I, I S :, y ^*'- »' "j;^ c^ JOURNALS OF THE SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY, IM THE Years 1817, 1818, and 1819, WITH \bservations on the system, ACCORDING TO WHICH OPERATIONS HAVE USUALLY BEEN CONDUCTED IN ' INDIA, JD A STATEMENT OF THE IMPROVEMENTS THAT APPEAR NECESSARY. BY EDWARD LAKE, ^EUTENANT OF THE HONOURABLE EAST INDIA COMPANY'S MADRAS ENGINEERS. WITH AN ATLAS OF EXPLANATORY PLATES. LONDON: JUBLISHED BY KINGSBURY, PARBURY, AND ALLEN, LEADENHALL STREET. 1825. vi Prititei bg Towntan and Burrill, Ckaiham. ^ th.. • •• • ILCk >- 5 > TO MAJOR-GENERAL SIR JOHN MALCOLM, ;t G.C.B. AND K.L.S. AT WHOSE SUGGESTION IT WAS UNDERTAKEN, THIS WORK, INTENDED TO ASSIST IN PROMOTING THE GENERAL EFFICIENCY OF THAT ARMY, O OF WHICH HE IS SO BRIGHT AN ORNAMENT, a> ^ IS INSCRIBED, oa I— o O WITH EVERY SENTIMENT OF ESTEEM, ADMIRATION, and REGARD, AS A FAINT TRIBUTE OF GRATITUDE FOR NUMEROUS AND LONG-CONTINUED ACTS OF KINDNESS, BY HIS OBLIGED AND FAITHFUL SERVANT, EDWARD LAKE, a' I a. 357179 iUiiiJ^'n i LIST OF SUBSCRIBERS IN INDIA* fl .■•:ii>«)tn 2 copies. AlTCHISON, A. Lieut.-Col. Military Aud^- Gen'- Bombay . Aitken, James, M.D. Assistant Surgeon Alves, Nathaniel Captain, Malwa Residency Anderson, A. ditto, Enginet>rs Arden, J. Lieutenant, 19th ditto ditto «, Awdry, J. D. ditto, 1st Kegt. N* I. B. Babington, Wiii. Captain Paymaster, Jaulnah Babington, G. K. ditto, 18th Regt. N. I. Bales, Thomas, Col. Commanding Hyd'*- Sub^>- Force .2 copies. Bales, James, Captain Paymaster, Ceded Districts Barclay, Peter, ditto. Assistant Commissary General Bayley, James, ditto, Assistant, Nagpoor Residency Bell, J. Lieutenant, 14th N. I. Bellasis, E. Major, Bombay Engineers Bennett, Thomas, Captain, Artillery 2 copies. Binny, William, Lieutenant, 7th N. 1. 2d Bn. Pioneers Bird, C. M. ditto, IGth N. 1. Bishop, C.T.G. Lieut.-Colonel Blackburne, W. Colonel, Resident at Tanjore • Officers names are inserted, according to the Regiments to which they belonged, when the MSS. of this Work was sent from India. Great changes have since taken place. LIST OF SUBSCRIBERS IN INDIA. Black, Charles, Captain, Horse Brigade Boldero, Charles, Lieutenant, 12th Light Infantry Bond, Thomas, Esq. Assistant Surgeon, 17th Light Infantry Bond, E. Captain, 15th N. I. ""^ Bonner, John, ditto. Horse Brigade Borthwick, \Vm. ditto. Commanding Holkar's Contingent Bowler, H. I. ditto, Q. M. Brigade Northern Division Boyd, David, Esq. Assistant Surgeon, Nagpoor Horse Brady, G. Lieutenant, 17th Light Infantry Brabazon, Du Pre, Lieutenant, 13th N. I. 2d Bn. Pioneers Briggs, John, Captain, Pol. Ass'- Khandesh Brodie, James, Lieut-Colonel, Infantry Brodie, F. W. Lieutenant, 15th N. I. Brooks, W. Lieut.-Colonel, Chief Engineer, Bombay Browne, C. A. Lieutenant, 2d Bn. 4tH Regt. Brunton, W. C. ditto, 2d Light Cavalry gyrn Jato, Russell Brigade. Bury' ^* • S* Lieut. 2d Regt. Light Cavalry Butler, Edward, ditto, H. M. Royal Regiafi^nt C. Caldwell, J. L. Colonel, C. B. Engineers 2 copies. Campbell, Sir Alexander, General, G.C.B. 2 copies. Campbell, A. Lieut.-Colonel, H. M. 46th Regt. Campbell, A. Esq. Assistant-Surgeon, Horse Brigade Carapbelli A. M. Lieutenant, 7th Light Cavalry Campbell, R. Captain, Ass'- Secretaiy, Military Board, Bombay Campbell, M. Lieutenant, Artillery Claridge, T. M. ditto, 22d Regt. N. L Clarke, A. ditto, 19th ditto Cloaveland, S. Major, Artillery Cleghorn, J. R. Major, Engineers 2 copies. demons, James, Lieutenant, Dth Regt. N. I. Clive, R. Esq. Military Secretary to Government LIST OF SUBSckiBERS Ix\ INDIA. Colburnson, Lieutenant, Russell Brigade ''^'*»1^^ M^f-fiO Jotin Colville, Sir Charles, Major-General, G.C.B. "^ Conran, G. Lieutenant, Horse Brigade Conway, T. H. S. Lieut.-Colonel, C.B. Adjutant-General Cooke, R. E. Lieutenant, Russell Brigade Cotton, H. C, ditto, Engineers Cotton, A. ditto, ditto Cowper,. T. A. Major, Engineers, Bombay Cracroft, Cliarles, Captain, 22d ditto Craigie, W. Lieutenant, 14th Regt. N. I. Cruttenden, E. H. Esq. Trichinopoly Cubbon, M. Captain, Assistant Commissary General Currie, James, Lieutenant, Russell Brigade D. Dads, George, Lieutenant, 3d Regt. N. I. Dallas, T. ditto, 3d Regt. N. I. Dalrymple, John, Major, H. M. 30th Regt. Davidson, Robert, Esq. Assistant-Surgeon Davidson, M. H. Captain, Assistant Commissary General Davis, — Major, commanding Nizam's Reformed Horse De Havilland, T. F. Major, Engineers Derville, F. Captain, Horse Brigade Dickenson, John, Lieutenant, Horse Brigade Dickenson, T. Captain, Engineers, Bombay Disney, C. B. Lieutenant, 14th Regt. N. I. Doveton, Sir John, Major-General, G.C.B. 3 copies. Drewry, W. T. Lieutenant, Engineers Dunn, C. D. Captain, Qr. Mr. Brigade, Southern Division Dyce, A. B. Lieutenant, 4th Regt. N. I. E. Elliott, Daniel, Esq. Civil Service 2 copies. Elphinstone, M. The Honorable, Governor, Bombay o copies. Ewing, J,. Captain, 1st Regt. N. I. LIST OF SUBSCRIBERS IN INDIA. P. Fair, Thomas, Captain, 6th Regt. N. I. Filson, Robert, Esq. Assistant Surgeon Fletcher, J. V. Lieutenant, H. M. Royals Foord, H. S. ditto. Horse Brigade Foote, E. I. Captain, M. B. Southern Division Foy, W. ditto, Engineers, Bombay Eraser, H. Colonel Frith, J. H. Captain, Horse Brigade Fullerton, H. Captain, Engineers G. Gamage, J. J. Captain, Artillery Garnault, J. Lieutenant, 24th Regt. N. 1. Garstin, R. ditto, 2d Light Cavalry Gibb, C. H. ditto, 12th Regt. N. L Gibbings, Robert, ditto, F.A. Qr. Mr. Gen'- Jaulnah 2 copies. Gill, G. Captain, 1st Regt. N. I. Goldingham, John, Esq. F.R.S. A.S. Goldingham, — jun. Esq. Civil Service Gordon, George, Ensign, H. M. Royals Gordon, Robert, Lieutenant, 13th Regt. N. I. Gordon, A. Captain, Nagpoor Residency Grant, A. ditto. Assistant Commissary General Gray, A. Lieutenant, 14th Regt. N. 1. Gray, G. ditto, llth Regt. N. I. Gunning, J. ditto, 1st Regt. N. I. H. Hall, Charles, Major, IGth Regt. N.I. Hamilton, Walter, Captain, Nagpoor Residency 2 copies. Hanson, James, Major, Deputy Qr. Mr. General Harrison, J. Captain, Horse Brigade Harris, Charles, Esq. Harvey, H. C. Captain, 19th Regt. N. I. LIST OF SUBSCKIBEUS IN INDIA. Higginson, C. H. Esq. Trichinopoly Hislop, — Lieutena»t, Russell Brigade Hodge, P. P. ditto, 1st Regt. N. I. Hodges, Henry, ditto, Madras European Regt, Home, E. ditto, 16th Regt. N. I. Hunter, N. Captain, Horse Brigade Hutchinson, G. F. Lieutenant, 16th Regt. N. I. Hyslop, A. G. ditto, Horse Brigade J. Jenkins, R. Esq. Resident, Nagpoor 2 copies. Jervis, T. B. Lieutenant, Engineers, Bombay Jobbing, G. ditto, 13th Regt. N. I. Johnson, N. F. ditto, 13th Regt. N. I. Jones, George, Captain, M. B. Northern Division Jones, William, ditto, 13th Regt. N. I. K. Kemble, Mattkevv, Captain, Ass*- Adj'- Gen'" Belgaum Kennan, T. Y. B. ditto. Artillery Kennedy, D. Lieutenant, Russell Brigade Ker, James, ditto, 17th Regt. N. I. Ker, A. ditto, 7th Light Cavalry King, H. R. ditto, 19th Regt. N. I. L. Lane, J. Eraser, Esq. Laurie, John, LieHtenant, 9th Regt. N. I. Lawrence, A. W. ditto, 7th Light Cavalry Lawe, Alexander, ditto, Engineers 2 copies. Lawry, Mr., Bangalore Library Leighton, D. Lieut.-Colonel, Adj'. General, Bombay Ley, J. M. Lieutenant, Horse Brigade Litchtield, W. E. ditto, 6th Light Cavalrj^ Light, James, ditto, H. M. 30th Regt. Low, WiUiara, Captain, Nagpoor Horse Lushington, J. L. Lieut.-Colonel, C.B. 2 copies. LIST OF SUBSCRIBERS IN INDIA. M. M'Cready, Edward, Lieutenant, H. M. 30th Regt. M'Curdy, E. A. Esq. 14th Regt. N. I. M'Dowall, A. Colonel, Commanding Northern Division Macdowall, L. Lieutenant, 12th Regt. N.I. Macdonald, John , Major, Fort St. George 2 copies. Macdouald, John, Captain, 1st Regt. N. I. Mackintosh, John, Captain, Engineers Mackintosh, WiUiam, Lieutenant, IGth Regt. N. 1. M'Kellar, Neil, Lieut.-Colonel, H.M.Royals Macleod, Charles, Lieut.-Colonel, Dep. Qr. Mr. Gen'- 2 copies. M'Leod, Alexander, Major, 9th Regt. N. I. Macleane, Thomas, Captain, Secretary Military Board M'Leay, K. A. Ensign, 13th Regt. N. I. M'Master, Bryce, Captain, 6th Regt. N. I. Mainwaring, E. Lieutenant, H. M. Royals Malcolm, Sir John, G. C. B., &c. Major-General 5 copies. Malcolm, J. Esq. Assistant Surgeon, 13th N. I. Man son, A. Captain, Artillery, Bombay Marett, Thomas, Captain, 9th Regt. N. I. Mathias, V. Lieutenant, Gth Regt. N. 1. Mathews, James, Captain, 19th Regt. N. I. Maxwell, John, Captain, Artillery Metcalfe, C. T. Esq. Resident, Hyderabad 5 copies. Milbourne, R. E. Captain, Engineers 2 copies. Miller, W. ditto, Artillery, Bombay Milnes, William, Lieutenant, 7th Light Cavalry Milson, George, ditto, 9th Regt. N. I. Mitchell, H. ditto, Persian Interpreter, Jaiilnah Monk, T. H. Captain, IBth Regt. N. I. Montgomerie, P. Lieutenant, Horse Brigade jVloore, — Captain, Paymaster, Russell Brigade Moorhouse, J. Captaui, Aitillery LIST OF SUBSCRIBERS IN INDIA. Morris, J. C. Esq. Masulipatam Mountford, Francis, Assistant Sorveyor General Morse, A. Lieutenant, Assistant Qr. Mr, General, Bombay Munro, James, Esq. Trichinopoly Munro, Sir Thomas, G.C.B. Major-Gen., Gov., «.Vc., 2 copies. Murray, Robert, Major, H. M. 30th Regt. N. Napier, Johnstone, Captain, Ass** Adj'* Gen'- Jaulnah Nash, James, Captain, 21st Regt. N. 1. Noble, John, Lieut.-Colonel, Horse Brigade 2 copies. Noble, James, Captain, Assistant Commissary General Norman, George, ditto, 9th Regt. N. I. O. O'Donnoghue, J. J. Captain, Ass'- Qr. Mr. Gen'-, Belgaum Otter, R. F. Lieutenant, 14tb Regt. N. I. Otter, R. B. Lieut.-Colonel, Qr.-Mr.-Gen'- Outran! , T. Ensign, Engineers, Bombay P. Palmer, William, Esq. Hyderabad Palmer, J. F. Lieutenant, 16th Regt. N. I. Parker, Robert, Major, 3d Light Cavalry Paske, T. T. Captain, Artillery Pasley, John, Lieutenant, H. M. 47th Regt. 2 copies. Pedlar, — Major, Nagpoor Horse Peile, C. F. Captain, Ass'- Qr. Mr. Gen'* Petre, Raus, Esq. Prendergast, Jeffery, Lieut.-Colonel Mil"- Aud^- GenK Price, John, Lieutenant, 8th Light Cavalry Proby, John G. Captain, Engineers Purton, John, Lieutenant, Engineers R. Ramus, Henry, Lieutenant, H. M. 30th Regt. Ravenshaw, W. Captain, Engineers Raynsford, H. Major, 3d Regt. Light Cavalry L1S.T or SUBSCRIBERS IN INDIA. Rice, D. Lieutenant, Russell Brigade Richardson, E. Captain, Commanding 2d Bn. Pioneers Robson, Thomas, ditto, 13th Regt. N. I. Rochfort, C. Lieutenant, 14th Regt. N. I. Ross, Hugh, Captain, 21st Regt. N. I. Ross, Alexander, Lieutenant, Engineers Rudyerd, H.T. Captain, Artillery Russell, George, Esq. Russell, L. Captain, Artillery, Bombay S. Scot, Robert, Colonel Scott, Hopetoun, Colonel 2 copies. Scott, John, Captain, 15th Regt. N. I. Sevestre, Sir Thomas, M.D. Sewell, Robert, Major General Sew ell, — Captain Sewell, Richard, Lieutenant, Horse Brigade Sherrifl", Robert W. Captain, Sub. Ass'* Commissary Gen'* Shirreff, iEneas, Lieutenant, Horse Brigade Sim, Duncan, Captain, Engineers Simson, C. Esq. Surgeon, 18th Regt. N. I. Sinclair, Charles, Lieutenant, 12th Regt. N. I. Smith, John, Captain, Ass'. Adj'* Gen'- H. S. Force Smith, John, Lieutenant, 2d Regt. Light Cavalry Sotheby, J. S. Esq. Hyderabad Residency Stall, George, Captain, Fort Adjutant, Bellary Stapleton, W. The Hon. Lieutenant, N. I. Bengal Steele, Thomas, Lieutenant-Colonel Steele, S. W. Captain, Surveyor General's Department Stevenson, J. Esq, Stewart, John, Lieutenant, H. M. 30th Regt. Stewart, — Major Stewart, David, Captain, 1st Light Cavalry, Bengal LIST OV SUBSCRIBERS IN INDIA. Stewart, D. Lieutenant, 12th Regt. N. fe i<«>£:'M'»M^ '< M>ith¥f- Stewart, — Lieut.-Colonel Stockwell, T. Lieutenant, 14th Regt. N.I. . Stokes, J. D. Lieutenant, 4th Regt.^i.^^^iiat^mtAh^.u^VlUh^f^ Strachan, W. ditto, Ass'. Qr.-Mr.-Gen'- Stratton, The Honourable George Straver, S. Major, Artillery, Bombay T. Tate, W. N. Lieutenant, Engineers, Bombay Thackeray, The Honourable R. Thomas, E. Lieutenant, Artillery Thorpe, R. ditto, lOth Regt. N. 1. Bengal Thorpe, R. ditto, 14th Regt. N. I. Tod, John, ditto, 17th Regt. N. I. Torriano, C.J. Ensign, 14th Regt. N. I. Trotter, J. S. Captain, 5th Regt. N, I. U. V. Underwood, J. J. Lieutenant, Engineers 2 copies. Underwood, G. A. ditto, ditto Vibart, Henry, Esq. W. Walker, James, Major, 3d Regt. N. I. Walker, Thomas, Captain, M.B. Ceded Districts Walker, Francis, Lieut.-Colonel, 2d Light Cavalry Wallace, E. Major, 2d Light Cavalry Warden, G. B. Lieutenant, 4th Regt. N.I. Watkins, Arthur, ditto, 7th Light Cavalry Watkins, W. S. Assistant Commissary General Webb, N. Esq. Circuit Judge, Northern Division Whitlock, G. C. Lieutenant, 18th Regt. N. I. Whish, R. Lieut.-Colonel, Artillery, Bombay Wilkinson, J. Captain, Artillery Williams, H. B. Lieutenant, 3d Light Cavalry LIST OF SUBSCRIBERS IN INDIA. Wilson, T. Major, 26th Regt. N. I. Bengal Wilson, William, M.D. Indore Residency Wilson, F. W. Major, 2d Regt. N. J. Woulfe, J. ditto, 11th Rdgt. N. I. Wynch, John, Lieutenant, Horse Brigade Y. Yates, R. H. Major, 20th Regt. N. I. Yolland, R. S. Lieutenant, Artillery Young, D. S. Esq. Assistant Surgeon, Reformed Horse Young, John, Lieutenant, EUichapoor Brigade CONTENTS CHAPTER 1. Page Of an Introductory nature. — The progress of Fortification in Europe traced. — Its imperfect state amongst the Natives of India. — General Observations on the defects of the Engineer Department in the Company's Service, as far as regards the duty of Sieges ; '^ CHAPTEU II. Formation of the Army of the Deckan. — Siege Operations of the First and Second Divisions. — Nagpoor. — Talneir.... 22 CHAPTER HI. Siege Operations of the Reserve Division. — Singhur. — Bel- gaum. — Sholapoor 58 CHAPTER IV. Siege Operations of Lieutenant-Colonel M'Dowall's Detach- ment, and of Lieutenant-Colonel Adams's Division. — Rajdeir,— Trimbuck. — Malligaum.-— Chunda 87 viii CONTENTS, CHAPTER V. Fagt llie Sieges of Asseerghur, Nowa, and Copal Droog lol CHAPTER VI. Extraordinary strength of the Native Hill Forts, contrasted with the weakness of the other Fortresses of India. — The causes of our numerous failures, in attacking the latter, investigated. — The system of irregular Sieges, and the too frequent use of rash assaults, condemned. — Improvements, that ought to be adopted, to insure success, in the event of future Sieges in India 204 CHAPTER VH. Tiie same subject continued. — Modifications in the usual system of attack, that should be adopted, in reference to the pecu- liar construction of Indian Fortresses. The necessity of having a Corps of Engineer Soldiers attached to each of the Company's Annies. — Remarks on the best organization of such Corps.— Conclusion of the Work 224 PREFACE. JIn the Work now committed to the indul- gence of the public, the Author does not pro- fess to relate any thing new, regarding the events of the late Mahratta War, which are already sufficiently known, through the me- dium of the different histories of it, that have been published: his object has been to present, in detail, particular operations, which the nature of those histories has obliged their Authors to treat in a cursory manner, but of which, as forming a most important branch of the war, it is essential that an account should be given ; not only as a record of the past, but as it may also be made a land-mark for the future. It is with this view, that he has added to the journals of the different sieges, a few remarks upon the operations carried on, and that he has treated the whole subject at large, in his preliminary and concluding Chapters. In the former of these, the Author has hazarded some observa- tions and reflections on the Native Fortresses A il PREFACE. of India, between which and the Fortresses of Europe, he has endeavoured to draw a com- parison. In the concluding Chapter, he has considered tlie best method of attack, and the means at present possessed by the Engineer Department, for carrying such a system into execution, and he has done so in hopes, that whatever objections may be raised to that sys- tem, and however defective it may be, the dis- cussion will be of use, in drawing more atten- tion to the subject, and that it may aid in giving a more decided and energetic shape to our future siege operations. It was the Author's original intention to have included in this Work, the sieges which took place under the other Presidencies, and an npplication was accordingly made for the ac- counts of those carried on by the Bengal army, from a quarter which he hoped would have met attention ; but in this lie was disappointed : and he has therefore unwillingly been obliged to confine himself to the sieges undertaken by the Madras Divisions. It may be observed, tliat an official Journal of every operation of the kind, containing each day's work, as entered at the time, was kept, wherever an Engineer Officer of the Madras Establishment was pre- sent, and transmitted with the Plans, &c. to the chief Engineers Office. The liberal access to these, which has been granted to him by the PREFACE. »" Madras Government, and which has aftbrded him every opportunity and information he could desire, demands his warmest acknowledge- ments. The Journals therefore, from which the following have been taken, are all official, and he has strictly followed them, except in one or two instances, where having been present himself, and having taken memoranda on the spot, he has viewed the operations in a different light. These deviations, which however are very few, are remarked in the notes. The ac- counts of the sieges, at which there was no En- gineer Officer present, have been extracted from Lieut.Col.Blacker's Memoir*, to which he is also indebted for much valuable information, regard- ing the strength of the different Corps, and the general movements of the Divisions and Troops, although these, it may be observed, are only noticed, so far as they are comiected with the object of the present work. There are one or two instances, in which the Author has found himself obliged to dissent from the conclusions drawn by that distinguished Officer ; and this difference of opinion is only noticed, that he may at the same time mention, that it is offered with diffidence. The Plans of tlie Forts, at the sieges of which Engineer Officers were present, were executed by them, and the Views, which * Of the operations of the British Army in India, thuing the Mahratta War of 1817, 1818 and 1819. A 2 IV PREFACE. are iiitroduced, to illustrate more fully the nature of some of the places attacked, have been copied from the drawings of different Friends and Brother Officers. The Author thinks it right to mention, that his Work has been considerably delayed, in consequence of the difficulty he experienced, in obtaining the information necessary for combining the Journ- als of the several sieges into a connected Nar- rative. Having thus stated his authorities for the facts recorded in the following Work, none of which are brought forward as such, but what he either knows or firmly believes to be true, it only remains to say a few words on the opinions the Author has expressed, regarding the ineffi- ciency of the Engineer Department, and of the improvements he considers necessary in con- sequence. These opinions have been honestly formed, after long reflection, and he has been strengthened in them by knowing, that they are the unanimous sentiments of his Brother Offi- cers, and that they all join wdth him, in an anxious wish, to see the Corps to which they have the honor to belong, placed on a footing of equal efficiency with the rest of the Army. He has expressed himself with confidence, because from the anxiety which the Court of Directors have always shown, to have this branch of their Army equal to the performance PREFACE. V of its duties, and the liberality with which they enable their Engineer Officers to perfect them- selves in their profession, he is certain, that it is only necessary that these defects should be clearly pointed out, in order that they may be immediately remedied. He is aware, that part of the system of attack he has laid down may be open to objection, but he trusts that the princi- ple on which it is grounded will be acknow- ledged to be correct, and therefore, that the whole will be indulgently received. The Author has great pleasure in publicly acknowledging the assistance he has received from all his Brother Officers, who have had it in their power to forward his present object, and in particular he must express the obliga- tions he is under to the late Captain Coventry, and to Captain Anderson, of the Engineers, who have provided him with much valuable information on diffi?rent points, since the com- mencement of his undertaking, and of whose advice he has largely availed himself. Whatever opinion may be formed of the pre- sent Work, the Author trusts, that the motive, which induced him to undertake it, will be considered praiseworthy. It was an ardent desire to see the Army, he feels it a pride to belong to, as distinguished in one branch of warfare as another; as victorious, when set down before the strongest Forts of the Natives, VI PREFACE. as they have always been, when charging the most overwhelnfiing Battery on the plain; and his anxiety is increased by a conviction, that the deficiency in the Department to which he be- longs, has been the only obstacle to this de- sirable object. He regrets that the subject has not fallen into hands (of which in his own Corps there are many) who would have done it more justice, but it is to be hoped, that so good a cause will not suffer from the weakness of the advocate. He has only to observe in conclu- sion, that as this Work would not have been undertaken, but for the kind and flattering assurances of the distinguished Officer, under whose command he was then serving, so would it never have seen the light, but for the encou- ragement received from him and other Friends, whose opinion in favour of it may, he fears, have been too much biassed by feelings of per- sonal regard towards the Author. Madras, Febnianj \4t/i, 1822. SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY, ^C. ^C. 6iC. CHAPTER I. OF AN INTRODUCTORY NATURE.— THE PROGRESS OF FORTIFICATION IN EUROPE TRACED.— ITS IMPER- FECT STATE AMONGST THE NATIVES OF INDIA.— GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE DEFECTS OF THE ENGINEER DEPARTMENT IN THE COMPANY'S SER- VICE, AS FAR AS REGARDS THE DUTY OF SIEGES. The Author of this short work, although CHAP. young in his profession, has had some expe- v.^^^ rience himself, and has always been anxious to profit by that of others. A strong sense of the benefit, he would have derived, even from such a collection, as that, which he has now been able to make, first suggested to him the idea, that his leisure hours might be well employed, in endeavouring to give that advantage to others, which he had so often regretted not possessing himself. Should he succeed in adding to the Library of his military friends, a short Tract, in which they will find, in a portable form, that information, which would otherwise have re- 8 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, niained shut up in portfolios, or in offices, and v„^,^l^ which consequently would have been unavail- able at the moment of emergency, his design will be fully accomplished. But he has said enough : his subject is fortunately one, which demands conciseness, and would be injured by an attempt at fine composition, to which he is unequal. He proceeds therefore directly to his task. The variety of construction in the Fortresses of India, the character of the Garrisons, some- times bold, obstinate, and enthusiastically brave, at other times timid, irresolute, and dis- heartened by trifling reverses, together with our own frequently imperfect means of attack, are circumstances, which have constantly obliged us to depart from the established rules laid down for the attack of fortified places ; and are the causes that our Siege History in this country so often exhibits results, different from what would be calculated upon, by those who are only accustomed to the regularity of this warfare, as carried on in Europe, The Science of Fortification is here almost in its infancy. With the exception of those built by ourselves, or by other European Powers, who have at different times obtained a footing in India, and of a few, belonging to Native Princes, which have been constructed, or im- proved, by European Engineers in their service, INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. » the Forts in India, are nearly wliat places of CHAP. defence were in Europe, four centuries ago ; v.>^v^^ and, therefore, a brief review of the rise and progress of the art of Fortification, in the latter quarter of the Globe, may serve to illustrate the comparison I wish to make, between Indian and European Fortresses, so far as regards their relative strength at the present moment. In periods of remote antiquity, when the means of attack were as rude as the defences which they were meant to destroy, a town sur- rounded by high walls, gave its inhabitants ample security against an enemy ; but when some degree of science was introduced in the attack, these defences were of little avail, and an improvement was found necessary. The first step towards it was the addition of round or square towers, to the angles and other parts of the walls ; but these towers, though they commanded the enemy's approaches while at a certain distance, ceased to be of use when he reached the ground at their base, which they left undefended, except by the uncertain fire of small arms through loop-holes. They therefore gave place, after the introduction of artillery, first to Redans, and afterwards to Bastions, which by establishing a flanking fire remedied this defect ; but which were at first made very small, and generally at a great dis- tance from each other, and were therefore unable 10 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. loiii> to resist with success the rapidly improv- ing science of attack. Indeed, neither the size, nor relative position of these works were re2;ii- lated by any established rules, but frequently depended on the caprice of the individual, by whom they were erected, until in process of time, the different Continental nations adopted peculiar systems of their own, all differing from each other, and all more or less defective. Such was the state of Fortification in Europe, in the middle of the seventeenth century, when Pagan undertook, in a Treatise published in 1645, to reduce to order these various and opposite theories, and to free them from the errors and intricacies with which they abound- ed ; and it was not until this period, when he laid down on sound principles, certain rules for the dimensions and relative position of the diflferent parts of a Fortress, that Fortification could be said to have become a science. Since that period, such great and rapid improve- ments have taken place in this art, that it may now be allowed to have reached a very high de- gree of excellence, although no method has yet been discovered of rendering a fortress im- pregnable. The natives of India have made but little pro- gress towards this perfection. They do not seem to be aware of the importance of that maxim, which is the ground-work of European INTRODUCXaRY CHAPTER. 1 I Fortitication, namely, " that every work of a CHAP. Fortress should be defended or flanked by y^^,^^ some other." Their system, if such it can be called, is that of a simple inclosnre, consisting of a continued wall, with round towers at in- tervals, the defects of which have already been noticed. There appear to be no determined rules for the profiles of these works, nor for the distances to be preserved between the seve- ral towers ; which particulars vary so much, in almost every Fort, that it would be impossible to attempt to fix a standard for either. Such are the works, by which almost every village in India is protected, but to some of their more important places, they have added one and sometimes two ditches, together with outworks, which render regular approaches necessary. The great depth of these ditches might consti- tute an obstacle, not to be overcome without some difficulty, were not this advantage in a great measure neutraIized,from the circumstance of the bottom geneiaWy coutmning dead groiaid close to the scarp, to which the besiegers, after having made their descent into the ditch, may therefore attach their miners with perfect safety. But defective as the Forts of India are in their construction, and infeiior as they are to those of Europe, it is far from my intention to represent them as conten)ptible. Experience, which we have bought at some places by de- 12 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, feat, and at others by the loss of many gallant v,,,^^^ soldiers, has too fully proved, that they are not to be despised ; but 1 wish to show, that they have been formidable only from our own in- efficiency. There are no traces of the Indians having ever constructed Fortifications different from those of the present day, and as they are in all things the slaves of custom, it would perhaps be no easy matter to induce them to alter a method, sanctioned by the practice of their forefathers : but the successful, or at least, pro- longed defences, which their Forts have almost always made against native attacks, and some- times even when assailed by Europeans, pos- sessed of superior science and equipments, afford a better and more probable reason for their reluctance to change ; and these would almost warrant the fallacious conclusion, that they need no improvement, were it not, that we have sometimes called forth all our energies, and by the speedy capture of the most esteem- ed native Fortresses in India, have proved how unequal they are to their object.* It is to be * These energies, however, it must be observed, have generally been displayed, not in the scientific, but in the overwhelming character of our attacks, and we seem in these very instances to have acknowledged the superior con- struction of the Native Forts, and to have admitted our inability to take them in the usual method, by bringing INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. ^^ regretted, that instances of this kind are com- CHAP, paratively rare, and while we can dwell with \.^_^^ proud satisfaction on tlie sieges of Serin gapatani, Hatrass, and Asseerghur, there arc on the other side of the picture but too many places, from the strongest Forts to the rudest Village Ghurries,* in the attack of which, whether from a contempt of our enemies, or from an ill-timed spirit of economy, we have neglected to employ the proper means of effecting our object ; and have in consequence experienced repulses, or purchased our success with an unnecessary against them an enormous train of artillery, much beyond what I is deemed necessary for the attack of the strongest European \ Fortress, as if the only way to reduce them were by making the place too hot for the Garrison to live in. This remark is more particularly applicable to Hatrass, of which the reduc- tion was hterally effected in this way ; but it would be impos- sible (putting aside all considerations of the expense attending such a method of attack) to bring a train, such as was dis- played there, against every other fort which was disposed to resist us ; and the Natives of India have fair ground to sup- pose, that without the aid of such a train, we are unable to reduce them. There cannot be a doubt, but that this idea prevails to a certain extent, and it is a general opinion, that, however superior v/e are to them on the plain, we are only on an equality when we have walls to attack ; and our repulses at Bhurtpoor, are to this day brought forward, as a proof of our inferiority in this branch of war. It is the object of the present work to shew that it remains with ourselves to destroy this opinion. * Keeps or small citadels. 14 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, sacrifice of lives ; but it would be painful to ^-^-^ pursue this subject, nor is it necessary for me at present to enlarge further upon the system we have generally followed in the attack of Indian Forts, as it will be fully exemplified in the sieges about to be recorded. The Native method of carrying on such operations, if briefly stated, may, however, be interesting, as it will show how completely in this, as in other countries, the arts of attack and defence have kept pace with each other, in their general efficiency. The Natives appear to be utterly ignorant of the advantage to be derived from attacking a salient angle, and of the art of conducting ap- proaches by Sap ; and, generally speaking, they are also unacquainted with Mining. When one of their armies sits down before a place, the ob- ject appears rather to be to harrass the besieged, and weary them out by a strict blockade, than to effect an entrance by breaching the walls : for although guns are used, they are placed at such a distance from the town, out of musket shot, and not always in battery, that their effect is uncertain, and even this desultory fire is only kept up at intervals during the day ; for at night, to guard against the consequences of a sally, tlie guns are always withdrawn to the camp; and this ridiculous process is continued till the besieged are tired out, and a compromise INTRODUCTmiY CHAPTER, lo is entered into.* The Natives of Hindostiin, CHAP. however, of a particular cast, are said to be ^^s,^ * An amusing account of the siege of Doonee, a small fort, garrisoned by two or three hundred Rajpoots, which resisted successfully for upwards of a month, the ut- most efforts of Dowlut Row Sindiah, backed by a numerous artillery, and an overwhelming force, is given in " Broughton's Letters from a Mahratta Camp." At the commencement of the siege, the operations were under the direction of Baptiste, who commenced a mine, and as there was no gun in the place, established posts round it within .musket shot : but Baptiste being ordered away on some other duty, the mine was abandoned. After this the garrison made several sallies, in one of which they succeeded in carrying off into the fort two guns : after which, to avoid a similar accident, the be- siegers withdrew their guns every night from their batteries. When the shot at length began to tell on the walls, and to destroy more than the garrison could build up at night, they commenced a ditch on that side, and carried it on in the face of, and in despite of the besiegers. This creditable defence was at last brought to a close, in the usual way, by a composi- tion being entered into with the besiegers. The siege of Darwar, in 1797, is too well known to require recapitulation, and the following account of the siege of Beescondah, a town surrounded by a wretched mud wall, situated in the Nizam's dominions, and attacked by a part of the Prince's force, and related in the words in which it was given to the author, by a friend who happened to be an eye-witness of the commence- ment, will well complete this picture of Native attacks, " The " besieging army consisted principally of horse, and about " four guns, and arrived before the place the same day on " whicli we were passing it, in January, 1815. They had no " defences for their guns in the shape of battery, or trenches. " which were drawn out in the open plain, at the dist'^ Hj sieges of the madras army. CHAP, expert Miners, and the Artillery attached to v,^^ Scindiah's regular brigades being well organiz- ed, more science may have been displayed where these have been employed ; but the pic- ture I have drawn is certainly not an exagge- rated one, as far as regards the system usually pursued by other Native Powers, who have not had these advantages. Hyder and Tippoo had French Engineers in their service, by whom their sieges were generally conducted, but when this was not the case, the same ridiculous and impotent mode of proceeding, that has been described, was followed by them. But to return to the subject : It is evident ** about 50 yards asunder. The besiegers' carap was placed "in low ground some distance in rear. They had a Portu- " guese, who levelled each gun himself, and appeared to " have the direction of the attack. They fired about once in " a quarter of an hour, and if by chance a shot struck any " part of the wall, so as to raise a dust, the air resounded " with acclamations in praise of the old Portuguese, who " seemed in no small degree flattered thereby. After about " three days, the inhabitants of the town, by a masterly " manoeuvre, broke down the bund of a tank, and swamped " the camp of the besiegers, who were obliged to move their " ground. The siege was brought to a conclusion in a curious " way. A small party of Europeans were pitched near the " place about three weeks after, and five or six of them stole " out of camp at night, to assist the besiegers, and fired the " guns so fast, that the town was found evacuated next " morning. Two of the Europeans were wounded in this " frolic." INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. '7 tliat without proper means, science in the CHAP. attack of places can be of no avail, and when v^.-^^ it is considered how utterly unprovided with these the siege tiepartment of the three Presi- dencies has, until very lately, been ; it will be found less extraordinary that reverses have hap- pened, than that we should have ever been successful. These means were formerly as much neglected in England, as they have been in our Eastern possessions, so that whenever we came in collision with the Continental Powers, our inferiority in this branch was severely felt. During the Peninsular campaigns, the inefficiency of a body of officers, when un- assisted by men trained to siege duties, was more fully displayed ; and in consequence of the representations of the Duke of Wellington, a Corps was raised, and an Establishment formed for their instruc^tion, under the super- intendance of one of the ablest and most distin- guished officers in the Royal Engineers. By the excellent system pursued at this Institution at Chatham, every man is made practically acquainted with the nature of his duties, before he is sent abroad, and the Corps of Royal Sappers and Miners now certainly yields to none of the older established ones, of the same nature, in other services, either in science, or in any other requisite for soldiers of this descrip- tion. B 1 B SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. The Directors of the East India Company are not ignorant of the advantages that would be derived, from having this branch of their army on a more efficient footing, than it has hitherto been ; for of late years all their Officers of Engineers, before leaving England, have been placed under the orders of the Officer above alluded to, in order that they may be more fully instructed in that part of their duty, which relates to the attack of places ; and re- cently a few recruits, trained at Chatham, have been sent out to Bengal, where a permanent Corps of Sappers and Miners has been raised, and a large increase made to the Engineer Corps. The sister Presidencies have not, as yet, shared in these benefits, although the prin- ciple has been established, and the necessity of improvement (in time of war at least) acknow- ledged ; for, during the last campaign in the Deckan, Lieutenant Davies, the Senior En- gineer of the Madras Establishment, with Sir Thomas Hislop's army, was allowed (as a tem- porary measure) to recruit 30 Europeans, and 50 Pioneers, for this Service, who were deno- minated Sappers and Miners. Tliese men, it must be observed, who only volunteered from the inducement of increased pay, were, when they joined that Officer, wholly ignorant of the duty they were to be employed on, and the European part of them were so far from feeling INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. 19 that Esprit de Corps, which should be the main CHAP. spring of a soklier's actions, that they at first v^v-^/ seemed to look on their duty as a degrading one ; but, notwithstanding all these disadvan- tages, and numerous others, attendant on every Corps, professedly raised only for a temporary object, they were brought to a state of con- siderable efficiency, by the exertions of their Commanding Officer; and limited as was their number, it may be fairly said, that the service derived from them the greatest advantage, and the favourable testimony of all the officers, un- der whom they were employed in the field, as to their utiUty, shows how much more might be expected from a regular Establishment of En- gineer Soldiers. The Madras Pioneers, who (with the above exception) were, during the late war, the only men at the immediate dis- posal of the Engineers, for the duties of that department, possess, in a peculiar degree, every necessary physical qualification ; but being never (except in times of actual warfare) era- ployed in Military Works, at least of this de- scription, their instruction in these duties com- mences, at the very moment that practised men are required ; and if the experience of a cam- paign may have made them somewhat more per- fect, another war finds them as ignorant as be- fore, or perhaps replaced by a fresh set of men ; and the trenches again become the school of (; 2 20 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, instruction for the most simple works of a siege. ^^^■^^ It is but too common a feeling, to ascribe a failure against a Fort, to want of skill in the Engineer, who conducts the operations ; but let it be remembered, that in his plan of attack, not only the quantity of stores neces- sary, but also the qualifications and skill of the men who are to act under his orders, must be taken into account ; and, from a deficiency/ in both, we have frequently been obliged tot. remain and breach at a distance, when we ought to have been at the foot of our enemy's walls. It is surely no argument, that because these Forts are rude, we should not employ against them the greatest science, and every means in our power ; that because our successes have hitherto been as numerous as our reverses, we should be content with this mediocrity of for- tune ; and should continue to incur the risk of adding to our failures, by a neglect of means, which would insure a certain and successful result to all our siege operations ; and finally, that we should hazard, before every petty place we attack, our reputation, and the lives of our soldiers, upon the chance of the Garrison not possessing a due degree of courage and resolu- tion. J^et the two essentials be united. Let Science be aided by efficient Means, and we shall render our enemies' situation as unsafe when sheltered by walls, as if is when opposed INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. 21 to us oil the plain : we shall prevent that gal- lantry, which overlooks difficulties, from de- stroying itself; and this page of our Indian History, which has hitherto been a chequered one, and sullied by defeats as often as it has been adorned by victories, will then become like every other, an unvarying record of success. The system which should be followed in be- sieging the Native Forts of India, must of course difter, in some degree, from that which would be necessary in the attack of more regular For- tresses. The reasons have been stated in the be- ginning of this Chapter, nor can any thing tend more to show all the varieties best suited to this warfare, than an accumulation of facts, from which every officer, who may be employed in this service, can draw his own conclusions, and adapt them to his own case. To furnish these is the chief object of the Journals con- tained in the body of the present Work, to which the Author has added a concluding Chapter, containing a few reflections on the nature of the operations, which would, in his opinion, generally insure success, and also on the formation of a Corps of Engineer Sol- diers for the Madras Establishment. ( 22 > CHAPTER 11. FORMATION OF THE ARMY OF THE DECKAN.— SIEGE OPERATIONS OF THE FIRST AND SECOND DIVI- SIONS— NAGPOOR.—TALNEIR. CHAP. It is well known that the object of the war ^^ undertaken in 1817, by the British Government 2gl7 in India, was the destruction of the Pindarries. These people have been so often and so well described by difterent writers, that it is need- less, nor would it indeed be within the scope of the present Work, to enter into a particular Brief ac- account of their rise and origin. It may be the Pin- observed of them in a few words, that almost from time immemorial, they have been attached as a distinct class to Native Armies, which they have followed, without receiving pay, or being actuated by patriotism (the general in- ducements of people to become soldiers), and that they have been so far from wishing to be distinguished for their prowess as fighting men, that they have never soughteven for plunder, their sole occupation, but where it could be obtained without danger. Such was tiie humble origin from which the Pindarries rose, to assume the character and features of a distinct and sepa- late nation, governed by Chiefs independent of each other, but acting in concert, and to sub due whom, the whole weight of the British power was called forth. dairies. PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. 23 Two causes had combined to operate this CHAP, change, and to raise a despicable horde of "^--^.-w/ phinderers into importance— 1st. The neutral 1817. and unintefering system of policy prescribed by the British Legislature to the Indian Go- vernment, and closely pursued after Lord Wellesley's administration, by which we were prevented from checking the growth of this tribe, till we had suffered from their inroads in the devastation of some of our finest provinces. 2nd. The weakness of the Native Princes, whose standard the Pindarries nominally fol- lowed, and by whose policy they were fostered and encouraged, not only for the sake of the booty in which these Princes shared, but as being the only means by which they could weaken, or perhaps destroy the British power in India, for to that pitch had their hopes soared. To crush them the whole energy of that power was put forth, and had the Pindarries stood alone and unassisted in the contest, there would have been little to record, but their efforts on the one hand, to escape from the net, which we had drawn round them, and our combinations and endeavours to enclose them on the other. But the opportunity which was thus oftered to the Native Princes was loo favourable to be neglected. By the destruction of the Pindarries the British supremacy would SJ4 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, be established and secured beyond their power ,,,,^-y-^ to subvert, and it was therefore resolved to sup- 1817. port them. Combina- 'fhis Combination, to which all the Mahratta tion or the Mahrattas. powers subscribed, had then for its object to free themselves from the bondage of the British yoke, and to assert and maintain the Mahratta independence. An Englishman's heart, though the interests of his country would suffer by their success, must pronounce their object a legitimate one, and their struggle for indepen- dence praiseworthy, but not so the means which they employed to further it: these would convey disgrace to the worthiest cause, and must meet with universal and unqualified con- demnation. It is difficult indeed, to imagine a scene of greater treachery and duplicity, than was ex- hibited in all the Native Courts, up to the very moment when they threw off' the mask of friend- ship, by which they had endeavoured to deceive our residents, and under which they had hoped to conceal their enmity. Fortunately the mea- sures which had been taken to give effect to the campaign, enabled us to resist successfully, in every instance, their treacherous commence- ment of hostilities ; and their treachery is hardly to be regretted, since it gave occasion to some of the most splendid achievements which have graced the progress of the British arms io PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. 25 India. Seldom indeed, or never, had a British CHAP. army of such magnitude been assembled, as v,*^.^,^ was put in motion on the present occasion, 1817. when the forces of the three Presidencies com- ^^^^*^ pre- parations bmed, to secure the destruction of the Pindar- for war . , made ries, and to provide against any attempts of the i^y the Native Powers to protect them. The Bengal General. army, to whose share it was expected that the most active part of the operations would fall, is estimated by Colonel Blacker, to have consisted of more than 40,000 fighting men ; and being strength commanded by the Governor-General in person. Grand was denominated the Gi:and Army. The Ma- '"^^' dras troops took the field under the designation of the Army of the Deckan, while a part of the Bombay Army was put in motion from the side of Goozerat, to co-operate in the general ob- jects of the campaign ; and in the course of the war, after onr rupture with the Peishwah, another division of the Bombay Army was em- ployed in reducing that Prince's territories in the Concan. For reasons which have been sufficiently de- tailed in the Preface, this Work has been con- fined to a relation of the Sieges undertaken by the Army of the Deckan ; so that an account of the formation and movements of the Bengal and Bombay Armies would be irrelevant, nor will those of the Deckan Army be detailed, further than as they may be necessary to pre- 26 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS AUMY. CHAP, serve a connection between the different sieges II. v,^„^ which were undertaken. 1817. The Army of the Deckan was composed of Derail of gj^ divisions : of these the first was under the the Army of the personal command of His Excellency Sir T. Deckan. * Hislop, the Commander-in-Chief of this army; the second was under the command of Brigadier- General Doveton; the third division was com- manded by Brigadier-General Sir John Mal- colm, who was also Agent to the Governor- General, and had chargeof our political interests throughout the Deckan ; Brigadier-General Smith had the command of the fourth division, consisting of Bombay and Madras troops ; and the fifth division, which was almost enth'ely com- posed of Bengal troops, was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Adams. The reserve division was commanded by Brigadier-General Munro. The strength of these divisions at the opening of the campaign was as follows : FIRST DIVISION, Commanded by His Excellenci/ Lieutenant-General Sir T/wnias Uis/up, Bart, 7 Companies of Europeans. G Regiments of I^ative Infantry. 1 Squadron of Dragoons. 2 Regiments of Native Cavalry. 2 Horse Artillery Guns. 8 Foot Artillery Guns. 4 Companies of Pioneers. 1817. ARMY OF THE DECKAN. '-^7 SECOND DIVISION, Commanded by Brigadier-General Doveton. 80 Sappers and Miners. 8 Companies of Europeans. 6 Regiments of Native Infantry. 1 ditto ditto Cavalry. 4 Companies of Pioneers. 8 Horse Artillery Guns. 30 Foot Artillery Guns. THIRD DIVISION, Commanded by Brigadier-General Sir J. Malcolm, K.C'.B. 21 Regiments of Native Infantry. 1 ditto ditto Cavalry. The Mysore Horse. Horse Artillery, 4 Guns. Foot Artillery, 6 Guns. FOURTH DIVISION, Commanded by Brigadier-General Smith, C.B. 2 Regiments of Europeans. 8 ditto Native Infantry. 1 ditto ditto Cavalry. The Poonah Auxiliary Horse. Horse Artillery, 10 Guns. Foot Artillery, 17 Guns. 4 Companies of Pioneers. FIFTH DIVISION, Commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, C.B. 8 Regiments of Native Infantry. 28 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. 3 ditto ditto Cavalry. Horse Artillery, 4 Guns. ^„ Foot Artillery, 18 Guns. RESERVE DIVISION, Commanded hy Brigadier-General Munro. 1 European Flank Battalion. 2 Regiments of Native Infantry. 4 Companies of ditto Rifles. 2 Squadrons of Dragoons. 1 Regiment of Native Cavalry. Horse Artillery, 10 Guns. Foot ditto 18 Guns. 4 Companies of Pioneers. \Jhe total Army of the Oeckau, including the Goozefaf Division, commanded by Briga- dier-General Sir W. G. Keir, a brigade at Secunderabad, His Highness the Nigam's troops called the Berar Brigade, and the irre- gular and auxiliary troops, which have not been enumerated in the above detail, is stated \ by Colonel Blacker to have amounted to 70,400 \ fighting men. The Battering Train and the Engineer De- partment alone, were utterly disproportioned to the strength of the army, to its general com- pleteness, and to the magnitude and importance Imperfect of the servicc on which it was to be employed. Baucdig" For the deficiency in the former it would be ^"'"' diflicult to account. The long rows of uri- ARMY OF THE DECKAN. 29 mounted cannon of different calibres, laying CHAP. useless in all directions, along the ranaparts of s^^.,^^^ our Fortresses, sufficiently attest that there is 1817. no want of guns to form the largest Battering- Train, if it were thought advisable to make use of them ; and to a person acquainted with the wealth of our well-stored Arsenals, it will ap- pear matter of astonishment, as well as regret, that what was dignified, with the appellation of a Battering Train, with the first, second, and third divisions of the Army of the Deckan, A^/fW consisted of only two l8-poimders and two 12- . / ^. pounders, two 8-inch mortars and two 8-inch howitzers. The Engineer Department with these divi- sions was similarly constituted. A few scaling ladders, intrenching tools for fifty men, with ?,"''."*' ^''^ ~ ./ ' Engineer two or three platform carts containina: small i^epart- ' ^ ment. stores, formed the Engineer Park. None of the peculiar tool^ or implements required in Mining, or in the Sap, were provided. Nor was there any equipment of Pontoons, or of other stores useful for the Military Passage of Rivers. These, although thought indispensable in Eu- rope, have never been supplied in India, either because they have been deemed unnecessary, or because it may have been thought that the advantage to be flerived from them would not sufficiently repay the expense of transporting them. \ 30 SIEGES OF THE MADE, AS ARMY. To those, who are acquainted with the large proportion of Engineer's stores of every descrip- 1817. tion, usually carriedwith the Continental armies, and recently with our own, towards the close of the Peninsular war, and subsequently in the operations of the Duke of Wellington in France, the above detail of stores, accompanying the Madras divisions, must appear insignificant beyond expression. In the other divisions, composed partly of Bengal and Bombay troops, and furnished with equipments from those Pre- sidencies, the Battering Train and Engineer Department, although very imperfect, were more respectable than with the three former divisions. The Battering Train with the fourth division and reserve, consisted of six 18- pounders, the same number of 12-pounders, besides heavy mortars and howitzers, and the Engineer Park was also tolerably supplied. Ignorance The waut of Engineer Soldiers at the opening diets at- of the Campaign, and the steps which were taken theEupi- to obviatc this evil, by embodying a few Eu- partment. Fopcaus and Nativc Pioncers, havebcen detailed in the preliminary Chapter ; but it may not be amiss to repeat here, that th^ Europeans knew nothing of the duties tlicy were thus suddenly called on to perform, and that the Natives, although accustomed to work, were as ignorant of every branch of Engineering as the Europeans. In the fourtli, fifth, and reserve divisions, even FIRST MOVEMENTS OF THE TllOOPS. 31 this assistance was wanting, and tfie Engineers CHAP, had to depend for all siege operations solely on ,^^^ the l^ioneers. 1817. The first iwovements of the troops in Angust, want of ' '^ moans tor brouojit into prominent notice, the imperfect the Pas- ® ' . ' . sage of state of the Department in one of its most im- Rivers. portant branches, and the third Chapter of Colonel Blacker's Memoir abounds in instances of the progress of the troops being delayed by the numerous small streams which intersect this part of the Deckan. The aid of the En- gineer Department to overcome these obstacles was only called for in one instance, when they were sent forward in September, to j)repare means for throwing the advanced division over the Taptee. As there were no Pontoons, and no timber for forming the superstructure of a bridge, if it had been attempted to construct one with the common country boats, which were to be pro- cured on the river, a flying bridge was the only resource, and this was effected by drawing a strong sheerline across the river, along which the boats plied. But even this bridge proved useless, for the advanced division was stopped in its progress from Jaulnah towards tlieTaptee, by a small intervening stream (the Poornah), for a passage across which, no means had been provided. Immediately after this operation, the Engi- 32 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, iieer Department returned to Miilkapoor, where ^^' they remained with the Battering Train, in rea- 1817. diness for the siege of Asseerghiir, which was then in contemplation ; but the hostilities, com- iTienced by the Rajah of Nagpoor, obliged Brigadier-General Doveton to recal them, and they joined that officer at Oomaroottee, in full march to INagpoor, which place they reached on the 12th by forced marches; the Battering Train having been thrown into Ellichipoor. Nes;ocia- The rcpulse received from our handful of the 'rjajah troops at Seetabnldee, had induced the Rajah pooi\^ to negociate for terms, and after considerable delay, he had come in to the Resident on the morning of the l6th, promising that his guns should be delivered by twelve o'clock ; but his troops, who were in possession of the city, and had occupied a position outside, defended by upward of fifty pieces of cannon, seemed resolved to try their fortune once more. The British Force was brigaded as follows: Horse Artillery. Cavalry Brij^ade 3 (Jth Bengal Native Cavalry. f Ho) )(;th_„.„ ,. / ()th Madras Native Cavalry. () Companies H. M. Royals. T,. w Ti • 1 Nsd Batt. 13th Native Infantry. '^ "^ Yl St Batl.22d Bengal Native Infontry. Flank Conip^' 1st Batt. 2d N. Infant^" ii^^'iijiiEirr c ji :d. .V'^,- TanA- uttf, /%,.io.I„ . .1r.ttvut/ Ufut £nmtyle JiiiOl^f nr'/l ("////*.■• Tmnht or' till' tiraiui Jiu/tt/ir. Otir^Ii^is tin,/ J'ttyod.tf. la A'ntvnyk Hatfery />/" tt ffutht rAtuyt^f Af fA^ /e^yttir antt ^r'*!/'! X. I. £r,^l,:, fi,^h^- nfa /««/w eA.iryi'^f Av /../.' Mr X?/A,r.f .AVix,..,. XV urn £nM>iyW /*,»«»«« on tA^ /.'.'* plw D:' />? ontA^ It::'' a TAi- /fr,fff^ £.im^- ,./>^u,f/ on /i lit TA^Mtj^ ^rtiff,^ fifiii,f. J. Part ,./■ fAr Enr^n' n-rhrtnn/, hut *«r «*/■ f.^fAf J„rhnfry fhi-r>,i/i,/ J.itii- O 1817. FIUST MOVEMENTS OV THE TROOPS. 33 1 Company H. M. Royals. Center Brigade ^ 2d Batt. 24th Native Infantry. 1 Brigade Horse Artillery. Sappers and Miners, jl Company H, M. Royals. Left Brigade . . <(lst Batt. 11th Native Infantry. ^1 Company 2d Batt. 24th N. Infantry. Foot Artillery. The baggage and stores of the division were placed at Seetabuldee, under the protection of two battalions of Madras Native Infantry, and a battalion of the Nizam's Infantry, while the Berar Infantry in the service of our Ally the Nizam, was stationed in rear of the line. The enemy on the 15th (the day before the Battle of Rajah came in) occupied a position with their ^^^ right flank terminating on the Rajah's arsenal Plate i. (two inclosed squares of masonry) and defended by a battery of 1 4 guns ; their left, which was thrown forward at right angles to their general front, rested on the village of Baboolkairah, and was also defended by a heavy battery, and their whole line was strengthened by a Pettah in their rear, which might be reckoned part of the suburbs of the city. The arrangements for the attack of the enemy while in this position, and while it was doubtful whether the Rajah would accept the proffered terms, were as follows : — The left brigade was ordered to storm the Arsenal, which was to be effected by turn- c 34 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, ing the flank of the troops occupying it, and j^^^^^^ taking it in reverse. The center brigade was 1817 ^^ attack the enemy's center, and to endea- vour to occupy the Succaderry, a pagoda, and extensive walled garden, with a tank, which was immediately in rear of the Pettah which the enemy occupied ; and the two brigades when in possession of the Arsenal and Succa- derry, were to establish a communication with each other. At the same time, the cavalry and right brigade were to attack the enemy's left, on which th^ir horse were posted, and the cavalry were also to try to gain the Succaderry tank, in order to attack the enemy in flank and rear. This plan, however, was not carried into execu- tion, for on the 16th the enemy abandoned this ground, with the exception of the Arsenal and 14-gun Battery, of which they still retained possession, and occupied a much weaker posi- tion with their right on the Nag Nuddee, a small stream which runs to the South of the City, hav- ing the Succaderry garden and tank in their front. They had also batteries distributed along their line,in the center, and on both flanks. On the signal l)eiug given for moving forward, the Arsenal was occupied almost without oppo- sition by the left brigade. On the lieads of the other columns crossing the avenue which leads from the Succaderry to the City, the enemy's center battery near the tank opened on them. OPERATIONS BEFORE NAG POOR. 35 and iminediat(!ly afterwards the batteries on tlje CHAP. enemy's right. The latter were stormed by the J^' right and center brigades ; and the reserve, at £g^^ the same time carried the battery near the tank. The cavalry attacked the enemy's left flank, and, having carried the battery defending it, pursued the enemy, who fled in all directions, seven miles. immediately after the battle which has been Prepaia, , i-ni •!! II />iTVT (ions for thus briefly described, a body oi the JNagpoortUc attack Infantry, estimated at 0000 men, and of whom poor, one third were Arab mercenaries, occupied the city, and as they refused to evacuate it, but on very unreasonable terms, it became neces- sary to dislodge them by force of arms. Nagpoor is situated in an extensive plain. That city and IS, strictly speaking, an open city. A ram- part in the usual Native style, with occasional round Towers, had on some former occasion been commenced, but has in no place been carried to a greater height than eight feet, and is in general less. The extent of the city, as de- fined by this unfinished ram j)art, is scarcely three miles, but the suburbs, which run close up to the city wall, are not less than seven miles in cir- cumference, extending chiefly on the North and East sides, and not exceeding 400 yards in depth on the West and South. (See Plate II). The strength of this position, and on which the Arabs depended, consists in the numerous c 2 36 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, stone buildings, situated in different parts of ,^' the city and suburbs, most of which are capa- 1817 ^'^ ^^^ defence. Of these the most important is the old Palace, an extensive square work flank- ed with towers, and of a considerable height. It is situated towards the S. W. angle of the city, at a distance of about 250 yards from either the South or West side ; and as from its central po- sition, and superior height, it in some degree commands the whole city, it necessarily became the object of our attack. From the foregoing description of its situation, and the extent of the suburbs around it, the choice of the direc- tion of the attack evidently lay between the South and West sides. On the former, immediately outside of the unfinished wall, the Toolsee Baug, an inclosure with some strong buildings, which could be easily gained, would afford considerable facility to an attack ; but from that point the advance would be difficult, through narrow winding streets, defended by a number of strong houses on both sides, and it would be previously ne- cessary to carry the Grand Fort (marked O), an old Citadel capable of defence, which flanks the right of any approach directed on the Palace from tiiis quarter. On the West side, the bank of a large Lake called the Jooma* Taloo, affords an advantage * Jooma signifies Friday, and Taloo is the Hindostanpc wood for Lake. OPERATIONS BEFORE NAGPOOR. 37 to assailants not to be overlooked This Lake, CHAP. or as it is termed in Indian phraseology, this v^,„V^ Tank, which extends from the base of the 1817, Seetabuldee hill to the suburbs on the West side of the city, is in shape nearly a parallelo- gram, about 1300 yards long and 500 wide. The banks or bunds, formed of masonry and earth, are sufficiently high to afford cover to troops, especially on the city side, where they command the whole intermediate space between the Tank and the Palace. The principal and widest street in the city runs immediately from the East bund to the Palace, and at about 350 yards from the former, passes through an arched gateway of brick, called the Jooma Durwasee, which is situated immediately behind the city wall, in a portion of an old rampart which remains complete. The main street, leading through this gateway, is bordered only by low shops, and affords a comparatively easy access. This side was therefore considered the most eligible for the attack, although it would be necessary to breach and occupy the Jooma Durwasee, which intervened between the bund and the Palace. PROJECT OF ATTACK. Under these circumstances, it was ))roposed, that the first approach should be made along the South side of the Tank, and having intrench- 35'?'lv! 38 SIEGES OP THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, ed the East bund of it, to convert part of it s^^„^L, opposite the Jooma Durwasee into a battery for 1817 destroying that work ; and this was deemed essential, although the city wall, 100 yards to the right and left of it, was not eight feet high, and might have been easily occupied, because, from the gateway the revetment of the Palace was seen to the very bottom, while from any other part, it could hardly be seen at all. The Jooma Durwasee being breached, it was pro- posed to make a lodgment on its ruins, and in the walls and houses on either side, and from thence to batter the Palace. This edifice once in our hands would in all probability oblige the enemy to evacuate the city; but in tlie event of their persevering to hold posses- sion of any other principal buildings, it would then become necessary to reduce them by bombardment, or by breaching, according to arrangements to be subsequently formed, the information regarding the interior of the city being only sufiicient for the formation of a plan to gain possession of the Palace. All the bat- tering train, except a few howitzers, having been thrown into Elliciiij)oor; on the rapid ad- vance of the Division from that place, a certain number of the enemy's guns, taken on the K)th, were selecte'd for the operations about to com- njence. They were of inadequate calibre, being principally (5 and 7 pounders, as the large guns were considered unsafe. JOURNAL OF THE ATTACK OF NAGPOOR. 39 December the \9th. The requisite materials having been prepar ed, the tirst advance was made during the \<^\(, :■', H' ,;k 'mm ATTACK OF NAGPOOR. 41 December 23rd. CHAP, The breach of the Jooma Durwasee was ren- ^^• dered practicable, and materials prepared for ^g^-, forming a lodgment in it. A good deal of rain fell this night. December Q^t/i. Materials for forming a lodgment having been prepared, an attack was ordered to be made on the Jooma Durwasee, at 12 o'clock. Colonel Scott and Major Pitman were directed to make a simultaneous advance at the same hour, to dispossess the enemy of several strong houses in their front, and to procure better cover for their troops. For this purpose the former was to occupy Toolsee Bang, and the latter a large extensive building (No. 5). The column for the storm of the breach, Anangc- _, ^ 1 -m/i. ments for consisted oi 23 l^uropean Sappers and Mmers, tbeassauit. one company H. M. Royal Scots, and five companies of Native Infantry, with the Pioneers provided with the necessary materials and in- trenching tools for forming a lodgment; in the trenches was a reserve of one company of Eu- ropeans, and four companies of Native Infantry. On the signal being given, the different par- Failure of ties advanced, and Colonel Scott and Major Pitman succeeded in occupying the positions assigned to them ; but the attack on the breach failed, notwithstanding it was perfectly prac- ticable, as the Pioneers who carried the mate- 42 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY, CHAP, lials ^ot into confusion, and the Europeans who ^^' led, could not be persuaded to pass the top of .0.^ the breach to annihilate the Arab party guard- ing it, who were so completely surprised, that they were found drinking coffee and warming themselves around a. fire; but they soon col- lected in great bodies, and obliged the column, after remaining at the top of the breach for some time, to retire with considerable loss; the Officer who connnanded the company of H.M. Royals, and the only one with them, being killed in the inside of the breach, the Senior Engineer severely wounded, and a large pro- portion of the Sappers and Miners disabled. Theeneiny After this failure, it was decided to wait for evacuate the battering guns, and in the interim the Arabs tic pace, jjggociated to evacuate the city, receiving all their arrears of pay ; and it was agreed that a British Officer should be sent with them as a safe conduct to the frontiers of Khandesh. The state of the Engineer and Artillery De- partment, at the attack on Nagpoor were — ENGINEER DEPARTMENT. Lieut. Dtivies, Command^- Engineer, severely wounded. Cnsigu. Nattcs, - - Staff - - slightly wounded. SAPPERS AND MINERS. iits -^ lals vEi •2S Privates ^ 3 Serjeants 3 Corporals v Europeans. 1817. ATTACK OF NAGPOOR. 43 3 Havildars "J 2 Naigues \ Natives. 28 Privates j The Engineer stores consisted of 1400 sand bags, and the onl?/ ifttrenching tools were such as could be collected from the Regiments of llic Line. ARTILLERY. Lieutenant-Colonel Crosdill, Commanding. Major Wcldon, Commissary oi" Stores. Major Gorcham, wounded slightly. Captain Poignand, Brigade Major. Lieutenant Maxwell. „ Coull, wounded severely, Ley. King. G Serjeants, ()}) Rank and File. 2 Heavy 5i-inch Howitzers. I Light ditto. 7 6-pounders \ 4 brass 7-poundcrsf ,, , . « ^^ , ^ , > the enemy s guns m Battery. 1 ditto 12-pouuder C ^ ^ ^ 1 ditto 15-pounder J 150 shells for the 5|-inch Howitzers, besides the complement in the Tumbrils. The ammunition used, besides the shells above-mentioned, was what had been taken from the enemy, which proved to be of a very bad quality = 44 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP. REFLECTIONS. ^ • Tlie failure before the open city of Nagpoor jgj^ lias given rise to great discussion, and the wis- dom of the operations pursued has been much called in question, but it is to be apprehended, that these doubts have originated solely in the bad success which attended it, and not in any due examination of the merits or demerits of the plan. Reasons The principal reasons, which induced the for attack- t t-( • i ^ht ingNag- Commauduig Jbngmeer to propose the West wesTside! sidc for the dircctiou of the attack, in preference to approaching by the low ground which sur- rounds the rest of the city, were— 1st. The excellent approach offered by the bund (or embankment) of the Tank, which afforded na- tural cover to within 550 yards of the Palace. •2nd. That owing to the superior height of the bund, the houses between our trenches and the city wall would be rendered untenable by the Garrison. 3rd. That the first batteries could be easily constructed by merely cutting embra- sures through the bund ; a consideration which, in the imperfect state of the Engineer Depart- ment, was of no small importance. There is no doubt that the Palace was the object to be gained, not only as the principal post, but as the easiest to be assailed, and if the propriety of opening trenches against it be conceded, the above considerations must appear conclusive. ATTACK OF NAGPOOR. 45 as to the superior advantages offered by an ap- CHAP, proach on the West side ; but it is against an ^^', ulterior part of the plan, that the strongest ob- jgj-- jections have been urged, and one writer, of deservedly high authority, has not scrupled to assert, not only that the occupation of the Joo- ina Durwasee was injudicious, but that it was undertaken against the Commanding General's better judgment, at the earnest solicitations of his Engineer. The first part of the question, as to the propriety or otherwise of the measure, affords reasonable matter for argument, but we may pass over the latter, as a gratuitous asser- tion, in direct contradiction to the tenour of the General's public dispatches, and which, even if founded on fact, could only tend to prejudice the fair investigation of the subject. Lieut.-Colonel Blacker, the author to whom Lieut Coi. I allude, and who has bestowed upon the attack ftdcture^s on the Jooma Durwasee his most unqualified o?luack" censure, appears to honour with his approba- "°'"^'^^' tion the previous operation of occupying the bund of the Tank, and also the ulterior object of obtaining possession of the Palace. Now as the Palace could not l>e breached from the bund itself, nor from any other point on that side, excepting the intermediate position of the Jooma Durwasee, an attack upon that posi- tion became an indispensable part of the gene- ral plan of operation, which seems to have been 46 SIEGES OF THF MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, approved by Colonel Blacker himself. He has ^^- not favoured his readers by explaining what he j^l« himself would have suggested in preference to the mode of attack actually attempted ; but it is evident, that after the bund was occupied with a view to operations against the PalJice, it would have been the height of absurdity to have reniained idle and inactive in the former position. In fact, after having beaten the enemy's army in the field, General Doveton had only one alternative : either to wait until the whole of his battering train and Engineer stores were brought up, which would have occasioned a delay of at least fifteen days ; or to commence an immediate attack with the im perfect means he had upon the spot. He chose the latter, in preference, as the more vigorous measure, and after having made this decision, he could not, with any degree of consistency, have acted otherwise than he did. To recapitulate, and state more in detail, the reasons in favour of the attack on the Jooma Durwasee, they were as follows : — 1st. It was the only spot, from whence the bottom of the walls of the Palace could be distinctly seen, as at every other part a large mass of houses in- tervenes, without previously levelling which, it would have been impossible to effect a prac- ticidjlo breach. 2nd. There were no large buildings in front of the Jooma Durwasee, ATTACK OF NAGPOOR. 4^ sufficiently near to it, from whence our troops, CHAP. after occupying that work, and lodging them- ^^• selves also on the right and left of it, could have ,j^^„ been annoyed by the enemy. .3rd. The esta- blishment on the Jooma Durwasee could be made under the protection of our battery and trenches on the bund of the Tank. It has been asserted, on the other hand, that even had the assault on that position succeeded, the troops would have found no cover, but at the gateway, a very confined space, and within the city walls. But it has been forgotten by those, who urge this objection, that the space between the bund and the gateway was a su- burb composed of low mud houses, every one of w hich would have afforded cover ; that this suburb extended on both sides of the road suf- ficiently to lodge the whole Division, had it been thought advisable to occupy it; and that the low wall of the city itself, not eight feet high, was excellent cover, and could easily have been improved, so as to answer every purpose of a parallel.* * The friends of Lieut.-Colcniel Blacker, and of Lieut, Davies, the Comniaiuling' Engineer before Naj^poor, who was kilietl next year in the execution uf his duty, must equally lament, that the former, in stating his objections to the plan of attack now under discussion, should have ex- pressed himself in language by no means respectful to the memory of the latter. Whilst he acknowledges some of 48 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. The foregoing considerations will possibly lead to the conclusion, that the general plan 1817. ^^^^ ^^^^ most judicious, perhaps the only one that could be adopted. To some of the details Remarks objections mi^ht be raised. The utility of the on the -^ ^ . j execution lodgement made on the first day (at a), might', of the plan ni' • ii- i-i H of attack, bc Called m question ; and the time which was \ spent on this operation, might perhaps have been better employed, by occupying at once the East bund of the Tank. Another arrange- ment of the storming party might have led to a different result. The leading men should have been directed to occupy, and obtain cover in the houses between our trenches and the gate- way, and to the right and left of the latter ; and the storming party would then have been better supported, and even if repulsed, much ground those high military qualities, by which Lieut. Davies was dis- tinguished, he applies to him the epithet " petulant," on an occasion, and in a manner, which to the general reader, un- acquainted with either of the parties, will probably appear unworthy of the dignity of Military history. Lieut. Davies certainly possessed great firmness and decision; and when called upon as the Commanding Engineer of the Division, to give his opinion on points of duty, he did so with that plain dealing and energy, which characterised his manly and ar- I dent mind ; but assuredly no man was less deserving of the implied reproach of want of temper or of manner, which Col. j Blacker has thus gratuitously thrown out against him, and I which no doubt that distinguished Officer will be glad to | cancel, for his own credit, if a second edition of his useful {I work should be required. ATTACK OF NAGPOOR. 49 would still have been gained. The party of CHAP. Europeans should have been stronger, and they ^^["1, should have been fresh men. The company ..o^^ , 1817. employed had been on duty twenty-four hours, and had been exposed during the whole of a cold night, in wet trenches, to a heavy rain ; and these two circumstances, their small num- ber, and the fatigue they had undergone, will perhaps be thought more naturally to account for their backwardness, than the reason assign- ed by Colonel Blacker, that " they saw no " advantage to be obtained," in going forward ; a feeling fortunately little known to British troops, and which if a common one, would oblige a General, before he attempted any ma- noeuvre, to submit the propriety of it, to the wisdom of his army for their decision. The misbehaviour of the Europeans on this occasion may be thought a delicate subject, and it would be so, if the reputation of one of the most dis- tinguished Regiments in the service could be supposed to suffer, by the misconduct of a few of their number; and if that misconduct had not been nobly redeemed by the gallantry of their leader, which called forth from his enemies the highest encomiums, and to which they paid the only homage in their power, that of sending out a flag of truce, that his remains left in the inside of the breach might be carried away. If we had been successful in obtaining pos- D 50 . > . SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, session of the Palace, it might have been diffi- ^^- cult and tedious to dispossess the Arabs of jg. ^ other parts of the city, for we must have trusted to the effects of bombardment; had the service been provided witli efficient Miners, a speedier termination might have been anticipated, for brave as the Arabs are, the destruction of a few of their strong holds by mines, would doubt- less have convinced them of the inutility of further resistance. The defence they made would have done credit to European troops, and, but in one instance, do they appear to have neglected taking every advantage which the nature of their position afforded them ; they might have retarded our occupation of the East bund of the Tank, which they allowed us to intrench, almost without opposition. These reflections on the conduct of the siege of Nagpoor, cannot be closed better than by the following extract from a letter from Brigadier- General Doveton, to the Adjutant-General of the army. Extract " I avail myself of this opportunity also of Brigadier- " bringing to his Excellency the Commander- Doveton's " iu-Chief's favourable notice, the exemplary letter. " couduct aud cxcrtions of the corps of Sappers " and Miners, and of the detachment of Foot " Artillery, during the several operations " against the city of Nagpoor, subsequent to *' the action of the \i\\\\ of Decond)er. ATTACK OF NAGPOOR. 51 " Had it not been for the uncommon exer- CHAP, " tions of Lieutenants Davies and Nattes of the ^^' " Engineers, and of the men of the former of igjg " these corps, we should never have been able " to carry on our approaches in the rapid man- *' ner they were. Their consequent fatigue and •' exertions were therefore proportionably great, *' and prove to my entire conviction, that this " particular arm only requires an adequate in- " crease to render the most essential service to " the public interest." The Arabs, agreeably to treaty, evacuated the city early in the month of January, and were accompanied by a British officer* to the Eastern frontier of Khandesh, which province, though nominally divided under the rule of the different Mahratta Powers, was in reality, almost entirely in the possession of these bold and enterprising adventurers. They were fol- lowed by the Second Division, which broke up from Nagpoor on the 22d of January, and pro- ceeded by slow marches to the Westward, through the valley of Berar, by the route of Ellichipoor. In their progress, the two hill Fortresses of Guyalghur and Nanalla, situated on the summit of the lofty mountains which form the Northern boundary of that valley, and * Lieutenant Sheriff. The Arabs on parting with him, in a manner eqaally honorable to both parties, forced on his acceptance a present, in testimony of their regard and esteem.. 2 D 52 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, belonging to the Rajah of Nagpoor, were sum- ^^- moned and surrendered. Both of these places 1818 ^""^ formidable from their situation, and the former was always considered impregnable by the Natives, till it was taken by storm by the English Army under Colonel Wellesley, in the Mahratta war of 1802; and this doubtless was the cause of the ready obedience which was paid to the Rajah's order for their surrender, of which Brigadier-General Doveton was the bearer. After occupying these places, and some others on the plain, which belonged to the Rajah, and which at first shewed symp- toms of resistance, the Division entered Khan- desh, and reached Ootran, a place in that province, in the middle of February, where they remained to await the approach of the first Division, with which a junction was to be formed. Victory of The first and third Divisions, it is almost Maliid- roor. unnecessary to relate, had crossed the JNer- buddah, and entered Malwa, the latter in the middle of November, and the former in the beginning of December, 1817, and shoiitly afterwards the combined Divisions encountered and defeated the Army of Mulhar Row Molkar at Mahidpoor. This decisive and glorious victory, which rendered unnecessary any fur- ther operations in this part of India, except to pursue the flying and broken bodies of Pin- OPERATIONS IN MALWA. 53 Carries, was quickly followed by the Treaty of CHAP. Miiiidissoor, negociated by Sir John Malcolm, v^~^ between the British Government and Mulhar ^818 Row Holkar, by which that Prince's territories were greatly reduced, and the British siipre- And Trea- macy acknowledged and secured. By one of dissoor. the Articles in that Treaty, all Holkar's pos- sessions in Khandesh, were ceded to the Englisli, and orders for the surrender of the different places were delivered to Lieutenant- General Sir Thomas Hislop, the Commander- in-Chief; who, shortly after it was ratified, returned with the first Division to the Deckan. The Division crossed the Taptee on the 20th of February, and a copy of the order for its sur- render, was sent to the Killedar of Talneir, one The Kiiie- of the places in question, situated on the banks Taindr of this River, The order, however, was dis- J^Jy Hor. regarded, and the Garrison having fired on the f^^ snrreV. advanced guard, which came within reach of j'osljfpjjo. the guns of the Fort, all hopes, of passing it by '"^sHisiop. without notice, were at an end ; and as the Di- vision was without a battering train, the Com- mander-in-Chief determined to attempt its reduction by a coup-de-raain. ATTACK OF THE FORT OF TALNEIR. The Engineers, on reconnoitrins: the Foit, t)csciin. . ^^ . '^ of the Fort found it situated on a knoll, but with the ground of TaineU-. around it so intersected by ravines, through Plate iii. 54 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, which roads generally run, that cannon might ^J^i. be brought under cover to within 1 00 yards of 1818 ^^^ place. The Taptee defends one side, and on the other three, there is a hollow way about 150 yards wide. The inclosure is a wall of masonry, about 60 feet high^ flanked by square and round towers. The entrance is on the East side, of difficult access, having several traverses of mud and masonry, and five gates. The huts of the town approach to within musket shot of the walls. About 10 o'clock a. m. an emplacement wavS formed, and two 6-pounders, and tw^o 5i-inch howitzers, protected by the piquets of the Division, were brought up to (a), to play on the defence near the gateway. About 2 P.M. two 6-pounders were placed at (b), at 120 yards distance, to ruin the thin para- pets of the traverses of the gateway, and render them untenable ; shortly after, a howitzer was removed, and placed at (c), and a few rockets were thrown into the place. The storming party, consisting of three guns of the Horse Artillery, t o blow open the gates ; the flank companies of I ^^the Royal Scots and Madras European Regi- ment, and the detachment of the Rifle Corps, | was formed at the same time, at (a) ; the firing ;: had considerable effect on the mud parapets, i and between 4 and 5 P. M. the enemy having 1. called for quarter, the storming j)arty advanced, j , H ATTACK OF TA LN EIR . 5o and met the Killedar in the gateway, coming CHAP. out to negociate terms; he was sent on to ,^„^^;^ Head Quarters, and the party advanced. Two ^g^g gates were burst open without any resistance being offered, two were altogether unclosed, and at tlie last, some officers and grenadiers entered by the wicket, and the latter attempt- ing to disarm the Arabs by force, who are remarkably punctilious in the preservation of their arms, an affray took place, in which all our party who entered, were killed or wounded. At length, the remainder of the storming party succeeded in forcing their way through the wicket, and every man in the Fort was put to the sword. ENGINEER DEPARTMENT. Lieut. Anderson, Madras Engineers, severely ivounded. „ T. H. Elliott, Royal Engineers, doing duty. „ Purton, Madras Engineers. REFLECTIONS. l^his operation offers little subject for pro- fessional reflections. The Fort of Talneir is of trifling strength, owing to thebrokenness of the ground around it, which aflbrds cover in every direction, and on the side of the river, up to the very walls of the Fort ; and with this defect, it could make little defence against a regular attack with sufficient means. Its principal strength lies in the construction of the interior 56 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, of the Fort, which (as is often the case with ' places similarly situated), is a solid mass of 1818 Garth, much higher than the surrounding- coun- try ; upon which, the rampart and parapet, perhaps 11 feet high, are raised, and these are the only parts not solid ; so that in battering the exterior walls, which are 60 feet high, the shot would bury themselves in an enormous mound of earth. But this would have been no obstacle against Mining, and thismethod, which would have been as expeditious as the one pur- sued, might have been tried on the present oc- casion, but, there being neither a Miner, nor a mining tool in the Division, nor even a scaling ladder, there was no resource but to attempt an entrance by the gateways. Like most of the Forts in this part of India, the gateway was the See Plate strongest part, and (as will be seen by reference to the plan of it) considerable pains had been bestowed, and apparently with great success, on preserving a proper flanking defence on the different passages ; and if the gateway had been defended with the usual obstinacy and resolution of the Arabs, it seems doubtful how far a passage could have been forced through the four inner ones, even after the outer gate had been battered down. Remarks on the uD- Fortunalcly, no resistance was offered ; and fortunate . . ... aflray,that it IS a stroug prcsumptiou agaiust the treachery took place . 11*1111 1 at Taineir. miputcd to thc Arabs, that the advantages they ATTACK OF TALNEIR. 57 could hope to gain from it, were not to be CHAP. compared to what they might expect, by an ^^• open resistance from the ramparts, which com- mand the passages between the outer and inner gates. By the former, they might destroy the first few who entered the wicket. By the latter, supposing the gates to have been shut, the whole of the principal Staff of the Army, who were pent up with the storming party in this narrow space, must have remained exposed to the unerring aim of the Arab matchlocks, while a gun was dragged up this steep ascent, to blow open the successive gateways. On the justice of the sentence passed on the Killedar and his Arab Commander, and on our right to inflict it, were I qualified to pass an opinion, I should feel little disposed to do so ; but I may be permitted to deplore, in common with all friends of humanity, that some Ambassador more polished than a British Grenadier, and one acquainted with the language and customs of the Arabs, had not preceded the storming party, to explain to them the terms on which they were to be admitted to quarter, and to prevent the possibility of such an affray as that which took place, and the loss of lives that necessarily resulted from it. After the reduction of Talneir, a junction Farther lY- i 1 1 1 ,> 1 1 •* 1 T-v • operations was eiiected between the first and third Divi- of the first sions, and they proceeded through Khandesh Divisions. 58 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, into the valley of the Godavery, which they y^_. entered by the pass of Chandore. The Fortress 1818 ^vliiich guards this pass, together with that of Gaulna, both belonging to Holkar, surrendered to the British Army without resistance. After an ineffectual attempt to come up with the Peishwah, the Head Quarters proceeded to Aurungabad, when His Excellency Sir Thomas theDcckan ^islop resigned the chief command, and the broken up. ^,.f,jy of the Dcckau was broken up. The second Division reverted to its old de- Prepara- siguation of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, tious for reducing and as such, the main part of it was employed th6 Peish- wall's For- in the pursuit of the Peishwah, while a detach- trcssGS ment, amounting to about 900 firelocks, with the battering train, was ordered to undertake the reduction of that Prince's Fortresses, and their operations will form the subject of a sub- sequent Chapter. CHAPTER HI. SIEGE OPERATIONS OF THE RESERVE DIVISION. SINGHUR.— BELGAUM.-SHOLAPOOR. • 1 Hb^ hostilities commenced by the Peishwah in November, 1817, had given ample employ- ment since that time to th<^ fourth and reserve Divisions, composed of Madras and Bombay troops ; and they had given liim, on several ATTACK OF SINGHUR. 59 occasions, but particularly at the battle ofcHAP. Kirkee, and the defence of Corygaum, a lesson, ^^" which probably convinced him, tliat his be&t 1818. chance of success rather lay in harrassing our troops by the rapidity of his movements, than by attacking even our smallest bodies on the plain. Shortly after thegallantdefenders of Cory- gaum had effected their retreat to Serroor, the combined Divisions had proceeded against Sat- tarah, which surrendered without opposition ; and immediately afterwards the fourth Division commenced anew their pursuit of the Peishwah, while the Reserve was ordered to undertake the reduction of such of his Fortresses, as lay in their line of operation, for which service they were particularly organized. The strength of the Reserve was as follows : Artillery, Madras and Bombay - 194 Madras Native Infantry - - - 1775 Bombay Native Infantry - - - 1776 Pioneers, Madras and Bombay - 350 Forming a Total of - 4095 ATTACK OF SINGHUR. The first object of their attack was Singhur, which place they reached on the 20th February, J818, and immediately invested it; the main body taking up its ground in the valley to the Southward of the Fort, with the exception of the 2d battalion of the 9th Regiment of Bombay 60 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP. Native Infantry, and a party of Horse, who were sent to invest the Northern side. The Fort of Singhur is situated about fifteen miles South of Poonah, on the summit of a Descrip- mountain, which forms the Western extremity tion of the _ , /> i • 1 1 • i Fort of 01 one ot the ranges of hills, runnmg between Singhur. ,-^ , , , _., , . _ . ^ . , Poonah and the JNeerah river. It is ot irresrukir Plate V, , , * form, being about 1000 yards in its greatest length, and 800 in extreme width. It is of great strength, particularly on the North front, na- ture having rendered it nearly inaccessible in almost every point. The Poonah gate is the only road of approach on this side, and con- sists of three separate inclosures, at some dis- tance asunder. The Fort contains abundance of excellent water ; and although there are no regular bombproofs, the ledges of the rocks atl'ord shelter for a small body of men. The garrison consisted of 1200 men. RECONNOISSANCE. Immediately on the investment, the place was reconnoitred, and it was determined to establish a mortar battery on the Eastern hill, about 800 yards distant from the Fort. ' February 22^ and 23cl. Working Party. — 3G0 Pioneers, 300 Dooly hearers. "^rhe working party was employed in collect- ing materials for gabions and fascines. One mortar and one howitzer were placed in position on the Eastern hill, as also four mortars and ) >'/ //i, U/IJ. J- OUT ,■/ ^ — v.i C(>mm;unl ol — ^^ ^ liiiii;': GEy':j^HiTZLi:n. f/ir ?:','/: Win/i hsiA'. ItF.FE/tEXIES # n ATTACK OF SINGHUR. 61 three howitzers, wilder cover of a hill S. E. of ciiAP. the Fort, marked (b) in the plan. On the morn- ~_, ing of the 23d, a reconnoissance was made on i^ig the Western side of the Fort, and possession having been taken of an eminence in that quar- ter, after a slight resistance on the part of the enemy ; it was determined to maintain this posi- tion, and to erect a two-gun battery. The ground between the Western and Eastern posts were also reconnoitred, and an eligible point discovered for a breaching battery. February 25d, at Night. Working Party. — 100 Europeans, 200 Sepoys, 260 Pioneers. Men were employed in making a road from the park to the Western post. The Eastern post was enlarged, to contain 2 six-pounders, and the guns were placed in battery. February 24^/<. Working Party. — 100 Europeans, 200 Sepoys, 100 Pioneers. Men were employed during the day in mak- ing a road to the center hill post. Mm^ M y February 24^//, at Niglit. Working Party. — 100 Europeans, 100 Sepoys, 160 Pioneers. The road to the Western post was finished. A two-gun battery (e) was completed, and armed with twelve-pounders, which opened their fire at dav-break. 6Q SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. February 25t/i. The carriages of the twelve-pounders broke "J^^ down after a few ronn(]s, but were replaced in the course of the day. The 25th, nt Night. Working Party.— 100 Europeans, 200 Sepoys, 260 Pioneers. The battery at the Western post M^as repaired, and enlarged for 2 six-pounders, which opened their fire next morning. The breaching bat- tery (c), intended for 3 eighteen-pounders, was commenced, and two-thirds of it prepared for | two guns. The European detail, with 60 of the Natives, by some mistake omitted to attend. Fehruary "iGtk. Working Party.— . . . Europeans, 100 Sopoys, . . . Pioneers. The road to tlie center post breaching battery was completed. The 26th, at Night. Working Party. — 100 Europeans, 200 Sepoys, 260 Pioneers. The breaching battery for two of the eight&en- pounders was finished, and armed, and a revet- ment of gabions for the third was placed and filled; but owing to the rockiness of the soil, nothing further could be added to the thickness of the parapet. ' February 27th. A further reconnoissance was made, and a ATTACK OF SINGHUR. 03 spot to the South East (marked d in the plan) CHAP. was fixed upon, for two additional eighteen- ^^^' pounders, to assist in making the breach. ig.g The 11th, at Night. 'Working Party.— 100 Europeans, 200 Sepoys, 200 Pioneers. The new battery (d), for 2 eighteen-ponnders, was nearly constructed. Fehrnary 28M. Working Party. — . . . Europeans, , . . Sepoys, 60 Pioneers. The new battery was completed, and armed with 2 eighteen-pound ers, which opened their fire about 10 o'clock next morning. A howitzer was also added. A brisk fire was still kept up by the enemy. The '2e>th, at Night. NYoRKiNG Party. — 100 Europeans, 100 Sepoys, 100 Pioneers. The center post breaching battery was re- paired, and completed for three guns. March 1st. About 9 A. M. a white flag was hoisted by the Garrison, and two Deputies were sent to the British camp, forthe purpose of negociating. Articles of capitulation were drawn up, with which they returned. During llie interval the fire from our batteries had been suspended, but was re-opened from the breachitig batteries a little after noon, no re[)ly having been received 64 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, from the Fort. About 3 p. m. a messenger ^^j^J^ arrived with a letter, stating that agents, vested 1818 ^^^^^ f^^^^ powers to treat, would be immediately dispatched, and they accordingly arrived be- tween 4 and 5 o'clock ; but the Articles could not be arranged, and a second communication with the Fort took place. During this time a partial fire was kept up by our batteries, excepting the Eastern post. 31arch '3rd. The batteries, except the Eastern one, opened as usual about 8 a.m. A third party from the Fort arrived, and the terms were finally ar- ranged. ENGINEER DEPARTMENT. Captain J. Nutt, Bombay Engineer, Commanding. Lieutenant Grant, Madras Engineers. „ Macleod, Ditto. „ Athill, Bombay Engineer. ORDNANCE. 4 Iron 18-pounders. 2 ditto 12-pounders. 2 brass 12-pounders. 1 ditto 10-inch Mortar. 4 ditto 8-inch Mortars. 2 ditto 5i-inch Howitzers. There were expended during the siege, 1417 shells, and 2300 eighteen-pound shot. REFLECTIONS. As is generally the case with similar For- ATTACK OF BELGAUM. 05 tresses, there remained to the Engineer no CHAP. choice as to the point to be attacked, and the ^.^^^ positions of the batteries, alone required the exer- jg^g cise of professional talents. These appear to have been well selected, and fortunately our fire had the effect of intimidating the Garrison. Had they shown more resolution, they might have detained us much longer, but the defence they made was unworthy of the name. While part of the Reserve Division was thus Opera- ^ tions of occupied, the remainder of it. commanded by Brigadiei- 1 1 • General Brigadier-General Munro, was employed in re-Munro. ducing the Southern Mahratta country, which was wholly in the possession of the Peishwah's adherents; and the General's first operations were crowned with very brilliant success. The attack of Badaumee may, in particular, be noticed as a remarkable instance of the effect produced by the bravery and resolution of our troops, in intimidating their enemy, when occu- pying an impregnable position. After the fall of this place, the Division marched to Bel- gaum, a Fort situated near the Western Ghauts, and which they reached on the 20th of March. The strength of the Division for the siege consisted of— 2 Squadrons of Dragoons. 3 Troops of Native Cavalry. 11 Companies of Native Infantry. 4 Companies of Mysore Regular Infantry. 4 Companies of Pioneers. E 66 SIEGES OF THE MABKAS AKMV. The battering train was composed of-~ * 2 Iron 18-pounders. 2 Iron 12-pounders. 2 Brass 12-pounders. 2 Heavy Mortars. 1818. ATTACK OF BELGAUM. On arriving before the place, the Pettah was Descrip- Qccupied, and the Fort Teoonnoitred. Its shape tioii of the Fort of is an irregnlar oval, in circninference abont 2600 Belgauin. Plate VI. ya»'ds ; its greatest length being abont 900 yards, from the Flag-staff Bastion to tlie Southward. It is surrounded by a deep wet ditcli, and a regular sloping glacis, with a clear esplanade around it of 600 yards. The Engineer, by whom the Fort was built, has, apparently, trusted entirely to the ditch for the defence of the East and West fronts, for the greater part of them has been left without any round towers, which are only placed on the North and South fronts; in the former of which is the gateway. The other defences of the Fort consist of two or three cavaliers, prepared for batteries; one of which is at the North-West angle behind the Plag-stafl" Bastion, and has apparently been placed there for the further protection of the " III one place Colonel Blacker mentions two Ift-pounders as the complement, but in his subsequent remarks he says, *' the three iron 18-pounders wore so run in the vent, &c." 1 have adopted the former, as this agrees with the number stated to have been in battery. f/.ATE n. / //''.''v/.l/i'i/ AU'V. A ii.>it^^.n;.KJ^andlA\,nd, '""^-C/." B. £ptUiniiftp Boittfy kT-; IS Py '^' \m^ 1 5-*Jlamt!fr ^1% D. Baturrd's J2K'-»ki^ ^mi nffff>ra rhnn time YynJfJ^rS^ e.f.e. TheTrme/mr 1. y*K«wri/*.wv ? frrrruvH" S. f7/jfl. OiUfSafart 4. KiUaii^Bftaf S. MoJtjiie oumd^ rhf Ihrt / r ' of tl)f (l^atf Uiitl) of the ■ J ATTACK OF BELGAUM. ^7 entrance into the Fort, which is situated near CHAP. Ill the North-East angle. There are three gate- ,^^,^^ ways, which, after the Fort was taken, were jgjg found to have been built up, and barricaded, platevii. Between the inner and middle gateways, there is a narrow causeway across the ditch, protect- ed by a small outwork, with a tolerably thick rampart, and a dry ditch and glacis in front of it. The Pettah lies opposite to the West front of the Fort, but extends some distance to the Northward, where are the remains of an old wall, which, after covering part of the Pettah > on that side, takesa South-Easterly direction, and terminates on the glacis of the Fort, oppo- site to the Flag-staff Bastion. The garrison consisted of 1600 men. The works were well supplied with ordnance and stores, and the walls, which are very substantially built of granite, and which vary from 35 to 60 feet in height, were in good repair. Marck 20lk. A battery for 3 twelve-pounders was com- menced near a mosque, opposite to the North face, about 900 yards distant from the Fort, and in order to create a diversion^, a five-and-a- half-inch mortar, and a six-pounder, opened from the Pettah. March 'list. The battery (a) opened, and was answered by five guns from the enemy, but notwithstand- 1818. 08 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP. i"R: this superiority, the enemy's fire was ^^^- ahnost silenced by the next morning. ^ March 22d, and 23d. During the night, an enfilading battery (b) was completed, situated in the Pettah, about 600 yards from the Flag-staff Bastion, for the purpose of enfilading the North face and gate- way. A gun opened on it from the cavalier behind the Flag-staff Bastion, and the fire of the battery (a), was returned from the cm-tain on the left of the gate. March 24th. An approach was connnenced from the North-East, behind the old Pettah wall, about 900 yards distant from the Fort, and was car- ried 140 yards to the Eastward, in the direction F F. March 2Dfh. The approach was continued 120 yards, and the enemy's fire appeared nearly silenced. March 26///. l^he enemy opened from the Flag-staff Bat- tery, which was supposed to have been nearly destroyed by the twelve-pounder battery (a) ; and they fired also from a gun on the right of the gate. The approach was continued 100 yards over very hard ground. March 27th. The mortar was moved from battery b to a. During tin- night, the trench was continued 100 yards. / €) A'lTACK OF BELGAUW. 09 March '28lh. The approach was continued 120 yards, in a South-Westerly direction, clearing tlie salient jq.^ angle of the outwork, in front of the gateway. The enemy only fired from two guns. March 30lh. The approach proceeded 120 yards. March 3\sl. The magazine belonging to battery (a) blew up, and the garrison sallied to take advantage of the confusion, but were met 100 yards froni it, by the battery guard and Artillery detail, who drove them back into the Fort. April \st. The twelve-pounder battery (a) was repaired, and an eight-inch mortar opened its fire. The r<\ 5|-inch mortar was carried back again to the enfilading battery. " The approach was con- tinued 50 yards in advance. April 2d. A breaching battery (c) for 2 eigh teen- pounders was commenced, and completed, at the distance of 600 yards from the gateway, and 550 from the Flag-staft' Bastion. April 3d. The battery opened, directing its fire on the left of the gateway, with great efl'ect. It was answered by two guns of the enemy, which caused some annoyance, and a battery (d) was therefore constructed for 2 twelve-pounders, to 70 SIEGES OF THE IVlADRAS ARMY. CHAP, silence them, 150 yards nearer the Fort, than ^^- the breaching battery. ,j^^o April 4^th, 5th, atid 6th. The batteries all continued firing without intermission till the 6th, when a battery (e) for 1 twelve-pounder, about 200 yards from the outer work of the gateway, was completed. April 1th. The battery (e) opened this day, but the gun burst after a few rounds firing. The breach of the curtain to the left of the ^^,} "'■■ gateway was continued, but the fire of the gar- rison was by no means got under. \^ April 8th. The 1 twelve-pounder battery (e) was length- ened fi)r 2 guns, and was armed with the iron guns from battery a, which was dismantled. April 9th. Battery e opened with great effect on the curtain near the gate, which had not been de- stroyed, and which gave cover to the enemy's gin jals* and small arms. A practicable breach was also made in the outwork, in front of the gateway, which induced the Killedar to open a negociation. * Long matchlocks, of various calibres, used as wall pieces by the Natives of India, which are coniiuonly fixed like swivels, and carry iron balls not exceeding a pound in weight. In the field, they are sometimes carried on the backs of camels. AITACK OF BELGAITM. "^1 April mh. CHAP. The batteries fired as usual, till the garrison ,^ surrendered at discretion, when the British 1818. troops took possession of the outer i^ateway, and on the l'2th the garrison marched out. IIEFLECTIONS. The foregoing account of the Siege of Bel- irauni has been extracted from Colonel Blacker's Memoir, and before commencing the reflections which I am about to offer on it, I must be allowed to join in the full tribute of praise, which that officer has paid to the zeal and per- severance, with which the attack was carried on, and all the obstacles arising from inefficient means surmounted ; and if in the spirit of im- partial investigation, which in these discussions it has been my endeavour to pursue, some objections should arise to the general details of the works carried on, and to the spot selected for the breach, they will be urged rather to show, what might have been done with a well organized department, than to call in question the abilities of the distinguished and respectable officer* who, in the absence of an Engineer, directed the attack. The first point to which the attention is di- rected, on an examination of the Plan, is the * Lieutenant-Colonel Newall of the Madras Infantry. 72 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, number of batteries^ which appear to have been I^^- somewhat needlessly accumulated ; and some 1818 ^^^^i6"'» ^^ ^^ ^^^y i^^S^ ^y their effect as de- tailed in the Journal, apparently at too great a distance to have made the desired impression on the works. This remark is particularly applicable to the batteries, marked a and c, \ which might perhaps have been dispensed with, \ and the guns in them placed more advantage- ously at once, in battery at d and e. The position for the battery at b, was most judi- ciously chosen, but it might have had still more effect in enfilading the North front, if it had been placed a little to the right, in the pro- longation of the general line of that front. The direction of the trenches, marked f f f, was probably regulated by some localities, with w hich the Plan does not make us acquainted ; and it is therefore suggested with diffidence, that if a trench had been made from b to e, connecting these two points, instead of following the line f f f, represented in the Plan, 200 yards of trench work would have been saved, and the garrison would have been more effectually con- fined ; or a part of the old Pettah wall, to the Northward, marked in the Plan 7 8, might '^i have been converted into a parallel, and the only trench necessary would then have been from 8 to f, which would have reduced the ATTACK OF BELGAUM. 73 quantity to 400 yards, instead of 750 yards* CHAP. actually executed. u-^^ If it was intended to carry on any sap in ad- jg^g vance of e, from whence to assault the breach, •the breaching battery was established too soon, as the enemy might, in the time which it would have required to make such a sap, have re- trenched or cut off the breach. If it was in- tended that the storming party should attack from the trenches at e, 200 yards distant, without any place to be occupied in the im- mediate vicinity of the breach, the result of the storm must have been doubtful. It will appear by reference to the Plan of the gate- way and breach (see Plate VII.), that the besiegers would have had no small obstacles to surmount in attempting it; and if the garrison had behaved with resolution, access to the breach, without some further operations, would appear impossible. The spot near the gateway, which was selected for the breach, was, in fact, the best defended point of the Fort ; but in this^ as in other instances during the war, the be- * Colonel Blacker's Memoir states 750 yards of trench to liave been the quantity executed, but the Plan shows nearly 1000. The distances, stated by Colonel Blacker, of the batteries from the Fort are generally inconsistent with the Plan, which will account for the difference in the distances given by mc, from those contained in Colonel Blackers Memoir. 74 SIEGES Ol THE MADKAS ARMY. CHAP, siegers were obliged to breach that part of the ^^^- walls, near which there was a cause wav across ^^^o the ditch, without reference to its comparative weakness or strength, for in the imperfect state of the siege department, it would have been be- yond their means to have effected the passage of the ditch at any other point. It is a great and undeniable proof of judge- ment, to regulate the project of attack of a Fortress, by the means at hand to carry it into effect, and judged by this rule, the plan pur- sued on the present occasion was judicious; but with sufficient means for common siege operations, an Engineer Officer, in all proba- bility, would rather have attacked the Fortress of Belgaum on the West side, innnediately opposite to the mosque (marked 5), where there is a salient point, without any fianking defence on it whatever ; and a similar one is to be found on the East front, but the cover afforded by the Pettah would ensure a preference to the former. One approach, connecting the Fettali with the mosque (5), another of 200 yards from thence (towards 9), and a third of the same lengtli, directed clear of the South-Western salient angle of the Fortress, would have brought the assailants to tiie foot of the slope of the glacis, from whence the descent into the ditch might have been carried on. When the trencJH s had advanced thus far, a breacliiuii: ATTACK OF BELGAUM. 75 battery might have been constructed on the CHAP, small rising ground, on whicli the mosque is ^^^• situated, and there is no doubt that operations ^g.^ of this kind might, with a well supplied De- partment, have been brought to a certain ter- mination in less time, than was employed in the present instance, in breaching a point, which, if defended,it was uncertain whether we could gain. But it would have been madness to have attempted such a course as I have described, under existing circumstances, and it must be allowed, that the Commanding officer, from his experience at Badaumee, had good reason to depend on the valour of the troops, in sur- mounting the obstacles, which the breach in the projected spot would have presented to them; and the trifling loss we experienced, of only 25 men, during a siege of twenty days open trenches, affords in itself the highest encomium on the manner in which the siege was conducted. Shortly after the capture of Belgaum, a junc-me Re- tion was formed with the remaining part of the Division Reserve Division, commanded by Brigadier- "Jfsl[,o^a. General Pritzler, which, after the fall of Sin- 1"*°'- ghur, had been successfully employed in re- ducing the Forts, between Sattarahand Poonah. On receiving this reinforcement, the Division immediately marched against the Fortress of Sholapoor, near which a part of the Peishwah's force occupied a position. The force of the Division was as follows. 76 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP. I^ig^it ^ European Flank Battalion ^;l(W'n HI. Brigade^ Rifle Corps i ^'^"'''^ Center ^ 4th Madras Native Infantry ^nio 1818. Brigade^2dBatt. 9th Madras Native Infantry S Left ^ 1st Batt. 7th Bombay Native Infantry "^ Brigade! 2d Batt. 12th Madras Native Infantry S 2 Squadrons H. M. 22d Dragoons 180 Artillery— 123 Rank and File. Pioneers — 4 Companies. The Division arrived before Sholapoor on the 9th of May, and took up its grouml about two miles and a half from the Fort, on its Western side. The Fort being much covered by trees, its figure was not distinctly observed ; but the enemy's Infantry and guns were seen, drawn up with their right upon the glacis, and 'their line extending to the Southward, along the bank of a Tank, which covered them breast high. The British force amounted to about 4000 men, as detailed above. The enemy (who were commanded by Gunput Row, one of the Peishwah's principal Chiefs) were about 6000 men, with 14 guns, independent of the Garri- son, who were estimated at 900 more. Sholapoor is situated in an extensive plain of Desciip- black soil, intersected here and there by rivu- tion of . ' . , Sholapoor. Jets of brackish water. The ground immediately to the South is gently elevated and undulating, of a hard reddish soil. It is a large commercial town, inclosed by a strong mud wall, with towers of masonry on all sides, excepting to- ATTACK OF SHOLAPOOR. 77 wards the South-VVest, where it is bounde the defences of the Fort are further impaired by a village, called Sumnaree, situated on the left bank of the river, nearly opposite to the outer gate of the Fort, which communicates with the Pettah. A thick grove of mango trees, 400 yards in depth, also runs along the same bank of the river opposite to the South-West angle. The country is perfectly flat to a considerable dis- tance around the Fort. The soil on the left bank of the river is a black mud, about one foot in s^ X ATTACK OF xMALLlGAUM. 115 the purpose. The Garrison, from the best in for- CHAP. mation that could be collected, was estimated, ,^^1, when we arrived before the place, at 700 men. 1818. In the reconnoissauce which the Engineers made, the Garrison allowed them to ride along the right bank of the river, immediately opposite the Fort, without interruption, as some nego- ciatious were going on at the time, and thus a good view was obtained of the defences of the inner and outer lines, on the South and West sides ; but nothing could be seen of the ditch or faussebray, the existence of which was only known from the reports of the Natives, who all differed in their accounts of the situation and dimensions of these works, describing the faussebray merely as a range of stabling. Very little could beascertamed regarding the strength of the Fort on the East and North side, as the Garrison occupied the Pettah, and the village af Sumnaree. PROJECT OF ATTACK. From the limited information which was thus obtained, the Commanding Engineer re- commended an approach from the right bank of the river, against the South-West angle, for the following reasons ; First, because in order to attack the East front, it would be necessary to carry the Pettah, which in all probability could not be effected, without suffering such loss as would cripple our future operations. Secondly, H 2 116 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. the same objections existed to an attack on the North side, and to the Southward the ground 1818. on the left bank of the river was too confined for the necessary operations. Thirdly, that the ground on the right bank of the river was the most favorable for the construction of the neces-' sary works. The following was the plan he proposed : to construct the batteries (1) and (2) in the pro- longation of the West and South faces, and at the distance of about 500 yards from them, in order to destroy the defences of those fronts, and to enfilade them. Each battery to have a place of arms attached to it, and to contain 2 guns, besides which, No. 1 battery was to be armed with 2 mortars and 2 howitzers for bom- barding the place. A parallel (B) for 200 men was to be constructed the same night, in the mango grove, between these two enfilading bat- teries. From the parallel (B) he proposed to advance \ by the zigzags BCDEF,to the bank of the river, j along which the second parallel was to be esta- i blished, and on its right flank the breaching battery (3) for 4 guns. This was to be armed with the same guns, which were to be with- drawn from the batteries (I) and (2), as soon as the defences of the Fort were ruined. The bottom of the revetments of the towers (j/) and (r), which were suj)posed to bo of mud .fen;./i on the lijtr r^f. -1 ATTACk OF MALLIGATIM. 1T7 facetl with stone, to be loosened by the breach- CHAP. ing battery, for the purpose of enabling the .^^^.^ Miners to form chambers for destroying them ; ^^^j^ and when this was effected, lodgments to be established in their ruins, and the intermediate cnrtain to be converted into a parallel ; that por- tion of it, which was in the line of fire of the breaching battery, being levelled, in order that the l>ottom of the inner wall might be seen over it. From behind this lodgment, he proposed to sink a shaft, and working from thence, to blow in the counterscarp opposite to the curtain (f) which was to be breached ; and he projected' some further mining operations on that side, which were to ruin the scarp of the ditch, and to destroy one of the interior towers. As much depended on confining the Garrison, he proposed that an establishment should b6 made opposite to the outer gate on the North side of the Fort, but it was necessary to post- pone this till a reinforcement arrived. ArrACK OF MALLIGAUM. May the \Wi. All the intrenching tools and materials col- lected for the siege, having been carried down at 5 P. M. to the Engineer Depot, which was established in rear of the mango grove, the working parties for the night assembled. At dusk the Engineers marked. out the enfilading batteries (1) and (2) about oOO yards distant 118 SIEGES OvF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, from the Soiith-West angle of the body of thie ^}/^ Place, and in the prolongation of the South joij^ and West faces. The former was intended for 2 eighteen-ponnders, 2 eight-inch howitzers, and, 2 eight-inch mortars: the latter for 2 twelve- pounders. Tli€ parallel (B) about 200 yards, in length, and 300 distant from the bank of the, river, was also marked out. As soon as it was* dark, the working parties filed off to their respective works, and commenced their operar tions. About eight p. m. the enemy made a sortie from their own left, along the bank of the? river, and attacked the covering party posted in the grove, in front of the working party, c<;>n.- structimg the parallel. This sortie was sup- ported by a sharp fire from the gun« in the Fort,,; and of matchlocks from the lower wall. The Arabs behaved with great gallantry, fighting from tree to tree, and were engaged hand tQ< hand with a detachment of the Madras Euro-^. pean Regiment, who could not form line, owing; to the nature of the ground, but who succeeded in repulsing them, after a short and sanguinary conflict, in which Lieutenant Davies, the Com- manding Engineer, was unfortunately killed.*! * This Officer has scarcely left his equal behind him in zeal, perseverance, and activity. His whole soiil was de- voted to the service. In the presence of an enemy, he alhiosr denied himself the necessary support of food and sleep; no' difficulty seemed to appal hini; and he carried the plans ihe' PLATE Jm. ele fc Son -fc. 352 Stxaiul fM. f.i /f// Ir-if////! r ATTACK OE MALLIGAUM. 110 J ](} Ani\) i\H\3Iay l/ie \9thi I -. i„;Tlie batteries (1) and (2) opened on the Fort at day-light, the former with tolerable eftect : ^g^g but the twelve-pounders in the latter were found to make little or no impression on the defences of the inner Fort. Tlie enemy returned the tire from 7 or 8 guns, of all calibres, from nine-pounders downwards, the greater part of which were disabled and sileliced by our guns in the course of the morning. During the night, the approach B C D E F was constructed, which afforded tolerable cover, and a small portion of the second parallel at the head of the zigzags was also completed, in which three embrasures had formed into executron wit^ a courage and perseverance, whi(ih deserved success if they could not always command it. Wh6n not actively employed, his time was entirely given up to the study of his profession, at»d to the instruction of his little body of Sappers and Miners : nor can higher proof of his merit be desired, than the proficiency attained by these men, during a period of active service, in duties entirely new to them. Having alluded in a former note to the reflection^ thrown out by a coteniporary writer*, agiainst his tenip^r, I shall only add, that it was too often tried' by the vexat?ious opposition, which he experienced to his enlightened views, whilst endeavouring to place his Department on a more eflScieut footing. His brother Officers of the Corps of En- gineers have determined to erect a monument to his memory, and to that of Lieutenant Nattes, who fell shortly after, hoping that this record of their esteem and respect, whilst it perpetuates the names of those distinguished Officers, may also serve as an incitement to others, to, follow their example, and emulate their fame. 120 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, were opened to protect the left flank of the ^^' parallel. A battery for 2 six-pounders was iftifi prepared at (G), and the adjoining avenues and gardens were occupied. At ten p. m. the enemy made a sortie, to attack this post, but were repulsed without loss on our part. The small- ness of our force did not admit of our taking possession of the whole village. 4 :^tu. MnythelOtli. i The village (H) on our left, which had been deserted by the inhabitants during the night of the 19th, was occupied by a party of Arabs, who at 10 this morning made a bold attack on our outposts, but were soon repulsed and driven out of the village by a charge of the Sepoys of the 13th Madras Native Infantry, under Captain Robson. The eighteen and twelve-pounders, in batteries (I) and (2) were lired but seldom, on account of a scarcity of shot. The approaches were completed to the proper width, and 2 six-pounders were placed in the battery at (F), to scour the river and de- stroy the defences of the lower work. During the night the parallel was extended, without loss, about 140 yards to the right, along the bank of the river, and at the distance of 150 yards from the exterior works of the Fort. May 'list. The right of the parallel was extended 150 yards, along the bank of the river ; and the ATTACK OF MALLIGAUM. I^t •breaching battery (3), of four 2:11ns, was con- CHAP, structed at the distance of about 150 yards ^^ from the enemy's exterior line of works, on the j^g^g. South side of the Fort. On the right of this battery, one mortar was placed, and at the ex- treme right a return was formed, for the protec- tion of this flank of the trenches. May 22^. The guns were brought up from tlie batteries (1) and (2), and were placed in the breaching battery after day-light, the enemy's fire being keptun)-*»jii^ 1818 On the right of this position, a small place of arms, and a battery (4) for 2 six-pounders, were constructed, into which the guns from the bat- tery (G), which was about 170 yards in rear of this position, were brought up, and that battery was dismantled. This new post, besides dis- tracting the enemy's attention, put a stop to the free ingress and egress, by the gateway, which they had formerly possessed; and consequently caused them to be, more exposed to our shells, than hereto forenj-/ h nU vd bne ,«9(i'>njTi I orl ■ b!»b:;ia(K> I' ^^::(f .] Mai/ '23d,\o{\-)\ 'ull i'<,; u.um-.ilU.u,.^ Mai/2ni/i:'' *'"' '■ " '^"^'^^ The battering guns were employed in cutling away the sides of the breach, so as to form aii ascent on each side for^ mo tin ting, the rampart. 124 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP. The breach was then reported practicable; and ' it was determined to assault the Fort at day- 1818 ^*S^^^} next morning.* ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ASSAULT. Three simultaneous attacks were ordered to be made, on different sides of the place ; one on the Pettah, the second on the exterior line of works, and the third and principal one on the breaches. The first had for its main ol)ject the occupation of the Pettah, to prevent the escape of the Garrison into it, on the assault of the Fort. The second party were to take posses- sion of the outer walls by escalade, between the great gate and the ditch, and to establish thenii- selves there, and as it was supposed that they would be able to find cover and command the passage of the ditch, no difficulty was contem- plated in eft'ecting their lodgment. Both of these attacks it was hoped would distract the attention of the Garrison, and would enable h«, if repulsed at the breach, to have recourse to extensive mining operations. ut The party for the attack of the Pettah con« * Before tlie assault, was finally decided upon, the expe- diency of forming a lodgment on the outer breach, and of establishing a battery thtie agiiinst the inner works, had been discussed ; but this measure was over-ruled in conse- (luencc of the opinion of Lieutenant Nattes, who represented that these operations would probably be attended with as heavy a loss, as was likely to result from the immediate assault of (he whole of the works on that side. ATTACK OF MALLTGAITM. 125 sisted of 500 Sepoys, accompanied hy 50 cHAP. Pioneers, not including the men who carried 5 ^^ • scaling ladders, the whole led by an Engineer ^o.g Officer. The party for the escalade of the outer wall consisted of 50 Europeans, 250 Sepoys, and 50 Pioneers, with 5 scaling ladders ; and was also led by an Engineer Officer. The storming party for the assault of the breach was led by Lieutenant Nattes, the Com- manding Engineer, and was composed of the European Sappers and Miners, and a Serjeant's party of Europeans, each carrying besides his arms, a bundle of grass for filling up the ditch. They were followed by the Native Sappers and Miners with scaling ladders, 15 Europeans with bundles of grass, and 80 Sepoys; 125 Sepoys were ordered to file to the right and left on passing the outer breach, and to scour the outer ramparts, taking possession of the huts between the walls. A reserve of 50 Europeans and 300 Sepoys were to follow this party, and had orders also to extend to the right and left, if it should appear necessary; otherwise they were to remain under cover, without the exte- rior walls. At seven o'clock p. m. the several parties for the assault occupied the positions pointed out to them, in the vicinity of their respective attacks. The party for the breach remained 126 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, during the night, in the breaching battery and ^^' adjoining parallel. That for the Pettah bi- 1818 ^'oiiacked on the left bank of the river, about 800 yards North of the Pettah. The party for the outer wall were stationed during the night m the gardens of the village of Sumnaree. "-' Mav29lh. At half-past three a. m., a brisk fire from the breaching battery (3), and from the mortar bat- tery (l), was directed against the breach, and the space between the walls. At broad day- light, the storming party advanced in the pre- scribed order. The Engineer who led, on reaching the summit of the breach on the first wall, waved his hand to his party, the meaning of which it is impossible to ascertain, as imme- diately afterwards he received several shots from a retrenchment (cc) that had been con- structed by the enemy for the defence of the breach, by which he was mortally wounded.* * Lieutenant Nattes was alike admirable as an Officer, a Oentleniari, and a Christian. With the science and zeal, which become the military clmracter, he combined the urbanity of manners, the liberal accomplishments, and the warmth of heart, that constitute the ornaments and the bond of private life, together with those virtues, which are the fruits of sincere devotion. Nothing could be more distressing, than to see him cut ofl" in the bloom of youth, just as his mild and unassuming merits were becoming generally known. Only a few hours before he died, he committed his thoughts to paper, in which he expressed, that the grief, which hrknew ATTACK OF MALLIGAUM. 127 The Officer commanding the storming party CHAP, afterwards mounted the breach, but on letting ^^ • down his scaling ladders, on the other side of .^^^x the wall, it is said that they all fell out of the men's hands, who held them. This circumstance being reported, orders were given for the whole party to retreat to the trenches, which was effected in a steady man- ner. Immediately afterwards the Garrison hung out a flag of truce, that we might carry away our dead and wounded. Meanwhile the party for the attack of the Pettah advanced at a quarter before four o'clock, took possession of a considerable part before day-light, and by seven o'clock gained entire possession of it, with a trifling loss. The other party did not escalade the outer wall of the Fort, as intended. There was some difficulty atlirst, in adjusting the length of the ladders, and after this was rectified, a delay occurred, whilst the Officer commanding the party was employed in posting sharpshooters to keep tlown the enemy's fire. Before this was efl'ected that his dear parents and some valued friends would feel, in case of his fall, was the only consideration, that weighed upon his mind, in anticipating the probability of such an event. In regard to his own feelings, he concluded by quoting some energetic lines from an admired modern British Poet, expressing a decided preference to the death of the warrior in battle, as contrasted with the lingering illness of a sick bed. 128 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, to his satisfaction, the failure of the storming ^^' party at the breach became known, and the „.g^ attempt was of course abandoned, having ex- perienced a trifling loss, in placing the ladders. During the night temporary barricades were constructed across the principal streets of the Pettah, upon which the enemy made several attacks, but was constantly repulsed. Mai/ the SOth, After the failure of the assault on the Fort, it was recommended that the attack on the West side should be abandoned, for the follow- ing reasons. First, the total want of guns and ammunition, the breaching guns having become unserviceable, and all the shot being expended. Secondly, the length of time that would pro- bably elapse before the arrival of a reinforce- ment of artillery. Thirdly, on account of the threatening state of the weather, and the ex- pected approach of the monsoon, which might render the river an insurmountable obstacle to our operations on that side. It was therefore proposed to commence an entirely new attack on the East face of the Fort, as the possession of the Pettah afforded our troops ample cover, and a safe approach, on that side, to the outer wall, the nature of which was now for the first time ascertained, as also a facility of mining, to which the river on the West side was an insurmountable obstacle. ATTACK OF MALLIGAUM. 129 III order to confine the Garrison as much as CHAP. possible, it was proposed to leave a battalion of ^^* Sepoys on the West side of the river, which jo^o might take up its quarters in the village (H), whence parties to be relieved occasionally might be sent to the post (I), and to a redout, which it was recommended to construct near the breaching battery. The streets of the Pettah, communicating with the Fort, to be barricaded, by which means an excellent parallel would be obtained, along the whole extent of that side of the Fort. It was then proposed to establish mines under the three towers (/, m, and u) of the outer wall, and for this purpose to sink shafts within the houses immediately opposite to them, and eventually to form lodgments on the breaches caused by these mines, in conse- quence of which it was expected, that the enemy would be driven from the outer wall. Having proceeded so far, it was not expected that much more could be done till the arrival of a reinforcement of artillery. Mai/ 3ist, Working parties were employed in preparing materials. Battery (1) was dismantled, and during the night, permanent barricades {o,p, q^ and r) were constructed across the principal streets of the Pettah. June \st. The Detachment encamped in a new position 130 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. GHAP. to the North-East of the Pettah, at the distance ^y, of about two miles from it. A redout (L) for 1818 ^^^ "^^" ^^^ commenced at night. Two bat- talions of Native Infantry, 50 Europeans, and the Sappers and Miners, remained on the old ground, during the construction of this redout. June 2d. Thesamework was continued during thenight. Jmie 3d. This day 2 iron eighteen-pounders, from the Hill Fort of Unkye Tunkye, arrived in camp : and the redout was completed in the course of the night. June 4t/i. The party on the West side of the river, with the exception of one battalion left for the de- fence of the post (I), and of the redout, joined Head Quarters. During the night, an approach to the redout, from the parallel, was constructed. June 5th. All the Sappers and Miners, under an En- gineer Officer, took up their quarters in the Pettah, and immediately commenced sinking shafts, opposite to the towers (/, m, and n) of the outer wall. June 61 h. The mines were continued this day and night, without intermission. June 7th. The two mines opposite to the towers (in & n) AITACK OF MALLIGAUM. 131 \rere abandoned, on meeting with a stratum of CHAP. hard rock, within 5 feet of the surface. The ^^^^^ mine opposite to the right tower (/) proceeded ^g^j^ slowly, the soil being rocky and hard. June 8t/t. The mine opposite to the right tower was continued, and about 30 feet of gallery com- pleted. This morning, a little before day-light, the mine fell in, in consequence of the little depth of soil above, and of a heap of stones under which the gallery ran, which gave way, and buried the European Miner, who was fix- ing the sheeting boards. Fortunately, the gallery was covered over, without being per- ceived by the enemy. June ^tli. During the night, battery (5) ou the North side of the Fort, for all the mortars, and 2 guns expected from Seroor, was commenced about 400 yards from the outer wall. The distance of the shaft from the tower (/) was this night correctly ascertained by actual measurement, by carrying a line across. June lOt/i. Battery (5) was completed during the night. The Bombay detachment arrived, consisting of 1 battalion of Native Infantry, and a detail of Artillery, with 4 eighteen pounders, 2 brass twelve-pounders, 1 ten-inch, 4 eight-inch, and I five-and-a-half-inch mortar. The mine pro- I 2 132 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, ceeded very slowly, in consequence of the rocky ^^' nature of tlie ground, and of the men not hav- 1818 ^"^ heeu sufficiently practised beforehand in the fixing of gallery frames. June 1 1 t/i. Battery (5) opened at daylight with I ten- inch, and 5 eight-inch mortars, and 2 five-and- a-half-inch howitzers. At eleven a.m. two of the enemy's powder magazines blew up in quick succession, bringing down a large portion of one of the curtains of the body of the place from the very foundation, and exposing the whole interior of the Fort. In consequence of the extent and apparent practicability of the breach caused by the explosion, it was resolved that no time should be lost in taking advantage of it. Accordingly, during the night, the battery (0) for 2 eighteen-pounders, was constructed in a Mussulman's burying ground, 320 yards from the works, in order to destroy the defences of the inner wall. Another battery (7) for 4 eighteen-pounders, was commenced on the bank of the river, opposite to, and (JOO yards distant from the outer wall, which it was resolved to breach, in frontof thespot, where the explosions above-mentioned had laid open the interior line of works. June X'lth. Negociations being entered into, we were *M[iabled to proceed with battery (7), which was ATIACK OF MALLIGAUM. 133 completed in the cpurse of the day. This niglit CHAP. the gallery reached the foundation of the tower ^ • (/). June \^lli. The Garrison surrendered. A Jemidar's party of Native Infantry was admitted into the Fort, and the British flag was hoisted upon one of the towers at noon. June lol/i. The Garrison marched out of the Fort at a quarter past nine a.m., and grounded their arms before our troops, who were drawn up to re- ceive them in front of the principal gateway. Tliey were afterwards marched off to a part of the Pettah, allotted to them for quarters. The Garrison marched out only 350 men, for a party made their escape, when the Pettah was taken. They acknowledged to have lost 35 killed and 60 wounded during the siege.* Our loss was much more severe, being 5 officers killed, 8 wounded, and 220 rank and file killed and wounded. These casualties were princi- [>ally occasioned by the skill of the Arabs, who are very expert marksmen, in the use of their matchlocks, with which they picked off those men, who exposed themselves in the trenches. They certainly made a very gallant defence, and their consideration in allowing us to carry ofl" • This is so unusual a proportion, that in all probability it must have been a misrepresentation. 134 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, our dead and wounded, as well as their respect ^^- for flags of truce, and of negociations entered -j^ig into, do them no less credit.* ENGINEER DEPARTMENT. Lieut. Da vies. Commanding Engineer C killed J . " Nattes, Staff C killed J. Ensign Purton, (severely wounded J. " Underwood, (slightly wounded J. Lake. 27 European 7^ , ^i,^. 45 Native T^PP^^'^ ^"^ ^^""'^• STORES, &c. 10,277 Sand Bags. 500 Gabions. 470 Fascines. And sufficient intrenching tools for the use of the Sappers and Miners. ORDNANCE. At the commencement of the Siege. 2 Iron eighteen-pounders 7 rendered 2 Iron twelve-pounders y unserviceable. 8 Brass six pounders. 1 Eight-inch mortar. 1 Five-and-a-half-inch ditto. 2 Eight-inch howitzers. 2 Five-and-a-half-inch ditto. Joined on the '3d of June. 4 Iron eighteen-pounders. * After they had laid down their arms, in front of our troops, Lieutenant-Colonel M'Dowall showed a laudable regard for good conduct in an enemy, by restoring their side arms, an indulgence so gratifying to their feelings, that many of them acknowledged it with tears. 1818. ATTACK OF MALUGAUM. 135 Joined on the 9lh of June. 4 Iron cighteen-poundeis. 3 Brass twelve-pounders. 1 Ten-inch mortar. 4 Eight-inch ditto. 2 Five-and-a-half-inch howitzers. AMMUNITION EXPENDED. Eighteen-pound shot 34G2 Twelve-pound shot 2395 Ditto grape 21 Six-pound shot 500 Ditto grape 50 Ten-inch shells 98 Eight-inch ditto 1004 Five-and-a-half-inch ditto 233 Eight-inch carcasses G Gunpowder, lbs 35,500 REFLECTIONS. If it were not for the Pettah, which weakens the East front so materially, Malligaum might be considered a perfect specimen of the strongest kind of Native Forts, so far as regards the size and disposition of the works, and also in re- ference to the rockiness of the soil, on which it is placed. The chief objection to the original project of attack is, that even if it had been possible to destroy the towers (if and z) by mining, as pro- posed, the intervention of the river between them and the trenches, must have proved an insuperable obstacle to that species of uninter- rupted and comparatively secure communica- 136 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, tion, at all hours, which is desirable, if notindis- ^^* pensably necessary to a besieging army, in the 1818 ^^^"^ ^^ ^"^ obstinate and protracted resistance, in which every successive work is disputed inch by inch. Accordingly it has been asserted, that the Fort was attacked in its strongest side; but it must be remembered, in justice to the ex- cellent Officer now no more, by whom the plan was formed, that he had only a choice of diffi- culties. The side actually attacked, but for the obstacle that has been noticed, was far from being the strongest. On the contrary, if success could have been anticipated on any side, from distant breaching batteries, without the neces- sity of progressive approaches, the sideactually attacked, or the West side, which like it can only be approached by crossing the river, may undoubtedly be considered the most favourable for such an operation ; for on the two other sides of the Fortress, the intricate works de- fending the gateways, and one extra inclosure, offer additional difficulties to an assault. But the chief reason which induced Lieutenant Davies to commence his operations from the opposite side of the river, was the reluctance which he felt to an attack on the Pettah, which otherwise must have been an indispensable preliminary. For in the event of a vigorous resistance, which there was every reason to an- ticipate, he thought that Lieutenant-Colonel ATTACK OF MALLIGAUM. 137 M'Dowall's original force would be so much CHAP. weakened, by the loss it must necessarily sus- y^J.^^ tain in the capture of the Pettah, as to become igjg^ entirely unequal to those ulterior operations, without which the fall of the Fortress itself could not be expected. Under this impression, having decided upon opening the trenches from the opposite side of the river, I shall only remark, that if he could have foreseen the im- possibility of destroying the towers {y and z) by mining, as originally intended, he would, in all probability have breached any other part of the South side, or some part of the West side of the outer wall, in preference to the re-enter- ing angle between these two towers. If, on the contrary, we had arrived before Malligaum, in sufficient numbers to have ren- dered a more vigorous mode of proceeding advisable, the Pettah would have been imme- diately assaulted, after the capture of which, the towers (/, m and ii) might have been destroy- ed by mines, either by driving galleries under them for that purpose, or by attaching the Miners to their scarp, for if the former method proved impracticable, on account of the rocki- ness of the soil, the latter might have been effected without difficulty, as the towers were constructed of mud. After these were ruined by mining, lodgements on the breaches might have driven the enemy from the outer line, and 138 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, confined him to the body of the Place and ^^' faussebray. The South side of the outer line 1818 ^'^"'^ falling into our possession, might have been converted into a convenient parallel, ex- tending from the Pettah to the tower marked (z) in the plan, near to which a breaching bat- tery might have been constructed to breach the front (a b), either in the spot where the breach was actually effected in the present instance, or in the curtain, near the tower (/>). It was before-mentioned, that Lieutenant Nattes, when on the summit of the breach, was seen to wave his hand, and that when the storm- ing party who followed him mounted it, imme- diately afterwards, the ladders dropped out of the hands of the men, wli^lst in the act of lower- ing them, for the purpose of descending the wall in rear of the breach. It has been confi- dently asserted, that the motion made by Lieut. Nattes, was a signal for the storming party to retire, in consequence of his having discovered from that elevated position, certain insuperable obstacles, previously unknown ;* and it has also been of course implied, that the ladders were considerably shorter, than the height of the wall alluded to, and consequently that they proved unserviceable, at the very moment when required for use. Of these assertions, 1 consider the one more than doubtful, the other decid- ' See Lieut.-Colonel Blacker'^ Memoir. ATTACK OF MALLIGAUM. 139 edly erroneous. For, on the most minute ex- CHAP. amination of the works, after the place surren- ^^' dered, the surviving- Engineers found, that the |oig only obstacle to the success of the assault, and certainly a very formidable one, was the fausse- bray. But Lieutenant Nattes fell on the breach, from whence he could not possibly have seen more than 5 or feet of the ditch of that work, the actual depth of which can no where be as- certained without advancing to the very crest of its counterscarp. It is evident, therefore, that nothing seen by him, on mounting the breach, could give him a more formidable notion of that work, than he entertained before, for although the precise strength of the faussebray was not known, its depth was by no means an unforeseen obstacle, but one considered, and in a certain degree provided for, in the plan of assault.* In regard to the breach itself, it is true * Extract of an official letter, written the day before the assault, from Lieutenant Nattes to Lieut.-Colonel M'Dowall. " That a ditch does exist, and that behind it there is a " loop-holed faussebray, are facts. That these are obstacles " is equally true, but I do not consider them insuperable. " Similar obstacles in Spain were overcome by the means I ^* which I propose," &c. &c. The above quotation sufficiently proves the incorrectness of the assertion, that Lieutenant Nattes discovered certain un- foreseen obstacles, on mounting (he breach of the outerwall. He had, however, in calculating- the quantity of materials for filhng up the ditches, estimated its depth at 20 feet, whereas it was afterwards found to be 25 feet. 140 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, that the original wall in the reverse of it, reniain- ^^^yj, ed nearly entire, but this was only 8 feet 1818 ^^S^^ ^**d the ladders carried to the spot were 18 feet long; and the enemy had made no at- tempt whatever to scarp away the ground at the bottom of the wall alluded to. In fact, the only work, constructed by them behind the breach, was the retrenchment marked (x) in the plan, which scarcely deserves the name, for it consisted of a trench, not 2 feet in width and depth, and of a parapet equally insignificant. (See the Section through e f in Plate XV). As the wall before described in the reverse of the breach, was a little lower towards the left, than on the extreme right, where Lieutenant Nattes himself had ascended, it is possible that the waving of his hand may have been intended to caution the storming party to incline a little to their left ; but for my part, as he must have despised the paltry obstacles at and in the immediate vicinity of the breach, I have not the smallest doubt but that the waving of his hand was a signal to the troops to advance without loss of time, in the hope of their being able to close with the Arabs in their retrench- ment, before the latter could effect their retreat into tiie faussebray. That the storming party did not advance further, as they certainly might have done, is, however, no discredit to them, for be- sides llic loss of the Engineer who led the as- ATTACK OF MALLTGAUM. 141 sault, their own Commanding Officer was badly CHAP. wounded, and the second in command killed ^^^^^ on the breach,* where the head of the column ^g|g remained with great coolness, exposed to a de- structive fire, until they received directions to retire, which they did in good order. If these unfortunate casualties had not paralized the efforts of thelroops at the breach, which caused the escalade on the outer line on the other side of the Fort also to be relinquished, it is not altogether impossible, but that the three simul- taneous attacks, vigorously conducted, might have produced such an effect upon the enemy, as to lead to the immediate surrender of the place. After the capture of Malliaaum, as the rains Lient.- ' '^ Colonel had already conimenced, Lieutenant-Colonel M'Dowaii takes up M'Dowall's detachment took up their quarters lusqnar- . tersforthe for the monsoon. In the mean tune, the force monsoon. under Lieut.-Colonel Adams had been em- ployed in the siege of Chanda, which we shall now proceed to relate, after briefly noticing the previous operations. Subsequently to the defeats sustained by the Move- ^ "^ ^ ^ mentsof Peishwah in November 1817, in the neighbour- the Peishwah hood of Poonah, he no where attempted to after his . • /» 1 defeat at make head agamst our troops m force, but Poonah in wandered about as a fugitive, always accom- * Lieutenant Kennedy of the 17th Native Infantry, an Officer of great merit. I 142 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, panied, however, by a considerable number of I^- armed followers. Cn the month of March 1818, ,r,^c; he was induced to move towards Nagpoor, by invitation of the Rajah, but being; closely pur- sued and nearly overtaken by Brigadier-General Doveton, on marching to the Northward to avoid that General, he was intercepted by Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, who with his divi- sion had for some time occupied a position at Hinghinghaut, South of Nagpoor. By making His troops a forced march from that place on the night of peWd'by the 16th of Ai)ril, Lieutenant-Colonel Adams aSs/' fell in with the Peishwah's troops next morning, marches ucar the village ofScuuee, and instantly attacked cKa. them. Those who attempted to resist were immediately routed, and the whole dispersed in great confusion. After this affair, Colonel Adams returned to Hinghinghaut, where he remained until he was joined by the Hussinga- bad battering train, and the Madras Artillery under Major Goreham. On the 5th of May he marched towards Chanda, the only place of importance in the Southern part of the Nagpoor country, and encamped before it on the 9th, about three miles to the North-West of the city. The force of Lieut.-Colonel Adams's Divi- sion was as follows : BENGAL TROOPS. 2 Brigades of Native Horse Artillery. DESCRIPTION OF CHANDA. 143 The 5th Regiment of Native Cavalry. CHAP- The 6th ditto. IV. '_^- — ,_/ I Squadron of the 8th ditto. 1818 1 Company of Foot Artillery. The 1st Battalion of the 19th Regt. of N. Infantry. The 1st Battalion of the 23d ditto. 4 Companies of the Grenadier Flank Battalion. 5 Companies of the Light Infantry ditto. 1 Company of Pioneers. MADRAS TROOPS. Half a Troop of European Horse Artillery. 1 Company of European Foot Artillery. The 1st Battalion of the 1st Regt. of N. Infantry. ITie 1st Battalion of the 11th ditto. 4 Companies of the Flank Battalion. 1 Company of Pioneers. 1000 Reformed Horse of His Highness the Nizam's. The city of Chaiida is situated on a plain, at Descrip- /• '1 r» 1 n -tionof the distance oi 5 miles from the coniliience of chanda, the Wurda and Paingunga Rivers. On the East side are two considerable suburbs, the Lai and Begum Pettahs, the former of which is very large, and extends upwards of a mile to the East. Part of the North side is covered by a large Tank, which supplies abundance of water at all seasons. Two Nullahs, dry in the hot season, run along the East and West sides, and join opposite to the South. A thick jungle ex^tends along the North and East sides, in some places within half a mile, and three quar- ters of a mile of the walls, close to which there are also gardens on these two sides. On the 144 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, other sides the ground is open (See Plate XVI I). 1^' The inclosure of the place consists of a ram- 1818 P'*^^^ ^^^"^ 8 to 12 feet high, and from 12 to 16 feet thick, surmounted by a loop-holed parapet, fortifica- 8 feet high and 4 feet thick, and flanked at mo- derate but irregular distances by round towers. The whole is constructed of excellent masonry, of a species of sand stone with chunam, in a high state of repair, and complete every where, excepting that part of the wall, which bounds the Southern side of the Tank, which has no parapet. The Bala Killa, or Citadel, is situated about the middle of the East side, 170 yards from the rampart. The height of its wall is 45 feet, and though apparently of a more ancient construction than that of the city, it was still in a good state of repair. An incomplete outer rampart of masonry surrounded this work. There are but few substantial houses within the walls of the city, the Palace being the only stone building of any importance. ATTACK OF CHANDA. May lOih. Lieutenant-Colonel Adams personally recon- noitred the North and East sides, protected by a considerable detachment of Cavalry and In- fantry, which the distance from camp, and the strength of the Garrison (reported to be 3000 men), rendered necessary. The Pioneers were employed in preparing materials. Wc O ATTACK OF CHANDA. 145 May Wth. CHAP. The reconnoissance was completed on the ^^^^^ West and South sides, and it was determined jg^g that the attack should be made on the South- East angle, this point being preferred, on ac- count of the cover afforded by the Pettah tope,* to the advanced detachments, and by a ravine offering a good approach to within half musket shot of the angle. During this day's recon- noissance, the enemy were driven from a small hill {a) on which they were constructing a re- dout. The Pioneers, and a working party of 100 Dooly-bearers, were employed as on the preceding day. May I2th. The Pioneers and working party of Dooly- bearers were still employed as before. 3Iay \3t/i. The troops moved their camp to a new posi- tion, at the distance of 2 miles to the Southward of the city. The hill from which the enemy was driven on the 1 1th, and to which they had not return- ed, was occupied ; and the Bengal Native Horse Artillery, and a troop of Cavalry, took posses- sion of the Begum Pettah. The company of Madras Pioneers, and 100 Dooly bearers, were sent out at twelve o'clock, to collect and prepare materials. At eight p.m. * A groye. K ■1 146 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, the company of Bengal Pioneers, and a work- IV. j,^o- party of 100 Sepoys, commenced a sunken 1818 ^^ttery for 2 guns, and a position for 1 howitzer on the hill (a) about 850 yards from the South East angle, to silence some large guns on the South face, which obstructed our communica- tions with the advanced detachment. The Madras Pioneers, and a fresh working party, relieved them at three o'clock in the morning, but the soil proving excessively rocky, the work was not finished at daybreak, and was accordingly masked. May lA't/t. During the day the Bengal Pioneers, and 100 Dooly-bearers, collected materials. The Madras Pioneers finished the battery at night. May I5t/i. The battery opened at daybreak, and had tl desired effect. The Bengal Pioneers, and 100 Dooly bearers, prepared and collected materials. March \6th. The whole of the Pioneers, and the same number of Dooly bearers, employed as yester- day. May \lth. The Pioneers, and 130 Dooly-bearers col- lecting materials, filling sandbags, &c. The Pioneers ceased work at twelve o'clock. A sufficient quantity of nialerials having now been IC ATTACK OF CHANDA. 147 prepared, the following batteries were com- CHAP. menced at eight p. m. by the two companies of ^^ Pioneers, and a working party of 300 Sepoys ; j^^^ First, A battery (b) of 5 embrasures, at tlie distance of about 400 yards, for 4 twelve-pound- ers, to fire on the defences to the right of the South-East angle, the point selected for the breach. Secondly, A sunken battery (c), at the same distance, for 3 six-pounders, to enfilade those defences : and Thirdly, A battery (d), at the distance of 630 yards between the above, for two howitzers. The working parties were discovered, and the enemy opened a fire, which, however, did not obstruct the progress of the work. Mai/ IStk. The batteries opened at daybreak. The light twelve-pounders proving insufficient to ruin the parapet, 2 of the eighteen-pounders were brought into the battery, and the whole played with good effect. A trench of connnunication was to have been opened from the Pettah to the enfilading battery ; but it was now consi- dered unnecessary, as the fire of the enemy, both from guns and matchlocks, was completely kept under ; the gate by which they might have sallied, nearest to the battery, was ascertained to be blocked up; and the party of infantry for its protection, found good cover behind the bank of K 2 14B SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. the Nullah. A working party of 130 Dooly- bearers filled sand bags during the day. At eight 1818 ^'^^' ^^^^ Bengal Pioneers, and a party of 100 Se- poys, commenced the breaching battery (e) for 3 eighteen-pounders, at the distance of about 200 yards. The Madras Pioneers, and 100 fresh Sepoys, relieved them at midnight, and the Bengal Pioneers returned to work at three o'clock in the morning. The enemy set fire to some huts, in consequence of which they dis- covered the working party on its approach, and kept up a fire of guns and matchlocks during the night, but without being able to retard the work. Mai/ \9t/i. The breaching battery opened at seven a. m. The working party of Sepoys had been with- drawn at daybreak, but the two companies of Pioneers continued working till ten a. m., com- pleting a communication with the ravine, and enlarging the shoulder of the battery for a twelve-pounder, to play on the defences flank- ing the South-East angle. At four p. m. a good and practicable breach of 100 feet was effected, but owing to the distance the troops had to march from camp, the assault was delayed. The 6 howitzers were brought down at dusk, to the flank of the breaching battery, and a con- tinued fire of round shot, grape, and shells, was kept up during the Jiight, on the breach and adjacent works. AITACK OF CHANDA. 149 Ma7j 20th. CHAP. The Cavalry and reformed Horse having- ^J^^ been distributed around the place to intercept |g|^ fugitives, the storming party, under the com- mand of Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, debouched from the Begum Pettah at half-past five a.m. It consisted of two columns, the right composed of Bengal troops, the left of Madras troops, and was supported by a reserve, consisting of a squadron of dismounted Cavalry, 2 light guns, and the Bengal Light Infantry Battalion. The breach was speedily crowned by both columns at once, when they diverged to the right and left, and at seven a. m. all resistance ceased. A small party of the Garrison had shut themselves up in the Bala Killa, but surrendered without resistance. The enemy had endeavoured to raise a platform during the night, to fire over the breach, but our batteries had prevented them from completing it. ENGINEER DEPARTMENT. Lieut. Anderson, Commanding. „ Crawford, Bengal Artillery, Acting Engineer. ORDNANCE. 3 Eighteen-pounder iron guns. 4 Twelve-pounders, brass. 4 Six-pounders. 6 Fivc-and-a-half-inch howitzers. The defence of the Garrison during the siege was spirited, but did little injury to the assail- ants, from the bad management of their ord- 150 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, nance. The stnall guns were mounted on the ^^' towers, and those of larger calibre were placed 1S18 ^" platforms, for barbet firing, erected behind the rampart. Chanda can hardly be considered as a place of strength, the great extent of it alone render- ing it indefensible, unless garrisoned by an army. Without a ditch or an outwork, protected only h| by a single rampart, in no place higher than 20 feet, and surrounded on all sides by Pettahs, and broken ground, to within a few yards of its walls; no European Garrison would think of standing a siege in it against battering guns, and it affords a striking proof of the incon- sistency of the Native character, that while they constantly, during the war, surrendered im- pregnable Fortresses without a blow, they should hare thought not only of defending this walled town, but of standing the assault, after a practicable breach was made. In the attack of a place, which was almost equally vulnerable on every side, there was of course little scope for the display of profes- sional skill, yet it may be remarked, that the advantage taken of the ground by the Engineer, who contrived to bring the troops up to within half musket shot of the walls, without trenches, was highly to his credit. The position selected for the breaching battery is also deserving of praise ; and the advantage of establishing it at as ASSEERGHUR. 151 sliort a distance as possible, was proved by the CHAP. circumstance of the rampart, which was a very ^J^l, good one, being breached in nine liours after jgj^g the opening of this battery, although the firing was constantly interrupted by the heating of the metal. The duty in the trenches was un- usually severe, in consequence of the heat of the weather, and amongst the victims of it was Major Goreham, a very distinguished officer of the Madras Artillery. CHAPTER V. THE SIEGES OF ASSEERGHUR, NOWA, AND COPAL DROOG. 1 HE Sieges, which form the subject of the present Chapter, were undertaken after the termination of the War, and two of them, Nowa, and Copal Droog, were altogether unconnected with it. The Fortress of Asseerghur had en- gaged our attention at different periods, but the attack of it had been postponed, in the first instance, in consequence of the hostilities com- menced by the Nagpoor Rajah, and afterwards, perhaps, from a consideration of the inadequacy of our means to reduce it. The Killedar Jes- wuntRow Lar, wasa warm supporter of the Pin- darry system, and even after his master Sindiah 152 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, liad signed the Treaty of the 5th of November, ^- he showed a determination to support it, by m^Q offering the protection of his Fortress to the Peishwah, when that Prince, after a pursuit by Brigadier-General Doveton, wliich for rapidity and distance is, perhaps, unexampled in India, fled there in June 1818. BajeeRow Fortunately Bajee Row accepted the terms tosir John offered him by Sir John Malcolm,* and with Malcolm, j^.^ ^rabs, who had adhered to him to the last, surrendered to that General. Jeswunt Row The hos- Lar had therefore no other opportunity of show- duct^of' ing his devotion to the Mahratta cause, than by Ro^Lar, admitting the Peishwah's family and treasure li'a'iXs- into his Fort, while the negociations were pend- seeighur. -^^^^ ^^^j j^^ firing on our troops, when, on one occasion, they came within reach of his guns. Circumstances did not allow us, to resent this insult at the time,t and the following year, be- * On the receipt of Bajee Row's overture, that General had proceeded by forced marches with his Division to Asseer- ghur, having left parties to block up the fords of the Ner- buddah, in the event of the Peishwah trying to get to the Northward. t It must be confessed that if Bajee Row had refused the terms which were offered to him, we should have been criti- cally situated, and the War might have been greatly pro- tracted. It would have been impossible to besiege the Fortress at that time, for in neither of the Divisions was there a gun larger than a six-pounder (Brigadier-General Doveton's small battering train having been rendered unserviceable before ASSEERGHUR. 153 fore our preparations for the purpose were com- CHAP, pleted, the Lar was again enabled to disphiy ^^^^^ his hostility to the English, and to mark his de- ^319 termination to uphold any power that promised opposition to them, by offering and affording protection to Appa Saib, their only remaining enemy ; who, since his escape from captivity, had been collecting adherents in the Mahadeo hills, and had fled from them to Asseerghur, just as Lieutenant-Colonel Adams's prepara- tions to attack him were nearly completed. In this attempt, some of his followers were i^epara- 1 3 A -I'l tious for kdled and taken, and Appa Saib himself the siege narrowly escaped being intercepted, by a de- gimr. tachment from Brigadier-General Doveton's Division, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Pollock, which was stationed for the purpose, on the roads North of the Fortress. As soon as he had reached Asseerghur, Brigadier-General Doveton's Division encamped a few miles to Malligaura, which at this time still held out), and the rains were just then commencing. The combined Divisions were not then suflSciently strong to blockade the place eftectually, so as to prevent the escape of the Peishwah, and they must have remained for six months, before they could have com- menced active operations, shut up between the rivers Ner- buddah and Taptee, in a country entirely destitute of supplies, and at that season, one of the most unhealthy in India. It has since been ascertained beyond a doubt, that Sindiah had determined, in the event of Bajee Row taking refuge in his Fort, to take up arms once more in his support. 154 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, the Southward of it, in the neighbourhood of ^^y^ Boorhanpoor; while Brigadier-General Sir 1819 *^^'^" Malcolm, who was the bearer of an order from Sindiah, for the Lar to proceed toGwalior, took up his ground to the North. As the Kille- dar refused compliance with his master's requi- sition, under the most frivolous pretexts, pre- parations were made for the siege, and they were greater, as regarded the number of men and ordnance, than had been assembled before during the campaign. The following is a statement of the force before the siege : BRIGADIER-GENERAL DOVETON'S DIVISION. Bengal Troops. 6th Regiment of Light Cavalry. 1st Battalion 15th Regiment of Native Infantry. 2nd Battalion 15th Regiment ditto. 300 Pioneers. Madras Troops. 1 Troop of European Horse Artillery. 2nd Regiment of Native Cavalry. 7th Regiment ditto. His Majesty's Royal Scots. „ 30th Regiment (one wing). „ ()7th Regiment. Madras European Regiment. J st Battalion 7th Regiment of Native Infantry. 1st Battalion 12th Wallajahabad Light Infantry. 2d Battalion 17th Chicacole Light Infantry. 2d Battalion 13tii Regiment of Native Infantry. 2d Battalion 14th Regiment ditto. A Detachment of Pioneers. DESCRIPTION OF ASSEERGHUR. 155 BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S DIVISION. CHAP. Madras Troops. * • Haifa Troop of European Horse Artillery. Camel Howitzer Battery. 3d Regiment of Native Cavalry. 2d Battalion 6th Regiment of Native Infantry. 1st Battalion 14th Regiment ditto. A Detachment of Pioneers. Bombay Troops. 1st Battalion Grenadier Rcgt. of Native Infantry. 1st Battalion 8th Regiment ditto. A Detachment of Pioneers. This respectable force was afterwards in creased by a part of the Saughur Division, under the command of Brigadier-General Watson, consisting of some Bengal Miners, two Batta- lions of Bengal Native Infantry, the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Regiment, and the 2d Battalion of the 13th Regiment, of Native In- Axntry, and some Artillery and heavy gnns. The Fortress of Asseerghur is situated about Jf^,^„*^UJ''^3. two njiles from the end of one of the great seeigimr. Western ranaes of the Sautpoorah hills, and Plates ^^ * XVIII sixteen miles North of the city of Boorhanpoor. an.ixix. It was besieged and taken by the Emperor Akbar on the first establishment of the Mogul power in the Deckan, and passed from the hands of the Mussulmen to tlie Mahrattas about seventy years ago, agreeably to a treaty made at Aurungabad A. 1). 1750, between Salabut Jung the Nizam of the Deckan, and 156 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, tlie Peishwali Ballajee Row. It was also sur- ^- rendered to the English in the Mahratta War ij^io <5f 1803, but was restored to Sindiah imme- diately afterwards. Being situated in one of the great passes from the Deckan into Hindo- stan, the possession of this Fortress has always been considered of importance, and the natural defence, which it receives from a precipice of rock, in almost every part, has been increased by a thick and lofty rampart of masonry, which is built on the summit of the rock, and by large cavaliers placed in different parts of it, mounted with enormous guns, which commanded the country around in every direction.* The gene- ral height of this position above the plain is 750 feet. Its greatest length is 1 100 yards, and its greatest breadth 600. Nearly one half of the rock towards the Westward has been fur- ther protected by a second inclosure of good masonry immediately below it, and following the curved outline of the natural scarp, from which circumstance, it has been aptly styled Kummurgah (or the belt) ; and on the same side, but not covering so much of the INorthern face of the rock, a third inclosure has been added of an irregular form, containing a space * One of these guns is pompously styled the Lord of the Boorhanpoor Bazar, which the Natives firmly believe it will reach, although fourteen miles distant in a direct line. It is of iron, and carrit.. a ball of 5)84 pounds. DESCRIPTION OF ASSEERGHUR. 137 nearly equal to the area of the upper or prin- CHAP. cipal Fort. This third iiiclosure, which is ^^ called Mallighur, constitutes the lower Fort, ^g,,^ The Pettah is situated still more to the West- ward, in a hollow intersected by numerous ravines, and lies immediately under the lower Fort, the works of which overlook and com- mand it throughout its whoje extent. The entrance of the lower Fort is from the Pettah, and the road to it, which forms a gentle ascent, is well flanked by the works on each side. In every other part the ascent from the Pettah towards the lower Fort is exceedingly steep. The principal entrance into the upper Fort, near the Western extremity of the rock, is by steep flights of stone steps, secured by five gateways of excellent masonry, by means of which it communicates with the lower Fort, through the second inclosure. There is also a sally-port at the South-East angle, open at top, and protected by five traverses, which affords a direct communication from the upper Fort to the country on that side. The second inclosure before described has likewise a direct commu- nication with the country, by a weak wicket or small gateway at its right extremity, under the middle of the Northern side of the rock. On the same side, but more to the Eastward, after a descent of about 2-50 feet, a nearly level 158 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, space juts out from the North-East angle of the ^ • rock, to the distance of about 400 yards, which 1819 ground has probably at one time been occupied, and perhaps connected with the works of the second in closure: for an old gateway of masonry still remains at the extremity of this level, im- mediately above the descent into the plain ; and the road, which leads directly from the country towards the second inclosure, actually passes through this gateway. The rock, which is the natural boundary of the upper Fort, fails in three places, where of course more attention has been paid to the masonry, than in other parts. First, on the PfcATE North side, at the part marked (o) in the plan, XVIII where a very thick double rampart has been built to supply this deficiency. Secondly, towards the East, not far from the North-East angle, at the head of a ravine, which commences in the interior of the Fort, and rnnsfrom thence into the plain, extending wide, and branching out into several ramifications in its descent. Across the top of this ravine has been thrown a casemated rampart, nearly 50 yards in length and 40 feet thick ; below which at the distance of 50 yards, there is a second wall, which ap- pears to have been intended chiefiy for the pur- pose of preventing the earth from being washed away during the rains. Thirdly, near the South-East angle, where are the works of the \ ) % ^^(V^S^^ k. [^ Fonrss ,„„/„■ r/„) ro.tl.n.l.VD or ( Orijaftifrcijntn-.tl/'^mifbm, (r?i9. y r,. Uir Brrm-ft on /Ar .V. Sf't/f ^ftA^lin Srff/hn t/uv Ike fff-ritrA A- (hsrmaresonHuKSideof^Fttrr. Rrfrrenri'i .y" West Attack Eist \ttack "^sss^oishs w&MrM sxBM sfiksj&ws BSAas:Es&mnm.. An ACK OF ASSEEKGHUU. 159 sally-port before-mentioned ; in front of which CHAP. a low wall has been built, to prevent this en- ,_JJ^ trance into the Fort from being seen from the ^^^i). country. There are a good many buildings in the Fort, and some fine tanks and wells. On the North and South sides, the country below the Fort is plain and generally level, but intersected by two or three Nullahs.* At the foot of the hill, on the North side, are several gardens and vine- yards, all supplied with wells of water. On the East and West sides, the country is inter- sected by deep ravines, and ranges of hills, which on one side extend as far as the river Taptee, and on the other connect with the great Santpoorah range, it being understood, how- ever, that every eminence within long cannon shot is considerably lower than the command- ing position of Asseerghur. ATTACK OF ASSEERGHUR. A large depot of materials had been forming for some time previous to the siege, at a village between Brigadier-Ueneral Doveton's Head Quarters, and the advanced post under Lieut.- Golonel Pollock, about seven miles distant from the Fort. On the 17th of Marcli, all at- tempts at an amicable adjustment having failed, * Nullahs are water courses generally dry, except in the rainy season, when they present the appearance of mountain torrents, and sometimes even of rivers. 100 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, the necessary orders were issued for the assault ^- of the Pettah. ^Q-iq March \Sth. The ground having been previously recon- noitred, and the necessary arrangements made, the Pettah was taken at daybreak, by a simul- taneous attack of two columns from the two Divisions, of Brigadier-General Doveton, and Brigadier-General Sir John Malcolm, which were encamped North and South of the For- tress. Brigadier-General Doveton's column, conunanded by Colonel Fraser, and led by His Majesty's Royal Scots, entered the Pettah by the South-West gate, at the head of the Battu- keerah Nullah. Brigadier-General Sir John Malcolm's column, entered by the high road from Boorgaum and Choulkan, through a gap in the hills, which cover the Pettah on the North-West. The enemy were taken by sur- prise, and made but little opposition, flying as the attacking party advanced, and our troops soon established themselves under cover of the houses, with a trifling loss, occasioned by the tire from the lower Fort, which opened as soon as the enemy's party had evacuated the Pettah. A battery (ci) for 6 light howitzers, to keep down the enemy's fire, was completed during the day. The Engineer Depot was established in the large bombproof Pagoda in the centre of the Pettah, and tlie troops occupied the street ATTACK OF ASSEERGHUR. 161 in advance, which runs parallel to the Fort. CHAP. The enemy's guns from the upper Fort, which ^* were depressed to play on the Pettah, made -.gng good practice. During the night it was in- tended to construct the battery (b) for 6 eigh- teen-pounders, and 2 twelve-pounders, to breach the North-West angle of the lower Fort ; to advance our posts to (rf), to prevent the enemy's sallies, and to barricade those streets enfiladed by the enemy's fire. Owing, however, to the difficult nature of the soil, and a deficiency of materials, the battery, although commenced, was not continued. A secure post at (d) was completed, but in consequence of the flank- ing fire of the lower Fort, as it was impossible to make an approach to it, without going through the tedious operation of the double sap, it was determined always to withdraw the troops at daylight to (c), that post answering the same purpose during the day. The streets were bar- ricaded, in the openings leading to the lower Fort, so as to afford a safe communication along the whole extent of the main street of the Pettah. The enemy fired during the night at the respective working parties, but without eft'ect. March I9ih. The post at (c) was this morning completed. The enemy made a sally at sun-set, under cover of a heavy fire of matchlocks from the lower L 102 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP. Fort, and drove in our troops from this post, ' which was the key to the whole position, and 1819 ^^'^^^^ which the advance of the enemy might have been eftbctually checked. They succeeded in burning some houses about the post at (fZ), which was apparently the object of their sally, as they immediately afterwards retired. The battery (b) was finished during the night, 400 yards from the North-West salient angle of the lower Fort; and another was commenced at (^), on the rising ground above the Pagoda, for eight mortars and howitzers. The ground on which the mortar battery was placed, was so hard, that the fascines (the only materials at hand) could not be picketed sufficiently strong. The revetment, therefore, gave way when nearly completed, and the work was left unfinished. The enemy did not fire this night, or attempt any annoyance, aft^r being beat back in their sally. March '10 tk. The guns opened at daylight with great effect, immediately silencing the enemy's fire. By evening they had effected a practicable breach in the salient angle of the lower Fort. The mortar battery was this night completed with sand bags. Brigadier-General Sir John Malcolm's Division njoved to a position North- West of the Fort, and that General's Head Quarters were established in the Lai Baugh. ATTACK OF AS8EERGHUR. 163 March ^\st. The enemy, expecting an assault, evacuated the lower Fort at four a. m., as was ascertained x81J). afterwards from a deserter. At seven a.m. the expense Magazine of battery {b), which was placed against the perpendicular bank of a deep ravine, 30 yards to the left, and in rear of the battery, exploded, from some unfortunate acci- dent. It contained 130 barrels of powder. A Native Officer, and 34 rank and file, of the Bengal Native Infantry, were killed, and a Native Officer, and 65 rank and file, wounded by the explosion. The enemy immediately returned in great numbers to the lower Fort, and re-opened their guns. These were soon silenced, the parapets in front of them being completely destroyed. The mortar battery {e) opened at three p.m. This day orders were issued, for the defence of the Pettah being made over to Brigadier-General Sir John Malcolm's Division. March -lid. During the day, 130 shells were thrown into the Fort from battery (e), and at night two additional embrasures were prepared, each for a twelve-pounder, about 200 yards to the right and left of the battery (ft); the one on the right, to destroy some defences of the lower Fort, from whence the troops in the Pettah were annoyed by the enemy's musketry ; that on the L 2 164 SIEG-ES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, '^ft, to silence the large gun in the centre bas- ^- tion of the North face of the upper Fort, which 181 Q ^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ battery (b). March '23d. The Engineer Department moved, under the protection of the Bengal Brigade, to reconnoitre the East front of the Fort, and to decide on the ground of encampment for Brigadier-General Doveton's Division. The mortars in the Pettah continued playing upon the Fort. A 45-inch howitzer was placed in the Pettah, at the top of the barricade, thrown across the principal street leading to the gateway of the lower Fort, to prevent the enemy's sorties in that direction. March 24///. The Engineer's reconnoissance being com- pleted, the East front was decided to be the most favourable for the attack of the upper Fort, and the following is an extract from the Commanding Engineer's letter to Brigadier- General Doveton on the subject : " The irregular nature of the ground, and the cover afforded by ravines, render extensive parallels unnecessary. A communication, how- ever, should be opened from the Ram Baugh, to a ravine on the left of the attack, to enable the working parties to arrive under cover. "As the approaches are to be carried up a ravine, exposed to a direct fire in front, and a ilanking fire on each side, it becomes an object ATIACK OF ASSEERGHUR. 165 of the first importance to knock off tlie defences CHAP. of the flanks, and to prevent the enemy from ^L, rolling down stones. 1 recommend that these jg^y works should be destroyed from their founda- tion. '* This, 1 conceive, can be eflfected by placing batteries on the prolongation of the fianks, in such manner as will enable us to breach the opposite, and enfilade the adjacent flank, from the same battery. The flanks being destroyed, and the defences of the curtain wall knocked off, the bottom of the revetment of the retaining and curtain walls is to be loosened, to enable the Miners to establish themselves ; or should this be found impracticable, a breaching battery to be constructed, and the curtain wall laid open. I am of opinion, that by one or other of these means, we shall be enabled to form a practicable breach. *' The mortar batteries to be disposed as re- presented in the plan, and, if practicable, a brigade of six-pounders to be placed in battery on the detached hill opposite to the South-East angle, so as to command the high ground in rear of the front attacked. '* To distract the enemy's attention from the real point of attack, it is advisable, that the evening previous to constructing the batteries, possession should be taken of the lower works on the Pettah side, and a battery constructed to play upon the gateways. 160 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP. " By these means the Garrison will be de- ^' prived of all hopes of escape, and their nncer- -,g,g tainty as to the true point of attack will weaken their efforts to oppose us. " On the same principle, I recommend that the South-East face should be breached where the rock fails, with a view to such advantage being taken of it, as circumstances may re- quire." The point (o) on the North face was after- wards selected for the second breach, instead of the South-East angle, as here recommended. On the Pettah side a battery for 2 eight-incli howitzers, and 2 five-and-a-half-inch mortars, was erected, 350 yards to the left of the breach- ing battery {b). The enemy kept up a smart fire from the lower Fort during the night. March 25th. West Attack. — Employed in destroying the defences to the right and left of the breach, and bombarding the upper Fort. 3Iarch '2.Qlh. West Attack.— Employed as yesterday. The Pioneers and public followers collecting- materials for a new battery, for 1 eighteen and 1 twelve-pounder, intended to make a breach in the South face of the lower Fort. During these two days, Brigadier-General Doveton's Divi- sion was moving to occupy a position, for the projected operations on the East front. ATTACK OF ASSEERGHUR. 167 March "11 th. East Attack.— The Ram Baugh, a garden situated under the North-East angle of the up- jg^y per Fort was occupied, and the Engineer's Depot established there. The enemy brought a large gun on the North-East bastion to bear on this point, and destroyed a good many car- riages, which were exposed for a short time to their fire. During the day a battery for 2 twelve- pounders was thrown up in front of the garden to silence this gun. A communication was commenced from the Depot, in the direction of the proposed batteries. West Attack The battery (^g) for 1 eigh- teen and 1 twelve-pounder, for forming a breach on the South face of the lower Fort, was com- menced, and the guns taken to the spot; but as the battery could not be completed before morning, they were placed under cover, 100 yards from the battery. 2 six-pounders were also carried upon elephants to the eminence, called the Mogul's Cap. March 28th. East Attack. — The communication to the proposed batteries Nos. 1 and 2 was completed, and a good road prepared for the guns up the side of the hill, through the old gateway already mentioned. West Attack. — The breaching battery on the South side of the lower Fort, was com- 1819. 168 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, pleted, and the eighteen-pounder placed in it, ^' during the night. The twelve-pounder broke down. March 29t/i. East Attack. — Two batteries Nos. I and 2 were constructed during the night, to destroy the defences of the flanks, to the right anti left of the curtain of the upper Fort, which it was intended to breach. No. 1 was made to contain 5 eighteen-pounders, and No. 2 four eighteen- pounders ; the former was 380 yards from the North-East angle, and 530 from the opposite flank, which it was intended to destroy ; the latter was 350 yards from the point of the Fort immediately above it, and 600 from the oppo- site flank. West Attack. — The battery (b) re-com- menced firing this morning to perfect the breach in the salient angle of the lower Fort, previous to the approaching assault. The guns in battery (g) opened at day light, and by evening effected a practicable breach. A four-and-a-half-inch howitzer vi^as established on a height to the right of this battery, commanding the gateway of the upper Fort. The breaches in the lower Fort being reported practicable, orders were issued for the assault to take place the follow- ing morning. March 30th. East Attack.— Owing to the great labour ATTACK OF ASSEERGHUR. 169 of carrying the guns up the heights, only 3 guns were got into battery No. J, during the day, although a Regiment of Europeans, and ^g^y one of Sepoys were employed as a working party, to drag them up ; and were assisted by elephants. A battery for 2 heavy mortars, was made immediately on the left of No. 1. West Attack. — The enemy evacuated Mal- lighur (the lower Fort) during the morning, and it was immediately occupied by our troops, who established themselves there with very trifling loss, as the enemy did not open from the guns of the upper Fort till the assailants were well under cover. Battery (b) was dismantled. During the night, all the mortars but one were taken from the Pettah, and placed under cover in the lower Fort. March 3ist. East Attack.— During this day all the guns in Nos. 1 and 2 were placed in battery, and commenced firing on the defences of the flanks with good eflect. A battery for 8 mortars and howitzers was thrown up in front, and to the right of the Ram Baugh, immediately under the hill. The enemy kept up a smart fire of matchlocks from the second Fort on the work- ing party, but with little effect. A twelve- pounder was placed in battery on the right of No. 1, to keep down the matchlock fire from the North-East angle, which annoyed our peo- ple in No. ) buttery. 170 SIEC^ES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. West Attack.— Two eight-inch and 2 five- aiid-a-half-inch howitzers were placed in battery ,gjq at (/) on the North side of the Fort, and 2 five- and-a-half-inch howitzers were placed on the Mogul's Cap. April 1st. East Attack. — The embrasures of battery No. 1 were repaired and widened. The eight- mortar battery opened this day. A battery for 1 mortars was thrown up to the left and in rear of No. 2. Batteries Nos. 1 and 2 continued firing to destroy their opposite flanks. West Attack.— A battery (A) for 6 guns was constructed, about 600 yards from the upper Fort, to breach the wall of the middle or second Fort. An eighteen-pounder and a twelve-pounder were placed in the Pettah, to destroy the Western defences of the second Fort. April 2nd. East Attack.— A magazine was formed for the ten-mortar battery, and the whole of the mortars brought in. The other batteries con- tinued firing with good effect. West Attack.— The guns vv^ere got into the six-gun battery, and opened on the North- West curtain of the second Fort, at two o'clock p. M. April 3r«?. The Saughur battering train and Bengal Miners arrived this day. ATTACK OF ASSEERGHUR. 171 East Attack.— The ten-mortar battery CHAP. opened this morning. A battery for 4 mortars ^T_, Avas thrown up, about 100 yards in front, and ^g,Q to the right of No. 1, immediately under the first descent from the North- East angle. West Attack. —The defences, to the right of the intended breach, were destroyed, but the fire on the corner bastion being too oblique, 2 eighteen-pounders were drawn out at night, to the right of the battery. A parapet was thrown up for a covering party, on the ridge (above battery (/<), in front of the intended new battery. In consequence of a reward having been ottered for shot, many were picked up and brought in by the camp followers. April 4>th. East Attack.— The defences of the flanks being ahuost wholly destroyed, a breaching battery, No. 3, for 2 twenty-four-pounders and 4 eighteen-pounders, was commenced ; and as the ground would not allow sufficient space for more than two embrasures in a line, the guns were placed on three different small levels, one above the other, forming an inclined battery. 3 eighteen-pounders were placed in battery to the right of No. 1, to bear upon and destroy the North-East bastion, from whence the enemy greatly annoyed our troops. West Attack. — Employed in making a mine under the rampart of the lower Fort, in 172 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, order to open a road for the guns, to the new ^' battery on the ridge (k). During the night 2 1819 eighteen-pounders, intended for this battery, were dragged up from the Pettah, and lodged in the lower Fort. April 5t/i. East Attack.— Battery No. 3, 400 yards from the retaining wall, and 450 from the cur- tain, was completed this evening. A magazine was formed for it, and a road for the guns made. The front of No. 2 was thrown forward, to convert it into a breaching battery, to bear on the retaininsj wall No. 4. The masonrv of the North-East angle was destroyed, and the large gun on the top of it, a one-hundred-and- forty-pounder, rolled from thence half way down the hill. West Attack. — The breach in the second Fort being completed, a four gun breaching bat- tery, for the upper Fort, was commenced, on the ridge in front of, and above battery (A). Two more eighteen-pounders were dragged up into the lower Fort during the night; the mine was sprung in the morning, and a good road opened by it, through the ramparts for the guns. A few good marksmen were pushed forward up the hill, from the lower Fort, to keep the enemy's matchlock men in check. April 6t/i, East Attac k. — The 2 twenty-four-pounders ATTACK OF ASSEERGHUR. 173 and 4 eighteen-pounders were placed in battery CHAP. in the course of the day, under a heavy fire of ^^J^^ matchlocks, but with trifling loss, as the inces- ^gjt) sant fire from battery No. 1 kept the enemy under. The ten- mortar battery was repaired during the night, and an approach was opened from No. 1, in the direction of the breach. West Attack. — The breaching battery was completed, a magazine made for it, and the guns got into battery. April Ilk. Intelligence was this day obtained, from a man who had been allowed to visit the Lar, that he began to despond, and that his Garri- son looked on further resistance as almost hopeless. East Attack.— Breaching batteries (Nos. 3 and 4) opened on the retaining wall with great effect, and with the assistance of an oblique fire from No. 1, a practicable breach was nearly effected in the course of the day. The approach to the breach was continued. West Attack. — The guns opened against the rampart of the upper Fort at ten a. m., with good effect. These operations created great alarm in the Garrison, and in the evening, two Vakeels came from Jeswunt Row Lar, with ofJ'ers of surrender, but wishing to stipulate for the Garrison retaining their arms, they were immediately ordered back into the Fort. 174 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. April Sth. The breaching batteries re-opened at day ^^^ light. About eleven o'clock A. m., orders were received from Brigadier General Doveton to cease firing, Jeswunt Row Lar having agreed to an unconditional surrender, on the part of himself and Garrison. The road to the breach on the East attack was continued during the night. The rock at the North-East angle was also reconnoitred, and it was ascertained, that there was a good path for troops, immediately under the rock, to assault the breach. April 9tli. The Garrison marched out at sun-rise, and delivered up their arms. The Fort was occu- pied by British troops, and the union flag hoisted, under a royal salute from all the bat- teries. ENGINEER DEPARTMENT. Lieut. Coventry, Madras Engineer, Commanding. „ Cheape, Bengal Engineer, „ Purton, Madras ditto. „ Irvine, Bengal ditto. Ensign Lake, Madras Engineer, Staff. „ Warlovv, Bengal ditto. 35 European Sappers and Miners ") Madras 48 Native Sappers and Miners j Establishment. 125 Native Bengal Miners. 1000 Pioneers (Bengal, Madras, and Bombay), and al)out the same number of Dooly Bearers and Lascars. 1819. ATTACK OF ASSEERGHUK. 175 STORES, vie. CHAP. 95,000 Sand Bags. V. ' 675 Gabions. 500 Fascines. ARTILLERY. Lieut.-Col. Crosdill, C. B. Madras Artillery. Major Weldon, Madras Artillery Commissary. Captain Poignand, Brigade Major. 1 Troop and a half of European Horse Artillery. 4 Companies of Foot Artillery. 1 Company of Native Golundauze. ORDNANCE. At the commencement of the Siege. 15 Eightefin-pounders, iron guns. 3 Twelve-pounders, ditto. 4 Twelve-pounders, brass. 1 Ten-inch Mortar. 5 Eight-inch Mortars. 1 Five-and-a-half-inch Mortar. 4 Eight-inch Howitzers. 2 Five-and-a-half-inch Howitzers, heavy. 5 Five-and-a-half-inch Howitzers, light. 2 Five-and-a-half-inch Howitzers, on beds. 4 Four-and-a-half-inch Howitzers, on beds. Arrived during the Siege on the 3rd of April. 2 Twenty-four-pounders, iron. 4 Eigh teen-pounders, ditto. 3 Ten-inch Mortars. 3 Eight-inch Mortars. 2 Five-and-a-half-inch Mortars. 2 Eight-inch Howitzers. REFLECTIONS. Owing to the failnre of the rock in three dif- 1 76 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, ferent places, Asseerghur may certainly be con- ,^^^,^1, sidered much weaker than the Fortresses of jgig Khandesh described in the preceding Chapter, and it partakes largely in the defect of all Hill Fortresses, in being surrounded by ravines and broken ground, affording cover in various parts almost to the foot of the walls. Yet from its character and from local circumstances, it was expected to offer great resistance ; and if the magnitude of the preparations against it be considered, it was certainly more respectably defended, than any of those which possessed greater advantages of position ; but the Kil- ledar, though he had received secret in- structions to defend the place to the utmost, knew that his Master had openly given us orders of a different tendency ; and doubtful perhaps, how far this duplicity would be avowed, and fearing that his personal safety might be compromised, he surrendered before he had cause for alarm. His feeling of doubt as to what course to pursue, was strongly ex- pressed in a conversation he held with Sir John Malcolm, the day before the surrender of his Fortress. He told that General, " that Sindiah would be very angry with him;" and on being answered that, '* he had just cause" he said, " Yes, he will reproach me much for having fought so badly with so tine a Fort, he will say I ought to have died." On General Malcolm ATTACK OF ASSEEROHUR. 177 asking him, " If he had not an order from his CHAP. Master to evacuate the Fort," he said " It v^T_. might be the usage amongst Europeans, but jg^t) with the Mahrattas, Forts like that, (pointing to Asseerghur) were not given up upon orders." The vigour, with which botli of the besiegers' attacks were pushed forward, and the manner in which their guns were carried to heights, which the Garrison had deemed inaccessible, must have made a great impression; and the besieged were further disheartened, by thedeath of their principal Jemidar of Artillery, who was killed on the 28th of March, while laying a gun in the North-East bastion. Had a practi- cable breach been effected in the casemated curtain on the East front, the storming party might possibly have gained it, by keeping close to the rock, after reaching the North-East salient angle of the Fort; and, in their progress, they would then have only been exposed to the opposite flank, the defences of which were completely destroyed, and the fire of it had once, even before that period, been kept under by the excellent practice of No. 1 battery, at the time that the guns were taken into the breaching battery. They would, however, have suffered from stones, which might have been thrown down on their heads from the rock, under which the path to the breach lay, M 178 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, and it cannot be supposed, that under any cir- ^' cumstances the attack of such a position, if well 1819 d^f'^"ded, could have been made without great loss. If there be any part of the operations, to which the praise that they generally merit, cannot be given, it is the delay which took place in the assault of the lower Fort. It was a principal object, of course, to confine the Gar- rison within as narrow limits as possible, in order to give greater effect to our bombard- ment ; but they were left in possession of the lower Fort, ten days after a practicable breach was made in it, without any apparent reason. Nor was this the only inconvenience, for the delay, which took place, afforded the enemy ample time for retrenching the breach, of which indeed they did not avail themselves ; but an apprehension that they might have done so, caused the additional laborious attack on the South front, which would otherwise have been unnecessary. An examination of the Fort, two years after it was besieged, has raised doubts in the Au- thor's mind, whether a practicable breach could ever have been effected on the West side. The two subsequent Monsoons, which had washed away all the masonry in some of the battered parts of tlie Fortress, had made no impression on this: and by a reference to the section ATTACK OF ASSEERGHUR. !79 through this part, (see Plate XVIII.), it will CHAP. be seen, that except about 10 feet of rampart, ^• and 6 of parapet, this wall, seventy feet high, is jq^q built against the rock; and the part immediately under it, is so steep, that if the rampart had been destroyed, the greater part of the rubbish would in all probability have rolled too far down the hill, to admit of a practicable ascent to the summit of the breach. The third place, where the rock fails, which forms a part of the sally-port, near the South- East angle, appears to present a more assail- able point, than either of the other two. It is not flanked, like the retaining and inner wall, on the East attack; nor, if we may judge by the sally-port being open to the top immediately behind it, is the rampart built against the rock, as at the part attacked on the North side. The breaching battery, in an attack on this point i^^ight be established at (A), within 330 yards see Plate XX of the point B, and the besiegers would have the benefit of a level space to traverse, between it and the breach. The outer work in front of this is only a breast wall, apparently made to hide the door of the sally-port, which here opens to the country, and indeed the only ap- parent objection to such an attack, is the great difficulty which would attend the carrying- heavy guns up to that height. The senior En- M 2 180 SIEGES 01 THt: MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, gineer with the Division, on the first recon- ^- noissance of the Fort, was of this opinion, and 1819 recommended it for the second attack; he would even have preferred it for the principal attack, but that a memoir, drawn up by an Officer of experience, who had been stationed in the Fortress while in our possession in 1802-3, described this as one of the strongest points, and particularly specified the ravine on the East front, as being the only part where there was any probability of attacking with effect. Asseerghur has, since its capture, been ceded to the British Government ; and its pos- session will perhaps enable us to restrain the excesses of the Bheel Tribes, who inhabit the neighbouring range of hills; and will, at all events, prevent it from becoming a strong hold of plunderers. It is a question however de- serving consideration, how far these advantages will repay the expense of garrisoning it, and keeping its now decayed works in repair. Its central situation, between the Deckan and Malwa, seems to fit it admirably for a general Depot, but this it can never become ; for the access to the upper Fort is too difficult, for the f constant passage up and down of heavy stores : l J and the lower Fort, which might be used for the purpose, is conunanded on every side ; be- t sides which the sum it would require, to com- plete it as a place of strength for this purpose, ATTACK OF NOW A. J^l would go far towards building a new Fort, ou CHAP, better principles, on the plain.* v— nW ATTACK OF NOWA. 1819. The Fort of Nowa which is situated about Descrip- _, , . ^. ,, tion of the 24 miles North-East of INandan*, a City on the Fort of 1 1 r Nowa. Godavery, is m shape an oblong square, ot ^^^^^ which the longest side is 46 yards, and the ^^^ shortest 36. The body of the place is defended by a rampart 20 feet thick, and the flanking de- fences consist of a circular tower, about 30 feet in diameter, at each angle. The outworks are, a faussebray and ditch, running parallel to the body of the place, and a sloping glacis on the European system; but it is without a covered way, except round the North, and part of the East front, as far as the communi- cation with the country. The interior area of the Fort is raised, so as to form a solid mound, to within about 6 feet of the terreplein of the rampart, the exterior height of which, including a parapet of 6 feet high, is nearly 30 feet. The faussebray runs at about 29 feet distance from the body of the place, and consists of a casemated rampart, 20 feet thick, surmounted * It would be unjust to close these reflections on the Siege of Asseerghur, without adverting to the exertions of the Ar- tillery, both OflScers and Men, throughout the siege. The former in many instances, particularly in battery No. 1, and the mortar battery on the North front, were without relief, and actually lived in these batteries, from the time they werQ lirst opened. tm SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP. J^y a parapet 5 feet high. At the angles, it ^ • follows the form of the circular towers of the 1810 ^^^^^y (>f the place, by which the ditch is much better defended, than is generally the case with Native Forts. The faussebray is further pro- tected by traverses, which are placed in dif- ferent parts, to prevent it from being enfiladed. There is no berm between the faussebray and the scarp of the ditch, and the height, from the top of its parapet to the bottom of the ditch, is .35 feet. The height of the counterscar[), from the bottom of the ditch to the crest of the gla- cis, is 25 feet; and as this latter work is raised 12 feet above the surrounding country, the whole depth of the excavation of the ditch is 13 feet ; and it is 35 feet wide. The principal gateway is on the East front, which is one of the longest, and is as usual very well flanked, by two circular projections, which spring from this front, in addition to the circu- lar towers at the angle. The communication with the country is by means of a bridge, over the ditch, easily removeable ; and a road across the glacis. There is also a sally-port on the West front, communicating w ith the country in the same manner. The environs are perfectly clear and level, to a considerable distance. Nowa is altogether an excellent specimen of the strongest style of Native fortification, but it is too confined in size, and the works are on ATTACK OF NOWA. 183 too small a scale. The West, South, and part CHAP. of the East fronts, are also weakened by being without a covered way, as the Garrison would loj^y be unable to make a sortie, against a lodgment on the glacis of either of these fronts, without exposure to the besieger's tire. The Garrison consisted of about 500 men. The besieging force, being His Highness the Nizam's Troops, disciplined by British Officers, was composed, at the commencement of the siege, as follows, but a part of it was detached during the operations. Troops present at the commencement of the Siege. European Europeans Native Officers, Attached. Officers & Privates, Artillery - - 1 - - 10 - - - - 136 Infantry - - 12 - - 5 - - - - 2236 Keformcd Horse 5 - - - - - - 2006 Total 18 15 4378 January Ith, 1819. The several corps forming this detachment, under the command of Major Pitman, assem- bled at Tomsa, 3 miles South-East of Nowa. In the afternoon, the Commanding Officer proceeded to reconnoitre the Fort, from a hill 900 yards South of it. January St/i. The detachment took up a position, near Nowa; the Infantry encamping at the distance of 1 mile to the North-East of the Fort, and the Reformed Horse at about the same distance 184 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, to the North, and West of it. At inid-day a ^- Risalah arrived under Lieutenant Sutherland, .oj^o aiif^ encamped on the left of the Infantry. Small parties were posted from this Risalah on the South and South-West, so as to communi- cate with those previously stationed on our right. The enemy during the day threw a few shot into our camp, but without doing any ^ injury. The Pioneers were employed through- out the day in cutting brushwood. January 9tli. A working party of 150 men from the line, with the Pioneers and Golandauze, were em- ployed in making fascines and gabions. January \Otli. It having been resolved that the North side of the Fort should be attacked, as it presented a small front, and was understood to be weaker than the other sides, the fascines and platforms were brought to a place 700 yards distant from it ; and a working party of 80 men were em- ployed in constructing battery (No. I) for 4 mortars. The enemy did not appear to have discovered us (owing to the jungle) till towards evening, when part of the Garrison advanced from the Fort, opening a shaip fire upon our people. They were immediately driven in, by a party from the Russell Brigade, under Cap- tain Hare. This battery Mas completed during the night, and another battery (No. 2), 100 ^-C A HACK OF NOVVA. 185 yards in advance, formed with iascines and CHAP, sand bags, was ready to open at day break. ^ • January Wth. v^xck Both batteries opened at daylight. 2 six- pounders were employed in keeping down the enemy's lire, and the eighteen-pounder being directed against the left bastion of the face attacked, brought down a considerable portion of the wall. Throughout the day, the enemy kept up a brisk fire from matchlocks, wall pieces, and a gun placed in the work before the gate. At sun-set posts of Infantry (2 and 6) were established to the riglit and left of the battery, at the distance of about 500 yards. At the latter post, battery (No. 3), was con- structed in advance, at the distance of 430 yards from the gateway. Sentries were place tiie from the Garrison was exceedingly hot, CHAP, and some loss was sustained : cover was how- ^_,,,^_^ ever obtained, in spite of all their eflbrts. ^^^q January ^\st. The sap was widened and deepened : during the night it was turned to the right, and ex- tended 20 yards. A place of arms was made at the head of it. January 227id. At nine a. m. the enemy made a sortie upon the sap, which threw our working parties into great confusion, and prevented the gnard of the trenches from beating them back, so soon as they would otherwise have done. We sus- tained some loss. The work of yesterday was widened and deepened, and during the night the sap was extended 15 yards in the same direction. January 2Srd. Yesterday's work was widened and deep- ened, and the sap was advanced 10 yards. This day a European, attached to the Engi- neer, was mortally wounded at the head of the sap. During the night, the work was advanced to the crest of the glacis. January '24tft. Yesterday's work was rendered more secure, and returns were made to the right and left. At four o'clock p. m., the Garrison sent a mes- senger to the Commanding Officer : and by mu- l.QO SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, tual agreement all firing* ceased till bis return. ^- Our works went on during the night, and a 1^1 f) lodgment on the glacis was completed. A six-pounder was brought up and kept in readi- ness. January 25th. The enemy having refused to accede to the terms proposed, the truce was at an end : great part of the glacis within the lodgment was cutaway, with a view to the commencement of a mine. Towards evening, the shaft was be- gun, and during the night was sunk 12 feet. The soil being stiff clay, was fomid to stand without support. A working party was em- ployed in making fascines. January 2Gth. The shaft was sunk 14 feet deeper, so as to make its depth 26 feet from the crest of the o-lacis. A gallery was commenced to the left, the object being, to blow in the counterscarp, opposite to the left tower of the front attacked. January 21th. X A mortar was got into tlie lodgment, and \ proved of great service. The gallery at mid- day measured 15 feet, and a branch was run out to the right, to the distance of 10 feet from the shaft. Working parties were employed in jnaking fascines. January 2lU/i. The gallery measured 28 feet, and a return ATTACK OF NOW A. 1^1 of 8 feet was iiiacle to the right. The branch CHAP, had been extended as far as the ditch, for the ^^ purpose of obtaining a view of it, and also to ^^^c) ventilate the mine. The gallery proved to be on the same level with the bottom of the ditch. A small branch to the left, was begun from the center of the great branch, in order to form a chamber, and was carried 6 feet, after which a return was made to the right. The enemy annoyed us with stones. January 29t/i. Both chambers being completed, were load- ed ; the one on the left with 900, and that on the right with 315 lbs. of gunpowder. The hose was laid, and part of the mine tamped. January 30//z. At day break the batteries opened, with 2 eigh teen-pounders, 1 six-pounder, and 2 mor- tars ; the mortars and the six-pounder being placed in the lodgment. By two o'clock the remainder of the mine was tamped. In the evening the breaches assumed a very respect- able appearance. Shells and grape were thrown into them, during the night. Jamtary ^\st. The firing from our batteries continued as yesterday. At eight a. im. the Garrison sent two men to negotiate. They were desired to inform the Conmiandanl, that he must surren- der at discretion. They returned to the Fort, 1819. U)2 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP. aw 190 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, approaches on the North front, as to coiinter- ^* balance it, even if it had been known. 1819 Nothing appears to have been overlooked, that could insure a successful result to the siege. The breach was not formed, till the mine that was to open a road to it, was ready for explosion ; and such was the consternation of the Garrison at this novel method of attack, that no resistance was offered by them, whilst our men were placing- the ladders, which were required to mount the breach of the faussebray ; although they had evidently determined to resist to the last, for ruany of our shells which had not exploded, and a quantity of 18lb. shot were found at the top of the breach, ready to hurl on the assailants when they should attempt to mount it. Indeed any further praise of these operations would be superfluous. The complete success which attended them, re- sulting from no accident, and against an enemy as resolute to the last^ as any we have en- countered in India, forms in itself the highest encomium that could be passed. ATTACK OF COPAL BROOG. Descrip- The works of Copal Droog are of extra- copai ordinary magnitude and strength, and (as will Plate appear !)y the plan) very complicated. The ■^^"* hill, which forms the upper Fort, is about 000 feet high above the plain, and is totally in- accessible on threesides. The fourth, or Eastern i K /i' 7' ,, \ 1 8 1 .<>?) B Oore^tmr hUmn open f (rrirrmiv ft'ynny open fn- Cnrnfiars 1> />•'. Z)." f)0 M. ('treMty when- the (mrri^n Surr^derd F Lincol'Wor^v, fwv^t-d /ryZ^Si/ver- of the SS'^mtft a/ewMm ( R^pht Escalade Pomt.^.(hlumnsad\tancin^ Sw^f * Si>nt)- 5.-;? .Slr«iMl .^ r ATTACK OF COPAL DROOG. *^7 side, is encircled with walls to the very base, CHAP. where a strong rampart terminates the hill for- ^^^^J,^ tifications ; below which there are, on this side, igx9. two additional inclosures, each consisting of a very respectable rampart with towers. The inner line of defence of these two embraces the hill in the form of an irregular semicircle, and is built of stone. The outer one is of mud, and surrounds the former every where excepting at the East end, where the two ramparts are united. In approaching the lower Forts, cover is every where afforded, to within 350 yards of the walls, by the Pettah on one side, and by a range of rocks on the other. The main strength of the place is at the point D, on the hill, where the flight of steps, leading to the upper Fort, turns to the left, behind a rock ; and being completely hid from breaching guns, the pro- gress of an enemy is checked by a gate, which presents itself, and where the assailants would be exposed on both sides to musketry, and to stones thrown from above. Maij 8th, 1819. Partof Brigadier-General Pritzler's Division, consisting of the following corps and detach- ments, encamped before Copal Droog this morning. The Brigadier-General commanded in person. Lieut.-Colonel Eraser's brigade was employed. 198 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. (PXTAP No. of ^XXfxi. . f'O'RP'** /irn Companies or No. of V V/Wrvir;5, OSC. squadrons. Men. s.,.^ Capt. Tew, H. M. Flank Battaliou 6 480 ^819. Major Knowles, C. B. Rifle Corps 10 630 Capt. Hall, 2d Batt. 4th Regt. Native Infantry 5 346 Capt. Green, 2d Batt. 12th ditto 10 683 Capt. Mills, H. M. 22d Dragoons 2 179 Capt. Kemble, 1st. Light Cavalry 2 370 Major Cleaveland, Artillery 2 74 Gun Lascars - 97 Capt. Smithwaite, Pioneers 3 200 3,059 A reconnoitring party proceeded at 9 a.m. to examine the vv^orks, and it was determined that the whole column should attack the out-posts of the enemy in the evening, and take posses- sion of the Pettah, with a view to erecting bat- teries during the night. At 4 o'clock P.M. the troops off duty moved towards the Pettah, but being met by a brother of the Rajah, who came out with his retinue to deliver up the place, they halted ; and four companies were detached to take possession of the gateways, but on approaching the walls they were warned off, and ultimately refused admittance. Whilst this parley was going on, the column was ordered back to camp, except- ing about 300 men, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Fraser, who remained to sup- port the four companies in case of necessity. At the close of the evening Lieut.-Colonel Fraser ATTACK OF COPAL DROOG. 19,0 withdrew the four companies, and took up a CHAP. position in the Pettah, where he was reinforced ^• by the galloper guns of the 22d Dragoons. ,gj(. During the night a mortar battery was pre- pared at ?/ (see Plate XXII.); and nine mortars opened their fire from it at midnight upon the lower works. The gallopers opened at the same time with shrapnels, from the position in the Pettah. May the i)t/i. The two gallopers were removed from the Pettah, and, together with a howitzer, were placed in position on the hill post (r) to the right of the mortar battery, where they were of considerable use, in silencing the fire from the upper works. 2 brass twelve-pounders were placed in the Pettah, in lieu of the gallopers, and during the night a battery was constructed for 2 eighteen-pounders at (x) to breach the North curtain of the lower Fort. Mai/ the ]()th. The fire from the breaching battery, and the whole of the other posts, commenced at sun-rise, and continued with little intermission through- out the day. During the night the breaching battery was enlarged for 2 more eighteen-pounders. Mat/ Wlh. The 4 guns opened at daylight, and with so much effect, that the breach was reported prac- 200 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, ticable at noon. Arrangements were conse- ^' quently made for the storming- of the lower 1819 f o^^s ^^ daybreak next morning ; and the brass twelve-pounders were removed, and, together with a howitzer, were placed a little in advance of the mortar battery, at (jv), for the purpose of covering the attack. \v\ These arrangements were rendered unneces- ■ sary, in consequence of the surrender of the lower Forts, which took place in the evening. The Garrison, to the amount of 1400 men, marched out, and the place was taken posses- sion of by our troops. Overtures w^ere at the same time made for delivering up the upper Fort. Mai/ I2th. Hostilities ceased in consequence of the ne- gotiations which were pending. These, how- ever, on the part of the Rajah, seemed to be entered into for the sole purpose of gaining time. The whole day was wasted without coming to any decision, and a farther period, till 9 o'clock of the morning of the 13th, was allowed, to bring them to a conclusion. Ad- vantage was taken of this interval, to examine the nature of the remaining defences. Mm/ 13///. The period fixed upon having arrived, and it appearing that no reliance could be placed upon the Rajah's professions and promises. ATTACK OF COPAL DROOG. 201 the following plan of attack was decided upon. CHAP. Two columns, of 4 companies each, to escalade the walls at the points G and H ; and having jq^q gained admittance, to support each other. A galloper gun to accompany the left attack, for the purpose of blowing open the gate B. Advan- tage to be taken of the confusion of the enemy, to follow them to the summit of the hill, if pos- sible. A reserve of .3 companies to advance from the mortar battery, to reinforce thecolumn which should first establish a footing. At twelve o'clock precisely, both columns advanced to the assault. The right under Captain Cuppage, of His Majesty's 53rd Regi- ment ; the left under Captain Tew, of His Majesty's 34th Regiment; the whole com- manded by Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser, of the 12th Native Infantry. Both escalades succeeded, and the gateway was blown open at the same instant. The troops rushed in, and effected a junction at the gate- way C, which afforded cover to a considerable number of men. At this point, they were checked by a tremendous shower of stones, which was hurled from the rocks above, and occasioned a number of casualties. Amongst the sufferers was Lieutenant Elliott of the Rifle Corps, a very promising young Officer, who had only joined his Regiment the preceding day, and anxious to distinguish himself, had volun- 202 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, teered to accompany the strong party. After V- a short pause, a party rushed forward, led by Lieutenant Silver of the 53rd Regiment, which after a gallant contest, succeeded in forcing the gateway D, driving the defenders before them, who retreated to the right and left, as our men entered. The main body of the assailants moved to the right, and immediately carried the line of works extending in that direction. A small party also went to the left, but being much exposed, and their ammunition expended, were obliged to retreat. A second rush was however made in this direction, and the enemy intimidated by the perseverance and gallantry of the attack, called for quarter, which was granted ; and the Garrison, to the amount of 500 men, were marched out prisoners of war. Our loss in the siege and assault amounted to 4 Officers and 57 men killed and wounded. ENGINEER DEPARTMENT. Lieutenant Grant, Commanding. „ Oliphant. ORDNANCE. 4 Iron eighteen-pounders. 2 Iron twelve-pounders. 2 Brass ditto. 8 Eight-inch Mortars. 1 Five-and-a-quartcr-inth Mortar. 2 Howitzers. The assaulting columns were on this occa- sion, as on every former one during the cam- ATTACK OF COPAL DROOG. '203 paign, led by Officers of Engineers, who well CHAP. supported the reputation of their Corps. The ^^J^J^^ right point of escalade was 20 feet high and the ^^^^^ left 19, the ladders were 25 feet long, and were found to be just sufficient. They were carried by Pioneers, and planted by the Engineer Offi- cers, assisted by Volunteer Artillery men. Ropes were attached to the ladders near the top to secure them when up, and bamboo poles with iron forks were used in rearing them. No particular notice has been taken of the strength of working parties, as no fighting men were required for that purpose. The cover near the Fort was so excellent, that nothing remained but to throw up a parapet, at any point required, for which the Pioneers, Dooly Bearers, and Bamboo Coolies, were found to be quite sufficient. The breaching battery was sunk (in a ploughed field) in four hours, and the other batteries constructed with equal facility. The gate B required three discharges from the galloper to blow it open, the first a blank cartridge, the second a round shot, and the third a double shot : the escalading party were just over the wall when the gate opened. ( 204 ) CHAPTER VI : EXTRAORDINARY STRENGTH OF THE NATIVE HILL FORTS, CONTRASTED WITH THE WEAKNESS OF THE OTHER FORTRESSES OF INDIA.— THE CAUSES OF OUR NUMEROUS FAILURES, IN ATTACKING THE LATTER, INVESTIGATED.— THE SYSTEM OF IRREGULAR SIEGES, AND THE TOO FREQUENT USE OF RASH ASSAULTS, CONDEMNED.-IMPROVEMENTS, THAT OUGHT TO BE ADOPTED, TO INSURE SUCCESS, IN THE EVENT OF FUTURE SIEGES IN INDIA. CHAP. The foregoing journals present a curious ^I- anomaly. We have taken apparently without -.g,g difficulty the formidable Hill Forts of India, Fortresses formed by nature, as if in proof of her superiority over the most laboured works of science ; whilst on the other hand, places on the plain, that would not delay an European Army, fully equipped for more than a week, have not only resisted our eflbrts with success ; but, in the opinion of the mass of mankind, who seldom look deeper than the surface, have even brought discredit on our military character. According to the plan laid down in the introductory Chapter, where the causes, which have led to such discordant results, have already been partially noticed, it now only remains to inquire more minutely into this question, and to consider the best mode of avoiding similar disasters, in the event of future wars in the East. REMARKS ON THE HILL EORTS. 205 In regard to the HjjJLFgrts of India, I shall CHAP. again most pointedly repeat the opinion ex- ^]^ pressed or implied in former parts of this work, jg^Q that many of them, if properly defended, may be considered absolutely impregnable. Those vast precipices of lofty granite may equally bid defiance to the battering Gun, and to the Mine, the latter of which, Vauban the great master of the Art of Sieges, recommends as the most powerful agent for the attack of mountain Fortresses. And in fact there seems no certain mode of reducing them, if vigorously defended, but the tedious opera- tion of strict blockade. Having given such a character of these Fortresses, it may be asked, from what cause or by what means we came to reduce the whole of them with such facility, in the late war? The reader will have observed, that the mode of proceeding always adopted, was to occupy without delay one or more positions as close to the rock as possible ; and to carry up field pieces to the spot by hand. This plan of operation was purposely recommended by the enterprising and skUful Engineer employed with Lieutenant-Colonel M'Dowall's Division, in the hope of intimidating the defenders, at the same time that he officially stated his opinion, that if this attempt at working upon their minds by a show of vigour i-liould fail, the cap- 206 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. €HAP. ture of these strong holds was absolutely im- ^^- possible.* Without, however, supposing any leiq extraordinary degree of pusillanimity on the part of the enemy, at the period alluded to, another cause must have had an equal or per. haps a greater share, in leading to the almost immediate surrender of these formidable For- tresses. The Commanders and their Garrisons were perfectly aware, that the Peishwah had been totally defeated, and that the state of his affairs was absolutely hopeless. They could therefore entertain no rational prospect of re- trieving their Master's fortunes, by a determined opposition to the British arms, which eventually might be injurious or even ruinous to them- selves. Under such impressions, it is more than probable, that they only waited for the opening of the first battery, to afford them a decent pretext for surrendering.! * See the Report of the Commanding Engineer on the Fortj-ess of Rajdeir (Page 92). t In former wars we have had similar instances of success against such places, especially in the war of 1791 against the Mahomedan Dynasty of Mysore, when three of the strongest HiW Forts of that Country, Nundydroog, Severn- droog, and Ootradroog, were successively carried, the two former by storm, the latter by escalade. Although these places were inferior in strength to those of the Deckan, and had their ramparts breached by guns, conveyed to positions deemed inaccessible ; yet, even under these circumstances, our successes at that period excited the utmost astonish- ment, and were attributed to the effect produced on the G ar- REMARKS ON THE HILL FORTS. iO? Having thus attempted to account for tl)e CHAP. poor resistance made by the Hill Forts of ^^^^^ Khandesh, I shall not presume to lay down any ^sio. fixed rules for the attack of such Fortresses in future ; as it must be evident, from the descrip- tion of them, that no certain result can be cal- culated upon, under all circumstances. A great deal of cover is usually found near them, owing to the inequalities of the ground ;* but the little depth of soil is a great impediment to the construction of batteries, and trenches, especially as the parapets of these works re- quire an extraordinary height to protect them from such very commanding Fortresses.f We risons by the recent fall of Bangalore. On the other hand, it is proper to notice the repulses we received in the two successive attacks of Kistnagherry, in 1789 and 1791, which in both instances, were effected by simply rolling down stones and large masses of granite on the assailants. * It frequently occurs that some of the lower lines of works of the Indian Hill Forts afford cover to the storming party, even as far as the very foot of the breach, as was the case at Dindigul in 1791, and at Vellore when besieged by Hyder's Troops, in 1781. At the last mentioned place, the besiegers, having been repulsed in their attempt to storm the breach, began to fill up the ditch with fascines, and as it was not lianked, the Garrison were unable to impede them in this operation, until Lieutenant Parr, the acting Engineer, descended with a party of men by the ladders, which had been placed by the assailants, and drove them out of the ditch by the bayonet. t When the Artillery of the Garrion can be kept under, the old expedient, described in the common elementary 208 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP. <^id not however suffer much from this circum- ^^- stance in the late war, as our batteries were 1819 P'^c^ observed, fhit although the Author OF AITACKS BY ESCALADE. 213 alluded to describes the gateway as the weakest CHAP. point in the Native Fortresses of Hindostan, ,T~^ this is far from being the case, on the Western jgjg side of India, when the gates are always very intricate and numerous, and they are also (at least the interior ones) the only parts, where any attention appears to be paid to a flanking defence; and if occasional success in any method of attack be sufficient to recommend it for general adoption, the Native way of breaking open a gate with an Elephant, which was prac- tised by ourselves in two instances in the late war,* possesses equal claims to such distinc- tion. An escalade is equally objectionable as a general system, but as a coup de main, is more likely to succeed than the former method ; for an enemy may be taken by surprise, and his attention distracted from the real point of attack ; which is impossible, when agate is to be blown open. The noise and preparations necessary to bring up guns, at once prevent ■ In 1818, at Compta, a place in the Nagpoor Rajah's dominions, where it succeeded, and at Lariga, a Fort, in the same Country, and attacked about the same time, where it failed. In 1751, Arcot, when defended by the immortal Clive, was attacked in this way by Chunda Saib, who sent forward elephants, with plates of iron hung on their foreheads to break down the gates ; and here the natural consequence of such an attempt ensued, for the animals being wounded, turned round, and trampled on their own party. •214 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, surprise, and as there is seldom more than one ^^' entrance to a Fort ; to that point, the attention 1819 *^^t^^^ Garrison must necessarily be directed. An attempt at surprise, however, which is essential to the success of an escalade, or of any other coup de main may be frustrated by the slightest accident. The escalade of Ma- dura, in 1757, although admirably planned, was repulsed through the barking of a dog, which alarmed the garrison.* * If the defenders are aware of the point, which is to be assailed, success can hardly be expected. The attack on Bobilee by the French, under Monsieur Bussy, in 1757, whilst it proves this, exhibits the Native Indian character in such an extraordinary Ught, that I shall, perhaps, be pardoned for introducing it. This was a petty square Fort, with a round tower at each angle, having its walls only 20 feet high, with a rampart of 12 feet, and was garrisoned by 250 Polygars. The French attacked it with a force of 750 Europeans, and 1100 Peous, divided it into four bodies, with a field-piece attached to each. They commenced their operations at daybreak. By nine o'clock, the field-pieces had battered the parapet, which was only 3 feet thick, sufficiently to admit of the scaKng ladders being applied. After vainly attempting for an hour to mount by them, the Etttack ceased till the breaches of the parapet were increased. Another attempt was then made, but proved as fruitless as the first ; and at two o'clock, not a man having been able to mount the rampart, a second cessation was ordered. At this period, the Polygar Chieftain despairing of success, sum- moned his brave followers, and represented to them the only alternative, by which their wives and families could be saved from dishonour. This cruel measure was instantly acted OF ATTACKS BY MINING. 215 If, from want of time for carrying on regular CHAP. VT operations, or from other circumstances, a eoitp ^^^„,/, de main be considered necessary, and such 1 am iqj<) aware will often be the case^ mining, where there is only one line of works, and those of mud, appears to me preferable to any of the methods which have been in general use ; as being equally expeditious, more certain, and less hazardous to the aissailants. In blowing open a gate, or in an escalade, the exposure of a number of troops is indispensable.* In min- ing, the work is done by two or three, nor are they in much danger, for, a miner working in front of a tower, could not be touched by mus- ketry ;t and a small mantlet, placed against it upon; and the whole of the women and chihhen were sacri- ficed to these high but mistaken notions of honour. During this tragic scene, the assailants took advantage of the absence of those men who wei'e employed in it, and forced their way into the place, where the Garrison disdaining to accept of quarter, continued their resistance, until every man was put to the sword. * The best and bravest men in an Army are generally most exposed in this sort of service. The success at the gate of Bangalore, in 1794, one of the most important of the kind ever gained, was dearly purchased by the life of Colonel Moorhouse, who fell on that occasion. At the attack of the gateway of the Pagoda, of Conjeveram, in 1759, to which there were no gates, and which was defended only by a small ravelin, thrown up by the French before it, no less than four Officers were killed and five wounded by one discharge of a gnn, after the assailants had carried the ravelin. t The Author had an opportunity of ascertaining this, at 21d SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, at a sufficient angle, would protect him from l^ stones or other missiles from above, till he had jgjtj lodged himself in the work, where he would be perfectly secure from any annoyance but that of sallies, which, of course, covering parties would be so placed, as to prevent; and, with workmen at all expert in mining, the whole might be effected in one night. The only in- stance, which I can find of this having been attempted, was in 1752, at the Pagoda of Velore, in the neighbourhood of Trichinopoly, and where it was completely successful. The walls of this Pagoda were of stone, and a large gateway was built up with mud, to prevent it from being blown open. A small party of Eu- ropeans, having marched in a dark night, con- cealed themselves in a neighbouring water course ; and one man having advanced, dug un- der the wicket, which was left in the gate, and having placed a barrel of powder in the cham- ber he formed there, the explosion brought the Siege of Malligaum, where he sat with a European, and three or four Pioneers, for half an hour in broad dayhght, in front of one of the towers, against which scaHng ladders had been reared for the escalade of the outer work, on the Pettah side. The enemy could not see the party to dislodge them with musketry, and the ladders being plficed at an angle, and covering them, warded off the stones which were thrown from above. A portable mantlet for the miner on this prin- ciple, might be invented for general use. OF IRREGULAR ATTACKS IN (iENERAL. 217 down the mud work and terrace of the gateway, CHAP, and formed a practicable entrance.* v.^v^ I cannot conclude my remarks on the rash 2819. assaults, which have been in such general use in India, better than by quoting the opinion advanced on the same subject by Bousmard, a deservedly esteemed writer, on the Attack and Defence of Fortified Places. He observes, that the arguments in favour of such rash at- tenjpts, when thoroughly analyzed, do not merit the smallest attention : that if they be discussed by a due consideration of the means necessary for carrying them into effect, and of the difficulties which oppose their success, they usually evaporate, without leaving in the crucible any other deposit, than the caput inor- tmmi, of the ignorance and folly of the pro- poser.-f The Author of the Observations on the At- tack of Mud Forts in India, to whose Work I * Talneir, the attack of which, has led to so much dis- cussion, and where we lost so many Officers, might certainly have been taken by the method 1 have here suggested. The gateway of this Fort was the strongest part of it, while the ravines running close to the ramparts, would have afforded great additional facilities to the miners, if this method could have been adopted ; but, strange as it may appear, there was not a single miner, or a single mining tool in the whole of the First Division, t See Bousmard's Essai General de Fortification, Liv. vi. Chap. v. " Des attaques irregulieres et brusqueesde Places Fortes, ctdcs moyens de defense a y opposcr." 218 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, have before alluded, deserves the praise of ^^- having- been the first writer, who exposed to 1819 P"*^^^^ notice, the very imperfect and vicious mode of attack, hitherto generally pursued. He states, that out of seven storms, at which he was present, he has seen no less than five unsuccessful, in which, upwards of 120 Bri- tish Officers and 3000 men were killed and vwounded. This simple fact speaks volumes as to the necessity of some improvement, whatever difference of opinion may exist as ' to the peculiar plan that ought to be adopted. The same Work contains several nseful sug- gestions, in one of which I entirely agree with him, as to the expediency of introducing the use of hand grenades, which are at present almost unknown in India.* Having allowed this Author the merit to which he is justly entitled, I must now enter upon the less pleasing task of pointing out his errors. Whilst he laments, as 1 have done, the disas- trous results of many of our sieges, he seems to think that the works of the rude Natives of Hindostan are stronger (not weaker) than those * The use of luiiul grenades as a branch of instruction, has recentiy been restored in Engiund, not only in the Royal Engineer Department, which was the tirst to adopt it, but also in several Regiments of Infantry, whose Grenadier Com- panies have been practised in this long foi^otten art, from which alone they derived their title. SYSTEM OF THE AUTHOR ON MUD FORTS. 219 of the most scientific modern Engineers ; and CHAP. accordingly, under this extraordinary impres- ^^'• sion, he rejects the sap and the mine, which j^^^ have triumphed over the strongest Fortresses of Europe, and proposes in lieu of them to sub- stitute a new method of attack of his own, to commence inmiediately after the establishment of the third parallel. To quote his own words, " the assault (he says) must not be made till *' the Rounee wall* be as completely destroyed, " as we have before recomnuiidehave * The quantity of powder to be used in these mines will depend upon the nature of the counterscarp, and also upon whether it is reveted. The ditches of Native For- tresses are frequently without revetments ; for the earth in some parts of India is of great tenacity, and notwithstanding the heavy periodical rains, it will stand at a much less slope, than in Europe. The Author remembers the ditches of Berwanee, a Fortress on the South bank of the Nerbudda, which had been formed several years, and to which, from the inquiries he made, he found that no great attention was paid, and yet they were standing in very tolerable order, at a slope of about one fourth. He could not discover, whether the earth had been prepared in the first instance, to enable it to resist the effects of the weather, and to preserve its slope. 230 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, been passed, and their scarp revetments ^^^' breached by mining, in spite of all the efforts of defenders, much excelling the Natives of India in discipline and military skill, and cer- tainly not inferior to them in personal courage. \ To pretend, like the Author of the Book on Mud Forts, before quoted, that the same pro- cess could not be applied, with at least equal success, to the passage of the imperfectly flanked ditches of the rude fortifications of the Natives of India, is, I conceive, a most glaring and pernicious error, that could only have arisen from the limited experience of the irre- gular sieges, and vicious system of attack, of which that Author was a witness. Having thus briefly described a mode of attack, which by taking advantage of the de- fects of the Indian system of fortifying, and by bringing into play the science and experience attained by Europeans in the art of sieges, would place the reduction of the strongest Na- tive Fortresses beyond the power of chance, and would render unavailing the most des- perate valour and the greatest exertions of their Garrisons ; before I proceed to another branch of my subject, it may be proper to notice some points already treated of, a little more in detail. First, in regard to the proper distance for breaching batteries, it may be remarked, thateven CONCLUDING CHAPTER. 231 when they are not from circumstances obliged to CHAP. VT I be advanced to the crest of the glacis, or to the ^^^^^ counterscarp, I should not recommend them to be established at more than 150 yards from the wall, that is to be battered. At the siege of Chingleput, in 1752, four twenty-four-pounders at 500 yards distance, were found to have no effect. At 200 yards, a practicable breach was afterwards made with thesameguns, both in the outer and inner walls, in the space of four days, and had the distance been still further di- minished to about 100 yards,, the breach would in all probability have been effected in half that time. If the ramparts of an Indian Fortress are of stone, the curtain should generally be battered in preference to the towers, as the shot are apt to be reflected from the latter, owing to their circular form, and the hardness of the material of which they are built. The propriety of this rule was exemplified in a re- markable way at the siege of Palghaut, in 1781, where the besiegers in vain attempted to breach one of the round towers of the Fort, which was composed of very large blocks of granite, laid in the manner technically called "headers," in architecture, so as to present their ends, not their sides, to the shot. In 1790, when the Fort was again attacked, one of the curtains was breached in a few hours. If all the works of a Fort be constructed of 232 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, mud, the breaches in each inclosure or Hue of ^^^' defence will be better and more quickly effected by mining, than by battering guns, for such is the nature of these earthen revetments, that the ^ shot bury and lodge themselves in the mud, without bringing it down. Live shells, the effect of which against earthen works, has been proved in Europe to be much greater than that of shot, may also be used to advantage; but it may justly be asserted, that there is no country in the world, in which mining may be used for the purposes of attack, to so much advantage as in India, where the ill flanked outline enables the Miner to lodge himself at once, in the face of the rampart, without the necessity of approach- ing it by subterraneous galleries, and where the mud, of which the works are composed, is soft enough to be penetrated with ease, and yet of sufficient tenacity to stand without woodwork of any description.* Captain Coventry, of the Madras Engineers, tried an interesting experiment, connected with this subject, in the year 1818, at Aniul- neir. It was his intention, in the attack of that Fort, to have breached the rampart by mining; but as the place surrendered without resistance, V \i » This would of course render the progress of the Miner \ more expeditious, than in soil, where regular mine frames and sheeting are necessary, in which the work proceeds seldom faster than at t)ie average rate of one foot per hour. CONCLUDING CHAPTER. '2-33 he resolved, on receiving an order to destroy the CHAP. works, to put to the test, the plan of operation, ^.^^^^ that he had previonsly determined to pursue, if the place had stood a siege. Accordingly he ran a gallery under one of the circular towers, and placed 1 100 lbs. of powder in the chamber, the Hne of least resistance being 22 feet : and although the powder was of inferior quality, being made by the Natives, the eftect of the explosion was very considerable, throwing down the whole of the tower, and a part of the adjacent curtain.* It may further be remarked, that it is better to effect a breach by mining, than by battering- guns, so far as regards the expenditure of shot, ' not so much, however, on account of the ex- * The Author of the Book on Mud Forts thinks Mininguse- less as an agent of attack, because when it has been attempted he has seen it fail, the besiegers being twice effectually coun- termined. Instead of this circumstance operating as a dis- couragement, it ought to be an incentive to us, not to allow any of the Natives of India to excel us in so important a branch of the art of War. However expert the Natives of Hindostan, where that Author served, may have been in the practice of Mining, it is absolutely impossible, that their Chiefs could have directed them with the same science as the Company's Engineers, to whom they were opposed. If the ■ latter had been at the head of a body of well trained Miners, the result of their labours must therefore have undoubtedly been success, instead of failure. In those parts of India, where I have served, the Natives have little or no knowledge of Mining. 234 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, pense,* as the difficulty of conveying a sufficient ^^^' quantity of this most essential article of store. In regard to the best hour of storming a For- tress, after practicable breaches are effected by the battering gun, or by the mine, opinions are divided. The morning, noon.f and night,;}: * Even this is a matter of some consequence, if it be con- sidered, that it may require three months to convey the shot to the advanced Divisions, and that it may be a year more before they are used : that in the Madras service they are always transported on bullocks, each of which carries only 4 eighteen- pound shot, and involves an expense of nearly five rupees a month, over and above the prime cost of the animal. Thus if the value of the shot, and of Sea carriage to India, he also taken into consideration, some idea may be formed of the sum, which every cannon ball costs the State before it is fired. There has generally been a deficiency of shot, especially towards the close of our sieges, when rewards, of from one quarter of a rupee to two rupees a piece, have been offered for the shot brought in, according to the exigencies of the service, and the number of camp followers, who may have been disposed to hazard their lives in this pur- suit. It is remarkable, that at the siege of Asseerghur, Sir John Malcolm's Division carried away more shot than they brought with them, owing to the reward offered being a trifle higher, than in the other Divisions. t The storming of Seringapatam took place in the middle of the day ; but it appears that the unusual bustle of the prepara- tions in the trenches, attracted the notice of several of Tippoo's principal Officers, who were fully aware of the intended assault, and requested him to prepare for it, but in vain ; as a blind fatality seems to have characterized all his actions, towards the close of his life and reign. t Ormc gives a sti-ong opinion in favour of night attacks. COISCLUDING CHAPTER. 235 have each their advocates. For my part, I CHAP. should be inclined to recommend as a general principle, subject however to such variations as local circumstances may require, to com- mence the assault in the very early part of the morning, before there is sufficient light for the enemy to distinguish objects correctly. At this time, they will also have had the fatigue of watching all night, and to exhaust the Garrison the more, a false alarm in the course of the night may previously be resorted to. Had the advance to the storm at Malligaum taken place half an hour earlier, as was origiiially intended, there is reason to believe that many valuable lives might have been saved, and that the result might have been very different. I have thus attempted to describe a line of operations, which would place the reduction of the strongest Native Fortresses beyond the power of chance, and which by being grounded on the principle of taking advantage of the faults and inferiority of construction, observable After relating the extraordinary success of the French under Monsieur Bussy, in 1750, in the assault of Gingee, which was considered the strongost Hill Fort in the Carnatic, he observes, that " had the attack been made in daylight, it " could not have succeeded, for the Moors, as well as In- " dians, often defend themselves very obstinately behind " strong walls, but it should seem that no advantage either of " numbers or situation, can countervail the terror with which " they are struck, when attacked at night. 236 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, in the Oriental system of Fortification, and of ^^^' bringing into play the science and experience attained by Europeans in the art of attack, would render unavailing and nugatory the most desperate valour, and the greatest exertions of their Garrisons. But with all the advantages, that this improved system of attack will un- doubtedly otfer, it can never be expected, that it shall generally be acted upon in India, until the Army of each Presidency shall be provided with the proper means for carrying it into effect, with a fair prospect of success, which The neces. has ucvcr yct bccu the case. This leads me to iig^a^co^ps the consideration of the second improvement, lifrioi- before-mentioned, namely, the necessity of hav- attached ing a wcU trained Corps of Engineer Soldiers, the^cdm^* or of men properly instructed and exercised Kies. beforehand, in all the operations of a siege, to assist the Engineer Officers in their arduous duties in the field. Of all the defects, that have hitherto led to those lamentable disasters, with which many of our Indian sieges have been attended, the want of such a Corps has been the most glaring and pernicious ; and if that defect be remedied, all the minor arrangements and improvements necessary will follow, as a matter of course. During the whole of the wars, that have hitherto been carried on in India, the Company's Engineer Officers have never had a man em- ( ONCLIJDING CHAPTER. 237 ployed under them, who understood before- CHAP. hand any one of the duties, which he was J^^^^ required to execute. Now, if we were told, that the Artillery of any Power consisted of a body of Officers, with an establishment of guns and stores, and sufficiently instructed in thetheory of their duties, but who, instead of having a permanent Corps of skilful Gunners under their orders, were only supplied with men to fight their guns on the day of battle; and that they were under the necessity of teaching these men how to load, and fire, and to perform all the other necessary manoeuvres of Artillery, in the presence of the enemy ; every military man would naturally laugh at such an arrangement as the height of absurdity, and one that must lead to the certaui loss of every action, in which the fire of Artil- lery was of the smallest importance. Yet, absurd as it may appear, such is a correct picture of what has hitherto been the actual state of the Engineer Department of the Com- pany's Armies. The only men generally avail- able for the duties of that Department have been the Pioneers, and as these men have never been employed in military works of this de- scription, excepting upon actual service, it has been the hard fate of the Engineer Officers, to be obliged to teach them every thing that was to be done, either when exposed to tire, or at 238 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, least when in the presence of the enemy, and ^^^- thus to waste those precious moments when skill, energy, and activity, were most wanted, in the irksome and laborious drudgery of su- perintending a multitude of little details, which in other services would be the duty of a Private, or, at the utmost, of a Corporal of Sappers. It is a fact, that in our sieges, the Officer of En- gineers in person, has often had to teach a Pioneer how to make a gabion or a fascine, and to stand over him in the execution of the work.* * It may be said, that the Pioneers, after having been em- ployed in several successive sieges, must necessarily have acquired some portion of that skill, in which they were at first deficient, and on this plea it may be urged, that the character I have given of their inefficiency is too strong. In reply, I need scarcely suggest to the reflecting reader, that the know- ledge thus acquired by some individuals out of a large body, without any systematic instruction beforehand, must neces- sarily be of a most imperfect nature, and if there be no regular practice afterwards to perpetuate it, it must of course evapo- rate almost instantaneously, and become lost to the service for ever. And, after all let us ask, what did the Pioneers actually do, or what did they learn in those sieges. Were they in the habit of crowning the counterscarp by sap ? No 1 Did they ever work across a dry ditch, or fill up a wet one under fire? Never! Did they ever breach an enemy's scarp revetments by mining? Never! And yet these arc the duties of Engineer Soldiers. Poor, indeed, would the Sapper and Miner be considered in Europe, whose skill like that of our most experienced Native Pioneers, extended no further than the making of a fascine and a gabion, and having some notion of the nature of a battery. By these observa- CONCLUDING CHAPTER. 239 The confusion, the difficulties, the loss of time, CHAP. and the consequent loss of lives, which have ^. attended, and which necessarily must attend, such an imperfect mode of proceeding, may easily be conceived. Even in the first and simplest operations of an irregular siege, such as the construction of a portion of a parallel, with a common battery or two, these difficul- ties have always been sufficient to exhaust the bodies, if they could not subdue the spirit of the Engineer Officers. What prospect of suc- cess, therefore, could an Engineer have had in contemplating the long protracted labours, attending the ulterior operations of a regular siege, such as the execution of the sap under close musketry fire, without Sappers, and the execution of mines, without Miners? The prospect was certainly appaling, and unless the evils of which I now complain be remedied, tions, I am far from wishing to depreciate that respectable body of men. It has been their misfortune, not their fault, that they have been constantly called upon to perform duties in the field of a most difficult nature, for which they were not qualified, like other soldiers, by previous exercise and instruc- tion. So far from blaming them, every Engineer who has witnessed their exertions, must admit that they deserve great credit for having shown so much zeal, under such very dis- couraging circumstances. But the opinions of those Officers of the Army, for some there are, who maintain, that the pre- sent Pioneers have always been a perfect model of a Military Working Corps, and equal to all the wants of the Service, cannot be too highly reprobated 240 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, in the event of new wars, very few Engineers ^^I- indeed, however scientific or enlightene(1 they may be, will venture to attempt much more than a small portion of a parallel, and a common breaching battery. For the bravest and most zealous men, will scarcely dare to incur the responsibility of recommending a regular siege, when they know that the Army has not the means of executing it with proper vigour, or even with a reasonable hope of success; and that from the general ignorance of such subjects, which unfortunately prevails amongst the Offi- cers of the British Army, any failure that might happen afterwards would be ascribed, not to the want of means, which caused it, but, to the obstinacy of the Engineer, in proposing an impracticable mode of attack. It is true, that from time to time, some very strong-minded man may follow the just rules of the Art, and do his best, without adequate means, in spite of every difficulty, and regardless of the con- sequences to his own reputation ; and it is not impossible, that an Engineer, acting upon such high-toned principles, may succeed : but instances of tliis kind are very rare indeed in the history of our Indian Campaigns. In the late war, the Siege of Nowa, conducted by Ensign Oliphant, is the only example of this nature; upon which it may be remarked, that if that enterprising and skilful Officer had been CONCLUDING CHAPTEK. 241 provided with a body of properly trained Sap-cHAP. pers and Miners, the place might undoubtedly ^I^- have been taken in half the time.* Another cause in some degree contributes to the inefficiency of the Engineer Department of the Company's Armies on actual service: that is the inadequacy of the Officers in point of numbers, arising from the various duties of a more civil nature, intrusted to their charge, and which leave but a very small proportion dis- posable for the tield. In the British Service, in * The siege of Tanjore, in 1773, was mentioned in a former note. That of Caroor, in 1760, in which the operations were conducted by Captain Richard Smith, is another in- stance of an attack upon a similar principle, which also proved successful. The Fort was square, with a bastion at each angle, and square towers in the curtains, and had stone revetments, with a dry ditch, but no faussebray. In every bastion there was a cavalier, consisting of a round tower. Captain Smith commenced his attack by occupying the Pettah, which he connected by trenches with some mud buildings in front of it, which offered advantageous cover to the assailants on one side. From thence he pushed his approaches in the direction of one of the salient angles of the Fort, to within 40 yards of the ditch, when the enemy's musketry forced him to have recourse to the double sap, by means of which he reached, and crowned, the counterscarp, and sprung a mine, which blew the revetment into the ditch, after which the Garrison capitulated. The highest praise is due to the method, and perseverance, with which he brought this siege to a close, with men so very ignorant and inexperienced in such operations, that they were seven days and nights in completing about 200 yards of sap. Q 242 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, other parts of the world, where the Corps of 7, Royal Engineers is employed, ten or eleven officers are considered indispensable for a siege of the smallest magnitude, in order to furnish the necessary reliefs, and to provide for the nu- merous casualties incident to this branch of service. But the number I have mentioned is equal to one-third of the whole Corps of Madras Engineers ; and although the climate of India renders impossible such continued personal exertions, as may be made in Europe, and therefore would seem to require rather a greater number of Engineer Officers than other- wise, for a service of a similar nature ; this cir- cumstance has been so little attended to, that there have seldom been present at a siege in India, sufficient Engineers to furnish a proper relief.* * This remark is equally applicable to the Artillery Officers, of whom there never were sufficient employed in the same siege to furnish a relief: and at the Siege of Asseerghur in particular, the Officers of the Madras Artillery actually lived in the batteries, to which they were respectively attached. A large augmentation, however, which this Corps has received since that period, will, in all probability, prevent the recur- rence of this inconvenience ; and indeed, the Engineers form the only branch of the Madras Army, which was not increas- ed at the close of the Campaign, but was allowed to remain of the same strength as before our late accession of territory. A brief recapitulation of the effects of these operations, on the Officers employed, will place the utter inadequacy of the Corps to meet the exigencies of the Service, in a more strik- CONCLUDING CHAPTER. 243 At the Sieges of Belgaum and other places CHAP. in the Southern Mahratta Country, there were .Y^^ no professional Engineers present ; nor were there collected together at any time during the late campaigns, more than tive ; and at one period, four out of these five were disabled. But besides the usual duties of Engineer Offi- cers during a siege, which ought to be those of general superintendence only, the labour of instructing the working parties, which is pecu- liar to the Indian service, and which as I before remarked, ought to be the office of a Corporal or Private of Sappers, has also been thrown upon the Engineer Officers, so that they have actually been obliged to live entirely in the trenches, and to take food and sleep there, at such moments as they could snatch. These are not represented as hardships. It is not too much to say, that they have always been cheer- fully born ; nor would such temporary incon- veniencies be thought of, if the Engineer Officers ing point of view. Out of eleven Engineer OflScers serving in the field with different Divisions, and at different times, during the war, two were killed, after having been both wounded on former occasions ; two died of fevers ; three were wounded ; two were obliged to quit the field from illness, and have since been sent to sea for the recovery of their health ; and more recently Captain Coventry, who conducted the Siege of Asseerghur, has fallen a sacrifice to the repeated attacks of a fever, to which he became subject in consequence of that severe service, Q 2 '244 SIEGES OF THE MADRAS ARMY. CHAP, who experience them, could look forward with ^^ any certainty to the prospect of their labours being crowned with success. Butthishas never been the case. Whilst their bodies have been harassed by unnecessary fatigues, their minds have been tormented by the anticipations of the failure of every operation of difficulty and importance, in which they have been engaged, owing to the want of properly instructed En- gineer Soldiers, to assist them in their duties. I have, perhaps, said enough to convince every impartial and reflecting person of the necessity of this important improvement, being immediately adopted in our Indian Army. In one Presidency only (the Bengal Government), steps have actually been taken, for carrying this measure into effect, as was before remarked in the Introductory Chapter,* and it is to be hoped, that ere long this salutary example will be followed at the other Presidencies. If, however, any other grounds than its own merits were required to prove the advantage that would accrue to the State, from a better organ- ization of the Engineer Department of our Indian Armies, recourse might be had toother examples for authority ; and the course pur- sued by all the j)Owers of Europe, with regard to this branch of their war equipments^ might be cited as a proof of the high importance that *8ce Page 18. CONCLUDING CHAPTER. -J45 is attached to it. But without entering into a CHAP. detail of the Establishment adopted by any ^J^^i^ other nation, I shall only remark, that towards the close of the Peninsular War, the Corps of Royal Sappers and Miners in our own Service, consisted of no less than four Battalions of eight Companies each* Let us now consider the objections, that are likely to be urged against this important im- provement. To those, who assert, that as we liave done without Engineer Soldiers hitherto, we may do without them still; and who object to every change, however beneficial, merely be- cause' it is a change; no answer is necessary ; for it is vain to oppose by argument, those opinions which haveno pretension tobe founded upon reason, and which can only be resolved into a blind confidence of the continuance of that good fortune, which has so often be- friended us in our Indian Sieges. If it be said, that although a Corps of this description may be occasionally useful ; yet that a siege oc- curs so seldom in this country, that their ser- * This Corps has subsequently had its share in the general reductions, which have affected the whole of the British Army, since the Peace. The formation into Battalions has been set aside altogether, and the present system is to number ihe Companies, which will probably be adhered to, even in the event of great augmentations taking place hereafter. Every Company is commanded by a Second Captain, and two Subalterns, of Q CJ cS ■*j « u to • v m pH 5C Q o a o h 5 CO ^ < O .C ki J3 0) S3 I— H Pm S o be c H ^r^ «M Si o o in o B is 1— 1 00 o h o o i-H b J3 Oh a C3 O © be o I H *3 >> P <1 m s O J2 »B« w © -« -1^ -♦J ■^ f "^ t<-i W •w (N O ■ij «M