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AMERICAN POLICY 
 
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AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
 IN ITS RELATION TO THE EASTERN 
 
 BY 
 
 JOHN BIGELOW 
 
 MAJOR U. S. ARMY, RETIRED 
 AUTHOR OF "mars-la-tour AND GRAVELOTTE"; "THE PRINCIPLES OF 
 
 strategy"; "reminiscences of the SANTIAGO campaign"? 
 "the campaign of chancellorsville." 
 
 NEW YORK 
 CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 
 

 o1 
 
 Copyright, 1914, by 
 CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 
 
 Published April, 1914 
 
^^ 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 The subjects of Foreign Policy and World 
 Peace have never been so much in the minds 
 and mouths of the people of the United States 
 as at the present day. Pan American Con- 
 gresses, the Panama Canal, the difference with 
 Japan, the revolution in Mexico, the question 
 of the Philippine^, tariff reduction. The Hague 
 Conferences, the Centennial of Peace with Great 
 Britain, and other incidents, direct our thoughts 
 to foreign countries and lead us to reflect on 
 the relations which we hold to them. The pur- 
 pose of this little work is to minister with fact 
 and reason to such reflection. 
 
 It deals with American policies in their 
 broadest aspects, with political problems of the 
 United States and of all America. It seeks 
 to explain the Monroe Doctrine, distinguishing 
 between the extension and the perversion of it; 
 to show its bearing and that of Washington's 
 
 285732 
 
^ 
 
 VI PREFACE 
 
 Farewell Address upon present national affairs; 
 and to expound the theory of Pan Americanism 
 in its true relation to the Monroe Doctrine. 
 
 As used in its pages, the word America means 
 the independent countries of North, South, and 
 Central America. Where the United States 
 alone is referred to it is done in express terms. 
 
 21 Gramercy Park, 
 
 New York, February 19, 1914. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 I Population and Government ... 3 
 
 II The Washington Precept. The Mon- 
 roe Doctrine 29 
 
 III Cases under the Monroe Doctrine . 85 
 
 IV The Bolivar Idea. Conclusion . . 137 
 
 Appendices 161 
 
 Bibliography 170 
 
 Index 177 
 
AMERICAN POLICY 
 
I 
 
 POPULATION AND GOVERNMENT 
 
 "In America, to govern Is to populate/'^ In 
 the last analysis the stability of every govern- 
 ment results, as in the United States, in Eng- 
 land, in France, in Germany, from the solution 
 of this problem of population; and the insta- 
 bility of government results, as in certain coun- 
 tries of Latin-America and in China, from its 
 non-solution. The most serious troubles of the 
 British Empire to-day are questions of popula- s/ 
 tion. The happy solution of the problem by 
 the United States is due principally to the ra- 
 pidity with which its immigration has been as- 
 similated, which is traceable to its form of 
 government. 
 
 One of the grievances which led to the Ameri- 
 can Revolution was the royal opposition to emi- * 
 gration to the colonies. Throughout the first 
 
 ^ Alberdi. Quoted from Latin America: Its Rise and ProgresSy 
 by F. Garcia-Calderon, p. 339. 
 
 3 
 
 / 
 
4 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 half of the nineteenth century Great Britain 
 strove by a variety of legislation to check the 
 tide of emigration to the United States. Not 
 until 1870 did she recognize or grant the right 
 of her subjects to renounce their British al- 
 legiance.^ 
 
 The nations of America were originally settled 
 with three varieties of people: the Anglo-Saxon, 
 the Portuguese, and the Spanish. The descend- 
 ants of the latter two are now designated as 
 Latin-Americans. This designation is unneces- 
 sarily broad; to be precise, it should be Iberian- 
 Americans.^ Out of respect for custom and 
 brevity, I retain the older, simpler term, Latin- 
 American. The Anglo-Saxon and the Portu- 
 guese elements are embodied each in a single 
 nation, the former in the United States, the 
 latter in Brazil; but the Spanish element is 
 dispersed among nineteen separate common- 
 wealths, distracted internally by racial as well 
 as political differences. 
 
 These two groups, Anglo-Saxon and Latin, de- 
 veloped separately — so much so that for a long 
 
 ^ Die Neueste Einwanderung in den Vereinigten Staaten, by R. M. 
 Jovanovich, p. 27. 
 
 2 Cuestiones Americanas, by J. S. Carranza, 1907, p. 92. 
 
POPULATION AND GOVERNMENT 5 
 
 time they hardly knew each other, except 
 through European Hterature. It was princi- 
 pally through English literature that the United 
 States knew the Latin states and through 
 French literature that the latter understood the 
 United States. Each group was more identified 
 with Europe than it was with the other, for it 
 was from her that it received the elements of 
 culture and of life that were necessary to it.^ 
 
 The Anglo-Saxon element became diluted by 
 immigration, with a variety of foreign blood. 
 In the United States the white population that 
 has descended from non-United States peoples 
 is about evenly divided between a British strain 
 and other non-United States strains. The fig- 
 ures in 1900 were about as follows: 
 
 British 34,300,000 
 
 Other non-United States 32,690,000 
 
 Total 66,990,000 
 
 A contingent of 9,313,390 colored people 
 brought the total population to 76,303,390.^ 
 It has, however, been remarked that the influ- 
 ential class formed by the higher officers of the 
 
 ^ Le Droit International Americainy by Alejandro Alvarez, p. 42. 
 
 2 These figures are based upon the results of exhaustive study 
 and calculation by Professor A. B. Faust, of Cornell University, 
 published in his work, The German Element in the United States, II, 
 27, and the Census of the United States for 1900. 
 
6 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 government, of the army and navy, and the 
 leaders in education, are still predominently of 
 British descent. 
 
 In Spanish America, French ideas, in Portu- 
 guese America (Brazil), German ideas, prevail.^ 
 The present population of these two regions, or 
 of Latin-America, is formed, for the greater part, 
 of three races, the Iberian, the Indian, and the 
 African. Certain mixtures of these have their 
 separate designations. Iberian (or other white) 
 and African is called mulatto; Iberian (or other 
 white) and Indian is called mestizo; Indian and 
 African is called Sambo; pure descendants from 
 Iberians (or French) are called Creoles. The In- 
 dian element is purer than in the United States 
 and numbers about five and a half million.^ 
 
 . . . though several tribes of the coast disagree 
 with those of the Sierra, they stand united 
 against the foreign invader and not at all 
 friendly but in the bottom of their hearts still 
 hostile and hoping secretly some day to over- 
 throw the rule of the foreigner. 
 
 In Peru, in BoUvia, and in Ecuador, the pure- 
 blooded Indian is the fundamental stock. In 
 
 ^ Garcia-Calderon, opus cit.y p. 251. 
 
 2 Siid-Amerika und die deutschen Interessen, by Wilhelm Sievers, 
 1903. 
 
POPULATION AND GOVERNMENT 7 
 
 Peru and in Ecuador the population is about 
 fifty per cent Indian.^ In the former it is only 
 about twelve and in the latter about seven per 
 cent white.^ 
 
 Juarez, who was President of Mexico while 
 Maximilian pretended to be Emperor, was a 
 full-blooded Indian. 
 
 In the countries in which the pure-blooded In- 
 dians have not been able to maintain them- 
 selves the mestizos abound. They form the 
 population of Colombia, of Chili, of Uruguay, 
 and of Paraguay, about ninety per cent of the 
 population of Venezuela, and about fifty per cent 
 of that of all South America.^ It is this stock 
 that produced Porfirio Diaz, of Mexico. An 
 Argentine anthropologist says that the mestizo 
 of first crossing is inferior to his European pro- 
 genitor, but is often superior to his native par- 
 ent. He assimilates the morality of a superior 
 civilization and predominates at the bar and in 
 politics. He is not, however, a factor in the 
 political and economical unification of America. 
 
 1 Sievers, opus cit. 
 
 2 According to Garcla-Calderon, the population of Peru and of 
 Ecuador is seventy per cent Indian and only six per cent white, 
 and that of Bolivia fifty per cent Indian, opus cit., p. 332. 
 
 3 Sievers, opus cit.., pp. 10, 15. 
 
8 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 He retains too many of the faults of the native; 
 he is deceitful and servile and often indolent. 
 It is only after new admixtures of European 
 blood that he shows well-developed character- 
 istics acquired from the white race. He is ex- 
 tremely patriotic; Americanism, the spirit of op- 
 position to foreigners, is his creation. He wants 
 to rise and possess himself of the privileges of the 
 Creole oligarchy.^ 
 
 Not only do the native whites, blacks, and 
 mestizos form separate strata or castes of so- 
 ciety, but the foreign elements of various na- 
 tionalities stand also more or less apart from the 
 native population, not entering into its political 
 and social life and being absorbed by it, as it is 
 in the United States. This is due partly to in- 
 difference on the part of the foreigner and 
 partly to exclusiveness on the part of the na- 
 tive. There are settlements of Germans which 
 preserve their language and national traits and 
 feelings with remarkable persistency, commu- 
 nities that have kept their mother tongue a hun- 
 dred years, their sons and daughters going to 
 Germany for education.^ 
 
 * Garcia-Calderon, opus cit.j pp. 332, 333. 
 2 WelcheAussichten bieten sich den Deutschen in Stld-Amerika, 
 by Doctor Backhaus, p. 4. 
 
POPULATION AND GOVERNMENT 9 
 
 While the Indian population is more numer- 
 ous, the negro population is less so than in 
 the United States. If any countries in South 
 America may be considered as white, they are 
 South Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentine. Al- 
 varez gives the white population of Latin- 
 America as about 10,000,000 out of a total of 
 about 60,000,000.1 
 
 The population of America, including Canada, 
 has about the same density as that of Africa; it 
 is from one-quarter to one-third as dense as that 
 of the non-American world; about one-tenth as 
 dense as that of Europe; from one-fifth to one- 
 fourth as dense as that of Asia; and from five 
 to six times as dense as that of Australia and 
 Oceanica. The population of Latin-America is 
 about seven-tenths as dense as that of the rest 
 of America, including Canada; nearly five times 
 as dense as that of Australia and Oceanica; about 
 one-half as dense as that of the United States; 
 
 * From figures given in A. Hartleben's Kleines statistisches Ta- 
 schenbuch tiber alle Lander der Erde (191 3), I compute the popula- 
 tion of the twenty independent republics of Latin-America as 
 79,863,336 and the white population as over 12,000,000. 
 
 But to quote from another authority: "The population of these 
 twenty republics, from the best obtainable sources of information, 
 . . . amounts to about 73,666,000." — {Bulletin of Pan-American 
 Uniony February, 191 3, p. 225.) 
 
 i-' 
 
lo AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 about four-fifths as dense as that of Africa; 
 about one-sixth as dense as that of Asia; and 
 about one-twelfth as dense as that of Europe.^ 
 This brings us to the great question which all 
 Americans, North and South, should join in 
 helping one another to answer, the mystery of 
 Pan America: Why is it that Latin-America, 
 with its greater extent of territory, and at least 
 equality with the United States in point of soil 
 and cHmate, is behind the United States in pop- 
 ulation and resources?^ Difference of race, it 
 has been said; difference of political conditions, 
 say others, under which the two regions were 
 settled and developed. The true answer is 
 probably a combination of both of these; for 
 the race is responsible for the government, and 
 the government, by its influence upon immi- 
 gration and its regulation of it, is more or less 
 responsible for the race. The two must work 
 together for their common good, if either is to 
 be materially improved. 
 
 Mr. Ugarte, with admirable frankness, gives 
 his readers a graphic description of the unat- 
 
 1 Computed from A. Hartleben, opus cit. 
 
 2 Latin-America is so sparsely populated that it may be called 
 a desert (Garcia-Calderon, opus cit., p. 309). 
 
POPULATION AND GOVERNMENT ii 
 
 tractive features of Latin-American republican- 
 ism. To quote from this portion of his work 
 
 (1910): 
 
 What first strikes one in the New World is the 
 contradiction between the loftiness of the con- 
 stitutions and the baseness of the political life. 
 The right to vote, which is the foundation of 
 our social contract, proves almost always a de- 
 lusion, because governments or parties substi- 
 tute their wishes for the will of the people by 
 means of fraud or revolution. ... X and Z 
 declaim in resounding periods terminating in 
 ^'Uberty," ** progress," or *' constitution," and 
 we take sides with one or the other, for no appar- 
 ent reason, as we choose head or tail in a game 
 of chance. ... In South America the time has 
 not yet come when ambitions are supported by 
 doctrines. The contest is brutal and plain 
 among those who want to occupy the highest 
 post. And as in a proud people, among whom 
 the greatest insult that can be inflicted on a 
 citizen is to call him '^adulador,"^ those who as- 
 pire to rise independently are many, the fact 
 may be accounted for that civil war has been 
 until recently a national function.^ 
 
 ^ Flatterer, satellite, henchman. 
 
 2 El Porvenir de la America Latina, pp. 205, 220. During the 
 seventy-three years between 1825 and 1898 Bolivia had more 
 than sixty revolutions, a number of international wars, and six 
 presidents assassinated, without counting those who died in ex- 
 ile. Pueblo enfermOf by Alcides Arguedas. 
 
12 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 The Indians and the mestizos, dispossessed by 
 the conquest or condemned to inferiority, find 
 themselves in the new population as in a for- 
 eign country. 
 
 Politicians use the combativeness of these 
 masses, corrupting them with a life of adventure 
 and combat, and leading them to find happi- 
 ness in individual license. In the populous cap- 
 itals it is not hard to put the suffrage into prac- 
 tice. But in the towns of the interior and in the 
 little villages, where huddle the common people 
 of America, it appears for the present to be an 
 impossibility. . . . Up to this time to cheat the 
 Treasury has been a venial offence. . . . '*I at- 
 tend only to what concerns me," says the ma- 
 jority; "let others attend to the general wel- 
 fare.'^ And, as every one says the same thing, 
 the result is that no one thinks of what in the 
 last analysis should be every one's business.^ 
 
 ^To the same effect writes Garcia-Calderon (191 1): 
 "Autocrat-presidents take the place of viceroys. . . . The dom- 
 inant caste, inheriting the prejudices of the Spaniards, despise in- 
 dustry and commerce, live on politics and its futile agitations. 
 The landed noblemen domineer as they did before the Revolution. 
 There are still the old latifundia, extensive domains, which ac- 
 count for the power of the oligarchies. The legislative assem- 
 blies act a minor part. . . . Catholicism is still the pivot of social 
 life. These *picaros' of the Spanish novel, haughty and ingen- 
 ious parasites, thrive. Bureaucracy swallows up the wealth of 
 the Treasury; it was formed a century ago of rapacious Castil- 
 ians, it is made up to-day of shiftless Americans. In spite of the 
 equality proclaimed by the constitutions, the Indian is subjected 
 to the pitiless tyranny of the local authorities, the priest, the 
 justice of the peace, the * cacique.' Under new names, the petty 
 despots of Spanish times are still in power.'* 
 
POPULATION AND GOVERNMENT 13 
 
 No North American or other foreigner has 
 exposed the defects of Latin-American char- 
 acter and institutions more faithfully and clearly 
 than has Alcides Arguedas in his Pueblo en- 
 fermOy Contribucion a la Psicologia de los Pueblos 
 hispano-americanos } 
 
 Before knowledge cometh humility; the first 
 step in improvement is a true apprehension of 
 one's faults. The remarkable freedom and 
 severity of such self-criticism is full of promise 
 for the future of Latin-America. The foregoing 
 quotations refer to Latin-America in general. 
 They do not apply to every Latin-American 
 country; notably not to the trio called the 
 ABC: Argentina, Brazil, and Chili, which 
 may be made a quartet by the addition of 
 Uruguay. These four nations, says Garcia- 
 Calderon, will within a century be perfectly or- 
 ganized republics. But a century seems a long 
 time to wait for that consummation. 
 
 Both of the forementioned writers favor 
 
 ^ With respect to reform he says: 
 
 "... the great problem, almost the only one, is to modify 
 those three elements which fatally co-operate to oppose the de- 
 velopment of the country for a long time to come: the excessive 
 immorality and lack of training of the governing classes, the thor- 
 ough corruption of the classes governed, and the nullity of the 
 indigenous, the numerically preponderant race." — (P. 428.) 
 
14 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 oligarchic, absolute government for Latin- 
 America; but Mr. Ugarte, being a socialist, 
 hopes for eventual popular government. He 
 makes a number of judicious recommendations, 
 but fails to suggest that Latin-American people 
 go to the land of the dreaded "Yanquis" and 
 learn from them the secrets of their success in 
 government and in business, and by association 
 with them acquire some of that energy and 
 aptitude which makes them formidable com- 
 petitors in so many fields of human endeavor. 
 But without his encouragement or approval 
 Latin-Americans are adopting that sensible 
 course in large and increasing number. Be- 
 tween the years 1900 and 1910 the number of 
 people in the United States born in Latin- 
 America increased from 137,458 to 279,514, or 
 one hundred and three per cent. The increase, 
 in the same period, of those born in other foreign 
 countries was thirty-nine per cent^ and of the 
 total population twenty-one percent.^ The num- 
 ber of Latin-Americans in Europe in 1910 may be 
 safely reckoned as less than 30,000; say 28,000, 
 about one-tenth as many as in the United States.^ 
 
 1 Census (1910), I, 789. 2 Jhid.^ I, 24. 
 
 3 Such statistics as I have been able to gather on this point are 
 given in Appendix A. 
 
POPULATION AND GOVERNMENT 15 
 
 The number of Latin-American students in 
 the United States has been the subject of some 
 loose talk. The Outlook^ is responsible for the 
 statement, for which it cites no authority, that 
 in 191 3 there were 1,500 Latin-Americans 
 studying in the United States. The Bulletin of 
 the International Bureau of the American Repub- 
 lics^ came out several years ago with this re- 
 markable assertion: 
 
 No statistics have been compiled of Latin- 
 American students in the universities, colleges, 
 technical schools, and industrial establishments 
 of the United States, but it is known that there 
 are several thousand of them. 
 
 The figures in both cases are estimates. 
 Those yielded by statistical compilation, as car- 
 ried out by the author, are 1,042.^ 
 
 It would be interesting in this connection to 
 note the number of Latin-American students 
 in European countries. Unfortunately, it has 
 never been compiled. They are, for certain coun- 
 tries, as follows: for France one hundred and 
 forty-one; for Sweden one; for Denmark one; 
 
 iAugust9, 1913, p. 783. 
 2 Vol. 25, pp. 72, 73 (1909). 
 
 2 Based on figures for years 1910-12, furnished by the Bureau 
 of Education. The number includes 231 from Porto Rico. 
 
i6 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 for Greece none; for Germany about twenty- 
 six^; for Belgium about one hundred and twenty- 
 nine.^ With regard to Spain, I am informed by 
 our ambassador that there are no statistics avail- 
 able. "As an illustration, however, it appears 
 from observation of the students in the Central 
 University of Madrid, who number more than 
 six thousand five hundred, that only a few 
 come from the Americas."^ The number for 
 Russia is reported as "practically negligible."^ 
 Allowing ten for Spain and Russia, the total for 
 these seven countries is about three hundred 
 and eight. It is not likely that the rest of 
 Europe contains more than three times this 
 number. It may be concluded that there are 
 more Latin-American students in the United 
 States than there are in Europe. 
 
 Mr. Ugarte cautions Latin-Americans against 
 allowing American capital and enterprise to 
 come in any considerable quantity into their 
 country. He pleads impressively for an in- 
 
 1 Computed for the second term of 191 3 from figures furnished 
 by the Amerika-Institut of Berlin. 
 
 - School year 191 2-1 3. At universities about 125 (letter from 
 Minister of Sciences and Arts to American Minister); at technical 
 schools of college grade, reported 2, estimated 2. 
 
 2 Letter from Ambassador J. W. Willard. 
 * Letter from United States Embassy. 
 
POPULATION AND GOVERNMENT 17 
 
 crease in influence, prestige, and security, by a 
 consolidation of the smaller Latin-American 
 countries into larger ones or all of them into 
 one. It has also been advocated that the Por- 
 tuguese Republic of Brazil be matched by a 
 Spanish Republic formed by a union of all the 
 American countries of Spanish origin.^ There 
 are considerable difficulties in the way of these 
 projects. One is the partiality of Latin-Ameri- 
 cans for centralization, or unification, as dis- 
 tinguished from decentralization, or confedera- 
 tion; the other is their fondness for public office. 
 Both are inheritances from long experience of 
 absolute government, lay and ecclesiastical. 
 The idea of reconciling centralization with free 
 representative government they imbibed with 
 the doctrines of the French Revolution. It has 
 proved impracticable. Union is less favorable 
 than disunion to professional office-holding. 
 The larger a nation the fewer the offices, es- 
 pecially the higher ones, in proportion to the 
 people, and it is the higher offices that the poli- 
 ticians want. Since the emancipation of Latin- 
 America the tendency of its component states 
 has been to subdivide rather than to combine. 
 
 ^ J. S. Carranza, 1907, opus cit., pp. 73, 74, 95. 
 
1 8 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 This pernicious condition has perhaps been ag- 
 gravated by the co-operation of the United 
 States in the secession of Panama from Co- 
 lombia. 
 
 We should be deluding ourselves if we 
 thought that the nations of America would 
 deliberately adopt measures to remove their 
 diflFerences of race, to assimilate themselves 
 racially. In case of a common danger, nations 
 differing in race may agree temporarily to sup- 
 port one another, as the French did the people 
 of the United States, as these did the people of 
 Cuba; as the French and Russian and British 
 on one hand, and the German and Austrian and 
 Italian on the other, are now co-operating in 
 maintaining the balance of power in Europe. 
 But they do not, in such cases, renounce their 
 separate sovereignties or nationalities to adopt 
 one in common. Races, like individuals, do 
 not take kindly to the idea of changing their 
 identity; that is what the transformation of a 
 race amounts to. It will not be, therefore, to 
 become like other people, or to prevent conflicts 
 with them, so much as to improve the domestic, 
 particularly the industrial, conditions under 
 which they live, that Latin-Americans will at- 
 
POPULATION AND GOVERNMENT 19 
 
 tend seriously to fostering immigration. An 
 eminent authority on this question made nearly 
 sixty years ago the following observations, to 
 which events have recently given a peculiar in- 
 terest and justification: 
 
 ... it appears that the only hope of Central 
 America consists in averting the numerical de-/ 
 cline of its white population, and increasing that 
 element in the composition of its people. If not 
 brought about by a judicious encouragement of 
 emigration or an intelligent system of coloniza- 
 tion, the geographical position and resources of 
 the country indicate that the end will be at- 
 tained by those more violent means, which 
 among men, as in the material world, often an- 
 ticipate the slower operations of natural laws. 
 To avert the temporary yet often severe shocks 
 which they occasion, by providing for the ne- 
 cessities of the future, is the true mission and 
 should be the highest aim, of the patriot and 
 statesman. Central America will be fortunate 
 if she shall be found to number among her sons 
 men adequate to the comprehension and control 
 of the circumstances under which she is placed, 
 and which are every day becoming more com- 
 plicated and exigent.^ 
 
 Probably nowhere is the mercurial and fickle 
 variability of Latin-American humor, the in- 
 
 ^ Notes on Central America, by E. G. Squler, p. 58. 
 
20 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 stability of Latin-American character, more ap- 
 parent than in the trials and tribulations which 
 brought to an early grave the peerless hero of 
 the War of Spanish-American Liberation, the 
 great "Libertador," Simon Bolivar.^ 
 
 The anguish of his disappointment and disillu- 
 sionment wrung from him on his deathbed the 
 following gloomy predictions, which, says Ar- 
 guedas, have been literally fulfilled. 
 
 America is ungovernable; those who served 
 the revolution have ploughed the sea. The 
 only thing that can be done in America is to 
 emigrate. Those countries will inevitably fall 
 
 ^ " From beginning to end his career was one long struggle, not 
 only against the Spaniards but also against the disloyalty and the 
 incompetence of the men who professed to work with him. . . . 
 
 " The figure of the worn-out Liberator, suffering in mind and 
 body, deserted by all but a few, reviled by the majority of those 
 who owed everything to him, is one of the most pathetic in history. 
 
 "His life is the history of a great success and a great failure. He 
 succeeded in throwing off forever the yoke of Spain, which had 
 pressed for three centuries on the shoulders of South America; he 
 failed to set up, in place of Spanish dominion, anything resembling 
 a stable, free, and popular government. . . . His failure hardly 
 detracts from his greatness, for the task of making a great nation 
 out of the materials he had to work with was an impossible one. 
 He had to deal with peoples depraved by centuries of bad govern- 
 ment. The mass of the population, sunk in superstition, ser- 
 vility, and ignorance, was without Initiative or capacity. The 
 majority of its leaders were either as ignorant as the rest or else 
 had been endowed by the Spanish system with a narrow literary 
 and legal education, which turned them into professional in- 
 triguers and fostered their innate vanity. With such materials 
 
POPULATION AND GOVERNMENf 21 
 
 into the hands of the unchecked multitude to 
 pass hence into diminutive tyrannies, devoured 
 by crime and consumed with ferocity. If it were 
 possible that a portion of the world should re- 
 vert to primitive chaos, that would be the last 
 state of America.^ 
 
 The governments of Latin-America have long 
 been favoring a limited, or select, immigration, 
 but do not seem to have sought a crossing of the 
 Latin race with other races. That process is 
 taking place in spite of unfavorable conditions, 
 and will doubtless continue to do so, but with 
 its traditional slowness. Next to the United 
 States, Argentina is the American republic that 
 attracts the largest European immigration. Sta- 
 tistics of marriages contracted by Argentinian 
 residents of Buenos Ayres, the capital of the 
 Argentine Republic, show about eight per cent 
 of such unions to be Argentinian-English or Ar- 
 gentinian-German, the remaining ninety-two per 
 cent being Argentinian-Latin, Argentinian-mes- 
 tizo, or Argentinian-Indian.^ 
 
 Washington could never have evolved the United States, and Na- 
 poleon could never have conquered the greater part of Europe." — 
 (Simon Bolivar , by E. L. Petre, pp. 443, 448, 449.) 
 
 ^ Alcides Arguedas, opus cit., p. 202. For an eloquent eulogy of 
 Bolivar, see Congres de Panama^ by de Pradt, p. 82 et seq, 
 
 2 Appendix B. 
 
22 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 Arguedas looks principally to educarion for 
 the awakening and development of Latin- 
 America. But if his description of present con- 
 ditions is correct, it would seem that immigra- 
 tion is indispensable to the introduction and 
 administration of an effective system of public 
 education. It may be that poHtical and other 
 reforms can be brought about by the importa- 
 tion and adoption of ideas without the absorp- 
 tion of new blood. But so far as the latter may 
 be called for, how can it be better effected than 
 by immigration from the United States? What 
 other country will furnish people that can be 
 so safely trusted to preserve republican insti- 
 tutions and make them work successfully? I 
 know the obstacle to United States immigration 
 formed by temperamental difference, amount- 
 ing in individual cases to incompatibility. I 
 have been a sorrowful witness of it on more 
 than one occasion.^ But the new population 
 might well come in large measure from Great 
 
 * A distinguished statesman, thoroughly informed as to condi- 
 tions in the Antilles, said not long ago that in Porto Rico and 
 even in Cuba, while there is greater order and more honest ad- 
 ministration than under the old regime, on the other hand, the 
 rudeness of the Anglo-American officials makes them odious to 
 the people, who are frequently offended by it, in their dignity or 
 self-respect. So far as such conduct is typical it is a duty of all 
 
POPULATION AND GOVERNMENT 23 
 
 Britain, Germany, and other non-Latin coun- 
 tries; and these contingents might mix better 
 with the Latin-Americans than those of the 
 United States. Latin-Europeans would mix 
 with them still better, but the wise and loyal 
 Latin-American will prefer in this new element 
 a certain incompatibiHty of temperament with 
 the quality of civic efficiency, to compatibility 
 of temperament without that quality — North 
 Americans, EngHsh, Scotch, Irish, Germans, 
 Swedes, and Norwegians, to Spanish, French, 
 and Italians, — leaving the latter to go to non- 
 Latin countries, such as the United States, and 
 improve them by imparting some of their 
 warmth, vivacity, and grace to a comparatively 
 cold, phlegmatic, ungainly people. 
 
 America to clamor for its correction. (J. S. Carranza, opus cit., 
 1907, p. 19.) 
 
 Mr. Ugarte says: ". . . it is evident that nothing attracts us 
 toward our neighbors of the North. By her origin, her educa- 
 tion, and her spirit. South America is essentially European. We 
 feel ourselves akin to Spain, to whom we owe our civilization, and 
 whose fire we carry in our blood; to France, source and origin of 
 the thought that animates us; to England, who sends us her gold 
 freely; to Germany, who supplies us with her manufactures; and 
 to Italy, who gives us the arms of her sons to wrest from the soil 
 the wealth which is to distribute itself over the world. But to 
 the United States we are united by no ties but those of distrust 
 and fear." — (El Porvenir de la America Latina, by Manuel Ugarte, 
 PP- 93, 94-) 
 
24 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 The Latin race is theoretical, abstract, ideal- 
 istic, the cosmopolitan United States race is 
 practical, concrete, materialistic. A certain 
 admixture of the latter characteristics seems 
 necessary to the perfection of Latin-American 
 character. According to Garcia-Calderon, a 
 limited supply of United States capital and emi- 
 gration may be judiciously admitted to Latin- 
 America, but no considerable immigration of 
 Yankees or intermarriage with them is desirable 
 or possible It is not desirable, because the 
 good qualities to be thus engrafted upon Latin- 
 Americans must be accompanied by many 
 that are objectionable, and they can be ob- 
 tained without such accompaniment, from 
 other people. 
 
 We find practical mind, industrialism, polit- 
 ical liberty in England; organization and instruc- 
 tion in Germany; in France inventive genius, 
 culture, wealth, great universities, democracy. 
 From these dominating people the New World 
 should receive the legacy of Western civilization 
 directly. . . . Europe offers to the Latin-American 
 democracies what they ask of Saxon America, 
 which was itself formed in the schools of Europe.^ 
 
 1 Garcia-Calderon, opus cit.j "Le Peril nord-americain," Livre 
 V, Chap. Ill, p. 288. 
 
POPULATION AND GOVERNMENT 25 
 
 To say that Saxon America was formed in the 
 schools of Europe Is to shut one's eyes to the 
 fact that Its early settlement was a protest and 
 revolt against those schools, and to ignore its 
 features of indigenous growth, the products of 
 American environment and experience, such as 
 climate, topography, aboriginal population, the 
 co-operation of separate commonwealths in the 
 defence of their peculiar civic principles; the 
 new, original form of government which this led 
 them to establish; the transformation in mod- 
 ern times of a wilderness into a thriving, popu- 
 lous commonwealth; the successful combination 
 of republican government with vast territo- 
 rial possessions. These and other develop- 
 ments of the United States, in the secrets of 
 which Latin-America is peculiarly interested, 
 cannot be studied at first hand, except in the 
 United States. 
 
 That no considerable intermarriage of people 
 from the United States with people of Latin- 
 America is possible is inferred by Garcia-Cal- 
 deron from the prejudice of **Les Yankees" 
 against half-breeds, such as mestizos and mulat- 
 toes. Without such blending of the races there 
 would be the same feeling on the part of the 
 
26 
 
 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 white toward the colored that there Is in the 
 United States.^ On both of these points his 
 reasoning appears to be a priori and may be 
 controverted by facts and figures. Racial prej- 
 udice in the United States has not prevented 
 miscegenation. Intermarriage was in 1910 pro- 
 hibited in twenty-six but allowed in twenty-four, 
 of the States and Territories.^ Between the 
 years 1850 and 1910 the ratio of mulatto to 
 total negro population has increased as indicated 
 in the following table :^ 
 
 Year 
 
 1850 
 
 i860 
 
 1870 
 
 1880 (no figures) 
 
 1890 
 
 1900 (no figures) 
 1910 
 
 Negro Population 
 
 Black 
 
 % 
 
 88 
 86 
 88 
 
 84 
 79 
 
 Mulatto 
 
 % 
 
 II. 2 
 
 13.2 
 12.0 
 
 15.2 
 
 20.9 
 
 ^ Opus Ctt.y p. 289. 
 
 2 Race Distinctions in American Law, by G. T. Stephenson, pp. 
 81, 98. 
 
 3 Thirteenth Census of United States (Abstract, p. 79). The 
 definition of the term "mulatto" adopted at different censuses has 
 not been entirely uniform. In 1870 and in 1910 the term was ap- 
 
POPULATION AND GOVERNMENT 27 
 
 Between 1790 and 1910 the percentage of 
 colored to total population has decreased from 
 19.3 to ii.i.^ This is largely due to immigra- 
 tion of white people in excess of colored.^ 
 
 As the preponderance of the white popula- 
 tion over the colored increases, race feeling 
 diminishes or becomes less manifest. As immi- 
 gration contributes in the United States, it may 
 contribute in Latin-America, to the solution of 
 the race problem. Statistics indicate that it is 
 doing so, at least in Central America. The im- 
 migration into that region has contributed al- 
 most twice as large an element of Germanic as 
 it has of Latin population. Following are the 
 contingents of foreign people "that have al- 
 ready established themselves in Central Amer- 
 ica": 
 
 German 2,400 French 2,050 
 
 English SjOOO Spanish 2,850 
 
 United States 5>7oo Italian 2,300 
 
 13,100 7,2003 
 
 plied to all persons having any perceptible trace of negro blood, 
 excepting, of course, negroes of pure blood. 
 
 ^ Statistical Abstract of the United States ^ 191 2, p. 39. 
 
 2 The term "colored," as here used, includes Chinese, Japanese, 
 other Asiatics, and American Indians. 
 
 3 These figures are compiled from a table in Immigration — A 
 Central American Problem, by E. B. Fllsinger. (The Annals, 
 May, 191 1.) 
 
28 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 In conclusion, be it said that the two great 
 wants of Latin-America are immigration and 
 education. Statistics on these subjects are 
 called for as indexes of its political condition 
 and rate of growth and development. 
 
II 
 
 THE WASHINGTON PRECEPT. THE 
 MONROE DOCTRINE 
 
 The foreign policy of the United States is 
 based upon three cardinal principles, which 
 may be briefly stated as follows : 
 
 1. Abstention from permanent alliances with 
 non-American powers, which was recommended 
 by President Washington in his Farewell Ad- 
 dress. This may be called the Washington 
 Precept. 
 
 2. Non-intervention by non-American pow- 
 ers in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere, 
 which was enunciated by President Monroe in a 
 message to Congress and is known as the Mon- 
 roe Doctrine. 
 
 3. Pan Americanism, or the co-operation of 
 all American nations, for the maintenance of 
 American control of the Western Hemisphere, 
 
 which was originally suggested by the Colom- 
 
 29 
 
30 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 bian patriot Bolivar. It may be called the Bol- 
 ivar Idea. 
 
 Taking its general direction from the fore- 
 going cardinal or fundamental principles, the 
 policy of the United States, like that of other 
 countries, is determined largely by minor prin- 
 ciples dictated by exigencies of the day or hour. 
 The fundamental principles are, generally speak- 
 ing, a guide to every administration, irrespect- 
 ively of political party. The minor principles 
 change more or less with the administration. 
 Among those which have had their day with our 
 government or now have it, are the following: 
 
 1. Protective tariff. 
 
 2. Tariff for revenue. 
 
 3 . Hegemony of the United States in America, 
 significantly called the '*Big Stick."^ 
 
 4. Diplomatic support of particular commer- 
 cial enterprises of American citizens in foreign 
 countries, known as '* Dollar Diplomacy." 
 
 ^ This principle may be read in the following declaration of 
 President Roosevelt's: "If a nation shows that it knows how to 
 act with decency in industrial and political matters, if it keeps 
 order and pays its obligations, then it need fear no interference 
 from the United States. Brutal wrong-doing or impotence which 
 results in the general loosening of the tidies of civilized society may 
 finally require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the 
 Western Hemisphere the United States cannot ignore its duty." 
 — (Moore, American Diplomacy^ p. 197.) 
 
THE WASHINGTON PRECEPT 31 
 
 5. The financial regeneration of insolvent 
 Latin-American republics, called by ex-Presi- 
 dent Taft "International Philanthropy." 
 
 6. Responsibility of the United States to 
 European nations for offences of Latin-Ameri- 
 can nations. 
 
 7. The "open door" in China. 
 
 8. Independence for the Philippines. 
 
 9. United States command of the Pacific. 
 
 10. Exclusion of Mongolians from the United 
 States. 
 
 11. Non-recognition of governments based on 
 violence. 
 
 From this notice of minor principles let us 
 return to the consideration of the major or 
 fundamental principles of American policy. 
 
 The Washington Precept 
 
 Washington's words, spoken on the 17th of 
 September, 1796, are these: 
 
 [^ A gainst the insidious wiles of foreign influ- 
 ence, I conjure you to believe me, fellow citizens, 
 the jealousy of a free people ought to be con- 
 stantly awake, since history and experience 
 prove that foreign influence is one of the most 
 baneful foes of republican governmenttj. . . 
 
32 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 (^ The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to 
 foreign nations, isjn extending our commercial 
 relations, to have with them as little political 
 connection as possible. So far as we have al- 
 ready formed engagements, let them be fulfilled 
 with perfect good faith. Here let us stogjj 
 
 Europe has a set of primary interests, which 
 to us have none or a very remote relation. 
 Hence she must be engaged in frequent contro- 
 versies, the causes of which are essentially for- 
 eign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must 
 be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artifi- 
 cial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her poli- 
 tics or the ordinary combinations and collisions 
 of her friendships or enmities. Our detached 
 and distant situation invites and enables us to 
 pursue a different course. . . . Why forego the 
 advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why 
 quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? 
 Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of 
 any part of Europe, entangle our peace and pros- 
 perity in the toils of European ambition, rival- 
 ship, interest, humor, or caprice ? 
 iLjTis our true policy to steer clear of perma- 
 nent alliances with any portion of the foreign 
 world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty 
 to do it — for let me not be misunderstood as 
 capable of patronizing infidelity to existing en- 
 gagements. . . . But in my opinion it is un- 
 necessary and would be unwise, to extend 
 themJJ 
 
 ^ Washington's Farewell Address. {Writings of Washington, by 
 Ford, XIII, 315-318.) 
 
 / 
 
4. 
 
 THE WASHINGTON PRECEPT 33 
 
 The term "entangling alliance," not used in 
 the Precept, aptly describes the particular sort 
 of association which it proscribes. To come 
 under that proscription an alliance must fulfil 
 the tallowing conditions : 
 
 It must be younger than the Precept; that is, 
 it must have followed the latter. 
 
 It must be permanent; that is, of indefinite 
 duration. 
 
 It must be partial; that is, it must associate 
 the United States with some power in opposi- 
 tion to a third power. 
 
 It must be non-American; that is, the other 
 power, or one of the other powers, must be of the 
 Eastern Hemisphere. 
 
 There is no violation of the Washington Pre- 
 cept in an aUiance which is older than the Pre- 
 cept, or temporary, or impartial, or formed 
 with only American powers. Before the Wash- 
 ington Precept was enunciated the United 
 States had more than once departed from the 
 impartiaHty prescribed in it. On the 4th of 
 May, 1778, two treaties, One of amity and com- 
 merce, and one of alliance, were ratified be- 
 tween France and the United States. By these 
 compacts each party secured to itself the right 
 
34 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 of fitting out vessels, condemning and disposing 
 of prizes, enlisting soldiers or seamen, in the 
 ports of the other. It was stipulated that the 
 enemies of either power should be denied these 
 privileges. The treaty of aUiance guaranteed to 
 "His Most Christian Majesty" the possessions 
 then held by ''the Crown of France in America" 
 and "to the United States their liberty, sov- 
 ereignty, and independence, absolute and un- 
 limited." It expressly provided that, in case of 
 a rupture between France and England, these 
 reciprocal guarantees should have "their full 
 force and effect the moment such war should 
 break out." War between France and Eng- 
 land broke out in 1792. In 1795 — this war was 
 then going on — a treaty of amity, commerce, 
 and navigation was ratified by the United 
 States with Great Britain in which it was agreed 
 that there should be "a firm, inviolable and uni- 
 versal peace, and a true and sincere friendship," 
 between those countries. This treaty obliged 
 the United States to grant to Great Britain and 
 deny to France the privileges formerly granted 
 to France and denied to her enemies. How 
 this treaty was denounced by France and de- 
 fended by the United States is immaterial in 
 
THE WASHINGTON PRECEPT 35 
 
 this connection. Each of the three treaties 
 committed us to "foregoing the advantages of 
 our peculiar situation." It was the recognition 
 of this fact that prompted Washington to qual- 
 ify his Precept with the words, "So far as we 
 have already formed engagements," etc., and 
 "so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty," etc. 
 There would be no violation of the Washing- 
 ton Precept in a permanent alliance for the sup- 
 pression of piracy or of the slave trade, for the 
 protection of American citizens or property in a 
 country with the government of which the alli- 
 ance was made, or in an alliance of whatever 
 sort, contracted with all the nations of the world. 
 In 1849 a treaty was negotiated, but not ratified, 
 by which the United States assumed the duty 
 of protecting the independence and territory 
 of Nicaragua against encroachment by Great 
 Britain. This engagement was injudiciously 
 criticised in the United States Senate as a vio- 
 lation of the Washington Precept. The speaker 
 was Senator J. M. Clayton. "This," he said, 
 "is one of the first instances since the ancient 
 entangling alliance made with France by the 
 treaties of 1778, in which any minister of this 
 government has attempted to disobey the sol- 
 
V 
 
 36 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 emn injunction of the Father of his country 
 to avoid all such political connections. For this 
 is a political, not a mere commercial alliance."^ 
 Secretary Seward erred in writing, as he did, 
 to our minister at Madrid : 
 
 ... it is a fixed principle of this government 
 not to enter into entangling alliances of any 
 kind with foreign nations ... we once de- 
 clined to enter into treaty stipulations for non- 
 intervention [in Spain], with France and Great 
 Britain . . . because we cannot enter into polit- 
 ical contests [contracts] for any general purpose 
 with foreign powers. 
 
 For the same reason we have often declined to 
 enter into the Congress of the American Republics.'^ 
 
 Our declining to join France and Great 
 Britain in the forementioned treaty stipulations 
 was prompted by the "fixed principle" of the 
 Washington Precept, but our declining, so far as 
 we did decline, to enter the congress of the 
 American Republics,^ was dictated by no set- 
 tled principle but by temporary expediency. 
 
 ^ Speech, March 8, 1853. 
 
 2 Seward to Perry, April 4, 1865. The italics are mine. — J. B. 
 
 ^ Congress of Latin-American Republics, which met four times: 
 at Panama in 1826, at Lima in 1847, at Santiago in 1856, and at 
 Lima in 1864. The United States was asked to send delegates to 
 each of the first two meetings. It sent two delegates to the first 
 meeting, but one of them died on the way and before the other 
 
THE WASHINGTON PRECEPT 37 
 
 In 1826 a congress of Latin-American re- 
 publics was held in Panama. In the discussion 
 which took place in the United States Congress, 
 as to the advisabiUty of sending delegates to 
 this assembly, there was much opposition to the 
 mission as tending _ tCL the formation of "en- 
 tangling alliances" and thus to the violation 
 of the Washington Precept. Its final approval f 
 was due not so much to reconciliation to such 
 alliances as to the conclusion that no such alli- 
 ance would result.^ But no effective answer was 
 made to the reasoning by which President John 
 Quincy Adams, in a special message, had antic- 
 ipated and refuted the contention that an alli-\ 
 ance of the United States with an American re- 
 public would be a violation of the Washington 
 Precept. 
 
 I cannot [he said] overlook the reflection that 
 the counsel . . . was founded upon the circum- 
 stances in which our country and the world 
 around us were situated at the time when it was 
 
 one arrived the meeting had adjourned. It was prevented from 
 sending delegates to the second meeting by its being engaged in 
 the Mexican War {Pan-Amerika, by S. H. Fried, p. 15). It was 
 not invited to send delegates to the third or to the fourth meeting. 
 1 House Reports, Resolutions Nos. 38, 40, 41, Nineteenth Con- 
 gress, First Session, Vol. II; Rep. of Sen. Com. on Foreign Affairs, 
 Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 232, Part 4 (1890). 
 
38 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 given; that the reasons assigned by him for his 
 advice were that Europe had a set of primary 
 interests which to us had none or a very remote 
 relation; that hence she must be engaged in fre- 
 quent controversies, the causes of which were 
 essentially foreign to our concerns; that our de- 
 tached and distant situation invited and ena- 
 bled us to pursue a different course. . . . Eu- 
 rope has still her set of primary interests with 
 which we have little or a remote relation. Our 
 -distant and detached situation with reference 
 to Europe remains the same. But we were then 
 the only independent nation of this hemisphere, 
 and we were surrounded by European colonies 
 with the greater part of which we had no more 
 intercourse than with the inhabitants of another 
 planet. Those colonies have been transformed 
 into eight independent nations, extending to our 
 very borders, seven of them repubHcs like our- 
 selves, with whom we have immensely growing 
 commercial, and must have, and have already, 
 important political, connections, with reference 
 to whom our situation is neither distant nor de- 
 tached, whose political principles and systems 
 of government, congenial with our own, must 
 and will have an action and counteraction upon 
 us and ours to which we cannot be indifferent 
 if we would.^ 
 
 Subsequently to these meetings, and at the 
 instance of the United States, the American re- 
 
 1 Message to House of Representatives, March 15, 1826. 
 
THE WASHINGTON PRECEPT 39 
 
 publics have united in forming what is now 
 called the Pan American Union. Under the 
 auspices of this association four Pan American 
 conferences have been held; at every one of 
 these the United States has been represented. 
 
 As thus far considered the Washington Pre- 
 cept refers principally, almost exclusively, to 
 alliances. But it is interpreted also as depre- 
 cating intervention, either between nations or 
 in the internal affairs of a particular nation. 
 This interpretation is perhaps due to a con- 
 fusion of Monroe's message with Washington's 
 Farewell Address. For Monroe, as we shall 
 see, dwells more on intervention and less on 
 alliances than Washington. But even if bor- 
 rowed from Monroe, the principle of non-inter- 
 vention may properly be associated for con- 
 venience with the principle of abstention from 
 entangling alliances, under the designation of 
 the Washington Precept. 
 
 The participation of the United States in the 
 Peace Conferences at The Hague has been mis- 
 represented as indicating a desire to be in **the 
 diplomatic game," to intervene in the interna- 
 tional affairs of Europe. It is rather an ad- 
 vance on the part of the United States toward 
 
40 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 the world as a whole, with a view to common 
 action in the service of their common interests. 
 The United States contemplates no interven- 
 tion unless it be for the protection of American 
 citizens or their property; this may be a duty 
 superior to every policy. The participation of 
 the United States in the allied expedition to 
 Pekin was dictated by this duty and military 
 expediency. If this was a violation of the 
 Washington Precept, it was one that Washing- 
 ton himself would have approved. There is 
 nothing in the Precept against expansion. It 
 may be construed as permitting of expansion 
 within the sphere of the Monroe Doctrine, 
 or the Western Hemisphere. The Philippines, 
 being in the Eastern Hemisphere, are without 
 the sphere of the Monroe Doctrine, or beyond 
 the limits of our expansion as determined by the 
 Washington Precept and the Monroe Doctrine. 
 By our annexation of them we acquired "pri- 
 mary interests" closely related to those of Old- 
 World nations; we thus forfeited, to an appre- 
 ciable extent, the advantages of "our detached 
 and distant situation." It is hard to see how 
 we can ever retrace this step. Giving the Phil- 
 ippines independence means entering into agree- 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 41 
 
 ments either with foreign powers for their neu- 
 tralization or with the Philippines themselves 
 for our exercising a protectorate over them. 
 Neither of these measures could be reconciled 
 with the Washington Precept unless it were con- 
 curred in by the nations of the Old World gen- 
 erally. 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine 
 
 History tells us that, after the downfall of 
 Napoleon, the rulers of Prussia, Russia, and 
 Austria formed a combination known as the 
 Holy Alliance, which in 1822 emitted this 
 declaration : 
 
 The high contracting parties, well convinced 
 that the system of representative government 
 is as incompatible with the monarchical princi- 
 ple as the maxim of the sovereignty of the peo- 
 ple is opposed to the principle of divine right, 
 engage in the most solemn manner to employ 
 all their means and unite all their efforts to put 
 an end to the system of representative govern- 
 ment wherever it is known to exist in the states 
 of Europe and to prevent it from being intro- 
 duced into those states where it is not known. 
 
 This declaration refers only to the states of 
 Europe. But it was natural to look forward to 
 
42 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 its extension so as to apply to the Western 
 Hemisphere.^ It was as unfavorably received 
 by Great Britain as it was by the United 
 States.2 On the 20th of August, 1823, Mr. Can- 
 ning, the British Foreign Secretary, wrote to 
 Mr. Rush, the United States Minister in 
 London : 
 
 ... Is not the moment come when our goverrw 
 ments might understand each other as to the 
 Spanish-American 'colonies? And if we can 
 arrive at such an understanding would it not 
 be expedient for ourselves, and beneficial for all 
 the world, that the principles of it should be 
 clearly settled and plainly avowed ? 
 
 For ourselves we have no disguise. 
 
 I. We conceive the recovery of the colonies 
 by Spain to be hopeless. 
 
 1 Metternich wrote to the Austrian representative at Madrid 
 (December 14, 1822): "... His Majesty will not cease to regard 
 disorder and insurrection [bouleversements], whatever part of 
 Europe may be the victim of them, as an object of lively solicitude 
 for all governments." He thus menaced insurrectionary move- 
 ments of which any " part of Europe might be the victim," in 
 whatever parts of the world the movements might take place. 
 (Politique exterieure des Etats^Unis, Doctrine Monroe^ by Ernest 
 Caylus, p. II.) 
 
 The Congress of Verona (Holy Alliance) wanted to treat the 
 Mexicans and Peruvians as it did Spanish or Italian liberals. 
 {U Imperialisme Americain, by Henri Hauser, p. 70.) 
 
 2 People asked themselves in England whether the Holy Alli- 
 ance might not some day think of re-establishing the reign of the 
 Stuarts. {Ibid., p. 12.) 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 43 
 
 2. We conceive the question of the recogni- 
 tion of them as independent states to be one of 
 time and circumstances. 
 
 3. We are, however, by no means disposed to 
 throw any impediment in the way of an arrange- 
 ment between them and the mother country, by 
 amicable negotiations. 
 
 4. We aim not at the possession of any por- 
 tion of them ourselves. 
 
 5. We could not see any portion of them 
 transferred to any other power [than Spain] with 
 indifference. 
 
 If these opinions and feeUngs are, as I firmly 
 believe them to be, common to your govern- 
 ment with ours, why should we hesitate mutu- 
 ally to confide them to each other, and to de- 
 clare them in the face of the world ? 
 
 If there be any European power which cher- 
 ishes other projects, which looks to a forcible 
 enterprise for reducing the colonies to subjuga- 
 tion, on the behalf or in the name of Spain, 
 or which meditates the acquisition of any part 
 of them to itself, by cession or by conquest, such 
 a declaration on the part of your government 
 and ours would be at once the most eflFectual 
 and the least oflFensive mode of intimating our 
 joint disapprobation of such projects.^ . . . 
 
 The "European power" referred to in the last 
 paragraph was France. In that day a colony 
 was a dependency, condemned to exploitation 
 
 •^ Massachusetts Historical Society^ Proceed., 2 S., XV, 415, 416. 
 
44 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 by the mother country and excluded from the 
 privilege of trading with any other country. 
 Canning, therefore, could not approve of col- 
 onies unless they were British. He saw an op- 
 portunity to thwart the hope which France 
 entertained, that, on the reconquest of Spanish- 
 America, there would be a large division of the 
 conquered territory reclaimed, subdued, and 
 turned over to her. He knew of the immense 
 commerce which had been diverted from Spain 
 to Great Britain in consequence of the revolt 
 of the Spanish-American colonies, and desired 
 that this vast trade be retained by his country. 
 It was to secure these ends, unmoved by love 
 or regard for the republic of the United States 
 or the Spanish-American republics, or repub- 
 lican institutions anywhere, that he approached 
 the minister of the United States at London with 
 his suggestion of an entente between the two 
 governments.^ He was farseeing enough to ap- 
 prehend an expansion of the United States over 
 Spanish-American territory that might prove as 
 detrimental to British commerce as the pos- 
 session of such territory by powers of the Holy 
 Alliance. His clause 5 is accordingly worded 
 
 ^ The Monroe Doctrine, by T. B. Edglngton, p. 7. 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 45 
 
 so as to debar the United States from such ex- 
 pansion, so far as diplomatic equivocation could 
 do so. The United States declined the British 
 overture because its acceptance might: 
 
 1. Implicate the United States in the "fed- 
 erative system" of Europe. 
 
 2. Give offence to France. 
 
 3. Obstruct the poHcy of the United States in 
 America. 
 
 Our secretary of state wrote to our minister 
 in London, replying to Canning's five propo- 
 sitions, as follows: 
 
 1. We conceive the recovery of the colonies by 
 Spain to he hopeless. 
 
 In this we concur. 
 
 2. We conceive the question of the recognition 
 of them as independent states to be one of time and 
 circumstances. 
 
 We did so conceive it until ... we had come 
 to the conclusion that the recovery of them by 
 Spain was hopeless. Having arrived at that 
 conclusion, we considered that the people of 
 those emancipated colonies were of rights inde- 
 pendent of all other nations, and that it was our 
 duty so to acknowledge them. We did so ac- 
 knowledge them in March, 1822, from which 
 time the recognition has no longer been a ques- 
 tion to us. . . . 
 
 3. We arey however ^ by no means disposed to 
 
46 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 throw any impediment in the way of an arrange- 
 ment between them and the mother country^ by 
 amicable negotiations. 
 
 Nor are we ... an arrangement between 
 them and Spain, by amicable negotiation is one 
 which, far from being disposed to impede, we 
 would earnestly desire, and by every proper 
 means in our power endeavor to promote, pro- 
 vided it should be founded on the basis of 
 independence. . . . 
 
 4. We aim not at the possession of any of them 
 ourselves, 
 
 5. We could not see any portion of them trans- 
 ferred to any other power [than Spain] with 
 indifference. 
 
 In both these positions we concur. And we 
 add: 
 
 That we cannot see with indifference any at- 
 tempt by one or more powers of Europe to 
 restore those new states to the crown of Spain, 
 or to deprive them, in any manner whatever, of 
 the freedom and independence which they have 
 acquired.^ 
 
 President Monroe replied to the Declaration 
 of the Holy Alliance by his memorable message 
 to Congress of December 2, 1823. There is 
 
 *J. Q. Adams to Rush, November 29, 1823 {Am. Hist. Rev., 
 VIII, 36). The italics in the propositions are mine, those in the 
 answers are Adams's. The last paragraph leaves no doubt as to 
 the difference, in Adams's mind, between the position of the United 
 States and that of Great Britain, with respect to expansion in 
 Spanish-America. 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 47 
 
 much in it that refers to non-intervention, and 
 the Monroe Doctrine has been consequently 
 understood to include the Washington Pre- 
 cept. But it does not. For the Washington 
 Precept, Washington's Address should be con- 
 sulted primarily and Monroe's message second- 
 arily. Monroe expressed himself as follows: 
 
 . . .jUhe occasion [of determining the Paisgian 
 northwest boundary] has been judged proper 
 for asserting as a principle, in which the rights 
 and interests of the United States are involved, 
 that the American continents, by the free and 
 independent condition which they have as- 
 sumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be 
 considered as subjects for future c olonization by 
 
 any European powe^O • .".' 
 
 It was stated at the commencement of the 
 last session [of Congress] that a great effort was 
 then making in Spain and Portugal to improve 
 the condition of the people of those countries 
 and that it appeared to be conducted with ex- 
 traordinary moderation. It need scarcely be 
 remarked that the result has been, so far, very 
 different from what was then anticipated. Of 
 events in that quarter of the globe, with which 
 we have so much intercourse, and from which 
 we derive our origin, we have always been anx- 
 ious and interested spectators. The citizens of 
 the United States cherish sentiments the most 
 friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of 
 
48 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 .eir fellow men on that side of the Atlantic. 
 
 Jn xhe. wans of xh^ Enropean powers, jp matters 
 r elating to themselves [and not to the United 
 f^i-Qt^cjYwp^h^^ npvpr tak ^n any pa rt^ nor does 
 it compor^"'^Tth our goljcy -so to ^^ ■"' It is only 
 when oT ir righty SfFHivaded or seriously men- 
 aced, that we resent injuries or make prepara- 
 tion for our defence. With the movements in 
 this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more im- 
 mediately connected, and by causes which must 
 be obvious to all enlightened and impartial 
 observers. The political system of the allied 
 powers is essentially different in this respect 
 from that of America. This difference pro- 
 ceeds from that which exists in their respective 
 governments^ And to the defence of our own, 
 which has Been achieved by the loss of so much 
 blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom 
 of their most enlightened citizens, and under 
 which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, 
 
 whole nation is devoted. 
 
 e owe it, therefore, to candor and to the 
 amicable relations existing between the United 
 States and those powers to declare that we 
 should consider any attempt on their part to 
 extend their system to any portion of this 
 hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and 
 safety. With the existing colonies or depend-^ ^^v ^ 
 enciesj)f any European power we have not in- \a\ 
 terfered, and shall not interfere. But with the ^ 
 governments who have declared their inde- 
 pendence and maintained it, and whose inde- 
 pendence we have, on great consideration and 
 
 S'^: 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 49 
 
 on just principles, acknowledged, we could not 
 view any interposition for the purpose of op- C^* 
 pressing them, or controlling in any other man- u ■, 
 ner their destiny, by any European power, in -^ 
 
 any other light than as a manifestation of an un^ j 
 fri^Ildly.jdispjosition towards the United StatesJ 4 
 In the war between these new governments [of 
 Latin-America] and Spain we declared our neu- 
 trality at the time of their recognition [by us], 
 and to this we have adhered and shall continue 
 to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, 
 in the judgment of the competent authorities of 
 this government, shall make a corresponding 
 change on the part of the United States indis- 
 pensable to their security. 
 
 The late events in Spain and Portugal show 
 that Europe is still unsettled.^ Of this impor- 
 tant fact no stronger proof can be adduced than 
 that the aUied powers should have thought it 
 proper, on any principle satisfactory to them- 
 selves, to have interposed by force in the in- 
 ternal concerns of Spain. To what extent such 
 interposition may be carried, on the same prin- 
 ciple, is a question in which all independent 
 powers, whose governments differ from theirs, 
 are interested; even those most remote, and 
 surely none more so than the United States. 
 Our policy in regard to Europe, which was 
 
 1 At the instigation of the Holy Alliance, a French army of . 
 100,000 men, under the Duke of Angouleme, marched into Spain 
 in April, 1823, and replaced Ferdinand VII upon the throne, in 
 opposition to the wishes of the great majority of the Spanish 
 
 people. 
 
so 
 
 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 adopted at anearlystage-of thewars which have 
 so long agitated that quarter of the globe, never- \ 
 theless remains the same, which is, not to inter- \ 
 fere in the internal concerns of any of its pow- 
 ers; to consider the_^o:irerniTient de facto as the 
 legitimate government for us; to cultivate 
 ^ friendly relations with it, and to preserve those 
 
 ^-X^ relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, 
 meeting in all instances the just cTaims of every 
 power, submitting to injuries from none. But 
 in regard to these continents, circumstances 
 are eminently and conspicuously different. J It is 
 impossible that the alUed powers should extend 
 their political system to any portion of either 
 continent without endangering our peace and 
 happiness, nor can any one believe that our 
 J southern brethren, if left to themselves, would 
 
 ^ J adopt it of their own accord. It is equally im- 
 possible, therefore, that we should behold such 
 interposition in any form with indifFerenceTJ 
 
 \ 
 
 About as this paper was being read in Con- 
 gress a circular emanated from the King of 
 Spain, calling for support from the sovereigns of 
 the Holy Alliance, to maintain in America the 
 principle of order and of legitimacy ^ the subversion 
 of which would soon he communicated to Europe, 
 This appeal remained unanswered, not — it 
 would seem — on account of the Monroe Doc- 
 
 ^ Sen. Doc. i, i8 Cong., i Sess. 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 51 
 
 trine, but because of a declaration made by 
 Great Britain that European intervention in 
 Spanish-America would impel her to recognize 
 the independence of the revolted colonies. 
 Rupture with Great Britain would have re- 
 animated the liberal parties and again shaken 
 the thrones of Europe. This consideration was - 
 enough to prevent it.^ ^ 
 
 Canning has been credited with suggesting 
 the Monroe Doctrine to the United States.^ 
 He suggested what may be called the Canning 
 Doctrine, according to which the United States, 
 as well as Great Britain and other European 
 countries, was to be prevented from expanding 
 in the Western Hemisphere, a very different 
 thing from the Monroe Doctrine, which allowed 
 of such expansion by the United States, but not 
 by Great Britain or any other non-American 
 country. 
 
 The object of Canning appears to have been 
 to obtain some public pledge from the govern- 
 ment of the United States, ostensibly against the 
 forcible interference of the Holy AUiance be- 
 tween Spain and South America, but really or 
 especially against the acquisition to \sic\ the 
 
 ^ Ernest Caylus, opus cit.^ pp. 21, 22. 
 2 Frelinghuysen to Lowell, May 8, 1882. 
 
52 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 United States themselves of any part of the 
 Spanish-American possessions. . . . By joining 
 with her, therefore, in her proposed declaration, 
 we give her a substantial and perhaps incon- 
 venient, pledge against ourselves, and really 
 obtain nothing in return.^ 
 
 Besides the United States, France was, as 
 already indicated, to be excluded from Latin- 
 America. In defence of his not having arrested 
 the French invasion of Spain, Canning said: "I 
 sought for compensation in another hemisphere. 
 ... I resolved that if France had Spain, it 
 should not be Spain with the Indies [Spanish- 
 American colonies]. I called the New World 
 into existence to redress the balance of the 
 Old."^ Pretension. Fanjaronnade, The Span- 
 ish-American colonies had won their independ- 
 ence by their own valor and had been recognized 
 as independent governments two years before 
 Great Britain took action in the matter.^ Can- 
 ning was so irritated by the Monroe Doctrine 
 that he retaliated by excluding the United States 
 from participation with Great Britain and Rus- 
 
 ^ Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, VI, 177. 
 2 Speech, December 22, 1826. 
 
 ^ The Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish- 
 America^ by J. H. Latane, pp. 86, 87. 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 53 
 
 sia in the settlement of the Alaska boundary 
 question.^ 
 
 Great Britain, he maintained, could not "ac- 
 knowledge the right of any power to proclaim 
 such a principle, much less to bind other coun- 
 tries to the observance of it. If we are to be 
 repelled from the shores of America, it would 
 not matter to us whether that repulsion were 
 effected by the ukase of Russia excluding us 
 from the sea, or by the new doctrine of the 
 President, prohibiting us from the land. But 
 we cannot yield obedience to either. . . ." 
 Describing the declaration of the President as 
 "very extraordinary," he announced that the 
 principle was one which his Majesty's ministers 
 were prepared to combat in the most un- 
 equivocal manner, maintaining that "whatever 
 right of colonizing the unappropriated portions 
 of America has been hitherto enjoyed by Great 
 Britain in common with the other powers of 
 Europe, may still be exercised in perfect free- 
 
 1 On the 4th of January, 1824, Rush wrote to Secretary Mid- 
 dleton that it was the intention of Great Britain to proceed sep- 
 arately, saying: "The resumption of its original course by this 
 [British] government has arisen chiefly from the principle which 
 our government has adopted, of not considering the American 
 continents as subjects for future colonization by any European 
 powers, a principle to which Great Britain does not accede." 
 
54 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 dom, without affording the sHghtest cause of 
 umbrage to the United States."^ To the end 
 of his career, it was Canning's purpose to thwart 
 and oppose the Monroe Doctrine. On every oc- 
 casion he impressed upon Latin-American gov- 
 ernments the advantage for them of an alHance 
 with Great Britain over an alliance with the 
 United States.^ 
 
 His successors in office have in general taken 
 this attitude. No other nation has criticised 
 and contravened the Monroe Doctrine to any- 
 thing like the extent that Great Britain has. 
 Incidentally to the Venezuelan controversy 
 Lord Salisbury wrote to Secretary Olney that 
 the Monroe Doctrine was not entitled to any 
 one's respect. 
 
 ^ The Monroe Doctrine^ by W. F. Reddaway, p. 97. 
 
 2 Later American Policy of George Canning {Am. Hist. Rev., ii, 
 704). See also Monroe Doctrine {Ibid., 7, 6y6', 8, 28), English 
 Policy towards America, 1 790-1 {Ibid., 7, 706), Mexican Diplomacy 
 on the Eve of War with the United States {Ibid., 18, No. 2). 
 
 Under date of May 2, 1854, Canning wrote to the United 
 States minister at London: "... With regard to the doctrine 
 laid down by Mr. President Monroe in 1823, concerning the fu- 
 ture colonization of the American continents by European states, 
 as an international axiom which ought to regulate the conduct of 
 European states, it can only be viewed as the dictum of the dis- 
 tinguished personage who delivered it, but her Majesty's govern- 
 ment cannot admit that doctrine as an international axiom which 
 ought to regulate the conduct of European states." 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 55 
 
 The prohibition of colonization in America 
 and of intervention in its affairs, expressed or 
 implied in the Monroe Doctrine, applied to all 
 European powers, including those which have 
 possessions in the American hemisphere, and 
 may be considered as extertded to apply to 
 e very non-A merican country . On the other 
 hand, it does not apply to any American coun- 
 try. Articles and books have been written to 
 prove that the United States has been untrue 
 to the Monroe Doctrine by giving it such appli- 
 cation as serves only the interests of the United 
 States — one that is not altruistic, looking to the 
 interests of all American nations, but solely or 
 mainly selfish, looking to the interests of the 
 United States.^ This sort of criticism and re- 
 sentment is due to misconception of the pur- 
 pose and meaning of the Doctrine, which might 
 be corrected by a careful reading of the pas- 
 sages which I have quoted. The Monroe Doc- 
 trine, while it here and there reveals an element 
 of Pan American altruism, is in its general form 
 and tenor fr ankly egoi stical or national. It 
 
 ^See La Doctrine Monroe et V Amerique Latine, by D. Anto- 
 kletz; Le Droit International Public, by Calvo; El Porvenir de la 
 America Latina, by Manuel Ugarte; Les Democraties Latines de 
 r Amerique, by F. Garcia-Calderon. 
 
56 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 speaks for the United States and its interests 
 and not for the Western Hemisphere and its 
 interests. " 
 
 To appreciate it in spirit as well as in letter, 
 it is necessary to recognize, as its primary pur- 
 pose, the safeguarding of the territory and po- 
 litical institutions of the United States. The 
 doctrine is commonly confounded with the 
 Bolivar Idea, which is expressed by the phrase, 
 "America for Americans." Such error is illus- 
 trated in the following quotation from a work 
 which, apart from this point, is most instruct- 
 ive and cannot be too highly recommended to 
 students of the Monroe Doctrine and the Pan 
 American movement. El Derecho internacional 
 americanOy by Alejandro Alvarez: 
 
 The declarations, in fact, of the Monroe Doc- 
 trine, have no value, except so far as they re- 
 flect the desire of all America and not the per- 
 sonal opinion of the President. It is this idea 
 that one must grasp in order to know its real 
 nature and its scope. ^ . . . The Monroe Doc- 
 trine represents the interests of the whole con- 
 tinent [both continents], and all the states of 
 America are of accord for its maintenance. So 
 that, while the United States has remained thus 
 
 ^ P. 139 (French translation). 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 57 
 
 far its only defender, Latin-American states 
 would now be found strong enough to maintain 
 it, if the United States should refuse to do so.^ 
 
 Every nation in America is welcome to co- 
 operate with the United States in keeping non- 
 American powers at a safe distance from the 
 United States. That is what the enforcement 
 of the Monroe Doctrine means, but that is 
 not what Mr. Alvarez means. He contemplates 
 a safeguarding by each Latin-American coun- 
 try either of its own interests or of those of 
 the Western Heniisphere as a whole. In the 
 former case the policy is similar to that of the 
 Monroe Doctrine; it may be considered as a 
 Monroe Doctrine, but not properly as the Mon- 
 roe Doctrine; in the latter case, that is, in 
 its continental application, it is a form of the 
 Bolivar Idea. The Monroe Doctrine has been 
 construed as applying to the continents of 
 North and South America and as applying 
 to these continents and the adjacent islands. 
 Monroe does, in his message, refer to the 
 "American continents," but he refers also to 
 **this hemisphere" as the sphere of his Doc- 
 
 ^ P. 173. See also Le Vol de VAigle de Monroe a Roosevelt, by 
 Joseph Ribet, p. 38. 
 
S8 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 trine. He may have used the term "this 
 hemisphere" as synonymous with "the Ameri- 
 can continents." But the probabiUty is that 
 his language on this point was purposely vague. 
 It would have seemed pedantic had it been 
 perfectly definite. It leaves the sphere of his 
 Doctrine to be determined by events, with the 
 American continents as a minimum. He ap- 
 parently intended that it should comprise if 
 circumstances seemed to warrant it, what is 
 commonly called the Western Hemisphere, in- 
 cluded between the twentieth and two hun- 
 dredth meridians of longitude west of Greenwich. 
 Daniel Webster would have restricted its appli- 
 cation, so far at least as it involved the use of 
 force, to the limits of North and perhaps Cen- 
 tral America.^ 
 
 Mr. Polk in his messages to Congress always 
 
 * Referring to the Monroe Doctrine he said: 
 
 ". . . This declaration must be considered as founded on our 
 rights, and to spring mainly from a regard to their preservation. 
 It did not commit us, at ^11 events, to take up arms on any indi- 
 cation of hostile feeling by the powers of Europe towards South 
 America. If, for example, all the states of Europe had refused to 
 trade with South America until her states should return to their 
 former allegiance, that would have furnished no cause of interfer- 
 ence to us. Or if an armament had been furnished by the allies 
 to act against provinces the most remote from us, as Chili or 
 Buenos Ayres, the distance of the scene of action diminishing our 
 apprehension of danger, and diminishing also our means of ef- 
 
a] 
 
 THE MONROE DOCTRINE 59 
 
 referred to the Monroe Doctrine as applying 
 to the North American continent, and never 
 as extending to the entire hemisphere.^ A num- 
 ber of United States writers on the Monroe 
 Doctrine have expressed the belief that it was 
 unnecessarily extensive in its application and 
 suggested that it be narrowed down. Such 
 views have not gained any considerable accept- 
 ance. The sphere of the Monroe Doctrine is 
 more likely to be enlarged than it is to be di- 
 minished. Exemptions from its application will 
 be rarer in the future than they have been in 
 the past. 
 
 It should be observed that the Monroe Doc- 
 trine does not commit the United States to any 
 belligerent action. The most that it threat- 
 ens is the unfriendliness of the United States 
 toward an oflFending nation. This threat may 
 
 fectual interposition, might still have left us to content ourselves 
 with remonstrance. But a very different case would have arisen, 
 if an army, equipped and maintained by these powers, had been 
 landed on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, and commenced 
 the war in our own immediate neighborhood. Such an event 
 might justly be regarded as dangerous to ourselves, and on that 
 ground call for decided and immediate interference by us. 
 The sentiments and the policy announced by the declaration, 
 thus understood, were, therefore, in strict conformity to our 
 duties and our interest." — {Speech on the Panama Mission, 
 April 14, 1826.) 
 ^ J. D. Richardson, opus ciu — T. B. Edgington, opus cit. 
 
6o AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 gain or lose in force with the armament at 
 our command, but it is far from being abso- 
 lutely dependent on it for effect. The lowness 
 of our present tariff on imports is a factor to 
 be reckoned with in the execution of our foreign 
 policy. Nations will not lightly expose them- 
 selves to losing the market which it allows them. 
 The Monroe Doctrine contemplated that any 
 expansion which the United States might enter 
 upon should not meet with opposition from any 
 colony established in America subsequently to 
 the announcement of the Doctrine. It was to 
 
 \ protect the government and institutions of the 
 United States, not only where they existed in 
 1823 but wherever they might extend them- 
 selves to on American soil. The construction 
 of the Panama Canal has brought South Amer- 
 ica more than one thousand miles nearer the 
 United States and an intensely sensitive part 
 of the United States. The Panama Canal is. 
 spoken of as a part of the coast-line of the 
 United States; in whatever sense that may be 
 
 y true, in that same sense all of Central America 
 and Mexico are a part of the United States. 
 Who will now say that any point in South 
 America is far enough from the United States 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 6i 
 
 to admit of its colonization hy a non-American 
 power without offending against the spirit as 
 well as the letter of the Monroe Doctrine? 
 
 It has been said in substance that because 
 we have taken the Philippines, thus invading 
 non-American territory, we have no right to 
 claim immunity for our hemisphere from inva- 
 sion by non-American powers; that our hold- 
 ing the PhiUppines is inconsistent with our 
 holding the Monroe Doctrine.^ Independently 
 of the Washington Precept, the Monroe Doc- 
 trine does not preclude the acquisition and 
 control by the United States of territory outside 
 of the Western Hemisphere. The United States 
 could not complain if the Old World should 
 promulgate a Monroe Doctrine directed against 
 the New, but it is not called upon to Anticipate 
 that contingency, so long as its possessions 
 in the Eastern Hemisphere are insignificant in 
 comparison to the territories in the Western 
 Hemisphere possessed by powers of the Eastern. 
 About half of the Western Hemisphere is Eu- 
 ropean. ^ The American territory in the East- 
 
 ^ Democratic national platform for 1900. 
 
 2 The territory of Canada is represented on British maps as 
 extending northward to the Pole. The claim thus made is prob- 
 ably contestable, but, so far as can be learned, has not been either 
 
'^ 
 
 62 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 ern Hemisphere consists of the Island of Guam 
 and the Philippine Islands, which form to- 
 gether about -^ of the area of the hemisphere. 
 The possessions of Great Britain alone in 
 America aggregate more than thirty times the 
 area of all the colonies of the United States. 
 But for our misreading of the Monroe Doctrine 
 we should probably be in possession of a num- 
 ber of islands in the Pacific Ocean now owned 
 by European powers and of all the Samoan 
 Islands, instead of sharing them with Germany. 
 Our portion of the latter comprises but seven per 
 cent of their area and about thirteen per cent of 
 their population. 
 
 Under the conditions attending the promul- 
 gation of the Monroe Doctrine no non-Ameri- 
 can power could be thought of as occupying 
 any part of a Latin-American country without 
 estabUshing there some government less in sym- 
 pathy, or more out of sympathy, with our own, 
 
 contested or conceded by the United States or by the other nations 
 of the world. 
 
 Palmyra Island, in the Pacific Ocean, is commonly represented 
 as a British possession. It appears on our Land Office map as 
 belonging to the United States. Cllpperton Island, off the west 
 coast of Central America, has been represented as British, also as 
 French, and as Mexican. It appears to belong to Mexico and to 
 be leased to the Pacific Islands Company, a British corporation. 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 63 
 
 and more dangerous to it, than the one which it 
 replaced. 
 
 The republican character of the United States 
 gave no concern to the courts of Europe, for at 
 that time politicians and publicists believed 
 that that form of government was reserved for 
 feeble states. 
 
 The monarchic form of government was a 
 matter of concern to the United States and the 
 other states of America; they knew by experi- 
 ence, and the pact of the Holy AUiance justi- 
 fied them only too well on this point, that that 
 form of government was expansive and tended 
 to enlarge its colonial domain.^ 
 
 The time may come when forms of govern- 
 ment will be substantially the same the world 
 over. The Monroe Doctrine, if directed only 
 against obnoxious forms of government, would 
 then lose its raison d^etre. But it has another- 
 objective. It is directed not only against certain ' 
 forms of government, but also, and perhaps 
 more, against an association of governments and 
 its collective policy. The two ideas, form of gov- 
 ernment and collective policy, Monroe com- 
 prehended in the term "political system." The 
 
 ^ Le Droit international americain, by Alejandro Alvarez, p. 
 38 n. 
 
64 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 difference between the political system of the 
 Holy Alliance and that of America '^proceeds/' 
 he says, "from that which exists in their respect- 
 ive governments." The source to which he par- 
 ticularly refers is the principle of divine right, 
 which is not yet wholly abandoned. But if it 
 were, the difference might proceed from other 
 principles or interests, common to Old-World 
 governments and not to ours, such as hereditary 
 privileges, European hegemony or solidarity, and 
 groupings or combinations of powers with their 
 respective policies. If every nation of Europe 
 were a republic modelled after our own, a Euro- 
 pean system might still exist, with its triple 
 entente and triple alliance^ its equilibrium, or 
 balance of power, and its concert, with its 
 congresses, for intervening in the affairs of par- 
 ticular nations. Let us suppose two or three 
 nations of Europe, whatever their forms of gov- 
 ernment, competing actively for the possession 
 or acquisition of territory, in America. Can we 
 not see all Europe concerning itself in the con- 
 test, and the concert or the opposing combina- 
 tions of powers agitating or influencing all the 
 nations of America? Let us go a Httle farther 
 and suppose a European power to acquire posses- 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 65 
 
 sion and control of any important strategic or 
 commercial position in the Western Hemisphere, 
 can we not imagine its raising in the course 
 of time a Near Eastern question for the powers 
 of our hemisphere even more troublesome than 
 the Near Eastern puzzle of Europe; can we not 
 conceive of European control and influence in 
 America so enlarged as to make the Western 
 Hemisphere but an annex to the Eastern, elim- 
 inating the New World as such by incorporating 
 it in the Old, nullifying the Washington Pre- 
 cept by making the affairs of European nations 
 the affairs of American, and necessarily extend- 
 ing the concert and the alliances and ententes 
 of Europe to include all America ?^ It is against 
 the complication and distortion of our policy by 
 such conditions as these, quite as much as 
 against any transformation of our polity by 
 monarchic, dynastic, or other specific forms or. 
 features of government, that the Monroe Doc- 
 trine is directed. If we are to have a 'Apolitical 
 system" for America, it is to be essentially 
 
 ^In former centuries the practice of the balance of power was 
 confined to Europe. . . . The acquisition of territory by any great 
 power anywhere in the whole world is now held to disturb the 
 balance, and to entitle other powers to a compensating acquisition. 
 {The Future Peace of the Anglo-Saxons, by S. L. Murray, p. 18.) 
 
66 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 American and not an importation or an imposi- 
 tion from Europe. 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine interdicts the Euro- 
 peanizing of any portion of the Western Hem- 
 isphere, not only without but even with the ex- 
 press consent of the American government or 
 governments immediately concerned. It not 
 only protests against any ^^interposition for the 
 purpose of oppressing" an American nation, but 
 goes on to say ^^or controlling in any other way 
 their destiny." It finally asserts in substance 
 that, if an American government should ex- 
 press itself as consenting to European domina- 
 tion, the United States would assume that it 
 was disregarding or misrepresenting the will of 
 the people.^ 
 
 It is hard to believe that such language was 
 meant to be taken literally. But it was, and 
 derived certainly some justification from the 
 arbitrary quality of the nominally republican 
 regime prevailing in the Latin-America of that 
 day. Presidential dictators who would assassin- 
 
 ^ ". . . nor can any one believe that our Southern brethren, if 
 left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. ... It is 
 equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interpo- 
 sition in any form with indifference." — (Monroe Doctrine, p. 50 
 ante.) 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 67 
 
 ate their opponents and sack their country's 
 treasury might not scruple to barter away its 
 Hberty and sovereignty. President Melgarejo 
 of Bolivia, an admirer of Napoleon and an imi- 
 tator of his absolutism, ceded to Chili and to 
 Brazil considerable portions of territory, be- 
 cause those countries had turned his head with 
 honors and decorations.^ What the United 
 States would do to-day if a Latin-American 
 country should invite a European one to annex 
 it, in whole or in part, is happily an idle ques- 
 tion. There is no indication that any nation of 
 Latin-America would willingly part with its 
 sovereignty or any of its territory, and there is 
 much to indicate that Latin-Americans are, if 
 possible, more opposed to foreign dominion, 
 more attached to their native land and deter- 
 mined to preserve it inviolate, than the people of 
 the United States themselves. But they are not 
 all capable of resisting the temptation to raise 
 money by granting concessions or leasing islands 
 or harbors, which is the next thing to surrender- 
 ing territory and sovereignty. It is not for a 
 citizen of the United States, whose government 
 has from another American government a per- 
 
 * Alcides Arguedas, opus cit., p. 209. 
 
68 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 petual lease of four hundred and seventy-four 
 square miles of territory, to indulge in severe or 
 sweeping condemnation of such transaction. 
 But he may consistently deprecate the habitual 
 resort to it by an American toward a non- 
 American government, and in so doing should 
 have the approval and support of every Pan 
 American. 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine opposes, not only the 
 substitution in the Western Hemisphere of non- 
 American for American sovereignty, whether 
 with or without the consent of the American 
 nations affected — but also the establishment 
 in America of foreign sovereignty where no 
 American sovereignty exists. When the Mon- 
 roe Doctrine was promulgated there were vast 
 territories in regions now embraced within the 
 limits of Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Ar- 
 gentina, that were not parts of any recognized 
 nation, that were res nullius in the light of 
 so-called international law. The Monroe Doc- 
 trine has been pronounced internationally illegal 
 because it undertakes or undertook to prevent 
 the appropriation of such unappropriated terri- 
 tories by European governments. Nations, it is 
 said, cannot be prohibited from taking res nuU 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 69 
 
 lius territories on the ground that such nations 
 belong to a different hemisphere or another con- 
 tinent. That is why President Monroe did not 
 base his action on so-called international law. 
 He put it on the ground of necessity, necessity of 
 self-preservation, the first law of nature. The 
 Monroe Doctrine enunciates not a legal right, 
 but a national policy based upon a natural right 
 as inalienable from nationality as life, liberty, 
 and the pursuit of happiness are inalienable from 
 humanity. With a view to the safety of the 
 United States the Monroe Doctrine meant that 
 the unclaimed territories of the Western Hem- 
 isphere should come under control only of 
 American powers. It has, in fact, been consid- 
 ered by more than one authority as proclaiming 
 that all such territories were actually under 
 American sovereignty. 
 
 With the exception [said John Quincy Adams] 
 of the existing European colonies, which it was 
 in no wise intended to disturb, the two con- 
 tinents consisted of several sovereign and in- 
 dependent nations whose territories covered 
 theilr whole surface.^ 
 
 ^ Message to House of Representatives, March 15, 1826. 
 "According to the message [of President Monroe] there were 
 not In America as there were In Europe territories unappropriated 
 
70 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 While recognizing the existence of European 
 possessions in the Western Hemisphere and 
 promising not to interfere with such ^'existing 
 colonies or dependencies," the Monroe Doctrine 
 does not commit the United States to permitting 
 their transfer by one European power to an- 
 other. On the contrary it warrants the preven- 
 tion of such transfer as a fresh extension of the 
 ''political system" of Europe to the Western 
 Hemisphere. 
 
 In 1825, Henry Clay, as secretary of state, 
 declared to the governments of France and 
 England that the United States would not per- 
 mit Spain to transfer Cuba and Porto Rico to 
 other European states. With respect to Cuba, 
 
 in law, although in fact the greater part of the American hemi- 
 sphere was in that situation. That declaration was not new. 
 Spain had made it at the beginning of her colonial period, with 
 regard to her colonies. The origin of her pretensions is found in 
 a bull of Pope Alexander VI, who separated by a geographical 
 line the possessions of Spain from those of Portugal. Spain found 
 herself, then, sovereign in law of all lands situated west of that 
 line. Although the bull has not been respected by the other 
 powers, it is none the less true that Spain put forth this claim on 
 a number of occasions . . . the Spanish government, by edict of 
 June 30, 1865, relative to the litigation between Venezuela and 
 Holland over the Island of Aves, declared that it belonged to 
 Venezuela, basing its decision on Spain's having formerly con- 
 sidered that island as a part of its domain, although recognizing 
 that Spain had never occupied it effectively." — (Alvarez.) See 
 also F. Garcia-Calderon, opus cit. 
 
/ 
 
 THE MONROE DOCTRINE 71 
 
 similar declarations were made by Secretary 
 Van Buren In 1830 and by Secretary Webster in 
 1852. In 1845 President Polk said that the 
 United States would never acknowledge any 
 transfer of territory, whether made by the de- 
 sire of the inhabitants, by purchase, or by force, 
 from any nation of North America to any nation 
 of Europe.^ 
 
 President Grant said : 
 
 These dependencies are no longer regarded as 
 subject to transfer from one European power to 
 another. When the present relation of colonies 
 ceases, they are to become independent powers 
 exercising the right of choice and of self-control 
 in the determination of their future condition 
 and relations with other powers.^ 
 
 and : 
 
 The Doctrine promulgated by President Mon- 
 roe has been adhered to by all poHtical parties, 
 and I now deem it proper to assert the equally 
 important principle that hereafter no territory 
 on this continent shall be regarded as subject of 
 transfer to a European power.^ 
 
 We may consider as a corollary of the Monroe 
 Doctrine that no non-American possession in 
 America shall be transferred to any non-Ameri- 
 
 * W. F. Reddaway, opus cit. ^ First annual message, 1869. 
 
 ' Message to Senate, May 31, 1870, relative to Santo Domingo. 
 
72 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 can power. In 1877 Sweden returned the is- 
 land^of St. Barthelemy to France without oppo- 
 sition from the United States. 
 
 In spite of this isolated case, a declaration^ 
 similar to Clay's would certainly be made by the 
 United States, if a feeble European state should 
 cede a colony in the Caribbean Sea to a power- 
 ful one; such cession would be considered by the 
 United States as a danger. This policy, which 
 at first sight seems high-handed, is not unprece- 
 dented; in Europe the great powers would cer- 
 tainly oppose such cessions of territory, in they 
 name of the equilibrium.^ 
 
 President Grant in his annual message of 
 1870 said: ^^The time is not probably far distant 
 when, in the natural course of events, the Euro- 
 pean political connection with this continent 
 will cease," and his secretary of state, in an ac- 
 companying report, remarked that the policy 
 announced by Monroe "looks hopefully to the 
 time when, by the voluntary departure of Euro- 
 pean governments from this continent and the 
 adjacent islands, America shall be wholly 
 American."^ 
 
 That the United States means to be supreme 
 
 * Alvarez, opus ciu 
 
 ^Foreign Relations of the United States, 1870-71, p. 257. 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 73 
 
 among the nations of the Western Hemisphere, 
 with a view to the gradual absorption of the lat- 
 ter, seems to be a postulate of all foreign critics 
 of the Monroe Doctrine. 
 
 It seems unnecessary to repeat [says Manuel 
 Ugarte] that the United States have not enter- 
 tained the idea of assuring our independence as 
 something permanent, but have meant to pre- 
 vent any other power from establishing itself in 
 what they consider as destined sooner or later 
 to be theirs.^ 
 
 Whether the North American peril here re- 
 ferred to be exaggerated or not, exception may 
 be taken to the author's linking it as he does 
 with the Monroe Doctrine. The jingos of the 
 United States can find no justification for an 
 aggressive policy toward Latin-America in the 
 Monroe Doctrine; and the patriots of Latin- 
 America can find none in it for attributing such 
 
 1 Opus cit., p. 136. See also La Doctrina de Monroe, by J. M. 
 Cespedes, Havana, 1893; Les Democraties latines de rAmerique, 
 by Y. G. Calderon, p. 274 et seq. 
 
 " America for the United States. American statesmen, whether 
 Democratic or Republican, have never understood the declara- 
 tion of President Monroe but in this sense." — {Autour de VIsthme 
 de Panama, by Joseph Justin, President of the National School of 
 Law of Port au Prince, p. 28.) To the same effect Das Volker- 
 recht systematisch dargestellt, by Doctor Franz v. Liszt, p. 37, and 
 Ulmperialisme americain, by Henri Hauser, p. 76. 
 
74 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 a policy to the United States. The Monroe 
 Doctrine claims nothing for the United States 
 to the exclusion of other American nations; it 
 pretends to nothing for the United States that 
 it does not concede to every other American 
 nation. If in the Monroe Doctrine the United 
 States arrogates to itself supremacy in the 
 Western Hemisphere, it is only with respect to 
 non-American powers, and with respect to them 
 it wishes every American nation to be supreme. 
 There is nothing in the Monroe Doctrine that 
 makes its provisions a monopoly of the United 
 States. Nothing would suit the United States 
 better than to have every American nation 
 promulgate a similar doctrine for itself. 
 
 Our absorption of a portion of Mexico and our 
 intervention in Colombia are pointed to as evi- 
 dence of land cupidity on the part of the ** Yan- 
 quis." I shall not undertake to justify in every 
 respect the courses taken by the United States 
 in the acquisition of these two additions to its 
 territory; on the contrary, I admit that there is 
 much in them to condemn. I wish only to point 
 out that they were not prompted by lust of con- 
 quest, but were both actuated by specific mo- 
 tives of a different character. 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 75 
 
 Let us unhesitatingly assert [says a Latin- 
 American] that the United States, as a nation, 
 has never confirmed any of these theories of 
 questionable tendencies, either by explicit en- 
 actments of the Congress or by their inclusion in 
 treaties or other documents of official character. 
 The great republic is, therefore, absolutely with- 
 out reproach as regards the projects of hegem- 
 ony which have been attributed to it with more 
 malice than justice.^ 
 
 Mr. Maurice de Waleff'e, in his work Les Pa- 
 radis de VAmerique Centrales asks the question : 
 "Will the United States gobble up Spanish- 
 America?" and answers it in the affirmative. 
 "The Yankee tide," he says, "after having ab- 
 sorbed Mexico, will overflow Venezuela, Colom- 
 bia, Ecuador, and Peru, to stop only before the 
 three substantial states of South America: Bra- 
 zil, Argentina, and Chili. But the wave that 
 will come to beat at their feet will have acquired 
 colossal proportions, and it is doubtful whether 
 they will be able to do more than give it a tem- 
 porary check. By that time — and those of us 
 
 1 Monro'isme, by F. Capella y Pons, Honorary Secretary of the 
 Uruguayan Legation at Berlin. 
 
 As I write these lines, both of the political parties in Mexico, the 
 Ins and the outs, are trying with more or less success to make 
 political capital out of the supposed longing of the United States 
 for more Mexican territory. — ^J. B. 
 
76 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 twenty years of age will live to see it — the 
 United States will be more powerful than all 
 'Europe united." 
 
 If the United States had the sinister designs 
 attributed to it respecting the other nations of 
 America, it would want those nations to remain 
 weak. It would assume the role of their de- 
 fender, and deprecate every attempt on their 
 part to develop their power of self-defence. But 
 what does the history of America show? That 
 the United States has repudiated the role of 
 champion for Latin-American countries, that it 
 welcomes the growth of those countries, their 
 advance in the arts of peace and of war, their 
 confederation, their contriving in any way to 
 strengthen themselves separately and collect- 
 ively. 
 
 The United States is not seeking territory. 
 It is true that its people go into foreign coun- 
 tries, notably Canada, Mexico, and others of 
 Latin-America, and they will probably do so In 
 ever-increasing numbers. This prospect has 
 created among the smaller and weaker countries 
 an apprehension that the Yankees may get con- 
 trol of them, either by force or by the ballot, and 
 bring about their annexation to the United 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 77 
 
 States. The feeling is natural and perhaps not 
 wholly groundless, but it may be said that there 
 is little likelihood of any uprising or revolt 
 on the part of settlers from the United States 
 against a government that gives them the essen- 
 tials of what they get from their own; that af- 
 fords them, by whatever forms and methods, 
 protection in their persons and property. There 
 has never been a case of settlers from the United 
 States revolting against a fairly good govern- 
 ment. In the case of Texas their revolt was 
 against an intolerable military oligarchy.^ To 
 attempt to make United States adventurers, sol- 
 diers of fortune, filibusterers, etc., responsible for 
 revolutions in Latin-American countries is un- 
 reasonable. That class of people only supply a 
 demand, as do the machinery and other products 
 of the United States and of other countries im- 
 ported into Latin-America. They do not cre- 
 ate the demand which they meet. That is the 
 work of the countries to which they go. Mili- 
 tary adventurers would not go to a country any 
 more than sewing-machines would, if there were 
 no use for them there. 
 
 1 Las grandes Mentiras de nuestra Historia, by Francisco Bulnes, 
 p. 261. 
 
78 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 Why should not settlers from the United 
 States do in other countries as settlers from for- 
 eign countries do in the United States, cast their 
 lots irrevocably with the country which they 
 adopt and become as loyal citizens of it as any ? 
 During our Civil War the foreign-born element 
 of our population rendered more military service 
 in proportion to its numbers than the native- 
 born.^ Should Canada ever be afflicted with the 
 scourge of war, she may count upon similar sup- 
 port from her United States subjects. Should 
 the war, by any possibility, be with the United 
 States, it would be for those subjects a civil war. 
 Some of them would probably desert her and 
 some even fight against her, but the majority, 
 assuming that her government continues as ex- 
 cellent as it is to-day, would stand loyally by 
 her. 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine does not protect any 
 American country, not even the United States, 
 against encroachments by another American 
 country. Should any Latin-American country, 
 or combination of such countries, undertake to 
 impose its form of government upon another or 
 
 ^ Das Deutschtum in den Vereinigten Staaten in seiner geschicht- 
 lichen Entzvickelung, by A. B. Faust. 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 79 
 
 seek otherwise to oppress it, or seem by expan- 
 sion to be endangering the integrity of the 
 United States, any prevention that we might 
 undertake would depend for its justification not 
 upon the Monroe Doctrine, but upon the natu- 
 ral right by which the Monroe Doctrine was in- 
 spired and according to which it is interpreted — 
 the right of self-preservation. This right has 
 been recently invoked as the basis of the follow- 
 ing Senate resolution, introduced by Senator 
 Lodge, and passed on the 2d of August, 1912: 
 
 Resolved, that when any harbor pr other 
 place in the American continents is so situated 
 that the occupation thereof for na.val or mili- 
 tary purposes might threaten the communica- 
 tions or the safety of the United States, the gov- 
 ernment of the United States could not see, 
 without grave concern, the possession of such 
 harbor or other place by any corporation or 
 association which has such a relation to another 
 government not American as to give that gov- 
 ernment practical power of control for naval ob 
 military purposes. 
 
 Commenting upon this enactment the sena- 
 tor says: "It rests on a much broader and older 
 ground than the Monroe Doctrine. This reso- 
 lution rests on the generally accepted principle 
 
8o AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 that every nation has a right to protect its own 
 safety; and if it feels that the possession of any 
 given harbor or place is prejudicial to its safety, 
 it is its duty and right to intervene." 
 
 The Lodge resolution was not approved by 
 President Taft. It may seem on this account 
 to have less authority than the Monroe Doc- 
 trine. But the authority that comes of formal 
 approval of such a declaration is of little im- 
 portance. Its real authority can come only as 
 the authority of the Monroe Doctrine has come 
 — from its observance. 
 
 As there is nothing in the Monroe Doctrine 
 that protects the United States from the rest of 
 Latin-America, there is nothing in that doc- 
 trine that protects Latin-America or any part 
 of it from the United States. If the United 
 States should annex Canada, Cuba, Mexico, 
 and all Central America, with or without the 
 consent of those countries, any opposition that 
 might be made by other American countries 
 could be based only on the same natural right of 
 self-protection. 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine does not make us the 
 protector of any American country, except so 
 far as an attempt upon that country may be 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 8i 
 
 a danger or a menace to the United States. 
 Whether or not it is such is to be decided by the 
 United States and to govern its action in each 
 case as it may arise. It was with this idea that, 
 in 1826, during the debate on the Panama Con- 
 gress, James Buchanan introduced and passed 
 in the House of Representatives the following 
 resolution : 
 
 In the opinion of the House the United States 
 ought not to form any alliance with all or any 
 of the South American republics, nor ought they 
 to become parties with them to any joint dec- 
 laration for the purpose of preventing the colo- 
 nization upon the continent of America, but that 
 the people of the United States should be left 
 free to act in any crisis in such manner as their 
 feelings of friendship toward these republics or 
 as their own honor and policy may at the time 
 dictate. 
 
 Manuel Ugarte exhorts his fellow Latin- 
 Americans to guard against the "Yanqui" 
 peril. If this was to be done by developing the 
 resource of Latin-America, the United States 
 could only wish them success; for in securing 
 themselves against the United States they would 
 be making themselves impregnable to Europe. 
 But Mr. Ugarte's idea of security for Latin- 
 
82 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 America is protection by European countries. 
 From these, he says, Latin-America has nothing 
 to fear and everything to hope. Think of it! 
 Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Aus- 
 tria, Italy, those hardened, bristUng, organ- 
 ized embodiments of intervention and conquest, 
 of ruined nationahties, of blasted hopes and 
 blighted aspirations toward liberty and inde- 
 pendence, to be looked to by the feeble, dis- 
 united young republics of Latin-America for 
 protection, and from what? From aggression 
 by their considerate, pacific elder brother. Here 
 is a Latin-American answer to Mr. Ugarte's 
 proposition: 
 
 In July, 1850, Russia, England, and France 
 signed at London a protocol establishing ''the 
 integrity of the Danish monarchy." Not only 
 that; when, in 1864, the question of the duchies 
 entered into the acute stage, the Prince of Wales 
 had already married one of the daughters of 
 Christian IX [of Denmark]. Besides the politi- 
 cal reasons and the treaties, strong family ties 
 weighed in favor of Denmark. So, notwith- 
 standing the evidence and the imminent danger 
 which threatened him. Christian IX appeared 
 unconcerned and was firmly convinced that 
 France would not abandon him and that Eng- 
 land would not let Prussia take possession of 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 83 
 
 the ports of Schleswig. Austria and Prussia, 
 however, threw themselves, for different reasons, 
 upon feeble Denmark. England and France 
 pretended not to know what was going on, and 
 Denmark was despoiled. Schleswig-Holstein 
 was taken from her, and the signers of the Lon- 
 don protocol made no sign of protest. 
 
 Haytians, my brothers, ponder, ponder well 
 this lesson. And remember, above everything, 
 that the great powers of Europe profess the 
 policy of "You scratch me; I scratch you." On 
 many occasions the United States have shown 
 themselves disposed to accord to us at least a 
 strong moral support; and they have always 
 treated us with the greatest courtesy. 
 
 It will be replied, perhaps, that their sympa- 
 thies cover a thousand selfish considerations. 
 Be it so; it is preferable to deal with interested 
 parties who do not lack consideration for us 
 than with friends who constantly maltreat us, 
 while entertaining, no doubt, the same egotistic 
 sentiments which they only know better how to 
 dissimulate. ... In my judgment, if it were 
 imperatively necessary that Hayti should con- 
 clude an alliance, it is, at any rate for the pres- 
 ent,^ not in Europe that it should be sought.^ 
 
 If Europe Is debarred from colonization in 
 America, what interest can it have in the pro- 
 
 1 In 1886. 
 
 2 La Politique exterieure (T Haiti, by J. N. Leger, formerly charge 
 d'affaires of Hayti in Paris. 
 
84 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 tection of Latin-America, except as a foreign 
 market? But considering it as a market, is 
 Europe likely to prefer for it Latin-American 
 control to United States control? If Latin- 
 America does not develop the population and 
 resources necessary to self-protection, the ques- 
 tion will be, not whether the United States or 
 Europe shall protect it, but whether the United 
 States or Europe shall absorb it. To^liis ques- 
 tion the Monroe Doctrine and the Bolivar Idea 
 answer: Let it, then, be the United States. 
 It is a Latin-American who says: 
 
 Nations must trust their destinies to the ef- 
 forts of their own people and strengthen them- 
 selves in the wisdom and probity of the latter. 
 The danger for the states of the South American 
 continent does not come from the North; the 
 real peril will always be the incapacity and dis- 
 order within themselves.^ 
 
 1 Monrotsme^ by F. Capella y Pons, honorary secretary of the 
 Uruguayan Legation at Berlin, pp. 158, 159. 
 
Ill 
 
 CASES UNDER THE MONROE 
 DOCTRINE 
 
 The cardinal policies of Great Britain and the 
 United States — British command of the sea and 
 the Monroe Doctrine — would seem at first blush 
 not likely to conflict, the province of one being 
 the oceans of the world and that of the other 
 the land of one hemisphere. One would think 
 that each of these policies could work itself out 
 on its own element without coming in the way 
 of the other. This might have been the case 
 had man contented himself with the distribu- 
 tion of land and water which nature provided, 
 and this he would perforce have done — so far 
 as we can judge — had there been no such thing 
 as intercontinental isthmuses offering the op- 
 portunity of changing the distribution of land 
 and water in a way to affect the value of each. 
 Great Britain could not without concern see the 
 
 85 
 
 /--/ 
 
86 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 United States secure for itself a shorter route 
 from the middle Atlantic Ocean to British India 
 than she had herself, nor could the United 
 States countenance the occupation and fortifi- 
 cation of American territory by Great Britain 
 to the extent necessary to the construction and 
 protection of an interoceanic railroad or canal. 
 It was destined that these two considerations 
 should contend for mastery wherever the ques- 
 tion of interoceanic communication should come 
 up in the Western Hemisphere. 
 
 Since the first third of the seventeenth century 
 Great Britain entertained a project of taking 
 possession of Nicaragua with the object of pro- 
 viding rapid communication between the At- 
 lantic and Pacific Oceans. The early surveys 
 made with this object in view represented the 
 route as impracticable, and it was not until 
 some two hundred years later that the acquisi- 
 tion of California led the United States to take 
 steps toward the connection of the two oceans, 
 and raised the question whether British or 
 American interests were to be supreme in the 
 American hemisphere. The first two articles 
 of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty answered this 
 question in favor of Great Britain. Article I 
 
CASES UNDER THE MONROE DOCTRINE 87 
 
 declared that neither nation would "ever obtain 
 or maintain for itself any exclusive control over 
 the said ship-canal: agreeing that neither will 
 ever erect or maintain any fortifications com- 
 manding the same or in the vicinity thereof, or 
 occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume or 
 exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa 
 Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Cen- 
 tral America. . . ." Article II said: "Vessels 
 of the United States or Great Britain traversing 
 the said Canal shall, in case of war between the 
 contracting parties, be exempted from block- 
 ade, detention, or capture by either of the bel- 
 ligerents, and this provision shall extend to 
 such a distance from the two ends of the said 
 canal as may hereafter be found expedient to 
 establish." While the treaty was under con- 
 sideration an American statesman wrote :^ 
 
 If Sir Henry Bulwer can succeed in having 
 the first two provisions of this treaty ratified by 
 the Senate, he will deserve a British peerage. 
 . . . The treaty altogether reverses the Mon- 
 roe Doctrine and establishes it against ourselves 
 rather than European governments. . . . To 
 get clear of this treaty will some day cost us a 
 
 ^ Buchanan to McClernand, April 2, May 30, 1850. {American 
 Historical Review, V, 99-101.) 
 
88 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 bloody war with Great Britain, should she re- 
 main as powerful as she is at present. 
 
 Sir Henry got his peerage. There has been 
 no bloody war over the treaty, but the time 
 has not yet come for saying that it has been 
 averted. A bloodless one, with occasional 
 truces, has been going on ever since the treaty 
 was enacted. One of our secretaries of state 
 wrote to our minister in London : 
 
 As an original proposition, this government 
 would not admit that Great Britain and the 
 United States should be put on the same basis, 
 even negatively, with respect to territorial ac- 
 quisitions on the American continent, and would 
 be unwilling to establish such a precedent with- 
 out full explanation.^ 
 
 Each party to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty 
 engaged "to invite every state with which both 
 or either have friendly intercourse to enter into 
 stipulations similar to those which they have 
 entered into with each other."^ 
 
 ^ Blaine to Lowell, November 19, 188 1. 
 
 2 "The attitude assumed on this occasion by the American sec- 
 retary of state," says a Senate committee on foreign relations, 
 "was so strangely inconsistent alike with the Interests and with 
 the dignity of the United States that it is Impossible for the com- 
 mittee to advert to it without pain. 
 
 "Mr. Clayton weakly sought to induce Great Britain to 
 
CASES UNDER THE MONROE DOCTRINE 89 
 
 It was in the condemnation of this transac- 
 tion that Senator Stephen A. Douglas made his 
 reputation as an orator. In the following pas- 
 sages from his speeches one may catch some of 
 the eloquence with which he moved his grave 
 colleagues of the Senate and won the heart of 
 Young America. The reference in his first few 
 words is to the opportunity, renounced by Sec- 
 retary Clayton, of having an exclusively Ameri- 
 can canal. 
 
 When Nicaragua desired to confer the priv- 
 ilege, and when we were willing to accept it, it 
 was purely an American question, with which 
 England had no right to interfere. It was an 
 American question about which Europe had no 
 right to be consulted. Are we under any more 
 obligation to consult European powers about an 
 American question than the allied powers were, 
 in their Congress, to consult us, when establish- 
 ing the equilibrium of Europe by the agency of 
 the Holy AUiance. . . . England not consent! 
 She will acquiesce in your doing what you may 
 deem right so long as you consent to allow her to 
 hold Canada, the Bermudas, Jamaica, and her 
 other American possessions. . . . 
 
 abandon her own unfounded claims on the territory of an inde- 
 pendent Spanish-American state by inviting her to share with us 
 the duty and privilege, peculiarly our own, of protecting an inter- 
 oceanic communication of infinite interest and concern to this 
 country." 
 
90 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 I was unwilling to enter into a treaty stipula- 
 tion with any European power in respect to this 
 continent, that we would not do in the future 
 whatever our duty, interest, honor, and safety 
 might require in the course of events. I am 
 not prepared to prescribe limits to the area 
 over which democratic principles may safely 
 spread. ... 
 
 You may make as many treaties as you please 
 to fetter the limits of this giant republic, and 
 she will burst them all from her, and her course 
 will be onward to a limit which I will not venture 
 to prescribe. Why the necessity of pledging 
 your faith that you will never annex any more of 
 Mexico? Do you not know that you will be 
 compelled to do it, that you cannot help it; 
 that your treaty will not prevent it, and that 
 the only effect it will have will be to enable 
 European powers to accuse us of bad faith when 
 the act is done, and associate American faith 
 and Punic faith as synonymous terms? What 
 is the use of your guarantee that you will never 
 erect any fortifications in Central America, 
 never annex, occupy, or colonize any portion of 
 that country? How do you know that you can 
 avoid doing it? If you make the canal, I ask 
 you if American citizens will not settle along its 
 line; whether they will not build up towns at 
 each terminus; whether they will not spread 
 over that country and convert it into an Ameri- 
 can state; whether American principles and 
 American institutions will not be firmly planted 
 there? And I ask you how many years you 
 
CASES UNDER THE MONROE DOCTRINE 91 
 
 think will pass away before you will find thesame 
 necessity to extend your laws over your own 
 kindred that you found in the case of Texas? 
 . . . Jamaica at present commands the en- 
 trance of the [projected] canal; and all that 
 Great Britain desired was, inasmuch as she had 
 possession of the only place commanding the 
 canal, to procure a stipulation that no other 
 power would erect a fortification near its ter- 
 minus. That stipulation is equivalent to an 
 agreement that England may fortify, but that 
 we never shall. . . . 
 
 Douglas related the following conversation 
 between himself and Sir Henry Bulwer: 
 
 He [Sir Henry] took occasion to remonstrate 
 with me that my position with regard to the 
 treaty was unjust and untenable, that the treaty 
 was fair because it was reciprocal — because it 
 pledged that neither Great Britain nor the 
 United States should ever purchase, colonize, or 
 acquire any territory in Central America. 
 
 I told him it would be fair if they would add 
 one word to the treaty so that it would read 
 that neither Great Britain nor the United 
 States should ever occupy or hold dominion over 
 Central America or Asia, ^^But," answered he, 
 "you have no interest in Asia." "No," an- 
 swered I, "and you have none in Central 
 America." 
 
 "But," said he, "you can never establish any 
 rights in Asia." "]N[o," said I, "and we don't 
 
92 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 mean that you shall ever establish any in 
 America."^ 
 
 An agreement to which there is but one party 
 can be violated only by that party. The United 
 States being the only party to the Monroe Doc- 
 trine, the only nation that can violate the 
 Monroe Doctrine is the United States. It com- 
 mitted such violation in ratifying the Clayton- 
 Bulwer Treaty: 
 
 This treaty is the only instance in which the 
 United States has consented to join with any 
 European power in the management of political 
 interests in the Western Hemisphere; and the 
 treaty is remarkable not only because it is a 
 departure from the settled policy of the United 
 States not to sanction any European interfer- 
 ence in the affairs of America, but because de- 
 viating in this way from our settled system, it 
 undertakes, in concert with a foreign power, to 
 determine a question the most important to the 
 United States that can arise outside of our own 
 territory.^ 
 
 When after our Civil War the United States 
 sought to establish coaling stations for its navy, 
 it found itself debarred by the Clayton-Bulwer 
 
 1 Stephen A. Douglas, by C. E. Carr, p. 36. 
 
 2 Wharton's Int. Dig., p. 168. 
 
CASES UNDER THE MONROE DOCTRINE 93 
 
 Treaty from acquiring such positions in Central 
 America. Our secretary of state wrote to our 
 minister in London suggesting a waiver by Great 
 Britain of her rights in this respect: 
 
 It is becoming more and more certain every 
 day that not only naval warfare in the future 
 but also all navigation of war vessels in time of 
 peace must be by steam. This necessity will 
 occasion little or no inconvenience to the prin- 
 cipal maritime powers of Europe, and especially 
 to Great Britain, as these powers have posses- 
 sions in various parts of the globe where they 
 can have stores of coal and provisions for the 
 use of their vessels. We are differently situ- 
 ated. We have no possession beyond the lim- 
 its of the United States. Foreign colonization 
 has never been favored by statesmen in this 
 country, either on general grounds or as in har- 
 mony with our peculiar condition. There is no 
 change or likely to be any in this respect. It is 
 indispensable for us, however, to have coaling 
 stations under our own flag for naval observa- 
 tion and police and for defensive war, as well as 
 for the protection of our widely spread commerce 
 when we are at peace ourselves. . . . Under 
 these circumstances you will sound Lord Claren- 
 don as to the disposition of his government to 
 favor us in acquiring coaling stations in Central 
 America, notwithstanding the stipulation con- 
 tained in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.^ 
 
 ^ Seward to Adams, April 25, 1866. 
 
94 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 Whatever propositions were made to Lord 
 Clarendon, they met with no response. Out- 
 side of the Panama Canal zone, the United 
 
 ^« States has not to this day a coaling station in 
 Central America. It made repeated attempts 
 to secure one in the Island of Hayti, but was 
 thwarted principally by Great Britain. That 
 it succeeded, by the Spanish-American War, in 
 securing one in Cuba and others in the Philip- 
 pines is due to Germany, whose naval develop- 
 ment determined Great Britain to cultivate 
 friendly relations with the United States. 
 
 When it developed that the expedition sent 
 by Napoleon III to Mexico had for its object 
 
 ^ the forcible substitution of a monarchical for a 
 republican form of government, the United 
 States expressed to France the belief that the 
 undertaking would be defeated by the Mexicans 
 themselves, but let it be undierstood that if it 
 were not, Mexico would; be assisted in defeating 
 it by the United States, Our government re- 
 fused to recognize the imperial usurper Maximil- 
 ian; recognized the republican executive Juarez, 
 and gave his patriot^^ollowers financial as well 
 as moral support. ^^'^Piis proved sufficient to 
 cause the withdrawal of the French troops. 
 
CASES UNDER THE MONROE DOCTRINE 95 
 
 Maximilian refused to abdicate and depart with 
 the latter. As a consequence, his illegitimate 
 Franco-Austro-Papal government was over- 
 thrown and he and two of his generals were cap- 
 tured and executed. 
 
 Upon the outbreak of our Civil War, the sym- 
 pathy developed abroad for the insurgents had 
 made it politic for the United States to respect 
 the general dislike of European governments for 
 the Monroe Doctrine. So, in our negotiations 
 with France looking to the withdrawal of the 
 French forces, care was taken not to mention it. 
 
 In 1862 Colombia (then New Granada), by 
 virtue of a treaty ratified in 1848, solicited the 
 intervention of the United States to establish 
 order on the Isthmus of Panama. Secretary 
 Seward's action thereupon was remarkably at 
 variance with the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine 
 and the ideas of Jefferson, Adams, Webster, 
 Douglas, and other expounders and supporters 
 of it. He wrote to our minister in London: 
 
 This government has no interest in the matter 
 different from that of other maritime powers. 
 It is willing to interpose its aid in execution of 
 its treaty with New Granada and for the benefit 
 of all nations. But if it should do so it would 
 incur . . . danger of misapprehension of its ob- 
 
96 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 jects by other maritime powers if it should act 
 without previous consultation with them. . . . 
 
 The points to be remembered are: 
 
 First, — Whether any proceeding in the mat- 
 ter shall be adopted by the United States with 
 the assent and acquiescence of the British and 
 French governments. 
 
 Secondly, — Whether these governments will 
 unite with the United States in guaranteeing the 
 safety of the transit and the authority of the 
 Granadian Confederation or either of these ob- 
 jects, and the form and manner in which the 
 parties shall carry out such agreement. 
 
 I need hardly say that this government is not 
 less anxious to avoid any such independent or 
 hasty action in that matter as would seem to 
 indicate a desire for exclusive or especial ad- 
 vantages in New Granada than the British Gov- 
 ernment can be that we shall abstain from such 
 
 The proposals thus made were a double viola- 
 tion of the Monroe Doctrine: 
 
 1. In subjecting the course of the United 
 States in this purely American matter to the 
 censorship of European powers. 
 
 2. In inviting the intervention of European 
 powers in the internal affairs of an American 
 nation. 
 
 Mexico, being herself at this time a victim of 
 
 ^ Seward to Adams, July ii, 1862. 
 
CASES UNDER THE MONROE DOCTRINp 97 
 
 European interference, was particularly con- 
 cerned about the latter and protested against 
 it.^ In a brief, not to say curt, reply Secretary 
 Seward stated that his proposals to France and 
 Great Britain had been misunderstood.^ He 
 did not and could not suggest any understand- 
 ing of them that did not include an invitation for 
 France and Great Britain to unite with the 
 United States in guaranteeing "the authority of 
 the Granadian Confederation." His reply was 
 an indirect, evasive acknowledgment of the pro- 
 priety of the Mexican protest. 
 
 Adams replied for Great Britain that the con- 
 tingency for intervention had not yet arisen, 
 the free transit across the isthmus not being 
 threatened; but that if it were, "the British 
 Government would readily co-operate with the 
 United States in the measures that might be 
 thought necessary to make good the privileges 
 secured by the guarantee." Dayton replied that 
 De Thouvenel "would not think it improper for 
 the United States to interfere." 
 
 Seward made no protest when, in 1862, the 
 settlement of Belize was erected into the Crown 
 
 ' Romero to Seward, March 19, 1863. 
 2 Seward to Romero, March 20, 1863. 
 
98 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 Colony of British Honduras in violarion of the 
 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty as well as in contra- 
 vention of the Monroe Doctrine. The em- 
 barrassments of the United States at home and 
 abroad incidental to the Civil War may justify 
 or excuse these instances of apparent indiffer- 
 ence to the Monroe Doctrine. 
 / In 1871 the independent republic of Santo Do- 
 mingo negotiated with Spain to return of its own 
 /^ (^ccord under that country's dominion; the United 
 States protested and Spain renounced the plan. 
 ^ The Monroe Doctrine was contravened by 
 Great Britain and violated by the United States 
 when these two nations concluded the Hay- 
 Pauncefote Treaty inhibiting the United States 
 from closing the Panama Canal to vessels of a 
 nation at war with the United States and mak- 
 ing the United States responsible to Great 
 Britain for its treatment of other nations than 
 Great Britain. 
 
 Nature and the Panama Canal have given to 
 America the inside line to the Orient; Great 
 Britain says that she shall not have it. In the 
 Hay-Pauncefote Treaty she denies to the United 
 States the right to close the Panama Canal. 
 Since the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine 
 
CASES UNDER THE MONROE DOCTRINE 99 
 
 most pf the islands in the Pacific Ocean and 
 within the Western Hemisphere have been an- 
 nexed by European powers or transferred from 
 one suchjpower to ^nntVipr Thus Great Brit- 
 ain colonized N ew Zealand in 184 0, the Fiji 
 Isla nds in 187 4-, and t he Solomon Is lands in 
 1885. The first two groups are wholly, the lat- 
 ter partly, in the Western Hemisphere. 
 
 The Falkland Islands 
 
 Whether the British colonization of the Falk- 
 land Islands contravened the Monroe Doctrine 
 depends upon when it took place. If b efore th e 
 de clara tion_of the Monroe Doctrine,itwas-san€— 
 tioned by it; if after that, it was prohibj ted_by it. 
 
 The original discovery of the islands is com- 
 monly ascribed to an Eng lish navigato r, John 
 Davis, who was driven upon them by a storm in 
 1592, but there is conclusive evidence to prove 
 that they were discovered long before that time, 
 no one knows by whom.^ 
 
 They were first explored in 1690 by an Eng- 
 lishman, John Strong. 
 
 In 1748 Great Britain gave indication of 
 coveting the islands and fitted out an expedi- 
 
 1 The Voyages and Works of John Davis, by A. H. Markham, 
 p. 108 n. 
 
loo AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 tion ostensibly for their exploration. Spain 
 objected to the enterprise as unfriendly to her 
 and it was abandoned.^ 
 
 The first government to take possession of the 
 islands or establish a settlement upon them was 
 that of France, which did both in 1764, giving 
 to the settlement the name of Port Louis. The 
 expedition was commanded by Captain L. A. 
 de Bougainville. Until this time the islands 
 had been uninhabited.^ 
 
 A year later, in 1765, England, not knowing 
 or pretending not to know of the French settle- 
 
 ^ Thoughts on the late Transactions respecting Falkland's Islands, 
 by Samuel Johnson. 
 
 2 The French commander built a fort and within it erected an 
 obelisk, a face of which bore an effigy of Louis XV, King of France. 
 Under this monument were buried some coin and a medallion, on 
 one side of which was engraved the date of the enterprise and on 
 the other the face of the King with the words, Tibi serviat ultima 
 Thule and the legend: Etablissement des Isles Malouines situees 
 au 50 deg, 30 min. de lat. aust., et 60 deg. 50 min. de long, occid. 
 merid. de Paris, par la fregate L'Aigle, Capitaine P. Duclos Guyot, 
 Capitaine de Brulot, et la corvette le Sphinx, Capit. F. Chenard de 
 La Giraudais, Lieut, de Fregate, armees par Louis-Antoine de 
 Bougainville, Colonel d'lnfanterie, Capitaine de Vaisseau, chef de 
 I'expeditlon, G. de NervIUe, Capitaine d'lnfanterie, et P. d'Arbou- 
 lln, Adminlstrateur General des Postes de France; construction 
 d'un fort et d'un obelisque decore d'un medallion de sa Majeste 
 Louis XV, sur les plans d'A. L'Huillier, Ingen. Geogr. des Camps 
 et Armees, servant dans I'expeditlon, sous le ministere d'E. de 
 Choiseul, Due de Stalnvllle, en Fevrier 1764. Conamur tenues 
 Grandia. {Voyage autour du Monde par la Fregate du Roi la 
 BOUDEUSE et la FlUte l'etoile en 1766, 1767, 1768, 1769, by 
 [L. A.] de Bougainville, 1771, p. 51.) 
 
CASES UNDER THE MONROE DOCtklNE loi 
 
 ment, formally appropriated the islands in the 
 name of the King of England, but without es- 
 tablishing any settlement. The point at which 
 the ceremony of appropriation took place, 
 already named by the French Port de la Croi- 
 sade, was given the name of Port Egmont. The 
 British commander was Commodore Byron. 
 
 In 1766 the first English settlement in the 
 islands was founded at Port Egmont. In De- 
 cember of the same year the commander of this 
 expedition, Captain MacBride, came upon the 
 French establishment at Port Saint Louis and 
 claimed the islands as possessions of Great 
 Britain. He threatened to force a landing, but 
 made no attempt to do so. 
 
 In 1767 Spain, jealous of France, claimed the 
 islands as a dependency of the continent, which 
 acknowledged her sovereignty. France recog- 
 nized, at least ostensibly, the justice of this 
 claim and surrendered the islands to Spain. 
 The latter paid no attention to England, the 
 presence of whose settlement at Port Egmont 
 she must at least have suspected. 
 
 In 1769 a Spanish vessel sailing out from 
 Port Louis came upon an English vessel coming 
 from Port Egmont. Great was the surprise on 
 
I02 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 both sides to learn that the two settlements had 
 for a number of years been neighbors, as it 
 were, without knowing it. Each party was in- 
 censed that an enemy had established himself 
 almost in the same locality with it. The Brit- 
 ish commander, Captain Hunt, ordered the 
 Spaniard to depart. The Spaniard made an 
 appearance of obeying, but two days later came 
 back with a message from the Spanish governor 
 complaining of the action of Captain Hunt. In 
 another letter, sent at the same time, he sup- 
 posed the British to be there only by accident 
 and to be ready to depart at the first warning. 
 In reply. Captain Hunt warned the Spaniards 
 from the island, claiming them in the name of 
 his King as belonging to the English by right 
 of the first discovery and the first settlement. 
 Correspondence ensued in which the Spanish 
 governor formally warned the captain "to leave 
 Port Egmont and to forbear the navigation of 
 the seas without permission from the King of 
 Spain." The captain repeated his former claim, 
 declared that his orders were to keep possession, 
 and once more warned the Spaniards to depart.^ 
 
 ^ Thoughts on the late Transactions respecting Falkland's Islands, 
 by Samuel Johnson. 
 
CASES UNDER THE MONROE DOCTRINE 103 
 
 In 1770 the British settlement at Port Eg- 
 mont was expelled from the islands by a Span- 
 ish force from Buenos Ayres. 
 
 In 1 77 1 the settlement thus expelled was re- 
 established in accordance with the following 
 declarations : 
 
 By Spain^ 
 
 London, January 22, 1771. 
 His Britannic Majesty having complained of 
 the violence done on the loth of June of the 
 year 1770, to the island commonly known as 
 the Great Malouine, and by the English as the 
 Falkland Island, in compelling by force the 
 commander and the subjects of his Britannic 
 Majesty to evacuate the port by them called 
 Egmont, a measure offensive to the honor of 
 his crown . . . his Catholic Majesty disavows 
 the forementioned act of violence and . . . 
 pledges itself to give immediate orders that 
 things in the Great Malouine, at the port called 
 Egmont, be replaced precisely as they were be- 
 fore the loth of June, 1770 . . . the pledge of 
 his Catholic Majesty to restore to his Britannic 
 Majesty the possession of the Fort and Port 
 called Egmont can and shall in no way affect 
 the question of previous right of sovereignty in 
 the Malouine, otherwise called Falkland Is- 
 land. . . . 
 
 ^ Translated from the French. 
 
I04 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 By Great Britain^ 
 
 London, January 22, 1771. 
 . . . His Britannic Majesty . . . will regard 
 the said declaration [of his Catholic Majesty's 
 plenipotentiary] accompanied by the entire ful- 
 filment of the said pledge on the part of his 
 Catholic Majesty, as satisfaction for the injury 
 done to the Crown of Great Britain.^ 
 
 In 1774 the English settlement at Port Eg-* 
 mont was withdrawn voluntarily. But British 
 colors were left flying and, on a fort, a leaden 
 tablet bearing the following inscription:^ 
 
 This is to certify to all nations that the Falk- 
 land Islands, as well as this fort, the store- 
 houses, wharfs, harbors, bays and creeks, which 
 pertain to it, belong of right only to his Most 
 Sacred Majesty George III, King of Great 
 Britain, France, and Ireland, defender of the 
 Faith, etc. In faith of which this tablet has 
 
 1 Translated from the French. 
 
 ^ It was in criticism of this pacific reconciliation, instead of a 
 declaration of war for the vindication of British honor, that Junius 
 produced the gem of English diction by which he lives in the mem- 
 ories of students of rhetoric: 
 
 "The King's honor is that of his people. Their real honor and 
 real interest are the same." . . . "Private credit is wealth; — 
 public honor is security. — The feather that adorns the royal bird 
 supports his flight. Strip him of his plumage and you fix him to 
 the earth." — (Junius, Letter XXXVI.) 
 
 3 Translated from the French. 
 
CASES UNDER THE MONROE DOCTRINE 105 
 
 been fixed and the flags of his Britannic Maj- 
 esty unfurled and raised, as a sign of possession. 
 Samuel William Clayton, 
 Commanding the Falkland Islands, 
 May 22, 1774. 
 
 About 1 8 10 the Spanish settlement and gar- 
 rison at Port Louis were withdrawn and the 
 islands again left uninhabited. 
 
 On the 9th of July, 18 16, the Argentine Re- 
 public declared itself independent of Spain. 
 
 In 1820 it took formal possession of the Falk- 
 land Islands, but domestic difficulties prevented 
 its establishing any colony or settlement in them. 
 
 In 1 82 1 the Argentine Government issued a 
 decree for the encouragement of fishery on the 
 coast of Patagonia, including the Falkland 
 Islands, and regulating the formation of settle- 
 ments thereon. 
 
 When the Monroe Doctrine was declared in 
 1823 unsuccessful attempts were being made in 
 Argentina to establish a settlement on the Falk- 
 land Islands. The principal mover therein was 
 one Louis Vernet. 
 
 In 1828 a settlement was started and Louis 
 Vernet appointed by the Argentine Government 
 as its director. 
 
io6 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 In 1829, at the suggestion of Vernet, and with 
 a view principally to the exclusion of foreign 
 fishermen from the waters of the islands, the 
 Argentine Republic issued a decree providing 
 for the appointment of a governor for the 
 islands.^ Great Britain protested against such 
 action.^ No answer was made to her com- 
 munication and Vernet was appointed governor. 
 The settlement thus became a colony. 
 
 ^ Art. I. — ^The Islands of Malouines and those adjacent to Cape 
 Horn in the Atlantic Ocean shall be under the command of a 
 political and military governor to be appointed immediately by 
 the government of the Republic. 
 
 Art. II. — ^The political and military governor shall reside in the 
 island of Soledad, on which a battery shall be erected under the 
 flag of the Republic. 
 
 Art. III. — ^The political and military governor shall cause the 
 laws of the Republic to be observed by the inhabitants of the said 
 Islands and provide for the perforniance of the regulations respect- 
 ing seal fishery on the coasts. 
 
 Art. IV. — Let this be made public. 
 
 ROD.RIGUEZ, 
 
 Salvador Mana de Carril. 
 2 Making the following allegations : 
 
 1. That the authority which that government [Argentina] had 
 thus assumed was considered by the British Government as in- 
 compatible with the sovereign rights of Great Britain over the 
 Falkland Islands. 
 
 2. That those sovereign rights, which were founded upon the 
 original discovery and subsequent occupation of those islands, 
 had acquired an additional sanction from the fact that his Cath- 
 olic Majesty had restored the British settlement, which had been 
 forcibly taken possession of by a Spanish force in the year 1771. 
 
 3. That the withdrawal of his Majesty's forces from the Falk- 
 
CASES UNDER THE MONROE DOCIRINE 107 
 
 In 1 83 1 three United States fishing schooners 
 were seized by Vernet for violation of the fish- 
 ing regulations. 
 
 In 1833, the United States and Argentina not 
 having settled their dispute, Great Britain re- 
 occupied the islands, reasserting her claims to 
 sovereign control of them. She has been in 
 possession of them ever since. Spain had taken 
 them from France to prevent France from hav- 
 ing them. Great Britain took them with the 
 double object of preventing the United States 
 from having them and of making more or less 
 use of them as a depot of supply and repair for 
 vessels rounding Cape Horn. 
 
 Upon the British reoccupation in 1833 the 
 sovereignty became a subject of dispute be- 
 tween Great Britain and Argentina. The right 
 of neither was perfect. Great Britain may be 
 credited with the original exploration of the 
 
 land Islands, in 1774, could not invalidate the just rights of Great 
 Britain, because that withdrawal took place only in pursuance of 
 the system of retrenchment adopted at that time by his Majesty's 
 government. 
 
 4. That the marks and signals of possession and of property 
 left upon the islands, the British flag still "flying" and all other 
 formalities observed, upon the occasion of the departure of the 
 governor were calculated not only to assert the rights of owner- 
 ship, but to indicate the intention of resuming the territory at 
 some future period. (Palmerston to Moreno, January 8, 1834.) 
 
io8 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 islands. Beyond that she had no right in them 
 but that of spoUation. The first power to ap- 
 propriate the islands and the first to establish a 
 settlement on them was France. From her 
 they passed by cession to Spain. Argentina 
 had held them by right of revolution, or for- 
 cible expropriation, from Spain. Neither Great 
 Britain nor Argentina had, by treaty or other- 
 wise, any cession from Spain. This was a case 
 for arbitration. It was decided by an act of 
 war, and may, therefore, be considered as a con- 
 travention of the Monroe Doctrine. Out of 
 respect for British battle-ships, or in considera- 
 tion of the remoteness of the Falkland Islands 
 from the United States, or from both of these 
 motives, the United States has not seen fit to 
 press the Monroe Doctrine with respect to this 
 bit of American territory. 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine was contravened by 
 Great Britain when she assumed dominion over 
 the Mosauito Coast and when she made a 
 British dependency of the Bay Islands also in 
 the following cases: 
 
 I . When, in returning the Bay Islands to Hon- 
 duras, in 1859, she bound that republic, by the 
 treaty of transfer, not to cede those islands, "or 
 
CASES UNDER THE MONROE DOCTRINE 109 
 
 any of them, or the right of sovereignty, to any 
 nation or state whatsoever." 
 
 2. When, in transferring the Mosquito coun- 
 try to Nicaragua, in i860, she stipulated in the 
 treaty of transfer that the district assigned to 
 the Mosquito Indians "may not be ceded by 
 them to any foreign person or state, but shall be 
 and remain under the sovereignty of the Re- 
 public of Nicaragua." 
 
 The United States sought to free itself from 
 the objectionable restrictions imposed upon 
 them as partners of Great Britain in Central 
 America by proposing the abrogation of the 
 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. Great Britain replied 
 by threatening that if the treaty were abro- 
 gated she would contravene the Monroe Doc- 
 trine at her discretion.^ 
 
 This threat was repeated when, in 1882, 
 Secretary FreUnghuysen sought through Lord 
 Granville to effect the abrogation of the treaty.^ 
 
 ^ . . . From the abrogation of that compact, if It should take , 
 place, they [her Majesty's government] will hold themselves free C ■ . * 
 to act In regard to Central America In the manner most conducive \ i' 
 to the advancement of British Interests. (Malmesbury to Napier, Cj ' 
 April 8, 1858.) 
 
 2 Granville to West, January 14, 1882. 
 
no AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 The Venezuela Boundary Controversy 
 
 A series of encroachments by Great Britain 
 upon the territory of Venezuela, by pushing out 
 the boundary Hne of British Guiana, was pro- 
 nounced by President Cleveland in a message 
 to Congress, December 17, 1895, ^^ be a vio- 
 lation of the Monroe Doctrine; the British Gov- 
 ernment was informed through our minister at 
 London that if the boundary line was not lo- 
 cated by arbitration it would be determined, 
 so far as the United States was concerned, by a 
 commission appointed by the President. This 
 vigorous measure was criticised in Great Brit- 
 ain as "shirt-sleeve diplomacy" and was not 
 universally approved in the United States. Re- 
 ferring to it a United States senator said: 
 
 I cannot for a moment reconcile to any Amer- 
 ican precedent or to any principle of interna- 
 tional law the proposition that in an honest dis- 
 pute over a boundary Hne between a South 
 American and a foreign state that [sic] we had a 
 right to dictate the method of adjustment and, 
 by the menace of war, compel submission to our 
 terms, or that the Monroe Doctrine ever con- 
 templated such an interference on our part.^ 
 
 ^ Speech of the late Senator Rayner of Maryland. The italics 
 are mine. For American disapproval, see also Henderson's 
 
CASES UNDER THE MONROE DOCTRINE iii 
 
 If the case had been, as the senator says, "an 
 honest dispute over a boundary line," the 
 United States would not have taken it up. As 
 long as it could be considered as such and per- 
 haps longer, the United States abstained from 
 every form of interference with it. The true 
 character of the dispute may be judged from a 
 general consideration of its origin and final 
 settlement. 
 
 The whole region in controversy^ belonged 
 originally to Spain by right of discovery. It 
 was subsequently transferred in part to Hol- 
 land. Great Britain succeeded to the rights of 
 Holland in 1814 and Venezuela to the rights of 
 Spain when Venezuela seceded from Colombia, 
 in 1830. The boundary line between the Dutch 
 and Spanish, and consequently between the 
 British and Venezuelan territories, had not been 
 defined, and in 1 841 trouble over it began. An 
 English engineer named Schomburgk planted 
 posts and other marks of dominion on what the 
 Venezuelans considered as their territory. Ven- 
 
 American Diplomatic Questions, p. 443 et seq. This work gives 
 the substance of President Cleveland's message and of the corre- 
 spondence between the governments of Great Britain and the 
 United States. (P. 411 et seq.). 
 ^ See map at end of volume. 
 
112 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 ezuela protested and the British Government 
 ordered the marks removed. In 1844 boundary- 
 negotiations were opened in England. Ven- 
 ezuela proposed the Essequibo River and Great 
 Britain a line through the Moroco River — Lord 
 Aberdeen's line. Venezuela declined the Brit- 
 ish proposition. In 1850 it was agreed between 
 the two parties that neither should order or 
 sanction any occupation of the territory in dis- 
 pute. There the matter rested until 1878, when 
 Venezuela again opened negotiations and of- 
 fered to accept Lord Aberdeen's line. Great 
 Britain declined this offer and proposed a new 
 line which took in a large piece of additional ter- 
 ritory on the coast, but followed the Aberdeen 
 line in the interior. This proposition was de- 
 clined. In 1 88 1 Great Britain advanced her 
 line on the coast a distance of twenty-nine miles 
 toward the mouth of the Orinoco. A British 
 man-of-war appeared there with telegraph-posts 
 and wire. Venezuela protested and invoked 
 the assistance of the United States. In 1884 she 
 again opened negotiations with Great Britain, 
 but a change ensued in the British ministry, 
 and arbitration, which had been contemplated 
 by it, was rejected. Again, in 1886, Venezuela 
 
CASES UNDER THE MONROE DOCTRINE 113 
 
 opened negotiations. Great Britain proposed 
 a new line not so far west as thgt of 1878, but 
 coupled with it a demand for the free navi- 
 gation of the Orinoco River, which Venezuela 
 rejected. In 1887 Venezuela tried to arrange 
 again for arbitration, but in vain, and mean- 
 time Great Britain took possession of a large 
 tract of territory in the interior, to which she 
 had no valid claim. Unable to procure arbi- 
 tration, Venezuela severed her diplomatic rela- 
 tions with Great Britain, but continued her en- 
 deavors to negotiate with her. Great Britain 
 went on seizing territory. In 1889 she took pos- 
 session of the main mouth of the Orinoco and 
 declared Barima a British port. In 1890 she 
 refused to accept arbitration as to anything east 
 of an arbitrary line drawn by herself and put for- 
 ward a new pretension over territory beyond 
 that line, to which no claim had ever been made 
 before. In 1893 Lord Rosebery proposed a line 
 going far to the west of one which he had him- 
 self formerly proposed. 
 
 It is this land-grabbing at the expense of a 
 weaker power that a United States senator re- 
 ferred to as "an honest dispute over a boundary 
 line.'' The contention of the senator, if sus- 
 
114 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 tained, would establish the principle that a 
 European power who has any territory in the 
 Western Hemisphere may acquire any amount 
 more, if it can only make out for itself a case of 
 boundary dispute; and it was on the occasion of 
 a boundary dispute that the Monroe Doctrine 
 was originally enunciated. But let us note how 
 another United States senator expressed him- 
 self on this question when it was a live issue be- 
 tween Great Britain and the United States.^ 
 Henry Cabot Lodge said : 
 
 England's motives in her Venezuelan move- 
 ments are, of course, entirely honorable and 
 disinterested, because England herself admits 
 freely on all occasions that these are her charac- 
 teristic qualities in dealing with other nations. 
 It is easy also to appreciate England's natural 
 and strong resentment toward a country she 
 had injured as much as she has injured Ven- 
 ezuela. But, at the same time, let England's 
 motives or feelings be what they may, we are 
 concerned for the interests of the United States. 
 The practical result of England's aggressions in 
 Venezuela is plain enough. They are all di- 
 rected to securing the control of the Orinoco, the 
 great river system of northern South Amer- 
 ica, and also of the rich mining district of 
 
 ^ North American Review, June, 1 895, on which I have drawn for 
 the foregoing narrative. 
 
CASES UNDER THE MONROE DOCTRINE 115 
 
 the Yuruari. All that England has done has 
 been a direct violation of the Monroe Doctrine, 
 and she has increased and quickened her ag- 
 gressions in proportion as the United States 
 have appeared indifferent. The time has come 
 for decisive action. The United States must 
 either maintain the Monroe Doctrine and treat 
 its infringement as an act of hostility or abandon 
 it. If Great Britain is to be permitted to occupy 
 the ports of Nicaragua and still worse take the 
 territory of Venezuela, there is nothing to pre- 
 vent her taking the whole of Venezuela or any 
 other South American state. If Great Britain 
 can do this with impunity, France and Germany 
 will do it also. These powers have already 
 seized the islands of the Pacific and parcelled 
 out Africa. Great Britain cannot extend her 
 possessions in the East. She has pretty nearly 
 reached the limit of what can be secured in 
 Africa. She is now turning her attention to 
 South America. If the United States are pre- 
 pared to see South America pass gradually into 
 the hands of Great Britain and other European 
 powers and to be hemmed in by British naval 
 posts and European dependencies, there is, of 
 course, nothing more to be said. But the Amer- 
 ican people are not ready to abandon the Mon- 
 roe Doctrine. . . . They are not now and never 
 will be willing to have South America and the 
 islands adjacent to the United States seized by 
 European powers. ... It is not too late to 
 peacefully but firmly put an end to these terri- 
 torial aggressions of Great Britain and to en- 
 
ii6 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 force the Monroe Doctrine so that no other 
 power will be disposed to infringe upon it. . . . 
 
 In the controversies over the Clayton-Bulwer 
 Treaty and the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, Great 
 Britain and the United States have acted virtu- 
 ally from the same principle or motive — the right 
 or desire to protect their possessions; each na- 
 tion was on the defensive, Great Britain with 
 respect to India and the United States with 
 respect to its own territory. In this Venezuela 
 controversy the situation was essentially differ- 
 ent. Great Britain was not simply protecting 
 her actual interests, but was endeavoring to en- 
 large them, to increase her possessions in the 
 Western Hemisphere; her attitude, ostensibly 
 defensive, was fundamentally aggressive. Isth- 
 mian canal controversies may be considered as 
 unavoidable; this boundary controversy was of 
 Great Britain's deliberate seeking. 
 J To prevent a settlement of it by the United 
 r States or a war with the United States, Great 
 \ Britain agreed with Venezuela upon arbitration. 
 I Pursuant to a treaty between these powers con- 
 \ eluded at Washington in 1907, a joint commis- 
 ( sion of arbitration was appointed with the fol- 
 \ lowing membership: 
 
CASES UNDER THE MONROE DOCTRINE 117 
 
 Baron Russell, Lord Chief Justice of England, 
 nominated by members of the British Privy 
 Council. . • . 
 
 Sir Richard Collins, Lord Justice of Appeals 
 of Great Britain, nominated in like manner. 
 
 Chief Justice Fuller of the United States Su- 
 preme Court, nominated by President Andrade, 
 of Venezuela. 
 
 Justice Brewer, of the United States Supreme 
 Court, nominated by the three forementioned 
 justices. 
 
 Frederic de Martens, Privy Councillor of Saint 
 Petersburg, nominated by the four foremen- 
 tioned justices. 
 
 Mr. de Martens acted as chairman of the 
 commission. 
 
 The impressions made by this commission 
 upon the minds of foreign and presumably dis- 
 interested observers or reviewers of its proceed- 
 ings may be judged from the following samples 
 furnished by MM. Bariset and de La Chanoine 
 of the French bar: 
 
 Article II of the Treaty of Washington had 
 specified that the arbitrators should be "ju- 
 rists," which, by implication, excluded diplo- 
 mats. The intention was that they should act, 
 
ii8 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 not as a commission of international policy, hav- 
 ing for its object to reconcile as well as it could 
 the conflicting prejudices of the opposing govern- 
 ments, by a solution which should give about 
 equal weight to the interests of Great Britain 
 and of Venezuela, but as judges forming a court. 
 They were, therefore, to take a lawyer's point 
 of view ... to seek justice and not mutual 
 concession. It was expected that their verdict 
 would be a legal decision and not a political 
 compromise. The arbitrators would not have 
 been "jurists," if they were not to have been 
 judges. Such at least were the hopes enter- 
 tained by the contending parties, but particu- 
 larly by the Venezuelans.^ 
 
 . . . The American judges observed an ex- 
 treme reserve and neutraHty; they preserved 
 with scrupulous care their attitude of judges, 
 and did not interrupt the discussion, except 
 with requests for information to enlighten their 
 consciences. The English judges, on the con- 
 trary, acted from the beginning to the end of 
 the debates, not as judges but as officials com- 
 mitted in advance to the British claims. They 
 practised neither circumspection nor neutrality, 
 as clearly appears both in their system of inten- 
 tional obstruction, consisting in tiring the attor- 
 neys of Venezuela in the course of the arguments 
 with interminable successions of diff'use and am- 
 biguous questions and in their favoring the at- 
 
 * U arbitrage anglo'Venezuelien^ by G. Bariset. 
 
CASES UNDER THE MONROE DOCTRINE 119 
 
 torneys of Great Britain by means of leading 
 questions^ not improbably agreed upon in ad- 
 vance.^ . . . While the two American arbitra- 
 tors were more judges than attorneys, the two 
 English arbitrators were more attorneys than 
 judges. Lord Russell, notably, made himself 
 conspicuous by the excessive frequency of his 
 interruptions no less than by his parti pris 
 against the arguments presented in favor of 
 Venezuela.^ 
 
 It was agreed in the Treaty of Washington 
 that actual possession and effective coloniza- 
 tion of any of the territory in dispute during a 
 period of fifty years should be deemed to give 
 title in such territory. Taking advantage of 
 the point thus conceded to them, the British 
 counsel based their argument chiefly on the plea 
 of uti possidetis^ actual possession. The result 
 was naturally a sort of arbitral victory for 
 Great Britain. The award gave back to Ven- 
 ezuela the rich mining territory of Yuruari, but 
 left Great Britain in possession of vast tracts of 
 territory to which she had never had any but a 
 squatter's right. 
 
 ^ Questions insidieuses. 
 
 2 Une application du Principe de V Arbitrage, by L. de La Cha- 
 nolne. {Revue d* Europe, March, 1900, pp. 2, 19, 220.) 
 ' G. Bariset, opus cit. 
 
I20 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 . . . The territory in dispute was divided un- 
 equally, seventy-nine per cent being awarded to 
 the English and twenty-one per cent to the Ven- 
 ezuelans. British Guiana tripled in area. It 
 was until then the smallest of the three European 
 Guianas; it became much the largest one. . . . 
 
 The line of extreme British claims was not 
 proposed seriously; the government designedly 
 asked for more than it wanted in order to obtain 
 just what it wanted. 
 
 . . . The Venezuelan agent, Mr. J. M. de Ro- 
 jas, declared that the sentence was laughable 
 [derisoire] and constituted "a manifest injus- 
 tice." At Caracas, General Ignacio Andrade, 
 President of the republic, stated in language 
 less strong, though equivalent to it in substance, 
 that "international justice had restored to the 
 country some of the territories usurped" . . . 
 the verdict was "essentially a compromise." 
 Most of the English papers said so. Speaking 
 for himself, Mr. de Martens declared that the 
 arbitral frontier was "a line based upon justice 
 and law." "The judges," he added, "were ani- 
 mated with the desire to establish a compro- 
 mise." These words contradict themselves; for 
 "a frontier of compromise" is not "a frontier of 
 justice," as was very truly remarked by Gen- 
 eral Harrison and Mr. Mallet-Prevost, the 
 counsel of Venezuela . . . the most equitable 
 solution, to be sure, could not but be a com- 
 promise, but on condition that the compromise 
 be an equitable one.^ 
 
 1 G. Bariset, opus ciu 
 
CASES UNDER THE MONROE DOCTRINE 121 
 
 My compatriots who read from here on may 
 wince at the remarks by which the writer of the 
 foregoing strictures accounts in his way for the 
 verdict rendered. When all allowance is made 
 for possible misconceptions, there is something 
 in his representations that every United States 
 American may well take seriously to heart as a 
 warning, if not as a reproach. 
 
 The arbitrators, the counsels, and even for a 
 time the agents were all English or American. 
 With the exception of the President [Russian, 
 of German birth] the international tribunal of 
 arbitration was exclusively Anglo-Saxon. . . . 
 Since 1897, the date of the treaty, the world 
 had moved. . . . Assured of the neutrality of 
 Great Britain, the United States stripped Spain 
 of her last remaining colonies. Assured of the 
 neutrality of the United States, the English re- 
 solved to rob the Boers of their independence. 
 When the proceedings in the case commenced, 
 the Americans were entering in the Philippines 
 upon a war as unjust as the war contemplated 
 at that time by the English against the Dutch 
 republics of South Africa. Yet in the tribunal 
 itself the Americans represented the Venezue- 
 lans, heirs of the Spaniards, and the EngHsh 
 founded their claims upon the rights of the 
 Dutch, whom they had succeeded in Guiana. 
 To pretend to decide a question in the name of 
 right and justice, living at the end of the nine- 
 
122 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 teenth century and being Anglo-Saxon, that is 
 rather paradoxical; to take the attitude of adver- 
 sary while proclaiming oneself brother, issued 
 from one and the same race as one's adversary, 
 that is still better; but to defend the rights of 
 the very people whom one wrongs, that is simply 
 perfect. . . . The North Americans were not less 
 satisfied than the English. Arbitration once 
 agreed to by England, and the Monroe Doctrine 
 having thus triumphed, their lively interest in 
 the cause of Venezuela subsided. A single ques- 
 tion concerned them still — that of the control of 
 the Orinoco, which they were bent on excluding 
 England from; and it was settled in accordance 
 with their wishes.^ 
 
 However much of the foregoing arraignment 
 we may resent as unwarranted, let us not in- 
 dulge ourselves in the conceit that we are proof 
 against every temptation to practise the devi- 
 ous, grasping diplomacy which we condemn in 
 Great Britain. Nations, like individuals, are 
 subject to temptations which prove too strong 
 for their sense of right. Our geographical posi- 
 tion has saved us — it can hardly be said to do 
 so now — from the need of oversea dominion. 
 We cannot say what we should do under such 
 temptation to freebooting as Great Britain has 
 
 * G. Barlset, opus cit. 
 
CASES UNDER THE MONROE DOCTRINE 123 
 
 been subjected to. We are too young a nation 
 to be able to compare ourselves ethically with 
 her; and we should candidly admit that our 
 treatment of our Indians, if not "A Century of 
 Dishonor, " included much that was hardly hon- 
 orable; and that such wrong as our intervention 
 in the Panama Revolution would not have to 
 be repeated very often to make a record that 
 would be a shame to any peoplf . 
 
 The forcible collection of a debt by one nation 
 from another is an act of war, except where the 
 debtor country is in a state of anarchy or in 
 such disorder as to be incapable of waging war. 
 In such case the collection involves taking pos- 
 session of the country, giving it a government, 
 and remaining in possession and control of it 
 long enough to collect the debt, which brings 
 us to a consideration of this question in the 
 light of the Monroe Doctrine. In 1907 Presi- 
 dent Roosevelt said in a confidential message to 
 the Senate: 
 
 An aggrieved nation can, without interfering 
 with the Monroe Doctrine, take what action it 
 sees fit in the adjustment of its dispute with 
 American states, provided that action does not 
 take the shape of interference with their form of 
 
124 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 government or of the despoilment of their terri- 
 tory under any disguise. But, short of this, 
 when the question is one of a money claim, the 
 only way which remains, finally, to collect it is a 
 blockade or bombardment or the seizure of the 
 custom-houses; and this means, as has been said 
 above, what is in effect a possession, even though 
 only a temporary possession of territory. The 
 United States then becomes a party in interest, 
 because under the Monroe Doctrine it cannot 
 see any European power seize and permanently 
 occupy the territory of one of these republics; 
 and yet such a seizure of territory, disguised or 
 undisguised, may eventually offer the only way 
 in which the power in question can collect any 
 debts, unless there is interference on the part 
 of the United States. 
 
 While not quite clear, the meaning seems to 
 be that every occupation is to be prevented 
 or discountenanced by the United States be- 
 cause it may develop into a permanent one, 
 which would be a contravention of the Monroe 
 Doctrine. 
 
 Following this line of policy, President Roose- 
 velt, in 1907, ratified a convention which pro- 
 vided for the assistance of the United States in 
 the collection of custom dues of the Dominican 
 Republic and their application to the liquida- 
 tion of a debt of about ^17,000,000. This may 
 
CASES UNDER THE MONROE DOCTRINE 125 
 
 prove to be a precedent for preventing foreign 
 intervention, by an arrangement between the 
 United States and the debtor nation providing 
 for joint settlement of the debt. But there are 
 precedents for a different course — for leaving the 
 foreign power to collect its debt, on the assump- 
 tion or its assurance that it will not offend 
 against the Monroe Doctrine. When, in 1862, 
 the joint French, British, and Spanish expedition 
 was undertaken against Mexico, the purpose 
 of it, so far as our government knew, was the col- 
 lection of debts due largely as indemnity for vio- 
 lence committed against the legations of France 
 and Great Britain. On the 23 d of August, 1862, 
 our secretary of state wrote to our minister in 
 Paris: 
 
 This government, relying on the explanations 
 which have been made by France, regards the 
 conflict as a war involving claims by France 
 which Mexico has failed to adjust to the satis- 
 faction of her adversary, and it avoids interven- 
 tion between the belligerents. 
 
 Not until it transpired that the purpose of 
 the expedition included the subversion of the re- 
 publican form of government in Mexico did our 
 government commence to protest against it. 
 
126 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 By this time Great Britain and Spain had with- 
 drawn from the coalition, leaving us France 
 alone to deal with. 
 
 In 1864 a conflict arose between Spain and 
 Peru over an attack made on a settlement of 
 Spanish subjects in Peru and old debts claimed 
 by Spain. To bring the Peruvian Government 
 to terms, a Spanish squadron seized the Chincha 
 Islands off the coast of Peru, which at this time 
 were still rich in guano deposits. In 1865 the 
 Spanish naval forces proclaimed the coast of 
 Chili under blockade, in retaliation for alleged 
 infraction of neutrality on the part of Chili 
 in favor of Peru. This brought Chili into the 
 war as an ally of Peru. In 1866 the Republic 
 of Ecuador, from a spirit of Pan American soli- 
 darity, allied itself with Chili and Peru against 
 the common European enemy. This led to the 
 bombardment of the unfortified place of Val- 
 paraiso, Chili, a purely commercial town of 
 from 80,000 to 100,000 inhabitants, many of 
 whom were citizens of the United States. The 
 minister of the United States, Mr. Kilpatrick, 
 expressed to the Spanish admiral, "in the name 
 of his government, his most solemn protest 
 against the act as unusual and unnecessary, and 
 
CASES UNDER THE MONROE DOCTRINE 127 
 
 in contravention of the laws and customs of civ- 
 ilized nations; reserving to his government the 
 right to take such action as it may deem proper 
 in the premises." But, apart from this ineffec- 
 tual remonstrance, the United States did not 
 attempt to interfere. Secretary Seward con- 
 tented himself with writing to Mr. Kilpatrick 
 (June 2, 1866): 
 
 . . . We maintain and insist, with all the de- 
 cision and energy which are compatible with 
 our existing neutrality, that the republican sys- 
 tem which is accepted by any of those [Spanish- 
 American] states shall not be wantonly assailed, 
 and that it shall not be subverted as an end of a 
 lawful war by European powers. ... In such 
 wars as are waged between nations which are in 
 friendship with ourselves, if they are not 
 pushed, like the French war in Mexico, to the 
 political point before mentioned, we do not 
 intervene. . . .^ 
 
 The Chincha Islands were retaken from Spain 
 by a Peruvian force in 1865. It must be ad- 
 mitted that the value of this case and the fore- 
 going one, as precedents for non-intervention by 
 the United States, is somewhat impaired by the 
 circumstances that both cases, like that of the 
 British colonization of Belize, arose during our 
 
 * Seward to Kilpatrick, June 2, 1866. 
 
128 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 /civil War, when the attention and resources 
 K f of the government were concentrated upon the 
 preservation of the Union. 
 
 In 1897 the unlawful imprisonment of a Ger- 
 .#• man subject in Hayti brought that republic into 
 * conflict with Germany. Ok the application of 
 the German minister the prisoner was immedi- 
 ately released, but the Haytian Government 
 hesitated to punish the responsible officials and 
 to pay the damage called for. As a consequence, 
 two German war vessels came into the harbor 
 of Port-au-Prince^ and their commander issued 
 an ultimatum, giving the republic six hours in 
 which to comply with the German Remands; 
 they were complied with. 
 
 In 1902 Great Britain, Germany, and Italy, 
 to secure the payment of debts due to their sub- 
 jects, united in seizing Venezuelan war vessels 
 and in the bombardment of Venezuelan ports. 
 These acts of war occasioned no remonstrance 
 from the United States. But Doctor Drago, 
 Minister of Foreign Relations of the Argentine 
 Republic, expressed himself thereon to our gov- 
 ernment, through the Argentine minister at 
 Washington, advancing for the first time the 
 principle known as the Drago Doctrine: 
 
CASES UNDER THE MONROE DOCTRINE 129 
 
 The recovery manu militari of debts implies 
 territorial occupation, which supposes the sup- 
 pression or subordination of governments. 
 
 That situation openly contravenes the prin- 
 ciples repeatedly proclaimed by the nations of 
 America and particularly the Monroe Doctrine, 
 so efficaciously asserted and defended on all 
 occasions by the United States, to which doc- 
 trine the Argentine Republic has already im- 
 plicitly adhered. 
 
 The principles enunciated in the memorable 
 message of December 2, 1823, contain two grand 
 declarations which have particular application 
 to those republics: 
 
 "The American continents are not hence- 
 forth to be subject to future colonization by 
 European nations, and the independence of the 
 nations of America having been recognized, the 
 intervention of a European power with the ob- 
 ject of oppressing or of controlling their destinies 
 in any way cannot be viewed but as the mani- 
 festation of sentiments unfriendly to the United 
 States." 
 
 All that the Argentine Republic maintains 
 and what it would like to see confirmed with 
 regard to the occurrences in Venezuela, by a 
 nation which like the United States enjoys such 
 great authority and power, is the principle al- 
 ready accepted — that there can be no European 
 expansion of territory in America, or oppression 
 of the peoples of that continent, on account of 
 an unfortunate financial situation that may 
 have led one of them to postpone meeting its 
 
I30 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 obligations. In a word, the principle that it 
 would like to see recognized is that a public debt 
 cannot occasion armed intervention, still less 
 material occupation of the soil oF American 
 nations, by a European power.^ 
 
 Had the distinguished writer, as he says, 
 maintained only that there should be "no Euro- 
 pean expansion of territory in America or op- 
 pression of the peoples of that continent" on no 
 matter what account, the United States would 
 have agreed with him, giving, however, a differ- 
 ent meaning to the word oppression from that 
 which he gives it. But in his last sentence he 
 maintains considerably more than this. How- 
 ever much the United States might disapprove 
 of the forcible collection of debts^specially from 
 an American republic, it could_not consider such 
 action as necessarily, nor in the case of Ven- 
 ezuela, an act of oppressiQn_Q£,such country or 
 even a remote danger to the government or in- 
 stitutions of the United States. It could not, 
 therefore, accept the Drago Doctrine as a corol- 
 lary of the Monroe Doctrine nor treat this case 
 as a contravention of it. 
 
 When, in 1895, Great Britain levied a fine of 
 
 ^ Drago to Merou, December 29, 1902. 
 
CASES UNDER THE MONROE DOCTRINE 131 
 
 $75,000 upon Nicaragua for an offence against 
 her dignity and, on its not being paid, sent her 
 war-ships to Corinto and took possession of the 
 town, our government resisted the pressure of 
 our people for intervention and left to the re- 
 publics of Costa Rica, San Salvador, and Gua- 
 temala the subscription of a sufficient sum to 
 liquidate the indebtedness. 
 
 On this subject of debts and the Monroe Doc- 
 trine, Mr. Bartholdt, of Missouri, said in the 
 House of Representatives: 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine is not nearly as im- 
 portant to-day as it was even ten years ago, for 
 the simple reason that at The Hague conference 
 it was determined — all nations agreeing in that 
 determination and it is now a part of the inter- 
 national law of the world — that contractual 
 debts could no longer be collected by force, 
 either in Central or SoutTi America. That takes 
 out of the Western Hemisphere nearly every ele- 
 ment of friction which has heretofore caused 
 trouble, and, therefore, I say the Monroe Doc- 
 trine is not to-day as important as it was, and 
 the European powers are ready to recognize it. 
 
 The Hague conference has not determined 
 *^that contractual debts could no longer be 
 collected by force in either Central or South 
 
132 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 America." That body is not competent to 
 take such definitive action. It can only recom- 
 mend to the nations rules or principles for their 
 approval and ratification. Here is what The 
 Hague conference did recommend regarding con- 
 tract claims: 
 
 The contracting powers are agreed not to 
 resort to armed force for the recovery of con- 
 tract debts claimed from the government of one 
 country by the government of another country 
 as due to its nationals. 
 
 However, this stipulation will not apply when 
 a debtor state refuses or leaves unanswered an 
 offer to arbitrate or, in case of acceptance, ren- 
 ders the settlement of the special agreement 
 impossible or, upon arbitration, fails to conform 
 to the award. {Article I of the convention of 
 June 30, 1908, concerning the limitation of the 
 use of force for the recovery of contract dehts.y 
 
 These provisions, be it observed, do not im- 
 pose on the debtor nation any obligation to 
 accept an offer of arbitration; they plainly recog- 
 
 ^ Les puissances contractantes sont convenues de ne pas avoir 
 recours a la force armee pour le recouvrement de dettes contractu- 
 elles reclamees au gouvernement d'un pays par le gouvernement 
 d'un autre pays comme dues a ses nationaux. 
 
 Toutefols cette stipulation ne pourra etre appllquee quand 
 I'etat debiteur refuse ou laisse sans reponse une oifre d'arbitrage 
 ou, en cas d'acceptation, rend impossible Tetablissement de com- 
 promis ou, apres I'arbitrage, manque de se conformer a la sentence 
 rendue. 
 
CASES UNDER THE MONROE DOCTRINE 133 
 
 nize his right to dedine it and the possibiHty of 
 his not even answering it. In either of these 
 cases the creditor nation is allowed to proceed 
 to collection by force. If all the nations of the 
 world had, as Mr. Bartholdt intimates, ratified 
 these provisions, there would still be consider- 
 able room for armed conflict over contract debts. 
 But the nations have not all ratified them. On 
 the 1st of October, 1912, the nations which had 
 and those which had not were the following. 
 The letter R indicates that the ratification was 
 qualified by a reservation.^ 
 
 Ratified 
 Latin- American Nations 
 
 1. Guatemala, R. 4. Nicaragua, R. 
 
 2. Hayti. 5. Panama. 
 
 3. Mexico. 6. Salvador, R. 
 
 Other Nations 
 
 1. Austro-Hungary. 8. Netherlands. 
 
 2. China. 9. Norway. 
 
 3. Denmark. 10. Portugal. 
 
 4. France. 11. Roumania. 
 
 5. Germany. 12. Russia. 
 
 6. Great Britain. 13. United States, R. 
 
 7. Japan. 
 
 ^ Hague Convention Ratifications, statement Issued by World 
 Peace Foundation, October i, 19 12; Les Deux Conferences de la 
 Paix, 1899 et 1907; Recueil general de Traites, by Martens. I have 
 considered adherence to the convention as equivalent to ratifica- 
 tion. 
 
134 
 
 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 1. Argentina. 
 
 2. Bolivia. 
 
 3. Brazil. 
 
 4. Chili. 
 
 5. Colombia. 
 
 6. Costa Rica. 
 
 7. Cuba. 
 
 1. Belgium. 
 
 2. Bulgaria. 
 
 3. Greece. 
 
 4. Italy. 
 
 5. Luxemburg. 
 
 6. Montenegro. 
 
 7. Persia. 
 
 Not Ratified 
 
 Latin- American Nations 
 
 8. Dominican Republic. 
 
 9. Ecuador. 
 
 10. Honduras. 
 
 11. Paraguay. 
 
 12. Peru. 
 
 13. Uruguay. 
 
 14. Venezuela. 
 
 Other Nations 
 
 8. Servia. 
 
 9. Siam. 
 
 10. Spain. 
 
 11. Sweden. 
 
 12. Switzerland. 
 
 13. Turkey. 
 
 Of the twenty nations of Latin-America, 
 eighteen were represented at the conference. 
 The two nations not represented were Costa 
 Rica and Honduras. Of the twenty nations, 
 three ratified the convention without reserva- 
 tion, fourteen did not ratify it, and three rati- 
 fied it with a reservation which amounts almost 
 to nuUification.^ 
 
 ^This reservation is expressed substantially as follows: 
 I. So far as debts resulting from ordinary contracts between the 
 nationals of one country and the government of another are con- 
 cerned, arbitration will not be resorted to except in the case of 
 
CASES UNDER THE MONROE DOCTRINE 135 
 
 The net result of it all is about this: that in 
 the collection of certain kinds of contract debt 
 a nation must make an offer of arbitration before 
 resorting to force; that its resorting to force may 
 be prevented by the acceptance of arbitration; 
 and that about one in severPof the probable 
 debtor nations has agreed to accept arbitration 
 when it is not strong enough to prevent military 
 occupation. If it accepts arbitration, it yields 
 to threats of force; if it submits to occupation, 
 it succumbs to acts of force. The settlement is 
 thus a matter of battalions and battle-ships in 
 either case. This arrangement, we are told, 
 "takes out of the Western Hemisphere nearly 
 every element of friction which has heretofore 
 caused trouble." Far from it. The critical and 
 delicate task of keeping on good terms with 
 non-American powers which intervene in the 
 affairs of our sister republics is still with us. 
 
 Whether it is safe for the United States to let 
 their armed forces go into American countries 
 depends upon their particular intentions and the 
 
 denial of justice by the judiciary of the country of the contract, 
 the resources of which must first be exhausted. 
 
 2. PubHc loans with emission of bonds, constituting national 
 debts, cannot in any case give cause for military aggression or for 
 material occupation of the soil of American nations. 
 
136 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 ability of the United States to evict them should 
 they attempt unduly to prolong their stay. It 
 is thus a diplomatic and military question, to 
 which there can be no general answer. It can 
 only be properly answered for each case as it 
 arises. So far as it is answerable in the affirma- 
 tive, the United States should let foreign nations 
 settle their differences with American nations 
 directly. 
 
 The Drago Doctrine is a corollary not of the 
 Monroe Doctrine but of the Bolivar Idea. As 
 such it deserves, and will doubtless receive, the 
 serious consideration of Pan American states- 
 men. 
 
IV 
 
 THE BOLIVAR IDEA. CONCLUSION 
 
 As the countries of the Old World become 
 more and more crowded, the need of territory in 
 which their surplus population may establish 
 and perpetuate itself under the flag of the 
 mother country becomes correspondingly greater 
 and the demand for colonies grows louder and 
 more insistent. Those lands should be looked 
 for, says the Bolivar Idea, in the Old World 
 and not in the New. But they will probably be 
 sought, strenuously and forcibly, along the lines 
 of least resistance, wherever they may lie. 
 
 Considering the annexation of Alsace and 
 Lorraine to Germany, the almost complete par- 
 tition of Africa among six European powers, the 
 spoliation of Central America and Venezuela 
 by Great Britain, the annexation of Corea to 
 Japan, of Madagascar and Morocco to France, 
 of parts of China to Germany, Russia, and Ja- 
 pan, of Tripoli to Italy, and the acquisition of 
 137 
 
L 
 
 138 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 the Panama Canal Zone by the United States — 
 all since the Franco-German War — one cannot 
 shut one's eyes to the fact that territory is still, 
 in the minds of statesmen, a prize to be fought 
 or bartered for — to be acquired without too 
 scrupulous a regard to means whenever the op- 
 portunity offers. 
 
 It is apprehended that Germany and perhaps 
 Italy and other nations having settlers in South 
 America are coveting territory in that region. 
 There are indications that the policies of those 
 countries are purely commercial, aiming only at 
 the creation and maintenance of markets for 
 the mother country; that there is no danger of 
 any attempt to acquire territory so long, at 
 least, as the policies mentioned are not seri- 
 ously thwarted. This may be true, but who 
 knows how far it may be due to the lack of 
 military and naval means to carry out a policy 
 of conquest and annexation, and when such 
 means may become available.? Policies change, 
 and true statesmanship regards not only what 
 has been and what is, but also what may be. 
 "^The Monroe Doctrine, construed as Monroe 
 meant it to be, so as to cover the whole Western 
 Hemisphere, goes far toward answering the pur- 
 pose of Pan Americanism. But there is a con- 
 
THE BOLIVAR IDEA 139 
 
 siderable and ever-increasing difference between 
 the protection that can be afforded to the 
 American world by the United States alone^and 
 that which might be afforded it by the united 
 efforts of all American nations, actuated by a 
 spirit not merely of national but of continental, 
 of Pan American, solidarity. Bolivar's active 
 interest and efforts did not go beyond a union 
 of the nations of Spanish origin, and even in 
 this he was to be bitterly disappointed. As to a 
 concert of all American nations, he indulged in 
 dreams and speculations which led him occa- 
 sionally to express himself as if he seriously 
 contemplated the union of all American states 
 in some sort of league or confederacy. Two in- 
 stances of his doing so may be cited : 
 
 Would that some day we might be fortunate 
 enough to establish there [at Panama] an august 
 congress of the representatives of the repubHcs, 
 kingdoms, and empires [of America], to deal with 
 the high interests of peace and of war with the 
 nations of the other three parts of the world. ^ 
 
 ... I venture to flatter myself that the ar- 
 dent desire which animates all Americans of ex- 
 alting the power of the world of Columbus will 
 
 ^Translation, letter to a Jamaican, Sept. 6, 1815. Docu- 
 mentos para la Historia del Libertador, edited under direction of 
 Guzman Blanco, V, 340. 
 
I40 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 moderate the difficulties and delays incidental 
 to ministerial preparations. . . . 
 
 The day on which our plenipotentiaries ex- 
 change their powers an immortal epoch will be 
 fixed in the diplomatic history of America. 
 When, after a hundred centuries, posterity shall 
 seek the origin of our public law, and record the 
 pacts which determined its history, it will regis- 
 ter with respect the protocols of the Isthmus of 
 Panama. In them they will find the plan of the 
 first alliances, which will indicate the course of 
 our relationship with the rest of the universe. 
 What then will be the Isthmus of Corinth to the 
 Isthmus of Panama?^ 
 
 The Isthmus of Corinth, being a central po- 
 sition with reference to northern and south- 
 ern Greece, was often chosen as the site of a 
 Pan Hellenic Congress. Panama appeared to 
 Bolivar as a great international emporium. *^Its 
 canals," he said, "will shorten the routes of the 
 world; will strengthen the conventional bonds 
 between Europe, America, and Asia; will bring 
 to that favored region the tributes of the sev- 
 eral quarters of the globe. Perhaps there only 
 will it be possible to fix the capital of the world, 
 as Constantine considered Byzantium the capital 
 of the Ancient World. "^ 
 
 ^ Translation, circular convening Congress of Panama, Decem- 
 ber 7, 1824, opus cit., Guzman Blanco, IX, 448 A 
 
 2 Translation, letter to a Jamaican, opus cit., Guzman Blanco, 
 
 V, 339. 
 
THE BOLIVAR IDEA 141 
 
 But the context, his language on other oc- 
 casions, and other testimony indicate that he 
 never thought of an all-American union as 
 practicable. After the failure of the first Pan 
 American Congress, he wrote: ^'The Congress 
 of Panama, which would have been admirable 
 if it had been more efficacious, makes me think 
 of that Greek madman, who, from the summit 
 of a rock, pretended to direct the movements of 
 vessels on the high sea. The power of the con- 
 gress will be chimerical. Its decrees can be but 
 counsels, nothing more. People write to me 
 that many dreamers desire a code with a penal 
 constitution. What code? What is the poht- 
 ical organization that will produce harmony? 
 All that is ideal and absurd."^ It appears that 
 he expected to unite the Latin-American repub- j 
 lies in an association somewhat closer than the 1 
 Holy Alliance and yet not so close as a confed- 
 eracy, to found a sort of amphictyonic council, 
 or assembly of plenipotentiaries, which should 
 discuss and promote the interests which the 
 states had in common, provide for their common / 
 defence, and settle their differences by arbitra- 
 tion backed by military force. 
 
 This union of Latin-American countries was 
 
 ^Translation, letter to Guzman, August 8, 1826. 
 
142 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 to be under the hegemony of Colombia.^ The 
 circular in which Bolivar invited the govern- 
 ments of Colombia, Mexico, Central America, 
 the United Provinces of Buenos Ayres, Chili, and 
 Brazil to send delegates to the Congress of 
 Panama gave no indication that the United 
 States was to be represented at that meeting.^ 
 The invitation received by the United States 
 was extended to it at a late date by the govern- 
 ments of the forementioned countries.^ While 
 not what is now understood by Pan American- 
 ism, Bolivar's purpose was the germ of that sen- 
 timent, the origin of that principle, and seems to 
 warrant its being called after him — the Bolivar 
 Idea. 
 
 ^T^he Pan American Association, formed at 
 the instance of the United States, was called first 
 The Commercial Bureau of the American Repub- 
 licSy then The International Bureau of American 
 Republics^ and is now called The Pan American 
 Union, These changes of name are significant 
 of the broadening scope and purpose of the insti- 
 tution. It is maintained by the twenty-one 
 
 , American republics and devoted to "the devel- 
 opment and conservation of commerce, friendly 
 
 1 El Ideal internacional de Bolivar, F. J. Urrutia, p. 27. 
 
 2 Sen. Ex. Doc. 232, Part 4, pp. 155, 156. ^ Jhid.^ pp. 74, 76. 
 
THE BOLIVAR IDEA 143 
 
 intercourse, and good understanding among all 
 the American republics."^ Its management is 
 determined by a governing board consisting of^' 
 the secretary of state of the United States, who ) 
 is eX'Officio chairman, and the diplomatic rep-j 
 resentatives of all the governments represented 
 in the bureau and accredited to the government/ 
 of the United States. It is located in Washing- 
 ton because that city is the only one at which all 
 the American repubjics_have diplomatic repre- 
 sentatives^ Its executive officers are a director- 
 general and assistant director, elected by the/ 
 governing board. Under the auspices of the^ 
 union there have been four Pan American con- 
 ferences: one in Washington in 1 889,^ one in' 
 Mexico in the winter of 1901--2, one in Rio de 
 Janeiro in 1906, and one in Buenos Ay res in - 
 1 910. The change of name from congress to 
 conference may be explained by the enlargement 
 of the scope of the meetings to include many sub- 
 jects not of political character and to provide for 
 discussing and agreeing without any view to 
 negotiation. The history of the Pan American 
 movement may thus be divided into two periods 
 — one of congresses, beginning with the Congress ^ 
 of Panama in 1826 and ending with that of Lima 
 
 1 The Pan American Union, by John Barrett, p. 60. 
 
144 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 in 1865, and one of conferences, beginning with 
 the Washington Conference of i _88cL ^nd, let us 
 hope, never to end. In the proceedings of the 
 first period the United States took Httle or no 
 part; in those of the second it has taken a prom- 
 inent, if not a leading, one. During the first 
 period ambitious plans for political union were 
 discussed and approved, but generally failed of 
 ratification; during the second period less has 
 been attempted and perhaps more accomplished. 
 But the results cannot be determined with accu- 
 racy and are easily exaggerated. A great show- 
 ing is made by stringing out the resolutions, 
 conventions, treaties, etc., that are passed; the 
 unwary public is thus led to believe that these 
 more or less admirable measures are made law 
 or usage. They are only recommendations un- 
 til formally ratified by their respective gov- 
 ernments. Which of them are ratified and 
 which are not ? Which of those that are ratified 
 are observed and which are a dead letter.? On 
 such vital questions, the publications of peace 
 societies and of the Pan American Union leave 
 us lamentably in the dark. With the light that 
 I have been able to get from these organizations 
 and from the Department of State, I have pre- 
 
THE BOLIVAR IDEA 
 
 HS 
 
 pared the following statement of the more im- 
 portant measures enacted at the principal con- 
 gresses and conferences, with the corresponding 
 ratifications. It is far from perfect or com- 
 plete, but it is presented as the best available 
 one and an important part of this discussion. 
 
 PRINCIPAL SESSIONS OF PAN AMERICAN CON- 
 GRESSES AND CONFERENCES 
 CONGRESSES 
 
 No. 
 
 Place 
 
 Date 
 
 States 
 
 More important 
 
 Ratified or ad- 
 
 
 
 represented 
 
 enactments 
 
 hered to, by 
 
 I. 
 
 Pana- 
 
 22 June to 
 
 Colombia, 
 
 I. League of 
 
 Col^abia (rati- 
 
 
 ma. 
 
 IS July, 
 
 Cent. Amer- 
 
 Perpetual Un- 
 
 fied in part J. 
 
 
 
 1826. 
 
 ica, Mexico, 
 
 ion and Con- 
 federation. 
 
 
 2. 
 
 
 II Dec, 
 
 Bolivia, Chili, 
 
 2. Treaty of 
 
 
 
 N 
 
 1847, to I 
 
 Colombia, 
 
 Confedera- 
 
 
 
 
 March, 
 
 Ecuador, 
 
 tion, 
 
 
 
 
 1848. 
 
 Peru 
 
 3. Treaty of 
 Commerce, 
 
 4 Co n s u 1 a r 
 Convention, 
 
 S. Postal Con- 
 vention. 
 
 Colombiaj^,.^ 
 
 3. 
 
 Santia- 
 
 IS Sept., 
 
 Chili, Ecuador, 
 
 6. League and 
 
 Bolivia, Chili, 
 
 
 go. 
 
 1856. 
 
 Peru. 
 
 Confederation 
 called ^ "The 
 Continental 
 Treaty." 
 
 Costa Rica, 
 Ecuador, 
 Guatemala, 
 Honduras, 
 Mexico, Nica- 
 ragua, Peru, 
 Salvador. 
 
 4. 
 
 Lima. 
 
 14 Nov., 
 
 Argentina, Bo- 
 
 7. Treaty of 
 
 
 
 
 1864, to 
 
 livia, Chili, 
 
 Union and 
 
 
 
 
 23 Jan., 
 
 Colombia, 
 
 Alliance, 
 
 
 
 
 1865. 
 
 Ecuador, 
 Guatemala, 
 Peru, ESal- 
 vador, Vene- 
 zuela. 
 
 8 Treaty for 
 Maintenance 
 of Peace. 
 
 
PRINCIPAL SESSIONS OF PAN AMERICAN CON- 
 GRESSES AND CONFERENCES— (Continued) 
 CONFERENCES 
 
 No. 
 
 Place 
 
 Date 
 
 States 
 represented 
 
 More important 
 enactments 
 
 Ratified or ad- 
 hered to, by 
 
 5. 
 
 Wash- 
 
 2 Oct., 1889, 
 
 All, except 
 
 9. Treaty for 
 
 
 
 ing- 
 
 to 19 Apr., 
 
 Santo Do- 
 
 Compulsory 
 
 
 
 ton. 
 
 1890. 
 
 mingo. 
 
 Arbitration. 
 
 
 6. 
 
 Mexi- 
 
 22 Oct., 
 
 All. 
 
 10. Treaty for 
 
 Guatemala,Hondu- 
 
 
 co. 
 
 1901, to 
 
 
 Compulsory 
 
 ras, Mexico, Peru, 
 
 
 
 31 Jan., 
 
 
 Arbitration, 
 
 Salvador, Santo 
 
 
 
 1902. 
 
 
 11. Treaty for 
 Arbitration of 
 pecuniary 
 claims, 
 
 12. Convention 
 for the codifi- 
 cation of 
 American In- 
 ternational 
 Law. 
 
 Domingo, Uru- 
 guay. 
 U. S. and seven 
 other states 
 (1909). 
 
 7- 
 
 Rio de 
 
 23 July to 
 
 All, except 
 
 13. Convention 
 
 U. S. and thirteen 
 
 
 Jan- 
 
 27 Aug., 
 
 Hay ti and 
 
 for the Codi- 
 
 other states 
 
 
 eiro. 
 
 1906. 
 
 Venezu- 
 ela. 
 
 f ica tion of 
 American In- 
 ternational 
 Law, 
 
 14. Convention 
 as to status of 
 naturalized 
 citizens, 
 
 15. Convention 
 for the pro- 
 tection of 
 Copyrights, 
 Patents, and 
 Trade Marks, 
 
 16. Treaty for 
 Arbitration of 
 Pecu n iar y 
 Claims. 
 
 (1912). 
 
 U. S. and twelve 
 other states 
 (1913). 
 
 Chili, Costa Rica, 
 Ecuador, Guate- 
 mala, Honduras, 
 Nicaragua, Pana- 
 ma, Salvador 
 (1910). 
 
 U. S. and eleven 
 other states 
 (1913). 
 
 8. 
 
 Buenos 
 
 12 July to 
 30 Aug., 
 
 All, except 
 
 17. Convention 
 
 
 
 Ayres. 
 
 Bolivia. 
 
 for the Pro- 
 
 
 
 
 1910. 
 
 
 tection of 
 Copyrights, 
 
 18. Convention 
 for the Pro- 
 tection of 
 Patents, 
 
 19. Convention 
 for the Pro- 
 tection of 
 Trade Marks 
 and Commer- 
 cial Names, 
 
 20. Treaty for 
 the Arbitra- 
 tion of Pecu- 
 niary Claims. 
 
 
 146 
 
THE BOLIVAR IDEA 147 
 
 These twenty compacts may be classified ac- 
 cording to subjects and to ratification, as fol- 
 lows : 
 
 SUBJECTS 
 
 Confederation, Peace, and Arbitration 10 
 
 Trade and Commerce 7 
 
 International Law 3 
 
 RATIFICATION 
 
 By United States and other states 4 . 
 
 By other states only S--" 
 
 Not ratified at all ii-"^ 
 
 While less visionary or more practical than 
 the congresses, the conferences can hardly be 
 said to have returned in useful achievement the 
 time, money, and labor that they have cost. 
 Their treaties for compulsory arbitration have 
 not been ratified by half of the Latin-American 
 states nor by the United States and, should they 
 be ratified, are doomed to violation. The con- 
 ferences have committed American countries to 
 undertaking the construction of a grand Pan 
 American railroad which may prove to be im- 
 practicable and seems of doubtful utility. 
 
 If the railroad were built, under present con- 
 ditions, it would not pay for its axle-grease. 
 There would not be one passenger in a year 
 
X 
 
 148 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 who would buy a through ticket. The journey 
 by rail would be wholly intolerable not alone on 
 account of the distance but because of the great 
 stretches of high plateaux with their heat and 
 dust. The journey from New York to Buenos 
 Ayres would be made in half the time on a good 
 ship and with infinitely greater pleasure. So 
 far as through freight is concerned, it is prepos- 
 terous to discuss the subject. Coal can be car- 
 ried from New York to Buenos Ayres by ship 
 for five dollars or six dollars a ton; it could not 
 be carried by rail, if such railroad were in exist- 
 ence, for less than thirty dollars or forty dollars 
 a ton. In such visionary, chimerical dreams as 
 this do Pan American conferences find their 
 strongest and most wholesome inspiration.^ 
 
 With a view to the unification of American 
 currency, weights, and measures, of censuses, 
 and of statistical nomenclature, there^has been 
 some discussing and resolving, but nothing, it 
 would seem, in the form of a treaty or con- 
 vention. The conferences have applied them- 
 selves chiefly to the assurance of peace. They 
 have promoted mutual understanding and good 
 will by the encouragement of trade and com- 
 merce and other forms of international inter- 
 course. It is true that the ten republics of 
 South America furnish the United States less 
 
 ^ American Supremacy^ by G. W. Crichfield, II, 431. 
 
THE BOLIVAR IDEA 149 
 
 than one-quarter of their exports and receive 
 from it only about a seventh of their imports, 
 but the ten northern repubUcs (Mexico, Guate- 
 mala, Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa 
 Rica, Panama, Cuba, the Dominican Repub- 
 lic, and Hayti) give nearly three-quarters of 
 their exports to the United States and receive 
 from it more than half of their imports.^ The 
 share of the United States in the trade of Latin- 
 America, while not equal to that of Europe, is 
 greater than that of any other country. In 191 1 
 Latin-America's foreign trade (value of exports 
 and imports) was partitioned as follows: 
 
 To the United States 28 .98 per cent. 
 
 To Great Britain 23 • 24 per cent. 
 
 To Germany 14 65 per cent. 
 
 To France 8 . 63 per cent. 
 
 To other countries 24 . 50 per cent. 
 
 100. cxD per cent.2 
 
 What IS more important, our trade with 
 Latin-America is increasing; and our and Latin- 
 America's trade with the rest of the world is 
 increasing even more rapidly than our trade with 
 Latin-America.^ 
 
 ^Bulletin of Pan American Union^ February, 1913. 
 
 2 Bulletin of Pan American Union, February, 191 3, p. 240. 
 
 3 Appendix C. 
 
 / 
 
I50 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 These conditions are attributable to the bet- 
 ter understanding among American countries 
 effected by Pan American conferences — not 
 wholly, but in sufficient measure to augur well 
 for the future usefulness of those meetings. 
 May the time come when they will deal with 
 the two fundamental problems of Latin-Amer- 
 ica — immigration and education — and by the 
 solution of them repeople America, drawing to 
 it the surplus brain and brawn of the world and 
 endowing it with an art and literature fraught 
 with new joys and inspirations for mankind. 
 As the states of Latin-America rise to the per- 
 formance of their appropriate parts in this 
 achievement the United States will give them 
 more and more consideration as political part- 
 ners, the Monroe Doctrine will be less invoked, 
 and the Bolivar Idea will come to express, not 
 merely the vision of an American patriot, but 
 the real, the successful, policy of America. 
 
 Conclusion 
 
 Pan American consciousness is a product of 
 
 common occupancy of the WesterJi Hemisphere, 
 
 common Eur opean origin, common repubHcan 
 
 form, or ideals, of government. It corresponds 
 
 \ 
 
CONCLUSION 151 X, 
 
 essentially to European, or Old World, conscious- 
 ness. This American spirit is about to be pow- 
 erfully stimulated by two new factors: the 
 opening of the Panama Canal and the return ^ 
 of the United States to ar-polixry~^f lew tariff 
 on imports. The commercial effect of these 
 changes will be followed by social and political 
 effects of even greater importance, the most no- 
 table of which will be a new Pan American sol- 
 idarity. It is no use to decry such continental 
 or hemisphere spirit as provincial or opposed to 
 world unity. As well find fault with the division 
 of the world into hemispheres. This geographical 
 condition is not more beyond the power of man 
 to make or unmake than is the spirit that is 
 born of it and nourished by it. We could not 
 abolish it, and why should we want to \ Its two 
 forms. Eastern and Western, differ, but need not 
 conflict; they are complementary rather than 
 antagonistic. The Western spirit craves the 
 culture of the Eastern; but it wants the privilege 
 of helping itself to it; the New World wants 
 much of the civilization of the Old, but does not 
 want any forced upon it. 
 
 Wise and efficient statesmanship may make 
 America as populous as the rest of the world 
 
152 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 and thus remove one excuse that nations of the 
 Old World might advance for its conquest and 
 annexation. Underpopulated sections of it may 
 become exposed to incorporation in a non-Ameri- 
 can country, if not previously merged in a pop- 
 ulous American one. The policy of population 
 should be accompanied by a liberal open-door, 
 commercial policy, which would give the Old 
 World about all that it could get in the way 
 of trade from colonies, and at less cost. Finally, 
 population and trade, doing what they can to 
 strengthen the New World and conciliate the Old, 
 an enlightened military and naval policy might 
 prove an effective complement to the system. 
 
 Toward one another, perhaps, more than to- 
 ward European nations, the nations of America 
 should cultivate the most cordial friendly rela- 
 tions. This appUes especially to the United 
 States, which, as the strongest, is the most liable 
 to suspicion and distrust. It should go to the 
 extreme of forbearance to avoid conflict with a 
 sister American republic and lose no opportu- 
 nity of removing any unfriendly feeling which 
 such country may on any account be harboring 
 against it. It should consider, too, that the 
 Pan American solidarity, which it favors and 
 
CONCLUSION I S3 
 
 fosters as a protection against the rest of the 
 world, is as resentful of American-born as It is 
 of foreign-born injury; that in dealing with the 
 feeblest American republic it has to do with all 
 America, with an aggregation of over 70,000,000 
 fellow American citizens. 
 
 The opposition in America to certain features 
 of European statecraft is diminishing as those 
 features themselves disappear from the Euro- 
 pean system. 
 
 What Americans regard as the "European 
 peril,'' against which the United States directed 
 the Monroe Doctrine, the Latin states their 
 past attempts at federation and open indorse- 
 ment of the Monroe Doctrine; and against 
 which they direct their present efforts for the 
 development and institution of an American 
 international law — this danger is nowhere so 
 ardently combated as in Europe itself. Only in 
 Europe it has a different name. The American 
 people sought to protect themselves against that 
 system of force, of intervention, of rank, of 
 egotistic expansion, of dynastic interest and 
 diplomatic ambition against which really cul- 
 tivated Europe has been striving since the days 
 of the French Revolution to protect itself and 
 the struggles of which fill the history of the last 
 one hundred and twenty years. What America 
 is trying to protect itself against is just what 
 
154 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 European democracy is by bitter, desperate 
 strife struggling to free itself from. . . . Eu- 
 rope, as here defined, and modern Pan America 
 have a common opponent — feudalism, which, 
 since the Middle Ages, has often changed its 
 form but never its essential spirit.^ 
 
 Pan Americanism does not involve a seces- 
 sion or divorce of the Western Hemisphere from 
 the Eastern. In the domain of so-called inter- 
 national law it implies not independence but 
 autonomy; it contemplates American regulation 
 of affairs peculiar to America or that concern 
 America more than they concern any other part 
 of the world — ^with due regard to those general 
 rules that are necessary to harmony in the 
 family of nations. It does not, as already inti- 
 mated, exclude non-American immigration, or 
 non-American capital, or even non-American 
 political influence. It admits of occasional co- 
 operation of European with American powers, 
 but draws the line at non-American dictation 
 or supremacy, at the determination of the des- 
 tiny of an American power by any non-Ameri- 
 can power or powers. It is not opposed to the 
 unification of the world, but it is to its Euro- 
 peanization. It means that American nations 
 
 ^ Pan-Amerika, by A. H. Fried, opus cit., pp. 290, 291. 
 
CONCLUSION 155 
 
 shall be as independent of the European concert 
 as the European concert is of American nations; 
 that the American hemisphere, though smaller 
 in area and in population than the European, 
 shall be politically the equal of it. 
 
 Whatever the efforts and the talents that 
 may be applied to its development, America, 
 comprising less than one-quarter of the land 
 surface of the globe and less to-day than one- 
 tenth of its population, will in all probability 
 never be able to defend itself as a sparsely pop- 
 ulated region against the rest of the world as 
 an overpopulated one. The twenty armies of 
 Latin-America aggregate on a war footing about 
 one and a half million men.^ Taking the army 
 of the United States, including militia and vol- 
 unteers, as two million, we get three and a half 
 million as the total of the American military 
 coalition. This force, hardly capable of united 
 action, is less than the war army of any one of 
 the three leading military powers of Europe — 
 France, Germany, Russia. 
 
 Africa is already, and is likely to remain, un- 
 der the dominion of Europe, especially of Great 
 Britain, who has been the most earnest and 
 
 ^ A. Hartleben, opus cit., compiled. 
 
156 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 active opponent of Pan Americanism. Aus- 
 tralia and Canada may possibly detach them- 
 selves from her and furnish some, but inade- 
 quate, support to America. Asia is in part 
 European, but is waking up to resistance against 
 its Europeanization. There is where America 
 must look for its greatest sympathy and most 
 effective co-operation in opposing Old World 
 domination of the Nj^w. Since the earliest days 
 of the republic there has been in the United 
 States, if not a party, an element of population, 
 which regards Great Britain as the natural 
 friend and ally of the United States. Commu- 
 nity of language makes a strong bond of union 
 between a mother country and its progeny, be 
 the latter dependent or independent. By the 
 language of Shakespeare, of Cervantes, and of 
 Camoens, the people of North America and of 
 Central and South America are forever affili- 
 ated to those of Great Britain, of Spain, and of 
 Portugal, but that relationship is, and should 
 be, intellectual, not political. It has nothing to 
 do with imperial greatness. There is no indi- 
 cation that Latin-Americans are less proud of 
 the history and traditions of Castile for its being 
 no longer the metropolis of a colonial world; 
 
CONCLUSION IS7 
 
 nor would people of the United States take less 
 pride in their heritage from old England should 
 not a British drum be heard outside of the Brit- 
 ish Islands. British dominion in India and in 
 Africa is not necessary to American regard and 
 afFection for the mother country. It is, if any- 
 thing, a damper to those feelings. 
 
 We should be on our guard against appeals to 
 Anglo-Saxon loyalty, the standard euphemism 
 for Anglomania — such as the following: 
 
 If British power prove insufficient to protect 
 the empire, the unity of the Anglo-Saxons may 
 be broken up and the great race, which united 
 should be able to make "liberty and freedom 
 within the law" the ultimate ruling principle of 
 humanity, may be scattered into a number of 
 small and weak and consequently uninfluential 
 states. . . . 
 
 The present division of the Anglo-Saxon race 
 is due merely to an old family quarrel, followed 
 by a few minor disputes and dissensions. . . . 
 We may well look forward in the far future to a 
 gigantic peace-compelling Anglo-Saxon federa- 
 tion of all the Anglo-speaking peoples, with 
 home rule all around and a great federal cus- 
 toms and defence union. Then will the Anglo- 
 Saxon race be truly unassailable.^ 
 
 ^ The Future Peace of the Anglo-Saxons^ by S. L. Murray, 
 
 pp. 122, 123. 
 
158 AMERICAN POLICY 
 
 A specious proposal that the United States 
 renounce the Washington Precept and the Bol- 
 ivar Idea. What the United States would 
 gain by it is hard to see. United America, not 
 Greater Britain, is the aim of American states- 
 manship. The nations of America have no such 
 interest in their mother countries as would jus- 
 tify them in cultivating their good will in gen- 
 eral opposition to other nations. The United 
 States owes to its British antecedents the foun- 
 dations of its government, the beginnings and 
 grandest inspirations of its literature, but jn 
 imperial administration it is shunning rather 
 than following the example of Great Britain. 
 In the domains of art, of science, of industry, of 
 war, of education, it is less beholden to Great 
 Britain than it is to Germany. To those who 
 look a little below the fortuitous condition of a 
 common language and origin; who consider the 
 acts of nations and ponder on their motives 
 and interests; who, looking over the past, note 
 the injuries and the benefits received from for- 
 eign governments and peoples, the best friend 
 of the United States appears to be Germany. 
 But those who look away from the past and be- 
 yond the present, whose vision ranges toward 
 
CONCLUSION 159 
 
 the purple rim of futurity, who contemplate a 
 possible worid conflict, between Old and New, 
 between Tradition and Progress, descry a 
 stocky, military figure silhouetted against the 
 rising sun, embodying the spirit of the New 
 East and representing the Great Britain of the 
 Pacific. Japan, however, is not alone in the 
 field for the mastery of the Orient. Russia may 
 secure it and, if she do not, may, with her hun- 
 dreds of millions of subjects, hold the balance of 
 power between America and Europe. The most 
 important friendship for Pan America to culti- 
 vate is that of Japan and Russia. It should 
 seek to attach those powers to it and to recon- 
 cile them to each other. Befriended by these 
 powerful empires and the lusty republic of 
 China, Pan America may proceed down the 
 vista of the ages, decking it with the trophies 
 of peace, with prizes of art, of science, and of 
 commerce, justifying the primitive meaning of 
 the name Pacific Ocean and holding out as fair 
 a promise as any yet given to men, of a Pacific 
 Worid. 
 
 THE END 
 
APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
 CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
 OF LATIN-AMERICAN COUNTRIES, IN 
 CERTAIN COUNTRIES OF CONTINENT- 
 AL EUROPE, IN THE COURSE OF THE 
 WINTER OF 1900-1901.' 
 
 Countries 
 
 United 
 States 
 
 Latin- 
 American 
 
 France 
 
 Germany. . . 
 
 Italy 
 
 Spain 
 
 Portugal . . . 
 Sweden .... 
 Luxemburg 
 Norway .... 
 
 Totals . . . 
 
 6,15s 
 
 17,848 
 
 2,907 
 
 438 
 
 646 
 
 422 
 
 18 
 
 3,648 
 
 32,082 
 
 10,017 
 2,812 
 1,638 
 1,972 
 
 7>67S 
 
 II 
 
 8 
 
 81 
 
 24,214 
 
 For Germany, on the ist of December, 1910, the 
 numbers are: 
 
 United States 17,512 
 
 Latin- Americans 4,890 
 
 ^ Except those in France, the census of which was taken on 
 the 24th of March, 1901. 
 
 163 
 
164 APPENDIX A 
 
 but for Berlin: 
 
 United States 702 
 
 Latin-Americans 808 
 
 and for Paris (March 24, 1901):! 
 
 United States 3>665 
 
 Latin- Americans 4,892 
 
 ^Resultats Statistiques du Recensement general de la Popula- 
 tion (1901), Tome IV. 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
 MARRIAGES OF ARGENTINIANS IN BUENOS 
 AYRES DURING THE YEAR 1907-8 
 
 Argentinians with Argentinians 
 
 
 4,565 
 2,824 
 
 Argentinian women with Italian men 
 
 Argentinian men with ItaHan women .... 
 
 2,270 
 554 
 
 Argentinian women with Spanish men . . . 
 Argentinian men with Spanish women . . . 
 
 936 
 404 
 
 i»340 
 
 Argentinian women with Uruguayan men 
 Argentinian men with Uruguayan women 
 
 421 
 
 240 
 
 661 
 
 Argentinian women with French men .... 
 Argentinian men with French women. . . 
 
 178 
 99 
 
 277 
 
 Argentinian women with English men . . . 
 Argentinian men with English women . . . 
 
 74 
 19 
 
 93 
 
 Argentinian women with German men. . . 
 Argentinian men with G erman women . . 
 
 51 
 21 
 
 72 
 
 Argentinian women with other men .... 
 Argentinian men with other women 
 
 Total 
 
 208 
 99 
 
 307 
 
 10,139 
 
 
 
 La Espana Moderna, April, 191 3, p. 
 i6s 
 
 IS3- 
 
i66 APPENDIX B 
 
 Deducting the undetermined 307, we have 9,832 
 marriages, of which 165 were Argentinian-EngHsh or 
 Argentinian-German, and 9,667 that may be con- 
 sidered as Argentinian-Latin, Argentinian-mestizo, 
 or Argentinian-Indian. 
 
APPENDIX C 
 
 These tables are compiled and computed from 
 Table No. 245, Statistical Abstract of the United 
 States^ 191 2, p. 429, and other data furnished by the 
 Department of Commerce. Unfortunately, no fig- 
 ures were available for the trade in general of Latin- 
 America, subsequently to 191 1. 
 
 TRADE OF UNITED STATES—EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
 
 Year 
 
 With Latin-America 
 
 With all countries, 
 including Latin- 
 America 
 
 Ratio of trade 
 with Latin- 
 America to 
 
 trade with all 
 countries 
 
 1905. •• 
 I9II 
 
 ^507,000,000 
 681,000,000 
 
 Increase, 34% 
 Per year, 5.7% 
 
 ^2,636,074,737 
 3,577,546,304 
 
 Increase, 36% 
 Per year, 6% 
 
 0.19 
 0.19 
 
 TRADE OF LATIN-AMERICA— EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
 
 Year 
 
 With United States 
 
 With all countries, 
 
 including United 
 
 States 
 
 Ratio of trade 
 
 with U. S. to 
 
 trade with all 
 
 countries 
 
 1905.... 
 I9II 
 
 $507,000,000 
 681,000,000 
 
 Increase, 34% 
 Per year, 5.7% 
 
 $1,776,516,000 
 2,457,676,000 
 
 Increase, 38% 
 Per year, 6.3 % 
 
 0.29 
 0.28 
 
 167 
 
i68 
 
 APPENDIX C 
 
 CO 
 
 H 
 P^ 
 O 
 
 Q 
 
 < 
 
 CO 
 
 £ 
 
 w 
 < 
 
 CO 
 
 H 
 
 C/3 
 O 
 
 o 
 w 
 
 < 
 H 
 
 
 IS 
 
 fe 4) '^ 
 
 ^ 
 
 r< O 
 
 d d 
 
 d d 
 
 
 1^ Th 
 
 r«^ O 
 
 00 lO 
 
 ^ O 
 
 ^^ 
 
 r^ 
 
 t^ 
 
 i^ 
 
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 A STAR * INDICATES THAT THE WORK INCLUDES A 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 The Messages and Papers of the Presidents, J. D. 
 
 Richardson. 
 A Century of American Diplomacy (1900). J. W. 
 
 Foster. 
 American Diplomacy^ Its Spirit and Achievements* 
 
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 American Diplomatic Questions (1901). J. B. Hen- 
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 The Foundations of American Foreign Policy"* (1901). 
 
 A. B. Hart. 
 American Supremacy (1908). G. W. Crichfield. 
 The Promise of American Life (1910). Herbert 
 
 Croly. 
 The Future Peace of the Anglo-Saxons (1905). S. L. 
 
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 Das Deutschtum in den Vereinigten Staaten in seiner 
 
 geschichtlichen Entwickelung (191 1). A. B. 
 
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 The German Element in the United States (1909). 
 
 A. B. Faust. 
 Das Wachstum der Vereinigten Staaten und ihre 
 
 auswdrtige Politik (1899). Albrecht Wirth. 
 170 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 171 
 
 Das Volkerrecht systematisch dargestellt. Franz von 
 
 Liszt. 
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 cio Alcorta. 
 Digest of International Law (1906). J. B. Moore. 
 Digest of the International Law of the United States 
 
 (1887). Francis Wharton. 
 Census of the United State s, 1910. 
 Le Droit international theorique et pratique (1887- 
 
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 Statistical Abstract of the United States (191 2). 
 Kleines statistisches Taschenhuch uher alle Lander der 
 
 Erde (1913). A. Hartleben. 
 La Revolution fr am; aise et V Amerique du Sud (191 2). 
 
 L. A. de Herrera. 
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 Filsinger, in The Annalsy May, 191 1. 
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 from Sadowa to Kirk-Kilisse (191 3). W. M. 
 
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 Les EtatS'Unis et la Doctrine de Monroe (1900). 
 
 Hector Petin. 
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 kletz. 
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 marchais. 
 Ibid, (1896). A. Desjardin. 
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 Ibid. (1904). T. B. Edgington. 
 
172 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Ibid. (1885). G. F. Tucker. 
 
 Ihid. (1863). Joshua Leavitt. 
 
 Ibid. (1853). S. A. Douglas {Cong. Globe, 32 Cong., 
 
 2 Sess., p. 941, and Append., p. 257). 
 The Monroe Doctrine, Its Origin and Meaning (1895). 
 
 J. B. Moore. 
 The Monroe Doctrine an Obsolete Shibboleth (191 3). 
 
 Hiram Bingham. 
 Die neuesten Anwendungen der Monroe Doctrine 
 
 (1908). J. C. Dunning. 
 Die Monroedoktrin in ihren Beziehungen %ur Ame- 
 
 rikanischen Diplomatie und zum Volkerrecht 
 
 (1913). Herbert Kraus. 
 The Life of Stephen A. Douglas (i860). J. W. 
 
 Sheahan. 
 The European Concert and the Monroe Doctrine (1905). 
 
 J. B. Angell. 
 The Clayton-Bulzver Treaty and the Monroe Doctrine 
 
 (1882). Published by United States State De- 
 partment (Sen. Ex. Doc. 194, 47 Cong., i Sess.). 
 Spain, Cuba, and the United States, Recognition and 
 
 the Monroe Doctrine {i^y 6). Americus, V. W. 
 
 Kingsley. 
 Politique exterieure des Etats-Unisy Doctrine Monroe. 
 
 Ernest Caylus. 
 Monro'isme. F. Capella y Pons. 
 Le Vol de VAigle de Monroe a Roosevelt (1905). 
 
 Joseph Ribet. 
 Les Paradis de VAmerique Centrale. Maurice de 
 
 WalefFe. 
 Vimperialisme americain. Henri Hauser. 
 Ibid. J. Patouillet. 
 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, vol. VI. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 173 
 
 Ocean to Oceariy an Accounty Personal and Historicaly 
 of Nicaragua and Its People (1902). J. W. G. 
 Walker. 
 
 Notes on Central America^ (1855). E. G. Squier. 
 
 The Relations of the United States and Spain (1909). 
 F. E. Chadwick. 
 
 The Diplomatic Relations of the United States and 
 Spanish' America (1900). J. H. Latane. 
 
 Stephen A, Douglas (1909). C. E. Carr. 
 
 Las grandes Mentiras de nuestra Historia (1904). 
 Francisco Bulnes. 
 
 American Historical Review (Monroe Doctrine), vols. 
 V, VII, VIII, XI, XVIII. 
 
 The Voyages and Works of John Davis (1880). 
 A. H. Markham. 
 
 Thoughts on the late Transactions respecting Falk- 
 land's Islands (1771). Samuel Johnson. 
 
 Voyage autour du Monde par la Fregate du Roi La 
 Boudeuse et la Flute VEtoile en 1766, 1767, 1768, 
 1769 (1771). L. A. de Bougainville. 
 
 The Case of Venezuela, a Reply to The British Blue 
 Book (1896). Commission, Government of Ven- 
 ezuela. 
 
 United States Commission on Boundary Between Ven- 
 ezuela and British Guiana (1897). 
 
 British Aggressions in Venezuela (1895). W. C. 
 Scruggs. 
 
 Venezuela, Nos. i (1899), 2 (1899), 7 (1899), i 
 (1902), I (1903), I (1904). British Foreign 
 Office. 
 
 British Guiana Boundary, Arbitration with the United 
 
174 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 States of Venezuela (1898). British Foreign 
 
 Office. 
 British Guiana^ Venezuela Boundary^ Arbitration^ etc. 
 
 (1899). British Foreign Office. 
 line Application du Principe de V Arbitrage, L. de la 
 
 Chanoine. 
 V Arbitrage anglo-venezuelien, G. Bariset. 
 The Venezuela Dispute (1896). J. B. McMaster. 
 The Venezuelan Boundary Controversy (191 3). Gro- 
 
 ver Cleveland. 
 
 Pan-Amerika* (1910). A. H. Fried. 
 
 Relaciones del Libertador Simon Bolivar, ... Dia- 
 
 rio de Bucaramanga (1869). Lacroix. 
 Documentos para la Historia de la Vida publica del 
 
 Libertador de Colombiay Peru y Bolivia (1875- 
 
 77), published by direction of General Guzman 
 
 Blanco. 
 Life of Simon Bolivar (1866). Felipe Larrazabal. 
 Simon Bolivar, E. L. Petre. 
 Esquisse de la Vie de Bolivar, S. de Schryner. 
 Union latino-americano ; Pensamiento de Bolivar ^ etc. 
 
 (1865). J. M. Torres-Caicedo. 
 The Pan-American Union (191 1). John Barrett. 
 International American Conference (1890). 
 Minutes of the International American Conference 
 
 (1890). 
 Congress of Panama^ House Resolutions^ 38, 40, 41, 
 
 I Sess., 19 Cong. (1826); Rep. of Sen. Comm., 
 
 Sen. Ex. Doc. 232, 51 Cong., i Sess., Part 3 
 
 (1890). _ 
 La Conferencia internacional de Mexico (1902). 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 175 
 
 Congres de Panama (1825). Abbe de Pradt. 
 Autour de Vlsthme de Panama. Joseph Justin. 
 Bulletin of the Pan American Union, February, 
 
 1913- 
 
 El Porvenir de la America latina (1910). Manuel 
 
 Ugarte. 
 Les Democraties latines de VAmerique (191 2). F. 
 
 Garcia-Calderon. Published in English as 
 
 Latin- America, Its Rise and Progress (1913). 
 La Politique exterieure d' Haiti (1886). J. N. Leger. 
 The Republics of Central and South America (191 3). 
 
 C. R. Knock. 
 South America, Observations and Impressions (191 2). 
 
 James Bryce. 
 Pueblo enfermo, Contribucion a la Psicologia de los 
 
 Pueblos hispano-americanos. Alcides Arguedas. 
 South American Problems* (191 2). R. E. Speer. 
 Cuestiones americanas (1907). J. S. Carranza. 
 Sild-Amerika und die deutschen Interessen (1903). 
 
 Wilhelm Sievers. 
 Welche Aussichten bieten sich den Deutschen in Sud- 
 
 Amerika, Doctor Backhaus. 
 The Two Americas (1914). Rafael Reyes. 
 V Amerique et le Droit international (1907). Etienne 
 
 Vernet. 
 Le Droit international americain (1910). Alejandro 
 
 Alvarez. 
 Race Distinctions in American Law (19 10). G. T. 
 
 Stephenson. 
 
INDEX 
 
INDEX 
 
 A B C of La tin- America, 13. 
 
 Aberdeen, Earl of, 112. 
 
 Africa, partition of, 115, 137, 155. 
 
 African race, 6. 
 
 Alaska boundary, 47, 52, 53. 
 
 Alexander VI, Pope, 70 n. 
 
 Alliances, on part of U. S., 32-39. 
 
 Alsace, 137. 
 
 Alvarez, Alejandro, on the Mon- 
 roe Doctrine, 56, 69. 
 
 America, in relation to Europe, 42, 
 153-156; transfer of territory of, 
 70-72; population of, 9, 10, 
 150-152, 15s, 156; currency, 
 weights and measures, etc., of, 
 148; armies of, 155. 
 
 Andrade, Ignacio, on Venezuela 
 boundary decision, 120. 
 
 Anglo-Saxon population, 4, 5; 
 union, 157. 
 
 Angouleme, Duke of, in Spain, 49. 
 
 Arbitration, Anglo - Venezuelan 
 boundary, 116 et seq.; of con- 
 tractual debts, 132-134; in the 
 Bolivar Idea, 141; treaties for 
 compulsory, 147. 
 
 Argentina, 13; res nidlius, 68; de- 
 clared independence, 105; col- 
 onizes Falkland Islands, 105, 
 106; Drago Doctrine, 129, 130; 
 134; invited to Congress of 
 Panama, 142; at Congress of 
 Lima (i 864-1 865), 145. 
 
 Asia, 140, 156. 
 
 Australia, 156. 
 
 Austro-Hungary, ratifies Hague 
 Convention, 133. 
 
 Aves, Island of, 70 n. 
 
 Bariset, G., on Venezuela bound- 
 ary arbitration, 117, 118, 121, 
 122. 
 
 Bartholdt, Richard, on collection 
 of contractual debts, 131, 133. 
 
 Bay Islands, The, a British de- 
 pendency, 108, 109. 
 
 Belgium, 134. 
 
 Belize. See British Honduras, 
 
 Big Stick, The, 30. 
 
 Bolivar Idea, The, 29, 30, 56, 136- 
 150, 158, 159. 
 
 Bolivar, Simon, his ill treatment, 
 20; the BoUvar Idea, 29, 30, 
 137-150; letters from, 139-141. 
 
 Bolivia, population of, 6; res 
 nullius in, 6S; 134; at Congress 
 of Lima, 145; absent from con- 
 ference at Buenos Ayres, 146. 
 
 Bougainville, L. A. de, takes pos- 
 session of Falkland Islands, 100. 
 
 Brazil, population of, 4, 9; Ger- 
 man ideas in, 6; government of, 
 13 » 134; invited to Panama 
 Congress, 142. 
 
 Brewer, D. J., Justice Supreme 
 Court of U. S., 117. 
 
 British element in America, 5, 27. 
 
 British Honduras, made a crown 
 colony, 99, 100, 127, 128. 
 
 Buchanan, James, on Clayton- 
 Bulwer Treaty, 87. 
 
 Buenos Ayres, United Provinces 
 of. See Argentina. 
 
 Buenos Ayres, Conference in, 143, 
 145; marriages in, 148, 165. 
 
 Bulgaria, 134. 
 
 Bulwer, Sir Henry, 87, 88, 91. 
 
 Byzantium, 140. 
 
 Camoens, 156. 
 
 Canada, territory of, 61 n.; U. S. 
 
 people in, 76, 156. 
 Canning, George, British secretary, 
 
 42-46; credited with suggesting 
 
 179 
 
i8o 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Monroe Doctrine, 51; his doc- 
 trine, 51-54- 
 
 Central America, population of, 
 19; as part of U. S., 60; under 
 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 91-94; 
 spoliation of, 137; invited to 
 Panama Congress, 142; at same 
 145. See Latin-America. 
 
 Cervantes, 156. 
 
 Chanoine, L. de La, on Vene- 
 zuela boundary arbitration, 118, 
 119. 
 
 Chili, population of, 7; govern- 
 ment of, 13, 134; invited to 
 Congress of Panama, 142; at 
 Congresses of Lima, 145; at 
 Congress of Santiago, id. 
 
 China, ratifies Hague Convention, 
 133, 137, 159. 
 
 Chincha Islands, The, 126, 127. 
 
 Civil War in U. S., foreign ele- 
 ment in, 78. 
 
 Clarendon, Lord, as to Clayton- 
 Bulwer Treaty, 93. 
 
 Clay, Henry, against transfer of 
 Cuba, 70. 
 
 Clayton, J. M., in Senate, 35; 
 secretary of state, 88 n. 
 
 Clayton, S. M., commanding Falk- 
 land Islands, 105. 
 
 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 86393;^ 
 proposed abrogation of, 109. 
 
 Cleveland, President, on Anglo- 
 Venezuelan dispute, no. 
 
 Clipperton Island, 62 n. 
 
 Coaling stations for U. S., 93, 94. 
 
 ColHns, Sir Richard, 117. 
 
 Colombia, population of, 7 ; course 
 of U. S. toward, 74, 95, 134; 
 hegemony of, 142; invited to 
 Panama Congress, id.; at same, 
 145; at Congress of Lima, id. 
 See Panama, Secession of. 
 
 Colonization by non-American 
 powers, 47, 53-55, 60-69. 
 
 Colored people in U. S., 5, 26, 27; 
 in Latin- America, 6, 8, 9. 
 
 Commercial Bureau of the Ameri- 
 can Republics, The, 142. 
 
 Concessions, Latin- American, 67, 
 68. 
 
 Congress of Panama. See Panama. 
 
 Contractual Debts. See Debts. 
 
 Conventions, Hague Conference, 
 13 1- 1 34. See Treaties and Pro- 
 tocol. 
 
 Corea, 137. 
 
 Corinth, Isthmus of, 140. 
 
 Corinto, British occupation of, 131. 
 
 Costa Rica, subscribes to debt of 
 Nicaragua, 131, 134; not at 
 Hague Conference, id. 
 
 Creoles, 6, 8. 
 
 Cuba, transfer of, 70, 71, 134. 
 
 Davis, John, said to have discov- 
 ered Falkland Islands, 99. 
 
 Debts, collection of contractual, 
 129-134. See Public loans. 
 
 Denmark, despoiled by Austria 
 and Prussia, 82, 83; ratifies 
 Hague Convention, 133. 
 
 Diaz, Porfirio, 7. 
 
 Dollar Diplomacy, 30. 
 
 Dominican Republic, under finan- 
 cial tutelage, 124, 134; absent 
 from Washington Conference, 
 146. 
 
 Douglas, S. A., on Clayton-Bulwer 
 Treaty, 89-91. 
 
 Drago Doctrine, The, 128-130, 
 136. 
 
 Drago, L. M. See Drago Doctrine, 
 
 Eastern Hemisphere, American 
 
 territory in, 61, 62. See Old 
 
 World. 
 Ecuador, population of, 6, 7; res 
 
 nullius in, 68, 134; at Congresses 
 
 of Lima, 145; at Congress of 
 
 Santiago, id. 
 Europe, in relation to America, 24, 
 
 25, 41, 42, 63-72, 81-84, 140, 
 
 153-156. 
 Exclusion of Mongolians, 31. 
 Expansion, by U. S., 40, 44. 
 
 Falkland Islands, appropriation, 
 
 of, 99-108. 
 Fiji Islands, colonized by Great 
 
 Britain, 99. 
 France, in relation to U. S., 33-36; 
 
 to Great Britain, 43, 44, 52; 
 
 intervention of, in Mexico, 94- 
 
INDEX 
 
 i8i 
 
 97, 125, 127; first settles Falk- 
 land Islands, 100; ratifies Hague 
 Convention, 133; annexes Mad- 
 agascar and Morocco, 137, 155, 
 163. 
 
 Frelinghuysen, F. T., secretary of 
 state, 109. 
 
 French element in America, 6, 8, 
 27. 
 
 French Revolution, influence of, 
 17. 
 
 Fuller, M. W., Chief Justice, 117. 
 
 Garcia-Calderon, F., opposed to 
 immigration from U. S., 24. 
 
 German element in Latin-America, 
 6, 8, 27. 
 
 Germany, intervenes in Hayti, 
 128; in Venezuela, id.; ratifies 
 Hague Convention, 133; her an- 
 nexation of Alsace and Lor- 
 raine, 137; her interests in 
 South America, 138, 155, 163. 
 
 Grant, President, on transfer of 
 territory, 71; disappearance of 
 European power from America, 
 
 Great Britain, present troubles of, 
 3; opposes emigration to U. S., 
 3, 4; in relation to U. S., 34-36, 
 42-45, 8s et seq., 156-158; in 
 relation to Nicaragua, 35, 130, 
 131; to Holy Alliance, 42, 50, 
 51; to Latin- America, 42-44; 
 to France, 43, 44, 52; her pos- 
 sessions in Western Hemisphere, 
 62, 99-108; in Pacific Ocean, 99, 
 115; refuses to abrogate Clay- 
 ton-Bulwer Treaty, 109; con- 
 troversy with Venezuela, iio- 
 120, 137; grasping diplomacy 
 of, 122, 123; ratifies Hague Con- 
 vention, 133; her spoliation of 
 Central America, 137; opposed 
 to Pan Americanism, 156. 
 
 Greece, 134. 
 
 Guam, Island of, 62. 
 
 Guatemala, subscribes to debt of 
 Nicaragua, 131; ratifies Hague 
 Convention, 133. 
 
 Guiana, British, boundary contro- 
 versy, no et seq. 
 
 Hague Conference, as to contrac- 
 tual debts, 131-134. 
 
 Haiti. See Hayti. 
 
 Harrison, Benjamin, on Venezue- 
 lan boundary decision, 120. 
 
 Hayti, intervention in, 128; rati- 
 fies Hague Convention, 133 ; ab- 
 sent from conference at Rio de 
 Janeiro, 146. 
 
 Holland, her litigation with Ven- 
 ezuela, 70 n.; acquires part of 
 Guiana, in. 
 
 Holy Alliance, The, 41, 42 n. 
 
 Honduras, 134; not at Hague 
 Conference, id. 
 
 Iberian-American, distinguished 
 from Latin- American, 4; mu- 
 latto, 6. 
 
 Immigration, to U. S., 3-5; to 
 Latin- America, 16, 18, 19, 21- 
 23, 76, 77. 
 
 India, British, 86, 157. 
 
 Indian race, American, 6-9. 
 
 International Bureau of American 
 Republics, The, 142. 
 
 International philanthropy, 31, 
 124. 
 
 Intervention, by U. S., 39, 40; 
 by Holy Alliance, 47-50; by 
 France in Mexico, 94-97, 125; 
 by Spain in Peru, 126, 127; by 
 Germany in Hayti, 128; by 
 Great Britain, Germany, and 
 Italy in Venezuela, 1 28. 
 
 Italian element in America, 27. 
 
 Italy, intervenes in Venezuela, 
 128, 134, 137, 163. 
 
 Japan, ratifies Hague Convention, 
 
 133; 137. 159. 
 Juarez, B. P., President of Mexico, 
 
 7. 
 Junius, 104. 
 
 Kilpatrick, H. J., minister to 
 Chili, 126, 127. 
 
 Latin-America, population of, 3- 
 28; 76, 156; republicanism of, 
 10-13, 66-68; union of coun- 
 tries of, 17 ; influenced by French 
 
l82 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Revolution, 17; two great wants 
 of, 28; congresses of republics 
 of, 36, 143-145; opposed to po- 
 litical system of Europe, 50; 
 liberation of, 52; in relation to 
 Monroe Doctrine, 56, 57; revo- 
 lutions in, 77; as a market, 83, 
 84; absorption of, 84; collec- 
 tion of contractual debts in, 
 131-136; represented at Hague 
 Conference, 134; German inter- 
 ests in, 138; trade of, 167-169. 
 
 Latin-Americans, distinguished 
 from Iberian- Americans, 4; in 
 U. S., 14-16; in Europe, id., 
 163; characteristics of, 18-20. 
 
 Latin race, 24. 
 
 Lima, Congresses of, 36, 145. 
 
 Lodge, H. C., on his resolution, 79; 
 on the Anglo- Venezuelan con- 
 troversy, 1 14- 1 16. 
 
 Lodge Resolution, The. See 
 Lodge f H. C. 
 
 Lorraine, 139. 
 
 Luxemburg, 134, 163. 
 
 Madagascar, 137. 
 Mallet-Prevost, counsel of Ven- 
 ezuela, on Venezuelan boundary 
 
 decision, 120. 
 Martens, Frederic de. Privy 
 
 Councillor, 117, 120. 
 Mestizo, 7, 8. 
 Mettemich, Prince, 42 n. 
 Mexico, as part of U. S., 60, 75, 76; 
 
 partly absorbed by U. S., 74, 77; 
 
 French intervention in, 94-97; 
 
 ratifies Hague Convention, 133; 
 
 invited to Panama Congress, 
 
 142; at same, 145. 
 Mexico City, Conference in, 143, 
 
 145. 
 Mongolians, excluded from U. S., 
 
 131. 
 Monroe, President, his message, 
 
 December 2, 1823, 47-50- 
 
 See Monroe Doctrine. 
 Monroe Doctrine, The, 29, 46-84; 
 "^ for benefit of U. S., 55-57; 
 
 sphere of, 57-59; enforcement 
 
 of, 59, 60; as to expansion by 
 
 U. S., 60; cases under, 85 el 
 
 seq.; 136; as protection of West- 
 ern Hemisphere, 138. 
 
 Montenegro, 134. 
 
 Morocco, 137. 
 
 Mosquito Coast, British Domin- 
 ion, 108, 109. 
 
 Mulatto, 6. 
 
 Napoleon III, his intervention in 
 Mexico, 94, 95. 
 
 Netherlands, ratifies Hague Con- 
 vention, 133. 
 
 New Granada. See Colombia. 
 
 New World. See Western Hemi- 
 sphere. 
 
 New York, 148. 
 
 New Zealand, colonized by Great 
 Britain, 99. 
 
 Nicaragua, in relation to U. S., 35, 
 131; fined by Great Britain, 
 131; financially assisted by 
 Costa Rica, San Salvador, and 
 Guatemala, 131; ratifies Hague 
 Convention, 133. 
 
 Non-recognition of governments 
 based on violence, 31. 
 
 Norway, ratifies Hague Conven- 
 tion, 133, 163. 
 
 Old World, overpopulation of, 137; 
 consciousness, 150-152, 156, 
 159. See Ancient World, East- 
 ern Hemisphere. 
 
 Open Door in China, The, 31. 
 
 Orient, The mastery of the, 159. 
 
 Pacific Ocean, The, 159. 
 
 Palmyra Island, 62 n. 
 
 Pan America, Pan Americanism. 
 See Bolivar Idea. 
 
 Pan American Association, 142; 
 Union, 142-145; conferences, 
 143-150; congresses, 143, 145; 
 league, treaties, conventions, 
 145-147; consciousness, 150; 
 soHdarity, 151, 153; railroad, 
 147, 148. 
 
 Panama, Congress of, 36-38, 81, 
 141, 142, 145; as site for con- 
 gresses, 139, 140. 
 
 Panama, Secession of, 18; ratifies 
 Hague Convention, 133. 
 
INDEX 
 
 183 
 
 Panama Canal, The, 60, 138, 151. 
 
 Paraguay, res nullius, 68; 134. 
 
 Peace conferences, 39, 40. 
 
 Pekin, allied expedition to, 40. 
 
 Persia, 134, 
 
 Peru, population of, 6, 7, 134; at 
 Congress of Panama, 145; at 
 Congresses of Lima, id.; at Con- 
 gresses of Santiago, id. 
 
 Philippine Islands, The, independ- 
 ence for, 31, 40, 41; acquisition 
 of, 40; in Eastern Hemisphere, 
 61, 62. 
 
 Political system of Europe, 48, 50, 
 63-66. 
 
 Polk, President, his understand- 
 ing of Monroe Doctrine, 59; on 
 transfer of territory, 71. 
 
 Population and government, 3-28. 
 
 Port de la Croisade, 10 1. 
 
 Port Egmont, 101-104. 
 
 Port Louis, first settlement in 
 Falkland Islands, 100; evacu- 
 ated, 105. 
 
 Porto Rico, transfer of, 70. 
 
 Portugal, 4, 6; ratifies Hague Con- 
 vention, 133; 156, 163. 
 
 Protective tariff. See Tarijff. 
 
 Protocol (1840), Russia, England, 
 France, 82. 
 
 Public loans, under Drago Doc- 
 trine, 130, 135 n. See Debts. 
 
 Rayner, Isidor, on Venezuela 
 boundary controversy, no. 
 
 Res nullius in America, 53, 54, 68, 
 69. 
 
 Rio de Janeiro, Conference in, 
 143. 
 
 Rojas, J. M. de, on Venezuelan 
 boundary decision, 120. 
 
 Roosevelt, President, on hege- 
 mony of U. S., 30 n., 123, 124. 
 
 Rosebery, Earl of, 113. 
 
 Roumania, ratifies Hague Con- 
 vention, 133. 
 
 Rush, Richard, U. S. minister, 42, 
 53 n. 
 
 Russel, Lord Chief Justice, 117. 
 
 Russia, boundary of, Alaskan, 47, 
 52, 53; ratifies Hague Conven- 
 tion, 133; 137, iss, 159. 
 
 Salvador. See San Salvador. 
 
 Sambo, 6. 
 
 San Salvador, subscribes to debt 
 of Nicaragua, 131; ratifies 
 Hague Convention, 133; at 
 Congress of Lima (i 864-1 865), 
 
 145- 
 
 Santiago, Congress of, 36, 145. 
 
 Santo Domingo. See Dominican 
 Republic. 
 
 Schleswig-Holstein. See Denmark. 
 
 Schomburgk, Sir R. H., in. 
 
 Self-preservation, right of, 79, 80. 
 
 Servia, 134. 
 
 Seward, W. H., secretary of state, 
 36, 95, 97, 127- 
 
 Shakespeare, 156. 
 
 Shirt-sleeve diplomacy, no. 
 
 Siam, 134. 
 
 Solomon Islands, colonized by 
 Great Britain, 99. 
 
 South America. See Latin-Amer- 
 ica. 
 
 Spain, invasion of, 49 n., 52; in 
 relation to Cuba, 70; to Portu- 
 gal, 70 n.; claims Falkland Is- 
 lands, loi; expels British from, 
 103; restores islands to British, 
 103, 104; right by discovery, to 
 Guiana, in, 134, 156, 163. 
 
 Spanish- America, 4, 6; union of 
 countries of, 17. 
 
 Spanish element in America, 4, 6, 
 27. 
 
 St. Barthelemy, Island of, trans- 
 ferred, 72. 
 
 Strong, John, first explored Falk- 
 land Islands, 99. 
 
 Suffrage in Latin- America, 12. 
 
 Sweden, returned Island of St. 
 Barthelemy to France, 72, 134, 
 163. 
 
 Switzerland, 134. 
 
 Taft, President, 80. 
 
 Tariff, for revenue, 30; a factor in 
 
 diplomacy, 60, 151. 
 Territory, value of, 137, 138. 
 Texas, revolt of, against Mexico, 
 
 77- 
 Trade of U. S. with Latin- America, 
 
 167-169. 
 
1 84 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Transfer of American territory, 
 70-72. 
 
 Treaties, U. S- with France, 33; 
 with Great Britain, 34, 86-91; 
 with Nicaragua, 35; with Co- 
 lombia, 95; Great Britain with 
 Venezuela, 116. See Protocol, 
 Conventions y Pan American. 
 
 Tripoli, 137. 
 
 Turkey, 134. 
 
 Ugarte, Manuel, on Latin-Ameri- 
 can republicanism, 10-12; op- 
 posed to U. S. immigration, 16; 
 favors Latin-American Union, 
 17; on hegemony of U. S., 73; 
 favors European protection, 81, 
 82. 
 
 United States, population of, 4, 5, 
 26, 27; immigration from, 16; 
 in secession of Panama, 18; 
 oflBcials of, in Antilles, 22 n.; 
 foreign policy of, cardinal prin- 
 ciples, 29 et seq.; minor prin- 
 ciples, 30, 31; hegemony of, 30, 
 72-75, 123, 124; responsibility 
 of, for Latin- America, 3 1 ; com- 
 mand of the Pacific, 31; in rela- 
 tion to France, 33-36, 125; to 
 Great Britain, 34-36, 156-158; 
 to Nicaragua, 35; to Con- 
 gresses of Latin- American re- 
 publics, 36-38; to Pan American 
 Conferences, 39, 144; to Peace 
 Conferences, 39, 40; to Russia, 
 47; to Dominican Republic, 124; 
 to Germany, 158; not seeking 
 territory, 74-76; not protector 
 
 of Latin- America, 76, 80, 81, 
 127; ratifies Hague Convention, 
 133; invited^ to Panama Con- 
 gress, 142; its pohcy toward 
 Latin- America, 152, 153; citi- 
 zens of, in Europe, 163; trade 
 of, 167-169. 
 Uruguay, population of, 7, 9; gov- 
 ernment of, 13; 134. 
 
 Van Buren, Martin, his declara- 
 tion respecting Cuba, 70, 71. 
 
 Venezuela, her litigation with Hol- 
 land, 70 n.; her controversy 
 with Great Britain, 1 10-120, 
 137; intervention in, 128, 134; 
 at Congress of Lima (1864- 
 1865), 145; absent from con- 
 ference at Rio de Janeiro, 146. 
 
 Vernet, Louis, 105, 106. 
 
 Waleffe, Maurice de, on expan- 
 sion of U. S., 75. 
 
 Washington, Conference in, 143- 
 145- 
 
 Washington Precept, The, 29-41, 
 47, 158. 
 
 Washington's Farewell Address. 
 See Washington Precept. 
 
 Webster, Daniel, on the Monroe 
 Doctrine, 58; on transfer of 
 Cuba, 71. 
 
 Western Hemisphere, The, 42; 
 expansion in, 51; sphere of 
 Monroe Doctrine, 57, 58, 61, 62, 
 138; contractual debts in. 135, 
 136, 156, 159. 
 
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