ALL RIGHTS RESERVED THE ROYAL REeiMENT OF ARTILLERY AT %« LE CATEAU, 26 AUGUST, 1914. BY MAJOR A. F BECKE. (late) R.F.A. l*ricc Sic ecu SJii/lliii^s diuf Six/^ciicc. I9in. I r"^ '^^ Widmore Street. • ^^ .^■?.„.^.,h Square) LondonN... jlliar /tterc ffon, taffeta, all which have not •e were worn m nbers' tribune. J were masculme , cloth and velvet •e hats, smaU hats, Skirts -were short, , others hardly ,^ ^ ^ _ leaching halfway ^^^ ^"^^ DDTrPfc fa Uxesses with long A/fODER/ir^ P^^^Rve Lped, or cut hke /J' MUUt^tW^J ^^^ ^^^^ve Ls! and there were ^^^ ^ments \ll"fp\^£d Gown Dcparttig*^ [ats and capes were ^ ^^, Moderate yPncea o^^^^^ ^^^ ^ide Dt-uidined. Pteats, ^^jich has recen ly P^^^^^^^ young ladicsrea Shont thickening their own dress aUowance^ ^f a ''lor the top of the is possibleto f ^^ Jes ^^ging from 39/6^ « fi^iTB and caught dusive design at pi^v- . f„n Se propor- -MMH— ^- .^^[T^^iT ¥hereiB-a general pKS^^=^^« ^^'^ tst line, or to sup- \ First FlooU ^ to make the dress 'hem. Tbemas«u-1 Kkk a cutaway U with one button ft with a co^^^t U plam sho«s, make fa man's as may be LaiSish is a pleated WnTand a flower m t ^n the chemisette l^soit pastel shades Lis, mauves P^^s, ^ of beige and ^y^ 5ette are "U^ed with ifith plain i"at«"_^^J; ^Xdribadacoat Tand with a gr^n 'dress went a httte ,een chiffon tied m ,1 ribbons. A pnce- A soft Uttle flounces fte plain bodice with ^nd cuffs.^ ^^^ lace I — ,, Commemoration Co+nrrlav of the Cenotaph ^ Headfort, 25, sn on Saturaay u „ ^ ^^^ yll and- Sutherland Hignian commemoration a advance in 1914. __^^^ ^^^_ ^^^ j^^^,^. Sides o sun si gleami; the sci work ! it is 8 Londoi Be i31.st January. I h 'with defective a undertake another v rore ^ all mv letterc iu^" "",''' ""^sr. There either 29 pd'rs. 9 Telt W ^^'''^^ to ha Ifacture, or 28 ndr^ r fi f f Barron Man manufacture and cfrrnn ^"i^"! •..°^ ^he sam, re.spondent Mr ChIr}T^^^ Your cor 'r^ct in stating thafri^-' ^fou^ke.s, is cor' founded in !759iGFn°"n^°'^Panv was" ICompany. Faikirk ^^°- P^^E. Carron .Tp ,.. •^''J"StontoAdmf' J- J- Crooks. haVe K'^ ^^«"'- better of ^^^y^' '--ish Reg, ?r without fhl i ^.'" "ever U^ "^ companif tersIhavede?iS/^^'-e- .^.P^?.' ^f.8""^"^ |facture:or'^28-pd'rs%'y7f- Barron ^S^^;' manufacture and cfrrnn ^"i^"! •..°^ ^he sam" re.spondent Mr ChIr}T^^^ Your cor l^ect in_statins th.^n'tl/foyJkes, is cor! ROYAL IRISH ARTILLERY With reference to letters which have recently "^he Times on the subject of the -rtillery I write to call attention iblished by Messrs. Browne and . ^-.....1 and Belfast, in 1914, by Major Crooks. Its title is " History of the Regtment of Artillery." On the jfc in Artillery ceasing to exist in 1801, D 1 irompanies were transferred to the 7th R.H f-^""^S^'''' Artillery, forming the 7th Battalion, R.A. One of these companies w s reduced ,n 1907. The remaining nine still exist and in 1937 are represented by the following batteries :— 3rd (Martinique— 1809) .. Field Battcrv 4th (Cole's Konl £,'^2 S'' L'^ rieiQ Battery Field Battery Field Battery 3rd (Martinique— 1809) 4th (Cole's Kop) 9th (Irish) iKih ^Toi...,..»\ ■ ■ •■ ■• riciu oattery 1« h (Talavera) . . . . pjcid Battery li'S Field Battery ■?s,h /Tu. i>„.., • •. „• • •• Medium Bat 23th (The Battlc-Axc Company) Medium Bat 20th Anii-Aircrali tery 20ih Anii-Aircralt V'" Anti-Aircraft —Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Leslie, and Navy Club, S.W.I. Medium Battery Anii-Aircral't Battery Anti-Aircraft Battery Army MSB LIBRARY ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. THE ROYAL REGIMENT OF ARTILLERY AT LE GATEAU, WEDNESDAY, 26th AUGUST, 1914 BY MAJOR A. F. BECKE (late) R.F.A. Historical Section (Military Branch) Committee of Imperial Defence Author of " Napoleon & Waterloo," etc. "C'EST AVEC UARTILLEEIE QU'ON FAIT LA GUERRE''— NAPOLEON. (CbiT. 11417— Posen, 8 December, 1806). Woolwich : Printed at the Royal Artillery Institution Printing Hous0 January, 1919. PREFACE. This study has been undertaken, first, to show Officers of the Regiment the use that will be made of their War Diaries, and the nature of the information that is required for historical work ; and, second, to encourage all Officers, who were present at the Action, to submit any further information that is in their possession. It is also hoped that it may prove of some instructional value. I am indebted to the courtesy of the Historical Section, Committee of Imperial Defence, for permission to use the War Diaries when writing this account. I wish to record my indebtedness to my colleague Captain J. J. Bell, 20th Battalion, London Regiment, for his untiring assistance and advice ; and to acknowl- edge most gratefully the valuable help given to me so freely by Captain C. T. Atkinson, O.U.O.T.C., Offi.cer in Charge of the Historical Section (Military Branch), Committee of Imperial Defence. A. F. BECKE. Public Record Office, W.C. 2. August, 1918. Vll. CONTENTS. Introduction Chapter 1. Chapter 2. Chapter 3. Chapter 4. Chapter 5. Chapter 6. Chapter 7. Chapter S. Chapter 9. Chapter 10. Appendix I. PAGE. Opening Events. ... ... ... ... ... 3 Retirement to the Le Cateau Position. ... ... 6 R.A., Second Corps, on Tuesday 25th Auoiist. ... 9 Order of Battle, R.A., Second Corps, 26th August. 15 The Action of Le Cateau- — ... ... ... 19 I. General Situation at Dawn. II. The Battlefield. III. The Opposing Forces. The A.ction of Le Cateau (cont'd. )> — ... ... 23 The Artillery at Dawn, Wed., 26th August. The Action of Le Cateau (cont'd.) — ... ... 27 Deploj^ment of the Artillery, 5 — 6 a.m. The Action of Le Cateau (cont'd.) — ... ... 34 (A). The opening of the Action, 6 — 9 a.m. . (B). The development of the Action, 9 a.m.- — noon. (C). The Crisis of the Action, Noon — 1.45 p.m. (D). The Retirement, after 1.45 p.m. (E). Covering Positions. The Retreat on St. Quentin. ... ... ... 71 Comments on the Action. ... ... ... ... 73 Copy of Operation Order issued to the Fourth Division at 6 a.m., 20. VIII. 1914 81 Appendix II. Guns lost by R.A., Second Corps, 26. VIII. 14 82 Appendix III. R.A. Casualties on 2G. VIII. 1914 S3 Appendix IV. R.A. Ammunition Expenditure, 26. VIII. 1914. 86 MAPS AND SKETCHES. (At end.) Map 1. Theatre of Operations. Map 2. R.A., Fifth Division, 26. VIII. 14. Map 3. R.A., Third Division, 26. VIII. 14. Map 4. R.A., Fourth Division, 26. VIII. 14. Map 5. R.A., at Le Cateau, 26. VIII. 14. Sketch A. Movements of B.E.F., 23—26. VIII. 14. Sketch A.A. Situation of B.E.F., Night 25/26. VIII. 14. Sketch B. British Right at Le Cateau, 26. VIII. 14. Sketch F. Results of Air Reconnaissances, 22/23. VIII. 14. AUTHORITIES CONSULTED. First Despatch of the Field Marshal, Commanding-in- Chief the British Forces in the Field, 7 September, 1914. War Diaries of C.R.A's, Brigades, Batteries, and Columns^ supplemented by statements and reports from various officers of the Regiment present in the action. The maps are based on the 25Woo<) — G.S.G.S. No. 2733; and the 40^0 ^^'^ 20000 Cambrai Sheet ; but the contouring of the right flank has been amended from information supplied by Officers. Previous War Services have been taken from the Table made by Lieut. -Col. H. W. L. Hime, R.A., published by the Royal Artillery Institution, January, 1890. ' In the Order of Battle, given on pages 15 — 17, the actual Diaries available are specified. THE ROYAL REGIMENT OF ARTILLERY AT LE GATEAU Wednesday, 26 August, 1914. Introduction. The more closely it is studied the more certain it becomes that the Action fought by General Sir H. Smith-Dorrien and the troops under his command on August 2.6th, 191,4, was not only a triumph for Wc<:i*xvJiAM, the British arms but had a most important bearing on the whole retreat. Indeed it is not too much to claim that future historians will pronounce Le Cateau to be one of the most important delaying actions recorded in history^. The time has come when the part played by the Regiment on this critical day can be examined. It is impossible at this stage to give the Germans any information that can be of the slightest value to them^ ; on the other hand it is necessary to set down as soon as possible the story as far as it is known, so that survivors may be able to correct statements, placings of Batteries, etc., which at present it is impossible to give more accurately from the data available. Any further delay will obviously make correction more difficult. Once comparative accuracy is reached then the work will be made easy for the Historian of this period of the Regiment's History, and incidentally the production of the Staff History of the War will be assisted materially when the time comes to write it. At first sight it would appear that nothing further is required than a close study of the War Diaries submitted periodically by each unit ; but officers who have kept them know their shortcomings as well as those whose duty it is to work on them. Kept as they were amidst the confusion of a great retreat, by officers overcome by weariness, in several cases by junior officers who were the only survivors of historic units that had suffered heavily in the firrht, sometimes put together weeks afterwards, when memory was dulled by other events which had thronged thick and fast on top of one * The present day popular view is simply expressed by Major Wliitton in his iMiok called "Tlie ilanie Campaign". On p. f)(> be writes "The British over- whelmed at IjC Cateaii". No statement coidd be more inaccurate. ' The Germans remained on the field at the close of the action. 1. 2 THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. another, the wonder is not that there are omissions of important .facts and mis-statements about time, but that they do succeed generally in giving a wonderful picture of this strenuous and critical day'. But the Diaries, even when they are first-hand evidence, are insufficient by themselves, and as far as possible they have been supplemented by statements from officers who were present at the engagement.-. If any other officers would communicate with the author any corrections about their own or neighbouring units, or supply any additional facts, they will be most gratefully received and recorded^. ' It must be slatetl quite frankly that in very few Diaries is a rough sketcli, or tracing, appended to show the position in action occupied by the Battery or Brigade. Very few Diaries give the aninnuiition expenditure. In liardly any case (except in tlie Diaries of the E.H.A. Batteries) is a nominal role furnished of the officers serving with the Battery, or Brigade, when it landetl in France. Many Diaries are not even signed, and thus this means of identification of the Battery Commander is not available In other words, impressed by the necessity for Jacksonian secrecy, officers have too often carried it to excess. For instaiue, in on© case an officei- described the position of his Battery as "In France". The probabilities were strongly in favour of the general accuracy of this maddening statement which the officer had the effrontery to label "confidential"! It is also most unfortunate that all Batteries did not keep Diaries, particiilarly for this eaily period. Valuable Battery Records are therefore missing for ever. ' To prove the need for additional inforaiation to supplement the official Diaries it is only necessary to quote in full two of the Brigade Diaries for 26th August 1914 (the nam\s are purposely omitte 1 to prevent identification). One runs: — "Retired all day covering Rear Guard of Infantr>-. Came into action near and did a night march to " The other states: — "7 a.m. moved to found Infantry engaged. All three Batteries came into action and took part in the fighting all day. ti p.m. Fighting ceased. 7 p.m. Retiremean continued, arriving 2 a.m. 27th August." It is only fair to say that the original of tlie second Diary was lost in the Retreat and the description of the action -wias rec-onstrncted from notes. Officers whose duty it is to keep the Diary of the Unit must remember that in laboiiring to be brief it is qiiite possible to become obscure. Ever>' one will agree that from official records it would take an experienced joiirnalist to de.scribe in detail the woi'k of the two Brigades in question. ' They should be addressed to the "•ftaiiiiiK _IteaiHt. °al itfi i L eyi Chancery Lane, W i O i 9. '". So fai- for obvious reasons, only officers in England and Switzerland have been asked for information. Note. — The following abbreviations are used: — B.E.F., for British Exjieditionary Force; G.II.Q , for General Head Quarters; O.R.A., for (Officer) Commanding Royal .Artillery (of a division); B.C., for Battery Commander; O.P., for Observation Post; B.A.C., for Brigade Ammunition Column; D.A.C., for Divisional Ammunition Column. Roman Numerals are used for Artillery Brigades, and Arabic fo'- Batteries. V THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. CHAPTER I. OPENING EVENTS. (See Map I and Sketches A and F.). Great Britain having declared War on Germany, on August 4, ''^£i>aKr. inobihsation was at once carried out ; ^.n3. shrouded in secrecy the _^^ ~ ^^ small B.E.F. crossed over to Franc e between ^gus t 9 and August \'Z - \^ f IM. In accordance with the plan arranged the B . KiT^now trained northwards and on A ugus t 21 had assembled in the concentration area about Landrecies. O^^ at day i ^ advari ced towards Mons^ikvOAY ^ forming practically the LeftU'''mg'of the Frendi^^^Vrinies m Nortnern France. ^ The results of our air reconnaissances on August 22 (see Sketch . F^ established the following facts — a heavy action was in progress ^^° along the Sambre near Charleroi, and t he French h ad retired from Kep»vjp<^' their first position. Large German forces, well covered by Cavalry -- ^ Civisions, were moving through Southern Belgium. Indeed they -r^.Jf were in close proximity to the British Expeditionary Force, of which Cc\=^»^^ the Second Division had not yet come into .ling. The information indic^?TtTiat'1ffi'?''^'Hhatts had formed the ambitious plan of effect ing the double envelopment of the French Fifth Army and the B.E.F. 2 •""' On Sunday^ August 23 , the Germans advanced against the B.E.F. and a general action commenced with dramatic suddenness along the line of the Canal. ^ Fighting was severe from Obourg westward, almost to Conde, the German attacks in massed formation being h eavily punished by the rapid fire of the Infantry outpost line". Through "the lack, however, of any suitable positions from wKich the Artillery could give support, the Infantry had, towards evening, to retire to a second position farther to the Southward. Owing to the news received about 5 p.m. on August 23, concering the situation of the French Armies on his right,* Field-Marshal Sir " The first portion of the B.E.F., under the supreme command of Field- Marshal Sir John French, included the Cavalry Division (I., II., III., IV. Cavalry Brisadest, Y. Cavalry Brigade, First Corps (Fii-st and Second Divisions), Second Corps (Third and Fifth Divisions), with 4 Squadrons R.F.C. etc., also 6 Battalions of Line of Communication and Armv Troops, 4 of which were formed into the 19th Infantrv Brigade. Strength about 9(t,000, with 334 guns (216 18-pdrs. ; T-Jlo' Hows".; 16 GO-pdrs.; and 30 13-pdrs.) * The tliree German Armies which advanced against the V. French Army and the B.E.F. were: — The 3rd German Arms'- (v. Hausen) which attacked the French right, advancing from the East against the line of the Meuse, from Givet to Namur • the lind Gennaii Army (v. Biilow) which advanced from the North and attacked the Sambre between X'lmur and Charleroi; and the 1st German Army (V. Kluck), whose mission \\as to envelop and overwhelm tlie B.E.F. In the 1st Army were included the II., III., IV., IV. Reserve, and IX. Corps. ' In one xmit, 2nd Duke of Wellington's Regiment (Fifth Division), the men had just returne0 p.m. Th^ men were then served nut with rations. The Battalion- was formed up ready to march again at 6.2-3 a.m. ott 2r)t]i \u^ THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 5 proportion of reservists present in the ranks, too little inured to physical exertions, the stram must have been tremendous. But the old regmiental traditions stood the grim test and esprit de corps carried through many a worn-out man until the dawn broke on September G, and the great advance began. ^ ]\Ieanwhile a welcome reinforcement reached the B.E.F. ; for on this same day, August 2J. the Fourth Division began to arrive to Mr>x^j the v,^st_pf _Le„Q,?,teau».^"d on ;^i^"st 25^, it moved out towards ^*«» Fourth Division — Ligny-Fontaine au Pire — Haucourt '.lO 19th Inf. Bde. — ^In Le Cateau and near Le Cateau Station. The Cavalry Division was much split up, having its furthest detachments at Catillon and Viesly."* On this same day the First Corps had been delayed and had not reached their allotted positions, actually halting for the night on. the right bank of the Sambre to the south-east of the Forest of Mormal, between Le Grand Fayt-Dompierre-Landrecies and Z5^a6 Noyelles. That evening the Germans^ blundered on to the Guards ' '' Brigade at Landrecies and after a hot fight w^ere repulsed . Meanwhile, during the afternoon, the Commander-in-Chief decided that the action he had intended to fight with the tw^o Corps on August 26 must be deferred till later in the retreat, when some natural obstacle, like the Somme or Oise, should have been placed ' Tliey crossed back again chiring the retreat and resumed their original posi- tions on '29th Aug., when S. of tlie Oise. ' General Sir James Grierson, who went to France to command the Second Corps, died in the train between Ro\ien and Amiens on the way to the front, ou Monday, 17th A us. T)ie command was then priven to General Sir H. Smith-Dorrien, and he reached Bavai in the afternoon of Friday, 21st Aug. ' This was only completed by the early a.m. of 26th Aug. * Tlie H. Q. of the R.F.C. made the following changes of station in the early davs:— Maubeuge (17th Aug.), Le Cateau (21th), S. Ouentin (2.5th), La Fere- (27th) and Compiegne (28th). * Probably part of the IX. German Corps. THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 7 between the B.E.F. and the Germans ; consequently on Aug. 25 he ordered t hat t he retirement should be contniued and that the B.E.F . was to march on Aiig n'^t^ '^n in. the line Busigny — ^Fremont — -Beaure- ^ ^ voir — Le Catelet . In order to comply, orders were i ssued by the Ai ^'jcU« Second Corps at 10.15 p.m . for the force to continue the southward c'uAa-' march, the Fourth Division starting at 7 a.m. and the Second Corps i(j-^^'k*ia , conforming- to it. It is now necessary to consider the state of affairs in the Second 2>W^ ff4 Corps on that Tuesday eve nino'. There is no doubt that the long 4:5-V*<>-*.a/». march performed on that d^, especially that of the Fifth Division i^'^CS-^- along the Roman Road, had proved most exhausting, particularly to the troops on Rearguard Duty. The constant checks and frequent deployments tried the men already wearied by three days spent in almost continuous marching, digging and figfiting, and always on short rations. In particular the Fifth Division suffered most from the scorching heat of the day, passing as they did under the lee of the Forest of Mormal whose great trees^ held off from the marching column any breeze there was, so that along that seven mile stretch ^^^the heat was almost suffocating. In the Third Division the 7th 2> Cy* ' V^Infantry Brigade , which acted as reargua rd and was sharply engaged at Solesmes. towards dusk , only readied Laudry at a very late hour and the men were very exhausted . The state of the Infantry of the Second Corps on that Tuesday night, as well as the dispersed bivouacs occupied by the Cavalry Division, must have caused the Commander on the spot to question the possibility of withdrawing any further on the next day and of covering the movement adequately with his slender force of cavalry, without first of all administering a severe check to the pursuing German Army. Knowing the British soldier so well he realised that the troops would have attempted another 20 mile march on the morrow but such an effort must have been too costly in stragglers to face, if it could be avoided. Unless . the enemy were delayed, how could the First Corps, whose nearest troops at Landrecies were 7 miles away to the north-east of Le Cateau, ever effect a retirement through Guise.- Again if the Germans were not roughly handled and checked on August 26 they would be able to attack on August 27 with far greater advantages than they possessed on the 26th, when the long bound in retirement ■ — from IBavai to the Le Cateau position — had undoubtedly spread- eagled the pursuers.-^ General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien rose superior to the occasion ; during the night August 25l/26 he decided that the Second Corps must stand and fight on the Le Cateau position and he issued orders <5vjk*^ ouXts accordingly to his troops, taking over as well the Cavalry Division, ^^s,^jl*^. _ Q.6*^ * There wa« a forest on this same site in Roman times, lii l!'it about inuv- "^ fifths of the total area was covered by big trees — beech, oak and hornbeam. (I aiu indebted to Miss Jones, Ijondon Schcwl of Economics, for this information). ' For situation at night see Sketeh AA ' * A German Coriin liad been allowed to rest after passing Dour on '21th Aiip;., whilst a fresh one moved to the front and oontinued Ihn piirsuil. (hi 'ifJth .\m^.<. the resting Corps wa-s suddenly called out and pushed forward in motor-lorries lt> take part in tlie action at Le Cateau. 8 THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. the Fourth Division^ and the lilth Infantry Brigade- who were on the ground. In the early morning of August 20 he telephoned his decision to G.H.O. at St. Oucntin-^ ;•♦. * Tiie message received at 7.20 a.m. by the Fourth Division is still available among ll'.o Appeudiees to Vol. I. of its G.S. Diary; it runs as follows: — To Fourth Division. G.W. 1 [Aug.'Jt)]. From information received from the <"avalry it has been found necessary to remain in our pi-esent position. The Second Corps is talking ui) a position fioni Reum.ont-Troisvilles-Audeiicourt-Caiidry Station. Sir Horace Smit h-Dorrion hopes that you will hold the ;;r()und on his left as far as Ilaiicourt. ■' From Second Corps Bertry. - G.H.y. 00. .'^. of -irAh Aug. (issued at 1 p.m.) placed the Itnh Inf. Bde. under the orders of the Second Corps. ^ F.S. Regus., Part I., Chapter II., para. 1."'. states very clearly the .latitude allowed to a subordinate with regard to the precise execution of the orders given to him by his superior. ■' At o a.m.. .\ugu>t iJiJtli. the following message was sent from the Second Corps to G.H.Q.: — "G. :{i>!^. Inform French Cavalry Corps that Secoiul Corps is not retiring "to-day, and ask for their co-operation on our lefv flank." .\t the same hour the Second Corps informed the Fifth Division: — "G. 8(J7. Tlie 1})th Infantry Brigade is i)laoed under your orders." THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. CHAPTER III. R.A. SECOND CORPS ON TUESDAY, AUGUST 25. (See ]\Iap 5). (A) FiftJi Division. The Divisional Artillery, Fifth Division, retired v^'ith their Division and bivouacked alongside the Roman Road to the north of Reumont. XV R.F.A. (11, 52 and SO R.F.A .) with 61 (Hows.) R.F.A. (detache3~"from Vlli R.l^.A.J had been attached to the Rearguard (14th Infantry Brigade) and did not get in until dusk (about 7 p.m.) after a trying march that had lasted since 4 a.m.^ One piece of good fortune had attended 01 on the only occasion when it fired on this day. When engaging some concealed German guns, a shrapnel shell from one of the Howitzers burst over a viaduct, destroying a company of German infantry who were engaged in crossing it at that precise moment. I'here is a certain grim satisfac- tion in recalling that the shell was off the line. 52 R.F.A. worked with the rear Battalion of the Rear Guard and the Battery came into action South of Bavai to cover the exits from the town. Whilst iiT this position some German cavalry were seen and successfully engaged. In the long march back to Reumont along the Roman Road, the country being very difficult and the only possible position being on the road itself, the B.C. kept a section with the Rear Party. These two guns were unlimbered repeatedly, coming into action behind the crest of every rise, but the Germans did not press and no target appeared. Although the Battalion (l/D. C.L.I.) on Rear Party was relieved by another battalion (l/E. Surr. R.) of the 14th Infantry Brigade, when about ^P^,f^} 64-^*^ hslf the distance had been covered, nevertheless the Battery was not ^f JVptM«' changed. 52 reached its bivouac to the north of Reumont at about 7 p.m., and on arrival the men were fortunate enough to get a hot meal.- Xo orders for August 20 were issued .to XV. R.F.A. when it arrived in bivouac, and the late hour prevented the Brigade Com- mander from carrying out any reconnaissance of the ground in his vicinity. During the night (at 1.15 a.m.) orders were received to continue the retirement and XV. was to be ready to move off at 3.30 a.m. with the 1-lth Infantry Brigade. ^^ 10s Heavy Battery had bivouacked at A Vargnies overnight W- <7y^'*i (24/25) ; to rejoin the Column and reach Reumont necessitated a ' In nt R.F.A. the horses, many of whom were reniomits, weie sliowing signs of the oontimioiis Avork and scanty food. On lilih and 12.")th lliey had only one feed of corn; stocks of oats being used when available. During the retirement the horses seem to have been kepi going by xising the oat-straw, of wliicli luckily fliere was an al)nndance. ■ No rations had Ix-eii isssued to the T^attery eitlier on 'l?>\-t\ or on iilth and the Iron Eations were then opened t*n tlie march into liavai, early on the iioth. ri2 passed tlse 'J/Manchester K. (1 Uh Inf. iJde.) who stated they were without food. Each man of the Battery gave up two of his biscuits to them. A 10 THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. — — march of 25 miles — -a very long one for a Heavy Battery at any time,. T>H»i»*^' especially so soon after mobilisation. On arrival in bivouac the Battery replenished its ammunition that evening. Jtfw* 10,0. \'2A. XXVI 1 and Yn,L-Gi2^tsJ.>B-£-A- . having marched fairly high 2>T- Csr^- i "«> . up m the main body, were m earlier and had a less trying march than ^rj^ '!«> ^ units before mentioned. ' ** MoTCi - XXVIIl also retired with the Divisiorj but, before arrival in I'Z'i. ' i\. t '" bivouac, took up and entrenched a covering posi Uon north o f ^^n,' {w^yj-Lu Montay .^ Just before sunset the Brigade was hurriedly withdrawn, j^) but did not reach the bivouac near Reumont until 11.30 p.m., owing to a bad block in the village of Montay which occasioned some hours delay. 123 R.F.A. had become detached from XXVIIl in the retire- ment from Dour on August 24, and marched on August 25 with XXVII ; thus it preceded XXV^III in the marching column and was not deflected from the road at Montay-. It arrived at the Reumont bivouac about 5 p.m., and here the whole Brigade was finally re- assembled that night. XXVIIl B.A.C. had undergone a different experience. Marching from Wargnies at 1.30 a.m. it attempted to regain the marching column of the Fifth Division, but was cut off by the Flank Guard of the Third Division and marched with it for some time. Then gradually working across country it reached the neighbourhood of Reumont about 5 p.m. As far as can be ascertained all the B.A.Cs. bivouacked near Reumont on the night 25/26 August. The Fifth Division D.A.C. retired to Reumont with the Division and bivouacked there ; some time early next morning detached portions of Nos. 2 and 3 sections appear to have rejoined the column. The C.R.A's H.Q. were in Reumont and in the same village were situated the H.Q. of the Fifth Division. Thus on this night the Artillery of the Fifth Division was con- centrated once more under its C.R.A. Considering the difficult nature of the retirement on August 24, the pressure applied to the Fifth Division on that day, the somewhat scattered bivouacs occupied that evening, and the march of the Third Division cutting across the line of retreat of the Fifth Division, this was in itself a considerable feat. Meanwhile, whilst marching southwards, orders had reached the column that the force was to turn about on August 26 and fight on a selected position. Thus the rare opportunity was given of studying the ground from the hostile point of view, and this was seized by the C.R.A. On reaching the line, which it was intended to hold, he rode over his section of it himself, but unfortunately heavy rain commenced falling about 5 p.m. thus obscuring the view. Con- sequently he arranged with his 'Brigade Commanders to carry out a detailed reconnaissance at dawn (about 4 a.m.). ' The 2/Siiffolk R. and 2/Mancliester R , 1 Hli Iiif Ede., who Jiad been with the Eeatrgiiard. also extended on fhis position, allowing the other 2 )>atta.] ion.'* of this Brigade (IE. Surrey R. and 1/D. C.L.I.) to pass through and proceed to I^e Oatcau. ' To take the place of 123, 11 R.F.A. of XV, remainetl with XXVIIl when the position at Montay was occupied. 11 R.F.A. finally Ijivouacked with its Brigade- to the N.W of Reiimont, but did not reach the bivouac until very late at ni^ht. THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 11 All the units occupied sodden, cheerless bivouacs in a drenching; rain that lasted from 5 p.m. till mid-night when at last it ceased. It was a dismal end to one of the longest days. *^ (B) Third Division. ■^'^^^ i^>^,- •!> ^^ " Generally speaking the Artillery of the Third Division were not quite so highly tried on August 24 and 25 as that belonging to the Fifth Division. Their march was more varied than the Fifth Division's along the dead straight Roman Road which presented a vista that appeared to be never ending. There was no Forest, like ISIormal, to complicate the move and act as a suffocating blanket alongside the line of march. A part of the Division (Sth Infantry B.<3i . Oof Eb ■ A^ Brigade and XL R.F.A.) had actually bivouacked at Amfroipret well •*'' on the line of retirement. The Artillery also seems to have been less ** *v scattered than was the case in the Fifth Division. A^- A^- Attached to the Rearguard ( 7th Infantry Brigad e) were XLH S:<^- ^•'** f^q-vao and XXX (Hows.^ R.F.A., but except in the neighbourhood of [i\t. CdfevK. ' Solesmes (about 5 to 5. .30 p.m.) there seems to have been no firing. In the retirement from Solesmes Jl R.F.A. became detached from its Brigade^ and then it accompanied the original Rear Party (2/R. Irish Rifles) marching via Monta}^ — Le Cateau — Reumont and Bertry. They passed the last named place about a.m. on August 2r). The rest of XLII reached Caudr)- about 11 p.m. and billetted there. XXX (Hows.) R.F.A. were less fortunate, they did not reach Caudry until mid-night and had to bivouac in the wet streets. XXIII R.F.A. m the mam Column, starting at 4 a.m., reached I o7- left. - Troisvilles at 5.30 p.m. Realising that an action was to be fought '^"^ on that ground next day, the Brigade Commander reconnoitred the }r^ portion allotted to his Brigade and his Batteries bivouacked in rear 2^"^ of it ready to occupy it at daylight. It had been decided that two sections should occupy a forward position in rear of the Infantry Firing Line, from which the valleys and covered approaches running south from Inchy could be swept with fire. These forward positions were selected on arrival and 107 and lOS proceeded to prepare entrenchments for a section from each Battery. In the case of the forward section of 108 the pits (as well as two dummies) were dug in the dark in a root-field betw^een S and 10.30 p.m. 109 also recon- noitred the position that the Battery would occupy on the morrow. XL R.F.A. 2 reached Caudry about 4 p.m. and billetted to the 6-*2'5-'^ E. of the town ; with it was XL B.A.C. > Xv*^ 48 Heavy Battery, on arrival in the neighbourhood of Troisvilles, ^ a/"*^ occupied a rough defensive position to the west of the village, ^'b^ " bivouacking there for the night. The Third D.A.C. had marched at 2 a.m., it parked to the west of Bertry, being complete with the exception of a few wagons.-' ' Unfortunately the Appendix containinnr the report of 11 on its work Ihi.s day- was never sent in with the Brigade Diary and cannot he traced. ' XL had had difficidty tlie previous night at Amfroipret with its supplies. They had heen dumped in tiie vicinity of the hivouae, but then it wa.s found that no wagon was availal)le to fetch them; an e.xasperating situation. Fortunately they were eventually sent up by a motor-lorry. ' They weie in Le Cateau. They marched to rejoin very early next morning. 12 THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. The C.R.A's H.O. were in Bertry, which also contained the H.Q. of the Third Division as well as that of the Second Corps. Thus in the Third Division the Artillery was well in hand at niglit, the ground had been reconnoitred and in the two important cases entrenchments had actually been dug for the advanced sections that were to co-operate closely with the Infantry defence. Here as with the Fifth Division, as evening fell, the weather turned cold and wet ; but this was not sufficient to prevent the earliest arrivals from making the most of the short time at their disposal. <• . •*» ■(Cj Foiirlh Division. ^n^ ^_3-^>» ^ "^^ This Dixisional Field iXrtiUery^ had a very different experience The Batteries spent August 2 1 in the train on the way to the front, ■detraining well to the south of what became, on August 20, the Battle- field of Le Cateau. During August 25, XIV, XXIX, XXXI f!' and ?7 '>»^ =h^- '^<> XXXVn (Hows. ) concentrated in the neighbourhood of Briastre ; as tney gradually liiiished their several detrainments, they made a rapid march to the front to join the Infantry of the Fourth Division, who were waiting in tlie neighbourhood of Solesmes ready to take the pressure off the retiring troops. At night the Divisional Field Artillery concentrated at Ligny, and the B.A.C's also seem to have been in the same neighbourhood. XXXII having been on rearguard with the loth Infantry Brigade. _fi <*: h-avj> reached Ligny much later than the rest^^ The C.R.A's H.Q. were at Haucourt, at which place were also the H.O. of the Fourth Division. The entry of the Fourth Division into active operations had been uncomfortable. The delay at home whilst the other Divisions left, then the concentration at Harrow, the hurried and crowded passage across, the equally hurried and crowded train journey to the north of France, the swift detrainment followed by a rapid march into action, had imposed a severe trial on all. But on the night of August 25/26 the C.R.A. had his Brigades well under his hand, though in the existing circumstances it had not been possible to make any reconnaissance of this section of the field. {D) Royal Horse Artillery. Ill R.H.A. " D" R.FI.A., although nominally attached to the I Cavalry Brigade apparently was never in touch with them all day. At night " D" reached Catillon wnth the III Cavalry Brigade and portions of ' The adventures of 31st Heavy Battery are rather strikin;^: — Arriving at Boulogne ai \:M) p.m. on 2-ltli Aug. it landed there, only to re-embark the next day. On 'JOtli .\ug. it sailed for Havre, di'^enibarking the same day. On Sept. 2nd it re-embarked once more; sailed on the Mrd Sept. ; reached S. Nazaire on the oth, di^-emljarked the same day. finally it entrained for the front on the 7th, when the advance had already Ijegun. The Fourth D.A.C. -^vhich had arrived at Havre at noon "2 tth Aug., entrained for S. Quentin on 2jth, and detrained at that place dining the morning of 2<>th August. - The Batteries seem to have passed the rest of the night halted in the road. THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 13 I and II ; and there it bivouacked, the men sleeping on the road.^ " E" R-H.A.' passed through Le Ouesnoy and Romeries during the retirement and finally halted for the night to the south-west of Le Cateau with the I Cavalry Brigade (see "L" below). VII R.H.A. " L" R.H.A.-\ startmg at 1 a.m. with the II Cavalry Brigade, reached Vertain about 5 p.m. Here there was a great congestion of troops, including French Territorials, and a halt was made to allov/ the troops to get clear. At dark the retirement was resumed agam, " L" Battery now being in rear of the column. Possibly darkness saved this part of the force when passing through a sunken road with German Infantry only a short quarter of a mile behind it. In the early morning " L" and the I Cavalry Brigade bivouacked in a field in the Fifth Divisional Area. " I" R.H.A. Unfortunately no Diary v^as kept for this Battery but as far as possible the omission has been made good from private sources, so that the War Services of this magnificent Battery — ^the Troop ever associated in the minds of all Gunners with the names of Norman Ramsay and Fuentes d'Onoro — -may be chronicled to swell its previous record. Within 10 years of its formation, in 1805, the War Services of " I" Troop numbered GO ; they ring like trumpet calls from the past — ^"Busaco" ; " Redinha" ; "Fuentes d'Onoro"; " Badajoz" ; Salamanca"; " Vittoria" ; " San Sebastian" ; "Waterloo". On August 2') "I" retired from the neighbourhood of Saultain with the IV Cavalry Brigade. When north of Haussy the column was shelled from the north-west and " I" came into action at once against the German guns. The Battery had not fired previously in the campaign. Later on the column retired to Solesmes and at 5 p.m. " I" unlimbered again, immediately to the north of the town. From this position the Battery fired .10 rounds against German artillery in action to the north and north-west. The German fire was quite ineffective — very short. When ordered to retire and billet at Beaumont, " I" had to move through S. Python, as Solesmes was blocked by troops*. In passing through Viesly " I" got attached to XLII R.F.A. of the Third Division and moved with it to Caudry, reaching there between 10 and 11 p.m. "I" billetted in a square on ' 'JTlie Rig-bt Section (Lieut. Watson) after liaviiiy: l)een detached to a flauk got separated from the Battery and did not rejoin for a considera1)le time. The story of tiiis section would be very acceptable. Eventually Lieut. Watson and his section joined up with "I" R.H.A. durinj^- tlie retreat after \,e Catean. The 8 gxm Battery thus formed was reOirganis€(l by Major W. Ci. Thoiup-on into a Brigade of two 4' gun Horse Artillery Batteiies. ~- It appears that "E" fired the first round from our artillery in this war. On . (v^jl Aug. 'J'Jnd atl().:W a.m. the Battery was in action near Braye (see map 1), and it «•▼« *^ •""•^ opened on some German guns that were -helling Peronnes; but the range was excessive and "E" soon ceased fire. ' ^iue as the record of "L" B.H.A. had been in H.E.I.C.S. yet it is certain that it had never shot with nu)re deadly effect fhan it did on the previous day (•2Jth Aug.) at Audregnies. Though "D". "B" and lliHli R.F.A. co-operated in this fight, "L" had been the Battery that was chiefly responsible tor taking the sting out of the outflanking attack- of a Uernian Torps which threatened the left fiank of the Fifth Division in its retirement from the Dour position. * Shortly afterwards the German guns lengthened their range and set Solesmes: ou fire. 14 THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. the western face of Caudry. It was no longer in touch with the IV Cavalry Brigade. The Royal Horse Artillery was necessarily much split up. Dur- ing the retreat, the Batteries were used as they were required. Moreover, their scattered bivouacs on the night of August 25/2(3 were not serious m view of the fact that a delaying action was to be fought on the morrow, because for that purpose Field Artillery and Heavy Batteries were primarily required ; and, when the time came to with- draw, the Horse Artillery would be well in hand for use directly the necessity arose for the employment of more mobile guns. What was more important, as the left flank had extra protection — Sordet's Cavalry and French horse artillery^- — was that guns might be re- quired to cover the open right flank of the Second Corps and to secure the spur to the S. of Le Cateau, near which our Infantry had halted on the Tuesday night ; and fortunately nearly three-fourths of the Royal Horse Artillery would be available for this task from an early hour, for practically three of the Batteries had bivouacked beyond the Right Flank or in the Fifth Divisional Area. ' On the afternoon of 25th Aug. an officer of XL. 3.A.C. saw Sordet's cavalry .marching W. along the Cambrai chaussee. THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 15 CHAPTER IV. THE ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE R.A. SECOND CORPS ON AUGUST 2G. Now that the situation on the Tuesday night has been appre- ciated, as well as the disposition of the available artillery on that same night, it will be wise to summarize the units present on the ground, giving as far as possible their commanders. ORDER OF BATTLE OF ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. Royal Horse Artillery!^ with the Cavalry Division. C.R.H.A.2;4 Colonel B. F. Drake.'^ Ill R.H.A.2;4 (Lieut. -Col. R. W. Breeks). "D"2 (Major G. Gillson). " E"- (Major A. B. Forman). Ill R.H.A., B.A.C. (Capt. W. S. D. Craven). VII R.H.A. (Lieut.-Col. J. F. N. Birch). "1"^ (Major W. G. Thompson). "L"2;4 (Major the Hon. W. D. Sclater- Booth). VII R.H.A., B.A.C. 2 (Capt. C. D. Uniacke). Number of guns with the Cavalry Division — 4 Batteries, or 24 13-pdrs. Divisional Artillery — Fifth Division. C.R.A.2;4;5 Brig.-Genl. J. E. W. Headlam, C.B., D.S.O. XV-' ;4 (Lieut.-Col. C. F. Stevens). ll* (Major P. W. B. Henning). i<7>v a^^uy^ .522; 4 (Major A. C. R. Nutt). 6 •• .^02; 4 (Major R. A. Birley). I ■• XV B.A.C. (Capt. W. G. Curling). XXVIP (Lieut.-Col. W. H. Onslow). 119 (Major E. W. Alexander). 120 (Major C. S. Holland, killed at Mons, Aug. 2.3.). cJ^ "2, . iV 121 (Major C. N. B. Ballard). XXVII B.A.C. (Capt. D. K. Tweedie). ' The five R.H.A. Batteries —"D", "E", "I", "i" and "L"— that went to France with the original B.E.F. were made up, in personnel and guns, by other R.H.A. Batteries. They took no remounts or reservists wi. them. * Diaries are available for the«e units. ' Lt.-Col. H. r. Dawson, E..\. ai^ Major E. Benson, E.A., kindly gave me considerable assistance in compiling the nominal roll of the commanders of the Tarious units. " Statements have been received fiom officers belonging +o these units. '' The wagon in which this Diary was carried was blown to pieces by a shell at Keiimont on August -Jtith. The O.E..\. re-wrote the description of the fighting, at Mons and l^e Cateau, whilst the Division was on the Aisne. 16 THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. XXVIIP;^ (Lieut. -Col. E. C. Cameron). 122- (Major G. H. Sanders). ^•^ ■ ^ J*^ 1232 (Major G. H. W. Bayley). »• <^ • 1242 (Major G. R. V. Kinsman). •• G •• XXVIII B.A.C.i (Capt. J. F. P. Thoiburn'. VIII (Hows.),i (Lieut.-Col. E. J. Duffus). 372 (Major E. H. Jones). ^W \.^r^- 611 (Major F. A. Wilson, D.s.o.) 65^ (Major J. E. C. Livingstone Learmonth). VIII (Hows.) B.A.C. (Capt. I. D. Vernon). 108 Hea\-y Battery^ R.G.A. ((Wi-pdrs.^ (Minor C. de Sausmarez, D.S.O.). '^•v*' I a»*-t>. Fifth Divisional Ammunition Column^ (Lt.-Col. E. P. England). Number of guns with Fifth Division — 13 Batteries, or 52, 18-pdrs.3; 1^^ 4--;'/ Hows. ; and 1, fiO-pdrs. Total— 74. Divisional Arlillcry — Third Division. C.R.A.i Bng.-Genl. F. D. V. Wing, CB. XXIIIi (Lieut.-Col. A. T. Butler). 1071 ;■- (Major L. J. Hext). ^"^ "Z^^ 108M- (Major H. E. Carey). ^ ** 10!)i;2 (Major S. F. Metcalfe). •— XXIII B.A.C. (Capt. H. W. Atchison). XLi (Lieut.-Col. R. J. G. Elkmgton). 6 (Major E. W. S. Brooke). " ^ " 23 (Major C. St. M. Ingham). 49 (Major T- S. Maidlow, killed at Mons, Aug. 23.). XL B.A.C?-^ (Capt. the Hon. H. E. Thellusson). XLIP (Lieut.-Col. G. H. Geddes). 29 (Major A. B. Bethcll). 412 (:\iajor T. Bruce). 45 (Major N. Gray, wounded at Mons, Aug. 24.). XLII B.A.C. (Capt. D. le P. Trench). XXX (Hows.)i (Lieut.-Col. W^ C. Staveley). 128 (Major W. Strong). 129 (Major L. T. Ash worth). 130 (Major G. |. C. Stapylton, killed at Solesmes, Aug. 25.). XXX (Hows.) B.A.C. (Capt. M. Muirhead). 48 Heavy Battery, R.G.A.,i (60-pdrs.) (Major C. F. Phipps). Third Divisional Ammn. Column. ^ (Lieut.-Col. C. H. Ford). Number of guns with 1 hirdii Division — 13 Batteries, or 54,. 18-pdrs. ; 18, 4*5" Hows. ; and 1, OO-pdrs. Total — 7('.. ' Diaries are available for these units. ' Statements have been received from officers l)eIonging to these units. ' Two ]S-pdrs. of 1'20 were lost on "2nrd Angf. THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. . 17 Divisional Artillery — Fourth Division. C.R.A.i Brig.-Genl. G. F. Milne, C.B., D.S.O. XIVi (Lieut. -Col. C. M. Ross-Johnson, D.S.O.) 39 (Major E. S. E. W. Eardley-Russell, M.V.O.) 68 (Major W. A. Short), 88 (Major R. England, killed at Le Gateau, Aug. 26.). XIV B. A. C. (Capt. E. W. ^I. Browne). XXIXi (Lieut. -Gol. H. E. Stockdale). 125 (Major H. G. Lloyd). 126 (Major R. A. G. Wellesley). 127 (Major E. W. Speddmg). XXIX B.A.C. (Capt. R. G. Maturm, D.S.O.) XXXIP;- (Lieut.-Col. M. J. MacCarthy). 272 (Major H. E. Vallentm:. - ^.r»> a^u*o. . 134 (Major H. Ward). 1352 (Major G. H. Liveing;. XXXII B.A.C. (Capt. J. Carruthers, M.V.O.) XXXVII (Hows.) i;2 (Lieut.-Col. C. Battiscombe). 31 (Major D. H. Gill). 35 (Major H. A. Koebel). 55(Major G. N. Cartwright). XXXVII (Hows.) B.A.C. (Capt. H. M. Ballingall). Number of guns with the Fourth Division^ — 12 Batteries, or 54,. 18-pdrs. ; and 18, 4-5" Hows. Total— 72. Thus the 42 Batteries available for the action on Aug. 26 were : 4 Batteries, Royal Horse Artillery. 36 Batteries, Royal Field Artillery (27 being ]S-pdrs., and 0' 4"5" Hows.) ; and 2 Heavy Batteries, Royal Garrison Artillery. In detail the guns were distributed as follov/s : — Cav. Divn. Fifth Divn. Third Divn. F'rth Divii. Total 13-pdrs. 24 — — — 24 18 „ — 52 54 54 160 4-5" Hows. — IS 18 18 54 60-,pdrs. — 4 4 — 8 Grand Total ... 240"^ ' Diaries are available for these units. ' Statements have been received from officers belonging to these units. ^ 31 Heavy Batlery, R.G.A. (Major k lit. Lt.-Col. G. McK. Franks) and the- Fourth Divisional Animn. Col. (Lieut.-Col. H. Biddulph) were neither of them ■present on the Battlefield of Le Cateau. Diaries are available for both of these- units. * At Waterloo on June 18th, 1815, there were 156 guns in the Duke of IS THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. WeUington's force, organized in It Troops of Horse Artillery and 18 Field Brigades (all nationalities). The Roj'al Artillery wa.s represented on that day by 8 troops, Eoyal Hoise Artillery (12 guns and <> howitzers) and 5 Field Brigades R.A. (27 guns and 'S howitzei-s) — total 78. {" Nuqwieon (Did Waterlooy" II., :M, "D", "E" and "1", E.H.A. are direct descendants of three "Waterloo Troops" — Webber Stoiith's Troop, Sir R. Gardiner's Troop, and Bull's Troop. (" Thr IJritis/i ArtiUcry at Waterloo."). "D" has also the honour of being one of the \ original R.H.A. Troops, although it was not formed until 17J11. The above note must not be misunderstood; it is no attempt to compare the importance of the Action of Le Catoau with the crushingly decisive Battle of Waterloo. THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. IJI CHAPTER V. THE ACTION OF LE CATEAU. WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 26. I. General Situation at Dawn. (See Alaps 1 and 5 and Sketch B.) There is no doubt that the German Arm}- had followed close on the heels of General Sir H. Smith-Dorrien's Corps and- that the pursuers halted in fairly close contact with it. This fact, coupled with the difficulty that the very scattered Cavalry Division would experience in covering any further withdrawal and the obvious exhaustion of the three Divisions now halted on the line Le Cateau — Caudry — Haucourt, had made it quite clear to the Corps Commander on the spot that, unless his troops could "continue the retirement during the night, a serious action could nbt be avoided without running too great a risk of jeopardizing the safety of the whole B.E.F. That further immediate withdrawal was quite out of the q uestion was settled at a c onference held at 2 a.m. at Corps H.Q. at Bertry ^ Shortly after dawn it also became certain that no co-opera- tion could be expected from the First Corps, which, as well as being behind time, had had a very disturbed night, its further retreat being complicated by the presence of Germans at the edge of the Forest of Mormal on the left bank of the Sambre. Consequently in the early morning the G.O.C. Second Corps issued orders for his whole available force to take up a position on the line Le Cateau — Quarries- -Moulin d'Esnes-, and this position was to be held at all costs. It will be convenient to take a brief glance at the Battlefield and at the approximate strength of the two opposing forces, before con- sidering in detail the part played by the Royal Regiment of Artillery on this day. 11. THE BATTLEFIELD (See Map 5.) From Flank to Flank, from the big spur to the north-east of Le Cateau on the one hand, through Trcisvilles, Audencourt, and Caudry, to Esnes on the other, the selected position measured about l^tvptA**' ' Present jit this half-hour's conference woie G.O.C. Secoiul Army Corns, and -. his G.SXJ. 1 : G.O.C. Cavnlrv Division. Avith his G.i^ < ). 1 a nd l)..\..\. & U.M.U . ; as 0(M^ weTl as (lie G. O.C. TInnI liiviMnn . T) inrv of il.O. i- O-M.G., Cav. I>lvn.) " "^ " Tliis place is oficii called "Mont d'Esnes". Tlip mistake is easy to under- stand directly Ihc (,'a7nlirai Sheet of the 1/80,000 map is consulted. » (^Va. 20 THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. ^^ thirteen miles . ^ This was to be held by the Sil4ii, Third, and IrouTFth Divisions . The Fifth Division on the right, holding from Le Cateau spur to Troisvilles (both inclusive) about four and a half miles ; the- Third Division in the centre , from Troisvilles Texclusive ) tO Caudry ( inclusive) about four miles ; and the Fourth^Divi^i^ii^ on the left, from__Ca^idiTjiexcJhi^ EsnesJjnclusii^e}7aDout CQui-.ani3.4i34f mTesT""""^"'^ The Battlefield is situated in the chalk country of Northern France, though between Le Cateau and Cambrai the chalk really forms the foundation and only crops out in the valleys, where the overlying strata have been removed by the action of the streams. The greater part of the field is covered with a fine grained yellow loam, its depth varying from a mere coating to a layer several feet thick ; it is generally regarded as wind-borne, in other words a dust.^ Wherever it was encountered it probably proved easy to dig in, even with the " grubber." At the time of the action the district was covered principally with corn-fields, but the corn was nearly all cut and stood in the fields in stooks ; whilst scattered over the open but undulating landscape were patches of beet and clover-fields. The only restriction to the free movement of all arms was an occasional wire fence. A feature of the landscape near the centre was a solitary, tall tree standing on the sguth bank of the hollow road to the east of Troisvilles (the Arbre of the 1/80,000 map). As this landmark would have been of use to the enemy, an unsuccessful attempt was made to cut it down before the action opened, great care having to be taken that the southerly wind did not cause the tree to fall into the cutting and thus prevent its use as a lateral covered way. The trunk, however, proved to be too thick and it was only half cut through when firing opened. Most of the roads were sunken where they crossed the spurs, the cuttings being shallow trenches varying from three feet to six feet in depth ; in other words they were ready for occupation by troops acting on the defensive wherever they happened to face in the re- quired direction. Many proved suitable for use as communication trenches as well as providing shielded points of vantage that could be employed as Observation Posts and Headquarters. * Some other frontages that are interesting to compare are : — Waterloo, 1815, frontage 3 miles, held bv the Duke of Wellington's Army. f>7,00C< strong, and 156 guns; of the 50,(K)0 Infantry, 15,000 were British and 5,000 were King's German Legion. (" ^ayolcon & Waterloo" ii., 35 — 38.) W risse liber f/, 1870, a delaying action, the French held a front of 2^ miles with 5,200 rifles. 900 sabres. 12 guns, and Ti niitrailleuses. The availal)le German force was 40,000 rifles, 3,000 sabres, and 141 guns; not more than half were eaigaged . Gravelotfe, 1870, 140,000 French and 4 56 guns held a position 9 miles in length. I{. Yaln, 1904, a delaying action, the Eaissians held a front of 12 miles, from An-tung — Gliin-Kou, with 13,000 bayonets, 640 scouts, 48 guns and 8 m. gun^. At Liao Yanef, 19(t4. the Russian ''Advanced position", 15i miles in length, was held by 158.0CO men (128,000 being infantn) with 36 howitzers, 28 siege- guns and 609 field guns. " I am indebted for the above geological information to the Director of the- Geological Survey & Museiim, London. THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 21 The rolling, billowy nature of the country and the numerous 'deep valleys, made the position one that was difficult to defend, as an assailant could approach quite close to many parts of the line before his advance could be observed and effective fire brought to bear on him. The spur to the east of Le Cateau, once it passed definitely into German hands, would facilitate the envelopment of the right flank and would endanger the retreat. Whilst the occupation by the Germans of the long spur which runs to the north of the Warnelle Ravine must prejudice the defence of the left flank section of the line. The villages situated on the field were strongly built. They were calculated to give ample cover from field-gun shrapnel, a point entire- ly in the German favour, but there was no time to prepare those held by the II Corps to withstand the effects of a heavy bombardment with high explosive. Generally speaking the gun positions were more suitable for an assailant and particularly for an assailant who happened to be in a crushing numerical superiority. His guns could unlimber at starting on a wide arc where it was almost impossible to locate them and knock them out, except with Heavy Batteries — and only two of the latter were available. Then having subjected the guns of the defence to a heavy converging fire some of the German Batteries could close up, covered by the fire of the others, and from these forward positions cover the advance of the rest of their artillery and prepare the final assault of their infantry. But there were other grave disadvantages, one was that both flanks of the position were in the air ; another that the line of retreat for the Fifth Division — the Roman Road to S. Ouentin — ran in a south-westerly direction across the rear of the position and this would probably lead to tremendous confusion when the time came to retire and troops, transport, and ammunition columns all came crowding back on it at the close of the day. Nevertheless, whatever its defects, it was necessary to hold the Le Cateau position at this juncture ; no further retirement could be made at the moment, for the pursuit of the German Army had to be stopped once and for all. At any rate the position would suffice for that task and General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien did not hesitate to take the responsibility in ordering its immediate occupation. III. THE OPPOSING FORCES. The Second Corps and attached troops that came under General Sir H. Smith-Dorrien's command on August 2G were: — The Cavalry Division. Third. Eojirthj, and Fifth Divisions, and W\h Jnfaptiy J3rigade. In other words: — 12 Cavalry Regiments, and 2 Squadrons Divisional Cavalry ; 40 Infantrv Battalions ; with 2-1 r, gunsj and G^j^oa^hin^^crunsja^^^^inos^ 'In the original B.E.F. each Cavaliy Regiment and each Infantry Battalion had '-i machine .guns. There were no other machine gun organisations in exis- tence at that time. At Mons, 23rd and 24th Aug., several of our machine guns had been destroyed by gun-fire. Tlie Fourth Division was without its Divisional Cavalry & Signal Section on August 26th. A./<^^i^>tf> 22 THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. On the German side no less than four Corps of the I German Army have beep idpntiFiprl as being engaged at Le Gateau on August 26 — ^ -rrV» . the II, III, IV and IV Reserve ; and there were probably tgp Cavalry 2-^- > Divisions. Consequently the Germans had available for the action : Otv* at least — 12 Cavalry Regiments, as well as 32 Squadrons, Divisional ' Cavalry ; 102 Infantry Battalions f exclusive of Pioneers) ; with more than 000 guns ; and about 240macliiii£-Sii]i2-^ $o"far as any militarymiHeftal^ing can be made a matter of accurate forecast and calculation, the German Army was certain to overwhelm the heavily outnumbered British Force that faced them undismayed on that August morning, calm in the assurance that at least they would render a good account of themselves, and glad that they were to change the disheartening role of retreat for the active one of hammer. As the result proves the Germans have little they can boast about concerning the achievement of their desire on August 26. ' This estimate of German machine guns must be taken as the minimum number that were present on August 26tli. There is a mass of evidence, given ia the Diaries and bv officers present at the action, that the Germans had an over- whelming superiority in maclane guns and handled them very boldly. THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 23 CHAPTER VI. THE ACTION OF LE CATEAU (CONTINUED). THE ARTILLERY AT DAWN, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 2G. (a) Fifth Division — (See Map 2 and Sketch B.) During the night of August 25/26 orders had reached the C.R.A. that the retirement was to be continued ; consequently XXVII I R.F.A. had been detailed for work with the Rearguard on August 26.1 XXVIII accordingly moved north along the Roman Road, about 3 a.m., to take up a l^earguard position m the neighbourhood of Pont des Quatre Vaux so as to assist the 13th Infantry Brigade to cover the withdrawal of the Fifth Division from its bivouacs around Reumont, and this position was to be maintained until 11 a.m.- The morning broke fine but cool and very misty, and thus the selection of this rearguard position was very difficult. Just before dawn (about 2.;)0 a.m.), as a preliminary measure, the Fifth D.A.C. had been ordered to move to Fremont at 4 a.m. and there await further orders. At Fremont it would be equally well placed either to retire or to supply ammunition if necessary. At dawn (4 a.m.) R.F.A. Brigade Commanders and the B.C. of 108 Heavy Battery met the C.R.A., as arranged overnight, to carry out the reconnaissance of the position ; but as a retirement had now been ordered this precaution became unnecessary, vv hen the counter-order was received some golden minutes had been wasted. Further, the Fifth Divisional front was now to extend from the high ground beyond Le Cateau to Troisvilles (inclusive) so any detailed reconnaissance became out of the question. As the front was between four and five miles in length this precluded any central supervision of the Divisional Artillery, also it was practically impossible for the Brigade of Howitzers to control the German guns from any central position. Consequently the C.R.A. detailed a Brigade of IS-pdrs. to each section of the line allotted to the three Infantry Brigades of the Division, attached a Howitzer Battery to each of the Flank Brigades, and ordered their Commanders to come into action at once in close co-operation with the Infantry defence.'^ Thus XV R.F.A., with ^Acting with the i:3t.h Inf. Bean v.as omitted from a mention in Prince Ferdinand's Oeneral Order. On discovering the oversight the Prince wrote a letter in his own hand to Captain Forbes Macbean acknowledging his indebtedness to him and to his Brigade. Captain Forbes Macbean was one of the witnesses at the Trial of Lord George Sackville. (Dimcan's, "Historv cf the E.A." I., 20S— 214; and "Trial of Lord George Sackville in 1760," 120— 12S and 251). The two other Minden Batteries were descendants of the old Train of Aitillery and iliey became IG Coy., E.G.A. & 53 Coy. E.G. A. (reduced 1907). THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 20- 1400 yards. To the northward, however, a good distant view was obtainable, only limited by a ridge about 50U0 yards off. To ensure for the Battery a certain supply of ammunition both wagons were brought up for each gun and placed alongside it. The Battery O.P. was about 200 yards in front of the guns and was on the forward slope, in line with the trenches of the 2/Suffolk Regiment. From the O.P. the gun-flashes alone were visible and a telephone was laid out to connect the B.C. with his Battery. Whilst 52 was preparing for action Lieut.-Colonel Stevens issued orders to the B.C. that "we would fight it out here and there would be no retirement." Major Nutt then went down into the Battery and explained this order to all ranks. Before 6 a.m. the Battery was ready for action. A hostile aeroplane now flew over the Brigade and subsequent events prove that it located the Batteries. The O.P. for XV and 37 was placed in the only possible situation on the tip of a small rise in front, from which a good view- was obtainable and communication to the batteries was easy, although 37 was actually out of sight. ^ The B.C. of 80 observed in the open close to his guns. Thus the four Batteries had come into action immediately behind the Infantry Line and actually in front of the troops whO' were in support in this section. Before the batteries were thoroughly dug in rifle-fire broke out. Doubtless this exposed position was the best that could be selected, giving due consideration to the bad weather and poor visibility overnight, the counter-orders that were received, the short- ness of time available for reconnaissance in the morning, and the early hour at which the action opened. Undoubtedly the readiness shown by the whole of the Brigade to share the same risks as the 2/SufTolk Regiment, and the willingness of the Batteries to take up a very exposed position in order to afford the closest support to their own infantry, had a great moral effect on the latter. Occurring at the commencement of the war this exhibition of real comradeship in a critical hour was bound to have a far reaching effect. In the Centre, XXVIII at dawn proceeded to the front to occupy a rearguard position. The Brigade halted half-way down the forward slope whilst the ground was reconnoitred. The task was by no means easy, for the mist limited the view to the poplars along the Le Cateau^ — -Cambrai Road. The position finally selected by 122 was the best placed of the three, ^ and about 5 a.m. the Battery unlimbered behind a low knoll that save cover from view but not 'Commiinication between the O.P. and 37 was at fii-st by telephone; after that was ciit flags were used. A telephone was used to connect the Brigade O.P. with 11 and 80. The O.P. for 52 was about 10 yards in front of the Bde O.P. ■In several Diaries and accounts, as well as in two sketches, it is quite clear that several officers confused Montay & Le Cateau, and the latter name is piven by them to the small village. On A.-ug. 25 none of the artillery of the Division had retired through Le Cateau itself. Tlie only Batteries to pass through Uu'town on Aug. 25 were "B", "E" and "L" R.H.A. and 41 R.F.A. of the Third Divisional Artillery. 'Apparentlj- it was discovered by one of the Battery officers. 30 THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. flash cover. ^ Slight as it was it sufficed. The Battery was never located and until the last phase hardly suffered at all.- 122 proceed- ed to dig itself in. 123 entrenched in a corn-field in the open, about 200 yards to the north-west of 122. These two Batteries were in action only a short distance behind the firing line itself. Although 123 had a few infantry in front of it, yet its only screen was the trees along the Cambrai road, consequently these positions did not err on the side of over-caution. 124 came into action about 100 yards in rear of 12;') with a /.one of fire to the west, the idea being that it should flank the front of the 13th Infantry Brigade. Owing to the mist and the uncertain positions occupied by these troops it was very difficult to allot the zone accurately at that early hour. (Apparently the Battery never fired in this direction.) Being just behind 123 and at right angles to it, 124 was very liable to be raked by any shell that ranged beyond the former. On taking up their positions these three Batteries at once dug in.'^ The O.P. of XXVIII w^as in the short length of cutting (three feet to four feet deep) immediately in rear of the Brigade and close to the Headquarters of the 13th Infantry Brigade. At the opening of the action 123's O.P. was also in the same cutting.^ Thus the Right and Centre R.F.A. Brigades of the Fifth Division had taken the injunction " to co-operate closely with its infantry" in the most literal sense. Nearly all the Battery positions were exposed to view and also to enfilade fire, and coming into action as they did on the forward slope there could hardly be any retire- ment. But quite undaunted by the outlook the Batteries proceeded to make every preparation for a fight to a finish. At 5.30 a.m., the following message was sent from the Fifth Divisional Head Quarters to the 13th Infantry Brigade: — "Opera- tion Order No. 4 is modified, in that the fighting troops will hold their positions." Immediately to the west the ground was more suitable and different dispositions were made in XXVII which was co-operating with the 15th Infantry Brigade. 119 was brought into action behind the ridge about 1,500 yards to the east of Troisvilles with its O.P. in the road to the north-east of that village.-^ 121 unlimbered in a valley-head immediately to the east of Troisvilles with an O.P. close at hand. The Brigade O.P. of XXVII was in a hollow road close to the Arhre and alongside the B.G.C., 15th Infantry Brigade. ' It was about this time that the Brigade loanied (he retirement was can- celled and the Second Corps was to hold the position, iwitil the arrival of heavy reinforcements rendered possible a great counter attack. ■ The only casualties that occurred in 122, before the arrival of the limbers, were two successive layers of No. 1 gun, shot through tlie head by a sniper from the commanding 15U-metre knoll to the right front of the Battery. ^ Whilst digging in 123 came undi'r riiie-fire from some Germans working up up the valley from Montay. ■" Thv? sunken road, in wliich the O.P's. were placed, had several short lengths of cutting where it crossed the small ridges on the ba^ck of the spur across which it ran to Troisvilles. •'' This identification of the O.P. of ll'J is from the Brigade Diary. Tiie pcsition selected for the Battery (ll!i) turned out to be rather an unfortunate fine. The guns could only fire at long ranges, owing to the difficulty of clearing the crest of the l)ill. THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 31 The Howitzer Battery allotted to this section — 05 — had come into action at an early hour to the south-west of Troisvilles.^ It was well concealed and adequately entrenched, it w^as practically never located. With reference to the Reserve, Ol (Hows.) came into action under cover in rear of the left centre of the Fifth Division. Its position was about 1,500 yards to the north of Reumont and to the west of the Roman Road. Before the action opened the Battery had dug itself in. 108 Heavy Battery unlimbered behind the spur that runs north from Reumont, having its O.P. on the rising ground to the front. These two Batteries were admirably placed, both to take an effective hand in the action as well as to cover the retirement of the Fifth Division when the Second Corps had completed its task. 120 of XXVII was never used in the Fifth Division; it was lent to the Third Division during the morning and then came into action near the Arbre to support the 9th Infantry Brigade. The C.R.A., Fifth Division, had his Headquarters at Reumont, which was also the Divisional Headquarters.^ (b) Third Division — (See Map .3). In this Division XLII R.F.A. was allotted to the 7th Infantry Brigade, whilst the rest of the Divisional Artillery was kept directly under the control of the C.R.A. It will be recollected that both XXIIP and XL had unlimbered about dawn. When the German guns opened on Caudry from the north the previous rearguard orders were clearly cancelled. Con- sequently the two batteries of XLII at once moved forward and unlimbered on the chaussee to the north-east of the town.'^ This action was the one best suited to meet the critical situation that had arisen. XXX (Hows.) R.F.A. had reached Caudry at mid-night; at 3 a.m. they came into action to the south-west of that place. Thus the bulk of the town screened them on the north side, whilst they were covered in front by the ridge just to the west of Caudry. But the Brigade nqver fired from this position and at S a.m. it moved back to a covered position in the Warnelle Ravine. Towards 6 a.m. 48 Heavy Battery also came into action about 300 yards behind the Audencourt ridge,- to the south-south-east of that village, and dug in there, with its O.P. close at hand to prevent the use of a long telephone line. The country was too wet to allow the Battery to occupy a position further back in the fields. The Third D.A.C., directly it was certain that an action was to ' See Map 3. - The authorities for placing the various Batteries on Map 2 are as follows: — For XV, 37 ^Hows.), XXVTII, 61 (Hows.), and lOS Heavy Battery, officers of various units present at Le Cateau. For XXVII k Go (Hows.), .sketch by C.R..\., Fifth Division, attacliccl to his Diary. ' The mist was thick until about G a.m. when it cleared off. The forward f.fction of 108 had used the e.xtra liour for work on its pits. When they trot the fiist view towards Inchy it was satisfactory to find that the necessary ground wa.s well covered. * It was arranged that "\" should come into action alongside XLII, but no suitable position could bo found. 32 THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. be fought, arranged for the re-supply of ammunition. In advance were placed the Heavy and Howitzer section at Bertry and another section at Clary ; the two remaining sections were at Elincourt and Malincourt, with the Headquarters of the Column to the north of Maretz. Although m this section of the front held by the Third Division there was a distinct salient — the large village of Caudry — yet the general position was easier to occupy than that of the Fifth Division on the right. The Third Division held the centre of the line, and the ground itself was more favourable for defence. Instead of three large spurs jutting towards the enemy, with a covered line of approach immediately outside its right flank — up the valley of the Selle through the town of Le Cateau — as was the case in the section allotted to the Fifth Division, the ground held by the Third Division mainly consisted of a long ridge that ran athwart the line of advance from the north. This ridge provided not only suitably covered positions for the Batteries, but the valley in rear of it — the Warnelle Ravine — could be used as a shielded way from flank to- flank. The only serious defects were the two villages of Auden- court cind Caudry, for there was no time to prepare them properly for defence, although the Infantry were bound to hold them to prevent the Germans from gaining an immediate and vital lodgment on the ridge. Except for this disadvantage, this part of the position if appropriately prepared was quite strong enough to offer a serious battle on. In this area, having no flanks to guard and a shorter length to defend, the C.R.A. deployed the whole force of Artillery, and the disposition of XXIII R.F.A., with its two sections dug in on the forward slope, was admirable. The Headquarters of the C.R.A. , Third Division, were close to 48 Heavy Battery, whilst the Third Division's Headquarters were at Bertry. During the action an advanced Headquarters was formed close to 48 Heavy Battery.^ (c) Foiii'th Division — (See Maps 4 and 5.). In this Division, which had only reached its billets after dark on the previous night, an Operation Order v/as issued at 6 a.m. for the Division to take up a defensive line fromi Le Coquelet Farm to Moulin d'Esnes.- The 11th Infantry Brigade was to hold the right and the 12th Infantry Brigade the left of the allotted space, being separated by the Railway to the south of Fontaine-au-pire. This left in reserve the 10th Infantry Brigade, a very necessary precaution as this was quite obviously the vital flank ; and the French Cavalry Corps, under General Sordet, which had reached their position to the west on the previous night, was an independent force. At ().]5 a.m. the C.R.A. issued the orders to his Brigades. XXXII R.F.A. and XXXVII (Hows.) R.F.A. were to reconnoitre suitable positions to the east of the d'Iris stream, whilst XIV and ' The principal authority for placing the Batterie.s in Map 3 is a sketch ac- companying the Diary of the C.E.A., Third Division. Wherever possible reference- has I)een made to officers who were present at the Action for verification and, further details. - A copy is given in Appendix I. THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 33 XXIX R.F.A. did so to the west. Meanwhile, to be ready as soon as they were wanted, XLV and XXIX R.F.A. were to take up positions of readiness to the south-east of Esnes, taking the necessary pre- cautious to cover their open left flank. ^ Brigade Ammunition Columns were to establish themselves to the South of the positions selected for their own Brigades. In this Division it is clear that nothing could be done overnight, because the troops were employed in covering the last stage of the retirement of the Third Division. Directly it became certain in the morning that the Second Corps was to stand and fight, everything that was possible was done to distribute the Batteries in the v/ay most suitable for immediate co-operation with the infantry defence. The position was difficult because the left flank was in the air and distinctly threatened. The Germans had apparently occupied Cambrai the previous night. Further, the long spur running to the north of the Warnelle Ravine provided cover for the German guns which could never be accurately located once the ridge of the spur passed definitely into German hands. ^ Also the ground to the south of the Warnelle Ravine was largely a series of spurs running north towards the assailants ; suitable covered positions would therefore be difficult to find close behind the Infantry, particularly when the Germans had crowned the ridge and established their O.P's on it. The absence of the Heavy Battery was certain- to be felt by the Infantry, particularly in the early stages of the engagement. ^ The Headquarters of the C.R.A., Fourth Division, were at Haucourt, and Divisional Headquarters were also in this village at the commencement of the Action. About noon D.H.Q. were moved to the south-west of Caullery.^ (d) Royal Horse Artillery. The first movements of "D", " E", and " L" have already been mentioned. "r R.H.A. When the firing broke out around the north end of Caudry, Major Thompson at once went back to XLII to arrange for " i ' to co-operate with the two field batteries in the most effective way. Finding no suitable position for "I" on the chaussee to the left of XLII the Battery commander finally discovered positions for two isolated guns on the north-western edge of Caudry. These were occupied at once. From these positions German infantry could be seen among the corn-stooks to the left front. The guns had un- limbered in the nick of time. ' XXIX R.F.A. apparently started for Esnes at 6 a.m. It must be reeollettted that all the Artillery of this Division halted at Ligny on the previous night. "^ At that timo no aeroplane communication and co-operation with the field batteries was attempted. ' Probably this fact accounts for the numerous statements that have been made to the effect that the Division was without its Artillery until the afternoon of Aug. 20. ' Practically the only authority for placing the Batteries in Map 4 is a sketch made by the B.M.R..\., Fourth Division, forming part of the Appendices rf the G.S. Diary of the Fourth Division for August 1914. The sketch does not entirely agree with tlie Diaries. As far as possible the sketch has been followed, because the diffei'ences may be accoiinted for by the rather vague way in which some of the positions are described in the Diaries. 34 THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. CHAPTER VIII. THE ACTION OF LE CATEAU (CONTINUED). (A.). THE OPENING OF THE ACTION. G— 9 A.M (See Maps 2 and 5, and Sketch B. •» 1^ Q>ckc, At the outset the 1 9th Infantry Brigade , which had bivouacked overnight near Le Cateau Railway Station, passed through the town and marched past the Pont des Ouatre Vaux in order to reach its place in the retiring column. ^ The head of the Brigade debouched from Le Cateau at 5.30 a.m ., but before the column was clear of the town its rearguard collided in the streets with Germans . To the east of Le Cateau, at G.30 a.m., as the detached portion \jic ode., of the 14th Infantry Brigade- was about to commence its march through the town in order to concentrate with the rest of its Brigade and take its place in the marching column, a heavy rifle fire was opened on it from the eastern end of Le Cateau and soon after it came under shell fire. Rallying immediately from the first surprise the two regiments made a fine fighting retirement along the spur to the south, in which General Cough's Cavalry and "D" Battery, R.H.A., co-operated. The spur of Le Cateau was clear of our In- fantry by noon. 3 This unfortunate occurrence laid bare, from the start of the Action, the right flank of the troops of the Fifth Division west of Le Cateau, who were holding the spur to the east of the Roman Road. The units immediately affected being the 2/Suffolk Regiment and XV R.F.A. with 37 (Hows.), all of whom had received orders to maintain their positions to the last. From the very outset there- fore the Germans possessed a covered line of approach — the valley of the Selle — and a covered concentration area — Le Cateau itself. The situation on the Right was critical from the commencement. (a) Fifth Division. (See Map 2). It was soon after 6 a.m. that the German Artillery opened fire* from the direction of Neuvilly. XV R.F.A. and 37 (Hows.) replied at once, they engaged gun-flashes at a range of about 5000 yards and silenced two of the hostile Batteries. But the Germans bringing more Batteries into action subjected the Brigade to a very heavy and accurate fire, chiefly high-explosive with an occasional burst of ' The cfliinter-orders did not reach the troops south and east of Le Cateau. = Brigade Signal Section and 1 East Surrey Regt. (less 2 cos.) & 1/D.C.L.I.; the last-nametl was to lead the column. ' In their advance against this portion of tlie 14th Infantry Brigade it waa noticed that the Germans came on extended, at about 5 paces interval. The time given varies considerablv; the B.C. of 52 states it was about 6.10 a.m. THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 35 shrapnel, causing many casualties in the gun detachments. ^ As our own Batteries had been ordered not to fire too freely at first most of the ammunition was saved for use against the German Infantry when they should deliver their assault. About 6.15 a.m. German Infantry were seen from the O.P. of 52 advancing m columns over the crest of the ridge to the northward and about 5000 yards away. This was a chance to be seized at once and the Battery immediately opened on the target. The fire caused the German infantry to deploy, but pressing on down the slope they soon disappeared from view. Shortly before 7 a.m. one salvo of H.E. burst over the XV Brigade O.P., killing a Bombardier and wounding both Lieut. - Colonel Stevens and Major Jones, commanding 37 (Hows.). Captain Leech (Adjutant), Lieut. Younger (Orderly Officer) and the Battery- Sergeant-AIajor of 37 (Hows.) were struck by shell-fragments. All remained at their posts. 2nd Lieut. E. H. Broadhurst, commanding the centre section of 52, was severely wounded about this time and rendered incapable of carrying on. He refused to allow himself to be removed from the Battery. Against XXVIII the fire opened from the north-east, from the direction of Forest, probably a little later than in the case of XV. 122 was never found; but 123 was subjected to the converging fire of three Batteries, one in front and one on each flank. The telephone wire being cut the B.C. came down to the Battery. Shortly after- wards the Germans got a direct hit on No. 2 gun which put the gun and detachment out of action, and wounded the Section Commander and the B.C. ; Captain A. G. Gillman thereupon assumed the command. 124 had undergone a very trying experience. When the fire first opened from the north-east the Battery, entrenched facing north- west, was unable to reply. The fire also took the Battery in reverse. The onl}/ way to obtain shelter was for the detachments to move round and crouch under the fronts of the gun-shields. Not long afterwards the original position of 124 became really untenable, for all the overs fired at 123 by the Battery in front burst in 124, raking it from end to end. Consequently Major Kinsman and his Battery man-handled the four right guns round in order to engage the German Artillery. As a result of this manoeuvre Major Kins- man's right section were now about 100 yards in rear of 123 and fired directly over that Battery. For the rest of the Action these four guns were fought in the open.^ ' The '2/Snffolk R. also f;uifei'efl very heavily from this fire directed against our Batteries ; liein^ hastily entrenched, only at a short distance in front of XV, .most of the shell tliat burst short of the fs 72 guns. ' 12r. of XXYIT. ■* Its arrival was reported to the Fifth Division by a message timed 11.32 a.m. 42 THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. valley round the right flank. To meet this imminent danger the left section was run back (the gunners being assisted in their heavy task by some of the 2/Manchester Regiment) and the section commander engaged the German Infantry at point-blank range. The reception accorded to the German Infantry by these guns as well as the effect produced by the rifles and machine guns of the 2/Manchester Regi- ment, immediately on the right of the section, proved so dishearten- ing to the assailants that for a time they discontinued further pressure in this dangerous quarter. The casualties suffered by the personnel of 1 1 had been heavy, and at length the Major, the only surviving officer, was wounded in the knee by a piece of shrapnel. However, he had the left gun of the refused right section swung round once more to the northward and remained in command of it, engaging any targets that appeared. This gun continued firing until about noon. The Battery had amply sustained its old reputation. ^ Immediately to the left of 11, SO (although enfiladed from both flanks) kept in action and maintained a heavy and effective fire on any German Infantry that showed, near Rambourlieux Farm, and drove them back. The corn-stooks behind which the Germans sought cover from the bursts of shrapnel proved a great disappoint- ment. So fully employed was the Battery that it expended the ammunition in its six wagons, whereupon three more were led up by the Captain, two of which actually reached the guns. Major Birley also made every arrangement to push his guns up to the Suffolks' trenches should the Germans make any attempt to rush that Battalion. Here on the exposed flank the Artillery showed they realised fully that the greater the difficulties of their Infantry the closer and more intimate must be the support afforded by the guns. 37 (Hows.) during this phase of the Action were also employed, at first, m shelling formed bodies of infantry. Later the Battery turned on to advancing waves, covering a large area with its fire, until gradually it fired away nearly all the ammunition in both its wagon lines. The left Battery of the Brigade, 52, was fought in the open under an extremely heavy fire. Before it had been definitely located 52 punished two German Batteries severely. During the German bombardment a high-explosive burst over No. 5, knocked out the detachment and set the limber blankets ablaze. Not long afterwards a salvo of H.E. caught the Battery and the centre section had to cease fire temporarily owing to damaged equipment and casualties. ' The various positions of the guns of 11 are shown below: — Lieut. Stanford's section refused, to en- gage hostile guns. Captain Buckle's section run-back to engage German Infantry. THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 4?> Nevertheless, the Battery managed to fire all its available ammuni- tion. Its Captain then succeeded in reaching the guns with three more wagons, thus enabling the Battery to continue shelling the German Infantry who were now advancing to the east of Rambour- lieux Farm.i It was suffering heavily itself from enfilade fire poured into it by German Batteries to the north-west, and No. 4. had to cease firing on account of the danger to the Infantry in its front. Shortly before noon German Infantry were seen issuing from the wood to the north-west of Le Cateau and advancing towards the deep cutting to the east of the Pont des Quatre Vaux. The Battery was at once switched on to this target, fire being opened at the lowest range that would clear the crest (1400 yards), fuze 2^/. Section fire was ordered at the best rate that could be kept up. Owing to the heavy casualties that had occurred in the detachments the fire was necessarily slow and ragged — but it was effective.^ The proof being that during the entire action this frontal attack never progressed beyond the cutting. Before the end of this period the telephone wires connecting the B.C. and his guns were cut to shreds by shell-fire. An attempt was then made to replace this method of communication by flag- signalling, but the signallers in the Battery at once became casualties. To keep up the connection was vital, so a chain of orderlies was used to link up the Right Section with the O.P. These men lay out in the open under a heavy fire, in order that their Battery should not fail the Infantry at the crisis, which all could see was fast approaching. 3 In this connection it is permissible to quote the testimony of the Officer Commanding the 2/ Suffolk Regiment, which the XV and 37 (Hows.) were immediately supporting: — "I should " like to place on record the more than excellent work done by the "four Batteries under Lt.-Col. C. F. Stevens, R.F.A. ; their " behaviour throughout was magnificent and the moral effect on us "was great. In spite of being enfiladed first from left and then from " right they continued to fire ; and though some had better targets than "others all behaved with the greatest coolness under the most trying "circumstances. From my trench I could see Major Birley, 80 R.F.A., " giving his orders as if it were an ordinary field-day. In a position " where a wrongly set fuze involved great loss of life to us I think I " am right in saying that there was not a single premature during the "whole day from the twenty- four guns — surely a wonderful feat."* ' Solid miisses of German Infantry were noticed advancing down a valley between Forest and Nenvilly towards the Selle. They came nnder our Artillery fire, apparently the ijO-pdrs.. The loss inflicted was considerable, but it was not sufficient to arrest Ihe forward flow of the Idocks of infantry. " The CO. of the German "'2nd Infantry Regiment (8th Division, IV Corps), the Regiment that carried out the frontal attack on our right flank at Le Cateau, visited Torgau in 1!J14. He informed our officers, who were imprisoned there, that his Regiment liad lost heavily on 26th August. The rifle-fire of tlie companies of the 2 K.O.Y.b.I. along the Roman Road (i-ide Sketch B.) played its part in the infliction of this punishment. The western bank of the lioman Road being higher than the eastern, two tiers of fire were possible. ' By this time in the exposed Battery O. P. the Battery Sergeant INfajor had been s-^verely wounded and the loet ^pnerall.T appeared to be a platoon extended shoulder to shoulder. One round gun-fire was sufficient for its destruction. The whole platoon Avould go down "like a taiget at practice-camp when the rope is cut." - Major X. S. Poeblts. d.s.o., who became 'Jnd in command of 2;'St.'.£F. K.. after the CO. was killed, located at least }• German machine guns in the deep cutting to the east of Pont des t Vaux. They did an eiioi-mous amount of damage. Capt. E. E. (Jrford of the -ame regiment al.so noticed and fired at others along the Cam- brai read to the west of Pont des 4 Vaux. ' Further details of tlie Gennan Infantry's attack formations on Aug. 26th wculd be very valuable. " XXVIII P.A.C. issued Hl-s.u(M) rounds S.A.A. to the 14th Inf. Bde. Reserve, and 8 wagons of iJ^-pdr. ammunition to XXVIII. THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. J 5 Immediately to the west the strain was much less severe. 119 obtained some effect against German Infantry beyond the main Cambrai road, but its held of fire was small and the enemy was not pressing on. In this period the Battery was unfavourably placed for effective work, consequently about noon it was ordered back to a position about one mile to the north of Reumont where it could fire with far greater effect against the advancing Infantry. 121 remained in its original position and fired heavily and with effect against the German Infantry. 120, which co-operated with the Third Division, pushed a section to the west of Troisvilles to flank any advance from Beaumont, and these guns caused considerable losses to the Germans as they left the village in their attempt to advance against the centre of the line, (■).■; (Hows.), co-operating with XXVII, bombarded the villages of Inchy and Beaumont setting them on fire. The Battery noticed three well marked attacks in its section of the front. All broke down under the fire with which they were greeted, 65 (Hows.) materially assisting in beating off two attacks on Troisvilles. In these repulses the rifle must also have had its share. The Reserve Artillery, meanwhile, had not been inactive. Gl (Hows.) searched localities using the map, useful results being report- ed ; whilst lOS Heavy Battery dealt with any targets that offered. The light had improved steadily as the morning wore on and the 00- pdrs. were able to deal with German guns in action near Croix^ and also with some Batteries nearer at hand. The fire of the former ceased almost immediately, but the latter tried, ineffectually, to find the Heavy Battery. Towards noon it became necessary to shift the Battery O.P. to a less exposed position about .300 yards to the right flank of the guns.- The Fifth D.A.C. was ordered at noon to take post at the road junction north-west of Fremont and to be ready to supply ammunition as needed. Thus against the right section of this part of the front the Germans were evidently concentrating their greatest effort.-^ Even so the Batteries of the defence had not been silenced before the German Infantry showed up and then the fire they poured in, from those guns that could still be fought, took a heavy toll from the assailants. It was not to be mere child's play for the attackers despite their preponderance in guns. The greeting accorded to the German Infantry caused the enemy to abandon temporarily the projected onslaught, and once more to have recourse to his numeric- ally superior Artillery in order to open the way for his Infantry to close, without suffering too heavy a loss.* ' At 9.2.5 a.m. one of our observers saw 3 German Brigades of Aitillery in action close to the Montay— Croix road. (Vide p. 11). ' It is interesting to note that A coy., 2/Duke of Wellington's R. (ahoul 100 strong), had been detailed as an escort to the Heavy Eattery and it fonned; np in the iiollow alongside the Roman Road. ' According to one estimate about 100 German guns were massed against the 2/Suffolks and XV R.F.A. * Our Air Reports for this period furnish the following information about German troops wlio were confronting tlie Tiftli Division : —By 9.35 a.m. Le Cateau was (m fire in several places, but the town was clear of troops. At noon fires were still noticeable in the place. It was soon afterwards that the same observer saw 4(; THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. (b^ Third Division- — (See Map 3). Opposite to this part of the hne large bodies of the German Infantry did not show up as much as they did against the right flank, and in advancing they used the available cover with considerable skill. 1 However, they were reported massing in several localities which were promptly shelled ; and the wood east of Bethencourt was subjected to a heavy cross-fire by XXIII and XL when German Infantry were using its leafy shade to camouflage their concentration. Indeed by a.m. our Batteries were seriously engaged and firing was practically continuous. By this hour the German guns had also opened fire and were engaged in pounding the ridge and all likely gun positions. But our Batteries were skillfully placed and com- paratively little damage was done to them. 109 kept a sunken road, west of Inchy, under a steady fire, and as long as the Battery remained in action the German Infantry failed to advance beyond this line. XL kept in action despite the heavy fire concentrated on them, il shelled the Bethencourt wood with good effect, whilst 23 and 49 dealt with German Infantry who w^ere visible between 3,000 and "2,000 yards away. At 11 a.m. 129 (Hows.) moved back into a position close to Montigny ; but the rest of their doings in this period are veiled in obscurity. XLII was unable to find a satisfactory posi'tion near Tronquoy, as the Batteries would have been open to enfilade from the north- west. The Brigade then moved through Montigny and came into action to the west of that village. Here it was unable to fire as the range was excessive during this phase. 41 was now brought into action at the north-east end of the small copse alongside which it had been hidden. ^ It registered, and then it remained in observation waiting for a target. The Battery had been specially ordered to be ready to cover Ligny in case of necessity. 48 Heavy Battery was busily engaged in shelling advancing Infantry, who at these longer ranges gave more promising targets, as w^ell as in searching the ground from which the Infantry appeared, to prevent any concentration prior to attack. It was also employed on counter-battery work controlling the German Batteries as far as possible. XL B.A.C., passing through Elincourt, found the Third D.A.C. at the fork roads immediately to the west of that place and pro- ceeded to refill. It was about 10 a.m. Immediately afterwards a Staff Officer arrived and ordered the B.A.C. to move back to the Third Division, as the Second Corps was fighting. The column at a heavy German folumii about six miles lonj? (pofisiljly a Division) marching down the Eoman Eoad. It had reached Englefontaine. This folumn wouhl proI)ably arrive on the l,attlefiekl at the critical moment of the action, when its intervention on the German side might prove decisive in the wavering fight against the out- numbered and hard-pressed Fifth Division. ' The German Infantry advancing across the rolling downs to Inchy were ex- tended at about 3 to 1 paces between files, the lines being about 100 yds. apart. ^ Tide Errata. THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 47 once moved towards the battlefield, and taking up a position north of Clary, about 11 a.m., it made arrangements to issue ammunition. From 10 a.m. to noon the Action raged in this section though never so fiercely as on the right flank. The German heavy (5'9") howitzers freely used high explosive shell. The moral effect of a sudden outburst from these weapons was very great, particularly on troops in villages^ and buildings ; but during this phase the Batteries of the Third Division, being well concealed, suffered comparatively slight loss.2 (c) Fourth Division — (See Map 4). Here on the left flank the Artillery duel was the principal feature until noon. Meanwhile, about 9.30 a.m., a position having been found for 135, of XXXII, to the north of Ligny, suitable for the close defence of that place in conjunction with the 11th Infantry Brigade, the Battery was brought into action in sections which were entrenched behind the hedges to the north and north-east of the village. Although dispersed the sections were fairly close together, a double line of communications connecting the centre and left sections whilst the right section (which later had one of its guns near the station) was supervised by the Captain. Two wagons were placed with each gun and the teams were kept in readiness among the houses. The village of Ligny was a very important point. Its loss, as well as jeopardising the position held by the Fourth Division, would affect the Third Division quite as materially. Once the Germans occupied this village they could enfilade all the ground round Tronquoy and Montigny. It was essential to hold the village, and the arrangement to allot guns for its close defence was obviously a sound one. To the west of Ligny 27 knocked out a machine gun for the 11th Infantry Brigade; but the Germans immediately opened so many Batteries on it that the ammunition could not be replenished, and when it was nearly exhausted the detachments were withdrawn until the storm subsided. By this time the Germans had put a direct hit. on the under shield of No. 5. Soon after a pause occurred and ammunition was replenished in all the wagons, being brought up by hand along the road in rear, and the wheels of No. 5 were replaced from the Wagon Body. Later on 27 was ordered to cover the re- tirement of our Infantry, but the Battery was unsuitably placed to carry out this task.^ As our Infantry in front fell back 27 opened on a German Battery in action close to the one it had knocked out earlier in the morning. But this activity drew down an intense return fire from a Heavy as well as from two Field Batteries. An Infantry Brigade Major now came up to the B.C. and said that the ' Both Audencoiirt and Caudry were heavily shelled by 5.0". - About 10 a.m. an observer iu one of our aeroplanes noticed that considerable numbers of Gorman troops vi'ere on the move near Viesly. Another reported that by noon Caudry wa.s on fire; and the same officer also noticed that I.o Quesnoy was full of troops. Later when flying over Blaugies (south-east of Dour) he saw that the place was blocked by German transport; very properly he found ilie tar- get a tempting one and threw some bom))s among the vehicles. ' The original position was not selected with this idea; it was obviously im- X)o«-:ib]e to change it after the action opened. 48 THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. Battery, by drawing the German fire on to itself, was doing just what the Infantry wanted. The Battery managed to keep in action until its ammunition ran out. Then, as no more could be brought up, the men were once again withdrawn under cover. XXXVII (Hows.) did not fire from their first position and it was not long before the Howitzer Brigade moved back a short distance to a better position in the valley to the east of Selvigny. The sector allotted to this Brigade was to the eastward of a north- south line through Haucourt.^ Soon after XXXVII had taken up. its position Lieut. -Colonel Battiscombe saw a German officer, follow- ed by an orderly carrying a black and white flag, gallop along the crest of the spur beyond the Warnelle Ravine. The Batteries were warned. Presently some gun-teams appeared and directly afterwards gun-shields were seen. A howitzer battery at once opened fire and smothered the German guns, and the latter never got off a single round. XXIX and XIV maintained their original positions and con- tinued their activity. Beyond the left flank the pressure had been slight. Except 27, which was in action in an exposed position, the Artillery of the Fourth Division were practically intact at the end of this phase and ready for any eventuality. (d) Royal Horse Artillery. Ill R.H.A. " D" remained in the positions already indicated. In VII R.H.A. " L" detached two sections which moved out and occupied two positions in front.- During this phase the Battery fired some rounds at long ranges, possibly to assist the Cavalry engaged on the spur to the south of Le Cateau. *'/" moved south with XLII and took up a position of observa- tion north of Montigny. This w^as found to be so open to enfilade from the north-west that the Battery limbered up almost immediately and moved through Montigny with XLII, finally coming into action' about 1000 yards west of that village. "I" remained here until 3 p.m. Suntfnary. Thus this important period came to an end. During the morn- ing the numerous German Batteries had unlimbered on a far-flung, sweeping arc that enveloped the whole British position, and then they proceeded to smother the whole line where the Second Corps stood so grimly at bay under that August sun. But the British' Batteries responded resolutely, roaring defiance at the German guns, spreading death and destruction among their Infantry, proving once and for all that, in 1914, as a killing weapon the 18-pdr. had no^ equal in Europe. ' During this phrase the Air Reports furnish the following information about the German troops opposed to the Fourth Division :— About 11 a.m. a German Brigade was seen in position to the S.E. of Douai. Soon afterwards the same ob- sei-ver noticed '2 Cavalry Regiments halted in the fields about 1 mile to the east of Cambrai, whilst a German division was in line facing S.S.E., astride the- chaussec to the north of Wambaix. - Possibly one was covering the approaches from S. Souplet. THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 49 (C). THE CRISIS OF THE ACTION. NOON TO 1.45 P.M. (a) Fifth Division — (See Map 2 and Sketch B.) The German Artillery gradually wore down XV and the Batteries had great difficulty in keeping any guns in action. An officer of the 18th Hussars, who was near S. Souplet, described the pounding that our right flank was subjected to, as follows: — " The whole spur was churned up by the German shells, and the "earth was thrown about as if by a succession of mines." Early in this phase the B.C. of 52 was wounded in his O.P.^ being shot through the throat. Captain Barber Starkey had just arrived at the O.P. to inform the B.C. of the situation in his Battery. When Major Nutt had regained consciousness and was able to whisper faintly he sent his Captain back into the Battery to keep up the best possible rate of fire. From this time onwards the only target that could be engaged was advancing infantry, passing from the wood (north-west of Le Cateau) to the deep cutting ; and, although the fuze was decreased to 2, yet no shorter range than 1400 yards was possible, owing to the difficulty of clearing the crest. Major Nutt remained in his O.P. to observe the effect and control the fire. About half-past one the signallers of 37 (Hows.) passed up to XV Brigade O.P. a message ordering the retirement of the guns. Considering the only orders he had received previously, Lieut. -Colonel Stevens decided he could not act on a mere signal message, and as far as he could ascertain the right flank was still capable of sustaining the action for some time longer. At the close of this period, 11 was out of action; 80 had at least two guns firing and had expended more than the ammunition carried in its original six wagons ; 37 (Hows.) were still in action as a Battery and had fired away nearly all the ammunition in both wagon lines ; whilst 52 had the two flank guns still stubbornly re- sponding to the German fire. By the close of the Action this Battery had fired about 1,100 rounds. ^ The teams and wagon lines of these four batteries had to change their position more than once, as the German Artillery constantly searched for them in the upper valley. As the fight wore on both men and horses suffered heavy casualties from this cause ; and the Commanding Officer of the 59th Field Company, Royal Engineers, who was on a spur to the east of Reumont, stated that " one of the saddest things I have seen was the wounded horses trying to keep themselves on their legs by leaning against the stooks of corn." Immediately to the west of the Roman Road 122 was probably in the best case of all the Batteries in these two Brigades, its only difficulty being the replenishment of ammunition.^ 123 had still • The O.P. of 52 wa3 not with that of the XV E.F.A. and 37 (Hows.) but a short distance (about 10 yards) in front of the latter. - The -Ammunition Expenditure on Aug. i*t)th is dealt with in Appendix IV. * During the last phase of the action the B.C. noticed that immediately after 122 had been active the German Batteries at once responded by plastering 123 and 124 with shell. 50 THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. three of its guns in action and they were firing until the end. The B.C. (Captain Gillman) observed from a position in the open cornfield on the spur to the west of his Battery. It was during this phase that he noticed the German Infantry pressing forward on his left front and only about a quarter of a mile away, so he went down into the Battery to warn the section commanders of what was impending and to make the necessary arrangements for meeting the attack. The left section was run round to receive the Infantry with a point-blank burst of fire directly it showed. The German Infantry, however, was driven back by an advance made by our Infantry and 123 was not called upon to intervene. Regularly every hour from the time he took over Captain Gillman walked slowly up and down his Battery, speaking to all the detachments, whilst salvoes of H.E. and shrapnel were poured in from no less than three German Batteries. In 124 two guns were kept in action, the other two had been silenced by direct hits and at least two wagons were on fire. It will give some idea of the nature of the German fire to which XXVIII was subjected when it is realised that a subaltern of 123 stated that he was quite unconscious of the fire of 124, although every round fired by the right section of that Battery must have passed within eight feet above his head. 124 never fired a premature all day. In XXVII all the Batteries were still in action and ()5 (Hows.) were particularly active against the German Infantry who were now providing the principal targets. By the end of this period 05 had fired 840 rounds and being unable to get any more ammunition the Battery stood fast awaiting further orders. The Howitzers were so well concealed that they had never been located and the few casualties suffered were the result of chance bullets and shells. The two Batteries in Divisional Reserve — Gl (Hows.) and 108 Heavy Battery — were actively employed during the period ; but they were shortly to be given a far better chance of exhibiting their powers of destruction. From the foregoing it will be realised that the B.A.C's must have been actively employed in replenishing the Battery Wagons ; and to refill the B.A.C's themselves as rapidly as possible the Fifth D.A.C., from the neighbourhood of Fremont, transferred ammunition to some of the motor lorries of the Ammunition Park in which it was rushed up to Reumont (5 miles away) in 20 minutes. The system worked admirably. Unfortunately some of the shell sent up for the Howitzers, as well as some for the r;0-pdrs., were short of fuzes and a bag of fuzes had to be fetched by a motor-cyclist ; luckily the mistake was repaired in time. The result of the extreme pressure exerted on the Fifth Division during this phase can be gauged from the messages which were sent into Corps Headquarters. At 12.58 p.m. the Corps was informed that if the pressure on the right flank was not soon diminished there was a grave risk that "it may go". At 1.15 p.m. a strong German force, about a division, was reported to be moving wide round the right flank; and at 1.20 p.m. the Divisional Commander considered THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 51 that it was a question whether he had better not start retiring at once, unless material assistance could be rendered to his Division. To meet this critical situation on the right there was only the General Reserve of two Battalions, 19th Infantry Brigade, that had moved to Alontigny earlier in the day. So far they had not been employed ; and now, as the crisis was obviously at hand, the Corps ordered back these two Battalions from Montigny to Bertry. At 1.40 p.m. the Fifth Division was informed by the Corps that directly these two Battalions reached Bertry they would be sent on at once to Reumont, and would thus be available to reinforce the threatened right or to cover its withdrawal. But some considerable time must elapse before they could be expected to reach Reumont. The Third Division were also asked if they could spare any artillery to assist the Fifth Division, but no batteries were now available for this task. It is clear that on the Right Flank and Right Centre of the Fifth Division the enemy had gained sufficient artillery preponderance to warrant him in risking another immediate overwhelming attack with his Infantry.^ To meet it there were on the ground only a comparatively few guns left in action and the ammunition supply in the exposed Batteries was almost exhausted. But the Germans remembered only too well the rapid fire of the British Infantry on August 2o and 24 and they made no attempt to rush the position. (b) Third Division — (See Map 3). In the centre a general lull in the German fire was noticeable between noon and 1 p.m.- It gave rise to various ideas, either that the enemy were beaten off, or that they were completing their ar- rangements before the delivery of the final assault. Probably never having intended to drive in the centre, and finding it too well placed and too strong to carry without disproportionate loss, they shifted what guns and troops they could to the East, in order to concentrate enough troops there to make certain of overwhelming the British Right Flank. At 1 p.m. the action broke out again with great violence ; apparently the crisis on the right was fast approaching. By 1.30 p.m. the Third Division reported to the Corps that an attack was develop- ing against Inchy. All the Batteries were still in action, and they remained actively engaged, with the exception of the two forward sections in XXIII which had been ordered to withold their fire and wait un'il the German Infantry commenced its advance up tiie vulner- able re-entrants on the forward slope of the Audencourt ridge. Shortly after noon a message reached the forward section of 108 that German Infantry in Inchy were becoming engaged with the 0th In- fantry Brigade. The section at once commenced to sweep in front of ' About noon the platoon commander .stationed in tlie front trench of A Comp- any, 1/E. Snrrey R. ^to the east of the Roman Road) saw the Germans niilimber two heavy guns on the 150 metre knoll immediately in front of onr riglit flank. These guns engaged our Batteries at about 2, ()()() yards range. The officer could distinctly see the detachments serving the guns. ■ This lull has not yet been traced eitlier in the Fifth or Fourth Divisional ureas. 52 THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. the village.^ Immediately afterwards some of our howitzers (uniden- tified) turned on to the village with H. E.- The German Infantry were held. An Officer'^ of XL B.A.C. describes his impression of the Battlefield, at 2 p.m., as follows: — "I was standing on the northern " edge of Bertry. To my front lay the open Caudry ridge beyond " which showed the dark line of trees along the Cambrai road. I "could see our Batteries strung out in an irregular Ime and all were "in action firing hard. Shrapnel flecked the whole landscape and in " the village of Audencourt heavy high explosives were bursting on " percussion among the houses. "But the din of battle was dominated by the throb of noise "from our right flank. We all looked instinctively in the direction " of Le Cateau where the Montay spur was overhung by a bank of " white and yellow smoke, punctuated by angry flashes." Between noon and 2 p.m. the B.A.Cs. of XXX (Hows.), XL, and XLIJ were along the road between Montigny and Clary. In the Third D.A.C. all the ammunition was used in replenishment, some of the sections even sending wagons directly up to the Batteries themselves. The ground permitted this re-supply to be carried out in the Third Division and no ammunition shortage is reported by any Batteries of the Division. Thus in this area the strain had not been felt unduly ; the line here had not been really tested, and there was nothing to indicate any necessity for retirement.* (c) Fourth Division — (See Map 4.) In this Division the Artillery remained in action although more severely tried than in the Third Division. At 12.10 p.m. the Division was able to report to the Second Corps that " my guns are keeping down the fire on Ligny".^ At that time the village w^as held by the six guns of 135, together with 200 men and two machine guns. 135 were engaged by two German field guns which were run up by hand close to Fontaine-au-pire, only 2,500 yards away. A section was at once turned on to them and eight shrapnel sufficed for the business, numerous casualties being observed. Any attempt made by the German Infantry to advance was heavily punished by this Battery, and no attack on Ligny w'as pressed home whilst 135 remained in action. The rolling down in its front gave the Battery an ideal chance to smash up any Infantry advance and it was quick ' The section of 108 was entrenched in a root-field, and all newly-turned soil as well as the giin-shields and the wagons had been camouflaged thoroughly with tnrnin-tops. Shortly before noon rifle bullets commenced to patter against the shields athough so far no hostile Infantry had been observed in Inchy. - This may have been 65 (Hews.) of the Fifth Division. ' Captain (then Lieut.) C. A. L. Brownlow, d.s.o. ' This is evident when the casualties of this Division are studied, ride Appen- dix III. ^ Jn the same mesage the Division said that, "the Cable Cart you sent us is most useful." In this way the disadvantage of being without its Signal Com- pany wag partially overcome During the action the Third D.A.C. assisted the Fourth Division, in the absence of the Fourth D..\.C. THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 53 to avail itself of it. The sections had been very skilfully concealed and were never located by the German Artillery. During the afternoon, the sky becoming overcast, the Brigade Commander went up to the guns of 27 with the B.C., but any movement there at once drew down a heavy fire and all idea of getting them out before dark was temporarily abandoned. Later they were again visited, when it was found that the trails were so deeply embedded that they could not be lifted until the earth around them had been loosened. Two Batteries of XXXVII (Hows.) — 31 and 55 — engaged German Artillery from their new positions, but no results could be ascertained. The enemy responded but the shell were chiefly over and no serious damage was done, though the German shooting improved after two aeroplanes had flown over the Brigade ; but even so the Howitzers were never accurately located. Towards the close of this phase German Infantry were seen advancing in strength across the ridge north of Longsart and two of the Howitzer batteries opened on them at ranges varying from 4,500 to 3,500 yards. Our Infantry reported that considerable effect was obtained. Probably with the idea of supporting this attack the Germans had placed one or more machine guns in the ]\Ioulin d'Esnes and their fire was particularly galling to the two companies of the 2/Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers that held Esnes. The Mill was set on fire — probably by the Howitzers — to the great relief of the Infantry. About this time 68 and 39 fell back to a position alongside 88, and the whole of XIV was then m action to the east of S. Aubert Fme.i In this section, as in that of the Third Division, nothing had occurred to shake the hold of the troops on their position, which they could certainly have maintained until dark, had it been necessary to do so and had not the situation on the Right Flank dictated otherwise. - (d) Royal Horse Artillery — (See Map 5.) All that can be gleaned about this period from the available Diaries and sources is that, probably about 1 p.m., "D" R.H.A. was Vk'ithdrawn from its position near Bazuel and that the Battery then moved back past S. Benin. Fortunately the Germans proved unenterprising and did not occupy the S. Benin spur. "D", meanwhile, was held in reserve ready to cover the eventual retirement of " E" and " L", which were in action covering the Honnechy valley. * It was probably here that Major R. England, Commanding 88, was killed. though the time is not certain. - About 1 p.m. an observer in one of our aeroplanes saw that Cambrai was occupied by the Germans and he noticed the usual traces of their handiwork in the town, fires liad started. At about l.:jo p.m. the engine of the aeroplane was un- luckily damaged by a bullet, but tlie pilot effected a glide of two miles and managed to land among some of the French cavalry who were retreating towards Arras. The pilot and observer were fortunate enough to obtain two bicycles and later a motor car, and thus made their way to S. Quentin. They reached the place about 11.30 p.m., and at once proceeded to report to the G.O.C., Second Corps. 54 THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. Summary . Favoured as -they were by circumstances, the ground, the open nature of our Right Flank, the lack of reserves in the Second Corps, as well as by their own crushing superiority m guns, machine guns, and men, the Germans had concentrated their main effort against the two Brigades holding the extreme Right Flank of the British line ; and as a result of eight hours fighting they had placed that flank in critical danger. But the action fought by the Second Corps on August 2Gth was only a delaying one and if the necessary time had now been gained then the moment to retire had come. Otherwise a disaster to the Right must be faced and that might easily involve the rest of the force, for as yet there were still left many hours of daylight. THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 55 (D). THE RETIREMENT— AFTER 1.45 P.M. i (a) Fifth Division — (See Map 2 and Sketch B). By 1.45 p.m. the situation on the right flank had reached a critical stage. German machine guns were now solidly established along the line of the Cambrai road, within 500 yards of the Infantry Firing Line. Further, owing to their great numerical superiority, the German guns had at last gained an ascendancy over XV and XXVIII R.F.A., whilst the German Infantry, in possession of Le Gateau and the big spur above the railway station, were steadily pour- ing round the open right flank of the 2/Suffolk Regiment and XV R.F.A. Many guns were out of action, a few owing to direct hits ; others failed to run up properly owing to the rapid fire maintained, or to dents in the buffers ; others ceased firing owing to casualties among the detachments ; others were silent through shortage of ammunition. The time had come to retire and orders were now issued about 2 p.m. to withdraw the guns. When the C.R.A. considered that XV had been practically silenced he ordered his Brigade Major to collect the teams and arrange for the withdrawal of the guns. Major Tailyour accompanied the teams of XV R.F.A.- It was decided not to attempt the with- drawal of 52, as the Battery was in such an exposed situation and, its wagon line having been heavily shelled after the German Artillery had worked round the right flank, the losses in horses had been considerable. The remaining teams were used to assist in recover- ing 37 (Hows.) and 80. At the time when their respective limbers arrived, although 11 had been definitely silenced, yet two guns of 80, 37 (Hows.), and the flank guns of 52 were all still firing; indeed the last mentioned guns continued in action until the end. The arrival of the teams was quite unexpected in the Batteries. As the situation was critical and it was quite impossible to keep the teams waiting in the open, as many guns as possible were limbered up at once and driven off. It seems probable that the teams of 11 were the first to reach the line of guns ; in their advance one team had been shot down but the other five guns were successfully ' At 1.30 p.m. the Fifth Division reported that the right flank was seriously attacked, but the G.O.C. was ordered to hold on as long as possible. At the same time the situation was communicated to the other Divisions and all were warned, if retirement became imperative, that the Fifth Division would give the order. In that case the Third Division was to conform whilst the Fourth Division covered the operation. The neceissary roads for the movement had been allotted to the Divisions. Between 2.30 and 3 p.m. news was received at Corps H.Q. at Bertry that the Fifth Division had been compelled to fall back. (From H.Q. Diary, II Corps). " Major Tailyour apparently reached Col. Stevens and was captured with him. The a<:'Count in the C.R.A's Diary has been followed. Other and later evidence ttuds to show that Maj. Tailyour led forward the limbers of ^O and 37 (Hows) himself. They galloped down the valley anrl Major Tailyoiir sent the limbers of 6(» to that Battery leading those of 37 up to the Howitzers. 56 THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. limbered up and started off.i The B.C. (who had been wounded) rode back on one of the Hmbers, but unfortunately this gun over- turned in the valley below^ and consequently only four of the six guns were saved. IMajor Henning finally got back to Reumont on a gun of 80, which apparently came out of action some time after 11 had retired.- Major Birley having sent off his Battery was on his way3 to the Brigade O.P. to report to the Brigade Commander, but he was wounded at once and on proceeding to Reumont was again hit. These daring attempts were surprisingly successful ; four guns of 11, five of 80, and four howitzers of :]~, were driven away and saved. Possibly a brief lull that occurred in the shelling, just as the limbers of SO and 37 reached the guns, was accountable for the success that was achieved. Nevertheless two teams were blown to pieces as they came up and it was only after great efforts that the guns were ex- tricated ; m some cases, where there were not sufficient gunners avail- able, the drivers promptly dism.ounted and assisted in the limber- ing up. The survivors of the Batteries now disabled the remaining guns and withdrew from them carrying most of the wounded with them. It was high time they retired. The German Infantry were closing inexorably round the right flank of the 2/Suffolk Regiment and the machine gun bullets were coming through the gun-shields. The Germans were now determined to assault, and masses of their infantry suddenly appeared out of the sunken road behind the right flank of the line held by the 2/Suffolk Regiment. The occupants of these trenches, a mixed force consisting of men belong- ing to the 2/Suffolk Regiment, 2/Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 1/Dorset Regiment, and R.F.A., promptly opened rapid fire on the mass and did so much execution that, instead of rusnino- the small British force, the German Infantry halted and returned the fire, some blazing away from the hip whilst others dropped on their knees before they answered. The appearance of these German troops behind our right flank did something to mitigate the machine gun fire from the guns concealed in the Pont des Quartre Vaux cutting, as the enemy realised that most of this fire must take effect on his own infantry. Seeing that the two aba,ndoned howitzers of 37 must fall into German hands within a few minutes, if they were left where they were, Captain D. Reynolds of the Battery obtained permission from the C.R.A. to call for volunteers to rescue them. Accompanied by Lieutenants E. G. Earle and W. D. Morgan (both belonging to the 37th Battery) Captain Reynolds led up two teams to bring out the ' Further details are still required about the withdrawal of 11. One of the guns of this Battery was lying overturned in the cutting (immediately to the light flank of the Battery) and was seen there by a supporting party of the 2/Argj'll and Sutherland Highlanders as they advanced some time before noon into the eouhem trenches of the '2/SuffoIk Regiment. It seems that after 11 was practi- cally silenced, some gunners of that Battery took rifles and ammunition and went into one of the trenches held by the 2/Suffolk Regiment. - The O.P., in which were Col. Stevens and Major Jones, was out of sight of the guns and these officers were informed that horses had been brought up for them; but Col. Stevens considered his duty was to remain. ' He had been observing in the open close to his guns. THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 57 howitzers. As they galloped down the valley towards the Battery position the German Infantry were commencing to swarm all over the ground on which the right batteries of the line had been in action. Nevertheless both howitzers were limbered up, but then one team was shot down by the German Infantry who now were not more than two hundred yards away. The other howitzer, however, gal- loped off and, although one driver was hit, it was brought away.' The C.R.A. saw this episode himself, and personally ordered one of our batteries to stop firing m order to allow Captain Reynolds to make his attempt. For saving this howitzer Captain Reynolds and Drivers Luke and Drain, all of 37, were awarded the Victoria Cross, Lieutenant Earle, who was wounded, received the D.S.O., and the Ser- geant and the Trumpeter were given tne D.C.M. It was done only just in time. Directly afterwards, at 2.45 p.m., the German vice closed round the doomed right flank and the 2nd/Suffolk Regiment was overwhelmed. The following description of the closing scene on the British Right Flank is frcm an eye-witness, Lieut. -Col. Stevens, Command- ing XV R.F. A. :— "About 2.40 p.m. some cheering was heard on our right, about "300 yards away and over the crest. About five minutes afterwards "we heard 'Stand Fast!' and 'Cease Fire!' sounded and whistles "blown. Then it was shouted down the line from the right, ' You " are firing on friends.' All firing stopped at once. On standing up- " right and looking just over the crest we found everyone standing up " and the firing line being rounded up by the Germans. The posi- " tion was lost, considerable numbers of the enemy being round our "right and right rear." Some time before the end the two right platoons of the 2/Suffolk Regiment had to face about as the Germans had worked right round behind them. Without exaggeration it may be said of the gallant 2/1 2th enduring to the end at Le Cateau — ''lis furent vaina'.s avec honneur r By their behaviour at Le Cateau on August 21) the 2/Suffolk Regiment,^ and those men of the 2/Argyll and Sutherland High- landers and 2/Manchester Regiment w-ho had reached the advanced trenches during the action to reinforce the Suffolks, proved they were as worthy of the title of " iinmohile infanterie Britamiique" as were the men of Waterloo. The end of 52 R.F.A. must now be given, it was not an in- glorious one. As this phase wore on the fire of the Battery became more and more intermittent, single guns firing at long intervals. The Battery was in its death-throes. More than once the B.C. must ' An officer of the 1/Norfolk R. (15th Inf. Bde.), then engaged in hokling the northern perimeter of Renniont to cover the retirement of the Fifth iJivision, saw Capt. Reynolds advance and return with a gun. He considered this took place between '.i and .'i.l.j p.m. Any confirmation of the exact time would be most valuable. ^ Attached to the 2/Snffolk Regiment during the whole action were a party of details who had become separated from their own units — i2tj men of the l/Dorset Regiment. '1 men of the 1/Bedford Regiment, and (j men of the J^.F. A. (the latter were unarmed). This parly had been handed over earlv that morning by the B.G.C.. 1 lt!i Infantry Brigade, to the CO.. ^/Suffolk Regiment. These men fought all day with the li!/Suffolk Regiment and shared its fate. 58 THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. have thought his guns were silenced. But through the devoted gallantry of the wounded the two flank guns were able to maintain a desultory fire. Captain Barber Starkey and a wounded sergean' served one gun, taking it in turns to bring up ammunition from a neighbouring wagon i. Finally at 2.45 p.m. the end came with startling suddenness and the flank was overwhelmed and rolled up from the right and right rear. It was impossible to lire into the surgmg crowd of friends and foes, and the O.P. of the dying battery was over-run by the German 2Gth Infantry Regiment (7th Division, IV Corps)-. By this time only dead and wounded men were around the guns of the old " Bengal Rocket Troop"3. When the guns of XV^ had been withdrawn an attempt was made to bring out the guns of XXVIII R.F./\. After his Brigade Major had gone up to XV, the C.R.A. went to XXVIII to ascertain the situation in that part of the field. XXVIII was in so exposed a situation that the withdrawal of its three batteries was bound to be very difficult ; but if it was to be attempted at all then there was no time to be lost. Some time pre- viously Captain R. A. Jones, of 122, had been up in the Battery, but no arrangements for limbering up were made because retirement entered into no one's calculations. Later on,^ after his return to the wagon-line, he received the order to retire the guns. Captain Jones at once proceeded to make adequate arrangements to carry through this duty. First of all he called for volunteers and six teams were immediately obtained. Then he explained the situation to the drivers who were to accompany him and he ordered them, should it prove impossible to limber up, that they should get as close to the guns as possible so as to replenish the ammunition by hand, for it was running short. Captain Jones then led his teams forward. Moving up the reverse slope they drove through the gap left for them in the trenches of the 1/Royal West Kent Regiment, who were in support to this part ' Captain Barber St). In this section there was little or no real pursuit About 3.30 p.m., XXIII (in conjunction with the 9th Infantry Brigade) took up a covering position from Bertry to Montigny, about 2000 yards be- hind their first position, and at once ranged on the line previously occupied by the Infantry so as to be ready to deal immediately with any serious advance. No enemy were visible and after waiting about half an hour the retirement was resumed.^ ' 27 guns, out of the 3G that were lost, were abandoned on this flank. The- losses suffered in guns by the other two divisions dispose once and for all of the theory that they were "overwhelmed." Even on the right flank some of the last units to leave the field marched away in fours from Reumont down the Roman Road, notably the 1/Queen's Own, Royal West Kent Regiment and a party of the 2/A. & S. Highlanders. ' The 9th Infantry Brigade did not pass through Clary till 6.30 p.m. They were marching as a formed body and they had moved in the same way from Troisvilles, when they retired from the original position to the covering one east of Montigny. In the centre tlie situation was well in hand. THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 69 20 (of XLII) also took up a covering position near Clary ; but no targets presented themselves and after remaining in action for some time the march southward was continued. There is no doubt that no attempt was made by the Germans to press on in the centre when the Third Division fell back. The posi- tion was naturally a strong one and it had been most skilfully occupied. Any desire the Germans may have possessed to keep touch with the Third Division was roughly opposed by the guns of the two advanced sections of 107 and 108 which blew away the •attacking troops as they shewed, and subdued any desire to press on. The 1/Gordon Highlanders fSth Infantry Brigade) and Companies of the 2/Royal Scots and 2/Royal Irish Regiment maintained their original position between Audencourt and Caudry until nearly mid- night, the Germans making no attempt to close with them.^ (c) Fourth Division. — (See map 5). To cover the retirement from Ligny, 127 (of XXIX) came into action about half a mile south of the village, and it was decided if necessary to face the loss of the Battery in order to ensure withdraw- ing the 11th Infantry Brigade clear of the place. Actually the Germans did not press on, consequently the Battery was not called upo.i to make the supreme sacrifice and as soon as the situation permitted it was safely withdrawn. 126, of the same Brigade, was also brought into action to T^sist in covering the further retirement. - A final position was taken up about 1 mile to the south-south- east of Selvigny, in conjunction with the Composite Regiment of Household Cavalry,^ to cover the formation of the marching column. Thus, broadly speaking, the Artillery occupied one covering posi- tion after another, the Batteries passing through each other in turn. But the Germans never attempted any pursuit at all^ and the ■column retired unmolested from the field, marching via Villers ■Outreaux.5 The one outstanding fact is that the retirement on the left flank was carried out far later than it was either on the right or in the centre — convincing proof that the Germans did not appreciate the importance of this wing. One of our airmen, flying over the field about 5 p.m., could see no infantry engaged, but he noticed that there was "considerable gun-fire, chiefly German." In support of this statement it is recorded that after the Fourth Division had withdrawn from its positions the German Artillery behaved here as it did all along the line. With Prussian thoroughness it subjected our vacated trenches and gun • The order to retire did not reach these units. ^ !^ome of our Infantry were in Haucourt until after dark. ^ They had also co-operated with 127 to the south of Ligny. " Oerraan Infantry were not seen again by the Infantry of the Fourth Divi- sion until September 1 at Verberie — south of the Forest of Compiegne. ^ The Fourth J).A.C. detrained at S. Quentin between 11 p.m., 25 Aug., and about noon, 2r> Aug. As it arrived the Column formed up on the road, and at 3.30 p.m. it marched to Hani on tlie Sonime, arriving there at 9 p.m. 70 THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. positions to a heavy bombardment — entirely satisfactory from our point of view. It wasted a considerable amount of valuable time as well as a great deal of ammunition. This exhibition of misdirected energy was clear proof of the heavy nature of the German casualties at Le Cateau and the serious need for re-organisation in their Arm\' before any vigorous pursuit could be undertaken. The Second Corps had not fought in vain. (d) Royal Horse Artillery. — (See Alnps."^ " /" R.H.A., still in action to the west of-Montigny, received orders at 3 p.m. to join the JV Cavalry Brigade to the south of Ligny. The Cavalry Brigade and the Batter)- were then ordered to take up a position to prevent the Germans debouching from the large woods south of Walincourt and thus cover the retirement of the Fourth Division from the field. " I" and the IV Cavalry Brigade remained in this position from 6 p.m. until dark, but the enemy never appeared and " 1" then moved toLe Catelet.i ' On Aug. 27, "1" was engaged with German Infantry in the neighbourhood of Vendhuille. Later that afternoon (about 4 p.m.) Gernian lufantrj- columns- (with transport) were seen marching towards I'eronne THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 71 CHAPTER IX. THE RETREAT ON ST. QUENTLX.i (See map 1). The Divisional lines of retirement were broadly as follows-. — FiftJi Division — along the Roman Road via Estrees (where there was a halt of some hourSy, to St. Quentm. Third Division — via Elincourt, Beaurevoir, Hargicourt, keeping to the northward of the Roman Road. Fourth Division — through Selvigny, Malmcourt, Villers Out- reaux, in other words along roads to the northward again of those used by the Third Division. There is no doubt that some writers have exaggerated the scene, during the first stage of the retreat, into a mere panic rout. Nothing could be further from the truth. ^ The strain was bound to be felt most along the Roman Road. All those' bodies of troops which retired along the other roads, to northward, although they were considerably mixed up yet they marched in formation and were definitely under control. Along the Roman Road this was not the case. Down that Via Dolorosa swirled a rudderless horde of men, guns, wagons, lim- bers without guns, carts, riderless horses. As units came into this stream they were engulfed in it, formations being broken up and cohesion lost. With nightfall it became harder to move and numer- ous long checks took place. Rain began to fall. The misery of hunger, thirst, and extreme fatigue could hardly be borne. Yet these men were soldiers still. Wounded and exhausted men were assisted along by their comrades, others were carried on wagons, guns, limbers, and carts. All kept their rifles and ammunition ; for none had aband- oned themselves to despair. In fact it was not a rout or panic, merely extreme confusion. Naturally no one who took part in it could ever forget that Wednesday night. Physical and mental weariness were alone enough to have put the finishing touch to any other army the world has ever seen. Yet these worn out, footsore officers and men, who had fought and marched and fought again since Sunday morning, trudged on along a dreary road that must have seemed to all like one of those intermin- • At .T..10 p.m. G.H.Q. of the B.E.F. moved from S. Qiientin to Noyon, which was reached at 5 p.m. At 1 a.m. rounds. ("Official History of the War in South Africa," Vol. I.). THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 73 CHAPTER X. COMMENTS ON THE ACTION. For the Gunner and the student the handling of the Artillery ■of the Second Corps in the Action of Le Cateau will always possess an interest entirely its own. The Action was fought by the Regiment as we all knew it, by Brigades and Batteries with the old famihar numbers and letters, by units trained in peace by those officers who then commanded them m the field. The training of the officers themselves was based on the doctrines emphasized in our Training Manuals — teaching that was now to be put into practice against the most powerful, the best armed, and the best found army m the world. This Army for nearly half a century had been crowned with a legend of invincibility, a fiction implicitly believed m by itself and •one to which nearly all the rest of the world subscribed. It was a myth for ever dissipated m smoke at Le Cateau, after it had been blown to shreds from the lean mouths of our guns. Thus, on the Allied side, Le Cateau possesses a first-rate importance, for it is the first milestone on the long road to ultimate victory. A.— GENERAL COMMENTS. Considering their crushing numerical superiority, their great preponderance m guns and machine guns, and the quantity of am- munition they expended, the amount of success achieved by the ■Germans in the Action of Le Cateau was astonishingly small. On Wednesday morning, August 26, the Germans possessed every conceivable advantage, m information, situation, numbers, and .armament. Through their superior air-service^ they must have known, or ought to have known, the bivouacking areas of the First Corps and also of those units of the Second Corps that reached their halting places before dark. Further confirmation about the First Corps was obtained from the fighting on Tuesday evening at Landrecies and Maroilles. The moves of the First Corps early on Wednesday could be kept under observation from the air. Given such a situation at the opening of one of Napoleon's great campaigns, it would be an interesting specu- lation to consider what profit he would have derived from it. At the end of the 2Gth it is certain that he would have been able to claim something more tangible as a success than having allowed the First Corps to escape, together with the barren honour of having gained a Pyrrhic victory at Le Cateau. He would have achieved more than the mere occupation of the Battlefield when the heavily outnumbered British Force had relinquished it, after having beaten their numerically superior assailants to a standstill in a fierce and bitter fight for the less essential part of the position. ' la August, 1914, their supremacy in this respect was due to their ^8up?rior preparedness. 74 THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. It has been suggested that the exposure of the Batteries of ^XV and XXVIII R.F.A . was the primary cause that tempted the Germans to mass agamst the right flank of the Second Corps and led them to anticipate an easy success at that end of the Battle line. If this is ever proved to be the case then the loss suffered by these gallant •• *»• Brigades in their forward positions will be far more than justified.^ 9*- For there can be no doubt that the first of the two principal mistakes .^ made by the German Command on this day was its decision to concentrate its great effort against the British Right in the neigh - bourhood of Le Cateau . The second undoubtedly was the Germaii ■^ . ' failure t o open an immediate and relentless pursuit direct ly the Fifth Division commenced its retirement . Judged by the supreme test, of being able to reap ail the advantages of the success he had then won, it is clear that the German Commander at Le Cateau was merely 2i7i bon General ordinaire for he failed to exhibit real driving energy at that hour. He allowed the weariness of his troops , the heavy losses they had suffered, t he ammunition they had expended , to weigh him down and render him immobile . Thus the golden hours of opportunity passed by whilst he was engaged in the profitless task of digesting his joy over his barren victory. To return to the first of these two mistakes. It is quite clear, when the situation is studied, that the Left (or west) was the vital flank. To crush in the centre must take too long and prove far too costly. To drive in the right flank could lead to nothing decisive unless it was followed up immediately and vigorously. Directly the Germans were content to employ an infantry sickle to reap what was merely left lying on the field itself, instead of using a cavalry scythe to cut down the real harvest that remained, then it was certain that the Second Corps would soon shake itself together and regain its morale for more than two-thirds of it had none the worse of the day's fighting. The retirement would be carried out along the roads still left open, the operations of the two British Corps would once more be combined, and the most effective co-operation arranged between the B.E.F. and the Armies of our gallant Ally. Actually whilst enveloping the right flank of the Second Corps the Germans, tempted by their numerical superiority and the success hitherto achieved, made a very feeble attempt to envelop the left ; but in face of the unshaken defence of that flank, and the presence of General Sordet's Cavalry beyond it, the attempt was not pressed. Yet had they been content w-ith a simple manoeuvre and contained the right and centre, whilst as early as possible throv^ing overwhelming strength against our left flank, then they might have achieved a great result.- ' Had the Second Corps continued its retirement voluntarily or been driven .liack on S. Quentin early on Aiig. 26 the Germans would have had a splendid oj)- portunity to crush the First Corps on that day. This may explain the concentr.i- tion of the German strength against the right of the Fifth Division. Here around Le Cateau the overwhelming hostile force was fully employed by the Second Corps during the critical hours of Aug. 2') and the First Corps crossed the- Sambre without undue difficulty. ' So far as can be ascertained at present, the original frontal attack was made by two Corps and a Cavalry Division — the IV and IV (Reserve) Corps and the 9th Cavalry Division. The IV German Corps attacked from I^e Cateau and the Selle Valhy (exclusive) tc about Troisville? and Audencoiirt; whilst the- THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 75 Our troops were later on the ground here than was the case with the heads of the other divisions, the artihery was ah in Ligny^ the ground apparently had not been reconnoitred, and no positions had been prepared so far to the west of Le Cateau. On the other hand this section of the line is no further from Bavai than is the right flank. 1 Once the left flank was driven in the whole retreat of the B.E.F. must have been endangered. The Roman Road must have become much more congested, for the Fourth Division would have been forced back on to the Third and the two together, if the Germans followed up at all, would have been driven across the line of retirement of the Fifth Division, which would probably have had to hold on to let the others open their retirement on St. Quentin. Had the advantage then .been pressed the whole of the Second Corps might have been shouldered off towards Guise, blocking the only lines of withdrawal open to the First Corps. xA-n irretrievable disaster would then have taken place. The only alternative open to the Second Corps would have been to stand its ground fighting to the last, and thus ensure at any rate the safe withdrawal of the First Corps. Even this alterna- tive had been faced by Sir H. Smith-Dorrien in the early hours of that Wednesday. Confident of himself, he had also implicit con- fidence in his men. He knew that on August 26, whichever way the battle might turn, the Second Corps would put up " a real grand fight." It will give the deepest satisfaction to all future historians to record that his confidence was amply justified ; and both his generalship and his character rose far superior to the critical occasion. ^ For on that August day, as the fierce fight swayed and surged, he remained the master^both of himself and of the situation — and in his eager grip the sword bit deep into the German host. The Commander in Chief, Field Marshal Sir John French, was the first to recognise what the Commander of the Second Corps had done on August 2r; ; and he did so in words that will stand so long" as an account of this war is read : — '^ " . . . .1 cannot close the brief " account of this glorious stand of the British Troops without putting " on record my deep appreciation of the valuable services rendered by "General Sir Horace Smith Dorrien. IV (Eeserve) Corps frontngc was from about Andeiiconrt to Esnes, the 9th German Cavalry Division probably beginning the attack in front of Hancourt against the 12th Infantry Brigade. Later the 111 Corps advanced through iJe Cateau and up the Selle Valley against the British right, whilst the II Corps was available to use against our left. The 1th Cavalry Division may have remained in reserve all day, as it had fouglit a fairly severe action, overnight, at Solesmes. ' The extreme left of the line, the village of Esnes, was held all day (till about 4.:^0 p.m.) by 2 Companies and 2 machine guns of the 2/Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. '^ ^' II faiit qii'ttn liomnte dc (jiicyrc ait aittant dc caractrrc que (Vcsxtrif. T.cs " homDies qiti ovt heaucoiip d'csprit et j^eii de caractere y sonf Ics Dioiiis proi^res ; '' c'rut ■iin vavirc qvi (t tine Didivre dLsj)f02)ortiov'nee d son lest; il vcnit micux '' hcancmip dc caractere et pen d' esprit. I.es Jioiiniies qui ovt niediocremenf d'csprit " et nn caractere proportionne reiissi-ront souvent dans ce metier; il fant aiitant " de base que de hantenr." ( Napoleon. ). ' Despatch, dated 7 Septr., 1911. 76 THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. " I say without hesitation that the saving of the Left Wmg of the " Army under my command on the morning of August 26 could never " have been accomphshed unless a commander of rare and unusual " coolness, intrepidity, and determination had been present to conduct " the operation personally." (B).— TACTICAL COMMENTS. It is time to turn to the consideration of the handling of the troops ■and particularly of the Artillery in this action. It is obvious that it is still too near the event for any full criticism of the details of the action. At the present time we are only beginning to learn what actually occurred ; consequently it is necessary, at this stage, to appre- ciate what was done, leaving till a much later date any attempt to draw all possible lessons from this battle. For our present purpose it is wise to recall the teaching of our training manuals anent a de- laying action. " Field Service Regulations, Part I, deals with a delaying action in Chapter VII, para. 114. It states clearly that " the delaying power "of a numerically inferior force is greatly affected by the ground The guiding principle in all delaying action must be that " when an enemy has liberty to manoeuvre the passive occupation of "a position, however strong, can rarely be justified, and always in- "volves the risk of crushing defeat; under these circumstances a de- " laying force must manoeuvre so as to force an enemy to deploy as " often as possible, but should rarely accept battle. A consideration of the situation and the condition of the Second Corps, on Wednesday morning must convince anyone that, if it was to avoid disaster, it was bound to accept battle in the Le Cateau position, and that this is one of those rare occurrences when the only means of gaining sufficient time was by engaging the enemy, the G.O.C. being ready to break off the fight directly the necessary time was gained. The passive occupation of the position be- yond that hour would lead to the isolation of the Second Corps by the I German Army, for the latter possessed full liberty of manoeuvre on that day. The risk was great. The responsibility resting on the shoulders of the Commander of the Second Corps was heavy. Fortunately the execution was equal to the conception and thus the desired end was attained. "Field Service Regulations," Part I, Chapter V, para. 72, deals with the handling of a rear guard, and much of this teaching applies to the dispositions of the delaying force at Le Cateau. It lays stress on "showing as strong a front to the enemy as possible, and making "sure of good lines of retreat." Further "the greater part of the " force should be in the fighting line from the ofitset .... as "great a display of force as possible being made." Both these points are admirably illustrated by the position select- ed and the skilful arrangements made of the available troops. The THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 77' length of the position occupied by the Second Corps on August 26 was virtually 13 miles. To hold this there were available about 32,000 bayonets (allowing for the losses of 23-25 August)/ which gives rather less than V5 men per yard of front, a suitable proportion for a delaying action. The question of reserves is also well illustrated. Practically all the spare troops, available as a General' Reserve, were the rather scattered Cavalry Division and the 19th Infantry Brigade, a by no means excessive amount considering the length of the position, the open nature of both flanks, and the preponderating amount of artillery that the enemy could unlimber. The Germans fully realise that no decisive victory can be gained without suffering bloody losses ; or as one of their writers says, " When necessary, to sacrifice ruthlessly the life of the soldier in battle " is the great law of war, to which both the soldier and the officer must conform with equal readiness." Consequently it is remarkable that no resolute and sustained effort was made to destroy the Second Corps on August 26. Had a determined assault been delivered all along the line, between 1 and 2 p.m., the Second Corps would have been forced to fight it out just where it stood ; and the arrival of fresh troops on the German side would have enabled the assailants to de- liver a death-blow to the hopelessly outnumbered defenders. No trace exists of such an attack ; the will to conquer was absent. The German leaders felt their way cautiously, weighed the pros and cons, and waited ; they let go their hold upon the Second Corps and the precious moment slipped away, never to return. Such is war! Another " point of great importance to the Commander is to "judge accurately the time to retire."' On August 26 it was essential to gain every possible moment and yet, if possible, to break off the action before the Germans definitely gained the upper hand on the left flank. As the action ran there was no great risk of the latter event occurring, and everything actually turned on how long the right flank could withstand the pounding to which it was subjected. No unit on that right flank has any cause to recall the Action of Le Gateau with anything but extreme pride. The troops on the right of the Fifth Division were fought out to the last limits of their human endurance, and when the G.O.C., who had kept his hand on the pulse of the fight, was finally compelled to sanction the retirement he had gained sufficient time. But his nerve had never failed him for he had not broken ofT the action a moment too soon. With special reference to the Artillery the manual states: — " The Artillery shall be able to open fire on the attacking artillery " at a long range and compel his infantry to deploy at the greatest " possible distance." This was extremely difftcult to apply on the ground, because of the misty light in the early morning, the undulat- ing nature of the country, and the covered approaches through the existing valleys. However sufficient range was obtainable to bring up the German infantry attacks all standing, wherever our guns had not been silenced previously by an overwhelming fire. ' See Note to Appendix III. 78 THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. The next principle enuntiated is that "the artillery should cover ""the withdrawal of the infantry." This was done by 61 (Hows.), 108 Heavy Battery, and the remaining section of 122 in the Fifth Divi- sion ; by the brusque reception given to the atttacking Infantry in the centre by the advanced sections of 107 and 108 R.F.A., in the Third Division ; and was due to the fire of 135 R.F.A. in the Fourth Division, and the readiness to sacrifice 127 to cover the evacuation of Ligny- Further "it should be possible to withdraw the Artillery without J^^ "difficulty." Except in the cases of XV R.F.A. and :i7 (Hows. *) ^MutiA closely supporting the 2/Suffolk Regiment (1 Ith Infantry Brigade^, \ i>,^, XXVIII R.F.A/ carrying out the same duty for 2/K.O. Y.L.I, and 2/K.O.S.B. (13th Infantry Brigade) in the Fifth Division; the case of the two advanced sections of 1 07 and 108 in the Third Division, de- .^6111 ^<^ liberately placed to afford the closestco-operation to their infantry •^**;,,^^ at a crisis; and the case of 135 and 127 in the Fourth Division, closely engaged for the same reason, all the Artillery was so placed that withdrawal v»-as not unduly difficult. Further, in each Division the Artillery was echelonned in depth and, when the Germans occu- pied the original positions, every discouragement to press on was offered by Batteries already in action in rear and registered on the old line. Our own manual, "Field Artillery Training," deals with the Eni-ployrncnt of Artillery in War in Chapter VII, and Rearguard work is considered in Sections 105 and IOC. It lays down: " When it is a question of ensuring the safe withdrawal of the " main body, artillery must be ready to take any risk, and loss of materiel is then fully justified." The Artillery of the Second Corps obeyed this teaching in the letter as well as in the spirit on August 20. Further in Section 165 it says that, "Should it become necessary "to abandon a position, a portion of the Artillery will be re- " quired to establish itself as quickly as possible in positions from "which the retirement of the rest of the force can be covered. The " fire of heavy guns from positions overlooking the main position, "combined with that of field guns which, owing to their greater " mobility, may occupy more advanced positions, would usually form "the most effective means for securing the withdrawal of the rest of " the force . . . ." The disposition of the heavy guns naturally applies chiefly to the artillery in the Fifth Divisional Area, and there is no doubt that it is exemplified perfectly by the positions occupied by 61 (Hows.) and 108 Heavy Battery . Both batteries were able to retain their original retired positions, when the front line of their Division fell back, and the barrage they put down at once, on to the old position, acted as a great deterrent to any immediate pursuit beyond it. Our manual also states that "a rearguard is usually strong in " artillery .... positions in rear of a crest are preferable " • ■ . . the flanks of a rearguard position are specially im- ■" portant and some guns should usually be employed in their defence." Here, at Le Cateau, all the Artillery was deployed for the delay- THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 79 ing action that was to be fought. In the case of XV R.F.A . and 37 '\. 55. "^o (Hows.), on the right flank of the Fifth Division, it may be considered i»»^ that it would have been wiser to place only sections in the forward i- •*^- ^ position, the rest of the guns being brought into action in the valley ^"m** and about three-quarters of a mile further back. Had this course <3u-4- \v>»>r. been pursued a more difficult target would have been presented to the German artillery in the misty light of the early morning ; the batteries would have been less liable to be doubly enfiladed ; the spur south of Le Cateau could have been kept under effective fire ; the southern exits from the town, as well as the Selle valley, could have been denied to the German infantry ; and nearly all the guns could have been saved. On the other hand it must not be forgotten that the position was clearly indicated to the Brigade Commander by the C.R.A. of the Division ; it was taken up in order to afford, their Infantry, continual and close support in a fight to a finish ; and the First Corps was expected to cover and secure its right flank. Neither must it be overlooked that there had been no time to make any adequate reconnaissance of the ground ; nor was their any idea, on the right flank, that the action to be fought was really to be one of a delaying character. In order to appreciate the dispositions suggested by "Field Artillery Training" the arrangement of the Batteries of the Third Division should be studied closely. Here the ground was eminently suitable. Certainly no flank was involved, otherwise the arrange- ments are strictly in accord with the advice of the training manual, with the one addition that makes them so admirable an illustration of the broad spirit in which text books should be read and applied — the use of the two advanced sections to give the necessary close co- operation with the Infantry at the crisis. This proves that the duty of training manuals is to assist and train common-sense ; they cannot take its place. Talent cannot be replaced by a regulation. " That the help thus afforded by the Artillery at Le Cateau was " appreciated, by their comrades of the Infantry, was touchingly shown next morning. Exhausted as they were by the long night " march, yet many men stepped out of the ranks as they passed to "give a silent pat to the g"uns drawn up by the roadside."^ Thus it is clear that the delaying action fought by the Second Corps at Le Cateau is a teaching example which will well repay the diligent study of all gunners. Whereas in the actions fought in the neighbourhood of Mons, on August 23 and 24, the heavy German casualties could be largely put down to the rapid fire of our Infantry, ^ at Le Cateau there can be no doubt that the very severe losses suffered by the Germans were main- ly the result of our gun fire. Both the tactical handling of the Artillery and the technical training of the fcrsomiel had been justly appreciated and developed on sound lines. When the chance was offered each commander was ready to use his Battery as a single six- • Extract from the. Diary of the C.R.A., Fifth Division. ^ An exception must be made of the Flank Guard Action at Aiidregnies on August 21. Ilere the damage and stopping effect were due hirgely to the fire ■of the four batteries engaged—"!./' "D," "E," R.H.A. and IIU R.F.A. 80 THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. barreled weapon with which he hit, at exactly the right moment and with crushing effect. The noble and stately motto of " Ubique" is honoured by the inclusion of Le Cateau among the services that it commemorates. For a ray of glory shone on those Batteries that thundered forth defiance to the foe on that field in Cambresis over four long years ago. THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 81 APPENDIX I. /5<^ ♦2>*1»'^' Copy of 0.0. 2, Fourth Division.^ "10th, 11th, 12th Bdes. O.O. 2. "Div. Art. "As originally arranged (see O.O. No. 1) the Expeditionary Force will take up a position on approx. line Le Cateau — Carrieres- — Mont d'Esnes.^ (approxy). Disposition IV Div.-Le Coquelet Fme. — Mont d'Esnes.^ XI Bde will occupy position from Le Coquelet Fme.^ to Rly.^ about South of O of Fontaine.^ XII Bde will occupy position from Rly. about South of O of Fontaine,^ to Mont d'Esnes,^ just N.W. of Esnes. X Bde. Haucourt (Reserve). 14 and 29 F.A. Bdes. East of Esnes ] All these under G.O.C. 32 and 37 F.A. Bdes. at Ligny \ R.A. J Div. H.O. remain at Haucourt. These positions to be taken up at once and entrenched as strongly as possible. Haucourt ] (sd) J. E. Edmonds, 26/8/14 \ Col., 6 a.m. G.S. IV Div.s ' Copies are to be found among the Appendices to VoL I. of G. S. Diary, Pourth Division, and also attached to Vol. T. of C.E.A.'s Diary, Fourth Division. ^ "Serainvillers" has been erasetl. ^ Moulin d'Esnes is meant. ' ''About V of CArDEY" lias been erased. ■' "Stn" has been erased. " "Cattenieres vincl.)" has been erased. '"Ely. Stn. S. of Cattenieres" has been erased. All the corectious are written above the erased words. ' On the copy among the Appendices to the G. S. Diary is written in pencil — "Some of these readied units, some did not." 82 THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. APPENDIX II. Guns lost by R.A., Second Corps, at Le Cateaii on 2G August 1914. Fifth Division. 11 R.F.A 21 80 R.F.A 1 XV R.F.A.^ 37/VIII (Hows.) R.F.A 1 52 R.F.A fl22 R.F.A 4 XXVIII R.F.A.h23 R.F.A 6 [124 R.F.A 6 108 Heavy Battery, R.G. A. (upset in ditch)l Third Division. XXIII R.F.A.] 107 R.F.A. (advanced section) 2 [lOS R.F.A. (advanced section) 2 XL R.F.A. 6R.F.A 3 Fourth Division. XXXII R.F.A. 27 R.F.A 2 2 Grand Total = 36 Total— 34, 18 pdrs. 1, 4" 5" howitzer. 1, 60 pdr. There also appear to have been about 1 ."> limbers and .50 ammuni- tion wagons left on the field in the Fifth Divisional Area. THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 83 APPENDIX III. Royal Artillery Casualties on 26 August, 1914. The records are most meagre in the Diaries and require supple- menting. The only recorded losses are as follows: — • Fifth Division -. — H.Q. Staff 1 officer missing (Brigade Major) Brigade Staff 3 officers wounded and missing, 16 other ranks casualties. 11 1 officer killed, 4 wounded, 36 other ranks casualties ; and 58 horses.^ 52 1 officer wounded, 2 wounded and missing. Other ranks 3 kill- XV I ed, 23 wounded, 8 missing ; 102 horses. 1 80 1 officer killed, 1 wounded, 1 missing ;38 other ranks casual- ties ; 70 horses.^ At least ^4 officers, 124 other ranks ; and 230 horses, c/d^^c ^ av^- Brigade Staff 1 officer killed. 122 1 officer killed, 1 officer wound- ed, at least 8 other ranks kill- ed, 14 wounded ; 20 horses. XX Villi ( 123 2 officers wounded ; other ranks 5 killed, 18 wounded. 124 1 officer killed ; 13 other ranks casualties. At least G officers, 58 other ranks ; and 20 horses, c^o >ioaw^ None recorded. XXVII VIII (Hows) i 65 7 (Hows.). 1 officer wounded and missing. (Hows.). 2 other ranks wounded ; 7 horses 108 Heavy Battery No record. Aoi^ ^Jk^ Ammunition Columns Total Artillery casualties Fifth Division, so far as recorded: — 22 officers, 180 other ranks, 257 horses. ' The numbers of the horse casualties in XV are based on those given in the C.R.A.'s Diary. 84 THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. APPENDIX lU.—(Co}i/iniied.) Third Division: — f 108 3 other ranks missing (patrol ; 1 horse XXIII <] wounded. I 109 4 horses. ok^^^^-^^ The above are the only casualties recorded in uie R.A. Diaries, Third Division. Fourth Division : — XXXII 27 1 Officer wounded ; other ranks, 1 killed, 7 wounded. caXo^ "i^-^M^ 120 1 wounded; 1 horse killed. 127 T) wounded; 10 horses killed. 88 1 Officer killed. .'3 1 1 wounded ; some horses. 35 1 killed, 2 wounded ; 1 horse killed,, several wounded. The recorded casualties in the Fourth Division amount to : — 2 officers, 18 other ranks, 12 horses. R.HA. No casualties are recorded in the R.H.A. Diaries. The total recorded casualties for the R.A. at Le Cateau amount to: — 24 officers, 201 other ranks, 274 horses. More information on this point is required. NOTE.^ The Infantry of the Fifth Division, which had numbered 12,000 and 24 machine guns on August 22, probably lost 2,300 up to and including August 25, as well as some machine guns destroyed by gun fire. 2 ' I am entirely indebted to Capt. Atkinson for the figures given in this note, they are based on the evidence ot" the Diaries, few of which give detailed state- ments. ' The losses then fell somewhat as follows: — 13th Infantry Brigade 000 14th „ „ 400 15th „ „ 1,000 By Aug. 29, 18 of the 24 m. guns were reported lost or destroyed. These losses must (je borne in mind when the advance from the Seine to the Aisne is being considered. To talk of a Brigade then and imagine it as still consisting of 4,000 rifles and 3 machine guns is extremely misleading. To take two examples from the Artillery of the Fifth Division: — XV R.F.A., after Le Cateau, had 9, instead of 18, 18 pdrs. ; whilst XXVIII R.F.A. had only 2 18 pdrs. until after the Aisne was crossed. THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 85 APPENDIX \\\.—(Xontinued:) Thus at Le Cateau the Fifth Division was not more than 9.7QQ infantry . The approximate losses it suffered on this day were as follows : — Fifth Division: : — 14th Infantrv Brigade ... 1,250 13th ., ' , . . 950 15th . , ... 150 Total = 2,;350 O DW. This loss is about 25% of the Infantry engaged. The other losses along the line were broadly as follows : — Third Division:— caUJ- I a O O O vr>4a^*^ X^ . 9th Infantry Brigade ... 150 8th ., ., . . 1,000' 7th ,, , ... 301) M Totals 1,450 3 ^^"< This loss is about 15% of the Infantry engaged. - Fourth Division: -. — 11th Infantry Brigade ... 1,150 12th ,, ' , ... 1,000 10th , , ... 1,000 ♦V Total-3,15u ^ OW This loss is rather more than 25% of the Infantry engaged. ^ iQth Infantry Brigade (reserve) 550. This makes the total Infantry loss about 7,50u. Consequently the total loss at Le Cateau will not exceed 8,000 men out of a total of 50,000 engaged, and does riot substantiate the theory that the force was overwhelmed. Also between 2,500 and 3,000 men, footsore and exhausted, were despatched by rail to the advanced base at Le Mans for recuperation and refitting. They must therefore be deducted from the available fighting strength on August 2S, when General Sir Horace Smith- Dorrien's Force had taken up a position on the Oise. * Of the losses shown for the Sth Infantry Brigade about three-quarters were due to the fact that, owing to an accident, the 1 Gordon Highlanders and flanking companies did not receive orders to retire (see p. 09). ^ A message sent, on August -ti, by the Second Corps to the Fifth Division, ran : — "Third Division about 2,000 below normal strength, and full of fight." ' The units of the Fourth Division were practicallv at full strength on Aug. 26. 86 THE ROYAI. ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. APPENDIX IV. R.A. Ammunition Expenditure on 2G August, 1914. The records are pitiably insufficient in this particular. All that is given is as follows : - — ■ Fifth Division:-. — {^i) (() wagons at least) ..\diik...\.^iMo. 456 r,2 (about) •! h.M.... 1,100^ Cl22 (about) V A:':..... 600 XXVlII.i 123 (6 wagons at least) ...:) ^..':.. 456 (^ I ZA- - ^ .. (;!7 (nearly both wagon lines) 550 li] (all with battery) ' 648 65 840 Third Division: — flOT (about) \f^...%.ft,^!^ 800 XXIII. i 108 :«... .^ .'«. 697 (l09 (about) 1,000- Foiirth Division. No record. It is hoped that officers will be able to supply information to complete the ammunition expenditure of each Battery, it will be ex- tremely interesting and valuable. NOTE. At Walcrloo, 18 June, i8ij, Captain Sandham's Field Brigade R.A., (now 7 R.F.A.) fired 1,100 rounds during the Battle from its six muzzle-loading 9 pdrs. On the same day Major Whinyates' Ilnd Rocket Troop, R.H.A., fired 560 rounds from its six light 6 pdrs., and 52 rockets. Our 78 guns on this day fired nearly 10,000 rounds.-"' In the decisive battle of GraveloUc, IS Atig. rSyo, the 4 56 French guns only fired .35,000 rounds, although one Battery belonging to the IV Corps fired 1,380 during the action.'' On the German side in the same Battle the 616 guns, actually engaged, fired 34,628 common shell, 196 shrapnel, and 20 canister, total 34,844 rounds. The maximum fired by any one Battery was 1,104 rounds.^ ' Nearly 1.5 full wagons. ^ 100 could certainly have fired more; but. early in the day, the B.C. had been warned that he was to be careful of ammunition. ' "The British Artilhri/ at Waterloo," bv Captain Becke. foin'ruil, L'.A. Imlitvtion, Vol. XXXIV. ' Gurrrc dc 1810-71, III, I'Donnncnls). (Paris, lfi05). '' German Artillery in 1870-71. (1873), by Captain (now Lieut. -Colonel) Hime. R.A.; also the Xotc on the same published in Aug. 1S73. THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT LE CATEAU. 87 At Wcisscjiburg, 4 Aug., /S/O, the 90 German guns, actually engaged, fired only 1380 common shell and 19 shrapnel, total ]399 rounds. The maximum fired by any one Battery was 200 rounds.^ I cannot ascertain the expenditure of ammunition by the French Artillery (12 guns) in this action. At Magersfontein, 11 December i8gg, our field batteries ex- pended an average of 1,000 rounds apiece, and "G" R.H.A. fired 1,163 rounds.- Considering that the action lasted eleven hours, this amount cannot be regarded- as excessive. During this war, particularly since the advent of trench warfare, the rate has risen steadily. In 1916, 3,000 rounds in a day from an 18 pdr. Battery was not unknown; whilst in 1917, even 4,000 has been surpassed. Unfortunately Batteries no longer keep Diaries and this information is exceedingly hard to find in Brigade Diaries. State- ments from Battery Officers of any excessive daily expenditure would be most acceptable for record purposes.-^ ' German ATtillery in 1870-71, (1873), by Captain (now Lieut.-Colonel) Hime, R.A., also the Note on the same published in Atignst, 1873. " Offlcial History of the War in South Africa. ' These may be sent to the address shown on the Errata .slip. Woolwich: Printed at the Royal Artillery Institution Printing House. LE CATEaT/'^GAN" essay, 1924-25: 5&9 iX ARTILLERY OFFICER ON THE EFFECTS OF THE BATTLE. An interesting narrative of tlie stand madt? j nt Le Cateau by General Sir Horace Smitli- borrien is included in the January issue of the '^Journal of the Koyal Artillery." The writer is Brigadier-Cleneial C. De Sausmarez. C.B., C'.M.G., D.S.O., who commanded a heavy battery at Le t'ateau. and wlio shows in a new liglit the pai-t ]3layed by that action in destroy- ing the eftective development of the German plan of campui'in. IMie narrative refers to the leading article "in TJie Times oji Sir Horace Smitli-Dorrien's book wliich, he says, rightly drew attei\tion to the fact that Lord \prea, by countenanrins the decision of tlie llnd. Corps Commander to stand and flglit, shared witii liim the credit of crippling the German pursuit. Brigadier-Genera) de Sausmarez. in deabng witli the possibilities had the stand not l^een made, says: — ' " J H'^ uemTfTn plan of advancing Sn numerous columns, attacking wherever opposi- tion was met and never stopping, must have formed part of tlie military creed of all ranks from general to private. They were taught to believe that this was the only sure road to victory. With their numbers, their iron dis- cipline, the bravery and plrj-sical fitness of their troops, they came near to justuymg their creed. It is pleasant to think that they were tausht at this early stage that the British .Vrmv of 1914 was good enough to thwart them, and we may be thankful that Sir John French s ' Great Subordinate' recognized this important fact and utilized his knowledge by standing up to them and striking them a crippling blow, instead of retiring with those of his troops who could march, and leaving the remainder to The detail contained in the articles is a ' valuable addition to the data concerning Le Cateau and supports the view ^^ken m the official histbry of the operations tliat the deci- sion to stancl and light had very important consequences, and led to the ultimate^ aban- donment of the original German offensive which, but for Le Cateau, might ha^e/ succeeded. "It is Ql course a mistake to dogmatize con- cerning the consequences of a supposititious haniH-ning. but it is not unreasonable to as.sume Ihil the battle of the Marne would not m these supposititious circumstances have been the -ictoiy for the Allies, which m truth \vas the case The fierman sledge-hammer plan of moving ruthlessly forward, each cohimn i attacking and knocking out everj-thmg that ' with'tood it. came perilously near to success as I it was but the machine was thrown out of gear 1 bv K.P blow it received at Le Cateau. which ^J^.x^^ ne oE the chief causes of the war not being won In- the Germans off-hand, according to plan ' Had this blow not been dealt and had - the German machine not bi^n thereby thrown out of gear, it is unpleasant even to contem- , plate what might have happened... That all i the tactical dispositions for the batJe were per- i feet and could not have lieen improved upon, 1 no one who has studied the subject seriously 1 could possibly as.sert : but it is contended that I the strategical conception ol the battle waa the i correct one, and that Creneral Sir Horace hmith- Dorrien made a great and light decision when I he determined to stand and tight. ... 510 THE STAND AT LE CATEAU. 26th AUGUST, 1914. By Brig. -General C. De Sausmarez, c.b., c.m.g., d.s.o. A LTHOUGH much about this subject has been written, more and more will probably be added as time goes by. There are several reasons for this, of which the chief is that students of military history are beginning to know the details of the 1914 campaign; and the more thoroughly conversant the man of average intelligence becomes with the facts as narrated by the historian, made clearer by a study, map in hand, of the actual ground, the more does he speculate as to the reasons for such and such a decision and the more severe are his mental strictures on some apparent failure to grasp an opportunity or seeming neglect of an elementary principle in minor tactics. He is apt, in his accumulated knowledge of historical facts, to regard the commander on the spot as having been as fully acquainted with every item as he is himself and to judge him accordingly. Regarding the question whether General Sir Horace Smith- Dorrien's decision v^'as justified or not, some will come to one conclusion and some to another, while others will hover between the two. The opinion of some ofiicer who was with the I Corps may carry weight, hinting that the stand was unnecessary, pointing to the ease with which the I Corps slipped away, and asking why the remainder of the force could not do the same. Or possibly another officer of the I Corps will create quite a different impression by saying, "As we marched off and got away, we did feel grateful to those fellows for covering our retreat so splendidly." Both of these divergent opinions have actually been expressed by dis- tinguished officers who fought in the I Corps in the summer of 1914. Curiously enough, neither of them give a true picture of what actually occurred. To an ofiicer of the II Corps who had the privilege of fighting under General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien this subject has always been of the keenest interest, any available writing thereon in the public press or elsewhere having been eagerly read. There was a T^o/. LII. No. 4. THE STAND AT LE CATEAU. 511 fine leading article in the Times, when that newspaper published the advanced extracts from the General's book which dealt with Le Cateau and other incidents of his career in France. This article drew attention — and rightly — to the fact that the late Lord Ypres by countenancing the decision of his "great subordinate" to stand and fight, shared with him the credit of crippling the German pur- suit. On the other hand, in a review of the book in the Sunday Times, Mr. Herbert Sidebotham asserts that the opinion that "the battle was unnecessary, a waste of life, and dangerous to the safety of the army" will be "generally accepted." One wonders how and whence this writer got this view and how much real study he has given to the subject. He may be a most distinguished journalist, — indeed a perfect archangel of journalism, but it is remarkable how angels will sometimes rush in where the ordinary fool would fear to tread. Why, it will be asked, does not the present writer fear to tread that path, even though it be in an angel's footsteps? Perhaps it is because his folly is extraordinary. The following brief attempt to deal with a thorny subject, after a study of Brigadier-General Edmonds' Official History and Major A. F. Becke's book entitled "The Royal Regiment of Artillery at Le Cateau," is made by one who saw something of the condition of the troops on the 25th August, 1914, who had the honour of fighting in the battle on the 26th, and who has lately had the great advantage of attending a most interesting and instructive staff tour on the battlefield. With regard to the two books above mentioned the Official History is invaluable to anyone who is trying to master all the facts. It is probably far more interesting to the real student than to the casual reader, who cannot be bothered with so much detail. Some gifted people have marvellous memories, but the average man must read and re-read with the map General Edmonds' account of the events leading up to any one battle, of the battle itself and of its immediate consequences. Tackled in this fashion the book is not only invaluable as an instructional guide but of absorbing interest. izi: Major Becke's is a wonderful book, published as it was at the beginning of 1919, two months after the armistice. Not only do we find a clear narrative and sound and instructive comments, but parts of the book form an epic. At first sight we are inclined to 512 THE STAND AT LE CATEAU. grumble at the number and length of the footnotes, but when fairly launched we clamour for more and more footnotes, such as those which portray the deeds of the field batteries of the 5th Division. Although in the light of subsequent information we may not agree with one or two of the deductions made by the author, we cannot but admire a treatise, on the whole so sound and well-reasoned. He is perhaps a little hard on von Kluck when he says that he was merely a bon general ordinaire. It must be remembered that this general was himself a subordinate ; that he was misled by a report from the German Supreme Command as to the direction of the- British Line of Communications; that information to be gleaned from air reconnaissance was comparatively meagre at that early stage; and that he had immediately opposed to him in the British Commander-in-Chief and his two Corps Commanders three tried leaders of a fighting type as great as that of the men whom they commanded. The wonderful march performed by the German First Army, interrupted as it was by severe fighting, seems proof in itself that von Kluck was a leader of a high order. It is hardly correct that he did not attempt to organise a pursuit after Le Cateau. A considerable portion of his pursuing troops, the 2nd Cavalry Division and part of the 9th Cavalry Division, of von der Marwitz's II Cavalry Corps, had been badly handled by the British 4th Divi- sion on the 26th August and were hardly fit to move that day; the remainder of this corps were opposed to, though not severely engaged with, the British 3rd Division in the centre, von Kluck's orders for the 27th were that the II Cavalry Corps should advance in front of the German right fiank and hinder the British retreat. Had he had cavalry available to intervene on the British right flank the story of Le Cateau might have had a less successful ending. At about 3 p.m. German cavalry v*^ere actually seen from one of our battery observing posts, moving south on the high ground west of Landrecies. The visibility was not good, there were other press-_ ing affairs of the moment which prevented anything like an accurate" computation of the numbers, but it is estimated that there was at least a regiment and possibly a brigade. To whom did they belong? They may have been the cavalry of the German III or IV Corps, and probably the role assigned to them by their Corps Commander was to watch the western flank. THE STAND AT LE GATEAU. 513 To return to Mr. Sidebotham ; this writer goes on to say, "After the Mons front had been abandoned owing to th e de feat of the French right, the only thing to be done was to retreat to the new front with as little delay and loss as possible. Haig did it, and Smith-Dorrien, although his position was the more dangerous, might have done it too." So far as these two generals knew up to a fairly late hour of the afternoon of the 25th, the portion of the "new front" to be held by the B.E.F. was the "Cambrai — Le Gateau" position. At a little after 3 p.m. on the 25th the G.O.G. I Gorps received at Landrecies a message from G.H.Q., asking when he could take up his allotted portion of this position, Inchy to St. Benin. His troops were then for the most part still on the march on the east of the Foret de Mormal. The G.O.G. II Gorps, knowing that the I Gorps was delayed, issued instructions for the temporary occupation (in addition to his own front) of a portion of the front destined to be occupied by the I Gorps, and one and a half battalions of the 14th Infantry Brigade which was rear guard of the 5th Division, were sent to the east of Le Gateau after they had come in at 6.30 p.m. At that time the 7th Infantry Brigade (rear guard of the 3rd Divi- sion) and the 4th Division (of which the bulk of the infantry and one brigade of artillery, having detrained at Le Gateau on the 24th, had been sent by G.H.Q. to the neighbourhood of Solesmes to cover the retirement of the II Gorps) were still a long way of!, fighting, or in a position to fight, a delaying action some miles to the west of the Foret de Mormal. The first indications of a change of plan were received by the G.O.G. I Gorps through his senior general staff officer, who had motored from G.H.Q. with instructions that his command should march, the 1st Division to St. Martin, 5 miles south of Le Gateau, the 2nd to Bazuel, 2 miles S.E. of that town. He issued orders for the march to begin at 2 a.m. on the 26th. The G.O.G. II Gorps, -in a private note timed 3.45 p.m. from the Deputy Ghief of the General Staff, was told that orders for a further retirement would reach him later. It was not till a considerably later hour that the I Gorps received the written order to continue the retirement on the 26th, and this 4 514 THE STAND AT LE GATEAU. operation order, though it indicated the same south-westerly direc- tion as did the instructions received through the senior general staff officer, laid down that the retirement of the I Corps should be carried out as far as Busigny, 7 miles S.S.W. of Le Gateau. At the time this order was received the 5th Infantry Brigade of the 2nd Division, which eventually passed the night of the 25th-26th at Noyelles, had not even then arrived near its destination. The 4th (Guards) and 6th Infantry Brigade (both of the 2nd Division) had arrived at Landrecies and Maroilles respectively. The 1st Division was in billets to the east, at Dompierre, Marbaix and Le Grand Fayt. In the same operation order G.H.Q. directed that the II Gorps should retire to Beaurevoir (exclusive), Fremont and La Sabliere, and the 4th Division to Beaurevoir and Le Gatelet. This order reached the G.O.G. II Gorps at 9 p.m., and he issued orders accord- ingly that the transport should march at 4 a.m. and the main bodies at 7 a.m. on the 26th. The 7th Infantry Brigade, with the brigade of artillery which also belonged to the 3rd Divisional rearguard, had not even then arrived in bivouac. The 4th Division were still further behind. - ta^ of ^o<*v>?«4. I2ria* vv^«i«\^ andrecies, the I Corps would probably have marched at 2 a.m. to lusigny; and, so far as can be gathered from the Official History, : seems most probable that the whole of the 2nd Division, from Joyelles, Maroilles and Landrecies, would have got clear as easily 3 the S.W. via Ors or Catillon, as did in fact the 4th (Guards) brigade, retiring due S. in the very early morning from Landrecies. No doubt Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien expected that the I Corps ould attempt to retire to Busigny, as ordered by G.H.Q., and he jared for their fate if he did not stand to cover their retirement. The dispositions of the I Corps for the 26th were briefly as )llows. The 1st Division took up a position near Favril and on its ;ft flank the 4th (Guards) Brigade, starting before dawn, retired due )uth without molestation. The 5th and 6th Infantry Brigades itired by the right flank, and owing to congestion on the road the 5th Infantry Brigade was very late. The retirement of the 1st 516 THE STAND AT LE CAIEAU. Division began at 1 p.m., actually before the 5th Infantry Brigade had passed them, but they did not reach their billets at Fesmy and Oisy till 10 p.m. The 5th Infantry Brigade eventually halted for the night at Barzy, 5 miles N.E. of the bulk of the 2nd Division at Etreux. So great was the delay in the retirement of the 5th Infantry Brigade that the rear-guard, the 2/Connaught Rangers, was actually engaged with troops of the German I Cavalry Corps and Second Army, who made prisoners of about 100 of our men. This incident gives some indication of what might have happened had the German First Army attacked our I Corps in flank from the west. Supposing, for the moment, that they had actually done so, what would have been the fate of the I Corps? General Haig would have been com- pelled in effect to stand and fight ; he might have halted the 4th Guards Brigade on its march southwards, and used it in a counter- attack to prevent envelopment. We may be sure that the I Corps would have put up as good a fight as did Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's command, but the odds against them would have been terrific, with the German First Army holding them until the Second Army should arrive from the north, von Richthofen's cavalry being employed, perhaps, in getting round to their rear by the right filank. The odds against General Smith-Dorrien were big enough, but small com- pared to those with which General Haig would have had to contend, had the German First Army attacked his command instead of General Smith-Dorrien's. If the II Corps, 4th Division and cavalry had retired in accord- ance with the orders of G.H.Q., the I Corps would in all probability have ceased to exist. Would the II Corps Commander then have received a pat on the back from some kind journalist, the I Corps Commander being duly censured for not getting back to the "new position"? The case of the I Corps would not have been so hopeless with the Le Cateau position held, because a German attack from the west would perforce have been half-hearted, and the I Corps, though perhaps badly crippled, would have contrived to avoid envelop- ment. Had Sir H. Smith-Dorrien's troops been fresh, un-wearied and free from battle casualties, it is not unlikely that G.H.Q. would THE STAND AT LE CATEAU. 517 have ordered him to cover the retirement of the I Corps, without any suggestion on his part that he should do so. It must, however, have been known at G.H.Q. that his troops had had severe fighting on the 24th, that their casualties had been large, that they had had little rest for five days, and that they were probably short of food. The operation order directing both corps to march S.W. was probably drafted with the intention of keeping the two corps as near together as possible. It said little or nothing about co-opera- tion, though no doubt the hope was that by marching on parallel routes at no great distance from one another, one corps would be able to help the other should the need arise. Whether the con- sideration of the wearying and trying conditions imposed on the II Corps, their casualties, their constant fighting and marching, induced G.H.Q. to ask nothing further of them we do not know, but we do know that these very conditions, coupled with the fact that the enemy were on their heels, were the compelling reason for the stand made at Le Cateau. In the early morning of the 25th, the day before the battle, it happened that the 108th Heavy Battery was a long way back in the 5th Divisional Column, marching down the Roman Road to the west of the Foret de Mormal. Orders had been issued for a unit of the 14th Infantry Brigade to halt and go back on their tracks to reinforce the rear-guard or relieve the rear party. As they streamed past the battery it was pitiful to see the men's faces, dirty, starved of food and rest, and desperate at the idea of more marching to be done and ground already covered once to be covered again and yet again. To add to their misery the weather was extremely sultry and the forest shut out any breeze there might have been. An infantry officer informed the battery commander that he had been ordered to hand over a platoon as escort to the battery, and added that the men were dead-beat and faint from want of food. **If you give them something to eat," he said, "they'll fight damned well for you, provided they haven't to move far." Fortunately, the bat- tery had helped itself on the previous day to biscuits and bully as well as oats from a deserted supply dump, and the men were only too glad to give a square meal to their comrades, who, loaded with rifle and pack, and desperately hungry and tired, were in a bad plight. But the infantry officer's words were true, and what is more his description was typical of most of the infantry. 518 THE STAND AT LE GATEAU. There was the situation in a nutshell ; they were ready to go on till they dropped, but were in imminent danger of dropping; give them a chance to halt and have a bit of food, and they would cheerfully fight while they rested. And this was the morning of the day before the battle, and they had many weary miles to cover before reaching their bivouacs on the Le Gateau position. If an infantry officer who fought at Le Gateau is consulted on the subject, he will almost certainly say that his men could not have continued the retreat in the early morning of the 26th ; that they had more than a little sting left in them while they rested their legs in battle during that day, the Germans would doubtless confirm. We know from the Official History and from his own account that when General Smith-Dorrien between 2 and 3 a.m. on the 26th considered the condition of his infantry and the fact that several of the II Gorps units, and practically the whole of the infantry and some of the artillery of the 4th Division had not even then arrived in bivouac, he was faced with a very difficult problem. How could he best carry out the orders received from G.H.Q., which, as we w have seen above, were to retire to Beaurevoir and La Sabliere? To retire at once, or as soon as those troops who were on the position could be got ready, was unthinkable. How could those who were still wending their way to the position with the enemy on their heels be left behind? And yet the Gavalry Gommander told him that unless he could get on the move at once it would be necessary to fight next day, the cavalry being too much scattered and their horses too beat for them to be of the smallest value in covering the retirement of the force. He had therefore one of two choices left to him, either to act in accordance with the orders he had already issued, but giving a ^ bigger proportion of artillery to his rearguards, or to fight with his ^ whole force in the hope of striking the enemy such a blow as would zz: cripple their pursuit. The orders that he had already issued detailed one infantry brigade and two artillery brigades per division, with the cyclist company and divisional squadron, as rearguards. (So far as con- cerned the 5th Division each of the three artillery brigades was affiliated to an infantry brigade, and the howitzer brigade and the heavy battery were to be under the control of the G.R.A. It seems THE STAND AT LE GATEAU. biv therefore as if the intention was that the two artillery brigades who should form part of the rearguard were the 18 pr. brigade, affiliated to the 13th Infantry Brigade (which was detailed for rear-guard duty), and the howitzer brigade, the heavy battery being added; whilst the other two 18 pr. brigades were also in a position to act should the infantry brigade to which they were affiliated be com- pelled to fight before leaving the position. It was evidently con- templated by the G.O.C. 5th Division that a fight might be necessary before evacuating any part of the line.) The first alternative, to leave a brigade of infantry per division and the bulk of his artillery to cover the retirement of the remainder of the force, was (if it ever occurred to him) rejected by Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, and he decided on the second alternative, to fight with his whole force. Let us try to picture what would have happened if the first alternative had been adopted. Dealing first with the right flank the action would have begun in the same manner, and one and a half battalions of the 14th Infantry Brigade, who were preparing to march ofi from Le Gateau would have been caught in exactly the same unfortunate way as actually happened. They and the remainder of the 14th Infantry Brigade would have eventually retired, probably with considerable casualties from artillery fire; the number of stragglers would have been large. The 15th Infantry Brigade would have retired, no doubt with fewer casualties, for the Germans did not attack them seriously in the early part of the day. The 13th Infantry Brigade which was in the centre of the 5th Division would have been isolated with strong enemy forces attacking their front and right flank. Their fate would probably have been annihilation. Turning to the left of the line, the whole of the 4th Division would have perforce been engaged at the beginning of the action, for the infantry had not long arrived on the position from Solesmes before they were attacked by German cavalry, horse artillery and jagers. If the two brigades had marched ofif, the German cavalry would quite possibly have got round to the rear of the remaining brigade which would have been mopped up by the German IV Reserve Gorps on its arrival. They would have learnt that the true direction of the British retreat was to the south rather than to the west, and von Kluck's wrong impression would have been removed. 520 THE STAND AT LE CATEAU. It is possible that the rearguard brigade of the 3rd Division in the centre would have made good their retreat, but not without serious loss. At least one of the other two brigades would have lost fairly heavily. The number of stragglers throughout the whole force would have been very large. Taking it all round we may be sure that the infantry casualties alone would have been as great, if not greater, than 8000, the approximate total number which occurred in the actual battle. It is possible that the loss in guns would have been trifling, or at all events much less than the actual loss. As regards the Germans, we know that their casualties were very heavy. Our infantry fully maintained, as they did at Mons, their 600-year old reputation as individual marksmen. If our force had been deprived of two thirds of its infantry strength the German casualties would have been insignificant compared to those which they actually suffered. They were so badly hammered that the First Army lost its grip of the B.E.F. and never regained it. With only one-third of the rifle power against them this would not have been the case. Instead of reeling from the blow inflicted on them they would have been in a position not merely to move forward, groping, after they had recovered from the shock, but to maintain a vigorous pursuit and to compel the II Corps and 4th Division to stand and fight before they had crossed the Oise. It is of course a mistake to dogmatise concerning the conse- quences of a suppositious happening, but it Is not unreasonable to assume that the battle of the Marne would not in these suppositious circumstances have been the victory for the Allies, which in truth was the case. The German sledge-hammer plan of moving ruthlessly forward, each column attacking and knocking out everything that withstood it, came perilously near to success as it was, but the machine was thrown out of gear by the blow it received at Le Cateau, which was one of the chief causes of the war not being won by the Germans off-hand, "according to plan." Had this blow not been dealt and had the German machine not been thereby thrown out of gear, it is unpleasant even to contemplate what might have happened. That all the tactical dispositions for the battle were perfect and could not have been improved upon, no one who has studied the L THE STAND AT LE GATEAU. 521 subject seriously could possibly assert ; but it is contended that the strategical conception of the battle was the correct one, and that General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien made a great and right decision, when he determined to stand and fight. It was owing to force of circumstances that this decision was made with so very little time to spare, and that the Germans were able to attack before the British troops on the right flank had received orders not to retire. It is difficult to see how orders could have been communicated more quickly. If, immediately after the Corps Commander announced his decision to stand and fight, a message had been sent to the G.O.C. 5th Division telling him to insure above all things that his troops on the right flank were ready — not to retire — but to fight a defensive battle, it is conceivable, but doubtful, that arrangements could have been made in time for the one and a half battalions who were on the east of Le Cateau to be in position covering that town, and for the remainder of the 14th Infantry Brigade to occupy a more suitable position than that which they actually took up. It was, however, an inspiration which caused a later order, to the effect that there was in no circumstances to be a retirement, to be issued for communication to all units. This order, at all events so far as concerned the 5th Division, was so firmly impressed on all units that two of them, the 2/Suf?olk Regiment and the 2/K.O.Y.L.I., sacrificed themselves for the remainder of the force. When, in the early afternoon, it was decided to break off the action, the orders to retire, presumably owing to the fact that the abnormally heavy fire prevented any message getting through to them, failed to reach the two battalions named above. They saw other troops retiring, but in spite of this held their ground because nothing had reached them cancelling the previous order that there was to be no retirement. Anyone privileged to read the diary of Major (now Lieut. -Colonel) Peebles who, owing to the death of his CO. and to the second in command being severely wounded, com- manded the 2/Suffolk Regiment at the end, will learn a story of devoted heroism, which loses nothing from the simple language used in its telling. He apparently did not know that all units had had similar injunctions not to retire, and assumed accordingly that it was the intention that his battalion should be sacrificed. He, 522 THE STAND Al Lh. ^^Ait^AU. therefore (as did Lieut. -Colonel Bond who commanded the bat- talion of Yorkshire Light Infantry on the left of the Suffolk Regi- ment), calmly accepted the principle that it was "expedient that one man should die for the people." They both assumed that their battalions were cast for this role, and unhesitatingly sacrificed them, and (incidentally) their own future prospects. They have some, consolation in knowing that their action was invaluable, and that though they missed all further chances of honour and advancement through being prisoners of war, their names should live longer in history than those of many who were more fortunate. These are the two outstanding instances of what may be called "accidental rearguards," but there were other examples in the 3rd and 4th Divisions of detachments whom the order to retire never reached, and who fought on stoutly, and caused consternation and delay to the enemy. To one and all we owe our gratitude, but we must not forget to be thankful for the inspiration which caused the special order to be issued which forbade any retirement. Supposing that the decision to stand and fight had not been made, it is quite conceivable that owing to the local situation at their respective posi- tions the two infantry brigades per division would not have retired at once, and that the battle would have actually begun as it did, with all the troops engaged. If they had not had the special order that there was to be no retirement, it w^ould have been understood that the main object was to retreat and not to fight, and the blow given to the Germans would have been trifling compared to that which was actually struck. It is interesting to speculate as to the probable effect on the battle, if the I Corps had carried out the orders of G.H.Q. and marched at 2 a.m. S.W. to Busigny, instead of retiring in a southerly direction. There seems every reason to believe that one or more Infantry Brigades with a quota of artillery would have arrived within two miles of Le Cateau by 7.3C a.m., and would have been able to launch that counter-attack against the German left flank which General Smith-Dorrien longed, but owing to lack of reserves was not able, to deliver. Reinforcements would have kept coming in on his right, and Le Cateau might have been a tactical as well as a strategical victory for the British arms. It was indeed a misfortune that the Germans "blundered on to" the I Corps at Maroilles and Landrecies. APtnoxmATE- FosirionoF- fmmG Line OF UC0KF5AW 4"^-^ DIVISION INDICATED ■Ff DOTTED Line THu5: , '^ o ^ ^(C^ ■^ THE STAND AT LE GATEAU. 523 The German plan of advancing In numerous columns, attacking wherever opposition was met and never stopping, must have formed part of the military creed of all ranks from general to private. They were taught to believe that this was the only sure road to victory. With their numbers, their iron discipline, the bravery and physical fitness of their troops, they came near to justifying their creed. It is pleasant to think that they were taught at this early stage that the British Army of 1914 was good enough to thwart them, and we may be thankful that Sir John French's "Great Subordinate" recognised this important fact, and utilised his know- ledge by standing up to them and striking them a crippling blow, instead of retiring with those of his troops who could march, and leaving the remainder to their fate. ■-UCSB LiBRAKT k • %^^.'f ■>* «Bm*4^<'..;V/-v. '1$^ ^*' /it -A T 1 .6" 0ir \}\ 4.; THEATRE or OPER/lTIONS WC 22 -2 7 /9/4-. h nfi? -«'-„,.^ .i^mm -^= X>, •■\ I n r -kg :t n 'n Di M/IPZ. 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V tn z H :xi c n H o 'Z. in > H O H m c CO m O H X m CO O c > m CO OH,Uuumv^, '^-^''^J^'* t^ 1 7 j of, - the ' one fdiri iing! inct fhen jcelii 1 l-e- for hun- ^ded "ving, .unit itain j-> for r to I irtil- tnear ?f.urse peted icers ^2 It^v^ ,,UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARV FACILITY A 000 654 502 4 INDIAN tlELD ARIILLEKIT 1 BRIGADE i FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT SIMLA, April 27 | A new scheme for the formation of \ Indian artillery has been laid before the \ Secretary of State in place of the one ! (described in The Times last summer) for an extension of the field artillery trainmg centre at Muttra. . . It is now proposed to establish a distmct field artillery brigade at Bangalore when the necessary preliminaries have been completed and the personnel has been re- cruited, and this will be the " school " for the whole process of training. One hun- dred picked volunteers from the disbanded Madras Pioneers are already receiving elementary instruction with a British unit there, and selected n.c.o.s of the mountain artillery will be attached to this group for a similar purpose. It is hoped later to send senior n.c.o.s of the mountain artil- 1 lery to the Artillery School at Kakul, near i Abbottabad, for an advanced course before being attached to the completed I new brigade, and British gunner officers will he invited to volunteer for service with the unit. "^^ '^^v.. ^ t L