^LOS ANGELA / \V\.IA/0/-1HU1,1J,,1.> ,-J^ *r --^y >-)n;m estimate the influence of Russia .and the condescension of Bonaparte, that lie exclaimed, " I ask any one who has at- tended to the affairs of the continent, whe- THE STATE OF THE NATION. 3 7 tlier he thinks that France, if she saw Great Britain and Russia firmly united against her, would not be appalled into justice and moderation." Our author occupies nearly ten pages in treating of the imprudence of commencing hostilities before the disposition of Prussia was ascertained. He comments on the changes of disposition in that power, and on her apparent hostility to the confede- racy at the commencement of the opera- tions. While he acknowledges that our documents on this important matter are peculiarly defective, he adopts a decided tone throughout, on a subject, in many respects, involved in mystery. This is neither a candid procedure, nor likely to lead to a true result. Let us, in availing ourselves of the scanty materials afforded by the official papers, combine with these an attentive consideration of circumstance? and events. This mode of reasoning will be found more favourable to the attain- ipent of impartial conclusions on a most 38 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO interesting topic, than the plan adopted in the Inquiry, which appears to recognize no arguments unless those which have a tendency to censure the conduct of the allies. Had the allies deemed the assistance of Prussia essential to the success of the co- alition, and relied on obtaining it, such confidence in a power whose policy has long been either wavering, or favourable to France, would have been extremely in- judicious. It appears, however, from the whole tenor of the official documents, that they neither reckoned upon her accession to the league, nor considered her co-ope- ration necessary for their success. But although they neither calculated on her alliance, nor viewed it as indispensible, it is probable they entertained hopes that in consequence of the league, Prussia would be reanimated to a sense of what she owed to her own safety and to the interest of Europe. That these hopes were not with- out foundation, may not only be presumed THE STATE OF THE NATION. 39 from a just view of her own situation, but is made apparent by the promptitude with which she assumed a hostile attitude to France immediately after the violation of the territory of Anspach, from the known disposition of her Minister Hardenberg, and from the influence of Russia at Berlin an influence of which it is difficult to describe the nature or extent, but wiiich appears from its effects to have been very powerful. Of the hostility of Prussia the allies had no reason to be afraid. She had con- tinued neutral since 1 7Q4, during a series of campaigns in the heart of Germany. Even when Austria fought alone, Prussia could not be induced by France to a de- parture from her favourite system. Much less would the arguments of France have availed, when Russia not only favoured the cause of Austria, but had become a principal in the war. Russia is not only the immediate and most formidable neigh- o bour of Prussia ; but I have the authority 40 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO of the writer of the Inquiry himself when I state, that the provinces of Polish Prus- sia are a constant subject of arixiety to the Court ot Berlin ; and that Russia, without incurring risk to herself, may at any time excite them to revolt. There is therefore no danger that the Cabinet of Berlin will hazard a war with that of St. Petersburg. With a view to the maintenance of peace in Germany, she interdicted, in the first instance, the passage of her territories to the Russians. But she had communicated a similar injunction tp the French. This, therefore, was no act of hostility to the allies, but a demonstration of neutrality. In urging the importance of the acces- sion of Prussia to the league, our author maintains, that " without her co-operation, every chance of ultimate success was against the allies ; with her aid, it was scarcely possible their scheme could alto- gether fail." This declaration is by much too absolute. The success of a confede- racy against France depends less upon the THE STATE OF THE NATION. 4 1 jiumber of its component members than upon the spirit which invigorates and the talents which direct. In a coalition of several powers, the accession of another conveys less additional strength than the numerical statement of her forces may suggest. In an alliance of Austria and Russia, the addition of 15 0,000 excellent troops to the armies at their disposal, would be an incalculable augmentation of force. Not so the co-operation of 1 5 0,000 Prussians, commanded by different ge- nerals, actuated by distinct views, and acjting on a remote part of the theatre of the war. In multiplying allies, you lose the benefit of unity of action, you incum- ber your plans, you delay yonr operations. Russia is to Austria a most valuable ally, not only from the magnitude of her power but from her disinterested views. Too distant from France to have any object in territorial acquisitions in the theatre of the war, she makes that disposition of her troops which Austria recommends. She renders their operations subservient, not 42 ANSWER TO THF INQUIRY INTO to the acquisition of a particular province, but to the general purposes of the league. Prussia, on the other hand, is possessed of territories near the seat of war, and de- sirous of making conquests for herself. Instead, therefore, of generously contri- buting her whole force to the common object of the league, she will direct her operations to the attainment of points con- ducive to her own views. An army of 50,ooo men may be thus detained for months, in the siege of a fortress, garri- soned by one-fourth of their numbers, while the enemy throw the mass of their troops, in irresistible force, in a different direction. Had Prussia been, from the beginning of the campaign, an active member of the coalition, the scenes of her operation would naturally have been Hanover, Westphalia, and ultimately Hol- land. According to their usual policy, the French would have left in these countries scarcely any more regular troops than were necessary to garrison the fortresses. The chief part of their force would have THE STATE OF THE NATION. 43 been withdrawn to attempts of daring en- terprise towards the centre of the war. The sieges of Hameln, and of the fortified towns in Holland, would have long occu- pied the Prussians. During this precious interval, the French would have made a diligent and effectual use of their troops in a different quarter. And it would have been conformable to their system to have brought back, on the approach of winter, large bodies into Brabant and Flanders, and to have attempted, by dint of an over- powering force, the recovery of the Prus- sian conquests. However singular it may appear, the Austrians have been more successful in se- veral campaigns without than with allies. In 17Q4, although aided by the Prussians, the English, and Dutch, they experienced nothing but disasters. Left alone in 1 795, they obtained the most brilliant victories. The issue of the campaign of 1 796, had it not been for the fatal talents of Bonaparte, would have been eminently successful. In 41 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO the memorable campaign of 1/99, they re- pulsed the French in every direction, and met with no misfortune until the arrival of KorsakofF, with 3 0,000 Russians, induced the Archduke Charles to give an unfor- tunate extension to the theatre of ope* rations. These examples by no means prove that the accession of an ally confers no increase of strength, but they warn us against adopting the additional numbers as the rule of computation for the extent of ac- tual assistance. The aid of 150,000 troops, so well disciplined as thetrussians, would be incalculable w r ere they placed at the absolute disposal of the generalissimo of the coalition. But if they receive their orders from the Court of Berlin, we must make a most important deduction from their computed efficiency, in consequence of the distinction of their objects, and their distance from the central operations of the war. THE STATE OF THE NATION.- 45 The author of the Inquiry finds fault with Ministry " for not attempting to avail themselves of the favourable change produced in the sentiments of Prussia, by the violation of the territory of Anspach, in submitting the whole dispute to Prus- sian mediation at a time when France/' he affirms, "would have listened to whatever came from Berlin ; while the forces of Austria were not irreparably injured, and the armies of Russia were still unim- paired." In this instance, as in many others, our author's reasoning is at vari- ance, not merely with probability, but. with facts of public notoriety. The vio- lation of the territory of Anspach took place on the 4th and 5th October ; and in a week afterwards, by Mack losing the opportunity of retreat, his army was lost to Austria. The sentence I have quoted must have one of two meanings : Either " that Ministers ought to have acquired the knowledge of the violation of Ans- pach, procured the mediation of Prussia, arid saved the Austrian army in a week," 4O ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO which is too absurd ever to have been in the contemplation of the author ; or " that thev should have obtained the Prussian mediation before the Austrian forces were otherwise injured than by Mack's sur- render, and wiiile the armies of Russia were still unimpaired" Strange to tell, this explanation of the author's meaning is equally inconsistent with fact as the other with possibility ; for before the Aus- trian force -was otherwise injured than by Mack's surrender, before the Russians had fought at all, (except at Krems where they were victorious) Count Haugwitz did arrive in the French camp with offers of mediation, to which Bonaparte refused to listen, except on the terms he had already offered to Austria terms equivalent to her absolute and unconditional submis- sion . Mediation is a favourite topic with our author. He seems disposed to recom- mend it on every occasion ; and there is an obvious correspondence between his . THE STATE OF THE NATION. 4 7 views in this respect, and the strain of pacific sentiments expressed at all times by Mr. Fox in the House of Commons. It is important, however, to observe, that the French are still more formidable in ne- gotiation than in the field ; and the history of Europe since 1 792 offers a series of proofs of the fatal effects of armistices and treaties. Their object in making these is not to conclude an equitable peace, but to gain time, to divide allies from each other, to effect separate negotiations, and always to avoid treating with a confede- racy. Even in the latter case, if obliged to treat with several powers at the same time, all the chances of success from di- plomatic artifice are in favour of France. In the progress of the negotiation, she will calculate on detaching one at least of the allied courts from the league. In re- gard to the duration of the conferences, as she is under no necessity to consult any other power, she may make it as long or as short as suits her purpose. She may at one period gain time, by inducing false 48 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY IKTO expectations of a conceding disposition, or she may proclaim a sudden rupture, if she' consider her forces in a state of prepara- tion to anticipate the allies. Upon the violation of the territory of Anspach,' Prussia with one hand unsheathed the sword, and with the other, opened the path to amicable negotiation. Our mini- stry then dispatched Lord Harrowby ta secure her in the interest of the league. The chief object of his mission was pro- bably a liberal overture of subsidy, if she would join her forces to the common cause. Had ministers omitted sex import- ant a measure, or had they confined them- selves, as the author of the Inquiry re- commends, to soliciting her mediation, what a torrent of abuse would have been poured upon them by the Opposition ! They would have been told that a con-' federacy is formidable only in the field - that in negotiation it loses not only its energy, but the chance of its existence that when a coalition has been formed, the oialy just policy is to proceed to im- THE STATE OF THE NATION. 4Q mediate action -that when a great power indicates a disposition to accede to a league, the most decisive measures should be adopted to procure her immediate co- operation in the field and that ministers, by confining their application to Prussia, at such a crisis, to the solicitation of her mediatory offices, had lost the only mo- ment for the redemption of Europe a moment which would never return. The writer of the Inquiry next censures the British government for allowing the command in chief to be intrusted to Ge- neral Mack. I agree with him that this choice was singularly injudicious, but the interference of our Cabinet could not have prevented his nomination. The same blind predilection in the Court of Vienna which led to his appointment, would have persisted in his choice. An ally may in- terpose in the election of a commander for a particular service in which that ally is interested. Had the campaign pro- ceeded as originally proposed, it is proba- P 50 ANSWER. TO TH INQUIRY INTO ble that that part of the Austro-Russian forces which would have been stationed to preserve the communication between the allies in Hanover and the grand ar- mies in the South, would have been given to any officer the English Cabinet might have preferred ; but to prescribe to Austria the nomination of the commander in chief of her forces, in the heart of her own empire, would have been an attempt not only fruitless but highly offensive to a great sat . The Austrian plan of operations was very judiciously drawn, and has been ge- nerally ascribed to Mack, with the quali- fication that he was skilful to combine but unfit to execute. After misconduct, how- ever, so glaring and inexcusable as that of last year, combined with his former er- rors, it is inconsistent to allow him any skill but that of intrigue, or any art ex- cept that of impressing others with a no- tion of his ability. It is very extraordi- nary that a man of such contemptible THE STATE OF THE NATION. 5 I parts should have been so long in favour at the Court of Vienna. No individual has contributed more to the success of France, and to the degradation both of his own country and of Europe. It is very probable that his influence with Prince Cobourg in 1792 and 1793 counteracted that vigorous plan of warfare which the genius of Clairfait would have recom- mended, and which, w T hen he became com- mander in chief, he so gloriously exem- plified. In 1799, Mack was sent to Na- ples, and in a few months entirely lost the army intrusted to him. Finally, in 1805, he is placed at the head of one of the finest armies ever sent into the field, and in six weeks he delivered it into the possession of the enemy. Our author proceeds to state, that a grand error was committed by the Aus- trians in passing the Inn, and carrying the war at once into Bavaria before the Rus- sians were near to support them. The in- fluence of England, he adds, should have Do 40 52 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO interfered to " modify the plan of the cam- paign, and prevent the violation of tlw Bavarian neutrality." To suppose that Austria would pay any attention to the suggestions of so distant a cabinet as our's, in regard to her opera- tions in Bavaria is almost as extraordinary as to believe that our Admiralty would send to Vienna for instructions for the channel fleet. Passing by this charge as undeserving either of the author's atten- tion or of mine, I shall proceed to a more interesting topic the consideration of what should have been the conduct of Austria to Bavaria. This question will involve reflexions on some of those grand causes which decide the fate of battles and the issue of campaigns a subject most important in itself, and essential to a dis- quisition of this nature, but on which it does not appear from the Inquiry that its author has bestowed the attention it de- serves. THE STATE OF THE NATION. 53 The conduct of Austria to Bavaria ought to have been similar to that of the King of Prussia to Saxony in 1756. That vigi- lant prince foresaw the approach of a war, in which he had reason to believe that his neighbour was concerned he therefore took immediate possession of his country. The connexion between Bonaparte and the Elector -of iBavaria was notorious. The electoral [house is the hereditary enemy of the house of Austria. When his troops have fought under its banners, it has been the effect, not of cordiality but of necessity. The known duplicity of the Elector not only justified but necessitated the prompt- est measures. The obvious policy of Aus- tria was, therefore, as soon as she judged hostilities inevitable, to invade, Bavaria with a very numerous army, to over-run it with the greatest celerity, to disarm every electoral soldier, and to strip the treasury of its last dollar, not with the mean in- tention of finally retaining the money, but to deprive the Elector of the means of ful- .54 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO filling his perfidious engagements with France. The invasion of Bavaria took place on (he ;th September. The time appears to have been well chosen, as it was exactly the period at which Bonaparte ceased to entertain all ideas of peace, and to prepare with energy for war. While the main ^^/ body of the Austrians passed the Inn, a division under General Klenau was or- dered to advance by forced marches to Neuburg on the Danube, to cut off the retreat of the Bavarians into Franconia. Hitherto all was well managed, and the electoral army, it was probable, would soon have been surrounded, when the cre- dulous Mack listened to the treacherous negotiations of the Elector and counter- manded Klenau's march, at a time when the progress of the Austrians against Ba- varia should not have been suspended an hour, by night or by day, except for the pur- poses of indispensible refreshment to the THE STATE OF THE NATION. 55 troops. The consequence of the Elector's falsehoods, and of Mack's simplicity, was the safe retreat of the Bavarians to meet the French at Wurtzburg. To haye communicated the intended league to a power so intimately connected with France as Bavaria, in the expectation of gaining her over to the alliance, would have been the height of folly. Instead of treating the Elector with more delicacy, as the author of the Inquiry recommends, the great error was in showing him too much, and in suspending operations for a moment upon the pledge of so faithless a prince. Although to invade Bavaria and disarm her troops was the undoubted policy of Austria, it by no means follows that the campaign should have been opened on the Iller. Wherever it was opened, the duty of the Austrian commander was unques- tionably tp retire upon the approach of the French, until he should have been joined 5(3 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO by the Russians. The plains of Suabia and Bavaria offered to the Austrians every advantage for retreat here were no de- files or mountains to impede their retro- grade march, or enable the enemy to cut off even detachments. It was not re- quisite to fight at all, unless perhaps some actions between the cavalry, a description of force in which the Austrians are far superior. That Mack should not have adopted so obvious a measure would jus- tify the suspicion of treachery or madness, were we not assured, by fatal experience, that his intellects are of the meanest class. Our author proceeds to explain the im- portance of Switzerland in an offensive war against France, and to insist on the impropriety of Austria acceding to the neutrality of that republic. I agree with him in regard to the importance of that country, and that it is in vain to think of assailing France elsewhere with effect, But it must be apparent to whoever has read the official papers, that although Aus- 3 THE STATE OF THE NATION. 5 f tria acceded to the demand of the Can- tons as long as Bonaparte should respect their neutrality, she was fully impressed with the advantages ot carrying the war through Switzerland, into Tranche Compte. It was evident, however, that until the whole of the Russian force should have arrived, there was no probability of the operations of the allies being sufficiently successful or extensive to justify the ex- pectation of carrying the war into Swit- zerland. To have refused, therefore, to acknowledge the neutrality of Switzerland, would have been to have declared to France, from the beginning, the plan of the campaign a declaration not only most imprudent but wholly unnecessary, for the chances were a hundred to one that before the allies could have penetrated to the neighbourhood of Switzerland, the French, agreeable to all former and recent example, would have of themselves vio- lated its neutrality. If it be argued that Austria ought not 58 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO to have made any calculation on the pro- bable conduct of the French, but to have declared from the beginning her determi- nation to make Switzerland the theatre of war, although such declaration was nei- ther prudent or necessary. I answer, that if such conduct be dignified, it is not \vise ; and that the simplicity it would discover, would at once unfit Austria to be the adversary of a power who is inca- pable of good faith, and whose whole policy is a system of fraud and false- hood. The next object of our author's animad- version, is the conduct of the British mi- nistry in the mode of our co-operation. He begins by blaming the expedition to Hanover, when a diversion might have been effected either in Holland or the north of France. To this the answer is obvious. By sending our troops to Hol- land, or the north of France, we should have exposed them to speedy destruction. What chance of success could attend a THE STATE OF THE NATION. 5Q detached force in the heart of an enemy's country, remote not only from the assist- ance, but even the communication of our allies ? By sending our troops to Hanover they formed, in conjunction with the Swedes and Russians, an efficient army ; and had not fortune so unexpectedly proved adverse to Austria, they would have assailed Holland in the only quarter in which her frontiers are open to at- tack. Boulogne now becomes the subject of our author's attention ; and he censures government because, when the French were conceived to have withdrawn their troops, they made no attempt against the flotilla. In a work professedly founded on official documents, and written in a style superior to common pamphlets, it is extraordinary to see the adoption of so vulgar an error as the eligibility of an at- tack, last autumn, upon Boulogne. " Ex- peditions of descent are, of all operations 60 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO in war," says a very intelligent author*, " the most difficult and dangerous. To all the fortuitous accidents of war, are joined those of the seasons, the weather, and the sea." The batteries of Boulogne are of such strength that they may be de- fended by a very small number, compared with the force of the assailants. What proof have we that all the veteran troops were at any time withdrawn, and the de- fence intrusted to new levies ? How ab- surd is it to suppose that such a master in the art of war as Bonaparte should leave this, the most important of all his stations, inadequately protected. And even had there been a reasonable expectation of suc- cess, would our government have been justified in wasting on an object purely English, those forces which our engage- ments with our allies, and the common cause of Europe, called to the scene of combined operations ? * Character of European Armie?. THE STATE OF THE NATION. 6 I He proceeds to find fault with govern- ment for accompanying the pensions to Swiss officers, with a stipulation that they should not reside in their own country. If government required the condition of non-residence, I must conclude, until the contrary be proved, that this measure was suggested by substantial reasons espe- cially when I perceive that the arguments advanced in the Inquiry, to censure, in this respect, the conduct of government, are fallacious. Let us briefly examine them. The author describes the Swiss officers in our pay as " panting after the moment when their rage against France might once more shew itself at the head of their pea- santry," and that " had they been allowed to receive their pensions at home, the means would have been prepared of rous- ing the whole Alps, from Constance to the Rhone, in hostility to France, as soon as the war should break out." 02 ANSWER TO THt INQUIRY &TO I reply to this elegant declamation, that the Swiss officer, embarked in foreign service, is not actuated by those generous feelings which our author so liberally at- tributes to him. He discharges his duty with exemplary fidelity, but he follows his profession, not for the honour 1 but for the profit it affords. He feels no other at- tachment to England, to Holland, or to France, than on account of the pay he re- ceives. On the contrary, the general dis- position of men in foreign service, is a ha- bit of invidious contrast between the coun- try of their temporary adoption and their own. In case of Switzerland becoming the theatre of war, the Swiss officer who might be resident there, and in the receipt of a pension from England, would obey her summons to repair to the standard of her allies, and would discharge his duty in the field as a man of honour. But if it be expected that he will be zealous beyond the line of military duty, and that h.3 *' pants," as our author presumes, to excite THE STATE CiF THE-NATION. 63 his countrymen to active hostility against the French, and in favour of the allies, the deception will be egregious. The prevail- ing sentiment in Switzerland is indeed a hatred of the French ; but this sentiment has not yet led to a predilection for any foreign power. The inhabitants of this once happy republic are strongly attached to their country and to independence ; and were not the attempt hopeless, they would generously brave every danger in a struggle between Switzerland and France. But it will be difficult to convince them that the invasion of their country by foreign armies will be the means of restoring its liberty. So slender is the basis on which our author would have depended for " rousing the whole Alps from Constance to the Rhone in hostility to France." He " words it well ;" but it' you attempt to seize the substance, it will fleet, like a shadow, from the grasp. frustra comprensa manus effugit imago, Par levibus ventis. volucrique simillima somno. 64 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO Were Mr. Fox, in the event of a new war, to make any reliance on opposing the arms of Bonaparte by means so ineffi- cient as these, his campaigns would be the counterpart of Mack's, and we might prepare ourselves for fresh disasters as fa- tal as those of Ulm. Our author proceeds to ascribe to minis- ters the delay which occurred in the sail- tf ing of our expedition to Hanover. With his accustomed confidence of assertion, he insists that " we were still less prepared than our allies," and " that we took the means to defeat as far as possible the uti- lity, and narrow the chance of success of our expedition." If the author was unac- quainted with the real cause of the delay, his negligence in inquiry is reprehensible. If he knew it, and affected ignorance, the charge is more serious, and it would not be amiss to remind him of the temperate language of his patron, Mr. Fox, to the opponent whom he considers capable of wilful misrepresentation. The real cause THE STATE OF THE NATION. % 65 of the delay of the expedition was the prevalence of a strong north-east wind, from September till the middle of Novem- ber. The armament was ready long before their sailing took place, and the same cause of detention prevented, for more than six weeks, a homeward-bound West India fleet from coming round from Portsmouth to London. Does our author mean to make Ministers responsible for the state of the winds ? or will he ascribe wdlful neg- ligence to our merchants, on account of a delay of which there had been no example for fourteen years ? In one respect, however, I correspond in opinion with him in the impropriety of landing an army in Naples. This mea- sure was obviously the wish of Russia, but it effected no diversion, and was conse- quently an unavailing mode of employing tw r erity thousand men. The author of the Inquiry proposes two alternatives for the disposal of these troops; 00 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO either to have disembarked them in the Venetian territory, and placed them under the command of the Archduke Charles, \vhich would have been the proper plan ; or to have landed them in Lombardy, in order to hang upon Massena's rear. To land in Lombardy would indeed be a dif- ficult operation, for Lombardy has no sea- coast. But our author's meaning, no doubt, is, that while the Archduke made head against Massena's army in front, the English and Russians should have been landed in the north of Italy, and marched to Lombardy to hang upon Massena's rear. After making such a proposition, the author must forego his claims to the reputation of judgment in tactics. The disembarked army must either have con- fined its operations, with a view to its own safety, within such narrow limits, as to enable it to regain the shipping when threatened by superior numbers ; a scheme so adverse to all efficient hostility, that I cannot consider it as having entered into the contemplation of an intelligent writer: THE STATE OF THE NATION. 67 or, the author's idea must have been, that the English and Russians should have advanced, with decided resolution, into that part of the interior where it was judged they could most effectually annoy the enemy. This plan, although appa- rently vigorous, would have been a renewal of the disastrous system of last war,in acting with divided forces against a bold and active enemy, whose greatest successes have been obtained by a rapid and skilful concentration of numbers. Twenty thou- sand Russians and English would thus have been placed behind Massena, whose army was not over-rated at seventy thousand. They could have had no direct communi- cation with the Archduke, and, in the event of attack from superior numbers, he could have afforded them no support ; for it is highly improbable that he should have received intelligence of their danger, until the season of relief was past. Mas- sena' s army was composed of men in the prime of life, many of whom had marched in 1797, at the rate of thirty miles a day, E 2 08 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO to destroy, on the same fatal scene, an Austrian force, detached and unsupported in consequence of the adoption of the unwise system recommended by the author of the Inquiry. This idea is equally ju- dicious with his proposal to disembark the British troops in Holland, or the north of France. In either case, speedy and inevitable ruin would have ensued. The system of the French is to accumulate, by sudden movements, a mass of force, in order to overpower any detached body of their enemies. And in both instances, the author of the Inquiry recommends exactly that plan which will throw our troops into their hands. The Second Part of the Inquiry relates to the consequences of our late foreign policy. The author begins by expatiating n the value of the cessions made by Austria to France. In speaking of Tyrol, he describes its loss as (( of greater dctri- THE STATE OF THE NATION. 6(j merit to Austria than her sacrifices in Italy, because it was invaluable as a barrier against the invasion of the hereditary states." He adds, that " Tyrol, if pro- perly managed, must always have been the main theatre of any war where Austria acted on the defensive." So erroneous is the whole of this reasoning, that the mis- fortunes of the Austrians have generally proceeded from acting in mountainous countries. It is this mode of warfare in which the French surpass them, and are always eager to engage. The French are not only superior in the agility and intel- ligence requisite for operations in hilly countries, but the nature of the ground prevents their adversaries from making use of their excellent cavalry. The Austrians must not put their trust in mountains or defiles ; they must summon their enemy to combat in the open plain to the pitched battle to the charge of the bayonet to the deadly encounter of the sabre. Let the numbers be equal, and the commander /O ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO of" the Austrians a Suwarrow or a Clairfait, and the issue will not long be doubtful. After a florid enumeration of the advan- tages of Italy, our author adds, "All these are now in the hands of the nation in the world best able to improve them, to combine them, to make them aid one another ; and after calling them forth to the incalculable augmentation of her for- mer resources, ready to turn them against those, if any such shall remain, who still dare, to be her enemies." This impartial writer does not then consider it necessary to notice, in a description of Italy, the hatred universally entertained in that country against the French ; the obstacles to improvement from the prejudices, the indolence, the cowardice of its inhabitants, or from the headstrong and injudicious nature of Bonaparte's civil administra- tion his own tyranny the rapacity of his officers the embezzlement of the public property in every department of the French government, arid a general system THE STATE OF THE NATION. 71 of arrogance, of rapine and oppression, which condemns to misery the inhabitants of this delightful country, and imposes silence by the bayonet on the just com- plaints of the victims of oppression. The conclusion of the sentence I have quoted is unworthy of a Briton. Can a citizen of this free and powerful nation be doubtful whether any countries shall remain who still dare to be the enemies of France ? Are Britain and Russia then so degraded and intimidated that they shall not presume even to take up arms ? Is their strength so exhausted, and their spirit sunk so low, that no alternative remains but to receive, in silent submission, the dictates of the enemy ? of an enemy who acknowledges no law but his own will, no appeal but to the sword ? Impiger, iracundus, inexorabilis, acer Jura negat sibi nata, nihil non arrogat armis. I must submit to the painful task of exposing to the indignation they deserve, 4 72 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO several similar expressions in the publica- tion under review. They are unworthy of a member of a free commonwealth, and, how much more, of a mind enlight- ened by the envied gifts of literature ! In mentioning that since last campaign, the prospect of the deliverance of Holland, Switzerland, and Italy, is much lessened, the author concludes, " They have Eng- land to thank for this reverse of prospects, and it is probably the last favour they will receive at her hands." In a few pages farther he says, speaking of the continental war, and of the dread of invasion, " We have purchased a miserable respite from our alarms ; for, in spite of our boasting, we were the dupes of our fears." Again, when adverting to the picture he has drawn of the state of the nation, he adds, " It is our misfortune that we look around in vain for any circumstances which may soften its features, while it is impossible to imagine any addition which may aggra- vate them." And he recommends to offer equitable terms of peace, " in order to ob- THE STATE OF THE NATION. 73 tain, for the first time, the favourable cha- racter of moderation and pacific disposi- tions." How false and treacherous are these assertions ! By what fatality is a writer of such talents impelled, instead of ac- cusing a party, to insult the nation ? Mr. Fox, in giving an avowed sanction to so unguardTed a production, belies his re- putation for manly and liberal conduct, and justifies all the censures which have been passed on him for imprudence. In the heat of debate, a generous audience will forgive the incautious expressions which have so frequently marked his speeches. But the invectives in the per- formance tinder examination are gratui- tous. They have been provoked by no aggression they are justified by no hos- tility. Composed by the author in the leisure of the closet, and revised at the office of his patron, the injury they in- flict is deliberate and wanton. The chief object of their acrimony is an illustrious 74 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO statesman, now beyond the reach of hu- man, censure ; and with a blind eagerness -fcp condemn his measures, the Inquiry be- fore us transfers its reproaches from Mr. Pitt to the country for whose cause his life was devoted* Not content with extolling the value of the countries lost to Austria by the last campaign, the author dwells upon the ba- lance produced in favour of the conquerors beyond the mere changes of territory. " Defeat," he says, " has caused humilia- tion in the Austrians, and victory a cor- responding elevation in the French." However the French may be animated by success, he ill appreciates the firmness of the Austrian character who represents that brave people as crushed, because they have been unfortunate. The Austrian soldier knows neither intimidation nor despondency ; he will not forsake the field until ordered by his commander, and he meets death with a firmness peculiar to himself. Equal constancy actuates the THE STATE OF THE NATION. 75 nation in their attachment to their sove- reigns. With such subjects what may not the Cabinet of Vienna accomplish if guided by enlightened views ? The weakness of Austria has confessedly been only in her government. The severe lessons of mis- fortune have a powerful tendency to era- dicate abuses. Such perhaps were the errors in the Imperial administration, that adversity alone could effect their cure. / Its salutary effects are already apparent. The Archduke Charles is raised to the supreme direction of military affairs a general enrolment for acquiring the use of arms is stated to have taken place. These wholesome provisions justify the expecta- tion of still greater improvements : they tend to promote the introduction of a \vise system of policy in every department of this extensive empire. The loss of Venice and Tyrol will be compensated by the acquisition of a species of strength far more solid and effective; and Austria, when the wisdom of her government shall equal the energy of her subjects, and the ;6 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO resources of her dominions, may with confidence appeal to arms, in vindication of her own rights and of the cause of Europe. The next remarks in the Inquiry relate to the increased danger of invasion. I view these in a very different light from the rest of the work, and I have accor- dingly made them the subject of a separate discussion. The author proceeds to accuse Ministry of having made no use of the interval of security from invasion, to effect a reform of our defensive measures. He neither indicates distinctly the plan of ameliora- tion he requires, nor gives any explicit reason why that was the proper season for its adoption. He mentions indeed, that we were then exempt from the ap- prehension of invasion ; hut in that cir- cumstance there was 'nothing novel, for two winters had already elapsed since the beginning of the war, and every reflecting THE STATE OF THE NATIOX. 77 man must be aware that, during that sea- son, the danger from Boulogne is infinitely lessened. The best apology the author can make for this awkward argument is, that at the time he urged it, he could not foresee that Mr. Fox would be in office for several months without passing a single act to remedy those defects, for which he had so loudly reproached his predecessor; that a principal feature in his measures of military improvement should be the inef- ficient scheme of an armed peasantry ; and that the whole plan should be inade- quate equally to the expectations of the country, and to the splendid promises of radical amelioration held out by himself and his friends, before coming into power- WE have now reviewed a large pro- portion of the Inquiry : we have seen the author attack almost every measure of 78 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY I Ministry since the prorogation of last session. He adopts the strain of unqua- lified disapprobation formerly pursued by the Right Hon. Secretary : he commences where Mr. Fox ceased, and he rivals him in asperity of abuse ; perhaps also he may dispute with his patron the palm of incon- sistent and erroneous assertion. Not satisfied with so liberal an effusion of censure, the author deems it necessary to revert to circumstances antecedent to the late coalition. In this, as in former parts of the Inquiry, we are presented with a fluent series of arguments deduced from the most fallacious views. He dwells on the probability of our having been able to procure the accession of Spain to a general league, when it is notorious that since 1796 the Court of Madrid has been blindly devoted to France. After expend- ing every epithet of reprehension on the imprudence of Austria and Russia in at- tacking France, he affects to consider the hostility of Spain, on the side of the Py- THE STATE OF THE NATION. 79 renees, as likely to be extremely hurtful to that powerful neighbour. The immense subsidies paid to France by the treaty of St. Ildefonso, as the price of the neutrality of Spain, he denominates a trifling aid. But the most extraordinary of his asser- tions is, that " if unfortunately we pre- ferred hostilities, we should have taken care to make the war as advantageous as possible, by liberating the Spanish colonies from the galling monopoly of the mother- country, and opening a most profitable inlet for our commercial speculations." This profound politician would then re- commend it as judicious to waste the lives of our seamen and soldiers, in attempts to conquer settlements in the fatal atmo- sphere of the Spanish main. He con- siders that commerce as likely to be most profitable, which, even in the event of conquest, we should have to carry on in a country without law, and with a race of men devoid of principle. Let him permit me to inform him that the evil of our West India acquisitions is their being 80 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO already too extensive. They are the grave of our population and the drain of our capital. The climate of the continent of America, on which he seems so desirous that we should extend our possessions, is still more destructive than that of our own islands : and the inhabitants are so destitute of good faith, that to sell them merchandise upon credit, is synonymous, in the language of our merchants, with the absolute loss of the property. I come now to that part of the Inquiry where the author considers the situation of Holland. He infers but too justly, both from its immediate proximity to France and from the character of the people, that the chance of freeing them from the influ- ence of our enemy is extremely doubtful, .prom the natural effects of commerce on .national character, he concludes, that the Dutch dread revolution and war as the THE STATE OF THE NATION. 81 last of dangers, and that they depend too. much on their trade to put honour and glory in competition with it. Having had the means of very accurate information, I feel justified in expressing a decided opinion on this important topic. My reasoning is the result of experience and observation. It applies to an interest- ing part of our foreign relations, and I claim accordingly the attention of the Right Honourable Secretary. Holland exhibits in every feature of her national character the effects of long com- mercial habits. Accustomed for ages to pursue trade and to reap its comforts, her people possess the care, temperance, and regularity, consequent upon the discipline of industry, but they are devoid of energy or enterprise. Her soldiers, and even her sailors, are raised only in a small propor- tion from her own population. West- phalia, and the other adjoining parts of Germany, supply recruits for her army F 82 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO and the landmen of her navy. Even the seamen, whether in the public or private shipping, are not in general native Dutch- men, but from the north of Germany, from Denmark and Sweden. Of the men who fought off Camperdown, and so bravely maintained the former fame of Holland, only a small proportion were Dutch. With respect to the army, Guel- derland, a province comparatively incon- siderable, is the only source of supply. There exists not a nation more destitute of military habits, or possessing less aptitude to acquire them. If the writer of the Inquiry believes that from a greater dread of the horrors of internal war than of their present subjection, they would rise in ac- tive opposition to an invading foe, he is egregiously mistaken. The Dutch, what- ever be their expectations from a force sent to deliver them, or whatever the tyranny of their oppressors, will act a neutral part. Individual safety is a Dutchman's object ; and from that, no consideration, except downright compulsion, can make him de~ THE STATE OF THE NATION. S3 part. They are divided into two parties, apparently so equal in numbers and influ- ence, that it is a matter of extreme difficulty to decide which of the two really possesses that superiority which is claimed by both. The highest and lowest classes are in general devoted to the Orange family, while the middle ranks constitute the popular party. The former are attached to the French ; the latter, as far as com- mercial jealousy will allow, to the English. This division has subsisted nearly two hundred years. Its spirit is hereditary, imbibed from the earliest period of life, and retained with the characteristic perti- nacity of the Dutch. So rooted is attach- ment to the Orange family in the minds of its adherents, that while that House pos- sesses a representative, no succession of revolutions, no variety of new constitu- tions, will eradicate it from their breasts. Yet such are the habits and disposition of the people, that, notwithstanding this strong predilection, no active co-operation in the work of their deliverance is to be p 2 81 AXSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO expected from them. In 1794, when the French approached their frontier, and threatened the overthrow of all that \vas dear to the Orange party, there was made no exertion of individual patriotism no voluntary levies no pecuniary subscrip- tions. The hired troops of the Republic (Swiss and Germans) were left to fight, unaided, the battles of the state. In 1 799, when the successes of the campaign had been entirely on the side of the allies, and the Prince's party had the strongest mo- tives, from the prospect of success, as well as congeniality of feeling, to co-operate with the invading army, it is notorious that they afforded not the smallest assistance. The republican party partakes equally of the national apathy. Their leaders, how- ever, have the benefit of whatever move- ment can be communicated to this languid mass by the machine of government. In 1795, after the French invasion, a number of the citizens attached to the democratic side were formed into volunteer corps. THE STATE OF THE NATION. 85 These, in the event of invasion, would le marched out against the assailing force. They would take the field from the neces- sity of obeying orders ; but although nu- merous, they are so inefficient in a military view, that I do not under-rate the measure of their exertion, when I state that the ad- dition of 5000 regular soldiers to the in- vading army would be an adequate pro- vision against the whole annoyance to be expected from the collective body of Dutch volunteers. My reasoning on the subject of Holland has not hitherto materially varied from that of the author of the Inquiry. We differ in the mode of deduction, but approximate in the result. In what remains, however, of this branch of the subject, we are most widely in opposition. He appears very imperfectly acquainted with the actual state of Holland ; and it is important that his inferences should be investigated with care. 80 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO In treating of the Dutch commerce, his language conveys a belief, that, although not equally extensive, it continues in other respects in the same busy and prosperous state as in the better days of the Republic. Nothing can be more fallacious, A war with England is the signal for the Dutch flag to disappear from the ocean. Their West-India colonies fall an easy conquest to our arms, and their trade with the East, formerly the pride of Holland and admira-? tion of the universe, is carried on by the limited and hazardous system of neutral flags. That portion of intercourse which they still maintain with other countries in Europe, is transacted in the same preca- rious manner. Their internal trade and manufactures are in a state of correspondent decay, and the whole country is under- going a most serious diminution, not only of wealth, but of population. Of this diminution our author appears to have been aware ; but he recollects alsp tp have read, as a principle in political econo- THE STATE OF THE NATIOX. 87 my, that the profits of stock increase as its total amount in a society is lessened. He not only applies this principle to the pre- sent state of Holland, but deduces from it a conclusion, which, in its present unqua- lified shape, conveys an impression alto- gether contrary to the actual condition of that unhappy country, I quote his own words : " In fact, the accounts of the Dutch op- pressions are greatly exaggerated. Many capitalists have been ruined and forced to emigrate. Many persons have had their wealth diminished, and the whole riches of the state are greatly impaired ; but the profits, which are still drawn upon the remaining stock, are necessarily higher ; and this of itself tends to alleviate the bur- dens of the capitalists who are left behind" The general principle here introduced is illustrated in book 1st, chapter IXth, of that invaluable work, the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Rations. It is thus ex- 88 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO pressed : " The diminution of the capital stock of the society, or of the funds des- tined for the maintenance of industry, as it lowers the wages of labour, so it raises the profits of stock, and consequently the in- terest of money." Dr. Smith quotes in support of this principle, the great fortunes suddenly acquired in the ruined countries of Bengal and the other British settlements in the East Indies. This principle is not to be denied, and receives, in fact, an exemplification from the state of Holland. It was easy formerly to borrow money there at an interest of four per cent. ; at present, it is nearly im- possible to procure it at five. But the de- duction of the author of the Inquiry, that the increased profit of stock tends to alle- viate the burdens of the capitalists left be- hind, is most erroneous, if we are to take it in the natural meaning of the words, that the profit on capital having become greater, the whole income of the capitalist has increased. This does not result from THE STATE OF THE NATION. 89 the general principle, and it is fully dis- proved by the actual condition of Holland. The diminution of stock in all societies is attended with the most ruinous conse- quences to the country at large. The capitalist sustains his share in the general calamity : he obtains a higher rate of in- terest, but his capital is less secure : he therefore dares not in prudence either lend or employ the whole. The hazards of trade are multiplied by the increased num- ber of failures. He suffers from this cause directly, if he trade himself; or indirectly through the instability of his debtors, if he lend his capital to others : he therefore does not employ the whole, either in trade or upon loan. Upon the invasion of Holland by the French, a large proportion of capital was hoarded. The practice of hoarding indicates a situation the reverse of pro- sperous, both in the individual and in the country. By a total loss of profit there- fore on a part of his stock, the capitalist, notwithstanding the increased rate of in^ QO ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO terest on the remainder, derives much less income from his whole property in times of public calamity. In speaking of Bengal, Dr. Smith tions, " that the great fortunes so sud-> denly and so easily acquired in it, and the other rritish settlements in the East Indies, may satisfy us, that as the wages of labour are very low, so the profits of stock are very high in those ruined countries. The interest of money is proportionally so. In Bengal money is frequently lent to the fanners at forty, fifty, arid sixty per cent." If this was the state of India thirty or forty years ago, it is now materially altered. The usual interest of money is at present from ten to twelve per cent. The fortunes said to have been made in that country, have, both in Dr. Smith's days and our own, been much over-rated. If their origin be investigated, it will be found more fre- quently in the official situation of the in- dividual in the Company's service, than in the legitimate profits of trade. They have THE STATE OF THE NATION. Ql generally been acquired by men who were strangers equally to the principles and the habits of commerce : presents from the natives, or the possession of monopolies, will be found in the history of British India to have been a more fruitful source of fortune, than industry. The nature and progress of such acquisitions have been re- gulated therefore by causes very different from the rules of political economy. It must be apparent that the state of society in Bengal and Holland is extremely different. In Bengal, property was for- merly very insecure, and trade confined to a small number. In Holland, property was sacred, and trade the universal occu- pation. No two countries can differ more widely in the gifts of nature. The fertile soil of Bengal supplies with the returning season, a harvest abundant both for the industrious husbandman and his rapacious master. But Holland, bereft of commerce, would lose that which alone renders her territory valuable. Her coast would be 92 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO reduced to a barren asylum for fishermen ; her interior would become a dreary marsh. The ruinous effects of diminished ca- pital would therefore be infinitely more felt in Holland, where commerce was both so generally prosecuted, and so indispen- sable to the prosperity of the country. There, as in this and in every trading country, a great part of business was trans- acted upon credit. So important an in- strument is credit in mercantile operations, that in many branches the amount of stock or capital ceases to be the criterion of the extent either of business or of profit. In this country a longer or shorter term is taken for the payment of almost every purchase, and credit is as essential to trade, in its present state, as the atmo- sphere to our existence. The Dutch, fur- ther advanced in their commercial career than the English, more abundant in money and less accustomed to speculative enter- prise, transacted more business by imme- diate payments. But even in Holland, THE STATE OF THE NATION. Q3 credit was the soul of commerce. A fo- reign conquest, a revolution, but . above all, their wars with England, have les- sened exceedingly the mutual confidence of the merchants. By the interruption of her intercourse with the East and West Indies, Holland is deprived of the most extensive and lucrative branches of her trade. The ruin of almost all the public funds of Europe, except the British, is a fatal blow to a people who had lent out a large portion of their stock to foreign powers. Their internal trade suffers under a universal diminution of consumption. This complication of disasters has conti- nued to press upon them for above ten years. Its consequences have been, the emigration of a large proportion of the population, and despondency in those who have remained. Peace alone can preserve to them what they still possess, and peace is the prayer of every Hollander. But in the present state of Europe there is no prospect of any pacification which can re- store them to independence. It may pro- 94 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO cure a partial relief from their burdens^ but it will confirm their degradation, and rivet the chains of French despotism. The argument of the author of the In- quiry, that the increased profit of stock tends to alleviate the burdens of the capi- talist, would have weight, provided taxa- tion in Holland observed a uniform ratio to the amount or profit of stock. Their late taxes are indeed a very large ratio or per centage upon property ; but this ratio is not uniform. It varies in different years ; and instead of being more easily paid by the remaining capitalists in consequence of the ruin and emigration of their country- men, its pressure is by that cause exceed- ingly augmented. The measure of taxa- tion in Holland has long been, not a just regard to the means of its inhabitants, but the unavoidable necessities of the state. The French prescribe to them the mainte- nance of an extensive military and naval establishment, or the payment of a direct contribution to themselves : for these, and THE STATE OF THE NATION. Q5 the interest of their immense funded debt, provision must be made. It is therefore the amount of their burdens, not the ratio of taxation, which is certain. The ruin and emigration of a number of capitalists, and the consequent diminution of the na- tional stock, increases very much the pro- portion of taxation on the remaining indi- viduals. A sum, certain and of large amount, must be paid the smaller the national property, the fewer the contribu- tors, so much greater must be the ratio of contribution. I have proved, I trust, that although, in the present calamitous state of Holland, the rate of interest is higher than formerly, the whole income of the capitalist is by no means increased. To maintain that the ruin and emigration of many capitalists is productive of effects tending to alleviate the burdens of those who remain, without taking any notice that the same causes pro- duce other consequences tending in a much greater degree to aggravate their misery, $0 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY IXTO is an extraordinary mode of describing the situation of a country. The total re- lief afforded is one percent, additional to the capitalist on part of his stock. Our author dwells on this advantage,but makes no men- tion that it can take place only tinder such circumstances of general distrust, that a considerable proportion of capital must re- main at the same time unemployed ; and that from the same causes the national de- spondency is so great, that this solitary advantage affords no substantial relief. It is a single ray of comfort sinking unper- ceived in the universal gloom. To lend a sanction to a work so erro- neous in these important points, is no slight imputation on the accuracy "of the Right Hon. Secretary himself. It is whimsical to consider how he will be apostrophized on the perusal of such a doctrine, by the classes whom it affects. The political economist will exclaim, " You lately ex- pressed a most extraordinary opinion, that you were very doubtful of the practical THE STATE OF THE NATION. 07 application of general principles. In the present case you not only apply decidedly the general principle, but you overstrain its operation.'* The merchant will say, " Your arguments are contradicted both by experience and common sense. To tell us that our burdens will be alleviated in consequence of failures and emigration, is equally judicious as to state that it is better to pay, instead of a moderate rate of in- come-tax, the enormous amount of ten per cent, at once." To the doctrine of moderation and pa- cific disposition recommended in the pub- lication under review, every man will subscribe. The difference will not be in regard to the admission of such principles while expressed in general terms, but in their application to particular circum- stances. Until these circumstances are defined, to descant in general terms, is to say no more than that peace is preferable to war, and moderation to violence. Un- questionably every enlightened and liberal OS AXSWJ R TO THE INQUIRY INTO mind, capable of appreciating the real causes of the prosperity of nations, will pronounce, that by a secure peace the in- terests of this country will be more effec- tually promoted, and its welfare more ra- dically and permanently established, than by the most successful war : and if Mr. Fox succeed in negotiating a peace ho- nourable to us and safe for the continent, he will deserve, not only the thanks of the country, but the forgiveness of all his in- consistencies. Of such a peace, however, we have no flattering prospect. To act a condescend- ing part in negotiation with so arrogant an enemy as Bonaparte, is to insure a renewal of hostility. Let it. never be for- gotten, that the treaty of Amiens, of which the chief recommendation was its having been made ' in the spirit of peace," kept us, during the short interval of its duration, in a state of alarm worse than war. In any negotiation with Bonaparte, let Mr. Fox remember, that he is treating with the THE STATE OF THE XATIOX. Q9 most false and artful of men, \vith one who combines the most subtle mind with the most perfidious heart. He alternately oppresses by open violence, seduces by secret fraud, or assassinates in midnight obscurity. */ Tile venena Colchica et quicquid usquam concipitur nefas, Tractavit. His system is to crush the weak, and be- guile the powerful to frighten the timid, and cajole the brave. The sword is the favourite engine of his government, and it is congenial to the turbulence of his temper. But he combines in his adminis- tration every species of support to himself, and of danger to his enemies. By the em- ployment of enlightened men like Talley- rand, he makes even Philosophy administer her sacred aid to his lawless violence. He has reduced falsehood into a system, and adapts his lies with wonderful sagacity, to whatever character he addresses. He pre- vailed on the Cabinet of Vienna to ac- quiesce in his usurpations in Italy, by pre- G 2 JOO ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO tending that they were necessary to enable him to re-establish with security, here- ditary monarchy in France. With equal truth, he will endeavour to persuade Mr. Fox that he desires peace for the sake of alleviating the sufferings of mankind that he has always admired pacific sentiments that he has no wish to abridge the power of Britain, but that he is desirous to culti- vate with her the most amicable relations, and to forget the evils of war in the inno- cent emulation of commercial rwalslnp. We have now followed the author of the Inquiry through the greatest, and by far most important part of his work. We have seen that the prospect of France agreeing to a negotiation under the mediation of Russia, was extremely doubtful : and even had it been ostensibly adopted by Bona- parte, we could have entertained no hopt- of the cordiality of his acceptance, or the THE STATE OF THE NATION. 101 sincerity of his overtures : for he had scarcely agreed to the advances made by Russia, when, regardless of peace, he com- mits in the seizure of Genoa, an outrage replete with alarm, and declaratory of hos- tility to all Europe. The pretended vagueness of the terms of the treaty of concert is best disproved by a reference to the treaty itself. The au- thor's ignorance of the Dutch frontier will be apparent on a slight inspection of the map. Yet though thus imperfectly in- formed, he has no hesitation in passing unqualified censure on the statesmen who represented England and Russia in the con- clusion of a treaty, whose object was the deliverance of Europe The proper con- tents of a treaty, like that of St. Petersburg, is a declaration of its objects, and an out- line of the means for their attainment. In both these respects, this treaty is equal in precision to any antecedent treaty entered into for the purpose of a general con- federacy. Its objects are defined with J02 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO perspicuity, and it includes every provision which a treaty, contracted under such cir- cumstances, could contain. Its result was a coalition far more powerful than any late confederacy against France. Europe, from the north to the south, seemed to rise up as one man against that overgrown power. She failed in her efforts hy the infatuation of a General, who, in the first month of operation, lost to his Sovereign an army of 80,000 men. The exemplary adherence of both Aus- tria and Russia to the common cause af- fords a most satisfactory contradiction to t/ the insinuations in the Inquiry. The fidelity of these powers justifies both the past con- fidence and the future hopes of Britain. Honour and courage are not always suc- cessful, but they are the best guardians of independence, and they offer a fair field of promise against a future period, when they may be called into exertion under more favourable circumstances. THE STATE OF THE NATION. 103 The co-operation of Prussia is valuable ; but it is not indispensable to the success of a confederacy against Franco. The allies do not appear to have reckoned on her assistance ; but they had, in her own situ- ation, the most satisfactory assurances that she would entertain no hostility against them. It is a whimsical excess of crimination to accuse our Cabinet of the mistakes com- mitted in conferences held between Russian and Austrian Generals in the heart of Ger- many, and of not having nominated the Commander in Chief of an army, where there was not a single British soldier, and of which we did not pay a third part. It is still more extraordinary to propose our Envoy at Vienna as a fit adviser for Gene- rals in matters purely military. Mr.lAdair might have adopted, but Sir Arthur Paget, we have no doubt, would have declined this innovation in diplomatic arrange- ment. 104 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO The necessity of insuring by treaties the co-operation of powers safe in their dis- tance from France, before we called on Austria, her neighbour, to incur the for- midable hazard of her hostility, is so ob- vious as to require no comment, unless it be on the ingenuity of the author of the Inquiry, who devises arguments for every case. Although facts and reasou oppose him, he will not shrink from the en- counter, but, like a true combatant, asserts the cause he has adopted under every dis- advantage. The invasion of Bavaria, so much con- demned by our author, was a wise and vigorous measure. It failed through the credulity of Mack in exercising towards a faithless Prince too much of that confi- dence which the writer of the Inquiry so strenuously recommends. Let him peruse again the Austrian plan of operations, and judge whether it was the intention of that Court to forego, in THE STATE OF THE NATION. 105 the event of successful operations, the ad- vantages of carrying the war into Switzer- land advantages which he has himself so fully and forcibly illustrated. The sailing of our expedition to Hanover was delayed, not through the fault -of Go- vernment, but by the continuance of con- trary winds. The author censures the sending our forces to that Electorate, be- cause the object was purely British ; and in the same page he accuses Ministers of making no attempt upon Boulogne. Does he then mean, that to have attacked Bou- logne would not have been an object purely British ? And would it have been an evi- dence of disinterested policy, after arming the continent agaim t France, to have con- fined our exertions exclusively to our own security ? To counsel an expedition against Bou- logne, to dissuade the speedy conquest of Bavaria, to recommend the landing of Bodies of British troops necessarily de- 106 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO tached and unsupported, in Holland, in the north of France, and in Lombardy, are propositions so radically erroneous as to prove a total ignorance of tactics in those who have composed this Inquiry. To a literary man, it is no reproach to have omitted to study a subject foreign to his usual pursuits ; but why does Mr. Fox lend his sanction to a work replete with such fallacious views ? The conclusion must be, that this far-famed statesman is unacquainted with the causes which de- cide the fate of battles and the issue of campaigns. When he relies on a defence so frail as an armed peasantry ; when he countenances the recommendation of de- tached operations in the heart of the country of an enemy so fatally active as the. French ; and above all, when he makes light of the danger of invasion, without explaining the grounds of his security, except in vague and general terms, we are but too well justified to conclude, that he has neglected to give to these most im- portant subjects the grave consideration THE STATE OF TH\E KATION. 107 they demand, and that he has seen Europe shaken to her centre without investigating the causes of the awful convulsion. It is a no less glaring error to assert, that the Austrians, by relinquishing Tyrol, have lost the best theatre of warlike operations. Mountains have been to them the scenes of reiterated disasters ; their strength is in cavalry; and their wisest plan of warfare is to force the French to pitched battles. In delineating the consequences of un- successful war upon Austria, the author of the Inquiry views the question only on that side which suits his argument. With sin- gular candour, he avoids taking any notice of the salutary reforms produced by the severe lessons of misfortune, and he de- scribes as dejected and despondent a people who are strangers to intimidation. The causes of our quarrel with Spain have been so amply discussed, and its necessity so fully demonstrated, that I have 108 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO confined myself to combating the absurd idea of acquisitions on the continent of America. The Spanish settlements would not be difficult of conquest, but success would to us be as fatal as discomfiture. To Holland I have assigned a longer chapter. The real situation of that coun- try, although contiguous to us, is very jmperfectly known ; and the Inquiry de- scribes it in terms which could not fail to increase the previous misconceptions of the public. I have already expressed surprise at the palpable errors in regard to tactics, in the high quarter which has patronized the present publication. An equal degree of ignorance in regard to trade, is apparent throughout. The commercial situation of Holland is as egregiously misunderstood as the nature of her frontier ; and to recom- mend an attack on Spanish America with a view to profitable trade, betrays an equal unacquamtance with the nature of these THE STATE OF THE NATION. 10Q settlements, and of West India colonies in general. To the author, or rather assistant author of this Inquiry, I will recommend a better task. By adopting the distorted views of party, he narrows the wide field which is the legitimate province of the philosophic mind. While he obtains the patronage of the Minister of the day, he relinquishes a fair claim to general and permanent ap- probation. Instead of being the apologist of a party, let him constitute himself the advocate of Britain against France, the vindicator of the cause of Europe against the arrogant tyrant who threatens to en- slave her. If we can indulge the hope of a secure peace, let him exercise his talents in an inquiry into those conditions and that system which alone can insure per- manent tranquillity. If this prospect be denied us, if Bonaparte refuse to acknow- ledge claims indispensable to our safety, and belie, as usual, his professions, it will then become an adequate object for the 11O ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO talents of this writer to excite merited" in- dignation against such insatiable ambition, to point out the nature and extent of our danger, and unfold those resources by which it may be successfully opposed. Had the publication under review been even less directly sanctioned by Mr. Fox, its internal evidence would have bespoke its parentage. It is replete with those extremes, both in thought and language, which characterize his speeches. Like them, the Inquiry presents us with an accumulation of arguments in support of whatever idea is uppermost at the mo- ment, without considering that the best means of refutation may be frequently found in this hasty assemblage. And, like his own career in public life, this work is an instructive exemplification of those in- consistencies which infallibly proceed from an ardent mind, unrestrained by caution and undisciplined by moderation. THE STATE OF. THE NATION. Ill Although Mr. Pitt's name is not men- tioned in this publication, the whole at- tack, with the exception of Lord Gren- ville's share, is directed in substance against him. AYhen the present confederacy, the greatest which for nearly a century had been formed against France, first developed its strength, the Opposition press loudly refused Mr. Pitt the merit of its formation; but since Mack's infatuation marred our fairest prospects, every epithet of censure has been cast upon that distinguished Mi- nister. He is accused of not having ex- ercised in foreign states an extent of power which a sovereign often finds difficult in his own kingdom of not having con- trolled from London the operations in Ba- varia. The faults of every court are ascribed to him, as if he had ruled Europe with despotic sway. Is it not obvious that England, remote from the theatre of war, must leave the conduct of military operations to the powers who are near them, whose force consists in armies, and J12 ANSWEH TO THE INQUIRY INTO who are more immediately interested in the issue of the campaign than herself? Were she permitted to direct the move- ments of the league, what could ensue from her distance but delay and disaster? The province of the British Minister was therefore to employ the resources of his country to unite as large a part as possible of the commonwealth of Europe against its oppressor ; to conciliate the jarring in- terests of those powers, and bind them together in a solid league, definite in its objects, and- upright in its views ; to con- duct this arduous negotiation with secrecy, and by every possible precaution to avoid awakening the suspicion of a vigilant enemy ; and finally, after having agreed upon a general plan of operations, to com- mit the detail to those who were to exe- cute them, avoiding that interference in particular objects which involves the ruin of confederacies by the distraction of their views, and the division of their force. THE STATE OF THE NATION. 113 In whatever way we examine the con- duct of these important measures on the part of Mr. Pitt, we shall find the most solid grounds of approbation. The alliance was formidable in magnitude beyond ex- ample, the cordiality of its members has been evinced by their constancy under disaster, and the whole scheme was con- cealed from the enemy until the Russians were approaching to Germany. England therefore amply fulfilled her part in the coalition, and its failure was occasioned by causes beyond her controul. The career of the illustrious Statesman we have lost, has been uniform ; it was no less great in its close than promising in its commencement. The historian of his life will be under no necessity to call in to his panegyric the aid of eloquent or impas- sioned language : let him endeavour to elevate his mind to the conception of Mr. Pitt's views, to investigate his measures by their own merits, to weigh his mo- H 1 14 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO lives and conduct in silent meditation, without attending to the reports either of friends or enemies, and he will pourtray a character equally admirable in all that enlightens the mind, and dignifies the heart. THE STATE OF THE NATION. STRICTURES ON THE CO ND UCT OF THE PRESENT MINISTRY. THE author of the Inquiry re-echoes the high encomiums on our present Adminis- tration, which were so lavishly bestowed on them when entering into office ; but of which we every day hear less. He de- scribes them as " uniting the largest portion of talents, experience, rank, and integrity; the most ample share of all the qualities, wiiether natural or acquired, intrinsic or accidental, which ever enabled a govern- ment to secure influence with its subjects, and command respect among foreign na- H 2 1 1(5 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY I!s*TO tions." He subsequently adds, " No com- promise of principles, no paltry half- mea- sures, no incongruous mixture of big words and little doings, will bear them out in redeeming their pledge to save the country." Let us briefly examine how far their proceedings, since they came into office, have entitled them to the lofty de- scription given of them by our author, have accorded with their own promises, or have fulfilled the expectations of the country. 1. Lord Ellenborough's appointment to a seat in the Cabinet. In an Administra- tion composed of men who, on all occa- sions, had professed so great a jealousy of the executive power, and so firm an ad- herence to the rights of the people, above all to the impartial administration of public justice, the introduction of the Lord Chief Justice into the Cabinet was a step equally unexpected and inconsistent. To unite in one person functions so opposite as the judicial and executive, is repugnant equally to the provisions of our excellent consti- THE STATE OP THE NATION. 117 lion, and to the first principles of justice. The impropriety of the measure was com- pensated by no countervailing advantage, it was required by no imperious necessity. Already fully occupied by most laborious duties, his Lordship can devote no ade- quate portion of his time to politico! avo- cations. Advanced to the summit of his profession, and enjoying its highest ho- nours, his dignity does not require this adventitious distinction. Besides, the study of law is not the school of politics. The best pleaders of the present day, whether distinguished for animated oratory, or depth of legal knowledge, are, with very few exceptions, unimpressive in the senate. The causes are obvious. A difficult and laborious profession absorbs that time, which, to make an able statesman, it is indispensable should be given to objects of general policy. The incessant study of former enactments and records accumulates a mass of in- formation in regard to statutes and prece- 118 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO dents, but is unfavourable to the exercise of those faculties which must be roused into action in order to provide for combina- tions of circumstances perpetually varying, and contingencies perpetually new. Were the study of the law indeed ducted in this country as it ought, it might "well be considered a proper preparation for the duties of a statebinan. Judicial may be no less necessary th r m political interference in the transactions which take place between the members of a com- munity; and an intimate knowledge of the general principles which regulate these transactions, as well as of the actual ch> cumstances in which the society is placed, seems equally essential to the complete education of the lawyer as of the politician. But while the study of the law consists almost wholly in a knowledge of forms, of an ill-contrived technical jargon, and of a mass of decisions and regulations, without any attention to the circumstances in which they originated, the principles on which THE STATE OF THE NATION. 1 1Q they are founded, or their defects and possible improvements the study of the law cannot fit a man for any employment beyond the precincts of a court of justice. This extraordinary measure of giving the Chief Justice a voice in the Cabinet, might suit the arrangement of parties, but it does not suit the country. Jt might gratify his Lordship, but it gives him no real exaltation. Jt renders more prominent that part of his character which is least admired. We reverence inflexible integrity and eminent talents in the Judge in the Senator we recognise the common passions and prejudices of men. 2. The accession of Lord Sidmouth to a Cabinet, of which Mr. Fox and Lord Grenville were the leading members, was matter equally of surprise and censure. So glaring an inconsistency is not to be excused by attributing similar conduct to Mr. Pitt. There were no such radical grounds 'of difference between his Lord- 120 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO ship and Mr. Pitt as between his Lordship and the present Ministers, Or the three years of Lord Sidmouth's administration, Mr. Pitt concurred in and supported the measures of the first two. In the third year, upon the renewal of the war, he gave an example of constitutional and temperate opposition, which, let us hope for our country's sake, will not he soon forgotten. He disapproved of several im- portant parts of the conduct of Adminis- tration ; but he continued to give them that assistance which he considered due to men of irreproachable intentions. He was desirous to introduce more decision and celerity into our military preparations ; yet, instead of thwarting, he supported the measures of Ministers. Instead of impeding their progress by new proposi- tions from himself, he transfused his own energy into theirs. A negotiation for his return to "office had been broken off under circumstances which he conceived the ground of just resentment towards Lord Sidmouth. But, contrary to the almost THE STATE OF THE NATION. 121 xiniform example of statesmen, his per~ sonal indignation led to no public oppo- sition; he was satisfied in telling the House of Commons that he was detached from Administration, and took no part in ad- vising their measures, except in Parlia- ment. Conduct, so temperate and patri- otic, endeared him to many who had for- merly admired only his talents. Even among his opponents there was not a man, alive to generous sentiments, or open to conviction, who did not forget all former hostility, and join in the general appro- bation. An opposition on such moderate and impartial principles as these, we are still fortunate enough to possess in Mr. Wil- berforce and other independent gentle- men. They, however, have never been in office, and are unconnected with party; they are strangers, therefore, to those cir- cumstances which intriguing men render instrumental to their ambitious designs, and which, even in the upright, have a powerful tendency to interest the feelings 122 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY JNTO and biass the judgment. But a Minister out of office is almost unavoidably exposed to the influence of party connexion. And in a leading Statesman, I know not, in our history, a parallel to the dignified and in> partial conduct of Mr. Pitt, It was not imti^he Addington ministry had put a negative upon several of his most important military propositions, and that our navy was hastening to decay, that Mr. Pitt considered it incumbent on him to make serious exertions for their removal from office. How differently had they been treated by Lord Grenville and Mr. Fox ! His Lordship had combated and ridiculed every measure they had brought forward ; and Mr. Fox, not contented with opposing particular propositions, declared them the weakest Administration who had ever governed the country. Despised, however, and vilified as he has been, Lord Sidmouth, instead of honourably disdain^ ing the connexion, is induced to sit in the Cabinet with those whom he never can for* THE STATE OP THE NATION. 123 give. After laying claim to the confidence of his Sovereign and the Country by a uniform appearance of candour and disin- teie^tedness, he is tempted to a connexion \vith men of the most opposite principles, by an office, nominal in every respect but income. Indebted to Mr. Pitt for his in- troduction into public life, by the appoint- ment to the high rank of Speaker, and professing throughout the greatest venera- tion for his talents and principles, his Lord- ship feels now no hesitation to act with the man who had been through life the opponent of his benefactor. Lord Gren- ville and Mr. Fox, who had formerly dif- fered in every thing, excepting the ridicule of Addington, now agree, with wonderful harmony, in recommending him as one of the confidential servants of the Crown *. * The publication by the French of the intercepted letters in the Admiral Aplin undeceived the public in. regard to a most important political transaction. On the unexpected appointment of Mr. Addington to the head of the new Administration in 1801, it was gene- believed, from his intimate connexion with Mr, 124 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 3. The remission of the unpaid penalties for the Additional Force Act, and the re- imbursement of those which had been Pitt, from his apparent unfitness for the situation, and from Mr. Pitt's reputed love of power, that Mr. Ad- dington was only a glove for the hand that still con- tinued to guide the reins of Government. This opinion was openly declared by the Opposition. Mr. Fox, with his usual discretion, harangued the Whig Club about a King who threatened to send his jack-boot to direct his Senate, and that we might now see the Jack, boot's jack -boot. This sagacious insinuation, how- ever, is disproved by Lord Gremille's letter to Marquis Wellcsley of the I2th of July 1803 (intercepted and published;, in which his Lordship, in speaking of the Ministry, says, " Mr. Pitt did not recommend Ad- clington ; and who that knew him would have done it ?" Again ; Mr. Henry VVellesley, in a letter to his brother by the same conveyance, dated aSth of July 1803, after mentioning that Mr. Pitt and Mr. Adding- ton were no longer on speaking terms, uses these re- markable expressions : " Mr. Pitt opposes daily the Defence Bill in the House, but he opposes it as a Counsellor ; and by his very objections, he has ren- dered it fit for its intended purposes, which would otherwise never have been the case." Those who justly appreciated Mr. Pitt's manly and disiaterested character knew him to be incapable either THE STATE OF THE NATION. 125 paid, ivithout any compensation to the parishes ivho had zealously fulfilled the intentions of Parliament, is one of the most extraordinary proceedings in history. We were prepared for obloquy being thrown on Mr. Pitt's measures ; but we could hardly expect in a Ministry, pourtrayed in such glowing colours, that even equity and justice should give way to resentment. By the mode adopted in rescinding this Act. those arc acquitted who have con- temned the authority of the Legislature ; and those only have suffered who have evinced a meritorious and exemplary obe- dience. The anticipation of this dispo- of Court intrigue for the appointment of a Minister, or of an insidious support in Parliament for his continu- ance in office. But the aspersions were plausible, and the Opposition urged them with an assurance calcu- lated to impose on all those who adopted the current report of Mr. Pitt's ambitious disposition. Of these and similar calumnies, that great man disdained to take the smallest notice ; and this specious assertion might have continued to mislead the public, had not the accidental publication of Lord Grenville's letter given it an explicit denial. 120 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO sition on the part of Government was lat* terly the cause pf the non-execution of the Act. By the actual remission of the fines, a most dangerous example is given to neglect the fulfilment of future statutes ; to oppose whatever may be troublesome or disagreeable to individuals, not by a con- stitutional resistance to a Bill in Parlia- ment, but by a treacherous dereliction of duty in the execution of the law. The intention of the author of the Bill, I am aware, was to find not money but men. The payment of the fine, however, was an evil on no account to be put in competition with the inconsistency and danger of rescinding an Act of Parliament tinder circumstances of direct injustice to that part of the nation whose exertions had been most zealous. Did Ministers re- peal the Act as a measure of popularity ? It could please only a part of the nation, and of that part only those narrow minds who can rejoice at their own escape, while their neighbours have suffered. Of this THE STATE OF THE NATION. 127 obvious consideration, Ministers must have been aw r are ; yet for the temporary grati- fication of condemning a measure of their predecessors, they have put on record, in its repeal, a precedent of most injurious tendency the pernicious effects of which will take a deep and permanent root, and will continue in destructive operation when the Act itself shall be forgotten. x 4. Complaints of the exclusion of merit from the high offices of State, have been sounded in our ears these twenty years. The failures of our expeditions, and the errors in the administration of important departments at home, have been uniformly ascribed to the employment of incompe- tent persons, and to the exclusion of the tried servants of the State. Party-favour, in short, has been the theme of the bit- terest reproaches from the late Opposition. Pledged as they were to the preference of merit, and possessing ample choice of able men by the union of parties, what a selec- tion have they made for the Trcasurership 128 AXSWRR TO THE INQUIRY INTO" of the Ordnance ! They have intrusted the control over millions of the public money to a man, by profession a contractor and a banker, that line which, of all others, offers the greatest facility for a lucrative use of the public treasure. They have promoted to a station of high rank, a private trader unknown to the public service of his country: and they have associated with themselves a man convicted, by an impar- tial tribunal, of bribery and corruption. | It will not avail them to plead, in apo- logy, the recommendation of higher influ- ence. As the Ministers of a free! country, it is their duty to correct the misrepresent- ations to which Princes are exposed, and to inculcate the value of public opinion. A nation characterized by rectitude of sen- timent and integrity of conduct, requires its public officers to be exempt, not only from the censure of the law, but even from suspicion. Adulation, or pretended purity, may deceive an individual, but they will THE STATE OF THE NATION. 12Q not deceive a people. Of the talents of its servants, the public is not, perhaps, the fittest judge ; but it will seldom err in the broad distinction between honour and im- morality. That to remove from offices of trust whoever shall have forfeited the public confidence, is necessary for the popularity of Government, w 7 ill be readily acknowledged. It is a kindred maxim with the wise saying, " that a King of Eng- land, to be powerful or happy, must reign in the hearts of his people." 5 . The refusal of a vote of thanks for the capture of so very valuable a possession as the Cape of Good Hope, is an act of un- precedented injustice. The time taken for its achievement was short ; but are we not indebted in a great degree for the prompti- tude of our success, to the skill and gal- lantry of the attack ? To the timid or unskilful, every enterprise is difficult. Has our navy the less merit because the de- struction of an enemy has now become the work of a few hours ? Had the attack on i 13O ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO the Cape been mismanaged, the force op- posed to our expedition was sufficiently large to have repelled it. But the question has long been decided by repeated prece- dents. Both the value of the object and the difficulty of capture were much greater than on former occasions, when honours were conferred, and the national gratitude expressed. Let it be contrasted in both respects with the conquest of Tobago, Demerara, or Surinam, and say, whether it is fair to deprive the Commanders on this occasion of the fair meed of their gal- lantry. The injustice of the measure is aggra- vated by its inconsistency. The tribute of national gratitude is withheld from our brave defenders by Ministers who profess the most anxious solicitude in their behalf. Sir Home Popham is not, indeed, attached to Lord St.Vincent ; but may he not justly claim the patronage of an Administration which pretends to make no distinction of parties, but to unite the talents, and re- ward the merits of all ? -. ^ft THE STATE OF THE NATION. 1 3 1 6. The next subject of my attention re- gards the Right Hon. Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Were an admirer of that gen- tleman desired to select any late conspi- cuous display of his talents, he would pro- bably name his speech on 23d April last, on the hostile conduct of Prussia. Let us examine the prudence and consistency of this celebrated oration. The Right Hon. Secretary had very lately given his sanction to the Inquiry we have reviewed, a work replete with the con- demnation of the haughty and intemperate conduct of former Ministers towards fo- reign countries. In the beginning of his speech itself, he advises mild and concili- atory language : in what manner does he exemplify the moderation he thus pre- scribes to himself, and recommends to others ? By terming the seizure of Hanover an outrage unprecedented in the history of the worst proceedings of the worst times of Europe the union of every thing contemptible in servility with every I 2 132 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO thing odious in rapacity ! In the prelude, lie states this to be the measure of France; but soon forgetting this admission, he ar- raigns it as the act of Prussia. He declares in his outset, that Prussia had been forced into the conduct he now deprecates ; but proceeding in his speech, he makes the important discovery, that this compulsion was only partial, and that, though obliged to cede Anspach and Bayreuth, she was not obliged to seize Hanover. And he concludes this most judicious and concili- ating harangue, by declaring this great Power (who is naturally our ally, and whom he had declared it bad policy to irritate) to be in the last stage of complete vassalage, and to have become the con- temptible instrument of the injustice of a master. Such is the consistency and moderation of that great man, to whom it was called presumption in Mr. Pitt to consider him- self a rival ! THE STATE OF THE NATION. 133 7. There is no talent of more essential im- portance to a country, in those who are placed at the head of its affairs, than the capacity of penetrating into the characters around them, and of making the wisest selections for the various departments of Government. Unless this be observed, it is in vain that some able men occupy the very highest situations ; if the accomplish- ment of their views be intrusted to assist- tants of a different character, the best plans may become nugatory in the execution. But whether from want of sagacity to pe- netrate into character, or from certain other motives, which lull that sagacity asleep, there are more instances than one, in which the choice of the present Administration seems to be very different from what the welfare of the nation requires. Let us turn our eyes to the most important station which it is in the power of a British Cabinet to confer, the government of our vast pos- sessions in the East Indies. The exaspe- rated state of the powers who surround these possessions, the pernicious animosi- 134 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY tS ties which subsist between the servants of Government and of the country in that quarter, and the still more dangerous jear lousies which have for years continued to increase between the Directors and the Board of Controul ; all require that the supreme government of India should be intrusted to a man of known prudence and exemplary moderation. The temptations which immense power and the opportunity of extending it still farther, afford to am- bition, demand that the Governor General should be a man in whom the love of rule ever yields with facility to a sense of public duty, and who is too careless of personal aggrandizement to make the slightest sa- crifice for its attainment. The embarrass- ment of the Company's finances, the ex- hausted state of its finest provinces, the ruin which must ensue from augmenting the expenccs and exactions of Government, by again plunging into war : all these cir- cumstances require a Governor General who shall regard the waste of public money with a degree of. horror, and be impressed THE STATE OF THE NATION. 135 xvith the conviction, that rigid economy is indispensable, not only to the prosperity, but to the salvation of our Indian empire. But which of these qualities is found in Lord Lauderdale ? For his moderation, let us look back to his public conduct when in Parliament, where, by the violence of his declamations, he obtained distinction even among the most violent. For the dis- cretion that guides his ambition, let us appeal to the citizens of London, who saw him come down to the Common Hall, and condescend to solicit the Livery as a can- didate for the office of Sheriff. For his sense of the indispensable necessity of public economy, we have not to refer to speeches which may have been ill-reported, or to actions which may have been misconstrued. We have his opinions on this important subject, fully stated and eagerly enforced in the work which he has lately given to the world on public wealth. We there find that private wealth is public poverty, and private poverty, public wealth; that eco- 136 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO nomy is the certain way to beggar a nation, and prodigality an infallible method of raising it to opulence; that to pay off a national debt is in every point of view a most ruinous and impoverishing measure ; and that the heaviest taxation serves only to circulate the wealth of a country ! ! ! Such are the avowed tenets of the man who has been selected for the government of India. In looking around for the merits which have entitled him to this distinction, we find that he has been a constant and violent adherent to the old Opposition ; that he lost his seat in Parliament in consequence; that he was considered a martyr to their cause, and that in the day of prosperity it was deemed just to bestow a signal reward on his attachment. By being made, how- ever, a British peer, he has already obtained an ample indemnity for his late exclusion. To appoint him Governor General of India, in order to avenge him of Lord Melville, would be a monstrous retaliation *. * It deserves observation, that the reputed author, or assistant author of the " Inquiry into the State of THE STATE OF THE NATION. 137 I might add that the Property Tax, formerly the most obnoxious to the present Administration of all Mr. Pitt's financial measures, and the object of their most cla- morous resistance, has been not only con- tinued, but almost doubled by them in a single stage. The measures on which I have animadverted, and others of a similar the Nation," was also the writer of a severe exposure of Lord Lauderdale's work on public wealth. This cri- ticism appeared in the Edinburgh Review for July 1804, and so much irritated his Lordship as to draw from him an indignant and very angry reply. The critic answered in a pamphlet, io which he drew a parallel between his Lordship and Dennis, and exposed to public ridicule both the noble author and his opinions. Mr. Fox, the zealous patron of his Lordship, has doubtless read his book and approved its principles. In the overflow of admiration, he may have declared it, like Mr. Francis's speech, unanswerable. If offi- cial avocations will allow, I should beg leave to direct his attention to the Review I have mentioned. A pe- rusal of it will probably alter his sentiments of his Lordship's work, and induce him to qualify the warmth of former approbation, by declaring that in calling it unanswerable, he meant of course it was so, unless some one should le alle to answer it. 138 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO nature, have already very much impaired the popularity of the new Ministry. Mr. Fox, so long the strenuous champion of popular rights, the jealous observer of Mi- nisters, has become in office an accommo- dating colleague, a pliant imitator of his predecessors. The adoption of those prin- ciples which it has been the object of his life to urge with vehemence, he now good- naturedly adjourns to a future period. He accounted them formerly of sufficient mag- nitude to hazard the division of the country. Such is now his additional stock of pru- dence, that he will not for their sake divide even the Cabinet. To the majority of his own party, who believed that all he said was sincere, and all that he proposed prac- ticable ; who, on his coming into office, were big with the expectation of that radical change which he had declared to be our only remaining chance of salvation, the disap- pointment has been inexpressible. His consequent loss of popularity has been in- calculable. With the opposite party his conduct in office has had a tendency to THE STATE OF THE XATIOX. 13Q tranquillize fear without procuring esteem. Those keen partisans of the late Ministry, who from his constant and violent opposi- tion considered him devoid of all principle, are pleased, without a minute scrutiny of. his motives, to find him pursue that course which raises a lasting monument to Mr. Pitt's fame, while it affixes the seal of con- demnation to himself. Those calmer minds, who explained the inveteracy of his oppo- sition by the warmth of his temperament, and who considered his speeches in general to be the effusions of the moment, have experienced no surprise from his late con- duct. They had always deemed him a man of more imagination than judgment. His talents they knew were great, but inade- quately cultivated. They had no sanguine expectations from his coming into office; but they had some dread of danger from the practical execution of former declara- tions. Of this dread they now begin to be relieved, and they consider it infinitely bet- ter for the country that a party should be inconsistent, than that the public safety should be compromised. The contrast 140 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY IS TO therefore between the present and former conduct of the old Opposition affords them matter of security : but this security, how- ever satisfactory in itself, is unmixed with any approving sentiment towards the quarter from whence it is derived. From Mr. Fox, the adoption of Mr. Pitt's measures proceeds with the worst grace, since it im- plies the dereliction of those principles for which he has so long and so violently con- tended. He must be impressed with a conviction either of the wisdom of Mr. Pitt's plans, or of the reverse. In the former case, he has made a very sudden discovery that he has himself been mistaken throughout ; that the objects of his hosti- lity to Ministers, and of his promises du- ring so many years to the country, have been fallacious, and his long course of op- position captious, wanton, and criminal ; or if he still retain his former sentiments, it will be difficult to explain his conduct in other terms than those the Morning Chro- nicle lately applied to the Governor, ad in- terim, of India, when desirous to make him give way for Lord Lauderdale; namely, THE STATE ON THE NATION. 141 ** by commending his personal policy and prudence at the expence of some other qua- lifications which alone can entitle any man to esteem in private life or to the confidence of the public." Of the motives indeed which have in- duced such a change, different opinions will be entertained. Conversion by argument in so short a time, will hardly be alledged at the mature age of sixty. Some persons, and among these many of the most zealous of his former friends, will explain his con- duct as originating in the vulgar feeling already alluded to the desire of keeping in place. Others, with more courtesy, and we hope with more truth, however per- plexed to reconcile his past and present con- duct, stoutly reject this idea as unworthy of so distinguished a statesman. Of the talents of the present Ministry a more decided opinion may be given. A most liberal portion of praise has been as- signed them by their adherents. The writer of the pamphlet now under review, 142 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO after extolling them in terms of the most fulsome adulation, adds, " No compro- mise of principles, no paltry half-measures, no incongruous mixture of big words and little doings, will bear them out in redeem- ing their pledge to save the country." Were not the author evidently devoted to the cause of Ministers, it would be natural to consider him a mauvais plaisant, amusing the public at their expence. They have been a considerable time in office, and what have they done ? Have they performed any thing commensurate with the lavish enco- miums of their friends or the public ex- pectations ? Had Mr. Pitt proceeded in that course of injustice, inconsistency, and error, which has characterized so many of their measures, how loudly would they have exposed his conduct to public repro- bation ! If the author of the Inquiry is desirous to give a faithful description of their conduct since they came into office, let me recommend to him to reverse exactly the sentence I have quoted. He -will nei- ther impair its fluency, nor will he be dis- tant from the truth. THE STATE OF THE NATION. 143 If the public expectation has been disap- pointed in the Ministry, the conclusion is fair that their talents were over-rated. With the exception of Lord Grenville, the lead- ing members of Administration have been eminent only in opposition. Now it is much easier to harangue with plausibility than to act with wisdom. There is gene- rally much more to be said against than in favour of a subject. The opponent of Mi- nistry has an advantage similar to that of the general who acts on the offensive. The enemy's positions lie before him, and he may choose his point of attack. If this ad- vantage be acknowledged, and it will hardly be disputed, I am justified in attributing a very considerable portion of the reputation of the late Opposition for ability to this cause. Mr.Fox has long been the chief of this party, and held up by them to the country as an un- paralleled assemblage of all that is wise and great. Instead therefore of discussing the merits of the minor members, I shall pro- ceed at once to examine the pretensions of their leader. 1 44 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY IKTO No man, of even the best natural parts, can become without application a profound statesman. The most acute penetration will not avail, unless exercised in diligent research. The benefit of experience from a long political life, embracing every vicis- situde of situation, and bringing under dis- cussion almost every important question, will be inadequately reaped by a mind averse from assiduous investigation. The expres- sion of manly sentiments is always gratify- ing to a British audience, for it promises independence and vigour. But what avails animation of language or of thought, with- out a correspondent firmness of conduct? That fertile imagination, which on the first view of a subject suggests argument upon argument 'in rapid succession, is the certain evidence of genius, and constitutes a for- cible orator. But in the great statesman we expect not only natural ardour and im- pressive eloquence, but a profound know- ledge of every important political question, and an unshaken adherence to fixed maxims. These are not the spontaneous fruits of na- THE STATE OF THE NATION. 145 ture, even in her richest soil. They are the precious result of talents and industry combined the effects of scrupulous re- search and careful meditation. Let us apply these remarks to the Right Hon. Secretary for Foreign Affairs. On particular occasions his eloquence has blazed forth with luminous splendour, while at other times his speeches have been appa- rently the crude effusions of the moment. It is proper I should support by illustra- tion an opinion of Mr. Fox so different from what his friends are desirous to pro- mulgate. I shall select therefore for exa- mination his sentiments on a subject upon which, above all others, it is indispensable that a British statesman should have the fullest information, and entertain opinions formed on the most decided conviction a subject, of which the ignorance in a Minister involves not only his own disgrace, but the fate of the country itself- I mean the de- fence of Britain against invasion. ANSWER TO THK INQUIRY INTO This most important topic has been a very frequent and anxious object of parlia- mentary discussion. During the first year of the present war, both Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox were detached from all share in Ad- ministration. What a contrast was exhi- bited in their conduct ! We saw Mr. Pitt bestow .on the defence of the country the most indefatigable attention, and discover in his speeches that profound knowledge of military science, the acquisition of which is to most men the labour of a lifetime : while he roused the country by his ardour, he enlightened it by his wisdom. Mr. Fox, on the other hand, spoke like one who had never studied the subject ; who rose to repel with vehemence a particular point, but took no comprehensive view of the various relations of the whole system. Even on the debate, which through Mr. Pitt's support produced the resignation of the Addington Ministry, when Mr. Fox had summoned the attention both of the House and of the country j when the " prize contended" was the fate of an administra- 4 THE STATE OF THE NATION. 147 tion ; when the subject of discussion was the defence of Britain, and Mr. frox the leader of the debate, his speech was vague, superficial, and defective to a degree alto- gether unworthy the importance of the oc- casion. It may be urged, that his object on this occasion (23d of April 1804) was ^ es s to make impression by his own eloquence, than to choose with dexterity a point which might unite Mr. Pitt in a joint attack on the Addington Ministry. I shall admit that this circumstance may account for a want of energy on this occasion on the part of Mr. Fox; but no man will ad- vance it to justify any radical fallacy in the measures he proposed, especially since one of the principal measures (an armed pea- santry), so far from having been aban- doned, has been revived in a conspicuous shape, under the denomination of trained men, in the new military regulations. The plan of an armed peasantry thus be- comes incorporated in a modified shape into K J48 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO our system of defence. This qualification bears the presumptive marks of a compro- mise of sentiment between the two Right Honourable Secretaries for the War and Foreign Departments. The one, it would appear, must have urged the superiority of a large regular force ; while the other saga- ciously adhered to his favourite system of an armed peasantry. The adoption of a happy medium appears to have been the result. Mr. Windham consents to intro- duce the peasantry, provided Mr. Fox will assimilate them in some degree to the regu- lars. It is important therefore to examine the degree of efficient resistance which may be expected from an armed peasantry, or from trained men, in the event of invasion. The local knowledge of the peasantry was a leading feature in Mr. Fox's recom- mendation of this description of force. Yet although he judged fit to term t'hem irre- sistible, a little reflection will convince us, that in regard to efficient operations, in this country, local knowledge is a chimera. THE STATE OF THE NATION. 14Q The peasant, it is obvious, knows the lo- cality only of a particular district : beyond that he possesses neither knowledge nor an aptitude for its acquisition. This precious quality then of local knowledge is necessa- rily confined to very few. And if the pea- sant know very little more than a French soldier of any district except his own, the inaptitude of the former to extend his knowledge by observation, will not be compared with the activity and ardour of the Frenchman. Local knowledge can be of use only in the neighbourhood of military operations. The French will keep together in strong and compact corps. Nothing will have divided them, unless they have separated on the passage, and been obliged to land on different points. Even in that case, the different bodies will strain every nerve to form a junction, and their object will be to advance with combined strength, by forced marches, to London. Against such formi- dable affailants, what would avail the efforts 150 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO of a peasantry ? The local knowledge of the district through which the French may be passing being possessed by the in- habitants only of that district, these are necessarily so few in number as to be inef- ficient for any enterprise of moment. The French advance on the succeeding day into a district unknown to these countrymen, and the British General must apply to a different class of peasants, the inhabitants of the district newly invaded, if he is de- sirous to avail himself of this boasted ad- vantage of local knowledge. So imperfect must be the useful employment of this qua- lity, which Mr. Fox extolled as the rock of our salvation. Was the Right Honourable Secretary aware of the circumstance I have stated ? His encomiums would imply, that the local knowledge of the peasantry was general, as if the circumstance of Jiving out of town gave to a man the kn9wledge of the whole country. In mountainous and difficult countries, where the roads are few, and frequently THE STATE OF THE NATIOX. 151 through defiles, local knowledge has often been useful. How different is the aspect of this country, every where open and in- tersected by public roads ! Did Mr. Fox mean that we should abandon London and England to the French, and retire to fight for an exemplification of his theory on the mountains of Wales or Scotland ? Whoever is acquainted with the quick- ness and activity of the French, their intel- ligence in a strange country, their skill, their ardour, and extraordinary success in desultory warfare, will never advise to act against them with half-disciplined troops. The only effectual mode of resisting them is by a brave and active army. You must oppose French veterans by British regulars. Avoid a general engagement, but multiply partial actions in every direction. Attack promptly whatever part of the enemy may be detached from the immediate support of the main body. Carry on a war of posts by night and by day. Our success will neces- sarily be various, and the scenes of blood* ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO shed distressing ; but we can afford to lose more men than the enemy. By these in- cessant interruptions, they will buy their progress with a loss of lives, which to them will be irreparable ; the time required for their march will be doubled, and, before they reach the capital, they will be harassed to such a degree that a battle may be hazarded without imprudence. If we are beaten, our superior cavalry will cover our retreat, and our numbers will supply a fresh army ready to engage the enemy next day. Let it be our practice, whether in general or partial engagements, to avoid manoeuvring, and to come, at every proper opportunity, to close action with the enemy. It is chiefly in this rude combat that we are superior to the French ; in stratagem and artifice we should wage with them a hopeless warfare. The flower of that force which has subjugated Europe will be brought against us ; and unless they are opposed with incessant yigour, they will bear down every obstacle, and rush forward like a torrent..^ THE STATE OF THE NATION. 153 How unavailing in such a contest would be the tardy efforts of an armed peasantry ! To the inexperience of recruits, they join the heaviness natural to their mode of life : their numbers would not correct the evil of their inefficiency, but would engender a confu- sion calculated to increase it. Had we 200,000, or even 500,000 peasants in arms, the issue would be the same. The French army, unless opposed by a regular force, would sweep the country like a whirlwind. The peasants might fight with courage, and support, in honourable death, Mr. Fox's opinion of the national spirit. But their re- sistance would be ineffectual, and their feeble efforts would not prevent the French from reaching London before our Right Honourable Secretary had recovered from his surprise at the overthrow of his favourite force. I have no wish to insinuate that Mr. Fox has ever represented an armed peasantry as sufficient for our defence without a regu- lar army. Misrepresentation is not neces- 154 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO sary to my arguments, and will not, I trust, be ascribed to my work. My object is dis- tinctly to state, that the plan of an armed peasantry, so strongly urged by Mr. Fox, is, in this level country, and against such an enemy as the French, not only inefficient, but nugatory ; that to describe such a force as irresistible is a proof of gross ignorance ; that such evidence of error on [lie part of the Right Honourable Secretary cannot fail to impair the authority attached to his opinion, and justify us to question the accuracy of his assertions in every matter in which they are not accompanied by proof. Of this vague and unsatisfactory nature are his sentiments on the subject of Inva- sion. He has expressed himself entirely tranquil on this head, and considers the at- tempt neither likely to be made, nor dan- gerous to us, if tried. The grounds of his confidence are the superiority of our navy and the spirit of the people. These are neither new discoveries, nor sentiments peculiar to himself. Few will differ from THE STATE OF THE NATION. 155 him in considering our countrymen the bravest, as they are the freest nation in Europe : but of the inefficiency of courage without discipline against veteran troops, I have already treated at some length ; and I refer the Right Honourable Secretary for ampler information to his friends Mr. Windham and Colonel Crawford. These gentlemen, I apprehend, will tell him, that the spirit of a gallant nation is valuable, as affording to Government abundant means of preparation ; but that on the day of in- vasion, we must not depend on the people, but on our army. In regard to our navy, no man will differ from Mr. Fox in an opinion of its decided superiority to the enemy. But when the strength of our Boulogne squadron is not to the adverse force in the proportion of one to ten, it becomes important to inquire what other circumstances justify the security so confidently entertained by Mr. Fox. 1 beg leave to submit to him a few considerations on this momentous subject. 15t) ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 1 . Our late naval victories, while they insure the safety of Ireland, have lessened very little the degree of danger from Bou- logne, the expedition from which does not depend on the protection of large ships. 2. Bonaparte, naturally presumptuous, is inflated with late success. He is no longer deterred from the experiment of invasion by the apprehension of domestic insurrec- tion or foreign invasion in the event of failure. Hatred to Britain is his predo- minant passion ; and where he cannot con- quer, he will delight to lay waste. His professions of peace should be viewed, like his flag of truce to Acre, as artifices to lull our vigilance asleep. 3. The chief disadvantage of Boulogne, Am'bleteuse, and Vimereux, has hitherto been the difficulty of ingress and egress. The French have been indefatigable in their improvements, and the number of craft which can now be brought out in twenty- four hours, is not, I apprehend, over- rated at five hundred. THE STATE OF THE NATION. 157 4. A flotilla of two thousand gun-ves- sels may be moored in Boulogne bay under the protection of the batteries, and secure from our attacks. They may ride there in safety, unless in strong gales, which, du- ring the summer months, it is known, do not frequently occur. 5. In theevent of the sailing of the flotilla, we shall be able to oppose to it only the force which may then be on the Boulogne station, or in the Downs. The easterly wind which brings out the flotilla, will prevent the arrival, till too late, of as- sistance from Portsmouth; and our force to the northward will be occupied by the movements (doubtless simultaneous) of the Dutch in the Texel, the Maese, and the Scheldt. 6. Yet although it cannot be unknown, that we can depend only on the force ap- pointed to the Boulogne station, that force is allowed to remain in a state of inade- quacy. If the French sail, as is likely, in 158 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO temperate weather, what would be the pro- bable issue of the conflict ? 1 certainly do not under-rate the exertions of our squa- drons, when I suppose them to capture or destroy twice their own force. But even this degree of success would neither arrest the course of the expedition, or make any great deduction from its immense numbers. 7. I am aware that it may be urged, that in the event of the preparations at Boulogne assuming a serious aspect, our squadron may be considerably reinforced. But in what will this reinforcement chiefly con- sist ? Not in sloops and gun-brigs, which are the best description of force for op- posing the Boulogne flotilla, whether in the passage or the landing, but in large ships of war, which are incapable of acting in shoal water, and ill calculated to destroy any considerable number of the small ves- sels of the enemy during the temperate weather, of which it is probable they will make choice to put to sea. THE STATE OF THE NATION. 159 These considerations prove, that invasion is a more serious danger than Mr. Fox ap- pears to believe. That it would ultimately end in the defeat of the enemy, cannot justly be doubted ; but the ravage they might make is incalculable, and the present question is not their final success, but the probability of the attempt. If Mr. Fox, in expressing his opinion on invasion, will take a comprehensive view of its various chances under different contingencies, and, adducing satisfactory arguments for its speedy defeat under every probable combination of circumstances, de- monstrate, that not merely its issue but its progress would be so hopeless, as to offer no strong inducement to the vindictive mind of Bonaparte to tempt the hazards of the enterprise : in that case Mr. Fox's con- fidence will be justified. He will not only enjoy security himself, he will communi- cate it likewise to the country; but without a full and conclusive exposition of this nature, the nation must give no attention to l60 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO the opinion or assertion of any man, in a question which involves its existence; es- pecially if proceeding from a quarter where we are blamed for not having conducted offensive operations, by landing our troops detached from support in the country of the most active enemy in Europe, and where so languid a mass as an armed peasantry is described as irresistible. The publication we have examined has been currently denominated the Manifesto of the new Ministry. This title is, in one respect, not inapplicable ; for an invading enemy could not have scattered a declaration more calculated to depress the spirit of the coun- try. Although professedly an Inquiry into the State of the Nation, it fulfils but a small part of its title ; for its researches extend only to those points in our national situation which it suits Mr. Fox's purpose THE STATE OF THE NATION. 101 to examine. It endeavours, by every species of misrepresentation, to throw odium upon the late Ministry, and to constitute them the authors of all the disasters of last cam- paign. It describes the situation of Europe, and of this country, as to the last degree calamitous, in order that the nation may feel grateful to the present Ministers, for having consented to undertake the manage- ment of affairs at this pretended crisis, and may shut its eyes to the contrast between the splendour of their former promises, and the insignificance of their performance between the abuse which they used to lavish on their predecessors, and the approbation they now confer by adopting the measures which they formerly reprobated. Delu- sions of this nature may impose on the cre- dulity of the French, but the British nation are not to be thus blinded ; they will not acknowledge that to be a just report of the state of the nation, in which all mention is studiously avoided of their trade, their finances, and their navy ; a trade extensive and flourishing beyond example; a navy fi 102 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO triumphant in every quarter of the globe; finances, in which in the thirteenth year of \var a loan is effected below the legal rate of interest, and our immense expences de- frayed, without increasing the national debt one fiftieth of its amount. The country is not in such terror of France as to consent to any peace which does not ef- fectually provide for their honour and se- curity. They will support the East India Company against Mr. Fox in their refusal to intrust the care of our Indian empire to a nobleman who has proved himself inca- pable of acting either wisely of his own accord, or of taking prudent advice from others. They will withhold their confi- dence from that Ministry which bestows offices of trust and emolument on such men, as the Treasurer of the Ordnance : and until they see a wiser choice of measures, with a more upright selection of servants, they will refuse to acknowledge the pretensions of the new Ministry (so modestly expressed in thepublication which has been examined), " to unite the largest portion of talents, THE STATE OF THE NATION. experience, rank, and integrity, which ever enabled a government to secure influence with its subjects, and command respect among foreign nations." The establish- ment of a commission for auditing the public accounts, to an amount nominally immense, may be a dexterous expedient for popularity ; but the public will not accept it as a real discharge of the pledges so often given to effect that radical change, in which was affirmed to consist ** our only remain- ing chance of salvation." An Administration skilful only in heap- ing censures on their predecessors, will not now avail us. In that respect, the abilities of the present Ministry have long been un- doubted. But the country now demands of them, " Either prove to us by your actions that you surpass your predecessors, or re- sign in unequivocal terms the pretensions you have made.' 1 If a secure and honourable peace can be obtained, there will be no necessity to pre- L 2 164 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO pare the public mind by the circulation of pamphlets, the obvious tendency of which is to disseminate depression. Unless the peace be secure and honourable, we shall act wisely to prefer war with all its burdens, to a deceitful truce with a tyrant so arro- gant, S9 perfidious, and so insatiably am- bitious as Bonaparte. Before we can in- trust with confidence a negotiation with so artful an adversary to Mr. Fox, he must give very different proofs of wisdom from any he has yet afforded ; whether in his former erroneous sentiments of the French ruler, in his late speeches in Parliament, or in sanctioning a pamphlet which accuses the head of Administration while it insults the country which declares to the British nation, " that it is in vain to look around for any circumstance which may soften the gloomy picture drawn of its affairs, while it is impossible to imagine any addition which may aggravate them." If Mr. Fox proceed in a course of such egregious imprudence ; if while he pro- 4 THE STATE OF THE NATION. 157 claims moderation lie shall endeavour to force obnoxious men into the most im- portant stations ; if he flatter himself, that by scattering abuse on his predecessors, he will blind the nation to his own errors, or be acquitted by nominal reforms of the pledges he has given the country, the con- sequence will be a total loss of public con- fidence, and life present, like his former administration, will be the transient vision of a few months. Let him exemplify the wise, just, and moderate policy he has so long recommended, or he will in vain en- deavour to soothe the public indignation by such insidious appeals as the work we have now examined. Fallacy and mis- representation have had their day. 158 SUPPLEMENT TO THE ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO THE STATE OF THE NATION. Strictures on the Arguments in the Inquiry in recommendation of' Peace. DURING the short time which has elapsed since the publication of the first two edi- tions of this work, the public mind has been in continued agitation in consequence of rumours of peace. The Inquiry into the State of the Nation contains the only communication on this very interesting topic which has hitherto been made to the country with any degree of official authority. It is highly important there- fore to bestow on this part of the Inquiry a more rigid and scrupulous examination SUPPLEMENT. 159 than has yet been given to it, and to in- vestigate the strength of the arguments so warmly urged in favour of a speedy pacification with France. There will naturally result from this discussion a view of those conditions upon which only it will be eligible for us to make peace with Bonaparte, and of the chances of a negotiation on satisfactory terms at the present juncture. The author of the Inquiry, after de- scanting upon " the delicate and urgent state" of our affairs in India, observes, that " the subject is only alluded to here as an additional presumption in favour of the moderate and pacific system which every other view of our present situation concurs to recommend." But a peace with France, so far from confirming the security of our Indian possessions, will expose thenTto a very serious increase of danger. At present the French have not a single settlement on the continent of India, and are consequently excluded 160 SUPPLEMENT. from communication with the native powers. But peace, by restoring to them Pondicherry and their lesser settlements, will re-open to them the avenue to in- trigue at the courts of the Indian princes. Bonaparte, unless very closely watched and spiritedly resisted, will introduce his offi er-5 in order to discipline their troops, and prepare them, by the most as.siduous exertion^, to dispute with us on our u xt rupture France the possession of that vast C'.m.iuy/ India has long been the favourite object of Bonaparte's ambition : the spirit uhich led him to attempt its conquest through Egypt and Arabia still animates him. , He regards it not with the deliberate consideration of a states- man, but with the enthusiasm of a soldier ; with the ardour of vulgar prejudice as an inexhaustible mine of wealth, the source of the riches and the power of Britain. He well knows, that during the continuance of the war his efforts to shake our power in that envied country will be hopeless ; and he desires peace in order to prepare, SUPPLEMENT. 161 in fraud and secresy, the means of its radical subversion. In regard to Ireland, the author of the Inquiry declares that " an interval of peace would be invaluable " I am prepared to admit that a secure and permanent peace would materially improve the situation of that important branch of the empire ; but I have }^et to learn in what respect an interval of peace (necessarily uncertain in duration) would conduce to that de- sirable end. Would this object be pro- moted by opening to the disaffected the intercourse between France and Ireland, and receiving Bonaparte's emissaries in the pretended capacity of commercial commissaries ? Among other inducements to peace the author of the Inquiry urges the improve- ment of our military economy. To make peace for the sake of improving our army is an idea so singular as to deserve at least an explanation. It is in war generally 162 SUPPLEMENT. that military reforms take place, especially in a free country, where an army, unless in the hour of danger, is an object of per- manent jealousy. At the peace of Amiens France was equally formidable to us as at present ; but did Mr. Fox avail himself of that occasion to counsel an improve- ment of our military economy ? Did he not, on the contrary, advise a large and immediate reduction of our forces ? I agree with the author of the Inquiry, that our military establishment is inadequate to the emergency ; but I am justified in doubting that Mr. Fox, in the event of peace, would adopt vigorous measures for its improvement. To judge from the uniform tenor of his past conduct, and particularly on the conclusion of the peace of Amiens, we may venture to predict that in submitting a treaty of peace to parliament, he will accompany it with an advice to reduce largely our establ ishments, that we may afford the enemy the strongest evidence of our pacific disposition. SUPPLEMENT. 163 " There was a time," a time winch has not long elapsed, when our present mi- nisters were the strenuous advocates of entrusting the direction of our army to a military council. If we were not mis- informed, this important alteration was deemed by them an object of primary consequence so lately as last February. By what powerful cause has so important a measure been made to sink at once into oblivion ? Has a change of sentiment taken place in so short an interval , and do ministers now no longer approve what they were formerly so eager to urge? In this case it is highly important that the country should be apprised both of the al- teration of their opinion and of its motives. Were they desirous to effect this improve- ment, and did they feel their influence unequal to the task ? Wherefore did they then represent themselves as " uniting the most ample share of all the qualities, whe- ther natural or acquired, intrinsic or acci- dental, which ever enabled a government to secure influence with its subjects ?" Do 164 SUPPLEMENT. they consider such a change adviseable in peace, but too hazardous in war ? Why did they then urge it on former admini- strations, in the midst of war, and repre- sent it as our best defence against a danger so imminent as invasion ? Or, in fine, does not the transfer of the patronage of the ordnance point out the bonus for the relinquishment of this favourite measure ? Such a compromise may provide for in- dividuals ; but does it assure the defence of the country? And has our govern- ment sacrificed to so paltry an object its character and its prospects of assistance from this important reform, at the mo- ment when that assistance would have been most valuable ? The writer of the Inquiry proceeds to ask, " Should the peace last for ten years, which is unfortunately a high estimate, how much would England gain in her commerce, her finances, her colonial and domestic economy, her military system, her foreign policy ? And France too would SUPPLEMENT. 165 gain somewhat in several of these parti- culars." Admirable reasoning! Eng- land, whose commerce, whose finances, whose colonial policy nourish in Avar, would then gain so greatly by peace, while France, whose trade is annihilated, and whose credit is extinct in war, would gain only somewhat ! England, who dares not in peace make any considerable re- duction of her large and expensive esta- blishments, would then, in the opinion of this impartial writer, gain more by peace than France, who dreads no enemy, and who holds in her hands the scales of peace and war ! He next enquires " would not the in- crease of the commerce of France be ut- terly incompatible with the military con- scription, the most formidable feature in her present aspect ?" I answer, the effect of peace, and of extended trade is unques- tionably to render a people less warlike ; but while Bonaparte lives, or while the government of France shall continue to 166 SUPPLEMENT. be supported by the sword, we shall in vain expect the relinquishment of the mi- litary conscription. He asks, " Could their navy in ten or even twenty years of peace, possibly grow up so as to match our own ?" Our author will not, I pre- sume, deny that Bonaparte is the best judge of the resources of his own empire. Let him permit me to refer him to the celebrated conversation between the First Consul and Lord Whitworth, where he will find that, in the midst of tranquillity, this pacific chief was immediately to com- plete his army to 480,000 men, and was confident of equalling in ten years that fleet which made England mistress of the seas. The arguments for peace in the Inquiry are thus equally unfounded as the other parts of the work. Peace, says the au- thor, is required for the security of India. I answer, in war India is secure from France, and in peace open to her intrigues. An interval of peace, he adds, would be SUPPLEMENT. invaluable for Ireland. What radical change, what substantial reform can we hazard in that country, during an interval of peace, which we may not attempt in war ? He demands peace for ithe amelio- ration of our military economy by mini- sters who no sooner come into office, than in defiance of former pledges, they forego the most important part of military im- provement ; that part which is the soul of the army, and which, in the day of trial, will be decisive of the safety of the country. Such inconsistencies, in the work be- fore us, are the consequences of view- ing this momentous subject only on one side; of making a question of party of that which concerns most deeply con- cerns the whole country ; of obeying the bias of individual feelings in a matter where such feelings should have no weight in a matter, where more than in any other, the most scrupulous investiga- tion of circumstances, the most calm and 168 SUPPLEMENT. impartial discussion alone can lead to safe conclusions. A wiser plan would be to weigh the disposition of our enemy and the nature of the peace we may expect ; the means which our success may have given us of opposing, by the conditions of a treaty, a barrier to his ambition ; the respective advantages of peace or war not of war contrasted with a secure peace, for in this there can be no question, but with such a peace as the situation and disposition of our enemy are likely to afford us. ' Of Bonaparte's disposition there can unfortunately be no doubt. The settled purpose of his soul is to aim at universal empire. He pursues this object with un- de via ting constancy in peace and in war. He advances to it alternately by force of arms, and by secret intrigues. He main- tains in peace an army of half a million of men, that he may pursue a uniform course of encroachment, and reply to the SUPPLEMENT. 169 remonstrances of his neighbours, by threats of immediate war. At the peace of Amiens, liberal concessions were made to him in order to afford him every in- ducement for the maintenance of peace. We asked to retain nothing which might injure the interests or wound the pride of France. With a wise and moderate ene- my, this policy would have laid the foun- dation of permanent tranquillity with a headstrong tyrant, it was the signal for new aggressions. The interval of peace was to him a time of greater activity, of more extensive aggrandizement than the most vigorous war. He parcels out Ger- many, he incorporates Piedmont with France, he enslaves Switzerland, he sows the seeds of war in India, he plans an- other perfidious surrender of Malta, and a second invasion of Egypt. He threatens to exclude England from intervention in the affairs of the continent) and he orders the construction of twenty sail of the linp in one year. His own harbours he shuts to our trade, and he commissions spies to 170 SUPPLEMENT. survey our's. And in the midst of these aggressions, he represents himself to Eu- rope with unparalleled assurance as in- jured, because our ministry, awakened at last to his violence, refused to deliver up the key of Egypt and of India. The first wish of his heart was, that Britain should have joined with France in conquering and oppressing Europe. " Two such countries," to use his own words, " by a proper understanding, might govern the world. Had he not felt our enmity on every occasion since the treaty of Amiens," (that is, had we yielded an unqualified obedience to what- ever he thought proper to demand), " there would have been nothing that he would not have done to prove his de- sire to conciliate ; participation in indem- nities as well as in influence on the continent ; treaties of commerce ; in short, any thing that could have given satisfaction and have testified his friendship." He once expected that Britain, insatiable of con- quest like himself, might have been SUPPLEMENT. tempted to join in a base league against the sacred rights of nations ; when, after exhausting our strength in the sub- jugation of Europe, he would have bent his utmost efforts to subdue ourselves. Awakened, however, from this delusion, his present scheme is to overthrow Bri- tain, and in her the rest of Europe. He will endeavour to attain this object by a gradual progress, similar to that which led to the completion of his usurpation in France. Violence and fraud combined, effected his appointment to the consulate, at first. for a limited period. In the third year of his sway, emboldened by a suc- cessful career, he procures his nomination for life. In the fifth, he openly lays aside the mask, and assumes the absolute sove- reignty of a country which had so lately braved utter ruin and extinction in the cause of liberty. Advanced in France to the plenitude of power, and secure of its duration, his ambition now takes a different range. He will pursue the de- gradation of Britain with the same com- 172 SUPPLEMENT. bination of artifice and violence, the same unwearied perseverance which has led to his own exaltation. War is an insur- mountable obstacle to his progress, and he therefore desires an interval of peace. It will hardly be argued that the out- line I have drawn is unauthorised, or that any project, however extravagant, which can gratify ambition, may not with justice be ascribed to Bonaparte. This un- governable passion hurries him on, not only beyond every restraint of religion or morality, but even against the dictates of policy. Was there ever an act of wilder injustice than to establish a sovereign in Holland, where royalty is proscribed by the concurrent voice of every party ? or to introduce two kings into the German empire, a measure calculated to offend equally Prussia and Austria. The same mind which- planned these daring inno- vations will hope to effect our expulsion from India ; to wrest from us the sove- reignty of the seas ; to dismember Ireland SUPPLEMENT. 173 from Britain ; and even dare to flatter itself with the hope of dictating a humi- liating treaty in London. The man who is animated towards us with such ran- % corous hatred is endowed with talents, to which the history of nations scarcely ex- hibits a parallel in the lapse of centuries. His invention supplies expedients for every difficulty ; his suotilty has dtceived successively every enemy ; his mind, in- cessantly active, renounces all relaxation, and occupies itself with perpetual schemes of ambition. He has maintained himself, during seven years, in possession of that absolute power which few of his 'prede- cessors enjoyed as many months. He has not only baffled every assault from abroad or conspiracy at home, but he has made them all subservient to his pggra-u- dizement. The half of Europe is subji-ot to his controul, and every foic^, except the British navy, has fled before i.im. Such is the power and the disposition of the enemy with whom we are aoout to N 174: SUPPLEMENT. negotiate. If Mr. Fox flatter himself that any display of confidence, any sur- render of conquests, will induce Bona- parte to adopt a system of moderation and of real peace, he is most egregiously mistaken. The experiment has already been made on a liberal scale, and has failed. It can never be sufficiently urged that peace is desired by him, only as it will furnish more vigorous means of war. He is most anxious to re-establish the trade and manufactures of France, but with what object ? Is it to promote the general happiness of his subjects ? Are we justified to ascribe such a feeling to him who poisons his sick and assassinates his prisoners ? Certainly not. He de- sires peace in order to recruit his finances and his navy. A soldier in the cabinet as in the field, he appreciates every thing by its utility in war ; and, much as he af- fects to value commerce, we shall see him in the midst of peace continue to keep half a million of his subjects armed and ab- stracted from the pursuits of industry. SUPPLEMENT. 175 After having considered the disposition of our enemy, let us examine the relative situations of both countries in war and peace. In the present war, the balance of advantages is in every respect in our fa-.- vour. To Fiance, war with Britain has become an inglorious and a hopeless con- test. Her fleets have either been de- stroyed and captured, or are accounted fortunate if, returning from a fruitless en- terprise, they reach their own harbours in safety. There remains only the hazard- ous attempt of invasion ; an attempt, which although much less impracticable than is commonly supposed, and iikeiy to lead in its progress to sharp and serious conflicts, would doubtless end in our tri- umph, and complete our victorious and preponderating attitude. To Britain, war against France has been a series of brilliant successes. It is in our allies only that we have experienced misfortunes ; with the termination of each successive co- alition, the aspect of the war has entirely changed. France, irresistible by land, N2 176 SUPPLEMENT. becomes inactive and languid when the operations are confined to sea. England is triumphant on the ocean, and reaps all the glory of the active warfare. The advantages of a peace to France are incalculable. It will relieve her from a disastrous contest, it will restore her colonies, revive her expiring commerce, recruit her exhausted finances, create in- numerable seamen, and re-establish her navy in its former splendour. But which of these benefits will England reap from a termination of the war ? Our trade, our finances, and our navy, are flourishing be- yond example. Will our security be in- creased by peace, or our burdens consi- derably lessened ? In former times the advantages of peace were solid and imme- diate. Fleets and armies were disbanded on both sides, and the burdens of war ceased with the signature of the definitive treaty. At present there can be no im- portant reduction of our war establish- ment. We must continue armed and SUPPLEMENT. 177 bear the burden of war in the midst of peace. I do not under-rate the advan- tages of peace to us, when I state them to be comprised in 1 . A partial reduction of public expence : 2. The diminution of insurance, and other war charges on our trade : and, 3. If a satisfactory treaty of commerce be concluded, a more free communication with the continent. Whether the consequence of peace will be an extension of our trade and manu- factures, is a question very difficult of solution. By the majority of those engaged in them, this question will be answered in the negative. And the expected im- provement of our finances by peace, is evidently much overrated. So deeply are a very numerous part of the nation impressed witli these consider- ations, that they are disposed to adjourn the question of peace altogether, until a more favourable combination of cir- 178 SUPPLEMENT. cumstances, when we may lay down our arms in security, and reap, undisturbed, the blessings of tranquillity. 1 differ from this opinion upon the important .Around that our continuance at war will not ef- fect so desirable a change. Wai will keep us secu/e, but oftbis no prospect of pro- ducing alteration in the state of France. The obvious deduction however from our present situation is to make no peace, ex- cept on term:, commensurate with our pre- ponderance in war ; terms highly advanta- geous to us, and conducive to the safety of the continent. Let us endeavour to weiiih those terms, and define them with o as much accuracy as possible. MV. Fox in urging peace a twelvemonth ago declared, that the equitable basis of negotiation would, in his opinion, be those terms with which we, were we in the enemy's situation, would be satisfied. This argument is specious, and has not, I believe, been answered. Like other opi- nions, however, of the Right Honourable Secretary, it will not stand the test of iu- SUPPLEMENT. 179 vestigation. Great Britain, bad she even the power of France, would be infinitely less dangerous to the liberty of Europe than that restless state. Morality in this country, among private, and we trust among public men is by no means at so low an ebb as with the giddy people of France and their perjured Ruler.' We do not negotiate with our neighbours to de- ceive them, or persist in a domineering controul, after declaring their indepen- dence by solemn treaties. Had Britain been in the situation of France, treaties so advantageous as those of Luneville and o Amiens would never have been violated by the wanton excesses of ambition. Has this ambition been moderated since the period when we were compelled to a rup- ture ? Does Bonaparte's conduct, either before or since the late coalition, justify us in shewing again that confidence which we evinced in the treaty of Amiens, and of which he proved himself unworthy > Intrigue and falsehood have always been the favourite instruments of the French 180 SUPPLEMENT. government, but these weapons are WK iik-tl at present with an assurance and activity beyond all former example. Bo- naparte as far surpasses in bold and syste- matic fraud his republican predecessors, as they were superior to the old govern- ment. Mr. Fox's rule, therefore, of con- siiieiino f'/af a ju^t b.tsis of peace, which But; in in tlk- situation oi' Fiance would deem fair, has no application unless the morality of the respective countries un- derwent a similar interchange with their political circumstances. This proposi- tion, while it is di proved by reason, is falsified by experience, for the treaty of Amiens was a peace on Mr. Fox's princi- ples, in all their latitude, and instead of terminating our differences and dis- quietudes, it was the prelude to tenfold 'agitation. After such experience of restless ambi- tion, after a state of perturbation and anxiety worse than, war, the nation will be satisfied with no treaty, which shall SUPPLEMENT. 181 not contain the provisions of real tran- quillity. Its conditions must be explicit and incontrovertible. We must not again rely on the professions of our enemy, or even on that moderate system which it is his interest to pursue. We must lay our account with an insatiable spirit of aggran- disement, which will explain in its own favour whatever shall not be clearly de- fined, and will seize for itself whatever shall not be occupied by us. It is a com- mon practice in capitulations on the con- tinent, that the French impose upon the credulity of those with whom they treat, by inserting a clause that " Whenever the conditions of surrender appear doubt- ful, their interpretation shall be in favour of the inhabitants." The capitulation is signed, and the gates opened to the French, who enter and violate successively, under pretext of necessity, every stipulation they have made ! The obvious result of these remarks is, that Mr. Fox's idea of placing ourselves 182 SUPPLEMENT.. in the enemy's situation, however plausi- ble, is neither a wise nor just rule of con- duct for I? .f.;ni towards France, because Britain in the situation of France (as in tv My other) would disdain to make a treaty which she did not mean to keep. 1 IIP Right Honourable Secretary per- mit me to suggest, to him a different plan. In the overtures to negotiation, let him remember that Bonaparte desires peace at present, for the sake of breaking it more advantageously hereafter ; that war is predominant in his thoughts, and ag- grandizement by fraud or force, the per- petual object of 'his solicitude; that am- bition instead of being satiated by success preys upon his mind, and " g. ows by what it feeds on." In the progress of the treaty, let Mr. Fox be prepared for a dis- play of the mo^t consummate artifice. In 1803, when Bonaparte considered our mi- nistry timid and spiritless, threats were his favourite weapons. He menaced us in his message to the councils ; in his com- munications to Lord Whitworth ; in his SUPPLEMENT. 183 appeals through Andreossi. But when We had defied his threats, arid dared him to the conflict, he adopts a different tone. In his overture for peace in January 1805, he assails our humanity, and affects to ex- / * tol as of incalculable value, those Indian conquests, which he well knew were barren glories. To Mr. Fox he will represent himself as aggrieved by preceding admi- nistrations, as unjustly attacked, and as anxious to make every sacrifice for so in- estimable a blessing as peace. In his communications with this country, he will pretend congratulations on the ap- pointment of a ministry, " estimable by their illumination/' while at the same hour he instructs his emissaries to seek access at St. Petersburg!!, and endeavour to detach that court from our alliance, by traducing Mr. Fox as the most fickle of men, as absorbed in interests purely Eng- lish, and an enemy to the co-operation of Britain and Russia. If our ministry be actuated by these 134 SUPPLEMENT. inp-es-'ions, .as we trust for the sake of 13.it.iin and of Europe that they are, they \vill not ufter to Bonaparte those condi- tions which they would themselves ex- pect, were they m the situation of the ciiemy. They will not disband our vic- toriou-, fleet* before they obtain stipula- tions calculated to prevent the further progress of usurpation on the continent ; they will not relinquish those means of se- cuiity for ourselves which we now hold ; they will make no allowance for vague assurances of pacific disposition, but they will give to every article of the treaty that explicit and indisputable shape which is indispensable with an enemy devoid of faith ana justice. The evils of war and advantages of peace, as already observed, are so greatly on the side of Fiance, that she should ac- count no sacrifice, except her honour, too great to obtain them. We have conquered from her and from Holland, Pondicherry, St. Lucia, Tobago, Surinam, Demerara, SUPPLEMENT. 185 Essequebo, Berbice, and the Cape ; we have destroyed her navy, and made pri- soners the flower of her seamen. Against all these acquisitions France has to place only Hanover, so unjustly occupied that it is doubtful whether she should be al- lowed to introduce it into the scale of equivalents. The continuance of the war promises to be equally in our favour. We cause to France incalculable depri- vations ; while the sum of her injury to us consists in petty depredations on our trade, and in the threat of invasion. Of invasion hardly any one doubts that the issue would be favourable to us ; and no minister will alledge the desire of averting it as an argument for pence. France challenged us to the conihi.it by den) ing that we were able single Landed to with- stand her. We accepted the defiance- we have fought and conquered. While the advantages of war are thus entirely on our side, the bene: ts of peace are nearly in the same degree on the side 186 SUPPLEMENT. of the enemy. No wonder that, in such a situation, there should be many who nr^e a continuance of war until circum- ~ stances justify the expectation of greater tranquillity in peace ; especially as our finances, which have been represented as our weak side, are, in consequence of the powerful operation of the sinking fund, in a -state of extraordinary prosperity in such a state that, although last year was extremely expensive, the addition to the national debt, after deducting the * o amount discharged by the sinking fund, was only ten millions ; a sum less than one-fiftieth of the aggregate, and not equal to the actual yearly diminution of our debt by the progressive depreciation of money. On the other hand, peace is recom- mended by humanity; by the prospect of a reduction (partial indeed) of our bur- dens ; and more immediately by the con- viction that the continuance of hostilities is not likely to lead to that change of SUPPLEMENT. 187 circumstances which will assure our tran- quillity. An enlightened and impartial view of our situation will induce this in- ference : That peace is preferable to war, if peace can be obtained on the terms we have a right to demand. Of the Terms of Peace. Were we to make peace for ourselves alone, without desiring any stipulation in favour of the continent, we should be en- titled not only to the cession in sovereignty of all we have conquered, but to further sacrifices from France and her allies. They have no prospect of either taking any of our settlements, or of re-capturing any of their own. To us the way is cleared for further conquests. Hanover is all the 'enemy can ofter in return ; and no one will maintain that the restoration of Hanover is of equal importance to us as the cessation of disastrous war to France. In order, however, to ameliorate the con- 183 SUPPLEMENT. dition of the continent, we are willing both to forego the flattering prospect of successful hostility, and to restore a con- siderable part of our conquests. A renewal of hostilities on the continent it is obvious would lead only to fresh dis- asters, and to the further aggrandizement of France. It is equally apparent that the safety, nay the existence of every power in Europe which yet retains a portion of independence, can be main- tained only by a deep impression of its danger from France, by a wise and dili- gent improvement of its resources, and by the cultivation of confidential inter- course with every state which is not under the controul of the common enemy. Austria can derive her safety only from a radical ameliora f ion of her whole sys- tem. Let Prussia, less fertile in resources, le.ss firm in the attachment of her subjects, beware of throwing more weight into the hands of a power of which she may be- come the next victim. Even Russia must SUPPLEMENT. 189 double the number of her gallant soldiers, and the energies of her vast empire, to retain at present any share of influence in the commonwealth of Europe, or to pre- vent her trembling hereafter before that power v/hich may attack her after laying the intervening states prostrate at her feet. While we deprecate the renewal of hos- tilities on the continent, we cannot too strongly urge an adherence to continental interests in a negotiation with France. Endangered, like the rest ot Europe, by her fatal preponderance, our common safety can be found only in those pro- visions which, obtained t>y sacrifices on our part, shall arrest her career of aggres- sion against weaker states. Such has in general been the policy of this country : a policy equally wise and generous ; and which, if at present boiciiy uiged and stedfastly persisted in, will procure us not only honourable terms of peace, but conditions of substantial security for our- o 190 SUPPLEMENT. selves and our allies. Let no considera- tion detach us in negotiation from Russia. Russia, the only independent power on the continent, represents, in conjunction with Britain, the commonwealth of Eu- rope against France. Were we to treat separately, our artful enemy might offer to each more tempting conditions, but our union and firmness alone can success- fully assert the cause of Europe, and pro- cure for us the grounds of solid peace. By the acquisition of all Italy, and especially of Venetian Dalmatia, France has opened a direct road to the heart of the Turkish empire. On the importance of Venice, and her territory, let us consult the author of the Inquiry into the State of the Nation. " The commerce of Venice does not occupy at present less than 400 vessels belonging to the port of Venice alone. In its better days the number of these was tenfold. The naval arsenal of that city is famous, and the neighbouring har- bours perfectly well adapted to the pur- SUPPLEMENT. 191 poses of trade. The coast of Dalmatia, with the islands, possesses more fine ports, with strong fortifications, than any in the world. Nona, Zara, Sebenico, Trau, Spalatro, Castel Nuovo, Matero, Lesina, Corey ra, are but a few of the harbours impregnable to attack, and commanding every commercial advantage, which have now fallen into the hands of the Cisalpine and its masters. It is unnecessary to state how prodigious an accession of trade and force this must, in a short time, se- cure to France ; and how paramount it must render her superiority in the Medi- terranean. Whether we now attempt to defend Sicily, or avert the downfal of Turkey and the seizure of Egypt, we shall feel the consequences of the treaty of Presburg in every operation of the war." After publishing to the country so for- midable a representation of the impor- tance of Venice and Dalmatia, our mini- stry cannot fail, in their negotiations, to o 2 192 SUPPLEMENT. be actuated by the necessity of a barrier in this direction against France. In the projected dismemberment of the Turkish empire, Bonaparte will not now be con- tented with Egypt as his share. He will desire to add Greece to Egypt, and Al- bania to Greece. His order for the re- lease of the Russian shipping is like his discharge of the Russian prisoners last war, the first of a series of insidious steps by which he expects to blind the court of St. Petersburg to his ambition, and to lure her to participate in his schemes of ag- grandizement. He will tempt Russia to co-operate with him in the partition of Turkey, by offering her Constantinople and the heart of the empire, pretending to desire for himself, at first, only the mari- time part ; he will flatter himself, with his characteristic perfidy, that Russia having, by aiding in this nefarious design, become embroiled with Britain, he will have the means of expelling her from her new ac- quisitions ; and that seizing for himself the whole of Turkey, he will insure the aequi- SUPPLEMENT. 193 escence of Russia in his future usurpa- tions by the threats of immediate war threats by which he has long overawed Austria, and by which he vainly thought to intimidate Britain. It is therefore the part of Britain to rouse the jealousy of Russia on the side of Turkey, and not only to confirm to her the retention of Corfu, but to stipulate to her the possession of such a barrier en the side of Turkey against Dahnatia, as shall enable her to withstand either the secret intrigues or the open violence of France. Malta is now less necessary to France, but doubly important to Great Britain. It is no longer required by Bonaparte as a stepping-stone to Egypt, but is indis- pensable to Britain as a central station, from which to detach her squadrons in order to assert, in conjunction with Russia, the integrity of the Turkish empire, or to impede its downfal, should Russia, se- SUPPLEMENT, duced by the perfidious intrigues of France, concur in the base partition. Malta therefore must be ceded to Britain, for we can intrust it to the honour and courage of a British garrison alone. Since the acquisition of Venice and Dalmatia to France, the cession of Malta is no longer so important a sacrifice on her part as formerly. We are therefore not only entitled to its retention, but justified in considering that its cession by no means affords us an equal degree of satisfaction and security, as it would have done previ- ous to the late conquests of "France. \\Tiile the cession of Malta to Britain is therefore indispensable, it by no means supersedes either the necessity or the jus- tice of a further barrier against France to O- beheld by Russia on the side of Dalmatia. The cession of Malta having long been the point of honour between France and England, it is important that it should be couched in the terms least offensive to France. It could either be provided for SUPPLEMENT. 195 by a secret article, or, if it be deemed better to insert it at once into the body of the treaty, it could be accompanied by an enumeration of the late acquisitions of France, in order to make it appear in its real light not of a concession, but of an equivalent. The retention of the Cape is obviously dictated by the avowed designs of France upon India. The Cape is highly import- ant to our trade ; it is the intermediate climate to season our troops to the burn- ing sun of India ; the station from which we can threaten Mauritius when the am- bition of France again forces us into war ; above all, the retention of the Cape is imperiously required by the absolute subjection of Holland to France. If you restore the Cape to Holland, you make it a depot to France for the assemblage of armaments against India. The situation of our unfortunate ally, the king of Naples, calls for our assist- 196 SUPPLEMENT. ance. If we cannot restore him to his throne, let us afford him a testimony of our fidelity, and procure if possible some alleviation of his calamities. These considerations suggest the fol- lowing outline of peace. Britain on con- dition of retaining [Malta and the. Cape, which no power can wrest from her, will forego the advantages of a state of war which is every where successful, and sub- mit to that increase of strength in France and her allies, which will be the speedy consequence of peace. She will restore all her other conquests and acknowledge the past changes on the continent, pro- vided France give up Hanover, consent to the establishment of a Russian barrier on the side of Dalmatia, and give assur- ance that no more changes in the state of Europe shall be attempted. The treaty of Amiens does not afford a valid argument against these conditions. It is an example indeed of less satisfactory SUPPLEMENT. 197 terms obtained under an equally favour- able combination of circumstances. But the treaty of Amiens is now acknowledged to have been a compact in terms altogether inadequate to our just demands. At that time the nation, weary of war, expected to enjoy in peace the blessings of tranquillity. A pacific ministry, anxious to meet the wishes of the country, and conceiving that to render Bonaparte moderate, it was only required to set, on our part, an example of moderation, made concessions evidently in- consistent with our just rights, and, as the event proved, impolitic in their operation. Nothing could justify the treaty of Amiens, but the expectation that it would lead to complete and permanent tranquillity. Bo- naparte has taught us, that to yield to him is not the way to accomplish so desirable an object. Once deceived, let us beware of again buying ouf experience at so dear a rate. Lord Grenville will subscribe, without hesitation, to the inadequacy of the treaty 198 SUPPLEMENT. of Amiens; but there is another feature in our situation, to which it may be necessary to request his Lordship's attention. If his Lordship continue to attach as much im- portance to continental co-operation as he lately did, he will deem the cessation of that co-operation, and the impossibility of its renewal, a strong argument for peace. I have already admitted, that it is highly improbable that the efforts of Britain alone, confined as they necessarily are to the sea, and operating on distant parts of the French empire, can effect any alteration in its in- terior. But it is equally obvious, that all the victories of France have proceeded from her enemies vainly persisting in the hope to assail her by land with effect. We had to act our part by sea, and we alone have performed it with success. In the years of continental operations, these successes have been clouded by the disasters of our allies, but when we have been left alone in the struggle, they have shone forth with uncli- minished lustre. In 1797 the Emperor of SUPPLEMENT. i99 Germany was forced to withdraw from our alliance, and the lot of Britain, it was pre- dicted, would be either an immediate in- vasion, or a humiliating peace. We replied to these gloomy presages by the victory of the Nile. In 1799 Austria, reanimated, took up arms, and although at first emi- nently successful, was in the succeeding year compelled to acknowledge the superi- ority of herrival. Britain, become again the only object of the vengeance of France, achieves,unaided, the victory of Copenhagen, and the conquest of Egypt. In 1803, Bona- parte re-echoes the vulgar opinion, in defy- ing us to contend single-handed with France. We have again decided the ques- tion; and how complete would have been our triumph, and the disgrace of France, had our victories not been clouded by the disasters of the continent ! In the present state of France, the efforts of the universe[against her, by land, would be unavailing.' Our safety and superiority 200 SUPPLEMENT. are assured by her inability to attack us otherwise than with troops weakened and di- vided by the obstructions to their passage by sea. In contemplating the relative situ- ation of Britain and France, the mind, over- come by the disasters of Austria, views Bri- tain i\ vanquished by the humiliation of her ally. But Austria has already paid, and dearly paid, the price of peace. That ques- tion is therefore at rest, and it remains for Britain tj exact in her turn, froai France and her allies, the price of cessation from successful hostility. By sea, France is at present as completely humbled as when Britain dictated peace in 1763. She is now indeed all-powerful on the continent, but that power to us who have defied it, can causj no intimidation. The just effect of a sense of that power on our negotiation should be, that we avoid all haughtiness, while we adhere the more firmly to those demands of security which her preponder- ance renders indispensable. Let us offer accordingly the restoration of every con- SUPPLEMENT. 201 quest we have made from France herself, and confine our acquisitions to a partial re- 1 tentionof the possessions of her allies. The cessation of continental war neces- sarily reduces the contest to maritime ope- rations. In these the discovery of the plan of forcing the enemy to close action, by breaking the line, has doubled rur former superiority. It puts an end to all evasive manoeuvres, and leads promptly to that direct trial of skill and courage, in which jt seems the birth-right of our countryirien. to be irresistible. A French fleet cannot now, as formerly, get away after exchang- ing a few broadsides; they have now no alternative, but to sacrifice half their ships, or come to a general engagement. The re- sult of a battle is no longer the capture of a few vessels, but the almost entire annihila- tion of the enemy's squadron. The ac- cessions of strength to France by land, great as they have been., are equalled by the in- crease of our naval ascendancy ; and were 202 SUPPLEMENT. the fleets of Europe to assail us with united strength, the result would be to us a series of brilliant victories. No proposition there- fore can be more radically erroneous, than that Britain must make peace because the continent is unable to co-operate with her. Every view of our situation justifies the demand of favourable conditions. The sentiments of the country are in unison with this opinion, and to yield to the enemy t* \vill cause the downfal of the present ad- 11 ministration. Having answered that part of the In- quiry which contains so strong a recom- mendation of peace, and given an outline of the conditions on which, or on equivalent terms alone, we ought to disarm, it remains to enquire into the probability of the conclusion of a treaty at the present juncture. SUPPLEMENT. 203 Of the Prospects of Peace. Bonaparte will be the principal actor on the scene of negotiation, and it is important to describe him in this character. He has made repeated overtures for peace, accom- panied by professions of humanity, in which it would be a satire on the credulity of any one to suppose that he was consi- dered sincere. As well might we deem him impressed with the belief of our sacred religion because he has found its re-esta- blishment in France conducive to his po- pularity, or consider him a convert to Ma- homet, because in Egypt he proclaimed himself a prophet, and the destroyer of Christianity. We may predict with a considerable de- gree of confidence the conduct he will hold. In his overtures and in the earl}' stage of the communications, while general terms only are used, we shall find him disposed to 204 SUPPLEMENT. promise every thing. Bat in the arrange- ment of the actual conditions, where the explicit nature of the terms will prevent the possibility of subterfuge, we shall ex- perience nothing but obstinacy and delay. "When Lord Malmesbury was sent to Paris in i 796, the Directory agreed to treat on the basis of mutual cessions; an admission which they afterwards qualified by the very temperate and consistent declaration, that they would listen to no proposals con- trary to the constitution, the treaties, and the fundamental laws of the Republic; namely, that constitution by which the chief part of their acquisitions was annexed to France, while the remainder were erected into republics dependent on her ; and those treaties, by which they had guaranteed to Spain and Holland the restitution by Britain of all her conquests. If we urge the necessity of security to Britain on account of the immense increase of the French dominions, Bonaparte will SUPPLEMENT* 205 affect to consider our visionary conquests in India as equivalent to his solid acqui- sitions in Europe. Conscious that Russia has taken nothing for herself in Europe, he will fabricate tales of aggression against Persia. When we alledge the subjection of Holland and Italy to France, he will consider us as answered by the statutes of his venal senate, which stipulate that those crowns shall never be united on the same head as the diadem of France, as if they \vere not substantially provinces of the same empire. When we demand to retain a part of our conquests, he will argue his own moderation in demanding cessions from Austria not for himself but for his allies ; as if a politic appropriation rendered these acquisitions less dangerous to Europe. And when we mention a barrier against further encroachments, he will have the confidence to appeal, as he did in 1803, to his known pacific disposition, and af- fect to treat the suspicion of ambition as an indignity. If we yield in anyone important point, we p 206 SUPPLEMENT. shall find him altogether intractable in every other. Have \ve forgotten the de- lays and artifices he practised at Amiens ? Even then it was necessary to threaten and to equip armaments, in order to make him agree to the few sacrifices we required in a treaty so highly favourable to him. In negotiation with Bonaparte there is only one effectual plan to be followed : Let our terms be explicit, our language direct and firm. Offer, in concurrence with Russia, a peace on such conditions as our success justifies, and the security of Britain and of Europe demands. Tender him a treaty on these conditions with the one hand, while in the other you hold the alternative of war. Adhere to these terms with in- flexible firmness a firmness equally re- mote from haughtiness as from submission. He will alternately storm and flatter ; but we must despise his threats, beware of his artifices, and refute his sophistry. Our claims are just and our means ample for their attainment. We ask to deprive France of nothing, but to stipulate pro- SfrPPLEMENT. 207 tection and tranquillity for ourselves. A manly perseverance will attain our end. The war can be conducted only by sea, and it is our's to rule the ocean. Bona- parte, convinced that we are neither to be overreached nor intimidated, will relinquish the hopeless contest, and seek a more solid glory in peace.. Those who are sanguine of an immediate pacification, and found their belief upon Mr. Fox's known sentiments, overrate both his inclination for peace and the extent of his influence. Mr. Fox, when in opposition to a warlike administration, expressed more ardour for peace in the heat of debate than it is likely he will feel in ,the calm delibe- ration of the cabinet. His official com- munications must have at last opened his eyes to the perfidious policy of Bonaparte, and his declaration in regard to Hanover announces not only that his Majesty will never consent to its relinquishment, but that he will accept of no equivalent for its cession. P2 ^08 SUPPLEMENT. Were the sentiments of the Right Honourable Secretary even as pacific as many believe, it is no compliment to ad- ministration to consider these sentiments as imperative on the cabinet. Mr. Fox regu- lates India and Ireland, because, in the partition of influence, these important branches are assigned to his party; but he is not therefore the arbiter of peace and war to the British empire. This question involves not the appointment of friends, but the salvation of the country ; and in a matter or so high interest, the country is represented not by the secretary for foreign affairs, but by the united cabinet. It is worthy of the vulgar only to suppose, that because the dispatches proceed from the secretary's office, they bear the stamp ex- clusively of his sentiments. Let us inquire the dispositions of the men who must be consulted, as well as Mr. Fox, on the present occasion. Lords Gren- ville, Spencer, and Fitzwilliam, along with Mr. Windham, have always been the ad- SUPPLEMENT. 209 vocates of war. Lord Sidmouth has been taught in a severe school, and,will not again lightly concur in another treaty of Amiens. Lord Grenville is so decidedly pledged to the country, that we should be justified to dread the conclusion of no hasty or inade- quate treaty without the signal of his Lord- ship's resignation. Flexibility is not his character, and it is very generally believed that the real cause of the dissolution of administration in the spring of 1801, was an incompatibility of sentiment on this most important subject, between his Lord- ship and Mr. Pitt. Such has long been the current report, and the conduct of these statesmen in the sequel, when each, detached from administration, spoke his individual sentiments, has given it an authority supe- rior to report. If this cause therefore pro- duced a dissolution of ministry, when his Lordship was joined with Mr. Pitt, the companion of his life, the friend of his bosom, how much more is it likely to oc- casion a similar effect, when acting with Mr. Fox, with whom his connexion is of 210 SUPPLEMENT, yesterday, unsanctioned by conformity of political ideas or by congeniality of personal feelings a connexion equally hollow in its origin and precarious in its tenure- prompted in its commencement by motives unworthy of distinguished statesmen, and evincing in its course, a contrariety of views equally subversive of the harmony and the permanency of administration | connexion which, in an evil hour, detached his Lordship from the illustrious character we have lately lost, and which at this moment of doubt and anxiety on the sub^ ject of a most important negotiation, is the elle, her encroachments were so rapid as to necessitate a recurrence to hostilities in less than seven years. Disap- pointed and overcome in the celebrated war which succeeded, it was with the utmost difficulty that after an interval of peace twice as long as the preceding, she yielded to the temptation of separating America from Britain, The peace of Amiens be- longs to the catalogue of her triumphant negotiations, and did it not produce their usual effects an unsettled truce, and a precipitate rupture ? SUPPLEMENT. 217 Let us beware therefore of yielding to such flattering pictures of the advantages of peace as are exhibited in the Inquiry into the State of the Nation, and of which the apparent intention is to prepare the country for negotiation on terms inadequate to our just demands. The difference be- tween peace and war cannot now be to us the difference between agitation and tran- quillity, between light and heavy burdens. Our anxiety must be increased, and the reduction of our burdens can be only par- tial. Yet humanity and policy concur to recommend a cessation of war, if we can obtain in the conditions of peace the pro- visions of security. From an over-bearing tyrant these are not to be gained, by hasty overtures, but by the gradual progress of negotiation, and the firm attitude of war. Necessity alone will induce his acquiescence, and war is the instrument we must wield. Let us assiduously improve our army. Our navy requires no alteration, except the addition of small vessels, calculated to op- 218 . s pose the enemy in the Channel. And to assure the prosperity of our finances, it remains only to adhere, \vith undeviating constancy, to the admirable plan prescribed by the statesman we have lately lost. If the negotiation is brokea off, our cne- o my will renew his threats of invasion with double arrogance. lie will publish his pretended injuries to his people, and deem himself so firmly seated on his throne as to be exempt, in the event of failure, from the dread either of domestic insurrection or of foreign attack. Let invasion come with all its terrors * AVe will not dissemble its dangers; we will boldly face them. .The conflict will be fierce, but its issue will not be doubtful. The strength of the nation will be roused, and if we are true to our- selves,we shall turn the boasts of Bonaparte into speedy discomfiture. Baffled in his only means of hostility, he will learn at last to yield, and conclude peace on those terms which are indispensable not only to SUPPLEMENT. 219 our tranquillity but to our safety ; and without which a cessation of war would be the signal for another series oi, insults and aggressions. THE END. Squire, Printer, Fia-nivalVlnn-Court, Holborp. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY Los Angeles This book is DUE on the last date stamped below. APR 4 1963 Form L9-50m-7,'54 (5990) 444 7r\n A UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY A 000 953 709 3