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 LIBRJ^RY 
 
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 OF THE 
 
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 University of California. 
 
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 Class 
 
 
 
 
 
IMPERIAL DEFENCE 
 
Principles and Problems 
 of Imperial Defence 
 
 UEUT.-COL. EDWARD S. MAY, C.M.G., R.A. 
 
 Professor of Military A rt and History at the Staff College 
 
 Author of 
 
 "A Restrospect on the South African War" 
 
 ' ' Field Artillery with the other Arms " 
 
 ' ' Guns and Cavalry " 
 
 etc. etc. 
 
 LONDON 
 
 SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO. LIMITED 
 
 NEW YORK : E. P. DUTTON & CO. 
 
 1903 
 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 I HAVE been induced to write the following pages by 
 some, probably most partial, friends, who have assured 
 me that they would help the study of Imperial defence. 
 It was with considerable hesitation and reluctance that 
 I acceded to such representations, because I. felt that 
 I should have to refer to many topics which could be 
 better dealt with by a sailor. On the other hand, lay 
 the argument that the part our army must play in 
 world warfare was sometimes underrated, and that, 
 though secondary to the navy, its efficiency was still 
 an essential element in the force which secured our 
 safety or existence. Imperial defence, although it 
 cannot be carried out at all without a navy, cannot 
 be accomplished by a navy alone ; and, the two services 
 being complementary to one another, it seemed not 
 illogical to endeavour to view them in combination 
 and lay stress on the correlation that exists between 
 them. But that all the armed forces we possess should 
 be regarded as a whole was a view I had long held ; 
 and such being my opinion, I had the less difficulty 
 in persuading myself to write. In addition, an even 
 more powerful motive actuated me. A constant 
 examination of the history of past campaigns had 
 impressed on me the value of a habit of examining 
 war, and the preparation for war, from the business 
 point of view. A continual search for the causes that 
 lay at the root of success or failure had established 
 the fact that, whereas the glowing pages of military 
 history often attribute victory to the personal courage 
 
 217153 
 
vi INTRODUCTION 
 
 or readiness of individuals, triumphs have most 
 frequently been arranged for at the desk. 
 
 From immemorial ages poets have glorified the 
 warrior ; painters and sculptors have exhausted their 
 imaginations in the effort to idealise and exalt the 
 actions of the heroes whose names they have sought 
 to perpetuate. Even Religion has not withheld the 
 promise of spiritual advantage to the resolute fighter. 
 Fanaticism, patriotism, ambition, greed, even fear, are 
 in turn invoked to nerve men to the sticking-point. 
 Ardent rhetoric and glowing colours, storied stones 
 and imperishable verse, each in turn are made to 
 appeal to the pride or vanity of great or little men. 
 To hide the hideousness of war, or warm the chill 
 virtue of self-abnegation, every device has to be 
 resorted to. Therefore we find the great leaders of 
 all ages entering, as it were, into the conspiracy, still 
 further inflaming popular imagination, and appealing 
 rather to the emotions than to the reason of those 
 whom they command. Generals and admirals, artists, 
 poets, and politicians, are all thus joined together in 
 diverting attention from the prosaic side of war ; while 
 the experiences of savage warfare, where something of 
 the old chivalry still lingers and the personal factor 
 has still a considerable share in influencing the combat, 
 assist to give a false idea of what a great struggle in 
 modern times will involve. 
 
 To the people of England a great war would mean 
 more than it would in the case of any other nation. 
 Almost every transaction of daily life would be upset. 
 Every cottager would have to adjust his means to 
 vastly altered conditions. An ever-increasing pressure 
 would be imposed on the resources of our working- 
 people during every month that hostilities went on. 
 On the Continent it is true that nations in arms 
 would face one another, but in our case the healths 
 
INTRODUCTION vii 
 
 and lives of wives and children, as well as those of 
 husbands and brothers in the ranks, would be involved. 
 Because food, not for the armies only but also for the 
 inhabitants of our country, would have to be provided. 
 When the effects of war make themselves keenly felt 
 in every village, errors and miscalculations have far- 
 reaching consequences and are not readily condoned. 
 Much more than the military reputations of individuals 
 or the lives of fighting men are at stake. Mis- 
 management will be resented, as any other mismanage- 
 ment that costs lives on a large scale is resented and 
 condemned in civil life. 
 
 In short, the conduct of war is, or should be, made 
 a business transaction. The healths and lives of his 
 men represent the capital of a general. He cannot 
 reckon on unlimited funds : he must exercise economy, 
 and utilise what he has to the best purpose. The 
 force that can be provided by the country is limited, 
 and it must be made to go as far as possible. Apathy 
 in peace, and panic in war, are the dangers that have 
 to be avoided ; and of these the former is perhaps less 
 dangerous than the latter, — panic, the child of forget- 
 fulness and the mother of waste, which calls ruinous 
 prodigality into being to destroy what careful economy 
 has painfully succeeded in building up, which endea- 
 vours in a week to make good the omissions of a 
 decade, and sees the edifice reared by strenuous 
 exertion crumble away when just completed and 
 just ready for use. 
 
 We have recently witnessed a most salient example 
 of what spasmodic effort can accomplish, and we have 
 been surprised by the warlike vigour which the country 
 has shown. Yet the army and its administration 
 has met with the most severe criticism, because it was 
 felt that the exertions made during the war exhibited 
 energy rather than skill, and zeal rather than wisdom. 
 
viii INTRODUCTION 
 
 And now, no doubt, it is to be feared that when 
 the skies have cleared, the uproar will die away. 
 When the rains are over, many reputable rivers in 
 South Africa disappear. Innumerable grains of sand 
 have waylaid and obstructed the thin trickle of the 
 failing stream. Split into millions of tiny drops, the 
 mighty volume of the great watercourse has finally 
 become obliterated amid the infinity of the little 
 particles ; and you may walk across the dry sands of 
 a river-bed incredulous that water can for years have 
 flowed there. Yet if you dig a little way below the 
 surface you will perhaps find forms of aquatic life ; it 
 may be that there are even fish ; just as amid inimical 
 conditions spirit and vigour may survive. When the 
 inevitable storms break in due season, a raging torrent 
 will again appear rolling millions of gallons of water 
 in wanton prodigality to the sea. It is possible to 
 rescue those wasted waters, to dam and save, to cut 
 channels judiciously and irrigate, — the generosity of 
 one season being called to redress the parsimony 
 of another ; the same quantity of water making a 
 whole countryside green, where now a narrow band 
 of verdure alone marks the course of the wayward 
 stream. Energy, imagination, and forethought, as well 
 as water, are sometimes smothered and lost amid the 
 illimitable little worries and obstructions of routine. 
 Thousands will come forward at moments of national 
 danger to swell the wild surges of unorganised force. 
 Then the tumult, short-lived as it is violent, will sub- 
 side, leaving no permanent trace of its volume or 
 even of its existence behind. 
 
 To legislate to make the most of what we have, 
 to employ it so that it may be productive and re- 
 munerative in the future, should be our aim ; so 
 that we can obtain men without a panic, as it is 
 possible to obtain water without a flood. These are 
 
INTRODUCTION ix 
 
 the true lessons of the war. We have fought in an 
 abnormal country against an abnormal foe. We have, 
 perhaps, learnt how to act in that particular region 
 and against that particular enemy. We know his 
 strength and his weakness, and we can gauge our 
 chances against him. But tactics vary with the cir- 
 cumstances of the moment, with the character of the 
 enemy, with the armament on both sides, and, above all, 
 with the ground. While certain very valuable lights 
 have been thrown on technical matters, on the manu- 
 facture, pattern, and durability of equipment, on the 
 effect of fire both of infantry and artillery, and, to 
 some extent, on formations, the value of our deduc- 
 tions is not absolute but relative. Against an European 
 foe we might find South African formations fail, and we 
 know that they would not be adopted against a savage 
 enemy. But the lessons we have gleaned as to the war- 
 like spirit that still inspires our fellow-citizens, the vital 
 necessity for trustworthy intelligence, for preparation, 
 for method, are applicable to every period and to every 
 war. The great truths of strategy have again asserted 
 their immutable and inexorable force. Politics and 
 strategy should go hand-in-hand. The plan of cam- 
 paign should be adapted not only to the force of the 
 enemy, but to that with which we can take the field. 
 The security of lines of communication, the danger of 
 an open base — these are absolute lessons, and no matter 
 where we may next fight we shall infringe them at 
 our peril. But beyond them we have been given 
 lessons equally absolute, more original, and, for us, 
 even more important. The need for cultivating, not 
 only the intelligence but the characters of both officers 
 and men, the inculcation of soldierly virtues, self- 
 reliance, determination, discipline, patience — what may 
 be termed the moral qualities of a good soldier, these 
 must not be left out of sis^ht. And we have learnt the 
 
X INTRODUCTION 
 
 importance of training for war, not for any particular 
 nature of warfare, but for war generally — principles 
 and not rules, manoeuvre and not drill, military in- 
 stinct and not pedantry. Most of all, when Imperial 
 defence is considered, have we learnt the value of 
 Colonial assistance, and the undeveloped possibilities 
 that lie before our Colonies. Yet, on the subject of 
 the training of our Colonial forces, or even of their 
 place in Imperial defence, I have said but little. As 
 regards the latter I have, in the chapter on organisa- 
 tion, given the reasons which have kept me silent ; 
 as regards the former much might be said, but it is 
 not my place to say it. The training of our Colonial 
 troops for war is in the hands of competent men, who 
 will do whatever is needed, and are now doing it. 
 To my comrades of the Colonies, or to those of them 
 who may perhaps imagine that spontaneous and in- 
 dividual efforts are of more value in war than any 
 that bear the imprimatur of official sanction, I may, 
 however, say that when we next fight shoulder to 
 shoulder it will help us if we completely understand 
 one another's methods and ideas. All soldiers under 
 one flag should speak the same tactical language. 
 The broad methods of every man succeeding to 
 leadership should be the same ; thus shall the system 
 flourish when the individual passes away, the chances 
 of error diminish, the rubs of friction be reduced to 
 vanishing-point. And if intelligent and genial co- 
 operation be demanded on the battlefield, how much 
 more are they to be sought and secured when land 
 and sea forces join against a common danger? 
 
 The co-operation of the services is, indeed, the 
 corner-stone of Imperial defence; co-operation, above 
 all, in the council chamber. It can be readily learnt 
 in actual practice. We have had some experience, 
 and the results have been encouraging ; but far- 
 
INTRODUCTION xi 
 
 reaching and not quickly to be amended are the 
 misunderstandings of great principles. Co-operation 
 in conception is more important even than in execu- 
 tion, and in weighing the relative importance of naval 
 and military needs it is the fate of the nation which 
 is often swinging in the balance. 
 
 Edward S. May. 
 
 DuRLEY House, Camberley, 
 isf November 1902. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 Foundations of Empire 
 
 The Basis of our Empire is Sea-Power — Our Empire primarily a 
 Commercial Organism — The Outcome of Individual Enter- 
 prise and of Natural Selection — Warfare hinges on Com- 
 munications — They are as essential to Commerce as to 
 Armies and Fleets — On what does Sea- Power depend? 
 "Great Shipping" — Water and Land Transport — The 
 Internal Communications of a Country and their Protection 
 — The Protection of the Greater Lines of Supply and of the 
 Trading Station — The Evolution of Naval Bases — England 
 specially favoured in the Development of Sea- Power — The 
 Population of an Island can concentrate its Attention on 
 the Sea — Natural Advantages of our Southern Coasts- 
 Disabilities of our Opponents— Russia, Denmark, Germany, 
 Holland, P>ance, Spain, Italy — The Effect of the Nature 
 of a Country in developing Sea- Power — Cold and Want 
 Incentives to Industry — Venice, Holland, Carthage — The 
 Prosperity of England compared to that of Holland — The 
 Necessity to bear in mind the Commercial Basis of our 
 Empire — The Relation of the Mercantile-Marine to War-ships 
 — The Quality rather than the Quantity of Recruits must be 
 considered — The former Naval Resources of France and 
 England compared — Reserve Forces are of as much Im- 
 portance as ever — The Beneficent Nature of a Sea- Power 
 based on Commerce — Aggression leaves small substantial 
 Results — The Effect of the Manner in which Wealth 
 is acquired — The Necessity to protect Merchant-Shipping 
 called forth Naval Strength — The Aims of Commercial 
 Activity have Continuity of Purpose — The P'oreign Policy of 
 Cromwell — The Influence of our Rulers has assisted us — 
 The Efforts of Colbert— Fatal Policy of Louis XIV.— The 
 Dangers of a Commercial Spirit .... 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 The Analogy between Land and Sea Warfare 
 and their influence on one another 
 
 The Art of War is applicable to Sea as well as Shore Opera- 
 tions — Former distinction between the Crew that fought 
 and the Crew that propelled or navigated the Ships — At 
 former periods Leaders often commanded on both Elements 
 — Prince Rupert, Don John of Austria, Monk, Coligny — War 
 an effort of Force, and in our case must always have a Naval 
 element— The Army and Navy complementary to one another 
 — The broad Principles of Strategy are applicable to both — 
 An Analogy may be established between Land and Sea War- 
 fare — Neither a purely Naval or purely Land War possible for 
 us — All our Forces should be used in Combination — Com- 
 munications must be secured — A great Fortress in Isolation 
 becomes a splendid Tomb — Bazaine, Mack, Cornwallis, Menou 
 
 — Imperial Strategy regards Sea-Power as Indispensable — 
 The various Aspects of the Sea — Its very Openness baffles us 
 
 — Physical Features of a Country often help Strategy — 
 Nothing circumscribes the Mobility of Ships — We may not 
 be able to reach our Enemy — But we may make the Enemy 
 acknowledge our Predominance — Crimea, Turkey, Franco- 
 German War — The special Characteristics of Naval War 
 — Evasion is easy to Ships, Flights may be continuous, 
 Vessels do not grow weary — "The Fleet in Being" — Its 
 Counterpart on Shore — The Russians in 1877 — Napoleon in 
 1814 — The Allies in the Crimea — The War between China 
 and Japan — A Fleet at large is, however, always Dangerous 
 — Fixed Defences only valuable to free the Fleet — Fortresses 
 unprepared for War may hamper rather than assist Armies 
 — Geographical Points in themselves of small value where Sea 
 Warfare is concerned — Only valuable if they supply Bases to 
 powerful Fleets — On Shore, too. Mobility is demanded if River 
 Lines or Froritiers are to be defended — Strategic "Keys" — 
 "The Key of India is London" — Our Objective must be 
 the hostile Fleets — The principles of Defensive Strategy are 
 the same on Sea and Land — The Imperceptible Force of 
 Strategy . ...... 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 The Predominance of the Navy 
 
 The Safety of the Empire founded on Sea Supremacy, but not 
 on Sea Supremacy alone — Claims on the Exchequer by Army 
 and Navy — How is Naval Strength to be measured? — The 
 
CONTENTS XV 
 
 PAGB 
 
 Two-Power Standard — The Frontiers of the Empire— The 
 Policy of Blockade— Its Monotony and Strain, but its Value 
 towards Training — Its true object — Menace of a Fleet at large 
 — Cervera's Squadron — The Distribution of the Fleets — 
 Necessity for good Intelligence— Blockading, Then and Now 
 — The Enemy must be brought to Battle— Difficulties in 
 doing so— Speed of Fleets — Duty and Strength of Navy 
 defined by St Vincent's Policy — Proportion of Battleships 
 and Cruisers— Cruisers for Commerce Protection— Protection 
 of Interests in Foreign Waters — Is our Navy equal to the 
 task?— Lord Brassey's Opinion— How Force is judged in 
 War— The Quality of our Seamen formerly— The Value of 
 Practical Training — The American War cf 1812-14 — More 
 Ships the most Pressing Cry in Imperial Defence— The Safety 
 not only of England but her Dependencies rests on the Navy 
 — The Transport of Troops to India and Canada — The 
 Defence of the Commonwealth — Special attributes of Sea- 
 Power — Special Colonial Squadrons need not be tied to 
 Colonial Waters— The Enemy must start from a Base in the 
 Northern Hemisphere— The Security of the Colonies depends 
 on the Navy— Commence Protection falls also to the Navy. 46 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 The Function of the Army 
 
 Dependence of the Army on the Navy— A predominant Navy has 
 its Limitations — All the Forces we can command must take a 
 Share in the Defence of the Empire— Army and Navy must 
 play into one another's Hands- At the opening of a great 
 Struggle the Army will play a Subordinate Part— The Army 
 holds the Communications of the Navy— A Navy cannot live 
 on the Country— The Army holds the Bases for the Navy and 
 thus frees the Navy— The Protection of Bases against Raids- 
 Safety ol Coal and Ammunition— Protection of Commerce- 
 How Strong must Garrisons be?— Bombardments— Dangers 
 from the Land Side— Landing Parties— Difficulties of Limiting 
 Defence— Mobility of Garrisons— Co-operation between the 
 Services— Element of Time— The Size of a Garrison often a 
 Deterrent— Large Expeditions necessitated — Small Works can 
 be bombarded — Margins for Waste— Civil Population — We 
 must make Counterstrokes- Ships confer Mobility on Troops 
 — Possible Objectives — Three Army Corps and a Cavalry 
 Division— No Jealousy between Army and Navy should exist 
 — The Potentialities of Combined Operations — The Peninsular 
 War- The Crimea— The Black Sea Littoral— The Danger of 
 a Raid on our Home Territory— The Home Army frees the 
 Navy— Summary— Invasion must never be . . -70 
 
xvi CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 Combined Naval and Military Operations 
 
 Conditions of Warfare of the Present Day— Railroads, Telegraphs, 
 and Steamships — Disabilities of an Invading Force — Balance 
 of advantage to Sea- Power not so great as formerly — Capacities 
 of Warships in Transporting Men — Disembarkations from 
 big Ships slower than from small — Opportunities for over-sea 
 Expeditions — Choice of Objective — A substantial Impression 
 on the Enemy must be sought — Difficulties of a Blockade — 
 An Expedition to seize a Hostile Port — Examples from the 
 American War — Seizure of Strategic Points such as Gibraltar 
 and Malta — Expeditions against Semi-Civilised Races — Naval 
 and Military Expeditions in Shore — The Federal Ships of 
 War in the Mississippi — Rivers compared to Railways as a 
 means of Transport — Federal Strategy in 1861 — Forts 
 Donelson and Henry — Porter and Vicksburg — Expeditions 
 to effect Diversions — Expeditions to foment Discontent — 
 Co-operation of Navy and Army to effect a change of Base — 
 Examples of the Operation — France and Germany in 1870 — 
 Command of the Sea essential to the Success of Expeditions 
 
 — Preparation for Contingencies — Ill-considered Expeditions 
 — The question of Command— The Duties of the two Services 
 in embarking and disembarking Troops — -Desiderata in such 
 Operations — The Landing at Aboukir Bay iSoi — At Maceira 
 Bay in 1808 — Algiers 1830 — The Operation as difficult as ever 
 — Number of Transports for a Force — Calculation of Tonnage 
 required — Co-operation does not necessarily cease when the 
 Disembarkation is finished — Examples from the Expedition 
 to Egypt 1801, and the Crimean War — Chinese Expeditions — 
 Expedition to Egypt 1882 — ^Japan and China 1S94— Success 
 can be assured by careful Preparation 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 Naval Bases and Coaling-Stations 
 
 Distinction l)etween Naval and Military Bases — The Naval 
 Fighting Line carries its Impedimenta with it — Relation 
 between Coal Endurance and locality of Coaling-Stations — 
 Coal Endurance of Ships — Taking in Coal at Sea — Commerce 
 Destroyers — Our Position as regards Coaling-Stations — Classes 
 of Coaling-Stations — Our Fleet Stations and their Bases — The 
 Mediterranean — The South African Station — Mauritius — 
 Chagos Islands — East Indian Station — China Station — Straits 
 Settlements— Hong Kong ~Wei-IIai- Wei— Australian Station 
 
 — South - East American Station — Falkland Isles — North 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 American and West Indies Stations— Bermuda, Halifax, 
 Jamaica, St Lucia, Barbadoes— Pacific Station— Esquimault 
 —The Duties of our Army with regard to these Bases— Various 
 forms of Attaclc— Raids— Torpedo Boat Attack — Bombard- 
 ment of Coast Towns— Set form of Attack— Transference 
 of Garrisons — Considered in the case of Hong-Kong and 
 Wei-Hai-Wei — Dangers from Land Attack at Hong-Kong 
 —At Esquimault— Garrisons of Labuan — Sierra Leone- 
 Sufficiency of Naval Bases in each Fleet Station — The 
 Situation as regards India — Objections to adding further to 
 our Responsibilities — Decentralisation in Manufacture of 
 Warlike Stores, etc.— The Eastern Question is shifting to 
 the far East — Growing importance of Hong-Kong — The 
 reply to Port Arthur should be a great Base in Australia — 
 The Isthmian Canal— Who will command it?— A Squadron 
 and Base in the Caribbean Sea— The Burthen of Empire 
 grows heavier daily ...... 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 The Great Cable Communications of the Empire 
 
 Facility of Communication throughout the Empire — A Strategic need 
 — Cables called into being by Commerce — The Cables of the 
 World described — They favour us, because mostly in our own 
 Hands— Importance of Secrecy to our Navy— The History of 
 the "All-British Cable"— Route of the "All-British Cable" 
 — Report of Inter-departmental Committee, 1902 — Call for 
 cheap Cablegrams — -New German and Dutch Cable — The 
 Neutrality of Cables in War Time— Importance of Time in 
 Commercial Transactions— Influence of All-British Cables in 
 Uniting the Empire— Further Arguments in favour of All- 
 British Cables— Cypher Codes— Cutting of Cables by War- 
 ships — Experiences of Spanish- American War — Action of 
 American Government — Absence of International Claims in 
 Cuba — Efforts of the Wampatuck — Attempts at Ponce and 
 Porto Rico— Cutting of two Cables in July— Cuba remained 
 in Communication with Spain — Dewey's Action at Manila — 
 The extent to which our Cables are open to Interruption- 
 Commercial and Military Lines considered — The Danger off 
 Newfoundland— A Reserve of spare Cables and Material for 
 Repair— Experiences during former Wars — The Cable will 
 follow the Fleet— Capacity of the Country for Cable Pro- 
 duction and for Repair of Cables — Number of Cable Ships 
 in the World — Policy in Protecting Cables — The weaker 
 Navy will be forced to deep Waters — Wireless Telegraphy 
 — The Cape to Cairo Railway and Telegraph . .163 
 
xviii CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 Our Food Supply in time of War 
 
 Acreage under Wheat in England — Importations of Foreign Corn 
 — The Example of Rome — Corners in Wheat — Financial 
 Difficulties in their Way — The Transport across the Sea of 
 our Food Supplies — Some Statistics from the Past — Increase 
 of our Population — The Remedies suggested — A Duty on 
 Imported Wheat — Establishment of Granaries — Mr Marston's 
 Scheme — Silos at Malta— Mr Yerhurgh's Suggestions — Experi- 
 ments which have been made — Subsidies to Private Firms and 
 Farmers — The System of Rationing the Population — The 
 various Estimates of Supplies available in the Country — 
 Objections to the various Remedies — The Effect of Shortage 
 of Coin on other Nations — Demand creating Supply — Change 
 in the Sources of our Food Supply — Future Developments — 
 Effect of Government Interference — Supply of Raw Material 
 in War Time — Supply of Food other than Corn — The Pressure 
 of War on our Poor — Our Experiences in the Past — Our 
 grounds for Hope in the Present — The Power of our Wealth 
 — A Lesson from the Crimean War — Our Sea-Power the 
 true Safeguard— Legislation to keep down Prices in Times 
 of War — Our Food Supply in War not the most pressing 
 Demand on us at Present ..... 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 The Protection of our Commerce 
 
 The two Aspects of the Question — The Guerre de Course no 
 Substitute for Naval Victories — Figures as to the Size of our 
 Trade and Mercantile-Marine, and the Proportion our War- 
 ships bear to them — Difficulties of the Convoy System — The 
 Protection of a Neutral Flag would not help us — Effect of the 
 Declaration of Paris — Efficacy of Blockades— Illustration from 
 the American War of Secession — Danger from hostile Mer- 
 cantile Auxiliaries — The Menace of the Torpedo Boat — How 
 it will be combated— The Conditions of the Past and Present 
 compared — The Experiences of the American War of Seces- 
 sion discussed — The Factor of Coal-Supply — Demand that 
 Merchant-Ships should be subsidised by Government — Speed 
 of our Mail-Steamers — Suggestions for a System of subsidised 
 Mercantile Auxiliaries — Views of Lord Brassey, Sir Donald 
 Currie, and others — British and Foreign Merchant-\'essels 
 compared — Mr Ismay on the Transfer of Ships to Foreign 
 Powers — Experiences of Manoeuvres, and the Spanish- 
 American War — The Shipping Combine — Importance to 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 I'Ai;e 
 
 the Army of a large and efficient Mercantile-Marine — Part 
 taken by the Army in the Protection of Commerce — Necessity 
 for secure Harbours — Importance of preserving Confidence at 
 Home ........ 21 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 The Defence of our great Dependencies and 
 of the outlying portions of our empire 
 
 Brief remarks on the North-West Frontier of India — On Canada 
 — The Commonwealth and New Zealand — South Africa- — 
 Local Defence not to be considered — Estimate of Force 
 required to leave our Shores in the Event of War on the 
 North-West Frontier— The Integrity of Afghanistan— Diffi- 
 culties in securing Continuity of Policy or of Plan — Foreign 
 War hinges on Communications — Examples from Military 
 History — The Efficiency of our Mercantile-Marine — We 
 shall always have to resort to Railways — Also strategical 
 Railways to assist the Defence of our Indian Frontier— The 
 Security of Canada— Her small Expenditure on Armaments 
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 Home Defence 
 Why Home Defence is discussed last — Our Position towards other 
 Nations — Foreign Views on our Expansion — Growth of 
 Colonising Tendencies Abroad — We stand in their Way — 
 Imperial Defence centres in the Southern Counties of 
 England — Possibilities of Invasion or Raids — Napoleon's 
 Schemes — The Condition of our Navy at the Beginning of 
 the Nineteenth Century— Our Condition in 1872 — Views on 
 the Subject of Invasion in that Year — Condition of I-'oreign 
 Mercantile Navies Thirty Years ago — The Situation To-day — 
 The German Mercantile-Marine of To-day — Number of Trans- 
 ports an Expedition would require — Admiral Mend's Estimate 
 of Time — The Attempt at Invasion would be made when 
 our Hands were full — Factors in military Strength — Quality 
 of Troops — Training — Knowledge of Country — The LevJe 
 en masse — War is a Business Transaction — Organisations for 
 Home Defence — The Situation on the first Outbreak of War 
 — Provision for Counterstroke — The Question of Entrench- 
 ments—Coast Defence — Lessons of the Spanish-American 
 War in this Respect — Systems of Fortification — Preparation 
 the Key-note of Home Defence — Reconnaissances of our 
 
XX CONTENTS 
 
 PAGB 
 
 Home Counties — Training of Officers — Finding of Men — 
 Military Training in Board Schools — Federation for Imperial 
 Defence— Let us train and organise what we have got . 250 
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 Organisation for Imperial Defence 
 
 The Share of our Colonial Forces in Imperial Defence— Value of 
 Combination— The highest Standard of Imperial Efficiency — 
 Meeting of Colonial Premiers — New Contributions from the 
 Colonies— Our Relationship to them— Our Empire compared 
 to those of the Past — The Bond of Union supplied by Com- 
 mercial Interests — Federation for Imperial Defence involves 
 an Imperial Parliament— Which will come as a Growth, not 
 a Creation— A Minister of Defence— Difficulties in the Way 
 — Von Moeltke's View — A less ambitious Proposal — Routine 
 obstructs large Views — A great general Staff necessary — 
 Objections raised to the Suggestion — The special Call for 
 such a Body in our Case— Education of Staff-Officers— One- 
 Man Power and Method— Organisations survive Individuals 
 — Preparation for War — Schemes of Operations — Preparation 
 for War against Semi-Civilised Foes — Preparation of a 
 specific Theatre of War— Examples of such an Operation- 
 Provision of Supplies— Special Preparations necessary to an 
 Empire such as ours— Representation of the Colonies on the 
 Staff at Home— Personal Responsibility— A Record of Advice 
 tendered— The Crux of the Situation— The ultimate Fate of 
 the Empire— The Potency of Sea- Power . .286 
 
IMPERIAL DEFENCE 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE 
 
 That the basis of our Empire is sea-power, and that 
 the first essential to Imperial defence is command of 
 the sea, it is happily no longer necessary to demonstrate. 
 I may assume that the writings of Captain Mahan, Sir 
 George Clarke, Mr Thursfield, the late Admiral 
 Colomb, and the many others who have laboured to 
 bring this fundamental principle home to our minds 
 have not been in vain, and that a condition of things 
 which twenty years ago might have required proof may 
 now be received as a postulate which will be accepted by 
 sailors and soldiers without demur. A broad conception 
 of Imperial defence will, however, embrace in its purview 
 other factors besides the military efficiency of the navy. 
 It will recognise the economical and political problems 
 which a great war brings with it, and will not allow us 
 to rest satisfied and free from anxiety because we can 
 boast of a navy, even though we may have wisely 
 rendered that navy supreme. 
 
 Our Empire is primarily a commercial organism. It 
 was individual effort and private enterprise that built its 
 foundations, and our Government has usually followed, 
 often hesitatingly and anxiously, where its citizens have 
 led the way fearlessly, and vigorously, and wisely. 
 Gordon, left to perish at Khartoum spoke truly when 
 he said that England had been made great by her 
 
2 FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE 
 
 adventurers. We owe India to Clive, who went there as 
 a writer in a commercial ofifice. Canada was drawn to us 
 through the vigour of the trading company which first 
 found a footing in its huge territories. The genesis of 
 our greatness was a commercial one, and the needs of 
 our people, the industry and enterprise that sought to 
 satisfy them, not the impulse of official direction, first 
 started and then kept up our progress towards the wide 
 empire which is ours. 
 
 That such has been the origin of our greatness is the 
 surest guarantee for its stability. It is sometimes said 
 to our disparagement that the vast edifice has been 
 thrown together at hap-hazard and piled up by good 
 fortune rather than by scientific foresight ; but while it 
 is true that the official in our case has followed the 
 trader and the merchant, it is possible that we find here 
 the outcome of a wise instinct rather than the gift of 
 mere good fortune. The official did not appear till he 
 was really wanted, and was called forth by the force of 
 circumstances. The commercial knowledge of the 
 trader understood where his true interests lay, and the 
 Government either did not think about him at all or let 
 him choose for himself That is a sounder method of 
 colonising than for the Government to select the site and 
 then leave the trader to make what he can of it. The 
 advantages are those of natural as opposed to artificial 
 selection. 
 
 It is necessary at the outset of the study of Imperial 
 defence thus to reiterate the story of our Empire, to 
 remember this commercial substratum, which underlies 
 the bristling strength we see before our eyes. All war- 
 fare hinges on questions of communications. Strategy 
 by sea and land alike asserts the power of the same 
 inexorable laws. But Imperial defence is governed by 
 special strategical laws of its own in addition to those 
 of universal application, because the communications 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE 3 
 
 we there deal with must be guarded not only for 
 military but for commercial reasons; because an Empire 
 which is built on a commercial basis must stand or fall 
 with its commerce, and our commerce depends on com- 
 munications over sea. 
 
 Again, if our Empire depend on sea-power on what 
 does sea-power itself depend ? What called the ships and 
 fleets into existence? Did the merchant shipping precede 
 the battleships, or were the latter provided to safeguard 
 and foster the former? It is but another form of the 
 question. Was the expansion of the Empire deliberately 
 planned and controlled in a Government bureau, or did 
 a natural tendency to increase call the bureau and the 
 officials into existence ? We shall all have a ready 
 answer to the latter question, but it is perhaps less 
 widely recognised that sea-power grew from, and now 
 is largely supported by that "Great Shipping" which 
 the Elizabethan adventurers held to be the most valu- 
 able outcome of long, arduous voyages to the outlying 
 quarters of the globe. They held that large view, 
 because they realised that facility of communication was 
 essential to intercourse, and that naval aptitude was 
 necessary to us if we wished to secure a means of 
 transport which was the best of the time. The broad 
 ocean constitutes one vast open highway ; and transport 
 was formerly, and is sometimes still, far more cheaply 
 and securely carried out by water than on land. Water- 
 ways can still compete even with railways, but up to 
 the end of the eighteenth century the advantages they 
 possessed over roadways, even in the most civilised 
 countries in Europe, were altogether preponderating. 
 The canals of Holland provided unrivalled facilities for 
 the carriage of merchandise, and were formerly as 
 necessary to her cities and industries as are railways 
 now. 
 
 During his campaigns in Bohemia the waters of the 
 
4 FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE 
 
 Elbe furnished Frederick with his most valuable line of 
 supply. 
 
 At the beginning of the last century travellers across 
 Ireland were towed by galloping horses from one side 
 of the island to the other along the Grand Canal, with 
 greater comfort and more expeditiously than they could 
 travel by coach. Nor is water transport at the present 
 day of anything but high importance. 
 
 In January 1902 the French Chambers voted the 
 huge sum of 6oo,ooo,CXDO francs, with what was reported 
 by the correspondent of the Times "as almost feverish 
 haste," for the construction, repair, and improvement 
 of the canals and waterways of the country, and of 
 her military and commercial ports. 443,500,000 francs 
 of this total are to be spent on new canals — a fact 
 which is eloquent as to the importance which still 
 attaches to waterways, even in a country so closely 
 intersected with railways as is France. 
 
 In countries where canals and navigable rivers did 
 not exist waterways ran round the shore, and in such 
 cases war with a naval power not only threatened 
 foreign trade, but (to use an Irishism) the chief internal 
 means of communication became likewise insecure. 
 The convoys that carried the imports to such countries 
 had likewise to distribute them after arrival, and ships 
 crept furtively from headland to headland anxiously 
 scanning the offing for signs of the ship-of-prey that 
 might be on the lookout for them. Under such 
 circumstances the internal as well as the foreign trade 
 of countries, situated so near to one another as France 
 and England, demanded protection, and the value of 
 sea-power was brought home to every little grocer in 
 a country town. 
 
 But when the wealth and enterprise of a flourishing 
 nation expanded, greater scope for its commercial 
 activities were demanded, and the argosies of great 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE 5 
 
 mercantile houses sought the ends of the world in 
 search of gain. Harbours where water, vegetables, 
 and fresh meat might be embarked became necessary ; 
 refuges where ships might refit or find shelter along 
 the paths that led to and from the markets which 
 supplied their cargoes were demanded. Soon the 
 trading-station itself called for secure protection ; the 
 stores where merchandise of all kinds was accumu- 
 lated, the coffers of the counting-houses, the shops, 
 the dwelling-houses of the little colony, could not be 
 left open to the raids of the lawless tribes of the 
 country. The favour and patronage of a semi-civilised 
 potentate, whose policy perhaps neither reflected nor 
 moulded the views of his subjects, was often an un- 
 certain element to reckon on. While the inroad of 
 robbers had to be guarded against on shore, the sea 
 had to be watched for the visit of a hostile warship. 
 
 Thus the defences of Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta 
 had their beginnings in the defensible factories or 
 trading-stations of a mercantile company. The castle 
 at Capetown, and Fort William at Calcutta, were built 
 by Dutch and English with the same objects in view. 
 
 The more business increased and thrived, the larger 
 was the bait offered to treacherous greed or avowed 
 hostility. Until the rich harvest was seen collected 
 and piled together, the full value of a concession had 
 perhaps been scarcely realised. The varied produce 
 of a country exhibited in concentrated form, garnered 
 and heaped together by the energy of traders in one 
 spot, might well glow with so broad a beam as to 
 attract from afar foreign enemies too. The lawless- 
 ness of individuals, the greed of the ruler, or the 
 jealousy of rival nations might all be found eager to 
 deprive industry of its reward. 
 
 A few loopholes and barricades soon developed into 
 counterscarps and curtains, a garrison was quickly 
 
6 FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE 
 
 called for, and the flag of the mother-country was 
 speedily waving over a fort that grew to be of national 
 importance, and an outpost of the Empire, which both 
 our interest and pride compelled us to defend, was 
 established. Warlike stores and ammunition and re- 
 inforcements were soon crowding the peaceful paths 
 of trade. The warships that were sent to escort them 
 needed bases of supply and refitment and harbours 
 in their voyages to and fro. When many and richly- 
 laden vessels were constantly traversing wide and 
 lonely stretches of the ocean at periods less civilised 
 than ours, piracy and lawlessness on the sea were to 
 be feared, and soon the heavily-burthened merchant- 
 men had more than the forces of the elements to dread. 
 
 The demand for such ports of call as Mauritius, 
 Capetown, and St Helena therefore became urgent, not 
 only for the accommodation of warships, but for the 
 convenience and safety of a mercantile marine, and 
 the health and comfort of the passengers it carried. 
 The evolution of what we now term a naval base or 
 defended harbour had been begun. 
 
 It is true, of course, that nations which sent forth 
 their navies with an aggressive policy in view, which 
 territorial aggrandisement, not commerce, impelled to 
 cross the sea, similarly needed ports for supply and 
 refitment ; but in the case of England commerce was 
 the germinating power that called our many resting- 
 places on the waters into existence. The strongholds 
 at the ends of the line, the shelters and supply ports 
 that form the chain of connection with the mother- 
 country, were supported by sea-power, and the security 
 of communication, which was vital to commerce, could 
 only be established by the mastery of the waves. 
 
 But special circumstances favoured England more 
 than any other nation in the creation and develop- 
 ment of sea-power. In the first place, she was an 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE 7 
 
 island, and had a maximum of seaboard, where a 
 seafaring population might thrive and live upon the 
 industries which are associated with the element that 
 surrounded them. A race of fishermen and sailors was 
 reared, familiar from boyhood with all that belongs 
 to shipping, bred up to seamanship, and knowing no 
 other means of livelihood. In other countries the 
 presence of a land frontier provoked anxiety, and 
 necessitated the training and upkeep of a powerful land 
 force. The soldier's calling there became a trade. But 
 England's whole energies and thoughts could be concen- 
 trated on the acquisition and development of maritime 
 advantage alone. It was across the seas that her young 
 men looked when visions of wealth or adventure stirred 
 their minds. Young Raleigh, brooding by the shore, 
 saw Eldorados below the offing, and the road to glory 
 and power behind the sun. To an Elizabethan boy 
 every dream of conquest contained a ship ; his ambition 
 was to be a sailor, his idea of a battle was a sea-fight. 
 
 Our extensive seaboard, however, gave us more 
 than singleness of purpose and immunity from counter- 
 attack. The geographical formation of our southern 
 coasts, those from whence expeditions across the ocean 
 would most naturally emerge, provided us with excel- 
 lent harbours and sheltered roadsteads. Nor was our 
 strategical position a less favourable one. On the 
 flanks of the great trade routes up the Channel lay 
 our strongholds. The ships of Russia, Denmark, 
 Holland, and Sweden, before they could cast anchor 
 in their own waters, must run the gauntlet of our 
 fleets in harbour. Our best ports were those which 
 confronted foreign shores. Spain and Denmark and 
 Italy, with such a coast-line as makes them all but 
 islands, have each their heel of Achilles, and have all 
 been struck in their most vulnerable point. The long 
 seaboard of France is spread from the Mediterranean 
 
8 FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE 
 
 to the Atlantic and the Channel, but is divided by 
 Spain and by Gibraltar. Spain herself, with a magni- 
 ficent seaboard, is similarly broken up, while frost 
 hampers Russia in one direction and the narrows of 
 the Bosporus in another. 
 
 A compact position, with facilities such as we have 
 for training and manning fleets, is a priceless possession. 
 
 The geographical conformation of Italy may at first 
 sight appear calculated to give her the same advantages 
 in the Mediterranean that we enjoy in the North. The 
 Mediterranean is the great trade route between East and 
 West, and in the old world has always occupied the 
 position the Caribbean Sea may one day fill in the new. 
 Past the southern shores of Italy the great commerce of 
 the world has flowed for centuries ; at Venice and Genoa, 
 on her northern shores, the richest coffers and store- 
 houses of the Levant were emptied out. But owing to 
 the nature of the country, the lateral communications 
 between Italian ports run along the coast, and are singu- 
 larly open to attack. Her position, to borrow a phrase 
 from tactical studies on shore, is not sufficiently deep. 
 Again, the possession of Corsica by France, and of Malta 
 by ourselves, constitutes an eternal menace to her, and 
 the approaches to her harbours are flanked by foreign 
 Powers, as our ports flank the trade routes to the North 
 Sea and the Baltic. 
 
 Buckle traced the history of civilisation and growth 
 of a people's characteristics to climate, the influence of 
 mighty hills and other natural features. It is in no 
 fanciful spirit that the development of sea-power has 
 been similarly attributed to the physical conditions 
 under which nations have grown to manhood. The 
 unfruitfulness of the soil, the rigour of climate which is 
 inimicable to the agriculturist, may drive men from the 
 fields to find food and a means of livelihood on the sea. 
 When the mother-countr)- could not supply their neces- 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE 9 
 
 sities, men were spurred to seek them beyond the borders 
 of the realm. The prodigaHty of nature in one region 
 was called on to redress her inhospitality in another. 
 
 The wine and varied agricultural products of France 
 satisfied the needs of a population whose frugality was 
 not to be matched in other countries. The warm 
 climate of southern Europe did not call for the heating 
 and expensive foods on which life depended in the more 
 rigorous North. A Neapolitan might spend a happy 
 day basking in the sun, and warming himself for no- 
 thing ; the polenta, or maccaroni, which sustained him, 
 cost him little more. Only rich men could be comfort- 
 able farther North. Cold and hunger stimulated the 
 northern races to an active life. The raw winds and 
 bleak pastures of our islands pampered their children 
 but little, their energetic dispositions and ambition 
 demanded more than nature gave, and in foreign ad- 
 venture they sought the riches through which comfort 
 in a climate such as theirs was alone to be obtained. 
 Less eager spirits stayed at home to learn a trade and 
 earn wages with which they might purchase the neces- 
 saries of life. The adventurers abroad sent back raw 
 material to their brethren at home, who in turn manu- 
 factured it, and, when they had satisfied their wants, 
 sent the superfluity away again to the markets of the 
 world. 
 
 The palaces of Venice were raised on mud and slime. 
 The energy which nature gave the Venetians was a gift 
 more valuable than miles of fertile soil, and it was all 
 they can be said to have received. Holland,* which 
 among the present nations of the world has received 
 least from nature, owed her prosperity to the same 
 harshness that had driven our people far afield, and had 
 
 * Such is a theory as to growth of sea-power in Holland which the pages 
 of Captain Mahan's great book, " The Influence of Sea- Power on History," 
 have inculcated. 
 
ro FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE 
 
 compelled the Venetians to lead a strenuous existence. 
 The poverty of the soil compelled the dwellers in the 
 Netherlands to look for food in the sea. Fishermen 
 who caught more than they could eat soon developed 
 into traders, and a seafaring population offered a wide 
 recruiting-ground to a navy. Situated between France, 
 and the Baltic, and the great waterways of Germany, 
 Holland naturally absorbed much of the carrying trade 
 of Europe, and her growth, corresponding with the 
 withering of the commercial Italian Republics, soon 
 spread, until she overshadowed Venice and Genoa, and 
 absorbed the trade of the Levant. The carrying trade 
 of the mercantile world, as it then existed, gradually 
 fell more and more into her hands, until, in the earlier 
 half of the seventeenth century, she occupied the same 
 position in relation to the world's commerce that we 
 have so long enjoyed. 
 
 We may add other factors in the growth of sea-power 
 to these, however, and one which we must not overlook 
 is the influence of race and tradition. 
 
 It was the seductive shores of the Eastern Mediter- 
 ranean which produced the enterprising mariners and 
 self-denying colonists who first explored every creek 
 and headland of the seas known to the ancients. From 
 Tyre and Sidon, merchants bearing the rudiments of 
 culture and art and science amongst their costly bales, 
 penetrated to the most distant shores. And where they 
 landed, the factory, as our adventurers would have 
 called it, made its appearance, and a trade was set on 
 foot. If Holland was rescued from the waves by patient 
 industry, and was too poor and small to feed her 
 population, the country that gave birth to the Phceni- 
 cians was more insignificant still. Their proper home 
 on the Syrian coast was only some thirty miles long, 
 and not more than one mile wide,* and, even with its 
 
 * "Carthage and the Carthaginians," by Bosworth Smith. 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE ii 
 
 immediate settlements added on, made but a marvel- 
 lously small cradle for the rearing of so great a race. 
 Carthage owed her first origin to one of the same com- 
 mercial factories that these Phoenicians had dotted 
 round the coasts, but the energetic and warlike race 
 which founded that city was not content to settle down 
 and enjoy in quiet the acquisition gained. Each added 
 strip of territory was but a foothold for a further spring, 
 the gathering of new wealth only provided capital for 
 greater ventures. As with the Jews, so with the 
 Phoenicians, a marked individuality and character re- 
 mained everywhere with the race. The presence of 
 Phoenicians implied progress ; what its children put 
 their hands to prospered. In the general scramble 
 for wealth which took place among the tribes dwelling 
 on the borders of the Mediterranean, the enterprise and 
 intelligence of the Phoenicians enabled them to emerge 
 foremost, and grow so strong, that for a hundred years 
 they contested the empire of the world with the greatest 
 power of antiquity. Race here owed something, no 
 doubt, to circumstances and opportunity, but itself sup- 
 plied the touch of sacred fire that compelled success, 
 when the face of fate seemed set against it. 
 
 The courage and patient industry of the Flemings, too, 
 left its traces in the Netherlands. A Huguenot strain as- 
 serted its worth in our own islands, and in South Africa. 
 
 There were, however, other islands and other swamps 
 besides England and the Low Countries, other regions 
 with great seaboards and deep harbours, whose sons 
 have not embraced seafaring life, as did the inhabitants 
 of the Batavian marshes. The Celts of Ireland received 
 as little from Providence as did the men of Devon or 
 the Dutch. They did not interpret the lesson in the 
 same way, and even to this day the wealth of Irish 
 fisheries is largely exploited by the energies of foreigners, 
 not by that of the Irish themselves. 
 
12 FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE 
 
 On the other hand, the Danes and Norsemen who 
 invaded England brought with them the vigour and 
 enterprise of their race. The strain of the sea-rovers 
 which was thus introduced, mingled well with the 
 patient and industrious Saxon blood, and gave fire and 
 quickness to more solid qualities. The Norman or 
 Saxon strain of Raleigh and Drake and Howard had 
 that stiffening which turns to practical account the 
 imagination of the Celt, and if we owe much to Pro- 
 vidence which gave us the seaboard, much to adversity 
 which compelled us to make full use of it, we owe some- 
 thing also to that adventurous spirit which even the 
 remote descendants of the invading Normans have 
 shown that they still possess. 
 
 But whether they were the outcome of a congenital 
 instinct, or the result of religion, or of circumstances, 
 it is certain that the rise and progress of the Dutch 
 Republics bears a marked similarity to that of our 
 own country. At the height of her prosperity it has 
 been said that Holland could only feed one-eighth 
 of her population.* The remainder had to trust to 
 foreign aid. Holland depended, therefore, as absolutely 
 as we do through her sea-power on her commerce, 
 and when the disastrous war with England from 
 1653-54 put an end to her shipping she had to accept 
 a humiliating peace in order that her very existence 
 might be saved. 
 
 The weakness of a country that depends on foreign 
 resources is here writ large. As Holland must have 
 perished, so must we perish when our commercial 
 prosperity is destroyed. Her prosperity at home 
 depended, as ours now depends, on the maintenance 
 of power beyond the confines of a narrow territory. 
 It is not only a matter of food, as some seem to 
 
 * "The Inlliiciicc i)f Sc;i-l'ower 011 Ilislory," by Captain Mahan, 
 P- 37- 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE 13 
 
 think, but a matter of wages too. The sea-power of 
 England in Cromwell's time could not reach the land 
 frontiers of Holland. Starvation could have been 
 staved off by means of traffic on land, when the 
 supply of food from over sea was cut. But the wages 
 of her artisans and mechanics, as of ours, were de- 
 pendent on trade from abroad, and when that foreign 
 trade was destroyed her industries languished and her 
 labouring population was ruined effectually, because 
 the means of supporting wives and children were 
 taken from her. 
 
 The prosperity of Holland and that of England 
 were both the artificial products of an accidental 
 combination of circumstances demanding extraneous 
 support, and now, as in the past, the greater the pros- 
 perity the more abnormal will the conditions of life 
 become, the more open to interference, and the more 
 vulnerable to the buffets of misfortune. 
 
 It is necessary to constantly insist on the commercial 
 basis on which our sea-power and Empire rests, for 
 the fact is often overlooked, and while much anxiety 
 is spent upon the question of our food supply we hear 
 comparatively little of the danger a want of raw 
 material will bring with it. 
 
 Moreover, while the Empire rests on commerce, her 
 navy is supported by the mercantile marine. 
 
 The support which cargo-shipping has given, both 
 directly and indirectly, to our fleets of warships is 
 manifested, moreover, in the reserve power which a 
 large seafaring population affords to a navy. Speak- 
 ing within certain limitations, it is the characteristics 
 of a people rather than their numbers which make 
 them formidable. The quality of the potential recruits 
 is more important than their quantity. The population 
 of France at the end of the revolutionary wars was 
 bigger than that of England ; but greater difficulty was 
 
14 FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE 
 
 experienced in manning the French than the English 
 fleet, because France had a smaller mercantile marine, 
 and fewer families who lived on what the sea brought 
 them. Not only fewer seamen, but fewer of the arti- 
 ficers and artisans who are occupied in providing all the 
 adjuncts that shipping demands. The special manu- 
 factures that filled many a marine store in an English 
 seaport did not exist to anything like the same extent 
 across the Channel. Even if the ships could be as 
 rapidly and as well built as ours, which was indeed 
 the case, their final equipment, and the refitment of 
 others that had been already at sea, constituted a drain 
 on the resources of France that she could not meet 
 with the elasticity that belonged to us, her rivals. 
 There was less behind her fighting line than there 
 was behind that of England, less naval resources in 
 the country both as regards personnel and material. 
 
 To some it may appear that such a reserve of 
 strength and talent, if it can be called so, in a country 
 is not of the same importance now as heretofore, 
 because modern wars are supposed to be of such short 
 duration that the issues will be decided soon after 
 the first battles are joined, that there will be no time 
 to recuperate, that we must win immediately or go 
 under without hope. I think we heard more of the 
 short duration of modern campaigns before the war 
 in South Afrfca broke out than we have since or 
 are likely to hear in the future. 
 
 The wars which in modern times have ended rapidly 
 have evidenced the presence of careful preparation and 
 organisation for war in peace-time rather than the 
 deadliness of weapons. It was not superlative tactics, 
 not the precision 6{ their armament, not the impetus 
 of their attack, that enabled the Germans to dispose 
 of the French main armies between the beginning and 
 end of August 1870. Four years earlier good organisa- 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE 15 
 
 tion, careful training, and able strategy had been behind 
 the needle gun. The possession of the advantage 
 which a breechloader conferred undoubtedly weighed 
 down the scales against Austria, but the adoption of 
 such a weapon was none the less due to the same 
 wise forethought and thorough system of preparation 
 which ensured the German successes in both their great 
 wars before ever a shot was fired. 
 
 War waged intelligently has been swift and remorse- 
 less before Moltke or Bismarck were heard of. Could 
 modern weapons have made the campaigns of Austerlitz 
 or of Jena more rapid or decisive, or have retarded the 
 catastrophe of 181 5 ? 
 
 Have we any sure ground for supposing that war 
 on the sea will in respect of rapidity differ widely 
 from what we are taught by history to expect ? There 
 will be great and sudden catastrophes. What repre- 
 sents a vast sum of money will be swallowed up when 
 the waves close over a battleship, but, while information 
 and knowledge is as widely diffused as at present, 
 navies will be built much on the same lines. The ad- 
 vantage will scarcely always be with one side, and, 
 to put it at the lowest, need not always be against 
 us. One defeat, or even one campaign, will scarcely 
 be enough to give us our coup - de - grace \ while if 
 it do not, then reserves of shipbuilders, mechanics, 
 engineers, marine stores, and war material, in addition 
 to merchant ships and merchant sailors themselves, 
 cannot fail to make their value felt in the future as 
 in the past. 
 
 Money, and all that money can provide, must 
 always prove the sinews of war. To hold out a little 
 longer is what in an emergency has often turned the 
 scale, and not seldom when a leader has thought 
 himself beaten his opponent has acknowledged him 
 victorious. 
 
i6 FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE 
 
 In the dark days of the South African war just 
 ended many at home must have recalled the bitter 
 words of De Witt, quoted by Captain Mahan, to 
 illustrate the tale of the decline of Holland. " Never 
 in time of peace, and from fear of a rupture, will they 
 (the Dutch) take resolutions strong enough to lead 
 them to pecuniary sacrifices beforehand. The char- 
 acter of the Dutch is such that, unless danger stares 
 them in the face, they are indisposed to lay out money 
 in their own defence. I have to do with a people 
 who, liberal to profusion when they ought to economise, 
 are often sparing to avarice when they ought to spend." 
 In changing their clime the Dutch have, it would seem, 
 belied the old proverb, and have changed their 
 character too. 
 
 It is pertinent for us also to remember that a sea- 
 power which has been called into existence by com- 
 merce, and has, in turn, become necessary to an empire 
 which rests on the same basis, has a more beneficent 
 influence, a more humane mission, than any other mani- 
 festation of military force. A sea-power which exists to 
 promote exchange and barter does not only enrich one 
 class of the community, but the country which possesses 
 it, as well. It likewise "blesses him that gives, and 
 him that takes." The demand for certain commodities, 
 and the possibility of satisfying the demand, creates an 
 industry which is occupied in the production of what is 
 needed. Trade benefits two sets of persons, those who 
 buy what they want, and those who .sell what they do 
 not require. The empire which sends its fleets to distant 
 peoples, bearing in them the gift of trade, is therefore 
 essentially a civilising and beneficent power ; and, resting 
 as it does on the interests it calls into being and de- 
 velops, is planted on a broader base, has deeper founda- 
 tions, than one which is the creation of autocratic 
 influence, and strives to satisfy a greed and rapacity 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE 17 
 
 which are purely selfish, and return nothing in the way 
 of exchange. Wars of conquest undertaken, whether 
 by sea or land, in the wantonness of personal pride, to 
 satiate ambition, or to enhance the dignity of an indi- 
 vidual or of his dynasty, bring no increased comfort to 
 the people who are expected to glow with admiration 
 at the tale of glory. Did the people of France enjoy 
 greater personal comfort or happiness after the victories 
 of Louis XIV., or of Napoleon than they did after the 
 defeats of Waterloo or Gravelotte? Did the British 
 farmer find his lot brighten when Marlborough won 
 Blenheim and the trophies of Dettingen were carried 
 home? When Frederick added Silesia to his dominions 
 did the golden age seem to the Prussian peasantry tc 
 have suddenly begun ? Surely not. The big grenadiers 
 marched and counter-marched, Seydlitz and Ziethen 
 wheeled and charged, labours unexampled were crowned 
 with bays of an immortal growth ; but in many a lonely 
 countryside the ploughman cut his furrow and ate his 
 frugal meal, and very likely never knew that war was 
 going on at all, died all ignorant of Rossbach, and un- 
 illumined by the glories of the Great King. 
 
 Swift wrote truly when he said that whoever could 
 make two ears of corn, or two blades of grass, to grow 
 upon a spot of ground where only one grew before, 
 would deserve better of mankind, and do more essential 
 service to his country, than the whole race of politicians 
 put together. Infinitely more he might have added, than 
 those who in pursuit of glory carried on aggressive war, 
 sowing thereby the seeds of future strife, and future 
 poverty, and often failing to reap substantial harvests, 
 even in their own lifetime, by their dearly - bought 
 victories. 
 
 It was the original character of our foreign expedi- 
 tions, this absence of set purpose in aggrandisement, 
 that has made our colonisation successful, and which 
 B 
 
1 8 FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE 
 
 differentiates it from that of Spain. We took away, but 
 we brought something in return, supplied and created 
 a market at one and the same moment. Our factories 
 were fed from abroad, and, in return, satisfied the needs 
 of foreigners too. Thus a mercantile marine, and a 
 carrying trade were called into being, new industries 
 were created such as gave wages and employment to 
 the population who could not find them on the farmlands 
 of a restricted country. Riches acquired through the 
 commerce established by colonisation were well earned 
 by patience and parsimony, were appreciated because 
 they were the prize of self-denial and industry. The 
 qualities which made men succeed in their acquisition 
 appealed to the moral sense of others. Great merchants 
 in England were respected, not despised. The aristo- 
 cracy of Holland, and of the great trading cities of 
 Europe, was a commercial aristocracy, but still a proud 
 one, proud of its achievements, of its integrity, of its 
 position won by hard work and shrewd good sense. 
 The hatchments of such great families loom as impres- 
 sively through the misty aisles of many a mediaeval 
 church or cathedral, where we may see them hanging 
 still, as do the tombs of warlike princes, political church- 
 men, or mighty men-at-arms. In our own country the 
 great merchants and bankers have merged into the 
 nobility, until a financial has become as distinguished 
 as a feudal pedigree, and the two are not seldom found 
 combined. 
 
 Gold and precious stones acquired and hoarded 
 merely for the pride of their possession do not 
 ameliorate the lot of a poor people, and do not re- 
 duplicate their influence. The treasure of an Indian 
 Maharajah may amount to millions, but while it is 
 lying hidden beneath the floor of an inner chamber of 
 the palace, his people may be starving, and it is not 
 benefiting him. Examples of such senseless hoarding 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE 19 
 
 were to be found not many years ago. The wealth 
 extracted by Spain and Portugal from the mines of 
 South America, if not thus stupidly rendered profitless, 
 was almost as criminally wasted when dissipated in 
 reckless profusion, and with no desire to make the 
 expenditure useful or remunerative. 
 
 The sight of sudden wealth arrived at without patient 
 labour, or prolonged self-denial, was, and is, a bad ex- 
 ample to a people. Soldiers and adventurers whose wild 
 wandering life appealed to man's natural instincts could, 
 by a bold venture, satisfy the dreams of avarice, while 
 the slow process of the counting-house was accumulating 
 only enough to make a living. A nobility, originally 
 endowed by the bounty of a sovereign, soon held mer- 
 chants in contempt, regarded wealth as the necessary 
 appanage of their titles and degrees ; and while a 
 grandee was proud of his possessions because he had 
 inherited them from his forefathers, a Dutch or English 
 merchant was proud of them because he had earned 
 them for himself. 
 
 Moreover, in a Republic like Holland, or constitu- 
 tional country like England, the race of life was a more 
 open one than where the will of the sovereign might 
 distribute and dispose of the revenues of the country 
 amongst his courtiers as he pleased. In these freer 
 countries commerce was the surest, if the most labori- 
 ous, means of acquiring money, and that position and 
 power which in a free country money cannot fail to 
 bring with it. 
 
 The desire to trade, and the facilities towards trading 
 which a good seaboard gave, soon combined together 
 to produce powerful warships as a defence to vessels 
 bearing valuable cargoes, and the germ of a great navy 
 was sown amongst the cargo ships of a mercantile 
 marine. 
 
 Where private wealth may carry with it all the 
 
20 FOUNDATIONS OF ElVIPIRE 
 
 dignity and consideration that attaches to high nobility 
 in other countries, and, if ambition be in that direction, 
 will in due course achieve nobility too, men will boldly 
 risk fortunes, and venture savings which, under other 
 conditions, they will furtively put away. Private enter- 
 prise too has this advantage over official action, that 
 where the latter may be diverted from its purpose by 
 political and other considerations, the former will con- 
 tinue patiently and doggedly in its course. The policy 
 of a trading company is single-minded. Party does not 
 influence it. Its resources are not diverted from their 
 object and turned into other channels according as the 
 exigences of the public exchequer may demand. 
 
 While the foreign and colonial policy of an English 
 Government may be vacillating, hesitating, and per- 
 plexing, the operations of its great trading companies 
 are business-like, vigorous, enterprising, and to be relied 
 upon. The business man knows what he wants, and 
 marches straight to his object. If he cannot reach it at 
 once he waits for a better opportunity, but the ulterior 
 goal is always the same. He will allow no outside 
 influences to disturb his plans or interfere with the 
 methods which he has found to be the best. 
 
 How great appears the advantage of such action 
 compared with that of governments which are often 
 obliged to trim their sails to catch the air of popularity, 
 and must direct their policy according to the variations 
 of the political barometer ! 
 
 There are advantages then in the anomalous system 
 by which our Empire has been put together, and that it 
 is due to private enterprise is the factor which has given 
 it its strength and durability. 
 
 But in a constitutional country such as England the 
 ruler reflects the ideas of his subjects, and if he cannot 
 direct, may mould and influence the destinies of the 
 country. 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE 21 
 
 The rulers of England who followed Elizabeth 
 listened to the echo of her stirring time, and asserted 
 and fostered our supremacy at sea. If the foreign 
 policy of Cromwell was not sagacious, it had at anyrate 
 the merit of being strong, and he grasped with a soldier's 
 instinct where the decisive factors in the struggle with 
 Holland lay. No despot ever maintained our pride at 
 sea more jealousy than did he, and arrogant is the only 
 term to distinguish the attitude adopted by his ships, 
 with his consent, towards those of the rest of the world. 
 Thus it came about that even the convulsions of the 
 Revolution did not turn us from our course. The broad 
 lines of our naval policy were unaltered from the close 
 of the fifteenth century to the great peace at the 
 beginning of the nineteenth, and now that the British 
 people have gradually absorbed and taken the manage- 
 ment of all the institutions of the country into their hands 
 there are signs that they are determined to make our 
 supremacy at sea their first duty and most pressing care. 
 
 Colbert, the Minister of Louis XIV., also perfectly 
 understood the factors which produce sea-power, and 
 Captain Mahan has admirably illustrated his conten- 
 tions by showing how, while Colbert enjoyed the Royal 
 favour and possessed the opportunity he threw all his 
 energy and industry into the development of naval 
 strength for his country. What private enterprise in 
 England and Holland had called into being by a natural 
 process, was in France to be the product of a highly- 
 centralised official intervention such as is characteristic 
 of all French efforts. The most decisive way of obtain- 
 ing the object in view was perfectly clearly understood. 
 The soil, naturally adapted in England and Holland for 
 the particular growth, was to be artificially prepared in 
 France for the production of the same luxuriant crops. 
 Production was to be stimulated ; trade encouraged ; 
 shipping provided ; colonies and markets established. 
 
2 2 FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE 
 
 The success of such schemes clearly depended on the 
 life of their originator, and on his retaining the power, 
 conferred by the favour of a despot, of carrying them 
 into effect. It is enough to state briefly here, that the 
 sunshine of Royal favour waned, the saplings forced 
 into growth by an artificial process withered ; the 
 sheltering hand withdrawn, the seedlings did not fructify. 
 The imagination of the King was caught by the glow of 
 conquest and annexation on shore. The plans which it 
 would have needed years of patient endeavour to perfect 
 were forgotten. Worse than all, Louis quarrelled with 
 Holland, and entered into an alliance with England to 
 destroy her great rival on the sea. An incredibly foolish 
 act, for it permanently secured the sea-power of England ; 
 and while the will-o'-the-wisp of glory led France far 
 beyond her frontiers, and emptied her exchequer, the 
 prosperity of these islands grew year by year. The 
 truth was again illustrated that expansion by sea pro- 
 duces colonies and increases a country's wealth, while 
 aggrandisement by land impoverishes it by the expendi- 
 ture that is necessitated, and mortgages the resources of 
 the future in furnishing the cause of further strife and 
 fresh depletion. 
 
 But while the commercial basis of the Empire has 
 been here insisted on because the problem of Imperial 
 defence cannot be completely grasped until that funda- 
 mental principle and all that follows from it has been 
 recognised, it is necessary also to lay stress on the 
 dangers that may lurk in a blind and unintelligent 
 acceptance of the fact. 
 
 A commercial spirit is essentially selfish, the pursuit 
 of private gain an incentive to national expansion and 
 progress which is by no means elevating. Self-reliance, 
 honesty, patience, caution, and assiduity will doubtless 
 take men far, but more unselfish impulses are needed 
 in a great national crisis. The more military virtues of 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE 23 
 
 self-abnegation, subordination, personal courage, quick 
 decision, and patriotism will alone preserve a nation 
 great. 
 
 To seek money for the sake of what money will buy 
 is a motive which will not spur men to face cheerfully 
 great sacrifices, to run great personal risks, or endure 
 prolonged privations. 
 
 Not to look beyond commercial profit is to be politi- 
 cally shortsighted. To gain a point in the easiest way 
 is not always the soundest course. Money will buy 
 many things — men to fight for you amongst others — but 
 the nation that condescends to mercenaries has already 
 lost its manhood. The acquisition of riches is so fasci- 
 nating that soon everything that interferes with it is 
 regarded as an interference to be kept away at all costs. 
 Men see things as they wish to see them. An army be- 
 comes an unnecessary expense, and can be got together 
 when wanted. It is apparently cheaper to do so than 
 to keep an adequate one always in existence. War is to 
 be avoided at the sacrifice of honour and dignity, so that 
 the price of food may be kept low, and the progress of 
 trade be uninterrupted. 
 
 Yet the greater the volume of commerce grows, the 
 wider the arms of the Empire are forced to stretch, the 
 more must we come into contact with the various peoples 
 of the world. The friction of clashing interests in 
 commerce produce heat. Punitive expeditions have to 
 be set on foot. The thousand channels of trade bear 
 within them the seeds of a thousand little wars. Men 
 by no means cowardly, but absorbed in the pursuit of 
 wealth alone, may soon shut their eyes to all other con- 
 siderations except buying and selling, and grudge the 
 precautions that perhaps interfere with trade because 
 they cause expense. An isolation is next demanded for 
 us, liberty to toil in a manner independent of the rest of 
 the world. If colonies and vast foreign possessions 
 
24 FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE 
 
 necessitate a different policy, they may be allowed to 
 drift away, to swim alone if strong, if not, to sink into 
 the possession of a more energetic or far-seeing nation. 
 It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that such views 
 as these were held at a period when our commercial 
 position was unrivalled, and our sea-power more un- 
 challenged than at present. 
 
 The presence of fleets and ships at foreign ports, and 
 on our trade-routes throughout the world, was a need 
 brought practically home to those connected with any 
 form of commerce over sea, and therefore the necessity 
 for an efficient navy was never so completely lost sight 
 of as was the need of an army held ready for action too. 
 But even the navy was allowed to dwindle, in the days 
 when the story of the growth and preservation of the 
 great empire that had descended to them was forgotten 
 by the people of this country. 
 
 Of late years our awakening from a selfish dream, 
 where we figured as the sole heirs of the world's wealth, 
 and other nations were to accept the situation, and allow 
 our operations to be unmolested, has been somewhat 
 sudden. The spirit of commerce has informed other 
 great nations not disposed to accept our supremacy 
 unchallenged : has worked its influence in the same 
 manner as history has taught us to expect ; and in quite 
 recent years another great sea-Power, which is also a 
 land-Power of the first magnitude, has been called into 
 being by commercial necessities. 
 
 Such striving for sea as well as land strength evi- 
 dences to us the need a great empire feels for both. 
 We too feel that need, and the part that our land forces 
 will have to play remains to be discussed in a later 
 chapter. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 THE ANALOGY BETWEEN LAND AND SEA WARFARE, 
 AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON ONE ANOTHER 
 
 There have been so many land and so few naval wars 
 of late that it has almost become customary in this 
 country to use the word war with reference to operations 
 conducted upon land, and to regard sea-warfare as 
 something technical and abnormal, lying outside the 
 area covered by the general term. 
 
 What is called " the art of war," and its history, is 
 often treated as though it excluded naval combats 
 entirely, and in the great majority of works bearing 
 upon the subject that part of it which deals with the 
 sea is altogether omitted. Similarly the term military 
 is almost always used in its narrow sense, which com- 
 prehends only operations on shore, while such expres- 
 sions as " military men " and " military action " are 
 in the popular notion associated with the land forces 
 of the country alone. Amongst other explanations 
 of this circumstance, a salient one is to be found in 
 the fact that long ago all seamen were not, as it were, 
 combatant, and that there was a sharp distinction 
 between that part of a crew which simply propelled 
 the ship, and that which was trained to fight and had 
 nothing to do with navigation. The men who worked 
 the great oars of the triremes and galleys simply 
 played the part filled in modern days by screw-pro- 
 pellers and paddle-wheels. They took the fighting 
 machine where they were ordered ; their duties were 
 25 
 
26 THE ANALOGY BETWEEN 
 
 simply mechanical, and ended when collision occurred. 
 In succeeding ages there often existed a similar dif- 
 ference between the men who navigated and those 
 who formed what may be termed the garrison of the 
 ship, just as down to quite modern times the drivers 
 of our batteries were civilians who had performed their 
 share of duty when they had brought the guns into 
 position to be unlimbered. They conducted a gun 
 in the same manner as they would drive a farm-waggon 
 or a team of horses in the plough. But thin partitions 
 divided soldier, sailor, or civilian. 
 
 Down to quite recent periods there appeared to be 
 nothing incongruous in a man figuring at one moment 
 on horseback as a general, and at another on the poop 
 as an admiral. Anthony and Octavius Caesar fought 
 their quarrel out at sea with the same readiness and 
 dexterity as they would have shown on shore. Don 
 John of Austria was distinguished as a general before 
 he gained one of "the most decisive naval victories of 
 history at Lepanto. Raleigh was prepared to command 
 on either element. 
 
 A born cavalry soldier like Prince Rupert dealt his 
 most successful strokes when in command, not of 
 horsemen, but of ships. Monk was both admiral and 
 general ; while, on the other hand, a Doge, such as 
 Dandolo or Morosini, was equally at home in a sea- 
 fight or a siege, and Admirals Bonnivet and Coligny 
 may be quoted as affording examples of the interven- 
 tion of seamen on shore. Even our artillery was 
 amphibious in its nature not more than a century 
 ago, when examples of batteries serving on board ship 
 are to be found, — the name, " Matrosses," by which 
 the ordinary privates, as distinguished from the skilled 
 gunners, were known, revealing the kinship to the 
 sailor, and surviving as an official designation till 
 quite modern times. Certain of our regiments have also 
 
LAND AND SEA WARFARE 27 
 
 had the honour to see service on board ship, while 
 in these latter times our navy have almost altogether 
 gained their laurels fighting side by side with our 
 land forces. 
 
 No further apology for my desire to regard war in 
 its broadest aspect, and to try and note the points of 
 analogy that exist between the art of its application 
 by land and on the sea, is perhaps needed. But if it 
 be, let us find it in reflecting that we are islanders, 
 that war, wherever waged, is the same effort of force 
 to bring about a result which milder methods have 
 failed to procure, and that in our case some part at 
 least of that effort must be a naval one. In any case, 
 I believe that in a discussion of Imperial defence for 
 a nation such as ours, whose army and navy must 
 necessarily be interdependent and complementary to 
 one another, it is desirable to find as many points of 
 contact between the two as possible, to widen the basis 
 of argument and appreciation as far as one can. 
 
 And, in truth, the broad principles of war are ap- 
 plicable to and are accepted by soldiers and sailors 
 alike. Commanders are guided by the same strategical 
 maxims both by land and sea, and of late it has not 
 been unusual to find exponents of land warfare mar- 
 shalling the views and quoting the words of Captain 
 Mahan, who has made sea warfare his special study, 
 and who has formulated his chief opinions only with 
 reference to it. 
 
 That there are special factors in both methods of 
 fighting quite outside universal application is, of course, 
 the case. They must be recognised and allowed for. 
 To establish an analogy is fascinating, but may prove 
 misleading if in the endeavour to find similarity we 
 press too far, allow our wishes to influence our judg- 
 ment, or let fanciful ideas take possession of us. 
 
 On the other hand, an unknown science is best 
 
28 THE ANALOGY BETWEEN 
 
 approached through one which is famiHar ; and, if the 
 latter can illustrate the former, to appeal from what 
 is known to what is unknown is a sure method of 
 rousing interest. To many who read military history, 
 and can appreciate its teaching, naval history, as applied 
 to sea warfare nowadays, is a sealed book, because it is 
 regarded as dealing with something essentially technical 
 and mysterious — a matter which unprofessional men 
 cannot understand, a science which the constant ap- 
 pearance of new construction and armament has placed 
 more or less in a state of flux. Yet I believe the 
 broad principles of naval warfare remain the same, 
 whether sails or steam propel fleets, and the great 
 laws which govern the application of force either on 
 land or sea are still potent, whether ironclads and 
 torpedo boats, or three-deckers and fireships form the 
 armaments of the age. 
 
 It will, then, be a distinct assistance to those who 
 are studying war on shore to be able to apply to that 
 on the sea, with which Imperial defence is bound up, 
 some of the principles they have been in the habit of 
 following, and to find the same causes producing the 
 same results on either element. 
 
 Besides, an empire so extended as is ours demands 
 for its defence a special and universal force ; able to 
 act both by land and sea, and to be handled in a 
 liberal grasp that gathers army and navy together into 
 its hand, and wields them together, now in one way 
 and now in another, according as the situation demands. 
 A war for us can never mean, or ought never to mean, a 
 purely land war. A purely naval war can be conceived 
 of more easily, but that, as will be shown in a later 
 chapter, can only have a limited scope, and when it 
 rises to the dignity of a great struggle the intervention 
 of an army will surely be demanded. 
 
 But for purposes of Imperial defence our forces of 
 
LAND AND SEA WARFARE 29 
 
 every kind should be regarded as available for the direc- 
 tion of one intellect. Some will be of one nature, some 
 of another, different tools to meet various difficulties, 
 but capable of being directed by one central organism 
 which understands the qualifications and utilities of 
 each. 
 
 Approaching the subject from what, for want of a 
 better term, must be called the military standpoint — 
 that which is most familiar to the great majority of 
 us — we are called on to remember that the most ele- 
 mentary of strategical maxims enjoins a general to 
 ensure the safety of his communications. 
 
 A secure line of supply is absolutely essential to the 
 army of a civilised power. Through it flows the nourish- 
 ment and recuperative power which secure to it life and 
 being as an armed force. To cut it is to sever an artery, 
 to destroy it means death. Therefore the great strategists 
 teach us that if we wish to strike a decisive and paralysing 
 blow, our object, while we safeguard our own, should be 
 to assail the communications of our opponent. 
 
 It is precisely for the same consideration that pre- 
 dominant sea-power is demanded by Imperial defence. 
 Secure lines of supply and intercourse between its 
 component parts are as vitally necessary to an empire 
 as they are to an army. 
 
 A great fortress in isolation becomes a splendid tomb. 
 A great army cut off on distant shores has found its 
 grave. 
 
 When Mack capitulated at Ulm, and Cornwallis at 
 Yorktown, Bazaine at Metz, or Menou at Alexandria, 
 the same forces were at work. 
 
 Imperial strategy demands naval supremacy as a first 
 postulate in our schemes of defence with the same 
 uncompromising austerity that inflicts condign punish- 
 ment on the general who neglects to safeguard his 
 connection with his base. 
 
go THE ANALOGY BETWEEN 
 
 We did not always see it so, however. Perhaps the 
 very variety of the ever-changing ocean, Protean in its 
 shifting aspects, baffled us. To some it seemed, I might 
 even say seems, to appeal as a vast obstacle, a wide 
 defence set by Providence round our favoured isles, — 
 " the moat defensive to a house," of which Shakespeare 
 wrote. To such minds it seems we can always rest 
 secure inside our impassable barrier ; it is only when we 
 rashly venture forth that we run risks and danger. 
 
 But to others, now I am glad to think the vast 
 majority, it represents an easy medium for transport, 
 and offers to those who have the enterprise, and possess 
 its secret, the securest means of reaching an opponent. 
 
 For it is always open to access, can never be over- 
 crowded, is impervious to injury, and, save at the ex- 
 tremities, is unaffected by heat or cold. 
 
 But its very openness and vastness are confounding. 
 Its immensity overpowers us. The unrestricted freedom 
 of its space bewilders, and sets our feeble resources at 
 defiance. 
 
 On shore many natural features come to our assist- 
 ance ; there are many adventitious circumstances that 
 may favour our action, or hamper the activity of our 
 foes. The physical geography and topography of a 
 country must often assert their influence. A great river 
 may safeguard a flank, a huge mountain-chain bar the 
 path of an opponent. The roughness of the country 
 may render movement away from roads impossible ; no 
 bridges or points of passage may break a river line. 
 The tired troops which oppose us may be unequal to 
 the march a wide turning movement will entail. The 
 tracks and roads may not run in the direction where we 
 may have most reason to dread the attempt being made. 
 But on the ocean there arc no limits to freedom of 
 manoeuvre. Armed forces afloat can be carried just 
 where the cunning or caprice of a commander may 
 
LAND AND SEA WARFARE 31 
 
 dictate. No natural obstacles or artificial channels pre- 
 scribe his course : he carries with him what he needs ; 
 unwearied by day and night he pursues his silent way, 
 free and untrammelled in his flight as a sea-gull on 
 the wing. 
 
 The very existence of such a force at large constitutes 
 a menace. That it exists at all, when we know not 
 where it is, will in itself bring about a sense of uneasi- 
 ness and misgiving. It is not enough to temporarily 
 ward off the cause of anxiety. The phantom must be 
 laid by personal touch ; it must be grappled with and 
 discredited for ever if our minds are to be at ease. 
 
 To wipe the hostile ships out of existence, to anni- 
 hilate their capacity for mischief at the very outset is 
 the best course. But to destroy you must get to close 
 quarters, and we may not be able at once to find our 
 foe. 
 
 In that case, our attitude must be so confident, our 
 aggression so bold as we set forth to do it, that we shall 
 compel the enemy to believe that we can do it. The 
 giant's strength may be so obvious as to scare away all 
 chance of opposition. The German fleets did not at- 
 tempt to pick up the gage of France in 1870. The 
 Russian ships were content to acknowledge the superior- 
 ity of the Turks seven years later. Before a shot was 
 fired during the Crimean War,the Alliesheld a supremacy 
 as absolute as had fallen to us after the costly triumph 
 of Trafalgar. 
 
 To establish this predominance at once is essential 
 to us, for the special characteristics of naval warfare 
 demand that the supremacy we seek for our maritime 
 force must be quite indefeasible, and beyond the risk 
 even of challenge. 
 
 For naval force, strong as elemental nature herself, 
 comes and passes as viewless as the wind and lightning. 
 No ruts or tracks or debris of any kind mark the paths 
 
32 THE ANALOGY BETWEEN 
 
 of ships ; the burnt-out camp fires, the refuse, the dead 
 animals, which strew the path of an army, are nowhere 
 to be seen. The swirling furrows close up behind the 
 keels, the foaming lather of the screw melts away. 
 When a ship has passed the waves destroy every sign 
 of her existence. Eloquent verse has not failed to sing 
 this matchless quality of the ocean. Ten thousand 
 fleets sweep over her in vain, and inflame the imagina- 
 tion of the poet, but to the soldier their pathless flight 
 has a very practical significance ; because, when on the 
 sea we lose sight of our opponent, we can never know- 
 where we may light on him again. 
 
 Evasion is more easy for ships than for armies for 
 another reason too. They need follow no given paths. 
 Even in this crowded world the wide stretches of the 
 oceans are still lonely. Even in these busy times you 
 may steam for days and never see a sail. On the ocean 
 there are no inhabitants to give information, no stragglers 
 to pick up. 
 
 The flight, too, may be absolutely continuous. Men 
 feed and sleep, as it were, on their horses, and what 
 carries them along never wearies. Did conditions such 
 as these prevail on land, few leaders could sleep at 
 nights, and wars would be short indeed. The opponent 
 could never be accounted for, there would be no know- 
 ing where next he might appear, no breathing-time, no 
 rest, no refitting. In South Africa, where the veldt was 
 often almost as easily traversed as the sea, and the 
 enemy had at times a monopoly of mobility, we experi- 
 enced circumstances which approximated to those I 
 have imagined. The rules of strategy did not therefore 
 apply ; the conditions were abnormal, the odds against 
 us almost overpowering. 
 
 The difficulty as to protection of communications in 
 South Africa reflect, then, in some measure those that 
 confront us when we study Imperial defence. To pre- 
 
LAND AND SEA WARFARE 33 
 
 serve our line of communication, military and com- 
 mercial, on the waters, a superiority in numbers of ships 
 which is unchallengable must be sought. Mobility 
 being equal, our strength must be ubiquitous. For we 
 can launch no naval and military expedition with any 
 but a gambler's hope of ultimate success until all doubts 
 as to the preservation of its connection with its original 
 base have been dissipated. The case is even stronger ; 
 we must preserve our ability to supply, not only our 
 expeditions, but our people at home. 
 
 It is in these respects that the analogy between land 
 and sea operations fails us, and these special attributes 
 of the sea warn us not to press our argument too far. 
 
 On shore, even though the menace of interruption 
 can be more effectively guarded against, a prudent 
 and capable leader will shed part of his fighting 
 strength as he forges ahead, and on the day of battle 
 can rarely bring all his troops into action. Part of 
 his force must be left to guard his base ; ports and 
 depots on the route will demand garrisons. He can 
 only fling anything like his whole might against an 
 opponent when, by doing so, he at the same time 
 either covers his own base, or is confident in its having 
 been made impregnable by others. 
 
 Moreover, in land warfare the needs of the army 
 in the field are paramount. The civil population of 
 a hostile country are usually left to provide for their 
 own existence ; the lines of communication bring little 
 or nothing into the country but what is intended for 
 the invaders themselves. We know that it has not 
 been so in South Africa — a fact which is only another 
 example of the extraordinary conditions that rendered 
 our recent war an abnormal one — but in Imperial 
 warfare, where the navy plays so prominent a part, 
 the necessity of establishing bases or lines of communica- 
 tion for our armed forces is scarcely of more importance 
 C 
 
34 THE ANALOGY BETWEEN 
 
 than that which imposes on us the duty of doing so 
 in the interests of our civil population and mercantile 
 marine. Trade, and free intercourse for trade, are as 
 necessary to the health of our Empire as is the free 
 flow of the vital fluid to our bodies. Without it, we 
 could not bear the weight of our weapons, far less 
 use them with effect. 
 
 The obligation to secure an almost sacred immunity 
 from interruption for our communications throughout 
 the Empire grows out of the peculiar characteristics 
 of war on the sea, and reminds us of a special phase 
 of naval strategy which a few years ago was so much 
 in men's mouths that it may bore rather than interest 
 those who remember the old controversies that raged 
 round it. 
 
 A few words on the " fleet in being " — that portentous 
 phrase that has played so prominent a part in dis- 
 cussions on national defence, can scarcely, however, 
 be avoided. 
 
 Admiral Herbert, Lord Torrington, coined the ex- 
 pressive term. When censured for not engaging the 
 French fleet more decisively at the battle of Beachy 
 Head, loth July 1690, he defended himself as follows: — 
 
 " Had I fought otherwise . . . the kingdom had lain 
 open to an invasion. What, then, would have become 
 of us in the absence of his Majesty, and most of the 
 land forces? As it was, most men were in fear that 
 the French would invade ; but I was always of an- 
 other opinion, for I always said that whilst we had 
 a ^ee^ in being they would not dare to make an 
 attempt." 
 
 This power of latent menace exerted by a " fleet in 
 being" has been rightly extolled by those who write 
 of naval strategy as so vast a deterrent, that, while 
 it exists, it is a serious bar to any enterprises against 
 us in the nature of invasion. 
 
LAND AND SEA WARFARE 35 
 
 That stout Elizabethan seaman, Wynter,* shrewdly 
 held the Duke of Parma's force at Dunkirk to be 
 powerless for mischief till the Dutch fleet, which hung 
 upon the flank of his projected movement, had been 
 disposed of. Soldiers can perfectly appreciate the 
 strategic principle that underlies the contention of the 
 naval men whose sagacity perceives the power of 
 the "fleet in being"; but the theory may be pushed 
 too far, and has indeed been exaggerated by some of 
 its too ardent supporters. There is no more magic in 
 the fleet than in the phrase. The force of the threat 
 which the fleet in being holds over us depends on 
 the relative size of the fleets engaged, on its being 
 too strong to be masked — to put the matter in a 
 nutshell, on its being able to carry out what it threatens 
 to do. Its power at sea is precisely that of a force 
 jeopardising the safety of a line of communication on 
 shore, and is exerted in just the same manner. The 
 power of evasion possessed by ships, which has already 
 been noticed, certainly demands that the force exerting 
 the menace be mpre closely watched than need be 
 necessary on land ; but that is simply a difference in 
 degree not in kind, and no one will deny that it is 
 possible to mask a naval force, or to fend off" its attack 
 by a detachment, provided its strength be not such 
 as to render such expedients hopeless. The main 
 principle is precisely similar both on sea and shore, 
 and is capable of illustration from land as well as naval 
 campaigns. 
 
 No general will invade a country while a hostile force 
 can fall on his lines of communication. To do so would 
 be to act in defiance of the first essential of offensive 
 strategy — i.e. the establishment of secure bases and 
 lines of supply. But that does not mean that because 
 there is a hostile force somewhere in the field upon 
 
 * " The Navy and the Nation," by Clarke and Thursfield, p. i6o. 
 
36 THE ANALOGY BETWEEN 
 
 your flank it is not possible to neutralise it and pursue 
 your forward progress undisturbed. 
 
 It is simply a question of throwing out a sufficiently 
 strong flank guard ; a body of men which in large 
 operations may be numbered by tens of thousands, 
 and in small may be a matter of a company or two. 
 When the Russians first invaded Bulgaria in 1877, the 
 Turkish forces in the quadrilateral menaced their left 
 flank, while another army of the Sultan's at Widdin 
 threatened their right. Strong flank guards on either 
 side were detached to ward off both dangers, and 
 between the two protective walls thus formed the 
 Russian advance pushed forward. In the final phase 
 of the campaign of 18 14, which had been illuminated 
 by quite a coruscation of genius on the part of 
 Napoleon, the presence of the Emperor with a force 
 behind the Allies, nearer to Vienna, as he expressed 
 it, than they were to Paris, was not enough to stop 
 them from pushing on. The situation had been in- 
 correctly gauged. Other factors in the problem out- 
 weighed the menace to their communications, and 
 Napoleon had to acknowledge himself beaten. The 
 " fleet in being " has no more the intrinsic and absolute 
 properties of an amulet or talisman to shield from 
 harm than any other fundamental principle of strategy, 
 but is potent or the reverse, according as it is in 
 harmony with the circumstances of the moment or 
 not. As a matter of fact, there was a Russian fleet 
 in being in the Black Sea when the allied fleets pursued 
 their policy of invasion without let or hindrance. The 
 fleet was there, and in strength — fifteen sailing ships 
 of the line, twelve war steamers, and some brigs and 
 frigates comprising it ; but it was not strong enough 
 to exert any determining influence on events, although 
 it did exert a certain menace, the disregard of which 
 might be termed rash by some. 
 
LAND AND SEA WARFARE 37 
 
 The Japanese also invaded the Corea a few years ago 
 when the Chinese fleet was still undefeated. On that 
 occasion they exhibited the fallacy of a blind adherence 
 to theory, but acknowledged the truth of the principle 
 it inculcated by proceeding to engage and destroy the 
 hostile fleet as soon as the landing had been effected. 
 
 Again the element of time enters into the problem. 
 A fleeting opportunity may be seized, and in a little 
 time a vast amount of mischief may be done. If the 
 intention is to do as much mischief as possible, even at 
 the sacrifice of the weapon which accomplishes it, an 
 expedition might be regarded as having accomplished 
 its purpose, even if its connection with its base were 
 cut, and it ultimately had to surrender. 
 
 Or a force may hope to establish a new base in the 
 raided country, and from thence, by alliances or local 
 support, derive supplies to enable it to do mischief 
 The end will no doubt be that of the French army 
 which landed in Egypt in 1798. But three weeks' or 
 three months' warfare might, under other circumstances, 
 prove as considerable a diversion and annoj/ance as 
 those three years in Egypt proved, and the price might 
 not be regarded as prohibitive by a state that had a 
 vast command of men. 
 
 What has been said is by no means intended to dis- 
 parage or discredit the value of the strategic counter- 
 stroke, potent both by land and sea, on which the 
 theory of the "fleet in being" is really grounded, 
 but to point out that it must be qualified by circum- 
 stances in the same way as every other principle of war. 
 Again, it is certain that forces afloat are invested with 
 the all-pervading characteristics of the element which 
 bears them. While ships are still borne upon the waters, 
 they may confront you unexpectedly, like the " message 
 from the sea" which the waves carry in the most un- 
 looked-for direction when the vessel has disappeared. 
 
38 THE ANALOGY BETWEEN 
 
 It follows that, where operations on the sea are 
 concerned, fixed defences can never alone guarantee 
 the safety of foreign possessions, or keep the road to 
 them open. We cannot build lines of blockhouses 
 through the deep, and we know that nothing short of 
 such a measure will sometimes suffice to preserve com- 
 munications by restricting the activity of a mobile 
 enemy. 
 
 Fast steamers on the waves represent the ponies of 
 the Boers upon the veldt. But fixed defences may, 
 nevertheless, free the fleet on precisely the same prin- 
 ciple as fortresses or blockhouses may release troops. 
 
 Ships are, indeed, as much wasted when utilised to 
 protect naval bases or coaling-stations as field armies 
 are when told off to remain inactive and cover fortresses 
 Whether on the coast or inland, strong places, when 
 they cease to be a support and shelter to a movable 
 force, become a source of danger rather than of strength. 
 Metz and Strassburg hampered French strategy in 1S70, 
 because they were not prepared for war, and had to be 
 " covered " by a field force. The armies were afraid to 
 boldly leave them for fear they might be unable to hold 
 out. Otherwise, the Imperial forces might have fallen 
 back behind the Meurthe and the Moselle, where their 
 mobilisation might have been duly completed, and the 
 invading hosts faced with more chance of success. 
 
 To deny strategic points to an enemy, or to hold 
 them because of the value they may be as supply ports 
 and rallying-points to our own fleets, is a wise policy ; 
 but it may be pointed out that neither on land or sea 
 do the posts thus created exert any positive influence 
 beyond the radius in which their garrisons can manoeuvre, 
 or their armaments throw their projectiles. Strategists* 
 are fond of indicating certain places on the map as 
 
 * The "strategists at sea," who provoked the sarcasm of Sir George 
 Clarke, vide " The Navy and the Nation," p. 215. 
 
LAND AND SEA WARFARE 39 
 
 dominating points, the possession of which would confer 
 on their owners a kind of supernatural power over and 
 above what their numbers and armament may bestow. 
 Before the war we often read in the newspapers that 
 we should hold Lang's Nek, and bar the entrance to 
 Natal. Any force we could then have spared to occupy 
 that position might indeed have prevented the Boers 
 from utilising the particular pass that runs over the 
 celebrated Nek. But there are many passes besides 
 Lang's Nek, and while a force was sitting there, the 
 enemy might have streamed down through Botha's and 
 those other passes which are sufficiently practicable in 
 the Drakensberg, to the South. The Nek might have 
 been turned, too, from the Eastern side across the 
 drifts of the Buffalo. 
 
 Meanwhile, unless the garrison at Lang's Nek had 
 been so strong as to be able to launch a counter- 
 attack, or detach parties to defend all the drifts and 
 passes, or finally to leave Lang's Nek and manoeuvre 
 against the enemy's army, it could have exerted no 
 influence beyond the immediate locality where it was. 
 
 Similarly, even were a Christian Power at Constanti- 
 nople, unless her sea-power were such that she could 
 issue out in strength, she would no more command the 
 Eastern Mediterranean than does Turkey now. The 
 acquisition would bring her many subsidiary advan- 
 tages, but the actual site could not dominate waters 
 many miles away. 
 
 There is no magic even in so excellent a naval base. 
 It would be a support to fleets, and raids might issue 
 from it. It would be possible from it to close the Bos- 
 phorus, and therefore the Black Sea, because the straits 
 are narrow, and modern guns and other engines of war 
 can be brought to bear ; but to command the route to 
 India, naval victories and a predominating force at sea 
 would be needed. 
 
40 THE ANALOGY BETWEEN 
 
 A crowd is not dominated by looking out of a window. 
 It will hold the streets till fired on, or, when out of fire, 
 dispersed by a mobile force. Yet on land, where move- 
 ment is confined to certain roads, a geographical point 
 may really prove of vast strategic or tactical importance. 
 
 Roads or railways or waterways may meet and join 
 in certain places, and the possession of the junction 
 may form a valuable strategic point, and bar the use of 
 more paths than one. The mouth of a defile, a moun- 
 tain pass, or a province exceptionally rich in supplies, 
 may similarly become of overwhelming importance. 
 
 It is very different, however, on the waves. There no 
 defiles or obstacles limit movement. If a ship has steered 
 too near the guns of a fort, she can stand a little farther 
 out ; the road is as good beyond artillery range as within 
 it. The ocean is, in fact, nothing but road, and the 
 right of the road falls to him who is strongest both on 
 land and water ; and he has proved that he is strongest 
 only when he has met and overthrown his antagonist. 
 
 Towns and fortified posts, however deeply entrenched, 
 however well armed and supplied, unless they can send 
 forth flying columns, control nothing beyond the range 
 of their guns. To defend a frontier or any stretch of 
 country, a mobile force is demanded. Had we been 
 able to keep such a force in the field — a force, that is to 
 say, which surpassed, or was at least fully equal to the 
 enemy in mobility — the commandoes in South Africa 
 would have been met in every movement by our troops. 
 As it was, the ubiquity which his mobility gave the 
 enemy had to be met by the ubiquity of force which 
 blockhouses gave us. But his ubiquity was compatible 
 with concentration, ours was based upon dispersion. 
 It was merely another manifestation of one of the 
 eternal principles of war — that to defend a wide extent 
 of territory or guard a line of communications, at any 
 but a cost of ofTcnsivc power which is prohibitive, you 
 
LAND AND SEA WARFARE 41 
 
 need a highly mobile force. On the open stretches of 
 the veldt the Boers could manceuvre against us with 
 all the freedom and absence of restraint that belongs to 
 a fleet at sea, and the analogy between land and sea 
 warfare is here almost perfect ; because, like ships, they 
 trailed no long lines of waggons behind them, and were 
 almost independent of supply arrangements. 
 
 There is a lesson here which is instructive, and it 
 may be applied to Imperial defence. Aden and Malta, 
 or even Gibraltar, do not command anything in the 
 sense that the fort of Bard blocked Napoleon's path 
 to Piedmont in 1800, or Ali Masjid commanded the 
 Khyber Pass. They can bombard the foolish ships that 
 do not keep far enough away, but they cannot, except 
 by sending out mobile forces, that is to say ships, deny 
 the highway of the ocean to whoever wants to use it. 
 
 It is easy to speak glibly and inaccurately about 
 strategic " Keys," but I think that was a very pregnant 
 saying of Lord Beaconsfield's, when he broke away 
 from pedantry with the words, "The key of India is in 
 London." London, not the geographical term, but all 
 that it represents and implies, — a supreme sea-power, 
 unimagined wealth, resources such as no ruler has ever 
 had behind him before. While England bestrides the 
 highways of the ocean, and London flourishes, while 
 we can borrow money at 2i per cent, and the King's 
 writ runs throughout the Empire, India will never be 
 snatched away from us. 
 
 If it be admitted, as it will be, that command of the 
 ocean is the gift of naval strength which has asserted 
 itself unmistakably, it follows that to establish superiority 
 we must seek out the fleets of the enemy. What is this, 
 then, but another application of that strategic principle 
 which we have laid to heart in our studies of land war- 
 fare — namely, that the first objective of strategy should 
 be the main armies of our opponents ? Circumstances, 
 
42 THE ANALOGY BETWEEN 
 
 it is true, may be such that this ulterior object may be 
 confused with an attack on the capital of the foe. That 
 capital, as in the case of Paris or London, may represent 
 the centre and mainspring of existence of a nation, and 
 its loss may possibly be as paralysing as that of a great 
 army. We know that circumstances gave Washington 
 such exceptional importance during the American war. 
 We may believe that the loss of London would be a shot 
 through the brain. Yet such exceptions but prove the 
 rule, that to deal decisive blows such as will rapidly 
 end a war we strike not at localities but at their produce, 
 at main armies and not at cities, at centres of vitality 
 not at geographical points. 
 
 Similarly, at sea, it is the destruction of the hostile 
 fleets that forms our objective : we endeavour to render 
 them powerless for mischief by wiping them out of 
 existence altogether. " Stone dead hath no fellow " ; 
 we fight not to win, but to annihilate ; and we so dispose 
 our force that collision with the chief armaments of the 
 enemy may be assured to us, and that our blow shall 
 meet with resistance sufficiently substantial to develop 
 its crushing effect. 
 
 It has already been noted that a foe may more readily 
 elude us by sea than on shore. The secrecy of the sea 
 enables a whole fleet to pass within striking distance of 
 another without its presence being betrayed. The ships 
 that a comparatively few miles separated at night may 
 in the morning be far out of sight of one another. In 
 1798 the French fleet from Toulon, bound for Egypt, 
 and our fleet, eagerly on the watch to pounce upon it, 
 passed each other within sixty miles without either of 
 them discovering their opponent. The chase was there- 
 fore prolonged, and the destruction of the French fleet 
 postponed until after it had effected its purpose and 
 had landed the expeditionary force. The enemy had 
 eluded us at the start, and we did not know where to 
 
LAND AND SEA WARFARE 43 
 
 look for him again. If you are acquainted with the 
 end as well as the beginning of his course, you can 
 make fairly sure even at sea of fastening on an enemy 
 at one or other point. But the space between re- 
 presents the unknown quantity that you cannot reckon 
 with. The only factor in the problem that is usually 
 certain is the presence in some port of the force you 
 wish to render powerless for mischief 
 
 To watch the bolt-hole and fall on him as he emerges 
 from it, is therefore the course that offers the best 
 chances of success. 
 
 On an element where evasion is so easy, and its 
 consequences have often proved so troublesome, the 
 surest mode of dealing with an adversary is never to 
 let him out of sight. 
 
 In the old days the frigates in the offing watched the 
 masts in harbour, or the exits which must be used. 
 The battleships lay perhaps out of sight, but were never 
 out of call. The light cavalry of the sea kept them 
 well informed as to what was going on, and when the 
 topsails showed, the signals ran along the water, and the 
 great ships gathered to the spot. The smoke of the 
 furnaces getting up steam will, I suppose, give warning 
 now, the big battleships will press forward, the old 
 manoeuvre will be repeated in another way. 
 
 But we know that sound strategy frowns upon any 
 attempt to be strong everywhere, and the application of 
 the rule against dissemination of force is universal. 
 Neither by land nor sea can a leader, unless in an 
 altogether overwhelming preponderance, hope to meet 
 his opponent at advantage everywhere. It is not there- 
 fore the intention to frustrate every raid, to catch every 
 fugitive, to stifle every little attempt at aggression. But 
 it is very firmly the intention to be superior at decisive 
 points, to waylay and engage the main forces of the 
 enemy with the chances of victory considerably in our 
 
44 THE ANALOGY BETWEEN 
 
 favour. If every little harbour and inlet cannot be 
 sealed, we can, at anyrate, hover round and watch the 
 great arsenals and naval bases which contain the most 
 dangerous elements opposed to us, and can arrange to 
 concentrate such a force against them as will enable us 
 to bear away a decisive victory. 
 
 After all, it was, and is, the same on shore. The army 
 whose cavalry lose touch with the enemy is as com- 
 pletely baffled as was Nelson himself before the two 
 great battles of his life. When the German cavalrj' lost 
 touch with that of the French after Worth, despite all 
 their organisation and training, the armies and the staff 
 were placed at a huge disadvantage. Whither had 
 MacMahon led his army? Where next might he be 
 expected to appear? 
 
 When Grouchy failed to press the Prussian columns 
 in retreat after Ligny, the same results supervened, 
 the same doubt and hesitation made their presence 
 felt, led up to divided counsels and ineffectual half 
 measures, and culminated in the complete overthrow 
 of a master mind in war and a disaster the most far- 
 reaching of modern times. 
 
 When in May 1862 Jackson slipped away from 
 Banks up the Shenandoah Valley, friend and foe 
 were alike mystified, and that pale ghost, irresolution, 
 again stalked abroad. A sea fog has its counterpart 
 on land. 
 
 The principles of defensive strategy can also be 
 shown to be the same on both elements. The skilful 
 general selects for the strategic deployment of his force 
 points whence he can strike freely, and with the greatest 
 advantage to himself He does not keep his troops 
 crouching along a frontier, or cooped up behind the 
 earthworks that girdle in a town. Strategy is surely 
 exerting its power though no men are visible, and no great 
 cannon or tangible barricades catch the ej-es of anxious 
 
LAND AND SEA WARFARE 45 
 
 citizens. A town may be safe without a garrison or a 
 harbour without a guardship. While hawk-eyed Jackson 
 was poised above Elk Run Valley, five-and-thirty miles 
 away the burgesses of Staunton slept secure. " The 
 storm-beaten ships on which the grand army never 
 looked stood between Napoleon and the conquest of 
 the world." 
 
 In 1805 the moat that encircled our homes was not 
 in itself impassable. It proved an obstacle, not on 
 account of its width or depth, but because more than 
 a thousand miles away a vigilant admiral was fretting 
 for a fight. And though his ships rolled idly in the 
 trough of the sea, strategy, impalpable and occult as 
 a force of nature herself, was exerting a mysterious 
 pressure, like that of frost, or the ebb and flow of the 
 tide, as unintelligible to the ignorant, as persistent, as 
 inexorable, and as stronsf. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE NAVY 
 
 In the preceding chapters we have learnt that the 
 safety of the Empire is not assured until we possess 
 complete freedom of military transit throughout its 
 extent, and that commerce demands a similar inde- 
 pendence with an urgency scarcely less. Such security 
 is alone attained when we possess command of the 
 sea ; and the task of our navy is to obtain the neces- 
 sary predominance for us. All this is, I trust, quite 
 clear, and beyond the reach of controversy. It is, 
 indeed, usually so well recognised nowadays that it 
 assumes the character of a self-evident proposition, 
 and, in the opinion of some, the supremacy of our 
 navy having been established, no more anxiety as to 
 Imperial defence need be felt, and controversy on the 
 subject should be hushed. But such a method of 
 begging the question will scarcely commend itself to 
 those who exaniine every aspect of it. The relation- 
 ship of navy to army is not so easily to be disposed 
 of; and it is necessary to speak out strongly and 
 clearly on this question, because it is not always argued 
 out disinterestedly or with unbiassed minds. Were 
 the structure of our society less complicated, our form 
 of government less cumbrous, the problem of party alle- 
 giance less complex, such a supreme question as the 
 efficiency of our navy might possibly be provided for 
 on its needs alone, taken out of the cockpit of politics 
 or partisanship, and dealt with as a matter concerning 
 
 46 
 
THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE NAVY 47 
 
 which the good of the state was the only considera- 
 tion. Above all, what was spent on the navy would 
 in no wise modify the army estimates. But this has 
 never been the case. The exigencies of party war- 
 fare reacting on the Budget will only allow in normal 
 years of a certain amount of money being spent on 
 armaments. There must be something in the nature 
 of a struggle when to two hungry men is thrown half 
 the bread they need between them. If the navy gets 
 all it asks, it may be impossible, loudly as it is calling, 
 to give the army anything at all. And vice versa, the 
 drain of a great land war may so diminish the flow 
 of money that the fleets on which our whole system 
 of defence relies may be left wanting. 
 
 Again, while it would be a huge fallacy to suppose 
 that the first few naval victories will be decisive in our 
 next struggle on a large scale ; it is equally false to 
 imagine that we can be indifferent to the duration of 
 a war, provided we can sit in our impregnable islands 
 secure against attack, careless of mankind in the 
 lazy detachment of the Olympian gods. It is the 
 aim of these pages to put forward another conception 
 of Imperial defence — a conception which views all 
 the forces of the Empire as a whole, which seeks to 
 establish a correlation between them, and endeavours 
 to free itself of any preconceived notions under which 
 their co-operation has sometimes been perfunctory 
 rather than sympathetic and genial. The good of the 
 service is often the last word with a Minister when 
 personal claims conflict ; the good of the Empire is 
 the final argument of statesmanship. If it were really 
 true that the security of the Empire could be achieved 
 with a supreme navy alone, recruiting for the army 
 should certainly cease, and what patriotic soldier would 
 gainsay the decision ? But the truth of that hypothesis 
 is easily, challenged ; the competence of the navy 
 
48 THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE NAVY 
 
 alone is denied, and tlien the question arises — What 
 is the due proportion we should aim at in adjusting 
 our forces, when will the navy be strong enough, or 
 the army be not too strong? It is inquiries such as 
 these that compel every officer who studies Imperial 
 defence to face the problem squarely, and dig down 
 to the very root of the subject. 
 
 But the soldier can only very tentatively approach so 
 highly technical a subject as naval strength, for even 
 naval experts are divided as to how that most elastic 
 term can be defined. There is such a variety of 
 strength, so many different kinds of ships. Various 
 rival types of construction follow close upon one an- 
 other ; various natures of protective armour are brought 
 into existence by an ever-varying penetration of pro- 
 jectiles. Coal endurance and pace, offensive power and 
 protection, the skill of the commander, the training 
 in combination of the ships, the excellence in shooting 
 of the guns' crews, and finally, the strategic conception 
 of the admirals. So many qualities unite to produce 
 efficiency — there are so many ingredients in the mixture 
 — that to analyse it accurately may well puzzle an 
 inquirer. Fortunately we have always two standards 
 by which we may, from time to time, measure our 
 readiness for war. They are supplied in two simple 
 propositions. What do we want to do? And what 
 opposition are we likely to encounter in attempting 
 to accomplish our purpose? 
 
 The reply to the first supplies us with an indica- 
 tion of what is the duty of the navy in Imperial 
 defence ; that to the second enables us to estimate 
 the strength it should possess to perform its task 
 with ease. 
 
 In another form, the question might be put thus: 
 What coalition against us does a reasonable foreign 
 policy anticipate, and how ought we to deal with the 
 
THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE NAVY 49 
 
 most powerful combination there is probability of our 
 being called upon to face? 
 
 For reasons which I need not examine here, a foreign 
 policy, alike free from over-confidence and nervousness, 
 does not anticipate a stronger coalition against us than 
 that of the two nations which at present come next to 
 us in sea-power. We have been called upon to face 
 heavier odds in our past history ; it is easily conceivable 
 that we may have to meet a stronger coalition in the 
 future ; but, as a basis for argument here, if we accept 
 a two-Power standard, we shall not go very far astray. 
 
 As things stand at present, and with due regard to 
 the history that lies behind us, it is perhaps no more 
 than our right to claim that we are mistress of the 
 seas — as against any other two Powers, at anyrate. 
 If the oceans be Britannia's realm, where then do the 
 frontiers of the Empire run ? Where the enemy's coast 
 lines meet the waves, is obviously the reply. When 
 on the Continent nation faces nation, when diplomacy 
 has said her last word, and the arena is being cleared 
 for combat, vedettes watch one other along the marches 
 between the two, and far away behind them the great 
 columns are rolling forward, gathering impetus as they 
 advance. When Britannia picks the gauntlet up the 
 arena includes all the oceans, and she too must place 
 her outposts along the frontier line. Then many miles 
 away from our homes the scouts of the ocean will be 
 found steaming to and fro, alert and vigilant, while 
 in touch with them, but out of sight, the heavy battle- 
 ships will draw together opposite the stronghold where 
 crouches the power of the enemy. 
 
 Unless the odds be greatly in his favour, it is not 
 to be expected that our opponent will sally out at 
 once into the open to give us battle. He will probably 
 prefer to do what mischief he can to our commerce, 
 and avoid decisive engagements ; or, if he does pledge 
 D 
 
so THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE NAVY 
 
 himself to battle, to fight where the consequences of 
 victory will be most advantageous to him, the results 
 of defeat most disastrous to us. At first, therefore, he 
 will very likely endeavour to elude us, and before we 
 can destroy his fleets we shall have to find them. 
 
 Moreover, to carry the war into the enemy's realm 
 is the true strategy of competent leaders. That is 
 why Howard and his captains wanted to meet the 
 Armada off the coast of Spain, why Raleigh wished 
 to fight out the issue before our shores were sighted 
 at all, why St Vincent in 1803 propounded the policy 
 of blockading the enemy's ports, why for many weary 
 months of a comparatively short life Nelson was tossed 
 about on board ship observing Toulon and Cadiz. 
 
 During the great war at the beginning of the last 
 century and close of the previous one, outside every 
 hostile stronghold a British fleet stood on guard. In 
 foul weather and fair, week by week, and month after 
 month, the patient ships hung on the horizon with 
 ominous persistency. Foreboding and intolerable as 
 that sleepless watch may have been to the enemy, 
 we know that the strain to our fleets was scarcely less 
 harassing and distressing. Monotony and discomfort 
 and ill-health afflicted the men. The sails and yards 
 and timbers of the ships themselves were not without 
 signs of the strain. The effort was exacting, but the 
 results obtained justified the sacrifice. 
 
 But whatever the consequences of the wear and tear 
 may have been on the ships, the effect on the men made 
 for efficiency. While the crews waited, for their oppor- 
 tunity, they were at the same time preparing themselves 
 to meet it. Always on the waters the sailors grew quick 
 and ready aloft, gunnery was improved, training for war 
 generally was constantly going on. The rigour of the 
 life braced the nerves and sinews and mental fibre of 
 officers and men alike, and when at length battle came, 
 
THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE NAVY 51 
 
 they were in the best possible condition, and bounded 
 into the arena Hke gladiators prepared through weeks of 
 careful practice for the supreme moment. Cooped up 
 within a port, their opponents, on the other hand, had lost 
 vigour and aptitude, and entered on the struggle with 
 their moral weakened by the humiliating inactivity that 
 they had been compelled to endure. 
 
 Carried to its extreme limits, St Vincent's policy is, 
 however, one that manifestly demands a very superior 
 navy, and may otherwise lead to disaster. It calls for 
 strength everywhere, which, unless vast resources are 
 available, and can be kept up, may inevitably decline 
 into weakness everywhere, and the laying open of our 
 blockading fleets to defeat in detail. A reserve fleet 
 must therefore be held ready in home waters to make 
 good losses, temporarily to relieve ships, and to reinforce 
 any British naval force exposed to the attack of hostile 
 fleets combined so as to be superior in strength at one 
 selected spot to ours in that particular neighbourhood. 
 - Further, we must note that the aim of St Vincent's 
 and Nelson's strategy was not to seal up in port the 
 ships of the enemy. On the contrary, they were to be 
 allowed to emerge, or even to be lured out, if possible. 
 But only to their destruction. Frigates were detailed 
 to call together our forces to meet them as they sailed 
 forth from their shelter ; they were to be followed up ; 
 kept in sight ; and attacked when the British forces were 
 collected, — the great object of our admirals being that 
 the whereabouts of the principal bodies of the enemy 
 should always be well known. When it was known 
 where they were, their destruction would form the 
 feature of a distinct plan. 
 
 But a hostile fleet at large, out of touch with one of 
 ours, was a menace to be guarded against at all 
 hazards. 
 
 We know that even in these days, when telegraphs 
 
52 THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE NAVY 
 
 render communication easy, the fact that a hostile 
 squadron is let loose at sea exerts an influence quite 
 beyond the real powers of destruction possessed by it. 
 Even in the confined area of the Mediterranean, a fleet 
 which had eluded vigilance would pass out of control, and 
 when unvvatched by an adequate force on our side, would 
 possess latent powers of mischief that would attract and 
 receive an amount of attention altogether dispropor- 
 tionate to its actual strength. 
 
 It is always the unknown which exerts the most marked 
 effect in war. If we only knew what the enemy was 
 about to do and where he was, it would be comparatively 
 easy to organise victory, but that is exactly what we 
 rarely or never can arrive at, and hence the difficulties 
 and doubts that weaken resolution have their origin. 
 
 By observing, which is a better term than blockading, 
 the great strongholds of our opponents, we can at least 
 early discover any attempts towards great combinations 
 that are made, and can frustrate them by counter combi- 
 nation. We cannot hope to mount guard over every port 
 and hermetically seal every exit, but we can watch the 
 most important places and prevent any substantial force 
 from creeping out unperceived. We can likewise so 
 distribute our forces that their speedy concentration 
 against all possible hostile combinations may be 
 assured. 
 
 Such distribution of our forces belongs to the realm of 
 high strategy. It is the counterpart of the strategic 
 deployment of armies on land which we have been 
 taught forms the crown of strategic skill. It hinges 
 chiefly on accurate and early information as to the 
 dispositions and movements of the enemy. In other 
 words, it demands an intelligence department, capable, 
 energetic, enterprising, and well-informed ; a system 
 for acquiring knowledge as to the enemy's movements 
 stretching like a network over every coast, always at 
 
THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE NAVY 53 
 
 work in peace time, but with its eyes turned steadily 
 towards war and to the demands that war will make upon 
 us. Such an organisation is not readily improvised ; it 
 can only be developed through long years of patient 
 labour in establishing connections, securing agents, 
 acquiring knowledge of local circumstances and re- 
 sources, in bringing about a state of things which, when 
 war breaks out, will place us in the position of men who 
 know, as opposed to those who only guess or surmise. 
 The highest genius and most intelligent minds are baffled 
 when, relying on the light of nature, they are met by 
 others supplied with a knowledge of facts such as are 
 here indicated, while to collect, collate and utilise such 
 facts is not beyond the reach of mediocrity. 
 
 Whether, even if we feel strong enough to make the 
 attempt, we shall in future be able to shut up hostile 
 fleets in port in the manner I have described is a 
 question on which I believe sailors have considerable 
 doubt. It was only when the wind blew in a favour- 
 able direction that sailing vessels could hope to leave 
 harbour. Until, therefore, the wind shifted into the 
 particular quarter that was propitious, the stress of 
 watching might be relaxed, to be taken up with 
 redoubled vigour when the circumstances again became 
 dangerous. It was only to leeward, too, that escape was 
 possible, and the area to be closely guarded was 
 therefore considerably restricted. 
 
 It was necessary also to give a dangerous coast-line 
 a wide berth, to allow an ample margin of safety, 
 whereas now steam has given such comparative pre- 
 cision of manoeuvre that the danger may be closely 
 approached, and great vessels creep along close under 
 the cliffs or near the shoals that must formerly have 
 been widely avoided. A steamship, too, has less above 
 the water than the old line-of-battle ship, and there are, 
 of course, no sails to attract attention. On the whole. 
 
54 THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE NAVY 
 
 then, it may be fairly questioned whether St Vincent's 
 policy can in future be carried out with the same 
 success as formerly. Even in the old days, no blockade 
 could make a certainty of sealing up a fleet which was 
 determined to escape. That Villeneuve got clear away 
 from Toulon is a commonplace of history, but Missiessy 
 baffled Collingwood at Rochfort, as Nelson had been 
 baffled at Toulon. 
 
 It is not necessary for us here to try and determine 
 a difficult naval question, full of technicalities, and 
 only to be disposed of by authoritative expert opinion. 
 There always has been another view of what naval 
 policy should aim at when hostilities commence, and 
 modern conditions may lend an increased support to 
 such opinion at the present time. 
 
 But it is certain that if the fleets of the enem)- are 
 not to be kept under lock and key, they must be met 
 in superior force, and brought to battle when they take 
 the open water. When next we enter on a naval war, 
 the command of the sea, which is essential to our pur- 
 pose, is not likely to go to us by default, and, if it do 
 not, will have to be obtained by force. We must see 
 to it that when we have to fight, we do so with two 
 chances to one in our favour. The strategical positions 
 occupied by our fleets must be so well chosen that 
 the enemy putting to sea will be confronted by forces 
 such as may engage him with a reasonable certainty 
 of success. He must never be allowed to completely 
 escape into the unknown. Whether he is to be fallen 
 upon immediately he leaves his shelter, or not until a 
 short time later, does not materially alter the principle of 
 the action against him, which is governed by the deter- 
 mination to render him, at all hazards, powerless for 
 mischief, either alone or in combination with other 
 fractions of his force. 
 
 In addition to the battleships that will thus have 
 
THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE NAVY 55 
 
 to be watched, masked, or defeated, the cruisers of the 
 enemy have likewise to be dealt with. Some of these 
 will probably elude our fleets whether they endeavour 
 to establish a close blockade or not, and they will then 
 strike at our mercantile marine, or at any transports 
 or convoys conveying munitions of war that we may 
 have at sea. 
 
 To meet them, and prevent their depredations, cruisers 
 must be detached, and, if we are to have convoys, escorts 
 for them will have to be found also. 
 
 Cruisers, the frigates of which Nelson felt the want 
 years ago, to follow up and track hostile fleets that may 
 have eluded us, to act as messengers and scouts, will 
 again be needed with our concentrated fleets. 
 
 Not only would there be a difficulty in finding a fleet 
 or squadron or single ship thus at large, but there might 
 be even more in bringing them to battle when discovered. 
 
 We here touch a question where military and naval 
 tactics and strategy have their points of difference. 
 Speed of manoeuvre on shore is a matter of exact com- 
 putation, as between European powers. The Boers 
 were all mounted riflemen, and sternly has the fact 
 of their vast superiority in mobility been forced upon 
 us. Certain savage tribes may possess powers of rapid 
 movement which the British soldier cannot be expected 
 to rival. But between Europeans in large bodies the 
 disparity is not very great. Transport and train hamper 
 the best marchers. What is feasible in a day, where 
 large battle units are concerned, has been pretty accur- 
 ately gauged and is universally recognised. 
 
 But the speed of some ships is far greater than that 
 of others, and, though that of a fleet is brought down 
 to what its slowest ship can accomplish, the powers 
 of that ship in the enemy's fleet are often an unknown 
 quantity. Unless the pursuing fleet be quite homo- 
 geneous as regards speed, it may be outpaced by 
 
56 THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE NAVY 
 
 another whose average speed is far lower, but in which 
 the powers of individual ships are more uniform. 
 
 If we accept the principle that the enemy's fleets are 
 to be parcelled out in the way I have described, shut up 
 in port, or masked and shadowed each by a particular 
 fleet told off deliberately for that specific purpose, we 
 are placed in a position to define with some nicety 
 exactly what the duties of our navy should be, and are 
 provided with a standard by which to measure its 
 efficiency for the task in hand. 
 
 The admirals who reported on the naval manoeuvres 
 of 1888 decided that it would not be found practic- 
 able to maintain an effective blockade of an enemy's 
 squadrons in strongly-fortified ports unless the blockad- 
 ing battleships were in a preponderance of at least five 
 to three. Under certain favourable conditions the pro- 
 portion might, it is stated, be reduced to four to three ; 
 but a considerable preponderance of force must in these 
 days belong to the blockaders, because modern ships, 
 owing to their consumption of coal, will have to be 
 relieved more frequently than was the case with sail- 
 ing vessels. That the ships of St Vincent and Nelson 
 were strained and worn almost to dangerous limits we 
 are aware ; still, they had only to think of food and 
 water supply, and could hold the seas for three months 
 at a time. 
 
 Again, naval opinion considers that a blockading 
 squadron in open waters must be composed of battle- 
 ships. Acting in the immediate neighbourhood of their 
 own ports, it is said that coast-defence vessels may 
 do effective service even in attack ; but the ships that 
 have to hold the open waters permanently must be 
 of a different type, and we cannot press into such 
 service ships that might fill a gap under less exacting 
 conditions. 
 
 The work, then, to be performed in war by our 
 
THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE NAVY 57 
 
 line-of-battle fleet can be approximately determined 
 by counting the strength which might reasonably be 
 expected to oppose it, and providing ourselves with 
 a navy superior to the potential combination against 
 it by about one-third. 
 
 But in addition to the battleships, naval authorities 
 demand for the blockading squadrons at least twice 
 as many cruisers as their opponents possess, while 
 another estimate goes so far as to require one cruiser 
 for each blockading battleship ; in addition, let us 
 remember, to the reserve squadron which I have shown 
 would have to be kept ready in the Channel. 
 
 A number of cruisers, whose mission would be to 
 protect our mercantile marine, must also be provided. 
 But, since evasion and escape would not be impossible, 
 and since it will be necessary to safeguard our interests 
 in foreign waters, perhaps to convoy transports, and 
 perform what may be termed the subsidiary duties of 
 our navy in time of war, we shall want ships over and 
 above those doing blockade duty, and forming the 
 reserve squadron. The demand for ships mounts up 
 the more we examine the duties of the navy, and the 
 more we weigh the issues at stake. 
 
 Moreover, lest I should overstate the case, I have on 
 a previous page suggested that we should measure our 
 strength with that of the two sea-powers next in impor- 
 tance to us ; and by a little optimism, not perhaps un- 
 justifiable in the light of our past history, it is possible 
 so to persuade oneself as to rise without misgiving from 
 one's calculations. But many sailors think that a three- 
 Power standard has lately been forced upon us, and such 
 a standard, since the foreign press has spoken so un- 
 guardedly, has become in the opinion of many high 
 authorities by no means a hysterical cry. 
 
 A soldier, and more especially one in an official 
 position, is debarred from discussing the efficiency or 
 
58 THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE NAVY 
 
 adequacy of the navy, even if he were, which I certainly 
 am not, venturesome enough to try. It is beyond his 
 duty to do more than place the situation broadly before 
 those he addresses without reference to individual foreign 
 Powers, and the attitude they may adopt towards us in 
 the future. Those who desire to satisfy themselves as to 
 how far figures go to prove the capability of our navy to 
 completely fulfil the role its distinguished leaders have 
 laid down for it, can do so with the greatest ease. 
 Numerous publications will furnish them with the 
 strength of foreign fleets and with their building 
 programmes. It is similarly not a very difficult matter 
 to ascertain our present strength and its future develop- 
 ments. My task ends when I have sketched that share 
 in Imperial Defence which a soldier thinks will fall to 
 our ships, and when I have shown where our army 
 takes up its part, and how the two services can aid 
 and supplement one another. 
 
 But though my scope may be limited, the interest 
 which a soldier must take in all that concerns war does 
 not necessarily flag. The army should, and, I am sure, 
 does, sympathise with all that affects the sister service, 
 and there are problems in connection with her which we 
 do not forget even when we put them aside, and which 
 continue to puzzle us, even though we may leave them 
 to be solved by others. Perhaps it is because we have 
 lately explored the weaknesses of our army that we feel 
 anxiety, because we have been rudely disillusioned our- 
 selves that we do not now accept as gospel what we 
 clung to a few years ago with implicit faith. 
 
 When we enter on a war with some petty state, we 
 may proceed tentatively as we have often done (if such 
 criminal playing with men's lives is any longer to be 
 tolerated), send out a small force, a kind of ballon d'essai, 
 and, if that be destroyed, follow it up with such a big 
 one subsequently as will ensure success. In a cynical 
 
THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE NAVY 59 
 
 spirit it may even be argued that such a course is in 
 the long run cheaper than providing an expedition with 
 more regard to the strategical problem than to the cost 
 incurred. If a leader of a real genius be lit upon, he 
 may make the little force suffice. No doubt, too, chance 
 may sometimes balance science. But we cannot ever 
 adopt such a happy-go-lucky policy where great in- 
 terests are involved, and when our welfare, perhaps our 
 existence, as a nation is placed in the scales. We 
 cannot command success in such a supreme struggle, 
 but we can at least leave nothing untouched which 
 may bring success about. And owing to our peculiar 
 circumstances we must go into the struggle fully deter- 
 mined to carry it through, not only with success, but 
 with rapid and decisive success. 
 
 Taking stock on the basis of class against class of 
 our position as regards the two next sea-powers, the 
 answer as to our superiority is scarcely convincing. 
 In cruisers we are above the standard, but in battle- 
 ships below. Lord Brassey stated last November,* that 
 in all the main elements of naval strength we are 
 equal to the two-Power standard. The question is 
 whether an equality is enough. A lifetime's continuous 
 fighting had made a leader of Napoleon's calibre able 
 to balance his chances of success to a nicety. The 
 character of the leader, the quality of the troops opposed 
 to him were appraised with exactitude. Long experi- 
 ence rendered Wellington even more accurate in his 
 estimates. Napoleon counted on beating the Prussians 
 at Ligny. Wellington was convinced that they " would 
 be damnably mauled." But with all his confidence in 
 his generalship, Napoleon ever aimed at as great a 
 superiority in numbers as possible behind him. 
 
 Many think that our numerical superiority is no 
 longer so great as it should be. It is argued that 
 * 1901. 
 
6o THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE NAVY 
 
 according to the estimate already quoted, known as that 
 of " The Admirals," it would certainly not be sufficient ; 
 it is said that it is not enough according to the standard 
 of another high authority who has stated that our fight- 
 ing fleet should out-number those of the next two 
 Powers by at least one-third. If we are to be ready to 
 meet a combination of three great Powers, it has been 
 pronounced quite inadequate. 
 
 While the effect of modern guns and inventions is still 
 an indeterminate quantity, it certainly does not seem, 
 whatever may be thought of this last standard, that a 
 two-Power standard can be regarded as anything more 
 than one of mere prudence for a nation with such 
 interests as ours to safeguard. 
 
 Force in war can be measured in various ways both on 
 land and sea, and wide margins of safety should be 
 allowed for. It may be exhibited in numbers of men, 
 or in ships of the same type, — in training, in armament, 
 in moral, in the physical or mental characteristics of 
 individuals. We must be prepared for surprises and 
 unforeseen contingencies. 
 
 What a difference such a personality as Nelson's made 
 to the British fleet can scarcely be over-estimated. But 
 until we have seen commanding genius blazing out like 
 a beacon in the mazes of a great battle, we cannot be 
 sure that we shall find it amongst our leaders. Indeed, 
 to judge by the number of reputations every war has 
 buried, we must distrust our judgment in this respect. 
 
 Our peace training tried by the demands of war may 
 prove less sound than we imagine. It is difficult or 
 impossible to test our armaments with those of our 
 potential enemies ; to more than guess at the relative 
 efficiency of ships. As to that patriotic rant which 
 regards the race we spring from as markedly superior in 
 courage and endurance to other white races, it can- 
 not be seriously considered. 
 
THF PREDOMINANCE OF THE NAVY 6i 
 
 Russia, with a populati(in of 85,000,000 and a war 
 strength of 900,000 men, sent in 1877 200,000 men 
 and 800 guns to meet 165,000 Turks with 450 guns, 
 felt confident of victory, but scarcely emerged trium- 
 phantly from a contest in which she had considerably 
 underrated her opponent's strength. 
 
 Moeltke never doubted as to the outcome of war 
 in 1870, because he knew that Germany could put ir.to 
 the field 519,100 men with 1584 guns, yielding a pre- 
 ponderance which unmistakably outweighed the forces 
 of France. Organisation and training, political stability, 
 and, possibly, physique, placed Germany at an advan- 
 tage too ; but numbers and readiness for war were all 
 strategy would allow for. Quality we still expect to 
 be on our side in future, as it certainly was during 
 the great French war ; but we cannot be sure that in 
 modern fighting it will have the same opportunity to 
 assert its value as it had then. As I have said, the 
 crews of the ships that kept the seas for months before 
 the hostile ports, became adepts in seamanship because 
 they were always at work amongst the spars and sails. 
 Those strenuous watches supplied an unrivalled course 
 of training, and when battle was joined the results were 
 seen in the greater manoeuvring power of both fleets 
 and ships, and the superior readiness and handiness of 
 their crews. Two rounds are said to have been fired 
 by them for every one that they faced. They were 
 better men and better gunners, as well as better seamen. 
 When we also consider how great a prestige and moral 
 impelled them onward, we need not weigh a boast too 
 nicely which claimed that an English sailor in Nelson's 
 day could beat two of the opponents he met with. 
 
 Here we have an example of what training in the 
 hard school of actual service can bring about. There 
 is a tangible superiority due to a certain cause ; the 
 cause removed, the results disappear. Nay, more, 
 
62 THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE NAVY 
 
 similar causes brought about similar effects where 
 another nationality was concerned. 
 
 In 1 812-14 we, with all the traditions of the glorious 
 past behind us, were at war with America. Our cousins 
 over the Atlantic had been training their men at the 
 guns too, and they had paid more attention to gunnery 
 than the majority of our captains of the same period. 
 Moreover, they had built frigates of a more powerful 
 type than those that flew our flag. 
 
 It seemed madness for the few American frigates 
 to try conclusions with the victors of the Nile and 
 Trafalgar ; yet in two successive engagements our ships 
 had to strike their colours. We were beaten on our 
 own ground by better gunnery, and a more powerful 
 type of ship. Probably we should hear more of these 
 humiliating defeats had they not luckily been over- 
 shadowed in the popular estimation by the brilliant 
 victory of the Shannon over the Chesapeake, which first 
 stayed the course of American success. Broke had 
 trained his guns' crews to the highest perfection, and 
 he reaped his reward in what is perhaps the most 
 dramatic fight on record. The opportune blaze of his 
 exploit enabled us to leave the arena with the glow of 
 a great success on our faces ; but the lesson is there 
 when the glow has faded, and, whatever may be thought 
 by the navy, our army would do well to ponder on what 
 it means. 
 
 Our last war with America is here quoted to emphasise 
 the argument that, under modern conditions, where the 
 element of physique is largely discounted by machinery, 
 there is nothing inherent in our ships to justify us in 
 counting them superior to those of other nations in 
 fighting capacity. 
 
 Everybody, of course, believes that when it comes to 
 the pinch our superiority in gunnery and manoeuvring 
 power will be proved once more; but before experiment 
 
THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE NAVY 6^:, 
 
 has shown it to exist, it should not be counted upon 
 when we reckon up our strength. We should possess 
 the necessary superiority in number and quality of 
 ships, in power of guns, in efficiency of seamen and 
 of engineers. If superior skill and courage are found 
 to be ours also, they will help to make our victories 
 more decisive, but at the same time they cannot be 
 calculated upon to win triumphs by themselves. 
 
 Thus, while the supremacy of our navy even over any 
 other two Powers is said to be still open to question, the 
 most pressing demand in Imperial defence is the cry 
 for more ships. The supreme fleet will not alone save 
 us, as the next chapter will show ; but without a fleet 
 that is unquestionably equal to the standard we have 
 set before ourselves, no precautions that we may adopt, 
 no efforts and no sacrifices that we may make on 
 shore, will do more than prolong the agony, and put 
 off a few days longer the final catastrophe. 
 
 It is not only that our security, our existence in these 
 little islands, depend on a predominant navy ; that pro- 
 position is never now disputed. The safety of our 
 foreign possessions, with the exception perhaps of two, 
 depends on it also, and on nothing else. The two 
 exceptional cases — and they can only be regarded 
 as partially so — are, of course, those of India and 
 Canada. They may lay some claim to exception, 
 because it is an attack by land that both most fear, 
 and it would be possible for an enemy to assault 
 them without first wresting from us the command of 
 the sea. 
 
 But in a wider sense Canada and India are as much 
 dependent on a supreme navy as are the other members 
 of the empire. Neither of them is strong enough to 
 fight alone ; if communication with England were cut 
 off for any length of time, both would infallibly be 
 snatched away. It is, indeed, with reference to these 
 
64 THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE NAVY 
 
 great dependencies that one of its most difficult duties 
 would be thrust upon the navy when war broke out. 
 
 The defence of our north-west frontier of India will 
 demand the despatch from home of immediate rein- 
 forcements, which may be placed roughly at two army 
 corps. To transmit such a force across the seas until 
 command of them had been assured would, if we were 
 at war with more than one other great Power, prove 
 a hazardous enterprise. The navy could certainly 
 not safeguard it. Because, in the first instance, the 
 whole of her energies and strength would be con- 
 centrated on the destruction or sealing up in port of 
 the allied fleets. 
 
 But absolute annihilation would scarcely be the fate 
 of the hostile ships all at once, while — even if the first 
 reinforcements safely reached their destinations — the 
 wastage in men, guns, horses, and all the paraphernalia 
 that an army needs, would demand that a free and 
 constant supply from home, and other parts of the 
 world, should be kept up. 
 
 Not the least advantage which we derive from 
 sea-power is, that our base in time of war is not 
 England only but the world. Almost every part of 
 the globe contributes something — either horses or mules 
 or meat or some other supplies — to the sustenance of 
 our fighting line. To keep all the roads open, all the 
 channels of supply free, becomes the duty of the navy. 
 Even after it has won its great victories, the strain upon 
 it will still be immense, and the security of India is 
 found to rest ultimately on our supremacy at sea. 
 
 In the case of Canada, the danger is not so pressing. 
 We shun the thought that we shall ever have to draw 
 the sword on the other side of the Atlantic ; but the 
 problem may have to be faced, and is of the same 
 nature. The first reinforcements that would have to 
 be dispatched would need, as matters now stand, to 
 
THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE NAVY 65 
 
 be equally as numerous as those we must send to India ; 
 the demands, under certain potential circumstances, on 
 the activity of the navy fully as great. 
 
 So that, although the power that may fight with us 
 for India or Canada need not first challenge and destroy 
 our maritime predominance, we, on our part, must first 
 make good that predominance before we can effectively 
 safeguard what we hold. The cause has, in either case, 
 to be determined definitely ; it is merely a question 
 whether we must appear as plaintiff or defendant. 
 
 In the case of the great Commonwealth, the situation 
 is very different. No possible enemy has a base in the 
 Atlantic circle. Back behind any aggressive expedition 
 for thousands of miles of open sea must run the lines 
 of communication and supply of the fleet that ventures 
 to make an attempt against our Australasian Colonies. 
 No hostile squadron can ever invade the waters that 
 encircle their shores without having first of all rendered 
 interruption of the enterprise by our fleets impossible. 
 Otherwise its line of supply would be cut ; it could 
 neither replenish its magazines, nor refit its ships, while 
 a hostile force lay between it and the base, to which 
 alone it could look for succour. While the English 
 fleet is undefeated, no Power with any sense of responsi- 
 bility would undertake an enterprise that called it to 
 the Antipodes. 
 
 Here the circumstances differ widely from those that 
 have just been discussed ; the gage must be thrown 
 down by our opponent ; he can do nothing effective 
 till he has given earnest of his capacity by a naval 
 victory. 
 
 In this connection, that special attribute of sea-power, 
 which forbids space to set limits to its operations, may 
 be noted. Just as water seeks its own level, no matter 
 how many miles separate the cisterns from the source, 
 so the Power that has gained predominance at sea can 
 E 
 
66 THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE NAVY 
 
 transmit its influence beyond sight and ken. It is not 
 confined even to a continent ; no natural barriers shut 
 it in. Sea-power is as ubiquitous as salt water, all-per- 
 vading and diffusive as the air we breathe. 
 
 The consideration of this distinctive characteristic, 
 this unique attribute, next forces on us the question 
 whether the special squadrons kept up for, and allotted 
 to, colonial defence need necessarily be bound to the 
 immediate neighbourhood of their own homes. If the 
 hostile forces can be located, the centre of gravity of 
 the strategic situation lies where they are known to be. 
 Following up the principle of strategy that teaches us 
 to strike at the main forces of our opponent, it is ap- 
 parent that we should gather our full strength against 
 them wherever they have been discovered, and that our 
 homes, apparently unguarded, are secure, as long as 
 they can be neutralised or destroyed. Our towns and 
 cities will be safe whether they can keep in view or not 
 the defenders they send forth, and a contest for which an 
 Australian colony is the prize, may be fought thousands 
 of miles away from the coast-lines of the Commonwealth. 
 The enemy which menaces it cannot be in force at more 
 than one spot, and his starting-point must be from the 
 Northern hemisphere. There he will be shadowed by 
 a British fleet. If he make distant enterprises, that 
 fleet will follow him just as Nelson hunted Villeneuve 
 to the West Indies. If, on the other hand, he should 
 concentrate his forces near our islands, ships left out 
 of touch by his movement may draw in on him from 
 the distant South, and leave their homes secure, when 
 they combine to annihilate him under the cliffs and 
 headlands of Europe. 
 
 Thus it is apparent that the duty of protecting the 
 Britains beyond the seas falls to the navy. The security 
 of Australasian coasts and territories stands or falls with 
 that of these islands. The supremacy of the navy, 
 
THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE NAVY 67 
 
 which preserves England inviolate, forbids the success- 
 ful invasion of New Zealand, and in securing London and 
 Liverpool, we also guarantee the safety of Melbourne 
 and Auckland. 
 
 In addition, our mercantile marine looks to the navy 
 for its protection. The battleships of the enemy may 
 be brought to an engagement, and may be destroyed, 
 or they may be obliged to take refuge in their strong 
 naval bases, where also are the dockyards and arsenals 
 that will enable them to refit. But, as has been shown, 
 all the fast cruisers opposed to us cannot be thus ac- 
 counted for, and probably a proportion large enough to 
 do considerable damage will have eluded us, and will 
 always be at large. When we consider the gigantic 
 proportions of that mercantile marine,* we realise what 
 a tremendous call on the efficiency of our fleets is thus 
 made. In a subsequent chapter, the question of pro- 
 tection against commerce-destroying will be specially 
 dealt with, and we need not dwell on it here further 
 than to note how considerable a number of ships our 
 navy will have to allocate to this part of its duty alone. 
 It may not be the declared policy of our navy to under- 
 take the duty of convoying either merchant vessels or 
 transports as in days gone by. The pressure of a 
 popular demand is, however, in a country such as ours, 
 impossible to resist, and where, as in this case, the whole 
 welfare and destiny of the people, individually and as 
 a whole, are bound up with commerce, interests are so 
 strong that they may succeed in bending the Govern- 
 ment in their direction. 
 
 Again, there are those who point to the undefended 
 state of some coaling-stations, and would add to the 
 
 * Amounting to a tonnage of 13,856,161 tons for the United Kingdom, 
 according to the tables given in " Whittaker's Almanac" for 1902. That 
 of the Colonies is given as 1,052,045, representing a total of 1935 ships. 
 The mercantile navies of the rest of the world put together amount to 
 a tonnage of 15,892,304 tons. 
 
68 THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE NAVY 
 
 other duties of the navy that of preserving their safety. 
 But the portion of the subject thus presented to us can 
 be better treated in a separate chapter. 
 
 In conclusion, it may be added that to formulate the 
 duty of the navy has been a difficult task, just because 
 the services it has to perform are so universal and indis- 
 pensable. What is the part that the air we breathe 
 plays in our existence? What is the function of the 
 blood in all the various actions of the body? The 
 answer is transparently obvious in one sense, and yet 
 a professional treatise might well be written ere the 
 subject was exhausted. The share of the navy in 
 Imperial defence is no less pervading and essential 
 than those elements in our bodily existence which have 
 just been named. The safety of our homes, the security 
 of our colonies, the safeguarding of our commerce, de- 
 pend largely upon it ; without it our army cannot 
 operate, and when it perishes our sun will set. The 
 supremacy of our navy has become an obsession when 
 the defence of the Empire under present conditions is 
 considered, and this obsession is the chief obstacle to 
 a minute inventory of all it may be called upon to do. 
 We accept the fact that the navy is indispensable 
 through the same instinct that tells us that we cannot 
 walk on water. 
 
 Moreover, we gain a better insight into its many-sided 
 usefulness when we view it in connection with the other 
 service, or performing definite duties such as our 
 economic condition and commercial welfare may de- 
 mand. We must remember, too, that essential and 
 indispensable are adjectives applicable to ingredients 
 as well as integers, and that the action of ingredients 
 is best understood when the whole mass is examined. 
 In the course of subsequent chapters, therefore, many 
 and diverse duties of the navy which have been but 
 lightly touched on, or even altogether ignored, will 
 
THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE NAVY 69 
 
 come to light, and in what manner the roles of ships 
 and armies are interwoven will, it is hoped, be made 
 clear. For the present, we may sum up the subject of 
 this chapter in a kw broad strokes. 
 
 The navy must keep the highways of the ocean and 
 communications of the Empire always open to us, and 
 must acquire, as early as possible after war breaks out, 
 such a mastery over the fleets of our opponents, that 
 it may be possible to send our land forces on expedi- 
 tions across the waves. 
 
 When the navy has done that, it will have attained 
 what we know as command of the sea, and until it has 
 established that essential condition in all schemes for 
 the defence of the Empire, the task it is called upon 
 to execute will remain unperformed, and the army 
 must stand and wait for its accomplishment. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE FUNCTION OF THE ARMY 
 
 The function of our army in Imperial defence is a 
 subject concerning which considerable controversy has 
 arisen and opinion been divided. 
 
 The peculiarities and physical characteristics of our 
 Empire are — in part at anyrate — responsible for this. 
 Its most vital portions, the heart and brain, from which 
 the arteries and nerves of the whole body radiate, are 
 altogether intangible by land ; while the extremities — 
 which are, however, greater in bulk than the central 
 trunk — are united to the seats of life and activity 
 only by so unstable and precarious a medium as the 
 waves of the sea. Thus the conditions which govern 
 the operations of our army are quite different from 
 those that other armies have to meet. 
 
 No distinct and separate sphere in Imperial defence 
 can be allotted to our soldiers, because their move- 
 ments, except within our own narrow islands, are 
 dependent on the aid of the sister service. While 
 other nations draw merely the luxuries of life from 
 across the seas, it is the necessities of existence which 
 are thus brought to us. Without commerce they may 
 droop, but we must wither. Our prosperity as a 
 nation is dependent on our command of the high- 
 ways of the world. Small wonder, then, if many 
 have thought, or perhaps still think, that an all- 
 powerful navy will completely secure our safety, and 
 regard military expenditure beyond a certain level 
 
 70 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE ARMY 71 
 
 as unnecessary waste, or a diversion of money in 
 a wrong direction. 
 
 It will need but a little consideration to show that 
 such views, however plausible, are fallacious. If in a 
 possible contest between the great Powers the condi- 
 tions of the struggle were the same for all, we might 
 perhaps rest confident on the action of our navy alone, 
 and cheerfully face an isolation where no enemy could 
 approach us. But even should we sweep the warships 
 of our opponent from the sea, and do substantial injury 
 to his commerce, we may not be making much progress 
 towards breaking his resolution or restoring peace. He 
 may not be able to attack us, but that will not enable 
 us to assail him. Home industries, and the commerce 
 to which an extensive land frontier will remain open, can 
 supply all his necessities and minor luxuries. A neutral 
 flag will safeguard the ships that will bring to him what 
 food and raw material he may demand in addition. 
 The war may become inconvenient, expensive, weari- 
 some to him ; but to us it will grow ruinous, and we 
 may finally succumb, smothered by our impenetrable 
 armour, without having received a single scratch. 
 
 While, therefore, we may be clear in our judgment 
 that the command of the sea must always be the basis 
 of all schemes of defence, and while we may have com- 
 plete confidence that our ships will obtain it for us when 
 the enemy is at our gates, we must still recognise that 
 even a predominant navy has its limitations and restric- 
 tions, and cannot alone produce decisive results. 
 
 Moreover, in such an effort as is implied by Imperial 
 defence all the forces we can command must be called 
 in to bear a part. The strategy we may adopt does not 
 only deal with one arm or one service or one set of 
 political problems. Many countries, more than one 
 continent, two elements, are involved ; the issues are 
 enormous, the problems complex. If the armies cannot 
 
72 THE FUNCTION OF THE ARMY 
 
 operate where strategy directs them beyond the seas, as 
 they may in a theatre of war which on shore may 
 embrace hundreds of square miles, the triumphant 
 swoop of the fastest ships is also circumscribed when 
 the headlands of the coast loom in view. The readi- 
 ness of the sailor has deservedly become proverbial, 
 and naval brigades on land have often done us supreme 
 service in little wars. In great conflicts, such as we 
 now have in mind, every seaman, however, will be 
 needed on board the vessels that will steam forth to 
 bear the first brunt of the struggle. Frequently as the 
 readiness of our sailors has been summoned in small 
 wars to supplement the early efforts of an inadequate 
 or ill-equipped land force, in the first stages of war 
 with one of the great Powers the army will appear as 
 the assistant of the navy. 
 
 Thus Imperial defence must be regarded from a 
 standpoint that will enable us to take in every side 
 of the question, and all the varying conditions which 
 the nature of the war we engage in may impose. We 
 must dispose of all our forces, untrammelled by pre- 
 judice or the narrow views of a particular profession. 
 Army and navy must play into one another's hands, 
 as in the more confined area of the battlefield the 
 various arms of the service co-operate and combine, 
 the chief part falling sometimes to one, and again to 
 another, a sympathetic appreciation of the needs of 
 others governing all. 
 
 Let us consider the case of a war with one of the 
 great Powers first. 
 
 When I say that the army at the opening of such 
 a great contest will be found in a role subordinate to 
 that of the navy, I mean that it will be employed in 
 such a way as to release the other to undertake in 
 full force and vigour the part she has been preparing 
 herself to play, and will need all her special strength 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE ARMY 73 
 
 and skill to carry through — a part where the decisive 
 issues of the moment must be dealt with by her, and 
 by her alone. 
 
 We know that the primary object of our navy will 
 be to obtain command of the sea. To swiftly obtain 
 such command, and at the same time protect our 
 merchant shipping in distant parts of the world, our 
 fleets must not be required to afford local defence to 
 any of our ports, or to hug the channel, and preserve 
 us from panic at home. They must move out in over- 
 powering force to meet the fleets of the enemy, and 
 keep the seas open. 
 
 Now, however widely the strategy and tactics of land 
 and sea warfare may differ from one another, they are 
 at one in demanding, as a first essential to offensive 
 action, the provision of secure bases and lines of 
 supply. 
 
 In a tactical sense it is, of course, true that fleets 
 and ships are more independent of their communica- 
 tions than land forces, that they draw no visible tail 
 in the shape of slowly moving waggons plodding 
 wearily after the fighting line behind them. They can 
 carry their ammunition, food, and stores in their roomy 
 holds, and a maximum supply will not in the least 
 impair their swiftness or manoeuvring power. But 
 in another direction they are hampered by considera- 
 tions which are more peremptory than any that 
 confront the leader on shore. No fuel is provided 
 by the sea ; no trees can be cut down at the end of 
 the day's march ; no coal can be abstracted from the 
 waves. Fuel is as necessary to modern warships as 
 water is to man, and, when the theatre of war spreads 
 over all the oceans, stages are measured by thousands 
 of miles, and lines of communication girdle half the 
 globe. 
 
 Moreover, nothing in the way of supplies can be 
 
74 THE FUNCTION OF THE ARMY 
 
 gathered as the armed force forges ahead. The wide 
 stretches of the sea have nothing to offer in the way 
 of plunder ; no rich provinces can be robbed or re- 
 quisitioned. Never can a Nelson imitate a Napoleon, 
 and make the war support the war ; or live on the 
 country after the manner of the Revolutionary armies 
 of France. 
 
 This fact is recognised in sea warfare, and has to be 
 provided against, according to the same principles that 
 govern war on land. Both theory and practice teach 
 us, although the lesson is frequently forgotten, that in 
 the offices of a general staff all possible theatres of war 
 should be studied and pondered over, and that any 
 theatre where operations are imminent should be care- 
 fully prepared beforehand with all the potentialities 
 and contingencies of the coming campaign in view. 
 
 The military roads and posts and magazines of 
 Frederick and Wellington have their counterpart to-day 
 in the railway lines, rail-heads, and advanced depots 
 of land warfare. In Imperial defence they are repre- 
 sented by naval bases, supply-ports, and coaling-stations 
 placed at intervals along our lines of operation, and 
 held secure by forces whose presence frees others for 
 the great strategic blows of the war, just as on shore the 
 troops told off to lines of communication enable an 
 active army to manoeuvre, confident and untrammelled 
 by anxiety as to questions of supply. 
 
 At the outset of a struggle with a great Power the 
 mobile force we are familiar with in military history 
 would be represented by the navy. Its whole energies 
 and ideas should be concentrated on carrying havoc 
 amongst the enemy's forces, on seeking out and destroy- 
 ing or obliterating his ships of war — what on shore we 
 should term his main army — not on warding off, except 
 indirectly, damage to our trade or colonial possessions. 
 Just as the tactics of minor combats teach us that 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE ARMY 75 
 
 our aim should be to kill our enemy, and not to 
 be contented merely to gain cover for ourselves, so 
 our navy will fight to deal execution, swift, decisive, 
 and permanent, on our foes, not to secure for us 
 immunity from loss or destruction. 
 
 During this earlier stage of a great war, the army 
 exists, then, to free our navy for such enterprising and 
 vigorous action. It undertakes the secondary but no 
 less honourable or important role of safe-guarding the 
 line of communication and ensuring supply, and yields 
 the place of protagonist for the time being to the 
 sailors. 
 
 The garrisons of the Imperial fortresses, coaling- 
 stations, and defended harbours are therefore found by 
 it, such places are by it rendered secure from attack, and 
 are held in the interests of the navy to enable our fleets 
 to feel confident that they will always find fuel, food, 
 ammunition, or facilities for refitment at their disposal 
 when they seek their anchorages. 
 
 Some years ago there existed a school of thinkers, who 
 seemed to wish that our navy should alone be responsible 
 for these bases and ports, and which viewed with a jealous 
 eye almost any expenditure on guns and works ashore. 
 
 On the other hand, it has perhaps with justice been 
 asserted that a school of soldiers and politicians termed 
 the " Bricklayers " used to revel in revetments, and could 
 alone breathe freely in cool retreats behind portentous 
 parapets. 
 
 A saner view seems to teach us that the ports of our 
 Empire held for the refuge, replenishment, refitment, or 
 repair of our ships should be rendered secure by such 
 means as will obviate the depletion of our fighting 
 strength in the actions where the great issues of the 
 war must be decided, and where all the armed forces 
 of the Empire will be called upon to make a combined 
 effort. 
 
76 THE FUNCTION OF THE ARMY 
 
 We will concentrate our ships where they may meet 
 and give battle to those of the enemy ; not disseminate 
 them along our coast-lines, waiting for the advent of an 
 opponent who may never appear at all. 
 
 The decisive operations at the beginning of a great 
 war will be the destruction of the hostile sea-power. 
 To accomplish it, we shall need to gather up all our 
 strength, and fling it into the scales at the decisive 
 point. 
 
 While, therefore, we hold such places as Malta, 
 Bermuda, St Lucia, or Aden, principally in the interests 
 of the navy, so far as its needs in times of peace are con- 
 cerned, a judicious application of our resources calls upon 
 the army to defend them, and here we recognise a promi- 
 nent duty or function of the army in our scheme of 
 Imperial defence. 
 
 It may be argued, and it has indeed been asserted, 
 that while we hold command of the sea it will be use- 
 less for hostile expeditions to attack our strong places, 
 because they could not keep them even if they man- 
 aged to capture them. It has been proved that mere 
 wanton destruction by bombardment will effect nothing 
 substantial, and may leave ships with empty magazines 
 to the mercy of such antagonists as they would prob- 
 ably encounter after they had spent their strength in 
 mere mischief But surely it is not excessive anxiety 
 that prompts us to make reasonable provision against 
 raids on places which contain commodities so valuable 
 to warships as coal and ammunition ? 
 
 To obtain them for himself, or deprive us of such 
 supplies, would be an enterprise that might well justify 
 a bold commander in accepting the risks involved. 
 
 Coal has become the determining factor in the efficiency 
 of ships, and a successful coup on a place where it was 
 stored might place complete disablement on us, while 
 the acquisition of what we lost might galvanise an 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE ARMY 77 
 
 enemy from palsied impotency into the full vigour 
 of manhood. 
 
 The possibility of destroying large stores of coal may 
 be problematical, yet we shall scarcely be willing to let 
 an enemy enter on an experiment with the fuel intended 
 for our warships. To destroy ammunition certainly 
 presents no insuperable difficulties ; while to carry away 
 either ammunition or coal is as feasible for an enemy as 
 it is for ourselves. 
 
 Moreover, evasion is possible when the issue of a 
 combat may not be in doubt ; and while so valuable a 
 prize as has been named lies open to a hostile swoop, 
 we must certainly feel that a very material part of our 
 interests was in jeopardy. 
 
 I have perhaps said enough to show that when our 
 land forces are utilised to guard the supply-ports of the 
 navy they are not being wasted. 
 
 But our Empire is the fabric of individual enterprise, 
 and rests on a commercial basis. We cannot flourish as 
 a great trading community if the various forms of wealth 
 which our commercial activity accumulates cannot be 
 stored away in many an outlying corner of our realm. 
 A nation which exists principally on commerce must 
 provide for the protection of its business people, and 
 lessen the risks of war as much as possible for them. 
 Now the strong-rooms of banks and the plunder of 
 warehouses may well prove an alluring bait to hostile 
 cruisers. The capture of vessels that may have sought 
 refuge in harbour, and lie helplessly at anchor, would be 
 an additional incentive. If sujjply-ports are essential to 
 the navy, defended harbours and anchorages for the 
 benefit of the mercantile marine can scarcely be con- 
 sidered less indispensable to commerce. It is through 
 the great arteries of trade that the pulses of the Empire 
 beat, that its life-blood ebbs and flows. When they 
 suffer lesion, the strong arm will fall nervelessly to the 
 
78 THE FUNCTION OF THE ARMY 
 
 side, bear it ever so bright and sharp a weapon. The 
 busy brain will reel and hesitate, the quick glance grow 
 dim and fade. 
 
 While we are protected by armament, we live by 
 trade, and the most enthusiastic soldier or sailor will 
 find it difficult to deny that some protection must be 
 given to such ports as Karachi and Calcutta, which are 
 held rather in the interests of our commerce than of 
 our naval power. 
 
 The question as to how much and what constitutes 
 an adequate protection next presents itself, and in turn 
 demands an answer as to the form of attack which it is 
 proposed to guard against. 
 
 We have already learnt that a mere bombardment 
 will promise so little substantial result that it is not 
 greatly to be feared ; is, in fact, not likely to be under- 
 taken at all. 
 
 The danger will come from the land side, and any 
 foe determined to do material damage, or carry away 
 plunder of any description with him, will be compelled 
 to send men ashore. It is to be expected, therefore, 
 that all attempts on our coast defences from over sea 
 will take the form of a combined attack by ships, and 
 by a landing-party. Ships are far more valuable than 
 human beings, and will not be risked where men may 
 do the work, while it is only by the presence of a force 
 of men on shore that considerable results are to be 
 reaped. 
 
 It is from these causes that our difficulties in estab- 
 lishing minor coast defences spring. A very few guns, 
 cunningly placed so as to offer little or no target to the 
 enemy, might well deter a hostile cruiser from approach- 
 ing, far less entering, a port, and but a mere handful 
 of men, involving slight expense, would be required for 
 their detachments. Guns of an adequate type would 
 cost comparatively little ; the preparation of their sites 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE ARMY 79 
 
 and protective cover for them would only be a matter 
 of small outlay. 
 
 But a few guns cannot do more than sweep a limited 
 extent of coast-line, and while their attention is absorbed 
 by the force on the water, a landing-party may assail 
 them from an unexpected direction. While they are 
 being masked or captured, the object of the raid may 
 be accomplished with a comparatively small expendi- 
 ture of force. 
 
 Moreover, when once we have placed a gun in position, 
 our attitude becomes defiant, and the national pride is 
 aroused. We have raised, as it were, the standard of our 
 country, and must carry through the challenge which 
 we offer to the world. So that it is manifest that the 
 protection of a harbour or anchorage may easily in- 
 volve more than at first sight appears, and that when 
 we lay submarine mines, and place guns to defend such 
 places, we are often obliged to look to the protection of 
 the protectors. The tendency is one to be guarded 
 against, and is but another example of "the little more" 
 that has to be often sternly put away from our minds 
 when making decisions about all military operations. 
 
 The best antidote to the evil is to be found in 
 making due provision beforehand for the speedy re- 
 moval and transfer of the defensive force, according as 
 the strategical situation may demand. At one period 
 the chances of an attack at a certain spot may be so 
 small that they may be neglected, while the defence 
 in another part may be far more vulnerable. Consulta- 
 tion between naval and military commanders should be 
 able to decide where the immediate danger lies, and an 
 elasticity in our defensive system should permit of 
 prompt action being taken. 
 
 Perhaps it may not be unnecessary to mention here 
 that when duties such as I have named are allotted to 
 the army and navy, the closest co-operation between 
 
8o THE FUNCTION OF THE ARMY 
 
 the two services should be sought for as a first essential. 
 There should be such an understanding between them 
 as should make it clear to the military commander what 
 the chances of attack are, what he should be prepared 
 for, and when he may expect it. Above all, he should 
 know for what length of time he may have to hold 
 out, and when he may expect to see a relieving fleet. 
 Since their existence depends on sea communication, 
 the ultimate security of our supply-ports must rest on 
 sea -power in the same way as that of the mother- 
 country is secured by naval strength. 
 
 But while it is certain that neither the nation at home 
 nor the garrisons abroad can hold out permanently 
 without the help of a fleet, they may yet survive for a 
 time, and as long as ammunition and supplies do not 
 run short, may keep the flag flying. 
 
 With time on our side, the most desperate situation 
 may be retrieved. The political horizon may clear ; the 
 unexpected, as is inevitable, supervene. It is no dis- 
 paragement of sea-power to make provision against a 
 temporary collapse, or to try and tide over the results 
 of an unforeseen disaster. 
 
 To gain time is a legitimate reason for the construc- 
 tion of fixed defences — time for our stamina to assert 
 its power, time for us to recover ourselves, time which, 
 more than once in our history, has been our surest ally. 
 
 This question of time brings with it some considera- 
 tions as to the size of garrisons at such places as our 
 great Mediterranean fortresses and more important 
 naval bases, which must not be left out of sight, and 
 are sometimes not fully understood. 
 
 In the first place, a considerable garrison will, in 
 itself, be a deterrent to an attack at the beginning of 
 a great war. If a force which can be reckoned by 
 hundreds holds an important point, an enterprising foe 
 will not consider that surprise and capture are be}'ond 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE ARMY 8 1 
 
 what may be regarded as a legitimate risk of war. It 
 is a very different matter to organise and despatch over 
 sea a raiding force of, say, 5000 men, than to embark 
 an army corps. The collecting together of the neces- 
 sary transports would neither be so difficult, nor would 
 it attract so much attention. Nor would the same 
 interests be involved, nor would the covering naval force 
 need to be so powerful. 
 
 Malta, held only by a battalion, might tempt the 
 daring of 5000 men — while guarded as at present, not 
 less than six times that number would probably be 
 told off for its capture. The latter force could not be 
 collected and despatched without our being apprised 
 of what was in contemplation, and the whole operation 
 might well assume such dimensions as would cause the 
 central Mediterranean to become the decisive point in 
 the theatre of war. A great fleet action, on the issue 
 of which the feasibility of attacking the place must 
 depend, would be brought about. And a great fleet 
 action is what our navy would most probably desire 
 to see. 
 
 While, too, an expedition of 5000 men might evade 
 us, the larger force could not hope to do so. 
 
 Again, a place well garrisoned will be capable of a 
 more prolonged defence than in a case where the de- 
 fending force is huddled together in a small closed 
 work, able to ward off the rush of a storming-party, but 
 a mere shell trap when subjected to bombardment by 
 modern ordnance firing high explosive shell. 
 
 To effectively bombard a wide area is very difficult, 
 wasteful of ammunition, and does not promise decisive 
 results, but a small work supplies a very different and 
 more vulnerable target. 
 
 Again, were our navy not so completely successful in 
 its first encounters as we expect it to be, it might, with 
 opportunity to refit and receive reinforcements, easily 
 F 
 
82 THE FUNCTION OF THE ARMY 
 
 retrieve its position. A great fortress, well provisioned 
 and supplied with ammunition, would then afford the 
 necessary shelter and accommodation for repair ; but 
 to be of use, it must have been prepared for the emerg- 
 ency in times of peace. At the outbreak of a great 
 war it will not be possible to send reinforcements across 
 the sea until we have established a mastery upon it. 
 The navy will be too much absorbed in its more import- 
 ant duties to undertake the safeguarding of convoys, and 
 we shall scarcely venture to send many transports away 
 unescorted. Thus our garrisons abroad in war time must 
 be self-dependent, perhaps for weeks, and during that 
 period disease and casualties will have exacted their 
 due percentage. Some margin above the bare neces- 
 sities of duty must therefore be allowed for, and a 
 provision for wastage made. 
 
 A civil population is also a factor in the defence of 
 a fortified post which has to be reckoned with, and 
 space over and above what the military exigencies 
 demand has to be prepared for its accommodation. 
 Politics, too, exert an influence in apportioning the 
 garrison to a place like Malta. Finally, it must be 
 borne in mind that while a perimeter may be contracted 
 as a garrison wastes, it is by no means easy to enlarge 
 it after an enemy has established himself in position. 
 Tactical, sanitary, and political considerations have all 
 to be taken into account when we determine the extent 
 over which our lines of defence must stretch, while the 
 numbers of the garrisons have to be apportioned to the 
 length of front to be defended. Such are some of the 
 reasons that govern our decision in garrisoning the 
 strategic forts that we have dotted over the globe, and 
 which compel us to keep up a considerable portion 
 of our army for their protection. The duties involved 
 are not particularly attractive to the army, nor do they 
 offer good training for young troops ; but the more 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE ARMY 83 
 
 secure we render the places committed to our charge, 
 the more freely and boldly may our ships proceed on 
 their proper and more exhilarating mission. 
 
 But the naval victories we look for from them — and 
 it is to be hoped that without presumption we may 
 count on such — must be but stepping-stones to wider 
 enterprises, and the momentum of success must not be 
 allowed to exhaust itself in the deepness of the sea. 
 
 Weak in point of numbers as our army unfortunately 
 is, we should not in that fact alone find ground for 
 either apathy or inactivity. On the contrary, it is owing 
 to this very circumstance that the lessons of war appeal 
 to us most forcibly for exertion, and give us confidence 
 when they show how the strategic counterstroke can be 
 made an effective weapon in the hands of the weak. 
 
 It is true that the area of the British Empire is 
 11,000,000 square miles, while that of Great Britain 
 and Ireland is only 120,000. That fact, and all it 
 implies, constitutes, however, no argument for an atti- 
 tude of nerveless expectancy on our part, but urges us, 
 unless we would be blind to what has occurred in the 
 past, to brace ourselves more firmly than ever for swift 
 and vigorous action. 
 
 Swiftness and vigour, however, are not the only factors 
 which make for victory. Secrecy is of equal importance, 
 and has been an essential element of success in such 
 operations as I have in mind ; and here sea favours us, 
 for an army on board ship leaves no traces behind it, 
 and once on the waters, the uncertainty as to where it 
 may next make its appearance constitutes in itself a 
 menace and deterrent. When Napoleon sailed for 
 Egypt, our forefathers were completely puzzled as to 
 his destination ; and the hostile fleets actually passed 
 within sixty miles of one another without their proximity 
 to one another being discovered. Luck aided Napoleon, 
 no doubt ; and Nelson had to complain of want of 
 
84 THE FUNCTION OF THF. ARMY 
 
 frigates. But luck is inevitable in war, and, I suppose, 
 from what we hear said, that want of cruisers will be 
 complained of in the future too. In this case we have an 
 example of ships conferring mobility and secret move- 
 ment on armies. Two years later, marching power and 
 audacity gave the same results on shore, and Napoleon 
 swooped on upper Italy across the Alps just as he sur- 
 prised Egypt when he swept across the water. Had 
 Napoleon been possessed of command of the sea, no 
 doubt a sea voyage, and not a mountain march, would 
 have led up to Marengo. The lack of ships forced 
 Napoleon, as it had Hannibal, to traverse weary miles 
 of road, when a Power that commanded the sea might 
 have sailed at ease over far greater distances. But 
 the principles at work are the same in all the cases. 
 Mobility, whether by land or sea, is the antidote to 
 ponderous armaments. 
 
 In 1862 the Confederates, following the wise counsel 
 of generals who had studied and understood war, by 
 mobility and energy redressed the balance in numbers 
 against their side. 
 
 The light of nature, and the character of the country 
 has enabled our enemies in South Africa to turn the ad- 
 vantage they possessed no less skilfully to account. In 
 a world-struggle our supremacy at sea endows us with 
 a mobility, the equivalent, on a large scale, of that 
 which good marching, and plenty of horses, gave in 
 the other cases. If we apply the lessons rightly, we 
 shall sally out from our bays and channels, carry the war 
 away from our own shores, and teach our opponents 
 that he who sets out to attack an enemy must first 
 secure the safety of his own possessions. 
 
 From Providence we have derived a position strategic- 
 ally valuable as the ports and trade-routes of the world 
 are to-day distributed. The predominance of our navy 
 will give us that facility and rapidity of movement 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE ARMY 85 
 
 which is an essential to offensive strategy. A combina- 
 tion of both mobility and a favourable position places 
 the strategic counterstroke within our grasp. 
 
 I do not mean that we are to enter into the turmoil 
 of continental warfare such as absorbed much of our 
 energies during the eighteenth century. In the face of 
 nations in arms dreams of conquests melt away. 
 
 Neither can we hope to derive advantage from foreign 
 alliances. No foreigners will want to secure our great- 
 ness ; and it is only with that end in view that we would 
 ever entertain their advances. I fear we can hope for 
 little from goodwill or sympathy. We shall do best 
 to trust in our own strength alone, and undertake 
 nothing we cannot ourselves carry through. 
 
 Nor need we despair. 
 
 Although the hearths and homes of an opponent may 
 never be menaced by us, he may have colonies in which 
 our presence might constitute a sore so galling to his 
 material interests and his pride, that he would be forced 
 to try and eject us at any cost. A compact and formid- 
 able British force, conveyed and supplied by an all- 
 powerful navy, would not easily be disposed of, while 
 the support of the war by an opponent not enjoying 
 sea-power might well prove an insuperable difficulty. 
 
 The sphere of usefulness of our army, when once the 
 waves are ours, is by no means, therefore, contracted 
 to a mere garrisoning of fixed defences. Indeed, the 
 conditions of our national life are, in any case, such 
 that a protracted war with a great Power would, even 
 if the laurels usually fell to ourselves, be only less 
 disastrous to us than a swift defeat. 
 
 It is quite possible that the question of food-supply 
 may prove less difficult of solution than some suppose. 
 The self-denial and self-sacrifice of our people may 
 encourage them to bear a loss of luxuries, or even some 
 deprivations of the necessaries of life, with equanimity. 
 
86 THE FUNCTION OF THE ARMY 
 
 Raw materials are, however, indispensable to our manu- 
 factures, and an interference with their supply might 
 close factories and diminish or disperse wages. The 
 certainty of war-prices for bread and meat, and a 
 simultaneous reduction or disappearance of the wages 
 that formed the support of families, is not a factor on 
 which to base anticipations of a prolonged struggle. 
 Undoubtedly, some vigorous measures to end the war 
 would have to be undertaken. Otherwise the early 
 victories of our navy might well prove of a Pyrrhic 
 type, and leave our country in a condition as deplorable 
 as that of a nation which had felt the heaviness of a 
 conquering hand. 
 
 It is evident, then, that we must do more than render 
 futile an invasion of our shores, or preserve the ad- 
 vanced ports and communications of our Empire intact. 
 We must have a fixed standard up to which, in ,the 
 first place, and at all costs, we must keep our navy ; 
 but none the less must we then organise an army equal 
 to the no less important duties that Imperial defence 
 will demand from it. 
 
 The standard by which the strength of the navy 
 can be gauged is known. It is less easy to determine 
 that of the army ; but the following scale, if adhered 
 to honestly, will perhaps suffice. 
 
 In the first place, we need the presence of such 
 regular forces at home as will be sufficient to train 
 and supply drafts for the units we maintain beyond 
 the seas as garrisons for India and our colonies, and 
 to hold the strategic points of the Empire that I have 
 already referred to. 
 
 Organised units must also remain at home, such as will 
 render it hopeless for any enemy to throw a raiding 
 expedition into our territories without the certainty of 
 defeat staring him in the face. But most especially must 
 we have an army such as can provide a well-equipped 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE ARMY 87 
 
 and easily-transferable force available at short notice for 
 the defence of any frontier of the Empire which may 
 be endangered, and ready to undertake an expedition 
 against any of the possessions of our enemies on which 
 sound strategy may call us to deliver an effective 
 counterstroke. 
 
 To undertake such a counterstroke would fnanifestly 
 be impossible until our navy rode the seas supreme, 
 and had accounted for the forces afloat that might 
 endanger its success. It is for this reason that the 
 duty of the army in protecting the bases of the navy 
 have first been dwelt upon. While the defence of our 
 homes rests primarily on a predominant navy, so in 
 not less degree, and for precisely the same reasons, 
 does the feasibility of offensive warfare by land depend 
 upon it. 
 
 Hostile nations can indulge in no visions of an 
 invasion of these islands till they command the high- 
 way that gives access to them ; but no more can we 
 hope to carry the war into hostile territory till we 
 have attained a similar predominance. 
 
 We should have, however, every right to hope that in 
 the future naval superiority shall be as completely the 
 appanage of England as it has been in the past. It 
 is, at anyrate, within our power to make certain of that ; 
 and therefore the provision of a force adequate for a 
 great counterstroke should, especially in view of the 
 perils with which a protracted war is fraught for us, 
 form a consideration in Imperial defence only secondary 
 to that which compels us to preserve our navy supreme. 
 To reinforce our troops in India or Canada or South 
 Africa or Egypt, or to provide means for such a 
 counterstroke, we should require at least three army 
 corps prepared for embarkation at short notice without 
 levying calls on the efficiency of other units, and ap- 
 propriating supplies either of personnel or material 
 
88 THE FUNCTION OF THE ARMY 
 
 intended for other portions of our military system. 
 In addition, at any rate, one cavalry division should 
 be held ready for immediate mobilisation. This force 
 is a considerably greater one than what a few years 
 ago would have been held sufficient for service abroad. 
 But our experiences in South Africa have shown us 
 what demands modern war will make upon us, and 
 for the future we shall have to think in brigades and 
 not in battalions. 
 
 The multiplication and improvements of modern 
 armaments have also totally altered the relationship 
 in which we formerly stood to semi-barbarous nations, 
 with whom we may not improbably become embroiled. 
 An Abyssinian war would now tax our strength as much 
 as that we entered on so lightly with the Boers more 
 than two years ago. Dusky warriors, superior in 
 mobility and physique to Europeans, become, when 
 equally well armed, even more dangerous opponents 
 than white men. We have no longer on our side 
 the advantage that armament used to give to civilisa- 
 tion ; we can no longer count on discipline restoring 
 the balance between numbers. Discipline and method 
 have ceased to be the monopoly of white men, and 
 Europeans have lately been selling their birthright in the 
 shape of rifles and guns and ammunition to the highest 
 bidder, whatever complexion he might wear. The era 
 of small wars is rapidly passing away, and in future 
 we must be prepared, even when dealing with those 
 whom we term uncivilised, to send a force against them 
 such as before the days of universal service would have 
 been sufficient to turn the scale on the battlefields of 
 Europe. 
 
 It is to be remembered, too, that save only in Aus- 
 tralasia our frontiers are now co-terminous, or practi- 
 cally co-terminous, with those of Powers which possess a 
 command of men and means of transport such as will 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE ARMY 89 
 
 compel us to deploy forces of the dimensions I have 
 named. Finally, now that the war in South Africa is 
 over, we shall have to hold what we have won with a 
 garrison, for many years, at least, four times as great 
 as that which before the war we deemed sufficient. 
 
 In the present state of politics and armaments all over 
 the world, three army corps and a cavalry division ready 
 for immediate mobilisation do not constitute a force 
 which in common prudence can be termed excessive. 
 
 Behind these first three army corps, three others, 
 largely composed of our auxiliary forces, are to be organ- 
 ised to furnish drafts and train troops in war time for 
 our establishments abroad, provide for home defence, 
 and reinforce our armies engaged with the enemy. 
 
 In addition, provision for garrisons and mounted 
 infantry in the shape of yeomanry will also be made. 
 The provision of such organised forces, besides our 
 Indian and Colonial garrisons, is to be taken as the 
 minimum that the protection of our Empire now de- 
 mands. Events not by any means improbable might 
 suddenly so modify the strategical situation abroad that 
 we might be called upon to augment them. 
 
 For example, should an outbreak of aggressive energy 
 in Central Asia bring about certain eventualities, an 
 addition of at least 60,000 men to our Indian garrison, 
 half of whom would be British, might well become 
 imperative. 
 
 When we consider such forces as I have indic- 
 ated, when we reflect on the vastness of the theatre of 
 war, on the immensity of the issues involved, on the 
 great roles open to either service, is there any room left 
 for any petty jealousies between the two ? — between the 
 right and left arms of the strong man armed ? Of course, 
 I put any starving of one service for the benefit of the 
 other out of the question. The navy must always stand 
 at that height of efficiency which has been laid down in 
 
90 THE FUNCTION OF THE ARMY 
 
 the carefully-considered projects of our experts. Then 
 should the case of the army be similarly and impartially 
 considered : the money spent being in the interests of 
 the Empire as a whole, and not ever regarded as a con- 
 cession to the claims or prejudices of any particular 
 service. 
 
 It is not with us any longer a mere question of the 
 inviolability of our shores or of the safety of London. It 
 is no dream of aggression or pompous triumphs that 
 conjures up these demands for adequate and efficient 
 land forces. It is a matter of preserving such trade and 
 prosperity to our working-classes as they have been 
 brought up to expect, of handing down to our pos- 
 terity the inheritance, whole and unimpaired, which has 
 devolved on us from the courage and labour and self- 
 sacrifice of our forefathers. 
 
 That the predominance of our navy is the foundation 
 stone on which the security of our Empire — our very 
 existence as a great power — rests, is absolutely incon- 
 trovertible. It is equally true, however, that we cannot 
 live and thrive, no matter to what pre-eminence our 
 navy may attain, if we maintain one gun or horse 
 or man fewer than the establishments I have fore- 
 shadowed. 
 
 On the other hand, never let us forget that these 
 battalions, batteries, and squadrons cannot secure our 
 shores from blockade, and cannot leave them without 
 the help of the navy. We can neither reinforce our 
 garrison abroad, nor attack those of our opponents, 
 unless we can count on a secure passage across the 
 seas. 
 
 Our army and navy are, in fact, complementary to 
 each other. To get the fullest effect from either they 
 must work in unison, and their co-operation must be 
 genial and intelligent. In any broad view of Imperial 
 defence their interests are seen to be in common rather 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE ARMY 91 
 
 than antagonistic, and while the Empire would perish 
 without the one, it could not exist without the other. 
 
 Yet just as empire involves for us possessions stretch- 
 ing over more than one element, open to attack and 
 demanding defence both by land and sea, so must the 
 military (using the word in its broad sense) forces of our 
 Empire be adapted to operations which are not confined 
 and hemmed in by the features of physical geography. 
 Sea and land forces, trained and accustomed to act in 
 combination until they merge together into what may 
 be regarded as our Imperial force, offer to us, however, 
 the very weapon our necessities demand, and the testi- 
 mony of military history tells us how vast a result a com- 
 bined military and naval expedition to foreign shores 
 may bring about. 
 
 It was the "Spanish ulcer" that first sapped Napoleon's 
 strength. The comparatively few British troops that 
 we landed in Spain first taught the nations of the 
 Continent how the French legions might be successfully 
 withstood. The triumphs of Vittoria and Waterloo, 
 not those of an invincible navy, finally brought the 
 struggle to an end. In the Crimean period we see the 
 army fastening on the huge flank of a powerful oppon- 
 ent, and wearing down, by the slow pressure of reinforce- 
 ments from over sea, the stubborn persistence of the Czar. 
 
 Again, at a more recent epoch, the navy and army 
 co-operate in Egypt, secure our route to India, and 
 bring good government and prosperity to the subjects 
 of the Khedive. 
 
 Without committing myself to the recommendation of 
 such a course of strategy, it is pertinent to point out 
 that the shores of her potential foes offer to that nation 
 whose sea-power dominates the waters, coast-lines many 
 thousands of miles in extent, opening to her numerous 
 footholds from which an invasion of hostile territory could 
 be launched, with far greater security of base and lines of 
 
92 THE FUNCTION OF THE ARMY 
 
 communication than any power making war on land in 
 Europe could count upon. When it is remembered how 
 anxiously the frontier between France and Germany, 
 only some two hundred miles in extent, is watched, 
 how much in doubt France stood as to where to look 
 for the inroad of the foe in the opening days of the last 
 disastrous campaign in those regions, we can gain some 
 notion of how mighty a power a nation wields which 
 may choose her own point of entry on such a front, and 
 what a menace an invading force, able to move freely 
 wherever steam and waves can take it, may become. 
 
 To guard such a frontier against so ubiquitous a foe 
 might fairly exhaust the energies and resources of a 
 commander, even when he could count his battalions 
 and regiments by hundreds. 
 
 In this connection the Black Sea has often been 
 referred to, and it has frequently figured in suggestions 
 for the employment of our army in Europe. It yields, 
 however, but an illustration of what is true in many 
 other parts of the world also. Wherever, in fact, hostile 
 territory, or what may be converted into hostile terri- 
 tory, is co-terminous with the ocean, there lurks the 
 same menace from the nation that is mistress of the sea. 
 
 If Northern Persia abuts on the Caspian and the 
 Central Asian dominions of the Czar, Southern Persia 
 marches with Britannia's realm, and strategic points are 
 open to enterprises from sea as well as land. 
 
 But to discuss the possibilities for combined naval and 
 military expeditions here would be a digression from 
 the subject more immediately before us, and I need 
 say no more of them than that they would offer oppor- 
 tunities to our army which must be reckoned amongst 
 its duties when we consider its place in Imperial 
 defence. 
 
 Home defence, again, is a part of the subject which, 
 if adequately dealt with, demands separate treatment. 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE ARMY 93 
 
 and will receive it in a subsequent chapter. Yet the 
 important function which our army is to perform in it 
 may here be briefly referred to. The defence of our 
 shores is primarily the duty of the navy, but the form 
 of defence adopted, owing to the anomalous conditions 
 under which we live, must be an active not a passive 
 one. 
 
 As I have already said, I view superiority at sea 
 to be the fundamental condition of our system of 
 national defence ; but while the navy may be termed 
 our right, the army is our left arm, and is as essential 
 in any well-considered plan as is the other. Moreover, 
 an interval of time may elapse before it is clear to 
 whom superiority at sea is to belong. The reasons 
 which have been given for strong garrisons to hold 
 our naval bases apply with equal force to the case 
 of our home defences also. 
 
 The coaling-stations and supply-ports are the links 
 in the great chain that bind our dominions beyond 
 the seas to our shores. But while we see to it that 
 every link is firm and true, we must not forget to 
 make sure that the shore end of the chain does not 
 fall into the enemy's hands. No prudent statesman 
 would be content with nothing at home behind the 
 navy. If naval bases are to be fortified to gain time, 
 it is necessary to make our central citadel secure 
 against unforeseen contingencies also. Otherwise, the 
 appearance of a few hostile cruisers off our coasts would 
 create a panic. Our fleets would be ordered back to 
 home waters, and, in place of going to meet their 
 opponent, they would have to wait for him to come to 
 them. 
 
 I am far from believing, too, that even heavy naval 
 reverses need necessarily prove the death-knell of our 
 country. It is not probable that the whole of our 
 navy will ever be wiped out all at once. Even a 
 
94 THE FUNCTION OF THE ARMY 
 
 great defeat is widely removed from annihilation, and 
 if a successful action should ever enable a foreigner 
 to get a footing in the kingdom, I am far from thinking 
 that we would be forced to strike our colours. On 
 the contrary, his advent should be the signal for such 
 a display of resolution and activity as would prevent 
 his penetrating very deeply into our territory or his 
 ever getting out of it again. 
 
 The danger of a raid on the United Kingdom is, 
 in one respect, more imminent than elsewhere in the 
 Empire, because we must remember that to reach 
 most of our Colonies and fortresses abroad our enemies 
 must traverse long stretches of sea, and must organise 
 expeditions which will have to operate far away from 
 their bases of supply. But the enemy is at the gates 
 of the United Kingdom ; comparatively few miles of 
 sea would separate his expeditionary force from its 
 home base, from which men and material might be 
 poured in practically unlimited numbers to his rein- 
 forcement. 
 
 In a few hours a steamship may easily cover the 
 distance that separates our south coast from potentially 
 hostile ports. When the leap is so small, an enemy 
 may gather himself together to attempt it. The mere 
 fact of his making preparation to do so would, unless 
 complete confidence in home defence were felt amongst 
 our people, be enough to spoil the plan of campaign 
 which our navy would have in view. 
 
 With an organised and efficient army in the United 
 Kingdom ready to meet the emergency, invasion would 
 assume the character of a forlorn hope, and it would 
 not be entertained by any responsible statesman. Such 
 an army we need, as before, in order to release the 
 navy from guard-duty at home, and free it for its 
 wider duties far away from our shores. 
 
 We find, then, that we may summarise the function 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE ARMY 95 
 
 of the army in our scheme of Imperial defence in the 
 following brief paragraphs : — 
 
 1. To defend India and our colonial possessions 
 which are without local forces of their own. 
 
 2. To hold the naval bases throughout the world 
 which supply our ships with coal, stores, and ammuni- 
 tion ; provide them with facilities for refitment or 
 repair, or give them shelter when menaced by superior 
 force — and this, when we are at war with a great 
 power, will form a duty hardly second to the first- 
 named. 
 
 3. In minor wars to furnish a compact, easily - 
 transferable force to provide punitive expeditions or 
 forces to deal with the savage races with which we 
 may come into collision. 
 
 4. When we are engaged with more formidable 
 antagonists, to place at our disposal the equivalent of 
 three army corps, with cavalry in addition, with which 
 to reinforce the troops defending India or our Colonies, 
 or to take offensive action as may be needed beyond 
 the seas. 
 
 5. To ensure the presence of such troops at home 
 as may provide drafts and reinforcements to those 
 abroad. 
 
 6. To give security and confidence at home and 
 enable our ships to operate where they will. 
 
 But with reference to the last-named duty, it must 
 be observed that the repulse of an invader of these 
 shores by the army is a contingency only vaguely to 
 be hinted at. The crisis, which would make such 
 action necessary, would be so momentous as to shake 
 the whole edifice that has laboriously been piled 
 together by centuries of industry. We cannot contem- 
 plate a struggle involving such issues with equanimity. 
 However supreme a navy, however adequate an army 
 we may possess, we must never let it get to such straits 
 
96 THE FUNCTION OF THE ARMY 
 
 with us ; and when we discuss the question of how 
 to deal with such an eventuality, when obliged to trust 
 to our army alone, the wisest counsel is also the briefest 
 — that which sums up the situation in the words : 
 " It must never be." 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 COMBINED NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 
 
 In the following pages it is not proposed to discuss 
 the action of naval brigades with other troops on land, 
 nor of small raiding-parties despatched from warships 
 to undertake the carrying away, damage, or destruction 
 of an enemy's property on shore. The first are im- 
 promptu efforts, rarely deliberately planned, and often 
 only entered on to eke out a little further the attenu- 
 ated forces which our national optimism and love of 
 economy magnify into a sufficiency for some enter- 
 prise that, it is secretly hoped, may fizzle out before 
 it attains the dimensions of a " small " war. 
 
 Expeditions of the latter nature are usually left to the 
 navy alone, and are to be classed with the cutting-out 
 and raiding enterprises that enlivened the monotony of 
 the old wars. 
 
 We want to speak, now, of more important operations ; 
 such as may influence the progress of a struggle waged 
 on Imperial lines, when we strike to bring about great 
 results, and aim only at such points as are strategically 
 valuable. 
 
 In considering the subject it is necessary to bear in 
 mind that the conditions under which war is conducted 
 in the present day differ so widely from those which 
 obtained even fifty years ago, that considerable caution 
 in drawing deductions from previous experience is de- 
 sirable. 
 
 Railroads and telegraphs have come to the assistance 
 of the defence ; steam and science in shipbuilding to 
 G 97 
 
98 COMBINED OPERATIONS 
 
 that of the attack. Invasion in the past has often been 
 a war of communications, and victory has ultimately 
 remained with those that had the best. Water-transport, 
 where the sea is held secure, is better than that by land 
 even now, and was immeasurably superior to it when 
 armies had to rely on waggons and horses instead of 
 railways and traction-engines for their supply. Our 
 communications, and those of the French in the Crimea, 
 were infinitely superior to those of the Russians, although 
 the latter were operating in their own country, because 
 the road system of our opponents was defective, and no 
 lines of rail fed their armies. 
 
 Behind the Allies steamships brought up the resources 
 of the world. 
 
 At the close of the war, when our arrangements had 
 been improved, the Russian reinforcements, having 
 traversed many a weary mile of road, arrived at the 
 front, wearied, and trailing behind them the huge percent- 
 age of sick and disabled men that war, even before battle, 
 exacts, to meet men fresh and buoyant and well-fed, 
 carried to the scene of action in comfortable ships. 
 
 Had a railway system connected the shores of the 
 Black Sea with the heart of the empire, all the vital 
 force of the country would have coursed through its 
 wide ramifications to the part assailed, and it may well 
 have been that the shorter lines of supply and the 
 greater numbers would have triumphed. As it was, 
 parado.xical as it may appear, the side farthest from 
 its ultimate bases triumphed, and did so because it 
 was in more effective connection with them. 
 
 There can be little doubt that to land a force in the 
 European territories of a great Power would, in fact, 
 now prove a far more hazardous operation than it has 
 been in the past. A force disembarking in an enemy's 
 country has to secure its ba.se and its lines of com- 
 munication, and will shed so much of its fighting 
 
COMBINED OPERATIONS 99 
 
 strength in the effort that, after these channels have been 
 made secure, a mobile force strong enough to penetrate 
 at all deeply into the country will very often not be 
 forthcoming. On the other hand, the enemy can de- 
 ploy his whole available strength against the weakened 
 force, while telegraphs may summon, and locomotives 
 draw to the battlefield, men from far away in the 
 interior. These, again, can be supplied by railways 
 with an ease that communications in hostile territory 
 will always lack when the coast is left behind. 
 
 Further, it is probable that the invaders will be weak in 
 cavalry, because the transport of horses demands much 
 space on board ship. Not only that, but after a sea- 
 voyage horses arrive weak and unfit for sustained 
 effort. Both in numbers and mobility, therefore, the 
 defenders should have the advantage as regards cavalry ; 
 and surprises and daring raids, such as are necessary 
 to successful attack, are not to be looked for under the 
 circumstances all at once. Unable to gain the informa- 
 tion as to the country or the enemy which it is the 
 duty of cavalry to obtain, an immediate and vigorous 
 advance will not probably be attempted. Hesitation 
 will add to the delay inevitable while the process of 
 disembarkation is going on ; while, on the other side, 
 every available man will be hurrying from distant and 
 undisturbed provinces to the spot. The circumstances 
 of the moment, in other respects, must indeed be 
 favourable to make the scales equal when such special 
 advantages benefit one side alone. 
 
 When Sir John Moore's army, in 1808, was met by 
 an overpowering French force in the north of Spain, 
 Napier has told us that he might have avoided the 
 combat then, only to reappear in the southern provinces 
 under more favourable conditions ; and has rightly ap- 
 preciated the sea-power which might move Moore's troops 
 in a few days to a spot that marching could not bring 
 
loo COMBINED OPERATIONS 
 
 their opponents to in weeks. It was northwards, in 
 the event, that Moore changed his base, and we all 
 know the story of Corunna and of the British Army 
 carried away by the ships from the clutches of the 
 French, as in Homeric battles the intervention of a 
 guardian deity snatched many a hero from the over- 
 powering fury of his opponent. Thus, to Moore, 
 either way of escape, north or south, was open because 
 the power of the sea, an agency beyond the control 
 of strategy on land, hovered over the combat, and 
 threw protection round its child. The balance of advan- 
 tage will still, in future, be with the troops that operate 
 from beyond the sea, but nothing like to the same extent 
 as was the case when the assistance of steam could not 
 be invoked to redress the bias against the land force. 
 
 On the other hand, it may be argued that the 
 introduction of steam has facilitated attack because 
 ships are now independent of the wind, and their 
 movements can be arranged with a nicety which with 
 sailing-vessels was impossible. The progress in naval 
 construction has also substituted large for small trans- 
 ports, and the proportion of ships to men is now far 
 smaller than it has been in the past. This enormously 
 lightens the task of the admiral, who has to provide 
 for the escorting of the expedition, in spite of 
 the fact that the speed and precision of movement of 
 cruisers has grown also, and surpasses that of almost 
 any transports. The merchant-steamers of to-day are, 
 nevertheless, big and fast too : independent of wind, 
 they are more easily kept together, and none should 
 be cut off by an enemy hovering round. Yet again, 
 it is said that warships cannot accommodate troops 
 as they used to do in the past, although their capacity 
 in this respect is probably greatly underrated. I feel 
 it is somewhat rash of me to offer an opinion on 
 such a point, but I believe that, for short voyages, as 
 
COMBINED OPERATIONS loi 
 
 many as 800 men might still be stowed away in a 
 battleship without more inconvenience or discomfort 
 than is inseparable from, and expected on, active service. 
 Formerly the capacity of warships in this respect 
 was very great. In 1854 the French fleet carried 
 more than 20,(X)0 men, " the Mo7ttebello accommodated 
 upwards of 1400 men in addition to her crew, while 
 the Valmy had on board 3000 men in all. In 
 evacuating the Crimea the Queen embarked two com- 
 panies of the 42nd ; there were on board, also, a battery 
 of artillery, and the whole of the 77th and 90th 
 regiments."* The experience of the recent war in 
 South Africa has certainly shown us that where ten 
 ships were formerly required for the conveyance of 
 stores two, perhaps, will now suffice. 
 
 As regards the disembarkation of men, however, 
 the big ships, io.^ in number, have certain disadvan- 
 tages. They draw more water, and must therefore lie 
 further from the shore. They have an aggregate of 
 fewer boats and fewer gangways, and it is not easy 
 to get men quickly off them. It is more difficult, 
 also, to dispose of one large ship-load of men than 
 several small ones, just as a large crowd cannot be 
 dispersed so easily as smaller assemblies. 
 
 When a choice as to a point of entry has to be 
 made, strategy will direct her blow where the land 
 communications of the defender are ill - adapted to 
 meet it, and in highly-civilised countries it must be 
 confessed that such places are not easily found. An 
 expedition by sea against European territory is not, 
 indeed, to be considered as an enterprise promising 
 good results except when, after a war has been a long 
 time in progress, the exhaustion of an opponent might 
 leave him open to it. At such a moment the prospect 
 of a descent on their own coasts might so work on the 
 
 * " Military Expeditions beyond the Seas," by Col. G. Furse, C.B. 
 
I02 COMBINED OPERATIONS 
 
 minds of a people, weakened and distressed by the 
 privations and reverses already endured, that results 
 greater than abstract calculations would look for might 
 be achieved. 
 
 But the war policy of our Empire should not be 
 content to wait for such an opening. A protracted 
 war is the very thing that, at all hazards, we should 
 desire to avoid, and an expedition, which in the case 
 of any other Power would only be undertaken as a last 
 resource or as a subsidiary operation, might, in the 
 case of a nation so powerful at sea as we are, form 
 the central feature of our strategic plan. 
 
 Even then, the obtrusion of a British force into 
 European territories would probably not commend it- 
 self to a British Government. It might well, however, 
 seek some hostile territory less centrally placed where 
 attack could be delivered with greater advantage to us. 
 
 The choice of the spot should aim at obtaining the 
 following advantages : — 
 
 The objective should be one at such a distance from 
 the main territories of our enemy, and so imperfectly 
 linked with them, that the balance should not swing 
 against us when the struggle, as it ultimately must, 
 came to hinge on excellence of communications. 
 
 We, being the nation with the most perfect water 
 communications while we hold command of the .sea, and, 
 thanks to the size of our mercantile marine, having more 
 means of transport by sea at our disposal than any other 
 Power, would fight at a maximum advantage when we 
 compelled a foe to engage us in a position where he would 
 depend to a great extent on sea communication also. 
 
 The attack of an important colony, or valuable naval 
 base, would offer such an objective to Imperial strategy ; 
 but before developing our plan it would be necessary 
 to rightly gauge the value that the enemy would set 
 on the territory which we proposed to invade. 
 
COMBINED OPERATIONS 103 
 
 The colony or base which is to be the object of our 
 attack must be one in the preservation of which the 
 whole pride and prestige, as well as the interests, of 
 the hostile nation are involved. 
 
 The loss of some coaling-station, of whose name 
 and existence many of the lower orders might be 
 ignorant, could be cheerfully borne. The seizure of 
 a newly-acquired colony of doubtful commercial value 
 could be glossed over, palliated, and forgotten ; but 
 the loss of an old-established and historic settlement 
 would be a humiliation, to escape from which a proud 
 nation would set all its strength at hazard. 
 
 To produce any substantial impression we must make 
 our enemy fight for some such stake as Cuba was to 
 Spain and South Africa was to ourselves. Every 
 Power which has acquired dominions beyond the seas 
 has such possessions. It is not necessary to lay one's 
 finger on the map and point them out in public ; it 
 is enough to say that an opening in the armour of 
 our potential enemies might be found. We do not 
 forget, however, that any war we indulge in will be 
 defensive in purpose. Our foreign policy will never 
 be aggressive ; we are content to hold what we 
 have already got, although in accordance with the 
 rules that guide a sound defence we may plan a 
 counterstroke. 
 
 Conversely, while the invasion of our islands is a con- 
 tingency which we may perhaps regard as remote, we 
 have given hostages to fortune all over the globe, and 
 war against us would take the form of an attack on 
 these. To meet the assault we should probably be 
 compelled to counter-attack, and in making our choice 
 of an objective we must consider whether the capture 
 we propose to effect will be of sufficient importance 
 to call the main effort of the enemy from our 
 possessions to the defence of his own. The mere 
 
ro4 COMBINED OPERATIONS 
 
 acquisition of territory will not benefit us. If our 
 assault does not make him loosen his grip on our 
 dependency it will have been made in vain. 
 
 Therefore when we do strike we must strike, vigor- 
 ously and heavily, if not at the body of our opponent, 
 at anyrate at such a limb as he cannot lose without 
 becoming a cripple. 
 
 A more definite indication of objectives is neither 
 expedient nor necessary in these pages. It is manifest 
 that political considerations, and many another factor 
 of the moment, must govern the decision of the 
 Ministry which in practice approves of and directs 
 the strategy of the war. It is more profitable to 
 deal with principles than examples and let the cir- 
 cumstances of the moment govern their application. 
 
 Combined naval and military expeditions might then 
 be undertaken by us with any of the following objects 
 in view : — 
 
 Firstly, the attack and seizure of the enemy's ports 
 or arsenals. 
 
 The necessity for such action will probably arise 
 in the future because of the difficulty which now 
 exists in effectively blockading a port. While, as has 
 been noted in the previous chapter, the speed and 
 certainty of movement which steam has brought with 
 it have rendered escape easier, the blockading ships 
 have lost many advantages owing to the disappear- 
 ance of sails. 
 
 I need not recapitulate what has already been said 
 on the subject, but the factor of speed which steam 
 has introduced into naval warfare is alone enough to 
 render more difficult a task which taxed all the 
 energies of our seamen a century ago. There is a 
 greater extent of coast-line to be watched also, and 
 our potential opponents are relatively stronger than 
 they used to be. Should a combination against us 
 
COMBINED OPERATIONS 105 
 
 call upon us to blockade many harbours, it is easy 
 to understand that the demand on our powers might 
 grow to prohibitive proportions, and we can appreciate 
 the forethought which already tells us that we are 
 setting ourselves a hopeless task. 
 
 In this connection the experiences of the American 
 war of secession are full of interest to us. 
 
 The first proclamation establishing a blockade of the 
 Southern ports was issued six days after Fort Sumter 
 succumbed. Eight days later the blockade was ex- 
 tended to the whole coast-line of the Confederacy. 
 The direct distance thus covered was more than three 
 thousand five hundred miles ; the shore-line following 
 indentations was nearly six thousand eight hundred 
 miles in length, while the shore-line of the islands 
 to be watched added another five thousand miles of 
 this huge total. Within this distance were one hundred 
 and eighty-five river and harbour openings, which it 
 was proposed to close to commerce. Twenty-six 
 steamers and sixteen sailing-vessels — of which three 
 only were at the time in the waters of the Northern 
 States — and twenty-seven ships fit for service, but 
 lying at the different navy yards, were all the Federal 
 Government had available for the purpose in hand. 
 
 With this inadequate force the great blockade began ; 
 but ship after ship was added to the force, until at 
 the close of the war six hundred were employed on 
 it. Even these were not enough to completely close 
 the Southern ports. Though over one thousand prizes 
 were made by the blockading squadrons during the 
 year, the efforts to run the blockade were continued 
 till the last Confederate port had been captured.* 
 
 If steam has made it easier for hostile ships to elude 
 observation, it has, on the other hand, made movements 
 and communications by sea more certain and more 
 
 * " The American Nav7," by Charles Morris, p. 71, ct seq. 
 
lo6 COMBINED OPERATIONS 
 
 easily arranged for. It has rendered the sea both a 
 better road and a more secure base. 
 
 Granted that an assault on an enemy's fleet in 
 harbour might, owing to the formidable land defences 
 which would usually shelter it, be an enterprise to 
 which we should not care to commit ourselves in the 
 same spirit in which we entered on the siege of 
 Sebastopol, the destruction of raiders on our mer- 
 cantile marine in their lairs and resting-places might 
 easily be worth our while. 
 
 Foreigners have more than once found that their 
 shipping was by no means safe from us, even when 
 in port. Drake destroyed the Spanish ships in Cadiz, 
 and we seized the Danish fleet in 1809 by a joint 
 naval and military expedition conducted most success- 
 fully on a fairly large scale. 
 
 But we may need not only to seize but to per- 
 manently occupy the port selected, and again military 
 history offers us instances where such operations were 
 accomplished with complete success. When during 
 the American war of secession the Federals captured 
 and held the forts and harbours of the Southerners 
 along the Atlantic coast and Gulf of Mexico — such 
 as Hatteras Inlet, Newberne, Roanoke Island, Pensa- 
 cola, and New Orleans — they gave us some examples 
 which are worthy of our attention. It is true that 
 they enjoyed absolute supremacy at sea, but that 
 advantage we may also hope to possess ; it is more 
 important for us to discriminate between expeditions 
 conducted as isolated enterprises leading to only local 
 results, and those undertaken in conjunction with 
 armies working on shore, and forming part of the 
 general strategic plan on which the whole course of 
 the campaign was being carried out. In another 
 American war, of less glorious memory, we also had 
 seized port after port along the sea-board of our 
 
COMBINED OPERATIONS 107 
 
 opponents, but without substantial results, because 
 none of the operations were calculated to affect the 
 main hostile forces and the great issues of the war. 
 
 Another object that might call for an expedition 
 such as we have in mind would be the invasion and 
 occupation of territory which might be of strategic 
 value for us, or which might, in the hands of a 
 hostile Power, prove a thorn in our side. Such ex- 
 peditions, I mean, as those by which we seized 
 Gibraltar and Malta, or the French occupied Cape 
 Breton Isle when they were the possessors of Canada. 
 Or again, as in 1882, when we were obliged to inter- 
 vene in Egypt in the interests of our Indian trade 
 and the security of the Suez Canal. 
 
 But with us the most usual form of combined 
 action between army and navy will be furnished by 
 those expeditions against savage or semi-barbarous 
 nations with which our interests all over the world 
 frequently bring us into collision, and of which other 
 nations have also had experience. 
 
 Our expeditions' to China in 1840 and in i860, the 
 first French expedition to Algeria, their descent on 
 Tunis in 188 1, our invasion of Abyssinia in 1866, 
 and the recent Chinese war, are some examples which 
 might be multiplied from the records of the past, 
 and are sure to be added to in the future. 
 
 But in such instances as these the superiority of 
 armament possessed by the ships engaged has spoilt 
 the interest of the combined operation, and we will 
 pass on to campaigns in which the naval operations 
 were more sustained and prominent, because their full 
 powers were evoked by the character of the opposition 
 experienced. 
 
 Ships have naturally had their greatest chance when 
 the seashore did not round in the sphere of their 
 activities and when the combined power of the two 
 
lo8 COMBINED OPERATIONS 
 
 services was able to make itself felt long after the 
 operations of disembarkation had been accomplished. 
 Such occasions were found when the navy has been 
 able to accompany and assist the army far inshore. 
 They can only be afforded when the landing takes 
 place at the mouth of a waterway leading inland, 
 and for this reason the mouth of a navigable river is 
 often the most favourable point for disembarkation 
 which can be selected.* 
 
 For an illustration of the value that rivers may be to 
 invaders we need not go beyond the influence exerted 
 by such waterways as the Mississippi, Tennessee, 
 Cumberland, and Ohio during the American war of 
 secession. The capture of New Orleans by the 
 Federals meant much more than a victory which 
 gave possession of an important port. It enabled the 
 army to co-operate with the United States Army, and 
 render the most important assistance to the soldiers. 
 A better example of a combined effort it would be 
 difficult to find ; for, when New Orleans fell, the Mis- 
 sissippi was opened to the Federal ships of war as 
 far up as Port Hudson. Even beyond that point 
 progress, though a little precarious, was no means 
 impossible, while the Confederate ports on the lower 
 Mississippi could, now the great waterway had been 
 gained, be assailed both by water and land. 
 
 * Sir Arthur Wellesley appreciated the advantage of water-transport as 
 much as any man. During the inglorious campaign in the Low Countries 
 in 1794, Lord Moira asked his advice as to how best he might join the 
 Duke of York. Wellesley told him he would save both risk and time 
 by re-embarking his troops at Ostend and taking them right up the Scheldt 
 or Maes to the nearest point. 
 
 "However, he would not do it, but set off marching along the great 
 canal, choosing most luckily the opposite side to the French who tried to 
 intercept him. He left me with my brigade of 3000 men to settle matters 
 at Ostend and then to come on as quick as I could. I obeyed his 
 instructions as to Ostend, and then felt so sure it was best to go round by 
 sea that I re-embarked, and actually reached the Duke of York some days 
 before him."— (Quoted from Sir Herbert Ma.vwell's "Life of Wellington," 
 Vol. i. n. II. 
 
COMBINED OPERATIONS 109 
 
 Nor did the strategical importance of the great 
 river end here. Kentucky was a doubtful state. To 
 the north of it lay Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, sup- 
 porters of the Union : on the south it was bordered 
 by Tennessee with opposite^ sympathies. A state so 
 situated could not remain neutral, for its neutrality 
 must sooner or later be disregarded by one party or 
 another in the struggle. Now, on the west of Kentucky 
 the mighty Mississippi formed the frontier. Through 
 its borders to join the great stream flowed the Cumber- 
 land and the Tennessee, forming water communications 
 of the first importance. When Kentucky threw in its 
 lot with the Union States the valley of the Mississippi 
 and its tributaries became available for operations, and 
 the waterways supplied by the Ohio and the other two 
 streams just mentioned gave the invading force facilities 
 which no other communications could have furnished. 
 Railways conveying food and stores behind armies have 
 come to be regarded as almost indispensable ; at any- 
 rate, locomotives and trucks are enormously superior 
 to waggons and horses or any other form of land- 
 transport. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that 
 a river such as those in question is, for transport 
 purposes, as much superior to a line of railway as 
 the latter is to an ordinary road. 
 
 The carrying power of a great stream is practically 
 unlimited : in comparison to it that of a railway is quite 
 small. 
 
 The volume of a river's flow is intangible. It cannot 
 be blown up, or, if sufficiently large, be obstructed. No 
 bridges or culverts are needed to carry it, no railway- 
 stations or signal-boxes can be destroyed. A steamer 
 can carry its freight and protecting armament concen- 
 trated together in a small and easily defensible compass : 
 it is self-supporting as regards its defence, and will 
 traverse a broad stream, from which opposition has 
 
no COMBINED OPERATIONS 
 
 once been cleared, without the endless guards and posts 
 that are needed to keep a long line of rail intact. Our 
 recent experiences in South Africa have furnished us 
 here with an illustration which will be fresh in the 
 minds of everyone. 
 
 Clearly, the general who is so fortunate as to get 
 control of such a waterway as the Mississippi, and, at 
 the same time, has a predominant nav\- behind him, 
 can concentrate almost all his force in tHe fighting-line, 
 can penetrate right into the heart of his opponent's 
 country, and can there seek out and destroy those main 
 hostile forces which the principles of sound strategy 
 show us to be the objective at which a general should 
 aim his principal blow. 
 
 In a previous chapter it has been shown that the 
 occupation of an enemy's country, and the capture of his 
 chief towns or capital, are objects which have sometimes 
 been falsely elevated into chief importance ; and that 
 they must always remain only of secondar\- considera- 
 tion, even though that may not necessarily be to place 
 them at a low value. But whether they are made the 
 primary or secondary objective, towns and localities 
 will, at some period or other of the war, be captured, 
 and then the possession of a navigable river as a means 
 of communication between the various parts of the 
 invading force which occupy them will be invaluable. 
 Not less so will the link with the sea and the com- 
 munications thence to the ultimate base at home be of 
 value to a country which rests its strength on command 
 of the waves. 
 
 In the case we are considering it is scarcely necessary 
 to dwell on an exposition of the strategical advantages 
 with which the control of the Mississippi endowed the 
 Federals. They are obvious to the most cursory in- 
 quiry. An advance up the Cumberland and Tennessee 
 rivers would directly threaten the lines of communica- 
 
COMBINED OPERATIONS in 
 
 tion of any Confederate force invading Kentucky. The 
 western portion of Tennessee could not be occupied by 
 the enemy while the Federals were masters of the river 
 that divides the state. A turning movement could be 
 safely conducted along that river, which, if attempted 
 by one of the ordinary operations of war, would be 
 dangerous in the highest degree. 
 
 These facts had not been lost sight of when the 
 Federals drew up their plan of campaign in the spring 
 of 1861, and it was determined to fit out a flotilla of 
 special vessels for work on inland waters. Naval officers 
 of distinction. Commander John Rodgers, and after him 
 Flag-officer Foote, ■^ were sent to superintend their 
 building and equipment. They were of two classes — 
 ordinary steamers, converted into ships of war, and 
 vessels newly and specially constructed for the exi- 
 gencies of service on rivers and inland waters. 
 
 Some of the first-class steamers were ready soon 
 enough to take part in the action of Belmont on the 
 Mississippi on 7th November 1861, but it was not until 
 January of the following year that the whole fleet was 
 equipped for service. On the 3rd of January Buell 
 formulated a scheme by which the Confederate centre 
 in the western theatre of war should be attacked by 
 20,000 men in two gunboat expeditions up the Cumber- 
 land and Tennessee. 
 
 This plan was never carried out in its entirety ; but 
 Fort Henry, on the Tennessee, was captured on the 
 6th of February by a force of 15,000 men under General 
 Grant, acting in the closest co-operation with a fleet 
 of four ironclads and three wooden gunboats under 
 Flag-officer Foote. 
 
 Such a victory had an electrical effect on the spirits 
 of the .North. It had been due to the brilliant and irre- 
 sistible attack of the fleet ; and the people of the United 
 
 * " The Story of the Civil War," by J. C. Ropes, Vol. i. 
 
112 COMBINED OPERATIONS 
 
 States, realising to whom the credit was due, rejoiced 
 in the possession of a weapon which the Confederates 
 seemed unable to resist. That fleets could be a match 
 for forts, was, of course, not true, and subsequent events 
 almost immediately proved the hollowness of any such 
 pretensions. 
 
 There was more solid foundation for the recogni- 
 tion of what co-operation between sea and land forces 
 might effect, and the reverse now to be received by 
 the triumphant navy does not weaken our faith in 
 such combined action. 
 
 The Confederate general himself never doubted but 
 that Fort Donelson would fall before the ships as Fort 
 Henry had already done. 
 
 The Cumberland river would then be open to the 
 enemy, and his line of retreat would be compromised. 
 
 Grant, however, did not follow up his success on the 
 Tennessee river by an immediate attack on Fort 
 Donelson, for he regarded the co-operation of the fleet 
 as an essential factor in the operations, and the fleet 
 had to repair damages. 
 
 We need not follow in detail the operations which 
 ensued. It is enough to say that on the 14th the ships 
 arrived and were at once taken into action. But this 
 time stone walls vindicated their superiority to those 
 of wood : the forts had much the best of the fight, and 
 the fleet was eventually put out of action for the time 
 being. Nevertheless, Port Donelson fell to the army 
 two days later, when 11,500 men with forty guns sur- 
 rendered unconditionally, and the story of the battle 
 tells us how much store Grant set on the co-operation 
 of the sailors, and, if he could have nothing more, how 
 greatly he desired even a demonstration on their part.* 
 
 Again, the most striking event on the Mississippi 
 in 1863 occurred when, on the night of i6th April, 
 
 " The Story of the Civil War," Vol. ii. p. jO. 
 
-^^ 
 
COMBINED OPERATIONS iig 
 
 Porter, then in command of the river fleet, ran past the 
 batteries of Vicksburg to the aid of General Grant, who 
 had marched his army down west of the stream. This 
 daring attempt was made with twelve vessels. It proved 
 remarkably successful, and the capture of Vicksburg 
 practically put an end to active operations on the river.* 
 
 But we must leave these stirring deeds to glance at 
 less abnormal performances, occasions, that is to say, 
 on which navy and army have worked in combination 
 to make descents on the sea - coasts of the enemy 
 with a view of creating diversions or effecting a change 
 of base during active operations with his armies in the 
 field. Such operations have been numerous in all ages 
 and under all conditions. Rome created a navy in 
 order to strike at Carthage, at first in Sicily, subse- 
 quently in Africa itself, and were successful because 
 they retained command of the sea. The French thus 
 struck at us in Ireland at the end of the eighteenth 
 century, and lost any hope of ultimate success they 
 may have had for the opposite reason. 
 
 Enterprises in the nature of diversions to draw away 
 the enemy's attention and strength from threatened 
 points are, however, strategical operations in which the 
 nicest political calculation and shrewdness must be 
 exhibited, otherwise they will fail, no matter how per- 
 fectly the military arrangements may be carried out. It 
 cannot be said of those undertaken prior to the Crimean 
 epoch that, with the exception of that to the Peninsula, 
 they are of happy augury to us. The expeditions to 
 the Helder in 1799, and to Walcheren, awaken no 
 pleasing memories, although it was in execution, rather 
 than in conception, that the latter failed. The genius 
 of Wellington dragged victory from Spain unaided 
 by the sagacity of our Parliament, and in spite of the 
 politicians, rather than by their aid. 
 
 * "The American Navy," by Charles Morris, p. 86. 
 H 
 
or THE 
 
 '•^"VERs/Ty 
 
COMBINED OPERATIONS 113 
 
 Porter, then in command of the river fleet, ran past the 
 batteries of Vicksburg to the aid of General Grant, who 
 had marched his army down west of the stream. This 
 daring attempt was made with twelve vessels. It proved 
 remarkably successful, and the capture of Vicksburg 
 practically put an end to active operations on the river.* 
 
 But we must leave these stirring deeds to glance at 
 less abnormal performances, occasions, that is to say, 
 on which navy and army have worked in combination 
 to make descents on the sea - coasts of the enemy 
 with a view of creating diversions or effecting a change 
 of base during active operations with his armies in the 
 field. Such operations have been numerous in all ages 
 and under all conditions. Rome created a navy in 
 order to strike at Carthage, at first in Sicily, subse- 
 quently in Africa itself, and were successful because 
 they retained command of the sea. The French thus 
 struck at us in Ireland at the end of the eighteenth 
 century, and lost any hope of ultimate success they 
 may have had for the opposite reason. 
 
 Enterprises in the nature of diversions to draw away 
 the enemy's attention and strength from threatened 
 points are, however, strategical operations in which the 
 nicest political calculation and shrewdness must be 
 exhibited, otherwise they will fail, no matter how per- 
 fectly the military arrangements may be carried out. It 
 cannot be said of those undertaken prior to the Crimean 
 epoch that, with the exception of that to the Peninsula, 
 they are of happy augury to us. The expeditions to 
 the Helder in 1799, and to Walcheren, awaken no 
 pleasing memories, although it was in execution, rather 
 than in conception, that the latter failed. The genius 
 of Wellington dragged victory from Spain unaided 
 by the sagacity of our Parliament, and in spite of the 
 politicians, rather than by their aid. 
 
 * "The American Navy," by Charles Morris, p. 86. 
 H 
 
114 COMBINED OPERATIONS 
 
 What we should remember is that the essential con- 
 dition of success in such diversions is that they should 
 oblige the enemy to employ considerably more forces 
 to meet the diversion than are brought to bear by it. 
 Thus the invasion of the Peninsula by an English army, 
 never exceeding6o,ooo men.absorbed and drewawayfrom 
 Central Europe five times as many of Napoleon's troops. 
 
 Diversions have often been intended to foster or 
 utilise discontent amongst the subjects of the enemy 
 and gain their assistance. The French Directory were 
 governed by these considerations in sending Hoche to 
 Ireland in 1796, and Humbert, two years later, again 
 counted on an alliance with discontent. In neither 
 expeditions were the expectations as to support from 
 the Irish realised, and it may be said, in general, that 
 he who puts faith in such allies as discontented inhabit- 
 ants may easily find himself deceived. To grumble is 
 one thing, to give active assistance to the enemies of 
 your country quite another ; and in times of stress 
 treason will not run the risk of such drastic punishment 
 as will prove a deterrent to all but fanatics. 
 
 Moreover, a man who will betray his country will 
 also betray his ally. 
 
 Our own experiences in the expeditions which we 
 launched to Quiberon in 1795, and in that of the follow- 
 ing year to the Isle de Dieu, are likewise examples of 
 how enterprises of this nature may miscarry. 
 
 It may be noted here that the expeditions under 
 Grant up the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers just 
 described partake of the nature of diversions, because 
 while they were in progress the main Confederate Army 
 under Sidney Johnson was opposed by the main Federal 
 army under Buell. 
 
 During the Crimean war, the expedition to Kertch 
 may also be classed as a diversion effected by co-opera- 
 tion between navy and army. 
 
COMBINED OPERATIONS 115 
 
 When a change of base has been intended the army 
 and navy have in our history frequently been seen in co- 
 operation. An all-powerful fleet enabled Wellington, in 
 1813, to quit Portugal and the harbours which there 
 formed his bases of supply and transfer his base to the 
 seaports in the north of Spain. Thus was he enabled 
 to assail the French line of communications and win the 
 great battle of Vittoria. 
 
 In 1877, after the Russians had passed the Danube, 
 the sea-power of the Turks enabled them to bring the 
 Montenegrin troops, amongst the best soldiers of the 
 Sultan, by sea to the Gulf of Enos, and thence by rail to 
 Adrianople. By this means 30,000 men were assembled 
 at Tirnova on the 26th of July, and a fine army placed 
 at the disposal of Suleiman Pasha. 
 
 The Turkish navy missed so fine an opportunity on 
 the Danube, that this is, however, the only example of 
 their navy considerably aiding the army that can be 
 brought forward. 
 
 A century earlier General Howe had been able to 
 embark his army at Staten Island, sail round Cape 
 Charles, and land at the head of Chesapeake Bay, 
 from whence he moved against Philadelphia, and 
 defeated Washington at Brandywine. The example 
 is not quoted as an illustration of sound strategy, but 
 is none the less noteworthy as an exhibition of the 
 mobility with which the navy may endow the army. 
 
 M'Clellan's change of base from the Pamunkey to 
 the James furnishes us with another illustration ; while 
 Varna and Balaclava were utilised by us with equal 
 facility during the Crimean war because of the same 
 advantages the country possessed of sea-power enjoys. 
 
 That France in 1870 had the advantage as against 
 Germany in this respect has often been noted, her 
 failure to turn it to good account been animadverted 
 upon, and reflections as to what might have been 
 
Ii6 COMBINED OPERATIONS 
 
 brought forward as illustrations of the value of sea- 
 power and the potency of counter-operations. Before 
 quitting this part of the subject it may, however, be 
 pointed out that a joint naval and military expedition, 
 if it is to affect anything substantial in the nature 
 either of diversion or counter-stroke, must be launched 
 at a moment which is in all respects opportune. 
 
 We know that in the realm of tactics the timing of 
 a counter-attack must be so nicely gauged as to appear 
 the gift of inspiration. Intuitive as the stroke of the 
 eagle, it must fall as swiftly and decisively. But where 
 instinct has to be replaced by calculation, the most 
 elaborate preparation to ensure promptness is de- 
 manded : the leader must be able to recognise the 
 golden moment, the troops must respond like the 
 members of the body to the volitions of the brain. 
 
 In the larger sphere of strategy the same require- 
 ments hold good. The weapon here must be ready 
 prepared beforehand also, the time as accurately judged, 
 the directing thought as unerring. 
 
 Immediately at the commencement of the war, before 
 the process of concentration is completed, the irruption 
 of a hostile force would seriously disorganise strategical 
 schemes, might create panic, and would certainly inter- 
 fere with the steady flow of preparation. In our own 
 case such an invasion would amount to no more than 
 a raid until the enemy had gained command of the 
 Channel. In the case of continental Powers the field 
 armies would be weakened by every man placed on 
 board ship. The main issue must always be decided 
 where the main armies meet, and an expedition over- 
 sea could scarcely do more than bring about alarm 
 and inconvenience. In a continental state the armed 
 forces are so vast, and communications are so perfect, 
 that before an army of, say, 50,ocx) men, which would 
 be a very large force with which to effect a surprise, 
 
COMBINED OPERATIONS it? 
 
 could penetrate very far and do much mischief, it 
 would be met by superior forces called out by telegraph 
 from the reserves, and conveyed by rail to cover any 
 important points which might be threatened. 
 
 That the main attack should be made over-sea would 
 not, therefore, be probable in the case of Powers on the 
 Continent, and as against us would have to be pre- 
 ceded by decisive naval engagements. The result of 
 such engagements, if unfavourable, would altogether 
 alter the conditions on which combined naval and 
 military expeditions from our shores are based. Were- 
 England seriously invaded, every man would be needed 
 on her shores, and we should not weaken our strength 
 at the decisive point by sending away men and ships. 
 Not, that is to say, unless we possessed a vast numerical 
 preponderance, and that, in such a case, we should not 
 be likely to do. 
 
 Combined expeditions are not greatly to be recom- 
 mended, therefore, where the military organisation to 
 be met is efficient, and where a highly-civilised popula- 
 tion in the country to be invaded has, in the interests 
 of its convenience and commerce, provided plenty of 
 roads and railways in addition, perhaps, to those which 
 military foresight has constructed. They may, how- 
 ever, be undertaken against a Power whose resources 
 are not fully developed, as was the case when we in- 
 vaded the Crimea, or the Japanese attacked the Corea, 
 although we shall much more frequently resort to them 
 on a less ambitious scale than either of these. 
 
 We will now proceed to consider what factors in them 
 are essential to success. 
 
 Two fundamental conditions have already been 
 pointed out. 
 
 The chosen moment must be opportune ; but not less 
 essential is the command of the sea to the Power which 
 ventures its land forces on the waves. 
 
ii8 COMBINED OPERATIONS 
 
 Napoleon invaded Egypt, and the Japanese the Corea, 
 without having first obtained command of the sea ; but 
 disaster followed in the first case, and in the latter the 
 fundamental condition of security had subsequently to 
 be established. The duty of the navy is to guarantee 
 the operation from interruption over-sea, and until it 
 feels that it is in a position to do so, or can count on 
 soon being in such a position, to undertake the expedi- 
 tion would be to accept a greater risk than would be 
 justifiable. 
 
 Those who may be at the time the responsible naval 
 advisers of a Government, having been able to give 
 satisfactory assurances on the above heads — that we 
 have the ships ready, and that the road is clear — the 
 next step would be for the heads of the military 
 service to formulate a scheme in conjunction with the 
 naval authorities, which would apply the necessary force 
 at the desired point. In framing such a scheme, the 
 attainment of some definite object must be clearly held 
 in view, and the results which may be expected to 
 follow when it has been gained must also be care- 
 fully thought out. " To do something," either to please 
 the electorate, or satisfy Parliament, or demonstrate in 
 the eyes of foreign Powers, is not a national policy, and 
 will lead only to disappointments. 
 
 Therefore, at any time when there may be a chance 
 of relations with foreign Powers becoming strained, 
 every move open to us should be considered, every 
 possible theatre of operations examined. The facihties 
 for landing troops that may exist in various places, the 
 internal communications, the climate, the resources of 
 the country, the season of the year — every factor in the 
 problem should be studied and weighed. 
 
 This all demands systemised preparation for con- 
 tingencies such as common prudence will make men 
 adopt in commercial transactions, in agriculture, even 
 
COMBINED OPERATIONS 119 
 
 in the organisation of sport. A means for ensuring 
 such preparation is an Imperial necessity and the 
 surest safeguard in Imperial defence. Otherwise, we 
 may fritter away our strength in petty expeditions and 
 half-hearted diversions, set on foot in haphazard fashion, 
 with more hope from good luck than from good guidance. 
 Our history will supply many records of such futilities. 
 Occasions when transports carried our regiments almost 
 aimlessly about the world, forces intended for one 
 hemisphere being suddenly sent to another, expeditions 
 fitted out in haste to carry out operations which were 
 abandoned when the men were ready, and such want 
 of unity and concentration of purpose evidenced in 
 operations, that at length the bitter cry, " God knows 
 what it all means 1 " went up from our camps and 
 fleets. Our foes wondered too, and Napoleon could 
 write of the Walcheren expedition : 
 
 "Before six weeks, of the 15,000 troops which are in 
 the Isle of Walcheren not 1500 will be left, the rest 
 will be in hospital. The expedition has been under- 
 taken under false expectations, and planned in ig- 
 norance." 
 
 Napier is more scathing than our opponent. Hear 
 him : 
 
 " For many years so much ridicule had been attached 
 to the name of an English expedition, that weak-headed 
 men claimed a sort of prescriptive right to censure, 
 without regard to subordination, the conduct of their 
 general." 
 
 The want of knowledge, forethought, and system at 
 the seat of government was the cause of the ill-success, 
 the short-sighted criticism, the chatter of superficial 
 strategists that duly made their appearance, swayed 
 counsels now this way and now that, and hampered 
 the execution of any project, while they could form no 
 feasible one of their own. 
 
I20 COMBINED OPERATIONS 
 
 The question of command is also of the first import- 
 ance when a combined expedition is being launched. 
 Our rule has generally been to let the naval commander 
 exercise control over the sea, while the general looks 
 after the land forces. The French in the Crimea placed 
 Marshal St Arnaud in supreme command both by land 
 and sea, and, on the other hand, D'Estaing commanded 
 the fleet and the land forces, too, in the West Indies in 
 1779. We have noted that formerly soldiers such as 
 Prince Rupert and Monck did not hesitate to assume 
 command of ships, but we may take it that the dual 
 system will always prevail with us, and it is probably 
 a good arrangement. 
 
 In the first stages of an expedition the responsibility, 
 and therefore the chief voice, must fall to the admiral. 
 When the troops are on shore the general must com- 
 mand and his needs must be ministered to by the navy. 
 
 That is to say, that the military authorities, when 
 troops are embarking, bring the men, stores, guns, 
 horses, etc. to the water's edge, and, under the super- 
 vision of the navy, place them on board the lighters or 
 boats which are to convey them to the transports, if 
 such conveyance is necessary. Then the navy are 
 responsible for getting them on board. During a dis- 
 embarkation the process is reversed. The naval authori- 
 ties either place the transports alongside jetties or 
 provide craft to convey the troops, etc. from the ships 
 to the shore. The task of the soldiers is then to land 
 them. There may be intermediate stages when good 
 sense and good feeling must ensure harmony. It is 
 probably more a matter of men than of methods, and 
 only such men as are likely to act in sj^mpath}' with one 
 another should be sent out. 
 
 Petty jealousies, prejudices, or self-interest are out 
 of place on active service, and perhaps men are more 
 reasonable now that the army and navy understand 
 
COMBINED OPERATIONS 121 
 
 one another better than, it is to be regretted, they have 
 sometimes shown themselves in the past. A good 
 understanding will be most certainly brought about by 
 officers of the two services meeting one another fre- 
 quently, being in close touch with one another's views, 
 and with the interests which both services must safe- 
 guard. Considering how often combined expeditions 
 have figured in our annals in the past, and how often 
 they will, in all probability, be undertaken again in 
 future, it would appear desirable to occasionally make a 
 disembarkation scheme the feature of our manoeuvres, 
 to give men practical experience and show what may 
 be demanded from them when harbours and quays are 
 not at their disposal. 
 
 A naval commander cannot be expected to risk the 
 safety of his ships, however urgently the situation may 
 call for the troops. He must be left to decide the spot 
 where the landing can best be effected from the naval 
 point of view. The nature of the coast, the weather, 
 the depth of water are all questions for him, but, on the 
 other hand, a covering position will have to be chosen, 
 and there is a host of other matters, with which 
 soldiers are familiar, which cannot be ignored when 
 a disembarkation of troops is contemplated. But all 
 such things can be provided for, and divergent interests 
 may be reconciled where mutual understanding and 
 good feeling prevail. It will not be out of place to 
 note a few of the chief executive arrangements which 
 operations such as we are discussing will demand. 
 
 Absolute secrecy, where there is the slightest chance 
 of the disembarkation being opposed, is perhaps of 
 first importance. Not more than two or three men 
 of all those who leave our shores should know whither 
 the ships are bound. Often no one should know 
 until sealed orders are opened. 
 
 A sheltered anchorage for the fleet and smooth 
 
122 COMBINED OPERATIONS 
 
 water for the boats are other points of saHent im- 
 portance. Great landings on open beaches — such as 
 our landing in the Crimea or in Egypt in 1801 — 
 have been effected when time was not a vital con- 
 sideration. The altered conditions which steam and 
 telegraphs have brought about will usually now 
 necessitate a far more rapid procedure. A wind 
 producing surf may blow for days, and while the 
 expedition — which calculated on three days being 
 enough in which to effect a landing — is tossing for five 
 upon the waves, the chance of surprise, perhaps of 
 success, is blowing away. The general who counts 
 on being able to land on an open beach whenever 
 he chooses is a gambler, even in these days when 
 steam has ousted sails and made him independent 
 of a fair wind. 
 
 The landing at Aboukir Bay in 1801 was delayed 
 five days owing to the weather, and we may picture 
 to ourselves how Abercrombie must have chafed and 
 fretted all that time as he watched the enemy's working 
 parties and their entrenchments growing more formid- 
 able day by day. 
 
 Just the same cause brought about just the same 
 delay, when in 1808 Sir John Moore brought his 
 force to Maceira Bay and disembarked it on an open 
 beach. 
 
 Napier tells us that five long days of incessant 
 exertion on the part of the navy were needed to 
 carry through the operation, not even then effected 
 without loss of lives and material. " For the boats 
 were constantly swamped by the surf, and such was 
 its fury that not more than thirty remained fit for 
 service at the conclusion." * 
 
 The French expedition to Algiers in 1830 en- 
 countered difficulties of the same nature, and in that 
 
 * Napier's " reninsular War," \'ol. i. p. 221. 
 
COMBINED OPERATIONS 123 
 
 case a delay of no less than twenty days before the 
 disembarkation could be effected was brought about. 
 
 How much, on occasions such as are under discus- 
 sion, we are in the hands of the wind and weather 
 is also exemplified in the story of our landing in the 
 Crimea. 
 
 Surf still obstructs an invader and protects the 
 invaded as much as ever it did. The feasibility of 
 the landing cannot be guaranteed from hour to hour. 
 A gale fifty miles away may stop it for days. With- 
 out surf the open beach is probably the best of all 
 landing-places where speed is of importance ; but, since 
 we cannot control the weather, we can never, when 
 time is a factor in the problem, safely select such a spot. 
 
 Neither does the substitution of steam for sails aid 
 us greatly. It gives precision to the movements of 
 the ships, and it enables them to anchor where a 
 sailing-vessel would not have dared to venture. Steam- 
 boats may tow rowing-boats to the shore, but they 
 cannot allow their own keels to grate upon the sand or 
 shingle. They are too deep in the water and too 
 heavily weighted. The ultimate landing must still be 
 made by means of oars in the old - fashioned way ; 
 and it was the opinion of the late Admiral Colomb 
 that landings on exposed coasts are still just as diffi- 
 cult and dangerous as they used to be. 
 
 Again, it may be possible to land infantry where 
 it would be impossible to place guns and horses ashore. 
 
 Water and fuel must often be taken ashore, for an 
 open beach is frequently deficient in such necessities. 
 A covering position is also always a necessity, and 
 the troops who land first must be ready to move into 
 it at once. This, again, implies the need for at any- 
 rate a proportion of regimental transport being early 
 disembarked, and this, in turn, imposes restrictions on 
 the landing of infantry. 
 
124 COMBINED OPERATIONS 
 
 But the ships may have, often will have, to cover 
 with their fire the landing of the troops. Hence it 
 is desirable to choose a spot vi^hich will not shelter 
 the enemy from this fire, and to which the warships 
 can approach sufficiently near to render their projectiles 
 effective. 
 
 We are here confronted with a difficulty which a 
 study of the chart alone can settle. The six-fathom 
 line will probably set a limit to the approach of the 
 warships, and the six-fathom line is often so far 
 out on a shelving-beach that the fire from warships 
 could not be reckoned upon to render adequate 
 support. 
 
 All of which considerations, only briefly indicated 
 here, point to the necessity for the most careful 
 previous reconnaissance of the locality both by land 
 and sea. There is no combined operation in which 
 the two services so absolutely depend on one another, 
 and with reference to which their requirements, how- 
 ever divergent, must be reconciled before a successful 
 issue is assured. 
 
 The number of transports required for a force will 
 vary with the length of the voyage. 
 
 A rough rule has been given as follows : — 
 
 For long voyages, such as to the Cape, India, or 
 Australia, the net tonnage allowed is 2| tons per man 
 and 7 tons per horse. For a voyage not exceeding 
 twelve hours, a horse requires 2^ tons and a man 
 i^ tons. For voyages under a week, 2 tons per man 
 and 6 tons per horse are considered necessary. Guns 
 and waggons have spaces allotted to them according 
 to their construction. These weights include first line 
 of transport, arms, stores, ammunition, and rations and 
 forage for three months in the first case and for one 
 month in the third. 
 
 A better notion of the magnitude of the undertaking 
 
COMBINED OPERATIONS 125 
 
 will perhaps be given b)' the following figures,* which 
 are quoted by several text-books as those required 
 in the case of an Army Corps for an expedition over- 
 sea involving a sea voyage of more than a week. 
 
 
 Ships 
 
 Gross Tonnage 
 
 1st Division 
 
 19 
 
 65,455 
 
 2nd „ . . . 
 
 19 
 
 61,828 
 
 3rd „ . . . 
 
 18 
 
 63,451 
 
 Corps troops . 
 
 21 
 
 69,313 
 
 Cavalry (two brigades) . 
 
 30 
 
 121,575 
 
 Lines of communication 
 
 27 
 
 75,490 
 
 Total 134 457,1 12 1 
 
 53,746 Officers and men 
 20,076 Horses and pack-animals 
 2,591 Carriages! 
 
 The task of the navy, when it had to safeguard the 
 flotilla which formerly conveyed a powerful expedi- 
 tion, was a far more difficult one than it will be in 
 modern times. In 1799, 17,000 British troops required 
 130 transports for their conveyance to Holland. Sir 
 Ralph Abercrombie's expedition to Egypt with some 
 16,000 men was, according to Colonel Purse's estimate, 
 
 * But with the very large force of artillery, by recent regulation allotted 
 to an Army Corps, these figures would be increased. 
 
 t "Staff Duties," by Clarke and Rothwell, gives the following infor- 
 mation as to calculation of tonnage : — 
 
 " Ships are registered as of so many tons gross, the numbers representing 
 the tons corresponding to the total cubic space below deck and of the 
 closed spaces above deck. To arrive at a vessel's freight-carrying capacity 
 all the non-freight-earning spaces, crew room, engine room, coal spaces, 
 etc., are deducted. For these a large deduction— some 40 per cent.— 
 has to be made in practice. So that a ship of 3000 tons gross may have 
 only a freight-carrying power of some 1800 tons. 
 
 " In the same way, when calculating the gross register tonnage required 
 for a given body of troops, about 66 per cent, must be added to the 
 estimated net tonnage." 
 
 t The 19,148 men and 5908 horses sent to Egypt in 1882 were conveyed 
 in forty-seven steamers of gross tonnage amounting to 140,000 tons. 
 
126 COMBINED OPERATIONS 
 
 conveyed in between 105-115 transports of various sorts. 
 The French force of 37,331 officers and men and 4008 
 horses, w^hich made the descent on Algeria in 1830, 
 utilised (according to the same authority), warships, 103 ; 
 transports, 357; one-masted boats, 124; chalands, 55; 
 flat-bottomed boats, 30 — 669 vessels.* 
 
 The men-of-war held the greater part of the troops, 
 commissioned ships having carried as many as 24,041 
 of all ranks. 
 
 The British portion of the expedition to the Crimea 
 consisted of 120 sail, including ten ships of the line 
 (two of them being screw steamers), four frigates (one 
 of them being a screw steamer), eleven steamers-of- 
 war (paddle and screw), twenty-four steam transports, 
 including three of Her Majesty's service, seven steam 
 tugs, which were a most valuable adjunct, and sixty-four 
 sailing transports. 
 
 The British ships-of-war, with two or three excep- 
 tions, carried no troops. 
 
 The British force to be disembarked consisted of— 
 
 30,000 infantry 54 guns 1,624 horses for guns 
 2,192 artillery 1,53° „ cavalry 
 
 1,240 cavalry 55 „ staff 
 
 160 „ regt. officers 
 
 33,432 men 3,369 horses. 
 
 Number of boats employed in landing men 326 
 „ horse and gun flats 24 
 
 Arrangements were made for landing at each trip 
 6,400 infantry, 12 guns, 216 artillery horses, and all 
 the horses of the staff 
 
 The operation began at 7 a.m. in smooth water, and 
 there being no opposition, by 6 r.M. 30,000 infantry 
 
 • Used for transporting animals and landing troops. " Military Expe- 
 ditions Beyond the Seas," by Colonel Furse, C.B., Vol. ii. p. 132. 
 
COMBINED OPERATIONS 127 
 
 and 24 guns, or four complete batteries, had been 
 landed. At nightfall the weather became so bad that 
 the operation had to be suspended.* 
 
 The French contingent of 28,000 men and 1430 
 horses was conveyed in 128 ships, which were for the 
 most part vessels-of-war. 
 
 The opportunity for co-operation between army and 
 navy does not by any means come to an end when the 
 troops are disembarked. The needs of an expeditionary 
 force will always demand a harbour to be utilised as 
 its base of supply, and, if the attack is not made in the 
 first instance on the port, which will not often be the 
 case, an operation on land will be the sequel to the 
 landing. This attack on the port from the land side 
 can be much assisted by the navy, either by creating 
 a diversion on the sea side, or by establishing a 
 blockade. 
 
 In the vast majority of cases this blockade and the 
 safe-guarding of the sea communications of the army 
 will exhaust the possibilities in co-operation which the 
 ships can avail themselves of Occasionally, however, 
 the march of the army may be along the shore, and 
 then the fleet can protect one of its flanks, or may even 
 take part with it in a general action. 
 
 Thus the march of the Allies to the Alma was covered 
 on the flank next the sea by their warships, and the 
 co-operation of the men-of-war was characteristic of the 
 great battle of the 20th September. In 1801 our ships 
 also bore a share in the battles which were fought near 
 Alexandria, and the co-operation throughout the cam- 
 paign was most genial. In the first place, the actual 
 disembarkation was covered by the fire of the warships. 
 Five days later our gunboats brought their fire to bear 
 during the battle of Mandora. Subsequently, English 
 
 * Vide Account by Captain W. R. Mends, R.N., C.B., in the "Journal 
 of the U.S. Institution," Vol. vi. p. 396. 
 
128 COMBINED OPERATIONS 
 
 gunboats on the lakes watched our left flank, and by 
 their presence threatened the enemy's right, while our 
 fleet on the other flank prevented reinforcements reach- 
 ing our opponents. The co-operation of the navy next 
 enabled us to establish a new base at Rosetta. 
 
 Again, during the advance to Cairo, gunboats on the 
 river accompanied the march of the army, and after the 
 capture of the capital we find gunboats again most 
 useful in escorting an expeditionary force of 4000 men 
 across Lake Mareotis to invest Alexandria on the 
 west. 
 
 Throughout the whole of their course the operations 
 of 1 80 1 are, in fact, a salient example of how the 
 amphibious power of England may be applied. Not 
 the least interesting part of the story is the lesson con- 
 veyed to us by the fact that it was the long delay in 
 Marmorice Bay, and the practice in carrying out a 
 disembarkation thus afforded, which made the opera- 
 tions so successful, in spite of the fact that the weather 
 was against us, and that surprise was rendered im- 
 possible. A landing on an open beach in the teeth 
 of strong opposition was thus forced upon us, and 
 demanded all the dexterity we had acquired. 
 
 Nor must we forget that the navy aided in the 
 defence even of so essentially a military undertaking 
 as the celebrated lines of Torres Vedras. It was not 
 only that several naval officers took part in the defence ; 
 that " Black Charles," afterwards distinguished in the 
 Baltic, was with his cousin, the Sir Charles Napier of 
 Scinde ; or that a naval officer was in charge of the 
 signal stations in the lines. More substantial assist- 
 ance was given by the flotilla of gunboats which .secured 
 the right flank of our entrenchments at Alhandra. "But 
 for the intervention of the Admiralty, the co-operation 
 would have been even more complete, for it was in- 
 tended to land a large body of seamen to man the last 
 
COMBINED OPERATIONS 129 
 
 line of works and thus free troops for active opera- 
 tions.* 
 
 Our wars in China in 1840 and 184 1 will also furnish 
 illustrations of our sea and land forces combining against 
 a foe on land ; but in bringing them and the foregoing 
 instances forward, the instruction to be reaped from 
 our annals is nothing like exhausted. 
 
 Before, however, leaving the subject of combined 
 naval and military action, a brief mention of the opera- 
 tions in Egypt in 1882 must be made. Until the recent 
 war the expedition which led to the defeat of Arabi 
 might well be considered the classic of its kind. An 
 interesting comparison between it and that of 1801 
 can be set on foot, and it may be shown how widely 
 different were the strategical problems set to V/olseley 
 and Abercrombie. I have, indeed, dwelt elsewhere on 
 this part of the subject; but such an inquiry belongs 
 rather to the realm of strategy by land, and would be 
 out of place here, where my object is to discuss only 
 that which interests both naval and military officers. 
 
 It will be enough to say here that we find the real 
 plan of these operations rigidly kept secret by the 
 Commander-in-chief, and that condition of success which 
 I have insisted on as essential in the earlier portion of 
 the chapter fully provided for. Secrecy, when com- 
 bined with resolution and swiftness, the foundation of 
 all great strategical triumphs ; secrecy, the silent, unob- 
 trusive, but determining factor in the opening of all 
 decisive campaigns is its special characteristic. Next we 
 have a good organisation of the force for the purpose 
 in hand, and finally a staff knovvledgable and competent. 
 
 Success followed swiftly. 
 
 Because assured by methodical arrangement. 
 
 Nor is it unbecoming to point out that if the story 
 
 * Vide an account in the Journal of the K.U.S.I. by Commander the 
 Honourable H. N. Shore, R.N. 
 
130 COMBINED OPERATIONS 
 
 of 1882 exhibits our land and sea forces most happily 
 co-operating, and playing into one another's hands, it 
 shows us also the limitations of naval power, and the 
 potency, or rather the absolute necessity, of an army 
 mobile and efficient, ready to go wherever the political 
 situation may call it, and prepared to intervene when 
 the efforts of the sailors have exhausted themselves. 
 While heavy guns could bombard, it needed a land force 
 to hold Alexandria and the shaken forts. Each service 
 showed its power, and each stepped in at the moment 
 that its peculiar characteristics were in demand. 
 
 Nor is that more recent and most curious contest 
 between Japan and China in 1894 to be overlooked. 
 Here we see both belligerents sending expeditions to 
 the same goal, both using water transport, one because 
 being an island it could not reach its goal without it, 
 and the other because the difficulties of marching were 
 greater than those of moving by sea. 
 
 The Japanese arrangements were admirable, and a 
 celerity and precision that no Europeans could have 
 surpassed characterised their operations. If the plan, 
 in view of the fact that command of the sea had not 
 been attained, was audacious, it was not rash. For the 
 risks were studied, correctly gauged, and wisely accepted 
 by the Japanese strategists. 
 
 The victory of the 15th of September was the 
 outcome of a carefully thought-out and well organ- 
 ised combination. By it the fighting qualities of the 
 modernised Japanese army were placed beyond a doubt. 
 The world was amazed. But while we wondered with 
 the rest we should have imitated. The lesson lies 
 before us plainly enough. A comparatively small 
 island in the Far East emerges, within a few decades, 
 from barbarism to civilisation, from the crudities of 
 savage warfare to the highest military skill. By dili- 
 gence, by system, by good organisation, a formidable 
 
COMBINED OPERATIONS 131 
 
 fighting force that works with the certainty and rapidity 
 of mechanism is produced. Conception and execution 
 are exactly adjusted to the means and purpose. An 
 eye-witness has assured me that it is questionable 
 whether we could have carried out the combined opera- 
 tion as perfectly as did the Japanese. And behind 
 us there sleep some centuries of practice and experi- 
 ence. To my mind the true lesson for us lies, not in 
 the details, but in the broad features of the scheme. 
 Whether done well, or not very well, that it was done 
 at all should give us pause. For it shows that any 
 race or any nation that sets to work to improve its 
 institutions, and administer its resources to the best 
 advantage, will succeed as surely in the realm of war 
 as in other departments of state. War is a matter of 
 business, and the effect of good organisation and pro- 
 fessional training will infallibly produce their effect, 
 and secure victory, whether the contest be on the 
 Rhine, or in the Korea. 
 
 War and the preparation for war can be studied as 
 methodically as can engineering or shipbuilding, and 
 the results are equally to be foreseen. The railroad or 
 the steamer built with the requisite knowledge, and 
 with a whole-hearted desire to produce the best article 
 for the money, will answer expectations. So, too, will 
 the army, whether British or Japanese. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 
 
 In the previous pages the analogy which may be traced 
 between the circumstances of a great Empire with 
 colonial possessions stretching far away from the 
 mother-country, and those of an army whose advanced 
 forces must be linked with the main base has been 
 pointed out. 
 
 The resemblance is more than superficial. It is 
 real and instructive. But the analogy must not be 
 regarded as complete. 
 
 A naval base, and the dependence of ships upon it, 
 bears, for example, only a superficial resemblance to 
 the term, as we use it in relation to land forces. 
 Soldiers are accustomed to look to their bases for 
 supplies of all sorts, and only a disaster or bad man- 
 agement is ever expected to interfere with their due 
 delivery. The navy secures the channel of supply so 
 absolutely that the flow proceeds as it would in times 
 of profound peace. Ammunition, rations, even forage, 
 occupy only a comparatively small space, and the 
 quantities piled up on the wharves furnish commanders 
 with resources that are practically unlimited. Food 
 and ammunition form for the navy, however, only a 
 small part of its needs. Coal is what ships will usually 
 most urgently require, and coal is bulky, and is prone 
 to deteriorate in store. So that even one of our greatest 
 bases can only furnish a great fleet with a reserve that, 
 were the needs of an army in question, would be looked 
 upon as trivial. Provisions and ammunition for three 
 months is but a moderate amount for a base on shore 
 
 132 
 
NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 133 
 
 to hold. Yet three months' coal always ready for our 
 biggest fleet is an impossible demand. So that a 
 base abroad can never represent the same thing to a 
 fleet as to an army. In peace time replenishment from 
 home keeps the reservoir full, and the fleet need look 
 no further than its immediate base, but in war time it 
 will be different, and the navy, until it has completely 
 cleared the seas of its opponents, will often have to 
 regard England or some coal-producing region as its 
 true support. When supplies can come to it direct 
 from thence it will often be desirable that they should 
 do so. Thus a fleet in European waters, even though 
 one of our great coaling-stations be nearer to it, may 
 prefer to lean on assistance from home. 
 
 Again, in the case of land forces, the conveyance of 
 food and ammunition from the base, and between the 
 various posts, either imposes an amount of labour on 
 the soldier that seriously interferes with his efficiency, 
 or so encumbers the columns with transport that, while 
 individuals may be well fed and unexhausted, the 
 mobility of the force they compose is destroyed. The 
 conceptions of the general are circumscribed by supply. 
 The brain may guide the army, but food regulates the 
 rate of progress. On the waters rations and fighting- 
 power move with equal rapidity ; the services of combat 
 and supply are combined, only the pace of the fighting- 
 line governs the schemes of the admiral. At half, or 
 at full speed, on the day of battle, or the day before 
 it, or day after it, in pursuit, or in retreat, life on board 
 ship follows generally its uniform course, the seaman 
 gets rest and food with the accustomed regularity : the 
 screw throbs with the same monotony, the ship steams 
 on. 
 
 Moreover, there is no fixed road between any two 
 points. A vessel may leave New York for London, 
 and reach its destination either by steaming round the 
 
134 NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 
 
 North of Scotland, or past the Lizard. From Durban 
 to Colombo your course may run either west of Mada- 
 gascar, or east of Mauritius, as the fancy moves you. 
 On their way to the Cape, during the late war, some 
 of our transports touched at Madeira, and some at 
 St Helena. While on shore, we are sometimes at 
 fault because there is no road ; at sea it is the number 
 of paths that bewilders us. 
 
 The prevalence or cessation of particular winds, how- 
 ever, formerly set limits to this freedom of movement, 
 and sailing-vessels had to study the currents of the 
 air as well as those of the sea, while, now that coal has 
 given greater independence, fuel still circumscribes the 
 activity and enterprise of the most modern ship. Coal- 
 endurance would, indeed, directly govern the number 
 and situation of coaling-stations, were it not that many 
 of them were called into existence under conditions 
 quite different from those which obtain amongst us to- 
 day. As it is, however, there does exist a close relation- 
 ship between coal-endurance and their positions, and 
 it is this relationship that, indeed, enables us to grapple 
 with certain problems of Imperial defence which would 
 otherwise present almost insuperable difficulties. The 
 protection of a world-wide commerce, and the shadow- 
 ing of hostile ships, were war-vessels really as untram- 
 melled in their choice of a course as the openness of the 
 sea suggests to us, might well prove puzzles for the 
 quickest brain. We should find ourselves contending 
 with the resources of nature as well as those of men. 
 Our foe might be as ubiquitous as the sea itself. 
 
 The aid of coal-vessels would not be a source of 
 supply which cruisers that had evaded our fleets could 
 usually count upon, and their own coal capacity could 
 only give them a comparatively short life. But how 
 long will that life be? Opinion amongst those who 
 arc not experts will usually be found singularly diver- 
 
NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 135 
 
 gent in the matter, even when ships of the same type 
 are under discussion. It is, indeed, impossible to lay 
 down a fixed standard, because the size, the speed, the 
 purpose for which the vessel is intended, are all factors 
 in the problem, and work out different results. Never- 
 theless, some general information on the subject can 
 be obtained, and some basis for discussion can be sup- 
 plied by a reference to the coal capacity which is 
 deemed desirable in the case of the various types of 
 warship.s. 
 
 The excellent " Naval Pocket - Book," founded by 
 Mr Laird Clowes, and edited by Professor Laughton, 
 will supply the information in the case of any particular 
 ship belonging to our own or foreign navies, and will 
 help inquirers greatly. We find, for example, the 
 distance in knots which a given quantity of coal will 
 carry a given ship at a given rate of speed. But the 
 actual speed of ships must vary greatly under different 
 conditions of weather, and according to the cleanliness, 
 or otherwise, of their bottoms. The skill and economy 
 of engineers varies also, and there is an art in utilising 
 fuel for steamships to the best advantage, just as there 
 is in every other profession. 
 
 The whole question of coal reserves is, however, a 
 very difficult one. The supply such a fleet as that 
 which we keep in the Mediterranean demands is so 
 enormous that more than a few weeks' fuel for its 
 furnaces could not be stored in any one place ; and 
 while in peace time replenishment could be kept 
 up from England, this would not always be an easy 
 matter in war. The close proximity of a supply of 
 coal such as could only be assured by coal-ships, 
 might again sometimes become a necessity. Other- 
 wise, an opponent steaming with full bunkers out of 
 port would be in better fighting trim than the ships 
 that awaited him. Hence it follows that, even if un- 
 
136 NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 
 
 exhausted, our great coaling - stations nnight not be 
 found sufficiently near at hand, and in such cases coal- 
 ships would have to be sent from home to accompany 
 and feed the fleet with fuel. 
 
 It is manifest, therefore, that whether we view the 
 case from the point of view of that " blockading " 
 which has been mentioned in a previous chapter, 
 where it is desirable to relieve ships as seldom as 
 possible, or whether sustained operations such as are 
 foreshadowed by the " Howe " policy are contemplated, 
 or whether we are called upon to send vessels on 
 distant expeditions, or perhaps in pursuit of hostile 
 cruisers, a large capacity for carrying coal, or the 
 presence of a floating supply will often make the 
 difference between success and failure. I suppose 
 coal-ships will accompany fleets, and may sometimes 
 meet cruisers and supply them at sea. That is an 
 operation, however, depending on weather, and, in 
 any case, inconvenient. It would also render a policy, 
 of evasion more difficult to carry out. It must mani- 
 festly be an advantage for ships to be independent 
 of predetermined routes, and to be self-contained as 
 far as possible. Even the number of coaling-stations 
 which we enjoy will not completely rid us of our diffi- 
 culties, because the free conduct of operations, both 
 tactical and strategical, must be much interfered with, 
 delayed, and interrupted by the necessity of going 
 into port. Battleships of the type of the Formidable 
 and Implacable are constructed, therefore, with a coal 
 capacity giving them the power of steaming 7000 knots 
 at 10 knots. It is, however, with reference to cruisers 
 that the coal - endurance question has most interest 
 for us, because it is the protection of our commerce 
 which forms one of the most difficult problems of 
 Imperial defence. 
 
 To chase hostile marauders for thousands of miles 
 
NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 137 
 
 across the seas is the task that will often fall to these 
 vessels. Ships that are intended for commerce de- 
 stroyers have therefore been built with an exceptionally 
 large coal capacity, and many of them can steam a 
 distance of 10,000 or 12,000 knots at their economical 
 rates of speed without replenishing their bunkers. 
 The very much larger numbers of coaling-stations 
 which we possess would enable the British ship in 
 pursuit to work with a greatly-enhanced confidence 
 and precision ; but, on the other hand, to stop and 
 coal must often mean the loss of the rubber. A 
 demand has therefore been formulated amongst naval 
 men * that we should legislate to direct their own 
 tactics against our foes, although they have been adopted 
 both because of the nature of the enterprises they 
 mean to undertake, and the lack of coaling-stations 
 which they have to face. If potential opponents 
 possess cruisers faster and of greater coal capacity 
 than any that sail under our ensign, our coaling- 
 stations will not alone reassure us against the menace. 
 A power of mischief, which we should find it trouble- 
 some to deal with, is in the hands of the foreigner. 
 If those we may one day be called upon to pursue 
 can steam for 1 2,000 knots at a stretch, we also must 
 be able to do so. The conclusion appears obvious, and 
 no more need be said about a technical portion of 
 the subject on which I will not venture to give a 
 decided opinion. 
 
 Besides, it is but a side issue, and leaves the broad 
 question unaffected. 
 
 For, however great the coal capacity of a ship may 
 be, she will sooner or later be compelled to renew 
 her supply of fuel. Hence the number and distri- 
 bution of the coaling - stations open to her are a 
 
 * Vide Gold Medal Prize " Essay," by Lieutenant Ballard, R.N., 
 Journal R.U.S.I., Vol. xliv. 
 
138 NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 
 
 matter for us to study. The most elusive and swift 
 cruiser is yet circumscribed in this respect ; and, just 
 as its counterpart, the otter must occasionally emerge 
 from its hidden course to breathe, so must the 
 marauding vessel sometimes seek the shore and coal. 
 At localities, therefore, where we know that our 
 opponents possess refuges and depots, we may waylay 
 and engage them. We find in the existence of such 
 localities a basis on which to work — the known 
 quantity which may help us to solve the equation. 
 Of course, our own ships find their freedom of move- 
 ment circumscribed in a similar manner, but to a 
 lesser extent, because we have been earlier in the field 
 than others, and are, as regards coaling-stations, more 
 liberally furnished than are they. 
 
 The risk of hostile vessels seizing on coal at the 
 ports of weak neutrals still remains to be examined. 
 A sea-power strong enough to fight us at all would 
 very likely feel sufficiently strong to over-ride equity 
 and international law, and coal her ships by force when 
 necessary. But this opens up a wide branch of the 
 question which we cannot here deal with, and involves 
 political considerations which are beyond the scope of 
 these pages. 
 
 Ships of war have other needs to be provided for, 
 however, besides coal. The floating army, like that 
 on shore, demands water, rations, clothing, ammuni- 
 tion, and articles of equipment. Ships require 
 periodical refitment, cleaning, and repair. Their guns 
 must be frequently examined, for the lives of our 
 modern ones are but short. A protracted war would 
 necessitate the renewal of some ; all would scarcely 
 come out of a great action scathless. Dry docks are 
 indispensable too, and so are depots and workshops. 
 Wide anchorages that will accommodate many vessels, 
 harbours into which they may put for shelter and 
 
NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 139 
 
 rest, are demanded also. Such requirements are felt by 
 every great maritime Power, and, therefore, in addition 
 to coaling-stations, such places as Gibraltar or Halifax 
 or Toulon, and the stores and docks and workshops 
 they contain, form valuable possessions that must be 
 secured in the strongest possible manner. 
 
 In this connection, it may be noted that, so far 
 from having too many of such strongholds, we, with 
 our world-wide responsibilities, have still too few. A 
 great Imperial dockyard and arsenal in the South 
 Pacific, which would help local capabilities to be 
 equal to the maintenance of our naval power at the 
 Antipodes, is one of the requirements of Imperial 
 defence which is urgent on us. 
 
 The fleets and squadrons of the South Pacific should 
 look to Australia as their grand base. The Common- 
 wealth, with a little help from England, might make 
 provision to render itself independent of the mother- 
 country. 
 
 No doubt, before the century is greatly older we 
 shall see such provision made ; the matter is here 
 touched upon chiefly to illustrate the evolution of 
 our naval bases, and their place in our scheme of 
 Imperial defence. The distribution of our fleets in 
 their eight stations all over the world makes it desirable 
 that facilities for repair and refitment should exist at 
 local headquarters, and that a decentralised system 
 should supply the requirements of wear and tear. 
 After every action a modern fleet will, in all prob- 
 ability, need to seek a port. What overhauling may 
 be required will be of a very different character to 
 that which was called for when the comparatively 
 small wooden vessels of the last great naval war were 
 placed in dock. Modern machinery and modern 
 armaments have delicate constitutions. It is not only 
 after fleet actions that they need the supervision and 
 
140 NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 
 
 resources of experts. They are the products of an 
 advanced civiHsation, and have the weakness as well 
 as the highly-developed powers of all such organisms. 
 Hitherto the term " coaling-stations " has been used 
 in a general sense ; but it is more correct to dif- 
 ferentiate between the various forms they may assume, 
 and they have been accordingly divided into classes 
 as follows: — (i) naval bases; (2) supply - ports ; (3) 
 defended harbours, although the nomenclature is never 
 closely adhered to. 
 
 The strongholds that come under the first category 
 have already been indicated. It is at them that we 
 find the headquarters of the local fleets. Some of 
 the greater ones are also known as " Imperial fortresses," 
 and are represented by such types as Gibraltar and 
 Malta. 
 
 Supply -ports furnish the local fleets with stores, 
 ammunition, etc., and their positions are selected b}' 
 our naval authorities according to our strategic 
 requirements. 
 
 Defended harbours, as has been noted in a previous 
 chapter, are kept up largely for the protection of our 
 merchant-shipping. They supply refuges at intervals 
 from which our merchantmen may flit to and fro 
 when in war time they have to steer a perilous course 
 amongst the prowling cruisers of the enemy. They 
 are the stepping-stones over which the food-stuffs and 
 raw material of our working people are borne to 
 these islands. 
 
 Amongst these three classes, the spots where the 
 roots of our Empire have worked themselves into 
 the soil, what are known by the general term coaling- 
 stations, may be divided. How the demands of de- 
 fence grew up round each has been touched upon on 
 previous pages. 
 
 But we may note once more how difficult it is to 
 
NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 141 
 
 limit what is undertaken ; how the amenities or fancied 
 security of a place may, by attracting a large civilian 
 population to it, complicate our position, and make 
 unexpected and unforeseen demands on our strength. 
 The problem soon loses the simplicity belonging to 
 one of a purely military character. Political and 
 social questions become involved. The soldier finds 
 his hand forced by pressure other than that of a 
 military nature. The sailor, less hampered by shore 
 influences, may misunderstand the soldier's motives 
 and measures, and thus a thorny controversy has 
 before now sprung up around the subject. It is to 
 be hoped, however, that agreement on general prin- 
 ciples has now finally emerged from the war of words, 
 and it may be admitted that if too much may some- 
 times have been done in the way of material protection, 
 the fault has been on the right side. " Too little " and 
 "too late" have most frequently, where preparation 
 for war has been concerned, brought us into trouble. 
 In order to show how heavy the calls on our land 
 forces are, it will, even at the risk of being tedious, 
 be well now to state our various responsibilities as 
 regards fixed defences in our fleet stations, and what 
 has been done to secure them. 
 
 The Channel station is so familiar that we need not 
 discuss it. 
 
 The Mediterranean naturally comes next to it on 
 the list. But its very importance, and the space it 
 fills in our minds, renders it possible to dismiss it also 
 in a very few words. Our two greatest naval bases or 
 Imperial fortresses, Malta and Gibraltar, with their 
 dockyards, lie within it. During peace time these 
 shelter and supply our fleets in the arena where the 
 great issues of naval warfare have often been deter- 
 mined. These, too, absorb large garrisons and 
 tremendous armaments, and these have also attracted 
 
142 NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 
 
 much criticism, which it is unnecessary here to discuss. 
 Our Mediterranean bases are the outcome of our 
 necessities. They are a growth, not a sudden creation. 
 They might be differently planned nowadays ; but 
 they are there, and it will not now be seriously con- 
 tended that they are over-strong — not, at anyrate, as 
 regards the numbers of their garrisons. 
 
 The permanent garrison of Gibraltar may be put 
 in round numbers at 5000 men. " The Colonial Office 
 list " tells us that there is also a small naval establish- 
 ment of 250 men, exclusive of the crews of the port 
 guardships, and that steps are being taken to increase 
 this latter. 
 
 The garrison of Malta is given in the " Statesman's 
 Year-Book, 1902," as 10,840 men, including 859 men of 
 the Royal Malta Artillery, some 2000 Royal Malta 
 Militia, and 59 Malta Militia Division Royal Engineers. 
 
 Egypt, which absorbs 5436 of our troops (including 
 124 of the Royal Malta Artillery), is not strictly to 
 be included in our discussion, but will always need a 
 garrison of British troops. 
 
 The South African station comes next to the 
 Mediterranean, and reaches up to the north of the Cape 
 de Verde islands. The garrison of our possessions 
 here can scarcely yet be said to rest on a permanent 
 basis, and is still * on what may be termed a war 
 footing. Simonstown, where there is a naval dock- 
 yard, is our naval headquarters in this locality, and 
 is a defended coaling-station and naval base ; while 
 Table Bay, close by, is to be clas.sed amongst our 
 defended harbours. 
 
 Other defended coaling-stations on this station are 
 
 St Helena, which has a garrison of about 700 men, of 
 
 whom some 500 are Colonials ; and Sierra Leone, which 
 
 is garrisoned by 2100 Colonials and 162 British troops. 
 
 * 1902. 
 
NAVAl, BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 143 
 
 Ascension is in a class by itself, being entirely under 
 Admiralty control, and being nothing more than a 
 dockyard, coaling-station, victualling yard, and store 
 depot for our navy, in whose interests alone it exists. 
 
 On the eastern coast of South Africa we find another 
 defended coaling-station at Durban — a place which will 
 probably attract more attention in the future. At 
 present a naval volunteer defence corps, numbering 
 about one hundred men, is all it musters for purposes 
 of coast defence. 
 
 Between the South African and East Indian stations 
 lie several stepping-stones in our Imperial communica- 
 tions. The first we reach as we progress East is 
 Mauritius, an important defended coaling-station, and, 
 with its dependency, Rodriguez, a valuable link in the 
 chain of our Imperial telegraphs. Port Louis, one of 
 the best harbours in the East, and containing a large 
 depot of naval stores, is defended by two forts named 
 respectively, Adelaide and George. The garrison of 
 this colony is 3583 men, including 2048 Colonial corps. 
 But numerous small islands cluster round the Mauritius 
 command, and several of them are of much assistance 
 to our warships. 
 
 Naval coaling-stations, for example, are found at the 
 Chagos Islands, dependencies of Mauritius, and at the 
 Seychelles, oases of fuel in the desert of the sea. 
 
 The latter has, however, an administration of its own, 
 and has been practically separated from Mauritius since 
 1897. 
 
 Ceylon has a garrison of 1778, inclusive of 265 
 Colonials, and provides for the security of a defended 
 coaling-station at Colombo. 
 
 A defended coaling-station and naval dockyard exist 
 at Trincomalee. 
 
 Defended harbours are to be found at Madras, Cal- 
 cutta — where there is a dockyard for our Indian marine — 
 
144 NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 
 
 and Rangoon ; while on the western coast of the Indian 
 peninsula we have the headquarters of the naval station, 
 and a dockyard for the Indian marine at Bombay, a 
 defended port of the first strategical importance. 
 
 Somewhat off the main trade routes, but valuable as 
 the outlet to the Punjab and North of India, lies the 
 defended harbour of Karachi, a port whose importance 
 in the event of war on our Indian frontier would become 
 enormously enhanced, and which the Persian Gulf ques- 
 tion also invests with a special strategical interest. 
 
 Farther to the west, again, we find a strongly-defended 
 naval coaling-station in the highway to the east at Aden, 
 and one valuable to our mercantile marine, but practi- 
 cally undefended, at Perim. 
 
 Suez and Port Said, still farther west on the same great 
 highway, are to be classed as neutral coaling-stations. 
 
 Next to the East Indian comes the China station, 
 with its headquarters and base at Hong-Kong, where 
 there is a dry dock and a vast quantity of accumulated 
 wealth of all descriptions. It is protected by a garrison* 
 of 1962 British troops, and 2463 Colonials. 
 
 The Straits Settlements absorb 2719 men, of whom 
 12 1 5 are Colonials, and a defended coaling-station is 
 found at Singapore ; but Labuan, possessing a natural 
 coal-supply, which it is hoped to develop more fully, is 
 practically undefended, its garrison consisting only of 
 a small force of armed constabulary. 
 
 At Wei-hai-wei we at first intended to establish a 
 secondary naval base, and fortifications were constructed 
 although never armed. Last spring it was announced 
 in Parliament that the idea of fortifying the place had, 
 however, been abandoned, although f it was intended 
 to keep possession of it as a commercial port. If our 
 
 * " Statesman's Vear-Book, 1902," p. 108. 
 
 t A garrison of 12S9 men, of whom 1083 were Colonials, was allowed for 
 it according to the "Statesman's Year- Book for 1902." 
 
NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 145 
 
 commercial interests develop there as much as many 
 expect, it is very possible that they will have to be 
 protected, in which event the guns may, after all, make 
 their appearance, and another illustration of the genesis 
 of armaments from trade so familiar already in our 
 history will be supplied. 
 
 South of the China we have the Australian station, 
 — lacking, we must note, an arsenal and adequate 
 naval base, but with a defended port and dockyard 
 at Sydney, where the headquarters of the station 
 are. 
 
 There are also defended coaling-stations at Thursday 
 Island, and Albany on King George's Sound. The 
 defence of these is provided for by the Australasian 
 colonies, and they also themselves secure the defended 
 harbours which they possess at Perth, Adelaide, Mel- 
 bourne, Newcastle, Brisbane, Townsville, Hobart Town, 
 Dunedin, Lyttleton, Wellington, and Auckland. In the 
 South-East American station we have the Falkland Isles 
 where there is a coaling-station, and there it is intended 
 that the naval base and headquarters of the South-East 
 American station shall be placed. 
 
 In the North American and West Indian station the 
 naval base is at the Imperial fortress of Bermuda, with 
 a garrison numbering 3068 men, of whom ion are 
 Colonials ; while at Halifax, Nova Scotia, we have 
 another naval base of the first importance which is to 
 be classed amongst our Imperial fortresses, and has a 
 garrison of 1783 men. 
 
 A defended coaling-station exists at Jamaica, where 
 there is also a dockyard ; and this island, when the 
 inter-oceanic canal is completed, will probably become 
 of increased strategical importance. It is to be noted 
 that it lies only about 120 miles from Santiago, an 
 important harbour now in possession of a young, 
 vigorous, and powerful nation. 
 K 
 
146 NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 
 
 The present garrison is only 1774 men, of whom 
 1050 are Colonials. 
 
 St Lucia, another of our defended coaling-stations, 
 will also, no doubt, become of considerably greater 
 importance when the canal just referred to has been 
 constructed. We may then find it necessary to increase 
 its garrison, which now numbers 1529 men, of whom 
 600 are Colonials, and from which the garrison of the 
 neighbouring island of Barbadoes, amounting to 38 
 officers and 753 men, has to be deducted. 
 
 Trinidad supplies a defended coaling-station at Port 
 of Spain, with a garrison of some 1200 Colonial troops, 
 and there is also a defended harbour at Georgetown, 
 British Guiana, where there is a small Colonial garrison. 
 Finally, in the Pacific station we have a dockyard and 
 naval base at Esquimault with a garrison of only 327 
 men. 
 
 How vast the problem of Imperial defence becomes 
 when the defence of so many outlying ports has to be 
 provided for will be at once apparent. But it cannot 
 be said that we have even yet reached finality here. 
 We shall probably have to add to the garrisons of some 
 stations as new developments in their neighbourhood 
 supervene. South Africa will certainly swallow up a 
 larger portion of our army than was allocated to it 
 before the war. The American Isthmus Canal fore- 
 shadows new possibilities in another region, and nowhere 
 are there signs that point to the abandonment of any 
 positions at present occupied by us. That it is a source 
 of weakness to be obliged to subdivide so greatly our 
 forces all must recognise. Soldiers with the lessons of 
 strategy in their minds will be the first to deprecate 
 a condition of things so inimical to all that science 
 inculcates. In a previous chapter something on this 
 part of the subject has been said, and the extreme views 
 which would only assign a garrison of one battalion to 
 
NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 147 
 
 a place like Malta have been combated. But to analyse 
 and discuss schemes of defence for all the places that 
 have been specified would be impossible, and, even if 
 not so, would be improper. The persons responsible 
 for their security draw up such schemes, and, no doubt, 
 make representations which receive attention in the 
 proper quarter. But we may make fairly sure that the 
 forces employed are not unduly large, and that it is 
 not in the least probable that any future re-arrangement 
 will lighten the burden our army has to bear in this 
 respect. 
 
 Neither will I attempt to enter on a detailed account 
 of the tactics of coast defence, or of the various adjuncts 
 that are called into play in those operations. Such 
 matters belong to a technical branch of the subject we 
 are dealing with, and do not affect the general principles 
 of a broad survey. But I may be allowed to touch 
 briefly upon the various forms of attack which we shall 
 most probably be called upon to meet, because it is the 
 possible form of attack which moulds the system of 
 defence, and fixes the standard to which our garrisons 
 should be kept up. 
 
 First may be mentioned a combined effort by both 
 ships and men to invade and capture the place. 
 
 For such an enterprise, while we retain command of 
 the sea, time becomes for our opponents an essential 
 factor towards success. All our bases should be im- 
 pregnable so far as a mere coup-de-7iiain is concerned. 
 Investment is a tedious operation, and will have to be 
 abandoned, unless the fleet which will inevitably come 
 to the rescue can be staved off. Attack and investment 
 on a grand scale, such as the Crimea witnessed, are 
 not dangers which we need greatly fear till our 
 supremacy is challenged and destroyed, at anyrate for 
 a time. 
 
 It does not, however, appear impossible that a foe 
 
148 NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 
 
 might find it worth his while to attempt something less. 
 A successful raid against one of our outlying possessions 
 would not be of decisive influence, or of permanent 
 detriment ; but might not a hostile fleet inadequately 
 found in stores or coal find its advantage in making a 
 dash at one of our depots, if left open to attack ? The 
 fuel it contained might certainly tempt a squadron of 
 cruisers, which had eluded us for the time, to try and 
 rifle the stores of one of our coaling-stations. 
 
 Again, an unfortunate disaster might render our ships 
 locally inferior, if only for a time, and they might then 
 be glad to seek secure shelter such as one of our fortified 
 bases can afford. And till the balance of power were 
 redressed from some other region, there might they have 
 to lie covered by the guns of fixed defences. 
 
 Recognising to the full that the command of the sea 
 is the bed-rock of our system of defence, such contin- 
 gencies as these are not surely mere chimeras of the 
 imagination? At the outbreak of a war the exact 
 position and strength of our foes may not be accurately 
 known, and uncertainty of that kind tends to breed a 
 very dangerous anxiety. We remember how puzzled 
 the world was as to where Cervera's squadron would 
 next appear after it left home waters, and we cannot 
 doubt that even in these days of improved communi- 
 cation, panic might again prove an element in the 
 situation not lightly to be faced. 
 
 A form of attack which is, however, a more real 
 menace is that from torpedo boats. 
 
 The bombardment of coast towns looms large in 
 popular apprehensions, and our complex existence can- 
 not afford to ignore popular feeling, but I feel confident 
 that we shall hear less about this particular form of 
 danger when the experiences of the siege of Lady- 
 smith have been fully assimilated, and the risk to the 
 lives of inhabitants is correctl)' gauged. 
 
NAVAL BASKS AND COALING-STATIONS [49 
 
 The shells that were thrown into that comparatively 
 small area may be reckoned by the thousand, and a great 
 many of them were of 4.7 (from the four Boer howitzers) 
 and 6-inch calibre. The damage effected was very 
 small, and I do not remember any case of stores or 
 supplies having been injured by fire. Yet the town 
 lay in a saucer under the hills round, and seemed 
 absolutely at the mercy of the guns. 
 
 Ships, unless in close proximity to their base, will 
 hardly venture to fire a very large number of shell 
 away, and run the risk of meeting our ships subse- 
 quently with their magazines only half full. The 
 heavier guns have a short life, and to fire anything like 
 the number of rounds from them that were discharged 
 b)' the Boer siege guns would be quite impossible. So 
 that this dread of bombardment is not by any means 
 well grounded. The other forms of attack mentioned, 
 with the exception of that from torpedo boats, are 
 rendered probable or possible, according as the strength 
 of our navy is markedly superior or not. 
 
 What may be termed the "set" form of attack — 
 that is to say, the deliberate closing of ships with our 
 forts to quite short range, medium musketry ranges we 
 should term them on shore, would be to run enormous 
 risks. It may conceivably be possible, as some antici- 
 pate, that the superior volume of fire brought to bear 
 by the fleet would quickly overpower the defence, that 
 while the ships were rapidly steaming in to short range 
 they would not receive any severe punishment ; yet 
 every admiral will hesitate to pit his ships against fixed 
 defences, and will think of what may happen if he sub- 
 sequently meet the hostile fleets with some of his ships 
 crippled, and magazines and bunkers not refilled. Per- 
 sonally, I cannot imagine that any admiral would think 
 of undertaking such an enterprise. 
 
 But a serious danger does exist at places where a 
 
I50 NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 
 
 landing might be attempted. And it is with this 
 question of meeting a land attack, that the strength 
 and composition of the garrisons of our bases and 
 supply ports abroad is closely involved. 
 
 During a war with a great naval Power, however 
 strenuous an effort may be made to account for and 
 shadow the hostile fleets, combinations and chances 
 may work against us, and occasions will arise when 
 some of our ports may be in no danger at all, while 
 others still lie open to menace. The naval commander- 
 in-chief on a station may feel quite confident in his 
 ability to prevent the attack on certain places, while he 
 is doubtful as to whether he can secure others. Since 
 bases and supply ports, both military and commercial, 
 are held in the interests of the navy, their security 
 becomes a question, which can, undoubtedly, be most 
 appropriately dealt with by the naval authorities. 
 
 That a garrison, at one time necessar)', might, at 
 another, be wasted ; that one place might, under certain 
 circumstances, be too strong, and yet, under others, not 
 strong enough, is easily understood. The strength or 
 pre.sence of the ships being the determining factors, and 
 the interests of the navy being principally concerned, 
 it would manifestly be convenient to have ships and 
 garrisons under the same control, and that the latter 
 should be transferable from one part to another, accord- 
 ing as the naval strategic situation demanded. Hence 
 has arisen the demand that the garrisons of many of 
 our coaling - stations should be taken over by the 
 admiralty, and should be placed under naval, rather 
 than army authority. 
 
 But we may want to go a step further, and, in place 
 of securing ourselves against a local attack, deliver one. 
 When an enemy's squadron has been driven into port, 
 an element of uncertainty will still remain, because, 
 unless the blockade on the ships can be made very 
 
NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 151 
 
 rigid indeed, they may escape. Especially, if time 
 presses, it may be better to try and destroy the hostile 
 ships than to watch them. Moreover, to deprive an 
 enemy of his local base and supplies, once for all, is the 
 most drastic and effectual method of dealing with him. 
 
 To land parties on shore in order to render the 
 positions of ships in a harbour untenable, is, therefore, 
 a most effective, and perfectly legitimate naval enter- 
 prise. It was thus that the Chinese ships in Wei-hai- 
 wei were attacked by the Japanese during the late war ; 
 and such a form of attack, especially when combined 
 with torpedo boats, as was the case at Wei-hai-wei, is 
 likely to be more deadly than the old-fashioned ex- 
 pedient of "cutting out." 
 
 The chief obstacle to the success would be the dififi- 
 culty that an admiral would experience at out-of-the- 
 way parts of the world in laying his hand on what 
 we may term a mobile force, to carry out an enterprise 
 of the description we have in view. 
 
 It has been suggested that if distant naval bases were 
 garrisoned by marines, such a force would be always 
 at hand, and that the self-governing colonies should 
 furnish us with a Colonial naval reserve to take the 
 place of the troops moved away from the fixed defences 
 to carry out some such scheme as has been indicated. 
 
 It has lately been stated that an increase of 5000 
 marines would give us a force, with a relief for it, large 
 enough to look after Hong-Kong and Wei-hai-wei, 
 and that the new system might be given a trial in these 
 colonies. However good the idea underlying the plan 
 may be in itself, exception may be taken to it, with 
 reference to Hong-Kong, on the ground that the 2500 
 men which, according to it, are considered a sufficient 
 white garrison, cannot be regarded as an adequate 
 protection for a place so valuable, and by no means 
 beyond the menace of attack from the land. At present 
 
152 NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 
 
 the Imperial troops, including the Hong-Kong regiment, 
 mount up to about that number of men, but it may be 
 questioned whether the place is as secure as it ought 
 to be. A garrison which had only the same dimensions, 
 and which might, and probably would, be taken away 
 to sea in time of war, to be replaced by a reserve 
 force without the same intimate knowledge of the de- 
 fences, and less highly trained, would not by any means 
 inspire confidence. Wei-hai-wei, we have learnt by 
 recent announcements in Parliament, is not to be turned 
 into a naval base of as great importance as was at one 
 time expected, and arrangements might suffice there, 
 that would not satisfy all demands farther west. 
 
 The truth is, that not only is Hong-Kong of such 
 supreme importance that it might well attract a care- 
 fully organised attack, but that there we must be pre- 
 pared to meet, not only a descent on the south, but 
 enterprises directed against it from the mainland. 
 
 The case of Hong-Kong is quoted here, not because 
 it is suggested that anything in the way of exception 
 can be taken to the plans for its defence, but because 
 it well illustrates the increased demands which the 
 growth of the instinct of colonisation amongst con- 
 tinental Powers has thrown upon our military resources. 
 The occupation of an island in the Far East has brought 
 us into touch with more than uncivilised races, with 
 Western progress as well as Oriental decay. It may 
 even be said that the Kowloon annexation has given 
 us a frontier co-terminous with that of China, and 
 through her, with the settlements of P^uropean Powers. 
 The Power which holds the hills on the mainland com- 
 manding the harbour, dockyards, etc., has Hong-Kong 
 at its mercy, and to defend our land frontier as well as 
 the coast demands, not only a garrison in considerable 
 force, but a mobile body trained for operations which 
 only a very efficient field army could undertake. 
 
NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 153 
 
 Lantao and Honf^-Kong itself absorb considerable 
 garrisons in their defences, but the danger of an advance 
 from Canton necessitates in addition the upkeep of a 
 field force to guard against it, or even to make a 
 counterstroke by which Canton might be taken into 
 our hands. Such a seizure of Canton would best be 
 effected by a combined naval and military expedi- 
 tion, but, if such an expedition were crowned with 
 success, the necessity for leaving a strong garrison 
 in the captured territory would still remain. It is 
 not to be considered probable that we should ever 
 find ourselves at war with China alone ; it is more 
 likely that foreign backing would precipitate, as it 
 would originate, hostility on her part. We ought, 
 therefore, to be prepared to meet a Chinese army 
 plus something behind it, giving it cohesion, direc- 
 tion, and enterprise generally, of a character such as 
 Western and not Eastern civilisation produces. 
 
 To select Hong-Kong as a suitable place for experi- 
 ments in matters of defence does not seem, therefore, 
 altogether a happy suggestion, and if any change in 
 the garrison is to be made it should rather take 
 the form of an increase which would provide a mobile 
 force held ready on the mainland to parry an attack 
 or make a swift and decisive counterstroke. 
 
 It is sometimes the fashion in speaking of Imperial 
 defence for writers to assume that the defence of our 
 Colonies and coaling-stations, except in the case of 
 India and Canada, is a matter chiefly for the navy. 
 Some authorities, indeed, seem to consider an all- 
 powerful navy as all that we need look to for their 
 security. 
 
 But a consideration of the altered conditions in the 
 far East, exemplified as they are in the case of Hong- 
 Kong especially, brings home to us the fact that we 
 have land frontiers in more places than Canada and 
 
154 NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 
 
 India, and that where a land frontier exists a field 
 force is necessary for its defence, because we can be 
 attacked by land as well as sea. 
 
 We could no more let Hong-Kong go than we could 
 throw Liverpool to the wolves. We might not impos- 
 sibly have to fight for Hong-Kong on shore as we 
 have had to fight on land, and were only the other 
 day still fighting, for Durban and Simonstown. Four 
 years ago the latter contingency seemed as remote 
 as the former does to-day. The defence of Hong- 
 Kong, in the event of a great conflagration in China, 
 not, again, the dream of a feverish imagination, might, 
 not perhaps in the immediate future but still very 
 possibly, be no more a naval question than were the 
 operations about Estcourt or Colesberg during the 
 earlier portions of the Boer war. We could not 
 defend it at all without a navy, but no more could 
 we do so without an army fighting on shore. It 
 is well to point this out at a moment when, hard 
 pressed as we are to find men for the army, an effort 
 to shift the responsibility for the defence of places 
 at present guaranteed by the arm)' may very possibly 
 be made. When the demands made on our army are 
 daily multiplying, and the supply of men to meet 
 them becomes more difficult to find, opportunism will 
 gladly avail itself of any shelter that may temporarily 
 turn attention from prospects where arduous duties 
 await us, and where responsibilities cannot be put 
 away. 
 
 Esquimault is another place where our interests will 
 in all probability increase, and which lies open to 
 assault on the land side. The interests which we 
 safeguard there are, however, not to be compared with 
 those that are to be found at Hong-Kong, and the 
 danger of attack is infinitesimally less, so small that 
 it may now be disregarded. But to our navy 
 
NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 155 
 
 Esquiinault may one day be of the highest possible 
 value, and its security against land attack might 
 become a matter of first importance. Again, we have 
 an illustration of how the growth of an Imperial spirit 
 all over the globe has altered the problems with which 
 we have to deal. An American standing army, five 
 or six times at least as strong as it was less than ten 
 years ago, trained and organised after European ideas, 
 is an entirely new factor in the question, and appreci- 
 ably, although still distantly, affects the situation in 
 the Northern Pacific. 
 
 Nor is the state of things, even where the element of 
 a contiguous and potentially hostile foreign territory 
 may be absent, everywhere quite satisfactory. 
 
 Labuan is a spot of which little is heard at home, 
 but which may in the event of war draw much attention 
 upon itself. It is of importance because it possesses 
 a coal-field which produces 4000 tons of coal per 
 annum, and, while it would supply our ships, should 
 be denied to the enemy. Its garrison is at present 
 merely a police force of small dimensions, yet it lies 
 close to the part of the world where a great drama 
 has in all probability yet to be played, where all the 
 great Powers have considerable interests and means 
 of protection and aggression, where from every 
 continent armed forces during recent years have been 
 gathered together. 
 
 Sierra Leone presents a difficulty because of its 
 unhealthy climate, and to send an adequate regular 
 garrison there would be to sacrifice the lives and health 
 of a large percentage of men. Sir C. Dilke has pointed 
 out that, as things stand at present, the neighbourhood 
 of Dakar constitutes a perpetual menace. And in 
 Senegal there is a large white garrison of more than 
 2000 men, as well as a black one about equal in 
 numbers. Situated half between Gibraltar and the 
 
156 NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 
 
 Cape, with the best harbour on the West Coast, the 
 place has most certainly a high strategical value, and 
 there can be no doubt that if we gave it up to-morrow 
 another Power would at once occupy it. If for no other 
 reason than this, it has importance for us. A hostile 
 base on the flank of our path round the Cape to India, 
 on the track too of our Eastern trade, might well prove 
 a most troublesome thorn in our side, and an increased 
 garrison of black soldiers, since white men cannot stand 
 the climate, seems another of our present necessities. 
 The hands of our navy will be so full when war first 
 breaks out that to send reinforcements then will be 
 difficult, perhaps impossible. But with many calls upon 
 us all over the world, even to find men will not be 
 a very simple matter. 
 
 Again, we are reminded how vastly the problem of 
 Imperial defence has expanded since Englishmen 
 might be found the lonely tenants of whole continents. 
 Where formerly we were pioneers we must now 
 share with others, and must preserve our status as 
 members of a community full of rival claims, rival 
 interests, and rival armaments. The considerations 
 which call upon us to make secure what we have 
 got, belong not to the instinct of annexation or aggres- 
 sion, but to self-preservation. It is no longer a matter 
 of choice with us, but of necessity. Herein lies the 
 explanation of what is termed militarism, misunder- 
 stood by many, reprobated by some ; and herein is 
 to be found the motive force that impels us to 
 continued efforts, and denies to us the luxury of 
 merely enjoying what we have gained. 
 
 It is because of all these responsibilities that our 
 arm)- has grown as it has done ; and they are quoted 
 by me here to show how little likelihood there is 
 that it can ever be reduced. Even while we ponder 
 on the difficulties we have to meet already, new 
 
NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 157 
 
 questionings force themselves upon us. Have we, 
 even yet, enough naval bases? Is every fleet station 
 furnished with its depot where its ships may seek 
 shelter and refitment? Few, I believe, will answer 
 these questions in the affirmative. It is, in fact, 
 practically admitted that at present we stand in need 
 of two more, and before very long considerable 
 movements will have to be undertaken as regards 
 yet a third. 
 
 Of the new bases which are now called for, one is 
 actually in process of construction in the Falkland 
 Isles, and when it is completed, not only will it be 
 of much assistance to our warships, but our merchant 
 vessels trading round Cape Horn will benefit from 
 it too. The other new base which is demanded is 
 that in the South Pacific, to which allusion has 
 previously been made. A high authority has lately 
 warned us that, in the East also, we should lose no 
 time in perfecting our arrangements. 
 
 In India, the situation, according to the late Sir 
 Andrew Clarke, R.E.,* is not, indeed, by any means 
 satisfactory. From Bombay to Calcutta, on a coast 
 line 2000 miles in extent, there is not a single port 
 where a vessel can run alongside a wharf to deliver 
 its cargo. A harbour should be constructed at Madras, 
 not only to facilitate the landing of heavy war material, 
 which is sometimes impossible at present, but in the 
 interests of the commerce of India. The coast of 
 Malabar, according to the same authority, has not a 
 single harbour which would provide sanctuary against 
 a hostile cruiser, and that of Coromandel is equally 
 ill provided. Nature has not in these regions given 
 us what we need, and the construction of several 
 artificial harbours would involve an expenditure from 
 which Indian statesmen recoil. It has been estimated, 
 
 * " Nineteenth Century and After," January 1902. 
 
158 NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 
 
 for example, that to provide a harbour of refuge for 
 Madras would involve an expenditure of 2| millions ; 
 but if, as has been asserted, harbours of refuge are 
 vitally essential to the security of the commerce of 
 India, the expenditure of such a sum for a place of 
 so great importance as Madras cannot be regarded 
 as an extravagance. 
 
 It was said that False Point, south-west of Calcutta, 
 could easily be converted into such a harbour, while 
 Port Blair in the Andamans might be made a coal 
 depot to supplement Trincomalee. 
 
 It must be pointed out, however, that while such 
 places would no doubt be of convenience and assistance, 
 the question of expense in money is not the only one 
 that should be taken into account when we consider 
 the advisability of establishing them. Economy in 
 men is even more essential than in money, and con- 
 centration of force is a strategical principle which 
 we must always keep in view. 
 
 Enough has been already said by me to show that 
 every defensive work erected entails greater responsi- 
 bilities than are involved by the number of men told 
 off to work the guns and man the entrenchments. 
 The "little more" ends frequently in the "how much 
 it is." We have always to be on our guard against 
 being drawn further than we originally intended ; and 
 it is not expense (although that is a big factor in 
 the problem too) so much as the frittering away of 
 our forces in small detachments that should give us 
 pause when we discuss the creation of new bases 
 and more coaling-stations, or the acquisition of fresh 
 strategic points. Moreover, we must bear in mind 
 that when the requirements of Imperial defence as 
 regards India are under discussion, demands even 
 more pressing than the provision of harbours suggest 
 themselves. Arsenals and dockyards in India should 
 
NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 159 
 
 not only supply local needs of both army and navy, 
 but should satisfy all the requirements of the coalinp^- 
 stations in the neighbourhood. Decentralisation is 
 certainly a policy which in war has been proved over 
 and over again to be the only sound one. India 
 and Australia are the natural foster-mothers of our 
 forces, both naval and military, in the East, and it 
 is to them and not to England, thousands of miles 
 away, that they should look for armament and supply. 
 
 It is more necessary to accentuate this point just 
 at present, because the centre of gravity of the Eastern 
 question is moving from West to East. The focus of 
 the cyclone, should it ever burst upon us, will very 
 likely be in the Yellow Sea, not in the Mediterranean. 
 The nations will gather to battle in the Far East. It 
 is there that the theatre of war must be prepared ; 
 it is there that the decisive issues will be fought out. 
 Hence the growing importance of Hong-Kong, the 
 need that India and Australasia should be self- 
 supporting and independent of a long line of com- 
 munications. The answer to Port Arthur was not to 
 be found in Wei-hai-wei, which has been appraised 
 now at its true worth ; the proper reply to it is the 
 creation of a great base in Australia. The future 
 lies in the hands of the young Commonwealth, the 
 infant cradled in the waves of the Southern Pacific, 
 which is scarcely yet dreaming of the mighty power 
 it may one day wield. 
 
 An Imperial army is already in men's minds. It 
 may come; but it will come after an Imperial navy, 
 because the foundation and corner-stone of Imperial 
 defence rests deep under the waves. It is from the 
 sea that the great edifice will spring, growing like 
 the legendary palaces from out the deep, " opening 
 on the foam of perilous seas." 
 
 And an Imperial fleet demands Imperial arsenals 
 
i6o NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 
 
 and dockyards ; numerous bases for the ships, whose 
 anchors grapple the bottoms of every sea, whose 
 services are universal. Before the army is created, 
 the means of equipping it locally must be set on foot ; 
 the port and dockyards for the ships that are to 
 confer mobility and ubiquity upon it must be planned. 
 Magazines and supply-depots are the first care of the 
 prudent commander, and the machinery of equipment 
 and supply is set in motion before the marching 
 columns throng the roads. 
 
 But it is not only in the Far East that the strategical 
 situation is fast altering. In the West a momentous 
 change in the great routes of the world is about to 
 be made. When the Isthmian Canal is cut, the high- 
 way of the world's trade will run East and West 
 through the Caribbean Sea. The same cause, which 
 from immemorial times has given its importance to 
 the Mediterranean, will operate at the opposite side 
 of the globe, and we, or our posterity, shall see the 
 West Indian Islands in the very centre of the vortex. 
 The great issues that sealed the fate of nations were 
 in the old times decided in the eastern Mediterranean. 
 Actium and Lepanto and the Nile were fought and 
 won on what is practically the same arena, the same 
 cause bringing about the same catastrophes in the 
 same regions, yet at epochs widely separated. It will 
 not matter when war comes who has fortified the 
 new canal, or who may levy the tolls there, or in 
 whose hands its possession is supposed to rest. The 
 batteries that may protect the passage will not give 
 a ship security that steams beyond their range. The 
 country which commands the seas will dominate the 
 outlets to the ocean, and that power which can keep 
 a squadron superior to those of others in the neigh- 
 bourhood will control the passage of the waterway 
 as surely as the superior fleet will dominate the 
 
NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS i6r 
 
 mouth of a harbour. To enable such a fleet to keep 
 the seas in strength a base must be provided in its 
 immediate vicinity ; and such a base, having regard 
 to the neighbourhood of other foreign bases from 
 which attacks might swiftly issue, will have to be 
 prepared to defy serious assault. 
 
 It is probable, then, that the next few years will 
 see St Lucia invested with a new importance, and a 
 squadron in the Caribbean Sea equal to the protec- 
 tion of our vast commercial interests in the new trade 
 route of the world. 
 
 Thus grow the responsibilities of empire, and from 
 east and west our destiny beckons us to wider efforts 
 and more sustained exertions. When others are 
 climbing on either side, to stand still is to be left 
 behind, eventually to disappear. If the path be 
 difficult, energy and exertion are as necessary to a 
 nation's as to an individual's health. And for us 
 the path to empire is the path of progress and the 
 path of duty. 
 
 The burthen is one which, once accepted, we can 
 never throw aside. When we attempt to do so we 
 shall be pulled down by its inertia, while if we brace 
 ourselves to the task, and keep our strength in full 
 vigour, we shall stride along and grow stronger, just 
 because we bear it on our backs. 
 
 List of British and Foreign Naval Bases and 
 Defended Harbours, exclusive of European 
 Waters 
 
 British 
 
 Imperial Fortresses and Naval Dockyards 
 
 Halifax Gibraltar 
 
 Bermuda Malta 
 
 L 
 
i62 NAVAL BASES AND COALING-STATIONS 
 
 Naval Bases and Naval Dockyards 
 Simonstown Sydney 
 
 Trincomalee Esquimault 
 
 Bombay Ascension 
 
 Hong-Kong 
 
 Other Defended Coaling- Stations and Harbours 
 
 Sierra Leone 
 Table Bay 
 St Helena 
 Durban 
 
 Port Louis (Mauritius) 
 Colombo 
 Madras 
 Calcutta 
 Rangoon 
 Karachi 
 Aden 
 Singapore 
 Labuan 
 Wei-hai-wei 
 Thursday Island 
 Perth 
 
 Albany, on King 
 George's Sound 
 
 Adelaide 
 
 Melbourne 
 
 Newcastle 
 
 Brisbane 
 
 Townsville 
 
 Hobart Town 
 
 Dunedin 
 
 Lyttleton (the Port 
 of Christchurch) 
 
 Wellington 
 
 Auckland 
 
 Falkland Isles 
 
 Jamaica 
 
 St Lucia 
 
 Port of Spain (Trini- 
 dad) 
 
 Georgetown (British 
 Guiana) 
 
 Defended Coaling- Stations of other European Powers 
 
 French 
 
 Martinique Obok (Gulf of Aden) 
 
 Diego Suarez Saigon 
 
 Dakar New Caledonia 
 
 Russian 
 
 Vladivostock Port Arthur 
 
 Germany 
 Kiao Chau (in process of fortification) 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE GREAT CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EMPIRE 
 
 To an ocean state submarine cables are as valuable in 
 time of war as are signalling arrangements and field 
 telegraphs to an army on land, or telephones and mes- 
 sengers to a Minister in his office. Good intelligence in 
 war is the first requisite of successful strategy, and with- 
 out a means of communicating information and intelli- 
 gence, the labour of collecting them is in vain. This is 
 true of any state which has over-sea possessions, but it is 
 of special application to us, because we have so many 
 interests, so many Colonies, so much to protect and so 
 comparatively little to do it with, that we can only hope 
 for success when we call in secrecy and swiftness to our 
 aid, make mobility redress the difficulties space imposes 
 on us, and base our strategy on vigour and decision. 
 
 Now we know that what appears intuition in war is 
 often but a manifestation of knowledge. Decision is 
 quick when it is based on the certain information which 
 trustworthy intelligence gives. In Imperial strategy we 
 are brought back to exactly the same principles that 
 govern success or failure in more limited undertakings. 
 To concentrate the forces of a scattered Empire accurate 
 and early intelligence is essential. As in some other 
 problems connected with Imperial defence, what is 
 merely convenient and desirable to other nations is a 
 matter of urgent necessity to ourselves. 
 
 Before 185 1, when the first cable was laid from Dover 
 to Calais, there were no submarine cables. The few 
 163 
 

CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE GREAT CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EMPIRE 
 
 To an ocean state submarine cables are as valuable in 
 time of war as are signalling arrangements and field 
 telegraphs to an army on land, or telephones and mes- 
 sengers to a Minister in his office. Good intelligence in 
 war is the first requisite of successful strategy, and with- 
 out a means of communicating information and intelli- 
 gence, the labour of collecting them is in vain. This is 
 true of any state which has over-sea possessions, but it is 
 of special application to us, because we have so many 
 interests, so many Colonies, so much to protect and so 
 comparatively little to do it with, that we can only hope 
 for success when we call in secrecy and swiftness to our 
 aid, make mobility redress the difficulties space imposes 
 on us, and base our strategy on vigour and decision. 
 
 Now we know that what appears intuition in war is 
 often but a manifestation of knowledge. Decision is 
 quick when it is based on the certain information which 
 trustworthy intelligence gives. In Imperial strategy we 
 are brought back to exactly the same principles that 
 govern success or failure in more limited undertakings. 
 To concentrate the forces of a scattered Empire accurate 
 and early intelligence is essential. As in some other 
 problems connected with Imperial defence, what is 
 merely convenient and desirable to other nations is a 
 matter of urgent necessity to ourselves. 
 
 Before 185 1, when the first cable was laid from Dover 
 to Calais, there were no submarine cables. The few 
 163 
 
164 CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EISIPIRE 
 
 individuals who risked their capital in laying that first 
 one were animated, it is hardly necessary to say, by 
 commercial, not by patriotic or strategical considera- 
 tions. It is well to mention this fact, which is con- 
 spicuous in the history of our cable laying, because it 
 is a characteristic feature of the growth of our Empire, 
 and is exhibited in our great lines of telegraphic com- 
 munication as it is in the history of our Colonial ex- 
 pansion and in the grouping of our lines of communica- 
 tion all over the world. The network of cables that 
 traverses the bottom of the seas and oceans reflects our 
 trading enterprise and the size of our mercantile 
 marine. The cables will be indispensable in war, but 
 they were called into being by the arts of peace. 
 
 The vigour of our private enterprise is further 
 evidenced when we examine the cable systems of the 
 Empire and the mileage they control. 
 
 There are 1750 cables in the world, stretching a 
 distance of 193,232 nautical miles. Of these, 1380 are 
 Government lines, and traverse 21,542.150 nautical miles, 
 while there are only 370 private cables, but the total 
 length of these is 171,690.661 nautical miles.* 
 
 Now, the private firms of Great Britain, reflecting in 
 her cables the greatness and enterprise of her com- 
 merce, own no less than 1 14,000 of these miles of 
 private cables. 
 
 The greater portion of Government cables are short 
 connections between our shores and those of the con- 
 tinent of Europe, or what may be termed small branches 
 in our great Colonies, or in India. 
 
 The great cable arteries from England southwards 
 through the Straits of Gibraltar are naturally those 
 mo.st likely to be of strategic importance to us, but, as 
 
 * These figures are taken from "Nomenclature des Cables, etc. 
 dress^e d'apres les documents officiels" par le bureau international des 
 administrations telegraphiques. 8 edition, juin 1 901. Berne, 1901. 
 
CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EMPIRE 165 
 
 alternative routes, those numerous short lines that join 
 us with countries such as Norway, Sweden, and Den- 
 mark, on the continent of Europe, are valuable also. 
 If our cables to Gibraltar and the Mediterranean should 
 fail us, we could still get information through the 
 Continent or even round by the United States. 
 
 Of the fourteen cables that connect Europe with 
 North America and Canada, eleven — one of which is 
 laid via the Azores — take their departure from these 
 islands. 
 
 Of the three cables that cross the South Atlantic, 
 all of which touch the shore at Pernambuco, none are 
 owned by foreigners, although one is laid via St Louis, 
 Senegambia, and two touch at St Vincent. A Spanish 
 line connects St Louis with Europe, and is the weak 
 point in this route. 
 
 It will be noticed from the chart attached to this 
 chapter that an all - British cable connects Jamaica 
 through Turk's Head Island and Bermuda with Halifax, 
 Nova Scotia, and that our West Indian colonies are 
 connected with it. 
 
 From England to Gibraltar there are four cables, 
 only one of which proceeds direct, while three join that 
 fortress with Malta and Alexandria. All of these 
 cables are owned by British companies. 
 
 The Red Sea is traversed by four cables, all of which 
 are in the hands of British companies. At Aden one 
 of these turns south to Zanzibar, the other three go 
 straight to Bombay. 
 
 Two British cables run from Madras to Penang and 
 Singapore ; thence the system radiates to the Far East 
 and to Australia. 
 
 A double cable from Sydney to Nelson joins Australia 
 with New Zealand. 
 
 South Africa is connected with home by various 
 cables owned by British companies on either side of her 
 
1 66 CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EMPIRE 
 
 coasts. From Aden an eastern cable touches at 
 Zanzibar, Mozambique, Lorenzo Marques, and Dur- 
 ban, and another cable runs from Zanzibar to the 
 Seychelles, Mauritius, and Durban. On this side, there- 
 fore, communication passes through foreign soil. On 
 the western side it is the same. Two cables are laid : 
 one follows the coast-line of Africa and touches at St 
 Vincent, Madeira, and Lisbon ; the other runs direct 
 from Land's End to Madeira, and thence by St Vincent, 
 Ascension, and St Helena to Capetown. 
 
 From Durban a newly-laid cable runs to Mauritius, 
 the Cocos, Perth, and Adelaide, and another newly-laid 
 cable connects Jask, in the Gulf of Oman, with Muscat. 
 
 A consideration of these lines of cable shows that, 
 if they have not been laid with any strategic intentions, 
 they at least favour us greatly, because the cable com- 
 munications of the world are, for the most part, in our 
 hands, and we could interfere, if necessary, more with 
 foreign Powers than they could with us. On the other 
 hand, we have infinitely larger interests at stake than 
 any other nation, and to watch the enemy's movements, 
 to follow up and shadow any detachment of his ships 
 that may escape us, is a necessity more imperative on 
 us than on others. If the telegraph in naval war as in 
 that on the shore is to enable us to bring about strategic 
 combinations and forestall the enemy at vital points, 
 it must be secure against interference. It should not 
 only be safe from destruction but from the risk of our 
 intentions becoming known through the carelessness or 
 dishonesty of the servants of neutral states. 
 
 All the three cables across the South Atlantic touch 
 Portuguese or Spanish soil, and one of these comes via 
 St Louis in Senegambia. The cables to Gibraltar touch 
 at Lisbon. The west coast of Africa is onl\- linked to 
 us through several foreign stations. 
 
 There is, in fact, at present no cable, except the new 
 
CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EMPIRE 167 
 
 Pacific one, communicating directly between Great 
 Britain and any point south of Madeira. Our tele- 
 graphic communications with the East pass through 
 Egypt or through Russian territory, Asia Minor, Kurdi- 
 stan, and Persia, a route which might well be open to 
 interference in certain eventualities. 
 
 While it is admitted that the interruption of cable 
 communications would be such a measure as in the 
 interests of neutrals a Power at war with us would 
 hesitate to embark upon, still, the issues involved being 
 in our case so momentous, there is ground for anxiety 
 where telegraphic communication is as precarious as it 
 is at present. 
 
 From this cause of late years there has arisen a 
 demand for all-British cables — that is to say, for cables 
 which do not touch any soil that is not part of the 
 British Empire. It is urged that we should have no 
 shore ends on foreign territory, that our messages should 
 pass through no hands but those of compatriots, that 
 our own interests alone should govern the management 
 of the line. 
 
 From what has been said already the importance of 
 the information which in time of war would converge 
 on our admiralty will be appreciated, and the value, too, 
 of secrecy being preserved as to the orders and instruc- 
 tions which would radiate from thence. 
 
 A feeling of insecurity and dissatisfaction with ex- 
 isting arrangements was manifested as long ago as 1887, 
 when the Colonial Conference in London took place. 
 The project, which has now emerged into tangible shape, 
 was again discussed at Ottawa in 1894, and was finally 
 approved of in 1897, when another special conference 
 on the subject was held. 
 
 The work was placed in the hands of the Cable Con- 
 struction and Maintenance Company, and an Imperial, 
 or all-British cable, was at length in process of con- 
 
i68 CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EMPIRE 
 
 struction. At the moment of writing, 1902, the final 
 stages have been reached, and the great undertaking 
 is on the eve of accompHshment* 
 
 The estimated cost was ^1,866,000, and the total 
 length, including slack, will be 7960 miles. The route 
 might have been shortened, and the expense have 
 been likewise diminished, had the cable been taken 
 across the Pacific via Hawaii, but, as this would have 
 destroyed its all-British character, the longer route by 
 Fanning Island was preferred. 
 
 The sections of this cable run as follows : — from 
 Vancouver to Fanning Island, 3561 miles ; from Fan- 
 ning Island to Fiji, 2093 miles ; from Fiji to Norfolk 
 Island, 961 miles ; from Norfolk Island to New Zealand, 
 537 miles; from Norfolk Island to Australia, 834 miles. 
 
 The all-British Pacific cable will be the property 
 of the Government of the United Kingdom, Canada, 
 New Zealand, and the Commonwealth, and will be 
 managed by a board composed of their representatives. 
 
 It is not improbable that this great cable will be the 
 forerunner of several smaller ones, which will bring 
 India and the Far East into communication with the 
 Commonwealth and New Zealand, and, via these de- 
 pendencies, with England. A new cable, which will 
 certainly be a valuable link, has, indeed, just been 
 finished by the Eastern Telegraph Company, which 
 connects South Africa with Mauritius, Rodriguez, Cocos 
 Island, and Perth, Western Australia. 
 
 The Inter-departmental Committee, which has just 
 issued its report on our cable communications, has 
 recommended the construction of a cable " connecting 
 either Rodriguez and Ceylon, Cocos-(Kecling) and 
 Ceylon, or Cocos-(Keeling) and Singapore.! 
 
 • The last link of the cable was completed at Sura, Figi, on the 31st 
 October. 
 
 t Vide " Report of the Inter-departmental Committee on Cable Com- 
 munications," issued as a BIue-Book, 1902. 
 
CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EMPIRE 169 
 
 An all-British cable to St Lucia is also recom- 
 mended for construction as soon as the state of cable 
 enterprise in the West Indies permits. In view of 
 the construction of the inter-oceanic canal, the change 
 in the strategic situation in the Caribbean Sea which 
 will consequently be brought about, and the enhanced 
 importance of St Lucia, such a cable will no doubt 
 in the future become an Imperial demand of the first 
 magnitude. 
 
 This all - British Pacific cable is, however, the 
 only great submarine cable which, up to the present 
 time, has owed its existence to the action of our 
 Government and not to private enterprise. It is 
 eminently characteristic, therefore, of the develop- 
 ment of our Empire, and especially so because, although 
 it owns official parentage, it was created, if not prin- 
 cipally, at anyrate to a considerable extent, with 
 commercial interests in view. 
 
 For -many persons have contended that there exist 
 mischievous monopolies ; not a few have feared the 
 formation of "trusts," or "pools," or "combines" — call 
 them what you will — which would exact heavy trib- 
 utes from men of business. A reduction in the rate of 
 cablegrams to Australia and India is vehemently called 
 for, what has been done not being regarded as 
 sufficient. It has ever been our custom to leave to 
 private enterprise matters that in other countries are 
 dealt with by Government. The burthen of empire 
 weighs on us already so heavily that there is possibly 
 a desire not to add to it. So, questions that will 
 some day have to be touched remain as long as 
 possible avoided, and the " can't you let it alone " 
 of Lord Melbourne becomes a seductive counsel against 
 which it is difficult to keep the ears closed. Even 
 this new submarine cable, which is to touch nowhere 
 save on British soil, migfht never have been undertaken 
 
lyo CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EMPIRE 
 
 by the Government at all had a slight change in the 
 route officially selected been agreed to. A private 
 company would very likely have been prepared to 
 work and maintain it, for a specified annual sum, if 
 it had been taken to Hawaii in place of Fanning 
 Island. But Hawaii is foreign soil, and, as the object 
 of the scheme was to keep the new cable on ours 
 alone, to come to any arrangement was impossible. 
 Some authorities will maintain that the injury inflicted 
 on a great private company brings with it dis- 
 advantages to the state not compensated for in other 
 directions. With such a question we have here no 
 concern. By us the all- British cable is regarded 
 as an Imperial necessity, and the possible injury it 
 may inflict on the interests of a commercial under- 
 taking whose shareholders prosper at the expense of 
 the public are not to be considered in the face of the 
 larger interests involved. 
 
 Nor is this desire for a cable controlled by one 
 set of interests only confined to this country alone. 
 In July 1901 a telegraph convention was signed 
 between Germany and Holland, which furnishes those 
 Powers with authority to establish a new telegraphic 
 communication between them and their Asiatic pos- 
 sessions. The two Powers are to have joint control 
 of the cables, which are to be independent of any 
 British company. A German-Dutch Cable Company 
 is to be formed, therefore, probably at Cologne. A 
 correspondent of the Times in April last gave a 
 detailed account of this new cable, and mentions 
 amongst other things the existence of a secret 
 protocol, which is thought to deal with the dangers 
 arising out of a state of war at some future date. 
 But the treaty itself does not seem to contemplate 
 a state of war ; it merely enables the two Powers to 
 safeguard cable communications with their colonies 
 
CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EMPIRE 171 
 
 in times of peace. How the same independence 
 could be maintained in war is another question, and 
 will be referred to again ; but it is believed that the 
 Continental Powers do not expect that England in 
 the event of war would respect the neutrality of her 
 opponents' submarine cables, and this idea very pro- 
 bably has a bearing on the subject. 
 
 In the present condition of things the neutrality of 
 cables, most desirable from the commercial point of 
 view, would not be in our interests as belligerents, 
 and we have always claimed that we must be free 
 to act as the military situation demands. 
 
 As the greatest commercial country we must not 
 overlook, however, that there are substantial advantages 
 for us in the use of neutral lines, and that there is 
 at anyrate a great deal to be said in their favour. 
 
 First of all, if the whole of a cable is entirely in 
 our hands there can be no possible hesitation on the 
 part of the enemy to destroy it. To do so will at once 
 become a legitimate enterprise, and as the cable, if 
 not most vulnerable, is most easily grappled in the 
 shallow water near the shore, the places where it 
 emerges from the sea will have to be strongly guarded. 
 A fresh burthen, therefore, on our Imperial resources 
 is created when such a cable is laid. 
 
 The question as to whether a belligerent has, by 
 international law, a right to destroy a neutral cable 
 because it is of use to his opponent does not seem 
 to be definitely decided by the authorities on the 
 subject, but within three miles of the shore of the 
 belligerent the opponent might undoubtedly take 
 what steps he pleased.* 
 
 * The Times, in a leading article of the 28th June dealing with this 
 part of the subject, remarks : 
 
 "According to the Naval War Code of the United States, a cable 
 entering a neutral territory may not be touched ; it is safe except when it 
 is outside the three miles' limit, or in the belligerent's territorial waters. 
 
172 CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EMPIRE 
 
 If this view as to the Hmit of an opponent's inter- 
 ference be correct, we should only need to defend the 
 ends of cables within our own waters and at places 
 where many lines converge, such as Valentia and the 
 Land's End, it would be sufficiently easy to do this. 
 But international law is capable of being construed 
 very variously, and is a very uncertain ally. A Power 
 or combination strong enough to keep up a prolonged 
 contest with us would probably be strong enough 
 also to disregard it, if convenient to do so. Who 
 are the guardians of international law ? and, when 
 found, quis custodiet custodes ? 
 
 There is, moreover, an objection to interfering with 
 the natural evolution of cable routes as well as of 
 other developments of a great commercial empire, 
 and the routes most convenient to our business people 
 are the best to follow if possible. 
 
 In commerce, hours are often of as great importance 
 as they are sometimes in war. A slightly shorter 
 connection, or one where the great depth of water 
 does not check the speed of transmission, where 
 rivalry in business matters runs high, may, by bringing 
 one certain factor, the element of rapidity, into the 
 transaction, turn the scale. The man who can gain 
 the earliest information, and enforce his decision first 
 when a financial crisis is in full flood, wins the rubber. 
 Industrial war is, in fact, waged by telegraph, and 
 industrial war is the concomitant of peace and forms 
 our normal state. 
 
 Cheap rates for messages, however, affect the com- 
 mercial aspect of the question too ; and here we have 
 divergence of opinion, because some people hail the 
 Government scheme as tending to cheapen rates and 
 
 Dr von Bar, Ihe well-known German authority on international law, 
 attempts to find support for the contention that a belligerent should be at 
 liberty to cut a cable connecting neutral with belligerent territory only 
 when there is an elt'eclive blockade." 
 
CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EMPIRE 173 
 
 destroy monopolies, while others argue that unless 
 the cheap rate conveys the message as rapidly as the 
 dearer one business people will not use it, because 
 in business transactions time is often equivalent to 
 money. 
 
 On the other hand, there are many arguments which 
 may be brought forward on behalf of all - British 
 cables between our widely-separated Colonies and the 
 mother country. 
 
 In the first place, the intimate connection tends to 
 draw our Colonies close together with one another 
 and to develop those feelings of unity and patriotism 
 amongst them which have already given us such 
 gratifying results and such brilliant promise. A cable 
 which brings one part of the Empire in direct touch 
 with another lying many thousand miles away en- 
 courages direct commercial intercourse, and stands as 
 a conspicuous and tangible proof of the solidarity of 
 the English-speaking race. This may to some appear 
 a merely sentimental argument, and, if a message duly 
 arrive, it may be contended that it is immaterial 
 whether it has come direct from British hands or 
 through a foreign channel. But, independently of the 
 fact that all - British intercourse will be cheaper, 
 and will therefore encourage social as well as com- 
 mercial communications, the absence of foreign 
 intervention certainly appeals to the imagination, and 
 arouses a sentiment which we cannot afford to 
 despise. Men, after all, are governed and influenced 
 by sentiment rather than by reason, and of all senti- 
 ments that of patriotism has always shown itself the 
 most powerful. A cable which connects England 
 with Australia through Canada is more than a link — 
 it is a band which binds three continents, three peoples, 
 three governments, into one Imperial whole. 
 
 The new Pacific cable will, moreover, bring the 
 
174 CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EMPIRE 
 
 Commonwealth 10,000 miles nearer to Canada, and 
 a message can travel from Vancouver to Queensland 
 with only three transmissions as against at least a 
 dozen of different nationalities by the older route. 
 The tariff is reduced by half, while the speed also 
 will be increased. More, therefore, than mere senti- 
 ment influences the demand in this case. 
 
 Again, the cable which chooses the farther distance, 
 the deeper water, and the longer sections, even though 
 some facility be sacrificed to sentiment, has this advan- 
 tage, that it gives us a variety of route, takes into the 
 connection new places, and substitutes strategy for com- 
 merce as the directing influence. The favourite trade 
 routes have always been well looked after by private 
 enterprise, and will always be well served through the 
 competition of rival firms. Competition and variety of 
 route make for economy, efficiency, and security. In 
 deep waters, too, it is more difficult to injure the cables; 
 and when several are widely separated more than one 
 successful coup is necessary to seize and destroy them. 
 Moreover, when one route is blocked, another will 
 remain open. If, on the other hand, we depend on 
 commercial lines only, we are exposed to the evils which 
 a combination and monopoly will bring with them. 
 
 Those in favour of the new policy are able to say 
 also that the other has had a long career, and that in 
 striking out a fresh path we may wisely try whether we 
 may not gain the benefit which change and competition 
 often bring. We have so much already that is highly 
 centralised in our Imperial system, our safety hangs .so 
 often on the .strength and completeness of a single chain, 
 that any alteration tending to multiply routes and con- 
 nections is one to be heartily encouraged, h^specially 
 is it to be welcomed in the interests of our navy. 
 
 A group of roads all close together and converging 
 on one spot are, militarily speaking, to be regarded as 
 
CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EMPIRE 175 
 
 one road : one force will block them all. So, too, with 
 cables close together, the victory, or operation, which 
 renders the destruction of one possible will also place 
 all the others in jeopardy, whereas several widely 
 separated and substantial successes, giving our op- 
 ponents a local mastery for the time being, will be 
 required to place communications, laid with other 
 considerations besides those of trade in view, at the 
 mercy of an enemy. 
 
 But what is really remarkable is that this question 
 of an all - British cable has not only been urged on 
 the Government by strategists, or those who may be 
 described as bitten with the Imperial idea and governed 
 by the spirit of militarism, but also by those interested 
 in and influenced by the claims of commerce. Our 
 chambers of commerce in many places have placed this 
 cable amongst the requirements they have asked for 
 from the Government, and we may be sure that their 
 representations have not been lightly treated. If a thing 
 is needed from the commercial point of view, and, at 
 the same time, demanded by those who have to study 
 the situation in which the Empire would be placed 
 during war with another great Power, the case for it 
 becomes a formidable one to upset, and we can under- 
 stand why the all-British Pacific cable is, at the moment 
 of writing, all but an accomplished fact. 
 
 But the impetus of the movement which called this 
 cable into being will be by no means exhausted with 
 its completion. The importance of a State - owned 
 British Atlantic cable is also strongly urged, and a 
 route is suggested for it which will be distinct from, and 
 to the north of, the zone of the existing trans- Atlantic 
 cables. It is claimed for this suggestion that by employ- 
 ing the latest improvements the new cable would earn 
 more than enough to pay its annual charges, while at the 
 same time the present cost of messages would be greatly 
 
176 CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EMPIRE 
 
 reduced. The more favourable terms of transmission 
 would attract messages from the new Pacific cable 
 through this route to England, and a really all-British 
 connection with Australia through Canada would be 
 established. Viewed in this way, a new Atlantic cable 
 appears, indeed, to be the supplement of the Pacific one. 
 
 One of the arguments which has been advanced 
 against the risks incurred in laying cables vid foreign 
 countries is that the use of a cypher code can prevent 
 messages from being read and information being 
 obtained by our opponents. But patience and ingenuity 
 will disclose any cypher — provided there are enough 
 messages sent, that the persons corresponding are 
 known, and that the probable nature of the communica- 
 tions can be arrived at. A new and elaborate code is 
 not easily established when war breaks out, and there 
 are never more than a few staff - officers or expert 
 civilians who would be available to utilise it. The 
 pressure of work during war time is so great that a staff, 
 already overdone, will be prone to fall back on cyphers 
 with which officers are already acquainted and can 
 utilise and interpret quickly ; so that it would be a 
 mistaken policy to pin our faith on the security of a 
 cypher correspondence alone. 
 
 During the present war many messages have been 
 sent in half-code and half-cypher form. If time were 
 available, and the results likely to be worth the labour 
 expended, the translation of such messages would be 
 perfectly easy. 
 
 On the other hand the cutting of cables by warships 
 is not quite so simple a matter as is sometimes as- 
 sumed. In water more than 2000 fathoms deep some 
 authorities state that cables may be considered quite 
 safe. In shallower water, and against special appliances, 
 they are certainly less so, but it is still by no means a 
 simple matter to pick them up. Great difficulties are 
 
CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EMPIRE 177 
 
 often encountered even by the special experts and ships 
 fully equipped for this particular purpose who attempt the 
 task with a view to the execution of repairs. There are 
 in foreign countries at present only a limited number 
 of engineers who thoroughly understand such work, 
 because most of the cables have been laid by, and are 
 in the hands of British companies. So that in practice 
 this risk is a smaller one than it looks on paper, although, 
 with specially fitted ships and plenty of time, cables 
 might be grappled or cut at considerable depths. 
 
 The experiences during the late Spanish-American 
 war have supplied us with some valuable data on this 
 subject. 
 
 At first the United States Government did not sanction 
 the cutting of cables, and the Secretary to the Navy 
 telegraphed to Admiral Sampson at Key West on the 
 25th of April directing that "telegraphic cables must 
 not be interfered with till further orders." 
 
 An explanatory telegram was sent to the following 
 effect : " Referring to your telegram re cables, my tele- 
 gram applies to all cables. We are considering the 
 desirability of declaring all cables neutral." * 
 
 The end of the cable which ran from Havana to Key 
 West was, however, naturally taken possession of by 
 the Government of the United States, and they thus 
 controlled all communication along it. 
 
 But, on the 30th of April, sanction to destroy the 
 cables on the south coast of Cuba was given. The 
 Eagle was already at work on the llth of the following 
 month, searching in very shallow water for the cable 
 which connected Cienfuegos and Batabanos along the 
 coast farther to the West. Even under such favourable 
 conditions the search was still fruitless. 
 
 On the same day, however, Captain M'Calla was more 
 
 * Quoted from "The Lessons of the Spanish-American War," by the 
 late Admiral Colomb, R.U.S.I. Journal, Vol. xliii. p. 426. 
 
178 CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EMPIRE 
 
 successful, and was able to report that another cable 
 running from Cienfuegos eastwards to Mazanillo had 
 been found by boats working close in to the shore, and 
 successfully cut. 
 
 Both these cables were wholly Spanish, simply con- 
 necting points along the southern coast of Cuba. Their 
 destruction, therefore, opened up no international ques- 
 tion, and this, doubtless, explains the willingness of the 
 United States Government to interfere with them. 
 
 What is important in the incident is the fact that the 
 boats had to go within 150 yards of the shore in order 
 to get hold of the cable, and that they there met with 
 such a heavy fire that, of the three cables which they 
 managed to grapple, they could only sever two, and 
 were forced to abandon the attempt to cut the third. 
 
 On the 1 6th of May the Wampatuck and the St Louis, 
 ships which appear to have been reserved for this special 
 duty, made an attempt to destroy the cable between 
 Santiago and Jamaica. The enterprise was undertaken 
 at night, but a patrol boat discovered the Wampatuck, 
 and the attempt had to be abandoned. 
 
 Two days later another attempt was made, and in 
 500 fathoms of water, and somewhat more than a mile 
 from Fort Movio, the cable was seized by a grapnel. 
 The ships were too lightly armed to engage the fort 
 which opened upon them, and were obliged to steam 
 away slowly to sea, towing the cable after them. 
 
 On the following day these same ships endeavoured 
 to cut the French cable from Guantanamo, but they 
 were foiled in their attempt by the fire of a Spanish 
 gunboat which was protecting it. But the next day 
 the American ships sought the cable near Mole St 
 Michaelas, on the western shore of St Domingo, and, 
 keeping beyond the three-mile limit, grappled and broke 
 it in deep water on the 20th of May. 
 
 Another attempt to cut a cable was made at Ponce, 
 
CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EMPIRE 179 
 
 on the coast of Porto Rico, but deep water and a rocky 
 bottom baffled the Americans. 
 
 In fact, it became clear that specially-equipped vessels 
 were necessary for cutting cables, and that any success 
 which had attended the efforts so far made must only 
 be regarded as examples of exceptional good fortune, 
 occurring in what was to be normally regarded as a very 
 slow and tedious operation. 
 
 Some two months later two local cables, from Maz- 
 anillo to Santa Cruz, and Santa Cruz to Jucaro, lying 
 in shallow waters, were cut, but this success seems to 
 round off the American record in these operations, and 
 Cuba remained still in communication with Spain. 
 
 In the Far East, Commodore Dewey, after he had 
 destroyed the Spanish squadron at Manila, requested 
 the representative of the Eastern Extension Telegraph 
 Company at Manila to allow him to utilise the cable 
 in the ordinary way. The Spanish governor refused 
 permission, whereupon Dewey cut the cable, and carried 
 the end of it on board one of his ships. As he had 
 neither instruments nor a trained staff with him it took 
 a considerable time for him to turn his prize to account, 
 and he was debarred also from utilising it for another 
 reason. The Spanish Government had, by agreement 
 with the Eastern Telegraph Company, the right of 
 blocking the end of the cable at Hong- Kong, and this 
 right they now availed themselves of, sealing the con- 
 nection there, and thus cutting off Commodore Dewey 
 and Manila too.* 
 
 These experiences are especially interesting, as being 
 the first examples we have had of a nature of operations 
 that may become common enough in future, and which, 
 owing to the interests we have at stake, possess an 
 
 * The foregoing account of the American experiences in cable-cutting is 
 taken from Admiral Colomb's lecture on the "Lessons of the Spanish- 
 American War," which has been already referred to. 
 
i8o CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EMPIRE 
 
 especial importance for us. They exhibit the difficulties 
 which will hamper a Power even when it has procured 
 a marked predominance at sea. No nation could have 
 achieved a more pronounced success over a hostile 
 navy than that of the Americans in the late war, but 
 even with such success behind them, the difficulties 
 encountered in cable-cutting were very great. 
 
 With a smaller measure of naval success might they 
 not have grown to be practically insurmountable? 
 
 That is the problem to which we have to apply our 
 minds. Granted that England may not decisively 
 triumph in a naval war, the question remains as to 
 whether we have substantial grounds for fearing that she 
 may be as completely worsted as Spain was recently by 
 America ? And if she be not so worsted, will operations 
 which proved so embarrassing to fleets that rode the 
 seas in full triumph, promise any result to navies less 
 confident and less secure from interruption? If Spain 
 could not be cut off from Cuba till the very end of the 
 struggle, are there not solid foundations for the argu- 
 ments that endeavour to make light of the anxiety dis- 
 played by another section of thinkers who have studied 
 the subject? It is at least right for us to weigh the 
 question critically and carefully, and endeavour to view 
 the matter in an atmosphere freed from preconceived 
 notions or anything approaching prejudice. Whether 
 by following commercial lines, but at the same time 
 •combating monopolies and cheapening rates, we shall 
 not only benefit our commerce but improve our com- 
 munications for war also, is an aspect of the question 
 which is certainly not to be ignored. On the other 
 hand, we should not, in our confidence as to our sea- 
 power, the bearing of which on this question will be 
 accentuated later on, forget that, while our cruisers 
 might prevent wholesale cable-cutting in difficult waters, 
 or in the neighbourhood of the great ocean roads that 
 
CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EMPIRE i8i 
 
 they patrol, if certain distant coasts and shallow waters 
 are left defenceless, an opponent may find a rapid 
 raid profitable. The neighbourhood of a potentially 
 hostile port would add to the chances of success against 
 us. On the Grand Banks, off Newfoundland, shallow 
 water and a sandy bottom favour cable-cutting enter- 
 prises. All the Atlantic cables, except one French and 
 one German one, pass near to them, and five are laid 
 quite closely together. They lie close, also, to St Pierre- 
 Miquelon, on the south coast of Newfoundland. Twenty- 
 four hours' steaming might well enable a small vessel 
 to bring serious mischief to the whole system of cables 
 that connect us with the farther shores of the Atlantic. 
 
 Without these cables the action of the North Ameri- 
 can fleet could not be directed from home. The Pacific 
 squadron on the other side of the continent would be 
 affected too, and would for some days be lost to our 
 control and direction. It is considerations such as 
 these that have raised the cry for the defence of our 
 Atlantic cables at their western ends. Not only de- 
 fence, but the provision of such ample stores of material 
 for repair and appliances as shall enable any damage 
 to be promptly made good. For a cable-depot might 
 be as valuable a prize, as fit an object for a raid, as 
 a coaling-station.* 
 
 St John's would, no doubt, be the spot for such a 
 depot, but, if so, it must be fortified to repel a raid 
 and cover the reserve stores and the repairing ships. 
 There, too, should be the headquarters of a warship, 
 which would, at the outbreak of hostilities, patrol and 
 guard the regions where the cables are so vulnerable 
 and so open to interference. 
 
 There are other strategical reasons, too, why St 
 John's should be rendered more secure, but they lie 
 
 * An article by Mr P. T. M'Grath in the Fortnightly Review for Sep- 
 tember 1902 gives some interesting information on this subject. 
 
1 82 CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EMPIRE 
 
 outside the scope of our discussion, and need not be 
 dwelt upon here. Before, however, we leave the sub- 
 ject, we may note again how, in every shape and form, 
 responsibilities crowd upon us ; how the calls upon army 
 and navy are growing from all sides ; how the very 
 scientific inventions that in one direction add so much 
 to our strength in another make demands that diminish 
 the value of the gift. The statesman watching over 
 the national expenditure must sigh for the days when 
 there were fewer competitors to force the pace and the 
 same standard of efficiency was not exacted. With all 
 the interests of our Colonies, and our land and sea forces 
 that have to be reconciled, no wonder if the problem 
 grows complicated and wide divergences of opinion are 
 proclaimed, and no wonder that finality seems ever 
 flitting further before and evading us. 
 
 But in one respect, at least, we may arrive at un- 
 animity and singleness of purpose. As we lay in stores 
 of ammunition, and supplies and materiel generally, so 
 must we keep a reserve of spare cables and materials for 
 repair at our naval bases throughout the world. 
 
 Not only, however, to restore existing lines but to 
 create new ones as circumstances may demand. 
 
 Just as in field warfare the engineers lay the field 
 telegraph and connect the army as it moves forward 
 with the base in rear, so in struggles on the waters 
 will the headquarters of our fleets be kept in connec- 
 tion with the Admiralty at home, or even with 
 squadrons detached for some particular purpose. The 
 cable must, in fact, follow the fleet, and an important 
 need, therefore, in Imperial defence which is sometimes 
 lost sight of is that there should always be a reserve 
 both of cables and of special ships and trained men 
 who understand the business of laying them, just as 
 there must be reserves of supplies and stores and coal 
 and guns and ammunition. 
 
CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EMPIRE 183 
 
 During the Zulu war a cable intended for Australia 
 was temporarily laid from Cape Town to Durban 
 (which places, it may be noted, are still not in direct 
 cable communication with one another) and our naval 
 base in South Africa. 
 
 During our occupation of Port Hamilton we also 
 laid what may be termed an emergency cable to 
 connect that port with China. 
 
 When the British Fleet in 1878 made a demonstra- 
 tion and went to Constantinople, arrangements were 
 made for keeping up communication with it by means 
 of a submarine cable specially laid for the occasion. 
 
 Such are a few examples of theory carried into 
 practice. 
 
 And no doubt, if in future we should set a blockad- 
 ing squadron in front of some hostile port, a cable 
 would be rapidly laid, which would place the admiral 
 in command in close touch with events in all parts 
 of the world. 
 
 Rapid cable laying in time of war is, in fact, one of 
 the problems of Imperial defence of first importance 
 to us, for early intelligence in naval warfare, especially 
 to a country such as ours, is as valuable as a reinforce- 
 ment of many ships and men. 
 
 Fortunately, we can afford to face the present situa- 
 tion with equanimity, and as regards facilities for laying 
 cables hold a marked pre-eminence as things stand at 
 present* It has been estimated by the leading 
 authorities on the subject that the telegraph manu- 
 facturers in this country can, in full work, turn out loo 
 nautical miles of submarine cable per day. There are 
 three large firms in existence and two of secondary 
 importance. This estimate, it will be noted, is based 
 on continuous full work being kept up and on a 
 
 * Vide the remarks of Mr Robert Kaye Gray, p. 1404, \o\. xliv. 
 Journal R.U.S.I. 
 
184 CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EMPIRE 
 
 supply of gutta-percha equal to this heavy demand 
 being assured. 
 
 Sir George Clarke in 1897, speaking at the United 
 Service Institution,* placed the powers of cable pro- 
 duction possessed by this country at 2000 nautical 
 miles per month, an estimate which he subsequently 
 explained in the discussion on Lieutenant Bellairs's 
 paper (whose estimate was somewhat lower) to have 
 been given him by three firms as far back as 189 1. 
 
 But the advantages which we possess do not alone 
 consist in those which enable us to lay fresh cables. 
 If cable-cutting is to become a familiar feature of the 
 the next great naval war, repairing and restoration 
 will follow the processes of destruction. The power 
 to cut may be counterbalanced by facilities for repair, 
 and here we have little or no cause for anxiety. 
 
 In the discussion just referred to. Sir George Clarke 
 stated that there were about thirty-eight cable ships 
 in the world, with crews thoroughly trained for the 
 work, and appliances adapted for the operations to 
 be undertaken. Of these, there are only about four 
 or five which do not sail under our flag, and, therefore, 
 it is scarcely an exaggeration to represent us as holding 
 a monopoly in such special operations as the repairing 
 of damaged cables. 
 
 The fact is, that if we leave out of sight such excep- 
 tional localities as the neighbourhood of St John's, this 
 question of the feasibility of cutting submarine cables 
 in war time is another variant of the power with 
 which command of the sea endows its possessors. 
 
 It may be conceded that, given a properly-equipped 
 ship, skilled labour, and, say, twenty-four hours' time, 
 it might be possible to grapple and cut a cable even 
 in water from 2000 to 3000 fathoms deep. 
 
 * Journal R.U.S.I., Vol. xli. p. 1132. 
 
CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EMPIRE 185 
 
 Again, it may be granted * that the situation of the 
 great cables of the world are already known, or that 
 full information would be easily obtained by a Power 
 at war with us. But, even conceding so much, unless 
 that Power had become predominant, or nearly so, 
 on the waves, the cutting of our cables would most 
 probably still remain a far-off contingency. 
 
 In the first place the special ships should not find it 
 easy to leave port and evade our fleets. The surest 
 way of protecting cables would be to shut up in 
 harbour their potential destroyers ; and it is the 
 method which naval strategy would very likely 
 adopt. 
 
 Then the operation of grappling a cable, although 
 with luck it might be successfully carried out in a 
 short time such as has been named, would in deep 
 water often prove a matter of considerable difficulty 
 and delay. Be it noted further that the weaker navy 
 would be obliged to seek deep water, so as to escape 
 observation, and, because in deep water the results 
 of a successful cutting would also be greatest owing 
 to the difficulties involved in the repair of the mischief, 
 the cable cutter may be tempted to try in them. 
 The weaker power at sea will probably, therefore, seek 
 the most difficult locality for its operations, and will, 
 consequently, unless luck favour it to an extent, which 
 we have no reason to anticipate will be the case, 
 experience delay in carrying out its project. That 
 delay will open up possibilities of interruption, and un- 
 less the luck is to be all on one side, a British warship 
 or small squadron may very possibly appear on the 
 
 * We have never made any attempt to conceal the situation of our 
 cables, and our cousins across the Atlantic have acted with equal frankness. 
 The French are, however, less confiding, and, according to Mr P. T. 
 M'Grath in the Fortnightly Kevieiv for September 1902, they have lately 
 laid their largest submarine cable without the knowledge of its exact 
 location having been allowed to leak out. 
 
1 86 CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EMPIRE 
 
 scene in time to cause the hasty abandonment of the 
 operations. 
 
 Again, where several alternative routes exist, the 
 cutting of one cable would not seriously embarrass 
 us, and a very pronounced naval superiority would 
 be necessary to allow cable-cutting vessels to roam 
 the seas unhindered and conduct operations on a 
 large scale undisturbed. 
 
 In the preceding pages nothing has been said as to 
 wireless telegraphy, yet something, undoubtedly, possibly 
 much of what I have had to dwell upon, will be 
 discounted by the new invention. The temporary 
 cables which are to follow the fleets may possibly 
 be dispensed with ; it is certain that communication 
 with shores from ships at a distance to be reckoned 
 by hundreds of miles will be possible. On the other 
 hand, there remains the present openness to hostile 
 interference to be overcome. But we are speaking of 
 things as they are, not as they may be, and wireless 
 telegraphy is still too immature in its widest develop- 
 ments for us to discuss it here. 
 
 Some reference also must be made to another great 
 Imperial project and another means of communication 
 which will supplement our great submarine cables. 
 The Cape to Cairo Railway may still be a long way 
 from assuming concrete shape. Of the 5000 miles or 
 so that had originally to be traversed 1340 have 
 been laid down, and, up to Bulawayo, the railway 
 may be said to have proved a valuable commercial 
 asset. The near future will probably find it as far 
 as Salisbury ; one day, no doubt, the track will reach 
 the Victoria Nj'anza. But, between Uganda and Khar- 
 toum, swamps and malaria threaten to bar the way. The 
 present generation will not see the great project com- 
 pleted: it is doubtful whether even our grandchildren 
 will be more fortunate. When, however, much of what 
 
London : Jwan Sonnensc"cin & Co itrj. 
 
WapD 
 
CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EMPIRE 187 
 
 appeared visionary and impossible twenty years ago has 
 already been accomplished, and Bulawayo is within the 
 reach of a Cook's tourist, it would be rash to prophesy ; 
 but with our present knowledge the difficulties to a 
 railway certainly seem all but insurmountable. 
 
 With the telegraph, however, it is very different : wires 
 may run where railways would find impassable barriers. 
 The cost is comparatively trifling, the risks far smaller. 
 In a word, although it may be accepted as certain that 
 we shall none of us ever see railway connection between 
 Egypt and South Africa, we may count on telegraphic 
 communication being established in the near future. 
 Another means of communication of Imperial signi- 
 ficance will then be added to those we already enjoy, 
 and another link in the chain that binds the Empire 
 together will be riveted. 
 
CABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE EMPIRE 187 
 
 appeared visionary and impossible twenty years ago has 
 already been accomplished, and Bulawayo is within the 
 reach of a Cook's tourist, it would be rash to prophesy ; 
 but with our present knowledge the difificulties to a 
 railway certainly seem all but insurmountable. 
 
 With the telegraph, however, it is very different : wires 
 may run where railways would find impassable barriers. 
 The cost is comparatively trifling, the risks far smaller. 
 In a word, although it may be accepted as certain that 
 we shall none of us ever see railway connection between 
 Egypt and South Africa, we may count on telegraphic 
 communication being established in the near future. 
 Another means of communication of Imperial signi- 
 ficance will then be added to those we already enjoy, 
 and another link in the chain that binds the Empire 
 together will be riveted. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 OUR FOOD SUPPLY IN TIME OF WAR 
 
 The question of our food supply is as closely linked 
 with that of Imperial defence as is the feasibility of 
 starving out a garrison connected with strategy in the 
 field. If it be true that a combination of foreign Powers 
 could cut off our supplies of food, even though our navy 
 were unvanquished, our position is indeed hopeless. 
 The operation of levying war on us would be reduced 
 to a bloodless contest between brokers, and the pur- 
 chasing of " futures " in corn ; while the moving acci- 
 dents and the element of uncertainty in war would be 
 removed from the seas and plains to the counting-house. 
 Putting aside for a moment controversies and supposi- 
 tions which will be considered later, we may at once 
 admit that the situation is one that must be regarded 
 with extreme anxiety. 
 
 The main facts of the case, although the estimates 
 of experts may slightly vary, are not seriously in 
 dispute. 
 
 The acreage under wheat in Great Britain, according 
 to the figures quoted in " The .Statesman's Year-Book " 
 1902, has fallen from 3,630,300 in 1874, to 1,700,828 in 
 1 90 1. In consequence, we have to import annually 22^ 
 million quarters of bread-stuffs, and of this, according to 
 Mr M'Caskie,* about 3 millions come from our country- 
 men of Greater Britain, while 19^ millions have to be 
 supplied from somewhere else. 
 
 * Times, 19th December 1901. 
 
OUR FOOD SUPPLY IN TIME OF WAR 189 
 
 In 1896 Mr R. B. Marston in his "War, Famine, and 
 Food Supply," quoting from the " Corn Trade Year- 
 book," pp. 35 and 36, put our total imports of wheat and 
 flour at 25,o78,3(X> quarters, and stated that of this total 
 the United States contributed 10,920,000 quarters ; 
 Russia, 5,410,000; the Argentine Republic, 3,843,000; 
 India, Canada, Australia, Uruguay, Chili, Roumania, 
 etc., all contributing smaller quantities. 
 
 Captain Stewart Murray, in the very able lecture he 
 gave at the Royal United Service Institution in February 
 1901, included Argentina under "America," and gave 
 their total importation of wheat at 14,500,000 quarters, 
 that of Russia and Roumania together at 5,000,000, and 
 that from Greater Britain at the same figure I have 
 quoted above. The supply from the United States is 
 diminishing, while that from the Argentine is increasing, 
 but the latter is a variable crop owing to local circum- 
 stances, and cannot be depended on. On the other 
 hand, Canada is increasing her output of wheat, and in 
 1901, according to " The Statesman's Year-Book," sent us 
 6,696,710 cwts. as against 2,541,500 cwts. from Russia. 
 
 It is clear, then, that we are dependent on foreign 
 imports for our supply of food, and that the United 
 States and Russia contribute so largely between them 
 to our needs that they may be said to have the market 
 in their hands. India, Uruguay, Chili, or Turkey produce 
 so little that they could not send us anything like 
 enough were our principal supply to fail. Such a con- 
 dition of things is manifestly highly abnormal. It 
 implies an artificial condition of life full of danger, for 
 what is unnatural and against our instincts is alwa)'s to 
 be mistrusted. It is of evil omen for us that Rome, 
 the prototype of our Empire, was dependent on and 
 ultimately ruined by a foreign corn supply, and that it 
 fell because its civilisation and power rested on an 
 unnatural foundation, and cheap grain from Africa 
 
190 OUR FOOD SUPPLY IN TIME OF WAR 
 
 desolated Italy. The danger that threatens us is not 
 only to be found in the obvious fact that the supplies 
 of corn from abroad might be intercepted, because our 
 navy would have so many duties to perform that it could 
 not prevent the depredations of hostile cruisers. The 
 facility of communication and the power of combination 
 it brings with it, which is the conspicuous feature of 
 modern life, has rendered it possible, so it is stated, for 
 a corner in wheat to be established against us such as 
 we have heard of being formed in the case of copper, of 
 steel, of salt, and of any other commodity necessary to 
 human existence, or largely in demand by our industrial 
 population. 
 
 It is agreed that if one of the countries which prin- 
 cipally supply us were to forbid the exportation of 
 grain, the price of that commodity could be raised in 
 all other markets of the world by brokers acting as 
 agents for our enemies, bidding for, and buying up, 
 the commodity which is essential to us. The richest 
 country would, in this case, it is true, get what it wanted 
 all the same, and we, having most money at our backs 
 might count, therefore, on emerging triumphant from 
 the contest. 
 
 But, I may ask, at what a price ? Prices would rise 
 enormously. That is admitted ; but many think they 
 would rise so far as to put bread altogether out of the 
 reach of many consumers. 
 
 There are those, on the other hand, who emphatically 
 deny that the corner could hold the field. The hostile 
 broker would have to spend, at least, ;^ 100,000,000 to 
 outbid us for the number of million quarters we were 
 seeking. There would still, even then, remain grain in 
 other parts of the world not outside our Empire ; and 
 to keep it from us the broker would have to go 
 into the market again, and again spend more than 
 ;^ 1 00,000,000 to keep it from us, perhaps as much as 
 
OUR FOOD SUPPLY IN TIME OF WAR 191 
 
 double would have to be expended to forestall us, for 
 we must suppose that the agents of our Government 
 are active too, and would bid on our behalf Is it 
 probable or conceivable that a country or countries 
 embarking on a war with the richest nation of the world 
 would begin a costly struggle by spending such a sum 
 as over ^100,000,000 in an attempt to starve us out? 
 
 But it is contended that such an expenditure would 
 not be demanded. Prices could be artificially raised 
 without the whole of the world's grain supply being pur- 
 chased. A private individual, Mr Leiter, a few years 
 ago did succeed in doing this, although it should not be 
 forgotten that he ruined himself in the effort. It is 
 argued that as we should have to pay enhanced prices 
 for the grain, the expenditure which brought the pinch 
 of war home to the electorate of the country would not 
 be wasted by the enemy, any more than the cost of 
 armament or projectiles which enabled him to win a 
 great battle. It would, in fact, only be necessary for 
 the agents of foreign countries to bid against us to make 
 us pay ruinous prices, just as if it be seen that a rich 
 man is determined to have a horse he can be bid against 
 at Tattersall's until he is compelled to pay an immense 
 price. It is stated that the purchase of the whole 
 visible supply of wheat in America, usually about 
 7,000,000 quarters, might be effected with a sum of about 
 ^i 1,000,000. When that occurred, everyone, foreseeing 
 a further rise, would lay in a stock of wheat, and prices 
 would at once be raised. The invisible supply would 
 then be offered, our opponents would again bid against 
 us for it, and prices, already high, would be driven higher 
 still. 
 
 No doubt we should get the wheat in the end by 
 paying enormous sums of money for it, but our weak- 
 ness, meanwhile, would have been exploited ; because 
 the cost of war would have been made to hit us harder, 
 
192 OUR FOOD SUPPLY IN TIME OF WAR 
 
 owing to our having to depend on foreign supplies, than 
 any other nation which happened to be more self- 
 supporting. 
 
 But even when the grain was obtained our difficulties, 
 we are told, would not be over ; for we should still have 
 to bring it home across the seas, where the utmost 
 vigilance of our navy would not prevent a certain per- 
 centage of cargoes being captured by the enemy's 
 cruisers. That element of risk would again operate to 
 further inflate prices. 
 
 The ravages of the Alabama are quoted, with much 
 point, to show that although during the war of secession 
 the Federals were absolutely predominant at sea the 
 little Confederate steamer was able to inflict the heaviest 
 injury on northern trade. With a number of swift 
 cruisers on the watch, and our navy occupied with the 
 fleets of an enemy not strong enough to meet it with 
 any chance of success in pitched battles, but still 
 immensely stronger than the South was as against the 
 North during the American War, no doubt the risks of 
 capture would be considerably greater than they were 
 during that struggle. 
 
 Some idea of the figure to which prices might rise is 
 supplied by the records of what has formerly occurred. 
 According to Alison, who quotes from the Committee 
 on the Corn Laws in 1814, the average prices of wheat 
 per quarter in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
 were as follows : — 
 
 
 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 During the ten years 
 
 end 
 
 mg 1705 . 
 
 ■ 42 
 
 II 
 
 ., 
 
 
 1715 . 
 
 • 44 
 
 A 
 
 ., 
 
 
 1725 . 
 
 ■ 35 
 
 4i 
 
 .. 
 
 
 1735 • 
 
 • 35 
 
 2 
 
 .. 
 
 
 1745 • 
 
 • 32 
 
 I 
 
 .. .. 
 
 
 1755 • 
 
 ■ 33 
 
 2i 
 
 » .. 
 
 
 1765 . 
 
 ■ 39 
 
 l\ 
 
UR FOOD SUPPLY IN TIME 
 
 OF WAR 
 
 
 s. d. 
 
 During the ten years ending 1775 
 
 ■ SI 3i 
 
 1785 
 
 . 47 8i 
 
 179s 
 
 . 54 3i 
 
 „ „ 1805 
 
 . 81 2j 
 
 „ eight years to 1 8 1 3 
 
 . loi 9^ 
 
 193 
 
 But in 1800 and 1801, when there had been a scarcity, 
 the average prices of wheat had been as high as 
 ri2s. 8d. and 11 8s. respectively. 
 
 In 1 81 2, when we were at war with America, the 
 price of wheat rose as high as 1 26s. 6d. per quarter. 
 
 At the moment of writing, the price of wheat is only 
 about 27s. 
 
 The war between Spain and America drove it up to 50s. 
 
 It may be admitted that, at anyrate for short periods, 
 we should probably see these panic prices again, and 
 wheat at lOOs. would have to be faced for a time. That 
 a rise might occur large enough to be extremely incon- 
 venient is not seriously in dispute. The question is 
 whether the pressure thus brought to bear on our people 
 would be so heavy as to make them realise that the war 
 could no longer be sustained. 
 
 There are many able and talented men who assert 
 that the burthen would be intolerable, and that the 
 risks involved are so great, that it is worth our while to 
 pay annually in some shape or form (for every scheme 
 ultimately means increased prices to the consumer, or 
 increased taxation) what may be described as a premium 
 of insurance. The importance of the question was 
 somewhat accentuated in 1901, because, during the 
 naval manoeuvres of that year, the fleet which was sup- 
 posed to be fulfilling duties that would fall to our navy 
 in war did not come victorious out of a contest with a 
 fleet supposed to be hostile. 
 
 It is also pointed out that since 1801, when wheat 
 
 N 
 
194 OUR FOOD SUPPLY IN TIME OF WAR 
 
 rose to so prohibitive a price, our population has in- 
 creased by 23,000,000 ; that our population then was 
 largely self-supporting, while now we have 40,000,000 
 mouths which must be fed principally with foreign food. 
 
 During the great war with France bread riots and 
 disturbances were not unknown; and that, too, at a time 
 when the temper of the people was more patient than 
 it is at present ; when the voice of the masses could not 
 make itself heard in the House of Commons, as is now 
 the case ; when the Government of the country was 
 aristocratic, while now it is essentially democratic. It 
 is proper to bring these points forward before I touch 
 on the remedies which are proposed to meet a condition 
 regarded by many with much apprehension. It is 
 right to show that a genuine and sincere patriotism 
 animates the pessimistic views expressed in widely 
 separated quarters ; that no taint of political feeling, 
 as has sometimes unjustly been asserted, hangs about 
 suggestions which have this in common with those of 
 the Protectionists that they view the disappearance of 
 wheat-growing in this country with dislike and appre- 
 hension. 
 
 The remedies which are put forward may with ad- 
 vantage first be stated, and a discussion of them follow. 
 
 Undoubtedly the remedy which would be at once 
 most easy of application, most efficacious, and which 
 would operate in the most natural manner, would be to 
 impose such a duty on imported wheat as would raise 
 its price to just over 40s. — the price at which it pays 
 a man to grow wheat in England. It is claimed 
 that such a duty would act automatically and almost 
 instantaneously ; that we should see from 2,500,000 
 to 3,000,000 more acres under wheat cultivation than 
 is now the case ; that the yield of home-grown wheat 
 would be greater by from 10,000,000 to 12,000,000 
 quarters than it is at present, and that we could then 
 
OUR FOOD SUPPLY IN TIME OF WAR 195 
 
 count on being able to tide over the difficulties which 
 war would bring with it. 
 
 With reference to this I have nothing to say except 
 that the scheme raises political issues of the first import- 
 ance, and that, as soldiers must remain outside politics, 
 it is impossible for it to be more than mentioned here. 
 
 That such a scheme is not within the realm of prac- 
 tical politics just at present will, however, be clear to all 
 of us, and this fact alone is enough to put it out of our 
 purview. 
 
 Another remedy which has not the same political 
 objection is that the State should set granaries on foot, 
 and that it should keep such a reserve of wheat in hand 
 as would enable it to fight a "corner" by putting corn 
 in large quantities on the market when an attempt to 
 create one was made. A reservoir would be created, 
 and the flood-gates opened at moments of crisis to 
 obviate a rise in prices due to shortages, either actual or 
 artificial. 
 
 Mr R. B. Marston, in his very able little book, pro- 
 pounds the plan of action. 
 
 He would store ;^30,ooo,ooo worth of wheat, about 
 the price of a year's supply, in fortified granaries. The 
 Government would take under its control the entire 
 year's import of foreign wheat, and would by this means 
 keep the reserve always good. According to his scheme, 
 all wheat or flour coming to our shores would be handed 
 over to our Customs officers. The owner of the wheat 
 would be guaranteed its full value by Act of Parliament. 
 The Government would give the purchaser, not the new 
 wheat which came from abroad, but a similar quantity 
 of wheat from its granaries one year old, at the same 
 price. Thus the wheat in reserve would be kept con- 
 stantly in circulation. 
 
 We should by this means always have twelve months' 
 supply of wheat in the country to fall back upon. 
 
196 OUR FOOD SUPPLY IN TIME OF WAR 
 
 Further, the corn merchants who bought it would be 
 restricted by Act of ParHament as to the price at which 
 they resold it to the public, so that only a fair profit would 
 be obtained, and the price of the loaf made from Govern- 
 ment reserves would be fixed by law. By following 
 this suggestion, it is claimed that we should, at a crisis, 
 have time to grow corn and other food at home in such 
 quantities as to make us, to a large extent, independent 
 of foreign countries. The estimated cost to the country 
 would be i^900,ooo a year, interest on the ^^30,000,000 
 alone. What the expenses involved in addition would 
 be have been variously estimated at from ^^ 1,3 39,800 
 up to about ^3,000,000. The total expenditure on this 
 granary system might, therefore, amount to as much as 
 ^4,000,000 a year, and has been placed double as high, 
 an estimate which is, however, an inflated one. 
 
 Granaries have, I believe, been successfully established 
 in Hungary, North America, and Egypt ; while at Malta 
 we have an example of the storage of corn daily before 
 our eyes. 
 
 The receptacles there are termed " silos," and several 
 hundreds of them exist in the island. They are dug 
 in the ground or hewn out of the rock in an oval 
 shape, the oval running vertically downwards. Layers 
 of barley straw to the thickness of a sheaf are placed 
 all round the carefully cemented walls, with a thick 
 layer at the bottom, before the grain is poured in. This 
 is done to prevent absorption of moisture by the grain, 
 which might otherwise ferment. It is, indeed, quite 
 paramount that the silo should be absolutely free from 
 damp, or the danger of fermentation will be always 
 present. When the silo is nearly full more straw is 
 is laid on the top so as to completely fill it up, a slab is 
 placed on the opening, and hermetically sealed. * 
 
 • Vide Mr Critien's account quoted in Mr R. B. Marston's "War, 
 Famine, and Food Supply." 
 
OUR FOOD SUPPLY IN TIME OF WAR 197 
 
 Grain thus stored will, no doubt, keep good for a long 
 time. 
 
 The capacity of these silos varies from 300 to 
 400 quarters each, and, when they are not defective, 
 corn remains perfectly sweet for years : in a climate 
 such as that of Malta for three or four. Should it, on 
 inspection, show signs of fermentation, it is taken out, 
 cured, and replaced. 
 
 It is evident, however, that a means of storage suitable 
 for the Mediterranean might be quite unfitted for our 
 purposes in England, and the system at Malta is quoted 
 by Mr Marston more as an illustration than as an 
 example to show what might be done in a different 
 climate. 
 
 There are several objections to this scheme, the most 
 obvious, and the one which will most appeal to us, being 
 that an expenditure of several additional millions on 
 our navy would render the chances of granaries being 
 needed almost infinitesimal. 
 
 Nor is the idea of monumental forts round London 
 to contain granaries one which will by any means 
 commend itself to soldiers. 
 
 Mr R. A. Yerburgh, M.P., is the author of a scheme 
 which resembles that of Mr Marston, but does not go 
 so far. His national granaries would only keep about 
 a third of a year's consumption in store, and that would 
 be drawn from our own farms. The expenditure in- 
 volved annually would therefore be much less, the 
 normal course of trade would be less open to disturbance 
 from Government action, the British wheat-grower 
 might possibly benefit ; but, on the other hand, the 
 relief when the pinch came would be greatly reduced. 
 Mr Yerburgh has placed the capital expenditure in- 
 volved at a little over ;^ 17,000,000 for the purchase of 
 8,000,000 quarters of wheat. 
 
 In answer to those who objected that in " our de- 
 
198 OUR FOOD SUPPLY IN TIME OF WAR 
 
 testable climate" it is impossible to keep wheat sound 
 and hard when stored, the author of this scheme has 
 stated that an experiment in the storage of British 
 wheat has been recently conducted, and has met with 
 complete success. 
 
 "In 1897 25 quarters of wheat of that year's harvest 
 were bought from a farmer in Suffolk, dried by a new 
 process in Berlin, then stored at Messrs Robinson's, 
 Rochdale, in a granolithic concrete silo. It remained 
 there till October 1900, when it was drawn out and 
 placed in sacks. In February 1901 it was sent to 
 Alford, Lincolnshire, to be ground." 
 
 It was found then to be in excellent condition, and 
 yielded a higher percentage of flour than new English 
 wheat. 
 
 Mr Yerburgh goes on to explain that the calculated 
 working expense of his scheme — including depreciation 
 and terminable annuities for fifty years issued at 2h 
 per cent. — amounted to less than ;,{;■ 1,000,000 a year, 
 and that it was proposed to find the money by the 
 reimposition of the is. duty on corn, which would, 
 it was estimated, bring in ^2,000,000 per annum,* 
 a sum sufficiently large to cover any unforeseen in- 
 crement of expense. 
 
 There are those again who think that private firms 
 might be subsidised with a view of inducing them to 
 keep a reserve of corn in their stores, which would 
 be officially inspected from time to time, and would 
 be kept up for distribution at moments of great 
 emergency. 
 
 Others hold that farmers might be subsidised in 
 order to enable them to keep their wheat in stacks. 
 F"ormerly, when financial pressure did not compel 
 farmers to thresh to pay the rent, such a course was 
 the custom in the eastern counties of England ; and 
 
 * I'ldc- letter to 7Vw«, 30th January 1902. 
 
OUR FOOD SUPPLY IN TIME OF WAR 199 
 
 it is said that such a method of storing would not 
 in the least cause deterioration, while it would obviate 
 the expense of granaries and the risks of fermenta- 
 tion. A sum of 2s. a quarter has been suggested as 
 a sufficient bonus to compensate growers for the loss 
 of interest they would experience in not converting 
 their corn into money at once. But another 2s. a 
 quarter would also be demanded to make good the 
 depredations of vermin, and something in the way 
 of bounty would have to be arranged for, too. Alto- 
 gether it is calculated that it would cost Government 
 ^1,000,000 a year in order to ensure 4,000,000 quarters 
 of corn being always in this way available. 
 
 A far-reaching scheme by which arrangements would 
 be made, during peace time, to place all the inhabitants 
 of these islands on rations when war broke out, has 
 also been put forward with much ability by Captain 
 Stewart Murray. 
 
 At a time when the army and navy estimates are 
 both far higher than the expenses of the war are 
 alone responsible for, and are very unlikely ever to 
 be reduced to the figures that a few years ago were 
 held by many to be excessive, further additions to 
 taxation not intended to strengthen our armaments 
 but to provide for contingencies should they be found 
 insufficiently powerful, are naturally very jealously 
 scanned and very searchingly examined. Prevention 
 is better than cure. It must appear more logical to 
 render yourself secure against attack than to spend 
 the money which would help to render you so on 
 arrangements to provide for defeat. I shall have more 
 to say on this head presently, but the conditions of 
 life in these islands have become so highly artificial 
 and abnormal that it is a fair answer for those who 
 would legislate at once for our food supply in war to 
 say that the best weapon is useless if the man is 
 
200 OUR FOOD SUPPLY IN TIME OF WAR 
 
 starving, that the most muscular arm will fail when 
 the brain and stomach are insufficiently nourished. 
 
 There is, undoubtedly, a strong case in favour of 
 foresight and precaution ; although, perhaps naturally, 
 the urgency of the situation has been somewhat un- 
 duly accentuated. 
 
 Sir George Clarke has stated that there is always 
 a supply of food equal to a six months' demand in 
 our islands. 
 
 Lord Wolseley does not consider that in war time we 
 need have any cause for fear as to our food supply. 
 
 Mr Mulhall thinks we ourselves raise enough to 
 enable us to tide over five and a half months. 
 
 Captain Stewart Murray's estimate is from four and 
 a half to five months. 
 
 Sir Howard Vincent has placed our powers of 
 endurance, if the supply from abroad were cut off, at 
 sixty days. On the other hand, some experts have 
 placed it as low as a few weeks. Thus authorities 
 differ ; but that it is a most unsatisfactory feature in 
 our prosperity that land should be going out of 
 cultivation in England, and that the agricultural 
 population should be steadily drifting to the towns, 
 almost everybody will agree. Both questions are 
 closely connected with that of our food suppl}-, and 
 are themselves offshoots of a larger one. 
 
 Yet I must confess that it is not possible to welcome 
 with enthusiasm some of the remedies suggested to 
 deal with the particular variant of a big question 
 which we are discussing under the heading of this 
 chapter. 
 
 That one which would introduce a mild measure of 
 protection is not, as I have said, within the sphere of 
 practical politics. Protection may possibly come, but 
 it certainly will not be accepted soon enough to form 
 an immediate remedy for the evils we suffer under. 
 
OUR FOOD SUPPLY IN TIME OF WAR 201 
 
 and independently of, other considerations. It is not 
 therefore worth while for us to discuss it here. 
 
 With regard to another class of remedy : 
 
 Those who oppose the acquisition of stores of grain 
 by Government to prevent a "corner" being created 
 point to the enormous expense involved, the disloca- 
 tion of business that such action would bring in its 
 train, and the uncertainty as to whether the money 
 might not be ultimately wasted ; because those who 
 attempted to make the " corner " would very probably 
 burn their fingers in the attempt, and the "corner" 
 would never be established at all. 
 
 The process of buying stores of corn by the Govern- 
 ment, or of drawing our supplies principally from our 
 own Colonies, would all tend to drive up the price of 
 corn, and would increase the price of bread to our 
 working-classes, and it is contended that while they 
 had to bear this charge in peace time, they would still be 
 called upon to face the increased price of bread in war. 
 
 The arguments that dwell on the risk of our supplies 
 of grain being captured on their way across the ocean 
 have perhaps not sufficiently allowed for the privileges 
 of the neutral flag, under which the grain might be 
 consigned to agents on the Continent, and come to 
 us through them, or reach us direct. Under the 
 Declaration of Paris there seems to be nothing to 
 prevent either. 
 
 It has been also pointed out that the war risks would 
 not probably be so great as is supposed. The rise in 
 the price of the commodity would cover the war 
 premium, and the permanent price would not be so 
 intolerable as to be beyond the powers of our people 
 to bear. There might be a very great and sudden 
 temporary rise, but the big prices would call forth 
 resource and enterprise, so that the demand would be 
 duly answered by a supply. 
 
202 OUR FOOD SUPPLY IN TIME OF WAR 
 
 The effect of the Declaration of Paris might be 
 calculated upon to counterbalance the greater risks 
 our modern conditions of life have brought with them. 
 We are not the only country which relies upon a supply 
 of wheat from abroad, although we are enormously 
 more dependent on such a source of supply than any 
 other nation. Measures by a great corn-growing country 
 in the nature of a prohibition of export of corn would 
 affect the whole corn trade of the world, and the 
 interests of others besides ourselves would suffer. If 
 all neutral nations were made to feel the pinch of 
 war with us, a belligerent would hesitate long ere he 
 adopted tactics which would make his cause a very 
 unpopular one. 
 
 The great extent of our coast-line, somewhere about 
 2000 miles, the numerous indentations and harbours 
 which it possesses, would, moreover, render a blockade 
 of our ports an operation so difficult that in the light 
 of past experiences it may well be termed impossible. 
 High prices would justify the risks involved. Blockade- 
 running would become a trade, and would tempt the 
 most capable and adventurous spirits of the world to 
 a certain and exciting means of making money. That 
 since Mr Marston formulated his scheme the sources 
 of our foreign corn supply have undergone a change 
 is a factor in the question which should akso be men- 
 tioned. In 1896 the United States sent us 10,920,000 
 quarters of wheat and flour. The supply from Russia 
 was the next largest, and amounted to 5,410,000 
 quarters. Argentina came next, sending us 3,843,000. 
 That the possibility of war with one of the above- 
 mentioned Powers supplied a basis for the apprehen- 
 sions of those who then took up the question is 
 manifested throughout all their arguments. But the 
 situation at present is by no means the same as it 
 was even six years ago. 
 
OUR FOOD SUPPLY IN TIME OF WAR 203 
 
 Next to the United States our greatest contributor 
 of wheat and flour is the Argentine Republic. Then 
 comes Canada, while Russia is only fourth in the 
 list. 
 
 Therefore as against one particular Power the situa- 
 tion has improved ; and there are grounds for hope 
 that as time goes on we shall be less at the mercy of 
 foreign nations than we are at present. 
 
 Nine years ago Lord Playfair stated that in twenty 
 years America would need almost all her food supply 
 for her own people. Eleven years hence, therefore, 
 even allowing for a margin of error, the capacity of 
 American supply will be greatly less than it now is, 
 while it is probable that the demands of other countries 
 in Europe also changing their character from agricul- 
 tural to industrial communities will be greater. The 
 output from India, Canada, and Argentina, will most 
 probably have grown considerably, while South Africa 
 may have begun to contribute her share ; so that there 
 is a solid foundation for the argument that natural 
 causes are at work which will, without intervention of 
 Government, operate to place the foreign food supply 
 of the country either in the hands of our own Colonists, 
 or at anyrate with those who are not to be reckoned 
 amongst our potential foes. 
 
 Moreover, if there were stores of corn in the country 
 at the commencement of a war the feeling of un- 
 certainty as to when the Government meant to open 
 them would certainly tend to prevent speculation, and 
 with the di.sappearance of speculation there would be 
 diminution also of enterprise. When \\iG. force majeure 
 of Government intervention was hanging over, and 
 might upset the market, and schemes depending on the 
 state of the market, the active speculator, who, while 
 enriching himself, would benefit us also, would hesitate 
 before he cast his net in the troubled waters. At the 
 
204 OUR FOOD SUPPLY IN TIME OF WAR 
 
 outbreak of war, the very moment when we should 
 most need them, it would be most detrimental to our 
 interests that the imports of corn should he checked 
 in any way. It will be understood, therefore, that with 
 every sense of the gravity of the issues involved, states- 
 men of both parties may well demur to taking any 
 steps in a direction where the effect of action is so 
 difficult to forecast, and where interference may so 
 easily put the nice balance of economic forces out of 
 adjustment. The remedy might prove worse than the 
 disease unless the straightforward course of a measure 
 of protection pure and simple were adopted. And that 
 measure is, as I have said, one which belongs to the 
 highest and most disputed questions of policy, and 
 must be put on one side by a writer who does not 
 deal with a problem so purely political. 
 
 In truth, however, the mention of protection gives a 
 certain balance to our argument, and recalls us from 
 the region of speculation to the chill atmosphere of 
 everyday life. 
 
 We must not forget that this question of food supply, 
 is only one aspect of the disabilities and difficulties 
 which a state of war with a great Power would bring 
 upon us. 
 
 All through the previous chapters the fact that wc 
 belong to an Empire based on commerce has been 
 steadily kept in view. It runs through the web of 
 our whole political system like a golden thread. It is 
 not only the want of food that will kill us if our inter- 
 course with other countries be destroyed, if the channels 
 through which we draw our food are either empty or 
 stopped. Of what good will food be to artisans and 
 factory hands who can no longer get work and who 
 have, in consequence, no money ? Why did people 
 want bread at the period of the French Revolution 
 when a bun might have been bought for a penny ? 
 
OUR FOOD SUPPLY IN TIME OF WAR 205 
 
 Raw material is as vital to the life of the nation 
 as is corn. If it will not be possible to get corn, 
 neither will it be possible to get cotton and other 
 kinds of raw material. The cry would soon be raised, 
 therefore, that we should lay in reserves of raw 
 material as well as food. A huge rise in the price 
 of cotton would, indeed, have a more disastrous and 
 permanent effect on the prosperity of the country than 
 interference with its food supply, for our industries 
 could no longer compete with those of foreigners, 
 already pressing on in close rivalry with us every- 
 where, and when once custom is lost it is not easily 
 regained. Gigantic, therefore, as would be the expense 
 of storing corn, were we to embark in the undertaking, 
 we should be pressed to carry our principles further 
 by those whose interests were at stake and who 
 feared a shortage in raw material almost as much as 
 one in flour. 
 
 Neither could we logically differentiate between corn 
 and meat. Meat, too, is imported in large quantities, 
 and is as necessary to life in England as is bread. 
 The demand for State storage might very likely not 
 stop even with meat or with cotton. Other articles of 
 food and merchandise would no doubt find their 
 advocates and be represented as indispensable. When 
 once interference on the part of the State is let loose, 
 it is difficult or impossible to set a limit to its action. 
 
 If we apply our minds to these various arguments 
 and representations we must see that, on the one 
 hand, it is the sense of patriotism which has prompted 
 many to proclaim to their countrymen the dangers in 
 the present condition of things. We cannot, on the 
 other hand, dismiss as mere official obstruction or 
 party feeling that sense of responsibility in administer- 
 ing the affairs of the country which deters Ministers 
 from accepting the contentions put before them or 
 
2o6 OUR FOOD SUPPLY IN TIME OF WAR 
 
 incites the Opposition to make light of them. The 
 more moderate of those who are anxious as to our 
 food supply in time of war do not place any highly- 
 coloured pictures before us. They do not draw 
 gloomy representations of a defeated navy, a close 
 blockade of our home ports, or a total stoppage of 
 our food supply from over-sea. They simply suggest 
 such a great rise in articles of food as will bring 
 about disastrous results in the closely congested 
 industrial communities of these realms. 
 
 No one will deny that wheat may easily attain a 
 price of lOOs. a quarter, and that would mean a three- 
 fold rise in the price of bread. 
 
 Again, it is said that our poorer working-classes 
 number 7,000,000 souls, and we are asked to consider 
 how long these people are likely to be able to stand 
 such a rise as I have hinted at. Would not their 
 resolution give way before our navy had driven the 
 hostile fleets off the seas, and might they not then, 
 by constitutional means or otherwise, attempt to bring 
 such pressure to bear on the Government as would 
 force it to patch up a disastrous peace? Those who 
 best appreciate the weakness and limitations of party 
 government cannot afford to scoff at such a presenta- 
 tion of the problem, and those who use the argument 
 that a whiff or two of grape-shot will bring everybody 
 to their senses have yet to find the politicians who 
 will give the order to fire. That such a remedy 
 should be brought forward as a practicable one 
 alone justifies the contention that the situation is 
 one full of dangerous elements. 
 
 While endeavouring, however, to do full justice to 
 what are not to be dismissed as hysterical and 
 exaggerated views we must not let ourselves lose 
 sight of the solid grounds on which confidence re- 
 poses. We have faced a European combination 
 
OUR FOOD SUPPLY IN TIME OF WAR 207 
 
 against us in the past when, it must be admitted, 
 our food supply was not dependent on the bounty 
 of foreigners, but when, on the other hand, the 
 forces of disorder and revolution in the country 
 were more formidable than they are to-day ; when 
 the stability of the throne itself was less assured ; 
 when a rebellion and invasion had only just been met 
 and beaten back in Ireland ; when we were removed by 
 less than fifty years from " the '45 " ; and when many 
 were alive who had seen an invading army penetrating 
 into the very heart of England. 
 
 There is solid ground for reassurance when we 
 examine the history of the past. We came out of the 
 great struggle with France reinvigorated rather than 
 enfeebled. Wheat, which on an average of five years 
 prior to 1792 had been sold at 5s. 4d. a bushel, had 
 risen on an average of five years ending with 1802 to 
 los. 8d., and on an average of five years ending with 
 181 3 at 14s. 4d. a bushel. Here we see the price of 
 bread nearly tripled. Prices rose all round in con- 
 sequence, and those who did not live by buying and 
 selling were ultimately reduced to great straits : straits 
 that were lamentable and deplorable, but which did 
 not mean national disaster. 
 
 We cannot here pursue the subject further ; it is only 
 referred to so that we may remember what our fore- 
 fathers endured : what they faced, not for a short time, 
 but for many years, how the Government unflinch- 
 ingly stuck to its purpose, and in the end triumphantly 
 carried it through ; how the country emerged from 
 the tremendous contest stronger, richer, and more 
 determined than before. 
 
 Some, no doubt, went under, but what one man lost 
 another gained. There was a vast redistribution of 
 the wealth of the nation, but the sum of all the wealth 
 was enhanced. The individual may have perished ; 
 
2o8 OUR FOOD SUPPLY IN TIME OF WAR 
 
 but the community survived to flourish in a vigour 
 and luxuriance previously undreamt of. 
 
 After the recent exhibition of the patriotism and 
 self-sacriiice which are still living forces in the country, 
 there seems at least room for doubt as to the want 
 of it amongst even the poorest of our working-classes. 
 During the siege of Ladysmith not only did our men 
 starve without complaining or any thought of giving 
 in, but the women and children who remained in the 
 place suffered the heaviest privations with patience, 
 constancy, and determination. The prolonged struggle 
 of the South against the North during the American 
 War of Secession was carried on by civilians at the 
 expense of personal comfort, health, and of life itself 
 The example of Paris, and, indeed, of the whole of 
 France in 1870, points the same way, and it is not 
 unreasonable to hope that what our people have done 
 before, what, in the Colonies especially, they are doing 
 now, they will be prepared to do again. 
 
 No more than what has been endured in times past 
 would be asked from them in future, for it is not at all 
 likely that our food supply, while we held command 
 of the sea, would be so much interfered with as to 
 bring food to famine prices for more than brief periods. 
 The wealth of the country could, if necessary, be called in 
 to compete with the foreign brokers who were engaged 
 in buying up the corn of the world. Being the richest 
 country, England would certainly prove a formidable 
 competitor, and the prices we should be able to offer 
 would, with magnetic influence, attract what we wanted 
 to our shores. Even the predominant power at sea 
 has not, in the past, always succeeded in establishing 
 a blockade. In 1854-55 Russia, unable to contest the 
 supremacy of the sea with the Allies, yet managed to 
 convey supplies of corn from the rich corn lands of the 
 the Don across the Sea of Azov to the garrison of 
 
OUR FOOD SUPPLY IN TIME OF WAR 209 
 
 Sebastopol. When at length our fleet forced the 
 straits of Kertch and stopped these supplies, it was 
 too late to be of service, for such ample stores had 
 already been collected by means of the waterway left 
 open that its closing did not seriously affect the 
 situation. 
 
 It may be argued that I have quoted an isolated 
 instance, and that what actually did happen should 
 never have been allowed to occur. It may be replied 
 that it is safer to reason from actual facts than from 
 theories. Again, while we were in command of the 
 sea it would be absolutely impossible to stop our food 
 supply. If what occurred in Russia in 1854, and hap- 
 pened in the case of the Southern States of America 
 not ten years later, could be brought about when the 
 mastery of the waters was in undisputed possession of 
 the Allies and of the Federals, it would be a super- 
 human task to blockade all our ports. 
 
 Partial obstruction would not starve us out, and we 
 have nothing more severe than partial obstruction to 
 be afraid of If the command of the sea passes to our 
 enemies, then neither food nor raw material can reach 
 us. Our exports as well as our imports will fail. There 
 will be an end of industry in the country, and there 
 will be an end of us. We shall fall back to the position 
 of a second or third-rate Power, and no efforts on our 
 part will avert that fate. Invasion would be possible ; 
 our Colonies would be swept away ; India could no 
 longer be held ; we should perish, and the loss of food 
 would be of no more moment to us than it would be 
 to a human being who was laid low by two or three 
 diseases, each incurable and each certain to be im- 
 mediately fatal. 
 
 While we have money we shall be supplied with 
 food ; at a high price, no doubt, but not at a ruinous 
 one. There is no way out of that ; but in order that 
 O 
 
2IO OUR FOOD SUPPLY IN TIME OF WAR 
 
 the price may not be prohibitive, money to keep our 
 navy invincible must be spent now. As in every 
 other consideration connected with Imperial defence 
 we, in fact, eventually get back to the naval one, which 
 does, and must, underlie them all. If our people cannot 
 face the prospect of potential hunger and war prices 
 for food, they must spend their money now to render 
 war with us unprofitable to our enemies and of little 
 more than some inconvenience to ourselves. War on 
 such terms will not be levied on us ; and if it were we 
 should win it by our staying power. The artificial 
 raising of prices may, and possibly will be tried by 
 our foes, but they will be no more triumphant in war 
 time, provided we can keep our superiority at sea 
 and our communications abroad open, than they are 
 likely to be successful in times of peace. As long as 
 supplies exist, can be brought to our shores, and can 
 be paid for, they will be forthcoming. The evidence 
 of experience points to the impossibility of impound- 
 ing a supply involving such huge figures as it does 
 in our case. 
 
 The provision of an open road across the seas is a 
 matter for our admirals. Until they are confident that 
 our naval strength is such that we can feel sure as to 
 the road being open, it must be better to spend money 
 on securing this primary condition of our existence 
 as an Empire than on remedies for the consequences 
 of our neglect. 
 
 When we have done all that we can in that direc- 
 tion we may begin to consider how high prices for food 
 in war time can best be combated by legislation. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE 
 
 In venturing to discuss such a subject as the protection 
 of our commerce an officer not belonging to the navy 
 would be bold indeed to suggest any scheme of action 
 either strategical or tactical, and I shall certainly not 
 make any such attempt. Nevertheless, even the 
 humblest effort to elucidate the study of Imperial 
 defence cannot afford to omit all reference to this 
 portion of the subject. To do so would be to leave 
 one of our main difficulties untouched. I will, accord- 
 ingly, endeavour to put some of the broader features 
 of the problem before my readers, speaking always with 
 the diffidence which one not an expert in the matter 
 must feel. 
 
 There are two aspects from which the question can 
 be regarded. In the view of many, an opponent might 
 confine his efforts to destroying and capturing our 
 merchant vessels, and while he avoided decisive 
 engagements with our fleets and squadrons might 
 seek to wear out the patience and determination of 
 our people by cutting off the supplies of raw material 
 which give them work and wages. Without, or even 
 with but slightly reduced wages, it would become 
 difficult for many a workman's family to exist. Con- 
 tinued destitution induces ill-health, and sickness will 
 weaken the stoutest heart. The prices of the neces- 
 saries of life must rise enormously during war with a 
 great Power, and the gloomiest prospect is opened 
 
212 THE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE 
 
 when greater expenses and reduced earnings for our 
 struggling poor are in contemplation. A Fabian policy 
 which never allowed our sea-power to plant a heavy 
 blow, nor gave a target to our battleships, would, in 
 the opinion of many, be difficult to meet, and might 
 bring so much ruin in its train that peace might be 
 accepted by us. It is certain that the lessons of 
 history do not give foundation to such views, and 
 another and sounder opinion is held by the highest 
 authorities on the subject. An attempt to destroy us 
 through our commerce will not succeed unless and 
 until we can no longer command the highways of the 
 ocean. The guet-re de course will never prove a sub- 
 stitute for naval victories any more than guerilla 
 warfare can decide the fate of nations on the shore. 
 That it will bring privation and poverty is true ; that 
 the hardships and barbarities of war can be prolonged 
 by it we know ; that there is good reason, too, why 
 we of all others should especially fear such a visitation, 
 and take precautions to deal decisively with it, will 
 be presently shown. But .something smaller than a 
 menace of annihilation demands preparation, and due 
 foresight is never out of place whether panic be in the 
 air or not. 
 
 What our trade means to us has been insisted on 
 over and over again throughout these pages. Reduced 
 to figures the situation is actually this, that whereas 
 the gross annual value of property and profits assessed 
 to the Income- Tax in the year ended 5th April 1900 
 in the United Kingdom was, according to the States- 
 man's Year-Book for 1902, ^788,023,603, the value of 
 our imports and exports of merchandise alone amounted 
 to ^870,584,718. 
 
 In the face of such figures anxiety is not unnatural, 
 and the demand for increased protection for our 
 commerce cannot be described as unreasonable in 
 
THE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE 213 
 
 view of certain other factors in the problem that we 
 shall now proceed to discuss. 
 
 Extracts from Lloyd's "Register of British and 
 Foreign Shipping" show that the total tonnage of 
 the steamers and sailing-vessels of the United Kingdom 
 in the year 1901-02, omitting those under a hundred 
 tons, amounted to 13,656,161 tons, while that of our 
 Colonies was ,1052,245 tons. The combined total, there- 
 fore, amounts to 14,708,206 tons. The tonnage of the 
 merchant-shipping of all the remainder of the world 
 combined together, including that on the great lakes 
 of North America, amounted to 15,892,304 tons; so 
 that we may be said to own almost half the merchant- 
 shipping of the world. 
 
 If, however, only ocean-going steamships are con- 
 sidered the proportion is considerably greater. But 
 even taking the proportion of the first figures, the task 
 which falls on our navy when called upon to protect 
 the vast bulk is greater than that which a state of war 
 would exact from any other country. Our navy would, 
 in fact, be called upon to safeguard about the same 
 amount of tonnage as would fall to all the other navies 
 of the world combined together. There can be no 
 manner of doubt that, relatively to other Powers, the 
 strength of our navy has diminished, and that, as there 
 has been no corresponding decline in the responsi- 
 bilities which our warships have to undertake, the task 
 set them now is more difficult than it was when last 
 we were engaged in a war that threatened our com- 
 merce. Countries which were of little or no importance 
 as naval Powers at the commencement of the last century 
 have now become of the first class. It is unnecessary 
 to specify names or make a careful analysis of strength : 
 the fact is one which is patent to all and is not open to 
 contention. We have done a great deal of late, and it 
 is not likely that in the future our navy will be neglected 
 
214 THE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE 
 
 as it has been more than once in our history ; but we 
 shall not in times of peace again stand so pre-eminently 
 first as we stood at the beginning of the last century. 
 It is probable, too, that we have suffered in relative 
 quality as well as quantity. A hundred years ago 
 the navy of France was still reeling under the blow 
 the Revolution had dealt her. The senior officers had 
 been proscribed as aristocrats and had disappeared at 
 a moment when there was no one to take their place. 
 Masts and sails called for manual dexterity and an 
 acquired activity from sailors. To be an efficient 
 seaman personal agility, readiness, and even physical 
 strength of a high order were required. The instincts, 
 sympathies, and education of a large seafaring popula- 
 tion gave England an advantage here, which all the 
 artificial encouragement and drastic measures of 
 Napoleon could not make up for. Captains trans- 
 ferred from the merchant-service could not vie with 
 such bands of brothers as a Nelson was able to attract 
 — men, from boyhood upwards leaders by birth and 
 hereditary instinct, trained to the trade of war, their 
 military virtues stimulated by the example of senior, 
 and the emulation of junior officers. 
 
 On the other hand the figures are not so alarming 
 as they may seem. The proportion of war to merchant- 
 ships is undoubtedly very much higher in other 
 countries than it is in our own. A calculation * 
 made a few years ago showed that the two sea-powers 
 ne.xt in importance to ourselves posses.sed about 38.} 
 per cent, of their floating ves.sels of all descriptions in 
 the form of vessels of war for the protection of the 
 remaining 6ii per cent, while we had about 12 per 
 cent, of our vessels in the shape of warships. But 
 the British navy is still predominant, and the pro- 
 portion it bears to the merchant-shipping is small 
 
 * "Journal of United Service Institution," Vol. xlii. p. 515. 
 
THE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE 215 
 
 only because of the enormous bulk to which the 
 former has attained ; because, in other words, we 
 have achieved the position of monopolising the carry- 
 ing trade of the world. We have never deliberately 
 organised a navy either to develop or protect our 
 commerce. Of late years in certain countries quite 
 a different policy has been set on foot. The strong 
 navies are being built up to protect the commerce, not 
 only that is, but that is to be; or there may be ulterior 
 motives beyond the mere protection of commerce. 
 But into this part of the subject we need not pene- 
 trate. Both in training and in quality of ships we 
 have still an advantage ; nor have the figures any 
 real bearing on the question of naval strength. We 
 have an immense advantage, too, in the possession 
 of more naval bases and coaling-stations and more 
 defended harbours than other Powers. But it will 
 appear, as this chapter develops, that the true form 
 of commerce protection lies in the mastery of the 
 routes which commerce traverses. The right of the 
 road falls to the strongest — that one who is militarily 
 the strongest and can bring the greatest force to bear 
 at decisive points. It is, in other words, the sum of 
 the fighting forces of a country, not their proportion 
 to its wealth or extent or population, that decides 
 campaigns. And victory draws with her in the folds 
 of her robe many minor gifts besides the trophies 
 which she triumphantly holds aloft. 
 
 While, however, there may be no solid ground for 
 alarm because our responsibilities are great as long 
 as our fighting force is still pre-eminent, the figures 
 which show the enormous proportion which our mer- 
 cantile-marine bears to that of the rest of the world 
 have a very important bearing on the methods that 
 we must resort to in preparing to defend our commerce. 
 In the first place, it appears that the old system of 
 
2i6 THE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE 
 
 convoys is not likely to be undertaken by our navy 
 any longer. With so vast a mercantile-marine to be 
 protected cruisers would be required by the hundred ; 
 more, probably, than w^e could man in war time, and 
 more than the country could be prevailed upon to 
 pay for in time of peace. The cost would, in fact, 
 be prohibitive, and the drain on the navy so great 
 that her more pressing duties would be greatly inter- 
 fered with. 
 
 The navy may be able and willing to do again what 
 it has done before. As a tactical problem it very pos- 
 sibly is easier to protect convoys now than it was before 
 the days of steam. But financial and strategical objec- 
 tions are not the only difficulties in the way. In 
 business matters time is money, and the collection of 
 the ships to be safeguarded, and the arrangements for 
 their protection, would all take a long time. So great 
 a delay and dislocation of business would supervene 
 that our mercantile interests in every part of the world 
 must suffer to an extent only less than that which the 
 actual capture or destruction of cargoes would entail. 
 All who could secure their services would inevitably 
 avail themselves as much as possible of neutral vessels, 
 and we should see a large proportion of our carrying 
 trade passing away from us. 
 
 The tactical aspect of the question calls on us to 
 consider whether the invention of steam has, or has 
 not, facilitated the guarding of a great flotilla of ships ; 
 whether such great assemblages of vessels do not 
 lie perilously open to the long-range fire of modern 
 artillery ; whether they would not offer tempting 
 chances to the enterprise of torpedo boats. Such 
 points as these all have additional bearing on the 
 subject, but the)- are technical matters for na\al 
 men to decide upon, and with them we need not 
 here concern ourselves. 
 
THE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE 217 
 
 It is, at any rate, manifest that, apart from purely 
 tactical considerations there are grave difficulties and 
 disadvantages in any system of protecting commerce 
 that pins its faith on convoys. 
 
 The form of action that will most probably commend 
 itself to those who have to face the responsibility will 
 be the more drastic method of seeking out, bringing 
 to action, and overcoming the main fighting strength 
 of the enemy. If they will not face the risk of 
 destruction or capture of their ships in the open, 
 but fly for shelter to their ports, they will be there 
 blockaded or masked as has been already explained, 
 and we shall always have to keep up such a superiority 
 in battleships as will enable us to carry out such 
 operations in front of all the principal strongholds of 
 our foes. 
 
 But some time must often elapse before even the 
 most powerful navy has completely asserted its 
 superiority, and the process of blockading is not 
 likely to be one that can ever be carried to the limits 
 of perfection. In the one case lapse of time, which 
 in mercantile affairs means loss of money, and in 
 the other the chances of evasion and the escape of 
 hostile cruisers, may tempt owners to seek their profit 
 by consigning their cargoes to a neutral flag, and thus 
 endeavour to escape from the straits in which war 
 has placed them. 
 
 But if the very volume of our merchandise militates 
 against its preservation by means of convoys, the 
 difficulties it imposes on any general adoption of the 
 neutral flag system are quite insurmountable. Un- 
 doubtedly we should lose some of our commerce in 
 this way, and the loss of even a small fraction of 
 the huge total would amount to a sum that we should 
 very distinctly feel ; but we could never lose anything 
 like all, because half the commerce of the world — which 
 
2i8 THE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE 
 
 is about what we now convey — would demand more 
 transport than the rest of the world can supply. If 
 the trading vessels of neutral Powers could not carry 
 all that fell from us in addition to what they now can 
 ship, either the whole commerce of the world would 
 collapse, as well as our own suffer, or our ships would 
 have to follow their cargoes. The wholesale transfer 
 of our merchant - shipping is not the matter of a 
 moment, and there are many and serious difficulties 
 in the way of the operation. Moreover, it might not 
 be effectual, because it might not be respected. 
 
 To build foreign ships to replace such of ours as 
 were thrown out of use would be a gigantic task, and 
 again could not be accomplished in time to make 
 the new vessels useful substitutes. It is probably 
 not unreasonable, therefore, to assume that both the 
 expedients of protecting our commerce by means of 
 forming and safeguarding convoys, or by its consign- 
 ment to a neutral flag, are not to be entertained as a 
 means of securing it. 
 
 And this brings us to consider how the Declaration 
 of Paris has affected us. By that Declaration, as has 
 been indicated, a belligerent may carry on his ordinary 
 trade unmolested by an enemy by transferring it to 
 the protection of a neutral flag. Unless neutral ships 
 are therefore found to have overstepped in some way 
 the privileges of their neutrality the goods of our foes 
 would be secure from us. But as the volume of our 
 commerce is so great that it could not, even if we 
 wished it, be transferred away from us, the advantages 
 accruing to belligerents under the Declaration would 
 be withheld from us. It is further contended by 
 many who speak with authority on the subject that 
 we shall now lose one of the weapons which we 
 wielded most effectively to subdue our enemies in 
 former times. For the effect of our great naval 
 
THE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE 219 
 
 victories was not only tlie capture and destruction of 
 the opposing ships of war, but also to drive hostile 
 commerce off the seas. The property of those who 
 fought us was never secure from depredation after it 
 had left the shelter of their ports. 
 
 Hostile ships carrying neutral cargo and neutral ships 
 carrying hostile cargo were alike open to our ravages. 
 We inflicted a more lasting and permanent injury on 
 our antagonists by blockading their harbours and hunt- 
 ing down their merchantmen on the seas than by sink- 
 ing or towing into port their battleships and frigates. 
 
 Since the Declaration of Paris, however, a vigorous 
 attack on the commerce of an enemy would drive it 
 into the hands of a neutral, and we should be unable 
 to exert our strength in what would often be its most 
 telling direction. On the other hand, it may be argued 
 that in any war in which we were neutral we should, 
 as the greatest carrying Power in the world, feel the 
 benefit of the provisions which so greatly favour 
 neutrals : anything that benefits them must in an 
 especial degree benefit us. But again this is denied, 
 and it is contended that the cargoes of belligerents 
 would be consigned anywhere rather than to a flag 
 which has provoked so much jealousy abroad. 
 
 To pursue such questions as are here briefly in- 
 dicated would lead us far and in a direction, more- 
 over, in which we do not desire to proceed. Political, 
 administrative, and other questions such as are not 
 strictly germane to our inquiry are involved. It may, 
 however, be pointed out that the loss sustained by 
 our opponents, owing to their trade being transferred 
 to neutral hands, would not in itself be inconsiderable ; 
 because it is probable that some of it would remain 
 alienated after the war was over, and the neutral 
 who intervened would derive more than temporary 
 benefit from his undertaking. 
 
220 THE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE 
 
 In any case, we have set out on this inquiry in 
 the spirit of accepting things as we find them, and 
 the Declaration of Paris is a great fact, which, what- 
 ever we may think of it, we must be prepared to face. 
 Moreover, even if the most gloomy view be taken of 
 that Declaration, the main argument which entrusts 
 the safety of our commerce to the supremacy of our 
 navy remains unaffected. If we cannot shelter our- 
 selves or derive benefit from any of its clauses, the 
 more need to trust to our strength. 
 
 That those dependent on our commerce must appre- 
 ciably suffer from a state of war, cannot, however, be 
 denied, nor could it ever be otherwise. It is, in the 
 fir.st place, very probable that our sailing-ships would 
 disappear from the seas entirely, and that in itself 
 would represent a serious loss.* 
 
 It is certain too, that, however close our blockade, 
 swift cruisers would somehow manage to evade it, and 
 be at large to become a terror to our merchantmen. 
 The Northern blockade may have been extended over 
 a long coast-line during the American war of secession, 
 but, on the other hand, the whole energies of their navy 
 could be turned to the task of sealing the Southern 
 ports. Yet the Sumter escaped from the Mississippi 
 in 1 86 1, and the Nashville ran out of Charleston. Fast 
 modern ships are more difficult to pen than were these, 
 and experiment at our naval manoeuvres has proved 
 what they can do. Vice-Admiral Baird blockaded 
 Bantry Bay in 1888, and was especially on his guard 
 to prevent the egress of his opponents. In spite, how- 
 ever of search-lights, in spite of most careful arrange- 
 ments, and without the intervention of fog or rain, 
 three ships got free, and that too, without being sighted 
 
 * In 1901-1902 the number of our sailing-ships of lootonsand upwards, 
 was 1773, ^nd their tonnage 1,602,767 tons, while our Colonies owned 989 
 ships of 366,259. 
 
THE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE C2I 
 
 or, recognised. The evaders were unpursued, and, 
 having effected a junction with some of their friends 
 from Lough Swilly, disappeared for a time from the 
 ken of their opponents. What their subsequent opera- 
 tions were, we need not here discuss, the point we 
 wish to make being simply the practicability of evading 
 a blockade. 
 
 What effect a few steamers of a speed of twenty- 
 three knots might at the present day exert, not only in 
 destroying our commerce, but in watching and dogging 
 the steps of our fleets, may be left to the imagination. 
 It would depend greatly on what fuel and supplies 
 they could obtain, but, if successful in obtaining them, 
 it would be a matter of the greatest difficulty to catch 
 them or to shake them off, and the destruction they 
 might do may be conjectured. 
 
 This danger from escaped cruisers or swift, armed 
 merchant-vessels constitutes one of the two principal 
 menaces which, if ever we are engaged in war with a 
 great naval Power, our navy will have to be prepared 
 to meet. It would lie within the power of such vessels 
 to continue their depredations for weeks or even 
 months, for they would probably possess the highest 
 speed, and would be enabled to carry a very large 
 supply of coal. As fighting would be, where possible, 
 avoided, the armament carried would probably be 
 light. A few comparatively feeble guns would make 
 a vessel formidable to merchant-shipping, and the 
 fewer shells carried, the more room there would be 
 for coal. Raiding and evasion would be the tactics of 
 these vessels, and their chief efficiency would lie in 
 their speed. What precise policy our sailors would 
 adopt to deal with them, it is not necessary for us to 
 inquire. Presumably, we should patrol and watch the 
 routes followed by our trading vessels with cruisers 
 sufficiently strong to cope with any single ships or 
 
222 THE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE 
 
 small squadrons which they might encounter, and as 
 nearly equal to the enemy as regards speed and sea- 
 worthiness and coal capacity as they could be made 
 to be. But for such a policy to be effective, since 
 the pace of a squadron is only that of the slowest 
 ship, all our cruisers would have to be equal both 
 in speed and power to the swiftest and strongest one 
 of the enemy. It is evident that, if we are to act as 
 is suggested, an enormous addition to our cruisers will 
 be necessitated. Moreover, our cruisers would be so 
 scattered over the globe that they could not be easily 
 concentrated for any other purpose. According to 
 the view of Captain Ballard, R.N., some 300 first-class 
 cruisers would have to devote themselves to the 
 gigantic task. 
 
 A method more in accordance with the precepts of 
 strategy would be to seek out the main forces of the 
 enemy where we suspect they are, and render them 
 impotent for mischief either by bringing them to battle 
 or by compelling them to take shelter and avoid it. 
 Touch once established, every effort to retain it should 
 be made. Even single ships should be accounted 
 for and shadowed. Such a s)'stem of dealing with 
 commerce-destroying brings us back to blockade, a 
 measure that we have already discussed. It is no 
 doubt the best means of meeting the difficulty, but, 
 as has been shown, we cannot expect it to be perfect. 
 
 How far towards perfection it could be brought would 
 vary according to the ports or seas to be blockaded 
 and to the enemy against which it was directed. A 
 methodical study of the ships to be encountered in 
 every imaginable contingency could be prepared, and 
 the relative strength and qualifications of the opposing 
 forces weighed. The actual scheme would depend on 
 these, and would vary with them. 
 
 But there remains, and probably always will remain. 
 
THE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE 223 
 
 a danger which a blockade could not be expected to 
 provide against. 
 
 In the Channel and narrow seas, where our trade 
 routes run close to the coasts or strongholds of 
 potential enemies, hostile torpedo boats and small 
 craft might dash out from such shelter on the flanks 
 of the courses of our ships, and such raiders might 
 in a few hours accomplish a great deal of mischief, 
 and return again to port. If it is as possible as it is 
 believed for a comparatively large vessel to emerge 
 undetected from a closely-watched harbour, the task 
 of getting out and going in again at night should not 
 be beyond the powers of so small and fast a craft 
 as a torpedo boat. But to attempt the feat in daylight 
 would probably offer so small a chance of success that 
 it would not even be attempted. If the period of 
 danger for merchant-shipping were limited to the 
 hours of darkness, a vast impediment would be put 
 in the way of their destruction. Because extinction 
 and not capture would, of course, be the only object 
 of the enemy. To discharge a torpedo would give 
 little clue as to the boat's whereabouts, and would be 
 a decisive means of destruction. If our mercantile 
 ships did not attempt to pass certain dangerous 
 stretches of coast-line by night risk of destruction 
 would be reduced to a small minimum, while the 
 delay in some secure anchorage till the following dawn 
 would often not amount to more than the waste of 
 some hours. In other localities a detour in the course 
 usually followed would supply equal security, for the 
 small craft could not venture far from their harbours 
 lest daylight should overtake them before they could 
 return. 
 
 In commercial transactions, however, time is an 
 important factor, and our shipowners might in some 
 cases feel the pressure of the delay incidental to the 
 
224 'T^HE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE 
 
 policy just described so severely, that an endeavour 
 to secure their passage through the most dangerous 
 waters, even at night, would have to be made. A 
 system of patrolling the threatened routes in addition 
 to the blockading of the hostile ports would have to 
 be undertaken, so that, no matter what policy we 
 adopted, the demands on the services of cruisers would 
 be very high. 
 
 On the other hand, we must not forget that night 
 operations would be attended with great difficulty for 
 the enemy, and that even when he had succeeded in 
 securing his own safety, he would by no means have 
 overcome all the obstacles in his way. " It would not 
 be easy to distinguish between the ships of belligerents 
 and neutrals in the dark, and any mistake where such 
 drastic methods of injuring commerce as torpedoing 
 and sending to the bottom merchant-vessels and 
 civilian crews were adopted might provoke something 
 more than mere remonstrance from any but very 
 weak neutral powers. While it was only our ships 
 and people that were thus ruthlessly sunk, the voice 
 of humanity might possibly be stifled by gratified 
 spite or self-interest, but a neutral would not long 
 tolerate a system of tactics which every now and then 
 involved a ship or two of his in the barbarous havoc. 
 Neutral goods on board a vessel captured and towed 
 into port may be respected when the division of the 
 spoils takes place, and neutrals will look complacently 
 on while the commerce of a rival is destroyed. But 
 torpedo boats could not seize and carry off vessels 
 under the conditions we are considering, and the risk 
 of immolating friend and foe in the general ruin would 
 be considerable. The reckless and ruthless adventurer 
 might do immense injury to our trade, skill and 
 courage might carry him on for long, but it is not 
 unlikely that while he escaped our cruisers, he might 
 
THE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE 225 
 
 involve those he served in international compHcations 
 sufficiently serious to effectually curb his indiscriminat- 
 ing zeal. It is even possible that so much friction with 
 neutrals might be developed by such a system of 
 nightly raiding that it would have to be abandoned 
 altogether in many regions. Thus the quarrelling of 
 our neighbours might temper the wind to the lamb 
 before ever it was shorn. 
 
 Those who point to the effect on our commerce of 
 the great war with France at the beginning of the last 
 century, and to the lessons of the past, are certainly 
 justified in their attitude of hope. It was the commerce 
 of our enemies, not that of our own people, that was 
 destroyed. We lost some 11,000 merchantmen, but at 
 the end of the struggle not only was our military navy 
 supreme but we had gained what was practically the 
 carrying trade of the whole world. If we lost a tonnage 
 of 1,375,000 in those twenty-one years it was only a 
 loss of about 2j per cent.* While the continental 
 system almost ruined us, it was the engine that brought 
 about the complete downfall of its inventor. 
 
 Yet must we note that the conditions under which 
 warfare was carried on by us a hundred years ago 
 were very different from those which now obtain. 
 We were still able to produce almost all the food our 
 people required ; we did not import foreign meat at 
 all ; and although the importation of foreign wheat 
 had begun it had as yet only attained small dimensions. 
 At that period the Royal Navy of Great Britain was 
 more than equal to the accumulated warships of the 
 whole remainder of the world. In those days the 
 Reform Bill had not been passed, and political power 
 was in the hands of an aristocracy, never wanting in 
 patriotism, and more likely to be unaffected by sudden 
 
 * Captain Mahan's ' ' Influence of Sea-power on the French Revolution 
 and on History," \'ol. ii. pp. 225, 226. 
 P 
 
2 26 THE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE 
 
 reverses of fortune than an assembly depending on the 
 votes and reflecting the weakness and instability of 
 those who largely live from hand to mouth. However 
 false politically the situation may have been, the fact 
 that the governing class was the one least affected by 
 the hardships and pressure of war was a safeguard 
 against panic and an assurance of a steadfast prosecu- 
 tion of our purpose. 
 
 There was also this further difference in the situation, 
 that whereas the remainder of the nations had no 
 shipping capable of assuming the functions of our 
 carrying trade, and it could not therefore be alienated 
 from us, merchant -shipping has sprung up since in 
 every direction, and in many a dockyard out of England 
 a first-class liner can be built. 
 
 We have now to compete with others in every 
 market and in the production of every commodity. 
 We have no longer a monopoly of excellence, no 
 longer do we command markets or control rates. 
 Amidst the struggle for existence profits dwindle. 
 There is a smaller margin to go upon ; it takes less 
 to upset the equilibrium. 
 
 When the margin of profit is so small, would not the 
 heavy rates of insurance that war must bring eat up 
 the scanty remnant, and leave nothing on which trade 
 can live? We know that the Government of this 
 country is never likely to undertake State contribution 
 to the cost of insurance of vessels in time of war. Yet 
 the rates we may expect to see will be almost prohibi- 
 tive, especially at first. We cannot obtain complete 
 command of the sea all in a moment ; there must 
 be a period of suspense ; some minor disasters are 
 probably inevitable ; the capture of a great liner would 
 resound throughout our harbours, premiums might, some 
 say almost certainly would, rise as high as lo per cent. 
 It has been the custom in many quarters to draw 
 
THE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE 227 
 
 the most gloomy inferences from the results of the 
 depredations of the Alabama, Sumter, and other vessels 
 that forty years ago preyed upon the commerce of 
 the Federals in their great struggle with the South- 
 ern States. Although the Northerners enjoyed an 
 undoubted supremacy at sea their commerce was 
 obliged to seek the shelter of our flag, and became 
 permanently absorbed in the great volume which we 
 already possessed. It has been shown, however, that 
 other causes besides the fear of hostile cruisers were 
 at work. Twelve years ago, in the United Service 
 Magazine, Sir George Clarke pointed out the fallacy 
 that underlay the arguments of those who looked 
 rather to effects than to causes, and last summer a 
 correspondent of the Shipping Gazette * supplied some 
 very valuable information on the point. 
 
 According to his view, the United States shipping was 
 declining before the war began, and the depredations 
 of the Alabama and her consorts only gave the coup 
 de grace to a structure which was already tottering. 
 The defection of the coast states in the Southern 
 Confederacy likewise caused a diminution which has 
 not always been accounted for. The number and 
 tonnage of the United States mercantile-marine as it 
 existed before the war was very considerably reduced 
 by this cause alone. But economic causes were at 
 work also. The "west" was still undeveloped, and 
 offered a better investment for money than did shipping. 
 America was using her accumulated capital in improving 
 and fostering the enormous resources of her territory. 
 The work of transporting by sea the produce obtained, 
 and the process by which commodities were brought 
 from other countries in exchange were left to Great 
 Britain, because it paid to let them go. The transaction 
 was, in fact, a commercial one, conducted on business 
 
 * Shipping Gazette and Lloyifs List, 19th August 1902. 
 
2 28 THE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE 
 
 principles, and aiming at financial advantage. And by 
 a fortuitous combination of circumstances it happened 
 that British shipowners were at the moment able to 
 absorb without inconvenience what fell away from the 
 United States. 
 
 The amount that America lost during the war was 
 1,229,035 tons, of which a very large proportion went 
 to us. But the point for us to bear in mind is that 
 the transfer was not primarily due to the devastation 
 caused by the Confederate cruisers. Neither even had it 
 been so, should any argument as to what would occur 
 to us, were we at war with an inferior sea -power, be 
 built upon it. The disposal of our carrying trade 
 would be a widely different thing to what it was in 
 the other case, because there would be no Power able 
 to take it up as we were able to do when the far 
 smaller volume of the United States tonnage was 
 ready for absorption. 
 
 But since the great French war, and even since the 
 American struggle of forty years ago, two great changes 
 have made their influence felt, and new factors not 
 involved in the problem of a hundred years ago at 
 all, and only partially in that of the early sixties, are 
 introduced into the question. The invention of steam- 
 ships has certainly favoured the protection of commerce, 
 and the improvement in telegraphic communications 
 has facilitated the shadowing of hostile cruisers. The 
 depredations of the Alabama and her class were com- 
 mitted amongst sailing-vessels, and at the earlier period 
 the difficulty of protecting ships even when near at 
 hand was very great, because the protecting cruisers 
 were dependent on wind and sails alone. 
 
 But the introduction of steam navigation has had 
 effects far beyond the mere tactical advantages to be 
 derived from it. Coal supplj- is complementary to 
 the efficiency of the most modern cruiser, — as essential 
 
THE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE 229 
 
 as is food and forage to an armed force on shore, and 
 as surely does it influence mobility. Foreign Powers 
 are restricted in their activity by the inexorable demands 
 of fuel. They have few coaling-stations in the seas 
 distant from Europe, and some that they have are not 
 by any means well secured. The raiding cruisers would 
 be driven to other expedients and to other sources of 
 supply than those our vessels could utilise. Coal-ships 
 would have to keep in touch with them, or they would 
 be compelled to raid neutral ports, or live on what they 
 could take from the bunkers of their prizes. Neutral 
 steamers might perhaps be chartered to meet them at 
 prearranged ports, or at sea. Such arrangements would, 
 however, have to be made in secrecy to prevent our 
 discovering what was intended, and would not very 
 easily be carried through during a time of war. Coaling 
 at sea is not always an easy task, and the risk of the 
 operation being disturbed would be considerable. The 
 cruisers that were compelled to fall back on such 
 measures would have to seek remote and lonely seas 
 such as are only to be found away from the trade routes, 
 where their spheres of activity would lie. They would 
 have to leave the very places where it was most 
 necessary for them to be, and that, too, often at a 
 critical moment ; so that the possession of our numerous 
 coaling-stations is an immense aid to any of our war- 
 ships that undertake the protection of our mercantile- 
 marine. Coal is a factor in the problem of the first 
 importance, and it is one which undoubtedly is very 
 much in our favour. 
 
 The preservation of our lines of communication from 
 home to our various bases, and their connection with 
 one another, forms, then, the primary effort of a supreme 
 navy, and, as I have in another chapter shown, the 
 keeping the great waterways open to our ships its 
 first care. The ultimate fate of our mercantile-marine 
 
2^0 THE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE 
 
 while our navy is strong enough to carry out this duty 
 is secure. But the power to perform this task is not 
 to be attained by anything short of supremacy at sea. 
 The nation that can hold the seas against its opponents 
 will survive the loss of a proportion of its merchantmen, 
 and will injure the commerce of its opponents more 
 than it suffers itself If it were a great commercial 
 nation before the war, a triumphant issue to the war 
 is not likely to make it less prosperous. 
 
 That there will be sacrifices to be faced is certain, 
 for the most invincible sea- power cannot secure 
 absolute immunity from loss. Unfortunately, too, we 
 must expect that in our highly artificial society losses 
 will press most heavily on our poor, and cause distress 
 from which it is the duty of every Government as far as 
 possible to shield its people. It is for this reason that 
 we must look beyond the possession of a predominant 
 navy or one that is manifestly so strong as to deserve 
 that title. And, moreover, we must so economise our 
 strength that as much of it as possible may be available 
 for the great actions that we trust will quickly win 
 the war for us. That we must not only win but win 
 quickly and decisively has been already explained, and 
 therefore we must take away as few ships as possible 
 from the concentrated flieets. 
 
 It is not only a question of initial expense. The 
 addition of a very large number of cruisers would raise 
 difficulties as to crews also, and their annual upkeep 
 would weigh heavily too upon our naval estimates. 
 Moreover, the armaments of foreign Governments have 
 to be kept pace with. 
 
 It is evident that although the Declaration of 
 Paris may assert that " privateering is, and remains 
 abolished," it will again some day appear under another 
 name. A stroke of the pen can convert a merchant- 
 vessel into a Government one, and she may prey on 
 
THE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE 231 
 
 commerce again, only with the difference that she 
 will have to hand over to her Government what she 
 captures. The cormorant does the same amount of 
 damage to a fishery whether he is allowed to swallow 
 or is made to disgorge the fish. 
 
 A demand that certain of our merchant - ships 
 should be subsidised in peace time by Government 
 has accordingly been raised amongst those interested 
 in our commerce. And the demand has for some time 
 been recognised as a just one by our Admiralty, which 
 does pay subsidies to certain owners, in order that it 
 may have the right to take up some of their ships at 
 a moment's notice. The conditions stipulate that the 
 ships are to be so built that they may be able to carry 
 the armament that is allotted to them, but kept in 
 store till needed. The arrangement of their bunkers 
 is also to be such that some protection may be afforded 
 to their vital parts. Lists of vessels which fulfil certain 
 conditions as to speed and internal arrangements such 
 as would make them valuable for national use in war 
 are kept. But it is represented that these subventions 
 have not gone far enough, and have not been sufficient 
 to induce owners to do all that is necessary. They 
 were not sufficient, for example, to induce owners to 
 build vessels of exceptional speed or of a quality that 
 would make them fit to carry armament. 
 
 It will probably not be contested that the English 
 mercantile-marine not many years ago enjoyed a pre- 
 eminence and prestige beyond what mere numbers 
 bestow. We not only had the fastest ships in the 
 world, but almost all the great ocean-going vessels 
 of really considerable speed belonged to us. To- 
 day it is thus. Messrs Harland & Wolff some two 
 years ago launched the Celtic, and last August added 
 the Cedric, her somewhat larger successor, and the 
 biggest ocean liner in the world, to our mercantile 
 
232 THE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE 
 
 fleets. Almost simultaneously, however, the Kaiser 
 Wilhelm II. was floated out to damp our exultation, 
 and, although 1000 tons smaller, is still the fastest 
 boat. In truth, we cannot to-day boast of the fastest 
 ship in the world, or of the second fastest, or even of 
 the third fastest. Indeed, of twenty-two ocean steamers 
 capable of doing 20 knots or upwards, only nine fly 
 the British flag. 
 
 What speed may mean in commerce-protection we 
 have seen, and the loss of our supremacy in respect 
 of it is not only a matter for regret on sentimental, 
 but furnishes ground for apprehension on commercial, 
 grounds. The advantage which the foreigner has 
 gained upon us is not due to his superior skill and 
 industry but to the encouragement in the way of sub- 
 sidies he has received from Governments which have 
 been studying the question from the military standpoint, 
 and have prepared in peace for the possibilities of war. 
 As I have shown, to encourage or mould private enter- 
 prise to the purpose of the State has never been 
 a feature of our policy. Our most cherished ideas 
 of political economy have been bitterly opposed to 
 any system of bounties or artificial forcing of trade 
 developments. And thus it has come about that, 
 although Sir Nathaniel Barnaby, Admiral Sir Frederick 
 Gray, and Sir Spencer Robinson, then Controller of 
 the Navy, all gave their support to the movement in 
 favour of establishing a system of auxiliary cruisers 
 to aid in the protection of our commerce, the essential 
 qualifications of speed were overlooked. Our naval 
 authorities recognised that there were British vessels 
 which could easily be converted into cruisers, but 
 money, as has often happened, barred the way towards 
 success. The late Lord Inverclyde proposed that 
 subsidised steamers should be built to meet certain 
 requirements, and that they should be manned by 
 
THE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE 233 
 
 seamen of the Royal Naval Reserve, who should be 
 trained in gunnery at the respective home ports of 
 the companies or owners. Sir Donald Currie read a 
 paper at the Royal United Service Institution, pointing 
 to the progress that was going on abroad, and sub- 
 mitted a scheme for the retention of swift merchant- 
 cruisers by means of an annual subsidy.* The views 
 of the French Admiral Fournier may also be quoted 
 in support of those of the formal naval advisers of our 
 Admiralty and of our own great shipowners. He has 
 said in La Flotte Necessairc : 
 
 " As types of fast cruisers for the destruction of com- 
 merce I know of nothing which more fully meets the 
 requirements than those magnificent Transatlantic 
 steamships, the Lucayiia and Campania, capable of 
 maintaining a speed of 22 knots an hour with extra- 
 ordinary uniformity. The New York, Paris, St Louis, 
 and St Paul, with the English ships Majestic and 
 Teutonic, possess the same qualities, though in a 
 somewhat less degree of perfection. Such ships will, 
 in my view, be the destroyers of commerce in the 
 future." Lord Brassey has lent his powerful advocacy 
 to the same cause, and has supplied some figures 
 which place our altered position with startling lucidity 
 before us. 
 
 The Deutschland and Kaiser Wilhelm, of 14,000 and 
 15,000 tons respectively, exceed in speed by nearly 
 two knots our best ships. No vessel now building 
 for the British flag will rival in speed the Kaiser 
 Wilhebn IL and Kronpriiiz Wilhelm now t under 
 construction. 
 
 And a table is given which shows that, taking 
 vessels above 3000 tons only, the relative position is 
 as follows : — 
 
 • "Merchant Auxiliaries," by the Right Honourable Lord Brassey, 
 K.C.B. t 1901. 
 
20 knots and over . 
 
 British 
 
 6 
 
 Foreign 
 
 6 
 
 19 to 20 knots . 
 
 I 
 
 II 
 
 18 to 19 knots. 
 17 to 18 knots. 
 
 9 
 
 22 
 
 4 
 18 
 
 16 to 17 knots . 
 
 17 
 
 18 
 
 Total 55 57 
 
 The latest returns of ships, of all countries, over 3000 
 tons, having a speed of 18 knots and over, are equally 
 surprising ; while, although we own about half the 
 aggregate tonnage of the merchant - shipping of the 
 world, less than half of the 157 ships of 16 knots and 
 over fly our flag. 
 
 The policy of binding our finest vessels to the 
 service of the State as mercantile auxiliaries is to 
 be recommended also on the grounds that otherwise 
 they may fall into the hands of other countries. Lord 
 Brassey quotes the late Mr Ismay as saying in his 
 evidence before the Royal Commission on coaling- 
 stations : " When a company has not been doing well, 
 and has got heavy bills running which it cannot meet, 
 the temptation to shut its eyes to what would be the 
 ultimate destination of ships sold to foreigners in a 
 crisis would be very great. At the commencement of 
 the Russian scare on the occasion of the Peuj-deh in- 
 cident, great temptations were offered to the owners of 
 the White Star steamers running between San Francisco 
 and Japan ; and it is not too much to say that our 
 whole commerce in the Pacific would have been trans- 
 ferred to the flag of the United States if that offer 
 had been accepted." According to Lord Brassey, the 
 remedy must be sought in the building for the future 
 of mercantile auxiliaries specially designed for con- 
 version into cruisers. Shipowners about to build large 
 
THE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE 235 
 
 and swift merchant-vessels should be invited to submit 
 their plans to the Admiralty, and the cost of any 
 alterations which they might be willing to make in 
 order to adapt their vessels for the emergencies of 
 war should be met by a grant from Government. 
 Liberal subsidies would be demanded, but a fleet 
 would grow up capable of supplementing the efforts 
 of warships, not only in protecting our commerce, but 
 useful as scouts and patrol vessels and auxiliaries in 
 general to a fleet. 
 
 Both manoeuvres and recent war have shown of 
 what value merchant-cruisers may become. In 1885 
 Admiral Hornby bore eloquent testimony to the good 
 service rendered by the Oregon, a slow ship measured 
 by our most modern standard, but at that time owing 
 her efficiency to her relative speed. 
 
 During the Spanish-American war the New York, 
 a merchant-vessel, flew the flag of Admiral Sampson, 
 the United States Commander-in-Chief, — a high com- 
 pliment for an auxiliary to receive, and one significant 
 as to the importance attached to such vessels by men 
 actually engaged on active service. The coal endur- 
 ance and continuous high speed of a modern mail 
 steamer give her, in fact, a remarkable advantage 
 over warships, and would render her of the greatest 
 assistance to us, but at the same time a weapon 
 which might in hostile hands be turned against our 
 commerce with equal effect. 
 
 Quite recently the proceedings of the Shipping 
 Combine have awakened public attention, not only 
 to the existence of these portentous ships, but to 
 the fact that they can change their flag with be- 
 wildering ease, and may one day be steered by friends 
 and the next by enemies. 
 
 A new element of variety has been added to the 
 forces of the sea, and our Government have just taken 
 
2^6 THE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE 
 
 fresh steps to meet it. Bearing all the facts that have 
 just been stated in mind, they have entered on an 
 agreement with a great shipping company, which will 
 enable them in time of war to command the services 
 of auxiliary cruisers after the manner which has been 
 foreshadowed. 
 
 Let not anyone imagine that this question of com- 
 merce-protection is entirely a naval one, and that 
 it does not, therefore, enter into the general question 
 of Imperial defence at all : that we can leave it on 
 one side as a highly technical and difficult portion 
 of the subject which may be relegated to experts 
 to decide upon. 
 
 No view of Imperial defence which forgets the 
 commercial basis of the Empire, or ignores the pro- 
 tection of those ships that bring raw material and 
 food to our work-people, could be considered satis- 
 factory, and no penetration into that field can be 
 regarded as a trespass. 
 
 Besides the other considerations which a liberal view 
 of the subject will suggest, that one which reminds 
 us what calls the army alone in times of war makes 
 on our mercantile-marine cannot be left out of sight. 
 Transports for men and horses, despatch vessels, 
 cable ships, hospital ships, all these may be found 
 amongst the adjuncts of an expedition over-sea. The 
 efficiency of our mercantile - marine is distinctly a 
 matter of personal interest to the army, independ- 
 ently of its bearing on Imperial defence, in which, 
 as I have shown, both services are closely bound 
 together. 
 
 And if the army can bear but a very small share 
 relatively to that of the navy in protecting our com- 
 merce, what it does do is not by any means to be 
 despised. Coaling - stations and harbours of refuge 
 fur our merchantmen to seek are held by the army. 
 
THE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE 237 
 
 Bases from which our cruisers and armed auxiliaries 
 can operate, and, last but not least, strongholds into 
 which hostile prizes may be towed and prisoners-of- 
 war detained must be secured by the army. One of 
 the advantages a great sea-Power with naval bases 
 and fortified harbours scattered all over the globe 
 can boast of is, that she can readily dispose of the 
 prizes her cruisers seize. A Power not so well supplied 
 would often be in difficulties as to how to get rid 
 of its booty. Prisoners would frequently be a very con- 
 siderable difficulty ; the goods of neutrals even a more 
 troublesome embarrassment. Without having been 
 called upon to face the responsibility, men may talk 
 lightly of torpedoing vessels, obliterating crews and 
 ships and cargoes from the face of the waters. Bar- 
 barism would be a light word to characterise so callous 
 a disregard of human life, recklessness but a faint 
 stigma on a policy so certain to vex strong neutrals 
 and provoke reprisals. 
 
 The army that secures harbours for its country, 
 and denies them to the enemy, will be of no in- 
 significant aid even in so wholly maritime an opera- 
 tion as the protection of commerce. 
 
 But the fact of our bases and ports all over the world 
 being held secure will aid shipowners in another way. 
 The existence of sanctuaries such as Hong-Kong or 
 Bombay is not only of material assistance but of moral 
 support. They help to reassure public opinion, and 
 tend to keep rates of insurance down. Any allevia- 
 tion of the pressure, the enhanced rates war must 
 necessarily bring with it, will be very welcome to 
 owners already in many cases struggling for existence in 
 the fierce competition that has narrowed their margins 
 of profit in times of peace. Every aid and every effort 
 that makes for stability and confidence is of value, 
 every ton saved from a neutral flag is a gain ; and here 
 
238 THE PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE 
 
 again the army finds its duties and its sphere of 
 action, and while it makes our great business centres 
 in outlying parts of the Empire impregnable, staves 
 off panic and all its attendant dangers from our people 
 at home. 
 
40 60 
 
 XH MAP 
 
 ► WING THE 
 
 RiTiSH Trade RouTts 
 
 ites shown thus 
 
 •ch will be created by Ihe 
 
 ?/ an Isthmian canal 
 
 London. Swan 5onnenschein St Co Ltd 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 THE DEFENCE OF OUR GREAT DEPENDENCIES AND 
 OF THE OUTLYING PORTIONS OF OUR EMPIRE 
 
 In a book which deals only with principles of Im- 
 perial defence, any analysis of the schemes for the 
 defence of the North-West frontier of India, or de- 
 tailed suggestions as to modification of them, would 
 be out of place. But even if this were not so, I 
 should certainly not enter on the subject here. It 
 must always, of course, engage much of our attention. 
 Probably no great problem of the kind has been 
 more closely examined, but it is not a matter for 
 me to discuss in public, and there is, moreover, no 
 need to do so, except in so far as to show how 
 all the forces of the Empire can be employed 
 upon it. The same remarks apply with even greater 
 force to the question of the defence of Canada. I 
 will therefore say but very little on the subject, 
 nor will I give any hint as to what views I may 
 hold upon it. 
 
 The case of the Commonwealth and New Zealand 
 is a somewhat different one. They stand or fall 
 with the predominance of our navy, and their de- 
 fence, illustrating as it does the virtue of sea-power, 
 has already been referred to incidentally. Questions 
 of local defence manifestly lie altogether beyond the 
 scope of these pages, and, as regards the broader 
 question, there is really very little to be said. 
 
 While our navy is supreme the great islands of 
 239 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 THE DEFENCE OF OUR GREAT DEPENDENCIES AND 
 OF THE OUTLYING PORTIONS OF OUR EMPIRE 
 
 In a book which deals only with principles of Im- 
 perial defence, any analysis of the schemes for the 
 defence of the North-West frontier of India, or de- 
 tailed suggestions as to modification of them, would 
 be out of place. But even if this were not so, I 
 should certainly not enter on the subject here. It 
 must always, of course, engage much of our attention. 
 Probably no great problem of the kind has been 
 more closely examined, but it is not a matter for 
 me to discuss in public, and there is, moreover, no 
 need to do so, except in so far as to show how 
 all the forces of the Empire can be employed 
 upon it. The same remarks apply with even greater 
 force to the question of the defence of Canada. I 
 will therefore say but very little on the subject, 
 nor will I give any hint as to what views I may 
 hold upon it. 
 
 The case of the Commonwealth and New Zealand 
 is a somewhat different one. They stand or fall 
 with the predominance of our navy, and their de- 
 fence, illustrating as it does the virtue of sea-power, 
 has already been referred to incidentally. Questions 
 of local defence manifestly lie altogether beyond the 
 scope of these pages, and, as regards the broader 
 question, there is really very little to be said. 
 
 While our navy is supreme the great islands of 
 239 
 
240 THE DEFENCE OF DEPENDENCIES 
 
 the Antipodes are invulnerable. They can only be 
 reached by water, and the Power that controls the 
 waterways of the world assures their safety, though 
 their inhabitants may never see a ship. 
 
 South Africa offers a different kind of problem. As 
 against other nations, her safety is assured by the 
 same sea-power that secures our Australasian Colonies. 
 As regards internal danger, the statesman and not the 
 soldier must ensure the stability of our rule. South 
 Africa's most dangerous enemy at present is herself. 
 From the chaos of war a united people will, we 
 hope, emerge — a people interested in preserving our 
 Government for its own sake, because it is more 
 liberal, more just, more beneficent than any other. 
 The native difficulty, and the defence of the Colonies 
 against attack on shore, is, or will be, a question of 
 local policy, and is, moreover, one on which instincts 
 of self-preservation should unite every race and every 
 faction. 
 
 No principles of Imperial defence that need ex- 
 planation or analysis will be involved in this question, 
 difficult and pressing as it may become. For the 
 present it is in the hands of those on the spot, and 
 it too will be here passed by. 
 
 But while all questions which have been and are 
 dealt with by authorities whose special duties lead 
 them to the task, will be left severely alone by me ; 
 and while it is not desired to discuss possibilities 
 which are more fitly and freely dealt with behind 
 closed doors, some of the larger strategical features 
 of problems which arc openly discussed in lecture 
 halls and newspapers and books of travel, can scarcely 
 be ignored by me. A few words, then, as to the nature 
 of the task which the defence of India, or of our 
 interests in the Far East, will impose on our armed 
 forces may be allowed me, more especially as in 
 
AND OUTLYING PORTIONS OF EMPIRE 241 
 
 their consideration are involved many questions which 
 bear directly on the nature and .extent of the duties 
 which our regular army must be prepared to undertake. 
 Whatever the precise line of defence taken up on 
 our Indian frontier may be, the estimate as to the 
 reinforcements that will be called for from England 
 will vary but little. Whatever form the strategical 
 plan decided upon may assume, the considerations as 
 to what garrison must be left behind in India will still 
 hold good. We will pass by, then, for the moment, the 
 various advantages and disadvantages that mark the 
 several courses open to us, and we will proceed at 
 once to the conclusion which in the end we are 
 certain to arrive at, namely, that an outbreak of a 
 great war on the Indian frontier will call for reinforce- 
 ments from England amounting to some 50,000 men 
 and 180 guns. When allowance is made for men 
 medically unfit, or too young to go abroad, such an 
 estimate practically means that two Army Corps would 
 be absorbed in the defence of India. But drafts to 
 our forces in that country, the making good of the 
 wastage caused by wounds and sickness in the field, 
 the reinforcement of our garrisons in certain other 
 parts of the world, and the thousand unlooked-for 
 calls that a great war makes on the manhood of a 
 country, would start further drains upon us. The Far 
 and Middle East would become involved too, and we 
 have contracted obligations in the latter. The equi- 
 valent of a third Army Corps would soon be eaten into. 
 No one who has worked out the problem, taking into 
 account the cardinal principles that govern our Indian 
 arrangements, will assert that such a forecast as has 
 here been made is anything but a moderate one. It 
 certainly is not put forward in any alarmist or pessi- 
 mistic spirit ; it is quoted to give those who doubt 
 whether the present establishments of our army are 
 Q 
 
242 THE DEFENCE OF DEPENDENCIES 
 
 really necessary some idea of what no very remote 
 contingency might demand from it. 
 
 There is, to be sure, an alternative policy, one not 
 in favour amongst the soldiers who have most deeply 
 studied the question, and one, indeed, less heard of 
 now than it used to be some years back : the policy, 
 namely, that recommends us to accept what we are 
 told is inevitable — that is to say, the disappearance of 
 a buffer state, and our acquiescence in a frontier along 
 the line of watershed formed by the Hindu Kush and 
 Hazara mountains, where we should be in touch with 
 a European Power. Now, whatever merits or demerits 
 may cling round such a frontier, one of its effects 
 would manifestly be that we should, once for all, find 
 ourselves in the position of a European country, with 
 our territory marching with the possessions of another 
 potentially hostile race of white men. It would 
 mean that a permanent addition, to be reckoned at 
 two Army Corps, would have to be made to the garrison 
 of India. Further, one of those Army Corps would 
 have to be composed of British troops. In other words, 
 our home army establishments would have to be still 
 further increased to enable them to feed the new 
 addition to our forces stationed in India, while the 
 burden on the Indian exchequer would be augmented 
 by the sum required for the upkeep of two more Army 
 Corps. Leaving out of sight, therefore, the military 
 aspects of such a proposal, we see that there are grave 
 financial difficulties in the way, — difficulties sufficiently 
 great as to shake the faith of any who may imagine 
 that responsibilities can be disposed of by evading them, 
 or that graceful concession is necessarily economical. 
 
 We shall never, it is to be hoped, adopt a policy 
 which would involve the breaking of our faith as a 
 nation, and we may pass these suggestions by as alike 
 immoral, impolitic, and impracticable. 
 
AND OUTLYING PORTIONS OF EMPIRE 243 
 
 To pass from the particular to the general : — 
 The greatest obstacle in our way when we deal with 
 such problems as the defence of a great frontier, is not 
 so much to formulate a plan, as to make provision that 
 it shall ever be completely adopted or consistently 
 adhered to. The intellectual effort involved in conceiv- 
 ing a sound strategic scheme, or in correctly appreciat- 
 ing one that is laid before you, is by no means one 
 beyond the powers of an average brain. Perhaps it is 
 for this reason that many imagine that there is little to 
 be learned in war, that a man may succeed in it by the 
 light of nature and step at once into leadership without 
 further equipment than what we call common-sense, 
 a quality which, we may note, is about as difficult to 
 find in men as genius itself The real difficulties begin 
 after the situation has been reviewed, the maps marked, 
 and the armies mobilised. The entanglements of 
 politics, unforeseen characteristics of the regions to be 
 traversed, want of transport, and the thousand other 
 cares of a general, then suddenly burst into vigorous 
 life, and choke the first promise of the most enterprising 
 mind. The purpose becomes lost in the litter of detail. 
 Opinions and advice and suggestions are poured, with 
 all the confidence of irresponsibility, into ears grown 
 weary under storm and stress. A man must often be 
 more prepared to parry the objections and modifications 
 that are put forward by his friends than the man- 
 oeuvres of the foe. Not seldom the main difficulty that 
 he has to grapple with is not so much to devise as to 
 carry out a scheme, not so much to make up his mind, 
 as to keep to his decision. 
 
 It is for this reason that a careful study of possible 
 contingencies, during times of peace, gives readiness 
 and decision when war suddenly comes upon us. If 
 the salient features of every aspect of a question have 
 been rendered completely familiar a kind of ballast 
 
244 'THE DEFENCE OF DEPENDENCIES 
 
 to meet the sudden gusts of popular clamour or un- 
 warrantable alarm, invaluable in times of stress, has 
 been provided. 
 
 And, apart from any concrete references, what do 
 great operations from distant bases hinge upon? On 
 facilities for transport of warlike stores, ammunition, re- 
 inforcements from the main centres of life and activity 
 in the country to the army in contact with the enemy 
 far away. The limb that is best nourished remains 
 eventually the strongest ; the tree whose roots reach 
 the river flourishes with a more luxuriant growth than 
 its fellow that is watered by a precarious rainfall. 
 
 Communications, always the most important factor 
 in warfare, assume decisive importance when the con- 
 test is waged at extreme distances that stretch from 
 one continent to another. The long line of the French 
 communications in the Peninsula was the canker that 
 lay at the root of their efficiency. Those weary miles 
 of roadway — a dreary vision of ruts and mud — stretch- 
 ing back from Cadiz and Valencia and Madrid, must 
 have shaken many a daring resolution. Back from 
 divisions scattered all over Spain ran the smaller 
 channels into the great artery that led by Burgos and 
 Bayonne to fertile and populous France. Those long- 
 drawn stages of slowly-moving waggons were not the 
 least opponents that Napoleon's marshals had to over- 
 come. Guerillas and partisans and a hostile population 
 on the one hand, and the sea-power which allowed 
 Wellington to continually change his base and shorten 
 his channels of supply on the other, were enough to 
 more than counterbalance disparity in numbers or 
 quality of troops. Russia, at the Crimean epoch, only 
 half-developed and unable to use her strength, is 
 eventually brought to her knees by the persistent 
 pressure which better communications enabled the 
 Allies to c.xert. In 1877 a similar spectacle is re- 
 
AND OUTLYING PORTIONS OF EMPIRE 245 
 
 vealed. A huge army, fed by a single line of rail, 
 and with indifferent roads behind it, arrives at length 
 before Constantinople reeling and exhausted. That 
 change of gauge in the railway line at Oungheni was, 
 alone, worth an Army Corps to the Turks. The deep 
 alluvial soil of the Danube valley cost Russia more 
 than the losses she incurred when the river itself was 
 forced. And modern armies need more to keep them 
 efficient than was the case in former days. There are, 
 to begin with, more mouths to be fed, because more 
 men can be put in the field in these days of universal 
 service and facilities for mobilising and concentrating 
 troops. More ammunition is also used because ranges 
 are longer, battles are more protracted, and the process 
 of discharging and loading firearms has grown more 
 rapid. The standard of comfort and humanity is 
 higher also ; there is not only more food to be carried, 
 but more medical comforts are needed ; there are more 
 wounded men to be attended to ; perhaps a large 
 number of prisoners to be fed. Any modern war, 
 therefore, in which two nations may engage, many 
 hundreds or thousands of miles from their capitals, 
 will hinge on excellence of communications. The 
 centres of the national life will probably be unassail- 
 able, and no attempt to reach them will be made. The 
 end will come as the result of a slow depletion of 
 strength, the life-blood will trickle drop by drop from 
 an opened vein, not gush forth as when a great artery 
 or the heart itself is rent asunder. No Austerlitz will 
 herald the immediate occupation of a capital, no 
 Gravelotte prepare the way for the stupendous military 
 and political downfall of a Sedan. 
 
 When European nations fight out their differences 
 in the Far East, or in the confines of Central Asia, 
 they will enter on a war of communications, and success 
 will crown the efforts of those who will be able to 
 
246 THE DEFENCE OF DEPENDENCIES 
 
 last the longest because they are supplied the best. 
 No tremendous tactical catastrophes are to be ex- 
 pected, no sudden strategical surprises are likely to 
 be seen, the issues will be decided more prosaically 
 and probably more slowly, but perhaps for that very 
 reason more decisively and more permanently. 
 
 From the nature of the cases that may occur, it 
 will also follow that water communications will, to a 
 large extent, be pitted against those that run by land. 
 
 It is for this reason that the efficiency of our 
 mercantile-marine is a matter vitally affecting our 
 schemes of Imperial defence, even when viewed from 
 the army point of view alone. A war in India 
 would demand the immediate embarkation and rapid 
 despatch of reinforcements. Immediate is, however, 
 here but a relative term, and must be taken in a sense 
 to be qualified by the naval situation of the m.oment. 
 The carrying capacity and speed of steamers will be 
 set in competition against that of railway trucks and 
 locomotives. Whatever strategical scheme be adopted, 
 these capabilities must be the prominent factors in it, 
 and the decision arrived at must bear the impress of 
 naval as well as of army thought and influence. 
 
 But water transport will take an arm}' no farther 
 than the shore or banks of a great river. Before 
 animals and waggons have to be pressed into our 
 service, there is often a great gap where the assistance 
 of a railway will be of incalculable value, and the 
 nearer the railhead can be pushed to the fighting-line 
 the more free and certain the flow of stores and 
 supplies. The provision, therefore, of strategical lines 
 of railway as a means of improving communications 
 becomes a duty which no .sea-Power, however great 
 and however much it can count upon the assistance 
 of a mercantile-marine, can afford to shirk. During 
 future conflicts in remote regions, water communica- 
 
AND OUTLYING PORTIONS OF EMPIRE 247 
 
 tions will certainly be pitted against land communica- 
 tions, yet a stage will inevitably be reached when the 
 water transport will have to be supplemented by rail- 
 ways. Further, the insidious advance that characterises 
 a line of rail is difficult to combat. A railway stands 
 for civilisation ; it creeps on to confer commercial 
 benefits ; it may be shown to have a philanthropic 
 mission, and in the mildest mannered way annexes 
 territory and dominates cities with a quiet ease that 
 a freebooter might envy. If commerce was the founda- 
 tion of our Empire, it is also perhaps the most danger- 
 ous foe it has at present to contend with. There 
 appears but one feasible counter-policy, but one anti- 
 dote, save the drastic one of war. Aggression by 
 railway must be met by obstruction by railway ; and 
 lines of rail which will improve our political and 
 commercial position in peace time, and which will 
 have an additional value in war, must be planned. 
 
 And many of the necessary railways are already 
 marked out. For example, from Dera Ismael Khan 
 along the Gomal Pass and Thob Valley to Quetta 
 runs the chief trade route from Afghanistan to India. 
 A railway line would improve the commercial value 
 of that route, and would help us to secure the friend- 
 ship of the Pathans. Should, moreover, the occupation 
 by us of Ghuznee ever become necessary, that operation 
 would be greatly facilitated by it. Again, a railway 
 from Peshawur to Kabul would certainly bring with 
 it strategical advantages, and might be expected to 
 consolidate and strengthen our relationship with the 
 Ameer. The extension of our railways to Kandahar 
 would be no less desirable on strategical grounds, 
 but the idea was distasteful to the late Ameer, and 
 could not therefore be carried out. 
 
 Further, a railway from the coast of Biluchistan to 
 Seistan could not but strengthen our strategical 
 
248 THE DEFENCE OF DEPENDENCIES 
 
 position, and would ultimately be connected with our 
 Quetta - Chaman line through Nushki, whither an 
 extension of the latter has just lately been carried. 
 
 Light frontier railways are likewise needed to open 
 up and secure the Trans-Indus region that from 
 Peshawur to Sind has not as yet derived any of the 
 benefits that railway communication brings with it. 
 But that only financial considerations bar the way 
 to wide developments here, there is probably little 
 doubt : and there is little chance of our interests being 
 overlooked. 
 
 As regards Canada and the defence of its frontier, 
 I do not propose to say anything here. It is not 
 possible for me to publicly discuss the question, and 
 the matter is essentially one to be left to those whose 
 duty it is to formulate proposals. The problems con- 
 nected with the defence of a frontier 4000 miles in 
 length will be found of absorbing interest by those 
 who desire to take them up ; but meanwhile we may 
 hope that we may never have to face them, for a 
 war with our kith and kin is a remote contingency, 
 and can never be viewed by us with anything but 
 abhorrence. 
 
 It has, however, been pointed out in Canada her- 
 self, that British Colombia may be exposed to attack 
 from a European Power, and that a consideration of 
 Canadian defence should not be confined to the 
 danger of an attack on her from the south alone. A 
 question of lines of communication is raised again 
 here. Our communications to the western coasts of 
 Canada run first by water and then by rail. Those 
 of a great European Power to the same spot would 
 run first by rail and then by water. The results of 
 a great struggle would again turn on the relative 
 excellence of those two long lines of supply. For 
 at present we should have to bear the brunt of the 
 
AND OUTLYING PORTIONS OF EMPIRE 249 
 
 fight, because the forces of the Dominion are as yet 
 inadequate to her position. But it is satisfactory to 
 note that we have no cause for anxiety here. No 
 Power could venture to assail the western shore of 
 Canada until the supremacy of her sea-power in the 
 Pacific had first been made secure, and especially in 
 the face of our recent alliance with the sea-Power 
 of the Far East, such supremacy will have to be won 
 by some hard fighting. 
 
 Colonial thought in Canada has, however, shown 
 lately that a feeling is making itself recognised 
 throughout the Dominion that the time is approach- 
 ing when the defence of the Atlantic seaboard also 
 should be taken into her own hands. Sydney and 
 St John are places rising daily to the importance 
 which claims special defence. At present the pressure 
 of armaments per head of the population is in Canada 
 smaller than that in the case of any other nation. 
 There is then a wide margin for increased effort, and 
 the future will doubtless see a different state of things. 
 Perhaps, some day, a great base, capable of equipping 
 and maintaining Imperial fleets, may grow up at 
 Halifax, and the enemy when he has cut communi- 
 cation with England may find he has still to reckon 
 with what the Colonies can do. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 HOME DEFENCE 
 
 By many it may be thought that a book on Imperial 
 defence should commence with a chapter on how 
 our homes are to be rendered secure. A man defend- 
 ing himself either with weapon or armour will in- 
 stinctively protect his head before his legs, and will 
 keep his vitals covered at all hazards. Before a nation 
 thinks of retaining her colonies, it is to be supposed 
 that she will have made her hearths and altars im- 
 pregnable. Home defence is the first postulate of 
 Imperial defence, and must be provided for before 
 we even begin to consider the larger subject. 
 
 All this is true, and to those who have followed 
 me through the previous chapter it is clear, I trust, 
 that the fact has not been overlooked by me. The 
 supreme navy has been the keynote throughout ; and, 
 within certain limitations, while we can count upon 
 a navy supreme and invincible, the security of our 
 homes is assured. If we were absolutely and entirely 
 convinced that our navy were supreme, and would 
 always remain so, the question of an invasion would 
 very properly become a matter no longer within the 
 realm of practical politics, and we might without rash- 
 ness or over-confidence occupy our minds with pro- 
 jects of an offensive character, and consider only the 
 possibility of ending a grievous war by carrj'ing an 
 army into hostile territory and forcing on peace. 
 
 In view of what our navy has done for us in the 
 
 250 
 
HOME DEFENCE 251 
 
 past, it is possible for us without any arrogance of 
 spirit to meet with steadfast faces the storms that 
 may await us in the future, and so far I have allowed 
 the confidence -of the country to be reflected in what 
 I have here said, and have let myself enjoy a share 
 in the feelings of patriotism that face what is coming in 
 the temper of exultation rather than of anxiety. When 
 the land forces of the country are taking up positions 
 to cover London, the barometer of our fortunes will 
 have fallen low indeed. We shall have been driven 
 to our last resort ; and shall have been forced to stand 
 at bay for the first time since the days of the Conqueror. 
 However gloomy the views as to our military efficiency 
 which may prevail, there is so far no need to place 
 such a national situation in the forefront of discussion. 
 It has seemed more proper to relegate home defence 
 to a less prominent position. 
 
 While, however, the confidence which may animate 
 us is neither unworthy or ill-founded, it is well that 
 when home defence is discussed the facts of the 
 situation should be carefully analysed, and any pecu- 
 liarities which our circumstances exhibit in these latter 
 days conscientiously noted. For truly our position 
 is unique. Animosity rears itself against us on every 
 side. We have gone to the ends of the earth to find 
 an ally. Rome, our great prototype, struggled in her 
 latter days against the pressure of barbarians. Her 
 strength ebbed away during a contest in which civilisa- 
 tion was pitted against the rapacity and unrest of war- 
 like but semi-savage foes. It is not hordes of naked 
 barbarians that will overwhelm us but the surplus 
 product of civilised races forced to expand by the 
 same necessities which drove our people to seek new 
 outlets and means of livelihood. Our course in the 
 eyes of some has been specially directed by Providence. 
 There are those who see in us a chosen people and a 
 
252 HOME DEFENCE 
 
 race predestined to enjoy the fruits of the earth. The 
 ideas thus suggested to our minds are flattering to 
 our vanity and soothing to our pride. Success is 
 most deHghtful when it is possible ;o persuade oneself 
 that it is the product of merit rather than of good 
 fortune. But it is not reasonable to expect that less 
 fortunate competitors should be as well satisfied with 
 the results as we are, should be appreciative and sym- 
 pathetic in place of jealous and disappointed. 
 
 It may be a mere platitude amongst our historians 
 that our marvellous expansion has been the result of 
 accident rather than of design. We may all acknow- 
 ledge that the greatness of the Empire has been thrust 
 upon us, and that the irresponsible actions of indi- 
 viduals rather than the deep-laid schemes of statesmen 
 have brought it about. Whether shaped by divine 
 favour or gigantic luck, the British Empire as it appeals 
 to foreigners is a huge monument of aggression and 
 aggrandisement, the creation of a Machiavellian state- 
 craft, the outcome of a nation's selfishness and greed. 
 The limits of the globe, which a few centuries ago ap- 
 peared immeasurable, are now within the view of all. 
 The land-hunger of other nations cannot be satisfied if 
 the portion of one is on so large a scale. While we 
 merely robbed inferior races which disappeared before 
 the white men, our encroachments were unperceived, 
 and aroused no more than a passing feeling of envy, 
 perhaps even of secret admiration. But colonies are 
 now appraised at a higher value than formerly, and 
 our neighbours are no longer content to acquiesce in 
 a doctrine which placed the uncivilised portions of 
 the globe at our command alone. Too late in many 
 cases have continental statesmen awakened to the 
 situation that has been brought about ; eager to push 
 the interests of their countrymen, to gain some share 
 of the foreign possessions which in the popular imag- 
 
HOME DEFENCE 25:5 
 
 ination gleam with wealth, and have been the founda- 
 tions of our wonderful prosperity, they find themselves 
 forestalled. Turn which way they will, the ensign of 
 our country is always in view ; some evidence of British 
 enterprise or domination reminds them of a successful 
 rival, of a pioneer that has been earlier in the field 
 than they. 
 
 I remember going to India the year that the King, 
 then Prince of Wales, was returning from his tour to 
 our greatest dependency. One night at sea we saw 
 a mighty blaze to the south-eastwards. The sky before 
 us burned with the glow of some tremendous conflagra- 
 tion. The incandescence of some mighty luminary 
 seemed to shine below the eastern horizon with a 
 radiance rivalling that of the other sun which had left 
 us to the west. As we drew nearer we surmised the 
 origin of the brilliant spectacle. It was Gibraltar 
 illuminated to greet the heir-apparent of the Empire 
 that blazed out its loyalty to the world around. 
 
 " What I like about it," said a passenger, " is that 
 it means England." He expressed in tho.se few words 
 the sentiments that probably animated every one who 
 saw that scene. While that beacon could burn the 
 Empire stood firm, and the fact was proclaimed to 
 every foreign ship that sailed the seas near Gibraltar. 
 That light flaming in the forehead of the East pro- 
 mulgated the ubiquity of the race, its labours, its vic- 
 tories, its spoils. To Englishmen it blazed forth 
 patriotism, incentive, and example, lighted the path 
 of duty and responsibility, beckoned them to renewed 
 efforts. But, we may be sure, it did not rouse such 
 feelings in foreign bosoms. If it glowed towards us 
 with genial welcome, to them it burned like a lurid 
 defiance in the sky. The labours and struggles that 
 had rendered the kindling of that beacon possible repre- 
 sented little to them but greed and rapacity, the victories 
 
254 HOME DEFENCE 
 
 were robberies, the spoils plunder, the trophies thefts. 
 What seemed to us pardonable pride, doubtless ap- 
 peared to the prouder Spaniard exulting insolence. 
 What animated us galled him, what we had gained 
 was his loss, our glory was his shame ; and while we 
 reminded our own people that we were everywhere, 
 other nations had no need to have the inconvenience 
 of our presence recalled to them. Our triumphs in 
 the field of expansion had denied space to them. 
 Nothing can succeed like a success which with its 
 progress destroys the possibility of imitation. 
 
 Under such conditions we need not look beyond our 
 own achievements for the causes of Continental dislike. 
 The head and front of our offending is, that as an 
 Empire we exist at all. We are in the position of 
 the heir who is keeping others out, and whom his con- 
 nections will unconcernedly see dead. Neither love nor 
 scruples have averted from us the doom of the intruder. 
 To strike at our heart will be the surest way, and our 
 heart is London. 
 
 In the bureaus and libraries of scientific soldiers, 
 who have made strategy the study of their lives, 
 how to strike a blow straight at our vital parts is the 
 problem which must inevitably claim first attention 
 when the possibility of hostilities with England is 
 considered. No success elsewhere could approach in 
 importance the effect of even a minor victory on the soil 
 of the United Kingdom. The key of the situation 
 is to be found in the regions that abut on the Channel 
 and the North Sea. Imperial defence centres in the 
 southern and eastern counties of England. It is there, 
 undoubtedly, that when the moment is thought oppor- 
 tune the thrust will be aimed, and some day the battle 
 that will decide the fate of half the world will be fought 
 out on the farm lands and downs of our eastern and 
 south-eastern counties. 
 
HOME DEFENCE 255 
 
 That no effort to assail us in the vital spot has been 
 made before is due, of course, to the presence of our 
 fleet — a fleet with all the prestige of Trafalgar and the 
 Nile still clinging to it — hitherto unsurpassed in materiel 
 and size and skill. 
 
 In the light of recent experiences in South Africa, 
 in the face of the situation produced at home by what 
 has, after all, been a successful war, who can doubt but 
 that it was our ships alone which stood between us 
 and the intervention of one or more of the great 
 Powers? Can there be any doubt, again, that inter- 
 vention would, in the temper of our people, have been 
 but the prelude of another war? It was the "great 
 shipping " that alone saved us from a contest in which, 
 as a hundred years ago, the stakes would have been 
 our Colonial Empire or even our national existence. 
 
 By some it will be denied that war with a great 
 Power would produce any prolonged struggle such 
 as the great wars with France exhibited. They point 
 to the artificial basis on which the lives of our home 
 population rest, and they argue that we shall stand 
 and fall entirely by our navy, and that after a few 
 victories have established the superiority in sea-power 
 of our opponents, the struggle will be practically over. 
 For their fleets, riding the waves triumphantly, will cut 
 off our supplies of food and raw material from abroad, 
 and we can be starved out and compelled to come to 
 terms more cheaply and quite as effectually by invest- 
 ment as by means of an actual invasion and the assault 
 and capture of our capital. 
 
 In a former chapter this feature of our national 
 weakness has been discussed, and the difficulties 
 attending an attempt to cut off our imports examined. 
 But it is possible to conceive of a policy of invasion 
 which did not look to the surrender of a starving 
 people for its reward. A raid on our arsenals and 
 
256 HOME DEFENCE 
 
 manufacturing districts might be worth undertaking, 
 and might be carried through without the over- 
 whelming and permanent naval superiority which the 
 policy of investment would demand. 
 
 Again, even were our coasts closely blockaded, the 
 ingenuity and enterprise of individuals, tempted to 
 try their fortune by the richness of the prices to be 
 earned, might, and no doubt would, find means to 
 smuggle food-stuffs into the country sufficient to ward 
 off" starvation from our people. 
 
 And if, as was sure to be the case, a war of the first 
 dimensions meant for us a struggle, if not on the 
 Continent, at anyrate somewhere in the more distant 
 regions of the globe, our fleets would find calls made 
 upon them that would interfere with their continual 
 presence near our coasts. Warlike stores, ammunition, 
 men and horses would have to be conveyed to our 
 armies not only from home but from Colonial ports 
 also. All the various impedimenta that clog the lines 
 of communication of an army would have to be carried 
 to the fighting-line on land. The lines of communica- 
 tion would have to be safeguarded, and the centre of 
 gravity of the war might sometimes shift temporarily 
 to them. Occasions might be deliberately brought 
 about, or be the result of mere chance, when the 
 watch on the Channel was relaxed, or when a severe 
 local reverse might for the time being lay it open. 
 
 It is not, therefore, the case that home defence 
 hinges entirely on food supply, although that matter 
 is, of course, the largest factor concerned. To refuse 
 to contemplate the possibility of a garrison holding 
 out for the relief the fortune of war may bring is the 
 attitude of a craven. British garrisons have set the 
 mother country worthier examples than that, or our 
 sun would have set long since, and, we will trust, such 
 insidious suggestions will be repudiated as they have 
 
HOME DEFENCE 257 
 
 been where smaller, though still great, issues were at 
 stake. 
 
 The question, moreover, remains as to whether a 
 blockade which could cut our communications in a 
 military sense could be established and sustained ; 
 whether, in fact, the investment — for it would amount 
 to nothing else — of the island fortress could be made 
 complete. I have shown that it is very doubtful 
 whether the food supply could be cut off; but private 
 enterprise would not come to our aid where it was a 
 question of sending arms and ammunition and men 
 across the seas. Nor would the Declaration of Paris 
 help us in this respect. High authorities have asserted 
 that a close investment of our long coast-line could 
 never be established. It could scarcely, in any case, 
 be maintained until our navy had been annihilated. 
 The annihilation of our sea-power is no more a matter 
 for profitable speculation in Imperial defence than the 
 annihilation of their armies would be in the case of 
 Continental Powers. Our sun would have set forever 
 when that occurred. We need not worry to consider 
 how we should peer and pry about in the twilight of 
 our nation's fortunes that would succeed those days 
 of national humiliation. 
 
 The possibility of a blockade is, however, a naval 
 question which I can only approach with extreme 
 diffidence, and certainly shall not venture to pro- 
 nounce a confident opinion upon. 
 
 But, whatever view be taken of its effects, a blockade 
 or investment implies a permanent and universal 
 superiority at sea. The question of an invasion comes 
 under a different category. 
 
 The success of an invasion of our shores would, if the 
 
 hostile operations on land were not rapidly decisive, also 
 
 depend on our opponents being so superior in strength 
 
 at sea as to be able to hold the Channel for a protracted 
 
 R 
 
258 HOME DEFENCE 
 
 period. On the other hand, the operations might be 
 rapidly decisive or so mischievous as to permanently 
 embarrass us. Assuming, however, that Napoleon seri- 
 ously intended to carry out his great project in 1805, it 
 must be admitted that inaccuracies greater than may, 
 in such a connection, be conceded to rhetoric make us 
 distrust the soundness of his views. 
 
 The famous appeal of July 1804, " Let us be masters 
 of the Straits for six hours and we are masters of the 
 world," is diluted on the 8th of May 1805 in one draft 
 of instructions to Villeneuve to the comparatively prosaic 
 words : " If your presence makes us masters of the sea for 
 three days off Boulogne, we shall be able to make our 
 expedition composed of i6o,(X>o men in 2000 vessels." 
 But later in the day the exhilaration has effervesced a 
 little more, and according to the second draft of the letter 
 the time required has extended to four days, while the 
 numbers of the host have dwindled to 150,000.* 
 
 Whether the scheme was in reality feasible under the 
 circumstances we need not stay to inquire into here. 
 What concerns us more is, that the conception was 
 formed at a time when the British navy was in the very 
 zenith of its strength, and was led by captains whose skill 
 and courage on the waters have never been surpassed 
 in the history of the world. Moreover, whether the in- 
 vasion was seriously intended or not it was certainly the 
 cause of very serious anxiety in England. If it were not 
 more than a gigantic and elaborate scheme to deceive 
 Austria as to Napoleon's true intentions, then it was the 
 hopelessness of gaining command of the sea that made 
 it so. And what were the conditions that rendered a 
 contest with England for the mastery of the sea a hope- 
 less one ? The British navy was at that period superior 
 to the combined forces of the whole of the rest of Europe. 
 The navy of the Emperor was the one which came 
 
 * I'iJe Colonib's " Naval Warfare," p. 201. 
 
HOME DEFENCE 259 
 
 next to our own, but in 1804 we had 175 ships of the 
 line as against 50 of the French, and 244 frigates with 
 which to oppose 32. 
 
 In other words, the total British fleet was 419, and 
 that of her great rival only 82. 
 
 In 1805 the combined French and Spanish fleets could 
 boast of 61 ships of the line in commission, to which we 
 were able to oppose 83 ships of the line* actually in 
 commission, and yet we were inferior in numbers when 
 at Trafalgar the decisive battle was fought. Our obliga- 
 tions all over the world, the protection of our com- 
 merce, and the interests we possessed in every region of 
 the globe had absorbed the remainder of our strength. 
 
 It was under such conditions that ideas of invasion 
 could fill men's minds with apprehension, could call 
 into existence the martello towers and military canals, 
 which are the silent witnesses to-day of the fears 
 that vexed our forefathers a century ago. 
 
 In 1870 the great military system and the army, the 
 inheritance handed down to France from the great 
 emperor, lay broken in the dust. Another great leader had 
 appeared, another formidable organisation threatened 
 to dominate Europe. The fate of Denmark and of 
 Austria and France once more stirred anxiety in us : 
 we began to set our military house in order and to 
 consider schemes of defence. 
 
 Again, I do not want to critically examine into the 
 merits of those schemes or inquire as to how far our 
 fears were mere nightmares or substantial terrors. 
 
 An oak that has attained so vast a growth as our 
 Empire must always rouse some anxiety when storms 
 and gales set in, and we may be certain that we shall 
 never be without tremors, if not panics, while we are 
 content to sit beneath the spreading branches and trust 
 
 * The figures are taken from Mr M'Hardy's "The British Navy for a 
 Hundred Years." 
 
26o HOME DEFENCE 
 
 that it will survive for the future just because it has 
 weathered many tempests in the past. But what is 
 of real interest at the present time is to count the 
 milestones we have passed in the last thirty years, to 
 compare how we stood in 1872 with how we stand at 
 the present moment. 
 
 Then, as now, there were alarmists ; now, as then, there 
 are those who deride the anxiety, which the other side 
 terms forethought ; and in a few cases the very same 
 voices are still making themselves heard in our councils. 
 
 In 1872 Sir, then Mr, William Vernon Harcourt, gave 
 a lecture at the United Service Institution on " Our Naval 
 and Military establishments regarded with reference to 
 the dangers of Invasion." * In that lecture, which I have 
 no doubt all soldiers welcomed as an earnest desire to 
 arrive at some fixed principles in our scheme of national 
 defence, and as an example of interest of others besides 
 themselves on questions which are of national importance, 
 some assumptions were made as to the composition of 
 the possible invading force which we need not enter into 
 here. But the opinion as to the capacity of foreign 
 mercantile-marines is to us, looking back on it from the 
 standpoint of to-day, extremely instructive. We may 
 assume that a man of great ability, with a vista of 
 political success leading to the highest places before 
 him, did not speak on such a matter rashly. Yet in 
 dealing with this part of the subject we find such 
 statements as the following : — " If you imagine the 
 mercantile - marines of great countries like France, 
 Germany, and Russia, you will find that they have 
 not got any." In a footnote the figures on which the 
 part of the statement as regards Germany was based 
 are given. They are as follows : — 
 
 " North German Lloyds from Bremen, 20 large 
 steamers ; Hamburg line, 17 steamers ; Baltic Lloyds, 3. 
 
 * Vol. xvi. p. 575 of the Journal of that Institution. 
 
HOME DEFENCE 261 
 
 Total 40. There are about 15 more in course of 
 construction." Mr Harcourt went on to say: " If you 
 come to examine the history of the mercantile-marine 
 of all nations except England, you will find it is 
 practically insignificant. Now, I think that is a matter 
 which has to be borne in mind. You will find in most 
 cases where great military nations have had to under- 
 take foreign expeditions, like the French to the Crimea, 
 they have had to put their soldiers on board their men- 
 of-war. Why ? Because they have nowhere else to put 
 them." He goes on to ask the soldiers present to tell 
 him how many transports would be needed to convey 
 the invading army to our shores, which he with much 
 moderation only placed at 50,000 men. The figures as 
 to the shipping employed by us in the Crimean ex- 
 pedition, and also in the then quite recent Abyssinian 
 expedition, were next discussed, and the huge task 
 involved in an expedition beyond the seas very properly 
 brought forward. In the chapter on " Combined Naval 
 and Military Expeditions," these needs and difficulties 
 have been dealt with by me : the only object in my 
 now mentioning Mr Harcourt's lecture is to show how 
 widely the situation of thirty years ago differed from 
 that of to-day, and how, according to the very arguments 
 then brought forward to belittle the dangers of invasion, 
 the reality of any apprehension which may be felt to-day 
 is established. 
 
 France was the Power then most feared, and in that 
 lecture the French menace is thus disposed of: "You 
 have paired off against the great naval power of the 
 world, and you have remaining nineteen English iron- 
 clads of the first class after you have disposed of the 
 French navy by an equal force." 
 
 " Now," it is asked, " what is the condition of the 
 other navies of Europe ? First of all, let us take Prussia 
 as a country from which invasion is considered formid- 
 
262 HOME DEFENCE 
 
 able. Prussia has three ironclads, none of which she 
 has been able to build for herself. . . . That is the 
 country by which a nation with forty-nine ironclads 
 is about to be invaded ! " Russia is next considered. 
 Russia is stated to have five ironclads, the best of 
 which is inferior to the Warrior, then one of our 
 inferior warships. The united ironclad navies of 
 Russia and Prussia are put at seven (it should, it 
 seems to me, be eight) ironclads. " Russia and Prussia 
 put together have what you may call seven moderate 
 ironclads among them as against nineteen ironclads 
 of England of the first class after disposing of the 
 French navy." The italics are mine. But the situation 
 was still more in our favour. " Then if you like to add 
 to these two countries the United States, which pos- 
 sesses no ironclad that is capable of crossing the 
 Atlantic with safety unaccompanied by a consort, you 
 have a combination of Powers with which you have 
 to deal. . . . Should we have war made upon us at 
 once by F"rance, Russia, Prussia, and the United States, 
 if you can conceive all these countries combined, you 
 will find that, after putting ship for ship against theirs, 
 it would leave ten ironclads of the first order to spare 
 as against them." 
 
 It is admitted that this state may not always exist. 
 " It may be altered. Russia and Prussia may build 
 more vessels. They have never been able to build 
 one yet, although I believe they are trying to do so. 
 Where are the dockyards of Prussia? . . . Where is 
 Russia going to construct against us? Where is the 
 United States going to construct against us?" and 
 so on. Finally, Mr Harcourt argued that if invasion 
 in the face of superior naval force were impossible, 
 the true safeguard of these islands was a superior navy. 
 " Therefore, if your force is not, upon the figures I have 
 shown you, overwhelmingly superior, let it be made so." 
 
HOME DEFENCE 263 
 
 Thirty years ago the answer was easy. Our naval 
 force was in adequate superior strength, and, moreover, 
 the capacity of other Powers as regards transport by 
 sea was vastly different to what it is to-day. But 
 can we now feel the same confidence as we did then ? 
 Is our navy "overwhelmingly superior" to a possible 
 combination even of two Powers ? Is the question of 
 water transport a hopeless difficulty to invaders ? 
 Above all, is it extraordinary that men should doubt 
 the confident assurances of those who cherish false 
 economy rather than security, when a statesman of the 
 first class could say, in 1872, that Germany and Russia 
 and the United States could never hope to rival us in 
 naval strength, because not only were they so far behind 
 us at the start, but they could build no ships to make 
 up their leeway. How do the contemptuous terms in 
 which foreign navies are discussed read in the light of 
 what we see to-day? 
 
 In the discussion that followed the lecture in question, 
 it is true that the accuracy of some of Mr Harcourt's 
 figures were impugned. Invasion was not viewed by 
 many whose memories we cherish with respect as an 
 imaginary terror. A second line of defence was con- 
 sidered essential. The details of relative naval strength 
 were not challenged. If anxiety then was not held 
 to be absurd, can it be dismissed to-day as foolish? 
 How do we stand at present? what is the relative 
 situation ? 
 
 Germany and the United States are taking the place 
 of Russia and France as the great foreign shipbuilding 
 Powers. Spain as a great naval Power has almost 
 disappeared altogether. Germany has taken her place, 
 Japan has become formidable also, and Italy too has 
 progressed. Those who wish to find chapter and verse 
 for the strength of foreign navies will find the names 
 and tonnage of all the ships in existence set forth in 
 
264 
 
 HOME DEFENCE 
 
 "Brassey's Naval Annual for 1901 " (p. 79), and will 
 there find recorded the immense change that has taken 
 place since we were last plunged in a great naval 
 war and had an absolute preponderance in naval 
 force over the whole of the other European Powers 
 combined. Now, it is with that of the dual alliance 
 alone that our strength is usually measured, and at 
 the close of 1901 we find it stood thus as regards 
 completed battleships : 
 
 Class 
 
 England 
 
 France 
 
 Russia 
 
 France and 
 Russia 
 
 Battleships — 
 
 First-class . 
 Second-class 
 Third-class . 
 
 Total 
 
 26 
 10 
 
 10 
 10 
 
 S 
 ID 
 
 18 
 20 
 
 12 
 
 47 
 
 31 
 
 19 
 
 50 
 
 Taking the list of effective fighting ships in existence 
 and under construction into account, the comparative 
 strength given on page 89 of the "Annual" is as follows : 
 
 Class 
 
 0^ 
 
 £ 
 
 .2 
 
 OS 
 
 _>> 
 
 
 
 51 
 
 1 
 
 Battleships — 
 First-class 
 Second-class . 
 Third-class 
 
 38 
 10 
 
 •3 
 10 
 II 
 
 14 
 10 
 
 9 
 
 5 
 2 
 
 16 
 
 7 
 
 17 
 
 I 
 
 6 
 
 Total Battleships 
 
 59 
 
 34 
 
 25 
 
 16 
 
 23 
 
 18 
 
 7 
 
 Cruisers — 
 
 First-class 
 Second-class . 
 Third-class . 
 
 44 
 
 19 
 
 2J 
 13 
 
 13 
 
 7 
 5 
 
 5 
 5 
 II 
 
 5 
 S 
 iS 
 
 16 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 10 
 6 
 
 Total Cruisers 
 
 149 
 
 55 
 
 25 
 
 21 
 
 3' 
 
 34 
 
 22 
 
 Coast Defence Ships 
 
 17 
 
 14 
 
 16 
 
 3 
 
 19 
 
 10 
 
 I 
 
 Torpedo Gunboats 
 
 34 
 
 21 
 
 9 
 
 17 
 
 4 
 
 
 ■ 
 
HOME DEFENCE 
 
 265 
 
 Since these pages were written, the handbook for 1902 
 has appeared, and gives the following figures, showing 
 comparative strengths in ships built and building 
 (p. 64):- 
 
 Class 
 
 6a 
 
 i 
 
 i 
 
 _>. 
 
 1 
 
 6 
 
 13 j; 
 
 1 
 
 Battleships- 
 First-class 
 Second-class . 
 Third-class 
 
 Total Battleships 
 
 Cruisers — 
 
 First-class 
 Second-class . 
 Third-class 
 
 Total Cruisers 
 
 Turpedo Gunboats 
 
 41 
 17 
 69 
 
 49 
 62 
 46 
 
 157 
 
 34 
 
 13 
 10 
 15 
 
 38 
 
 19 
 23 
 13 
 
 55 
 
 21 
 
 15 
 10 
 
 8 
 33 
 
 16 
 
 7 
 
 31 
 9 
 
 9 
 
 5 
 2 
 
 16 
 
 5 
 5 
 II 
 
 17 
 
 16 
 15 
 31 
 
 6 
 8 
 20 
 
 34 
 
 4 
 
 17 
 
 28 
 
 13 
 10 
 
 34 
 
 6 
 
 2 
 8 
 
 6 
 10 
 8 
 
 24 
 
 2 
 
 I have no desire to pose as an alarmist, and there- 
 fore do not quote the comments which accompany 
 these tables. 
 
 The figures are simply brought forward by me to 
 illustrate the changed situation in which we find our- 
 selves when we compare the conditions which obtained 
 in 1805 and 1872 with those of 1902. If in 1872 it 
 were possible to say that " Prussia has three ironclads, 
 none of which she has been able to build herself," 
 or that the best of the five Russian ironclads was 
 inferior to the Warrior, " one of our most inferior iron- 
 clads," or that, " if Prussia began to construct, we could 
 build ten vessels to one she could build " ; if under 
 such conditions there was anxiety in the country, as 
 there was, is it to be wondered at that there is in 
 some quarters anxiety now? and is it not manifestly 
 
266 HOME DEFENCE 
 
 the fact that the old derision of anxiety has no longer 
 any sting in it? and is not the case against invasion 
 far less strong to-day than what it was thirty years 
 ago? 
 
 But it is not only that our royal navy, strong as 
 it is to-day, is, nevertheless, by no means so relatively 
 powerful when compared with the other naval forces 
 of the world as it was at the previous periods ; but we 
 are less secure owing to another circumstance — our 
 second line of defence used to lie in the inadequacy 
 of the hostile transport that was available to convey 
 an invading force to our shores. In 1872 Russia had 
 practically no sea-going steamers at all* That was 
 the case with Germany also, according to the same 
 authority. 
 
 The neutrality laws would prevent their hiring trans- 
 port, we were told. The Germans could not hire, 
 and had no transport of their own, and so invasion 
 by them was a mere chimera of the imagination. 
 If such were the resources of North Germany in 1872, 
 what a vast change do we discover to-day ? 
 
 Out of a total of 596 vessels of over 5000 tons which 
 all the countries of the globe possess Germany con- 
 tributes 124, and Great Britain 346; the United States 
 comes next with 36, and then France with 23. 
 
 The two largest steamship owners in the world are 
 German companies, the Hamburg-American Line of 
 Hamburg, with a total of 668,000 tons, and the Nord- 
 deutscher Lloyd of Bremen with 556,000 tons. Next 
 to these come Elder, Dempster, & Co. of Liverpool 
 with a total of 386,000 tons. Germany in 190 1 owned 
 a total of 1293 steamships of 100 tons and upwards, re- 
 presenting 2,417,410 tons; France 679, repres^^nting 
 1,068,936 tons. The figures for other countries wilJ be 
 found on page 711" Whittaker's Almanac " for 1902. It 
 
 * Journal of United Service Institution, \'ol. xvi. p. 5S1. 
 
HOME DEFENCE 267 
 
 is unnecessary to give them here : those that I have 
 mentioned are a sufficient answer to the question : 
 " Where are they going to find their transport ? " 
 
 As regards the number of ships that would be 
 necessary to convey a given force across the North 
 Sea or Channel, we find ourselves in this difficulty : 
 that all our figures are based on the experiences of 
 expeditions involving voyages of at least a fortnight, 
 for a few hours men might be packed very closely, 
 indeed, how closely it would be somewhat difficult to 
 say without actual experiment, but so closely, without 
 a doubt, as to render any of the calculations I have 
 already given quite valueless. An officer stated,* at 
 the time that the discussion took place at the Royal 
 United Service Institution in 1872, that a first-class 
 merchant-ship of the day could convey 3000 men for 
 the short voyage involved. 
 
 Commander W. Dawson, R.N., estimated the neces- 
 sary transport at 1 000 men per ship of 2000 tons, 
 the horses at 300 per ship of the same size. 
 
 It is scarcely necessary for me to labour the point 
 further, because in a former chapter the difficulties 
 which lie in the way of expeditions across the seas 
 have been noted : they are not intended to be made 
 light of here, but the fact remains that the landing 
 of a hostile force on our shores is by no means so 
 remote a possibility as it was thirty years ago, and 
 that it is no longer prudent to regard home defence as 
 a matter which may be entrusted entirely to our navy. 
 
 It is perfectly true that we must stand or fall by 
 our navy, and yet when that is fully and frankly 
 admitted the necessity for improving our means of 
 home defence still remains. At present the lack of 
 organisation and the inadequacy of the means at 
 
 * The late Colonel Valentine Baker, in a letter to the Times. 
 
268 HOME DEFENCE 
 
 our disposal has this sinister influence, that it dangles 
 a colossal prize before the eyes of the Continent, — a 
 prize the mere chance of winning which would justify 
 a gamble. With such stakes on the table, many an 
 acute intellect is turned to consider the problem which 
 under other- circumstances would be dismissed as 
 insoluble for practical purposes. When the leap is 
 within the compass of vigour and enterprise, the 
 venture will no longer be regarded as suicidal folly 
 or the scheme of a dreamer. 
 
 The late Admiral Sir W. R. Mends, R.N., C.B., 
 Director of Naval Transport, who had planned and 
 carried out the Crimean disembarkation, stated, in a 
 lecture given by him at the United Service Institution 
 on "Disembarkations" in 1862, that with proper pre- 
 parations he saw nothing to prevent 10,000 infantry 
 and 24 guns being carried at each trip from the ships 
 to the shore, " allowing each trip to occupy two hours, 
 which is a long time : in six hours we should have 
 30,000 infantry and 72 guns on shore."* 
 
 How, then, it will be asked, are we to put invasion 
 beyond the realms of practical politics ? to what ex- 
 tent should we be prepared on shore ? Manifestly the 
 time is not yet when we need vie with Continental 
 armaments and aim at being a great land as well as 
 a mighty sea-Power. The answer to our question is 
 to be found in asking yet another. What force is 
 it possible that we might have to meet? Some have 
 contemplated an invasion by 50,000 men, others have 
 gone as high as five Army Corps — Napoleon thought 
 of 150,000 men. With all the difficulties that attend 
 a disembarkation in view, I should be inclined to 
 estimate a potential invader's strength at less than 
 Napoleon's figures. But, even placing it as half that 
 force, we can well imagine a moment — have we not 
 
 • Journal of United Service Institution, \'ol. vi. j). 406. 
 
HOME DEFENCE 269 
 
 indeed lately seen it ? — when such an intrusion 
 would be an embarrassment of the highest im- 
 portance. 
 
 Because I do not believe that an invasion would 
 be attempted when our hands were free. A surprise 
 is not quite so simple a matter as some appear to 
 imagine. Even should we be absolutely ignorant of 
 what was impending, a condition which in these days 
 of telegraphs it is extremely difficult to imagine, the 
 mere process of disembarking men and horses and 
 guns at places where arrangements would have to 
 be very primitive and impromptu would probably take 
 up a period of time long enough to allow of consider- 
 able resistance being organised and a force capable 
 of delaying the invaders being forthcoming. It is 
 when our hands were full elsewhere, when the bulk 
 of our army was abroad, that war would far more 
 probably come upon us, and with recent experiences 
 none can say that a too lurid picture is conjured up 
 when three Army Corps or their equivalents are sup- 
 posed to have been sent from our shores. 
 
 No one three or four years ago would have com- 
 templated the possibility of a quarrel in South Africa 
 demanding such a clearance of fighting men from 
 Great Britain as we have just witnessed. Four years 
 ago we should have classed a conflict with the Boers 
 as among our " little wars." Yet although, undoubtedly, 
 our struggle in South Africa may justly be regarded 
 as an abnormal one, in so far as both strategy and 
 tactics are concerned, it is by no means clear that 
 we might not again have to send an expedition as 
 strong as regards regular troops from home as has 
 lately been found indispensable. 
 
 Had we been plunged into a war with Abyssinia, 
 instead of with the Boers, three Army Corps from home 
 would have had to join the expedition. If they had 
 
270 HOME DEFENCE 
 
 not been promptly despatched, perhaps even that force 
 would not have been found sufficient. 
 
 A war on the North- West frontier of India would 
 certainly have called as many men away. 
 
 If we were called upon to defend another portion 
 of our Empire not less than an equal force would 
 have to leave these shores. 
 
 Complications in the Far and Middle East demanding 
 strong expeditions might very possibly arise. 
 
 The truth is that regular troops will not go so 
 far against uncivilised foes as they formerly did. The 
 spread of armaments all over the world, the facilities 
 of communication, of manufacture, and of supply, are 
 now so great that the semi-savage races of the globe 
 are no longer to be subdued by mere handfuls of men, 
 formidable because infinitely better armed, and not 
 always invincible even then. So that it is no alarmist 
 apprehension which pictures us with the equivalent 
 of three Army Corps engaged in a struggle be}-ond 
 the seas, and, while thus occupied, being menaced by 
 a great Power. Again, we might be at war with one 
 great Power, might have despatched the force I have 
 indicated to make the counterstroke which is a 
 recognised feature of our military policy, and might 
 find ourselves at war with a second Power while the 
 issue of the first conflict still hung in the balance. 
 
 Some of our remaining troops would be in Ireland, 
 and I think it is safe to say that they would stay there. 
 
 As things stand at present we should have no more 
 organised units left, but a considerable residuum of men 
 of doubtful military efficiency, whom we ma)' term the 
 levee en masse. Would the presence of these obviate a 
 panic and give confidence should a naval disaster, not 
 necessarily final, befall our fleet ? I do not express any 
 opinion, but I pass on to consider what the factors in 
 military strength are. 
 
HOME DEFENCE 271 
 
 The first is moral. Whether we are to possess it or 
 not at some hypothetical future moment belongs to the 
 realm of prophecy, and in avoiding that I will imitate 
 all prudent men. 
 
 The next is discipline. That depends on good 
 officers — officers with a bearing and knowledge of 
 their profession that inspires confidence and commands 
 respect. We certainly have not an adequate supply of 
 such men for all our forces. Skill on the part of those 
 in the positions of generals comes amongst the first 
 necessities of an army, if not first of all. Whether we 
 possessed that ingredient of victory is alone to be 
 tested by experiment. We might hope, at least, to 
 have professional, painstaking men who were physi- 
 cally capable and had some knowledge of their 
 business, but with a war going on abroad they would 
 probably be lacking in the experience of large 
 commands which foreign officers possess. 
 
 In mere numbers we should have an advantage, 
 because we should be fighting at home ; while not only 
 would the question of sea transport limit the size of 
 the invading host, but the necessity for carefully 
 guarding base and lines of communication through 
 a hostile country would eat up many men, and the 
 force actually available in the front line would by 
 no means coincide with that which disembarked. 
 
 But if quantity were on our side quality would 
 certainly be on the other. A force chosen for the 
 invasion of England would represent the very flower 
 of the army that undertook that operation. In courage 
 and physical vigour it is possible that no great differ- 
 ence between the combatants would be visible, but as 
 regards training there would be a considerable gulf 
 between the two. We should have to fall back on 
 the remnant of the regulars left in the kingdom and 
 on militiamen and volunteers, who are but amateurs 
 
272 HOME DEFENCE 
 
 compared to the highly-trained officers and men of 
 Continental armies. 
 
 In one respect, however, we ought to be greatly at 
 an advantage, and that should be in the knowledge we 
 possessed of the country, and the embarrassment which 
 its enclosures and hedgerows would impose on foreigners 
 accustomed for the most part to manoeuvre over fence- 
 less areas. But every part of the Continent is not the 
 same, and districts enclosed and wooded are to be 
 found there as well as in England. We should do 
 well, therefore, not to build too much on this advantage, 
 although it would probably tell in our favour. 
 
 We have run down the whole gamut of military 
 efficiency, and we find that we cannot justly claim 
 even a majority of the qualifications that make armies 
 formidable for the force that would be left for home 
 defence. Indeed, many will contend that I have put 
 the case too favourably for our troops, and that with 
 a large expeditionary force abroad the residue of our 
 military forces would be less equal to the comparison 
 which I have instituted than appears from these pages. 
 Granted, however, that it is not pessimistic, and that the 
 manner in which I have put the case may be accepted. 
 
 It will then be apparent that we want organised 
 forces of a strength greater than the two remaining 
 Army Corps, to make us secure. The levh en masse 
 will not do to repel the sort of invasion that we should 
 have to meet. To begin with, the officers who could 
 be trusted to lead it are not forthcoming, and when 
 war had claimed its percentage of sick and wounded 
 there would be a great dearth, not only of those for 
 regimental duty, but of those of the staff. Such experts 
 as supply officers, signallers, and engineers would all 
 have been absorbed by the part of our forces abroad. 
 Even military clerks would not readily be found. 
 What then do we require ? 
 
HOME DEFENCE 273 
 
 Organisation, system, method. 
 
 Organisation implies readiness for war, and is the 
 true taHsman of success. What is war but a business ? 
 What were the greatest leaders but good business men ? 
 Frederick, whether war or administration engaged his 
 thoughts, was always a business man. Wellington, who 
 boasted that he owed his success in life to being always 
 ready a quarter-of-an-hour before it was absolutely 
 necessary, was essentially a worker and man of business 
 all his long life. A copy of almost every letter he ever 
 wrote is in existence, and that, too, in his own hand- 
 writing. As a man of business, administrator, states- 
 man, even as a lawyer. Napoleon was pre-eminent ; 
 as abnormal in the bureau as he was on the battle- 
 field, as certain to have attained success, if his intellect 
 were given scope and turned in the required direction, 
 
 This matter of home defence has, in fact, got to be 
 treated as a business matter. We want to be so well 
 organised at home — I do not say so strong — that any 
 potential opponent would feel that, even if he did 
 succeed in landing, say,^ four Army Corps, he would 
 have such opposition to dispose of as would render 
 any sudden, rapid, and decisive success, any raid on 
 London, or enterprise of that kind, a hopeless under- 
 taking. 
 
 We should always have so much behind the fleet that 
 a naval disaster in home waters need cause no panic, 
 that our people should sleep secure when the fleet had 
 left the Channel to harry our opponents, that we could 
 send away such forces as at the moment of writing* 
 are abroad, and still never feel doubtful as to the 
 efficiency of the units left behind. 
 
 What I mean is this. We, before the war, had for 
 some years an organisation, 1 daresay a very admirable 
 one, for home defence. All the units in the United 
 
274 HOME DEFENCE 
 
 Kingdom had their allotted places, the barracks were 
 formally assigned, the ammunition columns and trans- 
 port vehicles had their designations duly painted on 
 them ; but the waggons went to South Africa, and 
 were labelled afresh according to the units of the force 
 which has been in that country for the last three years. 
 The elaborate scheme for home defence went promptly 
 to pieces, as a little reflection will show that every 
 scheme similarly devised must inevitably collapse. 
 
 What stands between this nation and the spectacle 
 of all the forces normally at home mobilised for home 
 defence ? Obviously the navy, and that command of the 
 sea, which we have fair grounds to hope it will maintain. 
 But should we go to war while our naval power is 
 supreme, we have learnt that one part of every strategic 
 scheme would involve the despatch of a powerful 
 expeditionary force from these shores. Therefore, if 
 at war with a Continental Power, and in possession of 
 the mastery of the waves, two, if not three, of our Army 
 Corps, according to what we are ourselves legislating 
 for, would be out of the country, and the process 
 of reinforcing them with drafts to make good the 
 wastage caused by sickness, wounds, and death would 
 absorb another large section of our strength. 
 
 It is true that we shall not at once know that we shall 
 have command of the sea. Time was when we could 
 count upon it, but against a two-Power combination 
 we should now certainly have to gain it by force of 
 arms; we might have to fight for it even as against 
 one Power. Therefore for a certain period the com- 
 mand of the sea may be in the balance, and the 
 presence of all our forces at home will be necessi- 
 tated, and may be called for to defend these islands 
 against an attack, which we should, as yet, have no 
 right to regard as out of the question. 
 
 Such a state of uncertainty would not, however, be 
 
HOME DEFENCE 275 
 
 very prolonged, and if, as we have a right to expect, 
 our navy establish a supremacy, we shall not keep our 
 strength wasted in England. In short, a condition of 
 things under which all six Army Corps would be 
 absorbed in a scheme of home defence must be 
 abnormal ; and the defence of these islands by what 
 remained of our land forces after three Army Corps 
 had been used up abroad forms the real problem to 
 be dealt with. Although every eventuality should 
 receive attention, we should legislate for what is likely 
 to occur, not for what is only a remote contingency. 
 
 If we had not sent a force abroad with the view 
 of counterstroke or diversion, the defence of India or 
 Canada — or the demands of a war, I need not neces- 
 sarily call it a small one, — with some Power other 
 than European, might have called away forces equal 
 in dimensions to those just named. It is, as I have 
 said, far more probable that we shall be assailed 
 when our hands are full elsewhere in some one or 
 other, or even in more than one, of the various cases 
 I have specified than when they are free. It is, in fact, 
 infinitely more probable that we shall have to look 
 seriously to our home defences when a considerable 
 proportion of our regular forces are out of the kingdom 
 than when they are in the barracks of Aldershot 
 and Salisbury. 
 
 If that be so, as I believe it is, what is the course for 
 us to take ? The answer is that we should be guided 
 in defending our homes by the same principles that 
 underlie all sound defensive measures. An officer 
 who intends to occupy a defensive position first 
 allocates such a proportion of the force under his 
 command to counterstroke as he considers necessary. 
 In Imperial strategy, I have pointed out that we should 
 do the same. Having provided for counterstroke, the 
 remainder of the forces at disposal are devoted to the 
 
276 HOME DEFENCE 
 
 defence of the ground to be held, the provision of local 
 reserves being kept in view. But the force constituting 
 a general reserve for counterstroke or other purpose 
 is held under the hand of the supreme leader ready for 
 eventualities, and altogether apart from the defence of 
 the position which is separately provided for. If this 
 special reserve be allowed to become absorbed in the 
 line of front held, it will never be available at the 
 moment it is required, and there will be no counter- 
 attack, nor any compact body of men ready to face an 
 unforeseen contingency. 
 
 If in drawing up a defence scheme for these islands 
 the Army Corps which should be available to go abroad, 
 and which very probably when the attack came would 
 be abroad, are counted upon as available for defence 
 pure and simple, manifestly the scheme will be upset, 
 and something else of an impromptu and hastily-put- 
 together character must be adopted in its place. The 
 substitute will, in all probability, bear the marks of haste 
 and incompleteness upon it. In all probability it will 
 not be what may be termed a business-like arrange- 
 ment. It will be a makeshift, as expensive and in- 
 efficient as a makeshift invariably is. 
 
 The remedy for such a state of things is not far 
 to seek. We should legislate for home defence, not 
 as we may wish the situation to be when the call 
 sounds, but as it will most probably be — as it should 
 be if we intend to carry out a sound strategic plan, 
 as it must be if we are assailed when we are involved 
 abroad in operations such as I have indicated. The 
 first two Army Corps might have their places in one 
 scheme of home defence, but it should be an alternative 
 scheme, and in the scheme which would in all prob- 
 ability be the one that would be actually adopted, the 
 first two Army Corps, and preferably the third also, 
 should be regarded as out of the country. 
 
HOME DEFENCE 277 
 
 Having deducted the expeditionary force of three 
 Army Corps, or say 120,000 men, from the forces * which 
 under the new scheme are to be organised for various 
 purposes, a surplus would remain which, if properly 
 trained and organised and commanded by efficient 
 officers, would be more than sufficient to render us reason- 
 ably secure, — enough to give us a mobile field army, a 
 garrison for London, and troops for coast defence. The 
 advantage of locking up 100,000 men ear-marked for 
 the defence of London may be questioned. Passive 
 defence is abhorrent to strategy. If the field armies 
 of England are destroyed, the garrison of London 
 may defer but will not avert surrender. Fortifications 
 have proved the ruin of other armies besides the one 
 that surrendered at Metz in 1870. It was not by 
 digging himself in round Richmond that Lee in 1862 
 rolled back the apparently overwhelming tide of the 
 Federal invasion. Entrenchments were Banks's ruin 
 in the valley, and Osman Pacha held on too long to 
 his at Plevna. It is well not to let any visions of 
 heavy guns and earthworks and forces incapable of 
 manoeuvre fill our minds when we picture the defence 
 of London, but to remember that parapets and ditches, 
 because they appeal to popular imagination, are not 
 necessarily the soundest safeguards. 
 
 The fortifications of our dockyards and harbours 
 
 * The army available at home, according to the rarliamentary 
 return by Mr Brodrick in March 1901, was to consist of the following 
 forces : — 
 
 Regulars ....... 155,000 
 
 Reserves 90,000 
 
 Militia 150,000 
 
 Yeomanry 35, 000 
 
 X^olunteers 250,000 
 
 680,000 
 
 On the one hand, the war will have greatly depleted the reserve ; on 
 the other hand, the three years' service system will act as a set-off and 
 increase it. 
 
278 HOME DEFENCE 
 
 come under a different category, and while they have 
 met with more sweeping criticism and more violent 
 opposition than those inland, have nevertheless a more 
 logical raison d' etre and supply a real need. 
 
 One of the lessons of the Spanish-American war 
 was the demonstration of the value of coast defences 
 in supplementing naval action which it affords. It 
 is hardly the place here to recapitulate what has been 
 said on this subject in a previous chapter, but the 
 absence of coast defences then so injuriously affected 
 the action of the American fleets, and supplies so 
 excellent an illustration of how ships and forts may 
 be of mutual support, that a few words on a subject 
 intimately connected with home defence may be 
 added here. 
 
 Those who decry fixed defences on the coast are wont 
 to dwell on the superior value of mobile naval forces, 
 and their arguments have often been met with the reply 
 that if the defence of our coasts were to be entrusted 
 to ships alone there would be a considerable risk that 
 the defensive force would very probably be removed, 
 and would leave its charge open. It is perfectly con- 
 sistent with the full recognition of the powers of mobile 
 forces, such as I myself have just expressed, to point out 
 that in the case of naval forces a distinct danger in 
 thus leaving important places open does exist. The 
 peculiar characteristics of fleets and ships exhibited, 
 more especially in their powers of evasion which have 
 been dwelt upon in a previous chapter, lie at the root 
 of this form of risk ; but that it does exist in more 
 than theory is vouched for by the experiences of 
 the Americans on their Atlantic seaboard during the 
 late war. 
 
 Stationary objects such as seaports, harbours, and 
 estuaries can be defended by stationary works, and 
 stationary works are both more economical and more 
 
HOME DEFENCE 279 
 
 effective than floating batteries. Naturally, then, they 
 should be called in to our aid when possible, more 
 especially when by doing so we shall release other 
 forces for active duties, but also because they cannot 
 be taken from their special tasks. 
 
 During the American war the six monitors intended 
 for coast defence were diverted from that object and sent 
 away to distant points. Two even went as far as Manila. 
 
 The long coast - line of the United States was 
 notoriously inadequately defended. What produced 
 uneasiness in professional men quickly engendered 
 panic amongst the populace. We read of unmeasured, 
 irrational, unworthy terrors amongst the inhabitants 
 of the Atlantic seaport towns. Contemptible very 
 possibly, and ill-founded beyond doubt, but still real, 
 actual, transitive, and therefore not to be disregarded 
 by a popularly constituted Government. 
 
 A Government whose existence depends upon an 
 electorate cannot disregard popular clamour and the 
 feelings of the multitude, and without some permanent 
 protection to our coasts it would be in the power of 
 an enemy to seriously embarrass the policy of our 
 country by working on the weaknesses, fears, and 
 ignorance of the population. 
 
 Because the American coast defences did not inspire 
 the masses with confidence, the Government had to 
 use the navy to supplement them and make good 
 theil- inadequacy ; and the fleets, whose true role, as 
 has been explained, should have been an offensive 
 one, had to be content in the first place with a defensive 
 attitude. No one, I think, who has done me the honour 
 to read these pages will accuse me of any love for fixed 
 defences or of any desire to minimise that necessity for 
 an all-prevailing navy which dominates the whole of 
 our Imperial policy. I trust I shall not be misunder- 
 stood in what I say. 
 
28o HOME DEFENCE 
 
 The mere fact that we are so dependent on foreign 
 aid for our supply of food differentiates our case from 
 that of any other nation, and modifies the relationship 
 between forts and ships in a very high degree. But 
 it does not alter the fact that there are two elements 
 in sea warfare, and that they are complementary to 
 one another. It is a question of proportion, and also, 
 be it noted, of methods. Bricks and mortar on land 
 fronts should be sparingly indulged in ; gun-power, 
 the choosing of judicious sites for guns, and com- 
 paratively light entrenchments, will go far to give 
 the necessary security, and will not entail the same 
 expense. 
 
 A system of coast fortification sufficient to free 
 the fleet, give confidence to the civil population of 
 the country, and prevent any of our important sea- 
 ports falling by a coup-de-main and being utilised as 
 a base of operations by an enemy, is a first necessity 
 in home defence. 
 
 The machinery, or what may be called the business 
 of home defence, is next separated from that which 
 provides for a force available for action beyond the 
 seas. 
 
 Finally, our remaining forces and resources of all 
 kinds are, or should be, so handled and allocated that 
 they may, when called upon, act with the greatest 
 readiness and under the conditions most favourable 
 to their application. 
 
 Preparation should become the key-note of our system. 
 Not only, however, as regards units, their organisation, 
 equipment, and training. For there is a wider form of 
 preparation of equal importance, which will go far to 
 enhance the efficiency of our forces however highly 
 trained and systematically organised they may be. 
 
 I mean that form of readiness to meet an enemy 
 which finds confidence in a complete knowledge of the 
 
HOME DEFENCE 281 
 
 ground on which we are called upon to fight him. 
 The theatre of war when home defence is under 
 discussion, is the soil of these islands. The whole 
 area involved, measured by continental standards, 
 and still more by those we ourselves have grown 
 accustomed to abroad, is comparatively small. The 
 area in which there is any considerable probability of 
 operations occurring is smaller still. The chapter 
 which dealt with disembarkations will have made this 
 clear. To deal with this smaller portion of our 
 islands is not a very gigantic task. To do so would 
 cost nothing, would provide excellent training for 
 officers, and would give an interest to work which 
 the routine of the barrack-square and the drill-field 
 can never supply. 
 
 I do not mean that in our case the works need 
 actually be constructed or the roads made, but every 
 portion of the country where fighting could occur 
 might be .systematically studied, as indeed parts of 
 it have already been surveyed, and although not a 
 sod be cut or spadeful of earth removed, the needs 
 and requirements of every potential position to resist 
 invasion — its advantages and limitations — might be 
 recorded, and the information carefully preserved for 
 use at a moment of emergency. Similarly, the places 
 where advanced depots and posts on the lines of com- 
 munication would in certain eventualities be established 
 should not only be known, but should have been 
 carefully surveyed and examined, and the plans 
 necessary to adapt them to the purpose for which 
 they are intended should be drawn up. The facilities 
 afforded for entraining and disentraining troops at 
 the various railway stations, and the alterations and 
 improvised additions in platforms and sidings which 
 war would demand, should all be calculated and ready 
 to hand. 
 
282 HOME DEFENCE 
 
 The facilities for encamping and bivouacking troops in 
 every district should be accurately known ; the existence 
 of water, fuel, suitable soil, and the tactical features 
 of the site. Here, it will be said, is created a huge 
 task, which may all end in labour thrown away. The 
 labour would not be thrown away, because the ofificers 
 who had been employed upon these estimates would 
 all have learnt much of permanent value to themselves 
 and to the service, while they were contributing to the 
 preparedness of their country for war. The staff tours 
 we are constantly engaged in from the Staff College 
 are all to a large extent taken up with work analogous 
 to that I have described, and form perhaps the most 
 instructive portion of the course at that institution. 
 The adoption of the methods I have foreshadowed in 
 our military districts would simply mean the extension 
 of the system of staff tours to every command, and 
 would bring with it the benefits derived from those set 
 on foot at Camberley. 
 
 Circumstances alter so rapidly at home that recon- 
 naissances already made would need revision every 
 few years, so that the mine of instruction afforded 
 by them is never likely to be worked out and ex- 
 hausted. 
 
 Organisation and training are the real secrets of 
 victory. It was not because they were braver or shot 
 better that the Prussians in 1870 overthrew the race 
 that sixty-four years previously had trampled their 
 fathers underfoot. Who shall question the courage 
 of the defenders of the Chateau Geissburg or the 
 splendid heroism of the counter-attacks at Woerth? Not 
 Gravelotte and not Sedan, but Algiers and Mexico 
 laid the third Empire low. The over-confidence of easy 
 victories blunted the intelligence and corrupted the 
 standard of the French army. The rough-and-ready 
 methods of savage warfare broke in pieces against the 
 
HOME DEFENCE 283 
 
 highly- tempered weapons of a scientifically developed 
 army. Generalship will redress many deficiencies of 
 armament, but capable generals are the product of 
 trained officers. A Icv^e en masse, even though it may 
 include many brilliant marksmen, is still a congeries 
 of individuals, not an army. It will furnish the materials 
 from which to make an army, but it is no more a 
 military machine that an ingot of steel is a quick- 
 firing gun. 
 
 Well-trained officers, therefore, are demanded not for 
 the comparatively few regulars who may be out of the 
 country when men are hurrying to the alarm posts, but 
 for that amorphous and invertebrate body, individually 
 valuable but collectively little more than men with 
 muskets, on which some day we shall perhaps have 
 to rely for the defence of the heart of the Empire, 
 and in whose keeping the fate of the country may 
 some day be placed. 
 
 Some, not without reason, will say that now I have 
 touched on the weakest point of all, and that what I 
 have left last outweighs in importance all that has 
 gone before. What if when the gun is to be made 
 the steel itself is not forthcoming? what if when the 
 bullets are to be cast there be no lead? The best 
 moulds and most scientific shapes are valueless then. 
 
 True ; but it is not my purpose to enter on a dis- 
 quisition on conscription, or military training in Board 
 Schools, or rates of pay, or rifle ranges. To defend 
 his country is the citizen's first duty. In our country 
 he has been in the habit of paying, by means of taxes, 
 other people to perform that duty for him. 
 
 He has done it by deputy. 
 
 Of late, finding that his wages were not sufficiently 
 attractive, he has increased them. If the substitutes 
 (for our recruits are but substitutes) are still not forth- 
 coming, the wages can be increased up to the spending 
 
284 HOME DEFENCE 
 
 power of those, namely, the electorate of this country, 
 who prefer not to perform a duty which the great 
 majority of other people in the world do for themselves. 
 When the income of the people — that is to say, of 
 the country, will no longer bear the expense of the 
 army, they must either soldier in person or leave 
 their possessions open to plunder. If you cannot afford 
 a gamekeeper, you must walk round your preserves 
 yourself or let the poachers have their way. It is the 
 task of statesmen, chosen from the spokesmen of the 
 electorate, to provide the men ; it is the duty of officers 
 to say how many they want, and to organise and 
 train those they get. Besides, the question of volun- 
 tary and compulsory service has been before the 
 country so long, and has been so ably argued, that there 
 is really nothing new to be said about it. Moreover, 
 it has beome a political question, and I desire to avoid 
 the discussion of politics. 
 
 But we may note that two circumstances give us 
 hope for the future. One is that a very large number 
 of people are strongly in favour of some form of 
 military training being adopted in Board Schools. As 
 attendance at school is compulsory, we find here the 
 germ of compulsory military training. The period of 
 compulsory service with the colours when it does come 
 may, therefore, be reduced to a minimum now impossible, 
 because the elementary parts of soldiering will not take 
 so long to acquire, as, when as at present, a wretched 
 yokel who has never handled a rifle or been taught 
 to march has to be trained. 
 
 But a greater impulse and help should come from 
 that federation for Imperial defence which we trust 
 is in the future. The Colonies are without the pre- 
 judices and inherited political trammels that hamper 
 us. It is possible that the example of the Colonies, 
 in the majority of which liability to military service 
 
HOME DEFENCE 285 
 
 is a feature of defence, will bring home to the people 
 of this country the advantages of a system which has 
 few real drawbacks. 
 
 And, finally, perhaps I may say too that the argument 
 most commonly used against any form of compulsory 
 service for home defence is that it is not needed, because 
 it is for an army liable to go anywhere that recruiting 
 is difficult, and that, were it adopted, we should actually 
 have too many men for the defence of England alone. 
 Even putting aside the great advantages as regards 
 training which liability to service would bring with it, 
 this argument is quite a fallacious one. 
 
 In the first place, we should not need to keep up all 
 the existing units. If a smaller but adequately trained 
 Home army could be set in the field by us, a foreigner 
 would as soon plan an invasion of the moon as of our 
 country. Secondly, liability to service does not forbid 
 exemption from service. The supply can be adjusted to 
 the demand easily enough, and varied according to cir- 
 cumstances. Thirdly, the experience of every officer 
 who has commanded a unit is that there is never any 
 difficulty in getting men to volunteer for service abroad ; 
 so many usually come forward that selection amongst 
 many applicants often causes much heart-burning. 
 
 Compulsory home service would therefore bring us 
 a foreign army too, and would supply us with officers 
 for the units at home in addition. 
 
 Thus the question of the provision of the men may 
 be dismissed. They can be got, and must be got, by 
 some means or other. Meanwhile, let us organise and 
 train what we have. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 
 
 In the preceding pages the combined action of the 
 army and navy has been dwelt upon at considerable 
 length. I have more than once perhaps ventured with 
 undue rashness on the realm of the sister-service, and 
 have rushed in where less mortal beings might have 
 feared to tread. Yet, having gone so far, it becomes 
 necessary to penetrate still further, and that, too, in 
 other directions before the subject can be left. The 
 fighting strength of our Imperial system includes more 
 than the Imperial army and navy, and no estimate 
 that overlooked the aid of our Colonial forces could 
 be regarded as complete. It may, however, be thought 
 that these latter are included in the terms of our 
 discussion, and that when we speak of the army we 
 bring those troops to whom the Empire owes so much 
 within our arguments. If courage, loyalty and zeal 
 were the only qualifications that war demands from 
 armies, it would, indeed, be unnecessary to add another 
 word. 
 
 But this is very far from being the case. Power, 
 which is the product of carefully prepared organisation, 
 is a potency vastly different from fighting energy de- 
 veloped on the spur of the moment. There is as great 
 a distinction between them as there is between trained 
 skill and natural aptitude, between the professional and 
 the amateur, the raw material and the manufactured 
 article. The existence of latent strength being assured, 
 
 286 
 
ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 287 
 
 we want to get the greatest possible value from it, to 
 be able to call it rapidly into activity, to direct it with 
 nicety and precision, to economise and husband as well 
 as wear and exhaust it. We want, in other words, to 
 co-ordinate the various forces we may have at our 
 disposal, and it is clearly impossible to do so until we 
 not only know exactly how much we can command, 
 but can count upon their being ready to our grasp 
 when the time comes for us to pick them up. 
 
 The conception of Imperial defence put forward 
 throughout the preceding chapters has hinged on all 
 the weapons in the armoury of the Empire being re- 
 garded as always at the disposal of one directing mind 
 for combined use. Elements of force, whether by land 
 or sea, have been viewed as forming one military power, 
 pooled — so to speak — in a common reservoir of strength 
 from which we draw what the needs of the moment may 
 call for. 
 
 Imagination may take a higher flight and picture 
 every service and every Government placing its re- 
 sources at the disposal of a central administration, 
 which, in turn, hands them over to a directing will to 
 assure a general security. Such is the highest standard 
 of Imperial efficiency. That is what we ought to 
 possess, may even at some future period enjoy. But 
 is it more at the pre.sent time than the dream of an 
 enthusiast? Many will, no doubt, dissent; but hardly 
 anyone will be found sanguine enough to argue that 
 we can as yet point to the existence of what is more 
 than a mere embryo. But that there has been of late 
 an altogether astonishing and rapid development 
 towards the ideal no one can deny. However much 
 Imperial federation may have formerly been derided, 
 the South African war has blown to pieces any doubts 
 as to the possibility of such a federation. The young 
 life is there, the seed has sprouted ; it remains for time 
 
288 ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 
 
 and patience to foster and protect development. But 
 we must look for progress to the slow expansion of 
 nature, not to injudicious forcing ; to the gradual 
 action of health, not to the rampant growth of a 
 disease. To correlate and judiciously utilise the forces 
 of the mother country is a labour that lies first before 
 us, and that alone will not be a little task. We may 
 be but a narrow space removed from a satisfactory 
 solution of that comparatively minor problem, but 
 what a world of controversy lies between us and the 
 larger question ! 
 
 The meeting of Colonial premiers this summer, if 
 it has not, so far, had any wide-reaching consequences, 
 has at least laid another stepping-stone to a larger 
 scheme, in the promise of other conferences every four 
 years, and in the increased contributions to the navy 
 which have been arranged for. We shall not know 
 all that was done at the proceedings, and resolutions 
 may not amount to much ; but the Imperial federalist 
 need not despair. The conference itself implies an 
 understanding more satisfactory than anything that 
 could have been anticipated ten years ago, and some- 
 thing more substantial than a demonstration seems 
 to have been achieved. 
 
 According to the Blue-Book which has just lately 
 appeared, which gives an account of what took place, 
 at least one result of the conference is to be found in 
 the fact that the Commonwealth Parliament will be 
 invited to make a contribution of ^2CXD,ooo in place 
 of ;^io6,ooo per annum towards the cost of an im- 
 proved Australasian squadron and the establishment 
 of a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve. 
 
 New Zealand is to be asked to send us ;^40,ooo 
 instead of ;;^20,ooo for the same purposes. 
 
 Cape Colony will contribute ;^50,ooo and Natal 
 ;^35,ooo towards the general maintenance of the navy. 
 
ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 289 
 
 Canada does not participate in this agreement. 
 
 But Newfoundland will contribute ^1^3000 per annum 
 (and a capital sum of ^18,000 for fitting up and 
 preparing a drill-ship) towards the maintenance of a 
 branch of the Royal Naval Reserve of not less than 
 600 men. 
 
 On the other hand, the Admiralty promises to send 
 better ships to Australasia, and engages to supply, 
 amongst others, a first-class cruiser. 
 
 The results, no doubt, fall immeasurably short of 
 the glowing conceptions some may have formed ; but 
 a decade, no small portion of the life of an individual, 
 occupies but a tiny space in the pile of an empire's 
 fabric. We have travelled far of late on the wave of 
 an Imperial crisis, but must not expect progress on 
 the billows of a storm every year. Yet may the lapse 
 of years, like the flow of an unseen tide, carry us ulti- 
 mately to our destination if we leave ourselves and our 
 fortunes to the keeping of its imperceptible strength. 
 
 Meanwhile, eager and zealous souls must never fail 
 to bear in mind the exact relationship in which we 
 stand to our Colonies, and the true nature of the con- 
 nection that binds us to them. They must temper 
 sentiment with stubborn facts, and lay to heart the 
 lessons of history. 
 
 In many respects that teaching should be encourag- 
 ing to us. We have profited by our lessons. The 
 great colonising Powers of the past did not always 
 succeed in retaining the affection of their offspring 
 as we have done during the last century. Our pre- 
 decessors in sea-power, when they founded settlements, 
 often sowed dragons' teeth, from which sprang mutual 
 hatred and internecine strife. If their children leaped into 
 being with all the warlike qualities of the parents, they 
 showed small sign of the filial ties that bind families 
 together. They left home because the parental roof 
 T 
 
290 ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 
 
 had no longer space for them, or because commercial 
 interests tempted them abroad. But when they sailed 
 away they trailed behind them none of those bonds of 
 union with their birthplaces that are woven during 
 long years of common dangers, common struggles, and 
 common triumphs. Where the parental influence has 
 not had time to assert its influence filial piety will outlive 
 self-interest in the case of states no longer than amongst 
 individuals. Athens, at one period almost as mighty 
 relatively to her contemporaries as we are to-day, might 
 boast of many cities and colonies thrown out as off"- 
 shoots of the vigour and energy of her race. But that 
 vigour was also exhibited in the abrogation of parental 
 authority ; while independence of character degenerated 
 into selfishness and intemperate license. Pride of race 
 may have supplied a slender thread of connection, the 
 Olympic games and a few such institutions a point 
 of meeting. While the Greeks might quarrel with one 
 another, they could make common cause against those 
 who were outside their civilisation. But the colonies 
 and cities that dotted the shores of Asia Minor, Italy, 
 Sicily, and Africa acknowledged no overlord, and were 
 governed according to almost every imaginable system 
 from republic to tyranny, according as popular feeling 
 had swayed while they were in process of development. 
 The Greeks may have carried their country with 
 them wherever they went, but distinct units and 
 separate organisms soon sprang up in the resting- 
 places where they settled down. 
 
 It has just been stated that a common danger, such 
 as the Macedonian inroad, could compel the states of 
 Greek origin to combine. But when the danger passed 
 the necessity for union disappeared also, the old rivalry 
 or antagonism returned, a Themistocles could go over 
 to the Macedonians, and Greek ascendency finally 
 perished as much at the hands of strife and intrigue 
 
ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 291 
 
 amongst members of the race as at the sword point of 
 the Romans. 
 
 Our Empire differs from that of the Greeks because, 
 although it has grown up on a commercial basis, the 
 ties of national and family life have never been severed. 
 England is still home to those who dwell at the other 
 end of the world. Warm affection and sentiment, 
 stronger, perhaps, than community of interests, still 
 bind our Colonies together. The same loyalty to the 
 same Crown makes patriotism all over the Empire 
 converge on one spot. But in the lion's brood all the 
 characteristics of the lion can be fully traced. The 
 courage, independence, and strength which have made 
 us what we are characterise our children too. The 
 spirit that made loyal Englishmen rebels in the case 
 of Cromwell and Hampden made foreigners out of 
 loyal Colonists when America broke away. If the 
 Greek emigrant carried his country with him, those 
 who left our shores did so in an even more unmis- 
 takable fashion. 
 
 Commercial interest is a very perishable bond of 
 union. Where monetary profit is concerned the sterling 
 attributes themselves of the British race make men 
 unwilling to abandon their advantage, still less their 
 rights, for mere sentiment ; or drop the substance for 
 the shadow when striking a bargain. What else binds 
 us to our Colonies? The Parliament at Westminster 
 cannot, although it produces a Colonial Minister, fulfil 
 that function ; for the great Colonies are self-govern- 
 ing, and are not likely to assent to or admit the 
 jurisdiction of a body in which they are not represented ; 
 and the question of how they may be represented in 
 an Imperial Parliament is one beset with so many 
 difficulties that its solution is not likely to come in 
 the immediate future. The King and the personal 
 loyalty his rule inspires is, in fact, at present the only 
 
292 ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 
 
 real link, except self-interest, that holds us together, and 
 even that link, strong as it appears, is not so complete 
 as it should be, because the view taken of it by all 
 Colonials and by all of our own people is not the same. 
 To many in the Commonwealth or Dominion the King 
 appeals as completely as a sovereign as he does to 
 the inhabitants of these islands. In the minds of those 
 who hold such a view the Crown governs the dominions 
 beyond the Atlantic and at the Antipodes through 
 their local parliaments just as it does England through 
 its representatives at Westminster. But that is not 
 always completely understood by all of us at home. 
 Some imagine that because Parliament governs some 
 of it, it governs the entire Empire, and do not, in many 
 cases, understand that the Colonists resent such a claim. 
 The principle which insists on representation accom- 
 panying expenditure, and consequently taxation, one 
 more deeply rooted in the hearts of those of British 
 origin than any other, stands, in fact, at present across 
 the road to a completely united Empire. 
 
 To have a complete federation we must have a 
 common Parliament and a common war-chest, to which 
 the members of the federation would contribute pro 
 rata. But until that day arrives Great Britain must 
 bear the compulsory burthen of Imperial defence almost 
 alone, and the co-operation of the Colonies, where their 
 own homesteads and cities are not concerned, must re- 
 main as absolutely a matter of their own choice as it 
 is at present. We could wish for nothing more genial, 
 spontaneous, and satisfactory than it has been in our 
 late war, and we can wish for nothing better as long 
 as the same support is forthcoming in the future, but 
 we cannot model any scheme of Imperial defence for 
 operations beyond the regions immediately concerned 
 on an uncertain quantity. However much we may ap- 
 preciate it, assistance which is voluntary, and therefore 
 
ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 293 
 
 precarious, cannot be reckoned up and parcelled out. 
 We can only regard it as a floating asset which may 
 or may not be available according as the temper of a 
 popular assembly sets. 
 
 It is hardly necessary to say that with purely local 
 schemes of defence we have here no concern ; local 
 dangers will be met by them, and the responsibility 
 for them rests on the local authorities who draw 
 them up. 
 
 Yet should the vulnerability of an empire be 
 measured rather by the absence of any local weakness 
 than by the existence of all but universal strength, it 
 is the distribution rather the sum of force which tells. A 
 local disorder may readily grow into general disturbance. 
 The health of a corporate existence like that of an in- 
 dividual should be secured by a general watchfulness. 
 
 It is evident, then, that considerations of the highest 
 constitutional importance bar the way at present to 
 any complete federation of the Empire as regards 
 military action. An Imperial Parliament, Imperial 
 taxes, and an Imperial exchequer must be created 
 before the battalions of an Imperial army can be 
 mustered. Whether such a consummation will ever 
 be realised must be doubtful : that it is not at present 
 within the realm of practical politics is sure. And 
 another thing is certain too : should it ever come it 
 will not burst upon us a sudden creation, but appear 
 almost imperceptibly as a growth and slow develop- 
 ment. The " Republic " was only imagined, not called 
 into being, by Plato. No statesman, however subtle 
 his brain, devising constitutions in a library, like an 
 Abbe Sieyes, will, by a bright inspiration, hit on the 
 happy combination. We must wait for times and 
 seasons of natural expansion, for the gradual swelling 
 of the tributaries and the gathering pressure of a 
 rising flood. 
 
294 ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 
 
 Let us descend a step till then, and be content to 
 work on a lower plane. 
 
 If we cannot regard all the forces of the Empire as 
 a whole, may one not so view those we control in Great 
 Britain ? 
 
 The suggestion is by no means new. In one shape 
 or other it has constantly appeared since our attention 
 has been drawn to the true foundations of our security, 
 and as lately as the past summer (1902) it has again 
 been in men's mouths. It even exists in the actual 
 form of the Defence Committee, which is occupied 
 with the great questions and heavy responsibilities 
 which its charge brings with it. But it has frequently 
 been pointed out that every one of the men who 
 compose that body have already as much or more 
 work in their own special departments as they can 
 efficiently deal with. We have been told that the 
 delicate and complicated questions that the Committee 
 grapples with demand complete freshness of mind 
 and concentrated thought, such as men oppressed by 
 other cares can scarcely give. Men have said that 
 the very name " Committee of Defence" is a misleading 
 one, and that what the members of the Committee ought 
 to consider is not protection, but war generally, and 
 the preparation for war. Certainly no sound system of 
 strategy can ever prescribe a purely defensive attitude, 
 even to operations conceived in the least aggressive 
 spirit. You do not defend yourself in a combat by 
 merely warding off blows. If war be forced upon us, we 
 must be ready to strike, and we must intend to strike. 
 There appears some ground, therefore, for the conten- 
 tion that to label a council which is engaged in warlike 
 deliberations as defensive is to open the door to mis- 
 conception. We need not quibble as to names, however ; 
 there is a larger question connected with the defence 
 of a great empire which we wish to investigate. 
 
ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 295 
 
 War certainly includes both offence and defence. 
 But war for Great Britain includes something above 
 and beyond and yet essential to the success of either 
 attitude. 
 
 War is war, whether by land or sea ; and we have 
 never waged a war, as distinguished from a rebellion, 
 since the time of Cavaliers and Roundheads, in which 
 both our army and our navy were not acting in com- 
 bination. 
 
 But not always was our sea-power turned to good 
 account, not always was it used to get full value from 
 our army. To assert so much may only be tantamount 
 to saying we are human. No mortal enterprises but 
 must sometimes go wrong : no schemes but must occa- 
 sionally miscarry. But we strive, nevertheless, to act 
 so that the chances at least are in our favour ; and in 
 launching an expedition over-sea we should at anyrate 
 be clear and persistent as to what we want to do. Now 
 it can scarcely be said that the expeditions to Buenos 
 Ayres in 1807 were the outcome of well-matured con- 
 sideration ; or that, whatever view may be taken of the 
 strategic conception that dictated the Walcheren ex- 
 pedition, the execution displayed anything but a gross 
 waste of our strength ; or that Castlereagh's contem- 
 plated raid on Boulogne was well-matured ; or that when 
 Sir John Moore was sent to Sweden before he went to 
 Spain our councils were well advised. It was certainly 
 more fortunate than scientific that at the moment 
 when we decided to launch an expedition where sound 
 strategy called it there were three several bodies of 
 troops provided with transports available, all destined 
 for enterprises to be conducted at the same time in 
 three widely divergent directions. Again, the success 
 of Howe in shifting his attack from the Delaware to 
 the Chesapeake has been used by Captain Mahan as an 
 example of the misuse of sea-power. If Howe won 
 
2^6 ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 
 
 Brandywine and captured Philadelphia, Burgoyne was 
 isolated and had to surrender at Saratoga. In other 
 words, even when we possessed command of the sea 
 we sometimes did not know how to use that priceless 
 gift. Soon our sea-power itself failed us. The two 
 Bourbon Powers were at war with us, the French and 
 Spanish fleets made a combination more powerful 
 than any we could set against it. 
 
 It is scarcely necessary to recount the dreary tale 
 again or pursue the course of futility to the last dis- 
 graceful finish. The loss of half a continent and the 
 goodwill of our own flesh and blood should be sufficient 
 to prevent our forgetting it. The criticism which a 
 brilliant naval writer has directed on our strategy at 
 the close of the war with our American Colonies might 
 have been turned upon it by Napoleon himself, the 
 military leader who is thought not to have understood 
 naval matters. When Captain Mahan demonstrates 
 how the British forces were divided so as to be unable 
 to render one another mutual help, when he derides 
 the policy that made them operate out of combination, 
 he is only illustrating that maxim of the Emperor's 
 which insists on one line of operations being best. The 
 circumstances of our time have shaken the infallibility 
 of the dictum as regards the present day but not as re- 
 gards the past. 
 
 And later, when the coalition against us on the sea 
 took from us the amulet that has often served us 
 before and since, it was to concentrate and not scatter 
 her ships that England should have striven. The sailor 
 who shows how an endeavour to cover every point 
 could only expose our ships to defeat in detail, enun- 
 ciates a principle that is, or ought to be, familiar to 
 every officer on shore. The wisdom that demonstrates 
 how the whole theatre of war should have been taken 
 into our purview, and insists that at the outset it should 
 
ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 297 
 
 have been considered carefully and decided clearly 
 what part of the assailed empire it was most nefcessary 
 to preserve, and what might be left to the chance of 
 capture, appeals to soldiers as well as seamen. War 
 demands risks and sacrifices whether it be a land or 
 a naval war, whether the fate of a province or of an 
 empire is at stake. 
 
 Mahan tells us that England, everywhere on the 
 defensive with inferior numbers, could not hope for 
 victory through any strategy or tactics, that did not 
 comprise vigorous, nay even rash, action and initiative. 
 
 Napoleon facing the whole of Europe in 181 5 pro- 
 claims the same gospel. Apparently overwhelmed, he 
 advances to meet his foes, almost gained, and certainly 
 deserved, the palm that rewards such energy and 
 vigour. Lee and Jackson have given us even more 
 sparkling illustrations of the same eternal truths ; while 
 on the other side vast hosts on shore and full sway 
 on the waters were unavailing because ignorantly 
 utilised. 
 
 There is nothing, then, in the nature of the principles 
 involved that would prevent one central authority 
 from dealing with the great strategical questions that 
 are raised in Imperial defence. It would, of course, 
 have to be assisted by professional advisers from each 
 service, and it would be desirable that the immediate 
 control of each service should be in the hands of 
 those advisers. 
 
 The difficulties that would be encountered in making 
 an organisation of this kind are, however, great. Many 
 naval officers are persuaded that in any department 
 where navy and army were both represented the 
 influence of the army would weigh the balance down. 
 It is not necessary to inquire into the reasons that 
 underlie such views : they exist, and have to be 
 faced. 
 
298 ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 
 
 Then there are objections from the political stand- 
 point. Unless the heads of the army and navy were 
 Ministers with seats, as at present, in the Cabinet, 
 it is asserted that the interests of the services would 
 suffer. If one Minister represented both services in 
 the Cabinet, he could not deal with the mass of 
 detail that would congest his office. The bolder course 
 suggested by the late Lord Randolph Churchill that 
 there should be professional heads of army and navy 
 with seats in the House of Lords, and Members of the 
 Cabinet, is the more logical conclusion to arrive at. 
 He would have linked the two services together by the 
 creation of a Minister of Defence, who would be in 
 the Cabinet also, and a Member of the House of 
 Commons. The duty of such a Minister would be to 
 propose the annual expenditure on both services in 
 the House of Commons, and he would be their mouth- 
 piece in that assembly. Two objections have been 
 raised to this suggestion. One points to the jealousy 
 Parliament is said to exhibit at any infringement 
 of its control of our forces, and quotes constitutional 
 precedent against it. The provision of armaments, 
 ships, and men is, however, a matter of money ; and 
 while the House controls expenditure it holds the 
 army and the navy in the hollow of its hand. 
 The Members of the House must be convinced before 
 the money is supplied : the power of the purse is the 
 determining factor : who holds the purse commands 
 the situation. 
 
 But it is further urged that the Minister who has 
 to place the estimates before the House and to 
 justify them in debate will inevitably become invested 
 with responsibility for them, and that then the raison 
 detre of the scheme will disappear. For we are to 
 note that it was to ensure direct personal responsi- 
 bility that the principle of professional control was 
 
ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 299 
 
 insisted on by the talented author of the scheme. 
 You cannot have personal responsibility without pro- 
 fessional training, knowledge, and control ; while to 
 ensure efficiency you must have personal responsibility. 
 Genius or good fortune may, once in a century, achieve 
 success by abnormal methods, just as a man may 
 paint beautiful pictures with his feet, or write with 
 his mouth ; but business men do not take risks on 
 such terms. 
 
 But the scheme I refer to was said to be weak 
 precisely where it was intended that it should have 
 been strongest, for the responsibility of the pro- 
 fessional Ministers created by it would tend to 
 diminish, while the power of the Minister who was 
 the link between them, but who sat in the popular 
 assembly would grow. Eventually he would become, 
 it was feared, too powerful, and the evils of civilian 
 control would once more flourish in their old luxuri- 
 ance. When we follow the reasoning of men whose 
 great knowledge of our Parliamentary system commands 
 our respect, and who foreshadow difficulties such as 
 have been named, we can realise how Moeltke, rising 
 from the complicated problem, concluded, "that not 
 only had we not got an army, but that from the 
 nature of our constitution we could never have one." 
 
 That personal responsibility is the only true method 
 to attain military efficiency every man who has a 
 shadow of experience is well aware. That the evils 
 of civilian control have over and over again marred 
 the fairest schemes of commanders every student of 
 military history appreciates. Civilians -and soldiers who 
 are men of business are in full agreement as to the 
 advantages of permitting men who know the details 
 of a business to manage it. On the other hand, the 
 essential characteristic of men of business is to be 
 practical. And, as practical men, let us face the 
 
300 ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 
 
 facts of the case squarely. Rightly or wrongly, men 
 who have made politics their profession regard such 
 suggestions as have been thrown out as inexpedient, 
 and assert that they cannot even be entertained. As 
 in duty bound, then, let us accept that view as 
 decisive, putting from us and placing on one side 
 the criticisms that have been levelled at it. If we 
 cannot proceed in one direction, let us, as practical 
 people, see whether we cannot make a scheme of a 
 less ambitious character carry us forward. Let us 
 again take a step lower, and inquire whether a 
 system which will improve our position cannot be 
 constructed on a humbler scale. 
 
 Could not the authority, be it represented by a 
 single war Minister or a defence committee which 
 watched over Imperial defence, have at its elbow a 
 body of men who were absolutely relieved of all 
 administrative or executive functions of any kind 
 except those which their immediate duties compelled 
 them to undertake, whose whole energies and time were 
 devoted to purely military questions, such as organis- 
 ation, manoeuvres, terms of service, or the provision of 
 stores? — a body whose principal thought was bent 
 on strategical questions and the preparation for war? 
 — men who would never be troubled with questions as 
 to discipline or promotion of officers or the transport 
 and housing of troops, who would simply assist in 
 indicating what ought to be the broad features of 
 our policy, leaving the doing of it to those whose 
 special duties led them to execute but not to devise. 
 
 A man will always deal first with questions that are 
 urgent, and matters of routine are just the things that 
 are always urgent. A regiment or battalion has to 
 go to India or the Cape ; returns have to be prepared ; 
 volunteers called for ; weakly, young, or men at their 
 close of engagement, to be weeded out ; transport has 
 
ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAI, DEFF.NCE 301 
 
 to be arranged for ; and so on. Such details in no 
 wise affect the defence of the Empire. It does not 
 matter in that respect which regiment goes or who 
 commands it ; whether an officer has not passed for 
 his promotion, whether another ought to be seconded. 
 A battleship or cruiser is needed on a foreign station 
 — that is to say, a unit of naval force has to be 
 despatched. The choice and equipment of the par- 
 ticular unit for that service should be a matter com- 
 pletely outside the purview of the authority that has 
 thought out the question as to whether or not the 
 increment of strength it represents is demanded. When, 
 as must often happen, a decision of far-reaching con- 
 sequence has to be taken, a man whose mind is full 
 of such details as have been enumerated cannot at 
 once enter into all the questions that are raised. He 
 brings a brain already fagged and tired to the con- 
 sideration of affairs that call for the readiest apprehen- 
 sion and the most vigorous examination. The head 
 that can carry everything in it, can dismiss one set 
 of ideas and at once take up another, is the phenomenon 
 of a century. It is good abilities and not transcendent 
 genius for which we should legislate. A sound system 
 will pull mediocrity through, a bad one may baffle 
 genius. In foreign countries such a department as I 
 have foreshadowed is formed by a great general staff: 
 a staff which is distinguished from the remainder of 
 the staff in this respect that it is entirely, or almost 
 entirely, occupied with questions beyond those of ad- 
 ministration. By some it has been called a thinking staff; 
 but, whatever be its designation, it is occupied with 
 matters to which an administrative staff cannot find 
 time to devote adequate attention. Such a staff does 
 not exist in this country, and there are those who do 
 not hesitate to assign to this deficiency the inadequacy 
 of our preparations and mistaken estimates of the 
 
302 ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 
 
 powers of our opponents that have marred many of 
 our wars both little and great. 
 
 With any controversial aspects of the subject we 
 are, however, not called upon to deal ; and it is very far 
 from my intention to put forward views or opinions 
 on anything approaching polemical questions. But an 
 abstract discussion on the organisation of Imperial 
 defence must lay bare the foundations on which that 
 superstructure is to be built. 
 
 Those who have followed me thus far will probably 
 admit that all the ramifications of the great subject 
 demand a special organ of some kind to deal with 
 them. Cable communications, food supply, commercial 
 harbours, coaling -depots, dockyards, and arsenals will 
 alone absorb the attention of a special department. But 
 there is much more to be thought of when the protection 
 of the Empire, passive and offensive, comes up for con- 
 sideration. In Continental countries the chief thought of 
 the great general staff must naturally be turned to land 
 warfare, and that, too, with their immediate neighbours. 
 But in a case such as ours a purely land war would be 
 all but an impossibility. An island Power can do nothing 
 without its navy, and in any body corresponding to the 
 German Great General Staff which it might create, some 
 representatives of the navy should find prominent places. 
 The Intelligence Departments of both itsservices, working 
 under their respective heads as at present, would be 
 affiliated to the war staff (as it might be called), and 
 would undertake the duties which these departments 
 now perform in placing information as required in its 
 hands. 
 
 But a staff occupied with the problems of war must 
 exert an influence in educating officers, and does not 
 fail to grow into touch with other institutions which 
 are most largely occupied in training oflficers for war. 
 
ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 303 
 
 War college is what the institution in close contact with 
 the general staff is termed in Germany, and in America 
 the same name has recently been adopted also. Names, 
 like details of uniform, do not greatly influence the 
 efficiency of armies. The essential point here is to 
 recognise that a great council or staff, call it what you 
 will, can and does often exist to study and deal with 
 the higher aspects of war, and does, in doing so, draw 
 in to its assistance the brains of the younger men who 
 are preparing themselves for service on it. The education 
 of officers for the general staff is, in fact, a matter which 
 the highest and most distinguished persons have often 
 personally undertaken. Moeltke, the most distinguished 
 general of the latter half of the last century, and one 
 of the great men of history, was occupied in training 
 and educating the German staff at the same time as 
 he was drawing up the strategic schemes which might 
 one day have to be carried out by them. He forged 
 the weapon while he planned the design it was to 
 accomplish : he designed and put together the machinery 
 that was to execute his conceptions ; and he recognised 
 that the one was complementary to the other. Therefore 
 he was as proud to educate his staff as to control the 
 strategic policy of a great empire ; and his mind was 
 not diverted from its legitimate task by the intrusion 
 of questions which officers in command of Army Corps 
 were quite competent to .settle, which, however important 
 in themselves and to individuals, do not influence the 
 fate of nations. But Moeltke, it will be urged, was an 
 exceptional man, and he is dead. Frederick trained 
 and led a great army too, but the victors of Rossbach 
 and Leuthen were the defeated of Jena and Ligny. 
 Wellington had a method also, and produced a mighty 
 engine in the army that marched from the Tagus to 
 the Garonne and swept the legions of another magnifi- 
 cent military system before it. The tactics of Nelson 
 
304 ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 
 
 are no longer those of our livii^Lj admirals. Such are 
 the arguments that invite us to believe that it is men 
 rather than methods that we must seek for. We are 
 told that the crisis has always produced a leader, and 
 that he will answer to his cue again. 
 
 Such reasoning is false. It is the argument of men 
 either by nature lethargic or whose utterances are 
 governed by what political expediency or party purposes 
 dictate. The efficiency of the German army was built 
 on the ruins of outworn systems. The phcenix ro.se 
 from the ashes of its former self 
 
 The very disaster of Jena was the salvation of Prussia. 
 The humiliating terms of Napoleon prompted in- 
 genuity, and a method of evasion was discovered in 
 the system of short service and large reserves. Careful 
 study, always thorough, always striving to turn the 
 means at hand to the best account, called into being 
 a set of administrators and staff-officers who made the 
 Prussian army a business concern. The business 
 survived Scharnhorst and Gneisenau : it has outlived 
 von Roon and Moeltke. So does a great bank or 
 railway company see successive managers disappear. 
 The shipbuilding yards of Belfast and the Clyde have 
 flourished and still flourish. Though men come and go, 
 the vast works at Essen and Elswick still hum and 
 throb. The great banks and the famous breweries pass 
 from father to son, and the business continues long 
 after the individual who founded it has passed away. 
 
 Continuity of policy is the secret of success : the end 
 and object always kept in view ; the means adapted to 
 them ; the influences of change allowed for ; combination 
 and economy of eft"ort studied. The managers of great 
 railways are, or ought to be, studying the trend of trade, 
 the opening of new markets the means of competing 
 with rival lines. Questions of high finance must occupy 
 the thoughts of some, at anyrate, of the men who direct 
 
ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 305 
 
 great banks. And so in every department in which 
 human thought and energy is engaged there is a spirit 
 which guides behind the hand that executes. 
 
 If the study of the higher features of war and the 
 efficiency of the fighting forces of the country is found 
 to be sufficient to absorb the entire energies and attention 
 of a distinct set of staff-officers in the great Continental 
 armies, surely it would even more completely absorb 
 them in the case of a world-wide Empire, where the 
 problems are far more complex and the fields of re- 
 search so much more various and extended ? With us 
 as has been urged, officers of the navy should be 
 associated with those of the army in this higher council 
 or staff, because with us every possible war brings on 
 co-operation between the services. Our force operates 
 by water ; that of France and Germany by land. But 
 it would be presumptuous in a soldier to offer any 
 views as to the exact shape and form naval energy and 
 activity on such a staff should assume ; and, moreover, 
 it has been urged that our navy needs a war staff all to 
 itself, and, if so, that necessity should be first satisfied. 
 
 There are many directions in which the two services 
 can co-operate, and in the chapter which deals with 
 combined operations some of them at least have been 
 set forth. But there are others also less easily defined 
 in which each of the two services are so closely associated 
 together in their work that to separate the spheres of 
 their activities is almost impossible. The large strategic 
 questions as to whether our policy should be attack or 
 defence, the direction of our attack, the strengthening 
 or temporary abandonment of certain places — these are 
 questions which are common to both services, and can, 
 in fact, only adequately be considered by a joint conclave. 
 There should be perfect harmony of view on such 
 matters, and harmony, moreover, not due to indifference 
 or neglect on one side, but such as is the outcome of a 
 u 
 
3o6 ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 
 
 thorough and prolonged exchange of views, the growth 
 of mutual conviction, not the product of persuasion or 
 clever pleading by a partisan. Policy will only be 
 touched upon here, therefore, when it affects both 
 services, and I shall, in discussing the duties and 
 functions of a staff such as has been foreshadowed, 
 leave the exact line of demarcation between the two 
 services undefined. 
 
 The first duty of this staff, by whatever name it might 
 be known, would be preparation for war in its highest 
 sense — that is to say, a definite scheme for every con- 
 ceivable contingency would be drawn up, considered, 
 criticised, amended, and finally approved of by its 
 members. What would become of such schemes is, for 
 the purpose with which I am writing, immaterial. In 
 what is here set down an attitude of detachment is 
 assumed. The study of Imperial defence leads to 
 certain conclusions, and demands answers on questions 
 generated by those conclusions. Those who are 
 sufficiently cynical or indifferent can also divest them- 
 selves of all personal interest in so momentous a question. 
 It may, as far as I am concerned, be treated, too, as a 
 purely academical problem, and regarded wholly in the 
 abstract. Without pretence of having arrived at so high 
 an atmosphere of pure reason we may, however, still 
 busy ourselves in inquiring how the forces at the 
 disposal of Imperial defence can best be organised 
 when we are aiming at efficiency and not expediency. 
 The schemes might be read, and carefully pigeon-holed, 
 as perhaps other able schemes have been before. 
 That need not deter us. 
 
 The important thing is that they should be known to 
 be in a pigeon-hole, should be referred to, amended, 
 discussed from year to year, so that there would always 
 be a definite scheme, always a war policy, always a 
 means of assisting the decisions of a Cabinet by a 
 
ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 307 
 
 reference to the deliberately recorded views of pro- 
 fessional men drawn up with a full sense of responsi- 
 bility and with no other object than the good of the 
 country in view. The men who drew up the schemes 
 might be dead when the moment for their being put 
 in practice arrived ; their voices would still be with 
 us none the less. They might have Jeft headquarters 
 for the outlying regions of the Empire ; their opinion 
 would still be available in Pall Mall. The members 
 of such a staff, although they had assisted to frame, 
 would by no means always be called upon to execute 
 the project. Its army members would simply be the 
 assistants of the Commander-in-Chief. The commander 
 of an expedition would not necessarily be selected from 
 amongst them. A man less able and less knowledge- 
 able might, because of local experience or some special 
 quality, be preferred. In the event of a great national 
 crisis probably many, or even all, the members might 
 be needed with the fleets and armies on the sea or in 
 the field. But as no members, or very few, would 
 remain permanently on this staff, an able man would 
 get his chance just as do the other members of the 
 headquarters staff at present. 
 
 But we may pass to the consideration of the nature 
 of the work that would be always going on. 
 
 It would embrace, in the first place, the prospect of 
 conflicts with the various civilised Powers of the world 
 and the combinations they might make against us ; 
 the exact strength of their armies and fleets ; the 
 characters of their Ministers and generals ; the effect 
 of a war on their political equilibrium ; the loyalty or 
 otherwise of provinces recently annexed ; the financial 
 strength of the potentially hostile country ; the amount 
 and sources of its food supply ; the extent of the detri- 
 ment war would bring to its commerce — such factors 
 in a potential situation should not be overlpoked in the 
 
3o8 ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 
 
 council chambers of a great war staff, but they should 
 be subsidiary to those that were more intimately 
 connected with warlike operations. 
 
 Themes more purely military would be taken up. 
 The approaches by sea to such strategic points as we 
 might desire to seize ; the nature of the coasts where 
 landing might be necessary ; the rise and fall of the 
 tides ; the depth of water near the shore ; the facilities 
 for anchoring ; the presence of shoals, currents, or 
 hidden rocks ; the direction of the prevailing winds ; 
 the probability of their producing surf — these are but 
 examples of a hundred questions of the kind that 
 would occupy the attention of admirals and generals 
 undertaking combined operations, and on which a war 
 staff should at short notice be able to supply them with 
 information. Many thousand miles of coast-line, many 
 countries, many nationalities would have to be studied. 
 An appalling pile of drudgery is pictured by the 
 imagination, and the most industrious may recoil at 
 the aspect of the task. 
 
 In reality, the labour, if judiciously parcelled out, 
 would be by no means excessive, and would be 
 extremely interesting. It is merely a matter of enough 
 men with enough time to turn enough stones. Much 
 information would be found already to hand : it is rather 
 to know where to look for what is wanted than to 
 collect it dc novo that is necessary. A patient per- 
 sistence directed in any direction undisturbed will 
 gradually overcome the inertia of the heaviest task. 
 Methodically, and bit by bit, the whole potentially 
 hostile coast-line of the globe might be mapped and 
 annotated. The efforts of travellers, and of specially 
 selected officers would, from time to time add fresh 
 information, until, in course of years, a veritable gazet- 
 teer of military information was compiled. 
 
 But even though the best anchorage, most tranquil 
 
ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 309 
 
 beach, or most convenient harbour were to hand, further 
 needs of the landing force would still have to be con- 
 sidered before the locality could be pronounced suited 
 to the enterprise of invasion. A covering position on 
 shore behind which the disembarkation could take 
 place unmolested would form a first necessity. Camping 
 grounds for the troops, water for men and horses, lateral 
 communications ; above all, roads for lines of advance 
 and subsequently for lines of communication to the 
 fleet would be demanded. Here, then, are presented 
 to us a whole series of objects for observation and 
 report ; further vistas towards which the energies of 
 a war staff might be turned ; new realms for energy 
 and industry to conquer. 
 
 But these subjects for inquiry in which naval and 
 army officers work together, important and numerous 
 as they are, can be regarded only as preliminary. 
 Having determined by means of them that it was 
 possible to land a force of a given size, the theatre of 
 war in which that force was to operate would next 
 become the centre of attention. The nature of the 
 country, the character of the inhabitants, the state of 
 roads, railways, canals and means of communication 
 generally would come under review. The possibility 
 or probability of obtaining supplies, and the amount 
 of shipping the navy might in consequence have to 
 convoy to and fro, would be considered. 
 
 The methods of local requisition and the quantities 
 that might thus be raised would next be arranged and 
 calculated. 
 
 The climate and its variations would also be a subject 
 of study, and the prevalence or otherwise of local 
 ailments in the case of men and beasts. 
 
 It may be objected that it is inconsistent with the 
 character of our people or the policy of our Government 
 to study plans of Continental aggression ; and that to 
 
3IO ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 
 
 elaborate schemes such as I have foreshadowed is 
 mere waste of time. It is true that our rulers are no 
 longer likely to imitate the Plantagenets and embark 
 armies for the annexation of Continental soil, but that 
 does not by any means preclude the possibility of our 
 again being compelled to undertake an offensive- 
 defensive war with a European foe, or of our being 
 assailed by a combination of Powers and having to 
 throw our weight into a counter-combination on the 
 Continent. Moreover, the labour involved in the pre- 
 paration of schemes and reports such as have been 
 mentioned could never be regarded as waste of time. 
 Even if none were ever used, as it is certain some 
 would never be, the compilation of schemes of opera- 
 tions would have afforded instruction and practice of 
 the highest possible value to many men, of whom 
 some, in all probability, would in future become in- 
 vested with the responsibilities of high command. 
 
 War, it is to be remembered, is a business to be 
 conducted on business principles, under business-like 
 managers. For one war which has been won by 
 brilliant tactics or dogged courage ten have been 
 gained by well-planned strategy and careful organisa- 
 tion. Genius has shone most brightly when a disaster 
 has had to be retrieved, a disaster which method and 
 forethought should often never have allowed to occur 
 at all. The presence of genius is problematical : its 
 sudden inspirations often expensive and eccentric. 
 Method, however, can always be counted on, while 
 foresight will nicely calculate and economically ad- 
 minister the expenditure that war must always entail. 
 It is not the least advantage of a thinking or war 
 staff that habits of thought and prudence are fostered 
 and developed by the nature of the work it undertakes. 
 
 But there are countries besides those of Europe where 
 we may have to fight, and in some of them the prospect 
 
of future wars can be regarded as by no means remote. 
 The most perfervid survivor of the Manchester School 
 will acknowledge that abroad we must protect our 
 wharves and warehouses from the inroad of savage 
 hordes, the farms and homesteads of our flesh and 
 blood across the sea from the plunder and rapine of 
 ruthless fanatics. The King's peace must be preserved 
 wherever our flag flies ; border forays must be prevented ; 
 tribal feuds restrained ; and on the frontier of more 
 than one of our Protectorates or Colonies there looms 
 the menace of invasion or turbulence. Lurking in the 
 hills of Africa or Central Asia may be found the germ 
 of more than one potential war ; while the Far East is 
 pregnant with possibilities. No longer in such regions 
 shall we meet a primitive foe armed solely with the 
 weapons of hand-to-hand combat, recking little of 
 anything beyond shock tactics, of the primeval bow 
 or spear or sword, of a combat where muscle and 
 activity and eye snatched the gift of victory. We 
 shall often meet in place of the naked savage of forty 
 years ago a rifleman armed and equipped as well as 
 European science can provide him, — men organised 
 in units like our own, with a system of command and 
 chain of responsibility, which is often but a clumsy 
 imitation of what we possess but is carried out with 
 the earnestness and vigour of a race with only one 
 intent in view. The thoughts of semi-barbarism are 
 concentrated in a manner different to ours : they fight 
 to kill and destroy utterly — no other considerations 
 disturb their mind or divert them from their purpose ; 
 and the dusky soldier is, as a man, immeasurably 
 superior to the degenerate waifs who take the shilling 
 because Society has tested and cast them aside. 
 
 It has been shown in a previous chapter that we 
 need a larger army now to deal with the semi-savage 
 races we could formerly engage successfully with very 
 
312 ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 
 
 inferior numbers. We need to treat such opponents, 
 as regards our preparation for meeting them, with 
 more respect also, for we may be called upon to 
 face unexpected developments, and may find the 
 resources of civilisation in unexpected quarters. 
 
 The task of reconnaissance and the collection of 
 information with regard to uncivilised countries is not 
 by any means as difficult as that which I have just 
 sketched. The frontiers of our potential foes are in 
 many places co-terminous with our own. The danger 
 of arousing hostile susceptibilities by making inquiries 
 and investigations is not so urgent. We have already 
 many officers on or near the spots we wish reported 
 on : it is not impossible to gain intelligence in numerous 
 ways which need not here be specified. The effect of 
 intervention by foreign civilised Powers could be accu- 
 rately gauged, and while we are the great sea-Power 
 of the world, need cause us little anxiety. As regards 
 our semi-civilised or savage neighbours all the world 
 over, there appears to be nothing to prevent a methodi- 
 cal and thorough preparation for almost every possible 
 contingency war might bring. For every move of the 
 enemy we should have ready a counter move ; for 
 every eventuality we should possess a remedy ; every 
 hostile enterprise should find a carefully-planned ob- 
 stacle in its way. 
 
 Nor would a multitude of agents or highly-paid 
 staff be necessary to find the information for us to 
 work upon. At many a foreign station there is little 
 besides the dull routine of the day's duties to occupy 
 the time of the garrison. If encouragement were given 
 to officers, and recognition of good work done were 
 marked by the rewards they aspire to, we should have 
 plenty of volunteers. The danger would rather lie 
 in the direction of too many than too few, and it 
 would be more necessary to curb injudicious energy 
 
ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 313 
 
 and over-zealous action than to impress unwilling 
 assistance. 
 
 Where good camping-grounds existed, where water 
 was to be counted upon, where passes lay through 
 the hills, where streams and rivers might be forded, 
 wherfe good positions lay — such should be the subject 
 of inquiry. For every square mile of English terri- 
 tory accurate notes on such subjects should be to hand. 
 As far as possible, the military topography of foreign 
 territories should be known also. It would not be 
 possible to know them all at once ; but, in course of 
 time, if methodical attempts were made, a great deal 
 might be accomplished towards the collection of 
 information that would be of the utmost value 
 when plans of operations were drawn up. 
 
 This staff, which for want of a better name I may 
 call a war staff, would then be occupied in studying 
 possible theatres of war, the strength and armaments 
 of foreign Powers, in planning schemes for operating 
 against potential enemies, in planning strategical com- 
 binations both by land and sea. But when war became 
 imminent it might go further. It might, when a breach 
 was inevitable, begin the preparation of the theatre of 
 war itself 
 
 What, it may be asked, is meant by the preparation 
 of the theatre of war ? Some may think that the phrase 
 brings a pedantic flavour with it : that it is redolent 
 of the lecture-room ; may even remind us of other 
 phrases, such as "the false front," "position of readi- 
 ness," which our army has hardly as yet assimilated. 
 In reality there is nothing either new-fangled or 
 pedantic or theoretical about it. It is the resource 
 of all practical soldiers, and our own Wellington has 
 given us the most striking illustration of what it 
 means and of how it should be undertaken. 
 
 A wise general or a prudent Minister, when it is 
 
314 ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 
 
 evident that hostilities are certain to supervene in a 
 certain district, takes the precaution to make prepara- 
 tions in the regions where fighting will probably take 
 place such as will enable him to fight at an advantage 
 while imposing difficulties on his opponent. The pre- 
 paration of the theatre of war is therefore a manifes- 
 tation of strategical ability ; it is one phase, in fact, of 
 the higher science of making war ; one method by which 
 we force our opponent to fight us when the chances of 
 the contest are in our favour. 
 
 The preparations the leader makes are included under 
 such headings as the arrangements for the feeding of 
 men and horses, for supplies of ammunition, medical 
 stores, and the other necessities of an army in the field. 
 He would often arrange not only for one line of com- 
 munication but for alternative routes and a change of 
 base ; and in our case, since we look forward to possess- 
 ing command of the sea, the latter would very usually 
 be considered. Posts on the lines of communication 
 and the fortification of certain strategic points would 
 form another care. It is scarcely necessary to say that 
 the fortification of the main base of operations would 
 be most important of all. 
 
 The story of the lines of Torres Vedras may be 
 remembered : the application of the lesson has some- 
 times been overlooked. 
 
 When, after the campaign of Talavera, Wellington 
 realised that the support of the Spaniards was not to 
 be relied upon and that he might be driven back on 
 the sea as was Sir John Moore, he set himself to work 
 to prepare the theatre of war wherein the British and 
 Portuguese forces must be ready to fight it out alone. 
 Such important places as Peniche, Almeida, or Elvas 
 were garrisoned and provisioned to face the coming 
 storm. Magazines and depots were placed along the 
 coast and navigable rivers. Abrantes on the Tagus, 
 
ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 315 
 
 Figueras and Pena Cova on the Mondego, Oporto 
 and Lamego on the Douro, each held supplies and 
 stores. Flying bridges were constructed on the Zezere 
 and Tagus. Roads were improved, and a chain of 
 posts connecting Hill with his commander ran along 
 those that formed the communications between them. 
 Signal posts were established, and the chief strategic 
 points connected by the system of visual telegraphy 
 of the period. 
 
 A more subtle scheme was developing itself behind. 
 Gradually, and stealthily the works that linked the 
 Tagus and sea were thrown up. Their number and 
 dimensions need not be dwelt on here. It is enough 
 to say that during the winter, when her foes seemed 
 about to drive England to bay by the waters, an im- 
 pregnable region was prepared. Silently and patiently 
 the work was carried on. And when Massena, striding 
 down to consummate Wellington's destruction, was 
 suddenly confronted in the autumn following with 
 parapets that frowned upon him from sea to river, 
 and denied him passage, he was baffled by as brilliant 
 an effort of strategy, as shattering a blow, as ever 
 genius conceived and dealt. The sudden inspirations 
 of the battlefield come but seldom in whole centuries. 
 Many of the great strokes even on the field itself that 
 astonish the uninitiated by their aptness and rapidity 
 are usually the outcome of cunning foresight and un- 
 wearying premeditation. The great generals planned 
 and led up to their famous coups just as many of 
 the brightest wits prepared their smartest sallies. 
 Torres Vedras is one of the commonplaces of history : 
 it illustrates what should be one of the commonplaces 
 of policy, for all capable commanders and adminis- 
 trations have worked in the same field. To find 
 examples we do not need to go beyond our own 
 history, nor far back in that. Take the case, for instance. 
 
^i6 ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 
 
 of Sir Henry Hardinge, one of Wellington's men, a 
 soldier and statesmen of sagacity and foresight. When 
 he succeeded Lord Ellenborough as Governor-General 
 of India in 1844 he foresaw that a rupture in the 
 Punjaub was inevitable. And he, having the power 
 and scope sometimes denied to others less fortunate 
 than he, commenced to prepare the theatre of war. 
 Warlike stores, supplies, and men were collected from 
 whence they could best be spared on our north-west 
 frontier as it then existed. Boats to bridge the river 
 were got together at Bombay, sent up the Indus, and 
 into the Sutlej to be hidden in the river at Feroze- 
 pore till they should be called for. More celebrated 
 instances will teach us no more than this casual illustra- 
 tion from a minor war. But in the old days of maga- 
 zines such preparations as we are considering were an 
 urgent necessity ; and when Napoleon spoke of living 
 on the hostile country no man ever more carefully 
 matured his preparations or organised his lines of com- 
 munication with more foresight. When they have had 
 free scope all our distinguished generals have done their 
 utmost in this direction too. The preparation of the 
 Indian frontier was for years the special care of Lord 
 Roberts. The capture of Khartoum was rendered pos- 
 sible by the continuation of the railway. The extension 
 of the lines of blockhouses hastened the surrender of 
 the Boers. There are plenty of examples of the action 
 of methodical foresight in attaining success in war. 
 
 Again, the provision of supplies and the means of 
 conveying them to the front is a subject intimately 
 connected with this preparation of a possible theatre 
 of war. Forage circumscribes the movement of the 
 most daring and swiftest cavalry. Even the most 
 reckless guerilla must feed his men. The power of 
 conveying forage with a force rapidly exhausts itself, 
 because the longer the train of waggons grows the 
 
ORGANISATION I'OR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 317 
 
 more animals have to be fed. The rate of interest 
 rises till the price becomes prohibitive. Therefore 
 stores and depots have to be prepared, fortified resting- 
 places on the lines of supply, where replenishment and 
 refitment may be sought for, have to be provided. 
 ■ It is not only a matter of collecting the stores but 
 of putting them, when collected, in secure positions. 
 The problem may be pre.sented in various shapes. If 
 the enemy acts in such and such a way, where will 
 our forces move to oppose him, where should our 
 depots be established, and how shall they be fed? 
 It is obviously a grave error to collect supplies where 
 it is possible for the enemy to capture them, and present 
 him with means of subsistence while your men starve. 
 It is also essential to protect a line of rail or it will 
 become an artery of supply to those you fight, not 
 to yourself; and, having protected it, to improve its 
 station accommodation and render it adequate to the 
 needs of an army, is the next step. It seems absurd 
 to gravely enunciate such platitudes : they form the 
 very A B C of strategy, the very pot-hooks of the 
 art of war. Yet have we ourselves furnished practical 
 and humiliating illustrations of the danger of despising 
 them. In these days of cable communications a 
 department charged with the duty of continually 
 watching over such questions, and absorbed by no 
 smaller matters even when the bustle of a coming 
 war may be in the air, should be able to prevent 
 gross blunders in this respect ; to suggest, advise, and 
 plan schemes which, always subject to revision accord- 
 ing to local conditions, might still bear in their main 
 features the impress of principles derived either from 
 personal or recorded experience. 
 
 The preparation of the theatre of war has only been 
 very briefly outlined here, but enough has perhaps 
 been said to show that preparation for war in general 
 
does not by any means round off the duties that fall 
 to a staff charged with the defence of a country. 
 
 But, when we deal with such an Empire as ours, 
 preparation of the theatre of war assumes dimensions 
 far beyond any that are contemplated by Continental 
 warfare, or with respect to land warfare of any kind. 
 What is the theatre of war when sea Powers range up 
 to take sides ? What natural features hem it in ? What 
 mountain chains or rivers or desert places ? When 
 our fleets weigh anchor the oceans of the world lie 
 before their scouts ; the enemy may be met any- 
 where ; there is no longer any arena ; the possibilities 
 are unlimited ; impromptu arrangements are impossible. 
 Preparation in a field so wide must be made months 
 and years before the first rumble of the war chariot 
 is heard. The distribution of our fleets in peace time 
 must coincide with their places of assembly for war. 
 The depots and magazines containing food and coal 
 and stores of all kinds, the lines of communication, 
 the strongholds for refuge or refitment have all to be 
 in fighting trim when peace seems most profound. 
 I have already shown how the needs of navy and 
 army should, and can, be made to dovetail in with 
 mutual help and assistance, but what a gigantic task 
 is involved in the due adjustment of the pieces — the 
 support of one service in one spot rendering possible 
 a reduction of strength as regards the other, and vice 
 versa. A staff which undertook that task would be 
 grappling with a problem which would practically 
 amount to the strategical deployment of all the forces 
 of the Empire. When the Great General Staff at Berlin 
 effected the strategical deployment of their armies on 
 a frontier not more than some 150 miles long without 
 any unusual bustle or strain, the world wondered. The 
 rapidity and decisive precision that made us marvel 
 were the outcome of years of carefully directed industry : 
 
ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 319 
 
 but the task was as nothing to what an EngHsh Ministry 
 might some day have to face ; and then, how high a 
 value would be set upon assistance such as had been 
 maturing for many years behind von Moeltke? 
 
 But, it may be said, the very magnitude of the task 
 itself accounts for the instances of its neglect : we do 
 not set men to dig down mountains or bridge the 
 Channel. The excuse will not serve. A very con- 
 siderable addition to Intelligence Departments, both 
 naval and military, would of course be entailed ; but 
 no startling proposition is thus formulated. A great 
 business cannot be carried on without a sufficiency of 
 agents and managers. 
 
 Knowledge, in the shape of intelligence as to the 
 enemy and his country, is, in war, worth almost any 
 sum ; and when the fullest price has been paid it is 
 probable the cost, as compared to the other expenses 
 of the campaign, is infinitesimal. If the spending of a 
 few thousands before a war, — and there is always some 
 war or other on foot in the case of a great Empire, — 
 will save hundreds of thousands and millions, and tens 
 of millions, according to the magnitude subsequent 
 operations and their concomitant errors and disasters 
 assume, surely they are not thrown away? Would 
 any business man hesitate to engage another clerk if 
 an increase in the number of his clients demanded it? 
 or would any captain risk the safety of his ship in 
 saving the wages of an extra quartermaster? 
 
 Objections to adequate Intelligence Departments 
 and the creation of a war staff, on the score of expense, 
 cannot logically be entertained. If a nation really 
 cannot face the additional cost involved, some small 
 items of less necessary expenditure, which as luxuries 
 or ornaments are not essential to the security of its 
 existence, must be lopped away. 
 
 The representation of our Colonies on such a staff 
 
320 ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 
 
 as Imperial defence demands is a matter which for 
 the present may be left on one side. When the 
 Colonies make the naval contributions to Imperial 
 defence, which has been noted at the beginning of 
 this chapter, the character of assistance which they will 
 yield and receive, is perfectly understood. What might 
 be done by them on land in an offensive campaign out- 
 side their own territories must remain for a long time 
 an indeterminate factor. The mother country will be 
 particularly grateful for whatever it receives, but assist- 
 ance will be in the nature of a bonus or free gift. As 
 such it should be left out of calculation before hostilities 
 assume definite shape and form. But, although officers 
 from Colonies need not necessarily appear as permanent 
 members of a war staff until it grew into the central one 
 of the entire Empire, some machinery by which Colonial 
 forces were all in the closest touch with the mother 
 country could easily be devised. 
 
 No one, however, who takes up the question of the 
 defence of the Empire, passive or active, can avoid 
 noting the most serious obstacle in the way of any large 
 scheme such as has been foreshadowed, or of even the 
 comparatively minor one often put forward on behalf 
 of the army only, ever taking concrete shape. To the 
 minds of men trained for many years on different lines 
 the new departure might appear a veritable Franken- 
 stein, a monster which, once called into e.xistence, might 
 threaten the life of its creator. Professional control 
 would, in such eyes, indeed be worse ; but professional 
 control is absolutely outside practical politics at present ; 
 nor is it likely to enter them while the views of our 
 politicians remain as they are. It will be replied that 
 personal responsibility is not to be enforced except 
 professional control also be conceded. But it is doubt- 
 ful whether the terrors and deterrent powers of personal 
 responsibility would be as efficacious towards efficiency 
 
ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 321 
 
 as some imagine. We no longer shoot our failures. It 
 is regarded as barbarous in our highly-cultured exist- 
 ence to visit sins of omission or errors in judgment 
 on the head of a man who has done his best and 
 been unfortunate. Social pressure, political support, 
 and the representations of partisans published in the 
 press will always temper the bitterness of censure. 
 It is at least a question, too, whether acrimonious 
 controversies should not be regarded as too high a 
 price to pay for an effort to partially obtain what can 
 never, under existing circumstances, be completely 
 secured. 
 
 But the outcome of the researches and deliberations 
 of a combined professional department, occupied solely 
 in studying the defence of the Empire from the strate- 
 gical point of view, and engaged in training men to 
 understand and carry out intelligently the principles 
 and schemes it would formulate, would form state 
 papers of such weight and importance that every 
 cabinet would hesitate once or twice before it dis- 
 regarded them. And in that event the record of the 
 advice tendered, and the reasons for disregarding it 
 would still remain. They would be of immense value 
 to those who, in the future, had to make momentous 
 decisions of the same kind. They would, at a glance, 
 lay bare where, and in what directions, execution had 
 strayed away from conception. Political considerations, 
 as no doubt they often have before, might render the 
 carrying out of the projects undesirable. Those con- 
 siderations would stand the test of examination accord- 
 ing as they approached or departed from a lofty sense 
 of responsibility for the nation's welfare. But it would 
 at least be possible and satisfactory for us to know 
 where and how we stood. The physician diagnoses 
 the case and gives his advice. Though the patient 
 does not choose to take the medicine the prescription 
 
 X 
 
322 ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 
 
 remains — for ever a record and a reproach. The patient 
 in the case before us is represented by the electorate. 
 If the advisers of the patient (the Government of the 
 day) induce him to disregard the physician, and evil 
 results supervene, the patient will lose confidence in 
 his advisers and change them. It may therefore be 
 that to let the patient see the physician's letter is not 
 to the interest of his advisers. Whether or not that 
 letter is to be an open one is, accordingly, the crux of 
 the situation ; because it is to be supposed that men 
 will act in the great events of life as they do in their 
 domestic affairs, and that they are possessed of an 
 average amount of common-sense — but we are here 
 trespassing on political questions, with which we 
 soldiers have no concern or desire to involve our- 
 selves. 
 
 That an Empire which has spread and flourished as 
 has ours demands a different organisation for its pro- 
 tection than a little kingdom must, however, be apparent. 
 The creation of such an organisation must begin with 
 the head ; the intellectual organs once in existence may 
 themselves be trusted to form and fashion the means 
 of executing the ideas they conceive. Narrow limita- 
 tions should no longer confine the destinies that lie 
 before us. As the years roll by, the little island in 
 the North Sea may be overshadowed by the stature 
 of her offspring. The mother may come to be over- 
 looked in the presence of her stalwart sons : but her 
 life or death will matter little while her descendants 
 survive. When Chatham and Portsmouth fail us, 
 Sydney and Halifax may take their place. If 
 we can hold together for a few more decades our 
 Empire will have spread its roots over so many lands 
 that to uproot it would shake the stability of 
 every neighbouring state. No single region would 
 contain the sources of its life. No one decisive blow 
 
ORGANISATION FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE 323 
 
 could destroy heart or brain. For England and her 
 children that element which conveys force most 
 irresistibly and diffusively would be everywhere at 
 work. Through water from one end of the world to 
 the other the concentrated energies of a combined 
 people would operate. Those energies would be 
 exhibited in sea-power, and the same potency that 
 called an Empire into being would intervene to save 
 it from destruction. 
 
 X2 
 
INDEX 
 
 Abbe Sieves, 293 
 Abercrombie, Sir R., 122, 125 
 Aboukir Bay, landing in, 1801, 122 
 Abrantes, 314 
 Abyssinian Expedition of 1866, 107; 
 
 wars in future, 88, 269 
 Achilles, 7 
 Actium, battle of, 60 
 Adelaide, 145 
 
 Aden, 41, 75 ; cables from, 166 
 Adrianople, 1 15 
 Adventurers, England made great 
 
 by, I 
 Africa, Carthaginian power in, 113; 
 
 cables to west coast of, 166 
 Afghanistan, integrity of, 242 
 Aggression, bold, 31 
 Alabama, depredations of the, 192 
 Albany, 145 
 Algeria, French expedition to, 107, 
 
 122, 126 
 Alhandra, 128 
 Alexandria, 29, 127 et seg. 
 Ali Masjid, 41 
 Alison's History of Europe on prices 
 
 of wheat, 192 
 All-British cable, demand for, 167 
 
 et seq. 
 Allied fleets in 1854, 31 
 Alma, battle of, 127 
 Almeida, 314 
 Alps, the, 84 
 America, South, 19 
 American, North, naval station, 145; 
 
 South- Eastern, station, 145 
 American War 181 2-14, 62 
 Analogy between land and sea war- 
 fare, 25 et seq. 
 Anthony, Mark, 26 
 Armada, Spanish, 50 
 Army, function of, 86 et seq., 95 ; 
 
 strength of, 86, 90 ; army and 
 
 navy complementary to each 
 
 other, 90 
 Ascension, 142 
 Athens, 290 
 Atlantic, 8 ; cables across North 
 
 and South, 165 et seq. ; British 
 
 demanded, 175 
 
 325 
 
 Atlantic coast of America, ports on, 
 106 
 
 Auckland, 67, 145 
 
 Austerlitz, 15 
 
 Australian station, 145 ; cables to 
 New Zealand, 165 
 
 Austria, 15 
 
 Auxiliaries, mercantile, for com- 
 merce protection, 232 et seq. 
 
 Baird, Admiral, at manoeuvres of 
 
 1888, 220 et seq. 
 Balaclava, 115 
 
 Ballard, Lieutenant, R.N., 137 
 Baltic, 8 
 
 Banks, General, 44, 277 
 Bar, Dr Von, on destroying cables, 
 
 172 
 Barbadoes, 146 
 Bard, fort of, 41 
 Barnaby, Sir Nathaniel, 232 
 Basis of the Empire is sea-power, I 
 Batavian marshes, 1 1 
 Bazaine, Marshal, 29 
 Beachy Head, 34 
 Belfast, shipbuilding at, 304 
 Bellairs, Lieutenant, R.N., 184 
 Belmont, action at, 1S61, 11 1 
 Bermuda, 76, 145 
 Bismarck, Prince, 15 
 Beaconsfield, Lord, 41 
 Black Sea, 36, 92, 98 
 " Black Charles," 128 
 Blenheim, 17 
 Blockades, naval, 49 et seq., 56 et 
 
 seq. ; during American war, 104 
 
 et seq. ; to protect commerce, 222 
 
 et seq. 
 Boers, 38, 41, 55 
 Bohemia, 3 
 
 Bombardment, 81, 148 
 Bombay, 5, 144, 316; cable to, 
 
 165 
 Bonnivet, Admiral, 26 
 Bosponis, 8 
 Botha's Pass, 39 ; 
 Bourbon powers, combination 
 
 against us of, 296 
 Brandywine, battle of, 115, 296 
 
326 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Brassey, Lord, 59; on mercantile 
 
 auxiliaries, 234 
 Brassey's "Naval Annual," figures 
 
 from, 264 et set/. 
 " Bricklayers," school of, 75 
 Brisbane, 145 
 
 Buckle's History of Civilisation, 8 
 Buell, General, in, 114 
 Buenos Ayres, expedition to, 295 
 Bulawayo, 186 
 Bulgaria, 36 
 Business, methods of, 20 
 
 Cables, cutting of, 176 et sec/. ; 
 emergency, 183; first submarine, 
 163 et seq. ; number and routes, 
 163 et seq. ; right to destroy 
 neutral, 170 et seq. 
 
 Cable communications, committee 
 on, 168 
 
 Cadiz, 50 ; destruction of Spanish 
 fleets in, 106 
 
 Cairo, advance to, in 1801, 128; 
 and Cape railway and telegraph, 
 186 
 
 Calcutta, 5, 78, 143 
 
 Canada, 2, 63, et seq. 107, 153 ; 
 defence of, 239 et seq. , 248 ; small 
 contribution towards armaments, 
 248 et seq. 
 
 Canals of Holland, 3 ; of France 
 and Ireland, 4 
 
 Canton, 153 
 
 Cape Breton Isle, 107 
 
 Cape Charles, 1 1 5 
 
 Cape Colony's contribution to the 
 navy, 288 
 
 Cape Horn, 157 
 
 Cape to Cairo railway and tele- 
 graph, 186 
 
 Capetown, 5, 6 
 
 Caribbean Sea, 8, idaet seq. 
 
 Carthage, 11, 113 
 
 Caspian, 92 
 
 Castlereagh's projected raid on 
 Boulogne, 295 
 
 Celts, II, 12 
 
 Central Asia, developments in, 89 
 
 Cervera's squadron, 148 
 
 Ceylon, 143 
 
 Chagos Isles, 143 
 
 Channel, 7, 8 ; reserve squadron in, 
 
 Chatham may be replaced by a Col- 
 onial base, 322 
 Chesapeake, 62 
 Chesapeake Bay, 115 
 
 China station, 144 
 
 Chinese, 37 ; expeditions of 1S40, 
 i860, and 1900, 107, 129; war 
 with Japan, 1894, iTp et seq. 
 
 Churchill, Lord R., on national 
 defence, 298 
 
 Clarke, Sir Andrew, on Indian 
 harbours, 157 et seq. ; Sir 
 George, 184 ; on our food supply, 
 200 ; on American war, 227 ; 
 Major, on sea transport, 125 
 
 Clive, 2 
 
 Clyde, shipbuilding on the, 304 
 
 Coal, value of, to ships, 75 et seq., 
 132 et seq. ; endurance, 48, 134 
 et seq. 
 
 Coaling-stations, classification of, 
 140 
 
 Coast defences, necessity for, 278 
 et seq. 
 
 Colbert, 21 
 
 Colesberg, 153 
 
 Coligny, Admiral, 26 
 
 Collingwood, Lord, 54 
 
 Colomb, Admiral, 123 ; on Spanish- 
 American war, 179 
 
 Colombo, 134, 143 
 
 Colonial policy, 20 ; conferences, 
 1887, 167 ; conference in 1902 
 and its results, 288 
 
 Combatant and non-combatant por- 
 tions of a crew or unit, 25, 26 
 
 Combined naval and military opera- 
 tions, 104, 117; duties of navy 
 and army in, 120 et seq. 
 
 Command of combined expeditions, 
 120 
 
 Commerce, our dependence on, 70 ; 
 protection of, 211 ; as affected by 
 coal supply, 228 ; part of army 
 in, 236 et seq. 
 
 Commercial genesis of Empire, 2, 22 
 
 Commonwealth, 65 et seq. ; defence 
 of, 239 et seq. ; contribution to 
 naval defence, 288 
 
 Communications, 2, 29 ; French in 
 Peninsula, 244 ; Russian in 1877, 
 245 
 
 Compulsory service, 284 et seq. 
 
 Confederate strategy in 1862, 84 
 
 Constantinople, 39 
 
 Continuity of policy, 20, 243 et seq., 
 
 304 
 Co-operation between army and 
 
 navy, 24, 28 
 Corea, 37, 117 et seq. 
 Coromandel coast, 157 
 
INDEX 
 
 327 
 
 Cornwallis, 29 
 Corsica, 8 
 
 Corunna, battle of, 100 
 Counterstroke difficult in Europe, 
 98 et seq., 116 et seq. ; objective 
 for, 102, 103 ; preparation for, 
 1 16 ; strategic, Zt, ; force at home 
 for, 275 et seq. 
 Crimean war, 31, 36, 91, 98, 115, 
 117, 122, 147 ; transport arrange- 
 ments in, 126 
 Cromwell, 13, 21, 291 
 Cruisers, 55 
 
 Cuba, value of, to Spain, 102 
 Cumberland River, loS et seq. 
 Currie, Sir Donald, 233 
 Cypher codes for telegraphic mes- 
 sages, 176 
 
 Dakar, 155 
 
 Dandolo, Doge, 26 
 
 Danes, 12 
 
 Danish fleet, destruction of, in iSog, 
 
 106 
 Danube, 115; cables to, 165 
 Dawson, Commander, R.N., on 
 
 transport of army over-sea, 267 
 Defence Committee, 294 
 Delaware River, 295 
 Denmark, 7 
 
 D'Estaing, Admiral, 120 
 Dettingen, battle of, 17 
 Devon, men of, 1 1 
 Dewey, Commodore, at Manila, 179 
 de Witt, 16 
 Dilke, Sir Charles, 155 
 Directory, French, 114 
 Disembarkations, loi 
 Diversions, 114 
 Don John of Austria, 26 
 Drake, 12, 106 
 Drakensberg, 39 
 Dunedin, 145 
 Dunkirk, 35 
 Durban, 134, 143, 153 ; cables 
 
 from, 166 
 Dutch, II, 16, 19 
 Dutch Republics, 12 
 Duty on corn, effect of, 194 
 
 East, our telegraphic communica- 
 tion with the, 167 
 Education of officers, higher, 303 
 Effect of modern inventions, 60 
 Egypt, 2,7' 42, S3 et seq., 107, 117 ; 
 expedition to, in iSoi, 122 ; in 
 1882, 91, 125, 12() et seq. 
 
 Elbe, 4 
 
 Eldorado, 7 
 
 Elizabeth, Queen, 21 
 
 Elk Run Valley, 45 
 
 Ellenborough, Lord, 316 
 
 Elswick, works at, 304 
 
 Elvas, 314 
 
 Empire, forces of, to be viewed as 
 
 a whole, 47 ; extent of British, 83 
 English rulers, 21 
 Enos, Gulf of, IIS 
 Esquimault, 146, 154 
 Essen, works at, 304 
 Estcourt, 154 
 Evasion, 32 ; power of, possessed 
 
 by fleets, 42 
 
 Falkland Isles, 145, 157 
 False Point, 158 
 Far East, situation in, 161 
 Federation of the Empire, 292 
 Ferozepore, preparations for war at, 
 
 rigueras, 315 
 
 Fixed defences, 80 
 
 Fleet in being, 34 et seq. 
 
 Flemings, ii 
 
 Food supply, our, 188 et seq. ; other 
 than corn, 205 
 
 Foote, Flag Officer, 1 1 1 
 
 Foreign views as to the Empire, 253 
 et seq. ; sea-Powers at present, 
 263 et seq. 
 
 Fort Donelson, 112 
 
 Fort Henry, iii 
 
 Fort Sumter, 105 
 
 Fournier, Admiral, 233 
 
 France, 7, 10, 13, 14; methods of 
 her armies of the Revolution, 74 ; 
 our commercial prosperity after 
 great war with, 225 et seq. ; pre- 
 sent naval position of, 263 
 
 Frederick the Great, 4, 17, 74; as 
 a man of business, 273 ; his work 
 as educator, 303 
 
 French canals, 4 ; fleet in 1870, 31 ; 
 strategy in 1870, 38, 116; attack 
 on Ireland, 113 ; in Crimea, 120, 
 127 ; defeats in 1870, causes of, 
 280 
 Frontiers of the Empire, 49 ; of 
 
 France and Germany, 92 
 Furse, Colonel, on "military ex- 
 peditions beyond the seas," loi, 
 125 et seq. 
 Garrisons, our, abroad, 80 et seq. 
 Genoa, 10 
 
328 INDEX 
 
 Geography, physical, 30 
 Georgetown, 146 
 
 German armies, in 1870, their 
 strategical deployment, 318 
 
 German fleet, in 1870, 31 ; force in 
 1S70, 61 ; future development of, 
 263 ; steamship companies, 266 
 
 Germany, 10 ; convention with 
 Holland as to cables, 170 ; posi- 
 tion of mercantile-marine of 1872 
 compared with that of to-day, 
 265 et seq. 
 
 Gibraltar, 8, 41, 107, 139, 140 
 et seq. ; cables to, 165 et seq. ; 
 garrison of, 142 
 
 Gneisenau, permanence of his 
 system, 304 
 
 Gordon, General, I 
 
 Government influence, 2 
 
 Granaries, 196 et seq. 
 
 Grant, General, in et seq. 
 
 Gravelotte, battle of, 17 
 
 Gray, Sir Frederick, 232 
 
 Greek Colonial system compared to 
 ours, 290 et seq. 
 
 Grouchy, Marshal, 44 
 
 Guerre de course, no substitute for 
 naval victories, 212 
 
 Halifax, Nova Scotia, 139, 145 ; 
 may become an Imperial base, 322 
 
 Hannibal, 84 
 
 Hampden, 291 
 
 Harbours, defended, need for, 140 
 
 Harcourt, Sir William, on invasion, 
 260 et seq. 
 
 Hardinge, Sir H., his action in 
 1844, 316 
 
 Hatteras inlet, 106 
 
 Helder, expedition to, 113, 125 
 
 Hill, Lord, 315 
 
 Hobart Town, 145 
 
 Hoche's invasion of Ireland, 114 
 
 Holland, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 19, 21 ; 
 convention with Germany as to 
 cables, 170; canals of, 3 
 
 Home defence, 93, 250 et seq. ; 
 organisation for, 273 et seq. 
 
 Homeric battles, 100 
 
 Hong-Kong, 144, 151 etseq. ; grow- 
 ing importance of, 159 
 
 Hornby, Admiral, opinion of mer- 
 cantile auxiliaries, 235 
 
 Howard, 12, 50 
 
 Howe, General, 115; expedition 
 to the Chesapeake, 295 
 
 Howe's, Lord, policy, 136 
 
 Huguenots, ri 
 
 Humbert's invasion of Ireland, 114 
 
 Illinois, 109 
 
 Imperial defence, combination in, 
 
 72 ; committee, 300 et seq. 
 Imperial fortresses, garrisons of, 75 
 Imperial Parliament, possibility of, 
 
 293 
 
 Intelligence staffs, 302 
 
 Increasing demands of defence, 79 
 
 India, 2, 41, 63 ; north-west frontier 
 of, 64 et seq. ; 153 
 
 India, route to, 91 
 
 Indian, East, naval station, 143 
 et seq. ; garrison, 88 ; arsenals, 
 158 ; frontier defence, 239 et seq. ; 
 270 
 
 Indiana, 109 
 
 Indus, 316 
 
 Intelligence Departments, informa- 
 tion collected by, 319 
 
 Invasion, probability of, 103 ; 
 danger of, 254 et seq. 
 
 Inverclyde, Lord, 232 
 
 Investment of our islands discussed, 
 257 et seq. 
 
 Ireland, French invasion of, 113 
 
 Irish fisheries, 1 1 
 
 Isle de Dieu, 114 
 
 Ismay, Mr, on transfer of mer- 
 chantmen to neutral flag, 234 
 
 Isthmian canal, 146, 160 
 
 Italy, 7, 84 
 
 Jackson, Stonewall, 44, 45 
 
 Jamaica, 145 
 
 James river, 115 
 
 Japanese invasion of Corea, 117, 
 
 1 30 «/ seq. 
 Jask, cable from, 166 
 lena, 15; the salvation ultimately 
 
 of Prussia, 304 
 Jews, II 
 Johnson, Sidney, 114 
 
 Karachi, 78, 144 
 
 Kentucky, 109 et seq. 
 
 Kertch, expedition to, 114 
 
 Keys, strategic, 41 
 
 Khedive, 91 
 
 Khartoum, i, 186; preparations to 
 
 reach, 316 
 Khyber Pass, 41 
 King George's Sound, 145 
 King, the, as holding the Empire 
 
 together, 292 
 
INDEX 
 
 329 
 
 King's writ, 41 ; journey lo India 
 when Prince of Wales, 253 
 
 Kitchener, Lord, his preparation 
 of the theatre of war in Egypt 
 and South Africa, 316 
 
 Kowloon annexation, 152 
 
 Labuan, 144, 155 
 
 Ladysmith, 149 
 
 Laird Clowes' Naval Pocket-book, 
 
 135 
 Lamego, 315 
 
 Land's End, cables from, 166 
 Lang's Nek, 39 
 Lantao, 153 
 
 Laughton, Professor, 135 
 Lee's, General, policy in defending 
 
 Richmond, 277 
 Leiter, Mr, 191 
 Lepanto, battle of, 26, 160 
 Levant, 8, 10 
 Ligny, battle of, 44, 59 
 Lisbon, cable to, 166 
 Liverpool, 67, 154 
 Lizard, the, 134 
 London, 42, 67 
 London, the Key of India, 41 ; 
 
 road from New York to, 133; 
 
 defence of, 277 
 Lorenzo Marques, cable to, 166 
 Louis XIV., 17, 22 
 Lyttleton, 145 
 
 Macedonian War, 290 
 
 Maceira Bay, 122 
 
 MacMahon, Marshal, 44 
 
 Mack, General, 29 
 
 M'Clellan, General, 115 
 
 Madagascar, 134 
 
 Madeira, 134 ; cable to, 166 
 
 Madras, 5, 143 ; harbour required 
 at, 157 
 
 Mahan, Captain, i, 12, 17, 21, 27 ; 
 on Howe's expedition to the 
 Chesapeake, 295 et seq. ; on our 
 strategy during American war, 
 296 et seq. 
 
 Maharajah's treasure, a, 18 
 
 Malabar, coast of, 157 
 
 Malta, 8, 41, 107, 140 et seq. ; 
 garrison of, 81, 82, 142, 147 ; 
 silos for corn at, 196 et seq. 
 
 Mandora, battle of, 127 
 
 Manoeuvres, naval, 1901, experi- 
 ences at, 193 
 
 Marengo, battle of, 84 et seq. 
 Mareotis, Lake, 128 
 Marine resources, 14 
 Marlborough, 17 
 Marmorice Bay, 128 
 Marston, Mr R. B., on our food 
 supply, 189 ; scheme for storing 
 corn, 195 et seq. 
 Massena, Marshal, 315 
 Mattrosses, 26 
 Mauritius, 6, 134, 143 
 Maxwell, Sir Herbert, 108 
 M'Caskie, Mr, on bread stuffs, 188 
 M'Grath, Mr P. T., on cable pro- 
 tection, 185 
 Mediterranean, 7, 8, 11, 39, 52, 
 80 ; supply of coal in, 135 ; naval 
 bases in, 81, 141 
 Melbourne, 67, 145 
 Mends, Admiral, 127 ; on disem- 
 barkations, 268 
 Menou, General, 29 
 Merchant-shipping, 3, 13 ; tonnage 
 of, 67 ; protection of our, 213 
 et seq. ; transfer to neutral flag, 
 218 ; speed of at present, 232 
 Metz, 29, 38, 277 
 Meurthe river, 38 
 Mexico, Gulf of, 106 
 Military strength, factors in, 271 
 
 et seq. 
 Missiessy, Admiral, 54 
 Mississippi, 108 et seq. 
 Mobility of defensive force, 79 
 Moira, Lord, 108 
 
 Moeltke, 15, 61, 319 ; on our army, 
 299 ; share in educating staff- 
 officers, 303 ; permanence of his 
 influence, 304 
 Monck, General, 26, 120 
 Mondego, 315 
 Montenegrin troops, transport of 
 
 in 1877, 115 
 Moore, Sir John, in 1808, 99 et 
 seq., 122, 314; his expedition to 
 Sweden, 295 
 Morosini, Doge, 26 
 Morris on American navy, 105 
 Moselle river, 38 
 Mother country, the, and her 
 
 Colonies, 322 
 Mozambique, cable to, 166 
 Mulhall, Mr, on our food supply, 
 
 200 
 Murray, Captain S., on our food 
 
 supplies, 189, 199 
 Muscat, cable to, 166 
 
33° 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Napier, Sir W., 99; Sir Charles 
 128 
 
 Napoleon, 17, 36, 41, 45, 59, 74, 
 83 et seq., 91, 114 ; invasion of 
 Egypt, 118; on the Walcheren 
 expedition, 119; project for in- 
 vading England, 258 et seq., 268 ; 
 as a man of business, 273 ; the 
 effect of his terms after Jena, 304 
 
 Natal, 39 ; contribution to the 
 navy, 288 ' 
 
 Naval bases discussed, 132 
 
 Naval brigades, 97 
 
 Naval force, evasive character of, 
 31.32 
 
 Naval strength, varieties of, 48, 
 58 et seq. 
 
 Navy, duty of, 69 ; position of with 
 regard to foreign Powers, 264 
 et seq. 
 
 Neapolitan, 9 
 
 Nelson, 44, 50, 51, 54, 55, 56, 60, 
 83 ; English sailor of his time, 
 61, 66, 74; tactics of, 304 
 
 Netherlands, 10, 11 
 
 Newberne, 106 
 
 Newcastle, 145 
 
 Newfoundland, danger to cables 
 near, 181 et seq. ; contribution 
 to Imperial defence, 289 
 
 New Orleans, 106, 108 
 
 New sea- Powers, appearance of, 24 
 
 New York, 133 
 
 New Zealand, 67 ; defence of, 239 
 et seq. ; contribution to naval 
 defence, 288 
 
 Nile, battle of the, 62 
 
 Nobility and commerce, 19 
 
 Norsemen, 12 
 
 Observing, policy of, 52 
 
 Ocean, the, all road, 41 
 
 Octavius CcBsar, 26 
 
 Ohif) river, 108, 109 
 
 Oman, Gulf of, cable in, 166 
 
 Oporto, 315 
 
 Organisation, German, 61 ; value 
 of for our home defence scheme, 
 273 et seq., 280 c' seq. ; for 
 Imperial defence, 2S4 et seq. 
 
 Osman Pasha at Plevna, 277 
 
 Ostend, 108 
 
 Ottawa, conference at, 167 
 
 Pacii-ic, need of naval base in 
 
 South, 139, 157 ; North, 155 
 Pamunkey, 115 
 
 Paris, 36, 42 ; Declaration of, effect 
 on food supply, 201 et seq. ; on 
 our carrying trade, etc., 218 
 et seq. 
 
 Parliament, limitations to power 
 of, 291 
 
 Parma, Duke of, 34 
 
 Pena Cova, 315 
 
 Penang, cable to, 165 
 
 Peniche, 314 
 
 Peninsular war, 114 
 
 Pensacola, 106 
 
 Perim, 144 
 
 Persia, 92 
 
 Personal responsibility difficult to 
 enforce, 320 
 
 Perth, 145 
 
 Philadelphia, 115; capture of, 296 
 
 Phoenicians, 11 
 
 Piedmont, 41 
 
 Plato's " Republic," 293 
 
 Playfair, Lord, on food supplies 
 from America, 203 
 
 Plevna, defence of, 277 
 
 Porter, Admiral, 113 
 
 Port Arthur, 1 59 
 
 Port Blair, 158 
 
 Port Hudson, 108 
 
 Port Louis, 143 
 
 Port of Spain, 146 
 
 Port Said, 144 
 
 Portsmouth may come to be re- 
 placed by a Colonial base, 322 
 
 Portugal, 19, 115 
 
 Preparation for home defence, 280 
 et seq. ; of theatre of war, 307 
 et seq., 313 et seq. 
 
 Privateering, 230 
 
 Prosperity of England and Holland, 
 and its results compared, 13 
 
 Quality of our seamen of to-day, 
 
 61 
 Quiberon, expedition to, 114 
 
 Race, influences of, 10, 11 
 Railways, influence of, in modern 
 
 war, 97 et seq. ; strategical, on 
 Indian frontier, 247 et seq. 
 Raleigh, 7, 12, 26, 50 
 Rangoon, 143 
 
 Raw material, supply of, 204 et seq. 
 Reconnaissance work abroad, 312 
 
 et seq. 
 Records of advice, 321 
 Red Sea, cables through, 165 
 
INDEX 
 
 B^ 
 
 Reinforcements, Russian in the 
 Crimea, gS 
 
 Revolutiim, armies of, 74 
 
 Richmond, defence of, 277 
 
 River, a, as a means of transport, 
 109 
 
 Roanoke Island, 106 
 
 Roberts, Lord, his preparations for 
 war on the north-west frontier, 316 
 
 Robinson, Sir S., 232 
 
 Rochfort, 54 
 
 Rodgers, Commander John, in 
 
 Rodriguez, 143 
 
 Rome, sea- power of, 113 ; ultimate 
 fate of, 251 
 
 Roon, Von, system of, 304 
 
 Ropes, Mr J. C, on civil war in 
 America, 1 1 1 
 
 Rosetta, 12S 
 
 Rossbach, battle of, 17 
 
 Rothwell, Colonel, on sea trans- 
 port, 123 
 
 Routes by sea, 133 ei seq. 
 
 Rupert, Prince, 26, 120 
 
 Russia, 7, 8 ; fleet of, 263 
 
 Russian fleet in 1877, 31 
 
 Russians in 1877, 36, 61 
 
 Salisbury, S. Africa, 186 
 Sampson, Admiral, 177, 235 
 Santiago in Cuba, 145 
 Saratoga, Burgoyne's surrender at, 
 
 296 
 Scharnhorst's system, 304 
 Scheldt, River, io8 
 Science, modern, in shipbuilding, 
 
 97 
 Sea, the, as an obstacle, 30, 45 
 Sea-power, basis of, 3 
 Sebastopol, conveyance of supplies 
 
 to, in 1854-55, 208 
 Senegal, 155 
 Seychelles, 143 
 Seydlitz, General, 17 
 Shakespeare, 30 
 Sha?!)!on and Chesapeake, 62 
 Shenandoah \'alley, 44 
 Shipping Gazelle, correspondent in, 
 
 on commerce protection, 227 el 
 
 seq. 
 Sicily, 113 
 Sidon, lo 
 
 Sierra Leone, 142, 155 
 Silesia, 17 
 
 Simonstown, 142, 154 
 Singapore, 144 ; cables to, 165 
 
 South Africa, experiences in, 14, 
 16, 32, 33, 84, 88 ; garrison for, 
 146 ; transport of troops to, 101 ; 
 value of, to us, 102, no 
 
 South African naval station, 142, 
 el seq. ; cables, 165 ; defence, 
 240 el seq. 
 
 Southern States of America, block- 
 ade of, in 1861-65, 208 el seq., 
 220 
 
 Spain, 7, 8, 18, 19, 50; Sir J. 
 Moore in, 99, 113; "Spanish 
 ulcer," 91 ; present position of, 
 as a sea- Power, 263 
 
 Spanish - American war, cable- 
 cutting in, 177 el seq. ; part 
 played by coast defences in, 278 
 el seq. 
 
 Speed of manreuvre, 55 
 
 Standard of strength for army, 86 
 
 Staten, Island, 115 
 
 Stations, coaling, 132 el seq. 
 
 Staunton, 45 
 
 Steam, influence of, 97-100 
 
 St Arnauld, Marshal, 120 
 
 St Helena, 6, 134, 142 
 
 St John's, Newfoundland, 181 
 
 St Lucia, 75, 146, 161 
 
 St Vincent, Lord, his policy, 50, 
 51. 56 
 
 Strassburg, 38 
 
 Strategy, principles of, are of 
 universal application, 229; of 
 coast defence, 38 et seq. ; mysteri- 
 ous force of, 45 
 
 Suez Canal, 107 ; port of, 144 
 
 Suleiman Pasha, 115 
 
 Sultan's, the, armies, in 1877, 36 
 
 Supply, line of, 29 
 Surf, da 
 
 danger from, 123 
 Sutlej, 316 
 
 Sweden, 7 ; expedition to, 295 
 Swift, 17 
 Sydney, 145 ; cable to, 165 ; may 
 
 become an Imperial base, 322 
 Syrian coast, 10 
 
 Table Bay, 142 
 
 Tagus, 315 
 
 Talavera, Battle of, 314 
 
 Telegraphs, influence in modern 
 
 war, 97 
 Tennessee, 108 el seq. 
 Themistocles, 290 
 Thursday Island, 145 
 Thursfield, Mr, I 
 Time, value of, in war, 80 
 
332 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Tirnova, 1 15 
 
 Topography of a country, 30 
 
 Torpedo boats as commerce de- 
 stroyers, 223 et seq. 
 
 Torres Vedras, lines of, 314 et seq. ; 
 naval assistance at, 128 
 
 Torrington, Lord, 34 
 
 Touch with the enemy to be kept, 
 44 
 
 Toulon, 42, 50, 54, 135 
 
 Townsville, 145 
 
 Trade, volume of our, 212 et seq. 
 
 Trafalgar, 31, 62 
 
 Training, effect of blockade on, 50 
 et seq. 
 
 Transport, water and land com- 
 pared, 98 ; calculation for sea, 
 124 et seq. 
 
 Trincomalee, 143 
 
 Trinidad, 146 
 
 Tunis, French expedition to, in 
 1881, 107 
 
 Turkish fleets in 1877, 31, 115; 
 armies in 1877, 61 
 
 Tyre, 10 
 
 Uganda, 186 
 
 Ulm, 29 
 
 United Kingdom open to raids, 94 
 
 United States, shipping of, trans- 
 ferred to our flag during war of 
 secession, 227 et seq. ; fleet of, 
 263 
 
 Vancouver, messages from, to 
 
 Queensland, 174 
 Varna, 115 
 
 Veldt, the, compared to the sea, 32 
 Venice, 9, 10 
 Vicksburg, 113 
 Victoria Nyanza, 186 
 Vienna, 36 
 
 Villeneuve, Admiral, 54, 66 
 Vincent, Sir Howard, on our food 
 
 supply, 200 
 Vittoria, battle of, 91, 115 
 
 Walcheren expedition, 113, 119, 
 
 295 
 War of 1870, 14 ; duration of a 
 
 war, 47, 71 
 
 War staff, prejudices against a, 320 
 
 Warfare, land and sea, compared, 
 73; with uncivilised races, 311 
 et seq. 
 
 War policy, our, 102 ; staff to con- 
 sider, 301 et seq. ; its duties, 306 
 et seq., t,iZ et seq. 
 
 War prices, 86 
 
 Warships, accommodation for 
 troops on board, loi 
 
 Washington, 42 ; at Brandywine, 
 
 IIS 
 Waterloo, battle of, 17, 91 
 Water transport compared wiih 
 
 land, 98 ; value to us of, 246 
 
 et seq. 
 Waterways and water transport, 3, 4 
 Wei-hai-wei, 144, 151, 159 
 Wellesley, Sir Arthur, in Low 
 
 Countries, 108 
 Wellington, Duke of, 59, 74, 113 ; 
 
 changes his base from Portugal, 
 
 115 ; as a man of business, 273 ; 
 
 his army, 303, 313 
 Wellington, New Zealand, 145 
 West Indies, 66, 120 ; naval 
 
 station, 145 ; growing import- 
 ance of, 160 
 Wheat, prices of, in various years, 
 
 193 et seq. ; supply from various 
 
 countries, 202 et seq. 
 Widdin, 36 
 Woerth, Battle of, 44 
 Wolseley, Lord, on our food supply, 
 
 200 
 Working population, poverty of 
 
 our, 206 et seq. 
 Wynter, Captain, 35 
 
 Yellow Sea, 159 
 
 Yerburgh, Mr R. A., M.P., scheme 
 
 for storing corn, 197 et seq. 
 York, Duke of, in Low Countries 
 
 1794, 108 
 Yorktown, 29 
 
 Zanzibar, cable to, 165 
 Zezere river, 315 
 Ziethen, General, 17 
 Zulu war, cable communication 
 during, 183 
 
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