LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. Class ^ m ssl ii ^: :::/KC & INTERNATIONAL BIMETALLIC CONFERENCE, MANSION HOUSE, LONDON, May 2nd and srd, 1894. Chairman : The Right Hon. The LORD MAYOR OF LONDON. OF THE REPORT PROCEEDINGS PRICE SIXPENCE ( EFFINGHAM WILSON & CO., ROYAL EXCHANGE. LONDON: J ( WATERLOW & SONS LIMITED, LONDON WALL, B.C. MANCHESTER: J. F. CORNISH, ST. ANN'S SQUARE. GENERAL INTERNATIONAL BIMETALLIC CONFERENCE. MANSION HOUSE, LONDON. MAY 2ND AND 3RD, 1894. Chairman : The Right Hon. The LORD MAYOR OF LONDON. REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS. OF THE UNIVERSITY OF -. r EFFINGHAM WILSON & CO., ROYAL EXCHANGE. LONDON : < \ WATERLOW & SONS LIMITED, LONDON WALL. MANCHESTER: J. F. CORNISH, ST. ANN'S SQUARE. GENERA LONDON : WATERLOW AND SONS LIMITED, PRINTERS, LONDON WALL, LONDON, E.G. 1894* CONTENTS. PACKS. LIST OF NAMES 5 LETTERS OF APOLOGY ARCHBISHOP WALSH, MONS. J. MAGNIN, MONS. A. DE FOVILLE, BARON VON KARDORFF, PROFESSOR WALKER, PROFESSOR ANDREWS, PROFESSOR SUESS, AND MR. H. W. CANNON 9 TELEGRAMS FROM PROFESSOR MAYOR AND THE VICTORIAN BIMETALLIC LEAGUE 16 ADDRESS BY SIR D. EVANS, K.C.M.G 17 Tri.ijiKAM IKOM UNITED STATES SENATORS .18 PAPER ON " The Fall in the General Level of Prices in relation to the Appreciation of Gold, and the Divergence in the Relative Value of Gold and Silver," BY PROFESSOR J. S. NICHOLSON 19 SPEECHES BY MR. G. M. BOISSEVAIN, SIR S. MONTAGU, BART., M.P., DR. OTTO ARENDT, MR. S. SMITH, M.P., MR. W. E DORRINGTON, AND MR. CHARLES HOARE . 38 ADDRESS BY THE LORD MAYOR 61 ADDRESS BY THE RIGHT HON. A. J. BALFOUR, M.P. . . . 61 PAPER ON "The Practicability of Maintaining a Ratio between Gold and Silver under an International Bimetallic Agreement," BY THE RIGHT HON. L.. COURTNEY, M.P. . . . 71 Si'EECHES BY MONS. H. CERNUSCH1, MR. R. BARCLAY, Mo.NS. A. ALLARD, AND PROFESSOR SMART 85 PAPER ON "The Effects of the Fall in the General Level of Pikes," BY SIR W. H. HOULDSWORTH, BART., M.P. . . 106 SPEECHES BY MR. R. L. EVERETT, M.P., MR. VESEY-KNOX, M.P., MONS. R. LAVOLLEE, MR. W. TAYLOR, SIR A. HICKMAN, M.P., MR. J. MAWDSLEY, MONS. E. THERY, MR. T. HANBURY, MR. D. MURRAY, MR. PEARCE EDGCUMBE, AND MR. S. WILLIAMSON, M.P. . . .118 ANNOUNCEMENT OF PRIZE OFFERED BY SIR H. MEYSEY-THOMPSON, BART , M.P 163 PAPER ON " The Finances of India," BY SIR D. BARBOUR, K. C.S.I. 163 SPEECHES BY MR. H. SCHMIDT, MR. R. B. CHAPMAN, C.S.I., MR. N. P. VAN DEN BERG, PROFESSOR MILEWSKI, MR. A. COTTERELL-TUPP, AND MR. W. H. GRENFEI.L . . . 1 72 1 00572 PAGE PAPER ON "The Principles upon which an International Ratio should be fixed," BY MR. HENRY HUCKS GIBBS 202 VOTE OF THANKS TO THE LORD MAYOR, PROPOSED BY SIR W. H. HOULDSWORTH AND MR. G. M. BOISSEVAIN . . . .211 BANQUET AT THE ALBION TAVERN SPEECHES OF THE RIGHT HON. H. CHAPLIN, M.P., MONS. CERNUSCHI, MR. R. BARCLAY, SIR W. H. HOULDSWORTH, M.P., MONS. GEORGES DE LAVELEYE, THE BARON DE LADOUCETTE, MONS. D'ALLIERES, DR. OTTO ARENDT, MR. G. M. BOISSEVAIN, MR. A. MCDONALD, SIR H. MEYSEY- THOMPSON, M.P., RIGHT HON. W. LIDDERDALE, AND SIR DAVID EVANS 213 OFFICE BEARERS OF THE LEAGUE . 235 OFFICIAL STATEMENT OF THE LEAGUE ...... 240- EXTRACTS FROM REPORT OF GOLD AND SILVER COMMISSION . . 243 INDEX 249, \B R A H OF TH UNIVERSITY OF ~ ,LIK. INTERNATIONAL BIMETALLIC CONFERENCE. MANSION HOUSE, LONDON. May 2nd and jrd, 1894.. Chairman : THE RIGHT HON. THE LORD MAYOR OF LONDON. The following were amongst those who accepted invita- tions to the Conference : Austria-Hungary. Professor Milewski, Professor of Political Economy, University of Cracow. Belgium. Mons. Alphonse Allard, Honorary Director of the Mint, Brussels ; and Mons. Georges de Laveleye, Brussels. France. Mons. Henri Cernuschi, Paris ; Mons. Edmond Thery, Paris ; a Delegation from the " Societe des Agriculteurs de France," consisting of Mons. d'Aillieres, Deputy, Mons. le Baron de Ladoucette, Mons. le Comte de Terves, Mons. Rene Lavollee, late Consul-General, and Mons. Teisson- niere, General Secretary of the Societe ; Professor R. G. Levy, Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques, Paris ; and Monsieur Francis Laur, Paris. Germany. Dr. Otto Arendt, Member of the Prussian Diet, Berlin. Holland. Mr. N. P. van den Berg, President of the Bank of the Netherlands, Amsterdam ; and Mr. G. M. Boissevain, Amsterdam. Australia. Mr. David Murray, Adelaide, S.A., late President of the Adelaide Chamber of Commerce (representing the South Australian and Victorian Branches of the Bimetallic League), Mr. George P. Doolette, of Adelaide, S.A., and Mr. Arthur McDonald, Dunedin, New Zealand. His Grace the Duke of Norfolk, i The Rt. Hon. Lord Sherborne K.G., E.M. The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M.P. His Grace the Duke of Fife, K.T. The Rt. Hon. Henry Chaplin, M.P. The Rt. Hon. the Earl of Dudley The Rt. Hon. Lord George Hamilton. M.P. The Rt. Hon. Lord Claud J. Hamilton The Rt. Hon. Lord Addington The Rt. Hon. Lord Castletown The Rt. Hon. Henry Matthews, M.P. The Rt. Hon. Leonard H. Courtney, M.P. The Rt. Hon. Wm. Lidderdale Earl Compton, M.P. Hon. A. de Tatton Egerton, M.P. Hon. and Revd. E. Lyttleton Hon. Evelyn Hubbard Col. The Hon. F. C. Bridgeman, M.P. Sir Hector M. Hay, Bart. Sir Henry Meysey-Thompson, Bart., M.P. Sir William H. Houldsworth, Bart., M.P. Sir F. Seager Hunt, Bart., M.P. Major-Gen. Sir C. W. D'Oyley, Bart. Sir R. H. Paget, Bart., M.P. Sir Mark J. Stewart, Bart., M.P. Sir J. E. Dorrington, Bart, M.P. Sir Samuel Montagu, Bart., M.P. Sir Richard E. Webster, G.C.M.G., M.P. Lt.-Gen. Sir Andrew Clarke, G.C.M.G., C B , C.I.E. Gen. Sir George Chesney, K.C.B., M.P. Sir Alfred Lyall, K.C.B., K.C.I.E. Sir Andrew R. Scoble, K.C.S.I., M.P. Surgeon-General Sir W. Davies, K.C.S.I. Sir David Barbour, K.C.S.I. Sir Auckland Colvin, K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G. Sir Lepel H. Griffin, K.C.S.I. Alderman Sir David Evans, K.C.M.G. Sir Henry S. Cunningham, K.C.I.E. Sir Malcolm Fraser, K.C.M.G. Sir Edgar Vincent, K.C.M.G. Sir James Mackay, K.C.I.E. SirGuilford L. Molesworth, K.C.I.E. Sir A. Hickman, M.P. Sir Joseph N. McKenna Sir W. J. R. Cotton Sir P. Nickalls Sir J. H. Puleston Sir Alexander Wilson Lieut. -Gen. Richard Strachey, C.S.I. R. B. Chapman, C.S.I., London Henry Hucks Gibbs, President, Bi- metallic League H. R. Grenfell, Chairman, General Council, Bimetallic League Alderman and Sheriff Dimsdale John Addison, Q.C., M.P. T. B. Bolitho, M.P. Gilbert Beith, M.P. G. H. Finch, M.P. A. B. Freeman-Mitford, M.P. J. Rankin, M.P. S. Storey, M.P. H. Seton-Karr, M.P. W. W. B. Beach, M.P. Alban G. H. Gibbs, M.P. Vicary Gibbs, M.P. T. H. Sidebottom, M.P. C. Bill, M.P. E. F. Vesey Knox, M.P. Alexander Cross, M.P. Samuel Smith, M.P. George Whiteley, M.P. G. Wyndham, M.P. Stephen Williamson, M.P. George Howell, M.P. J. H. Wilson, M.P. Charles Fenwick, M.P. W. H. Long, M.P J. W. Maclure, M.P. H. Shepherd Cross, M.P. S. Field, M.P. R. G. C. Mowbray, M.P. Lt.-Col. A. Lockwood, M.P. F. Tress Barry, M.P. A. Baldwin, M.P. P. A. Muntz, M.P. Col. J. P. Nolan, M.P. George Lambert, M.P. J. Seymour Keay, M.P. H. S. Foster, M.P. C. A. V. Conybeare, M.P. Wilson Lloyd, M.P. R. Lacey Everett, M.P. Florence O'Driscoll, M.P. R. G. Webster, M.P. A. D. Provand, M.P. Robert Barclay, Manchester, Chair- man of Executive Committee of Bimetallic League Reginald E. Johnston S. Steuart Gladstone Robert Henderson The Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress, of whom the following were present : Charles Fenwick, M.P., Secretary J. H. Wilson, M.P. James Mawdsley, Manchester E. Cowie W. Inskip J. Hodge, Manchester J. M. Jacks, Glasgow Alderman Ben Tillett, London David Holmes, Burnley Delegates from the United Textile Factory Workers : David Holmes, Burnley, Chairman Wm. Mullins, Manchester, Vice- Chairman Thos. Ashton, Oldham, Treasurer Mr. James Mawdsley, Manchester, Secretary Mr.. Arrandale, Manchester, Chairman of the Manchester and Salford Trades' Council Mr. George D. Kelley, Manchester, Secretary ditto Professor). S. Nicholson, M.A., D.Sc. Professor H. S. Foxwell, M.A. Professor Wm. Smart, M.A., LL.D. Professor Robert Wallace R. H. Inglis Palgrave, F.R.S., Great Yarmouth L. L. Price, M.A., Oxford Philip H. Wicksteed, M.A. H. Higgs, B.A., LL.B., London Lieut.-Gen. W. Gray Licut.-Gen. R. H. Keatinge, V.C., C.S.I. Major-General G. H. Saxton Lt -Col. H. E. Dolphin Col. T. Cadell, V.C. Col. T. M. Ward R. Attenborough, Northampton E. Ascoli, Manchester G. T. Addis, Liverpool F. B. Blake, London G. A. Batchelor, London S. H. Blockey, London John A. Beith, Manchester A. S. Betts-Chapman, Manchester J. W. Broad bent, London E. F. Baillon, London O. J. Baggally, London W. W. Baggally, London Seward Brice, Q.C., London H. R. Beeton, London M. Burnell-Tubbs, London W. Birch, Junr., Manchester E. Belfour, London F. S. Bishop, Swansea T. A. Bennett, London G. H. Burnett, London T. Barton Higson, London M. Bell, London Geo. Batten, London A. Cotterell-Tupp, London J. B. Concannon, London Hammond Chubb, London Andrew Currie, London H. Coke, London H. Carlisle, London C. A. Cooper, London Frank C. Capel, London F. B. Crouch, London E. Cox, Dundee A. Conder, London Rev.Canon Cromwell, M. A., Brain tree W. F. Carter, London E. Crewdson, Manchester A. Casella, London W. E. Dorrington, Manchester E. de Wael, London Sligo de Pothonier, London E. C. d'Eyncourt, London W. H. Duignan, Walsall G. Handasyde Dick, Glasgow H. Dickenson, London J. A. Duncan, Glasgow J. M. Douglas, London H. A. Dodds, London Samuel Digby, London E. F. Duncanson, London F. Eisenlohr, London A. G. Ellis, London E. M. Pearce Edgcumbe, Dorchester R. A. Elkin, London A. von Ernsthausen, London F. J. Faraday, Manchester J. P. Fleming, London Max Firmberg, London J. D. Farrell, London Francis B. Forbes, Paris W. H. Gibson, Haddington, N.B. J. Gordon, Nigg, N.B. W. H. Grenfell, Maidenhead B. Gonzalez, London Herbert C. Gibbs, London R. W. Granville-Smith, London T. A. Green, London R. S. Gundry, London J. Howard Gwyther, London G. H. Gwyther, London M. P. Grace, London Rev. J. C. Girling, Cotteshole A. S. Graham, Glasgow Emile Granier, Paris A. Hermandez, London Thos. Hanbury, London J. W. Hart, London R. E. Haslam, Southport Charles Hoare, London H. G. Hayter, London J. H. Howell, Bristol G. Harrison, Manchester E. M. Home, Accrington S. Hardeman, Southport Lewis Haslam, Bolton D. L. Holmes, London J. P. Heseltine, London J. Hargreaves, Blackburn O. E. Hayter, London W. G. Howell, London Alfred Harwood, Ipswich A. Henderson, Edinburgh E. Hartley, Preston Walter Houldsworth, Coltness, N.B. James Houldsworth, London Henry H. Houldsworth, Manchester S. Dana Horton J. R. Hepburn, Manchester Gonsuke Hayaski, H.I.M.'s Consu- late in London J. Hunter, London Arthur Ilbert, Upwey J. Jackson, Sheffield Rev. K. Jameson, London H. J. Jennings, London E. Kennedy, London W. Keswick, London H. Lambert, London E. Langley, London C. C. Laing, London R. Lamond, LL.B., Glasgow Capt. F. C. Loder-Symonds, Chair- man of the Bimetallic Committee of the Central Chamber of Agri- culture. George Lees, Oldham J. Robertson Luxford, London E. C. Morgan, London David McLean, London R. T. Mallet, London J. A. Maitland, London C. Macdonald, Manchester J. M. Macdonald, London T. Mackenzie-Ledlie, London J. O. Miller, London J. S. Mackenzie, M.A., Cambridge P. L. Mills, Nottingham Hugh M. Matheson, London J. B. Martin, London F. W. Maude, London D. Naily, London W. F. G. Normand, Dysart, N.B. F. H. Norman, London C. P. Gates, London E. A. O'Brien, London W. Paterson, London C. Parkinson, Worcester T. E. Powell, London J. Oscar Parker, Birmingham C. Pakeman, London David Russell, Dundee J. F. L. Rolleston, Leicester A. E. Rodewald, Liverpool G. D. Rowe, London C. D. Robertson, London J. Barr Robertson, London Hugh Roger, London A. G. Renshaw, London W. T. Roth well, Manchester David Reid, London H. D. Stewart, London Leopold Solomons, London Ernest Seyd, London David Spence, Manchester M. G. Schilizzi, London Walter A. Sandeman, London W. M. Strachan, London Hermann Schmidt, London J. Schack Sommer, Manchester E. Sassoon, London I. Seligman, London George Shipton, London I. Stott, Brighouse Thomas Salt, Stafford W. Shepherd, Dundee E. P. Squarey, London D. E. Stephens, Carmarthen W. Sturdy, London W. Taylor, Blackburn P. D. Thomson, London H. S. Trower, London J. Thomson, Manchester R. Vicars-Boyle, C.S.I., London C. von Buch, London H. E. Vardon, London J. M. White, Dundee H. L. Wethered, Clifton Thomas A. Welton, London C. Wooley, London Thomas Walsh, Paris A. Weston Jarvis, London T. H. Whitelaw, Glasgow W. Stewart Young, London A. Zimmern, London and Henry McNiel, General Secretary of the Bimetallic League. The following were amongst the Letters of Apology received; ARCHBISHOP'S HOUSE, DUBLIN, ^oth April, 1894.. DEAR MR. M'NiEL, I feel it a great privation that I cannot have the advantage of being present at the International Bimetallic Conference. I am hindered from leaving Dublin by a series of diocesan engagements which inexorably require my presence at home. Am I correct in assuming that a full report of the pro- ceedings of the Conference will be published ? There must be many who are looking out, no less anxiously than I am, for the publication both of the papers that are to be read, and of the discussions that will take place upon them. It is not often that a great question of practical science has the advantage of being discussed and elucidated by a body of experts so competent as .hose who are now about to meet in conference, so many of whom, if I may take the liberty of saying it, are adepts in the art of putting their views upon the most complex controverted questions before their fellow-countrymen in words that all can follow. I am, of course, especially glad to see that Sir William Houldsworth intends to deal with that aspect of the case, in which we in Ireland are most deeply concerned the ruinous effects of the present artificially-created dearth of money upon the agricultural interest. It can hardly be necessary for me to say to you that my views upon that aspect of the case remain unaltered, precisely as I stated them in full detail in my pamphlet last year. As to the Currency question in its more general aspects, I have only now to say that the experience accumulated since this time twelve months* from month to month, and, I might almost say, from week to week, has but served to deepen my conviction of the irresistible strength of the case in favour of International Bimetallism. The practical failure of the recent experimental tampering with the currency difficulty, as it is felt in India, ought surely to be sufficient to give a final check to the further develop- ment of the disastrous doctrinaire policy in currency IO matters which, no matter what set of statesmen have been in power, has so long held its ground in England. With the exception perhaps of the interesting topic that will form the subject of Mr. Courtney's paper, I know of no branch of the case which it is of higher importance to have lucidly dealt with for the information of the public than this of " the vanishing rupee," the effects of the gradually lessening value of the silver coinage upon the interests of India, the widespread influence of the perilous state of things thus created, the attempt made last year to stave off the difficulty by artificial means, and the failure of that attempt, a failure now sufficiently obvious to all skilled observers, and all but openly acknowledged by its authors themselves. I remain, Dear Mr. M'Niel, Faithfully yours, WILLIAM J. WALSH, Archbishop of Dublin. (Translation.] BANK OF FRANCE, PARIS, 2^rd April, 1894.. To the GENERAL SECRETARY, Bimetallic League. My absence has prevented my replying sooner to yours of the nth inst., which I regret. I applaud with both hands your resolution of getting together in London an International Bimetallic Conference. The Silver question imposes itself more and more every day on the attention of the financiers of the whole world, it requires a solution in the general interest, it is intimately bound up with the commercial and industrial prosperity of all nations. I had the honour of presiding in 1881 at the Inter- national Monetary Conference which met in Paris, and in 1889 at the Monetary Conference of the Universal Exhibition. I am, therefore, a resolute partisan of the rehabilitation of silver, and actual facts can only confirm II me in my settled conviction. Hence it is with great sin- cerity that I wish your Conference all success ; its delibera- tions will have a large circulation ; they will constitute, I feel sure, to the advancement of a solution ardently desired by all Who understand that the monetary question is one of those which, in the present day, must be dealt with, if the present condition, so fatal to business, is to cease. I regret that at the present time of the year it is im- possible for me to leave home, but I console myself with the knowledge that France will be represented by my friend Henri Cernuschi, the inspired and resolute apostle of silver, and by my friend Edmond Thry, the director of thq " Economiste Europeen," who has succeeded in his recent work in handling the question with an authority which has struck all men. Pray present my excuses to the members of the Confer- ence, and believe me, etc. J. MAGNIN, Vice- President of the Senate and Governor of the Ban/; of France. From Mons. DE FoviLLE, Director of the French Mint. (Translation.} PARIS, 4.th April, 1894.. DEAR SIR, My duties at the Mint do not allow me to respond to your call for the 2nd and 3rd May, but I thank you for having thought of me. You are about to discuss a problem, the importance of which is only equalled by its difficulty ; and as the root of the question lies in London, it is in London that the discussion can most usefully take place. I hope that the labours of the Conference will be published in their entirety, and that you will compensate me for my absence by forwarding me a copy. Receive, etc., A. DE FOVILLE. 12 From Baron VON KARDORFF. BERLIN, den 24. April, 1894.. DEAR SIR, Many thanks for your kind invitation to the International Conferences you have arranged for the second -and third day of May at the Mansion House. I would have been delighted to make there the personal acquaintance of the Right Honourable Mr. Balfour and other distinguished members of the Bimetallic League, but, unfortunately, official duties I have to look after, being first magistrate Landrath in my Silesian county, will not give me the liberty to leave home in the first week of May. My friend the Count of Mirbach, notwithstanding his first refusal, will come to the meeting with Dr. Otto Arendt, who may tell you something of the good work we have done here. Yours faithfully, VON KARDORFF. To the President of the Bimetallic League, HENRY HUCKS GIBBS, Esq. From Professor FRANCIS A. WALKER. Boston, U.S.A., April ipth, 1894.. DEAR MR. McNiEL, I exceedingly regret that it is not in my power to attend the Conference of the Bimetallic League at the Mansion House on the 2nd of May. Gladly would I cross the ocean did my subsisting engagements permit, to carry the greeting of the Bimetallists of the United States to those who are making such a gallant and gaining fight in England for the restoration of silver to its historical place in the currencies of the world. But I am tied down at home by duties and cares from which I cannot, at this season, release myself, and must therefore be content to send my heartiest congratulations -and good wishes. I am, Dear Mr. McNiel, Faithfully yours, FRANCIS A. WALKER. "3 From Professor E. BENJ. ANDREWS, President of Brown University. Providence, Rhode Island, U.S.A., April, 1894. MY DEAR MR. McNiEL, I am greatly your debitor for the interesting information conveyed in yours of the 3ist March. It is a delight to all of us here to know that interest in bimetallism is so encouraging in the City of London. Now, as to your important meeting with delegates present from different nations. That is precisely the Scheme I have been thinking of for months, and I sin- cerely hope and pray that it will be a great success. You gentlemen in England occupy the central point in this great fight. I have conferred with General Walker, and much to my sorrow I find that neither he nor myself can possibly be with you on that occasion, but we will try to send you someone else. Our cause is making rapid progress. A committee parallel with ours has been started in Chicago, led by the very ablest business men in that city. We are certain to succeed. Again thanking you for all your kindness, and always. ready to do what I can in return. Sincerely yours, E. BENJ. ANDREWS. From Professor E. SUESS, University, Vienna, DEAR SIR, April 2oth, 1894.. I beg you and the Bimetallic League to accept my respectful and cordial thanks for the honour of your kind invitation, and beg also to transmit my thanks to the Lord Mayor for his kind invitation. I am extremely sorry to say that it is not possible for me to come to London in the beginning of May. You are fighting for a good cause ; I am extremely happy to hear that you are making progress in the City,. 14 and I wish and sincerely hope that your exertions will be crowned with success. You ask me about the English edition of my book on precious metals, I have only published a small book on the future of gold in 1877. Of this an English translation has not been printed, but several years later, the late Mr. Emile de Laveleye gave an extensive abstract in one of your periodicals ; I believe in the XIX. Century. In 1892 I published another small book on the future of silver, and an English edition of this has been printed and distri- buted in great numbers by the Finance Committee of the U.S. Senate, I have taken leave to send you a lot of copies by yesterday's post, and would be very much obliged if you would kindly send one of these copies to A. Sauerbeck, Esq., 3 Moorgate Street Buildings. I repeat my very best thanks and pray to believe me, Dear Sir, your very obliged, E. SUESS. From Mr. H. W. CANNON, President of the Chase National Bank. THE CHASE NATIONAL BANK, NEW YORK, April /////, 1894. MY DEAR SIR, I regret that business engagements will prevent -my accepting the kind invitation of your Council to participate in the Demonstration and Conference on Inter- national Bimetallism, to be held at the Mansion House, London, on the second proximo. The proceedings of your meeting will excite great interest throughout the civilized world. It is, I believe, now generally conceded that the responsibility for the solution of the silver problem rests upon the people of Great Britain, and the other nations look to your Government to settle the status of silver as a money metal, and to decide whether or not the mints of the various nations shall again be opened to its coinage, or whether the demonetization of the white metal shall be complete and continuous. International Conferences and Monetary Commissions, composed of the most learned and distinguished men in 15 Monetary Science throughout the world, have met during the last few years and discussed the statistics of trade and of the precious metals. Unquestionably the intelligent and exhaustive inquiries which have been made by the various conferences and commissions have been of great service in increasing the knowledge of the people of the world as to uses of metallic money, and as to the relation of gold to silver. Unfortunately, however, no practical result, so far as the use of gold and silver as money upon a common International basis, has been reached, and the determination of Great Britian to continue a gold monometallic nation has done much to discourage those who believe that it is for the best interests of mankind to use both gold and silver as full legal tender money at a common ratio, and the United States has been compelled to close its mints to the coinage of silver and to adopt gold monometallism. It has been charged by the opponents of international bimetallism that the United States is particularly interested in the silver question, because it is a large producer of silver and wishes to provide a market for that product. It is true that the mines of the United States are capable of producing annually from fifty to sixty million ounces of silver, but silver mining with us is purely a private enter- prise, in which the Government has no pecuniary interest, and has been carried on as an important industry in only six of the forty-four States comprising the Union, and in three Territories. Taken as an industry, it is insignificant when compared with the other products of our great country. Our enormous agricultural, manufacturing and commercial interests employ the great majority of our people, and they need an annually increasing amount of money to properly transact their business and conduct their enterprises. In this country the sentiment is almost universal that both gold and silver should be used as legal tender money if a common ratio can be established by international agreement between the principal nations of the world. From our standpoint the interest of Great Britain in the re-establishment of a ratio between gold and silver is identical with that of the United States, only greater in degree, for if gold is to be the sole money of the civilized world, and if silver is to be abandoned as a money metal, what will be the value of the immense stock of silver in India and the East, and silver coins in circulation and held i6 by the great banks of Europe as a basis for the redemption of outstanding notes ? How can a stable rate of exchange be fixed and maintained between gold and silver under existing conditions ? It would seem that the citizens of Great Britain have a greater and more vital interest in the stability of such exchange than any other nation in the world by reason of her complex and extended commercial relations. If the Government of Great Britain is willing to suggest a practical plan, looking to the use of both gold and silver as money on some ratio to be fixed by international agreement, the Government of the United States will co-operate and assist in every possible way in carrying out such a plan, and the result would undoubtedly be of incalculable benefit to all mankind. Kindly convey to the Lord Mayor, your Council and other friends, my appreciation of your very cordial invitation and my regret that I am unable to be present at your meeting. I am, Dear Sir, Yours very respectfully, HENRY W. CANNON. To HENRY McNiEL, Esq. General Secretary ', Bimetallic League, London. Copies of Telegrams received : From Professor MAYOR, University of Toronto, Canada. Cordial wishes for success of Conference. From VICTORIAN BIMETALLIC LEAGUE. Wish success Mansion House Conference. INTERNATIONAL BIMETALLIC CONFERENCE. REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS. Wednesday, 2nd May, 1894., n a.m. In the temporary absence of the LORD MAYOR, the chair was taken by ALDERMAN SIR DAVID EVANS, K.C.M.G. THE CHAIRMAN said : Gentlemen In the unavoidable absence of the Lord Mayor, who is officiating elsewhere under the presidency of the Prince of Wales, it falls to me to occupy this responsible and distinguished position. In the name of the Lord Mayor, I desire to accord you all a hearty welcome, and more especially the visitors from foreign countries and our Colonies (Hear, hear) some of the most distinguished men in the field of academic thought, of industry, of finance, and of literature. I would remind this distinguished company that the first meeting of the Bimetallic Conference was held at the Mansion House twelve years ago, under the presidency of the then Lord Mayor, and we have a vivid recollection of the meeting held here last year in furtherance of this same object. The fact of our meeting here to-day needs no apology. The importance of our meeting is confessed by the present Prime Minister, Lord Rosebery, who, in a letter recently addressed to a gentleman in the City of London, wrote with reference to the currency question that it is one of the most important questions of the day. (Hear, hear.) Again, we must not forget the meeting here last year, addressed by Mr. Balfour. No one with any i8 knowledge of business can be blind to the calamities resulting from the depreciation of silver, or in other words the appreciation of gold. (Hear, hear.) In commerce, in industry, in agriculture, its detrimental effects are equally manifest, and any measures which would lead to a solution of the difficulty would be cordially welcomed by all who have the interests of the community at heart. (Applause.) On the other hand, it is argued that any attempt to bring about a fixed relation between gold and silver moneys would result in a rise in the prices of commodities which might be injurious to the masses of the people whose interests must be kept well in view. When, however, the opinions of the ablest financiers are so divided as they are on a question so complex, so far-reaching, and so im- portant, I do not feel myself able to do otherwise than adopt a neutral attitude, waiting for any further light which may be thrown on the subject by the development of the discussion which has so largely occupied the atten- tion of the financial world for some time past. I have no doubt that the distinguished audience I have the honour to address will be able by their united efforts to contribute materially to the elucidation of this arduous problem, and I can with confidence leave the matter in their hands. (Loud applause.) I desire to read the following cablegram from America, addressed to the Lord Mayor, to be read to this meeting this morning : " We desire to express our cordial sympathy with the movement to promote the restoration of silver by international agreement, in aid of which we understand a meeting is to be held to-morrow, under your Lordship's presidency. We believe that the free coinage of both gold and silver by international agree- ment at a fixed ratio would secure to mankind the blessing of a sufficient volume of metallic money, and, what is hardly less important, would secure to the world of trade immunity from violent exchange fluctuations." This cablegram is 19 signed by Messrs. John Sherman, William Allison, D. W. Voorhees, H. C. Lodge, G. F. Hoar, N. W. Aldrich, D. B. Hill, E. Murphy, C. Brice, C. H. Platt, A. D. Gorman, W. P. Frye, C. K. Davis, S. M. Cullum, J. M. Carey, United States Senators. Having to discharge magisterial duties for the Lord Mayor, I will ask my esteemed friend, Mr. Hucks Gibbs, to take the chair in my place. (Loud applause.) MR. HENRY HUCKS GIBBS: The Secretary will read certain letters of apology. But before his doing so I will mention that the significance of that cablegram which has just been read to you is much enhanced by the fact that the names appended to it include those of the leading " gold men " and advocates of the repeal of the Sherman Act in the Senate. (For letters of apology see pages 9-16.) THE FALL IN THE GENERAL LEVEL OF PRICES IN RELATION TO THE APPRECIATION OF GOLD AND THE DIVERGENCE IN THE RELATIVE VALUE OF GOLD AND SILVER. PROFESSOR J. SHIELD NICHOLSON, M.A., D.Sc. : I remember once reading in a very able philosophical work a criticism of an innocent looking sentence, to this effect : " This sentence holds in solution an assumption, and three fallacies." The title of the problem assigned to me will probably seem to many open to the same objection. The assumption they will say is that there is such a thing as a general level of prices, and the first fallacy is, that if there is such a level it has fallen; and the second, if there is such a fall it is related to the appreciation of gold ; and the third, that if there is such an appreciation it has any connection with the gold price of silver. Fortunately there is no dispute as to the fall in the gold price of silver ; here, at any rate, we have a fact so simple that it can be expressed B 2 2O in two figures. I shall endeavour to show that the assump- tion and fallacies supposed to be in solution in my problem, are in reality equally facts though more complex and not so easily expressed. FACTS AND THEORIES. It is not necessary to occupy much time in showing that there is such a thing as a general level of prices which is subject to movements upwards and downwards in response to general causes. There are many points in dispute amongst authorities in currency, but this is not one of them. The theory is plain, and the theory is abundantly confirmed by an appeal to facts. Some people, however, profess to distrust theories and authorities, and assert that they prefer to form their own opinions on the facts of the case. There could be no better subject on which to exercise their independence of judg- ment. Thanks especially to the labours of Thorold Rogers in the earlier centuries, we have continuous and voluminous evidence on the prices of the principal commodities in English markets, year by year from 1259 down to the present time. I heartily recommend those who distrust theories and rely only on facts, to refer to the monumental works of Rogers, in the History of Agriculture and Prices. The volumes run in pairs, one volume giving all the facts of the period, and the other the writer's theories and opinions about them. The obvious advantage to the practical man is that he can get all the facts together unadulterated by any theories. Take, for example, Vol. II., which gives the records of prices from 1259 to 1400. With the exception of an introduction in English, and an appendix in mediaeval Latin (which can be easily skipped), it is all facts together six hundred solid pages, in small print, of quotations of prices ; on a moderate computation there must be more than 100,000 of them. In appearance it is like a Bradshaw, but 21 more complex. There are similar compilations for the sub- sequent periods. The nearer we come to our own times, century by century, so much greater is the abundance of facts about prices. Now, the practical man may, if he pleases, look up all these facts and form his own opinion. But in any case he will find that to form any opinion at all on general movements in prices even to discover whether there are any general movements or not he must apply theories and principles of some kind or other. There is nothing more absurd than to suppose that if you collect enough facts the results will come out of themselves. The only way to grasp facts, to comprehend them, to make them intelligible, is to lay hold of them and bind them together with prin- ciples and theories. That is what Newton did for the movements of the stars, and Darwin for the development of species, and Adam Smith for changes in the wealth of nations. You can no more discover the general movements of prices by simply looking at price-lists, than you can dis- cover the laws of motion by lying on your back and watch- ing the stars. In both cases you must refer to theories of some kind, and your only safe-guard is this : As soon as you find a theory does not fit the facts, then reject the theory and look for a better. RELATIVE PRICES AND GENERAL PRICES. Well then, the theory that has been found to adequately explain the facts as regards movements in prices, may be stated in two propositions. (1) The price of every article depends partly on relative causes specially affecting that article and partly upon causes affecting prices in general. (2) By taking averages of the prices of several representative commodities over considerable periods, 22 we can discover the general causes, because the special causes of variation due to exceptional and temporary oscillations in demand and supply will balance one another. The first proposition namely, that the price of every article depends partly on special and partly on general causes, may be well illustrated by the case of English wheat.* 1260-140x3 ... price per quarter ... 5^. iof937 > m 1890, 20,325. Take telegraphs they were established between 1840 and 1850; and cables to France and to Ireland were laid in 1851, and the Atlantic Cable, after a partial success in 1858, became really effective in 1865. Other figures might be given, and reference made to other countries, especially the United States, and there can, I think, be no doubt that the general improvements in 30 production and transportation were as fully in operation- before as after 1873. It is therefore illogical to assign the fall in prices to this cause, especially as in the twenty years previous to 1873 tne same cause was at work, but with this difference, that general prices rose. THE REVOLUTION IN CURRENCY. But if 1873 cannot be assigned as the date of the beginning of a revolution in industry, it can certainly be assigned as the beginning of a revolution in currency a revolution which is as yet by no means accomplished. At a time when the annual supplies of gold were falling off, and the demand for the arts was increasing, there was, owing to the change in the monetary policy of Governments,. a great increase in the demand for gold. And we might be content with an appeal to the general law of supply and demand, without professing to explain the precise mode of operation. Nor is such a procedure either unscientific or unpractical ; in fact, in most practical problems we know little of the intervening processes. We know for certain, for example, the proximate causes of many diseases, but we know little of the actual chemical and vital changes that occur in any particular case of the precise way in which the microbes devour and digest our vital organs. We may be quite sure if we put enough of the comma bacillus into a patient the life of the patient will go out> but the intervening processes are to a great extent hidden. The more we can trace, however, the precise action, so much the more likely are we to discover a remedy. THE APPRECIATION OF GOLD. This brings me to the third and final stage in my problem : namely, the connection of this general fall in gold prices with the fall in the gold price of silver. Perhaps,, however, it may occur to some of you that I have left out the second part, namely, the appreciation of gold. I must plead guilty with extenuating circumstances. It is an ugly name for an ugly fact, therefore I avoided it. But it was the name only that I avoided. A fall in the general level of prices when these prices are measured in gold, is only another phrase for the appreciation of gold ; if prices fall on the average, then, in plain English, gold fetches more of things than it did ; in Anglicized Latin gold has appre- ciated. THE FALL IN GOLD PRICES AND THE FALL IN SILVER. To come then to the fall in the gold price of silver and its connection with the fall in other gold prices, or, if you prefer, the connection between the appreciation of gold and the depreciation of silver. This is the most difficult, as. it is the most interesting and most instructive part of the whole controversy. I have used the term difficult because people of importance do not agree in their interpre- tation, although, in my opinion, the difficulty has been much exaggerated. All that we have to do is to admit three facts, and to show the inter-connection. The first fact is perfectly obvious and admits of no dispute, namely, that the gold price of silver has, since 1873, suffered a severe and fluctuating fall. Here we have the records day by day to a quarter of a farthing. The second fact is that the prices of commodities reckoned in silver have remained comparatively stable that is to say, the depreciation of silver relatively to gold has not been reflected to commodities, or in other words, the level of prices in the silver-standard countries has not changed to any noticeable extent. Silver purchases less gold, but it purchases practically the same amount of other things. The third fact is that general prices measured in gold have fallen in other words, that gold has appreciated, or that it purchases more of other things. 32 The facts cannot so far, I think, be seriously disputed ; it is in the inter-connection that disputes arise. Personally, I am strongly of opinion with those who maintain that the fall in silver has been coincident with the fall of the prices of commodities to such an extent that there must be a connection between the two. This you will observe is simply a question of observation and measure- ment ; of course we do not mean to imply that the fall in every particular commodity has exactly coincided day by day or year by year with the fall in silver, and we do not say that taking the full period of twenty years there has been in every case such a coincidence. More than that, we do not even assert that the average level of gold prices has moved year by year in precisely the same direction, and in the same degree as the gold price of silver. It is not necessary that the coincidence should be so exact in order to prove a causal connection ; if it were we could never, in the whole range of industry and commerce, get an example of cause and effect. All that we maintain is that the degree of coincidence is so great, both in direction and magnitude, over a period of twenty years, that it cannot be the effect of accident. The case is analogous to the effects of taxation on foreign trade, or to the effects of the fall in the price of wheat on the amount of land under cultivation. The connection is certain, though the effects do not follow the cause in a simple numerical proportion. Now I do not think anyone can refer to the tables of Mr. Sauerbeck's, or to the index numbers of the Economist, without admitting the fact of a general coincidence between the fall in the gold price of silver and the fall in general gold prices. The matter is best illustrated by curves,* but is made sufficiently obvious by putting, side by side, the index number of commodities and that of silver. It is true that the Economist denies the coincidence, but it can only do so by requiring an exactness which is not required by the case itself, and is very rarely attained in * Compare the curves constructed by Sir G. Molesworth. 33 any other case. We know, for example, that a fall in the rate of interest tends to raise the price of securities on the stock exchange, but owing to special and relative causes the movement is not in every case precisely to the same degree. The following table * speaks for itself. It gives in parallel columns for the years 1874-92 (l.) the index numbers for the 45 commodities comprised in Mr. Sauerbeck's compu- tation, and (II.) the index numbers of silver for the same years. Mr. Sauerbeck's Index-numbers. Years. Index-number of 45 principal Commodities. Index-number of Silver. 1874 102 95'8 1875 9 6 93*3 1876 95 86-7 1877 94 90*2 1878 87 86-4 1879 83 84-2 1880 88 85*9 1881 85 85-0 1882 84 84'9 1883 82 83-1 1884 76 83*3 1885 72 79*9 1886 69 74-6 1887 68 73'3 1888 70 70-4 1889 72 70-2 1890 72 78*4 1891 72 74-1 1892 68 6 S -4 It will be observed that in one case the index numbers show a fall from 102 to 68, and in the other a fall from 95 to 65. Other facts to be observed are : "from 1874 to 1877 * Quoted by Archbishop Walsh in his pamphlet metallism," page 63. Bimetallism and Mono- 34 (inclusive) the index number of silver was on the average 5-25 below the aggregate index number. In 1878 it was only -6 below; in 1879 it was 1*2 above; in 1880 it was 2'i below; in 1881 they were equal. Then from 1882-92 (inclusive), with two exceptions, silver was above the aggre- gate. From 1884-7 it was on the average 6-5 above the aggregate per annum. On the whole, adding up the differences from 1874-1892, the total difference is 11-5 above the aggregate, or on the average '6 per annum. Thus it will be seen that the special causes affecting silver only seem to show it below the general level to any extent in the first four years after 1873. If we compare this steadiness of silver with the differences of some other commodities the contrast is very surprising. Thus in every year the index number of textiles is below the aggregate, in every year that of total materials (twenty-six commodities) is below ; in every year except one that of wheat is below. * On the other hand in every year animal food is above the aggregate. In these cases we seem to have evidence of special causes depressing or raising prices apart from the general causes which have produced the general fall. Thus, whilst the fall in the aggregate index number between 1874 and 1892 is from 102 to 68, i.e., 34, the fall in the index number of animal food is only 19, whilst the fall in that of English wheat is 46." THEORY. We generally try to confirm a theory by facts. In this case, however, we may confirm facts by theory. It is easy to explain first, why there should have been a general coincidence between the fall in silver and the fall in the gold prices of commodities ; and secondly, why this coinci- dence should not have been precisely or minutely exact. * Quoted from paper by the present writer in Economic Journal ', March, 1894, " Effects of Depreciation of Silver, et<\" 35 Suppose, then, that the gold price of silver falls, but that the prices of commodities in silver-using countries remain steady. For the sake of definiteness we may take rupee prices before the closure of the Indian Mints. If possible under these conditions, namely, with rupee prices steady (that is, of course, the level or the average), and with a fall in silver of some 37 per cent, if possible, suppose that gold prices do not fall in proportion. Then what would happen would be simply this : every export from India would obtain, so far, the same gold as before, but this gold would fetch more than 50 per cent, more silver, since every sovereign instead of obtaining about 4 ozs. of silver would obtain more than 6 ozs. But if the rupee prices in India were the same this would mean an additional clear .profit of 50 per cent. Similarly every import into India from England would obtain only the same amount of silver as before, but this silver would yield so much less gold in other words, there would be an exceptional loss of 37 per cent. an oz. of silver fetching 38^. instead of 6od., and by supposition the gold price of the import being unaltered. It is perfectly clear that this is a reductio ad absurdum ; under a system of industrial and commercial competition, such exceptional profit and loss could not possibly continue. Accordingly, if the price of silver falls, either the gold prices of the great staples of trade between gold and silver-using countries must fall, or silver prices must rise, or a combination of both movements must take place. Thus, finally, if silver prices have not risen, and silver has fallen, gold prices must fall. Just as this mode of reasoning shows the nature of the general coincidence, so does it account for apparent discrep- ancies. Two considerations are of special importance. In the first place, it takes time for competition to produce its full effect as -regards the articles of trade between gold-using and C2 36 silver-using countries; and secondly, these articles, although of great importance, do not include all the commodities that are used in the basis of calculations in estimating movements in general prices. PREDICTION. I have passed from facts to theory let me now pass from theory to prediction the most popular test of theory. At the beginning of the year, in a paper read to the Royal Society of Edinburgh, I ventured to predict that, judging by the experience of the past, the necessary readjustment consequent on the fall in silver, caused by the closure of the Indian Mints, would be made in gold prices. The Economist has very candidly called attention to the movements in its own index numbers, which indicate that such a fall has occurred. It is true that the fall has not yet been so severe as the fall in the price of silver being 3 per cent, as compared with 10 per cent, at the time the calculations were struck. But we must remember that for the time being the rupee is above its metallic value (I throw in the little prophecy that if India ceases to borrow it will not long remain so), and that the future of silver is so uncertain that the price is by no means steady. It is remarkable also, that at the beginning of the year everyone was predicting a revival in trade and an upward movement in prices. In the meantime the fall in gold prices has been so encouraging (I speak as a theorist) that I again venture to predict that unless which seems improbable silver rises in price there will be a further fall in gold prices. SUPPOSED INCONSISTENCY. There remainsone difficulty which I must at any rate touch upon, in spite of the length of this paper, and the strain on your attention. In my view a large part of the fall in gold prices is due to the fall in the gold price of silver, and 37 this fall again is due mainly to causes specially affecting silver. That is to say, in my opinion, the fall in silver is not to be accounted for simply by the general fall in gold prices, but on the contrary the reverse has happened. The question than arises : how do you reconcile this with the quantity theory of money with the position formerly laid down that the general level of gold prices depends on the quantity of money compared with the work to be done by it? The explanation seems to me to be two-fold. In the first place, the same events which have caused the fall in silver have caused a premium on gold in response to the depreciation of silver, .gold has been hoarded by banks and Governments. And in the second place, I should say that gold prices have been lowered more than was requisite according to the quantity theory on account of the depressing influence of this special cause. There is nothing in the quantity theory of money that is inconsistent with the theory of general inflations and depressions in trade, and in this we have a prolonged depression. Further consideration, however, of this topic would trench upon the ground assigned to other papers. SUMMARY. In conclusion, it may be convenient in a discussion not to follow this paper if I briefly summarise the main positions ; they are as follows : (1) There are certain causes affecting the general level of prices, apart from the special causes affecting particular prices. (2) Since 1873 there has been a fall in the general level of prices in gold-using countries, in other words, an appreciation of gold. (3) This general appreciation of gold has, on the whole, coincided with the fall in the gold price of silver or the specific depreciation of silver. 38 (4) The fall in silver is rather a cause than a con- sequence of the fall in gold prices, although the special events (chiefly political) which have caused the fall in silver have also tended to cause a pressure on gold. I must remind you that in the limits assigned I have been precluded from touching on those interesting practical questions which will later on be brought under your notice. But if the topics treated in this paper are necessarily of a general character, they are none the less essential to a clear understanding of the problems which appear to us more concrete and of more practical importance. I have given you my own opinions with frankness, and for the sake of clearness I have not at every step introduced the quali- fications and exceptions that are necessary for logical completeness and for protection against various modes of attack. I trust you will not mistake my frankness for dogmatism and my brevity for narrowness. MR. G. M. BOISSEVAIN : Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen In addressing you, or rather in making, as I want to do, a few observations on the very interesting paper which we have heard read by Professor Nicholson, I feel first of all that I have to apologise for addressing you in your own language (No, no) but I am sure, even if I speak it badly, you will understand me better than if I addressed you in my own language. Now I daresay we, having all of us heard what was in Mr. Nicholson's paper, will agree that it is a subject of the greatest interest, and a subject which he has shown to be undoubtedly one of vast importance. We are all of us well aware that we are suffering under the action of the monetary situation, but if we want to remedy it, we ought to know, and we ought to have a clear idea of what have been the causes of the situation under which we are suffering. (Hear, hear,) We want to know, in the first instance, whether there has been an appreciation of gold or a depreciation of 39 silver. Of course, the gold price of silver has fallen ; there is no doubt about that. It will always be admitted as true that things which look quite different may, after all, be quite the same, whether they are in Lilliput or Brobdignag, and the appreciation of gold may only be another way of saying the depreciation of silver. Here in England you speak of the fall in silver, but I think that in India they speak of the increased value of gold. (Hear, hear.) I think we ought to have a clear conception of what has really been the cause. Now it is very difficult to see what has exactly happened. When we say that gold has appreciated, it is generally answered by gold mono- metallists that it is not gold that has appreciated, but that it is our commodities that have fallen in price. I think what Professor Nicholson reminded you of in his paper in regard to the price of wheat was very remarkable. He reminded you that the price of wheat had risen through the influence of various important occurrences during the last seven centuries, although it has fallen quite lately. But what does that show ? I think it shows that there is quite a difference between low prices and cheapness and abundance. We had much greater abundance of wheat in the beginning of this century, and in the years 1850 to 1870 especially, than obtained some centuries ago, and yet prices were a great deal higher, as Mr. Nicholson reminded you, than they were before. I say this shows there is a great difference between low prices and cheapness and abundance (Hear, hear) and I think this explains the present situation. If low prices are the sign of prosperity and of abundance, then (and Professor Nicholson has referred to this also already) what has been the difference between the two periods in the history of the last half- century ? From 1850 to 1870 we had a period of general prosperity and general welfare, and accumulation of com- modities accompanying the welfare of especially the poorer 40 classes and the labourers, and still we had a period of continual rising prices. But in 1873 things changed entirely. Prices went down, but the general welfare also decreased, and in these last twenty years especially wages have decreased a great deal more than they had in the period between 1850 and 1870. Now this shows that prosperity is not dependent upon low prices, which one might have thought to be the case, but prosperity goes with high prices. (Hear, hear, and applause.) Now to know whether we have had a fall in the purchasing power of silver, or whether we have had an increase in the purchasing power of gold, I think we ought to observe what has been going on in the past. I have also to remind you of the great influence that Government has on the value of the precious metals gold and silver. The Government does influence the value of gold and silver in an artificial way. What a Government cannot do is to modify the laws of economics, and what they can do and what they do with regard to gold and silver is to influence the demand and supply, and that is exactly what has happened. . The value of gold and of the monetary metals is most of all dependent upon their monetary employment; and what has been going on since 1873 is that there has been a great change in the employment of gold and silver as money, and a change that has been brought about entirely by the action of the several Govern- ments. That is the way in which they have influenced the value of gold and silver. Now I need not recall to your minds the monetary history of 1873. Everybody knows it ; and I ask you how' could it be that what has happened should not have had an influence on the relative value of gold and silver ? We have seen silver demonetised and the place of silver in several countries usurped by gold, and much larger demand for gold than silver has taken place in several countries. How could it be said that such a 41 revolution in the use of the monetary metals could happen without having an influence on the values? We have to look again to the relation between gold and silver prices, and we see that silver prices have remained almost exactly at least till 1893 the same; that is, the silver prices in the countries where silver is the monetary standard. This has happened, although the employment of silver as a monetary metal has decreased, and it is no longer used as a monetary metal, in the way at least in which it had been previously used in so many countries previous to 1873. But, at the same time, in the silver countries the silver prices remained till 1893 almost exactly what they were before, and on the other hand in the gold countries the gold prices have fallen seriously. I think this shows that even if the employment of silver has decreased, and at the same time the production of silver has increased, the relation between silver and other commodities in the silver- using countries has remained almost exactly the same, but that has not been the case in the gold countries as regards the relation of the gold to the commodities there. There we have had a serious fall of prices, because there was a relative scarcity of gold. Gold was no longer to be found there in the same relation as had previously obtained. (Hear, hear). So I say that I think this shows that it is really gold that has appreciated, and gold has appreciated because it became more scarce that it was before. Then you will say, how is it possible to speak of scarcity of gold just now ? There are 32 million pounds worth of gold in the Bank of England, a larger amount than there has been in it for many years. At the same time there are 1,700,000,000 of francs in gold in the Bank of France. We all know that there is more gold in the world than that, and that as to gold that we now see accumulated in the several banks, we knew before it was accumulated in the banks that it existed in the world, but what does that show ? 42 That is another proof that money is very abundant, and money is very low at the same time. But that there is then proved to be practically an abundance of gold I do not think is the case. I think exactly the contrary is proved. The price of money is very low undoubtedly. Why ? Because the demand for money is very small just now. But what is it that we do when we are making a loan we obtain gold to-day in order to repay it at some time hence, and make use of it for buying commodities and using it in the several industries and things of that kind. When we say that there is a tendency for gold to appreciate, we imply that certainly that is a reason in itself for not making a loan of gold, because then we are sure that on the side of gold we shall lose if we bring about such a bad bargain. That is exactly what is the result of a scarcity of gold. If people do not in such circumstances refrain from making loans in gold, they make serious losses, and that is a reason why commerce, industry, and agriculture are suffering under the appreciation of gold. (Applause.) Then as to another point : I said that until 1 893 the silver prices remained exactly the same, and at the same time gold prices had fallen, and that this seemed to show that there had not been a fall in silver ; but then you will say that since last year there most certainly has been a fall in silver. I agree entirely as to that. I think that since June, 1893, there has up to the present time been a very severe fall in silver : whether it will continue will depend upon circumstances. It may be again that it will be gold that will most of all appreciate, but still I think if things are to continue going in the direction they have been going, and if things continue as has been the case since June, 1893, there will be a great probability of silver falling, and silver falling more than gold will appreciate. Still, even if silver is to fall because the employment of silver will be decreasing again, certainly 43 there will be so much the more appreciation of gold. Now I think I must apologise to an English meeting like this for making such observations as I want to make in their language, but what I would say in conclusion is this : Since June, 1893, we have had really a fall in silver, and at the same time the appreciation of gold is going on and threatens to become greater than ever it was before, and I say I think this shows that your Government in seeking to remedy the monetary situation have been looking in the wrong direction in order to find the remedy. (Applause.) What they have done has been to make gold scarcer than ever to make gold appreciate more than ever and to make silver depreciate ; whereas what they ought to have done was to rehabilitate silver. That would have been the real remedy. MR. SAMUEL MONTAGU, M.P. : Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen I find it very difficult to say anything fresh with regard to the principle of bimetallism or its effect upon prices, and I admire very much the ability of Professor Nicholson in putting before us so vigorously the usual arguments, and for having found also fresh points to bring before our notice. The few observations that I shall make will be from the standpoint of a trader in the City in gold and silver, and to remove any possible misconceptions I will point out that the trader's interest would not be advantaged by bimetallism, but quite the reverse, because the trader lives on fluctuations in the article in which he deals. (Hear, hear.) I need not argue with regard to the practicability of bimetallism, because that has been proved over and over again before the Royal Commission on Gold and Silver, of which I had the honour to be a member, and we were fairly unanimous on that point, although as to its adoption in this country or its promotion here at that time we were then equally divided. We could, I think, claim a majority of opinion on that Royal Commission, because 44 since it has terminated its sittings one of the ablest members that was on the Royal Commission, Mr. Leonard Courtney, has come over to our side. (Hear, hear, and applause.) I think, therefore, we might fairly claim a majority on that Royal Commission. Let me briefly refer now to the present position of this question of bimetallism and its future prospects. There is no doubt that bimetallism has spread fast in the country. There is, however, one danger ahead which I trust its pro- moters will carefully avoid, and that is the danger of making bimetallism a party question. (Hear, hear.) If its adoption would steady agriculture and other industries, it would also greatly benefit our traders in cotton manu- facture in Lancashire, and other of our national industries. Now, what is the present condition of silver on the Indian exchange. The price of silver has been recently 27^., and it has been fluctuating day by day, so that it is really over 2$d. now. On the other hand, the Indian exchange, that was last year is. 4^., is now down to about its lowest point, that is, is. i\d. The Indian Government have desired, and do desire bimetallism, but they have been prevented from carrying out their idea of promoting it actively by the present Government. Therefore, both parties are equally to blame in that respect. They have endeavoured to bring about a stability in the Indian exchange by adopting the measure of closing the Indian mint. That measure, how- ever, has been so badly managed that one can almost fancy that the Indian Government were very half-hearted in the matter, and that they would rather see it fail in order to bring about the only real and positive cure for the state of things that exists, namely, bimetallism. (Loud applause.) The existence of the fluctuation, or rather the deprecia- tion, because the rupee is constantly fluctuating, is to my mind caused by the want of confidence in the fiscal policy of the Indian Government. We all anticipated 45 that if this change were made India would be a great field for the investment of the surplus capital of Europe, but, instead of that, people have been only too anxious to bring their money home from India, which is, in fact, quite the reverse of the effect which one would have imagined would have been produced. Money, unfortunately, is at the present time about its lowest. Three months' bills are at a little over I per cent. In India they want bi- metallism very badly, and it would be an assistance to our fellow-subjects in India, and also an advantage to ourselves. The reason why bimetallism is not promoted we do not know, but if people invest their money there, no one knows how he will get his money back again. Therefore, we are prevented from the usual course of sending money where it is most wanted. Rumours are afloat as to the reopening of the Indian mints, and have been repeated, but I hardly see how that can improve the position unless bimetallism should at the same time be adopted. (Hear, hear). If the Indian Government thinks it would be beneficial to India to have a low exchange, then they can do so in the readiest manner possible. They can force the sale of bills, if they want money in that way, or they can buy gold in India, or they can let out the enormous sums of silver coin which they have in the Treasury, and they can bring the rupee down to a shilling or less in a day or in a week. Therefore, they cannot say that the opening of the mint would be any advantage, because they could not support the price of silver single- handed, with the mint open, even when the United States were largely minting that metal ; therefore, how is it possible they can keep up the price of silver now that the United States have ceased to coin that metal. The only effect of opening the mint would be to allow the dealers in silver to fix the price instead of themselves, because they would, of course, compete with the price of bills here in 4 6 London. Now our opponents taunt us with the fact that gold is present in sufficient quantities in this country. We might point out there are only three countries which now use gold in circulation : they are this country, France and Germany. In the United States they prefer paper to gold, and it is well for them that they do so, because their supply of gold is exceedingly small. The rest of America use paper generally, and cannot manage to pay their way even in the depreciated silver. Money resembles water, it always flows to where there is a void, and whenever it is wanted or scarce it will in the ordinary sense flow there. In recent years what I call artificial interference with the market has prevailed, and they have created a gulf between gold and silver-using countries, so that it is quite impossible that the ordinary laws affecting capital and money should prevail, on account of what has been done. The outlets of money have been blocked, but of course money, like water, overflows in the few centres where it has been particularly used. I had the opportunity last week of conferring with a gentleman who is a member of a Conference which is now meeting in Germany, and he remarked that if Governments and peoples will not use silver, he knew of no equally efficient substitute. Yet it must be admitted that if that metal is largely used in circulation without a fair gold value put upon it, it will be coined in spite of them. The pro- posal placed before the Conference, then, is to this effect, that an international agreement be entertained for a term of years for the coinage of silver, the maximum quantity to be coined in each country to be is. per head of popula- tion. Therefore, in this country we should, under that proposal, be compelled to coin about 1,800,000 yearly, but the proposal is, and that is the only novelty about it, that the seigniorage imposed by each country should vary between 10 per cent, and 20 per cent., depending upon the market price of silver, so as to keep silver at between 30^. 47 and $6d. All such projects may be worthy of consideration, but what we should desire is this, that Germany should ask for another Conference, with the avowed intention, that bimetallism should be adopted ; that what should be left to be dealt with at such a Conference of Powers would be the particular ratio or the seigniorage to be adopted for that purpose. (Applause.) I think we should certainly be allowed to join, and I should not be very much surprised if, now this movement is so popular, our Government were compelled to join with other great Powers in bringing about a settlement of this great question in a business-like fashion, not going to the Conference to discuss a variety of possibly worse projects brought up by one member or the other, but going at once on the basis of bimetallism. Then we should find this vast question settled for our time, and perhaps for many centuries, for the benefit of trade, which is the chief thing which actuates me in supporting bimetallism, and the commerce of this country would be conducted on an enlarged and safer basis. Therefore, I hope that the efforts of this Conference in Germany may bring about that one necessary element, for I think that a Power like Germany should take the initiative, and then I think that we should see carried out what we all desire. (Loud applause.) DR. OTTO ARENDT, Member of the Prussian Diet, Berlin, delivered an address in German, of which the following is a translation : I have to transmit to you the greetings and best wishes of the German bimetallists. We look with admiration and hope on the activity which the Bimetallic League displays in England, and expect that theirs will be the victory for their and for our good. In my own country the bimetallic movement is also making considerable progress, and especially the closing of the Indian mints has shown the people the precipice to which the gold standard leads. The Prussian and the German 4 8 Governments have made statements which prove that they recognise the evil effects of the depreciation of silver on German interests. After these statements it would be impossible for Germany to play in a future monetary conference such a passive part as it did at Brussels. More- over there has been instituted a Silver Commission, which is to propose means to improve, and, if possible, make stable the price of silver. Several proposals have been made, but the one mentioned by Mr. S. Montagu has so far not received much support. Mr. Gladstone said, in one of his speeches, that, "even if England were to declare in favour of bimetallism, other countries, notably Germany, might not follow." In this he is mistaken. Not a dozen men would, in Germany, oppose bimetallism in conjunction with England. In Austria-Hungary leading men told me, "We have no interest in gold ; we merely want the same standard as Germany, with which 70 per cent, of our trade is conducted." Indeed all that is wanted to make bimetallism a fact is the lead of England. Without England, however, nothing will probably be done. I do not personally approve of this attitude, but I cannot deny that the majority in my country is, on this point, against me. As a German, I regret this. Years ago I said in London, " It is England's good luck that two statesmen do not read the currency question correctly : Cleveland and Bismarck." Both of them could have secured the lead in the commerce of the world if they had adopted bimetallism without England. England would thereby have been under a disadvantage. For either such a step would have fixed the price of silver, and then even those who think that at present England derives some benefit from the gold standard, must admit that such benefit would no longer exist, or it would have failed to do so, and then England would have possessed the dearest standard, in which it would have been an in- 49 ducement to sell, but a discouragement to buy. It is said that in the latter case England's banking business would have received an impetus, but I doubt this, because the pros- perity of the banks depends upon the prosperity of trade, and the commerce and industry of England would have suffered. The decline of English exports to the far East since the closing of the Indian mints illustrates, in the clearest possible manner, the connection between commerce and currency. Mr. Gladstone has further said that, as a creditor country, England ought to retain the gold standard. It is true that the appreciation of gold is " at first " against the debtor, but in the end the creditor will lose, for the debtor must eventually fail. The appreciation of gold shows itself in other countries as a rise in the exchange, and this " premium on gold " brings one country after another into financial difficulties. The higher the exchanges, the greater the premium on gold, the more difficult it will become for the other countries to meet their gold engagements. For the English creditor a debtor wlio pays in silver is after all better than a debtor who cannot pay in gold. In England the bimetallic question has been coupled with the question of free trade, and the bimetallists have been represented as protectionists The very reverse is the truth. Bimetallism wants to lead the world back to free trade. The unhealthy and unnatural competition, engen- dered by the collapse of the exchanges, is the real cause of the protectionist movement on the Continent, and, if there is no change in the position, England will find this protectionist movement gather force, and a return to the free trade principles less and less likely. But I hope that the practical sense of the English will not much longer allow them to be led away by obsolete theories, but will initiate a reform, which, without England, the world considers itself too weak to carry through. 50 At the conclusion of his address in German, he added the following in English : Ladies and Gentlemen I thank you for your kind attention. It is now ten years since your President, Mr. Hucks Gibbs, wrote an open letter, and in this open letter he said that there was no present hope for bimetallism in England. That is ten years ago, but to-day I am sure I can go from this meeting and from London with the conviction that there is now every prospect of its adoption. (Applause.) I hope that the Council of the English Bimetallist League will achieve the ends at which it aims in its economic labours for England and all the world for the world, ladies and gentlemen, believes that it is not strong enough to achieve these things without the aid of England. (Loud applause.) THE CHAIRMAN : I will now call upon Mr. Samuel Smith to address you. He was one of the earliest supporters of bimetallism in this country. MR. S. SMITH, M.P. : Mr. President, Ladies and Gen- tlemen We have travelled over a wide range of matter to-day, but I think the kernel of all our discussion and the kernel of the whole question is the appreciation of gold. I think that Professor Nicholson treated the question in the right manner ; he treated it by the historical method, and it is only by the historical method that one can gradually come to see how these great changes in the level of prices have taken place, and how they mainly depend upon the value of the precious metals themselves. I think within the present century we have had four great changes in price levels to which I will just briefly refer. The first price level was from 1800 to 1815, when the country was suffering under an inconvertible paper currency, and when we had a very high scale of prices. Then came the con- traction after the great French war, with the establishment of the single gold standard and a fall in prices ; and during the period between 1815 and 1 850 we had a fall in prices equal to about 50 per cent. That was the period, perhaps, of the greatest dangers that this country ever passed through (Hear, hear) and practically the effect was to double the weight of the National Debt. The National Debt of ,900,000,000 bequeathed to us by the great war became as heavy as if it had been increased to ; 1,800,000,000, because the interest on this debt was paid by the sale of commodities, and it required just twice as many commodities to meet the interest on the debt after the fall of prices as before. (Hear, hear.) That accounted for the intolerable misery that existed in this country during that period. Then came the third period of the Australian and Californian gold dis- coveries, which started with a rise in prices, and went on till 1873 to 1874, which rise amounted to 40 per cent. That lightened the burden of debt enormously, and gave life to all the industrial enterprises of the country, and was the most brilliant period of trade that this country has ever enjoyed. (Hear, hear.) Now comes the fourth period. The fourth period began with 1873-1874, and has gone on till now that is, twenty years. The feature of that period has been a constant fall in prices, broken now and then by small reactions. According to Mr. Sauerbeck's excellent figures, based upon forty-five commodities, I see that in the month of March this year we are just 42 per cent, below the prices of 1873. Now mark you, gentlemen, a fall of 42 per cent., or say in round figures 40 per cent., means a much lower level than does a rise of 40 per cent. Supposing that the average of prices in 1845 to 1850 was 100, a rise of 40 per cent, took it up to 140, and a fall of 40 per cent, on 140 is equal to 56, and takes you down to a price level of 84. Therefore, we have now reached a much lower level than was attained during the depreciation of the period between 1840 and 1850. We are at the lowest level within the present century ; indeed, a good deal lower than D2 5 2 we have been at any point in this century. Now the effect of this immense fall of prices is that all the debts, burdens and obligations of the country have been directly increased in value. We have gone through exactly the same state of things as prevailed after the resumption of specie payment in 1819. Now people do not fully appreciate and under- stand what a vital question this is. It takes a little thought to feel the force of, and to appreciate the effect of, these fixed charges upon the country. I have taken some trouble to go into the subject, and if the meeting will allow me, I will give you a few figures which I collected a few years ago, which are only approximations, but which are, I think, perhaps pretty near the mark. We have, first of all, a National Debt of 700,000,000, with interest and sinking fund amounting to 25,000,000 a year ; railway bonds and preference shares, amounting to 500,000,000, with interest at 4 per cent., making 20,000,000 a year; local and municipal debts are estimated at about 160,000,000, which, at say 4 per cent, interest, give 6,400,000 ; then we have a vast amount of mortgages on land, and their value can only be guessed at something like 500,000,000, and that at 4 per cent, gives 20,000,000 a year ; then there are railways and house property, shops and industrial plant of all kinds, which I also put at 500,000,000, although they are probably more, and that at 4 per cent, represents 20,000,000 a year ; then we have long leases and fixed ground rents of 75 to 99 years' dura- tion ; and then we have royalties on mines which come to about 5,000,000, and in addition to these we have a large number of pensions and fixed charges, the total amount of which is 1 50,000,000 a year if we capitalize those on land at twenty-seven years' purchase, it is equal to 4,000,000,000, or two-fifths of the whole property of the country. Now this gigantic charge has been enormously increased in weight through the revolution of prices which has taken 53 place within the last twenty years. Supposing, for instance, a property was burdened with mortgages which twenty years ago were discharged by selling one-fourth of the produce of the land, it would take nearly one-half of the produce of the land now to meet them. Supposing that a rriine or factory by some means was burdened with a heavy mortgage, and in place of the usual charge of one-fourth of the profit of the mine or factory it took nearly one-half to meet the interest, the result would be the same as if we had been transferring, or, at least, as if we had stood still and seen a transfer taking place of a great portion of the property of the country from the hardworking industrial classes to the money-lending classes. The whole result of this monetary revolution which we have gone through in the last few years has been practically to rob the working bees of society in favour of the drones. (Hear, hear.) All has played into the hands of the financial classes as opposed to the hardworking, toiling industrial classes. Consequently there has been produced somewhat of a glut in all the industries of the country. Everyone can see it who knows anything about trade. Every large industry has suffered from a very bad blight. The excessive fall in prices turns all transactions of profit into losses, and loss after loss having been encountered in the large trades for the past twenty years, there has been at last taken away all hope of any enterprise succeeding. The same thing has taken place in all other countries which have a gold standard. Do not let us think it is peculiar to England. It is quite as bad in France or Germany or in the United States, and on this point I might refer to a little extract from a French paper as to the effect of this state of things in agricultural property upon the cultivators and peasant owners, and in most parts of the continent, where its effect has been materially to increase the debts which low prices have brought upon 54 them. With regard to this, take for instance the National Debt of Prussia ; it averaged only 65 per cent, of the value of land in 1860, whereas it is now 80 to 90 per cent. ; mortgages were valued at 112,000,000 in 1853, they are now more than 500,000,000 ; while in France in 1 876 they reached the figure of 840,000,000 that is half the value of the real estate of France and two-thirds that of Belgium. In conclusion the extract says that the picture of the day is the steady growth of debts of all kinds, and the division of most modern communities into debtors and creditors with widely opposed interests. (Hear, hear). Now, I say, Mr. Chairman, can anything be worse for civilized com- munities than a monetary revolution which is silently carrying all the property of this country into the hands of the money-lending classes ? Nothing could be worse. It is opposed to all the traditions of society and civilization, and is the greatest provocative of socialism ; it is the greatest provocative of discontent of all kinds, and it in fact is doing its best, so to speak, to disintegrate the social systems of all countries. Now I think that statesmen are exceedingly blind who cannot read the signs of the times. Statesmen are exceedingly dead to the true interests of the countries they represent who are fighting against this movement. This is a movement to be supported from social considerations ; it is a movement in the direction of justice ; it is a movement in the direction of the welfare of the masses as against that of the small, limited, but immensely wealthy financial classes. I think as these facts come to be understood, and they are coming to be understood, we shall find a great revolution in popular opinion taking place. It has already made great progress in this country, and it will make much greater progress in the next five years, and I shall not be at all surprised to see many of the statesmen of our country who are opposing it at the present day become its warmest supporters in a short 55 time. It is marvellous how soon statesmen become con- verted when they begin to see the force of public opinion is going against them. (Loud applause.) I do not think I need add anything more, except to say in conclusion that I have merely tried to deal with one particular aspect of the case, but I think it will soon come about that people will see that no question can be of greater moment when they appreciate the enormous social signifi- cance of our movement. The public are rapidly grasping it, and I hope the time is near at hand when most of those who are regarded as authorities by all, will one and all, without exception, have accepted these views. I believe the time is coming when the tide of intelligence gradually rising will at last submerge the older and more conservative statesmen who at present are the chief obstacles to the progress of our movement. (Loud applause.) THE CHAIRMAN : In calling upon Mr. Smith I said that he was one of the earliest supporters of bimetallism in this country. I now have the pleasure of calling upon a gentleman who I think I may describe, if not as one of the latest, at any rate one of the late and certainly one of the most earnest supporters of our movement in this country, Mr. Dorrington, of Manchester. MR. DORRINGTON : Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentle- men No one I think will contend that the cause of change in the general level of prices will affect all commodities alike. It is quite possible that while the general level of prices is falling owing to general causes, a particular commodity may remain stationary, and may even rise owing to special circumstances connected with its produc- tion and with its consumption. But this is one of those side issues which tend to obscure the main question, because our monometallic opponents are very fond of picking out a particular commodity and asking why it is not falling or why it is rising, in response to the rise or 56 fall in the general level of prices, brought about, as we believe, from the narrowing of the basis of the world's monetary system through the discarding of silver as an international money standard, and the elevation of gold to the position of being the official standard of monetary measurement to a degree which it neyer reached prior to 1873. No bimetallist will, so far as I know, contend that the laws of supply and demand no longer hold good in relation to particular commodities, and this is especially the case in regard to luxuries ; but if there is any truth in the quantity theory of money (and I think that Professor Nicholson has shown that there is great truth in that theory), it surely cannot be denied that there is a strong connection between the general fall of prices and the change in the currency system of the world brought into play by the events of 1873, an d the developing of the general tendency of nations since then to adopt a gold standard. Those who argue that money is merely a commodity surely lose sight of the fact that there is a great difference between money and the metal of which it is made. (Hear, hear.) The value of the metal will naturally adjust itself to the monetary use of the metal, but when it becomes money it is no longer a mere commodity, as that term is generally understood, but it is a measure of commodities in terms of which the commodities themselves are valued. (Hear, hear.) Can it be doubted that it is the function of Govern- ments to determine the monetary use of the precious metals, or can it be doubted that it is the duty of Govern- ments to base that determination upon such system as offers the greatest prospect of stability within the standard itself ? But, beyond this, Governments have not to deal with the ideal or primitive state of society. They have to deal with the world of hard facts, and one of these facts is, that however much the idea of a single gold standard may command theoretical admiration, more than half the world THE UNIVERSITY r Or 57 uses silver money, and either will not or cannot consent to abandon it in favour of gold. (Applause.) The develop- ment of international intercourse by means of steamers, railways and telegraphs, which have brought New York as near to London, perhaps, as Edinburgh was to London fifty years ago, the tendency towards the annihilation of time and space, have made currency an international instrument in a wider sense than ever before, and it is difficult to believe that a currency system, which isolates the silver-using portion of the globe from the gold-using portion, can claim superiority over a system which would tend to unite the metallic currencies of the world under one international exchange. There may be room for controversy as to the general good or the general evil which results from a general fall in gold prices, but if it be proved that silver money in silver-standard countries buys as much, or nearly as much, as it did twenty years ago, there can be little doubt, I think, that the dislocation of the world's currency which has developed since 1873 has thrown a difficulty upon the producers in gold-standard countries which the producers in silver-standard countries have to a large extent escaped. Compare for example the position of the British farmer with that of his Indian rival. The former has had to produce his wheat, for instance, under a continually falling price. Whatever the cause of the fall, he has been forced to dispose of comparatively more of his produce in order to obtain the gold necessary to him for the discharge of the many obligations, some of them extending over long periods of time, to which he had committed himself not in terms of commodities, but in terms of gold money. The Indian farmer, on the other hand, has been able to continue producing without this continual increase of his fixed charges, except in so far as the Indian Government has had to increase his taxation in order to make up its loss from the depreciation of silver in terms of gold another phase of the same question. Down to 1873, we may say that the British farmer who devoted 100 to the cultivation of wheat had practically to compete against the wheat produced with 1,000 rupees ; to-day, he has practically to compete against the wheat produced with 2,000 rupees. If the cost of producing wheat in India has not risen in like proportion, it is easy to see what a powerful effect the depreciation of silver in terms of gold has had in reducing the price of wheat in the gold standard of England. (Hear, hear.) It may be, as some allege, that the general falling in prices is good for the community at large, but it can hardly be denied that it threatens to wipe the British farmer out of existence. (Hear, hear.) It is difficult to believe that there is not great danger attached to a system which tends to make England more and more dependent upon foreign countries for her food supplies, and which is reducing her great agricultural industry to a state of despair. I venture to suggest that the position of British agriculture to-day affords cause for grave national anxiety, and we may surely ask those who oppose the bimetallic system not to cast it lightly upon one side without first examining into its truths and satisfying themselves that it would not prove a remedy for these many and great evils, the existence of which is generally admitted. (Loud applause.) MR. CHARLES HOARE: Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen I must apologise because I have not prepared a paper with such care as the papers that you have heard read to-day, but perhaps a few remarks by me may not be out of place. I should like to say a few words on the difficulty of fixing the value of silver, and on why bankers should be interested in arresting the appreciation of gold, and how the question of prices is really a fight between producers and people with fixed incomes. The most important question of all, perhaps, is 59 the fixing of the ratio between gold and silver, and I understand that is to be dealt with by Mr. Hucks Gibbs. Now with regard to fixing the value of silver, silver is a commodity, as gold is a commodity, as wheat is a commodity, and all other articles in constant use. But silver, like gold, has special uses. One is for the arts, for instance, and another for the currency. For currency purposes the use of silver has been very largely curtailed, as has been explained to you by previous speakers, and therefore silver has specially fallen in value more than any other commodity that is in general use as measured in gold. I should like to take an agricultural illustration. It is as if the grower of wheat should only have value for his produce owing to some invention, or some new law that the corn of his wheat land should not be of value for human benefit, but such that the wheat plant, instead of being of value to the grower, as it is now, for the sake of the corn and also the straw, should then be only of value, so to speak, for the sake of the straw ; and that is to a large extent what has happened to silver. There are two values of silver, one is for the arts, and the other is for currency purposes. For currency purposes silver has been largely curtailed in its use. (Hear, hear). Now with regard to the action of bankers on this question : it has generally been considered that bankers are opposed to any bimetallic alteration of the currency because they are supposed to gain by the appreciation of gold. As far as I can understand the question, bankers are mixed up most intimately with the prosperity of the country, and we do not gain by any large proportion of our customers carrying on their business at a loss. We gain by the general state of our customers' businesses being prosperous (Hear, hear); so it is quite a mistake to suppose that bankers gain by the appreciation of gold, which means the constant fall in prices, which means a constant 6o carrying on, by our most important customers, of their business at a loss. Now this difficulty of carrying out the programme of the Bimetallic League exists very largely, because the world, so to speak, and England in particular, is divided into two classes. One is the class of producers, and the other is the class of people with fixed incomes and people with fixed incomes I take to be all the people who get their incomes from investments of a fixed character, and all the people who get their income from fixed salaries, whether it is the Chancellor of the Exchequer or the humblest individual employed in Her Majesty's service. All these classes are interested in things being as cheap as possible, because then their fixed incomes enable them to live in increased comfort, and so you find anyone who has paid even but slight attention to this matter, if his income is a fixed one, would say, I am interested in things being cheap, I want things to be cheaper and cheaper, and the more gold appreciates the better will be my position. That is all very well as long as he gets his income, but a time will come, if nothing is done to arrest the appreciation of gold, when these people with their fixed incomes will not get them. (Loud applause). The Conference then adjourned till 2.30 p.m. 6i Wednesday, May 2nd, 1894, 2.30 p.m. THE RIGHT HON. THE LORD MAYOR in the Chair. THE LORD MAYOR : My Lord Dukes, my Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen This morning I was prevented from attending here at the opening of this Conference, but I have great pleasure in doing so now, and I give you all a hearty welcome. My predecessor, Sir Stuart Knill, received you last year. I do so this year with as much pleasure as he did on that occasion. I will not detain you now by any remarks, but will at once call on the Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, M.P. THE RT. HON. A. J. BALFOUR: My Lord Mayor, my Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen I am not sure that I do not owe an apology to this assembly for appearing before them for the purpose, not indeed of giving an elaborate and scientifically reasoned exposition of my views upon this important question, but for the purpose of expressing general sympathy with the objects which have brought us all together. I have always felt some embarrassment in dealing in public with this question, because I am inevitably so much occupied with party politics, it is so large a part of my duty to make myself the spokesman of the opinions of a particular party in the State, that I always feel bound to explain when I appear before a public audience in a different capacity. On this occasion it is specially necessary that I should say that in what I am going to lay before you I speak only for myself, and that I cannot claim, and have no right whatever to claim, to be the organ or the mouthpiece of that one of the great organized parties of the State with which it is my highest honour to be connected. (Hear, hear.) I hope, Ladies and Gentlemen, 62 you will feel in the first place that some liberty of action must be allowed, even to a Leader of an Opposition, and that it is not forbidden him to come and express upon a public platform opinions upon a matter which in his judgment is of the greatest possible public moment (Hear, hear), even if the subject with which he deals is not one upon which either party in the State is agreed, or upon which differences of opinion which exist amongst us at all coincide or correspond with the ancient lines of political demarcation. Now, Ladies and Gentlemen, it appears to me that there are three questions, and three questions only, which we have got to decide in connection with this great controversy, and the first question is this : Is bimetallism, is a double standard, possible? The second question is, Supposing a double standard to be possible, is it just and is it equitable ? And the third question is whether, supposing it to be both possible and equitable, is it expedient that we should adopt it ? On the first of those questions, namely, whether a bimetallic or double standard be possible, I think I see signs of a great change of public opinion. (Applause.) There was a period, and a period not so long ago, when any man who had the courage, or, as it was then termed, the audacity to express an opinion in favour of the double standard, was supposed to be guilty of some economical heresy which, if we still sent people to the stake for heresy, would certainly deserve the utmost rigour of treatment that either the secular or the ecclesias- tical law could impose. I think those days have long gone by. The general consensus of scientific economic opinion has now for many years been thrown with an overwhelming balance of opinion into the scale of the double standard. (Loud applause.) I am not offering an opinion now as to whether the double standard is just or is expedient, I am only discussing whether it is possible, and I say that on that question there is practically now a consensus of the 63 whole economic scientific opinion which has devoted itself to the elucidation of this problem, and any man who, in the face of that opinion, now quotes any of the old tags about demand and supply making it impossible to fix a ratio between the two metals, or such doctrines as that the interference of the State fixing prices must necessarily fail any man who now relies upon arguments of that kind to show that the double standard is an impossible expedient, does nothing else than write himself down as an individual ignorant of the latest scientific development of political economy. (Applause.) Of course, the percolation of scientific opinion through the general body of the community is slow in this case, as it is in every other case, but as in every other case you may be quite certain that what scientific and detached and disinterested speculation decides to be true will ultimately come to be the conviction of the great mass of the educated population of the country, so you may be sure that in this case many years will not elapse before a man who should say that a double standard is beyond the power of international agreement, will show himself to be entirely outside the general balance and body of educated opinion, and will make it clear to all who care to form an opinion upon his authority upon such matters that he is still helplessly and hopelessly groping among ancient and forgotten fallacies. (Loud applause.) I do not dwell further upon this branch, because I understand that my friend, Mr. Leonard Courtney, than whom no more com- petent exponent of economic opinion exists (applause) is going to follow me with a paper in which he will deal specifically with this very point. I pass on, therefore, to the consideration of the next question which I laid down as one of the three which must be answered before we finally make up our minds upon the policy which it behoves us as a nation to pursue. That second question was whether, supposing a double standard to be possible, it was consistent with 6 4 public morality and public honour that it should be adopted ? Now my friend and colleague, Mr. Goschen, than whom no greater financial authority I venture to think exists in this country, has publicly expressed his own dissent from the fallacious views which I have just been criticising, and has explained that so far as he is concerned he really does not agree with the popular current objections to the bimetallic theory. (Applause.) But if I really understand one of the utterances which he made in the course of a very interesting and important speech upon Indian matters, delivered not very long ago, he has not made up his mind that it is consistent with public financial honour that a State should make a change of this kind in the standard which regulates our personal, our national, and our international monetary obligations ; and I quite agree that this is a point in the general question of bimetal- lism which it behoves us most earnestly to consider. If we are to be branded, justly branded, as the immoral monetary party, then I think our case is lost, and deserves to be lost, and I will never come before any audience in this country, least of all an audience in the City of London, and advocate a scheme which, although at all events very convenient and very advan- tageous to particular classes, is inconsistent with the general principles of public morality, which ought to regulate our action in this delicate and important question of monetary honesty. (Applause.) But, Ladies and Gentle- men, though I have given much reflection to the subject I have never been able to see that there was any ground whatever for the particular difficulty with which I am now attempting to deal. Of course history is full of examples of States which have committed fraud, and made them- selves guilty of public plunder, by interfering with the currency over which they had control. The whole history of Europe, the history of North America, and the history 65 of South America give you examples of public frauds of that description ; but while it is certain and is admitted, and while we may further admit that it is a most critical thing for any community to touch the standard of obligations which regulates our commercial rela- tions, I do not think it is right to lay down a proposition so wide that we may not touch that standard for the purpose of improving it and making it more stable, and making it a fair measure of value. (Applause.) I quite grant that it is almost impossible, perhaps it is quite impossible, to pass any legislation with regard to the monetary standard which shall not have some effect or other upon the relations between debtor and creditor, public or private ; but who on that account has ever thought it wrong for a State to rectify a debased currency, or for a State to substitute hard coin (I think that is the American expression) for an inconvertible paper currency ? Such operations, of course, have some effect upon the relations between debtor and creditor, but so far from thinking them blameworthy, the conscience of civilized mankind has always been of opinion, has always thought that there is no object more worthy of the efforts of a great finan- cier than the placing of the currency of his country upon a permanent and stable basis, and the regulating it as far as he could for all time, so that these monetary obligations shall be governed by a fixed and stable measure of exchange. (Loud applause.) These being my general views upon the principles of public morality which ought to guide States in this difficult question, I, perhaps, might leave this branch of my enquiry into this part of the question which I have put to you without further comment or observation, but it may be worth while my reminding you that whether or not bimetallism leads to this interference with the legal standard, yet unquestionably monometallism does lead to it, and that in the most aggravated form. (Applause.) Of E 66 course, from this mixed assembly party politics are abso- lutely excluded, and nothing that I shall say will drag them unnecessarily into the field of our debates, but it may be not improper to say that I have listened with astonishment, verging on amazement, to certain utterances from respon- sible politicians, who have laid down very high doctrines upon the subject of interfering with the currency of the country, but who have made themselves personally and directly responsible for the greatest interference which has probably ever taken place in modern times. (Applause.) I am not going to express any opinion at the present time as to whether the recent Indian legislation upon the subject of currency, for which we in this country are directly responsible, is wise or is unwise, but two things about it cannot be denied the one is that it is the most remarkable attempt ever made by any civilised Government to manipulate the subject of the currency, and the other is that it is an attempt which is the direct and inevitable out- come of adhering to a monometallic system. (Hear, hear.) Therefore, I think I am not unjustified in claiming for bimetallists that at all events they shall not be made subjects of this kind of abuse by those who, if there be any fault in the matter at all, are far more open to criticism, and are far more proper subjects of blame, than any bimetallist can possibly be, even if his schemes be carried out to the full. Now, having disposed of my two first questions, namely, the possibility and the morality of adopting the double system, there remains only the third question, whether it be expedient to do so ; and on this I may perhaps be allowed to say, by way of preface, that I think it will not only be inexpedient, but also impossible to do so, unless the Government of the day which sets to work to deal with this great problem has behind it the balance of opinion in the greatest financial city of the world, viz., London 67 (Hear, hear) that it would be hopelessly impossible for any Government in this country to attempt to drag this country into an international agreement with the City of London against it ; and if it were attempted and in my opinion it ought not to be attempted it would be inexpedient, even if it were possible. But I think I am not wrong though my means of information cannot be so good as those which are possessed by many who now hear me I think I am not wrong in saying that there are indications of an important change in feeling amongst those who lead financial opinion in the great commercial community, before some of the leading members of which I have the honour of speaking at the present moment. It does not require much argument upon the platform from which I am addressing you to convince you that many persons who looked with either active dislike or with suspicion or doubt upon these schemes have now come to the double conclusion that we are menaced at the present time by a grave public danger, and that the way to meet that public danger is again to rehabilitate silver as one of the great instruments of monetary transactions in the world. (Hear, hear.) I believe I am not wrong in saying that there is no name which commands greater respect in the City than that of Mr. Lidderdale (loud applause) the ex-governor of the Bank of England, who did so much to steer us through one of the most fearful crises which has occurred within the memory of living men (Hear, hear) and I believe I am not wrong he is present, and he will contradict me if I am wrong in expressing it as his opinion that it is absolutely necessary that the monetary function of silver should be restored if the commerce of the world is to be carried on under healthy conditions and upon a solid and permanent basis. What Mr. Lidderdale thinks, I am convinced many others think in the City of London, and I do not believe that I am taking part in an E 2 68 impossible, or even a difficult propaganda, in desiring to spread further opinions, with the success of which, in my judgment, the prosperity of the City of London is so intimately bound up. Now the question with which we are concerned is whether it be or be not inexpedient to adopt, by international agreement, this double standard ; and I am far from denying and I think a bimetallist is a very poor friend of his cause who should deny it that there are difficulties, difficulties of detail it may be, but still difficulties inevitably attaching to the solution of this question. I have only to mention one of these difficulties, the difficulty, namely, of determining what shall be the ratio on which the nations of the world are to agree as that which is to govern the future relations between the gold and silver in the double standard. But though there are difficulties, they are, in my judgment, as I have just hinted, difficulties, not of principle, but difficulties of detail, and in spite of these difficulties not at all difficulties of an overwhelming character I am most strongly of opinion that if there be a question in this world which is by its character fit to be dealt with by international agreement, and which ought to be dealt with by international agree- ment, that question is the character of the currency by which international commercial business is to be carried on. (Applause.) I believe there are individuals who cherish the dream that currency is a matter for the State to regulate independently and for itself alone, that with its currency no foreign nation has a right to interfere, that it is a matter simply for the citizens of every community in relation to each other, and that the outside world need not be taken account of at all in coming to a decision upon a question which is one of purely domestic policy. Ladies and Gentlemen, this is a dream. (Hear, hear.) I will go further and say it is a dream worthy only of a mediaeval dreamer. We have long passed that stage in civilization 6 9 when each country was a self-contained, or approximately self-contained, national unit, and when it could afford to disregard the internal commercial relations of other countries. Those days have gone by. They have gone by never to return, and I do not think there is a man in this room who regrets it. (Applause.) But while we have no choice but to allow foreign nations to interfere with our currency, what we can do is to say that they shall interfere with as much regularity and under as carefully prearranged conditions as possible. Just consider this. There are people who say, all you have got to do is to fix on a gold standard or a silver standard, as the case may be, and stick to that, and you will have a measure of value not affected by what other nations do, but dependent upon your own action only. What nonsense that is ! The value of your standard, be it gold or be it silver, is the plaything of forces over which the nation as a nation has no more control than it has over the winds of heaven. A new country is opened up with gold mines or with silver mines, and lo ! your whole standard alters in value ; a chemist or mining engineer makes a new discovery, and lo ! your standard entirely alters in value and in character. It occurs to one nation that it is necessary for its dignity to have a gold currency, and the whole of your commercial relations are upset. Another nation has thought it cannot support by itself the weight of open mints for both metals, and again your whole currency system is upset. We are and must remain units national units in a great com- munity of nations, affected by their action, influenced by their deeds, prosperous or unprosperous according to the policy they adopt ; and, as I think I once said before in this room, is it not absurd to talk, of our taking an inde- pendent and isolated view of our own currency, when the action of the United States of America, an action not taken in concert with us, not taken out of friendly feeling 70 to us, not taken with our knowledge or with our advice, has forced upon the Indian Government and the English Government the adoption of the astounding system which now prevails in our great Dependency ? (Loud applause.) I therefore, Gentlemen, think that for the reasons I have given there is a plain answer to be made to each of the three questions which I put to you at the beginning of my address. I think that bimetallism, or the double standard, is a possible system the joint standard perhaps I ought to call it. I think, in the second place, that we are morally justified as a nation in adopting it. (Hear, hear.) And I think, in the third place, that every reason of expediency ought to urge us to come into international agreement with the other great com- mercial peoples of the world, in order to fix upon what is the most stable basis that we can possibly attain for the measure which is to decide upon all commercial inter- national relations, not now but for all future time. (Loud applause.) Holding these opinions, and feeling as I do how great has been the loss to the world at large, and to this great nation in particular, of having deferred so long coming to a decision on this question ; feeling as I do that the solution of the problem was incomparably easier ten years ago than it was five years ago, five years ago than it is now, and now than it will be five years hence (loud applause) holding, I say, these opinions, great is the responsibility which rests upon those who keep England, the country which, of all others, should take the lead in this matter, in a selfish and I will add a stupid isolation with regard to the movement by which the settlement of this great international question may finally be deter- mined. (Loud applause.) THE PRACTICABILITY OF MAINTAINING A RATIO BETWEEN GOLD AND SILVER UNDER AN INTER- NATIONAL BIMETALLIC AGREEMENT. THE RT. HON. LEONARD COURTNEY, M.P., said : My Lord Mayor, my Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen I feel a double difficulty in appearing before you at this moment. The first is one which you will all recognize the difference, the painful difference, between the art and distinction of the speech of my right hon. friend who has just addressed you and my own. But beyond that, which would be an ever- present difficulty, I have to face this. The special subject upon which I have been invited to address you is the question of the possibility of an international agreement being framed, which would have the promise and hope of permanence. Mr. Balfour has stated that that is a question upon which there is at present a complete consensus of opinion amongst the educated and teaching classes of political economists, and it is a very awkward matter to attempt to impress it upon any audience. Yet this is the question which the conveners of this Conference desired me to attack, and, although it is true, as stated, that the Professors throughout this country and far beyond this country are well united in the opinion that an international agreement would have, if properly made, all the promise of permanence, yet there is a mass of sluggish resistance to new opinions and new creeds which you must go on fighting against, again and again, before you can hope to succeed in the enterprise you have set your hands to. Mr. Balfour himself has said that it would be impossible for any Government, however convinced of the expediency of an international bimetallic agreement, to attempt to enter on negotiations for the purpose of effecting it unless that Government knew that behind it and supporting its 72 action there was the opinion of the City of London. Now I think I recognize, as he recognized, upon the platform behind me and in front representatives of the greatest interests in the City ; men who are deservedly classed as the leaders in its financial and industrial enterprise ; men who may properly be expected to direct and govern opinion. Still I suppose there is not one here who is not aware that there is a great outside mass still indifferent, still unconvinced, and it is in order to get at the uncon- verted without, rather than to preach to the converted within, that we are holding this Conference to-day. (Applause.) Now, upon this question of establishing and maintaining an international agreement, it may be confessed by us all that the answer of the natural man to any such propo- sition would be that it is quite absurd. It is beyond the habits of our thought. It seems to be outside the range of our legislation. How can you fix the value of gold in relation to silver any more than you can fix the value of other commodities ? A hundred voices have been heard in the past to cry out that the whole proposal is a dream ; that it belongs to past traditions, and could not be entertained at the present time ; that it belongs to the range of mediaeval conceptions, when the rulers of nations thought that they could fix the price of bread, and of beer, and of beef, and the wages of men ; and tried to fix these things, and tried in vain and, as we now know, properly tried in vain, and necessarily tried in vain, because they were fighting against the nature of things. Well, if we admit this to be true of the past, there is clearly some presumption against the notion that the relation could be fixed, and could be made permanent between gold and silver, and it is against that presumption that I have to address myself. I have put forward, not unsympathetically, the vast presumption against the possibility of tying gold and silver 73 together at a fixed ratio. We have all had to encounter in this matter the contempt of our friends, sometimes decently veiled, sometimes freely rampant. And it must be conceded to these open scoffers that the opinion they deride is a paradox if true. It is not what you would expect. But things beyond belief are sometimes true. Assertions that contradict our common sense turn out to be right. If it is thought that Mr. Balfour is right in his belief that practised and trained men have altogether put aside this contempt, I can say that I have heard it expressed without any reserve in quite recent months and weeks from the leaders and directors of financial actions amongst our- selves. Is there then any reason for suspecting that some difference exists or can be made out between the connection between gold and silver, and the attempt to fix the price of other objects so that, paradoxical as it may appear, it should, in the end, have to be confessed as practicable that a stable ratio could be effected and could be maintained. Now to persons of candid mind who are approaching this question, I would suggest that it is a somewhat staggering fact that twelve men, having been selected presumably because of some special qualifications for the work, and having given two years, more or less, to its consideration, came in the end unanimously to the conclusion that a stable ratio between gold and silver might, by agreement, be maintained in any condition of the future that could fairly be contemplated. Ridiculously im- possible, says Common Sense. Quite possible, reply the chosen and deliberative twelve. Two, indeed, subscribed to the conclusion with hesitation, doubting about the permanency of the ratio, though it might be maintained for a considerable time ; but this hesitancy scarcely abates from the significance of the consensus. Let it also be remembered, for this is most significant, and it is a thing I shall have to dwell upon again before I cease addressing 74 you, that the twelve were not united in favour of trying to establish a ratio by international agreement. Six were advocates of this step ; six did not see their way to recommend it; and the latter six, while declining to recommend International Bimetallism, made their plain declaration of opinion as to its practicability. Here are their words : "We think that in any conditions fairly to be con- " templated in the future, so far as we can forecast them " from the experience of the past, a stable ratio might be " maintained if the nations we have alluded to [the United " Kingdom, Germany, the United States and the Latin " Union] were to accept and strictly adhere to bimetallism " at the suggested ratio. We think that if in all these " countries gold and silver could be freely coined and thus "become exchangeable against commodities at the fixed "ratio, the market value of silver as measured by gold " would conform to that ratio, and not vary to any material " extent." Now, I have said that these twelve jurymen were persons who were presumably selected because they were able to understand the subject, to collect opinion with some degree of ability, and to come to just conclusions, which might be trusted, from the opinions so collected. I will not say anything more, because I was one of them myself. But these twelve were picked men, and this was the conclusion of the twelve, and especially of the six who were not themselves in favour of any international action. I am sure that the majority of them were men of some discre- tion, and I think nobody will say that our Chairman, who happens to be now, for the second time, Lord High Chan- cellor of England, is a man of hasty or rash or immature judgment. (Hear, hear.) I may add that I have some reason to believe that, if not all for I have not been able to make myself acquainted with the sentiments of all but 75 the majority are precisely of the same opinion now as they were when they signed the Report. They are confirmed in their opinion. Much has happened since the Commission. The development of the money organisation of the world has made it, as Mr. Balfour says, more difficult to consider a change now than it was five years ago, and yet the persons whose authority I have cited are of the same opinion now as they were then. So that we have two years 1 study, two years' examination, and more than five years' consideration of the financial developments which have followed the issue of the Report of the Gold and Silver Commission, confirm- ing the opinion then entertained as to the practicability of maintaining an international agreement. Now that is a very considerable fact, and I am justified in trying to emphasize it to the best of my power. I do not know whether the next circumstance to which Mr. Balfour himself alluded really will carry so much weight as he thought, and as I believe it deserves. After all, professors do not rule the world. (Hear, hear.) The uninstructed resist the tyrannies of their teaching with considerable pertinacity. Why, if professors governed the peoples, the United States would have long ago been a free-trade community, and those who follow the legislation of France cannot always see in that legislation a clear reproduction of the doctrine and the teaching of that great catena of authority which has distinguished the school of political economy for more than a century in France. Therefore, I would not lay too much stress on the practical consequences that should flow from unanimity of professorial opinion, but I may still put upon record upon high authority what I believe is true that all the professors of the United Kingdom have recently had it under their consideration whether they should not sign a declaration of opinion in favour, not only of the possi- bility of establishing an international ratio, but of the desirability of doing it. (Applause.) They have not, I 76 understand, finally agreed upon action ; they have differed as men do yet differ, as to whether there should be any indication of the kind of ratio to be established, and they differed also as to the character and reasons upon which stress should be laid for adopting international action ; but the fact remains and the fact is significant and important that they were all agreed, not only on the possibility of an international ratio being stable, but on the desirability of arriving at an international ratio. There is a concurrence of authority sufficient to make Common Sense reconsider its first conclusions, but I am the last man to think that this or any other matter can be settled by mere authority. I am a great rebel against authority : I like to have one man's opinion, even though the whole world is against it. Therefore, I proceed from the question of authority to consider briefly what are the reasons for this conclusion. What was it that led the Commissioners monometallists and bimetallists alike to believe an international ratio was practicable. I do not think they all thought it when they began their work. My impression is that a great section of them did not in the least believe that a stable ratio was possible when they began to consider the problem they were appointed to review. What was it then that led them one and all alike to believe this international ratio was practicable ? I think the ground of their conviction was very simple. They believed a stable ratio could be maintained because they found it had been maintained. (Hear, hear.) They thought it could survive the dangers of the future because they found it had survived the dangers of the past. After all, there are very few stronger arguments against an attempt to show a thing is impossible than that of adducing an example of its being done. You might have a thousand reasons demonstrating the impossibility of a particular course, but if you get one illustration of it being done 77 what becomes of the thousand reasons ? Sixty years ago people might be persuaded that a steamer could not cross the Atlantic, and learned persons put forth an argument to that effect, but nobody could be so persuaded now ; and the practical evidence that an international agreement, though partially limited, was still powerful enough to be maintained under a severe trial a trial the like of which it is improbable will soon again be met with is what I believe told with the mass of the Royal Commissioners in coming to the conclusion at which they arrived. The Royal Commissioners- found, as an uncontested and incontestable fact, that the price of silver measured in gold had remained wonderfully steady from the beginning of the century down to the year 1873, tne average price oscillating about 6od. per ounce, 59^. being about the lowest point, and 6i$/$d. the highest. For the whole of those seventy-three years that was the steady price of silver. We know what has happened since 1873. Something occurred then, and the price of silver has dropped and dropped and dropped till it is now somewhere between 2gd. and 30^. per ounce, I believe, about one-half of what it was steadily at during the whole of the years from 1800 to 1873. Now that steadiness was a remarkable fact. Mr. Gladstone, you may remem- ber, last year adduced the fact that silver had remained through those years steadily at 6od. an ounce to show the stability of gold. (Laughter.) That was a very queer proposition. If.he had adduced it to show the stability of silver it would have had ^prima facie appearance of being soundly stated ; but it no more proved the stability of gold than of silver. What it did prove was this : that gold measured in silver, and silver measured in gold, had remained steady (applause), that the ratio between them had been steady. As regards all other commodities measured by these two metals it proved nothing, but it proved as between two metals that they were steady, and 78 it becomes at once an important question to ask how was it possible that this steadiness was maintained. These years had been years of great international disturbance had been years of foreign wars of political complications and, what is more, they had been years of immense disturbance in the relative conditions of production of gold and silver. During the first forty-five years of the period under question, silver had been produced in very great abundance as com- pared with gold. During the last twenty-eight years the whole thing was overturned, the conditions of the production of the two metals were interchanged, and yet the ratio between them was unchanged. (Applause.) To what circumstance can you attribute that extraordinary stability ? It might be said " Oh, it is not difficult to understand why gold should always be measured with the same amount of silver, and silver with the same amount of gold both are produced with remarkable steadiness there is no variation in the relative conditions of production of the two metals, and so they remained in the same relation one towards another." But when the produc- tion of gold absolutely changed, as it did, after the gold discoveries of California and Australia, and the whole rela- tions of the two were altered, you must look to some other explanation of this very significant phenomenon. The gold discoveries were such as I say that the amount of gold pro- duced in the world was multiplied ten-fold, and instead of the value of silver produced being about three times that of the gold produced, the value of the gold produced became more than three times that of the silver. (Hear, hear.) Surely if there is any change due to the conditions of the production which must compel a change in the ratio between the two commodities, unless there is some other cause checking and altering the natural consequences of the change of these conditions, such an enormous change as that must have brought it about. (Hear, hear.) There 79 was a complete overturning of the values, and nobody could tell how the thing would end. Holland, we know, demonetized silver. Monsieur Michel Chevalier was so alarmed at the prospect that he wrote a book calling attention to the danger which threatened the whole organi- sation of the economic condition of society, and the late Mr. Cobden thought so highly of it that he translated it into English for the benefit of the English reader; and I am bound to say, looking back on that time, that I think their anxieties were not overstrained. Nobody could tell what would be the end of it. Gold might have gone on being produced more and more profusely. France might have become gorged with gold, parting with its silver so far as effective circulation was concerned, and we might have had, long before it came upon us, a dislocation of the ratio between gold and silver by gold being depreciated instead of appreciated. That danger was never realised. The peril was over-passed ; the production of gold began to decline after something like twenty years : the produc- tion of silver began to increase, and throughout it all there was maintained this absolute stability between gold and silver. (Applause.) But whether gold grew on silver, or silver on gold, the price of silver measured in gold remained steady at and about 60 pence an ounce, until something happened in 1873 having no direct relation to the supply of either metal. Germany demonetized silver, and the mints of France and the Latin Union, which had been freely open to the coinage of it and of gold, under a law which allowed every debtor the option of paying his debt in silver or gold at the ratio of 15^ to i, were closed to silver; and the price 'of 60 pence per ounce the price corresponding to this ratio which had remained steady under all vicissitudes of produc- tion of silver and of gold, began at once to waver and decline, and the decline has proceeded to this day. So With experiences such as these before them, it is not surprising that the Royal Commissioners who shrank from bimetallism were encouraged to express an opinion that a bimetallic ratio might be agreed upon with promise of permanence. There appeared to be no reason to appre- hend greater changes in the conditions of production of the precious metals in the future than had occurred in the past, and the changes that have been realized have in fact not approached those that accompanied the gold discoveries ; and if one agreement of limited range had weathered the severest trials, another and wider agreement might weather the future. It is too late to deny the possibility of that happening again which happened up to 1873. Now, I ask, were Lord Herschell and his colleagues who did not favour action towards bimetallism, rash in their deductions from the experiences of the century ? There is one critic one critic of the highest authority who shakes his head very sadly at the miscarriage of the judgment of those twelve men. Mr. Giffen fights his fight with an ardour and a courage that must command our highest admiration (Oh !) it does mine. He may be entirely mistaken, but I like to see a man fight with his back to the wall when he is convinced, as he is convinced, of the accuracy of his his opinion. Mr. Giffen does not deny that the price of 60 pence per ounce, which did prevail, corresponded to the ratio of 15^ to I, which was the ratio estab- lished in France, but he says that France was never really a bimetallic country ; that it was at one time a silver-using country with a premium on gold, and then it became a gold-using country with a premium on silver, and never, therefore, had the reserves necessary to enable it to keep the silver market steady. If it was steady, and if the point of steadiness corresponded with the French ratio, we must not assume the relation of cause and effect between the ratio and the steadiness. Post hoc ergo Si propter hoc, he says, and says properly, is a dangerous bit of reasoning, and you can never assume that the ratio operates until you understand how it operates. That, I believe, is a true statement of Mr. Giffen's position, as far as it goes. It might be all accident, but it would be a queer accident lasting for years upon years ; still opponents say it might be an accident, and unless we can concoct some explanation which shall show them how the thing worked, we shall not be able to persuade those who cling to the belief in accidents. The explanation which appears upon the face of things will be rejected as the true explanation, and men will remain in their incredulity until we can by some process of cause and effect bring together the stable price and the French ratio. The demonstration of the movement of the heavens was resisted long after it was made patent by Newton's discoveries, and it was resisted until the conviction of the accuracy of his reasoning permeated the public or instructed mind when his explanation came to be adopted. It is true, I admit, that France was predominantly a silver-using country up to 1847. The coinage of silver very much exceeded the coinage of gold. The silver in currency very much exceeded the gold in currency. But while it is true that France was predominantly a silver-using country up to 1847, ^ was not exclusively a silver-using country ; it had always a coinage of gold as well as of silver, and Mr. Giffen gives a table showing that from 1821 to 1847 the coinage of gold was one-tenth of the whole coinage. The fact that such a proportion was minted with fairly continuous steadiness gave France the characteristics and powers of a bimetallic country. A man never presses with equal pressure on both feet. I am not doing so at this moment. I press more heavily upon one or the other, and except in moments of transition from one to the other there is never an absolute equality of pressure, and that is true of all men. None the less, the F 82 fact that I rest upon two feet keeps me in a stable condition. France leaned more heavily on silver than on gold, but both were brought to the French mint, and, as long as both were brought, the ratio established between them in France determined the price of silver in Europe. You cannot have a different price prevailing in one market from that which prevails throughout the rest of the markets of the world, except so much difference as has reference to the cost of transportation, if that one market is effective and working ; and as long as the French market was effective and working, the price of silver in Europe as compared with gold necessarily corresponded to the price in France ; and hence the circumstance which Mr. Balfour has alluded to, and which you must always remember, that we are not and cannot be isolated in this regard. However much we here are indisposed to take any action, we must confess that the action taken elsewhere altogether alters our circumstances here, and our inaction becomes action our inaction produces a change, which cannot but have its effect everywhere, (Loud cheers.) Now what is the explanation ? If gold and silver were metals, with no other use than as means of measuring values, the explanation would be simple and transparent. Forgive me if I state what is to most of you elementary knowledge, but it is necessary to repeat these elementary things if we wish to reach the unconverted man. If I say gold and silver were mere materials of money, the modus operandi would be simple. Suppose a ratio of 25 to i adopted, it would then follow that, in the silver mine just on the margin of profitable working, the production of silver with a given application of capital and labour must be twenty-five times as much as the production of gold in a similarly situated gold mine with a similar application. If you have got a gold mine just making its way, and a silver mine just making its way, and if you apply the same 83 quantity of capital and labour to work the one as you do to work the other, and if the gold is twenty-five times the worth of silver in the markets, the same amount of capital and labour must produce twenty-five times as much silver out of the silver mines as gold comes out of the gold mine ; otherwise you get a transfer of labour and capital from one to the other, until the amounts produced in those mines, on the margin of working, corresponded to the ratio adopted by agreement. If the ratio were placed so high that no silver could be remuneratively obtained in accordance with it, no silver mine would be worked, and silver would cease to be produced ; if so low that gold could not be obtained at a profit, no gold mine would be kept open ; but between these limits many ratios would be practicable, and if a ratio were chosen that nearly corresponded with what may be called normal conditions of gold and silver mining, both the metals would be freely worked and freely tendered for minting. Between those limits indicated there are a great variety of ratios which might be practically adopted, and which might continue to rule, and by the adoption of which the Government would keep open or shut up the mines in question, so as to determine what gold mines should work and what silver mines. If, in fact, we said that gold was to be thirty times as valuable as silver, and it had no other use than its use in money, you could not keep open a silver mine, profitably working, except it produced thirty times the bulk of that metal as compared with the gold, both mines being carried on on the margin of production. The theoretical conditions of the problem are made more complex by the consideration that gold and silver have other uses than to serve as the material of coin, but they are not substantially altered by this addition. It is easy to see that if silver were now freely readmitted to use as money among the commercial nations at its present market F 2 8 4 ratio, gold would not cease to be produced, and its produc- tion and mintage need not even be sensibly lessened. The gold mines would go on as they go on now if we adopted a ratio which conformed to the present ratio, and if the ratio were more in favour of silver than the present ratio, some gold mines might cease to be profitable, but others would continue working : and up to a considerably higher point the ratio might be advanced before all the gold mines should be driven out of work. Between those extreme limits which can only be ascertained in fact by experience some mean can easily be recognized as that which will allow both sets of mines to be kept open. Between those extremities there is a long range of practicable ratios which might be adopted with stable maintenance by the countries of the world. (Hear, hear.) Now, I have only one thing to say in conclusion. The belief that an international agreement could be established with promise of permanence may be held without any corresponding conviction that it ought to be attempted. You will remember I stated at the first that the six of the Royal Commissioners who did not see their way to recom- mending international action were all convinced of the practicability of establishing a ratio. You may therefore be ready to recognise the practicability without proceeding to insist on its desirability, and it is well to get this one thing recognised and acknowledged and advanced. Another instance may be cited. There never was a sturdier monometallist than the late Lord Bramwell, who fought the battle of monometallism almost as lustily and pertinaciously as Mr. Giffen himself. But Lord Bramwell came before the Royal Commission, and demonstrated in his vigorous way, that a ratio was possible by international agree- ment. He disdained to palter with his mind. He saw it was possible, and he gave his reasons for the belief. He proved to the satisfaction of himself and of those who heard 85 him that it was possible, and he ended by saying it was not desirable. But indeed he demonstrated so much long before the Royal Commission sat. As far back as May, 1881, he had sent a letter to The Times, signed with his well-known signature " B," in which he laid down and demonstrated, not only the feasibility of effecting a ratio by international agreement, which could be maintained, but he pointed out, in the way that I have attempted to point out now, the limits within which such a ratio must lie in order to be practicable and effectual. I therefore only desire in conclusion to say that I have limited my speech and address to the point of the practica- bility of the ratio. I have myself gone farther. I have attempted to argue and I do not shrink from it that it is desirable that a ratio should be effected by international agreement. (Loud cheers.) The evils of its absence press upon me, and press upon me more and more heavily. I think it is desirable, but my paper here is only directed to the question of the practicability of a ratio. To that only it is addressed not to the desirability of it, though I am in favour of it. Nothing whatever has been said and I desire to safeguard myself in conclusion from being supposed to utter any opinion as to what the ratio should be if the ratio is to be adopted. I have only endeavoured to dispel, as far as I can, the prejudice of the common man the unthinking prejudice the vulgar prejudice the primary prejudice of the primary human being that this thing is impossible because he has not appreciated that it has been done, and because he has not been able to follow out the argument which demonstrates the reason why it has been accomplished. (Loud cheers.) M. HENRY CERNUSCHI (Paris) : Mr. President Either it will be stipulated that silver shall be universal money, and that in Europe and the United States gold shall be money at the ratio of I to 1 5 ^ of silver, or nothing will 86 be stipulated. Why? Because if for the ratio of i$y 2 you substitute a ratio more favourable to gold, France will be obliged either to remint her gold pieces in order to make them lighter, or to remint her silver franc pieces in order to make them heavier. I am going to demonstrate that France cannot and ought not to undertake to remint either her gold or her silver currency. Two hundred francs in silver, of nine-tenths fineness, weigh a kilogramme (40 crowns). Three thousand and one hundred francs in gold of nine-tenths fineness weigh also a kilogramme (155 coins of 20 francs). These 200 francs in silver, and these 3, 100 francs in gold constitute the 15^ ratio. Let us suppose that, in accordance with what is proposed from various quarters, France were to consent to adopt, as an international ratio between silver and gold, 25 to I, instead of the old ratio of 15^ to I. If France were to give effect to that change by coining gold pieces of less weight than those now current, she would have to divide the kilogramme of gold, not into 155 pieces, but into 250 of the current value of 20 francs each, though lighter. You would then have 5,000 francs in gold against 200 francs in silver 5,000 to 200, that is, 25 to one. Thus he who possesses at the present moment 3,100 francs in gold, would find himself worth 5,000. He would only have to melt down his 155 coins and present his bar to the Mint, and he would receive in return 250 pieces of 20 francs (5,000 francs). He would, therefore, gain 1,900 francs, or 62 per cent. That is absurd, ridiculous, and inadmissible. Then what would happen if France, to realise the ratio of 25 to I, instead of tampering with her gold currency, were to withdraw her silver coins in order to mint heavier ones ? It would then be necessary to divide the kilogramme of silver, not into 200 francs, but into 124, for 3,100 francs in gold are to 124 francs in silver in the ratio of 25 to I. The loss would be 76 francs, or 38 per cent. It would not 87 be the public who would have to bear that loss, but the Treasury. In return for a thousand million francs with- drawn from circulation, the French Treasury would have to pay a thousand million francs in silver coins of an additional weight of 38 per cent., or in gold coins. Loss, 380 million francs on each thousand million. It is true that since 1873 the five-franc pieces have been nothing more than metallic tokens just like all other silver coins in Europe and in the United States, and like all the rupees since the coinage of silver has been pro- hibited at Calcutta and Bombay. But francs in gold are so plentiful that they are not at a premium in silver francs. If Great Britain will not have bimetallism at a ratio of 15^, France must remain in statu quo and wait. The disappearance of the French bimetallic parity in 1873 was followed by two results : (i) frequent and violent fluctuations in the rate of exchange between countries, on the one hand, who only strike gold coinage, and, on the other hand, countries monometallic in silver ; (2) a great fall in this same rate of exchange. Fluctuations in the rate of exchange would be abolished if a ratio (whether 10, 15, 20, or 25) were fixed by the great metallic powers. But the incalculable damage that has been done, and is being done, by the great fall in the rate of exchange, cannot be stopped except by a return to the 15^ ratio. Even if you established by international con- vention the ratio of 25 to I, you would only sanction the evil, consecrate and perpetuate it. The Indian Treasury, which has already, in twenty years, disbursed a thousand millions of rupees, levied upon the taxpayers, to meet the losses on the exchange between the rupee and the pound sterling the Indian Treasury would find itself obliged to procure, every year, by taxes or by loans, about 120 million rupees, if instead of realising the 15^ ratio it had to accept the ratio of 25 to I imposed by international 88 agreement. The losses that the fall of the rate of exchange inflict in Europe upon agriculture, commerce and various industries, and those that it inflicts upon the finances of States monometallic in silver, and upon the creditors of those States, would become chronic and permanent. The ratio of 15^ was proposed conjointly by the United States and France at the Monetary Conference held in Paris in 1881. That ratio cannot but suit Germany, for the thaler, which is unlimited legal tender for three marks, has a ratio of 15^ to the gold currency of that country. The Dutch silver florin weighs almost exactly \^/z florins in gold. The silver rouble weighs 15^ roubles in gold. The 1 5 ^ ratio, therefore, suits the whole continent. The position of silver in Austria is, however, peculiar. The Austrian florin is too heavy in relation to the gold crown recently introduced. If 1^/4 were adopted as the inter- national ratio, Austria would have to convert her florins into silver crowns of a weight of 15^ in relation to the gold crown. The holders of florins would realise a bonus, but the other countries would have nothing to complain of, especially as the majority of these florins were coined when silver was everywhere at a ratio of i$yi to gold. What about the United States ? The silver dollar weighs 412^ grains, or equal in weight to 16 gold dollars. It is too heavy. It would have to be replaced by a new dollar weighing 15^ dollars in gold, that is to say, 400 grains. That change would mean a profit of 3 cents per dollar to holders either in specie or in silver certificates. Moreover, the Federal Government would, without spending a cent, become proprietor of the balance which would remain of all the silver purchased at a low price from 1878 to 1894. But these profits would involve no loss to Europe ; they have, so to speak, been paid in advance by the mine owners, who sold their metal to the Government during the suspension of bimetallism at 15^ to I. 8 9 With regard to England, while keeping her pound sterling and her token money, she would only have to resume the coinage of rupees and to introduce a ^s. piece containing 350 grains of fine silver, in order to realise at home the i$J/2 ratio to the pound sterling in gold. The 15^ ratio is even more advantageous, more indis- pensable to England and to India than to France, to Germany, and to the United States. And it is England that ought to protest if the other Powers proposed to sub- stitute for the 15*^ ratio any other proportion more favourable to gold (Cheers.) MR. ROBERT BARCLAY said : Ladies and Gentlemen The arrangements of this Conference were that certain papers were to be read upon given subjects, and that the discussion afterwards was to be on the subject of these papers. Mr. Leonard Courtney, as you are aware, has given an important paper upon the practicability of maintaining a ratio between gold and silver under an inter- national bimetallic agreement. Mr. Cernuschi has rather transgressed the rule of discussion, and I leave altogether what he has said to be dealt with by Mr. Hucks Gibbs when the matter of -ratio comes to be considered at to-morrow's sitting. I now go on under the arrangement with a very few words, following up Mr. Courtney's very able paper. I think that the Bimetallic League has very much reason to congratulate itself upon the great advance which this Conference marks. There has been a league of silence in existence working against our league ; and in no place has our question been so completely burked, and the public mind so kept in ignorance of the advance made, as has been the case by the press in London. (Hear, hear.) After great efforts, those who early started in this cause were delighted to find that the Government had consented to a Commission upon the subject. The Gold and Silver Commission was appointed, and after 90 two years of laborious investigation they issued their masterly report, not complete and in the style that we would have altogether wished, but it was, nevertheless, a most important report. Unfortunately, that report fell flat upon the London mind. Why? Because the London people did not know what it was. It was all in Blue Books, and very few people read these Blue Books. People trust to be informed by the public press of what is going on, by brief summaries of information giving them the gist of all that is done without the trouble and toil of wading through Blue Books. But nothing of this kind was done by the London press, and the consequence was that this important report fell dead, and seemed to have been as it were interred. Now to-day I think we are witness- ing here a resurrection of that report, and in the masterly speech of Mr. Courtney we have come to see to-day the underground foundation which this Commission laid a strong and stable foundation, not only in the report of the Bimetallic members, as one-half of them came to be called (they were not such, you must remember, when they began their labours), but in the report of the whole twelve selected jurymen, as Mr. Courtney has called them, was there laid a foundation upon which we can build up and go forward in this glorious cause ; and Mr. Courtney can cite the very words of these jurymen in support of his contention as to the practicability of maintaining a ratio between gold and silver. That is a very important point which we have gained. Mr. Courtney has also referred to the weight of scientific opinion now in our favour, and has very fairly stated the influence which the change of attitude in this respect ought to have. At the beginning of the movement all the then professors were against us, but it is very different now. We must remember that the whole of England was until lately monometallic. Twenty years ago the bimetallists could be counted almost on the fingers, and there were only a few men who raised their voices against the foolish counsels which were given in 1867, which led to the demonetization of silver by Germany, and brought trouble directly upon England and upon the whole world. I think the position that we have shown to-day of strength and progress marks a glorious step onwards in this great cause, and I do not see how the advance can stop here. You have given an impetus to it by this Conference, and the noble words which we have heard from Mr. Balfour, as well as from Mr. Courtney, and those who spoke earlier in the day, will help to carry us on to victory. .We often meet with people who say, You are missing the most important thing ; you are looking too much at silver, or you are looking too much at gold and neglecting the silver aspect of the question ; but the question is many-faced, and everyone from his own standpoint sees a particular aspect of it. It is just like a cut diamond with many faces, which sparkles most brightly from the one particular face which you happen to see, and this hides for the moment what the other faces of that diamond are, but every side is important when you come to look at it ; and you must remember that your friend, who has been perplexed by other considerations than yours, has as much cause for seriousness as you have. It is sometimes a silver question affecting exchanges ; at other times it is a gold question affecting values. It reaches all quarters, and is so many-faced because it touches the whole life of man, and the whole of his relations, both in business and in social life. Truth is often slow in getting under weigh, as it were, and the best productions of man sometimes at first remain unheeded, but they tell at last, and I believe that this important report of the Gold and Silver Commission is going to come up with light and strength and illumination upon this question in a way which people never thought of. 92 MONS. ALPHONSE ALLARD, Brussels (Honorary Director -of the Belgian Mint), gave an address in French, of which the following is a translation : : My Lord Mayor, My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen After the eminent speakers to whom you have been listening, I am naturally diffident in addressing such an imposing assembly. I must apologise for doing so in French, and will try not to overtax your patience. I wish to lay stress upon what the preceding speakers have told you, about that singular pretension in which the monometallists would have you believe, viz. : THAT IT HAS BECOME IMPOSSIBLE TO RE-ESTABLISH THE FIXED RATIO WHICH HAS HITHERTO EXISTED BETWEEN GOLD AND SILVER, AND THAT, ON ACCOUNT OF THE HEAVY FALL IN VALUE OF THE LATTER METAL. If the silver metal expressed in gold has fallen in value, we all know that it is because in 1873 ^ aws were made in Europe for abolishing the fixed ratio which existed between the two metals. When it was decided to make those laws the white metal had not depreciated ; the fall, therefore, has only been caused by written laws, and is only the fac- titious work of man not the fatal work of nature which is irremediable. To be frightened, with the monometallists, at the fall of silver would be acting like those children who make big shadows on a wall and are themselves frightened by them. What I wish to show, My Lord Mayor, is that, in spite of the fall in silver, the fixed ratio between gold and silver can be re-established ; that it has always existed, and that it will force itself on the civilisation of to-day in defiance of efforts to the contrary ; and finally, that if we wait too long we shall be threatened with much greater evils than those we have experienced so far. We belong to an age in which steam and electricity hurry us on so fast that we have scarcely time to read a 93 book, a review, or even a newspaper article one might almost ask if there is time to think ? You will, I know, excuse my entering, therefore, into certain details which are indispensable with so vast a subject. Simple solutions are accepted to-day with such facility that monetary studies become vitiated. Here are five points which have been spread about amongst the public these points are simple, but are only paradoxes : 1. IT IS NECESSARY TO HAVE ONE STANDARD OF VALUE ; 2. THERE SHOULD BE ONLY ONE METALLIC CURRENCY ; 3. SILVER MUST BE SUPPRESSED, BECAUSE IT HAS FALLEN ; 4. ONLY THE GOLD STANDARD SHOULD BE ADOPTED, BECAUSE IT IS UNCHANGEABLE; 5. FINALLY, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO UNITE BY A FIXED RATIO A METAL WHICH VARIES WITH ONE WHICH DOES NOT. 1 feel assured that I am reproducing here the arguments, of the monometallists just as I heard them two years ago (in 1892) at the Brussels Conference. We ought to combat such statements, not only in the name of Science, but in that of History, Progress and Humanity. I. " THERE SHOULD ONLY BE ONE INVARIABLE STANDARD OF VALUE," IT IS SAID. I have often heard this phrase repeated, and have devoted much time to trying to understand the idea which it was intended to express, but it has never, to my thinking,, represented more than a hollow sound, very sonorous, and resembling that of a drum. 94 The value of a thing is the quantity of money you pay for it. If money is scarce, one gives little ; if abundant, one gives much. The result, therefore, is that the value of commodities, as well as that of money, will always vary, and that incessantly, as much with one as with two metals. If all values are always variable, always changing, how, I ask, in these restless waves, will one find this myth which has never existed, an unchangeable standard of value ? It is very evident that there is no cause for attaching importance to the first of these five propositions which I have mentioned : there cannot be an invariable standard of values which are elastic. Let us pass, please, to the second point. II. " THERE SHOULD ONLY BE ONE METALLIC CURRENCY." It is very easy to state such a thing, but when it comes to putting it into practice a material impossibility confronts us. As Mr. Dana Horton said at the Monetary Conference of 1878 : " I can well say that I should be charmed to lose twelve inches of my waist ; but who will give me the means of doing so ? " It is now twenty years since the people of Europe decided to have only one metal, and not to use silver any more. It is not sufficient, however, to enact such a law in order to change the nature of things, and to modify society that has been established for many centuries past. In this connection let us remember the old adage which says : " that no law can validate that which is forbidden by nature?' Not one of the nations of Europe who have formulated this law of the demonetization of silver have succeeded in getting rid of that metal, or of doing without it ; and yet they have been striving to this end for nearly a quarter of a century. It is that nature is opposed to their efforts. Twenty years in attempting, without success, to demonetize 95 silver ! ! ! Is it not proof positive that monometallism with gold is but a dream, and that by itself gold is insufficient ? After all, its scarcity has up to the present only ended in a fall of all prices, an intense crisis, and to continue the experience would certainly result in a disaster ; we shall never succeed in suppressing silver money ; two-thirds of the population of the globe are using this metal only. III. " WE MUST SUPPRESS SILVER BECAUSE IT HAS FALLEN IN VALUE, AND MAINTAIN GOLD ALONE IN CIRCU- LATION BECAUSE IT DOES NOT VARY." Here, Gentlemen, the error is a double one, and we must all the more fight it with energy. It is from that mistaken belief that the error of our opponents arises it is gold alone which has risen in price. As for silver, it has but followed the fate of all the other commodities ; it has fallen neither more nor less than grain, silky wool and all the other riches of the world. This per- sistent mistake of refusing to see the rise of gold and merely observing the fall of silver, reminds us of the illustrious Italian mathematician of the i6th century, Galileo, who had such great trouble in proving that it was the earth and not the sun which was revolving. Our difficulty to-day consists in convincing people that it is gold which \\&s risen, and not silver which has /#//#, in value; that, in other words, the malady against which we are contending and to which the remedy should be applied, is the appre- ciation of gold. It is eleven years since this phenomenon was pointed out by one of your greatest financiers, one of your most eminent statesmen, Mr. George Goschen, at the Bankers' Institute. In 1883 it was that he summed it up in these few admirably expressed words : " Happy are those iv ho possess pounds sterling in gold unhappy those, on the contrary, who have merchandise or riches to sell!' 9 6 People are to-day beginning to understand how true was that remark uttered eleven years ago : they are beginning to understand that the capitalists and property owners suffer less from the fall in prices than the producers, agriculturists and workmen. It is therefore clear to every- body that the monetary question is developing protectionism and social war. We find, it is true, a few hardened persons, generally the oldest of the old School, who bravely assert that there is quite enough gold, and give as proof the abundance of cash balances at the banks, without in any way remembering that that arises from the decrease of business. Take away half the horses from the London omnibuses, and the public service would cease. Afterwards go to the stables, and tell me if you do not find there many horses. The cash balances of the Banks of Europe are the stables where the gold is, now idle for want of business transactions ; the presence of that gold is a sign of a public calamity. Gold is the social blood which ought to circulate in the channels of commerce, and when it stops one may expect accidents, apoplexy or ansemia ; we become now ansemics. It cannot any longer be doubted that the demonetization of silver has produced the scarcity of money and the fall in gold prices ; the only remedy is an international agree- ment for the restoration of silver to its former monetary position before 1873 ; that is to say, with a fixed ratio of value between the two metals. IV. They say further, " IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH A PRO- PORTION OF FIXED VALUE BETWEEN SILVER WHICH HAS FALLEN AND VARIES EVERY DAY, AND GOLD THE METAL WHICH HAS ESSENTIALLY A FIXED PRICE." In this there is an impossibility which does not exist, and against which facts themselves protest. Not only do all 97 the nations of Europe employ silver for payments in cash, but they employ it in a fixed proportion as compared with gold, although they all decided a quarter of a century ago to do without silver ! The monometallists pretend that it would be impossible for nations met in Conference to establish a fixed ratio between gold and silver, whilst each of these peoples retain at home their unit of value intact for a quarter of a century : the thaler s in Germany ; the 5 francs among the Latin Union ; the florins in Austria ; the drachmas in Greece ; the piastres in Spain ; and the roubles in Russia, are silver moneys joined by a fixed link of value to gold. In bars, silver is reckoned at 32 kilos to one kilo of gold ; whereas in coin only about 15^4 kilos are required. What you each one of you do at home, why could you not do all together by international arrangement ? I ask you. The price of gold coin is only, after all, a price forced by law. Why could not the price of all those silver moneys circulating with full paying power in Europe be also fixed by law ? and why could we not again open the mints to silver as in former years ? It is generally believed then, that England since 1816, and in conformity with the principles of Lord Liverpool, had become monometallic. In law that was true, but in fact it is, I believe, a mistake. England has in reality benefited until 1873 by the tie which existed in France between gold and silver in the proportion of I to 15^, and has used bimetallism, without which she could not have prospered. Whenever England received silver from her Colonies, that silver was sent to France in exchange for gold, which in London was coined into sovereigns. Whenever, on the other hand, she had to remit silver to India, she sent her sovereigns to Paris, taking in exchange silver five-franc pieces, which were sent to the East. This was constantly G 9 8 done between the years 1851 and 1868. This was the application of the monometallic principles of Lord Liverpool. Until 1873, England has therefore been able to remain with impunity monometallic in law, because in fact France furnished her with all the advantages of her own bimetallic system. England benefited by the fixity of value between gold and silver which existed on the other side of the channel. It was that system which was called Lord LiverpooFs Monometallism. After 1873, and when that fixity of value between the two metals ceased to exist in France, England entered, but entered then only into the monometallic state, both in law and in fact, such as Lord Liverpool had meant it. It is unnecessary to recall here the crises which began nearly a quarter of a century ago,, and which are far from ending if the fixity of value between the two metals is not restored. V. SINCE ITS ORIGIN CIVILISATION HAS USED THE TWO- METALS WITH A FIXED RATIO OF VALUE BETWEEN THEM. These questions are far from being new, in fact they are as old as the world. I am speaking to Christians who know the Scriptures. The wisest of all the kings, King Solomon y was confronted 3,000 years ago by the same diffi- culties as England is to-day ; he had also to consider the question of trade with India. This fact appeared to me sufficiently extraordinary to bring it before your notice ; it was established by the enquiring researches of one of your most illustrious Oxford Doctors, your celebrated philologist, Mr. Max Miiller. The Scriptures state in the Book of Kings that Solomon had the fleet of Tharsis, a long-voyaged fleet, which brought not only gold and silver to Jerusalem, but also great riches from India (Ophir), amongst which ivory ^ monkeys and 99 peacocks^ words written in Sanskrit, the language of the Brahmins, which betray without possibility of mistake their Indian origin. Solomon had also to consider the question of silver. He tells us in the Book of Kings (v. 27, ch. x.) that silver "was made to be in Jerusalem as stones" King Solomon was in the same position as England of to-day ; he had to consider the fall of silver. What did this wise king do ? He never thought for a minute, like Lord Liverpool did, of demonetizing silver ; he tells us himself (Kings I., ch. x., v. 25) he received his taxes in gold and silver, despite the depreciation, and performed an act of true bimetallism. He counted, doubtless, on the com- modities which he could purchase in India with that silver. Already in those remote days a fixed ratio existed between the two metals. In this very room of the Mansion House, in the month of February, 1889, your illustrious Oxford Professor, Mr. Max Miiller, announced his magnificent and learned discoveries in philology. He informed us that at Babylon there existed pieces of gold of the weight of one of your pounds sterling ; that pound sterling of gold was subdivided into twenty shekels of silver (one might almost say shillings). In calculating their weight the learned Doctor succeeded in proving that the fixed ratio between gold and silver was I to 13^ 3,000 years ago. You will allow, My Lord Mayor, that it is very strange to find that 3,000 years ago King Solomon had to consider the depreciation of silver, and that from the point of view of India, just as England has to do to-day. It is just as curious to find that bimetallism resisted the fall of silver which oppressed Jerusalem ; that, notwithstanding, Solomon continued to receive his taxes in silver; and that, finally, the English pound sterling which dates from those remote times had a fixed ratio with silver of i to 13^. There is, therefore, nothing very new in hearing us ask G 2 100 to-day for the re-establishment of bimetallism which existed already in the reign of Solomon. Europe and America are awaiting the signal from England for a new Inter- national Monetary Conference which would save humanity from its present ills. England would only follow the wise example of its ancient king, Edward IV. Allow me to mention to you in this respect a precedent very little known, and nowhere related until now. It was discovered a few months ago, by one of my countrymen, Mr. Alphonse de Witte, a very learned Belgian numismatist, in the archives of the city of Bruges, viz. : "King Edward IV. of England, and Charles the Bold, " Duke of Burgundy, being much concerned about the " scarcity of money which created in their dominions a great " fall in prices, disorders and a great wrong to the public " wealth, and both being very desirous of relieving the " agriculture, industry and commerce of their two countries, " agreed to call together in Bruges, in 1469, the first " Monetary Conference which, I believe, ever existed. As " a result of this Conference England and Belgium signed " a convention which gave currency in the two countries " to twenty-seven kinds of gold and silver coin. This " was consequently a bimetallic currency. The two " nations found so great an advantage from it that a " new treaty was made in 1 520." Might one not hope, My Lord Mayor and Gentlemen, that your great country, bearing this precedent and excellent example in mind, would decide to also take the initiative in calling together a new International Monetary Conference, as Edward IV. did in 1469 ? The whole world would be grateful for it. 101 VI. "CIVILISATION HAS ALWAYS USED THE TWO METALS, AND WHEN IT HAS ATTEMPTED TO DO WITHOUT ONE OF THEM IT HAS ALWAYS COME TO GRIEF." The most memorable attempt of this kind is, I think, that of Mirabeau, in the third year of the French Republic. There was enacted by the " Convention " a monetary system based on silver only ; gold was simply an accessory of variable value. Scarcity of money was the result of this law ; the fall in prices (which always follows) was the consequence, so that at the end of the year XI. they were forced to revert to bimetallism, which established itself everywhere, and still exists in Europe. It is the same attempt which was made on a larger scale and by more nations at a single time in 1873 ; it still continues the same evils have followed, and they will continue as long as a fixed ratio of value is not established between gold and silver currency, with free coinage for the two metals. Those laws made in 1873 against silver are in opposition to our manners, customs and habits, such as they have been established for more than 3,000 years. We have tried to do without silver, and the result is as a vast shroud thrown over the business of the world. The fall in prices, the persistent diminution of riches, the want of work, the struggles of labour against capital, socialism and even anarchism, are bringing us back every day nearer the worst times of 1848, with this difference, of course, that we have no longer California and Australia, as in 1851, to end the social troubles which -now cause us anxiety. Gold alone is evidently insufficient, and we shall have to imitate Solomon by accepting silver again as formerly, and fixing a relative value between the two metals this is the possible way of utilizing silver. 102 If we do not succeed in this we must give up putting silver in circulation, and we shall then be called upon to see the present crisis continue and the fall in prices increase. But you will ask how far can this go ? I reply in conclusion, My Lord Mayor, to that question, that, I fear, one can assign no limit to it, and, with your permission, I will find the proof in a fact drawn from the History of England in the time of Edward III., the illustrious founder of the Order of the Garter and of the Post Office in England in 1349. For 209 years no money had been coined at the London Mint ; merchandise, property and goods had reached such a point that the smallest quantity of gold or silver had the power of buying enormous quantities of commodities, so scarce was money and so high in price. The fall in prices reached such a point that Edward III., this powerful King of England, when marrying his daughter, only settled on her a sum scarcely equal (according to Jacob, on u Precious Metals") to 110 sterling. Our monarchs have not yet considered it their duty to content themselves with such a small income, but this example proves at all events that, without free coinage of silver, with a fixed ratio between gold and silver, we are advancing on certain ruin. In conclusion, I sincerely pray that the noble efforts of the English Bimetallic League may very soon be crowned with signal success, in order to avoid an impending disaster. Mr. WM. SMART, LL.D. (Lecturer on Political Economy, University of Glasgow) : There are two points bearing on the practicability of the ratio on -which I might say a word. The first is, that arguments against the maintenance of an international ratio, based on the failure of such attempts in previous centuries, are quite beside the mark. I do not 103 think that the people who use this kind of argument realise the difference there is between the ipth and all the centuries which came before it. If it is remembered that, in 1760, there was not a canal nor a spinning mill in all England ; that 70 years ago, there was not a railway line in existence, it is enough to show that many things may be attempted now which could not be thought of a hundred years ago. In particular, I would draw attention to one difference ; it has been noted by Professor Seeley, but does not get the attention it deserves. It is that it was not till well on in this century that peace became the habit of the world, and industry its all-absorbing occupation. Let me run over the wars in which we were engaged between the Revolution and Waterloo. The accession of Dutch William plunged us into a war with France, which lasted till 1697. Five years later we were righting, along with Austria, the Dutch Republic and Portugal ; again against France, the war of the Spanish Succession, made notable by the victories of Marlborough. This lasted 11 years. In 1713 came the longest truce of the century the 26 years of peace we owed to Walpole. But in 1739 we went to war with Spain over Captain Jenkins' ears, and Spain, being in close alliance with France, we fell into war with our old enemy by the way. This lasted nine years. Eight years more and we, in common with the States of Europe, were plunged into that sanguinary struggle known as the Seven Years' War France, Austria, Russia, and the German States on one side, against Frederick the Great and ourselves on the other. Twelve years after that again, in 1775, we entered on that most lamentable war with our revolted American colonies, which lasted eight years, and brought us into conflict again with France and the Dutch Republic. Ten years more, and we began that life and death struggle with revolutionary France, which lasted, with one year of uneasy truce, till -Waterloo, But before its end we had drifted into a war with America in 1812. That is to say : in 1 26 years we had seven great wars, the shortest lasting seven years, the longest twelve ; in all sixty-four years of active war. These were all European wars in which England was engaged. But, besides these, we had our disturbances within our own country ; we were conquering India meanwhile, and, of course, the nations of Europe had other wars among themselves. Now, gentlemen, if you consider the history of the world since Waterloo, how little, comparatively, its peace has been disturbed ; how limited the great wars of our century have been, and pass from that to realize how intimately the interests of every country are now bound up with the interests of almost every other, by reason of the develop- ment of trade and the investment of capital, you will agree with me, I think, that international agreements are now possible which a century ago were inconceivable. This being so, if we find that, for the first seventy years of the present century, one nation,, almost single-handed, maintained a fixed ratio between gold and silver, and so affected their relative values in the other countries that the greatest variation from that ratio was insignificant, I think we may say that an international agreement to maintain the ratio does not deserve to be called an " experiment." I am very much tempted to point out that there can be no better guarantee of international peace than an inter- national money. The other thing I should like to say is, that gold and silver are as much sui generis among commodities as the nineteenth has been among centuries ; and that the assertion, so often made, that no power has ever been able to fix the relative value of any other commodities, suggests a false analogy. Money metallic money is indeed a commodity, but it is a commodity which stands in a class by itself, and cannot be dismissed by assertion about commodities generally. Is there any other commodity which all the world wants, and of which no one has ever too much ? Is there any other commodity which we take, not to use, but to hold and to pass on unused ? Is there any other commodity whose market is the whole world a commodity, that is, which is saleable anywhere and at any time ? Is there any other commodity which you can take to a Government office, and have returned to you weighed and assayed, and guaranteed, and put in convenient form, with- out charge ? Is there any other commodity which does its work, not with the annual crop or with the crops of a few years, but with a stock accumulating since the days of the Pharaohs ? Is there any other commodity on which you can raise a superstructure of economies and substitutes so gigantic as to put the original foundation almost out of sight ? Finally : Is there any other commodity which a Govern- ment will accept for all dues, customs, taxes, and, to crown all, in which no creditor can refuse to take payment of his debt? Till our opponents can show us other commodities at all like these, I deny that failure to maintain the relative values of any ordinary commodities is an argument against the fixing and maintaining of a ratio between the two " Third Commodities " * of the world. The proceedings of the Conference then terminated for the day. *Gold and silver as monetary metals. io6 Thursday^ ^rd May, iSy^ n a.m. MR. HENRY HUCKS GIBBS, President of the Bimetallic League, in the Chair. THE EFFECTS OF THE FALL IN THE GENERAL LEVEL OF PRICES. a. THE AGRICULTURISTS. b. THE MANUFACTURERS. C. THE WAGE-EARNERS. d. THE MERCHANTS. e. THE BANKERS. /. THE INVESTORS. SIR WILLIAM H. HOULDSWORTH, Bart., M.P., said: I do not propose in this paper to attempt a demonstration of the specific effects of a fall in the general level of prices upon each of the various classes of business enumerated in the programme. These particular effects will be dealt with in detail by subsequent speakers. My aim will be to lay down the great principle which underlies all special results, in the hope that it may serve as a general explanation how it is that a fall in the general level of prices caused by a contraction of the currency, or, in other words, by the appreciation of the standard of value, leads to commercial and industrial depression, which must ultimately injuriously affect all classes of the community. That general principle can scarcely be better or more concisely stated than in the phrase used by Mr. Balfour in his speech in this hall on the 3rd of August last year. He then characterised " the appreciation of the standard of value " (which I need not remind you is the equivalent of a fall in the general level of icy prices) as " the most deadening and benumbing influence that can touch the springs of enterprise in a nation." The main reason why a continuous or prolonged fall in prices causes depression in trade and industry is, that it discourages enterprise on the part of capitalists, whether large or small ; and by increasing the burden of their obli- gations gradually deprives them of the power to extend or even to carry on productive industries. This state of things sooner or later must rob an increasing population of wage- earners of the opportunities of labour. This, in its turn, must react prejudicially on the army of distributors (some- times called middlemen), whether merchants, brokers or shopkeepers, and on the auxiliary businesses of bankers, stockbrokers and others. The process by which the wave of depression, caused by the failure and inability of capitalists to keep the wheels of industry going, reaches these latter classes, may be a slow one. But it will reach them at last ; as, indeed, is proved by the fact that the twenty years of depression, through which we have been passing since 1873, is now making its effect felt upon many departments of business in this City which, till lately, it was supposed* would remain exempted under all circumstances from the difficulties and losses which agricultural and manufacturing industries have for a long time been struggling under. It will be admitted, I suppose, that it is productive industry alone which creates wealth ; and that it is increased wealth which tends to diffuse prosperity. It will also be admitted that the first requisite for the develop- ment of industries is capital. Now, if it can be shown that a fall of prices discourages capitalists from embarking fresh capital in fresh undertakings, or in new extensions, then it is obvious that falling prices must have the effect of retarding industrial development, thus diminishing the demand for labour, decreasing the calls upon the auxiliary io8 forces of commerce, such as bankers, financiers, stock- brokers, contractors, engineers, lawyers and others, and in the end producing what is called Depression of Trade. The question therefore is, Do falling prices discourage capitalists from investing capital in trade ? And if so, why ? As an abstract proposition I imagine few will dispute that falling prices do tend to discourage the investment of capital in industrial undertakings. But the disastrous consequences of such discouragement seem to be very imperfectly realized. Francis Walker, the eminent Ameri- can Economist, whose book on Political Economy is the text-book at Oxford, speaking of the appreciation of gold says, "An appreciation of gold constitutes a truly fearful " addition to debts, mortgages, and fixed charges of every " description. But even this is hardly the worst feature of " the situation. Nothing is so discouraging to the merchant " and manufacturer as to bring forward goods for a falling " market. Declining prices cut into the normal profits of " business, check enterprise, and retard the productive u investment of capital." But in the face of the stolid indifference with which many well educated people, even statesmen in high places, regard a continuous fall of prices, such as has taken place during the last twenty years, I am forced to show how it operates against the investment of capital in greater detail. No one goes into business of any kind, either as an investor, or as an active worker, unless he thinks he may anticipate profit, or at any rate income. But falling prices, if they do not destroy all such anticipations, suggest risks which considerably modify them. For, though it be true that a fall in the market price of a particular com- modity may stimulate its consumption and so create an increased demand, and a subsequent rise in price yielding additional profit, this final consummation cannot be reached if prices continue persistently to fall. The additional profit ICQ in the case I have put, if made at all, is made by the rise in price, not by the fall. Moreover, the process I have described is not possible when the general level of prices is falling that is, when, broadly speaking, prices are falling all round, because during that time all incomes are diminishing, and consumption diminishes in proportion. In these circumstances there is not greater demand for commodities, but less. Then we hear the cry of over- production. No wonder: But it will be said if there is a fall of prices all round, there will practically be no change in the proportion of things. The only result will be that fewer counters will be used. Now people who argue in this way forget that, when a general fall of the prices of commodities occurs, there is no corresponding and simultaneous fall in the money value of old debts, nor of deferred payments, nor of mortgages, nor of demands which are fixed by law or custom, nor of salaries, nor of wages. These obligations are of the nature of fixed charges, and are at best only gradually and slowly reduced after a considerable interval. Mr. Courtney has remarked that a fall in the general level of prices of only 10 per cent. " would just counteract all that we have done in the last fifteen years in the reduction of the National Debt. We have reduced the nominal amount, but the real burden is unaltered. The pressure of all debts, public and private, has increased." They do not fall part passu with the falling in the prices of commodities in the wholesale markets. The consequence is that producers, whether agriculturists or manufacturers of any kind, are caught between the upper and nether millstones of falling prices and of fixed charges, and are inevitably crushed. Under such circumstances, when prices are continually and persistently falling, capitalists very naturally do not encourage industry. If engaged in it, they either withdraw their capital, if they can ; or struggle on, limiting their no operations as much as possible ; or are forced to seek relief from the kindly hand of the Bankruptcy Court. Those who are out of business do not go into it. We are often told that this is a fanciful picture. The Chancellor of the Exchequer in his Budget speech the other day congratulated the country upon its prosperity, and upon the soundness and solidity of its commercial, financial and monetary policy. He told us that the statement of Revenue for the past year which he presented was " not only financially, but socially, a most satisfactory return." But what is this " satisfactory return " ? Notwithstanding the fact that the population is increasing at the rate of over i per cent, per annum " the Exchequer Receipts from Taxes " of all kinds are steadily declining. If the Income Tax last year had remained at 6d., instead of being raised to jd., the following would have been the figures for the last three years : EXCHEQUER RECEIPTS FROM TAXES. 1891-92 ... ... 75,340,000 1892-93 74,840,000 1893-94 73,257,000 Such is the " deadening and benumbing influence " of a fall in prices. All gold-using countries are feeling it to-day. It is not so in silver-using countries, except so far as the want of fresh capital from gold countries may have retarded their development. But, internally, the industries of silver countries have prospered and increased because prices have remained stable, or, as lately, have rather tended to rise. This is a conclusive argument, in my opinion, that gold has appreciated. If it has, then all businesses, even those most remote from production, carried on under a gold standard must ultimately feel depression, because the fall of gold prices, which is only another name for the appreciation of gold, has made the businesses of producers unprofitable. Ill Capital no longer feeds and stimulates them, but holds aloof till solid ground is reached. I am purposely abstaining from illustrations, as I leave these to succeeding speakers. But I cannot refrain from mentioning that the low rate of interest in the money market, which some people seem to think is an argument against the theory of the appreciation of gold, is really an argument in support of the view that I am now putting forward. It is an evidence of the abundance of capital seeking investment and unable to find it. In' old days in Lancashire we used to say if cotton was cheap, or if food was cheap, or if money was cheap, there was sure to be good trade. Now we have all three cheap. Still the authorities, both in the press and in the country, tell us trade was never more depressed nor the outlook more gloomy. There are only two out of the six classes enumerated in the programme to which I would like for a moment specially to refer. I am induced to do this because, at first sight, they may not seem to be so directly affected by the considerations which I have brought forward as others. I allude to merchants and wage-earners. As to merchants, it is true that during a time of falling prices they stand comparatively in a more favourable position than producers. From the nature of their business, which is only buying and selling (both operations being often performed simultaneously), and having no plant or property liable to depreciation, and few fixed charges, they are able to a considerable extent '* to jump from ledge to ledge " while the earthquake is proceeding. But they often get caught ; and the em- barrassments of their business during a time of ceaseless change in prices and exchanges frequently compel them from time to time to cease their operations altogether. This policy of " masterly inactivity," which they are 112 often forced to adopt, tends still further to lower prices, thus injuring the manufacturer and producer, while at the same time they suffer loss themselves by the stoppage of their trade. I would here point out that any circumstances that tend to restrict or arrest the operations of merchants directly militates against the prosperity of producing industries. Merchants form the advance guard of commerce. They are the pioneers who open up the way for industrial productions. It is the supplies they carry to new markets and to uncivilised countries which create new demands. It is true demand creates supply; but it is also true that supply often creates demand. If, therefore, during any period, a sudden disturbance in prices, or abnormal variations in the exchange between gold and silver countries alarms the merchant and arrests his operations, it is not his individual loss which is the most serious feature in the situation (though that is not to be lost sight of), but it is the reflex action of the stoppage of distribution upon all the industries of the nation which is most disastrous. The wage-earners do not immediately feel the evil effects of a fall in prices. Indeed, so long as the former rate of wages is maintained and full employment is continued, they may possibly find themselves in rather a better position. But this cannot last long. The difficulties and losses of the capitalist employers very soon affect them. Short time is the first effect ; then irregular and diminished opportunities of employment. Later on, bankrupt em- ployers close their works. An increasing population of workers does not find a corresponding increase of work provided for them by capital. The labour market becomes congested. Demands are made upon the Government and upon Local Authorities to create employment which these bodies are unable to meet. Wages do not rise. They tend to fall. Reduction of wages is demanded. It is resisted. Then "3 ensue those painful conflicts between capital and labour strikes on the one hand and lock-outs on the other which embitter the relations between employers and employed, and which all the Boards of Conciliation and Arbitration cannot compose, so long as the economic forces of de- pression of trade are exerting their malign influence. I notice in the last report of the Labour Department of the Board of Trade it is recorded that *' the disputes of the month show a remarkable increase, 100 having been noted, compared with 57 last month and 37 in March, 1893." I had not originally intended to present any statistics to the Conference in support of the views I have put forward, but the following facts, taken from the Economist's " Com- mercial History and Review of 1893," are to important and suggestive to be withheld. They appear to me to indicate that a serious decline in the industries of this country has already begun. There is scarcely a single trade which does not exhibit marked symptoms of retrogression during the last five years. In the Iron and Steel Industries the production of Pig Iron has gradually diminished from 8 million tons in 1889 to 6f million tons in 1892 and in 1893. The exports of Iron and Steel have fallen in the same period from 4 million tons in 1889 to 2j million tons in 1892 and in 1893. In Decem- ber, 1892, there were 91 furnaces in blast in Scotland, while in December, 1893, there were only 84. Shipbuilding, although, as the Economist remarks, " con- sidering the depression it was on a fairly large scale in 1893," has dwindled from 1,209,000 tons in 1889 down to 836,000 tons in 1893, a decrease of not less than 30 per cent, in four years. In the Cotton Trade the Raw Cotton consumed has fallen from 1,656,000,000 Ibs. in the year 1890 to 1,482,000,000 Ibs. in the year 1893. H H4 The exports of cotton yarn have fallen off from 258,000,000 Ibs. in 1890 to 206,000,000 Ibs. in 1893, an d the exports of Cotton Piece goods from 5,124,000,000 yards in 1890 to 4,653,000,000 yards in 1893. In addition to these alarming figures the Economist gives, on the authority of the Oldham Chronicle, the following particulars as to the return on the capital invested in the Limited Liability Cotton Spinning Companies of Oldham during the last year, and the result was worse in 1892. It states that in 1893 tne net earnings of the ninety-three companies whose balance sheets are made public was 75,000, which, on the total capital employed, viz., 7,000,000, gives only about I per cent. " So that," says the Chronicle, " a cotton spinner employing none but his own capital in the business would have made a little over I per cent, in 1893 while in 1892 he would not have made more than j per cent." For the last ten years, frpm 1 884 to 1893 (both inclusive), the Chronicle states that "the balance of profit over loss is 10,253, or 1,025 per company per annum." The Economist adds, " as the average amount of the paid-up share capital is 40,333 each, it follows that for the last ten years the share capital invested in the Oldham and district cotton spinning industry has only earned on the average 2 IDS. lod. per cent, per annum." The number of these mills in Oldham has not appreciably increased since 1886, there having been ninety of them in that year, and not more than ninety- three now. This is not to be wondered at, for, as the Economist remarks, " with such results there is not much encouragement for capitalists to embark in the cotton spinning trade." It is said, I know, that such unsatisfactory results as these cannot fairly represent the general returns of Indus- trial trade, because the Income-tax Assessments under Schedule D continue to rise. But there are two answers to this argument. I. As a matter of fact the ratio of increase of profits under Schedule D has sensibly decreased during the last twenty years, compared with the preceding twenty years. This feature in the Income-tax Returns was pointed out by Mr. GifTen in a paper he read before the Statistical Society in 1888. From 1854 to 1874 tn ^ s increase in the Assessments was about 80 per cent. From 1874 to 1894 the total increase has not been more than 30 per cent. II. But there is another point which must not be lost sight of. Schedule D embraces the profits not only of the Productive Industries of the country, but also the profits of the Distributors of Commodities (middlemen, shopkeepers and others), as well as the incomes of the various professions. Now, however useful these latter classes may be, it will not be pre- tended that they add to the wealth of the country, or contribute to the employment of productive labour in the same sense or to the same degree as industrial undertakings do. If Schedule D were divided as it might be, and as it ought to be so as to show the annual profits derived from Productive Industries separately from those made in the various businesses of distribution and by the professions, the relative stagnation of industry during recent years would, I believe, be at once clearly seen. When it is remem- bered, as Mr. Goschen stated in his Budget speech of 1892, that "the aggregate profit made by the medical profession " exceeds the total profits realized in the whole of the Cotton Industry ; that the profits of the legal profession exceed the total profits from coal mines ; and, finally, that the profits of the whole of the u6 Productive Industries of the United Kingdom put together "cotton, wool, silk, ready-made clothing, metals and hardware of all kinds, shipbuilding, sugar refining, tanning, chemicals, brewing, distilling, and so forth " only amount to " one-half of the profits which fall under the head of distribution and trans- port " ; it must be evident that the returns of Income- tax under Schedule D, as they stand, are a most fallacious test of industrial progress or of the profits derived from Productive Industries. As to cotton weaving the Economist quotes " Worrall's Directory " as its authority for stating that in four counties of England alone, viz., Lancashire, Cheshire, Yorkshire and Derbyshire (no account being taken of Scotland, Ireland, or other parts of England), " there has been a diminution within the last twelve months of over 13,000 looms " on a total of 600,000. But the most striking fact, and one which bears closely on the views expressed in this paper, is the decreasing amount of new capital invested in enterprises of all kinds, even including loans to Foreign and Colonial Governments. The decrease per annum during the last five years is shown in a table given by the Economist. It is headed " Capital Created and Issued" and is to be found on page 6 of the " Commercial History and Review of 1893." It is as follows : 1889 207,000,000 1890 142,000,000 1891 104,000,000 1892 81,000,000 1893 49,000,000 Of this comparatively small amount of new capital invested in 1893, not one-fourth of what was invested ia 1889, the Economist states that II? 3,000,000 represents Loans to Foreign Governments. 12,000,000 represents Loans to Colonial Governments, almost entirely issued for the repayment of present existing loans bearing a higher rate of interest. 9,000,000 represents Loans to British, Colonial and Foreign Corporations. 12,000,000 represents Investments in Railways, British, Colonial and Foreign, chiefly in the form of new Preference Stock. 36,000,000 These items account for 36,000,000, out of the total of 49,000,000, leaving only about 13,000,000 for general industrial or commercial enterprises, of which sum I notice that over 1,000,000 was for " Music Halls and Hotels " ! But there is one statement more to which I must refer, and I will give it in the Economist's own words : " There is probably no better indication of the condition of our working classes than that afforded by the returns showing our consumption of the dutiable articles upon which a considerable portion of their income is spent. And from these it is evident that, owing to reductions in wages, want of full employment, even for willing workers, and the voluntary idleness, sometimes for protracted periods, of those who took part in the numerous strikes, there was, in 1893, a distinct curtailment of the spending power of the people." After giving some details and some explanations, the Economist proceeds : " Still the fact remains that the condition of the working population as a whole did deteriorate last year, and of this further evidence is afforded by the returns of pauperism." The returns of pauperism given show that the number of paupers in England and Wales had risen from 666,000 in 1891 to 727,000 in 1893 ; or fro m 22 7 to 24/5 persons in receipt of relief in every 1,000 of the population. On this point the Economist further remarks : " There nS was thus in 1893 a distinct increase, not only in the number of paupers, but also in proportion to population, and that this cannot be attributed altogether to the great coal strike (which however had undoubtedly a considerable influence) is proved by the fact that the increase was not confined to the districts mainly affected by that unfortunate dispute, but extended to all divisions of the country, without exception." It is this state of things that lies at the root of those social disturbances and those difficult labour questions which are so prominent a feature of the present time, and for which no real solution can be found so long as this deepening trade depression continues to paralyze the energies of the nation. The "deadening and benumbing effects" of a continuous fall in prices must, in the long run (slowly, insidiously, and silently it may be, yet certainly), reach every class in the community, from the highest to the lowest. It is perfectly idle to expect prosperity so long as honest, industrious effort is weighted by ever-increasing burdens, and so long as capital is driven away from industrial enterprise. MR. R. LACEY EVERETT, M.P. : Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen I will confine my observations within a very few minutes for two reasons, first, because many speakers desire to follow me on the interesting subject opened up by the paper which has been read to us; and secondly, because I have just had sent to me the message that owing to the indisposition of Professor Foxwell, I am desired almost immediately to go as a witness to the Royal Commission now sitting on the Depression in Agriculture, to give evidence in his place. Now my first observation is, that this generation is the first in the whole history of mankind which has looked upon abundance of the precious metals as anything other than a blessing. By all previous generations of mankind, through all the centuries, silver and gold have both been regarded U9 as kindly gifts of Providence to men, and free mintage and free use for money purposes have been gladly and willingly accorded to both of them ; but we have seen in our time the strange spectacle of one nation after another among the great commercial and industrial nations of the day closing their mints, either wholly or partially, against the free use of the white metal, and confining the legal standard and the legal tender to the other, and by that policy, which I need hardly say, is a policy really of protection to the yellow metal, protection by the exclusion of the free use of the other, the value of gold has been very considerably forced up. (Hear, hear.) In that interesting paper on the movement of prices and wages, which Dr. Giffen published in 1888, he pointed out that there was following from this policy a remarkable appreciation of money in gold-standard countries, and Dr. Giffen also states with great clearness, and in these very words, that the effect of that appreciation of money was to "spell ruin to many classes." I respectfully submit to this meeting and to the public that the condition of agriculture in all gold-standard countries to-day is a confirmation of the prediction which Dr. Giffen then uttered. Among the classes to whom the appreciating value of money has " spelt ruin " are to be enumerated, I believe in the very first place, the agricultural classes. For confirmation of that we have only to cast our eyes around us. If we look at Great Britain, we see that in 1879 an d 1 880 there sat a Commission to enquire into the Depression of Agriculture. Now at the present time a second Commission is sitting, of which I have the honour to be one of the members, and we have had testified before us, by every witness, that the condition of agriculture to-day is far more depressed than it was when the first Commission sat. (Hear, hear.) Those of us who are practical agriculturists know that in a large part of England we are surrounded to-day by classes formerly in comfort, but who are now reduced I2O to a condition of general ruin and bankruptcy. (Cries of " True, true.") If we turn to Ireland, we see the Court-fixed rents, supposed when they were fixed to be almost unduly low, become impossible rents, and Parliament has been compelled to reduce them. If we look to the Continent of Europe, we find in .Germany, and in France, and in the smaller countries of Europe, the same agricultural distress that there is here. We read of agrarian parties, and agrarian movements and anti-semitic agitations, that is, of agitations against the increased burden of the money- lender, and we see recourse had to protection ; but in spite of that protection, still the prices tend downwards, and still the agricultural classes find their condition grow more and more desperate. If we cross the Atlantic, and go to the United States of America, we come to a spectacle similarly sad and depressing. We have had witnesses in regard to that before the Royal Commission, and they assure us that, great as is the agricultural distress in Great Britain, it is as nothing in comparison with the agricultural distress that prevails among the faruiers in the United States of America. I do not exaggerate when I say that whether you look at home ; whether you look to the Continent of Europe ; whether you cross the Atlantic to the United States ; or whether you go to the Australian Colonies, or to any other of the great agricultural Colonies connected with this country ; everywhere you find depression, sinking of values, and agricultural ruin steadily progressing. A constantly appreciating standard, and, therefore, a con- stantly depreciating value of agricultural produce is dogging the heels of the agriculturist in every gold-standard country in every part of the earth. As he follows his plough, or as he tends his flocks or his herds, the blight of the gold standard follows at his heels and curses him with its cruel bitter curse of unrequited toil through ever falling values of his produce. (Loud applause.) As we 121 have been reminded by Sir William Houldsworth, in his very excellent paper, if you go to the silver-standard countries where the standard has remained steady, or at any rate has not appreciated, you do not find that distress you find a condition of fair agricultural prosperity ; and if you go to the paper-using countries I do not stand here to advocate the use of paper, but am simply recording facts to the Argentine Republic, you find agriculture progressing by leaps and bounds. The agricultural implement manufacturers in my own county in England are busy to-day making agricultural implements, not for use in the fields of Suffolk, but for use on the plains of the Argentine Republic ; and the producers in the countries that use gold as their standard are being steadily driven into ruin by those who have silver as their stable standard, or by those who use the depreciating standard of paper money. Now, in closing these few remarks, I desire to appeal to this meeting, and to appeal to this country, and to all the countries to which the voice of this great Bimetallic Conference will speak, on befralf of the classes to whom the present state of things is spelling ruin. I would appeal to you on behalf of the farmers. There is no worthier, more frugal, careful class of men all the world through than the tillers of the soil (applause) and yet, in spite of all their care, in spite of all their industry, in spite of all their skill, they find a blight upon their industry through this continual appreciation in the value of money. I appeal to you on behalf of the owners of land a class I know for whom there is not over-much sympathy, but still who are human beings, after all. How sad it is to see the owners of land, whether large owners or small owners, compelled to reduce their expenditure, to let their premises go to ruin, to discharge their personal servants, to, by every means, reduce the wages that they spend, and their outgoings of all kinds, and even in spite of 122 all that, driven with tears in their eyes, out of the homes of their ancestors, and compelled to go into lodgings, or in the humblest way to seek a bare subsistence. There is the great yeoman class too, which used to be the backbone of England (applause), most of whom, unfortunately, have mortgages upon their farms, and those mortgages are steadily swallowing them up. They have alas already swallowed up a large number of them, men who once occupied a happy independent position, and were able to look anybody in the face and to pay their way. These unfortunate men through no fault of their own have had care eating at their hearts, and despair consuming away the vigour of their strength. They have been turned from brave men into cowards, and have been driven ruthlessly out of the homes that they had bought, or that they had inherited from their fathers, bankrupt and ruined men. (A voice, " Free trade.") No, it is not free trade. After we had had free trade in England for thirty years we looked back* upon the longest period of continual agricultural prosperity that we had ever known in this country. (Loud and prolonged applause). It is not free trade that has ruined us ; it is not the open ports that are ruining us ; it is the closing of the mints. With free trade in produce, we ought also to have free trade in the precious metals, and I unhesitatingly affirm, in the presence, of this meeting, that, given us along with open ports open mints, the farmer in England can again, as he did before 1873, hold his own against the whole world. (Loud applause). Then I would appeal to you in the name of the agricultural labourers, than whom there is no worthier class amongst the industrial population. Their reward has at no time been a large one, but what is their condition now? Why, wages, small as they have been, are steadily and surely going down, and worse than that, the range of their employ- ment is continually lessening. Unless something is done I2 3 to arrest what is proceeding now, it is as certain as that I stand here, that every year will more and more rapidly see the ploughed fields of old England turned into green, permanent pastures, and the labour that has been employed upon them will have to come into the town, or to go to the Colonies, or to seek some other outlet. It is painful to-day to go through the villages and see, as I continually see, cottage after cottage that once held a happy, honest, industrious, producing family, now standing empty, because employment upon the land is gone. I do hope that through the exertions of this influential body gathered here to-day we shall see a remarriage between King Gold and Queen Silver, who once reigned in happy alliance to the great pros- perity of industry, and to the great blessing of mankind. They were alas divorced some twenty years ago. Let them be reunited, and in their reunion we shall again obtain a free and abundant supply of money. We shall have, instead of two kinds of money operating as a barrier between the commerce of different countries, one money only in the world, and in the unity and the greater abundance of money we shall have once more return to us prosperous industries and plenty of employment, rising wages, increasing revenue to the nations, and general con- tentment and prosperity. (Loud applause.) THE CHAIRMAN : I am glad to hear this hearty response to the eloquent appeals in connection with what is, after all, for England the most important of industries, agriculture. I now call upon Mr. Vesey Knox, Member of Parliament, and one who has written a very important and valuable paper upon this particular question with regard to Ireland, to address you. MR. VESEY KNOX, M.P. : Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen I feel great pleasure in being allowed to add a few words to what Mr. Everett has just said on behalf of agriculture, and especially on this question of the appreciation I2 4 of gold, as it affects the agriculture of Ireland. I need hardly say that I cannot claim in this matter to speak for any other Irishman except myself. The feeling in Ireland on this question has, I believe, been largely quickened in the last two years, especially by that pamphlet or book of the Archbishop of Dublin (applause) which has, I think, become the text-book of the agricultural bimetallist in every part of the world, but still attention is so rivetted on one single issue in Ireland that it would hardly be in accordance with facts to say that as yet the mass of our people had awakened to the importance of this question. That it is of importance for their interest, I for one most strenuously con- tend. Our one industry, speaking roughly, is the industry of agriculture. Now, agriculture suffers more than any other industry from the appreciation of gold, because there is necessarily a larger proportion of fixed capital used in agriculture than in any other industry. I believe that that is true, speaking roughly, of all parts of the world. In some countries the fixed capital is provided by the tenant ; in some countries it is provided by the landlord ; in some countries it is provided partly by the tenant and partly by the landlord ; but, however provided, somebody must pro- vide it. Without the sinking of a large sum of fixed capital, you cannot carry on agriculture according to the notions in which agriculture is carried on, at least, in the older countries ; and inasmuch as the capital is lessened through the depreciation of prices, the appreciation of gold means a steady loss to the man who has sunk it, whether the man be landlord or be tenant. (Hear, hear.) I am not trenching on political subjects when I say that, as a broad fact, it is true that in Ireland capital has been sunk by the tenant. He has made the vastly greater part of the improvements in the land ; it is on him, therefore, I think that in the main the loss has fallen, and I think this loss may be divided into two parts. You may speak of the loss that has already occurred, and of the probable loss in the future. Now, so far as the loss which has already occurred is concerned, it might perhaps be possible to write it off by largely reducing, and even in some cases, entirely abolishing, rent. In a great part of England, I believe, it is true that economic rent is gone, especially on the corn land. In those cases the pay- ment made to the landlord now is not rent in the economic sense, but is the interest on the capital that he has put into the farm. (Hear, hear.) But that process canrot go on for ever. Rent may be wiped out once, but it cannot be wiped out again, and if you want to encourage men to put capital into land you must assure them that they have a reasonable chance of getting some return for that capital. While depreciation of gold in the past is an undoubted fact, I take it that according to all reasonable probability there must be a continued appreciation of gold in the future if the mints are still kept closed to silver. We hear of the great production of gold, especially in the Transvaal. I read the other day, in a letter from the American corre- spondent of the Times, that the mintage of gold in the mints of the United States, in the fifteen months ending in next June, will exceed 80,000,000 dollars. What is all the production of gold in the Transvaal in all the years that that industry has been at work in the Transvaal ? It does not come anything like to the amount which has been used for mintage purposes in the United States in that single fifteen months ; so that, as that is a large demand, a demand that will be continuous, and will be joined in, in all probability, by other countries where the demonetisation of silver goes on, therefore I say that, as reasonable men, we cannot tell the agricultural classes that there is any chance of this fall in prices coming to an end ; and to lure them into a false security by telling them that things have touched bottom is not true friendship to the tillers of the soil. (Applause.) The people who admit the depression of 126 agriculture wish to cure it by bringing the people back to the land, or by rooting such small holders as there are in the United Kingdom on the land ; but whichever course you adopt, you must borrow money to do it. It cannot be done without it. You may interpose the Local Authority and the nation, or the Local Authority without the nation, between the lender and the real creditor, who is the small man, the labourer, or the small farmer whom you try to root on the soil ; but I say it is cruelty to try to bring the people back to the land, or to try to root the people on the land, if you are going to make the borrower pay back to the lender far more than he is giving to-day. (Applause.) We have heard it said many times that there is a magic in property, in peasant proprietary, which will turn the wilderness into a garden ; but I say it is just as certain that if the appreciation of gold goes on, that garden will go to the mortgagee. (Hear, hear.) You have to borrow if you want to root the people on the soil, and that loan will become a greater and greater burden upon the man who has borrowed if the appreciation of gold continues. We Bimetallists and Irishmen are often, I think, spoken of as being unduly favourable to defaulting debtors. I do not want to demand for the agricultural debtor any undue amount of sympathy, but what we ask is, that we should have, as far as human power and human legislation can give it us, a stable standard, so that the borrower may not have to pay back more than he has borrowed, and so that as the years go on the small agricultural borrower (for the small agriculturist must be a borrower) will not be burdened by an ever-increasing load of debt, but may have a reasonable probability of meeting, out of the produce of the soil, the burden that he has incurred in order to bring that soil into cultivation. (Applause.) That, I take it, is the demand of the Bimetallic League, and I say that, what- ever system of land legislation you adopt, whether you 127 abolish rent, or reduce rent, whether you simplify transfer, whether you abolish primogeniture, whether you establish a peasant proprietary, or a system of allotments, or what- ever you do, the rent system must, in the end, press hardly on the tiller of the soil, unless at the same time you establish a stable currency, and not a standard of value which increases from year to year. (Loud applause.) MONSIEUR RENE LAVOLLEE, Ancien Consul-General de France, Delegue de la Societe des Agriculteurs de France, said : Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen I must, in the first instance, beg your kind indulgence for my bad English, and for my worse pronunciation. Perhaps it would have been wiser for me to use my native language ; but, if I venture to explain myself in English, it is in order to make more intelligible to everyone the many and warm thanks that I am happy to transmit to the Bimetallic League for their kind invitation, not only for myself, but in the name of my countrymen and friends, Monsieur d'Aillieres, le Baron de Ladoucette, and le Comte de Terves, but also on behalf of the great French association, the " Societe des Agriculteurs de France." We are especially directed, Gentlemen, to express the sense of deep interest that that society takes in the present Conference, the satisfaction they felt in receiving your invitation, and their wishes for the full and speedy success of your endeavours. In fact, it is a long time since the " Societ6 des Agri- culteurs de France" recognised the great importance of the monetary question, and it has publicly declared its convic- tion that no satisfactory settlement of that question could be obtained, unless by way of an international arrange- ment on a bimetallic basis. That great association, numbering not less than 12,000 members, with 600 affiliated agricultural societies, aggregating nearly half-a-million of cultivators, and indisputably the most powerful and com- 128 petent representation of the French agriculturists, could not neglect a problem the solution of which will exercise the greatest influence on the condition of agriculture in the world. They have accordingly, and year by year, carried resolu- tions pointing to an international rehabilitation of silver, and to the resumption of the free coinage of that metal. In 1892, at a General Meeting, they asked that: u The French Government should promote a new Inter- " national Conference, tending, like those of 1878 and 1881, "to the formation between the Latin Union, England, " Germany and the United States, of a common monetary " law based upon a constant relation of value between gold " and silver." Yet more strong and complete is the resolution of 1893, the context of which is as follows : " Whereas the gold monometallism under which we " actually live is an indirect means of supporting speculators " to the detriment of producers ; " Whereas the depreciation of silver, or rather the arti- " ficial rise of gold, produces, for every transaction passed " in the countries that use only silver currency, a bonus " equal or superior to the Customs Duties established for " our defence ; " Whereas the only remedy to such a state of things is "the resumption of the free coinage of silver, as well as of *' gold, in the greatest possible number of countries ; " Whereas it is most important to arouse the agriculturists " to the sense of peril that is threatening from the present " state of things, and to promote among those concerned " in every nation an international movement, in order to " apply an effective remedy ; " W T e express the wish that the Council, with the assis- " tance of a Commission, appointed by themselves, should ' enter into correspondence with all the French or foreign I2 9 " associations, in order to call attention to the disturbance " caused in the various countries of the world by the " monetary system now in force, to promote a great " manifestation of public opinion that would enlighten the " International Congress of Brussels, and bring a quick " settlement of the question by the resumption of the free " coinage of silver." Ultimately, in their last session of January, 1894, and notwithstanding the adjournment of the Conference held in Brussels, the Socie'te' repeatedly urged the preparation of a monetary agreement, in the following terms : " Whereas the readoption of bimetallism and the resump- " tion of the free coinage of silver are the only means to put " an end to the present monetary depression, and to " the economical crisis that springs from it ; " Whereas the agitation in favour of bimetallism is " spreading more and more ; that in Germany particularly, " the Agrarian party and the Minister for Agriculture ask " for the re-adoption of bimetallism and the free coinage of " silver ; " Whereas an international understanding is desirable to " meet that result, and moreover, it would be sufficient to " make an understanding between nations similarly situated ** and of commanding position ; " Whereas the Latin Union and the United States of " America possess a monetary stock sufficient to impose " and maintain in the world the monetary law that they " might have adopted by mutual consent ; " We express the wish that negotiations should be " opened between the United States, Germany, England, " and the nations of the Latin Union, on the proposal of " France, in order to realize a common understanding and " a common monetary law, that should be accepted by at " least three of those Powers." I 3 o I think it useless to dwell further upon the above- mentioned resolutions, the importance of which any long comment would not only not strengthen, but perhaps weaken. I beg only to insist in a few words upon the principal grounds of the position taken in that matter by our Society. They consider, in the first instance, that the prolongation of the present state of things is intolerable, that it must be remedied, and that the single remedy practically possible is the rehabilitation of the silver metal. They deem it impos- sible that the civilized world should endeavour to maintain fixity in the measures of everything, except in the measure of the most important element of human transactions, namely, in the measure of values. They deem it impossible to disregard the circumstance that the simultaneous use of both gold and silver is a perpetual and universal fact, and that, even now, silver is the exclusive monetary standard among the nations of the East, that is, among those who are most immutable in their customs, who are the greatest producers of raw materials, and maintain with Europe large and continually increasing relations. They deem it im- possible that the world should live any longer in an unsettled condition, that hinders every serious business, fosters the most brisk and violent oscillations, not only in the respective values of gold and silver, but also consequently in the products of human labour, and finally gives to speculators every opportunity for profits, while it discourages and ruins the producer. They deem impossible a system under which the labourer and producer are condemned to give an always increasing sum of goods and labour to obtain an always decreasing quantity of coin. They believe, secondly, that the evil could not be remedied but by the normal and simultaneous use of both metals at a fixed ratio, and they derive that opinion not so much from theoretical demonstrations as from the experience of the present century. They do not assert that every variation of value will become impossible as soon as gold and silver shall be equally admitted to free coinage, but they believe that these oscillations will become far less violent and ruinous ; they recognize, indeed, from the very statements of monometallists that, even at the time of the greatest inflow of gold, that is between 1850 and 1860, the appreciation of silver comparatively to gold did not exceed about 3 per cent., although the production of the yellow metal had increased about 300 per cent, in five years, while, since 1873, silver has lost the half of its value, although the increase of its production has not exceeded 125 per cent. Why those different results? Because, in the first case, the Governments were wise enough not to interfere with the natural course of things, and maintained the free coinage of gold ; while, in the second, they have suspended the free coinage of silver. This demonstration by facts makes the " Societe " quite convinced that the monetary disease is not the single cause, but one of the most effective causes, of the bad condition of agriculture ; that international bimetallism would not be a panacea, but one of the most valuable remedies for the present difficulties ; and that the time has arrived when it becomes necessary to proceed from discussions to conclusions, and from theories to acts. Consequently they are ready to second every attempt of the Bimetallic League to promote the question, and par- ticularly to make it better known to all whom it concerns. Unfortunately, much has yet to be done in that direction, and especially among the agriculturists. To the greater part of the men engaged in the cultivation of the soil, the true, the main monetary question is, how to get the most money, and how to keep the most of it in their pockets. Perhaps they may consider the weight of silver coins, and from that ground give preference to gold ; but of the consequence I 2 I 3 2 of the use of either or both metals very few are aware. They suffer and lament without knowing one of the principal causes of their sufferings. It is to enlighten that ignorance, that the " Societe" des Agriculteurs de France " deems it most important constantly to work in order to create a movement of opinion that may oblige the Govern- ments to unite themselves and to act. In that direction, the " Soci6te " has not only voted the above-quoted reso- lutions, but it also advocated, two years ago, the meeting of an International Conference of the agriculturists on the question. It is a great satisfaction to us to see that scheme partly realized, and we are quite prepared to second in that way your endeavours in view of an international settlement of the question. Indeed, the " Societe" believes firmly that the monetary question is paramount, and could not but be an international one. They are convinced that it would be folly and disaster to try to authorize the free coinage of silver, unless three at least of the four great monetary Powers made an arrangement on that basis. They are confident that the community of interests of all the producers in the civilized world makes such an agreement possible, and they consider as a most encouraging symptom the present meeting held in such a country, in such a city, under such a presidency, and with such a success. MR. WILLIAM TAYLOR, of Blackburn, said : Mr. Chair- man, Ladies and Gentlemen It is not my intention to enter into the highways and byeways of Bimetallism, but rather to state how these constant fluctuations in exchange harass and worry the cotton spinners and manufacturers of this country, who spin and weave for silver-using countries. I have attended the Manchester Exchange before and since the time when silver was demonetised by Germany, and have noticed that when the exchange keeps steady for some time then we have active business. On the ist June, 133 last year, exchange was is. 2 T \\d. The manufacturer refused to comply with this request, the exchange being now below is. $d. 9 and the Secretary of State for India refusing to sell Council Bills at less than u. 3^., he thought surely there must soon be some improvement, and he continued to wait. The above order has not yet been placed, and on account of the further fall in the exchange from about is. $d. to a little over is. id., the price now offered is about 43. 6d. The same causes which so afflict the Cotton trade also affect the Iron, Steel, Woollen, Linen and Jute trades, and these form over forty per cent, of the exports of this country. Surely it is worth while for our Government to give more attention to this matter. What is the main cause of all this disturbance in our different trades ? It is for the want of a stable rate of exchange between gold and silver-using countries, and I do not believe that the resources of the statesmen of this country are so exhausted that this cannot be accomplished. It is no answer for monometallists to say that it would be a speculation or a " leap in the dark," because it has been tried and been perfectly successful. This monetary question stands in the way of the quicker development of India. When we consider that only about one-half of the culti- vatable land of India is under cultivation, is it not amazing that we allow this policy of drift to continue ? At the present rate of railway construction in that country (last year the new mileage was only 470 miles), it will take 900 years before it has the mileage which we have in England, in proportion to its area. The dislocation in exchange prevents gold from being sent to India for the development of the country. We have been building railways in India for nearly forty years, yet up to the present time that country has only about 18,000 miles, whilst in America they have built 13,000 miles in one year, principally with British capital. We have lent to Australia two hundred millions sterling, and it has a population of only five millions, while to India, with a population of nearly three hundred millions, we have only lent two hundred and twenty millions, simply on account of the currency difficulty. There is no nation in the world so well adapted as England for finding abundant employment for its people, if we only avail ourselves of the means at our command. Cotton piece goods worth six shillings each in Blackburn, can be packed, baled, stamped, and shipped to Maulmain for sixpence per piece, while to send the same goods up-country three hundred miles costs seven shillings and sixpence. In India, Burma and China, there is nearly one-half of the population of the world well disposed, industrious, and willing to trade with us, but on account of the cost of transit up-country the thing is rendered impossible except on a small scale. The greatest and grandest of all our possessions is India, and there is no way to it except by sea, which we command. Our desire is for the improvement of trade and the welfare of India herself; let us have a par of exchange that will best suit us both, whatever that may be, and in doing so we must have due regard to keep right the balance of trade. SIR ALFRED HICKMAN, M.P. : Mr. President and Gentlemen I have been asked to address a very few words to you upon this subject from the point of view of the iron trade. I apprehend that the iron trade was mentioned because perhaps it is the truest type of general prosperity, or otherwise. If the railway industry is profit- able and progressing, there is a great demand for iron. T 3 6 If the shipbuilding industry is profitable and progressing, there is also a great demand for iron ; and even agriculture requires iron to carry out its operations. I take it as an accepted axiom, at any rate in this room, that the contracting currency, in proportion to the requirements which it has to fulfil, means declining prices. As you know, the iron trade is a trade peculiarly liable to fluctua- tions, and peculiarly liable to be affected by speculation. If we find that, in buying iron, postponing our purchases means buying at less money ; or if, on the other hand, we find if we buy iron to-day that it is worth more money to us than it would be later on ; our operations are very much affected by that consideration. If it is in a declining market, everybody postpones their purchases as long as possible, and they buy as little as possible, and the consequence is that trade declines and profits vanish. All history teaches us that prosperity in the iron trade has been absolutely coincident with an expanding currency, and the contrary when currency has been contracted. During the great Napoleonic wars, the iron trade was most flourishing. This prosperity went on till the contraction of currency, which took place in 1815 to 1825, and then we had a most distressed period. Again, when the Californian and Australian gold discoveries were made we had a splendid time, and the culminating point of prosperity in the iron trade happened with the great expansion of currency which arose in the United States Civil War and the Franco-German War. In 1873, when the Latin Union suspended the coinage of silver, we had a reaction, which has been going on ever since, till now we are in a state absolutely unprecedented as regards prices, and there is very little demand for iron even at prices which are not remunerative. Mr. Vesey Knox told us in very well- selected language that this state of things would go on until the production of the precious metals, or till the 137 rehabilitation of silver produced a different state of things as regards the currency. We have Scriptural authority for the fact that there was a time when a hotel bill for a week could be paid with the sum of twopence, but I hope we shall not come to that state of things again, or at any rate before we come to it I hope the opponents of bimetallism will be converted. For these reasons, as an iron master, I most cordially support the proposal to rehabilitate silver. (Applause.) MR. JAMES MAWDSLEY (Secretary of the United Textile Factory Workers, member of the Trades Union Congress Parliamentary Committee, and member of the Royal Commission on Labour) said : It is not my intention to occupy much of the time of this Conference in speaking of the interests of the wage- earning classes. I have dealt with the subject on a number of occasions, and time and further consideration serve only to deepen my conviction that International Bimetallism will be a benefit indeed it is a necessity to the class to which I belong. (Applause.) Our Lancashire workers especially, and those in the adjoining counties, hold this in the strongest sense. One broad proposition, I think no one can deny, namely, that a contracted currency and a contracting currency is bad for those engaged in industry, and a check to industrial enterprise. If any man doubts this I will ask him to look at the lessons of history, and it will then be seen that broadly speaking, and dealing with periods, prosperity in industry has been contemporary with a full measure currency or an expanding currency, and the reverse has been equally marked. (Hear, hear.) In addition to the disadvantage to industry from the cause I have mentioned, there is another evil which we in Lancashire have had brought home to us again and again, namely, the evil of violent fluctuations in exchange between 138 our gold money and other moneys of the silver-using East, or perhaps now I should say, in view of recent events, between our gold money and the silver-using and rupee- using East. The Eastern markets are so important to us that this evil is one of the first magnitude. These fluctua- tions and the fall in silver have built up and fostered cotton mills in the East upon what I will venture to call an artificial basis. This has been remarkably demonstrated in the last few months. The fall in the gold price of silver which has followed upon the closing of the Indian mints is inducing a tremendous development of cotton spinning in Japan and China. (Hear, hear.) I will only mention one fact in this connection. Already freight has been engaged for the shipment this year of 40,000 tons of cotton-spinning machinery to Japan, and it is estimated that the number of spindles at the end of this year will be more than double what they were when the Indian mints were closed. We do not object to this compe- tition so long as it is fair and above board. If in the race, or in the battle, we, in the Textile districts of this country, are beaten fairly and squarely man to man, we shall have to accept our fate as people have had to do before us ; but we do object to our own Government, by its policy, being a party to the artificial bolstering up of a competitive industry, either in foreign countries or in any other part of the British Empire. (Applause.) One word as to " cheapness," about which we hear so much. Well, I for one, am not afraid if things get a bit dearer under Bimetallism, for that dearness if it comes will come about by the mass of the people being able to buy more, and that means their buying power will be greater. Don't suppose prices of commodities will go up without Labour, the greatest of all commodities, getting its full share. I will close by saying that at the last General Election, the United Textile Factory Workers, with which I am 139 connected, and which embraces the cotton districts of Lancashire, Yorkshire, Cheshire and Derbyshire, issued placards throughout those districts recommending its members to vote for no candidate who would not pledge himself to support International Bimetallism, as it was a " Bread and Butter Question to wage-earners," and this week we are issuing a circular to our members, asking them to see to it that this question is included in the number of test questions which are put to all Parliamentary candidates and sitting Members. (Applause.) Our opinion on the subject is stronger than ever, and if the wage-earning voters throughout the kingdom will take this line with Parliamentary Candidates at bye-elections, and at the next General Election, the next meeting of the Bimetallic League will not be to "Confer," but to celebrate the triumph of International Bimetallism. (Applause.) M. EDMOND THRY, Paris (speaking in French), said : After the brilliant speeches which you have heard and justly applauded yesterday and this morning, after the remarkable papers of Professor Nicholson and Mr. Leonard Courtney, and finally, after the paper, so luminous, so complete from every point of view, that Sir William Houldsworth has just read on "The Effects of the Fall in the General Level of Prices," I think it would be superfluous to further discuss the serious prejudice that the rupture of the old French bimetallic ratio, and the depreciation of silver which ensued in consequence of that rupture have done to agriculture, to industry, and to commerce, and to the interesting class of wage-earners the workers of every country, with a currency at par with gold. It would be equally superfluous to revert to the causes of the monetary anarchy that reigns in the world at the present moment, and by which the richest nations, like England and France, are most cruelly injured. But there is a special point which I am particularly glad to discuss here, in the 140 Mansion House, in the heart of the City, in the midst of those great banking houses whose operations embrace the whole universe, namely, the effects of the silver crisis, which your economists and statesmen have so lucidly explained, on investments abroad, and on the present state of mind of the bankers who are very specially concerned in these investments. (Hear, hear.) For a long time English and French bankers imagined that this crisis could not touch their interests ; the majority of them are still under the impression that international bimetallism would seriously prejudice either their own personal situation, or the capital of the clients who act upon their advice. They fear bimetallism because they think the free coinage of silver might endanger the position they occupy in relation to foreign countries. The truth is that they are afraid of bimetallism, for the simple reason that they do not in the least understand its mechanism (cheers) and that they have not yet realised that this monetary system, so far from prejudicing in any way capital invested abroad, would, on the contrary, in a very short space of time, regain for them the security which, at the present moment, is gradually slipping away from them. Bankers, Gentlemen, from the very fact that they manipulate that powerful lever of modern society called public credit, are at once, like public credit itself, audacious and timid. They are audacious in matters with which they are accustomed to deal ; they are timid in regard to every- thing that is new, everything that presents itself to their minds under the guise of a revolution. We must not be too angry with them, Gentlemen, on account of that timidity, for their fears, in so far as bimetallism is concerned, arise from very honourable pre- occupations. They do not understand in all its details the operation of that monetary system, and as they are generally too busy to thoroughly study it, to work out the synthesis, they hesitate, they recoil the unknown frightens them. It is for you, members of the English Bimetallic League, for you who have already so victoriously refuted the ignorance or the bad faith of your detractors, to prove to the bankers of the City that the word bimetallism has no real terrors for them, and that their personal interests and the interests of their clients now at stake in foreign coun- tries, can never be better served than by the rehabilitation of silver, and above all by the definitive settlement, by international agreement, of a stable ratio between the two precious metals. (Cheers.) Your task will be easy, Gentlemen, for you have on your side not only the theoretical demonstration, but the direct proof of actual experience, which is still more conclusive than theory. From a monetary point of view the nations of the civilised world are divided into two categories those with a currency at par with gold, that is to say, England, Germany, the United States, Holland, France, Belgium and Switzerland ; and on the other hand, the nations whose currency is debased, either because that currency has as a basis the exclusive use of silver, as in the case of India, China, Japan, Persia and Mexico, or for other reasons, as in the case of the Argentine Republic, Brazil; Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Russia, and a large number of other countries with a second-rate credit. Now here, is it not evident that the rehabilitation of silver, and above all the definitive adoption of a ratio between the two precious metals, would be favourable to the external creditors of the Empire of India ? Here is an example which the bankers may well contemplate, and you will see, Gentlemen, that in the end they will recognise that what is true in regard to India, may be applied in a certain measure to all the other debtor countries. You can 142 demonstrate to them, moreover, that with the adoption of international bimetallism, as we conceive it, and as we desire to see it established, any fears they may entertain to-day concerning the encroachments of silver are chimerical. You can prove to them by incontrovertible facts that that monetary system is a thousand-fold more favourable to their interests, and to those of their clients, than the gold monometallism now in force. When you have presented the question of international bimetallism to them under that particular aspect, the bankers of the City, will, I at all events am convinced, become the most resolute exponents of our theories, and will in their turn inscribe their names on the roll of the English Bimetallic League. (Laughter.) And now, Gentlemen, I cannot conclude my remarks without telling you how glad we Frenchmen who have been present at this Conference are to have had this opportunity of seeing for ourselves the great progress that the bimetallic cause is making every day in England. We were rather in need of some such evidence, for in Paris the great argument with which we are met by our monometallic opponents, whenever we speak of the possibility of inter- national bimetallism, is the peculiar attitude of England in regard to this question. They do not trouble to reply to the conclusive evidence we advance ; they content them- selves with telling us and we said it before they* did that the proposed new monetary regime is impossible without the formal adhesion of England, and that as England will not hear of it, it is useless to go on discussing an impracticable scheme. I repeat that what we have seen and heard during the past two days cuts the ground away from that argument. This International Conference will have, in any case, a great result, namely, to prove to the world that British, German, American, Austrian, Belgian, Dutch, and French H3 Bimetallists are already at one in regard to the main lines of the system, in regard to the great principles that con- stitute its fundamental basis : (1) The absolute necessity of maintaining gold and silver as international money, and fixing a ratio between these two precious metals ; (2) The possibility, or, to be more exact, the certainty, of maintaining the fixity of that ratio by means of an arrangement concluded between the great metallic Powers. (Cheers.) But we have still to examine the mode of application. On this point let me tell you that it will be much more easy to arrive at an agreement than our adversaries suppose, especially if the creation of an International Bimetallic League were to bring together the well-disposed men of the great metallic Powers, and were to enable them to study, with complete information before them, all the details con- cerning the practical application of the system. Really, in this delicate problem of an international arrangement, each nation must first of all examine the solution from its own particular point of view. But the constitution of an International League, enabling all questions of detail to be afterwards examined from a general point of view, would considerably facilitate the progress of the controversy, for each country would then be enabled to put forward, apart from all considerations of amour-propre or sentimentality, the reason for its preferences ; and I am absolutely convinced that agreement notably in regard to the ratio to be fixed and the mode of bringing the new monetary regime into operation would very soon become an accomplished fact. (Cheers.) The difficulties that to those who have not your robust faith in the merits of bimetallism now appear to be insur- mountable would disappear of themselves ; the details of practical realization that are still in the dark, and that may to-day frighten the most timid, would be made clear by the light of discussion ; and finally, the impartial examination of the facts would remove the remaining doubts. That is what every Frenchman who has taken part in your splendid Conference hopes to see realized, not only for the common good and prosperity of our two countries, but also for the well-being of all the nations of the civilized world. (Loud and continued cheers.) Now, Gentlemen, I have here an observation to make, namely, that the countries with a currency at par with gold England, France, etc. are precisely the countries to which the nations which have now a debased currency formerly came in search of the capital they required for their industrial and commercial development. (Cheers.) Thus, if we strike a balance-sheet between the two groups, we shall discover this indubitable fact, that the first group is always the creditor of the second. That is to say, that the countries belonging to the second group are to-day the tributaries of those belonging to the first, that they must labour to pay heavy imposts, to contribute to the lenders, to the capitalists of the creditor countries, the interest and repayment of the capital advanced. Now, is it not patent that the security of investments made under these con- ditions abroad by the countries with a currency at par with gold depend, not only on the good financial administration and honesty of the debtor countries, but also on the facility, more or less great, that the latter countries may enjoy in converting their national money (paper or silver) into the gold currency exacted to-day by the creditors ? (Cheers.) At the time when French bimetallism, which your economists now unanimously praise so highly, secured to the world the parity of gold and silver at the ratio of 1 5 J, nations with a metallic currency always found without difficulty the means of converting gold into silver and 145 silver into gold. It follows that the nations with a silver currency which were indebted to bimetallic nations like France and Belgium, or to the British nation, monometallic with gold, and vice versa, had always, without paying exchanges ruinous to their finances, the means of convert- ing their national money (in which, it must always be remembered, the imposts were levied) into the money of the creditor nation. Now, Gentlemen, I will not discuss here in what measure the rupture of the French bimetallic parity, or the fall in silver which was the immediate consequence, has con- tributed to propagate among the debtor nations, the nations which had borrowed capital from England, France, etc., that new epidemic known to-day as the crisis of exchanges. I will merely mention that at the present moment twenty-one nations in the world are afflicted by that terrible malady, and that already the interests of the capitalists of the creditor nations have suffered seriously from that malady in its general form. (Cheers.) Oh, yes, we must take into account from this special point of view that the disqualification of silver as international money, and the struggle for gold that this disqualification renders in a manner inevitable, will end by ruining all the capitalists who have lent to poor countries. I know very well that the financial administration of countries with a debased currency is open to criticism, and that they may generally be blamed for having tried to run before they could walk. But how can you help that ? The mischief has been done ; the debts exist. Must we, under the pretext of a system, the scientific value of which is very questionable, allow the great interests that we have abroad to be absolutely compromised ? (Cries of " No.") That is a question that the bankers must in the end ask themselves, and when they have more thoroughly studied the problem, you may be perfectly sure they will become 146 bimetallists, and bimetallists more ardent than even you, the members of the British Bimetallic League. (Laughter.) Were it necessary to-day to give the bankers a first proof of the truth of my observation, the example of India, which is to be the subject of discussion this afternoon, would supply it. When it is a question of the Argentine Republic, of Portugal, or of Greece, the bankers may, in a great measure, point to the bad financial administration of those countries as an explanation of the catastrophes of which foreign bondholders have been the unfortunate victims. But in regard to the financial crisis in India, they cannot employ that argument. Here you have the finest and richest English possession. It is admirably administered, since it is administered by Englishmen. Well, I ask you, who are familiar with the present financial situation of India, to say frankly whether, if India were not a dependency of the British Crown, if it could not utilise the marvellous credit which its situation as British territory gives it with English capitalists, it would not have failed in its foreign engagements exactly in the same way as the Argentine Republic, Portugal and Greece. (" Yes," and cheers.) MR. THOMAS HANBURY said : Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen I am not a practised speaker, and after the eloquent addresses that you have heard from others I should feel diffidence in rising, but that I can bring to bear on this question an experience gained as a merchant who went to China in 1853, who left it in 1871, and who has now just returned from revisiting that country and other great centres of our trade in the East, after an absence of over twenty years. I have been in fact on a tour round the world, with a determination made before starting to do my best to observe with a critical eye how the present enormous divergence between gold and silver is affecting the trade and English interests in the East. 147 A voyage of twelve or thirteen days across the Pacific Ocean lands one in Japan, a country that has been much and justly praised of late years, for the courtesy of its people, their advanced civilization, and also for its picturesque scenery. There is, however, another point that has not been sufficiently dwelt on, but which should surely be a great attraction in these hard times : the fortunate traveller landing on these shores finds his income doubled ! If he is an American he is delighted to find that the Bank pays him two dollars for every one he puts down on the counter; the Englishman is equally rejoiced tc find ten dollars counted out to him instead of the five to the pound sterling he has been used to in the United States. These dollars the traveller soon finds are just as good for spending at hotels or shops as they ever were ; and if you ask me the reason of this anomaly, I reply it is to be found in the appreciation of gold caused by the cessation of the free coinage of silver in Europe. Now it must be evident that this state of things gives an enormous stimulus to the Japanese to produce as much as they possibly can for sale in other lands, and accordingly that country is very prosperous and every year developing fresh industries. During six weeks spent there I do not recollect having once been solicited for charity ; the people appeared to be contented, happy and fully employed. Instead of the wretched return that joint stock companies for the making of yarn and cloth appear by their printed returns to yield in Lancashire, a long list was published last autumn shewing from 10 to 25 per cent, profit yielded by similar industries in native hands in Japan. Now while we do not grudge Japan her prosperity, we may profit by her example, and fairly consider whether her astonishing advance does not largely arise from the free coinage of silver which she enjoys. K. 4* 148 China enjoys also the great stimulus to her export trade afforded by the appreciation of gold, and the cessation of the free coining of silver in Europe and America. She is the only great country in the world whose traders are content to base their transactions on silver in its uncoined state, receiving and paying it by weight and keeping their accounts in Chinese ounces (called taels). When, there- fore, the Government of India last June endeavoured artificially to enhance the value of the rupee by closing the mints, they unwittingly offered a handsome bonus to the Chinese to set to work to cut out the natives of India in those articles which are common to both countries. If one talks to an ordinary Chinaman about the depre- ciation of silver and its excessive production, which our monometallic friends are so fond of insisting on, he will declare he does not understand you, and that there has been no depreciation. I found, in fact, after an absence of twenty-two years from Shanghai, where I formerly lived, that the market prices of all the chief necessaries of life showed no material variation, but that bar gold on the contrary had risen from 165 to 324. In view of this I confess I am at a loss to understand how there can be found thinking men in this City of London who will continue to assert that gold has not appreciated ! At all the chief ports of Japan, China and the Straits, I found a universal chorus of complaint as to the difficulty of conducting the foreign trade, the violent fluctuations in the exchange on London reducing it to the character of gambling, against which the most prudent merchants find it impossible to safeguard their transactions. Passing now to Ceylon, where the traveller cannot help admiring the astonishing industry and perseverance of our people, who, in the short period of ten or twelve years have clothed the hillsides of that lovely island with the tea shrub, resulting in an annual export of eighty-four millions 149 of pounds of tea, I found that the blundering experiment of the Indian Government in closing- the mints had inflicted on that export a loss of some 3 5 0,000 in the latter half of 1893, by forcing an artificial exchange of 15^. per rupee when the coin might have been minted in the island at a cost of a shilling. And now while mentioning the rupee, which so many have read about, but which I find so few, except those who have been to the East, have ever seen, T will ask leave to produce one, which I bought the other day in Lombard Street ; it is slightly larger than our florin, and it contains 165 grains of pure silver, as against 161 */% grains in the two- shilling piece ; both bear the effigy of the Queen, and one might be easily mistaken for the other. Now, how does the case stand as between two classes of Her Majesty's subjects : the farmer raising wheat here, and his competitor, the native of India, raising it in thePunjaub. The English farmer has been compelled to accept free trade ; he does so frankly ; he sees that the Indian farmer gets his labour at about one-fifth of what he has to pay ; that his rent, rates and taxes are less, that the freight across the ocean has been reduced to a sum scarcely superior to what he has to pay for the carnage of his produce to market. This com- petition, perhaps, he can stand, but when he has sold his corn at the miserable price it now brings, and is then told that his dusky competitor will be allowed to exchange his sovereign for 18 of these coins (holding up the rupee) wherewith to pay his labourers, while he, forsooth, must be contented with 10 of these (holding up the florin), can we feel surprised that he gives up the struggle, and declares it is impossible to grow wheat any longer in England. Mr. Chairman, our opponents have the hardihood to declare that bimetallism is " protection in disguise," but, if the present system be free trade, will they explain how it comes about that the master of the mint exacts a profit of over 100 per cent, at the present time on our silver coinage, and this impost, be it remembered, is levied as against the people, and not on the foreigner. We cannot ignore the fact that two-thirds of the popula- tion of the world use silver as money ; that year by year the industrious and frugal millions of India, China and Japan are more loudly knocking at our doors and actively com- peting with us ; and I submit there must be something radically wrong in our system that so handicaps our people as to permit their eastern competitors to obtain their circu- lating medium at half the price we have to pay. Mr. DAVID MURRAY, of Adelaide, South Australia (President of the South Australia Branch of the Bimetallic League ; late President of the Adelaide Chamber of Commerce), said : It seems matter for surprise that the subject of our gathering this morning should in many quarters be treated with so. much apathy, that the connection between the currency question and a wide-spread industrial depres- sion and commercial uncertainty, though in some degree acknowledged, has yet exerted little practical influence on social or political action. Speaking as a colonist I can testify to the almost entire apathy with which, until within the past two years, the question has been regarded. We have witnessed the gradual reduction in the prices of our staples, the increasing poverty and indebtedness of our producers, the straits of our financial institutions, and the augmented exactions of our Governments in endeavouring to make both ends meet, and to maintain their credit with the outer world. Yet notwithstanding all this, the public has not generally grasped the fact that the source of all these depressing conditions lies deeper, and holds in a more tenacious and withering grip the foundations of our prosperity, than any of those other causes of depression to which critics have been so ready to attribute our misfortunes. Over-trading and speculation, over-borrowing, both public and private, the effects of drought, labour troubles and other untoward influences may for a time retard progress but their influence is only temporary, and their action is to a certain extent curative. The depression caused by them is generally followed by a revival, which the recurrence of more legitimate trading, increased caution and better seasons combine to bring about. It is to be regretted that in these days of economic study the theory of over-production as the source of a world-wide depression has still to be combated ; in the colonies this theory has blind adhesion on the part of many who have attempted to explain the cause of falling prices, and it has tended to withdraw public attention from its true source. Among the labouring classes especially it has found favour, hence the efforts to restrict the hours of labour and curtail the numbers of apprentices in their various unions. That the depression should have any connection with the currency, or with that action in Europe and America which deprived silver of its status as legal tender, they had not the slightest suspicion, and were ready to ridicule the idea. As producers of gold, the colonists generally were delighted to uphold its supremacy. The fallacy of some occult connection between the prosperity of England and its golden standard found easy credence amongst the unthinking, and as far as this subject is concerned this class claimed the majority of our colonists. They could not be led to see that as money is to commercial and industrial vitality what the atmosphere is to physical life, any derangement of the condition of the world's currency by which its volume is diminished would have as preju- dicial an effect on commerce and industry, as the with- '5* drawal of a portion of the oxygen in our atmosphere would have on our physical existence. The well-worn aphorism connecting good trade with a plentiful supply of money was narrowed in its application, and scarcely any beyond the few far-seeing students of our social economy who sounded the first notes of alarm were prepared to apply the aphorism to a world-wide movement, which, while it did not actually diminish the stock of the precious metals, yet so altered its relation to the world's other commodities as practically to reduce the volume of our medium of exchange, and so correspondingly reduce the value of every sort of property which had to be measured by it. Thanks to recent agitation this new and more satisfactory view of the case is now taking hold of the colonial mind. We begin to feel that our existence as prosperous adjuncts of the British Empire is at stake. The value of our staple productions, on the profitable export of which our prosperity depends, is rapidly diminishing. With wool returning to the pastoralist something like ^\d. per lb., and wheat to the farmer is. \od. per bushel, and all other articles of export showing a like decline, while interest, rent, taxes and other fixed outgoings remain unaltered, the actual continuance of these industries is at stake. We begin to realize that the collapse of our financial institutions, the ruin of many of our most enterprising colonists, the universal fall in local securities, many of which had not been subject to inflation, the contraction of business generally, and the universally reduced incomes of the people, combined with want of employment and destitution among the working classes, are owing to something more real than an alleged over-production, more permanent than the result of over-speculation, more disastrous than over-borrowing for reproductive works, and more formid- able than strikes or lock-outs. The only adequate 153 explanation of these phenomena is the enormous rise in the exchangeable value of gold, which has reduced by one-half the prices of our commodities and the gold value of our assets, and thus doubled the burden of our debts. Our people begin to realize that if this is the true explanation of the phenomena, every effort put forth by them in further development of their resources, and all increased industry along the lines of their staple productions, will be futile while the gold by which their produce has to be measured and sold continues to appreciate. The burden of public, as well as of private, indebtedness is becoming intolerable. To meet it, an ever-increasing proportion of the results of their labour is required, and an ever-decreasing residue is available for exchange, for ministering to their home comforts, and for building up their common weal. The hope that an increase in the supply of gold will in time mitigate the pressure is a fallacious one, for the increase in population, and the consequent demands of commerce, keep ever in advance of any possible augmentation of the gold supply ; and, unless by the remonetization of silver, we cannot restore the equilibrium between commodities on the one hand and the medium of exchange composed of the two metals accumulated for centuries on the other. This accumulation formed the basis of a standard which, however imperfect on account of periodic variations in the supply of the precious metals, has been proved to contain the elements of stability more than is furnished by either of them separately, or than any other known standard, and the result of the misguided interference with it in the demonetization of one of its constituent elements, has given further proof that a currency automatically built up in accordance with the requirements of the world's commerce, cannot with impunity be interfered with by blind legislation. It is difficult to determine what the outcome of the '54 present condition of things will be, if there is no further legislative interference. That the colonies will struggle to the last to maintain their credit, we may take for granted. In order that each Government should meet its obligations the colonists will submit to heavier customs dues, additional taxes, and retrenchments of expenditure, even to the neglect of need- ful improvements, and the discharge of some of their ordinary functions. But this is the process of killing the goose which lays the golden eggs. Enhanced duties will be neutralized by decreased imports, heavier land and income taxes will be met by a fall in the value of all real property and by reduced incomes, and ere long it will be discovered how futile is the attempt to make both ends meet in a community which has made full use of its borrowing powers in the belief that a certain proportion of the results of its labour would suffice to meet the claims upon it for interest, when it afterwards finds that, by an unex- pected increase in the value of the medium of payment, a double burden is laid upon it, with no prospect of future alleviation. In these circumstances is it to be wondered at that a fear as to their ability to implement engagements should take possession of the minds of the colonists, and that some ultimate scheme of readjustment should be suggested as an alternative to a total collapse ? With our Governments strong in the fidelity of their people such a climax is probably still beyond the bounds of contemplation, but the signs of its approach are not wanting among our financial institutions. In regard to the portion of external capital invested in the private and hitherto reproductive undertakings of the colonies, they have already felt the pinch of the reduced productiveness of these undertakings, and are afraid of the threatened recall of the capital entrusted to them. 155 They have recognized the utter impossibility of realizing their assets, and have been compelled to recon- struct, that is, under the pressure of a threatened stoppage and disastrous realization, the depositors and debenture- holders have been induced to forego their right to recall their money, in the hope of a future restoration of confidence and credit. The question for consideration now is, on what is this hope based? Under present conditions can we expect a recovery in the price of our staples, our wool, our wheat, our minerals, or such an increase in the production as will show the profit necessary to pay interest and to raise the value of our securities ? Manifestly, with our population already straining its utmost in the way of producing we cannot expect much increase ; and if all our produce is to be valued in gold, the volume of which, in comparison with the volume of commodities it has to measure, is certainly on the decrease, then, according to the ordinary action of the law of supply and demand, the prices of our staples, and the values of our securities remaining subject to the domination of a stan- dard relatively decreasing in volume and appreciating in value, cannot be expected to increase, but on the con- trary, have in prospect only a further decline. There is therefore reason to fear that unless counteracted by legis- lative action, this continued strain on our producing capabilities may precipitate a catastrophe involving not merely the Australian Colonies, but under the universal influence of a reduced or contracted currency the entire industrial world. As units in the vast confederation, which constitute the Empire of Great Britain, the Australian Colonies can do little more than raise their voices in remonstrance. They look to the Mother Country to help them in this emergency. If the currency problem has to do with the present depres- sion, and they now believe it has, they call on her, in behalf of her children, no longer to delay the consideration of a question fraught with so much that is vital to their material interests. MR. H. HUCKS GlBBS : We heard a very interesting paper yesterday from Mr. Charles Hoare, who showed you how futile it was to think that the interest of bankers lay in the appreciation of gold. Now there is another banker here who will tell you the same story, a story which he has worked out for himself, and of which he will give you a brief account. MR. E. R. PEARCE EDGCUMBE, Dorchester : Mr. Chair- man and Gentlemen I feel that I owe an apology to you for addressing you at all at a moment when we are all anxious to go to lunch, more especially as I cannot claim in any way to be a pioneer in this movement, being really only a very recent recruit. Three years ago I was firmly of opinion that gold was the only possible metal for our currency, but two years ago I had serious doubts, though at that time I still had a sort of faith in gold that sort of faith which you know has been described as trying hard to believe what you know is untrue. I held on to that kind of faith for a while, but it would not do, and I have had to abandon it altogether, because I have come to see, as I believe you have come to see, that the only possible future for the commerce and industries of this country is a currency based upon the double standard. (Hear, hear.) Now I have been asked to say and my words will be very brief a word on the two last points of our programme : the banking interest in reference to investment. As I say, as far as bankers are concerned and their investments, I think you will probably find that bankers have rather benefited than otherwise by the movement which has been going on for the appreciation of gold. The investments which they hold have been driven up to what I cannot but 157 consider a sort of artificial value in consequence of the high price of gold. A large mass of investments in commercial undertakings, and the national investments of foreign countries, are held very widely by their customers. I have been surprised to find amongst people whom I know how widespread are their holdings in foreign securities, both of a national and of a commercial character ; and all these holders have suffered severely already, and may suffer more in the future. Some countries have had to abandon altogether the payment of interest ; some have had to cut it down ; and others we know are trembling on the brink of falling into arrear. Now that is a serious thing for bankers, because bankers must rely largely for their increasing prosperity upon the prosperity of their customers. If their customers are doing well, it follows almost of necessity that bankers must do well too ; and if their customers are doing badly or suffering, it is a necessity almost that bankers must suffer along with them. Now I come from the South-Western portion of England, where we are largely agricultural, and I need hardly say how serious has been the result of the appreciation of gold in all our rural districts. As late as 1878 you could sell land in our district for thirty-three to forty years' purchase. I could give you instance after instance where it has been sold for forty years' purchase, but thirty- three years' purchase was the very lowest sum that any seller would take. That was at a time when rents were at least 30 per cent, more than they are to-day. And what is the selling price to-day ? It is not thirty-three years' purchase ; it is only twenty-five years', and you find it difficult to get that. You have not only lost your rents, but the selling price is based on a very much shorter number of years' purchase. Once if you had taken a farm, even at 300 a year, it would have sold for 10,000 at thirty- three years' purchase ; but the rent has fallen to 200, and 158 the price is now twenty-five years' purchase, or 5,000. Now if this was a fair and proper fall we should have to put up with it, but I have travelled in our Colonies, and I have travelled in South America, and I can assure you that I can put my finger upon lands in those distant places where they are provided with the roads and facilities that we have got, and where they are selling at a higher price per acre than our land sells at in the South of England. You can buy whole tracts in the South of England now for 15 an acre, and you cannot get that very well situated in regard to roads and railways, while you cannot buy such land in the neighbourhood of Buenos Ayres for that price. Therefore, I say that there is something utterly wrong, and that we are by this system, unless it is checked, proceeding down- wards with regard to a large portion of the community. I cannot at this moment stop to tell you how it is affecting our rural districts, and how it is causing the farmer to lose so much, and how it is driving out the labourers from their employment, and sending them into the towns; but the result is that there are poor people who have to go without new hats and coats and different garments that are usually bought (to show what I mean by a familiar example) ; and this reflects even upon the townsfolk, who consequently have bad times, and sell fewer things, and have to wait longer for their payment. It is crippling the whole of our southern districts; and the only thing that relieves us is the fact that we are more favoured than some other parts of England, for we have watering places to which people come because of the milder climate, and they keep us going, and so help to reduce to some extent the loss, which, I think, ought never to have occurred. (Hear, hear.) Now I must say this for the farmer, because I have had a good deal to do with farmers, and I have had many interviews with them, that I have found farmers most reluctant to go to their landlords to ask for an 159 abatement of rent, and on numbers of occasions I have compelled the farmer to go to his landlord and say that he could not afford to pay. There are some who sponge on their landlords, but, taking the bulk of them, they pay up, and in many cases they have paid rents when they have not earned them. Now I will conclude what I have to say with one thing, and that is this: I do feel very strongly that those who call themselves monometallists are really not entitled to the name. I say they are not entitled to the name, because the term monometallist conveys the impression to the mind of everyone who has not investi- gated the subject that the one metal provides a currency for the world ; but the difficulty I find with everyone is this : that they say, Why do you want two metals why is not one good enough ? The very term monometallist gives them the impression that that one gold currency goes everywhere, but we have learnt to-day, if we did not know it before, that it only goes over one particular portion of the world, and that the other portion deals in another currency ; and therefore, if you are a monometallist, you are a man who is supporting a system which does not provide a currency for the whole world ; you are a man who has to trade, and who compels his neighbours to trade,, by a system of barter, and not by a system of currency. If I may give an illustration from an old divine, which I think may be useful in this matter about the views of the monometallist, I would refer to a quaint old saying of a divine, that the most difficult pursuit, the most hopeless pursuit, was that of a blind man in a dark room seeking for a black cat that was not there. (Loud laughter.) Now I say that our friends the monometallists are blind men in a dark room, and when they talk about being monometallists, as if there was a universal currency that they had got, it is simply a black cat which is not there. We are the only people who stand in the way of the world obtaining i6o a satisfactory currency, because we know you must have a double currency or none. I say we are under a difficulty in fighting, but it is a difficulty that can be removed ; still we are under a difficulty in the fact that the very term that our opponents use conveys a false impression. They are seeking, as I have said, for a black cat which is not there. (Applause.) MR. H. HUCKS GlBBS : Let me ask your attention for three or four minutes to Mr. Stephen Williamson, M.P., who was one of the pioneers of this movement. MR. STEPHEN WILLIAMSON, M.P. : Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen I will strictly adhere to what your Chairman has said, and not detain you but for two or three minutes. I do not intend to deal with those enormous difficulties which are now besetting our commerce, and that are affecting our mercantile and industrial classes, although I could enlarge on them, and tell you of difficulties which my own firm, and I particularly, encounter personally, but I refrain ; nor will I deal with that monstrous piece of legislative work the shutting up of the mints in India against the coinage of silver. I believe that no such act has ever before been consummated in the history of the civilized world as that of the shutting up of the mints, and the proscribing of that very metal silver which, by the nat of British law, is the money of India. I believe that such a thing such a piece of legislative absurdity never before was consummated in the civilized world. I do not intend enlarging on that, because that will be dealt with by others, but I just want to call the attention of financial men and investors to one point, and that is, the dangers of the situation to the investing classes who have their invest- ments in silver-using countries I mean the shutting up of those countries practically as outlets for capital. Those countries present to us an admirable field, but we are practically making it extremely difficult to avail our- selves of them if we do not shut them up entirely as a field of investment and enterprise for our money- lending classes. I understand that there now exists in circulation about 5 50,000,000 sterling of paper, pur- porting at any rate to be about that value in the civilized world. How on earth are those nations struggling to get upon a safe metallic basis ever to get on that safe metallic basis on which we all wish them to be, and how are we to look to them for the payment of our investments if we make it impossible so long as we adhere to our mono- metallic gold fallacy ? Now, without enlarging too much, let us take for instance the position of Mexico just now as a field for investment. I see that during the last year or two the exports from Europe to Mexico have fallen off by about one-third to one-half. Mexico, I believe, is extremely well governed ; at the head of it there are just people who wish to pay the interest on their National Debt. That interest is now 6 per cent. Suppose they resume the payment of that, honourably struggling to pay their debts and fulfil their obligations. As silver has fallen enormously, why should not Mexico say to us monometallists : When we borrowed this money we pledged ourselves to pay you 6 per cent, interest, but we came under that obligation when silver was worth 6od. an ounce, whereas it is now worth 30^., and why should not we in perfect integrity reduce the interest to 3 per cent. ? I think it would be right, and I am quite prepared to hear that Mexico wishes it, and I would not complain of it, but would think it a perfectly just and reasonable thing that they should do it. Mexico has a silver currency, and the same thing applies to other nations having a silver currency as to those that are now on an enforced paper currency. We make it extremely difficult for those on a silver basis, and we make it impossible for nations on an enforced paper currency to get back to a metallic money so long as we, the great L l62 creditor nations in Europe, insist on having our pound of flesh. Why not let the nations avail themselves of both metals ? Why not call in the aid of silver, as we used to do ? We bimetallists are the true conservatives in this matter. We want to get back to the old safe basis, and call in silver and tie it to gold and increase the prosperity of the world, and so make safe to us those fields for invest- ment for our spare capital, and promote the happiness and well-being of the world. (Cheers.) The Conference then adjourned till 2.30 p.m. i6 3 Thursday, May 3rd, 2.30 p.m. MR. HENRY HUCKS GIBBS, President of the Bimetallic League in the Chair. THE SECRETARY announced that Sir Henry Meysey- Thompson, Bart., M.P., offered a prize of a Silver Cup, value 25, and 25 in sovereigns, for the best essay on certain points of the Currency Question, and that full particulars were to be obtained at any of the offices of the Bimetallic League. THE FINANCES OF INDIA. SIR DAVID BARBOUR, K.C.S.I., said: I have been asked to explain the general effect on the financial position of the Indian Government of the appreciation of gold, and the divergence in the relative value of gold and silver. If I am brief it is not because I am dogmatic, but because I wish to save time. If I appear to speak strongly, it is because I feel deeply ; and if I speak plainly, it is because the time has passed for prophesying smooth things ; and on me, if on any man, the burden rests, in the interest both of India and of England, of stating to you the facts, and the whole of the facts, as plainly, as clearly, and as accurately as I can in the time at my disposal. To understand the full effect, direct and indirect, on the finances of India of the divergence in the relative value of gold and silver, it is necessary to bear in mind certain leading facts connected with that country. India is of vast extent, and contains an immense population. The people are intensely conservative, and suspicious of change. Their wants are few, and, judged by the Western standard of wealth, they are extremely poor. The amount that could be raised by taxation would, under any circumstances, be small relatively to the population, and a Foreign Government must be more lenient than a L2 1 6 4 Native Government need be. The governing of such a country in accordance, even to a limited extent, with Western ideas is necessarily expensive in comparison with the available resources. The preservation of peace and order depends, in the last resource, on the British Troops employed in India, and the body of Englishmen serving in the various Civil Depart- ments. Englishmen employed in India must be highly paid to compensate them for service in that country, and liberal terms of pension on retirement are also necessary. The capital for the construction of Railways and other great works in India is mainly provided from England, and there is a considerable body of non-official Europeans in the country who have invested capital and who have created, or who manage, or take a large share in managing, various industrial enterprises. It may be laid down as a general rule that no Englishman who can afford to return to his native country settles permanently in India, and European children must, if possible, be sent to England both for the sake of their health and in order that they may be educated. As a consequence of the state of things which I have just described, the tendency is for the public expenditure in India to outgrow the revenue, and the amount remitted every year from India to England on account of profits, savings from salaries, interest on capital, money for the support of families and education of children, and pensions, is very large in proportion to the total foreign trade of the country. The Indian Government practically owns the whole Railway System of the country, and also a very extensive system of Irrigation Canals. The capital expended on these works has been provided partly from revenue, partly from money borrowed in India, and very largely from money borrowed in England, or provided by English Companies. Many of the Railways were constructed by Companies on whose capital a certain rate of interest was guaranteed in gold by the Government of India. This state of things throws on the Government the burden of remitting to Europe every year the interest on the Capital expended in the construction of certain Indian Railways. The revenue of India is also specially liable to fluctua- tions. The country is subject to periodical droughts, which affect the Land Revenue the mainstay of Indian finance and involve heavy expenditure on the relief of famine. Both the Railway Revenue and the Opium Revenue vary very much in amount from year to year. On the other hand, the system for the control of Indian expenditure is defective. The control of the Revenues of India is vested in the Secretary of State for India in Council, but a large portion of his authority is, necessarily, delegated to the Government of India. The Government of India is comprised of seven members, of whom only one is chosen for his supposed knowledge of Indian or other finance. The other members of the Government are, for the most part, the heads of great spending Departments. They hold office for five years only, and they, not un- naturally, wish to show a satisfactory record of work done during their period of office. The making of a satisfactory record in each Department every five years involves, unfortunately, a liberal expenditure of the public money. A Government such as I have described might, of course, administer the resources of the country with the utmost economy, but the chances are against such a result. The tendency is towards excessive expenditure, by which I mean expenditure in excess of what is prudent and safe, and not necessarily wasteful expenditure in the first instance, though excessive expenditure always ends by becoming wasteful expenditure when financial embarrass- ment necessitates large reductions. The revenues- of India 166 . have, at times, been managed with great economy, but the credit of such management belongs entirely to the members of that Government for the time being. The system is not favourable to economy. The Secretary of State for India in Council is, in many respects, a valuable check on Indian expenditure, and the only real and permanent check, other than the inability of the Government of India to raise more revenue. No control over expenditure, however, which must be exercised from England can compensate for the want of sufficient initial check in India over Indian expenditure. The official organization for the control of Indian expenditure is, as I have stated, imperfect, and neither in India nor in England is there any intelligent and well- informed body of public opinion which can effectually check unduly liberal expenditure. India is a Continent rather than a single country. In addition to the Govern- ment of India, there are no less than eight Local Governments enjoying a certain amount of independence, and each with a separate financial system. There are also scattered and extensive tracts of country which are administered by the Government of India. The Financial Member of the Council of the Governor-General has not unfrequently been blamed because his Budget Statements were not readily intelligible to the English reader. The defence rests on the complexity of the subject, and the want of familiarity of the English, and I might add the Indian, critic with the details of Indian Administration. If the revenue and expenditure of all the Kingdoms of Europe were lumped together, shown in one account and explained in one Budget Statement, and a native of China devoted a few hours of his leisure to a study of that Statement, he would, no doubt, complain of the want of lucidity, and would hardly be tempted to return to the subject in the following year. At any rate, be the i6 7 cause what it may, the number of men, official and non- official, English and Indian, who are possessed at any one time of sufficient information to give a sound opinion on the general condition of Indian Finance, might easily be counted on the fingers of one hand. The facts which I have brought to your notice may be briefly recapitulated an Eastern country governed in accordance with expensive Western ideas, an immense and poor population, a narrow margin of possible additional taxation, claims for additional expenditure greatly in excess of possible additional revenue, a constant tendency for expenditure to outgrow revenue, a system of Government in India favourable to increase of, and unfavourable to reduction of, expenditure, no financial control by intelligent and well-informed public opinion either in India or in England, an insufficient check on expenditure in India, a remote and imperfect control exercised from England, a revenue specially liable to fluctuations from year to year, large and growing foreign payments. I have brought these facts to your notice in order that you might clearly understand what were the conditions of Indian finance when the divergence between the Indian and the English monetary standard began, and be in a position to recognise the specially injurious effects and intolerable financial embarrassment which, under the con- ditions I have stated, must flow from a continuous and heavy depreciation of the one standard and appreciation of the other. The divergence in the relative value of the two standards has had what I may call a two-fold effect. In the first place there has been a continuous fall in the value of the rupee relatively to the pound sterling, which was very seldom checked, and then only temporarily. And in the second place, there were occasional heavy and rapid falls, which, for the time being, quite dis- i68 organized the administration, and which led either to large reductions of expenditure or to increase of taxation. The reductions of expenditure were often of a specially injurious character, because, owing to the peculiar circumstances of India, the Government finds it necessary to undertake the construction of railways and other works for the development of the country ; and the vice, and what appears to be the incurable vice, of the Indian Govern- ment being a tendency to undertake works involving a larger expenditure than it can in a series of years find money for, every great fall in the value of the rupee led to a sudden and wasteful check on Public Works expendi- ture, to be followed in a few years, when fiscal equilibrium had been re-established, by an excessive expansion which, in its turn, led to another wasteful contraction. I do not propose to deal with all the great and sudden falls in the value of the rupee that have taken place. It will be sufficient for my purpose to go back to 1886-1887, and I will read to you what Sir Auckland Colvin, who was then in charge of the Indian Finance Department, said in March, 1886: " . . the position, as was explained in January, is very much com- plicated by the absolute uncertainty which hangs over the silver market. The fact that India, whose currency and revenue are in silver, has incurred heavy obligations in gold, has introduced into our financial situation since the fall of silver commenced an element which experience shows to be one of the most serious dangers with which Indian administration has hitherto been menaced. Owing, further, to the oscillation in the silver market, there is now little practical control over surplus, equilibrium, or deficit in the Indian Budget." Sir Auckland Colvin added: "Indian finance and Indian administrative improvement and advance have become, in a word, questions of currency." <\BR OF THt UNIVERSITY \x OF 9 ^4^^i* Sir Auckland Colvin used this language in connection with the Budget of 1886-87, when the rate of exchange was taken at the rate of is. 6d. the rupee, a rate which an Indian Finance Minister of the present day would not hope for in his wildest dreams. The rate taken for the Budget of 1894-95 i s only is. 2d., and, as you all know, the market rate is now materially lower. The crisis of which Sir Auckland Colvin spoke in 1886 was surmounted by reducing certain classes of expenditure, by levying contributions from the various local Govern- ments, by suspending the Famine Grant, and by imposing additional taxation. Subsequently the United States of America made an attempt to maintain the value of silver relatively to gold by increasing its purchases of that metal. For a time there was a large rise in the price of silver, a great improvement in the rate of the Indian exchange, and surpluses in the Indian Accounts, which, I am afraid, did more harm than good, as they lulled apprehension to rest and gave an altogether wrong impression of the permanent condition of Indian finance. The improvement in the financial position made it possible to restore the Famine Grant, but there was no cessation in the rate of growth of Indian expenditure, and no reduction ot the taxation that had been previously imposed. The end came speedily ; the attempt of the United States to maintain the value of silver relating to gold failed, and failed, I believe, owing to the increase in the production of silver and to the fall in gold prices. Silver again fell heavily, and the Indian exchange sank lower than it had ever been before. The stock of gold in the United States was reduced, and a strong agitation sprang up in that country for the repeal of the Sherman Act. It was under such circumstances that the financial year 1893-94 opened in India. In two years the additional expenditure caused by the fall in exchange had increased by Rx. 3,937,000 yearly. The rate of exchange for 1893-94 was taken at is. 2%d., which was somewhat above the market rate, and the Estimates for that year showed a deficit of Rx. 1,595,000. The condition of the European officers, civil and military, serving in India, had been so seriously affected by the fall in exchange, that further expenditure to compensate them, in some degree, was inevitable and could not be much longer delayed. On the other hand, the market rate of exchange was weak, and there was every sign of another great fall. It was not expected that the International Conference at Brussels would result in prac- tical measures being taken for the settlement of the currency question, and it was fully anticipated that, in that case, the agitation in the United States for the repeal of the Sherman Act would be successful. Up to 1893 the effects of the divergence in the value of gold and silver on the finances of India might be summarized as follows : (1) The expenditure on exchange had largely increased, so that the amount entered in the Estimates of 1893-94 came to Rx. 9,935,000, almost wholly due to the divergence. (2) There was also a heavy additional rupee expenditure, not included in the above sum, due to the fact that the pay of the British soldiers serving in India was fixed in gold, though paid in rupees. (3) Further expenditure, which could not be put at less than Rx. 1,000,000, and which would probably exceed that sum, must be incurred in order to improve the position of the European officers of Government. (4) There had been, in the past twenty years, several severe financial crises necessitating additional taxation, and involving waste of money and mis- chievous fluctuations in policy. (5) A further fall in exchange was impending, of so severe a nature that it was doubtful if the Government of India would be able to meet its obliga- tions, while it was quite certain that to do so would involve the maximum taxation which India could safely be required to bear. (6) There was every probability that the further fall would not be final, and that before long there might be another fall which would find the Government of India without resources. It was under these circumstances that the Government of India decided to stop the free coinage of silver and attempt to introduce a gold standard. It is too soon to say yet whether or not the attempt of the Government of India to introduce a gold standard into India will be successful, but it is quite clear that its introduction must be a work of time, and that further and heavy sacrifices will be required. Gentlemen, I have sketched very briefly and imperfectly the effects on Indian finance up to June last of that unhappy dislocation between the gold and the silver standard which began in 1873. The following matters that have occurred, I regret to say, subsequently to the closing of the Indian mints, and which are in reality the indirect results of the divergence in the value of gold and silver, also require notice : (1) Disturbance in the trade between India and silver-standard countries. (2) A failure to draw in 1893-94 the full amount of Council Bills, and a consequent increase in the sterling debt of India. (3) A further fall in exchange. 172 (4) An increase in the expenditure under exchange in the Indian Estimates for the current year to Rx. 10,306,000. (5) A further increase of the rupee cost of the British troops serving in India, and an additional charge estimated at Rx. 1,113,000 for the current year (but which will exceed that estimate) for compensation to European officers. (6) The absorption of the available portion of the Famine Grant. (7) The imposition of further taxation in the objectionable form of import duties. (8) The exaction of a contribution from Local Governments. (9) Reductions in Public Works expenditure. (10) A deficit of Rx. 302,000 in the Estimates for 1894-95. Serious as is the present state of affairs, I think matters would have been even worse if the Indian mints had been kept open to silver while the Sherman Act was repealed. Gentlemen, the catalogue of evils which I have given is not exhaustive. The speculative element which has been introduced into Indian finance is not favourable to good or economical administration. The contentment and (as a consequence) the efficiency of the European services, has been affected by their losses, while considerable political agitation has been caused in India. Great, indeed, would be the service to the British Empire of him who could show the Government of India a means of finally escaping from the financial difficulties which now beset them on all sides. MR. HERMANN SCHMIDT : Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen I think amongst the many papers which we have heard here from this platform yesterday and to-day, the paper which Sir David Barbour has read will stand '73 pre-eminent in the importance of the subject dealt with. India will be the object-lesson to this country showing what the course of exchanges leads to all over the world. We have only to look at any part of the world, and what do we see most countries suffering from ? We find them, even if their finances are in a fairly good condition, incapable of paying the interest on the gold obligations which they have undertaken, and through this cause, and this cause alone, one country after another gets into difficulties. (Hear, hear.) It is not only that the commerce is dis- turbed ; it is that the whole system of the finances is undermined, and in some countries brought to the verge of bankruptcy, simply by the inability of these countries to control their exchanges. Now, Sir, it is well- known that some of the critics in this City are not, perhaps, fully acquainted with what is going on in these different countries, and they say : " Oh, very well, it is owing to extravagance ; it is owing to bad administration of finance ; it is owing to this cause, and that cause." They will not, however, be able to deny that India has been governed on the most approved financial and monetary principles ; and that it is governed by honest people, by capable people; yet India finds herself in exactly the same difficulty as other countries. She finds herself practically unable to meet her gold liabilities. (Hear, hear.) If it were not for the fact that, for the time being (and nobody in the City can say for how long), the credit of England is enabling India to meet her gold indebtedness, already by this time India would have been unable to pay the interest of her debt, and that not because she does not possess the money, for 240,000,000 rupees are at the present moment locked up uselessly in the Presidencies of Madras, Calcutta and Bombay, but because she finds it utterly impossible, in the present state of the exchanges, and the present state of the commerce of the world, to convert those rupees which 174 she possesses into sterling money, and thereby meet the liabilities which she has undertaken. Now it is admittedly easy for the credit of England to back up India during temporary difficulties ; but this difficulty is not temporary ; this difficulty has been going on for some twenty years, and it is growing every year. It is said that the fall of a penny in the rupee makes a difference of a million sterling to the Government of India. But with every penny of a fall this difference becomes larger. It is the last penny that will make all the difference in the world between something and nothing. Therefore the difficulties grow, and the time will come, and in the opinion of experts it will come sooner than some people think, when it will be impossible for India to meet her liabilities ; then this question will come home to the Government of this country as the most pressing question of the day. Gentlemen representing labour and capital have spoken to you of their own grievances, but those grievances come home to the Govern- ment of this country only indirectly, whereas the difficulties of the Indian Government are practically the difficulties of the English Government, and I for myself can see no way out of it but to restore the rupee to a fixed relation with gold. We know that was the opinion of the Indian Government, but they have been unable to carry out their views, and they have, as an alternative, closed the mints of India. For myself, I have never been able to see that this step was anything except a temporary measure. Look at what has been done. India was suffering because silver was depreciated, and because gold was appreciated, and a step has been taken, with the result of still further appreciating gold, and still further depreciating silver. (Hear, hear.) I cannot see how, under those circumstances, we can expect from the closing of the Indian mints even a temporary relief from the evils of the present situation ; and if that is so, and if the last alternative has. 175 now been exhausted, we shall have to come back to the remedy which the Indian Government and the Indian officials originally proposed, the remedy of a fixed international relation between gold and silver. (Loud applause.) MR. R. BARCLAY CHAPMAN, C.S.I.: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen I did not come here at all prepared to take part in the present discussion. I thought perhaps that you would hear enough about India, from the Indian point of view, in Sir David Barbour's paper and from other speakers like Mr. Hermann Schmidt. I look upon the Indian exchanges as a most instructive (if we will but be instructed) object-lesson to this country. This desperate condition, for it is desperate, of the Indian exchanges, is not an evil itself, it is a symptom of evils, which affect not the gold-using countries only, but all countries in the world. (Hear, hear.) Be very sure I have not time to establish it now that no country is more adversely affected by the present critical state of affairs than this country of ours Great Britain. The evil in her case does not show itself in the simple form in which we find it exhibited in the Indian exchanges, but it does show itself in every direction by the stagnation of trade ; by the destruction of interests, some of them the most important interests in this country ; and by the general impossibility of carrying out those enterprises which are as the very life-blood of a commercial country such as England. Now, Gentlemen, we have been some of us for many years urging what can be said in regard to this subject, and I am not now going into the details of the question again. I would simply say this, that if you try to find the scientific explanations and reasons bearing upon this great question, you will find yourself beset with pitfalls, and the wisest and the most experienced are extremely likely to fall into one or other of these pitfalls ; i 7 6 yet the plain, simple fact, the outcome of it all, remains so clear, that he who runs may read. There can be no question that up to 1873 we had a standard which answered the purpose of the whole world quite admirably. We know quite well what disturbed that standard, and we know too well also the terrible consequences that have ensued. I cannot myself understand how gentlemen of ability and responsibility can afford to repudiate that plain fact, which stands out incontrovertible. Now the state of things which we have arrived at is this : I shall revert for a moment to India; but I shall not express any opinion with regard to the measure adopted last year, for my opinion is probably sufficiently well known. I cannot say what I should have done if I had been in the terribly difficult position in which Sir David Barbour found himself, and therefore I will not at all criticise what he did, and what the Government of India did, but I regret what was done for this reason, that the responsibility for the solution of this question lies not there but here. (Applause.) And so with the bearing of what was done for the moment to enable the Government here to repudiate their responsi- bilities, in effect to put by this great question, which will not bear putting by. Gentlemen, what is the prospect for the future ? I was asked a little time ago by a gentle- man familiar with the question : Have you any hope that you will be able to carry your point ? Shall we achieve bimetallism ? My answer was this, " By argument, No ; but by the coercion of irresistible circumstances, Yes." I have long seen that India is insolvent. It is a terrible thing for one to say, who has always been proud of the financial administration of India, and believed that there was no honester or abler financial administration anywhere ; but through the irresistible force of circumstances, India has become insolvent. I do not see myself how this very year India is to pay her way. You have heard from Sir David Barbour that last year she did not pay her way ; very far from it. She was unable to pay her gold obligations, which are not less part of her obligations than any other obligations that she has ; and that was not for the first time. For years past she has been unable to do it. We have come now to what looks to me very much like a crisis ! I do not like to prophesy evil, and perhaps I shall be told that what I say does harm, but the time for any reticence seems to me to have passed. (Applause.) Presently the time will come, I am afraid to say how soon, when India will not be able to pay her way in this country without again resorting to the disastrous and impolitic act of borrowing in times of peace, and borrowing for current expenditure. She did so last year; she took power to borrow 10,000,000, a certain part of which has not yet been exercised, and for my part I think that, if there were true and careful administration of the finances, the use of that remaining unexpended balance of borrowing power should be watched with the utmost jealousy. I suppose it will not be. It will be taken as done, and be allowed to flow along ; but that will last but a short time. Before very long it seems to me inevitable, that the Government of India will again have to come to the Government of Great Britain, and say, " We cannot pay our way ; we cannot meet our current obligations; we must again borrow 10,000,000." I do not know what gentlemen will think when that next demand is made. There will be some searchings of heart over it no doubt ; possibly it may be granted, but even that child thrown to the wolves will not settle the question. The real difficulty of the position is this, which Sir David Barbour spoke of, that we have not got to any end ; there is no bottom to this thing, and when the time comes, if it is not the next time, then the time after that, inevitably, whoever is then in power, whether the present Liberal Government or the Conserva- I 7 8 tives, will have to face this question ; and then will come the time which I spoke of as a coercion of facts. They may resist arguments, misrepresent them, turn them aside, pooh, pooh them, scoff at them, but when the fact comes, how is it going to be dealt with, how are India's obliga- tions to be met ? I cannot for a moment suppose that India will be allowed to commit any overt act of insolvency. (Hear, hear.) At the same time England has, and in my opinion very rightly has, always most anxiously disclaimed any responsibility for the finances of India. Mr. Schmidt pointed out to you what is an unquestionable fact, that the public does not so regard it. Do you suppose that if the Indian finances were standing in the public opinion upon their own foundation, with no responsibility on the part of Great Britain, we should have, at this moment, the India 3 per cents, a little above par ? My own belief is that they should be a little above the Argentine 3 per cents. That responsibility is upon Great Britain. Will she take it up ? I cannot tell. For good or for evil, the administration of political power in this country has fallen into the hands of classes of the population who do not easily perceive the political value to England of her connection with India. My own feeling is I do not know whether this important audience will agree with me that it would be impossible for Great Britain to tolerate the insolvency of its great Dependency, and the failure of what has been the most illustrious experiment and enterprise of her whole history, for that is what it will amount to. (Hear, hear.) If that took place, and India became insolvent, and England gave up the task as hopeless, as beyond her capacity to deal with, then I am afraid this beloved country of ours would sink, and sink justly, into a second or third or fourth-rate Power. (Hear, hear.) Now, Gentlemen, we do not know what will happen, but I do know what is wanting. It is a little genuine statesmanship applied to this question. It is '79 not the business of bimetallists, or of any other public body, to find a policy for the Government. There confronts them this tremendous crisis, for tremendous it is. We must not confine it to India. It is a tremendous crisis in every branch of our interests. It has confronted us hitherto, and we have obstinately refused even to deal with it in any way. We are waiting for a statesman, or rather for a Government of statesmen, to grapple with this business. (Loud applause.) The responsibility undoubtedly rests entirely upon Her Majesty's Government of Great Britain, and behind them, of course, upon this country. It is quite true what Mr. Balfour, the Leader of the Opposition, said here yesterday, that no Government can act until it has convinced the interests concerned, and especially the magnates of the City of London ; but at the same time it is very necessary that the Government should have a policy, and should declare it. (Hear, hear.) The time for drift has passed, and I must say it is clearly to my mind a perfect disgrace to this country of England, which should be in the very forefront, and even has been in the very fore- front, of sound financial administration, and of commercial enterprise, that she should be the one block in the way of the settlement of the question. (Loud applause.) Practically then, Gentlemen, what is to be done is to put such pressure I am afraid the pressure will have to come in that most disagreeable shape to which I have referred upon the Government as will compel them to lay aside that prejudice, which some of us venture to believe is bred, as prejudice always is bred, of ignorance only. I have great sympathy with those who have the task before them. I have known a little of what public life is under far less pressure than besets them. I know the difficulty of taking up and deciding great questions which have to be decided such as these, but the thing must be done. I think Home Rule important, and all the various interests of democracy M 2 i8o of vast political importance, but there is nothing so important as this. (Hear, hear.) The mainspring of the watch is out of order. How can it possibly keep time? It is perfect madness to attempt to deal with anything else without setting this great question right. Let us then hope that this great gathering which registers a most important advance in the consideration given to this question, in this very centre of the commerce and of the wealth of England, will wake up the Government a little bit and induce them to do their duty. It is for that that they exist. Let them appoint no longer Royal Commissions and Committees, and things of that kind, which are only devices for shelving difficulties. Some of our officials are only too familiar with that way of doing business. When you do not see your way through a thing, let somebody else enquire into it first, and the result is sure to be nothing definite being recommended, and, I am afraid I should add, it would end in the shattering of some great reputations of people who have sat on these Commissions. I have nothing more to say, but to express my own gratification, as an old bimetallist, perhaps one of the very earliest amongst English people, not reckoning perhaps our foreign friends, at the success which has attended this meeting, and to hope that at last something will be done. Our business in the meantime is to have our remedy ready. It holds the field. There is no other remedy to be proposed. I was reading a day or two ago what some of us I have no doubt have read Dr. Giffen's evidence before the Royal Commission, printed in the Times two or three days ago and what was his position ? He admitted to the full the fact of the appreciation of gold, and admitted it was synonymous I think they were his own very words with the fall of prices, and he described it as a great evil, but he said that he had been unable to discover any better standard, putting of course the one possible standard out iSi of the field altogether, and not referring to it, and he said, " This is a tremendous evil, but I have nothing to suggest" I think I am quoting him rightly, though it is from memory '* except that we should acquaint ourselves as far as possible beforehand with what is going to happen." Thus the doctors tell you that this is a hopeless case. Our remedy, however, holds the field. It is founded upon actual experience, and not upon any fancy theories which everybody can reject or split up. There is nothing to compete with it in the form of remedy. It constitutes the aggressive party, the aggressive force, and it has made great progress. Let us then be prepared with it, so that when this time which I have referred to does come, this time of inevitable and irresistible coercion, the Govern- ment, if they have not discovered it for themselves, may have from us the true remedy to fall back upon. (Loud cheers.) MR. N. P. VAN DEN BERG, LL.D., of Amsterdam (President of the Netherlands Bank), said : Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen I have accepted your kind invitation to be present at this meeting with the greater pleasure, as I have something to say about currency matters in Holland that may perhaps interest you. As a rule very little attention is paid by foreigners to what is going on in my country, and yet, I think, our experiments in practical political economy, in the art of settling intricate political and economical questions, may in many respects be con- sidered rather instructive. It has gradually become a popular belief amongst Englishmen, that " in matters of commerce the fault of the Dutch, is giving too little and asking too much " ; but after all I dare say, without any unbecoming national self-glorification, that at the present moment, and for a long series of years, Holland is and has been the leading free trade country on the conti- nent ; the only country, England not excepted, where the 182 principles of free trade have been applied without any restriction or deviation, not only in the mother-country itself, but also in its colonial dependencies. And in mentioning our colonies I cannot pass in silence the strange omission that struck me in reading some weeks ago the remarks of the London " Economist " in the issue of loth February last about European colonization. The article was written to prove that the Anglo-Saxon is by far the most successful ruler of tropical dependencies, and it went to show that neither the Germans, nor the Scandi- navians, nor the French, nor the Hungarian Slavs, nor the Spaniards, nor the Portuguese, could bear in this respect any comparison with the English people. The name of Holland, however, was not mentioned at all, notwithstanding her colonial empire is only second in importance to that of the United Kingdom, extending as it does over some 720,000 square miles, with a population of about thirty-two millions. Besides, our colonial regime is certainly not inferior to that of other European nations, but scarcely ever is any notice taken of it ; and the same remark applies to the banking system of the Netherlands, which for more than three- quarters of a century has worked so remarkably well. Even in the most recent publications about banking and banks, written by Englishmen, frequent mention is made of the account given by Adam Smith in his immortal work " The Wealth of Nations " of the old Amsterdam Bank, which was found to be utterly insolvent when the Dutch republic was overrun by the armies of the French in 1795 ; but till now I have never met with any account of the present Bank of the Netherlands, over which I have the honour to preside, and which has been in existence for the last eighty years without ever failing in its vocation to assist the trading community with the credit they require. Thanks to the organisation of the Bank of the Netherlands, we have been able to make head against the difficulties which in times of crises and depression have so often disturbed the money-market in England, and never, during all the time of the Bank's existence, has there been any question of the suspension of the Bank Act, as has been so often the case with the great banking institution of this country. It is beyond question that the banking system of Holland may be taken as a model of the kind, and as a safe guide for the organisation of any other similar establishment. I feel almost certain that the London money-market would scarcely have suffered under the great crises of 1857 and 1866 if the Bank of England had been able to act upon the same principles as our National Bank, which in many respects stands unrivalled amongst the other circulation- banks of the continent. Now, as regards the currency matters to which I beg more particularly to draw your attention, I need not remind you that Holland has often been blamed for adopting the single silver standard in 1847, a couple of years before the gold discoveries in California and Australia became known, and before the alarm was roused about the serious fall in the value of gold, which even impelled Richard Cobden to advocate the general demonetization of the yellow metal, the value of silver being according to his views much more stable, and the white metal, therefore, much more suitable to fulfil the functions of a meas.ure of value than gold. Whether Cobden may have been right or wrong, Holland at all events did extremely well under the silver standard during the twenty-five years of its working. Never has the country been so prosperous as during the period 1 850 to 1870. Agriculture and industry were in a most flourishing condition ; trade was growing and extending ; and the credit of the State stood almost unrivalled amongst all the nations of the continent. Our experience thus goes to prove that most certainly the commercial prosperity 1 84 of a nation does not lie in a gold standard, as seems to be the common belief here in England, notwithstanding that that great statesman Lord Beaconsfield told you twenty years ago that there scarcely could be a greater fallacy than this belief. Well, he said on the ipth November, 1873, when he was installed as the Rector of the University of Glasgow, " I think that any country which has a gold standard of value should think once, twice and thrice before it gives it up. But it is the greatest delusion in the world to attribute the commercial preponderance and prosperity of England to our having a gold standard. Our gold standard is not the cause of our commercial prosperity, but the consequence of our commercial prosperity." In many respects Holland may be taken as a most eloquent proof of the soundness of his views, and thoroughly satisfied as we were with our silver standard, and the monetary system based thereon, which for years has been considered as one of the most perfect systems of Europe, we certainly should not even have thought of altering our system if Germany had only left things alone. But it soon became evident that it would be impossible for Holland to retain the silver standard, were Germany and other adjacent countries to adopt gold as their standard of value. A first step in the new course was taken by our suspending the coinage of silver for private parties, and ere long the reform was completed by the adoption of gold as standard coin of the realm, the silver currency being left untouched as legal tender in payment of debt to any amount. Thus the system of the " limping standard " has been working in Holland now for about twenty years, and it cannot be denied that as a rule it has done fairly well, as has also been the case in France and other countries. But the system is in direct violation of the principles of monetary science ; and the danger remains for both countries that they may suddenly have to face unexpected contingencies, the consequences of which may make it indispensable to carry through the reform of their currency by demonetizing all their silver legal tender money. I need only mention the possibility of spurious coinage of silver money of full weight, a most profitable operation under existing circumstances, and which, it appears, is already being put into practice on a rather alarming scale. Now, Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen, what has made the solution of the monetary problem in our country most difficult from the beginning, is the circumstance of Holland having, like England, as I just mentioned, a vast colonial empire, where silver has nearly always been the only standard of value. Having no mint of its own, Nether- lands India has always been supplied with the money required for circulation by specie-imports from Holland a system which during all the time of its existence has fully answered the requirements of the country. Thus a very narrow link united the currency of Java and the other Dutch possessions in the Eastern Archipelago with the currency of Holland ; and from the moment it was thought necessary to take into consideration a reform of the latter, the question arose, what was to be done with the former. In Holland itself no hesitation prevailed about the answer to be given, the general opinion being, that silver ought to remain the only legal tender in the East, whatever reform might be introduced in the monetary system of the mother-country. The idea of introducing gold as a legal tender in the Eastern possessions of the Kingdom was thought almost absurd. No sane Government, it was stated, could think of advocating such a measure but the views that pre- vailed in Holland met with serious opposition in the colonies, where I have passed about thirty-five years of my life, and where, at that time, I was presiding manager of the Java Bank. The Java Bank, I may tell you, is a private concern, i86 a limited liability company, established in 1828, when it was entrusted by Government with the monopoly of the paper currency of the colony, which since then has always remained in its hands. It is managed on exactly the same principles as our home institution, with the same satisfactory results. By means of the Java Bank the commercial com- munity in the colonies has regularly had the benefit of plentiful and cheap credit : and I dare say, without any exaggeration, that in this respect England may have some- thing to learn from the experience gathered by us a bank rate of 10, 12, nay even 14 and 15 per cent, being a not uncommon or extraordinary occurrence in British India, while in Netherlands India the rate of interest has scarcely ever exceeded 6 per cent, for the last twenty years. The striking difference between the two money markets is mainly in consequence of our having in the colonies, as well as at home, a thoroughly sound system of paper currency ; whereas British India has been labouring under a system which, in my opinion, is the most impracticable and the most irrational ever adopted. But I need not enlarge upon this subject, having explained my views in a pamphlet on the money market and paper currency in British India, published at Batavia in 1884, an d which at the time attracted much attention from the banking authorities in your Indian empire. Now to revert to the colonial side of our monetary policy, the general opinion in Holland, as I already told you, was that Government ought to leave things alone, trusting that the fall in the price of silver would work its own cure ; because there would be an ever-growing demand for silver for the East consequent on its cheapness, as the lamented Walter Bagehot argued at the time in the London " Econo- mist." Nearly all the leading economists in Holland shared the opinion that there need be no fear of a serious and permanent fall in the value of silver ; but in a paper read l8 7 at Batavia, as early as the i6th June, 1873, I already took the liberty to protest most earnestly against these views, and to defend my opinion, that the East could not possibly absorb all the silver, for which there would be no longer an immediate use in Europe ; and the Asiatic silver market therefore would by no means be able to secure to silver that relative stability of value which, according to the recognised principles of monetary science, it ought to possess to serve as a permanent standard measure of value in Europe as well as in Asia and everywhere else I exposed the hollow- ness and unsoundness of the theory : " gold for the West and silver for the East," and being convinced that a serious depreciation of silver would ensue from its abandonment as standard of value by the leading monetary powers in Europe, I endeavoured to convince my countrymen that, equally with the people of Holland, the Indian subjects of the king of the Netherlands were entitled to protection from the ruin and disaster in which the action of a depreciating currency must necessarily involve them. Since leaving the school where I got my first notions of political economy, I have always been guided, in theory and in practice, by the principle that stability of value, as far as attainable, is the indispensable characteristic of a monetary standard for every country in the world. I consider it a primary duty of every Government to neglect no reasonable means of keeping the currency once imposed upon its subjects at the standard value ; and my struggle for what in this respect I think right has not been ineffectual, as our Home Government, after some hesitation, has done at last all that could lay in its power to protect the currency of the colony from depreciation, by enacting gold to be the only monetary standard of Netherlands India for the future, exactly on the same footing as in Holland itself. No doubt the abandon- ment by Netherlands India of the single silver standard, which for years had always admirably answered the purpose, i88 is, for various reasons, sincerely to be deplored but the most important is the most pressing. As long as silver is proscribed by the leading monetary States in Europe, gold alone offers the necessary guarantee of stability of value a monetary standard ought to possess, and it therefore may be put to the credit of the Dutch Government, that instead of leaving the Indian currency to its fate, and of imitating the " masterly inactivity " of the rulers of British India, it has made gold the regulator also of the currency in the Eastern possessions of the realm. But, Mr. Chairman, I already hear the objection that, after all, the fall in the gold price of silver has conferred a boon of immense value on the country as that eminent Indian statesman, Sir David Barbour, has told us on page 154 of his book on the " Theory of Bimetallism," and that Java indeed has been rather suffering in comparison with its neighbouring countries which have a silver standard. Well, Mr. Chairman, if it is taken for granted that the fall in the value of the rupee from 2s. the rate at which it stood formerly to is. 6d., is. ^d., is. 2d., nay, even to is., has been a benefit to India, then the benefit must become still greater if the value of the rupee goes down to 6d., to 4 ^ J 5 1 3 $ : ^ 1 ^ oj *S ^N ^^ \. * I,:! <-> . "C d CO & CO rH i-j s O ^ . 2 to - iS ^i 1 1 241 France and the other bimetallic countries, in view of the heavy sales of silver made by Germany, suspended their free coinage. This action caused the price of silver, as quoted in gold, to fall, and it (the gold price of silver) has since fluctuated violently, affecting all international exchanges between silver standard and gold standard countries. In the case of India, the rupee, formerly worth about 25., has gradually dropped to is. ^/id. in English money, with increasing uncertainty as to its prospective exchangeable value as against gold. The substitution of gold for silver, and the greater amount of exchange work that is in consequence thrown upon gold, has led to the " appreciation " of that metal, and to a fall in prices of commodities, as measured in gold, which is everywhere visible, and everywhere baneful in its effects upon commerce, upon manu- facturing and agricultural industry, and upon the growth of employment necessary to provide work for our rapidly increasing population. Whenever the London money market is distressed and perplexed by the withdrawal of even small quantities of gold, and by apprehensions as to further demands, coupled with serious doubts as to the sufficiency of future supplies of that metal, the necessity of fixing an international ratio between gold and silver so as to make both metals available for bank reserves becomes strikingly apparent. This would provide an adequate supply of money available for international purposes and for the internal transactions of the kingdom. Grave danger would thus be averted. The aim of the Bimetallic League, as already mentioned, is to secure, by international agreement, the opening of the mints of the leading commercial nations to the unrestricted coinage of silver and gold at such fixed ratio as may be mutually agreed upon amongst those nations. By this means a par of exchange would be secured ; the two metals would again acquire an international character as money, and would move freely from nation to nation according to the monetary requirements of the various markets, whilst prices and wages in all countries would be adjusted by a uniform standard. Convinced of the evils resulting from existing conditions of our monetary system, and of the hindrance to trade and agriculture, Q 242 which are largely due to the disturbed relation between gold and silver, we appeal to everyone- for co-operation in carrying out the objects of the League. There is every encouragement to press the matter, seeing that the United States of America, France (with the other States of the Latin Union), Germany, and Holland are willing to co-operate. These Powers, it is known, will not move without England, and, under an erroneous conception of the advantages of a single gold standard, this country has hitherto stood aloof. The final Report of the Royal Commission on Gold and Silver was, however, of a character so favourable to the cause advocated by the League that the question is now thoroughly ripe for settle- ment, and the recent public declaration by Mr. Leonard Courtney (one of the Commissioners who had signed Part 2), that he is now of opinion that International Bimetallism is both desirable and practicable, strengthens the case for monetary reform. It is advisable, therefore, that the facts of the case may be made widely known throughout the country, in order to bring the force of public opinion to bear upon Parliament and upon the Government, so that England, instead of being a barrier in the way of an International Convention, may take her due share in the settlement of a question so vital to the well-being of the Empire, so essential to the interests of British and Irish agricul- ture, and of Commerce everywhere, and to the financial stability of India. Any further information concerning the League may be obtained from the General Secretary, Henry McNiel, F.S.S., 26 Lombard Street, London, E.C., who will also acknowledge sub- scriptions and donations. Information may also be obtained from the Manchester Offices of the League, Haworth's Buildings, 5 Cross Street, Manchester, and from any of the local hon. sees. The League comprises ordinary members and associate members, the annual subscription of the former being One Guinea, and the latter 2s. 6d. Cheques to be made payable to the General Secretary. All publications of the League are delivered free to ordinary and associate members. 243 EXTRACTS FROM THE FINAL REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON GOLD AND SILVER, 1888. PART I. (Signed by all the Members of the Commission.} " The remedy which has been put before us most prominently and as most likely to remedy the evils complained of to the fullest extent possible, is that known as Bimetallism." " It must be borne in mind that in the case of other com- modities (than gold and silver) the effect of changes in the supply and demand is both more marked and more immediate. These commodities are generally produced for the purpose of consump- tion at an early date or within a comparatively short period. The supply at any time available for the market, or capable of being placed on it at short notice. 'is therefore a very important element in the process by which its value is fixed. " The precious metals, on the other hand, are but to a slight extent consumed, and the available supply consists of the accu- mulations of previous years. "It follows, therefore, that in their case a diminution or an increase in the new supply is of less importance than in the case of consumable articles, and that an increase or diminution in demand has also a smaller effect. The important consideration with regard to them at any one moment is rather the relation between the total stock then in existence and the then existing demands upon it." " Looking, then, to the vast changes which occurred prior to 1873 in the relative production of the two metals without any corresponding disturbance in their market value, it appears to us difficult to resist the conclusion that some influence was then at work tending to steady the price of silver, and to keep the ratio which it bore to gold approximately stable." " Prior to 1873 the fluctuations in the price of silver were gradual in their character, and ranged within very narrow limits. The maximum variation in 1872 was f FREMANTLE, K.C.B. Rt. Hon. Sir JOHN LUBBOCK, Bart., M.P. Mr. J. W. BIRCH. Sec. 9 . " However much opinions may differ as to the extent of the evil arising from the increased difficulty which a fluctuating exchange interposes, we do not think its reality is open to question." ec. 101. There cannot be two opinions as to the very serious effect which the continued fall in the gold price of silver has had on the finances of the Government of India." iec. *> 2 . We are fully impressed with a sense of the difficulties which surround the Indian Government, and of the serious questions to which any proposed additional tax must give rise. It is not only the' embarrassment which has already been caused to the Government of India that has to be borne in mind, but the impossibility of foreseeing to what extent those embarrassments may be increased, and their difficulty augmented, by a further depression in the value of silver." ; e c. 107. " We think that in any conditions fairly to be contemplated in the future, so far as we can forecast them from the experience of the past, a stable ratio might be maintained if the nations we have alluded tot were to accept and strictly adhere to bimetallism, at the suggested ratio. We think that if in all these countries gold and silver could be freely coined, and thus become exchangeable * In an Article in the " Nineteenth Century," for April, 1893, Mr. Courtney says : Five years ago I joined with my friends in deprecating any attempt to establish an international agreement for the free coinage of both gold and silver as standard money. I have advanced with further experience and reflection to the belief that such agreement is to be desired, and that it could be accomplished t with the minimum of change and with great advantage to the Empire and the world on the aonditions I have suggested" (in the Article). t The United Kingdom, Germany, the United States and the Latin Union. 246 against commodities at the fixed ratio, the market value of silver as measured by gold would conform to that ratio, and not vary to any material extent." " Apprehensions have been expressed that if a bimetallic system were adopted gold would gradually disappear from circu- lation. If, however, the arrangement included all the principal commercial nations } we do not think there would be any serious danger of such a result. " Such a danger, if it existed at all, must be remote. It is said, indeed, by some, that if it were to happen, and all nations were to be driven to a system of silver monometallism, the result might be regarded without dissatisfaction. " We are not prepared to go this length, but at the same time we are fully sensible of all the benefits which would accrue from the adoption of a common monetary standard by all the commer- cial nations of the world, and we are quite alive to the advantage of the adoption by these nations of a uniform bimetallic standard as a step in that direction." Rt. Hon. Sir Louis MALLET, C.B. Rt. Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, ft Rt. Hon. HENRY CHAPLIN, SirD. BARBOUR, K.C.S.I. PART TTT Rt - Hon ' A< J' BALFOUR M ' P - Rt. Hon. HENRY CHAPLIN, M.P. Signed by the other six Members of the Commission. - , Sir W. H. HOULDSWORTH, Bart., M.P. Sir SAMUEL MONTAGU, Bart., M.P. Sec. 28 " We think that the above remarks upon the evils affecting both the United Kingdom and India, if taken in connection with the more detailed statement in Part I. of the report, will sufficiently indicate our view as to their nature and gravity ; and that they are largely due to the currency changes which have taken place in the years immediately preceding and following 1873. " We think that too . much stress cannot be laid upon the novelty of the experiment which has been attempted as the result of the above changes. That experiment consists in the inde- pendent and unregulated use of both gold and silver as standards of value by the different nations of the world. " We are strongly of opinion that both metals must continue to be used as standard money ; the results of using them separately and independently since 1873 have been most unsatis- factory, and may be positively disastrous in the future. "It cannot be questioned that until 1873 gold and silver were always effectively linked by a legal ratio in one or more countries. "It is equally indisputable that the relative value of the two metals has been subject to greater divergence since 1874 than during the whole of the 200 years preceding that date, notwith- standing the occurrence of variations in their relative production more intense and more prolonged than those which have been experienced in recent years." Sec. 29. " In 1873-74 the connecting link disappeared, and for the first time the system of rating the two metals ceased to form a subject of legislation in any country in the world. " The law of supply and demand was for the first time left to operate independently upon the value of each metal ; and simultaneously the ratio which had been maintained, with scarcely any perceptible variation, for 200 years, gave place to a marked and rapid divergence in the relative value of gold and silver, which has culminated in a change from 15 J to i to 22 to i.' Proposed Remedy. Sec. 3 o. it appears to us impossible to attribute the concurrence of these two events to a merely fortuitous coincidence. They must, in our opinion, be regarded as standing to each other in the relation of cause and effect. " We cannot, therefore, doubt that if the system which prevailed before 1873 were replaced in its integrity, most of the evils which we have above described would be removed ; and the remedy which we have to suggest is simply the reversion to a system which existed before the changes above referred to were brought about ; a system, namely, under which both metals were freely coined into legal tender money at a fixed ratio over a sufficiently large area. " The effects of that system, though it was nominally in force only within a limited area, were felt in all commercial countries, whatever their individual systems of currency might be ; and the relative value of the two metals in all the markets of the world was practically identical with that fixed by the legislation of the countries forming the Latin Union. "As regards the possibility of maintaining such a system in the future, we need only refer to the conclusion at which our 248 colleagues have arrived in Sec. 107, Part II. (see above), and in which we entirely agree. " No settlement of the difficulty is, however, in our opinion, possible without international action." Sec. 43 . " The remedy which we suggest is essentially international in its character, and its details must be settled in concert with the other Powers concerned. " It will be sufficient for us to indicate the essential features of the agreement to be arrived at, namely (3) Free coinage of both metals into legal tender money ; and (2) The fixing of a ratio at which the coins of either metal shall be available for the payment of all debts at the option of the debtor." Sec. 35 . " The particular ratio to be adopted is not, in our opinion, a necessary preliminary to the opening of negotiations for the establishment of such an agreement, and can, with other matters of detail, be left for further discussion and settlement between the parties interested. u We, therefore, submit that the chief commercial nations of the world, such as the United States, Germany, and the States forming the Latin Union, should in the first place be consulted as to their readiness to join with the United Kingdom in a conference, at which India and any of the British Colonies which may desire to attend should be represented, with a view to arrive, if possible, at a common agreement on the basis above indicated." Sec. 3 6. " We have indicated what appears to us to be the only permanent solution of the difficulties arising from the recent changes in the relative value of the precious metals, and the only solution which will protect this and other countries against the risks of the future." INDEX. PAGES Agriculturists . . 106, 118-123, I2 3 -I2 7> in France 127-132, 156-160 Allard, A. (Brussels), Demonetization of Silver, 92 ; Ratio between Silver and Gold 3,000 years old 99 Andrews, Professor E. Benj., Letter 13 Arendt, Dr. Otto, Speeches 47, 229 Australia 150-156 Austria- Hungary, Monetary Commission and Gold Standard . . 193-194 Balfour, M.P., Rt. Hon. A. J., Address 61 Bankers 106, 139-146, 156-160 Banquet at the Albion Tavern ....... 213-34 Barbour, Sir D., K.C.S.I., The Finances of India . .163 Barclay, Robert, Speech, 89 ; Sketch of the Bimetallic Movement . 218-24 Beaconsfield, Lord, Gold Standard the Consequence of our Com- mercial Prosperity . 184 Boissevain, G. M., Low Prices and Appreciation of Gold, 38-43, 211 ; Bimetallism and Free Trade ...... 229-30 Cannon, H. W., Letter 14-16 Capital Created and Issued ........ 116-117 Cernuschi, H., The Ratio of 15$ to I . . . 85, 204, 218, 219 Chaplin, M.P., Rt. Hon. Henry, Address ..... 213 Chapman, R. B., C.S.I., Indian Currency and Finance . . . 175 China 146-150 Cobden, Richard, Advocate of Demonetization of Gold . . . 183 Colonies, The Interests of the Australian 150-156 Cotterell-Tupp, A., Increased Burden of the National Debt and of the Indian Debt, Owing to the Appreciation of Gold . . 196-198 Cotton Trade 113-114, 132-135,137 Cotton Spinning Companies . . . . . . . . 114, 137 Courtney, M.P., Rt. Hon. L., The Practicability of Maintaining a Ratio between Gold and Silver under an International Agreement 7 1 D'Aillieres, F. (Paris), Speech 228 De Foville, A. (Paris), Letter n De Lad oucette, The Baron (Paris), Speech 227 De Laveleye, Georges (Brussels), Speech 227 Dorrington, W. E., Speech ........ 55 " Economist," The 113-117 Edgcumbe, E. R. Pearce, Speech 156 Evans, Sir D., Speech Welcoming the Visitors and Friends, 17-19 ; Reply to Vote of Thanks 233-34 Everett, M. P., R. L., Speech 118 France 85-89, 127-132, 139-146, 227 Free Trade 227 Gibbs, Henry Hucks, The Ratio for an International Agreement . 203-10 Gold, Appreciation of 3O-3 1 Grenfell, W. H., Relinquishment of Seat in House of Commons, 199 ; the Work of Questioning every Candidate for Parliament 200-202 Hanbury, Thomas, Speech ........ 146 Hickman, Sir A., M.P., Speech ....... 135 Hoare, Charles, Speech ......... 58 Holland, Banking, 182-183; in 1847 adopted Silver Standard, 183; Agriculture and Industry, 183 ; Java 185-187 Houldsworth, Bart., M.P., Sir W. H., The Effects of the Fall in the General Level of Prices, 106-118 ; Vote of Thanks, 211 ; Speech at Banquet 224-27 Income-tax Assessments . . 114-116 India, Closing of the Mints, 66 ; Sir D. Barbour on Finances of, 163-172; Exchanges 173-181 International Agreement . . . . . . 61-71, 71-85, loo Investors . 106 Iron and Steel 113, 135-137 Japan 146-150, 160 Kardorff, Baron von (Berlin), Letter ...... 12 Knox, E. F. Vesey, M.P., Speech 123 Labour, United Textile Workers 138-139 Lavollee, Rene, Speech 127 Letters of Apology ......... 9-16 Lidderdale, Right Hon. W 233 London, the City of . . . 64, 67, 68 Lord Mayor, The, Address, 61 ; Vote of Thanks . . . . 211-12 Magnin, J, (Paris), Letter 10-11 Mallet, Sir Louis 240 Manufacturers .......... 106 Mavor, Professor, Telegram . 16 Mawdsley, James, Speech ........ 137 McDonald, Arthur (New Zealand), Debt and Debt Charge of New Zealand 230 Merchants 106, ill Meysey-Thompson, Bart., M.P., Sir H., Prize for Essay, 163 ; Injury to Labour at Home, Machinery going to the East . . 231-33 Milewski, Professor, Monetary Commission in Austria- Hungary, 193-5 ; Premium on Gold 5 or 6 per cent. .... 196 Money, Quantity Theory of 23-25 Montagu, Bart., Sir Samuel, M.P., Speech 43 Miiller, Professor Max, Ratio in Babylon ..... 99 Murray, David (Adelaide, S.A.), The Australian Colonies . . 150 National Debt, Increased Burden of 196-198 New Zealand 230 Nicholson, M.A., D.Sc., Professor J. S., The Fall in the General Level of Prices, &c. . ... . . . . 19-38 Ill Office-bearers of the League ........ 235-239 Official Statement of the League ....... 240-242 Parliamentary Elections, Action in regard to . . . . . 199-202 Pauperism 117-118 Prices, Fall in General Level of . . . . . . 19-38 Prize for an Essay on the Currency ..... 163,185-186 Ratio under International Agreement . . . 71-85, 85-89, 97, 202-210 Royal Commission on Gold and Silver, 73-77, 80, 84, 85 ; Extracts from, 243-48 Sauerbeck; A., Index Numbers ....... 33 Schmidt, Hermann, Indian Currency and Finance .... 172 Shipbuilding 113 Silver, Fall in 31-34 Silver, Steadiness of 95 Smart. M.A., LL.D., Professor W., Speech 102 Smith, Samuel, M.P., Speech 50 Suess, Professor E. (Vienna), Letter 13-14 Taylor, W., Speech 132 Thery, Edmond, Banking, Investments and Bimetallism . . 139-146 Van Den Berg, N. P., LL.D., Dutch Currency, Finance, Trade at home and in Java ......... 181-93 Victorian Bimetallic League, telegram ...... 16 Wage-Earners ......... 106, 112 Walker, Professor Francis A., Letter 12 Walsh, Archbishop, Letter ... .... 9-10 Wheat, prices from years 1260 to 1893 22 Williamson, Stephen, M.P., Speech 160 PUBLICATIONS. Money in its Relation to Trade and Industry. By Professor FRANCIS A. WALKER. Price 8/- Macmillan & Co., London. The Silver Pound and England's Monetary History since the Restoration, together with the History of the Guinea. By Hon. S. DANA HORTON. Price I4/- Macmillan & Co., London. A Treatise on Money, and Essays on Monetary Problems. By J. S. NICHOLSON, M.A., D.Sc., Professor of Political Economy in Edin- burgh University. Price 7/6. Adam and Charles Black, London. The Silver Question and the Gold Question, (Fourth Edition.) By ROBERT BARCLAY. Price 2/6. Effingham Wilson, London ; J. E. CORNISH, Manchester. The Disturbance in the Standard of Value. By ROBERT BARCLAY. Author of " The Silver Question and the Gold Question. Price 1/6. Effingham Wilson, Royal Exchange, London; J. E. Cornish, 16 St. Ann's Square, Manchester. The Silver Question in its Social Aspect. By HERMANN SCHMIDT, Price 3/- Effingham Wilson, London. The Joint Standard. By ELIJAH HELM. Price 3/6. Macmillan and Co. The Bimetallic Question. By SAMUEL SMITH, M.P. Price 2/6. Effingham Wilson, London. The Economic Crisis. By MORETON FREWEN, B.A. Price 2/- Kegan, Paul & Co., London. A Bimetallic Primer. By HERBERT C. GIBBS. Price i/- Effingham Wilson & Co., London. Irregularity of Employment and Fluctuations of Prices. By Professor H. S. FOXWELL, M.A., Cambridge University, and Professor of Political Economy in University College, London University. Price 6d. P. S. King & Co., London. Misconceptions in Regard to the Bimetallic Policy of a Fixed Ratio. (Fourth Edition.) By Professor H. S. FOXWELL, M.A. Free. Bimetallic League. Proceedings of Manchester Conference, April, 1888. Free. Bimetallic League, Manchester and London. Synopsis Gold and Silver Commission. By GEORGE HOWELL, M.P. Price I/- P. S. King & Co., London ; J. E. Cornish and John Heywood, Manchester. Deputation to the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, May, 1889. Free. Bimetallic League. Speech in the House of Commons, July 28th, 1893. By R. L. EVERETT, Esq., M.P. Free. Bimetallic League, Manchester and London. The Monetary Question (Prize Essay). By G. M. BOISSEVAIN. Price 3/- net. Macmillan & Co., London. Silver and Gold, the Money of the World (Prize Essay). By Sir GUILFORD L. MOLESWORTH, K.C.I.E. Price 6d. Effingham Wilson, London; J. E. Cornish, Manchester. The Joint Standard Consistent with Sound Political Economy. By Professor J. S. NICHOLSON, M.A., D.Sc. Free. Bimetallic League. The Appreciation of Gold and its Effect on Investments. By A. G. EI.LIS. Free. Bimetallic League. International bimetallic 1394 le ItS-i. .15 ico .8RARY