REESE LIBRARY 
 
 OF THE 
 
 NIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. 
 
 Received 
 
 Accessions No.__?._ 2?/_Oj3_ . Shelf No. 
 
BY THE SAME AUTHOR 
 
 THE POLITICAL EXPERIENCE OF THE 
 
 ANCIENTS, IN ITS BEARING ON MODERN TIMES. 
 JOHN MURRAY. London, 1851. Second Edition, 1865. 
 
 NOTES ON PUBLIC SUBJECTS, MADE 
 
 DURING A TOUR IN THE UNITED STATES 
 AND IN CANADA. JOHN MURRAY, 1852. 
 
 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
 
 STATES COMPARED WITH OUR OWN. JOHN 
 MURRAY, 1853. 
 
 TRANSLATIONS FROM PINDAR. EDWAKD 
 
 MOXON & Co., Dover Street, 1866. 
 
 \_All the above are now out o 
 
A MANUAL 
 
 OP THE 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF GOYEKNMENT, 
 
 AS SET FORTH BY THE AUTHORITIES OF ANCIENT 
 AND MODERN TIMES. 
 
 BT 
 
 HUGH SEYMOUR TREMENHEERE, C.B., 
 
 1 ; 
 Late Fellow of New College, Oxford, M.A., and of the Inner Temple, 
 
 Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 "The basis of the philosophy of man is to be laid in the records of his past existence." 
 HALLAM'S History qf Literature, Vol. ii, p. 69. 
 
 A NEW AND ENLARGED EDITION. 
 
 (UNIVERSITY 
 Ml gg[ 
 
 KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH & CO., 1, PATERNOSTER SQUARE. 
 
 1882. 
 
LONDON : 
 
 PRINTED BY ROWORTH AND CO. LIMITED, 
 
 NEtV'TON STREET, HIGH HOLBORN. 
 
 2- 2. / ^ 
 
 \*\ 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 THE First Edition of this book was published in 1852, the 
 second in 1865, under the title of " The Political Experience 
 of the Ancients, in its bearing upon Modern Times," and 
 has been long out of print. 
 
 It comprised in its Second Part a summary of the 
 opinions of a few of the greatest modern writers on the 
 principles of government. 
 
 On republishing it, with considerable additions to the 
 Second Part, it has been necessary to give it a more general 
 title. 
 
 PART I remains as it was first published. In it I have 
 put together concisely all that is most valuable in the 
 treatises on politics that have been left to us by three of 
 the most distinguished writers of antiquity. 
 
 Aristotle's celebrated treatise on government (com- 
 monly called his treatise on "Politics") was written 
 after a careful investigation of all the constitutions under 
 which the different free states of antiquity had been 
 governed previously to and during his day. 
 
IV PREFACE. 
 
 The masterly sketch by Polybius of the rise and pro- 
 gress of the Roman institutions the Preface to his great 
 work on Roman History was written at the time when 
 the constitution had attained its greatest perfection. 
 
 The beautiful fragment of Cicero, "On a Republic," 
 recovered in a remarkable manner in the year 1822 at 
 Rome, contains a clear and philosophical exposition of a 
 portion of the same subject, intermingled with touches of 
 patriotism and of eloquence that give it an additional 
 value. 
 
 These three dissertations embody nearly the whole of 
 the "ancient wisdom" on the subject of constitutional 
 government ; and, notwithstanding the achievements of 
 modern knowledge, are still recognised as the fountain 
 head of the principles of Political Science, and as lights 
 for the instruction of all ages. In the words of Burke, 
 " The science of government would be poorly cultivated 
 without the study of the form and spirit of the ancient 
 republics." 
 
 In PART II, I have traced the current of philosophical 
 opinion on the principles of government from the date of 
 Cicero's treatise to the present day. It will be seen that 
 this current runs through a series of great authorities, 
 nearly all in substantial agreement on first principles, and 
 all combining to exemplify the unity of history. I have 
 
PREFACE. V 
 
 thus endeavoured, in this compilation, to fulfil an intention 
 expressed in the First Edition. My duties on many 
 Parliamentary and Royal Commissions of Inquiry relating 
 to the manufacturing, mining, and agricultural populations, 
 from 1839 continuously to 1870, with a view to the reme- 
 dial legislation gradually adopted during those years and 
 to the great measure of elementary education, very early 
 led me to believe, from the facts of a more general nature 
 disclosed by those inquiries, that a short manual on the 
 principles of government would be a useful and accept- 
 able aid towards the formation of political opinion. I 
 venture to think that its republication at the present time, 
 with additions, will not be out of place. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PAKT I. 
 
 ARISTOTLE (B.C. 384 322) ON POLITICAL SOCIETY AND 
 
 GOVERNMENT. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Book I. Origin and Objects of Political Society ... 1 
 
 II. The Constitutions of the Free States of 
 
 Greece ... ... ... ... 6 
 
 III. The Franchise ... ... ... ... 10 
 
 The Different Forms of Government ... 12 
 
 IY. The Progressive Changes of Government ... 24 
 
 The Conditions necessary to the Best Form 
 
 of Government ... ... ... 38 
 
 V. Of Revolutions ... ... ... 46 
 
 VI. Of True Liberty ... ... ... 67 
 
 VII. The Foundation of Public Happiness ... 70 
 
 On National Character ... ... ... 74 
 
 On Education .. 76 
 
 POLYBIUS ON THE ROMAN CONSTITUTION, IN THE 
 PREFACE TO THE SIXTH BOOK OF HIS HISTORY OF 
 ROME ... ... ... ... ... ... 78 
 
 EXTRACTS FROM CICERO'S TREATISE ON A REPUBLIC OR 
 COMMONWEALTH ... ... ... ... 87 
 
 * The text which I used was that of Goettliug, Jena, 1824. 
 
V1U CONTENTS. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 OUTLINE OF THE COURSE OF OPINIONS ON THE BEST FORM 
 OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE DATE OF CICERO'S TREATISE 
 TO MODERN TIMES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 f Introduction ... ... ... ... ... 119 
 
 fMachiavelli 120 
 
 f Bodin 123 
 
 * Bacon ... ... ... ... ... 126 
 
 fBellenden 129 
 
 Harrington ... ... ... ... ... 131 
 
 Algernon Sydney ... ... ... ... 132 
 
 t Locke 134 
 
 * Vico... ... ... ... ... ... 143 
 
 * Hume ... ... ... ... ... 146 
 
 * Montesquieu ... ... ... ... ... 149 
 
 Dugald Stewart ... ... ... ... 152 
 
 Pitt, Fox, Burke ... ... ... ... 158 
 
 Sir James Mackintosh ... ... ... ... 177 
 
 Earl Russell, John Stuart Mill, and other authorities 
 
 on the Representation of Minorities ... ... 181 
 
 John Stuart Mill on Bentham ... ... ... 199 
 
 De Tocqueville on the Omnipotence of Majorities 203 
 
 * Earl Russell on Representation ... 205 
 
 Postscript ... ... ... ... ... 208 
 
 * The subjects marked with an asterisk, and all the passages in the text between 
 brackets [ ], have been added in the present edition ; those marked f have been 
 rewritten. 
 
CONTENTS. ix 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 * A. M. De Tocqueville and other authorities on the 
 
 Old Government of France and the Revolution 
 
 (" L'Ancien Regime et la Revolution") ... 211 
 
 * B. The Change, within the last fifty years, of the 
 
 Constitutions of the individual States of the 
 American Union to pure Democracies, and its 
 effects on the General Government ... ... 227 
 
 c C. The Origin and Growth of our Constitution, from 
 
 the earliest Records of History ... ... 259 
 
 * The subjects marked with an asterisk have been added iu the present edition. 
 
OF 
 
 SRSITY 
 
 ^ -^ 
 
 THE 
 
 PEINCIPLES OF GOYEENMENT. 
 
 PART I. 
 ARISTOTLE 
 
 ON POLITICAL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT 
 
 (B.C. 384322). 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 Objects of Political Society. Various Forms of. Origin and 
 Growth of. 
 
 EEEATA. 
 
 Page 126, line 14, for "have" read "who have." 
 
 Page 163, line 24, for "other power" read " the other powers." 
 
 Page 203, line 25, for " 138 " read " 139." 
 
 Page 214, last line, insert comma after " resolutions." 
 
 Page 223, line 6, for " de d'y voter " read " d'y voter." 
 
 Page 225, first line, for " equally " read " Equally." 
 
 Page 242, line 6, for "before the public" read "to light." 
 
 V u.u su, ici us IOOK at society m its 
 growth. 
 

 
THE 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT, 
 
 PART I. 
 
 ARISTOTLE 
 
 ON POLITICAL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT 
 
 (B.C. 384322). 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 Objects of Political Society. Various Forms of. Origin and 
 Growth of. 
 
 EVERY political society is a sort of community or 
 partnership ; and as every partnership is established 
 for the sake of some good, apparent or real, expected 
 to result from it, it is plain that the greatest partner- 
 ship of all, presiding over and comprehending all the 
 rest, namely, a commonwealth or political society, 
 must aim at the greatest good and the highest 
 benefits that can be derived from such a union. 
 
 The forms which commonwealths or political 
 societies assume are various, and to understand them 
 aright we must analyse them, and resolve them into 
 their constituent elements. 
 
 In order to do so, let us look at society in its 
 growth. 
 
2 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 We shall there find that certain parts or elements, 
 which cannot exist separately, are brought together 
 by a mutual necessity, namely, males and females ; 
 for without this union the species would cease to exist. 
 
 In the same manner, also, unless some ruled and 
 others obeyed, society would be destroyed ; for there 
 would be no security, and consequently society would 
 perish. 
 
 The same necessity, therefore, that compels associa- 
 tion produces government. 
 
 Again, knowledge and foresight are requisite for 
 the safety of a community. There must, therefore, 
 be the head to devise and to rule, and the hand to 
 obey and execute. And hence the relation of master 
 and servant. 
 
 Of the associations above mentioned, that of the 
 Family is the first in order; as says Hesiod (B.C. 850), 
 ef Get first a house, and then a wife, and then an ox to 
 plough;" for this primary association is founded on 
 daily exigency. 
 
 The next, founded, not on daily exigency, but on 
 the occasional requirements of mutual utility, is the 
 association of many houses, or the Village. 
 
 The village seems to have arisen naturally as the 
 offshoot or colony from the family; as is indeed 
 denoted by the name given to it in some places, 
 where the village is called a community, " nourished 
 by the same milk," the children and grandchildren of 
 the original stock. 
 
 Now, as every house is ruled by the head of the 
 
Book I.] OBJECTS OP POLITICAL SOCIETY, ETC. 3 
 
 family, and as these several families in the village 
 belonged to the same stock, and recognised the same 
 original head, their relationship led them to obey that 
 head. And thence arose the principle of obedience 
 to a chief or king ; which principle was by degrees 
 extended from the village to a collection of villages, 
 to a city or a commonwealth, and thence to nations. 
 
 This was the opinion in the time of Homer (B.C. 
 1000), for he says : " To wives and children patriarchs, 
 gave the law ; " for the growing communities were, as 
 it were, of a man's own household. 
 
 The village community having in the course of its 
 growth provided for its natural wants, the next step 
 therefore is, that out of the union of many villages is 
 formed a city or commonwealth. As the object of 
 the village community is to provide the means of 
 existence, the object of the union of many villages 
 into a city or commonwealth is to protect, exalt, and 
 perfect that existence. And this end and aim of a 
 commonwealth or political society is as conformable 
 to nature, as the end and aim of the earlier and 
 simpler associations. For that which conduces to 
 the perfection of a thing is most in accordance with 
 the order of nature. Man is therefore as much 
 formed by nature for a state of political society, as 
 he is for the simplest bonds of union those of his 
 family and his village. Even some animals unite in 
 a sort of society, and have the means of communi- 
 cating to each other their pains and pleasures ; but 
 to man alone has been given the power of considering 
 
 B2 
 
4 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 and giving expression to what concerns him what 
 is good or bad for him ; what is expedient or hurtful ; 
 just or unjust. And in order to consider these things 
 in common, men unite and form themselves into a 
 political society. They do so, as it were, by a 
 natural impulse, for they perceive that it leads to 
 the perfecting of man's nature. For without law and 
 justice man is the worst of all creatures. For, first 
 of all, he has craft and courage ; he then furnishes 
 himself with arms, and uses them against everything 
 right and good ; he becomes the embodiment of armed 
 injustice, which is the cruellest of tyrannies. Unholy 
 and savage, knowing nothing of religion, virtue, or 
 law, he abandons himself to his passions, to lust and 
 gluttony. Numerous were the benefits, therefore, 
 that he conferred on mankind, whoever he was, who 
 first taught men to live together in political societies. 
 As the whole is greater than a part, so is society 
 greater than an individual ; and as a hand or foot can 
 hardly be properly called such, in reference to their 
 uses, if separated from the body, so an individual is as 
 nothing, apart from the society to which he belongs. 
 For if he could stand alone and apart from all his 
 fellows, so might all the rest ; which is unnatural and 
 impossible for man. 
 
 Political society, therefore, is a greater and loftier 
 thing than an individual, and prior even in the in- 
 tention of Nature; for Nature (or the God of Nature) 
 intended, not man's existence alone, but the perfecting 
 of his moral and intellectual being, which is impossible 
 
BookL] OBJECTS OF POLITICAL SOCIETY, ETC. 5 
 
 except under the protection of political society, of 
 which justice is the rule and basis. 
 
 Aristotle (Chapters 2 to 5) then proceeds to analyse the 
 different domestic relations, which consist of husband and wife, 
 father and child, and, in his time, of master and slave. We need 
 not follow him in his reasonings in favour of the institution of 
 slavery, the mild and enlightened spirit of Christianity having 
 extinguished it among civilized nations ; or in the details of the 
 remainder of this Book, the subjects touched upon belonging 
 chiefly to the province of political economy, and being, there- 
 fore, now better understood. After pointing out the different 
 means by which, in the early growth of society, the industry of 
 the individual and the family contributed first to their support, 
 and then to the increase of their wealth and substance, he 
 adds : 
 
 " The next step in the social progress is that of the 
 interchange of commodities, and, in order to facilitate 
 this, the use of money. Thence arose the love of 
 gain, and, by degrees, the pursuit of wealth for its 
 own sake, the passion of avarice ever strengthening 
 itself in the mind. Mere accumulation becomes in 
 that case the end and aim of existence, instead of the 
 endeavour to improve and embellish existence by the 
 cultivation of all the moral and intellectual qualities. 
 This passion of money-getting is in itself boundless, 
 and if it cannot satisfy itself by fair means, it does 
 not scruple to resort to others, prostituting the best 
 powers and principles to its service. Very different 
 from this inordinate passion is the moderate and 
 equitable pursuit of wealth, with a view to comfort- 
 able subsistence and a provident care for those that 
 are to come after us. This is consistent with the 
 development of every virtue ; and it should ever be 
 borne in mind, in all reasonings and all measures 
 
6 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 having the increase of wealth for their object, that 
 there is a greater thing than that to be considered ; 
 namely, the cultivation of virtue and the elevation of 
 man's nature. And this is the work of Education, 
 a subject deserving of every attention ; for its first 
 object is to develop the domestic virtues ; and on the 
 domestic virtues depend those of the state." 
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 Having thus traced the growth of society from its infancy, 
 Aristotle proceeds, in his Second Book, to investigate the dif- 
 ferent forms of government known in his time, in order to 
 determine which was the best. It is said that, in order to 
 qualify himself for this task, he studied the laws and constitu- 
 tions of two hundred commonwealths.* Cicero bears testimony 
 to the fact, that Aristotle in this work " expounded the man- 
 ners, institutions, and social arrangements of nearly all the 
 existing states ; not those of Greece only, but those of all the 
 neighbouring countries." f 
 
 Ideal Commonwealths and their Errors. Sketch of the Constitu- 
 tions of Sparta, Carthage, and Athens, their Excellences and 
 Defects. 
 
 Before entering upon these, however, he disposes of the 
 arguments adduced in his day in favour of Plato's imaginary 
 Republic, founded on a community of wives, children, and pro- 
 perty. He shows such an arrangement of society to be contrary 
 to nature, destructive of industry and enterprise, as well as of 
 all the natural affections, and consequently rendering impossible 
 all social and moral progress, and all virtue. He then notices 
 other schemes of ideal republics ; first, that of Phaleas of Chal- 
 cedon, who proposed the equalization of property. J But to 
 
 * Fabricius, Bibliotheca Graeca. Hamb., 1791, vol. ii, p. 196, qnoted 
 by Dr. Gillies, in his translation of the " Politics," in 2 vols. 8vo, 1804. 
 This translation gives Aristotle's work entire, and, therefore, contains 
 much that is now useless with reference to modern times ; it contains 
 also long dissertations that have a strong party bias. 
 
 f De Finibus, Lib. v, c. 4. 
 
 J Modern socialism and communism are scarcely more than the 
 reproduction of these errors, which were exploded upwards of 2,000 
 years ago. 
 
BookIL] VARIOUS FORMS OF POLITICAL SOCIETY. 7 
 
 this Aristotle objects that, even if it were desirable, in order to 
 make it effectual a restraint must at the same time be placed 
 upon marriage, and also upon education ; for otherwise the 
 increase of numbers, and the free development of the faculties 
 of those gifted with superior ability, would soon destroy that 
 equality. Neither would such equality conduce to greater 
 happiness or greater order and tranquillity ; for it would not 
 extinguish in the human mind either its passions and ill- 
 regulated desires, or its ambition, which, if it has not a natural 
 and equitable course open to it, will gratify itself at any risk 
 and by any means, even the most violent, and end in the sub- 
 version of the state. The real remedy for these passions, and 
 the most effectual means of happiness, are to be found, he says, 
 in industry, in the cultivation of the mind and heart, and in 
 the pursuits of wisdom and philosophy. 
 
 Chapter 5. He next deals with the ideal commonwealth 
 proposed by Hippodamus, the architect who constructed the 
 Piraeus; and having shown the fallacy of its pretensions, he 
 warns his countrymen against rash innovations generally, as 
 tending to weaken the authority of law. 
 
 " Many," he says, " go so far as to doubt the expe- 
 diency of changing the ancient laws even for those 
 that may be better. But in this they are wrong ; for 
 it is impossible that every state of circumstances can 
 have been foreseen from the beginning, and it is 
 necessary, therefore, that legislation should adapt 
 itself to a new condition of things. But these 
 changes should be effected with great care and 
 caution, and it is better to bear with some amount of 
 error and inconvenience rather than accustom men 
 lightly to change the laws and institutions of their 
 country. For these laws and institutions derive a 
 great portion of their efficacy from time and custom, 
 and lightly to change them weakens the habit of 
 obedience, and undermines the authority of all law." 
 
 Chapter 6. Having as it were cleared the ground, by no- 
 ticing the various forms of ideal republics which were attracting 
 
THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 attention in his time, he takes in hand four of the most con- 
 spicuous commonwealths known to the Greeks, the Spartan, 
 the Cretan, the Carthaginian, and the Athenian ; and of these 
 respectively he points out the characteristic faults and excel- 
 lences. In the Spartan he comments on the poverty of the 
 magistrates (the Ephori), elected to represent the people. This 
 poverty exposed them to bribery, and subjected them to the 
 influence of demagogues. 
 
 " Yet," he adds, " imperfect as was this institution, 
 it contributed to the duration of the Spartan govern- 
 ment; for in it all classes were represented: the 
 kingly power; the aristocratic, whose talents and 
 virtues placed them in the senate; and the demo- 
 cratic, acting through their elected magistrates: all 
 orders of the state, therefore, were satisfied with its 
 arrangements, and harmoniously combined together 
 to preserve it." 
 
 After adverting to other defects in the Spartan institutions, 
 and especially that their main scope and object was the cultivation 
 of the warlike at the expense of all the other virtues, he passes 
 in review the government of Crete, which was earlier and more 
 imperfect than that of Sparta. (Chapter 7.) In that of Car- 
 thage, which is similar in its general character to those of Crete 
 and Sparta, he finds more subjects of commendation ; the proof 
 of its good qualities being, that, under it, order and liberty had 
 been preserved for many generations. 
 
 " It had, however," he says, " one conspicuous fault, 
 that of giving too great weight, in the selection of its 
 principal public officers, to mere wealth, irrespective 
 of mental cultivation, sense, and virtue. Than this, 
 there can scarcely be a greater source of evil, as lead- 
 ing a whole nation to the immoderate love of gain 
 and the worship of money; for when this is en- 
 couraged by the institutions of a country, and by the 
 heads of the community, the opinion and feeling is 
 
Book II.] VARIOUS FORMS OF POLITICAL SOCIETY. 9 
 
 speedily caught up and followed by the whole body 
 of the people, and leads inevitably to the corruption 
 both of the governing body and the governed. It is a 
 reproach to the laws of any country, if they do not 
 give full and fair scope to the development of wealth 
 and well-being, and thence to those opportunities of 
 leisure which enable well-disposed and able men to 
 devote themselves to public duties, and to whatever 
 may benefit their country ; but to prefer mere wealth 
 to cultivation, to character, and to capacity to dis- 
 charge those duties well and faithfully, is base and 
 corrupting, and will bring about by degrees the ruin 
 of any community, under whatever form of govern- 
 ment." 
 
 Chapter 9. With striking brevity, in one short page, Aris- 
 totle proceeds to analyse, to exhibit the faults, and to relate 
 the fall of the Athenian constitution. The narration seems to 
 be in harmony with the brief and brilliant career of this the 
 most remarkable people of antiquity. Writing within a com- 
 paratively short period of the greatest epoch of their glory, 
 while their name still filled the world, while their passions 
 which their ambition had provoked were still unallayed, and 
 the ruin it had brought upon the whole of Greece was still 
 fresh and palpable, it is worthy of observation with what com- 
 plete philosophic calmness this "wisest of the ancients" ex- 
 plains in a few words the principles of Solon's institutions, and 
 points out the two or three fatal errors afterwards engrafted 
 upon them, which caused their overthrow. 
 
 He says : " Solon is thought to have judiciously 
 mingled the different elements of the Athenian con- 
 stitution, by giving the oligarchical its due weight in 
 the Areopagus, the aristocratical in the magistracies, 
 and the popular in the judicial body. And in giving 
 this share of power to the people, he only did what 
 
10 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 was fair and equitable ; for, without the power of 
 electing their magistrates* and calling them to ac- 
 count for their administration, there can be neither 
 liberty nor contentment in a state. But this popular 
 power was by degrees unduly extended ; and, after 
 encroaching upon, it finally extinguished, all the rest. 
 For first Ephialtes and then Pericles curtailed the 
 powers of the Areopagus. Pericles again, and other 
 demagogues after him, by paying the people for the 
 discharge of their public duties, introduced corruption, 
 which went on increasing, under the influence and by 
 the intrigues of successive demagogues, until it ended 
 in the present democracy. And for this change it 
 does not seem that Solon or his institutions are in 
 fault so much as the dispositions of the people ; for, 
 after their great naval victories and their success in 
 war, they became unduly elated, and chose as their 
 magistrates bad and corrupt men, who conducted the 
 affairs of the state after their own manner, and, con- 
 sequently, brought it to its present condition." 
 
 Aristotle then touches lightly upon some few constitutions of 
 other states of Greece, or of the countries connected with it, 
 but reverts to the fact that those above described are the only 
 ones of which it is necessary to give the details. 
 
 BOOK III. 
 
 Definition of a Citizen. Privilege of full Citizenship, Jww obtained. 
 What Portion of the Community ought to be invested with 
 Political Power. 
 
 The Third Book opens with an inquiry into the proper 
 definition of the word citizen. In the opinion of Aristotle 
 
 * In modern times " representatives." 
 
Book in.] DEFINITION OF A CITIZEN, ETC. 11 
 
 " The answer to this question is different in different 
 states, and depends on the laws and constitution of 
 each. The whole body of the inhabitants of a country 
 enjoying the protection of its laws including the 
 young, who are still under the legal age, and the very 
 old, who have passed the time of action, and all others 
 under any other species of disability are, in a certain 
 wide and general sense, citizens. But the full and 
 complete definition of a citizen is confined to those 
 who participate in the governing power, either by 
 themselves or their representatives. This privilege 
 is not attached to mere residence in a place or 
 country, or derived from descent; for the question 
 always recurs, how did the original possessor obtain 
 it ? It is a privilege conferred in a legal manner by 
 the act of the state. Sometimes it has been greatly 
 extended by a revolution in the government, as by 
 Cleisthenes, when the Tyrants were expelled from 
 Athens ; and in that, and similar instances, it admits 
 of doubt, whether it was rightly or wrongly extended 
 to so many strangers and persons in a servile con- 
 dition; but the fact remained, and those on whom 
 power was then conferred retained it. He who is 
 entrusted with this privilege in a democratic govern- 
 ment is, more than others, invested with the powers 
 of a citizen. And the number of citizens so invested 
 with a portion of the governing power in a state 
 ought to be sufficient to ensure all the purposes of 
 security and well-being for which society was 
 founded." 
 
12 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle. 
 
 Chapters 2 and 3. The second and third chapters treat of 
 the question, whether the virtues of a good man and a good 
 citizen are the same ; an inquiry with respect to which the 
 strict and comprehensive rules of Christian morality can leave 
 no doubt. It is, therefore, unnecessary to follow Aristotle's 
 argument on this point. One observation which he makes in 
 the course of it is, however, worthy of remark ; namely, that 
 while it is the especial duty of those who govern, to seek to 
 arrive at wisdom and truth, it is no less the duty of the 
 governed to endeavour to form a right judgment of the acts of 
 their rulers ; which cannot be done without cultivation and 
 study. It was this opinion which led to the exclusion, in many 
 of the ancient commonwealths, of artizans and all who were 
 obliged to gain their living by the work of their hands, from all 
 participation in the governing power ; for it was thought that 
 moral and intellectual cultivation, and the capacity of forming 
 a right judgment, could not be expected when the faculties 
 were absorbed in the drudgery of manual labour. In some 
 states, the superior classes of artizans were admitted to the 
 rank of full citizenship, as being supposed to have acquired 
 wealth, and, therefore, leisure. In others, a political necessity, 
 such as a want of population, induced them sometimes to 
 admit strangers, and even persons of servile condition. But 
 Aristotle's opinion, formed on the ancient condition of society, 
 is against the admission of artizans, and even of all freemen 
 who were not above the necessity of manual labour. His 
 argument in this chapter, as throughout his whole work, treats 
 the question of admission to full citizenship, and to a consequent 
 participation in the governing power, as one to be determined 
 by the circumstances of each community, with reference to the 
 good of the whole. The facilities of acquiring knowledge, and 
 the means of elevating the moral character, even in the humblest 
 grades of life, in the present day, so different from anything 
 that Aristotle was acquainted with, render his strict limitations 
 as to classes now inapplicable, without, however, affecting the 
 principle so clearly worked out wherever he touches upon the 
 origin of the wisest and best arrangements of political power ; 
 namely, that they do not flow from any abstract rights in 
 individuals, but from a just and enlightened sense of expediency 
 in each particular case, having in view the safety of the state, 
 and the best interests of the community. 
 
 On the Different Forms of Government. 
 Chapters 4 and 5. We have now to consider care- 
 fully the different forms of government, their distinctive 
 characters, and the ends and objects of each. 
 
Book III.] DIFFERENT FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. 13 
 
 It has been shown that men's instincts lead them to 
 form themselves into political societies for the enjoy- 
 ment of social life, for mutual protection, and for the 
 improvement and embellishment of existence. The 
 object, therefore, of all good government is, the 
 pursuit of the common good. This object, however, 
 is aimed at by institutions differing from each other 
 in form and principle ; each of which may, neverthe- 
 less, under the existing circumstances, be a good 
 government. There is, for instance, the government 
 of one individual ; there is another form, where the 
 government is in the hands of a few ; a third, where 
 it is in the hands of a great number. When the One, 
 the Few, or the Many govern well, and for the 
 common good, theirs must be called a good govern- 
 ment. But if they govern with a view to their own 
 particular interests, that is a corruption, and becomes 
 a selfish and a bad government. A just and good 
 government in the hands of one man we call a 
 Monarchy ; a just and good government in the hands 
 of a few we call an Aristocracy, either because the 
 best men conduct the state, or because they rule with 
 a view to the best interests of the whole ; and when 
 the many, consisting of all orders united, govern for 
 the common good, we call that by the general name 
 of a Polity, or Republic, or mixed government.* 
 And these names are justified by experience ; for the 
 highest qualities for government are often found in 
 
 * So denominated br Aristotle in speaking of Lycurgus's Constitu- 
 tion for Sparta. 
 
 
14 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 one man, or in a few. But the tastes and qualifica- 
 tions of the many incline towards the warlike virtues ; 
 and citizens who are soldiers have usually a large 
 share of power in a republic. The corruptions of 
 these forms of government are a tyranny from 
 monarchy, an oligarchy from an aristocracy, and a 
 democracy from a well-arranged polity or republic. 
 A monarchy becomes a tyranny when the monarch 
 governs with a view to his own exclusive interests ; 
 an aristocracy becomes an oligarchy when the interests 
 of all other classes are sacrificed to the wealthy few ; 
 and a republic becomes a democracy when the interests 
 of all other classes are sacrificed to what appears most 
 conducive to the interests of the poor ; while, in all, 
 the general good is overlooked, or deemed a second 
 consideration. For this reason none of these corrup- 
 tions are endurable. For the object of government is 
 not to increase the wealth of the few, nor to favour 
 the poor at the expense of the rest, nor to encourage 
 mere equality ; nor is it established for mutual defence 
 alone, nor for the promotion of trade and commerce 
 only, nor for any other exclusively material purpose ; 
 but its greatest and highest end and aim is, to make 
 virtuous and good citizens ; to promote the happiness 
 arising from blamelessness of life; to lead to the 
 perfecting of man's social and moral nature ; and to 
 encourage those great and noble deeds that dignify 
 and adorn one's country. Those, therefore, who can 
 most contribute to all these results, have the best title 
 to a share in the government. 
 
Book in.] DIFFERENT FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. 15 
 
 Chapter 6. In what portion of the state, therefore, 
 ought the sovereignty to reside? It has been seen 
 that all the simple forms of government are liable to 
 fall into the abuses peculiar to each, and to work 
 injustice to some section of the community. It has 
 been accordingly said, that for these reasons the law, 
 and not individuals, should be the ruling power. But 
 what if the law be in its spirit despotic, or oligar- 
 chical, or democratical ; wherein will it differ from a 
 tyranny without law? The simple forms, therefore, 
 are to be avoided. But of all the modes of govern- 
 ment, there is a probability that the one in which the 
 people at large (including all orders) have the chief 
 power, will be the best; for some communities may 
 be sufficiently instructed and cultivated to use such 
 power wisely, while others, on the contrary, are as 
 little fit to be entrusted with it as wild beasts. The 
 probability that some communities would in fact use 
 such a power wisely, arises from the circumstance, 
 that the people collectively often come to sounder 
 conclusions than they would have done as individuals ; 
 for they have the opportunity of hearing the best 
 opinions on any subject of deliberation, and of en- 
 lightening each other. Moreover, it is the best plan 
 to admit to a participation in the governing power 
 as many as can be admitted with safety ; for where 
 large numbers are excluded, there will be discontent 
 and danger. Solon, guided by this principle, judi- 
 ciously assigned to the people at large the power of 
 electing the magistrates, and calling them to account 
 
16 THE PKINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 for their administration. He thought them capable 
 collectively of discharging this duty with sufficient 
 discrimination; and when thus acting in union with 
 the best and most enlightened citizens, they confer 
 great benefits on the state by their joint councils ; 
 just as, in matters of diet, a union of several ingre 
 dients is the most wholesome, the coarse and the fine 
 being judiciously blended together. And although it 
 may be objected, that to entrust such important func- 
 tions to the mass of the people is like giving credit 
 to the patient for a greater knowledge than the phy- 
 sician, or placing the pupil above the master ; yet it 
 must be remembered, that as he who inhabits the 
 house is a better judge of its comfort than the archi- 
 tect who built it, so those who are most affected by 
 laws and institutions are the quickest to appreciate 
 their merits or to feel their defects.* 
 
 Chapter 7. Who, then, are the persons best entitled 
 
 * Solon's constitution was founded on property. " He divided the 
 citizens into four classes, according to the gradations of their fortunes, 
 and regulated the extent of their franchise, and their contributions to 
 the public necessities, by the amount of their incomes." (Thirlwall's 
 History of Greece, vol. ii, p. 37.) The four classes were : 1st. Those whose 
 estates yielded a net yearly rent of 500 medimni (7r'Ta/to<rio / ue5t/zj'oi). 
 The medimnus equalled one bushel and six pints. 2nd. The Knights 
 ('Ifi-TreTs) who were able to keep a horse and to serve as cavalry. 3rd. 
 The small farmers using one yoke of oxen (Zeiryt'rcu). 4th. Smaller 
 proprietors and labourers in husbandry (Qfjres*). The two latter 
 classes formed the infantry of the state ; those of the fourth class 
 being also liable to be called upon to man the fleet. 
 
 Whether any others than those engaged in husbandry were included 
 in the 0^res does not appear, either from Solon's classification, or from 
 Aristotle's comments on it. But, in praising Solon's constitution, it is 
 clear from the course of his argument, in B. ii, c. 8, and in B. iii, c. 3, 
 that he considered one of its chief merits to consist in its being founded 
 011 property. 
 
Book III.] OSTRACISM. 17 
 
 to be entrusted with the administration of public 
 affairs? Not the mere rich alone, or the mere noble 
 alone, for those qualities are accidental, and imply- 
 no special ability for the discharge of public duties. 
 Moreover, when riches alone, or birth alone, are 
 allowed to be the only claim to power, the govern- 
 ment quickly degenerates into an oligarchy. In the 
 same manner, if personal superiority is taken as the 
 basis, then the argument leads to the selection of one 
 individual, and therefore to a tyranny. But to every 
 citizen qualified by education and good conduct, the 
 road to honour and power should be open; and no 
 state is well or wisely governed where this is not the 
 case. Where it is so, there the laws are framed with 
 a view to the best interests of the whole body of the 
 community; and those who frame or administer, as 
 well as those who are called upon to obey them, fulfil 
 their respective duties as good men and good citizens. 
 
 Ostracism. 
 
 Chapter 8. A law here calls for observation, which 
 is found chiefly in democracies. The natural endow- 
 ments and the opportunities of men being different, 
 some will greatly exceed the rest in all great and 
 good qualities, and consequently in political influence. 
 But, as the principle of democracies is equality, states 
 under that form of government have adopted the 
 practice of Ostracism, or sending into banishment 
 any of their citizens who greatly excel the rest in 
 wealth, influence, or any other species of political 
 
 c 
 
18 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 power. Tyrants and oligarchies also adopt the same 
 mode as democracies in getting rid of or keeping 
 down superior citizens. But all these, being perver- 
 sions of good government, do this with a view to the 
 particular interests of individuals or classes in the 
 state. No such law exists among any people whose 
 government aims at the general good of the whole 
 body of the people. A government ought to be so 
 constituted as not to want such a mode of protection ; 
 for, notwithstanding all palliative measures, such a 
 power is generally used unjustly. 
 
 Nevertheless, under a really good government, 
 which embraces all classes under its protecting care, 
 what, it may be asked, is to be done with those 
 citizens who overtop the rest in wealth and influence, 
 and in all good and valuable qualities of mind and 
 conduct? Clearly no sensible man would say that 
 they should be banished. The obvious thing to do 
 is, at all times to give them their due weight in the 
 national councils, as the persons best qualified as 
 natural rulers to direct the state with a view to the 
 good of all. 
 
 Kingly Power. Various Changes fro?n, to other Forms of Govern- 
 ment. The Law should be supreme in all. 
 
 Chapter 9. The above observation naturally leads 
 us to speak of Kings. We have already said that 
 monarchy is one of the just forms of government. 
 There are, however, various kinds of monarchy. 
 There are kings who, like the Lacedaemonian, are 
 mere generals for life ; there are hereditary and 
 
Book III.] CHANGES FROM MONARCHY, ETC. 19 
 
 elective monarchs, and there are the Asiatic kings, 
 who are nearly unlimited in their power, which is sup- 
 ported by the laws and customs of their country, and 
 by the servile disposition of their people. ' There were 
 also, in the earliest times in Greece, kings invested 
 with absolute power by the free will of the people, 
 sometimes chosen for life; sometime^ for a particular 
 exigency. 
 
 Another species of monarchy prevailed in the heroic 
 ages, that of an hereditary loyalty, limited by law, 
 and maintained by the willing obedience of the people. 
 It arose from the circumstance of the first founders of 
 it having been the benefactors of their people, either 
 in war, or by the useful arts, or by having led the 
 way in colonizing a new country ; they received, 
 therefore, a voluntary submission from public grati- 
 tude. They became generals in war, and judges in 
 peace, and presided over such religious ceremonies as 
 did not belong to particular priesthoods. This per- 
 petual presidency over the domestic affairs and foreign 
 relations of their subjects they lost by degrees by 
 voluntary surrender in some instances, by the act of 
 their people in others until, in most states, the kingly 
 office is now reduced to a mere superintendence of 
 religious matters, except in Sparta, where it has be- 
 come only a military command. 
 
 An inquiry arises, whether it is best to be governed 
 by one individual of superior wisdom and virtue, or 
 by the best laws. The answer is, that it is best to be 
 governed by good laws, with the best men in the state 
 
 c2 
 
20 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 to administer them. When too much power is given 
 to one man, too much scope is left to human weak- 
 ness and human passions. 
 
 These are more apt to be kept in check when the 
 governing power is in the hands of many, provided 
 security is taken that they be men duly qualified for 
 the exercise of it, that they be, as far as possible, 
 men of good principles, of mature age and experience, 
 and possessed of the full privileges of citizenship. 
 
 States have generally begun with Monarchy, as in 
 small communities they seldom found more than one 
 man fit to govern. But as the number of good and 
 able men increased, they proceeded to what was pre- 
 ferable, namely, an Aristocracy, and set on foot a 
 " Polity," or institutions having in view the common 
 good. Becoming corrupt, however, through the in- 
 crease of wealth, the governing body plundered the 
 community, and, contracting power into a few hands, 
 they degenerated into an Oligarchy. And this arose 
 from wealth being too much an object of pursuit. 
 
 The next step was to the tyrannical government of 
 one or a few, and after that to a Democracy ; for the 
 usurping factions continually narrowing the basis of 
 their power, in the corrupt pursuit of their own inte- 
 rests, provoked the mass of the people, and gave them 
 spirit and strength to overcome their rulers, and to 
 set up a Democracy. And, indeed, when communi- 
 ties become very large, it is, perhaps, difficult for any 
 other than a democratic form of government to exist. 
 
 With respect to Monarchy, another question arises ; 
 
Book III.] CHANGES FROM MONARCHY, ETC. 21 
 
 namely, whether it ought to be hereditary? It is 
 possible that a bad prince may succeed a good one. 
 In order, therefore, to prevent the ill effects that 
 might arise from this contingency, it is right that the 
 king should be invested with military power sufficient 
 only for the support of the laws, but not enough to 
 enable him to act arbitrarily and to oppress the 
 community. 
 
 An unlimited monarchy appears to some unnatural ; 
 and indeed it is so in communities of freemen, among 
 whom it is preferable that the law should govern, 
 rather than any individual; and if any are invested 
 with authority, it should be as guardians and adminis- 
 trators of the law, and as its just and wise interpre- 
 ters. He who submits to law, submits to what has 
 about it something of divine ; but he who submits to 
 the unlimited authority of man, submits to what may 
 have all the passions of a wild beast ; for evil desires 
 and corrupt passions are apt to turn aside even the 
 best rulers ; but law is like a high intelligence, above 
 the reach of passion. 
 
 It may be said, that if an individual is particularly 
 skilled in the art of governing, he ought to be allowed 
 to govern, just as you trust implicitly to a physician 
 in matters relating to his art and science. But the 
 physician has no object in view but that of doing his 
 duty and curing his patient ; whereas he who wields 
 political power is constantly liable to be misled by 
 personal feelings, by likes and dislikes, and by fear 
 or favour. The safest plan, therefore, in political 
 
22 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 matters is, that the law, which aims at establishing 
 the just mean between conflicting interests, should be 
 supreme ; especially that great moral law which is 
 superior to the written, and to which all written laws 
 ought to conform. 
 
 Besides, it is impossible for one man to conduct all 
 the affairs of government. He must call in many to 
 assist him. Is it not better, therefore, to provide for 
 this in a legal and formal manner, and to make 
 arrangements by which the administration of the 
 country would be placed in the hands of a sufficient 
 number of good and able men, capable of conducting 
 it with a view to the common good ? 
 
 We have now shown that there is a state of society 
 in which the patriarchal mode of government is wise 
 and natural ; another, to which a monarchy is suit- 
 able ; a third, in which men are fitted for living in 
 what we have called a just and equal polity, in which 
 all classes are represented, and which is administered 
 with a view to the general interests. But tyrannies, 
 whether of one man, or of an oligarchy, or of a demo- 
 cracy, are contrary to nature, and are corruptions of 
 the just forms of government. These just forms, we 
 have seen, are three ; each suitable to the particular 
 circumstances of the people ; a monarchy, where the 
 people are in a state to submit willingly to the ascen- 
 dancy of one man, gifted with high personal qualities 
 and with skill in the art of governing ; an aristocracy, 
 where the mass of the people are disposed to yield 
 b edi ence to a certain number who have skill to 
 
Book III.] CHANGES FROM MONARCHY, ETC. 23 
 
 govern well, and personal and political qualities that 
 make them fit to govern freemen ; and a polity or 
 commonwealth, in which the conflicting powers of 
 the state are united by their institutions, in such 
 wise, that while all obey, any one may rise to power, 
 according to laws that do not favour wealth only, but 
 open the road to power to any who can by desert 
 attain to it.* And where one man or a few are so 
 much above the mass as to be alone capable of 
 governing, in such a case he or they should neither 
 be put an end to nor banished, but allowed to 
 govern. 
 
 To recapitulate : we say, that there are three just 
 forms of government, and of these, the best is that 
 which is administered by the best men, under the 
 particular circumstances of each; namely, that in 
 which some individual, or class, or member, excel- 
 ling in virtue, or highly qualified for power, bears 
 rule ; some submitting willingly to authority, some 
 exercising it, and both having in view the highest 
 ends of life. And since the virtue of the man is 
 coincident with the virtue of the citizen in the freest 
 and best state, it is plain that in the same way, by 
 the same means, will be formed good men and citi- 
 zens, both in an aristocracy and a monarchy. It is 
 education and habit that make the good man and at 
 the same time the just government, whether it be a 
 
 * This, the "Polity" of England, has been lately described by 
 M. Lamartine as the true "Patrician Republic" of antiquity, with 
 additions and perfections to which no ancient government attained. 
 
24 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 constitutional government or an absolute monarchy. 
 It remains for us to consider which of the three just 
 forms is the best. 
 
 BOOK IV. 
 
 Practical Statesmanship. 
 
 The physician, in the exercise of his art, consults 
 the varying constitutions of his different patients ; the 
 professor of gymnastics considers the different degrees 
 of strength and aptitude of his pupils ; in the same 
 manner the political philosopher must adapt his specu- 
 lations, not to a community that may by possibility be 
 provided with all external and internal advantages, 
 but to men as they are generally found, and to com- 
 munities under a great variety of circumstances. For 
 the statesman is not always able to adopt the measure 
 which appears to his judgment to be clearly the best, 
 but is obliged to put up with that which circumstances 
 enable him to carry ; and he is bound to look, not to 
 the present only, but to the stability and duration of 
 his country's institutions. He must observe what is 
 fitting for men in general, and not stickle for what is 
 theoretically the best ; he must aim at what is possible 
 and easily accomplished and most generally accept- 
 able, and not follow the example of those who are 
 never content but with some fancied perfection, or a 
 state of things which can only arise under particular, 
 and those very favourable, circumstances, like the 
 Spartan constitution, and some others, which such 
 
Book IV.] CHANGES OF GOVERNMENTS. 25 
 
 men are always holding up to admiration. It is not 
 an easier matter to renovate a constitution than to 
 found one ; just as it is sometimes as difficult a task 
 to unlearn as to learn. 
 
 In order that the statesman may act beneficially 
 under the varying circumstances of different constitu- 
 tions, it is necessary that he should see clearly that 
 there are many forms of democracy, and many of 
 aristocracy, as well as of the other modes of govern- 
 ment, and that his business is to discover and determine 
 what is best and most fitting under the peculiar con- 
 ditions of each ; for a " Polity " or mixed government 
 is an equitable arrangement for the distribution of 
 power and the establishing of government, and holding 
 up before the eyes of the citizens the chief end to be 
 aimed at in political and social life. 
 
 Causes of the Progressive Changes of Government. 
 Chapter 2. In our first classification of govern- 
 ments we laid it down that there were three just 
 forms a Monarchy, an Aristocracy, and a Polity or 
 Commonwealth ; and that there were three corrup- 
 tions of these, namely, a Tyranny, an Oligarchy, 
 and a Democracy. Of all of these there are many 
 varieties, though called by the same name ; some 
 better for the governed, some worse ; and the worst 
 are generally those which arise from the corruption 
 and degradation of what had been the best ; as, for 
 instance, a tyranny from a paternal monarchy, and 
 a democracy from a well-regulated commonwealth. 
 
26 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 An oligarchy is in principle always bad, but in 
 practice some may be less bad than others. Now, 
 when we have clearly set forth the differences of 
 these various forms, and how each comes to be 
 established, and how one may be preferable under 
 one set of circumstances, and another under another, 
 we shall be in a condition more fully to understand 
 the essential principles of each, and to see what 
 changes would be fatal and what would contribute 
 to their well-being and preservation. 
 
 Chapter 3. The cause of there being many forms 
 of government is this. Each state consists of a great 
 diversity of constituent parts. First, every commu- 
 nity whatsoever is composed of a certain number of 
 families. Of these, some are wealthy, some are poor, 
 and some are in a middle condition between the two. 
 Again, these same classes are engaged in various 
 occupations ; some subsist by agriculture, as owners, 
 occupiers, or day labourers ; some by trade and com- 
 merce ; some by manual labour, as artizans. Of the 
 upper classes, some are distinguished by birth, by 
 their abilities, and by their virtues ; some by their 
 wealth only. In some forms of polity all these con- 
 stituent elements of society have some share in the 
 government ; in others, a few only have it ; in other?, 
 again, the number is extended beyond the few. And 
 accordingly, as the constituent parts differ from each 
 other, so will the governments differ, and take their 
 form from the particular parts which have the lead- 
 ing influence in each. The most manifest and most 
 
Book IV.] CHANGES OF GOVERNMENTS. 27 
 
 specific difference is between riches and poverty, and, 
 according as either of these two elements prepon- 
 derates in a community, the tendency is for the 
 government to incline either towards an aristocracy 
 or towards a democracy. The truest and best forms 
 are, as we have said before, two : a well-mixed and 
 harmonized aristocracy ; and the polity or common- 
 wealth, which we have described, consisting of all 
 orders and ranks, participating fairly in the govern- 
 ing power. These degenerate, the one into a highly- 
 strung and despotic oligarchy, the other into a relaxed 
 and self-indulgent democracy. 
 
 That there should be these different degrees and 
 distinctive elements in society, is consonant with 
 reason, and in analogy with every other form of 
 existence. All animals have their distinctive and 
 necessary parts, their peculiar senses and instincts, 
 their organs of motion, their means of taking and 
 receiving food : all these differ in different animals, 
 in kind and in degree, but all are essential for each, 
 to enable them to fulfil their respective functions. 
 So it is with commonwealths. One portion of the 
 people is employed in providing food ; another in 
 various arts and manufactures, some essential to 
 existence, others valuable for the comfort and em- 
 bellishment of life. There is then the large class 
 engaged in trade and commerce. There are also 
 those whose occupation it is to cultivate the art of 
 war, an employment not less necessary than any of 
 the foregoing, if a state would be secure from being 
 
28 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle. 
 
 conquered by any that may choose to attack it ; for 
 no commonwealth is worthy of the name, that has 
 lost its military spirit and is not ready at once to 
 defend itself and to repel aggression. There must 
 be also judges and magistrates ; for as the soul is 
 superior to the body, so the means of self-defence 
 and of administering justice are of higher importance 
 than those arts which merely minister to our physical 
 wants. Next to these is the occupation of the 
 statesman, which is one requiring political wisdom. 
 Suitable men are also required to fill all the various 
 administrative offices ; and if the state is to be well 
 and honourably governed, such men must have the 
 proper political knowledge, together with ability and 
 integrity. But the most marked and palpable dis- 
 tinction of ranks is that of the rich and the poor ; 
 the first comparatively few, the latter comparatively 
 numerous ; and according as either of these bodies 
 get completely the upper hand, the government is 
 either an oligarchy or a democracy. 
 
 Chapter 4. The persons of note in a community 
 are distinguished by birth, wealth, education, virtue, 
 and various good qualities. But democracy exists by, 
 and aims at, equality ; for the law of a democracy 
 declares that the wealthy shall have no privileges 
 above, or different from, the poor, nor have any title 
 to be at the head of affairs any more than the poor ; 
 therefore, as the poor are the most numerous, and 
 the opinion of the greatest number is paramount in 
 such a society, a democracy is the government of a 
 
Book IV.] CHANGES OF GOVERNMENTS. 29 
 
 numerical majority. A second kind of democracy 
 requires some qualification in point of property, 
 though a small one, in those who would aspire to 
 take part in public affairs. A third kind excludes 
 all who have been found guilty of any offence. A 
 fourth opens the way to all without distinction or 
 limitation. But all these are governed by general 
 and fixed laws. There is, however, another form of 
 democracy in which the numerical majority is abso- 
 lute, and general and fixed laws not respected, but 
 occasional decrees take their place. This happens 
 when the community falls under the hands of dema- 
 gogues. In a well-ordered democracy demagogues 
 have little weight, but the best citizens possess the 
 seat of authority. Where the fixed laws or institu- 
 tutions are weakened, demagogues step in, and the 
 people become despotic, like one individual monarch 
 armed with absolute power. Both these despotisms 
 are alike in nature and character ; both have their 
 flatterers ; both are inclined to depress and set aside 
 their best citizens ; the one governs by decrees, the 
 other by ordinances ; and as flatterers rule tyrants, 
 so demagogues lead democracies. The opinion of the 
 majority is without check or control, and as dema- 
 gogues wield that opinion, and draw everything under 
 the cognizance and jurisdiction of that majority, they 
 rule as they will, and pass what decrees they please. 
 Again, demagogues invite the multitude to take all 
 public offices into their own hands ; the many are 
 not backward to accept the invitation, and thus all 
 
30 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 established authority is destroyed. Such a state of 
 things is unworthy the name of government. 
 
 Chapter 5. Of oligarchies, also, there are many 
 kinds. One confines political power to those only 
 who have a certain income, and that is placed so high 
 as to exclude the great body of the people. In 
 another kind, the qualification for office is low, but 
 the magistrates themselves fill up, by election, the 
 vacancies in their own body; but if they elect from 
 the great body of the citizens, and not from a small 
 number possessing a certain income, they are rather 
 an aristocracy than an oligarchy. In a third, offices 
 are hereditary. In a fourth, in addition to offices 
 being hereditary, the holders of them govern arbi- 
 trarily, and not according to fixed law; this form, 
 therefore, which is called in Greece a "Dynasty," 
 bears the same relation to aristocracy as tyranny 
 does to monarchy, and democracy to a well-ordered 
 commonwealth. 
 
 Revolutions worked silently by Changes of Manners or Habits. 
 
 It should, however, be observed, that very fre- 
 quently a state may not, according to its fundamental 
 laws, be democratic, and yet it may be governed 
 democratically; and again, a state may be demo- 
 cratical in its laws, and yet be governed oligarchi- 
 cally. In these cases, manners and practice are at 
 variance with theory. And this happens during 
 periods of revolution. The changes do not take place 
 suddenly ; but while the new ideas are gaining ground, 
 
Book IV.] FORMS OF DEMOCRACY. 31 
 
 there is a lingering attachment to the old. The 
 ancient laws preserve for a long time a nominal 
 ascendancy, but in the end manners and habits 
 prevail, and those who effected the change remain 
 masters of the commonwealth. 
 
 To what People the Cheapest Form of Democracy is suitable. 
 Other Forms of Democracy. 
 
 When a people subsists chiefly by agriculture, and 
 possesses only a moderate subsistence, it usually 
 adopts a code of laws simple in themselves, and re- 
 quiring little time or trouble in their administration ; 
 for such a people are obliged to work for their liveli- 
 hood, and have little leisure to give to public matters. 
 All who possess the amount of qualification required 
 by law, are allowed to take a part in the assemblies, 
 and are eligible for office ; and as there is no payment 
 for exercising these public duties, there is little com- 
 petition for them, as those who exercise them must be 
 able to live on their own resources. 
 
 In two other states of society a simple democracy 
 of a similar kind may prevail. One where descent or 
 birth, the other where mere citizenship as a freeman, 
 qualifies for all offices ; but where there are no salaries 
 or fees for discharging public duties, few covet 
 them, and the regular action of law is not interfered 
 with. 
 
 The fourth species of democracy, and the last in 
 point of time in the gradual development of commu-- 
 nities, arises with the growth of wealth, and the 
 
32 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 consequent ability of the state to pay for public 
 services. With the increase of population, and the 
 gradual expansion of political power, the multitude 
 finally gets the upper hand, and then insists on 
 receiving payment for discharging public duties. A 
 commonalty of this kind, living upon the public pay, 
 and having no private business to attend to, have 
 nothing to do but to frequent the assemblies and the 
 courts of justice, which the wealthy abandon to them, 
 so that all the powers of the state fall by degrees into 
 the hands of the needy multitudes, who have no 
 respect for established laws, but proceed to govern in 
 accordance with their own notions. 
 
 The Various Forms of Oligarchy . 
 
 The first form of oligarchy is that founded on 
 wealth and substance as the qualification for sharing 
 in the government ; and this being participated in by 
 a numerous body possessing the requisite qualification 
 in various degrees, is on the whole equitably ad- 
 ministered. But when wealth accumulates in few 
 hands, then the second form of oligarchy arises ; for 
 these few, strengthening themselves in the govern- 
 ment by electing their own colleagues and partizans, 
 turn their power to their own purposes, under the 
 cloak, nevertheless, of law. But if their ambition 
 increases, and they aim at accumulating still greater 
 wealth and power in the hands of a few, they then 
 proceed to possess themselves of all the branches of 
 government and pass laws rendering their power 
 
Book IV.] VARIOUS KINDS OF ARISTOCRACY. 33 
 
 hereditary as well as absolute. They are able next 
 with ease to set themselves above the law, and thus 
 this last form of oligarchy corresponds with the last 
 and most corrupt form of democracy. 
 
 Of the Various Kinds of Aristocracy. 
 
 Besides monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy, there 
 are two other forms of government : that which is 
 called an aristocracy, and that which we have named 
 by the general appellation of all commonwealths, a 
 polity or mixed government ; but this last, on account 
 of its rare occurrence, has been overlooked by Plato 
 and other writers on politics. Strictly speaking, and 
 according to the definition we have already given, an 
 aristocracy is purely and simply a government of the 
 men most distinguished for worth and virtue ; a 
 government in which the duties of a good man and a 
 good citizen exactly coincide. Some few oligarchies 
 and some few commonwealths approach to this 
 standard, inasmuch as honours and offices are in 
 them conferred not alone with reference to wealth, 
 but to worth, ability, and virtue. And a common- 
 wealth in which this habit prevails in respect to the 
 selection of men for public trust, is in a certain sense, 
 and in that respect, an aristocratic commonwealth. 
 For in all states there will be a certain number of 
 men in all ranks of life, bearing high characters, and 
 possessing distinguished ability ; and the government 
 that avails itself of these, and, as that of Carthage, 
 seeks for its supporters among the wealthy, among 
 
34 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 those who are conspicuous for their moral qualities, 
 and among the people at large, that government is an 
 aristocracy. 
 
 In Sparta, worth and excellence, together with 
 numbers, long shared the government. These, then, 
 are the various forms of aristocracy ; and we may 
 add to these, every form of commonwealth in which 
 the balance inclines to the side of the few. 
 
 The Mixed Form of Government, or the Aristocratic 
 Common wea lih, 
 
 Chapter 6. It remains to speak of the mixed form 
 of government, or of a commonwealth properly so 
 called. We have shown that neither the aristocracies 
 which we have spoken of, nor the oligarchies, nor the 
 democracies, and least of all the absolute government 
 in the hands of one individual, are just forms of 
 polity, or anything else than corruptions; but, by 
 exhibiting their real nature and character, we are 
 better able to place in a strong light what is the 
 fairest and the best form of government. 
 
 It will be borne in mind that it has been above 
 stated that the characteristic quality of a democracy 
 is freedom, that of an oligarchy wealth, and that of 
 an aristocracy virtue, or rather, more properly speak- 
 ing, those intellectual and moral qualities which arise 
 from cultivation, for which wealth and leisure afford 
 the opportunity, and for which men are apt to give 
 credit to those who possess such opportunities of ac- 
 quiring them. It is assumed also, that men of virtue, 
 
Book IV.] HOW FORMED AND HOW PRESERVED. 35 
 
 ability, and wisdom, will pass good laws; that obe- 
 dience to the law is recognised as the duty of a good 
 citizen; and that the majority who enact the laws 
 will cause them to be respected. 
 
 Now the union of these several qualities and cha- 
 racteristics the freedom of a democracy, the wealth 
 of an oligarchy, the intellectual and moral qualities, 
 the high birth and breeding, of an aristocracy (for 
 birth and breeding are the representatives of the 
 wealth and virtues of past generations)* forms what 
 is best deserving the name of a government, and may 
 be called distinctively an Aristocratic Commonwealth. 
 
 How such a Government may be formed, and how preserved. 
 
 Chapter 7. We will now show how such a govern- 
 ment may be formed and preserved. In the first 
 place, give full scope and opportunity of exercise to 
 the peculiarities of each form ; let what is distinctive 
 of a government in the hands of a few (such as the 
 unpaid magistrates of Greece) exist in full vigour, 
 and at the same time adopt into the system some of 
 the principles and practices of a democracy. The 
 blending of these opposite qualities will produce a 
 mean between the two, and is therefore wise and 
 politic. Again, it is politic to adopt the mean be- 
 tween what either party, when left to itself, enforces ; 
 as, for instance, an oligarchy raises the qualification 
 for public office, or for taking part in public affairs, 
 
 * 'H yap <uyveia kcrlv apxwos irXovros Kal aperf. 
 
 D 2 
 
36 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 to a very high point ; a democracy will have none, or 
 a very little. Now neither of these is conducive to 
 the common good of all, and is to be avoided ; but a 
 qualification intermediate between the two extremes 
 is the proper one. So also as to the mode of elec- 
 tion; a politic government, such as the aristocratic 
 commonwealth we are describing, will borrow some- 
 thing of the peculiarities of both. The test of the 
 admixture of ah 1 the elements being well and com- 
 pletely made, is, when a government may be called 
 both aristocratic and democratic, according to the 
 impression it makes on the person describing it. For 
 both elements exist in its composition, and each ap- 
 pears most conspicuous according to the particular 
 point of view from which it is regarded. Such is the 
 Spartan government ; and accordingly, by some who 
 look to a certain portion of its institutions, it is called 
 a democracy, while by others, who fix upon other 
 portions, it is denominated an oligarchy. A mixed 
 government, therefore, partaking in due proportions 
 both of democracy and of oligarchy, should, at the 
 same time, appear both and neither. It must also be 
 able to maintain itself, without external aid, by its 
 own native vigour ; and it will do so as long as all its 
 component parts are so well disposed that neither of 
 them wish for any other form of government.* 
 
 * In Aristotle's criticism on Plato's Republic and Book of Laws, in 
 the Second Book of the " Politics," he points out, among other matters, 
 that Plato has not clearly explained what he means by mixed govern- 
 ment, and intimates that he omits the aristocratic element. Plato's 
 
Book IV.] ABSOLUTE GOVERNMENT. 37 
 
 Of A bsolute Government in the Hands of an Individual. 
 
 Chapter 8. We have yet to speak of an absolute 
 government in the hands of an individual ; not that it 
 is worthy of much consideration ; but in a methodical 
 treatise on the various forms of government, it cannot 
 be passed over. In treating of just and legitimate 
 monarchy, we have pointed out the conditions under 
 which it is expedient for a people, and how it arises. 
 We then mentioned two kinds of tyranny, both of 
 which so far resembled a reasonable monarchy, that 
 they both existed according to established law. The 
 first is, that which is found among certain barbarous 
 nations, who elect an autocrat to rule over them. 
 The second is, that which prevailed of old time in 
 certain states of Greece, the government of the 
 JEsymnetes. These were, indeed, in one respect 
 monarchies, for they were established by law, and 
 received the willing obedience of their subjects. But 
 in another point of view they were tyrannies, for they 
 
 comment on the Spartan constitution is, that the kingly power, being 
 limited, first by the Senate of 28, and then by the Ephori, was able to 
 maintain itself, and to be the source of safety to others. 'H paaiXeia 
 Trap vfuv, t% &v I5et, o-^/xt/cros yev6jj.i>i), KOL ptrpov ^%cw<ra, <rwQel<ra 
 avrri, ffurrjpias rots dXXo/s ytyovev dm'a. N6/zot, Lib. iii, c. 11. Edit. 
 Lipsire, 1814. 
 
 In a passage in the " Politicus" (his ideal of a perfect ruler and 
 Statesman), Plato places in a clearer light what he means by mixed 
 government, namely, " Monarchy limited by good laws ;" which, he 
 says, is better than any of the six forms of simple government which 
 he had described, and which are substantially the same as defined by 
 Aristotle ; namely, tyranny, unlimited monarchy, oligarchy, aristocracy, 
 democracy, and ochlocracy. Mopa/a^/a rolvvv feu%0et'(ra pv kv ypdfj.- 
 pacrtv dyadols, 8vs v6(j.ovs \tyonev, dpiffTT) T&V 2%. Platonis Opera 
 Omnia. Stallbaum. Gothae, 1841. HoXm^s. P. 297. 
 
38 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 ruled despotically, and without consulting any other 
 will than their own. But there is a third form of 
 tyranny, which is most deserving of the name, and 
 which is the direct opposite to a limited monarchy ; 
 namely, when one individual, setting himself above 
 the law, rules over his equals and his betters, with 
 no view to the general good, but solely for his own 
 advantage ; a government which no free man would 
 willingly submit to. 
 
 The Conditions necessary to the lest Form of Government. 
 
 The lest Form of Government is that in which the Middle 
 Classes predominate. 
 
 Chapter 9. Let us now proceed to investigate 
 what is practically the best form of government, 
 under which the generality of men and communities 
 of men, in their ordinary condition, would find their 
 life happiest, and themselves most at ease and con- 
 tented; for in inquiries of this kind we must look 
 to men in their average state, and not imagine what 
 a community might be if composed of individuals 
 all virtuous beyond the usual standard of humanity, 
 and all endowed with intellectual and moral quali- 
 ties which require peculiar gifts of nature and no 
 common training. Neither are we going to describe 
 a form of government such as our hopes might picture 
 as most perfect; but a mode of life in which most 
 men in an ordinary state of society might take a part, 
 and a commonwealth not beyond the reach of any 
 community. 
 
 Of the aristocracies which we treated of above, 
 
Book IV.] BEST FORM OF GOVERNMENT. 39 
 
 some, such as those presumed to be founded on virtue 
 alone, are above the level of the ordinary condition of 
 man; others resemble so nearly what we have de- 
 scribed as a well-ordered commonwealth, that they 
 may be almost included under the definition. Indeed, 
 the solution of all these questions is to be found in 
 principles applicable to all. These principles we 
 have laid down in our Treatise on Ethics, where we 
 have defined a happy life to be one which finds no 
 impediment to the pursuit of virtue ; and where we 
 proved that virtue is generally a course of action 
 between two contrary extremes. We therefore come 
 to the conclusion, that the middle course of life is the 
 best, as well as the one most easily accessible to all. 
 Now what is morally true of individuals, is also true 
 of a government ; for a government represents the 
 moral life of a community. Accordingly, as in all 
 states there are three great divisions, the very rich, 
 the very poor, and the middle classes, and as it is 
 admitted that a happy mediocrity is the thing most 
 to be desired, it is evident that the best condition of 
 society is that in which the middle classes most 
 abound, for of all classes they are most likely to be 
 governed by calm reason. But the two extremes of 
 society, the very wealthy and the very powerful on 
 the one hand, and on the other the necessitous, the 
 weak, the ignorant, those who neither respect them- 
 selves nor others,* are often the most difficult to bring 
 
 * 2065pa &TI/JLOV, .... rcnreivoi \iav. 
 
40 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 under its control. The first are apt to be contuma- 
 cious and wilful, the latter wicked ; both are disposed 
 to break through the restraints of custom and pro- 
 priety, and both are often guilty of conduct that is 
 mischievous to the community. Sometimes the one, 
 relying on their wealth, friends, and influence, throw 
 off all obedience; which indeed is of a piece with 
 their bringing up ; for even in their earliest years and 
 in their sfcliools, their self-will renders them difficult 
 to control. Those on the contrary who are oppressed 
 with want are generally too submissive ; so that a 
 state composed chiefly of these two extremes may be 
 said to consist of tyrants and slaves ; the latter un- 
 equal to the task of governing, and obliged to submit 
 to arbitrary power ; the former resisting control them- 
 selves, and ruling the rest despotically. Thence arise 
 envy on the one side, and contempt on the other, and 
 all those enmities which destroy the bonds of political 
 and social life. But the preponderating body in the 
 community should be, as far as possible, one of similar 
 habits, tastes and fortunes. This would chiefly be found 
 among the middle class ; and that state will be best 
 conducted which is composed to the greatest extent 
 of those whom we may call its main support and sub- 
 stance. Their position too is the most secure, for they 
 are above committing, and below provoking, injuries 
 and offences. Accordingly thus prayed the poet : 
 
 "Mine be the middle walk of life, 
 More blest, more calm, more free from strife." 
 
 It is plain, therefore, that the best commonwealth 
 
Book IV.] BEST FORM OF GOVERNMENT. 41 
 
 is that in which the middle class has the most in- 
 fluence, and is, if not more powerful than both the 
 others combined, yet able, by throwing its weight 
 into one scale, to turn the balance, and prevent either 
 of the others from going into extremes. Wherefore 
 the most happy condition of society is that where the 
 greatest number of persons is found possessing a 
 moderate yet sufficient substance. When this is not 
 the case, but the state is chiefly composed of the 
 extremes of poverty and wealth, that government 
 very soon becomes either an unlimited democracy or 
 an unchecked oligarchy, and soon after that all power 
 will fall into the hands of one man ; for a violent de- 
 mocracy and an arbitrary oligarchy naturally give 
 birth to absolutism. 
 
 In addition to the reasons already stated, a com- 
 munity in which the middle class predominates is less 
 liable to seditious movements ; and in general, in 
 proportion to the extension of that middle class, is 
 the tendency to tranquillity. For the same reason, 
 democracies are usually more durable than oligarchies, 
 for they have a greater number of that class, and 
 these are also admitted to the career of public 
 honours. On the other hand, wherever these are 
 few, and are greatly outnumbered by the lower class, 
 the administration of affairs is ill conducted, and the 
 government soon comes to an end. Solon, Lycurgus, 
 Charondas, and many others who have been most 
 distinguished as lawgivers, have belonged to that 
 middle class. 
 
42 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 From what has been already said, we may easily 
 see why the forms of government most commonly 
 found are either democracies or oligarchies ; for in 
 general the middle class is not numerous, and in 
 that case one of the two extremes gets the upper 
 hand. Contests, however, are continually arising, 
 and a violent struggle for the mastery is always 
 going on between the wealthy and the lower classes, 
 so that no fair and equitable government is possible, 
 but the chief power in the state is the perpetual 
 point of contention and the reward of victory for 
 one party or the other. Seldom, indeed, have those 
 who founded states been wise or disinterested enough 
 to place the basis of power in the middle classes in 
 the first instance. One man alone, indeed, who was 
 born for power, was induced to establish this political 
 arrangement.* But already the habit had been con- 
 firmed in the states of Greece not to look to or wish 
 for this reasonable equality; but some were ambitious 
 to govern, while others were not averse to servitude. 
 
 Chapter 10. In every community the stability of 
 government requires that those who wish for its con- 
 tinuance should be more powerful than those who 
 would destroy it. Now all communities consist of 
 persons and classes of persons differing greatly from 
 each other, and possessing certain broad distinctions 
 that are at once recognised and allowed. This being 
 the case, there are two ways of regarding society for 
 
 * Solon. 
 
Book IV.] BEST FORM OF GOVERNMENT. 43 
 
 political purposes : one which looks to mere numbers, 
 the other which recognises the different grades and 
 qualities existing among those numbers, namely, 
 birth, wealth, education, refinement, and all the best 
 results of freedom and cultivation. If mere numbers 
 are allowed to have the preponderance, the govern- 
 ment will be a democracy; a simple and primitive 
 one, such as the first we described, if the population 
 is solely engaged in cultivating their own lands ; but 
 the last and worst form of democracy, if the popula- 
 tion is chiefly composed of artizans and day-labourers. 
 If the power of the wealthy and most considerable 
 persons, centered in a few hands, greatly preponde- 
 rates over that of the many, an oligarchy arises, more 
 or less strict, according to circumstances. It behoves 
 the statesman, therefore, whatever his aims may be, 
 to bind to the institutions of the country the middle 
 classes ; for wherever those classes are stronger than 
 both the extremes united, or even than only one of 
 them, the institutions are most likely to be durable ; 
 for the wealthy are never likely to combine with the 
 lower classes to overthrow the middle, and thereby to 
 lead to a contest which must end in either the wealthy 
 or the lower classes getting the upper hand without 
 check or control. It is far better that they should 
 seek a middle point between these two extreme 
 results ; and if they seek it in good faith and in a 
 moderate spirit (neither of which they are likely to 
 display if acting hostilely to each other), they will 
 find it. An arbitrator is in all cases a thing great-y 
 
44 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 to be desired, as producing mutual goodwill and con- 
 fidence. Now, in affairs of state, a middle class is 
 just such an arbitrator ; and the more decidedly the 
 institutions are those of a mixed government, the 
 more decisive and effectual will be that arbitration, 
 and the form of government the more lasting. Other 
 political arrangements, which give to the aristocracy 
 an undue share of power, are errors, and sooner or 
 later the imaginary good turns out to be a real evil ; 
 for the overreaching ambition of the few is often 
 more destructive to states than the narrow selfishness 
 of the people. 
 
 Pecuniary Qualification for the Franchise. 
 
 Though the needy, and all who are excluded from 
 political power by their poverty or their low con- 
 dition in society, are generally quiescent, if not ill 
 treated, or deprived by bad government of the lawful 
 means of gaining their livelihood, yet it is desirable 
 to extend, as far as can be with safety, the number 
 of those invested with the franchise. 
 
 Formerly, in some of the states of Greece, those 
 only who could bring their own horses into the field, 
 in case of hostilities, were invested with the franchise ; 
 and in those times the cavalry was the chief arm in 
 war. They were well disciplined, and accustomed to 
 obedience, for without that an army is useless. But 
 as the population of cities increased, and more men 
 were able to bear arms, the number invested with a 
 
Book IV.] THE SOVEREIGNTY. 45 
 
 share of political power was augmented. The govern- 
 ment thence arising they called a democracy; but, 
 inasmuch as in it all orders are represented, we call 
 such an arrangement nowadays, a mixed government. 
 We see, therefore, now, why the ancient states were 
 truly either oligarchical or monarchical ; for on account 
 of the smallness of the population they had no middle 
 class. The numbers being few, and all accustomed to 
 discipline, it was natural that they should yield an 
 easy obedience in general matters to those whom they 
 were used to follow. 
 
 Of the Deliberative, the Executive, and the Judicial Powers. 
 
 Chapters 11 to 13. Having exhibited the different 
 elements of states, and shown the various forms that 
 they assume, and the reasons of those varieties, we 
 must now explain what is properly called the sove- 
 reignty. This complex object resolves itself into 
 three parts, the deliberative, the executive, and the 
 judicial. 
 
 Aristotle here proceeds to define the provinces of these re- 
 spective powers, and to point out the different modes of con- 
 stituting them then in practice, by different forms of election 
 or nomination ; but as the ancients were confessedly defective 
 in this portion of their political arrangements, and as the great 
 and distinctive merit of our own constitution is the mode in 
 which this difficulty has been solved, by the separation and 
 independence of these leading functions of government, it is 
 unnecessary to follow the author through this portion of his 
 subject. It is sufficient to have indicated the fact of his treating 
 of it, under heads very nearly analogous in substance to those 
 of modern political science. 
 
46 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 BOOK V. 
 
 Of Revolutions. 
 
 Chapter 1. Since we have disposed of nearly all 
 the other subjects connected with this inquiry, we 
 come at length to that of the revolutions of states, 
 their causes, and the means of preventing them. 
 
 It will be found that revolutions arise from the 
 neglect of the great principles of justice and equity ; 
 democratic revolutions from the exaggeration of the 
 principle of equality ; oligarchical, from carrying to 
 excess the principle of inequality or particular privi- 
 leges. We have examples of various forms of these 
 revolutions in the different states of Greece.* .... 
 A political system of absolute and universal equality 
 is bad ; experience proves it to be so, for no govern- 
 ment founded on that principle is lasting. The reason 
 is that what is faulty in its origin must of necessity 
 turn out ill. Numbers, therefore, ought to be 
 balanced by wealth and substance, by intelligence and 
 cultivatign. Nevertheless, a democracy is quieter 
 and less liable to sedition than an oligarchy, for the 
 latter has two enemies, its own internal factions, and 
 the mass of the people ; whereas the people have only 
 one, namely, the small yet powerful body that op- 
 presses them, for their contests with each other are 
 seldom serious. Besides, a democracy is nearer to 
 
 * The details relate to the particular circumstances of these dif- 
 ferent states, and are, therefore, now devoid of interest 
 
Book V.] REVOLUTIONS. 47 
 
 the true commonwealth, in which the middle classes 
 preponderate ; which is the safest and best of all. 
 
 Chapter 2. Men are tempted to sedition by the 
 love of gain, by the desire of distinction, by the en- 
 deavour to escape disgrace or punishment, by envy 
 and jealousy, by an immoderate estimate of them- 
 selves ; by cupidity, contempt, or other evil passions ; 
 by insolence or by fear ; or, lastly, to escape injustice 
 or oppression. Sometimes it is a just ambition, as 
 when too many are excluded from the franchises and 
 honours of the state ; sometimes it is a lawful fear, 
 which induces men to combine to ward off injustice ; 
 sometimes it is a commendable self-esteem, which 
 leads the many to throw off the yoke of an oligarchy, 
 or the few to rid themselves of the disorder and 
 anarchy of a democracy. Thus in Thebes the demo- 
 cracy was destroyed on account of its bad manage- 
 ment of public affairs, and in Megara in consequence 
 of the anarchy and confusion introduced by it. The 
 same thing happened at Syracuse until the tyranny of 
 Gelon interposed to stop it ; and at Rhodes until it 
 was overthrown by an insurrection. 
 
 Changes in political power also arise from the dis- 
 proportionate increase of some portion of the com- 
 munity. In the natural body, if symmetry is to be 
 preserved, its growth must be uniform in all its parts. 
 So it is of the body politic. In quantity (or numbers), 
 and also in quality, that is, in wealth, virtue, and 
 moral and intellectual culture, its expansion and pro- 
 gress should be harmonious and regular. Yet often- 
 
48 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 times a great and disproportionate development will 
 have taken place in some portion of the community 
 before it has attracted much notice. Sometimes such 
 changes happen all at once, in consequence of some 
 sudden and unexpected event. As an example of the 
 former, the gradual increase of the number of poor in 
 some democracies and commonwealths may be quoted. 
 Of the latter there are many instances. At Taren- 
 tum, the numbers of the nobility and the persons of 
 most influence were greatly reduced by the contest 
 with the lapygians, and afterwards with the Medes. 
 The consequence was, that the mixed commonwealth 
 was superseded by a democracy. The same effect 
 arose from similar causes at Argos and at Athens. 
 When democracies, however, grow wealthy, and the 
 number of men of substance greatly increases, they 
 are apt to change into oligarchies, or even to fall 
 under the absolute government of a still smaller 
 number. 
 
 Changes are effected also by faction, or are 
 brought on simply by bad management, or even by 
 the slightest unforeseen circumstances. By the latter 
 I mean circumstances which appear slight at first, and 
 are therefore overlooked, but which are found after a 
 while to have worked a total revolution. This was 
 the case at Ambracia, where the qualification for 
 voting was so small that it was thought that the 
 difference between it and none at all was not worth 
 preserving ; but the change produced the most impor- 
 tant results. 
 
OF 
 
 BookV.] REVOLUTIONS. 49 
 
 Great differences of race and dissimilarities of 
 character are also unfavourable to tranquillity. A 
 well-ordered state is not to be formed out of a col- 
 lection of people suddenly gathered together ; and 
 therefore sudden accessions of population have in 
 general led to disturbances and troubles, of which 
 there have been numerous instances in all parts of 
 Greece and Italy, and elsewhere. Differences of 
 locality also have often a considerable effect in 
 engendering feelings of hostility and disunion. At 
 Clazomena3 the inhabitants of the mainland were 
 frequently at variance with those on the island. In- 
 stances of the same kind occurred at Colophon and 
 Notium. At Athens the same thing is observable ; 
 the inhabitants of the Pirseus are much more inclined 
 to democracy than those of the city. For, as in war 
 even the passing over a small watercourse will break 
 the order of the phalanx, so it is in political matters ; 
 small causes often lead to great convulsions, no less 
 than the more conspicuous ones of inordinate wealth 
 or great poverty, superior qualifications unduly de- 
 pressed, or crime unchecked and unreproved. And 
 whenever these small causes of difference arise in 
 regard to matters in which powerful bodies in the 
 state take a deep interest, they should be handled 
 cautiously, and smoothed down, for it has been well 
 said that the beginning is the half of everything, and 
 there is no knowing to what extremities these small 
 beginnings may lead. 
 
 The eminent distinction acquired by one portion of 
 
 E 
 
50 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 the governing power, or the disproportionate increase 
 of one of its constituent parts, may turn the scale and 
 lead to either an oligarchy, a democracy, or a well- 
 regulated commonwealth. The council of the Areo- 
 pagus, which gained such credit in the Medean war, 
 appeared to have greatly strengthened the aristocracy 
 at Athens. But the rabble of the Athenian seamen 
 that won the battle of Salamis and the sovereignty of 
 the sea, thenceforth turned the scale of power in 
 favour of the democracy. Again, the Argive nobles, 
 after the battle of Mantinaea, endeavoured to put 
 down the popular government. The popular party 
 of Syracuse, on the other hand, after beating the 
 Athenians, changed their mixed government into a 
 democracy. There are many similar instances ; and 
 the struggles usually take place when the extreme 
 parties are nearly balanced, and the middle class is 
 weak or does not exist at all. In that case, the best 
 and most conscientious members of the community 
 take no part in these movements. They are the work 
 of force or fraud, and sometimes of a mixture of both, 
 as at Athens, when she fell under the tyranny of the 
 four hundred. 
 
 Of the Causes of Revolution in Democracies. 
 
 Chapter 4. The insolence of demagogues is gene- 
 rally the cause of the ruin of democracies. First, by 
 calumniating the wealthy, they raise these against 
 them, and cause even the most opposite parties to 
 
Book V.] REVOLUTION IN DEMOCRACIES. 51 
 
 unite against a common danger. Next, they produce 
 the same result by stirring up the populace and 
 creating a sense of insecurity. Many are the 
 examples of this. The democracy of the island of 
 Cos was put down by the persons of property rising 
 against the corruption and wickedness of the dema- 
 gogues. In the island of Rhodes, the demagogues 
 corrupted the soldiery with the money that ought to 
 have been appropriated to the purposes of the state. 
 The principal people were therefore driven in their 
 own defence to rise and put down the democracy. 
 This form of government was also destroyed at 
 Heraclea by the leading persons of property and 
 influence. These had been expelled by the dema- 
 gogues, but they returned with reinforcements and 
 extinguished the democracy. A very similar revolu- 
 tion took place at Megara. There the demagogues, 
 in order to gain possession of the public funds and to 
 carry on the government, drove into exile a con- 
 siderable number of the wealthiest citizens. These at 
 length became so large a body that they returned in 
 force, gave battle to the democratic party, and over- 
 threw it. Precisely the same thing happened at 
 Cumae; and wherever you turn you find the ex- 
 perience of these changes and revolutions the same. 
 Sometimes they raise the upper and middle classes 
 against them by seizing upon private property or the 
 public revenue, and dividing the proceeds in various 
 forms of bribery and corruption. Sometimes they 
 attack the rich through processes of law, that they 
 
 E2 
 
52 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 may have their property to apply to the support of 
 their government. In former times, when the same 
 men were demagogues in the assembly and leaders in 
 war, the next change was to a tyranny in the hands 
 of one man. Nearly all the tyrants of old began with 
 being demagogues. The reason why it was so then, 
 but is not so now, is, that in ancient times the dema- 
 gogues led the armies in the field, but were no great 
 orators in time of peace ; now, however, since oratory 
 has been so much cultivated, and rhetorical skill so 
 increased, men who are able speakers are the great 
 demagogues, but from want of experience in war they 
 are no longer able to ; enslave the people, except 
 perhaps occasionally for a short period. Tyrannies 
 also arose in former times oftener than now from 
 entrusting too much power to individual magistrates, 
 as happened at Miletus. For the cities being then 
 small, and the mass of the people living scattered in 
 the country and engaged in> husbandry, if their dema- 
 gogues had enterprise and military skill, they soon 
 got possession of the government. 
 
 The great instrument, however, by which they 
 accomplished their ends was, the confidence of the 
 people ; and this they won by the hatred they dis- 
 played and the persecution they exercised against 
 the rich. Such was the course taken by Pisistratus, 
 when he raised the people of Athens against the 
 inhabitants of the country, and established his power 
 over both. Theagenes did the same at Megara ; and 
 Dionysius, by taking advantage of the enmity excited 
 
BookV.] REVOLUTION IN OLIGARCHIES. 53 
 
 against the wealthy, and impeaching them, enslaved 
 the people of Syracuse. 
 
 Changes occur also from the old form of democracy 
 to one still more democratic, in which no qualification 
 is required either for electors or elected. In such 
 cases demagogues, aiming at power through flattery of 
 the people, bring matters to the pass that the populace 
 become masters of the laws and govern as they please. 
 The remedy, or at least the check upon this is, that 
 certain portions of the people should elect the rulers, 
 and not the whole people in mass. 
 
 The Causes of Revolution in Oligarchies. 
 
 Chapter 5. There are two most manifest causes of 
 revolution in oligarchies. The first is, the oppression 
 of the people. This they will throw off by the help 
 of the first man they can find to lead them, especially 
 if he happen to belong to the oligarchical body itself, 
 as was Lygdamis of Naxos, who, by the way, after- 
 wards set himself up as the tyrant of his countrymen. 
 The other takes its rise among the upper classes, and 
 occurs when a very few of them have monopolised all 
 the avenues to power, as was the case at Marseilles, 
 at Ister, at Heraclea, and in other cities. There 
 those who were excluded plotted against the govern- 
 ment until they brought about a revolution, and 
 obtained admission by turns to all the offices of the 
 state. In Marseilles the oligarchy was thus enlarged. 
 In the city of Ister it was extended to a body of six 
 hundred citizens ; but at Heraclea the change ended 
 
54 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 in a democracy. At Cnidus there was the same cause 
 of contention among the upper classes as at Marseilles; 
 an insurrection took place, and the people, under a 
 leader selected from the better sort, joined the in- 
 surgents, who were weak by themselves, and put 
 down the oligarchy. In ancient times, Erythrae also 
 was well and wisely governed by the family of the 
 Basilides ; but, not choosing to be governed by a few 
 individuals, the people changed the form of govern- 
 ment. 
 
 Oligarchies are often kept in a state of disturbance, 
 and finally overthrown, by a species of demagogues 
 belonging to their own class, who excite and mislead 
 the multitude in order to sustain their own faction, 
 as was the case on two occasions at Athens, when 
 Charicles supported the thirty tyrants, and Phrynicus 
 the faction of the four hundred. At other times, the 
 same sort of men have recourse to the arts of seduc- 
 tion and flattery at elections, when the choice of the 
 magistrates or of the judiciary body is in the hands 
 of the people at large, or even of a limited number of 
 them ; as happened at Larissa, Abydos, and Heraclea 
 on the Euxine. Sometimes an oligarchy is narrowed 
 into a very small compass, so that those who are 
 excluded are, as it were, compelled to seek the aid of 
 the people in order to regain their position in the 
 government. Men of spendthrift and profligate habits 
 also are a common cause of the ruin of oligarchies, 
 by their attempts to plunder the public, and their 
 quarrels about the division of the spoil ; especially if, 
 
Book V.] REVOLUTION IN OLIGARCHIES. 55 
 
 as at Elis, the ruling body has been contracted to 
 a very small number. But an oligarchy, governing 
 well, and acting harmoniously together, like that of 
 Pharsalus, is not easily overturned. 
 
 In time of war, oligarchies have sometimes been 
 overthrown, in consequence of having, through dis- 
 trust of their own people, called in mercenaries, whose 
 leaders have become their masters, and set up that 
 species of oligarchical despotism called a dynasty. In 
 peace, the cause of the fall of oligarchies has been 
 their various acts of oppression, and arbitrary inter- 
 ference with the rights of individuals. 
 
 Changes also happen in the bases of power in 
 oligarchies, and in that judiciously mixed form of 
 government which we have called a polity or mixed 
 commonwealth, by the simple operation of time and 
 of natural causes ; as, for instance, when a certain 
 pecuniary qualification has been settled for electors, 
 for the members of the senate, and for the judiciary 
 body, of such an amount as, in oligarchies, to place 
 the governing power in a few, and in commonwealths 
 to place it in the hands of the middle classes ; but a 
 long course of prosperity occurring, either in conse- 
 quence of peace or of some other fortunate events, 
 land and other possessions increase greatly in value, 
 so that the possessions of the poorest come up to the 
 point determined by the census, and give them the 
 requisite qualification. This change sometimes takes 
 place gradually and insensibly, sometimes rapidly and 
 almost at once, and converts the respective govern- 
 
56 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 ments above mentioned, not so often to their oppo- 
 sites, as to different species oi the same form; as from 
 steady and well-regulated governments to unchecked 
 democracies and oligarchies, or from the latter to the 
 former. 
 
 TTie Causes of Revolution in Aristocracies. 
 
 Chapter 6. The causes of revolution in aristo- 
 cracies are similar to those in oligarchies (for an 
 aristocracy is a sort of oligarchy), and arise from the 
 small number of those who engross power; for if 
 many having equal claims on the score of worth and 
 ability are excluded, an insurrection ensues, as was 
 the case with the Partheniae in Sparta. Spirited 
 individuals also often disturb the state, if unjustly 
 excluded from power. Aristocracies are also liable 
 to convulsions when the community becomes divided 
 solely into the very rich and the very poor, as has 
 happened after a long course of warfare, by which a 
 country is impoverished, and which causes the people 
 to cry out for an agrarian distribution of property. 
 This happened in Sparta, on account of the war with 
 Messene. 
 
 The ambition of a powerful individual to set up 
 a monarchy is also a cause of disturbance in this 
 form of government. But a more frequent one, both 
 in commonwealths and aristocracies, is some error 
 in the original structure ; the ingredients of virtue 
 and capacity, wealth, and numbers, not having been 
 well and properly combined. The governments that 
 
Book V.] REVOLUTION IN ARISTOCRACIES. 57 
 
 incline towards oligarchy we call aristocracies, while 
 those that incline rather towards the people are de- 
 nominated polities or mixed commonwealths. The 
 latter are more permanent than the former, since the 
 majority are masters of the state, and are more dis- 
 posed to be attached to their government, as it is 
 founded on justice and equity. On the other hand, 
 when power is in the hands of the merely wealthy, it 
 is apt to be misused, and to lead to a selfish policy 
 and to acts of injustice. Generally, a constitution falls 
 on the side to which it naturally inclines ; a common- 
 wealth declining to a democracy, and an aristocracy 
 to an oligarchy ; but the contrary happens occasion- 
 ally when a revolution is provoked by the injustice of 
 the upper classes towards the lower, and a sudden 
 and violent change ensues from an aristocracy to a 
 democracy, or from a commonwealth to an oligarchy ; 
 for that constitution only is stable which is founded 
 on justice and equity, and which secures to each his 
 own. A change of the above kind happened at 
 Thurium, where a small oligarchy got illegal posses- 
 sion of all the land of the country ; the people, who 
 were warlike, rose, massacred the mercenaries of the 
 nobles, and confiscated and divided their estates. 
 Moreover, as all aristocracies partake of the nature 
 of an oligarchy, their tendency is to seek to promote 
 what they conceive to be the interests of the upper 
 classes at the expense of that of the community at 
 large. This was the case in Lacedsemon, and at 
 Locri it caused the ruin of the constitution; measures 
 
58 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 having been adopted there which would never have 
 been permitted in a democracy, or in a well-combined 
 aristocratical commonwealth. 
 
 The alteration of the basis of power in aristocracies 
 generally occurs imperceptibly, and in consequence 
 of the neglect of some little matter which appeared 
 unimportant. We observed above that most consti- 
 tutions owed their ruin to the neglect at first of 
 some little circumstance ; for by overlooking some- 
 thing which touches an essential principle of the com- 
 monwealth, they are the more easily led to make 
 some other change, which is somewhat greater than 
 the little one just permitted ; and thus by degrees 
 they disturb the whole order and arrangement of the 
 government. An instance of this occurred at Thurium. 
 There was a law that no one should be re-elected to a 
 military command until after an interval of five years. 
 Some young men, distinguished in war, popular with 
 the troops and with the people, and not having much 
 respect for the civil power, set about getting this law 
 altered. The committee of the senate, to whom the 
 matter was referred, were over-persuaded to sanction 
 it, under the idea that the movers in this matter 
 would rest content with this change only, and would 
 not attempt to disturb the other parts of the consti- 
 tution. Very soon, however, another question arising, 
 they found out that they had lost all their power, that 
 their opposition was fruitless, and that a dynasty, or 
 military tyranny, was set up in the place of their 
 mixed government. 
 
Book V.] PRESERVATION OF GOOD GOVERNMENTS. 59 
 
 Constitutions are also sometimes overturned by 
 external violence, in consequence of the hostility of 
 powerful neighbours ; as by the Athenians and Lace- 
 daemonians in their late contests, and in their endea- 
 vours to bring all the states of Greece under forms of 
 government similar to their own. 
 
 How Good Governments are preswved. 
 
 Chapter 7. We have now to describe the means 
 by which good governments are preserved ; for which 
 we have cleared the way by what we have said of 
 the causes which lead to their destruction. In well- 
 combined and well-balanced commonwealths, besides 
 the strict observance of established laws, it is espe- 
 cially necessary to keep a narrow watch upon little 
 matters. For a great change in the laws may creep 
 on gradually, just as a small expense often incurred 
 ruins a large fortune ; and men are apt to be misled 
 by the sophism, that " a mickle is not a muckle." 
 Next, let men be on their guard against those who 
 natter and mislead the multitude ; their actions prove 
 what sort of men they are. 
 
 Some aristocracies, and even oligarchies, have been 
 long preserved, not by the unassailable nature of their 
 institutions so much as by the good and wise conduct 
 of the governing body. Dealing fairly and honour- 
 ably with the interests of those excluded from power, 
 acting in harmony with those of their own class, 
 bringing into office the leaders of the people most 
 distinguished for ability, not repressing the ambitious, 
 
60 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 not aiming at wealth through the oppression of the 
 poor, they govern with a view to the general good, 
 and avoid those convulsions which arise either from 
 the undue exclusion of men of their own order from 
 power (for aristocracies also have their demagogues), 
 or from allowing power to remain in the same hands 
 too long, and until it becomes impossible to control it. 
 
 At times governments are preserved by the very 
 proximity of danger, real or imaginary, just as an 
 officer, in order to keep the night watch attentive, 
 allows them to believe that the enemy is at hand. 
 
 Dangerous animosities, especially between the lead- 
 ing persons or most important classes in the commu- 
 nity, and political disturbances having for their object 
 a change in the laws, are most especially to be 
 guarded against ; and those who still hold themselves 
 aloof from the struggle, should be kept, if possible, 
 from joining in it ; and to do this, by discovering and 
 dealing with an evil at its commencement, is not 
 given to any ordinary man, but is the mark of the 
 true statesman. And the census, which regulates the 
 qualification for office, should be revised from time to 
 time, to prevent any undue exclusions, and to obviate 
 the possibility of power being concentrated in too few 
 hands, . . . The even balance of all the different 
 orders of the state should as much as possible be pre- 
 served, by strengthening the weak, and increasing the 
 middle class, which is the surest guarantee against 
 the factious designs of either party. . . . We 
 must repeat, that all classes should be well disposed 
 
Book V.] PRESERVATION OF GOOD GOVERNMENTS. 61 
 
 to the existing institutions, so that the number of the 
 discontented should be greatly outweighed by the 
 rest. . . . And it must never be forgotten in a 
 well-balanced state, as it is in those in which one 
 element is allowed to preponderate, that the mean 
 between all these extremes is especially to be aimed 
 at ; for it invariably happens, that where one element 
 alone is regarded and becomes paramount, the whole 
 fabric of government is destroyed. Certain devia- 
 tions from what may be strictly the best, may occur 
 without much injury ; as in the human features, a 
 departure from strict regularity does not much inter- 
 fere with beauty; but in forms of government, an 
 excessive deviation, or disproportionate increase of 
 any one of its constituent points, will first injure and 
 finally subvert the whole. The lawgiver and the 
 statesman should therefore always have their eyes on 
 these principles, and take care that neither party is 
 oppressed by the other. Without both rich and poor, 
 there can be no commonwealth properly so called. If 
 you come to a division of property, you set up some 
 form of government totally different, and, by destroy- 
 ing the existing laws, you destroy the state. A great 
 mistake is made by demagogues in a democracy, when 
 they make war upon wealth, and wrest the laws to 
 their own temporary advantage, and thus divide the 
 community into two hostile bodies ; and an equal 
 error and crime is committed by the rulers of an 
 oligarchy, in persecuting and denouncing the humbler 
 classes. Much rather ought their motto to be, " We 
 
62 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 will do the community no wrong, but govern according 
 to the maxims of justice and equity;" the very reverse 
 of this maxim being the one they generally act upon. 
 But what will most contribute to the permanence 
 and safety of states, and yet is now much neglected, 
 is an education according to the pattern of the con- 
 stitution. The best and most venerable laws are of 
 little avail, unless men are brought up to respect 
 them, and to shape their lives and manners in con- 
 formity with them. Whatever be the form of govern- 
 ment, the conduct to be inculcated should be free 
 from extremes, and should aim at moderation, and to 
 giving effect to the main principle of the constitution, 
 in subordination to, and with the view to promote, 
 the general good. This is often overlooked ; in oli- 
 garchies, by giving the rein to luxury and effeminacy; 
 in democracies, by carrying to excess the principles of 
 liberty and equality, and by living each for himself 
 and for his own interests. This is bad ; for no one 
 ought to think it slavery to live according to a high 
 and good model, but rather to deem it most expedient, 
 safe, and creditable so to do. 
 
 Of Revolutions in Monarchies. 
 
 Chapter 8. Monarchies, whether limited or abso- 
 lute, are liable to the same changes that befall limited 
 governments, and are preserved or destroyed by the 
 same causes. Royalty is a species of aristocracy. 
 Tyranny, on the other hand, is composed of the 
 narrowest kind of oligarchy and of democracy ; it is 
 
BookV.] REVOLUTIONS IN MONARCHIES. 63 
 
 therefore the worst species of rule for the governed, 
 as being the embodiment of two evils, the excess of 
 both the above-mentioned forms of government. 
 Royalty is created by the upper classes of society, to 
 enable them to resist the encroachments of the popu- 
 lace ; and originally a king was selected from among 
 the nobles for some personal superiority, or some emi- 
 nent and distinguished qualities of mind and character. 
 But a tyrant is usually the creation of the populace, 
 in their contests with the upper classes, and as a pro- 
 tection against oligarchical oppression. Nearly all 
 tyrants were originally demagogues, who were trusted 
 by the people to incriminate and attack the nobles. 
 Sometimes they arose out of a stretch of the kingly 
 power by one invested with only a limited authority; 
 sometimes from the conversion of offices of limited 
 duration to offices for life. The kingly power has 
 often been conferred on men of great personal worth, 
 or of highly distinguished descent, or for great benefits 
 effected for the community ; as, for the defence of 
 their country in war, or for delivering it from tyranny, 
 or for founding colonies and extending the national 
 conquests, like Codrus, and Cyrus, and the kings of 
 Sparta, Macedon, and others. A king is the national 
 guardian, protecting the property of the rich, and 
 shielding the poor from wrong. A tyrant, on the 
 other hand, looks not to the public interests, but to 
 his own ; and while mere selfish indulgence is the end 
 and aim of a tyranny, that of a monarchy is all that 
 is good and honourable. . . . 
 
64 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 Injustice, fear, contempt, cause the destruction of 
 tyrannies, as they do of monarchies when they over- 
 step the bounds of lawful authority. . . . They are 
 both also exposed to external violence, from govern- 
 ments opposed to them in principle ; and this is very 
 often assisted by domestic discord. . . . The ambition 
 of powerful subjects is a common cause of the fall of 
 tyrannies ; and they perish, also, in the hands of suc- 
 cessors who become dissolved in luxury, and lose the 
 skill and the courage of their first founders. 
 
 Royalty is not easily destroyed by external vio- 
 lence, but, on the contrary, is generally strong enough 
 to put down opposing powers, and is therefore usually 
 an enduring institution. The causes of its overthrow 
 are chiefly these two : the intrigues of its most power- 
 ful subjects, and the attempts of the king himself to 
 throw off all control and make himself absolute. 
 These limited monarchies, however, are forms of 
 government very seldom found nowadays, inasmuch 
 as they arise from the voluntary submission of the 
 whole body of the people. The great prevailing 
 equality at present prevents this ; * and, moreover, 
 there is no one so raised above the rest as to be equal 
 to the dignity and greatness of the throne, and worthy 
 of a willing homage. We see, therefore, only absolute 
 monarchies, or mere tyrannies, supported by force 
 or fraud. Sometimes limited hereditary monarchies 
 
 * Aristotle was writing at a time when all the mixed governments 
 of Greece had been destroyed. 
 
BookV.] HOW TYRANNIES AKE MAINTAINED. 65 
 
 fall, through the contemptible character of the reign- 
 ing sovereign, and sometimes in consequence of his 
 overbearing and tyrannical conduct, which causes the 
 voluntary submission on which his power rests to be 
 withdrawn from him. 
 
 How Limited Monarchies are best preserved. 
 Chapter 9. Limited monarchies are best preserved 
 by moderation. The more strictly they are limited, 
 the longer they will last. The farther they recede 
 from despotism, and the more they approximate to 
 equality of rights with their subjects, the less are 
 limited monarchs exposed to envy and unpopularity. 
 Hence the Molossian monarchy lasted so long ; and 
 hence also the kingly power in Sparta, by the divi- 
 sion and limitation of its authority, was increased 
 in real influence and stability. Accordingly, when 
 Theopompus was asked by his queen whether he was 
 not ashamed to transmit to his sons a less authority 
 than he had received from his ancestors, he answered 
 no ; for he should transfer to them a throne more 
 steadfast and durable 
 
 How Tyrannies are maintained. 
 
 Tyrannies are maintained by two modes severity 
 and lenience. The most conspicuous tyrants have 
 been very strict in keeping down all competitors 
 (mowing the tallest stalks, as the saying is), pro- 
 hibiting clubs and assemblies, putting down meet- 
 ings for mutual instruction, schools, or other places 
 
 F 
 
66 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 of education, keeping men personally ignorant of 
 each other and unacquainted with each other's move- 
 ments, and destroying everything tending to generate 
 
 mutual confidence and independent spirit 
 
 Spies and informers are their principal instruments, 
 and their great study is, to set man against man, 
 and class against class. They endeavour, also, to 
 keep the people poor, in order that, living only from 
 hand to mouth, they may have neither leisure nor 
 spirit for revolutions. The Pyramids of Egypt, the 
 vast building of the Cypselidse, the Olympian temple 
 of the sons of Pisistratus, and other great works, are 
 the records of that kind of policy, and were intended 
 to employ and to impoverish the people. Inordinate 
 taxation is also designed for the same end. In five 
 years the people of Syracuse paid the whole amount 
 of their property into the exchequer of their tyrant 
 Dionysius. War, too, is a favourite occupation of a 
 tyrant, for the sake of occupying the attention of the 
 people, and making himself necessary to them as their 
 leader. Those whom he distrusts most are his own 
 especial friends, as possessing the readiest means of 
 supplanting him. An unbridled democracy is, in all 
 its doings, exactly similar to a tyranny. Its objects 
 and instruments are the worst, and both equally are 
 served by the tamest and weakest of mankind. A 
 democracy is always anxious to lord it as a sove- 
 reign; it therefore has its flatterers in the shape of 
 demagogues, and its unscrupulous servants who are 
 ready for any unworthy action. The leaders of a 
 
Book VI.] TRUE LIBERTY NOT IN DEMOCRACIES. 67 
 
 democracy must, just like tyrants, have persons to 
 defend their misdeeds, and to please them by flattery ; 
 and as no man of a really free spirit, or with a due 
 sense of his own dignity, will condescend to this, 
 such men are hated and feared both by democracies 
 and by a tyrant. . . Such, then, are the wicked 
 expedients for upholding tyranny; namely, the de- 
 basement of the people, the destruction of mutual 
 confidence, and the impoverishment of the country, 
 for the better preservation of the tyrant's power. . . . 
 
 BOOK VI. 
 
 That True Liberty is not found in Democracies. 
 
 This book is little more than an amplification of some of the 
 points previously dealt with, and contains little that need be 
 here repeated. Aristotle remarks, that in his time the due 
 admixture of the elements of aristocracy and democracy, in the 
 various governments of Greece, was not sufficiently attended 
 to, and he points to that as the cause of their short duration. 
 He recapitulates the principles on which democratic govern- 
 ments are founded, the chief of which are, " arithmetical equa- 
 lity," or government by mere numbers, without reference to 
 property, or to any especial fitness arising from any considera- 
 tions, intellectual or moral. The opinion of the majority told 
 by the head becomes therefore law. Thence arises the subjec- 
 tion of the upper classes to the lower, and the consequent 
 licentiousness and tyranny of the latter under the idea that 
 liberty consists in living according to each man's individual 
 will. The laws and usages of democracies, in support of this 
 theory, are then enumerated the principal of which are, uni- 
 versal suffrage ; no property qualification for voting or holding 
 office ; the short duration of official power ; that no one except 
 military commanders should be elected twice to the same office ; 
 that the sovereignty should reside in the assembly, and should 
 be as sparingly as possible imparted to particular magistrates. 
 
 Then, inasmuch as birth, wealth, education, with 
 all their intellectual and moral results, are the dis- 
 tinguishing characteristics of oligarchical governments, 
 
 F 2 
 
68 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 the opposites of all these have the preference in 
 democracies, namely, low birth, want of substance, 
 want of education and of moral and intellectual 
 training. Under this system no magistracy can be 
 permanent, and if any should by chance have come 
 down from ancient times of any permanent or here- 
 ditary character, it must be got rid of, and its power 
 transferred to one appointed by election. These are 
 the properties of democracies. But this " arithmetical 
 equality" is not true equality, nor can true liberty 
 result from it. Without due proportion between 
 wealth and numbers, true equality, and the results 
 to be anticipated from just government, are impos- 
 sible ; and this must be aimed at by the wise admix- 
 ture of all the constituent elements of a well-ordered 
 state. . . . 
 
 Certain democratic governments, of people subsisting on 
 agriculture or pasturage r are next described. These were the 
 most ancient, as well as the most successful instances, of this 
 arrangement of soeiety, and, in Aristotle's opinion, they are 
 suitable only, if at all, to society in that primitive state ; but, 
 even in them, he says that the condition of permanence is that 
 there should be a property qualification for magisterial offices, 
 ajid consequently, the introduction of an aristocratical element ; 
 and if the social arrangements are such that the government is, 
 in fact, in the hands of the best and most capable men, and not 
 of men of inferior note or capacity, that may be taken as an 
 instance of the best form of democracy, on account of the good 
 and sensible qualities both of the governing body and of the 
 governed. He adds, that under such a state of society the 
 upper classes, finding themselves invested with a due share of 
 influence, would not be disposed to conspire to effect its over- 
 throw. His maxims of political economy for creating and 
 encouraging the growth of such a community are superseded 
 by those of modern times. Upon the democracies of towns, 
 Aristotle proceeds to pronounce a severe judgment, the ancient 
 stock of the wealthy and substantial citizens in each state having, 
 
Book VI.] TRUE LIBERTY NOT IN DEMOCRACIES. 69 
 
 in his day, been overwhelmed by the admixture of the lowest 
 order of artizans and of foreigners, who had been invested with 
 the franchise through the influence of demagogues. In such, 
 he says, the practice was that 
 
 "Ancient customs were to be done away with, 
 ancient ties, civil and sacred, to be broken, every- 
 thing to be changed according to the new and false 
 theory, in order to level all distinctions, and to 
 enable the multitude to live and to govern accord- 
 ing to their will. The result was, an assimilation of 
 democratical to tyrannical government, in its habits 
 and modes of action ; for to such a multitude it is far 
 pleasanter to live licentiously, than to submit to the 
 restraints of wisdom and prudence." . . . 
 
 Chapter 3. ..." The difficulty which those 
 who set up democracies meet with is, not in bringing 
 them about in the first instance, for any one can set 
 up a government of that kind that may last one, two, 
 or three days, but their main difficulty is, in making 
 them permanent. With that view, they should en- 
 deavour as far as possible to cut off all sources of 
 pecuniary corruption, to prevent all groundless im- 
 peachments, and all proceedings directed especially 
 against the upper classes, and calculated to make 
 them feel that the ruling power is hostile to them." . . 
 
 The mode of doing so, pointed out by Aristotle, has especial 
 reference to the institutions of ancient society, and to the then 
 state of economical knowledge ; but he recommends that mea- 
 sures should be taken to cause the prosperity of the people to 
 be permanent, by directing them to employments in which their 
 labour will be reproductive, and, in particular, in sending out 
 colonies to occupy waste lands. 
 
70 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 Of Oligarchies. 
 
 Chapter 4. ..." That species of oligarchy will 
 be most durable which most resembles a well-ordered 
 commonwealth, and which consequently opens freely 
 all inferior offices to the lower ranks of citizens, and 
 associates with itself the best men it can find among 
 the great body of the people. The chief safety is in 
 good government. Healthy bodies, whether natural 
 or political, like sound ships, will bear many hard 
 encounters ; but when the body politic, or the natural 
 body, is weak and sickly, it requires tender handling, 
 and, like a crazy vessel, may be knocked to pieces by 
 a slight blow, or wrecked by the smallest mistake of 
 its navigators. As, therefore, a democracy is only 
 preserved by the overwhelming force of numbers, so 
 an oligarchy must look for security from wisdom and 
 moderation." 
 
 The other chapters of this book may be passed over. They 
 relate to the details of civil administration, and have little 
 interest except as a record of the civil arrangements in the 
 leading Greek states. The extracts above given from this book 
 have been much abridged, as being little more than amplifica- 
 tions of tvhat had gone before. 
 
 BOOK VII. 
 
 The Foundation of Public Happiness the same as that of Indi- 
 viduals; namely, a certain Increase of External Prosperity, 
 and the perfecting of our Intellectual and Moral Nature. 
 
 Chapters 1 to 6. Whoever would rightly deter- 
 mine what is the best form of government, must first 
 define what is the best kind of life. 
 
Book VII.] FOUNDATION OF PUBLIC HAPPINESS. 71 
 
 Those people are the happiest (barring unusual 
 accidents), who live under the best government that 
 their circumstances admit. 
 
 What, then, is the kind of life most eligible for 
 man in general? And does the well-being of in- 
 dividuals and of communities result from the same 
 causes ? 
 
 The first of these questions was discussed in the 
 Treatise on Ethics, in which it was proved that the 
 happiness of man depends upon a certain measure of 
 external advantages, on health of body, and on the 
 state and condition of his mind. For no one would 
 call that man happy who possessed neither courage, 
 nor self-command, nor a regard for justice, nor in- 
 telligence and good sense. Devoid of the first, he 
 would be liable to be frightened at a fly ; without 
 temperance he would wallow in the lowest sensuality; 
 without honesty and a sense of justice, he would, for 
 the sake of the smallest gain, take in his best friend ; 
 and in the same manner, if without mental cultivation, 
 he is without judgment, and is liable to be misled like 
 a child ; or like one deprived of his reason. A certain 
 portion, therefore, of all these qualities and virtues is, 
 by common consent, necessary to happiness. Most 
 men are contented with their own measure of them ; 
 but of estates, money, power, and honour, the desire is 
 usually unbounded. Yet it is indisputable that happi- 
 ness is the lot of those who lead a virtuous life, and 
 whose minds are most adorned with intellectual culti- 
 vation, if possessing at the same time a moderate 
 
72 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 share of this world's goods; rather than the lot of 
 those who abound in wealth, but are poorly furnished 
 with moral and intellectual excellences. External 
 goods are mere instruments, the excess of which may 
 be injurious or useless ; but of mental and moral ac- 
 quirements and perfections there can be no excess, 
 but the more they abound the more honourable and 
 useful they are to the individual and to society. What 
 comparison can there be between the perfecting the 
 spiritual nature of man, and the acquirement of any 
 amount of external possessions ? It is for the sake of 
 the mind only that these latter are worth thinking of, 
 and as far as they contribute to virtue, to wisdom, 
 and to all noble actions. Of this we ought to feel 
 conscious from a consideration of the nature of the 
 Divinity Himself, whose happiness consists not in 
 external objects, but in His own perfections. 
 
 External prosperity, therefore, and happiness, are 
 things of a different nature ; chance may bestow the 
 one, but not the moral and intellectual qualities which 
 produce the other. And as these qualities are essen- 
 tial to the happiness of an individual, they are no less 
 so for a collection of individuals, gathered together in 
 a well-ordered state. Bad men can never make a 
 good government; for there can be no good action, 
 either from an individual or a state, that is not 
 founded on virtue and wisdom. The courage, justice, 
 and moderation of a government has the same power 
 and form as the courage, justice, temperance, and 
 wisdom of an individual; and it will probably be 
 
Book VII.] FOUNDATION OF PUBLIC HAPPINESS. 73 
 
 admitted without further argument, that the virtues 
 of individuals and of governments are the same. 
 Chapters 7 to 11. 
 
 In the succeeding chapters Aristotle proposes first the ques- 
 tion, whether the active or the quiet life be the preferable ; and 
 secondly, which is the best form of government ? The latter 
 question he answers by repeating his former opinion, that it 
 depends on the circumstances of each individual people ; and 
 that " that constitution is the best under which they will be 
 best governed and live most happily." 
 
 The former question he goes into at some length, and con- 
 demns that political ambition which leads nations to interfere 
 with and to aim at the oppression of each other. He then 
 throws out some considerations respecting the populousness of 
 states, the most convenient extent of territory, the means of 
 offence and defence, national spirit and national character, the 
 influence of climate, and other subjects, his opinions upon which 
 have now no particular interest ; but he is led in the course of 
 them to express more clearly and decidedly than he had done 
 before his opinion as to the best form of political society. 
 
 The Best Form of Political Society. 
 
 He says (Chapter 7) : "A community is composed 
 of several essential parts ; there must be husbandmen 
 to supply food, there must be arts, arms, wealth, law, 
 and justice ; and lastly, though first in importance, 
 due provision for the worship of the Divinity, and 
 priests to serve Him. All these things a well-regu- 
 lated state requires ; for society properly so called is 
 not an unorganized multitude, brought together by 
 chance or accident, but an assemblage of people 
 having among themselves every element of what may 
 be called their life and well-being." 
 
 He then recommends a division of labour and a due assign- 
 ment of employments to individuals according to their different 
 tastes and capacities ; and proceeds to say (Chapter 8), that in 
 the state theoretically the best, political power would be lodged 
 
74 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 in the hands of those only who, by the possession of property, 
 had leisure enough to afford a probability that, by due cultiva- 
 tion of their faculties, they would be found to have ability and 
 character fitting them for the right use of it ; carefully and by 
 name excluding those classes who, by reason of their being ex- 
 clusively occupied with manual labour of the lowest kind, he 
 thought unable to come up to that standard. 
 
 On Municipal Regulations. 
 
 Some minute suggestions follow with respect to municipal 
 regulations, and it is especially enjoined that all requisite sani- 
 tary measures should be attended to ; and in particular that a 
 plentiful supply of wholesome water should be provided ; that 
 the streets should be laid out with a view to elegance and com- 
 fort as well as utility ; and that due care should be taken to 
 place the temples and other public buildings in situations where 
 they would be the greatest ornament to the city. 
 
 On National Character. 
 
 Chapters 12 and 13. The next question passed under review 
 relates to the genius and character of the people. Aristotle 
 asks, what is the national character best calculated to promote 
 individual happiness and good government, and how such a 
 disposition may be produced. He says, that the perfection of 
 human happiness requires that we should propose to ourselves 
 the best and highest ends, and choose the best means of attaining 
 them. Nature, custom, and reason contribute towards enabling 
 us to form these dispositions, and to smooth the way for the 
 influence of that education which forms the virtuous citizen, 
 and makes him pliable and obedient to the hand of the wise 
 legislator. In the details of this portion of his subject, how- 
 ever, and in that of education generally, Christian philosophy 
 and modern experience have superseded the views of antiquity. 
 Nevertheless, the high standard of individual, and therefore of 
 national character, which he holds up as the point to be aimed 
 at by the legislator, is worthy of being kept in view. 
 
 He says, that his care should be " to consider by 
 what institutions, and by what training, he will be 
 
 * Aristotle nowhere treats political power as a matter of right, but 
 invariably as a question of expediency, to be determined with reference 
 to the interests of the whole community. 
 
Book VII.] ON NATIONAL CHARACTER. 75 
 
 able to form good men, and to develop the best parts 
 of man's nature by directing it to the highest objects. 
 There are two parts of our nature, the higher and 
 the lower. The latter seems to subsist for the sake 
 of the former, and in order, under right direction, to 
 be instrumental to its development. The arts minister 
 to and aid the reason. Labour and business are un- 
 dertaken for the sake of leisure ; war for the sake of 
 peace ; the most necessary and useful things for the 
 sake of leading to the most beautiful and the most 
 noble. The legislator, therefore, embracing all these 
 in his consideration, should have regard not alone to 
 the comparatively inferior acts and results, but to 
 those that belong to the higher and better part of 
 our nature, as the ends and objects of our existence. 
 Business and war are right in their turn; but far 
 better are peace and leisure ; the things necessary 
 and useful to our daily life are to be attended to ; but 
 even more, the true, the beautiful, and the honour- 
 able. And to these higher objects should the minds 
 of youth be directed and not of youth alone, but of 
 all others who need instruction. Great has been the 
 error of some who have passed for able legislators in 
 Greece, in not holding up these highest objects as the 
 aim of their institutions, and in not seeking to develop 
 all the virtues of our nature, but unwisely inclining 
 too much towards the mere useful arts, and those that 
 minister to the desire of gain. Lycurgus has been 
 unreasonably praised for sacrificing everything in his 
 institutions to ideas of war and conquest. Not that 
 
76 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Aristotle, 
 
 the military virtues are not to be cultivated, for with- 
 out courage and the power of endurance a nation may 
 be exposed to lose its liberties; but they should be 
 regarded chiefly as the means of maintaining peace ; 
 and peace and leisure should be made fruitful by the 
 devotion of men's minds to justice and temperance, 
 philosophy and wisdom, in which alone, and not in 
 idle and luxurious enjoyment, consists true happiness." 
 
 In the remainder of the present, and in the whole of the last 
 book (the 8th), there is little that is now interesting, the ques- 
 tion of education, to which they chiefly relate, being to the 
 ancient world so different in many respects from what it is in 
 modern times. A few sentiments, however, which are put forth 
 in these two books, are of universal applicability, and may very 
 appropriately conclude this abstract of a work which must in 
 all ages excite admiration by its profound wisdom, and by its 
 calm analysis of subjects that most deeply stir the passions, 
 while they most permanently affect the happiness of mankind. 
 
 On Education. 
 
 Parts of Book 7, c. 15, and Book 8, cc. 2 and 3. 
 " In childhood, and in the earliest period of educa- 
 tion, have more care for the health of the body than 
 for the mind, and for the moral character rather 
 than for the intellectual. Let nothing base or ser- 
 vile, vulgar or disgraceful, meet the eye or assail the 
 ear of the young ; for from words to actions is often 
 but a step. Let nothing of the sort, therefore, be 
 either spoken of by them, or be heard spoken of by 
 others. Let their earliest and first impressions be 
 in all things the best, for we are all governed greatly 
 by first impressions. Let them be taught fully all 
 the essential elements of education, and as much of 
 
Book VII.] ON EDUCATION. 77 
 
 what is merely useful in a mechanical point of view, 
 as will not have the effect of rendering the body, the 
 soul, and the intellectual powers, less capable of 
 arriving at the highest excellence of their respective 
 natures ; for a too exclusive devotion to some of the 
 mere mechanical arts is apt to injure the bodily facul- 
 ties, and, by unduly absorbing, to depress the mind. 
 Let, therefore, not those things only be learnt which 
 are the usual instruments of instruction, but those 
 which, like the fine arts, teach us how to enjoy and 
 embellish leisure. The merely useful or absolutely 
 necessary matters of education are not the only ones 
 that ought to be attended to ; but to those should be 
 added such as exalt and expand the mind, and convey 
 
 a sense of what is beautiful and noble For to 
 
 be looking everywhere to the merely useful, is little 
 fitted to form an elevated character or a liberal mind." 
 
78 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Polybius, 
 
 POLYBIUS 
 
 ON THE ROMAN CONSTITUTION. 
 
 (Extracts from the Preface to Book VI of Polylius's History of 
 Home. Written about B.C. 140.) 
 
 THE spectacle which the ancient world presented to Aristotle, 
 while composing the treatise with which we have just been 
 occupied, was the prostrate condition of all the governments 
 and people of Greece under the heavy hand of the military 
 power of Macedon, and the expansion of that power to the 
 furthest confines of the East by the genius of the youthful 
 Alexander. Through the calm reasoning and severe analysis 
 of the treatise on " Politics " there gleams a high and patriotic 
 spirit, which seems to aim at recovering his countrymen from 
 the degradation into which they had fallen, by pointing out its 
 causes, and holding up to their view the true models of political 
 wisdom and the pure sources of individual virtue and happiness. 
 But his efforts were in vain, for corruption had too completely 
 enervated the democracy of Athens ; the spirit and form of the 
 admired institutions of Sparta were extinguished ; and the 
 cognate and allied states of the two leading republics were 
 sunk in the same moral and political exhaustion. 
 
 A hundred years passed away, and another great power arose 
 from the other side of the horizon. Rome, which in the days 
 of Aristotle and Alexander attracted little notice, had become 
 animated with the vigour which had once inspired the people of 
 Greece, and was proceeding to fill the space in the then civilized 
 world which had been occupied before their day by their illus- 
 trious predecessors. Within 130 years after the death of Aris- 
 totle, the Roman armies had conquered Hannibal, destroyed 
 Carthage, subdued Spain, dissolved the Achaean League, over- 
 run Asia Minor, and planted their eagles on Mount Taurus, 
 and beside the Euphrates. 
 
 Among the principal Achaeans sent to Rome as hostages after 
 the final submission of the Greek people, was Polybius, about 
 the year B.C. 167. It appears that, during a residence there of 
 several years, he collected the materials for the history of that 
 
Book VI.] ON THE ROMAN CONSTITUTION. 79 
 
 people, from the commencement of the brilliant period of their 
 contest with Hannibal (B.C. 220, the beginning of the second 
 Punic war), to the point in their progress which he had himself 
 witnessed. In this design he was assisted by the conqueror of 
 Africa, whose friendship and companionship he enjoyed during 
 many years, being present with Scipio at the destruction of 
 Carthage (B.C. 146), and probably also at the taking of Numan- 
 tia, B.C. 133. 
 
 The first five books of Polybius's history describe the invasion 
 of Italy by Hannibal, and the series of striking events to which 
 that great enterprise gave occasion. The grand spectacle of an 
 untiring national spirit guided by profound wisdom, as exhibited 
 in the firm and finally triumphant resistance to Hannibal, is 
 unfolded with evident admiration and in much detail. The 
 magnanimity and courage with which the Senate and people of 
 Rome had braved the oft-recurring periods of threatening and 
 adverse fortune, impresses his mind as deeply as the great 
 exploits which he had himself seen ; which were fast giving 
 them the dominion of the world ; and which led them in a few 
 more years to extend their conquering arms from the utmost 
 extremity of Spain on one side to the Euphrates on the other. 
 Struck by these results of the union of resistless bravery with 
 consummate policy, he stops in the course of his history to ask 
 himself, what were the causes that formed a people capable of 
 this greatness ? what the form of government " from which, as 
 from a fountain, all these high aspirations, all these daring aims, 
 and all this splendid success had flowed," and which, by its 
 results on the national character, " merited the same praise that 
 you would give to an individual in whom all these qualities of 
 magnanimity and valour were most conspicuous ? " 
 
 This question he answers in the Preface to the Sixth Book 
 of his history, and in a manner so remarkable (as a proof that, 
 years after Aristotle wrote, the same principles that had been 
 so elaborately unfolded in the treatise on " Politics " were still 
 recognised as true by the leading minds of the day, and referred 
 to as the guides and standards of political life and true liberty), 
 that, even at the risk of a little repetition in some portion of 
 the following extract, from its similarity to the statements and 
 arguments of Aristotle, it will be acceptable to many readers to 
 see reproduced a large portion of Polybius's remarks on the 
 Roman Constitution, as it affected the development and caused 
 the greatness of that state. He says : 
 
 " That the state of Rome in his day was a matter 
 
 * Polybius, Bekkeri, Vol. i, p. 
 
80 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Polybius, 
 
 by no means easy to be thoroughly understood, on 
 account of the complicated nature of its government ; 
 nor could any one comprehend it without a clear 
 insight into all its institutions, public and private. 
 Whoever, therefore, would obtain a precise view of 
 its particular excellences, must bestow on the inquiry 
 much diligent and careful attention." 
 
 He therefore follows Aristotle in his enumeration of the three 
 simple forms of government the kingly, the aristocratic, and 
 the democratic and in his description of that which is the best 
 of all, namely, that in which all these elements are duly and 
 judiciously mingled, as in Lycurgus's Constitution for Sparta. 
 He then proceeds : 
 
 " As kingly government, and aristocracy properly 
 so called, rest not on force and fear, but on wise laws, 
 just and upright administration, and willing obedience, 
 so popular government is not that in which the mul- 
 titude is master to do what it proposes and wills, but 
 a government in which it is as it were a household 
 and hereditary custom* to reverence the ordinances 
 of religion, to obey parents, to respect elders, and to 
 submit to the laws. When, under such arrangements 
 as these, the opinion of the majority prevails, we may 
 rightly call such a popular government." .... 
 
 " There are, therefore, six simple forms of govern- 
 ment; the three which were first enumerated, and 
 their three cognate ones absolute monarchy, oli- 
 garchy, and ochlocracy, or government by the mob. 
 First, paternal monarchy arises in a natural manner, 
 
 * 'Os irdrpiov kar'i Kal (rvvrfies. 
 
.Book VI.] ON THE KOMAN CONSTITUTION. 81 
 
 and without art or design. This is followed by mo- 
 narchy, limited by law and custom. The next change 
 is to an absolute monarchy, or tyranny, which places 
 itself above law. This being intolerable, is put down 
 by a combination of the most powerful, and an aristo- 
 cracy takes its place. This in turn is naturally suc- 
 ceeded by an oligarchy; but the mass of the people 
 at length rise against the oppression of the few, 
 and establish a democracy; and this again, govern- 
 ing with insolence and disregarding established law, 
 excites hostility, and the measure of change is filled 
 up by the uncontrolled multitude seizing the reins of 
 power. And that this is the true progress of events, 
 may be clearly perceived by any one who will give 
 his attention to consider the sources and the parent- 
 age, as it were, of each form of government, and the 
 various changes they undergo ; and without this in- 
 sight into their origins, no one can take a just and 
 comprehensive view of their progressive development, 
 their culminating point, their declension, and their 
 end, so as to be able to point out when and how and 
 under what circumstances the same changes will occur 
 again. More particularly in regard to the Roman 
 government does this mode of investigation seem apt 
 and natural, inasmuch as its origin and progress has 
 corresponded with the order of nature which has been 
 described."* . , . . 
 
 In the succeeding four chapters he expands the above brief 
 
 * Book vi, cc. 3 and 4. (Edit. Schwcighauseri.) 
 
 G 
 
82 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Polybiu., 
 
 sketch of the successive changes to which all the simple forma 
 of government are liable, and which end at length in a cor- 
 rupted democracy governing by violence and restrained by no 
 sense of justice, " until its uncontrolled and unreasonable will 
 again finds the hand of a tyrant master." 
 
 " This is the circle iu which these simple govern- 
 ments revolve, this the natural order in which their 
 revolutions occur, until they come round again to 
 the point from which they set out. Whoever clearly 
 recognises this truth, in speculating upon the future 
 destiny of nations, may perhaps be deceived in the 
 precise time when he anticipates that either of the 
 above changes will come to pass, but he can scarcely 
 be mistaken in his estimate of the particular point at 
 which they have arrived in the course of their deve- 
 lopment or their decline, or of the next change that 
 awaits them, if he only approach the inquiry without 
 ill feeling or passion. And, as was remarked just 
 above, we shall by this mode of investigation most 
 readily come to a knowledge of the origin, progress, 
 and perfection of the Roman government, and form a 
 right conjecture as to the changes it is destined to 
 undergo ; for the course that it has taken from its 
 commencement to the present time is, more than that 
 of any other government, in exact conformity with 
 that natural order of development."! 
 
 He then refers to the wise legislation of Lycurgus, by which, 
 
 * "Ewj 6v, airoTOi]pui}[j.{i>ov f ir&Xir t^M Secrir&rrjv Kal fjt.6ya.pxoy. 
 (Ch. 9.) 
 
 f Chapter 9. 
 
Book VI.] ON THE ROMAN CONSTITUTION. 83 
 
 in drawing tip the Constitution of Sparta, he sought to meet the 
 defects of all these simple forms of government. 
 
 " For, observing these defects, Lycurgus did not 
 set up a simple and uniform mode of government, but 
 brought together, and united in one, all the excel- 
 lences and peculiarities of each form, in such a man- 
 ner that no one power, by its disproportionate and 
 undesirable increase, might turn the course of govern- 
 ment towards the extreme naturally inherent in it; 
 but each power being held in restraint by the rest, 
 neither should unduly preponderate, to the entire 
 exclusion of the weight and influence of the others ; 
 and thus the state, preserving its own weight and 
 even balance, might long endure, and hold on its 
 course like a vessel which, when the wind is strong, 
 is prevented from going to leeward by applying the 
 action of the oars on the leeward side. For the 
 kingly power is restrained from excess by the popular, 
 which has its due share in the government; and, 
 again, the popular power is prevented from encroach- 
 ing on that of the kings, by their respect for and 
 confidence in the senate, who, being chosen for their 
 public and private virtues and excellences, are always 
 found to throw their weight on the side of right and 
 justice. Accordingly, if any constituent element of 
 the state should happen to be weakened, the elders 
 and the senate, who hold steadfastly by ancient law 
 and custom, throw their whole weight into that scale, 
 and strengthen and support the weaker party. It 
 was by this wise and equitable constitution that 
 
 G2 
 
84 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Polybius, 
 
 Lycurgus enabled the Lacedemonian people to pre- 
 serve their liberties longer than any other people 
 with which we are acquainted." * ... 
 
 " The Romans, in forming the constitution of their 
 country, have attained the same end, though not by 
 the same process; for they began with no written 
 constitution like that of Lycurgus, but, after many 
 contests and long experience, and by always taking 
 advantage of circumstances, and choosing the best 
 course, they have framed a constitution which is the 
 very best of all which the world has seen up to the 
 present time." . . . "For all the three elements 
 above named have their place and influence in their 
 government, but they are so equably and suitably 
 distributed, and the administrative powers of each 
 so well arranged, that no one, even of their own 
 citizens, can pronounce decidedly whether the govern- 
 ment should be denominated an aristocratic, a demo- 
 cratic, or a monarchical one. When you look at the 
 power vested in the consuls, you would say it was an 
 entirely monarchical and kingly constitution; when 
 you contemplate the power of the senate, you would 
 call it an aristocracy ; and yet if you observe the 
 power that is vested in the people, one would be 
 justified in calling it a democracy."! 
 
 He then describes the respective powers and prerogatives of 
 the consuls, the senate, and the people ; but as the distribution of 
 these powers in our own constitution may, without presumption, 
 
 * Chapter 10. 
 
 f Chapter 11. See Arist. " Pol.," Book iv, ch. 7. 
 
Book VI.] ON THE ROMAN CONSTITUTION. 85 
 
 be said to be better than any other, and as we have nothing 
 to learn from antiquity on those points, it is sufficient to have 
 exhibited the principle which Polybius so commends, and to 
 have shown that it is in all respects similar to what is in opera- 
 tion among ourselves. He thus terminates his account of the 
 Roman government, which he witnessed in its perfection, and of 
 which he appears unwilling to anticipate the fall : 
 
 " Such, therefore, is the power of each of these 
 divisions of the government for mutual check and 
 mutual co-operation. They are ready to unite to 
 meet every conjuncture, and they thus form a state 
 that is the very best that can anywhere be found. 
 For, when any common external danger compels them 
 to union of mind and will, such and so great is the 
 power of the government, that nothing is omitted that 
 the occasion requires, for all vie with each other in 
 bending the whole vigour of their minds to determine 
 what is best to meet the circumstances in hand. And 
 when this is decided on, no time is lost in delay, but 
 all, whether in their public or private capacity, stretch 
 their energies to carry it forthwith into effect. There- 
 fore is this state invincible, from its very form and 
 constitution ; and whatever it determines upon it does. 
 But if, freed from the apprehension of danger from 
 without, and in the full enjoyment of prosperity and 
 abundance the result of their successes and their 
 victories they should become luxurious and corrupt, 
 and enter upon a course of insolence and oppression 
 as may possibly happen then will the state be seen 
 coming to its own aid, and ministering to its own 
 amendment. For when one of its constituent parts 
 swells beyond its proportionate power, and becomes 
 
86 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Polybius. 
 
 aggressive, it will immediately be checked by the 
 opposition of the rest, who will suffer no one separate 
 power to get the ascendancy. Everything, therefore, 
 will remain in its place, the impetuosity of some being 
 kept down, and others being deterred from moving, 
 by a knowledge of the opposition they will have to 
 encounter." * 
 
 * Chapter 18. 
 
87 
 
 EXTRACTS 
 
 FROM 
 
 CICERO'S TREATISE 
 
 ON 
 
 A REPUBLIC OR COMMONWEALTH. 
 (B.C. 54.) 
 
 ANOTHER century passed away, from the time when Polybius 
 pronounced the eulogy contained in the preceding pages on the 
 Roman Constitution as it was in his day, and ventured to 
 anticipate for it a long period of existence. He founded his 
 hopes on the self-restoring process which that constitution had 
 undergone on so many occasions in the course of the preceding 
 centuries, and on the fact, which he frequently adverts to in his 
 history, that notwithstanding the great extension of the Roman 
 power and their almost intoxicating successes, "the ancient 
 manners were not yet corrupted," the ancient domestic and 
 social discipline was healthy and strong, and the country 
 abounded in great men capable of serving it with consummate 
 ability and wisdom both in peace and war. Such, indeed, was the 
 height of prosperity and glory to which Rome had risen at that 
 epoch, that the great conqueror of Africa, on becoming invested 
 with the office of Censor, caused the form of public prayer to be 
 changed, and bade his countrymen pray "not that the gods 
 would add to the favours they had bestowed upon his country, 
 but that they would preserve them."']' 
 
 * Polybius went to Rome B.C. 167. Cicero wrote this treatise 
 B.C. 54. 
 
 f Valer. Max., Lib. iv, 10. " Satis " inquit, " bonee et magnae sunt 
 (populi Romani res), itaque precor ut eas (Dii immortales) perpetuo 
 incolumes servent." 
 
88 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Cicero's 
 
 There were, however, at that very time, seeds of evil in the 
 social and political state, which had begun to show themselves. 
 The aristocracy, by sundry acts of injustice, and by unwise 
 delay in removing just causes of complaint, roused the resent- 
 ment of large bodies of the people, and gave a legitimate ground 
 of influence to their leaders. The democratic power, gaining 
 the ascendancy, altered the balance of the constitution. The 
 aristocracy, now becoming corrupt with the riches of Asia and 
 the decay of the ancient moral code of Roman manners and 
 discipline, resorted to every means to regain their power. A 
 war of factions was the result, which was withstood and de- 
 ferred as long as possible by the best and most patriotic citizens, 
 in the early part of Cicero's career, but which he soon very 
 plainly perceived to be imminent, while he foresaw at the same 
 time the downfall of the liberties of Borne and the degradation 
 of the character of his countrymen. 
 
 Ten years after his brilliant consulship, in the summer retire- 
 ment of his villa by the sea-side at Cumse, he wrote (B.C. 54, and 
 about eleven years before his death) this Treatise on a Republic 
 or Commonwealth, for the sake, as he says himself, of recalling 
 to the minds of his fellow-countrymen the real principles of 
 their constitution, of showing them what it had been in its best 
 state, and how it had arrived at that perfection ; of exciting a 
 love and reverence for it in the rising generation ; and of 
 endeavouring to bring back the ancient tone of morals and 
 manners " which," he adds, " have so fallen in these days, that 
 the exertions of every good man are demanded to raise them up, 
 to restrain, and amend them." 
 
 With this view he throws his comments upon the true Roman 
 Constitution into the form of a dialogue, supposed to have taken 
 place about a hundred years previously (B.C. 129), between 
 Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus and a few of his immediate" 
 friends and followers, men of the highest position and character 
 in the state, in Scipio's gardens near Rome, during a short 
 remission from public business, at the time of the " Latin Holi- 
 days.'* The very natural way in which these distinguished men 
 seem to be brought together, the frank and affectionate nature 
 of their social intercourse, the grace and dignity of their address, 
 the respect for age and eminent services shown by the younger 
 to the elder in which even the great Scipio is conspicuous by 
 his manner and language towards his venerable friend Lselius 
 the beauty of the language, and the truth and wisdom of so 
 many of the sentiments attributed to the different speakers, 
 make this celebrated fragment one of the most interesting and 
 
 DC Divinatione, Lib. ii, ss. 1, 2. 
 
Treatise.] ON A REPUBLIC OR COMMONWEALTH. 89 
 
 valuable of Cicero's works. The treatise opened with a pre- 
 face consisting of an enumeration of the great deeds of the most 
 illustrious of his countrymen, who in successive ages devoted 
 themselves to the public service, and preferred the labour of 
 political life, its anxieties and contentions, to the ease and tran- 
 quillity in which their wealth and station would have enabled 
 them to indulge. The first portion of this preface has not been 
 recovered, but what remains sufficiently indicates the tenour of 
 the whole. It thus proceeds : 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 Cliapter 1 (ad finem) to Chapter 8. f 
 
 To minds properly constituted, useful and 
 virtuous action is almost a necessity of nature, and 
 the love of contributing to the common welfare is so 
 great, as to overcome all the attractions of a life of 
 sensual and idle indulgence. Philosophers in their 
 studies may define right and wrong, and lay down 
 the principles of morals, but it is the statesman who 
 embodies those principles in laws ; who gives the 
 
 * It was discovered at Rome, in the Library of the Vatican, A.D, 1822, 
 on a " palimpsest," or parchment which had been rubbed a second time 
 to obliterate the first work written upon it ^irdXiv i//aurrbs, rubbed 
 over again). This first work was Cicero's treatise " De Republica," 
 which, as far as the pages of the parchment itself were complete, was 
 legible beneath the second writing a portion of St. Augustin's Com- 
 mentary on the Psalms. It was discovered by Signer Angclo Maio, 
 Librarian of the Vatican, whose edition of it I have followed (Rome 
 and London, 1823), and who shows that, including other fragments of 
 the same work preserved in various authors, we have now about one- 
 third (fortunately the most valuable portion) of the whole. 
 
 In giving the substance of this treatise at least all that may be 
 usefully read at the present day I have not thought it necessary to 
 adhere to the form of the dialogue, inasmuch as nearly all that gives 
 particular value to the argumentative part of the treatise is attributed 
 to one speaker, Scipio. 
 
 f Throughout this " Fragment" several pages in a chapter, and 
 frequently several chapters together, are wanting, but enough has been 
 recovered of the first three books to make up a connected whole. 
 
90 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Cicero's 
 
 support of legal sanction to justice, honour, and equity ; 
 who sustains public morals, brands what is base, en- 
 courages what is noble and of good report, and sets 
 an example of fortitude in peril, and perseverance 
 and endurance in the laborious duties of his high 
 calling. It was said of Xenocrates, a distinguished 
 pupil of Plato, that when someone asked him what 
 advantage his pupils derived from his instruction, he 
 answered, that " they learnt from him to do of their 
 own accord what other men could only be induced to 
 do by the fear of punishment." Few, indeed, are 
 those who thus yield a willing obedience to the pre- 
 cepts of morality and virtue ; and therefore great are 
 the services of the statesman who produces a general 
 obedience to them by the compulsion of law, and thus 
 maintains a system of public right, public morals, and 
 a well-ordered government. For my part, as a great 
 and lordly city, as Ennius says, is a grander thing than 
 a little village or a small insulated stronghold, so 
 those who by their counsels and their authority govern 
 the state, are worthy of much higher consideration 
 than those who keep themselves aloof from all public 
 duties ; for however great the acquirements of the 
 latter may be, their wisdom, which can hardly co- 
 exist with a life of inaction, cannot be of much 
 account. Such men may lead an easy and quiet life, 
 and augment their substance and well-being ; and 
 indeed to the pursuit of wealth and to sensual indul- 
 gences, mankind are ever too prone to devote their 
 best energies of mind and body ; but let us not follow 
 
Treatise.] DUTIES OF PUBLIC MEN. 91 
 
 such examples ; let us hold that course which has ever 
 been that of the greatest and best of our countrymen, 
 nor give ear to the voice that sounds a retreat, and 
 that would recall from the contest even those who 
 have advanced boldly into it. 
 
 To these arguments, so clear and decisive, those 
 who take the other view of the question oppose, first, 
 the labours of public life ; as if that was calculated 
 to weigh with a man of active mind and industrious 
 habits ; for, to ensure success, what amount of labour 
 is not endured in the humbler professions, in the 
 discharge of private duties, and even in the pursuits 
 of commercial business ? They add next, its dangers ; 
 using thus the fear of death as an argument to brave 
 men ! Which, let me ask, do such men deem most 
 intolerable ? to waste and wear away their lives in use- 
 lessness and inaction, or to pay to their country a debt 
 which some time or other must be rendered to nature ? 
 Again, they think they may safely be eloquent upon 
 the hard measure often dealt out to the most illus- 
 trious men, and the injuries they often receive from 
 their ungrateful fellow-citizens ; and they quote freely 
 the numerous examples of this in Greek history and 
 in our own, and my own case among the rest, to 
 which they refer w r ith somewhat more affection to- 
 wards myself and acrimony towards others, because 
 they are pleased to attribute their own and the 
 country's present peace and quietness to my counsels 
 and conduct. As far as I myself am concerned, what 
 happened brought me more honour than labour, more 
 
92 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Cicero's 
 
 glory than anxiety ; and I felt more pleasure in the 
 sympathy of the good than pain at the exultation of 
 the wicked. But had it been otherwise, I should not 
 have complained, since I had made up my mind to 
 the worst return from the faction, which I put down 
 with so much benefit to my country. I knew to what 
 I was exposing myself, and what sacrifices of personal 
 ease I was making ; for though my own enjoyments 
 from a life of tranquillity and retirement were greater 
 than those of most men, in consequence of the ever- 
 varying delights of literature, in the midst of which 
 I had lived from my youth upwards, and though my 
 own share of any public calamity would have been 
 no greater than that of any of my neighbours, yet 
 I did not hesitate a moment to stem the torrent of 
 those evil times, and to meet the storm, for my 
 country's sake, and at the risk of my own life to pro- 
 cure the safety of others. For I do not hold our 
 relation to our country, which, like a parent, has 
 given us life and brought us up, to be this, that she is 
 to expect no aid and sustenance from us in return, 
 but only serve to minister to our necessities, to pro- 
 vide us with the conveniences and comforts of life, 
 and to afford us a sure refuge and a quiet home; I 
 hold, on the contrary, that she has a strict and irre- 
 fragable claim that we should devote to her service 
 all our best energies, our thoughts, our talents and 
 our counsels, and postpone our private interests to 
 the duties and sacrifices she may demand of us. 
 
 Another excuse w^hich they make to themselves, as 
 
Treatise.] DUTIES OF PUBLIC MEN. 93 
 
 justifying their devotion to a life of mere indulgence, 
 is the annoyance of being mixed up in public life with 
 men of low aims and indifferent characters, and the 
 danger also of such union in times of public excite- 
 ment. They say that it is not the act of a wise man 
 to assume the reins of government with a knowledge 
 that he may very possibly be unable to curb the un- 
 reasonable and impetuous impulses of the multitude ; 
 and they ask, whether a man of cultivated mind and 
 manners is to descend into the arena of contest with 
 the unprincipled and the reckless, and encounter mis- 
 representations and injustice which a prudent man 
 ought not voluntarily to subject himself to. But 
 can there be any stronger motive that ought to weigh 
 with high-minded, virtuous, and brave men, than the 
 determination not to see their country and themselves 
 at the feet of men without principle ? For by leaving 
 the course open and unobstructed to these alone, the 
 time would come when the well-disposed, however 
 they might desire it, would find themselves powerless 
 to prevent the most serious evils. 
 
 They say, indeed, that when the necessity arises, 
 there is time enough to act. But how, for instance, 
 could I, at the period of my consulship, have acted 
 with effect, had I not gone through all the other 
 offices of the state in regular succession? If you 
 wish to do your country service in a time of danger, 
 the danger must find you in possession of a vantage 
 ground that will enable you to render that service. 
 Neither can I understand the doctrine of men of a 
 
94 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Cicero's 
 
 certain school, who avow, in quiet times, that they 
 have never given themselves the trouble to learn, 
 neither do they care to know anything of govern- 
 ment and of public affairs, but say that they will be 
 ready to take the helm when the storm arises. They 
 allow that they have no special aptitude or knowledge 
 for the work, and that such belongs to men trained 
 and educated in it. How, then, does it become them 
 to volunteer themselves in times of danger, while they 
 admit that even when things are going smoothly, 
 they are unequal to the easy task? Indeed, if it 
 were true, that a wise man ought not to court the 
 trouble of public duties, but at the same time that 
 he ought not to decline them when the necessity 
 arose for his interference, it would, in my opinion, 
 even in that case, be unwise for any man likely so 
 to be called upon, to neglect preparing himself with 
 the knowledge and experience which he may any day 
 have occasion to put to the proof. 
 
 Chapter 7. I have said thus much, because in 
 what follows I am about to treat of a republic, or 
 commonwealth,* which would be of little avail if I 
 had not first endeavoured to remove the hesitation 
 which some have to embark in public affairs at all. 
 
 * It is almost unnecessary to say that the word Republic, in its 
 modern sense, conveys a very different idea from that intended by the 
 two words " res publica" (from which it is borrowed), in ancient times. 
 In its modern acceptation it scarcely ever implies anything but a demo- 
 cratic republic. Cicero defines it in this treatise (Ch. 25), as "res 
 populi," that is, " the political arrangement which has in view the best 
 interests of all classes and the entire body of the people." The Greeks 
 
Treatise.] DUTIES OF PUBLIC MEN. 95 
 
 If there are any whom I may have failed to con- 
 vince, I must beg them to listen to those great men, 
 who, like Aristotle and others, though not taking 
 any active part in public matters themselves, yet 
 did in a measure discharge a useful public duty, by 
 their investigations and writings on politics, and to 
 whose authority even the most learned defer with 
 respect. Those seven, indeed, whom the Greeks 
 distinguished above all their countrymen by the name 
 of Wise, were, nearly without exception, men versed 
 practically in political life. And it may be with 
 truth asserted, that in no sphere of action do human 
 powers so nearly approach the divine, as in laying 
 the foundations, or contributing to the stability and 
 welfare, of civil society. 
 
 Some who in former times have written on the 
 subject of political government, have themselves had 
 no experience in it; others, though distinguished in 
 active life, have had little skill in literature. The 
 part I have taken in public affairs, during my con- 
 sulship and on previous occasions, and my early- 
 formed literary habits, give me some qualifications 
 for treating of this subject ; nevertheless, what I am 
 about to say lays no claim to the merit of novelty, 
 but is little more than an exposition of the opinions 
 
 had no similar word ; the word IIoXtTeia, " Polity," standing as the 
 general term for all governments, which were qualified by the epithets 
 or descriptions appropriate to each, as " Aristocratic," " Oligarchical," 
 " Democratic," or " Mixed," &c. ; the latter being, as we have seen, 
 universally held the best, and corresponding to what Cicero calls a 
 <*res publica" or "res populi." 
 
96 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Cicero's 
 
 of some of the most illustrious men of the best age 
 of our political history. 
 
 Chapters 9 to 17. The different characters of the Dialogue 
 are then introduced, as has been before adverted to, and are 
 represented as meeting during a period of repose from the 
 turmoils of public life, in the gardens of the great general and 
 statesman of the age, P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus. The con- 
 versation first turns upon a natural phenomenon which had lately 
 excited attention, two disks of the sun having been visible at 
 the same time ; and while a regret is expressed at the very limited 
 knowledge of natural science then possessed by those who had 
 made it their study, and the consequent imperfection of their 
 attempts to account for the great phenomena of nature, the 
 utility of mastering such knowledge as existed on the subject 
 is shown by various examples which occurred to men engaged 
 in public life. After an effort at explaining the unusual appear- 
 ance, so as to bring it within the then existing theory of the 
 laws of motion of the celestial bodies, it is observed : 
 
 How all human things sink in comparison when the 
 mind has been habituated to the contemplation of the 
 works of Providence ; how transitory everything here 
 appears to one who dwells upon the eternal ; how 
 human glory fades before the thought of the small 
 part of the universe filled by the earth itself, and how 
 still smaller in comparison is that portion of it which 
 
 we inhabit How much happier he who 
 
 sets little store by this world's goods, seeing how small 
 a fragment of them he can really enjoy, and how 
 slight is that enjoyment ; how uncertain also his hold 
 upon them, and how often they fall to the lot of the 
 very worst of men; how much wiser, then, to moderate 
 the desires for all these things, and to be content with 
 what is necessary for daily life ; and to value power 
 and authority, not by the honour and fame it is wont 
 to bring with it, but as opportunities of rendering 
 
Treatise.] ON THE BEST FORM OF GOVERNMENT. 97 
 
 public service and discharging a public duty. Such a 
 man, having within himself all the best resources for 
 the employment of his time, may say, with some of the 
 best and wisest of our predecessors, that he is never 
 more busy than when he has the full command of 
 leisure, and is never less alone than when alone. 
 
 Chapters 19 to 22. Laalius then reminds his friends 
 "that there are other subjects of a nearer interest than 
 that of the cause of the appearance of two suns in the 
 sky at the same moment namely, the sources of those 
 factions in the state which by their divisions and con- 
 tests were then almost making two senates and two 
 people out of their formerly united commonwealth. 
 . . . . These natural phenomena are beyond our 
 power, and we know very little about them. But to 
 reunite the senate and the people is a matter within 
 our reach, and if we can affect it, will greatly con- 
 tribute to the general welfare To succeed 
 
 in this, it is necessary to have studied and to be well 
 acquainted with the principles of government ; and to 
 the knowledge of these principles must be added 
 wisdom and firmness in applying them. Let us there- 
 fore apply this present leisure to good purpose, and 
 endeavour to induce Scipio to expound to us what he 
 thinks the best form of government, from which we may 
 learn how to establish such among ourselves, and to 
 find our way out of the difficulties that now surround us. 
 . . . . Nor can there be any one better qualified 
 than Scipio for such a discussion, not only on account 
 of his great experience and conspicuous position in the 
 
 H 
 
98 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Cicero's 
 
 state, but because lie has often investigated the subject 
 in former days with Polybius and another learned 
 Greek, whose opinions were, that by far the best 
 form of government was that which our ancestors 
 bequeathed to us, and which was then in vigour." * 
 
 Scipio acknowledges that it is a subject to which he has given 
 great attention, and assents to their request. 
 
 "For," he says, "when I see the common artizan 
 bending the whole force of his mind upon his calling, 
 in order to attain excellence in it, it would have little 
 become me to show a less diligence in gaining an 
 accurate acquaintance with the duties to which I had 
 been brought up, and which had been as it were left 
 me as a legacy by those who preceded me, namely, 
 the duties belonging to the administration of public 
 affairs. I am, indeed, not quite satisfied with what 
 the most learned of the Greeks have left to us on this 
 subject ; nor yet am I quite sure that I can point out 
 anything better. I pray you therefore consider me, 
 in what I am about to say, as still willing to learn ; as 
 one who was carefully instructed by my father in all 
 the elements of a liberal education, and fired with a 
 desire of knowledge from my youth upwards, but as 
 nevertheless owing more to domestic precepts and 
 domestic training than to anything I have got from 
 books." .... 
 
 Chapter 25 to 29. To proceed, therefore : a 
 commonwealth is a political arrangement which has 
 
 * See the Extracts from Polybius on the Roman Constitution, p. 78. 
 
Treatise.] ON THE BEST FORM OF GOVERNMENT. 99 
 
 in view the welfare of all classes of the community, 
 or, in other words, the whole people. By the word 
 people, I mean not any mere congregation of 
 numbers, but an assemblage of the whole body of the 
 inhabitants submitting to the same laws, and united 
 with a view to the common good. The original cause 
 of their so coming together is not a sense of weakness 
 and the desire of mutual succour, so much as a love of 
 
 society, which is natural to man After thus 
 
 uniting themselves, they next choose a favourable, 
 that is, a defensible, place for their abode ; they then 
 strengthen it by their manual labour, and call this 
 collection of habitations a stronghold or a town, 
 furnish it with temples, and provide it with places of 
 meeting and of public resort. To provide for their 
 security and permanence, they adopt a mode of 
 government which conforms to that of their origin ; 
 either one man alone being placed at their head, or a 
 certain few chosen from the rest, or a government is 
 constructed formed from the mass of the people. The 
 first is called a simple monarchy ; the second an 
 aristocracy ; and the third a popular government, or 
 one in which the chief power resides in numbers. 
 Either of these is tolerable, and one may under 
 particular circumstances be preferable to the other, 
 provided all promote the common good, and there- 
 fore fulfil the original object which united men to- 
 gether in society; but I consider neither of those 
 forms perfect, or worthy of being called the best. 
 An absolute monarch may be wise and just ; so also 
 
 H 2 
 
100 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Cicero's 
 
 may be the government of a few ; and even that of 
 mere numbers, though the least desirable of the three, 
 may possibly be stable and firm, and be neither 
 allured by cupidity nor hurried away by passion. 
 But in an absolute monarchy, the subjects are un- 
 justly deprived of their common rights, and of the 
 power of deliberating for the common good ; under 
 the domination of an aristocracy, the many have little 
 security for their .liberties, since they are not con- 
 sulted and have little power; and, lastly, where all 
 power is in the hands of the many, though they may 
 use their power justly or with moderation, yet the 
 very equality is unequal and unjust, since it admits of 
 no gradations of rank and dignity. Accordingly, I 
 should not like to have lived even under that most 
 just of monarchs, Cyrus, inasmuch as the government 
 and the common welfare depended solely on his will. 
 Neither is the government of our friends, the aristo- 
 cracy of Marseilles, to be approved of,* for under 
 such a constitution there is too great a resemblance 
 to a state of servitude, in the relation of the lower 
 classes to the upper. Nor can we commend the 
 Athenians for destroying the council of the Areo- 
 pagus, and carrying on the government solely by 
 popular decrees, for in so doing they abolished all 
 ranks and dignities 1 , and deprived the state of its best 
 ornaments. And these objections which I have 
 
 * Aristotle refers to the government of Marseilles, in Book v, ch. 17, 
 of the " Politics." 
 
Treatise.] ON THE BEST FORM OF GOVERNMENT. 101 
 
 stated, apply to such governments even in their best 
 state, before corruption has taken hold of them and 
 produced the confusion which follows from it. But 
 all these simple forms have, in addition to the objec- 
 tions just adverted to, other faults, or rather, per- 
 nicious vices, into which they are prone to fall. For 
 an amiable monarch like Cyras, whose government 
 may be light and easy, may be converted by some 
 fickleness of mind into such a tyrant as Phalaris ; 
 since the unrestrained power of one man slides by a 
 very gentle and imperceptible transition into a 
 tyranny such as his. Again, the aristocratic power 
 wielded by the few at Marseilles is not far removed 
 from the mode of administration adopted at Athens 
 by the faction of the Thirty Tyrants. And at Athens, 
 the unrestricted power of the people soon degenerated 
 into the rage and license of the mob 
 
 But these simple forms are seldom lasting, 
 
 " giving place in turn, the one to the other, as cir- 
 cumstances and occasions may favour their growth 
 and predominance. And strange, indeed, are the 
 courses of revolution in these governments, and 
 various the orbits, as it were, in which they move. 
 It is the statesman's business to be acquainted with 
 these changes and their causes, and to prognosticate 
 their approach. And if he takes his measures ac- 
 cordingly, and succeeds in keeping the direction of 
 them in his own hands, he displays one of the greatest 
 efforts of human wisdom." 
 
102 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Cicero's 
 
 Such being the imperfections of these simple forms, and their 
 liability to constant change, 
 
 " there remains that last species of government which 
 is the best of all, namely, that which is moderated 
 in its action and steadied in its course by the due 
 admixture of all the three simple forms of monarchy, 
 aristocracy, and popular power." . . 
 
 Chapters 31, 32. Liberty can have no certain 
 dwelling in any state except where the laws are equal, 
 
 and the power of public opinion supreme 
 
 Where the whole community is in possession of their 
 just rights, a condition of society exists than which 
 nothing can be happier, greater, or more free. This 
 alone can with propriety be called a commonwealth, 
 when the interests of the whole people are connected, 
 and the government is conducted with the sole view 
 of promoting the common good. Accordingly, the 
 domination of an absolute monarch or of an aristocracy 
 gives place at last to that ; while, on the contrary, 
 a free people are never found to make a voluntary 
 surrender of their rights to either of the former. Nor 
 should a state of freedom be feared on account of the 
 evils that arise from its excesses, when an unbridled 
 democracy may happen to get the upper hand. If 
 the whole body of the community act together, and 
 have no other object in view but the common welfare 
 and the preservation of their common liberties, no 
 such excesses can arise, nor can the firm and equable 
 action of such a government be easily impeded or 
 disturbed. Concord and harmony naturally prevail 
 
Treatise.] ON THE BEST FORM OF GOVERNMENT. 103 
 
 under that state of things, inasmuch as everything 
 works together so as to promote the interests of all ; 
 whereas where interests clash, and what seems de- 
 sirable for one portion of the community is injurious 
 to another, the result can be no other than ill-feeling 
 and discord. Thus, under the ancient aristocracies, 
 which legislated for their own narrow interests alone, 
 the position of the government was never stable. Still 
 less was it so under the absolute monarchies to which, 
 as Ennius said, their subjects were never bound by 
 the ties of honourable and conscientious allegiance. 
 Law is the bond of civil society, and equality in the 
 eye of the law the right of every citizen. You do 
 not choose to attempt to equalize wealth, and it is 
 equally impossible to equalize the talents and genius 
 of mankind ; the laws, however, you can make just 
 and equal for all those who live under them. . . . 
 Chapters 33, 34. A free people will exercise its 
 choice in regard to those to whose government it will 
 entrust itself; on the discretion it shows in exercising 
 that choice, its very safety depends ; it will choose, if 
 it is wise, the very best men it can find ; for the 
 united counsels of such are often not less than are 
 essential to the public welfare. Nature herself points 
 out that it must be so, by fitting for command those 
 gifted with superior intellectual and moral powers, and 
 by disposing the weaker to obedience. But this ex- 
 cellent and natural state of things is very apt to be 
 overthrown, when the opinions of the unenlightened 
 ind the bad obtain the ascendancy. Such men have 
 
104 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Cicero's 
 
 nothing in their own minds which enables them to 
 judge of those high qualities in others. 
 
 Accordingly the more wealthy, who in the earlier 
 stages of society were also the noble, were, if they 
 resorted to corruption, selected for the offices of 
 government. And to such a mode of government 
 they persisted in giving the name of aristocracy, or 
 the rule of the best men, although it little deserved 
 the appellation, inasmuch as, by the error of the 
 people, mere wealth was placed at the head of the 
 affairs, and not virtue and ability. Indeed, wealth, 
 titles, and power are sources of disgrace rather than 
 of honour, and the parents of pride and insolence, 
 when their possessors dispense with the lessons of 
 wisdom, throw off the habit of self-command, and use 
 no measure or consideration in their mode of governing 
 others. There can scarcely be a more repulsive state 
 of society than that in which wealth alone is considered 
 the standard of excellence. But when men of virtue 
 govern the state ; when he who commands others is 
 himself enslaved by no base desires ; when he is an 
 example of that cultivation and refinement to which 
 he would lead and train his fellow citizens ; when he 
 imposes no laws on others which he does not himself 
 obey, and exhibits in his own life a rule and pattern for 
 his countrymen ; when such men govern a country, 
 what can more conduce to its honour and renown? 
 If one such man could embrace all the functions of 
 government, there would be no need of others ; and 
 if all men could see what would be the best course to 
 
Treatise.] ON THE BEST FORM OF GOVERNMENT. 105 
 
 take in political affairs, and unite in taking it, no one 
 would feel the want of men chosen for the special 
 purpose of advising : but the difficulty of coming to 
 right conclusions on important subjects has from time 
 to time caused the transference of authority from one 
 man invested with large powers to a council or as- 
 sembly ; while, on the other hand, the mistakes and 
 the rashness of popular governments have occasioned 
 the concentration in a few hands of power that had 
 for a time been exercised by the people at large. 
 Between these extremes, between the infirmity of one 
 individual and the rashness of many, an aristocracy 
 holds a middle place. Its characteristic, when in its 
 best state, is moderation ; and when a government of 
 this kind presides over public affairs, the people at 
 large are happy and free from anxiety ; those who are 
 entrusted with their interests devote themselves to the 
 task, and take care that the people never have cause 
 to complain that they are neglected. Under this 
 system of government, honours and dignities, of 
 different degrees of estimation and value, must neces- 
 sarily exist, as they do, indeed, even under those 
 governments where the popular power is most unre- 
 strained and absolute ; for even among these there is 
 a great ambition for places of dignity, and a great 
 competition among candidates for them ; for the rigid 
 equality which some free countries favour in theory 
 cannot be preserved, or, if it is, it produces the greatest 
 injustice. According to that theory, the highest are 
 confounded with the lowest and most abandoned, and 
 
106 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Cicero's 
 
 such there will be under every government; and the 
 pretended equity becomes most unfair and unequal. 
 Nothing of this kind can happen under the moderate 
 aristocracy which has been above adverted to. ... 
 
 Chapter 35. . . . You are right in asking 
 which of these three forms I most approve of, for I 
 entirely approve of neither of them, when by itself 
 and separated from the others, but greatly prefer, and 
 consider better than either, a form of government 
 that is composed as it were by the fusion and combi- 
 nation of all the three. 
 
 Chapters 36 to 39. . . . By the common 
 consent of the world, political society took its origin 
 under the kingly form of government. It was so 
 with the people of Rome. But after a time, they 
 conceived a hatred for the very name of a king, in 
 consequence of the haughty tyranny of Tarquinius; 
 they drove him into banishment, and, in the exulta- 
 tion of their newly-awakened energies, rushed at once 
 into unbridled license. Under this excitement they 
 banished many innocent men, and confiscated their 
 property; they appointed the consuls for one year 
 only; they claimed the marks of honour hitherto 
 given to their kings ; they caused all public questions 
 to be submitted to their judgment ; they broke out 
 into rebellion, and finally engrossed all the powers of 
 
 the state This continued as long as peace 
 
 and tranquillity lasted, but amidst war and dangers 
 they submitted implicitly to their magistrates, since 
 they regarded their safety more than the satisfaction 
 
Treatise.] CORRUPT FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. 107 
 
 of their passions. Indeed, when perils were immi- 
 nent, they have been wont to place the whole power 
 of the state in the hands of a single individual, whom 
 they named a dictator ; sufficiently indicating by the 
 
 very name the absolute nature of his authority 
 
 Chapters 41 to 44. Our ancestors had a great 
 reverence for the kingly power ; they were accus- 
 tomed to call their kings, not their lords and masters, 
 but the guardians of their country, and they regarded 
 them as the source of power and even of their political 
 existence ; and that disposition would have remained 
 in the people if kings had ruled justly. The tyranny 
 of Tarquinius gave a death-blow to that constitution 
 
 among ourselves And, indeed, in every 
 
 political society in its early stage, the change from 
 this mode of government to another is inevitable. 
 An unjust king arises, and is put down ; another suc- 
 ceeds, worse than he, and becomes a tyrant, and he 
 in turn is generally mastered by the upper classes. 
 These unite and form the second species of govern- 
 ment which has been mentioned, namely, an aristo- 
 cracy, which partakes somewhat of the kingly power ; 
 for such or somewhat similar are the qualities of an 
 aristocratic assembly that directs its measures with a 
 view to the general good. If it is the popular power 
 that rises and overthrows a tyranny in that case, 
 the use they will make of their victory, the stability 
 of the government they will set up, the moderation 
 they will show in the midst of their triumph, will 
 depend on the progress they have made in wisdom 
 
108 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Cicero's 
 
 and discretion. But if the popular violence declares 
 itself against a king who has given no good ground of 
 offence ; or if, as more frequently happens, it attacks 
 aristocratic power, commits excesses, sheds blood, and 
 prostrates every power of the state before its cupidity 
 and passions, you may as well undertake to quell a 
 raging sea, or to extinguish a vast conflagration, as 
 to restrain such a multitude, insolent with success, 
 and heedless of all control. Then that state of things 
 arises which has been so admirably described by Plato 
 in his book on a republic. u For when," he says, " a 
 city has fallen under the hands of demagogues, then 
 the people, athirst for more and more liberty, become 
 intoxicated with its immoderate draughts, demanding 
 it from servile ministers, and insisting upon having it, 
 not tempered, but unmixed and pure. Then they 
 turn upon their magistrates, and if they do not find 
 them yielding and subservient, and ready to submit 
 to all their demands, they accuse and punish them as 
 oligarchs and tyrants. Those who obey the magis- 
 trates they abuse and despise ; on the other hand, 
 the men who, though invested with power, submit to 
 dictation, or who, though filling only a private sta- 
 tion, assume the attributes of power, they extol with 
 praises and overwhelm with flattery. Such a city, in- 
 deed, will have its fill of liberty, which will penetrate 
 into every family, and end in establishing anarchy 
 throughout the whole range of domestic life. For 
 it will grow into a habit to place the father on a 
 level with the son, which will breed between them 
 
Treatise.] THE GENERAL COURSE OF REVOLUTION. 109 
 
 mutual suspicion and fear. There will be neither 
 respect nor reverence for parents, lest, forsooth, it 
 interfere with one's liberty.* You will be taught 
 that your neighbour is not more to you than a 
 stranger, and that the latter is to be considered on 
 an equal footing with the former. In such a state 
 of society, the teacher fears and flatters his scholars, 
 and the scholars despise their pastors and masters. 
 The young put themselves upon an equality with the 
 old, contend with them in argument, and ape their 
 actions ; the advanced in years descend to the level 
 of the young, imitate their doings, and take the 
 lead from them in manners and conversation, lest 
 they should lose their favour and appear despotic. 
 Servants and masters, wives and husbands, are upon 
 the same degree of equality ; and, as the proverb says 
 of wild horses and other ungovernable animals, you 
 must get out of their way unless you wish to be run 
 over. In all the other relations of life the same 
 unlimited liberty prevails ; and the result of it all is, 
 that such a people are first indignant at the slightest 
 species of control, and then end by throwing off 
 respect for the authority of all law, written or un- 
 written, lest it should be thought that they have in 
 
 * Qlov, e</>V> irartpa fju^v tdi^eadai TraiSi 8/moiov ytyvetrdcu Kal 0o/3e?0"#cu 
 TOI>S vlels, vibv de irarpi, Kal ^77 re alff-xyveadaa /XT; re deddvcu TOI)S yovtas, 
 
 Iva 8ri \evdtpos 17 .... Kal 6'Xws ol 
 
 Kal 5ta,LuXXcDi>Tcu Kal iv \6yois Kal iv t'/ryots. IIoXtTeta H. Edit. Bekker. 
 
 Lond. 1825, p. 442. 
 
 A similar passage in Plato's Book on " Laws " traces the decline of 
 morals in his time from disobedience to parents, and want of reverence 
 to superiors, to the abandonment of all respect for law, honour, or 
 religion ..... v5/j.uv ^reiv ^ v-rrriKoovs eiva.i, . . . 6pKwv, Ka 
 Kal rb irapairav Qewv. Nj/iot, Lib. iii, ch. 1G. Lipsix, 1814. 
 
110 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Cicero's 
 
 any way a master. . . . From this license, tyranny 
 springs as certainly as a tree from its root. As an 
 oligarchy perishes from the possession of too great 
 and unlimited power, so a too free people are reduced 
 to slavery by the very excess of liberty. In reality, 
 excess hi anything is wont to lead to its contrary ; as 
 we see in the seasons, in the premature growth of 
 plants, in the conditions of health in the human body. 
 It is not less so in matters of government, for excess 
 of liberty is accustomed to give place to nothing else 
 than to excessive slavery, whether in the case of an 
 individual or a state ; from no other institution, there- 
 fore, than a democracy, is tyranny more likely to 
 spring; and the more licentious the preceding state 
 of freedom, the more complete and severe will be the 
 servitude. They usually choose some active agitator 
 who has distinguished himself by his attacks on the 
 wealthy, and, placing him at their head, support him 
 in power until he acquires real influence. This he 
 effects in the common way, by surrounding himself 
 with guards, as if for the protection of his person. 
 At length he plays the tyrant over the very men who 
 set him up. The change may be for good, as often 
 happens when a good ruler puts down a tyrannical 
 faction. But it may be the contrary. Thus, under 
 these simple forms of government, the state is liable 
 to be bandied about, as a ball, from one to the other, 
 and to find stability and repose in none of them." * 
 
 * I have translated this passage from the original, instead of from 
 Cicero's version of it. 
 
Treatise.] MIXED GOVERNMENT THE BEST. Ill 
 
 Chapters 45 to 47. Of the three first and simple 
 forms of government, the monarchical is in my judg- 
 ment the best 
 
 That is, in the words of Plato, the monarchical denned and 
 strengthened by good laws. 
 
 But this species of monarchy is itself excelled by 
 the government which is tempered and balanced by 
 the due admixture of the three best forms above 
 described.* For it is desirable that there should be 
 in the state some element that is pre-eminent and 
 regal ; f another that has been won by, and is willingly 
 yielded to, the weight and dignity of the aristocracy;^ 
 a third consisting of matters reserved for the judg- 
 ment and the will of the people at large. This 
 constitution has in its favour, first, a certain great and 
 conspicuous principle of equity, which free men will 
 not long consent to be without; next, firmness and 
 stability, which distinguishes it from those first- 
 mentioned simple forms that run so readily into their 
 contraries, a monarchy becoming a tyranny, an aris- 
 tocracy a faction, a democracy mob-government and 
 confusion; each vicious excess often giving birth to 
 some new form of tyranny. These changes cannot 
 happen where the framework of government consists 
 
 * Regio autem ipsi prasstabit id quod erit aequatum et temperatum ex 
 tribus optimis rerum publicarum modis. 
 
 f Quiddam prcestans et regale. 
 
 j Aliud auctoritate principum partum ac tributum. 
 
 " Haec constitutio primum habet aequabilitatem quandam raagnam," 
 not " equality," but "equity," "consistency with itself and with the 
 order of nature." 
 
112 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Cicero's 
 
 of the discreet union of the several powers, as above 
 defined, unless through some great errors and vices of 
 the leading classes of society. For no legitimate 
 cause of change exists when each man stands firmly 
 on his own ground, and no pitfall is near into which 
 he could be precipitated.* .... 
 
 "It is my fixed and firm opinion," adds Scipio, 
 " that no form of government was ever comparable, 
 either in its limitations or its discipline, to the one 
 which our fathers received from their predecessors 
 and transmitted to us. Although, as you rightly say, 
 it has been altered by the late seditions,! I will, 
 nevertheless, expound to you its principles, and 
 exhibit to you, since you desire to hear my views 
 upon it, its many excellences." 
 
 The remaining part of this Book has not been recovered. 
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 Chapter 1. Seeing then the minds of all his audience fixed 
 in earnest attention, Scipio thus proceeded : 
 
 " The opinions I am about to express are those of 
 
 * The often-quoted opinion of Tacitus, " that the mixed form of 
 government is easier praised than discovered, or, if brought into 
 action, would probably not be durable" (" delecta ex his et consociata 
 Keipublica? forma, laudari facilius quam evenire, vel, si evenit, haud 
 diuturna esse potest." Tac. Ann., Lib. iv, 33), must be considered 
 in reference to the context, which is a lamentation over the degrada- 
 tion of the public manners, and the consequent extinction of Roman 
 freedom. " Nobis .... inglorius labor .... Nos saeva jussa, con- 
 tinuas accusationes, fallaces amicitias, perniciem innocentium, et easdem 
 exitu causas conjungimus ; obvia rerum similitudine, et satietate." 
 
 The great cause of the ruin of freedom, pointed out by Cicero in the 
 passage in the text the corruption of the upper classes (magna 
 principum vitia) had been fully realized in the time of Tacitus. 
 
 f Laelius, " etsi ne nunc quidem." 
 
Treatise.] MIXED GOVERNMENT THE BEST. 113 
 
 the venerable Cato, to whom, as you know, I was 
 attached by the strictest bonds of friendship, whose 
 character won my greatest admiration, and to whose 
 society the advice of both my parents and my own 
 good-will led me to dedicate myself from my youth 
 upwards. Of such intercourse it was impossible to 
 tire, so great had been his experience of public affairs, 
 which he had conducted for many years with the 
 greatest success both in peace and war, so great was 
 his moderation in speaking of his own actions, and so 
 well did he know how to mingle pleasantry with 
 dignity. His conversation was, as it were, a picture 
 of his life ; and, withal, he was not more willing to 
 teach than ever desirous to learn. On the subject 
 of our constitution he was accustomed to say that 
 there was one especial reason why it was superior to 
 all others. In nearly all other countries it had been 
 some particular individual who had framed the gov- 
 ernment on the model of laws and institutions drawn 
 up by himself. Thus the Cretans received their laws 
 from Minos, the Lacedaemonians from Lycurgus ; and 
 the Constitution of Athens, which has undergone so 
 many changes, was first framed by Theseus, then 
 modified by Draco, next by Solon, next by Cleis- 
 thenes, and after him by several others ; finally, the 
 well-nigh lifeless and prostrate body politic has been 
 taken in hand and supported by Demetrius, a pro- 
 fessor. Our constitution, on the other hand, is not 
 the result of one man's genius, but of many ; neither 
 did it come into existence in one man's life, but has 
 
 I 
 
114 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Cicero's 
 
 been built up in the course of centuries, and by the 
 efforts of many generations.* He used to remark, 
 that no individual genius ever did, or probably ever 
 would exist, who, in framing a form of government, 
 could provide for every contingency. He thought 
 that not even the collective ability of a whole people, 
 at any one particular period, was equal to the task 
 of foreseeing all that ought to be comprehended in 
 their scheme ; a result only to be expected from time 
 and experience. Wherefore we must go back, as 
 was his wont, to the origin of our political state ; and 
 if I show you our constitution in its commencement, 
 in its progress, and in its firm and vigorous maturity, 
 I shall better expound its principles, than by exhibit- 
 ing it in comparison with any imaginary standard, 
 such as Plato's version of an ideal republic." f 
 
 An eloquent and interesting sketch follows from Chapter 2 to 
 Chapter 22 of the origin of the city of Rome, its favourable 
 position for commerce and defence, the commencement of its 
 elective senate, its religious institutions, its penal system, the 
 early struggles between the aristocratic and popular power, their 
 difficulties in adjusting the balance of authority between them- 
 selves and the executive, and the encouragements given to agri- 
 culture and the arts of peace, as well as to those of war. An 
 outline is then given of the character of the successive kings, 
 and of the steps made towards perfecting the constitution, and 
 providing for the public health and recreation. In particular, 
 that change in the mode of voting in the elections for the 
 
 * The editor, Signer Maio, ndds in a note to this passage, " The 
 English political writers speak of their constitution in almost these 
 very words" (sic fere Britanni politic! de sua republica loquuntur). 
 
 f This imaginary scheme of civil polity he afterwards (Ch. 11) de- 
 signates as " having nothing akin to real life, and abhorrent to men's 
 habits and morals." Its doctrines have nevertheless been revived, as 
 the foundation of modern Communism. 
 
Treatise.] MIXED GOVERNMENT THE BEST. 115 
 
 senate is remarked, by which the influence of property was 
 increased, in comparison with that of mere numbers, " and care 
 was taken, as always must be in a free government, that mere 
 numbers should not have a preponderating power" (curavitque, 
 quod semper in republica tenendum est, ne plurimum valeant 
 plurimi). (Chapter 22.) " By voting, not individually, but by 
 classes and centuries," the invidiousness of exclusion was avoi- 
 ded, and at the same time, also, the danger of the predominance 
 of mere numbers. The names, too, of the different classes 
 were significant of their social position ; as, for instance, those 
 who contributed the smallest amount of taxes were called "pro- 
 letarians," as giving little more to the state than the increase of 
 population in their own offspring. Also of the whole ninety- 
 six "centuries" a greater number were combined to make up 
 one vote than the whole first class consisted of. Accordingly, 
 every one had a right to vote, but the preponderating influence 
 was preserved to those who had the greatest interest in main- 
 taining the country in its best and highest condition." (Chap- 
 ter 22.) 
 
 .... Chapter 23. " This three-fold combina- 
 tion of powers above described is common to us and to 
 other governments. But what we have attained to, as 
 our peculiar distinction, is, the manner in which these 
 several powers are tempered and brought to act in 
 harmony. This was not so in Carthage or in Sparta,, 
 where the regal power had too great a preponderance. 
 Such a government is ever liable to change, as de- 
 pending too much on the vices or virtues of an indi- 
 vidual. Yet perhaps the regal form is better than 
 either of the other simple ones, as long, at least, as it 
 preserves in purity its own theory, which is, the 
 embodiment of justice and wisdom in one head of 
 the state, and the good treatment, the safety, and 
 the tranquillity of the governed. But to a people 
 
 * Proletaries nominavit; ut et iis quasi proles, id est, quasi progenies 
 ciritatis expectari rideretur. (Ch. 22.) 
 
 I 2 
 
116 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Cicero'i 
 
 under a government of this kind, many things are want- 
 ing, and in the first place, liberty ; for this consists, not 
 in our having a just master, but in our having none." 
 
 Chapter 24. Instances are then given of this mode of govern- 
 ment and its results, generally ending in " Tyranny," a brief and 
 very dark picture of which is given, and which is described as 
 incompatible with the smallest amount of liberty (Chapter 27). 
 From this point the manuscript becomes so fragmentary that 
 the thread of the argument is entirely broken. From what 
 remains, however, it appears that it relates to the various laws 
 passed from time to time, which contributed, each within its 
 own sphere, to make up the whole fabric of the Roman Consti- 
 tution and social state. It attained perfection, according to the 
 opinion attributed to Scipio, when 
 
 Chapters 32 to 34. "The senate possessed the 
 principal weight in the government. Though the 
 people were free, their direct action was less than that 
 of the senate, who, supported by law and custom and 
 by their own weight and dignity, had the chief share 
 in the administration of public affairs. The consuls, 
 indeed, held their office for one year only, but their 
 power was in fact regal. The votes of the assemblies 
 of the people were of no avail unless ratified by the 
 senate ; an arrangement which preserved the authority 
 of the latter, and which they defended with great de- 
 termination. Only ten years elapsed from the first 
 creation of consuls, when, in a period of difficulty, a 
 dictator was appointed, with apparently uncontrolled 
 regal power. Yet all the branches of administration 
 continued to be carried on with undiminished authority, 
 by the leading persons in the state, the popular power 
 being for the time suspended ; and great and noble 
 actions were in those days performed by men of the 
 
Treatise.] MIXED GOVERNMENT THE BEST. 117 
 
 highest distinction, invested with great commands, 
 both in peace and war. 
 
 "A few years only passed on, and the people, as 
 was natural after the attainment of their first liberties, 
 gained a little more power ; more perhaps than the 
 occasion required ; but it is the nature of public affairs 
 often to bear down reason. Remember, however, 
 what I said in the beginning of this discourse that 
 unless there is an equitable adjustment in a state, of 
 rights, offices, and functions, so that the executive may 
 have sufficient power, the senate sufficient authority, 
 and the people sufficient liberty, the frame of govern- 
 ment cannot remain stable and free from violent 
 change. This consideration was overlooked in the 
 early days of our constitution, and led to popular out- 
 breaks, as it had before in Sparta and in Crete, and to 
 the diminution of the power and authority of the 
 senate. Nevertheless, in spite of these circumstances, 
 the senate sustained itself in great power and dignity, 
 supplying as it did to all the offices of administration 
 men of great wisdom, great bravery, and consummate 
 prudence. They continued, therefore, to stand very 
 high in the public estimation, not only on account of 
 their honour and renown, but of their private virtues, 
 their self-command, their comparative strictness of 
 life, and their liberal and generous expenditure. 
 Their public virtues were invested with a greater 
 grace because in their private conduct they exerted 
 themselves with the greatest diligence to aid, to 
 counsel, and to defend their fellow-citizens." 
 
118 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [MilL 
 
 The progress of decline in the Roman institutions is then 
 touched upon ; but so much of this and the remaining part 
 of the work is lost, that no good purpose would be answered 
 by pursuing it further. Enough, however, has been given to 
 show that the object of Cicero in this Treatise was, to warn his 
 countrymen against the corruption which was visibly in progress 
 in his day, and to remind them that their liberties could only be 
 maintained by adhering to the principles of public conduct and 
 private virtue that had distinguished their forefathers. " Tamen 
 de posteris nostris et de ilia immortalitate rei publicse sollicitor; 
 quse poterat esse perpetua, si patriis viveretur institutis et 
 moribus." Book iii, fragment of Chapter 28. 
 
 [The following remarks of John Stuart Mill on the 
 peculiar value in the present age of such thoughts and 
 reasonings as have occupied the preceding pages, may 
 be not unacceptable in this place : 
 
 " De Tocqueville was right in the great importance he attached 
 to the study of Greek and Roman literature ; not as being 
 without faults, but as having the contrary faults to those of our 
 own day. Not only do these literatures furnish examples of 
 high finish and perfection of workmanship, to correct the 
 slovenly habit of modern hasty writing, but they exhibit, in the 
 military and agricultural commonwealths of antiquity, precisely 
 that order of virtues in which a commercial society is apt to be 
 deficient ; and they altogether show human nature on a grander 
 scale ; with less benevolence but more patriotism ; less senti- 
 ment but more self-control ; if a lower average of virtue, more 
 striking individual examples of it ; fewer small goodnesses but 
 more greatness, and appreciation of greatness ; more which 
 tends to exalt the imagination and inspire high conceptions of 
 the capabilities of human nature. If, as every one may see, the 
 want of affinity of these studies to the modern mind is gradually 
 lowering them in popular estimation, this is but a confirmation 
 of the need of them, and renders it more incumbent upon those 
 who have the power, to do their utmost towards preventing 
 their decline."] (Mill's Dissertations, Vol. ii, pp. 68, 69.) 
 
119 
 
 PART II. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 [DURING the many centuries of the decay of the 
 Roman Empire and the almost entire extinction of 
 liberty, no opportunities were afforded for the philo- 
 sophical discussion of the principles of government. 
 When freedom had again revived in the Italian 
 republics, and while these, after periods of prospe- 
 rity, were running the same career as their prede- 
 cessors in ancient times of disturbances, convulsions, 
 extreme counsels, ambition, war, exhaustion, and 
 finally loss of liberty and subjection to military power 
 the study of the principles of politics attracted a 
 few leading minds,* among whom were Dante (1265 
 1321) and Petrarch (13041374), but neither treated 
 the subject fully. In his Dissertation on Monarchy, 
 Dante, from his experience of the troubled times in. 
 which he lived, was led to the conclusion that the 
 peace of the world and the elevation and happiness 
 of society could only be secured under a monarchy. 
 He says, that " he reads in the history of the Past, 
 
 * Blakey's History of Political Literature from the Earliest Timet. 
 London, 1855. Vol. i, p. 472. 
 
120 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT, [ilachiavelli. 
 
 and it pains him to witness in his own day the storms, 
 the injuries, and the destructions which the many- 
 headed factions that alternately bore sway had in- 
 flicted upon his country." Petrarch's great aspiration 
 was to re-establish the seat of the Western Empire 
 in Home, as a refuge from civil strife. In his three 
 political "Canzoni" (the 3rd, 6th, and 16th), and 
 especially in the one addressed to Rienzi, he mourns 
 over his country, exhausted by long civil feuds, and 
 endeavours to rouse his fellow-countrymen against 
 the foreigner ; a desire only fulfilled after five more 
 centuries of oppression. 
 
 It was not until the early part of the 16th century 
 that the systematic study of politics revived for the 
 first time since Cicero's Treatise.] 
 
 MACHIAYELLI. 
 
 (14691527.) 
 
 The conspicuous place occupied among his contem- 
 poraries by the statesman and historian, Machiavelli, 
 qualified him for the task he undertook, of interpret- 
 ing the political history of Rome to his countrymen. 
 
 In the Dedication and in the Preface to his Dis- 
 courses on Livy (written about the year 1513), he 
 mentions his motives in writing them. He refers to 
 his own studies in ancient literature, and to his long 
 conversance with public affairs; to the neglect into 
 
Machiarem.] INSTABILITY OF GOVERNMENTS. 121 
 
 which the study of the Past had fallen, and the con- 
 sequent want of the political lessons that are largely 
 taught by it. " So little is now generally known of 
 the great examples which the history of their own 
 country affords, and the instruction to he drawn from 
 them, that scarcely a sign remains of the antique 
 virtue which made its former power and fame." 
 
 In his Discourses,* or commentaries on Roman 
 history, he is ever keeping in view the instability of 
 the governments that had been so long the bane of 
 his own age ; the frequent changes from a tyranny to 
 a democracy, and from a democracy to an aristocracy. 
 He holds up to his countrymen their own picture. 
 He describes the changes that the Roman people had 
 passed through in all the stages of their history, and 
 their causes; and he puts before them the experience, 
 the truths, and the maxims that had been the guides of 
 the statesmen of ancient times. 
 
 After describing the different kinds of government 
 that of a monarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy, 
 and the steps by which they are liable to give place 
 the one to the other he says, that the wisest and best 
 form, and that which is most firm and stable, is one in 
 which the powers of the three are blended together. 
 He instances the Constitution of Lycurgus for Sparta, 
 and the government of Rome under the tribunes. 
 " In these, the legislator did not take away all the 
 qualities of the regal power to give it to the aristocracy, 
 
 * I Discorsi di Nicolo Machiavelli. Parigi, 1825. 
 
122 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [MchiaT.UL 
 
 nor did he diminish the authority of the aristocracy to 
 give it entire to the popular branch ; but the constitu- 
 tion of the state being mixed became perfect." 
 
 Machiavelli notices how important a part Religion 
 played in forming the character of the Roman people 
 in their best period, and causing their greatness ; how 
 essential prudence and circumspection are in introduc- 
 ing reforms ; how difficult it is for a corrupt people, 
 or for a people accustomed to arbitary power, to 
 preserve liberty when they have gained it ; and that 
 it very seldom occurs that a republic or a monarchy is 
 well founded from the beginning, or reformed on the 
 basis of its old institutions, except by one man, on 
 whose mind and guidance the whole depends ; * but 
 for their maintenance when formed, or reformed, they 
 depend upon the vigilance and ability of the many. 
 
 These discourses are divided into three books ; the 
 first relates to the principles followed by the Roman 
 people in their internal affairs ; the second to the 
 course they pursued in the augmentation of their 
 empire ; the third to miscellaneous subjects of peace 
 and war, and the proper policy and conduct of public 
 men in various contingencies. His conclusions, drawn 
 from the assumed identity of the circumstances of the 
 ancient and modern Italian republics, may not be 
 always trustworthy, and his advice to his countrymen 
 is often tinged with the lax political morality which 
 
 * Montesquieu makes the same remark : "In the infancy of states, it 
 is the great men who form the institutions ; afterwards, it it the 
 institutions that form the great men." 
 
Bodin.] TREATISE ON A REPUBLIC. 123 
 
 was the vice of the age. But, in the judgment of 
 Hallam, the discourses "contain more sound and deep 
 thinking on the spirit of small republics than could be 
 found in any preceding writer that has descended to 
 us ; more probably, in a practical sense, than the 
 * Polities' of Aristotle, though not so comprehensive;" 
 and Hallam considers that " few political treatises can 
 even now be read with more advantage." f 
 
 BODIN. 
 
 (15301596.) 
 
 Towards the close of the same century was pub- 
 lished Bodin's remarkable Treatise on a Republic; 
 the first edition in French, in 1576, the second in 
 Latin, with many additions, in 1586. Hallam has 
 given an analysis of it in his History of Literature,! 
 and agrees in the opinion of Dugald Stewart (Disser- 
 tation on the Progress of Philosophy, p. 40), that 
 " no political writer of the period contributed more to 
 facilitate and guide the researches of his successors." 
 His " extraordinary reach of learning and reflection" 
 enabled him to accumulate, in the course of his long 
 work, many just and valuable observations on the 
 first principles of society and government. His book 
 was used by lecturers both in London and Cambridge, 
 and is believed to be the source of the larger views of 
 
 * Hftllam's History of Literature, Vol i, pp. 398401. Edit. 1843. 
 f Vol. ii, pp. 5169. 
 
124 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Bodin. 
 
 politics which gathered strength during the eventful 
 17th century.* 
 
 The chapters of greatest interest in the present day 
 are those on " The Objects of Political Society," on 
 " The Origin of the Commonwealth," and on " The 
 Rise and Fall of States." He considers the object 
 of political society to be the greatest good of every 
 citizen, which is that of the whole state. His view of 
 the origin of civil society is that, as the family was an 
 association of many persons under one head, so the 
 commonwealth was an association of many families- 
 submitting to one chief; but the latter association 
 was brought about, not, as Aristotle thought, by 
 agreement, but by force. Ambition and covetous- 
 ness having led to wars, men were ready to give up a 
 portion of their natural liberty, to live under the 
 power of one who could protect them. 
 
 In reviewing the causes of the rise and fall of 
 states, and the changes that occur in the three diffe- 
 rent forms of government, monarchy, aristocracy, and 
 democracy at times natural, gradual, and beneficial ; 
 at times violent and injurious, according as wisdom 
 and foresight, or the contrary, have predominated in 
 the process he speaks strongly against the "vain" 
 attempts that had been made, as by Lycurgus, 
 in his institutions for Sparta, to prodiice and per- 
 petuate a rigid system of political and social equality 
 
 * Hallam's History of Literature, Vol. ii, p. 51, note. Also, Cam- 
 bridge Characteristics and Studies in the 17th Century, by J. B. Mullin- 
 ger, B.A. Macmillan, 1867, p. 20. 
 
Bodin.] RISE AND FALL OF STATES. 125 
 
 among the members of the conquering race. Bodin 
 compares the results with what would happen " if a 
 man were to mix barley, wheat, oats, millet, pulse, 
 in one heap together; for, in such case, he would 
 make each individual seed and the whole heap to- 
 gether unprofitable and useless." ' He argues, that 
 as order is suitable and desirable in everything, so 
 is it especially in the state (republica), in which all 
 orders and degrees should be united and connected 
 the one with the other, the highest with the lowest, 
 and the intermediate with the other two the different 
 orders of the nobility with the different ranks of the 
 commonalty. He says that this is the only arrange- 
 ment conformable to nature ; that in the endeavour to 
 establish any other a violence must be done to the 
 laws of nature, and that the arguments by which such 
 deviations from nature's laws are supported " are like 
 spiders' webs, which are, indeed, subtle and beautifully 
 made, and are capable of entangling small flies, but 
 the stronger creatures easily break through them." f 
 
 Bodin was not exempt from the errors of his own 
 time ; as, among others, that pure monarchy was the 
 best form of government, and that there were cases 
 in which the judge should obey the direction of the 
 sovereign. Nevertheless, in Hallam's opinion, two 
 names alone among the writers on political philo- 
 sophy could be compared with his Aristotle and 
 
 * Joan. Bodini, De Republica, Libri Sex, Franciro, 1591, p. 553. 
 f Ibid., p. 1086. 
 
v-u^ 
 
 126 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Bacon. 
 
 Machiavelli. " Without pretending that Bodin was 
 equal to the former in acuteness and sagacity, we may 
 say that the experience of two thousand years, and the 
 maxims of reason and justice, suggested or corrected 
 by the Gospel and its ministers, by the philosophers 
 of Greece and Rome, and by the civil law, gave him 
 advantages, of which his judgment and industry fully 
 enabled him to avail himself." * Hallam ranks Machi- 
 avelli's Discourses of less value as a study than Bodin's 
 Republic ; and comparing him with Montesquieu, he 
 regards Bodin and Montesquieu, in the province of 
 political theory, as "the most philosophical of those 
 who have read so deeply, the most learned of those 
 have thought so much ;" both in advance of their age ; 
 both just, benevolent, and sensible of the great object 
 of civil society, and both aware that " the basis of 
 the philosophy of man is to be laid in the records of 
 his past existence."! 
 
 BACON. 
 
 (15611622.) 
 
 Turning now our chief attention to the political 
 writers of our own country, it is to be remarked that 
 they had the advantage of possessing as their guide 
 the great body of ancient law and tradition, out of 
 
 * Hallam's History of Literature, Vol. ii, p. G8. 
 f Ibid., pp. 68, 69. 
 
Bacon.] TRUE GREATNESS OF KINGDOMS. 127 
 
 which the institutions of their country had arisen, 
 and which was regarded with so much veneration.* 
 
 Bacon was the first of our leading minds who took 
 a large view of political subjects, and endeavoured to 
 inform public opinion upon them. And although his 
 historical researches, and his reflections on the times- 
 immediately preceding his own and on those in which 
 he lived " times that were rough, and full of muta- 
 tions, and rare accidents" did not give birth in his 
 mind to any formal treatise upon politics, yet his 
 dissertations (in his celebrated Essays, first published 
 in 1597) on " The true Greatness of Kingdoms and 
 Estates," on " Empire," on Nobility," and on Fac- 
 tions," form a body of profound thought on the general 
 principles of human nature and of government. 
 
 Bacon points out that the elements of the true 
 greatness of kingdoms and estates are to be found in 
 the greatness of the individual men; in the disposi- 
 tion of the people, their welfare and prosperity ; in 
 good government, and wise institutions and laws ; in 
 freedom, and in a martial spirit. The people whose 
 " ordinances, constitutions, and customs " favour the 
 development of those elements, " sow greatness to 
 their posterity and succession." 
 
 On the other hand, although among counsellors and 
 statesmen " there be found, though rarely, those who 
 can make a small state great, there will be found a 
 great many who are so far from being able to make a 
 
 * Blakey's Political Literature, Vol. ii, p. 422. 
 
128 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Bacon. 
 
 small state great, that their gift lieth the other way 
 to bring a great and flourishing state to ruin and 
 decay." 
 
 On this, Archbishop Whately remarks, in his Anno- 
 tations to his Edition of Bacon (London, 1858, p. 115), 
 that " by extending, as Bacon does, our view over 
 many countries and through several ages, we may 
 distinctly perceive the tendencies in those directions 
 which would have escaped a more confined research." 
 This research, he contends, shows that, although many 
 facts prove that it is the design of the Creator that 
 mankind should advance not only as individuals but 
 -communities, yet, in the moral and political world, 
 wars, civil dissensions, tyrannical government, unwise 
 laws, " operate more or less towards the frustration 
 of this general design, and the retardation, or even 
 reversal, of the course of improvement." 
 
 The object of the Essays above mentioned is there- 
 fore to point out how the errors are to be avoided 
 which lead to bad government; and in so doing, 
 Bacon takes his examples quite as frequently from 
 Greek and Roman experiences as from those of the 
 Italian republics, of France, of Germany, of the Low 
 Countries, of Spain, and of England. The great mind 
 that gave a new and true direction to the scientific 
 thought of the world, recognised the fact that the 
 foundations of political philosophy were to he sought 
 for in the experience of the free nations of antiquity, 
 and that their experience is of value to all succeeding 
 times. Yet even he acknowledges the difficulty of 
 
Bellenden.] TREATISE ON A STATE, ETC. 129 
 
 just conclusions, and the need of caution in the effort 
 to arrive at the truth. He says of civil knowledge, 
 that "it is conversant about a subject which is of all 
 others the most immersed in matter and the hard- 
 liest reduced to axiom." 
 
 BELLENDEN. 
 
 Bellenden, by birth a Scotchman, became an emi- 
 nent advocate in Paris, where he probably met with 
 Bodin's work, De Republica. In 1615, he pub- 
 lished in Paris his Treatise on a State or Common- 
 wealth. * Having been invested with the honorary 
 title of Master of the Court of Bequests, by James I, 
 he dedicated to Prince Charles the first book of his 
 treatise " On the State of the Ancient World." He 
 tells the prince that he sends him this work "to 
 point out to him the sources of the first lessons of 
 civil wisdom, which, deriving their origin from the 
 early ages of the world, have, like rills, come down 
 to us with perpetual accessions in their progress to 
 the sea of history, that great record of the actions of 
 the human race." Of this book Hallam says, that in 
 it Bellenden seems to have taken a more comprehen- 
 sive view of history, and to have reflected more philo- 
 sophically upon it, than perhaps any one had done 
 
 * Gulielmi Bellendeni, Libri Tres, Parisiis, 1635. Dr. Parr's Edition 
 was published in London in 1787. 
 
130 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Bellenden. 
 
 before; and he classes him, in that particular, with 
 Vico and Montesquieu.* 
 
 The second and third books are dedicated to Prince 
 Henry. In the second, Bellenden treats of the duties 
 of a prince, and of the art of government ; in the third, 
 he holds up the high examples of the Roman Senate 
 and government to the prince and to the young 
 members of the nobility. f Following Polybius, he 
 describes the orders of which the Roman State, at 
 its best period, was composed ; the powers of each ; 
 the bonds that united them ; the mutual checks that 
 preserved their balance ; and how, finally, liberty 
 was lost by the transference of power, first to a few, 
 then to one man, and then to the soldiery. He 
 points out that when those misfortunes fell upon the 
 state, reason lost its hold upon men's minds ; mode- 
 ration, law, custom, duty had no longer any power ; 
 there was neither justice, nor respect for the character 
 and virtues of distinguished citizens, nor reverence 
 for posterity, nor deference to the authority of the 
 senate, nor sense of the dignity of the nation. (3rd 
 Book, pp. 42 195.) On this book Hallam remarks, 
 that Bellenden builds much political precept on the 
 Roman polity, but that it has less originality and 
 reach of thought than the first two books. 
 
 * Hallam's History of Literature, Vol. ii, p. 520. 
 t "Ut in usum publicum abeat, utilitatesque tradat juventuti patri- 
 ciee." Dedication to the Second Book. 
 
Hobbes, &c.] SEVENTEENTH CENTURY WRITERS. 131 
 
 HARRINGTON. 
 
 (16111677.) 
 
 ALGERNON SIDNEY. 
 
 (16201675.) 
 
 [Up to the early part of the 17th century, the great 
 ancient political writers, and the few already noticed 
 who succeeded them, were the main sources of the idea 
 of freedom, and of just and equitable government. 
 
 Writers advocating absolute monarchy had begun 
 about that time to disseminate their doctrines. Origi- 
 nating with the clergy, they were taken up by Hobbes 
 (1651), who, although he recognised the principle that 
 the happiness of the community was the sole final cause 
 of government, desired to found society on the despo- 
 tism either of a sovereign or an assembly. Undeterred 
 by the great political lessons of the previous ten years, 
 he continued to hold that "to the office of the sove- 
 reign belonged the power of levying money and 
 soldiers when, and as much as, in his own conscience 
 he shall judge necessary;" and "that the end of a 
 commonwealth is particular security, which is not to 
 be had from a great multitude, unless directed by a 
 single judgment." * 
 
 He was followed by Filmer (1680), who maintained 
 the duty of passive obedience to the actual sovereign, 
 however he may have become such.f 
 
 * Hobbes's Leviathan, or the Matter, Form and Power of a Com- 
 monwealth, 1651. Edited by Sir William Molesworth, Bart., 1839, 
 pp. 323 ; 153156. 
 
 f Hallam's History of Literature, Vol. ii, p. 535 ; Vol. iii, p. 429. 
 
 K 2 
 
132 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Harrington. 
 
 But the old doctrines of freedom did not cease to 
 animate the generation of men to whom we are in- 
 debted for the bold and firm resistance they made to 
 the arbitrary power aimed at by Charles I, and to 
 whom we owe the germs of many of the most salutary 
 reforms and ameliorations of recent times, which first 
 became subjects of discussion at the beginning of the 
 Long Parliament. 
 
 That violent counsels by degrees got the upper 
 hand, and led at length to despotism, is what history 
 records of every revolution that, after having estab- 
 lished itself on the ruins of prescriptive authority and 
 ancient custom, has run its full course.] 
 
 While the clouds of that political convulsion were 
 hanging over our country, the ablest minds and most 
 patriotic hearts were engaged in endeavouring to 
 discover the means for replacing freedom upon a 
 secure basis. 
 
 Harrington, in his well-known but unsqund and 
 speculative work, entitled Oceana (dedicated to Crom- 
 well), proposed to secure that object by an agrarian 
 law, preventing the accumulation of large properties, 
 and aiming at the establishment of a moderate aris- 
 tocracy.* 
 
 Algernon Sidney, a name never to be mentioned 
 without respect by every lover of freedom, in his 
 learned and admirable Discourses concerning govern- 
 ment (breathing the boldest spirit of liberty), while 
 
 * Edit, of 1770 ; London, pp. 51 and 189. 
 
Sidney.] DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT. 133 
 
 laying down the principle (as opposed to the 
 slavish doctrines of Filmer), " that God had left to 
 nations the liberty of setting up such governments as 
 best pleased themselves,* and "that all just magis- 
 tratical power is from the people," f asserts also, in 
 accordance with the examples of all former times, 
 that " the best governments of the world have been 
 composed of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy" 
 (p. 130). 
 
 With regard to democracy he says, " I believe it 
 can suit only with the convenience of a small town, 
 accompanied with such circumstances as are seldom 
 found" (p. 130). He praises the mixed form of 
 government that had for so many years prevailed, 
 and so widely, on the continent of Europe. " They 
 had kings, lords, commons, diets, assemblies of estates, 
 cortez, and parliaments, in which the sovereign power 
 of those nations did reside, and by which they were 
 exercised. The like was practised in Hungary, Bo- 
 hemia, Sweden, Denmark, Poland; and if things are 
 changed in some of these places within a few years, 
 they must give better proofs of having gained by 
 the change than are yet seen in the world, before I 
 think myself obliged to change my opinion" (p. 131). 
 Speaking of the ancient constitution of England, he 
 says (p. 418), that "the English government was not 
 ill constituted, the defects more lately observed pro- 
 ceeding from the change of manners and corruption of 
 
 * Sidney's Discourses, Edit, of 1763, p. 36, first printed in 1698. 
 f Page H. 
 
134 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Locke. 
 
 the times ;" and in describing the various franchises 
 of the counties and towns, he thus asserts the prin- 
 ciple that these franchises were conferred as a privi- 
 lege, and not claimed as a right: 
 
 " When the nation came to be more polished, to 
 inhabit cities and towns, and fo set up several arts 
 and trades, those who exercised them were thought to 
 be as useful to the commonwealth as the freeholders 
 of the country, and to deserve the same privileges. 
 But it not being reasonable that every one should in 
 this case do as he pleased, it was thought fit that 
 the king, with his council (which always consisted of 
 the " proceres " and " magnates regni "), should judge 
 what numbers of men and what places deserved to be 
 made corporations, or bodies politic, and to enjoy 
 those privileges," &c. He adds, that the conferring 
 these franchises by the ruling power on particular 
 portions of the people " can never change the nature 
 of the thing, so as to make that an inherent which is 
 only a delegated power" (p. 423). 
 
 LOCKE. 
 
 (16321704.) 
 
 The doctrine so closely connected with the name of 
 Locke that " civil society must have been consti- 
 tuted first by a covenant of a number of men, each 
 with each, to form a commonwealth and to be bound 
 
Locke.] CONSTITUTION FOR CAROLINA. 1&5 
 
 by a majority," was advocated, before him, by Puffen- 
 dorf, Hobbes, and Spinoza, in the middle of the 17th 
 century; but all these writers, especially the first 
 two, inclined towards absolutism.* No one, before 
 Locke, propounded a theory as to the foundations of 
 civil government which gave encouragement to the 
 notions embraced by the favourers of pure democracy 
 in modern times. These notions took their origin 
 from the publication of the Treatise on Civil Govern- 
 ment, written while Locke was suffering unmerited 
 exile in Holland, to avoid the persecution of an arbi- 
 trary court, and published shortly after his return to 
 this country, in 1688. 
 
 That the principles advocated in that treatise 
 received their impulse in Locke's mind from recent 
 disappointments at the course of public affairs, as 
 suggested by Hallam,f is made more probable by the 
 facts of his previous history. After the failure of the 
 Commonwealth, under Cromwell, his opinions expe- 
 rienced a strong reaction in favour of aristocratic 
 institutions. Having been solicited to draw up a 
 constitution for Carolina, he framed it in the strongest 
 spirit of aristocracy, instituting two classes of nobility, 
 and putting restraints upon the Press. This consti- 
 tution, drawn up in 1669, and accepted in 1670, was 
 found impracticable, and was abandoned in 1673. It 
 is thus spoken of by Bancroft, in his History of the 
 United States : 
 
 * Hallam's History of Literature, Vol. iii, part iv, Chapter iv, sect. ii. 
 f Ibid., p. 438. 
 
136 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Locke. 
 
 " The ill success of the democratic revolution in 
 England had made Locke an enemy of popular in- 
 novations, and he cherished, therefore, what at that 
 day were called English principles, looking to the 
 aristocracy as the surest adversary of arbitrary power. 
 In framing the Constitution of Carolina, he forgot 
 the fundamental principles of practical philosophy." 
 (Vol. ii, pp. 144, 145, London, 1837.) 
 
 After his exile to Holland, Locke's mind swayed 
 strongly in the opposite direction ; a change that gave 
 rise to his celebrated treatise, upon which Hallam, 
 after a full review of it, pronounces the following 
 judgment : 
 
 " For my own part, I must confess that in these 
 last chapters of Locke on Government I see, what 
 sometimes appears in his other writings, that the in- 
 fluence of temporary circumstances on a mind a little 
 too susceptible of passion and resentment, had pre- 
 vented that calm and patient examination of all the 
 bearings of this extensive subject which true philo- 
 sophy requires."* 
 
 The following is a summary of those principles, 
 which I have abridged from his work, using his own 
 words : 
 
 " The beginning of political society depends upon 
 the consent of the individuals to join into it, and make 
 one society. 
 
 " When any number of men have, by the consent 
 
 * Hallam's History of Literature, Vol. iii, pp. 438, 439. 
 
Locke.] CELEBRATED TREATISE. 137 
 
 of every individual, made a community, they have 
 thereby made that community a body, with a power 
 to act as one body, which is only by the will and 
 determination of the majority. 
 
 " The great and chief end of men's uniting into 
 commonwealths and putting themselves under govern- 
 ment is the preservation of their property. 
 
 " The supreme power cannot take from any man 
 any part of his property without his own consent. 
 
 " As governments cannot be supported without 
 great charge, it is fit every one who enjoys his share 
 of the protection should pay out of his estate his pro- 
 portion for the maintenance of it. But still it must 
 be with his own consent ; i. e., the consent of the ma- 
 jority, giving it either by themselves or the represen- 
 tatives chosen by them." * 
 
 The popular formulas embodying these principles 
 are : 
 
 1. That a political society can only be founded by 
 
 the act of the majority; 
 
 2. That taxation without representation is tyranny. 
 
 These propositions, so often refuted, are neverthe- 
 less of importance from the effects they produced and 
 are producing at the present day. The first has often 
 been demonstrated to be false in fact and unsound in 
 reason; the second has been shown to be an ex- 
 aggerated application of a theoretical principle, sound 
 
 * The Works of John Locke, Edit. 1824, Vol. iv ; " Two Treatises 
 on Government," Chapter viii, pp. 595 423. 
 
138 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Locke. 
 
 in itself, and acted upon in the early periods of our 
 history. In the words of Hallam, " it was even in the 
 mouths of our kings that what concerned all should 
 be approved by all."* But in practice it has always 
 been subject to limitations dictated by expediency.! 
 
 Hallam observes, that neither the Revolution of 
 1688 nor the administration of William III could 
 have borne the test of Locke's theory, and that it 
 stamps with illegality every government not founded 
 on that basis. "It has therefore," he says, "been a 
 theory fertile in great revolutions, and perhaps preg- 
 nant with more."t It destroys all authority resting 
 on prescription, and all respect for usages however 
 consecrated by the feelings of men, by long habit, and 
 by established custom. Accordingly, in the hands of 
 Locke's followers, in France and in other countries, it 
 has been used to overthrow monarchy and to supersede 
 it by democratic republics. It has been pushed still 
 farther, to support principles which, when reduced to 
 practice, as they were in France and Germany in 
 1848, render all government impossible ; and when 
 that point has been reached the circle of revolution 
 
 * Hallam's Middle Ages, Vol. ii, p. 151. 
 
 f The practice is as old as the ancient Lycians. Strabo, who wrote 
 in the early part of the 1st century, says of them, that their territory 
 contained twenty-three cities ; that they were a politic and wise people ; 
 that they were governed by an assembly which met at a stated place, 
 and was attended by representatives from those cities. The largest 
 sent three, those of middle size two, the smallest one. And in the same 
 proportion (avaXoyov 5e) they paid taxes, and took upon themselves the 
 other public duties. Strabonis Geographica. Edit. Kramer, Berlin, 
 1852, Vol. iii, p. 145. 
 
 J Hallam's History of Literature, Vol iii, p. 435. 
 
Locke.] CHANGE OF VIEW. 139 
 
 begins again, in subjection for a time to military 
 despotism. 
 
 Hallam thus speaks of it, after passing in review its 
 principal arguments. 
 
 " Such is in substance the celebrated treatise of 
 Locke on Government, which, with the favour of 
 political circumstances, and the authority of his name, 
 became the creed of a numerous party at home ; while, 
 silently spreading the fibres from its root over Europe 
 and America, it prepared the way for theories of 
 political society, hardly bolder in their announcement, 
 but expressed with more passionate ardour, from 
 which the great resolutions of the present age have 
 sprung." * 
 
 The liability to adopt a change of view, which has 
 been above noticed as a characteristic of Locke's 
 mind "under the influence," as Hallam observes "of 
 temporary circumstances," is exemplified in the 13th 
 chapter of that same treatise. I do not remember to 
 have seen anywhere adverted to the fact that, in that 
 chapter, Locke contradicts the whole theory which he 
 has been labouring to enforce. 
 
 He is arguing ( 157, 158) on behalf of a reform 
 of the parliamentary representation, rendered neces- 
 sary by the decay of some towns that had formerly 
 
 * Hallam's History of Literature, Vol. iii, p. 438. See Appendix B 
 as to the extension of these principles within the last fifty years, in 
 the Constitutions of the individual States of the American Union, 
 and its effect upon the Constitution of the United States as established 
 by Washington. See further, as to Locke's doctrines, pp. 178. 180, 
 205, 228, 236. 
 
140 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Burke. 
 
 been rich and flourishing, and had therefore sent 
 members to Parliament, and by the rise of new ones. 
 " These places," he says, " have a just right to be 
 represented which before had none; and by the same 
 reason those cease to have a right., and to be too incon- 
 siderable for such a privilege, which before had it" 
 
 There is in this proposition an entire abandonment 
 of, and a complete contradiction to, the principles he 
 had before laid down as the only foundation of just 
 government, namely, the consent of the majority, and 
 of the corollary which has been deduced from it the 
 right of universal suffrage and an acknowledgment, 
 as complete, of the principle which all the great writers 
 of former times had laid down as the true one, namely, 
 that admission to the franchise was a privilege, to be 
 conferred by the governing power upon as many as it 
 might be deemed most expedient, under the circum- 
 stances, to extend it to, with a view to the general good. 
 
 Burke's argument, in refutation of Locke's theory 
 that civil society rests upon contract, and that there- 
 fore it may be dissolved at any time by a majority 
 told by the head and another society substituted by 
 that majority (even of one) in its place, may be thus 
 briefly stated. 
 
 " Civil society," he says, " may possibly have been 
 first a voluntary act, but its continuance is under a 
 permanent standing covenant co-existing with the 
 society, and this covenant attaches upon every indi- 
 vidual born into that society, without any act of his 
 own. Without their choice, all persons derive benefits 
 
Burke.] [REFUTATION OF LOCKE. 141 
 
 from that association, and are subject to duties in con- 
 sequence of those benefits. Parents find themselves, 
 without their consent, bound by duties to their chil- 
 dren, children to their parents, and all to that ancient 
 order of society into which they were born. The real 
 rights of man are the benefits he derives from that 
 society. He has a right to protection, to justice, to 
 the fruits of his industry, and to all the other advan- 
 tages arising from a settled state of government. 
 None, except in extreme cases which are above all 
 rule, have a right to free themselves from the duties 
 arising out of those primary engagements. When 
 the extreme case occurs, the decision must be taken 
 by those who represent the whole corporate mind of 
 the state. 
 
 " The supposed power of acting by a majority in 
 those extreme cases must be grounded on two prin- 
 ciples that are mere assumptions ; first, that of an in- 
 corporation produced by unanimity, and secondly, an 
 unanimous agreement that the act of a mere majority 
 (say of one) shall pass with them and with others as the 
 act of the whole. Neither in France nor in England 
 had an original or any subsequent compact of the 
 state, expressed or implied, constituted a majority of 
 men to be told by the head to be the acting people of 
 their several communities. 
 
 " No legislator, at any period of the world, has 
 willingly placed the seat of active power in the hands 
 of the multitude ; because there it admits of no control, 
 no regulation, no steady direction whatsoever. The 
 
142 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Burke 
 
 people are the natural control on authority; but 
 to exercise and control together is contradictory and 
 impossible. 
 
 " When, in 1688, our constitution had been sub- 
 verted by the assumption of arbitrary power by one 
 of its parts, the Convention Parliament representing 
 ' the corporate mind of the state ' was called together 
 to replace it on its ancient foundation. In the words 
 of the Bill of Rights, ' The Lords Spiritual and Tem- 
 poral and Commons in the name of the people of 
 England' transferred their allegiance; and a subse- 
 quent Act preserved the hereditary succession of the 
 monarchy in the Protestant line. 
 
 " Long previously, in the Petition of Right to 
 Charles the First, the parliament said to the king: 
 ( Your subjects have inherited this freedom.' In the 
 same spirit, in the Bill of Rights, the two houses 
 declared, and required the king and queen to declare, 
 that f all and singular the rights and liberties asserted 
 and declared are the true, ancient, and indubitable 
 rights and liberties of the people of this kingdom.' 
 From Magna Charta onwards, our constitution has 
 claimed and asserted our liberties to be an entailed 
 inheritance, derived from our forefathers, and to be 
 transmitted to our posterity. We have thus an inhe- 
 ritable crown, an inheritable peerage, and a House of 
 Commons and a people inheriting privileges, fran- 
 chises, and liberties from a long line of ancestors. 
 They claimed these great rights and liberties on no 
 abstract principles, as ' the rights of man,' but as the 
 
Vice.] THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY. 14 
 
 rights of Englishmen, and as a patrimony derived from 
 their forefathers."* 
 
 VICO. 
 
 (16681744.) 
 
 After Locke's treatise On Civil Government, 
 published in 1688, the next systematic essay on the 
 subject of politics, was the Philosophy of History 
 by Jean Baptiste Yico, the earliest editions of which 
 appeared in 1725 and 1730, making part of his famous 
 work, the New Science. 
 
 Vico's studies at Naples, where he passed his life 
 (during forty years professor of rhetoric, and after- 
 wards historiographer to the king), were, he tells us 
 in his life written by himself and prefixed to the first 
 volume, f principally devoted to Roman law, to Plato, 
 Tacitus, Dante, Bacon, and Grotius. In his New 
 Science, he combated the metaphysical and political 
 opinions of his day, and studied to place the latter on 
 the sound basis of history. His influence as an 
 original thinker was impaired by a fantastic method 
 and style ; but in his political work, The Philosophy 
 
 * Burke's Works, Vol. iii, pp. 4556, 7681, 305, 306 ; Vol. ii, 
 pp. 331, 332, Edit. 1855. 
 
 f Principi di una Scienza Nuova di J. B. Vico, 6th Edition, 3 Vols. 
 Milan 1816. Vita p. 7. CEuvres de J. B. Vico, par Michelet, Brux. 
 1840, 3 Vols. 18mo. Vol. 1, Vie de Vico, Opuscules ; Vols. 23, 
 L'Antique Sagesse de L'ltalie ; Philosophic de 1'Histoire. 
 
144 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
 of History, he is considered to have anticipated sub- 
 sequent writers* in the fulness and precision of his 
 general views, which he thus sums up in page 240 of 
 the Fifth Book of his History :- 
 
 "After having observed how societies begin over 
 again to run the same course, let us reflect on the 
 many points of resemblance between ancient and 
 modern times, and we shall find reproduced, not the 
 exact history of any one Greek or Roman state, but 
 a kind of ideal history of the eternal laws which all 
 nations follow in the beginning of their progress, in 
 their decline, and in their end. Amid diversity of 
 forms we shall recognise an identity of substance in 
 all this course of history." 
 
 The following propositions may be taken as ex- 
 emplifying the various lights in which he places his 
 general conclusions : 
 
 1. The first kind of government is that of a sort of 
 domestic monarchy. 
 
 This changes by degrees into an aristocracy. 
 
 The restricted territory to which an aristocracy 
 confines itself, for the facility of government, becomes 
 extended by the conquering spirit of democracy. 
 
 Then comes monarchy again, as a refuge from 
 disturbances; and it is most respected in proportion 
 to its grandeur. 
 
 * See Biographic Universelle, Lit. Vico. The writer of the Preface 
 to the Milan Edition of his works says : "Montesquieu, chi ne connobbe 
 tutto il merito, trasporto, nello " Spirito delle Leggi, "molte idee del 
 nostro autore." 
 
OF 1 , 
 
 Vico.] THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY. 14o 
 
 I TElvsITY 
 
 2. Sometimes, from the suspicious government of an 
 aristocracy, the people pass to the storms Of democracy 
 and then seek refuge in a monarchy. 
 
 3. Again, they set out from the unity of a domestic 
 monarchy, to pass through the governments of the 
 few, the greater number, and the whole, to return to 
 the unity of civil monarchy. 
 
 4. The return may be expected of the same revolu- 
 tions when the societies that have been destroyed 
 recover themselves from their ruins.* 
 
 The main conclusion to which his researches and 
 reflections lead him is : 
 
 " This New Science would not deserve the name of 
 the uniform and eternal history of humanity, if the 
 author has not made it plain that the characteristics 
 observed in ancient times are reproduced, in great 
 part, in those of the middle ages" which he has been 
 passing in review. (Ibid.) 
 
 It is observable that Vico, in the absence in his day 
 of the test of experience, only alludes to the mixed 
 form of government to intimate his agreement with 
 the conclusion of Tacitus, that if formed it could not 
 be lasting. And the same circumstance leads him, 
 in his brief allusion to the English monarchy, to 
 anticipate, from its varied fortunes during his time, 
 that its tendency was to become arbitrary, as in 
 Poland. 
 
 It may be here noted that, after the second edition 
 
 * Michelet's Edit., Vol. iii, p. 207. 
 
146 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Hume. 
 
 of the Scienza Nuova had appeared in 1730, twelve 
 years elapsed before the publication of Hume's Essays, 
 Moral, Political, and Literary, in 1742; and that 
 Montesquieu's Esprit des Lois was published in 1748. 
 A revised edition of Vico's work was published in 
 1744, shortly before his death. 
 
 HUME. 
 
 (17111776.) 
 
 Hume's brief essays on Politics a Science, The 
 First Principles of Government, Civil Liberty, The 
 Independence of Parliament, and Parties making 
 part of his collected Essays* are coloured by the 
 feelings and experiences of his time. Having before 
 him the party passions and the political corruption 
 then prevalent, he was "led to the conclusion that the 
 world was still too young to fix many general truths 
 in politics which would remain true to the latest 
 posterity." Some, he thought, might be accepted, as 
 conformable to all experience of men in society. 
 
 He does not undervalue the fact that the circum- 
 stances of the ancient world greatly differed from the 
 modern; that the advance of the arts and sciences, 
 and of trade and commerce, a free press, a higher 
 standard of morals, the greater security of life and 
 
 * Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, by David Hume, 1712. 
 Longman, 1875. 
 
Hume.] POLITICAL ESSAYS. 147 
 
 property, the abolition of slavery, and other products 
 of civilization, afford elements of stability before un- 
 known. To these are to be added the established 
 principles of political economy, not known in Hume's 
 time,* but recognised by Dugald Stewart, writing in 
 1792,f as powerfully co-operating, with the other 
 factors above mentioned, towards the same results. 
 
 But those circumstances do not, in his opinion, 
 affect the conclusions that have been generally ac- 
 cepted regarding the main principles of human conduct 
 and government. 
 
 After referring to the careers of republican Rome, 
 aristocratical Venice, and Poland, and the absolute 
 monarchy of France, and pointing out their several 
 defects, he concludes in favour of a mixed govern- 
 ment, and affirms " That it may be pronounced as an 
 axiom in politics that an hereditary prince, a nobility 
 without vassals, and a people voting by their repre- 
 sentatives, form the best monarchy, aristocracy, and 
 democracy." And stating the conclusion more fully, 
 he says, that " The government which, according to 
 common understanding, is free, is that which admits 
 a partition of powers among several members . . . 
 who in the usual course of administration must act by 
 general and equal laws previously known to all. In 
 this sense, liberty is the perfection of civil society." 
 
 The balance of power he calls " a secret in politics 
 
 * Smith's Wealth of Nations was not published until 1775. 
 f See p. 152. 
 
 L2 
 
148 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Hume 
 
 fully known only in the present age." The problem 
 is, how to adjust the balance to meet each recurring 
 necessity as it arises. For the danger is never ab- 
 sent, amidst the constant mutations of power, of one 
 of the constituent elements encroaching upon the 
 other, " so that at one time men are jealous of 
 monarchy, at another more jealous of popular govern- 
 ment." 
 
 To counteract this danger, constant watchfulness 
 is required, and due adjustments must be made in 
 such a manner as not to impair the free and efficient 
 action of the whole. <f In the smallest court or office, 
 the stated forms, institutions, and methods are found 
 to be a considerable check on the natural depravity 
 of mankind. Why should not the case be the same 
 
 in public affairs ? " " Here, then, is a 
 
 sufficient inducement to maintain, with the utmost 
 zeal, in every free state, those institutions by which 
 liberty is secured, the public good consulted, and the 
 avarice or ambition of particular men restrained and 
 punished." . . . . " Effects will always correspond 
 to causes, and wise regulations in any commonwealth 
 are the most valuable legacies that can be left to 
 future ages." . . . . " This may teach us a lesson 
 of moderation in all our political controversies ;" and 
 *ie believes, notwithstanding the violence of tho^e 
 controversies in his day, that " all reasonable men 
 agree in general to preserve our mixed constitution." 
 
Montesquieu.] GREAT WOEK, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS. 149 
 
 MONTESQUIEU. 
 
 (1GS9 1755.) 
 
 The great work of Montesquieu, on The Spirit of 
 Laws, was published in 1748, just six years after 
 Hume's political essays. In order to make his work 
 useful to other countries besides his own, he visited, 
 while preparing it, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, the 
 United Provinces, and finally England, where he 
 stayed two years. He studied the laws and institu- 
 tions of each country, and became acquainted with the 
 prominent writers and public men in each. Burke, 
 in his splendid eulogy of the Esprit des Lois, states 
 that Montesquieu spent twenty years in its prepara- 
 tion.* In the Preface to the Paris edition of 1794 
 (p. 4), it is said that " He formed in London intimate 
 relations Avith men of thought and acquirements, from 
 whom he gained instruction as to the nature of the 
 government, so as at length fully to understand it. 
 That famous isle, that prides itself so much upon its 
 institutions, was for him a school in which he gathered 
 knowledge, without giving his approval to every par- 
 ticular." 
 
 In his chapter on the English Constitution, Mon- 
 tesquieu sets forth fully its chief characteristics the 
 separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial 
 
 * Burke's Works, Vol. iii, p. 113, Edit, of 1855. 
 
150 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Montesquieu. 
 
 powers ; * the system of representation, municipal and 
 general, and the respective power of the two houses 
 of the legislature. He examines and approves of the 
 reasons on which these several principles are based, 
 and points out their superiority over other free govern- 
 ments, ancient and modern. 
 
 As regards the portion of the community in whom 
 the power of voting should be vested, although 
 perfectly acquainted with the theory of Locke that 
 it is an inherent right he rejected that theory, and 
 treated the possession of the suffrage as a matter of 
 expediency, having for its object the obtaining from 
 the community an enlightened and independent judg- 
 ment. 
 
 He says, that in forming an opinion of political 
 institutions "it is necessary to have regard to the 
 particular character and circumstances of each people. 
 He did not take his own principles from his prejudices 
 (which were in favour of his own country), but from 
 the nature of things." He recognises with evident 
 regret, that the other countries of Europe, his own 
 included, were not in the condition to adopt the 
 mixed system which he saw in action in England. 
 They had to be content with following the example of 
 Solon who did not give the Athenians the best possible 
 
 * Sir Edward Creasy, in his work on the Rise and Progress of the 
 English Constitution (6th Edition, London, 1862), in classifying the 
 constitutional functions of each member of the state under three heads 
 1st, the deliberative ; 2nd, the administrative ; 3rd, the judicial 
 says : " I follow here the greatest of all writers on the subject of poli- 
 itcal institutions Aristotle." (Page 7.) 
 
Montesquieu.] TRUE EQUALITY. 151 
 
 laws, but the best which they could bear. But " the 
 more those mixed principles are anywhere in vigour, 
 the more stable is the government. It is from the 
 legitimate distribution and the suitable division of 
 these different species of powers that the greatest 
 perfection of political liberty arises. Thence proceeds 
 true equality ; " by which he understands "that happy 
 equilibrium which makes all the citizens equally sub- 
 jected to the laws, and equally interested in observing 
 them." 
 
 This same principle is strongly enforced by Ma- 
 chiavelli in his remarkable letter to Leo X, on a 
 scheme of reform for the State of Florence, in which 
 he says : " Those who model a commonwealth must 
 take such provisions as may assign a place to three 
 sorts of men the high, the middle, and the low.* Of 
 which passage Mr. Adams, in his defence of the 
 American Constitution (referred to in Appendix B), 
 speaks as "that great truth, that eternal principle, 
 without the knowledge of which every speculation 
 upon government must be imperfect, and every scheme 
 of a commonwealth essentially defective." 
 
 Each of the constitutional elements of the mixed 
 form of government the monarchical, the aristo- 
 cratic, and the democratic being in itself so strong, 
 Montesquieu perceives following Hume that the 
 just balance can only be preserved by the practice of 
 moderation, "which is the soul of a government of 
 this kind." 
 
 * Machiavelli's Works, Vol. v, p. 246. 
 
152 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [D. Stewart. 
 
 In the course of the chapter on the English Constitu- 
 tion, he refers frequently to the institutions of Greece 
 and Rome "of which the English Constitution supplies 
 the defects." " That fine system," he says, 
 
 "was found in the woods. It was worked out in several 
 of its main outlines by our German ancestors." * 
 
 DUGALD STEWAET. 
 
 (1753-1828.) 
 
 The chapter on the " Use and Abuse of General 
 Principles in Politics," in Dugald Stewart's noble work, 
 The Philosophy of the Human Mind (1792 ),f enlarged 
 the sphere of the political thought of the time, and led 
 it towards the more enlightened convictions which 
 bore fruit in the next generation. He was among the 
 first to perceive how greatly the then newly-published 
 doctrines of Adam Smith, on the Nature and Causes 
 of the Wealth of Nations, would promote the well- 
 being of a country, and " extend its political prospects." 
 
 * Tacitus, De Moribus Gerraanorum, Chapters vii, xi, xii, xiv. On 
 this subject Sir Edward Creasy remarks: "The main stream of 
 our nation is Germanic. The institutions of our Germanic ancestors 
 commanded the anxious interest of the master minds of ancient Eome. 
 Those same institutions are the first subjects to which the inquirer into 
 our laws and our political organization must bend his thoughts. They 
 have, indeed, been greatly modified by the other elements with which, 
 they have been mingled here, but they have exercised more influence than 
 any others. The Germania of Tacitus is equally a handbook for the 
 student of modern, and for the student of ancient history. It thus 
 demonstrates the unity of all history." (Rise; and Progress of the- 
 English Constitution, p. 10.) See further on this subject, Appendix C 
 
 f Edition of 1802, Vol. i, chapter 4, section 8. 
 
D.Stewart,] OX GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 153 
 
 And he cordially recognised all that was good in the 
 speculations of the French economists, in so far as 
 they "searched for the causes of national prosperity 
 and national improvement in those arrangements 
 which daily observations show to be favourable to the 
 prosperity and the improvement of individuals." 
 
 On the other hand, he pronounced strongly against 
 "those Utopian plans of government" of Locke and 
 others, "which have, at different times, been offered 
 to the world." " Of these plans," he says, "by far the 
 greater number proceed on the supposition, that the 
 social order is entirely the effect of human art ; and 
 that wherever this order is imperfect, the evil may be 
 traced to some want of foresight on the part of the 
 legislator ; or to some inattention of the magistrate to 
 the complicated structure of that machine of which he 
 regulates the movements. The projects of reform, 
 therefore, which such plans involve, are, in general, 
 well entitled to all the ridicule and contempt they 
 have met with; inasmuch as they imply an arrogant 
 and presumptuous belief in their authors, of the 
 superiority of their own political sagacity to the 
 accumulated wisdom of former ages." 
 
 He was impressed, as fully as Hume, with the 
 advantages which modern nations derive from the 
 vast number and variety of their inventions, from a 
 free press, and from the rapid circulation of know- 
 ledge ; and he was possessed with an ardent antici- 
 pation that the combined influences of those modern 
 powers would tend to the removal of the obstacles 
 
154 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [D.Stewart. 
 
 which the prejudices and vices of men had so long 
 opposed to the progress of truth, freedom, and virtue. 
 
 These considerations did not lead him to undervalue 
 the search after the great principles of government, 
 " of which the most extensive experience alone would 
 put us in possession." They were to be found in 
 "the known principles of human nature, combined 
 with the particular circumstances of the time;" in 
 those principles which we obtain " from an examina- 
 tion of the human constitution, and of the general 
 laws which regulate the course of human affairs, and 
 which are certainly the result of a much more exten- 
 sive induction than any of the inferences drawn from 
 the history of actual establishments." 
 
 The numerous speculative writers on government 
 in the two centuries before Dugald Stewart's time 
 aimed at recommending either an absolute monarchy, 
 an aristocracy, or a democracy,* and were therefore 
 open to his remark, that, so far as their reasons were 
 founded merely on the experience of past times, they 
 were unphilosophical and inconclusive, inasmuch as 
 they could necessarily take no account of the great 
 " modern power of public opinion, and its ascendant 
 in human affairs which it had never possessed before." 
 
 To this power, arising from the liberty of the press, 
 and now greatly increased by the many other in- 
 ventions and improvements of more recent times, 
 lie looked for a sufficient check on any dangerous 
 
 * For the writers of the 17th century, see Hallam's History of 
 .Literature, Vol. iii, part 4, section 2. 
 
D.Stewart.] ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 155 
 
 advance of extreme opinions in any direction. Refer- 
 ring to the remark of Hobbes, that " Democracy is 
 nothing but an aristocracy of orators, interrupted 
 sometimes by the temporary monarchy of a single 
 orator," he considers " that one of the greatest ad- 
 vantages to be expected from the liberty of the press 
 is, the effect that it must necessarily have in diminish- 
 ing the influence of popular eloquence, both by curing 
 men of those prejudices upon which it operates, and 
 by subjecting it to the irresistible control of enlightened 
 opinion." And in proportion as these prospects of 
 the progress of reason, the diffusion of knowledge, and 
 the consequent improvement of mankind are realised, 
 he anticipates " that the political history of the world 
 will be regulated by steady and uniform courses, and 
 the philosopher will be enabled to form probable con- 
 jectures with respect to the future course of human 
 affairs." 
 
 The spectacle of the result of the abuses of aristo- 
 cratical and monarchical power all over Europe, at 
 the time when Dugald Stewart wrote, did not carry 
 away his philosophical mind into any condemnation of 
 their principles. He perceived that then, partly as the 
 result of those abuses, partly " in consequence of the 
 progress of commerce and philosophy, the aristo- 
 cratical influence was rapidly declining." But he 
 thought, also, that " no well-wisher to mankind would 
 be disposed to accelerate its decline." He antici- 
 cipated a time when it might be dispensed with, 
 when " the true principles of political economy are 
 
156 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [D.Stewart. 
 
 completely understood and acknowledged by the 
 world." Doubtless he applied the term political eco- 
 nomy in a much wider than a mere material sense, 
 since he acknowledges the value of an hereditary aris- 
 tocracy in counteracting the influence of wealth, and 
 consequently in tending to promote all the qualities 
 that elevate human life. His ideal of government is 
 expressed in the following words : ^Governments are 
 more or less perfect in proportion to the greater or 
 smaller numbers of individuals to whom they afford 
 the means of cultivating their intellectual and moral 
 powers, and whom they admit to live together on a 
 liberal footing of equality." .... And there- 
 fore " to the statesman is assigned the sublime office 
 of seconding the benevolent intentions of Providence 
 in the administration of human affairs, by diffusing 
 as widely as possible among his fellow-citizens the 
 advantages of the social union." 
 
 He does not omit to point out that " the danger of 
 sudden and rash innovations cannot be too strongly 
 inculcated." . . . . " But it is possible, also, to 
 fall into the opposite extreme, and to bring upon 
 society the very evils we are anxious to prevent, by 
 an obstinate opposition to those gradual and necessary 
 reformations which the genius of the times demands. 
 The violent revolutions which at different times have 
 convulsed modern Europe have arisen from this 
 cause." " The perfection, therefore, of 
 
 political wisdom does not consist in indiscriminate 
 zeal against reforms, but in a gradual and prudent 
 
D.Stewart.] LECTURES ON GOVERNMENT. 157 
 
 accommodation of established institutions to the vary- 
 ing opinions, manners, and circumstances of man- 
 kind." 
 
 In his Lectures on Government (1804), Dugald 
 Stewart deals with 1st, the simple forms, 2nd, mixed 
 governments. Pointing out that the great object of 
 the theory of government is to separate and pro- 
 perly distribute the legislative, judicial, and executive 
 powers, so as to guard against the abuses to which 
 they might otherwise be liable, he says that " these 
 ends can only be accomplished by a mixed govern- 
 ment; that is, by a system of policy that would com- 
 bine the simple forms in such a manner as to correct 
 the inconveniences which, in their separate states, 
 they seem all to threaten." When these powers are 
 thus united, the political order which arises from such 
 a combination may be compared, as they were by 
 Cicero,* to the harmony resulting from the different 
 instruments and voices, and the high, low, and inter- 
 mediate sounds of a musical concert. These condi- 
 tions are satisfied by the English Constitution. He 
 adds, that one of his leading motives for those lectures 
 was his desire to " illustrate and enforce the duties of 
 patriotism, which, among those we owe to our fellow- 
 creatures, certainly hold a most distinguished rank."f 
 
 * De Rep., Book ii, ch. 42. 
 
 t The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart, edited by Sir William 
 Hamilton, 1856. Vol. ix, pp. 351, 459. 
 
158 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Pitt. 
 
 PITT. 
 
 (17591806.) 
 
 FOX. 
 
 (1748-1806.) 
 
 B U E K E. 
 
 (17301797.) 
 
 The three great statesmen of the latter part of the 
 last century, while fully agreeing as to the theoretical 
 excellence of the British Constitution, as settled by 
 the Revolution of 1688, were equally conscious of the 
 defects which had been imported into it by the undue 
 influence of the crown and the corruption of public 
 opinion. They differed as to the mode and time in 
 which its reform should be undertaken. 
 
 PITT. In his Notice of a Motion on the Present 
 State of the Representation of the Commons of 
 England, in May, 1782, Pitt prefaced his proposals 
 by the assertion that " That beautiful form of govern- 
 ment which had made us the envy and admiration of 
 mankind, in which the people were entitled to hold so 
 distinguished a share, was so far departed from its 
 original purity, as that its representatives ceased, in 
 a great degree, to be connected with the people."* 
 And he referred to his father, Lord Chatham, as 
 having said, some years before, that " Without reform, 
 this nation, with the best capacities for grandeur and 
 happiness of any on the face of the earth, must be 
 confounded in the mass of those whose liberties were lost 
 in the corruption of the people." Mr. Pitt proceeded 
 
 * Speeches of William Pitt. 6 vols. London, 1806, p. 27. 
 
Pitt] THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION. 159' 
 
 to say that the defects in the representation had given 
 reason to apprehend the most alarming consequences 
 to the constitution; and he recalled the previous 
 efforts at reform that had failed in consequence of the 
 too great influence of the crown. He asserted that 
 a spirit of unanimity in favour of reform had sprung 
 up in every part of the kingdom, and he proposed an 
 inquiry and a report to the government on the best- 
 means of carrying into execution a moderate and sub- 
 stantial reform in the representation of the people. 
 He intimated that he shared the opinion of those who 
 thought that " the best means of effecting a more near 
 relation between the representatives and the people 
 was to take from the decayed and corrupt boroughs a 
 part of their members, and add them to the places 
 which have a greater interest and stake in the coun- 
 try." (Vol. i, pp. 31, 32.) 
 
 He found the House of Commons averse even to 
 an inquiry. Nevertheless he returned to the subject 
 the next year, and in May, 1783, proposed three 
 resolutions: 1st. That measures should be taken to 
 prevent bribery and expense at elections. 2nd. The 
 disfranchisement of boroughs where the majority of 
 voters were convicted of corruption by a committee 
 of the House of Commons. 3rd. An addition to the 
 knights of the shire. It is observable that, in defe- 
 rence probably to the strength of the opposition, there 
 is no attempt to deal with the decayed boroughs. He 
 urged, that " The more he revered the venerable part 
 of the constitution the more he wished to secure its 
 
160 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
 [Pitt. 
 
 duration the greater he felt the necessity of guarding 
 against its decay." 
 
 On the subject of the franchise, he said, that 
 " Some * proposed to give this right of voting, indis- 
 criminately, to all the inhabitants of the kingdom. 
 . . . . But if this doctrine should prevail, nearly 
 one-half of the people must in fact be slaves ; . . . . 
 for all those who vote for an unsuccessful candidate 
 cannot, in the strictness of this doctrine, be said to 
 be represented in parliament, and therefore they are 
 governed by laws to which they give not their assent, 
 either in person or by representatives." .... 
 That the member, " when once chosen, ought to 
 consider himself the representative of the people at 
 large," does not invalidate the above conclusion. 
 " Universal suffrage," in his opinion, f( was a specu- 
 lative proposition, which may be good in theory, but 
 absurd and chimerical to reduce to practice." 
 
 The resolutions were lost by a large majority. 
 (Vol. i, pp. 7480.) 
 
 In April, 1785, Mr. Pitt again called attention to 
 the question of the reform of the representation. 
 He reminded the House that since the period of 
 Edward I, which was the first time when they could 
 trace distinct descriptions of men in the representation, 
 the doctrine of change was clearly understood. The 
 representation in counties was not uniform - s the total 
 number of members frequently varied. From the 
 
 * Referring to those who had adopted the principles of Locke. 
 
Pitt.] REFORM OF THE REPRESENTATION. 161 
 
 time of Edward I to Charles II there were few 
 reigns in which the representation did not undergo a 
 change. Of boroughs which used formerly to send 
 members 72 had fallen into decay, and had been dis- 
 franchised. After the Restoration, 36 petitioned to 
 be restored, and their prayer was granted ; the re- 
 mainder did not petition, and were left without their 
 franchises. (Vol. i, p. 226.) 
 
 The limited and tentative nature of Mr. Pitt's 
 proposals in this bill indicated the strength of the 
 borough interest in the House of Commons. Decayed 
 boroughs were to be purchased, with their consent, 
 by parliament, and their members distributed among 
 the counties ; and other small boroughs were to have 
 power to surrender their franchises for a consideration, 
 and their right to return members was to be trans- 
 ferred to populous and nourishing towns. Copyholders 
 were to have the franchise in the counties. But the 
 opinion of parliament was adverse to even this mild 
 measure ; and the rising storm of the French Revolu- 
 tion prevented the subject of the reform of the repre- 
 sentation from being again introduced until it was 
 revived by Mr. Grey in 1793. On this occasion Pitt, 
 while declaring himself as desirous as ever to see the 
 needful reforms effected, considered the time inoppor- 
 tune. The efforts to propagate the principles of the 
 French Revolution had alarmed the nation. " The 
 societies," he said, " demanding reform, brought for- 
 ward a claim that could be resolved into nothing but 
 a deduction from French principles that which is 
 
 M 
 
162 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Pitt. 
 
 termed the will of the majority, the will of the multi- 
 tude. Under a pretence of centering all authority in 
 the will of the many, it established the worst sort of 
 despotism." (Vol. ii, p. 156.) 
 
 When Mr. Grey again brought forward his motion 
 in 1797, disclaiming at the same time French principles, 
 Pitt opposed it on the ground that he did not think 
 the motion could be separated from the objects of the 
 societies (Vol. iii, p. 128); and although Fox, who 
 had strenuously supported his great rival Pitt in all 
 his endeavours to obtain acceptance for his proposals 
 for reform, also supported this motion, he found him- 
 self, together with all the friends of rational reforma- 
 tion, confounded, in the opinion of the country, with 
 the advocates of the wild doctrines of the French 
 He volution.* 
 
 During the great struggle into which, in 1794, the 
 country was forced, first with France, and for a time 
 with the whole of Europe, and which lasted until 1815, 
 the question of the reform of the representation re- 
 mained naturally in abeyance. Lord John Russell, 
 by whom it was taken up again in May 1819, and in 
 April 1822, found the country still unprepared for it. 
 But the subsequent French Revolution in 1830, which 
 aimed at establishing constitutional monarchy in that 
 country on a firmer basis, supplied the impulse that 
 enabled Earl Grey to introduce, and in 1832 to carry, 
 the great measure which will be for ever associated 
 
 * Burke's Speech on Economic Reform. Vol. ii of his Speeches, 
 p. 65. 
 
Fox.] REFORM OF THE REPRESENTATION. 163 
 
 with his name, and which gave effect to, and by the 
 aid of a wider experience extended, the principles by 
 which the enlightened patriotism of Pitt and Fox had 
 vainly sought to enlarge the bounds, and strengthen 
 the foundation of the constitution. 
 
 Fox. In his speech 011 introducing his Motion for 
 considering the State of the Nation, in January 1784, 
 Fox thus expressed himself on the subject of the 
 constitution. " The theory of our constitution con- 
 sisted in checks and oppositions ; in one part of our 
 legislature bearing up against and controlling an- 
 other, but it was the prudence of good men to moderate 
 the temper of the constitution, and on this practice a 
 happy medium has been hit upon at the glorious era 
 of the Revolution, temperate and accommodating, the 
 good effects of which we have experienced for near a 
 century."* (Vol. ii of Speeches, p. 321.) 
 
 Holding this view and (f regarding it as one of the 
 chief excellences of the constitution that it involved a 
 renovating principle in itself" (ibid., p. 172), and being 
 as zealous as the best men in his age to correct its 
 abuses, he nevertheless pronounced strongly against 
 the doctrines then becoming popular, by which all 
 other power A of the state would be overpowered by the 
 will of the majority. In his speech on Mr. Grey's 
 Motion for a Reform in Parliament, in May 1797, 
 (Vol. vi,p. 363) he says, "I always deprecated universal 
 suffrage." . . . " I do not think that you augment 
 
 * Speeches of the Eight Honorable Charles James Fox. 4 vols. 
 Bohn, London, 1815. 
 
 M2 
 
164 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Pox. 
 
 the deliberative body of the people by counting all the 
 heads, but that in truth you confer on individuals* 
 by this means the power of drawing forth numbers 
 who, without deliberation, would act implicitly on 
 their will. My opinion is, that the best reform is 
 that which shall bring into activity the greatest num- 
 ber of independent voters, and that that is defective 
 which would bring forth those whose situation and 
 condition take from them the power of deliberation." 
 
 A similar opinion, expressed by Fox in 1800, is 
 recorded in the life of Sir James (then Mr.) 
 Mackintosh, from the diary of a friend. Mr. Mack- 
 intosh mentioned that, upon asking Fox's opinion 
 of what he had observed of the necessary complexity 
 of all free governments, from the various elements 
 out of which they must arise and the various interests 
 with which they must be charged, Fox said that no- 
 thing certainly could be more true ; nor anything more 
 foolish than the doctrines of the advocates for simpler 
 forms of government.! 
 
 And of his claim upon the confidence and respect of 
 posterity for his political conclusions, Sir James 
 Mackintosh thus speaks in his eloquent exposition of 
 the lofty and splendid qualities of Fox's character: 
 " The measures which he supported or opposed 
 
 * An allusion to the leaders of the republican clubs who had made 
 themselves so conspicuous in France, and an anticipation of the 
 " wire-pullers " of the present day. 
 
 f Memoirs of the Life of Sir James Mackintosh, edited by his son 
 Robert James Mackintosh, Esq. Second Edition. In 2 vols. London, 
 1836. Vol. i, p. 109. 
 
Fox.] REFORM OF THE REPRESENTATION. 165 
 
 may divide the opinions of posterity; . . . but 
 he will most certainly command the unanimous 
 reverence of future generations by his pure sentiments 
 towards the commonwealth, by his zeal for the civil 
 and religious rights of all men, by his liberal principles 
 favourable to mild government, to the unfettered 
 exercise of the human faculties, and to the progressive 
 civilization of mankind; by his ardent love for a 
 country of which the well-being and greatness were 
 indeed inseparable from his own glory, and by his 
 profound reverence for that free constitution which 
 he was universally admitted to understand better than 
 any other man of his age, both in an exactly legal, and 
 in a comprehensively philosophical sense." * 
 
 A passage in Fox's History of the Early Part of 
 the reign of James II shows that, while having the 
 strongest sympathy for freedom, he sided with those 
 who would protect it from the tyranny, either of the few 
 or the many. In his description of the popular party 
 in opposition to Charles I, he says that "Many of 
 their leaders were greatly versed in ancient as well 
 as modern learning, and were even enthusiastically 
 attached to the great names of antiquity ; but they 
 never conceived the wild project of assimilating the 
 government of England to that of Athens, of Sparta, 
 or of Rome. They were content with applying to 
 the English Constitution, and to the English laws, 
 the spirit of liberty which had animated and ren- 
 dered illustrious the ancient republics. They had no 
 
 * Ibidem, p. 325. 
 
166 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Fox. 
 
 thought of a republic in its modern sense, the radical 
 defects of which, as wanting in freedom, can only be 
 mitigated by the genius of a Cromwell" (pp. 3, 19).* 
 And in his Address to the Electors of Westminster, 
 1793, in the midst of the excitement of the French 
 
 * The following old poem, from the Luttrell collection of " Broad- 
 sides," 8 of the probable date of 1660, and manifestly by an admirer of 
 the Long Parliament in its best period, so fully illustrates Fox's 
 sentiments in the above paragraph, that it may be permitted to add it 
 here. It was given in the Athenaeum of March 14th, 1857. 
 
 ENGLAND'S VOTE FOR A FREE ELECTION IN A FREE PARLIAMENT. 
 
 Great God of Nations, and their Right, 
 By whose high Auspice Brittain stands 
 So long, though first 'twas built on Sands, 
 
 And oft had sunk, but for Thy might, 
 
 In her own Mainland-storms and Seas : 
 
 Be present to her now as then, 
 
 And let not proud and factious men 
 Oppose Thy will with what they please. 
 
 Our Free full Senate's to be made ; 
 
 O put it to the publick voice 
 
 To make a legal worthy choice, 
 Excluding such as would invade 
 
 The Commonwealth. Let whom we name 
 Have Wisdome, Foresight, Fortitude, 
 Be more with Faith then Face endu'd ; 
 
 And study Conscience above Fame. 
 
 Such, as not seek to get the Start 
 In State, by Faction, Power, or Bribes, 
 Ambition's Bands. But move the Tribes 
 
 By Virtue, Modesty, Desert. 
 
 Such as to Justice will adhere, 
 
 Whatever great one it offend ; 
 
 And from the embraced Truth not bend 
 For Envy, Hatred, Gifts, or Fear. 
 
 That by their Deeds will make it known 
 
 Whose Dignity they do sustain ; 
 
 And Life, State, Glory, all they gain, 
 Count it Great Brittain's, not their own. 
 
 * In 3 vols. folio, now in the British Museum. The poem is in Vol. ii, A to H. 
 
Burke.] THE BKITISH CONSTITUTION. 167 
 
 Revolution, he referred to the terms of an Amend- 
 ment which he had recently moved to the Address to 
 the Crown in the House of Commons, in which he ex- 
 pressed the desire of the House to check the tendency 
 to arbitrary proceedings on the part of the govern- 
 ment, but at the same time " to assure His Majesty 
 of their most zealous attachment to the excellent con- 
 stitution of this free country, and their sense of the 
 immeasurable blessings which are derived from it, and 
 their unshaken determination to maintain and pre- 
 serve it." 
 
 BURKE. In his defence of the doctrine of the 
 constitution, as established in 1688, Burke said that 
 " The excellences of the British Constitution had 
 already exercised and exhausted the labours of the 
 best thinkers and the most eloquent writers that the 
 world had yet seen." * . . . It was the result of the 
 thoughts of many minds, in many ages. It is a very 
 
 Such the old Bruti, Decii were, 
 The Cippi, Curtii, who did give 
 Themselves for Rome : and would not live 
 
 As men good only for a year. 
 
 Such were the great Camilli too, 
 The Fabii, Scipio's ; that still thought 
 No work at price enough was bought 
 
 That for their country they could do : 
 
 And to her honour so did knit, 
 
 As all their Acts were understood 
 
 The Sinews of the Publick Good, 
 And they themselves one soul with it. 
 
 These men were truly Magistrates ; 
 
 These neither practised Force, nor Forms, 
 Nor did they leave the helm in storms ; 
 
 And such they are make happy States. 
 
 * Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, 1791. Burke's Works, 
 4 vols. London, 1855, Vol. iii, p. 12. 
 
168 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Burke. 
 
 complicated -system, and therefore to be handled with 
 caution. ef Our constitution stands on a nice equipoise, 
 with steep precipices and deep waters upon all sides. 
 In removing it from a dangerous leaning towards one 
 side there may be risk of oversetting it on the other. 
 Every project of a material change in a government 
 so complicated as ours, combined at the same time 
 with external circumstances still more complicated, is 
 a matter full of difficulties ; in which a considerate 
 man will not be top ready to decide, or an honest man 
 too ready to promise. . . . It is the business of 
 the speculative philosopher to mark the proper ends 
 of government; it is the business of the politician, 
 who is the philosopher in action, to find out proper 
 means towards those ends, and to employ them with 
 effect." * ..." "With, a disposition to improve he 
 should show an ability to preserve." f And in aiming 
 at improvements " he would vary his means to secure 
 the unity of his end ; when the equipoise of the vessel 
 may be endangered by overloading it on one side, he 
 would carry the weight of his reasons to that which 
 may preserve its equipoise." t 
 
 At the time of the French Revolution the abuses 
 and oppressions of the old monarchical and aristo- 
 cratical governments on the Continent had been so 
 great, that many of the finest intellects in this country 
 
 * Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents. Vol. i 
 of Works, pp. 368376. 
 
 f Reflections on the Revolution in France. Vol. ii of Works, p. 428. 
 j Ibid., p. 513. 
 
Burke.] THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 169 
 
 were carried away in ardent hope and expectation of 
 a new era of freedom and national well-being that was 
 to arise out of the doctrines then promulgated by the 
 French philosophers. The events of the Revolution 
 (to use the words of Sir James Mackintosh) " only too 
 effectually refuted " those doctrines, and dispelled the 
 expectations which he, among others, had at one 
 time built upon them. Burke from the first saw 
 deeper into the principles at work in France, and 
 gave all his marvellous energies to exposing their 
 fallacies. 
 
 The real foundations of civil society and govern- 
 ment upon which, if the responsible classes do their 
 duty, the well-being of a community in its highest 
 sense is constructed and maintained, are expounded 
 by Burke throughout a large portion of his works 
 and speeches, but nowhere more fully than in his 
 Thoughts on French Affairs, in his Reflections 
 on the Revolution in France, and in his Appeal 
 from the New to the Old Whigs.* He shows that 
 the abettors of the shallow theories that overturned 
 the old monarchical government of France proceeded 
 upon the assumption that, in the effort to attain a 
 better order of things, there was no middle way 
 between the despotism of a monarchy and the des- 
 potism of a multitude. They acted as if " they had 
 never heard of a monarchy directed by laws, con- 
 trolled and balanced by the great hereditary wealth 
 
 * Vols. ii and iii, Burke's Works. 
 
170 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Burke. 
 
 and hereditary dignity of a nation ; and both again 
 controlled by a judicious check from the reason and 
 feeling of the people at large, acting by a suitable 
 and permanent organ." They seemed to think it 
 impossible that anyone " could honestly prefer such a 
 mixed and tempered government to either of the 
 extremes" They were led to regard " as a truth 
 universally acknowledged, that a pure democracy is 
 the only tolerable form into which human society can 
 be thrown ; " they were unaware that " the extreme of 
 liberty ought not to obtain anywhere ; because extremes, 
 in every point which relates either to our duties or satis- 
 factions in life, are destructive both to virtue and en- 
 joyment. Liberty must be limited in order to be 
 possessed."* There may be small communities "in 
 which the purely democratic form will become neces- 
 sary ; there may be some (very few, and very particu- 
 larly circumstanced) in which it would be clearly de- 
 sirable. This he did not take to be the case of France, 
 or of any other great country. Until now we have 
 seen no examples of considerable democracies." f And 
 when adopted as the polity of a large community, in 
 which strong divisions of opinion may be expected to 
 be found, the oppression of the minority " will extend 
 to far greater numbers," and be exercised more harshly 
 than is likely to be the case under the government of 
 one man. The tendency of a pure democracy is " to 
 
 * Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol. Ibid., vol. ii, p. 30. 
 t Reflections, vol. ii, p. 396. 
 
Burke.] OPPOSITION TO CONSTITUENTS. 171 
 
 degenerate into an oligarchy ;" under it there is a less 
 prospect for a people to rise into a state of true 
 freedom ; " you can better engraft any description of 
 republic on a monarchy than anything of monarchy 
 upon the republican forms. The fact is so historically."* 
 And of this there is no greater example than the 
 English Constitution which, in its gradual growth, has 
 become compounded of all that is best in the three 
 simple forms. f The two great countries which, in 
 Burke's time, had adopted democratic institutions, 
 are now able to show a century's experience of them. 
 I have put together in the Appendix, (A and B,) 
 some observations on each. 
 
 One of the most conspicuous acts of Burke's public 
 life was his resistance to the dictation of his consti- 
 tuents at Bristol. On that memorable occasion he 
 originated a principle that has been recognised as 
 among the most valuable of our constitutional usages. 
 Speaking of himself in the third person he thus 
 describes it. " He was the first man who, on the 
 hustings at a popular election, rejected the authority of 
 instructions from constituents ; and who, in any place, 
 has argued so fully against it. Perhaps the discredit 
 into which that doctrine of compulsive instructions 
 
 * Reflections, vol ii, p. 397. 
 
 t It has been suggested by Mr. John Morley that the English Con- 
 stitution, which has been described as " not a creation but a growth," 
 would be more properly characterised as " the result of deliberate 
 human effort acting in accordance with national character and favouring 
 circumstances." (Vol. ii, p. 180, of Mr. Morley 's Dissertations on 
 Eousseau, referred to in pp. 217, 222.) 
 
172 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Burke. 
 
 under our constitution is since fallen, may be due, in 
 a great degree, to his opposing himself to it in that 
 manner, and on that occasion.* 
 
 In the speech itself, to which he alludes, delivered 
 at Bristol before the election in 1780, he urges that 
 " If we do not, by a fair, indulgent, and gentlemanly 
 behaviour to our representatives, give confidence to 
 their minds, and a liberal scope to their understandings ; 
 if we do not permit our members to act upon a very 
 enlarged view of things, we shall at length infallibly 
 degrade our national representation into a confused 
 and scuffling bustle of local agency. When the 
 popular member is narrowed in his ideas, and rendered 
 timid in his proceedings, the service of the crown will 
 .be the sole nursery of statesmen. . . . Then the 
 monopoly of mental power will be added to the power 
 of all other kinds that it possesses. On the side of 
 the people there will be nothing but impotence, for 
 ignorance is impotence ; narrowness of mind is impo- 
 tence ; timidity is itself impotence, and makes all 
 other qualities that go along with it impotent and 
 useless." t 
 
 There being no longer the boroughs under the in- 
 fluence of the crown (or of individuals), alluded to in 
 the above paragraph, through which men who had 
 been rejected by the exactions of constituencies might 
 continue their services to the public, the result in the 
 
 * An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, p. 26. 
 | Speech at Bristol previous to his election in 1780. Vol. ii of 
 Works, p. 130. 
 
Burke.] CONDUCT OF REPRESENTATIVES. 173 
 
 present day of the dictation of constituencies would 
 be to drive men of jealous honour and individual 
 character from public life, or to prevent them from 
 entering it. 
 
 The result of that habit of dictation may be now 
 studied in the representation in the individual States 
 of the American Union, and in that of the United 
 States, the leading facts of which I have given in an 
 Appendix (B) ; and they are not such as to commend 
 themselves to the higher sense and feeling and foresight 
 of the public of this country. 
 
 The line of conduct which Burke commends to con- 
 stituencies is that of a general agreement on principles 
 with their representative, and a candid and liberal 
 consideration of the ivholc tenour of his conduct. To 
 attempt to impose mere obsequiousness and flexibility 
 is a fault radically ruinous to the representative 
 character and to the state.* Elsewhere he describes 
 what should be expected of a good member of parlia- 
 ment. He should feel himself bound to look beyond 
 local interests to those of the nation ; to bear in mind 
 that the nation itself is but a part of a great empire,, 
 and that the several interests of the nation and the 
 empire are various, multiform, and intricate. Those 
 wide-spread interests must be considered, compared, 
 and, if possible, reconciled. To enable him to dis- 
 charge such duties it is obvious that a large discretion 
 
 * Speech at Bristol previous to his election in 1780. Vol. ii of 
 Works, pp. 129131. 
 
174 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Burke. 
 
 must be left to a representative, as a member of a 
 deliberate assembly.* 
 
 Burke's analysis of the principles on which the idea 
 of monarchy rested, and of the reasons in favour of a 
 Church establishment, are so expanded by the energy 
 of his convictions and the riches of his eloquence, 
 that nothing but a short summary of them is here 
 possible. 
 
 Of monarchy he says, that the idea has been com- 
 mon to all ages and nations, and is founded on our 
 natural impulses of respect and reverence. To respect 
 the office and person of the sovereign is among the 
 oldest and most universal feelings of mankind. This 
 reverence is yielded willingly and freely, with the 
 generous loyalty that " dignifies obedience," and 
 raises him who yields it in his own esteem. " We na- 
 turally cherish and cultivate those inbred sentiments 
 as the faithful guardians and the true supporters of 
 all liberal and manly morals." By reverencing the 
 sovereign, and thus embodying our institutions in a 
 person, we also engage the affections on the side of the 
 commonwealth. We therefore immensely strengthen 
 our institutions when we are able to bestow the natural 
 affections of love, veneration, admiration, and attach- 
 ment, on the person who represents to us the idea of 
 the state. So strong is the natural feeling of vene- 
 ration for the office of the sovereign, that it has often 
 survived the shock of the vices of the temporary 
 
 * Burke's Works, Vol. iii, pp. 2729. 
 
Burke.] CHURCH ESTABLISHMENT. 175 
 
 occupants of the throne. When on the other hand, 
 to the respect for office is added the claim of high 
 personal qualities, the nation's tribute of affection 
 and attachment is offered in full measure to the 
 sovereign, who is the worthy embodiment of its 
 dignity, grandeur, and power. 
 
 The loss is great to the nations whose social 
 system does not permit them to possess a living 
 embodiment of their national dignity. Deprived of a 
 legitimate object to which their natural feelings of 
 veneration can attach themselves, they are led to 
 expend those feelings on objects of a lower kind.* 
 
 The argument for a Church establishment rests, 
 according to Burke, on the following basis. The 
 common nature and common relation of men require 
 the institution of civil society. Without civil society 
 man could not by any possibility arrive at the per- 
 fection of which his nature is capable. It must 
 therefore be acceptable to the Divine Being who 
 is the Institutor, and Author, and Protector of civil 
 society, that national homage should be rendered to 
 Him ; that, as our nature is to be perfected by our 
 virtue, men bound together in civil society should 
 take the necessary means for its perfection. It is 
 incumbent on the nation in its corporate capacity, to 
 protect the means provided for that purpose. 
 
 In this country, the means for this corporate fealty 
 
 * Reflections on the Revolution in France ; Burke's Works, Vol. ii. 
 pp. 348366. 
 
176 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Burke. 
 
 and homage have been provided by individuals, and 
 placed under the guardianship of the state. These 
 means have afforded the opportunities of the public 
 recognition of the Sovereign of Sovereigns in build- 
 ings, by public acts of worship according to dignified 
 and suitable forms ; by instruction ; by the ministra- 
 tions of consolation and hope, in every parish of the 
 kingdom. These means thus assigned for these pur- 
 poses by individuals, from time to time, during the 
 course of more than a thousand years, are the in- 
 heritance of the nation, and are especially the in- 
 heritance of the poor. They provide a body of men, 
 the object of whose education and training is to 
 qualify them to be not only the teachers, but the 
 friends and guides of the poor, and the promoters 
 of the national civilization. That body of men, com- 
 manding also by their cultivation and position the 
 attention and respect of the rich, are the instruments 
 by which in that class the national standard of morals 
 and religion is sustained and elevated. In the main- 
 tenance of that standard at its highest point among 
 the rich, no class has a greater interest than the 
 poor ; for no class derives greater advantages than 
 the poor from the virtue and sense of duty of the 
 rich. Further, that body of men forms, by their 
 learning, the indispensable safeguard of Christianity 
 itself. 
 
 A religious national establishment is therefore a 
 matter of national obligation. It is essential to the 
 state, and is the foundation of the whole constitution, 
 
Mackintosh.] DISCOURSE ON LAW OF NATIONS. 177 
 
 with which, and with every part of which, it holds 
 an indissoluble union. Church and State are, in a 
 constitutional point of view, inseparable ideas, and 
 the principle runs through the whole system of 
 the national polity. The English nation has never 
 thought it wise to entrust that great fundamental 
 interest of the whole to what they trust no part of 
 their civil or military service ; that is, to the un- 
 steady and precarious contributions of individuals.* 
 
 SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH. 
 
 (17661832 ) 
 
 It is scarcely necessary to say that the principles 
 set forth in the preceding pages are those on which 
 our own constitutional system has been defended and 
 maintained up to the present day. It has stood the 
 assaults of all the shallow theories that have been 
 brought to bear against it, for it has had on its side all 
 that is greatest, wisest, and most eminent among the 
 writers, orators, and statesmen of our country. No 
 authority, I believe, could be quoted in support of 
 this assertion which would carry more weight with 
 
 * Reflections on the Revolution in France ; Burke'a Works, Vol. ii, 
 pp. 370376. 
 
 N 
 
178 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Mackintosh. 
 
 it than that of the late Sir James Mackintosh, filled 
 as he was with an ardent love of rational liberty, and 
 gifted with " the most Baconian mind since Bacon."* 
 In his admirable Discourse on the Law of Nature and 
 Nations, after stigmatizing those theories of govern- 
 ment, such as that of Locke, " resting upon supposed 
 compacts, which are altogether chimerical, which 
 must be admitted to be false in fact, which, if they 
 are considered as fictions, will be found to serve no 
 purpose of just reasoning, and to be equally the 
 foundation of a system of universal despotism in 
 Hobbes, and of universal anarchy in Rousseau," he 
 proceeds to say that, in the "unmixed forms of 
 government, as the right of legislation is vested in 
 one individual or in one order, it is obvious that the 
 legislative power may shake off all the restraints 
 which the laws have imposed on it. All such 
 governments, therefore, tend towards despotism, and 
 the securities which they admit against misgovern- 
 ment are extremely feeble and precarious." He 
 then states what is, in his opinion, the best form of 
 government. 
 
 "The best security which human wisdom can 
 devise seems to be the distribution of political 
 authority among different individuals and bodies, 
 with separate interests, and separate characters, cor- 
 responding to the variety of classes of which civil 
 society is composed, each interested to guard their 
 
 * Macaulav. 
 
Mackintosh.] FREE GOVERNMENTS. 179 
 
 own order from oppression by the rest; each also 
 interested to prevent any of the others from seizing 
 an exclusive, and therefore despotic power ; and all 
 having a common interest to co-operate in carrying 
 on the ordinary and necessary administration of 
 government." Such are our own institutions ; 
 affording to all, according to his own admirable defi- 
 nition of true liberty, " protection against wrong both 
 from their rulers and their fellows ; " allowing all 
 classes and conditions of men to be " undisturbed in 
 the exercise of their natural powers ; " offering the 
 freest opportunity for the full development of the 
 powers and capacities of each. " Such governments," 
 he adds, "are, with justice, peculiarly and emphati- 
 cally called free ; and in ascribing that liberty to the 
 skilful combination of mutual dependence and mutual 
 check, I feel my own conviction greatly strengthened, 
 by calling to mind, that in this opinion I agree with 
 all the wise men who have ever deeply considered the 
 principles of politics with Aristotle and Polybius, 
 with Cicero and Tacitus, with Bacon and Machiavel, 
 with Montesquieu and Hume."* To this he sub- 
 joins in a note : " To the weight of these great names 
 let me add the opinion of two illustrious men of the 
 present age, as both their opinions are combined by 
 one of them in the following passage. In his speech 
 on the Army Estimates, 9th February, 1790, Mr. Fox 
 
 * Mackintosh's Discourse on the Law of Nature and Nations. 
 London, 1800, pp. 4651. 
 
 X 2 
 
180 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Mackintosh 
 
 said he always thought any of the simple un- 
 balanced governments bad simple monarchy, simple 
 aristocracy, simple democracy : he held them all im- 
 perfect or vicious ; all were bad by themselves ; 
 the composition alone was good. These had been 
 always his principles, in which he agreed with his 
 friend Mr. Burke." 
 
 As to the origin of government, to discover which 
 Locke, and after him Rousseau, in his Contrat 
 Social, employed their speculations, Sir James 
 Mackintosh remarks that such speculations are 
 scarcely worthy of serious notice ; that the origin 
 of government rested not on any supposed contract, 
 but upon the solid basis of general convenience. 
 Men cannot subsist without society and mutual aid ; 
 the protection of government is necessary to them ; 
 to enjoy that protection they must submit to re- 
 straints ; thence the duty of obedience, and the re- 
 ciprocal duties of magistrates ; an argument ee which 
 directly and fully answers the only rational end for 
 which the fiction of a contract could have been in- 
 vented." 
 
 He then closes the argument with this noble pas- 
 sage. " I shall not encumber my reasoning by any 
 speculations on the origin of government, a question 
 upon which so much reason has been wasted in 
 modern times, but which the ancients, in a higher 
 spirit of philosophy, never once deigned to stir. If 
 our principles be just, the origin of government must 
 have been coeval with that of mankind, and as no 
 
Russell.] REFORM OF PARLIAMENT. 181 
 
 tribe has ever yet been discovered so brutish as to be 
 without some government, and yet so enlightened as 
 to establish a government by common consent, it is 
 surely unnecessary to employ any serious argument in 
 the confutation of a doctrine inconsistent with reason, 
 and wholly unsupported by experience." * 
 
 He refers in a note to the fact that this argument 
 is as old as Aristotle " who, in the Introduction to the 
 First Book of his ' Politics/ demonstrated the neces- 
 sity of political society to the well-being, and indeed 
 the very existence of man" (see above, pp. 1 5), and 
 that "the same scheme of philosophy is admirably 
 pursued by Polybius, in the short but invaluable 
 fragment of the Sixth Book of his History." (See 
 above, p. 82.) 
 
 EAEL KUSSELL. | JOHN STUAKT MILL. 
 
 The principles thus shown to have recommended 
 themselves to the highest reason of many successive 
 generations were taken as the basis of the great mea- 
 sures for the Reform of Parliament in 1832 and 1867. 
 
 The time is approaching when another change in 
 the same direction will be made, by the extension of 
 the borough franchise to the counties. 
 
 * Mackintosh's Discourse on the Law of Nature and Nations 
 London, 1800, pp. 4(5, 47. 
 
182 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Russell. 
 
 The problem will then be, how to make this great 
 addition to the voting power of the country without 
 disturbing the relative position of the respective mem- 
 bers of the body politic. 
 
 The mode of solving this problem namely, by the 
 representation of minorities was submitted to par- 
 liament by Lord John Russell, in his Bill for the 
 Amendment of the Representation, in 1854, in the 
 following words : 
 
 (( Very great advantage would be derived from a 
 change which has been advocated in writing and in 
 pamphlets, and which was suggested by my noble 
 friend, Lord Grey, in a public document, emanating 
 from a Committee of the Privy Council; namely, 
 that a representation should be given to the minority. 
 Sometimes, in the larger counties and cities, 2,000, 
 3,000, or 4,000 voters who voted for an unsuccessful 
 candidate experience great soreness and irritation at 
 their perpetual exclusion from the representation. 
 The more you have your representation confined to 
 large populations, the more you ought to take care 
 
 that there should be some kind of balance 
 
 When there is a large body excluded it cannot be said 
 that the community is fairly represented." (Hansard,. 
 Vol. 130, p. 496, Feb. 13th, 1854.)* 
 
 In his work on the English Constitution and 
 
 * One of the pamphlets referred to was doubtless that by Mr. James 
 Garth Marshall, on Minorities and Majorities ; their relative Rights. 
 A Letter to Lord John Russell. London, 1853. 
 
Russell.] EXTENSION OF THE FRANCHISE. 
 
 Government, in 1865, Lord John Russell, then be- 
 come Earl Russell, sets forth the principle more fully. 
 Arguing against the vague fears, that by a large 
 extension of the suffrage the working classes would 
 by their numbers swallow up all other classes, Earl 
 Russell gives it as his opinion that " this apprehension 
 may be removed by a judicious modification of the 
 proposed suffrage, and by a happy sense on the part 
 of the public, that an addition of the votes of the most 
 intelligent of the working classes to the constituent 
 body will form a security and not a danger." (Page 4.) 
 And while objecting to the suggestions for giving a 
 plurality of votes to property, and to Mr. Thomas 
 Hare's peculiar scheme for securing the representa- 
 tion of minorities, by allowing voters in any part of 
 the kingdom to vote for particular candidates, as con- 
 trivances altogether unknown to our habits, Earl Russell 
 proceeds to say, that " If there were to be any devia- 
 tion from our customary habits and rooted ideas on 
 the subject of representation, I should like to see 
 such a change as I once proposed, in order to obtain 
 representation of the minority in large and populous 
 counties and towns. If, when three members are to 
 be chosen, an elector were allowed to give two votes to 
 one candidate, we might have a Liberal county gentle- 
 man sitting for Buckinghamshire, and a Conservative 
 manufacturer for Manchester. The local majority 
 would have two to one in the House of Commons, and 
 the minority would not feel itself disfranchised and 
 degraded. Yet even this change would be difficult 
 
184 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
 to introduce, and would perhaps be unpalatable in its 
 first working." (Ibid., p. 4.)* 
 
 Mr. John Stuart Mill, in 1861, expressed his 
 approval of the same idea in his Considerations on 
 Representative Government, p. 138. " Lord John 
 Russell, in one of his reform bills, introduced a pro- 
 vision that certain constituencies should return three 
 members, and that in these each elector should be 
 allowed to vote only for two. Thus a minority equal 
 to or exceeding a third would be able to return one 
 member." And in pp. 131 148 he gives his reasons 
 for that approval. 
 
 " The dangers that beset a representative democracy 
 are," he says, "two; 1st, a low grade of intelligence 
 in the representative body, and 2nd, class legislation 
 by the numerical majority. . . By our present 
 representative system the electors who are on a dif- 
 ferent side from the local majority are unrepresented. 
 . . . This virtual blotting out of the minority is no 
 necessary or natural consequence of freedom, although 
 until recently it was thought to be so by all the friends 
 of freedom. It is diametrically opposed to the first 
 principles of democracy representation in proportion 
 to numbers. It is an essential principle of democracy 
 that minorities should be adequately represented. No 
 real democracy, nothing but a false show of democracy 
 
 * The original proposal, that in constituencies returning three mem- 
 bers every elector should have only two votes, has been attributed to 
 Mr. Winthrop Mackworth Praed, M.P., in 1831. (Hansard, Vol. 188, 
 p. 1075.) 
 
Mill.] REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES. 185 
 
 is possible without it." . . . "The tendency of 
 representative government is towards collective 
 mediocrity. This tendency is increased by every 
 reduction and extension of the franchise. The voice 
 of the instructed minority may have no organs at all- 
 in the representative body. . . . The conflict of 
 opinion is necessary to healthy existence ; the absence 
 of it would produce stagnation and decay." (Page 148.) 
 . . " The representative system ought to be so con- 
 stituted as not to allow any of the various sectional 
 interests to be so powerful as to be capable of prevail- 
 ing against truth and justice, and the other sectional 
 interests combined." (Page 129.) 
 
 In his previous volume of Dissertations, Political, 
 Philosophical, and Historical (1859), Mill arguing 
 strongly against Bentham's political principles which 
 would, equally with Locke's, lead to "the despotism of 
 the opinion of the majority told by the head," and also, 
 as he has said of Locke's,* would prove that represen- 
 tative democracy was equally applicable for Bedouins 
 and Malays thus expressed himself (p. 379) : 
 
 " The numerical majority of any society whatever 
 must consist of persons all standing in the same social 
 position, and having in the main the same pursuits, 
 namely, unskilled manual labourers, and we mean no 
 disparagement to them ; whatever we say to their dis- 
 advantage we say equally to that of the numerical 
 majority of shopkeepers or of squires. Where there 
 
 * Considerations on Representative Government, p. 36. 
 
186 THE PKINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Marshall. 
 
 is identity of position and pursuits there also will 
 "be identity of partialities, passions, and prejudices ; 
 and to give to one set of partialities, passions, and pre- 
 judices absolute power, without counterbalance from 
 other partialities, passions, and prejudices of a different 
 sort, is the way to make those imperfections hopeless ; 
 to make one narrow, mean type of human nature 
 universal and perpetual ; and to crush the influence 
 which tends to the further improvement of man's in- 
 tellectual and moral nature." (Page 380.) 
 
 Mr. J. G. Marshall thus gives the results of his ex- 
 perience at page 25 of his pamphlet above mentioned : 
 
 " In many localities the minorities are habitually 
 swamped and voiceless ; numbers would show a very 
 respectable but a silenced minority. Indirect pallia- 
 tives of this mischief (such as, among others, the 
 virtual representation of those minorities elsewhere) 
 are not sufficient ; all would leave a great weight of 
 inequality and injustice. Minorities so swamped either 
 constantly labour under a sore feeling of injustice and 
 oppression, abandon all attempts at choice in exercis- 
 ing their political rights, or resort to fraudulent means 
 and corruption. The majority have a monopoly of 
 power, and being without wholesome restraint become 
 tyrannical and bigoted. Can it be seriously argued 
 that to balance one great mischief against another is 
 as wise and safe a mode of proceeding as to endeavour 
 to avoid both ? " 
 
 The same view is taken by the writer of an article 
 in the Edinburgh Eevieio on the Representation of 
 
Lewia.] REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES. 187 
 
 Minorities (July, 1854), who adopts the opinion that 
 "the minority in every large county and borough 
 should have a fair share in the representation ; that a 
 national assembly should be a reflex as much as it 
 can be rendered of the nation itself ; and that all such 
 elections should be so conducted that every voter 
 should be put into a position to exercise an intelligent 
 choice. The principle of providing for a representa- 
 tion of the minority is one which will one day be seen 
 to be indispensable to any system of real representa- 
 tion. If the House of Commons is to be the main- 
 spring of our government, and to retain its political 
 and moral ascendancy, it ought to contain in its ranks 
 the leading men of all opinions. We should regard it 
 as a misfortune if able and fair men belonging to 
 all parties in the state were not present at its 
 discussions." 
 
 Sir Gr. Cornewall Lewis, in his Dialogue on the 
 Best Form of Government (1863), while acknow- 
 ledging that the decision of the majority is necessary 
 for the purpose of government ; that on the whole it 
 had worked well ; and that in this country the 
 dominant majorities are accustomed to abstain from 
 the extreme use of their superior power ; nevertheless 
 grounded his approval on the fact of the existence in 
 his time of small constituencies through which " the 
 interests and arguments of minorities had found a 
 voice." " By a proper application," he says, " of the 
 method of local representation, and by the forma- 
 tion of limited constituencies, the representation of 
 
188 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Bagehot. 
 
 minorities can be legitimately accomplished." It is 
 obvious, therefore, that in proportion as limited con- 
 stituencies disappear, a fair field must be provided for 
 the exposition of the interests and arguments of 
 minorities, by means of a new and effectual method of 
 local representation. 
 
 To the same effect also was the opinion of the late 
 Mr. Walter Bagehot, than whom no modern political 
 writer was entitled to higher respect. At page 345 
 of his work On the English Constitution (London, 
 1867), he quotes from a pamphlet written by himself 
 in 1859 as follows : 
 
 " We would give each of the great cities with low suffrage 
 three members, and allow all the voters to give their votes to 
 one member. This would give the rich and cultivated one 
 member at least ; for they would always be a large minority, 
 and any minority greater than a fourth is by this plan sure of a 
 seat." 
 
 The principle thus advocated by Mr. Bagehot was 
 proposed in a different form by Mr. Lowe during the 
 discussions on the Reform of the Representation in 
 1867. On the 4th July of that year Mr. Lowe moved 
 that " Where there are more than two members, and 
 more than one seat is vacant, every voter shall be 
 entitled to a number of votes equal to the number of 
 vacant seats, and may give all such votes to one can- 
 didate, or may distribute them among the candidates 
 as he may think fit." (Hansard, Vol. 188, p. 1038.) 
 But this proposition of the " cumulative vote " was 
 strongly opposed, more especially as it was to be 
 applied to the whole kingdom, and therefore went 
 
Cairns.] REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES. 189 
 
 further than the alleged need ; and it was negatived 
 by a majority of 141. 
 
 But when the bill reached the House of Lords the 
 more moderate remedy to which public attention 
 had, during so many years, been called by Earl Russell 
 and Mr. Mill and other authorities by which, in a 
 definite number of constituencies having three mem- 
 bers, each elector should be allowed to vote for two 
 only, was proposed as an amendment by Earl Cairns, 
 strongly supported by Earl Russell; and notwith- 
 standing the opposition of the Conservative ministry 
 was, by a union of Liberal and Conservative votes, 
 added to the bill ; the numbers voting being Contents 
 142, Non-contents 51 ; majority 91. 
 
 When brought down to the House of Commons, this 
 amendment was warmly contested by some of the 
 leading members of the Liberal party and by the 
 government, but was carried by a similar non-party 
 vote ; the numbers for its rejection being Ayes 204,. 
 Noes 253; majority for accepting it, 49. 
 
 The discussion in both Houses on Earl Cairns* 
 amendment is, I believe, fairly represented by the 
 following summary. 
 
 Against it the arguments were that 
 
 The large boroughs are great centres of political life ; their 
 majorities lead the political opinion of the country. 
 
 The fair weight they are entitled to would be diminished by 
 giving a representative to the minority. 
 
 The principle is new ; it recognises numbers instead of com- 
 munities, and points to electoral districts. 
 
 Communities have hitherto been considered an integral part 
 of the constitution. 
 
190 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Cairns. 
 
 The practice of the constitution has always been that the 
 majority of voices has elected the members. 
 
 To enable a minority to elect a representative would impair 
 the influence of the constituent body looked upon as a whole. 
 
 The minority vote would neutralize one of the majority ; 
 thus taking away half of its voting power in the House of 
 Commons. 
 
 To give a vote to the minority would be to deaden political 
 life in the constituencies. 
 
 By preventing contests the constituencies would lose all the 
 instruction that contests afford. 
 
 The members elected by the majority are bound to look to 
 the welfare and interests of the whole. 
 
 The minority would seek the means of being represented in 
 other quarters. 
 
 There would be injustice in the limited and partial application 
 of the principle. 
 
 It would also be rendered illusory at every bye election, when 
 the majority would resume their power. 
 
 So many bye elections occur during each long parliament, 
 that the action of the minority vote might affect the power of 
 a party, while there was no change of opinion in the country 
 generally. 
 
 The member for a minority would be a delegate. 
 
 There had been no sufficient time given for the discussion of 
 this new principle. 
 
 In favour of Earl Cairns' amendment the argu- 
 ments were that 
 
 If the numbers of the majorities in the great constituencies 
 are so large as to tell with great weight, the minorities are also 
 large, and are entitled to a distinct voice. 
 
 The majorities claim now more than their fair weight, as on 
 many great subjects, local and general, they do not speak the 
 opinions of a large minority. 
 
 Any plan for the representation of minorities must operate 
 in a very great degree to diminish and control the tyranny of 
 majorities. 
 
 The principle, undoubtedly, is new, but so also is the great 
 extension given to the franchise. Innovations are familiar to 
 the constitution. One innovation makes another needful, to 
 counteract it. 
 
 * " The greatest innovation that could be introduced into the Con- 
 stitution of England would be a vote that there could be no innovation 
 
Cairns.] REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES. 191 
 
 Although to grant representation to a minority is a " homage 
 to numbers," it is not more so than the giving a third member 
 to large constituencies. 
 
 It is a fallacy to consider the constituency and the majority 
 of the constituency the same thing. 
 
 The majority of a large constituency cannot be adequately 
 represented by a prominent member of it being returned for a 
 small constituency elsewhere. Such a member could not speak 
 with the same authority on subjects affecting his own locality. 
 The minority is not less local because it is a minority, f 
 
 With the extension of the franchise the number of small 
 constituencies must be reduced. Many more small boroughs 
 must be grouped together. More large constituencies must be 
 formed. 
 
 This must lead to uniformity of representation, and con- 
 sequently to the loss of the mediating element which is now 
 derived from the members not sent by either of the two great 
 classes of the people those of the county and the towns. 
 
 The minority vote would provide the variety required. If 
 introduced in constituencies returning three members, the vote 
 of the majority of those constituencies in the House of Com- 
 mons would be still two to one. 
 
 It would foster political feeling among the minority, and to 
 some extent supply the place of the small boroughs. It would 
 not put an end to, but encourage contests, and the instruction 
 they afford. 
 
 in it. The greatest beauty of the constitution was, that in its very 
 principle it admitted of perpetual improvements which time and circum- 
 stances rendered necessary. It was a constitution, the chief excellence 
 of which was that it admitted of perpetual reform." Speeches of the 
 Eight Hon. Charles James Fox. London, 1815, Vol. iv, p. 410. 
 
 * Burke recognises " local residence " as giving as full a title to 
 united political action as " corporate capacity," and attributes to the 
 petitions to parliament of a resident body an exceptional claim to be 
 heard. (Vol. iii of Works, Edit. 1855, p. 499.) The principle applies 
 to the claim of a large minority of residents to be directly heard by 
 their representative. 
 
 t Burke was of opinion that virtual representation, in which he 
 recognised^a certain value, could not to any great extent supply the 
 place of direct. " Virtual representation," he says, " is that in which 
 there is a communion of interests, and a sympathy in feelings and 
 desires, between those who act in the name of any description of 
 people, and the people in whose name they act." . . . . " But 
 this sort of virtual representation cannot have a long or sure existence, 
 if it has not a substratum in the actual. The member must have some 
 relation to the constituent." (Vol. iii, pp. 3JJ4, 335.) When representing 
 one place, a member cannot be said to be acting in the name of another. 
 
192 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Courtney. 
 
 In constituencies where one party holds irresistible sway the 
 minority become apathetic, and political life is extinguished. 
 The intelligence and property of the minority may feel itself 
 misrepresented on many great subjects, yet without redress. 
 
 If there was a fair representation of minorities in a certain 
 number of the large constituencies, a further extension of the 
 franchise might be made with safety. 
 
 If we follow democratic countries in widely extending the 
 suffrage, we should avoid their error of excluding the cultivated 
 classes. 
 
 " The art of representation, like other arts, is progressive. 
 The representation of minorities is an advance in the science of 
 government." 
 
 If the arguments in favour of granting representa- 
 tion to the minority, in a limited number of large 
 constituencies in counties and in towns, prevailed in 
 the discussions on the Eeform of the Representation 
 in 1867, by a non-party vote in both Houses of Par- 
 liament, they may be expected to tell with even 
 greater force in the deliberations that will before long 
 occupy the public mind on the subject of extending 
 the borough franchise to the counties. 
 
 This subject was again brought before the public in 
 1879. In the number of the Nineteenth Century for 
 August in that year it was fully discussed by Mr. 
 Leonard Courtney, M.P., late Under-Secretary of 
 State for the. Home Department, now Under-Secre- 
 tary of State for the Colonies. Mr. Courtney argues 
 that the present system of the representation of 
 majorities acts unjustly to the constituencies and to 
 the detriment of the representative body. He affirms 
 that if the principle of the representation also of the 
 minorities were adopted in large constituencies, this 
 important result would be assured namely, "the 
 
Burke.] REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES. 193 
 
 security that in the body elected there will be an 
 accurate reflection of the persons who elected them." 
 Under the present system the large body composing 
 the minority in such constituencies has no living 
 connection with the governing body of the country. 
 It has no certainty that its interests will not be over- 
 looked. " No party can be trusted to do justice to an 
 excluded party. No one possesses the intelligence 
 and imagination necessary before he can put himself 
 in the position of another, so as to understand what 
 the other wants." . . . . " There is no connection 
 between the excluded minority and the ruling majo- 
 rity. If men obtain no share in the representation 
 which constitutes the authority of a country, their 
 political energies die away and disappear." On the 
 other hand, if the large minorities were duly repre- 
 sented, "there would be a Chamber of larger informa- 
 tion, of broader sympathies, and of wider aim than any 
 we can now possess." Mr. Courtney adds, " We are 
 so accustomed to the system we have, that we call it 
 natural, although it is in the highest degree artificial ; 
 and we are disposed to reject as artificial what is in 
 truth most simple and natural." (Pages 144 152.) 
 
 Burke has thus expressed the same principle. " We 
 are so little affected by things that are habitual, that 
 we consider the idea of the decision of the majority as 
 if it were a law of our original nature. But such con- 
 structive whole, residing in a part only, is one of the 
 most violent fictions of positive law that ever has 
 been or can be made on the principles of artificial 
 
 o 
 
194 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Courtney. 
 
 incorporation. Out of civil society, nature knows no- 
 thing of it ; nor are men, even when arranged accord- 
 ing to civil order, otherwise than by very long training, 
 brought to submit to it at all. The mind is brought 
 far more easily to acquiesce in the proceedings of one 
 man."* 
 
 The principle of "electoral districts," each con- 
 taining an approximately equal number of electors, 
 and each district returning one member, which has 
 been adopted in some countries, is shown by Mr. 
 Courtney to be still more liable to lead to the total 
 exclusion of the minority, and he illustrates what 
 might take place frequently under that system by 
 what actually occurred in Lancashire and in Bir- 
 mingham. " In Lancashire, in 1868, there were 22 
 Conservative members elected against 11 Liberals ; 
 and yet, while 104,000 votes were given for Liberal 
 members, only 102,000 votes were given to the Con- 
 servatives." In this case the distribution of voters 
 favoured the Conservative minority, and gave them 
 twice the number of members obtained by the Libe- 
 rals. From the opposite point of view also, had Lan- 
 cashire been formed into one great district, the large 
 minority of 102,000 voters would have been without a 
 representative. In Birmingham, on the other hand, 
 in the election for the town council, the Liberals 
 being a majority in each ward into which the town is 
 divided, all the members of the town council in the 
 
 * Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, 1791, p. 82. 
 
Courtney.] REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES. 195 
 
 year in which Mr. Courtney wrote (1879) were, 
 with one doubtful exception, Liberals. In such cases, 
 Mr. Courtney says, "We run the risk of injustice being 
 ignorantly done to the unrepresented ; we condemn 
 to atrophy and extinction the political energies of the 
 minority ; we throw away the use of such practical 
 talents as they may possess, and, after all, we cannot 
 be sure that we obtain, upon a division of opinion in 
 the town council, a reflex of the division of opinion 
 among the electorate on the same question." (Pages 
 146148.)* 
 
 * In connection with this subject, it has been noticed that the neces- 
 sity of obliging members undertaking high office to undergo re-election 
 will call for reconsideration. 
 
 In the Reform Bill, 1854, which was ultimately withdrawn, Lord 
 John Russell introduced a clause proposing that the Statute of the 6th 
 Anne (c. 7, s. 26) requiring that if any person, being chosen member 
 of the House of Commons, shall accept an office of profit from the 
 crown, his election shall be void, but that he should be capable of re- 
 election should be repealed, and that the acceptance of office under the 
 crown should be allowed without re-election, as in the reign of 
 William III. (Hansard, Vol. 130, p. 496.) 
 
 On the 2nd of August, 1SG7, Earl Grey proposed in the House of 
 Lords, as an amendment to the bill of that year, for the further 
 amending the Representation of the People, " That no member of the 
 House of Commons should vacate his seat by the acceptance of an 
 office which does not disqualify him from sitting in Parliament if 
 re-elected." It was argued that the present practice limited the choice 
 of men to fill high offices; that it was essential that there should be no 
 check upon the power of the crown to fill the high offices of State; 
 that the practice Avas inconsistent, as it did not apply to the important 
 offices of secretaries of the Treasury and Admiralty, or to the under- 
 secretaries of the Home Office, the Colonies, or the India Office, and 
 that there was no longer any fear of the undue influence of the crown, 
 which gave rise to the enactment of the 6th Anne. (Hansard, Vol. 189, 
 p. 793.) 
 
 The proposition was accepted in a modified form, by the 52nd 
 Clause of the Act of 1867, which enacts that members already in office, 
 accepting other offices, shall not vacate their seats. 
 
 The former jealousy of the powers of the crown in reference to 
 appointments to office having ceased to exist, the probability that the 
 
 02 
 
196 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Mill & 
 
 Some authorities have thought that the representa- 
 tion might be improved by two other methods; the first, 
 by adding to the localities having only one member ; 
 the second, by dividing constituencies into wards, 
 one or two of which would presumably consist of the 
 upper classes, and the rest chiefly of the manual 
 labour class. Both plans are open to grave objection. 
 Under the first, the tendency would be to condemn 
 one party to a perpetual minority ; the second would 
 encourage the separation of classes, and the represen- 
 tation of class interests, while affording to minorities 
 no better opportunity of obtaining a voice in the 
 legislature. 
 
 On the great principles of government, as applicable 
 to this kingdom, John Stuart Mill and Earl Russell 
 are also at one. The opinions of each may be thus 
 summarised. 
 
 In his Considerations on Representative Govern- 
 ment (1861, pp. 11 152), Mill insists, that to inquire 
 into the best mode of government in the abstract (as 
 it is called) is not a chimerical, but a highly practical 
 employment of scientific intelligence. And to deter- 
 mine what kind of government is suited to this or 
 
 interests of a constituency would suffer by its member accepting office 
 being very small, and the embarrassment to public businesss arising 
 from the present practice being often very great, it will doubtless be 
 found expedient to review this question in connection with that of any 
 further adoption of the minority seats in the larger constituencies. 
 Where these minority seats are created, one of their principal objects 
 the stability of the seat would be frustrated if, immediately after a 
 general election involving a change of government, the holder of one 
 of those seats should, on accepting office, be sent back to the con- 
 stituent body, with the certainty of being rejected by the majority. 
 
Russell.] REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES. 197 
 
 that state of society, we must borrow from political 
 philosophy its general principles. 
 
 He then passes in review the Italian republics, the 
 free towns of Flanders and of Germany, the French 
 democracy, the United States, and the States of South 
 America, and compares their modes of government 
 and their results with our own, taking his illustra- 
 tions and enforcing his arguments equally from the 
 examples of Greek history and from the practices he 
 had observed in his own day in Marylebone, Finsbury, 
 and Lambeth ; thus manifesting his assent to the 
 maxim, that the actions and passions of men under 
 similar circumstances, whether on a large or a small 
 scale, have been, and will continue to be, alike in all 
 ages. 
 
 Acknowledging his preference for the mixed form 
 of government, to which a certain balance of power 
 is necessary, he observes that " that there is almost 
 always a balance, but the scales never hang exactly 
 even" (p. 87). But if one of the three pOAvers should 
 in this country threaten to overbear the others, it 
 may be expected that the latter will unite to prevent 
 it. The positive political morality of the country is the 
 safeguard against allowing one of the three forces to 
 dominate over the others." It is the business of the 
 statesman to devise the means by which this result 
 may be secured. 
 
 But instead of aiming at ascendancy, " A demo- 
 cracy," in Mill's opinion, " has enough to do in pro- 
 viding itself with an amount of mental competency 
 
198 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. fltilL 
 
 sufficient for its own proper work, that of superin- 
 tendence and check." (Ibid.) 
 
 How is it to obtain this ? It depends, he says, on 
 the proper constitution of the representative body. 
 " In proportion as in its composition it fails to secure 
 this amount of mental competency, it will endeavour 
 to encroach on the province of the executive ; . . . . 
 it will countenance or impose a selfish, a capricious, 
 an impetuous, or a short-sighted, ignorant, and preju- 
 diced general policy, foreign and domestic." . . "The 
 universal tradition, grounded on universal experience, 
 is of the liability of men to be corrupted by power." 
 
 It should be the aim of a democracy " to get 
 leaders of a higher grade of intelligence than them- 
 selves." Under the influence of " superior and guiding 
 minds," they may be proof against demagogic arti- 
 fices, which may aim at class ascendancy; and they 
 may, on the other hand, acquire a true public spirit, 
 in which is implied a disinterested regard for others, 
 for 'the idea of posterity, of their country, and of 
 mankind. A certain amount of conscience, of disin- 
 terested public spirit, may be fairly calculated upon 
 in the citizen of any community ripe for representative 
 government. This would be cultivated and enlarged 
 in proportion as public questions and the principles of 
 government became a more general object of serious 
 study. 
 
 In his volume of Dissertations and Discussions, 
 Political, Philosophical, and Historical" (1859), Mill 
 represents, with great fairness, the unsoundness of the 
 
Mill.] ON BENTHAM. 199 
 
 political reasoning by which Locke led the way to the 
 pure democracies of modern times, and Bentham lent 
 to them his additional authority. 
 
 In his Dissertations on Bentham in that volume 
 (p. 379), he powerfully controverts his political prin- 
 ciples, and gives an estimate of his merits and defects 
 as a thinker and writer, of which the following is a 
 brief reproduction. 
 
 Bentham's most important field of reform was that 
 of practical abuses, especially those of his own pro- 
 fession the law. All the great improvements both 
 in the science and practice of law which have been in 
 progress since his time are traceable to his influence. 
 
 His method of inquiry also the application of the 
 inductive philosophy to ethics, introduced into 
 morals and politics those habits of thought and modes 
 of investigation which are essential to the idea of 
 science. "It was not his opinions, but his method, 
 that constituted the value of what he did; a value 
 beyond ah 1 price, even if we should reject the whole, 
 as we unquestionably must a large part, of the opinions 
 themselves." ..." This method was a security 
 for accuracy, but not for comprehensiveness." . . . 
 " Bentham failed in deriving light from other minds. 
 He had neither internal experience nor external. The 
 quiet tenour of his life conspired to exclude him from 
 both. Other ages and nations were a blank to him 
 for the purpose of instruction." . . . "No one 
 probably, who, in a highly-instructed age, attempted 
 to give a rule to human conduct, set out with a more 
 
200 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Mill. 
 
 limited conception either of the agencies by which 
 human conduct is, or of those by which it should be 
 influenced." (Pages 332356.) 
 
 Man, as conceived by Bentham, is a being suscep- 
 tible of pleasure and pain. His impelling and restrain- 
 ing principles consist, according to him, only of self- 
 love and hatred. The world is considered by him as 
 a collection of persons pursuing each his separate 
 pleasure or interest; "each prevented from jostling the 
 other by the fear of the penalties of the law, or the 
 expectation of the pains or pleasures arising from the 
 favour or disfavour of his fellow-creatures or of the 
 Ruler of the Universe. There is an entire absence of 
 recognition of conscience as distinct from philanthropy, 
 or from affection to Grod or man, or from self-interest 
 in this world or the next." ..." The words rec- 
 titude, moral duty, self-respect, never occur ; honour, 
 love of beauty, or of power, or of order, are not recog- 
 nised as springs of action." (Pages 354, 355.) 
 
 A theory of government proceeding from a mind 
 constituted as was Bentham's was not likely to be 
 complete. Promulgated at a time of reaction against 
 the aristocratic governments of Modern Europe which 
 were founded on the entire sacrifice of the community 
 to the self-interest and ease of the few, his theory 
 found favour with the vast numbers whose sympathies 
 were excited on behalf of the sufferers by the abuses 
 of those governments. " Not content with enthroning 
 the majority as sovereign by means of universal suf- 
 frage, without king or House of Lords, he exhausted 
 
3IUL] OX BENTHAM. 201 
 
 all the resources of ingenuity in devising the means 
 of rivetting the yoke of public opinion closer and 
 closer round the necks of all public functionaries, 
 and excluding every possibility of the exercise of the 
 slightest or most temporary influence either of a 
 minority, or by the functionary's own notion of right." 
 . . . This was "to pass from one form of bad 
 government to another." (Pages 379 381.) 
 
 As a security for good government " it is necessary," 
 Mill says, " that the institutions of society should make 
 provision for keeping up, in some form or another, as 
 a corrective to partial views, and a shelter for freedom 
 of thought and individuality of character, a perpetual 
 and standing opposition to the will of the majority. 
 All countries which have been continuously progressive, 
 or been durably great, have been so because there has 
 been an organized opposition to the ruling powers, of 
 whatever kind that ruling power was." . . " Almost 
 all the greatest men who ever lived have formed part 
 of such an opposition." . . " A centre of resistance 
 is as necessary when the opinion of the majority is 
 sovereign, as w r hen the ruling power is a hierarchy 
 or an aristocracy."* . . . " Where no such point 
 (Tappui exists there the human race will inevitably de- 
 generate, and the question whether the United States, 
 for instance, will in time sink into another China (also 
 
 * Burke has said that " Difficulty is a severe instructor. He that 
 wrestles with us strengthens our nerves and sharpens our skill. Our 
 antagonist is our helper. This amicable conflict with difficulty obliges 
 us to an intimate acquaintance with our object, and compels us to con- 
 sider it in all its relations. It will not suffer us to be superficial." 
 (Works, Vol. ii, p. 437. Edit. 1856.) 
 
202 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [MilL 
 
 a most commercial and industrious nation), resolves 
 itself to us into the question, whether such a centre of 
 resistance will gradually evolve itself or not." (P. 380.) 
 
 " Surely," he adds, " when any power has been made 
 the strongest, enough has been done for it ; care is 
 thenceforward wanted rather to prevent that strongest 
 power from swallowing up all others. Whenever all 
 the forces of society act in one single direction, the 
 just claims of the individual human being are in 
 extreme peril. The power of the majority is salutary 
 so far as it is used defensively ; as its exercise is 
 tempered by respect for the personality of the indi- 
 vidual and deference to the superiority of cultivated 
 intelligence." . . . "If Bentham had employed 
 himself in pointing out the means by which institutions 
 fundamentally democratic might be best adapted to 
 the preservation and strengthening of these two senti- 
 ments, he would have done something more per- 
 manently valuable and more worthy of his great 
 intellect." (Page 381.) 
 
 " The bad part of Bentham's writings," in Mill's 
 opinion, "is his resolute denial of that which he does 
 not see. He thereby encouraged others to deny or 
 disparage all feelings and mental states of which they 
 have no consciousness themselves." . . . "A 
 thoughtful regard for previous thinkers, and for the 
 collective mind of the human race, is a necessary part 
 of the philosophical character. There he will find the 
 remainder of the truth of which he sees but hah ." 
 (Pages 356358.) 
 
De Tocqueville.] OMNIPOTENCE OF THE MAJORITY. 20S 
 
 The course of thought which suggested itself to 
 Mill, in 1859 and 1861, on the action of pure demo- 
 cracies, had already, in 1835, led De Tocqueville to 
 the same conclusions from his personal observations 
 in the United States. He calls attention, in his 
 chapter on the " Omnipotence of the Majority,"* to 
 the fact that " it is the individual States that really 
 direct American society," and that the change that 
 had begun in many of them, in the mode of electing 
 their representatives, and in electing them for very 
 short terms, had artificially added to the natural power 
 of the majority. The consequences had already begun 
 to develop themselves; the instability of legislation 
 had become very great, from the constant change of 
 representatives, and there was no country in the 
 world in which laws had such short duration. In 
 many of the States the independence of the judges 
 had been destroyed by their being elected by the 
 people, and for short periods, and the representatives 
 were so strictly tied down to certain instructions, as 
 to be converted into mere delegates. The changes 
 noted by De Tocqueville as having then begun, have 
 been since extended to the whole of the individual 
 States. I have therefore thought it desirable, as 
 already mentioned (p. 13^), to describe them in an 
 appendix,f setting forth their origin and tracing their 
 progress to the present time. 
 
 * De la Democratic en Amerique, par Alexis de Tocqueville. Paris.. 
 1835, Vol. iii, ch. 7. 
 t Appendix B. 
 
204 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [De Tocqueville. 
 
 De Tocqueville pronounced the consequences of 
 these great social and political changes to be " disas- 
 trous, and dangerous for the future." He asserted 
 that they put in peril true liberty, " by making one 
 social power supreme, with no obstacle to restrain 
 its steps and afford it time for consideration." He 
 remarked that it had already produced an injurious 
 effect on the national character. " When the Ameri- 
 can revolution broke out, a crowd of remarkable men 
 appeared in public life, and if the opinion of the day 
 had its influence on their minds, it did not tyrannise 
 over them. The celebrated men of that epoch, taking 
 their full part in the public movement, had, neverthe- 
 less, a grandeur of their own ; they spread their fame 
 over the nation, and did not borrow it from the posi- 
 tion in which the nation had placed them." .... 
 " The independence of thought which marks great 
 characters was becoming rare." .... The tyranny 
 of an absolute government strikes the body, but the 
 mind is beyond its reach. The tyranny of a majority 
 lets the body go free, but aims directly at the mind 
 ("va droit a Vainc"). " If ever liberty is lost in 
 America, the fault will be with the omnipotence of 
 the majority in driving the minority to despair, and 
 causing them to appeal to material force." Referring, 
 in confirmation of his conclusions, to a letter of Jeffer- 
 son's to Madison, De Tocqueville says : " I prefer to 
 cite Jefferson in preference to anyone else, because I 
 consider him the most powerful apostle that demo- 
 cracy has ever had." Jefferson said, in that letter 
 
BusselL] ON REPRESENTATION. 205 
 
 (15th August, 1789): " The executive power in our 
 government is not the only, it is not perhaps the prin- 
 cipal object of my solicitude. The tyranny of the 
 members of the legislatures is at this moment, and 
 will be for many years to come, the danger most to- 
 be feared. The tyranny of the executive power will 
 arrive in its turn, but after a more remote period." 
 
 EAKL KUSSELL ON KEPKESENTATIOK 
 
 Earl Russell, in his book on the English Consti 
 tution and Government (1865 1873), equally com- 
 bats the doctrines of Locke and Bentham, that 
 every man of sound mind and years of discretion has 
 an unalienable right to vote belonging to him, as a 
 member of a free country, thus including the whole 
 adult male population. This proposition takes no ac- 
 count of the end to be obtained. The purpose in view 
 is good government, the freedom and welfare of the 
 whole people within the state, and their security from 
 without. The problem is the best mode of attaining 
 this end. (( A representation that should produce 
 hasty, passionate, unjust, and ignorant decisions, could 
 not conduce to the welfare of the people, which is the 
 supreme law." 
 
 " If it is said" (as it is by Locke) "that no part 
 of the property of the people ought to be levied in 
 
206 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Russell. 
 
 taxes by the Government, without the consent ex- 
 pressed or implied of the whole community, it might 
 be answered that a man's life and liberty are as 
 valuable to him as his property, yet no one contends 
 that the judicial body, and the jury in criminal cases, 
 should be elected by universal suffrage." 
 
 But the suffrage being a means to an end, and that 
 end being the freedom and welfare of the whole com- 
 munity, it becomes a matter of expediency on whom 
 it should be conferred. " The mighty power of select- 
 ing the House of Commons should be entrusted to a 
 portion of the community, qualified by honesty and 
 intelligence." ..." The suffrage should be attain- 
 able by industry and thrift, like the old forty-shilling 
 freehold, or the payment of scot and lot in the 
 boroughs. That is quite as philosophical a basis of 
 representation as the metaphysical categories of 
 modern times." (Page 224.) 
 
 Earl Russell points out that the old franchises of the 
 forty-shilling freeholders, and the payment of scot and 
 lot in boroughs, implied the following qualifications: 
 1st. The possession of an average amount of intelli- 
 gence. 2nd. A security for the stability of property. 
 3rd. A probable exemption from the taint of corrup- 
 tion. 4th. A condition of life which identified the 
 ~Toter with the general sense of the community in 
 short, with the public opinion of his time. 
 
 In addition to the qualification of the voter there is 
 necessary, to attain the end in view, a proper distri- 
 bution of seats. Otherwise, " in large cities population 
 
Kussell.] ON REPRESENTATION. 207 
 
 would outweigh property, and in large counties, pro- 
 perty would outweigh population." It has been 
 already shown how Earl Kussell proposed to pro- 
 vide for this necessity, partly by grouping together 
 some of the smaller boroughs, partly by securing in 
 large constituencies the representation of minorities, 
 and that with the impending further extension of 
 the franchise and grouping of boroughs, the repre- 
 sentation of minorities, partially introduced in 1867, 
 will require also to be considerably extended. It will 
 be by this alone that it will be possible, in large con- 
 stituencies, to preserve the balance between population 
 and property, and to insure that the representative 
 body on the whole should present " a true image of 
 the property and experience, the knowledge, and the 
 wisdom of England." 
 
 Whatever may be the expectations of the advo- 
 cates of pure democracy, Earl Kussell felt it "hard 
 to believe, in this age of the world, that there are 
 any models of government still untried, promising 
 a cup of felicity and of freedom which England has 
 not tasted." ..." The limit," he says, " appears 
 to me to have been rightly laid down by the first 
 Earl Grey. That which tends to increase the secu- 
 rity of the prerogatives of the crown, the authority 
 of both houses of parliament, and the rights and 
 liberties of the people, may well be accepted ; the 
 plan, which has other objects, and looks to a different 
 form of government, ought to be rejected." . . . 
 " Let it not be forgotten that the intolerance of a 
 
208 THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. [Creasy. 
 
 despotism and of a democracy are alike unknown in the 
 temperate zone of our ancient form of government." 
 
 To the same effect are the words of Sir Edward 
 Creasy, in his Rise and Progress of the English 
 Constitution (p. 398): 
 
 " Our constitution must from time to time require 
 remedial changes, and at present the anomalies of the 
 distribution of the suffrage, and the shameful cor- 
 ruption with which its exercise is too often accom- 
 panied, are pressing upon our statesmen's anxious 
 attention. He who has studied our constitution 
 most deeply, will venerate it the most, and while he 
 vigorously extirpates abuses, and steadily works out 
 its vital law of growth and development, he will 
 religiously guard its primary institutions from the 
 experiments of the conceited theorist, and the assaults 
 of the disloyal destroyer." 
 
 " Love thou thy land, with love far-brought 
 From out the storied Past, and used 
 Within the Present, but transfused 
 Thro' future time by power of thought." 
 ******* 
 " Make knowledge circle with the winds ; 
 But let her herald, Reverence, fly 
 Before her to whatever sky 
 Bear seed of men and growth of minds." 
 
 TENNYSON. 
 
 Postscript. Sir James Mackintosh, in his valuable 
 work, A Discourse on the Law of Nature and Nations, 
 adverts to the fact that " the fashion of depreciating 
 authority" and " attempting to philosophise without 
 regard to fact and experience the sole foundation of 
 
Mackintosh.] POSTSCRIPT. 209 
 
 all true philosophy" originated with the revolution- 
 ary writers of the French school. He intimates that 
 his own practice in the pursuit of truth was to follow 
 reason, supported by authority. It is " in the works 
 of the great historians and philosophers of ancient and 
 modern times" that he finds stated "the substance, 
 the object, and the result of all morals, and politics, 
 and law." He looks to them (as he tells us the great 
 master of the science of the law of nations Grotius 
 did before him) " as witnesses, whose conspiring 
 testimony, mightily strengthened and confirmed by 
 their discordance on almost every other subject, is 
 conclusive proof of the unanimity of the whole human 
 race on the great rules of duty and the fundamental 
 principles of morals." (( Even Virtue and 
 
 Wisdom themselves acquire," he says, " new majesty 
 in my eyes when 1 thus see all the great masters of 
 thinking and writing called together, as it were, from 
 all times and countries, to do them homage and to 
 appear in their train." (Pages 17, 20, 72.) 
 
211 
 
 APPENDIX A. 
 
 (REFERBED TO IN PAGE 171.) 
 
 M. DE TOCQUEVILLE 
 
 AND OTHER AUTHORITIES 
 
 ON THE 
 
 "OLD GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE AND THE 
 REVOLUTION." 
 
 THE two great countries whose governments are now 
 based on the principles of Locke and Rousseau 
 France and the United States cannot be said to 
 give proof of the superior results anticipated from 
 those principles. 
 
 With regard to France, her best friends lament the 
 instability that, for nearly a hundred years, has fol- 
 lowed the overthrow of all authority resting on the 
 ancient foundations. M. de Tocqueville has amply 
 proved* that it was reform, and not revolution, that 
 should have been resorted to for correcting the abuses 
 of the old government ; and that the way to substan- 
 tial and salutary reform was shown in the old repre- 
 sentative assemblies that still existed in five of the 
 
 * L'Ancien Regime et la Revolution. Par Alexis de Tocqueville. 
 Paris, 185G. 
 
 P 2 
 
212 M. DE TOCQUEVILLE AND OTHER AUTHORITIES 
 
 provinces and in some other small districts. Those 
 of Bretagne and Languedoc were in full vigour. The 
 assemblies were composed of representatives of the 
 clergy, the nobles, and the commonalty. That of 
 Languedoc (comprising 2,000,000 inhabitants) was 
 convoked annually ; had free liberty of speech; raised 
 all their own taxes, and a portion of those of the 
 state, in their own manner, and executed all their own 
 public works (p. 325). " With these examples before 
 them, the modern spirit might have penetrated peace- 
 ably into these old institutions, and modified all, 
 without destroying anything." (Page 340.) 
 
 The error committed in breaking entirely with the 
 past, instead of reforming on the basis of the existing 
 institutions and usages, has, M. de Tocqueville says, 
 inflicted upon France wounds from which she will 
 never recover. The error arose out of the political 
 condition of the country. The extinction of liberty 
 from the time when Eichelieu (1624 1642) broke 
 the power of the nobility and made France an abso- 
 lute monarchy; the consequent absence, during all 
 the succeeding generations, of a class of statesmen 
 trained in political affairs, and of organised parties 
 directing public opinion, left the Revolution, when it 
 did break out, to be guided by speculative writers, 
 according to abstract principles and general theories 
 which they had themselves conceived. Consequently, 
 instead of attacking separately bad laws, they waged 
 war against the whole, and destroyed the entire fabric 
 of the ancient society. (Pages 311323.) 
 
r/ 
 
 ((UNIVERSITY) 
 
 ON THE CAUSES OF THE FREN 
 
 . 
 
 The same view was taken by the late Sir George 
 Cornewall Lewis,* who, to his experience as a practical 
 statesman, added the highest qualities of a political 
 philosopher and writer. He pointed out that the 
 attacks of the French philosophers were chiefly directed 
 against the Church and Religion ; that it was the 
 Swiss Rousseau whose doctrines formed the political 
 creed of the Revolution, and that the true cause of the 
 Revolution was the badness of the old government, 
 and the absence of men capable of seeing through and 
 effectually opposing the shallow doctrines that brought 
 it about. " Voltaire, although an enemy of many of 
 the abuses of the Ancien Regime, was far from being 
 a democrat, a leveller, or a communist. The same 
 remark applies to most of the other French Philoso- 
 phers of the Regency and of the reign of Louis XV. 
 They had no intention of undermining and destroying 
 the government of the country. Voltaire reprobated 
 the old customary laws on account of their variety ; 
 he did not attack the general form of government. . 
 If the old institutions had been allowed to thaw 
 gradually . . . the world would have been saved 
 all the bloodshed and spoliation of the Revolution, and 
 the desolating wars of the Empire (p. 58) ; and " if the 
 French had not so effectually exterminated the old 
 aristocracy they would have incurred less danger of 
 falling under a single master." (Page 78. ) 
 
 * A Dialogue on the Best Form of Government. By the Right Honor- 
 able Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Bart., M.P. London, 1863, pp. 50 
 52, 78. 
 
214 
 
 M. DE TOCQUEVILLE AND OTHER AUTHORITIES 
 
 The inquiries of De Tocqueville and Sir Cornewall 
 Lewis confirmed the opinions which Burke had formed 
 by personal observation in France a few years previously 
 to the Revolution. 
 
 Writing in 1790, Bnrke said that he "was no 
 stranger to the faults and defects of the subverted 
 government of France ; " but it was " not true that it 
 was so incapable or undeserving of reform that it was 
 an absolute necessity that the whole fabric should be 
 at once pulled down, and the area cleared for the 
 erection of a theoretic, experimental edifice in its 
 place. All France was of a different opinion in the 
 beginning of the year 1789. The instructions to the 
 representatives to the States-General, from every 
 district in the kingdom, were filled with projects for 
 the reformation of that government, without the re- 
 motest suggestion of a design to destroy it." . 
 His inquiries and observations did not present to him 
 any incorrigible vices of the noblesse, or clergy, or 
 monarchy of France which could not be removed by a 
 reform very short of abolition." . . . " M. Necker 
 found that very moderate alterations in the incidence 
 of taxation would have restored the finances."* If 
 there had been the wisdom to recur to, and to improve 
 upon the model of their ancient provincial states, 
 " they had in them the example of those opposed and 
 conflicting interests which interpose a salutary check 
 to all precipitate resolutions which render deliberation 
 
 * Reflections on the Revolution in France, pp. 398410, 389. 
 
ON THE CAUSES OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 215 
 
 a matter not of choice but of necessity, and make all 
 change a subject of compromise, which naturally be- 
 gets moderation."* Unfortunately blind prejudices, 
 and the absence of ah 1 practical experience in states- 
 manship, the fruit of years of absolute government, 
 rendered a wise course of transition impossible. As a 
 consequence of these defects, and "by following the 
 false lights of presumptuous speculation, France bought 
 undisguised calamities at a higher price than any 
 nation has purchased the most unequivocal blessings, f 
 
 Very remarkable illustrations of the truth of these 
 several opinions have been disclosed within the last 
 few years by various works in France, founded on 
 hitherto unpublished documents from the archives of 
 the secret police and other similar sources. 
 
 The interesting volumes of M. Taine, on the Old 
 Regime, The Revolution, and the Jacobin Conquest, 
 throw many new and ghastly lights on that most 
 terrible of national tragedies, and fully unveil the 
 causes which have made sf Contemporary France " 
 what she is.f Commenting upon the political incapa- 
 city of the upper classes, the result of despotism and 
 its debasing accompaniments, M. Taine says (in his 
 second volume, p. 398) that the noblesse, abandoning 
 
 * Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 309. 
 
 t Ibid., p. 311. 
 
 J Les Origines de la France Contemporaine. Par H. Taine. 
 L'Ancien Regime, Second Edition, 8vo, 1876. La Revolution, Vol. i, 
 1878. La Conquete Jacobine, Vol. ii, Paris, 1881. The first two 
 vols. have been translated by Mr. J. Durand. in 3 vols., London, 1881. 
 See also a very comprehensive article upon the subject, in the number 
 of the Quarterly Review for January, 1882. 
 
216 M. DE TOCQUEVILLE AND OTHER AUTHORITIES 
 
 the public interests and themselves, surrendered at 
 the first summons ; and the spectacle was seen of an 
 immense population of subjects, without rights, sub- 
 mitting themselves to a small despotic oligarchy, that 
 constituted itself the sovereign people. The actual 
 number by which that oligarchy was supported in 
 Paris, was estimated at one time as low as between 
 4,000 and 6,000 men, and never higher than 10,000, 
 in a population of 700,000 ; and in all France they 
 were believed never to have exceeded one-tenth of 
 the whole body of electors. (Page 399.) The vast 
 majority, without organisation, without mutual respect 
 or confidence, oppressed by misplaced taxation, and 
 impoverished by the intolerable exactions of the old 
 feudal laws, with deeply-seated jealousies and hatreds 
 raging in their midst, were at the mercy of the 
 reckless few who erected themselves into guides and 
 governors, and believed themselves capable of solving, 
 without preparation or experience, immense and com- 
 plicated problems which men of the highest capacity 
 and of special acquirements approach with hesitation. 
 (Vol. ii, p. 28.) 
 
 It was over a people in the state of mental, moral, 
 material, and political depression above described, 
 that the spirit of the great intellectual revival of the 
 18th century came to move, and to stir it to its inmost 
 depths. No wonder that one of the manifestations of 
 that spirit an enthusiastic belief in the possible re- 
 generation of mankind on some new principle should 
 have been eagerly received into every heart. 
 
ON THE CAUSES OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 217 
 
 Let us recall to mind, from the most recent and most 
 fully-instructed authority on those subjects M. Taine 
 what that belief was, the results of which are so 
 amply set forth in his second and third volumes. He 
 thus expounds it in his volume on the Old Regime. 
 (Pages 289328.) 
 
 It was a belief in a totally new view of human 
 nature, promulgated by Rousseau; the reflex of the 
 extraordinary and discordant structure of his own 
 mind. The fundamental principle of his reasonings 
 is, in his own words, that man is a being naturally 
 good, loving justice and order. Remove from him 
 all the restraints that laws and customs have placed 
 upon him, and which have moulded him to 
 what he is depraved and miserable and his in- 
 stincts and his conscience will make him not only 
 virtuous, but happy (pp. 290293). Therefore, all 
 hitherto established institutions, moral, political, and 
 social property, family, church have had no foun- 
 dation either in reason or justice, and must be de- 
 stroyed.* The only useful and creditable occupations 
 
 * Rousseau's principle, that as all previous governments rested on 
 usurped authority they should be destroyed, however good they may 
 have been, however slight the prospect of replacing them by a better, 
 and however great the danger to the national well-being, should be 
 contrasted with that laid down by Burke, as alone justifying a revolu- 
 tion. The contrast cannot be better expressed than in the words of 
 Mr. John Morley, in his exhaustive work on Rousseau : " The greatest, 
 widest, and loftiest exposition of the bearings of expediency on govern- 
 ment and its conditions is to be found in the magnificent and immortal 
 writings of Burke ;" .... in whose view " the true opposite of 
 Rousseau's principle is, the right and duty of throwing off any govern- 
 ment which inflicts more disadvantages than it confers advantages." 
 (Rousseau, by John Morley. 2 Vols. Svo, Chapman & Hall, 1873. 
 Vol. ii, pp. 186, 187.) 
 
218 ROUSSEAU'S THEORIES 
 
 are those which supply the primitive wants of man- 
 kind. All that has been regarded as " the flower of 
 human life " literature, manners, elegance, luxury 
 all these, and the swarms that live upon them, are 
 parasites, and only exist to the detriment of the pri- 
 mitive equality which is the great heirloom of the 
 race. The first man who enclosed a piece of land by 
 his industry, and called it his own, was a criminal 
 against all the rest. What he presumes to call his 
 property, which no one had a right to concede to 
 him, was a theft ; for the earth and its fruits belong to 
 all (p. 297). AU the clauses of the " Social Contract" 
 reduce themselves to one; namely, the total aban- 
 donment of each individual, with all his rights, his 
 powers and his goods, to the commonalty. The state, 
 as regards its members, is master of all their goods by 
 the " Social Contract." The possessors are only con- 
 sidered the temporary holders of what belongs to the 
 public.* Instead of the physical and mental inequa- 
 lities which nature has made among men, the social 
 agreement substitutes a moral and legitimate equality, 
 so that, although unequal in power and genius, they 
 become equal by convention and right ("pouvant 
 etre inegaux en force et en genie, ils deviennent 
 egaux par convention et de droit ") ; and for the en- 
 joyment of this " moral and legitimate equality," the 
 equalisation of property must also be aimed at, so 
 that while all have something, no one must have too 
 
 * Du Contrat Social, ou Principes du Droit Politique. Par J. J. 
 Rousseau. Paris, 1790, Lir. i, ch. 6. 
 
OF HUMAN NATURE AND GOVERNMENT. 
 
 219 
 
 much (" d'ou il suit que 1'etat social n'est avantageux 
 aux hommes qu'autant qu'ils ont tous quelque chose, 
 et qu'aucun d'eux n'a rien de trop").* The present 
 fabric of political society had its origin in some early 
 and iniquitous contract between the powerful rich and 
 their feeble dupes The real social con- 
 tract was made by an assembly of men, all meeting 
 for the first time, without traditions, without obliga- 
 tions, without country, all born accomplished moralists 
 and politicians, all equal, and intending to preserve 
 their equality ; determined to settle a form of govern- 
 ment and elect a magistrate over them, yet to retain 
 their claim to be the sovereign people. (Taine, pp. 300 
 305.) In the name of the sovereignty of the people 
 they withdraw from the government all authority, all 
 prerogative, all stability, and all power. The people is 
 the sovereign, and the government but its clerk ; even 
 less, its domestic servant. The moment the people 
 give themselves representatives they are no longer 
 free. There must be no representatives ; there must 
 be delegates, who can determine nothing without the 
 leave of those who sent them ; who are deprived of all 
 independent thought and action (pp. 316, 317). An 
 absolutism is thus established, more complete than that 
 of a single despot. The state becomes everything, the 
 individual nothing. The state substitutes itself for 
 the individual in all its acts. Henceforward it is the 
 public will that governs ; that is, in theory, the 
 
 * Contrat Social. Liv. i, ch. 9, and Note. 
 
220 ROUSSEAU'S THEORIES 
 
 arbitrary and unchangeable decision of the majority 
 counted by the head, but in fact, the rigid arbitrary 
 will of the assembly, the faction, or the one man, the 
 master for the moment of the public power (p. 327). 
 
 M. Taine has devoted a hundred pages of his first 
 volume, to bringing again fully into view these 
 theories, as a matter of history, and to recalling and 
 amplifying the refutations of them which their first 
 promulgation called forth in an abundant stream 
 during the two succeeding generations. 
 
 The socialistic portion of those theories has exhibited 
 of late years the great power they have obtained over 
 the minds of the ill-instructed classes both in France 
 and Germany; accompanied and strengthened as they 
 have been by the writings of that numerous French 
 school which, drawing their inspirations from Hobbes, 
 denied that there was any other base of morality than 
 that of self-love ; asserted that pleasure and pain are 
 the only springs of moral action ; that it is as impossi- 
 ble to love the right for the sake of the right, as it is 
 to love the evil for the sake of the evil ; that to obtain 
 and to preserve happiness is the only instinct, the only 
 right, the only duty. Whatever you do for others is 
 done from the motive of calculated self-interest. 
 Virtue is therefore only long-sighted egotism. Man 
 has no other reason for doing good, than the fear of 
 some harm being done to himself.* 
 
 * Hobbes' Leviathan ; Helvetius de 1'Esprit, passim. The doctrines 
 of all the writers of these materialistic and atheistical schools are well 
 summed up by M. Taine, in his first volume, pp. 282301. 
 
OF HUMAN NATURE AND GOVERNMENT. 221 
 
 These new sources of promised happiness have pro- 
 duced, instead, fierce discontent. That feeling formed 
 a strong element in the insurrections in Germany in 
 1848 ; and socialistic doctrines are still baffling the 
 statesmanship of that country. In France in 1848, 
 those doctrines were for a time triumphant ; and in 
 1871, the French army, smarting from the failure to 
 defend Paris against the Germans, had to retake it, 
 after a protracted struggle, from the insurgent 
 socialists, whose hostility was chiefly directed against 
 the middle classes, and whose name will be for ever 
 stained by the murder, in cold blood, of the Arch- 
 bishop of Paris, and a large number of his helpless 
 attendants. 
 
 Nor is that fierce discontent likely to be allayed, as 
 long as the minds of large masses of men are penetrated 
 with the material, sceptical, or atheistical doctrines, 
 derived from the writers above referred to. In vain, 
 hitherto, has the despairing cry of a thoughtful 
 Frenchman, "Give us back our religion," (Rendez- 
 nous notre religion), been echoed and re-echoed by 
 many both in his own and other countries. 
 
 The political portion of those theories, wherever 
 adopted, is too attractive to a certain class of minds to 
 be easily brought to relax its hold. Its vitality is a 
 tribute to its power of affecting the imagination, and 
 ministering food to the " envious fever " of ill-directed 
 aspirations. The introduction of the Caucus among our- 
 selves is one of the latest lessons we are called upon 
 to learn from pure democracy. (See pp. 243-5, 250-3.) 
 
222 BURKE AND OTHER AUTHORITIES 
 
 Unsound as is the " Social Contract" as a theory, 
 it would be unjust not to recognise its effect in raising 
 Europe from the political torpor then almost universal. 
 It is thus spoken of by one whose sympathies are too 
 wide not to do Rousseau full justice. 
 
 "The ' Social Contract' is worked out precisely in 
 that fashion which, if it touches men at all, makes 
 them into fanatics. . . . It is dogma that gives 
 fervour to a sect. There are always large classes of 
 men to whom any theory in the shape of a vigorously 
 compact system is irresistibly fascinating, and to whom 
 the qualifications of a proposition, or a limitation of a 
 theoretic principle, is distressing or intolerable."' 
 The premises being assumed, Rousseau's conclusions 
 follow with irresistible logical precision; and the 
 premises are too tempting to be canvassed by those 
 whom passion or suffering indisposes to the scrutiny, 
 even if their intelligence made them capable of it. 
 The " Social Contract," therefore, was " the match 
 that kindled revolutionary fire in generous breasts 
 throughout Europe. It was the virile and patriotic 
 energy thus evoked that saved France from partition, 
 and European civilization from the crushing supremacy 
 of powers even more dark and retrograde than the 
 first French empire."! The abuses of those times 
 have everywhere given way to mild governments, and 
 to great and continuous efforts for the general good. 
 
 * Rousseau, by John Morley. Vol. ii, pp. 134, 135. 
 f Ibidem, pp. 188, 189. 
 
ON THE PURPOSES OF A NATURAL ARISTOCRACY. 
 
 223 
 
 But (through its interpreters in this and other 
 countries) the " Social Contract " is still, and will long 
 remain, a social and political peril. It would be well 
 that one maxim of Rousseau's should not be over- 
 looked, That the right of voting imposes the duty of 
 instruction in its exercise (Le droit 7^ d'y voter 
 suffit pour m'imposer le devoir de m'en instruire." 
 Contrat Social, Liv. i, c. 1). 
 
 The destruction of the aristocracy of France, to 
 which Sir Cornewall Lewis refers above (p. 213), had 
 drawn forth from Burke, in a brilliant passage, an 
 analysis of the mode of growth of a natural aristocracy, 
 of which the titled aristocracy is only a part, and 
 which is recruited from time to time from the profes- 
 sions and from commerce. He points out the place 
 which such a body holds in the social order. " It is 
 not a separate interest in the state, or separable from 
 it. It is an essential integrant part of any large body 
 rightly constituted." And men qualified in the manner 
 he describes, by education and experience, "form 
 in nature as she operates in the common modification 
 of society, the leading, guiding, and governing part ; " 
 the best able to protect the weak and the less 
 enlightened ; the most capable of resisting the strong 
 and the evil-disposed ; the most efficient guardians, 
 therefore, of public liberty ; " trained to take a large 
 view of the wide-spread and infinitely diversified 
 combinations of men and affairs in a large society," 
 and " habituated to the greatest degree of vigilance, 
 foresight, and circumspection, in a state of things in 
 
224 
 
 CONSEQUENCES TO FRANCE 
 
 which no fault is committed with impunity, and the 
 slightest mistake draws on the most ruinous conse- 
 quences." * 
 
 Of such an aristocracy, if it performs its duties and 
 is worthy of its name, De Tocqueville says, that " It 
 may be compared to a firm and enlightened man, 
 endowed with perennial life."f And "when great 
 multitudes act together, under that discipline of 
 nature," Burke recognises "the voice of the grand 
 chorus of national harmony," which he calls " THE 
 PEOPLE." (Vol. iii, p. 87.) 
 
 The leaders of the French Revolution repudiated 
 that " discipline of nature," and inspired the French 
 people with what has become their ruling passion 
 the love of equality ; not equality before the law only, 
 but personal and social equality ; a vain desire, pro- 
 ductive of unceasing jealousies and disappointments ; 
 for " those who attempt to level never equalize." .... 
 (( In all societies, consisting of various descriptions of 
 citizens, some description must be uppermost." The 
 attempt to bring all down to one level, and to keep 
 them there, is an attempt to pervert the natural order 
 of things, and is, therefore, the worst of usurpations." } 
 
 It was the republican Milton, the friend of Crom- 
 well, who did not hesitate to warn his generation 
 against that error. He wrote that, " If not equal all, 
 
 * Bnrke's Works, Vol. iii, pp. 8587. 
 
 f " Un corps aristocratique est un homme ferme et eclaire qui ne 
 meurt point." Vol. ii, ch. 5, ad finem. 
 J Burke, Vol. ii, p. 322, Edit. 1855. 
 
OF DESTROYING THE BALANCE OF SOCIETY. 225 
 
 yet free, Equally free ; for orders and degrees Jar not 
 with liberty, but well consist." * Shakespeare has also 
 said: " Take but degree away, untune that string, 
 And hark what discord follows."! The discord in 
 France, which has lasted for nearly a century, has 
 abated little of its violence. It is exhibited in the 
 instability which has given rise in that country to its 
 many changes ; from pure democracy and its excesses 
 to its natural result military despotism; from imper- 
 fect attempts at constitutional government to personal 
 rule ; and again, at this day, after disastrous foreign 
 and civil war, and the uninterrupted struggles of 
 irreconcileable parties, to the very lately imminent 
 danger of falling again under the domination of one 
 man. " Thirteen times," says M. Taine, " in eighty 
 years have we demolished one government to replace 
 it by another, and in vain, for we have not yet found 
 what suits us." . . . . " Woe to those, the funda- 
 mental principles of whose social life have been shaken, 
 and the equilibrium of whose political system has been 
 overthrown by rude and hasty innovations." (L'An- 
 cien Regime, pp. ii, v.) France has reason to regret 
 that the heedless violence of the Revolution, bearing 
 down the helpless incapacity of the upper classes, 
 
 * Paradise Lost, Book v. 
 
 t Troilus and Cressida, Act i, Scene 3. The passage thus proceeds : 
 
 " Then everything includes itself in power, 
 Power into will, will into appetite ; 
 And appetite, an universal wolf, 
 So doubly seconded by will and power, 
 Must make perforce an universal prey, 
 And, last, eat up himself." 
 
226 CONSEQUENCES TO FRANCE, ETC. 
 
 destroyed the opportunity of forming, out of the mate- 
 rials that then existed, a renovated natural aristocracy, 
 which might by degrees have acquired the wisdom 
 and the power to restore and to preserve the balance 
 of society. The arbitrary law, made general soon 
 after the Revolution, for the compulsory subdivision 
 of inheritances, forbids any such healthy growth and 
 revival. The tree no sooner overtops the under- 
 growth, than it is headed down to the common level. 
 
227 
 
 APPENDIX B. 
 
 (REFERRED TO IN PAGES 139 and 203.) 
 
 THE CHANGE, WITHIN THE LAST FIFTY 
 YEARS, OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE 
 INDIVIDUAL STATES OF THE AMERICAN 
 UNION TO PURE DEMOCRACIES, AND ITS 
 EFFECTS ON THE GENERAL GOVERN- 
 MENT. 
 
 IT is important to note, that the present pure demo- 
 cracy in the United States is of a growth many years 
 subsequent to the establishment of its constitution in 
 1787. 
 
 The great founders of the constitution, Wash- 
 ington, Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, interpreted 
 Locke's maxim that " Taxation and Representation 
 should go hand in hand " in a sense very different 
 from that which has been usually assigned to it by 
 the democratic schools of more recent times. By 
 those great and enlightened men it was held to mean 
 that Representation should have some relation to 
 property. It was thus not confined to " either per- 
 sons or property, numbers or wealth," but it was an 
 
 Q2 
 
228 CHANGE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 admixture of all.* Accordingly, during their gene- 
 ration, and for many years after, in all the States of 
 the Union, " a denned portion of real or personal 
 property was requisite for an elector, and a strong 
 aristocratic element pervaded the constitution as then 
 established." f 
 
 The first blow was struck at this principle by 
 President Thomas Jefferson, in 1809, by an attack 
 on the independence of the Judges of the Inferior 
 (i.e., the Circuit and District) Courts of the United 
 States ; the second, also by Jefferson, and by Pre- 
 sident Andrew Jackson in his inaugural address 
 for 1829, by promoting the principle of appointing 
 the Judges in the individual States for a term of 
 years. (Story, 1600 1627, and 1618.) The impulse 
 then given towards democratic changes soon exten- 
 ded to the representation; the effect being that Mr. 
 Justice Kent had to record, in 1844, " the almost 
 entire destruction of all the constitutional checks and 
 Conservative elements, which had been regarded by 
 the framers of the constitution as essential to genuine 
 liberty ; " and the constitution was reduced to a pure 
 democracy, based on the principles of Locke and the 
 French Revolution. 
 
 Mr. Justice Story, in protesting in his great work 
 against the theory of Locke, that there is such a 
 
 !i * Mr. Justice Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the 
 United States, 632. Boston, 1833. 
 
 t Mr. Justice Kent's Commentaries on the American Constitu- 
 tion, New York, 1844, p. 227 ; a work of equally high authority to that 
 of Story. 
 
TO PURE DEMOCRACY. 229 
 
 thing as an abstract right to vote, affirms that the 
 idea is traceable to the habit of using the word 
 " right " in a too general sense. The imperfection of 
 language leads to the use of the same word to express 
 " natural right "as to express a " civil right." The 
 latter is a mere creation of law for the time being. 
 He says, " The truth seems to be, that the right of 
 voting, like many other rights, is one which, whether 
 it has a fixed foundation in natural law or not, has 
 always been treated in the practice of nations as a 
 strictly civil right, derived from and regulated by 
 each society according to its own circumstances and 
 interests." ( 580.) 
 
 Story proceeds to show that every State in the 
 Union had, at its formation, acted on this principle. 
 "In the adoption of no state constitution was the 
 assent asked of any but the qualified voters ; and who 
 should be the qualified voters had been continually 
 settled and altered by themselves." (f From this," he 
 adds, " will be seen how little, even hi the most free 
 republican governments, any abstract right of suffrage, 
 or any original indefeasible privilege has been recog- 
 nised in practice." 
 
 The authors of the "Federalist," Mr. Madison, 
 Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Jay, the great expounders 
 of the principles on which the American Constitution 
 was based, had great misgivings as to whether it was 
 in the power of human wisdom at once to strike out a 
 
 * Story, 581. 
 
230 
 
 CHANGE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 political system which should combine the elements 
 of freedom and authority in the measure required 
 to satisfy the highest purposes of civil society. 
 They recognised that good political institutions had 
 hitherto been, " not a creation but a growth ; " that 
 "intellect, information, and integrity were essential 
 to carry them through their severe trials ; " and 
 they designated the doctrines of pure democracy as 
 " idle theories, which amuse with promises of exemp- 
 tion from the weaknesses and the evils incident to 
 society." ' Also the whole scope of the learned work 
 of John Adams (afterwards the second President of 
 the Republic) written in 1787, is to prove that no 
 system of constitutional government can be just or 
 desirable that does not guard against the over-pre- 
 dominance of any one of its elements.f In this he 
 followed the great writers of antiquity, who, to use the 
 words of Burke, " considered an absolute democracy, 
 no less than an absolute monarchy, as the corruption 
 and degeneracy of the sound constitution of a re- 
 public." t 
 
 Mr. Justice Story and Mr. Justice Kent give the 
 means of tracing historically the changes which the 
 constitutions of the individual States, and by con- 
 sequence that of the United States, have undergone 
 since the establishment of the latter in 1787. 
 
 * Federalist, No. 6. 
 
 f The Defence of the American Constitution. By John Adams. 
 London, 1794. 3 vols. 
 
 J Burke's Works, Vol. ii, p. 396. 
 
TO PURE DEMOCRACY. 
 
 231 
 
 Ten out of the original thirteen colonies received 
 their charters between the years 1619 and 1751. The 
 three others, New Plymouth (the Pilgrim Fathers, 
 1629), Rhode Island, and Connecticut, formed their 
 own constitutions. 
 
 The ten " chartered " colonies possessed, from the 
 period of their charters down to their separation from 
 this country by their Declaration of Independence in 
 1776, forms of government, all of which, with some 
 varieties of detail, bore as strict a resemblance to our 
 own as was possible under the circumstances of a new 
 country. They may all be described as moderate 
 constitutional governments. The governor was the 
 king's representative ; the crown also appointed a 
 council acting as a consultative body ; the judges were 
 appointed by the governor, and during good behaviour; 
 and the governor had the authority to convene a 
 general assembly of representatives of the freeholders 
 and planters. A defined portion of real or personal 
 property was required for an elector, varying generally 
 from a freehold of forty shillings to a rented tenement 
 of 30 or 40, or the payment of taxes. 
 
 The colonists were greatly attached to those insti- 
 tutions. Franklin is represented by Burke as express- 
 ing the general sense of his countrymen when he said 
 that " he lamented the separation which he feared was 
 inevitable between Great Britain and her colonies. 
 He spoke of it as an event which gave him the greatest 
 concern. America, he said, would never again see 
 such happy days as she had passed under the protection 
 
232 
 
 CHANGE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 of England. . . . The Americans were going to 
 lose " the rare and precious advantage " they had 
 derived from the good government they had ex- 
 perienced.* 
 
 The admixture of the monarchical, aristocratic, and 
 popular elements which those old institutions con- 
 tained, and the habits of mind produced by them in 
 their public men, exercised great influence, at the 
 time of the separation from us, in moulding the con- 
 stitution they adopted. 
 
 In the celebrated Declaration of Rights of 1774 it 
 was unanimously resolved : " That the respective Colo- 
 nies are entitled to the Common Law of England;" 
 .... and that their ancestors, at the time of their 
 emigration, were entitled (not to the "rights of man," 
 but) "to all the rights, liberties, and immunities of free 
 and natural-born subjects of the realm of England." 
 Also, in the Constitution of the United States, settled 
 in 1787, there is no trace of the theoretical doctrines of 
 Locke, then in vogue in France. The Preamble of 
 the Constitution is as follows: " We, the people of the 
 United States, in order to form a more perfect union, 
 establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide 
 for the common defence, promote general welfare, and 
 secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our 
 posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution 
 for the United States of America." Their avowed 
 object was "good government;" to be arrived at, 
 
 * Burke's Works, Vol. iii, p. 30. 
 
TO PURE DEMOCRACY. 233 
 
 not through the adoption of abstract theories, but by- 
 means hitherto recognised as leading to that end, and 
 which form the body of the enactments of their con- 
 stitution. 
 
 Nevertheless, in the early part of this century, 
 those abstract theories began to gain favour, and a 
 strong impulse, as above adverted to, was given to 
 them by President Jefferson (18011809), and in 
 1829, by President Jackson, according to the former 
 of whom, in despite of history and the words of the 
 Declaration of Rights of 1774, the colonists brought 
 with them the "rights of men" of "expatriated men." 
 
 From that date, the progress towards pure demo- 
 cracy has been constant and uniform in all the States. 
 All property qualifications for electors have been 
 abolished gradually throughout the Union, with ex- 
 ceptions too small to affect the general principle. 
 
 Between 1801 and 1805 seven States had adopted 
 that course, by altering their old constitutions, which 
 contained the same constitutional checks as the Con- 
 stitution of the United States. 
 
 Kent, in 1844, thus describes this progress : " All 
 the States that had been formed since 1800 had omit- 
 ted to require any property qualification in an elector, 
 except what may be implied in the requisition of having 
 paid a state or county tax ; and even that is not in 
 the constitutions more recently formed or amended, 
 except in the Rhode Island Constitution of 1843."* 
 
 * Kent's Commentaries, Vol. i, pp. 227229. 
 
234 
 
 CHANGE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 In a book of mine, on The Constitution of the 
 United States compared with our Own (Murray, 
 London, 1854), now out of print, but from which I 
 have taken the facts here used, I carried down the 
 information to that date ; the result being, that at 
 that time " the members of the House of Represen- 
 tatives in each individual State, and consequently also 
 the House of Representatives of the United States, 
 were returned by voters having, in twenty-two States, 
 no property qualification at all, and in nine next to 
 none ; the remaining two only having retained any 
 valid qualification." (Page 118.) 
 
 Pursuing the inquiry to a date as near to the pre- 
 sent time (1881) as the best source of information 
 available permits, I find from The American Ency- 
 clopedia, which gives the Constitutions of each State, 
 that the qualification for an elector in thirty-four out 
 of the thirty-eight States is now, as a rule, and with 
 very trifling variations, simply that he must be twenty- 
 one years of age, and must have resided a year in the 
 State, six months in the county, and from ten to 
 sixty days in the electoral district in which he votes. 
 Three States have kept up a semblance of a qualifi- 
 cation. In Pennsylvania, a voter, if twenty-two 
 years of age and upwards, must have paid a State or 
 county tax ; in Tennessee, he must have paid one 
 dollar a year as a " poll tax," and in Delaware, if 
 under twenty-one, he must, within two years previous 
 to the election, have paid a county tax. Rhode 
 Island demands something more ; requiring of a 
 
TO PURE DEMOCRACY. 235 
 
 naturalized citizen that he should have resided for a 
 year, and possess a freehold of 134 dollars, or pay a 
 rental of seven dollars ; permitting native-born citizens, 
 before two years' residence, to vote on the same quali- 
 fications ; but if they have resided two years in the 
 State, and six months in the electoral district, they 
 can vote if they have paid one dollar in taxes, or 
 served one day in the militia ; but no person can vote 
 for the imposition of a tax or the expenditure of 
 money, unless he has paid a rate on property valued 
 at 134 dollars. 
 
 In all the States the elections are either annual or 
 biennial. As a rule, the members of the State Senates 
 are elected for four years ; their House of Represen- 
 tatives, with very few exceptions, is elected annually. 
 As a rule also, the governor and all the executive 
 officers are elected for two years ; in some instances 
 for four years, and in a few for one year. 
 
 In Kent's time (1844), the evils which "universal 
 suffrage " and frequent elections had brought with 
 them were thus described : " All officers were elected ; 
 all offices were held for short periods ; sudden changes 
 were made in the legislation of the individual States, 
 brought about by the alternate succession of opposite 
 parties to power ; the independence of the judiciary 
 was destroyed by the practice of electing the judges 
 for short periods, instead of during good behaviour, 
 and by paying them illiberal salaries." (Kent, Vol. i, 
 page 450.) 
 
 In the principles of this system of government and 
 
236 DEMOCRATIC ABSOLUTISM DERIVED FROM 
 
 their results, are to be recognised the doctrines of 
 democratic absolutism inculcated in the seventeenth 
 century by Hobbes and Locke, and in the nineteenth 
 by Bentham, including especially the distrust of all 
 persons placed in authority, so earnestly encouraged 
 by the latter. According to Hobbes, " The only way 
 for a community to erect a common power to keep 
 all in awe, and to direct their actions to the common 
 benefit is, to confer all their power and strength upon 
 one man or one assembly of men, that may reduce 
 all their wills, by plurality of votes, into one will." ' 
 Locke's theories have been already commented on 
 (supra, page 135). Burke thus formulated them as 
 adopted and acted upon by the leaders of the Revo- 
 lution in France. " The majority told by the head, 
 of the taxable people of every country, is the per- 
 petual, natural, unceasing, indefeasible sovereign ; 
 this majority is perfectly master of the form, as well 
 as of the administration of the state ; and the magis- 
 trates, under whatever names they are called, are 
 only the functionaries to obey the orders which 
 that majority may make. This is the only natural 
 government; all others are tyranny and usurpation."! 
 In order to reduce this dogma into practice, the 
 republicans in France and in other countries were 
 " to destroy all traces of ancient establishments and 
 form a new commonwealth upon the basis of the 
 
 * Hobbes's Leviathan, p. 157. See supra, p. 133. 
 
 f Thoughts on French Affairs. Burke's Works, Vol. ii,j>. 352. 
 
HOBBES, LOCKE, ROUSSEAU, AND BENTHAM. 237 
 
 French 'rights of man.' Monarchy was to dis- 
 appear; every species of nobility, gentry, church and 
 church establishments was to be abolished; all con- 
 ditions of men were to be levelled (except where money 
 must make a difference) all their priests and all their 
 magistrates being only creatures of election, and 
 pensioners at will." ; 
 
 Bentham thought to arrive at good government by 
 the assumption that the universal dishonesty of 
 governing bodies could only be kept in check by fear. 
 " As each member of the ruling few not only was 
 placed, but at a short interval is displaceable, by the 
 subject many, what such member sees from first to 
 last is, that any considerable and lasting sacrifice of 
 their happiness to his own is impracticable, and that 
 for every attempt to effect it he would be liable to be 
 punished. He will not, therefore, encounter such risk.f 
 
 Under this system of government, the progress of 
 the legislation in the individual States affecting the 
 independence of the judiciary was nearly as rapid and 
 complete as that which abrogated all property qualifi- 
 cations for electors. When Story wrote in 1833, five 
 States had adopted the practice of electing the judges. 
 Eleven years later, Kent enumerated twelve more 
 States, in which all the judges were elected, and all 
 appointed for terms of years varying from two and 
 three to seven and eight, and, in one instance only, 
 
 * Ibid., page 353. 
 
 t Bentham's Constitutional Code for All Nations, 1830. Vol. ix of 
 Works, Edit. 1813, p. 97. See also supra, pp. 199201. 
 
238 DEMOCRATIC ABSOLUTISM DERIVED FROM 
 
 for as many as twelve years. (Vol. i, page 294.) In 
 1853, I found that the election of judges and their 
 appointment for short periods prevailed in twenty-two 
 out of the thirty-one States of the Union. In three 
 others the elective principle was adopted, but the term 
 was during good behaviour ; and in two others they 
 were appointed for a term of years by the governor. 
 I ascertained, also, that in that year the salaries of the 
 judges in twenty-one States ranged from 1,200 to 2,000 
 dollars (250 to 400) ; in five, from 2,000 to 3,000 
 dollars ; in four, from 3,000 to 6,000 dollars ; in Cali- 
 fornia, from 2,000 to 10,000 dollars. 
 
 Between 1853 and the present year (1881) some 
 improvement has taken place in the payment of the 
 State judges, and the terms for which they are 
 appointed, but the general principle remains the same. 
 An increase has been made in the amount of the 
 judges' salaries, so that in three only of the thirty- 
 eight States are they now below 2,000 dollars. In 
 eighteen States they are between 3,000 and 5,000. 
 In California they are 6,000 ; in Massachusetts from 
 6,000 to 6,500 ; Nevada 7,000; in Oregon 7,000; and 
 in New York from 7,000 to 7,500 dollars ; the lowest 
 being 500, the highest 4,500 a year. 
 
 There is also a slight improvement in the modes of 
 appointment. In five States the judges are elected by 
 the legislature ; in six they are nominated by the 
 governor and the senate ; in two they are nominated 
 by the governor. In the remaining twenty-five they 
 continue to be elected by the people. 
 
HOBBES, LOCKE, ROUSSEAU, AND BENTHAM. 239 
 
 Further, in a few States, the term for which the 
 judges are elected or appointed is lengthened. Dela- 
 ware, Florida, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, 
 appoint their judges for life ; New Hampshire, until 
 the age of 70. In ten other States the term has been 
 slightly raised. In California it has been raised to 
 12 years; in Virginia and West Virginia to 12, in 
 New York to 14, in Maryland to 15, in Pennsylvania 
 to 15 and 21 years. In the remaining seventeen States 
 the elections range chiefly from 4 to 8 years. Illinois 
 has receded from election by the legislature, and for 
 life, to election by the people for 8 years. Louisiana 
 from a term of 8, to one of 5 years. Texas from 
 appointment by the governor for 6, to election by the 
 people for 4 years.* 
 
 Both Story and Kent put forth the full power of 
 their minds in endeavouring to impress upon their 
 countrymen the danger both to public and private 
 interests involved in the great change. They con- 
 sidered that although the Judges of the Supreme 
 Court were still appointed by the President, and 
 during good behaviour that principle was seriously 
 menaced by the change that had been adopted in the 
 individual States. Story reminded them that the 
 judiciary had hitherto been a co-ordinate power in 
 the state, since no alteration in the constitution could 
 be made without their sanction ; " that its indepen- 
 dence was the balance wheel of the constitution;" 
 
 * The American Almanac for 1881. 
 
240 DEMOCRATIC ABSOLUTISM DERIVED FROM 
 
 . "the only check upon the invasions of 
 faction ; " . . . " the safeguard of the rights and 
 liberties of the people against the tyranny of majo- 
 rities." ( 1621.) And with a view to private in- 
 terests, even in the individual States, "the standard of 
 good behaviour for the continuance in office of the 
 judicial magistracy, was certainly one of the most 
 valuable of modern improvements in the practice of 
 government : and the loss of it was the loss 
 
 of the best expedient that can be devised in any 
 government to secure a steady, upright, and impartial 
 administration of the laws." ( 1600.) Kent also 
 laboured with equal force to impress upon his fellow- 
 citizens the conviction, that a secure and independent 
 tenure of the judicial office is one of the cardinal 
 points on which their constitution, their liberties, and 
 even the individual safety of life and property, must 
 always in a great degree depend." (Vol. i, page 
 443.) The destruction, nevertheless, of that inde- 
 pendence went on, in state after state, until it per- 
 vaded nearly the whole, as has been above shown ; in 
 strange forgetfulness that in the celebrated Declaration 
 of Independence of July the 4th, 1776, one of the 
 principle articles of complaint made against the 
 sovereign of this country was, that "he made 
 judges dependent on his will alone for the tenure 
 of their offices, and the amount and payment of their 
 salaries."* 
 
 * Professor Lieber, in his work on Civil Liberty and Self-Govern- 
 ment (Boston, 1853), devotes a chapter of earnest reasoning in support 
 
HOBBES, LOCKE, ROUSSEAU, AND BENTHAM. 
 
 241 
 
 The ascendancy of pure democracy in the indi- 
 vidual States, gave rise to another great political 
 change in 1829, when General Andrew Jackson 
 became President. During the fifty years from the 
 establishment of the American Constitution up to that 
 period, the appointments to the civil service had 
 been made on the ground of fitness and merit. 
 Washington set the example by refusing a nomina- 
 tion to a friend whom he did not consider qualified 
 for the office, and the first six presidents, Washington, 
 John Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Munro, and John 
 Quincy Adams, strictly acted on the principle of not 
 dismissing a public servant except on substantial 
 grounds. But with the presidency of General Jack- 
 son, began a system of dismissal and nomination 
 which has been a deep source of regret to all to 
 whom the reputation of their country is dear. This 
 system, under the name of " the spoils of the victor," 
 gave the whole patronage, both in the individual 
 States and the general government, into the hands of 
 the party which was victorious at the elections. The 
 public mind was misled into adopting it by members 
 of the democratic party, and it was carried into effect 
 by that party rigorously, and without check, for 
 upwards of forty years. It has as yet only partially 
 
 of the elementary truth that " the immovability of judges is an 
 essential element of civil liberty." He also treated the subject very 
 ably in a letter addressed to the German people in 1848: " Ueber die 
 Unabhangigkeit der .Justiz, oder die Freiheit des Ilechts in England 
 und in den Veveinigten Staaten." 
 
 B 
 
242 
 
 DEMOCRATIC ABSOLUTISM DERIVED FROM 
 
 yielded, within the last ten years, to the patriotic 
 efforts of an influential portion of the republican 
 party to overthrow it. 
 
 The great and numerous public scandals arising out 
 of that system which have been continually brought 
 before the public are well known, as also the loss of 
 efficiency which the public service incurs from the 
 frequent and causeless dismissal of many hundreds of 
 officials, from the highest to the lowest. 
 
 When the republican party recovered power in 
 1871, General Grant introduced competitive examina- 
 tions for the civil service, but with only limited effect, 
 in consequence of the opposition of Congress. His 
 successor, President Hayes, was able to carry the 
 experiment further by establishing examinations at 
 Washington and New York, the results of which, in 
 promoting " the economy, purity, and efficiency of the 
 public service," have been highly spoken of by several 
 of the heads of departments. And more recently a 
 committee of the senate has published a report (Feb. 
 1881), strongly condemning the "spoils" system, 
 and recommending the general adoption of the 
 principle of competitive examinations "for securing 
 appointments, employment, and promotion in the 
 subordinate civil service of the United States. It is 
 believed that the late President Garfield would have 
 strenuously supported this action of the senate but for 
 the crime of a disappointed office-seeker. The indig- 
 nation and sorrow at this event, felt no less in this 
 country than in his own, may be expected to strengthen 
 
HOBBES, LOCKE, ROUSSEAU, AND BENTHAM. 243 
 
 the hands of those who desire to complete this great 
 reform. 
 
 The efforts of the large body now set upon firmly 
 establishing this reform in the appointments to govern- 
 ment offices, may, by degrees, be followed by a similar 
 change of opinion in regard to the appointments of a 
 like nature in the several States. And it seems not 
 improbable that it may, in the course of time, lead to 
 the correction of the other great abuse intimately 
 connected with the "spoils" system, namely, "the 
 absorption of the whole machinery of the elections by 
 persons who devote themselves to the occupation of 
 arranging them, of fixing upon and bringing forward 
 the candidates, of creating for them a name and 
 character by means of unceasing eulogies in the public 
 press, of dictating to them their policy, of describing 
 in the most minute details the course which it is 
 expected of them to take on all leading questions 
 before the public, and finally, when the elections have 
 terminated in success, looking for their reward from 
 the various sources within the means of the predomi- 
 nant political party, should their candidate belong to 
 it." (The Constitution of the United States com- 
 pared with our Own, page 107.) The motives for the 
 great exertions of the professional politicians, the 
 "wire-pullers," would be greatly weakened if their 
 present prospect of distributing and sharing the 
 st spoils " were taken away. 
 
 In an article on the " Spoils System in American 
 Politics," in the number of the Contemporary Review 
 
 R 2 
 
244 
 
 DEMOCRATIC ABSOLUTISM DERIVED FROM 
 
 for October, 1881, the author, Mr. William Clarke, 
 quotes from the Life of Andrew Jackson, by Mr. 
 James Parton, the code of political ethics of Aaron 
 Burr, the prominent leader of the democratic party, 
 whose powers and eloquence infected the party with 
 his unscrupulous notions, and prepared the way for 
 their ascendancy under President Jackson (1829-1837) 
 and his successors. That code contains, among others, 
 these maxims : " Politics is a game, the prizes of 
 which are offices and contracts ; " . . . " fidelity to 
 party is the sole virtue of the politician ; " . . . "in 
 all conflicts, a man must adhere to the behests of the 
 majority of his own local organization;" . . . "the 
 end and aim of the professional politician is to keep 
 great men down, and to put little men up. Little 
 men, owing all to the wire-puller, will be guided by 
 him. Great men, having ideas and convictions, are 
 perilous, even as tools." (Page 636.) 
 
 It would seem difficult for the democratic advocate 
 of this code to point out what room there is in it for 
 the "rights of man." A higher authority has well 
 said " When the minority are bound to give way to 
 the majority there is an end to ' the rights of man ' for 
 all those who are outnumbered." (Professor William 
 Smyth. See page 255.) 
 
 It is to be hoped that the " Liberal Association of 
 Birmingham," known as the " Birmingham Caucus," 
 with its "Federated Associations" now numbering 
 upwards of a hundred, may not be led by degrees to 
 the adoption of all the principles avowed by their 
 
HOBBES, LOCKE, ROUSSEAU, AND BENTHAM. 245 
 
 prototypes in the United States. But inasmuch as 
 the organization of our new domestic institution is 
 based on an open popular election, and a complete 
 hierarchy is created, rising through the committees of 
 the primary wards, the local executive committees, 
 and the management sub-committee, up to the central 
 federation, its council of delegates, and its general 
 committee the power that can be set in motion must 
 be fully as great as that of the energetic " wire pullers " 
 above described. The temptation, therefore, will be 
 considerable to dictate courses of action to con- 
 stituencies, to candidates, and to representatives. 
 Should this become general, there can be no other 
 result than the lowering of the character of the 
 representative body ; for, according to the sentiments 
 urged by Burke before the electors of Bristol, " Any 
 worthy representative of freemen must himself be 
 free." (Vol. ii of Works, page 130.) 
 
 The system of frequent elections, also pointed out 
 by Story and Kent as a disadvantage in the electoral 
 system, was not settled by the framers of the Consti- 
 tution of the United States without considerable 
 differences of opinion. The practice at the time in 
 the different States varied greatly. Virginia elected 
 its representatives for seven years, North and South 
 Carolina for two years, Connecticut and Rhode 
 Island for six months, and the other States for a year. 
 The resolution ultimately adopted and embodied in 
 Article 1, section 2, of the Constitution was, that 
 " The House of Representatives shall be composed of 
 
246 DEMOCRATIC ABSOLUTISM DERIVED FROM 
 
 members chosen every second year by the people of 
 the several States." 
 
 The results of this system had had time to develop 
 themselves when Story wrote in 1833. He exhibits 
 them with his usual plainness in 592, 593, and 
 602 604, of his Commentaries ; and he notices, in 
 particular, that the system " operates as a great dis- 
 couragement upon suitable candidates offering them- 
 selves for the public service. They can have little 
 opportunity to establish a solid reputation as states- 
 men and patriots, when their schemes are liable to be 
 broken in upon by demagogues, who may create 
 injurious suspicions, and even displace them from 
 office, before their measures are fairly tried ; and they 
 are apt to grow weary of continued appeals to vindi- 
 cate their character and conduct at the polls, since 
 success, however transparent, is of such short duration, 
 and confidence is so easily loosened." 
 
 It is this frequency of the elections, and the large 
 size of the constituencies scattered over wide areas, 
 that throw the management of the elections into the 
 hands of the professional politicians. It was remarked 
 by Sir G. Cornewall Lewis, in his Dialogue on the 
 Best Form of Government (referred to above in 
 pp. 187, 213), "that the tendency of an election so 
 managed is to exclude men of character and ability, 
 and to bring forward second-rate men. It is a 
 system which necessarily leads to the degradation of 
 the representative character." De Tocqueville had 
 long previously made the same remark from his own 
 
HOBBES, LOCKE, ROUSSEAU, AND BENTHAM. 247 
 
 observations ; and there are few passages in his great 
 work more impressive than that in which he affirms 
 and laments the inferiority of the House of Repre- 
 sentatives of the United States to the Senate, in all 
 qualities that command general respect, and give 
 political weight and influence.* In the case of the 
 periodical election to the Presidency, the evils of 
 frequency of election are more conspicuous, and are 
 too well known to require any detailed notice. 
 
 It was determined, in 1789, that the number of 
 representatives should be one to every 30,000 of the 
 population. The size of the constituencies increased 
 in 1823 to 40,700, in 1843 to 70,680, in 1863 to 
 127,381, and in 1873 to 131,427 ; and the number of 
 the representatives which in 1789 was 65, increased 
 in 1823 to 213, in 1843 to 223, in 1863 to 243, and in 
 1873 to 292. (American Almanack for 1881.) t 
 
 Upon these great changes, the editor of a recent 
 edition of Story's Commentaries makes the following 
 remarks : " Unfortunately, the experience of the 
 United States has not justified the belief that large 
 districts will always choose men of the greatest 
 wisdom, abilities, and real dignity." (Note to 675 
 of Story's Commentaries on the United States, 2 vols. 
 4th Edit. By T. M. Cooley. Boston, 1873.) 
 
 The descent of the government of the United 
 States from the mixed and balanced system established 
 
 * De la Democratie en Amerique. Far Alexis de Tocqueville. 
 Vol. ii, ch. 5. Edit. 1837. 
 
 f From March 1883 the constituencies will be upwards of 135,000, 
 and the representatives 325. 
 
248 POLITICAL AND SOCIAL RESULTS 
 
 by the constitution to pure democracy, dating, as lias 
 been shown, from the Presidency of Andrew Jackson, 
 in 1829, has produced consequences deplored by a 
 large body of the most thoughtful and intelligent of 
 the community. 
 
 A work published in 1868 amply illustrates that 
 feeling.* The author informs us that " during the 
 two previous years probably the most important two 
 years in the history of the United States Govern- 
 ment, if we consider all the changes that they brought 
 to pass his daily duties called him into close inter- 
 course with many of the most active public men of the 
 country ; and that he has founded his statements and 
 based his conclusions upon authority which ought to 
 be accepted in England, because no one challenges it 
 in America." He speaks freely of what came under 
 his observation ; and it is satisfactory to learn from 
 him that " the Americans do not take offence at a 
 candid and fair discussion of the government under 
 which they live." 
 
 Writing so soon after the Civil War of 18621865, 
 he was able to note one great additional change in the 
 constitution which that war brought forth namely, 
 that which has entirely altered the position of the 
 Supreme Court. According to the letter of the con- 
 stitution, no change could be made in it without the 
 consent of two-thirds of the States ; and power was 
 
 * Eighty Years of Republican Government in the United States. 
 By Louis Jennings. London, Murray, 1868. 
 
FROM THE ACTION OF PURE DEMOCRACY. 
 
 249 
 
 given to the Supreme Court to annul any change 
 attempted in any other manner. The conquering 
 States believed themselves to be under the necessity 
 of disfranchising for a time, by their own vote, the 
 whole of the ten States that had been in rebellion ; in 
 sweeping away the entire judiciary system of those 
 States ; and in placing the blacks at once, as regards 
 voting power and consequent authority, in the position 
 of their former masters. By this and other measures 
 the authority given by the constitution to the 
 Supreme Court, as its guardian, was set aside, and 
 can no longer be said to exist. The framers of the 
 constitution would now scarcely recognise their own 
 work. Another proof is thus given, if any were 
 required, that written constitutions are powerless to 
 restrain the immediate action of any future majority 
 of the legislature carried away by the ideas prevalent 
 at the moment. 
 
 The direct consequence of the acts of severity 
 against the whites of the conquered States above 
 mentioned, was a fierce and bloody insurrection of 
 the whites against the blacks, attended with wide- 
 spread devastation and suffering. 
 
 But it is remarkable that, instead of the permanent 
 weakening of the influence of the South in the general 
 government, as expected by the North, a gradual and 
 complete reconciliation has taken place between the 
 two races since their franchises were restored to the 
 whites, and especially within the last few years ; in 
 accordance, as it is said, with the character of the 
 
250 
 
 POLITICAL AND SOCIAL RESULTS 
 
 whites of the Southern States as " instinctive natural 
 rulers." The surprising fact is accordingly now seen 
 that, by means of the united votes of the whites and 
 blacks of those States and of their sympathizers in the 
 North, the democratic party at the last presidential 
 election very nearly equalled the republican, the 
 great supporters of the war ; the votes having been, 
 for General Garfield (rep.), 4,442,950 ; for General 
 Hancock (dem.), 4,412,950.* In 1868, only 8 States 
 voted for the democratic candidates ; in 1876, 17 ; 
 in 1880, 19; being exactly the same number that 
 voted for the republican candidate. The Southern 
 States, therefore, without any desire to reverse the 
 great issues of the past, appear likely to regain their 
 past ascendancy in the government of the republic. 
 
 3?he great social results from the adoption of the 
 doctrines of pure democracy, as far as these had 
 shown themselves up to the publication of my book 
 on The Constitution of the United States, in 1854, 
 have been noticed in the foregoing pages. Mr. 
 Jennings brings down the record to 1868. 
 
 The details given by Mr. Jennings are full and 
 instructive, and are supported by unquestionable 
 authorities. They can only be briefly touched upon 
 here. Their general purport is, that the degradation of 
 public life, through the great extension of the suffrage 
 during the last fifty years, and through the action of 
 the Caucus system in the hands of the party managers 
 
 * American Almanac, 1881. 
 
FROM THE ACTION OF PURE DEMOCRACY. 251 
 
 in the elections, and in the Houses of Legislature, 
 both of the individual States and of Congress, is such, 
 that no interests, whether of the rich or the poor, are 
 safe from the influences of the prevailing corruption. 
 
 The corruption has its foundation among the great 
 body of the electors. "In every State, in every 
 county, in every town, there is a rallying point for 
 the adherents of each side. The press is active and 
 well supported, the emoluments at the disposal of the 
 party in power flow safely into distant channels, and 
 the man who does his work knows that he is sure of 
 his pay." (Page 160.) It ascends into the State 
 legislature, where it is " so flagrant, that their legis- 
 lation, and the venality of the legislators, has become 
 a bye-word and a reproach." (Page 122.) It has 
 established itself in the two Houses of Congress. 
 " If seats in the State assemblies are worth a large 
 price, it may be inferred that a seat in the Federal 
 Congress is a still more precious commodity, and in 
 truth the traffic for it scarcely ever ceases." (Page 
 124.) The same electors who elect to the State 
 legislatures, have in their hands the election to the 
 Federal House of Representatives, and look to the 
 local leaders, at whose dictation they vote, for their 
 share in due time, of the " spoils." Further, in the 
 choice of senators for the Federal Congress, "the 
 State legislatures are often guilty of shameful cor- 
 ruption." (Page 121.) "Once in the senate, a man 
 may serve his country with fearlessness and honour. 
 But the road to the senate is too often paved with 
 
252 
 
 POLITICAL AND SOCIAL RESULTS 
 
 gold, and the gold has come out of the pocket of the 
 candidate." (Page 161.) 
 
 The general character of the Federal Congress is 
 thus described by Mr. Jennings : 
 
 " It is almost impossible for a man of independent 
 opinions to obtain a seat in Congress. He must be 
 'endorsed' by a party, and slavishly adopt all the 
 views of that party, or it is useless for him to contest 
 an election. Should any accepted member exhibit an 
 opinion of his own, in opposition to the general party, 
 he is practically driven out of its ranks ; he is assailed 
 on all sides with a virulence and unscrupulousness 
 unknown elsewhere ; he inevitably fails to receive a 
 future nomination, and thus he loses the next election. 
 Within the walls of the legislature every voice is 
 raised against him, and outside he has to confront the 
 unprincipled assaults of the combined agents of a 
 faction. Few public men in America can long contend 
 in so unequal a struggle. Thus the power of Congress 
 is securely concentrated in the hands of the leaders of 
 the dominant party of the hour, who may be so 
 actuated by personal ambition, or other unworthy 
 motives, as to render them altogether unsafe guides 
 for the nation. The discussions of this conclave are 
 carried on in secret, and the mockery of a deliberative 
 assembly is made complete by the systematic refusal (in 
 the House of Representatives) to allow of full debate 
 upon measures of the most momentous description. 
 They are decided upon in private Caucus, for reasons 
 which the public are not allowed to know ; and when 
 
FROM THE ACTION OF PURE DEMOCRACY. 253 
 
 they are brought forward in the legislature, by a form 
 of the House of Representatives known as the f previous 
 question,' which the adherents of the governing party 
 are almost always numerous enough to enforce, dis- 
 cussion is absolutely prevented. Sometimes, no one 
 is allowed to say a word. The minority is not ad- 
 mitted to the Caucus, and in the House a gag is placed 
 upon their mouths. . . . It is true that in the 
 senate there is no power to forbid discussion, but one 
 branch of the legislature, and that the popular branch, 
 submits quietly to a tyranny which is destructive of 
 the true principles of a legislative assembly, and a 
 betrayal of the trusts confided to it by the people." 
 (Pages 83, 84.) 
 
 According to an authority "which is never con- 
 tradicted in America, John Stuart Mill," every- 
 body should be represented, and everybody should 
 be represented equally. The American theory of 
 representation has entirely departed from this stan- 
 dard. "In other systems minorities are at least 
 partially represented, but in the United States they 
 are practically disfranchised. The best educated, 
 highest-minded class in America are unrepresented, 
 not only in Congress, but in the legislatures of their 
 States." ..." No one can affirm that either 
 property or intellect is adequately represented." 
 (Pages 81, 138139.) "Year after year there has 
 been a growing conviction in the minds of the wealthy 
 and cultivated classes that they are deprived of the 
 influence which they ought rightfully to exercise in 
 
254 POLITICAL AND SOCIAL RESULTS 
 
 the affairs of the republic, and that they have no pro- 
 tection against the encroachments of the majority." 
 And the question is asked "whether their system 
 does actually place all men on an equality, or whether 
 they have only reversed the ancient injustices of 
 classes." (Pages 76, 129.) 
 
 It has often been remarked that "in the United 
 States the people are better than their constitution." 
 To that effect is the following passage which Mr. 
 Jennings quotes (page 176) from Mr. Fisher's work, 
 The Trial of the Constitution (Philadelphia, 1862):- 
 
 " The government is below the mental and moral 
 level, even of the masses. Go among them. Talk to 
 the farmer in his field ; the blacksmith at his anvil ; the 
 carpenter at his bench even the American labouring 
 man who works for hire in the Northern States and 
 compare their conversation, so full of good sense and 
 sound feeling, with the ignorance, vulgarity, person- 
 ality, and narrow parti zan spirit of an ordinary Con- 
 gressional debate, and with the disclosures made by 
 investigating committees. Evidently the mind and 
 moral sentiment of the people are not represented." 
 (Page 347.) 
 
 It has also been noticed, and is referred to by Mr. 
 Jennings, that " there is no people that have a higher 
 and purer ideal than the Americans." (Page 176.) 
 The cultivated and the thoughtful compare their 
 / government, as they see it, with what they believe it 
 might be, and what they hope it may be in the future. 
 Their ideal they probably inherit from their forefathers, 
 
FROM THE ACTION OF PURE DEMOCRACY. 255 
 
 the great contemporaries of Washington, who did 
 their best under the circumstances of the day to bring 
 their work up towards the standard of the men of the 
 17th century, who, like Milton, yearned for a republic 
 the basis of which could be described in his words: 
 " Who would be free must first be wise and good." It 
 can hardly be an ideal built upon the unsound and 
 exploded theories of Locke and Rousseau, or the 
 perverted conceptions of human nature and of political 
 and moral principle propagated by Bentham, which 
 have unhappily led astray so many in the last two 
 generations. (See supra, pp. 199 201, 237.) 
 
 On such ideals I beg leave to recall the words of 
 one whose enlightened liberalism and large-hearted 
 wisdom gave him a high place in the esteem and 
 regard of his contemporaries Professor William 
 Smyth.* The following passages represent, in a com- 
 pressed form, his conclusions as given in the general 
 summary of his three Lectures on America, delivered 
 at Cambridge in 1836 : 
 
 "What then are the foundations of these demo- 
 cratical institutions? They are the perfectibility of 
 man ; they are his virtue and his intelligence ; they 
 are his pure and enlightened patriotism, supposed to 
 influence him at every moment. These are no trifling 
 virtues to be required from a community, and not very 
 likely to be found. This high democratic hope, this 
 faith in man, is not justified by fact or reasoning. 
 
 * See p. 244. 
 
256 PROF. WM. SMYTH ON THE DOCTRINES 
 
 " It is not found in practice in America. It is 
 not in accordance with the principles of human 
 nature. 
 
 " Our nature is imperfect. Yet governments are to 
 be made secure, and men to be made happy by their 
 faith in the virtues of each other. 
 
 " The Almighty did not depend on the higher virtues 
 of the human character for accomplishing the great 
 purposes of our being. He did not depend on the 
 benevolent interest which every exalted mind was to 
 take in the common weal. He added the sense of self- 
 interest, and the desires and passions of men. 
 
 " His system is one of mutual dependence and 
 assistance, of reciprocal obedience and control, of 
 diversified elevation and depression, of interchanged 
 offices of kindness and duty. These call forth the 
 virtues, and provide for the welfare of his creatures. 
 
 "The good and bad passions of our nature, the mean 
 and the honourable, the selfish and the disinterested, 
 are so mixed, and checked, and harmonized, that the 
 result is favourable. 
 
 "Democracy, in its extreme form, neither wants 
 nor wishes for nor understands the value of the 
 decoration of life, its elevations and its honours, the 
 civilities, the courtesies, the interchanged affections 
 and enjoyments which a highly civilized life is com- 
 petent to afford. 
 
 " There are some in this country who appear to wish 
 to bring us down to that level. Were they to succeed, 
 in England would die the most magnificent spectacle 
 
OF HOBBES, LOCKE, ROUSSEAU, AND BENTHAM. 257 
 
 of a civilized country that the world has ever seen." * 
 By the visions of democracy it is "doomed to death, 
 though" (let us hope) "fated not to die."f 
 
 The defects that have been commented on in the 
 working of the Constitution of the United States, 
 attract the attention of the European observer, chiefly 
 on account of the light they throw on the exagge- 
 rated anticipations encouraged by the theorists of the 
 last century, who pronounced that republics were to 
 be not only free from the failings and defects of the 
 old monarchies, but were to establish an ideal unat- 
 tainable by them. 
 
 No such defects, however, can obscure to any 
 impartial mind the grand spectacle that the old 
 British principles of Common Law and local self- 
 government have presented, in their steady progress 
 over the vast area conquered from nature, in the short 
 period of a century and a-half, by the energy and 
 enterprise of the Anglo-Saxon race. 
 
 Nor can the tribute of the highest admiration ever 
 be refused to the spirit which determined that the 
 union of their country should not be broken by the 
 
 * Lectures on History, by William Smyth, Professor of Modern 
 History in the University of Cambridge, 2nd Series, on America. 3 
 vols. 2nd Edit., 1842. Vol. 3, ad finem. 
 
 t Since this book was prepared for the press, a valuable contribution 
 to the recent political history of the United States, written in a liberal 
 and friendly spirit, has appeared in the number of the Quarterly 
 Review for Jan., 1882. Its facts and conclusions are in entire 
 accordance with those of Mr. Jennings, as given by him in 1868, with 
 one marked addition, A reference to the frequency with which wealth 
 is used to procure corrupt decisions from the state judges. 
 
 8 
 
258 PROF. WM. SMYTH ON DEMOCRATIC DOCTRINES. 
 
 Civil War (however opinions may differ as to its 
 having been avoidable by due foresight), or to the 
 noble self-sacrifice that has submitted to the most 
 burdensome taxation to pay off the debt that ensued. 
 Surely such a nation will one day find the means of 
 removing the blots now observable in its political 
 system. 
 
259 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 (REFERRED TO IN NOTE TO PAGE 152.) 
 
 THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF OUR CONSTI- 
 TUTION, FROM THE EARLIEST RECORDS 
 OF HISTORY. 
 
 THE expression of Montesquieu, that " the English 
 Constitution was found in the woods," strikes a note 
 that has often met with a response in this country. 
 Tacitus has exhibited for us, in the woods of Ger- 
 many, the framework of the political organization 
 which time has compacted and enlarged into our 
 own. 
 
 The German nation, occupying in his time the 
 country between the Rhine and the Danube, was 
 then divided, according to the best information he 
 could obtain, into seven tribes. Each had its king, 
 chosen from the royal stock. Their powers were not 
 arbitrary, but limited. Next in order were the chiefs, 
 also chosen and owing their authority to their quali- 
 ties as guides and leaders of the people in peace and 
 war. They too, had no arbitrary authority, their 
 powers of correction and punishment being subject to 
 
 s2 
 
260 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF OUR CONSTITUTION, 
 
 the approval of the priesthood, as representing the 
 Divine sanction. 
 
 Their assemblies met by summons on certain 
 days. The chiefs alone disposed of smaller matters ; 
 on the weightier affairs all deliberated together, and, 
 wherever the ultimate decision rested with the people, 
 the chiefs had the power of joining in the discussion. 
 They sat down armed. The priests commanded, and 
 enforced silence. The king, or a chief, according as 
 age or rank, or fame in war, or eloquence, gave 
 claims to be heard, spoke with a view to persuade, 
 but with no power to command. The people ex- 
 pressed their displeasure by shouts, their assent by a 
 clash of weapons. Anyone could be arraigned before 
 this assembly, and the punishment of death could be 
 inflicted, or other punishments, according to the 
 nature of the offence. In the same assemblies, chiefs 
 were chosen to administer justice through the hamlets 
 and villages, and they were accompanied by a hun- 
 dred men selected from the people, who gave the aid 
 of their advice and knowledge, and at the same time 
 enforced the decisions.* 
 
 This primitive system of government was no inven- 
 tion of the Tribes described by Tacitus. Their fore- 
 fathers had brought it with them in their wanderings 
 from the remote east. And when, five centuries after 
 Tacitus, the Angles and Saxons had established 
 themselves in this country, their social and political 
 
 * Tacitus, De Moribus Germanorum, Lib. i, cap. 1 12. 
 
FROM THE EARLIEST RECORDS OF HISTORY. 
 
 261 
 
 organization are found to be the same. " The polity 
 developed by the German races on British soil, is the 
 purest product of their primitive instinct. . . The 
 institutions of the Saxons of Germany long after the 
 conquest of Britain, were the most perfect exponent 
 of the system which Tacitus saw and described in the 
 Germania. In England, the common germs were 
 developed and ripened with the smallest intermixture 
 of foreign elements." * 
 
 A great accession to our exact knowledge of the 
 laws and usages of the Anglo-Saxons was made by 
 the publication, in 1840, of a large mass of documents 
 upon the subject by the Commissioners of Public 
 Records of the Kingdom, and by the collection of the 
 " Codex Diplomaticus oevi Saxonici," by Mr. J. M. 
 Kemble, published in six volumes by the Historical 
 Society of England between 1839 and 1848. To 
 those new sources of information we are indebted for 
 the many valuable works on our early history that 
 have since appeared, conspicuous among which are 
 the Saxons in England, by Mr. Kemble (1849); the 
 History of the Norman Conquest, by Mr. E. A. 
 Freeman (1870) ; the Constitutional History of 
 England, by Prof. Stubbs (1874) ; and the Making 
 of England, by Mr. J. R. Green (1881). The more 
 our knowledge extends of those early institutions the 
 more clearly do we discover our own connection with 
 them ; and, in the words of Mr. Kemble, " it cannot 
 
 * Professor Stubbs's Constitutional History, Vol. i, page 11. 
 
262 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF OUR CONSTITUTION, 
 
 be without advantage to us to learn how a state so 
 favoured as ours has set about the great work of con- 
 stitution, and solved the problem of uniting the com- 
 pletest obedience to law with the greatest amount of 
 individual freedom.* 
 
 From the documents above mentioned Kemble gives 
 a long list of the " Witena-gemotes " (meetings of 
 the wise), from Adelberg, King of Kent, A.D. 595, to 
 Edward the Confessor, 1065. " We are thus enabled," 
 he says, " to follow the action of the Saxon parliament 
 from the very creation of the monarchy." 
 
 In the Witena-gemote the rudiments are distinctly 
 marked of our limited monarchy, and of the aristo- 
 cratic and democratic branches of the constitution. 
 The king could do nothing without the consent of the 
 Witan. Earls or lay nobles and the clergy formed 
 the king's council, in which questions afterwards to be 
 submitted to the general meeting were discussed and 
 argued upon.f The commonalty was represented by 
 the Eorldermen and magistrates of the burghs, and 
 the Reeves of the upland or rural townships. The 
 Ceorls (simple freemen) had doubtless a theoretical 
 right to attend, and exercised it in the smaller 
 assemblies of the Mark and the Shire, and also in the 
 Witan when held near their homes. It may be too 
 much to say they had a right to vote, but, after the 
 manner of their ancestors, they freely expressed their 
 
 * The Saxons in England. By J. M. Kemble. 2 vols. London, 
 1849. Vol. i, Preface, page vi. 
 f Freeman, vol. i, page 79. 
 
FROM THE EARLIEST RECORDS OF HISTORY. 263 
 
 assent or dissent, which was practically equivalent to 
 a vote.* But when distance, or their occupations, 
 made it inconvenient to them to attend, some of their 
 number accompanied the Reeve to assist the delibera- 
 tions by their local knowledge, to make " presenta- 
 tions," to give testimony, and perform other acts 
 relating to the administration of justice, to defend 
 their own rights and complain of wrongs. f 
 
 The terms "Eorl" and Ceorl" ("gentle" and 
 " simple," or " esquire " and " yeoman "), form an 
 exhaustive division of the free members of the state. J 
 
 The origin of the Ceorl's right to attend the Gemote 
 of his own Mark (rudely represented by the modern 
 parish or manor) of the Shire, and of the Witan, was 
 the possession of land. " The possession of a certain 
 amount of land in the district was the indispensable 
 condition of enjoying the privileges, and exercising 
 the rights of a freeman." " Even until the 
 
 latest period, personal property was not reckoned in 
 the distinction of ranks, although land was. No 
 amount of mere chattels, gold, silver, or goods could 
 give the Saxon franchise." " Loss of land 
 
 entailed loss of condition in England long after the 
 establishment of our present social system." This 
 portion of land, usually a " hide " (an amount varying 
 with the quality of the soil, but of sufficient extent to 
 
 * Ibid., page 99. 
 
 t Sir Francis Palgrave's History of the Anglo-Saxon Period. Lon- 
 don, 1831. Preface, pp. xvi xxv ; pp. 3 17. Kemble, vol. ii, 188 
 194. 
 
 J Fieeman, page 81. Kemble, Vol. i, p. 88. 
 
264 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF OUR CONSTITUTION, 
 
 support a family), was assigned to the Ceorl at the time 
 of the conquest and appropriation of any new territory. 
 
 To the king and the Eorls the largest portions of 
 the conquered land were allotted ; to the principal 
 followers the Thanes, large portions, which often 
 enabled the Thane to rise into the rank of Eorl ; to 
 the Ceorls the small portions above named. 
 
 After these divisions had been made, much of the 
 territory (Folcland) remained unappropriated, and 
 was used in common. By degrees parts of it were cut 
 off with the consent of the Witan, and consigned to the 
 higher clergy the bishops and abbots or to cor- 
 porations under a written instrument, which gave to 
 them the name of Bocland (Bookland). 
 
 This, therefore, was the framework of the English 
 community in the Saxon times ; the freeman who was 
 the base of the village society ; the township which 
 included "a cluster of farmers' homes;" the Eorl and 
 the Thane, holding larger grants of the public land ; 
 the Eorls with the clergy forming the king's council; 
 and the king, who, " representing the national life, and 
 having one of his sons associated with him, to mark 
 the hereditary character of the office, entered into 
 the common stock of the historic dignity of kings." 
 . . . " Royalty was the product of migration and 
 conquest; the result of prowess in war and of the 
 qualities of a civil ruler. The king's power was 
 co-ordinate with, not superior to, his council." * . . . 
 
 * Stubbs's Constitutional History. Vol. i., pp. 67, 68. 
 
FROM THE EARLIEST RECORDS OF HISTORY. 
 
 265 
 
 " The life and sovereignty of the settlement was 
 solely in the body of the freemen whose holdings lay 
 round the . moot-hill and the sacred tree ;" . . . 
 " In the town moot, the community met from time to 
 time for the ordering of the village life and the 
 village industry ; the hundred moot, composed of the 
 representatives of the townships within it, made the 
 laws for the hundred ; the Folkmoot, or general 
 assembly, was at once the war-host and highest law- 
 court and general parliament of the tribe." . . . 
 " It was here that England learned to be a ( mother of 
 parliaments.' " It was in these tiny knots of husband- 
 men that men, from whom Englishmen were to spring, 
 learned the worth of public opinion, of public discus- 
 sion, the worth of the agreement, the "common 
 sense," the general conviction to which discussion 
 leads, and of the laws which derive their force from 
 being expressions of that general conviction. . 
 For "talk" is persuasion, and persuasion is force 
 the one force which can sway freemen to deeds such 
 as those which have made England what she is. 
 The " talk " of the village moot, the strife and judg- 
 ment of men, giving freely their own rede and setting 
 it freely aside for what they learn to be the wiser rede 
 of other men, is the groundwork of English history.* 
 
 This fair fabric of English liberty was greatly 
 marred by the incursions and ravages of the Danes 
 in the ninth and tenth centuries. The consequent 
 
 * The Making of England. By J. E. Greene, 1881. Pp. 174194. 
 
266 
 
 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF OUR CONSTITUTION, 
 
 distress that fell upon the small freemen drove them 
 to surrender their freeholds to the Thanes. The prin- 
 ciple was introduced that each man must have a lord 
 (Hlaford, loaf-giver), but each was permitted to choose 
 his own lord. Before the time of the Norman Con- 
 quest the change for the worse in the Ceorl's condi- 
 tion had made much progress ; he was fast descending 
 to that of the " villein," the territorial bondsman, 
 inhabiting the " villae " or farm buildings ; making 
 part of the household of his master and having no 
 political rights ; or to the scarcely less servile con- 
 dition of the " Bordarii " or " Cotarii," the small 
 cottagers with a little land attached, and subject to 
 small payments in kind. From this state of villeinage 
 the bondsman had indeed the power of obtaining his 
 enfranchisement ; but the progress was slow, and the 
 whole class had not become enfranchised until towards 
 the end of the fifteenth century. f 
 
 Simultaneously with this loss of freedom by the 
 Ceorl, the liberties of the classes above him were 
 impaired by the increasing power of the king, which 
 resulted from the union of the small Saxon kingdoms 
 under one ruler (by Egbert in 829), the subsequent 
 Danish wars, and, finally, the Norman Conquest. 
 
 Although the laws of Edward the Confessor were 
 confirmed to the Anglo-Saxon people by William the 
 Conqueror four years after the Conquest (in 1070) ; 
 and frequently, in subsequent reigns, when the king 
 
 * Kemble. Vol. i, pp. 8996. 
 
FROM THE EARLIEST RECORDS OF HISTORY. 
 
 267 
 
 wanted supplies, the spirit in which they were adminis- 
 tered was greatly changed. From having a strong 
 admixture of the democratic element they became 
 purely aristocratic, with a vast accession to the regal 
 power. And thus it was until the great statesmen of 
 the thirteenth century, Earl Simon de Montfort and 
 King Edward, fully established the principle of 
 representation. " In so doing they did but bring back 
 the old state of things in another shape ; and 
 
 the ordinary freeman received, instead of the right 
 of personal attendance at the Witan, the far more valu- 
 able right of attendance by his representatives." 4 
 
 Writs for sending members to Parliament were for 
 the first time issued in 1264 by Earl Simon in the 
 name of King Henry III. By the writ, the sheriff 
 was commanded to send up to Parliament two knights 
 for each shire and two citizens as burgesses for each 
 city or borough. f 
 
 The usual object of calling a Parliament in this and 
 many subsequent reigns was to impose taxes. The 
 
 * Freeman. Vol. i, pp. 69, 100, 102. 
 
 Eepresentation in the modern sense was far from being an invention 
 of that day. Kemble gives, on the authority of Pertz (Monumenta II, 
 361, 362), an ancient instance of the principle of election. In a Witan 
 by the " old Saxons," in the heart of Saxony, twelve men were elected 
 from each village at a certain time of the year, and by each of the 
 three orders, and formed the general council for the purpose of dis- 
 cussing, passing, and promulgating laws for the common good. 
 " Statute quoque tempore anni, semel ex singulis pagis, atque ab 
 iisdem ordinibus tripartitis, singillatim duodecem electi, et in unum 
 collecti, in media Saxonia secus flumen Wiseram et locum Marklo 
 nuncupatum, exercebant generate concilium, tradentes, sancientes et 
 propalantes, communis commoda utilitatis, juxta placitum a se statute 
 legis." 
 
 t Hallam's Middle Ages. Vol. ii, p. 148. Edit. 1841. Stubbs's 
 Constitutional History. Vol. ii, p. 222. 
 
268 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF OUR CONSTITUTION, 
 
 earls, barons, and knights of the shire appeared as 
 one body, the clergy as another, and the citizens and 
 burgesses as a third (sitting possibly, as Hallam con- 
 jectures, in different parts of Westminster Hall), and 
 each voted such a proportionate tax as they thought 
 fit an eleventh, a tenth, or sixth.* 
 
 The point of time when the knights of the shire 
 were joined in the same house with the representatives 
 of the citizens and burgesses is not, according to the 
 same authority, easy to define, but they were so 
 without doubt in the first year of Edward III 
 
 (1327)4- 
 
 In the following reign of Richard II, three great 
 constitutional principles were asserted which firmly 
 established for all future times, in spite of temporary 
 checks and obstructions, the power of the House of 
 Commons namely, that money could not be levied 
 or laws enacted, without its consent, and that the 
 administration of government should be subject to its 
 inspection and control. J And this was shortly after- 
 wards followed by the assertion of the power of the 
 Commons to make supplies depend on the redress of 
 grievances, to punish bad ministers, and to maintain 
 inviolate their own immunities and privileges. 
 
 To the above liberties and privileges the Long 
 Parliament, which assembled in November, 1640, 
 added, in the first nine months of its existence, the 
 great enactments for the periodical assembling of 
 
 * Hallam. Ibid., p. 169. t Ibid., p. 170. 
 
 $ Hallam's Middle Ages, Vol. ii, p. 215. Ibid., p, 216. 
 
FROM THE EARLIEST RECORDS OF HISTORY. 269 
 
 Parliaments, for the abolition of ship money, for 
 restraining the prerogative from levying customs on 
 merchandise, and for the abolition of the Star Cham- 
 ber; and thus, by the summer of 1641, "formed our 
 constitution, such nearly as it now exists." : ' 
 
 What class or classes in the counties possessed the 
 right of franchise, has been the subject of much dis- 
 cussion. According to some authorities, it was con- 
 fined to the military tenants holding direct from the 
 king. Hallam was of opinion that as the language of 
 the writs was large enough to include all freeholders, 
 and as the sums payable as wages to the knights of 
 the shire for their services, were levied upon all, the 
 right of electing knights was in all the freeholders 
 who resorted to the county court.f He believed also 
 that gradually, " all persons whatever, present at the 
 county court, were declared capable of voting for the 
 knight of their shire ; an opinion which he thought 
 acquired some degree of confirmation from the Statute 
 8 Hen. VI, c. 7 (1430), which, reciting that elections 
 of knights of shires have now of late been made by 
 very great, outrageous, and excessive number of 
 people dwelling within the same counties, of which 
 most part was people of small substance and of no 
 value, confines the elective franchise to freeholders of 
 lands and tenements to the value of forty shillings." J 
 
 * Hallam's Constitutional History, Vol. i, pp. 515521. 
 
 t Hallam's Middle Ages, Vol. ii, pp. 148152. 
 
 $ Hallam's Middle Ages, Vol. ii, page 243. About that period, 
 although the price of corn often greatly varied, 40s. may have 
 purchased from four to five quarters of wheat, reckoning wheat at 
 from 8s. to 10s. the quarter. When it fell below 6s. 8d. the quarter, 
 
270 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF OUR CONSTITUTION, 
 
 In regard to the original right of franchise in the 
 boroughs, Hallam's view is that those who partici- 
 pated in the liberties of a borough, and were sub- 
 jected to its burdens, had by a common law right, 
 springing from ancient usage, the privilege of voting 
 at elections. The burgess, at first a free inhabitant 
 householder in the borough holding his tenement in 
 fee ; afterwards, if only a lessee of a dwelling for a 
 year, or possessing moveable estate, was liable to the 
 local taxes, and those imposed by the king ; and by 
 reason of that liability he had the right of voting.* 
 The process was, that on receiving the writ requiring 
 the election to be made, the sheriff issued his precept 
 to the mayors, bailiffs, and head officers (t of every 
 city, town corporate, borough, or such places as have 
 been accustomed to send burgesses according to the 
 old custom and usage;" and although in the incor- 
 porated boroughs the elections were, in Hallam's 
 opinion, " for the most part very closely managed in 
 the sixteenth century, and probably much earlier, by 
 the Aldermen and Common Council " (as they con- 
 tinued to be down to the Reform Act of 1832), in all 
 the rest the election was made by the freeholders, or 
 by the inhabitants who were resident householders.! 
 
 The writs were sent to all the towns, large and 
 
 the Statute 15 Hen. VI, c. 2, made perpetual by the 23 Hen. VI, c. 5, 
 (1445), allowed corn "being of small price, to be carried forth of the 
 realm," "si souvent . . . que un quartr de frument n'excede pas le 
 price vjs. viiid." 
 
 * Hallarn's Constitutional History, Vol. ii, p. 200210. 
 
 f Ibid., p. 209. 
 
FROM THE EARLIEST RECORDS OF HISTORY. 
 
 271 
 
 small, with the exception of those which, by the 
 partiality of the sheriff, were omitted on account of 
 their wish to escape the burden of sending members. 
 Incorporated towns often received the privilege in the 
 hope of profiting by it by increased trade or influence. 
 Thus the representation of boroughs, originating in an 
 act of the prerogative, deprecated sometimes as a bur- 
 den, and growing into an advantage, gradually began 
 to be claimed as a privilege, and ultimately as a right. 
 The frequent changes which the borough repre- 
 sentation went through from the time of Henry 
 VIII to the Restoration need not here be minutely 
 described. It is sufficient to notice that to the 100 
 boroughs existing at the time of Edward I,* 33 were 
 added by Charter by Henry VIII, 14 created and 
 10 restored by Edward VI, 21 created by Mary, 
 60 by Elizabeth, and 27 by James I. These addi- 
 tions after the reign of Henry VIII were made, not 
 in reference to any popular principle, but " to secure 
 the authority of government, especially in the suc- 
 cessive revolutions of religion." f But in the reign of 
 James I, a principle was laid down in favour of 
 popular rights, that " every town which had at any 
 time sent members to Parliament, was entitled to a 
 writ as a matter of course." Accordingly, 15 more 
 boroughs were enfranchised down to the year 1641. 
 In 1673, the county and city of Durham were also 
 enfranchised, having been omitted when the large 
 
 * Ibid., Vol. ii, p. 209, note. t Ibid., p. 203. 
 
272 
 
 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF OUR CONSTITUTION, 
 
 extensions of the right of election were made by 
 Henry VIII, on account probably of the attachment 
 of that part of the country to Popery. In 1677, the 
 town of Newark was enfranchised by Charter, and 
 although this exercise of the royal prerogative was 
 recognised by a vote of the House of Commons, it is 
 the last instance of its exercise that has occurred.* 
 
 Nor is a more than a very brief reference required 
 to the continual efforts made by rival parties in the 
 reign of Charles II, and during a great part of the 
 following century, to supplant the ancient right of the 
 resident freeholders by the corrupt agency of small 
 corporations ; efforts which were finally frustrated by 
 the Act of 1770, associated with the name of Mr. 
 Grenville, by which the determination of all cases of 
 controverted elections was transferred from the House 
 of Commons to a sworn committee of fifteen members; 
 a jurisdiction transferred in 1868 to the Courts of Law. 
 
 But it was not until 1832 that the abuses that had 
 gathered round the constitution during the previous 
 century could be effectually dealt with. By the 
 Reform Act of that year, a large number of the small 
 and corrupt boroughs were disfranchised, a large addi- 
 tion was made to the constituencies throughout the 
 country, and the franchise was considerably lowered. 
 The Liberal Party carried this first great reform ; the 
 second was due to the Conservative Party, who, by 
 the Act of 1867, gave us household suffrage. In the 
 
 * Ibid., pp. 203-205. 
 
FROM THE EARLIEST RECORDS OF HISTORY. 
 
 273 
 
 same Act, the independent combination of Liberal 
 and Conservative thought, in both Houses of Par- 
 liament, compelled the recognition of the right of 
 minorities in large constituencies to their fair share of 
 the representation. (Page 189.) 
 
 The time is near at hand when, whichever party 
 may be in power, the franchise will be conferred on 
 the agricultural householder. And it will be con- 
 ferred with safety if, while enlarging the basis of 
 electoral power, the superstructure is also duly con- 
 sidered. An extension of the principle of the repre- 
 sentation of minorities would aid in giving security 
 to the great historic institutions of the country, which 
 we have derived from a remote Past, and which we 
 may trust to hand down in augmented strength to 
 future generations. 
 
 The object of this sketch has been to trace the 
 growth of the main principles of pur Constitution, not 
 to go into the details of their application in each 
 succeeding age, which belong to history. It is to 
 those principles that we are indebted for the great 
 fabric of our liberties, civil and religious, which has 
 been in the long course of ages built up, extended and 
 sustained, and which, next to individual character, has 
 been the main element of our greatness as a nation. 
 
 It would probably be difficult to find an educated 
 Englishman who has not taken into his mind and 
 heart Tennyson's Ode on Freedom. I nevertheless 
 
 T 
 
274 
 
 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF OUR CONSTITUTION. 
 
 may be pardoned for introducing it in this place, as it 
 has added the charm of undying poetry to the wisdom 
 which is the legacy of all ages on the subject of the 
 Principles of Government. 
 
 Of old sat Freedom on the heights, 
 The thunders breaking at her feet : 
 
 Above her shook the starry lights : 
 She heard the torrents meet. 
 
 There in her place she did rejoice, 
 Self -gather 'd in her prophet-mind, 
 
 But fragments of her mighty voice 
 Came rolling on the wind. 
 
 Then stept she down thro' town and field 
 
 To mingle with the human race, 
 And part by part to men reveal'd 
 
 The fulness of her face- 
 Grave mother of majestic works, 
 
 From her isle-altar gazing down, 
 Who, God-like, grasps the triple forks. 
 
 And King-like wears the crown : 
 
 Her open eyes desire the truth. 
 
 The wisdom of a thousand years 
 Is in them. May perpetual youth 
 
 Keep dry their light from tears ; 
 
 That her fair form may stand and shine r 
 Make bright our days and light our dreams, 
 
 Turning to scorn with lips divine 
 The falsehood of extremes ! 
 
 KOWOKTH AND CO. LIMITED, NEWTON STREET, HIGH HOLBORN, W.C. 
 
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