maxims and 
 principles of the common law which prevail in any jurisdic- 
 tion need not be shown in court. 13 So the rules of the law 
 
 of cider or ale after it has fermented. 
 State v. Biddle, 54 N. H. 379. And 
 whether blackberry wine is a spirit- 
 uous liquor is for the jury to decide. 
 State v. Lowry, 74 N. C. 121. 
 
 1 Caldwell v. Richmond, etc. Co., 
 89 Ga. 550. 
 
 2 Bookman v. N. Y. El. R. R. Co., 
 137 N. Y. 302. 
 
 3 State v. Gould, 26 W. Va. 258. 
 
 4 McDaniel v. State, 76 Ala. 1. 
 s King v. Luff, 8 East, 193. 
 
 6 Hunter v. Railway Co., 116 N. Y. 
 615. 
 
 7 Com. v. Marzynski, 149 Mass. 68. 
 In this case the court said: "Ordi- 
 narily, whether a substance or arti- 
 cle comes within a given description 
 is a question of fact; but some facts 
 are so obvious and familiar that the 
 law takes notice of them and receives 
 them into its domain. If the proof 
 had been that the shop had been 
 kept open for the purpose of selling 
 guns or pistols, it would hardly be 
 contended that the judge might not 
 
 properly have ruled that the sale of 
 these articles was not a sale of drugs 
 or medicine. The court has judicial 
 knowledge of the meaning of com- 
 mon words, and may well rule that 
 guns and pistols are not drugs or 
 medicine, and may exclude the opin- 
 ions of witnesses who offer to testify 
 that they are." 
 
 8 Engraving Co. v. Hoke, 30 Fed. 
 Rep. 444; Culverhouse v. Wertz, 32 
 Mo. App. 24; Fowler v. Park, 48 
 Fed. Rep. 789 ; Meely Hee v. Hudson, 
 21 S. W. Rep. 175. 
 
 9 Patterson v. McCausland, 3 
 Bland, 69. 
 
 10 Bennett v. Insurance Co., 8 Daly, 
 471. 
 
 ii North. Mfg. Co. v. Chambers, 58 
 Mich. 381. 
 
 12 Ausman v. Veal, 10 Ind. 355. 
 
 1 3 St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Weaver, 
 35 Kan. 412; Wilson v. Bumstead, 12 
 Neb. 1. "The authority of the max- 
 ims of the common laws rests upon 
 their general acceptance, and this
 
 § 242.] 
 
 JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
 
 373 
 
 of nations regulating the intercourse of civilized nations need 
 not be shown, 1 as the courts of all civilized countries will take 
 notice of the principles of that law. 2 So it is well settled that 
 notice will be taken of the law merchant 3 and of the customs 
 of persons engaged in particular avocations, such as mer- 
 chants; 4 railway companies, 5 and other common carriers; 6 of 
 bankers, 7 mercantile agencies, 8 physicians, 9 conveyancers 10 and 
 public officials. 11 So a court will take judicial notice of the 
 official character, signature and seal of a foreign or domestic 
 notary public attached to a protest for non-payment or other 
 instrument. 12 Foreign customs forming no part of the law 
 merchant must be proved as matter of fact. 13 
 
 la America the federal courts will take notice judicially not 
 only of the constitution and public statutes of the United 
 States, 14 but of all state constitutions and statutes applicable to 
 cases pending in them, 15 as well as of the decisions of the state 
 
 connotes their general notoriety. 
 Thus, as the courts cannot refuse to 
 know what is presumed to be within 
 the knowledge of all men — for 
 every one is presumed to know the 
 law — it is said that the doctrines, 
 axioms and principles of the com- 
 mon law are deposited in the breast 
 of the judges, to be applied to the 
 facts which are properly ascertained 
 or proved before them." 3 Bl. Com. 
 379. 
 
 1 1 Bl. Com. 75, 76, 85 ; Edie v. E. 
 I. Co., 2 Burr. 1226; The Scotia, 14 
 Wall. 170. 
 
 2 Croudson v. Leonard, 4 Cranch, 
 434 ; Ocean Insurance Co. v. Francis, 
 2 Wend. 64. 
 
 » Munn v. Burch, 25 111. 35 ; Wig- 
 gin v. Chicago, 5 Mo. App. 347. 
 
 *Almy v. Simonson, 52 Hun, 535; 
 Bank v. Fitzhugh, 1 Har. & G. (Md.) 
 239; Gibson v. Stevens, 9 How. 
 (U. S.) 384; Watt v. Hoch, 25 Pa. 
 St. 411 ; Consequa v. Willings, 1 Pet. 
 225 ; Jewell v. Center, 25 Ala. 498 ; 
 Reed v. Wilson, 41 N. J. L. 29. 
 
 s Lane v. L. E. R. Co., 23 N. Y. 
 
 Weekly Dig. 267; Isaacson v. N. Y. 
 Cent. R. R. Co., 94 N. Y. 278. 
 6 State v. Liquor, 73 Me. 278. 
 "' Fleming v. McClure, 1 Brev. 428; 
 Brandas v. Barnett, 3 M. G. & S. 
 519; Bank v. Hall, 83 N. Y. 338; 
 Yerkes v. Bank, 69 id. 383. 
 8 Eaton v. Avery, 83 N. Y. 31. 
 9 Yeaton v. Fry, 5 Cranch, 335; 
 Chamoise v. Fowler, 3 Wend. 173. 
 
 io Doe v. Hilder, 2 B. & Aid. 793. 
 
 n Bigelow v. Chatterton, 57 Fed. 
 Rep. 614. 
 
 i 2 Pierce v. Indseth, 106 U. S. 546; 
 Denmead v. Maack, 2 MacArthur, 
 475; United States v. Libby, 1 W. & 
 M. 221 , Stoddard v. Sloan, 65 Iowa, 
 680. 
 
 13 Dutch, etc. Co. v. Mooney, 12 
 Cal. 585; Munn v. Burch, 25 111. 21 ; 
 Turner v. Fish, 28 Miss. 306; Lewis 
 v. McClure, 8 Oreg. 273. 
 
 UKessel v. Albetis, 56 Barb. 362; 
 Murphy v. Hendricks, 57 Ind. 593; 
 Morris v. Davidson, 49 Ga. 361 ; 
 Laidley v. Cumniings, 83 Ky. 607; 
 Minis v. Schwarz, 37 Tex. 13. 
 
 I5ffinde v. Vattier, 5 Pet. 398;
 
 374 
 
 JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
 
 [§ 242. 
 
 courts construing them. 1 On the other hand, the federal con- 
 stitutions and statutes need never be proved in the state 
 courts, as they are bound to take judicial notice of their enact- 
 ment and contents, 2 as well as of the constitutions and public 
 statutes of their own state. 3 i 
 
 In conformity with the rule that courts will take judicial 
 notice of public statutes, municipal charters and acts incorpo- 
 rating public or quasi-public corporations need not be shown. 4 
 
 Jones v. Hays, 4 McLean, 521; 
 Course v. Head, 4 Dall. 22; Elmen- 
 dorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152 ; Cov- 
 ington B. Co. v. Shepherd, 20 How. 
 (U. S.) 227; Knower v. Haines, 31 
 Fed. Rep. 513; Fourth Nat. Bank v. 
 Francklyn, 120 U. S. 751 ; Jasper v. 
 Porter, 2 McLean, 579; Carpenter 
 -v. Dexter, 8 Wall. 515; New Jersey 
 v. Yard, 95 U. S. 112; Gormley v. 
 Bunyan, 138 U. S. 623; Gordon v. 
 Hobart, 2 Sumn. 401 ; Newberry v. 
 Robinson, 36 Fed. Rep. 811 ; Hanley 
 v. Donoghue, 116 U. S. 4. The federal 
 courts will notice state laws only 
 so far as the state courts notice them 
 and as far they are called upon to 
 administer them. If the state court 
 is required to notice local or private 
 laws, a federal court in that state 
 must also do so. Abb. Brief on 
 Facts, § 383, citing Beaty v. Know- 
 ler, 4 Pet. (U. S.) 152; Renaud v. 
 Abbott, 116 U. S. 277. " The circuit 
 courts of the United States are 
 created by congress, not for the pur- 
 pose of administering the local law 
 of a single state alone, but to admin- 
 ister the laws of all the states in the 
 Union in cases to which they re- 
 spectively apply. The judicial power 
 conferred on the general government 
 by the constitution extends to many 
 cases arising under the laws of the 
 different states, and this court is 
 called upon, in the exercise of its 
 appellate jurisdiction, constantly to 
 take notice of and administer the 
 
 jurisprudence of all the states. That 
 jurisprudence, then, is in no sense a 
 foreign jurisprudence to be proved 
 in the courts of the United States by 
 the ordinary modes of proof by 
 which the laws of a foreign country 
 are to be established, but it is to be 
 judicially taken notice of in the 
 same manner as the laws of the 
 United States are taken notice of by 
 these courts." The court, by Story, 
 J., in O wings v. Hull, 9 Pet. (U. S.) 
 624. 
 
 iCheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108; 
 Pennington v. Gibson, 16 How. 65; 
 Evans v. Railroad Co., 5 Phila. 512. 
 
 2 Morris v. Davidson, 49 Ga. 331 ; 
 Caughran v. Gilman, 81 Iowa, 442; 
 46 N. W. Rep. 1005; Laidley v. 
 Cummings, 83 Ky. 006; Baylis v. 
 Chubb, 16 Giatt. 284; Wetumpka 
 v. Wharf Co., 63 Ala. 611; Dwyer 
 v. Brenham, 65 Tex. 526; Durch v. 
 Chippewa, 60 Wis. 227; Bird v. 
 Com., 21 Gratt. (Va.) 800; State 
 v. Cooper, 101 N. C. 684. 
 
 3 Harpending v. Church, 16 Pet. 
 455; Van Swarton v. Com., 24 Pa. 
 St. 131 ; Bowen v. Missouri P. etc. 
 Co. (Mo., 1893), 24 S. W. Rep. 436; 
 Lane v. Harris, 16 Ga. 217; Berliner 
 v. Waterloo, 14 Wis. 378; State v. 
 Bailey, 16 Ind. 46; Binkert v. Jen- 
 sen, 94 111. 283. 
 
 ^Albritten v. Huntsville. 60 Ala. 
 486; Briggs v. Whipple, 7 Vt. 15; 
 Washington v. Finley, 5 Eng. (Ark ) 
 423; State v. Murfreesboro, 11
 
 § 242.] 
 
 JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
 
 375 
 
 The same rule is also applicable to statutes amending or re- 
 pealing a city charter 1 or other public statute. 2 
 
 The rule that public laws will be judicially noticed is not 
 violated by the fact that municipal ordinances and resolutions 
 must, independently of statute, be pleaded and proved, as these 
 municipal enactments, like the by-laws of private corporations, 3 
 are not public statutes within the meaning of the rule. 4 But 
 municipal courts will take judicial notice of ordinances. 5 
 Courts will not take notice of private statutes affecting an in- 
 dividual or small number of persons unless authorized by stat- 
 ute to do so; G for example, of a special act creating a private 
 
 Humph. (Tenn.) 217; Fayne v. 
 Treadvvell, 16 Cal. 220; Stier v. Os- 
 caloosa, 41 Towa, 353: Selma v. Per- 
 kins, 68 Ala. 145; Potwin v. John- 
 son, 108 111. 70 Solomon v. Hughes, 
 24 Kan. 211 ; State v. Sherman, 42 
 Mo. 210; Durcb v. Chippewa, 60 
 Wis. 227; Dwyer v. Brenham, 65 
 Tex. 529; Pasadena v. Stimson, 27 
 Pac. Eep. 604; State v. Tosney, 26 
 Minn. 2G2; fcvmth v Janesville, 52 
 Wis. 680; Bui-penning v. Railroad 
 Co., 48 N. W. Rep. 444: Many v. 
 Titcomb, 19 Ind. 136. 
 
 iNew Jersey v. Yard. 95 U. S. 11?; 
 State v. Bergen, 34 N. J. L. 439; 
 Swain v. Comstock, 18 Wis. 463; 
 Bow v. Allentown, 31 N. H 351; 
 Railroad v. Chenoa, 43 111. 209; Vir- 
 ginia City v. Manufacturing Co., 2 
 Nev. 86; Railroad v. Plumas Co., 37 
 Cal. 354. If the city has been incor- 
 porated under a general law its in- 
 corporation must be shown. Temple 
 v. State, 15 Tex. App. 405; Morgan 
 v. Atlanta, 77 Ga. 662; Ingle v. 
 Jones, 43 Iowa, 286. Contra, House 
 v. Greensburg, 93 Ind. 533. 
 
 2 Belmont v. Warrell, 69 Me. 314: 
 Parent v. Walmsley's Adm'r, 20 
 Ind. 82. 
 
 3 The courts do not notice judicially 
 the by-laws of a private corporation 
 
 (Benev. Soc. v. Phillips, 36 Mich. 22), 
 and the same rule is recognized in 
 the case of the private rules for the 
 government of the members of a 
 board of brokers. Goldsmith v. Saw- 
 yer, 46 Cal. 209. 
 
 4 Garvin v. Wells, 8 Iowa. 286; 
 Central Bank v. Baltimore, 20 Atl. 
 Rep. 444; Garland v. Denver, 11 
 Colo. 534 ; State v. Mayor, 1 1 Humph. 
 217; Young v. Bank, 4 Cranch, 384; 
 Porter v. Waring, 69 N. Y. 250; 
 Clapp v. Hartford, 35 Conn. 66; 
 Prell v. McDonald, 7 Kan. 426; 
 Lucker v. Com., 4 Bush (Ky.), 440; 
 Ingle v. Jones, 43 Iowa, 286 ; Stier v. 
 Oscaloosa, 41 Iowa, 353; Case v. Mo- 
 bile, 30 Ala. 538; Clarke v. Bank, 10 
 Ark. 516; Pettit v. May, 34 Wis. 666 ; 
 People v. Potter, 35 Cal. 110 ; Winona 
 v. Burke, 23 Minn. 254 ; Briggs v. 
 Whipple, 7 Vt. 15 ; Beaty v. Knowler, 
 4 Pet. 152. 
 
 5 Moundsville v. Velton, 13 S. E. 
 Rep. 373 ; 35 W. Va. 217 ; Anderson 
 v. O'Donnell, 29 S. C. 355. 
 
 «Hart v. Bait. etc. Co., 6 W. Va. 
 336 ; Somervill v. Winbush, 7 Gratt. 
 (Va.) 205; Bixler v. Barker, 3 Bush 
 (Ky.), 166; Morgan v. Cree, 46 Vt. 
 786 ; Collier v. Society, 8 B. Mon. 68 ; 
 Halbert v. Skyler, 1 A. K. Marsh.
 
 376 
 
 JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
 
 [§ 242. 
 
 corporation, 1 or one relating exclusively to the settlement of 
 an estate. 2 Such private acts relating to a few persons are not 
 matters of general public knowledge, and are regarded some- 
 what as quasi-contracts between the state and those persons 
 specially interested, with the terms of which the court is ig- 
 norant until it shall have ascertained them from the evidence. 3 
 So courts will not take notice of foreign laws, either statute 
 or common, and they will usually have to be alleged and proved 
 as matters of fact. 4 The states and territories of the United 
 
 1 Danville, etc. Co. v. State, 16 Ind. 
 456; Kelly v. Railroad Co., 58 Ala. 
 489; Hollo way v. Railroad Co., 23 
 Tex. 465 ; Jackson v. Plumb, 8 Johns. 
 295; Peoria, etc. Co. v. Scott, 116 
 III. 401. Sometimes proof of corpo- 
 ration charters is dispensed with by 
 statute unless incorporation is the 
 fact in issue. Star Brick Co. v. Reds- 
 dale, 36 N. J. L. 229. So when or- 
 ganized under general laws the 
 courts will notice the latter, but not 
 the incorporation under it. Coving- 
 ton Draw. Co. v. Shepherd, 20 How. 
 (U. S.) 227; Danville, etc. Co. v. 
 State, 16 Ind. 456. 
 
 2Leland v. Wilkinson, 6 Pet. 317; 
 Ellis v. Eastman, 32 Cal. 447. 
 
 3 Collier v. Society, 8 B. Mon. 68 ; 
 Leland v. Wilkinson, 6 Pet. 317; 
 State v. Pose, 33 La. Ann. 932; 
 Banks v. Gruben, 87 Pa. St. 468; 
 Perdicaris v. Trenton, etc. Bridge 
 Co. , 5 Dutch. (N. J.) 367 ; Broad Street 
 Hotel Co. v. Weaver, 57 Ala. 26; 
 Allegheny v. Nelson, 25 Pa. St. 332. 
 "The courts of justice are bound, 
 ex officio, to take notice of public 
 acts without their being pleaded, for 
 they are part of the general law of 
 the land, which all persons, and par- 
 ticularly the judges, are presumed to 
 know ; but they are not bound to 
 take notice of private acts unless 
 they be specially pleaded and shown 
 in proof by the party claiming the 
 effect of them." 1 Kent's Com. 430. 
 
 4 Millard v. Truax (Mich., 1888), 41 
 N. W. Rep. 328; Pickering v. Fisk, 
 6 Vt. 102 ; Liverpool, etc. G. W. Co. 
 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 464 
 (English statute); Spellier, etc. Co. 
 v. Geiger, 23 Atl. Rep. 547 ; 147 Pa. 
 St. 399; Cont. Bank v. Wells, 73 
 Wis. 352; Leathevwood v. Sullivan, 
 81 Ala. 458 ; Dainese v. Hall, 91 U. S. 
 13; Bouldin v. Phelps, 30 Fed. Rep. 
 547 ; Polk v. Butterfield, 9 Colo. 325 ; 
 Taylor v. Boardman, 25 Vt. 581; 
 Ludlow v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns. 
 95 (foreign revenue laws) ; Insurance 
 Co. v. Forchheimer, 86 Ala. 541 ; St. 
 Louis v. San Francisco R. R. Co., 35 
 Kan. 426; Mobile, etc. R. R. Co. v. 
 Whitney, 39 Ala. 468 ; Walsh v. Dart. 
 12 Wis. 635 ; Cavender v. Guild, 4 
 Cal. 250; Anderson v. Anderson, 23 
 Tex. 639; Talbot v. Seaman, 1 Cranch 
 (U. S.), 38; Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 
 (U. S.) 400; Chumasero v. Gilbert. 
 24 111. 293; Haines v. Hanrahan, 105 
 Mass. 480 ; Cutler v. Wright, 22 N. 
 Y. 472. In Liverpool Steam Co. v. 
 Phenix Ins. Co., 129 TJ. S. 444, the 
 court said : " The law of Great Brit- 
 ain, since the Declaration of Inde- 
 pendence, is the law of a foreign 
 country, and like any other foreign 
 law is a matter of fact which the 
 courts of this country cannot be pre- 
 sumed to be acquainted with or to 
 have judicial knowledge of, unless it 
 is pleaded and proved. The rule 
 that the courts of one country can-
 
 § 242.] JUDICIAL NOTICE. 377 
 
 States are so far foreign to one another that this rule is gen- 
 erally applicable to their courts. 1 
 
 As constituting an exception to the rule which has been 
 just stated, it has been held that in those parts of the United 
 States which formerly constituted parts of the colonial pos- 
 sessions of France, Spain or Russia, the laws in force at the 
 time such territory became a part of the United States need 
 not be proved as foreign laws, but will be judicially noticed. 2 
 
 Another exception to the rule that a state court will not 
 judicially notice the laws of a sister commonwealth is occa- 
 sioned by the application of the principle that a federal court 
 will always take notice of the state statutes which it is actually 
 called upon to administer. Where any question is litigated in 
 a state court involving the construction or enforcement of the 
 federal constitution or statutes, and is or might be subse- 
 quently appealed to a federal court, the statutory law of that 
 state, so far as it would be judicially noticed by the appellate 
 federal court, will, it has been held, be judicially noticed by 
 the courts of other states also. 3 
 
 Treaties made by the federal government with the Indian 
 tribes or with a foreign government are a component part of 
 the supreme statutory law 4 and possess the full power and 
 efficacy of an act of congress. 5 The courts, both federal and 
 
 not take cognizance of the law oT -'Crandall v. Sterling, 1 Colo. 106 
 
 another without plea and proof has Pecquet v. Pecquet, 17 La. Ann. 204 
 
 been constantly maintained at law Chouteau v. Soulard, 9 Mo. 581 
 
 and in equity." United States v. Perot, 8 Otto, 428 
 
 i Thatcher v. Morris, 11 N. Y. 437; Adams v. Norris, 23 How. (U. S.) 
 
 Wilson v. Cockrell, 8 Mo. 7; St. 353; Payne v. Tread well, 16 Cal. 
 
 Louis, etc. Co. v. Weaver, 35 Kan. 221; Henthorn v. Doe, 1 Blatch. 
 
 412 ; 21 Pac. Rep. 408 ; Owen v. Boyle, 157. The same exception obtains 
 
 15 Me. 147; Billingsley v. Dean, where new states are formed by the 
 
 11 Ind. 331 ; Hanley v. Donoghue, subdivision of one already existing. 
 
 116 U.S. 1; Sloan v. Torry, 78 Mo. Delano v. Joysling, 1 Litt. (Ky.) 
 
 623; Eastman v. Crosby, 90 Mass. 117; Holley v. Holley, 12 Am. Dec. 
 
 206 ; Bradshaw v. Mansfield, 18 Tex. 342. 
 
 App. 21. The law will be presumed 3 Butcher v. Brownsville, 2 Kan. 
 
 to be known to foreigners who con- 70 ; Morse v. Hewett, 28 Mich. 481 
 
 tract abroad where the contract is to State v. Hinchman, 27 Pa. St. 479 
 
 be carried out in this country. De- Paine v. Schenectady, 11 R. I. 411 
 
 witt v. Brisbane, 16 N. Y. 508. Con- Fellows v. Menasha, 11 Wis. 558. 
 
 tra where such a contract is to be 4 U. S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2. 
 
 performed abroad. Merch. Bank v. 5 Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 569; 
 
 Spalding, 9 N. Y. 53. Doe v. Braden, 16 How. 635 ; Hunen-
 
 378 judicial notice. [§§ 243, 244. 
 
 state, are bound to take judicial notice of their existence, 
 dates, character and contents, and of the rights of all persons 
 under them. 1 
 
 Finally, it may be noted that the legal rate or amount of 
 interest prevalent in the jurisdiction need not be shown, as 
 the court will compute it, 3 though a contrary rule obtains as 
 regards the legal rate abroad, 8 or even in a neighboring coun- 
 try. 4 
 
 § 243. Foreign nations, seals and official acts.— The ex- 
 istence of foreign governments need not be proved, for a court 
 will take judicial notice of this fact and will recognize the re- 
 spective title, flag and seal 5 of any state whose existence de 
 facto or de jure has been admitted by the sovereignty within 
 whose jurisdiction the court is located. 6 "Where a foreign 
 government has not been acknowledged its existence must be 
 proved, 7 while, if it has been acknowledged, the fact of its 
 acknowledgment, being a public executive act, will be judi- 
 cially noticed. 8 
 
 § 244. Terms of courts, records, rules of practice and 
 judicial proceedings. — A court will ordinarily take judicial 
 notice of its own records, 9 of the beginning 10 and length of its 
 
 stein v. Lynhara, 10 Otto, 483. See, Johns, 4 Dall. 416; Santissima v. 
 also, 1 Kent's Com. 31, 32. Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 273, 335; Lazier 
 
 1 Godfrey v. Godfrey, 17 Ind. Q; v. Westcott, 26 N. Y. 146. 
 
 Carson v. Smith, 5 Minn. 78 ; United 1 i Kent's Com. 189 ; United States 
 
 States v. Payne, 2 McCrary C. C. v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610; Yrissari v. 
 
 289; Dole v. Wilson, 16 Minn. 472; Clement, 2 C. & P. 223. 
 
 Montgomery v. Deeley, 3 Wis. 623: 8 Taylor v. Barclay, 2 Sim. 213. 
 
 United States v. Reynes, 9 How. » Dewey v. St. Albans Co., 12 Atl. 
 
 (U. S.) 127; Jones v. Laney, 3 Tex. Rep. 224; Dines v. People, 39 111. 
 
 342. Cf. American Ins. Co. v. Can- App. 565; Minor v. Stone, 1 La. Ann. 
 
 ter, 1 Pet. 511; Foster v. Neilson, 283; Farrar v. Bolles, 55 Tex. 193; 
 
 2 Pet. 314; United States v. Arre- Brucker v. State, 19 Wis. 539; Anix 
 
 dondo, 6 id. 691. v. Miller, 54 Iowa, 541 : Robinson v. 
 
 2 School Dist. No. 1 v. Lyford, 27 Brown, 82 111. 279; Jordan v. Circuit 
 Wis. 506. Court, 69 Iowa, 177; State v. Postle- 
 
 3 Coghlan v. Railroad, 142 U. S. wait, 14 Iowa, 446. Contra, Lake 
 101. Merced W. Co. v. Cowles, 31 Cal. 
 
 ^Kermott v. Ayer, 11 Mich. 181. 215; Baker v. M„gatt, 141 U. S. 141; 
 
 The rates will not be presumed to be State v. Edwards, 19 Mo. 674; Stan- 
 
 the same. ley v. McEhath, 86 Cal. 449, where 
 
 5 Lincoln v. Battelle, 6 Wend. 476. the records of one case are to be 
 
 "Schoerkin v. Swift, 19 Blatch. used in another. 
 
 (U. S.) 209; Church v. Hubbart, 2 10 Kidder v. Blaisdell, 45 Me. 461. 
 Cranch, 187, 238; United States v.
 
 § 244.] 
 
 JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
 
 379 
 
 terms; 1 of its officials, 2 as sheriff or marshal; 3 of the signa- 
 ture of its clerk 4 or its attorneys of record, 5 its rules of prac- 
 tice and procedure; nor is it necessary to prove similar facts 
 appertaining to other courts located in the same jurisdiction. 6 
 A court of superior or appellate jurisdiction will also take no- 
 tice of the officers, judges, 7 seals, 8 terms, 9 organization, juris- 
 diction 10 and powers of inferior courts. 11 Where insulting 
 language is used towards a judge holding court, he may in 
 committing the offender for contempt act solely and exclu- 
 sively upon his own knowledge of the words used, 12 although 
 under such circumstances it is not competent for him to take 
 judicial notice of the fact that the offender had been thereto- 
 fore tried and found guilty of a previous contempt of the 
 same court. 13 
 
 » Fabyan v. Russell, 38 N. H. 84. 
 
 -Norvell v. McHenry, 1 Mich. 227; 
 Land Co. v. Calhoun, 16 W. Va. 362; 
 Dyer v. Last, 51 111. 179. 
 
 3 Slaughter v. Barnes, 3 A. K. 
 Marsh. 412; Alexander v. Burnham, 
 18 Wis. 199; Ingram v. State, 27 
 Ala. 17; Thompson v. Haskell, 21 
 111. 215. But the official character 
 of deputy -sheriffs and deputy-mar- 
 shals must be shown. Potter v. 
 Luther, 3 Johns. 431 ; Land v. Pat- 
 terson, Minor (Ala.), 14; Ward v. 
 Henry, 19 Wis. 76; Bank v. Curran, 
 10 Ark. 142; Alford v. State, 8 Tex. 
 App. 545. 
 
 i Yell v. Lane, 41 Ark. 53 ; Buell v. 
 State, 72 Ind. 523; Alderman v. Bell, 
 9 Cal. 315; Land Co. v. Calhoun,' 16 
 W. Va. 362. 
 
 8 Masterson v. Leclaire, 4 Minn. 
 108. 
 
 6 Rees v. Lowenstein (Minn., 1888), 
 40 N. W. Rep. 370; Kenosha v. 
 Shedd, 82 Iowa, 140 ; 48 N. W. Rep. 
 933; Ohm v. San Francisco (Cal., 
 1890), 25 Pac. Rep. 155; Stanley v. 
 McElrath, 86 Cal. 449; Olmstead v. 
 Thompson, 8 S. Rep. 755; Benson 
 v. Christian, 129 Ind. 535; State v. 
 Ulrich, 110 Mo. 350; 19 S.W. Rep. 
 656; A'exander v. Gish (Ky., 1S91), 
 
 17 S. W. Rep. 287. Cf. Holly v. 
 Bass, 68 Ala. 206. 
 
 7 Graham v. Anderson, 42 111. 514. 
 
 8 State v. Snowden, 1 Brews. (Pa.) 
 218; Mangum v. Webster, 7 Gill, 78. 
 
 »Stubbs v. State, 53 Miss. 437; 
 Pugh v. State, 2 Head, 227; Will- 
 iams v. Hubbard, 1 Mich. 446; Mc- 
 Ginnis v. State, 24 Ind. 500; Bethune 
 v. Hale, 45 Ala. 522; State v. Ham- 
 met, 12 Ind. 448; Davidson v. Peti- 
 colas, 34 Tex. 37 ; Simms v. Todd, 72 
 Mo. 288. 
 
 10 Masterson v. Mathews, 60 Ala. 
 260; Stiles v. Stewart, 12 Wend. 473; 
 Tucker v. State, 11 Md. 322; Kilpat-' 
 rick v. Com., 31 Pa. St. 198. 
 
 11 Hancock v. Worcester, 18 Atl. 
 Rep. 1041 ; Nelson v. Ladd, 54 N. W. 
 Rep. 309 (S. D., 1893); Vahle v. 
 Brackenseick (111., 1893), 34 N. E. 
 Rep. 524 ; Hatcher v. Rocheleau, 18 
 N. Y. 86; Landlin v. Anderson, 76 
 Ala. 403; Cherry v. Baker, 17 Md. 
 75; Kilpatrick v. Com., 31 Pa. St. 
 198; Dorman v. State, 56 Ind. 454; 
 Lewis v. Wintrebe, 76 Ind. 13; Cut- 
 ter v. Caruthers, 48 Cal. 178. 
 
 12 State v. Gibson, 10 S. E. Rep. 58; 
 33 W. Va. 97. 
 
 l* Myers v. State (Ohio, 1888), 22 
 N. E. Rep. 43 ; Ralphs v. Hensler, 32
 
 380 
 
 JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
 
 [§ 244. 
 
 As respects all matters of which judicial notice is taken, 
 the judge may, where his knowledge is lacking or his memory 
 indistinct, consult any person or such works of reference as 
 he may select. 1 
 
 Pac. Rep. 243; Jordan v. Circuit 
 Court, 69 Iowa, 177. 
 
 i Wagner's Case, 61 Me. 178; 
 United States v. Teschnaaker, 22 
 How. (U. S.) 392; Taylor Ev. (7th 
 
 ed.), § 21 ; Reed v. Wilson, 41 N. J. 
 L. 29, holding that a court may re- 
 fer to an almanac. See, also, Case 
 v. Perew, 46 Hun (N. Y.), 57.
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 BURDEN OF PROOF AND RIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE. 
 
 247. Burden of proof defined. 
 
 248. Burden of proof in special 
 
 proceedings. 
 
 249. Burden of proof in criminal 
 
 trials. 
 
 250. Proof of negative — Facts best 
 
 known to party alleging. 
 
 § 251. When plaintiff may open and 
 close. 
 
 252. When defendant may open 
 
 and close. 
 
 253. Right to open and close in 
 
 special proceedings. 
 
 254. Right, when discretionary. 
 
 § 247. Burden of proof defined. — The phrase "burden of 
 proof" maybe defined as that "obligation which the law im- 
 poses on a party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing 
 necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, to estab- 
 lish it prima facie by proof." l The law casts the burden of 
 proof, as a general rule, upon the party maintaining the af- 
 firmative side of the issue. In other words, the party who 
 alleges his possession of a legal right is under the necessity of 
 substantiating his allegation by a preponderance of proof. 2 
 This rule is intended to expedite the administration of justice 
 and to aid in the ascertainment of the truth by requiring the 
 evidence to come, in the first instance, from the party whose 
 allegations are most susceptible of direct and simple proof. 3 
 The two phrases "burden of proof" and the "weight of evi- 
 dence" are quite diverse in meaning. The burden of proof is 
 fixed at the inception of the trial and does not change at any 
 
 * Anderson's Law Diet., citing Peo- 
 ple v. McCann, 16 N. Y. 66; Willett 
 v. Rich, 142 Mass. 357. 
 
 •z << Whoever desires any court to 
 give judgment as to any legal right 
 or liability dependent on the exist- 
 ence or non-existence of facts which 
 he asserts or denies to exist must 
 prove that those facts do or do not 
 exist." Stephen's Dig. Ev., art. 9:3. 
 
 SLauer v. Kuder (111., 1893), 34 N. 
 E. Rep. 484; Columbus Watch Co. 
 v. Hodenpyle, 135 N. Y. 430; Hyde 
 v. Shank, 93 Mich. 535; First Nat. 
 Bank v. Lowrey (Neb., 1893), 64 N. 
 W. Rep. 568; Costigan v. Mohawk, 
 etc. Co., 3 Denio, 609; Panama, etc. 
 Co. v. Johnson, 63 Hun, 629; Steven- 
 son v. Marony, 6 Ind. 330 ; Jones v. 
 Kennedy, 11 Pick. 125, 132.
 
 3S2 BUKDEN OF PROOF, ETC. [§ 247. 
 
 later stage of the proceeding. 1 The weight of evidence, on 
 the contrary, fluctuates from one party to the other, according 
 to the strength and character of the proofs produced by either 
 side in affirmance or in denial of the facts in issue, and the 
 necessity for the production of a preponderance of evidence 
 is thus shifted from side to side. 2 
 
 The burden of proof, i. <?., the duty or obligation of making 
 out a, prima facie case, and the obligation of convincing the 
 jury by a preponderance of the evidence, or in criminal trials 
 beyond a reasonable doubt, may both be imposed upon the 
 same party and may remain upon him throughout the trial, 
 though such is by no means always the case. Suppose the 
 plaintiff introduces evidence upon all the essential points 
 which he alleges, thus making a prima facie case upon which, 
 if it is not met by any evidence on the part of the defendant, 
 the court would be justified in directing a verdict in his favor. 
 So far he has both sustained the burden of proof and has pro- 
 duced a preponderance of evidence. But if his case as thus 
 made out is met by some evidence on the part of the defend- 
 ant sufficient to send the case to the jury, the plaintiff will 
 not be entitled to a verdict on what he has proved, unless the 
 whole evidence, taking in consideration what the defendant 
 has shown, preponderates in the plaintiff's favor, though he 
 has complied with the rule requiring him to sustain the bur- 
 den of proof, i. <?., to show a prima facie case. 3 Thus, where 
 one sues on a written contract, he sustains the burden of proof 
 satisfactorily by offering the writing in evidence. He need 
 not prove the consideration as a part of his case, as the valid- 
 ity and sufficiency of the writing will be presumed. But 
 where the defendant alleges and seeks to prove a failure or 
 invalidity of consideration, or to show fraud in procuring the 
 contract, the obligation is on the plaintiff to show a good con- 
 sideration and that he has acted in good faith by a prepon- 
 derance of all the evidence in the case. 4 
 
 1 Lake Ont. etc. Co. v. Judson, 122 v. Long, 44 Mo. App. 141 ; Kitnerv. 
 N. Y. 278. Whitlock, 88 111. 513 ; Eaton v. Alger, 
 
 2 See the remarks of the court in 47 N. Y. 451 ; Blanchard v. Young, 
 Central B. Corp. v. Butler, 2 Gray 11 Cush. (Mass.) 345; Pease v. Cole, 
 (Mass.), 132. 53 Conn. 71. 
 
 3 Scott v. Wood, 81 Cal. 400 ; Heine- * First Nat. Bank v. McConnell, 17 
 man v. Heard, 62 N. Y. 448; Long N. Y. S. 422; 63 Hun, 625; Western
 
 § 248.] 
 
 BURDEN OF PROOF, ETC. 
 
 383 
 
 The importance of ascertaining on whom the burden of 
 proof is cast results from the rule by which that party is enti- 
 tled to open and close the case in respect to the introduction 
 of evidence and the argument of counsel. Asa test to determine 
 where the burden of proof lies, it has been proposed that it 
 should be imposed upon that the party who, upon the plead- 
 ings and the admissions of record, would be defeated if no 
 evidence were offered on either side. 1 So where the defend- 
 ant admits the whole cause of action as alleged by the plaint- 
 iff, inclusive of the damages or sum which is claimed, but pleads 
 new matter by way of confession and avoidance, as payment, 
 fraud, tender or release, or pleads a counter-claim or set-off, 
 the burden of proof is cast on him. 2 
 
 § 248. Burden of proof in special proceedings. — It is also 
 necessary to consider the burden of proof in proceedings not 
 at common law and where no actual issue is involved, as a 
 
 Nat. Bank v. Wood, 19 N. Y. S. 81 ; 
 Galvin v. Meridian Nat. Bank, 129 
 Ind. 439 ; Burnham v. Davis, 144 Mass. 
 104; Hogue v. Williamson (Tex., 
 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 762. For cases 
 in which the burden of proof to show 
 bona Jides was on the holder of the 
 note, see Cover v. Myers (Md., 1892); 
 23 Atl. Rep. 856 ; Clafy v. Farrow, 
 18 N. Y. S. 160; Joy v. Diefendorf, 
 130 N. Y. 6; Kain v. Bare (Ind., 
 1892), 31 N. E. Rep. 205; Hazard v. 
 Spencer (R, I., 1892), 23 Atl. Rep. 
 729. " The burden of proof resting 
 on a plaintiff is co-extensive only 
 with the legal proposition on which 
 his case rests. It applies to every 
 fact which is essential to or is nec- 
 essarily involved in that proposition ; 
 not to facts relied upon in defense 
 to establish an independent proposi- 
 tion, however inconsistent with that 
 upon which the plaintiff's case de- 
 pends. It is for the defendant to 
 furnish the proof of such facts, and 
 when he has done so the burden is 
 upon the plaintiff, not to disprove 
 those particular facts, nor the prop- 
 osition which they tend to estab- 
 
 lish, but to maintain the proposition 
 upon which his own case rests, not- 
 withstanding such contradictory 
 testimony, and upon the whole evi- 
 dence in the case. The distinction 
 may be narrow, but it is real and often 
 decisive." Wells, J., in Wilder v. 
 Coles, 100 Mass. 490 ; Willett v. Rich, 
 142 Mass. 357. 
 
 1 Thompson on Trials, § 228; 1 
 Greenl. on Ev., § 74; 1 Taylor on 
 Ev., § 338; Kent v. White, 27 Ind. 
 390. So by statute. See Crabtree 
 v. Atchison (Ky., 1893), 20 S. W. 
 Rep. 266. " The burden of proving 
 any fact necessary to be proved in 
 order to enable any person to give 
 evidence of any other fact is on the 
 person who wishes to give such evi- 
 dence." Stephen's Dig. Ev., art. 97. 
 
 2 Fairbanks v. Erwin, 15 Colo. 366 ; 
 Truesdale v. Hoyle, 39 111. App. 532; 
 Auerbach v. Peetsch, 18 N. Y. S. 
 453 ; Brown v. Tanrick, 20 N. Y. S. 
 369; Suiter v. Park Nat. Bank, 35 
 Neb. 372; Hamilton v. Coal Co., 61 
 Hun, 624; Woodson Mach. Co. v. 
 Morse, 47 Kan. 429.
 
 3S4 
 
 BURDEN OF PROOF, ETC. 
 
 [§ 249. 
 
 proceeding to probate a will. Here the proponent of the 
 will is regarded as taking the affirmative, and is compelled to 
 assume the burden of proof in the first instance by showing 
 the valid execution of the will, 1 and the testamentary capacity 
 of the testator; 2 while the contestants, if any, have cast upon 
 them the burden of proving that the instrument offered was 
 procured by fraud or undue influence practiced upon the tes- 
 tator. 3 
 
 § 249. Burden of proof in criminal trials. — The burden 
 of proof and the obligation to convince the jury beyond a 
 reasonable doubt upon the general issue of the prisoner's guilt 
 is in criminal trials upon the state throughout. 4 Though the 
 defendant produce no evidence, it is still the duty of the court 
 to submit the prima facie case against him to the jury, and 
 to convict him they should be convinced beyond a reasonable 
 doubt of his guilt. 5 If the defendant shall plead an alibi, or 
 that the person for whose homicide he is indicted is alive, 6 the 
 burden of proof to establish either fact is upon him: 7 and if 
 
 1 Kennedy v. Upshavv, 66 Tex. 442 ; 
 Bee v. Bowman (Tenn., 1891), 14 S. 
 W. Rep. 481; Seebrock v. Fedawa 
 (Neb., 1891), 46 N. W. Rep. 650; 
 Mathews' Adm'r v. Furness (Ala., 
 1891), 8 S. Rep. 661 ; Goss v. Turner, 
 21 Vt. 437. 
 
 2 Norton v. Paxton, 110 Mo. 456; 
 19 S. W. Rep. 807; Knox v. Knox 
 (Ala., 1892), 11 S. Rep. 201; Jones v. 
 Jones, 63 Hun, 630; Harrison v. 
 Bishop, 131 Ind. 161 ; 30 N. E. Rep. 
 1069; Prentiss v. Bates, 93 Mich. 
 234 ; Graybeal v. Gardner, 34 N. E. 
 Rep. 528; Wilbur v. Wilbur, 129 111. 
 392. 
 
 3 Maddox v. Maddox (Mo., 1893), 
 21 S. W. Rep. 499; Chandler v. Jost 
 (Ala., 1893), 11 S. Rep. 636; Living- 
 ston's Appeal (Conn., 1893), 26 Atl. 
 Rep. 470; Lynch v. Doran (Mich., 
 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 882; Brown v. 
 Foster, 112 Mo. 297. 
 
 4 Com. v. McKee, 1 Gray, 62-65; 
 Lilienthal's Tobacco v. United States, 
 97 U. S. 237, 266; Turner v. Com., 
 
 86 Pa. St. 54, 74; People v. Hill, 49 
 Hun, 432. 
 
 5 See ante, § 6 ; State v. Wingo, 66 
 Mo. 181 ; State v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 
 308; Black v. State, 1 Tex. App. 
 368; People v. Perini, 94 Cal. 573; 
 Day v. State, 21 Tex. App. 213; 
 Horn v. State, 30 Tex. App. 601 ; 17 
 S. W. Rep. 1094 ; Slade v. State, 29 
 Tex. App. 381 ; People v. Tarm Poy, 
 86 Cal. 225; People v. Downs, 123 
 N. Y. 558 ; State v. Taylor, 1 Houst. 
 Cr. Cas. (Del.) 436; McDaniel v. State, 
 76 Ala. 366 ; People v. West, 49 Cal. 
 610; Dixon v. State, 13 Fla. 636; 
 Reid v. State, 50 Ga. 536; State v. 
 Knight, 43 Me. 11 ; Com. v. Webster, 
 59 Mass. 295; People v. McCarthy, 
 110 N. Y. 309; State v. Byers, 100 
 N. C. 312; Com. v. Daum, 58 Pa. St. 
 9; United States v. Mingo, 2 Curt. 
 C. C. 1 ; Hogan v. State, 36 Wis. 296. 
 
 6 Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295; 
 State v. Vincent, 24 Iowa, 570. 
 
 ' Westbrook v. State (Ga., 1893), 16 
 S. E. Rep. 100 ; French v. State, 12
 
 § 219.] 
 
 BURDEN* OF PROOF, ETC. 
 
 385 
 
 on either of these points the evidence of an alibi in connec- 
 tion with all the testimony raises a reasonable doubt of the 
 presence of the accused, the jury must acquit him. 1 
 
 I'pon the subject of the burden of proof where the defense 
 is insanity two views are held. By one class of cases it is 
 held that, the existence of the prisoner's sanity being an es- 
 sential fact, the proof of which is necessary to make the act 
 of which he is accused a crime, it must, like all other neces- 
 sary facts, be proved prima facie, by the prosecution, as a 
 part of its case. The presumption of law that every person 
 is of sound mind 2 must of course be taken into consideration 
 as sufficient to sustain the preliminary burden of proof on this 
 point. 3 When this presumption is rebutted or overthrown by 
 facts tending to show a lack of mental capacity, the duty 
 still rests upon the government to satisfy the jury upon the 
 whole evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt of the pris- 
 oner's sanity. 4 Elsewhere the rule is stated broadly that 
 Avhere insanity is relied on as a defense the burden of proof 
 is on the defendant; and though he need never prove his in- 
 sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, it is sometimes said that he 
 must do so by a preponderance of the evidence. 5 But the 
 
 Ind. 670; Ware v. State, 67 Ga. 649; 
 State v. Ward, 61 Vt. 192; State v. 
 McCracken, 66 Iowa, 569 ; 24 N. W. 
 Rep. 43 ; State v. Henrick, 62 Iowa, 
 414; Johnson v. State, 21 Tex. A pp. 
 368; Turner v. Com., S6 Pa. St. 54; 
 State v. Reitz, 83 N. C. 634 ; State v. 
 Johnson, 91 Mo. 439; People v. Fong, 
 64 Cal. 253; State v. Jennings, 81 
 Mo. 185; Garrity v. People, 107 111. 
 162; Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. 324. 
 Contra, McLain v. State, 18 Neb. 154; 
 21 N. W. Rep. 720. See, also, ante, 
 §6. 
 
 i Howard v. State, 50 Ind. 192; 
 Murphy v. State (Fla.. 1893), 12 
 S. Rep. 453; State v. Beasley (Iowa, 
 1892), 50 N. W. Rep. 570; State v. 
 Sanders, 106 Mo. 188 ; State v. Taylor 
 (Mo., 1893), 23 S. W. Rep. 806; 
 Adams v. State, 28 Fla. 511. In 
 Brieeland v. Com., 74 Pa. St. 469, the 
 25 
 
 court said : "The defense must cover 
 the time when the offense is shown 
 to have been committed so as to pre- 
 clude the possibility of presence at 
 the locus in quo. This impossibility 
 is to be proven like any other fact." 
 
 2Seecmte, §231. 
 
 3 Brotherton v. People, 75 N. Y. 
 159. 
 
 ^O'Connell v. O'Brien, 87 N. Y. 
 577; Com. v. Pomeroy, 117 Mass. 
 143; Hefron v. State, 8 Fla. 73; State 
 v. Millison, 15 La. Ann. 537; State 
 v. Hamilton, 55 Mo. 520; Dass Case, 
 1 Gratt. (Va.) 557; State v. Jones, 50 
 N. H. 370; State v. Wilner, 40 Wis. 
 304 ; Armstrong v. State, 30 Fla. 170; 
 Chase v. People, 40 III. 352; Walker 
 v. People, 88 N. Y. 81 ; Guetig v. 
 State, 66 Ind. 91 ; Cunningham v. 
 State, 56 Miss. 269. 
 
 s Walker v. People, 88 N. Y. 81;
 
 380 
 
 BURDEN OF PROOF, KTO. 
 
 [§ 250. 
 
 view which has received fullest support, and one by which 
 perhaps the lack of harmony in the authorities may be avoided, 
 is that while the burden to show insanity is on the defendant, 
 yet if he introduces evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable 
 doubt in the minds of the jury on that point, it is the duty 
 to acquit. 1 This, it seems, is but stating in another form the 
 proposition that it is the duty of the state to satisfy the jury 
 beyond a reasonable doubt of the prisoner's guilt upon all the 
 evidence, and if this is so, the seeming divergence of the cases 
 is reconciled. 2 
 
 §250. Proof of negative — Facts best known to party 
 alleging. — Though the general rule is that the burden of proof 
 is cast on him who maintains the affirmative, because the 
 affirmative of any proposition is most susceptible of direct 
 proof, yet it should not be considered that the negative, i. e., 
 a denial or defense, is incapable of proof. Particularly if 
 the negative is more than a mere denial of an affirmative 
 proposition — in other words, where it involves quasi-nftivma,- 
 tive and incidental allegations of time, place or manner — the 
 party asserting it may and should assume the burden of proof. 
 
 The natural probability of the truth of the affirmative, the 
 fact that prior to the introduction of any evidence in the case 
 the affirmative is supported by some rebuttable presumption 
 of law, or the fact that the means and instruments of proof 
 are peculiarly in the hands of the party alleging a negative, 
 will furnish some further considerations tending to emphasize 
 the propriety under certain circumstances of casting the bur- 
 den .of proof on the negative. 3 
 
 People v. Travers, 88 Cal. 238 ; People rison, 36 W. Va. 729 ; State v. Davis, 
 
 v. Taylor, 138 N. Y. 398; People v. 109 N. C. 780; Langdon v. People, 
 
 Bemmerly (Cal., 1893), 33 Pac. Rep. 133 111. 332; Fisher v. State, 30 Tex. 
 
 263; Lynch v. Com., 77 Pa. St. 205; App. 503; State v. Crawford, 33 Am. 
 
 McLeod v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. App. 331. L. Reg. 21 ; Moore v. Com. (Ky., 1892), 
 
 iBrotherton v. People, 75 N. Y. 18 S. W. Rep. 833; Boiling v. State 
 
 159; Casey v. People, 31 Hun, 528; (Ark., 1891), 18 S. W. Rep. 658; State 
 
 People v. McCann, 16 N. Y. 58; v. West, 1 Houst. Cr. Cas. 371 ; State 
 
 Wallers v. People, 32 N. Y. 147. v. Spenser, 21 N. J. L. 196; State v. 
 
 2 King v. Stuart, 91 Tenn. 617; Coleman, 20 S. C. 444. 
 State v. Schaefer (Mo., 1893), 22 S. W. 3 Best, Ev. (Am. ed., 1883), §§ 270, 
 
 Rep. 417; Armstrong v. State, 30 Fla. 273, 278; Colorado Coal & Iron Co. 
 
 170; Faulkner v. Territory (N. M., v. United States, 123 U. S. 317. 
 1893), 30 Pac. Rep. 905 ; State v. Har-
 
 § 250.] BURDEN OF TROOF, ETC. 387 
 
 In a criminal prosecution the burden of proving the guilt 
 of the accused is upon the prosecution throughout. Hence, if 
 the non-existence of some fact, or the non-performance of some 
 duty, is a constituent and essential element in the crime with 
 which he is charged, the burden of proving this negative alle- 
 gation of non-existence or non-performance is upon the pros- 
 ecution. 1 
 
 So in a civil proceeding, where the plaintiff's case is based 
 upon a negative allegation, the proof of which is essential, as 
 in an action brought to recover damages for a malicious pros- 
 ecution when the non-existence of a probable cause for the ar- 
 rest or prosecution is a material fact of his case, he will be 
 called upon to prove it. 2 Again, where it is alleged that the 
 contract which is sued on is not the contract which was made,' 1 
 or where an alteration in a note is alleged, 4 or its genuineness 
 is disputed by the alleged maker, 5 or a deed is alleged to be 
 invalid because of incapacity of the grantor to execute it, 6 or 
 in an action to recover a penalty for the non-performance of 
 some specific act, 7 the burden of proof is on the party alleg- 
 ing the negative. 8 If a fact is peculiarly within the knowl- 
 edge of one party rather than the other, the burden of proof 
 is cast upon him who has the better means of proof. This 
 rule may and does result very often in casting the burden of 
 proof upon the party alleging a negative fact. 9 So, for ex- 
 
 1 Com. v. Samuel, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 932; Pendleton v. Smissaert (Colo., 
 103; State v. Morphy, 33 Iowa, 270; 1892), 29 Pac. Rep. 521; Galvin v. 
 State v. Hirsch, 45 Mo. 429. Meridian Nat. Bank, 129 Ind. 439. 
 
 2 1 Greenl., §78; Lucas v. Hunt 6 Trimbov. Trimbo, 47 Minn. 389; 
 (Ky., 1891), 15 S. W. Rep. 781 ; Nash Chancellor v. Donell (Ala., 1892), 10 
 v. Hall, 4 Ind. 444; Lane v. Crom- S. Rep. 910. 
 
 bie, 12 Pick. 177. 7 Little v. Thompson, 2 Greenl. 
 
 s Sparks v. Sparks (Kan., 1893), 32 (Me.) 228; Com. v. Samuel, 2 Pick. 
 
 Pac. Rep. 892; Meentz v. Reiken, 42 (Mass.) 103; Com. v. Maxwell, 2 
 
 111. App. 17; Coffin v. Hydraulic Co., Pick. (Mass.) 139; Woodbury v. 
 
 136 N. Y. 655. Frink, 14 111. 279. 
 
 « Hartley v. Corboy, 150 Pa. St. 23; 8 Vigus v. O'Bannon, 118 111. 348; 
 
 Conable v. Keeney, 61 Hun, 624; Beardstown v. Virginia, etc., 76 111. 
 
 Franklin v. Baker, 48 Ohio St. 296; 34; Kelly v. Owens (Cal., 1893), 30 
 
 Hagan v. Insurance Co., 81 Iowa, Pac. Rep. 596. 
 
 321; Bushnell v. Glessner, 46 Minn. 9 Van Horn v. Van Horn (N. J., 
 
 531. 1891), 20 Atl. Rep. 826; Kilbourn v. 
 
 5 Western Nat. Bank v. Wood, 19 Latta, 7 Mackey, 80; Dickson v. Ev- 
 
 N. Y. S. 81 ; Tome v. Gerlach, 18 N. Y. ans, 6 T. R. 57; State v. Arnold, 13
 
 333 
 
 BURDEN OF PROOF, ETC. 
 
 [§ 250. 
 
 ample, in a prosecution for dealing in liquors, or carrying on 
 any other trade or avocation without a written license where 
 one is required by statute, the burden of proof is upon the 
 defendant to show that he has not violated the statute. 1 
 
 The party making a negative allegation will be compelled 
 to assume the burden of proof where non-performance or a 
 negligent performance of duty is alleged, as in actions which 
 are brought to recover damages for injuries caused by negli- 
 gence, 2 or where an allegation of fraud is made and denied, 
 as, for example, in an action by creditors to set aside a con- 
 veyance made for the purpose of defeating their claims. 3 
 
 In an action on an insurance policy the burden of proof is 
 on the defendant company to prove that the insured obtained 
 it by fraud, 4 or by the suppression of material facts which it 
 Avas his duty to communicate, 5 or to show any breach of con- 
 dition that will defeat a recovery on the policy. 6 
 
 Ired. (N. C.) 184; Wheat v. State, 6 
 Mo. 455; State v. Higgins, 13 R. I. 
 330; State v. Morrison, 3 Dev. 299; 
 Mehan v. State, 7 Wis. 670. 
 
 l Com. v. Zelt, 138 Pa. St. 615; 
 Stare v. Kriechbaum(Iowa, 1891), 47 
 N. W. Rep. 872; State v. Wilson, 39 
 Mo. App. 114; Flower v. State, 39 
 Ark. 209 (physician's license); Low- 
 ell v. Payne, 30 La. Ann. 511; Peo- 
 ple v. Nyce, 34 Hun, 298 (ferry 
 license); Great W. R. R. Co. v. 
 Bacon, 30 111. 347 ; People v. Pease, 
 27 N. Y. 45; Com. v. Curran, 119 
 Mass. 206. Contra, Com. v. Locke, 
 114 Mass. 288. Of. Potter v. Deyo, 19 
 Wend. 361; Bliss v. Brainard, 41 N. 
 H. 256; 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 79. 
 
 2 O'Kane v. Miller, 3 Ind. App. 136 ; 
 Texas, etc. Co. v. Morin, 66 Tex. 133; 
 Dowell v. Guthrie (Mo., 1893), 22 S. 
 W. Rep. 893. Burden of showing 
 contributory negligence is on defend- 
 ant. Denver, etc. Co. v. Ryan (Colo., 
 1893), 28 Pac. Rep. 79; Spurrier v. 
 Front St. Ry. Co., 3 Wash. St. 659; 
 Ftilks v. St. Louis, etc. Co. (Mo., 
 1892), 19 S. W. Rep. 818; Merrill v. 
 Eastern R. Co., 139 Mass. 252; 
 
 Omaha v. Ayres, 32 Neb. 375; Water- 
 man v. Chicago, etc. Co., 52 N. W. 
 Rep. 217; Railroad Co. v. Owen, 15 
 S. E. Rep. 853. 
 
 SLauer v. Kuder (111., 1893). 34 N. 
 E. Rep. 484 ; Zucker v. Karpeles, 88 
 Mich. 413; Sewell v. Mead (Iowa, 
 1892), 52 N. W. Rep. 227; Marsh v. 
 Cramer (Colo., 1891), 27 Pac. Rep. 
 169; Smith v. Ogiivie (N. Y., 1891), 
 27 N. E. Rep. 807: Gleason v. Wil- 
 son, 48 Kan. 500; 29 Pac. Rop. 693; 
 Probert v. McDonald, 51 N. W. Rep. 
 212; Martin Brown Co. v. Cooper, 82 
 Tex. 242; Blackshire v. Pettit, 35 W. 
 Va. 547. Contra, Norton v. Bank, 
 50 Ark. 59; Bartlett v. Cleavenger, 
 35 W. Va. 719. 
 
 4 Perine v. Grand Lodge A. O. U. 
 W. (Minn., 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 367. 
 
 5 Modern Woodman v. Sutton, 38 
 111. App. 327; Heilman v. Lazarus, 
 90 N. Y. 672; Tidmarsh v. Wash. F. 
 & M. Ins. Co., 4 Mason, 439; Murray 
 v. N. Y. L. Ins. Co.. 85 N. Y. 236; 
 Elmer v. Mut. Ben. L. Ass'n, 19 N. 
 Y. S. 289. 
 
 6 Sutherland v. Stand. L. Ins. Co. 
 (Iowa, 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 4531
 
 § 250.] 
 
 BURDEN OF PROOF, ETC. 
 
 389 
 
 Though the burden of proving fraud or undue influence is 
 cast usually upon the party alleging its existence, yet, where 
 from the circumstances or the relations of the parties fraud is 
 presumed, as it is in the case of a sale or a gift to a trustee by 
 the beneficiary, the burden is shifted and the grantee or donee 
 will be compelled to prove that the transaction was bona fide 
 and for a good consideration. 1 
 
 Where a note is alleged to be usurious and void, 2 or without 
 consideration, 3 or illegitimacy 4 or insanity is alleged, 5 or breach 
 of warranty in an action on contract, 6 or the bad reputation 
 of the plaintiff in an action for libel, 7 these allegations, though 
 negative in character, cast the burden of proof upon the party 
 making them. 8 
 
 1 Whitridge v. Whitridge (Md., 
 1892), 24 Atl. Rep. 645; Carter v. 
 West (Ky., 1892), 19 S. W. Rep. 592; 
 White v. Johnson (Wash., 1892), 29 
 Pac. Rep. 932; Jackson v. Tatebo, 3 
 Wash. St. 456; Corrigan v. Peroni, 
 48 N. J. Eq. 60? ; King v. Jacobson, 
 58 Hun, 610; Newton v. Newton 
 (Minn., 1891), 48 N. W. Rep. 450; 
 Haskins v. Warren, 115 Mass. 514. 
 
 ^ Holt v. Kirby (Ark., 1893), 21 
 S. W. Rep. 432; White v. Benjamin, 
 138 N. Y. 623. 
 
 3 MeKenzie v. Oregon I. Co., 5 
 Wash. C. C. 500. 
 
 4 Morris v. Davies. 3 C. & P. 215. 
 SHoge v. Fisher, 1 Pet. C. C. 163. 
 
 Insanity being pleaded as a matter 
 of defense in an action ex contractu, 
 the burden of proof is upon the de- 
 fendant to show insanity (Young v. 
 Lamont (Minn., 1893 j, 57 N. W. Rep. 
 478; Brown v. Brown, 39 Mich. 792; 
 Weed v. Life Ins. Co., 70 N. Y. 5G1 ; 
 Jarrett v. Jarrett, 11 W. Va. 562; 
 Perkins v. Perkins, 39 N. H. 163; 
 Wright v. Wright, 139 Mass. 177), 
 and remains on him, though if by 
 evidence he shows insanity, then 
 the party denying the insanity will 
 be obliged to prove by the weight of 
 evidence either that the insanity 
 
 had ceased to exist or that a lucid 
 interval had occurred. Wright v. 
 Wright, supra. 
 
 6 Piano M. Co. v. Root (N. D., 
 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 924; Cook v. 
 Tavenier, 41 111. App. C42. 
 
 7 Lotto v. Dans (Minn., 1892), 52 
 N. W. Rep. 130. 
 
 8 In the following cases the burden 
 of proof has been held to rest on the 
 plaintiff: To show breach of aeon- 
 tract or covenant: Western Union T. 
 Co. v. Bennett, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 558 ; 
 Landt v. Mayor (Colo., 1893), 31 Pac. 
 Rep. 524. Damages for negligence: 
 Richmond, etc. Co. v. White, 88 
 Ga. 805. Infringement of a patent: 
 National Harrow Co. v. Hanby, 54 
 Fed. Rep. 493. Ultra vires, when 
 ground for a writ of quo warranto: 
 Ellerman v. Stockyards (N. J., 1892), 
 23 Atl. Rep. 257. Performance of 
 contract when performance is de- 
 nied: Hitchcock v. Davis, 87 Mich. 
 629. Possession in trespass to try 
 title: Gunn v. Harris, 88 Ga. 439. 
 Receipt of money by the defendant 
 in conversion : Panama R. Co. v. 
 Johnson, 63 Hun, 629. Notice of a 
 defect in highway to a city : McGrail 
 v. Kalamazoo, 94 Mich. 52. 
 
 In these cases the burden is on the
 
 390 
 
 BURDEN OF PROOF, ETC. 
 
 [§ 251. 
 
 § 251. When plaintiff may open and close. — The general 
 rule being that the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff, it 
 follows that he has the right to open and close in most cases. 1 
 This is true though there may be several issues and the plaint- 
 iff ma}' have the burden of proof on only one of them. 2 In 
 actions on contracts either express or implied, where the de- 
 fendant does not deny the execution or validity of the con- 
 tract but pleads an affirmative defense such as payment, or 
 breach of contract by the plaintiff, and where substantial 
 damages are claimed which the contract has not liquidated, 
 the plaintiff has the burden of proving damages and the con- 
 sequent right to open and close. 3 The rule that the plaintiff 
 has the right to open and close in cases where the damages 
 are unliquidated is also invoked in actions in tort. The fact 
 that the defendant does not plead the general issue, but admits 
 the cause of action and pleads a defense by way of confession 
 and avoidance, does not, unless he also admits the amount of 
 damages which are claimed, deprive the plaintiff of his right 
 
 defendant: To show truth (Nelson 
 v. Wallace, 48 Mo. App. 193) or the 
 had reputation of plaintiff in libel : 
 Lotto v. Davenport (Minn., 1892), 52 
 N. W. Rep. 130. Justification in as- 
 sault: Jennison v. Mosely (Miss., 
 1892), 10 S. Rep. 582. Prior use or 
 want of invention in patent cases: 
 Hunt Bros. v. Cassidy, 7 U. S. App. 
 424; Anderson v. Monroe, 55 Fed. 
 Rep. 596. Exemption of homestead: 
 Kolsky v. Loveman (Ala., 1892), 12 
 S. Rep. 720; Wagner v. Olson (N. D., 
 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 286; Robertson 
 v. Robertson (Ky., 1893), 20 S. W. 
 Rep. 543. Condonation in divorce 
 proceeding: McConnell v. McCon- 
 nell (Neb., 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. 292. 
 A corporation must show its title in 
 quo warranto : Ginterman v. People 
 (111., 1892), 28 N. W. Rep. 1067. 
 Abandonment of easement on party 
 alleging it: Henessy v. Murdock, 
 137 N. Y. 317. Freedom from negli- 
 gence on carrier: Central R. & B. Co. 
 
 v. Hossalkus (Ga., 1893), 17 S. E. 
 Rep. 838. 
 
 1 Railway Co. v. Rhea, 44 Ark. 
 258, 264; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. 
 Co. v. Taylor (Ark., 1893), 20 S. W. 
 Rep. 1083; Felts v. Clapper, 69 Hun, 
 373. 
 
 2 Shaw v. Barnhart, 17 Ind. 183; 
 Bertrand v. Taylor, 32 Ark. 470; 
 Auerbach v. Peetsch. 18 N. Y. S. 
 452; Johnson v. Maxwell, 87 N. C. 
 18. 
 
 3 Thompson on Trials, § 232; 
 Stirnes v. Schofield (Ind., 1892), 31 
 N. E. Rep. 480; Whitesides v. Hunt, 
 97 Ind. 191 ; Mizer v. Bristol, 30 Neb. 
 138; Penhryn Slate Co. v. Meyer, 8 
 Daly (N. Y.), 01 ; Graham v. Gautier, 
 21 Tex. 112; Mercer v. Whall, 5 Ad. 
 & El. (N. S.) 447; Bates v. Farelet, 
 89 Mo. 121 ; Hurley v. Sullivan, 137 
 Mass. 86; Dahlman v. Hammel, 45 
 Wis. 466; McBee v. Bowman, 89 
 Tenn. 132; Mathews v. Farnies, 91 
 Ala. 157.
 
 § 251.] 
 
 BURDEN OF PROOF, ETC. 
 
 391 
 
 to open and close. 1 Thus, in an action to recover for slander 
 or libel, where the defendant admits that he uttered the libel- 
 ous or slanderous language which is alleged, but pleads the 
 truth in justification, or that the statements were privileged, 
 he is not entitled to the right to open and close, for the bur- 
 den of proving malice and the amount of damages, if any, is 
 still on the plaintiff. 2 
 
 Cases occur which do not arrange themselves under the 
 head of actions in contract or in tort, but in which the mov- 
 ing party applies merely to set aside some prior judicial or 
 other official determination or action, or objects to that which 
 is proposed or anticipated. The rule here invoked is that, as 
 the burden of proof is on him who would change the existing 
 condition of things, the applicant or party protesting will 
 therefore have the right to open and close. Thus, a con- 
 testant of an election, 3 interpleading claimants in attachment, 4 
 or a party who files objections to the settlement of an exec- 
 utor, 5 or excepts to the report of an auditor, 6 or who applies 
 for a supersedeas 7 or a license,** has the right to open and 
 close. 9 
 
 » Stirnes v. Schofield (Ind.. 1892), 31 
 N. E. Rep. 411; Young v. Highland, 
 9Gratt (Va.) 16: Mercer v. Whall, 
 5 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 447; St. Louis, I. 
 M. etc. Co. v. Taylor (Ark., 1893), 20 
 S. W. Rep. 1083 ; Beatty v. Hatcher, 
 13 Ohio St. 115; Stillvvell v. Archer, 
 18 N.- Y. S. 888 ; Cunningham v. 
 Gallegher, 61 Wis. 170; Aurora v. 
 Cobb, 21 Ind. 493; Opdyke v. Weed, 
 18 Abb. Pr. 223. 
 
 -'Tallmadge v. Press, 14 N. Y. S. 
 331 ; Burkhalter v. Coward, 16 S. C. 
 43."); Heckerv. Hopkins, 16 Abb. Pr. 
 (N. Y.) 301; Vifquain v. Finch, 15 
 Neb. 505; Shulse v. McWilliams, 104 
 Ind. 512; Louisville C. Jour. v. 
 Weaver (Ky., 1892), 17 S. W. Rep. 
 1018; 1 Thompson on Trials, § 230, 
 n. 3. The rule given in the text is 
 applicable where the defendant 
 pleads son axsault demesne to an al- 
 legation of assault and battery. 1 
 Thompson on Trials, § 231); Young 
 
 v. Highland, 9 Graft. (Va.) 16; Sey- 
 mour v. Baily, 76 Ga. 338; Johnson 
 v. Josephs, 75 Me. 544. 
 
 » Price v. Archuleta (Colo., 1892), 
 29 Pac. Rep. 460. 
 
 4 Sanger v. Flow, 48 Fed. Rep. 
 152; 4 U. S. App. 32. Cf. Central 
 R. & B. Co. v. Cons. & In v. Co., 32 
 S. C. 319; 33 id. 599. 
 
 5 Clay v. Robinson, 7 W. Va. 350. 
 
 6 Arthur v. Gordon, 67 Ga. 220. 
 7 Pearsall v. McCartney, 28 Ala. 
 
 110. 
 
 8 Hill v. Perry, 82 Ind. 128. 
 
 9 See, also, in attachment, Dolan 
 v. Armstrong, 35 ISeb. 339; Jones v. 
 Swank (Minn., 1893), 53 N. W. Re r . 
 634. In Huntington v. Conkey, 33 
 Barb. (N. Y.) 218, the court thus 
 sums up the rules bearing on the 
 right to open and close: "First. The 
 plaintiff in all cases where damages 
 are unliquidated lias the right to 
 open and close. Second. Whenever
 
 392 
 
 BURDEN OF rROOF, ETC. 
 
 U 252. 
 
 § 252. When defendant may open and close. — In all cases 
 where the burden of proof is on the defendant he has the right 
 to open and close. This usually occurs where he admits all 
 the facts upon which the plaintiff's cause of action is based, 
 in dueling the amount of damages claimed, whether liquidated 
 or not, 1 and pleads payment, 2 usury, 3 want of consideration, 4 
 the bar of the statute of limitations, 5 or some other defense in 
 the nature of a justification or discharge. 6 
 
 The defendant who seeks to open and close cannot claim to 
 do so upon a sham plea or on one entirely unsupported by any 
 evidence, 7 but must show by his pleadings that he has the right 
 to do so affirmatively and clearty, for the court will not examine 
 all the pleadings in the case in order to ascertain where that 
 right lies. 8 But the denial of unnecessary averments which 
 are in the complaint which the plaintiff would not be called 
 
 he has anything to prove on the 
 question of damages or otherwise he 
 may begin. Third. In cases where 
 the damages are liquidated or de- 
 pend on mere calculation, the party 
 holding the affirmative may begin. 
 Fourth. The affirmative in such case 
 means the affirmative in substance, 
 not in form, and on the whole rec- 
 ord. Fifth. The denial of the right 
 to begin to the party entitled to and 
 claiming it is reversible error unless 
 the court can see clearly that no in- 
 jury or injustice resulted from the 
 erroneous decision." 
 
 lUpdyke v. Weed, 18 Abb. Pr. 
 223. 
 
 *Truesdell v. Hoyle, 39 111. App. 
 532; Knapp v. Runals, 37 Wis. 135. 
 
 3 Hoxey v. Green, 37 How. Pr. 97 ; 
 Summons v. Hawver, 25 W. Va. 
 678: Huntington v. Kinkey, 33 Barb. 
 (N. Y.) 218; Suter v. Bank, 35 Neb. 
 372. 
 
 4 McShane v. Braender, 66 How. 
 Pr. (N. Y.) 294; Brown v. Tausick, 
 20 N. Y. S. 369. 
 
 s Maye v. Friedman, 69 N. Y. 608; 
 Payne v. Hathaway, 3 Vt. 312. 
 
 &Lindley v. Sullivan (Ind., 1893), 
 33 N. E. Rep. 361 ; East Term. etc. 
 Co. v. Fleetwood (Ga., 1893), 15 S. E. 
 Rep. 773; Love v. Dickinson, 85 N. 
 C. 5 ; Auerbach v. Peetsch, 18 N. Y. 
 S. 452; Donahoe v. Rich, 2 Ind. App. 
 540; List v. Kortpeter, 26 Ind. 27; 
 Lafayette Bank v. Metcalf, 29 Mo. 
 App. 384; Chicago, etc. Co. v. Bryan, 
 90 III. 126; Rigdon v. Jordan, 81 Ga. 
 668; Johnson v. Bradstreet, 81 Ga. 
 425; Page v. Carter, 8 B. Mon. 192; 
 Pingree v. Puckett, 35 S. C. 178; 
 Seymour v. Baily, 76 Ga. 338; 
 Maurice v. Warden, 54 Md. 233. The 
 defendant must admit all of plaint- 
 iff's cause of action. A plea which 
 is evasive or doubtful (Seymour v. 
 Baily, 76 Ga. 338; Comp. v. Brown, 
 48 Ind. 575). or which alleges a 
 modification of the cause of action 
 (McConnell v. Kitchens, 20 S. C. 430), 
 or which denies the alleged value 
 cf the subject-matter (Saunders v. 
 Bridges, 67 Tex. 93), will not suffice. 
 
 7 Vanzant v. Jones, 3 Dana (Ky.), 
 464; B.iehm v. Lies, 18 N. Y. S. 577. 
 
 8 Claflin v. Baer, 28 Hun (N. Y.), 
 204.
 
 § 253.] BURDEN OP PROOF, ETC. 393 
 
 upon to prove will not deprive the' defendant of his right to 
 open and close. 1 
 
 To obtain the right to open and close, the defendant's ad- 
 mission of the plaintiff's cause of action must be seasonably 
 made, usually before trial and by the pleadings. 2 Although 
 this question was the subject of much discussion in the earlier 
 cases, it is now well settled that whenever the plaintiff has 
 anything to prove on the question of damages he has also the 
 right to begin. 5 But where the damages are liquidated, as in 
 the case of an action brought on a promissory note, 4 bill of 
 exchange, 5 order for the payment of money 6 or insurance 
 policy, 7 the defendant who admits the cause of action has the 
 right to open and close, for on him the law casts the burden 
 of proving any affirmative defense which he may urge. 
 
 § 253. Right to open and close in special proceedings. — 
 In special proceedings the burden of proof and the correlated 
 right to open and close are his " who seeks to alter the exist- 
 ing state of things." d Thus, in proceedings to probate a will 
 the proponent has the right to open and close in the first in- 
 stance, 9 though when the validity of the will is prima facie 
 established by probate, the party who attacks it subsequently, 
 whether in the same court or elsewhere, has the right to open 
 and close, for the reason that he seeks to alter the status quo. 10. 
 
 The petitioner in a proceeding to condemn land for public 
 purposes by virtue of the exercise of the right of eminent do- 
 main, or to assess damages for the taking thereof, has gen- 
 
 i Murray v. N. Y. L. Ins. Co., 85 6 Elwell v. Chamberlain, 31 N. Y. 
 
 N. Y. 236. 611. 
 
 2 Mitchell v. Fowler, 21 S. C. 298; 7 Viele v. Insurance Co., 26 Iowa, 
 Merriam v. Cunningham, 11 Cush. 10: Brennan v. Security L. Ins. Co., 
 (Mass.) 40. 4 Daly (N. Y.), 296. 
 
 3 Smith, J., in Huntington v. 8 Thompson on Trials, § 239. See 
 Conkey, 32 Barb. 218; Mercer v. ante, § 248. 
 
 Whall, 9 Jur. 576. 9 Norton \. Paxton, 110 Mo. 456 
 
 4 Crabtree v. Atchison (Ky., 1893), Kennedy v. Upshaw, 66 Tex. 442 
 20 S. W. Rep. 260; Ayrault v. Perkins v. Perkins, 39 N. H. 163 
 Chamberlain. 33 Barb. 229; Bowen Harrison v. Bishop, 131 Intl. 161 
 v. Spears, 20 Ind. 146; Brown v. Wilbur v. Wilbur, 129111. 392; Hardy 
 Tausick, 20 N. Y. S. 369; Harvey v. v. Merrill, 56 N. H. 227. 
 Ellithorpe, 26 111. 418; Hudson v. 10 In re Simcox, 11 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 
 Wetherington, 79 N. C. 3. 545. 
 
 5 List v. Kortpeter, 26 Ind. 27.
 
 394 BURDEN OF PROOF, ETC. [§ 254. 
 
 orally the right to open and close; for the law casts on him 
 the burden of showing by evidence the necessity for the tak- 
 ing and the value of the property appropriated. 1 The con- 
 trary is supported by some cases, 2 and generally the owner 
 will have the right in any appellate proceeding to review the 
 award. 3 
 
 The burden of proof in criminal cases is, as we have seen, 
 upon the prosecution, and for this reason, and because the ac- 
 cused is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty, the 
 right to open and close belongs to the state irrespective of the 
 nature of the defense, and even where the accused offers no 
 evidence in his own behalf. 4 
 
 §254. The right to open and close — When discretionary. 
 Though a substantial unanimity of opinion exists that the 
 right to open and close belongs to the party on whom is cast 
 the burden of proof, the authorities are not harmonious upon 
 the question whether a denial of the right is ground for a new 
 trial. Many cases sustain the rule that the matter is wholly 
 within the discretion of the trial court, being a matter of prac- 
 tice over which its jurisdiction is final and exclusive. 5 But this 
 general rule is sometimes qualified by the proviso that it is 
 only applicable where a denial of the privilege has not re- 
 sulted in prejudice, injustice or unfairness to the party. 6 On 
 the other hand, it is held that the denial of the right to open 
 and close is a substantial error. The right is not a mere privi- 
 lege, and discretionary, but absolute, and a refusal to permit 
 its exercise cannot be disregarded on a motion for a new trial 
 or on appeal. 7 A statute granting the right to open and close 
 
 i Thompson on Trials, § 247; Gulf, nagin w State, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 529; 
 
 etc. Co. v. Ross (Tex., 1891), 16 S. W. State v. Millican, 15 La. Ann. 557. 
 
 Eep. 536; Com'rs v. Trustees. 107 See g 249. 
 
 III. 489; Neff v. Cincinnati, 32 Ohio 5 Gran v. Spangenberg (Minn., 
 
 St. 215; Spring Valley, etc. Co. v. 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 933; Cothran 
 
 Drinkhouse, 92 Cal. 528. v. Forsyth, 6S Ga. 560; Lancaster v. 
 
 2 Dallas v. Chenault (Tex., 1891), Collins, 115 U. S. 222; Wade v. 
 
 16 S. W. Rep. 173; Burt v. Wiggles- Scott, 7 Mo. 509; Fry v. Bennett, 28 
 worth, 117 Mass. 302; Springfield R. N. Y. 324; Corastock v. Hadlyme, 8 
 Co. v. Rhea, 44 Ark. 258. Conn. 254; 8 id. 296. 
 
 3 Indiana, etc. Co. v. Cook, 102 « Carpenter v. Bank, 119 111. 352. 
 Ind. 113: Omaha, etc. Co. v. Walker, 7 Porter v. Still, 03 Miss. 357; 
 
 17 Neb. 432. Royal Ins. Co. v. Schuring, 87 Ky. 
 * Thompson on Trials, §243; Jar- 410; 9 S. W. Rep. 242; Millard v.
 
 § 9M.] 
 
 BUKDEN OF I'UOOF, ETC. 
 
 395 
 
 is, of course, mandatory; 1 but the party claiming it should 
 do so promptly before any material progress has been made 
 in the trial of the case. 2 
 
 Tliorn, 5G N. Y. 402; Elder v. Oliver, 
 30 Mo. App. 573; Auerbach v. 
 Peetsch, 18 N. Y. S. 453; Colwell 
 v. Brower, 75 111. 516; Creston v. 
 Walker, 26 Iowa, 205; Ashing v. 
 Miles, 16 Ind. 329; Addison v. Dun- 
 
 can, 35 S. C. 178; Thompson on 
 Trials, § 226. 
 
 1 Bertody v. Ison, 69 Ga. 317 ; Heff- 
 ron v. State, 8 Fla. 73. 
 
 nicKibbon v. Folds, 38 Ga. 235; 
 Mason v. Seitz, 36 Ind. 516.
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 
 STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
 
 § 261. Origin and nature of the stat- 
 ute. 
 
 2G2. Agreements relating to inter- 
 ests in land. 
 
 263. Partition of real property. 
 
 26-1. Trusts in real and personal 
 estate. 
 
 265. Surrender or assignment of 
 
 leases. 
 
 266. Contracts required to be in 
 
 writing. 
 
 § 267. Articles of partnership. 
 
 268. Form and character of the 
 
 writing. 
 
 269. Wills required to be evidenced 
 
 in writing. 
 
 270. Agreements not within the 
 
 statute of frauds which 
 must be evidenced by writ- 
 ings. 
 
 § 261 . Origin ami nature of the statute. — The statute of 
 frauds and perjuries which was passed in England in the 
 twenty-ninth year of Charles II. (1678), and which has been 
 substantially re-enacted in every state of the American Union, 
 was the means of introducing into the law of evidence a new 
 mode of proof that renders its consideration of great impor- 
 tance. The spread of commerce and the complexity of social 
 affairs hail rendered necessary, while the increased employ- 
 ment of writing had made possible, the use of documentary 
 evidence in a large class of cases in which it had not before 
 been employed. The object of the statute is to prevent fraud. 
 This, it is conceived, will be most effectually accomplished bj r 
 requiring that certain transactions shall be evidenced in writ- 
 ing, which is then presumed to be the best evidence of the 
 intention of the parties. Accordingly, where it is alleged that 
 any one of the various classes of transactions or contracts which 
 are within the statute have been made, a writing evidencing 
 it must be produced or the party claiming the execution of 
 the contract will be denied a legal remedy. The various stat- 
 utes of frauds in the several states differ in minor points, 
 while a substantial similarity exists among all of them. 
 Though their consideration in detail is impossible in this work, 
 attention mav be called to some of their more salient features.
 
 § 202. J STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 307 
 
 § 2G2. Agreements relating to interests in land. — By the 
 
 statute all contracts to convey land and all conveyances of hind 
 or of any interest in land, freehold or less than freehold,- future 
 or immediate, vested or contingent, except leases for three 
 years or less, are required to be in writing. In construing 
 this provision the main difficulty has been to ascertain the 
 meaning of the words "land or an interest therein," and to 
 ascertain what was conveyed or sold, so as to render a writing 
 necessary. An agreement to convey, 1 or to create an easement, 2 
 or a license to go upon land, 3 or to relinquish an interest in 
 land, 4 or to buy lands jointly with another, 5 or to refrain from 
 bidding at an auction sale of land, 6 or to take away a certain 
 amount of bark yearly from trees, 7 is within the statute and 
 must be evidenced in writing. On the other hand it has been 
 held that an agreement between adjacent owners to establish 
 boundaries, 8 or a partnership settlement by which land is con- 
 veyed, 9 or a partnership formed to deal in land, 10 may be 
 shown by parol evidence. 
 
 Parol contracts for the sale of land will be valid and en- 
 forceable in equity where there has been a partial perform- 
 ance by the party seeking the enforcement of the contract, 
 either by his payment of the consideration and going into 
 possession of the land or by making valuable improvements 
 thereon, or by both. 11 Upon the question whether a sale of 
 
 1 Hayes v. Fine, 91 Cal. 391. p Murrell v. Mandlebaum (Tex.), 19 
 
 2 C!anton v. Scruggs (Ala., 1892), S. W. Rep. 880. 
 
 10 S. Rep. 757; May v. Prendergast, 10 Speyer v. Desjardins (111., 1893), 
 
 12 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 220. 32 N. E. Rep. 283; Fountain v. Men- 
 
 » Cook v. Stearns, 11 Mass. 533. ard (Minn., 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. 
 
 As respects the necessity for writing 601; Bates v. Babcock, 95 Cal. 479; 
 
 to convey lands prior to the statute, Case v. Seger, 4 Wash. St. 492; 
 
 see Tiederaan on R. P., §783. Sleven v. Wallace, 64 Hun, 288; 
 
 4 Littell v. Jones (Ark., 1892), 19 Clarke v. McAuliffe, 81 Wis. 244. 
 
 S. W. Rep. 497. n Barnes v. Bost. etc. Co., 130 Mass. 
 
 5 Morton v. Nelson (111., 1893), 32 388; Hanlon v. Wilson, 10 Neb. 138; 
 N. E. Rep. 916. Marshall v. Peck, 91 111. 187; Wal- 
 
 6 Roughton v. Rawlings, 88 Ga. lace v. Rappleyea, 103 id. 229; Ford 
 
 819. v. Finney, 35 Ga. 258; Cole v. Cole, 
 
 7 Thompson v. Poor, 67 Hun, 653. 41 Md. 301; So wry v. Buffington, 6 
 
 s Archer v. Helm (Miss., 1892), 11 W. Va. 249; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 
 
 S. Rep. 3 ; Lecomte v. Tondorize, 82 45 Mo. App. 622 ; Smith v. Arthur, 
 
 Tex. 208; Cavanaugh v. Jackson, 91 110 N. C. 400; Moulton v. Harris, 94 
 
 Cal. 580. Cal. 420 ; St. Louis R. Co. v. Graham,
 
 SOS STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [§ 2G3. 
 
 growing timber or crops must be evidenced by a writing the 
 decisions are inharmonious. The English cases hold that if 
 an immediate removal and severance by the vendor are con- 
 templated no writing is requisite, as the transaction can and 
 ought to be deemed a sale of goods alone. 1 The American 
 courts hold that "standing trees are a part of the inheritance, 
 and can only become personalty by actual severance or b\' 
 severance in contemplation of law as the effect of a proper 
 instrument in writing." 2 If in the sale of the timber or of 
 growing crops or fruits a severance and delivery of the trees 
 or crops as chattels by the vendor are not contemplated, but 
 the vendor is given, either expressly or by implication, a license 
 to go on the land and cut and receive them, then it is only 
 reasonable to require that the contract conferring the license 
 or quasi-\ea.se must be evidenced by a writing, 3 where its du- 
 ration exceeds the term for which a valid oral lease can be 
 made. 
 
 § 263. Partition of real property. — Whether a partition 
 among co-tenants may be effected and proved b}^ parol is a 
 question upon which considerable variance exists among the 
 authorities. Prior to the enactment of the statute of frauds 
 partition among coparceners and tenants in common of cor- 
 poreal hereditaments might have been made by parol coupled 
 with livery of seizin in severalty. According to the English 
 cases and the early American decisions, a voluntary partition 
 
 55 Ark. 294; Guthrie v. Anderson, Smith v. Surman, 9 B. & C. 561; 
 
 48 Kan. 3S1 ; Frank v. Riggs, 93 Ala. Watts v. Bruce, 10 B. & C. 446; Mar- 
 
 252; Larsen v. Johnson, 78 Wis. 300. shall v. Green, 33 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 
 
 " Every day's experience more fully 404 ; Evans v. Roberts, 5 B. & C. 836 ; 
 
 demonstrates that the statute was Bostwick v. Leech, 3 Day (Conn.), 
 
 founded in wisdom and absolutely 476; Warwick v. Bruce, 2 M. & S. 
 
 necessary to preserve the titles to 205. 
 
 real property from the chances, the 2 Tiedeman on Real Prop., §799; 
 uncertainty and the fraud attending Trull v. Fisher, 28 Me. 548; Green v. 
 the admission of parol testimony. Armstrong, 1 Denio, 550; McGregor 
 When courts of equity have relaxed v. Brown, 10 N. Y. 117; Vorebeck v. 
 the rigid requirements of the statute, Roe, 50 Barb. 305; Buck v. Pick- 
 it has always been for the purpose well, 27 Vt. 104; Hirth v. Graham 
 of hindering the statute made to (Ohio, 1893), 33 N. E. Rep. 90; De- 
 prevent frauds from becoming the laney v. Root, 99 Mass. 548; Poor v. 
 instrument of fraud." Purcell v. Oakman, 154 Mass. 316. 
 Miner, 4 Wall. 517. ^Tiedeman on Real Prop., §799; 
 iTiedeman on Real Prop., § 799; 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 271.
 
 § 2G4r.] STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 309 
 
 of land was considered to be a conveyance which, coming 
 under the operation of the statute of frauds, must necessarily 
 be in writing; and the courts demanded, therefore, that a 
 party alleging the fact of a partition must prove that fact by 
 evidence in writing. 1 But the contrary proposition, that a 
 parol partition is valid where it is carried out and is followed 
 by an actual and exclusive possession of the parcels in sever- 
 alty, is supported by the more recent cases. The exclusive 
 adverse possession in severalty, if it is continued long enough 
 to bring the case within the statute of limitation, or if it is 
 coupled with the making of extensive improvements by one 
 of the former co-tenants on the portion which has been set 
 out to him in severalty, would be sufficient in equity or law 
 to take the case out of the statute of frauds and to dispense 
 with written evidence. 2 In the New England States the pro- 
 prietors of common lands could make partition by an oral vote 
 and without actual possession in severalty. No writing was 
 required to evidence a title arising under such a partition. 3 
 
 § 264. Trusts in real and personal estate. — Prior to the 
 enactment of the statute of frauds, oral evidence was admis- 
 sible to prove an express trust in real property. By that stat- 
 ute it is required that all express declarations of trusts in land 
 shall be manifested and proved by a writing signed by the 
 party creating the trust. The statute covers all express trusts ; 4 
 
 iCo. Lit. lS7a; 2 Cruise, 384; Pipes v. Buckner, 51 Miss. 848; John- 
 
 Chenery v. Dole, 39 Me. 164; Mc- son v. Johnson, 65 Tex. 87 ; McCon- 
 
 Pherson v. Seguine, 3 Dev. (N. C.) nell v. Carey, 48 Pa. St. 430; Dock- 
 
 154; Den v. Longstreet, 18 N. J. L. terman v. Elder, 27 Wkly. Law Bui. 
 
 414; Porter v. Perkins, 5 Mass. 235; 195; Boiling v. Teel, 76 Va. 487; 
 
 Medlin v. Steele, 75 N. C. 154; Dow Mellon v. Eeed, 114 Pa. St. 647; 
 
 v. Jewell, 18 N. H. 380: Gratz v. Gates v. Salmon, 46 Cal. 461; Mc- 
 
 Gratz, 4 Rawle (Pa.), 411; Jones v. Mahan v. McMahan, 13 Pa. St. 376; 
 
 Reeves, 6 Rich. (S. C.) 132; Wright Tate v. Fashee, 117 Ind. 322; Sanger 
 
 v. Cane, 18 La. Ann. 579; Craig v. v. Merritt, 131 N. Y. 614; Rountree 
 
 Taylor, 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 459; Tiede- v. Lane, 32 S. C. 160. 
 man on Real Prop., § 260. 3 Folger v. Mitchell, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 
 
 2 Tiedeman on Real Prop., § 260; 396; Coburn v. Ellen wood, 4 N. H. 
 
 Meacham v. Meacham (Tenn., Ib92). 99; Corbett v. Norcross, 35 id. 99; 
 
 19 S. W. Rep. 757; Bruce v. Osgood, Springfield v. Miller, 12 Mass. 415. 
 113 Ind. 360; Brown v. Wheeler, 17 4 Tiedeman on Eq., § 296; Collar 
 
 Conn. 345; Bompart v. Roderman, v. Collar, 83 Mich. 507; 49 N. W. 
 
 24 Mo. 385; Shepard v. Rinks, 78 III. Rep. 507; In re Groome, 94 Cal. 69; 
 
 188; Compton v. Mathews, 3 La. 128; 29 Pac. Rep. 487; Wolford v. Farn-
 
 400 
 
 STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
 
 [§ 204. 
 
 but implied, resulting and constructive trusts are excepted 
 either expressly or by implication, 1 and may be proved by 
 parol. It is never necessary that the express trust should be cre- 
 ated in writing, for, as the writing is only required for proof, it 
 may operate as an admission of the existence of the trust. 2 
 The evidence must be clear, 3 for if the language of the writing 
 is uncertain, vague or fragmentary, parol evidence will not be 
 received to supply the omissions. 4 Personal or business cor- 
 respondence, indorsements and admissions by parties in plead- 
 ings have been held sufficient as written proof of an express 
 trust. 5 Trusts in personal property are not within the statute 
 of frauds and may be proven by parol evidence without the 
 introduction of any memorandum or other writing whatever. 6 
 
 ham, 44 Minn. 159; Bragg v. Paulk, 
 42 Me. rM; Hall v. Young, 37 N. H. 
 134; Daily v. Kinsler, 31 Neb. 340; 
 Pinney v. Fellows, 15 Vt. 525; Pat- 
 ton v. Beecher, 62 Ala. 579; Spies v. 
 Price, 91 Aia. 166; Watson v. Pinck- 
 ney, 18 N. Y. S. 790; Faxon v. 
 Folvey, 110 Muss. 392; Packard v. 
 Putnam, 57 N. H. 43; Gibson v. 
 Foote, 40 Miss. 788 ; Wadd v. Hazle- 
 ton, 137 N. Y. 213; Tollarson v. 
 Blackstock, 11 S. Rep. 2S4 (Ala., 
 1892): Renz v. Stoll, 94 Mich. 377; 
 Hamilton v. Buchanan (N. C, 1893), 
 17 S. E. Rep. 159; Kinsey v. Bennett 
 (S. C, 1893), 15 id. 965. 
 
 1 Holland v. Farthing (Tex., 1893), 
 21 S. W. Rep. 67; Franceston v. 
 Deering. 41 N. H. 443; Gee v. Gee, 32 
 Miss. 190; Merchon v. Duer, 40 N. J. 
 Eq. 333; Brown v. Case, 23 S. C. 
 251; Burdette v. May, 100 Mo. 13; 
 Seiler v. Mohn, 37 W. Va. 507; Rice 
 v. Pt-nnypacker, 5 Del. Ch. 33; 
 Heneke v. Floring, 114 111. 554; 
 Price v. Kane, 112 Mo. 412; Larmon 
 v. Knight, 140 111. 232; 29 N. E. 
 Rep. 1116; Hudson v. Wight, 17 
 R. I. 519; Curd v. Williams (Ky., 
 1892), 18 S. W. Rep. 634; Sasser v. 
 Sasser, 73 Ga. 275. For further cita- 
 tions see Tiedeman on Real Prop., 
 §507. 
 
 2 McClellan v. McClellan, 65 Me 
 500; Trapnall v. Brown, 19 Ark. 48 
 Moran v. Hayes, 1 Johns. Ch. 339 
 Phipard v. Phipard, 55 Hun, 433 
 Orleans v. Chatham, 2 Pick. 29 
 Guion v. Williams, 7 N. Y. S. 786 
 Cornelius v. Smith, 55 Mo. 528; Pin- 
 ney v. Fellows, 15 Vt. 525. 
 
 3 Rogers v. Rogers, 87 Mo. 257; 
 Hoover v. Hoover, 129 Pa. St. 201; 
 19 Atl. Rep. 851. 
 
 4 Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt, 1 
 Johns. Ch. 273; Chad wick v. Per- 
 kins, 3 Me. 399; Russell v. Switzer, 
 63 Ga. 711; Abell v. Radcliffe, 13 
 Johns. 297; Chase v. Stockett (Md., 
 1890), 19 Atl. Rep. 761. 
 
 *McCandless v. Warner, 26 W. Va. 
 754; Fisher v. Fields, 10 Johns. 495; 
 Barron v. Barron, 24 Vt. 375; Hell- 
 man v. Mc Williams, 70 Cal. 449; 
 Moore v. Pickett, 62 111. 138; Bates 
 v. Hurd, 65 Me. 180; Johnson v. 
 Delaney, 35 Tex. 42; Loring v, 
 Palmer, 118 U. S. 321 ; Macy v. Will- 
 iams, 55 Hun, 489; Weaver v. Emi- 
 grant, etc. Co., 17 Abb. N. C. 82. See 
 Tiedeman on Real Property, §'§ 506, 
 507, where the subject is treated in 
 full. 
 
 6 Conn. River Bank v. Albee, 64 
 Vt. 571; Chace v. Chace, 130 Mass. 
 128; Maffitt's Adm'r v. Reynd, 69
 
 § 265.] STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 401 
 
 § 265. Surrender or assignment of leases. It is also 
 generally provided by the statute of frauds that no leases or 
 other interests in lands of any sort, save in copyhold lands } 
 can be assigned, granted or surrendered except in writing 
 signed by the party. 1 The effect of the statute is to abrogate 
 the cominon-law rule that leases for life or years could be 
 surrendered by parol, and such surrender or the assignment 
 of such interests must now be evidenced in writing under the 
 statute. 2 The common law, prior to the statute, proceeding 
 upon the principle that estates in incorporeal hereditaments, 
 as easements and estates less than freehold, depended for 
 their validity upon a written grant and not upon feoffment 
 and livery of seizin, recognized the rule that such interests 
 might be surrendered by the destruction of the deed or other 
 writing by which they were created. The assimilation under 
 the statute of the proof which is required to evidence incor- 
 poreal and corporeal interests should not, however, be con- 
 strued to render the cancellation of a deed conveying a cor- 
 poreal estate equivalent to a surrender of the same. The 
 deed, properly recorded, is but evidence of a transfer of title, 
 and a conveyance under seal of a similar character is required 
 under the statute to evidence the retransfer or surrender of 
 the vested interest. 3 But the redelivery to the grantor of 
 an unrecorded deed by which no title has passed might, under 
 certain peculiar and very exceptional circumstances, operate 
 as a reconveyance, working an estoppel on the grantee, when 
 the interests of third persons had become vested in the land. 4 
 
 Pa. St. 380 ; Gadsden v. Whaley, 14 Miller, 25 Pa. St. 481 ; Breher v. 
 S. C. 210; Roch v. George's Adm'r Reese, 17 111. App. 545. 
 
 <Ky„ 1893), 20 S. W. Rep. 1039 
 Davis v. Coburn, 128 Mass. 377 
 Eaton v. Cook, 25 N. J. Eq. 55 
 
 2 McClelland v. Rush, 11 Pa. Co. 
 Ct. R. 188; Nally v. Reading, 107 
 Mo. 150; 17 S. W. Rep. 978; State v. 
 Silvey v. Hodgdon, 52 Cal. 363; Ray Ervien (N. J., 1888), 12 Atl. Rep. 136. 
 v. Simmons, 11 R. I. 266; Hawkins 3 § 262. 
 
 v. Gardiner, 2 Sm. & Gif. 441; Hon 4 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 265, citing 
 v. Hon, 70 Ind. 135. Farrar v. Farrar, 4 N. H. 191 ; Com. 
 
 1 Chicago Attachment Co. v. Davis v. Dudley, 10 Mass. 403; Hobbrook 
 (111., 1892), 28 N. E. Rep. 859. If a v. Turrell, 9 Pick. 105 Upon the 
 lease is under seal the surrender question of the necessity for the use 
 must also be under seal. Jackson v. of a sealed instrument to pass a 
 Gardner, 8 Johns. 404; Kiester v. freehold, see Tiedeman on Real 
 
 Property, § 783. 
 26
 
 402 8TATDTE OF FRAUDS. [§§ 2G6, 2G7. 
 
 § 2GG. Contracts required to be in writing. — The statute 
 of frauds also requires that every contract by an executor or 
 administrator to answer out of his own estate, all promises to 
 answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person, 
 agreements in consideration of marriage, contracts not to be 
 performed within a year, and contracts for the sale of goods 
 not exceeding in value the sum of £10 or $50, must be evi- 
 denced by a writing signed by the party to be charged or his 
 agent. 1 In the case of a sale of goods a writing is not required 
 where the buyer has received part of the goods or has paid 
 earnest-money. 2 
 
 § 2G7. Articles of partnership. — It is not necessary that 
 a contract of partnership or an assignment of a share therein 
 should be evidenced in writing. 3 If the existence of the part- 
 nership is not to commence within one year, 4 or if its dura- 
 tion is to be more than one year, 5 the transaction must be in 
 writing under the statute. But a part performance of an oral 
 contract of partnership is sufficient to take it out of the stat- 
 ute. 6 A partnership formed to carry on the business of buy- 
 ing and selling land need not, according to the current of the 
 decided cases, be proved by a writing, 7 though it seems that 
 where the partners contribute as their shares of the partner- 
 ship fund lands held by them individually, or as tenants in 
 common, a writing is necessary as evidence of what amounts 
 to a conveyance of lands. 8 
 
 Where real estate is purchased and used for partnership 
 purposes, being paid for with the money of the firm, it becomes 
 partnership property. Such a transaction need not be evi- 
 denced by a writing signed by all the partners, for if the con- 
 
 1 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 267. Snyder v. Wolford, 38 Minn. 175 
 
 2 2 Kent's Com. 493-495; 1 Greenl. Pennypacker v. Leary, 65 Iowa, 220 
 
 on Er., §267. Knott v. Knott, 6 Oreg. 142: Bun 
 
 »Buckner v. Ries, 34 N. Y. 344; nell v. Taintor, 4 Conn. 568; Hunter 
 
 Jack v. Clemens, 41 Iowa, 95 ; Jordan v. Whitehead, 42 Mo. 524; Carr 
 
 v. Miller, 75 Va. 442; Buffum v. Gravitt, 54 Mich. 540. Contra, Gantt 
 
 Buflum, 49 Me. 108. v. Gantt, 6 La. Ann. 667; Smith v. 
 
 * Williams v. Jones, 5 B. & C. 108. Burcham, 3 Sumn. (U. S.) 435. 
 
 5 Morris v. Peckham, 51 Conn. 128. ^Larkins v. Rhodes, 5 Port. (Ala.) 
 
 6 Yates v. Fraser, 6 111. App. 229; 195; Clancy v. Cranie, 2 Dev. Eq. 
 Huntley v. Huntley, 114 U. S. 394. (N. C.) 363. 
 
 7 Holmes v. McCray, 51 Ind. 358 ;
 
 § 268.] STATCTE OF FRAUDS. 403 
 
 tract was signed by and the title taken in the name of one, 
 he will be regarded as a trustee for his associates. 1 
 
 § 2(>8. Form and character of the writing. — No particu- 
 lar form is required for any writing evidencing a contract 
 necessary under the statute, and several incomplete or frag- 
 mentary documents may be sufficient if on being construed 
 together the existence of the contract can be ascertained with 
 reasonable certainty. But parol evidence is inadmissible to 
 supply words which have been omitted, 2 though it may be re- 
 ceived to show that a consideration passed where none is ex- 
 pressed in the writing. 3 The statutory requirement is that the 
 writing should be signed, not by both the parties, -but " by the 
 party to be charged" alone. The plaintiff who is seeking to 
 enforce his right need not therefore have signed the writing- 
 which he seeks to use as evidence. The position of the signa- 
 ture is immaterial. The printed name of the vendor in a bill 
 will suffice if the name of the vendee and the items are in 
 writing. 4 Except in the case of the execution of a conveyance 
 of land, a writing signed by an agent or attorney will not be 
 invalidated because his authority was created by parol. So an 
 agent ma) 7 be verbally authorized to enter into a written con- 
 tract for the sale of land belonging to his principal. 5 But an 
 authority to execute a deed or instrument under seal must have 
 been created by a deed, and no writing not under seal will be 
 received as evidence of the existence of such an authority. 6 
 An auctioneer immediately after the descent of the hammer 
 
 i Bryant v. Hunter, 6 Bush (Ky.), 22 Kent's Com. 511 ; 1 Greenl. on 
 
 75; Hogle v. Lowe, 12 Nev. 286; Ev., § 268. 
 
 Rank v. Grote, 50 N. Y. Super. Ct. 3 Packard v. Richardson, 17 Mass. 
 
 L75; Dewey v. Dewey, 35 Vt. 555; 122; Drake v. Seaman, 97 N. Y. 230. 
 
 Martin v. Morris, 62 Wis. 418; Cf. Hayes v. Jackson, 37 Cent. L. J. 
 
 Brooke v. Washington, 8 Gratt. (Va.) 298. 
 
 248; Cilley v. Huse, 40 N. H. 358; 4 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 268. 
 
 Campbell v. Campbell, 30 N. J. Eq. 5 Dickerman v. Aston, 21 Minn. 
 
 415; Tillinghast v. Champlin, 4 R. I. 538; Warrall v. Munn, 5 N. Y. 229; 
 
 173; Jones v. Smith, 31 S. C. 527; Moody v. Smith, 70 N. Y. 598; Riley 
 
 Hardy v. Norfolk Mfg. Co.,80Va. v. Minor, 29 Mo. 439; Wharter v. 
 
 404; Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U. S. McMahan, 10 Paige (N. Y.), 386; 
 
 512; Paige - v. Paige, 71 Iowa, 318; Rottman v. Wasson, 5 Kan. 552; 
 
 Tenny v. Simpson, 37 Kan. 353; Long v. Hartwell, 34 N. J. L. 116. 
 
 Divine v. Mitchum, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 6 Wheeler v. Nevins, 34 Me. 54; 
 
 488. Preston v. Hall, 23 Gratt. (Va.) 600;
 
 4(H STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [§ 209. 
 
 begins to act as agent for the buyer, and "his signature or 
 memorandum in any transaction, whether concerning real or 
 personal property, will bind both parties as a note in writing 
 under the statute. 1 
 
 §269. Wills required to be evidenced in writing.— By 
 the fifth section of the statute of frauds it was prescribed that 
 all devises of lands or tenements must be in writing, signed 
 by the person devising or by some one in his presence and by 
 his express direction, and they should be attested and sub- 
 scribed in his presence by three or four witnesses. Before 
 the Yictorian statute of wills, 2 testaments disposing of per- 
 sonal property only were valid if they had been reduced to 
 writing before the death of the testator, though never signed 
 or seen by him and without any authentication or attestation. 
 This statute, which placed wills of personalty and devises 
 upon the same footing so far as their ceremonial execution is 
 concerned, 3 has been followed by similar enactments in almost 
 every state of the American Union. 4 A will disposing of real 
 or personal property must therefore, except in those excep- 
 tional cases where nuncupative wills are permitted, be in writ- 
 ins: signed or subscribed bv the testator in the presence of two 
 witnesses at least, who must then usually sign as witnesses in 
 the presence of the testator, and frequently they are required 
 to sign in the presence of each other. The courts in constru- 
 ing these statutes regulating the execution of wills, which 
 
 Wells v. Evans, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 14 Ga. 173; Jones v. Marks, 47 Cal. 
 
 251; Damon v. Granby, 2 Pick. 242. 
 
 (Llass.) 345; Harshaw v. McKesson, ! Smith v. Arnold, 5 Mason (U. S.), 
 
 65 N. C. 688; Adams v. Power, 52 414; Morton v. Dean, 13 Met. (Mass.) 
 
 Miss. 828; Desp. Line v. Bellamy M. 388; White v. Crew, 16 Ga. 416; 
 
 Co.,. 12 N. H. 205; Rhode v. Lou- White v. Watkins, 23 Mo. 423; 
 
 thain, 8 Blackf. (Ind.)413; Smith v. Walker v. Herring, 21 Gratt. (Va.) 
 
 Perry, 29 N. J. L. 74; Rowe v. Ware, 678; Cleaves v. Foss, 4 Greenl. (Me.) 
 
 30 Ga. 278; Scheutze v. Baily, 40 Mo. 1 ; Linn, Boyd, etc. Co. v. Terrill, 13 
 
 69; Gordon v. Buckley, 14 S. & R. Bush (Ky.), 463; Anderson v. Check, 
 
 (Pa.) 331; Cain v. Heard,- 1 Coldw. 1 Bailey Eq. (S. C.) 118; Harvey v. 
 
 (Tenn.) 163. But a deed executed Stevens, 43 Vt. 653. 
 
 by an agent without authority under 2 1 Vic, ch. 26. 
 
 seal, though invalid as a legal con- 3 See Tiedeman on Wills, § 46 et 
 
 veyance, may be used as evidence of seq., where the subject is fully dis- 
 
 an equitable title. Watson v. Sher- cussed. 
 
 man, 84 111. 263; Ingram v. Little, 4 Stimson, Am. St. Law, § 2640.
 
 § 2G9.] STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 405 
 
 differ somewhat in minor details in the several states, have 
 usually been satisfied with a substantial compliance with their 
 provisions. 1 Any act of the testator by which a sign or mark 
 is made upon the paper by him or for him at his request evinc- 
 ing his intention that the instrument shall take effect as his 
 will is enough. 2 
 
 The statutory provisions differ as to the position of the 
 signature. The statute of frauds and the American statutes 
 which arc remodeled on it are satisfied with a signature in 
 any part of the will, while other statutes require a signing or 
 subscription at the foot or end of the will. If it is required 
 that the will should be subscribed at the end, a siomino; which 
 precedes any dispositive part of the will is not a valid sub- 
 scription. But a substantial compliance with the statute is 
 all that is required; 3 and the fact that the subscription is near, 
 or in or under the attestation clause is not material. 4 
 
 The witnesses are usually required to subscribe the will in the 
 presence of the testator. As to what shall constitute this pres- 
 ence the cases are not altogether harmonious. The mere bodily 
 presence of the testator is not enough. He must be conscious of 
 what is going on about him or the attestation will be invalid. 5 
 Yery many of the cases sustain the very liberal statutory con- 
 struction that the signing is in the presence of the testator, 
 whether performed in the room where he is or not, if he can 
 see the act of signing if he wished to do so. G But other au- 
 thorities hold that where the attestation takes place in another 
 room, in order to make it a signing in the testator's presence 
 
 iln re Phelps, 98 N. Y. 267; Mc- baerts, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 10; In re 
 
 Donough v. Loughlin, 20 Barb. 238; Dayger, 47 Hun, 127. 
 
 In re Guilfoyle, 96 Cal. 598; Mont- ^Hallowell v. Hallowell, 88 Ind. 
 
 goinery v. Perkins, 2 Met. (Ky.) 418. 251 ; Younger v. Duffie, 94 N. Y. 
 
 -'Baily v. Baily, 35 Ala. 6S7; 535. 
 
 Sprague v. Luther, 8 R. I. 252 ; In re 5 Right v. Price, Doug. 241 ; Gra- 
 
 Guilfoyle, 96 Cal. 398; In re Shot- ham v. Graham, 10 Ired. 219. 
 
 well. 11 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 444; In re 6 Green v. Green (111., 1893), 33 N. 
 
 Knox, 131 Pa. St. 220; Jenkyns v. E. Rep. 941; Snider v. Burke, 84 
 
 Gaisford, 32 L. J. Prob. 122; Tiede- Ala. 53; Pawtucket v. Ballou, 15 
 
 man on Wills, §§ 47, 48, 49. R. I. 58; Gallegher v. Killcerry, 29 
 
 3 In re Yoorhis, 125 N. Y. 765; 111. App. 415; Moore v. Spier, 80 Ala. 
 
 Sticker v. Groves, 5 Whart. 386; In 130; Turner v. Cook, 36 Ind. 129; In 
 
 re Conway, 58 Hun, 16; In re Lam- re Downie, 42 Wis. 66; Aiken v. 
 
 Weekerly, 19 Mich. 482.
 
 406 STATUTE OF FBAUDS. [§ 270. 
 
 it is necessary to show that he actually did see the witnesses 
 in the act of subscribing their names. 1 In many of the states 
 by statute, and in some others as the result of judicial legis- 
 lation, it is now required that the testator should publish his 
 will in the presence of the witnesses. This he may do in ex- 
 press terms by informing the witnesses that the paper the}'' 
 are attesting is his will or by any signs or actions by which 
 the knowledge of that fact is conveyed to them. 2 
 
 § 270. Agreements not within the statute of frauds 
 which must be evidenced by writings. — By various modern 
 statutes certain transactions not originally included within 
 the statute of frauds are now required to be evidenced in 
 writing. Thus, in New York, payment of money by execu- 
 tors, administrators or testamentary trustees is required to be 
 shown by a written receipt. 3 So, too, it is usually provided 
 that a new promise, in order to be sufficient to take a debt 
 out of the statute of limitation, must be in writing, 4 and the 
 same rule is applicable to the acceptance of a bill of exchange. 5 
 A contract to make a will must, in Massachusetts, be in writ- 
 ing, 6 as well as agreements to arbitrate, 7 if the arbitration is 
 sought to be enforced in a court of record. Notices in legal 
 proceedings are often required to be in writing, as in the case 
 of statutory notice to quit. 8 
 
 So, too, b} r various federal statutes assignments of land 
 warrants, wages due for naval service, of contracts with In- 
 dians, of patents and of copjTights are required to be shown 
 by writing signed by the parties thereto. Written evidence 
 is sometimes required of a contract af apprenticeship, 9 and of 
 the adoption of a child. 10 
 
 1 Mandeville v. Parker, 31 N. J. N. Y. L. 1873, p. 1243, ch. 830. The 
 Eq. 242; Hill v. Barge, 12 Ala. 687. text enumerates in part only the 
 
 2 Tiedeman on Wills, § 52. transaction which should be evi- 
 
 3 N. Y. Code C. P. 2734, 2750. denced by a writing. In University 
 * Mass. Pub. St. 1116, ch. 197, Law School Helps No. 8, a leaflet of 
 
 §§ 15, 16; Code C. P. 395. s'x pages prepared by Mr. Austin 
 
 s 1 N. Y. R. S. 768, §§ 6, 8. Abbott of New York city, from 
 
 6 Mass. Pub. St. Sup. 746. which these instances are condensed, 
 
 7 Horton v. Wilcle, 8 Gray, 425. will be found a full and concise 
 8 1 N. Y. R. S. 745, §§ 4, 11. enumeration of the principal trans- 
 9 Mass. Pub. Stat. 827, ch. 149, § 5; actions which under the statute of 
 
 2 N. Y. R. S. 154. frauds and other statutes may or 
 
 10 Mass. Pub. Stat. 824, ch. 148, § 2; must be evidenced in writing.
 
 CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES. 
 
 283. Continuance in criminal 
 
 trials. 
 
 284. Non-attendance of witness — 
 
 When a contempt. 
 
 285. Privilege of witnesses from 
 
 service of civil process. 
 
 286. Privilege of witnesses from 
 
 civil arrest. 
 
 287. Duration of the privilege 
 
 from arrest. 
 
 288. Attendance of witnesses in 
 
 custody. 
 
 289. Attendance of witnesses be- 
 
 fore legislative bodies. 
 
 § 275. The attendance of witnesses 
 at private arbitrations. 
 
 276. The subpoena — Fees of wit- 
 
 nesses. 
 
 277. Fees in criminal cases. 
 
 278. Subpoena duces tecum. 
 
 279. Time and mode of serving 
 
 the subpoena. 
 
 280. Recognizance to secure pres- 
 
 ence of a witness. 
 
 281. Obstructing attendance of 
 
 witnesses. 
 281a. Changing venue for conven- 
 ience of witnesses. 
 
 282. Failure of witnesses to at- 
 
 tend — Continuance, when 
 granted. 
 
 § 275. The attendance of witnesses at private arbitra- 
 tions. — It is hardly necessary to state that private individuals 
 have no power to compel the attendance of witnesses except 
 in the course of a judicial or legislative investigation. So 
 private arbitrators cannot, in the absence of statutory author- 
 ization to that effect, procure the compulsory attendance of 
 witnesses or the production of documentary evidence. 1 But 
 when a statutory power is conferred on the arbitrators, the 
 arbitration becomes a public and g^as£- judicial proceeding. 
 The arbitrator may then commit disobedient witnesses for 
 contempt, and the witnesses, on the other hand, are privileged 
 from civil arrest while in attendance at the arbitration, 2 or 
 while going to or returning from it. 
 
 § 276. The subpoena — Fees of witness. — The power of 
 the court to hear and determine controversies confers by im- 
 plication at common law the further power to require the pro- 
 
 *Tobey v. Bristol, 3 Story, 800; 
 Webb v. Taylor, 1 D. & L. 676. 
 2 Clark v. Grant, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 257 ; Sanford v. Chase, 3 Cow. (N. Y. 
 381 ; People v. Judge, 41 Mich. 726.
 
 408 ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES. [§ 276. 
 
 duction of evidence for or against the controverted facts. 1 
 The judicial power to summon witnesses is commonly ex- 
 ercised by the employment of a subpoena, which may be de- 
 fined as "a judicial writ, directed to the witness, commanding 
 him to appear at the court to testify what he knows in the 
 cause therein described, pending in such court, under a certain 
 penalty mentioned in the writ." 2 
 
 In England, and in most of the states of the Union, it is re- 
 quired by statute that the witness shall be tendered, when he is 
 served with the subpoena, certain fees to cover his expenses in- 
 curred in going to and from the place of trial and while remain- 
 ing there. In xAmerica these fees are usually fixed by statute,' 
 while in England the witness is allowed his living and travel- 
 ing expenses, according to what may be his social position. 4 
 The mileage which is allowed the witness is limited to his ex- 
 penses incurred while traveling within the boundaries of the 
 jurisdiction where he testifies, since the process of the court 
 does not run beyond its jurisdictional limits, and his deposition 
 would suffice in such a case. 5 A witness whose expenses are 
 not paid or tendered need not testify though he has obeyed the 
 subpoena, 6 except where it is provided by statute that his right 
 thereto is waived b} r a compliance with the summons or the 
 subpoena ticket. 7 Either party to the suit who appears and 
 testifies solely in his own behalf as a witness is not entitled 
 
 !The attendance of a witness be- Gunnison v. Gunnison, 41 N. II. 121 ; 
 
 fore a commissioner who has been Fish v. Farwell, 33 111. App. 240: 
 
 appointed to take his deposition by a Melvin v. Whiting, 13 Pick. 190. In 
 
 court which has received letters rog- the federal courts, if the distance 
 
 atory from a court in a sister state traveled is not wholly within the 
 
 may be secured by a subpoena or by district, mileage will only be allowed 
 
 an order in the nature of a subpoena, for one hundred miles and return. 
 
 State v-. Bourne, 21 Oreg. 218. See The Progress, 48 Fed. Rep. 239; 
 
 post, § 289. Buffalo Ins. Co. v. Steamship Co., 29 
 
 2 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 309. Fed. Rep. 237. 
 
 3 In re Cor win, 6 Abb. N. C. 437; ^Atwood v. Scott, 99 Mass. 177; 
 
 State v. Ramsay (Mont., 1892), 28 Mattocks v. Wheaton, 10 Vt. 493; 
 
 Pac. Rep. 258. Newton v. Harland, 9 Dowl. 16. 
 
 *2 Phil. Ev., pp. 375, 376; 2 Tidd, 7 But ordinarily a witness does not 
 
 p. 806; 3 Bl. Com. 369. lose his fees by not insisting on pre- 
 
 5 Crawford v. Abraham, 2 Oreg. payment. Young v. Merchants' Ins. 
 
 163; Kingfreed v. Pullen, 54 Me. Co., 29 Fed. Rep. 273. 
 398; Stern v. Herren, 101 N. C. 516;
 
 176.] 
 
 ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES. 
 
 40i> 
 
 to recover his fees or mileage as such, 1 or to have them taxed 
 as costs, though the rule is otherwise if he is summoned to 
 testify in behalf of his opponent, 2 and he need not testify until 
 he is paid. 3 
 
 Under peculiar circumstances a witness may be entitled to 
 fees for his attendance in two or more simultaneous cases, as 
 where he is summoned for the plaintiffs in different suits aris- 
 ing out of one subject-matter. 4 The fees and mileage of wit- 
 nesses are taxable as costs where they attend and testifv, 
 though they were not summoned; 5 or where they are summoned 
 in good faith and actually appear, though they may not be 
 called upon to testify. 6 The expense incurred by the witness 
 in procuring a survey of the land which was the subject-mat- 
 ter of his evidence cannot be taxed as costs; 7 nor is an attor- 
 ney who testifies solely to free himself from an imputation of 
 misfeasance entitled to witness fees. 8 
 
 1 Grinnell v. Dennison, 12 Wis. 402 ; 
 Beal v. Stevens, 72 Cal. 451 ; Stratton 
 v. Upton, 36 N. H. 581 ; Hale v. Mer- 
 rill, 27 Vt. 738; Grub v. Simpson, 6 
 Heisk. (Tenn.) 92 ; Nichols v. Bruns- 
 wick, 3 Cliff. (U. S. C. C.) 88; Del- 
 comyn v. Chamberlain, 48 How. Pr. 
 (N. Y.) 409. 
 
 2 Goodwin v. Smith, 67 Ind. 101; 
 Young v. English, 7 Beav. 10; Har- 
 vey v. Tebntt, 1 J. & W. 197; Penny 
 v. Brink, 75 N. C. 68; Bonner v. 
 People, 40 111. App. 628 ; Leeds v. 
 Amherst, 14 Sim. 357. Of. The Prog- 
 ress, 48 Fed. Rep. 239. 
 
 3 It has been held that the statu- 
 tory fees for each day's attendance 
 should be paid or tendered on the 
 day preceding, and the failure of a 
 party to do so will justify the wit- 
 ness in returning at once to his home. 
 Bliss v. Brainard, 42 N. H. 255. 
 
 4 Young v. Insurance Co., 29 Fed. 
 Rep. 273; Vernon, etc. Co. v. John- 
 son, 108 Ind. 128; Archer v. Insur- 
 ance Co., 31 Fed. Rep. 660; The 
 Vernon, 36 Fed. Rep. 113. 
 
 5 Christensen v. Union, 32 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 1018 (Wash., 1893); Cahn v. 
 Monroe, 29 Fed. Rep. 675; The Sy- 
 racuse, 36 Fed. Rep. 830. Contra, 
 Stern v. Herren, 101 N. C. 516. 
 
 6 Fish v. Farwell, 33111. App. 242; 
 Ohio, etc. Co. v. Trapp (Ind., 1892), 
 30 N. E. Rep. 812; Baumbach v. 
 Gessler, 82 Wis. 231 ; Chandler v. Beal, 
 137 Ind. 596; Young v. Insurance 
 Co., 29 Fed. Rep. 273; Pugh v. Good 
 (Oreg., 1890), 23 Pac. Rep. 827. But 
 where thirty-two witnesses were 
 summoned to impeach plaintiff's 
 character the fees of only five were 
 allowed, though all were admitted 
 to have been called in good faith. 
 Kley v. Healey, 2 N. Y. S. 231. 
 
 ' Tuck v. Olds, 29 Fed. Rep. 883. 
 
 spearsman v. Gold (N. J., 1889), 
 8 Atl. Rep. 2S5. It is provided by 
 the Revised Statutes of the United 
 States, section 850, that no federal 
 officer or clerk shall receive more 
 than his necessary expenses when he 
 is attending court as a witness for 
 the government. Ex parte Burdell, 
 32 Fed. Rep. 681 ; In re Waller, 49 
 Fed. Rep. 271. In calculating mile-
 
 410 ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES. [§ 277. 
 
 § 277. Fees in criminal cases. — The prosecution in a 
 criminal proceeding is under no necessity of paying its wit- 
 nesses their expenses, as in theory it is conceived to be the 
 duty of every citizen to assist so far as lies in his power, with- 
 out compensation or reward, in the punishment of wrong- 
 doers. A statute, therefore, which provides that a witness is 
 not entitled to fees in criminal cases does not conflict with a 
 constitutional guaranty that no man's services shall be de- 
 manded without just compensation. 1 If, because of his pov- 
 erty, a witness who is summoned in a criminal trial is unable 
 to attend, he will not, it seems, be in contempt of court. 2 The 
 prisoner on trial for a capital crime possessed, at common 
 law, no right to compulsory process to obtain the attendance 
 of his witnesses, while, if they attended voluntarily, that cruel 
 system of jurisprudence gave the judge the discretion to re- 
 fuse to permit their examination because they had not been 
 legally summoned. 3 
 
 By the provisions of the federal constitution and the con- 
 stitutions of the several states, the right to compulsory pro- 
 cess for obtaining the attendance of witnesses in his own 
 behalf is secured to the prisoner; 4 and it is often provided by 
 statute that if he is acquitted his witness fees shall be paid 
 by the county. 5 So, too, a subpoena is not always essential; 
 for if a witness, though not summoned, is in court, he may be 
 
 age the distance covered is measured 8 Abb. Crim. Brief, citing United 
 
 as the crow flies (Leigh v. Hind, 17 States v. Reid, 12 How. (U. S.) 361. 
 
 E. C. L. 774), though sometimes it 4 Homan v. State, 23 Texas, 212 ; 
 
 may be measured by the usually Willard v. Superior Court, 82 Cal. 
 
 traveled route. Smith v. Ingraham, 456. 
 
 7 Cow. 419. "The most direct route 5 State v. Massy, 104 N. C. 877; 
 
 of travel" between two places, State v. Willis (Iowa, 1889), 44 N. W. 
 
 within the meaning of a statute Rep. 699. A statute which prescribes 
 
 giving a sheriff mileage for carry- that a criminal trial shall not be 
 
 ing prisoners to a penitentiary, is the postponed when either party thereto 
 
 railroad, although it is sixty-four consents that the facts contained in 
 
 miles long while the highway is an affidavit for a continuance shall 
 
 but thirty-five. Maynard v. Cedar be regarded as the evidence of the 
 
 County, 51 Iowa, 431. absent witness is unconstitutional, 
 
 1 Daly v. Multnomah Co., 14 Oreg. as it deprives a prisoner of his con- 
 
 20. Cf. Morin v. Multnomah Co. stitutional right to compulsory pro- 
 
 (Oreg., 1889), 22 Pac. Rep. 490. cess. State v. Berkley, 92 Mo. 41. 
 
 2 1 Greenl. on Ev., §311; United This constitutional right, however, 
 
 States v. Durling, 4 Biss. 509. is not absolute, and does not from
 
 § 278.] ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES. 411 
 
 called to testify. 1 It has been held, however, that an attach- 
 ment against a witness will not be granted the accused in the 
 absence of a showing that the evidence is material,'- and that 
 the witness has been summoned, or that proper efforts have 
 been made to procure his attendance, that he is in the state, 
 and that his early presence can be secured. 3 A witness who 
 is subpoenaed and who testifies in behalf of a person accused 
 of a felony may recover for his services in an action of as- 
 sumpsit;* though it also has been held that he is entitled only 
 to the amount prescribed by statutory enactment as witness 
 fees, even if the party had promised to pay more. 5 If a wit- 
 ness becomes entitled to certain statutory fees on attending 
 and testifying, his right thereto is a vested right which is pro- 
 tected by constitutional guaranties and which cannot be de- 
 stroyed or impaired by any subsequent legislation." 
 
 § 278. Subpcena duces tecum. — Where the production of 
 documentary evidence in the possession of the witness is re- 
 quired a subpoena duces tecum- is employed, commanding him 
 to search for and bring to court certain books or papers which 
 are specifically described, together with all documents and 
 writings which may afford evidence in the cause. 7 The writ- 
 necessity include witnesses who are 574. Cf. State v. McCarthy, 43 La. 
 resident out of the state (State v. Ann. 541. 
 
 Pagels, 92 Mo. 300 ; 4 S. W. Rep. 931 ; 4 Bennett v. Kroth, 37 Kan. 235. 
 State v. Hornsby, 8 Rob. (La.) 554), 5 Walker v. Cook, 33 111. App. 561. 
 or those within the state whose In this connection it may be of 
 deposition can easily be procured if service to define the word " wit- 
 they are unable to attend in person, ness." The term is a general one, 
 Willard v. Superior Court, supra. If including every person from whose 
 the venue is changed on the applica- lips testimony is received or ex- 
 tion of the state's attorney, the court tracted to be used in a judicial or 
 may make it a condition that the quasi-judicial proceeding. An "af- 
 traveling expenses of the defend- fiant " or a " deponent" is always a 
 ant's witnesses who are too poor to witness, but every witness is of 
 pay their own expenses shall be pro- course not an affiant or deponent, 
 vided for. People v. Baker, 3 Abb. Anderson's Law Dictionary, citing 
 Pr. 42; 3 Park. dim. Rep. 181. Barker v. Coit, 1 Root, 225 (Conn.); 
 
 1 Robinson v. Trull, 4 Cush. 249; Bliss v. Shuman, 47 Me. 252. 
 
 Rex v. Sadler, 4 C. & P. 218; Black- 6 People v. Pyper (Utah, 1889), 21 
 
 burn v. Hargreave, 2 Lew. C. C. 259, Pac. Rep. 722. 
 
 cited in 1 Greenl. on Ev., §311. ' 1 Greenl. onEv., §309; 3 Bl. Com. 
 
 2 People v. Marseiler, 70 Cal. 9. 382. 
 
 3 State v. Johnson, 41 La. Ann.
 
 412 ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES. [§ 278. 
 
 ings which are required should be described specifically and 
 with certainty according to the circumstances of the case, so 
 that the witness, on the one hand, may know what is re- 
 quired of him, and the court, on the other, may ascertain if 
 the subpoena has been properly obeyed. 1 The object of the 
 writ is the production of documentary evidence alone, and a 
 piece of metal or other article cannot be brought in court by 
 a subpoena duces tecum; 2 nor can the writ be employed for the 
 sole purpose of discovering a secret process of manufacturing 
 a patented article, 3 nor to compel the production of writings 
 not as evidence but to refresh the memory of a witness. 4 But 
 disobedience to a subpoena duces tecum, by a postoffice official 
 is not excusable because the rules of his department forbid 
 the disclosure by him of any information contained in its 
 records. 5 
 
 As the power to issue a subpoena duces tecum is derived 
 from the power to command the production of a material 
 witness " to testify," the omission of the words " to testify " 
 will invalidate the subpoena itself. 6 A witness in whose pos- 
 session are papers which it is sought to produce by a subpoena 
 duces tecum is not excusable for refusing or neglecting to 
 brino- them into court because thev do not belong to him. 7 If 
 he is a custodian of public records, he may be excused from 
 doing so in answer to a subpoena on account of the public in- 
 
 1 Mitchell v. Sheriff , 7 Abb. Pr. 96 ; issue of a subpoena duces tecum. 
 United States v. Babcock, 3 Dill. While a subpoena duces tecum is un- 
 (U. S.) 568; Elting v. United States, returned or unserved, no second sub- 
 27 Ct. CI. 158. poena will be valid for the same 
 
 2 Re Shepard, 18 Blatch. 266; John- purpose. Elting v. United States, 27 
 son v. North Branch Co., 48 Fed. Ct. CI. 158. 
 
 Rep. 191. 7 The mere assertion of corporative 
 
 3 Averell v. Barber, 63 Hun, 630. officials that the corporation's books 
 
 4 United States v. Tilden, 10 Ben. are not in their possession is not suf- 
 566, 570-581. ficient to excuse their disobedience 
 
 5 Rice v. Rice (Ala., 1893), 25 Atl. of an order of court for the produc- 
 Rep. 21. tion of the books where it appears 
 
 6 Murray v. Elston, 23 N. J. Eq. that the books were lately in their 
 212. In Ex parte Moses, 53 Fed. possession, and they have failed to 
 Rep. 316, it was held that the stat- account for their disappearance, 
 utory power to issue a subpoena Fenlon v. Dempsey, 21 Abb. N. C. 
 commanding a witness " to appear 291. 
 
 and testify" did not authorize the
 
 § 270.] ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES. 413 
 
 convenience which would very probably ensue, and because 
 the writings in question may be satisfactorily proved by prop- 
 erly authenticated copies. 1 In any case the sufficiency of the 
 reason for not producing a writing in obedience to a subpoena 
 duces tecum is for the court. 2 
 
 § 279. Time and mode of serving the subpoena. — In jus- 
 tice to the witness the subpoena should be seasonably served. 
 He should be given a reasonable opportunity so to arrange 
 his business that it will not suffer greatly by his absence. 3 It 
 is now generally provided by statute in this country that the 
 wftness shall be allowed one da}''s time for every twenty 
 miles he is compelled to travel from his place of abode to the 
 place of trial. In every case, however, at least one day's no- 
 tice is necessary. 4 The subpoena should be served personalty, 
 that the witness, being apprised of its contents, may be charge- 
 able with contempt for his disobedience to it. To consti- 
 tute personal service the subpoena should be shown to the 
 witness, and a copy thereof or a subpoena ticket containing a 
 concise summary of its contents, with an oral statement of 
 what the paper is, should be delivered to him together with 
 his statutory fees. 5 
 
 Service may be made by a private person as a party 6 or by 
 a sheriff or other official acting for a party to the suit. In 
 the former case proof of service may be made by the affidavit 
 of the person serving the writ; in the latter by the return of 
 the officer. 7 A subpoena is only valid to secure the attend- 
 ance of a witness in the particular cause in which it has been 
 issued, and is inoperative to secure his presence at a subse- 
 quent term to which the trial has been subsequently ad- 
 journed. 8 Sometimes by statute a penalty is imposed upon a 
 witness who fails or refuses to obey a subpoena which has 
 been properly served on him. The penalty is recovered by 
 a civil action brought against the witness by the party ag- 
 
 1 See ante, %% 142c, 146-150. means personal service where no 
 
 2 1 Whart. Ev., § 377. other mode is expressly indicated. 
 
 3 In re Hughbanks, 44 Kan. 105. Rathburn v. Acker, 18 Barb. 375. 
 
 4 Scammon v. Scammon, 33 N. H. 6 Larimore v. Bobb (Mo., 1893), 21 
 52 ; Sims v. Kitchen, 5 Esp. 46 ; 1 S. W. Rep. 922. 
 
 Greenl. Ev., § 310. 7 McLane v. Piaggio (Fla., 1888), 3 
 
 5 2 Phil. Ev., § 373. A statute re- S. Rep. 823. See ante, % 150a. 
 quiring service on a person always 8 Sapp v. King, 66 Tex. 570.
 
 414 ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES. [§§ 2S0, 281. 
 
 grieved. Under such circumstances the writ of subpoena is 
 regarded as primary evidence of the service on the defendant 
 and its existence cannot be proved by the admission of the 
 defendant. 1 Parol evidence is admissible, however, to show 
 his non-attendance. 2 
 
 § 280. Recognizance to secure presence of a witness. — 
 In criminal proceedings, where the accused has been com- 
 mitted for trial or to await the action of the grand jury, or 
 where the trial is continued, it is sometimes the practice to 
 require the recognizance or personal bond of a witness in order 
 that his attendance at the trial may be secured. 3 Sureties 
 may also be taken in the discretion of the court, and if they 
 are not procurable, or if the witness refuses to give his Recog- 
 nizance, he may be kept in custody. 4 The modern tendency 
 is to regard such a mode of procedure as oppressive and unjust 
 to an innocent person whose only offense is his accidental 
 presence at a place where a crime is alleged to have been 
 committed, 5 and consequently it is sometimes provided by 
 statute that a witness who is unable to give sureties for his 
 appearance may be released from custody upon giving his 
 deposition. 6 
 
 § 281. Obstructing attendance of witnesses. — At common 
 law, and now very frequently by statute, any attempt to retard 
 or prevent the attendance of witnesses, 7 or the act of advising 
 a witness not to answer, 8 is a misdemeanor. 9 It matters not 
 
 i Hasbrouck v. Baker, 10 Johns. 7 4 Bl. Com. 129; Cutler v. Wright, 
 
 248. W. N. 1890, p. 28 ; State v. Carpen- 
 
 2 Cogswell v. Meech, 12 Wend, ter, 20 Vt. 9; Martin v. State, 28 
 
 147. Ala. 71; United States v. Kee, 39 
 
 iGwyn v. State, 64 Miss. 324; Fed. Rep. 603 ; Cora. v. Feely, 2 Va. 
 
 Comfort v. Kittle, 81 Iowa, 179. Cas. 1; State v. Ames, 64 Me. 386; 
 
 4 2 Hale, P. C. 282; Roscoe, Crim. Cameron v. Lightfoot, 2 W. Bl. 
 Ev., p. 87; Evans v. Rees, 12 Ad. & 1193; Com. v. Reynolds, 14 Gray, 
 El. 55. See Laws U. S. 1846, ch. 98, 87; State v. Horner (Del., 1893), 26 
 8 7; Fawcett v. Linthecum, 7 Ohio Atl. Rep. 73. 
 
 Cir. Ct. R. 141; 1 Greenl. on Ev., 8 State v. Gandy, 23 Neb. 436; 
 
 § 313. Perrow v. State, 67 Miss. 365. 
 
 5 See State v. Grace, 18 Minn. 398. 9 The fact that the witness was ex- 
 
 6 People v. Lee, 49 Cal. 37. A wit- pected to testify, though he is not 
 ness imprisoned is entitled to his per under recognizance to appear or has 
 diem while thus committed. Robin- been subpoenaed, is enough. State 
 son v. Chambers, 94 Mich. 471. v. Horner (Del., 1893), 26 Atl. Rep. 73.
 
 § 281a.] ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES. 415 
 
 that the attempt is unsuccessful, 1 or that the obstructor re- 
 frains from the employment of violence and confines himself 
 wholly to threats or scurrilous language, 2 gets the witness 
 drunk, 3 or employs the machinery of the law to prevent the 
 attendance of the witness by preferring an unfounded charge 
 of crime against him, and, in collusion with a magistrate, pro- 
 cures bis imprisonment. 4 The witness himself may procure 
 the arrest of the party who has thus maliciously hindered his 
 attendance at court, 5 or the person who is guilty of the offense 
 of intimidating or obstructing the witness maj r be indicted by 
 the grand jury. 6 Intimidating a witness from testifying 
 against a felon, though a misdemeanor, does not, it is held, 
 constitute the offender an accessory to the felony; 7 nor is a 
 person punishable for intimidating or impeding a witness who 
 beats him after he has given his testimony. 8 The public pros- 
 ecuting attorney should not be allowed to endeavor, to dis- 
 suade the witnesses for the accused from appearing and testify- 
 ing, even though he may believe they are unreliable and will 
 perjure themselves. 9 
 
 § 281a. Changing venue for convenience of witnesses. — 
 In order to save the expenditure of large sums as mileage or 
 for the taking of depositions, it is very frequently provided 
 by statute that, where the convenience of the witnesses re- 
 quires it, the venue or place of trial of the action may be 
 changed. Thus, where all the transactions occurred in the 
 county to which it has been moved to change the venue, 10 or 
 where, though the transaction may have happened elsewhere, 
 
 1 Gandy v. State, 23 Neb. 436 ; ity of the evidence of the witness 
 State v. Carpenter, 20 Vt. 9. (Com. v. Reynolds, 14 Gray, 87); or 
 
 2 Rex v. Onslow, 12 Cox, 356; the particular method used to in- 
 Charlton's Case, 2 My. & Cr. 316; timidate him (State v. Ames, 64 Me. 
 Littler v. Thompson, 2 Beav. 129. 386), should be set forth in the in- 
 state v. Holt, 84 Me. 509. dictment. See, also, Perrow v. State, 
 * United States v. Kindred, 4 67 Miss. 365 ; State v. Bailer, 26 W. 
 
 Hughes (U. S.), 493; State v. Buck, Va. 90. 
 
 62 N. H. 670 (witness arrested in civil 7 Reg. v. Chappie, 9 C. & P. 355. 
 
 case). 8 United States v. Thomas, 47 Fed. 
 
 5 Magnay v. Burt, 5 Q. B. 394. Rep. 807. Cf. United States v. Kee, 
 
 6 It is not necessary that the record 39 Fed. Rep. 603. 
 
 of the case in which the witness was 9 Gandy v. State, 23 Neb. 436; 40 
 
 summoned (State v. Carpenter, 20 N. W. Rep. 303. 
 
 Vt. 9); or the fact of the material- 10 Smith v. Mack, 24 N. Y. S. 131.
 
 416 
 
 ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES. 
 
 [§•282. 
 
 all or a large majority of the material witnesses reside in that 
 jurisdiction, the motion to change the venue should be granted. 1 
 But the rule is that no change of venue can be had in criminal 
 trials for the convenience of witnesses, 2 and in civil cases, if 
 the adverse party will sign a stipulation admitting what the 
 witnesses will prove, the motion for a change of venue for 
 their convenience may be refused. 3 
 
 § 282. Failure of witnesses to attend — Continuance, when 
 granted. — The parties should employ and exhaust every avail- 
 able means to procure the attendance of their witnesses, and 
 should be given every facility by the court for this purpose, 
 together with any reasonable and necessary amount of dela}^. 
 If, however, a party wholly neglects to summon a witness,.or 
 if, having subpoenaed him, counsel voluntarily goes to trial or 
 fails to ask for a continuance in case the witness does not ap- 
 pear, the party cannot be heard to complain because the court 
 orders the trial to proceed. 4 
 
 The granting: of a continuance because of the absence of a 
 witness is largely, if not wholly, 5 a matter of discretion for 
 
 i Thompson v. Brandt (Cal., 1893), 
 32 Pac. Rep. 890; Ringgenburg v. 
 Hartman, 102 Ind. 537; Nelson v. 
 Nelson, G6 Hun, 633 : Porter v. Lyle, 
 id. 629; Cordas v. Morrison, 23 N. Y. 
 S. 1076; Thurfjell v. Witherbee, 24 
 id. 278; Dunn v. Lewis, 65 Hun, 
 620; Thompson v. Norwood, 64 id. 
 636; Perry v. Boomhauer, 17 N. Y. 
 S. 890; 63 Hun, 629; Daley v. Hell- 
 man, 62 Hun, 620 ; Kurz v. Fish, 58 
 id. 602. 
 
 2 People v. Harris, 4 Den. (N. Y.) 
 150. 
 
 3 Wright v. Burritt, 63 Hun, 628. 
 < Pease v. State (Ga., 1893), 16 
 
 S. E. Rep. 113; Carllo v. State (Tex., 
 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 147; Crew v. 
 State (Tex., 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 
 973; Clay v. State (Tex., 1893), 22 
 S. W. Rep. 973; Dale v. State, 88 
 Ga. 552; Spahn v. People, 117 111. 
 538; Johnson v. State, 85 Ga. 561; 
 State v. Underwood, 44 La. Ann. 
 1114. A continuance is properly re- 
 
 fused where a party admits as evi- 
 dence the statement of facts in his 
 adversary's application for the con- 
 tinuance showing what the absent 
 witness was expected to prove. San- 
 ford v. Gates, 38 Kan. 405 ; Woolsey 
 v. Jones, 84 Ala. 88; Chicago, etc. 
 Co. v. Duffin (111., 1888), 18 N. E. 
 Rep. 279. If the absence of the wit- 
 ness was anticipated, and particu- 
 larly if prior to his departure his 
 deposition could have been readily 
 obtained, a continuance should be 
 refused because of his absence. Valle 
 v. Picton, 91 Mo. 207 ; 3 S. W. Rep. 
 860. 
 
 5 Winklemeier v. Daber, 52 N. W. 
 Rep. 1036; 92 Mich. 621; White v. 
 Portland (Conn., 1893), 26 Atl. Rep. 
 342; Guy v. Metcalf, 83 Tex. 37; 
 McQueen v. People's Nat. Bank, 111 
 N. C. 509; Richmond R. & E. Co. 
 v. Dick, 8 U. S. App. 99; 52 Fed. 
 Rep. 379; Valle v. Picton, 91 Mo. 
 207; 3 S. W. Rep. 860; McKinsey
 
 § 282.] 
 
 ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES. 
 
 417 
 
 the court, and, unless the evidence of the witness is material, a 
 refusal to allow a continuance is not ground for a new trial. 1 
 Not only must the materiality of the evidence of the absent 
 witness be shown, but the party should also show that he has 
 been served with a subpoena, or, if he cannot be found, that a 
 diligent search has been made for him. 2 If the witness is con- 
 fined to his house by illness or is absent from the jurisdiction, 
 that fact must appear, and usually it must also be shown that 
 his illness is so severe as to prevent h!s deposition from being 
 obtained. 3 The party must also show that no other witnesses 
 are known to him by which he could prove what he expects 
 to prove by the absent witness. 4 So a continuance should be 
 refused where the witness is a convict whose disabilities have 
 never been removed, 5 where it appears that his evidence would 
 be irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible, 6 or where he is a per- 
 son having; onlv a transient abode, without social or business 
 ties in the jurisdiction, and the party knows nothing of his 
 whereabouts or of the possibility of obtaining his future at- 
 tendance. 7 But where the materiality of the evidence is 
 shown, the absence of the witness satisfactorily accounted for, 
 
 v. McKee, 109 Ind. 209. Plaintiff 
 sued to recover the value of two 
 horses. Defendant moving for a 
 continuance because of the absence 
 of a witness, plaintiff agreed to dis- 
 miss the suit as to the horse regard- 
 ing which the witness was to testify. 
 A continuance was properly refused. 
 Herd v. Herd, 71 Iowa, 497. 
 
 i Barbour v. Melendy, 88 Va. 595 ; 
 Central R. Co. v. Curtis, 87 Ga. 416: 
 Cox v. Hart, 145 U. S. 376; Ala- 
 bama, etc. Co. v. Hill, 93 Ala. 514; 
 Davis, etc. Co. v. Riverside Co. 
 (Wis., 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 506; 
 Stone v. Railroad Co. (S. D., 1893), 
 53 N. W. Rep. 189; Hodges v. Nash, 
 43 111. App. 638. 
 
 2 Clouston v. Gray, 48 Kan. 31. An 
 allegation of diligence in the search 
 is not sufficient. The question of 
 diligence is for the court, and the 
 facts constituting it must be shown 
 in detail by the affidavit of the party. 
 27 
 
 Struthers v. Fuller, 45 Kan. 735; 
 Doll v. Mundine, 84 Tex. 315; Kilmer 
 v. St. Louis, Ft. S. & W. R. Co., 37 
 Kan. 84; 14 P,.c. Rep. 465. 
 
 3 Marmet v. Archibald, 37 W. Va. 
 778; Murphy v. State (Tex., 1893), 21 
 S. W. Rep. 45; Texas, etc. Co. v. 
 Hall, 83 Tex. 675; St. Louis, etc. Co. 
 v. Olive, 40 111. App. 82; German 
 Ins. Co. v. Penrod, 35 Neb. 273 ; Doll 
 v. Mundine, 84 Tex. 315. 
 
 4 Davis, etc. Co. v. Riverside Co. 
 (Wis., 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 506; 
 Hodges v. Nash, supra; Toledo, etc. 
 Co. v. Stevenson, 131 Ind. 203; 
 Trevelyan, Adm'r, v. Lofft, 83 Va. 
 141. 
 
 s Tillman v. Fletcher, 78 Tex. 673. 
 
 6 Longnecker v. Shields (Colo., 
 1892), 28 Pac. Rep. 659. 
 
 - Carberry v. Warrell, 68 Miss. 573; 
 Mantonya v. Hierter, 35 111. App. 
 27; Watson v. Blymer Manufg. Co., 
 2 S. W. Rep. 353 ; 66 Tex. 558.
 
 418 
 
 ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES. 
 
 [§ 283. 
 
 and a proper guaranty given that his testimony will be forth- 
 coming at the next term, a refusal to grant a continuance has 
 been held to be reversible error. 1 
 
 § 283. Continuance in criminal trials. — In criminal as in 
 civil causes the power to grant a continuance because of the 
 absence of a witness is, in the absence of statute prescribing 
 when one must be granted, a matter of discretion. 2 As a rule 
 the courts are disposed to exercise this discretion liberally in 
 favor of life and liberty; and where the competency of the 
 absent witness and the materiality and probable truth of his 
 testimony are shown prima facie by affidavits by the accused, 
 the courts have gone very far in sustaining his right to have 
 a continuance granted. 3 But if the evidence which the absent 
 witness is expected to give is very remote or immaterial, 4 
 or is merely cumulative in its character, 5 the continuance 
 should be refused. If from the evidence already received 
 it appears that the absent witness has no knowledge of the 
 matter in issue, 6 or if the court has sufficient reason for 
 believing that certain facts which the absent witness is ex- 
 pected to controvert are alread}^ so far sustained by a prepon- 
 derance of the evidence that his testimony bearing thereon 
 
 1 Gonring v. Railroad Co., 78 Wis. 
 16; Johnson v. Mills, 31 Neb. 524; 
 Cook v. Larson, 47 Kan. 70. 
 
 2 Brown v. State, 1 Pickle (Tenn.), 
 439; State v. Wise, 33 S. C. 382; 
 Jackson v. State, 54 Ark. 243; 
 Walker v. State, 91 Ala. 76; Wool- 
 folk v. State, 85 Ga. 69 ; Thompson 
 r. Com., 88 Va. 45; Price v. People, 
 131 111. 223; Hardesty v. Com., 88 
 Ky. 587; Walkup v. Com. (Ky., 
 189)), 20 S. W. Rep. 221. 
 
 3 Bovvlin v. Com. (Ky., 1893), 22 S. 
 W. Rep. 543; Givens v. State (Tex., 
 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 44; Tankersley 
 v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. App. 595; State 
 v. Lund, 49 Kan. 580; Harrington 
 v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 577; 
 Hyden v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 401 ; Price v. People, 131 111. 223 ; 
 Pyburn v. State, 84 Ga. 193; Mc- 
 Adam v. State, 5 S. W. Rep. 826; 24 
 
 Tex. App. 80; Sutton v. People, 119 
 111. 250. 
 
 * Goldsmith v. State (Tex., 1893), 
 22 S. W. Rep. 405 ; Dow v. State, 31 
 Tex. Cr. Rep. 278; Knowles v. State, 
 31 id. 383; State v. Falconer, 70 
 Iowa, 418; State v. Spillman, 43 La. 
 Ann. 1001 ; State v. Turlington, 102 
 Mo. 642; Hyburn v. State, 26 Tex. 
 App. 668; Crumpton v. United 
 States, 138 U. S. 361. 
 
 5 Attaway v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 
 Rep. 475; McKinney v. State, 3 
 Wyo. 719; Smith v. Com. (Ky., 
 1892), 17 S. W. Rep. 68 ; Gonzales v. 
 State, 30 Tex. App. 203; Wilkerson 
 v. Com. , 88 Ky. 29. 
 
 6 Griffin v. State (Tex., 1893), 20 S. 
 W. Rep. 552 ;. Jones v. State, 31 Tex. 
 Cr. Rep. 177; Norris v. State (Tex., 
 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 592; Cliilds v. 
 State (Tex., 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 1039.
 
 281.] 
 
 ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES. 
 
 419 
 
 would probably be untrue, 1 it is not error for the court to re- 
 fuse a continuance. Where by consent and to avoid a contin- 
 uance a stipulation is entered into that an absent witness for 
 the accused will testify as alleged, the reputation of the witness 
 for veracity may be attacked by the state. 2 
 
 § 284. Non-attendance of witnesses — When a contempt of 
 court. — A witness who has been properly summoned is guilty 
 of a contempt of court if he intentionally fails or refuses to 
 attend ; 3 and the court ma}% if his contempt is very mani- 
 fest, grant an ex parte and immediate order for his arrest, 
 though usually an attachment will issue only after the grant- 
 ing and return of a preliminary order to show cause. 4 Nor is 
 it essential that the trial should have begun or the witness 
 have been called in open court before an attachment will issue 
 to procure his presence if clear proof is offered that he is wil-, 
 fully disobedient to the court in thus absenting himself. 5 The 
 party should move promptly for an attachment to bring the 
 witness in person before the court, founding his application 
 
 i Brown v. State (Tex., 1893), 22 S. 
 W. Rep. 596; Robbins v. State (Tex., 
 1893), 20 S. W. Rep. 358 ; Harvey v. 
 State, 21 Tex. App. 178. 
 
 2 Johnson v. Com. (Ky., 1894), 23 
 S. W. Rep. 507. The affidavit for a 
 continuance must show specifically 
 the facts to which the witness will 
 testify, their connection with and 
 relevancy to the subject-matter 
 (Long v. People, 135 111. 535; State 
 v. Manceaux, 42 La. Ann. 1164; 
 Carthaus v. State, 78 Wis. 540 ; Hol- 
 land v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. Rep. 345); 
 that the witness has a knowledge of 
 such facts (Long v. People, 34 111. 
 App. 481 ; Benge v. Com. (Ky., 1892), 
 17 S. W. Rep. 146) ; that the affiant 
 believes the evidence of the witness 
 is true (State v. Dusenberry, 112 Mo. 
 277; North v. People, 139 111. 81); 
 that he also believes that his testi- 
 mony can be procured in time, stat- 
 ing the grounds for such belief (State 
 v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729 ; Skates 
 v. State, 64 Miss. 644; Faulkner v. 
 
 Territory (N. M., 1893), 30 Pac. Rep. 
 905; State v. Aired (Mo., 1893), 22 S. 
 W. Rep. 363); and that proper dili- 
 gence has been employed to pro- 
 cure the attendance of the witness. 
 Haverstick v. State (Ind., 1893), 32 
 N. E. Rep. 785; Vogt v. Com. (Ky., 
 1892), 17 S. W. Rep. 213. See post, 
 §§ 355-358, as to the form and lan- 
 guage of affidavits generally. 
 
 3 In re Gunn, 50 Kan. 155 ; People 
 v. Brown, 46 Hun, 320. 
 
 4 The power to grant an attach- 
 ment is discretionary (Dowden v. 
 Junker, 48 N. J. Eq. 584 ; State v. 
 Hillstock (La., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 352; 
 Bradley v. Fertilizer Co. (N, C, 1893), 
 17 S. E. Rep. 69), though the matter 
 is usually regulated by statute. 
 People v. Barrett, 56 Hun, 351. 
 
 5 Wilson v. State, 57 Ind. 71 ; Brad- 
 ley v. Fertilizer Co. (N. C, 1893), 17 
 S. E. Rep. 69 (examination of de- 
 fendant before trial). Cf. Robsen v. 
 State, 83 Ga. 166; 9 S. E. Rep. 610.
 
 420 ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES. [§ 285. 
 
 upon affidavits showing a prompt, seasonable and personal 
 service of the subpoena and the payment or tender of the 
 proper fees; for a writ of attachment for contempt is an ex- 
 traordinary remedy, wholly in the discretion of the court, and 
 it should only issue upon clear and convincing evidence that its 
 issuance is needed, 1 and that the evidence of the witness is ma- 
 terial, 2 though the immateriality of his evidence will be no de- 
 fense for a witness who distinctly refuses to obey a subpoena. 3 
 A witness who has received early notice to attend court 
 will be in contempt if, believing he has sufficient time, he 
 postpones compliance with the subpoena until the case is on 
 trial. 4 A magistrate who by the laws of the forum possesses 
 the power to punish for contempt may, where he is requested 
 by letters rogatory to take a deposition, commit a witness for 
 contempt if the latter fails to obey his summons or if he re- 
 fuses to be sworn or to answer any proper questions. 5 
 
 § 285. Privilege of witnesses from service of civil pro- 
 cess. — -A witness whose residence is beyond the jurisdiction 
 of the court is privileged from the service of a summons or 
 other civil process under the same conditions as to time and 
 place, and for the same reasons, as he is exempt from civil 
 arrest while voluntarily attending court. 6 The defect in the 
 service of a writ, caused by the privilege or exemption of the 
 
 i Garden v. Creswell, 2 M. & W. Wilder, 40 Ohio St. 130; Sherman 
 
 319; State v. Trounce, 5 Wash. St.. v. Gundlach, 37 Minn. 118; In re 
 
 804 ; People v. Van Tassell, 64 Hun, Healey, 53 Vt. 694 ; Bolgiano v. Lock 
 
 444; Wyatt v. People, 17 Colo. 252. Co., 73 Md. 132; Finch v. Galli- 
 
 2Corbett v. Gibson, 16 Blatchf. C. gher, 25 Abb. N. C. 401; Palmer v. 
 
 C. 334; Dicasv. Lawson, 1 Cr., M. & Rowan, 21 Neb. 452; Mulhearn v. 
 
 R. 934. Press Pub. Co., 53 N. J. L. 153; Mas- 
 
 : > Chapman v. Davis, 3 M. & G. sey v. Colville, 45 N. J. L. 119; Wil- 
 
 G09; Scholes v. Hilton, 10 M. & W. son v. Donaldson, 117 Ind. 356; Pope 
 
 16. v. Negus, 14 Civ. Pro. Rep. 406; 
 
 4 Jackson v. Seager, 2 D. & L. 13. Marks v. Societie, 22 id. 201; Shee- 
 Cf. Reg. v. Sloman, 1 Dowl. 618. han v. Bradford, etc. Co., 15 id. 429. 
 
 5 Burnham v. Stevens, 33 N. H, This exemption is limited to the 
 247. jurisdiction in which the witness 
 
 6 See § 286; Hollander v. Hall, 58 testifies. So a resident of Vermont 
 Hun, 604 ; Christian v. Williams, 35 may be served with civil process in 
 Mo. App. 297 ; First Nat. Bank v. Massachusetts while passing through 
 Doty, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 287 ; Thorp v. that state to testify in a Connecticut 
 Adams, 53 Hun, 603 ; Mitchell v. court. Holyoke, etc. Co. v. Ambden, 
 Judge, 53 Mich. 541;Compton v. 55 Fed. Rep. 593.
 
 § 2S6.J ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES. 421 
 
 person served, not appearing on the record, the service cannot 
 be set aside on motion merely. The privilege of a witness is 
 a defense which must be pleaded in abatement, and the issue 
 of fact, if any, arising thereon is for the jury. 1 
 
 § 280. Privilege of witnesses from civil arrest. — Wit- 
 nesses are protected from arrest under civil process during the 
 time they are proceeding to, remaining at or returning from 
 court, 2 or a place where a legislative or congressional investiga- 
 tion committee is in session. 3 ISTon-resident witnesses, in order 
 to encourage their voluntary attendance, and because they can- 
 not be summoned by subpoena, will be privileged though they 
 may come into the state voluntarily; 4 but the rule is other- 
 wise in the case of a witness residing in the jurisdiction at- 
 tending voluntarily without a subpoena. 5 The witness waives 
 his privilege by voluntarily submitting to arrest or by failing 
 to assert it and to claim his liberty at his earliest opportunity. 6 
 He cannot then claim that his privilege has been violated. 7 
 The court in which the witness is called to testify will, in the 
 case of his illegal arrest, order his immediate discharge upon 
 motion, 8 though in the case of inferior courts the witness may 
 be under the necessity of employing the writ of habeas corpus? 
 The trial in which he was to testify will be continued until 
 his discharge. 10 
 
 i Greer v. Young, 120 111. 184. L.) 517; Hardenbrook's Case, 8 Abb. 
 
 2 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 316 ; Meekins Pr. (N. Y.) 416 ; McNeil's Case, supra. 
 v. Smith, 1 H. Bl. 636; Ballinger v. 6 AVoods v. Davis, 34 N. H. 328; 
 Elliott, 72 N. C. 596; Randall v. Gur- Smith v. Jones, 76 Me. 138; Hess v. 
 ney, 3 B. & A. 252; Huntington v. Morgan. 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 84. 
 Schultz, Harp. (S. C.) 452; Hopkins 7 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 317; Brown 
 v. Coburn, 1 Wend. (N. Y.)292; May v. Getchell, 11 Mass. 11, 14; Steven- 
 v. Shumway, 16 Gray, 86 ; Ex parte son v. Smith, 28 N. H. 12 ; Dow v. 
 Temple, 2 Ves. & B. 391, 395; Sand- Smith, 7 Vt. 465. 
 
 ford v. Chase, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 381. 8 Moore v. Green, 73 N. C. 394; 
 
 3 Thompson's Case, 122 Mass. 248. Cooley's Const. Lim., p. 163. 
 
 « Person v. Grier, C6 N. Y. 124; » Smith v. Jones, 76 Me. 138. 
 
 Norris v. Beach, 2 Johns. 294; May 10 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 318, citing 
 
 v. Shumway, 16 Gray, 88; Dixon v. Sanford v. Chase, 3 Cowen, 381 ; Bell 
 
 Ely, 4 Edw. (N. Y.)557; Ballinger v. v. State, 4 Gill, 301; Hunt's Case, 4 
 
 Elliott, 72 N. C. 596; Jones v. Knaus, Dall. 387; Com. v. Daniel, 4 Pa. L. 
 
 31 N. J. Eq. 211. J. R. 49; United States v. Edme, 9 
 
 5 Rogers v. Bullock, 2 Pen. (3 N. J. S. & R. (Pa.) 147; Crocker v. Dun- 
 
 cin, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 278.
 
 422 ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES. [§ 287. 
 
 § 287. Duratiou of the privilege from arrest.— The wit- 
 ness is privileged not only on his journey to and from court, 
 but during his detention in the place where the court is sit- 
 ting, if the sole reason of his stay is his purpose to testify. 1 
 The rule allows a reasonable time for the journey but does 
 not countenance loitering, 2 though a slight deviation to par- 
 take of food, 3 to see one's friends 4 or to obtain papers which 
 are to be used as evidence at the trial, 5 will not nullify the priv- 
 ilege from arrest. If the witness, after testifying, before re- 
 turning home proceeds to transact business which is wholly 
 unconnected with, his functions as a witness, his privilege 
 ceases. 6 A witness in attendance is privileged while at his 
 lodgings 7 or during a temporary adjournment of the court, 8 
 though his inability to start for his home after the trial is 
 over because of his lack of means will not extend his privilege. 9 
 An officer, unless he is informed thereof, is not bound to know 
 that a person whom he arrests is privileged as a witness; 10 and 
 it seems that no action for false imprisonment can be main- 
 tained against an officer making or a person procuring the 
 arrest under such circumstances. 11 An arrest made after the 
 termination of the privilege is not illegal because it is based 
 on process which had issued and on which the witness had 
 been once illegally arrested while the privilege existed. 12 
 
 i Perse v. Perse, 5 H. L. Cas. 671; 429; Gibbs v. Pbillipson, 1 R. & 
 
 Gibbs v. Pbillipson, 1 Russ. & My. My. 19. 
 
 19; Ex parte Hurst, 1 Wasb. C. C. 8 Ex pai . te Temple, 2 Ves. & B. 
 
 186. 391 ; Spencer v. Newton, 6 Ad. & E. 
 
 2 Chaffee v. Jones, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 623; Hatch v. Blisset, 2 Stra. 986. 
 
 260. 9 Spencer v. Newton, 6 Ad. & E. 
 
 »Mabon v. Mahon, 2 Irish Eq. 623. 
 
 440. 10 Cooley on Torts, p. 192 ; Secor v. 
 
 4 Pitt v. Coomes, 5 B. & Ad. 1078; Bell, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 52; Sperry v. 
 
 I Attorney-General v. Skinner's Co., Willard, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 32; Wood 
 
 8 Sim. 377: Ex parte Clark, 2 Dea. v. Kinsman, 5 Vt. 588; Brown v. 
 
 & Cb. 99. Getchell, 11 Mass. 11. 
 
 5 Ricketts v. Gurney, 7 Price, 699. "Smith v. Jones, 76 Me. 138; 
 
 e Sbults v. Andrews, 54 How. Pr. Sperry v. Willard, supra; Vande- 
 
 (N. Y.)380; Heron v. Stokes, 6 Ir. velde v. Snellen, 1 Keb. 220; Chase 
 
 Eq. 125 ; Pitt v. Coomes, supra; Selby v. Fish, 16 Me. 132. 
 
 v. Hills, 8 Bing. 166: Jones v. Rose, 12 Humphrey v. Cumming, 5 Wend. 
 
 11 Jur. 379. (N. Y.) 90; Petrie v. Fitzgerald, 1 
 
 7Childerston v. Barrett, 11 East, Daly (N. Y.), 401.
 
 §§ 2S8, 289.] ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES. 423 
 
 § 288. Attendance of witnesses in custody.— The attend- 
 ance of a witness who is incarcerated in prison or who is in 
 the military or naval service may be procured by the service 
 of a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum on the prison 
 keeper or officer in whose immediate charge he is. 1 The ap- 
 plication for the writ should specify the nature of the suit in 
 which his attendance is needed, that the evidence of the wit- 
 ness is material, and that the witness is restrained from at- 
 tending court, together with the circumstances of the restraint 
 so far as they are known to the affiant. 2 As the general rules 
 governing the granting and the service and return' of this 
 writ are those which obtain in connection with the ordinary 
 writ of habeas corpus, no elaboration of them is necessary in 
 this connection. 3 
 
 § 289. Attendance of witnesses before legislative bodies. 
 As a rule the power to summon witnesses and to take testi- 
 mony is considered to be inherent in legislative bodies for all 
 purposes within the scope of the constitutional powers pos- 
 sessed bj those bodies, and the refusal or neglect of a witness 
 to appear or to answer proper questions is a contempt for 
 which he may be arrested and imprisoned. 4 The power of 
 the federal congress to commit for contempt should be strictly 
 confined within the constitutional functions of that body. 
 Neither house is a court of justice, as was the English parlia- 
 ment originall3 r , but either house may exert certain powers 
 under the constitution; as, for example, it may decide con- 
 tested elections and the qualifications of its members or may 
 impeach certain public officials. If then congress exceeds 
 these powers and summons a witness to testify to a matter 
 which is exclusively for judicial investigation, it has no power 
 to commit for contempt of its process if the witness refuse to 
 answer questions. 5 
 
 1 Ex parte Marmaduke, 91 Mo. 228, 5 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 105 U. S. 
 
 251. 108, 181-205. See, also, In re Pac. 
 
 21 Greenl. on Ev., § 312. R. R. Coin., 32 Fed. Rep. 251-253; 
 
 3 See Church on Habeas Corpus. Ex parte Dalton, 44 Ohio St. 150. 
 
 4 1 Kent, 236, 237; 2 Story, Const., As to the power of a city council to 
 
 §§ 305-317; In re Gunn, 50 Kan. 125 ; commit a witness for contempt, see 
 
 Burnham v. Morrissey, 14 Gray, 226 ; Whitcomb's Case, 120 Mass. 123. 
 Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204; 
 Yards' Case, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 41.
 
 CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 
 
 § 300. 
 
 Classes of persons incompe- 
 tent. 
 
 § 310. 
 
 301. 
 
 Parties as witnesses at com- 
 mon law. 
 
 811. 
 
 302. 
 
 Testimony of party admissi- 
 
 
 
 ble when his connection 
 
 312. 
 
 
 with action no longer ex- 
 
 
 
 ists. 
 
 313. 
 
 303. 
 
 What constitutes interest in 
 
 
 
 the event. 
 
 314. 
 
 304. 
 
 Exceptions to the common- 
 law rule — The answer as 
 
 
 
 evidence for the defendant 
 
 315. 
 
 
 in equity. 
 
 
 305. 
 
 Competency of parties as wit- 
 nesses in equity — The em- 
 
 316. 
 
 
 ployment and effect of a 
 
 317. 
 
 
 bill of discovery. 
 
 
 306. 
 
 Defendant in criminal trial — 
 
 318. 
 
 
 His competency as a wit- 
 
 319. 
 
 
 ness. 
 
 320. 
 
 307. 
 
 Statutory competency of par- 
 ties as witnesses. 
 
 
 308. 
 
 Incompetency of interested 
 
 
 
 persons to testify as to 
 
 321. 
 
 
 transactions with deceased 
 
 
 
 or insane persons. 
 
 
 309. 
 
 What are transactions with 
 
 322. 
 
 
 decedents. 
 
 323. 
 324. 
 
 Persons interested — Their 
 statutory incompetency. 
 
 Incompetency of parties to 
 negotiable instruments to 
 impeach them. 
 
 Competency of counsel as wit- 
 nesses. 
 
 Competency of judges as wit- 
 nesses. 
 
 Competency of arbitrators as 
 witnesses in an action on 
 the award. 
 
 Definition and form of oath 
 and affirmation. 
 
 Incompetency because of a 
 lack of religious belief. 
 
 Incompetency of insane per- 
 sons as witnesses. 
 
 Deaf mutes as witnesses. 
 
 Children as witnesses. 
 
 Witnesses rendered incompe- 
 tent by conviction of in- 
 famous crimes — The effect 
 of pardon. 
 
 Statutory regulation of the 
 competency of witnesses 
 convicted of crime. 
 
 Statutes construed. 
 
 Accomplices. 
 
 Corroboration of accomplices. 
 
 § 300. Classification of persons incompetent as witnesses. 
 
 The common law, proceeding upon the theory that the preven- 
 tion of perjury was of paramount importance to the possible 
 ascertainment of truth, rejected absolutely certain classes of 
 persons as witnesses. Thus, the parties to the suit and all 
 other persons who had any pecuniary interest in the litiga- 
 tion; such persons as from a deficiency or peculiarity of re-
 
 § 300.] COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 425 
 
 ligious belief were presumed to be regardless of the sanctity 
 of an oath, and persons of imperfect mental powers, as luna- 
 tics, children and idiots, were incompetent as witnesses. It is 
 clear that by rejecting the testimony of the parties and of 
 persons interested in the event of the suit two most valuable 
 sources of information were lost. Those who have a direct 
 and actual pecuniary interest in a transaction, or who are 
 connected by ties of relationship or interest with the parties 
 to it, are most likely to be best informed, not only as to the 
 main transaction, but as to its most trivial details. It was 
 considered, however, that a grave danger existed that inter- 
 ested persons would perjure themselves if allowed to testify 
 as witnesses, and to obviate the danger of such corrupting in- 
 fluences altogether they were absolutely excluded from the 
 witness stand. That interested persons when summoned as 
 witnesses would always commit perjury was not the basis of 
 their rejection. But the very great probability and even cer- 
 tainty that some would or might do so were considered suffi- 
 cient to incapacitate them as a class from testifying. 
 
 The arbitrary character of this common-law rule rendering 
 the parties and persons interested incompetent as witnesses 
 was recognized even by those authorities and cases in which 
 it was formulated. It was clearly seen that interest, like bias, 
 is only valid as an objection to a witness when it is urged in 
 connection with the credibilit} 7 of his testimony, and it was 
 admitted that it was absurd to permit a witness to testify, no 
 matter how friendl} 7 or hostile he might be towards the party 
 who called him, while, at the same time, excluding the testi- 
 mony of other witnesses equally well and perhaps better in- 
 formed because it happened that they had a slight pecuniary 
 interest in the result of the suit. The early writers do not at- 
 tempt to justify the rule on logical grounds, but, with the con- 
 servatism of the common law, they merely point out that the 
 rule being firmly settled from early times ought, in order to 
 obtain stability and certainty in the law, to be very strictly 
 adhered to, and that to abrogate it would certainly open the 
 door to a vast amount of perjury on the part of the majority 
 of interested witnesses. In the quaint language of Baron 
 Gilbert, 1 the rule was designed " to preserve infirmity from a 
 
 1 1 Gilb. Ev., §§ 220, 224.
 
 426 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. [§ 301. 
 
 snare and integrity from suspicion." Modern statutory legis- 
 lation, while full}'' recognizing the element of interest as it 
 affects the credibility of testimony, has swept away this arbi- 
 trary exclusion of parties and interested persons as witnesses. 
 While it is possible that perjury in court has been sensibly 
 increased by these enactments, it is very clear, on the other 
 hand, that the avenues and means for the ascertainment of 
 truth in judicial proceedings have been wonderfully widened 
 and augmented thereby. 
 
 § 301. Parties incompetent as witnesses at common law. 
 Though the common-law rule that a party to the record is 
 not competent as a witness in his own behalf has been abol- 
 ished in this country, it may be useful to consider some of the 
 cases in which it was employed at common law, as the ele- 
 ment of interest is still an objection to the competency of a 
 witness in certain cases where he is called upon to testify 
 against the representatives of a deceased person. Neither a 
 real nor a nominal part}^ to an action could at common law 
 be compelled by his adversary to testify against himself, 1 so 
 that where a party desired to interrogate his opponent he had 
 to resort to the expensive and cumbrous equitable proceed- 
 ing of a bill of discovery. 2 As the admissions of a party 
 have always been admissible against him, he might, at com- 
 mon law, consent to testify voluntarily for his adversary, 
 though it seems that where several persons were joined as co- 
 plaintiffs none of them could, where the interest of all was 
 joint and not several merely, testify in behalf of the defend- 
 ant, unless with the consent of those who were associated as 
 plaintiffs with him. 3 
 
 In respect to the competency of members of a private cor- 
 poration as witnesses in suits to which the latter is a party, a 
 distinction was made at common law between business or 
 trading corporations and those incorporated solely for relig- 
 ious or charitable purposes. In the case of business corpora- 
 tions the vested pecuniary interest of the member or stock- 
 holder was considered sufficient to render him incompetent to 
 
 1 Rex v. Woburn, 10 East, 395. mere nominal party could not con- 
 
 2 See post, % 305. sent to testify for his opponent witb- 
 
 3 Scott v. Lloyd, 12 Pet. 149; 1 out the consent of the real party. 
 Greenl. on Ev., §§ 353, 354. So a Frear v. Evertson, 20 Johns. 142.
 
 § 302.] COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 427 
 
 testify for or against the corporation. 1 The members of char- 
 itable corporations, on the other hand, were competent wit- 
 nesses in any action in which the latter was a party. 2 
 
 At common law an inhabitant of a public municipal or 
 ^wasi-municipal corporation was incompetent (because of in- 
 terest) as a witness in any action to which the corporation was 
 a party. 3 But the interest which the residents of a municipal 
 or public corporation have as such in the determination of the 
 action is so extremely small and contingent, and the necessity 
 for their testimony to prevent a miscarriage of justice is so 
 urgent, that this rule was often relaxed. It is now abrogated 
 expressly or by implication both in England and in the United 
 States. So, generally, the shareholders in a private corpora- 
 tion are now competent as witnesses for or against the corpo- 
 ration. 
 
 § 302. Testimony of party admissible when his connec- 
 tion with action no longer exists. — At common law one of 
 several defendants or plaintiffs jointly sued became a compe- 
 tent witness for the others immediately upon the severance 
 of his connection with them as litigants. In civil proceedings 
 a distinction was made at common law between actions ex 
 contractu and those which are ex delicto, so far as the compe- 
 tenc} 7 of a party as a witness is concerned, where his connection 
 with the litigation no longer existed. In an action on a joint 
 contract a defendant against whom judgment had been taken 
 by default was not allowed to testify on the trial, for the reason 
 that the value of such a judgment would of course depend 
 upon the ultimate decision of the action for or agaiust his 
 joint obligors. 4 But this rule is not universal. There are many 
 decisions which sustain the proposition that at common law 
 a party whom it is alleged is interested jointly with others in 
 , the subject-matter of the contract which is sued on could 
 testify as a witness for or against his alleged associates imme- 
 
 1 City Council v. King, 4 McCord, Bloodgood v. James, 12 Johns. 285, 
 
 487; Foundry v. Hovey, 21 Pick, and cases cited in 1 Greenl. on Ev., 
 
 453. § 331. 
 
 2 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 333 and cases 4 Thornton v. Blaisdell, 37 Me. 190; 
 
 cited. Mills v. Lee, 4 Hill, 549; Scherruer- 
 
 'Odiorne v. Wade, 8 Pick. 518; horn v. Schermerhorn, 1 Wend. 119; 
 
 Rex v. London, 2 Lev. 231. Cf. 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 355.
 
 428 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. [§ 303. 
 
 diately upon his ceasing by his default to be a party to the 
 record, 1 or by a nolle prosequi entered as to him upon his plea 
 of infancy, mental incapacity to contract, release or other 
 matter which will result in his discharge from liability. 2 
 
 A joint defendant in an action of tort becomes at common 
 law a competent witness for either party where a judgment 
 is taken against him by default, upon the ground that, though 
 jointly sued, there can be no contribution among wrong-doers, 
 and that his liability being ascertained he is no longer an in- 
 terested party. 3 
 
 § 303. What constitutes an interest in the event. — By the 
 rules of the common law persons interested in the event of 
 the action were, with the parties themselves, incompetent as 
 witnesses to testify therein, their incompetency being based 
 upon the extreme probability which was supposed to exist 
 that they would testify falsely. 4 The incompetency of inter- 
 ested persons has been almost universally abolished b} 1- stat- 
 ute, except that in certain cases all persons interested in the 
 event of the action are forbidden to testify to any transaction 
 they may have had with the other party to the action where 
 such party is deceased or insane. 5 The interest which will 
 disqualify a witness at common law must be a legal, substan- 
 tial, present, vested and ex parte interest. Its amount is not 
 material. Because of the difficulty of ascertaining how much 
 the witness would be influenced by his interest, the law recog- 
 nizes no gradations but excludes the evidence of all interested 
 persons, however small their interest may be. The mere be- 
 lief or expectation of the witness that he may gain or lose 
 by the result of the trial, or that he is morally bound to reim- 
 burse the losing party, or his inclination from friendship or 
 relationship towards the party, will not render him incom- 
 petent. 6 So the witness will be disqualified only where he 
 
 1 Berry v. Stevens, 71 Me. 503; who has suffered judgment by de- 
 Manchester v. Moore, 19 N. II. 564. fault may influence the amount of 
 
 2 Blake v. Ladd, 10 N. H. 190; damages recoverable, it would seem 
 Minor v. Bank, 1 Pet. 74 ;1 Greenl. on to be incompetent at common law. 
 Ev., §£ 855-357. Thorpe v. Barber, 5 M., G. & S. 675. 
 
 3 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 357, citing * See ante. §300. 
 Ward v. Hayden, 2 Esp. 552; Had- '■> See §§ 308-310. 
 
 rick v. Heslop, 12 Jur. 000. In so 6 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 386. 
 far as the testimony of a defendant
 
 § 30i.] COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 429 
 
 is interested in the event or result of the particular action. 
 That the rule of law which is decided in the case in which he 
 testifies will render him liable in another action or under like 
 circumstances does not make him interested in the event un- 
 less the judgment in the earlier action will be evidence for or 
 against him in the later. 1 
 
 At common law a person is interested in the event where 
 he is legally bound to indemnify a party against the conse- 
 quences of a fact which is essential to the judgment. So, gen- 
 eral^, where the title to real or personal property is in issue, 
 or where the quality or wholesomeness of articles of food or 
 other merchandise is involved, the vendor or other person 
 who stands in the position of a guarantor to one of the par- 
 ties is interested in the event of the suit. 2 
 
 § 304. Exceptions to the common-law rule — The an- 
 swer as evidence for the defendant in equity. — The com- 
 mon-law rule by which a party was incompetent as a witness 
 in his own behalf was subject to some exceptions even prior 
 to its modification by statutory enactment. So where inde- 
 pendent proof is given that the adverse party wrongfully 
 intermeddled with or converted or negligently lost property 
 committed to him as bailee, the owner was permitted to tes- 
 tify to its condition and value, for from the necessity of 
 the case these facts are usually known to him alone. 3 So be- 
 cause of paramount necessit}' a party was allowed to testify 
 to the loss of a missing w r riting as a foundation for offering 
 secondary evidence of its contents, or he was permitted to 
 take a supplementary oath to the correctness of his entries in 
 his books of account in cases where, from the nature of 
 things, neither party could claim any knowledge but that 
 which was contained in the books. When, however, a party 
 was permitted at common law to testify to the loss of and the 
 search for a deed, independent evidence was always required 
 
 1 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 3S9, citing Steers v. Carwardine, 8 C. & P. 
 
 Stewart v. Kip, 5 Johns. 256; Bent 570; Biss v. Mountain, 1 M. & Rob. 
 
 v. Baker, 3 T. R. 27 ; Hoyt v. Wild- 302; Baxter v. Graham, 5 Watts, 
 
 fire, 3 Johns. 518; Evans v. Eaton, 7 418; Heennance v. Vernoy, 6 Johns. 
 
 Wheat. 350; Evans v. Hettich, 7 id. 5; Hale v. Smith, 6 Greenl. (Me.) 416. 
 453; Ovvings v. Speed, 5 id. 423; 3 Childrens v. Saxby, 1 Vern. 207; 
 
 .Jackson v. Nelson, 6 Cow. 248. 1 Greenl. on Ev., §§ 348-350; Snow 
 
 2 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 397, citing v. Railroad Co., 12 Met. 44.
 
 430 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. [§ 304. 
 
 to show that the deed had at one time existed. 1 So at com- 
 mon law the testimon}' of a party was competent to prove 
 all preliminary allegations not directly involved in the main 
 issue; as, for example, that a witness was deceased, or could 
 not be produced after a diligent search had been made. 2 
 
 The sworn answer of the respondent to a bill in equity 
 constituted another exception to the incompetency of a part} r 
 as a witness. Where his opponent had by such means pro- 
 cured evidence for his own use, and by implication thus ad- 
 mitlcd the veracity of the adverse party, it was considered 
 only Just that the party who was thus compelled to furnish 
 evidence against himself should receive the benefit of any- 
 thing which he may have said in his own behalf. 3 But, on the 
 other hand, the admissions of the defendant contained in his 
 answer are conclusive upon him. 4 It should be noted, how- 
 ever, that the replies to the interrogatories which are contained 
 in the answer do not constitute evidence for the defendant 
 where the answer is verified only on information and belief. 5 
 As the denials or replies of the respondent constitute evidence 
 for him in equity, it follows that for the plaintiff to overcome 
 their force the averments in the bill which are denied or not 
 expressly admitted 6 must be substantiated by the testimony 
 of two witnesses, or by that of one witness corroborated by 
 circumstances. 7 
 
 'Patterson v. Winn, 5 Pet. 240; v. Perry, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 600; 
 
 Poignard v. Smith, 8 Pick. 278; Hard}' v. Summers, 10 Gill & J. 
 
 Page v. Page, 15 id. 368. (Md.) 316. See § 14. 
 
 2 Forbes v. Wale, 1 W. Bl. 532; ^Langdell, Eq. PI., § 84; Home 
 
 Cook v. Remington, 6 Mod. 237. Ins. Co. v. Myers, 93 111. 271 ; Miller 
 
 »2 Story, § 1528; Patterson v. v. Payne, 4 Brad w. (111.) 112. 
 
 Scott (III, 1893), 31 N. E. Rep. 433 
 Nulton's Appeal, 103 Pa. St. 286 
 Johnson v. Crippen, 62 Miss. 597 
 Rick v. Neitzy, 1 Mackey (D. C), 21 
 Bird v. Styles, 18 N. J. Eq. 297 
 
 5 Allen v. O'Donnell, 28 Fed. Rep. 
 17; Berry v. Sawyer, 19 id. 286. 
 
 6 Cushman v. Bonfield, 36 111. App. 
 436; Peeler v. Lathrop, 48 Fed. Rep. 
 780. 
 
 Monroe Cattle Co. v. Becker, 147 7 " Unless the complainant have 
 U. S. 47; Slessinger v. Bucking- two witnesses, or one witness and 
 ham, 17 Fed. Rep. 454; Hartley v. corroborating circumstances, he will 
 Mathews (Ala., 1893), 11 S. Rep. 452; not be entitled to relief. The rea- 
 Lee v. Baldwin, 10 Ga. 208; Lyerly son is, by calling upon the respond- 
 v. Wheeler, 3 Ired. (N. C.) Eq. 599; ent to answer, the complainant ad- 
 Miles v. Miles, 32 N. H. 147; Jones mits that the answer will be evidence
 
 § 305.] COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 431 
 
 This rule requiring the plaintiff to overcome the answer of 
 the defendant in equity by a preponderance of witnesses is 
 not invoked where the answer is not sworn to by the respond- 
 ent, even though a verification has been waived by the plaint- 
 iff, 1 or when, because of the fact that the defendant is a cor- 
 poration, no sworn answer can be procured, 2 or in the case 
 of any replies or denials in the answer which are not respon- 
 sive to the interrogatories or to the allegations of the bill, 3 or 
 where the defendant on being permitted to testify orally con" 
 tradicts the statements in his sworn answer, 4 or where the 
 denial is simply a denial of a conclusion of law. 5 
 
 § 305. Competency of the parties as witnesses in equity — 
 The employment and effect of a bill of discovery. — Prior to 
 the enactment of the statutes regulating the competency of 
 parties as witnesses their testimony was receivable in equity 
 with a great deal more liberality than in the courts of common 
 law. The chancellor could, even if discovery was not required, 
 in the exercise of his discretion issue an order for the exam- 
 ination of the defendant upon the application of the plaintiff 
 and upon proof by affidavit that his evidence was material. 6 
 The usual course, however, was for the plaintiff, where he 
 wished to procure the evidence of one or more of the defend- 
 ants, to include in his bill a prayer that the defendants 
 should be required to make discovery, i. e., a disclosure upon 
 
 equal to the testimony of any other v. Linville, 10 Humph. 1G3; Bank v. 
 
 witness, so that he cannot prevail Gerry, 5 Pet. 99-112. 
 
 unless the balance of proof is in his 3 Patterson v. Gaines, 6 How. 550; 
 
 favor. To turn the scales he must Rudy v. Austin, 56 Ark. 73: At wood 
 
 at least have circumstances which v. Harrison, 5 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 
 
 corroborate such single adverse wit- 329; Lane v. Marshall, 65 Vt. 85; 
 
 ness." The court, in Tobey v. Leon- Sears v. Mason's Adm'r (Va., 1890), 
 
 ard, 2 Wall. 403. See, also, United 10 S. E. Rep. 529 ; Cloud v. Calhoun, 
 
 States v. Ferguson, 54 Fed. Rep. 28; 10 Rich. (S. C.) Eq. 358; Green v. 
 
 Meyer v. Gullinan, 105 111. 272 ; Brook Vardiman, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 324: 
 
 v. Silver, 5 Del. Ch. 7. Cartlege v. Cutliff , 29 Ga. 758 ; Fisher 
 
 Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, v. Porch, 10 N. J. Eq. 243; Ingersoll 
 
 15 S. E. Rep. 289; Pecke v. Hunter, v. Stiger, 46 id. 511; Coleman v. 
 
 86 Va. 768 ; Bartlett v. Gale, 4 Paige Ross, 46 Pa. St. 180. 
 
 (N. Y.) s 503 ; United States v. Work- 4 Morris v. \\ bite, 36 N. J. Eq. 324. 
 
 logman's Council, 54 Fed. Rep. 994. 5 Gaines v. Russ, 20 Fla. 157; Dei- 
 
 2Langdell, Eq. PL, g 78; McLard mel v. Brown, 136 111. 586. 
 
 6 Ashton v. Parker, 14 Sim. 632.
 
 432 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. [§ 305. 
 
 oath of the truth of the facts in the case so far as they knew 
 them. This pra} r er is usually inserted in every bill which is 
 properly framed, the specific term " bills of discovery " being- 
 reserved for those bills the sole object of which is to obtain 
 evidence by discovery which is to be employed in a proceed- 
 ing in a court of law. 1 Interrogatories supporting and relat- 
 ing to the principal and material allegations of the bill are 
 usually appended to it, and these, if they are consistent with 
 the averments in the bill, should be specifically and respon- 
 sively answered by the defendant. 2 The defendant, in case 
 he is desirous of avoiding discovery, must plead or demur to 
 the bill. If he elects to make discovery he should answer 
 with particularity and preciseness, 3 for, if he demur or plead, 
 the truth of all averments in the bill which are not expressly 
 traversed are taken as true pro confesso and the averments 
 are then admissible as evidence for the plaintiff. 4 The defend- 
 ant is not compellable to give discovery in any case where, if 
 he were a witness, he might claim to be privileged from an- 
 swering the question put to him; as, for example, where his 
 answer would tend to render him liable to a criminal prose- 
 cution or to punishment for crime, 5 or where the information 
 which is sought had been communicated to the defendant 
 while he was acting in a confidential capacity, as attorney, 
 physician or priest. 6 
 
 As an unsworn answer cannot be considered as evidence for 
 the defendant, and as the plaintiff is not required to overcome 
 
 1 2 Story's Eq., § 1489. Eq. PI., § 846 ; Hill v. Cravy, 7 Ark. 
 
 2 Mechanics' Bunk v. Lynn, 1 Pet. 530 ; Jones v. Wing, Harr. Ch. (Mich. ) 
 (U. S.) 376; Miller v. Saunders, 17 001. 
 
 Ga. 92; Mechanics' Bank v. Levy, 3 5 Langdell's Eq. PI., § 69; 1 Dan. 
 Paige (N. Y.), 606; Read v. Wood- Ch. PL & Pr., pp. 562,567; Butler v. 
 ruffe, 24 Beav. 421; Parkinson v. Catling, 1 Root (Conn.), 310; Wolf 
 Trousdale, 3 Scam. (111.) 307; War- v. Wolf, 2 Har. & G. (Md.) 382; 
 ing v. Suydam, 4 Edvv. (N. Y.) 302; Livingston v. Tompkins, 4 Johns. 
 Shotwell v. Struble, 21 N. J. Eq. 31 ; (N. Y.) Ch. 415; Leigh v. Everheart, 
 Brooks v. Byam, 1 Story, 290; Woo- 4 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 379; Northwest- 
 ten v. Burch, 2Md. Ch. 190; M. E. ern Bank v. Nelson, 1 Gratt. (Va.) 
 Church v. Jaques, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) 108; Dwinal v. Smith, 25 Me. 379. 
 Ch. 65, cited in 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., 6 1 Dan. Ch. PI. & Pr., pp. 573, 
 § 204. 574; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 203 ; Story's 
 
 3 Walker v. Walker, 3 Ga. 302. Eq. PI., § 846. 
 ^Langdell's Eq. PI., §93; Story's
 
 § 306.] COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 433 
 
 its force as such by the production of two witnesses or o'.one 
 witness and corroborative circumstances, it follows that such 
 an answer cannot be excepted to upon the ground of the in- 
 sufficiency of the discovery contained in it. 1 Where, however, 
 the defendant undertakes to make discovery on oath, he w r ill 
 be required to make full discovery, and, in case he shall refuse 
 to do so, he may be coerced into making further and full dis- 
 covery by the chancellor. 2 
 
 § 306. Defendant in criminal trial — His competency as 
 a witness. — At common law the defendant in a criminal pros- 
 ecution was incompetent as a witness in his own behalf because 
 of his interest in the result, nor could he be compelled to tes- 
 tify against a person jointly indicted with him until he was 
 discharged from custody or convicted. But where one of 
 several jointly indicted pleaded guilty and received his pun- 
 ishment, he was held competent as a witness in behalf of his 
 fellows who denied their guilt. 3 By statute in nearly all the 
 states of the Union and in the federal courts as well, the ac- 
 cused may now, in all cases, testify as a witness in his own 
 behalf. 4 The statutory changes through which the incompe- 
 tency of the defendant in a criminal prosecution to testify in 
 his own behalf has been removed have rendered a defendant 
 a competent witness in behalf of those indicted with him. 
 But generally accomplices are competent witnesses for each 
 other, though concerned in the same crime, only when sepa- 
 
 1 1 Dan. Cli. PI. & Pr. 760, n. 2; as a party or otherwise, or by reason 
 
 Smith v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co., of his having been convicted of any 
 
 2 Tenn. Ch. 599; Bulkley v. Van crime, but such interest or convic- 
 
 Wyck, 5 Paige (N. Y.), 536; United tion may be shown for the purpose 
 
 States v. McLaughlin, 24 Fed. Rep. of affecting his credibility ; provided, 
 
 823. however, that a defendant in any 
 
 2 Satterwhitev. Davenport, 10 Rich, criminal case or proceeding shall 
 
 (S. C.) Eq. 305. only at his own request be deemed a 
 
 3 Rex v. Fletcher, 1 Stra. 633. competent witness, and his neglect 
 
 4 The statutes of all the states are to testify shall not create any pre- 
 substantially the same in principle, sumption against him, nor shall the 
 That of Illinois may be given as an court permit any reference or corn- 
 example. " No person shall be dis- ment to be made to or upon such neg- 
 qualified as a witness in any crim- lect." Illinois Crim. Code, § 426. 
 inal trial or proceeding by reason of The statutes are given in Abb. Crim. 
 his interest in the event of the same Brief, § 387. 
 
 28
 
 484: COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. [§ 307. 
 
 rately indicted. 1 Hence where several are jointly indicted and 
 jointly tried, whether the defendant testifies in behalf of 
 another defendant, or when he volunteers as a witness for 
 the state against his associates, i. e., turns state's evidence, it 
 is necessary that the proceedings should have come to an end 
 so far as he is concerned either by his condemnation or ac- 
 quittal. 2 
 
 The fact that the trial of a defendant had been postponed, or 
 that he was to have a separate trial, was formerly deemed in- 
 sufficient to render him competent as a witness for or against 
 others jointly indicted with him. 3 This rule, however, is in 
 modern practice and by statute somewhat relaxed, and 9, defend- 
 ant who is indicted jointly with another person but who has 
 been granted a separate trial may testify against but not for 
 the other defendant prior to the final disposition of the charge 
 against himself. 4 On the other hand, if the state has closed 
 its case without producing evidence of the guilt of any de- 
 fendant which is sufficient to go to the jury, it is the duty of 
 the court to direct a verdict of acquittal as to him, and he is 
 then competent as a witness for the other party. 5 
 
 § 307. Statutory competency of parties as witnesses. — 
 A party to the record is now general!}', if not universally, both 
 competent as a witness in his own behalf and compellable to 
 testify for the adverse party. 6 This important change has 
 been brought about by statutory enactment in the different 
 states, but as a general or detailed account of the numerous 
 
 i United States v. Hunter, 1 Cranch, Tenn. 923; State v. Steifel, 106 Mo. 
 
 446 ; McKenzie v. State, 24 Ark. 636. 129; Sparks v. Com., 89 Ky. 644; 
 
 2 South v. State, 86 Ala. 617 ; State Allen v. State, 10 Ohio St. 287 ; State 
 
 v. Minor (Mo., 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. v. Thaden, 43 Minn. 325; Carroll v. 
 
 1085; Ballard v. State (Fla., 1893). State, 5 Neb. 31. Cf. State v. Math- 
 
 12 S. Rep. 865: Com. v. Marsh, 10 ews, 98 Mo. 125; Barnes v. State 
 
 Pick. 57; People v. Bell, 10 Johns. (Tex., 1889), US. W. Rep. 679; Day 
 
 95; McGinnis v. State (Wyo., 1893), v. State, 27 Tex. App. 143. See post, 
 
 31 Pac. Rep. 978; State v. Jackson, §£ 323, 324. 
 
 106 Mo. 174; State v. Miller, 100 Mo. 5 Cochran v.. Amnion, 16 111.316; 
 
 606. Seepost, § : 30, for accomplices. Beasley v. Bradley, 2 Swan (Tenn.), 
 
 3 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 363. 180. And see cases cited in last two 
 
 4 McGinnis v. State (Wyo., 1893), notes. 
 
 31 Pac. Rep. 978; State v. Barrows, 6 In re Chiles, 22 Wall. 157; Dogge 
 
 76 Me. 401 ; Benson v. United States, v. State, 27 Neb. 272. 
 146 U. S. 245 ; Richards v. State, 91
 
 § 308.] COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 435 
 
 and variant statutes on this subject is impossible in a work of 
 this scope, the reader is referred to the local statute of his own 
 state and to the cases which are cited in the notes. 1 Generally 
 by these statutes the jury are empowered to take into consid- 
 eration the interest of the witness in the suit as an element 
 bearing upon the credibility of his evidence, 2 though no in- 
 ference should be drawn by- them from the fact that the party 
 does not exercise his statutory right to testify in his own be- 
 half. 3 
 
 The competency of witnesses in the federal courts is also 
 regulated by a statute which provides in substance that the 
 laws of the state within the limits of which the federal court 
 is located shall be its rules of decision as to competency " in 
 trials at common law, in equity and admiralty." The compe- 
 tency of witnesses in criminal trials in federal courts is not, 
 therefore, regulated by the statutes of the state in which they 
 are located, but by the common law of the state when it was 
 admitted into the Union, modified of course by the federal 
 statutes regulating criminal proceedings and the competency 
 of witnesses therein. 4 
 
 § 30S. Statutory incompetency of parties to testify as 
 to transactions with deceased or insane persons. — Some- 
 times parties and interested witnesses are made competent by 
 statute without any exception. In some of the states of the 
 
 lr The statutes mentioned in the necticut, Gen. St. 1888, §1094; Vir- 
 
 text are as follows : Maine, R. S. 1881, ginia, Code 1887, § 3345; North Cart, 
 
 p. 707, §993; Massachusetts, Pub. lina, Code 1883, § 589; Florida, Dig. 
 
 St. 1882, p. 987, §18; Rhode Island, 1881, p. 518; Georgia, Code 1882, 
 
 Pub. St. 1882, p. 587, § 33 ; New York, § 854 ; Mississippi, Code 1880, § 1599 ; 
 
 Code C. P., 828; Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Code 1888, § 605 : Illinois. 
 
 Bright. Dig., p. 727, § 20; Maryland, R. S., p. 681, § 2; Kansas, Gen. Stat. 
 
 Pub. Laws 1888. p. 685, §§1-4; West 1889, §4414; Nebraska, Comp. St. 
 
 Virginia, Code, p. 806, §23; South 1889, §899; Nevada, Comp. St. 1885, 
 
 Carolina. Code, §400; Alabama, §3399. 
 
 Code 1886, §2765; Tennessee, Code '-Meeteer v. Man. R. R. Co., 63 
 
 1884, §4563; Ohio, R. S. 1890, §5240; Hun. 533; Douglass v. Fullerton, 7 
 
 Iowa, Const. 1857, art. 1, §4; Indi- 111. App. 102; State v. Rush, 95 Mo. 
 
 ana, R. S. 1881, § 496; Michigan, 199; Harrington v. Hamburg (Iowa, 
 
 How. Ann. St. 1882, p. 7544; Minne- 1892), 52 N. W. Rep. 201. 
 
 sota, Gen. Stat. 1878, p. 792, § 9; 3 Moore v. Wright, 90 111. 470. See 
 
 Montana, Comp. St. 1887, § 647; post, § 346a. 
 
 Arizona, 1887, § 1831; New Hamp- ••Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 
 
 shire, Gen. Laws, 1878, p. 531 ; Con- 263; 12 S. Ct. 617.
 
 430 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES, [§ 308. 
 
 Union, however, it has been enacted that.no party or person 
 interested in the event shall be a competent witness against 
 an executor, administrator or the committee of a lunatic or 
 inebriate, while elsewhere such an interested witness is incom- 
 petent only so far as he is called to testify to a personal trans- 
 action with the deceased person or lunatic, 1 or "as to a matter 
 of fact occurring before the death of the deceased person," 2 
 or to "matters equally within the knowledge" of deceased. 8 
 The present policy of the law is to admit freely interested 
 persons as witnesses. Nevertheless it is deemed expedient, 
 where the mouth of one party to a transaction is closed by 
 death, that the other should also be silenced. The aim and 
 end of these statutes are to put both parties upon an equality. 4 
 But the provisions of these statutes may be waived expressly 
 or by implication by the representative of the deceased per- 
 son. So it is often provided by statute that if the representa- 
 tive voluntarily produces testimony to a conversation or trans- 
 action which was had with the deceased, either by going on the 
 stand himself, 5 or by producing the testimony of the deceased 
 taken by deposition, 6 or at a former trial, 7 the other party or 
 any interested person is thereby rendered competent. 8 These 
 
 i Illinois R. S. 1880, ch. 51; Colo- v. Hart, 29 111. App. 260, the statute 
 
 rado Gen. Laws, §§ 3644, 3647 ; New was applied in an action against a 
 
 York Code Civ. Pro., § 829. firm, one partner of which was a 
 
 2 Code Cal., § 1880. survivor of the old firm with which 
 
 3 How. St. Mich., § 7545. the transaction was had. 
 
 * Abbott's Trial Evidence, p. 61, 6 Allen v. Chouteau, 103 Mo. 309; 
 
 citing cases. Nixon v. McKinney, 105 N. C. 23; 
 
 5 Cousins v. Jackson, 52 Ala. 265; Munroe v. Napier, 52 Ga. 38S; Dun- 
 Mitchell v. Cochran, 10 N. Y. S. 545; lop v. Dunlop, 94 Mich. 11. 
 Hard v. Ashley, 117 N. Y. 606; 23 7 Taylor v. Bunker (Mich., 188S), 
 N. E. Rep. 606; Wilcox v. Corwin, 36 N. W. Rep. 166; Stone v. Hunt 
 23 N. E. Rep. 500; 117 N. Y. 500; (Mo., 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 454. Cf. 
 Jackson v. Jones, 74 Tex. 104; Wil- Walker v. Taylor, 43 Vt. 612; Hay- 
 cox v. Corsvin, 50 Hun, 425; Nay v. den v. Grillo, 42 Mo. App. 1. 
 Curley, 113 N. Y. 575. Where asur- 8 Munn v. Owens, 2 Dill. 477; Com. 
 viving partner in an action brought Ice Co. v. Kiefer, 26 III. App. 466; 
 against him on a firm note volun- Martin v. Martin, 118 Ind. 227; 
 tarily testified to that transaction, Haskell v. Henry, 74 Me. 197 ; Potts 
 the plaintiff was permitted to testify v. Mayer, 86 N. Y. 302; Williamson 
 in his own behalf to facts and cir- v. State, 59 Miss. 235; McCarlin v. 
 cumstances in rebuttal. Wiley v. Traphagen, 45 N. J. Eq. 265; Parris 
 Morse, 30 Mo. App. 260. In Foster v. McNeal (Neb., 1893), 55 N. W.
 
 § 308. J COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 437 
 
 statutes, it is held, do not prevent the representative from 
 calling a party or an interested witness to testify for the es- 
 tate, 1 though this fact alone, that such a witness testifies for 
 the representative, 2 or testifying in behalf of the opposite party 
 is cross-examined 3 by the representative, does not, where the 
 prohibition against testifying is absolute, waive the right of 
 the latter to have his testimony stricken out. 
 
 In a New York case 4 it has been held that the statute ex- 
 cluding evidence of a personal transaction was not meant to 
 abrogate the common-la\y, rule or principle of evidence that 
 where one party calls a witness, and, in examining him, brings 
 out a particular part of a communication or transaction, the 
 other part}' may bring out the whole communication or trans- 
 action so far as it has any bearing upon, or so far as it qualifies 
 or explains, that specific part to which the examination was 
 directed. So, in accordance with this principle, it has been 
 held that where a representative of a deceased party examines 
 the surviving party as to a personal transaction or conversa- 
 tion with the testator or intestate, the party thus examined is 
 thereby enabled to testify, as a witness in his own behalf, to 
 the whole transaction concerning which he has been exam- 
 ined, 5 but not to other transactions or conversations. 6 This 
 result follows only where the executor testifies directly to the 
 transaction, but not where he testifies to facts from which the 
 existence or non-existence of the personal transaction or of 
 some incident thereof may be inferred. 7 In such a case it has 
 
 Rep. 222. Thus writings signed by 612; Canady v. Johnson, 40 Iowa, 
 
 the deceased have been admitted to 587: Hopkins v. Bowers, 108 N. C. 
 
 rebut evidence of his verbal declara- 298. 
 
 tions given by the representative. 3 Achilles v. Achilles (111., 1891), 28 
 
 Smith v. Christopher, 16 Abb. Pr. N. E. Rep. 45. If the direct exam- 
 
 (N. S.)332. See further in support of ination is excluded the cross-exam- 
 
 the text, Kenyon v. Pierce, 17 R. I. ination goes with it. 
 
 794; Sherer v. Ingerman, 110 Ind. 4 Nay v. Curley, 113 N. Y. 575. 
 
 442; Trahern v. Colburn, 63 Md. 5 Nay v. Curley, 113 N. Y. 578; 
 
 104; Rice v. Daly, 66 Hun, 628; Michigan Sav. Bank v. Butler(Micl)., 
 
 Haines v. Watts (N. J., 1893), 26 Atl. 1894), 57 N. W. Rep. 253. 
 
 Rep. 572. Contra, Louman v. Au- 6 Copeland v. Koontz, 125 Ind. 126; 
 
 brey, 72 111. 619; Blood v. Fairbanks, Butz v. Schwartz, 32 111. App. 156. 
 
 50 Cal. 420. "' Bowers v. State, 19 N. Y. State 
 
 > Chase v. Evoy, 51 Cal. 618. Rep. 926. 
 
 2 Herrington v. Winn, 14 N. Y. S.
 
 438 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. [§ 308. 
 
 been held that, where the adverse party may testify directly 
 to the transaction itself which is gone into by the direct evi- 
 dence of the executor, he cannot testify to any fact which 
 would contradict inferences created by his evidence. 1 The 
 executor must have testified voluntarily in his own behalf in 
 order to let in the evidence of the surviving party. 2 The 
 statute is not applicable when a defendant to a suit in equity 
 dies after his sworn answer 3 containing matter which is ad- 
 missible in evidence has been filed, or where a party dies after 
 his adversary has been examined, 4 or where the executor is 
 suing on his own title. 5 
 
 The courts have adopted liberal rules of construction in con- 
 struing the meaning of the words which indicate representa- 
 tion or succession which occur in statutes providing that 
 parties or interested witnesses shall not be competent to tes- 
 tify in actions by or against the representatives or heirs of a 
 decedent. 6 Thus, it has been held that the word "representa- 
 tive" includes heirs, 7 legatees 8 and devisees. 9 The general 
 principle is that so long as the judgment will affect, whether 
 favorably or otherwise, the value of the estate of the deceased 
 person, the relation in which the representative stands to it or 
 the form in which he sues, whether individually 10 or as a rep- 
 resentative, is not material. 11 
 
 The true end and object of these statutes are to close the 
 mouth of a party to a contract or other transaction when- 
 ever the other party is dead or otherwise incapacitated from 
 
 i Lewis v. Merritt, 113 N. Y. 388. 7 Ferbrache v. Ferbrache, 110 111. 
 
 2 Corning v. Walker, 100 N. Y. 210; Ellis v. Stewart (Tex., 1894), 24 
 
 550; Rankin v. Hannan, 38 Ohio St. S. W. Rep. 585. 
 
 438. 8 Curtis v. Wilson (Tex., 1893), 21 
 
 a Sweet v. Parker, 22 N. J. Eq. S. W. Rep. 787. 
 
 455; Lanning v. Lanning, 17 id. 228. 9 Jass v. Mohn (R. I., 1893), 26 Atl. 
 
 But cf. Beckhaus v. Ladner, 48 id. Rep. 787. 
 
 152. io Louis v. Easton, 50 Ala. 470. 
 
 4 Marlatt v. Warwick, 18 N. J. Eq. UHollister v. Young, 41 Vt. 456. 
 108. It has been held, however, that " rep- 
 
 5 Hodges v. Carvill, 44 N. J. L. 456. resentative" should be strictly con- 
 
 6 Marshall v. Peck, 91 111. 187; strued as signifying only a party who 
 Dewey v. Goodenough, 56 Barb. 54 ; represents another on the record. 
 Green v, Edick, 56 N. Y. 696; Lloyd Crimmins v. Crimmins, 43 N. J. Eq. 
 v. Hollenback (Mich. , 1893), 57 N. W. 87. 
 
 Rep. 110.
 
 |j 308.] COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 439 
 
 testifying in his own behalf, and where his rights have passed 
 by his own act or by the act of the law to some other person 
 who represents him or his estate in the action, but whose 
 sources of original information as regards the transaction in 
 question are so inadequate as compared with the other and sur- 
 viving party that the representative is presumed to be utterly 
 unable to testify as to any of the details of the transaction. 1 
 In case the statute is in its form a proviso in or a mere ex- 
 ception from a statute abolishing the incompetency of inter- 
 ested witnesses at common law, then, if the party or interested 
 person would have been competent at common law as a wit- 
 ness against the estate of the deceased person, he is so against 
 his representative. 2 But the evidence of an interested witness 
 is absolutely excluded by a statute of this sort which is an in- 
 dependent and affirmative enactment. 3 
 
 These statutes have been construed liberally with the sole 
 object of placing the parties, living or deceased, upon an 
 equality so far as the evidence of the transaction is concerned. 
 The fact that one only of several persons jointly sued repre- 
 sents a deceased person is enough to render the adverse party 
 incompetent, 4 though where one of several joint parties, as, 
 for example, the members of a firm, is deceased, and it appears 
 that he took no active part in the transaction or had no knowl- 
 edge of it, his death before the suit is brought will not render 
 the actual parties to the transaction incompetent as witnesses. 5 
 But under such circumstances, when the deceased partner had 
 full personal knowledge, and the surviving partner, though 
 equally bound, had very little, if any, knowledge of the trans- 
 action, the adverse party will not be allowed to testify. 6 
 
 1 Taylor v. Dusterberg, 109 Ind. » Mattoon v. Young, 45 N. Y. 696. 
 165; Paxton v. Paxton ("W. Va., 4 Force v. Dutcher, 22 N. J. Eq. 
 1894), 18 S. E. Rep. 765; Louis v. 453; Godfrey v. Templeton (Tenn., 
 Easton, 50 Ala. 470; Johnson v. 1888), 6 S. W. Rep. 47. 
 
 Heald, 33 Md. 352: Hubbell v. Hub- » Hardy v. Chesapeake Bank, 51 
 
 bell, 22 Ohio St. 208; Brown v. Md. 596 ; Fulkerson v. Thornton, 68 
 
 Brightman, 11 Allen (Mass.), 226. Mo. 468. 
 
 2 Fink v. Hey, 42 Mo. App. 295; <> Wiley v. Morse, 30 Mo. App. 266; 
 Bates v. Forcht, 89 Mo. 120 ; Beach Campbell Banking Co. v. Cole 
 v. Pennell, 50 Me. 387; Sykes v. (Iowa, 1893), 56 N. W. Rep. 441; 
 Bates, 26 Iowa, 522; ADgell v. Hes- Williams v. Perkins, 83 Mo. 379. 
 ter, 64 Mo. 142.
 
 uo 
 
 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 
 
 [§ 309. 
 
 § 300. What are transactions with decedents. — The 
 
 phrase "personal transaction," while not to be defined in the 
 abstract, 1 does not include evidence of the birth of a deceased 
 person, 2 or of his physical 3 or mental condition, 4 or an opinion 
 upon the value of services 5 rendered him or board or supplies 
 furnished him by the plaintiff or by some other person than 
 the witness, 6 or evidence of the fact of a conversation having 
 been had. where this fact is collateral merely. 7 An interested 
 witness may testify to a conversation or transaction by the 
 deceased with a co-party to the record, 8 or with some third per- 
 son who is still living, 9 at which the witness was present and 
 overheard what was said, provided the witness did not him- 
 self participate in the conversation. 10 So the general rule is 
 that the interested witness may testify to a transaction or 
 conversation which he had with an agent of the deceased who 
 is still alive ll and who disclosed the name of the principal, 12 or 
 may testify that a contract on which he sues is in deceased's 
 
 1 Abbott's Trial Evidence, p. 68. 
 
 2 Matter of Paige, 62 Barb. 476. 
 
 3 In re McCarthy, 65 Hun, 624; 
 Sullivan v. Latimer (S. C, 1893), 17 
 S. E. Rep. 701. 
 
 4 Williams' Ex'r v. Williams (Ky., 
 1890), 13 S. W. Rep. 250 ; Carey v. 
 Carey, 104 N. C. 171; Ducker v. 
 Whitson (N. C, 1893), 16 S. E. Rep. 
 854. 
 
 5 Lewis v. Meginnis, 30 Fla. 419. 
 6 Pritchard v. Pritchard, 69 Wis. 
 
 373. 
 
 ^Loder v. Whelpley, 111 N. Y. 
 239 ; Daniels v. Foster, 26 Wis. 286 ; 
 Hier v. Grant, 47 N. Y. 278. A 
 party offering evidence which is 
 prima facie objectionable under 
 these statutes must show at the trial 
 that as limited by him it does not 
 infringe the statute. Rhodes v. 
 Pray, 36 Minn. 395. "A transaction 
 is whatever may be done by one 
 person affecting another's rights, 
 and out of which a cause of action 
 ma}' arise. A contract is a transac- 
 tion, but a transaction is not always 
 a contract." Scarborough v. Smith, 
 
 18 Kan. 406 ; Roberts v. Donovan, 70 
 Cal. 113. 
 
 8 Smith v. James, 34 N. W« Rep. 
 309. 
 
 9 Hughey v. Eichelberger, 11 S. C. 
 36; Lehigh v. Railroad Co., 41 N. J. 
 Eq. 187 : Petrie v. Petrie, 6 N. Y. S. 
 831; Stern v. Isman, 51 Hun, 224: 
 Connelly v. O'Conner, 17 N. Y. State 
 Rep. 261 ; In re Budlong, 7 N. Y. S. 
 229 ; Badger v. Badger, 88 N. Y. 559. 
 
 io Connelly v. O'Conner, 17 N. Y. 
 State Rep. 261; Stern v. Eisner, 51 
 Hun, 224 ; Lobdell v. Lobdell, 36 N. Y. 
 327; Holcomb v. Holcomb, 95 N. Y. 
 325 ; Petrie v. Petrie, 6 N. Y. S. 831 ; 
 Cary v. White, 59 N. Y. 336 ; Badger 
 v. Badger, 88 N. Y. 336. 
 
 ii Pratt v. Elkins, 80 N. Y. 198; 
 Reherd v. Clem, 86 Va. 374; Cairns 
 v. Mooney, 62 Vt. 172; Orr v. Rode, 
 101 Mo. 387 (trustee of deceased 
 trustor). Contra, Sutherland v. Ross, 
 140 Pa. St. 379; 21 Atl. Rep. 354: 2S 
 W. N. C. 17. Cf. Voss v. King, 38 
 W. Va. 236, where agont and princi- 
 pal were both dead. 
 
 i- Stamford v. Hornitz, 49 Ind. 025,
 
 § 300.] 
 
 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 
 
 4dl 
 
 handwriting, 1 though not that he saw him sign it. The sur- 
 viving party may testify as to his place of residence when he 
 had the transaction with the deceased, that being no part of 
 the transaction itself. 2 
 
 The term "contract in issue" in a statute rendering a sur- 
 viving part\ r thereto incompetent signifies the contract which 
 is substantially in dispute and not that which appears upon 
 the formal allegations of the pleadings. 3 Testimony is ad- 
 missible of facts occurring after the decease of the party under 
 a statute which renders incompetent evidence of personal 
 transactions with him. 4 Nor is such evidence objectionable 
 because the jury may infer from it the existence of a personal 
 transaction with the deceased party. 5 The rule excluding evi- 
 dence of a personal transaction with a deceased person oper- 
 ates to prevent the survivor from testifying to the contents 
 of a letter sent to the deceased, 6 or to the fact that a letter 
 was delivered to him, 7 though it does not prevent the intro- 
 duction of a writing executed, by him. The writing cannot 
 be explained by the testimony of a party or interested witness 8 
 
 The mere fact that a third person 
 was present at an interview between 
 the deceased and a surviving party 
 does not render the latter competent. 
 Hatch v. Perignet, 64 Barb. 189; 
 Hutchison v. Cleary, 55 N. W. Rep. 
 729; Burnham v. Cleary, 34 Wis. 
 117. 
 i Sawyer v. Grandy (N. C, 1893), 
 
 18 S. E. Rep. 79. Contra, Holliday 
 v. McKinnie, 22 Fla. 153. 
 
 2 Trimble v. Mims (Ga., 1894), 18 
 S. E. Rep. 362. Where a statute in 
 terms excludes the testimony of 
 parties and interested witnesses "in 
 any action upon a claim or demand 
 against the estate of a deceased per- 
 son," it has been held that the stat- 
 ute does not operate in an action to 
 enforce a mechanic's lien which is in 
 the nature of a proceeding in rem. 
 Booth v. Pendola (Cal., 1890), 23 Pac. 
 Rep. 200. But the contrary was held 
 in Gunther v. Bennett (Md., 1890), 
 
 19 Atl. Rep. 1048. 
 
 3 Barnes v. Dow, 59 Vt. 545. 
 
 *Kreps v. Carlisle (Pa, 1893), 27 
 Atl. Rep. 741 ; Swazey v. Ames, 79 
 Me. 483; Gifford v. Thomas (Vt., 
 1890), 19 Atl. Rep. 1088. 
 
 5 In re Debaun, 4 N. Y. S. 342; 
 Porter v. Nelson, 121 Pa. St. 640; 
 Moore v. Dutson, 79 Ga. 458; 5 S. E. 
 Rep. 38; Rothrock v. Gallaher, 91 Ga. 
 id. 108 ; Griffin v. Griffin, 17 N. E. Rep. 
 782; 125 111. 430. It is held that the 
 witness cannot testify to a relation- 
 ship or condition which existed after 
 the death of the party which was 
 founded on a personal transaction 
 with him prior thereto. Denison v. 
 Denison, 35 Md. 861 j Adams v. Ed- 
 wards, 115 Pa. St. 211; Adams v. 
 Morrison, 113 N. Y. 152. 
 
 6 Sabre v. Smith, 62 N. H. 663. 
 
 7 Howard v. Zimpelman (Tex., 
 1890), 14 S. W. Rep. 59. 
 
 8 Miller v. Motter, 35 Md. 428; 
 Berry v. Stevens, 69 Me. 290.
 
 442 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. [§ 310. 
 
 when offered against the executor, though it may be explained 
 or contradicted when offered ' in his behalf, as by such action 
 the representative has opened the door for the adverse party. 
 
 The prohibition of the introduction of evidence of a per- 
 sonal transaction with the deceased should be construed, not 
 only to prevent the introduction of direct proof of such a 
 transaction, but to prevent its proof by indirection as well. 
 So the surviving party should not be permitted to attempt to 
 prove the transaction inferentially by offering evidence that 
 some third person did not do the thing which the deceased is 
 alleged to have done, or by disconnecting any particular fact 
 from its surroundings and proving it as a seemingly independ- 
 ent fact, when in truth it originated in, was caused by or was 
 connected with a personal transaction evidence of which is in- 
 admissible. 2 
 
 Whether a transaction is within the statute is a preliminary 
 question for the court, 3 and the witness who is about to testify 
 may be interrogated by the court as to what passed and 
 whether he was a privy to the transaction or was disinterested 
 and merely overheard a conversation of the deceased with 
 some third person. 4 The death of the party whose representa- 
 tive objects to the admission of the evidence may usually be 
 shown prima facie by the letters under which he acts, 5 though 
 if a party sued individually defends as an administrator and 
 claims the statutory privileges of a representative, he must 
 have established his title and representative status in some 
 preliminary proceedings. 6 
 
 § 310. Persons interested — Their statutory incompe- 
 tency. — In some of the states it is provided by statute that no 
 person whatever who is interested in the event of an action, 
 or any person from whom a part} r or interested person de- 
 rives his interest, can testify in his own behalf or in behalf of 
 a party claiming under him against the personal representa- 
 tive of a deceased or insane person as to any personal con- 
 versation or transaction with the latter. 7 The interest which 
 
 1 Hubbard v. Johnson, 77 Me. 139. 5 Parhan v. Moran, 4 Hun, 717. 
 
 2 Clift v. Moses, 112 N. Y. 426; 21 ^Prewitt v . Lambert (Colo., 1893), 
 N. Y. State Rep. 777. 34 Pac. Rep. G84. 
 
 » Abbott's Trial E v., 66, "New York Civ. Pro., § 829; 
 
 4 Isenhour v. Isenhour, 64 N. C. Illinois R. S., ch. 51, sec. 1; Shields 
 
 640; Abbott's Trial Ev., 66. v. Smith (N. C, 1893), 10 S. E. Rep.
 
 310.J 
 
 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 
 
 443 
 
 will disqualify a witness who is not a party to the action 
 must be direct, pecuniary and beneficial, 1 such as would render 
 him incompetent at common law. 2 So if the witness is equally 
 interested on both sides, 3 or if his interest is very contingent 
 or remote, he will be allowed to testify. 4 An heir, legatee or 
 devisee of a party is an interested person, and hence is in- 
 competent to testify against the representative of a deceased 
 person. 5 
 
 The term " person from whom the party or interested wit- 
 ness derives his title" includes not onlv his immediate assignor, 
 but all prior grantors or assignors. 6 An interested witness 
 
 76; California Code, § 1880, cl. 3; 
 Florida Laws, ch. 101, § 24; Iowa 
 Rev. Code, 1886, § 3639; Maine R. S. 
 1833, ch. 82, § 98; Montana Stat. 
 Code Civ. Pro., § 647; Nevada Gen. 
 Stat. 1885, § 3399; North Carolina 
 Code, 1883, §§ £89, 590, 1357; Ohio 
 R. S. 1886, SS 5240, 5241, 5242; West 
 Virginia Code, ch. 130, § 23. 
 
 1 Fuchs v. Fuchs, 48 Mo. App. 18; 
 Nearpass v. Gilraan, 104 N. Y. 210; 
 Fowler v. Smith, 153 Pa. St. 639; In 
 re Bedlow's Will, 67 Hun, 408; 
 Bowers v. Schuler (Minn., 1893), 55 
 N. W. Rep. 817; Graves v. Safford, 
 41 111. App. 659; In re Taylor, 154 
 Pa. St. 183; Bunn v. Todd, 107 N. C. 
 226; Fogal v. Page, 59 Hun, 625; 
 Allen v. Hawks, 13 Pick. 70 ; Hobart 
 v. Hobart, 62 N. Y. 80; Stewart v. 
 Kip, 5 Johns. 256; Shaack v. Meily, 
 136 Pa. St. 161 ; 26 W. N. C. 569. 
 
 2 Beard v. First Nat. Bank, 39 
 Minn. 547. 
 
 s Scott v. Harris, 127 Ind. 520. 
 
 4 Huckabee v. Abbott, 87 Ala. 409; 
 Nearpass v. Gilman, 104 N. Y. 507; 
 Harrow v. Brown, 76 Iowa, 179; 
 Clark v. McNeal, 114 N. Y. 289; 
 Rank v. Grote (N. Y., 1888), 17 N. E. 
 Rep. 665; Wallace v. Straus, 113 N. 
 Y. 238; Duryea v. Granger (Mich., 
 1887), 33 N. W. Rep. 730. The son 
 of a party to an action is not by 
 reason of his relationship a person 
 
 interested whose evidence is incom- 
 petent. New York Smelting Co. v. 
 Lieb, 4 N. Y. S. 545; 56 Super. Ct. 
 Rep. (N. Y.) 308. 
 
 *Loder v. Whelpley, 111 N. Y 
 239; Mills v. Davis, 113 N. Y. 243 
 Kerr v. Lunsford, 31 W. Va. 659 
 In re Eysamen, 113 N. Y. 62. Cf. 
 Staser v. Hogan, 21 N. E. Rep. 911; 
 Todd v. Dibble, 6 Dem. Sur. 35 
 Brigham v. Gott, 3 N. Y. S. 518 
 Smith v. Pierce (Vt., 1893), 25 Atl 
 Rep. 1092; Dickson v. McGraw, 151 
 Pa. St. 98; West v. Randall, 2 Mason, 
 181; Payne v. Kerr, 66 Hun, 636; 
 In re Bedlow, 67 Hun, 408; Carlile 
 v. Burley, 3 Greenl. 250. A widow 
 whose inchoate right of dower will 
 attach to land recovered is interested 
 in the event. Crane v. Crane, 81 
 111. 166; Ervin v. Ervin, 18 Civ. Pro. 
 Rep. 11; Redfield v. Redfield, 110 N. 
 Y 674; Warrick v. Hull, 102 111. 280. 
 Cf. Miller v. Montgomery, 78 N. Y. 
 285; Sanford v. Ellithorpe, 95 N. Y. 
 48; Eisenlord v. Eisenlord, 2 N. Y. 
 S. 123; Steele v. Ward, 30 Hun, 355; 
 Devinney v. Carey, 23 N. Y. State 
 Rep. 20S; 5 N. Y. S. 289 (holding 
 that a tenant by the curtesy is an in- 
 terested person). 
 
 6 Parcell v. McReynolds (Iowa, 
 1887), 33 N. W. Rep. 139; Pope v. 
 Allen. 90 N. Y. 298; Drew v. Sim- 
 mons, 58 Ala. 4GJ; Stackable v.
 
 444 
 
 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 
 
 [§ 310. 
 
 ma} 7 be made competent bj r absolutely releasing his claims, 1 
 though he ma} 7 be asked if the assignment was made solely 
 to qualify him as a witness; 2 and if it is not a ho?ia fide as- 
 signment he will be still incompetent. 3 
 
 Where the statute expressly refers to parties as incompe- 
 tent it is held that third persons merely interested in the 
 event are not included thereby. 4 So where those having "ad- 
 verse interests" are mentioned, witnesses whose interests are 
 not adverse to the deceased may be permitted to testify in be- 
 half of the surviving party. 5 The evidence given by a sur- 
 viving party or by an interested person of personal transactions 
 with the deceased will not be rejected by the court of its own 
 motion, 6 but the objection to the witness, which must specific- 
 ally point out the grounds, 7 must be taken by the administra- 
 tor or other party acting in a representative capacity, 8 and 
 it will be deemed to have been waived if it is not promptly 
 made by him. 9 
 
 Upon the question whether the death or insanity of an 
 agent or other fiduciary representative of a party to a con- 
 tract will render the testimony of the other party or of an 
 
 Stackpole (Mich., 18S7), 33 N. W. 
 Rep. 808. 
 
 i O'Brien v. Weiler, 68 Hun, 64; 
 Genet v. Lawyer, 61 Barb. 211 ; In re 
 Wilson, 103 N. Y. 374; Loder v. 
 Whelpley, 111 id. 239; Brown v. 
 Clock. 5 N. Y. Supp. 245. 
 
 2 Buck v. Patterson, 75 Mich. 397. 
 
 :>Bonstead v. Cuyler (Pa., 1887), 8 
 Atl. Rep. 848. 
 
 < Rawson v. Knight, 73 Me. 340 
 Spencer v. Robbins, 106 Ind. 580 
 Bassett v. Shepardson, 52 Mich. 3 
 Wilson v. Russell, 61 N. H. 355 
 Lytlev. Bond, 40 Vt. 618; Pendell 
 v. Neuberger, 31 N. W. Rep. 177. 
 
 »Gerz v. Weber, 151 Pa. St. 396; 
 Thistlewaite v. Thistlewaite, 132 Ind. 
 355; Howie v. Edward (Ala., 1893), 
 11 S. Rep. 748; Haramill v. Sup. 
 Council, 152 Pa. St. 537. 
 
 6 Rowland v. Rowland, 40 N. J. 
 
 Eq. 281. Contra, Sherman v. Lanier, 
 39 N. J. Eq. 253. 
 
 "' Lewin v. Russell, 42 N. Y. 251. 
 
 8 Marcy v. Arnazeen, 61 N. H. 133. 
 
 9Parrish v. McNeal (Neb., 1893), 
 55 N. W. Rep. 222; Norris v. Stew- 
 art's Heirs, 105 N. C. 455; 10 S. E. 
 Rep. 912. Of. Sager v. Dorr, 4 N. 
 Y. S. 568; Dilley v. Love, 61 Md. 
 607. If the objection is taken be- 
 fore judgment it seems that it will 
 suffice. Dodge v. Stanhope, 55 Md. 
 121. Or if evidence to rebut it is 
 offered. Phillips v. McGrath, 62 Wis. 
 124. But it was held that the er- 
 roneous reception of evidence inad- 
 missible under these statutes is 
 cured where the opposite party fails 
 to attempt to rebut the fact which 
 has been testified to in case the bur- 
 den of doing so is on him. Wheeler 
 v. Wheeler, 18 N. Y. State Rep. 445; 
 2 N. Y. S. 44:;.
 
 § 311.1 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 445 
 
 interested person incompetent the cases are not harmonious. 
 The weight of the decisions sustains the rule that the adverse 
 party will not be allowed to testify to any conversation or 
 transaction he may have had with the deceased agent. 1 But 
 the contrary doctrine is not without the support of authority. 2 
 § 311. Incompetency of parties to negotiable instruments 
 to impeach them. — In many of the early English cases, 3 in 
 the supreme court of the United States, 4 and in the courts of 
 several of the state commonwealths, a rule has been laid down 
 that a party to a negotiable instrument, i. e., the maker or in- 
 dorser thereof, is incompetent in a subsequent suit brought on 
 the instrument to testify as a witness to any fact impeaching 
 the instrument which existed when he signed or indorsed the 
 note or other negotiable security. 5 The basis of this exclusory 
 rule is generally stated to be that it is contrary to sound public 
 policy and good morals to allow a person who has, for his own 
 benefit, giving currency and circulation to a negotiable instru- 
 ment, to state facts which might invalidate it in the hands of 
 a bona fide purchaser or holder for value. However true this 
 view may be in case the person is himself a party — and cer- 
 tainly as a party he should be estopped, upon general prin- 
 ciples of estoppel, from impeaching his own deliberate act, — it 
 does not seem applicable where third parties only are in liti- 
 gation, if the witness knows the discrediting fact and if that 
 
 1 Whiting v. Traynor, 74 Wis. 86; Henderson v. Anderson, 3 How. 
 293; Sabler v. Shef. S. Co., 87 Ala. (U. S.) 73. 
 
 305; Warten v. Strane, 82 Ala. 311 5 Fox v. Whitney, 16 Mass. 118; 
 
 (clerk); Mobile S. Bank v. McDon- Shainburg v. Commagere, 5 Martin 
 
 nell. 87 id. 736; Johnson v. Hart, 82 (La.), 9; Sweeny v. Easter, 1 Wall. 
 
 Ga. 767; Kansas M. Co. v. Wagner, 166; Haddock v. Wilmarth, 5 N. H. 
 
 25 Neb. 439. 187; Dewey v. Warriner, 71 111. 
 
 2 Farmers' Ins. Co. v. Insurance 198; Fox v. Whitney, 16 Mass. r .18; 
 Co., 40 Minn. 152; Sprague v. Bond Strong v. Wilson, 1 Morris (Iowa}, 
 (N. C, 1894), 18 S. E. Rep. 701 ; South 84; Dearing v. Sawtelle, 4 Greeni. 
 Baltimore Co. v. Muhlback, 69 Md. (Me.) 191; Treon v. Brown, 14 Ohio, 
 395; First Nat. Bank v. Cornell, 41 482; Rohrer v. Morningstar, 18 Ohio, 
 Ohio St. 401; Reynolds v. Iowa Ins. 579; Thayer v. Crossman, 1 Mete. 
 Co., 80 Iowa, 563; 46 N. W. Rep. (Mass.) 416; Gaul v. Willis, 26 Pa. 
 659. St. 259. The rule is not invoked in 
 
 3 Walton v. Shelley, 1 T. R. 296, case the party has indorsed " with- 
 ered in Greeni. on Ev., § 383. out recourse." 2 Pars, on Pr. N. & 
 
 * United States v. LejBfter, 11 Pet. B. 470; Abbott v. Mitchell, 6 Shepl. 
 
 355.
 
 UQ 
 
 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 
 
 C§ 312 - 
 
 fact is one of which the law allows proof. 1 The rule has been 
 repudiated both in England and in America by the majorit}' 
 of the cases. 2 In any case it is only applicable to negotiable 
 paper issued in the usual course of trade before maturity, 3 and 
 does not apply between the original parties or to those who 
 take the paper with notice of any equitable defenses good as 
 between the parties. 4 The rule does not render the person 
 incompetent as a witness to any facts which have taken place 
 subsequent to his act of indorsement, 5 or to facts not in any 
 way impairing or discrediting the validity of the instrument. 6 
 § 312. Competency of counsel as witnesses. — By some of 
 the early cases it was held, not indeed as a positive rule of 
 law, but rather as a matter of propriety and procedure deemed 
 necessary to the impartial administration of justice, that an 
 attorney-at-law could not testify for his client in the cause in 
 which he was engaged. 7 But the modern rule is otherwise, 
 and counsel are competent witnesses for a party as to all facts 
 which are within their personal knowledge, 8 though the prac- 
 tice of receiving this sort of testimony should not, it seems, be 
 encouraged, 9 in view of the bias with which the mind of the 
 
 1 Abbott's Trial Evidence, § 417. 
 
 2 Stafford v. Rice, 5 Cowen, 23; 
 Guy v. Hull, 3 Murph. (N. C.) 150; 
 Griffing v. Harris, 9 Port. (Ala.) 
 225; Taylor v. Beck, 3 Rand. (Va.) 
 216; Jackson v. Parker, 13 Conn. 
 352; Freeman v. Britton, 2 Harr. 
 (N. J.) 191; Knight v. Packard, 3 
 McCord, 71; Slack v. Mass, Dud. 
 (Ga.) 161; Abbott v. Ross, 62 Me. 
 194; Stump v. Napier, 2 Yerger 
 (Tenn.), 35; Todd v. Stafford, 1 Stew. 
 (Ala.) 199; Gorham v. Carroll, 3 Litt. 
 (Ky.) 121; Ringgold v. Tyson, 3 
 Harr. & J. 172; Parsons v. Phipps, 
 4 Tex. 341 ; Bank v. Hull, 7 Mo. 273; 
 Williams v. Walbridge, 3 Wend. 
 415 ; Orr v. Lacey, 2 Doug. 230. 
 
 3 Parke v. Smith, 4 Watts & S. 
 287; Rohrerv. Morningstar, 18 Ohio, 
 579; Thayer v. Crossman, 1 Mete. 
 416. 
 
 4 Bubier v. Pulsifer, 4 Gray (Mass.), 
 592. 
 
 5 Haines v. Dennett, 11 N. H. 180. 
 
 6 Sweeney v. Easter, 1 Wall. 166. 
 
 7 Stones v. Byron, 4 Dowl. & L. 
 393; Dunn v. Packwood, 11 Jur. 242; 
 Mishler v. Baumgardner, 1 Am. L. 
 J. 304. 
 
 8 Little v. Keon, 1 N. Y. Code R. 4 ; 
 Linton v. Com., 46 Pa. St. 294; Fol- 
 lansbee v. Walker, 72 Pa. St. 230 ; 
 State v. Cook, 23 La. Ann. 347; Pot- 
 ter v. Ware, 1 Cush. 519, 524; Mealer 
 v. State (Tex., 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 
 142. Cf. Traser v. Haggerty, 86 
 Mich. 521. 
 
 9 Gardner v. Benedict, 27 N. Y. S. 
 3. As to privileged communica- 
 tions to attorneys, see g§ 169-174. 
 In Cook v. United States, 11 S. 
 Ct. 268 ; 138 U. S. 157, counsel for 
 the defendant was examined by the 
 prosecution as to matters not priv- 
 ileged.
 
 §§ 313, 314.] COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 447 
 
 counsel is imbued because of his relation to the parties to 
 the action. 
 
 § 3 1 3. Competency of judge as a witness. — In consequence 
 of the peculiar province and duties of the judge presiding in a 
 cause, it has been considered objectionable, if not highly im- 
 proper and erroneous, for him to act as a witness in the same 
 case. Aside from the objection that his conduct should not 
 be subjected to cross-examination and comment, his peculiar 
 duties in administering oaths to the witnesses, in case the 
 court has no clerk, in adjudicating upon their competency 
 and the admissibility of the evidence, with his power to com- 
 mit for contempt, render it unfit that he should assume the 
 dual character of witness and judge in the same cause. 1 So 
 upon analogous reasoning it has been held that, where a cause 
 was pending before several referees, one of them could not be 
 sworn or examined as a witness by the others. 2 But while 
 these considerations are reasonable they do not apply in the 
 trial of a case in which the witness, though he is a judge, is not 
 presiding in that case; and hence it is a rule that a judge ma}'' 
 testify, as, for example, to the accuracy of the notes which he 
 has taken at a former trial. 3 
 
 § 314. The incompetency of arbitrators as witnesses in 
 an action on the award. — An arbitrator is a competent wit- 
 ness to prove any facts upon the existence of which his au- 
 thority as an arbitrator depended. In an action to enforce 
 the award he may be required to testify as to what matters 
 were included in the submission, 4 or what subjects actually 
 came before him for action, 5 and what matters were actually 
 
 i Baker v. Thompson, 89 Ga. 486; (N. Y.) 197; Ross v. Buhler, 2 Mart. 
 
 Buccleugh v. Board, L. R. 5 H. L. N. S. (La.) 312; Welcome v. Batch- 
 
 418, 433; People v. Miller, 2 Parker elder, 23 Me. 85. 
 
 C. R, 197; Rex v. Harvey, 8 Cox C. 4 Republic Bank v. Darragh, 30 
 
 C. 103; Regina v. Gazard, 8 G & P. Hun (N. Y.), 29; Thrasher v. Overly, 
 
 595. See ante, § 175. 51 Ga. 91 ; Hale v. Huse, 10 Gray 
 
 2Morss v. Morss, 11 Barb. 310. (Mass.), 99; Hall v. Vanier, 6 Neb. 
 
 3 State v. Duffy, 57 Conn. 525; 85; Birbeck v. Burrows, 2 Hall, 51 ; 
 
 People v. Doluing, 59 N. Y. 374; Cady v. Walker, 62 Mich. 157. 
 
 Morss v. Morss, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 510; 5 Duke of Buccleugh v. Board, 
 
 Shall v. Miller, 5 Whart, (Pa.) 156; L. R. 5 H. L. Cas. 418; 2 Moak's 
 
 People v. Miller, 2 Park. Cr. Cas. Eng. 448.
 
 418 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. [§ 315. 
 
 considered by him. 1 So an arbitrator may testify to the fact 
 that an award was made and delivered, and, if it was oral, he 
 may be asked to state it on the witness stand. 2 But an arbi- 
 trator is not a competent witness to impeach the legality or 
 validity of the award, or to show the impropriety of his own 
 actions in connection therewith, unless he dissented from the 
 award. His voluntary assent to or acquiescence in the award 
 as rendered will estop him from denying its validity subse- 
 quently. 3 Neither can he be interrogated as to his reasons or 
 the motives which actuated him while exercising the quasi- 
 judicial and discretionary powers over the matter submitted 
 to him for arbitration. 4 
 
 § 315. Definition and form of oath and affirmation. — An 
 oath has been defined as "an outward pledge given by the 
 person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under 
 an immediate sense of his responsibility to God."" 5 This defi- 
 nition, it should be noticed, omits entirely the imprecatory 
 character which was so prominent in the definitions of the 
 earlier writers on evidence, 6 and is certainly more consonant 
 with modern ideas upon this subject and less calculated to 
 give offense to any who may have conscientious scruples 
 against invoking the anger of Deity upon themselves. 
 
 Oaths are divided into two classes: judicial oaths, which 
 are taken during a judicial proceeding, according to legal 
 direction or requirement, and extra-judicial oaths, which are 
 taken without any express authority or direction of law. 7 
 Judicial oaths are usually administered by the clerk of the 
 court, who repeats the following formula to the witness: "You 
 
 i Mayor of New York v. Butler, 1 Cobb v. Dortch, 52 Ga. 548; Alex- 
 Barb. 325 ; Cole v. Blunt, 2 Bosw. ander v. McNear, 28 Fed. Rep. 403 ; 
 116. Tucker v. Page. 09 111. 179; Jackson 
 
 *Boughton v. Seamans, 9 Hun, v. Gager, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 383. 
 
 ?,92. 5 Tyler on Oaths, p. 15. For other 
 
 3 Newland v. Douglas, 2 Johns. 02; definitions, see Anderson's Law- 
 Jackson v. Gager, 5 Cow. 383; Diet., citing Parkes v. Parkes, 25 
 Tucker v. Page, 69 111. 179; Camp- E. L. & E. 019; King v. White, 2 
 bell v. Weston, 3 Paige, 124. Leach Cr. Cas. 482. 
 
 * In re Whiteley (1891), 1 Ch. 558; 6 i stark. Ev. 22. 
 
 Chapman v. Ewing, 78 Ala. 403; 7 Anderson's Law Diet. 
 Aldrich v. Jessiman, 85 N. H. 510;
 
 315.] 
 
 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 
 
 449 
 
 do solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, 
 and nothing but the truth, as a witness in this issue now joined 
 between A. and B. So help vou God." The assent of the wit- 
 ness is expressed by his uplifted hand or by his placing his 
 hand upon a copy of the Gospels while the oath is being re- 
 peated, and by his kissing the Bible at its close. 1 But no 
 particular form of administering the oath was or is required 
 so long as the witness is sworn in such a way as he will con- 
 sider binding upon his conscience. 2 
 
 Where a witness, when about to be sworn, says that he is 
 an adherent of a religious faith other than Christianity, he 
 should be asked what oath he would consider most binding, 
 and if he prefers any other than the usual form he should be 
 sworn accordingly. 3 Even in the case of a witness who is a 
 Christian, his wishes and scruples will be respected, and if he 
 shall object to being sworn upon the Gospels his solemn af- 
 firmation will be regarded as equivalent thereto. 4 A witness 
 
 ! See Jackson v. State, 1 Ind. 185; 
 State v. Norris, 9 N. H. 101. 
 
 2 In Omichund v. Barker, Willes, 
 545, 547, the court said: "Oaths 
 were instituted long before the be- 
 ginning of the Christian era, and 
 were always held in the highest 
 veneration. The substance of an 
 oatli has nothing to do with Chris- 
 tianity. The forms have always 
 been different in different countries. 
 But still the substance is the same, 
 which is that God in all of them is 
 called upon to witness the truth of 
 what we say. Such infidels who be- 
 lieve in a God and that he will pun- 
 ish them if they swear falsely may 
 testify." 
 
 3 Omichund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 21, 
 46; Atchison v. Everett, Cowp. 389, 
 390; People v. Green (Cal., 1893), 34 
 Pac. Rep. 231 ; State v. Chyo Chiagk, 
 92 Mo. 395. 
 
 4 State v. Welch, 79 Me. 99. Many 
 persons, construing the scriptural in- 
 junction " Swear not at all " as an 
 express prohibition of oaths of every 
 
 29 
 
 sort, refuse, because of conscientious 
 principle, to participate in or assent 
 to any form of words which involves 
 an invocation of the Deity. To such 
 persons an interrogation somewhat 
 in the following form is usually pro- 
 pounded: "You do solemnly, sin- 
 cerely and truly declare and affirm 
 that you will state the truth, the 
 whole truth, and nothing but the 
 truth, in the issue now joined be- 
 tween A. and B." An affirmative 
 reply to this question is equivalent 
 to an oath, and renders the witness 
 liable to a prosecution for perjury in 
 case he testifies falsely. But it is 
 now held in England that the wit- 
 ness should be asked by the judge 
 whether the ground of his refusal 
 to be sworn is a lack of religious be- 
 lief or whether he objects to taking 
 an oath. If the witness declares he 
 has a religious belief he should be 
 required to take an oath. Reg. v. 
 Moore, 61 Law J. Mag. 80; 17 Cox 
 Cr. Cas. 458.
 
 450 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. [§ 315. 
 
 may, after leing sworn, be asked if he considers the oath he 
 has taken as binding, though it would be improper then to 
 ask him, if any other form would be deemed b}' him to be 
 of greater force; 1 for he is liable to be punished for per- 
 jury, though he does not consider himself bound by the form 
 of oath by which he was sworn, if he failed to object at the 
 time of swearing. 2 If the witness is sworn before a separate 
 trial is ordered in the case of several jointly indicted, he must 
 be again sworn thereafter. 3 
 
 The objection that a witness was not properly sworn cannot 
 be raised for the first time w r hen a motion is made for a new 
 trial, 4 unless the omission to swear him was not noticed by the 
 objecting party until after the trial had been finished. 5 
 
 The power to administer oaths is usually conferred upon 
 private arbitrators by statute. At common law they did not 
 possess it, 6 and an oath administered by an arbitrator was a 
 nullity so far as a prosecution of the witness for perjury was 
 concerned. 7 The parties to the arbitration may, however, un- 
 less the witness is absolutely required to be sworn by a stat- 
 ute, 8 waive the taking of an oath by the witness. 9 After the 
 waiver, which may be by express language or by necessary 
 
 1 The Queen's Case, 2 Brod. & Bing. 6 Rice v. Hassenpflug, 13 N. E. 
 284. Rep. 655 ; 45 Ohio St. 477 ; Large v. 
 
 2 State v. Whisenhurst, 2 Hawks, Passmore, 5 S. & R. (Pa.) 51 ; Peo- 
 458. The clerk will be allowed, where pie v. Townsend, 5 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 a defendant has many aliases, to re- 315. 
 
 peat them in swearing a witness, 7 Frazer v. Phelps, 3 Sandf. (N. Y.) 
 
 stating also his true name. If the 741 ; Bonner v. McPhail, 31 Barb. 
 
 aliases are given in the indictment, (N. Y. ) 106. 
 
 their repetition by the clerk in the 8 Wolfe v. Hyatt, 76 Mo. 156. 
 
 hearing of the jurors is not calcu- 9 Newcomb v. Wood, 7 Otto(U. S.), 
 
 lated to prejudice them against the 581; Cochran v. Bartell, 91 Mo. 655; 
 
 prisoner. People v. Everhart, 104 3 S. W. Rep. 854 ; Maynard v. Fred- 
 
 N. Y. 591; 11 N. E. Rep. 62. erick, 7 Cush. 247; Price v. Perkins. 
 
 3 Abbott, Crim. Brief, § 336 ; Bab- 2 Dev. Eq. (N. C.) 250. An arbitra- 
 cock v. People, 15 Hun (N. Y.), 347. tor who possesses no statutory power 
 
 4 Goldsmith v. State (Tex., 1893), to administer an oath should call in a 
 22 S. W. Rep. 405. notary or other officer who has that 
 
 5 Hawks v. Baker, 6 Greenl. (Me.) power. Russell on Arbitration, 189. 
 72. In a trial for a felony it is ground See Rice v. Hassenpflug, 45 Ohio St. 
 for reversal to swear a witness while 377; 13 N. E. Rep. 655. 
 
 the accused is not in court. Bear- 
 den v. State, 44 Ark. 331.
 
 § 31C] COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 451 
 
 implication from the conduct or the silence of a party, he 
 cannot claim to have an award set aside for the sole reason 
 that the witnesses were not sworn. 1 
 § 316. Incompetency because of a lack of religions belief. 
 
 At common law, in consequence of the paramount importance 
 attached to the religious element of an oath, all persons whose 
 religious faith did not involve the belief in a Deity who would 
 punish falsehood were incompetent as witnesses. 2 So it was 
 sa'id, to require an oath to be taken by one who, like the athe- 
 ist, " was presumed to be unable to appreciate its religious 
 sanction, was a mockery of justice." 3 Every person born and 
 educated under the influence of Christianity was prima facie 
 presumed to possess sufficient religious faith to render him 
 competent as a witness. In any case he was only required to 
 believe in a God who would punish perjury, and it was of no 
 consequence w T hether he believed that the perjurer would be 
 punished by remorse of conscience in this life or beyond the 
 grave in some other way. 4 The witness could not usually be 
 directly questioned as to his possession of a religious belief, 
 though his atheism might always be shown b}' the evidence 
 of other persons in whose hearing he had voluntarily declared 
 his lack of religious belief: 5 and the fact that he had subse- 
 quently acquired sufficient religious faith to render him com- 
 petent might also be shown. 6 
 
 It is now the law by statute in almost every state in the 
 Union that no witness shall be considered incompetent be- 
 cause of his belief or disbelief in the tenets of any system of 
 religious faith, provided he understands the nature of an oath. 
 In conformity with the principles underlying such statutory 
 enactments, and having regard to existing federal and state 
 constitutional guaranties intended to secure freedom of relig- 
 
 i Cochran v. Bartell, 91 Mo. 655. 369; Bush v. Com., 80 Ky. 248, 250. 
 
 2 0michund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 21. See Com. v. Hills, 10 Cush. 532; 
 
 3 See ante, § 315. Hale v. Everett, 53 N. H. 55 ; Gibson 
 4 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 369; People v. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 37 N. Y. 584, for 
 
 v. Matteson, 2 Co wen, 433, 473; definitions of "atheist" and "in- 
 
 Crappell v. State, 71 Ala. 324 ; Brock fidel." 
 
 v. Milligan, 10 Ohio, 123, 125; Blocker 5 Odell v. Koppel, 5 Heisk. (Tenn.) 
 
 v. Burness, 2 Ala. 355; Arnold v. 88; Com. v. Smith, 2 Gray, 516. 
 
 Arnold, 13 Vt. 43, 362; Hunscom v. 6 Atwood v. Welton, 7 Conn. 66; 
 
 Hunscom, 15 Mass. 184; 3 Bl. Com. Scott v. Hooper, 14 Vt. 535.
 
 452 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. [§ 317. 
 
 ious belief, any question tending to discredit the witness by 
 showing his atheism or agnosticism is decidedly objection- 
 able. 1 So where, by constitutional enactment, it is provided 
 that no person shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil 
 rights on account of his religious principles, it is held that a 
 party is not incompetent as a witness in his own behalf be- 
 cause he did not believe in a God that would punish false 
 swearing. 2 
 
 § 317. Incompetency of insane persons as witnesses. — 
 The common law recognized little, if any, distinction between 
 the numerous forms which insanity assumes. Thus, a person 
 mentally unsound in any respect, whether he was an imbecile 
 or idiot, a furious maniac or a quiet sufferer from melancholia, 
 senile dementia or some harmless and perhaps temporary 
 monomania, was incompetent as a witness, 3 though if the ex- 
 istence of a lucid interval was properly established he was per- 
 mitted to testify. 
 
 It is now well established that the insanity or intellectual 
 weakness of a witness, no matter what shape it ma} r take, is 
 no objection to his competency, provided he has mental ca- 
 pacity sufficient to discern between right and wrong, so far 
 as the facts at issue and his testimony thereon are involved, 
 understands the binding character of an oath, 4 and can give 
 an apparently intelligible and reasonable account of any 
 transaction which he has seen or heard. 5 Nor is a party pre- 
 vented from testifying because he alleges and offers evidence 
 to show his own mental impairment. 6 A witness who is ex- 
 amined by a commission out of court will be presumed to be 
 
 i People v. Copsey, 71 Cal. 548. Crim. Ev. 128; Best's Ev., p. 168; 
 
 -'State v. Powers, 51 N. J. L. 432; Evans v. Hettich, 7 Wheat. 453, 470. 
 
 17 Atl. Rep. 969; Ewing v. Bailey, <Reg. v. Hill, 15 Jur. 470; 5 Eng. 
 
 36 111. App. 191 ; Hroueck v. People L. & Eq. 547; 5 Cox's C. C. 259, 266; 
 
 (111., 1890), 24 N. E. Rep. 861. In Holcomb v. Holcomb, 28 Conn. 177; 
 
 enunciating the rule at common District v. Armes, 107 U. S. 521 ; 
 
 law, Shaw, C. J., said in Com. v. Coleman v. Com., 25 Gratt. 865: 
 
 Smith, 2 Gray, 516: "The want of Worthington v. Mencer (Ala., 1892), 
 
 such religious belief must be estab- 11 S. Rep. 72. 
 
 lished by other means than the ex- 5 Walker v. State (Ala., 1893), 12 
 
 animation of the witness upon the S. Rep. 83. 
 
 stand." 6 Dickson v. Waldron (Ind., 1893), 
 
 3 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 365; White's 35 N. E. Rep. 1. 
 Case, 2 Leach's Cr. Cas. 430; Rose.
 
 §§ 318, 319.] COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 453 
 
 sane, and in case evidence of his insanity is offered when his 
 deposition is read in court, the question of his mental capac- 
 ity is then for the jury. 1 Where the witness, though he has 
 been legally pronounced insane and is in charge of a commit- 
 tee, has been permitted bj 7 the court to testify as a competent 
 witness, his credibilit} 7 is a question for the jur}'. 2 If his evi- 
 dence is uncorroborated, and where, being a party, he is inter- 
 ested in the suit, the jury may refuse to believe his testimony 
 if upon his whole evidence and his actions while on the stand 
 they believe his mind is so far diseased that his evidence is un- 
 reliable and incredible. 3 
 
 § 318. Deaf-mutes as witnesses. — By the earlier common 
 law a deaf-mute was regarded as an idiot, 4 and deemed to be 
 so utterly devoid of understanding that he was incompetent 
 to testify as a witness until it was clearly and affirmatively 
 shown that he possessed sufficient intelligence for that pur- 
 pose, 5 and the burden of proving him competent was on the 
 party producing him. At the present day, if he can read and 
 write, he may be questioned and may reply in writing, 6 though 
 ordinarily, even if he can write, his examination may be con- 
 ducted by the use of signs with the aid of an interpreter who 
 is properly qualified. 7 Expert testimony is not required to 
 show the intelligence of a deaf and dumb witness where his 
 employer or some other person acquainted with him testifies 
 to his intelligence and to his knowledge of the sign language. 8 
 
 § 319. Children as witnesses. — Until the contrary is shown, 
 it is a presumption that after a child has attained the age of 
 
 ^ainesworth v. Caldwell, 81 Ga. which he can make it intelligible, 
 
 76. Cf. contra, where a witness is but such writing must be written 
 
 examined in court, Clements v. Mc- and such signs made in open court. 
 
 Ginn (Cal., 1893), 33 Pac. Rep. 920. Evidence so given is deemed to be 
 
 2 People ex rel. Norton v. N. Y. oral evidence." Stephen's Digest, 
 
 Hospital, 3 Abb. N. C. £29. art. 106. 
 
 3 Worthington v. Mencer (Ala., 7 Skaggs v. State, 108 Ind. 53; 
 1892), 11 S. Rep. 72. Com. v. Hill, 14 Mass. 207; Ruston's 
 
 4 4 Bl. Cora. 303-4. Case, 1 Leach's Cr. Cas. 408; State v. 
 
 5 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 366. Wolf, 8 Conn. 93; State v. Howard 
 
 6 Morrison v. Leonard, 3 C. & P. (Mo., 1893), 24 S. W. Rep. 81; Sny- 
 127. "A witness, unable to speak der v. Nations, 5 Blackf. 295. 
 
 or hear, is not incompetent, but may 8 State v. Weldon (S. C, 1893), 17 
 give his evidence by writing or by S. E. Rep. 688. 
 signs, or in any other manner in
 
 454: COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. [§ 320. 
 
 fourteen he possesses sufficient intelligence to testify as a wit- 
 ness. In the case of a child under that age his competency 
 must be shown. 1 It matters not how young he may be, he 
 will be competent if he possesses enough mental capacity and 
 memory to enable him to give a reasonably intelligent account 
 of the transaction he is called upon to describe, and understands 
 the character, effect and obligation of an oath. 2 Where the 
 child does not fully understand the nature t and obligation of 
 an oath, the court may, in its discretion, where the witness 
 has sufficient mental capacity to profit by such teaching, allow 
 him to be more fully instructed by a proper person. 3 The 
 competency of a child under fourteen is always a question for 
 the discretion of the court, and unless this discretion is grossly 
 abused, its exercise is not reviewable on appeal. 4 
 
 § 320. Witnesses rendered incompetent by conviction of 
 infamous crimes — The effect of pardon.— At common law 
 persons who had been convicted of perjury, murder, piracy, 
 forgery, arson or other infamous crimes were thereby ren- 
 dered incompetent to testify as witnesses. A delinquency of 
 this character was conclusively presumed to indicate such a 
 state of moral turpitude on the part of the person who had 
 been convicted that his absolute incapacity to tell the truth 
 was taken for granted. In other words, the probability that 
 
 1 Hughes v. Detroit, 31 N. W. Rep. would be punished if she did not 
 603 ; 63 Mich. 10. tell the truth, was held competent 
 
 2 Davis v. State (Neb., 1890), 47 as a witness. 
 
 N. W. Rep. 854 ; State v. McGuff, 3 Rex v. Wade, 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 
 
 88 Ala. 151; McGuire v. People, 44 86: Com. v. Lynes, 142 Mass. 570- 
 
 Mich. 286 ; Jones v. Brooklyn, etc. 580. Contra, Rex v. Williams, 7 
 
 Co., 3 N. Y. S. 253; State v. Sever- P. & P. 320. Of. Reg. v. Nicholas, 
 
 son, 43 N. W. Rep. 533; Hoist v. 2 C. & K. 246; Taylor v. State (Tex., 
 
 State, 23 Tex. App. 1; Moore v. State, 1887), 3 S. W. Rep. 753. 
 
 79 Ga. 498. But the dying declara- i Ridenhour v. Kansas City, 102 
 
 tion of a child four years old has Mo. 270; People v. Frindel, 58 Hun, 
 
 been rejected upon the presumption 482; Hawkins v. State, 27 Tex. App. 
 
 that one so young could not realize 273 ; State v. Severson (Iowa, 1889), 
 
 the idea of a future state. Rex v. 43 N. W. Rep. 533. Leading ques- 
 
 Pike, 3 C. & P. 598; People v. Mc- tions are never objectionable when 
 
 Nair, 21 Wend. 608; State v. Michael, put to a youthful witness to ascer- 
 
 37 W. Va. 565. In Agnew v. Brook- tain his competency and under- 
 
 lyn City R. R. Co., 5 N. Y. S. 756, a standing of an oath. Hodge v. State 
 
 child only six and a half years of (Fla., 1890), 7 S. Rep. 593. 
 age, who stated that she knew she
 
 § 320.] COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 455 
 
 a person convicted of an infamous crime would commit per- 
 jury if allowed to testif} r as a witness was so great that the 
 interest of truth and justice demanded his exclusion from the 
 witness stand. 1 The common law required that the witness 
 should have been convicted of an infamous crime, and the 
 early writers usually classified under this head treason, felony 
 and the crimen falsi? 
 
 So far as treason is concerned, and that very numerous class 
 of offenses which in England, until the beginning of the pres- 
 ent century, constituted felony at common law, but little un- 
 certainty was experienced. A conviction of perjury, 3 forgerj 7 , 4 
 or conspiracy to suppress testimon} T or to obstruct justice, 5 
 was always sufficient to exclude the person convicted from 
 the witness stand. On the other hand, under the term crimen 
 falsi was rather loosely grouped those minor offenses, such as 
 criminal libel, barratr} 7 , maintenance and the like, which, 
 while not amounting to felony at common law, indicate an 
 inherent lack of respect for truth, or a deliberate intention to 
 interfere with and obstruct the administration of justice, or 
 to employ the machinery of the law for improper ends by the 
 person perpetrating such crimes. 6 
 
 As between third parties the witness was absolutely incom- 
 petent, 7 and the admission of his evidence was adequate ground 
 for a new trial. But it seems that his affidavit under certain 
 circumstances was receivable as to collateral points not in- 
 volved in the main issue, as, for example, on a motion to set 
 aside a judgment which had been irregularly rendered. 8 The 
 incompetency caused by infamy is removable at common law 
 by the pardon of the witness, 9 by the reversal of the judgment 
 
 I 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 372. The con- 3 Co. Lit. 6b. 
 
 viction of the witness could only be i Rex v. Davis, 6 Mod. 74. 
 
 proved by the record as at present 5 Bushel v. Barrett, Ry. & M. 434. 
 
 (Rexv. CastellCareinion, 8 East), and 6 2 Russ. on Crimes, 592; 1 Greenl. 
 
 the judgment must have been ren- on Ev., g 375. In Butler v. Went- 
 
 dered by a court having jurisdiction, worth, 84 Me. 25, an infamous crime, 
 
 Cooke v. Maxwell, 2 Stark.' 183. So for which no one can be held unless 
 
 if he has been convicted merely, but indicted, has been defined as one 
 
 not sentenced, it seems he is still that is punishable by more than one 
 
 competent. Brown v. Orr, 86 Va. year's imprisonment. 
 
 935. 7 In re Sawyer, 2 Q. B. 721. 
 
 26 Com. Dig. 353, Testmoigne, A. 8 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 374. 
 
 4, 5; Co. Lit. 6b; 2 Hale, P. G. 277. 9 Boyd v. United States, 142 U. S.
 
 45G 
 
 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 
 
 [§ 320. 
 
 against him, or by his enduring the punishment of imprison- 
 ment or transportation annexed to the crime of which he had 
 been convicted. When, however, a statute in expressly pre- 
 scribing the punishment which is to be inflicted for the com- 
 mission of a crime, provides also that the person convicted 
 thereunder shall forever be incompetent as a witness in any 
 court, a pardon is ineffectual to restore his competency. 1 A 
 witness who is infamous is not rendered competent by a par- 
 don which merely "remits the residue of the punishment he 
 was to endure," 2 or which is subject to revocation by the par- 
 doning power in case he shall again be convicted. 3 But a full 
 pardon is not rendered ineffectual because it was granted for 
 the express purpose of rendering a witness competent to tes- 
 tify in a case then pending in a court under the jurisdiction 
 of the pardoning power, and in which the state is the prose- 
 cutor. 4 The incompetency caused by a conviction of crime 
 is not regarded as an essential part of the punishment, nor is 
 
 450 ; Logan v. United States. 144 id. 
 263; Puryear v. Com., 83 Va. 51; 
 Martin v. State, 21 Tex. App. 1; 
 United States v. Hall(D. C), 53 Fed. 
 Rep. 352; State v. Dodson, 16 S. C. 
 453; Rivers v. State, 10 Tex. App. 
 177; Hester v. Com., 85 Pa. St. 139; 
 Jones v. Harris, 1 Strobh. (S. C.) 160. 
 See, also, Com. v. Bush, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 
 264; State v. Foley, 15 Nev. 64. 
 
 iRex v. Ford, 2 Salk. 690; Blane 
 v. Rogers, 49 Cal. 15 ; 2 Russell on 
 Crimes, 595, 596; Bull. N. P. 292. 
 It is provided in several states that 
 a person convicted of perjury is not 
 rendered competent as a witness by 
 his pardon. Virginia, Code, 3898; 
 Florida, Thomp. Dig. 344 ; West Vir- 
 ginia, Code, ch. 152, § 17. 
 
 2 Perkins v. Stevens, 24 Pick. 
 (Mass.) 277. 
 
 3McGee v. State, 16 S. W. Rep. 
 422 ; 29 Tex. App. 596. 
 
 4 Boyd v. United States, 142 U. S. 
 450. Parol evidence is admissible 
 to show that a pardon covered the 
 crime of which witness was guilty 
 
 (Martin v. State, 21 Tex. App. 1), or 
 to identify the person named in it 
 (State v. Rose, 92 Mo. 201). . The 
 court is bound to take judicial no- 
 tice of a general amnesty or legisla- 
 tive pardoning act (State v. Blalock, 
 Phill. (N. C.) 242), but an executive 
 pardon of a particular individual, 
 being in its nature a private deed or 
 release, must be proved, usually by 
 the production in court of the in- 
 strument itself. United States v. 
 Wilson, 7 Pet. (U S.) 150; State v. 
 Babtiste, 26 La, Ann. 134 ; Rosson v. 
 Stehr, 23 Tex. App. 287; Spalding 
 v. Saxton, 6 Watts (Pa.), 338. An 
 absolute pardon once delivered and 
 accepted is irrevocable (Rosson v. 
 Stehr, 23 Tex. App. 287), while if the 
 performance of some act by the wit- 
 ness is required before the pardon 
 becomes operative to restore his 
 competency, it will be necessary to 
 show that the condition has been 
 performed. Waring v. United States, 
 
 7 Ct. CI. 501 ; Scott v. United States,. 
 
 8 id. 457 ; State v. Keith, 63 N. C. 140.
 
 § 321.] COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 457 
 
 the conviction effective to disqualify the person beyond the 
 territorial limits of the jurisdiction wherein judgment was 
 rendered against him. A witness convicted in one state is 
 not incompetent to testify in the courts of a sister state, though 
 under a statute of the latter state persons convicted of crime 
 are incompetent. 1 
 
 § 321. Statutory regulation of the competency of wit- 
 nesses convicted of crime. — The common-law incompetency 
 of persons convicted of crime is generally abolished by stat- 
 utes in the United States. In many of the states the fact that 
 a witness has been convicted of any crime, however that 
 crime may imply or indicate his utter lack of respect for truth, 
 is no objection to his competency, though it is allowable to 
 show his conviction by proper evidence to enable the jury to 
 estimate his moral character as a man and his credibility as a 
 witness. 2 
 
 In some states a conviction of certain crimes, as perjury, 
 the commission of which involves an utter disregard of the 
 obligation or sanctity of an oath, is still an insuperable objec- 
 tion to the competency of a witness. 3 In some few of the 
 states of the Union a witness who has been convicted of a 
 capital crime or of certain specified felonies which involve or 
 indicate a high degree of moral turpitude, such, for example, 
 
 1 Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. ch. 82, § 105), Missouri (R. S. 1889, 
 263. Contra, Peltier v. State, 23 § 8925), Wisconsin (R. S. 1878, sec. 
 Tex. App. 366; Sims v. Sims, 75 4073), Delaware (Laws, vol. 17, ch. 
 N. Y. 466. 598, § 3), Kansas (Gen. Stat. 1889, 
 
 2 This is the statute law in New §4414), Nebraska (Code, p. 672, §330), 
 York (Code Civ. Pro. 831), Rhode Nevada (Gen. St. 1885, § 3399, sec. 
 Island (Pub. St., ch. 214, § 38), Utah 377), Montana (Code Civ. Proc. 647) 
 (Compiled Laws 1888, vol. 2, tit. 10, and Oregon (Hill's Ann. Laws 1887, 
 ch. 2), Colorado (Gen. Laws, § 3647), ch. 8, title 3, § 710). 
 
 California (Civil Code, § 1879), Con- 3 This is the law in Alabama (Code 
 
 necticut (Gen. Stat., § 1098), Indiana 1886, § 2766), Florida (Laws, ch. 202, 
 
 (R. S., 1888, §§ 506, 1798), Georgia § 6), Maryland (Pub. Gen. Laws, 
 
 (Code, § 3854), Michigan (Howell's art. 35, § 1), Mississippi (Rev. Code 
 
 Ann. Stat., §§ 7543, 7544), Illinois 1S80, § 1600), Pennsylvania (Laws 
 
 (R. S., ch. 51, § 1), Massachusetts 1887, ch. 89, § 2). Vermont (R. L. 
 
 (Pub. Stat., ch. 169, § 19), Minnesota 1880, § 1008) and Washington (Code, 
 
 (Statutes, § 5095), New Hampshire vol. 2, § 1647). The statutes cited in 
 
 (Pub. St. 1891, ch. 223, § 26), Ohio this and the preceding note are stated 
 
 (R. S. 1886, §§ 5240, 7284), Iowa (Rev. in full in 1 Greenleaf, note to § 372. 
 Code 1886, § 3637), Maine (R. S. 1883,
 
 458 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. [§ 322. 
 
 as burglary, forgery, counterfeiting, rape, arson, perjury, big- 
 amy, sodomy, etc., is by statute rendered absolutely incom- 
 petent to testify. 1 
 
 § 322. Statutes construed. — Where the conviction of a wit- 
 ness of crime is no longer any objection to his competency 
 the party in whose behalf he is called to testify may intro- 
 duce evidence of his reputation for truthfulness if his credi- 
 bility is impeached by proof of his previous conviction. 2 In 
 such a case the character of the witness for truthfulness is con- 
 sidered to be put in issue by evidence from which the jury is 
 permitted to draw the inference that the witness has committed 
 perjury because he has been guilty of some other crime of per- 
 haps a totally dissimilar character. In other words, the witness, 
 having been shown to be of a depraved character in one par- 
 ticular, may be equally deficient in moral qualities in other 
 directions. The conviction must, in the absence of statute, 
 be shown by the record ; :1 and if an appeal therefrom is pend- 
 ing when the witness is examined, evidence of the conviction 
 is inadmissible to impeach his evidence. 4 
 
 Upon the question whether, under the existing statutes, the 
 conviction of a witness for any crime which would not have 
 rendered him incompetent at common law may be shown for 
 the purpose of impeaching his credit, the cases are divided. 
 Much of course depends upon the express terms of the stat- 
 ute. On the one hand, it has been held that the witness may 
 be discredited by showing him to have been guilty of a mis- 
 
 i Arkansas (Code, § 2859), Ten- land v. State, 2 Pickle (Tenn.), 472), 
 
 nessee (Code, § 4562), Texas (Code if he elects to do so. 
 
 Cr. Pro. 730), Virginia (Code 1887, 2 Webb v. State, 29 Ohio St. 351 ; 
 
 § 3898). See last note. See, also, Com. v. Ford, 146 Mass. 131; Gertz 
 
 Corn. v. McGuire, 84 Ky. 57. These v. Fitchburg, 137 Mass. 77. 
 
 statutes are to be strictly construed 3 Com. v. Gorham, 99 Mass. 420; 
 
 and the crimes mentioned in them Hilts v. Colvin, 14 Johns. 182; Pul- 
 
 will be presumed to be crimes at len v. Pullen, 43 N. J. Eq. 139. 
 
 common law. Williams v. Dicken- Contra by statute, Spiegel v. Hays, 
 
 son, 28 Fla. 90; Com. v. Minor, 89 118 N. Y. 660; Com. v. Sullivan, 150 
 
 Ky. 555; 13 S. W. Rep. 5. Nor Mass. 315; State v. Miller, 100 Mo. 
 
 should these statutes be so construed 606; People v. Rodrigo, 69 Cal. 601; 
 
 as to prevent one accused of crime State v. Adamson, 43 Minn. 196. 
 
 from testifying in his own behalf 4 Jones v. State (Tex., 1893), 22 S. 
 
 (Ranson v. State, 40 Ark. 176; Ray- W. Rep. 404; Card v. Foot, 57 Conn. 
 
 431. See g 354!
 
 § 323.] 
 
 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 
 
 459 
 
 demeanor, 1 though where a statute expressly provides that 
 the witness may be interrogated as regards a " conviction of 
 felony," proof of a misdemeanor is inadmissible. 2 The cur- 
 rent of the decisions, however, supports the contrary view, 
 that a conviction for those infamous crimes only can be proved 
 which would have destroyed his competency at common law. 3 
 Where a statute removes the common-law disability arising 
 from infamy, the confession by a witness that he has per- 
 jured himself in the same matter to which he now testifies 
 constitutes no objection to his competency. 4 
 
 § 323. Accomplices. — At common law an accomplice was 
 competent as a witness for or against the accused, even though 
 jointly indicted with him, provided he was not himself act- 
 ually a party to the record. 5 If they are jointly tried and the 
 evidence against either is insufficient to convict, he may be 
 acquitted and discharged and be called to testify as a witness. 6 
 
 i State v. Pfefferlee, 36 Kan. 90; 
 Fischer v. Insurance Co., 33 Fed. 
 Rep. 544; Quigley v. Turner, 150 
 Mass. ,108 ; Com. v. Ford, 146 Mass. 
 131; 15 N. E. Rep. 153; Helm v. State 
 (Miss., 1S90), 7 S. Rep. 487. 
 
 2 Hanners v. McClelland, 74 Iowa, 
 318. 
 
 3 Bennett v. State, 24 Tex. App. 73 ; 
 Bartholomew v. People, 104 111. 601 ; 
 Card v. Foot, 57 Conn. 431 ; Coble v. 
 State, 31 Ohio St. 100; Com. v. 
 Dance, 8 Cush. 384 ; Reddick v. State, 
 21 Tex. App. 267 ; People v. Carolan, 
 71 Cal. 195. 
 
 < People v. O'Neil, 109 N. Y. 251. 
 In United States v. Gates, 6 Fed. 
 Rep. 866, the court said: "In early- 
 times the character of the crime was 
 determined by the punishment in- 
 flicted, but in modern times the act 
 itself, its nature, purpose and effect, 
 are looked at in determining whether 
 it is infamous or not." 
 
 5 As to presumptions respecting ac- 
 complices, see § 226. 
 
 6 See ante, § 305. One who, solely 
 
 for the purpose of discovering and 
 procuring the punishment of crim- 
 inals, communicates with and aids 
 them without a criminal intent, is 
 not an accomplice. People v. Smith, 
 94 N. Y. 649 ; People v. Molins, 10 
 N. Y. S. 130 ; State v. McKean, 30 
 Iowa, 343 ; Com. v. Downing, 4 Gray 
 (Mass.), 29; Com. v. Baker, 29 N. E. 
 Rep. 512; 155 Mass. 287; Com. v. 
 Willard, 22 Pick. 476; Campbell v. 
 Com., 84 Pa. St. 187; Harrington 
 v. State, 36 Ala. 236 ; State v. Brown- 
 lee (Iowa, 1892), 51 N. W. Rep. 25. 
 Whether an accomplice shall be per- 
 mitted to turn "state's evidence," 
 and when he does so, whether 
 he is entitled to exemption from 
 future prosecution on that account, 
 are wholly discretionary with the 
 public prosecutor. State v. Runnels, 
 28 Ark. 121. Mere knowledge that 
 an offense is being or has been com- 
 mitted does not render a party pos- 
 sessing such knowledge an accom- 
 plice. Alford v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 299 ; State v. Umble (Mo., 1893),
 
 460 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. [§ 323. 
 
 But accomplices jointly indicted are not competent witnesses 
 for each other while the indictment is pending, though they 
 may be tried separately. They do not become competent for 
 each other until the defendant who is to testify as a witness 
 has his name taken from the record by a nolle prosequi or 
 an acquittal. 1 When the defendants are separately indicted 
 they are of course competent for each other. 2 So where the 
 common-law disability of convicted criminals has been abro- 
 gated by statute, or where it is removed by pardon or other- 
 wise, no valid reason is conceived to exist against the admission 
 of the testimony of a convicted accomplice upon the trial of 
 another person who may have been implicated with him in 
 the commission of crime. 3 Where several are jointly tried it 
 is competent for the court to order the entering of a nolle 
 prosequi or to accept a plea of guilty on a promise of im- 
 munity or to order an acquittal for the express purpose of en- 
 abling an accomplice to testify for the prosecution. 4 
 
 The admission of the testimony of accomplices who are 
 under indictment as witnesses for the prosecution is said, 
 however, to be largely in the discretion of the court. 5 The 
 question is usually not only can the prisoner be convicted if 
 the accomplice does not testify, but can he be convicted if he 
 does testify. If, on the one hand, sufficient evidence has been 
 given upon which the jury may convict the accused without 
 receiving that of the accomplice, or if, on the other, the evi- 
 dence which was offered is so weak and conflicting that even 
 Avith his testimony no reasonable probability arises that a 
 
 22 S. W. Rep. 378; People v. Mc- State, 11 Colo. 170; Townsend v. 
 
 Gonegal, 136 N. Y. 62; Elizando v. Bush, 1 Conn. 267; State v. Walker 
 
 State, 31 Tex. Crira. Rep. 237; Peo- (Mo., 188S), S. W. Rep. 646; Mus- 
 
 ple v. McGuire, 135 N. Y. 639. son v. Fales, 16 Mass. 335; Churchill 
 
 i Noyes v. State, 40 N. J. L. 429; v. Stiter, 4 id. 1C2. 
 
 State v. Barrows, 76 Me. 401 ; Carroll 4 State v. Graham, 41 N. J. L. 15; 
 
 v. State, 5 Neh. 31; Allen v. State, 10 Lindsay v. People, 63 N. Y. 143; 
 
 Ohio St. 287; MeKenzie v. State, 24 State v. Lyon, SI N. C. 600; United 
 
 Ark. C36. States v. Ford, 9 Otto (U. S.), 594; 
 
 2 United States v. Hunter, lCranch, State v. Steifel, 106 Mo. 129; Oliver 
 
 416; Lucre v. State, 7 Baxter (Tenn.), v. Com., 77 Va. 590. See ante, § 305. 
 
 148. s people v. Whipple, 9 Cowen, 707 ; 
 
 3 Taylor v. People, 12 Hun, 212; Com. v. Brown, 130 Mass. 279; Run- 
 Rex v. Westbeer, 1 Leach, 14; Rex nels v. State, 28 Ark. 121. 
 v. Fletcher, 1 Stra. 633 ; Wisdom v.
 
 § 323.] 
 
 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 
 
 461 
 
 conviction will result, the court may reject him as a witness. 1 
 An accomplice who voluntarily confesses his own guilt and 
 offers to testify against his criminal associates cannot demand 
 as of right any exemption from a prosecution for his own 
 crime. 2 Cut such a witness whose evidence has aided mate- 
 rially in the conviction of another criminal certainly has a 
 strong moral claim to clemency, and, if he is subsequently 
 convicted of that crime, his moral claim should be recognized 
 by the pardoning power under such circumstances; and, partic- 
 ularly if his testimony was procured by a promise of immu- 
 nity, or during interviews with the public prosecutor, principles 
 of justice demand and the prevalent practice would sanction 
 the judicial recommendation of his case to the executive in 
 order that his pardon may be obtained. 3 But the voluntary 
 confession of an accomplice made under a promise of immu- 
 nity may be used against him on his subsequent trial where 
 lie refuses subsequently thereto to testify against his associ- 
 ates in crime. 4 In consequence of the doubtful character of 
 the evidence of an accomplice, the law not only permits but 
 encourages his liberal and exhaustive cross-examination for the 
 
 1 Rex v. Mellor, Staff Sum. Ass'n, 
 1833; State v. Pratt, 98 Mo. 482; 
 Reg. v. Sparks, 1 F. & F. 388 ; Ray v. 
 State, 1 Greene (Iowa), 31(3; Wight 
 v. Rindskopf, 43 Wis. 344. 
 
 2 United States v. Ford, 99 U. S. 
 594; United States v. Hinz, 35 Fed. 
 Rep. 723 ; Long v. State, 86 Ala. 36. 
 
 3 State v. Graham, 41 N. J. L. 15; 
 State v. Lyon, 81 N. C. 600; Neely 
 v. State, 27 Tex. App. 324. Cf. Reg. 
 v. Garside, 2 Lew. C. C. 38 ; Long v. 
 State, 86 Ala. 36. " Accomplices not 
 convicted of an infamous crime when 
 separately tried are competent wit- 
 nesses for or against each other. 
 The universal usage is that such a 
 party, if called and examined by the 
 state on the trial of his associates in 
 guilt, will not be prosecuted for the 
 same offense, provided it appears 
 that he acted in good faith and that 
 
 he testified fully and fairly. But it 
 is equally clear that he cannot plead 
 such fact in bar of an indictment 
 against him, nor avail himself of it 
 upon his trial; for it is merely an 
 equitable title to the mercy of the 
 executive, subject to the conditions 
 stated, and can only come before the 
 court by way of application to put 
 off the trial in order to give the pris- 
 oner time to apply to the executive 
 for that purpose." United States v. 
 Ford, 99 U. S. 595. 
 
 4 United States v. Hinz, 35 Fed. 
 Rep. 272; State v. Condry, 5 Jones' 
 L. (N. C.) 418; Com. v. Knapp, 10 
 Pick. (Mass.) 477; Runnels v. State, 
 28 Ark. 121 ; Wight v. Rindskopf, 43 
 Wis. 349; Neely v. State, 27 Tex. 
 App. 324; Alderman v. People, 4 
 Mich. 411 ; Rex v. Gillis, 11 Cox C. C. 
 69. See ante, § — , Confessions.
 
 4C2 
 
 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 
 
 [§ 324. 
 
 purpose of testing the credit due him while on the witness 
 stand. 1 
 
 § 324. Corroboration of accomplices. — While no presump- 
 tion of law exists against the credibility of the evidence of an 
 accomplice so that a conviction may be had upon his uncor- 
 roborated evidence alone, 2 the jury is usually instructed or 
 advised that the utmost caution should be employed in the re- 
 ception and consideration of accomplice evidence, or that it 
 should be submitted to the strictest scrutiny. 3 Accordingly 
 juries are generally advised that they may acquit the accused 
 if the evidence of the accomplice is not corroborated, though 
 a failure to so instruct is not ground for a new trial. 4 
 
 iCom. v. Price, 10 Gray (Mass.), 
 472; Lee v. State, 21 Ohio St. 151; 
 Marler v. State, 67 Ala. 55; Hamil- 
 ton v. People, 29 Mich. 173. Cf. 
 Craft v. Com., 81 Ky. 349. Whether 
 a witness is an accomplice has been 
 held to be a question for the jury. 
 People v. Bollinger, 71 Cal. 17. The 
 defense may show that an accom- 
 plice testifying for the state does so 
 with the expectation of gain or im- 
 munity, and it is immaterial whether 
 there has been any actual agreement 
 to that effect with the public prose- 
 cuting officer or not. Allen v. State, 
 10 Ohio St.' 287 ; People v. Langtree, 
 64 Cal. 256; Tullis v. State, 30 Ohio 
 St. 200; United States v. Hinz, 35 
 Fed. Rep. 272. The jury need not 
 be convinced that he is an accom- 
 plice beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 Com. v. Ford, 111 Mass. 394. 
 
 2 Bacon v. State, 22 Fla. 51 ; Porter 
 v. State, 76 Ga. 658 ; State v. Prater, 
 26 S. C. 198; 2 S. E. Rep. 108; State 
 v. Hawkins, 100 Mo. 666; Wisdom v. 
 State, 11 Colo. 170; State v. Jackson, 
 106 Mo. 174; Rountree v. State, 88 
 Ga. 457 ; State v. Dana, 10 Atl. Rep. 
 727; 59 Vt. 614; State v. Miller, 97 
 N. C. 484; People v. Gallagher, 75 
 Mich. 512; People v. O'Brien, 60 
 Mich. 8. See, also, ante, § 226. 
 
 3 See ante, Presumptions of Fact, 
 Accomplices, § 226. "When the 
 only proof against a person charged 
 with a criminal offense is the evi- 
 dence of an accomplice uncorrobo- 
 rated in any material particular, it 
 is the duty of the judge to warn the 
 jury that it is unsafe to convict any 
 person upon such evidence though 
 they have a legal right to do so." 
 Stephen's Dig. Ev., art. 121. 
 
 4 State v. Potter, 42 Vt. 495 ; State 
 v. Litchfield, 58 Me. 267; Ingalls v. 
 State, 48 Wis. 647; State v. Miller, 
 97 N. C. 484; Carroll v. Com., 84 Pa. 
 St. 107. See generally upon the cor- 
 roboration of accomplices, Sumpter 
 v. State, 11 Fla. 247; State v. Hol- 
 land, 83 N. C. 624 ; Tisdale v. State, 
 17 Tex. App. 444 ; Lumpkin v. State, 
 68 Ala. 56; State v. Dana, 59 Vt. 614; 
 10 Atl. Rep. 727; Craft v. Com., 80 
 Ky. 349; White v. State, 52 Miss. 
 216 ; Cheatham v. State (Miss., 1890), 
 7 S. Rep. 294; State v. Prater, 26 S. 
 C. 198; 2 S. E. Rep. 108; Ulmer v. 
 State, 14 Ind. 52; Powers v. State, 
 44 Ga. 209 ; State v. Bayonne, 23 La. 
 Ann. 78; State v. Williamson, 42 
 Conn. 261 ; Smith v. State, 28 Tex. 
 App. 309 ; Earl v. People, 73 111. 329 ; 
 State v. Watson, 31 Mo. 361 ; State 
 v. Litchfield, 58 Me. 267; Com. v.
 
 § 324.] COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 4G3 
 
 The credibility of the testimony of an accomplice and the 
 necessity for evidence corroborative of it before a conviction 
 can be had are involved in some confusion. The proposition 
 that an accused person may be convicted on the evidence of 
 an accomplice alone, and that the testimony of such a witness 
 should be corroborated, are both sound, though they involve a 
 seeming inconsistency. The proposition that an accomplice 
 must be corroborated is not equivalent to the proposition that 
 there must be cumulative testimony from some other witness 
 to the same facts to which he has testified. " If the testimony 
 of the accomplice, his manner of testifying, his appearance 
 upon the ivitness stand, impress the jury with the truth of his 
 statement, there is no inflexible rule of law which prevents a 
 conviction," 1 provided, of course, the jury believe that the 
 evidence of the accomplice tends to connect the accused with 
 the crime charged. 2 
 
 The character and degree of corroboration required may, 
 to a certain extent, be measured by the enormity of the crime 
 alleged, the moral perversity involved in its commission and 
 the punishment which may be inflicted, 3 so that conviction of 
 a misdemeanor might be sustained without the production 
 of independent corroborative evidence before the jury where 
 such evidence would be required in the case of a felony. 4 The 
 corroboration of the evidence of an accomplice need not ex- 
 tend to every material fact. 5 If, however, independent cor- 
 roboration by other witnesses is required in any case, it must 
 refer to that portion of the testimony of the accomplice which 
 is material to the guilt of the prisoner. The corroborative 
 evidence must tend to prove the guilt of the accused by con- 
 necting him with the crime committed, for it is of no impor- 
 tance whatever to corroborate the accomplice on irrelevant or 
 immaterial details, or to show that he has not perjured himself 
 
 Snow, 111 Mass. 411; State v. Moran, Reg. v. Young, 19 Cox C. C. 371; 
 
 34 Iowa, 453. McClory v. Wright, 10 Ir. Law, 514; 
 
 i Cox v. Com., 125 Pa. St. 103; Col- Rountree v. State, 88 Ga. 457. 
 
 lins v. People, 98 111. 584. 5 state v. Allen, 57 Iowa, 451 ; 
 
 2 See United States v. Reeves, 38 State v. Hennessy, 55 id. 299; United 
 Fed. Rep. 404. States v. Howell, 56 Fed.. Rep. 21 ; 
 
 3 Bell v. State, 73 Ga. 572; Rex v. People v. Elliott, 100 N. Y. 288; 
 Jarvis, 2 M. & R. 40. Lumpkin v. State, 68 Ala. 56. 
 
 * Reg. v. Farler, 8 C. & P. 106;
 
 464 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. [§ 324. 
 
 in stating matters not pertinent to the issue on trial and upon 
 which he had no interest to testify falsely. The corrobora- 
 tion must bear directly or indirectly, not upon his general 
 character for truthfulness, but upon the question whether, in 
 this particular case and upon the facts involved, his testimony 
 is reliable and worthy of credit by the jury in determining 
 the guilt or innocence of the prisoner. 1 
 
 The rule of the common law requiring the testimony of an 
 accomplice to be corroborated under certain circumstances 
 has been confirmed by statutes in some of the states. Thus, 
 in New York, "a conviction cannot be had upon the testi- 
 mony of an accomplice unless he be corroborated by such 
 other evidence as tends to connect defendant with the com- 
 mission of the crime." 2 The confession of the accused is 
 competent as corroborative evidence of the testimony of an 
 accomplice. 3 Whether the testimony of an accomplice is cor- 
 roborated so that the guilt of the prisoner is proved beyond a 
 reasonable doubt is a question for the jury to decide. 4 But 
 whether the evidence of the accomplice shall go to the jury 
 is a distinct question for the court. If corroborative circum- 
 stances are proved from which, with the evidence of the ac- 
 complice, reasonable men may infer the existence of the guilt 
 
 i Com. v. Bosvvorth, 22 Pick. 397, Grindell, 15 Col. 301 ; Cora. v. Chase, 
 
 399; Com. v. Holmes, 127 Mass. 424; 147 Mass. 597. 
 
 State v. Jackson, 106 Mo. 174 ; Mar- 2 People v. Everhardt, 104 N. Y. 
 
 ler v. State, 67 Ala. 55; State v. 594; People v. Ogle, 104 id. 515; Peo- 
 
 Allen, 57 Iowa, 431; United States pie v. Smith (Cal., 1893), 33 Pac. Rep. 
 
 v. Ybanez, 53 Fed. Rep. 530; Com. 58; People v. O'Neill, 109 N. Y. 251; 
 
 v.Holmes, 127 Mass. 424; Cohen v. People v. Elliott, 106 N. Y. 288; 
 
 State, 11 Tex. App. 622; People v. Bowling Green v. Com., 79 Ky. 604; 
 
 Clough, 73 Cal. 348; 15 Pac. Rep. 5; State v. Godell, 8 Oreg. 30; People 
 
 Kilrow v. Com., 89 Pa. St. 480; v. Clough, 73 Cal. 348 ; People v. Ry- 
 
 Coleman v. State, 44 Tex. 109 ; Peo- land, 28 Hun, 568 ; People v. O'Neill, 
 
 pie v. Elliott, 106 N. Y. 288; People 48 id. 36; Middleton v. State, 52 Ga. 
 
 v. Ogle, 104 id. 511 ; Watson v. Com., 527; Lumpkin v. State, 68 Ala. 56; 
 
 95 Pa. St. 418; People v. Everhardt, Burney v. State, 87 Ala. 80; Myers 
 
 104 N. Y. 591; Com. v. Drake, 124 v. State, 7 Tex. App. 640. See, also, 
 
 Mass. 21; State v. Kellerman, 13 McCalla v. State, 66 Ga. 346; State 
 
 Kan. 135; State v. Thornburg, 26 v. Hyer, 39 N. J. L. 598; People v. 
 
 Iowa, 80; State v. Walker (Mo., Courtney, 28 Hun, 589. 
 
 1888), 9 S. W. Rep. 646; Crowell v. »Partee v. State, 67 Ga. 570. 
 
 State, 24 Tex. App. 204; State v. 4 Com. v. Holmes, 127 Mass. 424; 
 
 Banks, 40 La. Ann. 736; People v. People v. Everhardt, 104 N. Y. 591.
 
 324.] 
 
 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 
 
 465 
 
 of the accused, the court is justified in submitting the evidence 
 of the accomplice to the jury under such a statute. 1 Corrobo- 
 ration by evidence independent of accomplice evidence is not 
 dispensed with where several accomplices are produced as 
 Witnesses against a prisoner. The accomplices are not deemed 
 to corroborate each other. 2 
 
 1 People v. Jaehne, 7 N. E. Rep. 
 290 (N. Y., 1889). That an 'accom- 
 plice is testifying under an express 
 agreement of immunity is an objec- 
 tion to his credibility alone. Black 
 v. State, 59 Wis. 471; Olive v. State, 
 11 Neb. 1. 
 
 2 Rex v. Noakes, 5 C. & P. 326; 
 
 30 
 
 Whitlow v. State (Tex., 1893), 13 S. 
 W. Rep. 865; United States v. Hinz, 
 32 Fed. Rep. 272; People v. O'Neill, 
 109 N. Y. 251; State v. Williamson, 
 42 Conn. 261. But a failure to charge 
 the jury to this effect is not revers- 
 ible error. McConnell v. State (Tea., 
 1893), 18 S. W. Rep. 645.
 
 CHAPTER XXIII. 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 i 830. Order for witnesses to with- 
 draw from court-room. 
 
 331. Direct examination and cross- 
 examination distinguished. 
 
 832. Refusal to testify, when a 
 contempt — Employment 
 of interpreter. 
 
 333. Mode of conducting direct 
 examination. 
 
 834. Questions put hy the judge 
 
 or by members of the jury. 
 
 835. Leading questions — When 
 
 allowable on direct exami- 
 nation. 
 
 836. Responsiveness of answers. 
 
 837. Witness may refresh his 
 
 memory by referring to a 
 memorandum or writing. 
 
 338. 
 
 339. 
 
 340. 
 
 341. 
 342. 
 343. 
 
 344. 
 315. 
 
 346. 
 
 346a, 
 
 Character of the writing 
 used to refresh memory of 
 the witness. 
 
 Cross-examination — Its pur- 
 pose and value. 
 
 Power of cross - examina- 
 tion — Its extent. 
 
 Redirect examination. 
 
 Recalling witnesses. 
 
 Receiving evidence out of 
 court. 
 
 Taking the view by the jury. 
 
 " Real evidence " — Physical 
 examination by the jury 
 in court — Identification. 
 
 Right of the defendant in a 
 criminal trial to confront 
 the witnesses against him. 
 
 The accused as a witness in a 
 criminal prosecution. 
 
 § 330. Order for witnesses to withdraw from court-room. 
 
 The presiding judge may, when he considers it necessary to 
 a proper administration of justice, order the exclusion of all 
 other witnesses from the room during the examination of a 
 witness. The order, though not perhaps of right. 1 is seldom 
 refused where it is at all evident that the ascertainment of 
 
 iVance v. State (Ark., 1892), 19 
 S. W. Rep. 10U6; State v. Fitzsim- 
 ons, 30 Mo. 236; Riley v. State, 88 
 Ala. 93; State v. Davis, 48 Kan. 1; 
 Benaway v. Conyne, 3 Chand. (Wis.) 
 214; Barnes v. State, 83 Ala. 204; 
 Kelly v. People, 17 Colo. 130; 29 
 Pac. Rep. 805; Nelson v. State, 2 
 Swan(Tenn.), 237; Binfield v. State 
 (Neb., 1884), 19 N. W. Rep. 607; Er- 
 
 rissman v. Errissman, 25 111. 136; 
 Zoldoske v. State, 82 Wis. 580; 53 
 N. W. Rep. 778; Taylor v. Lawson, 
 3 C. & P. 543; Heath v. State, 7 Tex. 
 App. 464; Com. v. Thompson (Mass., 
 1893), 33 N. E. Rep. 1111 ; Roberts v. 
 Com. (Ky., 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 845; 
 Taylor v. State. 130 Ind. 66; Haines 
 v. Territory, 3 Wyo. 166.
 
 § 330.] EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 467 
 
 truth will be advanced thereby. 1 If a witness stays in the 
 court-room, though by inadvertence, after the judge has or- 
 dered the witnesses to withdraw, the court may, in its discre- 
 tion, refuse to allow him to be examined, 2 and its action in so 
 doing will not be reversible error unless a party's substantial 
 rights are shown to have been prejudiced thereby. 3 The rule 
 that a witness, by thus disobeying the court, renders his tes- 
 timony subject to exclusion is not universally recognized. It 
 is manifestly unfair to deprive a party, who is not in fault, of 
 testimony on which he relies, and on which, perhaps, his 
 whole case is founded, because the witness, out of careless- 
 ness, obstinacy or caprice, refuses or neglects to obey the 
 order of the court. So it has been held that the testimony of 
 such a witness cannot be excluded, but must be received, and 
 the jury may be instructed that they may take into consid- 
 eration the fact that he remained in court in determining his 
 credibility. 4 The witness may be proceeded against for con- 
 tempt in disobeying the order. 5 After witnesses not under 
 examination have been directed to withdraw, it is within the 
 discretion of the court to permit one or more of them to re- 
 main; 6 and an exception will always be made in the case of 
 
 1 Thomas v. State, 29 Ga. 287 ; counsel who is also a witness cannot 
 
 Hellems v. State, 22 Ark. 207. An be excluded even where the right to 
 
 expert witness may be excluded in have the witnesses separated is stat- 
 
 a criminal case. Vance v. State utory); State v. Thomas, 111 Ind. 
 
 (Ark., 1892), 19 S, W. Rep. 1066. 516; 13 N. E. Rep. 85; Smith v. 
 
 SEthredge v. Hobbs, 77 Ga. 251; State, 4 Lea (Tenn.), 428; Taylor v. 
 
 State v. Brookshire, 2 Ala. 303; Mc- State, 29 N. E. Rep. 415; 130 Ind. 66; 
 
 Leon v. State, 16 Ala. 672; Trujillo State v. Ward, 61 Vt. 179; Cook 
 
 v. Territory (N. Mex., 1893). 30 Pac. v. State, 18 S. W. Rep. 412; 30 Tex. 
 
 Rep. 870; People v. Sam Lung, 70 App. 607; Grant v. State, 15 S. E. 
 
 Cal. 516; Hey v. Com., 32 Gratt. Rep. 488; 89 Ga. 393; State v. Lock- 
 
 (Va.) 946. wood, 58 Vt. 378; Lassiter v. State, 
 
 » Carlton v. Com. (Ky., 1892), 18 67 Ga. 739; Sartorius v. State, 24 
 
 S. W. Rep. 535; Cook v. State, 30 Miss. 602; Pleasant v. State, 15 Ark. 
 
 Tex. App. 607; 18 S. W. Rep. 412; 624; Porter v. State, 2 Ind. 435. 
 Lassiter v. State, 67 Ga. 739. 5 See cases cited supra. 
 
 * Roberts v. Com. (Ky., 1893), 22 6 Indianapolis Cab. Co. v. Herr- 
 
 S. W. Rep. 895; Hubbard v. Hub- man, infra; Riley v. State, 88 Ala. 
 
 bard, 7 Oreg. 42 ; O'Bryan v. Allen, 93; Barnes v. State, 88 Ala. 204; 
 
 95 Mo. 68; 8 S. W. Rep. 225; Boal- State v. Hopkins. 50 Vt. 316; Carson 
 
 mayer v. State, 20 S. W. Rep. 1102; v. State, 80 Ga. 170. 
 31 Tex. Crirn. Rep. 473 (holding that
 
 408 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 [§§ 331, 332. 
 
 a party to the suit, his attorney, 1 an officer of the court, 2 or a 
 juror 3 who is also a witness, and he will not be required to 
 withdraw. 4 
 
 §331. Direct examination and cross-examination dis- 
 tinguished. — The direct examination of a witness is his first 
 examination by the party in whose behalf he is called to tes- 
 tify. His cross-examination is his subsequent examination by 
 the adverse party upon the same subject-matter to which he 
 has testified upon his direct examination. 5 
 
 §332. Refusal to testify, when a contempt — Employ- 
 ment of interpreter. — A witness who refuses to be sworn or 
 to answer a relevant question without a satisfactory excuse is 
 guilty of contempt of court. But the judicial power to pun- 
 ish for contempt in refusing to testify is confined to courts of 
 record and to legislative bodies in the absence of any express 
 statute granting it to other officials whose duty it may be to 
 interrogate witnesses. 6 A court may punish as a contempt 
 the refusal of a witness to testify before a commissioner ap- 
 pointed by it to take depositions, 7 or before the grand jury 
 over which it exercises supervision, 8 or at an examination before 
 
 1 Everett v. Lowdham, 5 C. & P. 
 91. 
 
 2 Kelly v. People, 17 Colo. 130; 29 
 Pac. Rep. 805. 
 
 3 State v. Vari (S. C, 1892), 1| S. 
 E. Rep. 892 ; 35 S. C. 175. 
 
 * Allen v. Com. (Ky., 1888), 9 S. W. 
 Rep. 703; Kissam v. Forrest, 25 
 Wend. 651 ; Indianapolis Cabinet Co. 
 v. Herrman (Ind., 1893), 34 N. E. 
 Rep. 579. The exclusion of a party 
 is ground for a new trial. Schneider 
 v. Haas, 14 Oreg. 174; Mcintosh v. 
 Mcintosh, 44 N. W. Rep. 592; 
 Chandler v. Avery, 47 Hun. 9 ; Gar- 
 mon v. State, 66 Miss. 196. The 
 court will not, however, prohibit 
 witnesses who have been excluded 
 from reading newspapers which con- 
 tain the evidence in the case. Com. 
 v. Hersey, 84 Mass. 173. 
 
 5 Anderson's Law Diet. See post, 
 § 341, as to redirect examination. 
 
 6 White v. Morgan Co., 119 Ind. 
 338; People v. Rice, ION. Y. S. 270; 
 Barnes v. Reilly (Mich., 1892), 45 N. 
 W. Rep. 1016; Brunger v. Smith, 49 
 Fed. Rep. 124 ; Bradley v. Fertilizer 
 Co. (N. C, 1893), 17 S. E. Rep. 69; 
 Llewellyn's Case, 13 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 
 126; Pittman v. Hagans (Ga., 1893), 
 16 S. E. Rep. 352 ; Enos v. Garrett, 
 2 Pa. Dis. Co. R. 86 ; Ex parte Wood- 
 worth, 29 W. L. Bui. 315 (contempt 
 before notary). 
 
 TRobb's Case, 11 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 
 442. "A justice of the peace, though 
 he cannot commit a witness for con- 
 tempt, may bind a party refusing to 
 testify to answer an indictment for 
 obstructing justice." Albright v. 
 Lapp, 26 Pa. St. 101. 
 
 8 Ex parte Harris, 4 Utah, 5; Peo- 
 ple v. Kelly, 24 N. Y. 74; Ex parte 
 Stice, 70 Cal. 51.
 
 § 333.] EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 4G9 
 
 trial, 1 and it may do so as often as the witness refuses to testify. 2 
 Where the statutory right is conferred upon a witness to answer 
 only pertinent questions, he cannot be committed for contempt 
 in refusing to reply to a question which is not pertinent; 3 and 
 generally, where the court has not acquired proper jurisdiction 
 of the cause, the witness who refuses to testify is not in con- 
 tempt. 4 
 
 In the absence of a statute requiring it, the employment of 
 an interpreter where a witness is unable to speak or under- 
 stand the English language is discretionary, 5 though whe^n a 
 party was deprived of the testimony of a material witness by 
 the refusal of the court to employ an' interpreter, it was held 
 good ground for a new trial. 6 A witness may act as an inter- 
 preter for another Avitness, 7 and should be sworn as such to 
 interpret faithfully ; 8 while if he is inefficient as an interpreter 
 his restatement or interpretation may be impeached for inac- 
 curacy by the adverse party. 9 
 
 § 333. Mode of conducting the direct examination.— 
 After the witness shall have been sworn and asked to state 
 his name in order that his identity may be ascertained or con- 
 firmed, he is to be questioned in regard to his knowledge of 
 the matter in issue. The jury has a right to know every fact 
 which will aid them in estimating the credit of the witness. 
 
 1 Fenlon v. Dempsey, 21 Abb. N. C. 53 ; State v. Severson, 78 Iowa, 653 : 
 291. Swan v. State, 26 Tex. A pp. 115. 
 
 2 Ex parte Stice, 70 Cal. 51. 6 Chicago, etc. Co. v. Shenk, 131 
 
 3 Ex parte Zeehandelaur, 71 Cal. 111. 283 ; 23 N. E. Rep. 436. As to the 
 238; In re McKnight, 11 Mont. 126; custom of employing interpreters, 
 In re Odell, 6 Dem. Sur. 344. see under the word " translation," 
 
 4 People v.Warner, 51 Hun, 53. Anderson's Dictionary. See, also, 
 As regards the power of the court to Amory v. Fellows, 5 Mass. 225. 
 commit a witness for contempt in "> Chicago, etc. Co. v. Shenk, 131 
 failing to attend, see ante, §§ 284, 111. 283. 
 
 289. A publisher of a newspaper 8 People v. Dowdigan, 67 Mich. 95. 
 
 who refuses to testify or to give the 9 Skaggs v. State, 108 Ind. 53; 
 
 real name of the author of a libelous Schnier v. People, 23 111. 17. The 
 
 article may be punished for con- assistance of one or more bystanders 
 
 tempt, though he is himself under who are not sworn to interpret may 
 
 indictment for the libel. Pledger v. be allowed the interpreter where he 
 
 State, 77 Ga. 242. is in doubt. United States v. Gibert, 
 
 5 Horn v. State (Ala., 1893), 13 S. 2 Suuin. 19. 
 Rep. 329; Staggs v. State, 108 Ind.
 
 470 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 B 
 
 He may therefore be asked to explain his motives, 1 and to 
 state who he is, whence he comes, where he lived and other 
 personal details of a like character. 2 It is not permissible, ex- 
 cept in certain cases which will be discussed later, to ask the 
 witness leading questions, i.e., questions which by their form or 
 character ''suggest to the witness the answer which the party 
 desires and expects him to make and leads him to make it." 3 
 Thus, questions which take the form of a statement of fact, 
 and suggest thereby that the witness is to deny or affirm it by 
 replying merely "yes" or "no," may be given as examples of 
 leading questions. 
 
 Somewhat analogous to leading questions and equally inad- 
 missible are those which assume particular facts in issue or 
 material thereto as proved which have not been, or certain 
 answers to have been made to prior questions when no such 
 answers have been given. 4 Except as elsewhere explained, in 
 the case of the examination of experts, it is not permissible 
 during the direct examination to question the witness in re- 
 gard to matters which are not within his personal knowledge, 
 or to endeavor by assuming or leading questions to elicit his 
 opinion or inference as to any matter of fact. 5 But in certain 
 
 i Brooken v. State (Tex., 1888), 9 
 S. W. Rep. 735. 
 
 2 Avery v. Fitzgerald, 7 S. W. 
 Rep. 6. 
 
 3 1 Greenl. Ev., § 434; Anderson's 
 Law Dictionary. See, also, Chat- 
 tanooga, etc. Co. v. Huggins, 80 Ga. 
 494; Alabama, etc. Co. v. Hill, 93 
 Ala. 514; Hicks v. Sharp, 89 Ga. 
 311; 15 S. E. Rep. 314; Cannon v. 
 People (111., 1892), 30 N. E. Rep. 1077; 
 Brice v. Miller, 35 S. C. 272, 537; 
 Daly v. Melendy, 32 Neb. 852; Cling- 
 man v. Irvine. 40 111. App. 603 ; Bald- 
 ridge, etc. Co. v. Calrett, 75 Tex. 
 628; Spear v. Richardson, 37 N. H. 
 26; State v. Johnson, 29 La. Ann. 
 717; Wilson v. McCullough, 23 Pa. 
 St. 440. 
 
 4 Robertson v. Craver (Iowa, 1892), 
 55 N. W. Rep. 492; Hays v. State 
 (Tex., 1893), 20 S. W. Rep. 361; 
 
 Davis v. Willis, 67 Hun, 650; Thomp- 
 son v. Ray (Ga., 1893', 18 S. E. Rep. 
 59 ; Bostie v. State, 94 Ala. 45 ; Peo- 
 ple v. Lange, 90 Mich. 451; Foster 
 v. Dickerson, 64 Vt. 233 ; 24 Atl. Rep. 
 253; People v. Fong Ah Sing, 70 Cal. 
 8 ; Graham v. McReynolds, 90 Tenn. 
 673. 
 
 5 A question in the following form 
 has been held not to be a leading 
 question: "You may state whether 
 you were directed by defendant, or 
 any one of its employees or its 
 agents, to get off of the opposite end 
 of this coach from the end that you 
 did get off." McDona'd v. Illinois 
 Cent. R. Co. (Iowa, 1893), 55 N. W. 
 Rep. 102. Nor is a question leading 
 which merely repeats what a wit- 
 ness has testified to. Brice v. Miller, 
 15 S. E. Rep. 272; 35 S. C. 537. See 
 §§ 185-198.
 
 § 334.] 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 471 
 
 circumstances leading questions are allowable, and it is largely 
 a matter over which the court has control, and upon which it 
 may exercise a sound discretion whether, upon the facts in 
 any particular case, leading questions should be permitted to 
 be put in the direct examination. 1 If the discretion is grossly 
 abused to the substantial injury of either party, error will 
 lie. 2 A witness may be permitted to give his testimony in a 
 narrative form, and either party may, when he states facts 
 which are irrelevant, stop him and move to have such facts 
 stricken out. 3 
 
 § 3J34. (Juestions propounded by the judge or jurors. — 
 The policy of the law requires that the triers of fact should 
 not entertain, or at least should not manifest, any partiality 
 during the examination of the witnesses. Where the trial is 
 by a jury, it is not only the right but it is the duty of the 
 judge to decide all preliminary questions of fact bearing on 
 the competency of witnesses or of evidence, and to enable 
 him to do so he must question the witnesses. No objection 
 can be made so long as his questions or remarks are not aimed 
 to elicit facts bearing materially on the issue. Accordingly 
 the court, in ruling on the competency of the evidence offered, 
 may state the theory and grounds on which it was offered 
 
 1 Van Doren v. Jelliffe, 20 N. Y. S. 
 636; Donnell v. James, 13 Ala. 490; 
 Pucker v. Wilson (N. C, 1893), 16 
 S. E. Rep. 854; McClain v. Com., 
 110 Pa. St. 263; Walker v. Duns- 
 paugh, 20 N. Y. 170; Com. v. Chaney, 
 148 Mass. 8; Lander v. Lander, 5 
 Ir. C. L. Rep. 27 ; Wells v. Jackson, 
 etc. Co., 48 N. H. 491. "Questions 
 suggesting the answer which the 
 person putting the question wishes 
 or expects to receive, or suggesting 
 disputed facts as to which the wit- 
 ness is to testify, must not, if objected 
 to by the adverse party, be asked in 
 an examination in chief or a re- 
 examination, except with the per- 
 mission of the court; but such ques- 
 tions may be asked in cross-examina- 
 tion." Stephen's Dig. Ev., art. 128. 
 
 - Gunter v. Watson, 4 Jones' (N. C.) 
 
 L. 455; Van Doren v. Jelliffe, 20 
 N. Y. S. 1; 1 Misc. Rep. 354; Whit- 
 ing v. Miss. V. I. Co.. 76 Wis. 592: 
 Schuster v. State, 80 Wis. 107; 49 
 N. W. Rep. 30; Brassell v. State, 91 
 Ala. 45; 8 S. Rep. 679; Foster v. 
 Dickinson, 64 Vt. 235; 24 Atl. Rep. 
 255; 'Travelers" Ins. Co. v. Shepherd. 
 85 Ga. 751; Badder v. Keefer,* 91 
 Mich. 611 ; 52 N. W. Rep. 60; Union 
 Pac. Ry. Co. v. O'Brien, 46 Fed. Rep. 
 538; Weber Wagon Co. v. Keh], 139 
 111. 644; 29 N. E. Rep. 714; O'Neill 
 v. Howe, 9 N. Y. S. 746; Walker v, 
 Dunspaugh, 20 N. Y. 170: ObernaJte 
 v. Edgar, 28 Neb. 70 ; 44 N. W. Rep. 
 82; White v. White, 82 Cal. 427. 
 
 3 Northern Pac. R. R. Co. v. 
 Charless, 51 Fed. Rep. 562; 2 C. C. 
 A. 380.
 
 472 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [§ 334. 
 
 and rejected, and may estimate its probable effect if it had 
 been received, provided no language is used that will improp- 
 erly bias the jury for or against either party. 1 Indeed it has 
 been held that the active participation of the court in the ex- 
 amination of a witness, 2 even to the extent of suggesting to 
 counsel the manner in which the questions should be properly 
 framed, 3 or warning a witness that if he answers a certain 
 question he may have to answer another, 4 though not a com- 
 mendable practice, is not ground for a new trial unless a party 
 is actually prejudiced thereby. 5 
 
 A witness may very properly be questioned by the court as 
 to his understanding of a question which has been asked him 
 by counsel, 6 and the court may, at any time, in order to ex- 
 pedite the administration of justice, peremptorily check and 
 silence a very voluble or abusive witness, 7 or interpose sua 
 sponte and without the objection of counsel, 8 and particularly 
 if a party has no counsel, 9 to exclude incompetent evidence. 
 Sometimes, as a matter of practice, jurors are permitted to 
 interrogate a witness, and his answers, when relevant, are not 
 objectionable because thus informally obtained. A lengthy 
 examination by a juror, during which the juror's mental atti- 
 tude or bias towards the parties or the issue is exhibited, 
 should not be permitted or encouraged. 10 
 
 A very broad line of demarcation should be drawn and 
 
 'Queen Ins. Co. v. Studebaker, 4 Insurance Co. v. Slowitch, 55 N. 
 
 117 Ind. 416; Thompson v. Ish, 99 Y. Super. Ct. 452. 
 
 Mo.166; Keith v. Wells (Colo., 1890), 5 See Sharp v. State, 51 Ark. 147. 
 
 23 Pac. Rep. 991; State v. Milling estate v. Mathews, 98 Mo. 125. 
 
 (S. C. 1892), 14 S. E. Rep. 284: Hodge 'Robinson v. State, 82 Ga. 535; 
 
 v. State (Fla., 1890), 7 S. Rep. 593. Bourdon v. Bailes, 101 N. C. 612. 
 
 2 Robinson v. State, 83 Ga. 535; ^Durrett v . state, 62 Ala. 434; 
 Hodge v. State (Fla., 1890), 7 S. Rep. People v. Turcott, 65 Cal. 126. 
 
 593; Hudson v. Hudson (Ga., 1893), 9 McClure v. Com., 81 Ky. 448. 
 16 S. E. Rep. 349; Sanders v. Bag- 10 State v. Merkley (Iowa, 1888), 39 
 well(S. C, 1893), 15 S. E. Rep. 714; N. W. Rep. 111. Sometimes a de- 
 Bauer v. Beall (Colo., 1889), 23 Pac. fendant is permitted by statute to 
 Rep. 345; O'Conner v. Ice Co., 56 make a personal statement under 
 N. Y. Super. Ct. 410 (witness called oath to the jury of his defense. He 
 and examined by court over objec- is not, in such a case, a witness, nor 
 tion of counsel). can he be examined or cross-exam- 
 
 3 Metropolitan St. R. Co. v. John- ined by the jurors or by counsel, 
 son (Ga.. 1893), 18 S. E Rep. 816. (/. The court should, of its own motion, 
 contra, Jefferson v. State, 80 Ga. 10. protect him from the questioning
 
 331.] 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 473 
 
 recognized between the competency of evidence and its credi- 
 bility. The admissibility of evidence is a judicial question 
 not within the province of the jury, 1 and no remark which is 
 made by the judge during the examination of a witness as to 
 his competency or the relevancy or admissibility of his evi- 
 dence, or the reason for its exclusion or admission, can be urged 
 as ground for a new trial. 2 But the weight and credibility 
 of testimony are for the jury, and all judicial observations or re- 
 marks upon the credibility of a witness or the amount of 
 weight to be given to his evidence which are m&de duri?t</ the 
 examination of a witness are improper and may be objected 
 to. 3 That the remarks were inadvertently made is immaterial 
 if a party is substantially prejudiced by them, 4 though it 
 seems the error may be remedied by a prompt withdrawal 
 or explanation of the objectionable words, 5 or by an instruc- 
 tion to the jury to disregard them. 6 
 
 and interference of counsel, or of 
 any other person, and a neglect to 
 do so, if objection is promptly made, 
 will be ground for reversal. Han- 
 kins v. State (Fla., 1892), 10 S. Rep. 
 822. 
 
 iSeeanfe, §§ 11-13. 
 
 2 State v. Young, 105 Mo. 634; 
 Patterson v. State, 86 Ga. 70 ; Lewis 
 v. State (Ga., 1893), 15 S. E. Rep. 
 697; Com. v. Ward (Mass.), 32 N. E. 
 Rep. 663; Arnold v. State, 81 Wis. 
 278; Butler v. State (Ga., 1893), 16 
 S. E. Rep v 894; State v. Turner, 36 
 S. C. 534. In a case of homicide the 
 witness was in the room and was 
 repeatedly questioned as to the exact 
 spot on which he was sitting. On 
 his answering evasively the court 
 said: "You must have seen a part 
 of what was going on, didn't j 7 ou? " 
 Adding, " We all know that if any- 
 thing is going on in a room it is a 
 slight circumstance where a man 
 sits. He may turn his chair or turn 
 around. He is not fixed like a pillar 
 of wood. The jury understand that 
 perfectly well. It is a waste of time 
 to try and enlighten them on the 
 subject." Held no error. Carthaus 
 
 v. State, 78 Wis. 560; 47 N. W. Rep. 
 679. 
 
 3 Sharp v. State, 51 Ark. 147; 
 State v. Raymond, 53 N. J. L. 2G0 ; 
 People v. Wood, 126 N. Y. 249; 
 Shepherd v. State, 31 Neb. 389; 
 Brunker v. Cummins (Ind., 1893), 32 
 N. E. Rep. 732: Sterling v. Callahan, 
 94 Mich. 536; Hudson v. Hudson 
 (Ga., 1893), 16 S. E. Rep. 349; State 
 v. Jacobs, 106 N. C. 695 ; People v. 
 Fleming, 14 N. Y, S. 200; People v. 
 Wood (N. Y., 1891), 27 N. E. Rep. 
 362; Campbell v. State, 30 Tex. App. 
 369; People v. Willard, 92 Cal. 482; 
 State v. Lucas (Oreg., 1893), 33 Pac. 
 Rep. 538; People v. Hull, 86 Mich. 
 449; Bone v. State, 86 Ga. 108; New- 
 berry v. State, 26 Fla. 334. 
 
 4 Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113. 
 
 5 Johnston v. State, 94 Ala. 35; 
 Reinhold v. State, 130 Ind. 467; 30 
 N. E. Rep. 306; Ryan v. State, 83 
 Wis. 486; Com. v. Ward (Mass., 
 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 693; State v. 
 Black, 42 La. Ann. 861; Wynn v. 
 City R. R. Co. (Ga., 1893), 17 S. E. 
 Rep. 649. 
 
 6 People v. Northey, 77 Cal. 618; 
 Vann v. State, 83 Ga. 44.
 
 471: 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 [§ 335. 
 
 §335. Leading questions — When allowable on direct 
 examination. — The general rule rejecting leading questions 
 as above stated is subject to several important exceptions. 1 
 Thus, if the witness on his direct examination manifest hos- 
 tility to the party who called him by coloring his testimony 
 to favor his opponent or by an appearance of unwillingness 
 to answer or by attempting to conceal what he knows, he 
 may be asked leading questions. 2 Leading questions may be 
 propounded not only to an unwilling witness but to one who 
 is forgetful as well, 3 or who is very young and inexperienced, 4 
 or who is ignorant of the language, 5 or to one whose memory, 
 while clear as to the main facts of a complicated transaction, 
 
 i Hoody v. Rowell, 17 Pick. 498. 
 In this case the law on this point 
 was thus stated by the chief justice: 
 "The court have no doubt that it is 
 within the discretion of a judge at 
 the trial, under particular circum- 
 stances, to permit a leading question 
 to be put to one's own witness ; as 
 when he is manifestly reluctant and 
 hostile to the interest of the party 
 calling him, or where he has ex- 
 hausted his memory, without stat- 
 ing the particulars required, where it 
 is a proper name, or other fact which 
 cannot be significantly pointed to by 
 a general interrogatory, or where 
 the witness is a child of tender 
 years, whose attention can be called 
 to the matter required only by a 
 pointed or leading question. So a 
 judge may, in his discretion, pro- 
 hibit certain leading questions from 
 being put to an adversary's witness, 
 where the witness shows a strong 
 interest or bias in favor of the cross- 
 examining party, and needs only an 
 intimation to say whatever is most 
 favorable to that party. The wit- 
 ness may have personally concealed 
 such bias in favor of one party to 
 induce the other to call him and 
 make him his witness; or the party 
 calling him may be compelled to do 
 so, to prove some single fact neces- 
 
 sary to his case. This discretionary 
 power to vary the general rule is to 
 be exercised only so far as the pur- 
 poses of justice plainly require it, 
 and is to be regulated by the cir- 
 cumstances of each case." And see 
 Donell v. Jones, 13 Ala. 490. 
 
 2 State v. Tall, 43 Minn. 278: Meix- 
 ell v. Feezor, 43 III. App. 180; Ro- 
 senthal v. Bilger (Iowa, 139:?), 53 N. 
 W. Rep. 255; McBride v. Wallace, 
 62 Mich. 451; State v. Bener, 64 Me. 
 267; Doran v. Mullen. 78 111. 342; 
 Navarro v. State, 24 Tex. App. 378, 
 505; Bradshaw v. Combs, 102 111. 
 428. 
 
 3 Born v. Rosenow (Wis., 1893), 
 54 N. W. Rep. 1089; King v. Rail- 
 road Co., 26 N. Y. S. 973; Graves v. 
 Merchants', etc. Bank (Iowa, 1891), 
 49 N. W. Rep. 65 ; St. Paul F. & M. 
 Ins. Co. v. Gothell, 35 Neb. 351. 
 
 "Palson v. State (Ind., 1893), 35 
 N. E. Rep. 907; Proper v. State 
 (Wis., 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 1035. 
 Thus in a prosecution for commit- 
 ting a rape on a child the state was 
 allowed to ask the prosecuting wit- 
 ness, "Do you know that boy over 
 there?" pointing to the accused 
 party. Paschal v. State, 89 Ga. 303; 
 15 S. E. Rep. 322. 
 
 5 Navarro v. State, 24 Tex. 378; 6 
 S. W. Rep. 542.
 
 § 335.] EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 475 
 
 is weak and undecided as regards the minor facts, items or 
 dates which go to compose it. 1 
 
 In that portion of the direct examination which is merely 
 introductory, leading questions are allowed,- as where counsel 
 are permitted, instead of asking a witness what was said, to 
 ask him whether particular statements or communications 
 were made in his hearing, for the purpose of contradicting 
 another witness who had previously testified that they were 
 not made. 3 So, for the sole purpose of refreshing the memory 
 of one's own witness, counsel may ask him on his direct exami- 
 nation if he did not at a prior date state certain facts which are 
 not consistent with his present statements. 4 So where the mem- 
 ory of the witness is faint, the party may question him upon 
 unimportant and irrelevant but suggestive facts, 5 or may ask 
 the witness what was his uniform habit or routine of actin^ in 
 connection with certain transactions, 6 if the evidence of the 
 unimportant fact or the business routine will surest to the 
 memory of the witness a relevant fact which has been for- 
 gotten by him. 7 The witness may also be asked if he men- 
 tioned a fact which he has himself forgotten to another person, 
 and if he replies affirmatively the other person is competent 
 to testify to such a fact. 8 And if a witness is questioned as 
 to names which he has forgotten, a list of names may be read 
 over to him for the purpose of refreshing his memory. 9 
 
 1 A witness who on direct exam- 3 Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. 
 ination denies all knowledge of the Bair, 87 Pa. St. 124; Cannon v. 
 facts which she is called to prove, People (111., 1S92), 30 N. E. Rep. 
 but subsequently admits she sup- 1027; Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. O'Brien, 
 pressed the truth, may be recalled, 49 Fed. Rep. 53S; 4 U. S. A pp. 221; 
 on motion, though the party has 1 C. C. A. 354. See 'post, § 350. 
 rested his case. Her evidence may 4 State v. Cummins, 76 Iowa, 133; 
 then be regarded as newly discov- 40 N. W. Rep. 121. Cf, Avery v. 
 ered. Rice v. Rice (N. J., 1892), 23 Mattice, 9 N. Y. S. 1G6. 
 
 Atl. Rep. 946. If a witness profess 5 Prentiss v. Bates, 88 Mich. 567; 
 
 ignorance of a transaction he can- O'Hogan v. Dillon, 76 N. Y. 170. 
 
 not be required to inform himself e People v. Oyer &T., S3 N. Y. 436; 
 
 thereon for the purpose of answer- Morrow v. Ostrander, 13 Hun, 219. 
 
 ing a question, nor does the court "Abb. Brief on Facts, £393. 
 
 err in refusing to direct him to do so. 8 Shear v. Van Dyke, 10 Hun, 528 ; 
 
 People v. Ching, 78 Cal. 389. Green v. Cawthorn, 4 Dev. (N. C.) 
 
 2 Paschal v. State, 15 S. E. Rep. 409; Abb. Brief on Facts, § 397; 
 522; 89 Ga. 303; Shultz v. State, 5 Whart. Crini. Ev., § 360. 
 
 Tex. App. 390; Lowe v. Lowe, 40 ^Aceno v. Petroni, 1 Stark. 100. 
 Iowa, 220.
 
 476 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 [§ 336. 
 
 § 336. Responsiveness of answers. — The questions which 
 are put to a witness should be neither vague nor ambiguous, 1 
 and his replies thereto should be responsive, stating all the 
 facts called for, and no more, without any expression of his 
 opinion or his conjectures. 2 If a witness simply adopts the 
 answer of another witness preceding him, 3 or if his answer is 
 irresponsive so that it wholly or partially fails to convey the 
 information which is required, it may be stricken out on mo- 
 tion, 4 so far as it is irresponsive; 5 and a refusal by the court to 
 do so, if the objection is promptl} 7 made, would be reversible 
 error. 6 The court may, without abusing its discretion, instruct 
 a witness to answer a question responsively where he persists 
 in giving an evasive answer; 7 and whether an answer is re- 
 sponsive is for the court 8 to determine. An answer which is 
 not only not responsive, but abusive to the adverse party or 
 to his counsel, to such an extent that it is calculated to create 
 prejudice in the minds of the jurors, should be stricken out on 
 motion of the party injured, even where it was given in reply 
 to an irrelevant question. 9 
 
 1 Hill v. State (Term., 1892), 19 
 S. W. Rep. 674; Mann v. State, 23 
 Fla. 010 ; Bassett v. Shares, 63 Conn. 
 39 ; 27 Atl. Rep. 431. 
 
 2 While a witness may state all 
 the circumstances which are neces- 
 sarily involved in the answer re- 
 quired, he should not be allowed to 
 go beyond this. So, where a wit- 
 ness was asked to state a conversa- 
 tion he had with a certain person, 
 and while doing so stated that a 
 third person who was present was 
 crying, his answer is to that extent 
 irresponsive. Pence v. Waugh (Ind., 
 1893), 34 N. E. Rep. 860. 
 
 3 Eddy v. Lowry (Tex., 1894), 24 
 S. W. Rep. 1076. 
 
 4 Baldwin v. Walker, 94 Ala. 314; 
 10 S. Rep. 891 ; Colclough v. Niland, 
 68 Wis. 309; Harnickell v. Copper 
 Mining Co., 5 N. Y. S. 112; Kennedy 
 v. Upshaw, 66 Tex. 442; Link v. 
 Sheldon, 18 N. Y. S. 815; 64 Hun, 
 632; Lazard v. Mer. & Min. Co., 
 (Md., 1893), 26 Atl. Rep. 797; Bischof 
 
 v. N. Y. El. R. Co., 18 N. Y. S. 863; 
 Krey v. Schlusner, 62 Hun, 620; 
 Angell v. Loomis (Mich., 1893), 55 
 N. W. Rep. 100S. 
 
 5 Benjamin v. N. Y. El. R. Co.. 63 
 Hun, 629; 17 N. Y. S. 608; Pence v. 
 Waugh (Ind., 1893), 34 N. E. Rep. 
 860. 
 
 6 Chicago, etc. Co. v. Woodward, 47 
 Kan. 191. The answer thus stricken 
 out is wholly withdrawn from the 
 consideration of the jury, nor is it 
 the duty of the court, in its charge, 
 to caution them to disregard it. 
 State v. McGahey (N. D., 1893), 55 
 N. W. Rep. 753; Hillesum v. City 
 of New York, 4 N. Y. S. 506. 
 
 ^State v. Farley (Iowa, 1893), 53 
 N. W. Rep. 1089. 
 
 8 Galveston, etc. Co. v. Wesch 
 (Tex., 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 62; Van 
 Doren v. Jelliffe, 20 N. Y. S. 636. 
 
 9 Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. 
 Smith (Tex., 1^94), 24 S. W. Rep. 
 668. In this case the plaintiff suing 
 to recover for lost baggage replied
 
 § 337.] 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 477 
 
 § 337. The witness may refresh his memory by referring 
 
 to writings.— The general rule is that a witness will be per- 
 mitted to speak of those facts only which are within his per- 
 sonal knowledge and recollection. 1 He is at liberty, however, 
 to refresh or aid his memory, if it is at fault, by consulting on 
 the witness stand a writing or memorandum made by himself 
 or some other person, 2 if, after examining it, he is able to tes- 
 tify from his own recollection thus renewed and revived. 3 The 
 writing thus used is not generally or necessarily evidence, and 
 no question of its relevancy or materiality should be consid- 
 ered; 4 nor need it be read to the jury, 5 though it has been held 
 that the jury may examine it to determine whether the recol- 
 lection of the witness could be refreshed b} 7 it. 6 
 
 The cases in which a witness will be permitted to refresh 
 his memory from writings may be classified under two heads: 
 First. If a witness, though he retains no independent recollec- 
 tion of the facts transcribed in the writing, remembers having 
 made it himself or recollects having seen it before, and re- 
 
 to the defendant's counsel, "it is 
 enough to be robbed without being 
 insulted by a corporation that boasts 
 of its millions and then employs 
 men wanting in intellect and the in- 
 stincts of a gentleman to defend it." 
 
 1 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 436; 1 Whart. 
 Ev., §§ 516-26. 
 
 - Flint v. Kennedy, 33 Fed. Rep. 
 820: Card v. Foot. 56 Conn. 369; 
 Culver v. Scott, etc. Co., 55 N. W. 
 Rep. 552. 
 
 » Jenkins v. State (Fla., 1893), 12 
 S. Rep. 677; Morris v. Columbian 
 Iron Works & D. D. Co. (Md., 1893), 
 25 Atl. Rep. 417; Third Nat. Bank 
 v. Owen, 101 Mo. 558; Rohrig v. 
 Pearson, 12 Colo. 127 ; Stavinow v. 
 Home Ins. Co., 43 Mo. App. 513; 
 Byrnes v. Pac. Exp. Co. (Tex., 1891), 
 15 S. W. Rep. 46 ; McCloskey v. Barr, 
 45 Fed. Rep. 151 ; Kingory v. United 
 States, 44 Fed. Rep. 669; Weston 
 v. Brown, 30 Neb. 609; 46 N. W. 
 Rep. 826; Com. v. Clancy, 154 Mass. 
 128; 27 N. E. Rep. 1001; Finch v. 
 
 Barclay, 87 Ga. 393; Laboree v. 
 Closterman, 35 Neb. 150; 49 N. W. 
 Rep. 102; Watrous v. Cunningham, 
 71 Cal. 30. " The writing is used to 
 aid the memory. If the witness has 
 an independent knowledge of the 
 facts, there is no propriety in his in- 
 specting any note or writing." State 
 v. Baldwin, 36 Kan. 15; Sackett v. 
 Spencer, 29 Barb. 180. Where a 
 witness is forgetful be may be in- 
 terrogated upon irrelevant but sug- 
 gestive facts to refresh his memory 
 of the main transaction but not to 
 impeach him. Prentiss v. Bates, 88 
 Mich. 567; People v. Sherman, 61 
 Hun, 623 ; 133 N. Y. 349. See § 335. 
 
 ^McNeely v. Duff, 50 Kan. 488; 
 Baum v. Reay, 96 Cal. 462 ; 29 Pac. 
 Rep. 117 ; Flood v. Mitchell, 68 N. Y. 
 507; Pickard v. Bryant, 52 N. W. 
 Rep. 788; 92 Mich. 430. 
 
 5 Raynor v. Norton, 3 Mich. 210. 
 
 e Com. v. Halley, 13 Allen, 587, by 
 Hoar, J.
 
 478 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 [§ 337. 
 
 members that when he saw it he knew it to be a correct state- 
 ment of those facts, he may consult it. 1 Is" uv it is clear upon 
 considerations elsewhere explained that under certain circum- 
 stances such writings, if identified by the witness as being con- 
 temporaneous and original entries, if regularly made in the 
 course of his employment, he having a full knowledge of the 
 facts, are admissible ns independent evidence as a part of 
 the res gestae. 2 But where the writings do not fulfill these re- 
 quirements, that is, where the writings, though contemporane- 
 ous, were not made by the witness, or where they are subse- 
 quent copies of original writings made by the witness or by 
 another person, they are not admissible as evidence though 
 the witness may still consult them to refresh his memory, and 
 they should be produced in court that the opposite counsel 
 may inspect them (without being obliged to put them in evi- 
 dence) and have an opportunity to question the witness as to 
 eve^ fact which they contain. 3 
 
 1 1 Greenl. on Ev., §437; Labaree v. the like, in respect to which no 
 Closterman, 33 Neb. 150: 49 N. W. memory could be sufficiently re- 
 Rep. 1102: Baum v. Reay, 96Cal. 462; tentive without depending on mem- 
 29 Pac. Rep. 117; Hartley v. Cata- oianda, and even memoranda would 
 ract, etc. Co.. 19 N. Y. S. 121 ; Green not bring the transaction to present 
 v. Casilk, 16 Md. 556; Wagonseller recollection. In such cases, if the 
 v.Brown, 7 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 663; witness on looking at the writing is 
 State v. Baldwin, 36 Kan. 1 ; Con- able to testifv that he knows the 
 
 verse v. Hobbs, 61 N. H. 42; Hayden 
 v. Hoxie, 27 III. App. 533; Ellis v. 
 State, 25 Fla. 702; 6 S. Rep. 768; 
 Flint v. Kennedy, 33 Fed. Rep. 820: 
 Riordan v. Guggerty, 74 Iowa, 688; 
 Butler v. Benson, 1 Barb. 526 ; Bar- 
 bank v. Dennis (Cal., 1893), 35 Pac. 
 Rep. 444; Downer v. Rowell, 24 Vt. 
 343; Costello v. Crowed, 133 Mass. 
 355; State v. Col well, 3 R. I. 132; 
 George v. Joy, 19 N. H. 544; Mor- 
 rison v. Chapin, 97 Mass. 76; Card v. 
 Foot, 56 Conn. 361); Brotton v. 
 Langert, 1 Wash. 267. In Dugan v. 
 Mahoney, 11 Allen (Mass.), 572, the 
 court said: "It is obvious that this 
 
 transaction took place though he has 
 no present recollection of it, his tes- 
 timony is admissible." 
 
 2 See §§ 58-62. See, also, Cole v. 
 Jessup, 10 N. Y. 9!5; 9 Barb. 395; 
 Halsey v. Sinsebaugh, 15 N. Y. 485. 
 If the witness on consulting the 
 original memorandum does not find 
 that it refreshes his memory so that 
 he can speak of his own knowledge, 
 the writing may be offered in evi- 
 dence. Marcey v. Shults, 29 N. Y. 
 348. If a writing is already in evi- 
 dence it is not error for the court to 
 refuse to allow a witness to use it to 
 refresh his memory. Burlington, 
 
 species of evidence must be admis- etc. Co. v. Wallace, 28 Neb. 179; 44 
 
 sible in regard to numbers, dates N. W. Rep. 225. 
 and deliveries of goods, payments 3 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 437; Russell 
 
 and receipts of money, accounts and v. Rider, 6 C. & P. 416; Rex v.
 
 § 338.] EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 479 
 
 The other class of cases includes writings which the witness 
 does not remember having seen before and of whose contents 
 or correctness he has no present recollection, but, knowing 
 the writing- to be genuine, he is able on consulting it, and. 
 because of its aid and his confidence in its genuineness, to swear 
 independently and of his own knowledge to the facts. Thus a 
 subscribing witness seeing his own signature at the foot of an 
 attestation clause will be enabled to testify that a testator 
 executed a will though the witness has wholly forgotten some 
 or all of the circumstances of the execution. 1 
 
 § 338. Character of the writing used to refresh the mem- 
 ory of the witness. — The writing by which the witness re- 
 freshes his memory should be contemporaneous with the 
 transactions that are mentioned in it. 2 This is the general 
 rule which is supported by a majority of the cases, though it 
 is sometimes qualified by the statement that the entry need 
 not be precisely contemporaneous if it was made before the 
 memory of the person making it had become weakened and 
 unreliable by lapse of time. 3 In many cases copies made 
 some time after the original entry or writing have been per- 
 mitted to be used if the witness could swear of his own knowl- 
 edge to their accuracy. 4 But a copy cannot be used by the 
 
 Ramsden, 2 id. 003; Baura v. Reay, Md. 54; Watrous v. Cunningham, 
 
 96 Cal. 402; 29 Pac. Rep. 117; 71 Cal. 30: Burbank v. Dennis (Cal., 
 
 Wagonseller v. Brown, 7 Pa. Co. Ct. 1893). 35 Pac. Rep. 444. 
 Rep. 663: Little v. Lischkoff (Ala., 3 Culver v. Scott (Minn., 1893), 55 
 
 1893), 12 S. Rep. 429; Arlae v. Zangs, N. W. Rep. 552; Sisk v. State, 28 
 
 41 Iowa, 586; Huff v. Bennett, 6 Tex. App. 432; Jones v. Stroud, 2 
 
 N. Y. 337; Tibbetts v. Sternberg, 06 C. & P. 196; Howell v. Bowman 
 
 Barb. (N. Y.) 201: Peck v. Lake, 3 (Ala., 1892), 10 S. Rep. 640; Bank v. 
 
 Lans. 136; Dew v. Downam, 1 Green, Bollong, 21 Neb. 825. So it has been 
 
 135; Patterson v. Tucker, 4 Halst. permitted counsel to refresh the 
 
 322; Bonnet v. Glarlfehlt, 24 111. App. memory of a forgetful witness by 
 
 533. Contra, Chattanooga, etc. Co. reading evidence given by him on a 
 
 v. Owen (Ga., 1S93), 15 S. E. Rep. former trial from the stenographer's 
 
 853. minutes. Ehrisman v. Scott (Ind., 
 
 i See ante, % 138. 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 867; Batishill v. 
 
 2 Williams v. Wa?er, 64 Vt. 326; Humphreys, 64 Mich. 514; 38 N. W. 
 
 Weston v. Brown, 35 Neb. 699; 46 R^p. 581. 
 
 N. W. Rep. 826; Com. v. Clancy, 4 Lord Talbot v. Cusack, 17 Ir. C. 
 
 154 Mass. 128: 27 N. E. Rep. 1001; L. 213; Home v. McKenzie, 6 C. &F. 
 
 Converse v. Hobbs, 64 N. H. 42; 628; Birmingham v. McPoland (Ala., 
 
 Spring Garden Ins. Co. v. Riley, 15 1893), 11 S. Rep. 427; Anderson v.
 
 480 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 [§ 339. 
 
 witness until the absence of the original is accounted for. 1 A 
 witness who has been called to testify to the value of "mate- 
 rials may use a price list on the stand to aid him in forming 
 a correct opinion, where it is shown that it is impossible for 
 him to retain all the prices in his memory. 2 
 
 §339. Cross-examination — Its object and value.— As a 
 means of ascertaining the truth, the cross-examination of a 
 witness in open court is correctly said to be at once effective 
 and impartial. 3 . Writers on the law of evidence have fre- 
 quently adverted to its peculiar efficacy and excellence as a 
 method of investigating the motives and personal prejudices 
 of the witness, and his relation to the parties and to the sub- 
 ject of the suit. So, also, his knowledge and general intelli- 
 gence, the faithfulness of his memory, his impartiality or bias, 
 his means of observation and his opportunities for gaining an 
 accurate and full acquaintance with the facts and circum- 
 stances, may all be explored and ascertained for the consider- 
 ation of the jurors, to aid them in determining what weight 
 they should place upon his evidence. 4 
 
 Imhof, 34 Neb. 335; Stavinow v. 
 Home Ins. Co., 43 Mo. App. 513; 
 Watson v. Miller, 82 Tex. 279; Wat- 
 rous v. Cunningham, 71 Cal. 30; 
 Bonnet v. Glaclfeldt, 24 111. App. 
 533 ; Flint v. Kennedy, 33 Fed. Rep. 
 820; People v. Monroe (Cal., 1893), 
 33 Pac. Rep. 776; Burbank v. Dennis 
 (Cal., 1893), 35 Pac. Rep. 444; Ston- 
 dennie v. Harper, 81 Ala. 242 ; Cald- 
 well v. Bowen, 80 Mich. 382. 
 
 Byrnes v. Pacific Exp. Co. (Tex., 
 1891), 15 S. W. Rep. 46; Anderson v. 
 Itnhoff, 34 Neb. 335; 51 N. W. Rep. 
 854; Birmingham v. McPoland(Ala., 
 1893), 11 S. Rep. 427. That a witness 
 may refresh his memory by reading a 
 printed article published from manu- 
 script supplied by him, see Hawes v. 
 State, 88 Ala. 37. 
 
 2 Morris v. Columbian Iron Works 
 & D. D. Co. (Md., 1893), 25 Atl. Rep. 
 417. 
 
 3 ' ' Cross-examination, which is the 
 right of the party against whom a 
 
 witness is called, is a means of sep- 
 arating hearsay from knowledge, — 
 error from truth ; opinion from fact ; 
 influence from recollection ; of as- 
 certaining the order of the events as 
 narrated by the witness in his ex- 
 amination in chief, the time and 
 place when and where they occurred 
 and the attending circumstances, 
 and of testing the intelligence, mem- 
 ory, impartiality, truthfulness and 
 integrity of the witness." The Ot- 
 tawa, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 271. 
 
 *1 Greenl. on Ev., § 446; 1 Stark, 
 on Ev., §§ 160, 161. In Alison's Prac- 
 tice, p. 546, it is said: "Where a 
 witness is evidently prevaricating or 
 concealing the truth, it is seldom by 
 intimidation or sternness of manner 
 that he can be brought, at least in 
 this country, to let out the truth. 
 Such measures may sometimes ter- 
 rify a timid witness into a true con- 
 fession ; but in general they only 
 confirm a hardened one in his false-
 
 § 330.] 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 481 
 
 It is sometimes an important question whether a party has 
 so examined his own witness as to give his adversary the right 
 to cross-examine him. A witness who has been sworn, but to 
 whom no questions are put, cannot be cross-examined; 1 and 
 this is true a fortiori where the only object of calling him 
 is to obtain the production of a writing which is to be proved 
 by another witness. 2 But error in refusing a party the right 
 to cross-examine is absolutely waived by the party making 
 the witness his own. 3 It has been held that the parties to an 
 action have a right to regard the witness of a third party in- 
 tervening as adverse where the original parties have some 
 interests in common against the intervenor. Both parties 
 lna}^ therefore cross-examine the witnesses of the party inter- 
 vening. 4 The right and scope of a cross-examination as such 
 are confined strictly to those matters concerning which the 
 witness has already been interrogated on his direct examina- 
 tion. In other words, the counsel cross-examining will not be 
 permitted to ask the witness leading and general questions 
 upon matters which, though involved in the issue, were not 
 touched upon in his direct examination. 5 
 
 hood and give him time to consider 
 how seeming contradictions may be 
 reconciled. The most effectual rem- 
 edy is to examine rapidly and mi- 
 nutely as to a number of subordinate 
 and apparently trivial points in his 
 
 Reed v. James, t Stark. 132; Bush 
 v. Smith, 1 C. M. & R. 94; Davis v. 
 Dale, 1 M. & M. 514; Summers v. 
 Mosely, 2 C. & M. 477. A witness- 
 called only to prove a signature may 
 be cross-examined. Yost v. Minn. 
 
 evidence concerning which there is Hard. Works, 41 111. App. 556. 
 
 little likelihood of his being pre- 
 pared with falsehood ready made; 
 and where such a course of interro- 
 gation is skilfully laid, it is rarely 
 that it fails in exposing perjury or 
 contradictions in some parts of the 
 testimony which it is desired to over- 
 turn." 
 
 1 Austin v. State, 14 Ark. 555. 
 One of several jointly tried for a 
 crime may be required to cross-ex- 
 amine the state's witnesses and pro- 
 duce his own before the same is 
 done by his co-defendants. State v. 
 Howard (S. C, 1892), 14 S. E. Rep. 
 481. 
 
 2 Perry v. Gibson, 1 Ad. & El. 48 ; 
 
 31 
 
 3 Hemminger v. Western Ass. Co.- 
 (Mich., 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 949. 
 Cf. Territory v. Rehberg, G Mont. 
 467; ISPac. Rep. 132. 
 
 4 Succession of Townsend, 40 La: 
 Ann. 66; 3 S. Rep. 488. 
 
 5 Eamesv. Reiser, 142 U. S. 488; 
 St. Louis & Iron M. R. R. Co. v. 
 Silver, 56 Mo. 265; Bell v. Piewitt, 
 62 111. 362; Britton v. State, 115 Ind. 
 55; Haynes v. Ledyard, 33 Mich. 
 C19; Adams v. State, 28 Fla. 511;: 
 Bullis v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 76 
 towa, 680; Cramer v. Cullinane, 2 
 MacArthur (D. C), 197; Freeman v. 
 Hensley (Gal., 1893), 30 Pac. Rep. 
 792; Jones v. Roberts, 37 Mo. App.
 
 ■182 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [§ 310. 
 
 If a witness while being cross-examined avoids replying or 
 parries the questions, he may be pressed for an answer, and 
 the counsel calling him should not be allowed to interpose 
 frivolous objections to prevent a rapid cross-examination and 
 to afford the witness an opportunity to fabricate evidence. 1 
 But the extent to which the same question may be repeated 
 is largely in the discretion of the court. 2 
 
 § 340. Power of cross-examination — Its extent. — Though 
 the court may exercise its discretion in allowing or refusing 
 cross-examination as to irrelevant matters bearing on credibil- 
 ity alone, the right to cross-examine upon transactions directly 
 relevant and which have been brought out on the direct exam- 
 ination is absolute. So the fact that relevant evidence, elicited 
 by a proper question put on the direct examination, has been 
 improperly stricken out, furnishes no basis for a claim that 
 other strictly relevant evidence of the same matter should be 
 expunged when stated on cross-examination. 3 But the right 
 to cross-examine a witness is not lost because the party fails to 
 object to a direct examination out of the proper order. 4 The 
 proper remedy for a part} 7- who has had no opportunity of 
 cross-examining an adverse witness is to move the court to 
 strike out his evidence elicited on the direct examination and 
 to request an instruction that the jury should disregard it. s 
 The extent to which a party may cross-examine his adversary's 
 
 177; Lloyd v. Thompson, 5 111. App. 142 U. S. 691 ; Rigdon v. Conley, 31 
 
 90; Pye v. Bakke (Minn., 1893), 55 111. App. 630; Welcome v. Mitchell, 
 
 N. W. Rep. 904; Buckley v. Buck- 81 Wis. 566; 51 N. W. Rep. 1080; 
 
 ley, 12 Nev. 423; In re Westerfield, State v. Willingham, 33 La. Ann. 
 
 96 Cal. 113; Braly v. Henry, 77 Cal. 537. 
 
 324; Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass. l State v. Duncan (Mo., 1893), 22 
 
 v. Hutmacher, 127 111. 656; State v. S. W. Rep. 699. 
 
 Chamberlain, 89 Mo. 132; Hunsinger 2 Brown v. State, 72 Md. 477; 20 
 v. Hofner, 110 Ind. 390; State v. Atl. Rep. 140; McGuire v. Manu- 
 Farrington (Iowa, 1894), 57 N. W. facturing Co., 156 Mass. 324; Sand- 
 Rep. 606; Bohan v. Avoca, 154 Pa. ers v. Bagwell (S. C, 1893), 15 S. E. 
 St. 104 ; Townsend v. Briggs (Cal., Rep. 714; Lakens v. Hazlett, 37 
 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 307; Chandler v. Minn. 441. 
 
 Beal, 132 Ind. 596; Hansen v. Mil- 3 Turnbull v. Richardson, 60 Mich, 
 
 ler (111., 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 548; 400; 37 N. W. Rep. 499. 
 
 Amos v. State (Ala., 1893), 11 S. Rep. 4 Graham v. Larimer, 83 Cal. 173 ; 
 
 424; Gale v. People, 26 Mich. 157; 23 Pac. Rep. 286. 
 
 Mt. Vernon v. Brooks, 39 111. App. 5 People v. Cole, 43 N. Y. 508. 
 426; Home Ben. Ass. v. Sargent,
 
 § 340.} 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 is;; 
 
 witnesses upon matters not directly relevant to the issue, but 
 which affect the credibility of the witness, is largely within 
 the discretion of the judge, 1 and a reasonable exercise of thi3 
 discretion will be always allowed in limiting the method or 
 duration of the cross-examination or in admitting irrelevant 
 questions tending to explain the motives, 2 opportunities 3 and 
 powers of observation, the knowledge, 4 memory, 5 reliability 6 or 
 good faith of the witness. 7 
 
 Questions put to the witness designed to ascertain his rela- 
 tions, business or otherwise, towards the parties and his feel- 
 ings or bias towards them are not objectionable. 8 On the 
 other hand, it is not reversible error for the court to refuse to 
 permit the cross-examination to be unreasonably prolonged, 9 
 
 1 1 Greenl. Ev., § 447 ; Wallace v. 
 Railroad Co., 119 Mass. 91; Phillips 
 v. Marblehead, 148 Mass. 329 ; Hunts- 
 ville Belt Line & M. S. Ry. Co. v. 
 Corpening (Ala., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 
 295 ; Birmingham F. I. Co. v. Pulver, 
 18 N. E. Rep. 804; 126 111. 329; Col- 
 lar v. Potter, 88 Mich. 549; Graham 
 v. McReynolds, 90 Tenn. 673; Hold- 
 ridge v. Lee, 52 N. W. Rep. 265; 
 State v. Norris, 109 N. C. 820 ; Rior- 
 dan v. Guggerty, 74 Iowa, 688 ; 39 
 N. W. Rep. 107; State v. Miller, 93 
 Mo. 263 ; Gutsch v. Mcllhargey, 69 
 Mich. 377; Gadbois v. Chicago, M. & 
 St. P. R. R. Co., 75 Iowa, 530; 
 Schmidt v. McCarthy, 43 Minn. 
 288. 
 
 2 People v. Thomas, 92 Cal. 506; 
 Hartman v. Rogers, 69 Cal. 643. 
 
 3 State v. Avery (Mo., 1893), 21 S. 
 W. Rep. 193: International R. R. Co. 
 v. Dyer, 76 Tex. 156; Holmes v. 
 State, 88 Ala. 226. 
 
 4 Hess v. Lowry, 122 Ind. 225; 
 Williams v. State (Fla., 1893), 13 S. 
 Rep. 834; Chicago, K. & N. R. Co. 
 v. Stewart, 47 Kan. 704; Lentz v. 
 Carnegie Bros. Co., 145 Pa. St. 612; 
 Schwartz v. Wood, 67 Hun, 648; Col- 
 lar v. Potter, 88 Mich. 549. A wit- 
 ness may be asked on cross-examina- 
 tion if he understood a question 
 
 asked him on the direct examina- 
 tion. Pence v. Waugh (Ind., 1893), 
 34 N. E. Rep. 860. 
 
 3 State v. Duffy, 57 Conn. 525; 
 Sewall v. Robbins, 139 Mass. 164: 
 Davis v. California Pow. Works, 84 
 Cal. 617. A witness may be asked 
 to repeat on cross-examination his 
 evidence to a particular point on his 
 direct examination to test his mem- 
 ory and ascertain if he will contra- 
 dict himself. Zucker v. Carpeles, 88 
 Mich. 413; Beers v. Payment (Mich., 
 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 886. 
 
 6 Hare v. Mahoney, 60 Hun, 576. 
 
 7 Doyle v. Beaupre, 63 Hun, 624 ; 
 Pence v. Waugh, sxipra; Murray v. 
 G. W. Ins. Co., 25 N. Y. S. 414; Cur- 
 ren v. Ampersee (Mich., 1893), 56 N. 
 W. Rep. 87. 
 
 8 Graham v. McReynolds, 88 Tenn. 
 240; Pennsylvania Co. v. Newmeyer, 
 129 Ind. 401; Com. v. Lyden, 113 
 Mass. 452; Knight v. Cunnington, 
 13 N. Y. Supr. Ct. 100 ; Thomas v. 
 Loose, 114 Pa. St. 47; People v. 
 Thomson, 92 Cal. 596; Jackson v. 
 Litch, 62 Pa. St. 451; Schwartz 
 v. Wood, 67 Hun, 648; United States 
 v. Cross, 20 D. C. 365; Hamilton v. 
 Hulett (Minn., 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 
 364; Holmes v. State, 88 Ala. 26. 
 
 o Hamilton v. Hulett (Minn., 1893),
 
 4S4 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [§ 340. 
 
 or for the court to refuse to allow the same question to be 
 asked repeatedly when it has been once answered satisfactor- 
 ily, 1 or to exclude questions which are designed solely to ascer- 
 tain w T hat witnesses it may be advantageous for the party to 
 cross-examine. 2 While counsel may of right cross examine the 
 witness as to relevant facts gone into on the direct examina- 
 tion, he should not be permitted to open his own case and 
 present his evidence to the jury by a process of cross-examin- 
 ing the adverse witnesses.* 
 
 The general rule that excludes evidence of facts collateral 
 to the issue 4 is not applied so rigidl3 r to the cross-examination 
 as it is to the direct examination. The theory upon which 
 cross-examination is allowed is that it is primarily adapted to 
 ascertain the truth, not by eliciting positive evidence directly 
 hearing on the facts in issue, but by furnishing a means of test- 
 ing the truthfulness and credibility of the witness. 5 It is 
 never permissible on cross-examination to interrogate upon 
 wholly irrelevant and collateral matters solely for the purpose 
 of discrediting the witness by subsequently contradicting him 
 directly on that point by other evidence. 6 But it is proper to 
 
 53 N. W. Rep. 364 ; Pennsylvania Co. Rowell, 17 Pick. 499 ; Mount Vernon 
 
 v. Newmeyer, 129 Ind. 501 ; Birm- v. Brooks, 39 111. App. 426. 
 
 ingham F. Ins. Co. v. Culver, 126 4 See ante, § 210. 
 
 111. 329; 18 N. E. Rep. 804. 5 So where the witness testifying 
 
 1 Remer v. Long Island R. Co., 1 to a date states that on the date in 
 
 N. Y. S. 124; Gutsch v. Mcllhargey, question he looked into the almanac, 
 
 69 Mich. 377; 37 N. W. Rep. 303; he may be asked on cross-examina- 
 
 Mason v. Hinds, 19 N. Y. S. 996; tion why he did so, though strictly 
 
 Jones v. Stevens (Neb., 1893), 55 N. speaking his reason is irrelevant. 
 
 W. Rep. 251; Hughes v. Ward, 38 Thomas v. Miller, 151 Pa. St. 482. 
 
 Kan. 452. 6 1 Greenl. Ev., § 449; Futch v. 
 
 ^United States v. Cross, 20 D. C. State (Ga., 1893), 16 S. E. Rep. 102; 
 
 3135. An inquiry of a witness on Hoover v. Cary (Iowa, 1893), 53 N.W. 
 
 cross-examination if he was a total Rep. 415; Pye v. Bakke (Minn., 1893), 
 
 abstainer, he having stated that the 55 N. W. Rep. 904; State v. Elwood, 
 
 plaintiff had been discharged by his 17 R. I. 763; Elkhart v. Witman, 122 
 
 employer for drunkenness, is im- Ind. 538; Morris v. Atl. Ave. R. R. 
 
 proper. Fox v. Railroad Co., 52 N. Co., 116 N. Y. 552; People v. Mc- 
 
 W. Rep. 623; 92 Mich. 243. Kellar, 53 Cal. 65; Combs v. Win- 
 
 3 Adams v. State, 28 Fla. 511; 10 Chester, 39 N. H. 1 ; Sutor v. Wood, 
 
 S. W. Rep. 106; Sullivan v. O'Leary, 76 Tex. 403; People v. Hilhouse, 80 
 
 146 Mass. 322; Burke v. Miller, 7 Mich. 580; Com. v. Hourigan (Ky., 
 
 Cush. (Mass.) 547-550; Moody v. 1890), 12 S. W. Rep. 550; State v.
 
 § 340.] 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 4sr» 
 
 ask the witness whether he did not at some particular time or 
 place give a different account of the relevant facts to that which 
 he gave on his direct examination. If he denies that he has 
 done so, a foundation is laid for impeaching him by the testi- 
 mony of some one who heard him make the contradictory 
 statement. 1 So, too, where the witness on cross-examination 
 is questioned as regards his interest or prejudice, or, in other 
 words, where the purpose of the questions is solely to eluci- 
 date his existing or previous relation or conduct towards the 
 subject-matter or towards the parties, he may be contradicted 
 by other evidence. 2 Thus, a witness may be asked on his 
 cross-examination if he has not expressed feelings of hostility, 
 or acted unfriendly towards the adverse party or towards the 
 prisoner, 3 and if he refuses to answer, 4 or answers in the neg- 
 ative, the fact may be shown by the evidence of those who 
 heard him. 5 But if the witness state that although formerly 
 
 Rieck, 43 Kan. 635 ; State v. Blakely, 
 43 id. 250; Davis v. California Pow. 
 Works. 84 Cal. 617; People v. Tiley, 
 84 Cal. 651 ; Robbins v. Spencer, 121 
 Ind. 594. But it seems that ques- 
 tions which would be irrelevant on 
 the direct examination may be al- 
 lowed on the cross-examination if 
 they tend to explain the transaction 
 in issue by bringing out particulars 
 which were not touched upon by the 
 party calling the witness (Doyle v. 
 Beaupre, 63 Hun, 624; Collar v. Pot- 
 ter, 88 Mich. 549 ; Pickard v. Bryant, 
 92 Mich. 430; 52 N. W. Rep. 78S; 
 Osbiston v. Kaufman, 29 Pac. Rep. 
 748), because adverse to his case. 
 
 1 See infra, § 350 ; People v. Will- 
 iams, 18 Cal. 187; State v. Baldwin, 
 36 Kan. 1 ; State v. Tabott, 73 Mo. 
 347. And where a witness makes a 
 eertain statement on cross-examina- 
 tion, he may then be asked if he did 
 not give different testimony on a 
 former trial. Hall v. Chicago R. Co. , 
 52 N. W. Rep. 247. 
 
 *Holdridge v. Lee (S. D., 1893), 52 
 N. W. Rep. 265. 
 
 3 The prosecution may show the re- 
 lationship between the witness and 
 the prisoner, though this relationship 
 may prejudice the latter in the eyes 
 of the jury. State v. McGahey (N. D. , 
 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. 753; Burger v. 
 State, 83 Ala. 36. 
 
 4 State v. McFarlain, 41 La. Ann. 
 686. 
 
 5 Lyle v. State, 21 Tex. App. 153; 
 Atwood v. Welton, 7 Conn. 60 ; John 
 Morris Co, v. Burgess, 44 111. App. 27 ; 
 People v. Gillis (Cal., 1893), 32 Pac. 
 Rep. 586; Garnsey v. Rhodes, 138 
 N. Y. 461 ; Bonnard v. State, 25 Tex. 
 App. 173; Scott v. State, 64 Ind. 400; 
 Crumpton v. State, 52 Ark. 273; 
 Hamilton v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 9 
 N. Y. 313; People v. Thomas, 92 Cal. 
 506 ; People v. Goldensen, 76 Cal. 328 ; 
 Com. v. Byron, 14 Gray, 31. The ex- 
 tent of the right to cross-examine on 
 immaterial matters to ascertain bias 
 is discretionary with the court. 
 Miller v. Smith, 112 Mass. 470. The 
 hostility of an adverse witness may 
 be shown by the evidence of another 
 witness without questioning the hos-
 
 4SG 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 [§ 341. 
 
 hostile to a party he is so no longer, testimony showing his 
 previous hostility is irrelevant as being too remote. 1 
 
 § 341. Redirect examination. — A witness may be re- 
 examined by the party calling him when, on cross-examina- 
 tion, he has been questioned in regard to a prior contradictory 
 statement, 2 or he may be requested to state his motives for 
 acts done by him and described in his cross-examination. 3 
 He may be questioned on re-examination with a view of as- 
 certaining- the real meaning of his statements made on his 
 cross-examination and those made out of court in order to 
 show that, though seemingly inconsistent, yet when rightly 
 understood they are not contradictory. 4 But counsel will not 
 be permitted to go be} T ond this and bring in new matter con- 
 sisting of statements neither explanatory of the contradict- 
 ory utterances nor connected with them, although contained 
 in the same conversation and relevant to the subject-matter 
 of the suit. 5 In re-examining a witness he may also be asked 
 questions which will explain all facts which were brought out 
 on his cross-examination 6 from which wrong inferences might 
 be drawn or which tend to cast doubts upon his credit. 7 
 
 tile witness. People v. Brooks, 131 
 N. Y. 321 ; 30 N. E. Rep. 189. But 
 evidence that a party had brought 
 an action against an adverse witness 
 is inadmissible in the absence of evi- 
 dence showing the actual existence 
 of a hostile feeling as the result of 
 the suit. Wischstadt v. Wischstadt, 
 4? Minn. 38; 50 N. W. Rep. 225. 
 
 1 Consaul v. Sheldon, 35 Neb. 247. 
 
 2 Butterfield v. Gilchrist, 63 Mich. 
 155. 
 
 3 Westbrook v. Aultman, 3 Ind. 
 App. 83; 28 N. E. Rep. 1011; Com. 
 v. Dill, 156 Mass. 266 ; 30 N. E. Rep. 
 1016; People v. Hanifan (Mich., 
 1893), 56 N. W. Rep. 1048; Railroad 
 v. Randall, 85 Ga. 297. 
 
 • Wilkersons v. Eilers (Mo., 1893), 
 21 S. W. Rep. 134; Dole v. Wool- 
 dridge, 142 Mass. 184; Smith v. 
 State, 21 Tex. App. 277; State v. 
 Reed, 89 Mo. 168; Fuller v. James- 
 town, etc. Co., 26 N. Y. S. 1078. 
 
 5 Miller v. Railroad Co. (Iowa, 
 1893), 57 N. W. Rep. 418; Prince v. 
 Samo, 7 Ad. & El. 627. But see 
 contra, Springfield v. Dalboy, 139 
 111. 34; 29 N. E. Rep. 860. 
 
 6 "The examination and cross- 
 examination must relate to facts in 
 issue, or relevant, or denied to be 
 relevant thereto; but the cross- 
 examination need not be confined 
 to the facts to which the witness 
 testified on his examination in chief. 
 The re-examination must be directed 
 to the explanation of matters re- 
 ferred to in cross-examination ; and 
 if new matter is by permission of 
 the court introduced in re-examina- 
 tion, the adverse party may further 
 cross-examine upon the matter." 
 Stephen's Dig. Ev., art. 127. 
 
 7 State v. McGahey (N. D, 1893), 
 55 N. W. Rep. 753; Vanduzer v. 
 Letellier, 78 Mich. 492; United 
 >States v. Barrells, 8 Biatchf. 475;
 
 * 342.] 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 487 
 
 A suggestive mode of interrogating a witness on the re- 
 direct examination, though sometimes permissible * and always 
 in the discretion of the court, is not to be commended. Thus, 
 counsel should not be allowed to extricate the witness from 
 his difficulty by repeating to him his statement made on the 
 direct examination, and then asking him if the statements 
 made on cross-examination are consistent therewith. 2 Where 
 the court in the exercise of its discretion permits a witness to 
 answer irrelevant questions or to make irrelevant replies to 
 relevant questions on the cross-examination, the party may on 
 the redirect examination question him upon the same matters. 8 
 If the adverse party desires to re-examine the witness after 
 the redirect examination he may do so on the recross exam- 
 ination, but he will be restricted to new matter brought out 
 on the redirect examination. 
 
 § 342. Recalling witnesses. — Whether a witness, after 
 having given his testimony and left the stand, shall be per- 
 mitted to be recalled by the party in whose behalf he has tes- 
 tified, or for further cross-examination by the adverse party, 4 
 is a matter wholly in the discretion of the court; 5 and this 
 
 Norwegian Plow Co. v. Hanthorn, 
 71 Wis. 529; 37 N. W. Rep. 825; 
 Pullen v. Pullen (N. J., 1888), 12 
 Atl. Rep. 138; Feather v. Reading, 
 155 Pa. St. 187 ; Alderton v. Wright, 
 81 Mich. 244. Accordingly where a 
 witness acknowledged that a written 
 statement had been prepared by the 
 public prosecuting officer at whose 
 bidding she signed, she will be al- 
 lowed, on the redirect examination, 
 to state that the statement was 
 wholly voluntary, that it was true, 
 and that its language was her own. 
 People v. Mills, 54 N. W. Rep. 488; 
 94 Mich. 630. 
 
 i Smith v. State, 21 Tex. App. 277. 
 
 2 Smith v. State, 21 Tex. App. 277 : 
 Stoner v. Devilbiss, 70 Md. 160; 
 Ohlsen v. Terrero, L. R. 10 Ch. App. 
 127; Wells v. Jackson I. Mfg. Co., 
 48 N. H. 491 ; Moody v. Rowell, 17 
 Pick. 498; Gunter v. Watson, 4 
 Jones' (N. C.) L. 455. If a party in 
 
 cross-examining brings out a partial 
 disclosure of a transaction which is 
 not admissible if coming from his 
 opponent, the latter may on his re- 
 direct examination make a full dis- 
 covery. Howe v. Schwemberg, 4 
 Misc. Rep. 73; Simmons v. Havens, 
 101 N. Y. 427. 
 
 a People v. McNamara, 94 Cal. 509 ; 
 Furbush v. Goodwin, 5 Fost. (N. H.) 
 425; Uhe v. Chicago M. etc. Co. 
 (S. D., 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 601: 
 State v. Cardoza, 11 S. C. 195; 
 Schaser v. State, 36 Wis. 429; Good- 
 man v. Kennedy, 10 Neb. 270; 
 Blewett v. Tregonning, 3 Ad. & El. 
 554, 565, 581, 584, cited in 1 Greenl. 
 Ev., § 468. Contra, Lake Erie, etc. 
 Co. v. Morain, 36 111. App. 632; 29 
 N. E. Rep. 869. 
 
 * People v. Parton, 49 Cal. 632. 
 
 5 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Barker 
 (Ala., 1893), 10 S. Rep. 453; Gulf, C. 
 &S. F. Ry. Co. v. Pool, 70 Tex. 713;
 
 488 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [§ 343. 
 
 discretion, it has been held, was not abused where a witness 
 was recalled after a direct, cross, redirect and recross-exami- 
 nation. 1 
 
 So if the witness was unable to answer positively or defi- 
 nitely when on the stand, it is proper to refuse to permit him 
 to be recalled later for an additional examination, 2 or to permit 
 a witness who has already testified fully and satisfactorily to 
 a certain transaction to be recalled for the sole purpose of 
 having him repeat his testimony or to obtain cumulative tes- 
 timony on the same point. 3 But the fact that a witness on 
 being recalled merely reiterated his previous testimony does 
 not constitute error provided no practical injustice has re- 
 sulted thereby. 4 If a witness is recalled for further direct 
 examination or for further cross-examination, the adverse 
 party has the right of further cross-examination or of further 
 redirect examination respectively. 5 
 
 § 343. Receiving evidence out of court. — It is highly im- 
 proper for the jury to seek or to receive evidence out of court, 
 and such an act, where their verdict is influenced thereby, 
 will furnish ground for its reversal. Thus, the jurors will 
 not be allowed to experiment, 6 to take a private view of 
 the premises, 7 or to communicate with other persons, 8 particu- 
 
 Fowler v. Strawberry Hill, 74 Iowa, 28 S. C. 29; 4 S. E. Rep. 799; Rich- 
 
 644; 38 N. W. Rep. 521; Riley v. mond & D. R. Co. v. Vance, 93 Ala. 
 
 State, 88 Ala. 193; Nixon v. Beard, 144; Brown v. State, 72 Md. 468. 
 
 Ill Ind. 137; State v. Dilley, 15 2Bonnet v. Gladfeldt, 24 III. App. 
 
 Oreg. 70; Humphreys v. State, 78 533; 120 111. 166; 11 N. E. Rep. 250. 
 
 Wis. 569; 47 N. W. Rep. 836; Snod- 3 Chicago, etc. Co. v. Hazels (Neb., 
 
 grass v. Com. (Va., 1893), 17 S. E. 1889), 42 N. W. Rep. 93. 
 
 Rep. 238; State v. Huff, 76 Iowa, < Dillard v. State, 58 Miss. 368. 
 
 200; Graves v. Santway, 6 N. Y. S. 5 Stephen's Dig., art. 126. 
 
 892; Huff v. Latimer (S. C, 1890), 6 Jim v. State, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 
 
 11 S. E. Rep. 75§; Francis v. Roosa, 289; Yates v. People, 38 111. 527; 
 
 151 Mass. 532. In State v. Clyburn, Forehand v. State, 51 Ark. 553; 
 
 16 S. C. 375, it was held a proper ex- Indianapolis v. Scott, 72 Ind. 196; 
 
 ercise of the judicial discretion to State v. Sanders, 68 Mo. 202. 
 
 permit a witness to be recalled by 7 Harrington v. Worcester, etc. 
 
 the state to testify to a single fact, Co. (Mass., 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 955: 
 
 though the examination of the de- Woodbury v. Anoka (Minn., 1893). 
 
 fendant's witnesses was interrupted 54 N. W. Rep. 187; Garsidev. Watch 
 
 and suspended thereby. Case Co., 17 R. I. 691. 
 
 i Hollings%vorth v. State, 4 S. E. «Wynn v. Railroad Co. (Ga., 1893), 
 
 Rep. 560; 79 Ga. 605; State v. Jacobs, 17 S. E. Rep. 649; Hager v. Hager,
 
 343.] 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 4S9 
 
 larly witnesses. 1 Neither party has any legal right to submit 
 documentary or other evidence to the jury except during the 
 pendency of the trial and in the presence of the court. Upon 
 this principle the reception of evidence outside of court will 
 vitiate the verdict. So writings not a part of the evidence, 2 as, 
 for example, maps, 3 and legal or scientific books and publica- 
 tions, 4 are not permitted to be perused by the jury. But they 
 may of course consult the pleadings, 5 memoranda or notes of 
 the judge's instructions, 6 and all papers which constitute a part 
 of the evidence. 7 But writings forming no part of the evidence 
 
 33 Barb. 92; People v. Boggs, 20 
 Cal. 432; State v. Dorsey, 40 La. 
 Ann. 739; Epps v. State, 19 Ga. 102; 
 State v. Fruge, 28 La. Ann. 657; 
 Dower v. Church, 21 W. Va. 24, 55; 
 March v. State, 44 Tex. 64; Peter- 
 sen v. Siglinger (S. D., 1893), 52 N. 
 W. Rep. 1060; Collier v. State, 20 
 Ark. 36. 
 
 1 See cases in last note. If a juror 
 has personal knowledge of the facts 
 in issue or of the character of a party 
 or a witness, he should be called to 
 give his evidence as a witness in 
 open court. Where the verdict is 
 based upon or influenced by state- 
 ments of matters known to a juror 
 alone, made by him in the jury- 
 room, which would be evidence if 
 he were on the witness stand, a new 
 trial should be granted. People v. 
 Thornton, 74 Cal. 48; Winslow v. 
 Morrill, 68 Me. 362; McKiesick v. 
 State, 26 Tex. 673 ; Anshicks v. State, 
 6 Tex. App. 527 ; Salina v. Tuspar, 
 27 Kan. 544 ; Wade v. Ordway, 57 
 Tenn. 229 ; Taylor v. State, 52 Miss. 
 84; Wood River Bank v. Dodge 
 (Neb., 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. 234; 
 Lucas v. State, 27 Tex. App. 322. 
 
 2 State v. Hartman, 46 Wis. 478; 
 Cavanaugh v. Buehler, 120 Pa. St. 
 441 ; Munde v. Lambre, 125 Mass. 
 367; State v. Lantz, 23 Kan. 728; 
 Chase v. Perley, 148 Mass. 289; Mc- 
 Leod v. Railway Co., 71 Iowa, 138; 
 
 Toohy v. Lewis, 78 Ind. 474 ; Meyer 
 v. Cadwalader. 40 Fed. Rep. 32. 
 
 3 Moore v. McDonald, 68 Md. 321 ; 
 State v. Hartman, 46 Wis. 248; 
 State v. Lantz, 23 Kan. 728. 
 
 4 Johnson v. State, 27 Fla. 215; 
 Chamberlain v. Pybus, 81 Tex. 511; 
 Merrill v. Mary, 10 Allen (Mass.), 
 416; State v. Wilson, 40 La. Ann. 
 757; State v. Smith, 6 R. I. 33; 
 State v. Tanner, 38 La. Ann. 307; 
 Bernhart v. State, 82 Wis. 23; Har- 
 ris v. State, 24 Neb. 803; State v. 
 Hopper, 71 Mo. 425 ; State v. Gilleck, 
 10 Iowa, 98; Moon v. State, 68 Ga. 
 687; State v. Harris, 34 La. Ann. 
 118. 
 
 SHitchins v. Frostburg. 68 Md. 
 100; Smith v. Holcomb, 99 Mass. 
 553. 
 
 6 Cowles v. Hayes, 71 N. C. 231 ; 
 State v. Thompson, 83 Mo. 257 ; Po- 
 sey v. Patton, 109 N. C. 455; Henly 
 v. State, 29 Ark. 17. 
 
 ^ Hudspeth v. Mears (Ga., 1893), 
 17 S. E. Rep. 837; People v. For- 
 mosa, 61 Hun, 272; Territory v. 
 Jones, 6 Dak. 85; State v. Raymond, 
 53 N. J. L. 528; Baker v. Com. (Ky., 
 1892), 17 S. W. Rep. 625 (deposition) ; 
 State v. Thompkins, 71 Mo. 63; Peo- 
 ple v. Cochran, 61 Cal. 548; Paige v. 
 Chedsey, 23 N. Y. S. 879; Beeks v. 
 Odom, 70 Tex. 183; Hewitt v. Rail- 
 road, 67 Mich. 61 ; Shoms v. Ziegler, 
 10 Phila. (Pa.) 315; Davis v. State
 
 490 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [§ 344. 
 
 should not be allowed in the jury-room 1 unless both parties 
 consent. On general principles of justice, the impropriety of 
 permitting the jurors to take with them from the court arti- 
 cles which have been used to explain the evidence and from 
 which they may draw, in the absence of the court and the 
 accused, erroneous inferences of fact, will be readily admitted. 
 So to permit the jury to take with them into the jury-room a 
 weapon with which it is alleged a crime was committed is re- 
 versible error, as such a course of action is likely to result in 
 serious injustice to the accused. 2 If the accused consents to 
 it, however, it seems that even articles not in evidence may be 
 taken by the jury to aid them in their deliberations. 3 
 
 § 344. Taking the view by the jury. — In some of the 
 states it is permitted by statute for the court to order the jury 
 to be taken in a body and in charge of a sworn officer to the 
 place where the subject under litigation is located or where a 
 fact material to the issue occurred. But a view cannot be or- 
 dered in the absence of statute 4 without the consent of the 
 parties to the cause. 
 
 - The exercise of the statutory authority to grant a view of 
 the premises lies wholly in the discretion of the court, 5 and to 
 
 (Ga., 1893), 17 S. E. Rep. 292; Cargill jury as evidence, either in the court- 
 
 v. Com. (Ky. , 1893), 20 S. W. Rep. room or elsewhere. It is proper 
 
 782; Sholly v. Dillar, 2 Rawle (Pa.), to instruct the jury that the indict- 
 
 147; Posey v. Patton, 109 N. C. 455; ment has no evidential value and to 
 
 Wood v. Wood, 47 Kan. 617; Nott v. point out to them its true use and 
 
 Thomson, 35 S. C. 461 ; 14 S. E. Rep. signification. State v. Hart, 66 Mo. 
 
 940; Chamberlain v. Pybus, 81 Tex. 208. 
 
 511; Falvey v. Richmond, 87 Ga. 99; 2 Forehand v. State, 51 Ark. 553; 
 
 Avery v. Moore, 133 111. 74; Mooney 11 S. W. Rep. 766. 
 
 v. Hough, 84 Ala. 80; Cockrill v. 3 People v. Mahoney, 77 Cal. 529. 
 
 Hall, 76 Cal. 192. 4 Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 
 
 1 State v. Baker (Oreg., 1893), 32 295,298; Smith v. State, 42 Tex. 444 ; 
 
 Pac. Rep. 161 ; Himes v. Krehl, 154 State v. Bertin, 24 La. Ann. 46 ; 
 
 Pa. St. 190; Spalding v. Saltill Bostock v. State, 61 Ga. 635, 639; 
 
 (Colo., 1893), 31 Pac. Rep. 486 (plead- Doud v. Guthrie, 13 Bradw. (111.) 
 
 ings excluded); Hefrom v. Gallup, 653. 
 
 55 Me. 563; Oskaloosa College v. 5 Jenkins v. Railroad Co., 110 N. C. 
 
 Western U. T. Co. (Iowa, 1893), 54 438; Springer v. Chicago, 37 111. App. 
 
 N. W. Rep. 152, and cases in last 206; 135 111. 532; Stewart v. Railroad 
 
 note. The indictment in a criminal Co*, 86 Mich. 315; Springfield v. Dal- 
 
 trial is not evidence, nor should it be bey, 139 111. 34; 29 N. E. Rep. 860; 
 
 read to or by the members of the Kan. Cent. R. R. v. Allen, 22 Kan.
 
 3W.] 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNE88ES. 
 
 491 
 
 obtain a new trial for a refusal to grant a view it must bo 
 clearly shown that the view was necessary, practicable, and 
 that by the request being denied the party was injured. 1 
 Where a jury trial is had in equity it has been held that the 
 judge should accompany the jury in taking the view. 2 And 
 in some cases the power may be exercised sua spo/ite, while in 
 others the view can only be ordered if requested by a party. 
 The subject depends wholly upon the terms of the statutes, 
 which should be consulted. 
 
 Whether the object of the view is to supply the jury with 
 evidence or to enable them to comprehend more clearly the 
 evidence given in court has been differently decided. The 
 latter proposition is supported by the weight of the decisions 
 and seems most consistent with the well- recognized rules of 
 evidence and procedure. 3 The opposite opinion is not without 
 support. 4 So the question of the right of the accused to be 
 present when the view is ordered in a criminal trial is still 
 unsettled. If the knowledge thus acquired by the jury be re- 
 garded as evidence, his presence is indispensable, as he has 
 a constitutional right to confront the witnesses in the pres- 
 ence of the court and to hear the evidence against him, 5 while 
 
 285; Chicago, etc. Co. v. Leah, 41 111. 
 App. 584, 592; Gunn v. Ohio, etc. 
 Co., 37 W. Va. 421; Klepsch v. Don- 
 ald, 4 Wash. St. 436 ; Board v. Cas- 
 tetter (Ind., 1893), 33 N. E. Rep. 986 ; 
 King v. Iowa Midland R. Co., 34 
 Iowa, 458 ; Chute v. State, 19 Minn. 
 271 ; Owen v. Miss. Pac. R. Co., 38 
 Fed. Rep. 571 ; Smith v. Railroad Co., 
 32 Minn. 1 ; Leonard v. Armstrong, 
 75 Mich. 577 ; Snow v. Railroad, 6 
 Me. 230; Boardman v. Westchester 
 Fire Ins. Co., 54 Wis. 364; Baltimore, 
 etc. R. Co. v. Polly, 14 Gratt. (Va.) 
 447, 470; People v. Bonny, 19 Cal. 
 426. 
 
 i Hudson v. Roos, 76 Mich. 173; 
 Gunn v. Railroad Co., 36 W. Va. 165; 
 Stewart v. Cincinnati, etc. Co., 89 
 Mich. 315. 
 
 -'Fraedrich v. Flieth, 64 Wis. 184; 
 Jelfersonville, etc. R. Co. v. Bowen, 
 40 Ind. 545. 
 
 3 Morrison v. Railroad (la., 1892), 
 57 N. W. Rep. 75 ; Heady v. Vevay 
 Turnpike Co.. 52 Ind. 117; Parks v. 
 Boston, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 209; Colum- 
 bus v. Billingmeier, 7 Ohio Cir. Ct. 
 Rep. 136. "The purpose is to en- 
 able the jury the better to under- 
 stand the testimony and thereby the 
 more intelligently to apply it to the 
 issues; not to make them silent wit- 
 nesses, burdened with testimony un- 
 known to the parties and with no 
 opportunity for cross-examination or 
 correction of error if any is made." 
 Anderson's Law Diet. See Close v. 
 Samm, 27 Iowa, 507. 
 
 4 Washburn v. Railway Co., 59 
 Wis. 364, 368; Parks v. Boston, 15 
 Pick. (Mass.) 198; Toledo, etc. R. Co. 
 v. Dunlap, 47 Mich. 456; Springfield 
 v. Dalbey, 139 III. 34. 
 
 & Benton v. Slate, 30 Ark. 328; 
 People v. Bush (Cal.), 10 Pac. Rep.
 
 402 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [§ 345. 
 
 if this view be repudiated his presence, while allowable, is 
 never indispensable. 1 
 
 In proceedings to condemn land under the exercise of the 
 right of eminent domain, where a jury trial is allowed, the 
 members of the jury act as quasi-assessors in fixing the value 
 of the land taken, and under such circumstances the infor- 
 mation obtained may justly be deemed evidence. 2 The view 
 may be had after the summing up, 3 but no oral evidence 
 should then be admitted during its progress, the duty of the 
 showers being only to point out the place itself. 4 
 
 §345. "Real evidence" — Physical examination by the 
 jury in court — Identification. — By "real evidence" is meant 
 that evidence which is obtained through the eyes by the in- 
 spection of a person or thing by the judge or jury in open 
 court. 5 The question of the production of articles in court to 
 illustrate the evidence having been considered elsewhere, 6 it 
 will be necessary in this place to consider those cases only in 
 which some question of personal identity or resemblance is 
 involved, and in which the person himself may be required to 
 submit to the examination of the jury. 
 
 Where the legitimacy of a child is in issue the court has 
 often permitted it to be exhibited to the jury in court in order 
 that they, from a personal inspection, and comparison with its 
 putative parent, may be enabled to ascertain whether or not 
 it resembles the latter. 7 But where the child was very young, 
 
 169; Carroll v. State, 5 Neb. 1; Fos- 2 Remy v. Mun. No. 2, 12 La. Ann. 
 
 ter v. State (Miss., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 500, 503; Mich. etc. R. Co. v. Barnes, 
 
 822. " A person accused of a crime 44 Mich. 222; Parks v. Boston, 12 
 
 is deprived of his right of appearing Pick. (Mass.) 209; Toledo, etc. R. Co. 
 
 in person and of being confronted v. Dunlap, 47 Mich. 456; Harper v. 
 
 with the witnesses against him if the Lexington, etc. R. Co., 2 Dana(Kan.), 
 
 jury view the locus in quo without 227; Washburn v. Railway Co., 59 
 
 his presence." People v. Lowrey, Wis. 364; Springfield v. Dalbey, 139 
 
 70 Cal. 193. But see contra, Blythe 111. 34. 
 
 v. State, 4 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 435. 3 Patchin v. Brooklyn, 2 Wend. 
 
 iCom. v. Knapp, 9 Pick. (Mass.) (N. Y.) 377; Ken. Cent. Ry. Co. v. 
 
 496; State v. Adams, 20 Kan. 311; Smith, 20 S. W. Rep. 392. 
 
 Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 4 Hey ward v. Knapp, 22 Minn. 5; 
 
 295; People v. Yut Ling, 74 Cal. 569; State v. Lopez, 15 Nev. 407. 
 
 State v. Ah Lee, 8 Oreg. 214; Reg. v. 'Gaunt v. State, 50 N. J. L. 491. 
 
 Martin; L. R. 1 Cr. Cas. Res. 378; * Ante, §39. 
 
 State v. Sasse, 72 Wis. 3. 7 Warlick v. White, 76 N. C. 175 ;
 
 § 345.] EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 493 
 
 evidence obtained in this way has been held to be irrelevant 
 because, the child's features and personal appearance not hav- 
 ing yet assumed a permanent character, the resemblance, if 
 any, would be fallacious. 1 The resemblance alone, however 
 striking, while insufficient evidence to go to the jury as sole 
 proof of paternity, is a circumstance for them to consider in 
 connection with evidence of other relevant facts. Where an 
 inspection of this sort is made by the jury, the person is re- 
 garded as an exhibit from which the jury alone are to draw 
 inferences without any oral comments or accompanying ex- 
 planation, in the same manner that they adopt in the case of 
 any relevant testimon\\ The appearance of the person, his 
 form, features and complexion as they appear to the eyes of 
 the jurors, being evidence of facts within common knowledge, 
 it is a usurpation of the powers of the jurj'- to admit the opin- 
 ions of expert or of other witnesses upon such points in con- 
 nection with the inspection of the person himself. 2 
 
 Similar comparisons have been allowed where a person's 
 race or color was in issue. Here an inspection is of great 
 value on account of the more or less marked external racial 
 characteristics which enable all men of ordinary intelligence 
 to distinguish between the various races o£ mankind. 3 So 
 where the issue is negligence there can be no objection to 
 permitting the plaintiff to show to the jury the injured mem- 
 State v. Horton, 100 N. C. 443; v. Gray, 4 Allen, 435. In Garvin v. 
 Hutchison v. State, 19 Neb. 263; State, 52 Miss. 507, the court said: 
 State v. Smith, 54 Iowa, 104; Risk " Juries may use their eyes as well as 
 v. State, 19 Ind. 153; Crow v. Jor- their ears." So on cross-examination 
 dan, 49 Ohio St. 655 ; Gilmanton v. a party or a witness who has testified 
 Ham, 38 N. H. 108; Finnegan v. that he cannot read (Ord v. Fowler. 
 Dugan, 14 Allen, 197; Scott v. Don- 31 Kan. 478), or has been physically 
 ovan, 153 Mass. 378; State v. Arnold, injured to such an extent that he is 
 13 Ired. (N. C.) 184; State v. Wood- unable to walk (Hatfield v. Railroad 
 ruff, 67 N. C. 89. Co., 33 Minn. 130), may or may not 
 
 1 State v. Danforth, 48 Iowa, 43; be directed to read or walk in the 
 Ingram v. State, 24 Neb. 33; Clark presence of the jury in the discretion 
 v. Bradstreet, 80 Me. 456; 15 Atl. of the court. 
 
 Rep. 26; Overlook v. Young, 81 Me. 3 Garvin v. State, 52 Miss. 207; 
 
 348; Hana wait v. State, 64 Wis. 84; Clark v. Bradstreet, 80 Me. 456: 
 
 Fuller v. Carny, 29 Hun, 47; Risk v. Jacobs' Case, 5 Jones (N. C), 259: 
 
 State, 19 Ind. 153. Warlick v. White, 76 N. C. 175; 
 
 2 Jones v. Jones, 45 Md. 148; Eddy State v. Arnold, 13 lied. (N. C.) 184.
 
 494 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [§ 345. 
 
 bor or part of his body as evidence of the effect of the alleged 
 negligence of the defendant. 1 
 
 Whether or not the jury will be permitted to determine the 
 age of a person from his personal appearance or his demeanor 
 on the witness stand in the total absence of oral evidence has 
 been variously decided. Some of the cases hold that knowl- 
 edge obtained by such an examination would be satisfactory 
 evidence of age. 2 Other cases hold that such evidence is in- 
 competent, 3 and that the jurors should not be permitted to de- 
 termine age solely from an inspection of the person. 
 
 Though evidence of resemblance, identity, race or age thus 
 obtained by inspection admittedly possesses little probative 
 force because of the unreliability of the untrained powers or 
 faculties of human observation, this objection cannot be justly 
 urged to its admissibility, if it is deemed relevant, though 
 it may bear upon its credibility. Whether a compulsory exam- 
 ination by the jury of one accused of crime can be construed 
 into infringing his constitutional right to be protected from 
 furnishing evidence against himself depends on circumstances. 
 
 Where the accused waives his constitutional privileges by 
 going on the stand and submitting to cross-examination in his 
 own behalf, he may be directed to exhibit a part of his person 
 to the jury. 4 And if the defendant voluntarily, in open court, 
 stand up and, without objection, permit a witness to identify 
 him as the person who committed the crime, he cannot after- 
 wards ask for a new trial on this ground. 5 
 
 Pointing out a person by a witness to the jury without 
 naming him is a sufficient identification, 6 while if the prisoner 
 
 i Cunningham v. Union Pac. R. State v. Woodruff , 67 N. C. 89 ; State 
 
 Co., 4 Utah, 206; 7 Pac. Rep. 795; v. Hall (Iowa, 1890), 44 N. W. Rep. 
 
 Schroeder v. Chicago, etc. Co., 47 914; Garvin v. State, 52 Miss. 207; 
 
 Iowa, 375; Louisville, etc. Co. v. State v. Wieners, 66 Mo. 13; Beavers 
 
 Wood, 113 Ind. 548; Mulhado v. v. State, 58 Ind. 530 ; Short v. State, 
 
 Brooklyn, etc. Co., 30 N. Y. 370. 63 Ind. 376; McDoud v. State, 90 
 
 2 New York Pen. Code, § 19; State Ind. 320; Story v. State, 99 id. 413. 
 v. Arnold, 13 Ired. (N. C.) 184; Com. Contra, Blackwell v. State, 67 Ga. 
 v. Emmons. 98 Mass. 6; Keith v. 76. 
 
 New Haven & N. R. Co., 140 Mass. 5 Gallaher v. State, 28 Tex. App. 
 175. 247; 12 S. W. Rep. 1087; People v. 
 
 3 Stephenson v. Arnold, 28 Ind. Goldensen, 76 Cal. 328. 
 
 278; Bird v. State, 104 Ind. 384. <* Com. v. Whitman, 121 Mass. 361. 
 
 * State v. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 70 ;
 
 § 340.] EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 495 
 
 refuse to arise to be identified the witness may explain and 
 rectify his failure or mistake made in the attempt to identify 
 him; l nor will all the testimony of the witness be expunged 
 because he totally fails to identify a prisoner who will not 
 stand up lor that purpose. 2 
 
 § 340. Bight of the defendant in a criminal trial to con- 
 front the witnesses against him. — By various guaranties 
 contained in the United States constitution and in the consti- 
 tutions of the several states, it is provided that the accused in 
 a criminal trial shall be entitled to meet his accusers face to 
 face and that he shall be confronted with the witnesses against 
 him. 3 A statutory provision that the testimony of a deceased or 
 absent witness shall be competent in a subsequent trial of the 
 accused when, at the first trial, a full opportunity was given 
 the prisoner to cross-examine him, is not a violation of such 
 a constitutional provision. 4 Nor is it violated by a rule of 
 practice which permits the state to admit that a witness would 
 testify as it is claimed he would in an affidavit by the accused 
 asking for a continuance because of his absence, 5 or by a con- 
 sent to admit depositions 6 of absent witnesses, or by the fact 
 that the testimony of a witness against the accused was taken 
 at the trial by means of an interpreter, 7 or by a statutory pro- 
 vision that if the accused shall escape after the trial has com- 
 menced the trial may proceed and the witnesses may be ex- 
 amined in his absence. 8 
 
 Under some circumstances, particularly where the accused 
 has had an opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses 
 against him at the preliminary examination, their depositions 
 may be read at his trial. But it has been held that a steno- 
 graphic report of the testimony taken at the preliminary 
 examination is inadmissible at the trial, as its admission con- 
 
 1 People v. Foley, 27 Weekly Dig. People v. Fish, 125 N. Y. 156. Cf. 
 (N. Y.) 217. People v. Penhallow, 42 Hun, 103. 
 
 2 Walsh v. People, 88 N. Y. 458; 4 Com. v. Cleary, 23 Atl. Rep. 1110; 
 Abb. Brief on Facts, § 457. 30 W. N. C. 1 ; 148 Pa. St. 26. Cf. 
 
 3 Const, U. S.. Am., ait. 6; Const. People v. Fish, 125 N. Y. 126. 
 111., art. 2, g 9; Westfall v. Madison 5 Hoyt v. People, 140 111. 588. 
 Co., 62 Iowa, 427. The provision 6 Peopiev. Murray, 52 Mich. 288. 
 in the federal constitution is not ap- "State v. Hamilton, 42 La. Ann. 
 plicable to trials in state courts. 1204. 
 
 8 Gore v. State, 52 Ark. 285.
 
 496 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [§ 34G-Y. 
 
 stitutes an infringement of the right of the accused to be con- 
 fronted with the witnesses against him in the presence of the 
 court. 1 When, however, the absence of the adverse witnesses 
 is brought about by the accused, the latter cannot complain 
 if their testimony, given at a former trial, is introduced in 
 evidence against him. 2 The constitutional right to confront 
 the witnesses is reciprocal in its nature. Accordingly the 
 public prosecutor ma} r demand that the witnesses for the pris- 
 oner shall, when possible, be produced in court in order that 
 they maj r give their testimony orally and be submitted to a 
 cross-examination. 3 
 
 § 346a. The accused as a witness in a criminal prosecu- 
 tion. — By modern statutes the accused is now a competent 
 witness in his own behalf, though he cannot, in view of exist- 
 ing constitutional provisions, 4 be placed upon the stand as a 
 witness against himself. If he shall go on the stand in his 
 own behalf, the credibility of his testimony is a question solely 
 for the jury, though it is not error for the court to instruct the 
 jury that they should 5 or that the}' may 6 consider the fact of 
 his interest in the event of the trial, and that the fact that he 
 is testifying in his own behalf may be considered by them in 
 estimating the credit to be given him. The jury should not, 
 
 1 People v. Chung Ah Chue, 57 5 State v. Renfrew, 111 Mo. 589; 
 
 Cal. 567; People v. Gardner (Cal., People v. Cronin, 34 Cal. 191; Peo- 
 
 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 880. pie v. Crowley, 102 N. Y. 231; An- 
 
 '■Howserv. Com., 51 Pa. St. 338. derson v. State, 104 Inch 367; Wil- 
 li! People v. Brogle, 88 N. Y. 585; kins v. State (Ala., 1893), 13 S. Rep. 
 10 Abb. N. C. 300, it was held that 312; Chambers v. People, 105 111. 
 no error was committed by permit- 489; State v. Moelchen, 53 Iowa, 
 ting a cross-examination by counsel 310; 5 N. W. Rep. 186; State v. Mc- 
 for defense while defendant was Ginnis, 76 Mo. 326; State v. Slinger- 
 temporarily absent. land, 19 Nev. 135. 
 
 3 United States v. Angell, 11 Fed. 6 Wilkins v. State (Ala., 1893), 13 
 
 Rep. 34. S. Rep. 312; Spies v. People, 122 
 
 <U. S. Const, Fifth Amend. The 111. 1; 123 U. S. 131; State v. Ma- 
 constitutional provision has been guire(Mo., 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 212; 
 held applicable not only to criminal State v. Ihrig, 106 Mo. 267; Faulk- 
 proceedings in court but to the ner v. Territory (N. Mex., 1893), 30 
 case of accused persons summoned Pac. Rep. 965; Siebert v. People (111., 
 to appear before the interstate com- 1893), 33 N. E. Rep. 431. Contra, 
 merce commissioners (Counselman Townsend v. State (Miss., 1893), 12 
 v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547), and to S. Rep. 209. Cf. Com. v. Wright, 
 contempt proceedings. In re Mc- 107 Mass. 403. 
 Kenna, 47 Kan. 738.
 
 § 34Ga.] 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 497 
 
 however, permit the fact that the witness is accused of crime 
 to influence them to such an extent that they will disregard 
 all his testimony if it is otherwise credible, but should re- 
 member that the prisoner is presumed to be innocent until his 
 guilt is shown upon the whole evidence beyond a reasonable 
 doubt. 1 
 
 "Where a person accused of crime takes the stand as a wit- 
 ness in his own behalf he waives his peculiar constitutional 
 privileges, 2 and is subject to the ordinary rules of examina- 
 tion, and may be asked the same questions on cross-examina- 
 tion in regard to his previous life as any other witness. 3 He 
 may be asked questions tending to criminate him by connect- 
 ing him with the crime for which he is on trial, 4 and his pre- 
 vious arrest, 5 indictment or conviction of crime, 6 his prior 
 contradictory statements 7 or disorderly actions, 8 or disbelief 
 
 1 Bird v. State, 107 Ind. 154; Ran- 
 dall v. State, 32 N. E. Rep. 305 ; 132 
 Ind. 539; State v. Wells, 111 Mo. 
 589 ; State v. Sullivan, 28 N. E. Rep. 
 381; 114 111. 24; State v. Sandars, 
 106 Mo. 188; 17 S. W. Rep. 223. 
 See ante, § 234. 
 
 2 Clark v. State, 87 Ala. 71. 
 
 - 8 Disque v. State, 49 N. J. L. 249. 
 < People v. Spies, 122 111. 1. See 
 2>ost, § 354a, for other cases cited on 
 this point. In some states by stat- 
 ute it is allowable for the state to 
 cross-examine the prisoner only as 
 to those matters referred to in his 
 direct examination. These statutes 
 are strictly construed. State v. San- 
 ders, 14 Oreg. 300; State v. Under- 
 wood, 44 La. Ann. 852; State v. 
 Baker, 44 id. 11 08; Elliott v. State, 
 34 Neb. 48; 51 N. W. Rep. 315; State 
 v. Turner, 110 Mo. 196; 19 S. W. 
 Rep. 645 ; State v. Chamberlain, 89 
 Mo. 129. Under these statutes, 
 which are construed strictly in favor 
 of the prisoner, it has been held re- 
 versible error to allow the cross- 
 examination to extend beyond the 
 limits of the direct, not only as re- 
 gards matters relevant to the issue, 
 32 
 
 but also as regards questions affect- 
 ing the credibility of the accused as 
 a witness. And this is so where a 
 different rule is applicable to other 
 witnesses. State v. Lurch, 12 Oreg. 
 99, and other cases cited supra in 
 this note. 
 
 5 State v. Murphy (Tex., 1893), 13 S. 
 Rep. 229 ; People v. Foote, 93 Mich. 38. 
 
 estate v. Minor (Mo., 1893), 22 S. 
 W. Rep. 1083; State v. Alexis, su- 
 pra; Childs v. State (Tex.. 1893), 22 
 S. W. Rep. 1039; State v. McGuire, 
 15 R. I. 53; Prior v. State (Ala., 1893), 
 13 S. Rep. 681. A prior conviction 
 of an infamous crime does not de- 
 prive the defendant in a criminal 
 trial of the statutory right to testify 
 in his own behalf. Williams v. State, 
 12 S. W. Rep. 1103; 28 Tex. App. 
 301. Cf. %% 317, 318, 319. 
 
 ' Hicks v. State (Ala., 1893). 13 S. 
 Rep. 375; May v. State (Tex., 1894), 
 24 S. W. Rep. 910; Brubakerv. Tay- 
 lor, 76 Pa. St. 83; State v. Avery 
 (Mo., 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 193; Hoff- 
 man v. State, 28 Tex. App. 174. 
 
 8 People v. McCormack, 135 N. Y. 
 663; Com. v. Barry, 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 
 Rep. 216.
 
 498 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [§ 34G<2. 
 
 in religion, 1 his attempt to bribe a witness, 2 or his simulated 
 insanity, 3 may all be brought out by questions put to him to 
 show what credit he is entitled to as a witness. 4 
 
 When one of several jointly indicted goes on the stand to 
 testify in his own behalf alone, he is open to cross-examina- 
 tion, not only by the district attorney but by the counsel who 
 represent the other defendants. 5 The cross-examination of 
 the accused should be conducted in a regular manner; nor can 
 he be directly interrogated by the district attorney until he is 
 properly turned over to him at the close of the direct exam- 
 ination for that purpose. But where the defendant, on tak- 
 ing his seat after his direct examination, impulsively declares 
 to the jury that he is a peaceable, law-abiding citizen, and 
 that he had no idea of committing the crime with which he 
 is charged, it is not reversible error to permit the district at- 
 torney to ask him if he had not had trouble with many other 
 persons. 6 It has also been held that the court may recall the 
 accused after his examination for the purpose of further cross- 
 examination. 7 
 
 The counsel for the accused is not precluded from objecting 
 to questions put to the latter on his cross-examination upon 
 the ground that they are irrelevant. In this respect he has 
 the same right to object to irrelevant questions put to his 
 client as he would have if they were put to any other wit- 
 ness called by him. 8 
 
 1 State v. Turner, 36 S. C. 534. defendant made a similar defense is 
 
 2 Bates v. Holladay, 31 Mo. App. not admissible to impeach him. 
 162. Com. v. Lamon, 29 N. E. Rep. 467 ; 
 
 3 State v. Pritcher, 101 N. C. 667. 155 Mass. 168. 
 
 * Bell v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 5 Com. v. Mullen, 150 Mass. 394; 
 
 276; People v. Tice, 131 N. Y. 651; 23 N. E. Rep. 51. 
 
 McDaniel v. State (Ala., 1883), 12 S. 6 Taylor v. Com., 18 S. W. Rep. 
 
 Rep. 241; State v. Farmer, 84 Me. 852 (Ky., 1892). 
 
 436; State v. Walsh, 44 La. Ann. 7 State v. Home, 9 Kan. 119; State 
 
 1122; Parker v. State (Ind., 1893), v. Johnson, 72 Iowa, 393; State v. 
 
 35 N. E. Rep. 1105; United States Kohn, 9 Nev. 179. Where the ac- 
 
 v. Brown, 40 Fed. Rep. 457; Mitch- cused denies on the witness stand 
 
 ell v. State, 94 Ala. 68; 10 S. Rep. that he wrote an instrument in issue. 
 
 518; Com. v. Goodnow, 154 Mass. he may be compelled on cross-exam- 
 
 487; Keyes v. State, 122 Ind. 527; ination to write the same words on 
 
 Com. v. Lamon, 155 Mass. 168; State paper. United States v. Mullaney, 
 
 v. Buell, 89 Mo. 595 ; State v. Mc- 32 Fed. Rep. 730. 
 
 Guire, 15 R. I. 23. Evidence that 8 People v. Brown, 72 N. Y. 571; 
 
 on a former trial for a similar crime Hanoff v. State, 37 Ohio St. 178.
 
 § 346a.] 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 499 
 
 In conclusion it may be said that it is usually provided by 
 statute that the failure of the accused to testify must not 
 be considered as a circumstance against him, nor can it be al- 
 luded to or commented on by counsel. Under such a statute 
 it is the duty of the court to charge that the defendant's silence 
 creates no presumption of his guilt. 1 A strict compliance 
 with such a statutory provision is usually required. So the 
 prosecuting attorney will not be allowed to evade this require- 
 ment that he shall keep silence as to the defendant's failure 
 to testify by calling the attention of the jury to the fact that 
 none of the neighbors of the defendant in a trial for the mur- 
 der of his wife was informed by him how the latter came to 
 her death, 2 or by stating to the jury that if the defendant 
 fails to testify the law forbids the state to comment upon his 
 failure to do so. 3 But if the accused goes upon the stand and 
 testifies to any particular fact, the state may call attention to 
 his silence re^ardino* or his failure to denv certain other facts 
 concerning which he must have had personal knowledge; 4 and 
 if, after commenting on the failure of defendant to testify at 
 all, the district attorney withdraws his remarks and the judge 
 instructs the jury that defendant's failure to testify must not 
 be considered, the error is cured. 5 
 
 iFulcher v. State, 13 S. W. Rep. 
 750 ; 28 Tex. App. 465 ; State v. Ice, 
 34 W. Va. 244; 12 S. E. Rep. 695; 
 Staples v. State, 14 S. W. Rep. 603 ; 
 89 Term. 231; People v. Doyle, 58 
 Hun, 535; McFadclen v. State, 28 
 Tex. App. 241; Sutton v. Com., 85 
 Va. 128; State v. Mathews, 98 Mo. 
 125; State v. Teriison, 22 Pac. Rep. 
 429; 42 Kan. 302; People v. Rose, 
 52 Hun, 35; Watt v. People, 126 111. 
 9; Nelson v. Harrington, 72 Wis. 
 591: 40 N. W. Rep. 228; Quinn v. 
 People, 15 N. E. Rep. 46; 123 111. 
 333. In Ruloff v. People, 45 N. Y. 
 213; Austin v. People, 102 111. 261; 
 State v. Weddington, 103 N. C. 364 ; 
 
 and Com. v. Hanley, 140 Mass. 457, 
 it was held that any allusion by the 
 court in its charge to the fact that 
 the defendant has not testified is 
 error. 
 
 2 State v. Moxley, 14 S. W. Rep. 
 969: 15 id. 556; 102 Mo. 374. 
 
 s Jordan v. State, 16 S. W. Rep. 
 543 ; 29 Tex. App. 449. 
 
 *State v. Walker (Mo., 1888), 9 
 S. W. Rep. 646; Cotton v. State, 87 
 Ala. 103; Lee v. State (Ark., 1892), 
 19 S. W. Rep. 6. Contra, State v. 
 Graves, 95 Mo. 510. 
 
 5 People v. Hess, 85 Mich. 128 ; 48 
 N. W. Rep. 181; State v. Chisnell 
 (W. Va., 1892), 15 S. E. Rep. 412.
 
 CHAPTER XXIV. 
 
 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 
 
 § 347. Party cannot impeach his 
 own witness. 
 
 348. Exceptions to the rule that a 
 
 party vouches for hi3 own 
 witnesses. 
 
 349. How the adverse witness 
 
 may be impeached — Gen- 
 eral reputation for verac- 
 ity, etc. 
 
 350. Impeachment by proving 
 
 contrary statements or si- 
 lence of witness on a for- 
 mer occasion. 
 
 351. Falsus in lino falsus in om- 
 
 nibus. 
 
 § 352. Evidence of general reputa- 
 tion of an impeached wit- 
 ness. 
 
 353. Privileges of witnesses — 
 
 Questions disclosing pe- 
 cuniary liability. 
 
 354. Questions tending to dis- 
 
 grace the witness. 
 
 354a. Questions calculated to ex- 
 pose the witness to a crimi- 
 nal charge. 
 
 354&. Bias and prejudice of the 
 witness. 
 
 § 347. Party cannot impeach his own witness. — The word 
 "impeach," when employed in connection with the examina- 
 tion of a witness in court, has a twofold application, because 
 of which some ambiguity may arise. When used in connec- 
 tion with the witness himself, — as, for example, in the phrase 
 to impeach one's own witness, — it means to attempt to prove 
 him unreliable or unworthy of belief. On the other hand, 
 when employed in connection with the evidence of the wit- 
 ness, or more strictly speaking in connection with the credit 
 to be given his evidence, its meaning is to disparage, destroy 
 or render useless. A party will not be permitted, as a gen- 
 eral rule, to impeach the veracity and credibility of any wit- 
 ness that he calls in his own behalf. It is very reasonable to 
 presume that he is well acquainted with the character and 
 previous life of his witnesses and that he knows whether they 
 are habitually truthful or not. But this rule and its excep- 
 tions should be qualified by the statement that it is only ap- 
 plicable to impeaching testimony which shows, first, that the 
 character of the witness for truthfulness is bad; second, that 
 he has made contradictory statements out of court; or, third,
 
 § 347.] 
 
 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 
 
 501 
 
 to contradicting him solety with a view to impeach him and 
 not incidentally in proving other acts referred to. 1 For it 
 is well settled that a party is not to be enjoined from prov- 
 ing any relevant fact by a witness because his testimony to 
 that fact directly contradicts, and thus discredits necessarily, 
 the testimony of another of the party's witnesses to that or 
 to some other relevant fact. Nor is it material that the gen- 
 eral effect of such a conflict of evidence is to prove that 
 either one or the other of the witnesses was wholly unworthy 
 of confidence or belief. 2 Where a party, in cross-examining, 
 makes his adversary's witness his own by going into matters 
 outside of the examination-in-chief of the witness, he will not 
 then be allowed to impeach him, 3 but the part}'- who originally 
 called the witness may. 4 In the absence of a statute to the 
 contrary, where a party summons his adversary as a witness 
 he vouches for his credibility. 5 This rule has, however, been 
 abrogated by statute in some of the states, and the party 
 calling the adverse part}^ may examine and impeach him as 
 
 1 Chester v. Wilhelm, 111 N. C. 
 314; Pollock v. Pollock, 71 N. Y. 
 137; Cross v. Cross, 108 id. 629; Na- 
 tional Syrup Co. v. Carlson, 42 111. 
 App. 17S; Snodgrass v. Cora., 17 S. 
 E. Rep. 23S; Chism v. State (Miss., 
 1893), 12 S. Rep. 852 ; Thalheimer v. 
 Klapetzy, 59 Hun, 619; Eastern 
 Lum. Co. v. Gill, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 
 630; Dixon v. State, 86 Ga. 754; 
 Artz v. Chicago R. R. Co., 44 Iowa, 
 284. " By calling him to testify the 
 party represents his witness as 
 worthy of credit, or at least as not 
 wholly unworthy of credit. For 
 him to attack the veracity of the 
 witness would be bad faith towards 
 the court and give power to destroy 
 the witness if unfavorable and to 
 make good if favorable. Hence 
 while a party may contradict inci- 
 dentally he cannot ordinarily im- 
 peach his witness." United States 
 v. Watkins, 3 Cranch C. C. 442; 1 
 Greenl. onEv., §§461, 462; Sheppard 
 v. Yocum, 10 Oreg. 410. 
 
 2 McFarland v. Ford, 32 111. App 
 173 ; Cross v. Cross, 108 N. Y. 629 
 Lawrence v. Barker, 5 Wend. 305 
 Cowden v. Reynolds, 12 S. & R. 281 
 Moffatt v. Terney, 30 Pac. Rep. 348 
 17 Colo. 189; Cross v. Cross, 108 
 N. Y. 629; Hollingsworth v. State, 
 79 Ga. 603; Warren v. Gabriel, 51 
 Ala. 235; Pollock v. Pollock, 71 N. Y. 
 137; Hall v. Houghton, 37 Me. 411; 
 Chester v. Wilhelm, 111 N. C. 314; 
 Seavy v. Dearborn, 19 N. H. 351; 
 Coulter v. Amer. Exp. Co., 56 N. Y. 
 585; Edwards v. Crenshaw, 30 Mo. 
 App. 510. 
 
 3 Hill v. Froehlick, 14 N. Y. S. 610. 
 
 4 Pickard v. Bryant, 52 N. W. Rep. 
 788; 92 Mich. 430; Smith v. Utesch 
 (Iowa, 1892). 53 N. W. Rep. 343. 
 
 5 Good v. Knox (Vt., 1892), 23 Atl. 
 Rep. 520: Bensberg v. Harris, 46 Mo. 
 App. 404 ; Tarsney v. Turner, 48 Fed. 
 Rep. 818; Graves v. Davenport, 50 
 Fed. Rep. 881; Dravo v. Fabel, 132 
 U. S. 487.
 
 502 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. [§ 348. 
 
 though he were testifying in. his own behalf. 1 But the stat- 
 utory right to call a party as a witness does not, alone and 
 by implication, confer the right to impeach him. 2 
 
 § 348. Exceptions to the rule that a party vouches for 
 his own witnesses. — If the witness is one that the law thrusts 
 on the party, he is not, strictly speaking, his own witness, and 
 the party does not vouch for his truthfulness. So where a 
 subscribing witness is called to testify to the execution of a 
 deed or a will, the party who is under the necessit} r of calling 
 him is not concluded by his answers, and may impeach his 
 character for veracity, or prove the execution by another wit- 
 ness in case he denies it. 3 Again, the claims of a party should 
 not be sacrificed or defeated out of consideration for a treach- 
 erous witness who, when placed upon the stand, intentionally 
 misrepresents the facts or states them differently from what 
 he had previously told the party out of court. The witness 
 may have been, or may be now, in the secret employment or 
 under the control of the adverse party, and he may have made 
 the extra-judicial statements for the purpose of being called 
 as a witness, intending to confound the party calling him by 
 his hostile testimony. 
 
 1 Crocker v. Agenbrod, 122 Ind. laying a foundation for his impeach- 
 
 585; Schmidt v. Durnham (Minn., ment. Bennett v. State, 28 Tex. App. 
 
 1892), 52 N. W. Rep. 277; Ga. Stat., 359. 
 
 Act Oct. 14, 1891 ; Landford v. 2 Good v. Knox, 23 Atl. Rep. 520 ; 
 
 Jones, 18 Oreg. 307 ; 22 Pac. Rep. 64 Vt. 97. 
 
 1064; De Meli v. De Meli, 120 N. Y. 3 Orser v. Orser, 24 N. Y. 51 ; gem- 
 485; "Webber v. Jackson (Mich., inary v. Calhoun, 25 N. Y. 422; 
 1890), 44 N. W. Rep. 591; Helms v. Sharey v. Hursey, 32 Me. 579; Feck 
 Green, 105 N. C. 251. The evidence v. Cary, 27 N. Y. 9; Thornton v. 
 of an adverse party, taken before Thornton, 39 Vt. 122; Foster v. Dick- 
 trial for his opponent's use, may be inson, 64 id. 233 ; Crocker v. Agen- 
 impeached at the trial. Crocker v. brod, 122 Ind. 587; Freer v. Will- 
 Agenbrod, 122 Ind. 585. Of. Miller iams, 7 Baxt. 550, 556; Edwards v. 
 v. Cook, 124 id. 101. Where the Crenshaw, 30 Mo. App. 510; Hil- 
 statute permits the testimony of the dreth v. Aldrich, 15 R. I. 63; Mays 
 adverse party to be impeached by v. Mays (Mo., 1893), 21 S. W. Rep 
 "adverse testimony," his credibility 921; Martin v. Perkins, 56 Miss 
 and reputation cannot be attacked 204 ; Brown v. Bellows, 4 Pick. 179 
 directly. Helms v. Green, 105 N. C. Whitaker v. Galesburg, 15 id. 544 
 251 A party does not lose his right Garrison v. Garrison, 15 N. J. Eq 
 to impeach an adverse witness by 266; Turner v. Cheesman, 15 id. 243 
 recalling him with the sole object of Williams v. Walker, 2 Rich. Eq. 291
 
 § 348.] 
 
 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 
 
 503 
 
 In spite of some uncertainty, the current of the decisions 
 now sustains the proposition that a party may show that the 
 evidence of such a witness has taken him wholly by surprise, 1 
 and he may then proceed to impeach its credibility. So the 
 party ma}' show by questioning the witness that the latter has 
 been or is under the influence of his opponent, and he may be 
 asked if he has made contradictory statements out of court. 2 
 
 In many of the states it is enacted by statute that, if a hos- 
 tile witness denies that he has made contradictory statements, 
 a party may show by other witnesses that the witness has 
 made prior statements inconsistent with his testimony. These 
 statutes being in derogation of the common law must be 
 strictly construed. 3 So the circumstances of time and place 
 under which the contradictory statements were made must be 
 particularly described to the witness, it not being sufficient 
 merely to ask him if he has not made inconsistent statements 
 to some particular person. 4 Where one to lay a foundation 
 for a charge of fraud introduces a writing as evidence, the rule 
 that a party vouches for his witness is not applicable, as in 
 
 Deffenderfer v. Scott, 32 N. E. Rep. 
 87; Goodtitle v. Clayton, 4 Burr. 
 3224; Scribner v. Crane, 2 Paige, 
 147. Evidence of the bad character 
 of a subscribing witness was rejected 
 in Boylan v. Meeker, 4 Dutch. 275. 
 
 1 National Syrup Co. v. Carlson, 42 
 111. App. 178; Williams v. State, 25 
 Tex. App. 176: McNerney v. Read- 
 ing, 150 Pa. St. 611 ; 30 W. N. C. 
 534. The fact that a witness on tbe 
 stand appears wholly ignorant of the 
 facts in issue or fails to testify as 
 was expected does not, unless he 
 gives hostile evidence, permit the 
 party examining to show that he 
 made the desired statements out of 
 court or that he professed to have a 
 competent knowledge of the matter. 
 Chism v. State (Miss., 1893), 12 S. 
 Rep. 852: People v. Mitchell, 94 Cal. 
 550; 29Pac. Rep. 1106. 
 
 2 Davis v. State (Tex., 1893), 21 S. 
 W. Rep. 369 ; Bullard v. Pearsall, 53 
 
 N. Y. 230; Rice v. N. E. Ins. Co., 4 
 Pick. 439; Brown v. Bellows, 4 id. 
 179; Hurlbut v. Hurlbut, 63 Vt. 667; 
 Bank of Northern Liberties, 6 W. & 
 S. 285 ; Adams v. Wheeler, 97 Mass. 
 67; Coulter v. American Express 
 Co., 56 N. Y. 585; People v. Jacobs, 
 49 Cal. 384; State v. Sorter (Kan., 
 1893), 34 Pac. Rep. 1036 ; Gardner v. 
 Connelly, 75 Iowa, 205. But it has 
 been held that the answer of the 
 witness is conclusive on the party. 
 Hall v. Railroad Co., 51 N. W. Rep. 
 150 (Iowa, 1892). 
 
 3 Williams v. State (Tex., 1888), 7 
 S. W, Rep. 661 ; Hemingway v. 
 Garth, 51 Ala. 530; Blackburn v. 
 Com., 12 Bush, 181: Day v. Cooley, 
 118 Mass. 524; Brooks v. Weeks, 121 
 id. 433 ; Newell v. Homer, 120 id. 277. 
 
 4 Com. v. Thyng, 134 Mass. 191; 
 People v. Bushton, 80 Cal. 161. See 
 ante, § 342.
 
 504: IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. [§ 34$. 
 
 such a case there is no witness and he may therefore discredit 
 it subsequently. 1 
 
 In general, the intention to impeach a witness is to be ascer- 
 tained rather from the actual purpose of the question than 
 from its mere form. Thus; a question to one's own witness 
 whether he has not testified differently at a former trial is not 
 inadmissible where its sole purpose is to refresh the recollec- 
 tion of the witness, not to impeach him. 2 
 
 In conclusion it may be said that the rule against impeach- 
 ing one's own witness does not apply after the adverse party 
 has called the witness to testify in his behalf against the party 
 who first called him. 3 
 
 § 349. How adverse witness may be impeached — General 
 reputation for veracity, etc.— The credibility of a witness 
 who has been examined in chief may be impeached not only by 
 contradicting the facts as stated by him in his evidence by 
 other witnesses, but by evidence directly tending to destroy 
 his general reputation for truthfulness. In impeaching the 
 general reputation of a witness for veracity it is proper to ask 
 the impeaching witness, who ought to be called from among 
 persons resident near the witness whose reputation is under 
 consideration, 4 whether he knows the general reputation of 
 
 1 Henry Buggy Co. v. Pratt, 73 * Redden v. Tefft (Kan., 1892), 29 
 Iowa, 485 ; 35 N. W. Rep. 587 ; Pac. Rep. 157 ; Louisville, N. A. etc. 
 Bunce v. Gallegher, 5 Blatch. 481. Co. v. Richardson, 66 Tnd. 43 ; Healey 
 
 2 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hurt v. Terry, 9 N. Y. S. 519; State v. 
 (Ala., 1893), 13 S. Rep. 130. A party Johnson, 41 La. Ann. 574; People v. 
 who, to avoid a continuance, admits Markham, 64 Cal. 157. This rule 
 the facts to which an absent witness applies in a prosecution for crime 
 will testify is thereby precluded when the accused testifies in his own 
 from impeaching him. North Chi- behalf. State v. Rugan, 5 Mo. App. 
 cago St. R. Co. v. Cottingham, 44 592; State v. Beal, 68 Ind. 345; 
 111. App. 46; Powers v. State, 80 Mershon v. State, 51 Ind. 14. So the 
 Ind. 77. If, however, he only ad- reputation must be recent. Sun Fire 
 mits that the witness will testify as Office v. Ayerst, 55 N. W. Rep. 635. 
 it is alleged he will, he may impeach But evidence of bad reputation two 
 him, though he is absent. State v. or more years before the trial is com- 
 Swain, 68 Mo. 605. petent, as no presumption exists that 
 
 3 Pickard v. Bryant (Mich., 1892), a person of mature age would by ref- 
 52 N. W. Rep. 788; Smith v. Utisch ormation acquire a good reputation 
 (Iowa. 1892), 52 N. W. Rep. 343. But in that period. Mynatt v. Hudson, 
 cf. Richards v. Stete (Wis., 1892), 51 66 Tex. 66 ; Davis v. Com. (Ky., 1893), 
 N. W. Rep. 652. 23 S. W. Rep. 585. " It has been
 
 § 349.] 
 
 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 
 
 505 
 
 A. and what that reputation is. So the witness may also 
 be asked whether from what he knows of him and from his 
 reputation he would believe A. under oath. 1 But the fact that 
 a witness fails to state that he would not believe the witness 
 under oath will not prevent the introduction of evidence of 
 the bad reputation of the witness. 2 
 
 The question whether the witness would, from his knowl" 
 edge of the party, believe him under oath was excluded by 
 the earlier American cases as calling for the expression of a 
 conclusion or opinion b} 7 a non-expert witness. It was con- 
 sidered as an unwarranted departure from the established 
 rules of law, as tending to permit the prejudice and personal 
 bias of a witness to infect the minds of the jurors and as in- 
 vading their province as triers of the facts. 3 But the existence 
 of a person's reputation, i. <?., what the community in which 
 he resides says of him, is a fact which any witness maj 7 prove 
 who has learned the reputation from what he hears. " What 
 
 said that the regular mode of exam- 
 ining a witness is to inquire whether 
 he knows the general character of 
 the person whom it is intended to 
 impeach. In all such cases the word 
 'character' is used as synonymous 
 with ' reputation.' What is wanted 
 is the common opinion in which 
 there is general concurrence ; in other 
 words, general reputation or charac- 
 ter attributed; that is presumed to 
 be indicative of actual character." 
 Knode v. Williamson, 17 Wall. 588. 
 1 Mayes v. State (Tex., 1893), 24 S. 
 W. Rep. 421; State v. Boswell, 2 
 Dev. 209, 211; Hudspeth v. State, 50 
 Ark. 534 ; Ford v. Ford, 7 Humph. 92 ; 
 People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 257, 258; 
 1 Hill (S. C), 258; Wetherbee v. 
 Norris, 103 Mass. 565 ; State v. Chris- 
 tian, 44 La. Ann. 950; Hamilton v. 
 People, 29 Mich. 173; Nelson v. State 
 (Fla., 1893), 13 S. Rep. 361; Lyman 
 v. Philadelphia, 56 Pa. St. 483; 
 People v. Tyler, 35 Cal. 553: National 
 Bank v. Scriven, 63 Hun, 375 ; Eason 
 v. Chapman, 21 111. 35; State v. 
 Johnson, 40 Kan. 266; Keator v. 
 
 People, 32 Mich. 484. Contra, King 
 v. Peakman, 20 N. J. Eq. 316 ; Grif- 
 fin v. State, 26 Tex. App. 157; Mar- 
 shall v. State, 5 Tex. App. 273. 
 "Unwillingness to believe a man 
 under oath must be based upon two 
 facts — that the witness knows the 
 reputation for veracity among the 
 man's neighbors and that such repu- 
 tation is bad." Spies et al. v. People, 
 122 111. 208. It is error to instruct 
 the jury that they may rely upon 
 their personal knowledge of the 
 character of the witnesses. Chatta- 
 nooga, etc. Co. v. Owen (Ga., 1893), 
 15 S. E. Rep. 853. See § 343, ante. 
 
 2 Mitchell v. State, 94 Ala. 68 ; 10 
 S. Rep. 518. The fact that a witness 
 accepted a very small sum of money 
 in satisfaction of a slanderous accu- 
 sation of perjury made against him 
 may be given in evidence to show- 
 that he estimates his own reputation 
 at a low figure. Bird v. Hudson 
 (N. C, 1893), 18 S. E. Rep. 209. 
 
 3 Phillips v. Kingfield, 1 Appleton, 
 375.
 
 iOC 
 
 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 
 
 [§ 349. 
 
 the witness has heard is the reputation." l If, however, such 
 evidence be regarded as an opinion, then it is admissible on 
 the same ground as are opinions of a person's sanity, temper, 
 etc. The impeaching witness cannot be permitted to testify 
 to the commission of any specific acts of untruthfulness or 
 other bad conduct. 2 He will be required to confine his evi- 
 dence strictly to showing the reputation of the witness, not 
 his actions; 3 for it is admitted that no man can with fairness 
 be called upon, without notice, to defend his particular actions, 
 perhaps long since forgotten by him. 4 The impeaching wit- 
 ness need not be personally acquainted with the witness, 5 and 
 he may be cross-examined to ascertain how he acquired the 
 knowledge on which his opinion is based or his general char- 
 acter for truthfulness may in turn be attacked. 6 By some of 
 the cases evidence of this sort is confined to proving the good 
 or bad reputation of the witness for veracity alone, 7 and if the 
 witness has no knowledge upon that point he is wholly in- 
 competent to testify. 8 But elsewhere greater latitude is per- 
 
 1 Cooley, J., in Bathrick v. Detroit 
 P. & T. Co., 50 Mich. 652. 
 
 2 State v. Rogers (Mo., 1892), 18 S. 
 W. Rep. 976; Rattarre v. Chapman, 
 79 Ga. 574; People v. O'Brien, 96 
 Cal. 371; Davey v. Lohrman, 20 N. 
 Y. S. 675 ; Mentze v. Tuteur, 77 Wis. 
 236; Smith v. State, 88 Ala. 73; 
 People v. Ryan, 55 Hun, 214; Com. 
 v. Fox (Ky., 1890). 1 S. W. Rep. 396. 
 
 3 Mentze v. Tuteur, 77 Wis. 236; 46 
 N. W. Rep. 123; Clink v. Gunn(Mich., 
 1892), 51 N. W. Rep. 193 ; Moreland 
 v. Lawrence. 23 Minn. 84; Smith v. 
 State, 88 Ala. 73; Fox v. Com. (Ky., 
 1891), 1 S. W. Rep. 396; Randall v. 
 State, 132 Ind. 539; Conley v. State, 
 85 N. Y. 618; Dimick v. Downs, 82 
 111. 570. 
 
 4 " All the cases agree that the in- 
 quiry must be restricted to his gen- 
 eral reputation for truthfulness or to 
 his general character, and that it 
 cannot be extended to particular 
 facts or transactions, for the reason 
 that while every man is supposed to 
 
 be fully prepared to meet those gen- 
 eral inquiries, it is not likely he 
 would be prepared, without notice, 
 to answer as to particular acts." 
 Tees v. Huntingdon, 23 How. 11-13. 
 
 5 State v. Turner, 36 S. C. 534. 
 
 6 State v. Perkins. 66 N. C. 126; 
 Nelson v. State (Fla., 1893), 13 S. 
 Rep. 861. If a party, to impeach his 
 adversary's witness, offers evidence 
 which impeaches his own witness, 
 he should not be allowed to endeavor 
 to rebut it. Mealer v. State (Tex., 
 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 142. 
 
 7 Spears v. Forrest, 15 Vt. 435 ; 
 State v. Clavvson, 30 Mo. App. 139; 
 Kennedy v. Shaw, 66 Tex. 442; 
 Briggs v. Com., 82 Va. 554; Bates 
 v. Barber, 4 Cush. 107; State v. 
 Jackson, 44 La. Ann. 160; Sleeper v. 
 Van Middlesworth, 4 Denio, 431; 
 People v. Abbott (Mich., 1893), 56 N. 
 W. Rep. S62. 
 
 8 Healey v. Terry, 9 N. Y. S. 519 ; 
 State v. Coffey, 44 Mo. App. 455; 
 Com. v. Lawler, 12 Allen (Mass.),
 
 § 350.] IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 507 
 
 mitted, and it is held that evidence may be given involving 
 the whole moral character of the person whose evidence is 
 impeached, on the theory that where a person is shown to 
 have been addicted to a vicious habit of living, indicating 
 great moral turpitude, it is a very fair inference that his char- 
 acter for truthfulness is also bad and that he would perjure 
 himself if it was to his interest to do so. 1 
 
 § 350. Impeachment by proving contrary statements or 
 silence of witness on a former occasion. — " Every witness 
 under cross-examination in any proceeding, civil or criminal, 
 may be asked whether he has made any former statement 
 relative to the subject-matter of the action and inconsistent 
 with his present-testimony, the circumstances of the supposed 
 statement being referred to sufficiently to designate the par- 
 ticular occasion; and if he does not distinctly admit that he 
 has made such a statement, proof may be given that he did 
 in fact make it. The same course may be taken with a wit- 
 ness upon his examination in chief if the judge is of opinion 
 that he is adverse (i. e., hostile) to the party by whom he was 
 called and permits the question." 2 
 
 585; State v. Jackson (La., 1892), 10 State v. Eaven (Mo., 1893), 22 S. W. 
 S. Rep. 600; State v. Perkins, 66 Rep. 376. A male witness cannot 
 N. C. 126; Holmes v. State, 88 Ala. be impeached by proof of his general 
 29; Redden v. Teft (Kan., 1892), 29 reputation for unchastity. State v. 
 Pac. Rep. 157. A party is not pre- Coffey, 44 Mo. App. 455. The fact 
 eluded from offering cumulative evi- that a female witness is a prostitute 
 dence of bad character because he may be shown b}' her own ad mis- 
 has already impeached the character sions on the stand or by independent 
 of a witness. Browder v. State, 30 evidence; but, while the testimony 
 Tex. App. 614; 18 S. W. Rep. 197. of such witnesses should be closely 
 1 McTyler v. State (Ga., 1893), 18 scrutinized by the jury, they should 
 S. E. Rep. 140; Pierce v. Newton, 13 not be disbelieved on account of 
 Gray, 528; Gilliam v. State, 1 Head, their bad character for unchastity if 
 38; Eason v. Chapman, 21 111. 33; otherwise credible. People v. Mills, 
 State v. Miller, 98 Mo. 263; State v. 94 Mich. 630; Paul v. Paul, 37 N. J. 
 Boswell, 2 Dev. (N. C.) 200, 210 ; Peo- Eq. 25. Nor should evidence that a 
 pie v. Webster (N. Y., 1893), 34 N. witness has been fined in an inferior 
 E. Rep. 730; State v. McClintick, 73 court be received to impeach his 
 Iowa, 603; People v. Harrison, 53 character where it is not shown that 
 N. W. Rep. 725; 93 Mich. 594; he committed any offense which is 
 Crump v. Com. (Ky., 1893), 20 S. W. immoral per se. Goode v. State 
 Rep. 390; Winter v. Cent. Iowa R. (Tex., 1893), 24 S. W. Rep. 102. 
 Co., 45 N. W. Rep. 737; Hollings- -' Stephen's Dig. Ev., art. 131. See 
 worth v. State, 53 Ark. 337; Mitchell ante, § 336. 
 v. State, 94 Ala. 68; 10 S. Rep. 518;
 
 508 
 
 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 
 
 [§ 350. 
 
 In order to impeach a witness by proof that he has made 
 contradictory statements out of court, it is always necessary 
 in fairness to him to lay a foundation by first asking him upon 
 his cross-examination, clearly and distinctly, whether he did 
 or did not at some particular time and place and in the pres- 
 ence of or to some particular person make such statements. 1 
 By having his attention directly called to the particular cir- 
 
 1 This rule was so thoroughly dis- 
 cussed in the Queen's Case, 2 Brod. & 
 Biug. 313, 314, that it is sometimes 
 called " the rule in the Queen's 
 case." But the court in that case 
 only affirmed a principle which was 
 already well recognized in the com- 
 mon law. The court says: "If the 
 witness admits the words imputed 
 to him, the proof on the other side 
 becomes unnecessary; and the wit- 
 ness has an opportunity of giving 
 such reason, explanation or exculpa- 
 tion of his conduct, if any there may 
 be, as the particular circumstances 
 of the transaction may happen to 
 furnish; and thus the whole matter 
 is brought before the court at once, 
 which in our opinion is the better 
 course. If the witness denies the 
 words imputed to him, the adverse 
 party has an opportunity afterwards 
 of contending that the matter is 
 such that he is not bound by the an- 
 swer, and his proof in contradiction 
 will be received at the proper sea- 
 son." See, also, Cohn v. Heimbauch 
 (Wis., 1893), 56 N. W. Rep. 638; 
 Com. v. Mosier, 135 Pa. St. 221; 
 Bruce v. State, 21 S. W. Rep. 681 ; 
 31 Tex. Cr. App. 590; State v. Tur- 
 ner, 15 S. E. Rep. 602; 36 S. C. 534; 
 McCulloch v. Doleson, 133 N. Y. 114; 
 Zebley v. Storey, 117 Pa. St. 47S; 
 Spohn v. Mo. P. R. Co. (Mo., 1893), 
 22 S. W. Rep. 690; State v. Jones, 
 44 La. Ann. 960; State v. Calligan, 
 41 La. Ann. 574, 578; Jones v. State, 
 65 Miss. 179; State v. M'Laughlin, 
 44 Iowa, 82 ; Kent v. State, 42 Ohio 
 
 St. 429; State v. Glynn, 51 Vt. 577; 
 Hanscom v. Burmood, 35 Neb. 504; 
 Bonnelli v. Bowen (Miss., 1893), 11 
 S. Rep. 791; Greer v. Higgins, 20 
 Kan. 420; State v. Baldwin, 36 id. 1 ; 
 State v. Davis, 29 Mo. 391 ; St. Louis, 
 I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Swelt (Ark., 
 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 587 ; Jackson v. 
 Swope (Ind., 1893), 33 N. E. Rep. 
 909; Wright v. Hicks, 15 Ga. 160; 
 State v. Hunsaker, 16 Oreg. 497; 
 Morris v. Atl. Ave. R. R. Co., 116 N. 
 Y. 556; Diffenderfer v. Scott (Ind., 
 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 87 ; Hughes v. 
 Ward, 38 Kan. 452; Hammond v. 
 Dike, 42 Minn. 273; Babcock v. Peo- 
 ple, 13 Colo. 515; Klug v. State, 77 
 Ga. 734; Koehler v. Buhl, 94 Mich. 
 496; Bock v. Wygant, 5 111. App. 
 643; State v. Wright, 75 N. C. 439; 
 Root v. Borst, 65 Hun, 622 ; State v. 
 Parker, 96 Mo. 382. The witness 
 may be contradicted by his testi- 
 mony given on a prior trial of the 
 same case if he asserts that his pres- 
 ent testimony is the same as that 
 previously given (Hudson v. State, 
 2S Tex. App. 323; Bennett v. Syn- 
 dicate Ins. Co., 43 Minn. 48; Brown 
 v. State, 76 Ga. 623), and he should 
 be allowed to explain the contradic- 
 tion. State v. Reed, 62 Me. 129. Of. 
 Toplitz v. Hedden, 146 TJ. S. 252; 
 Phifer v. Ervvin, 100 N. C. 59; 6 S. 
 E. Rep. 672. A question whether 
 the witness had not made a contra- 
 dictory statement "last July" is 
 sufficiently definite as to time. State 
 v. Walters (Wash., 1893), 34 Pac. 
 Rep. 938, 1098.
 
 § 350.] IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 509 
 
 cumstances under which his alleged inconsistent declaration 
 was made, he is not taken unfairly by surprise, but, his mem- 
 ory refreshed by these facts, he may be able to show that he 
 was innocently mistaken or that he was misunderstood, or he 
 may explain away the seeming inconsistency of his statements 
 by showing their true relation, meaning and purpose. 
 
 Where a witness, when asked if he made certain contra- 
 dictory statements, declares he does not remember making 
 them, evidence may be adduced to show that he made them, 1 
 without further foundation for their introduction. 2 Whether 
 the witness denies making the contradictor}' statement or 
 declares that he does not remember it, the question asked 
 the witness who is called to impeach him should be the same 
 as respects the time, place and substance of the contradict- 
 ory statement as the question put to the original witness. 
 The question also should be so shaped as to admit of "yes" 
 or "no" for an answer. 3 If the witness is a party, his contra- 
 dictory statements are admissible as direct evidence and not 
 merely as impeaching evidence. Hence it is not necessary to 
 lay a foundation for their introduction if the party has, in the 
 course of the trial, a full opportunity to testify. 4 
 
 The rule as above stated is equally applicable whether the 
 evidence to be impeached is oral and given viva voce in open 
 court or is contained in a deposition; 5 but in the case of affi- 
 davits and depositions, which are generally formal in their 
 phraseology, the considerations pointed out by Lord Lang- 
 dale 6 should never be lost sight of. In the case cited the un- 
 fairness of comparing an affidavit made out of court by one 
 
 i Smith v. State (Tex., 1893), 20 S. gan v. Butcher, 37 N. W. Rep. 596; 
 
 W. Rep. 554; Heddles v. Chicago, 22 Neb. 523; King v. State, 77 Ga. 
 
 etc. Co., 77 Wis. 228; Levy v. State, 734; Young v. Bradley, 94 Cal. 128; 
 
 28 Tex. App. 203; Payr.e v. State, 60 Lewis v. State (Ga., 1S93), 16 S. E. 
 
 Ala. 80; Billings v. State, 52 Ark. Rep. 986. 
 
 303. Cf. Mayer v. Stone, 21 Neb. 5 Gilyard v. State (Ala., 1893), 13 
 
 717. S. Rep. 891 ; United States v. Taylor, 
 
 2 Fuller v. State, 30 Tex. App. 559 ; 35 Fed. Rep. 484 ; Hammond v. Dike, 
 17 S. W. Rep. 1108. 42 Minn. 273; Tabor v. Judd, 62 N. 
 
 3 Pence v. Waugh (Ind., 1894), 34 H. 288; Marx v. Strauss, 90 Ala. 453; 
 N. E. Rep. 860. Leiber v. Railroad Co. (Iowa, 1892), 
 
 * Meyer v. Campbell, 20 N. Y. S. 50 N. W. Rep. 547. 
 705; 1 Misc. Rep. 283; Rose v. Otis 6 In Jolin&ton v. Todd, 5 Beav. 600. 
 (Colo., 1893), 31 Pac. Rep. 493; Milli-
 
 510 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. [§ 350. 
 
 who is unskilled in or ignorant of the proper use of language 
 with his subsequent spontaneous replies in oral examination 
 in open court is pointed out. In such a case the language of 
 the affidavit is not his; and though it may have been read to 
 him before he signed it by the person whom he trusted to 
 voice his ideas in proper form, he may totally misunderstand 
 the meaning of a writing couched in such unusual and often 
 technical language. These considerations, together with the 
 agitation and hurry of a cross-examination, and the trickery 
 and intimidation too often practiced upon ignorant witnesses, 
 go far to render any comparison which is made between the 
 testimony of a witness taken in open court and his prior affi- 
 davit very misleading and unreliable. 1 
 
 Where the contradictory statement is a writing the coun- 
 sel is bound, if he intends to contradict the witness, to show 
 the writing to the witness and ask him if he wrote it,, or call 
 his attention to the part contradictory of his evidence. 2 If he 
 admits that he wrote it, the whole must then be read to him 
 as the best evidence of what is contained in it. The witness 
 cannot be asked whether he made certain statements in the 
 letter unless the whole of it is read. 3 Sometimes a portion of 
 
 1 Johnston v. Todd, 5 Beav. 600, been committed to writing and ad- 
 602, cited 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 462. mitted by consent, is open to contra- 
 
 2 Foster v. Worthington, 146 Mass. diction if its truth is not also admit- 
 607 ; Perishable Freight T. Co. v. ted, to the same extent as though the 
 O'Neill, 41 111. App. 423; Maxted v. witness had testified viva voce in 
 Fowler, 91 Mich. 106; People v. Cbing, open court, even though no founda- 
 74 Cal. 389; Weymouth v. Broad- tion can be laid. United States v. 
 way, etc. Co., 2 Misc. R. 506; Gunter Taylor, 35 Fed. Rep. 484. 
 
 v. State, 83 Ala. 96; State v. Crow, 3 Dunbar v. McGill, 69 Mich. 297; 
 107 Mo. 341 ; Robinson v. State, 124 Richmond v. Sundborg, 77 Iowa, 
 111. 366. A deposition when it is of- 258; § 32. Where it is attempted to 
 fered at a trial cannot be impeached impeach a witness by his inconsist- 
 by an earlier deposition containing ent statements made on the prelim- 
 contradictory statements, though on inary examination of the prisoner, 
 account of the death of the witness his testimony, if in writing, should 
 it is impossible to lay a foundation be shown to him and the inconsist- 
 by calling his attention to them, encies pointed out. State v Card en, 
 Eppert v. Hall (Ind., 1893), 31 N. 84 Ala. 217; Simmons v. State (Ala., 
 E. Rep. 74. Contra, Thompson v. 1893), 13 S. Rep. 896. It may then 
 Gregor, 11 Colo. 531. On the other be read or as much of it as the wit- 
 hand it has been held that the evi- ness denies. State v. Jones, 29 S. C. 
 dence of absent witnesses, which has 201.
 
 § 350.] 
 
 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 
 
 ill 
 
 a writing may be shown to the witness and the question put 
 to him, Did you write that? He cannot, however, be exam- 
 ined upon writing at all if he denies that he is the author of 
 that part, nor can the attorne}' for the adverse party ex- 
 amine the paper. 1 
 
 Where a witness is asked if he has not made a contradictory 
 statement out of court in regard to some matter which is 
 wholly irrelevant to the issue and he replies that he has not, 
 his answer is conclusive, and he cannot in the absence of a 
 statute be contradicted by the party cross-examining him. 2 
 If a witness is proved to have made contradictory statements 
 out of court, questions on re-examination to show that he 
 has made other statements consistent with his testimony are 
 not universally considered allowable, 3 though where, because 
 of relationship to the party or to the subject-matter of the 
 
 1 The Queen's Case, 2 B. & B. 288. 
 The English rule is thus laid down 
 by Sir James Stephen: "A witness 
 under cross-examination (or a wit- 
 ness whom the judge has permitted 
 to be examined by the party who 
 called him as to previous statements 
 inconsistent with his present testi- 
 mony) may be questioned as to pre- 
 vious statements made by him in 
 writing, or reduced into writing, rel- 
 ative to the subject-matter of the 
 cause, without such writing being- 
 shown to him (or being proved in 
 the first instance); but if it is in- 
 tended to contradict him by the 
 writing, his attention must, before 
 such contradictory proof can be 
 given, be called to those parts of the 
 writing which are to be used for the 
 purpose of contradicting him. The 
 judge may at any time during 
 the trial inquire the document to be 
 produced for his inspection, and may 
 thereupon make such use of it for 
 the purposes of the trial as he thinks 
 fit." Dig., art. 132. Contradictory 
 statements are not admissible to im- 
 peach a deposition where the atten- 
 tion of the witness was not called to 
 
 them when his deposition was taken. 
 Fitch v. Kennard, 19 N. Y. S. 468. 
 
 2 Jones v. Lumber Co. (Ark., 1893), 
 
 23 S. W. Rep. 679 ; Union P. R. Co. 
 v. Reese, 56 Fed. Rep. 288; Carter 
 v. St?te(Neb., 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 
 853; Hill v. State (Tenn., 1892), 19 
 S. W. Rep. 674; Second Nat. Bank 
 v. Wenzel, 151 Pa. St. 142: Murphy 
 v. Com., 18 N. Y. S. 353; 28 Abb. N. 
 C. 207; State v. Morris, 109 N. C. 
 820; Murphy v. Com., 23 Gratt. (Va.) 
 960; Com. v. Buzzell, 16 Pick. 157; 
 Com. v. Jones, 155 Mass. 170; 29 N. 
 E. Rep. 467; Phila. etc. Co. v. Stimp- 
 son, 14 Peters, 461 ; Harris v. Wil- 
 son, 7 Wend. 57; Lake Erie, etc. Co. 
 v. Morain, 29 N. E. Rep. 869; 36 111. 
 App. 862. 
 
 3 Davis v. Graham (Colo., 1892). 29 
 Pac. Rep. 1007; Robb v. Hackley, 23 
 Wend. 50; Smith v. Stickney, 17 
 Barb. (N. Y)489; People v. Doyell, 
 48 Cal. 85; Fallin v. State, 83 Ala. 5; 
 State v. Flint, 60 Vt. 304; Smith v. 
 Morgan, 38 Me. 468; Maitland v. 
 Bank, 40 Md. 540; Williams v. State, 
 
 24 Tex. App. 637; Railroad Co. v. 
 Davis, 1 Gray, 88; Connor v. People 
 (Colo., 1893), 33 Pac. Rep. 159;
 
 512 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. [§ 351. 
 
 cause, it is sought on cross-examination to show that the 
 witness is strongly biased, the party calling him may show 
 that before the relationship existed he made a similar state- 
 ment to what he has testified, to on his direct examination. 1 
 Sometimes it is attempted, to impeach a witness as regards 
 particular matters testified to by him by showing that he was 
 silent or that he concealed his knowledge of such facts on a 
 prior occasion when he might naturall} 7 ' have been expected 
 to speak. 
 
 That a witness on a second trial recollects a material fact 
 which he did not testify to on the first trial is a suspicious 
 circumstance in itself. The fact that he withheld testimony 
 of that fact, or denied that he possessed any knowledge of it, 
 is never conclusive of the unreliabilit} 7 " of his later testimony; 
 for he may be permitted to explain the reasons of his pre- 
 vious denial, silence or real or assumed forgetfulness and 
 ignorance. Thus it may be shown that the occasion of his 
 previous silence w r as a judicial proceeding at which he was 
 not questioned on the matter at all, 2 or that his prior state- 
 ments were unintentionally omitted from the record of the 
 first trial; 3 that he actually forgot the facts, 4 or suppressed 
 them through fear, 5 or that his silence or concealment was in 
 good faith and prompted by correct motives. 6 
 
 § 351. Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus. — The principle 
 illustrated by the above maxim permits the inference to be 
 drawn that because a witness is guilt}' of deliberate perjury 
 
 Loomis v. New York Cent. & H. R. 2 Babcock v. People, 13 Colo. 515; 
 
 R. R. Co. (Mass., 1893), 34 N. E. Rep. State v. Flint, CO Vt. 304; Territory 
 
 82. Contra, Bell v. State (Tex., v. Clayton, 8 Mont. 1; Hyden v. 
 
 1893), 20 S. W. Rep. 302 ; Hobbs v. State, 20 S. W. Rep. 764 ; 31 Tex. Cr. 
 
 State (Ind., 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 1019 ; Rep. 401 ; Bickford v. Menier, 9 N. Y. 
 
 Davenport v. McKee, 98 N. C. 500 ; S. 775 ; Cowan v. Third Ave. Ry. 
 
 State v. Rowe, 98 N. C. 629; 4 S. E. Co., 9 N. Y. S. 610. 
 
 Rep. 506; Malonee v. Duff, 72 Md. 3 United States v. Ford, 33 Fed. 
 
 283; 19 Atl. Rep. 708; State v. Mc- Rep. 861. 
 
 Kinney, 111 N. C. 683. 4 State v. Turner, 15 S. E. Rep. 
 
 1 State v. Thoniason, 1 Jones (N. 602: 36 S. C. 534. 
 
 C), 274; Thompson v. State, 38 Ind. 5 People v. Chapleau, 121 N. Y. 
 
 89; Hotchkiss v. Gen. Ins. Co., 5 266; 24 N. E. Rep. 469. 
 
 Hun (N. Y.), 101 ; State v. Flint, 60 6 Bruce v. State, 21 S. W. Rep. 
 
 Yt. 304; 14 Atl. Rep. 178; Hewitt 602. 
 v. Carey, 150 Mass. 445.
 
 § 351.] 
 
 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 
 
 513 
 
 in one particular his testimony may be wholly discredited by 
 the jury in other respects. The ride rejecting the evidence 
 of witnesses who had been convicted of an infamous crime is 
 largely based upon this principle, and the effect of the rule 
 ma}- be, according to circumstances, either to demolish the 
 case of the party who is shown to have knowingly and de- 
 liberately perpetrated or connived at a falsehood, or its effect 
 may be restricted to the testimony of the single witness guilty 
 of perjury. It is therefore not error for the court to charge 
 that the jury may disbelieve all the evidence of any witness 
 whose evidence as to o material fact is impeached, 1 though if 
 a false statement is made not wilfully but through misappre- 
 hension, inadvertence, mistake or forgetfulness, the entire tes- 
 timony of the witness should not for this reason be disre- 
 garded. 2 But if the jury believe that the witness has wilfully 
 and deliberately sworn falsely on any material point, they 
 have the right, and it may be their duty, to disregard his evi- 
 dence altogether, 3 except so far as it has been corroborated 
 by other credible evidence or by the facts and circumstances 
 which may be inferable from such evidence. 4 
 
 JSeligman v. Rogers (Mo., 1893), dan v. State, 81 Ala. 20; IS. Rep. 
 
 21 S. W. Rep. 94; Clapp v. Bullard, 577; Church v. Chicago, etc. Co. 
 
 23 III. App. 609. (Mo., 1893), 23 S. W. Rep. 1036; Peo- 
 
 2 Barney v. Dudley, 40 Kan. 247; pie v. O'Neill, 109 N Y. 25}; 16 
 
 Winter v. Cent. Iowa R. Co. (Iowa, N. E. Rep. 68; Dunn v. People, 29 
 
 1889), 45 N. W. Rep. 737: Frazer v. N. Y. 529. 
 
 State, 19 S. W. Rep. 838; 56 Ark. 4 Lohr v. People, 132 111. 504; Reyn- 
 
 242; Spencer v. Dougherty, 23 111. olds v. Greenbaum, 80 111. 416; City 
 
 App. 399; Plyer v. German Am. of Sandwich v. Dolan, 31 N. E. Rep. 
 
 Ins. Co., 121 N. Y. 689; Murtaugh 416; 42 111. App. 53; Hillman v. 
 
 v. Murphy. 30 111. App. 59. Schwenk, 68 Mich. 293. In The 
 
 3 Winter v. Railroad Co., 80 Iowa, Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 339, 
 
 443; -Seligman v. Rogers (Mo., 1893), the court, per Story, J., said: "If 
 
 21 S. W. Rep. 94 ; Cole v. L. S. & the circumstances respecting which 
 
 M. S. R. Co. (Mich., 1893), 54 N. W. testimony is discordant be imrnate- 
 
 Rep. 638; Morgenthau v. Walker, rial, and of such a nature that mis- 
 
 21 N. Y. S. 936; Judge v. Jordan, 81 takes may easily exist, and be ac- 
 
 Iowa, 519; Speight v. State, 80 Ga. counted for in a manner consistent 
 
 512; Clapp v. Bullard, 23 111. App. with the utmost good faith and prob- 
 
 009; People v. Petmecky, 99 N. Y. ability, there is much reason for in- 
 
 415; Frazier v. State, 56 Ark. 242; dulging the belief that the discrep- 
 
 State v. Beaucleigh, 92 Mo. 490; ancies arise from the infirmity of the 
 
 Moett v. People, 85 N. Y. 373; human mind rather than from de- 
 
 Welke v. Welke, 63 Hun, 625 ; Jor- liberate error. But where the party 
 33
 
 514 
 
 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 
 
 [§ 352. 
 
 Whether or not a witness has been successfully impeached 
 so that his credibility has been destroyed is a question over 
 which the province of the jury or other tribunal having power 
 to determine the facts is exclusive. They are not bound by 
 any rule of law to disregard his evidence whollj', but may 
 take it into consideration for what it is worth, together with 
 all the evidence in the case; for though the witness may have 
 been impeached on some material points, his evidence on others 
 may be credible in itself or may be corroborated by other evi- 
 dence which is credible. 1 
 
 § 352. Evidence of the general reputation of an impeached 
 witness. — The direct impeachment of a witness by any of the 
 means which have been above explained creates an issue re- 
 specting his general character for truthfulness. Evidence to 
 support this, and to show that he is a person in whose testi- 
 mony the jury may have confidence, is therefore now relevant. 2 
 But evidence of reputation is not relevant merely because 
 there is a contradiction between adverse witnesses, 3 or because 
 the credibility of a witness is shaken on his cross-examination, 4 
 though its admission in such cases may not be reversible error. 5 
 
 speaks to a fact in respect to which Strauss v. Abraham, 32 Fed. Rep. 
 he cannot be presumed liable to mis- 210; Flyer v. Ger. Am. Ins. Co., 121 
 take, as in relation to the country of N. Y. 089. 
 his birth, or his being in a vessel on 
 a particular voyage, or living in a 
 particular place, if the fact turn out 
 otherwise it is extremely difficult to 
 exempt him from the charge of de- 
 liberate falsehood, and the courts 
 under such circumstances are bound, 
 upon principles of law, morality 
 and justice, to apply the maxim 
 falsus in lino falsus in omnibus." 
 
 iWimer v. Smith (Oreg., 1892), 
 30 Pac. Rep. 416; Surles v. State, 89 
 Ga. 167; Lyles v. Com. (Va., 1892), 
 13 S. E. Rep. 802; Kerr v. Hodge, 39 
 III. App. 546; Cent. W. H. Co. v. 
 Sargent, 40 111. App. 4-8; People v. 
 Wallace, 89 Cal. 158; State v. Pat- 
 rick (Mo., 1892), 17 S. W. Rep. 666; 
 Howell Lumber Co. v. Campbell 
 (Neb., 1894), 57 N. W. Rep. 383; 
 James v. Mickey, 26 S. C. 270; 
 
 '-' Clem v. State, 33 Ind. 418; Surles 
 v. State (Ga., 1892), 15 S. E. Rep. 
 38; State v. Cherry, 63 N. C. 493; 
 Louisville, N. A. etc. Co. v. Frawley, 
 110 Ind. 26; George v. Pilcher, 28 
 Gratt. (Va.) 299; Griffith v. State, 26 
 Tex. App. 157; State v. Jones, 29 
 S. C. 201; 7 S. E. Rep. 290; Isler 
 v. Dewey, 71 N. C. 14; Hadgo v. 
 Gooden, 13 Ala. 718; Paine v. Til- 
 den, 5 Washb. C. C. 554; Kennedy 
 v. Upshur, 66 Tex. 442; Magee v. 
 People (111., 1892), 28 N. E. Rep. 
 1077. 
 
 3 Saussy v. So. Flor. R. Co., 22 Fla. 
 327; Britt v. State, 21 Tex. App. 215; 
 Diffenderfer v. Scott (Ind., 1893), 32 
 N. E. Rep. 87. 
 
 4 Stevenson v. Gunning, 64 Vt. 601. 
 
 5 Greene v. State (Tex., 1891), 12 
 S. W. Rep. 872.
 
 § 353.] IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 515 
 
 A distinction has sometimes been made by which it has 
 been held that general evidence of the character of the wit- 
 ness for truthfulness is not relevant if he was impeached 
 merely by showing that he had made contradictory state- 
 ments. 1 This distinction is repudiated by a majority of the de- 
 cisions which support the proposition that general evidence 
 of the character of the witness as a truthful person is always 
 admissible whenever any attempt, though it may have been 
 unsuccessful, has been made to impeach it; 2 as, for example, 
 where another witness is asked what is his character for truth 
 and replies that it is good. 3 
 
 §353. Privileges of witnesses — Questions disclosing a 
 pecuniary liability. — -The question of the privilege of the 
 witness from answering questions during his examination has 
 a twofold aspect, so that the immunity which the witness en- 
 joys may have for its object the protection either of the wit- 
 ness himself or the protection of some other person to whose 
 interests he may be related in a confidential capacity. In the 
 former class of cases, which we must now consider, the privi- 
 lege is personal to the witness and consequently may be waived 
 by him. It cannot be claimed by either party to the action 
 if the witness chooses to waive it. In the latter class, in which 
 are included confidential communications made to the witness 
 in his professional capacity, the privilege cannot be waived 
 by any one except the person who has made the communica- 
 tions. 4 
 
 In England at the common law a considerable diversity of 
 opinion existed upon the point whether a witness could claim 
 the privilege of not answering a question which would tend 
 merely to expose him to a civil liability or action or a pecun- 
 iary loss. 5 In England and in some of the states the matter 
 was regulated by statute at an early date, 6 while in other 
 states a precisely similar rule has been adopted by the courts, 
 
 i Brown v. Mooers, 6 Gray, 451. Thornsberry (Tex., 1892), 17 S. W. 
 
 Cf. Harrington v. Lincoln, 4 Gray, Rep. 521. 
 
 563, 565. 3 Com. v. Ingraham, 7 Gray, 46. 
 
 2 Com. v. Ingraham, 7 Gray, 46; * See §§165-178. 
 
 People v. Ah Fat, 48 Cal. 61 ; Tipton 3 Lord Melville's Case, 29 How. St. 
 
 v. State, 17 S. W. Rep. 1097 ; 30 Tex. Trials, 683. 
 
 App. 530; Galveston, etc. Co. v. «46 Geo. III., ch. 37; 2 N. Y. R. S. 
 
 405, § 71.
 
 516 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. [§ 354. 
 
 so that it is now the general rule that no witness is privileged 
 from answering any relevant question solely for the reason 
 that his answer may tend to render him liable to a civil liability 
 or open the door for the prosecution of a civil action against 
 him. 1 
 
 §354. Questions tending to disgrace the witness. — In 
 regard to those questions which merely tend to disgrace the 
 witness in the eyes of those who know him, an important dis- 
 tinction is made by the authorities founded on the nature and 
 relevancy of the fact which is to be elicited. 2 Where the 
 question is put on the direct examination, with the sole object 
 of obtaining evidence of some fact directly relevant, it is not 
 only unjust but absurd to close the mouth of the witness, 
 where the life, the liberty or the most valuable rights of others 
 may depend upon his answer, solely because that answer may 
 disgrace him. The answer which he may give, while it may 
 disgrace him, will not render him liable to punishment for a 
 crime nor subject him to the danger of a civil suit. On the 
 other hand, it may be absolutely necessary in ascertaining the 
 guilt or innocence of a prisoner accused of some heinous 
 crime or to determine pecuniary interests of paramount im- 
 portance. 3 So a witness will be compelled to give evidence, 
 however much it may humiliate, disgrace or degrade him, to 
 any transaction which forms a part of the matter which is in 
 issue. 4 But where questions tending to disgrace a witness are 
 asked in cross-examining a witness different principles apply. 
 To prevent the multiplication of issues it is not allowable, as 
 we have explained, to interrogate on cross-examination upon 
 wholly irrelevant matters merely for the purpose of subse- 
 quently contradicting the witness. Accordingly, if the dis- 
 
 i Williams v. Butcher, 22 Neb. 68?.; 2 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 454; Phil. & 
 
 37 N. W. Rep. 586; Cox v. Hill, 3 Am. on Ev., pp. 917, 918. 
 
 Ohio St. 411; Clark v. Zeigler, 85 3 People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 250- 
 
 Ala. 154; Jones v. Lanier, 2 Dev. 254; Cundell v. Pratt, 1 M. & Malk. 
 
 (S. C.) L. 480; Durfee v. Knowles, 108. See Phil. & Am. on Ev., pp. 917. 
 
 50 Hun, 601; 2 N. Y. S. 466; Taney 918; 2 Phil. Ev. 422. 
 
 v. Kemp, 4 H. & J. 348; Moline 4 Ex parte Boscowitz, 84 Ala. 463; 
 
 Wagon Co. v. Preston, 35 111. App. 4 S. Rep. 279 ; Johnston Hard. Co. v. 
 
 338; Ward v. Sharp, 15 Vt. 115. Muller, 72 Mich. 2C5. See cases in 
 
 Contra, Benjamin v. Hathaway, 3 note 3. 
 Conn. 528.
 
 § 354;.] IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSE8. 517 
 
 gracing question is asked for that purpose it may be excluded 
 because it is irrelevant. But objections based on irrelevancy 
 are to be taken by the parties, not by the witness, and mere 
 irrelevancy alone will not, in strictness of language, confer any 
 personal privilege as such upon a witness. 
 
 It is not possible to lay down any general rule as to what 
 questions are relevant on a cross-examination. While the matter 
 is largely in the discretion of the court it is clear that this 
 discretion should be exercised in protecting a witness from 
 needless insult and from impertinent questions designed to 
 surprise him and to cause him to lose his temper. 1 The pres- 
 ent tendency is to regard all facts as relevant which will 
 enable the jurors to decide to what extent the testimony of 
 the witness can be relied upon, and among such facts are his 
 present or previous moral character and his previous conduct 
 and life, whether irreproachable or the reverse. Accordingly 
 a witness ma} 7 be asked, with a view to show his character for 
 truthfulness, as to specific facts not too remote in time which 
 may tend to disgrace him, and counsel will be bound by his 
 answers. 2 
 
 In the absence of a statute permitting the question, the 
 witness cannot be asked on cross-examination if he has been 
 convicted of or imprisoned for a crime. Here no question of 
 privilege arises. It is for the party or the court, of its own 
 motion, to interpose, since the conviction or imprisonment is 
 usually of record, and a complete transcript of the record is 
 the best and only competent evidence of the fact of convic- 
 tion. 3 So while the fact that a prosecuting witness in a trial 
 
 iCom. v. Shaw, 4Cush. 593; Com. Shore, etc. Co. (Mich., 1893). 54 N. 
 
 v. Sacket, 22 Pick. 394; Smith v. W. Rep. 638; Ex parte Boscowitz. 
 
 Castles, 1 Gray, 108. 84 Ala. 434; People v. Casey, 72 N. 
 
 ^ Best, Ev.,§546; Clayton v. State Y. 383; Ryan v. People, 79 N. Y. 
 
 (Tex., 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 404; At- 594; Carroll v. State (Tex., 1893), 24 
 
 torney-General v. Hitchcock, 1 Ex. S. W. Rep. 100. Cf. contra, State v. 
 
 102; Reg. v. Burke, 8 Cox, 44; Peo- Houx, 109 Mo. 654. 
 pie v. Hite (Utah, 1893), 33 Pac. » Chambless v. State (Tex., 1894), 
 
 Rep. 254; Roberts v. Com. (Ky., 24 S. W. Rep. 899; Rex v. Lewis, 4 
 
 1893), 20 S. W. Rep. 267; State v. Esp. 225; Newcomb v. Griswold, 24 
 
 Miller, 13 S. W. Rep. 832; 100 Mo. N. Y. 298; Spiegel v. Hays, 118 id. 
 
 606; State v. Taylor (Me., 1893), 22 661; State v. Minor (Mo., 1893). 22 
 
 S. W. Rep. 806; Ford v. State (Ga., S. W. Rep. 1085; State v. Alexis 
 
 1893), 17 S. E. Rep. 667; Cole v. Lake (La., 1893), 13 S. Rep. 394; Daggett
 
 518 
 
 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 
 
 [§ 354. 
 
 for rape or seduction bad committed adultery with other 
 men is not directly relevant upon the guilt or innocence of 
 the prisoner, questions respecting" such intimacy may be asked 
 her if intended solely to impeach her testimon}' that she was 
 previously chaste. 1 
 
 Every man's family relations, his domicile, his business and 
 his social connections, his avocation and his manner of living, 
 are, to a certain extent, within his own power of selection. If 
 then he voluntarily associates with persons who are disrepu- 
 table, or engages in practices or in occupations which are dis- 
 graceful or vicious, though not perhaps criminal, he may, so 
 far as these facts bear upon his truthfulness, be compelled to 
 answer all interrogatories. 2 So a witness may be asked on 
 
 v. Sims, 79 Ga. 253; State v. Farmer, 
 84 Me. 436. Cf. contra. State v. 
 Taylor (Mo., 1893), 24 S. W. Eep. 
 449; People v. Crowley (Cal., 1893), 
 35 Pac. Rep. 84. It is very improper 
 for counsel to accuse the witness of 
 perjury by implication by asking 
 him if he knows the penalty for 
 that crime. People v, O'Brien 
 (Mich., 1893), 56 N. W. Rep. 72. 
 Sometimes it is provided by statute 
 that a witness may be asked on his 
 cross-examination if he was ever 
 convicted of a crime. Spiegel v. 
 Hays, US N. Y. 660: People v. Rod- 
 rigo, 69 Cal. 601 ; State v. Adamson, 
 43 Minn. 196; State v. McGuire, 15 
 R. I. 23; State v. Miller, 100 Mo. 
 106; Handlin's Estate v. Law, 34 111. 
 App. 84; Helm v. State, 67 Miss. 
 562; Com. v. Morgan, 107 Mass. 205; 
 State v. O'Brien (Iowa, 1891), 46 
 N. W. Rep. 861 ; State v. Merriman 
 (S. C, 1891), 12 S. E. Rep. 619; State 
 v. Pefferle, 36 Kan. 90. If he denies 
 that he was ever convicted of a 
 crime, he may be contradicted by 
 the record of his conviction. State 
 v. McGuire, 15 R. I. 23; People v. 
 Carolau, 71 Cal. 195 ; State v. Wise, 
 33 S. C. 582 ; Helwig v. Laschcowitz, 
 82 Mich. 619; Sisson v. Yost, 58 
 
 Hun, 609; State v. Sauer, 42 Minn. 
 258. See, also, cases supra. These 
 statutes are strictly construed. Thus, 
 a question, "'Were you ever con- 
 convicted of crime?" is improper 
 under a statute allowing the witness 
 to be interrogated as to his previous 
 "conviction of felony." Hanners v. 
 McClelland, 74 Iowa, 318. Where a 
 statute permits a " conviction of any 
 crime" to be shown, any crime, 
 whether a felony or misdemeanor, 
 may be shown. Helm v. State, 67 
 Miss. 562; State v. Sauer, 42 Minn. 
 258. See cases cited under §§ 318, 
 319. To i-ebut the presumption raised 
 by proof of the conviction of the 
 witness, he may on his redirect 
 examination, testify to his inno- 
 cence of crime. Walkoff v. Tefft, 
 12 N. Y. S. 464. And where it ap- 
 pears that he was pardoned, the rea- 
 sons for granting the pardon aud the 
 celerity with which it was granted 
 may also be shown. Sisson v. Yost, 
 58 Hun, 609; 12 N. Y. S. 373. 
 
 i Taylor, Ew, § 1293, n. ; People 
 v. Harrison, 93 Mich. 594; Com. v. 
 Regan, 105 Mass. 593. Contra, State 
 v. Patterson, 74 N. C. 157. 
 
 2 Grimes v. Connell, 23 Neb. 187; 
 People v. Tiley, 84 Cal. 651.
 
 § 354a.] IMrEACIIMENT OF WITNESSES. 519 
 
 cuoss-exami nation if she keeps a house of ill-fame; 1 if she is a 
 prostitute 2 or an habitual user of opium; 3 whether he is a 
 volunteer witness; 4 if he has attempted to bribe another wit- 
 ness/ 1 or whether he had not fled to escape criminal prosecu- 
 tion. 6 But a witness who is also a party defendant cannot be 
 asked on his cross-examination if he has disposed of his prop- 
 erty with the view of escaping an adverse judgment in that 
 case. 7 Nor can a witness be asked if he was impeached as a 
 witness in another cause. 8 
 
 The asking of incriminating or disgracing questions is a 
 matter largely in the discretion of the court, 9 and where no ma- 
 terial injury is thereby done to either party, the refusal of the 
 court to order such a question stricken out will not be reversi- 
 ble error. If, however, counsel persists in asking a material 
 witness, whose credit is otherwise unimpeached, insulting and 
 disgracing irrelevant questions not tending to show that the 
 witness was to be disbelieved, and follows this up by attempt- 
 ing to contradict him by offering and reading from inadmissible 
 writings, stating to the jury that the witness had contradicted 
 himself, a conviction of murder will be set aside because of 
 the unfair and prejudicial effect of such a course of action on 
 the minds of the jurors. 10 
 
 § 354a. Questions tending to expose witness to a criminal 
 charge. — A witness cannot be compelled to answer any ques- 
 tion where it is reasonable to suppose that his answer will 
 tend to incriminate him or render him subject to punishment 
 for crime. 11 It is immaterial whether the question has been 
 
 i State v. Hack (Mo., 1893), 23 S. 9 Com. v. McDonald, 110 Mass. 545. 
 
 W. Rep. 1089. io People v. Carr, 64 Mich. 702; 31 
 
 2 State v. Coella, 5 Wash. 99. N. W. Rep. 509. Cf. Com. v. Shaw, 
 
 3 People v. Webster, G8 Hun, 11, 4 Cush. 593. 
 
 4 Wabash, etc. Co. v. Ferris (Inch, n Worthington v. Scribner, 109 
 189:3), 32 N. E. Rep. 112. Mass. 487; Stevens v. State, 32* Pac. 
 
 5 State v. Hack, supra. Cf. Com. Rep. 350 ; 50 Kan. 712 ; Friess v. N. Y. 
 v. Mason, 105 Mass. 163. Cent. & H. R. R., 22 N. Y. S. 104; 67 
 
 « State v. Duncan (Wash., 1893), 35 Hun, 205; Taylor v. Mclrvin, 94 III. 
 
 Pac. Rep. 117; Copp v. Hollins, 9 N. 488; Minter v. People, 139 111. 363; 
 
 Y. S. 57. State v. Hardware Co., 109 Mo. 118; 
 
 7 French v. Wilkinson, 93 Mich. Yard's Appeal, 148 Pa. St. 509; Ex 
 
 322; 53 N. W. Rep. 530. parte Boscowitz, 84 Ala. 483; State 
 
 sCockrill v. Hall, 76 Cal. 192; 18 v. Coella, 3 Wash. St. 99; Com. v. 
 
 Pac. Rep. 318. Trider, 143 Mass. 180; Minter v. Peo-
 
 520 
 
 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 
 
 [§ 354a, 
 
 partially answered before he objects or is wholly unanswered ;* 
 for if the answer "forms but one link in the chain of testi- 
 mony which would convict him," he need not answer at all. 2 
 If the witness will swear that he believes that to answer 
 would incriminate him, he need not show in detail how that 
 result would be produced, for to compel him to do this would 
 be to destroy the protection which he enjoys. 3 If he choose 
 to answer he may do so, but the court must inform him that 
 he need not; 4 and it is for the judge to determine as a matter 
 of law whether any possible answer that the witness may 
 give will tend to incriminate him directly, or indirectly by fur- 
 nishing a missing link in the chain of proof. 5 If from all 
 
 pie, 29 N. E. Rep. 45; 39 111. App. 
 438; Temple v. Com., 75 Va. 892; 
 Southard v. Rexford, 6 Cowen, 254. 
 In an early case it was held that an 
 incriminating reply wrongfully ex- 
 torted from the witness could not 
 subsequently be used against him. 
 Reg. v. Garbott, 1 Denio, C. C. 236 ; 
 Emery Cases, 107 Mass. 180. A de- 
 fendant in chancery will not be com- 
 pelled to answer interrogatories con- 
 tained in a bill of discovery which 
 will tend to incriminate him or sub- 
 ject him to punishment. Mclntire 
 v. Mancius, 16 Johns. 592; Wigram 
 on Discovery, pp. 61, 150, 195; Story's 
 Eq. Pleading, §§ 524, 576, 577, 592- 
 598. So also, both in equity and at 
 law, a witness will not be compelled 
 to answer questions where his an- 
 swer may subject him to a forfeit- 
 ure of his estate. 1 Greenl. Ev., 
 ^453; Story's Eq. Plead., §§607, 846; 
 Respublica v. Crihbs, 3 Yeates, 429. 
 
 1 The matter is largely in the dis- 
 cretion of the court. Mayo v. Mayo, 
 119 Mass. 290; 1 Whart. Ev., §§ 553- 
 540. Only the incriminating portion 
 of the testimony should be stricken 
 out where the witness has answered. 
 State v. Tall, 43 Minn. 273. 
 
 2 1 Greenl. Ev., § 451. In 1 Burr's 
 Trial, 241, the court by Marshall, 
 C. J., said: "Many links frequently 
 
 compose that chain of testimony 
 necessary to convict an individual of 
 a crime. It appears to be the true 
 sense of the rule that no witness is 
 compellable to furnish any one of 
 them against himself. It is certainly 
 not only a possible but a probable 
 case, that a witness by disclosing a 
 single fact may complete the testi- 
 mony against himself and to every 
 effectual purpose accuse himself en- 
 tirely, as he would by stating every 
 circumstance which would be re- 
 quired for his conviction." 
 
 3 People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 229, 
 252, 253, 254 ; In re Bellinger, 8 Wend. 
 595; Friess v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. 
 Co., 67 Hun, 205. The actual inno- 
 cence of the witness is immaterial if 
 his answer would tend to convict 
 him of a crime. Adams v. Lloyd, 4 
 Jur. (N. S.) 590. If, having been in- 
 structed as to his rights, the witness 
 answers an incriminating question, 
 he may be compelled to go into 
 every detail of the inculpatory cir- 
 cumstances. Foster v. Pierce, 11 
 Cush. 437, 439; Com. v. Pratt, 126 
 Mass. 462 ; State v. Van Winkle, 80 
 Iowa, 15; Williams v. State (Ala., 
 1893), 13 S. Rep. 333. 
 
 * Close v. Olney, 1 Denio, 319. 
 
 ■"'See People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 
 252-254 » State v. Thaden, 43 Minn.
 
 § 354a.] 
 
 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 
 
 521 
 
 the circumstances and from the character of the answer which 
 is required it seems clear that there is no reasonable ground 
 for the supposition that the answer will tend to incriminate 
 him, the witness should be compelled to answer, though he 
 shall swear that he believes his answer will incriminate him. 1 
 If the danger to the witness is apparent he may be allowed to 
 use a large discretion in refusing to answer. 2 
 
 A defendant in a criminal trial who testifies voluntarily in 
 his own behalf cannot refuse to answer incriminating ques- 
 tions on his cross-examination, for by denying his guilt on the 
 stand he will (except in those states where the cross-examina- 
 tion is limited by statute to the matters gone into on the direct 
 examination) 3 by implication be deemed to have waived his 
 privilege as a witness so far as questions relevant to his guilt 
 or to his credibility are concerned. 4 
 
 The privilege of refusing to answer incriminating questions 
 is personal to the witness. Neither party can object to the 
 witness answering them if he desires to do so. 5 The jury 
 
 253; State v. Tall, 43 id. 273; Com. v. 
 Bell, 145 Pa. St. 374. A person who 
 waives his privilege and testifies be- 
 fore the grand jury cannot, when he 
 is indicted with others for the crime, 
 refuse to testify on the trial of a co- 
 defendant because his answer may 
 criminate him. State v. Van Winkle, 
 45 N. W. Rep. 388. 
 
 » Forbes v. Willard, 37 How. Pr. 
 193; Lathropv. Roberts, 16 Colo. 250. 
 
 2 Williams v. Dickinson, 28 Fla. 
 90; Chamberlain v. Wilson, 12 Vt. 
 491 ; Minter v. People, 29 N. E. Rep. 
 45 ; 39 111. App. 438. 
 
 3 State v. Chamberlain. 89 Mo. 129. 
 OfcClain v. People, 1 Atl. Rep. 45; 
 
 110 Pa. St. 263; Sullivan v. People, 
 114 111. 24; State v. Sanders, 106 Mo. 
 188; State v. Uhrig, 106 Mo. 267; 
 Com. v. Mullern, 97 Mass. 545; Rains 
 v. State, 88 Ala. 91 ; Andrews v. 
 Frye, 104 Mass. 234 ; State v. Ober, 
 52 N. H. 459 ; Connors v. People, 50 
 N. Y. 240; State v. Allen, 107 N. C. 
 105; Spies v. People, 122 111. 205; 
 
 State v. Withan, 73 Me. 531 ; People 
 v. Tice, 131 N. Y. 651; Com. v. 
 Damon, 136 Mass. 441 ; People v. 
 Oyer & Terminer, 83 N. Y. 436 , Com. 
 v. Morgan, 107 Mass. 199; Com. v 
 Nichols, 114 id. 285; State v. Went- 
 worth, 65 Me. 234; Stover v. People, 
 56 N. Y. 315; Roddy u. Finnegan, 
 43 Md. 490. 
 
 5 Williams v. Dickinson, 28 Fla. 90: 
 State v. Went worth, 65 Me. 234; 
 Thomas v. Newton, 1 M. & M. 48; 
 Taylor v. State (Ga., 1890), 10 S. E. 
 Rep. 412; People v. Teague, 82 Mich. 
 22; Com. v. Gould (Mass., 1893), 33 
 N. E. Rep. 656: Brown v. State (Tex , 
 1893), 20 S. W. Rep. 924; Cliffton v. 
 Granger (Iowa, 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 
 316; People v. Teague, 11 S. E. Rep. 
 665 ; 106 N. C. 576 ; Com v. Shaw, 4 
 Cush. (Mass.) 594; Lathrop v. Rob- 
 erts, 16 Colo. 250. Where the ac- 
 cused has voluntarily testified to his 
 age, he may properly be required to 
 stand up so that the jury may ob- 
 serve his personal appearance. Will-
 
 ;99 
 
 IMPKACIIMENT OF WITNESSES. 
 
 [§ 354J. 
 
 should be advised that no inference that the witness is a crim- 
 inal should be drawn from his refusal to answer, 1 and in any 
 case if, after he has claimed his privilege, he is forced to answer, 
 the information given cannot afterwards be used against him, 2 
 or by either party in the pending action. 3 Where the witness, 
 because he has been acquitted, 4 or by lapse of time, is no longer 
 liable to a prosecution, he is not privileged, and may be 
 compelled to answer. 5 
 
 § 354b. Bias and prejudice of the witness. — These words, 
 though commonly employed together, are not synonymous. 
 Prejudice, in strictness of language, means a prejudgment, 
 any judgment or opinion formed beforehand, and does not, 
 in its legal acceptation, necessarily imply any ill-will or en- 
 mity towards a person. 6 But a person whose mind is biased, 
 whether he be a witness or a juror, is one who entertains 
 such a degree of personal dislike towards one party, or such 
 an inclination, affection or prepossession towards the other, 
 that he is utterty incapable of acting or speaking indiffer- 
 ently and impartially as to a transaction in which either is 
 concerned. 7 A man who is prejudiced, who has made up his 
 
 iaras v. State (Ala., 1893), 13 S. Rep. 
 333. 
 
 i State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200; 
 Devries v. Phillips, G3 N. C. 53. It 
 is submitted that any rule, whether 
 statutory or formulated by judicial 
 legislation, which forbids a juror 
 from drawing the perfectly logical 
 and fair conclusion that a witness is 
 a criminal because he claims the 
 privilege of refusing to answer in- 
 criminating questions, would be nu- 
 gatory. 
 
 2 So by statute. See Ex parte Bus- 
 kett, 106 Mo. 602; 17 S. W. Rep. 753; 
 United States v. Smith, 47 Fed. Rep. 
 501. 
 
 3 Reg v. Kinglake, 22 L. T. (N. S.) 
 335. A witness who is under indict- 
 ment for a crime which is the sub- 
 ject of a legislative investigation 
 cannot for that reason refuse to at- 
 tend or to be sworn as a witness. 
 He must wait until he is questioned 
 
 before he can claim to be privileged 
 from answering the incriminating 
 questions. In re Eckstein, 24 Atl. 
 Rep. G3; 3 W. N. C. 59; 10 Pa. Co. 
 Ct. R. 41. 
 
 4 Lathrop v. Roberts, 16 Colo. 250. 
 
 5 Ex parte Boscowitz, 84 Ala. 434; 
 People v. Kelly, 24 N. Y. 74; So. 
 Rail. N. Co. v. Russell (Ga., 1893), 18 
 S. E. Rep. 40. Contra, McFadden v. 
 Reynolds (Pa., 1888), 11 Atl. Rep. 
 638. He may also be compelled to 
 answer incriminating questions 
 where it is expressly provided by 
 statute that such testimony shall in 
 no case be used against him. Ex 
 parte Buskett, 17 S. W. Rep. 753; 
 108 Mo. 602. 
 
 6 Anderson's Law Diet., "Preju- 
 dice;" Willis v. State, 12 Ga. 448; 
 Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. 297. 
 
 7 In Evernian v. Hyman (Ind., 
 1892), 28 N. E. Rep. 1022, bias is de- 
 fined as " A leaning of the mind,
 
 § 354&.] IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 523 
 
 mind and formed an opinion as to the justice of the cause, is 
 necessarily biased towards that party whose case he believes 
 is just. But a witness may be biased b} 7 his interest or by 
 the ties of friendship or affection without being prejudiced, 
 i. e., without having any definite opinion as to the merits of 
 the case. 
 
 The bias of a witness so far as it affects the credibility of 
 his testimony is not collateral and may always be shown 
 either by his own statements on his examination or by the 
 independent evidence of others. Thus, as has been already 
 pointed out, a party may show that his own witness has un- 
 expectedly proved hostile to him and may emphasize such 
 hostility or bias by showing by another witness that the 
 biased witness was formerly favorably inclined towards him. 1 
 The bias of the witness may also be shown on his cross-exam- 
 ination by interrogating him as to his sympathy or hostility 
 towards either of the parties or as to his interest in the sub- 
 ject-matter. 2 Though the possession of an actual pecuniary 
 interest is generally no longer an objection to the competency 
 of a witness, it may still be shown as a fact from which the 
 jury may infer that the witness was biased. And the same 
 principle is recognized in the case of an existing relationship 
 between the witness and a party to the action. So the jury 
 may with propriety employ great caution in weighing the 
 testimony of witnesses who are near relatives of the accused 
 in a criminal trial when they testify in his behalf, 3 unless the 
 inference of bias is rebutted by the party who calls the wit- 
 propensity towards the object, not Cal. 173: Bates v. Holladay, 31 Mo. 
 leaving the mind indifferent; incli- App. 162 (bribery of witness). If 
 nation, prepossession, bent." on being questioned witness denies 
 
 1 See ante, § 348. that he is biased, the fact may then 
 
 2 See ante, § 340. In proving bias be shown by other witnesses. State 
 for the purpose not of direct contra- v. McFarlain, 41 La. Ann. 68(5; 
 diction but of discrediting the wit- Hamilton v. Man. Ry. Co., 9 N. Y. 
 ness, it is the general rule that a S. 313; Bennett v. State, 28 Tex. 
 foundation must be laid and the at- App. 329. 
 
 tention of the witness called to the 3 United States v. Ford, 33 Fed. 
 
 time and place of the declarations Rep. 861 ; State v. Byers, 100 N. C. 
 
 showing bias. Queen's Case, 2 B. & 512; 6 S. C. R. 420; Simpson v. State, 
 
 B. 284, 811; Edwards v. Sullivan, 8 78 Ga. 91; Staser v. Hogan, 120 Ind. 
 
 Ired. (N. C.) 302 ; Crumpton v. State, 207. 
 52 Ark. 273; Baker v. Joseph, 16
 
 524 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. [§ 354£. 
 
 ness proving that the witness and he have been on bad terms. 1 
 The bias of the witness may have arisen because of promises 
 or threats made or bribes offered by one of the litigants. 
 Though the witness was thus tampered with his testimony is 
 still admissible, and while evidence of the attempt to bribe is 
 admissible it is for the jury to determine if either party 
 was implicated and what effect, if any, the threats or bribery 
 may have had upon the credibility of the testimony of the 
 witness. 2 
 
 1 Clapp v. Wilson, 5 Denio (N. Y.), 2 Hitchcock v. Moore, 70 Mich. 112 ; 
 285. 87 N. W. Rep. 914.
 
 CHAPTER XXV. 
 
 AFFIDAVITS AND DEPOSITIONS. 
 
 § 355. Affidavits and depositions de- 
 fined and distinguished. 
 
 356. Parties to affidavits. 
 
 357. Formal requisites of affida- 
 
 vits. 
 
 358. Language of the affidavit. 
 
 359. Definition and character of 
 
 depositions. 
 
 § 360. Mode of procuring deposi- 
 tions. 
 
 361. Statutes construed —The cer- 
 
 tificate. 
 
 362. Objections to depositions. 
 
 363. Use of depositions as evidence. 
 
 364. Equitable bills to perpetuate 
 
 testimony. 
 
 § 355. Affidavits and depositions defined and distin- 
 guished. — Written evidence which is verified by an oath is 
 sometimes loosely classified under the general term "deposi- 
 tion." . In view of the different uses to which affidavits and 
 depositions may be put, it is important to distinguish clearly 
 between them. A deposition usually consists of answers to 
 questions oral or written, and the opposite party is entitled to 
 notice and must be given an opportunity to cross-examine the 
 deponent. 1 An affidavit, on the other hand, is commonly vol- 
 untary, 2 ex parte, and may be and usually is taken without no- 
 tice to the adverse party. 3 So the uses to which an affidavit 
 may be put are very different from a deposition. Thus, an 
 affidavit is of utility in matters which are collateral or initia- 
 tory to the subject of the trial, but which prepare for it or 
 facilitate its progress; as, for example, where some extraor- 
 dinary remedy, as an attachment 4 or an injunction, is sought, 
 or where a commission is required for the purpose of procur- 
 ing the testimony of an absent witness, 5 or where it is desired 
 
 1 See post, § 359 et seq. 
 
 2 Dudley v. McCord, 65 Iowa, 671. 
 
 3 " An affidavit is simply a declara- 
 tion, on oath, in writing, sworn to 
 by the declarant before a person 
 who has authority to administer 
 oaths." Harris v. Lester, 80 111. 311 ; 
 Woods v. State (Ind., 1893), 33 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 903; State v. Hennings (S. D., 
 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 537 ; Stimpson 
 v. Brooks, 3 Blatch. 436; Atchison 
 v. Bartholow, 4 Kan. 124; State v. 
 Dayton, 25 N. J. L. 54. 
 
 * Wirt v. Dinan, 44 N. Y. App. 583. 
 
 5 " Questions which do not involve 
 the matter in controversy, but mat-
 
 520 
 
 AFFIDAVITS AND DEPOSITIONS. 
 
 [§ 356. 
 
 to open a default to obtain a continuance 1 or a new trial, 2 or 
 on a motion for judgment on a nonsuit. 3 They are no part of 
 the record unless the}' are made so, and serve mainly to verify 
 facts which are not themselves matter of record. Except so 
 far as they may constitute admissions of the affiant, affida- 
 vits are not evidence of the material facts in issue. 4 
 
 § 356. Parties to affidavits. — An affidavit should be made 
 by a party to the action, and it is immaterial whether he is a 
 party to the record if he is a party in interest; 5 though, if it 
 be shown that the party is disabled by illness, or that he is 
 out of the jurisdiction, an affidavit by his counsel may be ad- 
 missible. 6 But the reason that the affidavit is not made by 
 the party, 7 and the authority of the attorney to act for him, 
 must appear on the face of the affidavit. 8 In the absence of 
 
 ter which is auxiliary to the trial, 
 which facilitates the preparation for 
 it, often depend on the oath of the 
 party. An affidavit to the material- 
 ity of a witness, for the purpose of 
 ■obtaining a continuance or a com- 
 mission to take his deposition, or an 
 affidavit of his inability to attend, is 
 usually made by the party and re- 
 ceived without objection. So affi- 
 davits in support of a new trial are 
 often received." Taylor v. Biggs, 1 
 Pet. (U. S.) 591. 
 
 1 Freeport v. Penrod, 53 N. W. Rep. 
 74 ; 35 Neb. 273 ; Dawson v. Coston 
 (Colo., 1893), 33 Pac. Rep. 189; Keith 
 v. Knoche, 43 111. App. 161. 
 
 2 Atkinson v. Saltinan (Ind., 1893), 
 29 N. E. Rep. 435. 
 
 3 Ames v. Merriam, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 498. Supplemental affidavits are 
 those which contain averments upon 
 the same subject as another prior 
 affidavit and which are designed to 
 remedy some defect in it. Callan v. 
 Lukens, 89 Pa. St. 136; Fritz v. 
 Hathaway, 19 Atl. Rep. 1011 ; 26 W. 
 N. C. 273. 
 
 4 Lewis v. Bacon, 3 Hen. & M. 
 (Va.) 89; Armstrong v. Boylan. 4 N. 
 J. L. 84; Patterson v. Insurance Co., 
 
 3 Har. & J. (Md.) 71 ; Nat. S. S. Co- 
 v. Tugman, 143 U. S. 28; Asbach v. 
 Chicago, etc. Co. (Iowa, 1893), 53 N. 
 W. Rep. 90 ; Ohio, etc. Co. v. Levy 
 (Ind., 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 815. 
 
 4 Feeley v. Steinmetz, 22 Pa. St. 
 437; Hunter v. Riley, 36 Pa. St. 509; 
 Miller v. Hooker, 2 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 124. 
 
 6 Spencer v. Bell, 109 N. C. 39; 
 Gazam v. Royce, 78 Ga. 512. Con- 
 viction of an infamous crime ren- 
 ders a person incompetent to make 
 an affidavit at common law. Peo- 
 ple v. Robinson, 26 How. Pr. 90; 
 Webster v. Mann, 56 Tex. 119. See 
 ante, §31 9. Where an affidavit is 
 made by a person who is incarcer- 
 ated in an insane asylum, the jurat 
 must show the place where it was 
 made and all the surrounding cir- 
 cumstances in order that the mental 
 condition of the affiant may be in- 
 quired into. Spittle v. Walton, L R. 
 11 Eq. 420. 
 
 7 Pack v. Geofroy, 19 N. Y. S. 583; 
 Blake Crusher Co. v. Ward, 1 Am. 
 L. T. R. 423; Jackson v. Wood- 
 worth, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 136; City v. 
 Devine, 1 W. N. C. (Pa.) 358. 
 
 8 Adams v. Kellogg, 63 Mich. 105;
 
 § 357.] 
 
 AFFIDAVITS AND DEPOSITIONS. 
 
 527 
 
 statute an affidavit may bo sworn to before any official au- 
 thorized to administer oaths. 1 When, however, a statute 
 authorizes certain officials to administer oaths, an affidavit 
 not sworn to before that official is invalid and may be disre- 
 garded. 2 
 
 As a general rule affidavits which are sworn to before the 
 attorney of the party are not competent though the attorney 
 may be otherwise authorized as a notary to take affidavits. 3 
 But this rule is not without exceptions; 4 and generally an 
 affidavit may be taken by the partner of the attorney if the 
 latter is not also the attorney of the party. 5 
 
 § 357. Formal requisites of affidavits. — The affidavits 
 should be accurately entitled, 6 though as a general rule, when 
 the affidavit can be otherwise identified, a mistake in this re- 
 spect or the absence of a caption or a title will be disregarded. 7 
 If the venue is stated in the affidavit 8 it is immaterial that it 
 does not appear appended to the signature of the notary; 9 for 
 
 Weatherwax v. Paine, 2 Mich. 555; 
 Rutledge v. Stribling, 26 111. App. 
 453; Willis v. Lyman, 22 Tex. 268; 
 Wallace v. Byrne, 17 La. Ann. 8. 
 Contra, Simpson v. McCarthy, 78 
 Cal. 175. The affidavit of a corpo- 
 ration should be made by its chief 
 official having a competent knowl- 
 edge of the facts. Ex parte Ser- 
 geant, 17 Vt. 425. 
 
 1 Cassidy v. Meyeiv., 64 Miss. 510 ; 
 Young v. Rollins, 78 N. C. 485. 
 
 2 Haight v. Proprietors, 4 Wash. 
 C. C. 601, 606; Irving v. Edrington, 
 41 La. Ann. 671; United States v. 
 Bailey, 9 Pet. (U. S.) 238; Stanton v. 
 Ellis, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 319; Benedict 
 v. Hall, 76 N. C. 113; Love v. Mc- 
 Alister, 42 Ark. 183; Roberts v. Rail- 
 road Co., 1 Brew. (Pa.) 538. 
 
 sPullen v. Pullen (N. J., 1839), 17 
 Atl. Rep. 310; Taylor v. Hatch, 12 
 Johns. 340 ; Toorle v. Smith, 34 Kan. 
 27; Swearingen v. Hawser, 37 Kan. 
 126; Vary v. Godfrey, 6 Cow. 5S7; 
 Willard v. Judd, 15 Johns. 531; 
 Hammond v. Freeman, 9 Ark. 62. 
 
 Cf. Linck v. Litchfield (111., 1893), 31 
 N. E Rep. 123. 
 
 4Reavis v. Cowell, 56 Cal. 588; 
 Young v. Young, 18 Minn. 90 ; Ry- 
 burn v. Moore, 72 Tex. 85 ; Daws v. 
 Glasgow, 1 Pin. (Wis.) 171. 
 
 5 Northumberland v. Todd, L. R. 
 7 Ch. Div. 777. 
 
 6 Baxter v. Seaman, 1 How. (N. Y.) 
 51 : Humphrey v. Caude, 2 Cow. (N. 
 Y.) o09. 
 
 7 Harris v. Lester, 80 III. 207; 
 Beebe v. Morrell, 76 Mich. 114; 
 Maury v. Van Arnum, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 
 370; Hawley v. Donnelly, 8 Paige 
 (N. Y.), 415 ; Minzenheimer v. Heinze, 
 74 Tex. 254. 
 
 8 Thompson v. Burhans, 61 N. Y. 
 52; Cook v. Staats, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 407. 
 
 9 Smith v. Runnells, 94 Mich. 617; 
 State v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co., 17 Nev. 
 239. But the venue must appeal 
 somewhere on the face of the affida- 
 vit. People v. Canvassers, 20 N. Y. 
 S. 329.
 
 528 
 
 AFFIDAVITS AND DEPOSITIONS. 
 
 [§ 35T. 
 
 though without a venue stated the affidavit is void as such, 1 
 yet in a prosecution for perjury, committed in swearing to 
 the affidavit, the absence of the venue is immaterial, aa time 
 and place may be shown orally. 2 A signature is indispensable 
 to the validity of the affidavit only when it is required by 
 statute or by a rule of court; 3 but an unsigned affidavit will 
 sustain a prosecution for perjury, the gist of the crime being 
 the false swearing. 4 The jurat must state that it was sworn 
 to or affirmed before the proper official, 5 and it must gener- 
 ally be subscribed by him, 6 and should be authenticated by 
 his official seal, 7 unless it is to be used in the county in which 
 he resides. 8 
 
 But generally the courts are disposed to exercise a wise dis- 
 cretion in allowing amendments of technical defects, 9 and 
 sometimes of those which are material as well. 10 
 
 iCook v. Staats, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 407; Lane v. Morse, 6 How. (N. Y.) 
 394. 
 
 2Reavis v. Cowell, 56 Cal. 558; 
 Young v. Young, 18 Minn. 90; Par- 
 ker v. Baker, 8 Paige (N. Y.), 428. 
 
 3 Haff v. Spicer, 3 Paige (N. Y), 
 190; Norton v. Hauge, 47 Minn. 405; 
 Shelton v. Berry, 19 Tex. 154; Al- 
 ford v. McCormac, 90 N. C. 151; 
 Gill v. Ward, 23 Ark. 16; Bates v. 
 Robinson, 8 Iowa, 318; Hargadine 
 v. Van Horn, 73 Mo. 370; Nave v. 
 Ritter, 41 Ind. 301. 
 
 4 See cases in last note. 
 
 s State v. Green, 15 N. J. L. 88; 
 Palmer v. McCarthy (Colo., 1893), 31 
 Pac. Rep. 241 ; Ladow v. Groom, 1 
 Denio (N. Y.), 420 ; Morris v. State, 
 2 Tex. App. 502. 
 
 6Cantwell v. State, 27 Ind. 505; 
 McDermaid v. Russell, 41 111. 490; 
 State v. Richardson, 34 Minn. 118; 
 Davis v.Rich, 2 How. (N. Y.)86; 
 State v. Green, 15 N J. Law, 88. 
 That the official omits to state his 
 official title is immaterial. People 
 v. Van Rensselaer, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 543; Hunter v. Leconte, 6 Cow. (N. 
 Y.) 728. 
 
 7 Chase v. Street, 10 Iowa, 593. 
 
 8 Stout v. Slattery, 12 III. 162; 
 Clemens v. Bullen (Mass., 1893), 34 
 N. E. Rep. 173; Mountjoy v. State, 
 
 78 Ind. 172. Cf. Coward v. Dillin- 
 ger, 56 Md. 59. "If an oath was 
 administered by a proper officer the 
 law was satisfied, and the mere 
 omission of a clerk to put his name 
 to an act which was done through 
 him as an instrument should not 
 prejudice an innocent party." The 
 court, in Kruse v. Wilson, 79 III. 
 233. 
 
 9 Rosenberg v. Claflin (Ala., 1893), 
 10 S. Rep. 521 ; Stacy v. Farnham, 2 
 How. (N. Y.) 26; Watts v. Womack, 
 44 Ala. 605. 
 
 1« Cutler v. Rathbone, 1 Hill, 205 
 (affidavit of hearsay); Hardin v. 
 Lee, 51 Mo. 241 ; Kruse v. Wilson, 
 
 79 111. 233; Jones v. Slate Co., 16 
 How. (N. Y.) 129; Salmon v. Mills, 
 4 U. S. App. 101 ; 1 C. C. A. 278. 
 Cf. Freer v. White (Mich., 1893), 51 
 N. W. Rep. 807; Brookmire v. Rosa 
 (Neb., 1890), 51 N. W. Rep. 840; 
 Sheldon v. Kivett, 110 N. C. 408. 
 That an affidavit may be filed or a 
 jurat added nunc pro tunc, see Will-
 
 358.] 
 
 AFFIDAVITS AND DEPOSITIONS. 
 
 529 
 
 § 358. Language of the affidavit. — The terms in which 
 the affidavit is expressed must be certain, positive and unam- 
 biguous. 1 The affiant must swear to a definite thing, though 
 an affidavit will not be construed in a technical spirit if in the 
 main it substantiates the party's case. 2 Still it may be said 
 that where an affidavit is required to be made by statute the 
 requirements of the statute must be complied with, and in such 
 a case a strict adherence to the language of the statute is the 
 only safe course for the party to pursue in order to render the 
 affidavit valid. 3 Scandalous matter may vitiate an affidavit, 4 
 but the fact that an affidavit is a translation, 5 or that it was 
 sworn to in a foreign language which was not understood by 
 the affiant, will not render- it invalid, provided it was properly 
 translated to him. 6 Where a statute permits the affiant to 
 amend his affidavit he may amend at any time. He need not 
 wait until it is pronounced defective. 7 
 
 iams v. Stevenson, 103 Ind. 243. 
 " Oral evidence given on affidavit 
 must be confined to such facts as 
 the witness is able of his own knowl- 
 edge to prove except on interlocu- 
 tory motions, on which statements 
 as to his belief and the grounds 
 thereof may be admitted. The costs 
 of every affidavit unnecessarily set- 
 ting forth matters of hearsay or ar- 
 gumentative matter, or copies of or 
 extracts from documents, must be 
 paid by the party filing them." 
 Stephen's Dig., art. 125. 
 
 i Boulter v. Behrend, 20 D. C. 567 ; 
 Cosmer's Adm'r v. Smith, 15 S. E. 
 Rep. 977 ; 36 W. Va. 788 ; Johnson v. 
 Buckel, 20 N. Y. S. 566; 65 Hun, 
 601; Hitnier v. Boutclies, 67 Hun, 
 203; Irvin v. Howard, 37 Ga. 23; 
 Dunnenbaum v. Schram, 59 Tex. 
 281 ; Winters v. Pearson, 72 Cal. 553; 
 Parsons v. Stockbridge, 42 Ind. 121 ; 
 Burnett v. McCluey (Mo., 1888), 4 S. 
 W. Rep. 694; Carleton v. Carleton, 
 85 N. Y. 313 ; Thompson v. Judge, 
 54 Mich. 237. 
 34 
 
 2 Altmeyer v. Caulfield, 37 W. Ya. 
 847; Haight v. Arnold, 48 Mich. 512; 
 Filer, etc. Co. v. Sohns, 63 Wis. 118 ; 
 Wirt v. Dinan, 44 Mo. App. 583; 
 Baumgartner v. Mfg. Co. (Minn., 
 1893), 52 N. W. Rep. 964; Hinzie v. 
 Moody, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 26 ; Hall v. 
 Kintz, 13 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 24; Bige- 
 low v. Chatterton, 10 U. S. App. 
 267. 
 
 3 Carleton v. Carleton, 85 N. Y. 
 313; Pearce v. Hawkins, 62 Tex. 
 435; Ilett v. Collins, 102 111. 402; 
 Mathews v. Sharp, 99 Pa. St. 560; 
 Miller v. Munson, 34 Wis. 579; Blum 
 v. Davis, 56 Tex. 426. 
 
 * Balls v. Smith, 2 M. & G. 350; 
 Opdyke v. Marble, 18 Abb. Pr. 375. 
 
 5 In re Eady, 6 Dowl. Pr. Cas. 615. 
 
 6 Bose v. Solliers, 6 Dow. & Ry. 
 514 ; Marzetti v. Du Jouffray, 1 Dowl. 
 Pr. Cas. 41. 
 
 7 Musgrove v. Mott, 90 Mo. 107; 
 2 S. W. Rep. 214; Fortenheim v. 
 Claflin, 47 Ark. 49.
 
 530 AFFIDAVITS AND DEPOSITIONS. [§ 359. 
 
 § 359. Definition and character of depositions. — "A dep- 
 osition is evidence given under interrogatories, oral or writ- 
 ten, and usually written down by an ollicial person." 1 Deposi- 
 tions may be offered as evidence in all cases where a non-resident 
 witness refuses or is unable to attend court, or where a wit- 
 ness who is resident within the jurisdiction is so ill or feeble 
 that he cannot appear in court. 2 The usefulness of this mode 
 of procuring evidence was first recognized in courts of admir- 
 alty, where it is of particular value because of the difficulty of 
 obtaining the presence of mariners, who are usually transient 
 in their habits of living and places of abode. 
 
 The practice of taking depositions has been universally 
 adopted in other tribunals of justice, and it is now almost 
 wholly regulated by statutes, which should be consulted in 
 every case. Under these statutes, and as a matter of prac- 
 tice, in their absence the party who wishes to secure the tes- 
 timony of an absent witness applies to the court to issue a 
 letter rogatoiy, which is in form a writ, issued 3 under the seal 
 of the court directed to a court of superior jurisdiction located 
 in the state or country in which the foreign witness resides, 
 and requesting the latter court in furtherance of justice, and 
 out of international comity, to cause the evidence of the wit- 
 ness named therein to be procured according to its customary 
 mode of procedure, to have the same committed to writing 
 and returned to the court issuing the letter. 
 
 Interrogatories framed by the parties are forwarded with 
 the letter, and these, with the original answers thereto, 
 signed by and verified with the oath of the witness and duly 
 authenticated, are returned to the court in which the deposi- 
 tion is to be used. 4 Under certain circumstances the witness 
 
 1 Stitnpson v. Brooks, 3 Blatch. subsequent introduction of the evi- 
 
 (U. S.) 456. dence of witnesses who are disqual- 
 
 -' People v. Lundquist, 84 Cal. 23 ; ified, see ante, §§ 120-124. 
 
 People v. Thompson, 84 id. 598. 3 Blakelee v. Dye (Colo., 1893), 27 
 
 Where a physician testifies that Pao. Rep. 881. 
 
 though an infirm and sick witness 4 Hemenway v. Knudsen, 67 Hun, 
 
 was able to attend court, yet she 648; Fry v. Man. Trust Co., 23 Civ. 
 
 should not be compelled to do so, Pro. It. 520; Hobart v. Jones, 5 
 
 her deposition will be taken. Norris Wash. St. 383 ; Stierle v. Kaiser 
 
 v. Norris, 3 Ind. App. 500. See, also, (La., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 839. The in- 
 
 ante, §§ 282, 283, 288. As to the terrogatories should not be leading
 
 § 360.] 
 
 AFFIDAVITS AND DEPOSITIONS. 
 
 531 
 
 may be examined viva voce without written interrogatories 
 or the two methods of examination may be combined. 1 
 
 § 360. Mode of procuring depositions. — The details of the 
 law governing the taking of depositions are largely regulated 
 03 7 statutes which, while differing in minor points, are upon 
 the whole substantially alike. By the federal statute the com- 
 mission may issue to a judge of a federal court, or of a supe- 
 rior state court, or county court, court of common pleas, or to 
 a ma} T or or chief magistrate of a city. 2 The adverse party is 
 entitled to reasonable notice personally served on him or his 
 attorney, and has the absolute right to be present and to cross- 
 examine the witness; 3 and a failure to notify him, 4 or a notice 
 received when he is elsewhere taking another deposition in the 
 case, 5 will render the deposition inadmissible. 8 The witness 
 should be duty sworn in the precise mode which is prescribed 
 by the statute, if any, 7 and the examining magistrate's failure 
 to state the fact that he was so sworn will render the depo- 
 sition inadmissible. 8 
 
 The deposition when completed with a proper certificate of 
 
 (Lott v. King, 79 Tex. 292), nor im- 
 material (In re Allis, 44 Fed. Rep. 
 21(5), nor' call upon the witness to 
 speak from hearsay. Gilpin v. Daly, 
 58 Hun, 610. 
 
 1 Laidley v. Rogers, 67 Hun, 653 ; 
 23 Civ. Pro. R. 110; 1 Greenl. on 
 Ev., § 320; Pole v. Rogers, 3 Bing. 
 N. C. 780. Of. Nevitt v. Crow (Cal., 
 1892), 29 Pac. Rep. 749. See as 
 to "open commissions" in New 
 York, Code C. P., §§ 893, 894, 897 
 et seq. ; Jones v. Hoyt, 10 Abb. N. C. 
 324 ; 63 How. Pr. 94 ; Heney v. Weed, 
 4 Law Bui. (N. Y.) 10; Jennison v. 
 Citizens' Sav. Bank, 85 N. Y. 546 ; 
 Whitney v. Wyncoop, 4 Abb. Pr. 
 (N. Y.)370; Dwinnelle v. Howland, 
 1 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 87 (return of com- 
 mission). 
 
 2U. S. R. S., §§ 863-875; Bibb v. 
 Allen, 149 U. S. 481. 
 
 3 Cole v. Hall, 131 Mass. 88; Vaw- 
 ter v. Hulse, 112 Mo. 633; Carring- 
 ton v. Stimpsou, 1 Curt. C. C. 437. 
 
 4 Sinsheimer v. Skinner, 43 111. 
 App. 608; Goodhue v. Bartlett, 5 
 McLean, 186. The reasonableness 
 of the notice will depend upon the 
 circumstances of each case, among 
 which are the distance of the for- 
 eign witness from the court and the 
 facility with which he may be 
 found. Sing Cheong Co. v. Yung 
 Wing, 59 Conn. 535; Harris' Appeal 
 (Conn., 1891), 20 Atl. Rep. 617. 
 
 5 Uhle v. Burnham, 44 Fed. Rep. 
 792; Latham v. Latham, 30 Gratt. 
 307; Collins v. Richart, 14 Bush 
 (Ky.), 621. 
 
 6 See, also, Atchison, etc. Co. v. 
 Sage, 49 Kan. 524; Crabb v. Orth 
 (Ind., 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 711. 
 
 7 Bacon v. Bacon, 33 Wis. 147. 
 
 8 Parsons v. Huff, 38 Me. 147; 
 West. U. Tel. Co. v. Collins, 45 
 Kan. 88 ; Gulf City Ins. Co. v. Ste- 
 phens, 51 Ala. 121 ; Home v. Haver- 
 hill, 113 Mass. 344; Bush v. Barron, 
 78 Tex. 5 (signature).
 
 532 AFFIDAVITS AND DEPOSITIONS. [§ 301. 
 
 its regularity attached should then be securely sealed by the 
 commissioner and transmitted by mail, 1 or by some other con- 
 venient and safe method/ properly superscribed so as to show 
 the nature of its contents, to the clerk of the court where it is 
 to be used. 3 If the purpose of the deposition is solely to pro- 
 cure evidence to rebut evidence which the party expects his 
 adversary will offer, a notice to that effect must accompany 
 the interrogatories, or he may be compelled, on request, to 
 read the deposition to the jurj\ 4 A failure to examine all 
 the witnesses who are named in the commission will not ren- 
 der the depositions of those actually examined invalid ; nor 
 need an officer employ an interpreter if an attorney of one of 
 the parties is able to translate the answers to his satisfaction. 5 
 § 361. Statutes construed — The certificate. — The statu- 
 tory right to take depositions being in derogation of common- 
 law rules, it has been considered that the statute should be 
 strictly construed, particularly in view of the fact that such evi- 
 dence, if taken ex parte and without notice, may easily be dis- 
 torted and employed to deceive the jurors and subvert the 
 proper administration of justice. 6 Whether in any case a 
 deposition is necessary is a question for the court, and clear 
 proof should be required that the witness cannot attend in 
 person before the commission should issue. 7 The certificate of 
 the judicial officer taking the deposition is usually sufficient 
 2?ri7na facie evidence of his authority to do so, 8 of the reason 
 and necessity for taking the deposition, 9 and of the actual 
 domicile of deponent. 10 
 
 1 Prouty v. Ruggles, 2 Story, 194. 7 Everett v. Tidball, 34 Neb. 803 ; 
 
 2 Andrews v. Parker, 48 Tex. 94. Turnbull v. Laubagh, G Kulp, 368; 
 3 Babb v. Aldrich, 45 Kan. 218; Whitford v. Clark Co., 119 U. S. 523. 
 
 Beal v. Thompson, 8 Cranch, 70; 8 Fowler v. Merrill, 11 How. 375; 
 
 Travers v. Jennings (S. C, 1893), 17 Hoyt v. Hammekin, 14 How. 346; 
 
 S. E. Rep. 849. Littlehale v. Dix, 11 Cusb. 365; 
 
 4 Linfield v. Old Colony R. R. Co., Palmer v. Fogg, 35 Me. 368; McNeal 
 10 Cusb. 570. v. Brann, 21 Oreg. 218 ; Scbunior v. 
 
 5 Scbunior v. Russell, 83 Tex. 33. Russell, 83 Tex. 83; Curtis v. Curtis, 
 
 6 Stebbins v. Duncan, 108 U. S. 45 ; 131 Ind. 489. 
 
 Jones v. Neale, 1 Hughes C. C. 268 ; 9 West Boylston v. Sterling, 17 
 
 Walsh v. Rogers, 13 How. 286, 287; Pick. 126; Kinney v. Berran, 6 Cusb 
 
 Greening v. Keel, 84 Tex. 326 (an- 304 ; Littlehale v. Dix, supra. 
 
 swers privately supplied to witness 10 Patapsco Ins. Co. v. Soutbgate, 5 
 
 by party). Cf. Moore v. Robertson, Pet. (U. S.) 603, 
 62 Hun, 623.
 
 § 362.] AFFIDAVITS AND DEPOSITIONS. 533 
 
 § 362. Objections to depositions.— Objections to deposi- 
 tions should be promptly made immediately upon discovery of 
 defects where the objection is only to the irregular or im- 
 proper manner or form in which they were taken, and which 
 is remedial by a retaking, 1 and a failure to object until trial 
 may constitute a waiver. 2 But substantial objections either to 
 the incompetency of the witness or the irrelevancy of the evi- 
 dence may be interposed at the trial. 3 If the witness is incom- 
 petent because of interest when his deposition is taken, it is 
 not admissible at the trial though he may have released his 
 interest in the meantime. 4 The deposition of a competent 
 witness is not rendered admissible by his subsequent incom- 
 petency. 5 
 
 Parol evidence is inadmissible to show the reason for taking 
 the deposition where the statute requires that to appear in the 
 certificate; 6 nor will a deposition be admissible which is 
 written down by a party or his counsel, 7 or by a third person, 
 where the law direct:; that it shall be reduced to writing by 
 the officer or the witness. 8 Motions to suppress depositions 
 after they have been opened are in the discretion of the court ; 9 
 nor can a part} 7 object to the suppression of a deposition which 
 would not benefit his case. 10 
 
 In introducing depositions in evidence it is usually con- 
 
 1 Bell v. Jamison, 102 Mo. 71 ; by statute before the trial. Haynes 
 Harris v. Nations. 79 Tex. 409 ; v. Rovve, 40 Me. 181. 
 
 Leavitt v. Baker, 82 Me. 28; Bar- 5 Sabine v. Strong, 6 Met. 270. 
 
 num v. Barnum, 42 Md. 251; Mer. Contra, Messimer v. McCrary (Mo., 
 
 Dis. Co. v. Leysor, 89 111. 48 ; Leslie 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 17. 
 
 v. Leslie, 110 Mo. 81; Vilmar v. 6 Chase v. Garretson, 54 N. J. L. 42. 
 
 Schall, 61 N. Y. 564; Orr v. Hance, "Cook v. Shorthill, 82 Iowa, 277. 
 
 44 Mo. App. 461; Johnson v. Rail- 8 East Tenn., V. & G. R. Co. v. Ar- 
 
 road Co., 51 Iowa, 25. nold, 89 Tenn. 107. A deposition 
 
 2 Thompson v. Railroad Co., 45 taken on a typewriter is "reduced 
 Minn. 13; Sheldon v. Bury, 39 111. to writing." Behrensmyer v. Kreitz, 
 App. 154 ; Howard v. Stillwell, 139 135 111. 59. 
 
 U. S. 199. 9 Smith v. The Serapis, 49 Fed. 
 
 3 Fielden v. Lahens, 2 Abb. App. Rep. 393 ; Lewis v. Fish, 40 111. App. 
 Dec. Ill; Chase v. Garretson, 54 372; Zogan v. Hamilton, 90 Ala. 
 N. J. L. 42; Nobles v. Hogg, 36 S. C. 454; Ervin v. Bevil, 80 Tex. 332; 
 322. Goldmark v. Metro. Opefti H. Co., 
 
 4 Reed v. Rice, 25 Vt. 171. Contra 67 Hun, 652. 
 
 where the incompetency is removed 10 Cowen v. Eartherly (Ala., 1892), 
 
 11 S. Rep. 195.
 
 534 AFFIDAVITS AND DEPOSITIONS. [§§ 363, 364. 
 
 sidered necessary to prove that a commission had issued. This 
 should be proved by the production of the commission itself. 
 The production of the interrogatories, while always advisable, 
 may be dispensed with, though the answers may be less easily 
 comprehended because of the absence of the questions. 1 Both 
 affidavits and depositions, which, by actual filing, have become 
 a part of the record, may be proved in other courts by the 
 means adopted in proving judicial records. 2 
 
 § 363. Use of depositions as evidence.— A deposition once 
 admitted may be used by either party as evidence in the ac- 
 tion, 3 and the party in whose behalf it was taken may con- 
 tradict it if offered by his adversary. 4 But an extract from 
 a deposition cannot be read unless the whole is in evidence; 5 
 nor can a deposition which has been taken for use in one cause 
 be introduced as evidence in a subsequent proceeding unless 
 the parties in both cases are substantially identical. 6 The 
 presence of the witness in court does not of necessity prevent 
 the court from allowing his deposition to be read in evidence. 7 
 
 § 364. Equitable bills to perpetuate testimony. — Where 
 a party has a vested or contingent right to be enforced in a 
 future action he may bring a bill in equity to obtain the evi- 
 dence of an aged or feeble witness, or of one who is about to 
 leave the jurisdiction. The commission is issued and executed 
 in the same manner and form as commissions to take other 
 
 1 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 517; Rowe v. foreign corporation whose principal 
 
 Brenton, 8 B. & C. 737, 765. office is out of the state. King v. 
 
 2 See § 146. Enterprise Ins. Co., 45 Ind. 43; New 
 
 8 Watson v. Race, 46 Mo. App. York Laws 1869, ch. 589, and Laws 
 
 546; First Nat. Bank v. Forest, 44 1863, ch. 206. See, also, Code Civ. 
 
 Fed. Rep. 246; Rucker v. Reid, 36 Pro., §£ 3343 and 929-931. 
 Kan. 470. echoato v. Huff (Tex., 1892), 18 
 
 4 Bloomington v. Osterle, 139 111. S. W. Rep. 87; Sewall v. Robbins, 
 
 120. 139 Mass. 164; McClaskey v. Barr, 
 
 5 Lanahan v. Lawton (N. J. Ch., 47 Fed. Rep. 154; Fearn v. West 
 1892), 23 Atl. Rep. 476; Thomas v. Jersey Ferry, 143 Pa. St. 122; Stew- 
 Miller, 151 Pa. St. 4S2. Cf. Jackson- art v. Register, 108 N. C. 588; Hew- 
 ville, etc. Co. v. Southworth, 32 111. elette v. George, 68 Miss. 703. 
 App. 307. It is provided by statute ^O'Conner v. Curtis (Tex., 1892), 18 
 in some of the states that the books S. W. Rep. 953 ; Page v. Krekey, 63 
 of a private corporation may be Hun, 629; O'Conner v. Andrews, 81 
 proved by depositions taken outside Tex. 28. 
 of the jurisdiction in the case of a
 
 § 364.] 
 
 AFFIDAVITS AND DEPOSITIONS. 
 
 535 
 
 depositions, and the evidence may be used when the litigation 
 arises. The party must have a fixed interest which is recog- 
 nized and maintainable at law, though it may be contingent 
 or conditional. 1 So, though the rule has been changed by 
 statute in England, 2 an heir could not procure a commission 
 to perpetuate testimony in respect to the possibility of an in- 
 terest which he may acquire in the property of his ancestor. 3 
 The interest of the orator may be in any property, real or 
 personal, 4 but must be such an interest as could not be the 
 subject of an immediate action, for if there is shown no rea- 
 son why the testimony should be perpetuated the suit will not 
 be entertained. 5 The testimony having been obtained, the 
 suit is at an end, and the deposition will be filed or recorded 
 only when the suit in which it is to be used is commenced or 
 on the death of the witness. 6 
 
 'Townsend Peerage Cases, 10 CI. 
 & Fin. 289; Belfast v. Chichester, 2 
 J. & W. 451; Dursley v. Fitzhard- 
 inge, 6 Ves. 251 ; Allan v. Allan, 15 
 id. 134. 
 
 2 Campbell v. Earl of Dalhousie, 
 L.R1H. Sc. A pp. 462. 
 
 * In re Tayleure, L. R. 6 Ch. 416; 
 Sackville v. Ayleworth, 1 Vern. 105. 
 
 « Earl of Suffolk v. Green, 1 Atk. 
 450. 
 
 5 Angell v. Angell, 1 S. & S. 83; 
 Ellice v. Roupell, 32 Beav. 299; Earl 
 Spencer v. Peck, L. R. 3 Eq. 415. 
 
 6 Attorney-Genera) v. Ray, 2 Hare, 
 518; Angell v. Angell, 1 S. & S. 63; 
 Barnsdale v. Lowe, 2 Russ. & My. 
 142; Beavan v. Carpenter, 11 Sim. 22.
 
 CHAPTER XXVI. 
 
 RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE — NUMBER OF WITNESSES. 
 
 § 366. 
 
 Mode of offering and object- 
 ing to evidence. 
 
 § 378. 
 
 367. 
 
 Waiver of objections to evi- 
 
 
 
 dence — Necessity for* re- 
 
 .379. 
 
 
 peating objections. 
 
 
 368. 
 
 Motions to strike out evi- 
 dence. 
 
 -" 380. 
 
 369. 
 
 The improper admission of 
 evidence, when immaterial. 
 
 
 370. 
 
 The improper exclusion of 
 evidence, when immaterial. 
 
 381. 
 
 371. 
 
 Nature and use of stipulations 
 as regards evidence. 
 
 382. 
 
 372. 
 
 Demurrer to evidence. 
 
 383. 
 
 373. 
 
 Surprise. 
 
 
 374. 
 
 Rebutting evidence — Nature 
 and use of. 
 
 384. 
 
 375. 
 
 Order of proof — Evidence of- 
 fered by the party after he 
 
 rests. 
 
 385. 
 
 376. 
 
 Materiality and sufficiency of 
 
 
 
 newly-discovered evidence. 
 
 386. 
 
 377. 
 
 Diligence of party offering 
 new evidence must be 
 shown. 
 
 
 Newly-discovered evidence 
 must not be cumulative or 
 impeaching merely. 
 
 Writ of error — When em- 
 ployed at common law. 
 
 The powers of appellate tri- 
 bunals in relation to the 
 evidence received in the 
 trial court. 
 
 Limitations on the number of 
 witnesses. 
 
 Number of witnesses neces- 
 sary in trials for perjury. 
 
 Number of witnesses in trials 
 for treason. 
 
 Compelling the calling of the 
 witnesses. 
 
 Positive and negative testi- 
 mony — Number of wit- 
 nesses as affecting the 
 weight of evidence. 
 
 The discretionary power of 
 the court — Judicial discre- 
 tion defined and considered. 
 
 §366. Mode of offering and objecting to evidence. — An 
 
 offer of evidence should not be too broad, general or vague in 
 character. It should be specific in terms, pointing out clearly 
 the facts which are intended to be proved under it, 1 so that 
 the court may judge of the materiality of the evidence. The 
 burden of showing the materiality of any evidence which is 
 
 1 Lyon v. Batz, 42 Mo. App. 606 ; 
 Johnson v. Merry, etc. Co., 53 Fed. 
 Rep. 569; Kennedy v. Currie, 3 
 Wash. St. 442; Brelscherv. Treitske, 
 33 Neb. 699; Wincbell v. Express 
 Co., 61 Vt. 15; Toledo, etc. Co. v. 
 
 Jackson (Ind., 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 
 793; Carley v. Railroad Co., 48 Hun, 
 619; Wolford v. Farnham, 47 Minn. 
 95; Chicago, etc. Co. v. Debaum, 2 
 Ind. App. 281.
 
 § 36G.] RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. 537 
 
 offered is upon the party offering it, and unless he shall con- 
 vince the court that the evidence is material and relevant to 
 the issue no error is committed bv the court in excluding it. 
 Hence, the purpose of the party in introducing evidence must 
 clearly appear in order that an exception to its exclusion may 
 be taken advantage of by him upon appeal. 1 The adverse 
 party has the right to demand, except where the witness is 
 under strict cross-examination, that counsel shall state con- 
 cisely the substance of what he proposes to prove by the wit- 
 ness. If he request it, and if he does not then the court of 
 its own motion, may require the purpose of the question to be 
 shown before it is answered and not after the objection to the 
 answer as it is given has been sustained, 2 though if the com- 
 petency of the evidence is ascertainable only after the answer 
 has been given, it should be allowed subject to objection by 
 the adverse part) 7 . 3 If evidence is offered by a party as a 
 whole, it is not error for the court to reject all of it where it 
 clearly appears that a part of it is inadmissible, and the facts 
 which are susceptible of proof or which are relevant cannot 
 be readily separated from those which are not. 4 And where 
 evidence is offered for a particular purpose, it is not error to 
 receive it over a general objection that it is not admissible for 
 any purpose, if it was admissible for any purpose though not 
 for the purpose which was specified. 5 
 
 Again, evidence which is originally offered without any 
 limitation as to its purpose, when, on objection, its purpose 
 
 1 Smethurst v. Propes, 148 Mass. Va. 421 ; Carley v. New York, etc. 
 
 261; Atherton v. Atkins, 139 Mass. Co., 1 N. Y. S. 637. 
 
 61; Lahn v. Gustafson, 73 Iowa, 633; * Clark v. Ryan (Ala., 1893), 11 S. 
 
 35 N. W. Rep. 660; Masters v. Marsh, Rep. 22; Reynolds v. Franklin, 47 
 
 19 Neb. 458; Hamilton v. Ross, 23 Minn. 145; First Nat. Bank v. North 
 
 id. 630; White v. Spreckels, 75 Cal. (S. D.), 51 N. W. Rep. 96; Cincinnati' 
 
 610 ; Dwyer v. Rippetoe, 72 Tex. etc. Co. v. Roesch, 126 Ind. 445 ; Over 
 
 520 ; Hathaway v. Tinkham, 148 v. Schiffling, 102 id. 691 ; Beard v. 
 
 Mass. 85; Cheek v. Herndon, 82 Tex. First Nat. Bank, 41 Minn. 153. Cf. 
 
 146; Johnson v. Merry, 53 Fed. Rep. Gorsuch v. Rutledge, 70 Md. 272. 
 
 569; Lauter v. Simpson, 2 Ind. App. 5 Charleston Ice Mfg. Co. v. Joyce 
 
 293; Hurlbut v. Hurlbut, 63 Vt, 667. (C. C. A.), 54 Fed. Rep. 332; Giles v. 
 
 -'Chicago, etc. Co. v. Debaum, 2 Vandiver (Ga., 1893), 17 S. E. Rep. 
 
 Ind. App. 281. 115; Odell v. Metro. El. R. Co., 22 
 
 3Gunn v. Ohio Riv. Co., 37 W. N. Y. S. 737; Parsons v. New York 
 
 Cent. R. R. Co., 112 N. Y. 355
 
 538 RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. [§ 366. 
 
 is stated, becomes admissible for all legitimate purposes when 
 a farther objection is made and overruled that it is not admis- 
 sible for any purpose. 1 It is discretionary with the court to 
 call either for a distinct statement of the purpose and mate- 
 riality of the evidence, or to let these elements appear from 
 the tenor of the question itself. 2 If the question upon its face 
 clearly calls for evidence which is irrelevant or otherwise in- 
 admissible, the court has the right to rule it out at once, and 
 it may treat the matter as concluded and refuse to listen to 
 counsel in case they attempt to show by argument that the 
 answer which is called for is not incompetent evidence. It is 
 always within the sound discretion of the court to reject oral 
 evidence which is offered under circumstances from which the 
 inference may be drawn that the offer was not made in good 
 faith. 3 Among circumstances which are calculated to excite 
 suspicion is the absence from court of the witness who is ex- 
 pected to give the oral evidence. 
 
 Again, the court may, and perhaps should, require that the 
 evidence shall be offered so that it will not be heard by the 
 jurors, where it is likely that they will be prejudiced thereby 
 in case it is pronounced inadmissible. 4 If, however, the jury 
 are plainly instructed to disregard the evidence which is 
 offered in their hearing if it shall be deemed incompetent, no 
 error is committed by allowing them to hear it as offered, or 
 to be present during the argument upon the question of its 
 admissibility. 5 
 
 An objection to evidence, to be sufficient, should be specific, 
 pointing out clearly to the court the nature of the objection and 
 the particular grounds upon which the rejection of the evidence 
 is sought, or an exception will not be available. 6 A general 
 
 y i Sears v. Starbird, 78 Cal. 225. W. Va. 679; State v. Wood, 53 N. H. 
 
 3 Osgood v. Bauder (Iowa, 1891), 484. 
 
 47 N. W. Rep. 1001; Hathaway v. " 6 Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Walker, 113 
 
 Tinkham, 148 Mass. 85. Ind. 196; Noftsger v. Smith (Ind., 
 
 3 Scotland Co. v. Hill, 112 U. S. 1893), 32 N. E Rep. 1024; Smith v. 
 183; Robinson v. State, 1 Lea (Tenn.), Morrill, 39 Kan. 665; 18 Pac. Rep. 
 673. 915; Carroll v. O'Shea, 21 N. Y. S. 
 
 4 Omaha Coal, etc. Co. v. Fay 956; Godfrey v. Knodle, 44 111. App. 
 (Neb., 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. 211. 638; Brown v. Wakeman, 18 N. Y. 
 
 5 People v.Smith, 104 N. Y. 491 ; 263; Pennsylvania Co. v. Horton, 
 10 N. E. Rep. 873; State v. Cain, 20 132 Ind. 189; Mooney v. Peck, 49 N.
 
 § 366.] 
 
 RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. 
 
 539 
 
 objection that the evidence is "incompetent, immaterial and 
 irrelevant" will not suffice. 1 
 
 Upon an appeal or a motion for a new trial no other objec- 
 tions can be urged than those which were put forward on the 
 trial. 2 A party whose evidence has been rejected must, in 
 order to have a review on appeal, take an exception to the 
 action of the court after a formal tender and objection, which 
 exception should be noted by the judge or by the court ste- 
 nographer for him. The exception should be plainly and spe- 
 cifically stated in the bill of exceptions over the signature of 
 the party or his counsel, and the bill should be examined by 
 the judge, who should also sign it if it is true. 3 
 
 Where an assignment of error is required to be contained 
 in the transcript of the record, in the case on appeal or in 
 the appellant's brief, it must point out the particular erroneous 
 rulings of the trial court on the evidence; for a mere statement 
 that the court erred in overruling all of appellant's objec- 
 
 J. L. 232; Linton v. Allen, 154 Mass. 
 432; Tilley v. Bllvens, 110 N. C. 343 
 Helena v. Albertose, 8 Mont. 499 
 Drew v. Drum, 44 Mo. A pp. 25 
 Briggs v. Jones, 46 Minn. 277 ; Will- 
 iams v. Clink, 90 Mich. 297 ; Hogan 
 v. Shuart, 11 Mont. 498. 
 
 i Stringer v. Frost, 116 Ind. 477; 
 Johnson v. Brown, 130 Ind. 61 ; 
 Churchman v. Kansas City, 49 Mo. 
 App. 366; Alcorn v. Railroad Co., 
 108 Mo. 81 ; Evans. R. Co. v. Fettig, 
 130 Ind. 61 ; Rupert v. Penuer, 35 
 Neb. 587 ; Chicago, etc. Co. v. Beh- 
 mey, 48 Kan. 47. An objection to 
 an expert witness must clearly point 
 out the incompetency of his evi- 
 dence. Mortimer v. Met. E. R. Co., 
 129 N. Y. 84 ; Jefferson v. New York 
 El. R. Co., 132 id. 483. 
 
 2 Bailey v. Chicago, M. etc. Co. 
 (S. D., 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 596; 
 Falk v. Gast Lith. Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 
 890; Whitaker v. White, 69 Hun, 
 258; Wilson v. Railroad Co., 114 N. 
 Y. 487; Haviland v. Man. R. Co., 61 
 Hun, 626; 131 N. Y. 630; Toplitz v. 
 
 Heddens, 146 U. S. 252 ; Little Rock 
 v. Railroad Co., 56 Ark. 495; Chand- 
 ler v. Beal, 132-Ind. 596; Hommedieu 
 v. Railroad Co., 120 Ind. 435. 
 
 3 Hartsock v. Mort, 76 Md. 281; 
 Connell v. O'Neill, 154 Pa. St. 582; 
 Welborn v. Atl. R. Co. (Ga., 1893), 
 17 S. E. Rep. 672. As to the para- 
 mount necessity for a bill of excep- 
 tions, see Brooke v. Tradesmen's 
 Bank, 68 Hun, 129; Cramer v. Akin, 
 49 Mo. App. 163; Pace v. Lanier 
 (Fla., 1893), 13 S. Rep. 363; Spangen- 
 berg v. Charles, 44 111. App. 526; 
 State v. Cent. P. R. R. Co., 17 Nev. 
 259; Whidby Land Co. v. Nye, 5 
 Wash. St. 501 ; Pedrosena v. Hotch- 
 kiss, 95 Cal. 636 ; Bray v. Kemp (Mo., 
 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 220; Lusk v. 
 Parsons, 39 111. App. 380 ; Elmer v. 
 Marsh, 3 Ind. App. 558; Schneider 
 v. Tombling, 34 Neb. 661. The bill 
 of exceptions should contain all the 
 evidence where insufficiency of evi- 
 dence is alleged. Texas, etc. Co. v. 
 Cox, 145 U. S. 593. See, also, note 1, 
 p. 558, post
 
 540 RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. [§ 367. 
 
 tions will not suffice. 1 The evidence itself should be stated 
 and the action of the court thereon clearly described. A party 
 has no right to speculate on the effect of evidence. He should 
 not be permitted to maintain silence in case the inadmissible 
 evidence, which was introduced by his adversary without ob- 
 jection, proves favorable to himself, and move to strike it out 
 if, on the other hand, it turns out more favorably to his ad- 
 versary. Hence, the reception of inadmissible evidence is not 
 ground for a new trial because the jury was not warned to 
 disregard it, unless the party objected promptly when the 
 evidence was offered and took an exception in case his objec- 
 tion was overruled. 2 If evidence is rejected on the trial 
 because it was irrelevant or otherwise improper for the pur- 
 pose for which it was offered, a new trial will not be granted 
 because it has been subsequently discovered that the evidence 
 would have been admissible on other grounds or for another 
 purpose, unless the party who appeals or moves for a new trial 
 shall show that he was not in fault in the matter and that he 
 has been unjustly and substantially prejudiced by its admis- 
 sion. 3 
 
 § 367. Waiver of objections to evidence — Necessity for 
 repeating objections.— Objections to the admission of evi- 
 dence should be promptly made; for if a party is negligent in 
 permitting the evidence to be placed before the jury without 
 making any objection, bis laches may debar him from a new 
 trial, even though he may have moved to suppress it before 
 
 i Weston v. Moody, 29 Fla. 169 ; Graham v. McReynolds, 90 Tenn. 
 
 Union Bldg. Ass'n v. Insurance Co., 673; Haines v. Savies, 93 Mich. 440; 
 
 83 Iowa, 647; Mitchell v. Mitchell, Matson v. Frazer, 48 Mo. App. 302; 
 
 84 Tex. 803; Giboney v. German Ins. Carpenter v. Willey (Vt., 1893), 26 
 Co., 48 Mo. App. 185; Herbert v. Atl. Rep. 488 ; Fleming v. Latham, 
 Duffur (Oreg., 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 48 Kan. 773 ; Crawford v. Anderson, 
 502 ; Robertson v. Coates, 1 Tex. Civ. 129 Ind. 117; O'Connell v. Main 
 App. 664; McElroy v.'Braden, 152 Hotel Co., 90 Cal. 515; Teal v. Bilby, 
 Pa. St. r «8; Reese v. Coffey (Ind., 123 U. S. 572: 8 S. Ct. 239; "Wiggins 
 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 720. v. Guthrie, 101 N. C. 601; Johnston 
 
 2 Cleveland, etc. Co. v. Wynant v. Allen, 100 N. C. 131. 
 (Ind., 1893), 34 N. E. Rep. 569; In re ^Tuomey v. O'Reilly, 22 N. Y. S. 
 
 Gannon's Wills, 2 Misc. Rep. 329; W. 930; Higginbotham v. Campbell 
 
 U.T.Co. v.Lindley,89Ga.484;Deev. (Ga., 1893), 15 S. E. Rep. 797; Haines 
 
 Sharon Hill Acad., 2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. v. Thompson, 2 Misc. Rep. 385; Sul- 
 
 228; Boughton v. Smith, 67 Hun, livan v. Sullivan (Ind., 1893), 32 N. 
 
 652; People v. Cronise, 51 Hun, 489; E. Rep. 1132.
 
 § 3G7.] RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. 541 
 
 trial, as in the case of a deposition which is read to the jury, 1 
 or, where the witness is permitted to answer an immaterial 
 or irrelevant question, he has moved to strike out the answer. 2 
 "Where a witness has testified to certain facts without any ob- 
 jection, an objection to the admission of similar or cumulative 
 evidence from him or from another witness will be deemed 
 waived by the party's silence. 3 On the other hand, where ob- 
 jections to the general competency of the witness, or to the 
 admissibility of his testimon}' in its entirety, or to a certain por- 
 tion of it consisting of similar questions, have been promptly 
 made and overruled, counsel is under no necessity of repeat- 
 ing his objections indefinitely, either to the competency of the 
 witness or to the relevancy or admissibility of any question.? 
 which may be included legitimately in the prior objections. 4 
 The party over whose objection evidence is received should 
 demand an express ruling by the court upon his exception 
 taken thereto, for if no rulings appear upon the record it will 
 be presumed that the party waived his right to take an ex- 
 ception to evidence which he claims was inadmissible. 5 
 
 In conformity with the general rule that objections not 
 promptly made will be deemed to have been waived, it is held 
 that objections to evidence cannot be urged on a trial de novo 
 in an appellate court which were not interposed in the court 
 below. 6 An objection to the reception of evidence may be 
 
 ' Union Pac. Ry. v. Reese, 56 Fed. v. Miller, 89 Ga. 73; Brice v. Miller, 
 
 Rep. 569. 35 S. C. 537. 
 
 2 Cleveland, etc. Co. v. Wynant 4 Gilpin v. Gilpin, 12 Colo. 504; 
 (Ind., 1893), 34 N. E. Rep. 569; Sharon v. Sharon, 79 Cal. 633 ; Whit- 
 Omaha So. Ry. Co. v. Beeson (Neb., ney v. Traynor, 74 Wis. 289; In re 
 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 557; Chandler Eysamon, 113 N. Y. 62. If either 
 v. Beall, 132 Ind. 596 ; Scott v. Metro, party without objection introduce 
 El. R. Co., 21 N. Y. S. 631; Dall- a part of a conversation in evidence, 
 meyer v. Dallmeyer (Pa., 18SS), 16 his adversary will not be considered 
 Atl. Rep. 72; Hughes v. Ward, 38 to have thereby waived his right to 
 Kan. 452; Lewars v. Weaver, 121 object to the residue if the part al- 
 Pa. St. 268. Contra, Jones v. State, ready called out was irrelevant. Peo- 
 118 Ind. 39. pie v. White, 14 Wend. (N. Y) 111. 
 
 3 Pharo v. Beadleston, 21 N. Y. S. 5 Shroder v. Webster (Iowa, 1892), 
 989; Denver & R. G. Co. v. Morri- 55 N. W. Rep. 569; Taliaferro v. Lee 
 son (Colo., 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 859; (Ala., 1893), 13 S. Rep. 125; Burdin 
 Shrimpton v. Philbrick (Minn., 1S93), v. Trenton (Mo., 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 
 55 N. W. Rep. 551 ; Bank v. Innaan 728. 
 
 {Ind., 1893), 34 N. E. Rep. 21; Payne 6 The cases are very numerous.
 
 542 
 
 RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§ 368. 
 
 waived by the party who has objected to it introducing evi- 
 dence by his own witnesses bearing upon the same fact or 
 transaction to which the objectionable evidence related. 1 But 
 cross-examining the adverse witness who has given the objec- 
 tionable evidence is not a waiver. 2 Thus where a party, after 
 objecting that his witness was not properly examined to lay a 
 foundation for showing contradictory statements, recalls the 
 witness and proceeds to examine him as regards the same 
 statements, he waives the objection. 3 
 
 § 368. Motions to strike out evidence.— If a party's ob- 
 jection to evidence is overruled, or in case evidence is received 
 upon the strength of a promise by the party that he will 
 show its relevancy, and he fails to do so, and in certain cir- 
 cumstances if the party, being without fault, has failed to 
 object before the witness has answered, he should move to 
 strike out the answer, stating specifically the grounds upon 
 which his motion to strike out is based. His failure to move 
 to strike out will deprive him of his right to urge the errone- 
 ous admission of the evidence on an appeal. 4 The motion 
 
 The following may be cited: Brown 
 v. Foster, 20 S. W. Rep. 611; 112 
 Mo. 297; Paine v. Trask, 56 Fed. 
 Rep. 233 ; West Side Bank v. Meehan, 
 66 Hun, 627; Van Kamen v. Roes, 
 65 Hun, 625 ; Rupert v. Penner, 35 
 Neb. 587; id. 803; 53 N. W. Rep. 
 892 ; Wilkinson v. Ward, 42 111. App. 
 541; Chicago v. Edson, 43 id. 417; 
 Brand v. Servass, 11 Mont. 86; 
 Barnes v. Scott, 29 Fla. 285 ; Benner 
 v. Dredging Co., 134 N. Y. 456; Mer- 
 rill v. Floyd, 2 C. C. A. 58. 
 
 1 Doyle v. Kansas City Ry. Co. 
 (Mo., 1893), 20 S. W. Rep. 970. 
 
 2 Pugh v. Ayres, 47 Mo. App. 490. 
 
 3 Gaff ney v. People, 50 N. Y. 423 ; 
 People v. Weldon, 111 N. Y. 596. 
 
 4 Pennsylvania, etc. Co. v. Cook, 
 123 Pa. St. 170; Link v. Sheldon, 136 
 N. Y. 1 ; Doren v. Jelliffe, 20 N. Y. 
 S. 636; Payne v. Dicus (Iowa, 1893), 
 55 N. W. Rep. 483; Tuoraey v. 
 O'Reilly, 22 N. Y. S. 930; Cleveland, 
 etc. Co. v. Aherns, 42 111. App. 434; 
 
 Riche v. Martin, 20 N. Y. S. 693; 
 Flynn v. Manhattan Co., 20 id. 652; 
 Vannatta v. Duffy (Ind., 1893), 30 
 N. E. Rep. 807 ; Partridge v. Russell, 
 50 Hun, 601 ; 2 N. Y. S. 529; Turner 
 v. Newberg, 109 N. Y. 301 ; Reiley 
 v. Haynes, 38 Kan., 259; Delamater 
 v. Prudential L. Ins. Co. , 5 N. Y. S. 
 586 ; Kilpatrick v. Dean, 4 N. Y. S. 
 708. In some states it is held that 
 where no objection has been made 
 to the reception of incompetent evi- 
 dence, the court is not bound to 
 order it to be stricken out, but may, 
 on request, direct the jury to disre- 
 gard the objectionable evidence. 
 But it is also held in the same juris- 
 diction that the court may strike 
 evidence of its own motion ; and 
 where incompetent evidence has 
 been stricken out it is not error for 
 the court to omit to direct the jury 
 to disregard such evidence, though, 
 if requested, this instruction should 
 be given, and, even in the absence of
 
 § 368.] RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. 543 
 
 should be confined strictly to that portion of the testimony 
 which is objectionable, and the denial of a general motion to 
 strike out all the witness has said will be sustained on appeal 
 where a part of his evidence was clearly admissible. 1 A mo- 
 tion to strike out, made after all the evidence is in, comes 
 too late; 2 nor is such a motion proper upon the sole ground 
 of the insufficiency of evidence, the proper remedy being a 
 demurrer or a motion to direct a verdict. 3 If the evidence 
 which is given by the witness is irresponsive, 4 or irrelevant, 5 
 or if it appears that he has no knowledge of the matter 6 upon 
 which he is interrogated, a denial of a motion to strike out is 
 reversible error. So, also, when by consent the cross-exam- 
 ination of a material witness is suspended on his promise that 
 he will attend for further cross-examination when he is wanted, 
 it is error, for which a new trial should be granted, for the 
 court to refuse to strike out his testimony if he fails to appear 
 as promised. 7 
 
 A motion to strike out is properly denied where the sole 
 ground on which it is* based is the unfavorable character of 
 an answer which a party has elicited from his own witness in 
 reply to a relevant and proper question. 8 
 
 any request, it is the better practice 3 Wilcox v. Stephenson, 30 Fla. 
 
 for the court to do so. Platner v. 377. 
 
 Platner. 78 N. Y. 90 ; Gall v. Gall, * See § 336 ; Stillwell v. Patton, 108 
 
 114 N. Y. 109. Mo. 352. 
 
 ' Fleming v. Shepherd, 83 Ga. 338 ; 5 Williams v. Klink, 90 Mich. 297 ; 
 
 Davis v. Hopkins (Col., 1893), 32 Pac. Chester v. Bakersfield, 64 Cal. 42; 
 
 Rep. 70 ; Waymire v. Lank, 121 Gainard v. Rochester City R. R. Co. , 
 
 Ind. 1 ; Moore v. McDonald, 68 Md. 2 N. Y. S. 470. 
 
 321; Wilson v. Equitable Gas Co., 6 Bishop v. Hendrickson, 16 N. Y. 
 
 152 Pa. St. 566; Miller v. Windsor S. 799; Bronson v. Leach, 42 N. W. 
 
 W. Co., 148 Pa. St. 429; Buford v. Rep. 174; 74 Mich. 713. 
 
 Shannon (Ala., 1893), 10 S. Rep. 263; ? Mathews v. Mathews, 53 Hun, 
 
 Carrico v. West Vir., etc. Co., 35 W. 244; 6 N. Y. S. 589. 
 
 Va. 689; Roberts v. Burgess, 85 Ala. 8 East Tenn. etc. Co. v. Turvaville 
 
 192; Binford v. Young, 115 Ind. (Ala., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 63; Central 
 
 174; Bamford v. Iron Co., 33 Fed. R. & Banking Co. v. Ingram (Ala., 
 
 Rep. 677. 1893), 12 S. Rep. 801 ; Smith v. 
 
 2 Kansas, etc. Co. v. Phillips (Ala., Zeigler, 63 Hun, 624; Silberstein v. 
 
 1893), 13 S. Rep. 265; Falvey v. Houston, W., St. & P. F. R. Co., 4 
 
 Jackson, 132 Ind. 176; Overby v. N. Y. S. 843. 
 Chesa. & O. R. Co., 37 W. Va. 524.
 
 544 
 
 RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§ 369. 
 
 § 309. The improper admission of evidence, when imma- 
 terial,— 1 If it is clearly shown beyond all doubt that the evi- 
 dence which has been improperly admitted did not and could 
 not have had any possible effect upon the jury because of its 
 admission, a new trial should not be granted. 1 The irrelevancy 
 or immateriality of evidence which was admitted is not ground 
 for a new trial if its admission is not affirmatively shown to 
 have influenced the verdict. 2 So it has been laid down as a 
 general rule that if the verdict is rendered upon a preponder- 
 ance of sufficient, satisfactory or uncontradicted relevant and 
 competent evidence, it is never material how much irrelevant 
 or otherwise incompetent or inadmissible evidence has been 
 received. 3 
 
 1 Williams v. Fresno Canal & Irr. 
 Co.. 30 Pac. Rep. 961; 96 Cal. 14; 
 Van Kamen v. Roes, 65 Hun, 625 ; 
 Indianapolis Cabinet Co. v. Herrnian 
 (Ind., 1893), 34 N. E. Rep. 579; Mitch- 
 ell v. Bradstreet Co. (Mo., 1893), 22 
 S. W. Rep. 724 , Montross v. Eddy, 53 
 N. W. Rep. 916; 94 Mich. 100; 
 Angell v. Hill, 18 N. Y. S. 824; Cas- 
 sin v. La Salle County, 21 S. W. Rep. 
 122; ITex. Civ. App. 127; Reed v. 
 Stapp, 52 Fed. Rep. 641 ; 3 C. C. A. 
 244 ; 9 U. S. App. 34 ; Smith v. Sun 
 Pub. Co., 55 Fed. Rep. 240; Grun- 
 diesv. Kelso, 41 111. App. 200; North 
 Chicago, etc. Co. v. Cook, 43 id. 634 ; 
 Peck v. Hutchison (Iowa, 1893), 55 
 N. W. Rep. 511; Wayne v. Blun 
 (Ga., 1893), 17 S. E. Rep. 288. 
 
 2 People v. Duffie, 62 Mich. 487; 
 Dibble v. Dimick, 23 N. Y. S. 680; 
 4 Misc. Rep. 190; Foster v. Oldham, 
 23 N. Y. S. 1024; 4 Misc. Rep. 201. 
 So permitting an incompetent wit- 
 ness to testify is not error where 
 his evidence is wholly cumulative. 
 Travis v. Continental Ins. Co., 47 
 Mo. App. 472; Chicago, etc. Co. v. 
 Bivans (111., 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 456; 
 Reed v. New, 39 Kan. 727: Con- 
 nor v. City of New York, 19 N. 
 
 Y. S. 85; Dawson v. Schloss, 93 
 Cal. 194; 29 Pac. Rep. 31; Phoenix 
 Ins. Co. of London v. Freedman 
 (Tex., 1893), 19 S. W. Rep. 1010; In 
 re Gannon's Will, 21 N. Y. S. 960; 
 Larson v. Lombard Inv. Co. (Minn., 
 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 179; Miller v. 
 James (Iowa, 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 
 227; Lane v. Lane (Mo., 1893), 21 
 S. W. Rep. 99. 
 
 3 Wolfe v. Underwood (Ala., 1893), 
 12 S. Rep. 234; Keely v. Andrew* 
 (Colo., 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 175. The ad- 
 mission of the evidence of an expert, 
 who was incompetent, upon a ques- 
 tion of value is not error when his 
 estimate was lower than the verdict 
 recovered. Bramble v. Hunt, 68 
 Hun, 204. The admission of irrele- 
 vant evidence is not error if no 
 finding is based on it (In re Coun- 
 tryman's Estate, 151 Pa. St. 577; 25 
 Atl. Rep. 146; 31 W. N. C. 148; Ca- 
 hill v. Murphy, 30 Pac. . Rep. 195; 
 94 Cal. 129; Harrington v. Harring- 
 ton, 154 Mass. 517; Alcorn v. Chi- 
 cago & A. R. Co., 108 Mo. 81; 18 
 S. W. Rep. 188; Theodorsen v. Ahl- 
 gren, 37 111. App. 140), or if the rec- 
 ord does not show that it was sub- 
 mitted or read to the jury. In re
 
 § 370.] 
 
 RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. 
 
 545 
 
 Again, as respects the proof of particular facts considered 
 apart from the question of a preponderance of the evidence 
 in the whole case, it has been held that the admission of in- 
 competent evidence tending to prove such facts is not reversi- 
 ble error where they were admitted or have been proved by 
 satisfactory evidence of a different description. 1 Thus the 
 exclusion or admission of evidence to prove any particular 
 facts, the truth of which is admitted by either party in his 
 pleadings, is immaterial. 2 
 
 The admission of irrelevant, immaterial or otherwise inad- 
 missible evidence in a trial by the court without a jury, though 
 perhaps improper, is not ground for reversal on an appeal, the 
 theory of the law being that the court will not permit itself 
 to be influenced in its findings of fact by such incompetent 
 evidence. 3 
 
 § 370. The improper exclusion of evidence, when imma- 
 terial. — The improper rejection or exclusion of competent 
 evidence by the court in a jury trial is no ground for reversal 
 
 Westerfield, 96 Cal. 113; 30 Pac. 
 Rep. 1104. 
 
 1 Connor v. City of New York, 19 
 N. Y. S. 85; 64 Hun, 635; Symes 
 v. Exchange Bank, 48 Kan. 713; 
 Vulcanite Paving Co. v. Euch, 147 
 Pa. St. 251 ; 25 Atl. Eep. 555 ; Phoe- 
 nix Ins. Co. v. Pickel, 3 Ind. App. 
 332; 29 N. E. Eep. 432; Dawson 
 v. Schloss, 93 Cal. 194; Stanton 
 v. Esty Mfg. Co., 90 Mich. 12; 51 
 N. W. Eep. 101 ; Eeid v. New York, 
 N. H. & H. E. Co., 63 Hun, 630; 
 Searles v. State, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. Eep. 
 331 ; Eastis v. Montgomery, 93 Ala. 
 293; McKay v. Eiley, 135 El. 586; 
 People v. Fong Ah Sing, 70 Cal. 8; 
 Pensacola, etc. Co. v. Anderson, 26 
 Fla. 425 ; State v. Conable, 81 Iowa, 
 60; Hunter v. McElhanney, 48 Mo. 
 App. 234; McGarry v. Averill, 50 
 Kan. 362; Montgomery v. Hinds 
 (Ind., 1893), 33 N. E. Eep. 1100; 
 Grout v. Cottrell, 67 Hun, 650? 
 Dorsheimer v. Glenn, 51 Fed. Eep. 
 404; 2 C. C. A. 309; 4 U. S. App. 
 35 
 
 500; Seligman v. Eogers (Mo., 1893), 
 21 S. W. Eep. 94; Greer v. Laws, 56 
 Ark. 37. Thus the admission as 
 evidence of a memorandum used to 
 refresh the memory of a witness, 
 who then testifies fully to all the 
 matters referred to in the memo- 
 randum, is not erroneous. Butler v. 
 Chicago, etc. Co. (Iowa, 1893), 54 
 N. W. Eep. 208. 
 
 2 Hartman v. Louisville, etc. Co., 
 48 Mo. App. 619; Bosenbaum v. 
 Eussell, 53 N. W. Eep. 384 ; 35 Neb. 
 513; Consaul v. Sheldon, 52 N. W. 
 Eep. 1104; 35 Neb. 247; Greenspau 
 v. American Star Order, 20 N. Y. 
 S. 945; Heinlein v. Heilbron (Cal., 
 1893), 31 Pac. Eep. 838. 
 
 3 Markell v. Mathews (Colo., 1893), 
 32 Bac. Eep. 176 ; St. Louis, A. & T. 
 Co. v. Turner, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 625; 
 Baker v. Smith (Ga., 1893), 15 S. E. 
 Eep. 788; Kleiman v. Geiselman 
 (Mo., 1893), 21 S. W. Eep. 796; 
 Laumeier v. Gehner, 110 Mo. 122; 
 White v. White, 82 Cal. 427 ; Eat-
 
 510 KEOEPTION OF EVIDENCE. [§ 370, 
 
 where it would not, if admitted, have resulted in bringing 
 about a different verdict than was rendered. If the probative 
 force of the excluded evidence is very slight, or if its credi- 
 bility is doubtful, or its relevancy so remote that it is very 
 clear that it would not have affected the result in case it had 
 been permitted to go to the jury, it exclusion, though im- 
 proper, is not reversible error, as neither party is prejudiced 
 thereby. 1 If, however, the exclusion of the competent evi- 
 dence resulted in preventing the case from going to the jury, 
 or if the evidence was thereby caused so to preponderate in 
 favor of the successful party that the verdict as rendered by 
 the jury was the direct result of keeping the competent evi- 
 dence from their consideration, then a serious injustice has 
 been done, and the party who is prejudiced by the erroneous 
 ruling of the court should have a new trial. 2 But an erroneous 
 ruling by which competent and material evidence is excluded 
 will always be deemed cured by its subsequent admission be- 
 fore the verdict is rendered. 3 If the evidence is excluded on 
 the direct examination of the witness, the error is cured when 
 it is subsequently elicited during his cross-examination. 
 
 cliffe v. County Court, 36 W. Va. Tuomey v. O'Reilly, 22 N. Y. S. 930 ; 
 
 202. 3 Misc. Rep. 302. 
 
 1 Doll v. People (111., 1893), 34 . N. 2 McNarnara v. Corp. of New 
 
 E. Rep. 413; Dexter v. Harrison (111., Melleray (Iowa, 1892), 55 N. W. Rep. 
 
 1893), 34 id. 46; Stevenson v. Gun- 322; Haines v. Thompson, 21 N. Y. 
 
 ning, 25 Atl. Rep. 697; 64 Vt. 601; S. 991; 2 Misc. Rep. 385. 
 
 Higginbothani v. Campbell (Ga., 3 Gregory v. Coleman (Tex. , 1893), 
 
 1893), 15 S. E. Rep. 797; Smith v. 22 S. W. Rep. 181; Carpenter v. 
 
 Mott, 65 Hun, 625 ; Good v. Knox, Knapp, 66 Hun, 632 ; McKenzie v. 
 
 64 Vt. 97; Barnes v. Denslow, 9 N. Oregon Imp. Co., 5 Wash. St. 409; 
 
 Y. S. 53; Tischler v. Apple, 30 Fla. Chicago, etc. Co. v. Wedel(Ill., 1893), 
 
 132 ; Taylor v. Dominick, 36 S. C. 32 N. E. Rep. 547 ; Smalley v. Ful- 
 
 368; Abbott v. Petersburgh Granite lerton (Iowa, 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. 
 
 Quarry Co., 62 Hun, 622 ; Hunnicutt 520 ; Tenn. Riv. Transp. Co. v. Kava- 
 
 v. Railroad Co. (Ga., 1890), 11 S. E. naugh (Ala., 1893), 13 S. Rep. 283; 
 
 Rep. 580. No error is committed by Pharo v. Beadleston, 21 N. Y. S. 
 
 the exclusion of evidence which is 989; 2 Misc. Rep. 424; St. Kevin 
 
 competent to fix liability on a de- Mining Co. v. Isaacs (Colo., 1893), 32 
 
 fendant against whom the action is Pac. Rep. 822 ; Hamilton v. Rich 
 
 dismissed on other valid grounds Hill Coal Mining Co., 108 Mo. 364; 
 
 where such evidence is wholly irrele- 18 S. W. Rep. 977 ; Minnesota S. Ag. 
 
 vant as to the other defendants Soc. v. Swanson, 48 Minn. 231 ; Jer- 
 
 against whom judgment is rendered, man v. Tenneas, 44 La. Ann. 620; 
 
 Kelly v. Insurance Co., 82 Iowa, 137.
 
 § 371.] RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. 54:7 
 
 § 371. Nature and use of stipulations as regards evidence. 
 
 A stipulation is an agreement between counsel usually required 
 by statute to be in writing 1 and to be entered upon the minutes 
 of the court, 2 respecting the carrying on of a case which is in 
 litigation in court. When a stipulation, voluntarily entered 
 into by the parties or by their counsel, is committed to writing 
 and filed with the clerk of the court, it becomes a part of the 
 record, is irrevocable, and both parties are conclusively bound 
 thereby to the same extent and on the same principles as by 
 any other matter constituting an estoppel of record. 3 But a 
 stipulation is not binding on persons who became parties to 
 the action after it was entered into by the original parties, 4 
 nor will the stipulation be held to estop infant parties unless 
 it is ratified by the court upon affirmative proof that it is not 
 prejudicial to them. 5 
 
 Yery frequently, for the purpose of saving time and expense, 
 when a witness is ill or out of the jurisdiction so that his evi- 
 dence can only be obtained by a commission, or where the point 
 to be proved is collateral, immaterial or uncontradicted, a stip- 
 ulation is entered into that the witness will testify to certain 
 facts set forth therein, or that the point in question shall be 
 admitted as proved. In the former case the fact that the ab- 
 sent witness appears in court after the party's case is closed,* 5 
 or the fact that the deposition of the witness subsequently 
 procured is inconsistent with the statement of his evidence 
 contained in the stipulation, does not give the adverse party 
 
 1 Taylor v. Chicago, etc. Co., 80 Idaho, 1174. A stipulation as to evi- 
 
 Iowa, 431 ; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. dence which is filed in one action is 
 
 v. King (Tex., 1891), 16 S. W. Rep. admissible as evidence in a subse- 
 
 641. quent action between the same par- 
 
 2 Garrigan v. Dickey (Ind. App., ties, though not specially pleaded 
 
 1891), 27 N. E. Rep. 713. by the party who offers it. Cou- 
 
 3 Kenton Ins. Co. v. First Nat. brough v. Adams, 70 Cal. 374; 11 
 
 Bank (Ky., 1892), 19 S. W. Rep. 841; Pac. Rep. 634. 
 
 City of Chicago v. Drexel (111., 1892), * Kneeland v. Luce, 141 U. S. 437 ; 
 
 30 N. E. Rep. 774; Whalen v. Bren- Midland R. Co. v. Island Coal Co., 
 
 nan, 34 Neb. 129 ; 51 N. W. Rep. 759 ; 126 Ind. 384. 
 
 Worsham v. McLeod (Miss., 1892), 11 5 Eidam v. Finnegan, 48 Minn. 53; 
 
 S. Rep. 107 ; Dilworth v. Curts, 29 50 N. W. Rep. 933. 
 
 N. E. Rep. 8G1; 139 111. 508; Amer. 6 Harris v. McArthur (Ga., 1893), 
 
 Bank Note Co. v. Man. Ry. Co., 66 15 S. E. Rep. 758. 
 Hun, 627; Mahoney v. Marshall, 2
 
 548 EE0EPTI0N OF EVIDENCE. [§ 371. 
 
 a right to claim that the latter shall be disregarded, 1 or de- 
 prive the party in whose behalf the evidence is offered of 
 his right to use it. Though it has sometimes been laid down 
 as a rule that a stipulation ought to be construed most strictly 
 against the party for whose benefit it was made, 2 yet such an 
 agreement should receive a liberal and reasonable construe- 
 tion by the court, so as to bring about the apparent intention 
 of the parties and to aid in the expeditious administration of 
 justice. 3 So it has been held that parol evidence is inadmis- 
 sible to vary the terms of a stipulation, but that the court 
 should gather its meaning from the whole instrument viewed 
 in the liirht of all the circumstances in the case. 4 
 
 Where a party has entered into a stipulation that evidence 
 which has been given in a prior proceeding by witnesses who 
 may be unable to attend shall be used in a pending trial, he 
 does not waive his rights under it, in case any witness is sub- 
 sequently unable to attend, by calling one of these witnesses 
 who may be in court. 5 Where documentary evidence has 
 been lost and the parties enter into a stipulation that a cer- 
 tain mode of proof shall be adopted in lieu thereof, a substan- 
 tial compliance with the mode agreed on is all that can be 
 required, and proof as made will not be rejected because not 
 precisely identical in time, place or manner with that which 
 has been stipulated for. 6 Any stipulation entered into by 
 
 i Dickerson v. Mathewson, 50 Fed. 4 Schroeder v. Fry, 12 N. Y. S. 625. 
 
 Rep. 73. 5 Foster's Ex'r v. Dickinson, 64 Vt. 
 
 2 Heller v. Petterson, 3 N. Y. S. 257 ; 233; 24 Atl. Rep. 253. Astipulation 
 
 18 N. Y. State Rep. 928. that evidence given in one case may 
 
 3 Lally v. Rossman, 82 Wis. 147; be read "on the trial" of another 
 
 51 N. W. Rep. 1132; People v. Cooper, case means on any trial, whether 
 
 139 111. 461; 29 N. E. Rep. 872; Mackay first or second (Herbst v. Vacuum 
 
 v. Armstrong (Tex., 1892), 19 S. W. Oil Co., 68 Hun, 222); though by 
 
 Rep. 463 ; Keator v. Colo. Coal & signing such a stipulation the party 
 
 Iron Co. (Colo., 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. does not waive his right to object to 
 
 857; Davidson v. Felder (Tex., 1893), evidence which, though competent 
 
 21 S. W. Rep. 714; Schroeder v. in the early trial, is not competent 
 
 Frey, 114 N. Y. 266; Blossom v. in the later. Bridgham's Appeal, 
 
 Griffin, 13 N. Y. 569 ; Field v. Mun- 82 Me. 323. Contra, Thompson v. 
 
 son, 47 id. 221 ; Springsteen v. Samp- Thompson (Ala., 1891), 8 S. Rep. 419. 
 
 son, 32 id. 703 ; Calkins v. Falk, 39 6 Crow v. Gleason, 20 N. Y. S. 590 ; 
 
 Barb. 620; Otis v. Conway, 114 N. Y. 65 Hun, 625. But c/. Keator v. Col- 
 
 113; Rogers v. Kneeland, 10 Wend, orado, etc. Co. (Colo., 1893), 32 Pac. 
 
 219. Rep. 857.
 
 § 372.] KECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. 549 
 
 the parties which is equitable and fair to both, which is 
 reasonable in itself and does not contravene public polic}'' or 
 good morals, will be binding on the court. 1 If a stipulation 
 is tainted with fraud, or if it has been entered into by counsel 
 without his client's consent, or improvidently or unadvisedly, 2 
 as w T hen, for example, by mistaking the legal effect of the 
 agreement, the counsel admits as true material facts which 
 are not so. and this would prevent a trial of the case on its 
 merits, it will be disregarded. 3 So if the stipulation is framed 
 in such a manner that the interest of a party is likely to suf- 
 fer because of the fraud, collusion or unfairness which has 
 been practiced, it is within the discretion of the court to cause 
 it to be set aside. 4 
 
 § 372. Demurrer to evidence. — The defendant, by demur- 
 ring to the evidence of the plaintiff, is considered to admit its 
 truth. So the plaintiff is then entitled to all favorable infer- 
 ences which may reasonably and fairly be drawn from the 
 evidence, whether the facts which constitute his evidence 
 were elicited by direct or by cross-examination. 5 But a de- 
 murrer serves rather as an objection to the competency of the 
 evidence than to its sufficiency and weight; and if, in the 
 opinion of the court, there is evidence sufficient to go to 
 the jury, it is its duty to overrule the demurrer. 6 
 
 1 Matter of N. Y., L. & W. R. R. strongly against him ; and such con- 
 Co., 93 N. Y. 447; Hong Kong & elusions as a jury may justifiably 
 Shanghai Banking Co. v. Cooper, draw the court ought to draw." 
 114 N. Y. 388. Pawling v. United States, 4 Cranch, 
 
 2 Sperb v. Railroad Co., 57 Hun, 221. See, also, Nuzum v. Pitts- 
 
 588. burgh, C. & St. L. R. Co., 30 W. Va. 
 
 3 Ward v. Clay, 82 Cal. 502. 228. 
 
 * Stonesifer v. Kilburn, 94 Cal. 33 ; 6 Shaw v. County Court, 30 W. Va. 
 
 Powell v. Turner, 139 Mass. 97. 488 ; 4 S. E. Rep. 430 ; Hartman v. 
 
 SHawley v. Dawson, 16 Oreg. 344; Cin. etc. Co. (Iud., 1893), 30 N. E. 
 Hopkins v. Bowers, 111 N. C. 175; Rep. 930; Pitt v. Texas Storage Co. 
 City of St. Louis v. Missouri Pac. R. (Tex., 1893), 18 S. W. Rep. 465; Ben- 
 Co. (Mo., 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 202; ninghof v. Cubbison, 45 Kan. 621. 
 Healey v. Simpson (Mo., 1893), 20 S. "A demurrer to plaintiff's evidence 
 W. Rep, 8S1 (in equity). "The de- admits the facts the evidence tends 
 murrant admits the truth of the to prove. The court is to make 
 testimony, and such conclusions as every inference of fact in favor of 
 the jury may fairly draw, but not the plaintiff which a jury might in- 
 forced and violent inferences. The fer. If then the evidence is insufli- 
 testimony is to be taken most cient to support a verdict in his
 
 550 RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. [§ 373. 
 
 In a criminal prosecution, where the accused has once 
 pleaded not guilty, the state may hold him to his election of 
 a jury trial and refuse to permit a demurrer to the evidence; 
 and even if it shall join issue on the demurrer, the matter is 
 wholly in the discretion of the court, who may refuse to en- 
 tertain the plea. 1 
 
 § 373. Surprise. — By surprise is meant the introduction 
 of evidence at the trial which causes such a variance between 
 the allegations and the proofs that the adverse party is mis- 
 led in maintaining his action or defense on the merits. 2 A 
 party who has thus been surprised must move for- a new 
 trial, which should be granted if the variance was material 
 and the party was unjustly treated. 3 To warrant a court in 
 setting aside judicial proceedings, which are prima facie fair 
 and regular, upon the ground of surprise, it must have been 
 a legal surprise, and the party alleging it must himself have 
 been wholly without fault. 4 
 
 The fact that relevant evidence is introduced at the trial 
 which a party did not expect would be introduced, 5 or which 
 he is for any reason unprepared to rebut, does not constitute 
 surprise in its technical sense. If the evidence does not give 
 rise to a material variance between the allegation and the 
 proof, so that a new cause of action or a new defense is sub- 
 stituted for the original cause or defense, there is no surprise 
 for which a new trial will be granted. Where the party goes 
 to trial without sufficient preparation, or fails to examine 
 witnesses, or is unable to produce evidence upon some point 
 entirely within and relevant to the issue, to meet the unex- 
 pected evidence of his adversary, he must abide the conse- 
 
 favor, the demurrer should be sus- 29 Pac. Rep. 1044; Tittman v. Thorn- 
 
 tained." Donohue v. St. Louis, etc. ton, 107 Mo. 500; Griffin v. O'Neill, 
 
 R. Co., 91 Mo. 360. 47 Kan. 116. A new trial will not 
 
 Duncan v. State (Fla., 1892), 10 be granted because the successful 
 
 S. Rep. 815. party perjured himself on a mate- 
 
 2 Nash v. Town, 5 Wall. 698 ; An- rial point if his adversary, knowing 
 derson's Law Diet. See ante, §§22-24. the true facts, was unprepared to 
 
 3 Kenezleber v. Wahl, 92 Cal. 202 ; prove them. Randall v. Packard, 
 Texas, etc. Co. v. Barron, 78 Tex. 20 N. Y. S. 718. 
 
 421; 14 S. W. Rep. 698. 5 Bingham v. Walk, 128 Tnd. 164; 
 
 *Lockwood v. Rose, 125 Ind. 588; Shotwell v. McElhenny, 101 Mo. 677. 
 O'Donnell v. Bennett (Mont, 1892),
 
 § 374.] RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. 551 
 
 quences of his own laches; and though in its discretion tho 
 court may grant delay, he cannot claim a new trial because 
 he has been surprised. 1 So the mere absence of material wit- 
 nesses does not give the party a right to claim that he is sur- 
 prised so as to obtain a new trial, particularly if their absence 
 is the fault of the party, or if he has failed to ask for delay to 
 procure their attendance. 2 
 
 §374. Rebutting evidence — Nature and use of. — The 
 primary significance of the word "rebut" is to contradict or 
 oppose. From this word is derived " rebuttal," which is fre- 
 quently used as equivalent to the order and time in which 
 evidence that is intended to contradict other evidence is to be 
 introduced. Thus we speak of evidence "on" or "in" rebut- 
 tal. 3 
 
 "Kebutting evidence" sometimes signifies any evidence 
 which is conclusive, which will overcome a presumption or 
 outweigh other evidence. Again, the expression may mean 
 only evidence which contradicts. In the one case the effect 
 of the rebutting evidence is to avoid the operation of a pre- 
 sumption of law or of fact. In the other the result is to de- 
 stroy by explanation or denial the effect of affirmative evidence 
 already adduced. 4 What evidence shall be received in rebut- 
 tal is, as we have seen, largely discretionary with the court. 3 
 If the evidence which is offered is such that a party should 
 have properly introduced it in making out his original cause 
 of action or his defense, it is not error for the court to reject 
 it if he seeks to introduce it under the guise of rebutting 
 evidence. 6 But this principle should not be pushed too far ; 
 
 i Davidson v. Wheeler, 17 R. I. Fain v. Cornett, 25 Ga. 186 ; People 
 
 433 ; Hartnian v. Journal, 19 N. Y. S. v. Page, 1 Idaho, 194 ; Butterfield v. 
 
 401; Dillingham v. Flack, 63 Hun, Gilchrist, 63 Minn. 155; State v. 
 
 629; Jinks v. Lewis, 89 Ga. 787; Claire, 41 La. Ann. 1067; Collins v. 
 
 Crowell v. Harvey, 30 Neb. 570; Glass, 46 Mo. App. 297. 
 
 Francisco v. Benepe, 6 Mont. 243; 5 See § 375. 
 
 Smith & Keating Implement Co. v. « Young v. Brady, 94 Cal. 128 ; 29 
 
 Wheeler, 27 Mo. App. 16. Pac. Rep. 489 ; Belden v. Allen, 61 
 
 2 Brady v. Valentine, 21 N. Y. S. Conn. 173; Shearer v. Middleton, 88 
 776; 3 Misc. Rep. 19; Cassiano v. Mich. 621; 50 N. W. Rep. 737; 
 Straus, 23 N. Y. S. 1036; Leonard Chateaugay Ore & Iron Co. v. Blake, 
 v. German F. Ins. Co., 23 id. 6S4. 144 U. S. 476; O'Connell v. People, 
 
 3 See Anderson's Law Diet 87 N. Y. 377. 
 * Anderson's Law Diet. , citing
 
 552 RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. [§ 374. 
 
 nor is the rule applied with much strictness. Evidence which 
 is corroborative or cumulative of other evidence already offered 
 by a party, but which does not at the same time contradict 
 any affirmative adverse evidence or tend to overthrow any 
 presumption, is not admissible in rebuttal. But the mere fact 
 that certain evidence has, or may have, a tendency to corrob- 
 orate other evidence which the party has introduced to sub- 
 stantiate his cause of action so that it could more appropri- 
 ately have been introduced as evidence in chief, does not 
 necessarily render it inadmissible in rebuttal. The party 
 should not be deprived of his right to contradict and weaken 
 the evidence of his opponent because the only means available 
 consists of evidence which he might have used to confirm and 
 strengthen his original case. 1 So, though the introduction of 
 cumulative evidence is not to be encouraged, such evidence 
 has often been held to be admissible in rebuttal where one's 
 witness has been directly contradicted as to some material 
 fact in issue. Here the party may introduce another witness 
 to testify to the same fact as the witness whose evidence was 
 contradicted. 2 
 
 Where the office of rebutting evidence is to overcome a 
 presumption, evidence of a fact which was irrelevant or inad- 
 missible on the direct examination may be introduced in re- 
 buttal to overcome a presumption created by the adverse 
 party's evidence. 3 This evidence which is offered in rebuttal, 
 though it may not have been competent because of its irrele- 
 vancy or for some other reason as evidence-in-chief to support 
 
 i State v. Magoon, 50 Vt. 333. 368; Branstetter v. Morgan (N. D., 
 
 2 Green v. Gould, 3 Allen (Mass.), 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. 758; Zacharie 
 465; Sherwood v. Titman, 55 Pa. St. v. Franklin, 12 Pet. 151; Southern 
 77; Rorner v. Center (Minn., 1893), Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rauh, 49 Fed. Rep. 
 54 N. W. Rep. 1052; Kansas City, 696; 1 C. C. A. 416; Miner v. Baron, 
 etc. R. R. Co. v. McDonald, 51 Fed. 30 N. E. Rep. 481; 131 N. Y. 677; 
 Rep. 278; 2 C. C. A. 153; Cogswell Schott v. Youree (111., 1892), 31 N. E. 
 v. West St. & N. E. Elev. Ry. Co., 3 Rep. 591 ; Brunei- v. Wade (Iowa, 
 Pac. Rep. 411; 5 Wash. St. 446; 1892), 51 N. W. Rep. 251; Hopkins 
 East Tenn. etc. Co. v. Hesters (Ga., v. Bowers, 111 N. C. 175; Louisville. 
 1893), 15 S. E. Rep. 828; Waterman etc. Co. v. Crayton, 69 Miss. 152; 
 v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 52 N. W. Medlin v. Wilkins, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 
 Rep. 247; 82 Wis. 613. 465; Sheahan v. National S. S. Co., 
 
 3 Winslow v. State, 92 Ala. 78 ; 66 Hun, 48. 
 First Nat. Bank v. Clark, 134 N. Y.
 
 § 375.] RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. 553 
 
 the case of the party, has been rendered competent by the ac- 
 tion of the adverse party. 1 So, where a party brings out a 
 part of a conversation, his adversary should in fairness be 
 allowed in rebuttal to elicit the residue from the witness, to 
 explain the earlier portion or rebut any adverse inferences or 
 presumptions which may be drawn therefrom by the jurors. 2 
 
 § 375. Order of proof — Evidence offered by the party 
 after he rests. — The party who has the right to open and 
 close will not be allowed to develop his case in part only. 
 It is usually considered proper to require him to introduce all 
 the evidence he may have to support his case, though he need 
 not anticipate the evidence of his adversary and attempt to 
 rebut it before it is offered. Each party should be compelled 
 to exhaust his evidence, and neither should be permitted to 
 withhold evidence for the purpose of gaining an unfair advan- 
 tage over his opponent by producing evidence as in rebuttal 
 which should, because of its relation to the facts in issue, be 
 offered in chief. 3 
 
 After the evidence in chief on both sides has all been re- 
 ceived, the party who has the right to open and close may- 
 offer evidence in rebuttal intended to destroy or overcome the 
 effect of some particular evidence which the adverse party 
 has attempted to prove as a part of his case. But the order 
 and time of introducing evidence are largely in the discretion 
 of the court, and if the evidence which is offered is relevant, 
 and if the failure of the party to introduce it at the proper 
 time and in its proper order is not due to a lack of diligence 
 
 1 O'Brien v. Weiler, 68 Hun, 64; 55 N. W. Rep. 88; Blewett v. Gay- 
 Ingrani v. "Wackernagel, 83 Iowa, nor, 77 Wis. 378 ; Dunn v. People, 
 82; Kruschkev. Stefan, 83 Wis. 373; 29 N. Y. 523; Blake v. People, 73 
 Koontz v. Owens, 109 Mo. 1. N. Y. 586; State v. Hunsaker, 16 
 
 2 Haver v. Schuyhart, 48 Mo. App. Oreg. 497; Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. 
 50; Schwarz r. Wood, 67 Hun, 648; Chicago, etc. Co., 51 Fed. Rep. 309; 
 Swift Elec. L. Co. v. Grant, 90 Mich. York v. Pease, 2 Gray (Mass.), 282; 
 469; 51 N. W. Rep. 539; Scott v. Cushing v. Billings, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 
 People (111., 1892), 30 N.E. Rep. 329; 158; Brown v. Marshall, 120 Ind. 
 House v. Lock wood, 63 Hun, 630. 323; Easley v. Miss. Pac. Ry. Co., 20 
 
 3 Hamilton Buggy Co. v. Iowa S. W. Rep. 1073 ; McDermott v. Chi- 
 Buggy Co. (Iowa, 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. cago, etc. Co. (Wis., 1893), 55 N. W. 
 498 ; Ankersmit v. Bluxome, 48 Hun, Rep. 79; Mutual L, Ins. Co. v. 
 1 ; Casteel v. Millison, 41 111. App. 61 ; Thomson (Ky., 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 
 Thatcher v. Stickney (Iowa, 1893), 87; Lamance v. Byrnes, 17 Nev. 197.
 
 554 
 
 RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§ 376. 
 
 on his part, the court may re-open the case to admit it, not 
 only after the party has rested, but even after the argument 
 has begun. 1 
 
 § 376. Materiality and sufficiency of newly-discovered 
 evidence. — The power to grant a new trial because of newly- 
 discovered evidence is to a large extent a discretionary power, 2 
 and to call forth its exercise the court should be satisfied that 
 the new evidence is reasonably conclusive and of such force 
 and sufficiency that had it been admitted the verdict which 
 was rendered in the trial would have been set aside as against 
 the evidence. 3 
 
 It is the policy of the law to make an end of litigation and 
 to render necessary litigation as inexpensive as possible. For 
 this reason the courts are chary in granting retrials upon the 
 
 I Taylor v. Cayce, 97 Mo. 242 ; Hill 
 v. Miller, 50 Kan. 659; Fogarty v. 
 State, 80 Ga. 785 ; State v. Pratt, 98 
 Mo. 482; Kimball v. Saguin (Iowa, 
 1892), 53 N. W. Rep. 116; Gregg v. 
 Mallett, 111 N. C. 74: Owens v. 
 Gentry, 30 S. C. 490; Des Moines 
 Sav. Bk. v. Hotel (Iowa, 1893), 55 N. 
 W. Rep. 67 ; State v. Maber, 74 Iowa, 
 77; Kansas City, etc. Co. v. Mc- 
 Donald, 51 Fed. Rep. 178; Lewis v. 
 Alkire, 32 W. Va. 504; Scbuman v. 
 Pilcher, 36 111. App. 43; Sbaban v. 
 Swan (Obio, 1892), 26 N. E. Rep. 
 222; Cousins v. Partridge, 79 Cal. 
 224 ; Jacksonville, etc. v. Peninsular, 
 etc. Co. (Fla., 1892), 9 S. Rep. 661; 
 McNutt v. McNutt, 116 Ind. 545; 
 Jobbins v. Gray, 34 111. App. 208; 
 Blackman v. State, 80 Ga. 785. Tbe 
 reception of evidence by tbe court 
 after the jury's deliberations have 
 begun has been held not reversible 
 error. Keeveny v. Ottman, 26 Wkly. 
 L. Bui. 65 ; McConib v. Insurance 
 Co., 48 N. W. Rep. 1038. So a judg- 
 ment not objected to when rendered 
 will not be set aside because the 
 court admitted evidence thereafter. 
 Clavey v. Lord, 87 Cal. 413; Meserve 
 v. Folsom, 62 Vt. 504. In State v. 
 
 Magoon, 50 Vt. 333, the court said 
 *' the order in which testimony shall 
 be admitted is one of practice rather 
 than of strict right, and may, in the 
 discretion of the court, be varied to 
 meet the exigencies of a given case 
 without error being predicable 
 thereon, unless it is manifest that the 
 variance has operated to surprise or 
 in some way work a legal disadvan- 
 tage to the excepting party." 
 
 2 State v. Carlos (S. C, 1893), 16 S. 
 E. Rep. 832. 
 
 3 City of Chicago v. Edson, 43 111. 
 App. 417; Wilson v. Heath, 68 Hun, 
 209; Finelite v. Finelite, 68 Hun, 82; 
 Upington v. Keenan, 67 Hun, 648; 
 Hilburn v. Harris (Tex., 1893), 21 S. 
 W. Rep. 572; State v. Myers (Mo., 
 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 382; Williams 
 v. United States, 137 U. S. 113. "A 
 new trial will not be granted in any 
 civil action on the ground of the im- 
 proper admission or rejection of 
 evidence, unless in the opinion of 
 the court to which the application 
 is made some substantial wrong or 
 miscarriage has been thereby occa- 
 sioned in tbe trial of the action." 
 Stephen's Dig., art. 143.
 
 § 377.] RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. 555 
 
 production of new evidence by the defeated party, who has 
 little to lose and everything to gain by a new trial. Some- 
 thing more must be produced as new evidence than weak or 
 unsatisfactory evidence which would not have changed the 
 result had it been introduced, or which is readily reconcilable 
 with either side of the case. 1 Not only must the sufficiency 
 of the evidence be shown but its materiality and relevancy 
 must appear as well. If the new evidence would not have 
 been admissible at the trial because of its irrelevancy or other- 
 wise, then its sufficiency need not be considered, while, on the 
 other hand, its relevancy alone is not enough if it would not 
 change the result in a new trial. 2 The material character of 
 the new evidence and the manner in which it would have in- 
 fluenced the result of the trial must be affirmatively and 
 explicitly shown in reasonable detail in the application and 
 accompanying affidavits. Nothing should be left to inference 
 or conjecture on these important points. 3 
 
 § 377. Diligence of party offering new evidence must 
 we shown. — A party who moves for a new trial because of 
 new evidence must show affirmatively and specifically 4 the 
 reasons for his failure to produce the witness at the trial, 
 and he must convince the court that he was not guilty of 
 delay or negligence. 5 The fact that the newly-discovered 
 
 i Laing v. Rush, 66 Hun, 635 ; Whalen v. New York, 17 Fed. Rep. 
 
 Helmke v. Stetler, 69 Hun, 109; 72. 
 
 Eddy v. Newton (Tex., 1893), 22 S. 3 Shewalter v. Williamson, 125 
 
 W. Rep. 533; Field v. Corn. (Va., Ind. 373; Grayson v. Buchanan (Va., 
 
 1893), 16 S. E. Rep. 835; Gaddis v. 1891), 13 S. E. Rep. 457; Roberts v. 
 
 State (Ga., 1893), 16 S. E. Rep. 931; Johnstown Bank, 14 N. Y. S. 432. 
 
 Humphrey v. State (Wis., 1891), 47 * Etowah G. M. Co. v. Exter (Ga., 
 
 N. W. Rep. 836. 1893), 16 S. E. Rep. 991. 
 
 2 Thompson v. Thompson, 88 Cal. 5 Chicago E. & B. P. Co. v. John- 
 
 110. "The unconsidered evidence son, 44 111. App. 224 ; Coffey v. Proc- 
 
 tnust be such as reasonable diligence ter Coal Co. (Ky., 1892), 20 S. W. Rep. 
 
 on the part of the party asking for 2S6; Weinberg v. Somps (Cal., 1893), 
 
 the rehearing could not have secured 33 Pac. Rep. 341 ; Succession of Coste, 
 
 at the former trial; it must be ma- 43 La. Ann. 144; Queen v. Bell, 22 
 
 terial, not merely cumulative, cor- N. Y. S. 398; Briel v. Buffalo, 68 
 
 roborative or collateral, and be such Hun, 219; Broat v. Moore, 44 Minn, 
 
 as ought to produce important re- 468; Briggs v. Rush, 1 Tex. Civ. 
 
 suits on its merits." Codman v. App. 19; State v. Ginger, 80 Iowa, 
 
 Verm. etc. Co., 17 Blatchf. (TJ, S.) 3; 574; Keisling v. Readle, 1 Ind. App. 
 
 Dower v. Church, 21 W. Va. 57; 240.
 
 556 RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. [§ 37S. 
 
 evidence is relevant and material and will probably result in 
 a change in the verdict on a new trial will not excuse the 
 party's original negligence, 1 if he fails to show a good reason 
 for not producing it at the trial; and a fortiori th\s is the case 
 where the moving party suppressed the evidence himself. 2 
 The application for a new trial is usually accompanied by the 
 affidavits of the party. They should set forth in detail the 
 various steps which have been taken by him to obtain the evi- 
 dence at the trial, and the reason why the new evidence was 
 not offered, in order to satisfy the court of his diligence. 3 
 
 § 378. Newly-discovered evidence must not be cumula- 
 tive or impeaching merely. — A new trial should be granted 
 on the ground of new-discovered material evidence only when 
 it is positively shown that the evidence is not cumulative 
 merely, 4 or argumentative, 5 unless the testimony on the earlier 
 trial was very unsatisfactory, 6 or the verdict was rendered upon 
 a mere numerical preponderance of witnesses which the cumu- 
 lative evidence would have counteracted. 7 But an exception 
 to the rule that a new trial will be refused if newly-discovered 
 evidence is cumulative is recognized where the new evidence is 
 cumulative of the admissions made by an adverse witness favor- 
 able to the moving party, 8 or of the evidence of an adverse 
 witness on his cross-examination. Neither should a new trial 
 be granted because of newly-discovered evidence, the sole ef- 
 fect of which would be to contradict or otherwise impeach 
 
 1 Kansas City, etc. Co. v. Philips 7 Kulp, 103; State v. Hendrix (La., 
 (Ala., 1893), 13 S. Rep. 65; Fitzgerald 1893), 12 S. Rep. G21; People v. 
 v. Brandt (Neb., 1893), 54 N. W. Hong, 92 Cal. 41 ; 27 Pac. Rep. 1096; 
 Rep. 992. Maurer v. State, 129 Ind. 5S7; Will- 
 
 2 Mills v. Husson, 63 Hun, 632. iams v. Com. (Ky., 1892), 18 S. W. 
 
 3 Bank v. Gilmore (N. D., 1893), 54 Rep. 364; Weitling v. Millston, 77 
 N. W. Rep. 1032; McDonald v. Wis. 523; Langdon v. People, 133 
 Coryell (Ind., 1893), 34 N. E. Rep. 7. 111. 3S2; State v. Potts (Iowa, 1892), 
 
 * First Nat. Bank v. William Ruehl 49 N. W. Rep. 845 ; State v. Stowe, 
 
 Co., 33 111. App. 121; Davis v. 3 Wash. St. 203. 
 
 Mann, 43 111. App. 401; Wilson v. 5 Thompson v. Thompson, 88 Cal. 
 
 Heath, 68 Hun, 209; Douglass v. 110. 
 
 Anthony, 45 Kan. 439; Elmborg v. 6 Louisville, N. O. & T. Ry. Co., 69 
 
 St. Paul C. R. Co. (Minn., 1893), 52 Miss. 152. 
 
 N. W. Rep. 639 ; Sweat v. State (Ga., ~ Bulkin v. Ehret, 29 Abb. N. C. 62. 
 
 1893), 17 S. E. Rep. 273; King v. *> White v. Nafus (Iowa, 1892), 51 
 
 State, 91 Tenn. 617; People v. Ur- N. W. Rep. 5. 
 quidas, 96 Cal. 239; Com. v. Brown,
 
 § 379.] RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. 557 
 
 the evidence of some witness whose evidence was sufficiently 
 credible or corroborated. 1 So a new trial should not be 
 granted merelj 7 because a witness subsequently to the trial ad- 
 mits that he swore falsely, 2 or makes statements contradictory 
 of what he said on the witness stand. 3 
 
 § 379. Writ of error — When employed at common 
 law.— An appeal or appellatio as defined by Blackstone an 
 other writers on the common and the civil law was a pro- 
 ceeding the use of which was, to a large extent, confined to 
 courts of equity, admiralty and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, 
 whose procedure was modeled after the rules of the Roman 
 civil law. It was, as the word implies, an appeal or applica- 
 tion for relief against the alleged injustice of an inferior court, 
 and by the civil law the whole proceeding was removed to 
 the appellate court, and the matter was reviewed and retried 
 by that court both as to the facts and the rules of law in- 
 volved. 4 The purpose of the common-law " writ of error," on 
 the other hand, was not primaril} 7 to procure a retrial of the 
 whole subject by the supervisory court, for the reason that 
 the trial at nisi prius, being always by a jury, a retrial in the 
 court of error of the issue of fact involved b} 7 the same method 
 was not possible. The theory of this writ was that the issue 
 of fact had been properly decided b} 7 the jury on sufficient 
 evidence, but that in case it had not, or if an erroneous de- 
 cision of any rule of law had been made, the error would 
 appear at once upon an inspection of the record itself, or it 
 might be more clearly and specifically pointed out by the as- 
 signment of error. Thus, a writ of error might be brought 
 for a notorious or open mistake in any part of the record, or 
 
 i Fist v. Fist (Colo., 1893), 32 Pac. v. State, 129 Ind. 5S7 ; 29 N. E. Rep. 
 
 Rep. 719; W. U. T. Co. v. Hainan 392 ; Hudspeth v. State, 55 Ark. 323; 
 
 (Tex., 1893), 20 S. W. Rep. 1133; Russell v. Nail, 79 Tex. 644; 15 S. 
 
 Keith v. Knoche, 43 111. App. 161 ; W. Rep. 635; Vanderburg v. Cainp- 
 
 Sweigert v. Finlay, 144 Pa. St. 266 ; bell, 64 Miss. 89. 
 
 Green v. Beckner, 3 Ind. App. 39; 2 Hoy v. Chicago, etc. Co., 46 Minn. 
 
 State v. Potter, 108 Mo. 424; Pease 269. 
 
 v. State (Ga., 1883), 16 S. E. Rep. 3 State v. Workman (S. C, 1893), 
 
 113; State v. Potts, 83 Iowa, 317; 16 S. E. Rep. 770. 
 
 Marable v. State, 89 Ga. 425; Peo- 'Hestres v. Brennan, 50 Cal. 217; 
 
 pie v. Loui, 27 Pac. Rep. 295 ; 90 United States v. Wonson, 1 Gall. 13. 
 
 Cal. 377 ; State v. Chambers, 43 La. See, also, Anderson's Law Diet. 
 Ann. 1108; 10 S. Rep. 247; Maurer
 
 558 RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. [§ 380. 
 
 for any omission, irregularity or informality in the process or 
 committed at the trial. 1 The proceeding under the writ of 
 error affected the record alone which was removed into the 
 higher court, and on the denial of the allegation of error an 
 issue was raised placing the burden of proof on the party al- 
 leging the error in the record to prove its existence affirma- 
 tively. 2 
 
 In most of the states of the American Union the proceeding 
 by which the judgment of an inferior court is reviewed by 
 another court exercising supervisory powers, though termed 
 an appeal, is substantially and in principle the common-law 
 writ of error regulated and modified as to details by statutory 
 provisions. So far as these modern appellate proceedings in- 
 volve a reconsideration of the evidence which has been given 
 in the lower court, they are regulated rather by the princi- 
 ples of the common law than by the rules governing appeals 
 in admiralty and ecclesiastical courts. 
 
 § 380. The powers of appellate tribunals in relation to 
 the evidence receiver! in the trial court. — The weight of 
 evidence and the credibility of witnesses are for the jury ex- 
 clusively, and the general rule is that the appellate court 
 will not, either in civil or criminal cases, review the evidence 
 merely because it may have been of a weak, contradictory or 
 conflicting character, 3 provided that upon an inspection of the 
 
 1 "At common law a writ of error taken at the trial. If the bill con- 
 might be had for an error apparent tains matter falsely or untruly stated, 
 on the record, or for an error in fact, the judge ought to refuse to affix his 
 but not for an error in law not ap- seal." Wheeler v. Winn, 53 Pa. St. 
 pearing on the record; hence any- 126. 
 
 thing alleged ore tenus and overruled 2 Burkhalter v. State, 58 Pa. St. 376 ; 
 
 could not be assigned for error. To Bragg v. Danielson, 141 Mass. 195. 
 
 remedy this evil was the object of 3 Board of Com'rs Pulaski Co. v. 
 
 the statute of Westminster. Under Shields, 29 N. E. Rep. 385; 130 Ind. 
 
 its provisions a bill of exceptions is 6; Aultman v. Ritter, 81 Wis. 395; 
 
 founded on some objection in point Belles v. Anderson, 38 111. App. 126; 
 
 of law to the opinion and direction Vowels v. Com., 83 Ky. 193; Bull v. 
 
 of the court, either as to the com- Wagner (Neb., 1892), 49 N. W. Rep. 
 
 petency of a witness, the admissi- 1130; Smith v. State, 11 Pac. Rep. 
 
 bility or the legal effect of evidence, 908; 35 Kan. 618; Cooper v. Perry, 
 
 or other matter of law arising from 27 Pac. Rep. 946; 16 Colo. 436; Ros- 
 
 facts not denied in which either enthal v. McMann, 29 Pac. Rep. 121 ; 
 
 party is overruled by the court. The 93 Cal. 505; Graves v. Griffith, 3 
 
 seal attests that the exception was Wash. St. 742 ; Allen v. Kirk, 81
 
 § 380.] KECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. 559 
 
 record there is no such manifest preponderance of evidence 
 on the side of the defeated party as will show that the ver- 
 dict as rendered is erroneous or unjust. 1 
 
 A verdict will not be reversed on appeal which was based 
 upon facts which were shown in evidence, the legitimate in- 
 ferences from which were uncertain or controvertible. If the 
 facts which were proved are capable of more than one con- 
 struction in the minds of persons of average intelligence, or if 
 the evidence is such that reasonable men may, in considering 
 it, arrive at different conclusions, the decision of the jury is 
 final where the issue of fact was clearly and fairly submitted 
 to them. 2 If there is any evidence to sustain a verdict which 
 is in itself reasonable on all the circumstances of the case, the 
 verdict should not be set aside because of insufficiency of evi- 
 dence, though the appellate court might have arrived at a 
 different conclusion from the jury on such evidence. 3 Where, 
 however, the verdict as it appears from the evidence sent up 
 and contained in the case on appeal is not only against the 
 weight of evidence but is wholly unsupported by any evidence, 
 the appellate court will not hesitate to reverse the judgment 
 of the lower court. Every presumption will be made that the 
 jurj T acted impartially and fairly, and that their verdict was 
 according to the evidence. Especially is this true where there 
 is a conflict of evidence, and here the supervisory or appellate 
 court will not disturb the verdict, though the evidence may 
 
 Iowa, 60S; Bonner v. Beam, 80 Tex. Rep. 713; Puget Sound R. Co. v. 
 
 152; Simmons v. Spratt, 26 Fla. 449; Ingersoll, 4 Wash. St. 675; Coleman 
 
 Powell v. Achey, 87 Ga. 8; McBride v. Jones, 89 Ga. 459; Wells v. Yar- 
 
 v. Railroad Co., 60 Hun, 585; Sears- borough, 84 Tex. 660; Richmond, 
 
 mont v. Lincolnville, 83 Me. 75; etc. Co. v. Burnett, 88 Va. 538. 
 Noyes v. Pugin, 2 Wash. St. 258. 2 Evansville, etc. Co. v. Weikle 
 
 1 Rudolph v. Davis (Neb., 1892), (Ind., 1893), 33 N. E. Rep. 639; Goff 
 
 52 N. W. Rep. 841; Lalor v. Mc- v. Akers, 21 N. Y. S. 454; Paige v. 
 
 Donald, 44 Mo. App. 439; San Ga- Chedsey, 20 id. 898; Meentz v. 
 
 briel Wine Co. v. Behlow, 94 Cal. Reiker, 42 111. App. 17. 
 108; Huffman v. Burr, 26 Atl. Rep. 3 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. 
 
 367; 155 Pa. St. 218; Van Vlissenger Spann (Ark., 1893), 20 S. W. Rep. 
 
 v. Cox, 44 111. App. 247; Mansfield 914; Eckert v. Rule (Kan., 1893), 32 
 
 v. Rab, 21 N. Y. S. 65; 66 Hun, 631; Pac. Rep. 657; Kimball v. Saguin 
 
 Monselle v. Bacon, 66 Hun, 628; (Iowa, 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 116; 
 
 Beveridge v. Parmlee, 43 111. App. Lalor v. McDonald's Adm'rs, 44 Mo. 
 
 459; Ya'don v. Mackey, 50 Kan. 630; App. 439; Shailer v. Corbett, 61 
 
 Eppert v. Hall (Iowa, 1893), 32 N. E. Hun, 626.
 
 560 
 
 RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. 
 
 [§ 380. 
 
 preponderate somewhat against it and call for a different 
 verdict. 1 On the other hand, where the verdict is not against 
 the mere weight of conflicting evidence, but against uncon- 
 tradicted evidence amounting to positive proof of the fact 
 alleged, 2 or where the preponderance of evidence against the 
 verdict is so excessive that it is fair to presume that it was 
 rendered only because of the existence of partiality, unfair- 
 ness or corrupt motives or gross ignorance on the part of the 
 jury, the judgment of the trial court will be reversed. 3 
 
 The same rules that are held applicable to the review on 
 appeal of a verdict b} 7 a jury are also recognized where a jury 
 trial in the lower court is not of right or is waived by the 
 consent of the parties. If the evidence, though it is conflict- 
 ing, tends to or is sufficient to support the judgment, and no 
 errors of law appear from the record to have been committed, 
 the decision or findings of the judge upon matters of fact will 
 be regarded as final, notwithstanding the appellate court 
 might arrive at a different conclusion upon the same evidence 
 if before it. 4 
 
 iGayheart v. Patton (Ky., 1893), 
 
 20 S. W. Rep. 912; Angus v. Foster, 
 42 111. App. 19; Kouhn v. Schroth, 
 44 id. 513; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. 
 Kenley (Term., 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 
 326. 
 
 2 Walton v. Kansas, etc. Co., 49 
 Mo. App. 620. 
 
 3 Lewis v. Pallin, 48 Mo. App. 657; 
 Porter v. Sherman Co. Banking Co. 
 (Neb., 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. 234; Cole 
 v. National Sch. Furn. Co., 45 111. 
 App. 273; Stanfell v. Lewellyn(Ky., 
 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 645; Reuber v. 
 Crawford (Neb., 1893), 54 N. W. 
 Rep. 549; Kunimer v. Christopher 
 & Tenth St. R. Co., 2 Misc. Rep. 
 298; Unas v. Penn. R. R. Co., 152 
 Pa. St. 326; Gary v. Cole, 38 111. 
 App. 236; Huber v. Schmocht, 39 
 111. App. 229; Marabitti v. Bagolan, 
 
 21 Oreg. 299. 
 
 4 Castner v. Richardson (Colo., 1893), 
 33 Pac. Rep. 163; Teeter v. Teeter, 
 20 N. Y. S. 259; 65 Hun, 623; Kehoe 
 
 v. Burns (Wis., 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 
 731; Keesey v. Gage (Tex., 1893), 21 
 S. W. Rep. 397; Tolman v. Crane. 44 
 111. App. 237; Com. v. W T estinghouse 
 Elec. & Mfg. Co., 24 Atl. Rep. 1107; 
 151 Pa. St. 265 ; Gamble v. Ross, 44 
 111. App. 291 ; Brown v. Sullivan, 3 
 Ind. App. 211; 29 N. E. Rep. 453; 
 Smith v. Kipp, 49 Minn. 119; Rob- 
 bins v. City of Fond du Lac, 82 Wis. 
 340; Chase v. Jones, 84 Me. 107; 
 Glover v. Holliday, 109 Mo. 108; 
 Schuler v. Eckert, 90 Mich. 165; 
 Gwyn v. Butler, 17 Colo. 114; Worth- 
 ington v. Worthington, 32 Neb. 334 ; 
 Long v. Langsdale, 56 Ark. 239; 
 Redfearn v. Douglas, 35 S. C. 569; 
 Markley v. Hull, 49 N. W. Rep. 
 1050; 51 Iowa, 109; Tatum v. Col- 
 vin, 9 S. Rep. 747; 43 La. Ann. 755; 
 Belford, Clarke & Co. v. Scribner, 144 
 U. S. 488; Cox v. Jones, 110 N. C. 
 309. A statutory provision that an 
 appellate court "shall review a 
 cause where trial by jury has been
 
 § 381.] 
 
 RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. 
 
 5G1 
 
 So, in an appeal from the decision of the chancellor or of a 
 master in equity, the appellate court will not review his find- 
 ings of fact unless it appears that they are so manifestly er- 
 roneous and lacking in evidence to support them as to be un- 
 just or that they are evidently the result of mistake. 1 The 
 decision or finding of fact of a master in chancery, referee or 
 auditor which is confirmed by the court by which he was ap- 
 pointed is equivalent to the verdict of a jury upon the same 
 point, will be presumed to have been based on sufficient evi- 
 dence, and will be conclusive upon the parties in the appellate 
 court. 2 
 
 § 381. Limitations on the number of witnesses. — It is 
 the right of both parties to have all the witnesses heard by 
 the jury who are able to testify of their own knowledge to 
 any material fact which is controverted. The court cannot 
 in such a case limit the number of witnesses, and its action in 
 doing so over an objection which is taken in time will be 
 
 For the same reason if a party rely- 
 
 ground for a new trial. 3 
 
 waived in the same manner and to 
 the same extent as if it had been 
 tried by a jury " does not, it has 
 been held, mean that the appellate 
 court shall decide upon the weight 
 of the evidence. Lynch v. Grayson 
 (N. M., 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 149. If a 
 plain and manifest error is shown to 
 have been made by the trial judge 
 in his findings of facts they should 
 be reversed. Metro. Nat. Bank v. 
 Rogers, 3 C. C. A. 666 ; 53 Fed. Rep. 
 776. But a finding of fact will not 
 be disturbed where it can be shown 
 to be erroneous only by discrediting a 
 witness, as the credibility of testi- 
 mony is for the trial judge exclu- 
 sively. Delano v. Jacoby, 31 Pac. 
 Rep. 290; 96 Cal. 275. 
 
 i Ellis v. Ward, 137 111. 509; Mon- 
 tague v. Stoltz (S. C, 1893), 15 S. E, 
 Rep. 868 ; Dooly Block v. S. L. Rap. 
 T. Co. (Utah, 1893), 33 Pac. Rep. 229; 
 Thomas v. Chicago, etc. Co. , 49 Mo. 
 App. 110; McGill v. Hawks (Mich., 
 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 707; Hamlin v. 
 36 
 
 Phillips (Cal., 1893) , 33 Pac. Rep. 331 ; 
 Berry v. Berry, 24 Atl. Rep. 957 ; 84 
 Me. 541; Daveyac v. Seder (Ky., 
 1893), 20 S. W. Rep. 375; Herbert v. 
 Keck, 35 Neb. 508. The rule stated 
 in the text is also applicable to the 
 findings of fact on conflicting evi- 
 dence by a surrogate or similar ju- 
 dicial officer. In re Sherman, 24 
 N. Y. S. 283; In re Snelling's Will, 
 136 N. Y. 575. 
 
 2 McHugh v. Railroad Co., 65 Hun, 
 619; Warner v. Hare, 154 Pa. St. 
 548; Crim v. Starkweather, 136 N.Y. 
 635; Knell v. Stephan, 65 Hun, 624; 
 Tischler v. Apple, 30 Fla. 132; Por- 
 ter v. Christian, 88 Va. 730: Craw- 
 ford v. Osmun, 90 Mich. 77 ; Witte v. 
 Weinberg (S. C, 1893), 17 S. E. Rep. 
 681 ; Johnston v. Markle Paper Co., 
 153 Pa. St. 189; Morrell v. Kelly 
 (Mass., 1893), 31 N. E. Rep. 755; 
 Mech. & Trad. Nat. Bank v.Wynant, 
 49 Hun, 607 ; Levi v. Blaokwell, 35 
 S. C. 511. 
 
 3 Village of South Danville v. Ja-
 
 502 RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. [§ 382. 
 
 ing upon a misstatement by the judge refrains from introduc- 
 ing material evidence, he will be entitled to a new trial if the 
 judgment is against him. 1 But where there is no contradic- 
 tion as to the fact to which the witness is to testify, or where 
 the fact, though not proved beyond a reasonable doubt, is 
 immaterial, it has been held repeatedly that the court has a 
 discretion to refuse to permit other witnesses to testify thereto 
 whose evidence would be merely cumulative. 2 
 
 An exception to the general rule occurs in the case of ex- 
 pert or opinion evidence. Here it has been held that the 
 court may limit the number of experts which may be exam- 
 ined by either party. 3 
 
 § 382. Number of witnesses necessary in trials for per- 
 jury. — It was at one time a settled rule of law that no con- 
 viction of perjury could be had unless upon the oath of two 
 witnesses; for otherwise the single oath of the accused would 
 be met only by the oath of one other person. 4 But this 
 is no longer the law. The accused in a trial for perjury may 
 be convicted upon the evidence of one witness corroborated 
 by other independent evidence, which, though it need no longer 
 necessarily be "tantamount to another witness," 5 must still 
 be so strong, clear, convincing and corroborative 6 that, with 
 the evidence of the single witness, it shall overcome the 
 oath of the accused and the presumption of his innocence, 7 
 and convince the minds of the jury of his guilt beyond a rea- 
 sonable doubt. 8 In case several acts of perjury are alleged in 
 
 cobs, 42 111. App. 543; Page v. Kre- Rep. G78; Lake Shore, etc. Co. v. 
 
 key, 137 N. Y. 307; Meier v. Morgan, Brown, 123 111. 162; Couts v. Neer, 
 
 82 Wis. 289; Greene v. Phenix Ins. 70 Tex. 468; 9 S. W. Rep. 46; Bar 
 
 Co., 134 111. 310. Contra (where a hyte v. Summers, 68 Mich. 341; 36 
 
 default is set aside as a matter of N. W. Rep. 93. 
 
 favor), Burhans v. Norwood Park 3 Carpenter v. Knapp, 66 Hun, 
 
 (111., 1891), 27 N. E. Rep. 1088. 632: Sixth Ave. R. Co. v. Railroad 
 
 i Hanna v. Barrett, 39 Kan. 446; Co., 138 N. Y. 548. 
 
 18 Pac. Rep. 497. 4 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 257; 4 Bl. 
 
 2 Mears v. Cornwell, 73 Mich. 78; Com. 358; 2 Russell on Crimes, 179. 
 
 Stillwell v. Farwell, 64 Vt. 286; *1 Greenl. on Ev., g 257; State v. 
 
 Seekell v. Norman, 73 Iowa, 254; 43 Peters, 107 N. C. 8'. 6. 
 
 N. W. Rep. 190; Powers v. McKen- 6Woodbeck v. Keeler, 6 Cow. 118 
 
 zie, 90 Tenn. 167; Detroit City Ry. 121. 
 
 Co. v. Mills, 85 Mich. 634; Owen v. 1 State v. Miller, 44 Mo. App. 159. 
 
 Williams, 114 Ind. 179; 15 N. E. 8 Waters v. State, 30 Tex. App.
 
 § 383.] RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. 563 
 
 one indictment, it seems that there must be a corroboration 
 as to each act, for a conviction cannot be secured on any 
 which is thus corroborated though there maybe the testimony 
 of a single witness to each act of perjury. 1 But any fact al- 
 leged in an indictment for perjur}', excepting the falsit}' of the 
 evidence given under oath by the person and the fact that he 
 did not believe it to be true, may be proved by the testimony 
 of one witness uncorroborated by independent evidence. 2 
 
 The rule which requires the testimony of a single witness 
 with corroboration in order to justify a conviction of perjury 
 has been confirmed by statute in many of the states. In the 
 absence of such a statute it may be that the prisoner could be 
 convicted without any oral evidence bearing directly upon the 
 corpus delicti. So the written admissions of the accused or of 
 those criminally associated with him, or documentary evidence 
 found in his possession, and acted on by him as true, may, if 
 strong, be regarded as equivalent to the testimony of a single 
 witness. 3 But the authenticity of such documents would have 
 to be clearly shown. 
 
 § 383. Number of witnesses in trials for treason. — At 
 the common law, prior to the enactment of the statutes of 
 1 Ed w. VI., ch. 12, and 5 and 6 Edw. VI., ch. 11, a person might 
 have been convicted of treason upon proof by one witness 
 alone. Those statutes provided, and the provision has been 
 adopted into the constitution of the United States, 4 and into 
 most of the state constitutions, that no person shall be con- 
 victed of high treason "unless upon the sworn testimony of 
 two witnesses to the same overt act or on confession in open 
 court." 
 
 284; State v. Gibbs, 10 Mont. 213; 324; Williams v. Cora., 91 Pa. St. 
 
 United States v. Wood, 14 Peters, 493. If the jury believe the witness 
 
 440; United States v. Hall, 44 Fed. is not a "credible witness," whero 
 
 Rep. 864; Reg. v. Boulter, 16 Jur. the testimony of such a witness is 
 
 135; State v. Heed, 57 Mo. 252; Rex required by statute in a prosecution 
 
 v. Mayhew, 6 C. & P. 315; Reg. v. for perjury, they should acquit. 
 
 Braithwaite, 8 Cox C. C. 254. As to Kitchen v. State, 29 Tex. App. 45. 
 
 the corroboration required, see Reg. 2 United States v. Hall, 44 Fed. 
 
 v. Shaw, 10 Cox C. C. 66; State v. Rep. 864; People v. Hayes, 24 N. Y. 
 
 Blize, 111 Mo. 464; People v. Hayes, S. 194. 
 
 24 N. Y. S. 194; Heflin v. State, 88 3 United States v. Woods, 14 Peters, 
 
 Ga. 151. 440, 441. 
 
 1 Reg. v. Virrier, 12 A. & E. 317, < Art. 3, § 3.
 
 5C4 RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. [§ 384. 
 
 The English statute was so construed as to permit a convic- 
 tion upon the testimony of one witness to one overt act and 
 of another witness to another overt act of the same sort, 1 and 
 such doubtless would be the law in those states of the Union 
 which do not, in their bills of rights, require testimony to the 
 same overt act. 
 
 The extra-judicial confession of the accused may be proved 
 by one witness where it is offered in corroboration of the evi- 
 dence of the witnesses who testify to an overt act; 2 and gen- 
 erally any collateral fact not involving an overt act of treason 
 may be proved 3 in the same manner as in the case of indict- 
 ments for other crimes. 4 
 
 § 384. Compelling the falling of the witnesses. — The 
 prosecution in a criminal trial cannot be compelled to call all 
 the witnesses whose names are on the indictment, 5 or who 
 know anything of the crime which is alleged; nor can it be 
 required to put a particular witness on the stand though he 
 may be present in court in obedience to the service of a sub- 
 poena. 6 The introduction of evidence for the state in a crim- 
 inal trial being within the province of the prosecuting attor- 
 ney, his failure to place all his witnesses upon the stand is not 
 
 1 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 255, citing of protecting the subject against 
 
 Lord Stafford's Case, 7 How. St. Tr. royal oppression, which was continu- 
 
 1527. ally seeking opportunities for the 
 
 2 Willis' Case, 15 How. St. Tr. 623- silencing or punishment not only of 
 
 G25; Grossfield's Case, 26 id. 55, 57. those whose deeds were obnoxious, 
 
 3 1 Greenl. Ev., § 255. but of those whose language was 
 
 4 The origin of the English statu- calculated to arouse popular feelings 
 
 tory requirement has been by some as well. 
 
 ascribed to the weight and binding 5 Bressler v. People, 117 111. 422; 
 
 efficacy of the oath of allegiance of State v. Cain, 20 W. Va. 177; State 
 
 the accused (1 Greenl. on Ev., § 255), v. Baxter, S2 N. C. 602. 
 
 while the introduction of the rule 6 Com. v. Haskell, 140 Mass. 128; 
 
 has been by others attributed to the State v. Middleham, 62 Iowa, 150; 
 
 fact that the clerical judges of early Selph v. State, 22 Fla. 537; People 
 
 times followed the canon law, which v. Oliver, 4 Utah, 460 , State v. Mor- 
 
 provided that no one shall be con- gan, 35 W. Va. 260; Hill v. Com. 
 
 demned as a heretic save on the tes- (Va., 1892), 14 S. E. Rep. 330; Terri- 
 
 timony of two lawful and credible tory v. Hanna, 5 Mont. 248; Keller 
 
 witnesses. Stafford's Case, T. Raym. v. State, 123 Ind. 110; 23 N. E. Rep. 
 
 408. In the writer's opinion the rule 1138. Contra, People v. Kenyon, 93 
 
 of law requiring two witnesses to an Mich. 19; Phillips v. State, 22 Tex. 
 
 overt act was due solely to the neces- App. 229; Maher v. People, 10 Mich, 
 
 sity for the adoption of some means 212.
 
 § 385.] RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. 505 
 
 ground for dismissing the indictment; nor can it be urged in 
 support of a motion for a new trial if the evidence which was 
 introduced by the state was sufficient to convict the accused. 
 Nor is the prosecution debarred from calling a witness in re- 
 buttal merely because the district attorney has declined to 
 call that witness to testify in chief upon the request of the 
 defendant that he should do so. 1 If, however, the evidence 
 against the prisoner is wholly circumstantial and is met by 
 positive and direct evidence on his part, the refusal of a re- 
 quest that the state be required to put certain persons on the 
 stand who are present in court, and who were eye-witnesses 
 of the event with which it is sought to connect the accused, is 
 reversible error. 2 
 
 §385. Positive and negative testimony — The number 
 of witnesses as affecting the weight of evidence. — When 
 the occurrence of a certain event is the fact in issue, a witness 
 called to prove its non-occurrence may, if he had a good op- 
 portunity of observing it, testify that he did not see or hear 
 it, though unable to say positively that it did not take place; 3 
 and he may also be permitted to testify, if able to give the 
 details, 4 that he would have heard or seen it if it had hap- 
 pened. 5 Though the weight and credibility of evidence are 
 for the jury to determine, the court may be permitted to in- 
 struct them that the positive testimony of a witness that a 
 certain event has happened, while not conclusive, 6 is entitled 
 to more weight than the statements of others who say they 
 
 1 United States v. Bennett, 17 People v. Etter, 45 N. W. Rep. 1109; 
 Blatchf. (U. S.) 357. In this case 81 Mich. 370. Cf. Wheelis v. State, 
 the court said: "Whether the evi- 23 Tex. App. 238. 
 
 dence of the witness was necessary 3 Abb. Brief on the Facts, § 559, 
 
 to make out a case for the prosecu- citing Greany v. L. I. R. R. Co., 101 
 
 tion belonged to the district attor- N. Y. 419; Maxwell v. Harrison, 8 
 
 ney to determine for himself. What Ga. 61. 
 
 the defendant would testify to could 4 Burnham v. Sherwood, 14 Atl. 
 
 not be foreseen; and when the de- Rep. 714. 
 
 fendant's testimony compelled the 5 Abb. Brief on the Facts, § 559 ; 
 
 production of evidence in rebuttal, Casey v. N. Y. Cent. R. R Co., 6 
 
 the rights of the prosecution to pre- Abb. N. C. 104, 124: Hollender v. 
 
 sent such evidence by the testimony Railroad Co., 19 id. 18; Chicago R. 
 
 of any witness able to testify to the R. Co. v. Dillon, 123 111. 570. 
 
 facts is not open to question." 6 Lighthouse v. Railroad Co., 54 N. 
 
 2 Thompson v. State, 30 Tex. App. W. Rep. 320. 
 325; People v. Wright, 90 Mich. 302;
 
 566 KECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. [§ 386. 
 
 did not see it, 1 though they were present. The circumstance 
 that the latter admitted that their attention was not called to 
 it would render a verdict based upon their negative evidence 
 subject to reversal. 2 So the positive knowledge of a fact by 
 one witness is of greater value than the ignorance or forget- 
 f ulness 3 of another person who may have had equal opportu- 
 nities of acquiring knowledge. 4 But where two witnesses 
 with equal opportunities for knowing, testifying from their 
 recollection of a transaction, contradict each other, no infer- 
 ence should be drawn by the jury from the fact that one is 
 more positive in his assertions than the other. 5 The jury 
 have a right, and it is their duty, to consider the character of 
 a party's witnesses as well as their number; and the fact that 
 the jury have based their verdict on the testimony of one 
 witness and rejected that of several who contradicted him 
 will not justify setting it aside. 6 
 
 § 386. The discretionary power of the court — Judicial 
 discretion defined and considered. — The phrases "judicial 
 discretion" or "in the discretion of the court" as they are 
 used in this treatise do not refer to any purely arbitrary exer- 
 cise of the will of the judge, but to a deliberate and careful 
 choice made by him, and to his exercise of a calm judgment 
 unswayed by personal bias or prejudice, but guided by fair- 
 ness under established legal rules. 7 
 
 We have seen the important part that judicial discretion 
 occupies in the examination of witnesses, in the allowance of 
 amendments where a variance is alleged, in the granting of a 
 continuance, in the admission of cumulative evidence, and in 
 
 iCanfield v. Asheville, etc. Co., 781 ; Hinkle v. Higgins (Tex., 1892), 
 
 111 N. C. 597; Allen v. Bond, 112 19 S. W. Rep. 147. 
 
 Ind. 523. 5 Marshall v. Harkenson (Iowa, 
 
 2 Neil v. State, 79 Ga. 779 ; Rainey 1892), 50 N. W. Rep. 559. 
 
 v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 23 N. Y. S. 6 Neal v. Deniing, 21 S. W. Rep. 
 
 80; 68 Hun, 495; Hoffman v. Fitch- 1066; Goldstrohm v. Steiner, 155 Pa. 
 
 burgR. Co., 67 Hun, 581. Cf. Horn St. 28; Chicago, etc. Co. v. Fisher 
 
 v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 54 Fed. (111., 1892), 31 N. E. Rep. 406. Cf. 
 
 Rep. 301; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Howell v. Dilts (Ind., 1892), 30 N. E. 
 
 Pierce, 39 Kan. 391. Rep. 313. 
 
 3 Rai!sbackv. Patton, 52 N. W. 7 See Anderson's Law Diet., Discre- 
 
 Rep. 277. tion. citing Piatt v. Munroe, 34 Barb. 
 
 < McCluskey v. Barr, 54 Fed. Rep. (N. Y.) 293; Tripp v. Cook, 26 Wend. 
 
 152 ; Faber v. Bruner, 13 Mo. 543.
 
 § 386.] KECErTION OF EVIDENCE. 567 
 
 similar matters of detail appertaining to practice and pro- 
 cedure. 
 
 Judicial power to determine causes does not exist aside from 
 the law, of which the courts are the creatures and instruments. 
 The judge has no discretion except that which is conferred 
 upon him by the law. That discretion is a legal, not a per- 
 sonal, discretion, and consists in discerning, expounding and 
 canning out the law as it comes from the law-making power 
 and as it is contained in or modified by prior judicial prece- 
 dents. 1 
 
 To permit the courts to mold the law in any particular case 
 as often as the rights of a particular litigant may seem to de- 
 mand it would involve the whole body of jurisprudence in 
 uncertainty, and substitute the caprice or personal opinion of 
 a fallible judge for those well-considered and long-established 
 legal rules and principles which are recorded in the statute 
 books, and in the reports of judicial decisions, which, being mat- 
 ter of such notoriety, are or may easily be known beforehand 
 by all men. So when it is said that a matter is within the 
 discretion of the court and is not subject to review or re-exam- 
 ination, legal discretion is referred to, operating within the 
 limits of well-recognized legal rules and implying the presence 
 and exercise of fairness and justice by the court. But on the 
 other hand, the abuse of the discretion possessed by the court, 
 particularly if the abuse shall be palpable and gross, is always 
 subject to review. Such a perversion or abuse of judicial dis- 
 cretion occurs when the court departs from the well-trodden 
 path of legal rules and remedies and permits its action to be 
 swayed and guided by personal will or passion, by the prompt- 
 ings of prejudice or of affection, by bias, by partiality, or by 
 the allurements and rewards of corruption. 2 
 
 1 See the remarks of Marshall, C. J., the law of tyrants; it is always un- 
 in Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 known ; it is different in different 
 Wheat. 860. men ; it is casual, and depends upon 
 
 2 White v. Leads, 51 Pa. St. 189; constitution, temper and passion. In 
 People v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 29 N. the best it is often caprice; in the 
 Y. 431 ; Com. v. Lesher, 17 S. & R. worst it is every vice, folly and pas- 
 164; Tilton v. Cofield, 93 U. S. 166; sion to which human nature can be 
 Ex parte Reed, 100 id. 23; United liable." Lord Camden, cited by Gib- 
 States v. Atherton, 102 U. S. 375. son, C. J., in Commonwealth v. 
 "The private discretion of a judge is Lesher, 17 S. & R. (Pa.) 164.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 ABANDONMENT: 
 
 of old road, evidence of, 291. 
 
 ABANDONMENT OF CONTRACT: 
 parol evidence to show, 312-314. 
 
 ABBREVIATIONS: 
 
 parol evidence to explain, 319. 
 
 judicial notice of, 365. 
 
 of printers, etc., 364. , 
 
 ABILITY: 
 
 evidence to show, 283. 
 
 ABODE (see Domicile). 
 
 ABOLITION OF SLAVERY: 
 judicial notice of, 367. 
 
 ABORTION: 
 
 dying declarations not admissible in, 141. 
 
 time and means required to procure, 285. 
 ABSENCE : 
 
 presumptions from, 356, 357. 
 
 of witness, evidence to explain, 16. 
 
 of witness, when a contempt of court, 419, 420. 
 
 presumption of continuance of, 350. 
 
 evidence of, guilt presumed from, 124. 
 
 declarations to explain, 65. 
 (see also Alibi.) 
 
 of witness, when suspicious, 538. 
 
 ABSENT WITNESSES: 
 
 commissions to procure depositions of, 530-534 
 
 testimony of missing witnesses, 167. 
 
 witness need not be deceased, 167-169. 
 
 witnesses who have become sick, decrepit or insane, 169. 
 
 cross-examination at former trial requisite; identity of parties, 169, 
 
 170. 
 precise language of witness, how far necessary, 171-173. 
 continuance granted because of — 
 
 in civil trials, 416-418. 
 
 in criminal trials, 418, 419.
 
 570 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 ABSOLUTE CONTRACT: 
 
 allegation of, not supported by proof of an alternative contract, 40. 
 ABSOLUTE DEED: 
 
 parol evidence to show it is mortgage, 329, 330. 
 
 may be shown to be a trust, 312. 
 ABUSIVE LANGUAGE : 
 
 by witness, striking out, 476. 
 ABUSIVE WITNESS : 
 
 checking by court, 472. 
 ACCEPTANCE : 
 
 primary evidence of, 54 
 
 ACCEPTANCE OF DEED : 
 when presumed, 346. 
 presumption of, evidence to rebut, 315. 
 
 ACCESS : 
 
 of husband, presumption from, 360. 
 
 ACCIDENT: 
 
 relevancy of evidence of prior accident, 19. 
 evidence to show liability to, 268. 
 
 ACCOMPLICES : 
 
 their competency for and against one another, 433, 434 
 
 who are, 459. 
 
 competency of, as witnesses, 459. 
 
 when jointly indicted, 460. 
 
 when separately indicted, 460. 
 
 when convicted, 460. 
 
 admission of, as witnesses, when discretionary, 460, 461. 
 
 promises of immunity to, 461. 
 
 claims to immunity by, 461. 
 
 pardon of, 461. 
 
 cross-examination of, 461. 
 
 conviction on evidence of, 462. 
 
 corroboration of, 462. 
 
 extent of corroboration required, 338, 463. 
 
 corroboration, when required by statute, 463. 
 
 corroboration by confession of accused, 463, 464. 
 
 presumptions against, 338. 
 
 confessions of, 136. 
 
 ACCOUNT BOOKS: 
 
 as evidence, 78-86. 
 
 must be regularly kept, 84. 
 ACCOUNTS STATED, 113. 
 ACCUSED : 
 
 the identification of, 494, 495. 
 
 cannot be called as a witness against himself, 496.
 
 INDEX. 571 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 ACCUSED (continued) : 
 
 the credibility of his testimony, 496. 
 
 his interest, 496. 
 
 his right to confront the witnesses, 496. 
 
 presumed innocent, 497. 
 
 waives his privileges by going on stand, 497. 
 
 may be questioned as to prior life, 497. 
 
 limits of cross-examination of, 497. 
 
 effect of prior conviction, 497. 
 
 simulation of insanity by, 498. 
 
 his rights to cross-examine the witnesses, 169, 170, 4981 
 
 he may be recalled after testifying, 498. 
 
 he may object to irrelevant questions, 498. 
 
 his failure to testify, effect of, 499. 
 
 comments by counsel on, 499. 
 
 his right to be present at taking the view, 491, 492. 
 
 his explanation to the jury, 473, 473. 
 
 ACCUSED AS A WITNESS: 
 in his own behalf, 433. 
 for co-defendant, 433, 434. 
 against co-defendant, 433, 434. 
 
 ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL TRIAL: 
 
 his right to cross-examine and confront witnesses, 169, 170. 
 physical examination of, 298. 
 
 ACCUSED PERSONS (see Confessions) : 
 preliminary examination of, 131. 
 
 ACKNOWLEDGMENT : 
 
 as proof of handwriting, 187, 188. 
 
 substantial compliance with statute is required, 187. 
 
 necessity for, to obtain record, 188. 
 
 who may take, 188. 
 
 by de facto officials, 188. 
 
 before attesting witness, 188. 
 
 before relative of the grantor, 188. 
 
 before attorney of the grantor, 188. 
 
 before grantee, 188. 
 when taken out of jurisdiction of official, 189, 
 venue of, must be stated in, 189. 
 certificate of, 189. 
 official seal on, 190. 
 language of, 190. 
 amendment of, 191. 
 use of, as evidence, 192. 
 impeachment of, 192. 
 
 extrinsic evidence to supply omissions, 191. 
 as notice to purchasers, 192.
 
 572 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 ACKNOWLEDGMENT (continued) : 
 
 of married women, 192. 
 
 mandamus to compel amendment of, 19L 
 
 impeachment of, 189, 192. 
 
 conclusiveness of, 189, 192. 
 
 fraud in procuring, 189. 
 
 reformation of, in equity, 191. 
 
 of agent, when binding on the principal, 100-103. 
 (see also Admissions.) 
 ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF GOVERNMENT: 
 
 judicial notice of, 378. 
 ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PAYMENT: 
 
 evidence of, 86, 87. 
 
 of firm debt, after dissolution, 93, 94 
 
 ACQUAINTANCE : 
 
 of witness with handwriting, 195. 
 
 of witness with party at telephone, 122. 
 
 ACQUIESCENCE : 
 
 as an estoppel, 111-123. 
 presumption from, 341. 
 
 ACQUITTAL: 
 
 of witness, admits incriminating questions, 522. 
 of accomplice, its effect, 434 
 
 ACTS: 
 
 of congress, judicial notice of, 374-376. 
 
 of executive officials, 379. 
 
 estoppel from, 118-122. 
 
 of untruthfulness to impeach, 506. 
 (see also Admissions.) 
 ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE : 
 
 when witness must have, 64 
 ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION: 
 
 parol evidence of, 306. 
 ADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION (see Consideration). 
 
 ADMINISTRATOR: 
 
 exclusion of interested witnesses in actions against, 436-439. 
 
 (see also Personal Transactions.) 
 admissions by, 91, 109. 
 
 before appointment, 100. 
 
 " ADMISSIBLE : " 
 
 defined, 14, 15. 
 ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE: 
 
 of collateral facts, 17-19. 
 
 of motive, etc., 20-24 
 
 of character, 24-27.
 
 INDEX. 573 
 
 References are to pages. 
 ADMISSIONS : 
 
 definition and character, 88, 89. 
 
 privity as affecting, 89, 90. 
 
 parties whose admission is received ; joint interest, when required, 
 
 90, 91. 
 of partners, their effect, 92-94. 
 declarations of conspirators, 94-96. 
 assignor and assignee, 96, 97. 
 
 wife's admission, when binding on husband, 97, 98. 
 of inhabitants of towns, 99. 
 
 of strangers to the record ; principal and surety, 99, 100. 
 of agents, 101-104. 
 by attorneys of record, 104, 105. 
 offers of compromise; admissions under duress against interest, 106, 
 
 107. 
 in pleadings, 107, 108, 109. 
 by reference, 109-111. 
 from conduct and assumed character, 111. 
 self-serving declarations, 111-113. 
 mode of proof; nature of the admissions, 114-116. 
 weight and sufficiency of admissions, 116. 
 when conclusive; mistake, 116-11S. 
 estoppel defined, 118-120. 
 intention of party estopped, 121, 122. 
 admissions and communications sent and received by telephone, 122, 
 
 123. 
 to prove handwriting, 186, 187. 
 to prove an express trust, 400. 
 
 distinguished from declarations against interest, 162. 
 (see also Declarations.) 
 
 ADMISSION AS PRIMARY EVIDENCE, 58. 
 
 ADMISSION OF CAUSE OF ACTION: 
 
 must be seasonable, 393. 
 ADMISSION OF INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE: 
 
 when not ground for new trials, 544, 545. 
 ADOPTION: 
 
 agreements of, 406. 
 
 certificate of, as evidence, 211. 
 
 ADULTERY: 
 
 relevancy of evidence to show, 22, 24 
 
 presumption of continuance of, 350. 
 
 condonation of, burden of proof, 390. 
 
 incompetency of husband and wife on trial of issue of, 248, 
 
 ADVANCEMENTS : 
 
 parol evidence to rebut presumption of, 315. 
 
 ADVERSE EVIDENCE: 
 
 bringing out on cross-examination, 485.
 
 574 INDEX. 
 
 Beferences are to pages. 
 
 ADVERSE INTERESTS: 
 
 as disqualifying witnesses, 444 
 
 ADVERSE PARTY: 
 
 as witness, when he may be impeached, 501, 502. 
 
 ADVERSE POSSESSION: 
 
 husband and wife claiming by, 98. 
 presumptions from, 338-340. 
 resulting from parol partition, 399. 
 
 ADVERSE WITNESS: 
 
 impeachment of, by showing his bad reputation, 504 
 
 ADVERTISEMENT (see Newspapers). 
 
 ADVICE: 
 
 confidential, from attorney, 250-254 
 
 evidence to show taking, 66-68. 
 
 to show good faith, 67. 
 
 AFFECTION : 
 
 evidence to show signs of, 270. 
 AFFIDAVIT: 
 
 affidavits and depositions defined and distinguished, 526. 
 
 parties to, 526, 527. 
 
 formal requisites of, 527, 528. 
 
 language of, 529. 
 
 in denial of genuineness of writing, 187. 
 . to prove service of subpoena, 414 
 
 necessity of, to obtain continuance, 419. 
 
 what facts must be shown in, 419. 
 
 to procure attachment for a witness, 419, 420, 
 
 AFFINITY: 
 
 in declarations of pedigree, 72. 
 
 agency, not created by, alone, 97, 98. 
 AFFIRMATION: 
 
 denned, 449. 
 
 form of, 449, 450. 
 (see also Oath.) 
 AFFIRMATIVE : 
 
 burden of proof on party alleging, 381, 386, 
 AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE : 
 
 right to open and close in case of, 393. 
 AGE: 
 
 evidence of, 216. 
 
 opinion of, 269. 
 
 family reputation as to, 75. 
 
 evidence of, from inspection, 75. 
 
 inspection by jury to determine, 494 , 
 
 of document, 148.
 
 INDEX. 575 
 
 References are to pages. 
 AGENCY: 
 
 scope of. 101. 
 
 presumption of continuance of, 349. 
 
 proof of, by agent, 101-104. 
 
 between husband and wife, 97, 98. 
 
 among partners, 92-94. 
 
 of railroad employees, 103. 
 
 none from relationship, 97, 98. 
 
 usage to explain, 316, 317. 
 
 of speaker at telephone, 123, 123. 
 
 of telegraph company, 54. 
 
 creation by parol, 403. 
 
 proof by admissions, 104. 
 
 AGENTS: 
 
 declarations and admissions, 101-103. 
 
 AGREEMENTS (see Alterations ; Ambiguity; Admissions ; Parol Evi- 
 dence ; Consideration ; Seals, etc). 
 
 ALCOHOLIC LIQUORS : 
 judicial notice of, 371. 
 
 ALIAS (see Assumed Name). 
 
 ALIBI : 
 
 reasonable doubt in cases of, 12. 
 burden of proof to show, 384-386. 
 what must be shown, 385. 
 (see also Absence.) 
 
 ALIEN (see Naturalization). 
 
 ALLEGATIONS : 
 
 when formal, 38, 39. 
 
 when descriptive, 36, 37. 
 ALLOWANCE : 
 
 of time, to witness, 413. 
 
 ALMANACS: 
 
 to show sunrise, 218. 
 
 as evidence, 217. 
 
 court may use to refresh recollection, 218, 380. 
 
 ALTERATIONS IN WRITINGS : 
 defined, 178. 
 
 distinguished from spoliation and from cancellation, etc., 178. 
 when material, 179. 
 in conveyances, 180. 
 fraudulently made, 180. 
 before delivery, 180. 
 blanks in writings, 180, 181. 
 presumptions as to date of, 181, 182. 
 suspicions caused by, 181.
 
 576 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 ALTERATIONS IN WRITINGS (continued): 
 
 by consent, 180. 
 
 testimony of expert to, 204. 
 
 in contracts, burden of proof, 387. 
 ALTERNATIVE CONTRACT : 
 
 proof of, under allegation of absolute contract, 40. 
 
 AMATEUR PHOTOGRAPHS: 
 their admissibility, 60. 
 
 AMBIGUITIES: 
 denned, 323. 
 
 patent and latent, 323, 325. 
 parol evidence to explain, 324. 
 evidence to prove usage in case of, 316. 
 blanks, 181, 182, 326. 
 technical words, use of, 317, 318. 
 in affidavits, 530. 
 
 AMENDMENT : 
 
 statutes of, 41, 45, 46. 
 
 of pleadings, when presumed, 354. 
 
 of certificate of acknowledgment, 191. 
 
 of returns, 229. 
 
 of affidavits, 528, 529. 
 
 ANALYSIS : 
 
 chemist may testify to the result of, 283. 
 
 ANARCHISTS' CASE, 96. 
 
 ANCESTOR : 
 
 judgment against, binds heir, 231. 
 
 admission of, binds heir, 89, 90. 
 
 ANCIENT BOUNDARIES (see Boundaries). 
 
 ANCIENT DOCUMENTS: 
 definition, 148. 
 
 must come from proper custody, 149, 150. 
 execution need not be proved, 150, 151. 
 extent of corroboration required, 151, 152. 
 
 ANCIENT FACTS : 
 
 of history, how proved, 217. 
 
 ANGER: 
 
 opinion evidence to show, 270. 
 declarations of, 68. 
 (see also Threats.) 
 
 ANIMALS : 
 
 evidence of breed of, 275. 
 
 evidence of value of, 292. 
 ANIMAL BLOOD: 
 
 distinguished from human blood, 281.
 
 INDEX. 577 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE: 
 examination of party, 297, 298. 
 
 ANOTHER SIMILAR CRIME: 
 evidence to prove, 21. 
 
 ANSWER: 
 
 of third persons, as admissions, 109-111. 
 of witness, may be qualified, 2(i7. 
 of witness, must be responsive, 476. 
 
 ANSWER IN EQUITY: 
 
 admissions contained in the, 109. 
 
 mode of proof, 221. 
 
 when it is evidence for defendant, 430-43& 
 
 conclusive on defendant, 430. 
 
 proof to overcome, 430. 
 
 waiver of verification of, 431. 
 
 when irresponsive, 431. 
 
 when contradicted by defendant, 431. 
 
 as legal conclusion, 431. 
 
 must be full and responsive, 432, 433. 
 
 when privileged, 431. 
 
 ANTE LITEM MOTAM (see Controversy): 
 
 declaration of reputation must be, 155. 
 
 defined, 156. 
 APPEAL: 
 
 effect of on final judgment, 232. 
 
 variance cannot be shown on, 46. 
 
 evidence not reviewable on, 558. 
 
 preponderance must be shown on, 558. 
 
 when insufficiency of evidence will be considered on, 559. 
 
 APPEARANCE : 
 
 of person, from inspection, 492 495. 
 
 APPOINTMENTS TO OFFICE: 
 primary evidence of, 55. 
 
 APPRAISAL : 
 
 of goods, by expert witnesses, 291-294 
 
 APPRENTICESHIP: 
 contracts of, 406. 
 
 APPROACHING DEATH: 
 sense of, 139. 
 
 how shown generally, 140. 
 by declarations, 140. 
 a question for the court, 140. 
 burden of proof to show, 140. 
 37
 
 578 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 ARBITRATION: 
 
 attendance of witnesses at an, 407. 
 agreements for, must be in writing, 406. 
 presumptions as to regularity of, 356. 
 evidence taken at. 169. 
 submission to, by attorney at law, 104. 
 
 ARBITRATORS : 
 
 competency of, as witnesses, 110. 
 
 parol evidence by. when inadmissible, 110. 
 
 rules regulating evidence before, 110, 111. 
 
 parol evidence to vary their written awards, 300. 
 
 power of, to administer oath, 451. 
 
 waiver of oath before, 451. 
 
 what facts they may prove, 447, 448. 
 
 ARCHITECT : 
 
 as an expert witness, 290. 
 
 ARREST : 
 
 privilege of witness from, 407, 421. 
 
 of non-resident witness, 421. 
 
 duration of privilege from, 422. 
 
 delay of witness abrogates privilege from, 422. 
 
 notice to officer, 422. 
 
 waiver of privilege from, by witness, 422. 
 
 of persons intimidating witness. 415. 
 
 of accused, may be shown, 497. 
 
 of witness, for contempt, 419. 
 
 (see Non-attendance and Contempt.) 
 
 ARTICLES IN COURT: 
 
 cannot be obtained by subpoena duces tecum, 412. 
 exhibition of, to explain evidence, 60-62. 
 
 ASSAULT: 
 
 right to open and close in trial for an, 391. 
 
 ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES: 
 
 for land taken, right to open and close, 393, 394 
 ASSESSMENT ROLLS: 
 
 as evidence, 210. 
 ASSESSOR : 
 
 confidential communications to, 256. 
 ASSIGNMENT: 
 
 of lease, must be in writing, 401, 406. 
 
 parol evidence to vary, 300. 
 
 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: 
 necessity for, 539. 
 
 ASSIGNMENT OF JUDGMENT: 
 proof of, 225.
 
 INDEX. 579 
 
 References axe to pages. 
 ASSIGNOR: 
 
 when incompetent, 443. 
 
 of negotiable paper, 444. 
 
 his admissions, when binding on assignee, 96. 
 
 judgment against, when binding on assignee, 231. 
 
 ASSUMED NAME: 
 
 living under, 23. 
 ASSUMING QUESTIONS: 
 
 confessions procured by means of, 130. 
 (see Hypothetical Questions.) 
 
 ASSUMPSIT, ACTION OF: 
 formal allegations in, 38. 
 by witness, to recover expenses, 411. 
 
 ASSUMPTION OF FACTS: 
 
 in hypothetical questions. 272-274. 
 
 by court in its charge, 31. 
 ATTACHMENT: 
 
 against witness, when granted, 410, 411. 
 
 may be ex parte, 419. 
 
 affidavits to show ground for, 419. 
 
 discretionary character of, 420. 
 
 for witness giving deposition, 420. 
 
 ATTACK: 
 
 on validity of judgment, 230, 
 effect of presumptions, 355. 
 
 ATHEISM : 
 
 as disqualifying a witness, 451, 452. 
 ATTEMPT: 
 
 to prevent the attendance of witnesses, 415. 
 ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES: 
 
 at private arbitrations, 407. 
 
 the subpoena ; fees of witness, 407-409. 
 
 fees in criminal cases, 410, 411. 
 
 subpoena duces tecum, 411-413. 
 
 time and mode of serving the subpoena, 413, 414 
 
 recognizance, 414. 
 
 obstructing attendance of witnesses, 414, 415. 
 
 changing venue for convenience of witnesses, 415, 416. 
 
 failure of witnesses to attend; continuance when granted, 416-418. 
 
 continuance in criminal trials, 418, 419. 
 
 non-attendance of witness, when a contempt, 419, 420. 
 
 privilege of witnesses from service of civil process, 420, 42L 
 
 privilege of witnesses from civil arrest, 421. 
 
 duration of the privilege from arrest, 422. 
 
 witnesses in custody, 423. 
 
 witnesses before legislative bodies. 423.
 
 580 INDKX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 ATTESTATION: 
 of will, 405, 406. 
 
 ATTORNEY AT LAW: 
 
 competency of, as a witness, 4-16. 
 
 admissions by, 104, 105, 107--109. 
 
 stipulations by, 104. 
 
 compromises by, 104. 
 
 submission to arbitration by, 104. 
 
 as witness to handwriting. 198, 203. 
 
 for grantor, acknowledgment before, 188. 
 
 power of to make affidavits for party, 526. 
 
 confessions obtained by, 130. 
 
 may testify to foreign law, 212. 
 
 ATTORNEY AT LAW (CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS): 
 knowledge of, obtained non -professionally, 251. 
 employed by both parties, 252, 254. 
 termination of the suit, 252. 
 waiver of privilege by client, 249, 252, 253. 
 waiver by representative of the client, 252. 
 objection to testimony of, by client, 253. 
 communications to, when acting as conveyancer, 253. 
 documents in possession of, when privileged, 253, 254, 
 both parties, when acting for, 252, 254. 
 advice by, to aid infraction of law, 254. 
 advice to both parties, 252. 
 disclaimer of, by client, 253. 
 fees of, necessity for, 250. 
 to clerk of attorney, 250. 
 to interpreter, 250. 
 third person, presence of, 250. 
 time of the confidential communication, 251. 
 what attorney may divulge, 251, 255. 
 
 ATTORNEY'S BOOKS: 
 
 as evidence, 82. 
 
 AUCTIONEER : 
 
 as agent of both parties, 403. 
 
 AUCTION SALE: 
 
 of land, contract to refraiu from bidding at, 397. 
 
 AUTHENTICATION: 
 
 of standard of comparison for handwriting, 2CO-204. 
 of private writings (see Private Writings). 
 of copies of public records, 209. 
 of copies of statutory law, 211. 
 
 AUTHOR : 
 
 of scientific treatises not under oath, 275.
 
 INDEX. 581 
 
 References are to pages. 
 AUTHORITY: 
 
 to speak through telephone. 122, 123. 
 
 of agent, created by parol, 404. 
 
 of persons making promises to secure a confession, 134. 
 
 of agents, attorneys, etc., to make admissions, 101-109. 
 
 AUTOPSIES: 
 
 medical testimony regarding, 280. 
 
 AWARDS: 
 
 as admissions. 109. 
 
 parol evidence of, 110, 30G. 
 
 setting aside, 110. 
 
 presumption of validity, 356. 
 
 facts involved in, may be shown, 448. 
 
 B. 
 
 BAD FAITH: 
 
 evidence to rebut, 23. 
 evidence to show, 23. 
 
 BAD REPUTATION OF PARTY: 
 in libel, burden of proof, 389. 
 
 BAD REPUTATION OF WITNESS: 
 
 may be shown, to impeach his credibility, 506, 507. 
 
 must not be too remote, 506. 
 
 (see Reputation for Truth.) 
 BAILMENT : 
 
 negligence in case of, when admitting evidence of bailor, 429. 
 
 receipt forming a contract of, 309, 310. 
 
 BANK BUSINESS: 
 
 regularity presumed, 133. 
 
 BANK CHECKS: 
 
 as evidence, 84. 
 BANKERS: 
 
 judicial notice of customs of, 372, 373. 
 BANK MESSENGER: 
 
 his entries as evidence, 79. 
 
 BANK OFFICIALS: 
 
 as witnesses to handwriting, 203. 
 BANK PASS-BOOKS: 
 
 as evidence, 84 
 BANKRUFfCY : 
 
 evidence of general results in, 57. 
 
 declarations to show, 67. ,i . 
 
 BAPTISM : 
 
 ceitificate of ; its use as evidence, 216.
 
 582 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 BAR: 
 
 pleading judgment in. 230, 242. 
 BARK ON TREES: 
 
 contract to soil, must be written, 397, 398. 
 BASIS OF BELIEF, 4. 
 BASIS OF FACT: 
 
 for opinion of witness, 268, 285. 
 BEER: 
 
 judicial notice of nature of, 371. 
 
 BEHAVIOR OF ACCUSED: 
 
 where homicide is charged, 24. 
 BEHAVIOR OF PERSON : 
 
 evidence to show, 270. 
 
 BELIEF: 
 
 in religion, of witnesses, 451, 452. 
 
 BELIEF OF WITNESSES : 
 
 as to meaning of conversation, 289. 
 reasons for, 267. 
 as to handwriting, 198. 
 as to identity of person or thing, 269. 
 as to good faith, intention, etc., 270. 
 (see also Expert Evidence.) 
 
 BELIEF UNDER OATH : 
 evidence to show, 505, 506. 
 
 BENEFICIARY OF TRUST: 
 
 when bound by admissions of trustee, 100. 
 
 when bound by judgment against trustee, 233. 
 BEST EVIDENCE: 
 
 when required. 47-62. 
 
 (see Primary and Secondary.) 
 BIAS: 
 
 of witness, defined, 523. 
 
 distinguished from prejudice, 523. 
 
 when it may be shown, 524. 
 
 is not collateral, 524. 
 
 from pecuniary interest, 524 
 
 from promises or threats, 525. 
 
 may be shown on direct examination, 502, 503, 
 
 in evidence of common reputation, 155. 
 BILLIARD TABLES: 
 
 judicial notice of use of, 365. 
 
 BILL OF DISCOVERY: 
 nature of, 431. 
 definition, 432. 
 interrogatories in, 432.
 
 INDEX. 58o 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 BILL OF DISCOVERY (continued): 
 answers to, must be precise, 432. 
 averments of, confessed by silence, 432. 
 privilege in refusing to answer, 432. 
 unsworn answers to, 432. 
 
 full and further answer may be compelled. 433. 
 contempt in refusing to answer, 433. 
 
 BILL OF EXCEPTIONS: 
 
 its use to show testimony of a missing witness, 172. 
 necessity for and form of, 539. 
 
 BILL OF LADING : 
 
 presumption from the possession of, 346. 
 
 BILL OF PARCELS : 
 
 does not exclude parol evidence, 308. 
 BILLS TO PERPETUATE TESTIMONY, 534, 535. 
 
 BIRTH : 
 
 not provable by certificate of baptism, 80. 
 
 family reputation as evidence of, 73, 74 
 
 primary evidence of, what is, 53. 
 BLACKBOARD : 
 
 use of by expert, 204. 
 BLANK : 
 
 in wills, cannot be filled by parol, 326. 
 
 in other writings. 180, 181. 
 BLENDED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT, 3a 
 
 BLOOD STAINS: 
 
 exhibition of clothing containing, to jury, 61. 
 evidence to identify, 281. 
 
 BLOW: 
 
 evidence to show direction of, 270. 
 
 BOARD AND LODGINGS: 
 evidence of value of, 293. 
 
 BODILY CONDITION: 
 
 at death, physician as witness to, 283. 
 
 BODILY FEELINGS: 
 
 verbal expressions of, 68-71. 
 BONA FIDES: 
 
 evidence of, 21-24. 
 
 burden of proof, 388, 389. 
 
 BONA FIDE HOLDERS: 
 
 presumptions in favor of, 346, 347. 
 BONDS : 
 
 parol evidence to vary, 301.
 
 584 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 BOOK ENTRIES: 
 
 as evidence, 78-80. 
 
 as declarations against interest, 163, 105, 166. 
 (see Stranger's Declarations.) 
 BOOK-KEEPER: 
 
 as witness to handwriting, 198, 203. 
 BOOKS : 
 
 evidence to show results of examination of, 57. 
 
 erasures in, 178-182. 
 
 alterations in, 178-182. 
 
 (see also Public Records; Documentary; Evidence.) 
 BOOKS AND PAPERS: 
 
 production of, 175, 176. 
 BOOKS OF PARTY: 
 
 as evidence for himself, 81-86. 
 BOOKS OF SCIENCE: 
 
 use of, in cross-examining experts, 275. 
 BOUNDARIES: 
 
 public and private distinguished, 158. 
 
 reputation as proof of, 90, 159. 
 
 declarations of surveyors to prove, 160, 291. 
 
 maps and field-notes to prove, 160. 
 
 parol evidence of, 321. 
 
 monuments constituting, primary evidence of, 55. 
 
 of jurisdiction, witness fees in, 408. 
 
 agreements to establish, 397. 
 
 BOUNDARIES OF STATES. COUNTIES, ETC.: 
 judicial notice of, 368, 369. 
 
 BRAKEMAN: 
 
 on trains, 288. 
 
 BREACH OF CONDITION: 
 burden of proof, 388, 38a 
 
 BREED OF ANIMALS: 
 
 books to show, 275. 
 
 BRICK BUILDING: 
 
 meaning of the term, 290. 
 
 BROKEN LEG: 
 evidence of, 282. 
 
 BROKERS : 
 
 usages of, 373. 
 
 rules of board of, 375. 
 
 BUILDER : 
 
 as au expert witness, 290.
 
 INDEX. 585 
 
 Beferences are to pages. 
 BUILDING: 
 
 opinion evidence to 8lio\v strength aud construction of, 290. 
 relevancy of evidence cff condition of, 18, 226. 
 photographs of, 59. 
 
 BURDEN OF PROOF: 
 defined, 381-383. 
 in special proceedings, 383, 384. 
 in criminal trials, 384-386. 
 
 proving a negative, facts best known to party alleging, 386-389. 
 to show confession is voluntary, 127. 
 sense of approaching death, 140. 
 to account for alterations in writing, 182. 
 
 BURGLAR'S TOOLS: 
 
 exhibition of to jury to explain the evidence, 61. 
 evidence of their possession, when relevant, 23. 
 
 BUSINESS: 
 
 usages of, 316, 317. 
 
 usual course of, to aid memory, 475. 
 
 presumptions from course, 346-349. 
 
 BUSINESS-MEN : 
 
 as witnesses to handwriting, 203. 
 
 BY-LAWS: 
 
 of municipal corporations, 213-215. 
 
 (see Municipal Ordinances.) 
 not judicially noticed, 375, 376. 
 
 c. 
 
 CALENDARS : 
 
 as evidence, 217, 218, 38a 
 
 CALLING ATTENTION: 
 
 of witness, on impeaching, 507-513. 
 
 CALLING WITNESSES : 
 
 power of the court to compel, 564. 
 by prosecution in criminal trial, 564 
 refusal of request to compel, 565. 
 
 CANCELLATION : 
 defined, 182. 
 
 CANCELLATION, SUITS FOR: 
 parol evidence in, 331, 332. 
 
 CAPACITY : 
 
 of experts, 294. 
 
 evidence of, by comparison, 296, 297. 
 
 of machinery, 290.
 
 580 INDKX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 CARE: 
 
 common knowledge, 265, 260. 
 
 special knowledge, 265-268, 289, 290. 
 
 what may have been avoided, 265, 289. 
 
 observation with evidence, to show, 268-270. 
 CARGO : 
 
 stowage of, 289. 
 CASUALTY: 
 
 opinion as to cause of, 268, 278-280, 289. 
 CAUSE : 
 
 of death, physical injuries, etc., 278-°80. 
 
 of leak in vessel, 289. 
 
 opinions as to cause, when admissible, 268. 
 
 form of question as to, 272-274. 
 
 exhibiting instrument, 279. 
 
 experiments to illustrate, 296. 
 CAUSE OF ACTION : 
 
 identity when necessary, 233, 234. 
 
 splitting of, 234. 
 CAUTION : 
 
 to be employed in weighing expert evidence, 278. 
 
 employed by witness in answering, 267. 
 
 CAUTIONING THE JURY, 31. 
 CERTAINTY : 
 
 distinguished from reasonable doubt, 10. 
 
 CERTIFICATES: 
 
 of public records, 209. 
 
 of records of public departments, 210. 
 
 of private writings, 211. 
 
 form of, 209. 
 
 deputy may sign, 209. 
 
 signature to, 209. 
 
 of consul, to show foreign law, 212. 
 
 of publication in newspaper, 214. 
 
 of baptism, 80, 216. 
 
 CERTIFICATE ACCOMPANYING DEPOSITION: 
 language of, 531. 
 as prima facie evidence to show — 
 
 reasons for taking the deposition, 531. 
 
 domicile of deponent, 531. 
 parol evidence to supply omissions, 533. 
 
 CERTIFICATE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT: 
 when recitals in, conclusive, 189. 
 official seal of, 190. 
 signature of, 190. 
 language of, 190.
 
 INDEX. 587 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 CERTIFICATE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT (continued): 
 amendment of, 191. 
 
 mandamus to compel amendment of, 191. 
 omissions in, when supplied by parol, 191. 
 impeachment of, 192. 
 conclusiveness of, 192. 
 as proof of handwriting, 187, 188. 
 necessity for, to obtain record, 188. 
 who may take, 188. 
 
 (see also under Acknowledgment, Deed, and Notary Public.) 
 
 CERTIFIED COPY: 
 
 when primary evidence, 50. 
 
 CENSUS : 
 
 proof of, 208. 
 
 CENSUS REPORTS: 
 
 judicial notice of, 368. 
 
 CHANGE OF VENUE: 
 
 for convenience of witnesses, 415, 416. 
 
 CHARACTER: 
 
 in civil actions, 24, 25. 
 
 good character of prisoner, 20. 
 
 of deceased on trial for homicide, 27. 
 
 when synonymous with reputation, 507. 
 CHARGING THE JURY : 
 
 as to the evidence, 30-34. 
 
 CHARTER: 
 
 of corporation, usage to explain. 317. 
 
 CHARTER-PARTY: 
 
 oral contract in connection with, 311. 
 CHARTS OF PEDIGREE.. 73. 
 
 CHASTITY : 
 
 evidence of, when relevant, 24. 
 
 of plaintiff in trial for seduction, 361. 
 
 CHECKS : 
 
 as evidence, 84. 
 
 CHEMICAL TESTS : 
 
 applied to writings in court, 297. 
 
 CHEMISTS : 
 
 may testify to — 
 
 as to poisons, 283. 
 results of analysis, 283. 
 effects of noxious gases. 284, 
 ingredients of ink, 281. 
 safety of lamps, 284. 
 wholesomeness of food, 284.
 
 588 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 CHILD : 
 
 exhibition of to jury, 492. 
 
 CHILDREN : 
 
 their presence at conversation between husband and wife, 248. 
 presumptions of their legitimacy, 360. 
 
 CHILDREN AS WITNESSES: 
 when presumed competent, 453. 
 when competency must be shown, 453. 
 dying declarations of, 453. 
 may be instructed, 453. 
 
 CIRCUIT COURT: 
 
 jurisdiction of, 374. 
 will notice state laws, 374 
 CIRCULATING MEDIUM: 
 judicial notice of, 365-367. 
 
 CIRCUMSTANCES: 
 
 parol evidence of, 320-322. 
 
 CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE: 
 
 direct and circumstantial evidence distinguished, 5, 6. 
 nature and effect of circumstantial evidence, 7, 8. 
 reasonable doubt and the weight of evidence, 9-13. 
 (see also Presumptions.) 
 
 CITIES: 
 
 admissions of inhabitants of, 99. 
 judicial notice of, 368, 369. 
 
 CITY STREETS: 
 
 location of, judicial notice, 366. 
 CITIZENSHIP (see Naturalization). 
 CIVIL ARREST (see also Arrest). 
 
 CIVIL PROCEEDING : 
 
 criminal intention involved in, 10. 
 CLERGYMEN : 
 
 confessions to, not privileged at common law, 130. 
 
 confidential communications to, 258, 259. 
 CLERK OF ATTORNEY: 
 
 communications to, 253. 
 CLIENT: 
 
 when bound by admissions of attorney, 104, 105. 
 
 when bound by pleadings, 107-109. 
 
 counsel may testify for, 446. 
 
 communications by, to the attorney, 251-255. 
 
 CLOTHING: 
 
 blood stains on, 61, 281. 
 
 exhibition of, to jury, to explain the evidence, 6L
 
 INDEX. 589 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 COACHING WITNESS: 
 
 to handwriting, 199. 
 
 "C. 0. D. :" 
 
 meaning of, 365. 
 
 COHABITATION : 
 
 presumption of legitimacy from, 359. 
 as proof of marriage, 158. 
 
 COIN: 
 
 judicial notice of value of, 365-367. 
 "COLD STORAGE:" 
 
 evidence to explain term, 319. 
 COLLATERAL ATTACK: 
 
 on judgment, 230. 
 COLLATERAL FACTS: 
 
 relevancy of evidence of, 17-19. 
 
 judgment, when conclusive as to, 233. 
 
 when involved in offer of compromise, 106. 
 on cross-examination, 484. 
 COLLATERAL WRITINGS: 
 
 parol evidence to show, 307, 308. 
 
 primary evidence of, 54, 55. 
 
 COLLECTIVE FACTS (see Expert and Opinion Evidence). 
 
 COLLISION : 
 
 cause of, 289. 
 COLLUSION : 
 
 absence of witness by, may be relevant, 16. 
 COLOR : 
 
 inspection by jury to determine, 493, 494. 
 
 COMBINING WITNESSES OR EVIDENCE: 
 to show value, 294. 
 
 COMMERCIAL TERMS: 
 
 evidence to explain meaning of, 318. 
 COMMISSION: 
 
 to take testimony (see Letters Rogatory). 
 COMMISSIONER: 
 
 to take testimony, power to issue subpoena, 408. 
 
 COMMITTEE OF INVESTIGATION: 
 
 attendance of witnesses, 423. 
 COMMITTEE OF LUNATIC: 
 
 exclusion of interested witnesses against, 436-445. 
 (see also Personal Transactions.) 
 COMMITMENT: 
 
 of witness in criminal trials, 414.
 
 590 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 COMMON CARRIERS: 
 
 judicial notice of customs of. 373. 
 
 COMMON DISASTER: 
 death in, 358, 359. 
 
 COMMON KNOWLEDGE: 
 
 opinion evidence, when inadmissible in matters of, 265-270. 
 
 COMMON LANDS: 
 
 parol partition of, 399. 
 
 COMMON LAW: 
 
 judicial notice of, 372. 
 
 presumption of, 348. 
 
 of foreign country, proof of, 211. 212, 
 
 illogical character of rules of, 425. 
 COMMON REPUTATION (see General Reputation). 
 
 COMMUNICATIONS : 
 
 through telephone, 122, 123. 
 
 between attorney and client. 249-255. 
 
 between husband and wife, 245-247. 
 
 between physician and patient, 259, 260. 
 
 between priest and penitent, 258, 259. 
 
 through interpreter, 66, 111, 173, 253, 469, 532. 
 
 with deceased persons, exclusion of, 440-442. 
 COMMUNITY OF INTEREST: 
 
 distinguished from privity, 90. 
 COMPARISON : 
 
 proof of value by, 294. 
 
 by experts in court, 296, 297. 
 
 of machinery, 290. 
 
 COMPARISON OF HANDWRITING: 
 defined, 200. 
 statutory rules — 
 in England, 200. 
 in America, 201. 
 comparison with irrelevant writiugs, 202. 
 COMPENSATION : 
 of experts, 277. 
 
 when entitled to, 277. 
 cannot be taxed as costs, 277. 
 for services, evidence to show, 2931 
 for witnesses (see Mileage). 
 COMPETENCY : 
 
 of deceased person as witness necessary to render dying declarations 
 
 admissible, 143. 
 of expert, witness may testify to, 271-274.
 
 INDEX. 591 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 COMPETENCY OF EVIDENCE: 
 a judicial question, 34, 35. 
 
 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES: 
 
 classes of persons incompetent, 424-426. 
 
 parties incompetent as witnesses at common law, 426, 427. 
 
 testimony of party admissible when, 427, 428. 
 
 what constitutes interest in the event, 428, 429. 
 
 exceptions to the common-law rule ; the answer as evidence for the de- 
 fendant, 429-431. 
 
 competency of witnesses in equity; the bill of discovery, 431-433. 
 
 defendant in criminal trial ; his competency, 433, 434 
 
 statutory competency of parties, 434, 435. 
 
 incompetency of interested persons to testify as to transactions with 
 deceased or insane persons, 435-439. 
 
 what are transactions with decedents, 440-442. 
 
 persons interested; their statutory incompetency, 442-445. 
 
 incompetency of parties to negotiable instruments to impeach them, 
 445, 446. 
 
 competency of counsel, 446, 447. 
 
 competency of judges, 447. 
 
 competency of arbitrators. 447, 448. 
 
 definition and form of oath and affirmation, 448-451. 
 
 incompetency because of a lack of religious belief, 451, 452. 
 
 incompetency of insane persons, 452, 453. 
 
 deaf mutes as witnesses, 453. 
 
 children as witnesses, 453, 454. 
 
 witnesses incompetent by conviction of crimes : the effect of pardon, 
 454-457. 
 
 statutory regulation of the competency of witnesses convicted of crime, 
 457, 458. 
 
 statutes construed, 458, 459. 
 
 accomplices, 459-462. 
 
 corroboration of, 462-465. 
 
 COMPETENT: 
 defined, 14. 
 
 COMPLAINT: 
 
 made by the victim of a rape, 71, 
 
 COMPROMISE, OFFERS OF: 
 as admissions, 106, 107. 
 when confidential, 106. 
 collateral facts involved in, 106. 
 by attorneys of record, 104. 
 
 COMPULSORY EXAMINATION: 
 of an accused person, 494.
 
 592 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 COMPULSORY PROCESS FOR WITNESSES: 
 right of prisoner to have, 410. 
 right to, is not absolute, 416. 
 depositions of absent witness, 411. 
 
 CONCEALMENT: 
 
 when material in an insurance policy. 295. 
 
 of witness by party admits his testimony at a former trial, 168. 
 
 CONCEALMENT OF KNOWLEDGE: 
 by witness, 512. 
 
 CONCLUSIONS : 
 
 when inadmissible, 265-270. 
 
 when admissible, 268. 
 
 inadmissible as dying declarations, 141, 143. 
 
 CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTIONS, 333, 334. 
 
 CONCLUSIVENESS : 
 
 of extra-judicial confessions, 134. 
 
 of judicial confessions, 135. 
 
 of probate of will, 227. 
 
 of judgments, 232-234. 
 
 of judgments in rem, 236. 
 
 of criminal judgments, 237. 
 
 of evidence to show value, 292. 
 
 of recitals in an acknowledgment, 189, 192. 
 
 of deeds as evidence, 307. 
 
 of the presumption of a grant, 340. 
 
 of the answer of a hostile witness, 503. 
 
 CONCLUSIVENESS OF ADMISSIONS, 116-118. 
 (see Estoppel.) 
 
 CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS : 
 
 evidence of value of land at, 18. 
 
 right to open and close in, 393. 
 CONDITION : 
 
 photographs to show, 59, 60. 
 
 physical condition, inspection by jury to show, 492-495. 
 
 of things by inspection, 60-62. 
 
 presumption of continuance of, 349. 
 
 of highways, machinery, etc., evidence to show, 269-273, 291. 
 
 of mind, evidence to show, 285-288. 
 
 of parties or subject-matter, relevancy of, 18, 20. 
 
 of culverts, evidence to show, 270, 289. 
 
 of body, 283. 
 
 of railroad, evidence to show, 288. 
 CONDITIONAL CONTRACT: 
 
 proof of, under allegation of absolute contract, 40.
 
 INDEX. 593 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 CONDITIONAL DELIVERY: 
 of deed, may be shown, 315. 
 
 CONDITIONAL PARDON : 
 effect of, 454, 456. 
 
 CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO CONTRACT IN WRITING: 
 
 when oral, may be shown, 311. 
 CONDONATION OF ADULTERY: 
 
 in divorce proceedings, burden of proof, 390. 
 
 CONDUCT: 
 
 presumptions from, 12, 298, 314, 315. 
 
 as estoppel, 111, 118-123. 
 CONDUCTOR OF RAILROAD CAR: 
 
 his admissions not binding on company, 102. 
 
 duty of, evidence to show, 288. 
 
 CONFEDERATE (see Conspiracy). 
 
 CONFESSIO JURIS: 
 
 evidence of, is inadmissible, 58. 
 
 CONFESSIONS : 
 
 definition and classification, 124, 125. 
 to be regarded with caution, 125, 126. 
 voluntary character of, 126-128. 
 when voluntary ; inducements offered, 128, 129. 
 need not be spontaneous, 129-131. 
 preliminary examination, 131-133. 
 extra-judicial must be corroborated, 133, 134. 
 conclusive character of judicial confessions, 135. 
 persons offering inducements, 135, 136. 
 of persons other than defendant, 136. 
 of conspirators, 136, 137. 
 of treason, 137, 564. 
 
 (see also Admissions; Declarations; Privileged Communica- 
 tions; Reference; Silence.) 
 
 CONFESSION AND AVOIDANCE: 
 
 burden of proving in plea of, 383. 
 CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT: 
 
 after dissolution of firm by partner, 93. i 
 
 CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS (see Privileged Communications). 
 CONFIDENTIAL OFFERS OF COMPROMISE, 106. 
 CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS : 
 
 presumption of undue influence from, 389. 
 CONFINEMENT : 
 
 of witnesses, 414. 
 CONFLICT OF WITNESSES: 
 
 is not impeachment, 501. 
 38
 
 .">91 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 CONFRONTING THE WITNESSES: 
 
 before interstate commerce commission, 496. 
 constitutional right of, 495. 
 evidence of deceased witnesses, 495. 
 evidence received by interpreter, 495. 
 absence of witness caused by accused, 496. 
 right is reciprocal, 496. 
 
 (see also Taking the View.) 
 
 CONGRESS : 
 
 acts of, how proved, 208. 
 
 CONJECTURE : 
 
 as a basis for hypothetical questions, 273. 
 
 CONNECTING EVIDENCE: 
 
 when alleged to be irrelevant, 16. 
 
 CONNECTION OF WRITINGS: 
 parol evidence to show, 308, 309. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS : 
 of guilt, 126-128. 
 
 (see also Admissions ; Confessions ; Silence.) 
 of danger, as affecting confessions, 131-133. 
 of deceased persons, 146. 
 
 CONSENT: 
 
 to alterations, when implied, 180. 
 
 CONSEQUENCES : 
 
 natural, when presumed to be intended, 361, 363. 
 
 CONSIDERATION : 
 denned, 306. 
 
 must be proved strictly, 40, 41. 
 parol evidence of, 305-307. 
 presumption of, 346. 
 burden of proof to show validity of, 383. 
 payment of, in a parol sale of land, 397. 
 may be shown by parol, 402. 
 illegality of, may be shown, 305-307. 
 
 CONSPIRATORS : 
 
 declarations of, 94-96. 
 
 confessions of, 134, 135. 
 CONSTITUTION : 
 
 judicial notice of, 373, 374. 
 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT: 
 
 of accused, to have compulsory prqcess, 410, 411. 
 
 CONSTRUCTION : 
 
 of machinery, evidence to show, 290.
 
 INDEX- 595 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 CONSTRUCTION OF WRITINGS : 
 
 distinguished from their interpretation, 301, 302. 
 
 definition, 302. 
 
 liberal and strict construction, 302. 
 
 pi'ovince of jury, 303. 
 
 adherence to former construction, 304 
 
 foreign records, 226. 
 
 contracts and wills contrasted, 32.7. 
 
 of affidavits, 530. 
 CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS: 
 
 parol evidence to establish, 312. 
 
 by gift in will, 32a 
 
 CONSUL: 
 
 certificate of, to show foreign law, 213. 
 may testify to foreign law, 213. 
 
 CONTEMPORANEOUS CHARACTER : 
 
 of res gestae, 77. 
 
 of writings to refresh memory, 478, 479. 
 
 CONTEMPORANEOUS WRITINGS: 
 
 incorporation of, by reference, 308, 309. 
 CONTEMPT: 
 
 expert witness cannot be committed for, if refusing to testify without 
 compensation, 277. 
 
 non-attendance of witness, when, 419. 
 
 attachment in cases of, 419. 
 
 evidence to show, 419, 420. 
 
 wilful delay no excuse, 420. 
 
 by deponent, 420. 
 
 power of congress to commit for, 423. 
 
 in equity, 433. 
 
 power of arbitrators to commit for, 407. 
 
 non-attendance of witness, when not, 410. 
 
 of witness remaining in court, 467. 
 
 CONTESTED ELECTIONS : 
 judicial notice of, 370. 
 
 CONTINUANCE, FOR ABSENCE OF WITNESSES: 
 affidavit to obtain, 526. 
 when granted, 416. 
 party must not be negligent, 416. 
 discretion of court to grant, 416. 
 stipulation to avoid, 416, 419. 
 witness must be material, 417. 
 witness must be procurable, 417. 
 
 evidence must not be cumulative, and must be probably true, 418. 
 in criminal trials, 418, 419. 
 party must show diligence, 417, 418.
 
 596 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 CONTINUANCE, FOR ABSENCE OF WITNESSES (continued): 
 
 facts must appear in affidavit, 419. 
 
 language of affidavit, 419. 
 
 evidence admitted to avoid, impeachment of, 503. 
 (see Non-attendance.) 
 CONTINUED COURSE OF DEALING: 
 
 evidence of, to construe contract, 304. 
 CONTINUITY : 
 
 presumption of, 349. 
 
 CONTINUOUS SEIZIN : 
 
 presumption from. 339. 
 CONTRACT: 
 
 variance in proof of, 40. 
 
 parol evidence to vary, etc., 301. 
 
 impeaching validity of, 304, 305. 
 
 impeaching consideration in, 305, 306. 
 
 alteration of, burden of proof, 387. 
 
 right to open and close in actions on, 390. 
 
 for default of another under statute of frauds, 403. 
 
 under statute of frauds, 397-404. 
 
 to make will, must be in writing, 406. 
 
 (see Alterations ; Consideration, etc.) 
 " CONTRACT IN ISSUE : " 
 
 defined, 441. 
 
 CONTRACTS AND RECEIPTS: 
 
 distinguished, 310. 
 
 CONTRACTS IN WRITING: 
 best evidence of, 52-54 
 
 CONTRACT OF HIRING : 
 proof of. 40, 41. 
 
 CONTRADICTION : 
 of confessions, 134. 
 
 does not render admissions incompetent, 115. 
 of one's own witness incidentally, 501. 
 by usage. 316, 317. 
 of recitals, 304-306. 
 of expert, by text-books, 275. 
 
 CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS: 
 as in showing admissions, 115. 
 proving, to impeach witness, 507. 
 laying foundation for, 508. 
 the rule in the Queen's Case, 508. 
 time and place of, must be stated, 508. 
 evidence on former trial, 508. 
 when forgotten, mode of proof, 509.
 
 INDEX. 597 
 
 Eeferences are to pages. 
 
 CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS (continued): 
 when denied, mode of proof, 509. 
 in affidavits and depositions. 509. 510. 
 impeaching affidavits by, 510, 511. 
 when in writing it must be shown, 510, 511. 
 in writing, denial of, 511. 
 as to irrelevant matters, 511. 
 confirmatory statements to rebut, 511. 
 confirmatory statements to show bias, 512. 
 explaining on redirect examination, 486. 
 of accused, may be shown, 497. 
 
 CONTRADICTORY WRITINGS : 
 
 reconciling by parol evidence, 308. 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE: 
 burden of proof, 388. 
 must be pleaded, 46. . 
 
 CONTROVERSY (see Ante Litem Motam): 
 definition of, 156. 
 declarations must precede, 156. 
 declarant must have knowledge, 157. 
 knowledge of controversy will be presumed, 157. 
 declarations made to prevent, 158. 
 
 CONVENIENCE : 
 
 of witnesses, change of venue for, 416. 
 
 CONVERSATION : 
 
 to explain intention, entire statement of, interpreted, 66, 111, 253. 
 
 through telephone, 122, 123. 
 
 signs as, 453. 
 
 evidence to show understanding of, 268, 269. 
 
 referred to in a writing, 307. 
 
 CONVERSION : 
 
 burden of proof in, 389. 
 
 CONVEYANCES: 
 
 acknowledgment of, 187-192. 
 by corporation, 185. 
 when unstamped, 211. 
 parol evidence to vary, 300. 
 presumption of delivery of, etc., 345. 
 
 CONVEYANCERS : 
 
 confidential communications to, 253. 
 
 as witnesses to handwriting. 203. 
 
 judicial notice of customs of, 373. 
 CONVICT: 
 
 as witness, continuance in case of, 416.
 
 598 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 CONVICTION OF CRIME: 
 
 admissibility of, as evidence, 257. 
 
 to prove fact of conviction, 238. 
 
 suing for exoneration, 238. 
 
 infamous crime, what is, 454 
 
 incompetency caused by, 454. 
 
 effect of pardon, 454. 
 
 when pardon of, is conditional, 454. 
 
 absolute incompetency caused by, 457. 
 
 when an objection to credibility, 458. 
 
 mode of proving, 458. 
 
 what may be shown, 459. 
 
 may be shown by questioning accused, 497. 
 
 primary evidence of, 517. 
 
 questions put to witness to show, 518. 
 
 when renders affidavit incompetent, 526. 
 
 COPIES: 
 
 when receivable as secondary evidence, 48, 49. 
 
 of statutory laws, 209-211. 
 
 of legislative acts, 208. 
 
 as primary evidence of written admissions, 115. 
 
 use of, to refresh memory, 479, 480. 
 
 (see Exemplified Copies ; Public Records, eta) 
 
 COPIES, CERTIFIED (see Certificates). 
 
 CORONER'S INQUEST: 
 
 evidence taken at, cannot be used subsequently if a witness is missing, 
 
 169. 
 examination of accused at, 132. 
 
 CORPORATION : 
 
 presumption of continuance of, 350. 
 
 execution of conveyance by, 185. 
 
 when bound by admissions, 102. 
 
 their members, when incompetent as witnesses at common law, 427. 
 
 affidavits by officer of, 527. 
 
 CORPORATION CHARTERS: 
 
 judicial notice of, 376. 
 CORPORATION RECORDS: 
 
 right to inspect, 207. 
 
 primary evidence of, 54 
 
 CORPUS DELICTI: 
 
 order of proof of, 16. 
 
 confession as proof of, 133, 135. 
 
 in passing counterfeit money, 134 
 CORRECTNESS : 
 
 of records, when presumed, 354.
 
 INDEX. 599 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 CORRESPONDENCE: 
 
 declarations of pedigree in, 73. 
 
 familiarity with handwriting derived from, 197.J 
 
 CORROBORATION : , 
 
 of extra-judicial confessions, 133, 134. 
 
 required in the case of ancient writings, 151, 152. 
 
 required of plaintiff in equity, 430, 431. 
 
 of witness, by showing former statements, 511. 
 
 to show bias, 512. 
 
 of evidence of impeached witness, 514. 
 
 required in trial for perjury, 562. 
 
 CORROBORATION OF ACCOMPLICES: 
 mode and extent of, 462, 463. 
 when required by statute, 464. 
 in case of felonies, 463. 
 in case of misdemeanor, 463. 
 must tend to show guilt, 464. 
 question for jury, 464. 
 question for court, 464. 
 by confession of accused, 464. 
 
 CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE: 
 defined, 3. 
 
 COSTS : 
 
 where amendment is allowed, 45. 
 
 COUNSEL: 
 
 when taken excludes declarations, 77. 
 competency of, as witnesses, 446. 
 may state testimony of absent witness, 173. 
 (see also Privileged Communications.) 
 
 COUNTERFEIT MONEY: 
 
 presumptions from possession of, 342, 343. 
 corpus delicti of issuing, 134. 
 
 COUNTERPARTS : 
 
 their use and effect as evidence, 49. 
 
 COUNTIES : 
 
 judicial notice of, 368, 369. 
 admissions of inhabitants of, 99. 
 
 COURSE OF TRADE : 
 presumption from, 346. 
 
 COURT, CONTEMPT OF (see Contempt; Non-attendance of Wit- 
 ness). 
 
 COURTS : 
 
 presumptions as to their jurisdiction, 353-356. 
 records of (see Public Records).
 
 600 INDEX. 
 
 Beferences are to pages. 
 
 COURTS NOT OF RECORD: 
 proving their proceedings, 221. 
 
 COURT ORDERS: 
 
 as evidence of reputation, 161. 
 
 CRAMPED HANDWRITING: 
 
 testimony of expert to, 204. 
 CREDIBILITY : 
 
 of circumstantial evidence, 8. 
 
 of admissions, 114, 115. 
 
 of dying declarations, 144. 
 
 of private entries, 215. 
 
 of expert evidence, 276. 
 
 as affected by interest, 434-437. 
 
 of evidence, is for jury, 473. 
 
 of evidence of insane person, 453. 
 
 of the evidence of the accused, 496. 
 
 impeachment of, 500-524. 
 
 CRIME : 
 
 conviction of, when admissible, 518. 
 
 (see Conviction ; Infamous Crimes.) 
 CRIMINAL CONVERSATION : 
 
 incompetency of husband and wife, 248. 
 CRIMINAL INTENT: 
 
 relevancy of evidence of similar acts, 21, 
 
 presumptions of, 361-363. 
 CRIMINAL JUDGMENTS: 
 
 operation and effect of, 237. 
 CRIMINAL TRIALS : 
 
 variance in, 43-46. 
 
 exhibition of articles to the jury in, 61. 
 
 competency of wife in trial of husband, 245. 
 
 burden of proof in, 384. 
 
 right to open and close, 394. 
 
 fees of witnesses in, 410, 411. 
 
 recognizance to secure attendance of witness in, 414 
 
 change of venue, for convenience of witnesses, 416, 
 
 continuance in, for absent witnesses, 418, 419. 
 
 indictment not evidence in, 490. 
 
 CRIMINATING ARTICLES: 
 
 illegally obtained from the accused, 61. 
 CRIMINATION: 
 
 by writing name, 200. 
 CROPS : 
 
 farmer as witness to value of, 292. 
 
 growth, etc., judicial notice of, 366, 367. 
 
 sale of, when growing, 397, 398.
 
 INDEX. 601 
 
 ^References are to pages. 
 
 CROSS-EXAMINATION : 
 
 as to contents of writing, 51. 
 
 utility of, 64, 400. 
 
 admissions made on, 107. 
 
 as to voluntary nature of a confession, 127. 
 
 necessity of opportunity for, 170. 
 
 of witnesses, to handwriting, 198-200. 
 
 party may be asked to write his name on, 200. 
 
 of expert, 272, 273, 275. 
 
 right to, when exists. 481. 
 
 of witness, producing writing, 481. 
 
 waiver of right to, 481. 
 
 by intervening party, 481. 
 
 confined to matters brought out on direct, 481. 
 
 value of rapidity in, 481. 
 
 evasive answers on, 482. 
 
 as to irrelevant matters, 482. 
 
 discretion of court, 482. 
 
 motion to strike out by party denied right of, 482. 
 
 questions affecting credibility, 483. 
 
 questions on, to ascertain memory, knowledge, etc., of witness, 483. 
 
 prolongation of, 483, 484. 
 
 repetition of questions on, 484 
 
 collateral facts on, 484. 
 
 testing truthfulness of witness on, 484. 
 
 conclusiveness of, 484. 
 
 when witness may repeat testimony on, 483. 
 
 impeaching on, 485. 
 
 showing hostility of witness on, 485, 486. 
 
 right of accused to, 498. 
 
 irrelevant questions to accused on, 498. 
 
 writing by accused on, 498. 
 
 making adverse witness one's own by, 501. 
 
 disgracing questions on, 517. 
 
 CRY: 
 
 of pain, admissibility of, 68. 
 
 CULVERT: 
 
 evidence to show condition of, 270, 289, 
 
 CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE: 
 defined, 3. 
 on recalling witness, 487. 
 
 CURABLENESS : 
 
 opinion as to, 279, 280. 
 
 CUSTOMS (see Usage) : 
 judicial notice of, 372. 
 of foreign countries, proof required, 373.
 
 602 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 DAMAGES : 
 
 evidence of, 292, 293. 
 
 actions to recover, burden of proof, 388. 
 
 when admitted, burden of proof, 383. 
 
 when unliquidated, burden of proof, 389. 
 
 when unliquidated, right to open and close, 390-392. 
 
 when liquidated, right to open and close, 392, 393. 
 
 DAMPNESS : 
 
 of walls, its cause, 290. 
 
 DATE: 
 
 of birth, 80. 
 
 evidence of, 365. 
 
 of contracts, may be varied, 314 
 
 of erasures, 182. 
 
 of delivery of deed, 345. 
 
 relevancy of evidence to fix, 20. 
 
 DATE OF DEATH: 
 
 presumption of, 357. 
 judicial notice of, 370, 371. 
 DATE OF WRITING : 
 
 testimony of expert to decipher, 204. 
 
 may be supplied or explained by parol, 307, 314. 
 
 presumed correct, 314. 
 
 DAY OF WEEK : 
 
 judicially noticed, 365. 
 
 DEADLY WEAPON: 
 
 presumption from deliberate use of, 361, 362. 
 
 DEAF MUTES, AS WITNESSES: 
 common-law incompetency of, 453. 
 their present competency, 453. 
 may give testimony in writing, 453. 
 or by signs, 453. 
 
 DEALERS : 
 
 as expert witnesses to value, 292. 
 DEATH: 
 
 family reputation as evidence of, 75. 
 
 sense of approach of, 138-141. 
 
 of declarant, necessary to admit reputation, 155. 
 
 of declarant against interest, 165. 
 
 of subscribing witness, 194 
 
 effect of on confidential communication, 248. 
 
 physician may testify to — 
 
 probable cause of, 278, 279. 
 
 probable time of, 280. 
 
 probable means of, 281. 
 
 condition of body at, 283.
 
 INDEX. 603 
 
 Keferences are to pages. 
 DEATH (continued): 
 
 presumption of, from absence, 356. 
 
 of one having fixed abode, 357. 
 
 date of, 357. 
 
 presumption of, without issue, heirs, etc., 358. 
 
 evidence of report of, 358. 
 
 in common disaster, 358, 359. 
 
 presumption in case of, when caused by use of a deadly weapon, 381, 
 
 362. 
 incompetency of interested witness in case of, 435-445. 
 
 DEBT: 
 
 presumption of payment of, 347. 
 
 DEBTOR : 
 
 admissions of, when binding on surety, 99. 
 
 DECEASED MEMBER OF FAMILY: 
 
 his declarations, 72. 
 
 DECEASED PERSONS: 
 
 declarations of, 90, 155, 165. 
 dying declarations of, 138-147. 
 
 (see Personal Transactions with Deceased.) 
 
 DECEASED WITNESSES (see Absent Witnesses). 
 
 DECEIT: 
 
 writings obtained by, 177. 
 DECEPTION : 
 
 confessions procured by deception, 130. 
 
 DECK LOAD: 
 
 safety of, 289. 
 DECLARATIONS: 
 
 as evidence of marriage, 54. 
 
 of bodily or mental feelings, 68-71. 
 
 constituting a part of the res gestce, 74-80. 
 
 constituting pedigree, 71-74 
 
 when self-serving, 111-113. 
 
 of general reputation, 153-161. 
 
 of testator, when admissible, 322. 
 
 (see also Admissions ; Dying Declarations.) 
 DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST, 162-16& 
 
 (see Stranger's Declarations.) 
 DECLARATIONS OF TRUST : 
 
 under the statute of frauds, 400. 
 DECOY LETTERS, 177, 178. 
 DEDICATION : 
 
 evidence of reputation to prove, 161. 
 DEDIMUS (see Deposition and Letters Rogatory^
 
 604 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 DEEDS : 
 
 pedigree in, 73. 
 
 as evidence of reputation, 161. 
 destruction of, 178. 
 fraudulent alterations of, 180. 
 blanks in, 180. 
 
 unrecorded, when valid, 188. 
 acknowledgment of, 188-192. 
 presumption as to alterations in, 181. 
 incorporation of, by reference, 308, 309. 
 authority to execute must be under seal, 403. 
 (see Delivery.) 
 
 DEEDS. PROOF OF (see Ancient Documents). 
 
 DE FACTO OFFICIALS: 
 
 their appointment and tenure, 55. 
 
 may take acknowledgments, 188. 
 DEFEASANCE : 
 
 of mortgage, may be shown by parol, 333. 
 
 DEFECTIVE AFFIDAVITS: 
 amendment of, 528. 
 
 DEFENDANT : 
 
 when he may open and close, 390, 391. 
 
 when competent for or against each other — 
 in civil cases, 427, 428. 
 in criminal cases, 433, 434. 
 
 in equity, answer, when evidence for him, 430, 431. 
 answer as admissions, 109. 
 DELAY: 
 
 as excluding declarations, 77. 
 
 presumption from, 341. 
 
 estoppels from, 338-340. 
 DELIBERATE FALSEHOOD: 
 
 presumption from, 512-514. 
 DELIBERATION: 
 
 as shown by writing, 300. 
 
 DELIBERATION IN HOMICIDE: 
 declarations to show, 76. 
 
 DELIVERY (see also Deeds; Date, etc.): 
 
 of deed, parol evidence to show, 305. 
 
 of deed, when presumed, 345, 346. 
 
 evidence to rebut presumption, 315. 
 DEMAND: 
 
 as evidence of value, 293. 
 DEMEANOR: 
 
 evidence to show, 24, 270.
 
 INDEX. CU5 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 DEMONSTRATION : 
 defined, 3, 10. 
 
 DEMURRER : 
 
 to bill in equitj' : its effect, 433. 
 
 DEMURRER TO THE EVIDENCE: 
 
 in civil cases, 549. 
 
 in criminal trial, 550. 
 DENIAL: 
 
 of right to open and close, 392. 
 
 when refusal to deny is an admission, 112. 
 DEPARTMENTAL REGULATIONS : 
 
 judicial notice of, 370. 
 DEPOSITION : 
 
 non-production of, its effect, 16. 
 
 witness may be released on giving, 414. 
 
 when obtainable to avoid continuance, 416. 
 
 of insane persons, 453. 
 
 definition and character of, 529, 530. 
 
 mode of procuring, 531, 532. 
 
 statutes construed ; the certificate, 532. 
 
 objections to, 533, 534. 
 
 use of depositions as evidence, 534. 
 
 equitable bills to perpetuate testimony, 535. 
 
 impeachment by contradictory statements, 510, 511. 
 DEPUTY-SHERIFF: 
 
 ad?nissions of, binding on sheriff, 99. 
 DERAILMENT OF RAILROAD TRAINS, 288. 
 DESCRIPTION : 
 
 when ambiguous, parol evidence to explain, 321. 
 DESIGN: 
 
 to mislead, in estoppel, 121. 
 
 DESTITUTION : 
 
 evidence to show, 269. 
 DESTRUCTION : 
 
 of deed by stranger, effect of, 178. 
 
 of deed by party, effect of, 178. 
 DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE: 
 
 presumption from, 343, 344. 
 
 DESTRUCTION OF WRITING: 
 must be shown, 183. 
 oath of party to show, 183. 
 whether shown, a judicial question, 184 
 preliminary proof necessary, 184. 
 search for writing must be shown, 184. 
 lost instrument, in hands of bona fide holder, 184.
 
 606 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 DETAILS: 
 
 opinion of witness, with, 268, 269. 
 refreshing memory, 477-479. 
 
 DETECTIVES: 
 
 evidence obtained by, 5, 178. 
 
 DETENTION : 
 
 of witnesses, 414. 
 
 DEVELOPMENT OF LAW, 1. 
 
 DEVIATION: 
 
 by witness in returning from court, 422. 
 
 DEVISEES : 
 
 admissions of, not binding on co-devisees, 91* 
 bound by admissions of the testator, 89. 
 
 DIAGRAMS (see Maps). 
 
 DIARY OF SURGEON: 
 entry in, as evidence, 80. 
 
 DIRECT EVIDENCE: 
 
 definition of, 6. 
 
 may be disregarded by the jury, 12. 
 
 as a basis for presumptions, 835, 336. 337. 
 DIRECT EXAMINATION: 
 
 distinguished from cross-examination, 468. 
 
 mode of conducting, 469. 
 
 leading questions on, 470. 
 
 assuming questions on, 470. 
 
 when leading questions are allowed, 471. 
 
 answers on, may be in narrative form, 471. 
 
 questions by the court on, 471-473. 
 
 leading questions on, 474, 475. 
 
 disgracing questions on, 516. 
 DIRECTING A VERDICT: 
 
 when it may be done, 28. 
 
 on prima facie case, 382. 
 
 DIRECTION OF BLOW: 
 evidence to show, 270. 
 
 DIRECTORS : 
 
 admissions of, when binding — 
 on co-directors, 91. 
 on corporation, 102. 
 "DIRECT ROUTE:" 
 
 of travel, defined, 410. 
 DISASTERS : 
 
 presumption of death in, 358.
 
 INDEX. 607 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 DISCHARGE : 
 
 of writing, may be shown by parol, 312-314 
 of witness from arrest, 421. 
 
 DISCHARGE OF PRISONER: 
 how proved, 216. 
 
 DISCLAIMER : 
 
 of attorney by client, 253. 
 
 DISCOVERY : 
 
 by defendant, made in equity, 431-433. 
 
 DISCOVERY OF BOOKS AND PAPERS: 
 how obtained, 175. 
 
 DISCREDIT: 
 
 error to cast, on expert testimony, 276. 
 
 DISCREPANCIES : 
 
 reconcilement of, 32. 
 
 DISCRETIONARY POWER: 
 to allow amendments, 46. 
 
 DISCRETION OF COURT: 
 
 right to open and close in, 394, 395. 
 to grant continuance — 
 in civil trial, 416. 
 in criminal trial, 418. 
 to recall witness, 487. 
 to decide on necessity for depositions, 532* 
 over cross-examination, 484 
 to permit disgracing questions, 517. 
 to limit number of witnesses, 562. 
 defined and distinguished, 566, 567. 
 
 DISEASE: 
 
 evidence by expert, 279. 
 
 curability and character of, 280. 
 
 simulation of, 280. 
 
 proper treatment of, 281, 282. 
 
 evidence of, by non-expert witness, 283. 
 
 DISGRACING QUESTIONS: 
 rule when relevant, 516. 
 as to irrelevant matters, 516. 
 in the cross-examination, 516. 
 discretion of court to admit, 517, 519. 
 protecting the witness from, 517. 
 as to specific facts, 517. 
 must not be too remote, 517. 
 to show prior conviction of witness, 517, 51& 
 form of, 518.
 
 008 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 DISGRACING QUESTIONS (continued) : 
 in trial for rape, 518. 
 answer to, when not conclusive, 518. 
 
 to show habits, occupation and social surroundings of the witness, 518. 
 protection from, 519. 
 
 DISOBEDIENCE (see also Non-attendance): 
 by a witness, 407, 419, 420. 
 excused by his poverty, 410. 
 to subpoena duces tecum, 412, 413. 
 evidence to show, 414. 
 
 DISPOSITION OF A PERSON: 
 evidence to show, 269-271. 
 relevancy of proof of, 21. 
 
 DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS, 333. 
 
 DISPUTED WRITINGS: 
 
 primary evidence of, 51, 52. 
 testimony to genuineness of, 195-197. 
 proof of, by comparison, 200-204. 
 
 DISQUALIFICATION : 
 
 of witnesses (see Absent Witnesses). 
 
 DISSEIZIN : 
 
 presumption arising from, 339. 
 
 DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP: 
 
 power of partner to bind firm after, 93. 
 
 DISTANCES : 
 
 judicial notice of, 368. 
 
 DISTRICT ATTORNEY: 
 
 must not obstruct witnesses, 415. 
 
 "DOCKET:" 
 
 definition of, 221. 
 
 - DOCUMENT : " 
 defined, 175. 
 
 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE: 
 
 presumptions from possession of, 344. 
 
 (see also Public Records ; Private Writings.) 
 obtained by subpoena duces tecum, 411-413. 
 
 evidence of contents of, inadmissible against representative, 441. 
 (see Statute of Frauds.) 
 
 DOCUMENTS: 
 
 admissible as a part of the res gestce, 78-86. 
 when ancient, 148-152.
 
 INDEX. 009 
 
 References are to pages. 
 DOMICILE: 
 
 declarations to show change of, 76. 
 
 not provable by reputation, 157. 
 
 presumption of continuance of, 350. 
 
 absence from, presumption created by, 356-358. 
 
 surviving party may testify to, 441. 
 
 of deponent, evidence of, 532. 
 
 DOUBT : 
 
 expression of, by witness, 267. 
 (see Reasonable Doubt.) 
 
 DRAINS: 
 
 evidence to show condition of, 270, 289. 
 
 DRUGS : 
 
 possession of, intended to procure an abortion, 285. 
 judicial notice of, 372. 
 
 DRUNKENNESS, 269. 
 (see Intoxication.) 
 
 DUCES TECUM. SUBPOENA : 
 when it issues, 411. 
 language of must be certain, 412. 
 
 to produce articles or memoranda to refresh memory, 412. 
 power to issue, whence derived, 412. 
 excuses for disobedience to, by public or private officials, 412. 
 
 DUPLICATE : 
 
 of will, may be shown, 328. 
 DURATION : 
 
 opinion evidence to show, 267. 
 
 DURESS : 
 
 in procuring writing, may be shown by parol, 305. 
 
 rendering confession inadmissible, 127, 128. 
 DUTY: 
 
 presumption of performance of, 349. 
 
 non-performance of, burden of proof, 387-389. 
 
 negligent performance of, burden of proof, 389. 
 
 DYING DECLARATIONS: 
 defined, 138. 
 
 necessity for religious belief of deceased, 138. 
 made under sense of approaching death, 139. 
 proof of sense of death, 139. 
 by his own statements, 140. 
 subsequent expectation of recovery, 140. 
 admissible only in cases of homicide, 141. 
 time intervening before death occurs, 141. 
 dying declarations and res gestce distinguished, 142. 
 credibility and weight of, 144. 
 39
 
 610 Index. 
 
 Heferences are to pages. 
 
 DYING DECLARATIONS (continued): 
 in cases of alibi, 143. 
 form of the dying declaration, K5. 
 influence of a narcotic, 145 
 by signs, 145, 146. 
 in writings, 146. 
 language of, 146. 
 untruthfulness of, 147. 
 not admissible in civil cases, 145. 
 contemporaneous deaths, 145. 
 witness may state substance of, 147. 
 (see also Declarations.) 
 
 E. 
 
 EASEMENTS: 
 
 presumption of grant of, 840. 
 
 agreement to create, must be in writing, 397. 
 
 EARNINGS: 
 
 of expert witness, evidence inadmissible, 275. 
 
 EFFECT : 
 
 of what was said, 269. 
 
 probability of future, 278-280. 
 
 opinion evidence to show% 268. 
 EJACULATIONS : 
 
 admissibility of evidence to show, 68. 
 
 ELECTIONS : 
 
 judicial notice of, 369, 370. 
 
 EMINENT DOMAIN: 
 
 right to open and close in proceedings in, 393. 
 
 EMPLOYEES : 
 
 of corporations, declarations by, 102. 
 
 EMPLOYEES' ENTRIES: 
 
 as evidence, 81-85. 
 ENDORSEMENT (see Indorsement). 
 
 ENGINEER: 
 
 his admissions not binding on railroad company, 102. 
 
 ENJOYMENT : 
 
 evidence of, to corroborate reputation, 155. 
 presumptions from, when continuous, 339, 340. 
 
 ENTRIES : 
 
 which are a part of the res gestce. 78-80. 
 as declarations agaiust interest, 163, 165, 166. 
 (see Stranger's Declarations.) 
 
 EQUITABLE ESTOPPELS, 119-122.
 
 INDEX. 61 1 
 
 References are to pages. 
 EQUITY: 
 
 jurisdiction of, as influenced by the statute of frauds, 398. 
 
 answer of defendant in, 429-433. 
 
 bills in, to perpetuate testimony, 534, 535. 
 EQUITY, COURTS OF: 
 
 proving their records, 221. 
 EQUIVOCAL ACTS: 
 
 declarations to explain, 76. 
 
 ERASURES : 
 
 presumptions as to date, 182. 
 expert testimony to, 204. 
 (see Alterations.) 
 
 ERROR, WRIT OF (see Appeals ; Writ op Error). 
 
 ESCAPE : 
 
 evidence of attempt to, when relevant, 23. 
 
 as a confession, 124 
 
 ESSENTIAL DESCRIPTION: 
 matter of, 36, 37. 
 
 ESTOPPEL : 
 
 by awards, 110. 
 
 by pleadings, 107-109, 117. 
 
 by attorney's admissions, 105. 
 
 by judicial admissions, 117, 118. 
 
 defined, 118-120. 
 
 intention of party estopped, 121, 122. 
 
 in pais, 119. 
 
 by record, 119. 
 
 to deny genuineness of handwriting, 187, 197. 
 
 by recitals in certificate of acknowledgment, 189, 192. 
 
 by returns, 229. 
 
 by judgments, 230, 233-235. 
 
 by deed, 307. 
 
 from lapse of time, 341. 
 
 by silence, 341. 
 
 EVASIVE PLEA: 
 
 does not give right to open and close, 392. 
 
 EVENT : 
 
 interest in the, what constitutes, 428, 429. 
 EVIDENCE DEFINED, 2. 
 
 EXAMINATION : 
 
 by physicians, 278, 297, 298. 
 by jurors in and out of court, 492-495. 
 of experts, 271-273. 
 
 of witnesses, to prove writing, 198-200. 
 of persons by the jury, 492-495. 
 (see also Real Evidence.)
 
 612 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 EXAMINATION OF BOOKS: 
 
 when binding as admissions, 113. 
 primary evidence of result, 58. 
 
 EXAMINATION OF PLAINTIFF (see Physical Examination). 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES: 
 
 order for witnesses to withdraw from court-room, 466-468. 
 
 direct examination and cross-examination distinguished, 468. 
 
 refusal to testify, when a contempt ; employment of interpreter, 468, 
 469. 
 
 mode of conducting direct examination, 469-471. 
 
 questions put by the judge or by members of the jury, 471-473. 
 
 leading questions, when allowable on direct examination, 474, 475. 
 
 responsiveness of answers, 476. 
 
 witness may refresh his memory by referring to a memorandum or 
 writing, 477-479. 
 
 character of the writing used to refresh memory of the witness, 479, 480. 
 
 cross-examination, its purpose and value, 480-482. 
 
 power of cross-examination ; its extent, 482-486. 
 
 redirect examination. 486. 487. 
 
 recalling witnesses. 487, 488. 
 
 receiving evidence out of court, 488-490. 
 
 taking the view by the jury, 490-492. 
 
 •'real evidence;" physical examination by the jury in court; identi- 
 fication, 492-495. 
 
 right of the defendant in a criminal trial to confront the witnesses 
 against him, 495, 496. 
 
 the accused as a witness in a criminal prosecution, 496-499. 
 (see also Cross-examination.) 
 
 EXAMINATION, PRELIMINARY, 131-133. 
 EXAMINED COPIES: 
 
 defined, 219, 220. 
 EXCEPTION : 
 
 necessity for, 35, 539, 540. 
 
 waiver of, 541, 542. 
 EXCEPTIONAL DEMAND: 
 
 as evidence of value, 293. 
 
 EXCLAMATIONS: 
 
 evidence of, 68. 
 
 EXCLUDING WITNESSES: 
 from court-room, 466-468. 
 
 EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE: 
 
 when of slight force, 546. 
 
 when immaterial, 546. 
 
 when ground for a new trial, 546. 
 
 when error in, is cured in cross-examination, 546.
 
 INDEX. 613 
 
 Keferences are to pages. 
 
 EXECUTION: 
 
 of wills, 403-405. 
 
 of negotiable paper, when presumed, 346. 
 
 of deed, presumptions from, 341. 
 
 of ancient writing, need not be proved, 150. 
 
 EXECUTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT: 
 presumption from, 345, 346. 
 
 EXECUTIVE ACTS: 
 judicial notice of, 370. 
 
 EXECUTOR: 
 
 admissions of testator binding on, 89. 
 admissions of, 91. 
 
 exclusion of interested witnesses against, 436-445. 
 (see also Personal Transactions.) 
 
 EXECUTORY COVENANTS AND CONTRACTS: 
 effect of material alteration in, 180. 
 
 EXEMPLIFIED COPIES: 
 
 definition and use of, 219. 220. 
 when dispensed with, 222. 
 
 EXEMPTION : 
 
 of witnesses, 420-422. 
 
 (see Arrest ; Privilege.) 
 
 EXHIBITION IN COURT: 
 
 of persons, 492-495. 
 
 of articles, 60. 
 
 of writings, 200-20& 
 
 EXHIBITS : 
 
 proof of, 205. 
 
 defined, 205. 
 EXISTENCE OF GOVERNMENT: 
 
 judicial notice of, 378. 
 EXONERATION : 
 
 party suing for, when may prove judgment, 238. 
 EXPECTATION OF LIFE: 
 
 may be shown by life tables, 218. 
 EXPEDIENCY : 
 
 as a basis for presumptions, 335. 
 
 EXPENSES : 
 
 of witness, what allowed, 409. 
 (see also Mileage) 
 EXPERIENCE : 
 
 when necessary for expert, 264, 265. 
 
 as ground for belief, 4.
 
 614 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 EXPERIMENTS: 
 out of court, '396. 
 
 conditions must be reproduced, 236. 
 expert may make, 296. 
 operating machine in court, 296. 
 by jurors, not allowed, 488. 
 
 EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE: 
 
 definition, 264, 265. 
 
 matter of common knowledge; opinions of n<5n-experts, when admis- 
 sible, 265-270. 
 
 expert evidence when admissible, 270, 271. 
 
 competency and examination of experts, 271-274. 
 
 cross-examination of experts; use of scientific books as evidence, 275. 
 
 the weight and credibility of expert and opinion evidence, 276. 
 
 compensation of expert witnesses, 277. 
 
 physicians as experts ; cause of death, 278-280. 
 
 evidence of medical experts to show character of disease and blood- 
 stains; expert evidence as to autopsies and malpractice, 280-282. 
 
 non-expert evidence upon a person's physical condition, 282, 283. 
 
 chemists as experts ; poisons. 283, 284. 
 
 expert evidence where sexual crimes have been committed, 284, 285. 
 
 expert and non-expert evidence upon insanity, 285-288. 
 
 mechanical experts, 288-291. 
 
 expert evidence as to value, 291-294. 
 
 underwriters as experts, 294, 295. 
 
 to show handwriting, 197, 198, 200, 203-205. 
 
 experiments in and out of court, 296, 297. 
 
 physical examination of the party by experts, 297, 298. 
 
 EXPERT WITNESSES: 
 
 number of, may be limited, 562. 
 
 EXPLANATION: 
 
 of alterations, 178-182, 204 
 of ambiguity, 324. 
 of language, 316, 317. 
 
 EXPRESS ADMISSIONS (see Admissions)l 
 
 EXPRESSIONS : 
 
 of bodily or mental feelings, 68-71. 
 
 EXPRESS TRUSTS: 
 
 must be evidenced by writing, 312, 399, 400. 
 
 EXTENSION : 
 
 of contract in writing may be shown by parol, 312-314 
 
 EXTRA-JUDICIAL OATHS (see Oaths).
 
 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS : 
 must be corroborated, 133. 
 substance must be repeated, 134. 
 their weight for the jury, 134. 
 completeness of, 134. 
 
 (see also Confessions.) 
 
 EXTRINSIC CIRCUMSTANCES: 
 parol evidence of, 321, 322. 
 
 EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE (see Parol Evidence). 
 
 EYE-SIGHT : 
 
 evidence of condition, 283. 
 
 P. 
 
 FABRICATION OF EVIDENCE: 
 
 of alibi, 12. 
 FACT: 
 
 definition of the word, 3. 
 
 statements to be proved as, 66. 
 
 question of, 27-35. 
 
 agreement as matter of, 237, 238. 
 
 conclusiveness of judgment as a, 233. 
 
 assumed in hypothetical questions, 270-272. 
 
 judicial notice of, 364 et seq. 
 
 peculiarly in knowledge of party, 386-388. 
 
 FACTS OF GEOGRAPHY: 
 proof of, 218. 
 judicial notice of, 368, 369. 
 
 FACTS OF HISTORY: 
 proof of, 217. 
 judicial notice of, 367, 368. 
 
 FACT, PRESUMPTIONS OF (see Presumption). 
 
 FAILURE : % 
 
 to produce evidence, 342. 
 
 FAILURE OF ACCUSED TO TESTIFY: 
 no presumptions from, 499. 
 comments on, not permissible, 499. 
 when comments on allowed, 499. 
 
 FALSE CONFESSIONS, 125. 
 FALSE IMPRISONMENT : 
 
 evidence of character in action for, 25. 
 
 variance of proof in, 36. 
 
 action for, bv witness arrested, 422. 
 
 C15
 
 016 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pagea. 
 
 FALSUS IN UNO, FALSUS IN OMNIBUS: 
 
 meaning of, 512. 
 
 jury may disregard, 513. 
 
 corroboration may avoid, 514. 
 FAMILY BIBLES: 
 
 as pedigree evidence, 72. 
 FAMILY HISTORY: 
 
 of testator, 327-329. 
 FAMILY PHYSICIAN: 
 
 his testimony on insanity, 288. 
 
 FAMILY REPUTATION, 71-74. 
 
 (see General Reputation.) 
 FARMER: 
 
 as witness, to value of crop. 292. 
 
 as witness, to quality of milk, 284. 
 FEAR: 
 
 as an element in inducing confessions, evidence to show, 126-129. 
 
 FEDERAL COURTS: 
 
 competency of witnesses in, 435. 
 
 mileage in, 408. 
 
 when bound by state laws, 374. 
 
 will notice judicially the constitution and laws of a state, 373. 
 FEELINGS : 
 
 declarations to show, 68-71. 
 
 FEES: 
 
 of witnesses (see Mileage). 
 FEES OF EXPERT WITNESS (see Compensation). 
 
 FELLOW-PRISONER : 
 
 confession made to, 131. 
 
 FELLOW-SERVANT : 
 
 entries made by, 85. 
 FICTION : 
 
 of a presumed grant, 339, 340. 
 
 FIELD-NOTES : 
 
 
 
 as primary evidence, 57, 218. 
 
 FILING : 
 
 of pleadings, when presumed, 354 
 
 of returns, necessity for, 228. 
 FINAL JUDGMENT: 
 
 defined, 232. 
 FIRE-ARMS : 
 
 exhibited to jury, 60, 62. 
 FIRE EXPERTS, 294, 295.
 
 INDEX. 617 
 
 Beferences are to pages. 
 
 FIRM BOOKS: 
 
 as evidence, 81-85. 
 
 FIXED SUM: 
 
 proof of. agreement to pay, 40. 
 
 FLAGS AND BANNERS : 
 
 primary evidence of inscription on, 54. 
 
 FLIGHT OF ACCUSED : 
 relevancy of, 23. 
 as confessions, 124. 
 
 FLOODING LAND: 
 
 evidence of surveyor, 291. 
 
 FOOD: 
 
 wholesomeness of, 284. 
 
 FOOT-PRINTS : 
 
 compulsory comparison of, 298, 
 
 FOREIGN CURRENCY: 
 value of, 366. 
 
 FOREIGN JUDGMENT: 
 certification of, 223-225. 
 
 handwriting of certifying official must be proved, 225, 
 seal must be proved, 226. 
 proof of, 225-227. 
 validity of, 238-240. 
 in rem, 238. 
 
 FOREIGN LAW: 
 
 books as evidence of, 212. 
 court may construe, 211. 
 question for jury, 211. 
 consul may testify, 212, 213. 
 attorney may testify to, 212. 
 expert in, may testify, 212, 213. 
 presumptions as to, 349. 
 not judicially noticed, 376, 377. 
 
 foreign Nations, seals, etc.: 
 
 judicial notice of, 378. 
 FOREIGN RATE OF INTEREST: 
 not judicially noticed, 378. 
 
 FORGERY : 
 
 relevancy of evidence of possession of forged writings, 20. 
 
 proof of handwriting in trial for, 186. 
 
 witness may be asked to write in trial for, 200. 
 FORGETFUL WITNESS: 
 
 may be asked leading questions, 474, 475.
 
 CIS INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 FORGETFULNESS OF WITNESS: 
 
 when admits evidence at prior trial, 169. 
 (see Refreshing the Memory.) 
 
 FORGOTTEN FACTS (see Refreshing the Memory). 
 
 FORM : 
 
 of affidavits, 527, 528. 
 
 FORMAL ALLEGATIONS, 38, 39. 
 
 FORMER JUDGMENT: 
 plea of, 2:36. 
 
 FORMER STATEMENTS: 
 
 to impeach witness (see Contradictory Statements). 
 
 FOUNDATION : 
 
 for impeachment, 485. 
 
 for proving hook entries, 79. 
 
 FRANCHISE : 
 
 evidence of reputation to show enjoyment of, 153. 
 
 FRAUD : 
 
 evidence to show, 7. 
 
 when allegation of creates an issue allowing evidence of character, 25. 
 
 facilitated by reception of hearsay evidence, 66. 
 
 as an element in estoppel, 121. 
 
 possession of writings obtained by, 177. 
 
 presence of, where writing is altered, 179. 
 
 acknowledgment obtained by, 189. 
 
 in obtaining judgment, may be shown, 230. 
 
 in execution of contract, may be shown by parol evidence, 305, 308. 
 
 in use of deed, parol evidence to show, 329. 
 
 in procuring depositions, 532. 
 
 presumption of, from failure to testify, when alleged, 344. 
 
 FRAUD. BURDEN TO SHOW: 
 
 in procuring will, 384. 
 
 in conveyance, on creditors, 389. 
 
 in conveyance, on grantor, 390. 
 
 FRAUD (see also Statute of Frauds). 
 
 FRAUDULENT ALTERATIONS, 179. 
 
 FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATIONS: 
 relevancy of evidence to show, 22. 
 
 FRIGHT : 
 
 of horse, evidence to show, 269. 
 
 FRUITS : 
 
 sale of growing. 397, 398. 
 
 FRUITS OF CRIME: 
 
 presumptions from possession of, 342, 343.
 
 INDEX. 619 
 
 Beferencea are to pages. 
 
 FUTURE INTENTION: 
 
 declarations of, when au estoppel, 120, 121. 
 
 FUTURE VALUE : 
 
 evidence to show, 203. 
 
 FURNITURE : 
 
 evidence to show value of, 292, 293. 
 FURTHER CONSIDERATION : 
 
 parol evidence of, 300. 
 
 G. 
 
 GARMENTS: 
 
 exhibition of, to the jury, 61. 
 (JASES: 
 
 testimony to show nature and effect of, 284 
 GAZETTE: 
 
 official, as evidence, 208. 
 GENERAL DENIAL: 
 
 effect of. 38. 
 GENERAL REPUTATION; 
 
 adequate knowledge of declarant, 153, 154 
 
 identity of declarant. 155. 
 
 death of declarant, 155. 
 
 date of declaration, 155, 156, 157. 
 
 evidence of reputation in the case of private rights, 157. 158. 
 
 traditionary evidence regarding private boundaries, 158, 159. 
 
 documents showing general reputation, 160, 161. 
 
 to prove marriage, 158. 
 
 to rebut presumption of death, 358. 
 
 impeachment (see REPUTATION FOR TRUTH). 
 
 GENERAL RESULTS: 
 
 primary evidence of, 57. 
 GENERAL USAGE: 
 
 evidence to show, 316, 317. 
 GENUINENESS (see Handwriting) : 
 
 of handwriting, how shown, 1S6-205. 
 
 by comparison, 200-204 
 GENTLENESS: 
 
 of horse, opinion evidence of, 269. 
 GEOGRAPHICAL FACTS: 
 
 judicial notice of, 368, 369. 
 GESTURE: 
 
 dying declarations made by, 145, 146. 
 
 GIFT: 
 
 to trustee; burden of proving bona fides of, 389.
 
 020 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 GOOD CHARACTER OF ACCUSED: 
 when relevant, 26. 
 
 GOOD FAITH: 
 
 relevancy of evidence to show, 20-24 
 
 evidence of declarations to show, 67. 
 
 of witness, cross-examination to test, 483. 
 
 GOOD JOB: 
 
 meaning of, 290. 
 
 GOOD QUALITY: 
 
 evidence of, by comparison, 297. 
 
 GOOD RISK: 
 to insure, 295. 
 
 GOOD SPIRITS: 
 
 evidence to show, 270. 
 
 GRAND JURORS: 
 
 confidential communications to, 257. 
 
 GRAND JURY: 
 
 refusal to testify before, 469. 
 
 GRANT: 
 
 presumption of a, 340. 
 
 GRANTEE : 
 
 when may take acknowledgments, 188. 
 
 character of his title, 180. 
 GRANTING A VIEW (see Taking a View). 
 
 GRANTOR : 
 
 judgment against binds grantee, 231. 
 admissions of, 89. 
 acknowledgment before, 189. 
 incapacity of, burden of proof, 387. 
 
 GRAVE-STONES : 
 
 inscriptions on, primary evidence of, 57. 
 
 GROWING TIMBER: 
 
 when a writing is necessary in selling, 397, 398. 
 
 GROUNDS OF BELIEF, 4, 5. 
 
 GUARANTIES : 
 
 parol evidence to vaiy, 301. 
 
 GUARANTOR: 
 
 his interest in the event, 429. 
 
 admissions of, 99. 
 GUARDIAN: 
 
 admissions of, 100.
 
 INDEX. 621 
 
 References are to pages. 
 GUILT : 
 
 must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, 8, 9, 13. 
 
 burden of proof to show, 384-386. 
 GUN: 
 
 exhibition of, to jury, GO. 
 
 H. 
 
 HABEAS CORPUS: 
 
 to obtain discharge of witness from arrest, 421. 
 
 HABEAS CORPUS AD TESTIFICANDUM: 
 
 when employed to procure the attendance of a witness, 423. 
 
 HABIT: 
 
 of intemperance, 209. 
 evidence to show, 270. 
 
 HANDCUFFS : 
 
 confession made by prisoner in, 127. 
 HANDWRITING : 
 
 defined, 185, 186. 
 
 mark as, 185. 
 
 of subscribing witness, 186. 
 
 pi'oof of, by admissions. 186. 
 
 production of writing, when necessary, 186, 187. 
 
 denial of genuineness of, how made. 187. 
 
 proof, by acknowledgments, 187-192. 
 
 proof of, by subscribing witnesses, 192-194 
 
 proof by witnesses, 195-198. 
 
 proof by comparison, 200-204. 
 
 proof by testimony of experts, 204, 205. 
 
 mode of examining witness as to disputed writing, 198-200. 
 
 photographs as evidence of, 59. 
 
 HAPPINESS : 
 
 evidence to show, 270. 
 
 HATRED: 
 
 opinion evidence to show, 270. 
 (see also Threats.) 
 HEALTH : 
 
 evidence of physician to show, 278. 
 
 evidence of non-expert witness, 282. 
 HEARING: 
 
 evidence of a person, 283. 
 HEARSAY : 
 
 definition, grounds for its rejection, 63-66. 
 
 statements to be proved as facts, 66-68. 
 
 expressions of bodily or mental feeling, 68-71. 
 
 pedigree, oral and written declarations, 71-74.
 
 623 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 HEARSAY (continued): 
 
 declarations constituting a part of the res gesta: 74, 75. 
 requisites, 75. 
 
 must be illustrative and connected with main transaction. 75, 76. 
 must be contemporaneous, 77, 78. 
 
 entries as part of the res gestce and made by third persons, 78-80. 
 entries against interest and entries which are part of the res gestae dis- 
 tinguished, 80, 81. 
 a party's own books as evidence, 81-86. 
 indorsements as part of the res gestw, 86, 87. 
 commissions. 88 et seq. 
 confessions, 124 et seq. 
 general reputation, 153 et seq. 
 dying declarations, 138 et seq. 
 ancient writings, 148 et seq. 
 witnesses absent or disqualified, 167-173. 
 in affidavits, 528, 529. 
 
 HEIR: 
 
 admissions of, not binding on co-heirs, 91. 
 bound by judgment against ancestor, 231. 
 when an interested witness, 443. 
 presumption of death without, 358. 
 
 HERD-BOOKS: 
 
 as evidence, 275. 
 HEREDITAMENTS: 
 
 presumptions of grant, 339, 340. 
 HIGHWAY: 
 
 necessity for, evidence to show, 270. 
 
 reputation to show existence of, 153. 
 
 evidence to show condition of, 18. 
 HISTORICAL BOOKS: 
 
 as evidence, 217, 218. 
 HISTORICAL FACTS: 
 
 judicial notice of, 367, 36a 
 
 proof of, 217, 218. 
 HOLDING ELECTIONS: 
 
 judicial notice of, 370. 
 
 HOLIDAYS : 
 
 judicial notice of, 365. 
 " HOMESTEAD FARM : " 
 
 evidence to explain, 319. 
 HOMICIDE: 
 
 behavior of accused after, 24. 
 
 allegation of weapon in indictment for, 38, 44 
 
 insanity as a defense to, 351-3>3.
 
 INDEX. 623 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 HOMICIDE (continued) : 
 
 dying declarations in, 138-147. 
 relevancy of evidence in, 27. 
 burden of proof iD, 384-386. 
 
 HOPE: 
 
 as an element in inducing confessions, 126-129. 
 
 HORSE: 
 
 disposition of, opinion as to, 269. * 
 
 HOSTILE WITNESS: 
 
 impeachment of, by party calling, 502. 
 
 hostility and bias of, may be shown in direct examination, 503. 
 
 contradictory statements by, 503. 
 
 foundation for contradicting, 504. 
 
 may be asked leading questions, 474. 
 
 HOUSE : 
 
 evidence to show value of, 290. 
 
 HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE: 
 
 evidence to show value of, 291, 292, 293. 
 
 HOUSEKEEPER : 
 
 as witness, to show value of board, 293. 
 
 HUMAN BLOOD: 
 
 stains caused by, 281. 
 
 HUSBAND : 
 
 when bound by wife's admissions. 97, 98. 
 
 competency of as witness, 244, 245. 
 
 confidential communications, 245, 247-249. 
 
 statutory legislation, 245-247. 
 
 death of, its effect, 248. 
 
 as witnesses in issue of adultery, 248. 
 
 as witness to non-access, 249. 
 
 HYPOTHETICAL CASE: 
 stating to jury, 32. 
 
 HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION : 
 defined, 272. 
 
 facts on which based, 272. 
 not based on conjecture, 273. 
 must assume and state material facts alone, 273. 
 may assume doubtful facts, 273. 
 in cross-examination, 274. 
 when employed to test skill of expert, 274. 
 length, 273. 
 
 may be put in writing, 273. 
 on insanity, 287, 288.
 
 62 i INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 I. 
 
 IDEM SONANS, 43. 
 
 IDENTIFICATION: 
 
 of third person making an admission, 115. 
 
 of speaker at telephone, 122, 123. 
 
 use of photographs for the purpose of, 59. 
 
 of prisoner's statement at preliminary examination, 132. 
 
 of deceased person whose declarations constitute reputation, 155. 
 
 by witnesses in court, 298. 
 
 of subject-matter of writing, by parol, 320. 
 
 of persons, by witnesses, 494, 495. 
 
 IDENTITY : 
 
 'opinion evidence to show, 269. 
 
 of cause of action, to admit prior judgment, 234-236. 
 
 IDENTITY OF INTEREST: 
 
 as regulating admissions, 89, 90. 
 
 IDENTITY OF PARTIES: 
 
 required where evidence of missing witness is given at a subsequent 
 
 trial, 169, 170. 
 when judgment is relied on as estoppel, 233, 234. 
 
 IGNORANCE OF WITNESS: 
 
 when it admits contradictory statements or evidence of knowledge, 503. 
 when permitting leading questions, 474. 
 effect of, as evidence, 566. 
 
 ILLEGAL ARREST: 
 
 of witnesses (see Privilege of Witnesses). 
 
 ILLEGALITY: 
 
 of consideration, evidence of, 306. 
 
 ILLEGIBLE WORDS: 
 
 parol evidence to explain, 324. 
 
 ILLNESS; 
 
 evidence of non-expert witness, 282. 
 
 of witness, ground for a continuance, 416. 
 
 ILLNESS OF WITNESS: 
 
 admits testimony taken at a prior trial, 169. 
 
 IMMORALITY: 
 
 of consideration, evidence of, 306. 
 
 of witness, may be shown to impeach, 505, 506. 
 
 " IMPEACH : " 
 
 definition of, 500.
 
 INDEX. 625 
 
 References are to pages. 
 IMPEACHMENT: 
 
 of accuracy of photographs, 59. 
 
 of confessions, 134. 
 
 of certificate of acknowledgment, 189, 192. 
 
 of foreign judgments, 235. 
 
 of domestic judgments, 240. 
 
 of expert by scientific book, 275. 
 
 of consideration by pai-ol, 305-307. 
 
 of competency of interpreter, 469. 
 
 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES: 
 
 party cannot impeach his own witness, 500-502. 
 
 exceptions to the rule that a party vouches for his own witnesses, 502- 
 
 504. 
 how the adverse witness may be impeached ; general reputation for 
 
 veracity, 504-507. 
 impeachment by proving contrary statements or silence of witness on a 
 
 former occasion, 507-512. 
 falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, 512-514. 
 evidence of general reputation of impeached witness, 514, 515. 
 privileges of witness ; questions disclosing pecuniary liability, 515, 516. 
 questions tending to disgrace the witness, 516-519. 
 questions calculated to expose the witness to a criminal charge, 519-522. 
 bias and prejudice of the witness, 522-524 
 IMPERTINENT QUESTIONS : 
 refusal to answer, 469. 
 
 IMPLIED ADMISSIONS: 
 
 by conduct, 111. 
 
 by silence, 112, 113. 
 
 by inspection of books, 113. 
 (see also Admissions.) 
 IMPLIED CONFESSIONS, 124, 125. 
 
 IMPLIED CONTRACT: 
 
 allegation of an, 40. 
 IMPLIED MALICE, 362. 
 
 IMPLIED TRUSTS: 
 
 parol evidence to establish, 312. 
 
 not covered by statute of frauds, 400. 
 IMPOTENCY : 
 
 physical examination when alleged, 297. 
 
 IMPRESSIONS : 
 
 of witnesses, 268-270. 
 IMPRISONMENT: 
 
 of witness, to prevent attendance, 415. 
 IMPROPER ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE: - 
 
 when immaterial, 544, 545. 
 40
 
 026 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 IMPROVEMENTS: 
 
 on land as a partial performance, 397. 
 
 INADEQUACY (see Consideration). 
 
 INCAPACITY : 
 
 of grantor, burden of proof, 387. 
 
 INCARCERATION: 
 of witnesses, 414. 
 
 INCIDENTAL IMPEACHMENT: 
 of witness, 501. 
 
 INCOMPETENCY: 
 
 of privileged communications, 243-260. 
 of accused as witness, 433. 
 
 INCOMPLETE WRITINGS: 
 
 parol evidence to fill out omissions, 307, 308. 
 
 INCORPORATION : 
 
 when proof of, required, 376. 
 
 INCORPORATION OF WRITINGS: 
 by reference, 308. 
 
 INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS: 
 presumption of grant, 339, 340. 
 
 INCREASE OF RISK: 
 evidence to show, 294. 
 
 INCRIMINATING QUESTIONS: 
 answer to, not compellable, 519. 
 " one link in chain of proof,'' 520. 
 details need not be shown, 520. 
 belief of witness, 520, 521. 
 province of court, 520, 521. 
 witness may answer, 520. 
 to defendant in chancery, 520. 
 innocence of witness, not material, 520. 
 if witness waive privilege he must give details, 520. 
 when accused must answer, 521. 
 privilege from, is personal, 521. 
 answers to, canuot be used, 522. 
 if prosecution is barred, 522. 
 no presumption from refusal to answer, 522. 
 
 INDEBTEDNESS : 
 
 primary evidence of, 57, 58. 
 INDEPENDENT PAROL CONTRACTS: 
 
 may be shown, 310. 
 
 INDIAN TREATIES: 
 judicial notice of, 377.
 
 INDEX. 627 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 INDICTMENT: 
 
 allegation of weapon in, 38-44. 
 
 proof of and variance, 42-44. 
 
 when severable, 42. % 
 
 for intimidating witness, 415. 
 
 is not evidence, 490. 
 
 instruction on, 490. 
 
 of service, admissibility of, 166. 
 
 INDORSEMENTS : 
 
 as a part of the res gestce, 86, 87. 
 
 parol evidence to vary, 301. 
 INDORSER: 
 
 his incompetency to ynpeach note, 445, 446. 
 
 his admissions, 91. 
 
 INDUCEMENTS : 
 
 offered to procure confessions, 135, 136. 
 
 INFAMOUS CRIMES: 
 defined, 454. 
 
 common-law incompetency caused by, 454, 455. 
 pai'don of, as removing incompetency, 455. 
 conditional pardon, 456. 
 effect of full pardon, 456. 
 incompetency caused by, extent of, 456. 
 statutes relating to incompetency caused by, 457. 
 statutes construed, 458. 
 what crimes may be shown, 458, 459. 
 
 INFAMOUS PERSONS (see Falsus in Uno). 
 INFAMY : 
 
 of subscribing witness, 194. 
 
 INFANTS : 
 
 exhibition of, to jury, 492-495. 
 
 INFANTS, AS WITNESSES (see Children). 
 
 INFERENCES : 
 
 inadmissible as evidence, 265-270. 
 
 INFERENCES OF FACT (see Presumptions). 
 
 INFIDELITY : 
 
 as disqualifying a witness, 451, 452. 
 INFORMATION AND BELIEF: 
 
 admissions based on, 115. 
 
 INFORMERS : 
 
 evidence of, 5, 178. 
 
 names of, cannot be divulged, 256. 
 INJURIES : 
 
 judicial notice of, 372. 
 
 non-expert evidence to show cause, etc., of, 283.
 
 G2S INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 INK: 
 
 testing with chemicals in court, 296. 
 evidence to show composition of, 284 
 
 INNOCENCE : 
 
 presumption of, 9, 337, 360, 361, 497. 
 presumption of life, 361. 
 
 IN REM : 
 
 foreign judgments in, 238. 
 domestic judgments in, 236, 237. 
 
 INSANITY : 
 
 not provable by reputation, 157. 
 
 declarations to show, 67. $ 
 
 subsequent insanity of witness, 169, 
 
 opinions of subscribing witness to, 194. 
 
 non-expert evidence to show, 285, 286. 
 
 witness must give facts, 285. 
 
 weight of evidence of non-expert witness, 286. 
 
 expert evidence on, 286. 
 
 when based on personal examination, 287. 
 
 when based on hypothetical question, 287, 288. 
 
 testimony by subscribing witnesses to will, 288. 
 
 of accused, permits involuntary physical examination, 298. 
 
 of testator, may be shown by parol, 328. 
 
 presumptions of, 350. 
 
 in homicide, 351. 
 
 evidence to show, 352. 
 
 McNaghten's Case, 352, 353. 
 
 burden of proving, in criminal trials, 385, 386. 
 
 burden of proving, in civil proceedings, 389. 
 
 simulation of, may be shown, 498. 
 
 incompetency of interested witnesses in case of, 435-445. 
 
 renders person incompetent as witness, 452, 526. 
 
 INSCRIPTIONS : 
 
 pedigree contained in, 73. 
 
 INSCRIPTIONS ON BANNERS: 
 primary evidence of, 55. 
 
 INSOLVENCY : 
 
 not provable by reputation, 157. 
 INSPECTION BY JURY: 
 
 to determine age, race and parentage, 492-495. 
 
 of writings, 200. 
 
 of articles, 60. 
 
 (see also Real Evidence.) 
 
 INSPECTION OF BOOKS: 
 
 when binding as admi&sions, 113.
 
 INDEX. 629 
 
 Eeferences are to pages. 
 
 INSPECTION OF RECORDS: 
 right to, 206. 
 
 viandamus to compel, 207. 
 of private corporations, 207. 
 rules regulating, 207. 
 
 INSTRUCTIONS : 
 
 on the evidence generally, 29-33. 
 on expert testimony, 276. 
 on the presumption of innocence, 361. 
 on the value of positive evidence, 565. 
 
 INSTRUMENTS : 
 
 possession of, intended to procure an abortion, 285, 
 
 INSTRUMENT IN WRITING: 
 best evidence of, 49. 50. 
 defined, 175. 
 may be connected by parol, 308, 309. 
 
 INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE: 
 defined, 30. 
 demurrer because of, 543. 
 
 INSULTING QUESTIONS: 
 put to witness, 519. 
 
 INSURANCE EXPERTS: 
 
 their testimony of risks and premiums, 294, 295. 
 
 INSURANCE POLICY: 
 
 parol evidence to vary, 301. 
 burden of proof in actions on, 388. 
 
 INTENTION : 
 
 evidence of, 20-24. 
 
 evidence of declarations to show, 67. 
 
 declarations to explain, 76. 
 
 when deliberate, 300. 
 
 evidence of usage to ascertain, 316. 
 
 parol evidence to ascertain, 320-324. 
 
 of testator, evidence to ascertain, 325-329. 
 
 presumption of malicious intention, 361-363. 
 
 INTEREST : 
 
 declarations against, 80, 81. 
 
 stranger's declarations against, 162-166. 
 
 of witness to handwriting, 199. 
 
 of accused, when a witness, 496. 
 
 of deponent, incompetency caused by, 533. 
 
 INTERESTED PERSONS: 
 
 their statutory incompetency as witnesses, 434-437.
 
 030 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pagea. 
 
 INTERESTED WITNESSES: 
 
 reasons for their incompetency, 425. 
 
 their sources of knowledge, 425. 
 
 admissions of, 426. 
 
 when they become competent, 427-431. 
 
 their statutory incompetency, 442. 
 
 interest of, must be pecuniary, 443. 
 
 when w idow, heir, legatee is, 443. 
 
 when assignor is, 443. 
 
 how rendered competent, 444. 
 
 having adverse interests, 444. 
 
 exception to, must be promptly taken, 444. 
 
 in case of death of agent of party, 444. 
 
 INTEREST IN THE EVENT: 
 
 what constitutes, at common law, 428, 429. 
 statutory modification, 428. 
 
 INTEREST, RATE OF : 
 judicial notice of, 378. 
 
 INTERLINEATIONS (see Alterations). 
 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW : 
 judicial notice of, 372. 
 
 INTERPRETATION OF WRITINGS, 301-304. 
 
 (see also Construction.) 
 INTERPRETER : 
 
 his intervention does not make evidence hearsay, 66. 
 
 admissions by employment, 111. 
 
 may state evidence of absent witness, 173. 
 
 confidential communications to, 253. 
 
 employment of, discretionary, 469. 
 
 witness may act as, 469. 
 
 by-standers may assist, 469. 
 
 employment of, in taking deposition, 532. 
 
 INTERROGATORIES : 
 
 sent with letters rogatory. 530. 
 
 not indispensable when reading deposition, 534. 
 
 in bills in equity, 432, 433. 
 
 must be answered responsively, 432. 
 
 INTERVIEW (see Admissions ; Conversation; Parol Evidence, etc.). 
 
 INTIMIDATION : 
 
 of witnesses (see Obstructing the Attendance of Witnesses). 
 INTOXICATION : 
 
 confession procured from intoxicated prisoner, 130. 
 
 evidence to show fact of, 269. 
 
 of party to writing, 305.
 
 INDEX. Ci>l 
 
 References are to pages. ' 
 
 INTOXICATING LIQUORS : 
 judicial notice of, 371. 
 
 INVALID DEED: 
 
 use of as evidence, 404. 
 
 INVALIDITY: 
 
 of writing, may be shown by parol, 304-306. 
 of will, may be shown, 328. 
 
 " I. O. U. : " 
 
 meaning of, 319. 
 
 IRRELEVANCY : 
 
 motion to strike out for, 543. 
 when not error, 544. 
 
 IRRELEVANT WRITINGS: 
 
 when admissible as standards of comparison, 200. 
 
 IRRESISTIBLE IMPULSE (see Insanity). 
 
 IRRESPONSIVENESS : 
 
 of answers of witness, 476, 543. 
 ISSUE : 
 
 presumption of legitimacy of, 359. 
 
 presumption of death without, 358. 
 
 ISSUE OF FACT: 
 
 when for jury, 27 et seq. 
 
 J. 
 
 JAIL: 
 
 attendance of witness in, how procured, 423. 
 
 JETTISON : 
 
 necessity for, 289. 
 
 JOINT CONTRACTS : 
 remedies on, 236. 
 
 JOINT DEFENDANTS: 
 
 when competent as witnesses, 433, 434. 
 
 JUDGE: 
 
 his incompetency as a witness, 447. 
 his duty to certify to records, 224. 
 JUDGE'S NOTES: 
 
 to prove testimony of absent witness, 172. 
 
 JUDGES OF INFERIOR COURTS: 
 
 judicial notice of, 379. 
 JUDGE, PROVINCE OF, 27 et seq. 
 
 (see Province of Judge.)
 
 G32 INDEX. 
 
 Beferences are to pages. 
 JUDGMENTS : 
 
 how proved, 218-221. 
 
 in equity, 221, 222. 
 
 of sister states, 222-225. 
 
 of foreign countries, 225, 226. 
 
 of surrogates' courts, 226, 227. 
 
 effect of, 230, 231. 
 
 finality of, 232. 
 
 conclusiveness of, 233. 
 
 identity of cause of action, 234-236. 
 
 judgments in rem, 236. 237. 
 
 in criminal trials, 237. 
 
 as facts, 237, 238. 
 
 foreign, their validity, 238-240. 
 
 of sister states, 241. 
 
 in bar, 242. 
 
 best evidence of, 50. 
 
 JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS: 
 
 of record, 104, 105, 107-109, 117. 
 
 JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS (see ConfessionsX 
 
 JUDICIAL DISCRETION: 
 defined, 566. 
 not personal caprice, 567. 
 
 JUDICIAL KNOWLEDGE: 
 
 aiding, 380. 
 
 (see also Judicial Notice.) 
 JUDICIAL NOTICE: 
 
 judicial notice, 364, 365. 
 
 matter of common knowledge, 320, 365-367. 
 
 historical facts, 367, 368. 
 
 geographical facts, 369. 
 
 political facts ; elections, 370, 371. 
 
 scientific facts, 371, 372. 
 
 common and statutory law ; municipal ordinances and local and for- 
 eign laws, 372-378. 
 
 foreign nations, seals and acts, 378. 
 
 terms of court, records, rules of practice and judicial proceedings, 378- 
 380. 
 
 JUDICIAL OFFICIALS : 
 
 communications to, 255. 
 JUDICIAL OATHS (see Oaths). 
 JUDICIAL RECORDS (see Public Records). 
 JURAT: 
 
 must show venue, when, 526. 
 
 must be signed and sealed, 528.
 
 INDEX. t)33 
 
 References are to pages. 
 JURISDICTION: 
 
 presumptions of, 353-356. 
 of appellate courts, 557-561. 
 lack of, may be shown, 230. 
 may be inquired into, 235. 
 judicial notice of, 379. 
 JURISDICTIONAL FACTS: 
 when presumed, 353-355. 
 
 JURORS : 
 
 private view by, 488. 
 
 communications to, out of court, 488, 489. 
 
 evidence received by, out of court, 489. 
 
 maps, law books, pleadings, etc., read by, 489. 
 
 articles examined by, in jury-room, 489, 490. 
 
 as witness if they know the facts, 489. 
 
 questions put by, 472. 
 
 their oaths, 6. 
 
 confidential communications, 257. 
 
 may state testimony of absent witness, 173. 
 JURY: 
 
 offering evidence and examination of witnesses out of hearing of, 143, 
 538. 
 
 JURY, PROVINCE OF: 
 
 province of judge and jury, 27-32. 
 
 blended questions of law and fact, 33, 34. 
 
 preliminary facts bearing on admissibility, 34, 35. 
 
 over presumptions, 333-336. 
 JUSTICES' COURTS: 
 
 certification of their proceedings, 222. 
 JUSTICE OF THE PEx\CE : 
 
 incompetency of, as a witness, 447. 
 JUSTIFICATION : 
 
 of an assault, burden of proof, 390. . 
 
 K. 
 
 KEROSENE : 
 
 judicial notice of explosive character of, 371. 
 
 KIND DEMEANOR: 
 
 opinion evidence to show, 269, 270. 
 
 KNOWLEDGE: 
 
 of party making entry, 79. 
 
 of reputation by the declarant, 155, 157. 
 
 of strangers, declaring against interest, 165. 
 
 of witness to handwriting, 198, 199. 
 
 of expert, 264, 265. 
 
 of absent witness, necessary for a continuance, 418. 
 
 of witness, cross-examination to test, 483.
 
 G34 INDEX. 
 
 Heferences are to pages. 
 
 L. 
 
 LABOR: 
 
 evidence of the value of, 291, 292. 
 
 LACHES : 
 
 in summoning witness, effect of, 41G. 
 
 in failing to object to evidence, 540. 
 LAGER BEER: 
 
 judicial notice of its character as a malt liquor, 371. 
 LAMP : 
 
 evidence to show safety of, 284. 
 LAND: 
 
 evidence to show value of, 17, 292. 
 
 evidence of flooding of, 291. 
 
 partnership to buy and sell, 402. 
 
 when land is partnership property, 402. 
 
 contracts for sale of, what are, 397. 
 LANDLORD AND TENANT: 
 
 relationship of. primary evidence to show, 52. 
 LAND-OWNER: 
 
 when estopped, 120. 
 LANGUAGE: 
 
 of admissions, 116. 
 
 caution required in the use of, 126. 
 
 of witness subsequent!)' missing, 171, 172. 
 
 of certificate of acknowledgment, 190. 
 
 of writing, its construction, 302, 303. 
 
 LANGUAGE OF AFFIDAVITS: 
 must not be vague, 529. 
 statute must be followed in, 529. 
 when scandalous, 529. 
 amending, 529. 
 
 LAPSE OF TIME: 
 
 presumptions from, 338-341. 
 \ .ARCENY : 
 
 variance in an indictment for, 42-44. 
 
 presumption of, from possession of stolen goods, 342, 343. 
 
 LATENT AMBIGUITIES: 
 
 parol evidence to explain, 322-325. 
 LAW AND FACT: 
 
 questions of, 27-35. 
 LAW BOOKS: 
 
 excluded from jury, 489. 
 LAWFULNESS : 
 
 presumption of, 349.
 
 index. G3; 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 LAW MERCHANT: 
 presumptions of, 349. 
 judicial notice of, 373. 
 
 LAW, PRESUMPTIONS OF (see Presumptions). 
 
 LAW, STATUTORY: 
 proof of, 208. 
 
 LAYING FOUNDATION: 
 
 to prove contradictory statements, 508. 
 not necessary, when, 509. 
 
 LEADING QUESTIONS: 
 
 may be employed to obtain dying declaration, 14& 
 on direct examination, 470, 471. 
 
 when witness is hostile, 474. 
 
 when forgetful, 474, 475. 
 
 when ignorant, 474. 
 on redirect examination, 487. 
 
 LEAK: 
 
 e% r idence to show cause, 289. 
 
 LEASE : 
 
 need not be produced to show rental value, 52. 
 
 as showing reputation, 161. 
 
 parol evidence to vary, 300. 
 
 oral contract to rebuild, to vary written lease, 311. 
 
 surrender or assignment of, must be in writing, 401. 
 
 LEDGERS : 
 
 entries in, as evidence, 85. 
 
 LEFT-HANDED PERSONS (see Direction of Blow). 
 
 LEGALITY : 
 
 evidence of, declarations to show, 67. 
 
 LEGAL TERMS : 
 
 judicial notice of their meaning, 365. 
 
 LEGATEE : 
 
 is bound by admissions of the testator, 89, 
 when an interested witness, 443, 
 
 LEGISLATIVE ACTS: 
 proof of, 208. 
 
 LEGISLATIVE BODIES: 
 
 power to summon witnesses, 423. 
 
 to commit for contempt, 423. 
 LEGISLATURE : 
 
 privileged communications, 256. 
 LEGITIMACY : 
 
 inspection of child by jury, 492. 
 
 presumption of, 359, 360.
 
 636 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 LETTERS : 
 
 in cross-examining, must be shown to the witness, 51, 
 
 as standards of comparison, 200-204. 
 
 when unanswered, are not admissions, 113. 
 
 replies to, may be read, 114. 
 
 presumption from mailing, 347. 
 
 proof of (see Handwriting). 
 
 LETTER-PRESS COPY: 
 as evidence, 48, 49. 
 
 LETTERS ROGATORY: 
 defined, 530. 
 their use in equity, 530. 
 interrogatories therein, 530. 
 return of, 530. 
 
 to what courts issuable, 531. 
 notice to adverse party, 531. 
 examination of witness under, 531. 
 certificate of examining magistrate, 531, 
 commissioner under, may issue subpoena, 408. 
 
 LEX FORI : 
 
 when applied, 349. 
 
 LIBEL: 
 
 question of, for jury, 29. 
 
 evidence of character in action for, 25. 
 
 right to open and close in action for, 39L 
 LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION: 
 
 defined, 302. 
 
 LICENSE: 
 
 burden of proof to show, 388. 
 
 parol evidence to vary, 301. 
 LIFE : 
 
 presumption of, 356. 
 
 LIFE INSURANCE POLICY: 
 
 evidence of physician in action on, 295. 
 LIFE TABLES: 
 
 to show expectation of life, 218. 
 LIMB: 
 
 exhibition of, to jury, to show injury, 493. 
 
 examination of, by physican, 297, 298. 
 
 LIMITATIONS ON THE NUMBER OF WITNESSES: 
 
 when erroneous. 561. 
 
 when permitted, 562. 
 LIMITATION. STATUTE OF: 
 
 presumptions from. 339.
 
 INDEX. 037 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 LIQUIDATED DAMAGES : 
 
 right to open and close in cases of, 392, 393. 
 
 LIQUORS, INTOXICATING: 
 judicial notice of, 270, 371. 
 
 LIS MOTA, 156. 
 
 (see also Controversy.) 
 LITHOGRAPHS : 
 
 when primary evidence, 49. 
 LOAN: 
 
 presumption of, arising from payment, 317. 
 
 LOCALITIES : 
 
 judicial notice of, 369. 
 LOCAL LAW: 
 
 judicial notice of, 374, 375. 
 
 LOCUS IN QUO : 
 
 taking the view of, 490 et seq. 
 
 LOG-BOOKS : 
 
 when evidence, 216. 
 LOITERING : 
 
 by witness, 422. 
 
 LOOSE SLIPS : 
 
 to refresh memory, 477-479. 
 
 LOST ARTICLES : 
 
 proof of the value of, 294 
 LOST RECORDS : 
 
 primary evidence of, 55. 
 LOST WRITINGS : 
 
 evidence to show contents, 183-185, 313. 
 (see Destruction of Writings.) 
 LUCID INTERVAL: 
 
 in insanity, parol evidence of, 328. 
 
 LUNATICS (see also Insanity) : 
 
 when incompetent as witnesses, 452, 453. 
 incompetency of interested witnesses, 434. 
 
 M. 
 
 MACHINERY : 
 
 evidence to show condition and capacity of, 18, 266, 271, 290. 
 
 operation of, in court, 296. 
 MACHINISTS : 
 
 as expert witnesses, 290. 
 MAILING LETTER: 
 
 presumption from, 347.
 
 638 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 MAILS: 
 
 placing decoy letters in, 178. 
 
 MAIL TIME: 
 
 judicial notice of, 368, 370. 
 
 MALICE: 
 
 court may define, 31. 
 
 declarations showing, 68, 76. 
 
 of client, cannot be shown by the declaration of his attorney, 105. 
 
 defined, 363. 
 
 presumption of, in criminal trials, 361, 362. 
 
 MALICIOUS PROSECUTION : 
 
 evidence of good character in, 25. 
 evidence of probable cause, 67. 
 burden of proof in, 387. 
 
 MALINGERING: 
 
 physical examination of party, 297. 
 MALPRACTICE : 
 
 physician may testify — 
 
 that treatment was or was not proper, 281. 
 but not as to defendant's diploma, 281. 
 or his general reputation, 280. 
 opinions as to medicine employed, 281. 
 may state customary mode of treatment, 281. 
 MANDAMUS : 
 
 to obtain inspection of records, 206. 
 to compel record or filing of paper, 207. 
 to compel sealing, 207. 
 
 to compel amendment of acknowledgment, 190, 191. 
 MANNER OF ACTING: 
 evidence to show, 270. 
 
 MAPS : 
 
 as evidence constituting a part of the res gestae, 80. 
 
 as evidence of reputation, 160. 
 
 as evidence of boundaries and distances, 217. 
 
 should be authenticated. 218. 
 
 used to explain evidence, 218. 
 
 incorporation of, in deeds by reference, 309. 
 
 when not in evidence, excluded from jury, 489. 
 MARK: 
 
 signature by, 185. 
 
 proved by witnesses, 185. 
 
 subscribing witness may sign by, 185. 
 
 name alfixed to, 186. 
 MARKET REPORTS: 
 
 as evidence of value, 294.
 
 INDEX. 030 
 
 t 
 References are to pages. 
 
 MARKET VALUE: 
 
 evidence to show, 293. 
 MARRIAGE: 
 
 primary evidence of, 54. 
 
 reputation as proof of, 158. 
 
 cohabitation as proof of, 158. 
 
 proof by register, 216. 
 
 annulment of, evidence in action for, 297, 298. 
 
 presumption of continuance of, 350. 
 MARRIED WOMAN: 
 
 her acknowledgment, 192. 
 (see Husband and Wife.) 
 
 MASON : 
 
 as an expert witness, 290. 
 MASTER IN CHANCERY: 
 
 may state testimony of an absent witness, 173. 
 "MATERIAL:" 
 
 defined, 14, 15. 
 MATERIAL FACTS: 
 
 judgment conclusive as to, 233. 
 MATERIALITY : 
 
 of absent witness, when it must be shown, 416. 
 
 of alterations, 179. 
 
 of evidence, must appear from offer, 538. 
 MATURITY OF CROPS : 
 
 judicial notice of, 366. 
 
 MAXIMS : 
 
 judicial notice of, 372. 
 
 McNAGHTEN'S CASE, 352. 
 MEANING: 
 
 of manifestations of feeling, 270. 
 
 of conversation, 269. 
 
 of gesture, 270. 
 
 of technical terms, parol evidence to explain, 318. 
 MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE: 
 
 burden of proof on party having, 386-388. 
 
 MECHANICAL EXPERTS, 288-291. 
 MEMBER OF FAMILY: 
 
 declarations of, constituting pedigree, 72. 
 MEMORANDA : 
 
 in books, not admissible, 84. 
 
 as evidence, 86. 
 
 made on writing, when an alteration, 179. 
 
 parol evidence of written memoranda, 308. 
 
 of judge's charge, may be read by jury, 489.
 
 640 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 MEMORANDA, TO REFRESH MEMORY: 
 
 use of, 199, 477. 
 
 when evidence, 477, 478. ■ 
 
 when not evidence, 477, 478. 
 
 must be contemporaneous, 479. 
 
 when copies may be used as, 480. 
 (see Refreshing the Memory.) 
 MEMORY : 
 
 its unreliability, 51. 
 
 refreshing memory of expert, 275. 
 
 refreshing memory of court, 380. 
 
 refreshing by leading questions, 475. 
 
 of witness, cross-examination to test, 483. 
 (see also Refreshing the Memory.) 
 MENTAL CAPACITY: 
 
 opinions of subscribing witnesses, 194. 
 
 MENTAL CONDITION: 
 
 declarations showing, 66-68, 329, 325. 
 
 MENTAL FEELINGS : 
 
 oral expressions of, 68-71. 
 
 MENTAL INCAPACITY: 
 
 evidence of declarations to show, 67, 322, 325. 
 when disqualifies witness, 452, 453. 
 (see Insanity.) 
 
 MENTION TO THIRD PARTIES (see Self-serving Statements). 
 
 MERCANTILE AGENCIES: 
 
 judicial notice of customs of, 373. 
 
 MERCANTILE AGENCY RATING: 
 
 best evidence of, 51. 
 MERCHANDISE : 
 
 evidence of value, 291. 
 " MERCHANTABLE HAY:" 
 
 evidence to explain term, 319. 
 MERCHANTS : 
 
 judicial notice of their customs, 373. 
 MERGER : 
 
 of oral stipulations in writing, 301. 
 MERITS : 
 
 judgment on, is final, 232. 
 MESSAGE OF THE EXECUTIVE: 
 
 judicial notice of, 370. 
 MICROSCOPIST: 
 
 evidence of, as to character of blood-stains, 281.
 
 INDEX. C41 
 
 References are to pages. 
 MIDWIFE : 
 
 physical examination by, in action to annul marriage, 297, 298. 
 
 MILEAGE OF WITNESSES: 
 
 when paid in two or more suits, 409. 
 
 payable to witness though he was not summoned, 409. 
 
 not payable to attorney, 409. 
 
 of federal officials, 409. 
 
 in criminal cases, 410. 
 
 may be recovered from a party, when, 411. 
 
 vested right to, 411. 
 
 detained in custody, 415. 
 
 in federal courts, 408. 
 
 of a party when a witness, 408. 
 
 when taxable as costs, 409. 
 
 how estimated, 410. 
 MILITARY SERVICE: 
 
 attendance of witness in, how procured, 423. 
 
 MILK : 
 
 evidence to show its quality, 284. 
 MINER: 
 
 as expert witness, 291. 
 
 MINISTERS : 
 
 confessions to, not privileged, 130. 
 
 MINORITY : 
 
 determined by inspection of the jury, 492-495. 
 (see Age.) 
 
 MINUTLE: 
 
 summary or effect of, as observed by a witness, 2G8-270. 
 
 MISDESCRIPTION : 
 
 in wills, evidence in case of, 326. 
 
 MISNOMER : 
 
 in wills, evidence to explain, 326-329. 
 
 MISREPRESENTATION : 
 
 as an element of estoppel, 119. 
 MISSING WITNESSES (see Absent Witnesses). 
 
 MISTAKE : 
 
 as ground for avoiding an estoppel, 105. 
 
 that a will was executed by, may be shown, 328. 
 
 in a deed, may be shown by parol, 329. 
 
 MODE OF PROVING ADMISSIONS, 114 
 
 MODIFICATION : 
 
 of contract in writing, may be shown, 312-314, 
 MONTH AND WEEK, DAYS OF: 
 
 judicial notice of, 305. 
 41
 
 642 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 MONUMENTS: 
 
 primary evidence of. 55. 
 evidence of survej'or to identify, 291. 
 maps admissible to show, 1309. 
 parol evidence to identify, 321. 
 
 MOON RISING: 
 
 judicial notice of, 371. 
 MORAL INSANITY, 353. 
 
 "MORE OR LESS:" 
 
 evidence to explain the term, 318. 
 
 MORTALITY TABLES: 
 judicial notice of, 366. 
 
 MORTGAGE: 
 
 parol evidence to vary, 300. 
 
 absolute deed may be shown to be, 329. 
 
 MORTGAGEE : 
 
 bound by judgment against mortgagor, 231. 
 
 MORTGAGOR : 
 
 oral agreement that mortgagor may remain in possession, 311. 
 
 MOTIONS : 
 
 affidavits to sustain, 526. 
 to suppress depositions, 533. 
 (see also Striking Out.) 
 
 MOTIONS OR GESTURES : 
 
 their meaning (see Deaf Mutes). 
 
 MOTIVE : * 
 
 relevancy of evidence of, 20-24. 
 
 declarations to show, 67. 
 
 presumptions as to maliciousness of, 361-363. 
 
 of witness, explanation of, on redirect examination, 487. 
 
 of witness, cross-examination to test, 483. 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS: 
 
 their records as evidence, 216. 
 
 admissions by inhabitants of, 99. 
 
 competency of their members as witnesses, 427. 
 MUNICIPAL COURTS: 
 
 proving their records, 221. 
 (see Justices' Courts.) 
 
 MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES : 
 
 primary evidence of is required, 51. 
 
 statutory mode of proving, 213. 
 
 proof by certified copy, 213, 214. 
 
 power to enact, 214. 
 
 parol evidence to show a compliance with statute, 214
 
 INDEX. 643 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES (continued): 
 publication of, how proved, 214, 215. 
 in newspaper, 215. 
 in foreign language, 215. 
 judicial notice of, 375, 376. 
 
 MUTES, AS WITNESSES (see Deaf Mutes). 
 
 MUTILATION : 
 
 of evidence, presumptions from, 343. 
 
 " MY CHILDREN : " 
 
 devise to, evidence to explain, 326. 
 
 N. 
 
 NAKED CONFESSION: 
 defined, 133. 
 
 NAME: 
 
 abbreviation of. 319. 
 
 when forgotten, 475. 
 
 of articles ih trade, 317, 318. 
 
 witness may be asked to write his name, 200. 
 
 NARCOTIC: 
 
 dying declaration by party under influence of, 145. 
 
 NARRATIVE DECLARATIONS : 
 
 when inadmissible as admissions, 95, 96. 
 
 NATIONAL BANKS: 
 
 judicial notice of their existence, 366. 
 
 NATURAL CONSEQUENCES: 
 
 presumed to be intended, 361, 362. 
 NATURAL PHENOMENA: 
 
 judicial notice taken of, 366. 
 
 NATURAL SHOW OF FEELINGS, 6a 
 
 NATURALIZATION: 
 best evidence of, 50. 
 
 NATURE OF BUSINESS: 
 
 judicial notice of, 373. 
 NAUTICAL EXPERT: 
 
 evidence of, 289. 
 NAVAL SERVICE: 
 
 attendance of witness in, how procured, 423. 
 NAVIGABLE WATERS: 
 
 judicial notice of, 369. 
 NECESSARY EXPENSES: 
 
 of federal officials, as witnesses, 410.
 
 644 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 NECESSITY: 
 
 opinion evidence of non-experts, when admissible from, 268. 
 
 NEGATIVE : 
 
 burden of proof on party alleging, 380-389. 
 
 NEGATIVE TESTIMONY : 
 
 its admissibility, 565, 566. 
 
 NEGLIGENCE : 
 
 relevancy of evidence to show, 18. 
 
 is a question for the jury, 29, 291. 
 
 proper instructions as to, 33, 34. 
 
 opinion evidence of, 266, 267, 282. 
 
 of plaintiff, burden of proof, 388, 390. 
 
 of bailee, when admitting evidence of bailor, 429. 
 
 in management of railroad, 288, 289. 
 
 in management of ship, 289. 
 
 freedom from, burden of proof, 388, 390. 
 
 inspection by jury of injured person to show. 494. 
 
 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS: 
 
 incompetency of parties to, as witnesses. 445, 446. 
 value of, 293, 294. 
 filling blanks in, 181. 
 parol evidence to vary, 3G1. 
 presumptions in favor of, 346, 347. 
 
 NEW CONTRACTS: 
 
 may be shown by parol, 306-308. 
 
 NEW ENGLAND TOWNSHIP: 
 admissions of inhabitants of, 99. 
 
 NEWLY-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE: 
 
 materiality of, 554. 
 
 discretion of court, 554. 
 
 sufficiency must appear, 555. 
 
 diligence of party who offers, 555, 556. 
 
 affidavits necessary in offering, 556. 
 
 must not be cumulative. 556. 
 
 must not be impeaching merely, 557. 
 NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENT: 
 
 may state testimony of absent witness, 173. 
 NEWSPAPERS: 
 
 as evidence, 208. 
 
 as evidence of public acts, 218. 
 NICKNAMES : 
 
 their use in indictments, 43. 
 NOD : 
 
 significance of, 269.
 
 INDEX. 645 
 
 Heferences are to pages. 
 
 NOISE: 
 
 opinions as to effect of, 269. 
 
 NOMINAL CONSIDERATION (see Consideration 
 
 NOMINAL PARTY: 
 
 admissions of, when binding, 100. 
 his incompetency as a witness, 426. 
 
 (see also Parties and Interested Witnesse&) 
 
 NON-ACCESS : 
 
 when creating a presumption of illegitimacy, 360. 
 wife may testify to fact of. 249. 
 
 NON-ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES: 
 as ground for a continuance, 1 16-419. 
 procured by intimidation, 415. 
 commitment to prevent, 414. 
 poverty as an excuse for, 410, 411. 
 on whom subpoena is served, 407, 408. 
 attachment in case of, 410, 411. 
 may be shown by parol, 414. 
 when contempt, 419. 
 attachment in case of, 419. 
 clear proof must be made, 420. 
 affidavits to show, 420. 
 caused by delay, 420. 
 summoned to give deposition, 420. 
 
 NON-CONCLUSIVENESS : 
 of presumptions, 355. 
 of admissions, 114. 
 
 NON-EXISTENCE : 
 
 of fact, burden of proof, 387-389. 
 
 NON-EXPERT WITNESSES : 
 
 opinions of, when admissible, 265. 
 
 evidence of, on insanity, 285, 286. 
 NON-OCCURRENCE : 
 
 of event, evidence to show, 565, 566. 
 
 NON-PAYMENT (see Consideration). 
 
 NON-PRODUCTION OF WITNESSES: 
 presumption from, 16. 
 
 NON-REPAIR: 
 
 relevancy of evidence to show, 17-20. 
 
 NON-RESIDENT WITNESSES : 
 
 their former testimony, when admissible, 168. 
 taking depositions of, 169. 
 commission to procure deposition of, 530-534. 
 privilege of, from arrest, 420-422.
 
 G4G INDEX. 
 
 References are to pagea. 
 NONSUIT: 
 
 for failure of proof, 29. 
 
 motion for, affidavit to sustain, 52G. 
 NOTARY PUBLIC: 
 
 his entries as evidence, 79. 
 
 may take acknowledgments, 188. 
 
 acknowledgment before, after expiration of term, 189. 
 
 seal of, may amend his return, 189, 190. 
 
 judicial notice of seal of; 373. 
 
 his power to administer oaths, 527. 
 
 NOTES : 
 
 filling blanks in, 181. 
 
 presumption as to date of alteration in, 182. 
 
 presumptions of payment, 344. 
 
 NOTICE : 
 
 certificate of acknowledgment as notice, 192. 
 
 to produce writings, 176. 
 
 in legal proceedings, 406. 
 
 to adverse party to take depositions, 531. 
 
 NOTICE TO QUIT: 
 
 silence, when admission, 113. 
 
 NOTORIOUS FACTS: 
 
 judicial notice of, 364 et seq. 
 
 NUMBER : 
 
 of witnesses required in equity, 430, 431. 
 
 NUMBER OF WITNESSES: 
 
 court may limit, when. 561, 562. 
 
 of expert witnesses, 562. 
 
 in trials for perjury, 562, 563. 
 
 in trials for treason, 563, 564. 
 
 whose calling may be compelled, 565. 
 
 as affecting the weight of evidence, 565, 566. 
 NURSE: 
 
 evidence to show value of services of, 292. 
 
 o. 
 
 OATH : 
 
 of witness, its utility, 64. 
 
 should not be administered to prisoner on his preliminary examination, 
 
 131. 
 of party, to show loss of writing, 183. 
 defined, 448. 
 classified, 448. 
 form of, in courts, 448, 449. 
 assent of witness, 449. 
 affirmation, 449.
 
 INDEX. 047 
 
 References are to pages. 
 OATH (continued): 
 
 binding character of, 450. 
 objections to, 450. 
 administered by arbitrators. 451. 
 waiver of, in arbitration, 451. 
 mentioning aliases, 450. 
 religious character of, 451. 
 irreligion as a disqualification, 451. 
 constitutional guaranties, 452. 
 administration of, to deponent, 531. 
 of interpreter, 469. 
 
 OBJECTION: 
 
 to variance, necessity for, 46. 
 to evidence, necessity for, 35. 
 
 OBJECTIONS TO DEPOSITIONS: 
 should be promptly made, 533. 
 waiver of, 533. 
 
 because of interest of deponent, 533. 
 parol evidence to remove, 533. 
 in the discretion of the court, 533. 
 
 OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE: 
 must be specific, 538. 
 must be promptly made, 539. 
 must be followed by an exception, 539. 
 may be waived, 540. 
 need not be repeated, 541. 
 
 mode of waiver. 542. 
 
 snoulcl be followed by motion to strike out, 5421 
 
 OB LITER ATIONS (see Alterations). 
 
 OBSERVATION : 
 
 of detailed fact, with judgment, 268-270. 
 of witness, cross-examination to test, 483. 
 
 OBSTRUCTING THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES: 
 
 a misdemeanor, 414. 
 
 when witness was not subpoenaed. 414. 
 
 unsuccessful attempt at, 415. 
 
 by scurrilous language, 415. 
 
 arrest of obstructor, 415. 
 
 beating a witness after he testifies, 415, 
 
 by district attorney, 415. 
 
 language of indictment for, 415. 
 OCCUPATION OF REAL PROPERTY: 
 
 presumption of, from paying rent, 347. 
 OFFER OF COMPROMISE : 
 
 as an admission. 106, 107. 
 
 when presumed confidential, 106.
 
 G48 INDEX. 
 
 Beferencos are to pages. 
 
 OFFER OF EVIDENCE: 
 must be explicit, 10. 
 should show purpose, 537. 
 stating substance of, in, 537. 
 purpose may appear from answer, 537. 
 
 OFFICE COPY: 
 defined, 219. 
 
 OFFICER : 
 
 de facto, acknowledgment before. 188, 189. 
 seals of, judicially noticed, 370, 373, 378, 379. 
 arresting witness, when liable, 422. 
 authority of, to take depositions, 532. 
 authority of, to administer oaths, 527. 
 
 OFFICERS OF COURTS: 
 
 judicial notice of their character, 379. 
 
 OFFICIAL BOOK ENTRIES, 78-80. 
 
 OFFICIAL CHARACTER : 
 judicial notice of, 370. 
 
 OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS: 
 when confidential, 256. 
 
 OFFICIAL DUTY: 
 
 presumption of performance of, 349. 
 OFFICIAL RECORDS (see Public Records). 
 
 OLD AGE: 
 
 of witness, admits his former evidence, 169. 
 OLEOMARGARINE : 
 
 judicial notice of, 372. 
 
 OMISSIONS : 
 
 parol evidence to supply, 307, 308. 
 
 in wills, cannot be filled by parol, 326. 
 
 in declaration of trust, parol evidence, 400. 
 OPEN AND CLOSE: 
 
 goes with burden of proof, 383. 
 OPEN COMMISSIONS: 
 
 to take testimony, 529. 
 OPENING THE DOOR: 
 
 for the adverse party, 436, 437. 
 
 (see also Personal Transaction.) 
 
 OPERATION: 
 
 of machine in court, 296! 
 OPERATION OF RAILROADS: 
 
 evidence of experts to show, 288.
 
 INDEX. 64r'J 
 
 Heferences are to pages. 
 
 OPERATOR AT TELEPHONE : 
 when agent for both parties, 123. 
 
 OPINIONS : 
 
 form of question calling for, 267. 
 
 (see also Hypothetical Questions.) 
 inadmissible as dying declarations, 141, 143. 
 to show bad reputation of witness, 506. 
 
 (see also Expert Evidence.) 
 
 OPPORTUNITY : 
 
 relevancy of evidence to show, 20. 
 
 of witness, ascertainable on cross-examination, 480, 483. 
 
 ORAL EVIDENCE: 
 denned, 299. 
 
 (see also Parol Evidence.) 
 
 ORAL WARRANTY : 
 evidence to show, 311. 
 
 ORDER : 
 
 for witnesses to withdraw, 466-468. 
 
 ORDER FOR MONEY : 
 
 presumption from possession of, 345. 
 
 ORDINANCES : 
 
 judicial notice of, 375. 
 
 (see also Municipal Ordinances.) 
 
 ORIGINAL AND HEARSAY EVIDENCE: 
 distinguished, 65, 66. 
 
 ORIGINAL ENTRY : 
 books of, 83, 84. 
 
 ORIGINAL EVIDENCE: 
 when required, 47-62. 
 
 ORIGIN OF FIRE : 
 
 evidence to show, 295. 
 
 ORPHANS' COURTS: 
 
 proof of records of, 226, 227. 
 OUTCRY : 
 
 evidence to show meaning of, 268. 
 "OUT OF JURISDICTION:" 
 
 denned, 168. 
 OVERT ACT: 
 
 evidence of, in treason, 564. 
 
 OWNER OF PROPERTY: 
 
 cannot make evidence for his successor, 166.
 
 650 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 OWNERSHIP: 
 
 primary evidence of, 52. 
 
 ship's registry as evidence, 216. 
 opinion evidence on, 267. 
 presumption of, 341. 
 
 OWN WITNESS: 
 
 party may not impeach, 500-502. 
 exceptions to the general rule, 502-504. 
 
 OYER: 
 
 of sealed instruments, 41. 
 
 P. 
 
 PAIN : 
 
 declarations of, 68. 
 
 PARDON : 
 
 restoring competency of witness, 455. 
 
 when ineffectual, 456. 
 
 conditional, 456. 
 
 full pardon, 456. 
 
 judicial notice of, 456. 
 
 proof of, 456. 
 
 irrevocable character of, 4.10. 
 
 PARISH REGISTER: 
 
 as evidence of birth, 210. 
 
 not primary evidence of marriage, 54 
 
 PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE: 
 when inadmissible, 299-301. 
 
 interpretation and construction of writings, 301-304 
 rule applies between parties only, 304. 
 to vary or explain or show real consideration, 304-308. 
 incomplete and collateral writings. 307. 308. 
 to connect and explain contemporaneous writings, 308. 
 to explain receipts, 309. 310. 
 
 to show independent parol contracts and conditions precedent, 310, 311. 
 to establish implied, resulting or constructive trusts, 312. 
 to show discharge, modification or extension of contract, 312-314 
 to rebut presumptions, 314, 315. 
 to show usage, 316, 317. 
 to explain technical terms, 317, 318. 
 to explain abbreviations, 319. 
 to show the relations of the parties. 320. 
 to ascertain or explain subject-matter. 320-322. 
 ambiguities defined and distinguished; parol evidence to explain, 323- 
 
 326. 
 as applicable to wills, 326-329.
 
 INDEX. 05 1 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE (continued): 
 
 to show absolute deed a mortgage and in suits for specific performance 
 
 and reformation or cancellation, 329-332. 
 inadmissible to vary a written award, 110. 
 inadmissible to supply omissions in an acknowledgment, 191. 
 erroneous admission of, how cured, 51. 
 to explain returns on writs, 228. 
 to show contents of missing telegram, 263. 
 
 PARTIAL EVIDENCE: 
 defined, 3. 
 
 PARTIAL PERFORMANCE: 
 
 of parol contract for the sale of land, 397. 
 of parol partition, 399. 
 
 PARTICULAR CUSTOM : 
 
 actual knowledge of required, 316. 
 
 PARTIES: 
 
 to writing, their relation may be shown by parol, 320. 
 
 bound by rule excluding parol evidence, 304. 
 
 as witnesses, when entitled to fees, 408, 409. 
 
 may serve subpoena, 413. 
 
 competency of, as witnesses, 433-437. 
 
 competency of, as witnesses in equity, 430-433. 
 
 their incompetency to testify at common law, 426. 
 
 reasons for excluding them, 425. 
 
 their knowledge of the facts in issue, 425. 
 
 when they are competent, 427-429. 
 
 may make affidavits, 526. 
 
 as witnesses, impeachment of, 501, 503. 
 
 PARTITION : 
 
 by parol, when valid, 398, 399. 
 
 PARTNER : 
 
 admissions of, 92. 
 
 when a trustee for his associates, 403. 
 PARTNERSHIP: 
 
 must be shown to admit declarations of partner.% 93. 
 
 presumption of continuance of, 350. 
 
 contract of, when it must be in writing, 402. 
 PARTNERSHIP SETTLEMENT: 
 
 conveying land, 397. 
 
 PART PAYMENT: 
 
 evidence of, 86, 87. 
 of firm debt after dissolution, 93, 94. 
 PART PERFORMANCE: 
 
 of oral contract of partnership, 403.
 
 052 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 PASS-BOOK: 
 
 of bauk, as evidence, 84. 
 
 PATENT: 
 
 burden of proof to show want of invention. 390. 
 
 PATENT AMBIGUITIES: 
 
 parol evidence inadmissible to explain, 323, 324, 325. 
 
 PAYMENT : 
 
 indorsements as evidence of, 87. 
 of firm debt after dissolution, 93, 94. 
 presumption as to time and purpose of, 344, 345. 
 of money, when evidenced by writing, 406. 
 
 PAYMENT INTO COURT: 
 
 its effect as an admission, 117. 
 PAYMENT OF CONSIDERATION: 
 admission of, when conclusive, 117. 
 
 PEACEABLE DISPOSITION : 
 when relevant, 27. 
 
 PECUNIARY INTEREST: 
 
 declaration against, 162-106. 
 
 PECUNIARY LIABILITY: 
 
 of witness, questions showing, 515, 516. 
 PEDIGREE : 
 
 defined, 68-71. 
 
 PENALTY : 
 
 burden of proof in action to recover, 387. 
 PENCIL SKETCHES: 
 
 as primary evidence, 60. 
 PERFORMANCE : 
 
 time of, may be shown, 307. 
 
 burden of proving, 389. 
 
 of contract for the sale of laud, 397. 
 
 of parol partition, 399. 
 
 PERFORMANCE OF DUTY: 
 
 by officers, when presumed, 349. 
 PERISHABLE GOODS: 
 
 evidence to show the condition of, 284. 
 PERJURY: 
 
 variance in an indictment for, 44. 
 
 presumptions from. 343. 
 
 conviction of, disqualifies witness, 457. 
 
 presumptions from, 512-514. 
 
 in affidavit, 528. 
 
 possibility of excluded interested witnesses, 425. 
 
 number of witnesses in trials for, 562. 563. 
 (see Falsus in Uno.)
 
 INDEX. C53 
 
 ^References are to pages. 
 
 PERPETUATION OF TESTIMONY: 
 by a bill in equity, 534, 535. 
 
 PERSON: 
 
 exhibition of, to the jury, 492-495. 
 
 PERSONAL CONDITION (see Condition, Health, etc.). 
 
 PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: 
 of witness, its character, 64. 
 admissions based on, 115, 116. 
 juror having, should testify, 489. 
 of juror, verdict based on, 505. 
 
 PERSONAL PROPERTY: 
 
 presumptions from the possession of, 343. 
 trusts created in, by parol, 400. 
 
 PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE : 
 
 exclusion of interested witnesses against, 436-445. 
 (see also Personal Transactions.) 
 
 PERSONAL SERVICE: 
 of the subpoena, 413. 
 by a party, 413. 
 when it must be shown to obtain a continuance, 417. 
 
 PERSONAL SERVICES : 
 
 evidence to show the value of, 291, 292. 
 
 PERSONAL STATUS: 
 judgments fixing, 239. 
 
 PERSONAL TRANSACTIONS WITH DECEASED: 
 
 incompetency of witness to, 435, 436. 
 waiver of exclusion of, 436-438. 
 who are representatives, 438. 
 object of the statutes, 439. 
 
 character and construction of the statutes, 439. 
 definition, 440. 
 
 transactions with agent of the deceased, 450. 
 contract in issue, 441. 
 a writing is not, 441. 
 
 whether excluded is a question for court, 442. 
 incompetency of interested witnesses, 443, 444. 
 (see also Interested Persons.) 
 
 PERSONS : 
 
 proof of, in indictment, 43. 
 
 PHENOMENA OF NATURE: 
 judicial notice of, 366.
 
 C54 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 PHOTOGRAPHS: 
 
 when primary evidence, 49, 59, 00. 
 
 as evidence, relevancy of, 60, 80. 
 
 to prove handwriting, 59, 180. 
 
 to describe buildings, physical injuries, etc.. 49, 59. 
 
 for identification, 59, 00. 
 
 preliminary question, 60. 
 
 by amateur, 60. 
 
 weight of, 60. 
 
 changes in object photographed, 60. 
 
 PHRASES : 
 
 meaning of, will be noticed, 365. 
 
 PHYSICAL CONDITION: 
 
 photographs to show, 60. 
 (see also Health.) 
 
 evidence to show, 278-282. 
 PHYSICAL DISABILITY: 
 
 of witness, admits bis former evidence, 169. 
 PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: 
 
 evidence of an expert medical witness founded on, 278. 
 
 of party by medical experts, 297, 298. 
 
 by the jury, 492-495. 
 PHYSICAL FEELINGS: 
 
 verbal expressions of, 68-71. 
 
 PHYSICAL INJURIES: 
 
 photographs as evidence of, 59. 
 
 medical testimony as to, 278-280. 
 PHYSICIANS : 
 
 declarations to, 70. 
 
 information acquired by, non-professionally, 260l 
 
 credibility of, as witnesses, 276. 
 
 physical examination by, 297, 298. 
 
 PHYSICIANS AS EXPERT WITNESSES: 
 may testify — 
 
 to effect of wounds or injuries, 278. 
 
 to manner inflicted, 279. 
 
 to health, 278. 
 
 to possibility of recovery, 279. 
 
 to probable cause of injury, 279. 
 
 to curability of injury, 279. 
 
 to cause of death, 280. 
 
 to time of death, 280. 
 
 to means of death, 280. 
 
 to character of a disease, 280. 
 
 to simulation of disease, 280. 
 
 to manner of conducting autopsies, 280.
 
 INDEX. 65* 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 PHYSICIANS AS EXPERT WITNESSES (continued): 
 
 may testify (continued) — 
 
 to cause of condition of body, 281. 
 
 to blood-stain, 281. 
 
 in actions for malpractice, 281, 282. 
 
 to insanity, 288. 
 
 to chemical analysis, 283. 
 may examine weapon, 279. 
 
 PISTOL: 
 
 used to explain evidence, 60. 
 
 PLACE: 
 
 proof of, in indictments, 43. 
 allegations of, 39. 
 judicial notice of, 368. 
 
 PLAINTIFF : 
 
 his right to open and close, 390, 391, 
 PLANS (see Maps and Photographs). 
 PLATS : 
 
 incorporation of, in deeds by reference, 309. 
 PLEADING, MODE OF: 
 
 customs, 316. 
 
 former judgment, 236. 
 
 PLEADINGS : 
 
 pedigree in, 73. 
 
 as admissions, 107. 
 
 presumptions from, 107. 
 
 when sworn to, 108. 
 
 when considered as formulas, 108. 
 
 amendment of, when presumed, 354. 
 
 right to open and close arising on, 392. 
 
 admissions in the answer in equity, 430. 
 
 may be read by the jurors, 489. 
 
 FLEAS IN BAR: 
 
 proof of one of several, sufficient, 40. 
 POISONS : 
 
 testimony of chemists, 283, 284. 
 POLICEMEN : 
 
 confessions made to, 127. 
 POLICE OFFICIALS : 
 
 communications to, when confidential, 255. 
 POLICIES OF INSURANCE: 
 
 parol evidence to vary, 301. 
 
 expert evidence in actions on. 294, 2C5. 
 
 burden of proof in actions on, 388.
 
 *)~)C) INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 POLITICAL FACTS: 
 
 judicial notice of, 369, 370. 
 
 POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 
 judicial notice of, 368. 
 
 POPULAR MEANING: 
 
 of language, 318. 
 POPULATION : 
 
 judicial notice of, 368. 
 POSITION : 
 
 of objects, photographs to show, 59, 60. 
 
 POSITIVENESS : 
 
 of answers by witness, 267. 
 
 POSITIVE TESTIMONY: 
 
 its weight and credibility, 565, 566. 
 instructions on, 565. 
 
 POSSESSION : 
 
 evidence of, in corroboration of ancient documents, 152, 155. 
 
 presumption from adverse, 338, 339. 
 
 presumption of ownership, 342-344 
 
 in trespass, burden of proving, 389. 
 
 of land under statute of frauds, 397, 399. 
 
 of writings, presumptions from, 343, 344, 345. 
 
 of negotiable paper, 344. 
 
 of rent receipts, 347. 
 
 presumed continuance, 350. 
 
 POSSIBILITY (see Probable Cause and Care). 
 
 POSTAL LAWS, VIOLATIONS OF: 
 
 evidence of, obtained by decoy letters, 177. 
 POST-MARK : ' 
 
 presumption from, 347. 
 
 POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION (see Autopsies). 
 
 POVERTY : 
 
 evidence to show, 269. 
 
 of witness, as excuse for his non-attendance, 410, 411. 
 does not extend privilege from arrest, 422. 
 
 PORTRAITS : 
 
 inscriptions on, as pedigree, 73. 
 POWER OF ATTORNEY: 
 
 blanks in, 180. 
 
 PRAYER : 
 
 confession contained in, 131. 
 
 PREGNANCY : 
 
 expert testimony in case of, 284, 285.
 
 index. daJT 
 
 References are to pages. 
 PREJUDICE : 
 
 when rendering evidence of reputation inadmissible, 156. 
 of witness, ascertainable by cross-examination, 480, 483, 485. 
 (see Bias and Prejudice.) 
 
 PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS : 
 objects of, 131. 
 witnesses at, 131. 
 voluntary appearance at, 131. 
 statements of accused at, 132. 
 when taken down in writing, 133. 
 signature by accused, 133. 
 
 PRELIMINARY PROOF: 
 of partnership, 92. 
 of conspiracy, 95. 
 
 PRELIMINARY QUESTION: 
 for judge, 30, 35. 
 of voluntary character of confession, 126, 127. 
 
 may be submitted to jury, 35. 
 of competency of expert, 271. 
 of competency of dying declarations, 143. 
 of loss of writing, 184. 
 of conspiracy, 135, 136. 
 
 PREMEDITATION : 
 
 declarations to show, 76. 
 
 PREMISES : 
 
 maps or photographs of, 59, 60, 217, 218, 309. 
 
 PREMIUM : 
 
 increase of, for insurance, 295. 
 
 PREPAYMENT : 
 
 of witness fees, when necessary, 409. 
 
 PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE: 
 
 not required as basis for hypothetical question, 272. 
 
 sufficient in civil trials, 9. 
 
 may prevent a continuance, 418. 
 
 in equity, 431. 
 
 PRESCRIPTION : 
 defined, 335. 
 presumptions from, 339, 340. 
 
 PRESENCE : 
 
 of testator, what constitutes, 405, 406. 
 
 of witness, does not prevent reading his deposition, 534. 
 
 PRESENCE OF ADVERSE PARTY: 
 
 as rendering self-serving declarations competent, 112. 
 42
 
 658 INDEX, 
 
 "References are to pages. 
 PRESIDING JUDGE: 
 
 his duty to certify to records, 224. 
 his incompetency as a witness, 447. 
 
 PRESS COPY: 
 
 of letter, as evidence, 80. 
 when primary evidence, 48, 49. 
 
 PRESUMPTION : 
 
 arising from false testimony of alibi, 12. 
 
 from non-production of witness or deposition, 16. 
 
 of performance of official duty, 133. 
 
 of continuance of improper influence producing a confession, 129. 
 
 how rebutted, 129. 
 
 province of court to say whether it is rebutted, 129. 
 in favor of ancient documents, 148, 150. 
 as to alterations in a will, 182. 
 as to alterations in a deed, 181. 
 as to alterations in promissory notes, 182. 
 as to identity of persons, 183. 
 when two of same name, 183. 
 of impotency, 298. 
 
 that ordinance was properly enacted, 214. 
 of consideration from sealing, 305. 
 as to corm tness of date, 314. 
 satisfaction of legacies, 314, 315. 
 as to resulting trust, 314. 
 from advancements, 315. 
 as to delivery of deeds, 315. 
 as to acceptance of deeds, 315. 
 of knowledge of law, 377. 
 
 definition and classification of presumptions, 333, 334. 
 of law and fact distinguished, 334-337. 
 of fact, 337, 338. 
 
 from adverse possession and prescription, 338-340. 
 from lapse of time, 341. 
 from possession, 342-346. 
 from the usual course of trade, 346-349. 
 of lawfulness; continuity; sanity; insanity, 349-353, 385. 
 as to jurisdiction, 353-356. 
 of life, death and survivorship, 356-359. 
 of legitimacy; innocence; malice, 359-363. 
 none to be drawn from interest of witness, 435. 
 none from refusal to answer incriminating questions, 522. 
 from deliberate perjury, 512-514. 
 
 PREVIOUS COURSE OF DEALING: 
 
 effect of, in construing contracts, 303, 304. 
 
 PRIESTS: 
 
 communications to, 258. 259.
 
 INDEX. 659 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE: 
 
 distinguished, 47-49. 
 
 instruments required to be in writing, 49, 50. 
 
 disputed writings. 51, 52. 
 
 contracts and transactions actually reduced to writing, 52-54. 
 
 collateral writings, 54, 55. 
 
 exceptions in the case of records and appointments, 55-57. 
 
 exceptions in the case of general results, 57, 58. 
 
 admissions as primary evidence, 58. 
 
 photographs as primary evidence, 59 r 60. 
 
 production of articles in court, 60-62. 
 (see Statute of Frauds.) 
 PRINCIPAL: 
 
 when bound by agent's declarations, 101-103. 
 
 PRINCIPAL AND AGENT (see Agency and Admissions). 
 
 PRINCIPAL AND SURETY: 
 admissions of, 99, 100. 
 
 PRINTED BOOKS: 
 
 as evidence, 208, 211-213, 215-218. 
 PRINTED CLAUSES IN CONTRACTS: 
 
 their meaning controlled by written clauses, 303. 
 PRINTERS' ABBREVIATIONS : 
 
 judicial notice of, 366. 
 PRISON : 
 
 attendance of witness in, how procured, 423. 
 PRISON RECORDS: 
 
 as evidence, 216. 
 
 PRIVATE ARBITRATIONS (see Arbitration). 
 
 PRIVATE BOOKS: 
 
 as evidence, 79-86. 
 
 PRIVATE BOUNDARIES: 
 proof of (see Boundaries). 
 
 PRIVATE CORPORATIONS: 
 
 when bound by admissions of employees, 1021, 
 
 judicial notice of their charters, 376. 
 
 competency of members of, as witnesses, 427. 
 PRIVATE CORPORATION RECORDS: 
 
 parol evidence to vary, 300. 
 
 PRIVATE ENTRIES, 78. 
 
 PRIVATE MAPS: 
 
 to show boundaries, 218. 
 PRIVATE RIGHTS: 
 
 reputation to prove, 154, 157-159.
 
 660 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 PRIVATE STATUTES; 
 
 judicial notice of, 374-376. 
 
 PRIVATE VIEW: 
 by the jury, 488. 
 
 PRIVATE WRITINGS: 
 
 definition and classification, 174, 175. 
 
 production of ; proof of contents by secondary evidence, 175-177. 
 
 obtained by fraud or deceit; decoy letters, 177, 178. 
 
 spoliation and alteration distinguished; effect of material alterations, 
 
 178-181. 
 alterations; presumptions and burden of proof to explain, 181-183. 
 when lost or destroyed, 183-185. 
 handwriting defined, 185, 186. 
 production of writings, when necessary, 186. 
 proof by admissions of party, 186, 187. 
 when proof of handwriting may be dispensed with; acknowledgments, 
 
 187, 188. 
 who may take acknowledgments, 188, 189. 
 the certificate, 189-191. 
 impeaching the certificate, 192. 
 proof by subscribing witnesses, 192-195. 
 proof by witnesses acquainted with handwriting, 195-198. 
 mode of examining witnesses to handwriting, 198-200. 
 comparison of handwriting, 200-204. 
 to what expert may give evidence, 204, 205. 
 proof of exhibits in equity, 205. 
 
 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS : 
 foundation of the doctrine, 243. 
 
 husband and wife, when competent witnesses, 244, 245. 
 statutory legislation; confidential communications, 245-247. 
 
 between husband and wife, 247-249. 
 communications to attorneys, 249, 250. 
 
 character and time of the communications, 251. 
 
 attorney employed by both parties, 252. 
 
 permanent character of the privilege : its waiver, 252, 253. 
 
 privileges as to documents, 253, 254. 
 
 what communications are within the privilege, 254, 255. 
 privilege of police, judicial and executive officials, 255, 256. 
 privilege as relating to jurors, 257, 258. 
 confidential communications to clergymen, 258, 259. 
 communications to physicians, 259, 260. 
 telegrams are not, 262, 263. 
 
 PRIVILEGE OF WITNESSES FROM ARREST: 
 from service of civil process, 420. 
 service may be set aside, 421. 
 from civil arrest, 421.
 
 INDEX. 601 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 PRIVILEGE OF WITNESSES FROM ARREST (continued): 
 before investigating committee, 421. 
 in case of non-residence, 421. 
 duration of, 422. 
 
 abrogated by delay to return, 422. 
 officer is not bound to know, 422. 
 arrest after termination of, 422. 
 
 PRIVILEGES OF WITNESSES IN ANSWERING: 
 questions showing pecuniary liability, 515, 516. 
 questions tending to disgrace, 497, 498, 516-519. 
 questions tending to incriminate, 519-522. 
 
 PRIVIES : 
 
 judgment binds, 230. 
 PRIVITY : 
 
 as affecting admissions, 89, 90. 
 
 PROBABILITY : 
 
 as grounds for belief, 4. 
 relevancy of evidence to show, 21. 
 opinion evidence to show, 267, 268. 
 
 PROBABLE CAUSE: 
 a judicial question, 33. 
 evidence of declarations to show, 67. 
 opinions when inadmissible, 268. 
 of death, 278, 280. 
 of injury, 279. 
 of symptoms, 279. 
 in malicious prosecution, 387. 
 
 PROBABLE MEANS: 
 of death, 280, 281. 
 
 PROBABLE TIME: 
 of death, 280. 
 
 PROBABLE TRUTH: 
 
 of evidence of absent witness, 417. 
 
 PROBATE : 
 
 proof of fact of, 227. 
 PROBATE PROCEEDING: 
 
 burden of proof in, 383, 384. 
 
 right to open and close in, 393. 
 
 PROCEEDINGS: 
 
 special, right to open and close in, 393, 394 
 
 PROCESS : 
 
 privilege of witness from service of, 420. 
 
 to procure attendance of witness (see Compulsory Process, etc. ; Duces 
 Tecum; Subpcena.)
 
 GG2 . INDEX. 
 
 Beferences are to pages. 
 PROCLAMATION: 
 as evidence, 208. 
 judicial notice of, 370. 
 
 PRODUCTION OF WITNESS: 
 
 dispensed with in case of entries, 79. 
 
 PRODUCTION OF WRITING: 
 
 when necessary in proving a writing, 183-186. 
 how obtained, 175, 176. 
 
 PROFESSIONAL ENTRIES: 
 their value as evidence, 78-80. 
 
 PROLIXITY : 
 
 as an objection to hypothetical questions, 273. 
 
 PROMISE : 
 
 rendering confessions involuntary, 128. 
 confessions procured by, 130. 
 persons making, 135, 136. 
 to hold testamentary gift in trust, 328. 
 
 PROMISSORY NOTE: 
 
 right to open and close in an action on, 393. 
 
 PROOF: 
 
 dispensed with by judicial notice, 364. 
 
 " PROPER EVIDENCE : " 
 
 defined, 14. 
 PROPER CUSTODY FOR ANCIENT WRITINGS: 
 
 defined, 149, 150. 
 
 a judicial question. 149. 
 
 lessor or grantor, 150. 
 
 PROPER MANAGEMENT: 
 
 of ship, 289. 
 PROPRIETY : 
 
 of act, opinion of, 266. 
 
 PROSTITUTES : 
 
 association with, as revelant to prove adultery, 22. 
 
 PROVINCE OF JUDGE : 
 
 to instruct jury as to circumstantial evidence, 8. 
 to determine if dying declaration is admissible, 140. 
 
 as to proper custody of ancient documents, 149. 
 
 voluntary character of confessions, 127. 
 
 genuineness of standard for comparison of writing, 203. 
 to construe foreign law, 211. 
 on issue of domestic record, 220. 
 to construe contract, 302. 
 to permit disgracing questions, 520. 
 to permit incriminating questions. 521. 
 to take part in examination of witness, 472. 
 to exclude incompetent evidence, 472, 473.
 
 INDEX. 663 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 PROVINCE OF JURY : 
 
 to weigh circumstantial evidence, 8. 
 over opinion evidence, 273, 276. 
 over negligence, 291. 
 to determine damages, 292, 293. 
 to determine completeness of contract, 307. 
 to construe contact, 303. 
 to weigh the evidence, 472. 
 (see also Facts.) 
 
 PRUDENCE : 
 
 evidence to show presence or absence of, 268. 
 (see also Care.) 
 
 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENTRIES: 
 distinguished, 78. 
 
 PUBLICATION : 
 
 service by proving, 229. 
 of ordinances, how proved, 214, 215. 
 in newspaper as evidence, 215. 
 of will by testator, 406. 
 
 PUBLIC BOUNDARIES: 
 judicial notice of, 368, 369. 
 
 PUBLIC HOLIDAYS: 
 judicial notice of, 365. 
 
 PUBLICITY, 156, 157. 
 
 PUBLIC LANDS: 
 
 primary evidence of their boundaries, 57. 
 
 PUBLIC LAWS: 
 
 judicial notice of, 374-376. 
 
 PUBLIC OFFICIALS: 
 
 judicial notice of customs of, 373. 
 
 PUBLIC POLICY: 
 
 communications incompetent by (see Privileged COMMUNICATIONS). 
 
 PUBLIC RECORDS: 
 
 primary evidence of, 54. 
 
 PUBLIC RECORDS, PROOF AND EFFECT OF: 
 definition of, 209. 
 inspection of, 206, 207. 
 
 proof of executive and legislative acts and writings, 208. 
 proof of non-judicial records, 209-211. 
 proof of foreign laws. 211-213. 
 proof of municipal ordinances, 213-215. 
 effect of public documents as evidence, 215-217. 
 
 historical and scientific publications; almanacs and newspapers, 217, 
 218.
 
 664 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 PUBLIC RECORDS, PROOF AND EFFECT OF (continued): 
 proof of judicial records defined, 218-221. 
 records of courts of equity and of inferior courts, 221, 222. 
 records of courts of other states, 222-225. 
 foreign judgments, 225, 226. 
 records of surrogate courts, 226, 227. 
 
 returns on writs; the effect of judicial records as evidence, 227-229. 
 the effect of judgments on those in privitj 7 with the parties, 231, 232. 
 judgment records as evidence, 230, 231. 
 judgment must have been final and on the merits, 232. 
 judgments conclusive only as to material facts in issue, 233. 
 identity of cause of action required, 234-236. 
 persons affected by judgments in rem and actions fixing personal status, 
 
 236, 237. 
 criminal judgments, 237. 
 
 proof of judgments as facts and their use as proving ulterior facts dis- 
 tinguished, 237, 238. 
 validity and effect of foreign judgments, 238-240. 
 judgments of sister states, 241. 
 judgments in bar need not be pleaded, 242. 
 
 PUBLIC RIGHT: 
 
 reputation to show, 154. 
 
 PUBLIC STATUTES: 
 judicial notice of, 373. 
 
 •PUBLIC WRITINGS:" 
 defined, 174. 
 
 PURPOSE (see Malice, Intention and Motive). 
 
 Q, 
 
 QUALIFICATION OF WITNESS: 
 to testify to blood, 281. 
 to insanity, 287. 
 to value, 292. 
 to machinery, etc., 288. 
 of experts in general, 271-273. 
 to physical condition of a person, 283. 
 
 QUALITY: 
 
 allegation and proof of, 39. 
 proof of, by comparison, 297. 
 
 QUANTITY : 
 
 allegation and proof of, 39. 
 
 QUARRELSOME DISPOSITION: 
 relevancy of, 27.
 
 INDEX. 665 
 
 References are to pages 
 
 QUASI-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS : 
 admissions of inhabitants of, 99. 
 
 QUEEN'S CASE: 
 rule in, 508. 
 
 QUESTIONS PUT TO WITNESS: 
 when leading, 470, 471. 
 when assuming, 470. 
 may be answered by narrative, 471. 
 put by court or jury, 471-473. 
 to witness, must not be vague, 476. 
 responsive answers required, 477. 
 (see Hypothetical Questions.) 
 
 QUESTIONS FOR COURT OR JURY, 28-35. 
 
 QUESTION OF FACT: 
 
 proof of foreign law, 211. 
 (see also Facts.) 
 
 QUESTIONS OF LAW: 
 
 competency of expert, 271. 
 
 QUO WARRANTO: 
 
 judgment of ouster iu, effect of, 231. 
 
 R. 
 
 RACE: 
 
 inspection by jury to determine, 493, 494. 
 
 RAILROAD BUILDERS: 
 
 as expert witnesses, 288, 289. 
 
 RAILROAD CORPORATIONS : 
 
 when bound by the admissions of their employees, 102. 
 
 RAILROAD OFFICIALS: 
 as expert witnesses, 288. 
 
 RAILROAD TRAINS: 
 
 evidence to show speed of, 269, 270. 
 damage caused by running, 271. 
 proper method of stopping, 288. 
 derailment of, 288. 
 
 RAILROAD TRAVEL: 
 
 judicial notice of, 365. 
 
 RAILROADS : 
 
 judicial notice of the existence of, 372. 
 expert evidence to show operation of, 288, 289.
 
 666 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 RAPE: 
 
 relevancy of evidence of chastity of prosecuting witness in, 25. 
 declarations by the victim of, 71. 
 presumption that boy cannot commit, 334. 
 medical testimony in a case of, 284. 
 questions on witness' chastity in, 517. 
 
 RATE OF INTEREST: 
 judicial notice of, 378. 
 
 REAL ESTATE AGENT: 
 
 as a witness to land values, 292, 293. 
 
 REAL EVIDENCE: 
 defined. 492. 
 
 where legitimacy is in issue, 492. 
 resemblance shown by, 493. 
 to show a person's race or color, 493. 
 to determine age, 494. 
 to show identity, 494, 495. « 
 
 REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST: 
 admissions of, 99. 
 
 his incompetency as a witness, 426. 
 guarantor, his interest, 429. 
 
 REASONABLE CARE: 
 
 charging the jury on, 33, 34. 
 opinion evidence as to. 266, 267. 
 
 REASONABLE CONSTRUCTION : 
 defined, 302. 
 
 REASONABLE DOUBT: 
 
 defined. 8-12. 
 
 burden of proof, 384. 
 
 prisoner need not prove insanity beyond, 385. 
 REBUTTAL : 
 
 parol evidence in, of presumptions, 314, 315. 
 
 of experiments by others. 296. 
 
 evidence in, may be offered in chief, 16. 
 
 depositions for use in, 532. 
 
 defined, 551. 
 
 discretion of court to reject evidence offered in, 551, 553. 
 
 corroborative or cumulative evidence in, 552. 
 
 evidence in, to overcome a presumption, 552. 
 
 evidence in, to show whole of conversation, 552. 
 
 order of proof, 553. 
 
 RECALLING WITNESS: 
 
 discretion of court. 487. 
 
 after recross examination, 488. 
 
 refusal, 488.
 
 INDEX. C67 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 RECALLING WITNESS (continued): 
 
 if witness is unable to answer positively, 488. 
 
 not to obtain cumulative evidence, 488. 
 
 both parties may examine on, 488. 
 RECAPITULATION OF EVIDENCE: 
 
 by court, 32. 
 
 RECEIPTS : 
 
 indorsement as evidence, 87. 
 
 definition of, 309. 
 
 evidence to explain, 309. 
 
 form of, 310. 
 
 considered as co7itracts, 310. 
 
 as a declaration against interest, 162. 
 
 of agents, 100-103. 
 
 RECEIVING EVIDENCE OUT OF COURT: 
 
 when it is improper, 488. 
 
 by experiments, 488. 
 
 from private persons, 488. 
 
 from witnesses, 489. 
 
 in writing, 489. 
 
 from articles in jury room, 489. 
 
 by taking the view, 489-491. 
 (see also Taking the View.) 
 RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE: 
 
 offering and objecting to evidence, 536-540. 
 
 waiver of objections to ; necessity for repeating objections, 540-542. 
 
 motions to strike out, 542, 543. 
 
 improper admission of evidence, when immaterial, 544, 545. 
 
 improper exclusion of evidence, when immaterial, 545, 546. 
 
 nature and use of stipulations, 547-549, 
 
 demurrer to evidence, 549, 550. 
 
 surprise, 550, 551. 
 
 rebutting evidence; nature and use of, 551-553. 
 
 order of proof ; evidence offered by the party after he rests, 553, 554. 
 
 materiality and sufficiency of newly-discovered evidence, 554, 555. 
 
 diligence of party offering, must be shown, 555, 556. 
 
 newly-discovered evidence must not be cumulative or impeaching. 556^ 
 557. 
 
 writ of error; when employed at common law, 557, 558. 
 
 Lhe powers of appellate tribunals in relation to the evidence, 558-561. 
 
 limitations on the number of witnesses. 561, 562. 
 
 number of witnesses in trials for perjury, 562, 563. 
 
 number of witnesses in trials for treason, 563, 564. 
 
 compelling the calling of the witnesses. 564, 565. 
 
 positive and negative testimony ; number of witnesses affecting the 
 weight of evidence, 565, 566. 
 
 the discretionary power of the court, 566, 567.
 
 668 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 RECITALS: 
 
 parol evidence to vary, 304-308. 
 
 RECOGNITION : 
 
 of speaker tli rough telephone, 122. 
 
 RECOGNIZANCE: 
 of witness, 414. 
 when dispensed with, 414. 
 
 RECOLLECTION OF WITNESS (see Refreshing the Memory). 
 
 RECONCILEMENT: 
 of discrepancies, 32. 
 
 RECORDS: 
 
 primary evidence of, 54. 
 parol evidence to vary, 300. 
 presumptions where they are silent, 353-356. 
 judicial notice of, 378. 
 (see Public Records.) 
 
 RECORDS AND APPOINTMENTS TO OFFICE: 
 best evidence of, 55-57. 
 
 REDELIVERY: 
 
 of conveyance, effect of, 401. 
 
 REDIRECT EXAMINATION : 
 
 explaining contradictory statements on, 486. 
 
 explaining motives on, 486. 
 
 new matter may not be brought in, 486. 
 
 must not be suggestive, 487. 
 
 irrelevant evidence on cross-examination, its effect on, 487. 
 REFEREES : 
 
 incompetency of, as witnesses, 447. 
 REFERENCE : 
 
 admissions by, 109-111. 
 
 confessions by, 125. 
 REFORMATION : 
 
 evidence required in a suit for, 330-332. 
 
 of certificate of acknowledgment, 191. 
 
 REFRESHING THE MEMORY: 
 
 as to genuineness of writing, 199. 
 
 writing used for, not obtainable by subpoena duces tecum, 412. 
 
 by leading questions, 475. 
 
 by consulting memoranda, 477. 
 
 memorandum for, is not evidence, 477. 
 
 character of writing used for. 478, 479. 
 REFUSAL TO ANSWER QUESTIONS: 
 
 when it is an admission. 112.
 
 INDEX. GG9 
 
 Heferences are to pages. 
 
 REFUSALvTO TESTIFY: 
 when a contempt, 468. 
 who may punish for, 468. 
 before commissioner, 468. 
 before grand jury, 468. 
 at an examination before trial, 469. 
 in case of impertinent questions, 469. 
 when court has no jurisdiction, 469. 
 
 REGISTER : 
 
 of ship, as evidence, 216. 
 
 REGISTERS, PUBLIC: 
 proof of, 208-211. 
 
 REGULARITY : 
 
 of judicial records, presumptions, 353-356. 
 presumptions of, in official business, 341. 
 
 REGULATIONS OF DEPARTMENTS: 
 
 judicial notice of, 370. 
 RELATION OF PARTIES: 
 
 may be shown by parol, 320. 
 
 RELATIONSHIP: 
 
 declarations of, as res gestce, 76. 
 family reputation as evidence of, 75. 
 
 RELEASES : 
 
 parol evidence to vary, 301. 
 
 RELEVANCY: 
 
 a judicial question, 7, 14-16. 
 
 collateral facts, how far admissible, 17-20. 
 
 evidence of intention, motive, good faith, etc., when relevant, 20-24, 
 
 collateral facts bearing on character, 24-27. 
 
 of photographs, maps and diagrams, 59. 
 
 RELEVANT: 
 
 defined, 14. 
 RELIABILITY : 
 
 of witness, cross-examination to test, 483. 
 
 RELIGIOUS BELIEF: 
 
 as a sanction for dying declarations, 138, 139. 
 
 of witness, 451, 452. 
 RELIGIOUS DISCIPLINE: 
 
 communication in the course of, 258. 
 REMAINDERMAN : 
 
 admissions of, 91. 
 
 judgment, when binding on, 231. 
 REMARKS OF COUNSEL: 
 
 court may in the charge call attention to, 31.
 
 (370 INDEX. 
 
 Inferences are to pages. 
 REMOTENESS : 
 
 when an objection to a photograph as evidence, 60. 
 as bearing on relevancy, 17. 
 
 RENT: 
 
 presumptions from collection of, 347. 
 
 RENTAL VALUE: 
 
 primary evidence of, 52. 
 
 REPAIRS: 
 
 opinion evidence of, 270. 
 REPAIRS TO HIGHWAY, MACHINERY, ETC.: 
 
 relevancy of evidence of, 19. 
 REPLEVIN TO RECOVER WRITING, 53. 
 
 REPLIES : 
 
 of witness, must be responsive, 476. 
 
 REPRESENTATIVES : 
 admissions of, 100. 
 
 REPUTATION : 
 
 distinguished from specific acts, 26. 
 as primary evidence of marriage, 54. 
 defined, 153. 
 
 (see also Pedigree.) 
 
 REPUTATION FOR TRUTH : 
 impeachment of — 
 
 by evidence of bad reputation, 504. 
 
 bad repute must be recent, 504. 
 
 synonymous with character, 505. 
 belief under oath, 505. 
 
 jury may not rely on personal knowledge of, 505. 
 mode of impeaching, 506. 
 
 general moral character, when admissible, 506, 507. 
 of absent witness, may be attacked, 419. 
 REPUTATION OF IMPEACHED WITNESS: 
 relevancy of evidence to show, 514. 
 in case of contradictory evidence, 514. 
 when testimony of witness is shaken, 514. 
 when contradictory statements are shown, 515. 
 
 RESCISSION : 
 
 of writing, may be shown by parol, 312-314. 
 
 RESEMBLANCE : 
 
 proof of, value by. 294. 
 
 inspection by jury to determine, 492, 493. 
 
 RES GESTAE : 
 
 requisites of, 75. 76. 
 
 must be illustrative, 75, 76. 
 
 must be contemporaneous. 77, 78.
 
 INDEX. f)71 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 RES GESTAE (continued): 
 entries as res gestcc, 78-80. 
 distinguished from dying declarations, 142. 
 declarations of partners as a part of, 92-94. 
 declarations of conspirators as a part of, 94-96. 
 admissions of agents, when a part of, 103, 104. 
 
 declarations forming a part of and declarations against interest distin- 
 guished, 163. 
 
 RESIDENCE (see Domicile). 
 
 RESISTANCE TO ARREST: 
 as a confession, 124. 
 
 RESOLUTIONS : 
 
 of corporations, not judicially noticed, 375, 376. 
 admissible to explain corporative intention, 76. 
 primary evidence of, 55. 
 of municipal corporations (see Municipal Ordinances). 
 
 RESPONDENT: 
 
 in equity, his answer as evidence, 430. 
 RESPONSIVENESS : 
 
 of answers on the direct examination, 476. 
 RESTRAINT : 
 
 attendance of witness under, 423. 
 RESULT : 
 
 of experiments out of court, 296. 
 RESULTING TRUST: 
 
 parol evidence to establish, 312. 
 
 not under the statute of frauds, 400. 
 RETIREMENT FROM PRACTICE: 
 
 does not disqualify an expert, 273. 
 RETURN OF SEASONS : 
 
 judicial notice of, 366. 
 RETURNS ON WRITS: 
 
 defined, 227. 
 
 requisites of, 227. 
 
 irregularities in, 228. 
 
 signature to, 228. 
 
 parol evidence to explain, 228. 
 
 invalidity of, 228. 
 
 filing, 228. 
 
 amendment of, 228. 
 
 conclusiveness of, 229. 
 
 evidence of, 227-229. 
 REVIEWING THE EVIDENCE: 
 
 on appeal, 557-561.
 
 672 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 RIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE: 
 
 when plaintiff may open and close, 390, 391. 
 
 when defendant may open and close, 392, 393. 
 
 light to open and close in special proceedings, 393, 394 
 
 right, when discretionary, 394, 393. 
 
 RISK, INCREASE OF: 
 
 evidence to show, 2ZL 
 RIVERS: 
 
 judicial notice of, 369. 
 
 ROBBING THE MAILS: 
 
 evidence of, obtained by decoy letters, 177. 
 
 ROLLING STOCK : 
 
 evidence to show condition of, 288. 
 
 ROUTINE : 
 
 evidence of, to refresh memory, 475. 
 
 RULINGS : 
 
 of court, when presumed corrected, 354 
 on evidence, form and character of, 472. 
 
 s. 
 
 SAFETY OF DECK LOAD, 289. 
 
 SAILORS : 
 
 as expert witnesses, 289. 
 
 SALES OF LAND: 
 
 as evidence of value, 17. 
 SANITY : 
 
 relevancy of declarations to show, 67. 
 
 presumptions of, 350-353. 
 
 essential to crime, 385. 
 (see Insanity.) 
 SATISFACTION: 
 
 of legacies, parol evidence to rebut, 315. 
 SCANDALOUS LANGUAGE: 
 
 in affidavit, effect of, 529. 
 
 SCIENTIFIC BOOKS: 
 
 use of in cross-examining experts, 275. 
 
 as evidence, 217, 218. 
 SCIENTIFIC FACTS: 
 
 judicial notice of, 371, 372. 
 
 SCREAMS AND GROANS: 
 evidence of, 70,
 
 INDEX. C73 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 SEAL: 
 
 of corporation, when its signature, 185. 
 
 to acknowledgment, 190. 
 
 use of, at common law, 300. 
 
 presumption of consideration from use of, 305. 
 
 judicial notice of, 370, 373, 378, 379. 
 
 necessity for, on surrender of lease, 401. 
 
 necessity for, in creating an agency, 403. 
 
 when required on jurat, 528. 
 
 returning depositions under, 032. 
 
 SEALED INSTRUMENTS: 
 
 must be proved as alleged, 41. 
 power of partner to sign, 93. 
 agent's admission in, 103. 
 
 SEAMEN: 
 
 as expert witnesses, 289. 
 
 SEARCH : 
 
 for subscribing witnesses, 194. 
 
 for witness, when a continuance is asked, 410. 
 
 SEASONS : 
 
 judicial notice of, 3G6. 
 
 SEAWORTHINESS: 
 evidence of, 289. 
 
 SECONDARY EVIDENCE, 47-62. 
 
 to prove contents of writiug, 175-177. 
 
 SECONDARY AND HEARSAY EVIDENCE: 
 distinguished, 65. 
 
 SECOND-HAND FURNITURE : 
 
 evidence to show value, 293. 
 SECRECY : 
 
 confessions made under promises of, 130. 
 SECRET CRIMES: 
 
 circumstantial evidence in cases of, 6, 9. 
 SECRET PROCESS: 
 
 protected by court, 412. 
 
 SECURITIES: 
 
 evidence to show value of, 293, 294. 
 SEDUCTION : 
 
 proof of chastity of the plaintiff in, 361. 
 
 SELF-SERVING DECLARATIONS : 
 when hearsay, 111. 
 
 made in presence of adverse party, 112. 
 understanding of, by adverse party, 112.
 
 674: INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 SELF-SERVING DECLARATIONS (continued): 
 silence of adversary, 112. 
 consisting of scurrilous remarks. 113. 
 when competent as admissions, 113. 
 as hearsay, 63. 
 
 SEPARATE ESTATE OF WIFE: 
 
 when bound by husband's admissions, 97. 
 
 SEPARATE ORAL AGREEMENTS: 
 
 may be shown by parol, 310. 
 
 SEPARATE TRIAL: 
 
 when rendering accomplice competent. 434. 
 
 SEPARATING WITNESSES AT THE TRIAL: 
 when ordered, 466. 
 disobedience to order, 467. 
 exclusion of evidence, 467. 
 exceptions to order, 468. 
 
 SERVICE BY PUBLICATION, 229. 
 
 SERVICE OF PARTY: 
 when presumed, 354. 
 
 SERVICE OF SUBPCENA (see Subpceka : also Duces Tecum). 
 
 SERVICES : 
 
 evidence to show value of, 291. 292. 
 
 SETTING ASIDE THE VERDICT: 
 on appeal, 31, 557-561. 
 
 SETTLEMENT: 
 
 offers of, as admissions, 106, 107. 
 
 collateral facts involved in offers of, 106. 
 SEX: 
 
 as an element in survivorship, 357, 358. 
 
 medical testimon)' to show, 281. 
 
 SEXUAL CRIMES: 
 
 evidence of physicians in prosecution for, 284. 
 
 SEWERS : 
 
 evidence to show defect in, 291. 
 
 SHAM PLEA : 
 
 does not give right to open and close, 392, 
 SHERIFF : 
 
 judicial notice of, 379. 
 SHIP: 
 
 evidence to show management of, 289. 
 SHIPS REGISTER: 
 
 as evidence, 216.
 
 INDEX. G75 
 
 References are to pages. 
 SHIPWRECK: 
 
 of ship, as bearing on presumption of death. 357. 
 
 SHOE TRACKS (see Footprints). 
 
 SHOP BOOKS: 
 
 as evidence, 81-86. 
 
 SHORTNESS OF MANNER: 
 evidence of, 269. 
 
 SICKNESS (see Health; Disease; Insanity, etc.). 
 
 SICK PERSONS: 
 
 admissibility of their declarations of present pain, 69. 
 
 SIGNAL OR GESTURE: 
 
 evidence to show meaning of, 268. 
 
 SIGNATURE : 
 
 of accused to written statements on preliminary examination, 131. 
 
 by mark, 185, 186. 
 
 testimony of expert, 204. 
 
 identity of, 205. 
 
 to acknowledgment, 190. 
 
 testimony to genuineness of, 195, 196. 
 
 proof of, by comparison. 200-204. 
 
 to returns on writs, 228. 
 
 judicial notice of, 373. 
 
 of testator to will, what constitutes, 405. 
 
 not indispensable in an affidavit, 528. 
 
 to jurat in an affidavit, 528. 
 
 SIGNATURE OF PARTNERSHIP: 
 
 proof of, by admissions, 92. 
 SIGNS: 
 
 deaf mute testimony by, 453. 
 
 dying declarations by, 145, 146. 
 SILENCE : 
 
 of writing as to consideration, 306. 
 SILENCE OF ACCUSED: 
 
 as a confession, 124, 125. 
 
 of a conspirator not a confession, 136. 
 
 (see Failure of Accused to Testify.) 
 SILENCE OF PARTY : 
 
 as creating an estoppel, 112, 113, 119, 120. 
 SILENCE OF WITNESS: 
 
 when suspicious, 512. 
 
 may be explained, 512. 
 
 SIMILAR CRIMES OR ACTS: 
 relevancy of, 21, 22.
 
 G70 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 SIMULATION OF DISEASE: 
 evidence to show, 280. 
 physical examination to expose, 297. 
 
 SIMULATION OF INSANITY: 
 may be shown, 498. 
 
 SIMULATION OF WRITING (see Handwriting). 
 
 SINGLE WITNESS: 
 
 may prove usage, 317. 
 or perjury, 562, 563. 
 
 SISTER STATES : 
 
 judgments of, 222-225, 241. 
 
 SITUATION (see Maps; Photographs; Condition, etc.). 
 
 SIZE: 
 
 opinion evidence to show, 267. 
 
 SKELETON : 
 
 opinion as to sex founded on examination of, 280. 
 
 SKETCHES : 
 
 in pencil, their use as evidence, 60. 
 
 SKILL: 
 
 of expert, evidence of by other witness, 274. 
 
 SLANDER: 
 
 evidence of character in action for, 25. 
 right to open and close in action of, 391. 
 
 SLATE: 
 
 memoranda on, 85. 
 
 SMOKE : 
 
 damage by, 271, 
 
 SOBRIETY : 
 
 evidence to show, 269. 
 
 SON ASSAULT DEMESNE: 
 
 right to open and close on plea of, 391. 
 
 SPARK ARRESTER: 
 
 use of, 295. 
 SPECIAL PROCEEDING: 
 
 burden of proof, 383, 384. 
 
 right to open and close in, 393, 394 
 SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE : 
 
 parol evidence in suits for, 331. 
 SPECULATIVE VALUE: 
 
 of securities, 293.
 
 INDEX. 67T 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 SPEED : 
 
 non-expert evidence to show, 267. 
 shown by combination of witnesses, 270. 
 expert evidence to show, 288. 
 
 SPLITTING CAUSES OF ACTION, 234. 
 
 SPOLIATION OF INSTRUMENTS; 
 defined, 178. 
 
 (see Alterations.) 
 
 SPONTANEOUS CHARACTER: 
 of res gestce, 77, 78. 
 of confessions, 129-131. ■ 
 
 STAINS: 
 
 of blood, evidence of their character, 61, 281. 
 STAMP: 
 
 on deed, presumption of, 348. 
 
 STANDARDS OF COMPARISON: 
 
 of handwriting, 202. 
 
 irrelevant writings as, 201-204. 
 STANDING TIMBER (see Growing Timber). 
 
 STATE COMMONWEALTH : 
 
 statute of limitation does not run against, 339. 
 
 STATE COURTS: 
 
 proof of judgments of, 222-225, 241. 
 
 STATE LAWS: 
 
 judicial notice of, 377. 
 STATEMENTS TO BE PROVED AS FACTS, 66-68. 
 
 STATISTICS : 
 
 registry of, as evidence, 210. 
 STATUTE : 
 
 usage admissible to explain, 317. 
 
 STATUTE OF AMENDMENTS: 
 
 in cases of variance, 45, 46. 
 STATUTE OF FRAUDS: 
 
 writings required by, 49, 50. 
 
 omission in writings required by, 307. 
 
 oral extension of contract may be shown, 313. 
 
 does not exclude parol evidence to reform deed, 330. 
 
 origin and nature of, 396. 
 
 agreements relating to interests in land, 397, 398. 
 
 partition of real property, 398, 399. 
 
 trusts in real and personal estate, 399, 400. 
 
 surrender or assignment of leases, 401. 
 
 contracts required to be in writing, 402. 
 
 articles of partnership, 402, 403.
 
 678 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 STATUTE OF FRAUDS (continued): 
 
 form and character of the writing, 403, 404. 
 wills required to be evidenced in writing. 404-406. 
 
 agreements not within the statute of frauds which must be evidenced 
 by writings. 406. 
 
 STATUTE OF LIMITATION, 338-340. 
 
 evidence to remove the bar of. 87, 93, 94. 
 as a defense, right to open and close, 393. 
 
 STATUTORY FEES: 
 
 of witness (see MILEAGE). 
 
 STATUTORY LAW: 
 
 judicial notice of the, 372-374 
 proof of. 208. 
 foreign, proof of, 211-213. 
 presumptions of, 348. 
 
 STENOGRAPHER'S NOTES: 
 
 admissibility to show testimony of an absent witness, 171, 172. 
 
 use of, to refresh memory, 479. 
 
 employment of, to ascertain knowledge of witness, 479. 
 
 STERILITY : 
 
 physical examination, when alleged, 297. 
 
 STIPULATIONS ON THE EVIDENCE : 
 
 of attorney, when biuding on a client, 104. 
 as to admission of notes of evidence, 173. 
 to evidence, change of venue avoided by, 416. 
 continuance may be avoided by, 416. 
 defined, 547. 
 
 when a part of the record, 547. 
 when in estoppel, 547. 
 liberal and strict construction of, 548. 
 parol to explain, 548. 
 
 does not waive rights to call witness, 548. 
 substantial compliance required, 548. 
 when it may be disregarded, 549. 
 fraud in procurement of, 549. 
 STOCKHOLDER : ' 
 
 right of, to inspection of corporation's books, 207. 
 admissions of, 91, 92. 
 
 STOLEN GOODS: 
 
 presumption from the possession of, 342. 
 
 STORM : 
 
 effects of on ship, 289. 
 STRANDING : 
 
 of vessel, 289.
 
 INDEX. . 679 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 STRANGERS' DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST: 
 
 declarations of third persons and other declarations distinguished, 102, 
 
 163. 
 must be against interest, 16:5. 164 
 interest of the declarant, 164, 165. 
 death of the declarant, 165. 
 knowledge of the declarant, 165. 
 
 statements of predecessor against interest, when evidence in behalf of 
 successor, 166. 
 
 STRANGERS TO RECORD: 
 
 confessions by, 135. 
 admissions by, 99, 100. 
 spoliation of writings by, 178. 
 not bound by the judgment. 230. 
 
 not bound by rule excluding parol evidence to vary writing, 304. 
 delivery of deed to, 345. 
 may have deed declared a mortgage, 331. 
 STREET: 
 
 oral agreement to grade, 311. 
 
 STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF WRITINGS: 
 defined, 302. 
 
 STRIKING OUT EVIDENCE: 
 
 irresponsive answers, 476. 
 effect of, 476. 
 motions for, 542. 
 failure to move for, 542. 
 motion, waiver of, 543. 
 because of insufficiency, 543. 
 irresponsiveness, 543. 
 irrelevancy, 543. 
 STUDY : 
 
 expert qualified by, 264, 265. 
 
 SUBDIVISIONS OF TIME: 
 judicial notice of, 365. 
 
 SUBJECT-MATTER: 
 
 of writing, evidence to explain, 320-322, 325, 326. 
 
 SUBMISSION TO ARBITRATION: 
 facts under, testimony to show, 447. 
 
 SUBMISSION OF EVIDENCE: 
 to the jury, 30-32. 
 
 SUBMITTING TO JURY: 
 
 prima facie case in criminal trials. 384. 
 SUMMONS : 
 
 witness privileged from service of a, 420.
 
 680 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 SUBPCENA (see Duces Tecum; Subpoena): 
 defined, 407. 
 fees, 408. 
 
 traveling expenses, 408. 
 duces tecum, 411, 412. 
 in criminal cases, 410. 
 when unnecessary, 411. 
 time of service, 413. 
 mode of service, 413. 
 allowance of time to witness, 413. 
 notice to witness, 413. 
 penalty for disobeying, 413. 
 primary evidence of service, 414. 
 parol to show non-attendance, 414. 
 disobedience to attachment in case of, 419, 420. 
 power of the legislature to issue, 423. 
 
 SUBPCENA DUCES TECUM: 
 
 to obtain production of telegrams, 2G3. 
 
 SUBSCRIBING WITNESS: 
 death of, 194. 
 
 may testify to testator's mental state, 288. 
 defined, 193. 
 proof by, 192-194. 
 signature of, by mark, 185. 
 impeachment of, by party calling. 502. 
 not by showing bad characteV, 503. 
 
 SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUE: 
 
 matter of essential description, 36, 37. 
 
 value, quantity, time, place, etc., 39. 
 
 formal allegations, 38, 39. 
 
 proof of contracts, 40, 41. 
 
 variance, 41, 45, 46. 
 
 in criminal trials, 43, 46. 
 SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE: 
 
 required to convert an absolute deed into a mortgage, 330. 
 
 to go to the jury, 27. 
 
 when presumed, 355. 
 
 SUFFERINGS: 
 
 declarations of, 69. 
 
 SUICIDE : 
 
 presumption of death by, from absence, 357. 
 
 SUMMARY OF FACTS OBSERVED: 
 
 given by witness who is not an expert, 268. 
 
 SUN-RISE : 
 
 judicial notice of, 371.
 
 INDEX. 681 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 SUPERSCRIPTION: 
 of deposition, 532. 
 
 SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVITS: 
 
 defined, their utility. 526. 
 
 SUPPLEMENTARY OATH : 
 of defendant, 430. 
 
 SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEEDINGS: 
 best evidence of, 51. 
 
 SUPPLYING OMISSIONS: 
 in writings, 307, 308. 
 
 SUPPRESSION : 
 
 of material facts, burden of proof, 388. 
 SUPPRESSING DEPOSITIONS, 533, 534. 
 
 SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE: 
 by police officials, 125. 
 presumptions from, 343, 344. 
 
 SURETY : 
 
 not bound by rule excluding parol evidence, 304. 
 
 when bound by admission of principal. 99, 100. 
 
 to secure the attendance of a witness, 414. 
 SURGEONS DIARY: 
 
 entry in, as evidence, 80, 82. 
 SURPLUSAGE : 
 
 in indictments defined, 37, 44, 45. 
 SURPRISE : 
 
 defined, 550. 
 
 remedy of party in case of, 550. 
 
 negligence will not justify the claim of, 551. 
 
 SURRENDER: 
 
 of lease, must be in writing, 401. 
 parol, at common law, 401. 
 
 SURROGATES' COURTS: 
 
 proof of records of, 226, 227. 
 right to open and close in, 393. 
 
 SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES: 
 
 as res gestae, 74 et seq. 
 
 parol evidence of (see Parol Evidence). 
 
 SURVEYOR: 
 
 evidence of to show monuments, 57. 
 declarations of, when admissible, 160. 
 as expert witnesses, 291. 
 
 SURVEYS: 
 
 as evidence, 80.
 
 <!S2 INDEX. 
 
 Heference3 are to pages. 
 
 SURVIVING PARTY: 
 
 wlien incompetent as a witness, 43'$. 437. 
 (see also Personal Transaction.) 
 
 SURVIVORSHIP: 
 
 presumption of, 358, 359. 
 
 SUSPICION OF GUILT: 
 
 diverted by false confession, 125. 
 
 SWEARING THE WITNESS (see Oath)l 
 
 SYMBOLS: 
 
 parol evidence to explain, 324. 
 
 SYMPTOMS : 
 
 evidence of non-expert showing, 283. 
 
 T. 
 
 TABLES: 
 
 showing expectation of life, 218. 
 
 TAKING THE VIEW: 
 discretionary, 400, 491. 
 consent of parties to. 490. 
 in jury trial in equity, 491. 
 when ordered suasponte, 491. 
 necessity must be shown, 491. 
 presence of judge, 491. 
 
 knowledge thus acquired is not evidence, 491. 
 presence of accused at, 491. 
 oral evidence inadmissible while taking, 492. 
 in proceeding to condemn land, 492. 
 after summing up, 492. 
 privately by jury, not allowed, 488. 
 
 TALKATIVE WITNESS: 
 
 may be checked by court, 472. 
 
 TAMPERING WITH WITNESS: 
 attempt at may be shown, 498. 
 bias caused by, 525. 
 
 TAX SALES: 
 
 presumption of regularity, 341. 
 TEACHERS OF WRITING: 
 
 as witnesses to handwriting, 203. 
 TECHNICAL DEFECTS: 
 
 in affidavits, may be amended. 528. 
 TECHNICAL TERMS: 
 
 parol lauguage to explain, 318.
 
 INDEX. 0^5 
 
 References are to pages. 
 TELEGRAMS: 
 
 primary evidence of, 52, 53. 
 contents of, may be proved orally, 53. 
 not privileged, 263, 263. 
 presumption of delivery, 348. 
 
 TELEPHONE : 
 
 admissions by, 89, 122, 12a 
 judicial notice of, 365. 
 agency of operator, 123. 
 recognition of speaker, 122. 
 
 TENANT: 
 
 admissions of, 89. 
 TENANTS IN COMMON: 
 
 admissions of, 91. 
 
 parol partition among, 398, 399. 
 TENDER: 
 
 primary evidence of, 54. 
 TERMS : 
 
 of science, evidence to explain, 318. 
 
 TERMS OF COURT: 
 
 judicial notice of, 378, 379. 
 
 " TERMS, TWO MONTHS : " 
 
 evidence to explain, 318. 
 TEST : 
 
 to determine burden of proof, 383. 
 
 TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY : 
 burden of proof, 384. 
 
 TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION (see WiLLS)t 
 
 TESTATOR : 
 
 judgment against, binds devisee, 231. 
 
 admissions by, bind devisee, 89, 190. 
 
 mental capacity of, 285-288. 
 
 declarations sbowing capacity. 322. 
 
 when declarations are admissible, 325. 
 
 what constitutes his signature, 405. 
 
 statutory incompetency of interested persons as witnesses against, 432. 
 
 TESTING HANDWRITING (see Handwriting). 
 
 TEXT-BOOKS : 
 
 as evidence of foreign law, 212. 
 
 THIRD PARTIES: 
 
 declarations of, against interest. 162-166. 
 
 (see also Strangers' Declarations.) 
 entries made by, 78. 
 confessions of guilt by. 135.
 
 0S4 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 THREATS: 
 
 when relevant in a trial for homicide, 27. 
 
 evidence to show, G9. 
 
 when rendering silence inadmissible as a confession, 125 123. 
 
 persons who make, 135, 136. 
 TICKET : 
 
 when a writing, 174. 
 
 TIMBER (see Growing Timber). 
 
 TIME (see also Date) : 
 
 allegation and proof of, 39. 
 
 proof of in indictments, 43. 
 
 of alterations, 181, 182. 
 
 required to stop train, 288. 
 
 as affecting relevancy, 17-20. 
 
 of res gestae, 77, 78. 
 
 required to repair house, 290. 
 
 opinion evidence to show time of an event, 267. 
 
 as an element in experiments in court, 296. 
 
 presumption from lapse of, 336-341. 
 
 in proving alibi, 385. 
 
 of making contradictory statements, 503. 
 TIME ROOKS: 
 
 their use as evidence, 85, 86. 
 
 TOMBSTONES : 
 
 inscriptions on, as pedigree, 73. 
 TORTURE : 
 
 as a means of procuring evidence, 2. 
 TOWNS : 
 
 admissions of inhabitants of, 99. 
 
 judicial notice of, 368, 369. 
 TRACES OF AN ABORTION: 
 
 physician's evidence to show, 285. 
 TRADE : 
 
 opinion evidence to, 288-291. 
 
 TRADE TERMS (see Technical Terms). 
 
 TRADITIONARY EVIDENCE: 
 ■defined, 71-74. 
 
 (see also Pedigree : General Reputation.) 
 TRAINS : 
 
 their management, speed, etc., 288. 
 
 TRANSPORTATION : 
 
 opinion evidence, 288-291. 
 TRAVERSE JURORS: 
 
 confidential communications, 258.
 
 INDEX. 685 
 
 References are to pages. 
 TREASON: 
 
 confessions of, 136. 
 
 number of witnesses in trials for, 563, 564. 
 
 TREATIES : 
 
 judicial notice of, 377, 373. 
 TREATISES : 
 
 use of, in examining expert, 275. 
 
 TREES, MARKS BLAZED ON : 
 primary evidence of, 57. 
 
 TRESPASS: 
 
 evidence to show manner, 270. 
 
 TRIALS (see Burden of Proof; Right to Open and Close). 1 ] 
 
 TROVER : 
 
 formal allegations in, 38. 
 
 TRUSTS : 
 
 under the statute of frauds, 399. 400. 
 
 parol evidence to establish, 312. 
 TRUSTEE : 
 
 admissions of, binding on beneficiary. 91, 100, 102. 
 
 judgment against, when binding on beneficiary, 232. 
 TRUTH : 
 
 of libel, burden of proof, 390. 
 
 TRUTHFULNESS : 
 
 of witness, cross-examination to ascertain, 484 
 presumption of, 6. 
 
 TRUTH OF WRITING : 
 opinion evidence of, 267. 
 
 u. 
 
 ULTRA VIRES: 
 
 burden of proving, 389. 
 
 UNCHASTITY : 
 
 proof of, to impeach, 507. 
 
 UNDERSTANDING : 
 
 witness may be asked his, 473. 
 
 UNDERWRITERS : 
 
 as expert witnesses, 294, 295. 
 
 admissions of, 91. 
 UNDUE INFLUENCE: 
 
 in procuring execution of will, parol evidence to show, 328. 
 
 admissibility of declarations to show, 68. 
 UNIFORMITY : 
 
 necessity for, in usage, 316, 317.
 
 680 INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 UNIMPORTANT FACTS: 
 questioping on, 475. 
 
 UNINTENTIONAL OMISSIONS: 
 may be shown, 30S. 
 
 UNLIQUIDATED DAMAGES: 
 
 right to open and close in cases of, 890-392. 
 
 UNRECORDED DEED: 
 when valid, 188. 
 effect of redelivery of, 401. 
 
 UNSWORN ANSWER: 
 
 in equity, its effect, 431. 
 UNVEILING : 
 
 of party or witness in court, 298. 
 
 UN WHOLESOMENESS : 
 of food, evidence of, 284. 
 
 UNWILLINGNESS: 
 
 to believe witness under oath, 505, 506. 
 USAGE : 
 
 definition of, 316. 
 
 presumed to be known to parties, 316. 
 
 evidence to show, 316, 317. 
 
 usage must be general, 317. 
 
 evidence of, inadmissible. 317. 
 
 of insurance compan}*, evidence of, 295. 
 
 when judicially noticed, 373. 
 
 of foreign country, must be proved, 212. 
 
 USE OF SCIENTIFIC BOOKS: 
 
 to test expert, 275. 
 USURY: 
 
 burden of proof of, 389. 
 
 right to open and close where defense is, 392. 
 
 V. 
 
 VALIDITY: 
 
 of will, right to open and close in issue of, 393. 
 
 burden of proof, 384. 
 VALUE: 
 
 allegation of and proof, 39. 
 
 of expert testimony. 276. 
 
 judicial notice of, 366. 
 
 of machinery, 290. 
 
 of house, 290. 
 
 refusal to produce, creates presumption of, 344
 
 INDEX. 087 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 VALUE, EVIDENCE OF: 
 of services, 291. 
 of animals, 292. 
 of merchandise, 291. 
 of land, 292. 
 
 qualification of witness to, 292. 
 future value, 293. 
 value of securities, 294. 
 
 VALUE OF LAND: 
 
 relevancy of evidence to show, 17. 
 
 VARIANCE: 
 
 defined, 41, 45, 46. 
 
 VELOCITY (see Speed). 
 
 VENUE: 
 
 change of, for convenience of witnesses, 415, 416. 
 of certificate of acknowledgment, 189. 
 
 VENUE IN AFFIDAVITS: 
 
 should appear, 527. 
 
 absence may invalidate, 528. 
 
 VERACITY : 
 
 of witnesses (see Impeachment). 
 
 VERBAL ADMISSIONS: 
 when inadmissible, 116. 
 when estoppels, 120. 
 
 VERBAL AND WRITTEN DECLARATIONS: 
 
 distinguished, 78. 
 
 VERDICT : 
 
 setting aside, 31. 
 
 proof by copy, 220. 
 
 when one may be directed, 28. 
 VERIFICATION: 
 
 of answer in equity, its effect. 431. 
 
 of dying declaration under oath, 146. 
 
 VERIFICATION OF PLEADINGS: 
 
 effect of, 107, 108. 
 VERTEBRA : 
 
 exhibition of, to jury to explain evidence, 6L 
 VESSEL: 
 
 register of, as evidence, 216. 
 
 proof of seaworthiness of, 289. 
 
 proof of management of, 289. 
 VESTED RIGHT: 
 
 to witness fees, 411.
 
 G8S INDEX. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 VICAR : 
 
 his books as evidence for his successor, 1G6. 
 
 VIEW (see Taking the View). 
 
 VITAL STATISTICS: 
 
 registers of, as evidence, 210. 
 VIDELICET : 
 
 defined, 38, 39. 
 
 VOICE : 
 
 as showing identity of speaker at telephone, 122. 
 
 VOLUMINOUS WRITINGS: 
 primary evidence of, 57. 
 
 VOLUNTARY CHARACTER: 
 
 confessions must possess, 126, 127. 
 
 VOLUNTARY EXHIBITION (see Exhibition). 
 
 VOTING : 
 
 as evidence of naturalization. 50. 
 
 w. 
 
 WAIVER: 
 
 of privilege of communications — 
 
 to attorney, 252, 253. 
 
 to husband or wife, 247-249. 
 
 to physician. 259, 260. 
 of fees by the witness, 408. 
 of privilege from arrest by witness. 421. 
 by personal representative, to exclude interested witness, 436, 437. 
 
 (see also Personal Transactions.) 
 of privilege from incriminating questions, 521. 522. 
 of constitutional privileges by the accused, 497. 
 of objections to depositions, 533. 
 
 of objections to the reception or rejection of evidence, 539. 
 of exceptions, 541, 542. 
 
 WALLS : 
 
 dryness of, 290. 
 
 WANT OF CONSIDERATION: 
 
 as a defense, right to open and close, 392. 
 burden of proof, 383. 
 
 WAR : 
 
 judicial notice of, 367. 
 
 WARNING WITNESSES: 
 by the court, 472. 
 
 WAVES : 
 
 size of, 289.
 
 INDEX. 689 
 
 References are to pages. 
 WEAPON : 
 
 allegation of, in homicide. 38, 44. 
 use of, to explain the evidence, 60. 
 causing injuries, 279. 
 presumption from use of, 301, 362. 
 in the jury-room, 490. 
 
 WEARING APPAREL: 
 
 evidence to show value of, 292. 
 blood-stains on, 61. 
 
 WEATHER: 
 
 opinion evidence of, 270. 
 
 WEIGHT: 
 
 of extra-judicial confessions, 134, 135. 
 of expert evidence, 276. 
 of admissions, 114, 116. 
 
 WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE: 
 
 distinguished from burden of proof, 382-384 
 
 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES: 
 
 judicial notice of character of, 366. 
 
 WHOLESOMENESS: 
 
 of food and drink, 284 
 
 WIDOW: 
 
 when an interested witness, 443. 
 
 WIFE : 
 
 when bound by her husband's admissions, 97, 98. 
 
 confidential communications to, 247-253. 
 
 as a witness to non-access or intoxication of her husband, 249. 
 
 WILFUL PERJURY : 
 
 presumptions from, 513. 
 
 WILLS: 
 
 when ancient, need not be proved, 148. 
 presumptions as to alterations in, 182. 
 when admissible as evidence, 226, 227. 
 declarations inadmissible to vary, 68, 
 writings incorporated in, by reference, 309. 
 parol evidence to explain, 322, 325-329. 
 required to be in writing, 404. 
 attestation of, 404. 
 of personal property, 404. 
 place of signature of, 405. 
 
 "WITHOUT RECOURSE:" 
 
 indoisers, their competency as witnesses, 445, 446. 
 44
 
 C90 INDEX. 
 
 Heferences are to pages. 
 WITNESSES: 
 who are, 411. 
 
 distinguished from affiant and deponent, 411. 
 examination of, at preliminary examination, 131. 
 
 admissibility of their testimony when subsequently absent or disquali- 
 fied, 167-173. 
 husband and wife as, 244-249. 
 attorneys as, 249-255. 
 police officials as, 255. 
 officials as, 256. 
 jurors as, 257, 258. 
 clergymen as, 258, 259. 
 physicians as, 259, 260. 
 
 WITHDRAWAL OF WITNESSES (see Separating Witnesses). 
 
 WORDS : 
 
 meaning of, will be noticed, 365. 
 
 WORK AND SERVICES: 
 value of, 291. 
 
 WOUNDS : 
 
 opinions as to nature, cause and effect, 278. 
 
 WRITING: 
 
 hypothetical questions may be put in, 274. 
 defined, 174, 185. 
 
 (see also Handwriting.) 
 
 WRITINGS: 
 
 variance in proof of, 40, 41. 
 
 when ancient, 148-152. 
 
 as evidence of general reputation, 160, 161. 
 
 use of, to refresh memory, 199. 
 
 testing with chemicals in court, 296. 
 
 person signing, is presumed to have read them, 361. 
 
 obtained by subpoena duces tecum, 411, 412. 
 
 when not evidence, are excluded from jury, 489, 490. 
 
 (see Parol Evidence as Related to ; Memoranda to Refresh 
 Memory.) 
 WRITINGS OUT OF JURISDICTION: 
 
 best evidence of, 51. 
 WRITING TEACHERS: 
 
 as witnesses to handwriting, 203. 
 
 WRIT OF ERROR: 
 
 defined and distinguished from appeal, 557. 
 purpose of, 557. 
 does not review facts, 557. 
 may be brought for a notorious mistake, 557. 
 as employed in America, 558. 
 (see also Appeals.)
 
 INDEX. 691 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 WRITS (see Returns on.) 
 
 WRITTEN CONFESSIONS : 
 
 on the preliminary examination, 131-134 
 
 should be signed by the accused, 132. 
 
 parol evidence inadmissible, 133. 
 
 presumption of regularity, 133. 
 
 do not render distinct parol confessions inadmissible, 133. 
 
 WRITTEN EVIDENCE (see Public Records and Statute of Frauds). 
 
 WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS: 
 best evidence of, 49-57.
 
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