E FORE, DURING 
 AFTER 1914 
 
 ANTON NYSTRX

 
 HKFOKK, DURING, AM) 
 AFTER 1914
 
 BEFORE, DURING, AND 
 AFTER 1914 
 
 BY 
 
 ANTON NYSTROM 
 
 TRANSLATED BY 
 H. G. DK WALTERSTORFF 
 
 WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY 
 EDMUND GOSSE, C.B. LL.D. 
 
 NEW YORK 
 CHARLES SCR1BNERS SONS 
 
 1916
 
 SRLF 
 
 URL 
 
 
 Si I 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 MUCH has been said about the delicacy of Sweden's political 
 disposition, and the outpourings of such Swedish activists 
 as the egregious Sven Hedin have had enough, and more 
 than enough, notice given them by English journalists. 
 The pro-German opinions of this small class of Swedish 
 militarists and meddlers are not those of the vast majority 
 of the inhabitants of eastern Scandinavia. Too little has 
 been said in any of the Allied countries of the existence of 
 a consistent and powerful literature in which some of the 
 foremost intellects of Sweden protest against the crimes of 
 Germany. If we desire to know the real views of the best 
 minds in Sweden, we ought to make acquaintance, not with 
 the violent propaganda of a noisy court clique, but with 
 the volumes of Professor Ernst Wigforss and of Herr 
 C. N. Carleson, the remarkable Black Week of Herr Anton 
 Karlgren, the essays of Professor X. Eden, the leading arti- 
 cles in the principal Swedish newspapers, Dagens Nyhcter, 
 Stockholmstidningen, Goteborgsposten, Karlsladstidningen, 
 and many others. If further evidence were needed that 
 Sweden, as a whole, is not pro-German, it is found in the 
 constant flow of speeches by the leader of the Social Demo- 
 cratic Party, Herr Hjalmar Branting, and by the late 
 Liberal Prime Minister, Herr Karl Staai'f. 
 
 The very fact that an admiration of German methods 
 and an indulgence for German kultur have been more widely 
 spread in Sweden than anywhere else outside the borders 
 of the Central Empires gives a special value to the opinion 
 of those Swedes who have had the courage to oppose the 
 
 v
 
 vi INTRODUCTION 
 
 stream of lying literature steadily flowing from Berlin. 
 More and more, as the truth has filtered through to Scan- 
 dinavia, honourable and able writers in Sweden have 
 weighed tin- issues in the balance, and have decided in 
 favour of the Allies. But it must never be forgotten that 
 German propaganda is not merely untiring, it is protean. 
 At every turn of the war it takes new shapes, and bailies 
 the uninformed by its ingenuity and its impudence. The 
 judgment which survives its attacks in a friendly neutral 
 country is healthy indeed, and a peculiar value attaches 
 to the exposures made- by Swedish writers of authority, 
 in which the guilt of bloodshed is brought home to Germany 
 with overwhelming force. But among the protagonists 
 whom we have mentioned, none carries more weight or 
 speaks from a riper experience of men and affairs than 
 Ilerr Nystrom, whose- views are presented to the Fnglish 
 public. 
 
 Some notion of the career and activity of so remarkable 
 a writer may be welcome to his English readers. Anton 
 Nystrom was born at Gothenburg on February !.">, 1SV_. 
 He studied medicine at I'psala and at Stockholm, and 
 \\ith a Thesis the title of which betrays his lifelong 
 interest in practical matters. Tin- I-' not and the R'mht 
 Shnpe of the Shoe he began his long literary career in 
 lsr.7. lie spent two years in visits to foreign medical 
 schools, successively making himself at home m Copen- 
 hagen, Berlin, Vienna, Paris, and London, and then, in 
 l.S(i'.>, he stttled down to be a practising physician in 
 Stockholm. !! had, h"\ve\ r. from early youth com- 
 bined with scientific investigation a passion for philo- 
 sophical speculation, and this found its earliest expression 
 in 1 s7.'l, in a volume entitled ,/,.\i/\ <;;// Cliri^tiiinili/ 
 iii't'i'il from a Scientific StiifitljHiint. In London and m 
 Paris IP- had become acquainted uitli the \n\\s and 
 \\iitmgs of Augiiste Comtc. to \\hieh IK- was instantly 
 att ract ed, and in 1 *7.~> he made a profession of I In- ( 'omt ist 
 faith. He introduced !'< >sit i\ i-.m into Sweden, founded 
 a journal, was rccogni/cd bv Pierre Latittc as a mainsta\-
 
 INTRODUCTION vii 
 
 of the movement, and lectured through Sweden on the 
 philosophy of Comte. This exposition of Positivism was 
 Dr. Xystrom's principal occupation until after 1879. 
 
 In 1880 he started the practical work by which he is 
 doubtless most widely known in his native country. This 
 was a far-reaching effort to raise the intellectual level of 
 the working classes of Sweden. He founded the Working 
 Man's Institute in Stockholm, with courses of popular 
 lectures on almost every branch of scientific knowledge. 
 Here he developed a system of education, by means of 
 evening courses, completed in a period of eight months 
 in the year. The scheme was conceived in a manner 
 extremely adaptable to the habits of the Swedish artisan, 
 and it enjoyed a surprising success. In its second year 
 the Institute was subventioned by the city and later by 
 the State, and it branched out into similar bodies formed 
 in all the principal towns of Sweden. Dr. Xystrom 
 remained director of the whole enterprise, and when, in 
 1894, the Institute was able to build itself a fine hall in 
 Stockholm, he received an ovation from a huge assembly. 
 He himself lectured here regularly on anatomy, physiology, 
 and the history of civilization. The results of his medita- 
 tions on the last-mentioned theme were given to the 
 public in what is the most important of his numerous 
 literary works, his All man kulturhistoria (General History 
 of Civilization), which appeared in six volumes between 
 1886 and 1892. This work the author designed as a 
 sort of " systematic encyclopaedia or a circle of scientific 
 information." He seeks in it to bring all the natural sciences 
 into relation with sociology. No other work of the kind, 
 executed with anything like the same fullness, exists in 
 the Swedish language. 
 
 In more recent years Dr. Xystrom has extended his 
 labours in the direction of political history, and has 
 published a scries of volumes in which contemporary 
 problems are carefully examined. In The Mdin Political 
 Danger for Scandinaria (1901) he faced the situation in 
 which the North, and particularly Sweden, finds herself
 
 viii INTRODUCTION 
 
 in relation to her powerful neighbours. In The Wars of 
 Eastern Kurope between KHSSUI, Poland, and Sweden (MM)tt) 
 lie went still more deeply into this inquiry. In the pre- 
 ceding year Dr. Nystrom had visited Alsace-Lorraine, and 
 he recounted his impressions in a volume which was 
 published simultaneously in Swedish, French (with a 
 preface by M. Millcrand). and German. He proposed the- 
 n-turn of the provinces to France in exchange for the 
 cession to Germany of some of the French colonies, a 
 solution of the ditlieulty which he fancied mi^ht lead to 
 a settled peace. In the course of the present work it will 
 be noted that Ilerr Nystrom has not yet abandoned some 
 hope of a restoration of Kuropcan balance by means of 
 an interchange of colonies. 
 
 Of the medical theories of Dr. Nystrom. exposed with 
 k'reat frankness and sometimes with a certain audacity, 
 it is n>t necessary to speak here. Nor of his valuable 
 contributions to pure sociology, such as his Christianity 
 and /'/ Thought (I'.KiS) and his essay on the protection 
 of t he children of the poor ( l'.I 1 ). Enough has been said 
 to show how multifarious have b'-en his intellectual 
 activities, and it will easily be recoani/ed how valuable the 
 opinions of such a man must become when they deal with 
 questions of the moment on which his vast rantu of 
 experience has jjiven him authority to speak. That 
 Dr. Nvstrom. alter full rellection, has so unhesitatingly 
 pronounced in favour of the Fntente Allies must be a 
 matter of sincere- pleasure to all patriotic Englishmen. 
 
 Ki>MlM> (JoSSK.
 
 AUTHORS PREFACE 
 
 IT is after a certain amount of hesitation that I have made 
 up my mind to publish this work. Perhaps it will meet 
 with disapproval, seeing that it is not only a reiteration 
 of the notes exchanged between the Powers before the 
 outbreak of the World War and of their leading features, 
 but an attempt as well to inquire into the causes of the 
 war, and must therefore grapple with the question of 
 responsibility. 
 
 In all neutral countries the citizens have been exhorted 
 to maintain a neutral attitude in their discussions concern- 
 ing the nations at war, and to refrain from expressions of 
 opinion in favour of this country or that. I have seen 
 recently in an Italian paper warnings to this effect, but 
 these warnings had, it seemed, chiefly the object of 
 warding off enemies from Italy, and Maeterlinck's pro- 
 paganda on behalf of Belgium was looked upon there 
 with some alarm, as it might tend to arouse popular 
 indignation against Germany and thus jeopardize an 
 unbiased judgment. 
 
 On this point there is much to be said. I admit that 
 general expressions of opinion and demonstrations are 
 improper and may prove harmful in a country which has 
 affirmed its neutrality ; but that individuals could be 
 absolutely neutral in discussing one or other of the bel- 
 ligerent Powers in this the vastest war in the history of 
 man, is unthinkable. We hear in Sweden, in private circles, 
 the most diverse views based on ancient sympathies for 
 this country or that, on personal relations, faith in the 
 
 ix
 
 x AUTHOR'S PREPACK 
 
 opinions of a certain newspaper, more <>r less veracious 
 informal i< >n, etc. 
 
 Sweden, like the other Scandinavian countries, has 
 ollicially dcelan d her neutrality in this World War, and 
 rightly so. On this point public opinion in Sweden is 
 really at one. Apart 1'roiu a few solitary voices, the 
 Swedes will not hear of actual participation on the plea 
 that the interests of the country demand action on one 
 side or the other. 
 
 Hut, however strictly we may adhere to the declaration 
 of our Government in this matter, we need not on this 
 ground consider that our lips are sealed when contemplating 
 the policies of the- warring nations, the causes which gave 
 rise to the war, and the acts and deeds committed therein. 
 Anyone who conscientiously and in the interests of truth 
 and justice studies the course of events must hi- entitled 
 to express his opinion, even if such expression of opinion 
 involves severe criticism. If this were not so. silence 
 in the name of neutrality would he synonymous with 
 cowardice, want of character, or indifference; it might 
 give other nations entirely untrue conceptions of the pre- 
 vailing opinion and thus create distrust. 
 
 If people in other countries, and particularly those at 
 war, are interested in learning the Swedish attitude 
 
 as seems to lie the ease it may therefore serve a Useful 
 
 purpose jf persons who have made a conscientious study 
 of the World conHiet express their views thereon. 
 
 More than ever lie fore do we now stand in the need 
 of utterly independent historians and political authors 
 capable of objective, eoiiseient ions, and unimpassitmed 
 criticism, able to keep thi-ir oun leanings in cluck and dis- 
 regard political parties and the claims of diverse nations 
 wh< n thev do not coincide with \\hat is right. It is on 
 account of the n< ed of these qualifications that warlike 
 complications can often best be unravelled by observers 
 belonging to a neutral State. 
 
 The confusion is general and boundless, the highest 
 moral principles are at stake, and normal development is
 
 AUTHOR'S PREFACE xi 
 
 arrested. It has long been found necessary for the 
 advancement of seiencc, art, industry, commerce, and 
 morality that different nations should cooperate therein, 
 and for this purpose settled international relations have 
 been established, whilst an understanding between races 
 and nationalities has been arrived at. All this is now as 
 if it had never been. The World War has almost entirely 
 destroyed the sense of justice, and all codes of right and 
 wrong were upset when brutal force became the dominant 
 principle. The law of nations no longer exists, all passions 
 have been unchained, hate prevents the exercise of reason, 
 nations live that they may kill and plunge one another 
 into distress and misery, the foremost inventions deal out 
 death and destruction, humaneness is a mockery, truth 
 is withheld and falsehood organized, the future is wrapt 
 in gloom, the brotherhood of nations is made impossible, 
 the brute in us is brought to the fore, and peace will be- 
 but a transient truce to be observed until the nations, with 
 their souls black with hatred, once more II y at each other's 
 throats. 
 
 This state will inevitably follow if the nations are 
 not called to their senses and enlightened on the real 
 rw/.sr.y of tlic World War, and if open and serious criti- 
 cism is not brought to bear on the faults committed 
 by leading statesmen when the war was in the making. 
 That faults of the gravest kind have been committed is 
 indisputable. 
 
 To endeavour to unravel the causes of the war, in order 
 thereby first and foremost to prepare the way for a fresh 
 understanding between the nations and prevent new 
 motives for war, has to me become a necessity which, in 
 common with others eager to advance the cause of culture, 
 I feel most keenly. We have been tormented long enough 
 but oh ! how little compared with the victims of the 
 war- we wish to hear no more. May it not excite surprise 
 if a person outside the orbit of events and politics, after 
 many months of melancholy depression I might almost 
 say of cultural torment and urged on by his convictions,
 
 xii AITIIOK'S PREFACE 
 
 studies, and meditations, feels impelled to open his heart 
 on the subject of the fateful conflict. 
 
 To understand the origin of this war it is necessary to 
 k'o far back into the past, and the more I have meditated 
 upon its causes, the firmer has become my conviction that 
 these are wrapt up primarily with Germany's history from 
 the earliest a^es to our time, and particularly \\ith the 
 appearance of Prussia as a military State. In this con- 
 nexion it becomes essential to inquire into the origin of the 
 I)ano-(ierman War of 18(51, the German War of 1S;<5. and 
 the Franco-Gorman War of ls?o. Hut this is not enough ; 
 the development of (iermanism since the beginning of the 
 nineteenth century must also be ^one into in order that 
 the inner causation of events may be revealed. Further- 
 more, we must recall the general features of the (ierman 
 wars of the seventeenth century and of the Middle A^es ; 
 nay, we must carry our minds back to the first appearance 
 of the Germanic race in antiquity and the /jreat migration of 
 nations. 
 
 Whilst for more than fifty years back, ever since the 
 Dano German War which attracted me and many other 
 Swedish volunteers under the Danish banners I have 
 been opposed to the political system, with its oppression 
 and militarism, which Hismarck introduced into Germany, 
 I have never shut m v c-yes to (icrmany's cultural un at IK -ss 
 and influence. F.ven though I may have been still more 
 deeply impressed by certain Knjjlish and French thinkers 
 and politicians, to name- but J. Stuart Mill, Gladstone, 
 Diderot, Comte, Gamhetta, Jules Ferry, I ha\e- always 
 fe-lt ad n lira! ion for many r- ]>r- s, ntat i\ < s of (ierman cult un % , 
 such as I-'re-cli-nek th- (ire at. Kant, (ioethe. and many 
 othe-rs. I i e ali/.<- t o t hi full t lie ,'n at achiev<-m< lit s of t he 
 thinkers of (tcrmany and ot he-r ei\ ili/.e d count ries, and ha\ < 
 net cause to sieli \\ it h an\ on r nat ion in the ^ri at st rnu^lc. 
 Hut. fur that matte r. the- nations tliemselvcs did nt \\ant 
 tli- \\ar. It is deplorable' that at the \e-ry time- \\lien old 
 national ant i| iat hies \\in- on the \ ( r>^<- ot disappearing, 
 mistrust and hatred should have e<ime into t lie ir e\\ n not
 
 AUTHOR'S PREFACE xiii 
 
 through the nations themselves, but through a mistaken 
 poliey dictated by a few individual statesmen, mostly 
 actuated by chauvinistic conceptions. 
 
 The French philosopher P. Bayle, in his celebrated 
 work Dictionnairc historiquc et critique (1097), held that 
 a historian should possess the following qualifications : 
 "A historian who would faithfully fulfil his function must, 
 in so far as stands in his power, transpose his mind to 
 the attitude of a stoic who is not influenced by any passion. 
 He must, insensible to all else, think of naught but the 
 interests of truth. He must forget that he belongs to a 
 certain country, that he was reared in a certain faith, that 
 he has this or that individual to thank for his worldly 
 possessions, and that this or that person is his relation and 
 his friend. If he be asked, ' Where are you from ? ' he 
 must answer, ' / am neither a Frenchman, nor a German, 
 nor an Englishman, nor a Spaniard, etc. ; I am a denizen 
 of the world. I am in the service of neither the Emperor 
 nor the French king ; I am in the service of truth alone.'' ' I 
 have identified myself with these reflections of Bayle's in 
 dealing with the World War and the causes which led up 
 to it. 
 
 Whilst engaged in scientific, social, and political studies 
 I have during the past half-century often and for long 
 periods visited Germany, England, France, and other 
 countries, conversed with eminent personalities, made 
 myself familiar with current opinions and customs, and 
 collected pertinent literature. I have thus, whilst honestly 
 seeking the truth in European politics, had access to the 
 channels for finding it, and I think that in my writings on 
 the subject General History of Civilization, Alsace-Lorraine, 
 etc. I have hitherto always manifested my earnest desire 
 to be impartial and objective. 
 
 AXTOX XYSTROM, 
 
 STOCKHOLM, March 1915.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 PAt.K 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 AUTHOR'S PREFACE ix 
 
 I. ON WAR AND MILITARY HISTORY 1 
 
 II. ON RACIALISM, ITS SHORTCOMINGS AND 
 
 DANGERS 7 
 
 III. THE SLAVS AND THEIR EARLIER DISTRIBU- 
 TION : THE MODERN SLAVS : PAN-SLAVISM : 
 SLAV CIVILIZATION 14 
 
 IV. GERMANY'S ANCIENT GERMANS : THEIR 
 EARLY' DISTRIBUTION AND RAVAGES : THE 
 GREAT MIGRATION OF NATIONS AND THE 
 GERMAN WARS OF THE MIDDLE AGES : THE 
 THIRTY YEARS WAR : THE PRUSSIAN STATE 
 AND THE PARTITIONS OF POLAND -_>4 
 
 V. RISE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF GERMANISM : 
 
 GERMANISTIC DREAMS OF GREATNESS 38 
 
 VI. PRUSSIA'S OPPRESSION OF HER POLISH 
 
 SUBJECTS ->:j 
 
 VII. THE DANO-GERMAN WAR OF I8(ii : BISMARCK'S 
 MACHIAVELLISM : PRUSSIAN OPPRESSION IN 
 SCIILESWIG 59 
 
 VIII. THE GERMAN FRATRICIDAL WAR OF I860 78 
 
 IX. THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM AND LUXEM- 
 BURG 82 
 
 X. THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR OF 1870 : HOW IT 
 
 WAS CAUSED BY BISMARCK 85 
 
 XL ANNEXATION OF ALSACE-LORRAINE THE 
 CAUSE OF THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 
 AND THE MONSTROUS SPREAD OF MILITARISM 
 IN EUROPE, AND ONE OF THE CAUSES OF THE 
 WORLD WAR OF 1911 11J5 
 
 xv
 
 xvi CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 XII. THE WOULD WAR OF 1911 
 
 PART I 
 
 A. Relations between Germany and Knpland : 
 Germany's Colonial Policy and Over-Population one 
 of the Causes of the War \'29 
 
 PART II 
 
 A. Immediate Causes of the World War : Turkey's 
 Oppression of the Halkan Provinces, Revolutionary 
 Movements, Russia's Protection, the Russo-Turkish 
 War : The Berlin Congress of 1H7S : Austria's Annexa- 
 tion of Hosnia and Her/.eyovina : The Great-Serbian 
 Movement : The Murder of the Crown Prince Francis 
 Ferdinand : Austria's Note to Serbia 150 
 
 H. The Serbian Conflict and the Great Powers : 
 Austria's Determination to Subdue Serbia by War : 
 The Mediation Proposals of Great Britain, France, 
 and Russia : Austria's Opposition : Why did Austria 
 not want a Conference ? Germany Supports Austria : 
 War Declarations of the Powers 183 
 
 ('. Germany's Violation of the Neutrality of 
 Belgium and Luxemburg : Germany negotiates with 
 Great Britain : Germany's Hostile Measures against 
 France and Belgium : Protests : Declaration of War : 
 The Defenders of the Violation of Neutrality : What 
 drove Great Britain into Participation in the War : 
 Synopsis of the Causes of the World War L'OO 
 
 I). Germany's Militarism and Preparedness for 
 War : F.u rope's Fear of Germany : The German View 
 of the War : "We have been Attacked : Germany 
 i^ Wa^'iny a Defensive War : A Hypnoti/.cd Nation UltJ 
 
 !'.. The Barbarity of the War : No War between 
 ( ivili/ed Nations has ever been marked by so much 
 ( riielty and Savagery '.'(IT 
 
 Mil. DANGFRx OF OVKR-POIM'I.ATION : WHAT >TA- 
 TIsTK S TKA< II : GF.RMANVS OYI.H POIMT.A 
 TION A (ONsTANT MF.NA(F. TO PFA( F. :i(7 
 
 \IV. 101 NDATlONs o| I'|;A< I. AI'll.H IHK \NAR .T_". 
 
 IND1.X ;ii:t
 
 I 
 
 ON WAR AND MILITARY HISTORY 
 
 SOME APHORISMS WHICH PROVIDE FOOD FOR REFLECTION 
 
 WAR is appropriate only in primitive stages of develop- 
 ment, or when civilized States have to deal with un- 
 civilized peoples disturbing or injuring them and whose 
 barbaric acts compel war in the name of civilization, or as 
 a means of defence against aggression. 
 
 Amongst civilized nations war is otherwise devoid of all 
 sense. To settle disputes between them by murdering and 
 destroying in other words, by exercising brute force 
 when justice could have been done by mediation and 
 arbitration, is a mockery of culture and common sense. 
 
 It is in truth deplorable, and a disgrace to civilization, 
 that the fate of human beings, the weal or woe of their 
 country, should be determined, in the last resort, if dis- 
 putes arise between the States, by violence and devasta- 
 tion, victory resting with the side in possession of the best 
 that is to say, the most devilish weapons of destruction. 
 Well may we endorse the sentiments of Gibbon in dis- 
 cussing the employment of gunpowder : "'If we contrast 
 the rapid progress of this mischievous discovery with the 
 slow and laborious advances of reason, science, and the arts 
 of peace, a philosopher, according to his temper, will 
 laugh or weep at the folly of mankind.'' 
 
 Mature reflection must lead to the conclusion that war, 
 like most phenomena of human life sickness and other 
 human suffering, etc. may, as a rule, be ascribed to two 
 kinds of causes : Causa' prof i ma', immediate, more or less 
 
 1 A
 
 2 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 incidental causes, and cuusir rctn<>ia\ dcej)cr-lying and 
 remoter, predisposing causes. A causa prn.iinui is often 
 hut an insignificant reason or a pretext on the part of a 
 State which desires war, hut which does not wish to appear 
 to he the a<:^rcssive party a provocation, an accusation of 
 violated national honour, an election of a ruler, an altered 
 form of government, or internal disturbances in a neigh- 
 bouring country, etc. A cau^i rt'inuta is generally of a 
 more serious kind a reasonable fear for the welfare of 
 the State, anxiety for its commerce in the- markets of the 
 world, fear of undue predominance or hegemony, the 
 suspicion of |i re pa rat ions fur a \\ar of revenue and plans for 
 retaking comjuered pro\ mces, the need of new provinces 
 or possessions in distant parts of the world for the exi- 
 p-ncies of a L't'ov, in;,' pop u la t ion. etc. The predisposing and 
 real causes arc freijn-ntly concealed, and the arts of dip- 
 lomacy thus oft<n s ( i k bv pn texts, such as the brinLfiiiLT 
 foiuanl of an incidental reason mobili/ation, etc. to 
 make it appear as if a State which clearly has been the 
 ai_'L'r ssi ,r \\ , p in nality the assailed party. 
 
 The iibjiets of war and the (piestioii of how \\ar should 
 )>< coiidueti-d in our < ra hv civili/ed nations are matters 
 \\hich have In in s ( t forth by all authorities on inter- 
 national law. In /A/x /,'/// '///// /.seAr / ' i'tlh'i I'ft < lit. by I b f f t r, 
 ei^'lith edition, pivpaivd by (nffek-n (ISNS), We read for 
 iii-t an-e : " Ci\ ili/i'd nati'ins ivcoMni/.e j n War |, n f ;in 
 . \lrimitv, an inevitable ( \ il which must not be carried 
 
 furth'l' than the )ltii**itt( <l<linDl<is. Ib-liee its highest 
 pMii'-i;.!-, hallowed as much by r< a~.on and b\- lo\ . of 
 humaiiit \ as b\ s. If int i n >t . is : 1 )o \oiir \\< my. i \ < n in 
 \\.ir. ti', ni"it h<;iin tlnui M iin<i: onltittli \r th< at t Miniin nt 
 of th. purp.-e : v. hils! t h.- old code of war. m the ot !,, r 
 hand, tollou < d t ;,- principle : Do you r i ni my a > n nicli 
 harm a ^ you eaii ai.d liiid u - ful. Th< ithie^ 
 )H'-irib' tin pi rim .|b|. ni' aiis and the utmost 
 t h' \ forbid, and t hi < at n \\ it h tin curse of hist or\ 
 man it \ a i .-I ba i ban - n i . 
 
 I 'nloit . ,al. !\ t! i. i . -till but a t I.. ..|-\ . fof I h.
 
 ON WAR AND MILITARY HISTORY .3 
 
 War which began in 11)14 lias proved both inhuman and 
 barbarous, and often certain belligerents have endeavoured 
 to harm the enemy as much as possible and used pro- 
 scribed methods. 
 
 Frederick the Great, himself an eminent warrior, said 
 that " the world would be happy if there were no other 
 means than negotiation to maintain justice and restore 
 peace and harmony among the nations. The force of 
 reason, not of amis, should be employed. Yet a sad 
 necessity impels princes to resort to cruel means, and there 
 are occasions when one must defend by the force of arms 
 the freedom of a people threatened with the oppression 
 of injustice, or when princes must submit the fate of 
 their people to the test of battle. It is the purpose of a 
 war which makes it just or unjust. The passions and 
 ambition of princes often distort their vision and paint 
 the most violent acts in pleasing colours. War is 
 an extreme measure, and therefore it should only be 
 resorted to after deliberation, in desperate emergencies, 
 and after weighing carefully whether one be driven to it 
 by the illusion of pride or by serious and compelling 
 reasons. 
 
 " War, as a rule, is so full of misery, the issue is so 
 uncertain, and the consequences are so ruinous to a 
 country, that princes cannot too deeply reflect before 
 plunging into it. I am convinced that if the minds of 
 kings could conceive a true and faithful picture of the 
 misery which a single declaration of war brings upon their 
 people, they would not be insensible. But their imagina- 
 tion is not vivid enough to give them a real picture of 
 sufferings which they do not feel, and from which their 
 position shields them. How are they to understand these 
 burdens which oppress the people ? The privations 
 which the country's young recruits must undergo ? The 
 contagious pestilences which ravage their armies ? The 
 horrors of battle and the still more murderous sieges ? 
 The despair of the wounded who have lost a limb ? The 
 distress of the fatherless who have lost their sole- supporter ?
 
 4 HKFORK, DTKINC;, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 Tin- loss of so many men useful to the Statr, whom death 
 gat hers all too so< >n '.' 
 
 On the \vholr. Frederick found man despicable ; he once 
 remarked to the philosopher, Professor Sul/.er of Herlin : 
 ' You do not understand sufficiently this accursed race to 
 which we belong." 
 
 Frederick the (ireat belonged to the remarkable group of 
 authors who in the eighteenth century represented the 
 objrctive and pragmatic school of historians. He wrote, 
 when he was still Crown Prince, his famous I'AntinMchiai'fl, 
 and published later The History of my Time and The 
 History of the Seren Yearx \\ in\ etc., and all these works 
 denote a clear understanding of the causes of events, a rare 
 impartiality in jud^in^ his own acts, and a philosophic 
 tn-nd of thought. He considered most historical works to 
 br " lies, adorned by a few truths" ; tliat the prejudices 
 of author^, their l)lind partiality for the country of their 
 birth and their hatred of foreign nations, so distorted 
 facts and events that it was hardly possible to penetrate 
 
 the Veil which Covered t hem. 
 
 I shall, lie wrote, " dare to utter outright and aloud 
 what is otherwise silentlv admitted. I shall describe 
 princes such as they are, without bias in favour of those 
 who are my allies and without hatred of those who are my 
 en- mies. One must." he continued, " lie impartial, write 
 with discrimination, and rely on none- but fully reliable 
 evidence: truthful persons, authentic documents, con- 
 cordant reports from different sources," etc. 
 
 Tin- l-'ri-neh writer L. lioiirdeaii, in his work entitled 
 L'tii^foin <t l< s hisloriin* (isss), pronounced upi>n 
 ln-t i .rieal \srit ini_'s a learned and valuable criticism, and 
 indicated tli' (jiialities which the historian should possess. 
 II' -li"U->. aiiion^ other tiling's. h"\\ personal mti rests and 
 passiniis, different political systems and parties ha\e 
 alu a\ s ( \< 1 1 - (1 tin most deleterious inl!u< nee on hist oncal 
 r> <-ords. \\lneh thus have often [n-cume positive lalsiiica 
 ti'.ns. 
 
 Ti'uth has." he sa\s. " no -jreat' T enem\ than passinn ;
 
 ON WAR AND MILITARY HISTORY 5 
 
 wherever passion appears there is ground for distrust. 
 The study of science demands complete detachment 
 from personal interest. The only passion for which there 
 is room in such study is the wish to find and utter the truth, 
 whatever it may he. Therefore history needs to enlist 
 minds which are free from extraneous ties, for one cannot 
 serve two masters at a time." Hut this ideal is very 
 difficult of attainment, and Bourdeau says outright 
 that " entire impartiality, which can readily be found 
 in those who study the abstract sciences, is impracti- 
 cable in history, a concrete science, in which the acts of 
 men, the work of passion, are observed and rendered 
 with passion." 
 
 Patriotism, despite its virtues, has a certain tendency on 
 some minds to create and aggravate prejudices, so that it 
 becomes Chauvinism, or the notion that one's own country 
 must be superior to all others. Especially in wartime this 
 national feeling becomes exacerbated, and under its in- 
 fluences some writers, historians, and politicians transgress 
 all bounds in their accounts of their own country's ex- 
 cellence and the enemy's inferiority, the justice of their 
 country's cause in making war and the deplorable injustice 
 of the enemy's. Under this influence they do not stop at 
 distortions of facts, nay, actual lies, partly to appear in a 
 favourable light to foreign countries, and partly to stimulate 
 patriotism in their own countrymen and spur them to 
 devoted defence against the enemy. Facts arc given an 
 entirely different complexion in the different countries to 
 attain this object, and truth is thrown to the winds ; it 
 practically ceases to have anything to do with the argu- 
 ment, the only vital point being to discredit the opponent 
 and to give those in authority, who helped to bring about 
 the war, the blindest support and thus secure the co- 
 operation of the people. 
 
 We cannot but deplore with Bourdeau the difficulty with 
 which the historian is confronted in endeavouring to 
 reconcile patriotism with truth. '' The more they love 
 their country the less can one rely on their impartiality.
 
 G BEFORE, DTKING, AND AFTER 1911 
 
 Has one not pood reason for serious misgivings when one 
 considers that most histories arc the work of ardent 
 patriots ? " 
 
 Of the learned Florentine Pojj^io (d. ll.VJ) it was said, 
 when he had written The Histury of Florence : "Good 
 patriot, bad historian."
 
 II 
 
 ON RACIALISM, ITS SHORTCOMINGS AND 
 DANGERS 
 
 VAST and far-reaching movements have in recent times 
 arisen around the subject of racialism, movements which in 
 reality denote a tendency in international polities inimical 
 to civilization. The terms Germanism, Latinism, and 
 Slavism have come to he used as political constructions 
 designating rival and hostile racial groups, and this in an 
 era when the nations should instead have realized the need 
 for pacific mutual relations and enlightened under- 
 standing. 
 
 How meaningless the race question is in Europe from 
 a scientific point of view is evident from the fact that all the 
 races of which the European nations consist are in reality 
 closely related to one another, i.e. sister races belonging to 
 the Indo-European family, albeit with an admixture of 
 earlier, prehistoric races, and in certain localities of 
 Turanian, and more especially Finnish, elements. 
 
 Certain writers in Germany have, however, become 
 scientific agitators ; they have enlisted themselves in the 
 service of national egoism or chauvinism and sought to 
 furnish evidence of the superiority of the Germanic over 
 the Latin or Slav races. 
 
 The Germans long thought that a certain formation of 
 the skull was characteristic of them all, that they were 
 dolichocephalic, or long-skulled, in contrast to the French, 
 who were normally brachycephalic, or short-skulled. Ex- 
 haustive investigation has shown, however, that in many 
 
 7
 
 8 BKFOKK, Dmixi;, AND AFTER 
 
 German countries, us, fur instance, Hesse, Swabia, and 
 Bavaria, the shape of the cranium is brachyeephalic as in 
 France, and that the most typical German skull, the 
 Teutonic, varies much in shape and may he either dolicho- 
 cephalic, mcsoccphalic, or braehveephalie. 
 
 Anatomically, therefore, the German racial theory is 
 false, and if \ve look hack into history \ve lind that the 
 French, even if of Latin origin, by no means lack Germanic 
 eli imnts. tor the Franks and the Normans were Germanic 
 peoplt s. 
 
 If this racial theory were true, the elemental principle 
 of tin- law of nations would he false; the law of nations 
 would thru he a mere collection of declamatory rules and 
 phrases naively strung together, \\liy respect a nation 
 which with an assumed scientific rijjht one has already con- 
 demned to death to serve the ends of a policy of hrute force ? 
 Hesidcs, of late, eve n in Germany \oiei s have heen raised 
 which d< -nonnee this racial theory. 
 
 Friedrieh llert/., one of the shrewdest students of tin- 
 race question m recent times, observes in his ^ivat work 
 Mini, rn>- /w.'vv, ntln <irit n ( I'.MU ) : " Hot h t he magnitude and 
 the permanence ot the race factors have been exaggerated 
 in an incrc-dible decree an<l t heir role in hist oneal expos it ion 
 must be regarded as secondary. He also points out that 
 the greatest authorities on anthropology disparage the 
 historical significance of "noble and "ignoble ' races. 
 Thus Kollmunn writes: "All European races, m so far 
 a> \\ e ba\i- hitherto penetrated into the m\st( riis of race, 
 are equally competent to grapple \\ith any ci\ ill/at ory 
 task. 
 
 'Tip iace th(oi-\ m tli< traditional sense," sa\s Il<rt/., 
 
 ina\ m our time more ri^htlv be called a playground for 
 politician^ and dilettanti than a sphere lor exact mvesti 
 ^atofs." ll'it/ d' elares that iiothmi.' ' N more false than 
 tli- \ i< \\ that national consciousness implies race and that 
 th'- raei tli-oi\ supplies the fundamental explanation of 
 iiati'.h.il tndeneiis. 'There is no principle more pn>\ o 
 cat i\ . o| h< , ,t lilt \ than that of race and hat lonalit \ . The
 
 RACIALISM : SHORTCOMINGS AND DANGERS 9 
 
 race theory teaches contempt for the foreign race, its hopeless 
 inferiority, the danger of its intermixture with the ' noble ' 
 race. All nations are composed of the most varied races, 
 and we see, in point of fact, that those very nations which 
 arc made up of the most varied elements stand highest in 
 the civilized world." 
 
 What little importance must be attached to the shape of 
 the skull in determining the race I have shown in my work 
 on The Origin of Brachycephali and Dolichoccptiali (1903),* 
 in which I pointed out that both long and short skulls as 
 well as intermediate variations, arc to be found amongst 
 most races both in ancient and modern times, and that the 
 shape of the skull is not an invariable mark of race, but 
 varies according to cultural influences, the carriage of the 
 body, etc., and that one and the same people may in earlier 
 stages be mainly composed of dolichocephali, but later largely 
 of brachycephali. I have also found by examination of the 
 heads of 500 living Swedes that the brachycephali are 
 more numerous among the upper classes, but that among 
 the peasantry the dolichocephali predominate. 
 
 Eminent anthropologists have accepted my proofs as 
 conclusive, and my craniological theory seems to have 
 been generally adopted. 
 
 Apart from theoretical research, my investigations have 
 served one positive purpose : they must tend to counteract 
 race hatred and chauvinism, inasmuch as the theory of 
 distinct racial characteristics has led some writers to pro- 
 claim that the dolichocephalic nations in Europe were 
 superior to the brachycephalic, and therefore destined to 
 rule and to conquer. 
 
 As a rule, accuracy has not been a feature of the attempts 
 to fix the nationality of the different peoples ; in fact, there 
 has been a tendency to let the ruling clement, the Idnguage, 
 etc., determine the nationality of the people. Thus the 
 French have been classed as of " Latin,'' the Germans 
 
 First published in Runke's Arcfiiv fur Anthropologic. 1901, 
 er the title Ufbcr die Formi'erandcrungen dcs maischlicfieu 
 Schadcls.
 
 10 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 of " Germanic," and UK- Russians of " Slav " origin, 
 although all these peoples art- <>f very mixed origin. It 
 is cjuitc insuilicient . in deciding the question of nation- 
 ality, to know that a certain stork has during lonjj a^'cs 
 ruled in a certain area or occupied a country. It is 
 necessary to know in what measure it has expelled, or 
 extirpated, or absorbed, an earlier population of the area 
 where it has bccnie the ruling element. 
 
 Although in rare instances the inhabitants of a conquered 
 runtry have been exterminated, if they wen- relatively 
 few. there js no doubt that in most cases where a foreign 
 people has conquered a count ry, t he greater part of the old 
 inhabitants at all events, the women and children have 
 by no means been exterminated, but have remained as 
 serfs or r< tain- d certain liberties and privileges. In time a 
 fusion i f t he niluiL' wit h t he conquered people has as a rule 
 tak- -n place, (li.- latttr (lement having often been prc- 
 dominant and thus ethnographic-ally determined the 
 nationality in a lar^" r m< -asurc than the former, although 
 L'en- rallv the rulinu' element has <_'iven its name to tin 
 nat ion alter tin < >n< juest . 
 
 NO\', h 1 r- in Kup'pe is there a nation of unmixed race ; 
 e\en '.\hen political and social unity exists and seems coin 
 plete, the nation l> composed of se\eral racial eleineiils. 
 The l-'r neh nation, \\luch stems so homogeneous, j s tin's 
 mad-- u;> of pp-hist oi ic nnknoun races, Celts, Romans, 
 (iermans in th- Middle A'jes called Hretons Normans 
 ( Sealidl!ia\ lalis i, (Gascons, Provencals, etc., who have been 
 fii-.'d together, P -jard themst-|\-es all as l-'n nehmen. and 
 speak tin sain- laiiL'MaL'e. although etitain pro\ineis ha\e 
 
 til- It ' '\S II illaleet s. 
 
 The Kn^'lish and tin Scotch also form a fairly homo^e 
 n- on . n. it ion, but comprise maii\ diff<rent raeial 1> ment s 
 ! -- ml- ,| fp.m theCt It , (i. rmans. tc. llmse (iaeN. lictJ, 
 S-of s. AiiL'!' -. Sa \ojis, a IK I Scaiidina\ iaiis \\ ho in the Middl<- 
 \ ' - c. .lit i IK I- d for the ma 1 1 ry of t he count ry . 
 'li;' (.'imaM nation is made up of Celts. Hermans, and 
 :di . unknown prehistoric races. I'an^ermanisnj
 
 RACIALISM: SHORTCOMINGS AND DANGERS 11 
 
 should therefore, if it were consistent, expel the Celtic 
 elements in South Germany and the Slav elements in North 
 Germany for example, the Prussians ! 
 
 The Italian nation consists of Celtic and Germanic ele- 
 ments and the descendants of the old Romans, who them- 
 selves were a mixture of earlier Italian, Etruscan, and 
 other peoples. 
 
 The Danish people is also very mixed, though distin- 
 guished by strong national unity and feeling ; yet it is com- 
 posed of Celtic, old Germanic as well as modern German 
 elements, Slavs, etc. 
 
 The Swedish nation issued originally from a mixture of 
 unknown prehistoric peoples with Celts and Germans, who 
 at an early stage became the ruling stock. But throughout 
 the historical era, until our time, foreign racial elements 
 have been absorbed into it. I have found by inquiry 
 into the descent of 500 living Swedes that 07, or 14.4 per 
 cent., had foreign blood ; nearly half of these had German 
 blood, and next in order came those with Scottish, 
 Frankish, and Walloon blood in their veins.* 
 
 In Russia it has long been generally held that the German 
 is the cnemij. The Russian General Skobeleff, in 1882, 
 gave vent to the following utterance to Slav students in 
 Paris : " In our country the stranger has penetrated 
 everywhere - we have become the victims of his intrigues, 
 enslaved by his power. The German is that stranger ! 
 The German is the enemy ! The struggle between Slavs 
 and Teutons is inevitable ! " 
 
 In Germany, on the other hand, it has been contended 
 that Russia has much to thank Germany for on account 
 of the vast immigration from that country, that most 
 industrial establishments in Russia owe their existence to 
 German initiative, that even the leading positions in the 
 country's Government and Army have been entrusted to 
 
 * The author, for instance, is descended fnun very ancient 
 Swedish stock on his father's as veil as his mother's side; but 
 on both sides he h;;s inherited Scottish. Ce;m,:n. and Frankish 
 blood.
 
 12 HEFORK, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 individuals of (icrman descent, albeit they have since be- 
 come Russians. 
 
 Racial hatred /UT AT, or the hatred between races as such, 
 without a political background, without antagonisms 
 between the States, is in civilized countries an anomaly, a 
 folly, the sheerest madness. It is in reality an artificially 
 fostered st ntunent. often founded on ignorance or on dis- 
 torted history under the influence of warlike happenings 
 or exaggerated nationalism that is to say, chauvinism. 
 
 It is not racial antagonism that brought about the 
 great war of I'.Ul. It is State rearing itself against State. 
 It is not only Slavs who are lighting in the East against 
 Teutons, and Teutons who are lighting against Slavs, for 
 there is no lack of Slavs in the (iernian and Austrian 
 armies, and in t he West ue see t he (iermanic State of (ireat 
 Hritain lighting against tin- (iermans of (iermany. 
 
 Racial hatred exists, ho\vever, as a background to the 
 uar of that there can be no doubt and is not dillieult 
 to understand, seeing that the (iermans have since the 
 Middle Age-, aetuallv ousted the Sla\ s from Central Kuropc 
 and conquered several Sla\omc countries, (itrman poli- 
 ticians, moreover, IK \ < r t ire of point ini: out that among the 
 Sla\ s the hat red of ( ,< rniany is m t he blood. 
 
 In Russia th'fe is more than a tiiidiney to regard t!i.- 
 \\orld NNar as a stni^^li of Slavism against (icrmanism, 
 and in (i-rmany it has been didared to be the struggle of 
 (iirmanism against Slavism. 
 
 Aeei.rding to the (ierman \Vhite Hook, the Ini|)erial 
 ( hancellor, Rethmann Hollweg, dfelan d at the beginning 
 "t the uar: 'The subjugation nf all Sl.i\s under t he 
 KM -i.i n >erpt re through Aust ria's e. >mpl> t- do\\ ntall \\ou Id 
 mak' the position o| the (iermamc rae< in Muropc untin 
 Tli< relore (iirmans could not do ot!i<rui-e than 
 
 ||. r -npport in the Serbian e-iiilhet. 
 II' dm. alter |n s return hom 
 n^ .\i/l,,t>r mt i r\'ie\\ ., laid 
 
 It i. the rise of 
 l.'rmam uhie}, brought the
 
 RACIALISM: SHORTCOMINGS AND DANGERS l.'i 
 
 Germans' intense resentment against Great Hritain, as 
 they regard her participation in the war as racial treason. 
 This makes our responsibility all the greater. \Ve have 
 the purest blood of all Germanic peoples ; this carries 
 its duties with it/' 
 
 The tension between Russia and Germany, which, on 
 the outbreak of war, manifested itself once more by 
 its appeal to racial animosities, demands a closer eluci- 
 dation of the position and ethnographical conditions of 
 Slavs and Germans.
 
 Ill 
 
 '1 UK SLAVS AM) TIIKIH KAHLIKH DISTRIBUTION: 
 
 THK MODKHN SLAVS : I'AN-SLAVISM : SLAV 
 
 CIVILIZATION 
 
 Tiii. early diffusion of the Slav* in Kurope, about which 
 hitlii-rtu ii"t enough has been known, was originally far 
 greater than is ^ in rally credited. This is dearly shown 
 hv a remarkable \sork published by the Academy of 
 >cii ne< s at (.'raeou . fr< 'in t h<- pen of a 1'ohsh savant , Dr. \\ . 
 Ketr/.vn-ki, Tin Ku*t Rlu nish Slurs (() .S'A/u nuunlt mit~sz.ku- 
 i<Kijili ni^tlij* tnitdzy I'ttuni, a Laba, Sala i ( y.eska, (iranicu, 
 
 I s'.t'.). 
 
 Th ( K luiani-t Miilli nhoff ha<l alreadv jmintetl out that 
 all th- "M nanu-s of localities bt tueeii the Rhine and the 
 I'. ib* all l;{ (.(riiian and that the (iermans Were Uol the 
 original inhabit ant s ot t hose lucaht ies, but migrated t hit her 
 as e>.njii( I'M-s. He eiinteiidi (1 that the earlu r inhabitants 
 hail b< i n (dts; but now Ket r/\ n^ki sli<,\\s that these 
 oM^'inal inli.ii.it ant \s i n Sla\ s, for the nann s reeur in t he 
 1'ie ii1 (i.t\ s!a\ countries. He bases his case on n;mies 
 \M,ieh i\iii (finnan writers acknowledge t<> be s|a\oiiic, 
 uiid iii t .u, ci -, t hi' 1 1 niiinat ins // . and a<i*t and tin nann s 
 
 II -. II i ml. and thir combinations ; In slni\ss that 
 ti.'I' an about M.O Mich nailH s of loeallt ies b. tUeen t he 
 Hi; and t h- lat.r Slav b..imdarN in Ka-.t-rn I'lurope. 
 'II,' n. o t eon\ nn 'iiiL' are the naiins of mountains and 
 n\' i . -.neh a L'h' in. Lipp'-. Saale. ( )i|i r, !<-., all Sla\onie 
 i i.i n.- >. 
 
 1\' ) ; / \ 1 1 ki aNo shows t hat t In < Slavonic names cannot 
 
 11
 
 SLAVS AND THEIR EARLIER DISTRIBUTION 15 
 
 be claimed to indicate colonies of Slav prisoners of war, 
 but clearly point to descendants of an earlier Slavonic 
 population gave their names to these localities before 
 the Germanic occupation. 
 
 German runic records also denote the presence of Slavs 
 as late as the ninth century on the banks of the Rhine, 
 Fulda, etc., and give us the names of over a hundred 
 localities previously occupied by Slavs. 
 
 In most cases, however, the Germans on conquering a 
 new area are likely to have given it a new name, so that 
 the retention of the Slav designation would seem to 
 indicate that the Slav population was only Germanized 
 by degrees and thus preserved the name. 
 
 The Greeks and Romans of antiquity doubtless were 
 acquainted with the Slavs, although for a long time they 
 made no distinction between them and the Germans ; 
 just as at first they did not differentiate between Celts 
 and Germans. Ketrzynski points out that in antiquity 
 the Slavs were known by the name of Suevians, but that 
 the Greeks and Romans did not know how to pronounce 
 the crossed Slav letter I, and therefore altered the name. 
 But that the terms li Slavs " and " Sucvi " represent the 
 same race was long ago acknowledged by Grimm and 
 other philologists. 
 
 Csesar's Suevi, moreover, occupied the regions which, 
 according to the work in question, they hold in Western 
 Europe. 
 
 It is important to recognize that the " Gcrmania " of 
 antiquity was merely a geographical expression and had 
 no ethnographical significance. Caesar's Germania was 
 inhabited by Germans, Suevi, and Celts, and Germans 
 likewise inhabited Gaul. 
 
 Tacitus in his work on the customs of the Germans 
 describes German and Sucvian tribes as belonging to 
 different nations, and Ketrzynski points out that Tacitus' 
 description of the religious ceremonies of the Suevian 
 Semnones and the Herta cult of the Muithonians and 
 others, with their blood sacrifices, corresponds in all
 
 1C BKFORK, DriiiNu, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 essential particulars \\ith the accounts jjivcn by Adam 
 of Hrcmcn and llrlnmld in tlic eleventh and twelfth 
 centuries of the Radi^ast and Svantewit/. cults amonjr 
 the I'omeranian Slavs. Tacitus' Suevi were the Western 
 Slavs, and his Yciudi were the Russians and other Eastern 
 Slavs. 
 
 The (iothic historian Jordanes wrote in the sixth century 
 that Scandinavia was a " factory of nations " (ttflicinu 
 gentium, m^iiui tmtiunuin) ; according to Ket r/ynski, 
 nearlv all the (iermanic peoples of the Continent came 
 from Scandinavia, whence as conquerors, or, in other 
 w>rds, as pirates, they occupied the native lands of the 
 Celts and Slavs in (iermany. They possessed a military 
 organization, and hence were able to conquer the latter 
 race". \\ho lacked such organization. It is a significant 
 fact, mitreovir, that certain of the ticrmanic peoples in 
 Middle Europe, such as the (ioths, (Jerman I.onuohards, 
 and Saxons, had inherited traditions of Scandinavian 
 descint. and that others, such as the Franks and Ale- 
 mannt. at all < vents spoke of having come from a strange 
 count ry . 
 
 E\en the l)aii(s said that they came from Scandinavia. 
 In Schlcsu i^' traces have been found of Slav colonies as far 
 as Aahenraa. It it \\as the plundering incursions of the 
 Scandinavians and th<-ir colonization at the mouths of 
 the Hhine that j, r avc rise to the migrations of the Celts, 
 the former must ha\e settled in those parts as early as 
 the sixth or seventh centurv B.C. Hy ile^rees they pcne- 
 trat-d further into the countrv, and in C:esar's time a 
 coupli ni" tli-ir trilies, tli< N'an^iones and Trilmei. \verc 
 settlid permanently in the region of \\'orms and Stras 
 liurj.'- \Nhiii iJrusiis in the year '.' it.c. j-rosscd the Rhine 
 he loimd Id' (iermanic Chatti in the parts mhaluted in 
 ( ': .ar - t HIM I >\ SIM \ i ; thus the lat t r had in the mean 
 time succumbed in the st riiL'L'le \\ it li t he ( ii I mans. 
 
 At I ! ' t im of Tacit us. or at the end of the lirst cent ur\ 
 alt'i ( In i .( . the count r \ \\ i st of the Mil >c \\ as onl \ in 
 habit- d hv Lonjrdbards and ilermundun as independent
 
 SLAVS AND THEIR EARLIER DISTRIBUTION 17 
 
 Slav tribes; but towards the end of the fourth century 
 came the Scandinavians, who partly subjugated and 
 partly allied themselves to the Longobards, whereupon 
 the name passed to the conquering people, which became 
 a Slavo-Germanic race. These Longobards were later 
 driven south by the Angles and Varini, who occupied the 
 country of the Ilermunduri ; their mastery was brought 
 to an end in o.'Jl by the Franks, who now became the 
 ruling people on the Lower Saalc and Middle Elbe. 
 
 At that time German tribes were almost everywhere in 
 possession of the Western Slav regions, and free Slavs 
 only existed in the angle between the Main, Regnit/, the 
 Danube, and Bohemia. Here arose in 02.3 the kingdom 
 of Samo, which by the victory at Mogast (near Bayreuth) 
 he protected against the supremacy of the Franks. 
 
 A Serbian Prince, Dervan, whose people had long 
 acknowledged the suzerainty of the Franks, seceded from 
 them and made common cause with Samo ; Dervan's 
 country probably lay between the Saalc, the Ilm, and the 
 Main. 
 
 After Samo's death (G58) his kingdom was divided 
 between his many sons and thus lost all its importance, 
 to be merged finally into the empire of Charlemagne (805). 
 
 The Germanic incursion brought about a general up- 
 heaval of the conditions in the Slav countries. The 
 possessions of the nobles fell into the hands of the German 
 masters. Colonists holding the estates of others on lease 
 were reckoned personally '' free/' as were a number of 
 military on the Church lands. The great mass of Slav 
 peasants became, after the occupation, the serfs of the 
 secular or ecclesiastical masters or of the imperial crown 
 lands, although they were allowed to retain certain rights. 
 They were simply called Sclavi. 
 
 After the heathen Slav kingdoms in Northern Germany 
 had long been in a state of ferment and at war with one 
 another, Henry I defeated the Slav tribe of the Ilevelli 
 and took possession of their capital. Brandenburg (D'28). 
 The sphere of dominion of his empire was widened 
 
 B
 
 I* 1 HKFOKK, Dt'Rixi;, AND AFTER 1914- 
 
 considerably, whilst at tlu- same time the German national 
 interests were furt lu-rc-d, having been seriously jeopardized 
 by tlu- Slav unrest. The Germanizing of these Slavs was 
 Ixiund tn 1~>'1!<>\\ soon, for the masters would not con- 
 descend to Irani the language of their suhjeets and the 
 ecclesiastics showed a horror of everything Slavonic-. 
 Tin- const queiicc was that the Slav languages wen- bound 
 soi -IK r or later to die out in Germany. When this did 
 not come to pass fast enough, their use was simply pro- 
 hibited, as took place in IKS,") by means of the decree 
 E:ti /mini ntnr " ("Tiny shall be exterminated "). 
 
 The fact of the Slav nations having, generally speaking, 
 for so long been dominated by the- Germanie element was 
 by 110 means due to inferior intellectual equipment, for 
 this has proved to be as generous as that of the Germans ; 
 the reason is rather to be sought in the geographical 
 titii't'i'in and the political conditions in their countries. 
 
 Some Slavs have been exposed to Axialic invasions, 
 \\hieh prevented the development of their State organiza- 
 tion and progress in culture, whilst the Germans were 
 aMe to follow a more independent course of development 
 and \MTC preserved from foreign oppression. 
 
 In contrast to the slower and more dour Germanic 
 t !n[ >eraiin nt , the Slavs have always shown themselves 
 hv< her, brisker, and more sensitive. 
 
 Lo\c of hbertv has also from the remotest ages been 
 
 .raeteristie of the Slavs, and they have therefore been 
 ! - amenable to discipline and to the submission required 
 b\ modem State organization, to which the Germans have 
 b- 1 1 1 ' 1 1 t hemselves. 
 
 \\ h' re despot ism has had t ime to develop, as in Russia, 
 the Slav love of liberty has, however, in the course of 
 centurii , IM-II suppressed among the masses, though it 
 ] i->i t.il m /i minority and found exjiression in more or 
 1' - - i Vo'ut ii inary mo\'ement s. 
 
 Tii'- S!a\ -, \\lio since earli-st antiquity ha\e occupied 
 H.' major portion of Kastern Kurope and ^'ladually split
 
 THE MODERN SLAVS 19 
 
 language into three large groups : The Eastern, the 
 Southern, and the Western. The Eastern group con- 
 sists of : 
 
 (1) Great Russians or Muscovites, for the greater part a 
 mixture of Slavonic and Finnish tribes, and in a lesser 
 measure of Mongolian, Gothic, and other racial elements. 
 
 (2) Ruthenes or Ukrainians -so-called " Little Russians " 
 -inhabiting Ukraine, Eastern Galicia, Volhynia, and 
 
 Podolia. 
 
 The Southern group consists of : 
 
 (1) Bulgarians, a mixture of Slavs and the earlier 
 Finnish Bulgarians, Goths, and others. 
 
 (2) Serbians, in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
 Montenegro, Styria, Carinthia, etc. 
 
 (3) Slovenes, in Southern Austria. 
 Western Slavs are : 
 
 (1) Poles, in Poland, Posen, Galicia, and Silesia. 
 
 (2) Slovaks, in Moravia and Hungary. 
 
 (3) Czechs, in Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary, and Silesia. 
 
 (4) Wends (who call themselves Sorbs), in the two 
 Lausitz provinces (Southern Brandenburg and Northern 
 Saxony) ; now numbering about 120,000. In the oldest 
 historical period they were spread over a far wider area, 
 as far as the rivers Saale and Havel. 
 
 (5) Lettic and Lithuanian Slavs, in Lithuania, Courland, 
 and other areas. Prussia was inhabited at an early 
 period by Slav tribes closely related to the Letts and 
 Lithuanians. They sometimes came in contact with 
 Goths and other Teutonic tribes before the great migra- 
 tion of nations. They first appeared in history in the 
 tenth century under the name of Bomssians or Prussians, 
 who spoke Borussian or Prussian. The name of Prussia 
 is thus of Slav origin. By degrees the Borussians became 
 Germanized both in customs and language, as did a great 
 part of the Wends, with the result that in the Middle 
 Ages they could only be traced in certain villages. It 
 may be of interest to note that it is from the Lithuanian 
 that the most characteristic forms of the German language
 
 20 BKFOKK, DURING, AND AFTER 1014- 
 
 an derived, vi/. the \ sounds, the z sound, and the multiple 
 consonant sounds such as txch. as in the word " Deutseh." 
 
 Looking at all these Slav peoples, one may well wonder 
 what Pan-Slavism means and what can he expected 
 I" it. 
 
 Pan Slavism. <-r an endeavour to hrinjf ahout a close 
 union of all Slav peoples, is twofold: Political I'un- 
 SLi: i^rn. <-r a political union under Russia's guidance ; 
 ami Cultural I'tin Sim 7\w. or a eominunity of interests 
 found- d on racial jiride and sentiments in the domains 
 of hfr rat ure. lanuua^e, etc. 
 
 Tin first imp' tiis to this movement was aiven hy a 
 lit- iar\ int -Meet ual society in the f<>rti<s of last century, 
 uhieh hi Id its lii-st Slav Congress in Pra-jiie in the year 
 IMv The pan S!avnic ideas \veiv subsequently fostered 
 m Austria and Russia, where the Slavophiles Aksakow. 
 Katkow. an<l "fliers propagated them \\ith Lireat assiduity. 
 Hussja, tin n the only independent Slav State, constituted 
 h- r- If at lir-t "ii!\ thr"iiL.'h ne\\ s]ap< rs and societies 
 Ih- Pr-'t'etor "f all Sla\'s. and \vas aeelalimd as such !>\' 
 S!.i\ deputati"iis at the Kt hnoLTraphical Mxlnlut ion of 
 Moseo .. in ISU7. Th.. P.-!- - al"!,. abstained. 
 
 Pan Slavism m |{u-sia is connected \\ith the Russian 
 Sla\ "j'hil s' natp'ii.dly < \alted \< aching which claims the 
 >!.i\ x to he 'Tli> Chosen PI ople " called upon to create 
 a n- \\ ei vi I I/at ion. 
 
 Alt- i 1st'.? t ),, Pan Slavonic moveim-nt was more and 
 ni'.r- dipefid t..\\.ii'd- a ii'ilitii'til nni'iii nf ///< .S'///rv nniLr 
 l! : I, ..<!,i /,,'/>. Iii the so call, d Kastern i|Ue-,tion 
 
 < '!! I nin_' tl,' Halkan Slates Russia, t "". h:e- \\antiil 
 fo mak. I.- r 1 1 " n-.f only the pmti el n ss of the ()i'th"<l"\ 
 <.!' I. ( hi" i han I, ii I also t he L 'iiardian "I the Sla\ States 
 p'.iltleall', . thu- i.'l\in.J rise to serious t'lr-i"II l>(t\\el) 
 
 \ ; tri nd Ru -i.-i. 
 
 I . P.i't > s!a\ n 1 1 i "i i had. "I course, t" I.e alian 
 
 \M|,.,ii L 'h Russia has attempted to 
 a !-t, nov. "if , no\\ allot hr Sla\' lialion, she has, on
 
 PAN-SLAVISM '21 
 
 the other hand, oppressed other Slav peoples, espeeially 
 the Poles and the Ukrainians. 
 
 Moreover, in our own time, we have seen the Bulgarians 
 make a stand against Russia's Pan-Slavonic efforts. On 
 the outbreak of the World War a member of the Slavonic 
 Society at Sofia wrote an article in the I'olya newspaper 
 in which he criticized Russia's veiled Pan-Slavonic threats, 
 for " Russia does not contend for the supremacy of the 
 Slavs, but for the conquest of the smaller Slav peoples 
 and is the worst enemy of the Slav idea."' 
 
 There can therefore be no question of a " Pan-Slav- 
 onic " danger to Germany from the East. 
 
 Pan-Slavism, on the other hand, might, if it were 
 consistent, demand the reunion of the Prussians with 
 the Slavs, and the expulsion of all German, Esthonian, 
 Finnish, Tartar, and Circassian elements in Russia ! 
 
 Cultural Slavism is, moreover, nowadays, hardly Pan- 
 Slavonic, even though literary federations and congresses 
 between Slav peoples have taken place. But, in any 
 case, these are of a pacific nature. Slavism is, in this 
 respect, no enemy of Germanism, even if it attempts to 
 safeguard the unhampered development of the Slav peoples 
 and to combat opposition on the part of the Germans. 
 
 Is it really fair, apart from economical and political 
 interests, to see in the cultural leanings of the Slav peoples 
 elements of danger to European civilization and humanity '( 
 Have not the Slavs produced great minds and been of 
 some use to humanity ? 
 
 Let us east a cursory glance over Slav culture. 
 
 John IIuss, the head of the University of Prague, who 
 attempted to bring about the reform of his Church a 
 century before Luther and was condemned to be burnt 
 at the stake in 1415, was a Czech, born in Bohemia, as was 
 his disciple and collaborator Ilicronymus, sentenced to 
 the same death. IIuss inaugurated a new era in Czech 
 literature, further encouraged by the Hussites : this 
 literature had its golden age in the sixteenth and at the 
 beu'innina' of the seventeenth centuries, when arts and
 
 22 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 sciences were freely cultivated. The Czech progress was, 
 however, arrested in 1771 by an Imperial decree, which 
 ordained that the German language alone should he used 
 in the higher education, whereupon long and hitter 
 internal struggles were waged hy the C'/eehs against the 
 Germans. After 181S the C'/eehs began to gain for them- 
 selves a stronger national position, and a number of 
 poets C/elokowsky, Kollar, Holly, and others as well 
 as historians, archaeologists, and naturalists, now made 
 their appearance. A society for C/eeh literature was 
 formed in conjunction with the Bohemian Museum, 
 which magnificent building was completed in 1S1K5. Since 
 IS.S'J the I'nivcrsity of Prague has had a C'/ech and a 
 German section. 
 
 Poland gave birth to the celebrated astronomer 
 Copernicus. That country has also produced a large 
 number of eminent writers widely known and admired 
 Niemcewie/, Mickiewic/, Slowacki, (ios/.eynski, Krasinski, 
 I'Ylinski. Kra/ewski. Sienkievic/, and others in addition 
 to many historians, such as I,< h \el. Chodzko, Soltyk, 
 He/o/owski, Mi( roslavski, Dembrinski, Walis/ewski, etc. 
 
 The I'nivM'sitv of \Varsaw was long maintained by 
 1'olish savants, hut Russian oppression gradually drove 
 them away. The I "nivcrsit ies of Cracow and Lcmberg, 
 which formerly onlv had German prof< i ssors, liave now 
 fur several decades been staffed solely with Poles, and 
 manv of these have been eminent scientists of Kuropean 
 fame, such as the anatomist Kadyi and the bacteriologist 
 Buivid. tc. 
 
 Areh:ii.|o^y has had a famous representative in 
 Maj< u ski. 
 
 /,'/'/./ in Ih' ninetetiith e-ntui-y produci d a lar.''- 
 iiuu !> i" of aut hors of high rank : among t IK (in at -Russians 
 Pushkin. I.- niM-ntofi. H, slueh. 0. Il< i /, n. 1 )ost , .\ . \ ski. 
 TMI _ Hi- v. Al- \ i Tolstoi. I.i o Tolstoi, and ot h> i's, and 
 amoii:/ I'kr.iiniaiis Kot l.iri \ ski. (io^ol, I\\itko. dulak. 
 Sj> \ t i iiko. \s iminent historians and arch.'fologists, 
 ainon^' t h- ( iri at -Russians \\( ha\'e BogdaiiolT. Bai r,
 
 SLAV CIVILIZATION 23 
 
 Zagoskinc, Klincewski, PlatonolT, VinogradoiT, Kunik 
 Schachmatoff, Kondnkoff, J. Tolstoi, and others, and 
 among the Ukrainians Duehinski, Kostomarov, Kulisj, 
 Ilrusevski, Antonovitch, etc. 
 
 Among the many Russian natural scientists are numerous 
 famous men : the bacteriologist MetchnikolY, head of the 
 Pasteur Institute in Paris ; the chemist Mendelejew, 
 famous for his researches in the domain of physical 
 chemistry ; the physiologist Pawlow, who some years ago 
 was awarded the Nobel pri/e for epoch-making research, 
 etc. 
 
 Russia is, moreover, distinguished by a large number 
 of scientific institutions and museums, where many learned 
 men are working. 
 
 Scientific education among the Ruthencs is provided 
 for by fourteen Ruthenian professors and lecturers at 
 Lcmberg University. 
 
 Among painters, sculptors, and musicians the Slav 
 people's also have a number of eminent representatives. 
 
 As regards the Balkan Slav nations, it is only in recent 
 times, after they had thrown oil' the Turkish yoke, that 
 they have been able to attain a high stage of culture. 
 Among these peoples the Bulgarians are more particularly 
 deserving of attention on account of their quick perception 
 and anxiety for advancement. All Bulgarians re ce ive 
 school education and love their studies. A University 
 exists in Sofia, where humanistic, juridical, and scientific 
 subjects are taught. Bulgarian poetical art bears a 
 humanistic and social stamp, and keeps to realities. Its 
 foremost exponent and the most modern representative 
 of South Slavonic culture is Ivan Vazov, who took part 
 in the revolutionary movements against Turkey and 
 described these with poetic fervour in many of his writings. 
 
 The Serbians have also reached a higher stage of educa- 
 tion since the wars of liberation. A University lias been 
 instituted at Belgrade. Several poets and novelists of 
 high rank have appeared, among them Katjanski, Raeliti- 
 jevitj, and Lazarcvitj.
 
 IV 
 
 (.KRMANY'S ANCIKNT (.KRMANS: TI1KIR KARLY 
 DISTRIWTION AM) RAYACiKS : THE C.RKAT 
 MI(, RATION OF NATIONS AND TIIK CiKRMAN 
 WARS OF TIIK MIDDLK A(iFS : TIIK THIRTY 
 YFAKS \\.\\l : TIIK IMU SSIAN STATK AND TIIK 
 PARTITIONS OF POLAND 
 
 AT an earlv ]n riod, al)iut live liuiidri-il \cars H.e ., or 
 |>< rhajis as i arlv as tin sixth or s<veiith ceiiturv H.c.. 
 Scandinavia and (lie otlu r Haltic countries \\eie the- home 
 of tin ( n i 1 manic 1 1 iln s, \\ ho j^raduallv spread flirt her sotil h 
 and east . The ( arll< st nn >\ i UK lit s aim 'DL'st tin in of \\ hleh 
 U' ha\ i an\ r < < >i d s ( ( m 1 1 > ha\ v In i n dirt cted lint 1 1> t he 
 \\ i -t. lint to the south and <ast, Celts and Slavs heinjj 
 dnvi n out <>r al>sorl>ed 1>\ tin m in the |>roci ss. 
 
 Tin- name of (,< iniaiis IN ( < It ie and. originally, prcihahly 
 m< ant " in i^lihours " ; \\ \\ ;is ui\ ( n 1>\ (he Celts in (laid 
 I ' i a cnii j ili- i >f small Celt ic fr< int i< r I rilx-s ;md to t he |>< o|>les 
 inhaliitnrj the othi r side of the Rhine. At tin IM LMmiinu' 
 of t h- la^t ci lit III' \ 15. ( . this u ;IN jii'i ili;di|\ U hat t he Roinalls 
 
 mi. :iit to convtv l>\ it : t h (!(< ks did nut knou tin 
 ( ! i ma ns as ;i -( j.;i ra t s| i rk. a nd called t In m ( < It s or 
 Scvthlahs. C:cs;ir \\;is th< lirsl to di^t iii'jnish tin in. as 
 i v-i i ' i - l.i ii'jiiaL' 1 and customs, from tin Ci It s. R< ci nt 
 jiiil!' -1 'leal r- March has sho\\n that tin laliL.'iiaL:< of tin 
 M ne i- ill ( i m.i n \^ as [ lat i d to. l>nt < |I!M i '< nt from, that 
 
 of (In ( - It l.otll |>. ..|.l. s. lik. tin (,|, i ks, Romal.s. 
 
 !.i\ . - Ic., I,. Ion-, d to Ih' Indo.Fii!o ( ,< an familv of 
 I.,h-i, ;iL ., ,. 
 
 Ul
 
 GERMANY'S ANCIENT GERMANS 25 
 
 In (id-many the- ancient Celts inhabited the country 
 eastward as far as the Kibe, and were called Belgians in 
 North Germany, \Valchians in Middle and South Germany. 
 Partly by voluntary emigration, partly by the pressure 
 of the arms of the advancing Germans, they left the region 
 east of the Rhine in the latter half of the last century B.C. 
 Only a few remnants remained, which were Germanized. 
 Considerably greater was the intermixture of the Celtic 
 element with the South German tribes. The Celts west 
 of the Rhine, who spoke a Romance language, were also 
 Germanized in due 1 course. 
 
 The Germans of antiquity were- exceedingly uncultured 
 barbarians, with no civilization whatever, when the 
 Romans first became acquainted with them, and they did 
 not even live in organized communities, but in a number 
 of tribal aggregations some forty altogether which were 
 frequently split up still further, but some-times combined 
 for joint warlike enterprises. When they were not fighting 
 they lived in idleness and indolence, letting the old men, 
 women, and slaves attend to the cattle and cultivation 
 of the soil. As Tacitus says in his Germania, they could 
 sometimes be the idlest and sometimes the most turbulent 
 of human beings; war and dangers were their only real 
 pastime- ; in the intervals of pe-ace they we re immeasurably 
 addicted to gambling anel drink, ami the blooel of friends 
 and kindred often sullie-el the ir noisy revels. 
 
 ' Their boundless foivsts were devoted by the Germans 
 to the pleasures of the chase, and the gre-ater part of the 
 country was used as pasture-; they eultivate-d care-le ssly 
 an inconsiderable portion of it, anel then complained e>f 
 the infertile soil of their native- lanel. which could not. 
 maintain its inhabitants. When now anel again the 
 horrors of famine reminded them of the uses of inelustry, 
 the' national distress was some-time's ivlie veel by a third or 
 a fourth part of the- country's youth quitting it " (Paulus 
 Diacemus, aece>rding to Gibbon. Decline and Fall <>j the 
 Rinnan Empire}. 
 
 Ca-sar in his Gallic War state-s that the- foremost nations
 
 20 BKFORE. DURING, AND AFTF.R 1014 
 
 of " Gcrmania " were desirous of surrounding their boun- 
 darit s with uninhabited and devastated regions, and that 
 these terrible border lands bore ghastly evidence of the 
 |MWI r of tin ir arms and shielded them from the danger of 
 surprise attacks. According to Tacitus, "The Bruetcrian 
 trilx was exterminated by its neighbcurs the C'hatti. who 
 wen- iiH-' MS* (1 at their arrogance and tempted by their own 
 rapacity, and <jo.<)0() barbarians succumhed, not to Roman 
 arms, but I x fort our eyes and to our advantage." 
 
 It was futile for strangers to put their trust in these 
 barbarians. Of the Franks, the Al< manni. and others 
 it was said that tlnir character was distinguished by 
 rapacity and by contempt for the most solemn treaties. 
 and t hat it was iiselt ss to I ry to bind them by any pact. 
 
 Fn-dt rick tin tin at in iAntimuchiarel has supplied us 
 \\ith an interesting description of the migrations of the 
 northern pcoplt s : "I have always held the conviction 
 that tin absence of industry s in a large measure brought 
 al>out t hese gigant ic migrat ions from t he nort hern countries 
 )f tip si- Goths, tlitse Vandals, \\ ho so often swept over 
 t In soi it In rn countries. In t hat remote epoch agriculture 
 and hunting were the sole industries known to the inhabi- 
 tants of Suiden. Denmark, and tin- greater part of Ger- 
 many. The areas capable of eidtivation Were dividt d 
 b< t ui i n a c- rt ain numb< r of landowners, \\ h<> cult i vat ed 
 tli'in and thus obtained tlnir sustenance from the soil. 
 But .is the human race in f In se cold climatis has always 
 b n Vi ry prolific, a country often contained t \\ ice as 
 many )> opl.- as it could sup|ort by work, and the \ouii'_' ( r 
 in' nib rs of \\ell to do familii s then fornn d warlike hands ; 
 t h< y \\ r< notorious robin rs by s| r, ss of circumstance. 
 ! In \ rava;/'d ot In r countries and deposed tlnir ruli rs. 
 \\ ha\ - s, , ti in t In Fast ( rn and \\ t st i rn Hoiuan Fmpiri s 
 I hat I h< se barbarians usually only d<mand<d land to 
 i-ulti\at( ainl L-I\<- tin m sustenance. Tin not t In in coilli- 
 not 1. ss inhabited than they \\iiv then, but as 
 habits ha\'e multiplied our in ( ds. tlnV ha\e 
 r to nian\ arts and in!u>triis, which sii]iport
 
 EARLY DISTRIBUTION AND RAVAGES 27 
 
 entire nations that would otherwise be compelled to 
 seek their sustenance elsewhere." 
 
 The Roman Empire made its first acquaintance with 
 the northern barbarians when Teutons and C'imbri, occupy- 
 ing the present Mecklenburg and Holstcin, began (113 u.c.) 
 to move southward owing to the overflowing of the Haltic ; 
 they were defeated, however, as were further invasions of 
 France and Italy in 102 and 101 n.c. Shortly before the 
 beginning of the Christian era the Germans once more 
 sought to penetrate into the Roman Empire, but were 
 defeated by Julius Caesar and Augustus, whereupon a 
 part of Germany was made a Roman province. The 
 Germans, however, won several decisive battles, as in the 
 Teutoburger \Vald in A.D. 0. 13y degrees intercourse 
 between Germans and Romans began to develop through 
 trade, and by taking service with Romans the Germans, 
 whose migratory instinct never quite left them, obtained 
 early knowledge of the Roman Empire and a strong 
 inclination to possess themselves of a part thereof. In 
 the reigns of Tiberius, Vespasian, and Domitian the 
 Romans had many a hard tussle with them, and for 
 centuries after the struggles with the invading Germans 
 from the north and the east continued. At the beginning 
 of the third century the Aleinanni under Caracalla appeared 
 for the first time and looted Italian and Gallic territory, 
 but were defeated in 213 on the Main. Shortly afterwards 
 fresh hordes of Germans crossed the Rhine and Danube-, 
 but were thrown back in 235 by Scptimius Severus. 
 Gallicnus (2:53-268) formed an alliance with them, married 
 Pipa, a king's daughter, and gave her father extensive 
 possessions in Hungary. Under this emperor the Goths 
 invaded the Roman Empire and ravaged Gaul. Greece, 
 and the East. Trebizond, a rich colony with magnificent. 
 buildings and art treasures, was stormed, and the popula- 
 tion put to the sword without mercy ; the most sacred 
 temples and the most superb architectural monuments 
 were levelled to the ground, and the destructive ferocity 
 of the Goths knew no limits. Nicomedia, Prusa, Cicus.
 
 28 HEFOKK, DCKING, AND AI-TKU 1011 
 
 and other SUJH rh cities in Hit h\ ilia subsequently shared 
 
 the same fate, ami several \\( ic Imrnt to tin- Around. 
 Aft r tin- ancit nt and venerable city on tlu- island of 
 C'y/iciis had IKCII laid waste, a similar fate Ix-fcll Pineus 
 and Athens, \\hich wt re also destroyed to a threat extent, 
 and soon after Tlu IK s. Ar^'os, Corinth. S]>arta. and other 
 towns \\eiv visited, the wars ra^iiiL' throughout tin- whole 
 of (i recce. Ill t lie t lid KjihcMis fell a vict im to the dcstme- 
 tiveiitss <.f the (ioths. and Dianas famous temple \\as 
 burnt and dst roved \sith all its precious sculptures by 
 1'raxitclt s and othir ancient masters who made the 
 temple one of the wonders of the world. 
 
 During the ceiiturit s which followed, the incursions into 
 the IJoiuan Kmpiiv by ti rmans and other barbarians 
 Ix-caini- more and more frequent, although they were most 
 strenuously oppost d by Constantilic the (il( at. Julian, 
 and oth-r i mp< r< >rs. The (in at Mi'jratioii of Nations 
 fourth to sixth cintury \\as doubt ls S primarily brought 
 about i)\ tin pr< ssiii'e of the t< rrible Nuns. \\ ho about 
 .{?i diti\. out the (>< rnians ; the latti r m turn pi netrated 
 di ep- r into th'- liomaii I'lmpire, \\hich \\as no\\ more 
 an< 1 in' >i < t hr< at < IK d b\ them. 
 
 Tin- II mis v. . i r a no mad pi o pie from t he I ral and Altai 
 mountain--, u ho ori^|ina!l\ shai'ed \\ith Mongols, 'I'm ks. 
 TuiiL'i; ' -. and otlnr raet s the st ppes of Central Asia. 
 I.OIIL.' I ' fo|-e t he ( hrist ia n i ra tiny \\i i - e a po\\i rful t rd>e 
 of iM.iii.nl hunters and sluplnrds. \\lio did not practise 
 au'i'K'ult urc. and if t hi ir !: rds no lon<j ( r found snUiei) nt 
 sii-t< nance m the r- -jioii uhich the\- (.eeiipiid, t h< \ 
 \\alid- i' d oil III ^' arch of fr< sh pastill' s. Tins (,i(( u 
 brought t In m int o coiilli<'t \\ it h < \ In r pi opl< s. ; , nd at an 
 t a i 1 \ *>t aje of t In ir hist or\ t I ( \ bi ca im kno\v n m ( hma 
 a -. a 1 1- r< and \\ a I liki I'aci . The\ \\ r. doubt |i - ! I: ipt i d 
 b\ t !. \\i a It 1 1 of t In ci iimt r\ , and t lit u llieui-sh iis h, eaiiie 
 .< i ' l.i 1 1 foils t hat ( I. ma u as obli^i d for pi o! i el h >n to* I ct 
 tin l.i'.il \\ all alon- I In- \\ho|, noit In i n boimdai \ (from 
 -I I I'..' . In pit, of t his obslael. t I:. I hue- e..nt iniu d 
 
 t !. u 1. 1 id- into ( 1 1 ma and \>. re not xpi 11. d until \. i>. '.MI.
 
 THE GREAT MIGRATION OF NATIONS 29 
 
 Owing to wars, internal unrest, and a devastating 
 famine, the Huns were compelled, at the beginning of the 
 fourth century, to abandon the steppes of Tartary and 
 migrate in a westerly direction. They split up into two 
 main bodies, of which one settled east of the Caspian Sea 
 whilst the remainder marched onward to the l.'ral moui> 
 tains, from which they descended towards the Caucasus 
 and the Black Sea. Here they attacked the warlike Alans, 
 a Sarmato-Gothic people who lived between the Caspian 
 and the Black Sea, whereupon, making common cause 
 with them, they penetrated into Europe and subjugated 
 a part of the Goths who lived north of the Black Sea on 
 both sides of the Dnieper, whilst another part were forced 
 across the Danube into Roman territory. The Kmpcror 
 Theodosius was compelled by Attila, king of the Huns, to 
 purchase peace, and a number of peoples in Central Kurope 
 had to acknowledge the dominion of the Huns, whose 
 empire thus extended from the Caspian Sea to the Rhine. 
 Attila crossed that river in 151, destroyed a number of 
 towns in Gaul, and finally threatened Paris, though the 
 onslaught was averted. When he attacked Orleans the 
 Romans, joining hands with the Visigoths, came to the 
 rescue, whereupon a terrible battle ensued on the Cata- 
 launian Fields, near Chalons-sur-Marne (151). Attila had 
 Germanic tribes fighting for him, and thus brother fought 
 against brother. Attila's army was defeated, and he 
 withdrew to Italy, burning and sacking its cities. On his 
 death, soon after, there was a great battle between the 
 Huns and Germans in Pannonia (south of the Middle 
 Danube), as a result of Avhich the Huns withdrew to South 
 Russia, whence their descendants, under the names of 
 Avars and Hungarians, from time to time broke forth and 
 inspired terror among the neighbouring peoples. 
 
 The Ostrogoths, after they had been expelled by the 
 Huns, made themselves masters of Pannonia. and another 
 Germanic tribe, the Gepida^, settled in Dacia (Hungary). 
 Fresh Germanic peoples constantly appeared on the scene : 
 no sooner had one been defeated than another turned up
 
 30 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 and threatened the Romans with unsapped vigour. The 
 Vandals, under Genserik. plundered Home and sailed across 
 to Carthage, devastating the coasts. Tlie Franks and 
 Aleinanni burst into Human territory in another direction, 
 tin- Saxons attacked the coasts, and the Goths sought to 
 subdue a part of the country. 
 
 In the internal st rubles in Home during the (iftli century 
 Germanic chieftains and leadc rs assisted t he various part i s, 
 and at time s even nominated the cmjxTors. The Burpun- 
 dians took possession of sevi ral southern provinces in 
 Gaul, and the Visigoths Ix-camc masttrs of Spain. 
 
 Home's last emperor, Homulus Aujjustulus, \vas chosen 
 by the barbarians, who demanded that he should act as 
 they thought lit and t'ive t h< m a third of Italy's soil. 
 When this demand was rej cted. one of their chieftains. 
 Odoaei r. placid himself at the head of a LT< m ral rising; 
 ilium ns- levii s of Germans assembled under his banner, 
 and In deposed the emjnror \\ithout difficult y in 1?<>. 
 Odoanr became Home's master, abolished the imjx rial 
 till'-, and eall'-d himself Kin;: of Italy, lie t hereupon <_, r ave 
 a third of the con<ju< ivd country, which in many parts 
 was quite denud< d of its population, to his companions in 
 arms, and proved himself a \\ise and capable recent. 
 
 The powerful Ostrogoth Km^ Theodorie the Great, 
 however, yielded to the lure of Italy, which he conquered ; 
 he deflated Odoacer in Is'.) and 4!K>, and subsequently 
 caused his assassination (I '.).'{) in order that he mij^ht 
 nil-' al< >ne. 
 
 The G'-nnans had now assumed possession of the 
 \Nistern Homan Kmpirc. They were surprised at its 
 ori'ani/.' d civili/.at ion, its ma r niticent buihlinu's anucducts, 
 
 ~ 1 
 
 etc., and L'i'aduallv adapted themselves as permaiii-nt 
 oeciipiers to sittled conditions and the more advanced 
 civili/.at ion, and went so far as to adopt many Homan 
 in>t it ut ion >, a\ ailing themselves of Homan rxperirnce 
 and lai'L" Iv adojitini; Homan laws. 
 
 Wh< n the (ii-rmaiis invaded the Hom.in Mmpirc its 
 \italit\ was sapped bv cxt ravatfant li\ IDL.', \ ice, and
 
 GERMAN WARS OF MIDDLE AGES 31 
 
 much misery ; heathendom no longer had any hold on the 
 minds of the people, and Christianity had not yet leavened 
 its customs and morals. To their own vices the Germans 
 added those of the vanquished : deeeit, cunning, and 
 refined vice on the one hand, coarseness, rapacity, and 
 ferocity on the other. 
 
 Throughout the Middle Ages the Germans remained 
 the same and repeated time and again the campaigns of 
 loot and plunder of the migration epoch. They did not 
 know the meaning of intertribal loyalty ; the love of 
 fighting was in the blood, and they retained uncivilized 
 customs longer than their neighbours the Italians and 
 French. For many centuries, from the twelfth onward, 
 the party names of Guelph and Ghibellinc were associated 
 with incessant civil wars for the possession of the German 
 Imperial crown. During " the Great Interregnum,"' for 
 twenty-two years (from 1250), general lawlessness prevailed, 
 and no one could claim to be in possession of the throne. 
 Throughout Germany there was the greatest misery, and 
 the throne was offered to the highest bidder amongst the 
 vassals. Club-law flourished everywhere, and there was 
 no one to protect the people against the arrogant feudal 
 barons. The aristocrats were mostly predatory knigiits : 
 their castles were robbers' dens, and to plunder the 
 travellers was their sole profession. Rudolph of Hupsburg, 
 however, managed to subdue the most powerful vassals, 
 and destroyed some seventy of the castles of these pre- 
 datory aristocrats. 
 
 Many attempts were made to curb the pugnacious spirit 
 of the Germans. The Emperor Wenceslaus proclaimed 
 in 1389 a general truce for six years, and a ten years' 
 truce was decreed in I486 by the Diet, whilst in 149o the 
 Diet of Worms proclaimed that perpetual peace should 
 thenceforward reign in the German Empire. But it did not 
 prove of long duration. The Protestant revolution brought 
 about political disruptions which continued for a whole 
 century, bringing devastation and chaos in their train.
 
 32 BKFORK, DTKINC., AND AFTER 1014- 
 
 Tlu- Tliirty Years \Yar was brought about originally 
 by religious differences, hut liacl also another and far 
 more- important cause, namely, polities and State intrigue. 
 The princes fought in self-defence or for conquest, whilst the 
 people only knew of the religious incentive, which was 
 exploited l>v the former to jjain the support of the masses. 
 The world's history hardly records a more harlmrous war ; 
 there was scarcely a province in Germany which was not 
 laid waste, and bestial ferocity usurped the place of 
 civili/.at ion this a century after Luther and contempor- 
 aneously with Descartes, Hacon, Grotius, and other master- 
 minds of other countries. I will quote here what an 
 eminent German historian. Professor M. Philippson, wrote 
 about the Tliirty Years \\ar in his (,Y.v<7m7//c d<r mntrcn 
 7iit (vol. viii of All'^t nit in< M Y//iy.v<7//eA/r. by Th. Flathe 
 and others) : " Soon the soldiers looted, plundered, burnt, 
 tortured, and murdered as ;i matter of course, for the 
 sheer pleasure of tin tiling. I'Yiend and enemy was all 
 the sanie to them; their o\vn country, under whose 
 banners they fought, was spared as little as a foreign 
 
 land. . . . TlieV fell like biasts of pl'eV Upoll peaceful 
 
 regions, stole what there was ol value and demolished 
 the rt^t. destroyed the crops, tortured the inhabitants 
 to elicit where they kept their treasures, and ravished 
 wives and L'irK. It resistance was offered, murder was 
 done on principle, and neither children in arms nor old 
 men wen- spared. It was a favourite sport amon^ these 
 creatures to impale little children on the points of their 
 lances', dash them against walls, or roast them in the ovens. 
 
 . . . All crafts (|| (1 out. \ lilac's Were desirted; those 
 
 who could llv hid themst Ives 111 woods and caves. Houses 
 were sacked, fields \\ere laid waste, and the destitute 
 inhabitants m their dire \tremity ate the bodies of their 
 dead ; nay, worse things happened ; human bcinys, e\'en 
 
 (|i fenceless children. \\efe slaughtered for food. Tilt sc 
 
 horrors ar< no fables; they \\ep- rilatiil. not one-, but 
 hundreds of t imcs, by eye wit ness(s. . . . Spot ted t \ phus 
 and other cont at;ious diseasi s \\ i n tin ine\itable eon-
 
 THE THIRTY YEARS WAR 33 
 
 sequence of famine and finished those who were spared 
 by the sword. . . . 
 
 " No wonder that a formidable depopulation took place 
 in Germany. It is computed that in 1048 the country 
 had but a third of the population of 1018. . . . In Fran- 
 coma the depopulation was so great that every man was 
 allowed to have two wives. . . . Trade and handicrafts 
 were dead ; the German bourgeoisie lost all power, courage, 
 and initiative. Germany's material decline was sad 
 enough, but still sadder was the moral and intellectual 
 decay, and even now the injury done to the psychology 
 of the German people by the Thirty Years War has 
 hardly been repaired. A savage and coarse spirit pervaded 
 all classes of the nation. . . . The crassest superstition 
 reigned, and the atmosphere of terror and bloodthirstiness 
 in which every one lived, the latitude given to base pro- 
 pensities, were bound to dull the spirit even of the better 
 among the people and turn them from the beautiful and 
 noble to the black snares of sorcery. The soldiers thought 
 that they could be shielded from the enemy's weapons 
 by all sorts of witchcraft, and never and nowhere has the 
 faith in sorcery, with all its appalling and deadly con- 
 sequences, been so general as in Germany during the 
 Thirty Years War. A whole literature sprang up about 
 witchcraft, which was supposed to be inspired by the devil. 
 Countless human beings, especially women, fell victims 
 to suspicion of witchcraft. The long civil war smothered 
 the last remnants of national sentiment. The idea of a 
 common country was meaningless to these Germans, who 
 for thirty years had butchered one another in the most 
 revolting manner. 
 
 " The religious character of the war was lost sight of by 
 degrees and was replaced by the most shameless and self- 
 seeking scheming amongst those in power. . . . An ap- 
 palling apathy stole over the entire German people. Such 
 things as loyalty and pride were dead. Foreigners bore 
 themselves like arrogant conquerors ; they felt that they 
 were more brilliant, richer, and happier, and everything 
 
 c
 
 34 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 foreign was admired and imitated. National productions 
 of any kind were derided and despised as being vulgar. . . . 
 
 The spirit of flattery and toadyism was rampant ; every 
 one cringed before his superior, hut treated his subordinates 
 with insolence and contempt. It is supposed that this 
 repulsive combination of abject servility and arrogance 
 still survives in many parts of Germany. The princes 
 saw in their subjects naught but a flock existing that 
 it might be shorn. . . . The nobility fawned upon the 
 princes, and the bourgeoisie on the nobility, the princes, 
 the oflicers, and civil otlicials, and those who did not 
 succeed in getting ennobled sought some honorary title. 
 No branch of activity fell into greater neglect than that 
 of the learned professions ; masters and students fled 
 before the wild clash of arms, or the students fell victims 
 to the lure of lighting. At Helmstadt in Ki'Jl there were 
 K)() students, but two years later all lecture-halls stood 
 empty and only one professor remained. Save for a few 
 exceptions, the Germans, impoverished, coarsened, and 
 debased by the war. were unable to keep pace with the 
 .striking and flourishing advance of the exact sciences in 
 Italy, France, the Netherlands, and Kngland. German 
 scholars were obliged to go to foreign universities. . . . 
 It needed the effort of two centuries to heal these wounds 
 inilieted on the German people, to replace the weeds by a 
 fruitful growth. Vet the effort has not quite succeeded, 
 and many of the faults and shortcomings here touched 
 upon remain to this day, though in diminished measure." 
 
 I wtiiild point out that it is iidt'rnitin historian who has 
 supplied this deseript ion. 
 
 By the Peace of \NV>t phalia. which to this day has been 
 th- bi-droek of Germany's political or^ani/.at ion, the Ger- 
 man confederacy received a more definite constitution ; a 
 real confederation was formed which maintained an internal 
 equilibrium ; the princes of the Kmpnv were to be inde- 
 pendent and the Imperial authority became merely formal, 
 u it h t he result that the country's unity was dest roycd. Tin- 
 old German Kmpirc was dissolved by Napoleon in 1S()(.
 
 THE PRUSSIAN STATE 35 
 
 Germany's population fell through the Thirty Years 
 War from about sixteen or seventeen millions to about 
 live millions, so that for a couple of centuries there was 
 no lack of space for the rapid growth of the population. 
 In order to further this growth the Franconian Diet held 
 at Nuremberg in 1G">0 actually legali/ed bigamy. 
 
 Prussia, which under the " Great Elector,'' Frederick 
 William, became an altogether independent State (1057), 
 had through the ravages of the Thirty Years War sunk 
 into a state of the profoundcst misery, but soon revived 
 under the influence of this resourceful monarch. Under 
 his son, Frederick I, the kingdom of Prussia was recognized 
 by the Peace of Utrecht in 171, '3. Under this king, as well 
 as under his successor, Frederick William I, the country 
 continued to prosper, the neglected soil was cultivated 
 by a number of settlers, and about 1740 the population 
 amounted to two and a quarter millions. Frederick the 
 Great, by his victories and wise administration, raised 
 Prussia to the dignity of a Great Power, and during his 
 reign the population rose to nearly five and a half millions. 
 
 In conjunction with Catherine II of Russia and Maria 
 Theresa of Austria, Frederick the Great undertook in 
 1772 t\\c first partition of Poland, on his part a measure of 
 protection against the threat of Russia's growing power. 
 Had he not consented to this partition of Poland, Russia 
 would have taken an even larger slice, having previously 
 by force and treachery hastened the internal dissolution 
 of the country. The Prussian State now regained West 
 Prussia, which the German Order had ceded to Poland 
 in the year 1466. 
 
 This encroachment on the life of another nation cannot 
 be condoned from our modern point of view, but it should 
 be remembered that such acts were less reprehensible in 
 the eighteenth centurv than now, as the principles of the 
 
 ~ V 
 
 rights of nations were then not so widely accepted, and the 
 question of nationality did not weigh against the exigencies 
 of the State. The only one of the three States which could
 
 36 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 plead the stress of self -preservation >vas Prussia. East 
 Prussia was separated from the kingdom by West Prussia 
 (then a part of Poland) and practically defenceless. Al- 
 though Frederick tin- Cireat now proposed the partition 
 of Poland, it was nevertheless the Russian Minister Panin 
 who, in 1703, iirst suggested the idea in a communication 
 to the Prussian Ambassador Salms, when Frederick at 
 Iirst recoiled from it. 
 
 Of Poland it can be said that she almost deserved the 
 calamity of 1?7'J, having regard to the appalling disorder 
 within the country and the internal squabbles whieh let 
 in Russia as the dominant Power; but nevertheless the 
 second partition of Poland, in 17i>.'5, as well as the third, 
 in 17'.'."). was an infamy, a diabolical murder of a nation, 
 whieh must for ever be deplored by history. Frederick 
 the (in at was not then alive; he would certainly never 
 have consented to these crimes, whilst his feeble successor, 
 Frederick William II, was only too willing to support 
 Russia's nefarious plottings against regenerated Poland 
 and to lay hands on further slices of the unhappy country. 
 
 The conduct of the three (ireat Powers towards Poland 
 had a very deleterious effect on the public morality of 
 Kurope. People accustomed themselves to acquiescence 
 in acts of violence which were never righted or atoned for 
 and thus served as encouragement to others. Kver since 
 that revolting murder of a State to our time. Russia. 
 Austria and Prussia have, however, become a prey to 
 anxiety and have sought to preserve a certain under- 
 standing in mt t mat i< ina I com plicat ions, for t hey have never 
 felt quite sure of the Polish nation. ]{\ constant diplo- 
 matic sleights of hand it has hi ( n sought to repair what 
 was at the same time a folly and a crime. For it was 
 doubtless foolish and t hi .u^hi ,< s-, of Prussia and Austria, 
 at any rate since Poland's r< ^< neral ion aft r 17?'J. not to 
 seek by all possible n, cans fn tiiiiinlnin tin in<lt]>rn<ltnt 
 1'nltind us tin' ht+t Inikiiirk <rjnin*t ml: timing MIIMHI ili.^tn. 
 Poland's linal dissolution made Russia a direct neighbour, 
 and the lat'er Power has thus gained the inlluenec over
 
 THE PARTITIONS OF POLAND 87 
 
 European affairs which Prussia and Austria sought to 
 prevent, whilst their Polish prey was but an illusory gain 
 which often became an oppressive burden. Moreover, 
 the two German Empires have never succeeded in Ger- 
 manizing their Polish subjects, but tormented them instead 
 and tried to keep them under, thus fanning the national 
 hatred on both sides. 
 
 Silesia was also brought by Frederick the Great under 
 the Prussian Crown. This land received, in the Middle 
 Ages, after the great migration of nations, a mixed popu- 
 lation of Slavs and Germans, part of the country coming 
 under Poland, part under Bohemia, and part under German 
 dominion. In the course of a long series of internal 
 dissensions the population was augmented by German 
 settlers and became in 1.327 a Bohemian dependency, but 
 came later under the German Emperor, and, in 1720, 
 Maria Theresa was proclaimed its ruler. Frederick II 
 laid claim to certain Silesian duchies in 1740, and this gave 
 rise to the Seven Years War, which ended with the cession 
 of Silesia to Prussia in 1763. 
 
 Of the four and a half million inhabitants, about a 
 million are Poles and a hundred thousand Czechs, 
 Moravians, and Wends. 
 
 Altogether Prussia has something over three million 
 Polish subjects in West Prussia, Poscn, and Silesia, and in 
 Posen they constitute a majority and number about two- 
 thirds of the population.
 
 V 
 
 HISK AND SK.NIFK ANTK OF (.HUMANISM : 
 (iFRMANISTK DKFAMS OF (.HKATNKSS 
 
 NAPOLEON'S victories, after he had formed the Hhine 
 t'oiifederacy and dissolved the old (icrman Kmpirc (1S(M>), 
 turned out in the end to he of the greatest significance to 
 Prussia, which under Frederick \Yilliam. in alliance with 
 Russia. Knu'land and Sweden, formed the fourth coalition 
 against Napoleon. The iniincdiatc sequel, however, was 
 the defeats of .Ji na and Austerlit/., where the Prussian 
 nnny was d<-,tro\<d, whereupon Napoleon made his 
 ntry into Herlin and imposed <>n 1'russia a war indemnity 
 of 1. V.i. nuo. duo francs. After he had lieaten the Russians 
 at Kylau and Fricdland, he made the Peace of Tilsit (iso?) 
 with Al' -\and< r I, h\ v. hich Prussia lost halt her territory 
 and was m addition forbidden to keep an army of more 
 than :;.". (idd men. 
 
 The ferment against Na j>oli on in Ku rope became general, 
 and in (i-rman\ tin \-> had existid since the Peace of Tilsit 
 a vast seeivt si.eit-ty call-d the Tu^eiidbund. ha\ iiiL,f the 
 liberation of 1h. <-..untrv for its aim. Its foundi r was 
 M. Arndt, jirofessor of historv, who soon received the 
 support ( ,f st \- ( ral e\ Ministtfs, highly placed oilie ( r^, 
 Dr. (.aim, etc.. and Fiehtc, the philosopher, also eniilri- 
 liiit-d m a lai'L' 1 rni asiiri- to i-"U -IHL P the national feeluiL' 
 and st ri i\'j\ hi IHIIL' the soep t y bv his .)/, ,s>,/^, In ///< (i< nnn n 
 
 \iltinn ( 1 SOS). 
 
 This brings us to the birth of (irrnKinixni. or the 
 (ii rnninifitif Itlxis. (icrmanism is usuallv in (German
 
 RISE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF GERMANISM 39 
 
 a linguistic term, associated with peculiarities of the 
 German language, of expression and phrasing, notice- 
 able in the use of foreign tongues, and the term lt Ger- 
 manist " has currently been applied to scholars engaged in 
 German philological and antiquarian research. 
 
 But Germanism has also received another meaning, and 
 has become a national or race term brought into being by 
 the modern nationalist aspirations, so that the word has 
 come to stand for interest in the racial unity of Germanic 
 peoples, in the course of which movement the Gcrmano- 
 phils have often been guilty of somewhat remarkable 
 exaggerations. 
 
 By the term " Pan-Germanism " is meant a striving for 
 a closer union of all Germanic peoples : Germans, British, 
 Dutch, Scandinavians, without regard to historical ante- 
 cedents or admixture of races amongst all these peoples. 
 The term is particularly intended to denote a partly 
 existent, but partly non-existent, kinship in characteristics 
 and culture, and in reality Pan-Germanism has no meaning 
 at all, is a pure fiction. 
 
 In a quite distinctive sense, mostly outside Germany, 
 Germanism has been interpreted to mean the Germans' 
 systematic endeavour to become predominant in Europe. 
 
 The Pan-Germanistic idea of peace and alliance between 
 Germany and neighbouring Germanic countries, more 
 especially Scandinavia, has therefore, with few exceptions, 
 never commended itself to the Germans. 
 
 The specific Germanism arose through Napoleon's policy 
 of conquest and his attempt to create a universal monarchy 
 which pressed on Germany with iron weight and had for 
 its object the partition of the old German Empire and the 
 obliteration of its nationality. This state of things gave 
 rise to a very deep-rooted movement in which national 
 consciousness learnt to seek fresh strength in the recollec- 
 tion of former history and in the faith in the future des- 
 tinies of the nation. Originally this national movement 
 was quite natural and justified ; but it was soon entrusted 
 with a far bigger mission than the protection of the country
 
 40 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1014 
 
 against conquest and the rousing of tin- national spirit : 
 it was to become a civilizing movement in a wider sense ; 
 it was, in time, to put other nation* in the shade, or, in some 
 way or other, under the German nation. To civilize the 
 world was to be synonymous with Germanizing it ! 
 
 To strengthen the national spirit it was important to 
 endeavour to prove the superiority of the Germans in the 
 realm of intellect and thus pave the way for their material 
 power. By his Message to the German \ation Fiehte 
 wished to rouse the people from its despondency to a 
 proud consciousness of self and to the struggle for its 
 existence, and he extolled " the deep sincerity and moral 
 purity of the German spirit " in contrast to " the Roman 
 degeneracy." He spoke of " German fidelity and honour," 
 "German profundity." etc 1 ., which llattered the nation 
 and has since become an axiom, nay, a dogma, among the 
 Germans. By degrees they accustomed themselves to 
 believing in the superior nature and loftier destiny of the 
 German people, and in IM'J they were ripe to hear from 
 the writer Kggo that "in the German people the whole 
 essence of humanity has, so to speak, rallied to a centre 
 and taken definite shape; in every German's soul the 
 human genius has been integrally reali/ed." 
 
 In truth, one stands aghast at the mental arrogance 
 which finds expression in such terms. It is noteworthy 
 that the great German poets and thinkers who preceded 
 that chauvinistic era Kant. Goethe. Schiller, Herder, 
 Lessing, Klopstock, \\ieland. etc. did not take up this 
 one sidi d national standpoint, but were universal and 
 humanistic in their trend of thought. 
 
 During the r< action which followed Napoleon's fall in 
 is 1.1 then- arose a new important factor in the German 
 national niovenn-nt to wit, the Christian factor and 
 tlii- upshot was a Christian (it'rinanisni, \shich emanated 
 horn (In- I "iu\ rsit i< s. The student eluix nt \\lucli took 
 jiait in the \Var of Liberation was now to be placed < >n a 
 1'ifh'i' plane than the old coarse and licentious academic 
 life. New societies, " Bill M'heiiM-hal t en. \\iTe recruited
 
 RISE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF GERMANISM 41 
 
 from " Christian Germanic youths " who were to guide 
 the country towards u greater future. Germany's civil- 
 izing world-mission was identified with the future of the 
 Christian religion, whereby chauvinism and militarism 
 were placed on a religious basis and a real fanaticism could 
 be engendered. 
 
 In view of this incredible exaltation of German culture 
 by the Gcrmanists, it may be fitting to call to mind what 
 the great men of other nations had done for culture in 
 the modern epoch. I will mention but a few of the most 
 famous names : 
 
 Italy ' Dante, Ariosto, Tasso, Petrarch, Boccacio, 
 L. and F. Socino, Gentili, Bruno, Savonarola, Galileo. 
 
 Spain : M. Scrvcto, Caldcron, Lope dc Vega, Tirso. 
 
 France : Lefevre d'lStaples, Forel, Corncille, Moliere, 
 Racine, Descartes, Pascal, P. Baylc, Voltaire, Diderot, 
 Condorcct, A. Comte. 
 
 England : Wycliffe, Francis Bacon, Locke, Hume, 
 Milton, Shakespeare, Newton. 
 
 We have also to remember that the German nation is 
 far from being a pure Germanic race, but has since ancient 
 and mediaeval times been mixed with other races, Celts 
 and, more especially, Slavs. Many who think themselves 
 typical Germans are just as much Slavs. 
 
 Luther was of Wendish origin ; his father came from a 
 peasant stock in Mohre, in the Thiiringerwald, and was 
 called Lnder, a name which Luther originally bore. 
 
 The philosopher Leibnitz was not altogether German ; 
 his father was a Czech and emigrated to Germany ; the 
 family name was Lubinieczii or Leubnizii. 
 
 Kant's ancestors emigrated to Germany from Scotland. 
 
 Dr. Gall, the father of phrenology, the founder of the 
 study of the functions of the brain, was descended from a 
 Lombard family of the name of Gallo. 
 
 Rudolf Virchow, Germany's foremost representative in 
 pathological research, came from Further Pomerania and 
 was descended from a Slav familv.
 
 42 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 Prince Bismarck, as In- himself declared, was of \Vcndish 
 descent, and was not always willing to he called a German, 
 ns may he gathered from a frank talk which he had in 
 1 Ktiii with Napoleon Ill's cousin, Prince Napoleon, repro- 
 duced in the Figaro in 1891. In the course of their chat 
 ahout common political interests and the acquisition of 
 land. etc.. in which Bismarck, despite (Jerman opinion, 
 showed his indifference ahout the Rhine frontier, he let 
 fall the remark : " I am not German ; I am a Prussian, 
 a \Yend." 
 
 Neither was the philosopher Niet/.sehc a pure-bred 
 German, as he had Slav blood in his veins. The founder 
 of his family was a Polish nobleman who about 171<> lied 
 with wife and children to Germany. Niet/.sche's whole 
 tendency, too, was anything but German. 
 
 The historian Treitsehke was of Slav descent. 
 
 IJs/t. the composer and pianist, was \\ Hungarian, 
 deset -nd< d from an aristocratic family of old nobility; 
 he \\as born at Raiding, in Hungary. 
 
 It should also be noted that a very , r reat number of 
 Germany's most famous men in the realms of culture were 
 
 t/r U v. 
 
 Amon^r the musicians we may mention Meyerbeer. 
 Mendelssohn-Bart holdy, and Richard Wanner. The hitter's 
 father was an actor named Geyer, a name which frequently 
 occurs amoriL,' the Jews in (iermany. 
 
 II. Heine, t he poet, was a .few. 
 
 Amonu philosophers the following are famous: Moses 
 Mendelssolm, M. Ibrl/. M. I.a/.anis, professor of racial 
 psychology, Professor If. Colin, and Ste\nthal. professor 
 of phil' >! ><jy, etc. 
 
 Amon^r botanists F. G. Colin and N. Prin^heim were 
 famous, and as mvi ntor in tin IK Id of elcetricitv and 
 magnet ism II. f I- i f / I >< ars a celebrated name. 
 
 In medicine we have a Ion ^' list of Jews who have achieved 
 distinction ; T. If. nN , ppife-.si.r of anatomy ; I.. Traube, 
 professor in < \perimenta! pathology: I. Rostnthal. nerve 
 physiologist ; A. I'iuli nburu. IP rve pathologist ; the Nobel
 
 RISE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF GERMANISM 48 
 
 Prize winner Professor Khrlieh, bacteriologist, the inventor 
 of Salvarsan, the most effective remedy against syphilis; 
 Neisser, the diseoverer of the vehicle of infection of gonor- 
 rhoea; Lesser, Kleseh, Ulaschko, Wechselmann, etc., and 
 other famous venereologists. 
 
 Theories soon arose as to Germany's destiny and cultural 
 mission, and a feeling was created that Germany should 
 assume the mastery of- not only an understanding with - 
 all nations related to the Germans, without regard to 
 material and historical factors. That these theories have 
 borne fruit is evident from the fate of Schleswig and 
 Alsace-Lorraine in our own time. 
 
 A remarkable influence was exercised by the philosopher 
 Hegel's peculiar speculations on the history of the world. 
 When the kt world-spirit " has attained one of its higher 
 phases of development, it exercises absolute power : the 
 people which then represents the world-spirit dominates 
 all others through the irresistible force of the mind. In the 
 face of this absolute right, the other nations are " rcchtlos." 
 The world's history has been passing through four stages 
 of development : the Oriental, the Greek, the Roman, 
 and the Germanic. In the last-named phase all peoples 
 meet their ultimate destiny, and in it the world-spirit is 
 unified ! 
 
 The godlike glory of the German nation was thus demon- 
 strated by Hegel in a fantastic philosophical system, and 
 it cannot fail to have been very flattering to the Germans 
 that the evolution of the world's history should culminate in 
 the Germanic World Empire to which all other nations 
 must bow. 
 
 Hegel's successors, in an orgy of chauvinism, carried 
 these ideas still further, and their influence on German 
 policy to this verv dav is obvious. 
 
 L / *t , 
 
 The Sfaatslexicon (1840) contains the following statement : 
 " No people in the world has been favoured by Providence 
 with a nobler ancestry, a more glorious historical record, 
 a loftier destinv than the German ! "
 
 44 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 Rotteck wrote his celebrated History of the World in the 
 same vein of specious pleading, and on this basis of senten- 
 tious, chauvinistic historiography innumerable German 
 authors have since aspired to impress these teachings on 
 the German people. 
 
 The central idea of Germanism, Germany's civilizing 
 world-mission, has gained an enormous vogue in popular 
 literature. That it is the Germanic race which has civilized 
 the whole of the modem world has in most historical works 
 become a fundamental axiom. Usually the appellation 
 " Germanic " is made to include all peoples allied to the 
 Germans by kinship in language, such as the Scandinavians, 
 the Hritish, the Dutch, the North Americans, etc., and 
 everything that can be said for the Germanic peoples in 
 general has unhesitatingly been transferred by the Ger- 
 manists to the Germans and is cited as a proof of the 
 German world-mission. In this way they have attempted 
 to identify with Germany the culture, literature, and 
 history of the leading European States. 
 
 Thus, for instance, the celebrated Danish physicist, 
 II. ('. Orstcd, is referred to in a popular encyclopaedia as 
 fin gfborrncn Dfiitscher, although he was born at Rud- 
 kjobing, in Langeland (Denmark). 
 
 In his work on Tftc Sjtirit of the <iY//m/;i Stock (IS.V.i) 
 Nagler said : " The Germanic part of the world represents 
 the bright side of history, the non-Germanic part the 
 night of barbarism. The spiritual nature of Germanism 
 lias made it the standard-bearer of Christianity. Kuropcan 
 morality depends on the preservation of the Christian- 
 Gerinanic spirit and on the political ;>o:<rr of (nrnmnij." 
 Kirehhoff declared in a lecture (IS.V.t) that "civilization 
 and Christianity are unthinkable without the Germans." 
 Thus it is Germanism which, as the Lord's cliost'n inxtru- 
 rrunt, is to save the decadent world. 
 
 Ol eMiirse. many thinking Germans have opposed the 
 ehuuvinistic and militaristic development in Germany, 
 and have, like Kant, advocated a liberal :md pacific
 
 RISE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF GERMANISM 45 
 
 policy and been animated with humane and international 
 ideas. 
 
 From its very inception the ruthless policy represented 
 by Bismarck met with opposition from many eminent and 
 enlightened men. There was formed in 1801 a Progressive 
 Party consisting of members of the Prussian Diet, a 
 14 Fortschrittspartei," which emancipated itself from the 
 old liberal Party in the Diet and joined the Demo- 
 cratic Party, offering persistent and strong opposition to 
 Bismarck and his foreign policy. Amongst the foremost 
 leaders of this party were 11. Virchow, Germany's greatest 
 pathologist, and Eugcn Riehter, who in the name of liberty 
 combated the endeavour to form a strong that is to say, 
 a despotic power of government. Riehter was all his 
 life extraordinarily active in the propagation of his liberal 
 and democratic policy, in support of which he founded the 
 Freisinnige Zeilung. He was the most pronounced and 
 consistent of Bismarck's opponents, and often proclaimed 
 that the fall of Bismarck was his aim. The Conservative 
 chauvinists, the Germanists, accused him of allying himself 
 with all anti-national elements, a common accusation 
 against all who entertain democratic and cosmopolitan 
 ideas. The celebrated German writer and historian 
 Professor G. Kinkel (sentenced in 1848 for republican 
 and seditious propaganda to lifelong imprisonment, but 
 who succeeded in escaping after a couple of years) wrote 
 in 1809 : ;i The German people resembles a youth who is 
 still far from having completed his self-education, and at 
 that age it is particularly useful to learn and thoroughly 
 take to heart foreign opinions of ourselves." Kinkel 
 endorsed to the full the comment of the French historian 
 II. Martin as to " what every honest man thinks of the 
 miserable jealousy between France and Germany," the 
 obstacle to a general European confederacy for protection 
 against the Eastern peril, or for the thrusting back of the 
 Asiatics across their natural frontiers. 
 
 Kinkel further declared : " The Germans, and more 
 especially our patriotic blusterers, should take it to heart
 
 46 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 when a calm and able Frenchman shows them how ill 
 this jrctd of conquest, as exercised against Italy, Poland, 
 and Denmark, becomes a people which lias not even secured 
 the rijjht to call its own Ministers to account. Germans 
 of common sense and education enough to see the ludicrous 
 aspect of a campaign of political trumpeting, will enjoy 
 this l-'rcnch criticism, which nevertheless acknowledges in 
 a friendly spirit the virtius of our nation and our national 
 temperament." 
 
 Nict/schc, at the time of his seven- criticism of Richard 
 \Va<,'nT in "tin Wanner affair," observed that "we live 
 in a reaction :<.///</// the reaction " from "a certain catho- 
 licity of sentiment and a mania for everything ultra- 
 German, the so called 'national' cult." He satirized 
 'Warner's weakness for old tales and sonus in which 
 learned prejudice has discovered something Germanic par 
 tinll<n<( we latijjh at it today the reincarnation of 
 these Scandinavian monsters with a thirst for exalted 
 sensuality," etc. He looked for\\ard, however, to the 
 end of the era of national wars and ultra-montane 
 martyrdom. 
 
 Modern German historians have elaborated the Ger- 
 manistie ideas. The most famous of them is Treitsehke, 
 prof < -ssor and edit or ol I'rfux^isclu' Jahrlnicht r. and historio- 
 grapher to the State of Prussia ; he shoued hilnst If to be 
 an ardent champion of the strengthening ol Germany s 
 unity (although himself of Slav origin) and of a powerful 
 Go\ . riiim nt . Ib was a passionate patriot, or. in other 
 words, a sjMcilie Prussian chau\'inist and opponent of 
 Lib< ralisni. He created a school of German world po\\er 
 polu-y ( Mi:<h! [i>,li/t/. | and yarned many adh< rents, throuu-h 
 whom In- ha- i \> reiM d a sinr-t< |- intlu, m-i on present day 
 
 thou-ht. 
 
 Aeeonlin^f to '1'ri it M-hke. Th< .state is parami'iint in 
 thi cojiiniunit\ ; outside it nothing t\ists in the \\orlds 
 hi tor\. '1 he State must be exclusive, self contained, 
 and "this exclusive State is, as Maelnavelli \\as the first
 
 GERMANISTIC DREAMS OF GREATNESS 47 
 
 to rceogni/e, in its innermost essence, power. To sale- 
 guard its power is the highest moral duty of the State." 
 
 According to this dictum, international treaties are not 
 binding longer than the State finds convenient, and the 
 binding nature of international laics is not admitted ; the 
 State cannot bind itself to abide by them. The law of 
 nations is thus set aside by Treitsehke, as well as by the 
 German Empire if its statesmen agree with Treitsehke 
 as they seem to do. This carries us back to the point of 
 view of the ancient Germans : to disregard and to disown 
 the binding nature of treaties (cf. p. 20). 
 
 One of Trcitschke's most celebrated pupils, General 
 Hernhardi, in his work entitled Germany and the Xext War 
 (1911), expresses the same views regarding Germany's 
 cultural superiority and world-mission as the earlier 
 Germanists. Thus he says : " We now claim our share 
 of the riches of this world, having for centuries reigned in 
 the domain of the mind alone." He speaks of " the future 
 which Providence has intended for the German people as 
 being the foremost cultural nation in history." And he 
 adds, as an incentive to war, that defeat in war " would 
 throw us back for centuries and would shake to its very 
 foundations the influence of the German mind in the world 
 of culture, and thus hamper the progress of humanity in 
 its healthy development, for which the Gentian element is 
 a necessity." 
 
 Again, in recent years, the Gcrmanistic ethnographers 
 have taken up arms to proclaim the superiority of the 
 Germans. In an article on Die Urhcimat dcr Indoger- 
 mancn ("The Cradle of the Indo-Germans '') in the 
 Mannus, 1914, Dr. K. F. Wolff extols "the nationally 
 (volkisch) minded who gladly strive for the coming period 
 of greatness and believe in the world-dominating future of 
 the Germanic race'' in contrast to "the cosmopolitans of 
 golden or red internationalism who, enfeebled by material- 
 ism, long for eternal peace and universal equality and 
 detest nothing so much as the race-conscious German, 
 filled with the ideals of the ancient Germans' epic period."
 
 48 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 The nationally minded (the chauvinists) rejoice in the 
 " martial ideals of supremacy of the Indo-Germans and 
 hope with exultant hearts eager for the fight, that the 
 mantle of (j'frmtinfntutn will fall on the shoulders of 
 Dfutsclttnni, when in time the racial pulse of two thousand 
 years ago will once more throh through Europe from the 
 over- populated shores washed by the North Sea. They 
 regard northern Europe as the only possible home- of 
 this race of blonde patricians." 
 
 " The cosmopolitans," says Wolff, '' shudder at the mere 
 mention of the word - race ' and know not whether they 
 are to threaten <>r to fear, to deride or to abuse.' 'To 
 them there is no race, no people, nothing but human 
 creatures." Wolff further says that "Among thinking 
 people political conviction must rest on a scientific basis 
 that is to say. above all, on knowledge of the history of 
 civili/.at ion and racial theory; and the North-European 
 origin of th<- Indo (lermans. the favoured Indo (iermanen- 
 tiini of the (irrmamc race, and the independent growth 
 and development <'f North-Kuropean culture occupy the 
 foremost place in the minds of all nationally thinking 
 (iennans 
 
 These high l!o\vri and boastful effusions of Wolff's 
 were inspired by his having read a work of quite 
 the opposite tone by Dr. S. Feist entitled Kullitr, Aus- 
 tircilitn^ utul Ht'rkunj't <lir I ndugermancn (l'.)l.'J), in which 
 the latter, unhampered by all these (iermanistie conceits, 
 supported the view taken by so many historians, that the 
 cradle of the Indo European race lay somewhere in Central 
 Asia. In my own Ili^tunj nf ('irili^utinn I liavi- also 
 advanct d [\\< reasons \vhich support thi-s \u-\\. 
 
 J-'i4 arid olliej-s ha\ing attributed the assumption of 
 the northern origin of the Indo (Jermans to imtiuinil 
 
 < nit'/. NN'olff calls tins an unworthy reproach, and couples 
 hi- eoiiiiu' lit \\ith the surprising declaration (hat the 
 'iitL'i.i.i in tor the abo\-e theory had sprung from a 
 Ixirj'urj /.-/ i/ nt :i <<>nc<']>tinn af tltc \mrld that is (( sav, 
 
 '>n,i thing qiiiti foreign to scientific ethnographic research.
 
 GERMANISTIC DREAMS OF GREATNESS 49 
 
 This mundane theory is by no means new it is the old 
 chauvinistic Germanism of Hegel : " The theory of Euro- 
 pean origin helps us nationally minded Germans to realize 
 that we are blood of their blood, over whom, as Alexander 
 v. Puz said, ' lay the dewy freshness of Paradise.' It 
 promises us on the threshold of the next double millennium 
 a new epoch dimly discernible behind a lowering war cloud : 
 the. German era ! " 
 
 " Dcr schrecklichste tier Schrecken isl tier Memch in seinem 
 Wahn," said Schiller. 
 
 There is something utterly senseless in certain Gcrman- 
 ists' conception of Germany's influence on culture and 
 the legitimacy of her striving after power. The Germans 
 have become " God's chosen people," are better than all 
 the other nations, are more worthy to live and propagate 
 than others. It is a chauvinism without parallel in the 
 world's history. It is a collective megalomania of a certain 
 section of the German nation, particularly of some of the 
 patriots. This Wahn has often been exploited to distort 
 the truth, to organize falsehood, and to legitimize the 
 insolent breaking of treaties -the foundation on which 
 rest the laws of nations and peace as soon as the interests 
 of the German Empire demand it, and in dutiful obedience 
 to the teachings of the modern Gcrmanistic masters : 
 Bismarck, Treitschke, Bernhardi, and others. It is on 
 these grounds that Germany is feared and has so many 
 enemies among other nations, who by no means shut 
 their eyes to the real merits of the Germans, and admire 
 Germany's great thinkers, scientists, composers, etc. 
 
 Germany's quantitative greatness is claimed as synony- 
 mous with superiority in all spheres. " Deutschland, 
 Deutschland iiber Alles " has been sung so long that the 
 people believe that no country can compete with Germany 
 and that the Germans are the foremost people on earth - 
 God's chosen people -and that therefore they will be 
 allowed to rule the world, to oust other peoples from their 
 inheritance, to conquer and absorb as many adjoining 
 regions as possible. 
 
 D
 
 50 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 It follows inevitably that a people taught assiduously, 
 decade after deeade, by its philosophers and teachers that 
 the Germans are the climax of history and the greatest of 
 human races, must strive to occupy in the political and 
 economic world the role to which it is entitled -to wit, 
 that of teachers and leaders of the less gifted or degenerate 
 nations. The quest of widened power by conquest of 
 their smaller or weaker neighbours is a corollary of the 
 fundamental idea of Germanism. Out of it arose the 
 desire for unity and a strong world-compelling Empire 
 binding all German peoples together. In this wise Euro- 
 pean siipremacv was also destined to pass to Germany, 
 and by the logic of events Prussia was the State pre- 
 ordained to reah/.e the Gennaiiistic dreams of greatness. 
 
 It is a pitv that the far-sighted Kant, who died in ISO-l. 
 did not live a few decades later. With Ins principles of 
 e< put v and his broad humanistic out look, lie would certainly 
 have checked Germanism with its chauvinism. Kant 
 supported enthusiastically the principles of the l-'rench 
 Revolution, extolled republicanism, and disapproved of 
 the alienation of the peoples from one another into a 
 naiT'>u nationalism, pleading, on the contrary, their 
 union into a world embracing commonwealth. In the 
 iniddl'- of the Great Revolution lie published a remarkable 
 work. I'hil'isi >j>hic Ar'junxiit fur l'i rfictnul l\ti<< (17'..~>K 
 and s|i<>ued how peace might rest on a nninn n( f'<' r St<it< v 
 embracing the whole of Murope and represented bv a 
 ]n i niiijn a ' ( i;//i|/'f v\. The lirs t condition was, however, 
 that all State, should be republican, for whilst a king has 
 httl hesitation m declaring war. a demoeraev will L:" to 
 great I'liL'th- to avoid it. knowing the burdens and the 
 
 sIlff'TUlL,' to uhicll it will be exposed. 
 
 Not until the striving for nuht and justice has welded 
 th'- nations together will a real equilibrium make its entry 
 in international politics and replace crafty calculation and 
 the principle nt' brdanee of power established b\ alliances 
 
 .Mid eoiillt < r allia I iei s.
 
 GERMANISTIC DREAMS OF GREATNESS 51 
 
 Patriotism was too narrow a conception for Kant ; lie 
 wanted to embrace all humanity in a living sympathy. 
 But this did not make him a naive, optimistic dreamer. 
 On the contrary, he knew only too well the weaknesses of 
 man, and might rather he called a pessimist ; in fact, he 
 went so far as to attribute to the human race " Thorheit 
 mit einem Lineamente von Bosheit verbunden." Kant 
 contemplated with sadness the world's history, in which 
 he found no method or goodwill, in spite of apparent 
 method of de-tail here and there : " all is on the whole a 
 tissue of folly, puerile vanity, often childish malice and 
 destructiveness." He also pointed out that the ends for 
 which human beings strove and which they often regarded 
 so essential are in themselves mean enough. Worse than 
 that : in pleading these aims and in the effort to attain 
 them they try to do each other every conceivable injury. 
 
 To Kant war was a blot on the human race, and he 
 declared that the greatest misfortunes which befell civilized 
 nations had their origin in war. 
 
 No German philosopher was less accessible to the 
 Germanistic militarist cult ; it was entirely opposed to his 
 view of life and irreconcilable with his ethical principles. 
 
 Goethe, Germany's most versatile genius, would never 
 have countenanced the German war policy and chauvinism, 
 which, in point of fact, are Prussian. He had a predi- 
 lection for Shakespeare, for everything French, for the 
 classical era, for Italy and the East. lie was a naturalist 
 as much as a poet, and " the great heathen " who was so 
 deeply influenced by Bruno and Spinoza could not be a 
 party to the Christian Germanism. He admired Napoleon. 
 who visited Goethe, of whom he uttered the famous words. 
 '' Behold a man ! " and presented him with the Legion of 
 Honour. Goethe, whom the Dutch struggle for liberty 
 and the Duke of Alba's appalling persecution inspired to 
 write the drama Egmont, would probably, had he now been 
 living, have written a new Netherland drama after the 
 German ravages in Belgium, although it would long have 
 remained imprinted despite his glorious name. He would
 
 .V2 BEFORE. I)t HIM;. AND AFTER 1!*14 
 
 not have found favour with the mighty ones of present- 
 day Germany, although hundreds of thousands of Germans 
 every year make a pilgrimage to his famous home in 
 Weimar. If only he had been alive now! The Great 
 War might not then have turned Furope into a hell. 
 
 Neither \\ould Schiller, author of lit: nit nf the \dlitr 
 ///7i//.v, /)>,n Curio-. Tin- .Maid <// Orleans, H'illnlin 7V//, 
 and other masterpieces, have approved of Germany's 
 chauvinistic dcgcncraev and policy of violence. His whole. 
 character would have revolted against it. He was always 
 the apostle of liberty and human rights, endorsed repub- 
 licanism and was elected a French citi/en by the Cnnrcn- 
 tii.ii \dtimnilf. Schiller would probably in these days 
 have written another drama on Tin lil>t>tr*. The story 
 of this his ftrhmn/i ujm* is peculiar. The young Count 
 Carl v. Moor, a well meaning and industrious, but im- 
 petuous and forceful character, who in his brother had 
 a cruel i nemy. was driven bv the hitter's base machina 
 tiojis to take ivfugi- in the Bohemian forests \\ith a band 
 
 of folli i\\ ( I s, \\ here ttli V I'd the life of " noble robbers." 
 
 AS an historian Schiller, with his noble enthusiasm for 
 ri'jht and truth in the lives of all nations, \\.nild have 
 opposed Treifschke. Iii his splendid i ssay of JJ ,/s //< /.\\/ 
 iiml ~ti u't'lt'ficni I'lmlt stttrlit'rt >n<m I '///; < r^nl'ji >./'/< 7//< .' 
 (1?.V>) he shows how human progress has depended on 
 the long cooperation of many different factors, and that 
 a just acknowledgment of t he merit s of ot hers, as accorded 
 by a philosophical mind, is essuitial. He belie ved in the 
 pacitic collaboration of the different nations in an attained 
 /'/// " . " All preceding <-poehs have laboured to 
 
 brm_' into b< -m^ our hmnun ecnturv. . . . The barriers 
 \\hieh SIJJK!, red States aiiel nations have b. en ele-molished 
 ... A cosmopolitan bond of brotherhood now unit'-s all 
 thinking minds. . . . The European eommumty seems 
 trani.''orm< d to one great family."
 
 VI 
 
 PRUSSIA'S OPPRESSION OF HER POLISH 
 SUBJECTS 
 
 \YiiAT degeneracy have we not witnessed in German 
 politics since Bismarck's triumphs and since the Bis- 
 marckian system became more generally endorsed by the 
 rilling classes and literally dogmatized ! 
 
 Before' Bismarck's time opinion in regard to the Poles 
 was quite dilYcrcnt from now. For instance, the German 
 Diet held in Frankfort in the year 1818 ruled that the only 
 solution of the Polish question consistent with the dignity 
 of the German people and its real interests, was to pro- 
 claim Poland an independent State ! The German poet 
 Herwcgli appealed to all German peoples to combine in a 
 war against Russia, and declared that " there could be no 
 free Germany without a free Poland, and no free Poland 
 without a free Germany." 
 
 Bureaucratic and Bismarckian Prussia has since severely 
 censured this appeal for liberty and insistence on the rights 
 of nations as a fantastic folly. 
 
 Prussia's Polish subjects proved themselves in the war 
 with France in 1870-71 to be brave and loyal soldiers, 
 but no reward came their way (save orders and medals to 
 sundry individuals). It seems, on the contrary, as if 
 Prussia had become still more overbearing towards them 
 after the joint victories over the French, and the persecu- 
 tion has increased rather than otherwise. 
 
 tk You Polish swine ! " " You Polish ass ! " have Ix-e-n 
 common appellations in the Polish provinces, and if an
 
 ">4 BEFORE, DURING. AND AFTER 1914 
 
 incensed j>casant resented such treatment from a person 
 in authority. U- lie but an elementary school teacher, the 
 seven- |H-naltis of the law w< re promptly visited upon 
 him. In Mich casts Prussian newspapers arc- not slow to 
 relate ho\v the |x act -able (icrman poj)ulation are exposed 
 to the persecution of a coarse and ignorant mob, inflamed 
 by Catholic fanatics and mutinous agitators! Hut if a 
 Polish deputy lists in tin- Prussian Diet to protest against 
 the tnatiiKUt of the Poles by the authorities, no one 
 listens to the " Polish waitings." and the House- proceeds 
 to tin order of 1 he day. 
 
 The authorities lon<j exercised shameless pressure at 
 the political (lections and t< rrori/ed the peasants still of 
 military aye into voting for (icrman candidates. II. Sicn- 
 ktcuic/s ]x-asant tale linrtek the Triumphant pvt s n 
 harro\\mu account of tlusc outrages. 
 
 Tli- \shol-s;ilf ( Xjiulsi(,ii of Polish subjects from 
 Prussia in 1 sst', was a tyrannical and unjustifiable act, 
 and emiii' nt (unnan jurists, liellek( n amongst others, 
 expri sscd tin ir disapproval. Tin re \\< -re no valid reasojjs. 
 Kvi n if the intention had bet n to pivvi nt the Polish 
 e|. mi nt from j^ainiujj an ascendancy, this could have 
 \ < n tlTeeted by prohibiting immigration, but could not 
 possibly justify ('.ifxilriiitinn of Poles after they had been 
 allowed to live in Prussia and had. in fact. IOHLJ been 
 domiciled t In re. 
 
 H us vja in t urn did not fail to visit her an^er on Prussians 
 in HU-SIM. who were shortly afterwards expelled in larjjc 
 numbers. 
 
 ' 1 1:ik:it i>m " (" H.K.T."-ism) is the appellation 
 d> ri\< d from the initials of t IK n;im< s tif its fnimd< is. llan- 
 si mann. Ki nm inann, and Tiedeinann ^i\"< n to a lar^i 
 nit ra 1 1, it riot ic soeit t y. t he " Ost markcn-\ ( r in. descrdx-d 
 H -. a soeiity for promoting a (itrman spirit in the Kastern 
 pro\'inc s. This society has for its object to ur^e t he 
 I'M: i an ( io\ '< run H nt (as if it \\ ( re IK et ssary ! ) t o pt -rseeutc 
 Prussia's Polish subjiets, to injure tlnm in every way by 
 d- i.ii\ini,' t h- m of work, to close to them all avenues of
 
 PRUSSIA'S OPPRESSION OF POLISH SUBJECTS :>:> 
 
 economic activity, to wrest their native soil from I hem by 
 purchase, etc. 
 
 The chief founder of the society, Hansemami, had 
 previously been a poor official in Poscn, but had there 
 amassed an enormous fortune. In return it seems to have 
 been his aim to reduce the Poles to destitution. 
 
 Hakatism. or the H.K.T. Society, was founded in 1892 
 after Bismarck's retirement and when Caprivi had become 
 Chancellor. This change had brought about some improve- 
 ment in the condition of the Poles, and their relations 
 with the Germans had been rendered less unbearable. 
 The Ilakatists, however, went on a pilgrimage to Bismarck, 
 at Varzin. and ;it once received his blessing. They tried to 
 make t lu ir countrymen believe that the Poles oppressed the 
 Germans in the Eastern provinces, and that the Polish 
 representatives in the Reichstag, who had become in- 
 creasingly loyal and often voted in favour of the Govern- 
 ment proposals, did so designedly, in order to gain ad- 
 vantages for the Poles, etc. This incensed the Prussians 
 greatly, a feeling of renewed animosity was created against 
 the Poles, and the object of the new society was declared 
 to be " to prevent Polish acts of aggressiveness " ! As if 
 they had power to commit such acts ! By " aggressive- 
 ness "' no doubt was meant that in spite of all difficulties 
 they refused to be annihilated and had instead progressed 
 in all directions, thus retaining their status and pre- 
 serving their nationality. This was looked upon in 
 Prussia with much disfavour, especially as the Polish 
 population numbering nearly three millions presented 
 a serious obstacle to the desired complete Gcrmanization of 
 the Provinces of Posen and East and West Prussia. 
 
 Hakatism thus became a State within the State, and 
 did not shrink from exercising a literal terrorism, partly 
 in order to pick quarrels with the Poles and create griev- 
 ances against them, and partly to intimidate such Prussian 
 officials as wished to do justice to the Poles and who were 
 therefore branded as enemies of the Prussian State ! 
 
 Everything, literally everything, has been done to uproot
 
 56 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 the Polish element in these provinces. Xo public officct 
 are fifr giien to Poles : they are excluded from the Courts 
 of .lustier, the pu^tal service, the schools, etc. Polish 
 jurists, who have practise! for decades, can no longer 
 occupy any oflieial positions. All public ollices are filled 
 by Germans only, and railway oilieials must also Ix 
 Germans. 
 
 To Gi rmani/.e the Poles the Government lias now made 
 G- rman instruction compulsory in the schools. Formerly 
 school instruction was givi n in Polish in all subjects, but 
 tin use of the Polish language was gradually restricted by 
 fn sh deen < s, until at last it was only permitted for 
 religion* instruction. Hut finally (l'.K)l ) t he Polish language 
 was i>ro*criln'.l entirely, and the children had to learn even 
 thiir pravt rs in German. Thereupon a curious move- 
 m- nt arose; the children struck, t IK v rt fused to ans\V( r 
 eju- stioiis from the eat ehism ;md to n ad tin ir prayers in 
 Gi rman. This strike hi came gem-fal and comprised marly 
 a hundri d thousand children throughout Pos- n. The 
 childri n \\> re punished not only by 1>< inu; " k-pt in hut 
 also with corporal chastisement, which roused inti ns<- in- 
 dignatiiin f hr(ughout l'jiroj)e. Tin- " \\'r> SC!K n aiVair " 
 (l'.X)l) was i specially notorious. Aft<r barbarous cast Ra- 
 tion of a crowd of chiMri n at the (leniintary school at 
 \\nsehen, a number of mothers forced tlnir way into the 
 school preinisi-s to protect them: the police \v< n- called 
 in and arnsts were made, many mot In rs receiving very 
 harsh s, nt'-nc' s, nj> to t \vo and a half years' p. nal servi- 
 ludi-! Prince Itad/ivill int. rp. Hat. d the Chancellor, 
 I'rinci |{u- lo\v. in the G, rman KI ichstai,' upon t hi subject, 
 but HP latter treated tin matt-r lightly. d daring that 
 
 t h- count ry 's n put at ion had not su!Yi ri d by the UK a sun s 
 of t h- \\rischen oilieials." and Count I Jinburg-St irum 
 d'-fi nded the Hogging nntliod of the Gi rman school 
 Ilia >t i rs. 
 
 In I '.!'_' the Chancellor, vmi Hin lo\v, introdueid in I he 
 Pin- i. n I)|. t a tyrannical Hill h*r cninpnlttiry t'.rprnpruitinn 
 in i-rdi'i- to depi-ive tin Poles of tin ir holdings. <m tin plea
 
 PRUSSIA'S OPPRESSION OF POLISH SUBJECTS 57 
 
 that tk the Polish question is the question on the solution 
 of which our country's near future depends." This pro- 
 nouncement was held by Die Post to be a very just one, as 
 demonstrated by the unceasing fervour with which the 
 " Polish danger " was emphasized and discussed on all 
 sides. This fervour, the paper wrote, must not be abated 
 until the Polish danger has ceased to be. But it will take 
 a long time, and " particularly ominous for ' Deutschtum ' 
 do the conditions in the East appear. Germany's colonizing 
 power is not allowed to display itself there and passes 
 more and more from the offensive to the defensive." 
 
 Some Dr. K. Busse among others wanted at one time 
 to found a university in Posen, but others including 
 Dr. E. Stumpfe - opposed it, as they feared that the Poles 
 would soon become a majority and create a fresh arena 
 for national unrest. Stumpfe declared (in his Polcnfrage und 
 Ansiedelungskommission, 1902) that the " Prussian school- 
 master will not succeed in overcoming the < Polentum,' 
 but will instead place it in a position to combat the 
 "Deutschtum." The more we promote education and 
 culture amongst the Poles, the more difficult will our 
 struggle against them become. We must Germanize by 
 a continued wholesale German immigration, otherwise we 
 shall achieve nothing against the Poles." 
 
 Just as a thousand years ago ! (cf. p. 18). 
 
 " By German wholesale immigration we must make our- 
 selves the real masters of the country ; we must extirpate 
 the Poles in the frontier districts which they inhabit." 
 
 The Germans in Posen lead an isolated existence ; they 
 are cut off from Germany and live in a foreign country 
 where they are not liked. Hence they are far from eager 
 to go to Posen. There is no upper bourgeoisie and no 
 opportunity for animated cultural intercourse. Those 
 who might exercise a refining influence on the province 
 hasten away as quickly as possible. 
 
 Prussia has gained little by her attempts to Germanize 
 Posen, in spite of the many hundred million marks expended 
 on German colonization. The Poles are regarded as
 
 .~>8 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 enemies, and have literally l>en converted into such by the 
 brutal tn atmcnt of these Prussian subjects. 
 
 Is it t< Ix wondi red at. th< n. that the whole of the 
 eivdi/.ed world outside Prussia was indignant at this treat- 
 ment of Posen's Polish population '.' The ureat Polish 
 writer II. Sienkiewje/. to whom S\\eden awarded the Nolx-1 
 Pri/e, has ap|H-aled to the forum of KurojK-au opinion in the 
 matter of Prussia's treatment of her Polish subjects, and 
 n-e< i\vd replies of varying length from '2~)-l well-known 
 |x -rs( ins in all count ries of Knrope. who may be said to stand 
 for Immanent ss. education, justiee. and truth. All ex- 
 pr< ss ( ,| t heir abhorrence of Prussia's conduct, and the replies 
 till an i-normous volume of *JS*J patft s . which Sienkiewicz 
 published untler the title /Vf/.v.sr ct I'olo^nf, fntjuetc intcr- 
 nntintuilf (!'.<>'.) 'This is now." lie comments, "no 
 loiiL'< r a disjiute b<t\M(ii tin Prussian idea and a few 
 million Poll s, but IK t \\een that idea and t he out ra^ed con- 
 <! ne< of all humanity. Tin noblest representatives nf 
 all natiniis ha\'e i,'i\tii thtir verdict m the first instance, 
 and tin- futun mu^t pronomx-e judgment in tin- higher 
 mstaiie- s !
 
 VII 
 
 THE DAXO-GERMAX WAR OF 1804 : BISMARCK'S 
 MACIIIAVELLISM : PRUSSIAN OPPRESSION IN 
 SCHLESWJG 
 
 CoxrrsiON* reigned throughout the German states in the 
 middle of the nineteenth century. 
 
 It was the untenable condition of Austria's internal 
 situation which determined the German policy of that 
 country. The Germanizing centralization system, which 
 had long been applied, could not hope to overcome the 
 resistance of the other nationalities, more especially of 
 the Hungarians, without a very close understanding with, 
 but a decided hegemony over, Germany. 
 
 It is a remarkable thing that we now hear so much in 
 Germany of Germany's "organizing power," of Germany 
 having '' discovered the- fact of organization and her 
 consequent right to Germanize the world " (Professor 
 Ostwald) : yet it is only quite recently that Germany has 
 displayed this organizing ability. During the greater part 
 of the nineteenth century literal chaos reigned in Germany. 
 The spirit of strif( just as it had done among the Gothic 
 peoples of antiquity when they sought fresh homes in 
 Roman territory -divided the- people, the States wen- 
 unable to agree, the old German Empire tottered on its 
 foundations, and the princes, like the people, strove as 
 effectively as possible to frustrate all efforts towards unity 
 and freedom. The antagonism between Austria and 
 Prussia was particularly marked, both striving for hege- 
 mony, and the tension between them grew until well on in 
 
 59
 
 00 BEFOUL, Dt UINC;, AND AFTEK 1U14 
 
 the sixties, when the confusion reached its climax Then 
 at last came the Schkswig-llolstcin troubles, which gave 
 Prussia an opportunity for the active intervention, whereby 
 she hojh d to gain the upjK-r hand. 
 
 The long struggle fe>r Schleswig-IIolste in the bete-noire 
 of stall sine n anel publicists which was due to complicated 
 qut stions of sncee. ssiein a ud t he- dilTe re nt nationalities of t he 
 inhabitants. 1< d after 1'ivderick \'Il's accession tet the- 
 Danish throne (January ISIS) to the- formatiem of an in- 
 surrectionist party with the Prince e>f Augustcnlx>rg-Nocr 
 at ils head. His brotlur. the Duke of Augustciiborg, 
 ilireeteel tin \\he>l< enterprise fremi Berlin anel received 
 support from the King of Prussia. The party wanted to 
 d'tach tin Due-hits from Denmark, and succeeded in 
 bringing a deputation lx- fore th< (it n nan Diet at 1 rank fort, 
 dt iiiandinu' that Sehlcswig should be- incorporated in the 
 (e-rman ('enfi-d- racv, to :iliic!i il had mrr/' belnniled, as had 
 be t n thi case \\ith HoKti in. The- (it rmaiiists in (', rmany 
 were at t his t inn busy ad dr. s^ing so-ealle-d claims e.f just ice- 
 to >t In r nations m <>nle r to enforce- their b in<j ace* pled 
 bv the I Yaiikf' >rt Ditt. To Schle s\\ \<j, :chirh find I//TO///.V 
 litcn n Diiulxli rtiiintii/. (,< rmany hail no claim, but in ve r- 
 tlnl'ss it \\a^ attempted by the philologist (irimm to 
 justify tin a-jitatieMi fi.r annexation e>n anci' nt historical 
 L't'i'Uinls. T!;iis it uas pointed out that l-Kui years pr< - 
 vioiidy Jutland had a population of (ioths. Andes. anel 
 Smtaiis, which had been driven out by tin Danes. \\ ho 
 had attacked | h- m from the north ! 
 
 1' r< d> rick \II of Denmark thereupon de-cre e 
 
 lit'! t' 111 shollM reeti\e a separate (ie>Vi mine lit 
 
 indi p- ndrnt State forming part of the (itrma 
 
 ft d- racy, luit thai Schle swig should be insepai -.d>l\ 
 
 ''illi 1 ) nmark. In ists the dispute- culminate d m a \\ar 
 
 \'. hle-h lastid t \\ i Veal's \\ith tin ill -il ri'i et ie-nisf party 
 
 m tin- Duchy, assisted by Prussian and ol In r (ermali 
 
 iiil-l S\s- elt n anel Noruas s nt an army to D- n- 
 
 inaik - ass|staiic< and an Austrian armv like \\ |si slip 
 
 Dains. After \'.ir\in^' fortuins tin Dane s
 
 DANO-GERMAN WAR OF 1804 61 
 
 finally proved victorious in the battles of Isted, Mysunde, 
 and Fredriksstad (1850). 
 
 At a conference in London in 1852 the Great Powers, 
 joined by Sweden and Norway, thereupon settled the 
 succession question by granting Prince Christian of 
 Gliieksborg (who became Christian IX) the right of 
 succession to the entire Danish monarchy, whereby the 
 union of the Duchies with Denmark was definitely ratified. 
 
 The year before, the Duke of Augustcnborg had, on his 
 word of honour, formally renounced, on behalf of himself and 
 his family, (ill claims to the duchies, and by way of com- 
 pensation for this, as well as for his (states forfeited by 
 his treason of 1848, he received from Denmark an in- 
 demnity of six and a half million kroner. 
 
 When in 1857 the Danish Government, in order to make 
 an end of the disputes regarding the administration of the 
 Duchies, agreed to the only right solution, namely, that 
 Holstein should be detached, and Schleswig should be more 
 closely incorporated with Denmark, the German Confederacy 
 threatened " military execution " in order to maintain the 
 union between Schleswig and Holstein. and renewed 
 threats to the same effect were uttered in 18(50 by the 
 German Powers. 
 
 To create a new and separate buffer-State, the fictitious 
 State of Schleswig-Holstein, which was to belong to the 
 German Confederacy, was the real object in view ; but 
 this was an unjust and unreasonable claim, having regard 
 to the great political principle of the nineteenth century, 
 nationality, for the contemplated State would be one 
 consisting of two distinct nationalities. 
 
 By degrees Prussia had become better and better 
 equipped for the realization of the ideal of German unity, 
 and became about the beginning of the sixties a military 
 State in which consideration for the rights of nations 
 was practically a dead letter. This degeneration was 
 due in the first place to the ruthless 4i Blood and Iron 
 Chancellor." Bismarck. By trickery and despotism he 
 overcame his opponents in the Diet, and proclaimed, in
 
 62 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 accordance with his principle, that might goes before right, 
 that " (irrmany's unity cannot lx- founded with phrases 
 and majorities, but only witli blood and irun." 
 
 This (it-nnan Machiavelli thus introduced a new phase 
 into the |>olitical development of the country. (.Germanism 
 Ix-came anything but Christian ; in fact, it may IK- said 
 to have lx en a diabolical liennanism which was now 
 inaugurated. 
 
 Denmark was the first country destined to spill its blood 
 that (ierman unity might IK- encompassed and that 
 Prussia niijjht lx-coine the ruling State in Germany. 
 
 When on the death of Frederick VII the disputes con- 
 cerning the succession in Sehlcswig and Holstein were 
 revived, the question of a reconstitution of (iermany like- 
 wise came to the fore, and there is not the slightest doubt 
 but that the crafty and unscrupulous Bismarck interfered 
 with Schleswic and HoKtein's afYairs so as, by an easy 
 victory, /o hring the Duchies under Prussian rule, and thus 
 Cain the prestige which he lacked in the Prussian Diet : 
 her-- the lilwral Progressive Party, which represented the 
 humane tendencies of that time, enjoyed at the Ix-ginning 
 of the sixties a decided ascendancy and opposed the 
 enormous Army budget of the war party as unnecessary. 
 
 The Hall Ministry of 1 S<;;j thought it might achieve a 
 happy solution of the Schleswig (juestion as the out- 
 come of an alliance with Sweden and Norway, which 
 Charles XV concluded \\ith Frederick VII. A new con- 
 stitution was ratified on November !.'{, 1 Sd.'J. under which 
 the joint aiYairs of the monarchy and of Sehlt suig \\ ( r r to 
 be handed over to a Diet of two Chambers, whilst it was 
 left to the future to decide whether HoKtem should join 
 the union, and this new Act was passed In/ Danes and 
 Schleswigrrs jointly. 
 
 When Christian IX shortly afterwards ascended the 
 throne he cave his assent to the Constitutional Act, and it 
 WH> accordingly called the Xwember Constitution. 
 
 Bismarck, in his Reflections and Kcminiscences, pub- 
 lished by his secretary. Herr Buseh. himself explained his
 
 BISMARCK'S MACHIAVELLISM 63 
 
 Machiavellian policy towards Schlcswig-Holstcin. He re- 
 marks amongst other tilings : " In my opinion the definitive 
 solution of the Danish question had to be sought in the 
 acquisition of the Duchies by Prussia. I said so at a Cabinet 
 meeting directly after Frederick VII's death. I reminded 
 King William that every one of his immediate predecessors 
 had extended the boundaries of the State. I invited him now 
 to do the same. 
 
 1 This pronouncement of mine was omitted from the 
 protocol. When I asked Geheimrat Costenoble, who was 
 in charge of the protocol, why he had omitted this state- 
 ment, he replied that the King was of opinion that / 
 myself would prefer to see my remarks omitted Jrom the 
 protocol. His Majesty seemed to have thought that I had 
 spoken under the Bacchic influences of a dejeuner and 
 that I would be glad to hear no more of it. But I 
 insisted that my words should be put in, and they were. 
 The Crown Prince (the subsequent Emperor Frederick) 
 raised his hands towards heaven ivhilxt I was speaking, as 
 if he doubted my sanity. My colleagues remained silent." 
 
 With his characteristic lack of moral sense, Prussia's 
 greatest Machiavellist failed to see that his proposals were 
 so at variance with all international law and with a humane 
 and enlightened policy that his hearers could not but 
 think that he was drunk or momentarily out of his mind ! 
 His mania for power had quite blinded him, and he seems 
 to have regarded with contempt the Crown Prince's 
 appeal to heaven in this unrighteous matter. 
 
 But what is the good of talking about the perplexing 
 quarrels over the succession to the Duchies ? Their con- 
 quest had been decided upon by the Blood and Iron 
 Chancellor, and he skilfully exploited Duke Frederick 
 of Augustenborg's conduct when the latter broke his 
 pledged word to Denmark and claimed the ducal crown. 
 
 It is curious to note that the Germans, in dealing with the 
 Schleswig-Holstein question, obstinately pleaded certain 
 old clauses when they were to their apparent advantage- 
 even if they were unlawful but ignored others which
 
 64 BEFORK, DURING, AND AFTER 11)14 
 
 controverted their contentions and which were in accord- 
 ance with laws and treaties. Although the Danish 
 Government had been guilty of grave mistakes and omis- 
 sions, occasionally giving rise to misunderstandings and 
 complications, it cannot IK- denied that the German views 
 with r yard to the I)uchi s, t sjx cially Sehleswig. were 
 founded in th<- main on fictions of legal casuistry. 
 
 Among the German States there was no unity regarding 
 Schlcswig Holstcin. They were divided into two camps. 
 One. to which the central States belonged, wanted to 
 acknowledge Prince Frederick of Augustenhorg as Duke of 
 Sehleswig-IIolstein in spite of his lather's renunciation, 
 and to create a new buffer-State. Finally it was decided 
 by the German Confederation to occupy Ilolstein by an 
 executive force, and an army of 1'J. ()()() Saxons and Hano- 
 verians accordingly invaded the country without meeting 
 with resistance. 
 
 Hut it was quite contrary to Bismarck's plans that a new 
 buffer-State should be created, and he accordingly induced 
 Austria to coi 11 bine with Prussia in order to prevent this, and 
 instead to nlttick Denmark. Austria, however, assented 
 tu the proposal in order to keep a check on Prussia rather 
 than to support her. Thus both States broke the federal 
 law which decreed that the minority should follow the 
 majority, and th<-y resolved to take the matter in hand 
 wit hout considering the views of the ot her St at es. Shortly 
 afterwards (January '_'<), 1S(H) an army of .'}'.), (MM) Prussians 
 and 'Jl.oOO Austrians entered Holstein. 
 
 The confusion amongst the Germans in their attempt to 
 reconcile their various interests now became greater than 
 ever. What were the Saxons and Hanoverians to do ? 
 Their commanders found it necessary to evacuate the 
 eastern part of Holstein in favour of tin- Prussians and 
 Austrians, and otherwise to take up a waiting position. 
 
 On being challenged to evacuate Sehleswig a Danish 
 province! the Danes refused to do so, whereupon the 
 Prussians and Austrians took the offensive. The Danish 
 arinv of .'{s,."ii>o men now withdrew to Dvhl><">| and the
 
 BISMARCK'S MACHIAVELLISM Q.'t 
 
 island of Alsen. The Danes defended the Dybbol fortifica- 
 tions very pluckily for a long time, but they were finally 
 stormed (April 18) by the Prussians, who were now for 
 the first time equipped with breech-loaders and rifled 
 ordnance which could be mounted out of range of the old 
 Danish smooth-bores. 
 
 An armistice was agreed upon, and a conference of the 
 great Powers and Sweden and Norway was held in London. 
 Finally it was decided to divide Schleswig, the purely 
 Danish part of which, as outlined by the line of Flensburg- 
 Hojer, was to belong to Denmark. But by an inconceiv- 
 able act of short-sightedness the Danish Government did 
 not accept this proposal, and as the conference thus failed in 
 its object, the war broke out afresh. A few days later the 
 island of Alsen was evacuated by the Danes and taken. 
 This brought the war to an end, and Denmark had to 
 accept the Peace of Vienna (October 18G4), by which 
 Holstcin and Schleswig were handed over to Prussia and 
 Austria. 
 
 In Germany, where the principle of nationality had been 
 held inviolable as long as it concerned Germans under 
 Danish rule, and where it had been proclaimed that the 
 war was waged to liberate the " German brethren,"' it was 
 now found quite in order that 200,000 Danes in Schleswig 
 should be compelled to become German subjects. Bis- 
 marck, in order to devise some semblance of a right, 
 directed Prussia's Crown jurists to express their views on 
 the question of the Duchies, and received the farcical 
 answer that their rightful ruler was the King of Denmark, 
 but that as he had (by his peace terms) '" relinquished his 
 rights to Prussia and Austria/' the latter were thence- 
 forward the rightful masters of the Duchies ! 
 
 Protests soon arose in Germany. The National Society, 
 at a meeting at Eibnach (October 1864) stigmatized the 
 surrender of the Duchies to the tyrannical governmental 
 system of Prussia, and shortly afterwards a committee of 
 thirty-six members of the Prussian Diet issued a rousing 
 protest against the annexation. But it was no use ; 
 
 E
 
 06 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 might had to go before right, and the old German sense of 
 justice had to go by the board. 
 
 In Sweden, as in Norway, the sympathy for Denmark's 
 Cause- had b< e-n \vry marked ever since the In-ginning of 
 tlu- war. and the resentment against Bismarck and 1'russia 
 was general. Charles XV wanted an alliance- with Denmark 
 for the protection of Schleswig and did all he could to 
 involve Sweden in tin- war. Hut he- met with opposition 
 from the- majority of his Ministers, who from motives of 
 prudence opposed his elTorts. The Prime Minister. Louis 
 tie (ieer, a man of high integrity, has given us some in- 
 teresting particulars of this period in his Memoirs (189*2). 
 The Fore i^n Minister. Mandcrstrom, had for several years 
 (spoused Denmark's cause- and seems to have wanted 
 Sweden and Norway to enter the lists as Denmark's ally, 
 since- Charli s XV in .Inly lS;j promised Frederick VII 
 in Hall's pre-s. nee a treaty e>f alliance. This treaty was 
 duly draft d. and Charles XV discussed it in Septembe r 
 1 Sti.'i \\ith several of his Ministers. Hut he- nie-t with 
 considerable opposition. (iri|x i nstedt emphasized uith 
 great eloqu< nee the danger to Swi el. n eif a \\ar with 
 In rmany, and "tin King was so eager to cemtradiet 
 him that it was dillieult f>r tin ot he rs to g< t a \\<>rd in." 
 
 IV (i< i r and t he- Norwt gian Prime Miniate r opposed t he 
 treaty unl ss we- obtained the- assistance- e>f at least on- of 
 the- (iivat Powers. In tin end Fngland, France-, and 
 lliissia \\' }'< inveik' il to ci.ni' to I )( nmark's assistance- and 
 u i iv proinisiel Sweden and Norway s eo-opcrat ion if they 
 eliel so. Charles X V \\oiiM not L'lVe \\ay. ho\\ev<r. but 
 wanted 1e> reel.cni his pre>mise-. and trie el. though un- 
 successfully, to form a in \\ Minist r\ . 
 
 I )-- ( i< r \\ as e if opinion t hat . \\ hat < \ r ha |>p< in el in tin 
 quarrels l> t\\iiii Denmark and tin (rrman states re- 
 garding Se-lil- s\\ ig-Ilolst i in, notlnnjj eouM be done' from 
 e.ur side. lie wrote : (i (tin < inif'. v rml rmsnn for going 
 to uar WHS lust "/ cunijiit'st pure an<l sinijile , and all other 
 
 Jd-et'\ts Were- notlllllL,' but eVas|.,!is of til' issue-. A -- lor
 
 BISMARCK'S MACHIAVELLISM 67 
 
 myself, 1 still believe that Sweden's intervention would not 
 have averted the war or given it a European eharaeter, and 
 that it would have ended in precisely the same way, only 
 with the difference that we should have been beaten as 
 well as the Danes, as our army at thut time was very 
 indifferent ly equipped." 
 
 The adherents of Scandinavism, who had hoped for 
 participation in the war, were very bitter against the 
 Ministry, and at the beginning of March 18(54 this resent- 
 ment took shape in riots and window-smashing, especially 
 at Mandcrstrom's n. sidence. In Norway the Scandinavists 
 tried to induce the Storthing to pass a vote of sympathy 
 for Denmark. 
 
 The popular sympathy for Denmark in the other two 
 Scandinavian countries took tangible shape in the dispatch 
 of a number of volunteers, including some ninety officers 
 and twenty doctors from Sweden, I being one of the latter. 
 I was then an undergraduate of twenty-two, and I think 
 that the other volunteers were fired by the same con- 
 viction as myself, namely, that the Germans had no right 
 to start the war and that the Danes were in the right. 
 Personally, I felt it a duty to help my injured brethren 
 in a struggle into which they had been forced by violence 
 and injustice. 
 
 I was stationed for some time at Augustenborg Palace, 
 then converted into a base hospital, and was posted at the 
 first-aid dressing-station at Sonderborg, right opposite the 
 Dybbol fortifications, the day before they were stormed, 
 April 1 8. The scene was one of utter desolation battered 
 and smoking houses everywhere, relief parties hurrying 
 to and from the fortifications with stretchers and wagon- 
 loads of wounded ; in the dressing-stations white faces 
 and blue lips, in the operating-theatres a literal carnage, 
 buckets full of blood, amputated limbs lying about, gaping 
 wounds, and through it all the thunder of the Prussian 
 guns and the vicious hissing of the shells overhead. 
 This sort of thing one never forgets, and it makes one 
 think of politics, of the instigators of it all.
 
 68 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 The Dano-Gcrman War was not calculated to strengthen 
 the Scandinavian feeling of kinship with the Germanic 
 cousins of Germany. On the contrary, a deep antipathy 
 grew up against Germany, or rather Prussia that is to say, 
 against her policy, and more esjx-cially against her real 
 leader, Bismarck, who has always been disliked, nay, 
 hated, throughout Scandinavia on account of his doctrine 
 of brute force. 
 
 It is a n-markable and paradoxical fact that the German 
 Empire, founded on the systematic growth of Germanism 
 and thus resting on the principle of nationality, has itself 
 violated the rights of other nations ; and the expositions 
 of many of its learned chauvinists have been a mockery of 
 history. 
 
 PRUSSIA'S OPPRESSION* OF THE SCHLESWIGERS 
 
 When the German fratricidal war of l<S(i<; was ended 
 by the Peace of Prague, with Napoleon III as mediator, 
 it was <1< eided that Austria should sum ndcr her rights 
 in Schleswig-IIolstcin to Prussia. At the same time, 
 there was added to Article ."> of the Peace Treaty a 
 clause to the (fleet that " the population of tin- northern 
 district of .SV///<.sti /<,', ichen by a j>lebiseite it .shall hare 
 expressed its wish to be incorporated u'ith Denmark, shall 
 he surrendered to that eonntrt/.'" 
 
 Prussia shortly afterwards (December 1HGO) proclaimed 
 t In incorporat ion of t he Duel i it s of Sell It s\\ ig and Ilolsti in 
 in hi r n aim. and tin I)an< s in North Sehlcswig were thus 
 
 ford <i to li enliie Prussian slibjt ets. 
 
 The Kolni.sche Xeitung. in 1 S<>(i, espoused tin cause of 
 the North Sehli s\\ i^< i s v< i v energetically, and strongly 
 urgi-d that Article "> of the Pi ace of Pragui should l>e 
 carrii d out. It wrote amongst otlnr things that "it 
 would be a wise and statesmanlike act to n iiounce North 
 Schlsuig voluntarily." and pointed out tliat "Prussia 
 promi^' d to do so by the Peace of Prague." adding : " We 
 cannot cone. i\v how anyone dare hflieie that Prussia \\ill
 
 PRUSSIA'S OPPRESSION OF SCHLESWIGERS 69 
 
 leave the most advantageous peace which was ever con- 
 cluded unconsummatcd by not redeeming a solemn under- 
 taking entered into under the eyes of the whole of Europe ! " 
 
 When the Prussian Diet had to deal in December 1880 
 with the question of the incorporation of Schleswig and 
 ITolstein with Prussia, and when a committee expressed 
 the hope that Article 5 of the Peace of Prague would be 
 deleted, Bismarck made the following statement : " I 
 have always been of opinion that a population which does 
 not wish to be Prussian or German, and which has unequivo- 
 cally expressed its desire to belong to an adjacent State 
 of its own nationality, does not conduce to the strengthening 
 of the Power from which it is striving to be separated. . . . 
 I consider it necessary to point out that ice cannot possibly 
 regard ourselves as released from obligations entered into 
 by the resolution of the Committee and of the Diet ; we 
 must honour these obligations, but we will do so in such a 
 way that in the voting which is to decide our course there 
 can be no doubt of its voluntary and independent nature, 
 and as to its expressing the will which it is its purpose to 
 elicit." 
 
 Bismarck's organ, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 
 declared in an article respecting Article 5, which appeared 
 in the spring of 1867 and which was assumed to express 
 the intentions of the Prussian Government, that Prussia 
 would allow the vote to be taken, but not until the popula- 
 tion at the end of a considerable lapse of time had become 
 familiar with Prussian rule, as until then they could not 
 vote without bias. 
 
 What Bismarck and his organ meant was that 4i after 
 a considerable lapse of time " a large number of Danes 
 would have been driven out of Schleswig and replaced by 
 Germans, so as to obtain a satisfactory result from the 
 voting. But events turned out otherwise. 
 
 Article o of the Treaty of Prague was deleted purely 
 and simply at the end of twelve years, during which time 
 no offer had been made to carry out its terms whilst 
 nothing happened in Schleswig or Denmark which could
 
 70 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 justify its abrogation. The promise of a plebiscite was 
 withdrawn in a convention dated Vienna. October 1878. 
 between the German and the Austrian KmjH-rors, and this 
 astounding breach of a treaty was officially given the 
 inolYensive name of " revision." This act of releasing 
 William I from his obligations is eonsidered by political 
 authors of Bismarck's school, such as Professor W. MiilK r. 
 etc., to have In-en Austria's quid pro quo for the services 
 which the German Government rendered that country 
 during the Oriental crisis and at the Berlin Congress of 
 1H78. 
 
 In the above mentioned "revision" it is stated that 
 "The stipulation in this treaty [Treaty of Prague] con- 
 cerning the possibility (Modalitiit) of the return of Schles- 
 wig's northern districts to Denmark has not yet been 
 carried out." It is made clear that The German Emperor 
 attache* importance to the removal of thin possibility, and it 
 is further explained that " the Kmperor of Austria rcaliy.es 
 the difficulties which stand in the way of carrying out 
 this fifth article." What these difficulties were is not 
 explained, and could hardly be explained, inasmuch as 
 they did not exist unless they consisted in the mortifica- 
 tion over the failure during a period of t\\elv- years to 
 Germanize North Sehleswig in spite of all stratagems, such 
 as school coercion. language co rcion. etc. 
 
 The "revision in question of the Prague Treat v was 
 of truly laconic bn-vitv and consisted in Article ."> being 
 declared null and -, oid (ans\cr (riltigkeit {/or/;/) ! 
 
 Such " r<-vis| ( ins, " m the vocabulary of ot IK r Kuroj>can 
 n:it imis. are called despotism and hinh lorcc. and it is 
 certain that Art icle ." df th< Ti-atvof Prague \\niild IDIIL,' 
 sine- ha\ b< i n earrii d nut had t In re > xist < d in Kurope a 
 po\\ iful Slat- \\lueh could < nfoiee the claims of politieal 
 morahtv and \\ateh ov. j- the rights of the small- r nations. 
 Hut 1'iaiiei \\as vaii(plish( d. and Prussia dad gained in 
 streir'th diiriiM' the past t\\e|ve \ears and kn \\ that no 
 
 I 
 
 oth r nation \\oiild dai' . fur t h sak< of the " re\ ision 
 of th Prague Treat \. to challenge this (ivcrbcanng
 
 PRUSSIA'S OPPRESSION OF SCHLESWIGERS 71 
 
 military State. The convention of October 11, 1878, 
 destroyed any lingering illusions as to the return of 
 Schleswig to Denmark. It ratified the annexation as a 
 conquest in the spirit of ancient times that is to say, 
 without regard for the rights of nations, nationality, or 
 historical progress. 
 
 Bismarckian publicists and historians have vainly 
 sought to make the world believe that " great joy prevailed 
 in the North Schleswig districts on publication of the 
 convention," etc. (\V. Miiller). The Danish Schlcswigers 
 have always been, and are still, dissatisfied with the 
 annexation, as shown by their always sending Danish 
 deputies to the Reichstag in Berlin. 
 
 When William II visited Christian IX in 1888 news- 
 papers threw out hints as to the fulfilment of the 
 treaty. But the whole German Press, including even 
 the Liberal and independent papers, in touching upon 
 this question voiced the opinion that " Article 5 of the 
 Peace of Prague may now, both from a political and 
 juridical point of view, be regarded as dead and done with 
 (Vossische Zcitung). 
 
 It is surprising to see otherwise sound political authors, 
 such as Dr. K. Baumbach, member of the Reichstag, 
 (in his Staatslexicon, 1882), speak of the deletion of this 
 clause ''by agreement between Prussia and Austria.'' as 
 an accomplished fact without commenting on the obvious 
 injustice done. 
 
 When an address concerning the Schleswig question 
 was presented in 1880 to the Liberal members of the 
 German Reichstag by the Posit ivist Society at Stockholm 
 through the present author, the Freisinnige Zeitung wrote 
 as follows : " This document contains an appeal to the 
 Liberal members of the Reichstag to agitate in order that 
 the German language may be abolished in the- Danish 
 Schleswig Primary Schools, and that the northern districts 
 of Schleswig may be ceded to Denmark. These gentle- 
 men might have spared themselves their trouble and print- 
 ing expenses."
 
 72 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 The Kolnische Zeitung, in reproducing the above, added 
 the following comment : " This presumptuous demand 
 from foreign peace league members would hardly have 
 been submitted to the German Liberals had not their 
 repeated fraterni/.ing with Poles, Guelphs, and Social 
 Democrats, their hostile attitude towards colonial policy, 
 and their quarrels with Bismarck created abroad a mistaken 
 notion as to the aim and nature of the German Lilx ral 
 Party. The German Lilx-rals must once and for all make 
 it their rule not to let their opposition to the policy of the 
 Government degenerate into a struggle against the vital 
 interests of our country ; they will not then in the future 
 have to face the disgrace of being taken by Joreign enemies 
 of the German Empire for opponents on principle to 
 Germanism." 
 
 Tliis approval of Germany's ruthless treatment of a 
 couple of hundred thousand Danes, whose right to a 
 plebiscite on a question of nationality was acknowledged 
 during many years, and of the Prussian annexation of 
 North Schle^wig without a shadow of historical justifica- 
 tion, but mere ly in the alleged vital interests of the German 
 Fatherland, only illustrates the degeneration which follows 
 in t In wake- of a traditional policy of violence'. 
 
 Pretests against the- Schleswig-IIolstein annexation 
 were- not altoget her lacking in G rmany. alt hough t hey were 
 f< w. Thus Dr. I 1 '. 11. Ge-iTke-n. diplomatist and professor 
 of internarional law. trieel to prevent this incorporation, 
 just as after the Dano-German N\ ar he- opposed Bismarck 
 in London on the Luxemburg question. Net wonder, 
 then foiv. that \\hen Bismarck semght (in 1SSS) (e> in- 
 stitute proceeding against him for his puhlicatieMi of an 
 extract from the Kmpen>r Frederick's Diary, showing 
 the latter's share in bringing about Gi rmany's unity, his 
 (Bismarck's) judgment complt tely fe.rseiok him and he- 
 tried first t< brand the extract as a for:_ r < r\ and afterwards. 
 whi n he fail- d in this at t e in jit . (! dare d it to be a punishable 
 tiffttx'f! lie wanted to crush his old opponent. \\ ho had 
 ,)(,(,(! up for right against might, d'l'iken \\as most
 
 PRUSSIA'S OPPRESSION OF SCHLESWIGERS 78 
 
 barbarously lodged in goal pending prosecution for l&se 
 majest^, but was acquitted by the court. 
 
 The Prussian Government has ever since the annexation 
 of Schlcswig attempted a systematic and ruthless suppres- 
 sion of the Danish language amongst the Danish Schles- 
 wigers and has persecuted them for any tokens of affection 
 for their old country, Denmark. Many of then have, 
 therefore, by degrees emigrated from Schleswig to Denmark 
 or to America, whereby their number has decreased some- 
 what since 180-t, when there were about 200,000 of them. 
 According to oflicial data, there were in 1890 about 
 135,000 Danes in Schleswig who were subjects of Prussia, 
 and in addition about 30,000 so-called " foreign " Danes. 
 
 The German language was introduced into the Schlcswig 
 schools in 1889 and made compulsory for all subjects ; 
 occasionally, however, exceptions were made in favour 
 of religious instruction. But the Danish language is not 
 allowed to be taught. There must be no Danish masters, 
 no families must engage tutors as they would probably 
 be Danes and parents must not themselves instruct their 
 children ! If they do, they are prosecuted and punished 
 (with a fine to begin with) pursuant to a law r which says 
 that no one must teach who lacks " moral competency " 
 and this competency is supposed to be lacking in Danish 
 parents when they are not good Prussian subjects ! 
 
 The Prussian Government has further forbidden parents 
 to send their children to school in Denmark. Guardians 
 sending children to Danish schools after they have been 
 confirmed are punished. 
 
 A German song-book (Liederbuch) was introduced in 
 1884 into Schleswig schools by an order of the Government, 
 and it was directed that the school-children should learn 
 at least twenty of its songs by heart. Of these twenty 
 songs, twelve are German national or war songs, and 
 it may be of interest to note that amongst them is 
 the famous Preussenlied " ich bin em Preusse." But 
 this historical inexactitude was not enough. The song
 
 74 BEFORE, DrRixu, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 consisted originally of five- verses, but for the benefit of the 
 Schleswigers a sixth vt-rse, by Privy Councillor Schneider 
 (a (icrman immigrant), was added in 1S>(. This verse 
 runs as follows : 
 
 I'm! wir, die wir am Ost uiul Nordensrc uN Waeht ^estcllt, 
 grstahlt von Woj4 uiul Wind, wir, die- Sett I>ii]>}>rl durch dcs lilutcs 
 Hatuie an I'rnisM ns Thnm and Yolk jjckrttct sind. wir woll'n nicht 
 ruckwarts scliam n, ncin vurwiirts mil Vrrtraurn ! Wir rufcn'.s 
 luut in ullc Welt hinein : " Atich icir sinti 1'retisscn. wollcn I'reHsscn 
 scin '. " 
 
 The following is a literal prose translation of this verse : 
 
 "And we, posted as sentinels on Haltic and North Sea, 
 hardened by wave and wind, we who since the Dnppcl 
 fiilht have been tied by bond* of blood to 1'i'iissia's throne 
 and p<-opl-, \v<- will not look back, nay, forward, and with 
 confidence! \Ve cry aloud that all the world may hear : 
 ' HV too (ire Prussiunx, und Prussia us cant to (>< .' 
 
 It is not only by the int roduet ion of the (icr man language 
 that th- schools in Schl'-swig are used as a means of 
 destroying the national spirit of t he population ; instruction 
 in history has also been directed to this end. 
 
 In Heirnath-fkitndf (subjects relating to one's own 
 country) the children are taught nothing of Schl swig's 
 history prior to 1 Sil I that is to say. that the province has 
 Ix-cn Danish from tune immemorial, that it had always 
 had Danish laws, etc. : on t he cont rary. Denmark is spoken 
 of as ;i totally for- i '_ r n or hostile eountrv. to which the 
 Duchy had b- n tied, but from which it has now been 
 happily lib' rat- d ! 
 
 T!i> instruction in "national historx d'MTilxs 
 
 (' rmany 's great IK ss in t h- Middle A^'es and h- r suits, <|U( nt 
 declini-, until the time \\hin Prussia ;ipp ( ;ind on t he 
 sc.-ii'-. The po)ie\- of h< r rulirs has I >< < n patriotically 
 v If sacrificing and loyal \\ithoiit jiarall 1. \\hilst that of 
 th-ir n ighboiirs \\as mad' up of intrigue ami \ 'io|< nee ; 
 that is why Prussia has been ivuardid ! The coiuplest of
 
 PRUSSIA'S OPPRESSION OF SCHLESWIGERS 75 
 
 Silesia, the partition of Poland, the annexation of Hanover, 
 etc., are signs of God's wondrous guidance of His chosen 
 people, the great nat ion which is considered to have dimmed 
 the lustre of all others. By the side of all this glory, 
 Denmark's history and culture are rarely mentioned, 
 and then usually with pity or irritation. 
 
 Children hare been punished when they hare spoken 
 Danish in the school or in the playground ! In some places 
 as, for instance, at Aabenraa, a system of fines was in- 
 troduced some time ago, the school-children being fined 
 for every Danish word they uttered ; but later on the 
 punishment was changed to '' staying-in." It is not 
 unusual to subject to corporal punishment any children 
 who are unable to repeat their German lessons, and a 
 certain headmaster named Blohm, of Iladerslev, was 
 particularly notorious in the eighties as being one of 
 Sehleswig's worst school tyrants in this respect. 
 
 But all this Germanization has been in vain. The 
 Schleswigers have remained as Danish as before and look 
 to Denmark as their mother-country, continuing to cherish 
 Danish culture. The greater part are well-to-do peasants, 
 and, as I had occasion to note some years ago during a 
 journey in Schlcswig, they are highly educated. 
 
 It was really a feeling of impotence in the matter of the 
 Germanization of North Schleswig which caused Governor 
 Roller in the autumn of 1898 to issue the revolting decree 
 ordering the expulsion of Danes from Schleswig. This 
 measure caused the deepest indignation throughout Un- 
 civilized world and gave rise in Germany to energetic 
 protests, amongst others by the Reichstag members 
 E. Richter and Vollmar, Professor IT. Delbrtick (Con- 
 servative, professor of history at the Berlin University), 
 Professor Kaftan, the Miinchener Allg. Zeititng, and other 
 organs representing cultured opinion in Germany. The 
 Government prosecution against Professor Delbriick for 
 his attitude over the deportations deepened the anger 
 throughout Europe and lessened the hopes of a- pacific 
 solution of the Schleswig question.
 
 76 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 It will be of interest to note what a German in an official 
 position, Pastor O. Gleisz, of Holstein. had to say on the 
 subject of Schle-swig's national cause after a trip in the 
 Scandinavian countries in 1884. The following passage 
 occurs in one of his Utters written when on his travels : 
 
 I cannot help stating as my firm conviction that the 
 return of the northern Danish-speaking portion of Schles- 
 wig would not lx- too heavy a price to pay fora real and 
 sincere friendship with Denmark and the North." 
 
 In a remarkable work by a German, Theodor Brix, 
 entitled N or d- Schleswig und die Selbsterniedrigung Deutsch- 
 lands (Berlin, 1902), we have the gratification of noting 
 another German protest against the Prussian policy of 
 tyranny in Schleswig. 
 
 lie shows how the North Schleswig policy is but a 
 counterpart of German policy as a whole. The former, 
 like the latter, is a sign of "the decline (\iedergang) of 
 political life in Ge rmany. The leading circles in G( rmany. 
 having wholly abandoned thems< Ives to worship of power, 
 to flattery and adulation of individuals, of monarchs, now 
 demand from others the same readiness te> sacrifice every 
 independent political conviction. The spirit of liberty 
 in Germany has take n refuge- among the- le>wer classes, who 
 are inaccessible te> Court and Government influences. . . . 
 By torment ing and wearing out t he- spirit e>f the- champions 
 ef the political aspirations of the Danes, by criminal 
 prose cut ions and sent noes, or by deporting their adherents 
 and thus injuring tin in economically, no doubt the end 
 can t><- gained of stifling the political life of the- Dams 
 outwardly, and many a supporter who lacks material 
 or moral po\\< r of resistance- against such weapons may 
 fall away from tin party and 'keep quiet.' But real 
 chauvinism is n< de d to s. < in tin- ellVcts of sue-h me thods 
 a e-iinvi rsion tei the C,i rman spirit." 
 
 1 wi 11 know." write-s the- author, "that every appeal 
 
 to the sense of justice eif the German people is use less. 
 
 But MIP ly an enlightened nation m;iy reasonably In 
 ep'htrd uith so miu-h understanding of the interests of
 
 PRUSSIA'S OPPRESSION OF SCHLESWIOERS 7T 
 
 its own State as to make it realize the disastrous elements 
 of the Roller method of ' quieting ' the people. A public 
 agitation is far less dangerous than one carried on in 
 secret beneath the surface. And the ' quiet ' is the ashes 
 under which the fire of the hatred of the Germans is 
 smouldering."
 
 VIII 
 THK (iKRMAN FRATRICIDAL WAR OF 180(5 
 
 PursMA. having gained in importance since tin- war with 
 Denmark, was hound sooner or later to fight Austria, a 
 war which, as both parties were well aware, would settle 
 the question of (iernian hegemony. This question had 
 hitherto formed a persistent obstacle to the unity of 
 (iermany. 
 
 The two countries soon came to loggerheads over the 
 administration of Schleswig-Holstein ; t he Notes exchanged 
 between them became more and more provocative in 
 tone, and the interjacent States showed themselves 
 increasingly hostile to Prussia. Bismarck then turned to 
 Italy to obtain an ally against Austria, holding out Venetia 
 as a reward. He also visited Napoleon III at Biarritz 
 (September 1H<;.~>), and their negotiations resulted in 
 Napoleon promising neutrality in the struggle which 
 Bismarck meant to provoke between (iermany and 
 Austria. There is no doubt that the Imperial adventurer 
 \\as \\oji over by crafty promises of conquest on the 
 part nf him whom he merely regarded as a desperado 
 and u horn he hoped to out \\ it . 
 
 Austria and Prussia began in March I M',I; to mass t mops, 
 each ascribing the initiative to the other, whilst Prussia 
 and Italy entered into an offensive and <l< fi nsi\-.- alliance 
 against Austria. 
 
 Bi inarek, however, found in King William and his 
 
 diat- entourage a verv serious obstacle to the prose 
 
 ?H
 
 THE GERMAN FRATRICIDAL WAR OF I860 79 
 
 cution of his war plans. William was perturbed at the 
 thought of a rupture with the old ally and of a war between 
 German nations, and Queen Augusta, the Queen-Dowager, 
 the Crown Prince Frederick, and the Crown Princess 
 supported him in this view, Bismarck, whom sound 
 German opinion regarded as William's evil genius, was 
 so incensed by this opposition to his boundless ambitions 
 that he fell ill. However, William's view underwent a 
 change after Bismarck had escaped assassination at the 
 hands of a fanatical young champion of liberty named 
 Cohen, who had been overwrought by the general indigna- 
 tion against the Iron Chancellor. His escape was regarded 
 as an intcrpositi&n of Providence, and the following day 
 William issued an order for the mobilization of the entire 
 Prussian Army ! 
 
 The immediate cause of the rupture was the dispute 
 over the administration of Schleswig-Holstein, which 
 Austria wanted to refer to the Federal Diet, summoning 
 for this purpose a sitting of the Provincial Estates of 
 Holstein. Bismarck declared at once that this would be 
 tantamount to a withdrawal from the convention which 
 the Monarchs of Austria and Prussia concluded at Gastein 
 in 18G5, to the effect that Prussia alone should administer 
 Schlcswig, and Austria Holstein. 
 
 To be on the safe side, and in order to settle the dispute 
 by a war Bismarck's favourite method he sent a 
 Prussian army into Holstein (June 7, 1806), which the 
 Austrians evacuated without fighting. Prussia now sub- 
 mitted to the Federal Diet an ultimatum, demanding 
 reforms in the German Federation with the exclusion of 
 Austria. The President of the Federation, however, 
 declared that Prussia's conduct constituted a breach of 
 treaty, and ordered the mobilization of the whole of the 
 forces of the Federation with the exception of the Prussians 
 (June 11). Three days later the majority of the States, 
 among them Bavaria, Wiirtembcrg, Saxony. Hanover, and 
 Nassau, voted for Austria, Avhilst only a few minor North 
 German States sided with Prussia. The Prussian envov
 
 80 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER Idl4 
 
 thereupon announced that the Treaty of Federation was 
 to be considered broken and no longer binding. 
 
 When Saxony, Hanover, and the Electorate of Hesse 
 rejected Prussia's reform proposals, Prussia declared war 
 on these States, and immediately after followed the 
 declarations of war between Austria on the one side-, and 
 Prussia and Italy on the other. 
 
 It will be plain to everyone that this war came about 
 without any real that is to say, legitimate and com- 
 pelling cause, and contrary to all law of nations. The 
 victory rested with Prussia and proved " brilliant," as 
 we used to say ; and the battle of Koniggriitz (or Sadowa), 
 one of the greatest and bloodiest in our era, ended in the 
 hautboy players striking up the hymn, " Now thank we 
 all our God." 
 
 In fact, God was thanked for His wondrous interposition 
 in letting 7'JO,<)<>() well-armed Germans butcher one another 
 in a barbarous fratricidal contest according to the laws 
 of " military science," but letting the Prussians butcher 
 best ! 
 
 The Paee of Prague, which followed upon this conilict, 
 was concluded with the assistance of Napoleon that is 
 to say, of a foniati 7'wurr, without which seemingly these 
 representatives of the Germanic race were unable mutually 
 to adjust their differences. 
 
 IJv this peace Austria had to acknowledge the dissolution 
 
 * I 
 
 of the (ierman Federation and countenance a new German 
 Federation, <>{ which Austria would not be a member. 
 Thus Prussia obtained the longed-for hegemony in 
 Germany. 
 
 At the Prussian headquarters the intention was to 
 occupy Vienna when peace was concluded the army 
 was at the gates and large territorial gains from Austria 
 were anticipated, apart from the kingdom of Hanover, 
 which was simply annexed by Prussia : but fear of war 
 with France induced the Government to accept the terms 
 of peace. 
 
 Austria had to cede Vep.etia to Italy :md make o\er her
 
 THE GERMAN FRATRICIDAL WAR or 1800 81 
 
 rights in Sehlcswig-IIolstein to Prussia. It was stipulated, 
 however, that the population of Venetia should express 
 its wish for incorporation with Italy by a plebiscite, and 
 (Art. f>) that the inhabitants of the northern or Danish 
 part ol Schleswig should settle by the same means whether 
 they wanted to return to Danish rule. 
 
 Outside Germany there was general consternation, not 
 to say contempt, at this scandal of European civilization, 
 and Prussia gained no admirers, unless among soldiers on 
 technical grounds ; on the contrary, her martial progress 
 was watched with general anxiety. 
 
 This German war had its origin in the brutal obtrusion 
 of a new military State in the midst of Europe, which 
 might be expected to await suitable opportunities for 
 attacking other nations and had most clearly shown that 
 ?/.v oien /xr^'cr, its ort'/f advantage, were its only considerations 
 in its dealings with other States, and that the rights of 
 nations did not enter at all into its policy.
 
 IX 
 
 TIIK NKITHALITY OF BFLUIUM AND 
 LUXEMBURG 
 
 BKi.<;irM. which in the eighteenth century belonged tu 
 Austria, passed into the hands of France after the war of 
 IT'.t'j and the French victory at .Jemappes ; it remained 
 Fivneh until 1M.~>, \\hen at the Vienna I'on^ress the 
 kingdom of t he United Netherlands was formed, consisting 
 d Belgium and Holland. '1'he IK \\ State, \\ith its different 
 nationalities, customs, religions, etc., proved very un 
 wield \ ; dissensions s ( >c >n arose. an<l in t he end t he Belgians, 
 in 1 > .'<>, broke into open rebellion, which ended with the 
 dielaration of Belgium's independence. Knirlaiid and 
 France s\ mpat hi/.ed with Belgium, and induced Austria. 
 Prussia, and Russia to join them in acknowledging the new 
 kingdom as an unit JH ntlt nt and nt'Ul i'nl St at e m accordance 
 \\ith the ' Treaty .f the Twenty four Articles " .!' l,s;51 . 
 
 !ii li (juarreU with Holland sm>n arose, however, and 
 the BI lu'iaiis were l)eaten, l>ut \\ere sa\id hy a l-'reiich 
 i\. Alter renewed tiL'htinLf BI iL'ium had to abandon 
 I,- r claims to Maastricht and parts t>\' Luxemburg and 
 I libui'L'. l-'m.'illv, by th<- treat\ of London (isM'.M. 
 Filmland. I-'rancc, Austria. Prussia, and Russia deluuteU 1 
 ratilierl B'-lL'ium's international position and guaranteed 
 th'- neutrality of the country. 
 
 Aee,,niin^ f<. Art. 7, ]'> L'liim \vas to constitute an 
 
 pi ndent State in perpetuity, subject to the limitations 
 
 peeilied in Art>. 1, 'J. and I. Bel^'ium \\'as bound to <>!>- 
 
 r\ e f !,. a me neut ralit y in its relat imis \\ it h ot her St at is. 
 
 S"
 
 BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG NEUTRALITY 83 
 
 Whilst the Powers thus undertook to respect Belgium's 
 neutrality and protect her from any infringement thereof, 
 Belgium, on the other hand, undertook in ease of hostilities 
 not to favour any one State, and accordingly to abide by the 
 old-established rule of refusing permission to the armies of 
 a belligerent country to march through her territory. 
 
 This treaty has never ceased to have a binding effeet. 
 
 Whilst the peace negotiations between Prussia and 
 Austria were going on in August 1800 Bismarck and 
 France's ambassador, Benedetti, discussed the territorial 
 gains which Napoleon hoped to make in return for his neu- 
 trality, and on that occasion Bismarck (according to Benc- 
 dctti) gave him to understand that Belgium and Luxemburg 
 would form a suitable compensation, whereupon Napoleon 
 desisted from his claims to German territory. This ruthless 
 proposal to seize countries which had not taken part in 
 the war and had given no cause for attack was, of course, 
 contrary to the principle of nationality previously pro- 
 claimed by Napoleon ; but this violation troubled the 
 usurper as little as it did the '* Blood and Iron Chancellor." 
 A proposal for an alliance between France and Prussia 
 was now drafted, providing that Napoleon should recog- 
 nize Prussia's acquisitions as well as the steps which this 
 country might take for the -formation of a new German 
 Federation, whilst the King of Prussia promised to facili- 
 tate France's acquisition of Luxemburg and, if the Emperor 
 should find it desirable to conquer Belgium, to " assist with 
 an armed force " / 
 
 This treacherous proposal of August 20, 18(50, outraging 
 all principles of modern statecraft, was written down by 
 Benedetti in the course of the negotiations on the subject 
 with Bismarck, and practically at the hitter's dictation. 
 Subsequently neither Napoleon's Government nor Bismarck 
 was prepared to admit the responsibility for having initiated 
 this proposal. 
 
 The Grand Duchv of Luxemburg, which was annexed
 
 Ml 13r.ro UK, DruiNi;, AND AFTKK 11H1 
 
 by France in 1?'..~> and ceded to tliat country by the Peace 
 of C'ainpo Formio in l?l>7, was constituted at the Vienna 
 Congress of 1M.~> a separate State within the (icrnmn 
 Federation, although awarded to the Kini: of tlie Nether- 
 lands. On the outbreak of the Helu'ian revolution in 
 Ih.'jO Luxemburg attached itself to Hcl,'ium. whose provi- 
 sional (iovcnmunt declared the country to be a Hcl^ian 
 province. Subsequently it was settled by the Treaty of 
 London in IS.T.i that only the western part should belong 
 to Helijiuin. whilst the remaining part was to be adminis- 
 tered as a separate State, acknowledging the sovereignty 
 of the Kin<j of the Netherlands, but still belon^im,' to the 
 (ierman Federation. On the dissolution of the latter 
 through the war of lM',;, Luxemburg became an indc- 
 pendent State. It was then-fore unreasonable to aix r ue. as 
 the (iermans did. that. Luxemburg, "as ;m old (ierman 
 coiintr\\" should not lie separated from "\\hat is called 
 (ierniany." " (iennany " \\;is ii"t a national unit, but a 
 confederation of a number of (ierman Slates. Hismarek 
 admitted, in fact, m th<- North (ierman Diet on April 1, 
 lst',7, thai by the dissolution of th<' (ii rman Federation 
 Luxemburg, like other members, repaint <1 its full sn\, r< i<jn 
 ri'jht s. That bein^ so. o!i\ iously I he fort rcss of Luxemburg 
 no longer remained an allied t'ort ress. and Prussia had 
 th'-refori- no ri'jht to keep it occupied. 
 
 \Vlien siiL."_ r ' st ions \\ i re made on behall' of the French 
 as to tin cession of Luxemburg to France subject to an 
 mill mint Y and to the approval of t he I\ m^' of t he Net IMT- 
 la nds and o)' t !i< pnpu lat ion. \\ a rhke t hri at s \vere ut t eivd 
 m tli- N'oith (ierman Di t in the name of tin " joint 
 1 -'.it IM -rland." whereupon t hi- Fri neh (io\- ( I'nment \vithdre\\ 
 it-, proposals pro\-idi d that the Prussian garrison wi-rc 
 remo\'cd. Through I h- m dial ion f the ( ireat Po\\ < rs a 
 1 n at \ \\ as t hen made MI London on M , \ 11. I sti?. \\ ht-ri by 
 tl: (iranil I)i.<-!i\ of Lu\i luburL; \'- a -. declared a >irit!r<il 
 S',;!, ' u nd- r I IM- ciilli-ctive guarantee of the Po\\. i s." 
 
 T!: I - IP ut rallt V had t h- n ! of to I M r> s| K el ( <| ui ease 
 
 of !|o,tl!ll|. - I i. t \\ i II II' iLjllbolirillL.' Collllt I'll s.
 
 X 
 
 THE FRAXCO GERM AX WAR OF 1S70 : HOW 
 IT WAS ( Al SEI) BY BISMARCK 
 
 FROM the time when Prussia, by defeating Austria, had 
 secured the hegemony in Germany, it was generally t bought 
 that war between France and Prussia for the hegemony 
 in Europe was inevitable. Roth countries were merely 
 waiting for the moment when they should resort to arms. 
 It was the object of Bismarck's diplomatic art to bring 
 about the war while at the same time goad ing France into 
 declaring it.* 
 
 Bismarck's aim was to extend Prussia's power, to bring 
 all German States under her leadership, and thus to pre- 
 pare Germany's unity- that is to s&y, Germany's identifica- 
 tion with PniNsid. For welding Germany together there 
 could be no better means than tension wilJt France and 
 consequent fear of attack 1'rom that quarter. 
 
 Xapoleon's insecure ])osition in France at that time 
 helped to further Bismarck's plans. The Emperor's military 
 and diplomatic failures had created a strong opposition 
 
 * Among the numerous works written on the Franco- German War. 
 I wish to draw attention more especially to that by the French 
 historian II. Welschintrer, " Ld Guerre dc 1S70, Causes et Ifespon- 
 sabilitt's " (1910) in two volumes. This author was secretary and 
 archivist to the Legislative and National Assembly in lS(>8-?(>: 
 he was pn-sent at all debates on the war. recorded all important 
 events, copied all important documents, and conversed witli most 
 of the leading men of that period, thus acquiring extraordinarily 
 ample and detailed materials which were duly published in this 
 very unique work. 
 
 85
 
 8G BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 against him. Accordingly he found it necessary to concede 
 modifications of his power, with a proportionate strengthen- 
 ing of the Senate and Legislative Assembly. Hut it was 
 too late ; the protests in pamphlets and newspapers against 
 the muddle in the administration, the appalling State 
 expenditure, the loans, etc., became louder and louder. 
 After the political elections of lS(i'., which sent a number 
 of talented oppositionists into Parliament, the I'surper 
 found himself no longer secure on his throne, and lie then 1 
 fore pretended to turn Liberal and restored, in 1870, more 
 or less the old parliamentary system of Government. 
 The nation was now invited by means of a plebiscite to 
 declare that it "approved tin- liberal changes introduced 
 into the Constitution." but admittedly it was understood 
 that whoever voted in the affirmative also approved of 
 the Ftnpire, its institution and its corollaries, and gave the 
 Imperial Prince a lawful title to the crown. Hy enormous 
 pressure on the part of the Government the plebiscite 
 resulted in a bii; majority for Napoleon, but the minority 
 was nevertheless a great danger, as a number of t he military 
 element voted against him. and it was unanimously agreed 
 in the Imperial councils that a war was necessary to save 
 Napoleon's t lirone ! 
 
 In France t he opinion had j/rown t hat a strong and united 
 Germany constituted a danger to France, whilst the 
 Germans regarded the French as opponents to their 
 strivings for unification. The warlike feeling against 
 France in Germany may be gathered, inl<r <ili<i. from a 
 report sent in lsis |i\- the French military attache. Colonel 
 Stoffil. in which he spoke of the constant accusations 
 against France and the continued arming of Prussia, and 
 declared that the position was such that it must 'm 
 
 i 1 ifilhltf l> ild In ti Hi'. 
 
 That Hismarck lon^' contemplated war \\ith France 
 (r the eiiiMjuest of AKace and Lorraine may be gathered, 
 apart from other indications, from his Mi /unit. , published 
 b\ hi> secretarv, M o ri ! /. Husch, m \\hieh he says that in 
 1 M;;. before the G( rman \\ar of that Year, he mooted an
 
 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR OF 1870 87 
 
 amicable settlement between Prussia and Austria, where- 
 upon the two Powers would jointly make war on France in. 
 order to reconquer Alsace-Lorraine. 
 
 This was confirmed by the leader of the German Centre 
 Party, Franckenstein, who published a note from his 
 diary recording a conversation with Bismarck on the 
 subject. 
 
 We know also from a letter of October 28, 1808, written 
 by General Ducrot, that the Prussian Countess Pourtales, 
 after her arrival in Paris from Berlin, informed him of a 
 statement made by Sehleinit/, minister of the Royal House, 
 respecting Prussia's impending acquisition of Alsace. 
 
 That the Germanists in Berlin were thinking in the 
 sixties of the conquest of Alsace and Luxemburg, as 
 well as of Schlcswig-IIolstein, is shown by the following 
 incident : 
 
 When in 1807 the Luxemburg question at one moment 
 threatened to develop into an armed conflict between 
 France and Prussia, the students of Strasburg sent a 
 fraternal and pacific address to the students of Berlin. 
 The latter answered with a long address published in the 
 tilraxxbHrger Courier, which contained the following pro- 
 nouncement : " To us, as to all honest men who know 
 how to distinguish between mine and thine, there exists no 
 question as to whether the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, 
 or Schleszvig-IIolslehi, or Alsace are German countries, the 
 inalienable property of the German nation. . . . We 
 Germans are a peaceful people and not a people eager for 
 conquest, but we wish to keep what belongs to u$ and 
 preserve it from iliicrcft. We regard as traitors to our 
 country and to the German nation those who, in order to 
 escape a dcfctixire :<:ar waged to reject shameless claims, 
 are willing to surrender a German country by urging a dis- 
 honourable peace. . . . You, inhabitants of Alsace, speak 
 to us as Frenchmen, but most of you bear German names, 
 you are of German race. You wish at all costs to be 
 Frenchmen and you sing to your shame ' O France, 6 ma 
 patrie ! ' instead of intoning our * Deutschland, Deutsch-
 
 88 BEFORE, DTRING, AND AFTER l 
 
 land iibcr Allcs, iibcr Allcs in der Welt.' We say to you, 
 ' know yourselves ! 
 
 A war wa^'cd to obtain Alsace was thus regarded not as a 
 war of aggression, but as a :iv;r "/ </< /< mr defence ol' all 
 the alleged ri|_ f ht of the (icrman nation | 
 
 Tin- French ambassador at Berlin. Beiiedt 1 1 1, had ever 
 since 1S;; furnished detailed particulars of the views held 
 in Prussia and of the probable plans of that country, its 
 preparations for war. etc. 
 
 In the end a n/x//.v Ixlli between 1'Yancc and I'nissia 
 arose in a quarter from which it was least expected. 
 
 Spam, which 1>Y the revolution of isiis had shattered the. 
 fetters of the Bourbon throne, already weakened by decay 
 from within, and deposed the dissolute Qiu en Isabella, 
 wanted a new monarch. Marshal I'rim thereupon induced 
 the Cortes to offer the Spanish crown to a Prussian prince, 
 Leopold of Hohen/.ollern, a relative of Km^ William. 
 
 Heiiedetti had reported as early as March IM'.'.I from 
 Ucrhn that the Spanish ambassador, Kances. h;id arn\'cd 
 on what \\as said to !>' an uniiiiport ant errand, l>ut that 
 he himself suspected that it had to do \\ it h Print L'-opoM's 
 candidature, and he had questioned him on the matter, 
 but received an evasive answer. Heiiedetti spoke about 
 t he candid at lire to t he Prussian I'nder S< en t ary of St at c, 
 Tliile, who pretended to kno\v tiothui'j about it, and to 
 Bismarck, who f. i^n- d indifference and interred that he 
 ilid not think Prince L-op ( ,Id would !- able to retain the 
 Spanish throne lor ver\ lon^, ;im l ||, a | j,^ father. Prince 
 A lit on. was t hi r> lop- disinchn d to help him. 'I'ln po^si- 
 biht y of a 1 1 oh' n/."!l' rn | irinee on I he Spanish t hroiie was, 
 h"\\ i \ i r. admit !-( 1 b\ I >i . marek. aiid ' \ r\ t !i:n_ f point s to 
 his ha\ inu' sto.nl b- hind this plan, b\ \\hieh |-'r,i!ic< \\ as 
 to be goaded into u ar. II' clearly I lit ndi '1 at a pi'opil loiis 
 lii'Mii' nt to bniiL' a boii | an an i I'd e.inlliet \\ith l j< r.inee. 
 l-'rom the n i ilit a r \ point - .f \ \< \\ ( < rman\ \\ as ri ad\ . The 
 armi<> u iv e\ei-llnl|\ or/ani/' > I and tram, d and could 
 a->s Irom a ace to a \\ar lo.itin:, r in a v i \ l< \\ das.
 
 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR OF 1870 89 
 
 Moltkc had prepared everything, and shared Bismarck's 
 wish to bring about a war with France before long. They 
 were we'll aware, through spies, that the military organiza- 
 tion in that country was very faulty and that mobilization 
 would take a comparatively long time. 
 
 In France a new regime was to be inaugurated at the 
 beginning of 1S70 by the so-called Liberal Ministry of 
 fimile Olliviers, but, unfortunately, the task was beyond his 
 powers ; and what was still worse, the future Foreign 
 Minister, the Due do Gramont, lacked all the subtler 
 qualities required of a diplomat. lie became the chief 
 cause in France of that country's misfortune through the 
 conllict over the aspirations of the Hohenzollern prince 
 to the Spanish throne, which Bismarck wanted to bring 
 about. lie was overbearing and shortsighted, ruthless 
 and deceitful, both towards Napoleon and his colleagues 
 and towards the Parliament. Bismarck, who had met him 
 before, once said in his coarse, jesting way, that Gramont 
 was '* the greatest fool in Europe " ; in fact, he called him 
 "a blockhead." In Welschingers opinion this was one of 
 the secret causes which aggravated the dispute between 
 Prussia and France, for Gramont had felt deeply offended 
 and had sworn to avenge himself on Bismarck sooner or 
 later. 
 
 After Gramont, the Empress Eugenie, the beautiful 
 Spaniard, who led the world of fashion and also aspired to 
 political influence, was the chief cause of France's humilia- 
 tion, as she wanted war on dynastic grounds. 
 
 Napoleon III was at this time in indifferent health and 
 irresolute in mind, and had less influence on the trend of 
 affairs. He allowed himself to be led by the Empress and 
 Gramont, although he held back occasionally and tried to 
 prevent an armed conllict. 
 
 That King William and his whole Government were 
 anxious to secure Prince Leopold's nomination to the 
 Spanish throne is now well known. The question was 
 debated in a Cabinet Council on March 15, 1870, over 
 which the King presided and at which the Princes Anton
 
 90 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 and Leopold of Hohenzollern, Bismarck, Thile, Moltke, 
 Roon(thc Minister of War), and others were present. Bis 
 rnarck said to Prince Leopold : " It is a Prussian patriot's 
 duty." The Prince refused. Bismarck said : " It is a 
 political necessity." But the Prince persisted in his refusal. 
 Bismarck, later on in the spring, appealed to Prince Anton 
 to induce his son to accept the candidature in (Icrnuimfs 
 inttrt'st. At length Prince Leopold yielded to the pressure 
 and obeyed the call on June 1-, because the " inl<rt .v/.v of 
 the Stuff dfintindfd It," whereupon King William gave his 
 consent as the head of the House. 
 
 In spite of all this the King persisted throughout that 
 he was ignorant of all these int rifles.* 
 
 Time was soon ripe for Bismarck to intervene more 
 actively. On July .'J (iramonl learnt that Prim had offered 
 the Spanish throne to Prince Leopold and that the latter 
 had signified his acceptance. When this became known 
 in Paris all the newspapers beat the alarm and declared 
 that a II"hen/.ollern on the Spanish throne would be a 
 serious iwnacr. The leading English newspapers expressed 
 themselves in tin- sann- strain, and it was pointed out how 
 si cr 1 1\ the n< L'"' 'at 1 1 >lis had been conducted and how this 
 implied hostility to I-'ranee. (iramont declared to Prussia's 
 ambassador in Paris, \\< ft In r. that I-'raiice could not 
 tolerate a Prussian prince on the Spanish throne. Tlnle. 
 1 'ndi i Secret arv of State, declared on Julv I to l-'rance's 
 representative in BI r'm. I.e Sonnl. in B< nedetti's absence, 
 that " the (,o\< ni!i!( nt \\ i re (jmte ignorant of the matter. 
 
 \\ Illeh to till III (I H I I;o{ i \]st ." 
 
 'I'll- ne\\ s t li.-.t Pi i nee Leopold had be. n in\ it< d to occiipy 
 t he thioiie o! Spain dro\e the Paris public opinion into a 
 
 fen I Mlit of e\e|t e[||< lit . all- 1 tin <_<reat esf col 1 1 1 1 1- .t I- -ll rel^'lK (I 
 
 m the L- L'islat i\ e ASSI n b|\ . ( )n Jii!\ r, ( i i-an.oi,l issued 
 
 a si at 1 1 Ml it fri >Mi 1 IM ( to\ . i mi" lit m \\ lileli it \\ ;, said that 
 " we do not In lii \ e that re-, pi et lor t IM n- hi of a IK i-jh 
 
 (f \V. -Isehiiii." r, I.n <;>i,rr, <!, ]s7(. \ul. 1. p. In. II. n frrs 
 IM n t,, (hi- (.. riu:m :iuth.r -f ///w r //-///. ;e /\".n\ /'. Dr. ()n<kin. 
 ailn ili^'t \s hi IM- ;iii| In ifit irs ;ir< t h< I - - ' -I < I > < 'f t IM 1 in) ii i 1.1! :u i hi \ i .
 
 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR OF 1870 91 
 
 bouring nation compels us to permit that a foreign Power 
 shall be enabled, by placing one of its princes on the throne 
 of Charles V, to disturb to our detriment the present balance 
 of pourr in Europe and place the interests and honour of 
 France in jeopardy. If it be otherwise, we, strong in 
 your support and the nation's, shall know how to fulfil our 
 duty without hesitation and weakness.'' The pronounce- 
 ment was received with extraordinary enthusiasm by the 
 Legislative Assembly majority. 
 
 Gramont thereupon directed Bcncdetti to proceed to 
 Ems, where King William was staying, in order to ask the 
 King to revoke the Prince of Ilohenzollern's acceptance of 
 the Spanish crown. Benedetti, on requesting the honour 
 of an audience, was invited to dine with the King on July 9, 
 and carried out his delicate task with skill and moderation, 
 but could achieve nothing. The King declared that the 
 matter had not been discussed by the Prussian Govern- 
 ment and that, whilst he had by no means encouraged the 
 Prince to accept the proposal of the Spanish Cabinet, he had 
 not wished to place any obstacles in the way. 
 
 It seems fairly certain that King William did not want 
 war with France, and that he had different views from 
 Bismarck on the achievement of German unity. When 
 Prince Leopold, on July 11, expressed his wish to abandon 
 his candidature for the Spanish crown and the King heard 
 of this, he wrote to Queen Augusta that he joyfully 
 approved of the decision. When the British ambassador, 
 Lord Lyons, heard of Prince Leopold's withdrawal, he 
 asked Gramont to proceed cautiously so as to save France 
 from war and not to yield to a passing wave of opinion. 
 The Cabinet was irresolute, but the majority of the 
 Ministers were inclined for peace. Napoleon, who was 
 suffering from his usual complaint (gout), was not inclined 
 to commit himself to a campaign, but his entourage were 
 more warlike. Gramont tried to curb the bellicose spirit 
 in the Legislative Assembly, but was received coldly, 
 whereupon he telegraphed to Benedetti to urge King 
 William still more strongly to forbid Prince Leopold's
 
 92 BEFORE, DriiiNi;, AND AFTER 11H4 
 
 oandidatnrc and to j^ivt- an early answer. The 
 declared on July 11 that there was no harm in waiting 
 and that he wanted ample time. HI ncdctti repeated that 
 a delay would imperil the maintenance of peace. Bencdetti 
 made it clear, however, that it' Prince Leopold withdrew 
 from the candidature, t his decision would have his approval. 
 The Spanish ambassador in Paris notified Napoleon on 
 Julv 1'J that 1'rinct 1 Anton fnul in ///.v son'* m//m 'dthtlru'cn 
 tin ctintliiltiturt' /"/' thi' Spanish throne on account of the 
 complications \vhieh it seemed to create. The matter 
 should have stopped here, for the danger of Prussian 
 influence in Spain was thcrely averted and France had no 
 loiiL't r any cause to feel affronted. 
 
 Bismarck regarded the matter as a personal defeat 
 and uanted to resign at once his ollice of Prime Minister 
 and I'l.aiiet llor. I'nfortnnatcly, Paris did not understand 
 how to take advantage of the new situation, now so 
 favourable to France. 
 
 The Fmpress and the Bonapartists, who wanted war, as 
 t hi v hopi d for \ ict < iry and for the removal t hereby of t he 
 Lil>< ral Party I'roni ollice, scoffed at "Father Anton's 
 ti ]< -<_'rarn ;ind pn t.nd<d that the 1'impire was tottrin^ r . 
 The L. -^jslat i\ ( AssemliU' loiullv condemned Ollivier s 
 credulity \\lnn In- express, d his joy at Prince Leopold's- 
 withdraual. The F\tn-me Hidit pr< s. nt d through l)u\'er- 
 jiois iwlto had li-'-n jostled out of the (lovcrmncnt l>y 
 Olhvicn rtn int. r| l!at ion demandin'_r to know whether 
 tli> ( i< >\ i in; i nt proposed to jiroiurt' ^nm'iintii^ lor the 
 warding off o| l'i., la's mlliience. Ollivier and the 
 map-nix of hi-, eiiili a'_Mi s in th<- ( -\ rnm- nt \..i;it.d to 
 .ai . and t | : . adrs of tin (in at 
 
 to th- (io\ rnni n! tin d< sjr.diiht y of 
 . ith th- \\ithdraual of th.- Prince of 
 'id L\"iis had r'C'ivtd sp.cial in-lruc 
 
 t ions \\i in i hi ( e .\ i !'ii in. nt i .n I li. - ill ij. et and re] .p. s ( nt ,d 
 to ( i raiiiont in a ! 1 1 . r t In nnni' asiiralde responsihiht v 
 
 f t h< dispute.' Supjiortid li\ ()ih\nr. \\lio. h"\\c\'tr,
 
 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR or 1870 93 
 
 lacked the requisite firmness, Gramont tried to induce 
 the Prussian ambassador in Paris, Wcrther, to prevail 
 upon Kin*,' William to give a declaration as to guarantees 
 and to express his desire that all misunderstandings should 
 now be considered at an end. This message displeased the 
 King according to Benedetti and he recalled Werther. 
 \Vhcn (iramont informed Napoleon of the situation in order 
 to discuss the measures the Government should take, and 
 when he told him of the dissatisfaction among the Deputies 
 and Senators who demanded Prussia's complete humilia- 
 tion, the Kmperor was so swayed by what he heard, as 
 well as by the Empress and the Court, that he authorized 
 Gramont to direct Bencdctti to demand an assurance from 
 William that he would not allow any renewal of Prince 
 Leopold's candidature. 
 
 Instead of dissuading Napoleon from this course, which 
 was the worst possible, Gramont encouraged him in it, 
 clearly influenced by his desire to humble Bismarck, and 
 disregarding more prudent counsels. But by acting thus 
 lie gave the crafty Bismarck a new and unexpected oppor- 
 tunity of attaining his object and bringing about the war 
 by provoking France. 
 
 Without consulting Ollivicr and the other Ministers, of 
 whom several were determined to preserve peace, the 
 arrogant Gramont took upon himself to send at once 
 (evening of July }'>) a telegram to Benedetti instructing 
 him to demand from King William a declaration that 
 Jie teonld not permit flu- nriral of Prince Leopold's candi- 
 dature. 
 
 The King had promised Benedetti to send for him. but 
 in order to avoid a fresh discussion of the subject he told 
 his adjutant. Prince Radziwill. to inform him that Prince 
 Leopold had withdrawn his candidature and that he 
 considered ihe incident closed. Benedetti nevertheless 
 asked Radziwill to obtain an assurance that the King 
 would not permit a renewal of Prince Leopold's aspirations 
 in the future, whereupon the Prince gave him the following 
 ollicial answer : " The King luix contented to c.rprexs liis
 
 04 BEFORE, DI-RINC;, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 full approval of the u'ithdraicul of the Prince of Hohenzollern. 
 He cannot do more." 
 
 On the ivm-wal of the request for an audience, the Kin; 
 answered through the same adjutant that lie must defi- 
 nitely decline to enter into any further discussions cm the 
 subject of an assurance which was to hind him for the 
 future, and that he had said hi* /</.v/ leord in this in-ittcr. 
 " For this- reason, says Had/iwill's ollicial report, "the 
 Kin^ refused to ^rant a fresh audience, as he had no 
 other answer to ijive and as any further negotiations 
 /;w.v/ he conducted through the Ministers." The Kin<; 
 granted Count Heiudetti's wish to he allowed to hid him 
 <M>od-bye on his departure by meeting the Minister at 
 the railway station as he was about to proceed to Coblen/. 
 A Frenchman, who was present. M. A. Me/ieres. agrees 
 wit h Bcnedetti's emphatic declaration that on t his occasion 
 "no one took or u'ayc offence." and that the relations 
 between the Km<, r :u>d the ambassador up to the last 
 moment were marked by the utmost courtesy. 
 
 BISMARCK'S FOlUiKHV OF Till! K.MS 
 TKLKGHAM 
 
 On .July II- a dispatch arriyed from the French Charge 
 d'Affaires in Herlin. Le Sourd, (jtiotint: a tile^ram from 
 Fins \\hich had appeared in the \' ordilcntschc Ztitnn^ 
 and \\hich was of the following tenor: "Alter the ne\\s 
 of the renunciat i< in of the hereditary Prince of Iloheii- 
 /ollern had been o|]ieiall\' notified to the Imperial French 
 (iovernment by the Royal Spanish (iovernmeiit. the Fieneh 
 ambassador at Fins further demanded of His Majesty the 
 Kin;,' that he should authori/.e him t" telcL'raph to Paris 
 that II. M. the Kin^' bound himself for the future ne\-er 
 attain to <I\\T his consent if the Hohen/.llerns should i-enew 
 t hrir candidat urc. II. M. the Kmu' thereupon decide,! not 
 to recciye the French ambassador a^ain, and left \\ord 
 throut:h an adjutant that His Majesty had nothing further 
 to tell him."
 
 How BISMARCK CAUSED IT 05 
 
 This telegram was sent by Bismarck to the N orddcut.schc 
 Zeitung and other papers, after receiving a telegram which 
 King William had sent him from Ems through his Minister 
 Abeken on July l.'J. This telegram of 2.'J2 words was 
 reduced by Bismarck by sundry deletions to one of 100 
 words, whereby the meaning was appreciably altered. 
 The real telegram did not say that King William refused 
 to receive Benedetti, but merely that he declined to give 
 any assurances as to guarantees for the future, and further 
 stated that "* as the ambassador had been advised of 
 the withdrawal of the Prince of Hohen/ollern before the 
 King, he must reali/e that His .Majesty's Government had 
 no hand in the matter,'' and further that after receiving 
 the Prince's confirmation " he had nothing to say to the 
 ambassador." 
 
 The real telegram was anything but an affront to the 
 French ambassador or an insult to France ; it merely 
 showed the conciliatory nature of the King's last conversa- 
 tion with Benedetti. Bismarck's abridged (falsified) tele- 
 gram, on the other hand, implied an affront : Benedetti 
 had been ignominiously rebuffed, a rupture had taken 
 place. 
 
 Bismarck was beside himself with anger when he saw 
 from the telegram which the King had sent him from 
 Ems through Abeken that the whole question of the 
 Spanish candidature had been dropped. His hope that 
 it would goad France into war was now dashed to the 
 ground, but he soon devised another trick to attain his 
 aim, which, with cynical frankness, he revealed to a corre- 
 spondent of the Vienna Xcue Frcie Presse on November 20, 
 1892, when he was no longer Imperial Chancellor. 
 
 When Bismarck heard of the withdrawal of the Prince 
 of Hohenzollern he was the correspondent quotes Bis- 
 marck's own words " quite surprised at this unexpected 
 termination, for I asked myself, Will such a favourable 
 opportunity ever occur again ? . . . I sent a telegram 
 to His Majesty at Ems resigning my offices of Prime 
 Minister and Chancellor. In reply I was asked by the
 
 96 BEFORE, DURING, AND AETER 11)11 
 
 Kinij to L'O to Kins, lint I thought to myself: If I jjo 
 to Kins, all is np. In the most favourable circumstances 
 we shall merely arrive at some petty compromise, and we 
 shall then miss the only honourable, the only ,'ivat snhition. 
 
 " I had invited M<>ltke and Hoon t<i dine with me on 
 Julv 1 '>, and \\ e \\ ere discussing a ll kinds of rout mi^elieies. 
 ^ "e were still stated at table when a telegram arrived 
 from Kins. I sat down at a little round marble table 
 standing beside the dining 1 aide. I read the telegram 
 cart-fully, took np mv pen and crossed nut intentionally 
 the whole passage where Heiicdctti asked for a new 
 audience, etc. I only let the be^i unin^ anil the end 
 remain." 
 
 "Success." he said, "depends above all >n the impivs- 
 sions which the lx 'jmnin-js of war make on us and others. 
 // is n''cessarif thiit :<.< should //< tin titlnclittl i><;rti/. (Gallic 
 susceptibility \\ill m\'( st us \\ilh this rM<- if \\c announce 
 before Knrope t hat we do n.,t f'-ar I-'rance's ollieial t ! treat s." 
 These tine \\irds had a e!iei-i-inL, p influence on his ^u- -sts. 
 Hoon and Moltke, \\hom tli. r, adm'_ r ol' Abi k- n's ti le^ram 
 had \isibly depressed, and their spirits now r>se to a pitch 
 which surprised the Chancellor himself. "'!'//> i/ h<id 
 smlilenltf rt'curt ri'd thiir filctixurt in tiitnrj and tlrinlcing 
 and sjinl.'i in /i more chrtrtnl :<i>i." They await- d \\ith 
 calm confidence the effect of the telegram \\hich had thus 
 been so cleverly patch'-d up. " It fell like a thunderbolt." 
 said Bismarck. ' \\!H n our KMILT had nci i\ed a humilia- 
 ting telegram. th<- Kins tclcura'ii made the Kl'elich believe 
 that tlpir represent at i\'e had ln-tn insulted b\ the l\tn<_ r . 
 The bouli-vard loafers decided that tin- ^<>rt of tinner 
 could not be tolerat- d. ' A H- rlin 1 A H rlin ' ' s!, ( ,ute.l 
 the rabble. 11,1, :iv/.v the et't'n't ~^> >""_/'/ >',,,-, \( was th.' 
 same a t liome as m r'ranec. . . . 1 1 \\ as t his deVelonment 
 that surprised (iraniont. lb- did n >t understand how, 
 at'dr tiling's had takin a pi-aei fill ti;''ti. this \\ai' feeling 
 sudi !< n!y ro < up. "Some sinister spirit has intervened." 
 he s.i id . \\ ha t has happeip d '.' " I . --aid Ml - marek . 
 
 \\ as t hat sjnist ej- surit .
 
 How BISMARCK CAUSED IT 1)7 
 
 The reason why Bismarck so frankly related how he had 
 falsified the Kins telegram is easy to understand. In 
 his resentment at, having fallen into disgrace in IS'.X) he 
 wanted to revenue himself on William II by letting the 
 whole- world know that // uv/.v he and not King \\ T iUiiun 
 who had welded Germany together, and that he had done 
 so by bringing ubout the war of 1870, despite the resistance 
 of Court and Parliament. lie considered that he was 
 entitled to perpetual gratitude, but found that he had 
 been guilty of a miscalculation when William II, contrary 
 to his expectation, accepted his resignation of the post of 
 Imperial Chancellor. The fallen despot then tried to 
 vent his boundless fury by embittered opposition. 
 
 Many of Bismarck's adherents did all they could to 
 shield him. 
 
 The German historian, Horst-Kohl, in his criticism of 
 Bismarck's Reflections and Reminiscences, speaks with 
 regret of " Social Democrats who have no patriotism and 
 show incredible effrontery in speaking of the forgery of 
 the Ems telegram, whilst Bismarck, with Moltke's and 
 Boon's approval, only strove to carry out a royal order under 
 the strong influence of an overwrought sense of honour. 
 . . . Instead of thanking the guardian of our national 
 honour, who courageously took upon liimsclf the respon- 
 sibility which his ojjice placed on his shoulders, we allow 
 him to be insulted by knaves and windbags." Bismarck's 
 organ, the Hamburger Nachrichtcn, asserted that Bismarck, 
 by modifying the telegram, forced France to take the iuitia- 
 lire and the responsibility for the war and that therefore 
 he deserved well of his country. Had he acted otherwise 
 the war would not have come about. This war was 
 necessary for cementing German unity." 
 
 Such pronouncements leave one speechless with ama/.e- 
 ment. "When German unity, which seems to have' been 
 the goal which took precedence over all European interests. 
 could not be attained by the mutual efforts of the German 
 States, it was deemed right and just to reach this goal 
 
 G
 
 98 BEKORK, DURING. AND AFTEK 1914 
 
 by provoking war with other States Denmark in 1804, 
 Austria in I8'.t'., and France- in hs?o ! 
 
 Then were, however, many people in (icrmany who 
 censured Bismarck for the forgery of tin- Kins telegram. 
 The (irrnmititi wrote as follows : " Kvery liennan must 
 blush with shame on rcali/mg fn>m the testimony of the 
 late Chancellor himself that (i<rnuini/ uv/.v unworthily 
 <l< (( i: t (I in the matter of the war of l.s?O, winch Bismarck 
 not only wanted, hut shunned no means of provoking. 
 The good (Germans wi-nt out to battle, spurred on by the 
 conviction that tiny were lighting a sacred, patriotic 
 defensive war against the contemptible and unrighteous 
 attack of the French, and that they were defending the 
 honour of King \\ illiam, who liad been grievously affronted 
 by France, All these good (iermans wen- but pupjh't* 
 in the Immlx of tin' MIDI j lilnixl and Iran." 
 
 The I'ufixixche Xt'itiing could not conceal its indignation 
 \shen it learn* d with what cynicism HiMnarck dared to 
 applaud his o\\n action. " \-]\ ( n it we assume that 
 (iermany's unity could not be encompassed without the 
 war, this docs not just il'y a re-edit iny of t he royal telegram 
 uhieh comes terribly near to a fn/^iri/. 
 
 Liebkneeht, e\ ( r since the article in the \in< l-'rcif 
 /'/v.vxr. in \ er failed to denounce Bismarck s admitted 
 forgery and <le!ied the thn-ats of prosecution to which 
 his I'larless denunciation ^avc rise. He could not under- 
 stand how the " former" had (land to make such a con- 
 tession. Liebknicht dissected the telegram word for word 
 and commented on it as follows: 'This forgery, this 
 falsi- ne\\s, tliis ci inN'ei'sion of peace into \\ar. is acclaimed 
 b\ Bismarck s panea\ris|s as a stroke of <_M mils. . . . 
 ( ' >n i in' 'n human morahtv cond< nnis the crime and brands 
 the criminal." II< add< -1 the retl.-ction that (ii-rnuiny's 
 ii!iit\ and the (,- rman Fmpire are founded on a forgery. 
 
 Tli<- res. ntmi-nt \\hn-h Bismarck's forgery aroused m 
 l-.iiroj.e may be jjath'nd from aii article m the Ddilij 
 A'/ti. 1 . to the following effect : " Nothing has so isolated 
 1 i.iiM' as the ^.'eiMlal bi hi t that she helped to bring
 
 How BISMARCK CAUSED IT 99 
 
 about the war for paltry reasons. This declaration of 
 war was like a bolt from the blue, for there was no cloud 
 on the horizon. It was thought that the French in their 
 incurable vanity insisted on fighting, and that after the 
 withdrawal of the Hohenzollcrn candidature they wanted 
 a fresh excuse. It is deplorable to learn that the moral 
 responsibility for the greatest crime of history has so long 
 been ascribed to those with whom it did not rest.'' 
 
 The calculated effect of the forged Ems telegram did 
 not fail to assert itself. The public were informed by 
 all the newspapers and by prominently exhibited placards 
 of the sensational news, which created a strong wave of 
 feeling in Prussia in favour of war. 
 
 Bismarck's telegram deceived both the Germans and 
 the French. 
 
 It should be noted that the forged dispatch was a 
 private telegram from Wolff's Bureau, not an oflicial 
 communication from the Prussian Government. 
 
 If the French Government had ascertained the real 
 facts, it would not have attached the same importance 
 to the telegram. 
 
 But Bismarck was cunning enough to issue Wolff's 
 telegram in such a way as to make it appear to be an 
 official communication. 
 
 When the news of the Ems telegram readied Paris it 
 caused an extraordinary commotion, and the Government 
 used the newspapers in its pay to stir up the war feeling 
 to a still greater pitch. The streets of Paris resounded 
 with cries of " Vive la guerre ! A Berlin ! A Berlin ! 
 It was a terrific orgy of the maddest chauvinism. As 
 for the Government, it was now able to shelter itself behind 
 " irresistible public opinion." 
 
 The majority of the deputies thought that the Govern- 
 ment had acted wisely, that King William had rejected 
 all advances, that France went to war with the right 
 entirely on her side, that the preparations for war were 
 complete for the War Minister, Le Bocuf, had given every
 
 100 HKFOKE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 assurance to this effect and that France had reliable 
 allies fur tiramont. contrary to the truth, had L'iven 
 them to understand that this was so. 
 
 Hut the people knew nothing further about tlie events 
 at Kins and were unaware that there was discord in the 
 (Government, that Napoleon changed his mind about 
 mobilization several times a day, and that several of the 
 Ministers were opposed to war. No thought was Driven 
 to tiie fact that the rejection of the Army Kstimates a 
 short time previously had weakened the country s military 
 efficiency. To the Opposition, which assented, must be 
 ascribed a laru'e share in the responsibility. 
 
 Napoleon and his Ministers were but puppets in His- 
 marck's hands, and with their, especially (iramont's. 
 political incapacity and reckless and foolish actions, they 
 were no match for the Chancellor's trickery. This the 
 forgery of the Mms telegram was, ho\\ever. so clumsy 
 and foolhardy a stratagem thai il would only have needed 
 a day's postponement of tin (Government's declaration of 
 war to ascertain more accurately \\hat had really passed 
 between Kmir William and Hcnedctti at the last eonversa- 
 tion at Mnis. This \voiild have be< n tin < asiesf tiling in 
 the world, had 1?- IP < \< t 1 i's r.-turn to Paris, \vhieh took 
 place in the morniiiLT of .Inly 1.*). IK < n a\\ait-d. 
 
 (iramont declared at the Cabim t Council on July 11- 
 that \\-ar was una\'oidable and that, if it were declined 
 after the telegram in the \nrtiili'ntxclu' '/titnn'j. lie would 
 not for a moment ret ain his port folio. I,-- Hcruf supj)orted 
 him and ur^'ed immediate mobih/at ion. 
 
 A proposal tor. f. r t he mat t < r t o a Con-jress \vas approved 
 by N a polt on, but t lie Mmpri s . , .pp. .-,, , | j j a - t" m-_' iL'tiomi 
 nioiis, and umi-r lc r mllu. nee tin Council -non rcsol\id 
 on the fatal step; a declaration of uar. >l.e had b ( n 
 I'd to belie\e | ( \ e. ft a i n ambitious i."!iciaU that l-'ralice 
 was vtrom.'er than I'ms-ia; she I'. ard the ( ): >i " '-it P >n 
 and hoj.. d that a successful \\ar \\ouM consolidate the 
 dy nast v. ( )\er Napoleon she had I h- st r. iiiLfsl mtluencc. 
 and ( i ram ' Mil and s, \ . i a I < -I h. r Nl m ; t < i . \\ < re al \va\ s
 
 How BISMARCK CAUSED IT 101 
 
 ready to give way to her. However, the Emperor was by 
 no means so eager for the war as the Empress and had 
 repeatedly remarked to Ollivier that he was determined 
 to do nothing. Furthermore, he was depressed and 
 enfeebled by his complaint ; he wanted to promote his 
 Liberal projects in peace, and laid his plans before the 
 Council accordingly. When he had finished and when 
 the .Ministers were about to vote on the subject, he was 
 suddenly taken ill and had to retire for about half an 
 hour, and when he returned the Empress had so wrought 
 her will on the Ministers, aided by the telegrams from 
 Ems and Berlin, that the voting showed a majority of 
 four in favour of the war. The Emperor had to give 
 way, and on July lit the Council ratilicd the declaration 
 of war on Prussia drawn up by Ollivier and Gramont.* 
 
 Among other reasons it was urged that Prussia's King 
 had formally refused to forbid Prince Leopold's Spanish 
 candidature for the future, and had rudely declined to 
 grant the French ambassador an audience, etc. 
 
 It is a remarkable thing that when Bcncdetti. a few 
 hours later on the same day, July 15. met Ollivier and 
 Gramont he. according to Ollivier, " did not tell them 
 any news of what had happened at Ems and noted, 
 without comment, the details of the telegrams and reports. 
 lie knew absolutely nothing of what had taken place in 
 Berlin and of Bismarck's machinations.'' 
 
 Benedetti cannot possibly have i'ailed to state that he 
 had by no means been insulted by King William or cava- 
 lierly dismissed and that the German newspapers had 
 misstated the facts. Here was another distortion of facts. 
 But war had been decided upon, Bencdetti's presence was 
 found inconvenient, and this he was given to understand. 
 Hence he was not heard at the Council. 
 
 Ollivier declared in the Legislative Assembly that the 
 
 King of Prussia had " insulted our ambassador by declining 
 
 to grant him an audience " as set forth in " a diplomatic 
 
 dispatch from Prussia," etc. Benedetti heard this, but 
 
 * Cf. WL'lschingiT, La Guerre cie 1870. vol. i, pp. 116-157.
 
 102 BEFORE, DURIXC, AND AFTER 11)11 
 
 was seated in the gallery and was powerless to enlighten 
 the House as to the facts. 
 
 Thiers, Gambetta, Jules Favre. IJnffet, and other 
 members of the Opposition demanded the production of 
 the dispatch on which the Government based its action, 
 lint this was impossible. Ollivicr merely repeated the 
 Government's complaints about King William's refusal 
 to furnish guarantees for the future, that the notification 
 to Kurojie of the- refusal to receive France's ambassador 
 was a thing not to be toll-rated, etc. Hut he did not say 
 that the King had pointed out that the negotiations could 
 lie continued in lierlin with his Ministers. The leaders of 
 the Left entered a strong and courageous nratt'xt ti<ininxt 
 
 ~ r* / 
 
 t/ :ctir (i* fully unjustified, whereupon they were greeted 
 by the Kight with all sorts of vituperations, Mich as 
 " Anti patriots," 'Traitors.'' "Prussians," etc. 
 
 Gamhcttu eritici/cd very sevcrclv the \\hole conduct of 
 the (iovermnent on account of its "lack of political 
 honest y." and on account of its attempt t o shift the respon- 
 sibility for the war on to the Chamber. He pointed out 
 that the Kins telegram, \\hieh had so perturbed the 
 Government, had been made known to Henedetti \\ithout 
 his having felt offended thereby. 
 
 The (io\i rnnn nt wanted to force France to be content 
 with unproved assertions, and. deplorably eunuch. !.">'. 
 deputies, as a<_ r -'iuist * I of the Opposition, voted against 
 the demand for the production of the- telegram said tei 
 eon\ey the insult t"> France's honour. The Hudget Coin 
 mittee h;id onl\' seen the earlier telegrams, and (iramont 
 had ii'>t f.ild t h< m < \ i r\ t hint,', but onlv \\hat he thought 
 suitable, and hi-. \\>rd \\as believed \\itlnnit demur. It 
 is v< TV regrettable' that tin Cummittee did nut insist mi 
 Hell" d< 1 1 i bein;,' In aid. 
 
 According to \\elschingcr, \\ho \\as jire-sent at the 
 d< bat. > in the ( hambi r during that turbuli nt tune. 
 (irani'Mil - \\h">!'- conduct \\as dictated " b\ the awkward 
 . it ua 1 1< in m \\ hi eh h' 1 \s as placed : in the lace o| the t hn at s 
 of Ih' l',\ti.ini-ts and of the anger of the Opposition he
 
 1870-71 AND PEACE OF FRANKFORT 103 
 
 had no alternative but to seek war. . . . Otherwise he 
 would have had to admit that he had ' begun badly and 
 finished badly ' . . . and that he had clumsily fallen into 
 the trap set by Bismarck through the fault of an unbalanced 
 party and the will of an Empress who blindly trusted to 
 our strength and our resources." 
 
 No fact is better authenticated in history, as shown by 
 the documents referred to, than that the war with France 
 was sought by Bismarck, that he brought it about by 
 trickery and fraud, although, by wounding France's 
 honour, he made her appear the attacking party. 
 
 The forged telegram, having, in point of fact, led to the 
 War of 1870 with all its consequences, felt up to this very 
 day, up to the World War of 1914, constitutes one of the 
 most terrible crimes of history. 
 
 THE WAR OF 1870-71 AND THE PEACE OF FRANKFORT 
 
 The war so fervently desired by Bismarck, Moltke, Roon, 
 and other representatives of the war party in Prussia now 
 came to pass and France was beaten. Xo wonder ! The 
 whole of Germany supported Prussia, and not only the 
 North German Federation, but also the South German 
 States of Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, Baden, and Hesse- took 
 part, pursuant to the alliance of 1 8(JG. All the armies were 
 excellently equipped, and Prussia especially, who had long 
 been preparing for this war, possessed a superb military 
 organization and skilful leaders. 
 
 France, on the other hand, was without allies and badly 
 equipped, her supply of armaments had in a large measure 
 been exhausted by the Mexican campaigns of 1802-67, her 
 armies were inferior to those of the Germans in numbers, 
 and several of her generals lacked ability. 
 
 The best proof of the fact that France and her Govern- 
 ment wanted peace and did not contemplate any attack on 
 other countries was the complete absence of preparations 
 and the deficient military preparedness. There had even 
 been a reduction in the Armv Estimates. The Minister
 
 104 HKFOKK, DURIM;, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 of War, Le Uu-uf, had. a few days before the dispute about 
 the Spanish candidature, consented to a retrenchment of 
 thirteen million franes <>n his budget. Later on pitiful 
 proofs were forthcoming of t he defective military or^am/a- 
 tioii and the inadequate supplies of munitions, clothes, 
 food. etc.. on the outbreak of war. 
 
 France launched her declaration of war on Prussia on 
 .Iul\ 1 '.. Tin- North (ierman Diet, which was quickly con- 
 vened. and the South (ierman Diets, imbued with national 
 fervour, ^ranted all the demands of the Government. It 
 soon became clearly evident that Heiiedetti's and Stuff el's 
 reports in I Mis as t<> Prussia's extensive armaments were 
 true. Moltke no\\ submitted to Kinir \Villiam a plan of 
 campaign against France, prepared bv the Prussian 
 leiii-ral Staff, and asked that the (ierman forces be 
 mohili/ed and distributed accordingly, everything having 
 been worked out m the minutest detail. This plan of 
 Moltke's \\a^ dulv carried out. .Julv H> (when the news of 
 the decision of the French (Government came to hand) was 
 the day enter, d on each mobilization order; i leven days 
 later the entire mobili/ation was completed, and on 
 
 August '_' all the armies stood posted between tin Hllllie 
 
 and the Saar, Km^ \Villiam assuming snpi-eme command. 
 The (ierman forces totalled about KiO.ntio men. against 
 whom Napoleon could onl\' put 'joo.ooo men in the li< Id. 
 
 Ill t he course of a few Weeks t lie French We IV defeated ill 
 
 a number of act ions. They lost the first bat t le on August I 
 at \\ YisNi -n! iiii'LT. Hi Alsace, \\here the Crown Prince 
 l^'i'd-riek \\as in eon in ia m I on the (ierman side. Then 
 fol|.i\\.d m r.ipid succession the battles of NN'orth. Saar- 
 bnicken, M'!/. IJeichshof. n, Forbadi. (ira\ t lot te, St. 
 Pi i\ as, . t e., \s hi r< I h. I 'r- neli \vi re defi at i d despit < li- r-'ie 
 e\i rt ion--, \\ lii! ,t an nt i re arn i \ und r Marshal Ha /a me \\ as 
 compel!, d to take j-et'ii'je in ^|et/. A n i u army \\as 
 i-o!|eet.(| m all li.-t-te ai'd coiiimandcd b\' Napolion and 
 Mar hal Ma.-Mah..n. but was beaten in the bat t le of Sedan 
 on S"pt . mb. r 1 . \. liepeiij ,. .n the fort res s, \\ it h the m\ st < d 
 i\ of .s.'i.ooo men, capitulated and the Fmpiror sur
 
 1870-71 AND PEACE OF FRANKFORT 105 
 
 rendered his sword to King William (September li). He 
 was immediately conducted to the eastle of Wilhclmshcihc 
 (near Cassel), where lie was kept a prisoner until the eon- 
 elusion of peace (whereupon he took refuge in England, 
 where he died in 187.'J). 
 
 When General Wimpffen, on September 2, negotiated with 
 Bismarck at Sedan for peace, the latter deported himself 
 with brutal arrogance and assumed an offensive and 
 braggart manner, as if he were intoxicated. The incredible 
 success of the last six weeks which followed upon the Ems 
 telegram had gone to his head. ' You shall never," he 
 said, " forget Sedan. If we make peace now, you will 
 begin war again in live or ten years. We, in contract 
 to you, arc (in honourable nation, who have never coveted 
 conquest and only ask to be left in peace, if you will but 
 cease disturbing us with your quarrelsome disposition. 
 Now we have had enough of it. France must be punished 
 for her arrogance, her aggressive temper, and her vanity. 
 We must have territory, fortresses, and frontiers which 
 will safeguard us from further attacks on your part. The 
 party in France which engineered tJte war is the same party 
 that makes and unmakes Governments : it is the populace, 
 the journalists ; it is them whom we want to punish. It is 
 on this account that we must march on Paris.'' He 
 declared further that Prussia would demand an indemnity 
 of 4000 million francs in addition to Alsace and German 
 Lorraine as her price of peace. 
 
 The fact alone that Count Bismarck Bohlen on August 14 
 was appointed Governor-General of Alsace shows that 
 Prussia regarded this province as a permanent possession. 
 
 The annexation of Alsace and German Lorraine by 
 Germany was at this time being urged with great insist- 
 ence by the German newspapers and by public meetings. 
 
 That the war would be continued until Germany reached 
 the desired goal, was obvious. On September 3 orders 
 were issued from the German headquarters that two armies 
 were to march on Paris, and on September 1!) the city was 
 invested on all sides.
 
 106 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 On September I the Empire collapsed under the weight 
 of popular indignation. Napoleon was deposed, and a 
 Republic was proclaimed by the people from the Hotel de 
 Ville in Paris. A Government for National Defence was 
 organized under General Trochu, comprising the following 
 deputies for Paris : Jules Favre, Jules Ft rry, Gambetta, 
 Arago, (.'rcmieux. Picard, Rochefort, and others. 
 
 The Government decided to trv to induce foreign Powers 
 to mediate for peace with Germany and elected Thiers, 
 who in spite of his seventy-three years p< >sscsscd more spirit 
 and energy than most, as its representative. On Septem- 
 ber 1 '2. he started on a journey to London, St. Petersburg, 
 Vienna, and Florence, and made the best of his power*, of 
 eloquence, adducing the most cogent reasons in long con- 
 versations with the Foreign Ministers in those capitals. 
 Rut all, regarding intervention useless, declined to mediate, 
 and France was left to her own devices. It was known at 
 the German headquarters that the Great Powers would 
 not give effect to their friendly counsel by force of arms, 
 and the war was accordingly continued pursuant to the 
 prearranged plan of crushing France. Jules Favre. the 
 Foreign Minister, visited Rismarek (September lit and 'J(t) 
 1 1 1 Iiegi )t late 1< >r peace. 
 
 He who had brought about the war now said with his 
 usual masterlv hypocrisy : " .til I ;i<;/// is /nticc. It is 
 not Germany who disturbed it. You have :(.it/i<ml cause 
 dt'cUirt'tl "(.in' an f/.s with the soli object of dc^nrin^ its uf 
 }><irt (if ni/f cniint/'i/. . . . \\ e know that you will never 
 relinquish your policy, that you uill regain strength SC| 1< lv 
 that \oii mav atlaek us once more. Germanx has not 
 sought this opportunity ; she avail< d h' rsrlf of it /,,/ //, r 
 a- (.n .s tifftif. and this safet v cannot be assnn d \s it hoi it ccssinn 
 at Itrritnri/.' 
 
 Favre, \vho-,e Government eouM not eoi 
 cession <>| t-inforv, thus gained nothing by In 
 iliiplaeaMr Chalie- llor. 
 
 \\hilst France \\ as straining e\ery nrr\e to secure by 
 n L." >t lat i in an arni!"-tier and the support of the neutral
 
 1870-71 AND PEACE OF FRANKFORT 107 
 
 Great Powers, the German armies continued their irre- 
 sistible advance. Toul fell on September 20, Strasburg on 
 the 27th after a resistance which even the enemy charac- 
 teri/ed as honourable and heroic. On October 5 King 
 \Villiam moved his headquarters to Versailles. Orleans 
 was taken on October 11, and Soissons capitulated on 
 October 15. 
 
 The army shut up in Met/, under the command of the 
 incompetent Ba/aine, was compelled, vanquished by 
 hunger and without making any serious attempt to drive 
 the enemy away, to capitulate on October "27. 
 
 On his return from his journey, Tliiers was instructed 
 by his Government to approach Bismarck with a view to an 
 armistice. Several meetings took place during the early 
 days of November, but Bismarck's conditions were such 
 that the Government could not accede to them. 
 
 Gambetta, Minister of the Home Department, accom- 
 panied by his collaborator Spuller, left the besieged city 
 on October 7 in a balloon, and organized the defence in the 
 provinces as a sort of voluntary dictator. He engaged the 
 assistance of the engineer Freycinet, and between them 
 they did wonders. Their improvised armies rehabilitated 
 France's military honour, sullied by unworthy capitula- 
 tions. Although these armies could not in the long run 
 resist the enemy, they earned world-wide admiration, and 
 even Moltke could but acknowledge his respect for their 
 ability to defend their country for several months and 
 win several victories. Generals Paladines and Faidherbe 
 were victorious at Coulmiers and Bapaume, but the Paris 
 army, under General Ducrot, fought the bloody but 
 indecisive battle of Champigny. Mans had to be 
 evacuated (January T2, 1871), and the northern army was 
 beaten at St. Quentin (January ID). Bel fort was defended 
 by Colonel Denfert. Bourbaki gained a victory at Ville- 
 sexel, but did not succeed in raising the siege of Belfort. 
 lie tried to reach Lyons, but was finally forced by the 
 enemy against the Swiss frontier, over which his army was 
 iinally driven, and it was thereupon disarmed.
 
 108 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 The excitement in Paris rrrw clay by clay, especially 
 after the Germans bc^an on January ."> to bombard the 
 city. A number of houses were destroyed, 1'ood became 
 scarce, famine and sickness bejjan to assert themselves and 
 caused jjrcat mortality. Attempts \vere made to wrest 
 the j>o\ver from the Provisional Government and place it 
 in the hands of the Socialist parties. 
 
 The Government decided that Favre should once more 
 negotiate with Hismarek for an armistice (January 'J."5). ami 
 in the end orders were jjiven to suspend the bombardment 
 (January 'J(i). On January 1'S a three weeks' armistice 
 was signed and the capitulation of Paris was discussed, a 
 newly elected National Assembly hein^ convened at 
 Bordeaux to decide about peace or war. 
 
 The National Assembly on February 1'J elected Thiers 
 as chief of the executive power, and instructed him and 
 t he Ministers Favre and Pica rd, to open pi -ace negotiations 
 at Versailles. 
 
 After six days' negotiations the peace preliminaries were 
 signed on February '_'> hv the plenipotentiaries; the 
 National Assembly ratified them on March 1. One of the 
 conditions \\as that a part of Paris should be occupied by 
 German troops ('.',(), <><>0 men). 
 
 The principal peace conditions were: (V.vv/o// nf .itsiK'C 
 tuul (it riiiiin L<irrninc and payment of .")(>()() million fr<incx as 
 war indemnit y. 
 
 The linal peace conditions were to be discussed in 
 HnisseU. Alter an abortive conference in that citv, a 
 meet in;,' was arranged at l-'rankforl be! \\-ei-n Mismarek and 
 Favre, etc., when peace was finally concluded; this was 
 the Peace < >l Frankfort (May !<(. 1 .s? 1 ), \\hich confirmed 
 the preliminaries <>\ Versailles and determined sundrv 
 details in << inne\ii in t h- i'< \\ it h. 
 
 Prussia ha\iiiL r reed\id the support of all the German 
 States m the uar. the task remained of accomplishing 
 (iermanv's umtv, which offered the IKS! tjuarant < i - lor 
 (iirmaiiN s safetv and greatness. ( )n Hismarck s mitia
 
 1870-71 AND PEACE OF FRANKFORT 109 
 
 tivc representative Ministers of the four South German 
 States visited Versailles and diseussed the terms for joining 
 the North German Federation, it being finally agreed that 
 all the States jointly should constitute the- German Empire 
 (November 1870). Thus was created a nnc derman Im- 
 perial realm, and on the proposal of Ludwig II of Havana 
 the German princes and free cities conjointly conferred 
 upon William I the dignity of Emperor, a ceremony which 
 took place at Versailles during the siege of Paris on 
 January 18, 1871. 
 
 When I was in Germany and France in February and 
 March 1871 I had the opportunity of seeing and hearing 
 much about the war and its termination, and I relate below 
 a few incidents and experiences which throw a light on the 
 great struggle.* 
 
 I reached Paris, after having stayed with the besiegers, 
 on the day that the capitulation took place and remained 
 until the outbreak of the Commune (March 18). It was 
 surprising to see how resigned the French can be. They 
 spoke openly of their own faults and generally blamed 
 France herself in a large measure for the misfortune, 
 Napoleon and his Government having allowed the country 
 to drift into war, but having entirely neglected to prepare 
 for it. Every one tried to envisage calmly and sensibly 
 what had happened. The superior discipline and ability 
 of the Prussians were praised, and yet people asked them- 
 selves if the French would have been beaten had not the 
 Germans for many years past, everywhere and among all 
 classes of the community in France, instituted a higJily 
 organized system of espionage. It was known that no fewer 
 than seventy-two Germans had been employed in the 
 Government Departments many in the War Ollice that 
 they had been in correspondence with General Blumenthal, 
 and that Marshal Bazaine had long had a Prussian oilicer as 
 
 * I wrote at the time three war letters to Aftonbladct (March 
 15, 17, and 20, 1871), which I will refer to in the course of my 
 narrative.
 
 110 BEFORE, DURIXI:, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 his servant ! Prussian otlicers had also been employed in 
 many very modest situations in Paris. 
 
 In this way the Germans had obtained a thorough insight 
 into France's defences and their shortcomings. When their 
 armies stood ready <>n the frontier, all ollicers and non- 
 eoinmissioned ollicers had special maps of the localities 
 where the war was to be fought. These maps had not been 
 prepared in a week, or after the declaration of war. Many 
 were found on killed and wounded. 
 
 I was further informed that young Germans who had 
 been in Paris in olliees, or for linguistic studies, etc., had 
 always industriously devoted their Sundays to excursions 
 in all possible directions ; these young men, who later 
 formed part of the invading forces, doubtless knew the 
 country better than many a Frenchman. 
 
 It may be mentioned that in ISO'.) no fewer than 
 I'JO, <)<><) Germans resided in Paris for varying lengths 
 of time. 
 
 I spoke to several Prussian soldiers (Brandenburgcrs) 
 stationed outside Paris during the armistice, just before the 
 signature of the peace preliminaries; they were in a very 
 pacific mood and told me that the opposing outposts had 
 with the utmost friendliness exchanged articles of food. 
 drank out of one another's bottles, etc. Had it depended 
 on them, they said, there would have been no war with 
 France. 
 
 " No doubt it was Bismarck," I remarked, " who wanted 
 it." 
 
 "./'/. iy:i o v / >tii, <lfr Ititiwurck, <!<>' /./ fin Tfitfflx 
 K< // .' " ("Ah. yes, Hismarck ! II. 's a devil of a fellow ! ") 
 they replied. 
 
 I also spoke to many persons of education in (< rmany 
 and found that the people of Hanover, Haden, and \\tir 
 tcmbcrg hated Prussia and her policy most cordially, 
 although thev considered Hisniarck a u'lmit amongst 
 statesmen. They regarded it as an nntrd^ on the part of 
 Pnis>ia to have hteralK 1 /<//<,</ the oth< r German states to 
 take part in the \\ar. In Han<'\er, in .January, literal
 
 1870-71 AND PEACE OF FRANKFORT 111 
 
 demonstrations took place against the new Emperor, 
 and the civic magistrates refused to sign the address 
 to the Emperor which the Prussian officials there had 
 drawn up. 
 
 Many titled Prussians were differently disposed and 
 expressed themselves with supine arrogance on the 
 Parisians 1 de-fence of their capital. They assured me 
 that it was only through the Emperor William's extra- 
 ordinary forbearance that the bombardment was deferred ; 
 it might have taken place many months earlier, but the 
 same spirit of clemency found it more humane to reduce 
 the city by starvation. They asserted that the Germans 
 had taken several forts and that it was quite proper that 
 they should march in triumph into Paris as into a con- 
 quered city. " The defence was not such as to deserve 
 any consideration, for the resistance had really been quite 
 chimerical.'' I was able to inform them, however, that 
 the Germans had not taken a single one of the forts, 
 and I took it for granted that untrue reports had been 
 circulated in order to justify the desired triumphal entry 
 into Paris. 
 
 Parisians described to me the horrors of famine and told 
 me that for the last five weeks they had never ceased to 
 be hungry, and that during the last two weeks they had 
 eaten hardly anything but the inadequate and horrible 
 black bread. Everything edible had been consumed, the 
 rats in the sewers, the dogs, the animals in the Jardin 
 d'Acclimatation, etc. The sick did not recover, there was 
 a lack of medicaments at the hospitals, the mortality 
 rose and amounted towards the end to more than 5000 
 weekly. 
 
 To the famine and its ravages were added the terrors of 
 the bombardment, which kept the population in a per- 
 petual state of nerves. The inhabitants were particularly 
 incensed at the Prussian guns being trained on the Pantheon 
 and Saint Sulpice churches and on the Val-de-Grace 
 Hospital, all of which were hit during the bombardment, 
 until General Trochu threatened to lodge the Prussian
 
 ll'J BEFOKK, DURING, AND AFTER 1911 
 
 prisoners in the Val do-Grace if the bombardment of such 
 buildings did not cease. 
 
 Although Paris was not taken, Bismarck demanded in the 
 Fmpcror's name as part of t he terms of capitulation that a 
 Gorman army of Hit, (too men should march into Paris and 
 that they should be allowed to visit the galleries at the 
 Louvre and the Hotel des Invahdes. Instead of honouring 
 a brave opponent, it was intended that the Parisians 
 should be humbled on account of their patriotism and their 
 valiant resistance. Thicrs and Favro expressed their 
 disgust and their fears that the sinjht of the enemy would 
 exasperate the population to the point of li^litin, r when 
 Paris was to open her _jates which the enemy could not 
 break down. But it was no use; the Prussians were so 
 ea^'or for this triumph that Bismarck agreed in return to 
 France's ret en I ion of t he fort ress of Bel fort which had not 
 been taken either and in the end the protests were over 
 ridden. Bismarck had reckoned on lengthy deliberations 
 in the National Assemblv. so that the German army corps 
 mijjht relieve on. another in Paris and all miu'ht thus have 
 the pleasure of inspecting the wonderful citv. But the 
 National Assembly found it neeessars to accept the peace 
 terms immediately, so that the German stay in Paris only 
 last ed a e< tuple < >l days. 
 
 I was a witness of this remarkable event and was m the 
 Place de la t'oncorde and the Champs FJysoes -u hen the 
 German regiments made then- entry on March 1. 1 s? 1 . 
 Beyond this aria th<\ could not penetrate, as the rest of 
 the city was completely shut off b\ barricades and sentries 
 at the i lit ranees to all st n < t s. On the r< com UK IK la I ion of 
 the authorities the population absented tlninselvis com 
 pl't.lv and remain' d indifferent and calm. Onl\ a !'e\\ 
 hoi ih-jan> and other p rsoiis of the 
 d thems.-lv. s in the sir, , | , through 
 
 Wel'e to pass. FverV tlllllL' \\as ijlllet, 
 
 ' \eept for a couple of ladles of a d rtain class (evidentlv 
 German^) who took it upon th'in>el\, s (.. pay deference 
 
 to some German ollieers. wherell|ion the\- were hustled
 
 1870-71 AND PEACE OF FRANKFORT 113 
 
 aside into a side street by un enraged mob, who punished 
 them for their impudence by beating them and tearing off 
 their clothes. 
 
 Practically all the inhabitants remained indoors and put 
 on mourning, which, as a matter of i'act, many had worn 
 ever since the capitulation, and black Hags were ex- 
 hibited from many houses. Crepe had also been tied 
 over the faces of the statues in the Place de la Concorde, 
 and the impression taken away by the Germans must on the 
 whole have been rather melancholy. Strasburg's statue 
 was covered with wreaths and French Hags to commemorate 
 the heroic defence of the city. 
 
 It had been intended that the German army should on 
 the occasion of this triumphal entry march through the 
 magnificent Arc de Triomphe (erected in memory of 
 France's innumerable victories), but this plan was foiled by 
 a dense mass of gamins who completely blocked the passage 
 and would not yield an inch, so that the army was obliged 
 in order to avoid violence and possibly bloodshed, to 
 march past by the side of the monument. Besides, it did 
 not witness the triumphal procession in its usual state, 
 having been covered over with boarding in order to protect 
 the sculptures from the bombardment. But what the 
 conquering army did see was the word VEXGEAXCE ! 
 traced in letters half a yard deep on one wall of the monu- 
 ment. 
 
 Yes, vengeance was at that time the order of the day 
 throughout France. All, young and old, men and women, 
 retained this feeling for many years. How could it be 
 otherwise ? How unjust had been the conduct of Prussia's 
 dictator, Bismarck, when France ever since the disaster 
 of Sedan and Napoleon's capture, time after time asked 
 for peace on the plea that it was the Emperor and his 
 Government who had issued the declaration of war, and 
 that those who after Sedan had been at the head of the 
 Republic Thiers, Jules Favre, Gambetta, Jules Ferry, 
 and others had protested against the icar ! 
 
 Besides, had not the just and righteous Crown Prince 
 
 H
 
 114 BEFOKI:. DURINC;, AND AFTER 1911 
 
 Frederick declared in his proclamation to the inhabitants 
 of Lorraine at the beginning of the \var that " Germany 
 is waging war against the Kmperor, n>t against the French 
 nation '.' " 
 
 Hut the " HliMid and Iron Clianeellor " thonght other- 
 \vis,- and \vanted to eru^h France aiul huniKle the French 
 
 eo.lr to the (lllSt.
 
 XI 
 
 ANNEXATION OF ALSACE-LORRAINE THE CAUSE 
 OF THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE AND 
 THE MONSTROUS SPREAD OF MILITARISM 
 IN EUROPE, AND ONE OF THE CAUSES OF 
 THE WORLD WAR OF 1914 
 
 THE civilization of an enlightened era demands that 
 policy should be founded on the rights of nation* and their 
 free icill, not on racial considerations, which, as I have 
 pointed out earlier in this work (pp. 7-1,3), are, moreover, 
 exceedingly obscure and often based on the purest fictions. 
 
 The Alsatians had during the union with France become 
 a part of the French nation, accepted French culture, and 
 felt themselves to be Frenchmen, although they spoke the 
 German language. 
 
 The word " nation '' cannot cursorily be dismissed as 
 meaning race or descent ; it is a gradually developed 
 cultural conception with many contributory elements. 
 In certain countries, it is true, the term " nationality "' 
 has been identified with the term 41 State," and other 
 countries have become in the course of centuries a melting- 
 pot of different nationalities which have become a concordant 
 whole with common traditions, a common history, and common 
 interests. 
 
 Although the term " nation " is primarily associated 
 with common descent, it is often characterized by a 
 consciousness of affinity in matters of politics and language, 
 when in the course of development an intimate coalescence 
 
 115
 
 116 HKFOHE, DURING, AND AFTER 1911 
 
 has taken place in the public mind and produced a real 
 feeling of nationality. 
 
 Many Frenchmen are of foreign descent, but have never- 
 theless allowed themselves to be absorbed into the French 
 nation and feel themselves to be Frenchmen. Thus the 
 famous statesman K. Spullcr, Minister of Education in 
 Gambctta's Cabinet, and an ardent patriot, had German 
 blood in his veins, his father having come from Hadcn. 
 
 It would be unfair to plead what lias happened in the 
 past, under other political conditions, in proceeding in a 
 more recent era to exact retribution. Conquest and 
 annexation arc not undertaken by a eivili/cd State in our 
 time without incurring the severe indictment of public 
 opinion and the hatred and revengeful feelings of the 
 injured peoples. 
 
 If Germany were to demand the subjugation of all 
 states and provinces which formerly belonged to the 
 old German Empire on the plea of " old proprietorship '' 
 although the Germany of 1S70 was by no means the same 
 as the old Empire the whole of Lorraine, Holland, 
 Switzerland, Italy, etc., might be coveted with equal 
 justice. Nay, more than that, the Germanic conquests 
 of the fifth century might also he pleaded, for the Visigoths 
 took Spain, the Hurgundians Southern France, and the 
 Ostrogoths under Theodoric took Italy, so that Germany 
 might, with Gcnnanistic logic, lay claim to these ancient 
 Germanic possessions as well ! 
 
 As regards Alsace, this province, although Germanic in 
 race and language, mi^ht equally well be considered as 
 belonging to France, seeing that, before it was taken by 
 peoples of the Germanic race, it was Celtic. 
 
 It was a somewhat ]>reeai;us policy which Germany 
 embarked upon when pleading Germanism as a reason 
 for claiming certain provinces, for in that case the Slavs 
 might on the plea of Slavism demand certain countries 
 and provinces which formerly were Slav but have been 
 occupied by peoples of German race. On this principle
 
 ANNEXATION OF ALSACE-LORRAINE 117 
 
 Prussia must not be surprised if Poscn attempts to eman- 
 cipate herself, and Austria will have to put up with Galicia 
 and several other Slav provinces detaching themselves from 
 the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
 
 Bismarck might well be congratulated and might well 
 be proud of being the prime creator of Germany's unity 
 through the war with France, and Germany might well 
 feel conscious pride in the magnificent peace terms which 
 she extracted from the defeated side. But the Peace of 
 Frankfort was no guarantee for the future ; on the con- 
 trary, it caused the deepest resentment in France against 
 the Germans, or rather against the Prussians. At that 
 time, and long before, it was the fashion in the German 
 Press to call the French der alte Erbfeind der deutschen 
 Nation (the old hereditary foe of the German nation). 
 Did not Bismarck realize that the war which he called 
 into being and the harsh peace terms laid down by him 
 would heighten the animosities of the French and inspire 
 them with the hope of vengeance ? The peace brought 
 about no reconciliation, as Bismarck was soon to realize. 
 lie wrote on February 2, 1874, to Arnim, the German 
 ambassador in Paris : " The openness with which the 
 national hatred against the Germans has been fanned and 
 expressed by all parties in France since the Peace of 
 Frankfort permits no doubt but that every Government, 
 to whatever party it may belong, will regard rengeance 
 as its principal raison d'etre. The only point in doubt 
 is the time that the French will need to restore their 
 armies and prepare alliances which, in their view, will 
 enable them to renew the fight." 
 
 It was thought in the time of the Emperor Frederick 
 (1888) that this humane monarch desired a peaceful 
 settlement regarding Alsace-Lorraine whereby friendly 
 relations between France and Germany might be brought 
 about. Ribot, who was at that time Foreign Minister in 
 France, stated, in fact, that a step in this direction had 
 actually been taken during Frederick's reign. A suggestion
 
 118 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 hud been made to let Alsace-Lorraine become a neutral 
 country this plan had many adherents in France and 
 it had also been proposed not to toueh upon the Alsace 
 (jii' 'ion. hut only to let Lorraine, which is a French 
 country, he returned to France :l p' a 'i which (Jambctta 
 supported and which later on was mooted by J. Lcmaitre. 
 In return Germany was to receive some colonial possession. 
 
 Hismarck rejected with j^reat emphasis the idea of 
 Alsace Lorraine he-coming a neutral Slate like Switzerland 
 and Belgium and thus creating a sort of buffer stretching 
 from t!ie Alps to the North Sra. Such an arrangement 
 would, in his opinion, be effective in preventing (icrmany 
 from attacking France, but would not stop France from 
 attacking (Germany by sea. Rismarck's most important 
 reason was, however, that the very principle of neutrality 
 is onlv tenable jtrovided that the population is prepared 
 in an emergency to defend it by force of arms. " Rut in 
 a country whose sympathies and traditions are bound up 
 with France, neutrality would hi- an illusion, useful to 
 France, but to us quite the reverse." However decisive 
 and ama/inu: the success of Rismarck's policy may seem 
 to have been, it has nevertheless in manv eases he< n but 
 incidental and illusory ; sundry consequences have sprung 
 i'rorn it of which he would never have dreamt. Thus, for 
 instance, he is nallv the person who, by his uncouth 
 treatment of Russia and France, may be said to ha\e 
 created the Franco-Russian Alliance. 
 
 After Prussia's war with Austria-Hungary in ism; 
 Ri-marek skilfully contrived to brin^ about an alliance 
 b"twi < n tho,<- countries and (iermany, the mainspring "f 
 \\hieh was the f<-ar of Pan Slavism as represented by 
 Russia. Hisinarek had In < n unable, except to a v< ry 
 limited extent, to curb the pohcv of that coiintr\. and 
 Rtis>ia had -oiu.tini'^ be, n surjU'isin^ly succev-|'ul in 
 tli\',artiu^ the plan, of the " J{!ood and Iron Chancellor." 
 Not content \\ith ha\in^ d< feated l-'ranee in I.NTo 71, 
 Ri^man-k. on witnessing the reL"'ncrat ion of that rich 
 s'. wanted to crush it entiivlv ami had the intention
 
 ANNEXATION OF ALSACE-LORRAINE IT.) 
 
 in 1875 of attacking it without any reason whatever. But 
 the Tsar, Alexander II, or rather his Foreign Minister, 
 Prince Gortchakoff, Bismarck's antagonist, prevented on 
 that occasion the contemplated assault. 
 
 In order to strengthen Prussia's position in other 
 words, her supremacy -Bismarck thereupon created the 
 "alliance of the Three Emperors" of Germany, Austria, 
 and Russia, still in pursuance' of the same object, the 
 isolation of France. His tactics were to reiterate con- 
 stantly that the French, by their thoughts of revenge, 
 were- a constant threat to the peace of Europe, and to 
 represent the republican institutions of France as being 
 a menace to all monarchs and an encouragement to Revo- 
 lutionaries, Socialists, and Nihilists. Alexander II joined, 
 the alliance in the hope that it would procure him Prussia's 
 support for his plans in Turkey. But when Russia had 
 defeated Turkey in 1878 and the Berlin Congress was to 
 decide the conditions of peace, Bismarck managed to 
 restrict the advantages at first conceded to Russia. ; ' I 
 have been deceived," said Alexander II after reading the 
 Treaty of Berlin, and from that moment the " Three 
 Emperors' Alliance '' ceased to be. When Russia had 
 withdrawn from it and had gone so far as secretly to prepare 
 for war in 1870, as shown by documentary evidence 
 published by Bismarck, he had to devise a fresh grouping 
 of power, and in 1882 he created the Triple Alliance, or, 
 as Bismarck's organ called it, '' The League of Peace,' 5 
 between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. Its 
 object was to isolate France and to keep Russia in check. 
 
 Russia had ever since 1813 been allied to Germany, but 
 from her point of view there was one condition to the 
 friendship : the limitation of Prussia's military ascendancy. 
 By that country's victories over Austria and France this 
 condition was no longer operative, and by the accomplish- 
 ment of German unity Russia's influence over the small 
 German states, founded on family alliances, disappeared. 
 Actual conflict between Russia and Germany was, however. 
 prevented by the friendship which united Alexander II
 
 120 BLFUKE, DURING, AND AFTER 1U14 
 
 with his uncle William I. The constantly growing military 
 strength of Russia and France-, which Hismarek declared 
 to be directed against Prussia, gave rise to a great 
 strengthening of tin- Prussian army, which took place 
 in I.SMI. Sliortly alter the assassination of Alexander 
 (ISM) serious movements arose which deepened the 
 antagonism between Russians and Cicrmans. The Pan- 
 Slavists, who dreamt of the emancipation of all Slav 
 nations under Russia's protection, accused Austria-Hun- 
 gary of oppressing the Slavs under her rule and of harbour- 
 ing the plan of bringing the entire Balkan peninsula 
 tinder her influence, and also gave expression to the 
 suspicion that (iermany contemplated the annexation 
 of Russia's Haltie provinces. Frequent demonstrations 
 against the Ciennans took place. It seemed as if the two 
 States were preparing for a coming struggle, for which 
 it was nccessarv to both parties to create a homogeneous 
 nation and weed out foreign elements from the frontier 
 districts. Hence the Russilication of the Haltie provinces 
 and the driving out of the (icrmans, and hence Prussia's 
 expulsion fr"in hT Fastern provinces of Russia's Polish 
 
 subject s m 1 SS.";. 
 
 There is much evidence to show that, although the 
 French brooded over the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, the 
 thoughts of revenue sunn gave wav to a (juieter spirit, 
 notwithstanding that the l -< rench have frequently been 
 provoked and goaded by (iermany. (iermany, or, in 
 other \\ords. Hismarck, managed in INS? to create a 
 dangerous crisis b\ inducing the (ierman Reichstag to 
 accept the " Sept cnnatc," or the seven years' increase of 
 Military Intimates and the augmentation if the 
 He wanted thereby to prepare the (icrman people 
 i,d d;ith st ruL, r L.'l ( ' \M'!I l-'rance il' that country 
 induced to show more aeti\e sympathy for the 
 ! AKace Lorrain<-rs or to gi\ c \\a\ to drinoiistra 
 .uii -t pro\ i ie.it l\ i act . ( )ne <iich act of the 
 itant LMI'| \\:s th- arn -t o| 1 1.. Fi-e|,c|, nohc,
 
 ANNEXATION OF ALSACE-LORRAINE 121 
 
 commissary Schnabele on a false charge of high treason 
 by espionage. 
 
 But no casus belli arose, and France remained quiet and 
 self-possessed. However, Bismarck's evil conscience and 
 constant anticipation of revenge gave him no peace, and 
 he must needs work upon the feelings of the people to 
 pave the way for the " Septennatc." Sensational articles 
 and disquieting rumours appeared daily in the Press, and 
 fresh acts of chicanery were organized in Alsace. '* If 
 you do not vote for candidates supporting the ' Septennate ' 
 there will he war! " "If we do not succeed in German- 
 ising Alsace-Lorraine there will he war!" This was the 
 constantly repeated cry of the newspapers. 
 
 Field-Marshal Moltke said in the Reichstag on January 
 11, 1887 : k ' If the proposal of the Government is rejected, 
 I firmly believe that we shall have war." 
 
 Bismarck thereupon declared : " We shall endeavour 
 to put it out of the power of France to attack us for 
 another thirty years. The War o/'1870 it'/// be child'* play 
 by the side of that 0/1890 or of I know not ichcti as regards 
 its effect on France." His promise that the French 
 should be " bled white " was punctuated by the Reichstag 
 with an enthusiastic " Bravo ! " 
 
 Lieut. -Colonel Kottschau published about this time 
 a work entitled Der nachste Krieg, which was a brutal 
 threat against France and was intended to influence 
 the Reichstag in favour of the " Septennate." 
 
 In March 1887 Major H. von Plister published a book 
 in which he urged that France should be dismembered, 
 and declared that '' the German people has been chosen 
 by the Almighty for the inheritance of the Roman Empire." 
 The German Empire was to annex Western Lorraine and 
 Franche-Comte, and the Xord and Ardennes Departments 
 were to be given to Belgium, which, together with Holland, 
 was to become a vassal State of the German Empire. 
 Switzerland and the Italian Tyrol were also to be annexed 
 by German}'. 
 
 The war agitation having resulted in the acceptance of
 
 122 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 the Septennate " by the Reichstag, its realization was at 
 once proceeded to ; movements of troops took place in 
 all garrison towns and large forces were collected in Alsace- 
 Lorraine, (.'oust ant articles appeared in the Berlin Press 
 about French war preparations ( = manoeuvres), about 
 French espionage, about the doings of the League of 
 Patriots, etc., until every one began to believe in the 
 imminence of a contliet. Suddenly, in April, the sensa- 
 tional news was spread abroad that the universally 
 respected police- commissary Schnabcle, of the frontier 
 town of Pu<_ r ny, had been arrested in German territory and 
 thro\\n into prison at Met/. It turned out, however, 
 that he had been requested by the ill-famed German 
 police commissarv a renegade of the Alsatian frontier 
 town of Xovcant to visit him on a matter of business, 
 but that he had been lured into an ambush. He was 
 attacked, according to the testimony of two witnesses 
 (unseen labourers in a vineyard), by two disguised police- 
 men, but ran back across the frontier; he was pursued, 
 knock d down, handcuffed, and dragged across into 
 German territory. A prosecution followed, and this 
 canxf cclclirc, \\hich filled live hundred pages, was tried 
 by the Iliu'li Court at Leipzig; at the same time the 
 case was submitted to the Kmpcror William, who found, 
 h\\i\-er, that an act of chicanery had been committed, 
 and ordered that Sehnabclc should be at once released 
 f roji i prison and allowed to return home. That Bismarck 
 had a hand in this contemptible affair is but too obvious. 
 II'- h\ d in a ma/.e of pohtieal intrigue and trickery. 
 
 l-'ranec. her Gov< rnment and Press maintained a diuMii- 
 lu d. immovable composure throughout this affair in 
 spite of tin urave provocation, for she wanted no breach 
 of thi peaee. Thus it eaiii'- about that Germanv's warlike 
 designs v, i re t hwart < <i . 
 
 Br-.inarek ii"\\ hit upon a IM-W scheme for compromising 
 I I.UM--. Ma\inu' induced I hat country to occupy Tunis, 
 \vi:< re th- IV'iieh had a vast '.pherc of interests, he stirred
 
 FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 123 
 
 up Italian feeling against France on the pretext that 
 Italian interests were being threatened. lie excited the 
 ire of the Italian chauvinists, who naively aimed at nothing 
 less than the exclusive right to occupy the whole of North 
 Africa as being an old Roman province, and finally managed 
 to convince Italy that the country had been the victim 
 of a foreign State's pretensions, to which an end' must 
 now be made. 
 
 The Italian Premier Crispi, who was not distinguished 
 by firmness or integrity of character, allowed himself 
 to be persuaded by Bismarck of the necessity for renewing 
 the Triple Alliance (1887) and of embarking on a policy 
 hostile to France. Crispi clearly hoped that this alliance, 
 thanks to certain conventions, would enable Italy to 
 take possession of a part of the African coast-line. Despite 
 Italy's challenges, which for a long time seemed likely 
 to make war unavoidable, peace was maintained, thanks 
 to the calm demeanour of the French Government. 
 
 These renewed attempts to injure and irritate France 
 gradually led to a rapprochement with Russia. 
 
 Russia on her part had begun to make overtures to 
 France in the eighties. At the coronation festivities at 
 Moscow in 1883 the French ambassador was made the 
 subject of demonstrations of the strongest sympathy, and 
 from that, time the friendly relations between the French 
 and the Russians became more and more marked. 
 
 In their fear of the ascendancy of the German element 
 in Russia, the Russian Slavophiles began to interest 
 themselves in French culture, whilst the French, even 
 those holding the most advanced political views', began 
 to conceive a liking for Russia and to forget the old anti- 
 pathies. Poland's fate, which had long caused heart- 
 burnings in France, had constituted an obstacle to a 
 rapprochement with Russia, but new conditions demanded 
 a. suppression of the old sympathies. The fears for 
 France's independence, if the country were utterly isolated, 
 became the determining factor of French opinion. French
 
 124 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 hopes soon turned in the direction of Russia, and presently 
 the " Boye tsariii khrani " (" God save the Tsar"), the 
 Russian National Anthem, became a familiar and poj>ular 
 melody in Paris. 
 
 We know that Gambetta had hopes of an alliance Avith 
 Russia and discussed tlie subject with (inn-nil Skobeleff 
 in 1881 in Paris. 
 
 When Flourciis was President of the Council (188(5-88) 
 IK- tried to l>rmj, r about a closer understanding between 
 France- and Russia. Jules Grew declared in 1887, in an 
 interview with the Danish Legation Councillor. J. Hansen, 
 that " Russia and l-'ranc-e have a great intc-rest in common, 
 namely, to prevent the further growth of German power : 
 it threatens Russia as it does France. These two coun- 
 tries must, therefore, support one- another in a mutual anil 
 pacific spirit." 
 
 For a long time the French Republic had inspired scant 
 sympathy at the Winter Palace, but by decrees its growing 
 internal stability attracted Russia's attention, and it was 
 reali/ed that to abandon France to the tender mercies 
 of lur en- niies would mean that. Russia would have to 
 faee the Triple Alliance alone. 
 
 Thus it came about that Alexander III, in 181)1, deco- 
 rated Carnot with the insignia of the Order of St. Andrew 
 and conveyed his cordial sentiments, whilst the same 
 year saw the momentous visit of the French squadron to 
 Cronstadt. Shortly afterwards a rumour sounding like 
 a fairy tale from the ,-i r<if/itin \i^ltts was spread abroad 
 that a Franco-Russian Alliance- was in contemplation! 
 An alliance between Russia and France, those opposite 
 poles ot Despotism and Republicanism, how preposterous 
 it appi an il ! \N hat a danger it seemed to t he unhampered 
 spread ol Western culture! The explanation was a 
 simjile one: the alliance had its routs in the common 
 f.tl<niiil in'ttrtsh ol both alli-d States the necessity for 
 eh-'-kiiiL' tlie L'i'owth of ( ,i riiian po\\er and for creating a 
 < .';nt < rpoise to the Trip!'- Alliance (or th-- maintenance 
 "t piaee. It is e|i ar that the contrast in the systems of
 
 SPKEAD OF MILITARISM IN EUROPE 125 
 
 government and social conditions of the two allied States 
 had no bearing on this need. The internal institutions 
 and conditions of a country are predetermined by its 
 historical development and are national in character ; its 
 alliances, on the other hand, are determined by external 
 conditions and arc international in character. The Treaty 
 of Alliance between Russia and France was signed in 
 August 1891. 
 
 This sequel to Germany's militarism and unwise conduct 
 towards France in 1870, when she had sought peace after 
 the fall of Napoleon, had not been dreamt of by Bismarck. 
 His arrogance blinded him to realities and rendered him 
 incapable of drawing other political inferences than those 
 inspired by his own illusions intensified by success. It 
 is obvious that France, even if nothing else was gained 
 by the alliance, was justified in seeing therein an end of 
 the hegemony which Germany since the Franco-German 
 War had asserted in Europe. 
 
 In spite of Prussia's victories in the wars provoked by 
 Bismarck, he nevertheless was filled with anxiety for the 
 preservation of Prussia's power, which he constantly saw 
 threatened, and hence he was always seeking to form 
 alliances and perpetually increasing the military burden. 
 Well he might, to impress the world with the armed might 
 of Germany, exclaim in one of his " grand speeches '' in 
 the Reichstag (1888) : 4i We Germans fear God and naught 
 else in the world ! " But of this there is no doubt, that 
 there was one thing Bismarck feared more than God, and 
 that was --France and Russia ! This grand speech of his 
 presaged vaster armaments, and to obtain them he drew, 
 with indifferent logic, a perfectly harrowing picture of 
 the dangers which threatened Germany. He unctuously 
 exclaimed : "' God has placed us in a position in which 
 we arc prevented by our neighbours from ever sinking 
 into a state of decrepitude and sloth. He has placed the 
 most warlike and turbulent nation, the French, by our 
 side, and has permitted the growth of Russia's bellicose
 
 PJ<> HKFOKK, DriuNi;, AND AFTF.K I'.H I 
 
 propensities to a decree unparalleled in past centuries. 
 Thus we feel, as it were, the pressure of the spur on both 
 sides, and arc forced into exertions which otherwise perhaps 
 we should not make." 
 
 Germany thereupon increased her enormous peaee 
 strength by more than half a million soldiers, and she 
 could now plaee over a million men in the field and yet 
 have half a million in reserve. 
 
 A study of the European wars of the- sixties and seventies 
 of last century cannot hut show that Bismarck was their 
 main cause and that it was he who in the first plaee revived 
 militurixni in Kuropc and prevented the growth of a 
 friendly policy between the States; it is, thanks to him, 
 that suspicion, diplomatic intrigues, and equivocal alliances 
 
 so-calli-d peace leagues armed to the teeth have been 
 tin- main preoccupation of Kuropean statecraft in recent 
 decades. What a panxlv of civili/.ed polities'. The 
 continuous armaments, the appalling military lurdeiis 
 rendered all demonstrations of friendship between the 
 1'owcrs utterly ilhisorv. The perpetual increase in military 
 strength, the principal concern of all Governments and 
 Parliaments ever since Prussia's victories, has precluded 
 all real pacilic international progress. 
 
 Kver since the I-'ranco German War. militarism has 
 de\e]nped throughout Kurojx- at an appalling rate : < \ < TV 
 \s here t here has been nothing but war preparations, larger 
 armies, added armaments, more warships and fortrtsses. 
 t iioniious and \\ ant on expend it ure : all in order to be prc 
 part d pp pap d to meet an i nemv. No reliance could be 
 placed i>n eiiinposin^ difference s aniK ably. It had IK c n all 
 t oo i as\ tn .it aloi it . wit hout any r al cause, I In \\ ar \'. it h 
 France in l.sTu as \\. II as the \\ars o!' l.stil and l.st.ii. 
 
 G< rmany has ne\ < r ei a si < I to arm, and has st rcn^t h< ne el 
 her nnlitar\ s\ste-m in so astounding a fashinn that one- 
 -hoiilej ha\ e tltoiiL'ht a ne w uar \\as ever iminine lit . \< t 
 p ace |, as In i n preserved for fort V three' years, and 
 ( .' ' IM:UI\ t ak- > t In chie -f en dit , for (ie Tinany, it i > claimed,
 
 SPREAD OF MILITARISM IN EUROPK 127 
 
 has only lived i'or peace and peaceful interests, lor her 
 internal eulture, her material needs, the welfare of her 
 people, etc. 
 
 Why, then, has Germany never ceased to arm ? To 
 this the answer is that she has ever been fully conscious of 
 the perilous geographical situation of the country and the 
 dangers underlying the enmity and armaments of other 
 Powers, and that she has found that other nations begrudge 
 Germany her extraordinary industrial and commercial 
 development and will not willingly permit her to seek an 
 outlet in other continents. Open and secret hostility has- 
 been the lot of Germany from East and West and from 
 across the oceans. Hence, it is argued, Germany could 
 not but hold herself prepared for war. 
 
 It seems to have been forgotten that one of the chief causes 
 of German anxiety was the war with France, the annexa- 
 tion of Alsace-Lorraine, and Bismarck's repeated threats 
 against France in the seventies and eighties, all of which 
 contributed to bring about France's alliance with Russia. 
 
 Whilst the Triple Alliance, or the so-called " League of 
 Peace," had for its object to isolate France and to force 
 Russia to give up the fruits of her victories on the Danube 
 and in the Balkan peninsula, Germany has striven to 
 strengthen her hold on her own conquests in the West 
 and North. These conquests were the real cause of the 
 " armed peace." Had that country's Government obeyed 
 the dictates of prudence and humanity and either returned 
 Alsace-Lorraine to France or made those provinces into 
 a State enjoying the same neutrality as Switzerland, and 
 had the Danish-speaking Schlcswig been restored to 
 Denmark, Germany would have been in a far stronger 
 position and her people would have been relieved of at 
 least half of their enormous burden of military expenditure. 
 But this was not to be ; the Government has always made 
 it clear that the Alsace-Lorrainers must make up their 
 minds that they are for ever united to the German Empire, 
 and as regards the Schleswig question, it is looked upon as 
 dead and buried.
 
 1*28 BEFORE, DTRING, AND AFTER 1914- 
 
 The " Peace League," therefore, has in reality been a 
 war league, which mavc rise to the creation of another war 
 league, although that, too. is a " peace league." 
 
 The- whole system of equilibrium which in the last few 
 decades has constituted the real pivot of European politics, 
 the Triple Alliance and the Franco-Russian Alliance, 
 was (i r exult i>J the tension between France and (icrmany due 
 t<> the (inne.i'dlion of Alsace-Lorraine under the Peace of 
 Frankfort. Hut it is (juite evident that this system of 
 equilibrium has been of no benefit to the cause of peace ; 
 on the contrary, it lias meant a latent .state of war or an 
 armed truce pending a fresh war between the two enemies 
 >!' l.sTi) 71. 
 
 " Hy t;ikin^ Alsace-Lorraine," a Russian diplomat 
 once remarked, " Bismarck is working for us. Strasburg 
 and Mel / in (ierman hands means in a coming war France's 
 di-votiiin to Russia." 
 
 NM\\. at last, the (.real \Var which was considered by 
 many ti In- inevitable, has come to pass. When Russia be- 
 came involved in Austria's war \\ilh Serbia, and Germany 
 join* -d A ust na, France, as Russia's ally, had to be drawn into 
 tli'- war, \\liich. by Filmland's participation on account of 
 tin' (icrman violation of Hel^ian neutrality and the menace 
 to l-'ranci-. became a \\orld-wide contlict. Hut this conflict 
 would not have come to pass had nut (ierniantf annexed 
 Alsace-Lorraine, and thereby created the main incentive to 
 the Franco-Russian Alliance.
 
 XII 
 THE WORLD WAR OF 1914 
 
 PART I 
 
 A. RELATIONS BETWEEN GERMANY AND ENGLAND : 
 GERMANY'S COLONIAL POLICY AND OVER-POPULATION 
 ONE OF THE CAUSES OF THE WAR. 
 
 TIME and again it has been said that the causes of the 
 World War cannot be unravelled with the aid of the 
 materials now at our disposal, that we cannot at present 
 view in a right perspective the forces and events which 
 led to the kindling of the spark of war, and that years of 
 calm and unimpassioned research are needed to place this 
 epoch of history in its right light. I do not share this 
 view, but find at the time of writing eight months after 
 the outbreak of war that we possess in well-known 
 incidents of the last few decades, in the official documents 
 of the warring Powers their White, Red, Yellow, etc., 
 Books in authentic utterances and the various parlia- 
 mentary records, etc., very ample material for an objective 
 and authoritative exposition of all the causes of the war, 
 and that on the evidence thus obtained we can express 
 impartial opinions on the value or otherwise of the publica- 
 tions of the belligerent nations purporting to show who is 
 responsible for the war. Were we to wait for years in order 
 to collect better materials on which to base our judgment, 
 the only result would probably be the accumulation of other 
 documents which would merely repeat what is now extant 
 with the same positive assertions, for the leading statesmen 
 
 129 i
 
 130 BKFORK, DURING, AND AFTER 1914- 
 
 of the various nations would hardly be likely to change 
 their point of view or give the lie to their original utter- 
 ances. 
 
 liermany's colonial policy is of recent growth, but has 
 achieved remarkable results. It was inaugurated on 
 August 7, 1>M, when the world was surprised by the 
 announcement that (iermany had taken possession of 
 Angra Pequeria. in South-West Afriea, by an agreement 
 with a commercial house in Hamburg, which previously 
 owned the region. 
 
 There had already existed, in (icrman towns, private 
 societies with colonial aspirations, the chief of which was 
 tin- Dtitlscficr Kitlmi idl-l't rein, founded in I.SS'J. The 
 object of these societies was to interest the (icrman mind 
 m the study of colonial problems and to give an impetus to 
 the cnii^i'dtion f/itt ,\tiun mi ///;<. s of naliotxil tlcrt'ltij>nu'til, so 
 that emi'jratfd (icrmans would remain (.Germans and not 
 be absorbed m foreign nationalities, thus counteracting 
 the threatened growth of other nations at the expense of 
 (ierman caj)ital and (ierman labour. 
 
 Th' acquisition of colonies soon followed. In Africa 
 (iermany has (ierman South-West Africa, (ierman Mast 
 Afriea, KatiK run and Togoland : m the 1'aeilic. New 
 (ininea. the Caroline Islands, the Marianne Islands, the 
 I'i !-w Inlands, the Marshall Islands, and the Sanioan 
 Islands. Th se colonies have an a^Liregate population of 
 1 _'." V. ii(io. and co\ ( r an area of _',;."), s,. "> ts square kilo- 
 metres, or |i\ ( times the area of the (ierman Kmpire in 
 Mur<tp<-.* (,( rinany occupies third place after Kngland 
 and I^'raiiee among Colonial Powers. 
 
 Mir/l.'ind \\as the first State of modern tunes to aetjuire 
 colojiies, and the British have proved very able and 
 siiccessl'iil eulo ni/.ers. I'raiiee f"ll.iwed in England's foot - 
 st'-ps a> a coloni/ing nation and obtained some valuable 
 possi ssjons. d( rmany, lik- Italy, came a century too late 
 f'-r r-oloiiial expansion on a large seal- .-'"d !>fid not the 
 I-'M.H, s,',//. / //,;/, ,\l',, !, /. ,/. Dent*. I,, li.ifli. MM);.
 
 GERMANY'S COLONIAL POLICY 131 
 
 same advantages as England and France. Nobody must 
 begrudge Germany her belated wish, nay, her necessity, 
 for expansion in order to find room for her overflowing 
 population and a market for her growing industry. Hut 
 Germany, on the other hand, must not allow herself to 
 be ruflled by England's and France's colonial successes and 
 say that these countries begrudge Germany a place in the 
 sun, or colonial and commercial advantages throughout tin- 
 wide world. 
 
 The great obstacle to Germany's colonial policy is 
 that the best places were long since taken by the earlier 
 Colonial Powers and that the unappropriated spaces were 
 coming to an end when Germany decided on colonial 
 expansion. 
 
 Germany also possessed a so-called " protectorate " in 
 the Far East, to wit, Kiao-Chau, in the Chinese province of 
 Shantung, occupied in November 1897 by a squadron after 
 a couple of German missionaries had been murdered in 
 China (the full details never really came to light). By way 
 of redress Germany was granted the " lease " of Kiao-Chau 
 for ninety-nine years, whereupon the possession Avas 
 strengthened by powerful fortifications. 
 
 As the Chinese offered no resistance to this act of 
 usurpation, Russia followed suit by seizing Port Arthur 
 (since taken by Japan), England occupied Wei-hai-Wei and 
 France Hai-Choau. 
 
 The altered situation in the Far East since the beginning 
 of the World-War Japan having taken Kiao-Chau and 
 now seeking to make China a protectorate in order, for self- 
 preservation, to prevent the further penetration and 
 influence of the white race seems to mark the end for all 
 time of Germany's colonial ambitions in China. 
 
 It must not be forgotten that Bismarck never gave a 
 thought to a German colonial empire, Germany being in 
 his opinion ''satiated,'' and that in 1884 he encouraged 
 France to pursue colonial conquests in order thus to divert 
 her attention from Alsace-Lorraine. As alrendv pointed
 
 132 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 out he also hoped by this mean-* to set Italy against 
 Franee (p. I'J.'J). 
 
 New factors began to make their appearance about this 
 time, which gave birth to the expansionist movement. 
 Germany had. in the great Westphalian coalfields and the 
 industrial region on the banks of the Ruhr, rendered so 
 famous by Krupp's ironworks, created a world-wide 
 industry which rivalled that of England and America, anil 
 she had also in other directions in Silesia. Berlin, etc. 
 attained an enormous industrial development which 
 needed an outlet in foreign countries. To this end a 
 German mercantile marine was necessary, and soon there 
 arose in Hamburg and Bremen mighty shipping concerns 
 with vast Meets of ships for transoceanic trade.* 
 
 The great manufacturers and shipowners now pointed out 
 the necessity of a navy to defend, if necessary, the mercan- 
 tile marine and the commercial interests in foreign coun- 
 tries, and to protect the (iermau colonies. The Kmpcror 
 William reali/ed this need and furthered the plan with his 
 accustomed energy, and his words, " Germany's future lies 
 upon t he water." soon became a corner stone in Germany's 
 
 l|e\V pi illCV. 
 
 The buildniH of a large navy now became the mam pre- 
 occupation of the Government, and in 1 '.>()() the Reichstag 
 passed the desired Yntc in the face of strenuous oppo- 
 -ition Irom the Liberals and Social Democrats, to whom 
 a biu navv in- ant warlike complications, and who pointed 
 "tit that tlii be^t areas outside Kurope had already been 
 occupied and that the political situation in Kurope. being 
 lull of dangers, did not justify splitting up the country's 
 
 I'esi ilirce-,. et c. 
 
 * Aiii'iii;j the iiKiny \V"iks i|i ;i!iii^' \\itli tins s\il)jrc| I may fin n- 
 li-.n : (.. Sr| im ..||,-r. M. S'-riiii;. A. \V;i^in r. 7/f/mMv- u Mn< litjinlitik 
 fll<K>,: I), s, |, a f, r , />// 11,-ih-ntnn^ <l>r S'-ftnmf,! (lOOO): (.. A. 
 r.nliii.-itm. \nn n*r :inl,r (I'.IOO) ; I >r. A. \^i;.'. l>n il> nt^rh frntt- 
 :'oj.s<-/- .\nnnttiTnn<> fl'.MM)); 1'. .\Ji inlcinlt , l\itnn I )< iitftctiltirui 
 \i rtt :<,!, t, I. tmh,n ' (\ !<>:',, : Dr. V.. -I., ra Id !- .\\ . 11, r (,rnn<l^<lait);r 
 IfT '/- nt\i fit ii K'llntuiil/mlitik I I1>O.'<) ; Hari'ii \i\ I'':ilk< IIC^L'. M's:iir</ 
 '! ntiMirn K'llnnirn .' ( 11MHI).
 
 GERMANY'S COLONIAL POLICY 133 
 
 It was openly urged that, to be u Great Power, Germany 
 must show herself to be un industrial Power of the iirst rank, 
 for the yearly addition of 800,000 souls made it necessary to 
 divert them to the lactories, seeing that there was no 
 room for them in agriculture. Now, as these products of 
 industry could not all iind a market in Germany, they 
 had to be exported, and this meant the need of colonies and 
 commercial houses, etc., in all parts of the world, which 
 in turn required for their protection a powerful navy. 
 
 By degrees it became clear to all that a large navy for the 
 protection of trade and colonies was a matter of life and 
 death. The workmen realized that Germany's colossal 
 industry demanded an export trade, and that this export 
 trade must be protected overseas by warships. If exports 
 were stopped the factories would have to shut down, and 
 this would mean loss of wages to millions of workers, 
 who would then be given over to the stress of starvation. 
 
 Apart from American trade rivalry, against which all 
 European countries have to contend, it is chiefly England's 
 trade that Germany fears, although she has successfully 
 stood the test of competition. The Germans have gone 
 so far as to call England the '' hereditary enemy," and 
 England, on the other hand, has become concerned over 
 the German competition. 
 
 The Saturday Kcvieiv, in 1897, tried to set the British 
 against the Germans, and published an article declaring 
 Germaniam cxse delendam (Germany must be destroyed). 
 
 In his pamphlet, The Meaning of Sea-power to Germany 
 (1000), Professor D. Schaffer described "the energy and 
 ruthlessness which the British have shown in their craving 
 for colonies and their quest of oversea trade," and proceeded 
 to show how, since the inception of the German colonial 
 policy, " England has with feverish haste laid hands on all 
 that could be taken, mostly for no other reason than to 
 prevent others from settling there." He wanted the threat 
 in the Saturday Kerieic to be taken to heart, and it was 
 long repeated everywhere. It was, of course, only in 
 certain circles in England that this view was held, and the
 
 131 BKFOKK, DTRIM;, AND AFTER 1014 
 
 threat must not, therefore, he taken as an expression of 
 public opinion. 
 
 For many years numerous German national economists, 
 Mich as Hassc, member of tin- Reichstag, Professor Stengel, 
 and Dr. G. A. Krdmann, have declared that the enormous 
 growth of Germany's population over 800,000 annually 
 
 furnishes the mainspring of the colonial policy. In 
 a short time a great part of German industry might be 
 threatened with ruin were it not for this policy, and the 
 \\hole German Kmpire might become the scene of a social 
 revolution this is a perspective with which the Germans 
 an- familiar. 
 
 Hitherto, in German ollieial circles', it has been regarded 
 as an axiom that the power of a State depends on the 
 tiuml/tr of its inhabitants and that Gcrmanv can maintain 
 her position among the Great Powers only by the constant 
 and untrammelled growth of her population. Hut for 
 maiiv years notes of warning from per-ons ( ,f \\ ( ight have 
 lii.ii sounded against this view in Germany. Thus (',. 
 Schmoller wrote in ISS'J in Lttnd'i'irtxi.'hiifll. Juhrlnichrr : 
 
 " AS regards the number of children. 1 do not wish to 
 commend the l-'reiich ' two children s\s| ( m ' ; but neither 
 do I think it wis<- on our part to adhere blindlv to the old 
 dogma of the blessings of unlimited families a dogma 
 \\hieh rightly belongs to an epoch of semi civili/at ion. If 
 we could only clear the German nation of the stigma of 
 the greatest child mortality in the \\orld. \\hich is but a 
 
 eo[|vi ( jui lice o| our excessive birth fate, IllUcll WOllld be 
 
 1 ' 
 
 In hi- /'- tit if. Tivttsrhke declared in ls ( .'.~> : " In the divi- 
 sion ot the extra Kuropeaii \\oi-ld atiion^ (hi Kuropcan 
 nat ion-, ( ,i i inaii\ has a!\\ a\ s ri-ei i\ i d the small, st share." 
 Tlii-. ^oiili<ls like an aecn atiiiii against ot IK r Pouii's. 
 I'ut Tr< it ehl.e must ha\ i kno\\ u I hat In I on- I .s.s 1 (,, rmany 
 iii \ i r Bought to si cure aii\' cdi -IIK -. He goes on : " And 
 \ t 01 ; r \ i v < M -I enee as a ( i at I ' 'U i r di | i IK Is on \\ h< t her 
 '.'. ' en 1 1 b co|||e an o\ i j'scas P iWer. (
 
 GERMANY'S COLONIAL POLICY l.'i.~> 
 
 reduced to seeing England nnd Russia dividing up the 
 world between them/' 
 
 Speaking of the start which certain Powers have had in 
 the division of the earth, G. A. Krdmann wrote in his 
 pamphlet A'w?i abcr writer (1900), in support of Treitsehke's 
 theory of might : " In moulding the fate of nations might 
 and right arc synonymous. He who has the greatest 
 might, must also have the greatest right that is to say, 
 must seize the best and largest inheritance. This is a 
 political moral principle (!) with which the German nation 
 must make itself familiar, for fear that its philosophic 
 morality may bring about its bankruptcy." And to prove 
 that Germany needs new territory Krdmann wrote : 
 " Germany is faced with an all-compelling L inuxt ' ; any 
 shirking of this duty of world-policy will enormously 
 weaken her position, or probably destroy it for ever. 
 Those who speak of the ' colonial adventures ' of our 
 Government merely show their narrowness of vision, for 
 the time might come when Germany would have to pour 
 out rivers of blood for the possession of a strip of land 
 claimed by another State. The establishment of close 
 economic bonds with the aid of colonies of her own would be 
 to Germany merely a safeguard against such cupidity on 
 the part of other States/' 
 
 G. Schmollcr wrote in Handels- u. MachtpolitiJc (1900) : 
 " Our existence will be threatened if we have no sea-power 
 and do not permanently keep open the maritime routes on 
 which the grain-exporting States may in certain circum- 
 stances bring their forces to bear."' This work, in which 
 several political economists collaborated, was intended as 
 a note of alarm over the desperate position in which Germany 
 would be placed without a strong navy to support the 
 country's colonial policy. 
 
 During my several visits to Germany in the years 1899- 
 1903, when the debates on colonial policy raid the increase 
 of the navy were going on, I became convinced of Germany's 
 need of important colonies for her home and export trade
 
 13G BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1911 
 
 then representing a sum of 10,000 million marks -and of 
 the urgent necessity under which she laboured to provide 
 a livelihood for many million workers. A. Lalancc, the 
 eminent Reichstag member from Alsace, had suggested in 
 1888 that Germany should endeavour, by amicable negotia- 
 tions with France, to acquire a favourably situated French 
 colony. After I had studied the conditions in Alsace- 
 Lorraine I felt I was able to suggest a transaction which 
 would make an end of the old animosity between French- 
 men and Germans which hail prevailed since the- annexation 
 of the provinces, and at the same time would promote 
 Germany's colonial policy ; this suggestion consisted in 
 taking up Lalanee's idea as to the restoration of Alsace- 
 Lorraine to France against a suitable colony. In addition 
 to this, (iermany should enter into a Tariff I'nion with 
 France, which might be expected soon to develop into a 
 dt'f'rnxire dlluincc. Thus the peace of Furope would be 
 assured and the colossal sums expended by (iermany and 
 France, and, in fact, by all other Furopean countries, on 
 war preparations, might be reduced to an insignificant 
 figure. 
 
 I presented and elaborated this suggestion in a work 
 entitled Alsace-Lnrmine,* to which the French deputy A. 
 Millcrand, now French War Minister, wrote an introduc- 
 tion. My suggestion, however, met with no success in 
 (iermany, being rejected with the greatest emphasis 
 both in the Press and in private utterances in letters and 
 conversations. The retrocession of Alsace Lorraine could 
 
 IH-Ver be (hniiultt i,f. 
 
 That b( m:_' so. I confess I \-ie\\ed the future \\ith con- 
 siderable pes-siinisiii, for. although 1 had every reason to 
 think that France \\ould ne\ r make \\ar on (iermany for 
 
 the s;ike of A 1 sace Lor I'a 1 IH , I |M came IlloTe ami more Con- 
 
 vmeid that Germany s r/;r?' /></jw/^//o/i and her consequent 
 
 iiilniiiul jiolutj \\ould become a cuu*f <,f ~>-<ir ;<;//< I'lnglund, 
 an opinion \\hieh I also expressed m the above-named 
 
 V \\--ti" in. I.' .-ll'in<-r-l.i,rriiim-. l':iri-. IIMI.'J; /. 7.v;.v.v -/.<///, ma'< M 
 <FI// <t,<- M I'll, 1,1. i it 1 11,1 r f/i//w h-niiii' MS,/,,;, .-Ilium-, lit rlin. MMM.
 
 GERMANY'S COLONIAL POLICY 137 
 
 work. The War of 1914 is, in fact, essentially attributable 
 to these factors in the economic life of Germany. 
 
 That England, in view of her insular position and her 
 colonies, must have a large navy is obvious ; without it 
 the country could be starved in a very short time in ease of 
 war, and her trade would be entirely at the mercy of an 
 enemy Power. Thus when Germany suddenly appears 
 with a powerful navy, it is plain that England must increase 
 hers, especially as German trade has become a dangerous 
 competitor to England's. In these circumstances the 
 British Government and Press have repeatedly attempted 
 to persuade Germany not to accelerate her naval pro- 
 gramme, making it clear that England would also moderate 
 hers if the suggestion were accepted. But Germany would 
 not fall in with this proposal, and continued year after year 
 to build more and more warships, until at last an absolute 
 panic arose in England. 
 
 There can be no doubt that the enormous growth of 
 the German navy was a deciding factor in England's 
 rapprochement with France, which came to pass after 
 Edward VII's visit to President Loubet in 1903, and by 
 which a safeguard against the German danger was con- 
 templated. 
 
 The necessity for England to increase her Navy, since 
 the German navy was continuously being added to, was 
 emphasized by the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, in a speech 
 in Parliament in 1909. 
 
 The tension between Germany and England turned 
 chiefly upon their African interests, England's plan to 
 link up Cape Colony with Egypt clashing with Germany's 
 plan of connecting Kamerun and the East African colony. 
 There has also been antagonism between the two countries 
 in Asia, where the German Bagdad railway was an obstacle 
 to England's plan of establishing railway connexion 
 between Egypt and India. 
 
 But there was no reason why these plans should lead to 
 war, and before the conflict of 1914 there was every ground
 
 138 BEFORE, l)i KING, AND AITEH 101 I 
 
 for hoping that the two countries would be able to settle 
 their differences amicably. 
 
 At the beginning of the war Dr. A. Zimmcrmann, 
 
 Imperial Legation Councillor, in an article un ' \\liy 
 England Makes War" (in Die \Vnche, August 'J'J, 1914), 
 wrote as follows : " The more our indignation and sur- 
 prise at the vile attack f ihe Triple Entente i^ives way 
 to calm reflection, the more obvious it becomes that the 
 icur /<//(/ upon Germany was unfortunately inevitable." 
 It was l-'iancc's schemes of revenue, Russia's rapacity, and, 
 first and last, England's treacherous commercial policy 
 that brought about the \Vorld \Yar : 
 
 " In (icrmanv we should never have- decided for war 
 had not our most sacred possessions liberty and honour, 
 hearth and home been at stake. In England war has 
 always been a business like any other. Other nations 
 have regarded war, even if successful, as a judgment <>f 
 (ind t a terrible visitation, whilst to the British it has always 
 meant a ^ood opportunity of enriching themselves by 
 j>ir<ie>i tinil the like. They have more than once in tin- 
 course of his'orv indignantly rejected any paeilic effort. 
 More than one British (iov< rnment has been overthrown 
 bv the anL'er of the British commercial interests at tin- 
 prospect of bcin^r depriv< d of t heir opportunities for t radc 
 robber\- 1>\- a premature jn ace. ... It is si|_rnu:cant that 
 tin- I.ibi rals ha\c takn o\'< r from the Ton- s the chief 
 n-pn 'iitati\-es of the anti-Cierman policy. Sir l-'.d \\ard 
 (,! y and Churchill." 
 
 ll there is aii\ tiling as certain as that Sir Mdward 
 di-'\ s iffi.rts tn jire\int the \\ar must be reLMi'd* d as 
 ab "hit el\ sinei i e. it is t hat earlier Brit i^h st at ^\n< n ha\ . 
 energetically smii^ht ( priser\e peace. H. Hiehard 111 
 Is?:; br'iii.'ht for\\ard a Bill for the or^ani/at \<>i\ of pi ace, 
 v. hieh ua^ pass, d |,\ the House of Common^, (iladstone 
 id- nt ill. d him-' If \\ith the I 'race Congress at Naples in isso 
 ;iiid 1 1 ; d to promot e the id* a of disarmament . Richard. 
 Bii:'ht. and other 1-ad. rs of the Maneh'sttr School pub
 
 GERMANY'S COLONIAL POLICY 139 
 
 lished writings on the same subject. Courtney in 1881 
 made a proposal for simultaneous general disarmament 
 which was approved by the House of Commons. 
 
 About the same time Moltke was declaring in the German 
 Reichstag that Germany must stand armed for another 
 fifty years and saw to it that the armaments were pushed on 
 with the utmost activity. 
 
 The British have long looked with disfavour on the 
 Germans on account of the competition occasioned by 
 the flourishing growth of German commerce and industry, 
 and this broadened into alarm on witnessing Germany's 
 preparations on land and sea. 
 
 But then there appeared on the scene pacifists of 
 varying shades who sought to prove that it was absurd to 
 worry on account of Germany, who could not possibly 
 have any intention of injuring England. Persons in high 
 places, representative corporations -merchants, ollicials, 
 journalists, etc. paid and returned visits to Berlin and 
 London in order to establish and assure friendly relations 
 between Germans and Englishmen. Thus, in recent 
 years, an improvement had taken place in Anglo-German 
 relations, and it was found that in many spheres the 
 two countries could work side by side and that in many 
 respects their interests were not antagonistic. Germany 
 has been England's largest customer, and in many respects 
 England has been dependent on German industry. 
 
 But once more a nervous feeling arose in England on 
 account of the colossal armaments, the huge sea-ports, 
 and the great fleet which Germany was building, for it 
 was evident that she contemplated an extension of her 
 power and armed compel it ion in the world's markets. 
 
 A sensational Army Bill was presented in Germany in 
 1912, and in the same year the Government asked for an 
 enormous vote for the navy. 
 
 That there has been a fear in many quarters in England 
 of Germany's competition in trade is not to be denied. 
 But there is no reason to suppose that England, or rather 
 her Government, contemplated seizing some favourable
 
 l-io HEIOKK, DURING, AND AFTER 1014 
 
 opportunity to strike at German competition in the world's 
 markets by seeking an excuse to destroy the German navy. 
 This belief has been universally cultivated in Germany, 
 when- it has been laid down that England is the arch- 
 enemy. 
 
 Yet we have been assured that the Imperial Chancellor 
 Hcthrnann-Holhvcjj eagerly strove to improve German 
 relation* :i-j'/A England and to bring about & friendly feeling 
 -L'ith France. No doubt it has always been the aim of all 
 Governments to maintain friendly relations with other 
 1'owers. Hut why was not this effort persevered in ? 
 Other points of view arose and all the good intentions 
 suddenly collapsed. 
 
 It may be true enough as the authorities say, to hypno- 
 tize the German people that the Germans are waging war 
 " as a matter of life and death, for their very existence," 
 for they must expand and acquire colonies in order to 
 live; but they have by no means been attacked by other 
 countries and their existence has not been threatened, 
 
 In Germany it has been the fashion to cast the blame for 
 the \\.ir on KniJand. on the plea, amongst others, that 
 King Kduard VII introduced, and King George V and 
 Sir Kdward Grey continued, the encircling policy which 
 through the F.ntente with France and Russia is intended 
 to pi'< vent German expansion. Then- is, of course, a 
 eertam amount of truth in this, but it does not follow that 
 Kn^'land is to Maine for the war. because the reasons 
 I'-r tli<- " i ncireliii'_ r pohc\ are just as much to be sought 
 in t|i- conduct of Germanv herself. It the Germans find 
 it necessary lor their existence to procure new territory 
 for I heir commerce and surplus population, other nations 
 !,nd it equally neci-s;iry to safeguard themselves against 
 nep .achiiH ?it -.. 
 
 I'- rnhardi d- clan , in (It nnan >/ ami lite \iit ll'ar that 
 " \\ar is lir-,1 and foremost a hin]n^ienl necessity, a regulator 
 iii the hfi of mankind \\hich cannot be dispensed with." 
 IT luith- i a\ s that " in nature the .\lrni!^le fur c.i'ixfcnrc
 
 GERMANY'S OVER-POPULATION 141 
 
 is also at the root of all sound development that every- 
 where we find that the right of the stronger prevails, that t In- 
 weaker goes to the wall. This struggle is regulated and 
 controlled by biological laws and by the interplay of 
 opposing forces. In the vegetable and animal world this 
 process is worked out in unconscious tragedy.'' 
 
 That is so, no doubt, if we plaee ourselves on a level 
 with animals and savages and barbarians. This reflect ion 
 carries the mind back to the early migration of the Germans 
 forced upon them by famine and the necessity of finding 
 food and pastures, and it reminds us also of the migration 
 of certain animals for a like purpose - all biological 
 necessities. 
 
 Bernhardi recognizes that Germany's growth of popula- 
 tion calls for colonies, and he considers it quite in order 
 that these colonies should be taken by force of arms. He 
 remarks in the same book : " Strong, healthy, and 
 flourishing nations show increasing figures of population ; * 
 they need from a certain moment onward a constant 
 expansion of their boundaries ; they must have neic 
 territory in order to make room, for (heir surplus population. 
 But as nearly every part of the globe is inhabited, new 
 territory can, as a rule, only be obtained at the expense of 
 the occupants that is to say, by conquest, which thus 
 becomes a law of necessity. The right of conquest is 
 universally acknowledged." 
 
 This utterance by a leader of the German war-policy 
 shows that Germany was preparing to act as aggressor 
 whenever she found it necessary or desirable for tin- 
 acquisition of fresh territory. 
 
 Far from constituting Germany's strength, her enormous 
 increase of population has been harmful to the nation. 
 The birth to the country of many million potential soldiers 
 is only a temporary source of strength, enabling Germany 
 
 * I may add : So do weak nations ; and I may point out that a 
 small increase of population is primarily attributable to other 
 causes than the quality of the race or intentional limitation of 
 births. This is known to all students of the subject.
 
 1V-* BEFORE, DTRINC;, AND AFTER 101 1 
 
 by having prepared for the great war in every detail, to 
 keep the enemy at arm's length. But what colossal sums 
 it has cost ! What suffering, what a loss of human life it 
 has brought about ! For it is plain that this great growth 
 of population has been one of the principal tvw.sr.v of the 
 icnr o/'l'.U I. 
 
 B. Tin: SITTATION is REGARD TO THK BRITISH AND 
 FRENCH POSSESSIONS IN NORTH AFRICA. THK 
 MOROCCO DISIMTK WITH (JERMANY. 
 
 In Egypt, owing to financial conditions, France and 
 England have in recent times had legitimate interests to 
 safeguard, mainly in connexion with the building of the 
 Su /. Canal. The Khedive, Ismail Pasha, supported with 
 vigour and with considerable sums the gigantic enterprise 
 of the Sue/ (anal, earned out. under the supervision of 
 tin- French engineer Lesseps with the aid of Napoleon III 
 and with French capital ; it was opened in iMi'.K Internal 
 conditions in Egypt became shortly afterwards anything 
 but reassuring for the success of the enterprise : the 
 Khedive's costly administration and appalling extrava- 
 gance, in conjunction with an unsuccessful \var against 
 Abys-inia. brought about a hopeless muddle in the finances ; 
 and in order to obtain funds the Khedive in 1ST") sold his 
 shares in the Sue/. Canal to England for <Jl.ooo. <)<><). The 
 prodigality continued, and soon it was found impossible 
 t<> pay the inti rest on the debts, so that England had to 
 ad\anei the mfeivst on the Canal shares. The war with 
 Aby-.sii,ia. coupled with a revolt at home, added to the 
 financial chaos. ;,i, ( ] the European creditors were con- 
 fr- 'lit' d \\\\}\ the risk of lo. in % their money ; after a vigorous 
 protest from England and France, demanding reforms, 
 Ismail had to abdicate and the country was placed under 
 the financial control of an Englishman and a Frenchman, 
 who put the finances in order, a British Meet being at the 
 v -amr- time sent, in support, to Alexandria. The Minister 
 f War. Arabi Pasha. DOW organi/.' d a i> -volt .Mid demanded
 
 BRITISH AND FRENCH POSSESSIONS 14:3 
 
 the abolition of European financial control. The popula- 
 tion of Alexandria was incited against the foreigners, and 
 the British Fleet therefore bombarded the forts of the 
 town ; after a terrible massacre of Europeans had taken 
 place, the British occupied the city and defeated Arabi's 
 army at Tel-el-Kebir (July 1882). The British troops 
 remained in occupation of the country, and the financial 
 administration was entrusted by Tcwfik, the Khedive, to 
 Englishmen, who organized the finances with such skill 
 and economy that there was soon a surplus. 
 
 England had invited France to join her in quelling the 
 revolt, but France declined and thus lost her influence, 
 England obtaining the ascendancy in Egypt. Thus, by 
 force of circumstances, and not without legitimate claim, 
 England became the real mistress of Egypt. The occupa- 
 tion of the country was followed by the struggles with the 
 Maluli in the Sudan, in the course of which General Gordon 
 lost his life (1885). The British took Dongola in 1890, 
 and thereupon, in 1898, embarked on a new expedition 
 under General Kitchener, to reconquer the Sudan ; a 
 large army of Dervishes under the Mahdi was beaten, 
 whereupon Kitchener marched up the Nile to Fashoda. 
 In the meantime the plucky French Major Marchand, at 
 the head of an expedition, had marched right across Africa 
 from the Congo and arrived at Fashoda, where he planted 
 the French flag. He was now compelled by the menacing 
 attitude of England to haul it down and to evacuate the 
 place (December 1898). This humiliation, which nearly 
 led to war, was, however, atoned for shortly afterwards 
 by a treaty with England (March 1899), by which the 
 *23rd degree of latitude was fixed as the dividing line of 
 the spheres of interest of France and England in Central 
 Africa. 
 
 The great agreement, the Entente of 1904 between 
 England and France, obliterated all remembrance of the 
 Fashoda episode and marked the inception of the friend- 
 ship between these two countries. In a secret clause of 
 the agreement England guaranteed France the possession
 
 144 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 of Morocco by way of compensation for her lost position 
 in Egypt. 
 
 France, which had long had colonies Algeria dated 
 from 18.'U) and was constantly being augmented embarked 
 in the seventies on a new colonial policy. This policy 
 encountered many serious obstacles and soon met with 
 determined opposition from leading politicians and public 
 opinion, it being feared that it would weaken France's 
 position in Europe and prove disastrous to the country. 
 Nevertheless the policy of colonial development has been 
 followed by all Governments. Jules Ferry, as Foreign 
 Minister, in the middle of the eighties pursued it with 
 great vigour and obeyed the prudent maxim of maintaining 
 friendly relations with Germany, whom he joined in safe- 
 guarding European interests in Egypt and West Africa. 
 Hr utili/.ed France's power to acquire Farther India, and 
 thus to obtain possession of Annam and Tonkin. 
 
 I'ntil 1 s'.'S Ferry's successors pursued the same tactics, 
 uhieh brought them the possessions of Tunis. Sudan, the 
 Fn neli I'oiigo, Madagascar, and Indo-C'hina, without 
 France having to give any compensation to other coun- 
 tries, liut in that year a serious change took place, 
 Dclcassc. on becoming Foreign Minister, abandoning the 
 friendly attitude towards Germany. lie obtained Morocco 
 lor France by giving considerable compensations to 
 England, Spam, and Italy, whilst Germany, in spite of 
 aeknowl. dgi <1 interests in Morocco. gut nothing a dan- 
 gerous all ,j uiiwisr policy. t Itimatelv Delcasse's anti- 
 German policy led to Germany demanding his dismissal 
 
 i r. (>."> i. 
 
 Like a bolt from the blue came the ne\ss (July I '.Ml) 
 that a small warship dispatched by Germany, the 1'iintlnr, 
 had arrived at Agadir, a seaport m Southern Morocco. 
 This caused the greatest sensation, and formed the subject 
 of lively debates in German, English, and French news- 
 papers. Some English papers took the line that Germany 
 had the same right to a sjitcial mission as France, and
 
 THE MOROCCO DISPUTK WITH (inuMAxy M."> 
 
 that the latter country ought to act in conceit uith 
 Germany. Others could not understand how a German 
 warship could he sent to Anadir, which was closed to 
 foreigners and to foreign trade, and that Germany's 
 conduct was inconsistent with the terms of the Algcciras 
 Convention regarding the settlement of Moroccan affairs, 
 and with the Franco-German Agreement of !!)()!>. 
 
 Germany's Morocco Note to the Powers contained a 
 statement to the effect that " (icrman linns in Southern 
 Morocco, especially in Agadir and neighbourhood, had 
 been rendered nneasy by certain disturbances in other 
 parts of the country and had therefore applied to the 
 Government asking for protection of life, and property. 
 For this reason a warship was sent to Agadir, in order, 
 if necessary, to afford the desired protection. As soon as 
 peace and order were restored the ship would leave 
 Agadir.'' 
 
 Negotiations now took place between the German and 
 French Governments, the Germans disclaiming all terri- 
 torial ambitions in Morocco, but demanding compensation 
 in the Congo and the " open door " in Morocco. The 
 French Government accepted (in September) the lirst 
 condition, and shortly afterwards the position in Morocco 
 was defined by a treaty (November) between the two 
 Governments. Under this treaty the French Government 
 undertook to preserve the economic equality of the different 
 nations and declared that the principle 1 of the " open door " 
 would be respected. The German Government, on the 
 other hand, conceded to the French Government full 
 liberty of action for the maintenance of order in Morocco 
 and for the carrying out of needful reforms. 
 
 By these prudent arrangements the possible causes of 
 a conflict were removed and a fresh colony was secured 
 for Germany. This ought to have satisfied the German 
 nation. But the nascent chauvinistic current of opinion 
 which had hoped for the acquisition of a part of Morocco 
 received an added impetus through the Agadir affair, and 
 the newspapers expressed themselves in very heated tones.
 
 146 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 "German} has ncvi r hitherto," they said, "asserted any 
 claims in regard to Morocco, although lier interests there 
 were considerable, and we cannot look on with equanimity 
 whilst France and Spain share the plunder." Many 
 deplored the passive policy of the Government and that 
 it had done nothing to protect German interests, and 
 pointed to the increased French activity in Morocco as 
 obstructing German interests. 
 
 The Khein.-Wcstjtil. Ztitung wrote (September 11) that 
 "There is nothing left for us but cither to relinquish all 
 political rights m Morocco by an ignominious retreat and 
 to acquiesce in France's political and economic protec- 
 torate, or to demand political rights in Morocco and. on 
 the basis of these, economic rights. 'We had hoped that 
 the Government would rcali/e its mistake after tin- affair 
 at Ajjadir." 
 
 \\olffs Telegram Bureau <leelarcd on November .'{ that, 
 according to the Algeciras Convention, no single Power 
 had a riu'ht to establish order in Morocco. As France had 
 asserted this right, the German Government reminded 
 her of the provisions of the Algeciras Convention and 
 point i d out that Germany was us much entitled, by sending 
 a \\arship, to safeguard her rights as France was to protect 
 
 hers. 
 
 The Morocco dispute was bound up \sith the secret 
 clause in th<- agreement of I'.Hil between Filmland and 
 France, in which France w as guaranteed the possession 
 of Moroeeo a-, compensation for her withdrawal from 
 
 1>\ this di-pute Germany secured a considerable gain, 
 and t!i- l-rnt'iiA in th- CoiiLfo was sunl\ more valuable 
 than a -trip o| land in Morocco, as it ad|"ins an existing 
 ( i- rman colony. 'I ii>- disput i could in \ < r. in the minds 
 of thinking people. ha\e become a prt(Xl lr uar, and 
 y t , as m' nt ion' d above, it ;.;a\ ' rise to a \\< at d a;_'il at n>n 
 ani"i!L. r G> rman\ s dissat islied chauvinists, and Gi neral 
 ]{ iiihardi made it his nareiv in the preface (dat-d 
 Octob.r I'.'ll) of his l.ook (;,n"<itii{ ,ti',l tin- AY// liar.
 
 FRANCE'S PEACEABLE FEELING TO GERMANY 147 
 
 The author, who, by his work, desired to stimulate the 
 warlike spirit of the Germans and spur them on to fresh 
 conquests, writes here with arrogant pathos : 
 
 "All the patriotic sections of the (ierman people were 
 deeply stirred during the summer and autumn of 11M1. 
 The conviction lay heavy on all hearts that the settlement 
 of the Morocco dispute involved no mere commercial or 
 colonial questions of minor importance, but that the 
 honour and future of the German nation were at stake. 
 A deep rift has opened between the feeling of the nation 
 and the diplomacy of the Government. Public opinion 
 seems to have a clearer conception of its will to assert the 
 status of the nation than of the dangers of the political 
 position and the sacrifices which a boldly outlined policy 
 must demand. . . . Petty bargaining is as pronounced 
 a characteristic in our Berlin of the present day as it 
 was in the llegensburg of old." 
 
 C. THE PEACEABLE FEELING IN FRANCE TOWARDS 
 GERMANY 
 
 Dr. A. Zimmcrmann, Imperial Legation Councillor, pub- 
 lished at the beginning of the World War in Die Woche 
 (August 2'2, 1914) the following indictment of France : 
 '' France's old, irrepressible thirst jor vengeance has, of 
 course, in no small measure contributed towards bringing 
 about the World War. All Germany's friendly overtures 
 have been in vain, as has been the creation of strong 
 common interests between the two neighbours, so closely 
 dependent on one another. The great colonial empire 
 created with Germany's help has not enabled leading 
 circles in France to forget the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. As 
 it turns out, the republican form of government is no 
 better able than the old monarchical system to curb the 
 turbulent passion for adventure uliic/i has xo often xide 
 France the disturber of the world's peace." 
 
 But I think that the following statement describes more 
 trulv the state of feeling in France in recent times : The
 
 1 is BKFOIIF., Dnuxc. AND AFTKH 
 
 thniiirlit of vengeance ]>( r AC \\as by derives forgotten, 
 although tin- hope <>f a revision euneernin" Alsace Lorraine 
 was ^eiieral. Hut it may truly be said that a war on 
 account i)f these provinces was contemplated by no one 
 at tin bcjjinninjj of this century, unless by a handful of 
 seiiM-less fanatics, too few to mtliii nee public opinion. 
 France lias s t t -\\ too much of war to desire more of it. 
 
 The Fr< nch nation. acc. riling to coin|)(ttnt fon-i^n 
 jinli,'( -s \\ ho ha\c known l-'raiu-c intinuitfly for decades, 
 \\as o\ i r\\ IK -Imiii^ly in favour of pt-acc. a statrnu-nt which 
 is coiilinai (1 ly the ardt nt efforts which so many l-'rcnch- 
 iii' n have put forth for the cause of peace, both in peace 
 societies and at peace congresses. I can testify that at the 
 Wind's I'eace C'oiiL'i'ess at Hamburg in 1M>7 many French 
 P j >r< s. nt at i\ i s displayed the utmost cordiality towards 
 ( i' rmanv. 
 
 \\ith a \ie\\ to ascertaining l - 'r<-nch opinion rt'jjardinjj 
 th- r'latioiis \\ith ( iermany. t he re\"ie\v Mi-rcurt' dt' /'"I'tinct" 
 sent out. m the autumn of IN'.'?, a list of questions to 
 eminent l-'renchinen. and reeci\'ed IK) answers, t he 
 majority of \vhieh were for reconciliation and p< ace. It 
 was curious to tind that the older Fn nelinn n were t he 
 mojc ehau\ mist ic and cither made emiihatie rest r\ at ions 
 or expressed thciiiselves strongly against the surrender 
 ot' pat riot ic aspirat ions ; in doin^ so t hi \ u i r< not inspired 
 by li.ih-d ol (iermany. but by concern for the future of 
 the 1 r> neh race, nor did they contemplate any French 
 h'-L." iiiony, l)iit expressed the tear that by a complete 
 reconciliation with (iermany the l-'ivneh spirit mi^ht 
 IMC.. in.- |es', mtlii- nt ial than tin (ierman spint. Sonic, 
 aL,'am, contend' d that the ri linjuislnnent for -jood and all 
 of ANaer Lorraine would destroy the national backbone. 
 
 Mo^t of the \oimu.r Frenchmen were in fa\our of 
 uneoiidit lonal reconciliation \vitli (iermans ; si, me ex 
 j-laiii'd tli-ir attitude sol. 1\ by their disapproval ol' \\ar, 
 others b\ thf desiri- for solidarity amoHL,' 'he leading 
 ei\i!i/'d nations m general, and others. aL'.'in, by philo 
 -opl.ie i-ont i mplat ion of historical and social factors;
 
 FRANCE'S PEACEABLE FEELINC; TO GERMANY ill) 
 
 several of them exhibited genuine admiration and appre- 
 ciation of German eivili/ation, which forms a natural com- 
 plement to the Latin and Celtic civili/ation represented 
 by France, but a few displayed concern at and antipathy 
 against, Slavism, and above all against the Hritish. 
 
 In general they seemed to dwell upon the inalienable 
 love of France in the lost provinces. Some of the younger 
 men proclaimed the union of Alsace and the greater 
 part of Lorraine with Germany as an historical and ethno- 
 logical necessity, a view which already before the war had 
 many champions among the population of those provinces. 
 Some declared that the alleged decline of France is alto- 
 gether superficial and that the spirit of the nation would, 
 when an emergency arose, assert itself with the same 
 irresistible clan as of old. On the whole, even the most 
 sanguine patriots had to admit that a war with Germany 
 would find few sympathizers in France. In the first place, 
 the French people detests war, and any incitement of the 
 national spirit would be impotent in the face of the growing 
 scepticism of the people ; moreover, one would have to 
 reckon with the solidarity among the workers of different 
 nations. 
 
 How the cause of peace had progressed and the idea 
 of revenge had receded in France by the end of the nineties 
 may be gathered from the many proposals made for a 
 settlement of the Alsace-Lorraine question and a perma- 
 nent reconciliation with Germany. The French Admiral 
 Reveillere proposed in 1899 that Alsace-Lorraine should 
 be declared neutral and placed under Germany's military 
 protection and continue to form part of the German 
 Zollverein, a view which was shared by Leroy-Beaulicu. 
 Gaston Moch, the author, made an equally conciliatory 
 proposal (1899), which was as follows : 
 
 ''(1) Alsace-Lorraine, to be declared independent and 
 neutral, shall be called the Rhine Republic. Germany 
 shall receive a suitable compensation for the territory she 
 now owns in Alsace-Lorraine, and for the work she has 
 carried out there.
 
 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 *' (*2) The Rhine Republic shall be disarmed, besides which 
 France and Germany shall undertake to create a neutral 
 zone between their armies and the boundaries of the 
 new State. 
 
 " (.'{) Germany, France, and the Rhine Republic shall 
 conclude a mutual ' Treaty of Friendship.' The main 
 features of this treaty shall be as follows : 
 
 " (</) An agreement for the institution of a permanent 
 Arbitration Tribunal. 
 
 " (l>) A complete Feonomic Alliance. 
 
 " (c) A military Defensive Alliance which shall imply 
 no t hreat to ot her States. 
 
 " (il) The establishment of a Franco-German Model 
 l"ni\'ersity at Strasbur^, the main mission of which shall 
 be to assist Alsace Lorraine in accomplishing the attractive 
 task of forming a cnnnnlin^ link between the leading 
 cultured nations of Central Kurope.' 1 
 
 II. Fernau. a German who had lived in France for ten 
 years, expressed, in his book D'n- fnniiuxiticftt' Di'innkrntie 
 (It'll), the linn conviction that the vast majority of the 
 Fn-nch people are peace-loving and by no means want 
 a war of revenue on account of ANace Lorraine. He 
 denouncc-s certain chauvinists who have been shouting 
 for rcvi ni;e and writes: " hi spite of all < . fforts by the 
 jjood patriots, there exists u<> i!tn<r<;l upinion in ftirour 
 "/ ri:iti'^i agiiinst (jcrtnum/, but. at the most, a patriotic 
 willingness to TO/LV <i i!t'ft'tixirt' 'cur. 
 
 According to Fenian, the war traditions in France are 
 thoroughly undermined. A striking proof hereof js fur- 
 nish'd by the fact that a lai\ f e number of primar\' school 
 teaeh. is ha\e join' d the aiiti militarist propaganda of 
 t he \\orkni' n. NN'h- n t he pat riot ic Press in I'.H'J rep road n d 
 
 them f!|| this aeeiilint. the eollllll it I ec (i| (he Uoll political 
 
 I 'iiion of T. aeh( i , \\hich consists ot' '.is.oou members, 
 i s s u ( ( 1 an explanation i n which 1 1 n v said: " I n as n H i eh 
 ris the t'.-ieh.rs must reallirm their paeilist tendencies and 
 11. -ir I.eli, f m the nah/.ation of t he idea of international 
 arbitration, the\ di sire to point out that thev teach their
 
 FRANCE'S PEACEABLE FEELING TO GERMANY 151 
 
 pupils a patriotism which is based on a sense of justice 
 and a respect for the rights of others. . . . They condemn 
 emphatically the short-sighted, jealous, and aggressive 
 chauvinism as a danger to the safety of the nation." 
 
 What a contrast between this French patriotism and 
 the degeneration of the German patriotism of Gcrmanistic 
 teachers after the defeats in Napoleon's wars into a 
 policy of brute force and of utter disregard for the rights 
 of nations ! 
 
 No, in France those who in chauvinistic delirium shouted 
 for revenge are, indeed, but a small minority. The people 
 have long ago ceased to believe in its possibility, and 
 most of them have urged a friendly policy towards Ger- 
 many. A. Guerard, a Frenchman, writing on l ' France 
 and the War of Revenge " in the Contemporary Review 
 for September 1914, has ably dealt with this subject. 
 
 A promising rapprochement between Germany and 
 France was inaugurated by the Interparliamentary Con- 
 ferences, the initiative of which was taken in 1913 by a 
 German Reichstag member, the Social Democrat Dr. 
 Franck, who has been killed in the war by an enemy 
 bullet. The other Franco-German Conference was held 
 in the spring of 1914 at Bale, and the delegates assembled 
 therein represented a majority of the Parliaments of both 
 countries. It was resolved to hold a similar peace con- 
 ference in September 1914, but at that time the war 
 was already raging. The chief item on its agenda was 
 to be the reconciliation of France and Germany. The 
 movers of the resolutions were to be deputies belonging 
 to the popular parties of both countries. 
 
 In the spring of 1914 the French deputy Sembat, now 
 a member of the Government, published a book in which 
 he advised France definitely to relinquish the idea of 
 revenge, and went so far as to suggest that France should 
 abandon the alliance with Russia and England and, in- 
 stead, join the Triple Alliance. The majority of the 
 Chamber of Deputies were in favour of reconciliation with 
 German v.
 
 BEFORE, DLKINC,, AND AFTER 1'Jll 
 
 I). (il.KMANY HAS NoT BLLN Til HLATLNLI) HV HfSSIA 
 
 That tin- pacific sentiments which had gradually gained 
 ground in Kurope, and which I'tiiind expression m the 
 Interparliamentary Conferences, \vt re not allowed to bear 
 1'ruit was due, in the opinion <>f many, to the "\var 
 agitator-,," and the (ierman parliamentarian (lotlu-im 
 (in Htrlintr '/'ti^i lilatt. Deeeinher I'.Mh- in speaking of 
 the Russians, said: "That is why the (ireat Serbian 
 agitators incited to the pint (against the Austrian heir 
 apparent), and that is the cause of the intrigues in 
 cnnc i' inn -cith tin St. l'cttrxlmr<i rixit of tin' French 
 I'ft *itl< nt (iiul tin 1'i't^nltn! nf tin' Count il. both of whom 
 \\ i iv \\orked iijioii \sith"iit their colleagues in the (iovern- 
 inent. \vho \\ ( re anything lut bellicose, having anything 
 to say." 
 
 Thus m a l'i \v \\nrds (iothcini dismisses the Serbian 
 conflict and impudently imputes to the 1'iineh President 
 and the I'ri sidi ht of the Council the plan of having, by 
 intrii/U's \\ith the Russian (overnmeiit , bi-ou,'ht about 
 this \\nrld \Var. "the greatest crime ever committed 
 against Immaiiit \ . 
 
 Ace. irdiu^ In him, (iirmany and Austria ha\e no share 
 in it. \N e ha\'e." he says, "striven up to the last to 
 Hittuifiitn /nail and ha\e only taken up arms to r/< /</;</ 
 
 nil 1 I I l*t( Iti < . 
 
 It has also bc'ii said in (iermany tiiat the ( iermanie 
 race \,as m uae ( d b\ I'aii SlaN'lsm and that the \\ hole 
 Slavonic world \-. a , threatened \\ it h subject ion to Russian 
 ru I- In can se R ii -s la support i d S< rbia . Th i - r- ut t ei I \ 
 uiirea -ouabl- . I'olitiea! I'aii >la\i-m. as | ha\i alnady 
 point i d out i p. i 1 ' i i, i-- 1 1 1 ii 10 s 1 1 i|i | or s( \ i ral reasons. I Jut 
 i\en i! it could be Veah/'d, il b\ no in- an. to||o\\s that 
 tin, imph' the subjugation o| all >la\ nations under 
 Ru la. \\hieh Ui that ease \\oiild eertainU u'ain some 
 dan;.'' roils alii' -. nor \\ould it ni'an tic do\\nlall ot' the 
 (ten name \\orM. Roth '_'i'"" ls "'' nations ma\ \ i r\
 
 GERMANY NOT THREATENED BY RUSSIA l.^.'j 
 
 well lead an independent existence and learn to respect 
 one another. 
 
 No, the talk of the Slav menace against the position 
 of the Germanic race is nothing but a phrase, an equivo- 
 cation with which to rouse German opinion and create 
 general patriotic enthusiasm for the defence of the country 
 against a suppositious enemy. It is a deliberate " sugges- 
 tion," and the intention is clearly to show how Germany 
 has been compelled by an overhanging menace to wage 
 war against Russia. 
 
 Germany has seldom had Russia for an enemy ; on 
 the contrary, she has usually been her Ally. It is true 
 that in the Seven Years War (1750-03) Elizabeth had an 
 alliance with Maria Theresa directed against Frederick 
 the Great, but after her death Peter III contracted an 
 alliance with Frederick. The latter also made an alliance 
 with Catherine II in 17(>4. In a couple of coalitions against 
 France during the Revolution Russia acted jointly with 
 Austria and Prussia, and after the dissolution of the 
 alliance with Napoleon, entered into by Alexander I at 
 Tilsit in 1807, Russia once more (1813) joined Austria and 
 Prussia to liberate them from the Napoleonic yoke. Ever 
 since that time friendly relations have subsisted between 
 Russia and Germany. In fact, it was Russia's benevolent 
 neutrality in 1870 which shielded Germany from an 
 attack by her opponents of Sadowa. It is true that the 
 friendship has always been subject to Prussia's military 
 predominance being kept within certain limits. By the 
 victories of the latter over Austria and France this condi- 
 tion ceased to be, and by the accomplishment of German 
 unity in 1871 Russia's influence over the small German 
 states, founded on family alliances, disappeared. Every 
 conflict between Russia and Germany was- prevented 
 by the friendship which united Alexander II with his 
 uncle William I, and the last advice the latter gave his 
 grandson on his deathbed was to keep on good terms 
 with Russia. 
 
 Soon after the assassination of Alexander II (1881),
 
 154 BEFORE, Drmxc;, AND AFTER 1911 
 
 however, serious agitations arose which fostered the 
 antagonism between Russians and (icrmans. In Russia, 
 Austria-Hungary was accused of oppressing the Shivs 
 in tliat monarchy and of harbouring the ambition of 
 subduing the whole Balkan peninsula, and the suspicion 
 was also expressed that liermany contemplated the 
 annexation of Russian Baltic provinces. Numerous 
 demonstrations against the (iermans took place in Russia, 
 and it seemed in the middle of the eighties as if the two 
 States \\ere preparing for an inevitable war. It was at 
 that time that Russia expelled the (iermans from the 
 Haltic provinces, and (iermany expelled Russia's Polish 
 subjects from her Kasteni provinces. 
 
 In tli'- end, howcvt r, the tension relaxed, and notwith- 
 standing the conclusion of the Franco Russian Alliance 
 (PV1 1 . the L'"od relations between Russia and (iermany 
 remained undisturbed until I'.M 1. 
 
 William II \isited Nicholas II at St. Petersburg in 1M7, 
 and their relations wen- most ei.rdial. the two monarchs 
 < -mphasi/inLT in tln-ir speech< s "the traditional bonds 
 \\hich united them" and "the traditional, concordant, 
 and unalterably harmonious relations het\\<tn their 
 countries." They met at Fredrikshamn, in the (iulf of 
 Finland, in ]'."., at Potsdam in P.H<>, and a<jain at Hal- 
 tischjort in P.PJ. on \\hieh occasion they were accom- 
 patui d by their Mmist crs \\ it h a view to discussing political 
 (ju-stioiis. Mor-oM-r. tin- deniian Chancellor Hethmann- 
 II..!1\\ L' \ isit. d St. P. ter^buri: in P.M'J. All these meetings, 
 \\hieh took plae.- duniiLf the Ralkan eonthcts-. were dis- 
 I iiiL"ii !.' d b\ tii- same t'n- ndly spin! as in Ps'.7, and the 
 speech' s emphasi/ed t h "mutual t rust bet Wee II the 
 ni"iiai i'l; ^ ' and tl:' "<jnod relations IM t \\ t < n their coun- 
 tries." It \\.-is [.lit on i- cord at the m< tint's of t he 
 Mini- 1 - rs that " t h v< \\ :. no di-.eoi'd on eurr< nt < |i:'s| j< >ns 
 and that t h t u o St at s \\ 'uM " eo oj ( rat c t o\\ ards I, i id I lit,' 
 u p'aeeiul solution (or i \ i ry political <ju<sti(,n which 
 m 1 1 ' h t arise." 
 
 In P.' 11 all this ^\as chanL.' 1 d. The \ei\ Russia who
 
 GERMANY NOT THREATENED BY RUSSIA 155 
 
 had never threatened Germany and had been her friend 
 and ally for a century was now declared to he her enemy, 
 a barbarous country polluted by Mu.scovitism and Tartar- 
 dom, and the very Tsar who had so recently been Emperor 
 William's friend was now (unjustly) branded as having 
 acted the part of a liar in the telegraphic correspondence 
 between them.
 
 XII continued 
 THE WORLD WAR OF 1<U 
 
 1'AHT II 
 
 A. IMMKIMATI: ('.\rsr.s or Tin: \Voi;i.i> \\'.\u : TIKKF.Y'S 
 Oi'i'Ki.ssioN or Tin: BAI.KAN I'KOVINCF.S, Ri.vo- 
 
 I.riloSAKY .MoYl.MI.N I s, Hlssi\'s I'lto'l l.( I ION. Till: 
 
 Krsso TruKisii \\.\n : Tin: BI.KI.IN CONCKI.SS or 
 I.^TS : AtMKivs A\M \\iios or HOSNIA AND 
 IIi.i:/r.<;ovi\A : Tin: di;r.AT SI:I;IUAN MOVI.MI.NT : Tin: 
 MI KDI.K 01 TIN: Ciutws I'HINCI: I-'KANCIS I'LHIMNAND : 
 Ai -^IKIA'S NOTI: TO SI.KIMA. 
 
 Tin: iiniiii iliut r cause of the \Yorld \\ur of I'.tl I was the 
 murder of fn Austrian Inir ti[>jxii'int /''/v/^c/.v Frrtlinund 
 and his cdiis'irt, coininittcd on .June *JS in Bosnia's 
 capital. S-Tajcyo, liy the t went y-vear old Bosnian student 
 IVineip. The murder \vas connected with a sti-on^ Serlnan 
 agitation, and as Austria was of the opinion that t he 
 S'rl>ian ( i"\ 'i -rninent \\as responsible for it. she made 
 war <>n Serliia, \\ith the result that other l'ow<Ts \\ere 
 draun in. 
 
 BI hind this proximate cause o| (he Austro Serbian con- 
 llict lay anothi r cause of the greatest si^nilicance, which 
 explains tli-- muni' r at S-raji-\ < , nainelv, Anstriii'x 
 <iniii i ill inn I// ltu\tim ami Ilii i^ni/ini. 
 
 B'l'iua a!i<l I Ier/ejfo\ ina. \\hnse population is mainly of 
 Si rl"i Croatian nationality, had belonged at different times 
 it h- i to 1 1 un^'arv or to t h- ,,\<\ kingdom of Serbia, or had
 
 IMMEDIATE CAUSES or THE WORLD WAR 157 
 
 been an independent kingdom, hut came by conquest, m 
 1 K5,'J, under Turkish rule.* 
 
 The defective administration and shaky finances of 
 Turkey, the ahsenee of discipline amongst ollieials, the 
 tyranny of taxes, the persecution of t lie Christ ians all these 
 factors combined to weaken the position of the country 
 more and more during the seventies and to create dis- 
 satisfaction among the European tributary States: 
 Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Iler/e- 
 govina, etc'. The inisettlement was universal, and they 
 were all merely waiting for an opportunity to throw off the 
 yoke. The signal for the revolt was given in 1M7.") in 
 Herzegovina, where the Christians had been incensed by 
 along succession of atrocities committed by Turkish tax- 
 collectors supported by soldiery, and finally resorted to 
 arms. Volunteers from Serbia and Montenegro came to 
 their assistance, and all capable of bearing arms took part 
 in this war of liberation and retribution. The ambassadors 
 of the Powers at Constantinople deemed it their duty to 
 intervene to help the oppressed, and the insurgents declared 
 that they would not lay down arms unless the Great 
 Powers guaranteed certain reforms, which, however, they 
 were unable to do. The fanaticism among the Turks made 
 matters worse in the Balkan States ; the German and 
 French Consuls at Salonica were murdered, and revolting 
 massacres took place in Bulgaria. In that country a 
 general revolt broke out in 1875. which was more than 
 justified by the long-borne oppression : but as it was 
 inadequately prepared and arms were lacking (the Christians 
 were not allowed to bear arms in the Turkish provinces), it 
 
 * The population of Bosnia and Herzegovina wa-> in 1S79, 
 1,158,114 ; in 1910, 1 .898, lli-J made up as follows : 
 
 In 1ST 1 ,) In H10 
 
 Greek Catholics .... 49<>. iS5 .. s:i:5.(il,S 
 
 Roman Catholics. . . . 20!t.:Ul .. i:H.li)0 
 
 Mohammedans .... 44S.t>i:$ .. lirJ.OUO 
 
 Jews :M_Mi .. 11.S57 
 
 Protestants 'J19 <>..'5:57
 
 158 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1911 
 
 ended in defeat. Tin- most appalling atrocities were com- 
 mitted by tlu- Turks in isTt) in suppressing the re-volt. 
 1 "1,000 persons being murdered. The whole of Furope 
 was horrified, and Gladstone Hung out a withering protest 
 against these Bulgarian massacres.* 
 
 Serbians and Montenegrins continued the insurrection 
 and attacked the Turks in .May lS?t>; soon after tin- in- 
 surgents in Bosnia proclaimed Milan, the Prince of Serbia, 
 their ruler, whilst the Hcrzegovinians acknowledged the 
 overlordship of Prince Xikita of Montenegro (June 1870). 
 Bosnia's union with Serbia and ller/egovina's union with 
 Montenegro thus became a sine qua non of peace with 
 Turkey. \Vhen Turkey refused to accept tliis condition 
 war was declared by Serbia and Montenegro (.Inly 1S7G). 
 
 The diplomatists of the (ireat Powers once more set to 
 work and the antagonism between Russia and Austria now 
 began to be widely reali/.ed. The Slavonic Balkan peoples 
 who had risen against Turkey were Russia's kinsmen, and 
 she could not regard their subjugation with indifference. 
 Russia armed the Serbians and provided them with ollicers 
 and ni' n, money, and hospital supplies, and Russian doctors 
 and ladies went to Serbia and Montenegro to render aid. 
 
 From Austria-Hungary, unfortunately, the oppressed 
 Slav peoples of the Balkans did not receive the same sym- 
 pathy as from the Russians, and espeeiallv in Hungary, 
 sad to relate, there was far more sympathy fur the Turks 
 than for the insurgents. The (Government assumed a 
 \\aitniL r attitude, and the Press urged t hat Austria should 
 f'tfiifnf Bosnia (in the collapse ol the Turkish rule, which 
 n< >\v s<. med imminent . 
 
 Tli- anti-Prussian policy of the Prime Minister Beiist (a 
 Sav-n/ was replaced in I .s? I by a friendly pohcv under 
 the ! adej-ship of Andrassy (a Hungarian), and Francis 
 Joseph's meet ing wit h \Vilham I and Alexander II in Berlin 
 in 1 >>?_' had lid to t he " Alliance ol ' t he Three Kmperors 
 
 * 'I 1 1- si' i \ nl s h;i\ i l)i < n di MTJ|)I <1 1>\ i iiir \\\\<> t c >ok |>;irt in t he 
 .1 \ .i/' '\<. . HiiL':in.i's fi ,n in. . t |.< M | . in I In- historical IK ivt I 
 I ml, r tl.r \,,h,-.
 
 TURKEY AND THE BALKAN PROVINCES 159 
 
 and marked a now epoch in Austria's policy, which was 
 thenceforward supported by Germany. Austria's rela- 
 tions with Russia also remained cordial for many years. 
 
 At a meeting at Reichstadt on July 8, 187<>, between 
 Alexander II and Francis Joseph and their Prime Ministers 
 Gortchakoff and Andrassy, they agreed not to intervene 
 and to consult one another as matters progressed. If war 
 should ensue between Russia and Turkey, Austria under- 
 took to remain neutral, and in return Russia consented to 
 permit Austria to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina in order 
 to preserve order on her frontiers. This arrangement was 
 confirmed in 1877, but was never carried into effect. 
 
 Serbia and Montenegro's war against Turkey, which 
 lasted nearly four months, underwent many fluctuations, 
 The Russian General Tchernayeff, who had entered Serbian 
 service, commanded the Serbian main army and was largely 
 instrumental in securing the ascendancy of the Serbian 
 arms in the early stages ; yet, in spite of their bravery, both 
 the Serbians and the Montenegrins suffered many defeats, 
 and in the end they were forced to sue for help from Russia. 
 Thereupon General Ignatieff, under threat of Russia's 
 armed intervention, obtained an armistice, and a conference 
 of the Great Powers took place at Constantinople. 
 
 The reforms and concessions proposed at this conference, 
 as well as a later suggestion by the Powers, were declined by 
 Turkey. Thereupon the Russian Premier Gortchakoff, as 
 the Powers seemed disinclined for joint action against 
 Turkey, in order to enforce the demands presented to her, 
 declared that since the Turkish Government had declined 
 all suggestions for the amelioration of the disturbed con- 
 ditions among the Balkan peoples, which inconvenienced the 
 neighbouring States, the Tsar had no alternative but to inter- 
 vene by force of arms. This gave rise to the Russo-Turkish 
 War of 1 877, in which Russia had Rumania. Montenegro, 
 and Serbia for her Allies and was assisted by Bulgarian 
 bands of volunteers. After severe defeats on both sides 
 the Russians won the decisive battle's of Kars, Plevna, and 
 Chipka, took Adrianople, and marched on Constantinople.
 
 1(H) HKIOHI:, I)riu\<;, AND AFTKK I'.Hl 
 
 Tilt- Sultan Iio\\ sued lor peace, all armistice foiloued, 
 
 ami peace preliminaries were signed at Adrianople. The 
 Russian successes jjave rise t< anxiety in Kn^land. uho 
 had laru'e interests to protect in the Turkish Km pi re 
 (Ktrypt. etc.), and to safeguard these she sent a licet to the 
 Dardanelles to support the Turks and declared that she 
 could not consent to a separate settlement between Russia 
 and Turkey, but would insist on the terms of peace hem*; 
 set t led bv a Kuropean d> i n;rcs s. wherein Austria concurred. 
 When thereupon Turkey became less tractable over t he 
 peace negotiations, the Russians threatened to occupy 
 Constantinople, and shifted their headquarters to San 
 St- lano, near by. \\here the peace was signed on March .'$. 
 1 N?S. Ry t he terms of t his peace Rul^'aria \vas t< receive an 
 <>ut let on t he .Ku' ( an and become a principality, tributary to 
 Turkey, but remaining for the time beiiiLT ^ Russian pn>- 
 tect'irate; whilst Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro were 
 t" become independent. Rosma and Hcr/cijovina \\crc 
 still to belong t" Turkey, but the reforms voted at the tir.st 
 (inference at Constantinople were to be carried out. 
 Russia nceivi d Kal's. Rat < Mini, and Raja/id in Asia Minor. 
 This treaty, which deprived Turkey of the rank of a 
 (in-at 1'owei. to the advantage of Russia, created dissatis- 
 laetion in I'-Uu'land and Austria. I'-ii'jland armed and \\ as 
 
 on the \ erL.'e o|' ^om^r Jo \V a I' With Rllss|;l. Allst I'la, which 
 
 could not acquiesce m t he nc\\ dist ribut ion o! power amonjjj 
 
 the Ralkan pi'iplis. jwertid to the plan of arranu'iiiLf a 
 Congress of 1 1|.- ( , p at l'< iu i I'-, hoping to _' t the peace of 
 San St fa no i , \ \ < < ) t . , h. i ad\ ant a^fe. She \\ a lit d. above 
 all. t" occupx !{ ni.t and 1 b r/< L" p \ m:i. \\hieh had become 
 a laet-ir ol the utmi-t importance in tin po|ic\ of l-'rancis 
 Josi ph. although Austria had !n\er had an\ rights m tins 
 direction, and t!ie daiiL" r of fiirthei- Slav elements m this 
 
 heterogeneous IlioIiarellX oiiL'ht to |ia\ e been P all/' d. 
 
 Au-tiia ace. irdiiiL'K mad- repri sent at ions to tin- i.ther 
 C,r> at I ' \s r s \\ 1 1 1 1 a \ i e \s t ' i a ( or i <j res s , a 1 1 d on Russia a I so 
 a:M''iii;, r to tli' plan, to a\irt \\.ar \\ilh I'JiL'land. the 
 Conurr-ss was ultimately opened at Ri rim nil June I.'-, l.sTS.
 
 TURKEY AND THE BALKAN PROVINCES 101 
 
 Prior to that date, on June 4, England had concluded a 
 treaty with Turkey, by which she undertook the protec- 
 tion of Turkey's Asiatic possessions and received in return 
 Cyprus, subject to an annual tribute. This treaty was 
 produced at the Berlin Congress, not as a subject for dis- 
 cussion, but as a fail accompli. 
 
 The Berlin Treaty of July 13, 1878, diminished in some 
 respects the advantages which Russia had gained at San 
 Stefano, and favoured Austria instead. 
 
 Bulgaria was to be an independent principality, though 
 tributary to Turkey ; its prince was to be elected by the 
 unconstrained will of the people, subject to Turkey's 
 sanction. Bulgaria's Government was to be provisionally 
 entrusted to a Turkish and a Russian Commissary, and 
 Consuls appointed by the Powers. The Russian army of 
 occupation was not to remain in the country longer than 
 nine months. The territory previously allotted to Bulgaria 
 was to be restricted so as not to extend to the ^Egean 
 Sea. 
 
 Russia was to return Bajazid to Turkey and was not to 
 fortify Batoum, which place, together with Kars, she was 
 to retain. 
 
 Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania were to be self- 
 governing States, quite independent of Turkey. The 
 most important measure passed by the Congress was the 
 mandate granted to Austria, on the proposal of England, 
 for the occupation and administration of the province* of 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina. These countries, however, were 
 to remain under the suzerainty of the Turkish Sultan. 
 
 An agreement was thereupon concluded (1879) between 
 Austria and Turkey expressly acknowledging the Sultan's 
 suzerainty in respect of the two provinces. 
 
 Austria had now attained her object ; but dangerous 
 consequences were to follow. The Berlin Treaty did not 
 definitively solve the Eastern question : it merely shelved 
 it for the time being and averted the danger of a big Balkan 
 war or a general European conflagration. 
 
 Austria, having by the Berlin Treaty of 1878 been 
 
 L
 
 162 BEFORE, DURING, AND A*TER 1914 
 
 permitted, with Bismarck's help, to occupy Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina, thereby aggravated the tension of her rela- 
 tions with Russia. To balance this antagonism Austria in 
 1871) entered into a formal alliance with (lermany, and with 
 the accession of Italy in ISS'J, this developed into the 
 Triple Alliance. 
 
 Alexandi-r II considered he had been cheated by 
 Andrassy and Bismarck through the Berlin Treaty, and in 
 Russia it was universally considered that (iermany had 
 robbed her of the fruits of her victory against Turkey. 
 Alexander now withdrew from the " Alliance of the Three 
 Kmperors " and instead made overtures to France, which 
 culminated in tin- alliance with the Republic. 
 
 Kver since 187") it had been Francis Joseph's aim, by 
 pains in the south-west, to recoup himself for the losses in 
 the west Venetin, 1 si. This was aK( > t he pol icy pursued 
 by the Prime Minister Andrassy. and at the Berlin Congress 
 lie strove very hard to obtain the ratification of Austria's 
 occupation <,f Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
 Nevertheless Austrian opinion was by no means unani- 
 mous ; the majority of the so-called Constitutional Party 
 were against Andrassv's occupation policy for fear of a 
 still larger Slav element in the population of the Empire 
 and it was only with the support of the Opposition parties 
 t hat the Government succeeded in giving effect to the ruling 
 of the Berlin C< nj/ress. 
 
 Professor I,. \. Thall6<"/y (a Hungarian), at the Con- 
 sular Academy in Vienna, had IOULT defended this policy 
 of Andrassy's and had laid down that " the occupation of 
 B">ma and H< r/< -<j<>\ ma can only be judged correctly from 
 an historical point of view. The Habsbnrt,' dynasty lias 
 merelv pursued consistently the natural extension of the 
 monarchy south -westward that is to say, the acquisition 
 of the ' Adriatic triangle.' This aim lias been the central 
 principle of our foreign policy since the Peace of Passaro- 
 wity." (171 HI, \\tien Serbia for a short time came under 
 Aust nan rule.
 
 REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS 163 
 
 Again : " Bosnia and Herzegovina were brought under 
 the Habsburg sphere of influence in 1878 in pursuance of 
 a settled policy." * 
 
 Austria has long needed a policy of concentration, of 
 internal consolidation, not of external expansion. Her 
 statesmen should have remembered the words of Montes- 
 quieu : t% Monarchs should have the wisdom to keep their 
 power within hounds and to bear in mind the snares of 
 greatness ; they should remember that all greatness, all 
 power is relative, so that in seeking to enhance the out- 
 ward greatness one must not lessen the inner." 
 
 However, Austria's political system has always been 
 based on historical traditions of dynasty and annexation. 
 National unity, which constitutes the strength of every 
 modern State, is unattainable on account of the many 
 nationalities eight in number -who generally regard 
 one another with rancour and suspicion, and in conse- 
 quence the very existence of the Austrian State may easily 
 be threatened at times of great political conflicts. Its 
 leaders must act with the utmost prudence and must 
 cautiously consider the aims and wishes of the various 
 nationalities. The real bond of unity in this abnormal 
 State, so torn by strife and dissensions, is the Crown, the 
 Habsburg dynasty, which constitutes the virtual guarantee 
 of the continuance of the monarchy. How much more 
 imperative is it not, then, in view of the dangerous forces 
 at work within the monarchy and on its boundaries, that it 
 should undertake nothing which may foment disquiet and 
 dissatisfaction ! 
 
 Unfortunately the country has long been without a great 
 state-small. Its preposterous system of Government, with 
 its mixture of absolutism and parliamentarianism, permits 
 the most autocratic acts. For instance, the Foreign 
 Minister is not responsible to Parliament. Dr. A. Jensen, 
 who has studied Austria so thoroughly, has declared that 
 there ww everything incredible is credible,'' and that the 
 
 * f/.Tluill.V/y. Austria-Hungary and the Balkan States (1901). and 
 Bosnia and Herzego-cina (1900).
 
 164 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 " dilemma of Austrian statecraft " is the natural result of 
 the stupidity, clumsiness, and falseness of centuries, and 
 more especially of the last decades (in Hubxburp. 1MW). 
 
 The occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina l>y Austria 
 was demanded at the Berlin Ce>nu r rexs by the monarch's 
 representative* on the plea that it was the only im-ans of 
 maintaining onler in the provinces, from which l."0. <(!() 
 refugees had lied into Austrian territory and could not he 
 induced to return as le>n<_ r as the country remained under 
 Turkish rule. Austria received her chief support from the 
 British envoys, who considered that the occupation would 
 help to restore order in the provinces. 
 
 Although the Austrians "came as friends," to quote 
 tin- words of a proclamation, the ocetipat in was vigorously 
 opposed by the population, who had never hecn consulted 
 and had no feeling of sympathy towards Austria. For 
 nearly three- months three army corps had to contend 
 against the population. \sln> in several < -ULML'* -UK nt s were 
 supported bv Albanians and some' Turkish troops. This 
 deplorable peace mission reminds one of the " jackhooting 
 mission" and " dragonadcs " of Louis XI\'. whereby the' 
 Huguenots were to In- converted to the Catholic faith by 
 muscular lojve. After a lidit at Stolat/.. 1 hr/.t i, r <>\ ina s 
 eapit :il. Me >st ar. was occupied, anel al't er t lie capt ure ol t tie 
 te.wn of Trehinje and the fortress of Klolmk, the- resistance 
 in this province bn>k< down. In Bosnia many sanguinary 
 i neoiinti TS took place- befeire St raje \o \\as take n hv storm 
 ;i!:el thi- Austri.-ins were- defeated ;it Tiisla and Bibatch 
 be fore th-\ finally managed to ejiie 11 all resistance afte-r 
 taking the- fort re-s-^e-s (l f B-hac anel Kladus. 
 
 Th'-nujiem the- t \vo pre\'inces were litei-;i!l\ hinieel into 
 colossal camps with arum s. lortn-sses, bnrra< % ks, e te-. 
 
 The " jine-ificat ion " took a lony time- to carry out. 
 Ilo^t ilit ie-s \\orr rontinued by ^in-rnlla ban<N, and when 
 ronrnj 't ion wr\s intre>durrd in iss] a revolt broke out, 
 whie-h wn^ quelled by forre eif arms in iss'j. Bosnia 
 became t }\r- si^rne of yet a not her upnsuiL' Hi 1 SS.T. 
 
 B\ el^iee-s things became- e|iiiiter, anel under Austrian
 
 ANNEXATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 1C5 
 
 administration the provinces made considerable progress. 
 Order has been maintained ; the economic conditions 
 have improved ; bridges, roads, and railways have been 
 built ; public baths, secondary schools, etc., have been 
 instituted ; and religious toleration and social considera- 
 tion have been shown to the people. 
 
 Affection for Austria there has been none, for the people 
 have felt oppressed by the introduction of conscription and 
 the heavy taxation. Ollicially it has always been promised 
 that the army of occupation should be withdrawn as soon 
 as the internal administration was organized on a proper 
 basis ; but in reality the occupation was clearly permanent. 
 
 ' The occupied provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina," 
 as they have been called officially, were in the end uncere- 
 moniously annexed in 1908, in contravention of the treaty 
 of 187!) with Turkey stipulating the suzerainty of the 
 Sultan, and without consulting the people at all. With 
 absolutistic autocracy Francis Joseph announced the 
 annexation by a rescript of October 5, 1908, to his Foreign 
 Minister Aehrenthal indisputably a very remarkable mode 
 of procedure in our time, reminding one of Louis XlV's 
 "L'etat c'est moi " - in which he declared that, "in view 
 of the high cultural and political purpose for which the 
 monarchy undertook the administration of Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina and of the results, which were only attained 
 with great sacrifices, and realizing, moreover, that a ' clear 
 and unequivocal legal position ' of the two countries is 
 absolutely essential for the maintenance of their con- 
 stitutional institutions, / extend my sovereign rigJits to 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and decree that the succession 
 of my House shall also embrace these countries." 
 
 To Turkey the Austro-Hungarian Government on 
 October 7 sent a Note relating to the annexation, reminding 
 her of the tokens of friendship which the Fmperor hud 
 given, declaring that law and order now reigned in Bosnia 
 and Herzegovina under the Austrian administration, and 
 stating that, as Turkey had now (after the revolution)
 
 166 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 received a new Government which could maintain order, 
 the Imperial and Royal Government, to show its concilia- 
 tory spirit, would evacuate the Sanjak of Novi-Ba/ar and 
 restore that province to Turkey. 
 
 " As Bosnia and Ilcr/egovina," it proceeded, " have 
 now reached a high level ol' material and intellectual culture, 
 the moment seems opportune to complete the good work by 
 bestowing on these provinces the ln-nelits of the autonomy 
 and constitutional regime desired l>y the population. 
 Austria-Hungary must, however, in order to realize this 
 lofty aim, conscientiously regulate the situation in the' two 
 provinces and provide for an effective guarantee against 
 the dangers to which a continuance of the regime intro- 
 duced in l.sTS might give rise. Austria-Hungary is thus 
 confronted with the imperative neeessiti/ of releasing herself 
 from the reservations of the Constantinople agreement, 
 and, as regards Bosnia and Her/.egovina. of regain ing her 
 former liberty of aelnm. (Ocslerrcich-L'ngarn sieht sieh 
 daher iar der gt'bietcrischcn Notwendigkeit, sieh der in der 
 Konstantinopelcr Konnntinn entlniltein n I'urbchaltc zu 
 entlcdigen and, ti<;.v IJasnirn nnd die Ilerzegurinu betrifft, 
 seine friilu-re Aktionsfreiheit wieder/ucrlangcn)." 
 
 The Foreign Minister made a statement to the Austrian 
 Delegation for Foreign Affairs respecting the annexation, 
 explaining that it had become necessary to introduce 
 constitutional institutions in the provinces, the chief of 
 which was a Diet whose duty it was- to examine and 
 sanction the Budget. "This," lie said, "has placed us 
 under the titces.^iti/ of definitely settling the (/nestinn of 
 the tni'nt'rshij) <>f Hn.^nui and lit rzeHarimi and of recouping 
 ourselves for the definitive surreudt r of mir rights in the 
 Sanjak of No\ i Ba/ar under Art . '_'." of (lie Tr< aty of B< rim 
 by tin ff/rnitil nnne.Kitinn "/ tin '.<.'> ju'n; / m< .v (Die umr- 
 Uixslieh gi'Cnrdene fcinfuhriing t'erju.txnng^mn.s.'iiger 1'Iin- 
 riihtnti'jt n in /t<,.-ni<n hut un* in r//V /wantage ; < r*t /;/, die 
 dt finiti: i I\ him ni! di i Fra^'e d r /ii^ji IMM igkeit Bosniens und 
 <ler Her/egovina /// Angiifj '.n nehtm n und (his endgnllige 
 .Infuihtn nnsfrtr aus Art. !'." dt* Hti'linii I'ertrnges Jlies-
 
 ANNEXATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 1G7 
 
 senden Rechtc im Samhchak (Xovibazar) mil dcr formellcn 
 Annexion cler beiden Provinzcn zu kompensieren)." 
 
 Russia, supported by England, protested against the 
 annexation, wliilst Germany, " in shining armour," en- 
 couraged Austria in this contravention of treaties and t he 
 law of nations. Thus was paid the debt of gratitude for 
 the agreement of 1878 between the German and Austrian 
 Emperors, whereby, through the annulment of Article ;"> of 
 the Prague Treaty, Schleswig definitely became a Prussian 
 province, whilst at the same time Austria was compensated 
 for the loss of Venetia in 18(JG. 
 
 It was oilicially intimated that the annexation, generally 
 speaking, caused lively satisfaction among the peasant 
 population, but, however this may be, it is a fact that it 
 gave rise to a fierce agitation among other classes of the 
 community. We are reminded very forcibly of Louis XV's 
 comment on the condition of France in his time : " Aprcs 
 nous le dtluge.'' 
 
 Although the Serbian Government lodged no protest 
 against the annexation, protests were expressed both in the 
 Skupshtina and in the declarations and acts of the respon- 
 sible representatives of the State. Thereupon, following 
 the advice of the Powers, the Government closed the 
 incident by a declaration on March 31, 1909, to the Austrian 
 Government in which " Serbia recognizes that her rights 
 have not been affected by the fa it accompli regarding Bosnia 
 and Herzegovina, and consequently she will conform to the 
 decision that the Powers may take in conformity with 
 Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice 
 of the Great Powers, Serbia undertakes to renounce hence- 
 forth the attitude of protest and opposition which since 
 last autumn she has adopted with regard to the annexation, 
 and undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her 
 present policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and live in 
 future on good neighbourly terms with that country." 
 
 The Foreign Minister Aehrenthal declared on the annexa- 
 * Cf. Schulthc's Enropuischer Geschichtskalender for 1908.
 
 168 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFFER 1914 
 
 tiun of Bosnia and Herzegovina : " The essential purpose of 
 Article "25 of the Treaty of Berlin was to create stable condi- 
 tion* in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the aid of a Power 
 strong enough to quell nery ujtrising (Aujlehnung) on its 
 ineeption. Tliis was the reason which led the British 
 statrsinen Bcaconslield and Salisbury at Berlin to offer the 
 mandate <>1" occupation t Austria-Hungary." 
 
 This mandate thus did not imply the ownership of the 
 provinces; its alleged object, to quell ei'ery uprising, was 
 exceedingly vague, and it might well he asked what was 
 meant by it. 
 
 I-'or instance, did the mandate refer to uprisings against 
 Turkey or against Austria ? 
 
 In reality the occupied provinces became a conquered 
 ci/untri/. Their inhabitants were vanquished, and 
 nourished feelings of resentment, not of friendship, to- 
 wards the Austrian victors. 
 
 Howt ver, Austria had received her mandate to quell 
 every uprising, and it mattered little that the Berlin 
 Congress had no ri^'ht to give it. 
 
 It is nut enough, in moulding a State, to consider the 
 suppositions requirements of political power, which, 
 moreover, may varv according to the composition of the 
 (iovernment. One must also look upon the matter from 
 the point of \le\v of the psychology of the people. No 
 absorption of a countrv into a larger Slate without the 
 c<>n*i nt "/ the /;///>/< is in accordance with the rights of 
 nationalities. Kvery nation incorporated by force becomes 
 an <-nemy of the ruling St at c. 
 
 The Berlin Tr< aty. as far as Bosnia and Her/ego\ ina are 
 concerned, const it u ted a \ lolat ion of t he principle of nat ion- 
 ality. and the Serbian population was derplv mcensi d. 
 
 The Slavs .f tin Dual Monarchy have not forgotten 
 l,o\\ lor a IOIIL' time bark Austria has snii^ht b\ nxthods 
 ol violence or despotism to (it niiiut i'. i' tin .S'//;r y///.v.xr,v>;<//j\ 
 '</ tin rnnnarrhif and to fa\mir the (i<rmanic element in 
 e\< r\ \\ay at the expense of the Slavs.
 
 ANNEXATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 16'J 
 
 Thus, in Bohemia, the Czechs became the victims of an 
 Imperial decree (1774) which proclaimed without ceremony 
 that only the. German language might he used in the schools, 
 in spite of the fact that Czech literature had long thriven 
 and nourished. 
 
 After protracted and very bitter struggles between 
 Czechs and Germans, due to Austria's policy of forcible 
 Gcrmanization, the former finally succeeded in asserting 
 their cultural independence (cf. pp. 21 and "2"2). 
 
 The same kind of thing happened in Galieia, an entirely 
 Slav country peopled by Poles and Ruthenes. When the 
 country after the partitions of Poland came under Austrian 
 rule, it was to be Germanized, and the Polish and Iluthcnian 
 languages were no longer used in the higher education. 
 The Universities at Cracow and Lemberg had none but 
 German professors. After Austria's defeat at Sadowa in 
 1806 she found it necessary to grant Galieia a fairly 
 comprehensive autonomy, and, strange to say, its Polish 
 representatives in Parliament, the %i Polenklub," have 
 long exercised a large amount of influence. The Polish 
 language ousted the German at the Universities as early 
 as the eighties of last century, after a Polish professor had 
 boldly begun to lecture in Polish, and Polish culture has 
 since then enjoyed unhampered freedom in Galieia. 
 
 The Austrian Government has long been to blame for 
 a great part of its troubles with the Slav elements in the 
 monarchy by looking down on them and favouring the 
 German element. By degrees the Germans have entered 
 into a bitter contest with the Slavs for the retention of 
 their predominance in Government and administration, 
 though by no means for the protection of their culture. 
 Thus there is no longer any question of the struggle of 
 Germanism against Slavism in the accepted sense ; it is 
 merely a social party struggle, and the Germans reap 
 what they have sown, seeing that they monopolized all 
 lucrative posts and sources of income and have sought to 
 oust any but the Germanic culture, pretending to regard 
 the Slavs as an inferior element. Germanism has been
 
 170 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 the same everywhere. If Slavism plays any part in 
 Austria's present war, it is merely as a reaction against 
 tier ma n ic oppression . 
 
 Austria has always, in spite of the numerous Slavs anil 
 Hungarians in the monarchy, pursued a (iernuin policy, 
 and would pay no attention to national claims. The 
 system of Germanizing centralization which has been in 
 operation ever since the time of the absolutistie and ruth- 
 less Premier Schwarzcnberg (1818-;VJ) has had to be main- 
 tained by the Government by the closest understanding 
 with Germany in order that the opposition of the other 
 nationalities, especially of the Hungarians, might be 
 overcome. 
 
 fa Tor many years back there has been a " (treat-Serbian '' 
 propaganda with the object of uniting all Serbians in the 
 Balkan peninsula, and Serbian agitators have travelled far 
 atield to win over the Bosniaks to their scheme. At one 
 time a union with Serbia was held to he the proper goal, 
 but her monarchs inspired little confidence and in the end 
 the Prince of Montenegro, Nikita, who enjoyed the sup- 
 port of Alexander III of Russia, became the head of the 
 agitat ion and dreamt of becoming king of a Greater Serbia. 
 To reali/.e his ambition it was necessary to detach Bosnia 
 and Iler/egovina from Austria. Deputations were sent to 
 Vienna to complain to the Emperor and the Bosnian 
 Minister about their grievances, and thence they pro- 
 ceeded to Belgrade, where they waited upon the Russian 
 Minister. The hopes of the Prince of Montenegro were 
 based on the impression that the Serbian monarchy 
 was neanng its dissolution and on the provisional 
 nature of the relations of the occupied provinces with 
 Austria. 
 
 But the kingdom of Serbia did not collapse, and its 
 King, Milan, looked to Austria for support, as did his son 
 Alexander. This led to the assassination of the latter 
 and his consort, whereupon the old and exiled IVtcr 
 Karagcorgievitch was called to the throne in his stead.
 
 THE GREAT-SERBIAN MOVEMENT 171 
 
 Peter embraced the opposite policy and turned instead to 
 Russia for support. 
 
 The Great-Serbian idea is a national movement \vhieh 
 in itself is not to be wondered at, for nationalist aspirations 
 have made themselves felt in Europe for the past hundred 
 years. The Germans, least of all, considering their 
 Germanistic strivings, are entitled to iind fault with 
 Scrbism. But under the political conditions which have 
 prevailed in the Balkan peninsula, and seeing that the 
 Serbs are distributed over different countries and provinces 
 where they live side by side with other peoples, the Great- 
 Serbian propaganda may truly be described as fantastic, 
 and the iicry Serbian temperament, which readily excites 
 party passions, is very liable to lead to excesses. The 
 Serb is highly patriotic, but is k ' anarchistieally '' inclined 
 and gives himself up heart and soid to politics that is to 
 say, political debates and party strife. The party dis- 
 tribution has usually been based on conceptions of foreign 
 policy in other words, Serbia's relations with Austria- 
 Hungary, Russia, and Turkey or on the influence of 
 leading personalities. This is the impression given by that 
 very thorough student Dr. A. Jensen in his interesting 
 work Slavia (1897). To his question whether Russia's 
 help did not introduce an clement of danger, thinking 
 Serbians have given the same answer : li Our little State 
 cannot be altogether self-dependent, and if we were to 
 refuse the helping hand of Russia we should be thrown 
 entirely on tfic mercy of Austria-Hungary" Moreover, 
 the Russophil leanings of the Serbians cannot be wondered 
 at when it is remembered that Russia has poured out rivers 
 of blood and roubles for the liberation of their country. 
 
 That the Russian nationalists or Pan-Slavists have been 
 the cause of the World War, as alleged in Germany and 
 Austria, cannot be proved, even if it be admitted that they 
 had some share in the Serbian unrest. It has also been 
 widely assumed that the Russian Minister at Belgrade, 
 von Hartwig, whose sudden death at the residence of the 
 Austrian Minister may not have been a natural one,
 
 172 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 took an active share in the Serbian agitation against 
 Austria. 
 
 Russia has always competed with Austria for the 
 ascendancy in the Ralkans, mainly with the object of 
 securing Constantinople ; but it must be said to her credit 
 that Russia was the only (irfdt Pow( r which in the name of 
 hunidniti/ inttKtntd a^iinst Turkey in 1S77 and thus put 
 an end to Turkish oppression and secured the independent 
 ndtinndl existence of several Balkan States. 
 
 Russia has looked upon the Great-Serbian agitation with 
 approval and has perhaps gone so far as to support it in 
 order to weaken her old antagonist, Austria-Hungary. 
 Rut to say that this monarchy would collapse if Bosnia 
 and Her/egovina were, with the aid of Russia, to become 
 part of the Serbian monarchy, and that the whole Slavonic- 
 world would come under Russia, and further that " t he- 
 position of t he Germanic race would become untenable " 
 as has been said in leading circles in Germany, and, in 
 fact, adduced as a cause of the war is surely very much 
 beside the mark. Austria Hungary and her dependencies 
 had existed lunLr before Bosnia and Iler/.egovina were 
 annexed, and these provinces were clearly not needed to 
 strengthen the monarchy : on the contrary, their annexa- 
 t u MI has b< en a HH ndi'i In //.v sajt ///, a cause < if unrest and < >f 
 Russian interference. This is so palpable that one could 
 not well understand the short-sightedness of the Austro- 
 Hungarian Government in ignoring this factor when decid- 
 ing u j on the annexat i< MI. 
 
 Thi- Gnat S< rbian idea, which implies a union of all 
 Si rbian peoples, is, of course, fraught u it h great dangers to 
 t IP Austrian State. I < M- not onlv Bosnia and Her/ego vina, 
 but also thi coastal region \\ist of them, Dalmatia, is a 
 pure]\ Si rbo-Croat ian count ry. and Croat ia and SI a von ia in 
 the nort 1 1 are inhabit ed by < s < nt ia. !i\ the same nat ionalit v. 
 Thi- S> i bo Croat i an t nbes \\< r a part of the ;T< at Slavonic 
 lamilv, and, according to \. .la;, r ie, there is neither m 
 (hi Hi''!' modern (ievelopnient ot the language nor in its 
 old' r |:i.a s any sharp line o| demarcation bet \\eeii them.
 
 THE GREAT-SERBIAN MOVEMENT 173 
 
 No doubt it is probable th;it Serbia, who has so long 
 striven for an outlet on the Adriatic, hoped to attain this 
 object through Herzegovina and by the absorption of 
 Dalmatia into a Great-Serbian kingdom. If Croatia, and 
 Slavonia were to be joined to a Greater-Serbia, Austria 
 would lose all her southern Slavonic provinces : and, maybe, 
 this will be one of the results of Austria's war with Serbia. 
 
 The aspiration to form a Great-Serbia, which has always 
 persisted in Serbia, may partly be attributed to the old 
 wish of reaching the Adriatic in order to obtain a port on 
 that seaboard and thus make the country commercially 
 independent of Austria-Hungary, who has always availed 
 herself of Serbia's land-locked position to obtain ad- 
 vantages at her expense. Serbia has, for instance, had to 
 put up with extortionate duties and no end of chicanery in 
 the Customs, and has been compelled to obtain nearly all 
 her imports from Austria-Hungary, although she might 
 have secured far better and cheaper articles elsewhere ; 
 moreover, when Serbia asked for a railway to the Adriatic, 
 Austria vetoed all export from Serbia, who, however, con- 
 trived to escape the danger of total impoverishment by 
 obtaining a market for her goods elsewhere by circuitous 
 means and at appalling expense. 
 
 When at the beginning of the war with Turkey in 19T2- 
 13 Serbian troops, reinforced by Montenegrins, made for 
 the coast of Albania, Austria-Hungary immediately tried 
 to bar the way, and when threats proved of no avail she 
 entered into negotiations with Bulgaria. It was Austria 
 who. with Italy's assistance, enforced the principle of 
 " Albania for the Albanians " which gave rise to the ill- 
 starred little principality of Albania in order thus to 
 frustrate Serbia's projects as regards a sea-port on the 
 Adriatic. 
 
 It will easily be understood that these manoeuvres on the 
 part of Austria provoked passionate resentment among all 
 Serbs and helped to fan the Great-Serbian agitation. 
 
 Professor J. Redlich, of Vienna, in Die Friedenstcarle, a 
 journal published by the Xobel Prize winner A. I . Fried,
 
 171 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 gives an account of the Scrbo- Austrian conflict, from which 
 an extract may be of interest : 
 
 " Centuries of foreign oppression have failed to stamp 
 out the Serbian national consciousness : in spite of all 
 persecutions and sufferings the love of freedom and in- 
 dependence survived, and grew with the accession of the 
 present King into an imperialistic dream of u (ireater Serbia 
 as the protector and mistress of all Southern Slavs. Hussia 
 is appearing more and more as Serbia's supporter and as the 
 promoter of her interests, and under M. 1'ashiteh's guidance 
 the Russophil party may be expected to remain in power 
 for a long time to come. How strong the new Serbian 
 national feeling has become may be gathered from the 
 passionate resentment which the annexation of Hosnia and 
 Herzegovina evoked in Serbia. From that moment the 
 undisguised dreams of conquest of a (ircater Serbia have 
 become a factor in Kuropean politics and a link in the chain 
 of forces which have gathered against Austria and the 
 Triple Alliance. It is true that the annexation crisis led 
 to a diplomatic defeat for Serbia, but this was more than 
 balanced by the knowledge that with Russia's warm 
 friendship she had also trained the sympathies of France. 
 Thus there arose out of the annexation crisis the founda- 
 tion of the Halkan Alliance under the ;egis and guidance 
 of Russia. 
 
 " The thrusting bud- of Turkey was the first task. It will 
 be remembered how Serbia, successfully and with com- 
 paratively small sacrifices, foii-jlit her \\ay through the 
 two Halkan \\ars. These successes were won by an army, 
 
 a levy of the people which, from the highest to the lowest, 
 
 regardless, of internal party differences, was inspired by the 
 same idea : th>- thought of Serbia's mis.^iun to gather in all 
 the South Slavonic peoples, to mould them into one nation 
 wit h it s place in t h" sun. 
 
 " It is not to be wondered at that the Serbian rising and 
 the siireesses of the Serbian army made the deepest im 
 pression on Ih- whole South Sla\onie \\orld. of which 
 the maiontv has from time immemorial inhabited Austro-
 
 THE GREAT-SERBIAN MOVEMENT 175 
 
 Hungarian territory. There were two contributory causes : 
 first, the dream of union -originally academic and 
 literary in cultured circles among the Austro-Hungarian 
 southern Slavs ; and, secondly, the dissatisfaction of the 
 Hungarian southern Slavs, especially of the Croatians, 
 with the political regime in the country. This regime, 
 encouraged by Magyar chauvinism, must, together with 
 the ruthless economic policy of the Austro-Hungarian 
 agrarians, bear the main responsibility for the unfortunate 
 sequel to Austria-Hungary's Balkan policy. Finally, the 
 intellectuals, and by degrees, wider strata of the Croatian 
 and Serbian population in Croatia combined against the 
 brutal regime of the Magyars. The Hungarian Govern- 
 ment replied with fresh reprisals, and by so doing revealed 
 within its own boundaries a most receptive soil for a violent 
 Great -Serbian propaganda." 
 
 Despite the progress which accompanied Austrian 
 administration in the annexed provinces, an implacable 
 party fanaticism made itself felt. " Only on one point," 
 says Redlich, " do the parties seem to have achieved unity, 
 and that was in the matter of the hatred of the old regime, of 
 all officials, teachers, and economic propagandists sent out 
 from the Monarchy to both provinces, and of the thousands 
 of Germans, Magyars, Czechs, and Poles who have carried 
 out most of the important educational work of the last 
 thirty years. All of them were from the very iirst day 
 regarded as strangers and replaced by natives, quite 
 irrespective of whether the latter possessed the necessary 
 qualifications. Kindness and consideration proved of no 
 avail ; they were usually interpreted as weakness and 
 submission; and only served to increase the dissatisfaction. 
 In the meantime Serbian newspapers were proclaiming 
 loudly that what the Dual Monarchy had done for Bosnia 
 was but a sham, and was to be put down to the fear that 
 the Dual Monarchy might collapse on the death of the 
 Emperor Francis Joseph and that Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 would then fall to Serbia." 
 
 In recent times a new agitation, which originated with
 
 176 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 the Mohammedans in Mostar, has been organized against 
 Kallay, Minister of Finance, and the malcontents demanded 
 that the forcible Catholieization and the Croatian propa- 
 ganda should cease, that the taxation should not be 
 enforced with the customary severity, etc. 
 
 The Bosnian Diet presented in December l'.l 1 a memo- 
 randum to the Austro-IIungarian Government demanding 
 the right of decision concerning recruiting proposals 
 and Budget grants, as the withdrawal of these rights from 
 the country had placed it at the mercy of the Austrian 
 and Hungarian Governments and gave Bosnia the character 
 of a colony. These rights, it was claimed, could fairly he 
 demanded by Bosnia, seeing that the expenditure on the 
 Bosnian and Her/egovinian troops bad risen from *Jlft,0()() 
 kronen in ISS.'J to 7,1<>7,70S kronen in IIU'2. 
 
 The Hungarian Home Secretary..!. Andrassy (son of the 
 I'n-mier of t he same name), in a recently published book on 
 the causes of the War of I'.M 1,* energetically champions 
 Austria-Hungary's cause against Serbia in view of the 
 Great-Serbian propaganda, etc. 
 
 His reasoning concerning the annexation of Bosnia and 
 Her/et'ovina and the Serbian question is particularly 
 illustrative of the Austro-IIungarian official point of 
 view, but is hardly likely to convince the impartial 
 ibscrvcr. 
 
 " I do not deny," he says, "that we, too. have made 
 mistakes in our relations with Serbia, but there can be 
 no doubt that it is not we. the larger State, who 
 desire conquests to Serbia's detriment, but that it is 
 the lesser State which harbours plans of expansion at 
 our exp'-nse." 
 
 But the answer to this is that the annexation of Bosnia 
 and Hcr/egovina was a conquest at the expense of Serbia, 
 who thus lost all hopr of re-aching the Adriatic, to her 
 last ini; del rimrnt . 
 
 ' Tli- annexation." says Andrassy. " was a direct result 
 
 .1. \nir;i^\. \\'rr hut !> n l\ i / i,' ; rtnmfn ti .' ( UM .". ).
 
 Tin: GREAT-SERBIAN MOVEMENT 177 
 
 of the Serbian agitation, and was carried out under pres- 
 sure of the conviction that the steadily growing Serbian 
 propaganda could not be stamped out as long as the 
 legal titatux of our monarchy was not internationally 
 defined. 
 
 " The Bosnian loeal Government believed that the 
 constantly growing South Slav agitation would be promoted 
 by the false notion that Bosnia and Herzegovina were only 
 temporarily placed under our charge and that the European 
 mandate would soon be revoked, since it had ceased to 
 have any purpose. 
 
 ' The annexation decree was intended to put an end to 
 these notions and agitations.'' 
 
 Andrassy shows, however, that this Government measure 
 brought about the opposite to -what was intended by it. 
 This decision aggravated the resentment. The whole 
 Serbian nation, the ollicial as well as the non-official 
 classes, displayed an aggressiveness which perhaps is only 
 met with among neighbours who live in peace with one 
 another. The then Foreign Minister, Joanovitch, although 
 the most peaceable among Serbian politicians, wrote (in 
 Die Scrbische Frage) : " I declare, as the Minister re- 
 sponsible for Serbia's foreign policy, that the Serbian 
 national programme, in the situation created during 
 the last few days, demands the liberation of Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina. . . . Here Austria is a constant danger, a 
 constant menace to us. By the annexation of Bosnia 
 and Herzegovina, by the closing of the Adriatic to Serbia, 
 by preventing a union between us and Montenegro, 
 Austria-Hungary forces upon us and all Serbians in a 
 more or less distant future a titanic struggle, a fight of 
 life and death." 
 
 Andrassy admits that " there arc and may be differences 
 of opinion as to the expediency of the annexation, and the 
 formalities employed in this measure may also be open 
 to discussion/' Yet he emphasizes that " the direct 
 purpose of our occupation was once and for all to destroy 
 Serbian hopes of expansion westward." He disputes the 
 
 M
 
 178 BEFORE, DLRING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 contention of tin- Serbian Foreign Minister that Austria- 
 Hungary's mandate of occupation had come to an end, 
 and maintains that it was not subject to any limitations 
 whatever. As a sort of proof in this respect lie recalls what 
 the elder Andrassy said on December 1, 1S7.S, in tin- 
 Austrian Delegation, in reply to a question how long the 
 occupation would continue : " Until it has attained nil its 
 ends- that is to say, until the South Slavonic danger has 
 disappeared, until the Western Balkans have reached a 
 more settled state and the Eastern question has ceased to 
 exist.'' 
 
 It was Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
 
 and the violation <>f the law of nations and the will of the 
 people which it involved, that brought into being the 
 vehement agitation among the Serbians there and in 
 Serbia. In societies and in the Press hatred and incite- 
 ment to revenge were the order of the day. Foremost 
 among these societies was the Xd/'odixi Odlirnnti of 
 Belgrade, founded as a result of the popular agitation 
 which surged up in Serbia on the annexation of the two 
 provinces, and which had for its object the strengthening 
 of the national sentiment, the formation of volunher 
 corps, the championing of the defence movement among 
 the Serbian people, etc. The society had four departments : 
 educational work, physical training, economies, and 
 foreign affairs. With it were associated M-veral other 
 societ irs wit li a like aim. 
 
 Among them was the Diistin Siln! a " Sokol " or 
 training club. According to a spneli of its president, in 
 January I'.'ll. tin- " Sk"l " movrnnnt. \shirh arose 
 through th<- ^tniL'^le n^ninsl (i< nmnti- in. is a puivlv 
 Slavonic institution which has for its aim to unit . t <> ins] iirr. 
 and, by educational and physical tiainmi,'. t" pi'rpaiv for 
 the contest with the enemies of Slavism. 
 
 Amongst the proiiounc< ments m the Si rbian Press I may 
 iiiMition artielis in the l*iilitil;n and Mali Jmiriitil of 
 Orl.,1,. r h. I'.'lo. discussing the annexation of Bosnia and
 
 ASSASSINATION OF FRANCIS FERDINAND 17!) 
 
 Herzegovina. These articles contained vehement out- 
 hursts against Austria-Hungary, and warned Europe that 
 the Serbian people were intent on revenge. The Palitika 
 on April 18, 1911, said : " By the incorporation of Bosnia 
 and Herzegovina all chances of friendship between Serbia 
 and Austria-Hungary have been destroyed for ever. 
 That every Serbian knows." 
 
 Piemont on October 8, 1913, said : " It is five years 
 to-day since, by an Imperial decree, the Ilabsburg sceptre 
 was extended over Bosnia and Herzegovina. The people 
 vow vengeance. Serbian soldiers vow this day that they 
 will deal with the ' second Turkey ' as they have, with 
 God's help, dealt with Balkan Turkey." * 
 
 Even though we must deeply deplore the assassination 
 of the Austrian Heir Apparent, Francis Ferdinand, and his 
 consort on June 28, 1914, carried out by the young Bosnian 
 student Princip pursuant to the plans of a Serbian con- 
 spiracy, we should lack a true understanding of national 
 psychology were we not to admit that the conspiracy was 
 in a certain measure brought about by Austria and that it 
 was founded on political and patriotic motives. In times 
 of popular unrest and clamour we must reckon with young 
 hot-heads whose acts follow too closely on the impulse of 
 the moment but may nevertheless be an expression of 
 universal and righteous resentment. Unhappily, in this 
 case, entirely innocent people, whose murder served 
 no end whatever, became the chance victims of circum- 
 stance. 
 
 The criminal psychology of our time demands a dis- 
 passionate scrutiny of all conceivable motives for crime, 
 and often takes extenuating circumstances into account 
 in passing judgment. This science does not, like the 
 criminal judge, look to the penal code alone for guidance. 
 and does not merely see in the accused person a potential 
 criminal ; it studies him as a human being, seeking to elicit 
 his inherited qualities, his temperament and character, 
 * Cf. Austria-Hungary's lied Book, No. 19.
 
 180 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 and, last hut not least, thr environment in which he has 
 lived, the external circumstances, etc. 
 
 It seems to me evident that Princip was not a vulgar 
 murderer. but an overstrung. IHTVOUS young man who, 
 together with the other assailant, Cubrinovie, hail l>een 
 hypnoti/.cd into committing an act of 1'olly by the passionate 
 hatred of Austria. 
 
 The Belgrade newspaper Balkan said of the two 
 assassins : * " Cabrinovic, a compositor, was full of 
 anarchical ideas and known to be a restless spirit. Princip 
 was a quiet, nervous, docile young man, inclined to 
 Socialism. Both had grown up in Scrajevo and were since 
 childhood united by the bonds of the closest friendship." 
 Another Belgrade paper, the Mali Journal, said of the 
 murder of the Heir Apparent: "He was assassinated by 
 a boy whom grief over the oppressed and stilled country 
 of his birth had driven to hysteria." 
 
 Austria-Hungary deli\ered on July 'J.'J the notorious and 
 fateful Note to Serbia, demanding ;l replv within forty- 
 eight hours. '1'h is Note constituted an accusation against 
 Serbia of complicity in the conspiracy which a number of 
 Bosniaks had formed against the Austrian Heir Apparent. 
 and opened witli a reminder of tin- Serbian (Government's 
 declaration of March .'51. r.m'.i, regarding the abandonment 
 of all opposition to the annexation of Bosnia and Hcr/ego- 
 vina. 'l'h<-n followed the indictment : "The history of 
 recent years, and more especially the painful events of 
 June L'fS, have shown the existence in Serbia of a M/tar/vatr 
 moi t'tn< at with the obj- el of d< ttit Itin^ ctrlnin jitirt* of the 
 ttrrilnnj <<f Anxtria-Hnngnrij from the Monarchy. The 
 Serbian (Government, far from carrying out the formal 
 undertakings contained in t! d<claratn>n of March .'il. 
 l'.M)'., has done nothing to repri -^ this mo\'( nn nt. It has 
 permitted the criminal machinations of various societies 
 and associations direct<d a-jaiiisf (),, Monarchy, and has 
 tolerattd unr( strain* d languaL'e on the part ol' the Press, 
 ( f. \ustu.i Hui.^'irj-'s /I'M/ 7/-i'A-. siij'|.l. l, p. HI.
 
 AUSTRIA'S NOTE TO SERBIA 181 
 
 the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages. The depo- 
 sitions and confessions of the perpetrators of the deed of 
 June 28 show that the Serajevo assassinations were planned 
 in Belgrade, that the arms and explosives with wliieh the 
 murderers were provided had been given to them by 
 Serbian oilicers and functionaries belonging to the \arodna 
 Odbrana. . . . These results of the investigation impose 
 on the Government the duty of putting an end to the in- 
 trigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity 
 of the Monarchy." 
 
 The Austrian Government accordingly demanded a 
 formal assurance that the Serbian Government condemns 
 this propaganda, and enjoined that it should publish in the 
 Official Journal a specified declaration of ten points. 
 
 In its reply of July 25 to the Austro-IIungarian Note, the 
 Serbian Government declared that it " could not be held 
 responsible for manifestations of a private character, such 
 as articles in the Press and the peaceable work of societies, 
 manifestations which take place in nearly all countries," 
 etc. ; but it is " prepared to hand over for trial any Serbian 
 subject of whose complicity in the crime at Serajevo proofs 
 are forthcoming . . . condemns and deplores all pro- 
 paganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary 
 . . . regrets, that according to the communication from 
 the Imperial and Royal Government certain Serbian 
 officers and officials should have taken part in the propa- 
 ganda . . . declares that it will take the most rigorous 
 steps against all persons guilty of such acts," etc., all of 
 which would be published. 
 
 The Government declared itself willing to carry out 
 eight of the ten points of the Austrian Note which deal with 
 the suppression and punishment of the agitation directed 
 against the Monarchv, but stated that " it does not clcarlv 
 
 o . - * 
 
 grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand (Clause 5) 
 that Serbia should accept the collaboration of the organs of 
 the Imperial and Royal Government upon her o:cn territory, 
 and cannot agree that (according to Clause 0) a gen IK or 
 authorities appointed bij Ihc Imperial and Royal Government
 
 18*2 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 shall he entitled to participate in the inquiry into the plot of 
 June *J8. as this would he a violation of the Constitution 
 and of the la'C of criminal procedure." 
 
 The Serhian Government concluded its reply with the 
 following words : " If the Imperial and Hoyal Government 
 is not satisfied with this reply, the Hoyal Serhian Govern- 
 ment, considering that it is not to the common interest to 
 precipitate the solution of this question, will be ready 
 always to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring 
 the question to the decision of the International Tribunal 
 nt The Unique or to \.\\c Great Po:ccrs which took part in the 
 drawing up of the declaration made by the Serbian Govern- 
 ment on March ;n , I'.KiU." 
 
 Austria-Hungary's ultimatum, seeing that its rejection 
 by Serbia was clearly expected and a warlike solution of the 
 contlict was desired, was undoubtedly a precipitate and 
 deplorable act. Its consequence has been a World War 
 in which millions of human beings have h en killed or 
 mutilated, and which has been earned on with a barbarity 
 to which the history of modern times knows no parallel.
 
 XII -continued 
 THE WORLD WAR OF 1914 
 
 B. THE SERBIAN CONFLICT AND THE GREAT POWERS : 
 AUSTRIA'S DETERMINATION TO SUBDUE SERBIA BY WAR : 
 THE MEDIATION PROPOSALS OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, 
 AND RUSSIA : AUSTRIA'S OPPOSITION : WHY DID AUS- 
 TRIA NOT WANT A CONFERENCE ? GERMANY SUPPORTS 
 
 AUSTRIA : WAR DECLARATIONS OF THE POWERS. 
 
 COMPETENT judges throughout Europe have agreed that 
 the conditions of points 5 and G were unacceptable by 
 any independent State. Moreover, they could not have 
 been complied with in the short respite of forty-eight 
 hours allowed for the reply, as this would have necessitated 
 an amendment of the Criminal Code, which would require 
 a longer time. 
 
 The Governments of Russia, France, and Great Britain 
 also expressed the view that these points were unaccept- 
 able, and that Serbia's reply in other respects tendered 
 ample satisfaction a fact which Austria-Hungary should 
 recognize. Russia also advised Serbia to concede every 
 possible point of the Austrian Note. 
 
 M. Viviani, the French Premier, declared in a letter to 
 Paul Cambon in London on August 1 that " France lias 
 throughout, with England's concurrence, advised modera- 
 tion in St. Petersburg ; this advice has been followed. 
 M. Sazonof has from the very beginning exercised pressure 
 on Serbia to induce her to accept all the demands of 
 Austria's ultimatum which were compatible with IKT 
 sovereignty." 
 
 183
 
 181 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER TJ14 
 
 \Vhen point "> of Austria'* demands for satisfaction 
 from Serbia by assenting to tlu- collaboration of Austrian 
 functionaries in the suppression of the subversive move- 
 ment in Serbia, was opposed by the Powers, who considered 
 it to constitute an encroachment upon the sovereign rights 
 of the Kingdom, and the Russian Foreign Minister called 
 attention to this. Count BerchtoKl instructed the Austrian 
 ambassador to inform Sa/.onof "in strict confidence" 
 that the insistence on this point "was due altogether to 
 practical considerations and was by no means intended to 
 raise the question of Serbia's sovereignty. In speaking of 
 ' collaboration ' in point ."> we have in our mind the institu- 
 tion of a .v<r;r/ ' bureau d< *uri 7<' ' in Belgrade which would 
 operate in the same way as the analogous Russian institu- 
 tions in Paris, and would collaborate with the Serbian 
 police and ddmitiislrdtirt' authttritit's." 
 
 Sa/onof allowed himself to be persuaded that Serbia's 
 sovereignty was not threatened, but declared that the 
 enl'orcement of this point woiiKl jilace Serbia in a position 
 of rasxdldHt' in Aunt rid. 
 
 Austria's l\,/l lit, nl; and Serbia's Him ttnnl; show the 
 points of view of the two States respecting the Serbian 
 agitation against Austria. In spite of all their efforts to 
 clear themselves, the Serbian (iovcrnnicnt must un- 
 doubtedly bear a heavy burden of responsibility; for 
 tiny had remained inactive during the propaganda against 
 Austria and had been guilty of sundry evasions with 
 iv^ard to the evidence, and i! is clear that Austria was 
 'lit it led to demand guarantees for the future, and satis- 
 faction for tins toleration of the agitation. 
 
 The Austrian Note of July I'.'?, however, not onlv ask< d 
 lor jMiarantii - and satisfaction, but seemed calculated to 
 jtit^/t the r i inflict in a jminl from which th- re could be no 
 
 lecedm^' except //// /<//'<> nf tll'lri--. 
 
 In a Note of Julv L'.'l to the Austrian ambassador in 
 
 I."!iflon Count Rcrchtold stated that Austria fnubl n<>! 
 
 ' ' ' <]' ' 't 1 1' r demands to m '^t nit inn un<l i </ni ]'<>ni i *< . a-- 
 
 !fi-\ onl\ contain' d \shat \\a ( ; i'lint. and th:(t t h-
 
 THE SERBIAN CONFLICT 185 
 
 Monarchy, in view of its economic interests, could not 
 run the risk of Serbia prolonging the crisis indefinitely. 
 
 The Austrian Government, on a proposal for mediation 
 being put forward by Sir Kdward Grey, insisted that the 
 question at issue was one for settlement between Serbia 
 and Austria alone although knowing full well Russia's 
 attitude - and must, therefore, have foreseen that a 
 universal war would follow. 
 
 When Sir Kdward Grey (July '_>!) objected to Austria's 
 appending to the Serbian Note an ultimatum allowing 
 but forty-eight hours for a reply, on the ground that it 
 would be time enough to present an ultimatum after the 
 reply had been received if it were found unsatisfactory, 
 Count Bcrehtold explained that it was " not a formal 
 ultimatum," only " cine befristete Demarche " (a demarche 
 with a time-limit), which, if it were not accepted within 
 the time given, would " for the time being only be followed 
 by the rupture of diplomatic relations and the beginning 
 of the necessary military preparations " a diplomatic 
 jeii de mots, in other words. That the Note bore the 
 character of an ultimatum was evident from the added 
 observation that Austria was " irrevocably resolved " to 
 enforce her demands. 
 
 Austria's ambassador in Belgrade, Baron Giesl, sum- 
 marized in a telegram of July 'Jl Serbia's recent attitude 
 and referred to it as t- nationalistic madness," at the 
 same time dwelling on Serbia's hatred, nay. her contempt, 
 for Austria. As this telegram was dispatched the day 
 before Austria's Note to Serbia it will be seen that it could 
 not have formed a basis for the latter. Moreover, the 
 telegram contains nothing beyond general reflections on 
 the incxtirpablc enmity of the Serbians, and Baron Giesl 
 merely remarks that " a settlement with Serbia, a nar 
 to safeguard the Monarchy's position as a Great Power, 
 nay. its very existence, cannot in lite long run be avoided." 
 
 The Serbian Crown Prince Alexander telegraphed on 
 July _' t to the Tsar acquainting him with tin- Austrian 
 Note and the unacceptable points, and pointing out the
 
 ISC BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 probability that Serbia would be attacked. " We arc 
 unable to defend ourselves," he wrote, " and we beseceh 
 your Majesty to come to our assistance as quickly as 
 possible. 
 
 The Kmperor Nicholas answered on July .7 that he 
 hoped the Serbian (Government would omit nothing which 
 miijht obviate a war. as lon^ as Serbia's dignity was not 
 at stake, and that he was making efforts in the same 
 direction. " If. in spite of our most earnest wish, we fail 
 herein, your Royal Highness may rest assured that Russia 
 will under tin circumstances remain indifferent to Serbia's 
 fate." 
 
 When the Russian Charge d' Affaires in Berlin was 
 instructed to ask the (German (Government to obtain from 
 the Vienna Cabinet on July '2') an extension of the time- 
 limit allowed in Austria's ultimatum, von Ja<M>w did not 
 receive him till late in the afternoon that is to say, when 
 the {jraee was about to expire. lie pointed out that 
 Austria's communique 1 to the Powers took place so late 
 as to make its effect illusory, seeing that thf time did tint 
 ]>< nnil tin m In luhi' cni>niz(ince of the alleged facts, for 
 which reason he must ask for an extension of time. Ilerr 
 von JaL'ow answered that he considered that all these 
 m- a-un s came Inn l<itc. He said further that " it was not 
 a question of war, merely of punishment in a local ques- 
 tion " ; and when the ambassador complained that "the 
 (' rman (Government <lid not ivali/e its responsibilities, 
 as in the evi-nt of hostilities ensuing, Ihftf misfit ini'nli't' 
 tin r,^t f Kur]>,-," JaL'ow answered that he could not 
 !> IM-VI- in any such eon-i quences. 
 
 Tins ni'thoil i.f \\a-hinL' OIK'S hands of the whole 
 conflict and of tls- questmM of mediation by declaring 
 that it was JIM r< ly a matter of " [nmishment " in a local 
 question is far too trivial a tna'ni'iit of an appallingly 
 si nous cont uiu" -ncv. It shows, in any case, (Germany's 
 determination to connt'-nanci- no mediation. 
 
 On t In- -an ! da\ tin Russian Chart:*'- d' Affaires in X'ienna
 
 THE SERBIAN CONFLICT 187 
 
 made similar representations to the Foreign Ofliec, and 
 pointed out to the Foreign Secretary that it was a breach 
 of international courtesy to refer to the Powers causes 
 for complaint based on absent documents without giving 
 them time to acquaint themselves with the circumstances. 
 
 When the Russian Government requested Count Bcreh- 
 told to grant an extension of the time-limit for Serbia's 
 reply to the ultimatum, he directed Count Szapary, the 
 Austrian ambassador in St. Petersburg, to answer (July 25) 
 that " we cannot allow an extension of the. time-limit.^ 
 The ambassador was, moreover, instructed to say that 
 ' our Note to the Powers was not at all intended as 
 an invitation to them to give their respective views," and 
 was merely to be regarded as " an intimation which we 
 thought it our duty to give as a matter of international 
 courtesy." 
 
 Thus a categorical rejection of all mediation. 
 
 It was on the same day that Giesl advised Serbia that 
 diplomatic relations had been broken off, and immediately 
 left Belgrade. 
 
 That, the Austrian Government, whilst declining all 
 mediation of the Powers in the Serbian question, was 
 aware that Russia, in case of war with Serbia, would 
 become Serbia's ally, and that Germany would join 
 Austria in the war, is plain from Count Berchtold's letter 
 of July '2. 1 ) to Austria's ambassador, Count S/apary : 
 " We realize, of course, the possibility that a conflict with 
 Russia may develop out of the Serbian dispute. We 
 could not, however, allow the prospect of such a conflict 
 to sway us in regard to our attitude towards Serbia. Yet 
 it is conceivable that if Serbia rejects our demands and 
 armed intervention on our part becomes necessary, Russia 
 may reflect before she acts and may even be willing to 
 restrain the war party." 
 
 Count Bcrchtold also assumed that the ambassador 
 would have arrived at a complete understanding with the 
 German ambassador in Petersburg, '' who has no doubt 
 been instructed by his Government to make it perfectly
 
 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1011 
 
 clear to the Russian Government that Austria-Hungary 
 in case of conflict with Russia, :r// nut stand alone." 
 
 Austria's declaration of war against Serbia was made on 
 July i'S by the following communication from the Foreign 
 Minister: "The Royal Scrl>ian Government not having 
 answered in a satisfactory manner the Note which the 
 Austro-Hungarian Minister delivered on July '_'.'{, the 
 Imperial and Royal Government are compelled to .v<r 
 In the tiafeiiuarding of their rights and interests, and, with 
 this object, to hare recourse to foree of arms. Austria- 
 Hungary, therefore, considers herself henceforward in a 
 fitate af ' :ear with Serbia." 
 
 Next day Rdgrade was bombarded. 
 
 Kven if Austria - Hungary's charges against Serbia 
 respecting the aggressive agitation ngainst the Monarchy 
 caused by the Great-Serbian propaganda were well- 
 founded, this did not constitute a sullicient reason for war 
 until attempts had been made to settle the dispute raised 
 by the assassination of the Heir Apparent, more especially 
 as Serbia agreed to the proposal of mediation by neutral 
 Great Powers and herself suggested referring the matter 
 to The Hague Tribunal. 
 
 Aeeoidini.' to Austria's l\ t d Ii(nJ,\ the l{n**ian mobiliza- 
 tion was the cause of the rupture between Russia and 
 ( i' rmanv. 
 
 But it should le noted that the Russian Minister of 
 War had declared to the German Military Attache at 
 St. I'< t . rsburi! as early as July '_'<; that if Anstriii ero.\sed 
 tin Siiliian frontier Russia u ">//'/ inoliili-.e four mihtai'v dis 
 tricts aiMinst Austria. 'J'hus, when Austria d dan d \var 
 on Serbia on July '_'s, she was aware of Russia's intention. 
 If seems a nai\e nio\'e that Count Hirchtold should now 
 appeal to the (ierman (io\'< rnni' nt to point out to th- 
 |{us^lan ( i- >\ I Tini" lit "in a lrindl\ inaiiii-r that this 
 mobilization constituted a threat a^am^t Austria and must 
 ;m \\ n-d by "the mo-.f e\t<nsi\e military count' r 
 measure in Austria and Germanv.' The ambassadors in
 
 AUSTRIA TO SUBDUE SERBIA 189 
 
 St. Petersburg and Paris were also " to declare in a friendly 
 manner that a continuation of the Russian mobili/ation 
 would lead to counter-measures in Germany and Austria, 
 which must have serious consequences. This was a final 
 attempt to avert a European war/' 
 
 It is of the highest importance to note, however, that 
 Berchtold nevertheless declared that Austria " clearly 
 could not allow any interference in her military measures 
 against Serbia " / 
 
 It should he noted that Germany's demand that Russia 
 should cease mobilizing, at the risk of otherwise giving 
 rise to a German mobilization and a declaration of war, 
 was not presented until after Austria's representations of 
 July '28 and 29. Austria must thus bear a great part of 
 the responsibility for Germany's ultimatum of July ,31, 
 and the cause thereof lies in her obstinate insistence on a 
 settlement of the Serbian conflict by force of arms and 
 her refusal to accept the mediation suggested by Sir 
 Edward Grey. When Count Berchtold on July 31 stated 
 his willingness to accept a further English proposal for 
 mediation, he laid down two conditions : that " our 
 military action against Serbia shall continue," and that 
 the British Cabinet should prevail upon the Russian 
 Government to " suspend the Russian mobilization directed 
 against us." 
 
 Berchtold had, however, declared the day before in a 
 telegram to the Austrian ambassador in St. Petersburg that 
 "it has never been our ijitention to K'ithdrau' any part of the 
 point.s of the Xote.'' 
 
 Pursuant to an old tactical device -which by now 
 should be considered out-of-date Austria-Hungary made 
 out at the beginning of the Serbian War that Serbia nas 
 the aggressor ! Berchtold instructed his ambassador in 
 London (July 28) to inform Sir Edward Grey that Serbia 
 had ordered a general mobilization as early as ;} P.M. on 
 July 25, whilst her answer to Austria's Note was not 
 delivered until G P.M., and that Austria " had up till then 
 made no military preparations/' but " was compelled to
 
 !'.<) BKFOHE, I)t KING, AND AFTER I'.Hl 
 
 do so hy the Serbian mobilization." Tlic Austrian ambas- 
 sador in Petersburg was told to make a similar statement. 
 
 I low little this signified may be gathered from the fact 
 that Bcrehtold instructed the Austrian ambassador in 
 London a> early as July -4 that " military preparations" 
 in Austria must ensue on expiration of the time-limit. 
 
 When Austria-Hungary had presented her declaration of 
 war to Serbia and immediately began warlike operations 
 (July L"J), although Russia had declared that she could 
 not be indifferent to the fate of Serbia, Russia mobilized 
 four of her military districts. The German Government 
 had been made aware of the Russian measures by the 
 statement that they were a consequence of Austria's 'car 
 preparations. The Russian Foreign Oilice issued an 
 ollieial account of the incidents of the last few days pre- 
 ceding the outbreak of war. in which reference is made 
 to " the Russian Government's willingness, l>y means of 
 direct negotiations with the 1'icnna Cabinet, or, /// accordance 
 with (treat Jtritain's proposal, by a conference bet \\een 
 Great Britain. Germany, France, and Italy, to continue 
 the negotiations for a j)eaceful solution of the conllict. 
 Hut Austria-Hungary declined all further negotiations 
 with us, and the Berlin C'abinet refused to take part in 
 the proposed Conference between the Powers. Russia 
 still persisted in her efforts to arrive at a peaceful solution, 
 but her proposal was declared by Germany to be unaccept- 
 able. At the same time news was received of general 
 mobili/ation in Austria-Hungary, and warlike measures 
 w< re being taken on Serbian territorv, Belgrade being 
 subjected to a fresh bombardment." * 
 
 It has been unanimously attested from British, Russian, 
 and French soiirc s (White and Yi!l'>:c ltnnl;s) that 
 Austria did tint only tnlirtly cunttiil in r inti nlimis ini/iinst 
 Si rt/m during July, but sought, on the contrary, to lull 
 the Entente I'<,:ier.s into the In lit f that no warlike enterprise 
 was ronteniplatcd, but that "a peneefnl settlement might 
 ( /. Hussion Orange Hook, N<>. 77.
 
 MEDIATION PROPOSALS OF GREAT POWERS 11)1 
 
 be anticipated," us reported on July 22 by M. Dumainc, 
 French ambassador at Vienna. 
 
 Germany, moreover, assured the Entente Powers 
 repeatedly that the German Government was not cognizant 
 of Austria's Note to Serbia before it was delivered. 
 
 Herr von Jagow, the German Foreign Minister, declared 
 
 on July 21, in answer to the inquiry <>f M. Jules C'ambon, 
 
 the French ambassador, that the Berlin Cabinet had been 
 
 ignorant of the Austrian demand* until they were presented 
 
 at Belgrade, but that he approved them now that he had 
 
 seen them. Cambon, however, was struck by the anxiety 
 
 of Jagow and all his officials to convince everybody that 
 
 they were unaware of the contents of the Austrian Note. 
 
 To a representative of the British Legation Jagow also 
 
 solemnly declared that he had no previous knowledge of 
 
 the Note. Baron von Schocn, the German Ambassador 
 
 in Paris, assured the Foreign OHice (July 25) that Austria 
 
 and Germany had not discussed the Austrian Note together 
 
 and that the German Government -were unacquainted 
 
 with it, although they subsequently approved of it. M. 
 
 Berthelot, sectional head in the department, said to him 
 
 frankly that " Germany's attitude was unexplainablc by 
 
 any ordinary mode of reasoning, unless that country 
 
 contemplated war. Was it likely that Germany would 
 
 range herself by Austria's side in such an adventure with 
 
 her eyes sliut ? Could it be supposed that Austria had 
 
 taken up an attitude from which there was no going 
 
 back, unless she had first weighed witJi her Ally all the 
 
 consequences of her uncompromising attitude ? Schoen 
 
 once more affirmed that Germany had no knowledge of 
 
 the tenor of the Austrian Note.'' 
 
 The Entente Powers had their reason for doubting this 
 statement. M. Allize, the French Minister at Munich, 
 advised the Foreign Minister on July 2.3 that the Bavarian 
 Premier ''had spoken of the Note, wilJt whieJi he was 
 acquainted,"' and the British ambassador at Vienna, Sir 
 Maurice de Bunsen, informed Sir Edward Grey that lie 
 " had received information that the German ambassador
 
 19*2 BEFORE, DTRINO, AND AFTER 1911 
 
 U-</A acfjttaintt'd it.' it It the ttnur of Austria's ultimatum to 
 Serbia before it was dispatched, and that lit' telegraphed 
 it to tin German ]-,in}>tn>r. I know from tin- German 
 ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it."* 
 All very strange. The German Emperor, like the Bavarian 
 Premier, had been acquainted with the contents of tin- 
 Note before it was dispatched, but the German Foreign 
 Minister, von Jajjow, and the German ambassador, von 
 Sehoen, knew nothing about it ! Does that mean that 
 the German Emperor, who is answerable for his actions 
 to God alone, need not confer with his Ministers, or does 
 it mean that he was ill on the fateful day when the Note 
 was telegraphed to him and therefore could make no 
 communication ? Or is this merely In haute politiquc ? If 
 so, it is unfortunate that it should have been so completely 
 exposed by the French and British ambassadors. It 
 brings to mind one of Bismarck's favourite sayings ; " He 
 lies like a dispatch ! " Are the new German Ministers 
 eajjer to display the same ingenuity as Bismarck, when 
 he forced the Ems telegram '. / 
 
 Jud^iiiL: from all reports, it is evident that the Entente 
 Powers were complete! v taken aback by Austria's demands 
 in the N<>te to Serbia, its suddenness and its form of an 
 ultimatum, just at a moment when the French President 
 and Premier were on their way from St. Petersburg to 
 Stockholm and could therefore, in the short time of forty- 
 ( ii_'lit hours, do nothing to contribute towards a peaceful 
 solution of the conflict. 
 
 Sir Maurice d<- Buns, n, the British ambassador in 
 Vi- nna, t- 1 u'i'.'M'li' d "U .Inly ? to Sir Ed \\anl Grey that 
 aft' i' eoni ' rniiL.' uith ot In r ambassadors o! the Great 
 Pou.r--. th<- impi"e-^i< .n \\as left on his mind that "the 
 Au-fro Hungarian Not' \\as so drawn up <i\ t<> make 'car 
 i /ii ; itnlili . 
 
 \\ IM n Sir Eduard Grey on ,Iul\ L't; submitted his jiro 
 
 < f. IP'.!. V///T,( /;..-./.-. N". -Jl. :iii.l tin- IJnleli Uln,- liu'.k.
 
 MEDIATION PROPOSALS OF GREAT POWERS 10,3 
 
 posal, supported by Franco, for a conference between 
 Germany, Great Britain, France, and Italy, with a view 
 to averting hostilities between Austria and Russia, the 
 German Foreign Minister, von Jagow (July 27), declared 
 that this conference, politically regarded, would be tanta- 
 mount to a court of arbitration and could not be summoned 
 except at the request of the two States. He lt was there- 
 fore unable to agree to the proposal, however gladly he 
 would have co-operated to preserve peace.'' He declared, 
 in spite of Cambon's earnest entreaties, that " he could 
 not intervene in the Austro-Serbian conflict." In reply 
 to the question whether he had undertaken to follow 
 Austria blindly whatever she might do, and whether he 
 had acquainted himself with Serbia's answer to Austria, 
 he said that he " had not yet had time " ! * 
 
 In a telegram to Sir Edward Grey of July 28 Sir Edward 
 Goschen, the British ambassador in Berlin, declared : 
 '' The Imperial Chancellor wished me to tell you that he 
 was most anxious that Germany should work together with 
 England for the maintenance of general peace. . . . 
 He had not been able to accept your proposal for a conference 
 of representatives of the Great Powers because he did not 
 think that it would be effective. . . . His Excellency 
 said that he did not wish to discuss the Serbian Xote, but 
 that Austria's standpoint and in this he agreed was 
 that her quarrel with Serbia was a purely Austrian concern 
 with which Russia had nothing to do. . . . His last words 
 were that a war between the Great Powers must be 
 avoided." 
 
 On the following day Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed 
 to Sir Edward Grey : i- The Imperial Chancellor regrets 
 to say that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom 
 he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered 
 that events had marched too rapidly and that, therefore, it 
 was too late to act upon your suggestion that the Serbian 
 reply might form the basis of continued discussion.'' 
 
 When Serbia was unable to submit to Austrian police 
 
 * (/. French Yellow Booh. No. 74. 
 
 X
 
 HKFORE, Dnuxo, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 supervision as demanded by Austria, and the latter State 
 would not aceept Serbia's promises without a guarantee 
 that they would be fulfilled, Carnbon suggested at Berlin 
 that an International Commission should be appointed to 
 supervise Serbia's inquiry into the conspiraey against 
 Austria. Hut Herlin and Vienna deemed that there was 
 no time to lose. When Cambon's suggestion was put 
 forward (July 29) the eonlliet between Germany and 
 Russia had come into the foreground. 
 
 The French and Hritish oilicial documents contain 
 vehement reproaches against Germany on account of her 
 having, through her ultimatum to Russia, destroyed the 
 prosprets of a peaceful solution of the Serbian conflict, 
 of which hopes were held out when Count Herchtold 
 permitted his ambassador in St. Petersburg to discuss the 
 Serbian Note with the Russian Foreign Minister. 
 
 Whilst the Austrian Government regarded the Serbian 
 reply to the Note as unsatisfactory, and considered the 
 conciliatory attitude to be only apparent, the Hritish 
 ambassador in Vienna intimated that the Serbian reply 
 seemed to furnish the possibility of a basis for an under- 
 standing. Hut with this Count Herchtold could not agree. 
 Sir Kdward Grey thereupon appealed to the German 
 Government to prevail upon Vienna either to regard the 
 Note from Serbia as satisfactory or to accept it as a basis 
 for discussion between the Cabinets. Hut Herchtold was 
 equally obdurate in declining the suggestions received 
 from Germany, inasmuch as the negative portion of the 
 Serbian reply referred to the very point which would 
 furnish a guarantee for the attainment of the desired 
 purpose. 
 
 The German ambassador in Vienna, Herr v>n Tschirscky, 
 was represented both by the French and the Hritish 
 ambassador th<-re as working for war, and the French 
 ambassador in Herlin, M. Cambon, reported that Germany 
 was preparing to "*ti]>])nrt .in^triii in a particularly 
 effective manner." 
 
 Wli' n Hie German runb.i^sadnr in St. IVferslnirL' d<
 
 MEDIATION PROPOSALS OF GREAT POWERS 195 
 
 manded on July 80 that Russia should cease her military 
 preparations, affirming that Austria would not violate 
 Serbia's territorial integrity, M. Sazonof replied : " It is not 
 only Serbia's territorial integrity which we have to safe- 
 guard, but also her independence and her sovereignty. We 
 cannot permit that Serbia should become the ra.ssal of 
 Austria. By intervening in Petersburg and declining to 
 intervene in Vienna, Germany is only seeking to gain time 
 so as to give Austria an opportunity of crushing the 
 little Serbian kingdom before Russia has time to come to 
 its assistance. But the Emperor Nicholas is so anxious 
 to avert war that I am permitted in his name to make 
 you a fresh proposal : 
 
 '' If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Serbia 
 has assumed the character of a question of European 
 interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ulti- 
 matum those points ichich violate the principle of Serbian 
 sovereignty, Russia engages to stop all military prepara- 
 tions:' * 
 
 According to the Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg's state- 
 ment in the German White Book, Germany meant to make 
 common cause with Austria in the Serbian conflict. This 
 fact is of the utmost importance, as it implies that Germany 
 approved the wrongs which Austria inflicted on Serbia 
 and Austria's refusal to accept Serbia's proposals for an 
 amicable settlement, and rejected Serbia's suggestion 
 that the matter should be referred to The Hague Peace 
 Tribunal, as well as Sir Edward Grey's proposals for a 
 conference of four Great Powers with a view to composing 
 the differences between Russia and Austria and thus 
 averting war. 
 
 Everything goes to show and there is no dearth of 
 evidence in the published official correspondence between 
 the Powers prior to the outbreak of war that the German 
 Government, whilst never failing to protest its pacific 
 intentions and its wish to co-operate with the other 
 
 * Cf. French Yellow Book, No. 103, and Russian Orange Book, 
 No. 60.
 
 1U6 BEFORK, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 Powers, by procrastination and evasions placed itself 
 between them and Austria and brought all attempts 
 at conciliation to naught and encouraged, if it did 
 not actually exhort, Austria to take up an obdurate 
 attitude. 
 
 How can one condone a policy like that of the German 
 Chancellor, who professed that he was willing to co-operate 
 with England, yet did not tc/.v// to <//.vri/.v.v the question ut 
 /.v.vf/f 1 ; or an attitude such as that of the German Foreign 
 Minister, who, like the Austrian Government, found that 
 the proposals for negotiation and mediation had come too 
 late, as events had marched too rapidly, etc. ? During 
 the last few days before war broke out many telegrams 
 were exchanged between the Russian. Jkitish, and German 
 monarchs. all of whom besought one another to work 
 for peace and to defer mobilization ; Prince Henry of 
 Prussia and KIIIL' George also exchanged telegrams on 
 the subject. Hut it all came to nothing, as all proposals 
 for mediation or arbitration, the only means of averting 
 war, were declined by Germany and Austria. 
 
 It is a enrius fact that the telegram which the Tsar 
 dispatched to the Kmperor William on July '_"., and 
 which conveyed his desire for ////////<///(///. is entirely 
 omitted from the German While Haul;! It has since 
 I" en published in Russia's () file in I (in-.tttt and contains 
 the following passage : " // :\.'<>nld be ri<jhf In j,'/;r arcr lf/t' 
 .tnxtro-St'rbiuti firohlfin to The Ununc Tribunal. \ trust 
 in y< -ur \\ i-ilnin and friendship." 
 
 ( oin men t ing hereon, t he .N arddt'iitxt'lii . I H'jt nn i in Kt'itung 
 points ..lit that this proposal for arbitration "could not 
 In- taken seriously m ; if~t of I\I/*M<I ,\ tnilittirtf ftrt'ittii'dtions 
 di'iiin^f .ttistrin-Hini^firif, seeinjj that Ku^ia on the 
 same day, .lulv l".. ordered the inobili/.at ion of thirtiiii 
 army corps aL'.'imst Austria Hungary." It is \\orthy o|' 
 note that mobih/at ions \s< r< eon tantl\ cited as causes 
 tor war, although, of course. e\ . ry State, including 
 Cermany. must prepare to ha\e rccoui'se to arms -,\.'hi>t 
 n< L'otmtion\ ]>roie of no n\tiil.
 
 MEDIATION PROPOSALS OF GREAT POWERS 197 
 
 In his work \\'cr hat den A'riVg verbrochen ? Andrassy 
 deals exhaustively with Russia's Balkan policy and 
 endeavours to show that it is Ilussia who is mainly to 
 blame for the Great-Serbian agitation, and that " Itu.s.sian 
 aggressiveness and pretensions in the East were the prininm 
 mobile and the real cause of the World War, and that this 
 aggressive policy was only rendered possible by her Allies." 
 
 Austria-Hungary's share in bringing about the war can, 
 says Andrassy, even in the eyes of the Entente, " only 
 consist in our wish to prosecute our legitimate- aim, to 
 safeguard our existence and our most vital interests by 
 more radical means than the Entente considered suitable 
 or cared to endorse" that is to say, in other words, 
 castigation by force of arms in a localized icar. For the 
 conflict with Serbia, he says, was " a matter which did 
 not concern anyone else in the least." Andrassy goes on 
 to say that whilst the acts (Datcn) of the Entente show- 
 that it made no tangible offer in the interest of the world's 
 peace, these same acts show that we, the offended, the 
 threatened party, agreed to great sacrifices in the cause 
 of peace." He also praises Germany for having " honour- 
 ably supported vis in our endeavour to solve the Serbian 
 question icithout European complications and with such 
 guarantees as would obviate any renewal of the agitations 
 which have been carried on up to the present." 
 
 It is surprising to note that Andrassy denies the Entente 
 Powers the merit of having sought to settle the Serbian 
 dispute in the interests of peace, whereas they demon- 
 strably made the most strenuous efforts in this direction, 
 and that, on the other hand, he does not shrink from 
 asserting that Austria-Hungary made '' great sacrifices." 
 These sacrifices are quite unknown. It is clear that 
 Austria-Hungary did not concede a single point of her 
 ultimatum to Serbia, and Andrassy himself says that 
 ' ; more radical means'" than those of the Entente would 
 have to be used. As regards Germany's help, it was not of 
 a kind to avert European complications, but exactly the 
 reverse.
 
 198 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER UU-4 
 
 We have on record from an Austrian source a remarkable 
 statement which is in clear contrast to Andrassy's view and 
 shows that Germany really stood in Austria's way and 
 exerted a determining inlluence on her attitude in the 
 Serbian dispute. I refer to a communication in La 
 Gazette de Lausanne of December 17, 1914, from an Austrian 
 diplomatist, who had retired on account of differences of 
 opinion with the leaders of Austro-Hungarian policy. He 
 wrote, amongst other things, the following : " The Serbian 
 answer to the Austrian Note after the Serajevo crime 
 seemed satisfactory enough to justify us in claiming a real 
 diplomatic victory. By consenting to a conference of the 
 Great Powers we could have secured a partial surrender 
 suflicient to prevent a recrudescence of the Great-Serbism 
 which the Government at Belgrade has favoured to our 
 detriment. 
 
 Our diplomacy was spurred on to maintaining an obdurate 
 attitude, and at the moment when the- question seemed, 
 in spite of all, to be Hearing a solution, the ultimatum to 
 Russia was dispatched in order to cut off our retreat and 
 present any conciliatory efforts on our part. 
 
 Ever since October 7, 187 ( J, when we signed the treaties 
 of alliance with Germany and Italy, we have been a 
 political tool in Prussia's hand. Italy's role has been no 
 more pleasing, but during the last few years she has 
 managed to emancipate herself from the Prussian tyranny 
 and safeguard her vital interests, and this at our expense. 
 For thirty years the Ballplatz has toed the line traced out by 
 Merlin ; we have forgotten Sadowa and turned our at tent ion 
 to the Kast, which Germany assigned to us as a suitable 
 prey ami at the same time prevented us from taking. We 
 have served only to alarm Russia, to threaten the interests 
 of the Mediterranean Powers, and thus to maintain the 
 political insecurity indixpcnxublt' t<> the rulers <>f (icnnuni/ in 
 order that the Keichsttift nu^ht be induced t /M.S.V the in- 
 creasingly burdensome War liudget." 
 
 We have seen from the foregoing how iirst Serbia in her
 
 AUSTRIA'S OPPOSITION I'M) 
 
 reply and then the Emperor Nicholas proposed that the 
 Serbian dispute should be referred to The Hague Conference, 
 and that Great Britain and France suggested mediation 
 through the Great Powers, but that Austria would have 
 nothing to do with it. 
 
 Now, if ever, with the prospect of a general European 
 war, surely the Powers should have been unanimous in 
 referring the dispute to The Hague Tribunal. The- parties 
 to The Hague Conference of 11M)7 ailirmed their inflexible 
 desire to work for the maintenance of universal peace and 
 to encourage by every means in their power an amicable 
 settlement of international disputes. They also bound 
 themselves, as far as circumstances would permit, to invite 
 the co-operation of impartial Powers before having recourse 
 to arms. 
 
 It is curious to note that Serbia had not pledged herself 
 to The Hague Convention, but that Austria, on the other 
 hand, was a party to it ! 
 
 What can have been Austria's innermost motive in the 
 dispute with Serbia in preferring the arbitrament of war to 
 consenting to arbitration ? 
 
 This motive must have been a very serious one. I can 
 find only one reason : the Austrian Government must 
 have feared that the mandate of the Berlin Congress 
 authorizing Austria to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
 occupation itself after a three months' war. and finally the 
 formal annexation would be brought forward as throwing 
 some light on the anti-Austrian agitation in Serbia and 
 Bosnia. 
 
 It was impossible to tell beforehand how a conference 
 would regard these matters. The mandate of the Berlin 
 Congress authorizing Austria to occupy the provinces 
 might be disapproved of different times, new points of 
 view, other men -or perhaps the conference would not 
 endorse the Imperial rescript proclaiming the annexation 
 and would declare it to be but a worthless scrap of paper 
 with far more reason than Bethmann-Hollweg had in so 
 describing the Belgian Neutrality Treatv.
 
 200 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1911 
 
 f- Austria has maintained, in view of the Great-Serbian 
 aspirations, that it was impossible for Austria to concede 
 any part of her territory to Serbia ; it would have been a 
 dangerous precedent for other parts of the Monarchy. 
 
 But supposing that a conference were to decide that the 
 part called Hosnia and Herzegovina was not a legitimately 
 acquired territory ? Supposing it were to regard the 
 annexation as a breach of international rights ? 
 
 These fears would have been well grounded, and Austria 
 clearly did not wish to run the risk, and refused uncon- 
 ditionally to agree to the arbitration proposals. Hut she 
 could not have acted as she did without Germany's help 
 and without the hope that Germany would give her an 
 effective backing. 
 
 Andrassy says so outright in his book Wcrhai den Kru'g 
 rcrbrochcn ? " Germany," he says, " did all in her power 
 to locali/e the question, but when she saw that this could 
 not be done and that Russia was willing to go to war for 
 the sake of Serbia's prestige, Germany had but one aim : 
 to conduct the negotiations in such a way as to bring 
 about a quirk decision and enhance the i>r<>*]>eclx ofriclnrt/. 
 
 M. Ivanoviteh, Serbian Minister at Vienna, wrote to the 
 Premier, M. 1'ashitch, in a report on the situation, that 
 Herr von Tschirseky, German ambassador in Vienna, had 
 stated openly that Jiuxxia :c<iuld ket p quiet :ehil*t Auxiria- 
 Ilnnzarij carried out her punitive < i jxdilimi against Serbia, 
 and that Russia had no right to intervene. 
 
 Long before this it had been said and written in Vienna 
 that there must be tiv/r mill liuvsia hefui'e xhc :e.<i* readif in 
 a military sense. 
 
 The French ambassador in \ lenna. M. Duma me, \\ n -t e on 
 July i's, I'.in. to the For. IL.-II Minister: 'The most dis 
 quieting among the suspicions aroused |\- the sudden and 
 \ lolent resolve of Austria is t hat Germany may ha\ e urged 
 I)- r to aggression a<_ r amst Serbia so as to be able herself 
 to enter the lists against France and Russia in circum- 
 stances \\hich she sn j ,j,( ise-, to be tin most favourable for 
 h. r/
 
 GERMANY SUPPORTS AUSTRIA 201 
 
 The Italian Premier, Sulandra, made a statement in the 
 Chamber on December 4, 1914, concerning the outbreak of 
 war, which also shows the opinion held in Austria with 
 regard to Russia's attitude : " From the beginning of the 
 war, after the Serajcvo crime, when the relations between 
 Austria and Serbia were at their worst, the then Foreign 
 Minister, the Marquis di San Giuliano, deemed it his duty 
 to advise Vienna to show moderation and avoid Russian 
 intervention in Belgrade's favour. To this Austria replied 
 that she did not think that Russia ivas sufficiently prepared, 
 after the war with Japan, to undertake any military 
 operations in aid of Serbia." 
 
 The German Government and General Staff were well 
 aware of the need for prompt action, and certainly did not 
 expect that Russia would be ready to fight Germany in 
 1914. And so Germany boldly challenged fate and placed 
 herself without wavering by the side of Austria-Hungary 
 when that monarchy declared war on Serbia. 
 
 Germany's plan, confident as she was in her superior 
 preparedness for war, and believing that she would only 
 have the Franco-Russian Alliance to deal with, was to 
 hurl herself on France witli lightning speed and force her 
 to capitulate, or at all events to take Paris by a coup dc 
 main, and then with equal rapidity to throw the greater 
 part of her armies across to Russia and bring her to her 
 knees by a scries of decisive victories. In Berlin ollicers 
 boasted at the beginning of the war with the most un- 
 bounded confidence before persons whom I know that '' in 
 four weeks we shall be in Paris," and this seems to have 
 been the general opinion. 
 
 As England in 1914 was menaced with civil war in 
 Ireland and stood on the threshhold of a social revolution, 
 and Russia was also being threatened by a new vast 
 upheaval, whilst in France the new Army Bill was still 
 under discussion, it is all too probable that Germany and 
 Austria deemed the moment propitious 1'or a war with 
 these countries and thought it inexpedient to delay any 
 longer.
 
 202 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1011 
 
 Although war might have born avoided if Austria had 
 accepted the proposals fur mediation in the Serbian con- 
 flict, it wa.s represented that the -car :a/.v forced upon 
 Austria. Thus Francis Joseph wrote to Sturgkh, the 
 Prime Minister (February 191. 5), an autograph letter in 
 which the following passage occurred : " When I look back 
 upon the period of half a year, during which we have been 
 involved in a struggle forced upon us by the hostile inten- 
 tions df our enemies, 1 think with a grateful heart of the 
 self-sacrificing bearing of my faithful peoples in this trying 
 time." 
 
 Andrassy speaks in a similar strain in his above-mentioned 
 book on the causes of the war : " The responsibility rests 
 in the first place with Russia, and in a lesser degree with her 
 Allies. We haif merely defended ourselres." 
 
 In his speech from the throne, witli which the Emperor 
 William opened the Extraordinary Session of the Reichstag 
 on August 4, he expresses himself in the following terms : 
 " Francis Joseph uv/.v compelled to hare recourse to arms 
 in defence of the safety of his country from the dangerous 
 plottings of a neighbouring State. . . . When the Monarchy 
 with which we are allied asserted its rightful interests, (he 
 ]{ussiiin Empire placed itself in its path. It is not only our 
 duty as faithful Allies that calls us to the side of Austria; 
 we are also confronted with the tremendous task of safe- 
 guarding our ou'n position as well as the culture common to 
 our two countries from the assault of the enemies' forces. 
 . . . The hostility which has so long been smouldering in 
 Fast and West has now burst into flame. The present 
 situation is the result of the accumulated resentment of 
 many years at the mi^ht and pros]>criti/ of the (it nnan 
 Empirt . . . . From the documents which have been 
 placed before you (the (iermaii White Honk) you \\ill see 
 how mv (iov< rniix nt, and first and foremost my Chancellor, 
 have to the very last striven to art rt a eataslrophe. In 
 self-defence, \\ith a clear conscience and with clean hands, 
 do we take up the sword." 
 
 Th' Imperial 1'hanccllor, Bcthmann-IIollweg, explained
 
 GERMANY SUPIHWIS ATSTIMA 4 J<KJ 
 
 the situation on the outbreak of war in the German \\' hilt- 
 Book (August IJ). He described the conspiracy against 
 the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and the Great-Serbian 
 agitation, and spoke of Serbia's hope of obtaining Hosnia 
 and Herzegovina with Russia's aid, but lie said nothing of 
 Austria's annexation of the provinces and their dissatisfac- 
 tion with this step. He evidently considered that the 
 Austrian Emperor was acting fully within his rights when 
 he annexed them to his realm in 1!K)8, and that every pro- 
 test against this action was a criminal act. lie wrote as 
 follows: i4 It was plain to Austria that it could not In- 
 consistent with the dignity and spirit of self-preservation 
 of the Monarchy to remain any longer an inactive witness 
 of this movement on the other side of the frontier. The 
 Imperial and Royal Government appealed to Germany's 
 righteous judgment and asked us to state our opinion. We 
 could not but endorse with all our heart our Allied rie:e of 
 the situation, . . . We could not, when Austria-Hungary's 
 vital interests were at stake, advise her to make con- 
 cessions, the more so as our own interests were sensibly 
 threatened by the Serbian agitation. If the Serbs, with 
 Russia's and France's aid, had continued to threaten 
 the existence of Austria-Hungary, this would by degrees 
 have led to Austria's downfall and the subjection of 
 all Slavs to the Russian sceptre, and the position of the 
 Germanic race in Central Europe would have been made 
 untenable."' 
 
 It is truly surprising to witness this solicitude on Austria's 
 behalf in a quarter from which that country had suffered 
 the cruellest blow dealt it in modern times, when Prussia 
 made war on Austria and vanquished her at Sadowa. shook 
 her position as a Great Power, drove her out of the German 
 Federation, and took Venctia from the Monarchy in order 
 to present that province to Italy. Xo country was for a 
 long time afterwards so hated in Austria as Prussia, to 
 which the anti-Prussian policy of the Prime Minister 
 Bcust bore witness, when he plotted vengeance for ISt)*!, 
 sought a French alliance, promised Xapoleon III Austria's
 
 201 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1911 
 
 support in the war of ls?o, and worked against Germany's 
 reconstitution after 1S71. 
 
 As a compensation for Ycnctia, Germany helped Austria 
 t> get Bosnia and Herzegovina ; but this brought her 
 nothing but fresh dilliculties. If her existence is threatened 
 at the present moment, it is iirst and foremost due to that 
 arbitrary annexation. 
 
 Ilcrr von Bethmann-IIollwcg sought to show iiow war 
 had been made inevitable by Russia's intervention, and his 
 main argument in this respect was the declaration which 
 the German Government made to Russia : 
 
 " A'f/.v.v/V.s preparatory military measures have compelled 
 us to take- counter-measures which must take the form of 
 mobilization. Jiut a mobilization mean* ~car." 
 
 To him the question of mobilization was the deciding 
 factor, and he refers to mobili/ation in one country or the 
 other twenty-four times in eleven pages in the White Hook 
 to show that "the Russian Government, by their mobili/a- 
 tion. which imperilled the safety of the German Fmpire, 
 frustrated the painstaking mediatory efforts of the 
 European Cabinets." 
 
 \Vhen Russia did nut stop her mobili/ation on Austria's 
 declaration of war against Serbia, the German Government 
 declared that " we consider ourselves in a state of war 
 since our demands have been rejected. Furthermore, 
 Russian troops had crossed our frontiers and marched into 
 German territory before the continuation of the carrying 
 out of the onl< r had been received, linxxia thus bc^an 
 tin :o/r agtiiti^t u.v." 
 
 \Vith regard to I-'ranee. the Chancellor asserted that her 
 I'rime Minister, on Germany inquiring as to her attitude, 
 gave "an unsat isfactorv answer and declared that France 
 intend(d to act as IK r interests dictat-d. A fe\\ hours 
 later order ^ were s ( nt out for the mobili/ation of t he en t ire 
 French Army and Na\ y. On the following morning 
 France cnmnitneeii ho^tilititx. 
 
 The Chancellor endcavoun d to support this assertion, 
 n.ade in hi-, R- leh-taL; -^\ < eh o|' August I, by quoting the
 
 GERMANY SUPPORTS AUSTRIA 20.5 
 
 German ambassador von Schoen's unconfirmed statement 
 as to hostile aets on the part of the French. 
 
 It should, however, he pointed out that, as the French 
 Government emphasized, mobilization in not icar. 
 
 Of this Sweden is an example. Directly the war broke 
 out the Government ordered general inobili/ation, but this 
 was most certainly not done in order that we might take- 
 part in the war on one side or the other, but so as to place 
 us in a position to defend our neutrality in ease it should 
 be violated. 
 
 The impartial, pragmatic historian, who depicts the 
 sequence of events and trace's them to their source, cannot 
 admit that a mobilization shall be held up as reason for a 
 declaration of war. The tactical device of thus denouncing 
 the opponent as the attacking parly is an old one, and might 
 now be regarded as antiquated. This persistent produc- 
 tion of proofs -real or apparent. as to u-ho rtv/.v the jirxt 
 to mobilize and as to rc7/o teas the first to cross the frontier is a 
 diplomatic trick which inspires little respect. The inten- 
 tion was to point to certain countries as the real instigators 
 of the war, whilst others would seem to have done all in 
 their power to preserve peace and to stand forth as tin- 
 attacked party, forced into a war of self-defence. It is 
 the old story. Xo impartial and thinking observer pays 
 any heed to it. The date of the mobilization in one country 
 or the other is a secondary matter, however important it 
 is made to appear. The mobilizations did not settle the 
 question of peace or war. 
 
 The war between Russia and Austria-Hungary was 
 stated here to have come about as follows : The Austrian 
 ambassador in Berlin telegraphed on August '2 to Count 
 Berchtold : '' Russian troops have crossed the German 
 frontier at Schwiden. Russia has thus attacked Germany. 
 Germany therefore considers herself at war with Russia." 
 Thereupon Count Berchtold, in a Note to the Russian 
 Foreign Minister on August .">, declared that "in eon- 
 sequence of Russia's threatening attitude in the conflict 
 between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Serbia,"
 
 JOG BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 and as Russia " by reason of this conflict considers herself 
 justified in commencing hostilities against Germany, and 
 Germany is thus in a state of war with the said Great 
 Power. Austria-Hungary likewise considers herself to he 
 at 'car :<. //// Russia." 
 
 Germany having declared that a state of war existed, 
 the 'J\ar issued a manifesto containing the following 
 passage : " Austria Hungary, having presented demands 
 to Serbia which were intentionally of such a nature as 
 could nut be accepted by an independent State, and having, 
 without considering the Serbian Government's pacific and 
 conciliatory answer, rejected Russia's friendly interven- 
 tion, hastened to proceed to an arnwd attack and began the 
 bombardment of the defenceless city of Belgrade. . . . 
 Russia's duty is not only to protect a kindred State, which 
 has been unrighteously affronted, but also to safeguard 
 Russia's honour, her dignity, her integrity, and her place 
 amongst the Great Powers.' 1 
 
 Hetween Trance and Austria-Hungary the state of war 
 be^an by the French Government intimating that "since 
 the Austro Hungarian Government have declared war on 
 Serbia, and have thus tul'cn the first step to hostilities in 
 Kurope. they have without challenge from the Government 
 of the French Republic created a stute of war with France : 
 (1) Germany having in turn declared Avar on Russia and 
 France, the Austro-IIungarian Government has entered the 
 contliet. ('j) According to numerous trustworthy reports, 
 AIM ria has dispatched t roops to the German frontier under 
 circumstances equivalent to a direct threat against France. 
 In view of t lies,- facts t he French Government are compelled 
 t' d< e]arc that they will take all steps which may be 
 necessary to reply to these acts and threat*." 
 
 Great Britain entered a state of war with Austria by Sir 
 Fdward Greys declaration that "as a rupture has taken 
 place \\itii France a state of war exists between Great 
 Britain ami Austria-Hungary/' 
 
 Th-re is no doubt that the German Imperial Government
 
 WAR DECLARATIONS OF THE POWERS 207 
 
 could hare averted war had they wished to do so. A 
 juxtaposition and impartial examination of all the Notes 
 exchanged between the Powers as taken from their 
 ollieial White, Yellow, and lilue Hooks, etc. shows this 
 with the utmost clearness. In this respect Germany has 
 not been " maligned " by her opponents. 
 
 When M. Viviani in his speech in the Chamber of 
 Deputies on December '22, 1914, said that Germany could 
 have prevented the war as late as July .'Jl, had she agreed 
 to the proposal already accepted by Russia and France 
 for pourparlers in London, and had she meanwhile sus- 
 pended all military measures, Bethmann-Hollwcg contro- 
 verted this view which is becoming more and more 
 widely shared in neutral countries in a long circular to 
 the German diplomats abroad in which, as in all his 
 previous utterances, he merehj denied everything that had 
 been said and proved by opponents as to Germany's nega- 
 tive negotiations prior to the outbreak of war, and once 
 more threw the blame on England, France, and Russia. 
 
 Italy's neutrality during the early part of the war was 
 significant, not only as a disappointment for Germany 
 and Austria, as Italy had now left the Triple Alliance, but 
 also as bearing on the question whether the war was one 
 of attack or defence. Italy was tied to the Triple Alliance 
 only in the event of the other members of the Alliance 
 being attacked that is to say, waging a defensive war - 
 but not if they were the attacking parties. This is clearly 
 evident from the statement which the Premier, Signor 
 Salandra, made in the Italian Chamber on December 4, 
 1914, in the course of which he said : " Without our having 
 been consulted and without our approval, the war suddenly 
 broke out. After weighing with the utmost conscientious- 
 ness the letter as well as the spirit of the Treaty of Alliance, 
 and after having made ourselves thoroughly acquainted 
 with the causes and the aims of the war, we arrived at the 
 conscientious and firm conviction that we were not bound 
 to take part in if, and we accordingly at once proclaimed 
 our neutrality."*
 
 208 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 Thus the Italian Government were unable to share the 
 view of the German Government, that Austria and Germany 
 were attacked ami were compelled to wage a defensive 
 war, but considered, on the contrary, that they were 
 themselves the attackers and that their war was a :a;r 
 of aggression.
 
 XIF continued 
 THE WOULD WAR OF 1011 
 
 C. GERMANY'S VIOLATION OF THE NEUTRALITY OF BEL- 
 GIUM AND LUXEMBURG : GERMANY NEGOTIATES WITH 
 GREAT BRITAIN : GERMANY'S HOSTII.K MEASURES 
 AGAINST FRANCE AND BELGIUM : PROTESTS : DECLARA- 
 TION OF WAR : THE DEFENDERS OF THE VIOLATION OF 
 NEUTRALITY : WHAT DROVE GREAT BRITAIN INTO 
 PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR : SYNOPSIS OF THE CAUSES 
 OF THE WORLD WAR. 
 
 AUSTRIA'S ultimatum and declaration of war against 
 Serbia drew Russia into the war between these countries, 
 with the result that Germany, as Austria's ally, declared 
 war on Russia. France, as Russia's ally, was hound to 
 join in the war against Germany, whom she had not 
 challenged, and Germany desired, in pursuance of her 
 plan of campaign, to penetrate into France across her 
 most vulnerable frontier, that in the north-east, for which 
 reason she asked Belgium and Luxemburg to permit 
 her armies to march through these countries, although 
 their neutrality had been guaranteed by treaty (cf. pp. 
 8284). M. Davignon, the Belgian Foreign Minister, on 
 July 25, 1914, advised those Powers who had guaranteed 
 her neutrality that, in the event of the realization of the 
 menace of a Franco-German war, it was the Belgian 
 Government's "firm resolre to fulfil the international 
 obligations imposed upon us by the treaties of IS.'W." 
 
 Nevertheless the German Chancellor on August '_' 
 demanded that Belgium should " observe a benevolent 
 
 209 o
 
 210 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 neutrality towards (Germany " and permit a free passage 
 through Belgian territory, threatening that it' Belgium 
 aete<l in a hostile manner towards the (German troops - 
 that is to say, defended her neutrality she " would be 
 regarded as (.Germany's enemy." The reason adduced 
 was that the (iennan (iovernment "possessed reliable 
 information as to an intended advance of French forces 
 al>n<j the- MCUM- over the sector from (Givct to Namur." 
 
 No evidence was offered in support of this assertion. 
 
 The Belgian Foreign Minister replied that "the inten- 
 tions ascribed to France were contrary to the express 
 declaration given us in the name of the Republic on 
 August 1," and that "if Helgian neutrality were violated 
 by France Ht'lgiurn shnnld fulfil all tier international obliga- 
 tions." " The Be-lgian (Government, \verc they to accept 
 the proposals made, would sully the honour of the 
 nation and at the same time fail in Ifn'ir duties towards 
 fcnrojx ." 
 
 The (German (Government thereupon declaretl. on 
 August I. that in view of this negative- answer they would 
 be compelled to "take such measures of jirecaittinn as 
 were deemed indispensable to count emit,' the /'/'< tn'/i 
 threat*. ' 
 
 Diplomatic relations were thereupon broken off. 
 
 On the same day the British (iovernment informed the 
 liel-jian (Government that they "expect that Hel^ium will 
 resist by any means in her power, and that they are 
 prepared, jointlv with Russia and l-'ranee. to offer common 
 act ion for t he purpose of resist in ^ use of force by (Germany 
 against IJelginm." 
 
 \Nlien the I-'reneh dovernment \verc inlonned of (Ger- 
 many s ultimatum to Heljjmm conceniuiL.' the breach of 
 neutrality, they protested against it in the following 
 terms: 'The (Government of the Republic protest to all 
 civili/ed nation^, and es|eciallv to the (Governments si<jna 
 tor\ to the conventions and treat], s [respecting Belgian 
 neutrality], against the iii,l,:tmn hi/ (i,/nn;ni/ nf I/, r inter 
 tifitintial i Ui'a^ernents ; t he\ make all reservations as to
 
 GERMANY'S VIOLATION OF NEUTRALITY 211 
 
 the reprisals which they may be led to use against an 
 enemy so little heedful of a given word." * 
 
 When the fortress of Liege had been taken by tin- 
 Germans, the German Government sought to induce tin- 
 Belgian Government to become a party to the breach of 
 neutrality : " Germany does not come as an enemy to 
 Belgium." When the Belgian army, by heroic resistance 
 against overwhelming numbers, had upheld its military 
 honour, the German Government asked the King of the 
 Belgians and the Belgian Government " to spare Belgium 
 the further horrors of war." 
 
 When this appeal, which would have meant unhampered 
 operations in Belgium against France, was rejected, it 
 was said that " Belgium has committed suicide." But 
 Belgium, had she granted this request, would have 
 betrayed her neutrality. 
 
 The German Government had nursed the hope- of seeing 
 Great Britain remain neutral in this war, and made 
 strenuous efforts to achieve this end. 
 
 On July 20, 1914, Sir Edward Goschcn, the British 
 ambassador in Berlin, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey : 
 '' The Chancellor said that if Austria were attacked by 
 Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become 
 inevitable, owing to Germany's obligation* as Austria's 
 ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. 
 lie then proceeded to make the following strong bid 
 for British neutrality. lie said that it was clear so far 
 as he was able to judge the main principle which governed 
 British policy that Great Britain would never stand by 
 and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might 
 be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany 
 aimed. Provided that the neutrality of Great Britain 
 were certain, every assurance would be given to the 
 British Government that the Imperial Government aimed 
 at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France. 
 
 * TheHelgianGrn/Boofc, Xos.3, 12. -JO, '2'2. '21. -JS. 17. and Fm.ch 
 Yellow Bonk. No. 1"7.
 
 '212 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 should they prove victorious in any war that mi^ht 
 ensue. 
 
 " I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, 
 and he said that he was unable to pire a similar under- 
 taking in that respect. ... It depended on (lie del ion of 
 France what operations Germany inijjht he forced to 
 enter upon in licl^ium, l>ut when the war was over Belgian 
 integrity would l>e respected it' she had not sided against 
 Germany." 
 
 Thus we find the German Chancellor, on the day following 
 his statement as to the necessity of aroiditiil -car, nego- 
 tiating with Great Britain f/.v // :car had already been 
 planned. He had also acquainted Sir Edward Goschcn 
 with the reply of tlie Austrian Government: Too late 
 for mediation. " He ended," says Sir Edward Goschen 
 in the same telegram, "by saying that the object of his 
 policy had been, ever since he became Chancellor, to 
 brinj,' about an understanding "cith England." 
 
 On the same day. July '_".>. Sir Edward Grey informed 
 Sir Edward Goschen by telegram that IK- had told the 
 German ambassador in London that " if Germany became 
 involved [in war] and then Eranee, the issue mi^ht be 
 so <_Mvat that it would involve all European interests; 
 and I did not wish him to he misled by the friendly tone 
 of our conversation into thinking that we should .stand 
 n.^iili . . . but that it the situation really became such 
 that we thought British interests required us to intervene, 
 :t< must intin'ine a! once." 
 
 ()ii July ,'io Sir Edward Grey replied to Sir Edward 
 Guschen's telegram of .Julv '_".: " His Majesty's Govern- 
 ment cannot f<,r a moment entertain the Chancellor's pro- 
 posal that they should bind th<-niselv<s to neutrality on 
 such terms ... to stand by \\lnle I-'rench colonies are 
 bemjj taken and Fran ft i\ hi iti^ crn.sfn <l, so IOIIL' as G( rmany 
 takes no I-'reneh territory as distinct from the colonies. 
 ... It would be a di*<jr<!<'<- for us to m>ifce this bargain 
 nith (Jenruinij at the c.Jj)i'n*c of France. . . . The Chancellor 
 a \.- us in efft-et to fmt'i'ain a:<.at/ \\hate\ir obligation or
 
 GERMANY NEGOTIATES WITH GREAT HKITAIN 21.'J 
 
 interest we have as regards the neutrality of Helgium. 
 \Ve could not entertain tiiat bargain either. . . . We 
 must preserve our Cull freedom to aet as circumstanees 
 may seem to us to require." 
 
 This was the' message which Sir Edward Gosehcn was 
 instructed to de-liver to the Chancellor, and lie was to 
 add : k% It' the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the 
 present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be 
 to promote some arrangement to which Germany could 
 be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive 
 or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies 
 by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately." 
 
 On July ,'H Sir Edward (iosehen replied to this tele- 
 gram : " I read to the Chancellor your answer to his 
 appeal for British neutrality in the event of war. His 
 Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian 
 measures along the frontier, referred to in my immediately 
 preceding telegram, that he received your communication 
 "without comment." 
 
 On July 31 Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to the British 
 ambassadors at Paris and Berlin as follows : " In view 
 of the prospect of mobilization in Germany, it becomes 
 essential to his Majesty's Government, in view nt existing 
 treaties, to ask whether the French (German) Government 
 are prepared to engage to respect the neutrality of Belgium, 
 so long as no other Power violates it.'' The ambassador 
 at Paris replied the same day that he had received an 
 answer from the French Foreign Minister in the following 
 terms : " The French Government are resolred to respect 
 the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event 
 of some other Power violating this neutrality that France 
 might find herself under the necessity, in order to ensure 
 the defence of her own security, to aet otherwise. This 
 assurance has been given several times. The President 
 of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, 
 and the French minister at Brussels has to-day sponta- 
 neously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister fur 
 Foreign Affairs."
 
 214 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1014 
 
 Tin- German Government made no response to the 
 retjuest ; the British ambassador telegraphed on July 31 
 that " tlu- Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed me 
 that lie must eonsiilt the Emperor and the Chancellor 
 before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what 
 he said that he thought any reply they might give eould 
 not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign 
 in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very 
 doubtful whether they could return any answer tit (ill. . . . 
 It appears from what he said that the German Govern- 
 ment consider that certain hostile (ids hare already been 
 committed by litliiium. As an instance of this he alleged 
 that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed 
 under an embargo already." 
 
 Germany's intention was thus clear. Hut to "con- 
 sider" that Belgium had committed a hostile act against 
 Germany by acting as alleged is an utterly unjust charge; 
 for Belgium was bound, under The Hague Conven- 
 tion nl' l'.M;7, to order this embargo after Germany's 
 ultimatum In Russia. 
 
 The Belgian Foreign Minister also made a statement 
 on the subject to the effect that it was a matter of " comply- 
 ing with the Hoy al Ordinance of July .'50 prohibiting for t lie 
 time bring the export from Belgium of certain products." 
 and that whin the German minister gave notice about 
 the gram consignment the Belgian Customs authorities 
 'ii August 'J "received instructions which gave Germany 
 full satisfaction." * 
 
 That Luxemburg would keep her neutrality inviolate 
 \\as not to In t \pietiil. An attempt was made, however, 
 \sli>!i M. 1,\ >( In ii. In r Prime Minister, on Jul\ :!i 
 demanded liom tin (iirman ministir an ollicial declara 
 lion promising that the mulraliti/ <>t the (ir<in<l Ihtchy 
 sh'.ulil h, r, v/,,,7,'/. Tin- lattir r-pli-d that this :cent 
 :^itli<>nt Mii/ini 1 , but it \\as neces^arv that tin- i'riiich 
 (in: t rnrm nt should tnalci a \iinilar fit duration. On August 1 
 tin I' /i n< It (loi't nnnenl tehjraphtd tin di^irtd undertaking. 
 
 S.c J{. l-ian C,Tr\ t Unnl;. No. 1\L
 
 GERMANY'S HOSTILE MEASURES *Jir> 
 
 On the following day Luxemburg was occupied by Gmnan 
 troops. 
 
 The Prime Minister thereupon sent an energetic protest 
 to the German Emperor. The Chancellor, Bethmann- 
 Ilollwcg, replied that the military measures taken in 
 Luxemburg were solely intended to protect the German 
 traffic on railways leased to Germany from possible attack 
 by the French army. It was further alleged that French 
 troops had already crossed over into Luxemburg territory 
 and thence threatened the German frontier. This assertion 
 is dealt with exhaustively in a Yellow Book published 
 by Luxemburg. Of great importance is the Prime 
 Minister's categorical denial of the German assertion as to 
 the violation of neutrality on the part of France. " Before 
 Europe," and with the approval of the Chamber, he 
 called the entire Grand Duchy to witness that nobody in 
 Luxemburg had seen or heard of any such French measures. 
 Far from crossing the frontier of the Grand Duchy, the 
 French had by fearing up a part of the railway deprived 
 themselves of the means of moving troops into Luxemburg 
 by rail. 
 
 M. Viviani, the Prime Minister, issued on July .'50 a 
 statement to be communicated to the British Foreign 
 Minister in order to show the French and German military 
 preparations respectively : " Although Germany has taken 
 her covering precautions up to within u few hnmlrcd metres 
 of the frontier along the whole front from Luxemburg 
 to the Vosges, and has advanced her covering troops 
 to their lighting positions, we have kept our troops at a 
 distance of ten kilometres from the frontier and have for- 
 bidden them to advance further. ... In France men on 
 leave were only recalled after we were sure that Germany 
 had taken this step Jive days earlier. ... In Germany 
 the garrison troops of Met/, have not only been brought 
 up to the frontier, they have also been reinforced. . . . 
 The preparations to place the frontier fortresses on a 
 war footing were begun in Germany on July -."> ; ^"e in
 
 216 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 France arc now also about to take these steps. ... In 
 Germany reservists have bet n called ii|) in tens of thou- 
 sands by individual notices ; those re-siding abroad have 
 been recalled, and reserve ollicers have been called up ; 
 in the interior of the country the roads are barred, and 
 motorcars may only circulate with special permits. 
 This is the last stage before mobili/.ation. None of these 
 steps have yet been taken in France. The (icrman armies' 
 advanced posts are at our frontier sign-posts. On two 
 occasions yesterday German patrols invaded our territory. 
 It is thus clear that France has taken no aggressive 
 measures-." M. Ymani next advised M. I'ambon, the 
 French ambassador at Berlin, on August 1, that France 
 \vas up to the last endeavouring with the co-operation of 
 Gnat Britain to reali/e Sir Kdward Grey's last mediation 
 proposals, but that Austria was placing obstacles in the 
 way by her mobili/.ation. " (ifrnuiny's attitude," he went 
 on, "has absolutely forced us to issue to-day a decree 
 of mobili/.ation. Lmi'j, Injure thi Huxs'nin tnobiliztition, 
 on .Inly _"., Banm von Schocn announced to me the 
 forthcoming proclamation of the Krirgtigefdhrzusttind. 
 This steji has now been taken by Germany ; under cover 
 of this screen she began at once her real mobili/.ation. 
 Our d cree of mobi 1 i/at i< >n is therefore a mrr.v.vfjr// /mwu/v 
 af si lf-]irt*( n lit inn. The Government ha\'e accomj)anicd it 
 by a proclamation, signed by the President of the Republic! 
 and all the Ministers, m which they explain that mobiliza- 
 tion /- nut :cnr, that mobili/ation in the present moment 
 is to France tin best in- aiis < if pn serving peace." 
 
 The (ifi'iuaii ambassador at Brussels intimated to the 
 Belgian Government on August :; that German t roops /j<;c/ 
 rut i it 1 1 Hi l-jiu m , and (It li\ t r< <l nu ultuntituin // tfu~ t fjt ct tlutt 
 ///A (ini irnrmnt, tuning Imrtit tin:! tin /'/ /// TI//V /i>'i /ninn^ 
 /<// njn riitniH.*. m tin vieimt \ of (.i\it and Namur. saw 
 themselves compelled to lak-' c'-rtam iinasiires of which 
 HP- l;r-t \\a> to call upon th< B'lL'ian ( io\ ' 1'iinn lit to 
 ,l at f u it hm si \ i n hours \\ In t h* r t In \' were \s illuiL! to 
 jintlittttt in Iltli'iiun (11 rmunif'fi imlitan/ \n i'<ifi<>n.\ (i^mn.^t
 
 GERMANY'S HOSTILE MEASURES 217 
 
 France. In case of refusal the matter would IK- settled 
 by recourse to arms. 
 
 The Belgian Government replied that " they deemed 
 the- information as to French movements unreliable in 
 view of the formal assurances which had just been given 
 by France ; that Belgium .solemnly protest* against all 
 violation of her territory no matter from what, quarter, 
 and re ill know how to defend with all energy her neutrality, 
 which has been guaranteed by the Great, Powers, and 
 more especially by the King of Prussia." 
 
 The assertion in Germany's ultimatum that the French 
 contemplated military operations at Givct and the accusa- 
 tion of thus threatening Germany are absurd, as Givct is 
 a French town. 
 
 After German troops had on August "2 crossed the 
 French frontier in several places, M. Viviani lodged a 
 protest with the German Government against what had 
 thus taken plaee, which constituted an unprovoked 
 violation of the frontier. 
 
 On August ,'3 the German ambassador, von Schoen, 
 handed the Premier a communication intimating that a 
 state of war with France existed and giving the following 
 reasons : '' German administrative authorities have had 
 brought to their attention a number of unmistakably 
 hostile acts committed by French military arialors. Several 
 of these have plainly violated Belgian neutrality by flying 
 orer tJie territory of that country (!) ; one has sought to 
 destroy buildings at Wesel ; others have been seen in the 
 neighbourhood of Eiffel ; and yet another has thrown 
 bombs on the railway at Carlsruhe and Nuremberg. 
 
 tk I am empowered and have' the honour to inform your 
 Excellency that the German Empire, in tin- face of these 
 attacks, considers itself to be in a stale of war with France 
 by reason of the measures taken by that country.'' 
 
 He accordingly asked for his passports. 
 
 So this was the reason which Germany elected to give 
 for her war on France. One may well be astounded at 
 this rupture, for which there was no provocation whatever
 
 218 BEFORE, DITRIXCJ, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 ^m the jxirt of France. The German Government referred 
 to France's " measures." What had France done but to 
 work hand in hand with Great Britain and Russia to 
 ai'ert war '.' She had declared that she would respect the 
 neutrality of Belgium and had not made, or even prepared 
 to make, an attack on Germany through Belgium, the 
 allegation of which is demonstrably a pure invention. 
 
 M. Yiviani emphatically contradicted the German 
 ambassador's statements, both to his face and in the 
 speech in the Chamber of Deputies on August 4, in which 
 he announced the state of war. He pointed out in his 
 speech the absurd nature of these- pretexts, and declared 
 that " no French aviator has at any time Mown over 
 Belgium ; no French aviator has either in Bavaria or in 
 any other part of Germany committed any hostile act.'' 
 
 The Premier once more drew attention to Germany's acts 
 of aggression against France. Luxemburg, and Belgium. 
 The French frontier had been crossed at fifteen points; 
 nlles had been discharged at French soldiers and custom- 
 house otlicers, several being killed and injured ; a German 
 military aviator threw three bombs on Luneville on 
 August '.]. ll< instructed the ambassador at Berlin to 
 protest to the German Government against these hostile 
 
 I 
 
 acts, since supplemented bv others: two German patrols 
 had crossed the frontier on August '2 and penetrated over 
 ten kilometres into the interior, reaching the villages of 
 .Fond:, ivy and Baron, where the ollicer in command shot a 
 French soldier t h rough the forehead, and where cavalrymen 
 
 sel/t d }| ifses. i t e. 
 
 I ranee had demonstrably committed no hostile act 
 
 and had conscientiously respected the /one of tell kilo- 
 metres b'-hind \\hich she kept her troops even after 
 mobili/at i< in. 
 
 It mav be nientioiud, bv the way. that the German 
 newspaper \'<,r-^arl* contradicted <ne of the statements 
 that |-'n neh a\iators had been seen o\vr Germany, and 
 that the G< rman Government admitted au attack on 
 I '(' neh soldiers by (it rman patrols.
 
 PROTESTS liio 
 
 In his message to Parliament on August t President 
 Poincare declared that ki France has been the victim of 
 a brutal and premeditated attack which constitutes an 
 insolent challenge to the rights of humanity. . . . France- 
 is entitled to claim most solemnly that up to the last 
 moment she made supreme efforts to avert the war which 
 has now broken out and Tor which //// (lenimn Empire 
 must bear before history a most crushing responsibility. . . . 
 France represents to-day before the world the cause of 
 liberty, of justice, and of reason." 
 
 King Albert of Belgium appealed on August 4 to Great 
 Britain, France, and Russia, as guarantors of the neutrality 
 of Belgium, to co-operate in the defence of her territory 
 against German aggression. The appeal to Great Britain 
 contained the following words : " The German Government 
 have handed the Belgian Government a Note proposing 
 a benevolent neutrality which will permit a free passage 
 through Belgian territory and promising on the conclusion 
 of peace to preserve the independence and integrity of the 
 kingdom and its possessions, but threatening in the event 
 of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy'' 1 An answer within 
 twelve hours was demanded. 
 
 The Belgian Government categorically rejected this 
 request as constituting a most flagrant violation of inter- 
 national law, and lodged a protest against this violation 
 of a treaty (Treaty of London, 18:39) to which Prussia, 
 as well as Great Britain, France, and Russia, was a signa- 
 tory. The British Government called upon the German 
 Government (August 4) to withdraw their ultimatum to 
 Belgium and to give their answer on the same day, and 
 declared themselves prepared to come to the aid of Belgium 
 in co-operation with France and Russia. 
 
 The German minister at Brussels informed the Belgian 
 Foreign Minister on the same day that " the German 
 Government, as the Belgian Government have rejected 
 the friendly proposals made by the Imperial Government, 
 will be compelled to carry out by force of arms those measures 
 which are necessitated by the French menaces."
 
 220 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 'j. \Vhcn, in view of the (ierman threats to penetrate into 
 Belgian territory by force of arms, the British ambassador 
 presented the ultimatum of his (Government and demanded 
 that Belgium's neutrality, which had been guaranteed l>y 
 treaty, should be respected, Bethnwnn-IIolhveg expressed 
 his surprise at (ireat Britain attaching so much importance 
 to the " ficnij) of paper " of 18.'M ! Seldom has the civili/cd 
 world been so dumbfounded, seldom has its sense of ri^ht 
 and wronu been so offendi-d, as by these words uttered 
 by a leading statesman, and the actions which followed 
 them. 
 
 [;. We are reminded by these incidents of what the upright 
 and enlightened Swedish Chancellor. Axel Oxenstjurnn, 
 who, with (iiistavus Adolphus and Richelieu, had so jjreat 
 a share in European j>olitics during the Thirty Years 
 War, wrote to his son Krik : ' The world is made up of 
 dissimulation and falseness; this we must rcco<jiiiy.c and 
 bear in mind, that we may not be deceived " ; and to his 
 son Julian: "Are you not aware, my son, :<.'itk ichat 
 little 'i'ixilutn the :cnrld /.v gort'rnt'd ? 
 
 Kver since Bismarck or^ani/ed the diabolical (Jcrmanism 
 and the brutal policv of mi^'ht, in accordance with Maclua- 
 velli's tf-achitiL's. international law has ceased to exist 
 in the minds of certain leading statesmen and professors 
 in (iermany. Treitschke in his works on I'nlitik (ls7l 
 and Ih'.U) openly jtropounds this <lc.elrine of illicit and 
 violence, which unfortunately has brought him many 
 admiring <li^cipl<-s. 
 
 A Stat- cannot pledge its o\\ n \\ill for times to COMIC 
 in its relations \\ith other States," hi- say--. In other 
 words, international treaties are n-it alua\s bindiiiLT "ii '-i 
 State, hut merely constitute a voluntarv restrictiiin as 
 
 1'iJil,' as the State del nis sllell l'< strict loll to be to its 
 
 advantage. 
 
 Tr it schke's disciple, (ieiieral BI rnhardi. also declares 
 t hat t here is no general inteniat ional law. and that " < \ i !'V 
 nation \\orks out its ou n conception of \\hat is ri^ht." 
 
 Thus it was in pursuance of a (iirman made pohev of
 
 PROTESTS 
 
 might and violence that Germany's leading statesmen 
 violated Belgium's neutrality. 
 
 One of the foremost exponents of the law of nations, the 
 Frenchman Montesquieu- President of Parliament, his- 
 torian, encyclopaedist wrote in his famous work L* esprit 
 des Lois (1718) on the subject of war : " Power of offence 
 is regulated by international law, which is the political 
 law of nations regarded in the light of their relations to 
 one another. . . . Law in war is based on necessity and 
 on ichat /.v strictly just. If those who guide the conscience 
 of ])rinees or are their advisers fail to abide thereby, all is 
 lost ; and if one be guided by such principles as honour, pros- 
 perity, and utility, rivers of blood will inundate the earth." 
 
 It may also be apposite to recall what Frederick the 
 Great wrote in his Antimachiarel on the sanctity of treaties : 
 " I admit that there are deplorable necessities under 
 which a prince must not recoil from breaking his treaties 
 and alliances ; but he should withdraw from them as 
 an honourable man by giving notice of his intention in 
 good time, and, above all, should not proceed to these 
 extremities unless obliged to do so for the welfare of his 
 people, or by a most urgent need. . . . Honour and 
 wisdom demand of princes that they shall religiously adhere 
 to treaties and strictly observe their prorixions."' 
 
 Now, did the welfare of the German people demand 
 that the German Government should violate the Belgian 
 treaty of neutrality ? 
 
 In his Reichstag speech of August 1 Bethmann-Hollweg 
 declared that the violation of the neutrality of Belgium 
 and Luxemburg was necessitated by Germany's " ex- 
 tremity," that " necessity knows no law/' and that this 
 is "contrary to the dictates of the Ian' of nations," but that 
 " tcr knew that France stood ready for attack -for which 
 reason we were obliged to ignore the protests of the 
 Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium/' 
 
 But he adduced no proofs, no facts, no reports or 
 intercepted documents, etc., to show France's intentions ; 
 it sufficed for him to sav : iw We knew.'
 
 22U BEFORE, DTKING, AND AFTER 1014 
 
 The Imperial Chancellor admitted, however, that the 
 rights of the neutral States had been infringed when he 
 remarked : " The wronj; whieli we eommit we shall 
 endeavour to make ^ood hereafter." 
 
 Germany asked of Belgium a " benevolent neutrality ' 
 and a free passage for her armies through Belgian territory. 
 Tims it was on strategical grounds, to the detriment of 
 France, that Germany's violation of the law of nations 
 was committed. 
 
 Had Belgium consented, she would, as the German 
 statesmen oujjht to know, herself have violated her 
 neutrality and the Treaty of ls:v., which pledged lielgium 
 not to grant any such privilege to any belligerent Power. 
 Had Belgium done so, she would thereby have given 
 France the right to let her armies march through Belgium. 
 
 It cannot be made suMiciently clear that the violation 
 of the guarantee of Belgian neutrality was thoroughly 
 pn meditated and formed part of Germany's xlrategiedl 
 plan in ea*e of \car leith J'' ranee. Lieut. -Colonel Frobenius, 
 in his book on (1< rrnant/'x Fateful Hour, published shortly 
 before the war, speaks of the possibility that "German 
 tn><>]>s may, hi/ infringing lit'lgiun neutrality, make tlieir 
 invasion through that country, or else through Swit/.er 
 land." Tin- invasion of Belgium and of Luxemburg had 
 nothing whatever to do with the alleged knowledge that 
 the French entertained a similar strategical plan, or that 
 an agreement in the nat un- of an alliance bet ween Belgium 
 and Gnat IJritam had been discovered. \<> proofs ha\c 
 In en fort hconiin^' in these respects, and these statements 
 are nothing but assertions and misrepresentations. 
 
 In G'-rmany tin y have sought to explain away Belgium's 
 neutrality and to sho\\ on tli-- authority of certain Belgian 
 doruments that Belgium h-rself broki- fur neutrality, 
 and that (iermany was. therefore, fullv entitled to treat 
 li r as an enemy. But all this has I,. , n m \am. as may be 
 cat In r '1 1 1 ' 'in the \'i >\\< iwim/ : 
 
 In i 1 u. of November '.',. |i1 I. the Ki>lnis,l>, '/'ifh:>
 
 PROTESTS i>ii3 
 
 wrote as follows : " We were within our rights in invading 
 Belgian territory, seeing that Belgium did not observe fur 
 obligations as a neutral. That this is so is clearly proved 
 by two unassailable documents, one of which has been 
 published in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine /.(itung. This 
 document proves that there existed a secret agreement 
 between Belgium and Great Britain for co-operation 
 between the military forces of those two countries in a 
 war against Germany.'' 
 
 The Belgian Government published in this connexion a 
 reply stating amongst other things that when Colonel 
 Barnadiston, military attache to the British Legation, one 
 day in January 1 '.){)<! asked General Ducarnc, of the \Var 
 OHice, whether Belgium was prepared to defend her 
 neutrality, the General answered that " we are prepared to 
 defend ourselves at Liege against Germany, at \amnr 
 against France, and at Antwerp against Great Britain." 1 
 Subsequently several conversations took place between the 
 Chief of the General Staff and the military attache regard- 
 ing the measures which Great Britain should take for the 
 performance of her duties as guarantor. 
 
 By devoting himself to the study of this question tin- 
 Chief of the General Staff merely performed the duty of 
 inquiring into the measures calculated to enable Belgium, 
 either alone or with the aid of the guaranteeing Powers, to 
 repel a violation of her neutrality. 
 
 On May 10, 1900, General Ducarne submitted to the War 
 Oflice an account of his conversations with the British 
 military attache. In this report it is made clear in two 
 separate passages that the dispatch of British assistance to 
 Belgium would be contingent upon theriolation of her territory. 
 Besides, there is a marginal note which the Norddeutschc 
 AUgcmeine Zeitung omits to translate, lest it should conn- 
 to the knowledge of the majority of its readers making 
 it unmistakably clear that British troojis a-ould not enter 
 Belgium until after Germany had violated Jier neutrality. 
 The course of events has amply demonstrated the wisdom 
 of tin's anticipation.
 
 22-1 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 11)11 
 
 A document published in the Xurddcutsche Allgemeine 
 Zcittinz on October 'J,">, l'.14, refers to a meeting between 
 (General Junjjbluth and Colonel Bridges which shows that 
 tlu- conversation about tin British uuarantcc, in r.'H', 
 led to no result. Was it necessary, then, to inform the 
 Powers that Colonel Bridges had ^ r iven a piece of advice 
 which was approved neither by the British nor (lie Belgian 
 Government and against which (ifncrul Junjjbluth im- 
 mediately protested, his interlocutor not deeming it wortli 
 while to insist ? That would have been absurd. 
 
 (n'rnniny's intcndfd justification ///?/* recoil* U]><>n In rxt'lf. 
 
 In his speech before the Kcichsta^ on August 1, 11H1, 
 and in his conversation with the British ambassador on the 
 following day, the (ierrnan Chancellor declared that the 
 attack on Belgium was solely dicta ft <l //// xlrdtt^ic necessity. 
 
 (iermany cannot plead ^ood faith, seeing that she only 
 dixcurcrfd the dnctinit'nt.s with winch she pn-t ended to 
 justify her \i> 'lath >n of Belgian neutrality <///</ xltt' had 
 dt'liht'nitt I if f > ml: i n In r h't <itif nhligntinnx. The docnmcnts to 
 which (iermanv refers show plainly that a liuliitinn nf 
 lit'lgium's nentnililif li (i<nnnini uv/.v (inticij)ttted and that 
 no agreement had ever been concluded on this <|in stion. 
 
 A speech by M. de Bro< jueville. Beli, r i:'n Premier and 
 \Var Minister, at a secret sitting of the Parliament in 1 '.!.'{ 
 with reference to the new National Ser\ ice Act, shows 
 plainly that all the (iernian Chancellor's talk of a secret 
 alliance bi-tweeii Belgium and I-'rancc is the purest fiction. 
 
 I )e Bro(|lle\ ille's speech ContallKll the follouina passage: 
 
 'Tin- ! a^on for thi- (iovernment's Army Bill is the 
 (ierman Armv Act of .July I 1, I'.H'J. This Act implies 
 the greatest strain \\lneh (iermany has imposed upon 
 h'-rself since jsTo. Last summer we learnt that it is 
 intended to I, t tin (iirnnni unnif ii<l:'ti)ici' tfirmi^h Itfl^iutn. 
 \Vr owe this infonnat ion to several for''ijn PO\VI rs. It is, 
 therefore, incumbent on u - to L r, , t , , | (,, r , ,| , ,f t !K- mat 1 1 r. 
 I fear no violation of our ii'iitrality on the part of 
 France, |,ut I am informed that the l-'niicli (i<i\trmn<*nt 
 fni\ In i n fnincllcd t'i st>nli/ tl/i r"' v ''"" "f " l''r< ni'h ildititU't'
 
 PROTESTS 225 
 
 through Belgium in the trail tliul (iernuinij should Jail d, 
 respect our territory. In ordrr to prevent a breach of our 
 neutrality we must speedily prepare in both direelion*. 
 The greatest danger is that foreign Towers may take 
 possession of our territory for the purpose of protecting 
 us. This -warning has been given us by several heads of 
 States, and as late as .July of the present year a friend of 
 the King of the Belgians, the ruler of a State, remarked 
 with emphasis to our King: k I give Belgium the friendly 
 advice to proceed with vigour to prepare for .^elf-defence, 
 for the miracle of 1870, when Belgian territory remained 
 inviolate between two hostile armies, will not be repeat ed.' ' 
 The personage in question was King Carol of Rumania. 
 
 De Broqueville also spoke of the French military 
 measures which Belgium would have to take into account in 
 considering the protection of her territory, although there 
 was good reason for assuming that France would not 
 infringe her neutrality except as a means of defence against 
 a German attack through Belgium. This was what 
 actually took place a year after the speech was made. 
 Germany obviously stood to gain infinitely more by violat- 
 ing Belgian neutrality, because she had more* rapid means 
 of attaining a war footing. This was an eventuality which 
 Belgium had to reckon with and was bound to prepare for. 
 
 King Albert, in speaking to a Swiss correspondent of the 
 Berner-Bund at the end of March T.)1.5, uttered the follow- 
 ing words, which confirmed the sentiments which the 
 Belgian Government had already expressed : " Neutrals 
 art- very sensitive to any attack or reflection on their 
 attitude. That is quite natural. I can assure you that 
 I and my country have always prior to the war ohxerre<l 
 with I he lit most conscientiousness the duties of neutruliti/ 
 prescribed Inj the Great Power*. 
 
 'Vet we are only doing what Swiss citi/ens would have 
 done, had anyone sought to infringe the neutrality of their 
 country. Our passionate lore of independence serins to 
 have surprised the enemy, and seems to have been made 
 an excuse for the assertion that we ourselves, Inj reason of </ 
 
 p
 
 220 BEFORE, DmiNc;, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 prnious agreement uith other Pourm, nere tu blame for the 
 infringement of vur neutrality. Once more I say : There is 
 no truth in this assertion." 
 
 \\ith regard t( the allegation that France- was ready to 
 attack (icrmany through Belgium, and that French regi- 
 ments were there when the war broke out, it may be of 
 interest to repeat what a Belgian lieutenant and artist, who 
 took part in the war for several months, related to tin- 
 writer (Justaf Ilellstrom, who published his statement in 
 Daaens \yhftir (November I'.Ul). 'The Ciermans," he 
 said, " plead that if they had not broken the neutrality 
 the French would have done so. Did the French do it ? 
 No, sir, when the war broke out the French had one, I say 
 one, tnixerahle army carps </<,'/// kilonu'trt'ti from the lielgian 
 frontier. Had they had more, had they thought that the 
 (iermans would have marched through Belgium, they 
 would have had ten army corps up there, and in that 
 case Charlcroi and MODS would not have looked as they 
 look now, and Belgium would have had a jjrcat many 
 towns safe in her hands, and our wretched countrymen 
 would have had no need to tramp the roads and be^ a 
 crust of bread. But, as it was, .//<///> uv/.v sndtlenly obliged 
 to transfer ///< :ehol<- of hi* nmin ooilij fi''n tti^t to north. 
 7V/ /.v tool: time, and it was we poor devils who had to suffer 
 i'( r it , we and our ci >nnt ry." 
 
 ( )n the subject of the supposed agreement with Knjjland 
 the llel-jian s;iid ; 'The (icrmans made the excuse that 
 it liii'l A/rr// Iriiilie* :>. ith Kiiflltind. \N e have seen all the 
 \\orld lias seen how much the Kn<_'lis|i \\ i i'e able to helj) 
 us. \Ve \\.11 knew ejijlit years a<_ r o that fcn^l<inil'x army 
 :i.ni/lil nut In trtiitttl until TK//' hud li/'nL< n nut. and that it 
 tak< - si\ months before they can put an armv \sort hy of 
 tin- name into the field. And if \\ < had a secret arran^'''- 
 ment \\ith Kn^'land ei^'hl \ i ars ;n_'o. \\hydid \\( not see to 
 it that \\ e had a proper arm\ In lore a f< \\ months aLjo '.' 
 
 The (i<nuan dejiuty dotliem \\rotc (in the lieiliner 
 Ta>j,l>!.itl in Decemb, r I'.Ml.i: ' That H. l U Miim would 
 be amon^ the number ! our opponents u> knt~c Jur (i
 
 PROTESTS 227 
 
 fact yearn ago, although the details of flic Prancn -Anglu- 
 Belgian agreements were unknown to us." 
 
 Hut how did they knmv this ? Nothing, absolutely 
 nothingw&s known of any Belgian enmity towards Germany. 
 Had it existed, doubtless Belgium's military organization 
 would have been more eilieient. The much advertised 
 agreements with France and Great Britain amount in 
 point of faet to nothing at all, as I have shown above. 
 
 No ; there is no real ground for the German accusations 
 against Belgium ; they are merely desperate attempts to 
 defend Germany's violation of the country's neutrality, 
 which is, and ever will be, a shameful blot on her reputa- 
 tion this is now reali/cd in Germany unless means can 
 be found of imputing to Belgium, warlike designs against 
 Germany. 
 
 The German deputy Dr. F. Naumann, in a widely read 
 and applauded address given in Berlin on January 10, 
 1915, made the following characteristic comments on 
 Belgian neutrality (I quote from the Berliner Boersen- 
 Courier) : 
 
 " When one utters the word ' neutrality ' one is neutral 
 only in the sense that one awaits (nur ini Sinne Abicartens] 
 the shaping of events. 
 
 " Had not the preposterous settlement of 1839 taken 
 place, whereby a State was permitted to wage war, main- 
 tain armies, and build fortresses whilst itself remaining 
 immune from attack, the course of action in regard to 
 Belgium would now have been extraordinarily simple. 
 We should merely have said, as Bismarck did in lSt><> to 
 Hanover : ' Will you, or won't you ? ' As it was. tin- 
 British had an excellent excuse for upholding the validity 
 of the ' paper ' of 1839." 
 
 So Dr. Naumann, too, regards a treaty as a mere 
 piece of paper : to him, in other words, there is no such 
 thing as international law. 
 
 Some have maintained that Belgium had no valid 
 neutrality treaty at all. 
 
 The German professor Dr. Dernburg and a pro-German
 
 228 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1911 
 
 professor in America, Mr. Burgess, have thus attempted 
 to prove that Belgium's neutrality, guaranteed by tlie 
 Treaty of l.s.'J'J, has ceased to be guaranteed by the Powers 
 since the Guarantee Treaty of 1S70, enacted in connexion 
 with the Franco (ierman War, expired in 1M72. "Since 
 then neither France nor the (ierman Empire has renewed 
 the old Treaty of IS.'JU. nor have they concluded a fresh 
 one," says Burgess in attempting to prove that Belgium 
 had no guaranteed neutrality at all. 
 
 The Treaty of 1S7<>, however, provides that "after the 
 expiration of this period [twelve months from the ratifica- 
 tion of peace] Helium's independence and neutrality shall 
 continue, as heretofore, to be based on Art. 1 of the Treaty 
 of the Five Powers of April 17 ID, 1S.T./' 
 
 l)ernbur<4 simply omitted this termination of the treaty 
 and has thus been <_ r uiltv of a palpable falsification. Such 
 are the methods which have been employed in (ierman 
 quarters to seek to justifv the outrageous violation of the 
 neutrality of Belgium. 
 
 In a collection of essays on Deiitsehhind nnd d< r \\tlt- 
 kric (from 7,t itschrift fur I'olkcrrcchL I'.'M) a number of 
 (ierman scientists have come forward to defend Germany s 
 position in the war. and above all her I'i^ht In commit the 
 nron^ which the Chancellor admitted in regard to Belgium. 
 
 Professor Kohle r, in his essay on Self-defence and 
 \i ntralitii, declared t hat t he violation of Belgian neutrality 
 was a 1 y pieal < \ain| ile of an ae-t of " ju*ti finlilf s< lf-dt ft nee, ' 
 as I-'ranee \\as read\ to let h< r troops march thnnidi the' 
 coiintrv. He in. nlv re-peats \\hat the Chancellor said on 
 the siibjiet, \diie-h is a demonstrable untruth, and e>n 
 
 pi llll^S' s slleh as t lii si the p foe if of si If ( |, f, -nee is ol' course 
 easy. 
 
 KohN-r contends that Belgium hael no ridit to oppose 
 the pa^a;_'e of t he (iirman troops, that, on the- contrary. 
 
 die ull'jtit fo lilt: t lit 1 1 U il I In III !'i U al'el off the pl'i I IH I 1 1 1 ; 1 1 I ( 1 
 
 breach of neutrality l>\ I'ranc' ! F\nlentl\- he is not 
 
 MUal'e of HI I^'IUIII s nil! I i'/ll /nil to I'l I'llse sllell passage. lie 
 
 j/eie-s on to explain that I'du'iuin had an Uliele rst alidili^
 
 PROTESTS 220 
 
 witli France, and repeats the unconfirmed or disproved asser- 
 tions that French troops were taken to Belgium and crossed 
 the German frontier before the declaration of war, etc. 
 
 The same is alleged by another author, Nelte, in an essay 
 on Die belgixche Fruge, and he says that, the town of 
 Erquelines was occupied by French troops, which was not. 
 the case; it is also asserted that, the late French War 
 Minister Picquart made a journey through Belgium to 
 inspect the fortresses on the Meuse and that French 
 aviators had down over Belgian territory all suHieient 
 reasons for annulling the treaty of neutrality (rf. declara- 
 tions of French and Belgian Governments, pp. i'l."> 'J'JO). 
 
 Nelte admits, however, that there are eminent experts 
 on international law in Germany who have prinilcli/ 
 expressed their disapproval of the plea of self-defence. 
 
 When the great Dutch writer and thinker F. van Feden 
 in an open letter to his German friends eritici/ed the 
 attempts which have been made in German quarters to 
 convince foreign countries of the legitimacy of German 
 warfare in Belgium and of the reprisals against the opposi- 
 tion of Belgian civilians, and when he declared that " the 
 curse of the evil deed is that it goes on creating evil," 
 meaning by the evil deed the violation of Belgian neu- 
 trality. W. von Blumc, professor of jurisprudence at 
 Tubingen, wrote in reply an article 1 in 7^/.v fjmv.sr/r Dcutxch- 
 land (November '28, 1914) entitled Die belgixche \eittnilitiit 
 und tc'/r. He says, to begin with, that even Germany has 
 her " well-intentioned men, who thoughtfully shook their 
 heads over our march into Belgium," and explains that " it 
 is not the same to us how honest people regard us," and 
 that ' ; we have always relied too much on our clear con- 
 science and our trusty sword, and have not suflieiently 
 taken into account that in international relations a <i<n>d 
 reputation is an clement of strength." But in this ease, he 
 says, " we are vainly struggling against calumny," and 
 he proceeds to show that Germany was entirely within her 
 right when she allowed her armies to march into Belgium, 
 and that the countrv itself violated it - m-utralitv.
 
 230 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1014 
 
 Seldom has a German professor used such an apparatus 
 of learned advocacy to annihilate an opponent as Blume 
 doc.s in this article, by which he seeks to safeguard Ger- 
 many's "good reputation." The reader may judge for 
 himself from the following summary of his article : 
 
 The Germans occupied Belgium by force, he says, 
 because they were refused a passage, although they were 
 i-ntitled to it by the right of Wir.v.v/'///. " There exists 
 among the nations a right of necessity, which transforms 
 t rent if* into xcrapx of paper and rescinds them for the sake 
 of a hi fur right. This and nothing else was meant hy the 
 German Imperial Chancellor when he spoke the famous 
 word which our enemies have quoted with hypocritical 
 indignation/' 
 
 It will he seen from this that " scrap-of-paper " cynicism 
 has now become part and parcel of German ethics ! 
 
 " International law," says Blume, " rests on the funda- 
 mental conception of intcrntithnml fclhncxhip. No neu- 
 tralitv can give anyone the right always and in all circum- 
 stances to he inviolable in the face of the neighbours' 
 extremity in war. Just as the iniitr.il State must give 
 an asvlum to troops who wish to light no more, it nittxt 
 in certain circumstances permit lighting armies to march 
 through its territorv. The right of ' /JMV.V >//;/ /\ the higher 
 n'i'ht. But it is a *ine f/na non, however, that the State 
 demanding the right of passage niuxf beifnnd doiiht he en 
 'j<i<j.ttl in a ju*t tlt-ft nee tigainxt attach', and itnalde t<> :i'ard off 
 tin' nlltn-L- i tci /it hi/ *<ttinn /not mi !h< fnreign hrritori/." 
 
 This, of course, is the point at issue, hut. in spite of the 
 contention-, of Blume and innumerable others that Ger- 
 many \\as in this [lo-ition, there exists I repeat it once 
 more tin t~ ulfjict "i : fniti"i'i'r ><\ I* ranees plan ti> attack 
 Germany through Belgium, or of B< Ilium's secret alliance 
 \\ith J-'raiu'e and Knuland. This h:is lieennie a li\ed idea 
 \\ith the (erman d< fender-, of the breach o|' niutrality, 
 :tnd i^ r i>ated quite meclianic-ally. Mlume's revilaticii 
 "f h<.\\ B. h/mm infringed her i.\\ti neutrality, h'\\ m 
 collusion \-,ith Germany s < \\< mn s she jinjxind l/n tn/r
 
 DECLARATION OF WAR 
 
 against Germany," how in Berlin "this was suspected with- 
 out possibility of absolute proof 7 ' when the Chancellor ex- 
 posed France's assumed plan of marching through Belgium 
 " all this has now at length been brought to light through 
 the archives of the Belgian General Staff." He speaks of 
 the celebrated papers concerning the conferences between 
 the British military attache and the Belgian General Staff in 
 190(5, etc., which have been fully proved not to imply any 
 preparations of war against Germany (see pp. L'L'L'-'JL'.'J). 
 Blume proceeds: "I am quite prepared for the next 
 retort, that Belgium look precautions merely in (lie eicnt 
 of her being attacked by Germany." lie must be well aware 
 that this was the case, and yet he says that " we knoic that 
 Belgium made every preparation for the operations of the 
 allied armies." 
 
 A spirit of utter fanaticism seems to have obscured the 
 reasoning faculties and blighted all sense of justice in the 
 mind of this eminent professor of jurisprudence. 
 
 But it is not enough that Belgium should herself have- 
 violated her neutrality ; this culpable country has further 
 offended against her obligations as a neutral by not having 
 armed sufficiently ! One can hardly believe one's own 
 eyes. The learned " Professor der Reehte '' teaches as 
 follows : " It is the duty of a neutral State to be so icell 
 armed that its neutrality does not become a danger to its 
 neighbours. A State which has not performed this duty 
 does not deserve to retain its neutrality. Its neutrality 
 becomes a worthless scrap of paper, if the others consider it 
 obnoxious (!)... That Belgium TCY/.V not sufficiently ;>;v- 
 pared to ward off a hostile attack has now been proved to 
 the consternation of that deluded country. . . . No. my 
 neutral friends, neutrality is not a house which others 
 have built for you, that you may reside in comfort therein. 
 whilst others must purchase their existence dailv with the 
 sweat of their brow. . . . If a neutral State 1 fails to secure 
 its safety by its own efforts, whilst trust in^ to its neutrality, 
 it becomes a danger to others, for it mu-t. by a policy oj 
 alliances, make ijood what it lacks in defensive strength.
 
 232 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 . . . When Belgium neglected her armaments she became 
 dependent on the will <>f her neighbours. When she entered 
 into negotiations with one neighbour concerning her 
 attitude in east- <>f war she failed grossly in her duties to- 
 wards the others. When, in line, she was allied to one 
 she could not on the outbreak of war claim to occupy a 
 neutral position. She thtrclnj forfeited her neutrality." 
 
 This reasoning compels the conclusion that Hclgium 
 /. rt'sjmnsiblf for her war with (icrmany and consequently 
 for Kngland's intervention, which so enlarged tin- sphere 
 of war //// neglecting In rnixc <i sufficient tirnii/ to jircrcnt 
 (itnmini/ front inrudinu her territory and occupying the 
 count r i/ ! 
 
 Belgium had. as a matter of fact, adopted a new system 
 of national defence, but hail not had time to carry it through 
 in r.l 1. She had not been altogether neglectful, but she- 
 had delayed t he reform. 
 
 That the war came so suddenly was hardly Belgium's 
 fault : it was (icrmanv's will. Hut. supposing that the 
 
 I I 
 
 new Belgian sch< me of national defence had been fully 
 completed, does anyone think that (Jermany with her 
 preparedness for war and her colossal armii s would not 
 liave given Belgium short shrift \\heii she had made up her 
 mind to march t h rough ? We saw how in t he initial st ages 
 of the war the (ierman armies smashed the resistance 
 of I lie I'Yencli and even t hivat < in -d Paris, so t hat the I 1 ' fell eh 
 (iovernment was compelled for a t imc to move to Bordeaux. 
 In refutation of the " ri-liablc information"' as to the 
 projected TYciM'h advance through Belgium along the Meiise 
 
 I J ."~ 
 
 \ ia ( ii\ t N;-. mur, it is of t he greatest interest to not e what 
 a dist in^uishi-d S\sedish militar\ writer. Captain .1. 
 Hall'jren, \\rote in his scries of articles on "The World 
 \\ar" in the ie\n\\ i'<,nun on \o\imbir 7, I'.'ll. lie 
 points out that the (Germans on August 1 '. be^an the 
 attack on Namur, and on AiiLfist % _'o siini'd prepared to 
 be|_-in t he decisive ope rat ions, and t hat it was on Iv about this 
 tin, that the I'raiieo Biitish army \\ a s nady alon^ t he 
 r. 'That t ! i- \\\\< - w re not i > ad v sooner
 
 DEFENDERS OF VIOLATION OF NEUTRALITY ii'J.3 
 
 may well excite surprise. The French should, if the trans- 
 port arrangements h;ul from the beginning been directed 
 towards Belgium, have been ready before tin- Germans. 
 From this we may draw two conclusions : That the Fn nch 
 did not contemplate an advance through lit-l^ium at the In-pin- 
 ning ofthewar, and that the- main (ierrnan onslaught through 
 that country came as a surprise."' 
 
 Hut what is the use of all these sophistical arguments and 
 unproved assertions about Hclgium's alleged breach of 
 neutrality when Het hmann -Hollweg expressly declared t hat 
 the violation of Helgium's neutrality was a :cni<i and was 
 a measure of " self-defence/' and wlien the Chancellor did 
 not even hint that to his knowledge Helgium would figure 
 as Germany's enemy and had a see-ret alliance with England 
 and France ? 
 
 We have besides, from a German source, an uncom- 
 promising explanation of why Germany is waging this war. 
 It comes from Maximilian Harden, who in his review Die 
 Ziikunft (October 17, 191-t) expressed his opinion in the 
 following terms : 
 
 " It is not (igainxl our oicn rn'// that we have committed 
 ourselves to this tremendous adventure. \Ve have not 
 been forced into it by surprise. We tcilled it we had to 
 will it. Mighty Germany does not propose to appear 
 before the tribunal of Europe ; we recognize no such 
 tribunal. 
 
 " Our growth in power will create new laws for Europe. 
 // ?'.v tier man >/ :<.'!/ xtrikex. 
 
 " Germany wages the war in the unshakable conviction 
 that ^vhat she lias accomplished entitles her to a more 
 prominent place in (lie -^orld and more elbow-room for her 
 activities. 
 
 " Spain, Portugal. Holland. France, and Great Britain 
 long ago took possession of and eoloni/ed enormous 
 stretches of country, the richest in the world. Now 
 Germany's hour has struck, and she miM take up her 
 dominant position in the world !
 
 231 BEFORE, DTKING, AND AFTER 1911 
 
 With regard to Belgium. Harden says that never was a 
 justcr war wau'cd than that in which Belgium has been 
 crushed, nor has a war ever been a source of greater 
 blessing to the conquered people! 
 
 When Belgium expressly stated that she would not 
 permit the passage of the German troops, and was bound 
 to act thus under her treaty of neutrality. Germany's in- 
 tervention with armed force became an act of barbarism. 
 This method of farcing a nation into war, when it had 
 done no wron-j and shown no hostile intentions, and this 
 deliberate violation of a treaty which had been he-Id 
 absolutely sac-red and liael been accepted by civilized 
 nations as part and parcel of their code of e-thic-s, have- 
 everywhere' caused the- greatest depression and indignation. 
 The duty of observing political neutrality cannot tie- down 
 the neutral citi/.ens of ne-utral countries to an ethical 
 iKutrnlitij that is, in other words, to indifference and 
 nonchalance; they have, on the contrary, expressed 
 themselves strongly auainst this violation of the rights 
 of it hers and the exaggerated and ruthle-ss method of 
 punishing the participation of the e-!vil population in the- 
 defence of their country against the usurper. Germany's 
 jjood name was indelibly tarnished by tin assault on 
 Belgium, and n<i appeal to Germanic kinship has be-e-n 
 capable of propitiating other nations of Germanic stock. 
 The sense of justice and humanity is stronger than the 
 sentiment of kinship, and this latter disappears entirely 
 \\hen unjust and cruel acts are committed. 
 
 H iL'ht i on- in -s-, \\ill ne\'er tolerate injustice. wherever 
 it m.iv lie committed. 'I he \'i>ie-e ol conscience must 
 never be stilled or silenced. A solemnly ctiaetid treaty 
 has I.e. n trampled underfoot, and Germanic peoples 
 out ide Germany cannot, becaiisi they come of t he same 
 stock, endorse this policy of mii'ht. however milch tluv 
 ma\ admire G< rmanv's ad\aiic< d culture. They grieve 
 o\ i r this fall from the hi;/h place \\hich German culture 
 but MM \ are not alto.. 
 H7.s 1 )' nmark wa > \ nt
 
 WHAT FORCED GREAT BRITAIN INTO WAR 235 
 
 policy of might, and the Schleswigers an- to this day 
 groaning under its sinister dominance. 
 
 WHAT FOKCKD GHKAT BRITAIN INTO TIIK WAK 
 
 The German Foreign Minister, Herr von Jagow, instructed 
 his ambassador in London, Prince Liehnowsky, on August \ 
 to inform Sir Kdward Grey that "the German army 
 could not he exposed to a French atlacl; through lielgium, 
 as to the planning of which lie had absolutely incontro- 
 vertible evidence. Germany was, therefore, compelled 
 to disregard Jlelgiiun's neutrality, seeing that to Germany 
 it was a matter of life and death to prevent the French 
 advance." 
 
 On the same day Sir Kdward Grey was advised that 
 German troops had entered Belgian territory and that Liege 
 had been called upon to surrender by a small German 
 body, which, however, was repulsed. 
 
 In view of these events the British Government's 
 request that Germany should respect Belgium's neutrality 
 was changed into an ultimatum, which the British ambas- 
 sador was to present to the Chancellor on August 1. 
 This ultimatum drew attention to the German Govern- 
 ment's threat to Belgium to resort to force of arms if 
 Belgium did not grant a free passage to German troops, 
 and to the fact that Belgian territory had been violated 
 at Gemenich. " In these circumstances, and in view of 
 the fact that Germany has declined to give the same 
 assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week 
 in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin 
 and Paris, we must repeat that request and ask that a 
 satisfactory reply be made to-day. If this is not done, 
 you are instructed to ask at once for your passports and 
 to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take 
 all steps in their power to uphold ihe neutrality f liel^ium 
 ant! the obxerrance of a treaty to which Germany is as 
 much a party as ourselves." 
 
 Great Britain's policy could ,'">/ hare h,-cn J (ft rent in
 
 236 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 the face of the- aggressive attitude of Germany and in view 
 
 of all the persistent efforts which her Foreign Minister 
 
 as well as those of France and Russia had made to prevent 
 
 the Serbian eonlliet from developing into a general \var. 
 
 The Austrian and German ambassadors in London were 
 
 certainly guilty of a piece of poor political judgment when. 
 
 as reported by M. Paul C'amhon on July '_'?. they lirmly 
 
 reckoned on Kngland's neutrality, us did the German Govern - 
 
 rnent up to the last moment. To judge from Sir Kdward 
 
 Goschen's account of the impression \\hieh the British 
 
 ultimatum created, it seems that Hetlunann-Hollwey lost 
 
 his head completely and suddenly reali/.ed the danger 
 
 which now threatened (iermany through her Government's 
 
 hold but unwise policy. The dreamt -of war with France 
 
 and Russia was now through Great Britain's intervention 
 
 about to become a \crl<l :o//' and (iermany would no longer 
 
 be able to bring her o|)ponents to their knees and dictate 
 
 terms of peace as quickly as she had hoped to do. This 
 
 ought to have been foreseen by the Chancellor. Instead, 
 
 he was taken hv surprise and overwhelmed with anger, 
 
 but he aKo show< d how little he. in common with Treit schke 
 
 and Bernhardi, respected the sanctity of treaties. \Vhcn 
 
 he could no longer hope for the a<l vantage of keeping 
 
 Fngland neutral, he felt that lie must at least hold i])i<j_hind 
 
 rt'sj)>iiixil>lt /'// the Tiv/r a war which had already been 
 
 declared to be the struggle of Germanism against Slavism 
 
 and to have been created by the Si rim Austrian eonlliet ! 
 
 In the Chancelli ir's speech before the Reichstag and 
 
 throughout tin- Press it was the same story: 'The 
 
 German nation has b, , n forced thr"U:jh (ireat Britain 
 
 to light for IN lit'.." This is the stock phrase which 
 
 n cut's time a lid aL'.'tm. In his speech in the Reichstag on 
 
 December 'J, I'.Ht. B- t h ma nn 1 1. -II \s . - <! ela r, < I : " (irrnt 
 
 Uritnin nml IIIIMHI tn'jilhir Iniir In fun Cid mnl i/iiin t/n 
 
 r< ^ i,n.\-ifiil>li/ \r this catastrophe \\hieh has entjulfed 
 
 J''.iii-ot,e and the human race." 
 
 \\liMi a(terman manifesto against FiiL'land on account 
 e| h< r part ieip:it ion m the \\; ( r had b en sent out, signed
 
 WHAT FORCED GKKAT BRITAIN INTO WAR 237 
 
 by the leading lights of the learned world of (in-many, 
 there was published in reply u manifesto signed by a large 
 number of British men of science who defended Gnat 
 Britain's policy. Its main points were to the following 
 effeet : 
 
 " Up to the very last there was a widespread wish to 
 preserve Great Britain's neutrality, provided that it could 
 be done without dishonour. But (iennany herxelf made 
 this impossible. 
 
 "Our strongest feelings and our most vital interests 
 arc- alike bound up with the neutrality of Belgium. Its 
 violation would not only destroy the independence of 
 Belgium ; it would undermine the whole foundation which, 
 on the whole, makes it possible for a State to be neutral. 
 
 "When Germany prepared before our eyes to break the 
 treaty to which we and Germany were joint signatories, 
 and when we saw that she expected to find in England a 
 cowardly accomplice, then hesitation became impossible 
 even to the most peace-loving Englishman. Belgium 
 appealed to the pledged word of England, and England 
 kept her word. 
 
 4 ' We deeply deplore that under the sinister influence 
 of a military system and //.v /{/riYr.v.v dream* of conquest the 
 country which we once honoured now stands revealed 
 as the common enemy of Europe and of all nations who 
 respect international law. We must continue the war 
 we have begun. To us, as to Belgium, it is a defensive 
 war, a war for freedom and i>e<ice." 
 
 The manifesto is signed by 11(1 English, Scotch, and 
 Irish scientists, amongst whom are no fewer than four 
 Nobel Prize winners, namely, Lord Rayleigh, Chancellor 
 of the University of Cambridge. Sir W. Ramsay, professor 
 of chemistry, Sir J. ,T. Thomson, professor of physics, and 
 Sir Ronald Ross, professor of medicine. 
 
 Exactly the same opinion is expressed in a work by 
 six members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern IINtory 
 entitled Why We Are at War (translated into Swedish), 
 in which the authors, E. Barker, II. W. C. Davis, etc.,
 
 238 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1014 
 
 declare that they are n<>t themselves politicians and belong 
 to different schools of thought. They proceed very 
 systematically to describe the most important events 
 preceding tin- war, the alliances and armaments which 
 followed after 1 S? 1 , the Serbian crisis, the negotiations 
 between the Powers, the new German policy of might, 
 etc. 
 
 " History," say the authors, " will doubtless jiscribc 
 the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Germany 
 to the development of the Belgian question, and, we- arc 
 confident, W 'H j ut ^ a ' that, had it not been for the gratuitous 
 attack made on a neutral country by Germany, war with 
 Great Britain would not have endued on August 4, 1911. 
 \Ve know now that there was no chance of the efforts at 
 mediation proving successful, for Germany had made up 
 her mind that they should not succeed. Nothing but a 
 German invasion of Belgium could have convinctd the 
 British that German diplomacy had degenerated into 
 robbery. Kngland is not lighting the German people; 
 she is lighting the political system which at the present 
 time the Cierman Kmpire represents." 
 
 Although the immediate cause of Great Britain's inter- 
 vent n n in t lie War of 1 1H 1 was t he ; inltitii/n of tltf neutrality 
 of lit' I gin in and the ihrcutrncd piitiilinn "/ France, she had 
 another motive for participation in the war, that of .v<7/- 
 ilif< nc(' against Gfrttmni/'s Droning /nr^ir. This motive 
 has not been repudiated in Kngland, and hence it is unfair 
 to speak of British hypoerisv. The 7'/;m-.v wrote at the 
 beginning of the war : \\ e are not goin^ to war for tin- 
 sake of Serbia, we are not goini,' to war tor the sake of 
 Russia, we are going to war for the \<;/,r n/ ur (f.cti t.nsl- 
 <ncf, 'I'll'- same paper on March S. |'.il.">, declari-d that 
 "when Kni,'Iand, to redi t m her pli du r d \\ord, interveiK'd 
 
 Ml defence of Belgium We klleW \e|'V \Vill, Ml keipillL,' it, 
 
 that self-interest has jjone hand in hand with honour, 
 with justice, and \\ith p'lv. \Nhy did we <_ r uarant<-e t he 
 nenti.tlit\- of Belgium 7 1'or an imperioiis reason of sell' 
 int<i--t, for the reason which has alwavs made us resist
 
 WHAT FOHCKD GKF.AT BRITAIN INTO \\.\n j:)i 
 
 the establishment of any Great Power u\< T against our 
 east coast. Ilcrr von Ih'thnmim-Holhvejj is quite right. 
 Even if Germany had not invaded Belgium, honour and 
 interest would have united us with France. We had 
 refused, it is true, to give her or Russia any binding pledge 
 up to the last moment. We had, however, for many 
 years past led both to understand that, if they were 
 unjustly attacked, they might rely upon our aid. To 
 pillory us in such a position of infamous isolation has 
 long been a darling dream of the Wilhehust rasse. I 
 would materially advance Germany's schemes of world- 
 empire, to which, as she clearly sees, the destruction 
 or the humiliation of England is an indispensable pre- 
 liminary." 
 
 Great Britain had, with regard to France-, good reason 
 to participate in the war. Sir Edward Grey declared, in 
 reply to the German neutrality proposals on July .'JO, that 
 Great Britain could not stand aside whilst France was 
 being crushed, and that, if France were involved without 
 having shown an unreasonable spirit. Great Britain, t><o, 
 would be drawn in. The British Government thereupon, 
 on August 'J, gave the French Government the assurance 
 that " if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through 
 the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against 
 French coaxts or shipping, the British licet will give- all 
 the protection in its power." 
 
 This assurance was given because the French licet, 
 according to an agreement with Great Britain, had been 
 transferred to the Mediterranean, so that it was not able 
 to protect the coasts of France. 
 
 If Great Britain had remained neutral. Germany would 
 in all probability soon have defeated France a consum- 
 mation relied upon in Germany pursuant to a preconceived 
 strategic plan but this Great Britain would not permit; 
 hence the Franco-British Entente. 
 
 That (ircat. Britain was bound to Miit herself actively 
 to the actions of France and Russia, both in the common 
 European interest and in her unn. was made clear by
 
 210 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1014 
 
 Mr. Asquith ;is well as by Sir Fdward (iny in their speeches 
 of August .'{ ; : 
 
 "If France were beaten," said Sir Edward (irey, "if 
 she lost her position as a (ireat Power and became 
 subordinate to tin- will of a 7'ouvr ^rtnttr than herself, 
 if Hclgium fell under the same dominating influence and 
 then Holland and then Denmark, would not (in at Britain 
 feel that then- would be a common interest against the 
 unmeasured aggrandi/emcnt of the Power which sought 
 to bring about this result '.' The country must reali/e 
 the full magnitude' of the dangers which wire hanging 
 over Western Furope. (ireat Hritain could not wait, and 
 at the end of such a war she could not prevent the whole 
 ol the \\est of Kurope falling under the domination of a 
 single Power." 
 
 Mr. Asquith pointed out that (in at Hritain was lighting 
 "to vindicate principles of vital import to civih/.ation : 
 the sanctity of solemn international obligations, and the 
 right of small nations not to be crushed by the arbitrary 
 will of a strong and overmastering Power." 
 
 (in at Hrilain's TI//O// y/o.s/////;/ was, mort o\ cr, threatened 
 by (iermanv'.s assault on France and Belgium, for this 
 might lead to (lerman mastery of the Channel, which 
 (in at Hritain could never permit. 
 
 When Sir Fdward (irey on July .'5<> ga\'e his reply to 
 Hethmann Ilollweg on the subject of the neutrality offer, 
 intimating that (ireat Hritain \votild act on the suit uf 
 Hclginni and France if these countries wen- attacked, t he 
 dermaii Chancellor oii!_ r lit not to have been so surprised 
 and aii'_'i\ a-> he was \sln n Sir Fd\\ard (ioschen submitted 
 (ireat Hritain s ultimatum on August 1. The -jiiiiriinti t~ 
 
 '// litl'jlllins tli lit III! it I/ Ti //.v In (iltill Itl'lftlin the eoriKf 
 
 stone n"t only of international la\\ but aUo uf the 
 political fabric of NNevdrn l - !uro|ie. and u a - the r 
 a struggle \\hieh (ireat Hritain had carn d on 
 to finiint d tmliturij (i/int I'n-.nr /rm/i 
 Cfutnn.l. 
 
 H'thmann II<ll\vcg on^ht to ha\
 
 WHAT FORCED GREAT BRITAIN INTO WAR L'tl 
 
 was by no means u secret, especially as Germany had 
 embarked on a colonial policy for her surplus population 
 and had of late become a great naval Power. 
 
 He ought to have borne in mind Richelieu's words in 
 his Political Testament: " By /orrv /<,'/// one can n-adily 
 avert many ills which can only be cured with dillieulty 
 once they have developed. . . . He who looks far ahead 
 does naught with precipitation, because he has had ample 
 time to weigh his acts, and one rarely does wrong when 
 one has deliberated maturely beforehand." 
 
 To say that Great Britain wanted war with Germany to 
 disarm this dangerous competitor is undoubtedly an 
 unjust charge. Everything goes to prove the contrary. 
 
 That, on the other hand, when war seemed inevitable, 
 she ranged herself by the side of France and Russia with 
 an eye to her own interests, there can be no doubt, for 
 her ichole existence would hare been threatened by Germany's 
 supremacy. And this supremacy would prove a very 
 great danger indeed were Germany, as was feared, to 
 obtain a firm footing in Holland and Belgium or on th<- 
 North Sea coasts opposite England. That Great Britain 
 now intervened on account of the violation of t he neut rality 
 of Belgium cannot be set down as an act of duplicity. 
 This intervention was thoroughly justified by her duties 
 as guarantor, and she had two good reasons for going to 
 war with Germany. On this point no German statesman 
 ought to have been in doubt. 
 
 Certain well-known historical factors make England's 
 policy perfectly obvious. Her aim has always been, as 
 a matter of life and death to her, to prevent a Great Power 
 from obtaining the mastery of this north-western corner 
 of Europe. When Louis XIV made up his mind to conquer 
 Belgium and subdue Holland, England joined Sweden 
 and Holland in a Triple Alliance (IOCS) for the purpose 
 of helping Spain to retain Belgium, a design winch in 
 the main proved successful. In the Austrian "U ar of 
 Succession (1741-48) England joined Austria in order, 
 with the aid of Holland, to combat her enemy France 
 
 Q
 
 242 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1014 
 
 when that Power invaded Austrian Belgium, and by the 
 Peace <>f Aix-la-Chapolk 1 England secured the restoration 
 of Belgium. Later on, during the (Great Revolution, 
 Enpland once more had to oppose France in Belgium, the 
 Republic having occupied the country in IT'.i'J. France's 
 indefat i<jable enemy, the younger Pitt, announced to the 
 (Government of the Republic that " (Great Britain would 
 never permit that France should arbitrarily arrogate to 
 IK TSI !f t he riyht to break up the political system of Furope, 
 and the British (iovernment would never look <>n with 
 indifference whilst France made herself the mistress of the 
 Netherlands and the arbiter of Europe's rights and liberties." 
 Recently, however, a rftil prnnf \\i\t come to li^ht in con- 
 firmation of the decl a rat ion of the Brit ish (Government that 
 it was (Germany's violation of Belgium's neutrality which 
 determined them in favour of war with (Germany. This 
 evidence is supplied by certain information published at 
 the be^inniiiLT of April 1 '.'1 ."> in the I.iilmur I.< n>li r, t he or^an 
 of the I n<lt/>< >ul<nt /lii'^lixh Lulmur l'<irh/. to the following 
 effect : " \\"e think that we are ri^'hl in sayinir that a week 
 before (Great Britain's ultimatum to (Germany the majority 
 of the members of the Cabinet wi re opposed to British 
 intervention. \N"e kno\\- on the !ii:_ r li< v t possible authority 
 that e\'en when \\c stood on the threshold of war the 
 Premier had in his hands the resignation of six members 
 of the (Government. Mr. .\s<juith. Sir Edward (Grey, and 
 what we may call the Imperialist unnip in the (Government 
 favound (Great Britain's intervention on account of the 
 Entente with France and Russia and the secret pledges 
 
 of the Foreign Ollice. The other L'l'ollp was opposed to 
 
 such intervention. //" (it-rnmni/ hml iml ini;r< '! <l in!<> 
 litl^unn it is }>r<f},/il/lc ti/iit <i liir^f ^rniiji : ( ill/in tin (',il>i>/i/ 
 "t'oulfl ha~'f I'i'si'jni'i}. and that a Coalition (Government 
 would have been formed. f-r letters froiu Lord L;uisdo\vnc 
 and Mr. Bonar Law to Mr. A^'|uith shou-ed that the 
 Imperialists could reckon on tli-ir support. '/'/;/ (it-rwini 
 in; mit, ft i if' Ili'ln iinn cnn-,'n!l //;// out of the s|\ reealei 
 trant. into supporters of the war party. Lord Morlev
 
 CAUSES OF THE WORLD WAR 213 
 
 and Mr. John Burns persisted in their attitude and resigned, 
 and they were joined by a member of the Ministry, Mr. 
 C. P. Trcvelyan." 
 
 Mr. Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Kxelirrjucr, 
 declared in an interview published in J'earsun's Ma^a:.im- 
 that he would not have eared to share the responsibility 
 of a declaration of war had nut liel^ium been allackea 1 , and 
 lie thought he might say tin; same on behalf of most, if 
 not all, of his colleagues. 
 
 This shows that, by the breach of neutrality, Germany 
 drove another enemy into arms against her, and, in the 
 circumstances, the most dangerous of them all. More- 
 over, it was this breach of faith which consolidated British 
 opinion in favour of the war. 
 
 There is no ground for the suggestion that Great Britain 
 deliberately brought about, the war; on the contrary, her 
 attitude in the Austro-Serbian crisis showed that she was 
 anxious to secure a peaceful solution. 
 
 In spite of the trade rivalry with Germany there was 
 an excellent chance of composing all differences in a 
 friendly spirit and of satisfying the mercantile interests 
 both of Great Britain and Germany : the British colonies 
 were not menaced by Germany any more than the German 
 colonies were menaced by Great Britain. 
 
 SYNOPSIS or THE CAUSES or THE Wom.n WAR 
 I. Causer remote 
 
 If we look back upon the principal happenings in Europe 
 during the past ccnturv, we find the following antecedent, 
 
 I * 
 
 remote, or predisposing causes of the World War : 
 
 (1) Germanism, originally a necessary reaction after 
 Germany's defeats in the Napoleonic wars, became a 
 chauvinistic obsession, bringing with it a false racial policy 
 based on Germanistic megalomania. 
 
 (2) Prussia established under Bismarck's guidance her 
 hegemony of Germany by the Danish War of IStH and the 
 German War of I860.
 
 244 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 (3) Bismarck provoked the Franco-German War of 
 1870, by which he aimed at and paved the way for 
 Germany's hegemony in Europe under the leadership 
 of the military State of Prussia. 
 
 (4) Germany's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine hi 1871, 
 consequent upon which Germany, out of iVar of a war of 
 revenue on the part of France, continuously increased her 
 military strength, forced France into corresponding arma- 
 ments, threatened her with a new war, created the Triple 
 Alliance and gave rise to the Franco-Russian Alliance. 
 
 (.">) \ftvTt\\cRusso-Turkish War r;/ 1877-78, which made 
 an end of Turkish oppression in the Balkan peninsula and 
 pave rise to independent Balkan States, the Berlin Congress 
 of l.s7S garc Austria adrantagcs at Russia's expense, with 
 the result that Russia began to make overtures to France. 
 
 (<) Austria's mandate from the Berlin Congress to 
 occupy Jiosnia ami Herzegovina and the arbitrary annexa- 
 tion of the provinces in l'.M)S, violating the spirit of 
 nationality and adding fuel to the Serbian agitation 
 against Austria. 
 
 (7) (itrmani/'s orer- population ami colonial policy gave 
 rise to the creation of a powerful Meet and the growth <>f 
 an aggressive policy which operated as a threat against 
 other I'owers. 
 
 //. Causer pro.rinur 
 
 The events which may be set down as proximate- causes 
 of the World War were : 
 
 (1) Austria's refusal, supported //// (nrrnant/, after the 
 assassination of the lit ir Appannt. Franeis Ferdinand, 
 had brought about the Serbian conflict, to refer the dispute 
 to a conference, as proposed by Gn-.-it Britain, Franee. 
 Russia, and Serbia, and Austria's ultimatum to Serbia. 
 
 ('_') Germany's rinlatinn <*f liil^ian neutrality. 
 
 These events took plaee during the historic days of 
 July 'JS August 1. I'.'ll, and may therefore be regarded 
 as the prelude to the most appalling catastrophe that 
 l-'.uroi , has ever known, a military " halt " in the ad\'ance
 
 CAUSES OF THE WORLD WAR 1M.5 
 
 of civilization, which has brought about the barbaric 
 destruction of the lives, health, and happiness of millions 
 of human beings. 
 
 The responsibility for the World War must, therefore, 
 if these proximate causes have been correctly stated, be 
 laid to the charge of the last-named Powers, both of which, 
 by two annexations of Alsace-Lorraine and Hosnia- 
 Hcrzegovina gave rise to the fatal conflicts which pre- 
 cipitated the war.
 
 XII continued 
 THK WORLD WAR OF iyi-t 
 
 I). GERMANY'S MILITARISM AND PREPAREDNESS FOR 
 WAR : EUROPE'S FKAH OF GERMANY : THK GERMAN 
 \'IK\V OF THK WAR : " WE HAVE BEEN ATTACKED ; 
 GERMANY is WAGING A DEFENSIVE WAR'' : A HYPNO- 
 TIZED NATION. 
 
 A SURVEY of the wars which have visited Western and 
 Central Kuropc in the last half century those of l.sci, 
 IM'>>. and ls7() will reveal Prussia as the attacking party, 
 moulding (Germany into the most powerful military State 
 in tin world. Kver since the Franco -German War 
 Germany has never ceased to arm, and has developed her 
 militarv strength at an abnormal rate, and the peace, 
 which lasted forty-three years, was luit an armed peace, a 
 sinister truce prolonged under the shadow of impending 
 strife. 
 
 All other States have been compelled to arm and to 
 develop their militarv resources to a preposterous decree 
 beeaiis'- Gi-rmany, through her colossal military power and 
 her rut h less disregard \'< >r int ernat ional auri cm< nt s, has been 
 a cn.\lnnt nnnm i In /niifi . Paciiie assurances Irom leading 
 men in Gi-rmanv ha\<- never quite succeeded in reassuring 
 other nations. This is, I think, an acknowledged 1'aet . 
 
 \\hen we speak <! the monstrous siireail of tnilttiirixni. 
 dui In the Drouth o|' German mihtar\ strength. \ve mean 
 primarily th- development of military po\\< r [>< r sf. Hut 
 this 1 1 rm also lias another m aninu'. \\hich, applied to 
 ( ''< i man\ , is sj^ iii Leant . 
 
 L'Ki
 
 GERMANY'S MILITARISM AND PIIKPAKKDNESS 247 
 
 liy iniliturisia in the narrower sense we mean colloquially 
 the predominance and encouragement of tin- martial 
 spirit, of military domination or the ascendancy of the 
 military over the civil element. 
 
 In small countries, which have long been spared the 
 trials of war and which have had no cause for embroil- 
 ments, such as may be brought about, lor instance, through 
 alliances, a tendency to oppose all measures of national 
 defence is apt to spring up amongst the so-called " paci- 
 fists," who think that nothing need be done to earn the 
 privilege of living in peace, and that it is wrong to en- 
 courage armaments, because a neighbouring State might 
 regard them as indicative of hostile intentions, or because 
 it would he impossible in any case to protect oneself from 
 attack by a larger Power. These people do not distinguish 
 between militarism and national defence, and any n naked 
 interest in the latter cause is stigmatized as "militarist 
 propaganda,'' which calls for counter-organization in the 
 shape of "anti-militarist propaganda." 
 
 To some extent this opposition to military propaganda 
 also makes itself felt among the Great Powers, as when 
 the German workmen agitated for Abriistung (disarma- 
 ment), but by this was only meant a reduction of the pre- 
 posterous armaments to moderate proportions by mutual 
 agreement between the States. 
 
 Although the whole world has long regarded Germany 
 as a typical example of militarism, there arc 1 Germans who 
 will not admit that there- is any ground for this view. 
 Thus, for instance.. Dr. K. L. Walter van der Bleek * writes 
 as follows : " Our enemies connect the- word Germany 
 with the term ' militarism.' Thi> is more than a mere 
 phrase, more' than a mere shibboleth. Germany's militarism 
 is also meant to imply a principle, ami the term has by 
 malicious innuendo been given a repulsive significance. 
 
 * Si-c Die I'crnicftlting dcr cn^li^cl/tii Wfltinacttt mid </ ,\ russisciteii 
 Zarixnius dnrc/i den Drcihund nnd den l.^lmn ("The l'i.-t't:< M n--i 
 Ki <rli-h \Yorhl-rov.iT ; nd IJus-i. 11 'JVa'i>m 1 y tin- 'I'iij'U- All:a: et- 
 and Isl;;m"). l>y K. L. UV.lU-r van dn likrk. Hi;>.
 
 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 " Germany is supposed to be a State built up on a founda- 
 tion of sabre-rattling and high-explosive shells, whose- ideal 
 is war, whose morality is .soldierly brutality, whose system 
 is military despotism. But those who, sine iru it studio, 
 relleet on the real meaning of the word will lind that the 
 mueh abused militarism of the Germans is their superb 
 organization, the subordination of egoistical interests to the 
 great and ever-present aim : the freest conceivable develop- 
 ment of cultural aspirations is made possible only by all- 
 powerful order and discipline, the intelligent fitting of a 
 part into the whole, and army and armaments merely serve 
 for the protection of the most diligent and the most 
 assiduous labours. ' The definition of Germany's milita- 
 rism is, therefore, l<trc of order, which, carried to its logical 
 conclusion, means an ideally organized military system. This 
 explains to the whole of Europe and to the inner conscience 
 of the whole of the inhabited globe the true import of 
 (iermani/ and hence also of the (jcnminic raee as embodied 
 in tin- one, albeit misunderstood, expression." 
 
 \Ve iveo^ni/e in this da/./ling pieture of t he " maligned " 
 German militarism the Germanistic dreams of greatness 
 of the beginning of the nineteenth century, but they are 
 now organically welded to the military might which Ger- 
 man}' attained through Hismarck, whilst the spokesmen 
 of popular enlightenment and liberal policy in the sixties 
 ni last, centurv, such as Yirchow, K. Kichter, and other 
 nn-ml)ers ol'the Progressive 1'arty, have vainly sought, to 
 stem the growth of Germanistie chau\'inism into military 
 nil--, or, in othtr wonN, militarism in the spirit of the 
 " lilood and " Iron Chancellor (//" )' !">) 
 
 \'an d r 15!' k ri-ach' s his apot heosis of German militarism 
 wh'-n he sa\ s : " 15\ Imperialism Germany does not mean 
 military dictatorship, but men-lv a spiritual and mural 
 cultural mission backed by great nuhtarv and na\'al 
 str- nu'th." 
 
 ( )n t h- NVoi'ld \\ ar he makes the following observations : 
 
 ' 'fli' aim of Germanv and her allies is not conijiiest ; it. is 
 
 t'liiiniiinii in ni'ii'nlit i/, in culture. . . . The :e< II l>t in:! of
 
 GERMANY'S MILITARISM AND PREPAREDNESS 
 
 the world is hound up with (irrmanijs victory ; . . . t ,! 
 nations must be finally liberated from the Hriti.sh uorld- 
 yokc. ... It is incumbent upon us to preserve Europe's 
 civilization through the Germanic peoples of Germany 
 and of the North, and the nations bound to them by ties 
 of kinship and alliance." 
 
 According to van der Bleek, " the Emperor William's 
 Imperialism is not a craving for power, but a craiing for 
 peace," but he " is not deterred from chastising with a 
 heavy hand all acts inimical to culture, and thus, when the 
 law of nations was infringed in China, he did not hesitate- 
 to strike with his mailed fist." 
 
 If Germany was justified in that ease the murder of a 
 couple of missionaries in a riot (cf. p. 1,'Jl) surely England 
 had as great, if not a greater, right, in view of Germany's 
 violation of the law of nations by her attack on Belgium, to 
 chastise Germany with her mailed list. 
 
 Nowhere has militarism attained such a growth as in Ger- 
 many, and especially in Prussia. The idea of the superiority 
 and importance of the military, as compared with the civi- 
 lian element, is encouraged by the ruling class ; to don 
 the Emperor's uniform is to achieve a higher status, and 
 no one is given a commission in the army who belongs 
 to the lower classes, so that one may truly speak of a 
 military caste. Implicit obedience to one's superiors is 
 the duty of all, and this duty is impressed with the utmost 
 rigour on recruits. William II once said in a speeeli to the 
 recruits of his Guards, some years ago, that they must 
 blindly obey their superiors, even were it a question of 
 shooting their father or mother ! 
 
 This subordination is an exact parallel to that en- 
 forced in the Order of the Jesuits : the supreme head is the 
 sole arbiter of the conscience of the members, and is 
 entitled to blind obedience, according to the rule Kris xicui 
 cadarer. It is obvious that sueh discipline must have an 
 injurious effect on the character and must cramp the 
 individual initiative, with the result that the men become
 
 250 BEFORE, DTRING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 geknechtet (cowed). That real brutality is often practised 
 we know from tin- newspapers and I'm in the parliaincntiiry 
 debates, which constantly testify to maltreatment of 
 soldiers ly oMiccrs and non-commissioned otliecrs ; suicide 
 sometimes results from this cause. 
 
 We saw not lon<j ajjo an instance of military hi;h- 
 iiandedncss at /abcrn (Alsace), when a young lieutenant, to 
 compel respect for the uniform, attacked " in self-defence." 
 with the sword, a lame and crippled cobbler who happened 
 to stand in his way and was thereupon sci/ed by two 
 soldiers. Blind obedience and respect for the uniform have 
 the effect of turning numberless men almost into auto- 
 matons who act altogether without rcllection.* 
 
 It is greatly to be i'eared that (ierman culture, which we 
 have hitherto valued so highly, will long remain tainted by 
 the policy of violence which, introduced by Bismarck and 
 evolved in the Bisnmrckian spirit, led to such violations of 
 accepted law as the assault on Belgium, the massacres of 
 Louvain and ot her to\\ us, etc. 
 
 The cold blooded manner in which (icneral Bcrnhardi 
 has elaborated t he pohcv of might , founded on (icnnanistic 
 dreams of greatness, has made a deep impression on all 
 outside (Jermanv who have read his fiendish book, and has 
 aroused univt rsal ama/ement and horror. It can (juite 
 
 * In t h. ; ^ e. iiinrxi'in I may r< < .ill t In famuiis exploit of I In t -i M.li r 
 V.'i/t :it Kiip nick (-uhiiil. "f ll'-rlin) in I'.MMi. II. li.nk a i_'n at 
 in' n st in ma! 1 1 is f inili ! ;i' y cmiimand and \\ < II I-. in \s I In- pi >\\ i r 
 i .f t In- ii n:f> )iin ; In iiec i iiu- ilay , \\ IK n lie \\ as mil nf \\nrk, lie Ire i del I 
 
 t i put lu> kii"\* I 1 1: - "f In i man nal m . t . . p: ;:<! ieal n-c and limn/lit 
 a c.ipl .iin'x ,. ( -. ,inl li.tinl n m fi 'i n i at an uld do' la s slip. At t in <1 in 
 111:,. IP i '. i ! i d a i -i 1 1 p a al ai:i I :i i' \\ IIP n \'. li> 'in li- nn t 1 1 > a< < < 'inpaiiy 
 In n i ; I In s i .|M \ i >1 \v 1 1 In MI I a in* 'in' nt ' . in --it a 1 1' HI a 1,1 1 f 'II' >\\ i il him 
 out In KiijH iiii-k. Ilifi Iliiy in. in In i' up In tin 1 1 '\s n-lia!l. \\hin 
 t In in:i\ i 't , \\ hi i \\ a - a 1 1 'M r ' - i \ i ! i 'Iliii r. mail 1 ad'ipi'lnisain'1' 
 In f' IP t In " i apt ail i,' liiil I IP !.i! ' < i ' i i ; 1 \ ! \< I '< d t hat I In ma\ m 
 s In Mild I H- arri -lid and I al.i n 1 1 I '>i 1 1 in . 'I In - \v .1^ 1 1< 'in . ai.d In \\ a > 
 t a!., n |i\ tin - .Idn i -. t .. tin : 'i|.ild l< in at tin 1 ',i add' id -in i' (.ate. 
 M . i ',v. 1 1 1 1 1 1 n ' ' c.- 1 i I a i n " i i /i d 'JU ,( H H I n ia t k s i .11 1 i f 1 1 n 1 1 ' a - 1 1 1 \ 
 of tin 1 1 1 -,-. n and di a|'p'aiid fi>r a Inin-. In iin iitlnr l-Jimpiaii 
 i i MI lit i v '.> ' MI Id t hi ^ unlit ai \ t xph >it ha\ i Inin |n >--M| '!i-.
 
 GERMANY'S MILITARISM AND PREPAREDNESS ii">i 
 
 confidently be asserted that such a book could in (.111 
 time have been written in no other country in the world. 
 That lie dared to publish it, and that he, a Prussian 
 general, was allowed to publish it, is a terrible and melan- 
 choly token of the spirit which reigns at all events in the 
 military caste of Prussia, and which means, not progress 
 in cult urc, but retrogression. That this and similar works, 
 as well as the Bismurekian policy, are disapproved by many 
 Germans there can be no doubt. 
 
 That Germany did not go to war over Morocco in 11)11 
 was due, according to Bcrnhardi, to a " false humanity ' 
 which gave birth to the peace movement. Hence he 
 wanted to show that war is a duty not only for self- 
 defence but for the purpose of extending the power of the 
 State, for conquest. 
 
 Bismarck is dead, but he founded a school and his 
 disciples have pursued his policy. The Bismarekian or 
 Machiavellian principles arc still applied and approved by 
 many admirers of the '" Blood-and-Iron Chancellor/' 
 There are many who endorse the principle that )ni<^ltl is 
 everything and who consider that it is better to be feared 
 than to be loved. 
 
 Germany has become through Bismarck, in spite of all 
 cultural effort, primarily a military State, and her people 
 have been systematically educated to this view. Ger- 
 many's warrior caste has devoted its greatest efforts to the 
 furtherance of armaments in anticipation of a war which 
 it has long deemed inevitable and which military authors 
 welcome as a means of stiffening the fibre of the people and 
 promoting culture ! Its sole preoccupation is to lind 
 pretexts for war, and it deplores peace as a debilitating 
 factor. 
 
 In a manifesto to the army and navy on the outbreak 
 of the War of It) 11 characteristic, by the way. of a 
 military State -the Emperor William gave vent to t Ill- 
 following sentiments : " I put my faith in the o!d xdrlike 
 spirit still living in the German people, this miilhty warlike
 
 252 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 spirit which assaults tin- enemy where it finds him. cost 
 what it may, the warlike ,s/)//// which from the remotest 
 ages has been the terror and xcoitrge of our enemies. Re- 
 member our great and glorious history, remember that 
 ye are Germans ! God with us ! " 
 
 Thus the Gcrmanistic faith in Germany's superiority 
 over all other countries has been gradually suggested to 
 the consciousness of the people, who seem to have not the 
 remotest notion that German policy has ever been at 
 fault in important matters, that Germany, especially 
 Prussia, has ever violated international law and trampled 
 the rights of nations under foot, causing enemies to arise all 
 round her and creating throughout the world antagonism to 
 her military policy, Germany's lofty intellectual culture and 
 industrial efficiency are acknowledged ei'crifit'here, but the 
 nations do not admire her policy; they feel apprehensive 
 of this warrior State. 
 
 It seems, indeed, as if the military caste actually desired 
 to create fear of Germany. 
 
 How different were the sentiments df Frederick the 
 Great ! ' To make enemies," he said, " in order to 
 vanquish them is equivalent to breeding wild beasts in 
 order to light, against them. It is far more natural, far 
 more sensible, and far more human to make friends." 
 
 In a rep] v to t he pamphlet Why do the \alions 11 ate I 'a ' 
 recently published by a well-known Berlin physician. Dr. 
 M. Hirschfeld. the Dutchman Dr. Tivuh observed that the 
 reason why the Germans generally are not liked lies in 
 tin ir arrogance, their spirit of llunkeydom, and their 
 coarseness, and that the nations hate Germany on account 
 of her militarism and her eagerness t< subdue all other 
 jiei ipleS. 
 
 No country in the world has ever been so perpetually 
 pri pared /'// :mr as Germany, the military State par 
 excellence. Germany has no need to speak of mobili/ation 
 in the ordinary sense when war threatens; she is per- 
 in/incntly mobih/ed m a stiHicient decree and is therefore
 
 GERMANY'S MILITARISM AND PREPAREDNESS 2.53 
 
 ready when a state of war is declared to exist. The Minister 
 of War lias but to press a few buttons n'/i.v, zwi, drri and 
 at the word of command the armies stand at the frontier 
 ready to strike within a couple of days. 
 
 With their eyes steadfastly fixed on the goal before them 
 the military authorities have anticipated (very want with 
 the most admirable minuteness : colossal depots every- 
 where, containing food, clothes, boots, and other articles of 
 equipment, hospital requirements, etc., for untold millions 
 of soldiers of every age-class, whilst guns, rilles, and other 
 war material have been piled up sky-high in arsenals and 
 factories in preparation for the war of wars. Kvery need 
 which may arise in waging war with other Great Powers 
 has been foreseen and the industrial life of the nation has 
 been organized accordingly. 
 
 Germany, therefore, has never any cause to worry over 
 the mobilizations of other States. She was always ready 
 for war and always ready to strike. 
 
 Although the majority of the German nation that is 
 to say, the workmen, farmers, small manufacturers, mer- 
 chants, etc. are friends of peace and, according!}', have 
 been taken to task by Bernhardi the agitation organized 
 by Bernhardi and other chauvinistic leaders has succeeded 
 in working upon public opinion to such an extent that the 
 Morocco Treaty of November !, 1 01 1 . was actually received 
 with disappointment by millions of people in all classes of 
 society in Germany, and rendered possible the new military 
 law of 1012 which vastly augmented the strength of the 
 army. The sequel in France was the proposed reintro- 
 duction of three years' military service, which was sanc- 
 tioned after considerable opposition. This was followed 
 in Germany by proposals for a further increase, and the 
 celebration of the centenary of the great War of Liberation 
 against France in 1813 was exploited to spur the nation 
 to fresh effort. The result was the great extraordinary 
 defence tax of 1013, which amounted to 1000 million marks 
 and was accompanied by increased annual taxes for the 
 army. When the Government began to fear that the
 
 254 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 people might murmur under these burdens, they sought, 
 as often before when increased military estimates were 
 impending, to show that the safety of the Empire was in 
 jeopardy. 
 
 M. Ktienne, the French War Minister, succeeded in 
 March llH.'i in obtaining possession of a (iennan official and 
 secret report concerning the new military laws and the aims 
 of (ierman policy, etc. This remarkable document of 
 March 1 i, 1 1>1.'}, contains the following illuminating observa- 
 tions : " It is our sacred duty to sharpen the sword which 
 has been placed in our hand and to hold it ready for defence 
 as well as to strike down our enemy. The rie:e that our 
 armaments are a repbj to the armaments and policy of the 
 French must he fostered amongst the people. The people 
 must be accustomed to the thought that an offensive uv/r 
 on our jxirt is a necessity if we are to make an end of our 
 adversaries' provocations. We must proceed with caution so 
 as not to arouse suspicions. . . . The Avar must be pre- 
 pared from the financial point of view. . . . Disturbances 
 mn*t he provoked in \orlhern Africa am! Ifnssin as a means 
 of diverting th<' forces of the adversary. Therefore it is 
 necessary that we should through well-chosen interme- 
 diaries- get into contact with influential persons in Kgypt. 
 Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco in order to prepare the 
 measures which will become necessarv in ease of a Kuropean 
 war. . . . \\ "e must be strong in order that we may be 
 able to strike down our enemies in the Kast and W< st . 
 Hut in the next Kuropean War flic small Stall s mnsf also 
 In forcid to jinn us or must be subjugated. In the North 
 we have not In UK to fear fr< mi Denmark or t he Scandinavian 
 countries. . . . Hut we cannot contemplate with the same 
 confidence the situation <>n our N'ort h- Western frontier, 
 where we have the two small States of Hel-num and 
 Holland. Hep- we are confronted with a most vital 
 probN m. and our plan must be to ////,-, the offcnsi:'c at the 
 ' ' rif brg}nnin<i and with ijreat siij >en< irit y \n ulti- 
 matum with bi'ief time hunt, follow ed immediately by 
 t n: a inn , would just ifv our act mn suflieient ly fr< >iu t he point
 
 GERMANY'S MILITARISM AND PKKPAUEDNKSS !'.">."> 
 
 of view of international law. . . . We must remember that 
 the provinces of the old (German Empire, tin- County of 
 Burgundy, and a great, part of Lorraine, an- still in the 
 hands of the French, that, thousands of our German 
 brethren in the Haltic provinces groan under the yoke of 
 the Slav. It will he a patriotic act to restore to (icrmnny 
 re hat she formerly possessed." 1 * 
 
 So here we have a complete plan for a rear of aggression 
 and conquest ! 
 
 'Flu's report was. ol' course, repudiated in official German 
 quarters. Hut it hears t lie impress of undoubted genuine- 
 ness, and all its details correspond entirely with other 
 utterances of German military authors and politicians, 
 so that there is no cause to doubt it. especiallv when we 
 have seen what General Hernhardi wrote two years 
 previously in d'ermany and the \erl War. Hut, of course, 
 it must he very annoying to the German Government that 
 an official and see-ret report, of this kind should become 
 known to the French Government ; hence the official 
 dcmenii which is always to be expected in such cases. f 
 
 M. Cambon, the French ambassador in Herlin, wrote 
 in his dispatch of May C>. 101.'). to the French Foreign 
 Minister that he had obtained cogni/ance of an utterance 
 by General Moltk;- as to the plan of the General Staff in 
 case of war, which consisted in taking the enemy by 
 surprise. "The banal view of the responsibility of 
 the attacker," said Moltke, " must be s:cc]>t aside. \\\\<-n 
 war becomes necessary all chances of success must be 
 seized. Success alone can justify it. dcnnuny neither run 
 nor jnusf girc Russia time to mobilize, for in that ease 
 
 * See French Ycllnic Bonk. No. 2. p. It!. 
 
 f It h:i^ hei-n sontrht to discredit (lie irenuineness of thK report 
 by pointing out Hint the " fount y of Hurjiundy " ^ ;i s -I ad d to !>. a 
 part of the old German Empire, n mistake " \\hieh a r< -p> ni^iMe 
 Gormnn nuthor would never have made." On tlii- jmint I -.limild 
 likr to say Hint not only the old kingdom i.f HurL r :md\ . but a!>o 
 the Duchy of Oureundy. or the present province of H"urL" ^nr. ^ vas 
 formerly at times in n condition of vna!nire to tli.' "hi (,<nnan 
 Empire, ns \vas Franche C'omte, or " Frei^rrafsohaft I?ur^uiid."
 
 256 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 Germany would be compelled to keep on her Eastern 
 frontier an army of such strength that she would be 
 reduced to equality tf/V//, if not inferiority to, France. Thus 
 we must forestall our principal opponent as soon as there 
 are nine chances against ten that war will ensue-, and we 
 must begin without a moment'* delay, so that we can 
 remorselessly crush all resistance." 
 
 Germany's militarism, by the psychological effect which 
 its severe discipline and its insistence on implicit obedience 
 have produced on the mind, has been one of the factors 
 in the unanimity which the German nation has displayed 
 in its conception of the cause of Germany's action in the 
 \Var of r.ll. The idea has been instilled into the national 
 mind, by suggestion, that Germany has been attacked, 
 and this view has been kept alive by constant iteration. 
 The method is an old one, and we have H celebrated example 
 of it in the device of the elder Cato, who ended all his 
 speeches in the Human senate with the words : " (Vterum 
 censeo C'arthagincin esse dclcndam." This view in time 
 became the ruling opinion in Home, with the result that 
 in the end the hostile city fell before the repeated assaults 
 of the Homans. 
 
 Hy xugaextion is meant an act by which an idea is 
 implanted in the brain and becomes rooted there, an 
 induced view which may deepen into a strong conviction. 
 The process may take place either in a waking or in an 
 hypnotic state, and for such surest ion to take effect it 
 is only necessary that the individual shall believe or be 
 predisposed to believe. 
 
 Preachers, advocates, orators, statesmen, etc.. are all 
 suggcstionists and s. < k \\ith all their power to impress 
 certain mental pictures on others, and political fanaticism. 
 Ilk-- religious fanaticism, obtains its adherents by surest ion 
 or hypnosis, as it is also called, when it lias the same effect 
 as hypnotism. 
 
 The universal patriotic dev..tion slmwn by the Germans 
 in this war, in the suuu'ested b< li> I' that the Kat hcrland
 
 GERMANY'S MILITARISM AND PREPAREDNESS 257 
 
 has been attacked, is the most remarkable instance of 
 collective hypnotism on a colossal scale witnessed in 
 modern times. If reminds us, viewed psychically, of 
 the emotion which took possession of the people when 
 Pope Urban II at the Council of Uermont in !()'.." exhorted 
 the multitude to set out on the First Crusade against the 
 "unbelievers" in Palestine: the great assembly was 
 seized with ecstasy, and suddenly the cry broke forth : 
 "Dens vult ! Deus vult ! " The throng outside took 
 up the cry, and all fastened a red cross on their right 
 shoulder. 
 
 The French were then " God's chosen people." When 
 the pilgrims set out on the First Crusade the rallying 
 cry " God :t'///,y // / " was ever on their lips ; all objections 
 from the cautious were met with " God wills it ! " And 
 when at last the crusaders stood before Jerusalem the 
 joy was boundless ; all fell on their knees and cried : 
 " God icills it ! " 
 
 We witnessed a similar religious and patriotic fervour 
 in Germany when the war was in the air : from the most 
 exalted quarter it was proclaimed : Germany lias been 
 attacked bij her enemies The tear lias been brought upon 
 us to destroy us -The Government has done all in its jnncer 
 to avert war Onward icith God Let your heart* beat for 
 God and let your fists strike doicn the enemy To us it means 
 to be or not to be God -a'Ufi us ! 
 
 All this was repeated in the churches and in the Press 
 many thousand times and the suggestion took root in 
 all minds. From the highest to the lowest all were pene- 
 trated by this conviction and displayed the greatest 
 devotion and self-sacrifice in the defence of the Fatherland, 
 which was thought by all to have been attacked by 
 treacherous enemies. The blind faith in the word of the 
 supreme authority of the State permitted no doubt : tin- 
 rejoinders of other States, the negotiations bet \veeii the 
 Governments, were in the main unknown, and that which 
 was made public had been tinged with the colouring 
 which the Government thought suitable. The whole 
 
 R
 
 258 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 nation was united in a single thought : Germany has been 
 attacked, Germany's existence is threatened. Among people 
 usually self-possessed, among thinkers anil .savants, the 
 exultation was as great as in the military caste, and all 
 were penetrated with the certainty of viet<ry, for " Ger- 
 many's cause was sacred and just." " Germany cannot 
 be destroyed," this home of the world's noblest race, 
 God's chosen people which is destined to march at the 
 head of civili/ation and to found the Germanic world- 
 power : (JuJ ic ilk it ! 
 
 In his war manifesto to the German people the Emperor 
 William declared : " Our enemies begrudge us the reward 
 for our labours. We have hitherto borne with patience 
 all open and secret enmity from east and west and across 
 the sea. Hut nmc tltcy seek to humiliate us. \Ve are 
 expected to look on with folded arms whilst our enemies 
 prepare for a treacherous assault <>n us. . . . In the midst 
 aj jitdce (fie enemy assails us ; therefore, to arms! . . . 
 It is a light to determine whether German strength and 
 German spirit is In he <>r >i</( to l>c. Onward with God, who 
 will be with us as he was with our ancestors ! " 
 
 In the course of a Christmas speech in France the 
 Kmperor said: "God has willed that the enemy should 
 force us to celebrate this festival lure. MY liare been 
 attacked and :ce are defending uumeh'cs. \\ e stand on 
 the enemy's soil with the enemy at t he point of our sword. 
 \\ith our hearts bowed before our Lord we say, as did the 
 (in -at Klretor : " To the dust with all Germany's enemies ! 
 Amen." 
 
 Like the German oilicial proclamations, the Austrian 
 manifestos also spoke of the war as a defensive war. 
 An ollieial < n//i/niiiti</ue of April 17. I'.M .">. aniiouiicmg that 
 all capable of blaring arms bet \\eeu the ages of eighteen 
 and lifty shall be liable to si r\ ice in the Landsturm savs : 
 ' The gigantic struggle \\hich has In en ft/ret <1 n/mn us 
 bv an cnemv superior in population compels us to use all 
 our st reiigt h, etc. 
 
 The German Chancellor declared in the Keichstai; that
 
 GERMANY'S MILITARISM AND PHKPAKKDNKSS I'/i!) 
 
 Serbia had evaded Austria-Hungary's just demands and 
 that the- German Government shared with its ally the 
 view that the position of the Germanic race was menaced, 
 that Russia had prevented Germany's efforts at media- 
 tion and wanted war. " Our troops were content at first 
 to act on the dtjensirr. We stand with our hacks to 
 the wall. ... It is with a clear conscience that Germany 
 marc-lies out to battle." That Germany lias been attacked 
 and is therefore waging a defensive war was also averred 
 by General von Falkcnhayn, Chief of the General Staff, 
 when he was interviewed in January 1 '.>!."> by Mr. Conger, 
 representative of the Associated Press, in Berlin. 
 
 This is no offensive- war on our part," he said. " It 
 has not been brought into being by an;/ military caxtc or a 
 military party ; it is a :ear waged in self-defence, forced 
 upon uti by the Russian mobilization. Russia had been 
 warned by the Emperor and his ambassador and had 
 been told that if she mobilized we should be compelled 
 in self-defence to proclaim a general mobili/ation and to 
 take all steps to safeguard, our national e.rixtcnce."' 
 
 When the German Government in March 11>1."> asked 
 the Reichstag for another 1(),()(M) million marks to continue 
 the war, Dr. Helfferich, Minister of Finance, said : " We 
 must absolutely insist that our enemies xhall be lit Id 
 responsible for the material loss which they have brought 
 upon us by this criminal attack." 
 
 In the German Upper House its President, after tin- 
 passing of the Budget on March l(i, 11M.~>, said: ' The 
 old cnnj of our neighbours has united the Entente Powers 
 against us. France av//f/.v the prorinccx which >//< ln*t in 
 1871, Riittxia in: a nix the prorince of Pnixxia, and England 
 contemplates the destruction f Gtnnan trade and xhipjn'ng. 
 What have they attained? The loss of nu^t of our 
 colonies is not decisive. On the other hand, Germany s 
 territory has bci-n cleared of eiu-mies, ami Poland. Belgium, 
 and a great part of France an- in our posM-ssion. The 
 plan of our enemies to crusJi. Germany has tliu^ In , n foiled. 
 If we did not aspire to more than beating back the enemy.
 
 JGO BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 it \vuiild not he dillicult to secure a speedy peace ; but 
 Germany cannot n -st content with tliis consummation. 
 (Loud cheers from all sides.) \\ e shall not sheathe our 
 sword until we are assured that our neighbours icill nut 
 ft /an the attack." 
 
 Ciothein, a political economist and number of the 
 Reichstag, declared (in the Hiriuur Ta^tblatt in December 
 I'.tllj that "it could be proved most conclusively that 
 Germany did all she could in aicrt iciir, that the Russian 
 mobilization and the declaration of France as to her 
 attitude j'nrctd .v In dtft nd r////-.se/; < .v, and that, even 
 though the formal declaration of war came from Gcrmanv, 
 this step was only taken that we might avail ourselves of 
 our superior organi/ation for swift action in the \\ar thus 
 forced upon us." He further observed that had il lm n 
 in tin' j>'iii.tr nj tin' (iinnan Gui't'i'inncnt to prevent this 
 war, the 111 Social Democrats in the Reichstag would 
 not have voted for the war credit. 
 
 One mav well ask: llo\s were these Social Democrats 
 or othi-r ivpresi nt at i\ t s then anil there, at the racing 
 speed at which \ents were moving, to examine the 
 Government's attitude and actions m relation to the 
 eonlliet and its abihtv to pn-veiit the war? It must be 
 rcmemberetl that cvcrytlimg was secret. 
 
 On the occasion of a German All Souls' festival held 
 in Hapaume parish church on November 1. lull, in 
 commemoration ol the lallcn soldiers, a sermon was 
 pr< aehi d in \\hich the following passage occurred: 'To 
 our i-n' inn 's th'se graves are a gigantic reproach, but 
 to us t!n\ \\ill be a sacr< d memorial in times to come. 
 Tlios.- \\ho ha\( sown the \\ind shall reap the whirl\sin<l. 
 J.i it <i !/<n/ l'i/ /'(//'/ ni!iii* and bv small L'i'''iips o| sellish 
 partisans, 'th(\ ha\i s<i\\n in the tlesh and they shall 
 r-ap destruction.' \\ e make bold to su<ar before God 
 that :ir half .\<,\\.n in tin >////// </ ri^ltti <in.\H(X* anil 
 pi at i . To us the \\ar i^ a monumental .\jnrttnul 
 utatti i' that touches the innerinosl heart of a nation 
 \\hieh has ri -' n in unitv, \shieh has been outragid in
 
 THE GERMAN VIEW OF THE \\.\K 'J(il 
 
 its most sacred sentiments and lias been forced into y,(f- 
 defence. 
 
 Dr. Sclu-pj), school inspector, embodied in :m article 
 entitled k> School and \V;ir," which appeared in l)i, \\'<,, h,- 
 on March '20, 1!)1.">, several items of advice on point-, 
 connected with the war, which the youthful pupils should 
 take to heart. lie said /;///; alia: "The pupils must 
 understand that we are carrying on the li^ht of //;//// und 
 right against falsehood and deceit and against Hritish 
 perfidy ; that good faith with us has not become an empty 
 phrase, but that we stand linn and resolute beside 
 our ally, and that to be a German means to be true to the 
 bottom of one's sold. They must know that we are 
 fighting for pence, and not out of a pure lu\l of conquest 
 as Russia docs, nor out of wngcfulncss as France does, nor 
 out of sordid greed as England docs." Vet at the same 
 time he explains and in so doing contradicts the above 
 that "the children must above- all understand to what 
 Germany owes her growth. In 1S<!<; we fought for /'n'vsm'.v 
 hegemony in Germany; in 1S70-71 we attained our unity 
 and Germany's position in Europe as a Great Po:ct r : in 
 the present war it is our duty to secure and to extend 
 thin position as a world- Power. . . . They are further to 
 understand that we must have clbo-e-room in t 
 and particularly on the seas for our trade." 
 
 At a meeting of teachers and mothers held at tin 
 Town Hall in November ID 14 to discuss the subject. " How 
 are we to talk to the children about the war '.' " it was 
 agreed to teach certain humane principles, as. for instance. 
 that hatred of others must not be inculcated in the childish 
 mind and that one must cultivate the sentiment of coin- 
 passion and brotherhood, etc. But it was also resolved 
 that the children were to be told that " (iermany is en-ja^ed. 
 through no fault of her oien. in n Jighl for l/< r < > 
 fight of life and death, wherefore (!crmans must suffer and 
 bear all and must submit to every sacrifice. 
 
 So we see that the rising generation is systematically 
 to be drilled into the belief that Ge nni;n>i hear* n /'-.?>"
 
 262 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1014 
 
 in the bringing about i if tin' ~car and that slie was the attacked 
 party. This will become to the growing generation an 
 unassailable truth, for then- are probably very few that 
 will study the origin of the war from other than (ierman 
 sources. How, in such circumstances, will it be possible 
 to avoid hating other nations who " have attacked (icrinany 
 and forced her into a life -and-dt at h stru^le for her 
 existence ? " 
 
 The same line is taken in a work entitled The Truth about 
 tin- If (/;, being a statement from otlieial sources compiled 
 in August 11H1 by ten well-known authors, of whom a 
 couple are members of the Reichstag, and who include 
 Dr. Xaumann. Count Oppersdorff, Dr. Fr/ber-jer, Dr. 
 Hohrbach, and others. The blame for the war is 1'irst 
 and foremost placed on Russia's shoulders. 'The Tsar 
 bears before fi'nl iin'l posterity tin' rt'x}>f>nxihility for having 
 allowed himself to be terrori/.ed by an unscrupulous war 
 party. ... It was not until France and Belgium Ion! 
 tht'mxelrt'.'i \i<ilnt<<l /iel^ian neutrality that our troops 
 entered the country. France and Russia have combined 
 to ilestroii us. . . . The (ierman Fmperor sought to induce 
 t he Tsar to preserve peace, but he was cruelly diaappniiili d," 
 etc. 
 
 This work was translated into Swedish in order to 
 influence Swedish opinion in favour of (let-many, and is 
 
 prefaced bv " A \\ord to the Swedish People." I L r l\'C .'I 
 
 few extracts ; "Our lore of peace is part of our national 
 spirit. . . . Hut we are compelled to be a nation of soldiers 
 sci that we max remain free. ... II e jil nur Ini^t in ('mil 
 and fr< >m amid-t t h< din of b.'it tie we appeal to you not t o be - 
 lieve t he male yi dent lies spr - ad abroad by our iicniies. . . . 
 \\ ( In In \ e t hat (iertnami eatinot lie effaced \i'< >m tip surface 
 of thi- L'lobe. ^'011 know that our p--op]e has c_-i\, u birth 
 t'> "reat thinkers and |>o<fs. \\lii. . aim abox'e all \\as ti> 
 
 I 
 
 further the cause of humanity. The names i.f (,<>< the and 
 Kant are r< \erenecd all the world o\ er, and there is no 
 eu|tur< \\ithoiit these giants \ <j< nius," etc.
 
 THE GERMAN VIEW OF THE WAR 203 
 
 It will ho gathered from the foregoing how public opinion 
 in Germany had het-n led astray when the war broke out, 
 and how the Germans were hypnoti/ed by the ollicial 
 declarations. Not a word of the untiring efforts of (in at 
 Britain, France, and Russia to avoid the war by media- 
 tion ; the Kmperor William was "cruelly disappointed 
 in his appeal to the Tsar, although we know that the Tsar 
 proposed to him that the dispute should be referred to 
 The Hague Tribunal. Xo outsider can conceive in what 
 way Germany was threatened by her neighbours; no 
 State has ever thought of lt effacing Germany '' or depriving 
 the (iermans of their freedom. 
 
 All these fancies have been suggested by political 
 hypnotists who want a nation of self-denying patriots and 
 ever so much money from the Reichstag. And well have 
 they done their work. 
 
 Rut to speak, in conjunction with the war. of t he German 
 thinkers who have guided humanity, as was done in the 
 above appeal to the Swedish people and on many other 
 occasions, and to bring in the names of Goethe and Kant 
 this is a little too extravagant. I have already spoken of 
 these great men (p. 50). but T showed that they were 
 diametrically opposed to the self-seeking world-policy 
 which has come to the fore in Prussia since Bismarck's 
 time. Goethe and Kant, would have execrated a Rethmann- 
 Ilollwcg, a Bernhardi, and the like, had they lived in this 
 accursed time. 
 
 In the compilation entitled Die J'ertiichfinm der cn.Uwhni 
 Wellmtichi ("The Destruction of British World-Tower") 
 (1915) we find an article by Dr. S. Iledin headed " Germany 
 and the Northern States." I give the following qu< >t at ions : 
 
 "All Germans know that their country is the victim 
 of an attack bi/ a league, the lending nxinh, r <>t :chi<-h 
 ?',9 En^Jand whose one idea is to annihilate (itrniani/. 
 Germany is fighting for her existence. whiNt the 
 English have taken up arms to destmii the }ir>i*)>eriti/ 
 which their German kinsmen have won by hard and 
 honourable toil.
 
 264 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 " A fresh wind is blowing on the German front, hut how 
 do matters stand at home up in the North ? In Germany 
 they act ; in the \nrtli fhet/ situ pit/ talk'. They applaud a 
 delusive pence wliieh in reality is a death sleep, 
 
 " If >ur people do nut now, when freedom and perpetual 
 peace beckon to the whole world, realize tin ir dnti/ and their 
 proper place in the (iernianlc life-simple, then truly tin- 
 days uf our nation arc numbered. If the hour has not 
 struck when we should pass on to action, then surely it will 
 never strike, and it will be all up with us. He who is 
 content to remain a spectator at a time of such colossal 
 happenings as this is not worthy to lire ! " 
 
 This nonsense is accepted with the greatest delight 
 a.s a valuable contribution to the above-mentioned work, 
 and Iledin's name heads the list of collaborators on the 
 cover ! 
 
 lias HI din taken leave of his senses ? Does he not 
 know that Germany has never been attacked by any 
 Power, but went into the war to make common cause 
 with Austria and has herself attacked Belgium, an act 
 which made Kngland her enemy? Truly the time has 
 come to put an end to the exploits of this German Doctor, 
 his revilement both of England and of Sweden. This 
 llunkeydom and toadyism towards Germany, which is 
 as unblushing as it is lacking in tact and political judgment, 
 may do harm to Sweden in the eyes of other Powers, 
 especially if it be not n-ali/ed that his psychical equilibrium 
 has l< en affected ami that there is a growing opinion in 
 Sweden which denounces his views on the war. on Germany 
 and on Germanism, etc. To his assertion, made before 
 the German public, t hat " every r<-al S\\ < <!< feels ' G-rmam- 
 cally,' " by which term he implies sympathy for German 
 military Germanism. I reply emphatically that this 
 movement ni-ets \\ith no response in Sweden, and I may 
 n-mind the r< ad' r of the antipathy towards Germany, 
 and esjiicially towards Prussia, which was felt in Sweden 
 for many years on account of the Dano German War of 
 isf. I and the I'Yaneo German War of is?o. We felt like
 
 WAGING A DEFENSIVE WAR 205 
 
 Scandinavians should IVcl in tin- former, and entertained 
 the liveliest sympathies Cor France in the latter, although 
 we arc not united by any ties of blood with the French 
 nation. At the present, time most Swedes are animated 
 with the deepest, sympathy for the Belgians. As regards 
 the alleged struggle of the Germanic race, I contend that 
 if the Swedes should side with any nation on account of 
 bonds of Germanic kinship, it should be with the British, 
 who are a purer Germanic race than the Germans, seeing 
 that the latter contain many foreign, and particularly 
 Slav, elements. 
 
 Although it seems as if it had become the prevailing 
 notion in Germany that the country has been attacked 
 and is therefore carrying on a defensive war, we find 
 here and there a German who does not share this view, 
 as, for instance, Maximilian Harden, whom I have quoted 
 to the effect that Germany icuntcd the ictir and was not 
 forced into it. 
 
 The diplomatic papers published by the belligerent 
 nations in their White, Blue, Red. Yellou-, and (ir<tf Itookx, 
 together with the speeches of their Premiers and Foreign 
 Ministers and other official conininnieations brought to 
 light after the books were published, furnish us with the 
 chief material for elucidating the origin of the \Yorld \\ ar 
 and passing judgment on the attitudes and actions of the 
 various States. 
 
 A comparative and critical study of all these data ought 
 to enable us to find the truth about the origin of the war. 
 Everything one-sided or which has been unfairly stated 
 should be ignored. Although the published papers 
 of each State naturally support its point of view, it 
 should nevertheless be possible, from incontrovertible 
 facts and positive' statements acknowledged by both 
 sides to be authentic, to draw conclusions devoid of 
 bias. 
 
 To an impartial observer unconnected \\ith Germany 
 and the other belligerent countries, il is clearly evident
 
 266 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 from these ollieial publications and other reports and 
 information held to he of weight and importance : 
 
 (1 ) That Auslrid :c/;.v the attacking party in the war against 
 Serbia, which gave rise to the World War, and that 
 Germany supparted Austria in her action. 
 
 ('_') That (icrmanii ~cas not attacked by Russia, France, 
 and Cireat Hritain. 
 
 (.'{) That the -car cnuld hare heen amidcd had Austria 
 and (Germany agreed to the mediation proposals of the 
 Kntente Powers in the Serbian eonllict. 
 
 (1) That (icrmanii attacked liclgiurn, in violation of her 
 guaranteed neutrality, thereby forcing Helgium into a 
 defensive war. 
 
 (.">) That m> jironfx c.rixf thai Helium failed in )nr duties 
 ax a neutral, and that the documents found in her War 
 Oilier, by which it was sought to establish this charge, 
 rei'eal nn plan nf attack <>n (n'nnant/, but merely point to 
 certain precautionary measures in the event of attack by 
 that Power amply justified in the light of (iermany's 
 action on the outbreak of war.
 
 XIF continued 
 THE WORLD WAR OF l'.n 
 
 E. THE BARHARITY OF TIIF. WAR : No WAI: I'.ETWF.F.N 
 CIVILIZED NATION'S HAS EVER HEEN MAHKF.D i-.v so MICH 
 CRUELTY AND SAVACF.RY. 
 
 THE present World War unhappily marks a return to 
 tin 1 more bestial warfare of former times. Many \vars 
 have been comparatively free from deliberate desfnietivc- 
 ncss and cruelty in its real sense, but the present stniL"_ r le 
 has in numberless instances been waged with a barbarous 
 brutality which constitutes a shameful blot on Christian 
 Europe, a civili/.ed continent, the home of philosophy and 
 science. 
 
 The Greeks and Romans of antiquity, who stood highest 
 in culture among the peoples then known to history, called 
 other races Ixirbarinn.^ because they lacked their civili/.a- 
 sion and refinement. Ever since, the term " barbarians 
 has been applied to uncivilized and cruel peoples-, races 
 which lacked feelings of humanity. 
 
 But civili/.ed nations cannot always be sure that they 
 have subdued their brutal and barbarous instincts, and in 
 great upheavals, violent and bloody revolutions, ferocious 
 individuals are found who arc guilty of cruel and savage 
 acts. The same applies to many wars wa^vd by ei\ ili/.ed 
 nations, and more than ever to the World \Var which has 
 now been raging for nine mont hs.* 
 
 War generally has a Imrhurliin^ influence and Jirn!i;!r.t-.<f 
 even the most highly civili/.ed. It places the warrior on a 
 * This work w;n written in M uvh 1 '.!">. - /' u. <;<:!''.
 
 268 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 level with the bt'tiat <>f prey and reduces him to the condition 
 and the instincts of primitive man. linitul also means 
 bestial, ferocious. 
 
 Predatory beasts regard their live prey merely as an 
 article of food which they have appropriated, and are quite 
 indifferent to its ajjony. Man also acquires the general 
 character of beasts of prey, and their indifference to the 
 sufferings of animals and human beings when these are tin- 
 object of his attack in the chase and in war. All primitive 
 and barbarous peoples have shown the greatest callousness 
 and cruelty towards their enemies, and eivili/.ed nations 
 have often been no whit better. They have oppressed 
 and ill-treated conquered races in a, most revolting manner, 
 as, for instance, the Portuguese in Africa, the Spaniards in 
 America, and the English in India, etc. 
 
 Wiir ilxt'lf ilt'hutminizes : the combatants have to think 
 of themselves, of their defence, of salvation from ever- 
 threatening death, and they arc apt to be worked up into a 
 state of fury which turns them into wild beasts, impelled 
 by the hist of murder and destruction. 
 
 The i nst i net s of t he beast of prey are latent in numberless 
 human beings, their brutality beinjj largely due to ntnrixjii 
 or the hereditary transmission of qualities which dis- 
 tinguished their forefathers in earlier phases. 
 
 By incidental causes, such as fear of danger, insult, etc., 
 many people who are otherwise kind and peaceable may 
 be driven into committing violent and senseless acts, 
 assaults on persons, etc. The ordinary citi/eii, who in 
 peacetime regards other nations with sympathy and 
 fellow feeling, eonsid i's, when In has been called out in 
 war tit li^'ht against tin-in, that they are contemptible 
 creatures who deserve no nit rev and whom it is his duty 
 to dest r< >y. 
 
 Far from marking progress in Immanity and mutual 
 und'-rstandint:. the nations now confront one another as 
 (le,tdl\ eiieinii >, all through the fault of certain statesmen, 
 and barbarity and cruelty no\v tloiirish in the midst of a 
 continent r'-L'arded as the cent re of civili/ation just as if
 
 THE BARBARITY OF THE \\.\R 209 
 
 war were raging between tribes of primitive savages. In 
 fact, it is a horrible atavistic phenomenon that we arc now 
 called upon to witness. 
 
 Bernhardi and other war politicians have sought syste- 
 matically to bring out the fighting instincts of the Germans 
 by reminding them of their "original warlike propen- 
 sities." 
 
 Mankind is being stunted in its development, the earth 
 is becoming a hell, the sun no longer shines as of yore, and 
 there is darkness in the souls of the people. Mi"ht has 
 
 I I 
 
 Usurped the place of right, but has in a truly Satanic 
 manner been "sicklied o'er" with attractive names, 
 such as patriotism, statecraft, self-defence, fate, in- 
 terest; aggressive war is exalted and peace strivings are 
 derided on the pretext that a loftier culture is being 
 promulgated. 
 
 What appalling degeneracy ! 
 
 It is very dillicult to form a general judgment of a whole 
 nation. The majority of people in a eivili/ed country arc- 
 gentle and peaceable beings, but there is always a leaven 
 of vicious individuals. The Germans have in their news- 
 papers and other writings which they have scattered 
 abroad to meet accusations of atrocities committed during 
 the war, declared that " we are no barbarians," and have 
 pointed out what Germany has done for universal culture. 
 That, however, is one thing and nobody denies it. But 
 quite another matter is the policy of the leading statesmen, 
 the war, the violation of the neutrality of other countries, 
 and certain barbarous acts committed in the war by 
 Germans as well as by others, and which cannot be 
 reasoned away by those at home declaring : ' Ks ist 
 nicht wahr." 
 
 Nobody can say of his own nation : "' \\ e are no bar- 
 barians " ; nobody can say in war-time that it is only the 
 enemy who is cruel, that one's own nation is not guilty of 
 such things, and that all stories to this effect are lies 
 disseminated bv the enemv. The Germans have been all
 
 270 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 too eager to resort to this latter device during the great 
 World War. Here, for instance, is an appeal distributed 
 very widely in neutral countries by a group of distinguished 
 German ladies ; it is addressed " An die Fraucn ties 
 Auslandcs," and contains, inter alia, the following passage : 
 " \Ve mothers, wives, and sisters would feel that we, too, 
 were guilty if German men had really in this war offended 
 against the dictates of culture and humanity. Hut ur know 
 that our husbands and sons, our brothers and friends hurt- 
 nut censed to be the representatives of German culture when 
 they have given their lives for the defence of the Father- 
 land. No one knowing Germany, the morality of her 
 people, her advanced popular education, the discipline and 
 order in her public life, can seriously believe that the war 
 has overthrown these monuments of German culture and 
 suddenly completely transformed her people" Whilst the 
 appeal protests against "the revolting atrocities which 
 the misguided Belgian population have perpetrated on our 
 troops," the latter are exonerated because they " were 
 forced into ttiking nu'titmrex necessitated by all t he manifesta- 
 tions of frane-tirt ur warfare." 
 
 No one can answer for what is done in war in the heat 
 of a sanguinary engagement. Vet it strikes one as peculiar 
 that in the above appeal the German people are made out 
 to be so moral, so loft v 111 their concept ions, that there arc- 
 no bad individuals. All countries, unfortunately, have a 
 fairly lar^e sprinking of rough, uneducated, and dangerous 
 individuals \\ho m normal circumstances commit criminal 
 acts. Hut this is no reason 1'or calling the whole nation 
 coarse or barbarous, and most of its units are honourable 
 individuals. Tin- Suedes are undoubtedly a cultured and 
 moral nation, yet statistics sho\v that in I'.()7 close on "jooo 
 were sentenced lor srnoiis crimes (three to the death 
 penalty), and nearly I 1 ,000 w< re convicted of lesser 
 crimes. 
 
 It u< turn to Germanv, ue find in the Stuti^tik ilex 
 (It nl.\( hi n iiticht* (I'.wiT). Jn.^ti '.a ( >< n. for the live-year 
 period 1 V..s I'.Mi'J, th- folloumg criminal statistics :
 
 SAVAGERY BETWEEN CIVILIZED NATIONS 271 
 
 Con vie- Y.-arly 
 
 Nature of crime tioiia avi.-rago 
 
 Murder .... \n is 
 
 Manslaughter ... l<;7 ;j;{ 
 
 Robbery with violence . . ~,\\ .. lo-j 
 
 Severe bodily injury . . !M,MO .. IN.'.H;-J 
 
 Slight bodily injury . . 'J(,7!)S . . .".:!.",!> 
 
 Violation of domicile , . 'J'J.fiti? .. 
 
 Petty theft .... s.'i. .'!:;() .. 
 
 Serious theft . . . TJ.TI'J .. 
 
 It is thus evident that there are always thousands <,f 
 Germans who will coinniit brutal and criminal acts and 
 cannot he regarded as representatives of German culture. 
 Many such primitive individuals have probably taken part 
 in the present war and committed atrocities on enemy soil 
 without having been compelled to do so by franc tirtur 
 warfare. Proofs an- not lacking. 
 
 It is really hardly to be wondered at that cruelties have 
 been perpetrated by German soldiers, seeing that German 
 military writers never tire of declaring that war must be 
 waged with frightfulness. Thus General J. von Hartmaim 
 wrote in his work The Necessity and Humanity of War (1 877 ) 
 as follows : 
 
 " The enemy nation must not be spared the distress 
 and horrors of icar. That private individuals should be hard 
 hit thereby, that they should have to serve as a warning 
 example, is very regrettable on their account ; but to the 
 people this severity is a useful and mere/fill blessing. When 
 a war breaks out between nations terrorism becomes, from 
 a military point of view, an indispensable principle." 
 
 The pamphlet of the German Great General Staff 
 entitled Kriegsgebraiich ini Landkricge (1902) says that 
 " every means of waging war, the abstention from which 
 would cause the failure of the object of the war, may be 
 regarded as justified." 
 
 A German manifesto to the eirilr.ed natinns in answer to 
 the reports of German atrocities in the invasion of Belgium 
 was sent out some time ago bv ninety three of German v s
 
 272 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 most famous nun. including Brcntuno, Deissmann, Kuckcn, 
 
 Haeckel, Harnak. Hcrhardt Hauptmann, Max Klinger, 
 Lamprceht, Lis/.t. Ostwald. Schmollcr, Sudermann, and 
 S. Wanner. Hen is an exei rj>t : 
 
 We, the undersigned Herman representatives of science 
 and art. do herel>v solemnly jn'otest before the civilized 
 world against the lie* and calumnies by which our enemies 
 have sought to besmirch the righteousness of the Herman 
 cause. . . . 
 
 " It if not true that in waging war we arc contemptuous of 
 the Id- c of nations. Our soldiers commit no undisciplined 
 acts and no cruelties. . . . 
 
 " // is not true that our soldiers have taken the lives of 
 civilian citi/ens unites they hare been compelled to do so, 
 driven by the /</:i - of necessity. . . . 
 
 " It is nut true that our troops have wantonly destroyed 
 
 LoUKlin, et c. . . . 
 
 " lit Here us ! Relieve us that in this struggle we shall 
 march onward to the end as a civili/ed people, a people to 
 which the heritage of a Hoethc. a Hecthovcii, a Kant is as 
 sacred as its \vn hearth and home. Let our names and 
 
 our h' 'II' >ur lie our pledge ! 
 
 Resides this jirotest from the Herman intellectuals, 
 anot her collect ive protist of the (iernidn unirersities (t wenty- 
 t wo in number) was s. nl out . in which t hey appealed t o t he 
 professors of all ot ln-r universit ics abroad to protest against 
 the allegations of cruelty which have been brought against 
 the Herman method of warfare. They plead that every 
 university teacher must he familiar w'ith Herman r;////rr and 
 Herman M-I< nr, mul r< \< ./;(//. and ask how it can be believed 
 that a national army \\hich contains a lari_ r(> j'roporlion of 
 the teachers and students of (iirman umvirsities (,//; he 
 thniiitlif to In 'juiltt/ nf Imrliiirnus <uts or of destroying the 
 moniimi nts o|' culture e\c< pt und' r the stern necessity of 
 uar. The appi al concludes as follous : 
 
 " It' in the course of this monstrous war, in which our 
 pi "pit <ire /(//<(// In fi-j/it not only for their j,o\\er but for 
 their \< r\ existence and culture, the \\oik ol destruction
 
 SAVAGERY BETWEEN CIVILIZED NATIONS 273 
 
 would serin to be greater than in other wars, and allirit 
 many valuable treasures of culture have been saerilieed, 
 the responsibility tlierefor must rest wholly on the shoulders 
 of those who were not content to loose this infamous uv/r 
 upon the world but have not shrunk from forcing murderous 
 weapons into the hands of a peaceful population spurred 
 on treacherously to assail our troops whilst they wen- t rust ing 
 to the observance of the acknowledged usages of war of all 
 civili/ed nations. \V ith the allies must rest tin hlat/ie for all that 
 is now taking place. On them will rest t he curse of history 
 for all the irreparable injury thus done to civilization. " 
 
 This appeal shows that practically all representatives of 
 German learning have in the same measure as the (ierman 
 nation as a body, been hypnotized into believing that 
 Germany was " forced " to wage war for her existence and 
 that the whole responsibility must therefore be borne by 
 the Entente Powers. They did not reali/.e that history 
 can already prove the part, which Germany played in the 
 origin of the war; they believed blindly in Germany's 
 right to violate Belgium's neutrality, and they forgot that, 
 even if Germany's academical eiti/ens cannot be thought- 
 guilty of barbarous acts, there must be many others of little 
 education in the colossal German army who might perpe- 
 trate acts of violence and cruelty. 
 
 We have seen what the German intellectuals at home had 
 to ndi/. Meanwhile the German soldiers acted the direct 
 opposite, as can be proved by their diaries found in France. 
 The following extracts may serve as illustrations : 
 
 " Dorf (lurch die 11 Pioniere /erslort. .'5 Fraueii an den 
 Biiumen crhangt." ("Village destroyed by the llth 
 Pioneers, three women hanged on trees.") Longeville, 
 August 24, 1911. 
 
 " In der Nacht sind unglaubliehe Saehen passiert : Laden 
 ausgcpliindert. Geld gcstohlen, Vcrgcwaltigungen. Kinfaeh 
 haarstriiubcnd ! "' ("During the night incredible things 
 have happened : shops looted, money stolen, acts of 
 brutality. Enough to make one's hair stand on end.") 
 Cirey. August '_' t. 
 
 s
 
 274 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 " Das wundt rschone Dorf (Jue d'Hossiis soil ganz un- 
 in Fiammen aufgcgangen sein. Kin Uadfahrcr soil 
 sein und dabci sein (ic\vchr losgcgangen ; gleieh 
 ist auf ihn geschossen word* n. Man hat miinnliche Kin- 
 wohner cintach in die Fiammen gcworfen ! ("The 
 beautiful \illagc of (iue d'llossus, though (mite innocent, 
 said to have been burnt down. A cvehst said to have 
 fallen from his machine, accidentally discharging his rille ; 
 he was immediately iircd on. Male inhabitants have 
 simply been thrown into the ilames.") From the diary of 
 an o'licer of the IT.sth Infantry Regiment, First Corps of the 
 Saxon Army, August '_';. 
 
 The last page of the note-book of a soldier contains the 
 following: " So haben \\ir s llauscr mit den Kinwohnern 
 verniehtet. Aus eincm Hausc wurden allein '_' Manner mit 
 ihren Frauen und ein 18-jiihriges Madehen erstochen. Das 
 Made] konntc mir Leid tun deim Sic maehtc solch unschul- 
 digen Blick, aber man komite gcgen die aufgcrcgte Mcnge 
 nielits ausrichten, denn dann sind es keine Mensehcn 
 sondern Tien-. Wirsind jet/.l auf dem \\\ ^e nach Sedan." 
 ("And so \\e destroyed ei^ht houses \\ith inhabitants. 
 In one house alone two men with their wives and a 
 L r irl of eighteen were run through. I felt sorrv for the 
 girl, she had such an innocent look, but one could do 
 nothing against the excited mob, for at such times 
 thev arc not UK n, but beasts. \Vc are now on the way 
 to S. dan.") 
 
 Th' sc diary jottings are taken from a collection of some 
 forty in all published by J. Hedier, the celebrated French 
 philologist, professor at the College dc l''i'ance, under t he 
 title 'I'fii- (iinti<tn ( rinn - <;< <-nr<lini! I" (iirnnin Tt *tirnnnif.* 
 M'^l ol' tip m are reprodue, d m photographic facsimile so 
 that anvoiie can see tor himsell \\hat (< rman soldiers have 
 
 \'.ritt'ii about t he at I'oeit |i -, they lia\e \\ltlli-.ed. H''dler 
 
 comments as follo\\s : " An\one opening tliis pamphlet 
 v. ill liiid nought but documents whose genuineness must 
 
 ' /.' .< n mi s ullt >/iiim!s il'tijii <*,(/', lcini'jnn<;i ,s d!l< initials I .l:iliu;iry
 
 SAVAGERY BETWEEN CIVILIZED NATIONS 'J7."> 
 
 ut once strike his eye, if he has eyes to set- with, just a, the 
 atrocities must strike iiis heart, if lie lias a In-art.'' 
 
 So it is not worth while to deny that brutality is practis.-d 
 by some nations in the World War now raging ; it occurs 
 amongst them all, even though many individuals better 
 favoured by circumstances are more humane. 
 
 Dr. S. Iledin, after having seen the war at close quarters, 
 writes : " People talk of modern warfare having been 
 humanized. What a deplorable error ! War as now 
 raging between civili/cd nations is worse than ever. It is 
 waged on both sides with a f'rrir.i/ and a /<>'<><ili/ which 
 bailie all description. One can tell that it is a war of life 
 and death." 
 
 Sometimes we come across statements bv highlv placed 
 ollicers at the front which testify that war is barbarism. 
 Thus General Hindenburg remarked to a correspondent of 
 the \ciic Frcic Prcsse in November, when he had learnt 
 that the Russians were slurring and that even the country 
 itself (Poland) was suffering from famine : " This is 
 regrettable, but it is just ax iccll Ihut it should be so. We 
 cannot make war sentimentally. The more ruthlessly 
 war is waged, the more humane does it really become, 
 for that is the best way to bring it to a rapid conclusion." 
 
 This reasoning has unfortunately proved faKe : the war 
 has lasted since August, 11)11, and will probably be of 
 very long duration. 13ut then- must be no mercy shown ! 
 Nothing but death, distress, destruction ! 
 
 Franc-tireurs, or persons who in their own country and on 
 their own initiative seek to stay the progress of an invading 
 enemy arc proscribed by modern military usage, and it has 
 been sought by international agreements to prevent such 
 defensive aid, inasmuch as the- regular armies arc- held to be 
 the sole belligerents in war. If such volunteer tighter^, 
 formed into a body, are to be permitted to tight, it is 
 deemed necessary that they should be recognized by a 
 military authority, that they should have -crittt'n in.^lruc- 
 tiunx and should wear some sort of uniform, so that they
 
 270 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 can IK- identified as soldiers. Hut the force of circum- 
 stances often makes this impossible, and as in reality it is 
 unreasonable that the citizens of a eountry ravaged by an 
 enemy, when urged by the unhappy state of their country 
 and their patriotic rixtntnunt and despair to injure the 
 enemy us franc- 1 incurs, should be treated differently from 
 .soldier* and be shot like vermin if caught. For instance. 
 a Jranc-tircnr may not have had time to procure, a uni- 
 form, or there may, through some delay in the working 
 of a Conscription Act, not have been time to register him 
 as a combatant. 
 
 We know, however, that in the Franco-German War of 
 1870-71 the German General Staff did not insist that all 
 combatant Frenchmen should wear a uniform. The franc- 
 tirt'urx who fought in that war in the national blue blouse 
 were practically unrecognizable as combatants, and they 
 were, in fact, encouraged in a circular sent out by the 
 Prefect of the Cote d'Or (November 1,S7<>) to form little 
 pickets of three or four men and shoot down Prussians 
 when it could be done without risk. 
 
 War is war, war is brutality, whether organi/cd or 
 extemporized. To hide in ambush and employ ruses of war 
 is very common among regular troops; they do not light 
 with arms alone, t hey use pit s and mines and seek to deceive 
 t he enemy by piling up logs and barrels to resemble guns, etc. 
 
 As regards the Belgians, it is clearly unreasonable to 
 reproach them for crimes against tin- /</:r\ oj i^ar and t he 
 /fju'.v nf tuition*, seeing that thev were drawn into the light 
 against the German invasion through the crime which 
 Germany committed against international law by infringing 
 Belgium's neutrality. In the face of this revolting crime, 
 to which the Chancellor Bet hmann-IIollweg pleaded guilty 
 before the H' -ichstag, it is natural that, manv Belgians 
 should cast aside all scruples. 
 
 Germany's crime loomed large before their eyes and they 
 I- It that they must avenge it. 
 
 How the Belgians felt when the Germans invaded and 
 devastated their land mav be gathered from the account
 
 SAVAGERY BETWEEN CIVILIZED NATIONS 
 
 which a combatant in the war, a Belgian artist, to whom 
 I have already referred (p. 'JU<>), gave Mr. Gustaf Hellstrom, 
 who passed it on to the Dagi-nx \yheter : " We know tliat 
 it is all no use, hut we cannot help thinking of all they hare 
 burnt and destroyed; we cannot helj) thinking that they 
 have made us a people without a home, that our :eires ami 
 children and parents and brothers and sisters arc this very 
 night toiling like tramps along the roads leading to Holland 
 and France. . . . When we think of all this our brains 
 almost give way. When we think that we have let them 
 in as merchants, as hotel-keepers, and that they have 
 returned all this with treachery, we feel that it is almost 
 more than we can bear. 
 
 kk And to-day I sec- in the papers that they call us bandits ! 
 I myself am an artist by profession. . . . 
 
 tk Do you think we did not know what it would cost us ? 
 And do you think that such overwhelming unity could have 
 been brought about through some Government or other 
 which half the population does not care a rap about 
 having made a secret treaty with another Power ? Does 
 any sane person believe this ? Say we were fools ichen let- 
 stood up as one man, but don't call us traitors and bandits ! 
 There are moments when from the King down to the 
 navvy we simply feel like this : Sooner death and devasta- 
 tion than to sit sleek and comfortable by the fireside. To us 
 the problem simply resolves itself into that. The King 
 need not have spoken, we would have acted as we did 
 anyhow.'' 
 
 During the early stages of the war in Belgium, the 
 German newspapers circulated many stories of atrocities 
 committed on German soldiers by Belgian civilians, women 
 as well as men : mutilation, gouging-out of eyes, etc. 
 Two official commissions, one civilian and one military, 
 were appointed by the War Olliee at Berlin to investigate 
 the charges, and after exhaustive inquiries they came to 
 the conclusion that in the state of confusion and excite- 
 ment which prevailed it was quite natural that acts of 
 brutality and crueltv should be committed here and there
 
 278 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 by nil parties, but that on the whole these nets had been 
 greatly exaggerated. The partieularly revolting stories 
 of the gouging-out of eyes were formally contradicted. 
 
 That many of Belgium's civil population turned out as 
 franc-tirciirs against the German usurpers is explained by 
 the fact that universal military service had not been 
 introduced, with the result that the able-bodied nun, 
 filled with patriotic fervour on seeing the enemy on their 
 soil, threw themselves upon him. often doubtless without 
 knowing that the international law governing warfare 
 forbids such volunteer efforts. 
 
 Hut to punish iilhtrti than those caught in the act as 
 franc-tireurs, and to make entire villages and towns suffer 
 for such attacks, is surely contrary to all accepted tenets of 
 warfare between eivili/ed nations. 
 
 The envoy H. Kleen says in his great work on The IM~CS 
 of Wnr : "To put to death a lar^c nninlnr for the 
 sake df one undiscovered culprit, or to pick out at 
 random or by drawing lots one or more victims to atone 
 for an act of which, in many cases, they have tin /.'//</:i/< i/^v 
 Ti'hfitti'tT, is a procedure which brands the belligerent as 
 unworthy to be reckoned amongst civili/ed nations." 
 
 Article .*><) of the War Regulations adopted by The 
 Hague Conference of 1M>1> contains the following passage: 
 '* Cnllt flii't' punishment in the form of lines or otherwise 
 must not be inflicted on the population by reason of 
 indiridinil tuts for which it cannot l>c In Id cnllcctirt'li/ 
 rcspmisihlf." 1 
 
 1'ripfi^or Meun r, in an article entitled "The Judg- 
 ment on I.oiivam." \\hieli appeared in Dcnlschlund und 
 tier lit lll;ri< -j /.''// has. like many other (ierman war 
 writ i rs. \i uk an i ] i. < t c.. drawn at t < nt i< >n to the IK \\ spa per 
 accounts of atroeihis committed by HI Igians on (Jerman 
 soldiers, which mav possibly lie partiallv true, but have 
 al o lii-en partiallv dispro\ ( -d. Tlii rumour that jrnnc- 
 tiit nrs had ]iiit out tin ryes ,,f \\niMiilril (ii-rman soldiers 
 has. alter a careful invest igat ! MI m which the (lerman 
 ne\\ -,paper / nr:<.'irt* took part. pn'\id tn be unfounded.
 
 SAVAGERY BETWEEN CIVILIZED NATIONS 279 
 
 But the title alone of Meurer's article, >k The Judgm< nt 
 on Louvain," shows that the German commanders <lir< -cti ! 
 that, certain atrocities should be committed on civilian 
 Belgians, atrocities of which the author approves: the 
 shooting not only of those who had iired on the Germans, 
 but of numerous women and children as well; and the 
 deliberate setting fire to the town in the course of uhieh 
 107-1- dwelling-houses were burnt down as a pntiishnit >it 
 is an atrocious act of barbarism which is not in accordance 
 with the rules of war in regard to reprisals. 
 
 The Hague C'onfercnee of IS'.H) adopt eil certain rules 
 against the participation of civilians in war, amongst them 
 a clause formulated by Martens in which it was decreed 
 that "in unforeseen cases the population and the com- 
 batants shall remain under the protection and safeguard of 
 the laws of nations as established by the ;/Ay/<y.v in ojtiTntion 
 behceen cirilized nations, the diddles of humanity, and the 
 principles of etJiics in general." 
 
 That this clause was transgressed by German soldiers. 
 actually by the order of their commanders, both at Louvain 
 and at many other places, has been amply demonstrated. 
 When cruel reprisals are admitted from German <|uarters 
 they arc excused on the plea of the necessity of protecting 
 the German troops. The burning of Louvain was thus an 
 appropriate punitive measure ! 
 
 The non-combatants who have suffered most terribly in 
 the war are the Belgians, although they thought that they 
 were safeguarded by their neutrality guaranteed by the 
 Great Powers. Germany having violated this neutrality 
 and Belgium having sought by the force- of arms to defend 
 it, the country has been crushed, towns have been bom- 
 barded, commerce and industry have ceased, supplies and 
 cattle have been taken away, the crops have been dest r< >yed, 
 enormous war contributions have been levied, and a jireat 
 part of the utterly destitute population have been forced 
 by want to ilce to Holland the Cmirrur 7>Y/i.v computes 
 the number at about a million, including L'o.(HH) orphaned
 
 280 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 children. This enormous number of people consists mainly 
 of old men, women, and children. Almost daily, at the 
 time of the invasion, one heard of women who had gone 
 mad or committed suicide. Most had lost their husbands, 
 many their children. The future is to the majority utterly 
 without hope. Everything lias crumbled; most of them 
 neither dare nor can return to their country, when- their 
 homes have been laid waste or have disappeared altogct her. 
 Distress has also overtaken those who have remained at 
 home we are witnessing the starvation of a nation. 
 Seldom has history had to record such limitless suffering 
 of a whole people : for a parallel we must go back to the 
 times when Carthage and Jerusalem were destroyed. The 
 gaunt spectre of want hangs over Belgium, and it is as 
 if an overwhelming natural catastrophe, an all-engulfing 
 earthquake or a gigantic tidal wave, had visited the 
 country not a friendly Power which had guaranteed 
 its neutrality. Sonic help is being given to the unhappy 
 Belgians through the collections of compassionate fellow- 
 creatures in other countries, but their sufferings are none 
 the less terrible and in numberless cases impossible to 
 relieve. 
 
 The whole unhappy countrv is utterly paralysed and the 
 inhabitants who are left are leading a pitiable existence. 
 In the middle of December the (icrman newspaper J'nrtaiV/.s 1 
 gave an account of the appalling economic situation in 
 Belgium, written by a person familiar with the state of 
 things tin re. Any sort of recovery from this plight was 
 not to br thought of. Communications had practically 
 ceased; raw materials fur the industries were altogether 
 lacking: tin L'lass and metal industries were de;id. the 
 quarries could not \sork. the building trade was at a 
 standstill. About '.to p< r cent, of the [Mi-sons otherwise 
 engaiM '1 ui mdiist ry \s ere out of \\ ork. and i \is| ed onlv \\ it h 
 the aid of communal support ; tin coffers of t he t rade unions 
 were i mpty. |-,\ i n person^ of tin civil si r\ ice class wen- 
 in want, and most of tlnni reeei\<d no salarv. ()\er 
 ."*(>, (Kid persons in Uriisst Is \\erc compilled daily to fetch
 
 SAVAGERY BETWEEN CIVILIZED NATIONS 281 
 
 their soup at the public kitchens, where representatives of 
 all classes foregathered. 
 
 In April 1915 the following telegram on the situation in 
 Belgium was made public : " The War Aid Committee 
 formed by the Rockefeller Trust to inquire into the condition 
 of the Belgian population in the invaded territory has now 
 published its report, which constitutes a crushing indict- 
 ment of German rule in Belgium. In the smallest villages, 
 as well as in the large towns laid waste by lire, the (ierman 
 army has looted till houses which remained standing, and all 
 objects which could not be removed had been deliberately 
 given over to the ilames. In the half-burnt villages the 
 unhappy families linger on in the most pitiable and in- 
 sanitary state.'' 
 
 On May .3 the following telegraphic message was dis- 
 patched from Belgium : " Germans continue their methodi- 
 cal sack of Belgium " 
 
 The newspaper Vadcrland publishes a telegram from Aix- 
 la-Chapcllc of the following tenor : '* During the last few 
 days trains loaded with all kinds of articles from Belgium 
 have passed through Aix-la-Chapelle. Your correspondent 
 counted over ten trains laden with beet, tools, furniture. 
 and carts, all of which will probably be sold in Germany." 
 
 An important dossier of the German atrocities in Belgium 
 has been published in the Revue des deu.v Mundes of 
 January 1915 ; it is contained in a contribution by P. 
 Nothomb, a prominent member of the Belgian Parliament, 
 entitled " La Bclgique Martyrc." 
 
 In France the Germans acted with most appalling 
 brutality and cruelty in the departments occupied at the 
 beginning of the war. This is evidenced by the Rapport 
 issued on December 17, 1911, by the Commission appointed 
 by the Government to investigate the enemy's violation of 
 international law.* This Commission was composed of 
 
 * linpport par la Commission inxtitnce en rue dc f :>ist<ilt r It .s actes 
 commix par I'ennemi en violation dn dmit </<\ ifenn : Journal njficicl, 
 JuniKirv, 8. 1915.
 
 282 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1014 
 
 M. Payclle, President of the High Court. M. Mollard, 
 ambassador, M. Maringer, Conseiller d'fitat, and M. Paillot, 
 Councillor of Justice. They went to work with the most 
 scrupulous thoroughness and accepted no accounts which 
 had not hern amply proved, so that they can vouch that 
 the report contains nothing lut facts which have l>een 
 fully substantiated and which can therefore he taken as in- 
 contestable evidence of the crimes committed. State- 
 ments whose authenticity has not been demonstrated 
 beyond all doubt have been admitted. K\ try case dealt 
 with is accompanied by the most absolute proofs based 
 not only on personal observations on the part of the 
 members of the Commission, but also on photographic 
 evidence and numerous sworn statements. 
 
 The atrociti'-s M t forth in the report surpass in extent 
 and horror anything that the imagination can conceive. 
 Kntire villages have been destroyed by gun and riile tire. 
 Win ilf /o:i/f.v arc cmnjilttclij dcscrlxl and nothing but ruins 
 remain. In some places, where the incendiaries of the 
 invader have been at work, one mi'jht think that one had 
 been transplanted to the ruins of some ancient town 
 destroyed by a great cataclysm of nature. The report 
 goes on to show that never has a war between civih/ed 
 nations been marked by such savage ferocity as that now 
 waged in Western Kurope by a merciless enemy. Facts 
 prove indisputably that the (ierman army is animated by 
 an absolut e and cut ire c<inlf in/il \<>r ]t unit in ///<' The oilicer, 
 no less than the soldji-r. kills the wounded and murders 
 without rip rev th'- defenceless inhabitants of occupied 
 territories, sparuiLf n< itlr r women, old men, nor children. 
 The olliei i-s themsi Ives take pail in these massacres. The 
 content ion of t he (Jermans t hat i\n- ci't'il jiujmlt'liim hc^nn thf 
 fiHiirh i,n lhtin i> a li- . Those who Iia\f spr.-ad abroad 
 these ri-ports ha\ e been unable to jjive them any semblance 
 of \eraeit\\ The tueuibi I, of tin- Commission m many 
 ea es ha\'e eoll.et.d evid<-lie-- to sho\v that the (iirtimm 
 tin iii.->t I; i -', to make l'lie\ ( that tiny had been attacked, 
 have tlisclinY'tinl rifli'* from the \ieimt \ of dwelling's. In
 
 SAVAGERY BETWEEN CIVILIZED NATIONS 283 
 
 almost every town and village citi/ens have been dragged 
 away from their homes and thrown into prison. Many 
 have died or been killed on the way. The enemy, says 
 the report of the Commission, has practised incendiarism 
 partly in order to cow the population and partly in pur- 
 suanee of a system of deliberate destruction. The in- 
 cendiary fury of the Germans has been vented first and fore- 
 most on churches and historical monuments. Thousands 
 of houses have been burnt to the ground, but the members 
 of the Commission have concerned themselves only with 
 fires started with solely criminal intent, and have taken no 
 notice of those caused by shell fire in the course of the 
 fighting. On the subject of thefts, it has been demon- 
 strated that the Germans, in the presence of their oilicers 
 and often in collusion with them, have carried on methodi- 
 cally organized looting. This abominable practice of the 
 Germans is particularly noticeable at Luneville and throws 
 a strange light on the mentality of the usurpers. After 
 having indiscriminately looted and gutted seventy houses, 
 they proceeded to massacre peaceful inhabitants. The 
 German authorities posted up a proclamation bringing the 
 most ridiculous charges in order to justify the levying, 
 under threats of the death penalty, of a contribution of 
 650,000 francs. 
 
 The report concludes by saying that these acts are as 
 many violations of the rights of man. The murder of 
 wounded and prisoners is forbidden by international con- 
 ventions, as are attacks on the Red Cross staff, doctors, 
 and stretcher-bearers, of which numerous instances are 
 cited. 
 
 Old wen of seventy and eighty and over have been shot. 
 
 Cri?ninal assaults on young girls, nuns, and ladies whose 
 husbands were fighting have been extraordinarily numerous 
 and many cases have been proved to the hilt. Frequently 
 several, as many as nine, soldiers have committed rape on 
 one and the same woman, often under the nm//le of the 
 revolver. 
 
 This ghastly report, which tills sixteen three-column
 
 284 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 pages of folio size, in which every case cited is accom- 
 panied by a statement of the locality, date, name, etc., 
 can be read bv no one without the deepest horror, and 
 makes one sick in soul and body. This at least is the 
 impression it made on me, and I could not read it without 
 pausing now and then, just as when I read the history of 
 the Inquisition and its terrors. 
 
 On the subject of the destruction of the town of Senlis, 
 on September >, also referred to in the- report. Mr. liustaf 
 Hi list rom has given the Dn^cns \i/lititr an account of his 
 personal investigation. There wen- no French or British 
 soldiers in the town, only a few Zouaves, and there was no 
 lighting. The town was bombarded for three hours and 
 shells were dropped on the cathedral, after the Germans 
 had heard rille firing from the Zouaves. The mayor had 
 drawn up a proclamation, which was found at his domicile, 
 but which he had no time to post in a public place. I It- 
 was nevertheless dragged away as a hostage together with 
 several others, all of whom were shot : even boys were 
 .shot down. The (( rman soldiers began by looting an 
 hotel and stealing food and wine, then they got drunk 
 and began to dance ; they went from cabaret to cabaret and 
 became more and more intoxicated, after which they set 
 lire to the town wit h hand grenades and pet rol. According 
 to the Commission of Investigation, live hundred houses 
 Were reduced to ashes. Although it was the Zouaves who 
 had lired the shots heard by the (icrmans, the latter per- 
 sisted in their pretext that they came from civilians, which 
 was not t lie ease. 
 
 \Vlnlst the (i-rmans in the first month of the war 
 pursued then triumphal progress through Hel^uim and 
 
 France with "uood results," the people at home were 
 he^de themselves \\tth exultant j"V ; tl.'iL's and bunting 
 were universal, and everywhere the people sailer with 
 patriotic f. T\our " Deiif schland. I )eut schland iiber All< s 
 in d'T \Y'lt." Tli' eliurehi s r< .omul* d with the swelling 
 tones of " Nun dank' t a lie ( lot t ." and the ( i rman pi o pie 
 wen- exalted as the \\ortliv d ci ndants of (;.,. t h< , Kant,
 
 SAVAGERY BETWEEN CIVILIZED NATIONS 285 
 
 and Beethoven. Meanwhile thousands of civilian Belgians 
 and Frenchmen were lleeing from their burning homes, 
 hundreds of them wounded or /// riY/rw/.v, whilst .hundreds 
 again lay murdered and many hundred raped women were 
 suffering agonies of despair and humiliation brought 
 upon them by these worthy sons of Goethe, Kant, and 
 Beethoven. 
 
 It is not difficult to understand that the French, who for 
 the last deeades have felt no rancour against the (Germans 
 and whose desire for revenge had died away, have by the 
 German exploits in this war been filled wit h unext inguish- 
 able hatred, and are resolved, Government and people 
 alike, to light to the last man and not to make peace until 
 the enemy is beaten ; nor can one wonder that the women 
 of France declined to join in the Women's Peace Congress 
 at The Hague at the end of April 1 ( .>1.">. k ' So long as the 
 soil of France is not freed from the enemy, her women 
 cannot think of peace " -that was their message to the 
 Congress. 
 
 The Emperor William's message to his army on the out- 
 break of war, to the effect that he placed his trust in the 
 " unconquerable martial spirit which from days of old has 
 filled our enemies with fear and terror," 1 and General Ilart- 
 mann's doctrine that " the enemy States must not be spared 
 the distress and horrors oficar,'' have 1 had had an appalling 
 sequel. This may well remind us of the Germanic bar- 
 barians of antiquity, when they burst into the Roman 
 Empire and ravaged Gaul, Greece, and the East, sacking 
 towns and putting the population to the sword, or of the 
 Huns, whose savage lust of destruction spread terror over 
 Europe (cf. p. 2S). 
 
 The Emperor William threatened China some twenty 
 years ago with Germany's " mailed fist,'' and his order^ to 
 the China troops of Field-Marshal Waldersce were : " Go 
 ye forth as Huns ! " The Germans have shown that they 
 can obey : they have not forgotten the command, and 
 even in this European World War they have obeyed it with 
 Prussian thoroughness.
 
 286 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 When General Ilindcnburg had defeated the- Russians in 
 East Prussia, the- Germans penetrated into Poland and 
 Litliuania, and although these countries arc not inhabited 
 by Russians, they have been treated in the most appalling 
 manner by the victorious Germans. According to data 
 published by the " Lithuanian Information Bureau " in 
 Paris,* sonic fifty communes, tlu- names of which are given, 
 were badly ravaged by the German invasion. The looting 
 has been systematic ; the soldiers took food, cattle, and 
 horses without giving the receipts prescribed for such 
 requisitions, and when the inhabitants in some places 
 asked for these vouchers, they received pieces of paper oil 
 which was written: "\\hocvcr produces this shall be 
 hanged or shall receive 100 strokes of the cat." In all 
 the localities mentioned the Germans have destroyed or 
 requisitioned propcrtv representing tens of millions, and 
 have taken a toll of thousands of lives. 
 
 A report was sent to Pope Henedict (January 28, 1915) 
 appealing for hi*- inters cnt ion with the German Government 
 and his protest against the way in which the Germans 
 treated prints and churches in Lithuania. In this report 
 it is stated that seven churches in the districts of Yilna 
 and Seina have been bombarded and that three of them 
 are in ruins, several hundred persons women, children, 
 and old men who took refuge within having been killed or 
 wounded. A couple of priests who refused to incite the 
 population to rebellion against the Russian administration 
 were sip >t . 
 
 The devastation in the Polish theatre of war has been 
 
 described bv the Polish I'olintess Lei 1< ich< \\ ska Ilk two 
 
 addresses <,M\en at Stockholm in April r.H.">, in the course 
 of which she gave t he f< >llo\\ HIM- d I ails : A b nit '_'(i(i t < iwiis 
 and '.M)()O Nilla^es have l - n affected by the war. and .")o()O 
 "iillii'Jis ha: i In t n l<~tlltd In tin' ground illisuluttli{. The 
 churches are in nnn->. the granaries are emjifv, and au r n 
 culture is comjiletely paral\sid f ( r \\ant of cal t Ic and seed. 
 
 * ( f. /'// l.iliiiinnn , ////.'/'/i/i iin/i-.iiil <ln lniii'in <T infni mnti'iiis
 
 SAVAGERY BETWEEN CIVILIZED NATIONS 'J87 
 
 Many towns, such as Lodz with its t.~>(), 000 inhabitants, 
 twice conquered, are completely ruined. The factories un- 
 closed, reducing some 400,000 workmen to destitution. 
 Thousands of inhabitants arc wandering about in the forests 
 homeless, and mothers have no food to give their starving 
 children. Terrible ej)idcniicx famine, spotted typhus, 
 dysentery, etc. have broken out, especially among the 
 children, who have suffered from a total lack of milk. 
 Hundreds, nay, thousands are stretching out imploring 
 hands for a crust of bread, but there is none to give. 
 Mothers turn their faces from their children to be spared 
 the sight of their wan faces, pinched by famine. The 
 soldier, who has gone out to light, but treasures in his 
 innermost heart the picture of the home he left behind 
 him, returns to find the corpses of wife and children, starved 
 to death. 
 
 A race who have suffered cruelly through the war are 
 the Jews. AVhat has made the war particularly terrible 
 for them to bear is the devastation which has swept over 
 those countries of Eastern Europe where they lived in large 
 communities, as in Russian Poland with its 'J. 000. 000, 
 and Galicia with its 1,000, 000 Jews. We know now that 
 these countries are nothing but an immense cemetery, a 
 huge waste of ruins, where all industrial life has ceased and 
 in the midst of which the remaining inhabitants are 
 threatened with complete annihilation, whilst millions 
 have had to llec from their native soil and have neither 
 home nor bread. 
 
 The Jews, like the other subjects of a State, are required 
 to serve in the army, and it is reckoned that about a million 
 have been in arms, of whom some 200,000 have- been killed 
 or seriously wounded. Scattered as they are over the 
 countries at war, these co-religionists and kinsmen have 
 everywhere been made to light against one another. 
 
 In Palestine a Jewish culture which has sprung np in 
 recent decades is now threatened with extinction owing to 
 broken communications and the resultant impossibility of 
 making agriculture productive. For the Jews, therefore,
 
 288 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 tin- war is a catastrophe, perhaps tin- greatest that lias 
 befallen tin-in in our era since the destruction of Jerusalem. 
 
 Professor Hi iss. of Lausanne, after investigating the 
 Austrian atrncititx in Strbiti, has furnished the- following 
 details. At Sjabaty. the investigation only covers this 
 district KiUO civilians, mainly of the peasant class and 
 females of ages varying between two and ninety-two, have 
 been massacred. Most of them were taken as hostages, 
 but as it was impossible to get them sent to Austria at 
 once, they were put to death. At Letchnit/a the Austrians 
 compelled lo ( .) citi/ens of the civil population between the 
 ages of eight and ninety, who had been taken as hostages, 
 to dig trendies. They were thereupon ranged up along- 
 side these trenches and shot, t heir bodies falling into the pit 
 behind them. Many of them, however, were not killed 
 outright, and a number, in fact, were not even touched, but 
 nevertheless the t rcndu-s were filled in over dead and living. 
 Professor Reiss adds that in some of the smaller towns 
 which he has visited 1 1 IS civilians have hern killed. 
 
 In the Austrian Press these atrocities are excused on the 
 plea that the Serbian civilian population attacked the- 
 Aust nan t n>< >ps ! 
 
 An ollieial summary of the' Kitstiidn atrocities in Mast 
 Prussia has been published by the- (ierman Government 
 (April 1 ( .H ~> }. all data given being taken from ollieial reports 
 and sworn declarations, lie-re- we- read the- following : " It 
 is now a fact familiar to all that the formerly nourishing 
 n L'in of Mast Prussia now presents, as a ivsnlt of the bar- 
 barous Russian methods of uarfare, a picture- of the most 
 hopt li s S desolation, that entire towns have- hern burnt 
 do\\ n and dr^trovrd, and that th< peaceful inhabitants 
 havr had to l!y from the iv-jime- of sack and nmrelrr and 
 Iravr all that they possrssi d behind. Ollieial details now 
 to hand show that in tin- course- of tin- tuo Russian in- 
 vasions of Mast Prussia thousands of mrn, \\iinnli. anil 
 children wen- dr:i;_'!_" <1 auav. \\hiUt thousands of others 
 wrrr murdered and L'O.OOO buildings were destroyed or 
 burnt ; in the second invasion so. (((( dwelling-houses were
 
 SAVAGERY BETWEEN CIVILIZED NATIONS 280 
 
 looted and destroyed. The last Russian raid on Memel 
 also proved to be a savage looting expedition punctuated 
 by every conceivable horror. The cert i lied statements 
 annexed to the report bear ghastly witness to the cruelties 
 and acts of savagery inflicted on the population. 
 
 "In every conceivable way the Russian troops have 
 stolen, plundered, sacked, and wantonly destroyed t Im- 
 movables of rich and poor. Cattle and supplies have been 
 taken away without payment and without leaving re- 
 quisition receipts. Men and women were forced to hand 
 over their last pfennigs to the rapacious soldiery. Houses 
 were ransacked from top to bottom and everything that 
 appealed to the greed of the rank and file was carried away. 
 To crown their infamy, they deliberately and wantonly 
 burnt and destroyed homesteads, farm buildings, and 
 supplies. 
 
 " The population, amongst them women and children, 
 were maltreated under all sorts of pretexts and without 
 rhyme or reason, although they did all in their power to 
 please the Russian soldiers as regards food and lodging. 
 These cruelties include many acts of deliberate torture ; 
 thus in one case all the male inhabitants of a whole village, 
 including the judge, were flogged and threatened with 
 death. A very common occurrence was the murder of 
 peaceable eiti/ens without the slightest cause, often with 
 refined torture and before the eyes of their family. Rape 
 of women was frequent. In many eases the unhappy 
 victims were assaulted by several soldiers in succession and 
 many were infected with venereal diseases. Women in an 
 advanced stage of pregnancy fell victims to these lascivious 
 beasts in human form, and even old women of over seventy 
 were not spared. A little girl of eight was raped by t:co 
 Russian soldiers in succession. Ofiicers were also to be 
 found amongst the guilty." 
 
 Germany has now surprised her enemies with giant 
 mortars of 42 centimetres, with which the most appalling 
 execution has been done and by the aid of whi^h the 
 
 T
 
 290 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 strongest fortresses have been taken consummate in- 
 fernal machines which Fran Bertha Krupp has con- 
 tributed to German warfare, a token, by the way, of 
 woman's share in modern culture. These guns have 
 been playfully called >k Dieke Bertha " ("Fat Bertha ") 
 after her.* 
 
 Besides many highly perfected types of gun, howitzer, 
 etc., hitting their target with incredible precision at an 
 enormous range determined by scientific calculations, and 
 in addition to improved shells and shrapnel, this war has also 
 witnessed the introduction of machine guns of the very 
 highest ellieit ney. capable of dealing death wholesale. A 
 German ollicer wrote in a war letter from Belgium, after his 
 men had been decimated by British machine gun tire: 
 "These machine-guns are the invention of the devil 
 himself! " 
 
 This war has been very fertile in new methods of lighting 
 and engines of destruction hitherto undreamt of. To 
 aerial bombardment has been added the use of hand- 
 grenades and mines, and now we have the " spraying with 
 corrosive liquids." This diabolical invention is (ierman, 
 and was first used in February l'.H.~ in the forest of Malan- 
 court between the Ardennes and the Meuse. where the 
 Germans sprayed the French in their trenches with a 
 corrosive liquid which burnt them badly and compelled 
 them to evacuate their position. 
 
 Another hellish device adopted by the Germans (in 
 March l'.i|.") was the spraying \ the cnttni/ :\. < ilh petroleum 
 ignited by hand-bombs and burning torches. The soldiers' 
 
 l-'.i|ii:i!l\ l.-ii'L'' . if ii"t lari.'i r. L r ii)s \\rrr used in 1 I .VI and M al< <\ 
 tin f.-ilc , ,f ( .,n-tantin.|.!- at tli.- hands f Muhainin. d II. II- had 
 i!inn:tL r < <1 t ' i eaj< Mi- int < i l,i ~ r\ n i- a < li \ i r ( I >;iin -h < <i Hungarian) 
 jMin-f. iiind'-r naiin d t 'i ban, \v In < If mine ln^ IM upp. At 1 1,< i irdnaiu 
 \\<>rk- at Aiirian'ijilr- h<- M-t tu \M>rK tn inaki- I'lins of incn-diMi- sj/c. 
 Thf s(,,nf jir-'.jn-tik if tli<- larr-'t \\.ij.'h'<l ddO ]!>. : thr t ran^jn>r 
 i if t h'-si- ini iii 1 - 1 1 i L'niis r< i|U!i' d t lii 1 1 v \\ 'AI'I >ns fa- 1 1 in d 1 1 i^t tin r ami 
 drau n l>y sixty o \i-ri. 'Ih- tiun << in!d n< >t In tin d in. TI I han << \ < n 
 t mi' s a dri\ , a' u! I "rlian s, ,i];'ht t < pt < \ i lit its dm ^t in;' (an nrridi nt 
 \-. !.!' !i \ < nt i! il!r hap|" m d ) l>\ | -in m^ in i nl af I > r < \ < i \ i > MI in! .
 
 SAVAGERY BETWKEN CIVILIZED NATIONS 201 
 
 clothes were saturated by the oil, when upon tiny bei-ame 
 wreathed in flames and resembled living torches; yet 
 they went on fighting until their rifles dropped from their 
 hands. 
 
 At the beginning of April the Germans introdueed at 
 Ypres the use of bombs containing (i.^filii/i in/ing j^/.sr.v, the 
 efficiency of which was loudly praised in their commnni'im'*. 
 
 Hritish and French doctors have reported on these 
 bombs and have found that the medium UM d is the very 
 noxious and corrosive chlorine ga.s. Those who are exposed 
 to its effect first feel a burning pain accompanied by 
 intolerable irritation in throat and eyes ; th--se symptoms 
 arc succeeded by severe attacks of suffocation and terrible 
 pain in the chest, accompanied by an ine ssant cough. 
 Many fell, never to rise again; others reeled about in 
 dreadful agony, began to choke, and had to withdraw 
 from the firing line. A great number of those who escaped 
 lay sick for many days and died in spite of the most lavish 
 care. 
 
 It has been the intention of the Germans to bring 
 methods of this kind into general use, and they have had 
 them up their sleeve' for a considerable time. In fact, 
 the ic hole plan! J/ad been organized beforehand. II lias been 
 stated by a prisoner that cylinders containing gas had 
 been served out over a great stretch of front, twenty 
 cylinders to every fifty metres. A sub-lieutenant who 
 had been taken prisoner has declared that he considers the 
 asphyxiating gases a useful weapon in Germany's service. 
 That the organization has long been in preparation is 
 demonstrated by the fact that the German troop-, on 
 April 22 carried an outfit to protect them from asphyxia- 
 tion. 
 
 Finally, the Germans have attempted to /)<// 
 for their enemies in South-west Africa. The British 
 Colonial Secretary issued on May .">. 1 '.)!.". a statement 
 on the subject giving the following (let ails : On t h-- < >ecupa- 
 tion of Swakopmund by the Union troops it was discovered 
 that six wells had been poisoned with some
 
 292 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1014 
 
 substance. In sonic cases bags containing this poison were 
 discorered in the -cell. General Botha sent a letter to 
 Colonel Franeke commanding the German forces, in which 
 he pointed out that such action was contrary to Article 4 J.'{ 
 of The Hague Convention. 
 
 Franeke admitted that the Germans had tried the 
 substance in question and had found that by its use any 
 enemy would be compelled for some time ahead to procure 
 water from elsewhere. Franeke added that in order not 
 to injure the health of the enemy he had given orders that 
 wells thus treated should have warnings posted beside 
 them. 
 
 Hot ha declared, however, that no such warnings were 
 found. Three weeks later, moreover, a letter was inter- 
 cepted from a Captain Kriigcr, of the German Protectorate 
 troops, to an advanced post at Pforte. In this letter it 
 was said that "the patrol at Gahib has received instruc- 
 tions thoroughly to infect the Ida Mine :cith : irus. Please, 
 therefore, approach Swakop and Ida Mine with greatest 
 caution and never water there a^ain." 
 
 After evacuating Aus, Warmbad, and other places, (he 
 German troops systematically poisoned all :cells along the 
 raihcay line.s during their retreat. 
 
 Article -ja of The Ha<_rue Convention of 1 S<7, signed 
 by Germany, provides: "It is particularly prohibited; 
 (a] To use poison or poisoned weapons." 
 
 Many other appalling things have been reported from 
 the war. Hayoint fighting is described as bein<r particu- 
 larly san quinary : the men fi-_ r ht hand to hand in unbridled 
 passion and aim their thrusts at the most vulnerable 
 parts of the body the head, the chest, and the stomach. 
 They throw their whole strength into the one purpose of 
 killing, not of wounding only, and n> one escapes death 
 if lie does riot succeed in killing his adversary. As a rule 
 there are few survivors after a bayonet ti<,'ht. 
 
 Aerial icarfare by means of aeroplanes and airships 
 has become a really diabolical nutjiod of taking the life 
 of huni.-ui beings who form no part of the fighting armies.
 
 SAVAGERY BETWEEN CIVILIZED NATIONS *J93 
 
 of attacking unfortified towns, and of destroying monn- 
 inental works of art, private property, etc., and is on<- 
 against which the whole civili/ed workl should have 
 lodged the most emphatic protests. This dropping of 
 bombs otherwise than on fortifications and armies is 
 absolute barbarism, a new invention which has brought 
 shame and dishonour on the belligerents and which has 
 been more particularly exploited by Germany with her 
 Zeppelins. 
 
 Even though the rules for aerial warfare, to the effect 
 that only reconnaissances and attacks on fi^hlin^ forces 
 and fortification* are allowed, have not been codified, let 
 alone ratified by an international conference, they are 
 surely self-evident and belong to the most elementary 
 principles of international law, being an expression of 
 the sense of justice of the nations. 
 
 According to the international agreements on the rules 
 of war, the aerial bombardment of unfortified towns 
 should be regarded as a crime pure and simple, and those 
 guilty of such ill-deeds should be hanged like vulgar 
 malefactors when their aircraft happens to be shot down. 
 Russia has found it necessary to issue a notice to the effect 
 that such bombardment from the air will be regarded as 
 piracy, since documents have been found on dead German 
 officers showing that the Emperor William had ordered 
 them to treat the Cossacks as robbers. 
 
 Mines at sea as used in this war are one of the mo^t 
 barbarous weapons, which injure not only the belligerent 
 parties, but also the citizens and ships of neutral countries. 
 
 By sowing mines in the North Sea, with a total disregard 
 for international trallic, whereby a number of lishing- 
 vessels and merchant-ships of neutral countries have- been 
 lost and numberless people drowned, Germany has shown 
 once again that to her there is no such thing as inter- 
 national law, and that, as the Imperial Chancellor, 
 Bethmann-Hollwcg, said about the violation of Belgian 
 neutrality, "Necessity knows no law.' 1 Everything, 
 apparently, may be done for the sake of Germany s
 
 '294 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 " necessity/' and Germany is cluing naught but defending 
 herself. 
 
 It should he put on record that Germany, although 
 a signatory to The Hague Convention of 11K7, has been 
 guilty of violating it in the following ways : 
 
 (1) Mines have not been laid in such a way as to make 
 them harmless if torn adrift. 
 
 ('2) Germany has not taken steps to provide for the 
 safety of peaceful navigators, mines have not been sys- 
 tematically watched, and nothing has been done to indicate 
 tlie dangerous areas to neutral shipping. 
 
 Germany not having scored a decisive victory, the war 
 has now begun to be conducted by that country in a 
 more and more barbarous manner and with open dis- 
 regard for the principles of the laws of nations and the 
 accepted rules of warfare. As instances of this I may 
 cite the German airship bombardment of unfortified 
 Knglish towns and villages and, what is even worse-, the 
 appalling havoc which German floating tnim:* and xitb- 
 nmrint.*. have wrought not only amongst the Jintish but 
 also amongst neutral merchant-ships, fishing-vessels, and 
 emigrant-ships. One's reason is almost numbed by these 
 misdeeds, \\hieli have already taken a toll of hundreds of 
 lives and resulted in enormous material loss. It looks 
 as if the Germans had gone raving mad and wanted to 
 show the world what, t lie juror Tfulnnicnx really is. Or 
 have certain submarine commanders taken leave of their 
 s'-nsi > '." Gi rman submarim s seem to torpedo vessels 
 indiscriminately \\ilhout \\arning and without knowing 
 \\hethir the ships an- neutral \ ess, ] s or carrv neutral 
 passi ngi rs. Swiden, \or\\av, Denmark, and Holland 
 have aln ady l<--t a large number of ship^ and livis. 
 
 Jnlnse indignation was fill < \II\\\!M n- w h< n the 
 stiamer l i 'iilnl>u with it. 1 ID passi HL'' "i's and crew of !(>() 
 
 wa, torpedo) d m April I'.l."i; onl\ ll\e minutes Were 
 al!ow<d m which to get pasM-n^i rs and crew into the 
 boal -> ; \\hen the torpedo \\.is launcln d some of the
 
 SAVAGERY BETWEEN CIVILIZED NATIONS 'J05 
 
 latter were still suspended from their davits and only one 
 boat had reached the water, with the result that about 
 100 people were drowned. 
 
 The atrocities committed by means of German sub- 
 marines seemed to reach a climax when, with the most 
 ghastly callousness, placing other similar exploits com- 
 pletely in the shade, one of the world's largest passenger- 
 steamers, the Cunarder Lu.sitnnia, with L'hiO people on 
 board, was sunk off the Irish coast on May 7 by torpedoes 
 discharged from a German submarine. The vessel sank 
 after eighteen minutes. The number of lives lost was 
 l.'i'JG, and only 7<5-t were rescued. 
 
 There was a word here- and there in the German papers 
 expressing regret at the loss of life, but in others there 
 was a note of the most unmistakable triumph. " By the 
 vigilance of one of our U-boats,'' chortles the Jierliner 
 Boersen Courier, "we have been able to sink this titan 
 of the seas ; by a single blow a vessel worth tens of millions 
 of marks has been annihilated." Not a word about the 
 innocent victims, not a line suggesting compassion for the 
 sorrow of thousands. " There is," telegraphed a Berlin 
 correspondent of the Stockholms Dagblad, " a certain 
 feeling of satisfaction and pride that the- Germans, despite 
 the patrols of the British Fleet, have been able to justify 
 their warning." 
 
 But from all corners of the earth came the unanimous 
 verdict which the rest of the world, with its sense of decency 
 and justice unwarped, has given on the German crime. 
 
 The Germans in due course came forward with the 
 proofs supposed to show that they acted correctly. The 
 arguments have been weighed and have been found want- 
 ing. We know what they are. Count Bernstorff, it is 
 said, in an open naming urged the public in America 
 not to travel by the Luxitania, and went so far as to 
 have personal warnings sent to individual passengers. 
 But, apart from the fact that the warnings could not reach 
 all li'hose lives uv>v forfeited, nobody could have taken 
 the notice of the projected crime for anything but an
 
 296 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 empty threat, a piece of bluff. Who could possibly imagine 
 ttmt the German Admiralty intended in culd blotxl to commit 
 an act which, rrcolting as German warfare has been, surpassed 
 in cynieisin everything that had gone before ? 
 
 The German plea that a warning had been given must 
 be tlinrnissfd categorically on the ground that the crime 
 remains a crime even if notified beforehand ; just as pre- 
 meditated murder is judged more si-verely than man- 
 slaughter, Germany's moral responsibility beeame greater 
 when it was brought to light that the deed had been 
 planned and prepared long beforehand. 
 
 It has been alleged that the Lu.sitania was an auxiliary 
 cruiser, but the fact that the ship was on the list of vessels 
 which in certain circumstances might be used as ships of 
 war is, of course, no proof that she made her last voyage 
 in that capacity ; the British Admiralty has, in fact, 
 indignantly repudiated the German allegation. 
 
 It has also been asserted that the Luxitania carried large 
 quantities of ammunition and war malt rial in her holds, 
 but tins contention has not been jtrortd and does not sound 
 particularly convincing. 
 
 But even if this was the ease, and even if we accept the 
 preposterous Gcnnan altitude that the Germans are entitled 
 in their submarine warfare to override all rnlt* of inter- 
 national law regarding seizure and capture, and even 
 assuming that tin- Germans were thus justified in sinking 
 the vessel, the German crime remain* iicrcrlhclcss in all 
 i/.v naked iniijniti/. 
 
 During the first month of the submarine war the pas- 
 sengiTs and civus of the doomed steamers were given a 
 chance of xa:inn tin ir //;<\ : tliev were allowed the number 
 oj minutis ntct**arif to lo\\er the boats. But in the case 
 of the Lnxitania the first torpedo \\as discharged without 
 ant/ teaming whatt ; i r. 
 
 In>t ead of allowing tin- life saving "[" rat ions to proceed 
 unhampered, bv \\hieh means perhaps the majority of the 
 j>a >-(U'_'< r> might lia\c been reseued, another torpedo :eas 
 ill i inii-'jeil at the ship ; this time she reei ived a heavy list.
 
 SAVAGERY BETWEEN CIVILIZED NATIONS 207 
 
 the lowering of the lxuts WHS made more dillieult, if not 
 impossible, and a i'ew minutes later the Liisilania went 
 to the bottom. The firing of this second torpedo was a 
 piece of utter and perverse bloodthirstiness, which could 
 have no other object than to kill for the sake of killing. 
 The above account, by the- way, is taken from Du^tus 
 NyhcUr editor : (). v. Zweigbergk, M.I', and I agree- 
 in every respect with that paper's view of the crime, and 
 its verdict is shared by the greater part of the Swedish 
 Press. 
 
 The whole of Sweden has been deeply stirred by this 
 policy of lawlessness and murder, which, if German states- 
 men and leading organs defend the Luxitaniu crime, places 
 Germany outside the pale of humanity. We have to 
 observe a strict political neutrality in the war, but this 
 should not prevent us from loudly protesting against this 
 horrible degeneration of Germanic megalomania. 
 
 Karh-tadfitidningen- editor : Mr. M. Ilellberg, M.P. 
 commented as follows : " There is something utterly insen- 
 sate, something utterly mad, in such conduct, which reveals 
 a total lack of a sense of proportion. It looks as it' the 
 Germans thought nothing of Haunting their contempt in 
 the face of humanity and ranging the- two remaining Great 
 Powers beside their enemies. 13ut Mich ruthless arrogance 
 must not remain unpunished. // nn<*l <>f necexxiti/ route 
 tJic cntnity of nation*, and everything in their natures that 
 is proud and free, everything that speaks for culture and 
 humanity, must revolt at such principles. Like the 
 Russian despotism persisting as it does in the constant 
 struggle with the best elements of the Russian nation 
 the insolent Ccnnan Or.wmw, that faithful champion 
 of reaction, stands forth as the defiant challenger of 
 humanity/' 
 
 A Vttrr//.s7i protest againxf the " Luxitania " crime testi- 
 fying to the opinion held there amongst sane people, and 
 signed by a large number of persons representing Swedish 
 science and art, was addressed to the Knglish newspapers 
 a few days after the catastrophe. It took the form of
 
 298 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 the following telegram : " You in England know that the 
 Swedish nation, practically speaking, stands united round 
 its Government in the demand for the maintenance 
 of the strictest politieal neutrality, lint this by no means 
 prevents a great part of our people whether a majority 
 or not we cannot sav from heiii" ani/thin:* but nmtrul 
 
 \J 
 
 in tht'ir fftlingx regarding tin- methods <>f warfare adopted 
 in /A/.v horriblf uar, and which have now culminated in 
 the sinking nf the " L uxita nia." The misconception that 
 uar suspends all laws of humanity will surely prove fatal 
 not only to future civilization, but above all to the senti- 
 ment oj human solidarity which is so vital to the smaller 
 nations." The telegram was signed by a large number of 
 prominent people the names of many of whom are house- 
 hold words in Sweden. 
 
 As an excuse for their inhuman aerial and submarine 
 warfare against Kngland. the (Germans plead that (.ire at 
 Britain bigan l<> wage a barbarous 'car against (icrmany by 
 seeking to reduce her by stari'ation. 
 
 Hut it docs not seem to have been ivali/ed that in all 
 wars it has been a matter of course that it a decision is 
 not quickly reached bv force of arms, shortage <>f food 
 may be relied upon to bring about capitulation. Much 
 privation may have to be endured in this way, but it 
 can be brought to an end at any time by laying down 
 arms and abandoning the hope of victory. Hesides, the 
 nameless suffering and loss of life and property caused 
 bv aetive warfare mav be avoided by this consummation. 
 The so-called starvation method need, therefore, be no 
 worse than the hutcherv method. 
 
 Hut it is ol>\ ions that a State \\hieh engages in war 
 mu -t n gard it as one of its primarv duties to make pro- 
 vision for a sulliei. ncy of food for a long time ahead. 
 
 It is (jiute certain, on the ot hi r hand, that those in 
 charge of (iermany's, destinies did not contemplate that 
 thf :ciir :i'iiilil la-i us /"//;_' a* if lm.\ </"//,, for that part ot 
 their plan of mobili/at ion \\hieh concerns the 1'ood supply 
 of t h< pojjtilat ion has not reci i\ i d ad< < jiiat e at t cut ion.
 
 SAVAGERY BETWEEN CIVILIZED NATIONS 
 
 It is peculiar to note that the Germans are now accusing 
 England of barbarism by seeking to starve out Germany, 
 seeing that we know that they si a reed out 1'arix in 1S71, 
 the city capitulating only when its two million inhabitants 
 were no longer able to withstand the ravages of famine. 
 
 How the Germans, whilst believing themselves to be 
 " God's chosen people," can yet defend the Lu.sitania 
 crime has been demonstrated in an ama/ing manner by 
 a German clergyman, Pastor Giinther, whose sermon to 
 the German congregation at Christiania on May 1) (as 
 reported by Stockholm^ Tidningen) contained the following 
 observations : 
 
 " The Germans do not trouble themselves about the 
 opinions of others. The voice of conscience is their only 
 standard. In the World War its conscience has been the 
 German people's comfort and strength. The sinking of 
 the Lusitania leaves the German conscience untarnished. 
 England, and England alone, must bear the responsibility 
 for this terrible tragedy. The torpedoing of the Lusitania 
 was the right answer to England's brutal and illegal policy 
 of attempting to stanc out Germany, If England's will 
 were paramount, thousands of innocent women and children 
 in Germany would be tortured to death. Why should 
 the lives of the Lusitania 's passengers be held more precious 
 than those of German women and children ? Might is 
 might, and the accountability to God for this dreadful 
 happening rests on England.'' 
 
 Apart from the denial of the British Admiralty, the 
 chief custom-house ollicer of the port of New York has 
 declared officially that the Lusitania did not carry a 
 single gun. 
 
 The Germans, on the other hand, say that the ship 
 " demonstrably " carried ammunition 5100 cases and 
 this is claimed by them in justification of the crime. But 
 no proofs have been produced, nothing but empty asser- 
 tions. 
 
 Truly the Germans have not forgotten the Imperial 
 command : " Go ve forth as Huns !
 
 300 BEFORE, DTRING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 It cannot he tot) clearly emphasized that even if the 
 Lusittinia had been armed with guns anil had carried 
 ammunition on hoard, and even though the German 
 ambassador at Washington issued warnings against travel- 
 ling by the vessel, the sinking of her remains a monstrous 
 crime for the reason that no linn :K/.V <///</:. r</ for saring 
 the /K/.v.vrMgfT.v and r/vti-, with the result that the majority 
 perished miserably. 
 
 As regards the German ambassador's warning, we find 
 that his newspaper advertisement did not caution people 
 against travelling by the Lusit<inia, but merely in a 
 general way against travelling by English vessels. 
 
 \\ (. cannot but feel the deepest compassion for all the 
 rictini* of the uv//', those thousands of grievously wounded 
 who have lain helpless on the battlefields and there tiled 
 a lingering death, or who have been earned off to the 
 hospitals mutilated, with horrible gaping wounds, suffering 
 from gangrene, with amputated limbs, sightless, etc.. or 
 those countless thousands strieken d<>wn by malignant 
 diseasi s brought on bv hardships and inelt ment weather 
 the many victims of the "trench disease," \\ith feet and 
 legs blackened by a kind of mortification, and those 
 unhappy creatures whose nervous system is for ever 
 wn-eked by the horrors of never-ending slaughter, or 
 those, again, who are worn out by nightmares, collapsing 
 into a state of apathy, listlcssness, aberration, madness. 
 In the trenches the soldiers suffer horridly from night- 
 man^, to which the I-'nnch military surgeon. Dr. II. 
 Hoiir:_"t, has <|i voted much tini'' and which he considers 
 to h at tlr n><>t of psvehic aillietioUs amongst the com- 
 batant forci x. \\oin out bv incessant dut\. the soldiers 
 drop off to sleep, but their slumbers are soon disturbed 
 by phantasms of what I h- \ have seen <n<ln\ soldiers 
 without heads or arms, or otherwise ternblv mutilated, 
 t he bin st ii,._r O f shells, et e. and inaii\ start up and shriek 
 m terror, attacking their comrades m their ship, or 
 wand' iinu r about like sleep \\alkej-s. These nightmares
 
 SAVAGERY BETWEEN CIVILIZED NATIONS 301 
 
 give them no rest and frighten them out of their senses, 
 often turning the trenches into the semblance of mad- 
 houses. 
 
 The war brings suffering not only upon those who take 
 part in it, upon the wounded and those who undergo 
 hardships on the battlefield, hut also on numberless non- 
 combaiants, the wives, mothers, sisters, and daughters at 
 home who have lost their male supporters and are reduced 
 to penury, as well as those who owing to the war are. 
 expelled from a country because their own people are 
 at war with it. Here in Stockholm we have had many 
 opportunities of seeing and hearing thousands of Russians 
 who had been expelled from Germany, and thousands 
 of Germans who have been deported from Russia all 
 proceeding homeward via Sweden. They have had much 
 to endure and have had to leave everything behind, and 
 many, probably for ever, have been deprived of their live- 
 lihood, their factories and businesses, at which they have 
 toiled and laboured for many a year. Horses have been 
 taken for war service without compensation, banks have 
 withheld invested funds, factories have been closed ; in 
 fact, we have seen here in Sweden thousands of persons 
 who are totally ruined and will find nothing to do in the 
 home country to which they are returning. 
 
 Besides, all men of military age have been retained as 
 prisoners of war and taken to internment camps, where 
 they lead an idle and pitiful existence, and are prevented 
 from supporting wives and children who have been driven 
 out of the country. 
 
 Again, let us think of the loss to civilization which this 
 war has entailed : the killing of thousands of eminent, 
 intelligent men representing learning and research, and 
 who might have rendered their countries, nay, the whole 
 world, the most invaluable services. 
 
 All common ideals have disappeared, all international 
 cultural effort haft been rendered imposftible, for the nations 
 hate one another and will not co-operate.
 
 302 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 What credence will henceforth be attached to inter- 
 national treaties ? 
 
 To study international laic is now to waste one's time. At 
 the Copenhagen University, for instance, the subject of 
 international law has been provisionally deleted frmn tfic 
 laic examinations. Professor Jtirgenscn notified his students 
 that they would not have to prepare for an examination 
 on this subject, seeing that the provisions of international 
 law were no longer being observed. This applies in par- 
 ticular to the Declaration of London, which, as stated by 
 Professor Jorgenseii in his address, has been suspended, 
 more especially with regard to the rights of neutral Powers, 
 
 Europeans, who have hitherto looked down on tin- 
 Asiatics from the eminence of their lofty civilization, must 
 now hide their heads in shame. 
 
 The miserable condition of Europe revealed by the 
 World War : the burning hatred between the nations, the 
 destruction of life and property on a scale never previously 
 witnessed; all this has dist roved the respect in which 
 Eurojiean eivili/at ion has been held. Professor Erik 
 Nystrom. who has laboured with so much success at the 
 Shansi I'niversity in China, had intend' d on his return in 
 1 '.! 1 to bi L'in a series of addresses on European eivili/at ion : 
 but, as he said on lea\ iiiL! Stockholm, this scheme must be 
 dropped, for the Chinese now reali/c to the full what a 
 pitiful sham European culture has Income. 
 
 I s ( , in. times wish that certain authors would cease, in 
 attempting to explain the nameless misery of this war, 
 to introduce religion and philosophy, that they would 
 abstain from talking "f (iod\ providence and His d'-si^ns, 
 
 of the la\\s of history, of the solll of the people ill tllJS 
 
 country or that, of the revelation of the cosmic mind, of 
 the port.nt of the world -spirit, etc., all of which are empty 
 and m anin-jless phrases. Away with all philosophy, all 
 morali/ing musings ! What we src is chaos, nothing Kr. 
 
 Life on earth in those countries win re the \var is racing 
 has become so dreadful, so hellish, that men are forced 
 to (lee fn im their homes, to u a nd' v a bo ut no In 1 1 1 r than
 
 SAVAGERY BETWEEN CIVILIZED NATIONS 303 
 
 beggars, and often to seek shelter underground to escape 
 the fury of their enemy. 
 
 We are almost tempted by these dismal thoughts to 
 hark back to the demonology of ancient and medieval 
 times and to the old belief that evil spirits do exist, who 
 influence men. All ancient peoples h;id a conception of 
 supernatural powers for good and evil, and Western 
 civilization has in no small degree been influenced by 
 Zoroaster's teaching of ()rmu/d and Ahriman, tin- per- 
 sonifications of good and evil. It has always been an 
 unsolvable riddle why God permitted th< devil to exist, 
 and "why He did not destroy his power when he appeared. 
 The devil was created, we are told, but we do not know that 
 he will be destroyed, unless perhaps it be on the dis- 
 appearance of the human race. Celebrated dcmonologists 
 of the Middle Ages wrote a number of works on the devil 
 and his disciples, describing the origin of his powers; 
 they told us how his realm was governed and that he had a 
 court with a number of dignitaries and officials : a high 
 chancellor, grand dukes and kings Satan, Baal, Beel/ehub, 
 Leviathan, Lucifer, Moloch, etc. and that they all had 
 innumerable ministering spirits under them. It was 
 hardly to be wondered at that villainy, war. and de- 
 struction dogged the footsteps of man ; all his crimes were 
 then ascribed to demoniacal influence, for the demons 
 pervaded everything and circled through the air from one 
 end of the earth to the other. God. instead of keeping them 
 chained up in hell, gave them full freedom to tempt and 
 plague men, and permitted the Prince of Hell to demand 
 human blood for his altar sacrifices. 
 
 I recall these horrible notions of bygone ages because 
 unhappily they fit our own time, because there are bad 
 as well as good qualities in man, which assert themselves 
 in troublous and warlike times and turn him into a savage 
 beast, brutalizing him and endowing him with devilish 
 qualities. 
 
 It is truly pitiful to note how in Russia as well as in
 
 304 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 Germany, on the outbreak of this devastating World War, 
 the people were wont to appeal to (iod as their protector. 
 " Onward with (iod, who will be with us ! " " CJod with 
 us ! " With this war-cry the armies inarched forth to 
 their butchery and destruction, blindly obeying the doc- 
 trine : " :<.'<>< to tin- vanquished! " 
 
 We are living in a t ime when one has good cause to doubt 
 the existence of honour and faith, human kindliness and 
 goodwill, when warlike passions have stilled reason. There 
 has never been a time when pessimism was so justified as 
 now, for the World War, the greatest and cruellest in 
 history, has come upon us and we have fallen from our 
 boasted eivili/ation to the barbaric level of ancient times, 
 when international law was still undreamt of, when there 
 had been no (irotius, no Puffendorf, no Thomasius, no 
 Wolff, no Leibnit/, no Kant indeed, for auijht we have 
 learnt, we mi^ht have had no great thinkers and en- 
 lightened statesmen to guide Us. 
 
 It is as if all the powers of lull had been let loose, as if 
 the earth had become an inferno uith Satan as Kin-,'- It 
 is not to be wondered at if, to many, the thought has 
 occurred that Satan, not (iod. rules the universe. No 
 wonder that in many troubled minds this doubt has arisen : 
 
 How can a g 1 and almighty (iod permit this horrible 
 
 war, with its sacrifice of t he lives of hundreds of t hou sands 
 and of the well-being of many millions ? 
 
 One tiling is certain: after ten months of the most 
 unsparing exertions and the sacrifice of millions of 
 human lives, (iod has not made (iermany victorious, 
 in spite of all imploring prayers offered up in churches 
 and palaces. 
 
 In spite of th<' Kmperor's faith in the "tremendous 
 warlike spirit " of the (iermans ; m spite of his appeal to 
 the (ierman soldiers' "indomitable will to conquer"; m 
 spite of Hindi-nhurg'.s "glorious victories" and tin- "joy 
 of battle" winch he and other (ierman generals and 
 soldiers have displayed, as placed on record in the Imperial 
 t' l'-:/ram of congrat ulat ion ; in spite of all this, (iennanv
 
 SAVAGERY BETWEEN CIVILIZED NATIONS 305 
 
 would still seem to have no prospect of dictating peaee with 
 God's help, when the hour has come. 
 
 Germany's leading men, when they committed their 
 country to the war, had grossly overrated its ability, in 
 spite of many years of preparation, to make short work of 
 its enemies and dictate peaee terms in Paris. 
 
 France has shown herself to be stronger than had been 
 supposed, and the invasion of that country was arrested 
 long ago. Great Britain is sending a constant stream of 
 fresh troops to France and contributing strongly towards 
 an effective resistance. 
 
 Not only did Italy refuse to range herself by the side of 
 Germany and Austria on the outbreak of war, for her 
 Government was of the opinion that those countries, far 
 from waging a defensive war, were themselves the 
 aggressors but the Austrian treaty concerning the 
 Triple Alliance was formally denounced by Italy on May 4, 
 101 "), and war was declared against Austria on May '-'.'5. 
 
 The Italian Foreign Minister, Sonnino, sent the Govern- 
 ments of the neutral States a detailed communiqu& on 
 the rupture with Austria-Hungary, which shows that the 
 tension between the two countries had existed since the 
 very beginning of the war and that the old grievances 
 respecting Austria's oppression of Italian subjects had not 
 been abated. 
 
 li By bringing about the European War," he says, " by 
 rejecting Serbia's most conciliatory ansii'cr which gave all the 
 satisfaction that could reasonably be demanded, and by 
 rejecting all proposals for mediation put forward by Italy 
 and other Powers in order to save Europe from a terrible 
 conflagration, Austria-Hungary has with her own hands 
 torn up the Treaty of Alliance with Italy. Moreover, by 
 her action against Serbia, Austria-Hungary has deliberately 
 disregarded Italy's general interests in the Balkan 
 Peninsula." 
 
 After all these iniquities, sufferings, and losses among the 
 belligerents, after the miscalculations connected with the 
 brin<nn<T about of the war, after the disappointments which 
 
 * f* 11 
 
 U
 
 306 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 must have followed when no decisive victories were forth- 
 coining in spite of months of sanguinary lighting, and with 
 the prospect that the war will end, as it be^an, with 
 murder on an unexampled scale, hut with no decided 
 advantage for either side, whilst the resultant economic 
 losses will cripple the nations for generations, and con- 
 sidering further that the war miuht actually have been 
 averted, it is indeed surprising that none of those capable 
 of bringing such calamities upon the world have, like Judas 
 Iscariot, felt impelled to atone for it all with their lives.
 
 XIII 
 
 DANGERS OF OVER POPULATION : WHAT STA- 
 TISTICS TEACH : GERMANY'S OVER POPULA- 
 TION A CONSTANT MENACE TO PEACE. 
 
 THKUK have been times when it was necessary to promote 
 the growth of the population or when war was the almost 
 normal state, as in antiquity, the Middle Ages, and after 
 the Thirty Years War, when a great part of the population 
 had succumbed on the battlefields or through the pestilences 
 which followed in the wake of war. At such times the 
 Governments were compelled to try to make good such 
 losses, and to this end often doled out land to the poor. 
 
 In our time the situation is reversed in many countries. 
 
 The leading civilized countries are already over-popu- 
 lated, and every dislocation of trade and industry brings 
 about great hardships and sufferings owing to the difficulty 
 which members of all classes have in obtaining a livelihood. 
 
 But even under normal conditions, when wars are not 
 raging and crops are satisfactory, the majority find more 
 difficulty than should be the ease in making ends meet, 
 and this usually gives rise to dissatisfaction and to an 
 indifference to the loftier aspects of life which is not hard 
 to understand. 
 
 Reproduction is still to countless numbers a purely 
 instinctive act, as in the epoch of the cave-dwellers and in 
 the Stone Age, and now, in the twentieth century, in the 
 great majority of cases, no attempt is made to regulate it. 
 Yet it ought to be the aim of an enlightened age to civilize 
 this primitive condition, to bring reflection and the feeling 
 
 307
 
 308 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 of responsibility to bear on the sexual instinet with an eye 
 to the improvement of the raee and the duty to combat 
 poverty and distress through over-population with its 
 attendant evils : a perprtual struggle for existence and 
 devastating barbarous wars. 
 
 That many countries of the globe are already ovi-r- 
 populated, is certain : and although there are numerous 
 tracts, as in Al'riea, South America, and Siberia, where 
 there is still room for millions, it is nevertheless a fact that 
 most countries are now so densely populated that many 
 millions find life a hard struggle and suffer want, and a 
 constant increase of the population of the globe must thus 
 Soon became d rtrif urarf danger. Although exact figures 
 are lacking with regard to t he populat ion of many count ries, 
 reliable statisticians have considered themselves justified 
 in computing the population of the globe as under : 
 
 In 1S7O about 1-KK) millions 
 
 that is to say an increase of MOO millions in forty -four years, 
 or about .srirn million* per annum. 
 
 \Vhilst on the subject of the menace to the world's peace 
 through over-population, I may. among extra-Kuropcan 
 States, instance Japan, a Power which has already adopted 
 a policy of expansion made necessary by its colossal growth 
 of population. Here are some figures on Japan's popu- 
 lation : 
 
 isso ..... as millions 
 1<>oo . . . 1") 
 
 i '.!_' ..... :>n 
 
 To make room for and feed her growing population 
 Japan made war on China and Hu^ia. and her pri/.e was 
 Korea. Now, in the World War, Japan, as Britain's ally, 
 has attacked the (i<-rman possession (the so-called ninety- 
 nine y< ars lease) of Kiao chau. which fell after an energetic 
 
 defence.
 
 DANGERS OF OVER-POPULATION 309 
 
 This was followed by protracted negotiations between 
 China and Japan in regard to certain demands of the latter, 
 and a settlement has now been readied which entires a 
 durable peace in the Kast and has promoted the friendly 
 relations between Japan and China. 
 
 The Japanese Government issued at the beginning of 
 May 101.5 a communique^ respecting the whole string of 
 questions which formed the subject, of her negotiations 
 with China, accompanied by an account of their progress, 
 China's concessions and objections, and the linal basis of 
 settlement. 
 
 The net result of the Japanese demands for privileged 
 treatment in certain Chinese provinces is that China has 
 been compelled to abandon her undivided sovereign rights 
 over the provinces of Shantung, Fu-kicn, and Southern 
 Manchuria. All rights held by Germany in Shantung are 
 thus made over by China to Japan. 
 
 In Southern Manchuria Japan now enjoys an altogether 
 privileged position ; this Chinese province may henceforth 
 be regarded as a. Japanese Protectorate. The Japanese hold 
 the right to own land, to carry on industry and trade, yet 
 are not obliged to pay other taxes to the Chinese authorities 
 than arc approved by the Japanese consuls. As regards 
 administration of justice-, China agrees to accept Japanese 
 jurisdiction, although under the nominal co-operation of 
 the Chinese authorities. 
 
 The Imperial Government is to be consulted In-fore 
 advisers or instructors are appointed in political, financial, 
 and military matters. 
 
 In Eastern Mongolia Japan will also enjoy extensive 
 privileges. " Joint enterprise " between Japanese and 
 Chinese is permitted in the domain of agriculture and 
 auxiliary industries. 
 
 The central administration must appoint influential 
 Japanese ax political, financial, and military aik'i^ers. The 
 Chinese Government shall acknowledge- the right of the 
 Japanese to own real property for the erection ol' Japanese 
 hospitals, temple*, and acJiools in the interior of China. The
 
 810 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 police in the districts where such institutions are required 
 shall he placed under joint Japanese and Chinese control, 
 or alternatively Japanese may he appointed for the policing 
 of these districts. China must import from Japan a 
 certain quantity of armaments or must establish in China 
 an tir.ft'ntil under joint Japanese and Chinese adminis- 
 tration, the materials for which shall he furnished from 
 Japan. 
 
 The eminent Knglish etigenist Haveloek Kllis has pointed 
 out on the subject <>f the population of Japan, on the 
 authority of that country's foremost expert. Professor 
 Tokano, how colossal is the infant mortality in Japan in 
 I'.MI? no less than 'J.V7 per cent, and that the birth-rate, 
 which in 1 '.<)_' was high, '_'<; per thousand, has fallen some- 
 what in the last decade. This declining hirth r<ii<\ com- 
 bined with the rixinn death-rule, is. if this tendency con- 
 tinues, a serious problem for Japan's social reformers, but 
 should comfort those who speak in Kuropc of the " yellow 
 peril " from .Japan. 
 
 1'Yom China, for the same reason, there is little cause 
 to fear a " yellow p< HI." It is true that the birth rate is 
 high, but the infant mortality is enormous. 
 
 Professor V. \. Ross, who knows China well and bases 
 his 1 inures on t he evidence of t lurt v t hive doet ors practising 
 in that country, < stimates that out of ten children born in 
 China three die at a tender :iL. r(i . and prohablv live besides. 
 Others place the infant mortality at !K) per cent. 
 
 Heverting to the conditions in our own continent, we 
 lind the following statistics on Kitrp<'s stipulation : 
 
 In 1 s?o . . . .'in.', millions 
 
 ., ls!>o .... .'If,:} 
 11*11 . . . . l.VJ 
 
 The L M-o\\th from 1MM) to l'.Il was thus M> millions, or 
 I '_' mill ions per annum. 
 
 At the same ratio of increase the population of Kurope 
 would amount :
 
 WHAT STATISTICS TEACH an 
 
 In 1930 to 582 millions 
 1940 to 571 
 ,, 1950 to OH) 
 
 One shudders at these figures and at the thought of what 
 they portend not wealth or prosperity, hut dire distress, 
 starvation, and misery, which result in war, which a^ain 
 is followed by demoralization and decay of all civili/at in ! 
 And to think that this may come about within a few 
 decades ! 
 
 France contributes relatively little to this regrettable 
 state of things, for her birth-rate has long since been 
 checked. Her population amounted : 
 
 In 1821 to ;H) millions 
 ,, 1872 to .'50 
 ,, 1911 to ;jl)!J 
 
 After the population for a long series of years had shown 
 a hardly perceptible increase, there occurred, for the lirst 
 time in 1911, an actual diminution ; the number of births 
 was in that year 742, 11 1 and of deaths 770,083, equal to a 
 decrease of 31,569. 
 
 In Russia and Germany, on the other hand, the population 
 
 has been growing steadily, and the question naturally 
 arises whether either of these countries thereby becomes a 
 menace' to the world's peace. /I'MS.VW'.S population was : 
 
 In 1815 . . . . -1.5 millions 
 
 ,, 1807 . . . 71 
 
 ,, 1897 .... 129 .. 
 
 ., 1912 . . . . 171 
 
 In spite of the enormous growth of Russia's population, 
 we may conclude that Europe is not threatened by any 
 westward pressure on the part of the Russian-^, tor they 
 have in Siberia a colonizing territory which it will take 
 very long to till. 
 
 During the three hundred years preceding 189(5 there
 
 312 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 emigrated from Russia to Siberia about 3,000,000 persons, 
 and in the nine years from Ih'JO to KK).> about 1,330,000, 
 whilst from ItXiJ to lli;j no fewer than 3,000,000 Russian 
 settlers took up their abode in that province. Thus in 
 tight years as many Russian emigrants have settled in 
 Siberia as in the whole- of the three hundred years preceding 
 Ih'JO ! \\hen the emigration figures were at their highest, 
 in KM)S, 7.VJ.OOO emigrants arrived in the territories east 
 of the Ural ; in recent years the figure has been from 
 2">0,0<)() to ;{_'.">,(>()(). It was more especially after the 
 Russian Board of Agriculture had instituted a systematic 
 distribution and eoloni/ation of the immense steppe and 
 forest lands in Western Siberia, and in the Amur country 
 on the shores of the Pacific, that the emigration assumed 
 the colossal dimensions above-mentioned. 
 
 The Russian Government is now spending considerable 
 sums on the creation of a new Russia in Siberia, and com- 
 mitti-es have been formed in all the provinces which supply 
 all requisite information and assist the emigrants. 
 
 Frithiof Nansen, who in the course of a long journey 
 through Siberia in 1 1M .'5 took careful stock of that count ry, 
 realized that it presented a colossal field for emigration if 
 certain vast and fertile areas were cultivated and river 
 navigation were introduced. In his opinion Russia's 
 tendency towards expansion is now directed M/.N/TIV//V/ in 
 the direction of her colony of Siberia. His observations are 
 recorded in his recentlv published book (ijcnnt'tn Xilicntti 
 (" Through Siberia "). 
 
 As iv-jards the fear of over-population in Russia, it is 
 important to note that, although the birth rate is v ry 
 high, this factor is counterbalanced by the enormous 
 mortality. Havelork Kllis states that, although tin- infant 
 mort aht v in Russia lias been reduced in t he course ol about 
 thirty \.ars from ;{] to -jr, j ,< r cent. (|s'.n; I'.KiO). it is 
 nevertheless gri-at er t han in an v < >t In r Kuropi an count rv. 
 Statistics sho\v, he says, that out of |()(l() persons 1 "i more 
 die in Russia than in Kngland, \\lneh is, taking the whole 
 pi "j'l<-, ( i jual to an annual loss o| 1 ,i ;.*>(), (K id lives.
 
 WHAT STATISTICS TEACH 318 
 
 In Germany, where- the population after the end of the 
 Thirty Years War, about the middle of Die seventeenth 
 century, had dropped to about ,5, 000, 000, there was room 
 during the next two centuries for a considerable increase. 
 Germany's growth of population may be seen from the 
 following figures : 
 
 Population in 1820 .... "27 millions 
 
 1871 . . . .41 
 
 1890 .... 49i 
 
 1914 . . . . 08 
 
 For many years Germany's population lias been growing 
 at the rate of about 8<JO,000 per annum, or about 4, '_'.">(), 000 
 in live years that is, 8,600.000 in ten i/cttrs. Statistics 
 show that the increase in the decade 11)04 l.'J was s.m.000. 
 Taking this increase as a basis for an approximate calcula- 
 tion of future growth, we iind that Germany's population 
 will amount 
 
 In L'O years, or 1934, to about 85 millions 
 40 1954 ,, 102 
 
 ,, GO ,, 1974 ,, 119 
 
 ,, 80 1994 ,, 1J3G 
 
 In other words, in about eighty years the population will 
 be doubled. 
 
 The danger, within but a few decades, of a real over- 
 population which will constitute a menace to Germany 
 and the rest of the world alike, is obvious. One cannot 
 conceive how Germany will be able, within her present 
 boundaries, to accommodate her (calculated) population in 
 forty years from now, let alone in sixty or eighty years. 
 
 In all countries enjoying an advanced civilization, it is 
 now becoming general for married people to realize the 
 necessity of limiting the number of child rt n according to 
 their material circumstances, the higher cost of education, 
 of study, of medical care, etc. 
 
 That the French have given this aspect their considera- 
 tion we know, for in that count rv the so-called two-children
 
 314 BEFORE, Driuxc, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 system has long been popular in almost all classes of the 
 community. In England, too, the system has obtained a 
 great vogue among the enlightened middle-classes and also 
 in an increasing measure in the working classes. 
 
 In del-many, where the population has hitherto grown 
 with such appalling rapidity, and where in certain circles 
 this has been looked upon with satisfaction as adding to 
 the military security of the country, the people have 
 nevertheless begun of late to limit the increase of their 
 families. Thus Professor Max Kleseh (in his Prostitution n. 
 Fraiirnkrankht'itru, IS'.KS). writes as follows : " In all strata 
 of the community it is dillicult nowadays to bring up 
 a large family. Tin- women of tin- poorer classes fear 
 not onlv the accouchement but also the domestic troubles 
 brought about by the suspension of their earnings during 
 pregnancy. In the more well to-do classes the worries in 
 connexion with the children's education, and the troubles 
 of providing for t heir daughters and for t he st udies of t heir 
 sons, have lessened the desire for large families." 
 
 During the last few decades many physicians and social 
 reformers have come forward \\ith emphatic \\arniugs 
 against the heedless rate of reproduction in liermany. 
 mainlv with the object of checking poverty and disease. 
 
 Dr. M nsinga ( FlensburL' ) was t he lirst ( I ss.">) to writ e on 
 this subject in (Germany: he was followed by Dr. L. 
 Low. nt, Id. 1'rofessor A. Ilegar. A. Mi-yerhof (writing 
 under the pseudonym of H. l-Vrdy). Professor M. (iruber, 
 and ot h< TS.* All t hese writers pointed out tin justification 
 of the ii'-w Malt husianism both in regard to marriage and 
 to the population as a uho]r, and the necessity of clucking 
 tip- rate of reproduction, seeing that gi\ ing birth to too 
 many chili Inn often aff ct s t he In alt h of t he mot her and t he 
 offspring: they, tin r< ton, n commend tin use of pnven- 
 
 I.. I.M-A, nf. M. *, in>ill>l'i m,,! .\, r.,i,l, i<!, i!. 1 SM| ; A. ll.- 
 1) t <.. >,l,,),t\tri<>>. Is'.il; II, I. nl%, />,, M,ll,l ;ur I', rhn' 
 if, r (',!< , j, tinn ls!C. ; .M. (,rul"|-, Il>/i!i,it, it, s (,i M 1,1, < AMr /.
 
 WHAT STATISTICS TEACH 315 
 
 live measures in order to alleviate distress among the 
 lower elasses and reduce the mortality among infants, etc. 
 
 On the other hand, out of fear of a reduced birth-rate or 
 eventual diminution of the population. Hills to combat 
 the new Malthusianism have at frequent intervals been 
 presented to Parliament both in Germany and in France. 
 The Hill introduced by M. Gauthier in the French Chamber 
 in 1 009 was prefaced by the plea that " if the population is 
 still further reduced, we shall not be able to till the cadres 
 of the Army or to meet the requirements of our interna- 
 tional industry." In Germany Professor Flesch eriticiy.ed 
 the movement very thoroughly in the periodical Si.rudl- 
 Problcmc (1010), and pointed out that it would militate 
 against the poorer classes " if they wen- to do what is 
 customary amongst the upper classes." He also showed 
 that, although Germany's population has increased so 
 enormously (by 802.000 in 1905), the shortage of agricultural 
 labour is nowhere so severely felt, and that the most 
 important work can often only be coped with by the aid 
 of foreigners, instancing the employment of Italians on 
 the railways and of Poles in the mines, and he pointed out 
 that most of the men found unlit for military service 
 belong to the towns and industrial communities. 
 
 When the Imperial German Government in 1011 intro- 
 duced a Bill in the Reichstag for legislation against New 
 Malthusian practices. Dr. Max Marcuse wrote an exhaustive 
 protest in Scxual-Problcme (1011). lie pointed out that 
 " whilst in Germany, as in all Western States, the rate of 
 reproduction amongst the upper classes is relatively low, 
 large' families are the rule in tin- working-class communities. 
 The economic and sexual misery in our proletariat is in 
 a large measure traceable to the 1 fact that they do not 
 sufficiently resort to the new Malthusian methods. There 
 arc conditions tchich arc xtron^cr than all l<i:i*, and it' the 
 Reichstag were to pass this Bill, the new law would quite 
 certainly be found inadequate for attaining the real object 
 aimed at, namely, the raising of the birth-rate." 
 
 Marcuse quoted one of the foremost German population
 
 316 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 politicians, G. Rumclin, who has declared that " if Germany 
 continues yearly to add 800,000 to LMJO.OOO souls to her 
 population, she must inci'itably seek an overseas expansion 
 of her territory, which Kn^'land nirc especially cannot 
 admit. And in that case, in a not too distant future, 
 Germany's increased population must lead to the orer- 
 jln-cing of our boundaries." 
 
 When the question of the diminished German birth-rate 
 was before the Prussian Lower House in April IIH.'J, Dr. 
 Mujdan refuted the contention that it was due to decadence 
 and showed that such diminution is more often due to a 
 stricter conception of the duties of parenthood, pointing out 
 at the same time that it is an international phenomenon. 
 
 This subject is discussed every year in many well known 
 journals, more especially Sexual- Probli'ine, edited by Dr. 
 .Max Marcuse (JJerlin), and Die neue Generation, edited 
 by Dr. llch iu- Stocher (Uerlin). Moreover, a society 
 has recentlv been formed with the title " Gescllsehaft 
 zur Uekiimpfunjj der L'berbcvolkcrunjj Deiitschlands " 
 ("Society for Combating Germany's Over-population"), 
 with Dr. F. Goldstein (Berlin) as president. The birth 
 question, " birth polities," etc.. have during the last two 
 vears en, r a<,'ed t he at t en t ion of a Socict y for t he Protection 
 of Mothers (" Deutseher Bund fiir Mutterschutz "). 
 
 It should be mentioned that during the ^reat Hygienic 
 Kxhibition at Dresden in 1 ( .M 1 the scientific 1 and social 
 congresses held there included an international NI w 
 Malthusian Congress" (September -I -7), at which, bc- 
 sidt-s the deliberations in private, public addresses were 
 k'iven which aroused the greatest interest. 1'rofesxor K. 
 \\ieksell ^'a\'e some \ ( ry \aluablc li-ctures in the course of 
 which he uttered warnings against (icrman ovi-r pnpulat ion, 
 and I also contributed papers to the transactions of the 
 Congress. 
 
 The will and resolution to escape poverty and to live in 
 circumst anc<-s wort hy of 1 mm an civilization have for many 
 years induced numberless families of all classes, especially
 
 GERMANY'S OVER-POPULATION A MENACE 317 
 
 in the towns, to keep the number of cliildn n within certain 
 bounds, and statistics show that Germany has also ex- 
 perienced an appreciable diminution of the birth- rate. 
 
 This result ought not to worry Germany. Statistics 
 have shown that a reduced birth-rate is now experienced 
 in all European countries and also in all civili/ed States 
 outside Europe. Rumania alone shows an increase. In 
 the German Empire the yearly birth-rate per 10, 000 
 inhabitants has been as follows : 
 
 During the decade 1871-1880. . 391 
 1901. . . 3<;9 
 
 1910. . . 307 
 
 ,,1911. . 29:, 
 
 This, it is true, shows a diminution of r>f>,000 in the 
 number of births in 191 1 . But it does not convey by any 
 means that an actual decrease in the growth of population 
 has taken place. On the contrary, it has for many years 
 been enormous and practically constant. In the German 
 Empire ,'38, .'303 fewer children were born in 1 909 than in 1 90S ; 
 yet the increase of population was about the same as before, 
 or 884,061. In 1904 it was 802, (H54. 
 
 This is explained by the considerable reduction of the 
 death-rate, this reduction exceeding that of the birth-rate. 
 Thus the number of deaths per 10,000 inhabitants has been 
 as follows : 
 
 In 1870 . . . 290 deaths 
 
 ,, 1890 . . . 250 ,. 
 
 1910 . . . . 171 
 
 The danger of over-population in Germany has become 
 particularly menacing for the reason that the emigration, 
 which formerly was very considerable, has in the last 
 twenty years dwindled to comparatively small dimensions 
 owing to the colossal economic advance which lias given 
 opportunities of profit to the workers. 
 
 The overseas emigration from Germany amounted in 
 1881-90 to an average of 1.30,000 and fell in 1S93 to 87,000 ;
 
 318 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 in 1891 there was a still further drop to roughly 40,CCO 
 The average has since been as follows : 
 
 1901 ."> . . . L >( .),.'U)S annually 
 
 KMM; 10 . . . _';, in* 
 
 11)11 . . . _".', .V.CJ 
 
 l <>r_' . . . is. ii:> 
 
 HM;J . . . _'.-), 77.') 
 
 The conditions for emigration not being favourable 
 every where owing to inadequate opportunities for earning 
 a livelihood, immigration prohibitions, etc.. Germany must 
 have xuitnhlf colnnif^, which, moreover, are needed for the 
 country's trade and for the export of its industrial products 
 and the import of raw materials, etc. 
 
 (it rmany. with her sixty-eight millions, has now clearly 
 reached the practicable maximum of population if she 
 is to harbour a prosperous and contented people; and 
 yet. even now, a certain part of her people have to seek 
 their sustenance outside the country's boundaries or in 
 
 its ci >1< ililes. 
 
 The stupendous growth of (Jermany's population 
 finally, at the beginning of the twentieth century, led 
 to tn't'Tcnncding in HKIHI/ truilf*. Dr. (ioldstcin, in a 
 Dt'nkwhrift published in 1!11 on the subject of over- 
 population, pointed out that doctors, lawyers, engineers. 
 musicians, painters, sculptors, singers, and actors all 
 complained of overcrowding in their professions. Shop 
 assistants are also ton numerous, and many small shop- 
 keepers complain of poor trade, whilst handicrafts are also 
 L f oinu r back. 
 
 It is true that at that time the demand for labour in 
 the bi<_j industries was verv L't'-at, yet many men were 
 often out of work '' to S per cent, of the trade union 
 members in I'M) J. I'.MI? and in 1 '.MIS 1 0<)0 the unemployed 
 ani ( Minted to 1 o per cent . 
 
 Subsequently unemployment among industrial workers 
 seems to have grown still more and to have menaced the 
 existence of many thousands, and the problem lias been
 
 GERMANY'S OVER-POPULATION A MENACE 319 
 
 the subject of earnest discussion in the widest circles. 
 In September IDl.'J the question of unemployment WHS 
 dealt with exhaustively by the Social Democratic Congress 
 in Berlin. All t he speakers drew attention to the appalling 
 increase of unemployment, which the coming winter was 
 bound to intensify. It was deemed absolutely necessary 
 that the Empire, the States of the Confederation as well 
 as the local communes, should do something to lessen the 
 unemployment. 
 
 During the taxation debate a resolution was adopted 
 demanding that those out of work should, as far as possible, 
 be exempted from all taxation. 
 
 The reduced birth-rate has, especially with the example 
 of France be-fore them, created considerable anxiety 
 amongst the Germans, particularly among those who 
 consider that the paramount need of the State is a con- 
 tinual increase of military recruiting material. 
 
 Brcntano, writing in 11)09, sounded a warning against 
 this danger in an article in a review, and lie was followed 
 in 191 1 by Oldenburg, who wrote a treatise on Dcr Ruckling 
 der Geburten, recorded in the Archir fur Soziahi'i.fsen- 
 schaft. 
 
 The Emperor William took a peculiar step intended to 
 stimulate the birth-rate, and which was announced in the 
 newspapers in October 1909 in the following terms : 
 " Notice is given by circular from the Home Olliee that 
 the Emperor is willing for the future to be godfather to the 
 eighth child in every German family, whether rich or 
 poor." 
 
 Another circular empowered the authorities to pay a 
 State bounty of sixty marks to families in poor circumstances 
 on the birth of the eighth child. "The Emperor hopes by 
 this means to assist to bring about an increase of the 
 German birth-rate, which plays an important part in the 
 strengthening of German military power. Recent years 
 have shown signs of a diminution in the percentage of 
 births:, a circumstance which not only the Emperor, but
 
 320 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 many eminent statesmen besides, regard as a grare national 
 danger" 
 
 What has born the result of this Imperial deeision ? 
 Doubtless it has been very disappointing, for there cannot 
 be many German parents who, with seven children, are 
 anxious to add an eighth for the- sake of the above reward. 
 To most of them seven children have been a sullieient 
 source of trouble. 
 
 That this anxiety regarding a reduced birth-rate is 
 unfounded may be gathered from what I have said above. 
 
 Since the war broke out, and in connexion with it, 
 Ilerr Seelmann, insurance actuary (Oldenburg), has dealt 
 with the subject of the reduced German birth-rate in an 
 article in the Berliner Borscn-Couricr (January 10, 11)1.")) 
 in which lie sounded a note of warning and hoped that 
 something would be done to counteract it. 
 
 "Among the blessings which will follow upon the war, 
 I count," he says, "the circumstance that the bulk of 
 the population will take a mope intelligent interest than 
 hitherto in a factor which in time to come will exercise 
 a decisive influence on Germany's fortunes, the lowered 
 birth-rate. . . . Shall we really, after we have spent, so 
 to speak, our last drop of blood in safeguarding our exist- 
 ence, announce our :iill to commit suicide? For if the 
 present tendency continues, Germany will have to face 
 the danger of ending in national suicide." 
 
 Seelmann admits, however, that Germany's population 
 goes on growing, and is of opinion that it will continue 
 to do so fur a few decades to (Mine. Hut he has fears 
 for the future and is afraid that if the birth-rate goes on 
 diminishing, and the two-children system is generally 
 adopted. Germany will by the end of this century be 
 reduced below the level of France. He therefore con- 
 siders that "at the end of the war one of the foremost 
 tasks to grapple with will be to int roduce counter-measures 
 in t his connexion." 
 
 Professor A. Sch loss man n has also dealt witli the question
 
 GERMANY'S OVER- POPULATION A MENACE .TJ1 
 
 of the diminished German birth-rate and its causes, hut 
 finds himself face to faee with an insolvable dilemma, 
 being confronted on the one hand with what he regards 
 as the interest of the State, and on the other with t In- 
 private citizen's motives for limiting his family. He is 
 anxious that the educated classes should set a good example 
 in this respect and realize that the country's eeonomic 
 condition and political situation demand absolutely a 
 continued increase of the population. He points out how 
 Germany in the last few decades has developed from an 
 agricultural into an industrial country, and remarks that 
 tk for the sake of our future we must remain a growing 
 people." 
 
 Whilst maintaining that "the interests of the State 
 need an increased population, taxpayers, soldiers, workers 
 -the more, the better for the State," he points out that 
 " to the private individual few children are an advantage, 
 whilst a large family nowadays spells ruin." " Hen-/' 
 he exclaims, " we reach an impasse," and proceeds to 
 put the pertinent question : " Can we ask of the private 
 citizen that he, individually, shall make sacrifices for tin- 
 good of the State and take upon himself all the worries 
 of providing for the country's needs ? " ' To the bread- 
 winner every child means added worries." * 
 
 Dr. Julian Marcnse, in his work on Die Beschrankung 
 der GeburtenzaJil ein Kultiirproblcm (191. '5). takes up arms 
 against those who voice the opinion that a reduced birth- 
 rate is a sign of national decadence or a " diseased State 
 organization,'' and regards it as a phenomenon dm- to 
 the interplay of a number of factors of our modern civiliza- 
 tion. Amongst other reasons he points to the increased 
 practical activity of women and the heightened feeling 
 of responsibility amongst parents who seek to give their 
 children a better training for suitable occupations, who 
 are anxious to promote their health and strength, etc. 
 
 In a remarkable work entitled Fruchtubtrcibitng und 
 Prdventii'vcrkehr ini Zusammenhang tnit dttn Geburten- 
 
 * See Sc.fUtil-Probh'tnc, 1911. p. o.VJ. 
 
 X
 
 322 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 riickgang (1'JU) Dr. Max Hirsch (Berlin) makes the fol- 
 lowing statement : " Undoubtedly preventive intercourse 
 is the ehief cause of the lower birth-rate. Its enormous 
 spread is patent. . . . The deliberate limitation of the 
 number of children is attributable to the experience that 
 the eeon(tmic welfare of the family and the maintenance of 
 the decree of comfort indispensable for the health of the 
 family and tin- education of the children are only possible 
 by preventing too numerous a progeny. 
 
 This view and this feeling of responsibility arc signs 
 of an adraneed civilization and presuppose a certain measure 
 of moral maturity, spiritual culture-, and enlightenment 
 in physical science. 
 
 " Under modern conditions the limitation of progeny 
 is a weapon in the- economic struggle, an act of self-pro- 
 tection." 
 
 Besides preventive intercourse, the measures taken to 
 procure abortion are in Ilirsch's opinion a general con- 
 tributory cause of the reduced birth-rate in (lermany, and 
 he has found that whilst the former method is more in 
 vogue among the upper classes, the latter prevails among 
 the masses. 
 
 This limitation in the number of children reveals, 
 according to Ilirseh. a parental forethought towards the 
 progeny, and is a sign of the .v/)/v</f/ "/ culture. 
 
 Ilirseh also points out that the measures taken to 
 procure abortion (usually during the very first months) 
 are discussed with perleet frankness amongst the married 
 W'lineii, who often advise one another on the subject, 
 and t hat tin provisions of t he law do not exercise a deter- 
 rent effect. Such are the horror and fear of illness and 
 distress. 
 
 Manv other (ierman doctors. Dr. A. Bernstein, Dr. 
 Moses. Dr. Max Marcuse, and others, have expressed 
 themselves to the same effect as a result of their personal 
 observation^ among the w irking classes of Berlin.* 
 
 A Social Democratic author, .Job. 1-Yrch. has also 
 * SIT Sr.rmil-rrnltlciHr, \\*\'.\. \<\>. T.'t.'l and 7.VJ.
 
 GERMANY'S OVER-POPULATION A MENACE 323 
 
 recently drawn attention to the improved ednentitm of the 
 working cldsscs, which he considers the leading factor 
 in their now more general limitation of families. 'To a 
 thinking workman a thinking wife nuist he an indispen- 
 sahle necessity," and consequently the working class are 
 crying out aloud for the emancipation of women and 
 men from the crushing economic worries and for a few 
 leisure hours for intellectual recreation. In working- 
 elass homes the idea is now gaining ground that this jjoal 
 can be reached by limiting the number of children.* 
 
 This preoccupation as to the limitation of families now 
 engages the attention of all classes of (ierman society, 
 and according to Max Mareusc it has, in recent years, 
 increasingly manifested itself among the working classes, 
 especially in the big towns. In this matter, however, the 
 leaders of the Social Democrats arc by no means united, 
 and some that is to say, those who represent the older 
 revolutionary standpoint, that of class feuds do not 
 wish to see any improvement in the condition of tin- 
 working classes until they themselves have created a new 
 era after overthrowing the present foundations of society. 
 This view was brought to light more- especially at two 
 laro-e Social Democratic Congresses held at lierlin in 
 
 ~ o 
 
 August 1913,1 when Fran Klara /etkin (Stuttgart) spoke 
 against ''birth strike* " and accused the New Malthusian 
 Social Democrats, the Revisionists, of what practically 
 amounts to treason against the cause of the working class. 
 Workmen who limit the number of their children to one 
 or two, she said, were simply aping the bourgeoisie, and 
 the business of the working class was not to let the indi- 
 vidual try to improve his conditions of life on the lines 
 of the bourgeoisie, but to curry on the class strii'j'Jile. The 
 working class must not forget that number* are a decisive 
 factor in the fight for freedom. If we have fewer children, 
 she contended, this means that the working-class families 
 will breed fewer soldiers for Ihc revolution. 
 
 * Sir Sc.riKtl-Pi-uhifnie, H>i i. ]>. :;:!. 
 
 f Sir report in Sc.riial-l'rublt'inc, l!i:?. p. ?-S.
 
 824 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 Tiic majority of those who attended the Congress 
 showed unmistakably that they did not share Fran 
 Zetkin's point of view, and two doctors helemging to the 
 Revisionists of the Social Democratic Party. Dr. Bernstein 
 and Dr. Moses, set forth the causes which primarily 
 determine the reduced birth-rate : deteriorated health 
 and illnesses amongst mothers, of which tuberculosis is 
 the chief, the great infant mortality in working-class 
 homes, the poverty which often drives the daughters to 
 prostitution, the housing difficulty, the procuring of 
 abortion universally practised by poor mothers, etc. 
 Tluy pointed out, moreover, that Social Democratic 
 workmen now very generally limit the number e>f children 
 in their families. 
 
 German chauvinists have' long regarded the colossal 
 growth of Germany's population as a gratifying pheno- 
 menon, something particularly meritorious, which points 
 to fibre- and vitality in a nation de-stme-d to rule ove-r 
 others which do not augment in the same- proportion. 
 
 But this is demonstrably not due- to di tie-it nt vitality, 
 but to deliberate limitation of reproduction brought about 
 by a growing sense e>f responsibility towanls the progeny 
 er the- wish to escape poverty by not having too many 
 chilelren to proviele- for. 
 
 Is it re-ally true that a large population me-ans gtvatne-ss 
 and strength for all time-? No doubt this factor is of 
 great importance when war is waged with le-ss populous 
 countrn s. But this numerical inferiority can be counte-r- 
 balanced by <///wmv.v, as seen by l-'ranei \ alliance with 
 Russia and (iivat Britain in the pivsenl war. 
 
 In tin- I mill run the unchecked me-n ase of its pnpulat ion 
 must undotibtedlv In'cutnt' n iltitigtT tn <i n<itin as well as 
 to tin (. nrlil' s ]>t<i< t . 
 
 Germany's niilitnri/ mnl cnlunial /"<//<// has lee-n foiinel< d 
 on the calculat ion that h< r morn ions gn>\\ t h of populat ion 
 will continue. But a policy basi d on thse premises, and 
 which presujij)ose-s a certain future- mere ase- of population,
 
 GERMANY'S OVER-POPULATION A MENACE 325 
 
 must also reckon with the possibility of world- wide 
 conflicts. 
 
 In Germany, as we have seen, many thinkers have warned 
 the nation against this eventuality, though in vain. 
 
 I have pointed out in the foregoing (pp. 131-142) how the 
 huge growth of Germany's population has been one of the 
 reasons of her colonial policy, which in turn has become 
 one of the predisposing causes of the War of 1011. The 
 eminent political economist G. Schmoller disputed in 1 ss-j 
 the old dogma as to the blessing of the greatest possible 
 number of children, and considered that it belonged 
 rightly to a semi-civili/.cd age : but in the end he had to 
 take the line of least resistance, and declared in I !><)() that 
 Germany's existence would be threatened if she were not 
 a Power to be reckoned with at sea. 
 
 In view of the colossal growth of the German nation 
 and the policy of expansion to which it has given rise, it 
 may not be out of place to remind the reader that the 
 dissemination of the nations, and not least of the Germanic 
 peoples, was mostly due, in earlier stages, to the same 
 cause. The home country became over-populated, and it 
 grew difficult for many to support themselves and find 
 room at home, resulting in a periodical exodus either to 
 uninhabited regions in the earlier periods or to richer 
 countries, when war often resulted between their inhabi- 
 tants and the invaders. 
 
 The struggle for existence has often made war a " biolo- 
 gical necessity,'' as Bernhardi says, but this law applies 
 to the more primitive stages, to savages and barbarians, 
 just as it applies to certain animals.* 
 
 * I may instance the Norwegian lemming, a rod<nt. which 
 periodically migrates in immense numbers ri'irht across Sucdm, 
 ultimately to drown in the waters of the (Jtilf of Hothnia. These 
 animals are compelled to undertake these migrations through lack 
 of food when, owing to their colossal fertility, they become too 
 numerous. 
 
 Another example from the animal world is supplied by the rabbits 
 in Australia and New Zealand, whose fertility has made tlurn a 
 positive plague. Everything edible is consumed by these millions
 
 326 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 Civilizt-d nations ought no longer to permit unregulated, 
 irresponsible propagation. 
 
 The over-population of Germany is due to the fact that 
 the overwhelming majority have needlessly gone on 
 breeding children, and this in its turn lias been a causa 
 rt tnota of the war. If the reproduction continues on the 
 same scale as heretofore, it will become a causa proxhnti, 
 the direct and immediate cause of a new war. Over- 
 population becomes a causa tfticiens, or a mechanically 
 acting cause of war in the animal world, but to t lie Germans, 
 who do not ivali/.e that they are not entitled to such sexual 
 life in the heart of Kuropc, it becomes a causa justa, for 
 they hold that they have a right to anything; unfor- 
 tunately, therefore, it becomes an ominous causa justa 
 litiganili that is to say, they will regard the struggle for 
 and claim to more and more territory to be fully justified, 
 as beinLT a necessity /" them They must, they say, struggle 
 for their existence, and have as much right to live as 
 others. 
 
 That may be but only as rational beings who will not 
 spoil life for themselves and others bv thoughtlessness and 
 lack of foresight ! 
 
 I'crc srirc cst per catisas set re " To understand rightly 
 is to understand through causes " said Francis Bacon 
 three hundred years ago. 
 
 A glance at the statistics of the stupendous growth of 
 Germany's population shows us that it was nnc of the 
 causes of' the World War. for it gave rise to the colonial 
 policy, which L'avc the impetus to Germany's licet, which 
 in turn made Great Britain apprehensive of (German sea- 
 power, et c. 
 
 The (iennans must as individuals and as a State 
 Government and Reichstag comprehend this and must 
 
 <'f ril pt.il - ID tin i|< I riiiH ill of ill 1 D! lii i -animals ami i.f human 1 > MIL'S. 
 s' i -1 .11 1 1< (1 i ffnrl s |ia\ In ( ii i n ail i ID i xl i i iniinit r tin i alil.il in 
 V \s >Diilli \Val.s ;I!DIH DM r t?.",M Odd ha- In MI spnt animalK 
 I. Mt it i- Dnl% lad ly that III' p la-m lias |.. .1, am-l'i! \>\ <N- 
 ri|>t!"nal iliDii^'lit ( aii'-in^' Ilii ral'l'ils ID piii'-h in IIIIIIH use 
 riu mix is.
 
 GERMANY'S OVER-POPULATION A MENACE 327 
 
 not seek to throw the blame on other nations supposed 
 to be actuated by envy, ete. It is waste of energy to 
 plead their kk just cause/' that it is their only wish to live 
 in peace and enjoy their prosperity, and shout "Death 
 to the English ! " England has not prevented (Germany's 
 acquisition of colonies, nor has she been able to cheek 
 German rcproductivcncss, Germany's gravest danger. 
 
 That the German Government would, were France to 
 be conquered, demand some of her most valuable colonies 
 is beyond doubt. This may be gathered from the reply 
 which the German Chancellor made to Sir Kdward (Joschen, 
 the British ambassador, on July l".> (see British lilnc Hook, 
 No. 85) : " Every assurance will be given that t he Imperial 
 Government aims at no territorial acquisitions at the 
 expense of France . . . but he could not girt' a .similar 
 undertaking with regard to the French colonies." 
 
 The Germans have never been such capable colonizers 
 as the British and French, and that is one of the chief 
 reasons why they have not profited much by their colonies. 
 But this is no reason why they should seek to ttike colonies 
 away from others who have acquired them at the cost of 
 great sacrifices. 
 
 It lias been one of the aims of the German chauvinists 
 that as soon as Germany has secured the hegemony of 
 Europe she shall gain the hegemony of the whole world 
 with the aid of a vast colonial empire, and they are by no 
 means content to pursue a peaceful existence in the 
 enjoyment of their hard-earned prosperity. The belief 
 in Germany's ability to achieve all this and the faith in 
 her mission to save the world by means of her " culture ' 
 have long been dominant amongst the Germans, thanks 
 to the Germanistic doctrine and the successes of German 
 arms. 
 
 One hears too much in Germany of Germany's greatness 
 and cultural importance, of her call to guide the world. 
 I must once again point out that a growing population is 
 by no means synonymous with growing eivili/.atory worth. 
 Outward greatness is not the same as cultural greatness.
 
 328 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 In reality there are in every country but relatively 
 few intelligent and noble minds who represent the higher 
 culture. The great majority of the people enjoy its 
 benefits without thcmsi Ives contributing to it : every 
 country has innumerable mediocrities and innumerable 
 unintelligent and useless individuals, parasites who are 
 but a burden to the community. Of Germany's colossal 
 population the latter form a considerable part, and when 
 the country claims the need of an expansion policy for its 
 sixty-eight millions, it cannot be too clearly reali/cd that 
 it is not for the sake of the representatives of the higher 
 culture, but on behalf of many millions of inferior and 
 relativclv useless beinirs.
 
 XIV 
 FOUNDATIONS OF PK.U K AFTKR TIIK WAR 
 
 EVKKY nation, every individual has now for many months 
 been longing lor the horrible war to stop, so that a real 
 peace may be concluded. Hut now, at the end of May 101."), 
 after the war has lasted ten months, peace is as far off as 
 ever and the outcome 1 of the conflict is very uncertain. 
 What, then, it may be- asked, is the use of outsiders 
 discussing the question of peace when they have not the 
 slightest influence over the course of the war and over 
 the belligerent Powers ? 
 
 Although such discussion may serve no direct purpose, 
 it may nevertheless be fruitful as preparing the groundwork 
 for the views which it is hoped that the nations will hold 
 when peace approaches and they come to discuss the 
 conditions which are to preclude the possibility of fresh 
 wars. For that is a sine qua non amongst all the nations. 
 
 It is from Holland that the first general appeal in this 
 respect has come since the war began, the " Nederlandsche 
 Anti-Oorlog Haad " having been formed with the object 
 of preparing for the coming peace. At a discussion at The 
 Hague between representatives both of the belligerent and of 
 neutral Powers (April 191.")) certain fundamental conditions 
 were agreed upon which were to form the groundwork for 
 peace propaganda among the nations. This programme, 
 which has recently been accepted by the Swedish Peace 
 League, contains the following points : 
 
 (1) Annexation or cession of territory must not take place 
 in opposition to the interests and iiisfies <>j the population. 
 
 3'29
 
 830 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 (2) The States shall agree to introduce full freedom of 
 commerce in their colonies, protectorates, and spheres of 
 interest. 
 
 (3) The work of The Hague Conferences for the pro- 
 motion of international laws shall he continued. 
 
 These Conferences shall have a permanent organization 
 and must inert at regular intervals. 
 
 The States shall agree to refer all disputes to judicial 
 settlement <r to investigation and to tentative arbitration. 
 With this ohjeet it will he necessary to institute, besides 
 the existing Arbitration Tribunal at The Hague : (a) A 
 permanent international tribunal ; (b) a permanent com- 
 mission of investigation which may contingently submit 
 proposals for an amicable settlement. 
 
 The States shall bind themselves by mutual consent to 
 take diplomatic, economic, or military steps if a country 
 should report to arms instead of submitting the dispute to 
 a tribunal or to the investigation of the commission of 
 investigation. 
 
 (I) The States shall seek to come to an agreement with 
 a view to mutual limitation of armaments. The right <>f 
 capture shall be abrogated, and the principle of the freedom 
 of the seas shall be established. 
 
 (.">) Foreign policy shall be subject to effective Parlia- 
 mentary control, so that secret treaties withheld from the 
 Parliaments may not be binding on the nations. 
 
 These demands, which contain the main points of all 
 previous proposals of the last two hundred years for tin' 
 preservation of durable peace, must be endorsed by all 
 enlightened men and women so that they may take com- 
 mon aetion for the prevention of war and the safeguarding 
 of permanent peace. The programme was duly accepted 
 by the great Women's Peace Congress held at The Hague 
 in May l'.l.'. 
 
 In order that durable peace may be ensured for the 
 future it is neeessary that the Cun^ri .v.v which will take 
 place between the belligerent (tovernment s, alter an 
 armistice has been agreed upon, shall express the :nll of nil
 
 FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE AFTER THE WAR ;m 
 
 the nations drawn into the rear and shall include national 
 representatives elected by the Parliaments. \Vh< re the 
 latter are not sitting they should be convened without 
 loss of time. 
 
 At a, Congress thus constituted the nations themsflrcfi will 
 be able to decide as to their fate, and resolve that foreign 
 territory may not be annexed in opposition to the will of 
 the population. It shall and must have power to deene 
 relative disarmament and the settlement of disputes by 
 mediation and arbitration through a commission in- 
 vestigation and a peace tribunal. 
 
 The incidents leading up to the World War have clearly 
 shown how unsatisfactorily the foreign policy of the State 
 has been conducted, being, as it is, in the hands of a small 
 oligarchy of a Jew statesmen who conduct secret negotiations 
 and at a given moment, without notice to or control by 
 the national representatives, decide upon warlike action. 
 
 Yet other Powers, and more- particularly a disinterested 
 Great Power, Great Britain, came forward with proposals 
 for mediation, which, if accepted, might have prevented 
 the war. Instead of entertaining these proposals, these 
 leading statesmen exchanged notes on incidental matters, 
 mobilization, etc., which were made out to be decisive 
 reasons for Avar, and settled everything with watch and 
 almanac in hand, in accordance with an unacceptable 
 ultimatum. It was the purest parody of enlightened 
 policy between civili/ed countries. 
 
 Are the nations to put up with this sort of thing for ever ? 
 The answer must be no ! Can it be tolerated that a handful 
 of men shall continue to be allowed to decree the slaughter 
 of hundreds of thousands of human beings and the 
 unhappiness of millions ? No. a thousand times no ! 
 
 The nations must rise' against this mad system <>t des- 
 potic conduct of State affairs, and must insist at once, 
 everywhere, on constitutional laws which will safeguard 
 the peaceable intercourse of nations and preclude craftily 
 engineered warlike conflicts.
 
 332 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 In most countries the Government alone is responsible 
 for the foreign poliey and need not consult Parliament. 
 Germany and Russia are typical examples of the absolute 
 authority of the Government, or, rather, of the monarch, 
 in this respect. 
 
 In countries with constitutional government and an 
 advanced parliamentary system the Government is always 
 in contact with Parliament on matters of foreign policy, 
 although usually having the power to decide in the last 
 resort. 
 
 In the I'nited States and Norway, however, foreign 
 policy is under constitutional control. Tin- President of 
 the I'nited States and the Government deliberate with the 
 Committee of the Congress in foreign affairs before coming 
 to a decision as to their policy in matters of importance. 
 
 In Sweden it is customary, when serious political com- 
 plications appear to threaten the country's neutrality and 
 pacific attitude, for the KiiiLT to "invite special deputies 
 of the Riksdag to deliberate \\itli him on matters which 
 should in his view be kept secret," pursuant to Article ~> 1 
 of the Constitution. These Deputies have, however, no 
 power of decision. 
 
 If wars are in future to he averted between European 
 States a nfcfsxartj consummation it is iirst and foremost 
 imperative : 
 
 (1) That a \tntt' nf :cnr shall not be decreed inertly as a 
 result of negotiations or an exchange of notes between 
 a couple ol statesmen < if between a mnmirch and a Ftireiffn 
 Minister or Clmneellnr, essentially in accordance with the 
 old regime of autocracy, but that the ri jirt.-'inliili: r.v ';/ 
 Ihc people shall, in pursuance of the principles of en- 
 lightened democracy, be consulted in some form or other, 
 either collectively or by delegation. 
 
 ('_') That all States must unconditionally, 1 fore a 
 declaration of war is issued. Milmiit tin iiiullirs in dispute 
 ID mediation either through delegates ol a number ol otlier 
 States ,,r t hroii L'h the PI ace Tribunal at The Hau'Ue.
 
 FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE AFTER THE WAR 333 
 
 (3) That war must not be declared by ultimatum allowing 
 an insufficient time- such us twenty-four or forty-eight 
 hours for u reply, us is usually done, and that a lunger 
 time, fit least a month, must he allowed, so as to avoid 
 precipitate judgment and give time for mature reflection. 
 
 These three cardinal conditions, the justice of which 
 must be as clear as daylight to every thinking person, were 
 ignored in the negotiations between the Powers on the 
 eve of the World War. 
 
 // must not be tolerated, at the end of this stupendous 
 World War, that, as happened after the Franco-German 
 War of 1870-71, the States shall be allowed to renew their 
 efforts in the direction of fresh armaments, to prepare for 
 fresh wars. There must be an end to this era of wars, which 
 is contrary to all tenets of eivili/ation. Every enlightened 
 person in the whole world demands it. 
 
 All States must agree, if not to disarmament, then at 
 least to a considerable reduction of the military establishment, 
 let us say to one-tenth thereof, so that only militia troops 
 remain. 
 
 The .stupendous expenditure for warlike purposes such as 
 this World War has witnessed, and which gives rise to 
 terrible losses whilst leaving the contending parties at the 
 same relative strength, must not be incurred a^ain. 
 
 So long as the States are not able to agree upon a general 
 reduction of armies and naries. it will be useless to hope for 
 peace. Peace in such circumstances will be but a truce. 
 
 It will be necessary, lirst of all, to reduce the military 
 establishment in the military country par excellence : 
 Germany. So long as this military Power is not restricted, 
 there can be no peace. 
 
 The coming Peace Congress will have no ta^k more 
 urgent. For how can it serve the world if the Congress 
 
 r* 
 
 decides with an overwhelming majority upon a reduction 
 of the military establishments, upon mediation and arbi- 
 tration, etc., if Germany is no! a party to these measures ? 
 
 But even if she consents, this means nothing if her 
 military establishment is not reduced, for in that case
 
 33i BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 Germany, with her military organization, her live to ten 
 million men in arms, can defy the rulings of the Congress 
 and the rights of nations. 
 
 And Russia ? Is not this colossal Empire as dangerous 
 a military Power as Germany, and is sin- not as great a 
 menace to the peace of the world '.' 
 
 No. Russia disseminates her surplus population over 
 Siberia (><< p. .311 ) and is not in the same sense- as Ciermanv 
 a military Power ; she- is not, as Ciermanv, organi/.ed in 
 every detail of her social life for military purposes, nor is 
 she, like Germany, permanently on a semi war footing. 
 The Russian people are not, like the Germans, inspired with 
 warlike ideals and have had no great wars, no apostles of 
 war to inculcate its glories. Such a work as Hcrnhardi's 
 could not have been written in Russia. If we except a 
 certain war party, those who have studied the Russian 
 nation will admit that the educated Russian is as much a 
 European as the Frenchman, the German, the Swede, and 
 so forth, and has no yearning for war and conquest ; the' 
 national temper is on the whole gentle and sensitive, 
 accessible to good impulses. Sweeping and much needed 
 reforms will conic in due course, and one of the most 
 important has already been introduced during the war: 
 t he abolit ion < >f vodka. 
 
 Russia will in a not far distant future probably cease 
 altogether to be ruled by an autocratic Tsar, and it is 
 not unlikely that several autonomous States, in Poland. 
 I'kraine, etc.. will be created and give rise to a Russian 
 confederacy. 
 
 It may still be of interest to sav a few words about tin- 
 address u hi eh Professor \V. ( )s( wald delivered at Stockholm 
 in October I'.tl 1 . \\ h n lie visit ed Su < den as an " ml < Ilect ual 
 war volunteer* :it the instigation of the newly formed 
 " Kulturbund," whose principles and aims he propounded, 
 although lie added a few personal opinions of (MS own. 
 The following is a statement which he issued to several 
 newspapers. " People talk <>t (itrrnun tnilituristn, and the
 
 FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE AFTER THE WAR 88-> 
 
 dislike which Germany has created in tin- world may 
 perhaps be due to its growth. Hut this very " inilitarism " 
 is one of tlie most powerful expressions of Germany's 
 organizing pma-r. I say frankly that I consider that 
 Germany through her organisation talent, has reached a 
 higher stage of civilization than the other nations, and that 
 the war will he the means of admitting them to a higher 
 civilization on this basis. 
 
 ' What does Germany want ? Germany wants to 
 organize Europe ! For hitherto Europe has by no means 
 been organised. Germany wants to strike out in a new 
 direction in order to realise the idea of united effort. I will 
 explain to you Germany's great secret. We, or perhaps 
 the Germanic race, have discovered the //</ of organization. 
 The other nations still live in the epoch of individualism. 
 We live in that of organization. With us the whole strives 
 to develop every part to its highest possible cllicieney, but 
 at the same time to guide it into the path where it will be 
 7/10*7 useful to the community. That is our liberty, the 
 highest form of liberty, in which all forces are preserved 
 and co-operate." 
 
 This pronouncement by the eminent scientist and 
 pacifist, who in his cultural mission to Sweden had behind 
 him a large body of representatives of German culture, 
 shows us more plainly than anything how the Gcrmanistic 
 dreams of greatness, blended with the all-conquering 
 militarism, has perverted the vision of even the best men 
 in Germany. All seem to have had the same train of 
 reasoning drilled into them : German military power is 
 synonymous with a higher civilization, and Europe must 
 be organized on the foundations of militarism. Such 
 peculiar ideas as that, for instance, the Germans or the 
 Germanic race have " discovered the fact of organization 
 can thrive only in a confused mind. There is n<> M-HM- in 
 this phrase, viewed as an abstract conception. 
 
 The Germans may have shown great orgnni/.ing power 
 in developing their military system, but Napoleon may 
 also be regarded as one of the greatest military organizers
 
 336 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 known to history. And it will surely be conceded that the 
 English arc singularly capable organizers in regard both to 
 their colonies and to their navy. 
 
 Germany's ambition to " organize Europe " means that 
 when Germany has \von and has dictated the terms of 
 peace Gorman Imperialism is to rule Kurope and re-model 
 the map of the world to suit her own ideas. 
 
 The States which are to be organized so that they may 
 co-operate with the conquering Gorman Empire are no 
 doubt to be allotted the role of vassals, but this prospect 
 tempts no one quite the contrary. 
 
 Every State must inevitably cherish its independence, 
 none willingly forfeits its liberty, and Prussia's treatment 
 of Poles and Danes in annexed provinces lias furnished us 
 with a forbidding example of the German method of 
 organization. 
 
 Professor Fran/, von Liszt, the famous criminologist, has 
 come forward since the war began (October I'.ill) with 
 proposals concerning (ierinany's future and her inter- 
 national position: his scheme is a Centra! European 
 Confederation, and his plan of organization coincides on 
 essential points with that propounded by Ostwald. In 
 common with all other Germans he holds that Germany 
 is menaced primarily by England, but also l>y Russia. 
 He takes up the standpoint that Germany cannot even 
 after a successful war attain a degree of material strength 
 which \\ill secure her against the world Powers of Great 
 Hritain and Russia. Hence her remedy lies in a confedera- 
 t ii m < if St at es. 
 
 Germany, as a result of this war. must aspire to the 
 following ends : she must satisfy the need of mlu 
 pensable to an industrial State, she must ;<<'// 
 (iirntiin Stnti'* internally, and she must or^ani/.e the 
 Central Kurtijtftin Cmift'tli'mlinn. 
 
 Sweden. Norway, and Denmark are tempted with the 
 added security against Great Uritam and Russia and with 
 the pr<peet that they may become a Scandinavian
 
 FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE AFTER THE \\.\n .'J37 
 
 subdivision oft.hr Great Confederation, possibly with tin- 
 addition of Finland, which should henceforth be free, like 
 Poland and Ukraine. 
 
 All the members of the Confederation are to retain 
 their independence. But the union between them must 
 be " riveted " by their constitutions and cemented by a 
 military convention. In other words, there must be a sort 
 of common Parliament with delegations. 
 
 A delicate point of the programme is, of course, that 
 which concerns Germany's position. Lis/t rejects the 
 term "hegemony," but accepts the formula />r/wf/\ inttr 
 pares, nnd emphasizes that, the post of leadership must 
 preferably be based on a willingness to bear the burdens 
 of others (!). He also holds out hopes of the Germans 
 becoming more amiable and re lined in their manner, less 
 intractable and overbearing, once they feel safe and 
 unassailable and arc consequently able to bestow more 
 care on the choicer blooms of culture. 
 
 In spite of many good ideas and a moderation which is 
 in marked contrast to most other German proposals and 
 appeals to neutral nations, Liszt nevertheless shows that 
 he is under the influence of the same hypnosis as all other 
 Germans in regard to the origin and outcome of the war, 
 the charges against Belgium, England's culpability, etc-. 
 He endorses the view which Dr. G. Inner, Legation Coun- 
 cillor, advances in his pamphlet on England's " world 
 yoke " and her role as instigator of the World War. as 
 unbalanced and one-sided an exposition as one can well 
 imagine. lie blames in the first place Edward VII for 
 the anti-German policy of England, and says that Sir 
 Edward Grey is merely the executor of his political testa- 
 ment : " English policy stands arraigned for all time 
 before the tribunal of history as the unscrupulous instigator 
 of this conspiracy against the German Empire, and 
 England must bear the burden of having launched this 
 European war against us." 
 
 Curiously enough, Liszt and Inner, together with 
 Professor Lamprceht, in their joint preface to these 
 
 Y
 
 338 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 pamphlets, which form part of a series entitled ' 
 War and Peace, gave vent to their joy over the war, clearly 
 in the unshakable conviction that Germany will win. 
 They quote Treitschke's words about war as a " fountain 
 of health for tin- people " and declare that it has now 
 " come into its own," and they acknowledge that Germany 
 herself took the offensive. They deplore " the distressing 
 era of political decline, which filled the stoutest hearts 
 with anxiety for the future," and rejoice that " the valiant 
 energy of leading strategists has evoked in the hour of 
 crisis throughout the land the unanimous cry : 'At last 
 the- hour has come for action and deliverance ! ' It may 
 be opportune in this connexion to recall Bcrnhardi's 
 words in the preface- to his book Germany and the \c.rt War, 
 which I have already quoted (p. 117) ; it is curious to note 
 his concordance- with the sentiments of these authors. 
 
 They declare that "sword and pen must not rest until 
 Germany with rejuvenated strength rises from this new 
 ordeal as a guarantor of a peaceful future and as a staunch 
 protector against the arrogance and contumely of bygone 
 days." No suggestion, it is to be noted, that Germany 
 has ever been guilty of arrogance and contumely. 
 
 As will be seen. Lis/t proposes to found the coming peace 
 on a Central European Confederation which is to keep in 
 cheek the two menacing world-Powers of (ireat Itritain and 
 Russia. As the backbone of t his Confederation Germany 
 and Austria-Hungary is not considered strong enough to 
 combat t hcsc t \\ ( Powers it is proposed t hat ot her Kuropcan 
 States, primarily those who have been neutral in this war, 
 should enter the Confederation. 
 
 This brings us face to face with the " il " of t he German 
 scheme : will the neutral St at t s of Kurope agree to b< come 
 not only allied to. but organically and constitutionally 
 bound up with, Germany as the lending State, with the 
 object the paramount task of opposing (ireat Hritain 
 and Russia in anticipation of coming wars ? 
 
 Surelv tlu-rr is not a single country to which this plan 
 appeals.
 
 FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE AFTER THE WAR :W 
 
 None of the States who have remained neutral in t In- 
 World War will have any cause for hostility toward-, 
 Great Britain and Russia ; on I he cont rary, all nf t hem \\ ill 
 he anxious to remain on friendly terms with these Powers. 
 Least of all should Sweden, Norway, and Denmark desire 
 to pick a quarrel with them, and this they have amply 
 shown by the neutrality which their Governments, with 
 clear-sighted resolution, proclaimed at the outset of 
 the war. 
 
 A curious example of the German notion that it has 
 been reserved for Germany to organi/c that creative cul- 
 ture which, as Ostwald says, is to supersede "a single 
 nation's brutal mastery and become the paramount 
 factor in the realm of justice and order." has been fur- 
 nished by Dr. F. Xaumann, a cleric, in an article in his 
 paper Die Uilfc (October 11)1 1). Pastor Naumann is a 
 member of the German Reichstag, belongs to the " Fort- 
 schrittliehe Volkspartci " (Progressive Democratic Party) 
 and took part in the inter-parliamentary congress of 
 German and French delegates held at Bale in the spring of 
 1914. 
 
 He considers that the most important result of this war 
 will he the formation of stronger confederacies of States 
 than have hitherto existed, and, cleric withal, he seems to 
 discern in the 1 sanguinary carnage a higher reason or a 
 divine interposition and guidance. 
 
 To him the interests of peace are best served by pro- 
 moting the formation of large States by the amalgamation 
 of smaller ones, and he condemns as doing poor service 
 to the cause of peace those who uphold a system of Miiall 
 States maintained by the principle of neutrality. Dr. 
 Xaumann goes so far as- to deny the "moral right " of 
 neutrality. It is the duty of nationalities as w 11 as of 
 individuals to take sides when called upon to d,> so. 
 Neither must stand apart : they must take np their post in 
 the struggle : and must argue that he who seeks isolation 
 in reality violates the natural law which directs that no
 
 340 BEFORE, DI-RIXG, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 one must shirk participation in the fight for larger con- 
 federacies -the road to peace and happiness. 
 
 The Belgian devotion to neutrality was egotistical and 
 selfish. I-'or, according to Dr. Xaumann, one cannot 
 admit the unconditional right of the individual State to 
 oppose "a universal reconstitution." Wars are, nowa- 
 days, a " process of organi/.atory transpositions in the 
 evolution of humanity." 
 
 "The leadership of mankind is now being fought for. 
 Individually one can understand the wishes of the neutrals, 
 but in point of principle one cannot acknowledge their 
 rii, r ht to evade the progressive centralization of the leader- 
 ship of mankind." 
 
 This means, in other words, that Belgium ought to have 
 subordinated herself to Germany's leadership by virtue of 
 t he universal reconstitution which t hat country is destined 
 to carry out. We rccogni/e hep- the doctrine and aims of 
 Germanism as proclaimed for the last centurv. 
 
 Sweden's duty, according to Xaumann. under this 
 doctrine, is clear. But Sweden has nevertheless adhered 
 to her independence and he-r neutrality. 
 
 The first t hing to be- done is t o impress public opinion in all 
 
 ci: ilir., ({ nntinns :citfi the <ih\olnt( mrr.v.v//// nf realizing tin- 
 iiliii nf arbitration, which has long been consistently 
 fostered by a large number of philosophers, jurists, and 
 statesmen. This must be done by international treaties, 
 
 under which disputes between State's must be settled by 
 arbitration. It is very essential, however, that such 
 arbitration must not be subject to any optional consent 
 of either party: it must be founded on the acknowlcdg- 
 ni' nt of t he principle- of arbit rat ion as a />> rniitm nt ftirtnr 
 that is to sav, <>t a }i>'i;mnsli/ ratified agreement between 
 
 the States. 
 
 In discussing int i-rnat ional 1 n-at ies respect ing arbit rat ion 
 tribunals, it cannot be made too clear that the first and 
 foremost condition is that thev shall be }>t rnuitn 'tit. that 
 th< v shall be i.^tnhlisht il and oriiuni'it'd beforehand mother
 
 FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE AFTER THE WAR :H1 
 
 words, they must be resorted to in nrny dispute that may 
 arise. It is too late to talk about arbitration omr ///< 
 dispute has arisen. There can be no doubt that oner tin- 
 dissension exists, proposals to refer it to arbitration an- 
 very unlikely to succeed when the subject of discord is a 
 ri'alhj serious one, for in that case it will already have 
 roused the passions of the peoples and given rise to 
 minatory expressions of opinion. In most eases tribunals 
 of arbitration can only hope to settle disputes of a minor 
 nature and which in any ease would not have brought on 
 war, and this will remain so until general treaties stipulat- 
 ing that unconditional arbitration shall be aj>i>!il to eitnj 
 kind of dispute have- been concluded be forehand . 
 
 By this means the discussion of a dispute will become 
 vastly different, much calmer, much more peaceable than 
 when both sides know that, failing an agreement, they are 
 certain to resort, according to militarist tradition, to the 
 arbitrament of brute force, or, to begin with, to armaments 
 and mobilizations which are sei/.ed upon by the news- 
 papers and forthwith acquire the weight uf arguments in the 
 discussion. 
 
 It is quite possible that, peace congresses may by a 
 resolute attitude avert many a war, and compel through the 
 pressure of public opinion a pacific solution of many new 
 disputes between the States. Hut this is far from enough 
 so long as old wounds remain unhealed, so long as a feeling 
 of injustice still rankles. Crimes against humanity still 
 besmirch many a throne, and in many countries certain 
 parties hold warlike and chauvinistic notions which 
 perpetually impede normal, peaceable, and humane 
 advancement. 
 
 It is clear nowadays that tin- peace congresses- in 
 the different countries and the international peace 
 conferences with their humanistic or humanitarian 
 programmes, the "a be" of the peace movement 
 which nobody dispute's, must concern themselves with 
 lire political questions- that is to say. with the eaust-* <>t
 
 342 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1014 
 
 international discord if they are to attain any real 
 importance. 
 
 No durable peace can he brought about by the official 
 peace conferences until the remnants of the old policy of 
 conquest which survive in existing treaties have been 
 extirpated by permitting every nationality incorporated 
 with another by force, to :o/rA out its own destiny. Not until 
 then will national hatred cease to pollute the currents of 
 thought, and not until then can there be any idea of 
 limiting armaments, for so long as such nations are under 
 bondage, the States ruling and oppressing them will fear 
 " rebellious " movements among the smaller nationalities 
 whom they have- subdued by violence. 
 
 For over three decades as witnessed by the Berlin 
 Treaty of 1 S7S and the abrogation of Article ."> of the Treaty 
 of Prague of ls<;;, which took place in the same year 
 questions of nationality have been kept in the background 
 in the policy of the Great Powers. Hut it is obvious that 
 sooner or later they are bound to appear on the agenda 
 of international politics. For they are questions of life 
 and death to many nationalities in Kurope, and the interest 
 which they amuse is as lively as ever. All that these 
 nationalities are waiting for is an opportunity to present 
 their national demands. 
 
 Unfortunately it has not been customary in Furopean 
 communities to rccogni/c, and as far as possible to repair, 
 otlicial errors and blunders or acts of injustice on the part 
 of the State. 
 
 Let us hope that a new era will witness the introduction 
 of such expressions of a new public morality, and that 
 injustices and faults committed bv public departments 
 will be righted as far as possible by reparation to the 
 viet ims. 
 
 \\lien The Hague Peace Conference was created in 1 S'.S 
 a negative principle was adopted which, il it continues to 
 
 lie applied to peace conferences. Jllllst llie\ltablv pIVVellt 
 
 anv radical changes. It was resolved that "no delibera- 
 tion* regarding the political conditions in a State or
 
 FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE AFTER THE WAR 813 
 
 questions defined by treaties shall take place." This was 
 proposed by the Dutch Foreign Minister after consultation 
 with the Russian Government, and several Great Powers 
 only accepted the invitation subject to this condition. 
 
 Hut to achieve a real peace it. is necessary to probe to tin- 
 bottom all factors of the international policies of the (in at 
 Powers and their relations with other States and with con- 
 quered or annexed territories, to approach all disputes with 
 an open mind, and to remove known causes of dissatisfac- 
 tion. It is necessary, therefore, to discuss not only 
 possible future causes of discord, but to go into grievance.'* of 
 old standing, questions of legalized brutality, which, again, 
 make it necessary to examine certain treaties forced upon 
 unwilling nationalities and to reri.se them. Otherwise a 
 peace conference becomes illusory and useless as a means 
 of averting fresh wars. 
 
 Nothing in politics is irrevocable, least of all the ruthless 
 conquest and annexation of countries and provinces against 
 the wish and the will of the population. 
 
 There are many black spots on the map of Europe which 
 denote crimes against the law of nations and usurpation 
 of the rights of nationality, to the enduring shame of 
 European civilization. To establish the freedom of 
 nations and their right to work out their own destiny must 
 be one of the chief duties of the Peace Congress which will 
 follow this war ; otherwise there- can be no peace. 
 
 This is no place for going into these questions deeply. 
 and I will merely cite the provinces which should be 
 allowed to be the masters of their own fate : Sehleswig, 
 Finland, Lithuania, Poland. Posen. Galicia. Ukraine, 
 Alsace-Lorraine, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Austria's 
 Italian provinces. 
 
 The position of the Jews must also be made secure in 
 the countries where they have lived under har^h condi- 
 tions, as in Poland, Russia, and Rumania. 
 
 Belgium has now become a country occupied by Germany 
 and placed under German administration. 
 
 The coming peace will have no meaning whatever it' the
 
 344 BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 Congress which settles its terms does not decide absolutely 
 that Belgium must remain an independent country as 
 before, must be liberated immediately from the German 
 occupation, and must receive lull compensation, so 1'ar as 
 compensation can be given, for all the losses which that 
 unhappy country lias suffered through the war. Belgium 
 was attacked by Germany in violation of the law of nations 
 and of treaties of neutrality, and it is therefore for Germany 
 in the iirst place to give her compensation. But the 
 Entente Powers must also be held liable, for they under- 
 took to safeguard Belgium's neturality, and her resistance 
 against the German invasion arrested in a great measure 
 the invasion of France and gave that country and Great 
 Britain time to gather strength, unprepared as they wen- 
 fort he war. Belgium's integrity is of vital importance both 
 to France- and Great Britain. 
 
 The utterly false conception took root in Germany at 
 the beginning of the war that the \cholc countri/ ro/.v 
 tunattntd and that it was a matter of lighting for the 
 existence <>J the (nnntin nation and for its civilization, which 
 the Germans were bound to defend as one man. \Ve arc- 
 witnessing here a psychological phenomenon which is 
 easily explained. The most elementary of the psychic 
 factors is: Germany is engaged in a war with redoubt- 
 able Powers, the Fatherland is threatened; so thinking, 
 the whole nation is sei/ed with patriotic- defensive fervour, 
 the citi/eii docs not trouble about the cause, but accepts 
 the reason suggested to his mind by tin- Government : 
 
 \\ e have been attacked/' Then comes the notion that 
 the enemy may invade the country if the hope of victory 
 does not materialize, and this is followed bv an increasing 
 anxietv for his material existence, and he thinks with 
 trepidation of the impending devastation of the countrv 
 and th< set back to culture bv distress and famine. 
 
 But n<> I'txccr Im.f thrt'utrnt'd (icrtimny, no one has wanted 
 to 1 1, ,v /;</// h< r cnlluri . Germany's cult u re is great I v valued 
 by the whole world, even bv her present enemies, and
 
 FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE AFTER THE WAR 345 
 
 nothing could destroy it. Hut the- whole world, not her 
 present enemies alone, deplores that this exalted culture 
 has been thrust into the background in certain circles 
 and that another tendency, that of militarism and of 
 aspiration to material domination involving a threat to other 
 nations, has obtained the upper hand. \<> one xays that 
 the German is a barbarian, but surely it is the universal 
 opinion of Europe that some Germans have conducted 
 themselves as barbarians, nay, as Huns, in this \var, and 
 that the Chief High Command has given voice to senti- 
 ments which, coupled with the cvcr-dcmorali/.ing war 
 i'ren/y, have brutalized many German soldiers. 
 
 Can peace endure ? It can if the Germans cease exclaim- 
 ing : " \Ve arc the sons of Goethe, Schiller, Kant, and 
 Fichte," and instead seek to call forth the spirit of these 
 giants of German thought, to vivify their ideas in a new 
 epoch, to banish military Germanism and thus honour 
 their own country and free the world from the fear of 
 Germany and pave the way for renewed sympathy for tin- 
 good that lives in Germany. 
 
 Otherwise there can be no peace in Europe. 
 
 Europe will not be safe until the German bellicose spirit 
 has lost its inlluence and until the German States prevent 
 absolutely, by prohibition and confiscation, the dissemina- 
 tion of the kind of literature which military writers and 
 other chauvinistic authors have- published of late to arouse 
 warlike tendencies among the people and to glorify war, 
 and until a wave of German opinion has risen up against them 
 and the- people reali/e that, far from having learnt sound 
 common sense, they have surrendered their minds to the 
 counsels of utter madness. 
 
 When so celebrated a man as Thomas .Mann can say that 
 culture and militarism are brothers, that their ideals are 
 identical, that they are founded on the same principle and 
 have the same enemy, peace, then surely it is time tor a 
 new German race to emerge and to exclaim with pity : 
 " Poor Mann, his senses had deserted him ! " 
 
 To Maximilian Harden who deemed the German
 
 340 BEFORE, DTHING, AND AFTER 1914 
 
 apologies for tin- violation of Belgian neutrality unneces- 
 sary and wlio said : " \Vliy all this talk ? // i',v brute force 
 that dictates our laics. Has the stronger ever yielded to the 
 impudent pretensions of the weaker ? '' this new German 
 race will say : " l-'ie on you, outlaw ! We despise your 
 brutality, your cynicism ! 
 
 Bernhardi's teaching of " the necessity nfu-ar, its blessings 
 and its idealism" that it constitutes an indispensable 
 and beneficent evolutionary law and his exclamation 
 that " icar is oftiud's making " and as necessary and useful 
 to the world as eating and drinking," and that the striving 
 for perpetual peace is an unsound " Utopian dream," will 
 be stigmatized, like the rest of his barbarous doctrines, 
 by this new (ierman opinion as unworthy of a civili/ed 
 nation. 
 
 If this does not come about there will be no peace in 
 Europe. 
 
 No durable peace can be expected as long as the Bismarck 
 cult endures in (iennany, for it is an insurmountable ob- 
 stacle to a sound public outlook on questions of inter- 
 national polities. I'ntil this cult is reduced to a minimum 
 and restricted to a handful of chauvinists without political 
 influence, one cannot hope for a real peaceable growth of 
 (erman culture, t'ntil then Bismarck will be worshipped 
 as a i;od in spite of the commandment : " Thou shalt have 
 none other gods but Me." Kvery lar<M- town in (iermany 
 has its Bismarck monument ; the largest of all is in Ham- 
 burg, a colossal statue visible at an immense distance and 
 measuring seven met resin height * an imperator arrayed 
 in armour, his expression ;is hard as the stone of which it is 
 fashioned, the hands resting on a colossal sword. He is 
 (iermany's War (iod, and one can read his thought of 
 thoughts : ich bin das ,SVA;i < rl. Tin-re he stands, a graven 
 iin;iL r c, hypnoti/ing his worshipping people like the gods of 
 antiquity. Their cult is dead, most of their chief monu- 
 iii' nts have been destroyed, and the tune will come when 
 
 I-' i .HP t HIP s t In In i^'lit of a 111:111 <>r culiicalK sixl y-fmir I itncs t lie 
 
 si/- i>f a liiiin:iti In in^'. Tin- ilintli i> ii\< r ^' \ < n ini-ln s In^'h.
 
 FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE AFTER THE WAR 847 
 
 the god Bismarck will suffer the same fate. Then peace 
 will reign in the work!. 
 
 It is truly astounding to hear the Germans complain that 
 the world zvill not make roam for their enterprise, that 
 England stands in their way first and last. Vet in a short 
 time Germany has acquired very considerable colonies 
 and now stands third amongst colonial Powers. 
 
 The German colonies occupy no fewer than '2, 038,548 
 square kilometres or live times the area of the German 
 Empire in Europe. 
 
 But the remarkable thing is that so few Germans have 
 settled in these colonies. In 191.'} their population 
 numbered 1 '2,004, 992, but of these 12,040, 0(),'3 were natives 
 and only 24,.'} 8 9 icere Germans, a large percentage of the 
 latter being ollicials and soldiers. 
 
 Here, surely, there is room for German emigration on a 
 large scale, a movement which Germany's over-population 
 renders absolutely necessary. Germany inuxt, whatever 
 the upshot of the war, be allozved to retain her colonies for 
 her own benefit and for the salvation of other nations 
 from fresh wars to which otherwise the preposterous rate 
 of reproduction in Germany must give rise. 
 
 Germany will more than ever be menaced in the near 
 future with the danger of over-population and will, at the 
 present almost constant rate of increase of SCO. 000 per 
 annum- -even if we allow for the death of 1,000,000 in 
 the war have a population of about 7.5, 000,000 in ten 
 years and about 83,000,000 in twenty years, and there 
 are but two ways to avert this catastrophe : 
 
 (1) Emigration on a large scale, and 
 
 (2) A considerable reduction of tit e birth-rate. 
 
 If these ends are not achieved there will be no peace in 
 Europe. In that ease a fresh war cannot fail to follow in 
 a not very distant future, perhaps in a decade, for the 
 overcrowded country will then have many millions of 
 unemployed, destitute, and famished inhabitants who must 
 in one way or another be provided for.
 
 848 BEFORE, DTRIM;, AND AFTER 11)14 
 
 Failing war with otlu-r Powers, there must ho a devastat- 
 ing revolution with civil uur in Germany, when the workers, 
 reduced to desperation, will find themselves disappointed 
 in their expectation of (ierinan power and prosperity. 
 In this revolution, which will he the work of the Socialists, 
 the Government will no longer he ahle to count on the 
 present universal discipline amongst its soldiers, for 
 millions of them are Socialists and Republicans, and 
 millions will rise to light under tin- stress of starvation. 
 There will he a horrible slaughter of millions an appalling 
 reaction from the state which has hitherto obtained. 
 
 Unhappy German people, what is to he your fate ?
 
 INDEX 
 
 AAHKNKAA. 16 ; lines for speaking 
 Divnish in, 75 
 
 AlH-ken, 95, 9(5 
 
 Abru-itnmj, '247 
 
 Abyssinia, Ismail Pasha's war with, 
 142 
 
 Adam of Bremen, cited. 16 
 
 Adolphua, Gustavus, 220 
 
 Adrianople. taken by Russia 1877, 
 159 ; peace preliminaries signed 
 187S, 1UO; ordnance works at, 
 290 note. 
 
 Adriatic. Serbian hope for an outlet 
 on the, 173 
 
 /Egean, Bulgarian post on the, 1(30 
 
 Aehrenthal, Austrian foreign minister, 
 165-68 
 
 Aerial warfare on non-combatants, 
 292-94 
 
 Africa. German East, 130, 137; 
 North. British and French posses- 
 sions in. 142-47 ; South-West. 130 ; 
 wells poisoned by Germans, 291-92 
 
 Aftonbladet, letters to, 109 note 
 
 Agadir, the Panther at, 144-47 
 
 Aix-la-Chapelle, peace of, 242 
 
 Aksakow, the Slavophile, 20 
 
 Alans, the, 29 
 
 Alba, Duke of. 51 
 
 " Albania for the Albanians," 1~3 
 
 Albanians, help rendered to the 
 Bosnians by, ItU 
 
 Albert of Belgium, appeal of, to the 
 Powers, 219 ; on the neutrality 
 question, 225 26 
 
 Alemanni, the, 10, 26. 27, 30 
 
 Alexander I, Peace of Tilsit 1807, 38, 
 1 ;>3 
 
 Alexander II. dissatisfaction with 
 the terms of the Berlin treaty, 119, 
 162 ; "Alliance of the three. Em- 
 perors," 119, 158-59; assassina- 
 tion, 120, 153-54 
 
 Alexander III of Russia, French 
 policy, 124 ; Serbian |>oliey, 1 7O 
 
 Alexander of Serbia, assassination of, 
 1903, 170 
 
 Alexander, Serbian Crown Prince, 
 telegram to the Tsar. l.S.">-H(5 
 
 Alexandria, British fleet at, 142-43 
 
 Algeciras Convention, the, terms, 
 145 
 
 Algeria, French possession of, 144 ; 
 German designs regarding, 25t 
 
 Alliances, value of, 324 
 
 Alli/.e, M,, French Minister at Munich, 
 191 
 
 Alsace-Lorraine, Bismarck's designs 
 for acquisition of, 86-87, 120-22; 
 the annexation, 105 ; cession, 108 
 109 ; proposals to make neutral, 
 117-18, 127-28, 149-50; question 
 of retrocession. 136 ; hopes for 
 revision of terms, 14849 ; Ger- 
 many's annexation, a cause of the 
 World's War, 244 
 
 Alsations, French leanings of the, 1 15 
 
 Alsen, Island of, (54 
 
 Altai Mountains. 28 
 
 Amur countrv as a colonizing terri- 
 tory, 312 
 
 Andrassy, Count, foreign policy, 158 
 59; at the Berlin Congress, 162; 
 the elder, on the annexation, 
 qttolrd. 178 
 
 Andrassey. -I., W>r hut dm Krciy 
 I'crbrochen, 176-77. 197-9S ; cit-'d 
 on the causes of the war, 200, 2^2 
 
 Angles, the, 1 7 
 
 Anglo-German relations, friendly 
 visits. 139 
 
 Anirra Pequefm, South-West Africa, 
 130 
 
 Annam, 144 
 
 Anton, Prince. SS-90. 92 
 
 Antonovitch, 23 
 
 319
 
 350 
 
 INDI.X 
 
 " Antwerp against Gnvit Britain," 
 
 223 
 
 Arabi Paflha, revolt of. U2--I3 
 Ara^o. 11*5 
 
 Arbitration. th<- idea of. 3-4 n -II 
 An- de TrJomphi 1 . the pri>s<-tl 
 
 march of (ierman* through, I 111 
 Ardennes, the. 121. I"."' 
 Ar k -.,.. 2s 
 An.. -to, 41 
 Army KstimaN-.*, Fr-n< h. reduced 
 
 U-fore war of 1*7", I""'. l'i.'{ 
 Am.it. M.. 3S 
 
 Aniiin. Bismarck's l'-tt.r to, 117 
 Arthur. Port, sci/ure of. l.'M 
 Asphyxiating ^aws, us*- of. 2!U 
 A-'juitli. Mr., navy spcci h in HHl'.t. 
 Iii7 ; s|-cch of, Aiik'ust .'t r>. I'.M.'i. 
 240; attitude toward- interven- 
 tion. 242 
 A--' -iiil'lv. National, and the peace 
 
 negotiations. 1('S 
 Atavi-iu. 2r,s-o'J 
 Athens, -js 
 
 Atrncitii-s. (rt-rrmn, manifesto to the 
 < ivili/ed nation- i'ii. 271-72; 
 p-]>rts of oft'u ial >mmissions of 
 iiiijiiiry. L'~7 L' 1 .*! 
 Attil.i. i-inpiri' i.f. L".t 
 Aii.-u-t.-i. Qu.i n. T'.i. !1 
 Au-ust. -nt-.,r-. ltik. ,.f. tin, ;i. C.:{ 
 Au.'ii-t'-nl">rk' 1'"! > ( ' . Ip 7 
 Au.'U--ti-n)ir^'-N<H-r. Prim of. li<> 
 Au.Mi-tu>*. d.-f'-.it jf th<- < ;-Ti!i;in-.. ^7 
 Am. -".'_' 
 Au-t- rlit/.. .'(S 
 
 A'i-tr.ili.i. r. iM.it- of. IIJ.". ri"?. 
 Au-'r:i. r>- i-oii for ( li-riininyV a.K.swt- 
 ani'i- n.-.'ii'i t > rbi.i, 1 L' ; thf 
 jurti'ion of Pol. mil. li.'i .'IT ; ii^- 
 M-t.-vn^.- Milt to iMuiMrk in 1^1^. 
 t'rtt : join- PTII--I.I n. iin-i S< hl-'-wi^r- 
 ll..!-t.-!li. t'.t >',:>. ,-> ; ali'l th- 
 Tr. AT v of Pr.i. ii". TO : w ir of 
 iMi'i with I'm- -i.i. 7^ si : '1 iirki~h 
 (yiiij>.it h v in I^T'i. \.'>** .>'.; iiuil 
 th" 'I r. "it v of S.in St'-fiiiio. I'.o i) ; 
 
 on Ijp.lt Jon of PH. -111. I .11. '1 H' r/i'- 
 
 t'o\ tii.-i. I til ; fonirif ion of t h> 
 Trij.l- All.iin. -. If.l .-' ; it.-- "- 
 rup.itioi) |H,h,y j.iir 1 -!!' 'I. I 1 '-' >'>l; 
 cy-i'-iu "f fovrnmi nt . It'.'i '! ; 
 nnri'-\-\t ;.,n i.f P-.'in.i .-\ii.l HIT/I- 
 ;-o\nri. |t'i.' ti7, 1 T'i . >l.-iv uii'l'r 
 Au-t ri in nil. . li'>x 7o ; i-uj.).. ,rt 
 
 i.v .\ii.-\m-i i:nj I a. i::t . .s.-ii.i.m 
 
 j-!i'-v. IT.'! TI'> : t!." S'-tbi.tn N'o'r 
 '.f .Inly L'.'l. P.tl I. nii'l th- l"]'lv. 
 
 1SO-83; evidence of 
 int<-ntion to make common causo 
 with, ls.'M)S; war on Serbia 
 dcdarc*! July 28. 1S8; concoal- 
 mi-nt of h-r warlike intent ions, 
 11K>-11 ; war ni.ulf inevitable by 
 the Not*'. I'.'L' '.!." ; AndrasKy'H 
 d-f<-n.-e of her ad ion, l',7-l's ; 
 opjxi-ition to arbitration, HK* ; 
 n-ply to Salandra. L'nl ; the 
 events leading up to tlie war with 
 Ku-.-i:. i!(i.>l; tlreat Britain's 
 declaration, '2iH\ ; I'Vancf'a rcast^n 
 fur the war with, iMMi ; the mani- 
 festoes. ^.".S ; the attacking jwrty 
 in the \\ orld's \\'ar, 'Jt>(> ; atrocities 
 in Serbia. L'*S ; the tension with 
 
 Italy. :tt>:. 
 
 Austrian War of Sucre-vMoii 1741 IS, 
 241 
 
 Avars, tiie. l".l 
 
 Aviators. Freneli. over Belgian terri- 
 tory, falx- charge. JIT, L'J'.t 
 
 B.vri\. l-'ram K 41, ,'lL't'i 
 
 Bailen and the war of I s7U. Id!} 
 
 Baer. L'l' 
 
 lU^-dad Railway, the. I.'IT 
 
 liaj.i/id (. il.-d to llus.si.i. lin ; re. 
 
 tuni.-fl to Tnrk.-y. l''l 
 Bale inter-parliamentary eon^nv-M-s 
 
 In hi. I.M. :f:t'.t 
 H'llknti, lli-LTa<le news|k-i|>er. artiile 
 
 auot'il. lS<l 
 
 Balkan alliatu . the. 174 
 
 Balkan ipiestion. enV.-t> of tin- B-rlin 
 
 Tr.'.ity on (!,.. |C,1 (VI 
 Baltic prnvinc'--. (Germany's doii/ns 
 
 on tin . IL'II ; ( ;.-rmant i-xp< lied 
 
 from. I.M 
 
 Bait ie. iiiinul.it i.'ti of the. L'7 
 P.alti- h|H,rt. I.M 
 
 P..ip:uni|.-. Io7 
 
 Barbarianx," u-i- of the ( nil. L''i7 
 Bilk. I. Iv. II /M/ II . .|T- -/f \\.ir. L':i7 
 P. irn uh-ton, ( i.lonel. c c .n\ei -..it imis 
 
 with. I'. 1 .'! 
 
 Bar. .n. vill.i.. of. iMs 
 P.atoiiin ...,!., I to KU--M. li,n r,| 
 iViiiinb.i. h. I IT K . --t.it' inriit re. 
 i.-:ir.!in.' TP-MY ..f Pr.i/ui- r> vi>i..n. 
 71 
 
 Bav.in.i. Vote f..r A'istiia. 7'.'; and 
 tli.- war of 1 sTo, lo.'i . and I he 
 Aii'-'mn N'.t'-. I'.'l '..'; ch i ir.-.-M 
 a/-\in-.t I'r.-n. !i airiii'-n. 'J 1 s 
 P.ivl-. P . 11 
 l'..-iNon^t I'uhtin^'. froi itv of, '2\>'2
 
 INDEX 
 
 351 
 
 Bazaino, Marshal, 1()4. 107, 109-10 
 
 Beaconafleld, Karl of, 108 
 
 Bedier, J., The, (icnnttn Crimt*, 
 274-7", 
 
 Bohac, fortress of, 1(54 
 
 Bolfort, siege of, 107, 112 
 
 Belgian atrocities, charges of, 277-78 
 
 Belgian General Stall, archives of 
 tho, 231 
 
 Belgian Neutrality Treaty, 1JM) 
 
 " Belgians," tho name applied to 
 (Annans, 25 
 
 Belgium, rebellion in 1830 and in- 
 dependence, 82 ; neutrality of, 
 82-84, 209-10; German designs 
 on, 121 ; neutrality guaranteed, 
 Germany's demand, 2O9--10; mes- 
 sago from Groat Britain. 210 ; 
 Germany's future intent ions re- 
 garding, 212 ; (lie Hrst " hostile 
 act," 214 ; the Gorman ultimatum 
 presented by, 21ti-17; Belgium's 
 reply, 217-19; von Sehoen asks 
 for his passj>orts, 217-1S; viola- 
 tion premeditated by Germany, 
 222 ; remarks of Or. F. Naumann 
 on Belgian neutrality, 227 ; in- 
 fringement of Belgium's own neu- 
 trality according to Blunie, 229-31 ; 
 the new scheme of national defence, 
 2152; designs of Louis XIV. 241; 
 restoration under peace of Aix-la- 
 rhapelle, 242 ; her duties as a 
 neutral. 26(5 ; crimes against tho 
 laws of war, 27(1-77 ; German 
 atrocities in. 279-85 ; report of 
 the Rockefeller Trust, 2S1 ; future 
 into-rrity of. 343-44 
 
 Belgrade, University of, 215 ; bom- 
 barded July 29. 188. 20(5 
 
 Bonodetti. French Amkissador at 
 Berlin, Bismarck's proposal to, 815 ; 
 reports of. ijiiotnl. SS ; mission to 
 Kini: William. 91-94 ; the Ems 
 telegram. 94, !>.">. 102 ; return to 
 Paris, 100-1 ; report on arma- 
 ments, 104 
 
 Benedict, Pope. Lithuanian appeal 
 to. 28(5 
 
 Berehtold. Count, on the Austro- 
 Huncarian Note to Serbia, 184-8.") ; 
 letter to Count Szapary. 187-88 ; 
 apjioal to ("lermany on Russia's 
 mobilization, 188-89; message to 
 Sir Edward Grey. 189-90; dis- 
 cussion of tho Serbian Note. 194 ; 
 Noto to the Russian Foreign 
 Minister, 205- 
 
 Berlin Connrena, 70, 119, Ki<>-Gl 
 
 Ik-rlin, N'lMHjh-on'H ontry into, 38 ; 
 industrial development. 132 ; 
 Social Democratic Con^reiw, 1913, 
 319, 323 
 
 Berlin Treaty, 187H, diminUhr-d a<l- 
 vantages to KusMin, 1U1, 244; 
 settlement of Bosnia and Herz-- 
 covina, Kil -(18 ; results, 342 
 
 Berlin L'niviTHity, reply of tho 
 students to those of StniHbur;:, 
 87-88 
 
 Bfrlinrr littrrx'n Count r, articlcn 
 fjiiotnl, 227, 29."> 
 
 Hi'rlinrr T<nj>lil<ilt, articles quotfi, 
 152, 226-27 
 
 Berntr- Buntl, the, 22."5 
 
 Bern!i:irdi, (leneral, (ifrmnny nnd the. 
 Xrj-t War, tjimtr'l. 47. " 1 Jd-12. 
 14(5-47. 338; t.-achin-s .,f. 22<>. 
 23(5, 2(59. 32."), 34(5 ; criticism of 
 his l>ook, 2.V) .")!, 2.">3. 2."i.", 
 
 BTnstcin. Dr. A., 322, 324 
 
 BornstorfT. Count, 295 
 
 BertheU. M., 191 
 
 B<-stuchetT. 22 
 
 Bethmann-Hollwe^, on thn suh- 
 jiiL-ation of the Slavs. 12 ; po'icy 
 towards England and France, 140; 
 visit to St. Petersburg. 1">4 ; state. 
 ments in the White Book, lit.".; 
 his conditions for co-op-ration 
 with EnL'land, 19(5 ; and tho 
 JV'hzian Neutrality Treaty. 199; 
 on the situation at the beL'innini; 
 of the war. 202-3; on Russia's 
 preparatory military measures, 
 204-5; denials of.' 2<>7 : the. 
 demand on Beli_'ium. 20!>-1 1 ; the 
 bid for Enirland's neutrality. 211- 
 13; and Sir Edward C.isehen, 
 212, 327 ; reply to Luxemburg's 
 Prime Minister. 21"> ; the "Scrap 
 of Paper" statement. 220; on 
 the violation of Luxemburg. 221- 
 22; defence of the attack on 
 Belgium. 224; and Britain's ulti- 
 matum. 2:>ti. 240-11 : on tho 
 causes of the war. 25S--59. 27i> ; 
 sayings of. qunt^l. 2 ( .)3-'.4 
 
 Binist. anti-Prussian policy of, 158, 
 203 
 
 Bibatch, 1(54 
 
 Bigamy lecalized in lt>5i\ 35 
 
 Birth strikes. 323 
 
 Bismarck. Prince, ori.in. 42 ; f'->rrii;n 
 policy. 45. 24S ; Polish policy of 
 Germany before his time, 53-55 ;
 
 352 
 
 INDEX 
 
 the man of " lilood and Iron." Bo.nia, Austria's annexation of, 156, 
 
 61-62. 25O-M ; Rrfltrtions and If.LMiT, 174-71). 190- 2t*> ; popula. 
 
 Rfm\n\ctncfs, 62-*'3 ; hat ml of, 
 
 in Sweden. 6s ; and Article ."> of 
 
 the I'eacv of 1'rapif. '.<, To ; ami 
 
 I>r. (.leffkcn. 72--73 ; anil N'a|ol'-oti 
 
 III, 7S. S3; plans for t(u- Franco- 
 
 tion, 157 tio/r ; reforms. 16U ; 
 Turkish suzerainty. 161 ; n^-htin^ 
 in, 1*V| ; the danger from, 172; 
 Austrian occuj>ation a cause of the 
 war, 214 
 
 an War, s.">, IM ; .*/. m-ir., Botha. (Ivn-Tal, l.-tt-r to Colonel 
 
 Franckr, 2'.>2 
 
 H6 s" ; on tin' candidature of 
 
 l'rin<-t- Leonid of Hoh'-n/oll.-rn, Bothnia. Uulf of, 325 no/c 
 
 to n-Mi.'n. 12, '.t.V' 
 
 Bourliaki. 1<>7 
 
 and (iramont, l>3 ; forjji-ry of the liounl<-;i\i, L., I.'ht*t<>trt (t 
 
 Knm t-l'- 
 n<-L'otiati. 
 
 .un. IM-1H3 ; th % ] 
 , 1 (>.">; F;ivn-'s nr^ 
 
 tri>-n*, qaotnl, 4 -4i 
 li<iiirL'''t . l)r. II . work of, 3<H) 
 
 ti.n.t witli, !'*''. 
 
 'I'hi'-rs, 
 
 In7 ; jMili,-y aft.-r Frankfort . lns-. ; 15rand.Tit.uri; <;;it<-, IV-rlin. 2."><) 
 
 opnon f tf 
 Hit; his dfinan.l 
 
 i/ 1'aris. 
 
 Branlenburf;rn<, tli-, and |ti*marok, 
 
 lid 
 
 112-14; l.-tt.-r to Arni.-ii. 117; Br. in-n. t ra<l.- f. 132 
 
 r .-j.rti'ii of th' n--\itr;il ]>r\ '-'il, Hn-nt.in<>, L'7- ; and tin- 
 
 T.-.ktor 
 
 .f th 
 
 Fran 
 
 birth-rat*-, 31! 
 
 AlHui..-, 11s _'". 12:5 I'-; Mridp-s. Colom-1, 224 
 
 Alliance, ll'.i 2d. Ml r,2 ; 
 
 th.- S.-pN-nnaN-, I2d 22 ; fre.sh 
 
 attempts- on Fran..-. 122 23; 
 
 hp'-t-ch.--' in tli.- K.-ii h.-tJi/, JSSN, 
 
 125-2'i; and < J'-rman\ s colonial 
 
 joliry. 131-32; th.- Berlin Treaty, Bruno. II.. M 
 
 lt;2 ; -ivint.' "f. 1 ,{,,,(!. l'.2; 1'.: 
 
 evil of hi- ( i- Tin .ini-.ni. 22d ; pn 
 
 voki-r of th'- l-'ran'-"-i I'-rman \\ 
 
 of Is7o, 2 H ; hi- -mi- NT intlu<-n<- 
 
 346 
 
 Bithvnia, devastation of. 27 2s 
 Black S-a. 2'J 
 Blaschko. 43 
 Bl.-'-k, Dr. K. I. . opinions .f. </'/'/' 
 
 217 -J'.t 
 
 BlohFii. .- !i'M, Inn-NT. 7.". 
 Blum.-. \\. von. -p.--. h of. <!>.!. 
 
 22 ! -31 
 
 M' !i kl. i ;!! r.il. Jo'.t 
 
 Brix. 'I'he<Klor. ]>rot<--t a^ain.^t 
 l'ru--ian treatment of SchleHwiiz, 7> 
 
 Broiruevill. 1 . M. .!<-, sjx-1-ch on th>< 
 Nat ion il S-rvie.- Act. (jnt>t.,!. 224 -25 
 
 Briii t'-rian t nl<-, th.-. 2'i 
 
 h- !d in. Ids ; 
 
 pov-i ' y in. 2sd .si 
 Bu-'low. 1'rince, on tli.- \\ i. -. h>-n 
 
 aiT ur. :>>> 
 I'.ui!.-;. Id-.' 
 Buivid. 22 
 BuL-ari.i. I!u--ia and. 21 ; r. volt 
 
 in Is7.".. 1.".7 5s ; iin|. JM i,,l. n, .-, 
 
 It^t HI 
 BuL'arian-. di-1 ril.iit ion of. I'.t ; 
 
 .due it ion anion^ the. 23; hands 
 
 ..f Bul.-.iri MI \oliuiN-.-r'. a--i>t 
 
 e if. I.- . Fr- ii' Ii \\ ir Mini-i-T 1 
 '.!'. loo ; I'.ud.-. ' "f. Io| 
 
 i i. I 7 ; s t l.--i.i ;ind. 37 ; I /' 
 .f. I'i'.t ; < .-Tiiiaiii/ it |.,n . .f. I'.'.i 
 B-.}.. -1111.111 Nli; HIM. th--. 22 
 B..hl'-n. ' "'.'lilt I'.i-ln.ir. k. I! 
 ( ;.'Vrn"r-( i'-n.-ral "f \! -a. -, lo. 
 
 u f. 2-.M 
 
 1'^.;, ip ir'l-' -. po!;cv ot th'-, ''_' 
 B-.rd-.-iux. National A -ml.lv ' 
 
 v.-n-d at. 1"-^ . --it ..f Fr. 
 
 in-cti. Sir M niri. .- d". and the 
 \u-tri.m \. i". I'.'l '.2 
 ir.-.---. ^lr . . 'ii ('-Li'iiu''. ii' 11- 
 t r.ilit \ . 22s 
 
 ir.-iindl m-. atti.-k- "II ' i ml, 3d, 
 I 1 1. 
 
 it . un.!\ . i . .'in' v . .f. 2."."> 
 :MI-. .John. 213" 
 it- !,. n- h.ft- n. Id >l 
 
 i - h. N|..r it/, ptil.hcal i"ii of Bl-- 
 
 ,.; u. k - M,m..,f. t.2. s., ,: 
 
 i - -. I ir K . - [fort-, t" f.'und a 
 
 i M'-i-.iS'i\ n i-Mii-[i!r.-\t>pr. 1 sd 
 
 ( i--ir. i,-:!!i>- H .M. cif'i, \.~>. 2-1 27 
 
 ( kld-r. n. II
 
 INDEX 
 
 Cambon, Jules, and tho declaration 
 
 of von Jagow, 191-94 ; letter 
 
 from M. Viviani, 2 1 (5; dispatches 
 
 quoted, 2;l.l-f>(i 
 Cambon, 1'aul, 183, I'M 
 Campo Formio, Peace of, 84 
 Capo Colony linking up with Egypt, 
 
 137 
 
 Caprivi. Chancellor, r>~> 
 Caracalla, General, 27 
 Carlsruho, 217 
 Carnot, decorated by Alexander III, 
 
 124 
 Carol of Rumania, warning to 
 
 Belgium, 22. r ) 
 Caroline Islands, 130 
 Carthage, devastation, 30, 280 
 Caspian Sea, 29 
 Catalaunian Fields, 20 
 Catherine 11 of Russia, 3/5, 153 
 Cato, quottil, 2f>(5 
 Caucasus, 29 
 
 Celts, migrations of tho, 1(5 ; inter- 
 mixture with the Germans, 24, 2.1 
 Central European Confederation, 
 
 scheme of Professor Liszt, 33(538 
 Chalons-sur-Marno, 29 
 Champigny, Battle of, 107 
 Champs Elysoes, an incident of 1871, 
 
 112 
 
 Charlemagne, empire of, 17 
 Charleroi. 220 
 Charles V of Spain, 01 
 Charles XV, 02, titi 
 Chatti, the, 1(5, 2(5 
 Children anil the war, teaching of 
 
 Dr. Schepp, 2(il 
 China, Hunnish raids on, 28-2!); 
 
 Emperor William's threat to, 2 8.1 ; 
 
 opinion of European culture, 302 ; 
 
 Japanese negotiations with, 308-10; 
 
 infant mortality in, 310 
 Chipka, Battle of, lf>!> 
 Chlorine gas, use of, 201 
 Christian IX, (51, (52, 71 
 Christian Germanism, 40-.12 
 Churehill, Winston, Dr. Zimmer- 
 
 mann on, 138 
 Cicus, 27 
 
 Ciiubri, migration of the. 27 
 Cirey, atrocities at, 273 
 Clermont, Council of, 100."), 2.17 
 Coalition, the fourtli, against 
 
 Napoleon. 38 
 
 Cohen, attempt on Bismarck's life, 79 
 Colin, F. (!.. 42 
 Cohn, Professor II., 42 
 Colonies, German. 130-31, 318. 347 
 
 Commune, outbreak of the March IS 
 
 1871, 109 
 Commission* of inquiry, ollirial 
 
 re|>ortM, 277-94 
 Comte, A.. 41 
 Condorcet, 4 1 
 Conger, Mr., 2.1!) 
 Congo, French, 1441(5 
 Congresses, inter-jKirliamfntary, fit 
 
 little. 1.11 .12. 33!) 
 Constantino the Great, 2H 
 Constantinople, confen-nee of tho 
 
 Great 1'owers, Is7>, 1.10; Rusifin 
 
 march on, Is77, 1.19 -W; object 
 
 of Russia and Austria, 172; bom- 
 bardment, 14.13, 290 noli- 
 Contemporary R>rinr, article rjiiotnl, 
 
 1.11 
 Copenhagen University, international 
 
 law deleted from studies, 302 
 Copernicus, 22 
 Corinth, 28 
 Corneille, 41 
 Corrosive liquid, spraying with, a 
 
 German invention, 29O 
 Costenoble, Cchcimrat, (53 
 Coulmiers, 107 
 (.'Duriir-li'l'ji', the, 270 
 Cracow University, 22, 1(59 
 Cremieux, 10(5 
 Crispi, renewal of the Triple Allianre, 
 
 123 
 
 Croatia, people of, 172-7(5 
 Cronstadt, visit of the I-'reneli 
 
 s(p.iadron. l.s'.tl, 124 
 Crusade, the First. 2.17 
 Cyzieus. Island of, 2S 
 Czechs distribution. 10; literature 
 
 of the, 22 ; Germanization of 
 
 Bohemian. 1(59 
 Czelokowsky, 22 
 
 Dagrn* Xyhrhr, statements in the, 
 
 22(5. 277. 2S; ; account of the loss 
 
 of the Linit'inia, 20(5-07 
 Daily A'ci's condemnation of tho 
 
 Ems telegram, 98-99 
 Daltnatia, people of, 172-7.'! 
 Danes, origin, 1(5 ; number in 
 
 SchlcswJL', ~.'i : people forming th.< 
 
 Danish nation, 1 1 
 Dano-Gennan \\ar of lM'4. .10-oS, 
 
 243, 2(it 
 Dante, 41 
 Dardanelles, the En-li>h Fle,-t sent 
 
 to. KsTS. Itio 
 Daviirnon, M., declaration of, 209-10, 
 
 214 
 
 Z
 
 354 
 
 INDEX 
 
 l>avia, H. \V. C'.. 237 
 
 Ivfence tax, (irrman. L'. r >3 .~>4 
 
 iH-LSMnanu, -~'2 
 
 lH.-lbru' k, 1'rofe.H.sor. pruM-rutin of, 7."> 
 
 lH-U.-A.stw. (i4-rmaii j>lify of, 144 
 
 I>embnn.-ki, I'll 
 
 iH-monolo^v. 3i3 
 
 lH-nfert. ( olonel. 107 
 
 Ih-muark, the l>ano-tterman war of 
 1*V4, .".l -u\ '243. I'M; annexa- 
 tion, >f Schlrtiwif'-HoLitcin by 
 l'ru-Ma. M'-77 ; .-hijw loci by, 1".4 ; 
 ami thi- European Confederation, 
 330 
 
 l>-rnbur^. 1 >r., on lielgium'a neutral- 
 ity, Jl'7-1'8 
 
 iH-rvan, S-rbian 1'rince, 17 
 
 l>eM-arte.s. 31'. 4 1 
 
 " l>'-ut-t in r lUmd fur Muttor&ehutz," 
 310 
 
 !><ut*chir A'f'/cnt'//- r>r>i'. the, I 3O 
 
 Itfiitffhland t/.</ </ r H.Wn 1^, wrtidi'8 
 nM, li-'s. U7S 
 
 l>uina, tempi" of, IIS 
 
 luirie.s of Cvnn.in Mildiers, extr;u-tf. 
 ^73-75 
 
 Iti.l. r. t. 41 
 
 Iht nnif liintrntiiirk. Itlii 
 
 Ihe /'(>-<. urtii ! i.n tin- I'dli-h ijin-.-- 
 ti'.n. .".7 
 
 It,. \\',,fh>-. lirtiel,- q,:,,t. I. l.'JS 
 
 IH. /'iL-uHjt. art ill.- (ittut.ii. -^'M 
 1 ii.initi.in, L'7 
 
 l),,iu-.,u, iv-,, i j:t 
 
 ])!, -to-. -Vr-ki. UJ 
 
 1 >[ -.-d. ii H\vi -nie K.xliiljition.lH! 1,311'. 
 I iru-UH, |r, 
 
 1 )ui-;inie, ( ' -iii Tril, ( (invTMitioti.o with, 
 ^L'.'J -'4 
 
 l>u. hm-ki. i::t 
 
 1 hi. n.t. < .en.-r:il. h7. In7 
 liurii.ut).-. M., I'.'l, L'"<i 
 
 lMlp|'l. 71 
 
 /*...in >:/M. til-. 17.^ 
 I IM\' rii'.i'. '.'_' 
 |i\!.U.l, i.l. ii7 
 
 HAS -i KKN Q'l- "t i' ii. th". ^'" 
 K.l;ir.l \ II. M -it i" I'r. -\<\<-\\\, 
 I/. ul- -t in I'.Ni.'t. i:i7 ; t!,.- en- 
 
 . ir, iin.- " P..II. > .f. 1 1". :;:'.: 
 
 \S [ II. I N.'ill. 1' tt<T 1,1. '/ .! !. ^J'." 
 
 K^-(.. t. .v Kni/- i.f, 4ii 
 
 Ki-\j>'. liiikiii.- u|p with ('.i|' < "I.'iiv, 
 I!;T. . iiiiniiiii' HI icn with Iii'li.v, 
 I :;7 ; lin.ni' i.il i uti'lit i.'ii.i, 1 *i>'., 
 1 !_' . Kn/lLih ii.-' ' li'l;ilj< \ in 1 ^M'. 
 
 1 i.; 
 
 Khrlich, Professor, 43 
 Kil.nach, ti5 
 
 KltTel, 1'17 
 
 K1U-. Middle, |*-oplo of the. 17 
 Elizabeth, iilliaiut* with Maria 
 
 Then-Mi, l.">3 
 Klh>, Ha\elK-k, on Jiijwn's popula- 
 
 tion. 3|n ; on llu-.-ia n, .'tlL* 
 Knu^ratioii from (lernuiny, 317 1'J 
 Kins telegram, Bumarck'd ft>rpTV. 
 
 HI, ( >l 103 
 
 Kiul-ind. famous inm. .-. 41 ; as a 
 colonizing 1'ower, 13O-31 ; o-iu- 
 I'.itioii of \\ei-hai-\\ei, 131 ; lier- 
 nuiny'a hereditary enemy, 133 ; 
 nen-tvMty f..r a lar^e navy, 137 ; 
 the rtippnxh'-m'-nt with l-'rarxx- in 
 Ili3. J:i7 ; the entente. 143 --44 ; 
 Meet wilt to the l>ard:inelleM. lh7S, 
 ItHl ; attitude towards KUSMA, 
 1S7S, l',<i; vi.-w of the Au.->tro- 
 HuiiuMrian Note to Serbia, Is3; 
 threat of eivil war in l'.14. Jil ; 
 war de< hired a^ain>t Austria, Htn> ; 
 neutrality hojH-d for by Germany, 
 1111-13; (termany failed UJM>H to 
 withdraw her ultimatum to 1V-1- 
 
 eiuill bv, \1 1 '. ; Ml | 'I 'o>. d M-eH't 
 
 !> l.-ian ai_-n emeu! with. J3. JJii ; 
 
 why -In- entend the war. :.';{.". -J3 ; 
 
 manif. -to of the Bnti-h men of 
 
 M lenee, 1'MT ; I'.'iroj" an |KI!H y of, 
 
 Jl 1 ; i nii-lty in India. L'l^ ; 
 
 aeeu-^-d of Mar\mi: out (iermany, 
 
 I".IH ','.! ; thi- two , laid .sy.-tem. 314 
 Kni.li.'di nation. ra-es ioiii|>>Nin>; the, 
 
 lo 
 
 Kphe-u*. .-a. kiiii. 1 of, I'M 
 Krilmanii. ('.. A., .Yuri n)*r tr.ittr, 
 
 I3J r,-/. . 131 3.'. 
 Kri|ii' Iitii-, town of, 1'^'.) 
 Kr/t. -r^'i-r. I T.. L't;^ 
 K--|iion,it.'r. ( ',' nil. in. in France, iM'furi' 
 
 l^Tti. In'.t in 
 F.thno-ra|.hii al Kxhibition at Moi. 
 
 ow. 1 Mi7, L'n 
 F.ti- rim . M , L'M .".:. 
 
 }'.\l< ken, L.'7J 
 
 l-'.u.-. Hi'. Minpr.---. :ind the 1'r.inco- 
 
 t ,. -nn. in \\ar. s'.t, '..'. '.>.',. IIMI Jo) 
 F.ul.nbur/, A.. !_' 
 
 Kur. j- . poj.ul it ion stJiti-ti. -, 3|o I'.i 
 " l-'.xt'-riniii' ntur," de. r> . of, 1 s 
 
 l'\li'KKi:iiE, ( J. n< r.il. loT 
 /.!/.<'.. loni <-f th-. 1".M '.'"
 
 INDKX 
 
 Falkonegg, Baron von. Was wird au 
 
 utuirren Koluiurn, 132 nutr. 
 Falkonhayn, General von, on Ger- 
 
 niiiny'H |M)Mition, 259 
 Fa.shodii, incident of, 143 44 
 Fiivre, Jules, on tin* declaration of 
 war, 102 ; negotiations with BIH- 
 marck, KMi, 108, 112; op|x>sition 
 to the, war, 113 
 Federation, Treaty of, 80 
 Feist, Dr. S., ktillur, Auxbriituixj 
 und Herkmift dir Indoyrrmunfn, 48 
 Folinski, 22 
 Forch, Joli., on the limitation of 
 
 families, 322-23 
 Ferdy, 11., pseudonym of A. Meyer- 
 
 hof, 314 iiml note 
 Fernau, II., Die. franzoxixrhf Drino- 
 
 knit ir, IT)*.) 
 
 Ferry, Jules. 10<>. 113. 144 
 Fichto, tho philosopher, MCMUJ?. to 
 
 the drrnvin Xutioii. 1808, 38, 40 
 Fi(j(tro, 1891, article on Bismarck 
 
 citdl, 42 
 
 Flesch, Professor Max, Prostitution 
 v. Frauenkrank heiten, 43, 314, 315 
 Flourons, Russian policy of, 124 
 ForlHich, Battle of, 104~ 
 Ford. 41 
 " Fortachrittspartci " or '' Fortsch- 
 
 rittlicho Volkspartoi," 45. 33'J 
 for it m, the, article quoted, 232 
 France, famous names, 41 ; Napoleon 
 deposed and republic proclaimed, 
 lOti ; the feeling of revenue in, 
 after 1870, 119. 'l2O. 147 .">! ; the 
 war crisis. 1887, 120-22; Bis- 
 marck's fresh attempt. 122-23 ; 
 as a colonizing 1'ower, 130-31 ; 
 occupation of Hai-Choau, 131 ; 
 the entente with KiiL'land, 137, 
 140-44 ; the Fashoda incident, 
 143 ; new colonial policy, 144 ; 
 the A(i<nlir incident, 14447; Dr. 
 Zimmermann's indictment. 147 ; 
 view of the Austro-Hungarian 
 Note to Serbia. 183 ; the new 
 Army Bill of 1914. 201, 2:>3 ; 
 mobilisation. 204 ; reasons for tho 
 war with Austro-Hungary. 20(1 ; 
 jirotest against the German ulti- 
 matum to Belgium. 21011; re- 
 solve to resjH'ct the neutrality 
 of Beliiiuin. 213 ; unanintees neu- 
 trality of Luxemburg, 214-1.~> ; 
 preparations on the Luxemburg 
 front, 215-H'i ; von Schoen's state- 
 inent of the reasons for war, 217-18; 
 
 falsity of (Jt-rman charges, ^!H 19, 
 22. r >-20. 230, 232 33 ; Sir K. 
 (!rey' iigreenn-nt with, 239 ; n-l;i- 
 tionn with Kntrl.ind, 1>.H 1792, 
 241-42; (ierman brutulitjcM in, 
 iJHl-82 ; population, 311 ; th- 
 two-children ny*t<-m in, 313-14 
 Franche-l 'omte. 121 
 Francis- Ferdinand, asKu.sMniition of, 
 
 l. r >i;, 179 82. 244 
 
 Fraiu i.H-JoHeph, Km|xTor, '' Alliam n 
 of the three F.mperors.'' l.'iS ,">9 ; 
 Bohemian policy, lto ; fon-imi 
 jxilicy, Iti2 ; annexation of Bonn in 
 and Uer/rgovina, l*ir> (17, 17">; 
 letter to Stiirgkh. 2<t2 
 Franck, I)r., view of, !.">! 
 Francke, ('(jlonel, the poisoned well*, 
 
 292 
 FranekenaU-in, note from his dairy 
 
 published, 87 
 Franco-! Ierman Agreement of 19O9, 
 
 145 
 
 Franco-German War of 1870, 85; 
 Bismarck's aim, 8.">-88 ; scheme, 
 of the Kmpress Kirjenie, S9-9O ; 
 the candidature of Prince I>-opold, 
 90-91 ; forgery of the Kms tele- 
 gram, 94-100 ; return of Px-nedetti 
 to Paris. 100-3 ; results of tin- 
 war. 103-. r > ; the annexation of 
 Alsace, 10.V-9 ; the feelillL' of 
 vengeance, 109-14; Fninr-Hri Mrs 
 of the, 27(i 
 
 Franconia, depo])ulation in 1 til 8-48. 
 33 ; Franeonian Diet, l(j. r >(l. bigamy 
 legalized by. 3."> 
 Franco-Russian Alliance, the, 118-20, 
 
 123-2"). 128, l.Vt, 244 
 Franr-tirfurt, of France, 275-7G ; 
 
 of Belgium, 278 
 
 Frankfort. Peace of. Ins, 117, 128 
 Franks, the. 17. 2(1. .'JO 
 Frederick I, 35 
 
 Frederick 11. the Croat, on the 
 object of war. ijuati'l. 3-4 ; I'Anti- 
 machiai'fl, citl, 2li-27 ; partition 
 of Poland under. 35-37: on the 
 sanctity of treaties, q-;<,;,il. 221 ; 
 sentiments of. 2">2 
 
 Frederick 111 and Bismarck. <'>3 ; 
 diary. Dr. CetTken's extract. 72; 
 poliev towards Alsace-Ixjrrnine, 
 117-18 
 
 Frederick \\\ (Deinnirk) and the 
 Sohleswig-Holstein. que.-tion. tiO. 
 02 : C'harles X\ "s promise of an 
 alliance, Oi>
 
 356 INDEX 
 
 Frvderick, own Prince, afu-rwards (.n-rman Empire, the old. disulvtHi 
 
 FniitTJck III. 7'J. 104, 114 l>y Napoleon. 38; constitution of 
 
 Frvtierk-k \\ilham 1. 3.", the, Is7o, In'J 
 
 Frederick U ilium 111 and tin- (icrman Fttlr rat ion, the new, formed, 
 
 Fourth Coalition against Najx.leon, IM>;. MI 
 
 3S (lerman (Irvat (JtntT.il Stall, pain- 
 
 Frt-dnkdiamn, 1"4 phlct of. i'71 
 
 FrednL-vtad, til ( i- -rman I^.n.-nkirds. lt"> 
 
 />f i. 11 rimy Z*-itutj, article-, nt-il, -l.~>, (icrman nation, r.iic-- comj>oMn^ tin-, 
 
 Tl !< II ; derivation of tin- name 
 
 French n.ition. tin-, racial theory " (."Titian." 1M ; nuiutxT of (!<T- 
 
 ci>ncTnini: thi-, formation f tin- rnaii.s in l';iri.t in 1 *7n, | In 
 
 .-kull, h. V ; races i-i>iii|x.>^in;: the, (."-rnian uoiui-n. ajiju-al of, l!7n 
 
 In f/rrwiriKi, the, c-n>ur- of UUniarck, 
 
 Fr-n< h Kt-volution, principles .sup- Its 
 
 |>rt'-d by Kant, ."d I " (iernuinia," sL-niticiiiue of term, 
 
 Freycinet the cnvinwr. work of, Io7 !.". 44 
 
 Fri-d, A. U., Ittt Fritdtnevxirtr, 173 (termnnisni, 1'an-SlavUin and. ^1, 
 
 Frii-dlanil, 3s l.'.J ">.">; r'\^~ of. It* ; Christ i:in, 
 
 FroU-niiiM. Lieut. -Col., IJtrtn'ttty's 4n ,"rj ; n cau.-e of the \\'orltl'n 
 
 f-'at'fnl H,,ur, L'Jl' \\ ar, 'J43 
 
 Fu-kien, 3O'J ('leniuiny, attitude towards llus.sin, 
 
 ll-lll ; attitude townrd.s the Slavs, 
 
 (iAblii, 'J'X! \'2 ; inva.-inn ,if Roman Umpire, 
 
 (iahn, lir., 3S L'S ; tlepopulation in lil,s-S, 
 
 (iiile. l)r., origin. 4 1 33 --;{."> ; war agitation in Iss7, 
 
 dalicia, ( K-nuani/ation of the Slav.-* 1'jn '22 ; < an- s nf the armed 
 
 of. !''.' 7n ; Jews of, '_S7 jK-a.'e. l_'"i -J^ : colonial po- M -s- 
 
 (liihcia, Ka--.t'Tii, 1 'J *\:\<. !:>' 31. .'!17; over popida- 
 
 (ialil'-o, 41 t ion and < on- ijii' nl colom.il |~'li> v 
 
 trlllH-IUl.-*, J7 II c.lll-e of l||,- .ir of I'.MJ. ll^i -t_. 
 
 (iamU-tM. attack on tin- foveni- Jll, 3_'4 _'^. .'U7 ; the .!</.jJir 
 
 ment, li'L' ; in the government for qii'-lion. 111 -17, Moro, . o Note 
 
 national def.-iu.-, liii ; ,, r k of, to the POW.T-. M"> ; KU.-.-I.I'.- 
 
 li>7 ; opjKisition to the w.ir, llit; earlv ri-l.itions with. I-'- .">.">; 
 
 catiiii'-t, lli>; projx.^al n-ijardin^ formation of the Triple Allian. e, 
 
 Irrame, lls ; hopt-8 for 11 Uuhsian I'il >'- ; nip|irt^ An-tri.i ^ an- 
 
 allKince, 1J1 ne\.ition of |i<i.~nia. Iii7 ; evul.-n.i.s 
 
 (i:i-.t-in. 7'. of her intiiitioii t.i m.ik'' i oininoii 
 
 (latjthier, M., I'.ill of, I'.Hi'.t. :tl."> (Hii-e with Au-tria. \<\ '.^ ; de- 
 
 'fiz'tt' <[ /.'i'i-'t>in-, article on the mand on Ku-<-i.k to i I-HM- mi>liili/in^', 
 
 I M-rm.in .ittitud--, n/.,/, I'.IS IS'.t-'.HI; dl.-avow.il of knowl-.l_'e 
 
 (ie.-r, I<-.uii de, p-iliey towapN 1 e n - of Au-tn.iii Note. I'.U ; and t he 
 
 in irk, iii i7 re-|Miits|),ility for the \\.ir. I'.i'.t- 
 
 (letlk'-n, l>r. !'. U., opposition to ^>. I'M'. ; how vhe rould lu\e 
 
 Pii.-mtnk. 7J 73 previ-nteil t he war. 'Jnt; > ; demand 
 
 < i- i:i' in h. '-'>> on P- l.-i'im for a fr- e pi--.-i.-e, 
 
 I e-Il-Tlk. .'(II I'O'.I 11 ; |I.,|H ,.f l-in.'l Hid - II' U- 
 
 I e Tit ih. 4 1 t r.ilit v. .'11 111 ; o. , ,j|nt |,.n of 
 
 I e-or.'e \'. IT ir> 1m/ p>.]i. y of, ll'i; I.UM mt>ur/. 'J 1 I -'!.,; \<r> t>.ir.i- 
 
 t. ! -/ram on the mlij. , t of the tin on th- l.u\'M,Knr/ fr.'iit, 
 
 S-rl'i.in Not.-. I'.", 1_'|.'. lil; the nit iniitiim ti- lLium 
 
 < i'-or/'-, I.lo-, ,j, on int.-rv nt i"ii, .'43 pr--'iii'd. r-l.-ium'i fpl). '-''' 
 
 (;-p|,|.l-, the, l!'.l 17. L'!7 I'.t; til" Molltloll'of 1-1 
 
 (i'-nii.in aimy. in< TI i-.- in l s> < > >, cmm [T' meditated. L'- J ; miht-kn-m 
 
 !_'', Js ; Army und \.i\y I'.ill of of, _'i; ."ij ; ...ntimial flat.' of 
 
 I'.tlJ. i:;:i. confidence in MI' iff*, pr- pare.lne*s. 'J.'.J .',;(; it h>p 
 
 L'i'1 ; Armv A. t.Julv 1 . I'.ilJ. ^'J not i/. d l op],., ^:,f, .
 
 INDI.X 
 
 HtutinticH, 270-71 ; UH of uiant 
 mortant by. 289 -IK) ; mine-lnvinn 
 by, 293-94 ; the call on Cod. 
 304-<5 ; jM>pulation Htati.sticH, 311, 
 313 ; question of limit in/ the 
 numlx-r of children in, 314--15; 
 Hill against tho new Malthusiftn 
 practices, 315; (question of the 
 reduced birth-rato, 315-19; ahso- 
 luto nuturr of the government in, 
 332 ; organi/ing power of, 335-30 
 
 " Gesellsehaft 7.11 r Bckampfung der 
 Uberbovolkorung Dcutschlands," 
 31<i 
 
 Coyer, family name of \Vngnor, 42 
 
 Chilx-lline, party mime of, 31 
 
 Gibbon on the employment of ^un- 
 powdor, quoted, \ 
 
 (Jiesl. Huron, telegram of, 185; 
 leaves Belgrade, 187 
 
 Ciuliano. Marquis di Snn, advice to 
 Vienna. 201 
 
 Civet. 210, 217 
 
 Civet-Namur sector, French advance 
 expected by Cermans, 210, 232 
 
 Cladstone, \V. K., and peace, 138; 
 and the Bulgarian massacres, 1875 
 70. 1.~>S 
 
 Gleisz. Pastor ()., on the Northern 
 Schlcswigers, 75 
 
 Coethe, 40, 51, 202-03 
 
 Gonol. 22 
 
 Coldstein. Dr. V.. 31(5. 318 
 
 Cordon, General, death of, 1 13 
 
 CortehakolT, Prince-, opposition to 
 Bismarck. 119; foreign policy, la!) 
 
 Goschen, Sir Kdward, correspond- 
 ence with Sir K. Crcy. 193, 21 1-13 ; 
 cm the reception of the British 
 ultimatum in Herlin. 230; reply 
 of the German Chancellor to, 327 
 
 Goszevnski. 22 
 
 Cothien. on the responsibility for 
 the war. 152, 220-27. 200-01' 
 
 Goths, wars of the. 10, 20-30 
 
 Gramont, on the appointment of 
 Prince Leopold to the throne of 
 Spain. 90-1)3 ; and Bismarck. Si), 
 03 ; and the Ems telegram. 90, 
 102-3 ; the declaration of war, 
 100. 101 
 
 Gravelotte. Battle of. 101 
 
 " Great Interregnum." the. 31 
 
 Great Revolution, the. 17!)2. 242 
 
 Greece, invasion by the Goths. 28 
 
 Grenades, hand, use of, 290 
 
 Grcvy, Jules, on the Russian Alliance, 
 124 
 
 rey, Sir Kdwurd, I)r. /iinniernmnn 
 on, 13M; th<- i-ncirclin^ [Mdicy of, 
 140 ; projHmiil for mediation, lHf ; 
 the offer refllHed, Ih9 !K); l.-ttT 
 
 from Sir Maurice d- Hiin.i<-n, 
 192; Sir Kdward <!o.-'hen'H t.-l<-. 
 (/ram, 193 ; ]>lr-fi for rvcrcptuncc 
 of the Serbian Not.-, 191 ; the 
 declaration of war against Hu.Mfia, 
 2<>0 ; corn-Hpondence with Sir 
 Kdwar.l GoM-hen, 211-13; I.ux- 
 emburt;'.s npprt-ciation of media- 
 tion proposals. 210; reply to 
 Prince Lichnowsky's rn<--sa^e, 23"> ; 
 the agreement with I'Vancc. 239; 
 speech of AiiL'Ust 3 0, |91."i, ijiintnl, 
 240; attitude towards interven- 
 tion, 242 ; anti-German poli<-v, 337 
 
 rimm r.ttrtl, 1 5, 00 
 
 ripenstedt and, Sweden's Danish 
 |)olicv, 00 
 
 rot ins, 32 
 
 .uarantee Treaty of 1S70, 228 
 
 irulx-r. Professor M.. 314 und nutr. 
 
 tin'- d'Ho.-sus, atrocities at, 274 
 
 luelph, party name of, 31 
 
 liierard. A., " France and the \\'ar 
 of Revenue," 151 
 
 lulak, 22 
 
 lunpowder. Gibbon on the employ- 
 ment of. q\iat< '/, 1 
 
 Inns used by the German*. 2V.--(M) 
 
 iiinther. Pa>tor. sermon of. 299 
 
 llAHsnmo dynasty, jiower of the, 103 
 
 llaeekel. 272 
 
 Hau'ue. Tlie, Serbia's olTer to >ubmit 
 to arbitration. 1S2. Iss. !<-,. 1<)< : 
 Belgium bound by the Cunvention 
 of l'.M)7. 214 ; war regulations 
 adoj)ted }>y the Conference of 1.S99, 
 27S-79 : \\'omen's Peace Con- 
 LTCSS. 1015. 285. 330; articl.'> of 
 the ( 'onvention of 1^97. 292; rules 
 of war laid down, 293-94 ; prin- 
 ciples adopted at the Conference 
 of 1S08, 342-43 
 
 Hai-Choau. I'rent'h occupation, 131 
 
 " Hakatism." 54-55 
 
 Hall Ministry, 1803. 02, 00 
 
 llall^ren. Captain J.. on the unprc- 
 paredness of I-'raiuc. 232-33 
 
 Hambui-L'. trade of. 132; \\"orli's 
 Peai'e ConL'rc.-s. 1MI7. 14S; the 
 Bismarck statue in. 340" 
 
 Hamlinr'jrr Xitc/iricfit-n, the. Bis- 
 marck's or^an, ( .)7 
 
 Hanover annexed by Prussia, 79- SO
 
 358 INDEX 
 
 Hansomann and the Poles, ">4, ">.") Hirschfeld, Dr. M., 252 
 
 Hanson. J., Jules Grew and. 124 Holland, separation from Belgium 
 
 Hanlen, Maximilian, on why I!T- 1S31, H2 ; (k'rman designs on, 
 
 many wa^t-s war, 233-34, 235, 263, 121 ; doiim* of Louis XIV on, 
 
 34."> 40 241; fugitives in. 279 ; ships lost 
 
 Harnak. 272 l>y, 294 ; founds tiona for the 
 
 Harimann, (it-ntral J. von. The peace after the war, 320 
 
 StC'tfity and Ilum-.ntty <>J \\'nr. Holly. 22 
 
 quot-d. 271, 2S-". Holatoin. 27. C.I, 79 
 
 Hartwi^', von, death of, 171-72 Hon.t-K.ohl, deft nee of UL-mank, 97 
 
 Harwejrh. jxx-t, ~>3 Hotel den Invalidcs, Bismarck'* 
 
 Ha.-.st-. C., J/en.s.ri-y.i. 314 nle demand. 112 
 
 Ha.H.M- <,f the liei, It-taj:. 134 HniM-vski, 23 
 
 Hanptmann. (lerhardt, 272 Huuuenots, jK^rsecutions of the, 104 
 
 Hedin. Dr. S., !>> \'rnnrfitnn'j <lrr Hume. 41 
 
 emjli.-rhfn Wtllnvicht, qiuMfil, l'2-\3, Hungary, Turkish sympathy, l!S70, 
 
 203-0.",. H7.") lf>S; Balkan policy. 1 75 
 
 HeiTter, Lhi* Euriipai'irhf Yvlkerrrcht, Huns, raids on China, 28-29; 
 
 c\("i, '1 cruelties of the, 2Ho 
 
 He-ar. Profe.--or A.. 314 >in<l n<,(,- Huss. .lohn, 21 22 
 
 He^el, philosophy of, 43 ; (uTinanisiM Hyiru-nic KxhiUtion, Dresden, 1911, 
 
 of. 49 3 1C) 
 H -itie, H.. oii^'in, 42 
 
 Heltferieh. Dr.. 2.VJ ., 
 
 ,. ... .. .,, _ 1 1> v Mine poisoni d. 292 
 
 L- ' .'."'.' , llMlatieff. (leneral. I.V.I 
 
 H-llstrorn (Jiistaf. on the situation ., ,_ 
 
 , , ., Ilin Hiver, thf. 1 , 
 
 N-fore Ihe war, -Jt) : Recounts , , , . ,. , , , , ,, 
 
 , .,__ ., . Indepcndi-nt hn^li.-n l-alx>ur tarty. 
 
 Helm'oid 'nt- I. 1C, 
 
 . ,. .. i ...i.i India, cotnmunieation witli h^vpt. 13< 
 
 Melinntadt L mve nut v empty in lt)2o, , ,. ., 
 
 ... India, rarther, acquisition of. 144 
 
 ,. ,. ... , Indo-China. 144 
 
 lerd'-r 10 Indo-dernian.-. Dr. Wolff on, 47 Is 
 
 ,, ... ,_ Infant mortality in Jai>an and China, 
 
 H' rniiinduri, the, 1<>, 1. ... 
 
 Horta. the, 1 ."> 
 
 i- i i .1 Inner. Dr. (... views of, 33 3> 
 
 H'-rt/., rriedrifh, on the ra-r' (ines- ... ... . 
 
 .. , .. . ' Isalx-lla of Sjiain, deposition, SS 
 
 i I H '<* ' ' ' I-mail Pasha, 142 
 
 He'rT/'lf '- ' sl " <l - l^"!'- "*''' 
 
 J 1 ' I I /- , I 1 . . I *. It- I/ ' l 
 
 ., , Italian nation, ix-oples fortniiii! the, 
 
 ii'r^/. ..i., !. ,, it- i 
 
 .... II ; Italians on t > nnan railways, 
 
 H'T/rtfovina, Austria a annexation .... 
 
 of, l.'-'i. HU (17. 174 70. 1 9! I'iNi ; 
 
 , .-_ , Italy, famou.H name-, 41 ; alliance 
 
 .'I' 1 with Prus>ia uuain.-t Au-.tria, 7,s. 
 
 l'.<'; lurki-h hii/eramty. Hi I ; v .1 ,, 
 
 ., , ._, .-_., so ; |.o,x-n.n. in North Africa. 
 
 the ilrin.er from. 1,J. 1/3; oe. . .. . . . ... 
 
 , / .1 122 23; under tli" I riple Alliain e. 
 
 iiipatioii irf, a i:u- of th'- war, ,,, , .. _ 
 
 ... I. I i,2. I'.'s ; ..firh neutrality, 2iO ; 
 
 H ( . .,., d.-noiin. e> the 'I rip!.- . \lh, inn-, ;!(.;, 
 
 ',.7~. , ,, , , I\.ino\it.h M.. reiN.rt of. 2m 
 H. . r.l'rt. irate of, PniH.-ia dei Lire* 
 
 war on, s ( >; and th-- war of IsTi', 
 
 P'.'t J \ .IK. \'.. fit- .'.m the Slav family. 172 
 
 H' ' Hi 1 1 i\f. th. , 17 Ja.-i.w. H'-rr y.n. P |,lv t.i the 
 
 II ! r. !,. i! iii -. 21 Ku--ian ' har/. d A ll.ur. > in Ilerlin, 
 
 Hindenlmr/, (ien.-ral. on the crtieltieN |M, ; d. . larat ion.^ of. l;i| '.rj ; 
 
 of !| t i. w ir. 27.,. in I-'.a'-t Pru-'ia. reply to Sir T'dward ( Iri\ ' reijiie>.t 
 
 2 si. ; " vi' (<>r i H of, ;;ii | .', f, ,r a , . >nfep-n, , . I '.i.'t ; m*i t u. 
 
 Hir" h. I'r. Ma\, on the limitation tiont to t.<rn.an Aiulxts'.ador in 
 
 of famih' -, 322 London, 23.'.
 
 INDKX 
 
 359 
 
 Japan, seizure of Port Arthur, 131 ; 
 war with HuKia, 201 ; question 
 of overpopulation, SOS -10 ; nogo- 
 ciation with China, 308-10 ; infant 
 mortality in, 310 
 
 Jardin d'Aoclirnatation, the animals 
 oaten during tho siege of Paris, 1 1 1 
 
 Jemappos, 82 
 
 .Tona, 38 
 
 Jensen, Dr. A., on Austrian char- 
 acteristics, 163-64 ; flavin, 171 
 
 Jerusalem, destruction, 280 
 
 Jews among tho (Ioniums. 42 ; suf- 
 ferings through tlie war, 287-88; 
 }M>sition of the, 343 
 
 Joanovitch, Serbian Foreign Minister 
 on the annexation, quolc'l, 177-78 
 
 JolTre, plans of. 226 
 
 Joneherey, village of. 218 
 
 Jordanes, (!othie historian, citnl, 16 
 
 Jorgenson, Professor, address of, 302 
 
 .Julian, 28 
 
 Jungbluth, Clenoral, 224 
 
 KAUYI the anatomist, 22 
 
 Kaftan, Professor, lit 
 
 Kallay, Minister of Finance, 176 
 
 Kamerun, 130, 137 
 
 Kant principles. 40, 41. 44-45, 50, 
 
 202, 263 ; Philosophic Argument 
 for Pcrpftnnl Peace, 50-51 
 Karageorgievitch, Peter, 170-71 
 Karlstadstidningh, comments on the 
 
 loss of tho Lutitunia, 297 
 Kars. ceded to Russia, 159-61 
 Katjanski. 23 
 
 Katkow, the Slavophile, 20 
 Kennemann, 54 
 Ketrzynski. Dr. \\".. The East Rhenish 
 
 Slav*, citfl. 14-16 
 Kiao-Chau. 131. 308 
 Kinkel, Professor (!., opinions, 
 
 qiiol.;!. 45 46 
 Kirehhoff. quote il. 44 
 Kitchener, (Joneral. 143 
 Kladua, fortress of, 164 
 Kleen. K.. The. L<nr.< of \\'ar, 278 
 Klincewski. 23 
 Klinger, Max, 272 
 Klobnk, fortress of, 164 
 Klopstoek. 40 
 Kohler, Professor, essay on Si:lf- 
 
 il>-finc' a ml X cutral iti/, 228-29 
 Kollar, 22 
 Kollor. (-overnor. expulsit>n of Danes 
 
 by. 75, 77 
 Kollmann on the race question, 
 
 quoted, 8 
 
 Kdlnischf. Kfitung, the, articl-H citrd, 
 
 OS, 72, 222-23 
 KondiikofT, 23 
 
 Ko|K-niek incident, OK-, 2.Vi mttr 
 Korea, Ja|Min'H prize, 308 
 Kostomarov, 23 
 Kotlarevski, 22 
 K'ittschau, Lieut.-Colonfl, I)ir mirlulr 
 
 Krinj. 121 
 Krasinski, 22 
 Kra/.ewski, 22 
 Krirqxgebrauch tin Lnu'lkriiy cit"l, 
 
 271 
 
 Kriiger, Cajitain, letter of, 292 
 Krupp, Frau liertha, guns of, 2'.H) 
 Knijip, ironworks of, 132 
 Kulisj. 23 
 
 " Kulturlnind," aims of, 334- 36 
 Kvitko, 22 
 
 Labour Lrmlrr, the, article quotrd, 
 
 242 
 
 Jjxlanco, A., memtxT for Al.-^ce. 1315 
 Lamprceht, Professor, views, 272, 
 
 337-38 
 
 Isiiuhcirtschnft'l Jahrbiifher, 131 
 Language, a determining factor in 
 
 fixing the nationality of people, 
 
 9-10 
 Lansdowne, Lord, letter from, to 
 
 Mr. Asquith. 2)2 
 Law, Mr. Honar, letter to Mr. 
 
 Asquith. 212 
 Laws, international, teachings <jf 
 
 Treitsehke. 46-47 
 Lazarevitj, 23 
 Lazarus, M.. 42 
 League of Patriots. 122 
 " LeagiK^ of Peace," 119 
 Lcdochowska, ('ountcss. arcount of 
 
 devastation of Poland. 2*<6-S7 
 Lofevre d'Htajilcs. 41 
 Legislative Assembly of France. Is7i, 
 
 opposition to the appointment of 
 
 Prince Leopold, 90-92; reception 
 
 of the Kins telegram. 99-lOU. H>|-2 
 Lebnit/., the philosopher. orLin, 11 
 IxMp/ii.'. 122 
 Tx'levcl. 22 
 Lemaitre. .1.. proposal r.-garding 
 
 Lorraine, 1 18 
 
 LemlxTg I'niversity. 22. 2:!. Ii''9 
 Lemming, tli" \or\ve_-iaii. fertility 
 
 of. :vj:> /. 
 
 Leopold of Hohen/.ollcrn. Spani-li 
 Crown o tie red to. SS-9U; ah.in- 
 dons hi.- candidature. 91 -94 : His- 
 marck and his renunciation, 94-95
 
 300 
 
 Lerrnontoff, 22 Lyon*. 107 
 
 L<roy-I}< auli-u, protnisals for wttle- Lyons, Lord, British Ambassador in 
 
 nif-nt of Alir<> qij. *tion. 1 4!) oO 1'aris, and (Iramont. '.11-1*3 
 
 Ix-Jt.-4-ji.i, work of. 142 
 
 !>*.<. r, 4.'t MAASTUH-IIT. 82 
 
 I>-*Mn.'. 4u .Maehiavelli. t<-n. hint's of, 4<>-47 
 
 Ix-tehttitM. Austrian atroeities in, 2<sH Ma hine ;:un-, 2'.Hi 
 
 I>-ttic Slavs. .li-tril.uti<.n, I'.i MarMnhun, M ir-hal. d. { at at Sedan. 
 LiU-ra].>, C-rriuni. and tin- Sc-hK -s- IHJ 
 
 wL-ers. 71 72 .VafA/jw/Kii-. policy df, 4<3 
 
 LH.-ration. \\arof. IsKJ, 2.">:i Madat;awar. l4t 
 
 Li>hnow-ky, I'ririe.-, ni--.-.-at:e to >ir M:\li.li. th-. \\'.\ 
 
 Kdward <;rcy. 2:t:> Main Hivt-r. tin-. 17 
 
 Li> l'T>,',ch. the. 7:t Maj.-w.ski. th- arch-vlopist. 22 
 
 l.i-.'.-. fill of, 211; ix.-iti'.n, 22.'J ; MaUnrourt. Forest of, 21K1 
 
 tli.- atta. k on, I'.'!.". M,,li Jour mil. artii-1. c <iol{. 17^. 1,SO 
 
 Liinl.tir.'. si' .MaltliUMani-in. tin- iit-w. :tll-lt',. :J2:< 
 
 Limtiur^-Stirum. Count, 66 Mam-huria. Southi-ru. .lajwin's iH,.-i- 
 Li-/t. 1'p.fi-sM.r Frnii/. von. 42. 272; \ j,,n in. .'!"'.' 
 
 M-hi-nif of, ;{:{>- :<s M.ind. r-tniin, ]>li-y towards 1 'en- 
 Lithuania, (I'-nnan lirutalit i<> in. 2Si mark. (>) Ii7 
 
 Lithuanian Information Bureau in M,um, 'llioma-., on rulturr and 
 
 1'aris. htat. in.-nts hy. 2 s *', militarism. :M,"> 
 
 Lithuanian lan-ua.-c. Cn-rtnan forms Mart hand. Major. 14. 'I 
 
 d'-rivd from. I'.i 2<" Minn-'-. I r. .lulian. .'121 
 
 Lithuanian >lav-. di-t ril.ut ion, lit M:in u>- lr. Max, artklt-H by. 315-10, 
 L<^. k.-. 41 1122 2!5 
 
 Ixxlz, d.-tructioti of. 2s7 Maria 'lhcr.--a of Au-tria, '.]:>. 37,l. r >3 
 
 London cr.nf- n-n'-t-s r.-^ardinj S< hlf.s- Marianin- 1-I.uid-. l.'io 
 
 wi/.Hol-t. in. r,|. I,:, Mariiv r. M., 2>2 
 
 Ixm.lon, I',-, hration <.f. ;{<i2 Mar-hall Ifland.-. L'tD 
 
 I>mdori, 'lr.'itv of. 1 S'W, S2, ^^; MartoiiH. clause formulated l>y. at 
 
 <l--rnmn violation, 2l! Hatrue ( \.nf'-r< in . 27l> 
 
 Txndon. Treaty of. lv.7. M Martin. 11., opinion- ,^u,>>f,l, 4'> 
 
 Lon^fvillf. atn-i itii H at, 273 Ma--a( res, 'lurki.-h, in lUil/aria, 
 Lon.-,, bards, th- . l>\ 17 Is7.". - 7il. 1.'.7 '.^ 
 
 I...1-- <! V- -a. tl M.rklenl'ur/. 27 
 
 Loul.-T. Kdward VII - vi-it to, in M.-inlianit. I', A'*/'iu I>>-ul.*ehlan:i 
 
 ]'.*>:',, I.H7 II 'tltj'-lilil. tr- >>" n. l.TJ !../< 
 
 I.OIIH \\\'. It'. I. If,:,, 211 Mem, I. liu-ian raid on. 2M 
 
 Lo-ii. XV, -a\ni.- of, quot.'L H',7 Mendel.-j.-w. 2H 
 
 I.ouvain. tl,'.- (i.rinvn inaiuf.-to, M, -nd- -l--ohn. MO-.-S. 42 
 
 272; lh.- jud-ment on IVofi-c.-nr M.-nd- l--ol,n. lUi t holdy. 42 
 
 M.-IIPT- w-.rk. 27^ 7'.' M.-n.-in/a. 1 'r | H.-nxImrj:). 3H 
 
 Ix.uvn-. th" . I'.i-n, r. k - il n.ai.d. 112 M. r< .intile Marine. ( ' nnany * need 
 I,-u. nf. Id. IT I. . ::i I -I,-.-! .! for a. l.'!2 
 
 Ludwu- II of r,.i'.tiia. oro]M,>;i| of. .l/.rri/r. ..'. f'r-ir.r. , ijt|.->t ion* oil 
 
 |o'.i J-'.'l. e, 14^ !'. 
 
 1,'in. . ill- -. l-.mb- on. Au.'u t :t. 21 s ; M. i, l.niko!;. L'.'f 
 
 loot in.- nr. 2V I Met/. l"l. 1"7. 122. 12S 
 
 /. .<iM. i'i. !" - of t!,. . 2'.C. :;<i M- 'ir. r. rr<.fes'or. "'Ihe .Jud^mi-nt 
 I.M'h. r. 21. 32. 41 on I.ouvain." 27s T'.i 
 
 Lut.-ml.ur/. neulrahly of. S3 s| ; M. u -. 2!<>. 22'., 2:12. 2!l 
 
 I , rn.air. - r;,-l.t l>. ^7 vs ; ri'il- M' \ I- an am |>.ii. n- of 1'rance, \\>'.{ 
 
 tral.--, u-u.iri>ni...|, ; rman\ - r. M.\-rl.er. 42 
 
 ,,. -", 'jo'. ; ,|, man.lH fun'runM M. \. rh-.f. A.. .'!! I 
 
 of K. r i,. utral:f\ fi . m 1 '.< r n.an \ . M- n> -r '. M. A., '.' t 
 
 2U , (.. rn.an <- . uj.ation, 2l."> Mi' ki- -w i /. 22
 
 INDEX 
 
 361 
 
 Mioroslavski, 22 
 
 Migration of Nationu, tho Groat, 
 causcfl, 28-31 
 
 Milan, King of Serbia, policy, 170 
 
 Milan, Prince of Serbia, declared 
 ruler of Bosnia, 187(5. 158 
 
 Militarism, causes of, 12(5-28 ; growth 
 of. 24(5 ; German, 247-52 
 
 Millerand, A, 13G 
 
 Milton, 41 
 
 Mines, employment of, 290, 21(3 ; 
 lloating, 294 
 
 Mobilization, not a reason for war, 
 204-5 
 
 Modi, Gaston, views on Alsace, 149 
 
 Mogast (near Bayreuth), victory of, 17 
 
 Mohammed 11, 290 mile 
 
 Mohammedans, agitation in Mostar, 
 1711 
 
 Miihre, 41 
 
 Moliere. 41 
 
 Mollard, M., 282 
 
 Moltke, Count von. attitude towards 
 the Franco-German War, 89, 90 ; 
 Bismarck and the Ems telegram, 
 9(>. 97 ; plan of campaign, 104 ; 
 admiration for Gamljetta, 107; 
 on the war crisis 1887, 121 
 
 Mongolia, Eastern, Japan's position 
 in. 309 
 
 Mongols. 28 
 
 Mons, 1(17, 22(5 
 
 Montenegro, discontent in, 157 ; 
 attack on Turkey. 158-59 ; allied 
 with Russia, 1S77. 159; inde- 
 pendence. 1S78. 1(50-01 ; help 
 given to Serbia, 1912-13. 173 
 
 Montesquieu, L'txprit <!<< Lni.t on the 
 .subject of war. quoit /I, 1(13. 221 
 
 Morli-y Lord, resignation, 24243 
 
 Morocco, French possession of. 144 ; 
 the Afjndir incident, 144-47 ; 
 Treaty of Novemlvr 4, 1911. 251, 
 253 ; German designs on. 254 
 
 Mortars of 42 c.c., German use of, 
 280-90 
 
 Moscow, the coronation festivities in 
 
 18S3, 123 
 
 Moses. Dr.. 322. 324 
 Mostar, occupation of, 104 ; Mo- 
 hammedans of. 17(1 
 Muchtiur Ally. Zrituixj. the. 75 
 Mugdan. Dr., on the decreased birth- 
 rate. 31li 
 
 Muithonians. the, 15 
 MiillenhotT. cit"l, 14 
 Miillcr. Professor \\ ., opinion on the 
 Treaty of Prague revision, 70, 71 
 
 Muscovites, distribution, 19 
 Mysunde, Battle of, 01 
 
 NAOLER, quntfl, 44 
 
 Namur, 210. 210. 223 
 
 NaiiHen, Frithiof, " Through Silx-ria," 
 312 
 
 Naples, Peace Congress, lh8O, 138 
 
 Napoleon Bonaiwirte, the old German 
 Empire dissolved by, in I8OO, ,'H ; 
 jM-ace of Tilsit, 38 ; organizing 
 power of, 335 
 
 Napoleon 111 and the Peace of 
 Prague, 08 ; at Bi;irrit7., Bismarck 
 and, 78, 8O ; reward for his n-u- 
 trality, 83-8(5 ; the Franco-German 
 War, 89; and the appointment 
 of Prince Leopold, 91 ; truarantees 
 demanded from Kinc William, 93 ; 
 the declaration of war, 1<N) 1 ; 
 number of his army, 104 ; de|>osed, 
 10(5; Sedan, 113"; and Austria, 
 203-4 
 
 Napoleon, Prince (cousin of Najx>leon 
 111). 42 
 
 Xiirorlna Odbrana, Society of Bel- 
 grade, 178, 181 
 
 Nassau vote for Austria, 79 
 
 '' Nation," the term, 1 15 
 
 National Service Act, lielsxium, 224 
 
 National Society, the. (55 
 
 Naurnann. Dr. F., on neutrality, 227, 
 2(52, 339-10 
 
 Navy. Germany's necessity for a. 132 
 
 " Nederlandsche Anti-Oorloi; liaad," 
 329 
 
 Neisscr. 43 
 
 Nelte, admissions of. 229 
 
 .Vn/c Freie Prf**c, articles published, 
 95. 98, 275 
 
 Neukamp, cited, 278 
 
 Neutrality, Dr. Naumann on, 227, 
 2(52, 339-340 
 
 Neutrals, loss of life amom:. 294 
 
 New Guinea. 130 
 
 "New Malthusian Conirress" 1911. 
 316 
 
 New Zealand, rabbits of, 325 imf.- 
 
 Newton. 41 
 
 Nicholas II. visit of William II to, 
 in 1S97. 154 ; reply to telegram 
 of the Crown Prince of Serbia, 
 1S<>; fre.-h projHtsal to Austria, 
 195 ; telegram to (Jerman Etnjvror 
 not published in \Vhite Book, 190 ; 
 manifesto of, 2oO 
 Nicomedia. 27 
 Nicmcewicz, 22
 
 3G2 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Nietz-sche. origin. 4'2 ; on the 
 
 affair, 4G 
 Nikita, I'rinoo <>{ MonU-ti'vro made 
 
 rulT of Herzegovina I,s7>, l.">s, 
 
 ITU 
 Sorddrulickf AU'Jfmtint /.'tinny, Hi* - 
 
 marck's ori/an. ti'J ; publication of 
 
 the Km." tele.-ram. !l. '..">. loo ; 
 
 comments on tin- T tsar's U-lrjjrani, 
 
 1W ; otlu-r articles published. in, 
 
 223 24 
 
 Nord. tli.-. 121 
 Nrth Ctcrman l'i-t, and the war of 
 
 ls7n. I<q 
 
 North (rt-rman Federation. In3 
 North Sea, mines in th--. 2'.'3 
 Norway sympathy with l>enmark, 
 
 t^> -HI. (if, ; .-hips ]..>t l.y. 214 ; 
 
 and th>- Kuroje.in < 'onfedp-ratiuii, 
 
 :ur, 
 Nossii/. l>r. A.. Ihr d. it<cfi-fnui- 
 
 ;/i .</!' Aumih' runy, l.'ilJ ""/< 
 N'otlioinh. 1'., " l^'i IVL-iijur Mart vn-," 
 
 2*\ 
 
 Nov.-ant, town of, \-2'2 
 \ni. n\l*r l'i,n.'t>t>tti'iti, tin-, t',2 
 Novi- !> k/.-ir. >.mj.ik of, r-^ton d ti 
 
 Turk. v. JiiC, 
 Nun-mU-r/. H.'i. 'Jl 7 
 Ny.-trom, A.. Al"if- -l.-Tr-nn, , lliii 
 
 ri'/f. 
 Ny-trom, i'r.,f. --.-or l-ink. l^ij 
 
 < >i>i'A< KI:. attack on I'.oim-. .'in 
 nff\,-i.i! 'iiZ'tt--. I'.u-'-iin p'llilii-ation 
 
 "of th- 'I's ir'.- t'-l'-^niui, I'.tii 
 Old-iihiir/ and tii.- (.rui-ui hirth- 
 
 rat.-. iil'.l 
 (tllivi.-r. Kniil.-, Mini-try of. s!, '.i~2 ; 
 
 <! l.ir.t! i'lii nf w.ir i|r,in up iiv, 
 
 l'>| _' ; hi- rc]p|y to tii.- < ipp..-i 
 
 tion. I"-' 
 On. k. n. lr.. ''-./ Il,l.l,n-K'ii"r,'.*i 
 
 1 1 it- 
 
 Oj n d.,..r in M'.r ..... .. I |.~, 
 
 t ipp. r d.-rtf. i omit, 2<>2 
 
 Orl.-i-in-. att.i. k l.v At 'ill. -". ; fill 
 
 of. |oT 
 
 Or-t.-d. II ('., It 
 ( rth"d"\ ( ir> k i hri-ti ui-, I'.m 
 
 -! kvi-iii and. J' 
 ' o .1 in uk- i. \- " in." !!. ."! 
 (i tro.-nlh-, ' 1 1 ! !.. !,' in |Viniii.iii.i, 
 
 :.". . . ..!i'|!i. t ,.f It ,1s. 1 |i, 
 
 Oror- population, tlan^ors of, 3CI7-24, 
 
 :M7 
 O.vn.'-tjarna, Axi-1, '2'20 
 
 1'Ai'iKK'. (it-nnan iMi^.^-ssioiis in the, 
 
 13U 
 
 1'aillot. M.. ( ounrillor of ,hi.-tic.-. 282 
 1'aladin.-.-. Ct-ni-ral. MIH .-.- of, Ri7 
 ali-Minc. J.ws ..f, I's7 ss 
 "an-Cif nnaniMii, meaning of tho 
 
 t-rm. 39 
 
 'anin, RuHxinn Minister, 3i 
 'annonia, L'U 
 
 an-Slaviam, 20-23. 120, 152 . r >, r >.171 
 
 'antlii-on. 1'aris, bombanimcnt. 111 
 
 I'atithcr, minion of the, July 1'Jll, 
 
 144-47 
 
 Paris, attack liy Attila on, 2U ; 
 reception of the Km* telegram in, 
 U'J ; investment of, lo.VT., 1<>S ; 
 tiie jx-ace conditions, lOS ; lx)m- 
 banlment, 111-12; the (Icrman 
 soldier.-* in. 112-13; (!<Ttnan plans. 
 2<il ; the thn-at to, 232 ; capitula- 
 tion, 1.S71, 2'JO 
 'aseal. -II 
 
 ashitch. M.. jM.licy. 17-t. 2iH) 
 'asteur Institute, 1'aris, 23 
 ';iw low , 23 
 'ayelle, .M.. 2s2 
 'cace : 
 
 Aix-la-('hapelle. of. 2t2 
 
 ( 'um]Mi i-'unnio. of. s-1 
 
 COIUTI ss at Naples in Issn. l;is 
 
 CtiiL-re-x-s, utility of. 341 42 
 
 J-'oiindations of, after tlie war, 
 
 3211 31 
 
 Frankfort, of. Ins 
 !><-.-i^ue, .-,f Triple Alliance 
 Prague, of. C>s 7n. HO 
 San St'-fano. of. 1M> 61 
 Tilsit, of, Us 
 V.-rsailles. of. ins 
 \'i'-nn.i. of. ti.'i 
 \\.-tph.iln. of. 3t 
 
 -. t. r ill. i..:: 
 
 '. ti.in h. ! 1 
 
 'etri'I'-um. s|ir.iyin/ %Mth. a (i'-rman 
 
 d--\H e. 2'.HI. 'J'.ll 
 
 li..t. r. M.ij..r II. von. l.'l 
 
 'fi.tt. . L".'J 
 
 hih mi. I'rof- hM>r M.. i;,ch\fhtt 
 
 (it 
 
 < II 
 
 r,' ui:/in/ ]<,*< r. .'.' ; hi- .uidri 
 
 t M.M ki.olm. :;:'.! :ii 
 
 'n .lid. tli'- l-a. n-voti it i"Iis. los 
 
 'n ijii.irt, hupp"-' d journey of. 221*
 
 INDHX 
 
 Piemont, the, article quoted, 179 
 
 Pijw, 27 
 
 Piraws, 28 
 
 Pitt the Younger, declaration to 
 
 Franco, 242 
 Placo do la Concorde, an incident of 
 
 1871, 112-13 
 PlatonuflF. 23 
 Plevna, Battle of, 159 
 Podolia, 19 
 
 Poggio, tbo Florentine, (1 
 Poincaro, charge against Germany, 
 
 219 
 
 Poland, savants of, 22 ; partition of, 
 35-37 ; German policy towards, 
 l>ofore Bismarck, 53-54 ; German 
 devastation of, 280-87 
 " Polenklub." the. 1(19 
 Poles, distribution of, 19 ; Russia 
 
 and the, 21 
 
 Polish subjects in Prussia, 37 ; 
 Russian, Prussian expulsion of 
 54-55, 120, 154 ; efforts to Ger- 
 manize, 56-58, 109-70 ; in German 
 mines, 315 
 
 Politika, the, articles quoted, 178, 179 
 Pomeranian Slavs, the, 10 
 Population, question of limiting the 
 number of children, 313-14 ; the 
 new Malthusian teachings, 315-10 ; 
 question of the reduced birth-rate 
 in Germany, 310-19 ; of Japan 
 and China, 30S-10 ; European, 
 statistics, 310-13 
 Portuguese in Africa, cruelty, 208 
 Posen. persecution of the Poles in, 
 
 56-58 
 Positivist Society, address on the 
 
 Schleswin question, 71 
 Potsdam, 154 
 Pourtnles, Countess, 87 
 Prague, Peace of 1800, 08-70, 80, 
 
 107, 342 
 
 Prague University, 22 
 Praxiteles, sculptures of, 28 
 Preussenlied, the, 73-74 
 Prcu$si*che Juhrbiicher, 40 
 Prim. Marshall, and the disposal of 
 
 the Spanish Crown, 88-90 
 Princip. assassin, 150, 179-80 
 Pringsheim. N.. 42 
 Protestant revolution, the, 31 
 Prusa, 27 
 
 Prussia, Prince Henry of, 190 
 
 Prussia, the racial question in. 11 ; 
 
 revival after the Thirty Years War, 
 
 35-37 ; treatment of the Poles. 
 
 54-5S ; suppression of Schleswig- 
 
 HolHtein, 60-77 ; war with Austria, 
 1866, 78-81 ; tho Franco-German 
 War, 85 94 ; unity of, Bixmurck'H 
 aim, 108-9 ; Htrcngth of army 
 increased in 18HO, 120 ; expulsion 
 of PolcH in 1885, 120; hegemony 
 of, a cause of tho World's \\"ar, 
 243 ; militarism in, 249 ; German 
 account of Russian atrocities in 
 East, 288-89 
 
 Pugny, town of, 122 
 
 Pushkin, 22 
 
 Puz, Alexander v., quutf.d, 49 
 
 RAIIIHT, fertility of the, 325 null 
 Racialism, German theory regarding, 
 
 in Europe, 713 
 Racine, 41 
 
 Raditiast cult, the, 16 
 Raditijevitj, 23 
 Radzivill, Prince, on the \Vreschcn 
 
 affair, 50 ; and Benedetti, 93-94 
 Raiding in Hungary, 42 
 Ramsay, Sir W., 237 
 Ranees, Spanish Ambassador, 88 
 Rayleigh, Lord, 237 
 Redlieh. Professor J., quoted, 173-75 
 Reirnitz. 17 
 
 Reichshofen. Battle of, 104 
 Reichstadt. the meeting at, 1876, 159 
 Reichstag, navy vote 1900, 132 
 Reiss, Professor, on the atrocities in 
 
 Serbia, 288 
 
 Religion and the war. 342-0 
 Republic, the French, of 1870, pro- 
 claimed, loo 
 Rcveillere, Admiral, on neutrality of 
 
 Alsace. 149 
 
 Revisionists, the. 323, 324 
 Jievur d(# deux Mondcs, 281 
 Rezozowski. 22 
 Rhc.in-\\'r*tfiil Zcitu>i>j. on the Aqalir 
 
 incident, quoted. 1-40 
 Rhine Confederacy, the, 1800. 38 
 " Rhine Republic." proposed name 
 
 for Alsace-Lorraine, 149-50 
 Ribot, on policy of Frederick. 117 -IS 
 Richard. H.. Peace Bill of. l.'is 
 Richelieu, quotid. 220. 241 
 Richter, EiiL'en, principles. 45. 75, 
 
 2 IS 
 
 Rockefeller Trust, report of the, 2Sl 
 Rohrbach. Dr.. 202 
 Roman Fmpire. German invasions 
 
 of the. L>7-31 
 
 Rome plundered by the Vandals, ;>i> 
 Romulus August ulus, German defeat 
 
 of, 30
 
 364 INDEX 
 
 Roon, German War Mini*t<-r, 90; Saint Sulpice, bombardment. Ill 
 
 Bismarck and. 9<3, t<7 Salandra, Italian 1'rvmirr, Htatcmcnt 
 
 Rosenthal, I., 42 on tin- war, 201. 2O7 
 
 Ko-ss, Professor K. A., on infant Salisbury, Marquis of, at the Con- 
 mortality in China, 310 t'ress of IVrlin, It'.S 
 
 Rofwt, Sir Ronald, '231 Salrns, I'ru-.-ian Ambassador in 
 
 Rotteck, History of the Wvrll, 44 Ru>-i:. 'M 
 
 Rudolph of Ha|*ihtir.r. 31 Salonika, \~>~ 
 
 Ruhr. industries of tin-. 132 Salvarsan. 43 
 
 Rumania, dix-ontent in. 1.17 ; allied Samo, kingdom of, 17 
 
 with Russia Is77, l.'itl ; indopend- Satnoan Islands, 13n 
 
 erne Ib7s. lt>4> dl ; l>irth-rate. 317 San Stefano. peace signed at. lt)O il 
 
 Rumelin, (.!., warnin:.' to Ui-rmanv, > - 'i/r<//ji/ //row, lSl>7, anti-Gorman 
 
 31i articles. 133 
 
 Ru.-sia, Pan-Slavi-m in. 2< -3 ; Savonarola, 41 
 
 authors of, 22-23; and }>artition Saxons, tin-, lt>, 3<> 
 
 of Poland. 3.". 37; Pol-s r.\i-ll<d Saxony. l'ru--i.ui war on. 70 SO 
 
 from. .>l ; rauM- of tin- I'nuu... Sa/.oiinf. M., virw of the Aiiftro- 
 
 Ru.-.-ian Allian.-,-. 1 ]>, 1 lit. 123 2.". ; Hungarian Not.- to St-rhia. l,s3-M ; 
 
 th- Jrt-ak with (lermany. ll'.t 2<' ; r ''I'ly to tli'- (Jerman Amlnfutadur's 
 
 tlie KiiL'H.-h ent-nt<- with, ltd; reque.st. I'.t.'i 
 
 t-arly friendly relation.s witli (ier- Scandinavia, saying of Jordanoa rr- 
 
 nifiny. I."i2 ~<~> ; help riven to (jnrdin^. Ill; jx-oples of, 17,24 
 
 S-rl.ia Is7f>, J.'.S-.V.J; war with SehaehmatolJ. 23 
 
 Turkey Is77. l.V.. 172; prc.t-.-.t Seliafer. 1).. 7>i> liflrutumj drr 
 
 to Austria re^rardini: Ito.-nia and Sinnrf,!. 132 iu>tr ; The M dining 
 
 Honr.ei/ovina, 1*17; S-rliian jMilii-v, cf Sm-l'twr to tiermuny, 11MH.>, 133 
 
 171. 174; vi.-w c.f the Au>triii- S< h. pp. 1 >r.. 2iil 
 
 Uun.-arian Note to S-rhia. Is3; Schill-T, 4c. 4'.l. .02 
 
 Count S/]>ary i>n the situation, S'hleinit/., s7 
 
 1N7 ; in'ihili7,iti<'i). (<,unt 1'- n h- S< hl'^vvu-- 1 lol-t.-in. l'niian .-t ru^'i-'lo 
 
 told s appeal, l^^ ^'.t ; ( ;. rin an for. lt',43. i^ till; Swedi-h .-yin- 
 
 (ornin'-nt-. I'.tt', ; Andra--y -n the j>aihy, ' is ; revision of the 
 
 Ji-ilkan p<.liey of Kii-^ii. I!t7 its ; Treaty, IN 72; suppression of tho 
 
 intervention on S rhia'.- part. 2txi ; I'ani>h lanirua^e. 73 77 ; adiiHiiis- 
 
 (lermanv'.s eonfnlenee in h'-r uti- t rat ion of. 7^. I'M 
 
 re.-ulines.M. L'ol ; the events leading S''lilo,Mn inn. Pri.f--or A., 32O-21 
 
 up to the war with Austria, 2II.VO ; S< Inuoll. r. (',.. '/unt,,l, 132 wo/-, 
 
 ntro<-iti. -s in Ka-t 1'ru-^ia. (i-rrnan 131 !!.">. 272. ,'i2"> 
 
 nrcount, 2^7 >'. ; rules r'-;-aniinv r Sihniilx-Ie affair, the, 12i> 22 
 
 a'-rial \varfari-, 2!3 ; population, S. hii'-id'-r. 74 
 
 311 312; the (lovernment absolute Sehoen. Itiron von. declaration con- 
 in. 332; a dan.-eruu.- military ceniin^' the Austrian Not<-, I'.H H2 ; 
 jK.wer. 331 anti-l-'p ndi stateni' rit s. 2"."i ; imd 
 
 Rii'-ians. "Slav" or;. -in, 1"; di-- M. \uiiiii. 21ii; ultiuiatuin pre- 
 
 trilmtion, I'.t; (ioih-iiu on the .- nt- d hv. 21 ' 111 
 
 cau~e of th<- u ir. l.'ij Si 1m a r/.. ni. i/. 1'n inii r. 17" 
 
 Iiu-o. Turkish \\ar 1-77. l.'/i i'.'i >ch\\id. n. -.'. 
 
 P. u 1 hi n- -. di -t ril.ii' ion. Ill ; - i- ni i-t H S'p n. r. men nf, maiiif'-- to, 237 
 
 union/ th i- , 23; ( i'-rmani/at ion "f. S>Ia\i, 17 
 
 Jti'.i 7' > ot- h n-itii-n, r:n > < < "iu|>",-in/ the, 
 
 I" 
 
 S A M t: l:iv r, 17. Ill ^ rap of I' a j- r of 1 s.';:i," 22' 
 
 >;arl.ru' ki n. P-attL-of. |o S< \ <hi in>. t he. 21 
 
 Sad'.wa, l.,:i. !..'.(. IHr 2'>3 -din. 1"| .,. 113. L'7l 
 
 >aint PI t.-r-l.'jr/. I..I liiiann. !! rr, 32"' 
 
 S'jiiiit Priva. liiittl'- i.f. liit S- in i. at r"< it !( in. 2 s '"' 
 
 Sam' (^u'li'iii. P.att!'-iif, Io7
 
 INDEX 
 
 305 
 
 Semnonea, tho, 1/5 
 Sonli.s, destruction of. 284 
 " Septonnate," tho, 120-22 
 Soptimiua Severus, 27 
 Sorajovo. 150, 104, 179 82. 198 
 Serbia, distribution of tho people, 
 1!), 23 ; (lothciiu on the Serbian 
 question, 152 ; discontent in, 157 ; 
 war on Turkey, 1870, 158 ; allied 
 with Russia, 1877, 159 ; indc|M'iid- 
 enco, 1878, 100-01 ; attitude 
 towards Austria's annexation of 
 Bosnia, 107 ; the '' ( !reat -Serbian " 
 propaganda, 170-7(5, 203 ; \v;xr 
 against Turkey 1912 13, 173; tho 
 Austrian Note of July 23 1914, 
 and tho reply, 180-98 ; war de- 
 clared by Austria July 28, 188; 
 Austria's opposition to arbitration, 
 199 ; atroeities in, 288 
 Soring, M., 132 note 
 Sorveto, M., 41 
 Seven Years War, causo of the, 37 ; 
 
 alliances during the, 153 
 Sexual Prdbleme, the, articles cited, 
 
 315-1(5, 321-23 
 Shakespeare, 41 
 Shansi University, 302 
 Shantung, 131 ; German rights mado 
 
 over to Japan, 309 
 
 Siberia as a colonizing territory, 
 311-12, 334; the steppes of 
 Western, 312 
 
 Sienkiewicz, 11., 22, 54, 58 
 Silesia, cession to Prussia, 37 ; 
 
 industrial development, 132 
 Sjabatz, atrocities in, 288 
 Sjevtjenko, 22 
 
 SkobeletT, General, on tho German 
 enemy, quoted, 11 ; and Garubctta, 
 124 
 
 Slav students in Paris, General 
 
 Skobelcff and. 11; Congresses. 
 
 first at Prague. 20 ; culture, 21-23 
 
 Slavonia, people of, 172-73 
 
 Slavophiles, Russian, sympathy with 
 
 France, 123 
 
 Slavs, race hatred towards Germany, 
 12; earlier distribution of the, 
 14-1S ; characteristics of the. 18- 
 1!) ; the modern. 18-19; civili/.a- 
 tion among the. 20-2.'! : Pan- 
 Slavism. 20-23 ; intermixture with 
 the Germans. 41 ; under Austrian 
 rule. 108-70 
 
 Slovaks, distribution, 19 
 Slowacki, 22 
 
 Social Democrat in rongrowcii held at 
 
 Berlin 1913, 319, 323 21 
 Societies, German colonial, 130; 
 
 Serbian, 17* 
 Socino, L. and !'.. 11 
 Sofia I'niversitv, 23 
 Soissons, fall of, 107 
 " Sokol " movement, the, 17H 
 Soltyk, 22 
 S<inderl>org, 07 
 Sonnino, the charge against Austria- 
 
 lluii-ary, 3O5 
 Sorcery rife during the 'I hirty YrarH 
 
 \\'ar. 33 
 
 Sotird, I;-, 90. 94 
 South German Diet and the war of 
 
 1870, 101 
 
 Spain, VLsigothH the masters of, 3<i ; 
 famous names. 41 ; retention of 
 Belgium ItiOS, 241 ; cruelty of 
 Spaniards in America, 20S 
 Sparta, 28 
 Spino/a, 51 
 
 Spuller, work of, ]07, 1 1> 
 St't<it.<l<jcic<i. the. article ijiuitnl, 43 
 " State." the term, 1 15 
 St'iti--:tik (/r.f tlcut-ichrn I\> iclit*, quotfd, 
 
 270-71 
 
 Stengel, Professor, 134 
 Steynthal. 42 
 Stocher, Dr. Helene, 310 
 Stockholm. 301 
 Stoc (/,[ m.-i Dii'iUfl. the. 295 
 Kiockholmx Tiilnnigen, 299 
 StotT.'l, rejxirt citul. SO, 1O4 
 Stolatz, 101 
 
 Strasburg. Iti. 1>7, 113, 128 
 Strasburg I'niversity. S7. 15O 
 Stnuxburiji r (.'uuri'.r, the, article 
 
 quol'd. S7-88 
 Stumpfe, J)r. E.. 57 
 Stiirgkh, 2<>2 
 
 Submarines, German, crimes com- 
 mitted l)y. 294-95 
 Sudan, the! 143. 144 
 Sudermann. 272 
 Suevi. the. 15-1(5 
 Sue/. Canal. ojK'ning, 142 
 Sul/.er. Professor. 4 
 Svantewit/. cults, Iti 
 Swakop mine poi.-oned. 291-92 
 Sweden. sym]iathy with Denmark, 
 00-07; mobilization, 2('5; Sven 
 lledin's revil'-ment of. 2ti4 ; sym- 
 ]>athy for l>-l_-iuni. 2i'>5 ; crime 
 in. 270 ; ships lost by. 294 ; 
 protest a^ain^t the /. nit'ii'la crime, 
 ::97 ; anti-German feeling in. 3ol ;
 
 .'JGO 
 
 INDKX 
 
 jtyU'tn of government. 332 ; and Treaty of the Twenty-four Articles, 
 toe European Confederation. 33(5 1K31. s2 
 
 Swedes, skull-formation amont; the, Trcbinje. capture of. 1G4 
 '.i ; Copies forming the Swedish Trcbizond. sack of, 27 
 nation. 11 ; attitude towards the Tn-itschke, origin. 42; principles, 
 
 4t;-47. f>2, 22(1, 230; 1'vlitik. 
 article qm>il, 134-3.') 
 Tn ub. lr.. 2.">2 
 Trevelyan. Mr., attitude toward* 
 
 intervention. 243 
 Tnlioci, tit--. l(i 
 
 war. 2('>2 
 Swedish l'i-.-i- I^-.i.-ii--. pr.'jranime 
 
 accept. -<1 by. 32'. 31 
 Switzerland, (ierinan designs on. 121 
 Szajwry. Count. lett<-r to, from 
 ( 'mint l'--ri htold. 1^7 ss 
 
 Triple Alli.ni' .-. creation and object 
 /. 1"> It'., 2. r , of the. 11! 2ii. 127-2S, IH2. 244; 
 
 renewal in lsS7, 123; Scinlwit's 
 Hiiiru'estion. 1.">1 ; Italy's with- 
 drawal. 21)7. 3"."> 
 Triple Alliance of ItiUS (England, 
 
 Sweden, Holland i, 241 
 Tciitobur.-er \\ aid. Battle of the, 27 Triple Entente. 13h, l.'.l 
 Teutons, migration, 27 Trochu, (Jcneral, organization of 
 
 'J'ewlik, Khedive of Evypt. 143 national defence, luc, ; threat to 
 
 TArrrt'S, Gtrtiuiniu, n! 
 
 2C> 
 
 Tartan-. stcpi*-:) of, 29 
 Ta-wo.41 
 TehernayetT, l.'.O 
 TeUl- Kebir Iss2. 143 
 
 y. I'rof.'-.-or L. v., on the 
 occupation policv, 152-(3.'J 
 
 TheU-s. 2S 
 
 TK-I..ri<- the Cn at, .'iU 
 Th'-<li.ri.-, f.,nt t u'-r.t.s <>f, 1 !', 
 'I'll- <!'. -iu-, Kni|Tor. nnd . \ttila, 2'. 
 Thi-r> "ti th'- di-el.iration of w.ir, 
 
 1"2 : |-.i' iiii--i('ii (jf, KM; 7 ; 
 
 prut. -t to I'.i-in .iri k. 1 lL' l!t 
 Thil>-. l'ru--iji!i l'nd-r-S-i ri-tarv of 
 
 State, ss. '.HI 
 Tliirtv V'-ars \\'.ir, rrxva^ 
 
 .'{J '.Vi 
 
 Thomson. Sir .1. .1.. L':t7 
 " Tlir--<- KnijitTor.-." Allian. 
 
 ll'.t IT", l.'.s, |f,ii 
 Tilx-riu.-. 27 
 Ti<-driiiann, ">t 
 
 Til-it, p. ,i, . of. 1^17. :t\ i:,:j 
 
 Tun*.*, tin-, nil our r'-.isun for ;- 
 
 t.. w.ir, <i>i,:i.d, L'!!s :!'J 
 Tir-o. .Jl 
 
 T'lkAii'i, 1'rof.-- -or. < n 
 
 t.ilit \ in .lap.-in. 31") 
 Tol-r.,,". Al-\. i, 22 
 'l'ol,toi, .).. 23 
 Tol.toi, I, ... -jj 
 Tonkin, I 1 
 Toiil. f.ill of. 107 
 '1 niu'i--, I. . 12 
 'Ip-iit|., -.in. tit y of, I'r-d'ri'k tho 
 
 Cr. it on. 221 " 
 
 Tr.-at> of th- I'lv I'-.w-rs Isii'.l, L'JS 
 Tn-atv <.f Ixndon Is.'i'.t. s2. si; 
 
 1'nis.sian prlsom-r.-. Ill 12 
 Truth <il>"iit th? War. th<-. extracts 
 
 from. 2(i2 
 
 T.-chirM-ky. Herr von, l'J4. 2lK) 
 Tuirenbund, S-cret Society of the. 
 
 Tuiii.-*, 1 44 ; French o< i-upjit ion. 
 
 Turkey. dcfc.Ued by llu.-ia ls7S. 
 I I'.l : tributary States of. l.",7 ; 
 S-rbia and Montenegro make w;ir 
 on. Is7(>. 1 .">!l ; J'us.si.in war 
 1S77-7S. I.V.I ; peai e of San 
 
 Stefano. lii" t'd ; Au.-tria'a Note 
 to. (>ctol.-r 7 I'.HIS. in;, (17 
 Turks. 2s; inas-..icn-rt in Ituk'ariii 
 
 Tu.sla. K.l' 
 
 Twenty-four Articles. Treaty of the 
 
 Tyrol, Italian, (iennan devious on, 
 '121 
 
 I'-ii" \i s, work of the. 2'i.' 
 
 I'kraine. I'.l 
 
 I'kramianx, iltitribut ion, I'.l ; KU--I.I 
 
 and the, 21 
 
 1 ti' n i pi ' >\ IIP nt . i) ue t ion of. 3 1 s l;i 
 I in.. u of i i' h'Tf. In n< !i non- 
 
 [Hilit icnl, pro]ni.'anda of. I.'HI .M 
 t'nivi-rMtH -M, ( ii -rinan. prote-t of th". 
 
 U72 7.'! 
 I'ral Mountaini'. Huns i.f th". 2>. L".
 
 INDKX 
 
 307 
 
 Urban II, Pop<\ preaching the Firwt 
 
 Crusado, 257 
 Urban, Turkish gun-founder, 29O 
 
 note. 
 Utrecht, Peace of, 1713, 35 
 
 Vaderland articles published, 281 
 
 Val-dc-Graee Hospital, bombardment, 
 111-12 
 
 Vallmar, 75 
 
 Vandals, 20. 30 
 
 Vangioncs, the, 10 
 
 Varini, the, 17 
 
 Varz.in, 55 
 
 Vazov, Ivan, 23 
 
 Vazow, .).. Bulgarian poet, Under the. 
 Yoke, 158 note 
 
 Venedi, the, of Tacitus, 1(5 
 
 Venetia ceded to Italy, 78, 80, 102, 
 107, 203-4 
 
 Versailles, 107-8 
 
 Vespasian. 27 
 
 Vienna, the Prussian threat to, 80 
 
 Vienna Congress, 82, 84 
 
 Vienna, Peace of, 1804, 65 
 
 Villesexel, 107 
 
 Vilna, (iennan atrocities in, 286 
 
 Vinogradoff, 23 
 
 Virchow, Rudolf, 41, 45, 248 
 
 Visigoths, 29, 30, 110 
 
 Viviani. M.. on moderation, 183 ; 
 on Germany's responsibility for 
 the war, 207 ; statements on the 
 French and German military pre- 
 parations, 215-10 ; contradiction 
 of German statements, 218 
 
 Vogt the cobbler, exploit of, 250 
 note 
 
 Volhynia, 19 
 
 Voltaire. 41 
 
 V oh/ft, newspaper, 21 
 
 Vortcart.*, statements made in the, 
 218, 278-80 
 
 Vosberg-Rckow, Dr., Dcr Grund- 
 gcdanke tier deut-schen Kolonial- 
 politik, 132 note 
 
 Votsische Zfilunj, 71, 98 
 
 WAOXER, A., Handds-u. Macht- 
 politik, 132 note 
 
 Wagner, Richard, 42, 40 
 
 Wagner. S., 272 
 
 Walchians, the name applied to 
 Germans, 25 
 
 Waldersee. Field-Marshal, the Em- 
 peror William's orders to, 285 
 
 Waliazcwaki, 22 
 
 Warm bad, 292 
 
 Warsaw University, 22 
 
 Washington, German Ambassador, 
 warningH to the LuAitunut, &X) 
 
 \\'cchMelmann, 43 
 
 \\ei-hai-\\ci, 131 
 
 \\'eimar, 52 
 
 Wewsenburg, 10 1 
 
 \\Vll.s, iM)L-)niiig of, by Germans, 
 291 92 
 
 \\'el.sching<T, H., J.a <hu.rre ilf I.H7<l, 
 I'ltu-a* ft lte*poninl>ilititji, 85 note, 
 89, DO noli; 102, In.'i 
 
 \\'enc<-sliius, KrnjK-ror, truce of, 31 
 
 \\'cnds, dLstribution, 19 
 
 Werther, Prussi;in AmUv.ssador in 
 France 1870, 1MJ, 93 
 
 We.se 1. 217 
 
 Westphalia, coalfields of, 132 
 
 Westphalia, peace of, 34 
 
 Wick.sell, Professor K., 310 
 
 Wieland, 40 
 
 Wilhelmshohe. castle of, 105 
 
 William 1 and the Treaty of Prague, 
 70; Bismarck and, 1800, 78; 
 supjxjrt of Prince lyopold 187O, 
 89-90 ; reluctance to outbreak of 
 war with France, 91 ; asked to give 
 guarantee to France, 93 ; reports 
 of the parting with JJenedetti, 
 93-103 ; the plan of oampaitrn, 
 104, 105; at Versailles, Io7 ; 
 created Emperor of Germany, ld!l ; 
 the address to the Emj>Tor. 
 110-11 ; and Alexander 11 of 
 Russia, 119-20. 153 ; the S:hnal>ele 
 affair 1S87, 122; alliance of the 
 Three Emperors, 158-59 
 
 William II, visit of ( hri.-tian IX 
 1888, 71 ; visit to Nicholas II, 
 154 ; and the Austrian Note, 192 ; 
 telegram from the Tsar omitted 
 from the White Book, 190; on 
 the responsibility for the war, 
 202 ; on the duty of olxvliciiee. 
 249; war manifesto, 251-52. 25s ; 
 message to his soldiers, 2*5 ; orders 
 regarding the Cossacks. 293 ; and 
 the birth-rate. 319-20 
 
 WimptTen, General, peace negotia- 
 tions. 105 
 
 Wolff. Dr. K. F.. !)>' Urhimnt <l<r 
 Inilo'jfrni'int n, qu<>lr-{. 47-48 
 
 Wolll's Telegram Burcavi. the Ems 
 telegram .-cut from, 99 ; on the 
 Agadir incident. 140
 
 868 INDEX 
 
 Women's Peace Congress at Tho " YILI.OW Peril," the, 310 
 
 Hague 1915. 283, 330 Ypres. asphyxiating gases used at. 
 
 World's Peace Congress. Hamburg 291 
 
 1897. 148 
 
 World War, synopsis of the remote ZABKRV, militariam at, 250 
 
 causes, 24344 ; synopsis of the Zagoskino, 23 
 
 near causes, 244-45 Zctkin, Frau Klara, on birth tttriL-tt, 
 
 Worms, Diet of, 16; peace decree of, 323-24 
 
 31 ZimiiuTinann, Dr. A., Why England 
 
 Worth, Battle of. 104 mnkt War. quoit d. 138 ; />i 
 
 Wn-sthon atTair. the, 56 Woe he articles quoted, i\n indict- 
 
 \\ 'iirtemberg, the vote for Austria, iwnt of Franco, 147 
 
 79 ; and the war of 1870, 103 Zouaves in Senlis. 2S4 
 
 Wycliffe, 41 Zweigljergk, O. v., M.P., 297 
 
 ri;lNTKI> AT 
 
 I II I. I'.M.I. \MYNK I'I!K~-; 
 I.DMxiN ,v KDIN 111 \:< II
 
 K 
 
 A 001 374676