SECOND LETTER 
 
 TO 
 
 CHARLES EDWARD LONG, Esq., 
 
 ON THE 
 
 MS. JOURNAL AND PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE 
 
 OF THE LATE 
 
 Lieut-Gen. R. B. LONG 
 
 BY 
 
 GENERAL 
 
 LORD VISCOUNT BERESFORD, G.C.B. 
 
 LONDON: 
 JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET. 
 
 MDCCCXXXIV.
 
 LONDON : 
 
 I'nuied by William Clowes, 
 Duke-street. Lambeth.
 
 A SECOND LETTER 
 
 TO 
 
 C. E. LONG, Esq. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 I regret being obliged by the tenor of 
 your late publication to enter again on the discussion 
 of those parts of General Long's military career and 
 correspondence which formed the subject of my pre- 
 vious letter to you. The further considerations 
 which I have to offer will be compressed into as 
 short a space as possible; and, without any profes- 
 sions of candour, any inquiry into the motives that 
 may have led you to continue the controversy, or any 
 observation on the prudence of such a measure, I 
 shall at once proceed to the refutation of those pas- 
 sages in your late Pamphlet which I conceive to be 
 erroneous, and to which I shall strictly confine my 
 attention. — However widely we may differ on many 
 points, I can assure you, sir, that such differences of 
 
 B
 
 2 
 
 opinion can never excite in me any angry feelings 
 towards yourself, neither shall they ever betray me 
 into any unconrteousness of expression; but, as this 
 is the last notice that I shall ever allow myself to 
 take of these matters, you will not be surprised at 
 my producing on the present occasion such evidence 
 as I have in my possession, with such remarks upon 
 it as I feel requisite to the proof and establishment of 
 my case. 
 
 I have no doubt, sir, with regard to the opinion 
 which the public will form of that correspondence, in 
 which your relative privately detailed to his friends 
 at home a long catalogue of grievances against his 
 superior officer, of which not a single hint was ever 
 heard among his comrades abroad. I have made, 
 you say*, " all but direct assertioyis that he was in the 
 " daily habit of forwarding to his family and friends 
 " deliberate misrepresentations of facts, for the express 
 " purpose of injuring the credit of his commander." — 
 The conclusion, sir, is your own ; and I will not dis- 
 turb it by any observations of mine. — I have nothing 
 to do with the motives from which the errors of 
 General Long's statements sprung. My only concern 
 is with the errors themselves, and to them my obser- 
 vations will be exclusively addressed. 
 
 You state f that I devoted " no less than three 
 " pages to a discussion respecting the word ' difFer- 
 " ences.' " — I was not conscious that any doubt existed, 
 
 * Letter to Lord Beresford, p. 7. t P- 12.
 
 or had been entertained, respecting the meaning of 
 the word; but, as you seemed to advance it as a 
 fact of which several officers were aware, that differ- 
 ences had occurred between myself and your late 
 relative, and that my feelings towards him had been 
 consequently warped, I thought it right to prove 
 that your information on that point was incorrect. 
 It appears, however, that I mistook your meaning. 
 And, as you now say that you " did not mean to 
 " allude to early differences antecedent to the affair of 
 '* Campo Maior, or of any particular quarrel subse- 
 " quent," it is manifest that, whatever General Long 
 might find to object to in my conduct towards him on 
 military points, I could not have been influenced by 
 any feelings of personal prejudice. The short pre- 
 vious intercourse that subsisted between us from the 
 1 5th to the 25th of March was more likely to pre- 
 possess me in his favour, than against him. We were 
 evidently, at that time, mutually well disposed towards 
 each other. He says, in one of his letters : " From the 
 " three days' intercourse I have had with the Marshal, 
 " I am disposed to like him exceedingly. I find him 
 " unreserved, affable, open, sociable, and obliging, and 
 " the revolution he has effected here" (alluding to the 
 discipline of the Portuguese infantry) " bespeaks his 
 ability." — This extract has been published by yourself 
 from your late relative's letter of the 4 21st March, 1811; 
 and I do not comprehend why, or in Avhat manner, 
 any difference of opinion that I might have had with 
 General Long on purely military matters should have 
 
 b2 

 
 force to annul the good qualities which are ascribed 
 to me above ; and it most certainly could never have 
 undisciplined the Portuguese army. — You proceed 
 to acquit me of any hostile feelings towards General 
 Long during the time of his remaining under my 
 command, although you produce reasons to show why 
 your relative should not have been equally well 
 disposed towards myself. " The schoolmaster," you 
 say, " does not suffer from the e ffect of his own 
 ** lecture or his own rod. The scholar does, and, 
 " perhaps, profits by them." — Your illustration, sir, is 
 most defective. The poor schoolboy has no one to 
 look to for redress. The officer, and more especially 
 the general officer, is not placed in so unfriended a 
 position. He knows that he has an effectual resource 
 under any species of military wrong to which he may 
 be subjected. And I am not acquainted with a 
 single officer who would have refrained from 
 appealing to it, if he had encountered any kind of 
 indignity, oppression, or injustice. But if, sir, your 
 simile fails in this case, in another particular it 
 applies more justly. The schoolboy gives vent in 
 private complaints to those angry feelings which 
 are engendered by the imaginary injuries of his peda- 
 gogue, and against which he cannot venture to offer 
 any public remonstrance. In this respect, I admit 
 that the figure you have employed is admirably 
 descriptive of the case. With regard to that conduct, 
 in defence of which you do not appear to have any 
 excuse to suggest, I continue to hold the same opinion
 
 that I expressed in my previous letter to you. The 
 only palliative that you have attempted to advance 
 is one drawn from the precedents afforded by the 
 practice of others : of itself a miserable plea and no 
 justification. — But, in this instance, the very pre- 
 cedents adduced afford no authority for the conduct of 
 General Long. — The circumstances bear no resem- 
 blance. In General Long's case, the party who con- 
 ceived himself aggrieved and was most interested 
 in giving a peculiar colouring to the transactions, 
 was the person who had recourse to private corre- 
 spondence as the means of gaining circulation for his 
 own views. In both the other cases which you have 
 cited, the parties could have had no personal interest 
 whatever to influence the accounts they delivered of 
 the events, and they had no other object in writing than 
 to describe what actually occurred, or what appeared 
 to them to be the truth. You have referred to Sir 
 Benj. D'Urban's letter, dated 29th August, 1811. 
 He sent it to me with other papers, three or 
 four years since, from Demerara. It was originally 
 written in answer to a friend, who had communicated 
 to him the various reports concerning the battle of 
 Albuera, which, flowing from some hidden source, 
 had obtained circulation in London. The letter 
 touches upon points which must, then, have been 
 fresh in the mind of the Quartermaster-general of 
 the allied army. It contains an account of many of 
 the principal events of the time. The reader will 
 perceive that such a letter, written at such a moment,
 
 6 
 
 in refutation of error, and by a person who could 
 have had no reason either for concealing or mis- 
 representing the truth, is a document deserving the 
 highest possible degree of credit and consideration. 
 With regard to the statement of Lieut.-General Sir 
 William Lumley, I cannot understand why that 
 officer, because he had " never up to the summer of 
 " 1832 entered upon those occurrences in writing 
 " even with his oldest friends," should therefore 
 refrain in 1833 from giving the information which 
 was required of him, and which he considered him- 
 self called upon by common justice to afford. The 
 public, sir, will fully comprehend and appreciate Sir 
 W. Lumley's reasons for remaining silent on the 
 affairs of the Peninsula in 1832, when applied to by 
 yourself in the cause of General Long, since it has 
 been shown that he had no intelligence to give which 
 could have answered your object, or which would 
 have proved of a welcome description. It is a work 
 of supererogation even to say thus much in reply to 
 your observations on the statements of two officers 
 so much esteemed and honoured wherever they 
 are known, as Sir Benj. D'Urban and Sir Wm. 
 Lumley. Be well assured, sir, that censure, 
 whether direct, or by insinuation, levelled against 
 such persons, cannot fail of proving pernicious to 
 the cause of the advocate who allows himself to 
 hazard it. 
 
 I have said in my letter, that " after my command 
 " had ceased, I never, to the best of my recollection.
 
 " came again in contact with General Long." You 
 doubt the accuracy of the account, and appeal to " a 
 "certain controversy respecting two Portuguese Aides 
 "de Camp." I have a perfect recollection of that 
 circumstance, and did not overlook it when making 
 the statement to which you object. But, I believe 
 that even on that occasion no direct communication 
 took place between General Long and myself. He 
 was not at the time under my command. The act of 
 which he complained was my ordering, I conclude 
 through the Adjutant General of the Army, the two 
 officers whom I considered to be employed contrary 
 to the rules of the service to join their regiments. It 
 was most satisfactorily proved that I was correct 
 in my view of the subject, and in the course 
 which I consequently adopted ; for my orders were 
 confirmed by the Duke of Wellington, to whom 
 General Long appealed, and were immediately car- 
 ried into effect. The Commander in Chief, as is 
 usual on such occasions, forwarded to me General 
 Long's letter of appeal, and I wrote my reply, per- 
 fectly aware that it would also be submitted to the 
 inspection of General Long. But I do not think 
 that we were brought into personal contact with each 
 other, or that even any direct correspondence ever 
 passed between us. Such was the sum of this trans- 
 action. I regret, sir, that you did not publish the 
 whole of my letter on this occasion, as it would have 
 rendered the case more clear. 
 
 I do not feel myself at all hurt at your being com-
 
 8 
 
 pelled occasionally " to doubt the perfect accuracy of 
 " my recollections." The events happened a great 
 many years ago ; and, never imagining that I should 
 be so unfortunately called upon to engage in this 
 public discussion of them, I did not, at the time, adopt 
 the precautions, which I might have taken, and 
 which experience has shown to be so expedient, of 
 furnishing myself with memoranda to which reference 
 might afterwards be made to support or to refresh 
 my recollections of facts. But still my memory is, I 
 believe, pretty correct respecting them. It was for- 
 tunate for me, perhaps, that the various rumours then 
 propagated in England came to the knowledge of 
 myself and many others, and naturally led us to 
 reconsider the then recent events, to compare our 
 views of them, and to discuss them so fully and so 
 frequently as served to impress them indelibly upon 
 our memories. To the several false reports concerning 
 those events which we were continually receiving, I 
 am most probably indebted for much of the vividness 
 with which many of the minor events are still remem- 
 bered ; though, as you will readily believe, sir, from 
 the nature of my position, the greater and more pro- 
 minent transactions of the time — at least such as can 
 be matter of doubt — are those of which I was not 
 only best informed and am likely to have the clearest 
 recollection, but with regard to which no other person 
 can be acquainted ; except the few officers immediately 
 about me, and who, from their military position, were 
 necessarily in my confidence. — In concluding the pre-
 
 fatory part of your letter you say, " I shall number these 
 " charges, (those advanced in the 'Strictures') " sub- 
 " joining a short notice of your lordship's confirmation 
 " of them, or, through their abandonment, of your 
 " virtual contradiction of them." I only quote this 
 passage for the purpose of protesting against the in- 
 terpretation which you have put upon my silence. 
 There are, I believe, many statements made in your 
 " Reply," which I forbore noticing — as I shall, per- 
 haps, many more on the present occasion — on differ- 
 ent accounts, — sometimes because they did not appear 
 to be of the slightest consequence, and, at others, be- 
 cause I really did not happen to know anything about 
 them. Such, for instance, was the case with regard 
 to Col. Colborne's position at Campo Maior. When 
 writing my "Letter" to you, I was really ignorant 
 of the matter. I have since, however, received some 
 information upon it, and shall be able to gratify you 
 with such an explanation as will most satisfactorily 
 prove that I never intended my silence on that or any 
 other point to be considered as a virtual abandonment 
 of it. But, sir, as this is a principle which you lay 
 down, I necessarily conclude it to have been the prin- 
 ciple on which you have acted yourself; and that all 
 those parts of my letter to you are to be considered 
 as unanswerable which you have omitted to notice. 
 
 I shall not, sir, imitate the tone of irony in which 
 you have thought it expedient to address me. In 
 discussions of this kind, which relate to mere matters 
 of fact, any deviation from the plain straightforward
 
 10 
 
 style of writing must, whether adopted with that in- 
 tent or not, always have the effect of bewildering the 
 reader, and seems to betray a want of confidence in 
 the force and connection of our proofs. I now pro- 
 ceed to reconsider those charges of misconduct in 
 and from General Long, which you have made the 
 object of your attention. 
 
 The first point which you have touched upon, is 
 your relative's extraordinary detour at Campo Maior, 
 with regard to which, after quoting the words of the 
 " Further Strictures," you add, " the enemy, per- 
 " ceiving that the movement was made, began to 
 " retire to Badajoz ; by which means your lordship's 
 " intentions of surprising and capturing the whole 
 " were frustrated." 
 
 The expectation of "surprising" the enemy, which 
 you have here ascribed to me, is particularly unfor- 
 tunate. General Long informs us in the letters which 
 you have published, that the enemy had discovered 
 our approach on the preceding evening, and again 
 early that morning. He also tells us, that he had 
 seen them previously to the commencement of his 
 detour; that they reciprocally manoeuvred ; and that, 
 being in sight of them, he halted " to wait for 
 further orders." — You will, therefore, see, sir, that 
 the intentions which you have imputed to me 
 could never have engaged my mind ; as I never 
 could by any possibility have designed to surprise an 
 enemy, whom I knew, by the usual reports and by 
 ocular demonstration, to be fully aware of my pre-
 
 11 
 
 sence. But to return to the fact. — You are " willing 
 '• to give to me the benefit of the detour to the fullest 
 " extent of Col. Doyle's evidence, of which evidence," 
 (you say) " I approve." This latter conclusion is 
 perfectly gratuitous, and not warranted by any ex- 
 pressions of my letter to you, not even by the passage 
 you have produced in proof of it. I certainly said, 
 as you have quoted, that " nothing can be more fair 
 " than the manner in which that officer's statements 
 " are made." But I added, which you have not quoted, 
 " It is manifest that he always speaks with perfect 
 " impartiality and to the best of his recollection." I 
 still entertain the same opinion of Col. Doyle's state- 
 ment. It was made, I am convinced, according to 
 the best of his recollection ; but that I did not think 
 that recollection always accurate, has been shown in 
 my previous letter to you, on more than one occasion. 
 I approve the spirit in which Col. Doyle's evidence 
 is given ; but I am very far from approving all the 
 details of the evidence itself. But, sir, I cannot com- 
 prehend why you should think fit to tie me down to 
 the evidence of this officer, unless it be with the view 
 of keeping out of the reader's sight the far stronger 
 weight of opposite authorities adduced by myself upon 
 the same subject, which is a most principal one, not 
 only in a military point of view, but as being the 
 primary cause of this most disagreeable discussion. 
 Besides the evidence of Col. Doyle on this detour, 
 wc have that of Sir Henrv Hardinge, and of General
 
 12 
 
 Long liimseli', with, — which is of more weight than 
 all, — the broad and plain fact of the Commander in 
 Chief having sent twice, at the time and on the spot, 
 to inform General Long that he was making too wide 
 a circuit, and acting in disobedience to his orders. 
 This, sir, is the plain state of the case, which it is 
 impossible for you to controvert, and which, when 
 Col. Doyle, an officer of some experience, gives due 
 attention to, he will immediately perceive that, whe- 
 ther your relative's detour was, or was not, too 
 extended, can no longer be "a matter of opinion." 
 In such a case, no one can have an opinion except the 
 Commander in Chief on the spot. His orders are 
 imperative; and, if every subordinate officer were to 
 be allowed to deviate from them at discretion, he 
 would, as in the present instance, be deprived of the 
 direction of his own troops. I certainly object to your 
 deciding the question of General Long's detour by the 
 evidence of Col. Doyle alone; though he most dis 
 tinctly shows how incorrect you were in saying no 
 detour was made, and proves, as every military man 
 will see, that it must have been pretty considerable, 
 when he says that " in the course of the five miles' trot 
 the troops had frequently to bring up their left shoulders 
 to meet the enemy." But, sir, your relative's own 
 description of this movement, even without the facts 
 and statements adduced in my former letter to you, 
 is quite sufficient to establish the extent of it. — This, 
 however, is really of very little importance. — General
 
 13 
 
 Long disobeyed my orders twice sent to him : he 
 withdrew the cavalry from my immediate direction 
 and controul : what his own views and intentions 
 were it was impossible for me to divine ; but he so 
 entirely separated the cavalry from the infantry, that, 
 whatever my views and intentions might have been, 
 the execution of them was necessarily frustrated. You 
 have, sir, allowed yourself to be somewhat ironical 
 respecting the objects I had in contemplation. I am 
 not aware by what possible means they could have 
 become known to you, as the only intimation respect- 
 ing them that has fallen from myself, was with regard 
 to the case of the enemy's retaining possession of 
 Campo Maior ; — a case which did not occur. 
 
 I now proceed to the Ravine, which General Long 
 conjured up, as his excuse for disobeying my instruc- 
 tions. 
 
 ° It is," you say, " as obvious as words can make 
 " it, that this ravine was met with in approaching 
 " Campo Maior," and in proof of this position you 
 refer me to General Long's journal as given in the 
 41st page of your " Reply" and his letter to General 
 Le Marchant, in the 75th page of the same pub- 
 lication. 
 
 I have, sir, consulted the 4 1st page of your "Reply," 
 and do not there find it intimated that your relative met 
 with any the least impediment in his progress towards 
 Campo Maior. His words are, " I was directed to 
 " move circling round a considerable height, over
 
 14 
 
 " which the infantry marched, but from which I was 
 " separated by a deep ravine ;" but he does not say 
 that he had this ravine to pass. He describes him- 
 self, on the contrary, "as trotting away with the light 
 " gentry," (cavalry), and, " after driving the enemy's 
 " picquets from the positions they occupied, at length 
 " passing over a considerable plain, which brought 
 " him to a small ridge from whence he looked down 
 " on the town of Campo Maior, &c." 
 
 From page 41 of your "Reply," I turn to page 75, 
 to which you have also referred me ; and there only, 
 or rather in the following page, I find that General 
 Long mentions and describes a ravine which separated 
 him from our infantry, and which he had to pass be- 
 fore he came in sight of Campo Maior ; but in cross- 
 ing which he does not appear to have encountered 
 any opposition. Thus, in his journal of the 28th of 
 March, written at most three days after the affair, he 
 omits mentioning an obstacle of which, just one month 
 after the affair occurred, he has a most clear and par- 
 ticular recollection, and which actually led to no result 
 whatever. 
 
 But how, sir, did it happen that you have neglected 
 to notice an intermediate letter of your relative — 
 intermediate both with regard to its date and its posi- 
 tion in your " Reply?" — In a letter from Los Santos, 
 of 22nd of April, 1811, only three days earlier than 
 that to General Le Marchant, General Long says, 
 " Our debut at Campo Maior, but for the untimely
 
 15 
 
 " interference of others, would have been attended 
 " with perfect success and little loss. The official 
 u representation I have seen of it in the Lisbon 
 " Gazette is very unfair. The Marshal says, the 
 " movement I made to get round the town was more 
 " circuitous than he wished ; he should have added 
 " the reason, namely, that, ignorant of the ground, 
 1 ' he was not aware that a deep and impassable ravine 
 " separated me from the enemy, and prevented my 
 '• getting over at any other spot but where I did ; 
 " but even with this fact, I maintain that my column 
 " was never more distant from the town than he 
 " directed." 
 
 If you will turn to the official document, to which 
 your relative above alludes, and by which he would 
 make it appear that injustice had been done him, you 
 will perceive that he could have nothing to object to 
 in any observations of mine respecting his conduct on 
 our approaching Campo Maior, as in that part of the 
 official account of the affair I neither mention his 
 name, nor make any allusion to him whatever. It is 
 evident, sir, from my despatch that, while approaching 
 the town, we did not meet with any opposition from 
 the enemy, and that even the skirmishing did not 
 commence till we arrived under the walls. Such 
 was the fact. 
 
 • Indeed, General Long and I are both agreed that 
 the enemy's force was first seen by us respectively on 
 our approaching the height, about a mile distant from 
 Campo Maior; — he says in one place "about 1200
 
 16 
 
 yards." We are both agreed upon the orders he 
 received, which were, he says, " to lead the column 
 " of light cavalry so as to turn and gain the rear of 
 " the town," or rather, according to the terms of my 
 despatch, "to turn the enemy's right, keeping out 
 " of the reach of the place." We are also both 
 agreed that these orders were given and received, 
 after he had arrived and halted in sight of Campo 
 Maior and of the enemy's main force. What then 
 could any movement he made, or any impediment he 
 met with in the execution of my orders after this, 
 have to do with a ravine which he had long before 
 passed, and left in the rear ? Or why should General 
 Long complain, or defend himself upon a point to 
 which there was not the slightest allusion made in 
 the official account of the affair to which he objects ? 
 My despatch does not mention any delay occasioned, 
 or any circuit made by General Long in our approach 
 to the town, nor say that he was directed to go round 
 it before he saw it, or knew any reason for such a 
 measure ; but it does state that, after he had halted 
 in sight of Campo Maior and the enemy, and after he 
 had received my orders to turn the right of the 
 enemy, who were then halted under our eyes, he 
 " made a greater circuit than was necessary." It 
 was this remark that he complained of in his private 
 letter, when he observes, " The Marshal says, the 
 u movement I made to get round the town was more 
 " circuitous than he wished ; he should have added 
 " the reason, that, ignorant of the ground, he was
 
 17 
 
 ** not aware that a deep and impassable ravine sepa- 
 " rated me from the enemy, and prevented my getting 
 " over at any other spot than where I did." It is in 
 this passage, sir, " as obvious as words can make it," 
 that General Long pleaded the impediment of " an 
 " impassable ravine" as his excuse for not carrying 
 my orders into effect, and making a less circuit than 
 he did make. I do not dispute his saying that, in the 
 earlier part of the day, he had " a ravine on his right;" 
 but he does not describe that ravine as separating him 
 from the enemy, but from our own infantry. However, 
 with that ravine, or any other ravine, which your re- 
 lative met, or fancied, I have nothing to do ; the only 
 ravine with which I am concerned is the one which 
 General Long, in discussing the correctness and com- 
 plaining of the justice of my official account, alleged as 
 his excuse for not acting in compliance with my com- 
 mands. He most distinctly states, that he encoun- 
 tered this " impassable ravine" in the course of his 
 second movement, that is, after halting to receive my 
 final instructions, and whilst proceeding in the execu- 
 tion of them. He says, expressly, that he met with this 
 obstacle during his movement to get round the town, 
 which, according to his own account, he received orders 
 to do after his halt. I need not pursue this subject. 
 It is incontrovertible that your relative, as stated in 
 my former letter, describes himself as having been 
 prevented by an impassable ravine from fulfilling my 
 orders ; a fact, sir, which you could not for a moment 
 have doubted, had you not overlooked — though you 
 
 c
 
 18 
 
 had published it — your relative's letter to E. H. of 
 the 22d of April. It is also equally incontrovertible 
 from the evidence of Sir Henry Hardinge, Sir W. 
 Lumley, and Col. Doyle, that no such ravine was in 
 his way. 
 
 But General Long also speaks of a "ditch, or 
 rivulet," and you reproach me for having given a 
 partial quotation from a passage of his journal, and 
 omitting all mention of this circumstance. I shall 
 now cite the whole passage. Having forgotten his 
 impassable ravine, he says, is It is necessary to ob- 
 " serve, that I led the Light Division over a ridge of 
 " heights and broken ground, which overlooked the 
 " valley in which the enemy were formed, and through 
 " which ran a nasty, boggy, and almost impassable 
 " ditch." In my former letter, sir, I quoted only the 
 first part of this passage, as confirmatory of my own 
 and Sir Henry Hardinge's statement, and to shew, 
 from your relative's own account, that, notwithstand- 
 ing the ravine which we have just discussed, he 
 encountered no real impediment to his movement. I 
 have no objection whatever to the existence of this 
 " nasty, boggy, and almost impassable ditch." I can- 
 not perceive how it affected General Long's operations, 
 who only looked down upon it from the heights on 
 which he was moving, and perceived it in the valley 
 below, where he describes the enemy as being. He 
 does not state, you say, that this was " an insuperable 
 " impediment to his movements :" to which I would 
 add, he does not even say it was any impediment.
 
 19 
 
 Indeed, if this " ditch" was an obstacle to any party, 
 it must have been to the enemy ; and Col. Macal- 
 lister, your own witness, says, " Having gone over 
 " the ground after the affair, I observed a portion 
 " of swampy ground with an ugly gully, or ditch, 
 " part of which appeared to have been passed." 
 Now General Long certainly did not pass over this 
 swampy ground ; and, since he describes it as 
 lying in the valley where the enemy were formed, 
 it would appear pretty clear, from Col. Macallister's 
 account, or rather from the conjoint accounts, that it 
 had been passed over by the enemy. I cannot com- 
 prehend, therefore, what advantage I deprived General 
 Long of by omitting the latter part of the above-cited 
 passage in my previous letter. I might, indeed, have 
 used it to my own advantage. — Before I quit this 
 subject, I would observe, that the evidence of Col. 
 Macallister, as far as it goes, confirms Sir William 
 Lumley's account of the ground ; an account which, 
 sir, I feel satisfied no one but yourself could ever feel 
 inclined to censure, and which must give the reader a 
 far clearer notion of the country over which your rela- 
 tion had to move his troops, than any the most elaborate 
 and minute description could have afforded. " I 
 used," says Sir William Luinley in his comment 
 on General Long's letter, " to take the Light Horse 
 " Volunteers over worse ground on Finchley Com- 
 " mon." In confirmation of this opinion, I shall here 
 insert a question on the point I lately put to Sir 
 Henry Hardinge, and his answer. 
 
 c 2
 
 20 
 
 QUESTION. 
 
 l * When we proceeded in pursuit of General Long 
 " and the cavalry with him, going as we did at a 
 " quick pace, and in a direct line so far as we could 
 " judge, did we meet with any impediment of ground 
 " to check our pace, such as ravine, boggy ground, 
 " or an almost impassable ditch ; that is, before we 
 " came up with the cavalry ? 
 
 ANSWER. 
 
 " In answer to your question, I do not think that 
 " there was any impediment of ground to check cavalry, 
 " such as ravine or impassable ditch, from the place 
 " at which the cavalry left the high road to turn Campo 
 " Maior, until they again got into the Badajoz road. 
 " There was a part of the ground near the high road 
 " on the Badajoz side of Campo Maior, where the 
 " Heavy Brigade, having turned the town, regained 
 " the road, which was wet, and might be termed 
 " swampy, but by no means constituting an obstacle 
 " to cavalry." 
 
 In proceeding after General Long, Sir Henry 
 Hardinge and I took a shorter and a more direct 
 line than he had done, and we were consequently 
 never so far from the high road on which the 
 enemy were marching as he ; and yet it is proved 
 that we met with no obstacle, and that the ground 
 exactly corresponded with the description given of it 
 by Sir W. Lumley. Having thus, sir, got rid of 
 ravines, and every other impediment adduced by 
 General Long, as reasons for not complying with my
 
 21 
 
 orders, I leave the reader to form his own opinion of 
 the character of these various and incongruous ex- 
 cuses. I have shewn in my former letter to you, that 
 your relative, in writing to E. H. on the 22d of April, 
 introduces " an impassable ravine" as his excuse. To 
 Sir Henry Hardinge, on the spot, " he urged the pro- 
 " priety of securing his left flank against any enemy's 
 " cavalry force which he was of opinion might be con- 
 " cealed under cover of the undulating ground on the 
 " left." While in his letter of the 25th of April, to 
 General Le Marchant, he actually introduces the 
 enemy on that left flank, and says " the enemy's de- 
 " monstrations on my left obliged me to extend to 
 " cover that flank." 
 
 Disagreeable as the task is, sir, to point out and 
 dwell upon such unaccountable contradictions in the 
 statements of a departed officer, I am driven to it by 
 a sense of justice to myself. General Long's corre- 
 spondence, if we may judge of that which is still un- 
 published by the portions which have been submitted 
 to the public, teems with aspersions on my military 
 character ; and in defence of myself it is necessary 
 for me to show how undeserving of credit that cor- 
 respondence is. If I should point out only one pal- 
 pable and obvious misstatement, with regard to a fact 
 of which he had a personal knowledge and ought to 
 have been able to give correct information, his autho- 
 rity as a good and competent witness is annihilated 
 for ever ; and his praise or censure of my conduct 
 become equally valueless. I do not impute — I do
 
 not inquire about General Long's motives for making 
 such misstatements — I leave that to the reader. I 
 content myself with producing instances to prove that 
 he made them, and I will here advert to a most ob- 
 vious one. General Long, speaking of this circuit, 
 says, in his letter to General Le Marchant, as cited 
 in your Reply, page 76, " Though the Marshal and 
 " I differ on this point, I do not believe that I was 
 " ever more than the prescribed distance from the 
 " town, although the enemy s demonstrations on my 
 " left obliged me to extend to cover that flank." 
 
 I must here quote from my letter to you, page 20, 
 where the above assertion is discussed. I say, "His 
 " (General Long's) excuse for not following my 
 " directions at the time was of a very different nature. 
 " The General urged the propriety, Sir Henry Hard- 
 " inge informs you, of securing his left flank against 
 " any enemy's cavalry force, which he was of opinion 
 " might be concealed under cover of the undulating 
 
 " ground on the left." 
 
 " Great indeed was my surprise at the moment 
 " when this answer was reported to me. General 
 " Long had received precise instructions relative to 
 " a visible enemy on his right flank ; and acting as 
 " he was under the immediate personal direction of 
 " his superior, he had no concern with any possible 
 " contingency of a concealed enemy on his left. The 
 " whole responsibility of the operation devolved 
 " upon myself, and the only duty of Brigadier-Gen. 
 " Long was to carry my commands into exact and
 
 23 
 
 " immediate execution, or, at the utmost, to make a 
 'f representation of his fears, and allow me to decide 
 " whether they should be acted upon or not." 
 
 " Singular, sir, as such a reason for evading a 
 " fulfilment of my orders will appear to every military 
 " man, it had not even the shadow of fact for its found- 
 " ation. There were no troops of the enemy to the 
 " left : no reason existed for supposing any to be there. 
 " Sir Henry Hardinge told the General at the 
 " moment that there was no necessity for his pre- 
 " caution. Indeed, had his fears been well grounded, 
 " the precaution that he adopted in consequence of 
 " them would appear most strangely unmilitary. No 
 " other officer, I apprehend, acting under similar sus- 
 " picion of a concealed enemy, would have executed 
 " his movement en masse, instead of sending out 
 " patroles, or flanking parties. But, sir, is it not 
 " somewhat remarkable, that to Sir Henry Hardinge, 
 " who was present, General Long should only have 
 " spoken of the force ' which might be concealed 
 u under the cover of the undulating ground to the 
 " left ;' while to General Le Marchant, who was at a 
 " distance from the scene, he stated that 'the enemy s 
 " demonstrations on his left obliged him to extend to 
 " cover that flank?' But what was the real state 
 " of the case? The General has himself described the 
 " enemy as retreating in compact order along the road 
 " from Campo Maior to Badajoz. No other enemy 
 " was that day seen, and not even a single French 
 " soldier appeared upon General Long's left from the 
 '* commencement of his departure till he came in con-
 
 24 
 
 " tact with their columns. I need add nothing further 
 " on this point." 
 
 The above passage, sir, is extracted from my pre- 
 vious letter to you. As you have not attempted to 
 answer it, I may fairly conclude, according to your 
 own maxim, that you have " virtually admitted it." 
 But I will give substantial evidence to confirm it, 
 in Sir Henry Hardinge's reply to some questions 
 which I addressed to him on the subject : — 
 
 QUESTION- 
 
 " To obviate the possibility of any misunderstand- 
 " ing on such a point, I will call your attention to 
 " page 76 of Mr. Long's ' Reply,' where, in a letter 
 " to General Le Marchant, General Long states, 
 " ' Though the Marshal and I differ on this point, I 
 " ' do not believe that I was more than the prescribed 
 " f distance * (two or three gun-shots, he says) * from 
 " ' the town, although the enemy's demonstrations on 
 '' ' my left obliged me to extend to cover that flank. ' 
 
 " I ask you if there was any the slightest ground 
 " for such a belief by General Long ? or if the enemy 
 " ever appeared on, or near, his left ? 
 
 ANSWER. 
 
 " In answer to your Lordship's questions embraced 
 " in the extract from General Long's letter to General 
 " Le Marchant, in the publication of 1832, page 76, 
 " beginning with the words * Though the Marshal 
 " and I differ on this point,' &c. &c, I have 
 " to state, that the order carried by me to Gene- 
 " ral Long, was to turn the town by the shortest 
 " line, keeping the cavalry out of the range of the
 
 25 
 
 " guns of the place, which object was pressed upon 
 " General Long's attention in both the messages I 
 " conveyed to him by your order. 
 
 " To the other question I have to state, that I did 
 " not see any enemy on Gen. Long's left flank during 
 " the day, and consequently no demonstration of an 
 " enemy which obliged him to extend to cover that 
 " flank, as stated in his letter to Gen. Le Marchant ; 
 " and that when I was sent a second time by you to 
 " urge him to take a shorter line, his explanation to 
 " me for extending to his left was, that an enemy might 
 " be concealed behind the undulating ground on his 
 " left, which opinion I resisted ; and reported to you, 
 " on rejoining you, that the movement was an unneces- 
 " sary loss of time, as the only enemy to be seen or 
 " apprehended was the force moving out of Campo 
 " Maior on the road to Badajoz." 
 
 I thus present to the consideration of yourself and 
 the public a broad fact, stated by Gen. Long in 
 one of his private letters, only one month after the 
 affair, which was distinctly pointed out to your 
 notice in my former letter to you ; which is now 
 proved by direct evidence to be without any the 
 least foundation, and which indeed is as strongly 
 contradicted by Gen. Long's description of his fur- 
 ther progress and coming up with the enemy, as it is 
 by the above statement of Sir Henry Hardinge. I 
 might, here, sir, leave your case as quite broken 
 down ; but from respect to the public, I shall, though 
 as summarily as possible, proceed with the consi-
 
 26 
 
 deration of it. You inform me* that, since tlie 
 publication of your " Reply" an opportunity has 
 been afforded you " of referring to a more detailed 
 " account of the operations than that given in Gen. 
 *' Long's Journal, in which the name of Col. Har- 
 " dinge appears as the bearer of the order to Gen. 
 " Long to turn the town. — I further find," you add, 
 " the name of Col. Hardinge used to designate the 
 " Aide-du-Camp, who appeared to flatter Gen. Long 
 " with a hope of meriting your Lordship's approbation 
 " by attempting something against the enemy." 
 
 These two extracts appear to be very cautiously 
 inserted. We are not informed from what source 
 they are derived ; it must, however, be presumed 
 that they are taken from the family archives, as it 
 can hardly be supposed that any one would or could 
 give a more full and particular account of the Gene- 
 ral's operations than himself. — But be this as it may, 
 it is actually impossible that Col. Hardinge, who 
 never was my Aide-du-Camp, could have been the 
 officer who, at the moment so precisely marked in 
 the correspondence you have published, thus flattered 
 Gen. Long with the hope of meriting my approbation 
 by attacking the enemy. Sir Henry Hardinge was 
 at that time with me. It will be remembered that I 
 twice sent that officer to desire your relative to 
 change the direction of his movement. On his last 
 return the cavalry was either altogether or nearly 
 out of sight. Gen. Long was leading them, as he 
 has described, at a trot : he was, in fact, on his way 
 
 * Letter, p. 28.
 
 21 
 
 to re-discover an enemy which he had seen tit to 
 lose sight of, but which, when he was put in 
 motion, was halted before his eyes. But on this 
 point Sir Henry Hardinge shall speak for himself. 
 " I shall endeavour," he says, " to answer your 
 " question whether the passage in Mr. Long's pub- 
 " lished letter to your lordship of 1833, at p. 28, 
 " be correct, in which he says, ' I further find the 
 " * name of Col. Hardinge used to designate the Aide- 
 " ' du-Camp who appears to have flattered Gen. 
 " * Long with the prospect of meriting your Lord- 
 " ' ship's approbation by attempting something against 
 " 'the enemy.' 
 
 " If I were to answer the question according to 
 " my first impression of what I believe to be correct, 
 " I should say, that the Aide-du-Camp holding that 
 " communication with Gen. Long must have been 
 " some other officer, and could not have been me. 
 " But when I am called upon, at this distance of 
 " time, twenty-three years after the event, to speak 
 " to a point on which my recollection is at variance 
 a with a written document, made by Gen. Long, 
 " shortly after the event, I am most anxious not 
 " to trust to my memory alone, in answering the 
 " question. I am, therefore, obliged to be more 
 " tedious than I could wish, and to show, by a 
 " reference to Gen. Long's letter, addressed to Gen. 
 " Le Marchant, dated 25th April, 1811, published in 
 " 1832, that there is so decided a mistake as to the 
 " time and circumstances under which your Aide-du-
 
 28 
 
 " Camp is stated to have joined him, that it is impos- 
 " sible for me to reconcile his account with my 
 " recollection of the facts, if I am supposed to be the 
 " Aide-du-Camp in question." 
 
 " At page 76, I find Gen. Long says — ' I had 
 " ' proceeded in a direction that intersected the line of 
 " ' march, or rather of retreat ; and as every step I 
 " ' took brought me more and more upon their flank, 
 " ' and towards their rear, it was not long before we 
 " ' closed so much, that I was enabled to distinguish 
 " ' their whole force and position. I should here 
 " ' mention, that one of the Marshal's Aides-du-Camp 
 " ' having joined me about this time, whilst I was 
 " ' reconnoitring the position and strength of my 
 " ' opponents, rather urged my attempting some- 
 " ' thing against them, as likely to give the Marshal, 
 " ' his master, considerable satisfaction.' 
 
 " The passage I have quoted represents the allied 
 " cavalry as having closed so much on the enemy, 
 " when the Aide-du-Camp joined Gen. Long, as to 
 " enable him to distinguish the enemy s whole force 
 " and position. 
 
 " At no period, whilst I was with Gen. Long, 
 " having delivered your second order, was there any 
 " enemy to be seen, either on his left flank, or in his 
 " immediate front ; the enemy on the outside of the 
 "■ town on the Badajoz road being then too distant 
 " to distinguish their force or position. — And the 
 " message from your Lordship, urging Gen. Long to 
 " take a shorter line, would have been unnecessary
 
 " and inapplicable to the state of things described by 
 " Gen. Long about the time the Aide-du-Camp is 
 " stated to have joined him." 
 
 " Further, Gen. Long being personally acquainted 
 " with me, knew that I was the deputy Quarter- 
 " master-general of the Portuguese army, and not 
 " your Aide-du-Camp ; and as Gen. Long's account 
 " to Gen. Le Marchant, at p. 76, confirms mine 
 " given at p. 8, that you and he differed as to the 
 •• mode in which he had moved the cavalry round 
 " the town, I am confident that my letter to Mr. 
 " Long, at p. 8, was the substance of the conver- 
 " sation which passed between me and Gen. Long, 
 " when I delivered your second message, urging 
 " upon him the propriety of taking a shorter line to 
 " intercept the enemy's retreat." 
 
 Thus, sir, it appears that Gen. Long describes a 
 positive fact as having taken place — a fact which 
 appeared to afford very little opening for mistake or 
 misconstruction, and with regard to which he was 
 deceived in every particular when writing an account 
 of it only thirty-four days after the event. A person, 
 s>, whose memory was so little tenacious that it 
 deceived him on such very material points as the 
 import of his orders, — the mode in which they were 
 to be executed, — the individuals he saw, — and the 
 subject of the communication he held with them, — 
 cannot be admitted, on any point whatever, as a 
 witness of the slightest authority. 
 
 Before I proceed any further, I will pause a
 
 30 
 
 moment, to show that two short sentences in my 
 despatch, on the affair of Campo Maior, to which 
 you attach great value in your defence of the late 
 Gen. Long's conduct, are wholly unavailable to your 
 purpose. You would endeavour to make it appear 
 that there is a discrepancy between the opinions 
 which I then expressed and those that I at present 
 entertain. It is with regret that I find myself com- 
 pelled to deprive you of such valuable auxiliaries. 
 The sentences of my despatch, to which you have 
 alluded, are the following : First — " Brigadier Gen. 
 "Long, seeing a favourable opportunity, ordered Col. 
 " Head to charge;" and secondly, "Gen. Long manoeu- 
 " vered with great ability, and made the greatest 
 " exertions to moderate the excessive ardour of the 
 " cavalry, and regulate their movements." — -On these 
 expressions of commendation from my despatch, you 
 have rung the changes with unwearied perseverance 
 and great triumph. But, I think, a very few words 
 will be sufficient to annihilate all the advantage to 
 your late relative's cause, which you have so indus- 
 triously, and, I must add, with so much ingenuity 
 derived from them. — I was not present at, I was not 
 the personal witness of, the transactions which are 
 here commended. — An official report on such occa- 
 sions must necessarily give information upon many 
 details which have not fallen under the immediate 
 observation of the Commander-in-chief, and are 
 reported to him by others, and especially by those 
 officers who commanded where he was not. Such
 
 31 
 
 was precisely my case in the present instance. I 
 saw nothing, either of Gen. Long, his corps, or their 
 movements, during any part of the transactions that 
 are commended in my despatch. From the time of 
 his leaving me I did not see him again till long 
 after the charge of the 13th Light Dragoons ; and, 
 after again catching sight of them on my advance, 
 the first thing I saw was the affair of the Portuguese 
 cavalry, and that at a very considerable distance. 
 
 All that part of my despatch, sir, which expressed 
 approbation of your late relative's conduct in the 
 affair of Campo Maior, was founded on information 
 reported to me by that officer himself. That such is 
 indisputably the fact, you will perceive from the 
 evidence of Sir Henry Hardinge, stating the time 
 and manner in which I was left by Gen. Long, and 
 from every evidence relating to the period when I 
 rejoined his corps. Had I, sir, under these circum- 
 stances, written unfavourably of your relative, what 
 weight or value would you have attached to my 
 account ? I merely acted, as is usual on such 
 occasions, and reported the information that was 
 given me. I was not, I repeat, present at the 
 evolutions against, or the attacks upon, the enemy 
 near Campo Maior ; and my report of them was 
 made, if not in the exact words, certainly according 
 to the tenor of the account delivered me by Gen. 
 Long himself. — But, sir, from the manner in which 
 I gave such information, one thing is most manifest : 
 it is clear that my mind had imbibed no prejudice
 
 3-2 
 
 against General Long from any thing which occurred 
 during that day. It does not appear to me that I 
 have really censured him in my despatch. You say 
 that I highly eulogized him ; and, as my official re- 
 port was written after the affair, and on reflection, 
 his only ground for supposing that I had imbibed 
 any personal prejudice against him from his conduct 
 on that occasion is removed, and both he and you 
 are left without any assignable cause for the un- 
 favourable feelings towards him which you have 
 thought fit to ascribe to me, except such as naturally 
 and gradually arose in the course of service. 
 
 I now turn, sir, to the reported capture of the 13th 
 Light Dragoons. 
 
 You state that you did not intend to convey, by 
 your extract from General Long's letter of 29th May, 
 1811, that "he then first became acquainted with 
 " the report that such an idea (as that of the capture) 
 " had existed in the minds of some persons, but that 
 " he then first heard Baron Trip had stated it as a 
 "fact direct!" The distinction is curious; but you 
 have a right to give an explanation of your own 
 words, and I have no doubt but such was the sense 
 in which you designed them to be received. But it 
 was not, sir, so much your showing on this point, as 
 that of General hong, upon which I was commenting. 
 And I do not believe that any person could read the 
 isolated passage from his letter, which is given in 
 your "Reply" without inferring from it that your re- 
 lative had then, three months after the affair, heard of
 
 33 
 
 the report for the first time. I will here repeat that 
 extract. 
 
 " Things come out by degrees : General Lamley 
 " has told me a fact I was never before acquainted 
 " with, and which accounts for the Marshal's feel- 
 " ings and conduct at the time. After the charge 
 " of the 13th Dragoons, an officer rode up to the 
 " Marshal, and assured him that the Avhole of that 
 " regiment had been surrounded by the enemy and 
 " carried off." 
 
 General Long does not here drop the slightest in- 
 timation of his ever having had the idea of such an 
 occurrence suggested to him before by a single indi- 
 vidual, nor is the name of Baron Tripp alluded to. 
 But you can show in evidence, you say, that he was 
 previously aware of it. I want not the evidence. 
 Supposing that it could have been a matter of doubt, 
 your assurance on the subject would have been suffi- 
 cient ; but, sir, I have, myself, in my former letter 
 to you, distinctly proved that he knew it. — Indeed it 
 had been proved in your former publication, for Col. 
 Doyle says* that on coming to where I was, towards 
 the end of the affair, he then learnt " it had been re- 
 " ported that the 13th had been all cut to pieces or 
 " bodily taken," and adds, that he " of course re- 
 " turned and acquainted the Brigadier General of 
 " what he had been told." But the fact which I pro- 
 pose to show, and which I hope to do most distinctly, 
 is, that General Long was not only aware of the 
 
 * C. E. Long's " Reply," p. 50, note. 
 D
 
 84 
 
 report at the time, but that lie, himself, was the per- 
 son who communicated it to me. I certainly quoted 
 the evidence of Sir Henry Hardinge, with the under- 
 standing that General Long was in the group at head- 
 quarters. After the halt, nearly every one of the 
 general staff assembled there, or came momentarily, 
 either from curiosity or for information ; and my 
 memory assures me that, your relative was among the 
 number. Sir Henry Hardinge intimates that he was 
 there, in stating that Col. Head, on regaining head- 
 quarters and hearing the report, " expressed himself 
 " warmly, directing his remarks against General Long 
 " and Baron Tripp." — If this passage does not actually 
 declare the presence of General Long, it at least 
 proves that Col. Head had heard and believed him 
 to have given the information ; I admit, as I before 
 admitted, that Baron Tripp was in this group, and 
 that he assisted in spreading the report. You have 
 brought forward the evidence of Col. Leighton, Major 
 Doherty, and others, to show that this report did not 
 originate with your relative. The officers whose 
 statements you have produced are, most undoubtedly, 
 gentlemen of the highest honour and credit ; but to 
 what does their testimony amount ? — It is all of a mere 
 negative description — They either say that they did 
 " not hear of the report coming from General Long," 
 or that " they did not understand it to come from 
 General Long." Such evidence can be of no avail 
 against the positive evidence by which it is opposed. 
 The Count de Villa Real proves that I saw and
 
 35 
 
 spoke to General Long*, who then actually reported 
 to me the capture of the 13th Light Dragoons. 1 
 thus, sir, received the intelligence from the officer 
 who was in command of the corps,, who was on the 
 spot, who saw what passed, who was the best chan- 
 nel of information on the subject, and who was, cer- 
 tainly, the only channel which I was likely to apply 
 to. That we met at the time indicated could scarcely 
 be doubted, even without the evidence of the Count 
 de Villa Real. It is proved, beyond dispute, that I 
 made but a momentary stop with the heavy brigade, 
 and then passed on to the front. From this place to 
 General Long and to the enemy was not more than 
 500 yards. — Where then, or to whom, did I go ? 
 There was but one corps of three squadrons remain- 
 ing ; and with that corps your relative was. To them, 
 therefore, I necessarily went. It is impossible to 
 suppose any other course of proceeding, and that I 
 pursued that course is confirmed by the statement of 
 the Count de Villa Real, which is itself confirmed by 
 the circumstances of the time. Yet, sir, there does 
 not appear a single expression in the passages you 
 have hitherto produced from your family archives, in 
 which General Long makes any allusion to these 
 events ; on the contrary, he clearly intends it to be 
 understood that we never met, still less spoke to each 
 other, during the whole course of the affair, and he 
 sends me to a distance with the Heavy Brigade which 
 it is proved I was not with, and to a spot where it is 
 equally proved that corps never was. All this, it must 
 
 d2
 
 36 
 
 be admitted, is singularly strange. But I shall at once 
 wind up my review of this point with the conclusive 
 statement of Lieut. -Col. Owen. This officer was 
 then a captain of one of the three squadrons of Por- 
 tuguese cavalry which remained with General Long 
 after the disappearance of the 13th Dragoons. His 
 letter, after describing the affair, proceeds in these 
 words : " Soon after the halt, a staff-officer rode up to 
 " me with an order to go to the Marshal. As he had 
 " known me long before, he kindly said to me, on my 
 " way, ' Be careful how you answer the questions 
 " ' going to be asked you ; for it is reported that the 
 " ' 13th are all prisoners, and the cavalry move- 
 " ' ments are all paralyzed.' When I reached the 
 " Marshal he said, ' Where do you come from, Capt. 
 " ' Owen ? Are you hurt V — I was covered with dust, 
 " my overalls torn, and my cap lost. — I answered, 
 " ' I come from the melee, sir ; my horse was thrown.' 
 " The Marshal said, ' Have you seen any thing of the 
 " '13th Dragoons?' ' Yes, sir, they passed me in 
 " ' pursuit of, and are beating the enemy.' — The Mar- 
 " shal replied, 'JVhy, General Long tells me they are 
 " ' all taken prisoners' — I answered, 'That I was not 
 " ' of that opinion ; that I knew the ground well, and 
 " ' did not believe that the regiment could have been 
 '* 'taken.' The Marshal then said to General Long, 
 " ' Do you hear, sir, what this officer says?' The 
 " General made some observation, with which I can- 
 " not charge my memory, when the Marshal some- 
 " what angrily turned quick round to him, ' Damn it,
 
 .37 
 
 «c c 
 
 sir, why did you not do something ? — why did 
 ** ' you not support them, or send to bring them 
 " 'back?'" 
 
 I give the words as I find them plainly recorded 
 by Col. Owen. No one, I think, after reading the 
 above, will doubt whether General Long was, or was 
 not, the person who reported to me the capture of 
 the 13th Light Dragoons. 
 
 Allusion is made, in Col. Doyle's evidence, to the 
 support of the 13th by the Heavy Brigade ; and in 
 the 46th page of your letter to me you observe, " I 
 " am of opinion that both your Lordship and the 
 " Count appeared to have laboured under an utter 
 " misapprehension of my relative's meaning. He 
 " may have said (I do not state that he even said 
 " that) that the regiments, if not supported, might 
 " be taken prisoners or cut to pieces. I merely offer 
 " this in solution of the mystery." This, in very 
 truth, does appear to me a most strange comment on 
 a very plain matter of fact. It is a curious guess, 
 and a still more curious mode of disproving testimony 
 which you would not, I fancy, be inclined even to 
 attempt in Westminster Hall. — But, sir, if you had 
 had recourse to the assistance of any military friend, he 
 might have informed you that the support ought to 
 have been given by your relative, when the charge 
 was made, or when the pursuit began, and that 
 when my conversation with him took place, it was 
 altogether too late to render such support, as the
 
 38 
 
 J 3th Dragoons were out of sight, and their position 
 and circumstances perfectly unknown to me. I have 
 also, in my former letter, proved, from his own corre- 
 spondence, as given in your own publication, that 
 General Long never intended the Heavy Brigade to 
 support the 13th Dragoons. 
 
 The last point that I shall take notice of on this 
 subject is part of the evidence of Lieut.-Col. Mac- 
 alister. He, as is the case with the other respectable 
 officers whom you have adduced, only speaks nega- 
 tively. He says, " It is the rirst time that I ever 
 " heard General Long's name coupled with the report 
 " to which you allude." 
 
 I implicitly believe the above ; and he adds, " I 
 " remember to have heard him frequently express 
 " himself in the most unqualified terms of indignation 
 " against the author of what he termed a wicked and 
 " scandalous report.'* 
 
 Even supposing that General Long had not been 
 the officer who originally informed me of the capture 
 of the loth Dragoons, knowing, as he did, from Col. 
 Doyle, that such a report had been made and was 
 prevalent, it is very extraordinary that he did not 
 hasten to me, as every military man knows it was his 
 bounden dutv to have done, and inform me of what 
 he considered the real state of the case ; — and be it 
 remembered, I was then not more than 300 yards 
 from him. But how very extraordinary does it also 
 appear, that after having ascertained, as he states, that
 
 39 
 
 Baron Tripp was the originator and propagator of 
 the account, and regarding it in the odious light 
 described by Col. Macalister, he should never 
 have required any explanation from that officer, nor 
 ever have made any representation or complaint 
 against him on the subject. The Baron still appears, 
 after the date of this discovery, to have remained with 
 your relative in the same state of social intercourse ; 
 and he probably went to his grave without ever 
 receiving any mark of his General's displeasure, 
 though named in his private letters as the author of 
 a report, against which, in conversation, he had been 
 frequently heard to express the most " unqualified 
 indignation" and to describe as " wicked and scan- 
 dalous." 
 
 I now proceed to consider the position, object, and 
 movements of the Heavy Brigade during this affair of 
 the cavalry. The representation of Brigadier- Gen. 
 Long is positive, direct and circumstantial on this 
 point, and is given with a marked design and appli- 
 cation. 
 
 In his letter to General La Marchant, he writes, 
 " On locking round to make proper arrangements and 
 " dispositions, I discovered to my astonishment that 
 " the whole of the Heavy Brigade, which I had sta- 
 " tioned in my rear in two lines, but outflanking to 
 " the right to support me, and observe the column of 
 " infantry, had been drawn across to the other side 
 " of the valley, and were halted on the opposite 
 " height about two miles from me." Now, sir, what
 
 40 
 
 character must we attach to General Longs corre- 
 spondence, if it be shown again, as it already has 
 been in my former letter, that no such movements 
 as those which he has above described ever occurred ; 
 and that, consequently, no plan of his could have 
 been marred by them ? I cpiite agree with you 
 that there may be vagueness in your relative's, or in 
 any one's, account of distances on such an occasion ; 
 and, if the above extract referred to distances only, I 
 should be most willing to make every reasonable 
 allowance for any mistake that he might have incurred. 
 But in the present case there was an express object 
 for describing the Heavy Brigade as removed to the 
 station assigned them by General Long. He wished 
 to prove that his plans were frustrated by their being- 
 taken so far off; and it cannot be expected that that 
 allowance for error in the computation of distances, 
 which might be available, under ordinary circum- 
 stances, to another, should be granted to him ; when 
 that error constitutes the very grounds on which he 
 endeavours to justify himself, and to cast reproach 
 upon his commander. But, sir, it is distinctly proved 
 by Sir C. D'Albiac, that the Heavy Brigade never 
 deviated from its direct line, in proceeding, as it was 
 ordered, to take post near, and on the right of, the 
 enemy's column. He says, in answer to your 7th 
 question, " I should say the Heavy Brigade halted 
 " for some minutes (not a quarter of an hour), after 
 te which it descended from the rising ground in the 
 " direction of Badajoz." And again, " The Heavy
 
 II 
 
 " Brigade crossed the road to Badajoz, and formed 
 " line about 250 yards short of the enemy ; the left 
 " of the brigade bearing on two of Major Hartman's 
 '* guns placed on the Badajoz road." You say, " it 
 " was first halted, and then moved in a direction 
 " away from General Long." But this is the very 
 reverse of your relative's own story. He says, it was 
 first moved in a direction away from him, and then 
 halted two miles off. You have not advanced any 
 authority to support the above assertion ; unless the 
 note of Col. Doyle, which is attached to this part of 
 your letter to me, is meant as such, and which could 
 be of no avail against the clear and direct evidence 
 of Sir Charles D'Albiac, as published in your former 
 pamphlet. But what does Col. Doyle say ? — His 
 note is given in explanation of his own previous note 
 and of my remarks upon it. His words are, " In page 
 " 27, Lord Beresford says, 'Col. Doyle, in his note, 
 " ' appears to confirm this statement,' viz., 'that Lord 
 "' Beresford not only sent the Heavy Brigade two 
 " * miles across the plain, but accompanied it in per- 
 " ' son.' ' (t I " (says Col. Doyle) " mention no dis- 
 " tance hi my note, which refers solely to the move- 
 " ment of the Heavy Brigade from the left to right 
 " of the Badajoz road, instead of direct to the front ; 
 " neither do I here mention anything regarding 
 " Marshal Beresford" a person." 
 
 The explanation which Col. Doyle here offers of 
 the note published in your " Reply" confirms the 
 opinion respecting it that I suggested in my former
 
 42 
 
 letter to you. He states, that " his observations 
 " merely related to the movement of the Heavy Bri- 
 " gade from the left to the right of the road, instead 
 " of direct to the front." This brigade was on the 
 left of the road. General Long's small remaining 
 force was on the same side and in front of it, the 
 enemy were on the ro.;d ; and consequently, to place 
 itself to the right of the enemy as ordered, the Heavy 
 Brigade must necessarily have crossed the road, as 
 Col. Doyle has stated ; but, so far was it from making 
 any circuit in effecting this operation, that, Sir C. 
 D'Albiac informs you, it went to its point in a direct 
 line. He tells you that, on receiving the order to 
 advance, " the brigade descended from the rising 
 ' f ground, where it had been halted, in the direction 
 " of Badajoz." Thus it appears, sir, that the Heavy 
 Brigade, so far from proceeding in a different direc- 
 tion to the enemy, was marching on the very same 
 point with them, and did not cross the' road till it 
 came within two hundred and fifty yards of them. 
 This distance was most certainly not increased after 
 crossing that road ; where (as Sir C. D'Albiac has 
 said) u the Heavy Brigade formed in line near the 
 " enemy." Thus, sir, the account in your relative's 
 letter is found to be fallacious, in every particular. 
 I will here give what General Long has stated, as 
 published in your " Reply" * — " Upon turning back, 
 " however, lie (General Long) discovered that the 
 " Heavy Brigade had been withdrawn from the situ- 
 
 * C. E. Long's Reply, p. 34.
 
 43 
 
 " ation he had directed them to keep, and halted two 
 " miles off, on a slope of ground across a valley on 
 11 the other side of the route, Fig. 2, and moreover 
 " putting a valley and impassable ditch between 
 " them." In this Figure 2, your relative has abso- 
 lutely indicated the line of march which this brigade 
 took on returning from its distant position, thus — 
 
 
 Route of the Heavy Brig*** 
 
 ^ 
 
 It is quite impossible to mistake General Long's 
 meaning in the above extract and accompanying plan ; 
 and they are too particular and circumstantial to 
 allow the admission of any plea of " vagueness of 
 distance" as an excuse for the gross errors they con- 
 tain. But I Avill cite another passage from your 
 relative's correspondence on the same point. " Col. 
 " Otway," he states,* "with the two supporting 
 " squadrons, disbanded also in pursuit, and away they 
 " all raced, without further support, to the bridge of 
 " Badajoz. On looking round to make fresh 
 " arrangements and dispositions, I discovered, to my 
 " astonishment, that the whole of the Heavy Brigade, 
 " which I had stationed in my rear in two lines, but 
 '* outflanking to the right, to support me and observe 
 " the column of infantry, had been drawn across to 
 
 * Letter to General Le Merchant, — C. E. Long's Reply, p. 79.
 
 14 
 
 " the other side of the valley, and were halted on the 
 " opposite height about two miles from me." Now, 
 sir, I believe that every one of the facts which Gen. 
 Long has here stated has been proved incorrect. It 
 has been shown that the halt of this brigade was 
 only for a few minutes ; that it took place at the spot 
 and time I passed it : that it was on the left of the 
 road ; that, therefore, it neither did, nor could, have 
 moved across a valley on the other side of this road ; 
 that, on being again put in motion, the corps pursued 
 the enemy in the direction of Badajoz, so as to place 
 itself on their right flank, and cross the road at only 
 250 yards in their rear ; and that it continued in this 
 position till the general halt. It is, moreover, proved 
 that I came up with the brigade at about 500 yards 
 in rear of the enemy ; that my stay with it was only 
 momentary ; that, having halted it, I passed on to 
 the front ; that I saw and spoke with General Long 
 immediately after; and that I did not rejoin the 
 Heavy Brigade from the time of my passing it in the 
 first instance, till it came within about 250 yards of 
 the enemy. 
 
 Sir C. D'Albiac and the Count de Villa Real 
 establish the above facts beyond dispute ; and Col. 
 Doyle, who is no longer (indeed I never thought he 
 was) a witness in favour of General Long's most ex- 
 traordinary statement, tells us that he " never, in his 
 former note, referred to distance,'' and, by his present 
 explanation, as given by yourself, confirms the testi- 
 mony of Sir Charles D'Albiac : while, with regard to
 
 45 
 
 my being with this cavalry beyond the impassable 
 ditch, he states, that on being sent by General Long 
 to order up the Heavy Brigade, " he found Marshal 
 " Beresford and his staff with two of Major Hartman's 
 " guns contiguous to the Badajoz road, and not above 
 " 300 yards from the enemy ;" and concludes this 
 note with saying, " Be this as it may," (the distances,) 
 " I was only sent once during the day to Marshal 
 " Beresford, and this was only at the close of the 
 " affair." All these several accounts agree with my 
 recollections of the occurrences of the day, and with 
 what every military man would consider as the na- 
 tural course of events. I left our column of infantry 
 on the point where we first halted on coming in view 
 of Campo Maior. After I had lost sight of the cavalry 
 under Brigadier-General Long, I went in pursuit of 
 them, and from the height I was going on, caught sight 
 of them again at a distance of about half a mile from 
 me. On descending towards them, I first came up with 
 the Heavy Brigade, which was in the rear, and halted 
 it, on account of my perceiving that a great confusion 
 existed among our light cavalry near the enemy, and 
 that very few of them were to be seen. I then passed 
 on to the front, to learn how matters stood ; and hav- 
 ing received General Long's report, I sent back in- 
 structions for the Heavy Brigade to advance, and for 
 two of the nearest guns to be sent forward. Till these 
 arrived I remained with or near the remaining Portu- 
 guese and the enemy, from which I was not seen at any 
 moment after, at a distance of more than 300 vanls.
 
 46 
 
 The evidence of Col. Doyle has left, sir, another 
 vacuum to be filled up. He was most clearly not the 
 officer whom General Long says he sent to me, when 
 I was two miles off, and who is described as desiring 
 me to bring up the Heavy Brigade, which it does not 
 appear I was with till it came within 250 yards of 
 the enemy, and from a position which it is quite cer- 
 tain that corps was never near. There is thus, sir, 
 a great deal more than an inaccurate estimate of dis- 
 tances to be accounted for ; and to a most strange 
 vagueness of vision, or of conception, must that man 
 be subject, who could suppose that a person whom he 
 had just seen and spoken with, and who was not more 
 than a distance of 300 yards from him, was two miles 
 off! However, I leave the point to the judgment of 
 the reader. 
 
 In the 55th, 56th, and 57th pages of your last 
 publication, you have argued at some length to prove 
 that that passage of my letter to you, in which I say 
 " it does not appear that Col. de Grey, who com- 
 " manded the Heavy Brigade, had any orders what- 
 " ever respecting the 13th Light Dragoons," is 
 inconsistent with that part of my official account of 
 the affair which describes the charge (that of the 13th 
 Light Dragoons) as " followed by Col. Otway with 
 " two squadrons of the 7th Portuguese, and supported 
 " by General Long with the remnant of that regi- 
 " ment and the brigade of Col. de Grey." I repeat, 
 sir, that I was not on the spot when these events oc- 
 curred ; and any military man will inform you that,
 
 4? 
 
 on such occasions, the General in Chief states what 
 is reported to him by the officer actually in command. 
 In the present instance, that officer was Brigadier- 
 General Long. In commenting on the passage, you 
 observe, that, in 1811, when writing my despatch, 
 I " really thought that the Heavy Brigade did actu- 
 " ally support somebody or something." I then 
 believed and reported what was reported to me. It 
 was not possible for me to state, on my own authority, 
 that which I did not witness. And I never doubted 
 the truth of that report, sir, till I read, in your own 
 publication, General Long's explicit contradiction of 
 the account he had supplied me with for that part 
 of my despatch, in which I was obliged to trust to 
 his intelligence. It was in your own " Reply" that 
 I found the evidence which proved that Col. de 
 Grey, who commanded the Heavy Brigade, had no 
 orders whatever respecting the 13th Dragoons; and, 
 consequently, that the account of the support, which 
 General Long had caused me to insert in the de- 
 spatch, was as imaginary as many of the details of 
 his correspondence have been shown to be. The 
 quotation you adduce from Sir C. D'Albiac's first 
 answer, as given in your former pamphlet, is quite 
 inapplicable to the subject. " His impression," he 
 says, " was that the allied cavalry were to attack 
 " that of the enemy, if a favourable opportunity 
 " offered." This evidence is general as to the 
 cavalry, and can have no allusion to any detail, or 
 particular events. Besides, it was given in answer
 
 48 
 
 to a question that referred to a time antecedent even 
 to the first movement of the cavalry from the first 
 halt before Campo Maior. I shall here cite the 
 question to which the above answer applies, that the 
 reader may perceive what a very extraordinary mode 
 you have of making use of your evidence. Your 
 question to Sir C. D'Albiac was, "When the allied 
 " cavalry, under the command of Brigadier-General 
 " Long, was ordered to advance on the morning of 
 " the 25th of March, 1811, was it your impression 
 " that no attack was on any account to be made on 
 " the enemy's cavalry?" It is quite manifest, sir, 
 that no answer to the above question can fairly be 
 brought to bear upon the charge of the 13th Light 
 Dragoons, which happened at an after period of the 
 day. The orders to the cavalry, as supposed by Sir 
 C. D'Albiac, relate only to what might occur during 
 a general movement on the advance. But you have 
 furnished us with your relative's own account of the 
 directions which he gave on coming up with, and on 
 proceeding to the attack of the enemy. He informs 
 us, in one place,* that he " commanded the Heavy 
 " Brigade to support Mm, and observe the column 
 " of infantry ;" and in another placef, that he 
 followed "to support the attack of the 13th; still 
 " supposing the Heavy Brigade in his rear occu- 
 " pying the attention of the remaining part of the 
 " enemy's force." Such, sir, is your relative's own 
 account, and it seems extraordinary that you should 
 * C. E. Long's Reply, p. 79. t Idem, p. 46.
 
 49 
 
 question its accuracy; though any other person might 
 say it was contradictory. To conclude this point, I 
 will merely observe that, though I might, as you say, 
 " suppose the Heavy Brigade supported somebody or 
 " something," I could not possibly suppose that, after 
 the charge, it supported the 13th Light Dragoons ; 
 for, on reaching the field, I found the Heavy Brigade 
 500 yards in rear of the enemy, and the 13th Light 
 Dragoons not anywhere within sight. 
 
 With regard to what you designate " the order of 
 " reprimand," it is only necessary for me to say that 
 the account which appeared in my dispatch was taken 
 from your relative's after-report of the events that had 
 taken place. I have had occasion more than once to 
 mention, what every military man is perfectly aware 
 of, that, for facts of which I was not an eye-wit- 
 ness, my intelligence could only be derived from the 
 officer in command on the spot. I have never said, 
 sir, that Colonel Head was altogether blameless ; but I 
 have said, and I repeat, that the statements of Colonel 
 Doyle, Sir Henry Watson, and Colonel Otway, prove 
 the account given in your relative's correspondence, 
 as published by yourself, respecting the 13th Light 
 Dragoons and the Portuguese under Otway after 
 the charge, to have been altogether without founda- 
 tion ; and, as that account exactly corresponds with 
 my official report of the affair, it very clearly indicates 
 the source from which the information contained in 
 my report was derived. 
 
 E
 
 50 
 
 You next speak of the state of the artillery horses. 
 Upon this point you adduce the evidence of Colonel 
 Doyle, who says, " it was currently stated that the 
 " officer commanding the Artillery (Major Hartman) 
 " had been anxious to bring up the entire brigade," 
 and of Major, now Sir Julius, Hartman, who con- 
 firms this account. To the last-mentioned officer, 
 (since Colonel Doyle only speaks of what was ru- 
 moured, without pretending to have any personal 
 knowledge of the subject,) the authority on your 
 side of the question is confined, and it can hardly be 
 regarded as sufficient to stand against the opposing 
 testimony of Sir Henry Hardinge, the Count de 
 Villa Real, and Sir Benjamin D'Urban. An ex- 
 tract from a work of Sir Julius Hartman has been 
 cited by Colonel Napier, as evidence upon certain 
 events at the village of Albuera, during the battle to 
 which it has given the name ; and no one who has 
 read the exposure of the strange misstatements em- 
 bodied in that extract, will thenceforward feel in- 
 clined to attach much value to the accuracy of its 
 author. On the present subject, his account is given 
 from memory. I can only say, that his recollections 
 are diametrically opposed to mine. At the time the 
 two guns in question arrived and commenced firing, 
 I was with my staff on the right flank of and near 
 to the enemy's column ; and it was not till they had 
 fired a few shots, and every one around me was com- 
 plaining of the little effect produced— I did not see
 
 51 
 
 any— that I proceeded to the guns. After being some 
 short time with them, I urged the officer who com- 
 manded them to take up a position nearer the enemy ; 
 but he replied that his horses were so fatigued, as to 
 render it impossible for him to continue the pursuit 
 any longer. Sir Henry Hardinge, Sir B. D' Urban, 
 and the Count de Villa Real, my Aid-de-Camp, 
 were all with me ; and it was on receiving this an- 
 swer that I commanded the whole to halt. But, Sir, 
 this is one of those cases in which argument is use- 
 less. The facts speak for themselves. What other 
 probable, or imaginable, motive could there have been 
 for my order at this moment ? I had sent up for these 
 two guns, which, could they have continued to act, 
 would have proved quite sufficient for the object, per- 
 fectly conscious that, if I withheld my cavalry from 
 going upon the enemy, he could not possibly do me 
 any injury. With what imaginable view, then, should 
 I have prevented these guns from injuring him, if they 
 could have continued so to do ? The case speaks for 
 itself. As to Sir Julius Hartman's proposal of bring- 
 ing forward the whole brigade of Artillery, I should 
 like to know to whom and when it was made. He 
 does not say that it was made to me, though that may 
 appear to be his meaning ; neither does he intimate 
 at what moment it was made. If it was when he re- 
 ceived the order for the advance of the two guns, it 
 could not have been to me, as I was then two miles in 
 front of him : if it was when the guns were desired 
 
 e2
 
 52 
 
 to halt, this would appear, under the circumstances, 
 an extraordinary time for addressing such a proposal 
 to a Commander in Chief. I have not the slightest 
 recollection of ever receiving any such suggestion ; 
 and to say the least of it, I could not but have re- 
 garded such a proposal from Major Hartman very 
 strange and unmilitary, when, having sent for two of 
 this brigade, I must have been perfectly aware that 
 at the spot they came from there were still four others 
 remaining. Sir Julius Hartman says, " the Artil- 
 " lery were immediately in the rear of the advanced 
 " guard," that is, of the advance of the infantry. We 
 have more than enough evidence to show that that 
 advanced guard was about two miles in the rear. — 
 You observe upon this, " Sir Henry Hardinge's 
 " informant was most egregiously in error." Sir 
 Henry Hardinge, sir, was his own informant ; he 
 was an eye-witness present with me on the occa- 
 sion. 
 
 I will now proceed to the case of Lieut. -Colonel Col- 
 borne, respecting which, with an evident, but, I trust, 
 a very short-lived triumph, you say, * " As this offer 
 of Sir John Colborne," (to cut off the enemy's bag- 
 gage), "given in p. 70 of my Reply, has unfortu- 
 " nately escaped your Lordship's notice, I am tempted 
 " to relieve it from its obscurity by the evidence of 
 " Colonel Macalister of the 13th, who was attached 
 " to that Officer on the occasion in question. His 
 
 * C. E. Long's Letter to Lord Beresford, p. 63.
 
 53 
 
 " reply respecting the baggage before the attack, 
 " and the guns after the attack, is as follows : — 
 
 " * I always understood,' says Colonel Macalister, 
 " ' that Sir John Colborne had made an offer to cut 
 " ' off the baggage. With respect to the guns I am 
 " ' positive, as I volunteered the service myself, and 
 " ' I understood from Sir John that the Marshal 
 " f would not allow it, saying that too much had 
 " ' been done, or words to that effect." — It is true, sir, 
 that I did not take any notice of this passage in 
 my former letter. One reason of this omission was 
 that the absurdity of the account, as far as I was con- 
 cerned, appeared to be evinced by a single line of it. 
 Colonel Macalister has stated " that Sir John Col- 
 " borne sent back word to beg he might be sup- 
 " ported." It is clear, as was proved in my letter to 
 you, that at the time indicated I had left the infan- 
 try to follow the cavalry, and, therefore, could not 
 by any possibility have returned Sir John Colborne 
 an answer from the rear, where I was not. But, I 
 confess, my principal reason for omitting to mention 
 it was my not retaining the slightest recollection of 
 the circumstances ; and it was not till after my pre- 
 vious letter to you was written that I sent Sir John 
 Colborne the passage from General Long's Letter to 
 C. B. L. of the 3rd Dec. 1811, in which the state- 
 ment concerning him is made, and requested him to 
 inform me how far it was correct. I shall lay his 
 account of the transaction before you. It will not 
 be found to confirm the statements either of General
 
 54 
 
 Long or Colonel M acalister. This latter officer, by- 
 the-by, talks of having " volunteered his services to 
 " cut off the enemy's guns," which he never could 
 have seen, as they never were within sight of 
 Colonel Colborne, but were, as is on all hands 
 acknowledged, a great distance in front of the enemy 
 — about a league — and were never seen by any one 
 except those who advanced with the 13th. This is 
 passing strange ! — But we will proceed to Sir John 
 Colborne's Letter. 
 
 " York, U. Canada, May 25, 1833. 
 
 " I have been for so long a time and so fully 
 " occupied in the situation which I at present hold, 
 " that I have paid but little attention to military 
 " publications. 
 
 " I am anxious, however, to inform you, in answer 
 " to your note of the 3rd March, that I met General 
 " Long frequently at Villa Vi^osa after the affair at 
 " Campo Maior, and my Brigade Major was after - 
 " wards attached to his brigade of cavalry. I may, 
 " therefore, have conversed with him on the move- 
 " ments of which we were all at that period interested 
 " in giving our own version. I will state to you the 
 " impression which I now have of the extent of my 
 " conversation with him, or with any person, on the 
 " occurrences that were brought under my notice 
 " connected with the affair of Campo Maior. 
 
 " At Arronches I was very unexpectedly appointed 
 ' to command the advanced guard of your corps
 
 55 
 
 " d'armee from the bivouac, between Arronches and 
 " Campo Maior, on the morning of the march on that 
 " place. When we arrived at the commencement 
 " of the hill, where the arrangements were made 
 " for ascending the position near Campo Maior, I 
 " found the whole of my advanced guard disposed of 
 " and placed under the immediate command of Sir 
 " W Lumley, with the exception of a squadron or 
 " troop of cavalry and the 66th regiment. Sir W. 
 " Stewart, perceiving that I had received no orders 
 " to advance, rode up to me and desired me to ascend 
 " the hill with the cavalry and the 66th regiment to 
 " the right of the town. I immediately hastened up 
 " the hill with Major Boycein command of the squa- 
 " dron, and ordered the 66th to follow. I had pa- 
 " trolled up this hill a few hours before daylight, 
 " and alarmed a picket of the enemy, and was, 
 " therefore, persuaded that the town was evacuated. 
 " On reaching the summit of the hill southward of 
 " Campo Maior, accompanied by the squadron of 
 " cavalry, I observed a column of French infantry, 
 " protected by cavalry, marching rapidly towards 
 " Badajoz, abandoning from time to time two or 
 " three horses or mules, apparently loaded with 
 " baggage. The head of the column was a very 
 " short distance from Campo Maior. I moved 
 " through some inclosures to the southward, and 
 " ordered the 66th regiment to follow the cavalry 
 " under my command, as rapidly as possible. While
 
 56 
 
 " Ave were greatly excited, and the commanding 
 " officer of the 66th receiving my instructions, an 
 " Aid-de-Camp from the General commanding the 
 " brigade came from the northward of the town, 
 " and delivered me a message that I was separating 
 " too far from him. I hastily said, ' Tell the General 
 " ' I can see better than he can from this ground ;' 
 " and proceeded through a small ravine or valley, at 
 " a gallop, till we found ourselves on the flank of the 
 " enemy's column, and, perhaps, at about six or seven 
 " hundred yards from it. I think we must have been 
 " in this situation not more than a quarter of an hour 
 " after we had separated from Sir W. Stewart. 
 
 "We halted when the French column formed 
 " square, and their cavalry trotted towards Col. 
 " Head's squadrons to receive their charge. After 
 " this charge the two bodies of cavalry were so mixed 
 " that we could scarcely judge of the result, till the 
 " infantry opened a fire on the 13th Dragoons, on 
 " their passing through their opponents. 
 
 " The French retired, pursued by our cavalry, 
 " and, from the ground we occupied, the Portuguese 
 " Skirmishers and the Heavy Brigade appeared to 
 " be advancing in the form of a crescent. I men- 
 " tion all these details to explain to you that what- 
 " ever conversation I may have had with General 
 " Long, it must have referred to my detached corps, 
 " and to the accidental position in which we were 
 " placed. / never communicated with any officer of
 
 0/ 
 
 " your staff, nor with any General daring the affair, 
 " nor received any message except that which I have 
 " related above." 
 
 I omit, for the sake of brevity, some further details 
 in this letter, all of which, however, are corroborative 
 of the foregoing account, as will be clear from its 
 conclusion. " I advert to these circumstances, that 
 " Sir W. Lumley and Major Boyce may confirm 
 " my statements, and that they may show how far 
 " it is probable that I made the remarks attributed to 
 " me. In fact, I am positive that I have now com- 
 " municated to you the substance of all my conver- 
 " sation with General Long, or with any other 
 " officer relative to the affair of Campo Maior." 
 
 The reader will here perceive that I had nothing 
 whatever to do with the movements of Sir John 
 Colborne, but that they were divisional or brigade 
 arrangements. I do not believe they were ever re- 
 ported to me, probably because they had no particu- 
 lar result. 
 
 You have, sir, as you say, though under the im- 
 pression of a different result, enabled me " to relieve 
 " this matter from its obscurity." The whole story, 
 as related in your relation's correspondence, turns 
 out to have been no more than a mere creature of his 
 imagination, fostered, it is true, by yourself, and re- 
 ceiving some degree of sanction from the vague and 
 imperfect recollections of Col., then Capt., Macalister. 
 It is curious to observe that, notwithstanding the very 
 prominent part this latter officer ascribes to himself in
 
 58 
 
 the transactions in question, Sir John Colborne does 
 not appear to recollect that any such person was 
 near him. His name is never mentioned. No one 
 circumstance of his evidence is alluded to ; and 
 what he states respecting the cutting off the baggage, 
 the capturing the guns, and the directions which he 
 attributes to me, is positively contradicted by Sir 
 John Colborne ; unless, indeed, the two or three 
 horses or mules, which were from time to time aban- 
 doned by the enemy, constituted the baggage which 
 Col. Macalister proposed to cut off, but which, accord- 
 ing to Sir John Colborne, had been cast off. Is it not 
 intolerable, sir, that I should be called upon, after 
 such a lapse of years, to defend myself against im- 
 putations, produced upon the authority of a private 
 and hidden correspondence, and these confused and 
 imperfect recollections of regimental or subaltern 
 officers? — Is such conduct fair and just? — It is, sir, 
 an extraordinary thing that I should be able to rebut 
 such attacks at all. If Sir John Colborne had not 
 survived to declare the truth, what defence could I 
 have put up? I could have done no more than 
 simply state that I had no remembrance of the cir- 
 cumstance ; and what would that have availed me ? — 
 It would only have afforded matter for sarcasm and 
 ironical observations. Yet, how clear and simple 
 does this military operation appear, when truly de- 
 scribed by the officer who commanded. You also 
 conceive, sir, that glorious results would have ensued 
 if General Stewart's proposal had been acted upon,
 
 59 
 
 and Sir John Colborne's wishes had been attended to. 
 The foregoing letter has spoiled this combination. — 
 But with regard to the proposal of General Stewart : 
 I am surprised that an officer of Col. Doyle's ex- 
 perience and judgment should have noticed it, or 
 assisted in propagating a rumour of this description. 
 It is not, indeed, said to whom this proposal of Gen. 
 Stewart's was communicated ; but it is, of course, to 
 be inferred that he made it to myself. Now it has 
 been distinctly shown in my former letter to you, 
 and also, I believe, in the " Strictures" that during 
 my course after General Long and the cavalry, the 
 Count de Villa Real brought me information of the 
 enemy having evacuated Campo Maior, and that, 
 on receiving the intelligence, I sent back to order 
 our infantry to advance. I thus never saw Sir W. 
 Stewart from the time he and the infantry were 
 ordered to advance, until they rejoined us after the 
 final halt. He could not, therefore, have made the 
 proposal in question to me. This sets the rumour 
 at rest, as far as I am concerned with it. — But, in- 
 deed, the instructions which were sent back to Sir 
 W. Stewart* were of such a nature, that, ashecom- 
 
 * The Count de Villa Real relates that, having been desired 
 by me to ascertain whether the town was evacuated, he spoke to 
 some persons on the ramparts, from whom he learned that the 
 French, after having sent on before them the artillery to Badajoz, 
 had left the town. " I returned," he says, " towards Marshal 
 " Beresford immediately, and met him at some distance from the 
 " infantry, going towards the cavalry. He sent immediately to 
 " the infantry to advance as quickly as possible, but so that it 
 " might not be exhausted on coming up with the enemy."
 
 60 
 
 manded the leading division, he would have been 
 fully authorized in acting during the absence of the 
 Commander in Chief, as he is said to have pro- 
 posed, if he had really considered such a measure as 
 expedient. So much for the validity of all these 
 rumours, against which I have to defend myself. 
 
 You have said a great deal, sir, about a discre- 
 tionary order which General Long in his private 
 correspondence has thought fit to represent himself 
 as having received from me. He writes to General 
 Le Marchant*, "However, I had a conversation in 
 " the morning with the Marshal. He told me the 
 " enemy was exceedingly strong in cavalry, and that 
 " I must hug the infantry for support, if necessary. 
 " I asked him peremptorily, if I should attack them 
 " wherever I met them. His answer was, ' Do not 
 " ' commit yourself against a superior force ; but, if 
 " ' the opportunity to strike occurs, avail yourself of 
 " ' it.' ' On a former occasion, not wishing to meet 
 this extraordinary statement of General Long by a 
 mere unsupported contradiction of my own, I showed 
 you how inconsistent it was with what he had 
 written in other places, and what he is known to 
 have done. — But the whole account involves a mass 
 of contradictions and inconsistencies. The latter half 
 forgets the beginning — He informs us that " I first 
 " cautioned him not to expose himself, telling him 
 " that the enemy was exceedingly strong in cavalry." 
 Here, by-the-by, I must have told him more than I 
 
 * C. E. Long's Reply, p. 75.
 
 61 
 
 knew, .and more than proved to be the case. Next, 
 sir, this inferior officer "peremptorily" demands from 
 his superior, decided orders : — and for what? Why, it 
 would appear that he was preparing for some ser- 
 vice which was to be effected at a distance, and not 
 immediately in the view and under the control of 
 the Commander in Chief. He asks if he should 
 attack the enemy " wherever he met them ;" and my 
 answer, as he has reported it, is precisely such as 
 would be given on the understanding that he was 
 about to execute some duty where I should not be 
 present. No officer, I apprehend, ever heard of 
 such a question under similar circumstances. He 
 goes on to say, " With these instructions I proceeded 
 " to move, and was ordered to the front (as usual) 
 " with all the cavalry. The " as usual," here, might 
 have been very well left out ; as this was positively 
 the first time, since your relative joined, that we had 
 come near the enemy. He then moved on, having 
 the light portion of his division supported by the 
 Heavy Brigade. " I followed," he says, " implicitly 
 " the instructions I received as far as the ground 
 " permitted." It is thus, then, clear that he had par- 
 ticular and precise instructions, in pursuance of 
 which he proceeds to file his column across the 
 ravine, drives the enemy's pickets back on Campo 
 Maior, advances across a plain, and halts about a 
 mile from the town. He now perceives the enemy's 
 cavalry, and informs us that they began to manoeuvre 
 behind the heights, as if intending an attack upon
 
 62 
 
 him ; and that lie employed himself in making, what 
 he considered, the best dispositions to counteract 
 their intentions, " waiting the Marshal's further 
 " orders." — Here then, again, he distinctly "proves 
 that he did not consider himself acting under such 
 general and discretionary orders as he had before 
 represented himself as receiving, and with respect to 
 which I can say no more than that, if the conversa- 
 tion General Long has reported ever took place, it 
 has totally escaped my recollection. But, I think, 
 every military man will allow that a conversation of 
 the nature described could scarcely have arisen under 
 the circumstances of the time, and that it was wholly 
 inapplicable to the occasion, which required that the 
 several arms should act in unity and conjunction, a 
 combination which could only be effected under one 
 command. — But what General Long has stated is 
 not only inconsistent with our then position, but is 
 altogether inconsistent with itself. I caution him, 
 because the enemy is exceedingly strong in cavalry, 
 to hug the infantry ; and he consequently abandons 
 the infantry entirely, and sets out after the exceed- 
 ingly strong cavalry of the enemy supported by their 
 infantry. He has precise orders for his approach to 
 Campo Maior ; and, on coming in sight of it, he 
 halts his corps to wait my further instructions. He 
 receives his new orders, is put in motion, is twice 
 informed that he is not fulfilling my intentions, and 
 peremptorily desired to conform to them ; but he 
 pays no regard to these repeated commands, and
 
 63 
 
 then endeavours to shelter himself under the pretence 
 of some previous order, which, if it ever existed, had 
 been superseded and annulled by the recent and 
 direct instructions applied to the occasion itself as it 
 occurred. 
 
 On this case you further observe* : " Either General 
 " Long was intrusted with the direction of the 
 " cavalry operations, or he was not. If he was, 
 " your Lordship should, I submit, have allowed him 
 " to carry his intentions into effect. If he was not, 
 " your Lordship should have been at hand, to have 
 " directed him, as you say, immediately and per- 
 " sonally." If this is the reasoning of a civilian, it 
 may be smiled at and excused ; but, if it has been 
 directed by any military critic, it is not very credit- 
 able to its author. General Long was the officer in 
 command of the cavalry ; but, sir, they were not his 
 intentions, but mine, that he had to carry into effect, 
 and after the manner that I directed. In the first 
 instance, he might have mistaken his orders ; but he 
 was informed twice, of the mistake which he had 
 made ; and, persisting in disobeying my instructions, 
 he withdrew the cavalry from me. I had moment- 
 arily other points to attend to, before I could go 
 after him. His letter has informed you of the pace 
 he proceeded at, and, considering the distance to 
 which he had removed himself from me by the time 
 Sir Henry Hardinge returned from his second 
 message, it is manifest, your relative had precluded 
 * C. E. Long's Letter, p. 65.
 
 64 
 
 the possibility of my being, as you say, " at hand to 
 " direct him." It has been seen that, though I went 
 after him at a quick pace, so far was I from being 
 able to be " at hand," that the 13th Dragoons had 
 made their charge, and were out of sight before my 
 arrival. So much for your well-advised paragraph. 
 I consider your evidence to show, that the Portu- 
 guese cavalry did not charge the French infantry 
 by orders of General Long, as perfectly satisfactory, 
 and acknowledge myself in error with regard to that 
 fact. Looking down on the parties, at the distance 
 of half a mile to the rear, I might easily have been 
 deceived as to whether the affair I witnessed was 
 between our cavalry and that of the enemy, or 
 between our cavalry and his infantry — the whole 
 being close together. My attention, in the distance, 
 was first attracted by the fire of the enemy's 
 infantry, and seeing our cavalry flying from it 
 immediately afterwards, I concluded that they had 
 charged and were repulsed. It appears that I was 
 in error ; but I do not perceive what General Long 
 can possibly gain by my mistake. It is almost more 
 incomprehensible that he should have exposed his 
 light cavalry to the fire of the enemy, without in- 
 tending to make any attack. But this point I will 
 not discuss : my only object in reverting to this 
 movement, is to acknowledge that I was deceived 
 with regard to the nature of it. 
 
 ALBUERA. 
 
 You have, sir, filled several pages to prove, if I
 
 65 
 
 clearly understand the drift of them, that General 
 Long had not sufficient instructions to direct him on 
 the approach of the enemy to the battle of Albuera, 
 and that he was not informed in time of the point of 
 his retreat. 
 
 I shall merely observe in reply, that I never 
 received the slightest hint of such a circumstance 
 until, some twenty years after the events, you 
 thought fit so to state, on the authority of your 
 late relative's private correspondence. You demand,* 
 " Are we to understand that General Long did not 
 " repeatedly apply for orders?" This, sir, has never 
 been denied. On the contrary, he was considered 
 as making those applications far too frequently and 
 most unnecessarily. The Quarter-master-general's 
 letter of the 14th of May, from Valverde, will pretty 
 distinctly point out the feeling entertained at head- 
 quarters respecting General Long's correspondence. 
 The second paragraph shows, that your relative was 
 thought to entertain opinions which were neither 
 founded on the instructions he had received, nor 
 fitting the nature of his position. The third shows, 
 that he was considered as too timid of incurring 
 any responsibility. From such responsibility, how- 
 ever, it appears that I had no objection to relieve him, 
 and consequently issued to him such precise and 
 detailed instructions, as I had never previously 
 thought it necessary to deliver to any officer in a 
 similar position, and such as I am certain never 
 
 * C. E. Long's Letter to Lord Beresford, p. 82. 
 
 F
 
 66 
 
 ought to have been required. I should be glad to 
 be informed, if any other general officer of cavalry, 
 situated as General Long was, would not have con- 
 sidered such orders as your relative applied for and 
 received as derogatory to his military skill and intelli- 
 gence ? Every document you have published proves 
 him to have had the most ample notice that he 
 was to retire on Santa Martha, three leagues from 
 Albuera. And on the 14th, he writes from the 
 former place*, " as far as my private opinion goes, I 
 " have no reason to expect that I shall be forced 
 " from this position to-day, nor perhaps to-morrow." 1 * 
 The above was stated after receiving a report from 
 the Alcalde of Los Santos, three or four leagues in 
 advance of Santa Martha. Now, sir, General Long 
 in this passage, does not express the slightest doubt 
 respecting the point of his retreat, which he most 
 assuredly would have done had he been in ignorance 
 respecting it. Nay, you relate that, in the letter 
 from which the above extract is made, he expresses 
 his " readiness to dispute every inch of ground 
 " between Santa Martha and Valverde," by which 
 he distinctly proved that he was, at least, aware of his 
 line of retreat ; as Albuera is on the Valverde road, 
 and two leagues nearer Santa Martha. You have 
 publishedf a letter from Sir B. D'Urban of the 
 12th, which General Long would receive early on 
 the 13th, informing; him, that head-quarters would 
 
 * C. E. Long's Letter to Lord Beresford, p. 79. 
 t C. E. Long's Letter, p. 78.
 
 67 
 
 be transferred on the latter day to Valverde or 
 Albuera, the road to the former running through 
 the latter. If your relative had been previously in 
 the dark respecting his line of retreat, this alone, in 
 the absence of any command to the contrary, would 
 have been sufficient for his instruction ; and when he 
 wrote on the 14th — the day after the above-mentioned 
 letter was received — that he would dispute every inch 
 of the ground to Valverde, it was evident that he 
 understood it in that sense. We have only General 
 Long's own evidence, detailed in his secret corre- 
 spondence, that the order of the Quarter-master- 
 general, directing him to march immediately to 
 Albuera, and which was sent at half-past seven in 
 the morning of the 15th, did not reach him till he 
 had commenced his retreat from Santa Martha. If 
 this was the case, it is obvious, from the very move- 
 ment he was making, that he was quite aware of the 
 line he was to retire on, a fact which in your present 
 publication has been proved to demonstration. Lieut. 
 Heathcote, then an officer in the Quarter-master- 
 general's department, relates, that*, " on the morning 
 " of the 15th, General Long's division of Cavalry, to 
 " which I was attached, was posted about a mile 
 " in rear of Santa Martha on the road towards 
 " Albuera." And, after describing this position 
 of the cavalry, Mr. Heathcote goes on to say. 
 " General Long, having left General de Grey in 
 " charge of his division, joined Count de Penne 
 
 * C. E. Long's Letter to Lord Beresford, p. 105. 
 
 F2
 
 68 
 
 u near the church of Santa Martha situated on 
 " an eminence commanding an extensive prospect, 
 " where we remained several hours." It is thus 
 manifest, not only from the documents that you 
 have published, but from the very conduct of your 
 relative, that he was perfectly aware of the line on 
 which he was to retire. He acted as if he had a 
 perfect knowledge of it. No doubt on the subject 
 was apparent ; nor did any mistake occur ; and we 
 find him, early on the morning of the 15th, before, 
 according to his account, he had received the 
 Quarter-master- general's instructions for such a 
 measure, posting his troops on the road to Albuera 
 from Santa Martha, several hours before ordering 
 the retreat, or the appearance of any enemy. Whe- 
 ther General Long was really left in ignorance on 
 this subject, the reader may decide. 
 
 I now proceed to consider the manner in which 
 this retreat was conducted. You have adduced the 
 evidence of many most honourable officers to support 
 your representation of this matter. But their testi- 
 monies are strangely at variance with each other*. 
 
 * I cannot forbear introducing here, as a note, the obser- 
 vations of a general officer on this pnrt of your letter to me. 
 " The Retreat from, Santa Martha to Albuera. 
 
 " Although fifty-two pages of Mr. Long's letter are devoted to 
 " discussion relative to the retreat from Santa Martha to Albuera, 
 *' the points in controversy may be brought into a very small 
 " compass. 
 
 " The following questions appear to me to comprise the whole 
 of them. 
 
 " 1st. Did General Long; occasion the British Cavalrv to 
 " retreat from Santa Martha, before the French advanced guard
 
 69 
 
 At this I am not greatly surprised. Such discre- 
 pancies to a certain extent may easily be accounted 
 
 " only ; and with more precipitation than there was occasion 
 for? 
 
 " 2nd. Was the retreat, or the end of it, on crossing the Alhuera, 
 " hurried, and more precipitate than was necessary ? 
 
 " 3rd. Was the representation of the proceedings, (which 
 " General Long's account of them to his private correspondents 
 " seems intended to convey,) namely that ' the enemy's nearer 
 ""approach to (Santa Martha) having fully established their 
 " ' strength, I fell back at a walk to Albuera' — and that ' the 
 " ' enemy's advance soon came up with our rear, and skirmished 
 " ' with us all the way to Albuera,' a correct and true statement 
 " of the facts, or was it not ? 
 
 " To form answers to these questions, I will call for no testi- 
 " mony, nor use any materials but the written evidence which 
 " Mr. Long himself has laid before the public. I must, however, 
 " first say, that it is with grief and pain that I submit myself to 
 44 point out the contradictory and erroneous statements which the 
 *' documents alluded to contain ! — with still more pain that I feel 
 " compelled to show how very indiscreet and ill judging an ad- 
 <l vocate has started up to vindicate the military fame of General 
 " Long!! 
 
 " Question 1st. The evidence of Mr. Ralph Heathcote, who 
 " was an officer of the Quarter-master-general's department, and 
 '* who (as he says) ' hardly quitted General Long's person, (p. 104, 
 " Long's Letter,) during the whole of the 15th of May, (which 
 44 was the day of the retreat,) states, (p. 105,) when the enemy's 
 " ' advance-guard appeared, driving in the Spanish outposts, 
 44 ' General Long sent off orders to General de Grey to commence 
 " ' his retreat towards Albuera.' 
 
 " The evidence of Col. Light shows (p. 108). that' the Spanish 
 " Cavalry covered the British rear, and that they were so little 
 ** pressed upon, that they were enabled to retreat 'in good order' 
 " and had not one man killed. 
 
 " It further appears from the evidence of Mr. Heathcote, 
 " (p. 105,) that General Long remained in person with his staff, 
 " &c. a ' considerable time' at the church of Santa Martha after 
 " he had ordered the retreat of his division, (and that it was by 
 " so remaining that he became able 'distinctly' to see 'a strong
 
 70 
 
 for by the different views which they took of the 
 state of things at the time, and by the many years 
 
 " ' force of cavalry as well as infantry was advancing in several 
 " ' columns,') and ' until the enemy's skirmishers were on the 
 " ' point of entering and passing the village' !!! 
 
 " After the perusal of this evidence, does a soldier exist who 
 " will doubt, that the British cavalry, by General Long's orders, 
 " did retreat before the French advance-guard only ? Or who 
 " will not deem that the commencement of the retreat was more 
 " precipitate than there was occasion for ? 
 
 " It appears clearly that even the skirmishers of the French 
 " advance-guard did not commence pushing into the village of 
 " Santa Martha until a considerable time after the British had 
 " received orders to retreat on Albuera, and that General Long 
 " was not able to overtake his corps, on their route, until they 
 " had retired about eleven miles, and were within ' one or two 
 " miles of Albuera (p. 105) !!! 
 
 " As to question 2nd, General Sir Loftus Otway could not 
 " have mistaken the pace at which his Brigade was obliged to 
 " move, in order to keep up ! We have, moreover, the testimony 
 " of Col. Wildman, that, at one period of the retreat, the 4th 
 " Dragoons (p. 101) trotted two miles in retreat: and that they 
 " were hurried over the bridge of Albuera, and that there was 
 " confusion amongst the Portuguese in passing the wood. 
 
 " Is not all this then quite enough to have fully justified every 
 k ' word of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's letter? And was not the 
 " whole of the ground on the right bank of the Albuera stream 
 " given up to the enemy ' without the slightest dispute,' so far as 
 " General Long was at all concerned? And was not the hurried 
 " manner in which the 4th regiment passed the bridge, and the 
 " confusion amongst the Portuguese in passing the wood, sufficient 
 " to account for the impression on the mind of Marshal Beresford 
 " that the retreat was made with unnecessary hurry and confusion? 
 
 " As to question 3rd, I think it must appear to every person 
 " who peruses General Long's account to his friends, that the 
 " account was meant to convey the idea of a skilful retreat, at a 
 " slow pace, in the face of the enemy ! Let us quote what he 
 " says — 'The enemy's nearer approach (to Santa Martha) having 
 " * fully established their strength, I fell back at a walk to Albuera'
 
 71 
 
 which have elapsed since the events occurred, but most 
 of all the incompetency of those officers from their 
 
 " — that ' the enemy's advance soon came up with our rear, and 
 " ' skirmished with us all the way to Albuera.' 
 
 " It is truly painful to dissect this account ! and to contrast it 
 " with that which is detailed as the fact by one of Mr. Long's 
 " own witnesses, Mr. Heathcote, who was the assistant Quarter- 
 " master-general attached to the cavalry division !! 
 
 " Mr. Heathcote writes, ' on the appearance of the French 
 " ' advance-guard, General Long sent orders for his corps to 
 " ' commence their retreat towards Albuera.' And from what 
 " follows, it appears that, at the time of sending this order, he 
 ' was not assured of what force was approaching him He 
 " (in person), with his staff, waited ' a considerable time' (after 
 " the order for the retreat of his corps was sent) at the church of 
 " Santa Martha ; and it was then only, and after the lapse of 
 " 4 a considerable time,' that he could 'distinctly' see that ' a strong 
 " ' force of cavalry, as well as infantry, was advancing in several 
 " ' columns.' It was also after the lapse of this ' considerable 
 "'time,' that 'the enemy's skirmishers were on the point of 
 " ' entering and passing the village below.' 
 
 " General Long then rode off leisurely ; and at six miles to the 
 " rear of Santa Martha, he found the Spanish cavalry formed, and 
 " he discovered his own corps four or five miles farther to the 
 " rear, on to the wood of Albuera. 
 
 " (How will Mr. Long reconcile this with ' the enemy's advance 
 " ' soon came up with our rear, and skirmished with us all the 
 " * way to Albuera' ? !!!) 
 
 " On passing the Spaniards, it seems that the General deemed 
 " it prudent to ' mend his pace,' and he trotted to overtake his 
 *« corps ; but while so trotting, « hearing the French attack the 
 V ' Spaniards in his rear, he hastened on as fast as possible.' He 
 " did not, however, succeed in overtaking General de Grev, until 
 " he had retired through the wood of Albuera, and was within 
 " one or two miles of that place ; and was ' retiring by alternate 
 " ' regiments towards the bridge of Albuera.' 
 
 " The 4th dragoons were then hurried over the bridge, and 
 " the Portuguese (p. 102) were in confusion in the wood of 
 " Albuera ; although Col. Light declares, that ' the Spanish
 
 72 
 
 respective positions to judge justly of what they even 
 saw. But do not the very circumstances that thus 
 
 " • cavalry covered the retreat of the British,' and he ' knows no 
 " ' reason why the retreat should have been disorderly or con- 
 " ' fused, for there was no confusion with the Spaniards, who 
 " ' were between General Long's corps (p. 108) and the enemy.' 
 
 " These accounts relative to the retreat, being placed in juxta- 
 " position with that written by General Long, no comment seems 
 " requisite !! 
 
 " Mr. Long may be able to reconcile them ! — I cannot ! 
 
 " I have said that it is with pain that I must point out the con- 
 " tradictions of Mr. Long's witnesses. I must justify the expres- 
 " sion ; but I will go as little into the subject as possible. Col. 
 " Leighton says (p. 99), ' skirmishing did take place with the 
 " ' enemy's advance and our rear guard.' 
 
 '* Col. Light (p. 108), that the Spaniards were between the 
 " French and General Long's corps !'. 
 
 tC Major Spedding has no recollection (p. 100) of the retreat 
 " being * hurried.' 
 
 " Col. Wildman (p. 101) says the 4th Dragoons ' trotted' at one 
 " time for 'two miles;' that they again 'trotted' through the wood, 
 " and that they were subsequently 'hurried' over the bridge at 
 ** Albuera ! 
 
 " Col. Macalister says, ' General Long (p. 104) certainly was 
 " not at the head of the column during the whole of the retreat, 
 " ' as J repeatedly saw him, and never left my own station.' 
 
 " Ralph Heathcote, Esq., says (p. 106-7), that General Long 
 " never overtook the column until they were eleven miles to the 
 " rear of Santa Martha ; that the General then directed him to 
 "' proceed on to General de Grey, while he remained wilh the 
 " ' 13th or Portuguese ;' but it will appear that the General 
 " altered his mind about remaining with this part (namely the 
 " rear) of his column, as he overtook Mr. Heathcote again before 
 " he ' joined the Heavy Brigade ' which was retiring on the bridge 
 " of Albuera, on the other side the wood !! 
 
 " However there is no use in pursuing this subject. 
 
 " Mr. Long's criticisms about taking up and occupying the 
 " position of Albuera are unworthy of any notice. 
 
 " I must, however, remark on one other piece of information
 
 73 
 
 account for the variations, also tend to prove of how 
 little value such evidence must be ? Col. Leighton 
 prefaces his account by saying that, ' to the best of 
 " ■ his recollection, the enemy did appear in force 
 " ' near Santa Martha on the 15th of May, before 
 " ' the retreat;' and states that 'the cavalry cannot be 
 " ' said to have fled before the enemy, not did any 
 " ' thing like it take place during the retreat. The 
 " ' pace was not rapid.' 
 
 " given by one of Mr. Long's evidences (Mr. Heathcote) as well 
 " elucidating General Long's character (p. 105) ! 
 
 '"While posting our piquets for the night (says Mr. H.), 
 " ' General Long repeatedly expressed his surprise at the manner 
 " * in which the army was drawn up, &c. &c.' ' He was so much 
 " ' annoyed at the disposition of the respective corps on the 
 " ' ground they occupied,' (on the morning of the 16th,) ' that he 
 " ' ordered me, on the spot, to make a sketch of the position of 
 " ' Albuera.' 
 
 " We have thus exhibited to us the General in the evening 
 " condemning ' repeatedly,' to a subaltern officer, the manner in 
 " which his chief had drawn up the army !! And in the morning, 
 *' (instead of bestowing all his watchfulness and care upon the 
 " course of the Albuera stream, which separated the opposing 
 " armies,) we have him finding fault with, and 'annoyed' at the 
 " ' disposition of the respective corps on the ground they occupied,' 
 " and employing one of his staff, at that critical moment, to make 
 *' a sketch of the position of Albuera!! 
 
 " Mr. Long's ignorance of military matters has led him to 
 " endeavour to attach some blame to Marshal Beresford, about 
 *' the unprepared state of the cavalry ; and its having received 
 " orders to go and forage immediately antecedent to the com- 
 " mencement of the action. But every officer of experience will 
 " perfectly well know that this is a sort of detail into which a 
 " commander in chief would never enter, and that any such order 
 4< would necessarily emanate from the chief of that particular 
 " corps ! Therefore, if any blame was to be imputed, it must lie 
 '* on the proper shoulders !"
 
 74 
 
 Besides this account of Colonel Leighton, you bring 
 forward the statements of eleven other officers, exclu- 
 sive of Mr. Heathcote, to substantiate your represen- 
 tation of this movement, and to contradict that which 
 has been given by myself, Sir Benjamin D' Urban, 
 Sir Henry Hardinge, and others ; but you appear, 
 sir, to have forgotten altogether that the latter were 
 produced in contradiction to the previous statements 
 of General Long, which you had dragged from their 
 darkness into light, and published in your " Reply." 
 Your relative had asserted in his correspondence*, 
 " not a singh instruction had I received, nor could I 
 " obtain, though repeatedly applied for ; my route or 
 " point of retreat were not even pointed out." 
 
 This extract, be it remembered, is from a letter 
 written after the battle ; and the evidence, which you 
 have yourself produced, proves that it is unfounded. 
 Again, he saysf, " I remained under arms at Santa 
 " Martha, and about eleven o'clock dispatched another 
 V messenger, to ascertain whether or not Solana was 
 " really occupied by the enemy, and open the com- 
 " munication with General Madden. Scarcely had 
 " this messenger been sent off half an hour when we 
 " perceived a very strong column of the enemy's 
 " cavalry (apparently about 3000), followed by in- 
 " fantry and artillery, coming over the hills directly 
 " down upon Santa Martha." Such is General Long's 
 account of the first hostile force which he saw ap- 
 proaching him ; and which is directly contradicted 
 
 ' C. E. Long's Reply, page 109. t Idem, page 111.
 
 75 
 
 by the very full and particular description of the 
 enemy's advance, which has been given by Ralph 
 Heathcote, Esq., and printed in the 105th page of 
 your letter to me. " The nearer approach having 
 " fully established their strength, I fell back," says 
 General Long, " at a walk to Albuera, detaching 
 " the Portuguese Brigade in advance to cover the 
 "■ passage of the bridge at that place ." It has been 
 proved by the officer commanding this brigade, and 
 by every one of your own witnesses who mention the 
 Portuguese cavalry, that no such order could have 
 been given, as it continued tbe wbole retreat in rear 
 of the British. Mr. R. Heathcote states*, " it was 
 " to take up a position, covering the bridge over the 
 " little brook that crosses the road between Santa 
 " Martha and Albuera, about six English miles from 
 " either place." — These are most strange and un- 
 accountable contradictions ! 
 
 Many of the officers, whom you have produced as 
 witnesses, speak only to the "best of their recol- 
 lection," or " from the impression now remaining on 
 their memories ;" though some positively confirm 
 General Long's statement of the enemy having " ap- 
 " peared in great force at Santa Martha before our 
 " cavalry retreated." I shall be able, however, to 
 prove most distinctly that such was not the case ; and 
 that it was not possible for any of those officers to 
 have seen what their memories now betray them into 
 the belief of. Indeed, the evidence of Mr. Heathcote 
 would be quite sufficient and decisive for that object, 
 
 * C. E. Long's Letter, page 106.
 
 76 
 
 With regard to General Long's assertion, that " he 
 " fell back at a walk to Albuera," it is contradicted by 
 every officer who has written on the subject. The 
 word, sir, is a military one, and is, therefore, not to 
 be explained away, or taken in any other than its 
 simple meaning. Your relative might have said 
 " leisurely," which is also a military term, and need 
 not have implied, as his present expression does, 
 that the retreat was altogether made in a walk. As 
 to whether it was more or less quick, or whether it 
 was, or was not, hurried, each individual may have a 
 different opinion, according to his view of the circum- 
 stances of the case ; but it appears from more than 
 one of your own witnesses, that there was consider- 
 able trotting. Not having been personally present 
 at any part of this retreat, I can have no other know- 
 ledge of it than such as is derived from the report of 
 others ; and, perhaps, the Commander in Chief is the 
 person who was most likely at the time to have 
 received the best information on such a matter. But 
 I shall at once bring forward my authorities on these 
 points. They are no less than the two officers com- 
 manding the two brigades of cavalry : Major Osten, 
 Brigade-Major to the Heavy Brigade ; the Quarter- 
 Master- General of the Army ; Sir Henry Hardinge, 
 the Deputy Quarter-Master- General ; Count de Villa 
 Real; Col. Napier, Ralph Heathcote, Esq., your 
 own witness, and whose evidence I shall cite from 
 your own publication ; and lastly, I shall add the 
 corroborative testimony of Captain Lapene, an officer
 
 77 
 
 on the staff of the 5th French corps, and then and 
 there present. 
 
 I will give precedency to your own witness. Ralph 
 Heathcote, Esq., says*, " On the morning of the 15th 
 " of May, 1811, General Long's division of cavalry, 
 " to which I was then attached as Deputy- Assistant- 
 " Quarter-Master-General, was posted about a mile in 
 " rear of Santa Martha, on the road towards Albuera." 
 
 Thus then to begin : the cavalry was placed a mile 
 from Santa Martha, on the line of its retreat, and 
 General Long, at this early hour, leaving Col. de Grey 
 in charge of his division, placed as stated, joins 
 Count de Penne Villa-mur near the church of Santa 
 Martha, which is situated on an eminence, and com- 
 mands an extensive prospect. " From this height," 
 continues R. Heathcote, Esq., " when the enemy's 
 " advanced guard was seen driving in the Spanish 
 " outposts, Gen. Long sent off orders to Colonel de 
 " Grey to commence his retreat towards Albuera." 
 It thus then appears that the cavalry, being already 
 a mile from Santa Martha, had orders to commence 
 their retreat, as soon as from this height the enemy 
 was seen driving in our outposts : and yet several 
 officers, relying on the impressions of their memory, 
 have stated, more or less decidedly, that they saw the 
 enemy in force before the commencement of the re- 
 treat. But Mr. Heathcote marks the fact, if possible, 
 still more distinctly. He informs us that " General 
 
 * C. E. Long's Letter to Lord Beresfbrd, page 104 — 107.
 
 78 
 
 " Long and the officers of his staff remained for a 
 " considerable time longer, till they had distinctly 
 " seen that a strong force of cavalry as well as in- 
 " fantry was advancing in several columns, and till 
 ** the enemy's skirmishers were on the point of enter- 
 *' ing and passing the village below." Thus then it 
 is proved that, after dispatching orders from this 
 height for the retreat of this division, General Long 
 remained there " a considerable time," and it was 
 only after this considerable time that, from this height, 
 which commanded an extensive view, the enemy's 
 masses or columns were seen, and none but the very 
 advanced skirmishers of the French advanced guard 
 had approached near the village. Now, during all 
 this considerable time that the General had been 
 stationary, our cavalry had been retreating ; and they 
 could not have been less than two or three miles off 
 when the enemy's skirmishes only had arrived at 
 Santa Martha. And yet, sir, some of your witnesses, 
 though they were not at any time nearer than a mile 
 of the, place, and though it would appear, from the 
 remainder of Mr. Heathcote's evidence, that our ca- 
 valry must have been three miles to the rear of it, 
 when only the advanced skirmishers of the French 
 were seen, have asserted that the enemy appeared in 
 great force before Santa Martha previously to the 
 commencement of the retreat. It is, sir, manifest 
 that no officer, a mile to the rear of Santa Martha, 
 could have seen the enemy in great, or considerable, 
 or even any force, before our troops began to retire.
 
 79 
 
 Mr. Heathcote's description of the advance of an 
 army is military, and according to general practice ; 
 and I will corroborate his account by the testimony 
 of other officers who, from their position and expe- 
 rience, were more likely than any of your own wit- 
 nesses, who were then all young men and never, 
 with one exception, above the rank of Captain, to 
 have paid attention to the circumstance. Mr. Heath- 
 cote has informed us that Colonel de Grey was at 
 this very point of time in the command of this divi- 
 sion of cavalry. Let us then hear his account of 
 the case. I will now, sir, lay his letter before you 
 more fully than in my last address : it is dated April 
 17th. The year is not mentioned ; but it was written 
 very shortly before his death. 
 
 * My Lord, 
 
 " Relative to the retreat of the cavalry, on 
 " the 15th May, 1811, from the plain, I forgot to 
 " mention to you yesterday, that we never saw a 
 " French soldier, either horse or foot, previous to 
 " General Long commencing a retreat. We were 
 " drawn up in two lines upon the plain, equal to any 
 " advance the enemy might have brought against us 
 " in the first instance. 
 
 " General Long all at once (most unaccountably 
 " to me) ordered us to withdraw, and during that 
 " retreat, perpetually sent to me either to hasten the 
 " pace, or again to go slower, but he still continued 
 ' it, and never rested until he ordered us across the 
 " bridge at Albuera."
 
 so 
 
 This will be corroborated, first, by Major Osten of 
 the 16th Lancers and then Brigade-Major to the 
 Heavy Brigade ; and, secondly, by Captain Lapene, 
 who was on the staff of the 5th French corps, and 
 who distinctly proves that the French never got sight 
 of the British near Santa Martha, nor were aware of 
 their presence until they came within a league of 
 Albuera. Major Osten, to whom I forwarded a copy 
 of Colonel de Grey's note to me, answers — 
 
 " Hatch, Beauchamp near Taunton, 
 « Sept 20, 1833. 
 
 " Your Lordship's letter, dated August 6th, reached 
 " me only yesterday, a considerable delay having 
 " occurred in its being sent to Hanover instead of 
 " Wiesbaden, where I have been staying. This will 
 " at once account and plead my excuse for this late 
 " acknowledgment. 
 
 " With respect to the copy it incloses of the late 
 " Lord Walsingham's letter, I perfectly recollect and 
 " can bear witness to all the circumstances therein 
 " mentioned ; and I remember that considerable hurry 
 " and confusion took place on the retreat of the 
 " cavalry from Santa Martha to Albuera the 15th 
 " May, 1811, (although no enemy was in sight, and 
 " not a shot was fired,) in consequence of many orders 
 " of a contradictory nature issued by General Long. 
 " In fact, orders and counter-orders followed each 
 " other in such quick succession, that it was diffi- 
 " cult, almost^ impossible, to carry them into ex- 
 " ecution."
 
 81 
 
 Both the above letters tally perfectly with Mr. 
 Heathcote's account as to the appearance of the 
 enemy near Santa Martha. I will now produce 
 Captain Lapene's statement on this point, and it will 
 be seen whose story it confirms. 
 
 " On the night of the 15th Marshal Soult was six 
 " leagues from Badajoz at Santa Martha. The 
 " French army had all arrived there. The half of 
 " General Werle's brigade only had remained two 
 " leagues in the rear at Villalba. 
 
 " Soult, uncertain for a part of the day if Beres- 
 " ford had taken up a position, was rather inclined 
 " to believe that the enemy would avoid a decisive 
 " battle and repass the Guadiana. His views, with 
 " regard to the real intentions of the allies, were soon 
 " decided by Gen. Briche, commanding the Light 
 " Cavalry of our advance guard. He had encoun- 
 '* tered the enemy posted at two leagues from Santa 
 " Martha, on the road to Badajoz, and had made 
 " them fall back before him. Informed of this dis- 
 " covery, &c." It is thus manifest that the French 
 were ignorant of the presence of any British till they 
 came within a league of Albuera ; and that they were 
 then made acquainted with the circumstance by the 
 information of their advanced guard. And yet we 
 find it affirmed that the British did not retire from 
 Santa Martha till the enemy appeared in great force 
 before it ! 
 
 The reader must judge on which side the weight 
 of authority lies, and whether those superior officers, 
 
 G
 
 82 
 
 whose business it was to look to the general move- 
 ments, who received the orders and who had to execute 
 them, were likely to he the best judges of the matter 
 in dispute ; or the regimental officers whom you have 
 cited, who had their own, though more restricted, 
 duties to attend to, and who could scarcely have been 
 so well informed of what was in progress, or so aware 
 of the general scope of a movement, as to be able to 
 form a correct opinion even of what they saw. 
 
 The hurried and confused manner in which the 
 retreat was conducted is distinctly proved by Colonel 
 de Grey and by Major Osten who received General 
 Long's orders, and had to put them into execution. 
 Your own evidence, sir, clearly speaks to the same 
 effect. Lieutenant-Colonel Wildman says that they 
 " retired about half the way, and were halted for a 
 " short time*; that they were then ordered to the 
 " rear in a trot for about two miles ; and that after- 
 " wards they were again desired to trot." This may 
 certainly have been done without confusion ; but it 
 certainly has the appearance of hurry, and corrobo- 
 rates Col. de Grey's account. When they differ, it 
 must be remembered that Lieut.-Colonel Wildman 
 Avas at that time only a subaltern in the 4th Dra- 
 goons ; and that Col. de Grey, as the officer in com- 
 
 * This may serve to mark the time of the respective commands 
 of Colonel de Grey and General Long : the former commanding 1 
 during 1 the first period, the latter during the after period, when 
 the hurry and confusion is said to have commenced, according to 
 every witness who admits that there was any hurry or confusion 
 at all.
 
 83 
 
 mand of the brigade, must have seen and known 
 more of what was actually going on than he, and 
 must, therefore, be received as the most perfect wit- 
 ness on the subject. No one has pretended, nor can 
 pretend, to deny the nature and the frequency of 
 the orders with which General Long harassed Col. 
 de Grey during the retreat, and which sufficiently 
 evince the state of confusion your relative himself 
 was in., The Brigade Major, who, next to the officer 
 immediately in command, was the individual most 
 likely to be well informed upon this point, most fully 
 corroborates Colonel de Grey's statement. Lieut. -Col. 
 Wildman most distinctly says, that " after passing 
 " the wood, the heavy brigade were formed in line, 
 ", and halted facing the wood, when the light cavalry 
 " went to the rear, the 3d Dragoons then retired, 
 " and the 4th followed soon after, retreating in line, 
 " covered by the skirmishers, to the bridge, over 
 " which the regiment was hurried, but by whose 
 " orders, or for what reason, I never knew, as I was 
 " with the skirmishers, but had seen no enemy to 
 " skirmish with." Col. Wildman had previously 
 <( stated " that there was some confusion in the Portu- 
 '• guese cavalry in passing the wood," which confirms 
 the impression received from the statement of Sir 
 Loftus Otway. I will also assert as a military 
 man, that nothing can show more plainly the confu- 
 sion that actually existed than the foregoing para- 
 graph from Lieut. -Col. Wildman. To halt a corps 
 of cavalry with its face to a wood, from which it 
 
 g2
 
 84 
 
 could not be a musket-shot distant, and with the ob- 
 stacle of a river in its rear, while the enemy is sup- 
 posed to be near at hand and even pressing it, is cer- 
 tainly a most extraordinary proceeding ; nor can I 
 wonder, under such circumstances, that Lieut. Col. 
 Rook should have desired the commander to pass to 
 the left bank of the stream. The place chosen for the 
 halt was, besides, in a bottom. I know of no other 
 officer who would have required an order to place his 
 corps in a position, where the obstacle would be be- 
 tween himself and the enemy from which he was re- 
 tiring. It is you, sir, who have supplied me with 
 this evidence, which proves not only hurry and con- 
 fusion on the part of your relative, but something 
 more. Besides these ample evidences of the state of 
 affairs, we have skirmishers sent out, where there 
 was no enemy to skirmish with ; and, after all, with- 
 out an enemy in view, the rear regiment is hurried 
 over the bridge. 
 
 You next produce the evidence of Major Norcliffe, 
 who answers for his own brigade, by which, I pre- 
 sume, he means the brigade in one of the regiments 
 of which he was then a subaltern. He retired, he in- 
 forms us, " in admirable order, and took up his 
 " ground on the field of Albuera without hurry, 
 " confusion, or disorder of any kind." Lieut. Nor- 
 clifFe, sir, was not only in the same brigade but in 
 the same regiment, the 4th Dragoons, with Lieut. 
 Wildman. I need only observe that the memory of 
 one of these officers must have sadly failed him. But
 
 85 
 
 I would here revert to the evidence of Colonel, now 
 Major-General Sir L. Otway. He says, " the 
 " march from Santa Martha to Albuera was hurried 
 " and harassing, the rear of the column being obliged 
 u to gallop." Col. de Grey's account of the contra- 
 dictory orders that he received now to go faster and 
 again slower would, as every military man knows, cause 
 the rear of the column, even where the horses were of 
 equal power, which was not the case in the present in- 
 stance, to proceed at the pace above described. Gen. 
 Otway states that " he went up to Gen. Long and 
 " reported this fact to him." There can, therefore* 
 be no doubt upon that point. This was done on the 
 spot, at the time, and by an officer commanding a 
 brigade. On this representation being made, Gen 
 Long was induced to trot rather slower. This again 
 is confirmatory of Col. de Grey and Major Osten's 
 statements. Sir Benj. d'Urban's account of the man- 
 ner in which this retreat was effected will be found, 
 as well as the others above alluded to, in my former 
 letter to you. They all speak positively to the fact, 
 that the cavalry retired from Santa Martha in a hur- 
 ried and unmilitary manner ; and there is not, sir, 
 a single individual of your own witnesses who cor- 
 roborates your relative's assertion, that " he fell back, 
 at a walk, to Albuera." 
 
 The last evidence which I shall offer in confirma- 
 tion of this point is derived from a source to which, I 
 think, you will not object. Col. Napier* says, " In 
 
 * History of Peninsular War, vol. iii., p. 531.
 
 86 
 
 " this posture of affairs, about 3 o'clock in the even- 
 " ing of the 15th, while Beresford was at some 
 " distance on the left, the whole mass of the allied 
 " cavalry, closely pursued by the French light horse- 
 " men, came in from Santa Martha in a hurried 
 " manner, and passing the Albuera, abandoned the 
 " wooded heights in front to the enemy, &c." I do 
 not, sir, know how it can be denied, in the face of 
 this great mass of evidence, that the allied cavalry 
 under the immediate orders of your relative retired 
 unmilitarily, and that they retired in this hurried 
 manner when (as appears more particularly from La- 
 pene*) there was no enemy in pursuit of, nor was 
 there any near them, except Bridie's brigade of light 
 cavalry. 
 
 In discussing the third extract from General 
 Long's correspondence, on which I offered some ob- 
 servations in my former letter, you enter into a 
 minute inquiry respecting the time when the cavalry 
 and infantry arrived at Albuera on the 15th of May. 
 No one can be more willing than I am to make every 
 allowance for mistakes in the calculation of time and 
 distances, and more particularly under circumstances 
 of strong excitement and absorbing interest. I 
 would not, therefore, engage in any discussion upon 
 such matters, unless, as is the case in the statement 
 of your relative, I observed some extreme exaggera- 
 
 *This author states the same fact several times in his History 
 of these events, and says, indeed, that no other cavalry arrived till 
 the next morning - .
 
 87 
 
 tion. General Long relates that, having left Santa 
 Martha about noon and reached Albuera about 
 2 o'clock (Col. Napier says about 3 o'clock), " none of 
 " the infantry made their appearance for several 
 " hours after his arrival." Before this period, I had 
 no personal knowledge of what occurred ; for the 
 rest, I can speak upon my own authority. Previous 
 to the arrival of my troops, I had been over and 
 made my observations on the ground of Albuera, and 
 left officers to place them as they arrived. I then 
 went a considerable distance to the left down the 
 stream, but certainly could not have been absent 
 more than two hours ; and, though on my going to 
 the left I was not even informed that your relative 
 had left Santa Martha, I found on my return that he 
 had been some time at Albuera. Some infantry had 
 then arrived. If General Long, therefore, had come 
 up immediately on my leaving it, and the infantry 
 only just before my return, it must be quite evident 
 that the account of his having arrived " several hours" 
 before them is wholly incorrect. I only refer to this 
 point for the sake of noticing a passage which you 
 have quoted from " Recollections of the Peninsula" 
 and in which it is said, " on the 14th we broke up and 
 " marched upon Valverde, halted for the night and 
 " moved forwards, at mid-day on the 15th, to Albu- 
 " era, which 'place we reached about five in the 
 " evening" — You have, sir, given the last sentence 
 in italics ; why did you not print in a similar charac- 
 ter " and moved forwards at mid-day ? " — Now, Sir
 
 88 
 
 W. Stewart's division was bivouacked considerably 
 in front of Valverde towards Albuera. He was, 
 when I passed him, ready to march. The total dis- 
 tance between the two places is two leagues. The 
 route, which is generally speaking a gradual descent, 
 was as good as troops could have to march over ; and 
 yet they are described, by your authority, as having 
 been jive hours marching six miles over such a 
 route*. 
 
 The author you have cited styles his book "Recol- 
 lections" and never, I dare say, dreamt of being ad- 
 duced as an authority for hours and minutes ; but, if 
 the troops marched at mid-day, as I believe was the 
 case, they would scarcely have reached the point where 
 they halted after half- past two or three at the 
 latest. I will not, at this distance of time and from 
 recollection, take upon myself to say at what hour 
 of the day the several movements began or ended ; 
 but I most distinctly affirm, that I could not have 
 been absent more than two hours from the ground 
 at Albuera ; that, on my leaving it for the left, I 
 was not even aware of General Long's retreat from 
 Santa Martha ; and that, on my return, I found his 
 cavalry, and the infantry of Sir W. Stewart and 
 Baron Alten had arrived in my absence. How long 
 each of these corps had arrived on the ground I can 
 only know from what was reported to me at the time; 
 
 * The distance from Valverde to Albuera would be between 
 7 and 8 miles, but Sir W. Stewart was considerably in advance 
 of Valverde, and halted short of Albuera.
 
 89 
 
 and, without disputing which came up first, I cannot 
 believe there was an hour's difference between the 
 arrival of the several corps. 
 
 You state it as your opinion, which you support 
 by a quotation from Lord Londonderry, " that Soult 
 " was beforehand with me." I confess myself un- 
 able to divine from what single circumstance such 
 an opinion is derived. It is not supported by — it is 
 contradicted — by the facts of the time. Were any 
 of the troops that I calculated upon absent when 
 Soult made his attack ? I had more objects to attend 
 to and combine on this occasion than he had ; and I 
 was fortunate enough to secure them all, and to be 
 prepared to meet him. You say, sir, that General 
 Madden's brigade was away. It was so; but I 
 could no more' have prevented its absence, as you 
 are well aware, than I could have hindered General 
 Long's unexpected arrival at Albuera, or his dis- 
 obeying my orders at Campo Maior. The brigade 
 of Brigadier- General Kemmis was likewise not 
 present, but it was on service and employed elsewhere 
 for military objects which could not be dispensed 
 with ; and, if this diminution of the number of my 
 army is to be made a ground of charge, you should 
 also object to Soult's having left a small garrison at 
 Villa Alba, and coming to the ground without that 
 force. 
 
 This battle of Albuera has, indeed, been canvassed 
 and sifted to the very bottom ; and I cannot imagine
 
 90 
 
 any effort that has not been attempted, to destroy 
 whatever credit the commander of the Allied army 
 might derive from the victory which he was so fortu- 
 nate as to have achieved. With what success it is 
 not for me to decide. 
 
 I shall not, sir, stop to notice Mr. Heathcote's 
 statement of the opinion entertained by General Long 
 respecting the disposition of our force at Albuera. 
 That point has been most fully discussed by the 
 author of " Further Strictures." and his observations 
 are si ill unanswered. I shall merely further observe 
 that the account of the ground on the right, which I 
 did not deem it necessary to occupy, as given in the 
 "Strictures," is most fully corroborated by Lord Lon- 
 donderry and by Col. Jones in their respective histo- 
 ries of those transactions. 
 
 I now turn to your relative's assertion that " no 
 " Spaniards had appeared at daybreak ; " and to 
 your attempted explanation of this extraordinary 
 mistake. You say that, from their having taken, upon 
 their arrival, an erroneous position in the dark, the 
 " Spaniards did not pass near the spot where General 
 " Long was stationed." You also accuse me of 
 having separated the sentence of General Long's 
 correspondence which I gave from the context, with 
 the view of fixing a mis-statement on your relative. 
 I will now publish the passage as it stands in your 
 letter, and leave the reader to discover what difference 
 could possibly have been made by my omission ; or,
 
 91 
 
 if there be any, whether my view is not more strongly 
 confirmed by the whole passage, than by the brief 
 extract previously cited. 
 
 " In the mean time," says General Long, " I dis- 
 " tributed the cavalry along this strong line of de- 
 " fence, and we remained quiet during the night, my 
 " orders being to maintain that ground till relieved 
 " by the Spaniards." 
 
 " The morning of the 16th May arrived, but no 
 " Spaniards appeared." 
 
 Can any one suppose that your relative does not here 
 distinctly state, that those Spaniards had not arrived 
 at the break of day, who, in fact, according to my 
 former showing, had arrived during the night, and 
 who, at daybreak, were tediously manoeuvring in the 
 sight of the whole army ? But, sir, so far is your mode 
 of accounting for this misrepresentation from being 
 correct, that the exact reverse is true. It was from the 
 error committed by the Spaniards in taking up their 
 position that they passed near the spot where Briga- 
 dier General Long was stationed, as, instead of 
 forming on the right of, and in alignment with the 
 2nd British division, which was placed under and to 
 the rear of the hill, they passed in the dark to the 
 front of it, and formed in line with the support of the 
 advance posts near the village and bridge, thereby 
 slanting close to the rear of General Long ; while, 
 again, on retiring in the morning to take up the po- 
 sition that had been marked out for them, they 
 had to press immediately under his view up the 
 slope from the river. On this I say no more. There
 
 92 
 
 can, I think, be no doubt but your relative's state- 
 ment and your explanation of it are equally inac- 
 curate. 
 
 " If the enemy," you demand,* " did not make 
 " some attempt near the village in the early part of 
 " the morning, what is the meaning of the passage in 
 " the ' Further Strictures? p. 138 : ' some guns were 
 u ' immediately brought to bear upon them and with 
 "'considerable effect?'" — Your question, sir, is 
 answered by the passage from which your extract is 
 taken. That passage, which relates to the first move- 
 ment of the enemy in his grand attack, states that I 
 was present and perceived the movement. It cannot 
 therefore, as you seem to represent, refer to any at- 
 tack previous to the general one ; and most certainly 
 not to that mentioned by your relative, which I never 
 heard of till your former publication, and which Ge- 
 neral Long describes himself as having discomfited. 
 No other account that I have seen speaks of 
 any such early attack. If you turn to Col. Napier's 
 History,! you will see what I have stated fully con- 
 firmed. But, sir, you seem to have misunderstood 
 Gen. Long, who, I think, agrees with all the other 
 accounts respecting the attack of the enemy, and 
 states it to have been at the beginning of this opera- 
 tion that he directed the 3d Dragoon Guards to beat 
 back a corps of Lancers which attempted to pass the 
 river. It was this I alluded to in saying, " I was not 
 
 * P. 117, C. E. Long's Letter to Lord Beresford. 
 t Vol. iii., p. 534.
 
 93 
 
 ** fortunate enough to have had it reported to me at 
 " the time," which I not only now repeat, but add, 
 that every authority describes this corps of cavalry as 
 having passed the brook, then wheeled to their left, 
 and joined Latour Maubourg on our right. Such is 
 the account given by Colonel Napier and Sir Benja- 
 min d' Urban, neither of whom make any mention 
 of their having been charged by our cavalry, nor of 
 their having been beat back. All are agreed, on 
 the contrary, that they continued their route on our 
 side of the rivulet, and then joined their main body. 
 The statements made in your ensuing pages* re- 
 late to one of the marvellous facts advanced by Col. 
 Napier in his " Justification." It is affirmed, on 
 the authority of an officer, that the cavalry, just 
 before the advance of the enemy, were sent to the 
 rear to cut forage. This circumstance has been fully 
 discussed in my " Refutation of Col. Napier." I 
 shall not again enlarge upon the subject, but refer 
 you and the reader to that publication, merely ob- 
 serving, that the author of this report has never in- 
 timated by whom these orders were issued, or how 
 they reached the cavalry ; and it has been proved 
 that they did not emanate from me. The orders 
 which I actually gave respecting the cavalry have 
 been distinctly ascertained by the evidence of the 
 officer who bore them, and also of the officer by whom 
 they were received. The former was Sir Benjamin 
 
 * Pp. 118, 119, 120, of Mr. Long's Letter.
 
 94 
 
 d'Urban, the Quarter-Master-General of the army ; 
 the latter was Brigadier- General Long, then in com- 
 mand of the cavalry. 
 
 On the 30th May, fourteen days after the action, your 
 relative appears to have been entirely unacquainted 
 with these foraging parties ; to have been equally 
 ignorant of the enemy having passed the rivulet 
 above our right, as stated by Capt. Gregory ; and to 
 have been no less uninformed of his having made 
 any report to me on the subject. He, on the con- 
 trary, most decidedly contradicts it ; for, after 
 describing the real advance of the enemy, he says — 
 " The moment the enemy s movements ivere reported to 
 " head quarters, the Ath Dragoons were ordered back, 
 " and fresh dispositions appeared to be making with 
 *•* the infantry." These measures General Long de- 
 scribes as having been taken after, and as soon as 
 the enemy was seen moving down on the right bank 
 of the river towards the bridge ; and he immediately 
 adds, " In the meantime" (that is, whilst fresh 
 dispositions were making with the infantry) " the 
 " enemy's columns on our left, or rather centre, 
 " formed opposite the bridge and ford, opened a can- 
 " nonade which we answered, and pushed a corps of 
 " Lancers across the rivulet." The corps of Lancers 
 here mentioned is that which General Long says 
 he ordered the 3d Dragoon Guards to attack, a mea- 
 sure of which I expressed my ignorance. In every 
 other respect, his statement agrees with all the ac- 
 counts which have been published, except that of
 
 95 
 
 Captain Gregory, which it most decidedly contradicts. 
 It will be seen that the cannonade, which Gen. Long 
 says Ave answered, corresponds with the guns men- 
 tioned both by the author of the " Strictures" and by 
 Col. Napier, as having been at that very time brought 
 to bear with considerable effect against the enemy. 
 
 I have thus, sir, gone through the main points 
 touched upon in your pamphlet, though it really ap- 
 pears to me that they were fully answered already 
 in my former letter to you. I have said that, as this 
 is the last notice which I will ever take of any com- 
 ments or attacks on my military conduct or reputa- 
 tion, I would avail myself of this opportunity for lay- 
 ing such documents before the public, as tended to the 
 full elucidation of the facts under discussion between 
 us : — and, as you have referred to Los Santos — a sub- 
 ject which I was not anxious to touch upon, I shall 
 here submit to you a letter from Sir Benjamin d' Urban 
 relating to that affair, which will not only clear up 
 many points respecting it, but may serve to show that 
 my forbearance towards Gen. Long was great and 
 continued, and deserved a better return than it has 
 encountered from himself and his friends. 
 
 This letter of the Quarter-Master-General of the 
 army was written, as the date will show, from British 
 Guiana, of which he was then governor, and before 
 he had read your observations on the " Further 
 Strictures." It affords therefore a refutation by anti- 
 cipation of your letter, and a full confirmation of the
 
 96 
 
 contents of the '* Further Strictures," which he had 
 read. 
 
 "British Guiana, 26 Jan., 1833. 
 
 " I have received your letter of the 3rd Dec. last, 
 " and I will most readily go through the 'Strictures,' 
 u and the other works, with all care and attention, 
 " and send you such observations as may suggest 
 " themselves upon the whole. But I have not yet 
 " seen that which you mention of General Long's 
 " nephew, nor can I find, upon inquiry, that any one 
 " here has yet received it. 
 
 " I cannot comprehend what there is in my 
 " pamphlet which can bear the inference of my 
 " approving anything that the General did. My 
 " desire, when that narrative was written, was to 
 " bear lightly upon him, and not to bring into notice 
 " anything to his prejudice that could be avoided. 
 " The same feeling, I know, had actuated you during 
 " the operations I was relating, and especially on his 
 " supercession in the command of the cavalry, which 
 " was ostensibly attributed to the difficulty of recon- 
 " ciling the 'jarring pretensions of the Spanish 
 " ' Brigadiers ' (the rank which he then held) and 
 " the consequent necessity of our having a Major- 
 " General to command the whole. This was, indeed, 
 " one reason ; but it was, perhaps, the slightest of 
 " all. The main reasons were, that he was appa- 
 " rently incapable of the charge in which he had 
 " been placed, and that the period was too critical,
 
 97 
 
 *' to risk the advantages of our small cavalry being 
 " thrown away. The general circumstances that led 
 " to this conclusion were shortly as follows; and, 
 " although I never made any remarks reflecting upon 
 " him or any other person in my journal, yet all that 
 " happened in regard to any officer does not the less 
 " forcibly strike me in running my eye over their 
 *' names ; even if it were not otherwise in my recol- 
 " lection. 
 
 " General Long's incapacity for cavalry command 
 *' above adverted to had, as I think, early shown 
 " itself. The affair of Campo Maior was the first in- 
 " stance that I am aware of. His share in that affair 
 " appears very correctly described in the ' Further 
 " Strictures,' concluding by the wild and improbable 
 " (and fortunately unfounded) report of the Light 
 •' Cavalry having been cut off and lost. 
 
 " Then follows the scene at the entrance of Los 
 " Santos, which can never be forgotten by any one 
 " who saw it; and you must well remember that a 
 " small brigade of French hussars were there caught, 
 " in presence of all our cavalry, heavy and light, and 
 " that much precious time was lost by General 
 " Long's indecision, until you, yourself, were at 
 " length obliged to ride up to him, and urge him to 
 " charge; that he still galloped about calling for his 
 " gmis ; and that in the end they were charged by 
 ** the 13th Light Dragoons (the regiment then in 
 " front of the column, upon somewhat narrow 
 " ground) by your own personal order to the com- 
 
 H
 
 98 
 
 " manding officer. — Nay (if my memory serves me) 
 " so strong was the impression on your mind at the 
 " time of the vacillation which had before prevailed, 
 " and of the crisis to which it had led, that you said 
 " to Boyce, ' Charge them, or they'll charge you.' 
 " The ensuing charge and pursuit there is no need 
 " to dwell upon, they had nothing to do with the 
 "question before us. 
 
 " Then followed a series of reports from the out- 
 " posts, concluding, as I think, with the memorable 
 " one from Santa Martha. These reports I have not ; 
 " the last time 1 saw them, as well as I remember, 
 " was among the papers of your English military 
 " secretary's office at the Pateo de Saldanha, but I 
 " cannot be mistaken in their tenor, which (if I do 
 " not greatly err) was full of difficulties, complaints, 
 " alarms, and despondency. The spirit of these 
 " papers, combined with the recollections of Campo 
 " Maior and Los Santos, induced me to propose that 
 " you should take advantage of the report, in which 
 " General Long had set forth the inconveniences 
 " arising from the collision of ranks, and replace 
 " him in the command of the cavalry by General 
 " Lumley ; for the vital object of having it under 
 k ' some officer on whom dependence in emergencies 
 iC might reasonably be placed. You yielded reluc- 
 " tantly to this advice, which it was painful to you, 
 " on the General's account, to follow, as I am sure 
 '' it was to me to offer : and he was then, I believe, 
 " apprised, ' that, on account of the difficulties arising 
 " from the ill-defined ranks' which he had reported,
 
 99 
 
 " he should be speedily relieved by a Major- General. 
 " Immediately afterwards occurred the movement 
 " from Santa Martha. Among the other arrange- 
 <l ments for assembling upon Albuera on the 15th 
 '* May, General Long was directed to march upon 
 " that place (by the enclosed order) ; * but that 
 " march could never have been intended to have 
 " been so hurried before an enemy's advance, even 
 " supposing that any enemy had been near him, 
 " which he had not reported ; whereas, you know 
 " the cavalry came back so rapidly, that it scarcely 
 " even skirmished, if it did so at all; but crossed the 
 " Albuera, without drawing bridle, and without 
 " leaving even a piquet on the other bank, which the 
 " French videttes immediately took possession of; and 
 " the whole of that ground was left to the enemy. 
 
 " The morning after this adventure, (which was 
 " the battle-day of Albuera,) General Lumley, who 
 " had been already called to the cavalry from his 
 " brigade of infantry, arrived ; and when he did so, 
 " I recollect your reluctance, even then, to displace 
 " General Long, which occasioned me to express 
 " myself in these words, or words to the same effect. 
 " ' If you do not, sir, the cavalry will be worse than 
 " ' useless, and perhaps thrown away.' So strongly 
 " had the series of proceedings, to which I have 
 " shortly adverted, impressed me with that appre- 
 tl hension ; nor do I now think that it was un- 
 
 * This order was that before spoken of, and which was sent to 
 General Long at half past 7 a.m., of the 15th May. 
 
 h2
 
 100 
 
 " grounded. You then placed General Lumley in 
 " the command of the cavalry. That he conducted 
 " it admirably is unquestionable ; and I cannot re- 
 " gret the measure. 
 
 " I well remember that Hardinge and myself had 
 " for some time before come to the conclusion, that 
 " there was imminent danger to the cavalry whilst it 
 " remained under General Long's management. 
 
 " The above is, I believe, the substance of all that 
 " mainly relates to the subject, and I have no doubt 
 " that the whole will be in the recollection of Har- 
 " dinge, as clearly as it is in mine. 
 
 " (Signed) Benjamin D'Urban." 
 
 I sent the above letter to Sir Henry Hardinge for 
 perusal, and I am authorized by him to give the state- 
 ments it contains his full confirmation. 
 
 I repeat, sir, that I had no wish to rip up this 
 affair of Los Santos in all its details ; but I should 
 be now wanting to myself, and still more to those who 
 have stated the foregoing circumstances, if I did not 
 add the corroboration of the Count de Villa Real. 
 This statement was given before the letter of Sir Ben- 
 jamin D'Urban was written ; and each officer was 
 totally ignorant of what the other had related. 
 
 He heads his account 
 
 " Los Santos. 
 
 " I was with Marshal Beresford on the 16th April, 
 "1811, at Los Santos. The army had completed 
 " its day's march, and halted at a very short distance
 
 101 
 
 *• from Los Santos, while the Quarter-Master-Ge- 
 " neral was marking the ground it was to occupy. 
 " Head-quarters were established at Zafra, where 
 " they were arrived, when a Spanish officer came 
 " in great haste to report to Marshal Beresford, 
 " that a column of French cavalry was advancing 
 " upon Los Santos. This information came totally 
 " unexpected. 
 
 " The Marshal got immediately on his horse, and 
 " in a few minutes reached the ground upon which 
 " the cavalry were halted. It was still dismounted. 
 " The Marshal ordered General Long to mount imme- 
 " diately, and to keep under the high ground in order 
 " not to be perceived by the enemy. 
 
 " While giving the orders above-mentioned, it was 
 " reported that the French were moving on, and had 
 " already entered Los Santos, where it appeared we 
 " had no outposts. At this moment a party of the 
 " French showed itself on our side of the village ; 
 " but, on perceiving our cavalry, they retired irame- 
 " diately. The Marshal having seen them, then de- 
 " sired General Long to make the dispositions he 
 " thought proper to advance quickly. General Long 
 " said that the Portuguese cavalry having their left 
 " in front, he thought he must bring their right to the 
 " front, and asked whether he was to move right or 
 " left in front, adding something about the time it 
 " would take. The Marshal replied briskly not to 
 '■', lose time in whatever he did, lest the opportunity 
 " of acting might escape him.
 
 102 
 
 " I consider that our cavalry was not above two 
 " hundred yards from Los Santos. 
 
 " The Marshal, after giving orders to General 
 " Long to advance, rode on towards the village with 
 " the officers of his staff. He entered it, and stopped 
 ' : in the street waiting for the cavalry, which I was 
 " desired to go and hurry on. General Long said 
 " he was manoeuvring ; and would advance the 
 " moment he got the cavalry in order. 
 
 " Upon my delivering General Long's answer, 
 " Marshal Beresford, not seeing the cavalry come 
 " up yet, sent me back again to General Long im- 
 " patiently to order him to come on without any 
 " further delay, as the French would be off before he 
 " arrived. 
 
 " The 13th Light Dragoons being in motion, tiie 
 " Marshal proceeded farther on ; and, on getting out 
 " of the village, we saw the French cavalry halting 
 " in column fronting us, at about two hundred yards 
 " beyond it, among some stony ground and low 
 " walls, which only left a narrow open space before 
 " them. As soon as the 13th Light Dragoons got 
 " sight of the enemy, they formed in front of them 
 " rather obliquely. The French, on their side, when 
 " they saw that the 13th had formed, detached their 
 " leading squadron to charge them. The first squa- 
 " dron of the 13th did not wait to receive the charge; 
 " but advancing instantly in a gallant style, they met 
 " the French squadron, drove it back to its column, 
 " and reformed in the greatest order. At this mo-
 
 103 
 
 " ment two Spanish guns were brought up, but did 
 " not fire. 
 
 " The Marshal was very anxious that the cavalry 
 " should act, and pressed Gen. Long to be quick, and 
 "to attack the enemy; but, though he remained 
 " a while in presence, there was no charge from our 
 " cavalry, except that already mentioned of the squa- 
 " dron of the 13th. The French, however, seeing 
 " our cavalry advancing, opened from the rear, and 
 " went off. Upon this the Marshal ordered one 
 " of the squadrons of the 13th to disperse, and to 
 " pursue: he rode himself with the remainder of the 
 " regiment in support of the pursuing squadron. 
 '• Being myself with the advance, I saw the soldiers 
 " of the 13th getting in the rear of the French co- 
 " lumn, cutting down and taking prisoners many of 
 " the French soldiers in their ranks. The French 
 " finally broke, and galloped off in confusion." 
 
 I might, by a simple relation of this affair, per- 
 haps make its several events more clear to the 
 reader, and show the bearings of the foregoing testi- 
 monies upon them. But I leave them to tell their 
 own tale, without any comment or observation on my 
 part. 
 
 I finally, sir, proceed to the consideration of a sub- 
 ject to which you personally appear to attach some 
 importance, my not having recommended Gen. Long 
 for the Albuera Medal. Upon this head you say*, 
 
 *C. E. Long's Letter, p. 123.
 
 104 
 
 " I am now, my Lord, arrived at that portion of your 
 " Lordship's Pamphlet and of my own reply, with 
 " which I am, individually speaking, more imme- 
 '•' diately concerned." Again* — " I am now put upon 
 " my own defence" — and again* — " Your Lordship 
 " has been so obliging as to advance an accusation 
 " against me, of having made a most important alter- 
 " ation in the sense of Sir Henry Torrens's answer 
 " to Gen. Long, by substituting the word considera- 
 " tion for circumstances, thereby, as you say, casting 
 " the onus of my relative's having been refused the 
 " medal entirely upon your Lordship." 
 
 I open my observations on this subject with the 
 foregoing extracts, that I may, at once, put all per- 
 sonality out of the question. I cannot even now 
 perceive any thing in what I previously advanced 
 upon this head, which intimated the slightest charge 
 against yourself. Most assuredly, sir, no such accu- 
 sation was intended ; and I had mentioned with 
 commendation, the very fair and candid manner in 
 which you have laid your evidences before the public. 
 But, the words of my letter to which you object do 
 not, I think, justify the construction you have put 
 upon them. They are as follows : " It is to be 
 " observed that your account of Sir Henry Torrens's 
 " answer contains a most material mistake with 
 " regard to the terms of the communication." This 
 is the only passage to which you could possibly 
 
 *C. E. Long's Letter, p. 131.
 
 105 
 
 object ; and it merely states that a mistake had been 
 made. Having thus exculpated myself, at least, 
 from all intention of personality, you will allow me 
 to doubt whether you have disproved the mistake I 
 have pointed out by " an indignant denial of its 
 " existence." You add,* " I own I was somewhat 
 " surprised at your lordship's statement, in as much 
 " as a mere walk to the Horse Guards would have put 
 " you at once in full possession of the real facts of 
 " the case." It is a trite observation that persons 
 seldom practise what they preach. Such, sir, must 
 have been the case with yourself on the present 
 occasion. It is evident that you have not taken this 
 '* mere walk to the Horse Guards." I, on the contrary, 
 had anticipated your recommendation, and can assure 
 you, from having personally inspected and compared 
 them, that the communication from Sir Henry 
 Torrens inserted in my published Letter to yourself 
 is a true and exact transcript of that at the Horse 
 Guards. You say, " the copy in your possession is 
 " different ;" of this I entertain no doubt. It is 
 clear, therefore, that the mistake which I pointed out 
 exists ; but I cannot understand upon what authority 
 you assert yours to be the original, though I do not 
 pretend to say it may not be such. The priority of 
 its claims must depend on whether the copy of the 
 Horse Guards was taken from your Letter, or yours 
 from it. This is not, however, of the slightest con- 
 sequence, for I shall, in proceeding to consider your 
 * C. E. Long's Letter, p. 131.
 
 106 
 
 further observations on the subject of this medal, 
 show, that the rules, regulations, and practice of the 
 army, with regard to such honorary distinctions, are 
 conformable with the copy of Sir Henry Torrens's 
 Letter which I gave, and with my explanation of it. 
 
 Reverting to the comparison which you drew 
 between the cases of Lord Collingwood and your 
 relative, you say, in " nothing but the particular case 
 " as regarding the medal, could I, or did I attempt 
 " to compare the individuals in question." I am not 
 aware of having ever stated that you did; but, as you 
 did not consider it expedient to pursue the comparison 
 even on the point of the medal to its end, and state 
 the result in either case, I thought it just to myself 
 to take up the parallel where you left it, and, follow- 
 ing out the conduct and the feelings of both the 
 officers alluded to, show that the course they pursued, 
 the feelings that influenced them, and the effects pro- 
 duced on them, were in every respect diametrically 
 opposite. 
 
 You undertake to prove that I was mistaken in 
 stating that I acted according to precedent in not 
 recommending General Long for the Albuera medal; 
 and, after citing the first of the three rules which 
 you had before quoted from the Official Regulations 
 for the granting of the medal (viz. " no General Officer 
 " shall be considered entitled to receive medals unless 
 " he has been personally and particularly engaged 
 " upon occasions of great public importance,") you 
 proceed to say that, " with the aid of a multitudinous
 
 107 
 
 " assemblage of synonymes, I had extracted an 
 " answer from Sir Henry Hardinge to the effect, 
 " that he was not aware of any particular service 
 " rendered by General Long during the action.'' 
 The question, sir, which I addressed to Sir Henry 
 Hardinge was a very simple and direct one. The 
 answer which he gave to that question was equally 
 laconic and direct. You object to the vagueness of 
 the word "particular." This I am not surprised at; 
 as the sense in which the word is generally under- 
 stood can by no means be made to apply favourably 
 to the case of your relative. But, sir, the word is 
 neither mine, nor Sir Henry Hardinge's. It is taken 
 from the Official Regulations which you have quoted, 
 and describes the circumstances under which an 
 officer would be entitled to the distinction of the 
 medal ; and, notwithstanding your criticism on our 
 military terms, I must think that, according to the 
 above rule, an officer is required to have been 
 personally and particularly engaged. My inquiry 
 of Sir Henry Hardinge, whether he knew of General 
 Long's having rendered any such particular service, 
 and his reply, knowing as he did the object of the 
 question, and the full military sense of the word, 
 " that he was not aware of any such particular 
 " service," will, I apprehend, be considered by every 
 reader as most appropriate to the subject in discussion 
 between us ; and many, I doubt not, will think they 
 ought to have been received as conclusive. You 
 proceed to quote some terms of general commenda-
 
 108 
 
 tion from my despatch, with a view, I suppose, of 
 proving that your relative really did effect some 
 " particular service." But it appears to me that 
 your quotations prove too much. When, for instance, 
 you cite, " the Marshal feels that every officer, and 
 " every soldier, deserve particular mention," or " the 
 " conduct of all was noble," expressions which, in 
 their general application to the whole army, were 
 strictly true, — a person of so nice and discriminating 
 a talent as yourself must perceive, that it never could 
 have been my intention to assert that there might 
 not be some few individuals among the 20,000 men 
 which were at Albuera, who were not deserving 
 of such commendation. Many, indeed, were never 
 in the action ; and, sir, though all might deserve 
 particular mention, the whole army would not, 
 consequently, have been all entitled to medals ; for 
 the grant of which clear and special regulations 
 were prescribed. " I find," you continue, "that 
 " your lordship could not omit also mentioning with 
 " praise Brigadier-General Long and the Honourable 
 " Col. de Grey, for the part they had in conducting 
 " the cavalry." To adopt your own expression, 
 sir, " when the general note of thanksgiving was 
 " to be sounded, I mentioned him with praise." 
 But, still, this general note does not tend to establish 
 any such " particular services " as are required from 
 those who are recommended for medals. Indeed, 
 sir, had I not mentioned him in " the general note of 
 praise," the omission would have been considered as
 
 109 
 
 particular in an unfavourable sense ; and my silence 
 would have been construed by you, as it was on the 
 occasion of Los Santos. But, sir, your relative, on 
 finding that he was not included in the list for medals, 
 might have appealed — at the time and on the spot — 
 through Sir William Lumley to myself, or direct 
 to me, or immediately to the Duke of Wellington. 
 Many other officers have so done, as you will presently 
 see. But, I would here call your attention to this 
 very extraordinary circumstance. Your relative never, 
 during the period of his remaining in the Peninsula, 
 deemed it expedient to make any representation on a 
 matter, which, privately, he so bitterly complained of 
 as an act of personal injustice. What was the cause 
 of this forbearance ? Was General Long averse from 
 seeking redress when he considered himself injured? 
 Was he ignorant of how or where to apply for it ? 
 When, sir, as mentioned in your last publication, we 
 call to mind the complaint that he subsequently made 
 to the Duke of Wellington on a point, which he need 
 not have considered as personal to himself, and on 
 which he was proved to be in error, the above ques- 
 tions must be answered in the negative. Is it not 
 then, I demand, very extraordinary that a person, by 
 no means backward in asserting his claims, and doing 
 justice to himself, should have omitted doing so on 
 the occasion in question, if he really thought himself 
 personally aggrieved ? I will not follow you, sir, any 
 farther on this subject, but lay before the reader a 
 letter from the Horse Guards, which will confirm
 
 no 
 
 what I stated to you in my former letter, that medals 
 were not indiscriminately given to every general 
 officer who was present in a battle ; and, that when 
 any officer considered himself overlooked, an appeal 
 was open to Mm and known to be so, and he would 
 find redress if he was entitled to it. Brigadier-Gen. 
 Long, by his private correspondence, appears to have 
 considered himself in that predicament ; but instead 
 of having recourse at once to the authorities on the 
 spot, he delayed his appeal for five years, when his 
 pretensions were considered by His Royal Highness 
 the Duke of York, the Commander in Chief at the 
 time ; and though your relative had then actually 
 received the thanks of Parliament with all the other 
 General Officers present at the battle of Albuera, his 
 claim to the medal was negatived, and, as I think, 
 neither in a soothing nor a flattering manner. I must 
 here observe, that several other officers, like General 
 Long, appealed to the Duke of York, and that, ac- 
 cording to the following letter, their claims were 
 admitted or negatived according to the justice of their 
 respective claims. 
 
 "Horse Guards, 17th August, 1833. 
 " It very frequently occurred in the Peninsular war 
 " that the distribution of medals to general and other 
 " officers in command of corps, or in situations of 
 " responsibility, was not made general, but was con- 
 " fined to those who were actually engaged under a 
 " musketry fire : one instance of this is as good as a 
 " hundred; and, therefore, it may be sufficient to cite
 
 Ill 
 
 " Lord Hill, who commanded a large corps d'armee 
 " at Busaco, but, not being particularly engaged, did 
 " not get the medal. I might also mention Sir Miles 
 " Nightingale, who had a brigade of infantry in the 
 " 6th division, at Busaco, which was exposed to a 
 " cannonade, but who was not recommended for a 
 " badge of distinction. The same thing happened 
 " with the brigade of Guards on the same occasion, 
 " notwithstanding that the loss it sustained from the 
 " enemy's artillery was far from inconsiderable. 
 
 " It frequently happened that the names of officers 
 " who were entitled under the regulations, were by 
 " mistake omitted in the first instance, and were after- 
 " wards inserted in supplementary lists. Of these I 
 " have now several lying before me, and among others 
 " they contain the names of Sir John Elley, Sir Fre- 
 " deric Ponsonby, Lieut.-Col. Charles Beckwith, Sir 
 " Dudley Hill, &c. 
 
 " I send you an extract of the regulations under 
 " which the lists were prepared by the Duke of 
 " Wellington. 
 
 (Signed) " FlTZROY SOMERSET." 
 
 I will add the copy of the extract of the regulations 
 above-mentioned. 
 
 " The distribution of medals, or badges for military 
 " services of distinguished merit, shall be regulated 
 " as follows, viz. 
 
 " 1st. That no General or other officer shall 
 " be considered entitled to receive them unless he has 
 " been personally and particularly engaged upon those
 
 112 
 
 " occasions of great importance and peculiar bril- 
 " liancy, in commemoration of which the Prince 
 " Regent, in the name and on the behalf of His Ma- 
 " jesty, may be graciously pleased to bestow such 
 " marks of distinction." 
 
 " 2nd. That no officer shall be considered a can- 
 " didate for the medal or badge except under the 
 " special selection and report of the Commander of 
 " the Forces upon the spot, as having merited the 
 '' distinction by conspicuous services." 
 
 " 3rd. That the Commander of the Forces shall 
 " transmit to the Commander in Chief returns signed 
 " by himself, specifying the names and ranks of those 
 " officers whom he shall have selected as particularly 
 " deserving." 
 
 Any one, sir, who reads those instructions with 
 attention, will see that an officer may have done his 
 duty most perfectly, and yet not have had the oppor- 
 tunity of rendering any particular or conspicuous ser- 
 vices. Indeed it must be obvious to any one, that if, 
 as you suppose, every general officer present at a battle 
 was entitled to the medal, the instructions would be 
 superfluous and absurd. I am quite satisfied that I 
 did Brigadier-General Long most ample justice for 
 all the services he performed at the battle of Albuera ; 
 nor can any one, I apprehend, be led to suppose, from 
 the extracts which you have quoted from my de- 
 spatches or general orders, that I had ever entertained 
 any feelings of personal unkindness towards him, or 
 still less that I had any intention of treating him with
 
 113 
 
 injustice. I must here, sir, again repeat, that during 
 the whole time Brigadier-General Long was under 
 my command, I was altogether ignorant of his being 
 in any respect dissatisfied with my conduct. I had 
 always believed that, from the commencement to the 
 conclusion of that period, the same good will had sub- 
 sisted between us, and that we had parted as amicably 
 as we had met. The nature of your relative's feel- 
 ings, while he was, thus, outwardly, living on terms of 
 kindly intercourse with one whom he was habitually 
 maligning in his private letters, I shall not attempt 
 to describe, or comment on. 
 
 I have the honour to be, &c, 
 
 Beresford. 
 
 August, 1834.
 
 LONDON : 
 PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES, 
 Duke Street, Lambeth.
 
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