^^ LIBRARY UNivERsinr Of CALIFORNIA SAN DIEGO .^ a .(îi h /I Ck 1^ 3 1822 01215 4803 V. 1 ^ oii^ ^^6. y^pf^ THE GOVEENMENT OF M. THIERS, FROM 8th FEBRUARY, 1871, TO 24th MAY, 1873. FROM THE FRENCH OF M. JULES SIMON. IN TWO VOLUMES. VOL. L Ncto ^ork: CHARLES SCEIBNEE'S SONS, 743 AND 745 BROADWAY. 1879. [^All rights reserved.] CONTENTS OF THE FIRST VOLUME. CHAPTER L MSB The Elections • • 1 CHAPTER IL The Assembly at Bordeaux , , • • • 5i CHAPTER m. The Pbelimix ABIES of Peace . • • • «116 CHAPTER IV. Paris before the 18th March, 1871 • • • 176 CHAPTER V. The Central Committee ..•••• 258 CHAPTER VL The Commune 357 THE GOYERNMENT OF M. THIEES. CHAPTER I. THE ELECTIONS. This narrative opens on the 28th of January, 1871, a date of solemn import, that of the capi- tulation of Paris. On the 27th at midnight the firing had ceased, in virtue of a verbal agree- ment, which was to be ratified on both sides on the following day. Early on the morning of the 28th, M. Jules Fa\Te went to Versailles, but Count Moltke, who was not satisfied with the stipulations that had been agreed upon, showed but little readiness to bring matters to a conclusion ; at every moment some fresh difficulty was raised by the Staff, and the armistice was not signed until ten o'clock at night. It was one o'clock a.m. of the 29th when M. Jules Favre rejoined his colleagues. The railway managers VOL. I. B 2 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. had been summoned, for tlie first thing to be arranged was tlie supply of food to Paris. The Council, having accomplished this task, would not separate until all matters connected with the convocation of the Assembly had been agreed to. Time and authority for the drawing up of an electoral law were alike wanting. It was resolved to put in action, with certain indispensable modi- fications, the last electoral law of the Republic, that of the loth March, 1849, which may be sum- marized as follows : — Scrutiny of lists, cantonal voting, the electorate at twenty-one years of age, eligibility at twenty-five, no exclusion from either electorate or eligibility, except in the case of individuals under the sentence of the law. At a time when so many citizens had accepted public functions from patriotic motives, it was considered expedient to suppress the greater number of cases of ineligibility that had been defined in 1849, and therefore the application of Articles 81 to 90 was suspended. The prohibition of the election of prefects and sub-prefects in the department in which they exercised their functions was confirmed. The army was called upon to vote, as in 1849, a measure rendered more than ever necessary by the fact. that every Frenchman fit to carry arms was now enrolled. The number of deputies was fixed at 753 for conti- THE ELECTIONS. 3 nental France, 6 for Algeria, and 9 for the colonies : 768 in all. The decree of the Council was signed at early dawn, immediately inserted in the Journal Officiel, and placarded in Paris a few hours later. Orders were issued for its immediate dissemination in the departments, but it was evident that this must for some days be impossible, or at least very difiScult. The election was fixed for the 8th February, and the meeting of the Assembly at Bordeaux for the 12th. When M. Jules Favre announced these decisions to Count Bismarck, the first words uttered by the Chancellor were, " It is impossible." It was indeed impossible ; but nevertheless it was done. More than a third of the territory of France was invaded by the enemy, and the administration of the occupied departments was carried on by German prefects. It was necessary to entrust the prefectorial functions to the mayor of each township,^ and to proceed with the elections by sufferance of the conquerors. The uninvaded departments were in relations with M. Gambetta only, and notwithstanding the raising of the siege, communication between Paris and Bordeaux • This is the nearest English equivalent for the French "chef-lieu." B 2 "* THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. was slow, difficult, and sometimes dangerous. The telegraphic despatches necessarily passed through Versailles, and were under the control of the Prussians. M. Gambetta having telegraphed to M. Jules Favre on the 30th January, was replied to by Count Bismarck, and was in- formed in the answer that the message of M. Gambetta should be communicated to the person for whom it was destined " as a matter of information." The railroads were in a deplorable condition, the rails torn up, the permanent ways encumbered, the bridges broken, the rolling stock dispersed or destroyed. Only from the 31st was it possible to travel from Paris to Bordeaux by railway, and then the line was broken at Orleans for a distance of six kilometers. The train leaving Paris on the 31st January at five o'clock in the morning, did not reach Bordeaux until one o'clock in the afternoon of the 1st February. Four hundred thousand French soldiers, and consequently four hundred thousand electors, were either prisoners in Germany, or refugees in Switzerland. Six months of war- fare had disorganized the municipal service ; the lists had not been revised, in many places they had disappeared ; the functionaries were no longer at their posts. Such were the conditions under which the work of several months in ordinary THE ELECTIONS. Ô tîmes liad to be done witliin one week ; and, the elections over, four days only would remain for the transaction of the subsequent business, consisting of verification of votes, declaration of results, and despatch of papers to Bordeaux. The new deputies would have to set out instantly on being informed of their election in order to arrive in time. It was easy to foresee that many would find no direct road open to them, and be obliged to make roundabout journeys, while others would hear simultaneously, in German prisons, of their candi- dateship and their election. The outlook on all sides was full of difiiculties and hindrances, and finally, as if to turn the strained situation into an im- possible one, a conflict arose between the Govern- ment in Paris and the Delegates at Bordeaux. In his correspondence with M. Jules Favre during the siege, M. Gambetta had frequently declared his opinion that all the ministers, senators, councillors of state, prefects, and former official candidates of the Empire, should be excluded from the future National Assembly. Prior to his departure from Paris, he had argued in this sense in the Government councils ; he had not prevailed, and M. Gambetta had signed, toge- ther with his colleagues, the decree of the 8th September, 1870, of which the new decree was only a formal reproduction. During that b THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. long day wliicli M. Jules Favre passed at Ver- sailles, awaiting the ratification of the treaty, he had to consider whether the leader of the Delegates would again give in his adhesion to the decision of his colleagues, and undertake the execution of a decree of whose principle he disapproved. In this uncertainty, and in order to avoid strife, M. Jules Favre resolved on sending a member of the Government armed with full powers to Bordeaux, and before consulting his colleagues, he announced this resolution, in general terms, by a despatch which Count Bismarck undertook to transmit, and which was received at Bordeaux on the 29th. The Council selected M. Jules Simon, the former deputy from the Gironde, and member of the General Council of the city of Bordeaux, before the Revolution of the 4tli September. His nomination was confirmed, and his instruc- tions were signed during the night of the 30th January. He left Paris on the following morning for Bordeaux. The Government of Paris regarded it as ex- tremely important that the clause of the decree by which the eligibility of all citizens without distinction was recognized, should be carried into effect ; and it was no less important that a con- flict with the Delegates should bo avoided. M. THE ELECTIONS. 7 Jules Simon took with him two decrees ; the first was as follows : — " The Government of the National Defence directs M. Jules Simon to pro- ceed to Bordeaux, there to join the Delegates in the exercise of authority in concert with his colleagues, and to carry into execution the decrees of the Government of National Defence. The deliberations of the Delegates shall be taken by the majority of votes, no member having a casting vote. Paris, oOth January, 1871." The latter stipulation was hardly necessary, inasmuch as the number of the Delegates was raised to five by the addition of M. Jules Simon; and served no purpose except that of seriously altering the position of M. Gambetta, who had hitherto had a casting vote. The second decree reproduced the terms of the first, with the following addi- tion : — " In the unforeseen case of resistance by the Delegates to the decrees and the orders of the Government of National Defence, M. Jules Simon is hereby invested with absolutely full power to carry them into effect." The second decree was not to be communicated to the Dele- gates until all hope of conciliation should have been abandoned. When M. Jules Simon arrived at Bordeaux, anger and consternation reigned in the city. The missive addressed to M. Gambetta on the 28th, 8 THE GOVEENMENT OF M. THIEES. had been sent from Versailles at 11.15 in the evening. M. Jules Favre announced the surrender of Paris, the conclusion of an armistice of twenty- one days, the summoning of an Assembly for the 12tli February, and the despatch to Bordeaux of a member of the Government; but nothing more. At three o'clock in the morning of the 29th this message arrived at its destination. The whole of the 29th passed away in the vain expectation of further news. On the 30th, M. Gambetta tele- graphed to M. Jules Favre, complaining of the strange silence. Count Bismarck received the telegram ; did not transmit it to the Government in Paris until the following day, the 31st, but himself replied at noon to M. Gambetta, inform- ing him that hostilities were continuing " pend- ing agreement " before Belfort, in the Doubs, in Jura, and in Côte d'Or. Although it had long been known that no aid could reach Paris, and that its supplies of food were exhausted, the fall of the capital city produced the effect of an unexpected calamity. Instead of surrender, there ought to have been a sortie en masse, the " torrential " sortie afterwards demanded so often by the leaders of the Com- mune. Nothing but corpses and a desert should have been left for the enemy; but all France THE ELECTIONS. 9 would not have been in pawn. However great the importance of Paris, after all it was only one stronghold which surrendered. Why was the capitulation signed by M. Jules Favre in the name of the Goverument, and not by the military Governor in the name of the fortress ? Why did the capitulation include an armistice for all France (with the fatal exception of the east), and an undertaking, given to the enemy, to summon an Assembly? This capitulation was not only a stipulation made for Paris ; it was in reality a preliminary of peace. And what would that peace be, whither would it lead us, if the elections should introduce into the National Assembly ac- complices of the Empire, who, having had power in their hands for eighteen years, and having been dispossessed of it for barely six months, still pre- served a portion of their former influence, espe- cially over the rural populations ? Was there not reason to fear that they would consent to the completion of the ruin of which they were the authors, and that they would endeavour to restore the imperial dynasty ? These thoughts were working in the mind of M. Gambetta during the whole of the 30th January. Was this to be the conclusion of all the efforts made by himself and his fellow-labourers during the past six months, to defend the territory 10 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIEliS. and found tlie Republic ! After twenty-four hours of suspense — without reflecting that M. Jules Favre had written to him on the 28th at the last moment, and before he could have consulted with his colleagues, that on the 29th and 30th the con- vention had to be concluded, the last obstacles to be surmounted, an electoral law to be drawn up, an envoy to Bordeaux to be selected, his instruc- tions to be discussed, and the railroad to be re- stored to working order — M. Gambetta induced the Delegates to adopt an electoral law which afiirmed the ineligibility of the functionaries of the Empire, and issued a proclamation in which the Government of Paris was accused of " culpable levity." This proclamation drew forth a few days later from the Government of Paris an equally angry reply ; it was only a reprisal indeed, but it widened the breach between the two Govern- ments. Then came a difficult moment ; that of the first tussle between the Government of Paris and the Delegates of Bordeaux. It was inevitable. The armistice found M. Gambetta in the full tide of his exertions, and surrounded by an army of fighting-men; and it disarmed him just when he believed himself to be in a condition to fight, and even to conquer. It may be said without THE ELECTIONS. H exaggeration that lie had performed wonders. He had created armies and generals, won battles, repaired defeats, provided for the most urgent necessities of order, rallied the timid, and inflated the courage of others, resisted the intrigues and the malevolence of parties, effected bargains, raised loans, filled the arsenals, and found time during all these labours to write letters — some of them admirable, — and to deliver harangues which aroused enthusiasm in their hearers. He did not refuse to summon an Assembly, on the contrary, he had long since called for the convoca- tion of such a body, but he imposed as a condition, which he would not relinquish, the exclusion of all imperialists. He would not place power in the hands of men except such as were, like him- self, resolved to prosecute the war, and to found the Republic. For two days he expected from Paris explana- tions which did not come ; but then, as the time fixed for the elections was approaching, he issued three decrees, all bearing date the 31st January. The first contained the convocation of the As- sembly, the second the exclusion pronounced against all servants of the Empire; the third, which was to answer the purposes of an electoral law, put in action, with necessary modifications, the law of the 15th March, 1849. It is important 12 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. to observe that at tlie very hour at which the Delegates pubhshed these three decrees, the Government of National Defence on its part was making other dispositions, but the decree pro- mulgated in Paris on the 28th, and inserted in the Bulletin des Lois on the 29th, w^as not knowm at Bordeaux. By acting thus hastily M. Gambetta simply meant to be beforehand with his colleagues in Paris, he had no deliberate intention of entering upon a conflict with them. The decree of exclusion, signed by Cremieux, Gambetta, Glais Bizoin, and Admiral Fourichon, was posted on all the walls when M. Jules Simon arrived at Bordeaux. It ran as follows : — " The members of the National Defence, dele- gated to represent the Government, and to exercise its powers ; " Considering it just that the accomplices of the reign that commenced with the deed of the 2nd December, and has ended in the capi- tulation of Sedan, bequeathing to France ruin and invasion, should be included in the same political deposition which has been pronounced against the accursed dynasty whose guilty instruments they have been ; " Considering that this step is a necessary consequence of the responsibility they have incurred by willingly and knowingly aiding and THE ELECTIONS. 13 abetting tlie ex-Emperor in the fulfilment of those divers acts of his Government, whereby the country has been placed in danger : " Decree, — " Art. 1. Those individuals who, between the 2nd December, 1851, and the 4th September, 1870, have accepted the functions of minister, senator, councillor of state, and prefect, cannot be elected representatives of the people in the National Assembly. " Art. 2. Those individuals who, at the legisla- tive elections which have taken place between the 2nd December, 1851, and the 4th September, 1870, have accepted official candidateship, whose names are to be found on the lists recom- mended by the prefects to the votes of the electors, and have been published in the Moniteur Officiel, as Government candidates of the Ad- ministration, or Official candidates, are equally excluded from eligibility to the National As- sembly. " Art. 3. Eeturns of votes bearing the names of individuals comprised in the above cate- gories are absolutely null and void. These re- turns will not be included in the computation of votes." M. Jules Simon, on his way from the railway- station to the prefecture, with M. Lavertujon, 14 THE GOVERNilENT OF M. THIERS. aliglited from the carriage and read this decree. Without losing a moment the Delegates met. The situation was very easy to understand. What did M. Jules Simon represent there, in the midst of his colleagues, who were divided between anger and despair ? He represented the capitula- tion. Of what was he the bearer ? Of the order to retreat, to disown themselves; the order for M. Gambetta to renounce a long-cherished idea, concerning which he had written to M. Jules Favre, "If you adopt it, I will proceed with the elections ; if you reject it, I will not do so." On his entrance into the apartment where his colleagues awaited him, M. Jules Simon was assailed by bitter reproaches on the score of the capitulation, the armistice, and the situation in which the Army of the East was placed. M. Glais Bizoin has acknowledged this violence of language in his pamphlet entitled, Cinq Mois de Dictature. " M. Jules Simon allowed himself," says the author, " to be reviled." M. Jules Simon afterwards boasted in the tribune that he had done so, for he was in nowise ashamed of the fact. Charged as he was with great interests, he had no riofht to think of himself. To the reproaches directed against the capitu- lation, he might have replied .that no one had striven harder than he to prevent or to resist it ; THE ELECTIONS. 15 tliat in his capacity as president of tlie Commission of Supplies, he had delayed until the stronghold had victuals for only eight more days before he gave "warning to the Government; that he had insisted on the last council of war, and when the generals had renounced the attempt at a last sortie, a " sortie of despair," that he had taken it upon himself to assemble the colonels and ascertain their opinion ; that Paris had surrendered, after five months of heroic resistance to cold, epidemic disease, bombardment, and famine. He might have pleaded that the Government thus severely condemned was guilty only of having failed to execute an impossible task, that of raising the blockade of a place besieged by a great army, without external aid; that neither he nor those who now attacked him had ever believed that Paris could save itself by its own strength only ; that this Government now accused of supineness and incapacity had completed the ramparts, cast cannon, armed and drilled 300,000 men, prevented civil war, checked riot, made supplies last for five months which every one had believed to be in- sufiBcient for more than a few weeks ; that the army of rescue so often announced in despatches that were now menacing, anon encouraging, had never made its appearance. Also, that if the governor were guilty, as his accusers declared, of not having 16 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. made sorties and fought battles often enoiigli, tlie other generals who had twice held councils of war, on the 31st December and the 16th January, were as guilty as he, since none of them had proposed or procured the acceptance of a new plan ; that after the battle of Buzenval not the generals only but the colonels also had declared it impossible for Paris to raise the blockade by her own strength, and that a sortie, whether partial or general, could have no other result than a butchery, without advantage to the defence. He might have pleaded that at the moment of the capitulation there remained only food enough — and such food ! — for one week ; that Paris was threatened with death by famine should the state of the railroads retard the revictualling of the city, as there was reason to fear ; that the enemy was aware of the situa- tion, and at the commencement of the negotia- tions had proposed the recall of Napoleon III., the convocation of the former legislative body, the military occupation of Paris, when the Na- tional Guard should be disarmed, the regiments deprived of their colours, and the officers of their swords, and the garrison carried as prisoners into Germany. Only after a long and desperate struggle, and reiterated threats of complete rup- ture, had less odious terms been obtained. M. Jules Simon might have added that the armistice THE ELECTIONS, 17 did not apply to the armies of tlie provinces until three days after it was signed ; that on the 30th January the army of the east had crossed the Swiss frontier; and that if an omission had been made in the despatch of the 28th it was indeed to be regretted, but had no influence upon the fate of our army. Instead, however, of entering upon a discussion which would have been designedly prolonged, and might have been interminable, M. Jules Simon refused to make any reply until the electoral question had been settled. He had no trouble in proving its urgency, for two contradictory decrees were actually then promulgated. He warned his colleagues at Bor- deaux that the Government of Paris neither could nor would yield on the point of ineligibility. He appealed to the supreme authority of universal suffrage, before which an established Government is obliged to bow, and, with much more reason, one newly organized in an emergency. Universal suffrage is the expression of the national will : in the name of what principle, in the name of what interests would the delegates presume to prescribe laws, or mark out limits for it ? Would the Assembly produced by the Bordeaux decree be a National Assembly ? No, it would be a party As- sembly. Under such conditions would its authority be submitted to by France or recognized abroad ? VOL. I. 18 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIEES. After lia\âng so frequently reproached the Empire with official candidateship, were we to adopt that system more boldly and on a larger scale ? When we might found the Republic upon the desire of the country, should we base it upon a decree of Messieurs Gambetta, Crémieux, Glais Bizoin, and Fourichon ? Even taking into account the narrowest political interest only, could it be believed that five months after Sedan the electors would vote for the accomplices of the Empire? Was a handful of Bonapartists, reduced to the status of a trumpery minority on the benches of the Chamber, more to be dreaded than an entire party outlawed by the nation, and who would have the right to call our own principles, those principles upon which the public peace rests, to witness against us ? The Bonapartist deputies, it was said, would lead the Chamber into the acceptance of a disgraceful peace. Was not talk of this kind the supposition of a Bonapartist majority, that is to say, of the impossible ? Was it not even a calumny against the Bonapartists, to whom as our enemies justice was due ? Six hun- dred Frenchmen, whatever their opinions might be, chosen by their fellow-citizens, would make peace if it must be so, or would continue the war if they could. AVas it really a disgraceful peace that was feared ? was it not rather any peace, no THE ELECTIONS. 19 matter on wliat terms ? Was it war à outrance^ a vs^ar of extermination tliat was desired ? Was such a war possible ? Was it just ? Was it even so patriotic as it was sincerely believed to be ? What would it lead us to ? To the turning of France into another Poland. A glorious struggle had been carried on for four months, but our best soldiers were either dead or in captivity, many of our generals were prisoners, the materials of war were becoming exhausted ; the country was agitated, a peace party was already formed, and was growing in numbers day by day. Paris had yielded at last; there was no longer room for victory, but only for heroic defeat. We were marching either to exhaustion or destruction. The abandonment of us by Europe was evident and complete. Was it to be eternal ? A people who is only conquered may always revive. Sedan, like Jena, may have its morrow. Between a war of extermination and a conditional peace who should be the judge, if not the people, the whole people, voting with full power and freedom ? M. Jules Simon did not ask his colleagues to abrogate their decree, he conceded all to them except that impossible clause, the mutilation of Universal Suffrage. But he reasoned, entreated, and com- manded in vain ; all failed before the invincible determination of M. Gambetta, M. Crémieux, M. c 2 20 TUE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. Glais Bizoin, and Admirai Fouriclion, who persisted in maintaining the Bordeaux decree with the ineligibility clause intact. Before leaving for Bordeaux, and during the long hours of the journey, M. Jules Simon had reflected profoundly on the contingencies that might arise, and he had made up his mind that he would neither yield, nor have recourse to an open rupture, unless it should prove absolutely im- possible to avoid it. He firmly believed that France could not be saved by an irregularly elected Assembly, and he was no less firmly persuaded that the country could not endure a struggle between two sections of the Republican party. He perceived by the reception he had met with on entering the house of M. Crémieux, and by the first words which were interchanged, that he should gain nothing by discussion. Ought he to rise at the conclusion of the sitting of the Council, protest against the resolutions of his colleagues, read to them the document that in- vested him with plenary authority, and then retire, after having given them notice that he was about to promulgate the Paris decree without their con- currence ? By acting thus he should indeed free himself from his responsibility, but he might probably encounter a check ; in any case, such a proceeding would be a commencement of strife. THE ELECTIONS. 21 He had gone from the railway-station to the Prefecture, and from thence to the house of M. Crémieux, without seeing any one. The city was hke a camp. M. Gambetta ruled over it. M. Jules Simon, knowing that his colleagues would be as averse to kindling civil war as he was, believed that if he had the municipality of Bordeaux on his side, he would be able to bring about an arrangement. The Mayor, M. Fourcaud, now a member of the Senate, and the municipal councillors, who had been informed of his arrival, presented themselves at this opportune moment, and were ushered into the hall where the Delegates were deliberating. They were all his personal friends, his electors, promoters of his election, members of his committee. In their presence the discussion was renewed with more calmness. M. Jules Simon explained the dissen- sion which had arisen, gave his reasons, and asked them whom they would obey. M. Gambetta in his turn spoke with great eloquence and vehe- mence. The answer of the Municipal Council was that they would not dissociate themselves from the Delegates, and that the elections at Bordeaux must take place in conformity with the decree that had been posted on the walls in the morning. The Major warned M. Jules Simon that this resolution would also be adopted by the National 22 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. Guard and the immense majority of the popula- tion ; certainly by the whole of the Republican portion. M. Jules Simon repeated that he had, for his own part, undertaken the task of securing absolute freedom of choice to the electors ; that it was, to his mind, a question of principle and of public safety; that he was resolved to succeed, and that, before the elections were proceeded with, the whole of France should know that the Government of the National Defence desired free elections and a Chamber which should represent, not a party, but the country. He added, " You are entering into a struggle with the Go- vernment." They answered, " We know no other Government than that which is here. We greet your entry into it with pleasure. We have obeyed it for four months past, and we will continue to obey such resolutions as shall be adopted by the majority of the members present." The sitting of the Council terminated at five o'clock, and on its conclusion M. Jules Simon had interviews with M. Glais Bizoin and Admiral Fourichon, separately. Each of these gentlemen repeated to him that he was resolved to follow the majority of the Delegates, and M. Glais Bizoin added that he personally approved the spirit of the Bordeaux decree and the exclusion of the Bonapartists. Admiral Fourichon spoke in a THE ELECTIONS. 23 totally different sense ; he was of the opinion of M. Jules Simon and the Government of Paris, and he regretted that the Delegates had refused to yield. The popularity of M. Gambetta with the Re- publican party was immense ; so great, indeed, that three days afterwards, on Sunday, February 4th, a public meeting was convened at the Grand Theatre, in order to confer the Dictatorship upon him. He had the good sense to refuse to attend the meeting, and to disavow all complicity with the projects of his fanatical friends. M. Jules Simon, on the contrary, was deposed from his former popularity ; and held accountable, as were all the members of the Government of Paris, for the capitulation. The truth is that, but for them, the siege would not have lasted two months ; but this truth, which, even now, almost every one denies, would not have been believed by any single individual on the day after the surrender. M. Glais Bizoin did justice to the Government, but only up to the moment of the capitulation " There should have been a sortie," he said ; " the 300,000 men of the National Guard and the army ought to have been hurled upon the enemy." He declared that he would yield to the majority, but should vote with M. Gambetta and M. Crémieux. Admiral Fourichon, who cherished no illusions whatever about the propriety of a " torrential sortie," 24 THE GOVEKNMENT OF M. THIERS. founded his objection upon the resolution an- nounced by M. Glais Bizoin. " "What would be the use of voting with you ?" he inquired of M. Jules Simon, *' we should never be more than two ao^ainst three." M. Jules Simon did not fail to point out to his two colleagues that the Delegates, strictly speak- ing, formed only a portion of the Government of Paris, that the Paris decree was signed by seven members of the Government, while that of Bordeaux was signed by only four, so that there was a majority for the Paris decree. He was answered that this matter was not one of logic, that the majority mustered at Bordeaux, and that at the bottom of all this there lay a question of civil war. M. Thiers was "at Bordeaux. M. Jules Simon Avent to him, and laid the facts of the case before him. The first sentence uttered by M. Thiers was, " Your decree must be published." It was by no means clear that such a step would be possible. The Government existing at Bordeaux refused to recognize this decree. Could it be believed that in the face of that refusal they would quietly allow it to be published in the newspapers and posted on the walls side by side with their own opposition manifesto ? If publicity were denied to it within the city of Bordeaux, was it to THE ELECTIONS. 25 be hoped that they could succeed in publishing it outside ? It was clear that the BiUletin des Lois^ which had been despatched by the Paris post, had not been suffered to pass the Loire. What had become of the copies which M. Jules Simon himself had distributed on his way from Paris to Bordeaux ? Those persons who had received them from his own hand at Orleans, Vierzon, Limoges, and Perigueux had been unable to get them re- printed for distribution, or published in the news- papers. It was useless to resort to a simple announcement by telegraph, because the officials would be forbidden to transmit the message. The post remained, but this also was far from being a safe expedient. ÎSTevertheless M. Jules Simon determined to try it, and while he was with M. Thiers, M. Lavertujon and some other trustworthy and devoted friends prepared the packets. None of those which contained printed matter reached their destination; only private letters addressed to non-official persons were allowed to pass. But even had the decree forced its way through every obstacle, it could only have reached the departments as a piece of news, and news in a sense proscribed, whereas the Bordeaux decree, transmitted by official despatch, was already posted up everywhere. The prefects, perceiving that a struggle was going on between two sections of 26 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. the Government, would consider themselves free to choose between the rival decrees. Who were those prefects ? They were friends and creatures of M. Gambetta, who had selected and appointed them, and who had for four months had sole and entire authority over them. The greater number were so devoted to the policy of war to the knife, that it might easily be foreseen they would carry the Bordeaux decree into execution with extreme reluctance. As for the Paris decree, they would reject it at once, holding it of no account whatever. Supposing that even a few of them were to accept the policy of the Paris decree, their number would be very small, the elections would be carried on under various con- ditions in the several places ; there could be no result except trouble and confusion. In short, nothing could be done. No action of any kind was possible so long as the Delegates should persist in their opposition. M. Thiers did not require a statement of these objections from M. Jules Simon ; he had foreseen them all. But, at first, perceiving no other issue than a struggle between the two sections of the Government, he inclined to advise immediate action. " You have no time to wait," were his words ; " you will have at least a legion of the National Guard with you, and you may perhaps THE ELECTIONS. 27 reckon on the neutrality of tlie rest. You must feel the pulse of General Billot's troops. Dispose of me as you will," he added, with his usual resolution and promptitude, " if my name or my presence can serve you, I am ready." M. Jules Simon was of opinion that recourse to forcible measures, even supposing it to be suc- cessful, a result of which he felt by no means certain, would be a calamity. Before coming to a decision of so serious a nature he wished to be able to plead the excuse of absolute necessity, and the exhaustion of all other resources. Admiral Fourichon was held back solely by his apprehension of civil war ; M. Glais Bizon declared that he would submit to the majority, if a majority could be formed at Bordeaux. This end could be obtained by bringing down three new members of the Govern- ment from Paris. They might arrive at Bordeaux on the 6th February at nine o'clock in the morning. There would be time to telegraph to the depart- ments, on this occasion in the name of the entire Government, and under such conditions as these disobedience would be impossible. Doubtless the despatch would arrive very late on the day or the day but one before the vote ; but the preparations for the elections were not in question at all; only an exclusion had to be repealed, and this could be effected at the last hour. After 28 THE GOVEENMENT OF M. THIERS. some reflection M. Thiers approved of this plan. He recommended M. Jules Simon to send a number of letters to the departments, to prefects, newspapers, friends, and former col- leagues, and he strongly advised him, while believing himself certain of peace, to prepare for war. M. Jules Simon informed M. Thiers that it was his intention to see the generals, but in the utmost secrecy, also certain influential officers of the National Guard, and magistrates; that he would leave nothing to chance, but appeal to the patriotism of all ; and that he still entertained a strong hope of success without any open strife. This plan was carried out from point to point. The first thing to be done was the w^riting to Paris, and as M. Thiers had advised that the post should not be employed, but that the letters should be confided to a friend, M. Cochery was selected, and he consented to start that same evening. He stopped at Orleans, and from thence made known to M. Jules Favre what was passing at Bordeaux. M. Alfred Liouville left on the following day, and was present in Paris on the 4th February at the sitting of the Council in which the Bordeaux decree was officially annulled. "While M. Cochery and M. Albert Liouville were on their way to Paris, M. Jules Simon saw the representatives of the press, who were then very THE ELECTIONS. 29 numerous at Bordeaux, and unreservedly explained to them the mission with which he was charged. He wrote, and the friends who were with him wrote for him, a great number of letters for the de- partments, and, as he feared that his handwriting misfht be recoc^nized, or that letters addressed to political personages would be intercepted, he ad- dressed several to merchants, and to Professors, and had the addresses written by other hands. Afterwards he conferred with the generals and magistrates. One general who had in the first instance promised him assistance in the improbable case of his finding himself obliged to resort to force, refused it at the last moment. Another, General Foltz, promised unreservedly to support him. The minister explained to him that he had certain reasons for expecting the resigna- tion of M. Gambetta on Monday, the 6th Feb- ruary, at nine o'clock in the morning, but that if, contrary to all expectation, the circumstances which would bring about that resignation did not take place, the Prefecture must be seized without a moment's delay, so that the postal and telegraphic services should be available during the whole of the afternoon. He added that the surest means of averting a collision would be to discourage resist- ance by the display of an imposing military force. The General replied that he had only a very 30 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. small number of men under his command, and that the power of authorizing the transfer of regiments from one territorial division to another was ex- clusively reserved to the Minister of War; but M. Jules Simon had foreseen this difficulty before lie left Paris, and was the bearer of a blank decree of nomination of a Minister of War, whicli he filled up with the name of General Foltz. This docu- ment was then placed in the hands of the first president, M. Cellerier, with all the decrees necessary to empower him to proceed with the elections. In case of M. Jules Simon's being arrested before the 6th February, M. Cellerier was to publish these decrees immediately, and General Foltz was to seize the Prefecture, according to a carefully prepared plan which could not fail of success. Thus everything was provided for. On the morning of the 6th three members of the Govern- ment of Paris were to arrive at Bordeaux, and terminate the crisis by their presence. If by any unforeseen accident they should not be in the train which would arrive at nine o'clock, the troops were to be drawn up around the Prefecture at eleven a.m.; at noon the orders of the Govern- ment of Paris would be carried by telegraph into all the departments. Thus, at any rate, freedom of election would be secured. THE ELECTIONS. 31 On the 2nd February, in the evening, two im- portant personages, both members of the Assembly, and one of whom had been for a long time a minister, called on M. Jules Simon, and made strenuous efforts to induce him to take forcible measures on the following day. They reiterated their arguments many times. A struggle between the Governments of Paris and Bordeaux, that is to say, between republicans, did not alarm them, and they affirmed, with no little temerity, that a portion of the National Guard was with them. The representatives of the Monarchical Press also urged M. Simon in the same sense. He, how- ever, resisted all this pressure, without making known either his hopes or his resolutions, but merely declaring, as he had not ceased to do since his arrival, that he was confident of success. On the morning of the 3rd, the following pro- clamation, despatched to the prefects by telegraph, was posted on all the walls of Bordeaux : — " Citizens, I have received the following tele- gram, — " ' Versailles, 6. 40 p.m. " ' Monsieur Leon Gambetta, at Bordeaux. " * In the name of the freedom of Elections stipulated by the armistice convention I protest against the disposition emanating from you to 32 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. deprive numerous categories of Frencli citizens of the right of being elected to the Assembly. Elections made under a rule of arbitrary oppres- sion cannot confer the rights which the armistice convention recognized as those of deputies freely elected.^ " ' (Signed) Bismarck.* *' Citizens, we were saying a few days ago that Prussia, in order to satisfy her ambition, was reckoning upon an Assembly into which, owing to the shortness of the allotted time, and to our material difficulties of every kind, the adherents and accomplices of the fallen dynasty, allies of Count von Bismarck would be admitted. The decree of exclusion of the 31st January de- feated these hopes. The insolent pretension put forward by the Prussian Minister to interfere in the constitution of a French Assembly is the most striking justification of the measures taken by the Government of the Republic. The lesson will not be lost upon auy who possess the sentiment of National honour. " The Minister of the Interior and of War, "L. GAMBm'A." Nothing indeed could be more opposed to the right of nations, to justice, and to propriety, than Count Bismarck's despatch ; nor could anything ^ This message was in singularly bad French. The above is a literal translation. THE ELECTIONS. 33 have been more ill-judged. It was openly averred by tlie followers of M. Gambetta that M. Jules Simon and liis colleagues in Paris were neither more nor less than agents of Count Bismarck. Added to this, the Monarchists, by taking sides with M. Jules Simon, made it appear that he was an enemy of the Republic and of Republicans. M. Jules Simon, fully alive to the peril of the situation, knowing besides that he could no longer count on the adhesion of any of the Delegates, and having taken all the necessary measures for securing his freedom of action on the Ctli, went to the Prefecture, where his col- leagues were assembled, and having read aloud, to them the decree which conferred full powers upon him, announced that he was about officially to annul their decree of the 31st January, by which former functionaries of the Empire were declared ineligible for election to the National Assembly. Having made this announcement, he immediately quitted the Council, accompanied by M. Lavertujon, without replying to the vehement interpellation by which he was assailed. From thence he went to the office of the Gironde news- paper, and there, in concert with M. Lavertujon, Secretary to the Government, who had come with him from Paris to assist him in this crisis, he drew up the following proclamation : — VOL. I. D 34 THE GOYEENMENT OP M. THIERS. " Citizens, *' This morning at 45 minutes past 8 o'clock, I received the despatch of Count Bismarck. "I understand and share the irritation to which that despatch lias given rise. " But the decree of the Government now seated in Paris is dated the 28th. January; it was in- serted on the 29th in the Journal Officiel and the Bulletin des Lois ; and I am here to exact its application. " I have never hesitated in requiring the exe- cution of that decree, and I exact it to-day, as I exacted it yesterday, because I beheve it to be indispensable to the safety of my country. " It matters little to me that political adver- saries agree upon this point with the Repub- lican party to which I belong. At the present moment everything must yield to the most in- dispensable of civic duties. " The decree of Bordeaux only being known to the prefects, and being in course of execution in the departments, " Seeing that there is Urgency, *' In virtue of the powers conferred upon me by the Government of National Defence, and which are thus conceived : " In the unforeseen case of resistance by the Delegates to the decrees and orders of the Govern- THE ELECTIONS. 35 ment of National Defence, M. Jules Simon is in- vested by these presents with absolute full powers to carry them into execution. " Done at Paris, the 30th January, 1871. " (Signed) Jules Favre, Ernest Picard, Gene- ral Trochu, Emmanuel Arago, Gamier Pages, Eugène Pelletan. " I make known to the public the following decree, — • " Article 1. — The elections shall take place in all the departments on the 8th February, con- formably to the decree published at Bordeaux by the Delegates of the Government, but with the fol- lowing modification: the choice of the electors may be exercised upon every French citizen, not legally ineligible, and having attained the prescribed age. Every kind of incapacity set forth by former laws and decrees, and especially by the decree published at Bordeaux on the 31st January, is abolished. " Article 2. — The Assembly shall meet at Bor- deaux on Sunday, the 12th February. The Govern- ment of the National Defence will immediately place its powers in the hands of the Assembly. '* Done at Bordeaux, the 3rd February, 1871. " The Delegate Member of the Government, " Jules Simon. " The Delegate Secretary of the Government, " André Lavertujon." D 2 36 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. The Gironde printed this document at once, and supplied a great number of proofs, which were sent to all the newspapers. It also printed large posters, which were immediately distributed to the bill-stickers. A letter was written to the Mayor of Bordeaux, in which he was requested to take immediate steps for the official publication ; and a copy of the proclama- tion was sent to the telegraph office for prompt transmission to the prefects. These efforts to procure the promulgation of the decree were useless, as was to be expected, and as M. Jules Simon had known from the first that they would be. The Delegates had one of two courses to take : either they must submit to the orders received from Paris, or they must maintain their own decree and prevent the promulgation of the other. The Delegates prohibited the transmission of the decree by either post or telegraph, and threatened the bill-stickers with imprisonment if a single poster should appear. The Gironde and all the newspapers of the 4th February which con- tained the decree of M. Jules Simon were seized by an order emanating from the Prefect of the Gironde, and couched in the following terms : — " The Prefect of the Gironde orders M. Leclerc, Commissary of Police, immediately to seize all the THE ELECTIONS. 37 copies of the newspaper, No. — , after lie sliall have satisfied himself that the said newspaper con- tains a pretended decree relative to the elections, signed ' Jules Simon,' or * André Lavertujon,' and to place the copies seized at the disposal of the Procureur of the Republic. '' Bordeaux, the 4th February, 1871." The letter, signed by the Prefect of the Gironde, is marked " Approved. *' The Director of General Safety, " Eano." On the same day, the 4th February, several persons informed M. Jules Simon that it had been seriously proposed to have him arrested. Admiral Fourichon had strongly opposed the motion, and he had been seconded by M. Glais- Bizoin. The enemies of the Republic spread this report in hopes of widening the breach between the two sections of the Government. M. Glais-Bizoin said to M. Jules Simon, "It has been decided that you are not to be allowed any means of addressing the public, but your personal liberty will not be molested." The representatives of the newspapers that had been seized came to M. Jules Simon to protest against the measure of which they were the victims. They placed in his hands a protest which ended thus : " In virtue of the unlimited 38 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIEES. powers you have received from the Govern- ment of Paris in order to secure the execution of this decree, we demand that you shall cause the liberty of the press and submission to the law to be respected in our persons." The individuals who signed this protest knew perfectly well that he to whom they addressed it had, at that moment, no other means of getting justice done to them than by resorting to force. They thought, with the two other personages already mentioned, that the battalions of the National Guard belonging to the central quarters might be relied upon ; and some among them would perhaps have seen the two sections of the Government come to fisticuffs without much regret. M. Jules Simon, on the contrary, could not regard such an eventuality otherwise than as the greatest of misfortunes. He was convinced that if a struggle should take place on that day, with the uncertain support of a few battalions, it would turn out ill for the cause that he was charged to defend. He hoped that a peaceful solution would be reached in two days, and when that time should have come, if his hopes were not realized, there was a resource remaining, on which he might reckon securely. He therefore limited his action to the drawing up of the following declaration in answer to the protest of the newspaper editors, THE ELECTIONS. 39 forwarding it to the Delegates and to the news- papers concerned, at the same time sending a copy, signed by himself and M. Lavertujon, to M. Cellerier : — " Declakation. " The decree unanimously adopted by the Government of National Defence is dated the 28th January, 1871. " It was inserted in the Journal Officiel on the 29th, and placarded in Paris on the same day. It was ordered on the 28th that it should be sent into all the departments. " I do not think it advisable to publish tlie entire text of that decree, or to maintain all its dispositions, as I desire to avoid any confusion between the instructions already received, and those which would result from the decree of the 28th January. " But I repeat the declaration that the decree which was passed on the 28th, published on the 29th, and signed by all the members present in Paris, contains the express clause that all French citizens in enjoyment of their civil rights are eligible. " I have been charged, not only with the execution of this decree, but especially to watch over the preservation intact of universal suffrage. *' I was authorized, if need were, to conform in 40 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. other respects to the views of the Delegates ; but I am the bearer of an imperative mandate so to act that all citizcDS who are in the CDJoyment of their civil rights shall be eligible. " The decree is perfectly regular ; my powers have been communicated to the Delegates, I maintain the text of that decree in the most formal manner. *' The journals that have published it have acted in conformity with right and law. The seizure of those journals is illegal. Those persons who have ordered, and, pursuant to Article 75, those who have executed that seizure, are responsible for the obstacles opposed by them to the liberty of the press. " Bordeaux, 5th February, 1871. " (Signed) Jules Simon, " André Lavertujon.'* Each time that the delegate of the Government of Paris had to write a declaration or a letter, he was careful to repeat the terms of the Paris decree, to explain its motives, and to point out its legality. In spite of the close watch that was kept upon all his actions, his mission had become known at Bordeaux, and a certain number of his letters had reached the public. The Delegates had from the beginning adopted the expedient of casting a doubt, which they did not entertain, upon the THE ELECTIONS. 41 authenticity of the decree. They had demanded not only the text, but the original minute, signed by the members of the Government; with which M. Jules Simon had not been fur- nished, no demand of the kind having been anticipated, and, more especially, because the decree had been printed in the Journal Officiel and in the Bulletin des Lois, and distributed broadcast since the 29th January. As railway communi- cation between Bordeaux and the capital was restored, it was supposed at Paris that the decree had been published in the usual way. At the first suggestion of this strange and insulting suspicion, M. Jules Simon, who was present at the Council of the Delegates, instead of giving way to in- dignation, as he might fairly have done, at once proposed that they should telegraph to Paris, so that the question might be settled by the answer of M. Jules Favre. This was at first agreed to, at least in appearance, but on the following day M. Jules Simon learned that the proposed tele- gram had not been sent, " because messages had to pass through the hands of Count Bismarck," and that the question had been put by means of a carrier-pigeon. The pigeon never reached Paris ; and, when at length, after the seizure of the newspapers, public rumours became almost threatening, it was decided, 42 TeE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. notwitlistanding tlie despatch of the carrier, to send M. Cremieux to Paris, with a commission to ascertain whether " the pretended decree " was, or was not, a reaHty. This decision, with the words " pretended decree," was posted on the walls of the city, a fact of which M. Jules Simon was apprised by a member of the Government, who was indeed indignant at it, but who had, never- theless, added his own signatures to the other three. M. Jules Simon, who was resolved to accomiDlish his purpose, but to take no personal questions or incidents whatever into account, merely shrugged his shoulders. On the 5th, M. Crémieux started for Paris, and at Vierzon he encountered Messieurs Garnier Pages, Emmanuel Arago, and Pelletan, who brought him back with them to Bordeaux, where the party arrived on the 6th at nine o'clock a.m. So soon as their arrival was made known, and that it was evident the majority of the Government at Bordeaux were resolved upon the suppression of the ineligibility clause, no difficulty was made about the despatch of the decree by telegraph even in anticipation of the meeting of the Council. M. Jules Simon himself took it to the Director-General, who had it sent off immediately in every quarter. By direc- tion of M. Jules Simon, General Foltz at once re- scinded the order by which the troops were confined THE ELECTIONS. 43 to barracks. The crisis bad ended peacefully, after an anxious contest of a week's duration, and a good understanding was re-established between the members of the Government of National Defence. One source of grave anxiety remained. AVhat would the prefects do ? M. Gambetta had always been of opinion that the elections ought to take place, provided they should be conducted on his system. All his prefects (or nearly all), held with him on the second point, the exclusion of the Bonapartists ; a few only obeyed, in trembling, on the first, the convo- cation of the electors. At Toulouse, M. Duportal, the prefect, published the following proclama- tion : — " Dear Fellow-Citizens, " In conformity with the unanimous desire of true and tried patriots, the Government of the Republic proposed to postpone the convocation of the electors until it should have accom- plished the patriotic mandate of National Defence, which it had courageously accepted. The fortune of war and the adverse destiny of France have otherwise disposed. Afflicting truth, which never- theless must be told ! It is beneath the trium- phant roar of the cannon of the invader, under the bloody heel of the Prussian, that we are called to vote!" &c., &c., &c. 44 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. On the 31st January, the municipahty of Saint Etienne sent a deputation to M. Gambetta, bearing an address which was posted the same day on the walls of Saint Etienne, and contained the follow- ing passage : — " Take every energetic measure for continuing the war ; either an honourable peace, or war to complete exhaustion. " We again demand from you absolute powers, both civil and military, for our departmental authority, so that every individual capable of carry- ing arms may be enrolled, without any exception whatever. " As for the Elections, if they are to take place, and it is our opinion that they ought not to be held, we demand that it shall be decreed that all those who have directly served the Empire, senators, chamberlains, prefects, and others, and also all place-seekers shall be ineligible to the Constituent Assembly. " We demand, besides, that every refractory individual shall be deprived of the vote." The prefect of Bouches du Rhône, an active and intelligent man, had gone so far as to send in his resignation rather than co-operate in the forma- tion of a National Assembly. At the entreaty of M. Gambetta, he consented to retain office and to publish the Bordeaux decree, but he refused m THE ELECTIONS. 45 to tlie end, even after the resignation of M. Gambetta, to give official publicity to the acts of the Government of Paris. In the sitting of the 11th March, 1871, M. Cocherj related the details of this incident. " M. Gent," he said, " being called upon to furnish us with explanations, replied, that in fact he had received, on the 30th January, a telegram, despatched from Bordeaux, by which he was enjoined to publish the decree of convocation for the elections of the 8th February, but M. Gent was opposed to the elections, and a partisan of war à outrance. Con- sequently he telegraphed on the same day to the Minister of the Interior that he could not accept this new policy, and that he requested a successor might be sent to replace him, and to fulfil the electoral formalities. "Not until the 3rd February did M. Gent, yielding to urgent ministerial remonstrances, consent to allow the decree of convocation to be printed and placarded. "It is equally certain that the decrees of the 29th January, the annulment of the ineligibility clause, and the resignation of M. Gambetta were not officially published by the Prefect of Bouches du Rhône." M. Gent, M. Duportal, and the Mayor of Saint Etienne were not unsupported in their protest 46 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. against the convocation of the electors. They and the other malcontents, however, resigned themselves, provided that the conditions of the Bordeaux decree on the elections were maintained, i. e. with the ineligibility clause. The prefect of a central department summoned a young lawyer, who had received a letter from M. Jules Simon, and was distributing copies of it, before him, and threatened him with imprisonment and a prosecution. Many similar examples might be quoted, and also proclamations by prefects and sub-prefects, in which the Government of Paris was violently attacked. M. Paul Bert, Prefect of the Nord, a celebrated savant, and a distinguished man in every respect, had taken elaborate pre- cautions to ]3revent the election of functionaries and candidates of the Empire. The placard setting forth the names of the candidates to be excluded is dated 6th February : — "List or Candidates declared Inéligible. Brame (Jules), former Minister of the Empire. Plichon, former Minister of the Empire. Des Rotours, Official Candidate in 1868 and 1869." A few hours afterwards the Lille newspapers, with the text of the decree promulgated in Paris on the 29th January, reached the prefect, and he THE ELECTIONS. 47 immediately issued a proclamation, wMcli contains these words : — " This decree by the Government, prisoners in Paris, and for a period of four months ignorant of the state of the provinces, unable to com- municate freely with them, and ignorant of what their own delegates at Bordeaux were doing, cannot, either in strict law or in equity, be placed in opposition with the decree by the Delegates at Bordeaux, who were in full pos- session of freedom of thouscht and action. It is only reasonable that the decree of the 31st January should have the force of law, even admitting the existence of that of the 29th." Four prefects only refused to apply the in- eligibility clause : M. Mestreau, Prefect of Cha- rente-Inférieure, M. Achille Delorme, Prefect of Calvados, M. Emile Lenoël, Prefect of La Manche, and M. Ricard, Commissary-General for Deux-Sèvres and Vienne. M. Ricard sent the following note to M. Jules Simon : — " I am told that you are the bearer of a decree which con- firms the eligibility of all citizens. Let me be in- formed of the text of it, and I will answer to you for its being obeyed wherever I have authority." At the sitting of the 9th March, 1871, M. Bethmont read aloud the telegrams that had 48 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIEES. been exchanged between M. Mestreau and M. Gambetta. *' M. Mestreau to the Minister of the Interior. "It is impossible for me to pubHsh the documents which you have just forwarded to me ; they would produce a most unfavourable efifect in Charente-Inférieure." " The Minister to M. Mestreau. " I am not concerned with the spirit of your department, but with that of all France. In my double capacity as Minister and Republican, I give you a formal order under my personal respon- sibility, to publish my proclamation." " M. Mestreau to the Minister. *'It is in view of the general condition of France, as well as that of my own department, and also under the inspiration of Republican principles, not authoritative, that I have refused to publish your proclamation, in which an outrage is inflicted on the Government of National Defence. I therefore maintain my former declaration." On his resignation, M. Gambetta addressed an important circular to the prefects, in which, while holding to his opinion with regard to the Bonapartists, he formally advised that the elections should be proceeded with ; and this counsel, emanating from him, put an end to all hesitation. THE ELECTIONS. 49 *' Bordeaux, 6tli February, 1871, 3 p.m. *' The Minister of the Interior to the Prefects and Sub-Prefects. " Notwithstanding the grave objections arising from the execution of the Convention of Ver- sailles, I had determined to cause the elections to be proceeded with, that by so doing I might furnish an incontestable proof of moderation and sincerity, and also remain at my post until relieved. " You are aware. Monsieur, from the various documents which have been sent to you, what is to be the nature and character of those elections ; nevertheless I am convinced that, notwithstand- ing the material diJ0Q.culties of every kind heaped upon us by the enemy, a faithful and resolute Assembly will be their outcome. *' I consider that our decree was called for alike by justice as regards the accomplices of the imperial rule, who are responsible for it, and prudence in view of foreign intrigues. It has elicited an insulting protest from Count Bismarck. " Since then, on the 4th February, 1871, the members of the Government of 'Paris have sup- pressed our decree by a legislative measure. They have also sent Messieurs Garnier Pages, Eugène Pelletan, and Arago, who signed the decree of VOL. I. E 50 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. abrogation, to Bordeaux, with their commission to apply it. " This is at once a disavowal and a dismissal of the Minister of the Interior and of War. " A fundamental difference of opinion from both the exterior and the interior point of view is therefore manifest beyond all doubt. My con- science tells me that it is my duty to resign my functions as a minister of the Government, with which I no longer have ideas or hopes in common. " I have the honour to inform jou that I have this day sent in my resignation, and to thank you for the patriotic and steady support you have afforded me in my endeavours to bring the task which I had undertaken to a successful ter- mination. " Let me say to you that, on reflection, I am convinced, seeing how grave are the interests at stake, and how little time is at our dis- posal, you will render a supreme service to the Republic by proceeding with the elections of the 8th February. Thus you will obtain time, to enable you to take such resolutions as you shall think proper. " Receive the assurance of my fraternal senti- ments. " Léon Gajif-etta.'* THE ELECTIONS. 51 The Council met at the house of M. Crémieux, immediately after the arrival of Messieurs Garnier Pages, Arago, and Pelletan. M. Gambetta did not attend; he sent in his resignation by letter, and his colleagues met him next in the As- sembly. Admiral Fourichon had always desired this solution of the difficulty ; M. Glais-Bizoin felt himself beaten, and said so, but received his three friends with no less cordiality on that account. M. Crémieux yielded to the ne- cessity of the case, while he bitterly regretted the defeated policy, and persisted in believing that the war might still have been carried on. He tendered his resignation on the following day, but the Council begged him to withdraw it, as all the members of the Government were to resign col- lectively in five days from that time. Short though the interval was, it was neces- sary to appoint a successor to M. Gambetta. M. Jules Simon had been already appointed in that capacity. The newly-arrived Delegates brought him his nomination, signed by General Trochu, Jules Favre, Arago, Pelletan, Garnier Pages, and Ernest Picard. M. Glais-Bizoin ex- claimed against this appointment, which, as he said, aggravated the defeat of the Delegates. " I resign myself to being beaten," said he, "but not to being beaten to this extent." M. E 2 52 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. Crémieux also said that it was unwise to pass from M. Gambetta to tliat identical member of tlie Government who represented the most moderate policy ; and such was likewise M. Jules Simon's own opinion. He felt convinced that the Council, composed as it was now, would, after this sitting, be unanimous in its resolutions. The whole question was merely the substitution of one name for another. He thought the name of M. Arago would have more authority than his own with the prefects who had been appointed by M. Gambetta. They had almost all gone against him during the week of struggle that had just expired; it would be easier for them to submit to the new orders they were about to receive, if those orders were not signed by him. These reasons seemed conclusive. The consent of M. Emmanuel Arago was obtained, but not without difficulty. A circular was immediately drawn up, and addressed by telegraph to all the prefects and sub-prefects of the uninvaded departments. At Bordeaux everything went off smoothly. In the evening M. Arago presented himself at the meeting of the Municipal Council and was warmly received. The popularity and good management of M. Fourcaud aided materially in preventing any disturbance. None took place indeed in any part THE ELECTIONS. 53 of France. The elections were lield on tlie 8tli, conformably with the Paris decree, and on Sunday, the 12th February, the Assembly met, to declare itself constituted. 54 THE GOVEENMENT OF M, THIEES. CHAPTER II. THE ASSEMBLY AT BOEDEAUX. It would be difficult for any one who had not seen the city of Bordeaux when it was the capital of France, to form an idea of the busy and bustling crowd which at that time filled the hotels and thronged the streets. The handsome, refined, calm, and kindly city had become for the nonce a political capital, a " Bourse " on a gigantic scale, and the head-quarters of a large military force. The Place des Quinconces was occupied by cannon ; the Prefecture was the residence of M. Gambetta, but the Government, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of War, the Police and Telegraph Administrations, and the Pre- fecture of the Gironde were also lodged there. In the vast rooms set apart for the use of the General Council, clerks, who had been employed under the Empire, worked beneath the eyes of their directors like schoolboys with the master's THE ASSEMBLY AT BORDEAUX. 55 cane in view ; tlie prefect's cabinet, the former reception-rooms, and even the antechambers were crowded by persons of another class, equally busy and bustling, who might have been seen five months before in the offices of the demo- cratic newspapers. The all-powerful minister enjoyed no privacy. "When he needed a little quietness, while writing an order or a circular, he took refuge behind a screen. He gave audiences to the crowd on the balcony, to deputations at the stairhead, and to individuals behind the door. The grand staircase was thronged hke that of a railway-station when the trains are starting^. Ministers and Generals made their way through the press with their elbows ; a space would be cleared only for the master and two or three of his familiars. This buzzing and swarming crowd was enlivened by a great variety of costumes. M. Gambetta had shown incomparable activity in the creation of armies ; — all the anger and ill-will of his enemies can never deprive him of credit on that score • — he had also created officers in o-reat Dro- a X fusion, and those officers had created uniforms. Civil functionaries indulged in them to their hearts' content ; a director of telegraphs wore a plumed hat, and gold lace like a general. The Bordeaux people who remained quietly at 56 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. tlieir business hardly recognized their own city ; their streets, their Prefecture, their theatres, their counting-houses, indeed their own houses. In the course of three months Bordeaux was taken by assault two or three times by different armies ; by civil functionaries, by speculators in all kinds of business, by officials, and finally, after the retirement of M. Gambetta, by deputies. Only eight days were allowed for the transaction of the onerous business of the elections, which, in ordinary times, sets so many persons in motion ; and those eight days were fertile in unexpected occurrences in the uninvaded departments. Operations had been commenced on the 2nd or 3rd February, in obedience to the Bordeaux decree ; then, almost on the eve of the voting day, came the decrees of M. Jules Simon and the Government of Paris. In several departments the prefects had been obliged to alter their in- structions and to contradict their proclamations. A few of them retired. The new prefect of Lille, M. Hendlé, arrived on the voting day itself. No less pressing, although of a different kind, were the difiBculties under which the departments in- vaded by the Prussians laboured. As there were no longer any prefects in those departments, a circular issued by M. Herold, Minister of the Interior, transferred the most essential portion of THE ASSEMBLY AT BOEDEAUX. 57 their functions to tlie mayors of the various town- ships. The enemy, who desired that the Assembly should be summoned, offered no obstacle to the proceedings. Liberty to meet, to advertise, to correspond and to vote was unchecked, but the state of siege was, in itself, a terrible impedi- ment. Almost all the Mairies were turned into barracks, the electoral lists were lost or destroyed, the railroads were either blocked up or torn up, many of the most active and important citizens were serving with the army. Nevertheless, the elections were held all over France at the appointed hour. They were conducted in freedom and with regularity. M. Thiers bore witness to this in the sitting of the 10th March, 1871. " Never," said he, " no never, has a country been more sincerely interrogated, and never has it answered more sincerely than on the recent occasion. " The country was in great part occupied, but where that was the case, the foreigners did not meddle with your elections. In the other portions of France certain prefects would have liked to meddle with them, but they had not time. *' Thus, because the foreigner regarded them with indifference, and the previous administration had not time to interfere, the elections were not in any way impeded." 68 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. It has since been repeatedly alleged that the Government of National Defence brought pressure to bear on the electors, but this accusation is not only false, it is absurd. The Assembly, which was not to be suspected of a leaning towards the Government, granted only one inquiry, — in the case of the department of Vaucluse, — and annulled, in all, only five returns, those respectively of M. Cyprien Chaix in the Hautes Alpes ; M. Marc-Dufraisse in the Alpes- Maritimes ; M. Mestreau in Charente-Inférieure ; M. Lamorte in Drome, and M. Girot-Ponzol in Puy-de-Dôme. These elections were annulled solely in virtue of the principle of the ineligibility of prefects in the departments under their own administration. It is therefore quite true that the elections throughout all France were declared valid, with the exception of those of one depart- ment only. The Delegates had authorized the candidateship of prefects in their own departments (although it was a departure from their principles) for the reason that the circumstances of the case were completedy exceptional, and that it would have been unjust to disqualify men who had accepted office, not as a career, but as an oppor- tunity of rendering disinterested service to the country. THE ASSEMBLY AT BORDEAUX. 59 M. Jules Simon, whose object it was not to dishearten the prefects, did not wish to provoke to disobedience those who might have offered themselves as candidates several days before the existence of his decree had come to their know- ledge. As it happened, the greater number of the prefects abstained from offering themselves as candidates. Only eleven prefects and two sub- prefects were returned. Several of those who were elected had sent in their resignation in time. M. Marc-Dufraisse, whose seat was in- validated, was elected simultaneously in the department of the Seine. The other four pre- sented themselves anew, and were re-elected. Not a single case of corrupt practices was even alleged, and some instances of intimidation which it was attempted to exaggerate were not proven ; the Assembly took no heed of them. Several prefects had advised the electors to vote for war à outrance ; but the change which had taken place in the administration two days previously had nullified their influence, which was not, indeed, important beforehand, for every one knew that they were about to vacate their posts. Their promises were not to be relied upon, nor were their threats to be feared. At the date of the elections the Government and their agents of every degree, including the mayors, possessed moral authority 60 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. only over tliose who were of their way of thinking ; whosoever was not entirely with them was against them. The Government of Paris was reproached with the capitulation, the Government of Bordeaux with a Dictatorship. In reality the only collective influence was that of the clergy, who had remained at their posts, with their organization intact, while war and revolution had profoundly troubled and terribly thinned the ranks of lay society. From that time forth the clergy openly and ardently joined in the strife of parties On the day after the elections the deputies began to arrive at Bordeaux. Several of them came direct from the army, or from the ambulances, and had not allowed themselves a glimpse of their homes. A few were still wearing their regi- mental uniforms. The Grand Theatre had been arranged as a temporary Assembly House; a purpose which the large and commodious building served admirably, with but one drawback. It was not lighted from the outside, and therefore gas had to be used on all occasions. The Lecture- Room was assigned for the use of the public, the actors' dressing-rooms and the property-rooms were arranged as best they might be for the use of the officials. The Assembly met at three o'clock in the after- THE ASSEMBLY AT EOliDEAUX. 61 noon of the 12tli February, in the green-room. At first it was proposed only to get intelhgence, but Count Benoist d'Azy, who was summoned to preside at the sitting as the senior member pre- sent, moved that considering the gravity of the circumstances, the Assembly should at once declare itself constituted. This proposal was unanimously adopted. Provisional officers were also elected. M. Benoist d'Azy was to con- tinue to act as President. M. Duchâtel, M. de Castellane, M. Paul de Remusat, and M. L'Ebraly were appointed Secretaries. The Assembly ad- journed until the following day for the verification of powers. A considerable number of deputies were already present. When on the 16tli the Assembly proceeded to elect the permanent officials, there were no less than 633 voters. Neither the Paris Government nor the Bordeaux Delegates had thought of defining the powers of the Assembly, or of fixing a term to its mandate. It was evident that the Assembly as the out- come of universal suffrage possessed absolute and sovereign power, and that from the moment of its meeting its authority was sole and supreme in France. It was generally believed that the Assembly had been summoned to decide upon peace or war ; that its mission would terminate with the vote which should finally dispose of this 62 THE GUVERNMExN'T OF M. THIERS. formidable question, and that afterwards it would liave nothing to do except to pass an electoral law, and summon its successors. Those who are familiar with history know that an Assembly always takes all the powers it can get, and always lasts as long as it can. Doubtless, however, the deputies would have been astonished if they had been told that they should sit for four years, and should make a Constitution. The list of the newly-elected deputies, upon whom the fate of the country depended, v/as studied with considerable anxiety at this time. The indications afforded by it were by no means clear. It included several new names, and it was rightly believed that there would be numerous con- versions among the former deputies. Everything was conjectural, and the most skilful statisticians dared not claim complete accuracy. One important, sahent, and reassuring fact was that only a few Bonapartists had been returned. They numbered thirty in all, and the only well- known men in the little group were M. Conti, M. Gavini, M. Gallioni, M. Daru, and M. Brame. Two-thirds of this small party, who afterwards formed the nucleus of the group known as that of " The Appeal to the People," would have indig- nantly repudiated tlie appellation of " Bonapar- tists." The apprehensions of M. Gambetta that THE ASSEMBLY AT BORDEAUX. 63 a Chamber composed of former official candidates might be returned were very wide of the mark. France had remembered the 2nd of December, the mixed commissions, the transportations, the law of Public Safety, Mexico, and Sedan. The head of the Bonapartist party, M. Rouher, was then abroad. He did not offer himself as a can- didate until the elections of the 2nd July, when he was beaten in Charente-Inférieure and the Gironde. M. Se vérin Abbatucci was obliged to resign in order to secure M. Rouher's seat for the department of Corsica, which was then regarded as a Bonapartist pocket-borough. The party could not pretend that it was a victim to the Bordeaux decree, for it was not more fortunate on the 2ud July than on the 8th February. On the other hand, the number of republicans amounted to only 250 ; and this was a disappoint- ment. It was, however, to be expected that all the Monarchical parties would league themselves together against the Republic ; and that although the Republic would win in the end, it must be some time before it could be declared the definitive Government of France, and still longer before it could be secured against aggressive attempts by the beaten parties. If the elections could have been hold in September or October 1870, an almost 64 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. entirely Republican Assembly would have been returned. The resurrection of the Legitimist party was a novel and unexpected event, chiefly ex- plicable by the intervention of the clergy. This was a party of which France knew nothing, which was believed to be extinct. It had, for a long time, been composed of leaders without soldiers; but now all the leaders were elected. It became evi- dent, after a few sittings, that the representa- tives of the old régime were ignorant of public affairs, and that they did not number among them any of those superior men who lend brilliancy to their party, who force other parties to fear it, and who occasionally succeed, by dint either of political ability or oratorical talent, in displacing a majority. It was otherwise with the Right Centre, a group which outnumbered that of the Repub- licans, and in which were included M. Thiers, M. Dufaure, M. Léonce de Lavergne, M. Casimir Per- rier, M. Laboulaye, and a number of learned and eloquent men, accustomed to public business, and to the handling of assemblies, governing men who had been thrown into opposition by the Empire, and who, if they should prove sufficiently high- minded to keep clear of former prejudices and the interests of a clique, could not fail to exercise a preponderating influence in the Assembly. THE ASSEMBLY AT BORDEAUX. 65 Thus, tlie Right Centre was the most important group ; next in order came the Eepubhcans, with some first-rate speakers, M. Jules Favre, M. Gam- betta, M. Pelletan and M. Picard ; after them the Legitimists ; and lastly, the Bonapartists, in an insignificant minority. If to all these be added thirty individuals whose opinions nobody knew anything about, tentative, expectant persons, who certainly did not themselves know how they ought to be classified, an almost exact estimate may be formed of the state of parties at the opening of the Assembly. No group had the majority. The Right Centre and the Republicans came first, with un- equal forces ; and this result was discouraging to the Bonapartists, and disheartening to the Republicans. The only party who were justified in congratulating themselves, and in thinking that France was coming back to them, were the adherents of Constitutional Monarchy. They were accustomed to look upon Republicans as devoid of political ability, and they calculated that the check which the Republican party had received through them in February, 1871, would be still more complete when the supplementary elections should have taken place. The Repub-^ licans could not fail to make mistakes, and they themselves would not fail to profit by those errors. VOL. T. ' F 66 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. Then, too, every man of the Legitimist party wlio was not too deeply pledged, every man who was capable of taking a correct view of the state of modern society, would join the Constitutional Monarchists. Was it not essential, above all, to escape the Eepublic? A second time in tlie course of the century, the Constitutionalists would be a necessary expedient. In the first place they were certain to place M. Thiers at the head of the Government. And then, as if to secure the triumph of the Eight Centre, no sooner had the Eepublicans met together than they began to quarrel among themselves. M. Gambetta and the other leaders of the Republican party had seen the double danger that awaited the Eepublic from the Orleanists on the one side, and the Bonapartists on the other. Against the latter they had the resource of the decree of ineligibility, which they held to be justified as a sort of lex talionis, in retaliation for the official candidateships of the Empire; but they had no such weapon to use against Constitutional Monarchy. They believed rightly that all persons of superior intelligence would end by regarding the Eepublic as the only Government possible and the best of Governments, and that the great body of the nation, freed from the delusion of Cœsarism, THE ASSEMBLY AT EOEDEAUX. 67 could not but embrace the E/cpublican cause. Progress, however, in human societies, does not tread with even and measured pace; it springs forward, then it recoils; it is subject to interruptions, until, having triumphed over final obstacles, it at length acquires irresistible force. If the members of the Eight Centre had obeyed one leader, if they had practised the only kind of disinterestedness which a party can exhibit, that is to say patience ; if, above all, they had remained faithful to that liberal policy which they had so loudly demanded under the Empire, instead of making common cause with the reaction and with clericalism, France might have recommenced, under less enduring conditions, the experiment of 1830. Their internal divisions were a happy chance for the Republic. They had nothing in common except their attachment to the representative system and their dislike of running risks. The dissensions in the party were manifest from the first. A very few among them denied all salvation outside of an Orleanist restoration, and they sacrificed everything to that conviction. The entire political faith of others was summed up in instinctive aversion to democracy, and fear of being deprived of the political and social advantages they en- joyed. They loved liberty in theory, they would F 2 Q8 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. even have consented to administer it to fhe country, provided tliey liad been permitted to measure the dose. Their conditional and tempe- rate liberalism did not survive the spectacle of the commune, and when three years later it became evident that an Orleanist restora- tion was impossible, they were forced to choose between two evils, the Empire and the Repub- lic. They made that selection which appeared to them to be the safer, if not the more honourable, and one by one they were seen to enter the Assembly, and take their places in the ranks of the party that hid itself under the name of " The Party of Appeal to the People." Between the obstinate Orleanists and the Orleanists turned Bonapartists, there existed in the Eight Centre a group consisting of one hundred clear-headed men, who were equally incapable of abandoning the principles upon which all society rests, and of renouncing liberty. They would have preferred Constitutional Monarchy to any other form of government ; if they had found it established, or if they could have restored it by a vote without violent measures. But they perceived at once that neither the Legitimists nor the Bona- partists would accede to the constitutional form ; it would not have a majority either in Parlia- THE ASSEMBLY AT BORDEAUX. 69 ment nor among tlie people, while it was in itself, and from the temperament of its advocates, happily unable to resort to force. They were well aware that the reappearance of the Legitimist party upon the political stage was a brief incident which would have no result ; and the only possible monarchy was that which they would not accept at any price, that which openly and unscrupulously appealed to material interests and to force. The Republic inspired them with distrust, which, in some cases, at that time, certainly reached the height of aversion. But, being persuaded that they would have to choose between the Republic and the Empire, and that the Empire would never reconcile itself with the principles of right, with justice, or with liberty, they did not despair of being able to construct a hberal and conservative Republic. In a word, they rejected Legitimacy as chimerical, and dictatorship, whether Republican or Csesarian, as odious ; they preferred a liberal Monarchy to a moderate Republic, but they did not hold that it would be right to bring about a revolution simply that they might make the presidency of the Republic hereditary. Not only was M. Thiers the head of this party, he was the party itself, for it was by following him, by comprehending his ideas, that the others came to the conclusion that the existing Govern- 70 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. ment must be provisionally maintained. Mean- time, the lists were to be kept open, so that the power of making a free choice between the two forms of constitutional Government should be reserved to the country, which was to withhold its judgment until after the reconstruction of the nation ; that is to say, until France should once more possess an army, an administration, and finances. The sitting of Monday, the 13th February, was in reality the first sitting of the Assembly. It commenced at two o'clock, in the theatre, M. Benoist d'Azy presiding. The Deputies had to struggle to their places through an enormous crowd, who wanted to see the most important and popular among them. Garibaldi, who wore his uniform, and Victor Hugo, were the most closely sur- rounded and the most loudly applauded. The whole crowd was ardently Eepublican, and the Deputies of the Eight complained of the be- wildering shouts of Vive la Bêjmbliqne, which followed them as they entered or issued from the theatre. M. Jules Favre spoke first ; the purport of his address was to place the powers of the Govern- ment of National Defence in the hands of the representatives of the country. " Ever since the members of the Government of THE ASSEMBLY AT CORDEAUX. 71 National Defence have been cliarged with the task which they accepted," said M. Jules Favre, "they have had no greater solicitude or desire than for the arrival of the day when they should find themselves in tlie presence of the representatives of the people. {Hear ! hear !) *' They are in that presence now, and under most cruel and grievous circumstances; but, thanks to your patriotism, gentlemen, thanks to that unity among you, to which I feel convinced that we shall not appeal in vain {Bravo /), and which, if need were, would be imposed upon us by our misfortunes, by good sense, and by solicitude for the interests of our dear country (Cheers), we shall yet heal her wounds and recon- struct her destiny. (Loud cheers.) " To you, gentlemen, belongs this task. We are no longer of any account, except that we are responsible to you for all our acts, and ready to answer for them; knowing that they will be investigated with loyalty ; that loyalty which will inspire every deliberation of yours, as you know that it will be our guide in the explanations to be laid before you." {Unanimous appla.use.) M. Jules Favre added a few words respect- ing the negotiation which he had opened, and which obliged him to return on that same day to Paris. " My first duty," he said, " will be to 72 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. carry back to those with whom we are treat- ing, the assurance that France is ready, hap- pen what may, to do her duty bravely. {Loud applause.) " The Assembly will decide with the perfect liberty that is the right of the representatives of the country, careful for nothing save the salva- tion of France, and her honour." (Renewed applause.) The President then read aloud the collective and several letters of resignation of the members of the Government ; and afterwards made known to the Assembly the following document, — " Citizen President of the National Assembly, "As a last duty rendered to the cause of the French Hepublic, I have come hither to tender it my vote, which I place in your hands. " I renounce the mandate, by which 1 have been honoured by various departments. " I salute you, "G. Garibaldi." The drawing for the bureaus then took place, and the Assembly adjourned in order that the examination of powers might be proceeded with immediately. The public were already leaving the galleries, THE ASSEMBLY AT BORDEAUX. 73 and the Deputies were quitting the Chamber, when General Garibaldi rose, and asked permission to speak. He was met with cries from all sides of "It is too late! The sitting is adjourned." A member added, " A deputy who has resigned has no longer any right to speak in an Assembly." General Garibaldi ought indeed to have spoken during the sitting, and before he sent in his re- signation; but the members of the Right were glad of an opportunity of opposing him in this sense, and of refusing him a hearing. Some days later, very severe things were said of him on that side of the Chamber. The members of the Left, on the contrary, came hurrying in again when the rumour spread that Garibaldi wished to speak. The Republicans were not only animated by sentiments of respect and admiration for the General, but they thought the sitting might have been resumed for a few minutes, in con- sideration of the courtesy due to a foreigner, and the gratitude due to a military leader who had fought for us. Unfortunately they were in the minority. M. Benoist d'Azy resumed his presidential chair, but without removing his hat, and said, — " I have declared the sitting suspended, and I can only request my colleagues to retire to their 74 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIEES. bureaus. I order the galleries to be immediately cleared." The members dispersed amid considerable com- motion. The representatives, who repaired to their bureaus, could hear the acclamations long and loud with which Garibaldi was greeted by the vast multitude outside. He set out for Italy on the same evening. The Assembly got on rapidly with the examina- tion of powers. On the IGth February the final nominations took place. The president was appointed unanimously, and that president was a Republican. M. Grévy was, however, so plainly indicated by the circumstances, that his election did not furnish a true criterion of the respective strength of parties. Neither the Legi- timists nor the Right Centre could possibly have flattered themselves that a candidate of theirs would be elected ; the support of the Republican party was indispensable to the success of any one who might be proposed. On the 4th September, M. Grévy had not approved of the Govern- ment which was proclaimed at the Hôtel de Ville, and he had refused to accept office under it as Minister of Justice. He had even under- taken to convey the proposals of the Corps Légis- latif to the Government on the same evening. He was respected by the Republicans for his THE ASSEMBLY AT BOEDEAUX. 75 talents, his character, and the sincerity of his convictions, and he had won favour with the Monarchists by steadily holding himself aloof from the revolution from the beginning. M. Thiers, who was all-powerful in the As- sembly, and especially over the Right Centre, was the first to pronounce the name of M. Grevy, and not a single objection was raised. The state of parties was revealed in the subsequent nominations. Four vice-presidents were required. The per- sons appointed were M. Martel, M. Yitet, M. Léon de Maleville, all belonging to the Right Centre, and M. Benoist d'Azy, a Legitimist. M. Léon de Maleville, the last elected, had 288 votes. The next candidate, M. de Vogué, a Legitimist, had 214 votes. The Right Centre had two questors, who passed with 458 and 430 votes ; the Legiti- mists succeeded with great difficulty in getting M. Princeteau passed. He had only 212 votes at the first ballot ; but the Republican candidate had only 147, and this number fell to 55 at the final ballot. The six secretaries were Messieurs Bethmont, Paul de Rémusat, de Barante, Johnston, de Castellane, and de Meaux. Of these, only M. Beth- mont was a Republican; so that there were but two Republicans in a bureau composed of four- 76 THE GOVEENMENT OF M. THIERS. teen members. The strength, of the Republican party is exactly represented by the number of votes given to M. Magnin for the post of questor, and to M. Charles Rolland for that of secre- tary. M. Magnin had 147 votes, M. Rolland, 145. The Republicans voted without any allies. The most liberal and intelligent members of the Right Centre, those who, a few months later, were to rally round the Republic, and form the Left Centre of the Assembly, were still hesitating. They voted for the Monarchist candidates, who entered the bureau with majorities of 300 and 400 votes. The most urgent duty of the Assembly was to form a Provisional Government; first, because France must have a Government, and secondl}^, be- cause a Negotiator, who could speak with authority, was indispensable. Afterwards the Assembly would have to discuss the peace proposals, and to fix the permanent locality of Parlia- ment. Such was the order of the urgent business of the Assembly and of France at that moment. The Assembly had no choice about placing the Government in the hands of M. Thiers ; it had only to follow the lead of the country. Not only had he been elected in twenty-six different places, but he had obtained important THE ASSEMBLY AT BORDEAUX. 11 minorities in others, and tlie total number of votes given for him exceeded two millions. When he was returned for Paris in 18()3, his election was regarded throughout Europe as an important event. He was obliged to allow himself to be chaired, and some one called out to him, " It will be a dialogue between the Emperor and you." In July, 1870, the Government, acting the braggart's part, but in reahty beginning to tremble, entreated him to join the Council of Defence. He replied that he would only consent on the invitation of the whole Chamber ; and the Chamber, like the Government, knew that in that hour of great danger he was indispensable. On the 4tli September he was entreated to preside at the final sitting. The Provisional Government had recourse to him in its turn, and requested him to become the advocate of France with kings and peoples. He had never sought for popularity; he had braved it. All alike, friends and enemies, knew that he was our only statesman, and that in his name was our protec- tion and moral force. During the sitting of the 16th February it was proposed that he should be placed at the head of the Government. The proposition was signed by Messieurs Dufaure, Jules Grev}^, Vitet, Léon de Maleville, Rivet, Mathieu de la Eedorte, and 78 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. Barthélémy Saint -Hilare, and was voted on tlie 17th, upon the report of M. Victor Lefranc. "The commission," says the Report, " does not require to lay before you the motives for the selection of the man to whom it requests you to delegate the Executive Power of the French Republic. " The inspiration which led him, thirty years ago, to fortify Paris, that city which famine only has been able to reduce (Sensation); the foresight which made him oppose the war a few months ago, while it was yet possible to avert it, the noble self-devotion which led him to visit all the nations of Europe that, in their hearing, he might defend the rights of civilization together with the interests of France; and, finally, the homage of so many departments; all these things point him out to our choice. [Cheers arid applause.) " Let us strengthen him by our unanimity : it is the only means whereby we can add to the strength of his patriotism. [Reneived applause.) " He will find worthy auxiliaries among those who have borne the burthen and the pain of the conflict, both in Paris and in the provinces. (Approhation.) " Let all France bo of one mind with this THE ASSEMBLY AT BORDEAUX. 79 Assembly; so shall slic fulfil the duties im- posed upon her by her past, her present, and her future." (Loud and ])rolonged api^laiise.) The proposition was in the following terms : — " The National Assembly, entrusted with Sovereign. Authority, " Considering it important, before the in- stitutions of France are settled, that the neces- sities of the Government and the conduct of the negotiations should be immediately provided for; " Decrees : — *' M. Thiers is appointed Chief of the Execu- tive of the French Republic. He will exercise his functions under the authority of the Na- tional Assembly, with the assistance of Ministers whom he shall select, and over whom he will preside." There was no public ballot. The Journal Officiel reports the vote as follows : — " The proposition was put to the vote, and adopted almost unanimously." The second paragraph had been added by the Commission to the primary proposition. Its object was to place on record that the Chamber did not accept the Republican form otherwise than provisionally, and pending legislation. M. Louis Blanc called attention to this from the 80 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. tribune ; adding to his own protest that of those members of the Republican party who regarded the Eepublican form as above all discussion and contest. He declared that France regarded the provision for a future revolution, made by the Monarchists, in the very act which constituted the Government, with uneasiness. No truth was ever more evident. The majority in the Assembly was commencing its struggle with the majority in the country. M. Thiers had set about formino- his Cabinet prior to his being charged with the executive power, indeed ever since the result of the elections had made it evident that he must speedily find himself at the head of the Govern- ment. He resolved to take his ministers from the two great sections of the Assembly, the Left, and the Eight Centre. M. Dufaure was naturally indicated as the Minister of Justice. The portfolio of Commerce was confided to M. Lambrecht, who had been a member of the Legislative Body from 18 ^3 to 1860, had con- stantly voted with M. Thiers, and was remarkable for the extent of his information, the directness and precision of his intelligence, and also for elegance and clearness as a speaker. M. Thiers, between whom and M. Lambrecht an old and sincere friendship existed, used to say familiarly THE ASSEMBLY AT BORDEAUX. 81 of him that he was " wisest of the wise." M. de Larcy, a Liberal Legitimist, a member of the Chamber of Deputies under Louis Philippe, and a determined enemy of the empire, became Minister of Public AYorks. This non-political office was the only share in the composition of the Cabinet which fell to the Legitimist party. M. de Larcy, a lawyer, and formerly a magistrate under the Eestoration, had been for a long time in the habit of taking part in political assemblies, and was not adapted to the office which he was appointed to fill. M. Lambrecht, an engineer in official employ,^ would have been more suitably placed as Minister of Public Works ; but M. Thiers was bent upon having a Minister of Com- merce who shared his own opinions in the matter of Customs. The President retained General Le Flo at the Ministry of War, and gave the naval portfolio to Admiral Pothuan. General Le Flo voted afterwards with the Right, and Admiral Pothuan joined the Left Centre of the Assembly, but, at the time, their respective nominations to the Cabinet were not regarded as political either by M. Thiers, or by the Chamber. M. Thiers was careful to explain his selection of Admiral Pothuan in his speech of the 10th March, 1871. "The Naval Mmister," he said, "might ' In the service known as Ponts et Chaussées. VOL. I. G 82 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. remain at Bordeaux ; nevertheless we wanted liira in Paris because he is popular, and even renowned there, not only for good sense, but also for calm courage. We are glad to avail ourselves of tlie popularity he has won." M. Thiers reserved only three out of nine portfolios for Republicans, but he rightly con- sidered that in appointing them to the Ministries of Home and Foreign Affairs respectively he had placed them in the most important posts. M. Jules Favre had been Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Government of National Defence, and in Sep- tember had made the journey to Ferrieres, whose result was decisive division between the Im- perial and the Republican policy, release of the Government from responsibility, and the demon- stration of their true situation to France and Prussia respectively. M. Jules Favre had also negotiated and concluded the convention of the 28th January; it was natural that he should become the associate and fellow-labourer, or rather, as he afterwards said, the fellow-martyr of M. Thiers in the negotiations about to be opened. M. Jules Favre made his accept- ance of office conditional upon the appointment of M. Ernest Picard, his intimate friend, to the Ministry of the Interior. During the early years of the Empire, when there were only five dis- THE ASSEMBLY AT BORDEAUX. 83 sentients in the Legislative Body, M. Jales Favre was the leader of that small but glorious band, and Messieurs Ollivier and Picard were his com- panions in arms. In later times M. Ollivier became a Minister, while M. Ernest Picard re- mained by the side of M. Jules Favre in the Re- publican Opposition. They entered the Govern- ment of National Defence together, and assumed its direction. M. Thiers, who appreciated the worth of M. Picard, accepted his services with eagerness. He begged M. Jules Simon to retain his office as Minister of Public Instruction. On the 1 9th February, M. Thiers announced to the National Assembly that he had formed his Cabinet of the gentlemen above mentioned. The name of the Minister of Finance was missing from the list. *' The choice is already made by the Council," said M. Thiers, " but the honourable member to whom the department of Finance will be entrusted has not yet reached Bordeaux, so that I do not consider myself at liberty to give publicity to his name." For a short time M. Thiers had thought of M. Buffet for the Ministry of Finance. On returning to Paris he resolved to call upon M. Pouyer- Quertier, one of our chief manufacturers, and a powerful and original speaker on financial affairs in the Legislative Body, to fill the important post. G 2 84 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIEES. " He is a financier of the first class," wrote M. Thiers to M.Jules Simon, "fertile in resource, and bold to the last degree." The economic views of M. Pouyer-Quertier, which were shared by M. Lambrecht, but which M. Jules Simon strenuously opposed in the latter years of the Empire, also recommended him to M. Thiers. The economic question above all others was pressing upon the mind of the chief of the Executive, and with good reason. Subjects of disagreement were already but too numerous, in the Council as well as in the Assembly, and indeed throughout all France, this one must inevitably lead to fresh complications, and that speedily, since new taxes must inevitably, and soon, be levied. M. Thiers relied upon the moderation and the patriotism of his colleagues although he did not hope to convert them all to his economic views. He wrote to M. Jules Simon as follows : — " I said to M. Pouyer-Quertier that he must confine himself to a moderate raising of the tariifs, a measure which is indispensable to our finances, for the customs only will be able to give us one hundred millions of francs, the chief resource of the future budget. I also told him that his nomination was subject to your acquiescence. As the Ministry must positively be completed, THE ASSEMBLY AT BORDEAUX. 85 especially in the department of Finance, which must find money by the beginning of March, I beg you will immediately summon the Council and reply to me by telegraph. Do not lose a moment." The consent for which M. Thiers asked was telegraphed at once, but M. Jules Simon wrote to him on the same day : — " M. de Lat'cy takes exception on the point of free trade ; M. Dufaure also, but more formally. He has expressly charged me to write to you to that effect ; and to add that he fears this nomination will produce a bad effect in England, where it may be interpreted as an abandonment of the principle of free trade. I need not tell you that I also take similar exception, and I have every reason to believe that Jules Favre thinks with me. " I regret deeply that I am obliged to speak just now of anything except the mission which you are accomplishing so admirably, but the first condition of an honest ministry like ours is that the situation shall be perfectly clear on all points. It must be understood then that I abide by all the deplorable doctrines which, as you know, I hold, free trade, obhgatory education, &c. That point being settled, rest assured that I will help you with all my might to conclude the peace, and to tranquillize the country." 86 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. On the 1 9tli February, in announcing tlie for- mation of the Ministry (M. Pouyer-Quertier had not yet joined it), M. Thiers made the memorable speech in which he set forth what has since been called " the pact of Bordeaux." This was the programme of the Cabinet, and it was scrupulously adhered to b}'' the Ministers and their illustrious chief, but the majority of the Chamber, although it was apparently adopted by them on that day, afterwards refused to regard it otherwise than as a precaution against a Republican Government. When M. Thiers wished only to adjourn, they wanted to condemn. ** You have left to me," he said, " the selection of my colleagues. I have chosen them from no motive of preference beyond the public esteem universally accorded to the character and the capacity of each of them; I have taken them not from one only of the parties into which we are divided, but from all ; just as the country did when it gave you its votes, allowing persons of the most widely-different opinions to figure upon the self-same lists, because they are all united by patriotism, intelligence, and community of good intentions. {Hear ! hear !) " France, flung into a great war without a grave motive. and in sufficiently prepared, has seen one balf of her soil invaded, her army destroyed, her fine THE ASSEMBLY AT BORDEAUX. 87 organization broken up, her ancient and powerful unity impaired, her finances crippled, multitudes of her sons torn from their bread-winning toil to die on the field of battle, order rudely disturbed by the sudden uprising of anarchy, and the war, sus- pended for a few days only, after the enforced surrender of Paris, ready to break out again unless a Government, held in esteem by Europe, accept- ing power with courage, taking the responsibility of most painful negotiations upon itself, shall put an end to these frightful calamities. " In the presence of such a state of things, is there, can there exist a division of policy ? On the contrary, is there not one policy only, enforced, necessary, urgent ; — the securing of the promptest possible cessation of the evils by which we are overwhelmed ? *•' Is there any one who would venture to deny that the first thing to be done and as soon as possible, is to bring the foreign occupation of the territory to an end by means of a peace, to be earnestly debated, and rejected if it be not honourable? {Hear ! hear ! Applause from several benches.) " Will any one venture to tell us that a more pressing duty exists for us than to free our lands from the enemy who treads them under foot, and devours then* produce ; to recall our soldiers, our 88 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIEES. officers, our generals, from their foreign prisons with them to reconstitute a disciplined and brave army ; to re-establish order ; to fill the places of "unworthy officials, or of such as have resigned ; to reform our dissolved General and Municipal Councils by election; {Hear! hear!) to reconstruct our disorganized administration, check ruinous expenditure, re-establish — if not our finance, — that we could not expect to do in a day — at least our credit, which is our only means of facing our pressing engagements ; to send back our mobiles to their fields and their workshops ; to reopen the intercepted highways, to rebuild the demolished bridges ; to revive labour which is everywhere sus- pended, labour which alone can secure the means of existence to our workmen and our peasants ? {Hear! hear!) Is it possible that any here present would enter upon a lengthy discussion of articles of constitution, while our prisoners are languishing in distant lands, and om' starving populations are forced to relinquish their last morsel of bread to foreign soldiers ? {Prolonged sensation.) " No, no, gentlemen ; the only policy possible or even conceivable at this moment is that of re- organization, of the revival of labour, of the resto- ration of credit. In these tasks every sensible, honest, and intelligent man, let him think as he THE ASSEMBLY AT EOKDEAUX. 89 may about the Monarchy or the Republic, may worthily and usefully assist ; and if he has laboured for those ends for only one year, or for six months, then he may retire unto the bosom of his country, with head erect and conscience at ease. {Rear! hear!) " When we shall have rendered those pressing services which I liave just enumerated to our country, when we shall have raised up bleeding France, now lying low, when we shall have healed her wounds and renovated her strength, then we shall restore her to her own guidance, and she, having recovered her liberty of spirit, standing firm once more, shall rule her life as she pleases." {Loud apj^Ianse.) M. Thiers concluded his speech with an eloquent appeal for concord. The building resounded, for several minutes with the applause with which every member of all the parties greeted his brave and noble words. He repeated the same declara- tions, with equal precision and with similar success, at the last meeting of the Assembly at Bordeaux, on the 10th March. The question was the place in which the Assembly should sit. The Extreme Left wanted Paris, the Right demanded Fontainebleau, the Government designated Ver- sailles. After he had discussed the question in a lofty tone, and with irresistible effect, M. Thiers 90 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. went on to speak of the part wliich the Assembly liad now to act. " You are sovereign," said he to his colleagues. " Never was there an Assembly elected more freely, or with more extensive powers conferred upon it. You have the power, if you choose to use it, of making a Constitution ; but you will be wise enough to forego the exercise of your power." These words met with some opposition from the benches on the Right, and he then dwelt upon the divisions in the Assembly, and their inevitable consequences, should such a moment be chosen for framing a Constitution. "France," said he, " needs all our efforts, she requires union among us, for her new birth. Let us adjourn our divisions, and working heartily at our most pressing business, under the Government de facto, leave the future an open question." Dealing with the characteristics of the parties in the Assembly, M. Thiers dwelt on two only, as befitted a practical man, fully aware of the powerlessness of the Legitimists, and the worth- lessness of the Bonapartists. " You are divided,'* he said, "into two great parties: — one, and this is perfectly legitimate, perfectly respect- able, — believes that France can find definitive repose only under a constitutional monarchy ; the other, as sincerely, believes that in the institu- THE ASSEMBLY AT BORDEAUX. 91 tions which you have conferred upon yourselves, in that great institution, Universal Suffrage, in the general direction of the movement of men's minds, in the disturbance which exists at the centres of Government all the world over, there is something which draws existing generations towards the Republic." M. Thiers spoke of the opposed parties with equal respect, which was not only very politic on his part, but also quite sincere. " Let calumny cease among us," he said, "let us learn to do justice, and to respect each other's opinions." He made a brief allusion to the internal dissen- sions among the different parties. " There are Republicans who believe that the Republic, even when it is not in their hands, is still the Republic. There arc others who admit the Republic only when it is in their hands." Recalling the errors into which the first Republic fell in the final years of its existence, and the long-continued exposure of them, while the excesses of the White Terror were scrupulously kept in the shade, knowing besides that a party cannot improvise capable administrators off-hand, and that to know how to use power it must be for some time in power ; and also, perhaps, yielding in some measure to the in- fluence of his old monarchical prejudices, M. 92 THE GOVERîs^MENT OP M. THIERS. Thiers uttered tlie plirase " a Republic without Republicans," wliich might indeed define a system, but which, as he used it, was nothing more than an exhortation to wisdom and moderation. Those words were afterwards turned into a weapon in the hands of those enemies of the Republic who for a while governed it. "I do not want," he added, " to flatter any one — at my age I am not likely to begin to do what I have never done under any system, I have flattered neither king, nor people, nor party; — I profoundly honour those who have the good sense to recognize that the institution itself not being reassuring, it is necessary that the men should be so. " What, then, is our duty ? " said M. Thiers in conclusion. " What is the duty which I, whom you have overwhelmed with your confidence, am bound to fulfil ? It is loyal dealing towards all the parties which divide France and which divide the Assembly. It is due to them all that we deceive none of them ; that we do not so act as to prepare without your knowledge an ex- clusive solution, which would cause dismay to the other parties. {Hear! hear !) " No, I swear in presence of the country, and if I might consider myself so important that I may allude to history, I would say that I THE ASSEMBLY AT BORDEAUX. 93 swear in presence of history, that I will not deceive any of you, that I will not prepare through the medium of constitutional questions any solution unknown to you, and which would be a sort of treason on my, on our, part. (Loud applause) *' Monarchists, E;epui)licans, no ! Neither one party nor the other shall be deceived. We have accepted only a single mission, but it is almost overwhelming. We will occupy ourselves solely with the reorganization of the country. We shall always ask for your support in that re- organization, because we know that if we step beyond this limited task we divide you, and our- selves. " We will labour at this dijBScult work only. But I must be permitted to say to men who have given their whole lives to the Republic, be just to those members of this Assembly who do not think as you do. " You have called me Chief of the Executive of the French Republic. In every act of the Govern- ment, the word Republic is repeatedly used. If we succeed in effecting reorganization it will be done under the Republican form and to its profit. (Hear ! hear ! from several benches !) You must not come and say to us, *Do not sacrifice the Republic ! ' for I should reply, * Do not ruin it yourselves I ' 94 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. " The Eepublic is in your hands, it will be the reward of your own prudence and of nothing else. Every time that you lose your temper, every time that you raise inopportune questions, every time that you appear to be, let me say the confidants or the involuntary accomplices — certainly invo- luntary — of the party of disorder ; say to your- self that by accepting this apparent complicity you deal the Republic the deadliest of blows. (Sensation.) "When the country has been reorganized, we shall come here, if happily we ourselves have been able to reorganize it, if our strength have sufficed, if we have not lost your confidence by the way ; then, in that case, we shall come as soon as we can, very happy, very proud of having contributed to that noble deed, and we shall say to you, ' You confided the country to us, bleeding, covered with wounds, scarce alive ; we restore it to you somewhat revived, now is the moment to give it the form which it is definitely to wear.' And I give you the word of an honest man, on not one of the reserved questions shall any resolution have been taken; no solution shall have been effected by a breach of faith on our part." The speech of M. Thiers was followed by long- continued and enthusiastic acclamations, and the THE ASSEMBLY AT BOEDEAUX. 95 orator was surrounded, almost mobbed, by mem- bers of the Assembly wlio expressed their admira- tion of it, some of them with tears. It was not the orator whom they admired, whom they thanked, though he had never been greater; it was the statesman, the patriot, and — no one would then have thought the word too strong — the saviour. This speech was delivered on the 10th March, and in it M. Thiers had almost announced the insurrection which actually did take place on the 18th. More than one among his hearers might afterwards have recalled those memorable words : " Every time that you appear to be the con- fidants or the accomplices of the party of disorder, you deal the E-epublic the deadliest of blows." How often, afterwards, the whole Assembly, the Left as well as the Eight, ought to have bethought themselves of those other words, spoken with such solemn sadness : " There is too much calumny among us ! Let us respect each other's opinions." France had so much need of peace ! There was such a great work to be done in common ! It was not, however, easy to bring about in- ternal peace in the country. Civil war was on the point of breaking out in Paris. Strife, less fierce indeed, but which, for the misfortune of 96 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. France, was destined to last for years, already existed in the National Assembly. Twice only during tlie sittings at Bordeaux did tlie various parties seem to be fused together in a common purpose; first on the nomination of M. Thiers as Chief of the Executive, and secondly, on the proclamation of the abolition of the Em- pire. The latter solemn decision was brought about by an incident of the sitting on the 1st March. M. Bamberger, the deputy from Metz, had ascended the tribune, to protest against the treaty of peace, "or rather," said he, "the treaty of shame." " One man only ought to have signed it," continued M. Bamberger, " Napoleon the Third." Then M. Gallioni was heard to exclaim, " Napoleon the Third would never have signed a shameful treaty !" In a moment there arose the wildest confusion. All the members of the Assembly stood up, and all spoke, or rather shouted simultaneously. The public in the galleries, as indignant as the deputies, shouted with them. M. Conti made his way towards the tribune amid cries of " Let him speak ! Let him explain himself! Let him justify the Emperor ! Let him dare to defend him who has betrayed and ruined France ! " " I stand here," said M. Conti, " to defend, with THE ASSEMBLY AT BORDEAUX. 97 earnest conviction a glorious past, a revered sovereign, whom France has applauded by four plebiscites, to whom those who now revile me have, like me, sworn allegiance, to whom our country owes fifteen years of repose and prosperity. If my protest be stifled here, I hope, I am sure, that it will resound throughout the whole of France." " A glorious past ! " cried M. Yitet, " say a shameful past. Plebiscites imposed by craft and violence ! Did not your Emperor take the oath to the Republic ? You call years of oppression and tyranny years of peace. Peace ! You have gone to war against the will of France four times over ! When M. Thiers demanded the preservation of peace, you drove him from the tribune ! You brought about the war by lies, and went into it like madmen, without allies, without resources, without generals ! You are responsible for the blood of our soldiers, sacrificed by your criminal folly ! responsible for our humiliation, our ruin, and the dismemberment of France ! " M. Galloni, M. Gavini, and M. Haentjens supported M. Conti, but they only were with him. M. Bamberger pushed his way to the tribune, and took his place beside M. Conti. M. Victor Hugo joined the two, and also endeavoured to speak. The President could not get a hearing. A member called out VOL. I. H 98 THE GOVEUNMENT OF M. THIEIiS. loudly : " The deposition of the Empire must be proclaimed ! " Then arose the cry, " Deposition ! Deposition ! " {La déchéance ! La déchéance !) from every part of the Assembly : it rolled like thunder through the galleries, the corridors, and the staircases, until it reached and was echoed by the dense crowd which thronged the Place de Tourny and the adjacent streets, and by the troops under arms in the vicinity of the Theatre. The President suspended the sitting, which was resumed half an hour later, and then M. Grévy read the text of an order of the day which had been laid upon his desk : — " The National Assembly closes the incident, and under the grievous circumstances in which the country is placed, in presence of unexpected pro- tests and exceptions, confirms the deposition of Napoleon the Third and of his dynasty, which has been already proclaimed by universal suffrage, and declares him responsible for the ruin, the invasion, and the humiliation of France." The reading of this order of the day was followed by prolonged acclamations. All the members of the Assembly rose to their feet, applauding, and shouting " bravo ! " A great number of Repiib- licans were among the signatories, but every one wanted to sign, all parties were represented. The names of Messieurs Lambert de Sainte- Croix, THE ASSEMBLY AT BORDEAUX. 99 de Brette-Thurin, Wallon, Victor de Laprade, Baragnon, and de Marinier, were side by side with those of Messieurs Target, Paul Bethmont, and Charles Rolland. Three times the cheering was renewed. M. Conti again demanded permission to speak, in the midst of general indignation. " Give him leave," said M. Thiers ; " Monsieur le Président, give him leave to speak ! Sustain his demand ! " The President, finding it impossible to procure silence, M. Thiers made up his mind, ascended the tribune, and said, — " Gentlemen, I have proposed a policy of con- ciliation and of peace, and I hoped that everybody would understand our reserve and silence with respect to the past. When, however, that past uplifts itself again before the country, when it seems to mock our misfortunes, which it has caused, not by its faults only, but also by its crimes, we are bound to answer on the instant, and make known the truth. Do you know, gentlemen, what those princes whom you represent are saying in Europe ? They are saying that it is not they who are guilty of the war, they are saying that we are guilty, that France is guilty of it ! Well then, I give them the lie in the face of Europe. No, France did not want war ; it was you, you who now protest, who would have it ! You have disowned the truth, but it has risen to confront you to-day, and it seems like a H 2 100 THE GOVEENMENT OF M. THIEES. judgment from heaven that here, in this place, you should be obliged to undergo the sentence of the nation which will be that of posterity." After these terrible words, the order of the day was put to the vote. " The Assembly confirms the deposition of Napoleon the Third and his dynasty, already pronounced by universal suffrage, and declares him responsible for the ruin, the invasion, and the dismemberment of France." A few members stood up at the counter-proof. " I afQrm," said M. Cochery, " that five members only have stood up at the counter-proof." " There are six," said M. Wilson in his turn, " not one more ! I require that the fact be stated in tho Moniteur." After such a sitting as this, and considering the effect which it produced on the country, it might have been beheved that Bonapartism was finally and irrevocably vanquished. The Republicans had not exhibited greater indignation than the Constitutionalists and the Legitimists. M. Vitet, usually so circumspect, and M. de Franclieu, had remained during the entire scene at the foot of the tribune, in the midst of the excited throng, and were with difficulty restrained by their friends. Nevertheless, this party, condemned, stigmatized, dishonoured by a solemn vote, in which all the other parties without exception had taken a part, THE ASSEMBLY AT BORDEAUX. 101 reduced to six members in tlie Assembly, and witli no organs except M. Conti (who died shortly afterwards), M. Gavini, and M. Galloni d'Istria, was destined to become in time the most influential in that same Assembly. It ob- tained toleration from the Monarchists, in the first place, as a useful auxiliary in their incessant struggle against the Republic and Republicans: then it became a necessary make-weight, securing the victory to the side to which it leaned, after this it profited by the senseless political cam- paigns of the Orleanists and the Legitimists, who seemed to put themselves forward to meet defeat, and finally it became the director-in-chief of the manœuvres of the Right, and their eventual beneficiary. In order to account for this extraordinary luck, we must thoroughly understand that its point of departure, at Bordeaux itself, was the hatred of the Republic and Republicans entertained by all the Monarchists. The explosion of wrath against the imperial régime which took place on the 1st March is easily explicable by the revival of the recollection of our recent misfortunes, and the discussion of the preliminaries of peace on the same day. The Bonapartists, however, were well aware that hatred of the Republic was an older and a deeper sentiment, and one which would last 102 THE GOVEENMENT OF M. THIERS. longer in the breasts of the majority of tlie Mon- archists. Republicans were constantly represented as enemies of religion and property. The identi- fication of them with atheists and socialists was merely a continuation of a system of calumny which dates back to the earliest contests between the Royalists and the Revolution in 1789. The Bonapartists added to these charges against the Republicans that they had caused our disasters by urging on the war, disorganizing the army, bringing about a revolution in presence of the enemy, prolonging resistance, and refusing to summon the Assembly. All these imputations were false. The Republicans had not urged on the war ; on the contrary they had resisted to the utmost the declaration of war which was made by the leaders of the Bonapartist party, in sj^ite of the Repub- licans and of all France. The Republicans had not disorganized the army; they had merely insisted together with the whole of the Legislative body upon a reduction of 10,000 men on the con- tingent proposed by M. Emile Ollivier. Neither had they brought about a revolution in presence of the enemy; but they had courageously and patriotically assumed power when the Empire fell, crushed under the weight of its own sins and our misfortunes, and unable to command the THE ASSEMBLY AT BOHDEAUX. 103 obedience of either soldiers or officials. Tliat tlie Republicans bad not voluntarily prolonged resis- tance to the enemy after the 4th September was amply proved by the interview at Fer- rieres. They were, indeed, forced in their own despite to continue the war, and they urged it on vigorously, according to the laws of honour, until the moment at which further resistance had become impossible. They had not refused to summon a National Assembly, but they had not thought it possible to do so without an armistice, and while one half of France was invaded. These contradictory assertions, some of which were grossly absurd, were made by the Bonapartists in all their newspapers, with the object of distracting public attention from the crimes of the Empire. Although the country at large treated the calumnies of the Bonapartists with the contempt they deserved, it was otherwise in the Assem- bly, where the most timid of conservatives and the most fanatical of clericals were among the members. That it was their set purpose to get rid of the Republic and make war on Repub- licans became especially evident when the ques- tion of fixing the seat of Government outside of Paris came on for discussion. To the Right, at that moment, Paris meant Republic. 104 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIEES. It must be borne in mind tbat the question was wbetber not tlie Assembly only, but the Chief of the State, the Ministers and the entire adminis- tration should not be located outside of Paris, and even, if the more extreme had been listened to, at a great distance from the capital. The present aspect of the same question is entirely changed. The President of the Republic and all the Ministers reside in Paris. The public offices have never been transferred. A few officials are sent to Ver- sailles, during the session of the Assembly, that the law may appear to be observed. In fact the resolutions adopted at Bordeaux, and confirmed by constitutional law are obsolete, with the sole exception that the Assembly and the Senate meet at Versailles instead of meeting at the Palais Bourbon, and the Luxembourg. This is a great inconvenience to the members of the two Assem- blies, who lose much time every day, attend com- mittees irregularly, and have few opportunities of meeting and coming to an understanding with one another. It is a still greater inconvenience to the Ministers who are at a distance from their bureaus, and consequently from the centres of information and business during the greater part of the day. What does Paris lose by all this ? Nothing. When the discussion took place at Bordeaux, on the 10th March, 1871, a week before THE ASSEMBLY AT BOEDEAUX. 105 the outbreak of the Commune, the case was en- tirely different. M. Thiers proposed "Versailles. He would have preferred Paris, for he loved the capital deeply and truly, and would not willingly have consented to inflict a slight upon it. He was fully aware that the tide of business flowed there, that the Government ought not to be far from the great financial centre ; that the danger, if danger there were, from the crowded state of the city, and the floating population, rendered the presence of the Government all the more necessary. " A Prefect at Paris ? " said he. " If you know one who would be capable of governing and restrain- ing it, show him to me. I shall be delighted. He shall be put at the head of the Government ; and rid me of a very heavy burden." M. Thiers felt the necessity of restoring its former splendour to the great city which is not only the political, but also the literary, scientific, industrial, and financial capital of the country. To make little of Paris is to make little of France, and to lessen its wealth. Foreigners come to see Paris rather than France. To wealthy and enlightened Europe Paris is France, and the strength and splendour of France is estimated by the strength and splen- dour of Paris. All the rest of the world takes its tastes, its fashions, and its customs from Paris, 106 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. submits to its judgment, comes tliitlier as to tlie universal meeting-place, the centre of civilization. Our history itself would be less comprehensible if Paris "were no longer the capital. One of the most admirable speeches ever made by M. Thiers was his speech of the 10th March, and all its con- clusions were in favour of Paris. Nevertheless he said, several times over, " I do not propose Paris to you." Why ? He did not give his reason. The growing excitement of which he had just been a witness, and which, a week later, cul- minated in insurrection, was the explanation. He could not propose Paris, and, had he done so, it is not unlikely that, almost all-powerful as his influence was, the proposal would have been re- jected. He was restrained by that consideration also. He did propose that the seat of the Assem- bly should be at the gates of the city, with the certainty that when things should have calmed down, the Government, if not the Assembly, would remove to Paris. Time has proved that he was right. The Monarchical majority, who had come to Versailles against their will, have made strenuous efforts to keep the Government there. They thought nothing of spending millions for this purpose. They would have erected all the necessary buildings, without reflecting that a more colossal Paris would probably be the sole THE ASSEMBLY AT BOEDEAUX. 107 result, for, after all, it is only half an hour from the Palais Bourbon to the Château de Ver- sailles. They even inserted an Article in the Constitution which very nearly threw everything into confusion, and which, though put in practice by the two Chambers because they can obey it at the cost of some inconvenience, is openly violated by the President of the Pepublic, because it would be at once improper and impossible for him to con- form to it. How was it that the Monarchists, who foresaw these consequences, and who wanted Fon- tainebleau in order to avoid them, agreed to Ver- sailles? Several of the least clear-sighted among them said, " It is not Paris." Others, conscious of the enormity of their demands, had not suËBcient courage to persist. They were strong in the Assembly, but very weak in the country, and they knew it. They did not even venture to propose Bourges, their ideal, openly. They held to Fon- tainebleau, which did not mean another capital, but no capital at all; a locality in which the Government would be deprived of the means of action, but an insurrection would not. Fontaine- bleau was, in plain words, a folly. Bourges would have been an outrage; Versailles was an expedient. Versailles carried the day by a large majority. The true sentiments of the Monarchists came out on several occasions during the debate. M. 108 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIEES. Louis Blanc was the first speaker. " Why," said he, " should we follow up one provisional install- ation by another ? Why should we be condemned to offer to all Europe the spectacle of a wandering Assembly, which goes begging for a refuge in the very country which it represents ? Is it because we are afraid of Paris ?" A Memher. — " Yes." The Assembly instantly recognized the impru- dence of this utterance, and cries of " No, No ! " arose on all sides. The rectification might be sound policy, but the word had been uttered. A little later in his speech M. Louis Blanc put this question : — " Is there not a party in the Assembly which, in order to disarm what it calls the Revolution, would remove the seat of Government from Paris for ever ?" A Voice on the Bight. — " Yes." M. Louis Blanc. — " You say, * Yes.' Oh, my fellow-citizens, reflect on this, and do not, I entreat of you, touch the national unity. To do so would be to complete by the hands of Frenchmen that dismemberment of our beloved France that has been commenced by the hands of the enemy, and, perhaps, to kindle from the ashes of the horrible foreign war that is hardly yet over, a civil war more horrible still. {Great a^jplause from several benches.) THE ASSEMBLY AT BORDEAUX. 109 " The other day one of my colleagues said in my presence, — " * Hitherto revolution has marched from Paris on the provinces. It is time that order should march from the provinces on Paris.' " {Hear! hear! on the Right.) M. Alfred Giraud replied to M. Louis Blanc. " Many representatives have, like myself, received, not an imperative mandate — that we would not have accepted — but an imperious one. This mandate is so to act that the Assembly shall not deliberate either under the bullets of the Prussians or the paving stones of rioters. Afraid ! The word * afraid ' has been uttered, and I accept the challenge. Yes, I am afraid ! Not for myself. I am afraid for the National Assembly. I am afraid for my country. France has endured misfortune enough to earn our compassion for her, grand, dear, and mournful wreck as she is!" M. de Belcastel expressed himself with complete frankness. "What is," said he, "the mind of the great majority in France on this vital point ? I be- lieve it to be this : — " France knows that ten times in eighty years Paris has sent her ready-made governments by telegraph. {Assent on the Right.) " She knows that iusurrections, even when they no THE GOVEENMENT OP M. THIERS. are put down, are ugly dates. She knows that Paris is the head-quarters of organized revolt (Assent on the Bight), the capital of the revolutio- nary idea, though only temporarily so, I hope and believe. However, while this violent state of crisis, of which she is the judge, lasts, France will not, because she ought not, deliver up her fortunes, and her last remaining citadel, your Assembly, gentlemen, to the chances of a contest and to the pressure of that idea." M. Fresneau, although he pronounced a glow- ing eulogium upon Paris, spoke as follows : — " The mere fact of these deliberations seems to prove that, while all our industries are disor- ganized, there is still one which lasts and flourishes, the industry of those worthies who make a trade of overturning governments, as highwaymen might stop a coach at the corner of a wood, and lay hold of the sovereignty of thirty millions of men in two hours. In this situation, and since we have been nominated here, I admit that something like fear has taken hold of my mind." M. de Boisboissel also exclaimed, — " If you want us to go to Paris, at least disarm the faubourgs." In every speech this fear of Paris, or, as the speakers put it, of the revolutionary idea, is evident. Paris was not to be the capital of the Republic, THE ASSEMBLY AT BORDEAUX. Ill therefore it was that they would none of Paris. 'No one said what would have been true, that Paris was, just then, in a state of violent excite- ment, easy to explain, but undeniably threaten- ing ; and that if there were indeed some danger for the Assembly it arose from present circum- stances, and would disappear with them. All this was in M. Thiers' mind. He was satisfied with a provisional sojourn outside of Paris, but at the gates of the city, at Saint Cloud or Versailles. He would have preferred Saint Cloud, had there been suitable accommoda- tion, but the château was destroyed, and the village in ruins. Even though fearing an in- surrection he would have accepted Paris, had he not despaired of the vote of the Assembly. He did not go so far as M. Louis Blanc, who believed that the sojourn of the Assembly at Versailles would be one of the chief causes of the insurrection, nor did he think that the presence of the Assembly in Paris would prevent it. And yet, such a proof of confidence in the capital at such a moment might have allayed the tumult of the public mind. The Government, supported by the Assembly, present like itself at the post of danger, would have gained in strength. If the Assembly had been Republican, there would not have been no hesitation. In any case, an ad- 112 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. journment for a short time might be explained by the circumstances, but a set purpose not to re-enter Paris could only be explained by a set purpose to overthrow the Republic. No doubt the Monarchists were afraid, but their fear arose from their own intentions. It would never have been easy for an Assembly sitting in Paris to announce the substitution of Monarchy for the Republic. Napoleon himself, when he con- templated the deeds of the 18th Brumaire, trans- ferred the Council of the Ancients to Saint Cloud, with the connivance of his brother. The Council had a constitutional right to fix the place of its abode. It remains to be seen whether, from the point of view of the timid, such a right is not more satisfactory than an article of the Constitution by which a sojourn at Versailles is rendered obligatory. Prior to the Constitution of the 18th February, 1875, an Assembly always had power to remove itself from Paris. In June, 1848, when the insurrection seemed for a while on the point of triumphing, a blank order was given to the President, M. Senard, empowering him to convene his colleagues in any city in France which he might select. During M. Jules Simon's mission to Bordeaux, he had a similar blank order from the Government of National Defence. THE ASSEMBLY AT BORDEAUX. 113 The animated discussion that ended by making Versailles the seat of Government, gave utter- ance not to the resentment of the provinces but to that of the Legitimist and Clerical parties. The large towns, and indeed all towns in general, have the Parisian, because they have the Repub- lican spirit ; the provincial spirit, which is losing ground day by day, lingers in small towns where there is but little manufacture, and in country places in which curés and country gentlemen still maintain their influence. The Prussians had their own interests to serve by spreading these discus- sions between Parisians and rurals. The follow- ing article appeared on Monday, the 24th October, 1870, in the Nouvelliste de Versailles^ the ofi&cial journal of the German army : — " There are two nations in France, and be- tween them a distinction should always be made. They are the Parisians, and the French properly so called. Since the great centralization, the work of Richelieu and Mazarin, the Parisians have always usurped dominion over true French- men of the provinces. The Parisians have decided on peace and war, monarchy and the Republic, liberty and despotism ; in short, as they have invariably governed in fact, they have treated the inhabitants of the country as helots. The administration has always had its centre in Paris, VOL. I. I Hi THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. and prefects were, so to speak, enforced upon the provinces ; not one of tliose functionaries could be nominated, without having gone through a previous probation in Paris, so that he should be a Parisian by adoption, in default of birth. " Thus it is not in reality against provincial France that Germany is in arms at this moment. The Departments, having up to the present time submitted almost involuntarily to the yoke or the domination of the Parisians, are now, as a matter of course, involved in the consequences of a war to which Paris, and the Government chosen by Paris, have treated them without their assent. Let provincial France emancipate herself from a pu- pillage which has no longer anything to justify it; let the departments show the domineering capital that henceforth they will not be exploited by it, to the detriment of their best interests." The Nouvelliste de Versailles hardly stops short of presenting the Prussians in the character of liberators of the French provinces from their Parisian oppressors. Our clever enemies under- stand European opinion too well not to know that to abase Paris was to abase France. On the 10th March the Assembly decided that its final sitting should be held at Bordeaux on the next day ; and that they should meet again at Versailles on the 27th. M. Thiers had proposed THE ASSEMBLY AT BORDEAUX. 115 the 16tli, which would have been better, but he did not insist. The Assembly had sat seventeen times, during its sojourn at Bordeaux, including its preliminary- meeting. It had verified the election, formed the provisional Government, proclaimed the deposition of Napoleon the Third and his dynasty, voted the law on bills of exchange, appointed fifteen commis- sions to report on the political, financial, industrial, and military situation of France, decided on Ver- sailles as the provisional residence of the Assembly and the Government; and, finally, ratified the preliminaries of peace. After all this work, the Assembly took a week's holiday. Many of its members, having come direct to Bordeaux from the army or from the German prisons, required to devote a few days to their families and their busi- ness. The week destined to needful repose ended on a sinister date, 18th March. But before we enter upon the history of the Commune, we must place before our readers the details of the nego- tiation and the ratification of the preHminaries of peace. I 2 116 THE GOVEENMENT OF M, THIEES. CHAPTER III. THE PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE. During the war, two opposite current of opinions had been formed in France, both equally violent ; one for war à outrance, for extermination or vic- tory, the other as strongly for peace, even at the cost of the severest sacrifices. The Government of Defence, the object of contradictory accusa- tions on all points, has been execrated by the one party for having desired peace, and condemned by the other, for having, as they say, retarded that end, by delaying the summoning of an Assembly. Certain it is that the majority of the Delegates to Tours and Bordeaux were for war à outrance, and that the Government at Paris was consistently for peace. This difference of opinion came out strongly towards the end : it had been perceptible from the beginning, but had not produced disagreement in action, because the Prussians were manifestly bent on abusing their THE PKELIMINAEIES OF PEACE. 117 victory. Paris was as incapable of accepting a disgraceful peace, as Bordeaux would have been of refusing peace with honour. The efforts made at Ferriéres by M. Jules Favre, and at Ver- sailles by M. Thiers, to obtain an armistice, having failed, the Government of Paris resolved to wait for the assistance that Bordeaux continued to promise, and to hold out until famine should put an end to the siege. To summon an Assembly without an armistice, when one third of France was invaded, and to put the guidance of armies or the negotiations for peace into the hands of a body of men thus irregularly called together, perhaps unknown to each other, and necessarily disturbed by the gravity of events and their own immense responsibility, appeared to all to be a deepening of our material and moral disorganiza- tion, almost equivalent to a surrender at discre- tion. On the 14th January an intimate friend of M. Thiers, knowing the siege was coming to an end because famine was imminent, wrote a private letter, asking him if it would not be possible, considering the position of the departments, to summon an Assembly immediately, reserving the seats of those deputies whom Paris should nominate after the siege was raised. " Thus only," said he, *' shall we have a negotiator of peace, who will not, at the same time, have to 118 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIEKS. treat for the surrender of the citadel. On the day when General Trochu goes to Versailles — and that day is not far off, for we are exhausted — Bismarck will ask him for France." The battle of Buzenval took place, and with it came the end. It should be borne in mind that, throughout the enth^e duration of the siege, the Government could take no steps towards peace, except in secret. After the 31st October they ceased to take any. The population wished for war, and still hoped for victory. Every man had enrolled himself in the National Guard, and enlistments in the regiments were already more than suf- ficiently numerous. These improvised soldiers asked no better than to be immediately drilled, and sent to the advanced posts, and out in sorties. They were full of the idea that the National Guard would beat the Prussian army. Their only fear was lest the Government should parley with the besiegers. When M. Jules Favre went to Ferrieres he concealed his departure from the people, and also from several members of the Government. WTien his report was published a few days after- wards, it was received with general applause, not so much because it exhibited the admirable courage of the negotiator, although that was fully recog- nized, as because it furnished fresh causes of THE rHELIMINAKIES OF PEACE. 119 complaint against the Prussians, and new motives for a continued resistance. The fatal events of the 31st of October took place to the cry of " No Armistice !" It was in fact the rising of that day which rendered the armistice impossible ; but that was its only success. The same ringleaders brought about the scenes of the 22nd January for the same motives. On the 31st of October at least hope was still left; there were provisions in the city, and succour had been promised. It was a crime to select that date for an explosion of hatred towards the bourgeoisie, and it was madness to plan the substitution of M. Gustave Flourens for General Trochu. But when the rising of the 22nd January took place, we had no bread left, we had no succour to hope for, we could no longer deceive ourselves, after the experience of Buzenval, as to military resources ; nevertheless the Govern- ment were seriously threatened. Once more M. Jules Favre was obUged to hide himself like a thief in order to accomplish the most painful task that could be imposed upon a patriot. The populace howled with rage at the shghtest rumour of a negotiation, and yet they were all threat- ened with speedy death by hunger ! " No, no ! " they cried ; there was plenty of provisions, but they were hidden so that the people might be starved into a surrender ! An officer wrote in a 120 THE GOVEENMENT OF M. THIERS, newspaper, "You have provisions for six months !'* True, they had been beaten at Buzenval, but that was the fault of the generals. The sortie had not been genuinely " torrential ! " The revolutionary newspapers declared every morning that when an entire people moves it is irresistible. Six weeks later, at Bordeaux, when M. Thiers brought down the preliminaries of peace to the sitting of the 10th of March, he had to repeat over and over again to the bellicose members who would not listen to them, " But the means ! the means ! " " The means," answered intelligent, well-informed men (see official report), " the means ! You shall be taught it if you do not know it already. A levee en 7nasse ! Let the 750 deputies place them- selves at the head of the nation in arms, and we shall utterly destroy the enemy." This was said on the 10th of March by members of the Assembly, after more than a month's reflection, and with the condition of our troops and their equipments under their eyes. AYas it surprising that in Paris, when the blow fell that shook the reason of the strongest, when it became evident that the Government was making terms, a cry should have rung through the great city, decimated by pestilence and cannon, " We are betraved ! " 1/ This cry found its echo in the provinces. It is one of the grossest instances of injustice on record. THE PKELIMINAEIES OF PEACE. 121 It was allowed that the population had immor- talized themselves; but many added that the Government had betrayed France by capitulating. The most moderate accused them of incapacity and weakness. There was great astonishment at the fall of Paris, the really astonishing thing was that it had not occurred three months earlier. This incapable Government had put the fortifications into a state of defence, raised an army which, im- provised though it was, and necessarily lacking the steadiness of veteran troops, performed garrison duty perfectly, and displayed both dash and cou- rage when under the enemy's fire ; eked out the provisions beyond all hope; made head against two revolts; had not spilt one drop of blood, ordered one arrest, or committed one single act of vengeance after the revolution of the 4th Sep- tember, and, for the space of five months, had kept order in Paris. The capital had neither surrendered nor been taken ; it had been starved out. The Government had so prolonged the resistance, that no time was left for negotiation. All the public stores were empty, the roads were blocked up, and the enemy knew it ! The delay of a day or two might give rise to one of the most frightful famines on record. The conditions of the armistice were less hard than might have been feared under such circumstances, and it 122 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. is paltering with the trutli to deny the men of those conditions to M. Jules Favre. It would not be less unjust to deny that tne Government did good service to France, by causing the elections to take place with perfect freedom, and such promptitude, that the Assembly was able to hold its first sitting fourteen days after the date of thedecree of convocation. Once called together, the principal mission of this Assembly — some said, its sole mission — was to deliberate upon peace or war. It had only twelve days in which to decide upon a course of action; the armistice expired on the 22nd of February. Peace had its adversaries in the Assembly. The number of them 107, is known. Doubtless, there were sincere men among them who, believing that France could still fight with some chance of suc- cess, looked upon the treaty of peace as cowardice and treason. There were also deputies from Alsace and Lorraine, who could not bring them- selves to understand the truth, or perhaps could not admit to themselves that they did understand it. M. Thiers used a terrible phrase in speaking of a third class of peace partisans as " those who came to court a false popularity in the tribune at the risk of destroying their country." France could certainly fight still, but she could no longer conquer. We had been beaten, one might say THE PRELIMINARIES OP PEACE. 123 crushed, in the war which had just ended ; how could we rationally hope for victory in a renewed struggle when we had lost thirty-one depart- ments, Strasburg, Metz, Paris, some of our generals, and 420,000 men now prisoners in Ger- many, without reckoning those dead on the field of battle ? The war party reasoned that 200,000 men still remained to us. Of what troops? and with what oflQcers ? According to them, we still had plenty of war material. Who would venture to compare what was left in our arsenals, and in our camps, with the immense resources of Ger- many, and the 500,000 disciplined men, used to war and well commanded, whom she could im- mediately array against us ? A levee en masse was talked of ; but a multitude is not an army. Men who can neither march, nor fire, who cannot stand fire, nor endure fatigue and privation, are a weakness, not a force. The levée en masse took place; the experiment was complete ! With ad- mirable vigour, M. Gambetta had drawn from the nation all it would and could give. The Revolu- tion, it was said, had subdued the world by the levée en masse. The Revolution began with vic- tories, because it had at its disposal the veteran French army, disciplined and trained to war, and commanded by Dumouriez. When it sent raw recruits, commanded by second-hand generals, 124 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIEES. against Europe, it underwent a series of reverses which brought the country within a hair's-breadth of ruin. And yet the science of war was far from the perfection to which the genius of Napoleon brought it some years after. In these days, rail- ways, and the transformation in weapons, give power, against which mere superiority of numbers can do nothing, to a well-commanded army, well supplied with war material. At the beginning of February, 1871, the Germans had the supe- riority over us in numbers, in generalship, in supplies of war material, and in money. They had also the moral force lent by six months of unheard-of success. A prolonged war would in- deed have been terrible for them; but for us, fatal. By treating for peace, France might be sure of rising again, one day, as Prussia itself had arisen, sixty years after Jena ; by continuing the war, she would condemn herself to the fate of Poland. Was there any hope that Europe would intervene to save us ? Had Europe interfered after the 4th of September ? During the course of the nego- tiations, it was easy to measure the extent of the help in store for us from European diplomacy. Every one pitied us, and every one let us be butchered. In Russia, the people were for us; the Czar was for his uncle the Emperor of Germany. He recommended moderation to the conqueror; THE PEELIMINAHIES OP PEACE. 125 but he informed Austria, whose sympathies we had gained, that if she ranged herself on the side of France, he would take the side of Prussia. Italy, whom so many reasons should have attached to us, was already afraid of the strength of the clerical party in the Assembly, and conceived that if this party, doubly blind, should attain power, our armies would be placed at the disposal of the Pope. Spain, sympathizing indeed, but a prey to internal divisions, was powerless to help us. England, as impolitic as the French Government after Sadowa, gave us nothing but moral support, and that at the close of the negotiations, when it could avail only to irritate Count Bismarck, without serving us. In our position patriotism counselled, nay, commanded us to submit to peace. A dis- honourable peace, a shameful peace was talked of; the resistance of Paris, and the glorious struggle of the provinces were a sufficient answer ; honour was more than life. Doubtless, if we had been obliged to sacrifice the future of France in order to obtain peace, it would have been better to die fighting. If, however, by accepting all these calamities for the present generation, we might safely count upon the future, true honour con- sisted in submitting to a disaster which had been organized by the Empire with its own 126 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIEES, hands. The one absorbing anxiety of thinking men, of true patriots, was this : to secure a to- morrow ! "What would Prussia demand? She would claim an enormous war-indemnity, perhaps a reduction of our effective force and our fortresses, certainly a cession of territory. "We could not deceive ourselves upon the last point. Even before the war, it was known that Prussia was threatening Alsace and Lorraine. At the Tuileries the menace was ridiculed. When General Ducrot, who commanded at Strasburg, warned the Imperial Government of the designs which were entertained at Berlin, and the preparation for a campaign of invasion, they laughed at the warning ! Germany avowed her pretensions openly after our earliest disasters. Europe was silent ; a circumstance to be noted. The day after Sedan, Count Bismarck said to General de Wimpffen, who had taken the command at the last moment, " We have had enough of this. France must be chastised for her pride, and her aggressive and ambitious temper. We intend at last to make sure of our children's safety, and, for that, we must have a glacis between France and us ; we must have land, fort- resses and frontiers which will place us, for ever, beyond all risk of attack on her part." A few days later, the interview at Ferrières took THE PEELIMINARIES OF PEACE. 127 place. During the conversation between Count Bismarck and M. Jules Favre, the Chancellor said, "You declared war against us without a cause, and with the sole intention of taking a portion of our territory. Germany, which did not seek this opportunity, has made use of it for her own security, which can only be guaranteed by a cession of territory. Strasburg is a perpetual threat to us. It is the key of the house, and we want to have it." M. Jules Favre replied, " Then, that means Alsace and Lorraine ?" The Count answered, " I have not spoken of Lorraine. But as for Alsace, I speak point blank. We look upon it as absolutely necessary ^or our defence." At another point in this same interview Count Bismarck did sneak of Lorraine. He expressly states this in a letter written by him at Ferrieres, on the 24th of September, to rectify certain assertions contained in M. Jules Favre' s report, and which was published in German in the " North German Correspondent." " I expressly declared to M. Jules Favre," writes the Count, " that I refused to enter upon the subject of the new frontier demanded by us, until the principle of a cession of territory had been openly recognized by France. As a consequence 128 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. of this declaration, the formation of a new department of the Moselle, containing the districts of Strasburg, Château-Salins, Sarraguemines, Metz, and Thionville, was mentioned by me, as an arrangement suitable to our intentions. . . ." M. Jules Favre, in his turn, rectifies Count Bismarck's rectifications, in a circular addressed to the representatives of France in foreign lands, recapitulating this important part of the con- ference thus : — " I have allowed that upon this subject the Chancellor of the Confederation of the North had, at first, met me with a sort of put-off, drawn from my positive declaration that I would not consent to any cession of territory; but my in- terlocutor cannot have forgotten that, upon my insisting, he explained himself categorically, and mentioned, in case the principle of the cession of territory should be admitted, those conditions which I have enumerated in my report, i. e. the relinquishment by France of Strasburg, with the whole of Alsace, Metz, and part of Lorraine." Germany's intentions were so well known to every one in France, that M. ]\Iicliel Chevalier spoke of them, in a letter to Mr. Gladstone on the 12th of September, thus : " The conquest of Alsace and Lorraine by Prussia is simply a whim. Nancy is as French as Paris, and the THE PEELIMINARIES OP PEACE. 129 two chief towns of Alsace, Strasbur^ and Miil- hoLise, are nearly as mucli so. Germany has no interest in incorporating Alsace and Lorraine with herself ; they are outside of her topography and her hydrography." Moreover, a striking and significant fact was to be remarked prior to the conclusion of peace. When the Germans invaded a district which they wanted to keep, they established German institu- tions there, at once ; when, on the contrary, their occupation was only provisional, they ap- pointed an administrator, who did not disturb the French institutions. The alarm of the popu- lation of Lorraine was no less vehement than that of Alsace. The fears of both were made known, at Bordeaux, by a declaration which M. Keller undertook to lay before the Assembly in the session of the 1 7th February, a few hours before the vote was taken that entrusted the Government of France to M. Thiers. It was signed by all the Deputies from Lower Rhine, Upper Rhine, and the departments of the Moselle and the Meurthe, to the number of thirty-five. " Alsace and Lorraine refuse to be alienated. With one voice, the citizens at their firesides, the soldiers under arms, the former by voting, the latter by fighting, proclaim to Germany and to the world at large, the immutable will of Alsace and Lorraine to VOL. I. K 130 THE GOVEKNMENT OP M. THIEES. remain French. France can neither consent to nor sign the cession of Lorraine and Alsace, without perilling the continuity of her national existence, and dealing a death-blow to her unity with her own hands." The Assembly heard this document read with keen emotion. Great things were to be done that day, the Assembly had to constitute the Govern- ment. It was suggested that the consideration of M. Keller's proposition should be deferred until the following day, but M. Thiers insisted upon its being discussed at once. " The Assembly ought to understand," he said, " that, in so grave a matter, we must act like thoughtful men. " Let us not be carried away by empty words ; we must know what we mean to put behind our words. *' One thing alone is worthy of you, worthy of France, worthy of true patriotism ; it is that you declare yourselves at once, so that jour will may be made known. To put this off to to-morrow would be puerile. Be assured of this, you cannot screen yourselves behind any Government which you may institute. Have the courage of your opinion ; either war, or peace. " I promise you, if I can influence your fate, to devote, as others do, my energies to the service THE PBELIMINAEIES OP PEACE. 131 of our country so long as I can be useful to lier; but I could not — I tell you this at once — accept a mission tliat, as an honourable man and a good citizen, I should be unable to carry out." An hour after, M. Beulé, who had been ap- pointed reporter during the interruption of the sitting, moved the following resolution, which was carried by a vast majority : — " The J^ational Assembly, having received the declaration of M. Keller and his colleagues with the greatest sympathy, refers it to the wisdom and patriotism of the negotiators." Thus the negotiators were given full powers. The nomination of M. Thiers as Chief of the Executive took place immediately afterwards. That night and the next day were occupied by him in forming his cabinet. On Sunday, the 1 9th, he was able to give the Assembly a list of the new ministry, and to lay down his programme. On the same evening he set out with M. Jules Simon for Paris; and went to Versailles alone, according to his own desire, very early on Tuesday morning, the 21st. On his arrival there an unforeseen difficulty presented itself. The Assembly had appointed a committee of fifteen, who were to proceed to Paris in order to assist the negotiators with their presence and K 2 132 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIEES. advice, witliout, however, sharing their respon- sibility. This measure was also taken for the purpose of diminishing as far as possible the in- convenience arising from the seat of the Assembly being at Bordeaux, while the conditions of peace w^ere under discussion at Versailles. The commis- sioners got M. de Chaudordy to apply in London for a safe conduct ; a needless precaution, which retarded their journey by a day, and irritated Count Bismarck, who was anxious to prevent all inter- vention by the neutral powers. The Count ac- quainted M. Thiers with these details at the outset of the interview, and did so with vehemence only slightly tempered with courtesy towards his illus- trious interlocutor. After this unpleasant incident, a prolongation of the armistice was agreed upon. That evening M. Thiers wrote to M. Jules Simon, "I have been fighting all day with Count Bismarck. I have obtained a prolongation of the armistice until midnight on Sunday " (that was Tuesday), " but had to struggle hard for it, which shows that our critical position could not last long." At that time Count Bismarck wanted to limit the negotiators to a very short time, because he expected his proposals to be accepted as an ultimatum ; we shall see that he relaxed this rigorous rule towards the end of the negotiations, when the principal bases had been agreed upon ; THE PEELIMINAEIES OF PEACE. 133 and that lie tlien consented, without difficulty, to prolong the armistice until the 12th March; but on Tuesday, 21st February, the day of M. Thiers' arrival, he insisted that everything should be agreed upon and signed by the 26th, and obstinately refused to grant one more day. That point settled, he made known his proposals ; France was to pay an indemnity of six milliards, to give up the whole of Alsace, including Belfort, Metz with its fortresses, and a considerable portion of Lorraine ; the Prussians were to enter Paris, and remain there until the ratification of peace. M. Thiers protested against conditions which he declared to be not only exorbitant, but im- practicable. Six milhards represented more than twice the savings of France. It was not a war indemnity ; two milliards would have been ample to reimburse Germany for her expenses and her material losses. Six milliards w^ere demanded with the evident design of exhausting the re- sources of France. Had Germany considered the consequences to herself and to the whole of Europe of reducing a nation with such a geographical position as ours, and concerned in all the com- mercial and financial operations of the world, to poverty and ruin ? Had Germany weighed the results of the monetary disturbance which would infallibly ensue from the payment of such a 134 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. sum ? Nor was the dismembering of France more politic, or more practicable. The populations would not give themselves up, France could not deliver them over; the fifteen commissioners would not permit the discussion to be carried on upon such foundations. It is a dictate of wisdom that a lasting and true peace should be made after war ; but in this case the two countries were con- demned to perpetual division. This would not end war, but merely suspend hostilities, for France could never rest so long as the two provinces were exiled from her breast. We could not, with- out vainglorious folly, pretend that in carrying on the war we had any hope of victory; but Germany knew what it would cost her to destroy the last armies of France. If we were driven to despair, our enemies might crush us, but we would not submit to degrading conditions. M. Thiers was not satisfied with speaking thus to Count Bismarck only ; he requested an audience of the Emperor. It was granted reluctantly, and was very brief. The Emperor declined any political discussion. He could not hinder M. Thiers from reminding him, in a few ardent though respectful words, of all the arguments against this policy of extermination. In short, M. Thiers obtained nothing on the first day. All his genius, all his eloquence, were expended in THE PEELIMINAEIES OF PEACE. 135 vain upon an inflexible resolution. He returned to Versailles on the following day, again unac- companied. Having a very high opinion of Count Bismarck's political capabilities, he wished to speak with him privately in the language of politics. He hoped to prove to him that the cession of Metz would make the two nations enemies for ever, and that France, though ever so willing, could not pay six milliards. But he found the Chancellor of the Empire more inflexible than before, more inimical to every idea of negotiation or arrangement. Count Bismarck asserted that in Germany, " the most thinking men " estimated the losses sustained by the country at fifteen mil- liards. He was universally taxed with weakness for having demanded only six. He was even on the point of refusing all further conversation, alleging that his proposals constituted an ulti- matum requiring a simple yes or no in answer. M. Thiers replied that an armistice had been concluded ; that in virtue of the very terms of that agreement, an Assembly had been summoned to deliberate upon peace or war ; that he had come in the name of that Assembly, and conse- quently in the name of all France, on the strength of a convention signed by Count Bismarck, on the faith of a treaty, in the character of a negotiator, having a right to be heard, and not as the envoy 136 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. of an army wlaich has surrendered at discretion, and has only to receive the orders of the con- queror. Count Bismarck was sHghtly confused at having given way to a fit of passion, so insulting to us, and so httle worthy of him. He resumed the conversation, but did not yield an inch of ground. He even announced to M. Thiers that he was benevolently exerting himself to facilitate our payment of the six milliards, and that he had found two financiers who were disposed to undertake the operation by sure and easy means. "You will pay," said he, "without perceiving it.'* M. Thiers returned to Paris, believing that he had gained nothing. Next day (Thursday, February 23rd) the aforesaid bankers presented themselves. Count Bismarck had good reason to boast of their skill and importance ; they were no less personages than Count Heukel and Herr Black- Schroder, the two chief bankers in Germany. M. Thiers would not listen to them except in the presence of the commissioners. Their system was ingenious enough ; it would have given us, or rather sold us, time, and it resolved itself into the doubling of our indemnity. They argued at great length, but of course our commissioners were no more tempted to accept their proposals than was M. Thiers; they submitted to this interview as he THE PEELIMTNARIES OF PEACE. 137 did, as an additional trial; and were resolved beforehand to trust to France for rescue from our embarrassments, and not to the interested expertness of our enemies. After this interview, which took place in the morning, M. Thiers returned to Versailles, ac- companied by M. Jules Favre, who left him no more until the negotiations were concluded. They were immediately informed by Count Bismarck that the Emperor had consented to reduce the indemnity by one milliard. All the entreaties, all the arguments of the negotiators to obtain a more equitable and less overwhelming assessment, were unavailing. It was agreed, in order to save time, that a preliminary treaty should be made, defin- ing the bases of peace only ; but tha.t the stipula- tions in detail should be reserved for an ulterior treaty. Thus, during those three days, Thursday, Friday and Saturday, the discussion was confined to the amount of the indemnity, the mode and dates of payment to correspond with the successive evacuation of the territory by the German troops, the territorial concessions, and the entry of the Prussians into Paris. M. Thiers' great achieve- ment was his obtaining that Belfort should be left to France. He won this success, so to speak, by main force. M. Jules Favre has described this incident with so much passion and energy, 138 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. that we feel bound to place his narrative before our readers. "I see liim still," says M. Jules Favre, " pale, agitated, now sitting, now standing ; I hear his voice, broken by grief, his faltering words, his accents at once beseeching and proud, and I know nothing grander than the sublime passion of that noble heart, breaking out into lamentation, menace, and entreaty. " When, with his own inimitable eloquence, he had set forth the immensity of our sacrifices, the unexampled rigour that imposed an over- whelming indemnity on us, in addition to the mutilation of our territory, upon the ancient ties that bound us to a town which had never belonged to Germany and had nothing Germanic about it, seeing the inflexibility of his hearer, he cried out, ' Well then ! let it be as you will Count ! These negotiations are nothing but a sham. We appear to be discussing, but we are merely to pass under your yoke. We ask of you a city which is altogether French ; you refuse : this is to admit that you have determined upon a war of extermination. Make that war then ! Ravage our provinces, burn our houses, slaughter the inoffen- sive inhabitants ; in a word, complete your work. We will fight you until our last breath. We may be defeated, but at least we shall not be dishonoured 1 * THE PEELIMINAEIES OF PEACE. 139 "Count Bismarck seemed moved. M. Thiers* emotion had touched liim; he repHed that he understood what M. Thiers must be suffering, and that he would be glad to be able to make a con- cession. * But,' he added, ' it would be wrong of me to promise what I cannot grant. The King has commanded me to keep to our conditions ; he alone has the right to modify them. I must take his orders. I must also confer with General Moltke. If I have his consent, I shall be stronger.' He then left the room. " In a quarter of an hour he came back. The King was out walking and would not return until dinner-time, General Moltke was also out. Our suspense may be imagined. It was at its height when, about half an hour after, General Moltke was announced. We did not see him; Count Bismarck shut himself up with him." "I think no accused man ever waited for a verdict in more feverish agony of mind. Motion- less and mute, we followed with scared eyes the hands of the clock that was about to strike the hour of our sentence. The door opened at last, and, standing on the threshold, Count Bismarck spoke : * I was commanded by the King to insist upon the entry of our troops into Paris. You have expressed to me your repugnance and your fears, and earnestly requested that this clause may 140 THE GOVEENMENT OF M. THIERS. be mthdrawn. We will give it up if, on your side, you will leave us Belfort.' " ' Nothing,' replied M. Thiers, ' can equal the grief which Paris must feel in opening the gates of its unconquered walls to the enemy who has been unable to force them. Therefore we have besought you, and do still beseech you, not to inflict this unmerited humiliation upon the city. Nevertheless it is ready to drink the cup to the dregs, so that one bit of its soil and an heroic city may be preserved to the country. We thank you. Count, for having afforded Paris the oppor- tunity of ennobling its sacrifice. The mourning of Paris shall be the ransom of Belfort, which we nowpersist, more than ever,in claiming.' 'E-eflect,' said Count Bismarck : ' perhaps you will regret having rejected this proposal.' 'We should fail in our duty if we accepted it,' replied M. Thiers. The door was once more closed, and the two Prussian statesmen resumed their con- ference." " It seemed to us to last an age ; after General Moltke's departure, the Chancellor informed us that there was only the King to convince. Despite our impatience, we had to wait until the monarch had finished his meal ; it was nearly half-past six, when Count Bismarck went to him. At eight M. Thiers reaped the fruits THE PEELIMINARIES OP PEACE. 141 of his valiant effort. He liad given back Belfort to France," Eightly to estimate the importance of this success, it must be borne in mind that between the Vosges hills and the Jura range, there is a deep hollow through which all our invaders have passed at every epoch. The fortress of Belfort was built to command this pass. If Belfort had remained in the hands of the Germans they would have had a ready-made road between the Jura and the Vosges, by which to penetrate into the heart of France. After the loss of Strasburg the possession of Belfort had become indispensable to us. M. Thiers fought for it during fourteen hours, and while he was making this almost desperate struggle, he, who looked upon peace as absolutely necessary, asked himself several times if it would not be better to go on with the war, than to leave our eastern frontier open to fresh invasion. When, on his return to Paris, M. Thiers made known his unhoped-for success to the commission, all the members expressed boundless gratitude to him. It was not only a few leagues of territory he restored to us ; it was an important position upon our frontiers. Every evening, on returning from Versailles, M. Thiers made the commissioners, who were pledged to the strictest secrecy, thoroughly 142 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. acquainted with all that had passed. He even found time, before taking a few hours' rest, to write to M. Jules Simon. *' We made our first report to the commission yesterday," he wrote, on the 24th of February. *' They did not seem ill- pleased. "We have laid such stress upon secrecy that I count a little upon their observing it. The ignorance the Bourse is in proves that the secret is pretty well kept. In two days we shall know where we are." On the 25th he wrote : " Yesterday, M. Jules Favre and I passed eight hours in conference with Count Bismarck. We set out at half-past eleven in the morning, and were at Paris by ten o'clock in the evening. I would France could see what we have done to save her from loss and humi- liation. The peace is to be signed this evening, and I have asked myself twenty times whether we shall have peace after all. It is certainly not so bad as we might have feared, in our position, at the feet of a conqueror who knows we can expose France to frightful havoc, that we can prolong a bloody and destructive struggle, but that we cannot alter the ultimate result. Do not say a word of this to any one, above all about the nature of the peace. It must not be subjected beforehand to party discussion. ** If, as we hope, it be signed this evening THE PRELIMINARIES OP PEACE. 143 (under the form of precise preliminaries), we will announce it to you by telegraph to-morrow morn- ing. We shall leave on Monday, if we can, for every hour costs us millions." Peace was not signed on Saturday. On his arrival at Versailles on that day, M. Thiers found Count Bismarck particularly excited. His manner of receiving M. Thiers was constrained and haughty, his language was sharp, all but menacing. He accused M. Thiers of wanting to spin out the con- ference, and of seeking pretexts for recommenc- ing the war. Our negotiators easily penetrated the secret of the Chancellor's irritation. He had been advised officially the day before, that the English Government intended to make certain representations to Germany concerning the amount of the war indemnity. The Count went so far as to say, " I see plainly your only aim is to begin the campaign again, and you will have the sup- port and advice of your good friends, the English." By testifying a desire that the indemnity should be reduced to a sum, the payment of which might reasonably be expected, England gave us the only support we could hope for from her after all that had passed; and, far from thinking of begin- ning the war again, M. Thiers and M. Jules Favre were only bent upon hastening the conclusion of peace. 144 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. Count Bismarck liarslily and violently spurned our assurances of our pacific intentions, which at that stage of the business he could not have doubted had he been calm and collected. " It is very good of me," he said roughly, " to take the trouble you condemn me to ; our conditions are an ultimatum ; you must either accept or reject them. I will have nothing more to do with it ; bring an interpreter to-morrow; henceforth I will not speak French." And, in fact, he began to talk in German with extreme vehemence. M. Thiers showed that he was offended, but without departing an instant from his dignity and composure. This stormy and cruel day was but so much time lost, after all. Count Bismarck eagerly insisted upon our accepting his two bankers, and his system of payments and financial operations ; M. Thiers persisted in his refusal. When they separated for the evening at ten o'clock, everything remained as agreed upon in the terms accepted on the preceding days. There only remained the transcription and signature of the agreements. It was decided that the signatures on both sides should be affixed the next day, Sunday, February 26th, at half-past one o'clock. Our negotiators arrived punctually at the place of meeting ; but they had to wait three hours before the documents were ready. The duplicate copies THE PKELIMINAEIES OF PEACE. 145 being brought in and compared, Count Bismarck announced that he was about to summon " his colleagues " of Bavaria, Wurtemburg, and Baden. They came in, heard the treaty read without offer- ing an observation, and affixed their signatures. Count Bismarck sent for a golden pen which had been presented to him by the ladies of a German town for use on this occasion. M. Thiers and M. Jules Favre did not exchange a word on their journey back to Paris. M. Thiers had tears in his eyes all the way ; he dried them in silence ; he was a prey to the most terrible grief the heart of a man can feel. Instantly on reaching the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he sent off a telegram in cipher to Bordeaux, as follows : — " The Chief of the Executive to M. Jules Simon. " Paris, February 27th, 7 p.m. " The preliminaries of peace have been signed to-day, after a long and painful contest. The conditions are severe with respect to money, but as regards territory they are less disadvantageous than was to be feared. Belfort and five-sixths of Lorraine are restored to us. The war indemnity is five milliards, the payment to be spread over several years. " As ib is fitting the National Assembly should VOL. I. L 146 THE GOVEENMENT OF M. THIERS. liave the first knowledge of the conditions, make nothing pubhc but the fact that peace is con- cluded." M. Thiers arrived at Bordeaux on the 28th of February : he immediatelj entered the Assembly, which was sitting, and read a bill, which com- menced with the following words: " The National Assembly, having to bear the consequences of deeds of which it is not the author, ratifies the preliminaries of peace, the text of which is hereto annexed, etc." M. Barthélémy Saint-Hilaire after- wards read the Articles of peace. Article I. comprises the cession of territory. "We lose Alsace, with the exception of Belfort and its ter- ritory. We retain the whole of Lorraine, with the exception of Metz, its territory, and a few villages. Article II. stipulates for the indemnity of five milliards. One milliard is to be paid in the course of the year 1871, and the remainder of the debt within a period of three years dating from the ratification of peace. Article III. regulates the details of the evacua- tion, which is to take place at three periods : the first to begin immediately after the ratification of peace ; the second after the payment of the first half milliard, and the third after the payment of two milliards. During the third period, and until the complete liquidation of the debt, only the THE TEELIMINAEIES OF PEACE. 147 departments of Marne, Ardennes, Upper Marne, Meuse, Vosges, Meurthe, Belfort and its territory, will continue to be occupied by the Prussians. The occupation of the interior of Paris and of the forts on the left bank of the Seine will cease after the ratification of peace, that of the fort on the right bank and of the department of the Seine after the payment of the first half milliard. The French army is to retire beyond the Loire until the signature of the final treaty of peace, leaving upon the left bank only such garrisons as are indispensable for the fortresses, and 40,000 men to form the guard of Paris. From the date of the payment of two milliards, the army of occu- pation is not to exceed 50,000 men in number. The Emperor of Germany states that he will be disposed to accept a financial guarantee at the same date, as an equivalent for the guarantee resulting from the territorial occupation. Article IV. suppresses all requisitions in money and in kind, on the French Gov^ernment under- taking to provide rations for the German troops. Article V. protects the interests of the citizens in the ceded territories ; and secures to them the right of declaring for France, without having to suffer any loss of property. Article VI. provides that the prisoners of war shall be given up immediately after the ratification L 2 148 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. of tlie preliminaries, and prescribes tlie necessary measures for accelerating that operation. Article VII. designates Brussels as tlie place in wbicli negotiations for the final treaty of peace shall be opened, immediately after the ratification of the preliminary treaty. ArticleYIII. restores the collection of taxes to the French Government at once; the administration, properly so called, will not be restored to them until after the ratification of the final treaty of peace. The two last articles (Articles IX. and X.) are simply a matter of form. Added to this was a special agreement in four articles, which M. Barthélémy Saint-IIilaire also read from the tribune. Article I. prolongs the armistice until the 12th March. The fourth article of the convention of the 28th January was to the effect that the German troops should not enter Paris. This was replaced by Article II. in these terms : " That part of the city of Paris, which is within the enceinte, and lies between the Seine, the Eue du Faubourg Saint-Honoré and the Avenue des Ternes, will be occupied by German troops, not exceeding 30,000 men in number. The manner of occupation and the arrangements for billeting the German troops in this part of the city shall be settled by agree- THE PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE. 149 ment between two superior officers of the two armies, and access to it will be forbidden to the Trench troops and the National Guard so long as the occupation lasts." Article III. forbids the German troops to levy contributions in money in the occupied territory, but it authorizes the Germans to collect the taxes due to the state. Lastly, in virtue of the Article IV., the two contracting parties are at liberty to end the armistice after the 3rd of March, with a delay of three days for the resumption of hostihties, if such should take place. If we refer to Count Bismarck's requirements as they were formulated on the 21st February, we shall see at once what had been obtained by our negotiators. We owed to them the fortress of Belfort and the reduction by a milliard of the sum at first demanded. We owed to them the eventual substitution of a financial for a territorial guarantee, after the payment of two milliards, the suppression of requisitions in money and in kind, the immediate restoration of our prisoners, the re-establishment of the French authorities after the signing of the peace. These concessions, wrung with immense difficulty from Count Bis- marck, by dint of talent and energy, had appeared to M. Thiers, M. Jules Favre, and the parliamen- 150 THE GOVEENMENT OF M. THIEKS. tary commission, to be a succession of victories ; but to tlie Assembly, who only saw tlie total result of the negotiations, tliat result was overwhelming. The reading of the articles was hstened to with consternation, and in gloomy silence, interrupted from time to time by a spontaneous groan from the benches. All this had been foreseen, yet it all seemed new. So it is wdth those who gather round the dying; vain is their knowledge that the agony cannot last long, the actual death always takes them by surprise and redoubles their anguish. M. Thiers demanded *' urgency." There were a thousand reasons for voting it. And yet, how was the Assembly, hardly recovered from the har- rowing emotion evoked by the words w^hich had been just read, to consummate so terrible a sacrifice? Those who would have had the war to continue demanded at least time for inquiry and discussion. M. Tolain, M. JMillière, M. Langlois, M. Turquet, opposed urgency, which was, however, carried by a large majority. M. Schœlcher and M. Gambetta asked for an adjournment until the next day, in order that the bill might be printed and distri- buted. But M. Thiers insisted that the Chamber, despite the lateness of the hour, should at once go into committee. " There are," said he, " only three or four questions in this treaty for you to settle. A long and earnest examination was THE PEELIMIN ARIES OF PEACE. 151 necessary for tlie negotiators ; they discussed in despair, and even with tears, each several con- dition of the treaty ; they put forth all their strength in the effort to preserve to the country her territory and her wealth ; but for you, I repeat, there are only three or four questions whose solu- tion is in all minds and all hearts." He returned to the charge over and over again, replying to every objection : " One thing only I ask of you ; to testify, by a vote, to your zeal for the execution of the treaty. *' By the simple manifestation of this disposition, you may exercise considerable influence over the state of Paris ; you may even save our capital from a great misfortune." In these words M. Thiers gave the real, the principal reason for his persistence. According to the terms of the treaty, the Prussians were to evacuate Paris immediately upon the ratification of peace. They had not yet entered Paris on the 28th. Arrangements had to be made with the Commissariat and the staff, and they were not to enter Paris until the 1st. The Emperor proposed to come in on the 3rd, and to hold a review in the Champs-Elysées. In Paris nothing else was thought of, whilst at Bordeaux, where the treaty was new, the " shameful and unacceptable " peace was the sole topic. On the 2Gth February, M. 152 THE GOVEENMENT OP M. THIERS. Jules Favre wrote to M. Jules Simon, " We have no security against some mad act on the entry of the Prussians into Paris. They will occupy the Champs-Elysées so far as the Tuileries. They are to remain until the ratification of the prelimi- naries. The ratification must therefore be speedy. Besides, what good can discussion do ? Who has not an opinion to give ? Is it not an impiety to expose the misfortunes of our country ; and a crime to add to them the spectacle of civil dissen- sions ? The Assembly will understand this. Our colleagues' hearts bleed with ours. They will think as we do." The discussion which took place on the 1st March was in fact very short, occupying as it did only one sitting ; but it was very passionate. The reporter was M. Victor Lefranc. " We desire but one thing," said he, " for the strengthening and the pacifying of our consciences. It is that this peace may be disapproved of only by those who would have ventured to resolve upon prolonging war." In these words all was said. M. Edgar Quinet, M. Victor Hugo, and M. Louis Blanc made admirable speeches on the terrible concessions demanded by Prussia, and the possibility of renewing the struggle. "Uni il now," said M. Quinet, " conquerors have contented themselves with laying their hands upon a territory, with THE PRELIMINAEIES OF PEACE. 153 taking possession of it by force. They kept it if they could. That was the right of war. Now Prussia has advanced entirely novel claims. After having seized upon Alsace and Lorraine, she demands that this taking of possession shall be con- secrated by universal suffrage. What is up to the present time a depredation only would then become a right, sanctioned by the French themselves ! " Victor Hugo pointed out the political consequences of such a dismemberment. " Henceforth," he said, " there are in Europe two nations which will be formidable, the one because it will be victorious, the other, because it will be vanquished." He affirmed that Germany would not keep her con- quest. " Taking is not keeping. Possession supposes consent. Did Turkey possess Athens ? Did Austria possess Venice ? Does Eussia possess Warsaw ? Does Spain possess Cuba ? Does England possess Gibraltar ? " Victor Hugo was in the right ; but he was wrong to be in the right before an Assembly which was under the yoke of inexorable necessity. The more the Assembly saw and felt as he did, the more angry with him they grew. They ended by forgetting that respect which was doubly due to the person of Victor Hugo and to the cause he was defending. He remembered this, on the 8th March, when being desirous to express the gratitude of the Republi- 154 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIEES. cans towards Garibaldi, he was again interrupted and attacked by the Right. He sent in his resig- nation on the spot. In vain M. Gré^^ implored him to withdraw it, and even refused to read it. Victor Hugo persisted. His letter of resignation was read at the sitting next day. " It is one more misfortune added to so many others," exclaimed Louis Blanc, " that this powerful voice should be silenced at the very moment when it was proclaim- ing the country's gratitude for eminent services. This sentiment will be shared by all who cherish or revere genius fighting for liberty." M. Victor Hugo, in opposing the treaty of peace, had declared that France would one day take her revenge npon Germany. " France will be heard to say : It is my turn ! Germany, behold me ! ! ! Am I your enemy ? No, I am your sister ! I have taken all, and now restore it upon one condition, that we become but one people, one family, one single Republic. I am about to demolish my fortresses, you shall destroy yours. My vengeance is brotherly love ! " The orators, who followed him, spoke only of war. They maintained that we might still fight with hopes of success. M. Brunet pro- posed the formation of a military commission to examine our means of action. M. Louis Blanc asked, " Could we not find means to THE PEELIMINAEIES OF PEACE. 155 disconcert the Prussians in the science of murder, and the mathematics of carnage, by forming all the elements of our strength into one homogeneous whole, substituting partisan warfare for a great war ; avoiding pitched battles, no longer opposing a mass of men, raised hap-hazard, and undis- ciplined, to hostile armies, strong in organization and numbers, but a large number of small corps, whose varied, ceaseless, and unforeseen action would harass and weaken the enemy, and baffle its strategy." M. Thiers had ascended the tribune the first time, only, as it were, to ask that he might not be called upon to speak. " If I could have seen," he said, " the slightest chance of maintaining the struggle, of maintaining it successfully, never would I have subjected myself to one of the greatest sorrows of my life, that of signing the preliminaries of peace which I have brought you. It is my absolute conviction of the impossibility of continuing this struggle, which has constrained me to bow my head before the strength of the foreigner. I entreat you not to impose upon me the necessity of explaining the grounds of my conviction ; my silence is a sacrifice which I make to the safety and the future of my country.' (Hear! hear!) Yes, my profound conviction is, that by making peace to-day, and by submitting 156 THE GOVEENMENT OF M. THIEUS. to this great trial, we are saving the future of our country, and securing her future greatness. This hope alone could have determined me. I offer no advice to the Assembly ; I can only counsel it by my example. (Hear! hear!) I have imposed upon myself, I repeat, one of the most cruel sorrows of my life." At this point the speaker was overcome by emotion, and the Assembly broke out into applause. " I conjure my honourable colleagues not to force me to explain myself further. The interests of our country alone could constrain me to enter more at length upon this discussion." It may be said that nearly all the Assembly understood these words, and shared the senti- ments of the speaker. Even of the hundred and seven representatives who voted some hours afterwards against the ratification of the treaty, more than half recognized, not the impossibility of fighting, for no such impossibility existed, but the impossibility of victory. Certain orators, however, insisted upon speaking against the suffi- ciently-evident feeling of the Assembly. To what end it would be hard to tell, for each member had reflected upon and studied the matter ; it was the great care, the great trouble of the moment ; no Frenchman could banish it fi^om his thoughts. The deputies who had accepted so great a respon- THE PEELIMINABIES OF PEACE. 157 sibility were not suddenly enlightened on this occa- sion as to the state of our resources. Each had made up his mind beforehand. In the bureaus, where all the details might be entered into, and where publicity does not exist, there might have been discussion, in order to convince ; at a public sitting, to discuss was to accuse. And, in fact, the bearing of every speech was an accusation against M. Thiers. " This is a peace which cannot be accepted, you say. A treaty of shame ! Let him who speaks of shame stand up ! " cried M. Thiers, who was at last obliged to reascend the tribune and put the truth before those who did not, or feigned not to see it. He did this in a few words. He showed what our regiments were when the war broke out. Blank cadres. We went to war with blank cadres, insuflScient war material, an inca- pable general, an absurd plan of campaign. This was the crime of the Empire. Out of 120 regi- ments, 117 were made prisoners at Sedan and Metz. It is true that armies were raised to replace these regiments, but those armies were merely masses of men, doomed, in spite of their bravery and the skill of their generals, to defeat and slaughter. A soldier cannot be made in a day ; cadres cannot be filled in a year. " Where are they, these armies that sprang from the earth ? 158 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. In Germany. We have left only 200,000 recruits under arms. The levee en masse, supposing it possible, would not give us an officer, or a ser- geant. We should resume the contest now, having lost 420,000 men, all our former cadres of trained and experienced officers and sub-officers, an immense quantity of war material, Strasbourg, Metz, Paris, all the positions north of the Loire. It is not the feebleness of France that I come to plead. I would die rather than plead that. I would fain preserve hope, for without hope I could not live. I only want to tell you that your organiza- tion has been shattered, and that you cannot put it together again in a few days. If there are any military men here who think that they can say the contrary, let them declare it from this tribune and I will answer them." In this speech, which occupied only a few minutes, M. Thiers delineated our true position in a few graphic touches ; that was neither the time nor place to enter into details. It is the misfor- tune of representative governments that too often under critical circumstances they cannot tell every- thing, they cannot assign their true motives. The Assembly had, in the sitting of the 19th Feb- ruary, upon the proposal of M. Barthélémy Saint-Hilaire, ordered an inquiry into the state of our military resources. This inquiry had been THE PEELIMINAEIES OF PEACE. 159 effected witli great expedition ; the results were not published until the 11th March, but the members of the commission were in possession of the principal items. M. Brunei asserted from the tribune that we could bring into the field a million of men and 12,000 field-pieces. " I am a member of the military commission," said he, *' and from the first day to the last I have sought to make myself acquainted with the real state of our forces. I say that, in respect of men, who number a miUion, and in respect of material, which includes 12,000 field-pieces, we are in such a position, that with great eff"orts, and under the direction of an earnest executive, it is possible to reestablish our armies and to continue the con- test." Thus, in this same sitting of the 1st March, M. Brunet, a member of the commission, talks of a million of men, and M. Thiers, Chief of the Executive, declares that we could not take the field against a regular army of 500,000 soldiers. The Assembly would have been able to account for this apparent contradiction ; they would have seen the truth clearly, if the Report of Admiral Jaureguiberry, which was not distributed until ten days afterwards, had been before them. Yes ! France had called out a million of men; but of this million, 420,000 were prisoners. There was still an active army of 534,000 men, a reserve of 160 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. 354,000, and tliose enrolled in 1871, consisting of 132,000 men, who might be called out at short notice. All these came to more than a million on paper. The error was in thinking that a million of men were at our disposal. Unhappily, the report of M. Jauréguiberry dispelled the illusion. We shall see presently how he rated the active army. Let us begin, like him, with the army of reserve. " The men now existing in the territorial divisions, in the depots, in Algeria, and a large number of mobilized national guards in the training camps, will form, when armed, equipped, and drilled, the reserve of the active army. At present not more than 53,087 soldiers of various arms could be placed in line. It would be possible, later on, to add to these forces the men enrolled in 1871, whose effective strength amounts to 132,000 recruits. But the Minister of War has not thought it advisable to call out these young men, because he is unable to arm, clothe, and drill them." Here, then, are nearly 350,000 men, who form our reserves, as the Admiral says, and will make an army, when they have been drilled, disciplined, equipped, and trained. They might indeed be counted upon "to reorganize our army," as M. Brunet said ; but it is not a question of reorgan- izing armies, but of having an army to bring into THE PEELIMINAEIES OP PEACE. 161 the field by the 6tli of Marcli, tbe day on wliich hostilities might be recommenced, according to the terms of the armistice. 'Now out of these 354,000, or 500,000 men, if we reckon those enrolled in 1871, how many can be brought into the field on that day — for the particular date is all-important ? Admiral Jaureguiberry replies with inexorable precision, 53,087. M. de Guirand gives the same number in a supplementary Report upon the efi&ciency of the army, but it is noticeable that to the words, " 53,100 men, ready for service," he adds, " wanting accoutrements." The active army was then the only force on which we could reckon. " France can only count at present," says the Report, " upon the troops forming the active army. These will be immediately called upon to maintain the struggle should hostilities be re- commenced." The effective strength of the ten army corps composing our active army, on the 1st March, 1871, was proved to amount to 634,552 men, a number somewhat short of the million M. Brunet talked of. From this total 2090 had to be deducted for the gendarmerie; 2375 for the staff", 6,408 for the various adminis- trations, in all about 11,000 men. M. de Mornay, who also furnished a Report, deducts, besides, 16,022 men for the free corps. " The free VOL. I. M 162 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIEES. corps," lie says, "wliicli were very numerous at the beginning of the war, are now greatly reduced in numbers. Their presence in advance of the army has been, besides, of very little advantage, and with the exception of some special corps, whose exploits recall the finest traits of heroism in our history, the military authorities have found themselves under the necessity of disbanding most of them. They were sometimes more dangerous than useful, and their insubordination and want of discipline were very injurious to the regular troops." Both Admiral Jauréguiberry and M. de Mornay re- ported very unfavourably of the mobilized corps. "We must quote the admiral's words. " With regard to the mobilized national guards, whose cadres have been filled by election, we must unfortunately admit that they have hardly ren- dered any service, and that their ignorance of the art of war, their want of discipline and of steadiness in presence of the enemy, have fre- quently been the cause of serious evils. Some splendid exceptions ought, however, to be pointed out, for mobilized battalions might be named whose ardour has rivalled that of veteran troops. "It is not impossible," he adds, "to remedy the relative inferiority of this considerable portion THE PEELIMINAEIES OE PEACE. 163 of our troops ; but for this it would be necessary completely to reform their cadres, to give them military instruction and habits of discipline, which need time for their acquirement, under the direction of capable commanders, at once energetic and patient." We must then deduct, according to the Admiral, 135,735 mobilized national guards, who would, like the men of the reserve, have become good soldiers in time ; but time was precisely that which we lacked most ; and the Germans, aware of our state of disorganiza- tion, refused to give us even until the 12th March ; and insisted upon the right of recommencing the war at their pleasure. " The armistice may be declared at an end on the 3rd, hostilities may recommence on the 6th." All deductions made, we could actually bring into the field 60,307 men, consisting of regiments of the line, and 135,735 mobilized guards, in all, 204,942 men. These are Admiral Jauréguiberry's figures. " In one word, at present we could in reality only oppose to the enemy's armies 205,000 infantry, including regiments of the line and mobiles ; nearly all the rest is a hindrance, and a source of disorder, and can only furnish us with soldiers worthy of the name several months hence." A force subsequently mentioned by the Admiral must, however, be added to the list ; it consisted M 2 164 THE GOVEENMENT OF M. THIERS. of a corps of marines 14,000 strong — one small in numbers, but great in military virtues and wortli. Our infantry was tlius raised to a total of 220,000 men. Admiral Jaureguiberry concludes : — " We have then, outside of special arms, only 220,000 infantry capable of offering resistance." " Shall this resistance be crowned with the success we all desire so ardently ? We dare not even hope it; for we must not hide from our- selves, that to conquer armies, so numerous, so well organized in all respects as those of our enemy, it is indispensable that our troops should be, not only trained and well armed, but, above all, animated by a spirit of dauntless endurance, by contempt of danger, and by an ardent patriotism, which unfortunately they do not all possess. " The 220,000 infantry upon whom we can count, up to a certain point, are too easily disheartened. A fight prolonged beyond a few hours fatigues and disconcerts them, and as our enemies have always reserves at theircommand, while thenumerical weak- ness of our army deprives us of a similar resource, the result is, that at the end of an obstinate engage- ment, during which we have succeeded in main- taining our positions, we are obliged to retreat, because the enemy has been able to make a flank THE PEELIMINARIES OP PEACE. 165 movement at a great distance, or to recommence the attack with fresh troops. " Our soldiers would fight with more obstinacy, and would not break their ranks, if the cadres of our regiments were better composed. " The disasters of the outset of the war have deprived France of nearly all her best officers and sub-officers." It is necessary to insist upon these details, because it is now constantly said, by men who believe what they say, that we had a million of men to bring into the field, and that we could have reversed our defeat by a levée en masse. The facts, for whose accuracy such a man as Jauréguiberry has vouched, are a conclusive answer to all state- ments of this kind. The commission included eight generals, three colonels on active service, and several retired officers. It is not possible, in the face of such a report, to accuse France of cowardice. She submitted to peace, because she could not continue the war without rushing upon irreparable disaster. The 205,000 with whom we must have opposed the 500,000 disciplined soldiers of the German army, were made up of soldiers of various arms and regiments, for we had no longer a complete regiment of the former line. These soldiers formed a regiment, if you will, because they had a number, colours, and a colonel ; but 166 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. the real regiment, wticb. is a family, wliose officers know their soldiers, and tlie soldiers their officers, where each man is surrounded by friends and observers, where there is a heritage of honour to defend in common, the regiment which con- stituted the glory and the strength of the former army of France ; where was it ? " All these corps," says Jauréguibery, speaking of the 205,000 men, who formed almost the whole of our army ; " all these corps have for the most part new cadres, and in capacity and experience are too often defec- tive." When the admiral thus pronounced upon the numbers and condition of our forces, with the sure judgment of a man accustomed to war, he could not foresee the spectacle that should be presented by a part of our army at Paris on the 18th March ; he had not seen the soldiers huddled together at Versailles the day after the in- surrection, irresolute, undisciplined, hardly know- ing whether they would or would not make up their minds to obey and fight. It is true, this same army reformed itself after the first shots were fired ; but who among us can ever forget the suspense of all patriots, until the troops of General Yinoy, descending the heights of Montre- tout, dispersed the insurgents and drove them beyond Neuilly. At that date Germany had already given us back some of our imprisoned THE PRELIMINAEIES OF PEACE. 167 soldiers, tlie cadres liad been reconstituted, which was all-important, and could not have been done but for the peace. To judge what our army could have done if all the prisoners had remained in Germany, by what it actually did, with the good officers and sub -officers belonging to the old regiments and just returned to us, would be to imitate the error of those speakers, who, at the sitting of the 1st March, reckoned raw recruits, who did not know how to handle a musket if they had even had muskets to handle, as fighting men fit to march against the enemy. Two facts were incontestably proved by Admiral Jauréguiberry's Report : one, that we could not fight to-day ; the other, that we might recover to-morrow. Thus, then, we must submit to peace, if we would reserve the future to ourselves. A re-perusal of M. Thiers' speech on that memorable and sorrowful occa- sion, on which the Assembly ratified the treaty of peace, must lead to this double conclusion, and we know that the years which have since passed away have confirmed the precision of his words upon those two points. The Assembly, who at that time had unlimited confidence in him, divined what he did not utter, took his reserve kindly, and hastened to close the discussion in accordance with his advice, in which they all concurred. It was indeed more than 1G8 THE GOVEKNMEÎs"T OF M. THIERS. time to have done witli it. On tbat very day, tlie 1st Marcli, the Prussians invaded the Champs Elysées ; the Emperor of Germany was to make his solemn entry two days later. By an imme- diate vote Paris might be delivered after an occu- pation of forty-eight hours, and the military fetes^ which would have been an insult to us, and dangerous to all, prevented. M. Thiers had only been able to hint at this, M. Cocbery reiterated it pertinaciously. The sitting had been already prolonged by the incident, due to the imprudence of M. Conti, which had led to the declaration of the deposition of the Imperial dynasty. M. Henri Martin, M. André (of Moselle), M. Langlois, M. Brisson, M. Delescluze, M. Floquet, M. Clemenceau, M. Tolain, and others had put down their names, but they all waived their right to speak. What could they have said after such speakers as M. Victor Hugo, M. Edgar Quinet, M. Louis Blanc ? "What could they have replied to M. Thiers ? General Changarnier, in a few supremely dignified words, advised peace. The Assembly voted for peace by 548 votes against 107. It was remarked at the counting, and has since been commented upon, that four generals. Billot, Chanzy, Loysel, and Mazure, had voted against peace. General Deligny abstained from voting, as did the Orleans Princes. On the other hand, THE PEELIMINAEIES OP PEACE. 169 the ratification was voted by nineteen generals and admirals — D'Aurelles de Paladines, Cliabaud- Latour, Chabron, Changarnier, Charetou, Dom- pierre d'Hornoy, Ducrot, Fouriclion, Frebault, Jauréguiberry, La E-oncière le Noury, Le Flo, Martin des Pallières, Montaignac, Pellissier, Poth- uan, Saisset du Temple, and Trocbu. Among the four who voted in silence that day, General Chanzy only explained himself afterwards, when he spoke, on the 18th May, 1871, against the final treaty of peace. It would be rash to speculate upon the motives of the other three, but it may be admitted that in the improbable but not impossible case of a resumption of hostilities, they did not wish to record their con- viction that success was impossible beforehand. M. Jules Simon had taken measures that the text of the law, clothed with all the ojfficial for- malities, should be at once carried to Paris, and communicated to Count Bismarck. The document had been copied beforehand, and prepared for the necessary signatures, which were affixed to it immediately after the vote. A special train was in readiness, and started at once for Paris, carry- ing deliverance to the capital. The ratification was the signal for numerous resignations. M. Girot-Pouzol had resigned at the commencement of the sittinsr. *' I could not 170 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. TUIEIÎS. make up my mind to vote for the bill," said lie; " but as I know that in acting thus I should not give satisfaction to my constituents, I resign my seat." The terms in which the resignation of M. Grosjean and his colleagues of Moselle, and of Upper and Lower Rhine, were tendered, affected the Assembly painfully. They were as follows : — " The representatives of Alsace and Lorraine, prior to any peace negotiations, laid a declaration before the National Assembly, by which they affirmed, in the name of these provinces, their will and their right to remain French. Delivered over, in contempt of all justice and by an odious abuse of power, to the rule of the foreigner, we have a last duty to fulfil. " We declare once more that a compact which disposes of us without our consent is null and void." "It remains for ever open to one and all of us to claim our rights, in such form and measure as our conscience may dictate. " On quitting this Assembly, in which our dignity no longer allows us to sit, and notwith- standing the bitterness of our grief, the one supreme feeling in the depth of our hearts is gratitude to those who for six months have unceas- ingly defended us, and of unalterable attachment to the country from which we are violently torn. THE PBELIMINAEIES OP PEACE. 171 " We shall follow you witli our hearts, and wait with perfect confidence, until, in the future, regenerated France shall once more resume the course of her great destiny. " Your brethren of Alsace and Lorraine, now separated from the common family, will preserve a faithful love for France, absent from our fire- sides, until the day when she shall return and resume her place there." This document bore twenty-eight signatures, and was followed by the resignation of the three deputies of Meurthe; MM. Varroy, Brice, and Claude. Some of those who resigned again obtained seats in the Assembly, either by new elections, or in consequence of a parliamentary incident wliich occurred at the sitting of the 11th March, on the resignation of MM. Georges and Denfert-Rochereau, and which, we will narrate in this place. M. Grévy, after having read letters from the two deputies above-mentioned, spoke as follows : — " The President avails himself of this oppor- tunity to point out to M. Georges and M. Denfert, and also to those among our colleagues, who, finding themselves placed in an analogous posi- tion have thought it right to send in their resig- nation, that notwithstanding the changes of condition which the populations who elected them 172 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. have had to undergo, they are, and ought to remain, representatives of the French people. It is my duty to point this out, in the interests of the Assembly, as well as in those of the populations of the Eastern provinces, who will remain French. " I can only invite M. Georges and those of our colleagues who are in the same position, not to persist in their withdrawal and resignation." These words received unanimous assent. M. Georges, who was present at the sitting, im- mediately withdrew his resignation ; MM. Varroy, Brice, Claude, Bamberger, André, and Deschange followed his example. Twenty deputies were, however, finally lost to the nation. This was a source of grief to the whole country; and a severe blow to the Republican party, who thus found their numerical strength lessened, and had to regret it bitterly, on one or two important occa- sions, when they were beaten by a majority of one or two. The 2nd March brought demonstrations of a different class ; first came the collective resigna- tion of MM. Rochefort, Ranc, Tridon, and Malon. The latter signed himself, " B. Malon of the In- ternational." Their letter declares the Assembly deposed; and is a formal act of insurrection, a forerunner of the insurrection of the 18th March. THE PEELIMINARIES OF PEACE. 173 "By the vote of tlie 1st March the Assembly has dehvered up two provinces, dismembered France, ruined the country. It is therefore no longer the voice of the country, and its delibera- tions are henceforth null and void. " The votes of the four generals commanding our army corps, and the significant abstention of three others from voting, give a formal contradic- tion to M. Thiers' assertions that we are incapable of continuing the war. " Our conscience, therefore, forbids us to sit a day longer in an Assembly whose acts we cannot recognize as valid." The three generals mentioned in this letter, as having abstained from voting, are General Deligny, the Due d'Aumale, and M. de Charette. The latter was at Rennes when the vote was taken. His resignation, based upon other motives than the vote of the 1st March, reached the Assembly on the 6th. M. Félix Pyat's letter is in the same style as that of MM. Rochefort, Ranc, Tridon, and Malon: — " Citizen President, " The vote of the National Assembly has im- posed a duty of conscience upon me ; the duty of declaring that this vote has outraged my mandate. I am the representative of the sovereign people, 17é THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIEES. and not their master, and if I kept silence before the vote, it was because I was not authorized to discuss such a treaty. *' I have received from the people an impera- tive mandate. I do not know the mandate of others, but I know my own. It is this : An honourable peace, Trance and the Kepublic indivisible. " I am then bound to protest, not to resign. The Assembly has no power to accept my resignation, for it is dissolved. It no longer represents France, all France, by whom it was called together on the 8th February: it exists no longer. "Faithful to my mandate, to the unity of France, to the duty of representing her such as she was when her capital did me the honour to elect me, I am bound to protest, by leaving this Assembly, which can no longer represent France in her entirety, and I will never enter it again so long as this parricidal vote shall remain unannulled. *' Greeting and fraternity, " Felix Pyat.'* M. Ledru Rollin had been beforehand with them all. He resigned on the 28th February, from similar motives, having protested in advance " against the harrowing and fatal things that were about to take place." THE PRELIMINAEIES OF PEACE. 175 Sucli is, in brief, tlie sad history of the prelimi- naries of peace. The final treaty, which was only the applica- tion of the bases laid down by these preliminaries, was discussed at Frankfort during the insurrec- tion of Paris, and voted at Versailles on the 20th May, 1871. 176 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIEfiS. CHAPTER lY. PARIS BEFORE THE i8th MARCH, 1 8/ 1. The insurrection of the Commune, wliicli tri- umphed on the 18th March, did not begin on that day. The same actors, with the same object, may be traced in all the disturbances in February and March, 1871 ; and again on the 31st of October, and the 22nd of January. It would be an exaggeration to say that they took the chief part on the 4th of September ; that day's work was the deed of the entire popu- lation. A multitude in which parties were lost, rendered all-powertul by indignation, overturned the Imperial Government, without any considera- tion of what was to be substituted for it. The future organizers of the Commune were, how- ever, on the spot, and were perhaps the only persons who had a fixed design, and were under control. They were the first to enter the Assembly, and they marched to the Hôtel de Ville PAEIS JBEFOEE THE i8tH MAECH, 1 87 1. 177 witli tlie premeditated intention of seizing upon the reins of government. They had indeed formed their government beforehand — Blanqui and Delescluze were its chiefs, — and they had already thrown the list of names out of the windows of the Salle St. Jean, among the crowd, when M. Jules Favre appeared upon the balcony, and was saluted by acclamations which put a stop to all competition. They submitted, with a bitter regret, that they did not try to conceal, to the formation of the Government of Defence, impro- vised on the spur of the moment by the 500,000 men who thronged the Place de la Concorde, the Place de Bourgogne, the quays, the Place de l'Hôtel de Ville, and the Hôtel de Ville itself, and who with one voice laid this burden upon the deputies for Paris. Decimated after the Coup d'Etat of the 2nd December, and the proscription which ensued, this party had left the Republicans, liberal and conservative, to carry on the struggle against the Empire. They did not appear, either as speakers at the electoral meetings, or as candi- dates in the elections of 1857, 1858, and 18(33. They had a candidate of their own for the first time in the partial elections of 1864. The earliest organization of workmen, which had nothing political about it at the outset, dates from 1862. Sixty delegates, chosen by the workmen out of VOL. I. N 178 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIEES. the different corporations, were sent at the Govern- ment expense to the Exhibition in London. On their return to Paris their reports had to be written out, read in common, and revised for pubhcation : all this took time. The sixty dele- gates asked nothing better than to become a permanent representation of the workmen, and the workmen asked nothing better than to have one. Two years later, in 1864, the sixty men still formed a sort of central committee, which claimed to speak in the name of the workshops of Paris. The partial elections seemed to offer a good opportunity for asserting themselves. They published a political and social manifesto, and called for a workman candidate. The desired candidate was M. Tolaiu, who stood against M. Garnier Pages, and had only 495 votes. Then it was that Proudhon published his book, entitled " La Capacité Politique des Classes Ouv- lièresy "Since," he says, "the working classes have for the first time made an act of will and personality in the elections of 1863-64, since it is upon this occasion that we have heard them stammer their ideas, since their first appearance has been at once a great victory and a great blunder, let us begin by showing them the conse- quences of the experiment." The great victory was their having beaten the Government, and the PARIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 1 87 1. 179 great blunder, according to Proudhon, was tlieir having sacrificed tlie workmen's candidatesliip to the bourgeois candidates. From that ' moment, the sociah'st movement, which had been arrested in 1852, increased in importance day by day. Proudhon contributed to this by his writings, M. Tolain by his in- telligence and activity, and the Government by a line which they adopted after some hesitation ; that of exaggerating the strength of the socialists in their journals and speeches, and throwing the responsibility of socialist doctrines on all Repub- licans, in order to put themselves forward as the sole guardians of social interests. On the 26th September, 1864, M. Tolain went to London with two other workmen delegates, to be present at the great meeting at St. Martin's Hall, where the bases of the International Association of workmen were laid. On his return he established the office of the French branch in the Rue de Gravilliers, and took care to send the statutes of the associa- tion to the Minister of the Interior and the Prefect of Police. He attended as delegate of the French branch at the subsequent congresses of the Asso- ciation, which took place in London in 1865, at Geneva in 1866, at Lausanne in 1867, at Brussels in 1868, and at Basle in 1860. With that practical good sense which has always distinguished him ou N 2 180 TUE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. these occasions, lie defeuded the rights of indi- vidual property against the Communists, who, however, gained the preponderance, and fixed upon the International Association — whose aim had been for the three first years but ill- defined — the character of a political association, with the claiming of political rights for working men for its immediate object, and Communism for a theory. The claiming of political rights for working men would have had no seasonableness to French citizens, even under the Empire, if it had been taken in its literal sense. All Frenchmen possessed the same rights both civil and political; the work- men might be elected, like other citizens ; no one dreamed of contesting this. But what they called by that name, was not the right to run the same chances with others in the elections, it was the right of having a direct and special repre- sentation in Parliament ; a bench of workmen in the Corps Législatif, like the bench of bishops in the Senate. This was, undeniably, a social ques- tion ; for if the workman be elected in virtue of a common right, he represents equality, but if he be elected because he is a workman, and under the pretext that the workmen have an exceptional right to send members of their own class to Parlia- ment, he no longer represents anything except PAEIS BEFOEE THE i8tH MARCH, 1 87 1. 181 the contest between labour and capital. In 1867, after the abortive manifestation of the 2ncl November, a search was made at the house of M. Chouteau — a member of the Central Com- mittee in 1871 — and the statutes of a secret society, called " The revolutionary Commune of the workmen of Paris," were brought to light. All workmen were not socialists, and all social- ist workmen did not belong to the International Association, which derived much of its impor- tance from the alarm with which it inspired the Conservative party. Nevertheless it grew. A bond of union was naturally formed between it and communist or simply socialist writers, who undertook to spread the opinions of Proudhon and Blanqui, by means of pamphlets, confer- ences, and newspaper articles. The non-socialist revolutionaries, whose dream was to return to the principles of 1791, and who had Delescluze for their ringleader, could only succeed with the concurrence of the workmen, and there- fore supported them in their revolt, without associating themselves with their theories. Pro- cessions to the tomb of Baudin, who died for liberty during the " da3^s of December," and the prosecutions to which they gave rise, cemented the alliance. Popular meetings at which attacks upon the Government were mingled with attacks 182 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. upon property, and wliicli increased in number after 18C8, brought the greater part of tbe men of the future Commune prominently forward : Peyrouton, tbe Gaillards, father and son, Longuet, Briosne, Pindy the carpenter, Yermorel, Ducasse, Lefrancais, and Humbert. M. Félix Pyat had also received a sentence in 1863, and had risen in popular favour in consequence. Men who were for agitation by the press, by secret societies, by street rows, reappeared on every side. Then came strikes, menacing combinations, and violent repressions. The troubles of Ricamarie left behind them eleven corpses (nine men and two women) ; the scenes at Aubin were not less disastrous. These terrible commentaries upon Communist doctrines rendered them still more odious, and the Government, faitliful to its policy, made use of them against its enemies, who, for the most part, repudiated them, and held them in horror. The conservative Republicans, who were objects of hatred and distrust to the Communists, did not think it possible for public opinion to be deceived into holding them responsible for anti-liberal doctrines and practices. They did not repu- diate the libel with sufficient energy, and it happened that they gave a pretext to it on more than one occasion. "While the Government PAKIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 187I. 183 was attributing every outbreak of disorder and every false and perverse idea to them, tliey con- fined themselves to contemptuous denials, and so great was their need of allies, that they accepted, not indeed compromising alliances, but questionable approaches. They contested the doctrines, but showed too much indulgence for the men who held them. This was a mistake, which may be explained, but not justified, by the violence done in electoral matters by the Empire, its manifold abuses of authority, its financial scandals, and its deplorable foreign policy In 1869, at the elections, however, an absolute and final separation took place. The revolu- tionists opposed Jules Favre by Eochfort, Garnier- Pages by Raspail, Jules Simon by Vallès, Glais- Bizoin by Barbes. They had thought of bringing forward, first Ledru-RoUin, and then Louis Blanc, in aU the arrondissements ; but these two men seemed " hardly pure " enough. The election of their candidates was to be preliminary to the rising. Clearly to express the aim they had in view, and although E-ochefort and Raspail had taken the oath, they called their candidates, " the unsworn." M. Lulher, a candidate in 1869, and afterwards a general under the Commune, wrote in his circular, " Danton will come back from the Shades I " M. Maurice Joly demanded 184 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. for tlie people the right of opposing the promulga- tion of the laws, election for one year only, an imperative mandate, and a constituent assembly. " A manifestation is expected from the electors of Paris," said Lefrançais, *' which will bring all France to herself once more." Citizen Lombard made a direct attack upon the deputies of the Left. "We have," he said, "to name four deputies ; what advantage will it be to us to have four irreconcilable deputies the more ? We have seen them — these irreconcilable deputies : the word is big, but the deputies are very little. What have they done ? Nothing, nothing, nothing. Vote for an unsworn one, without troubling your- selves about anything else concerning him ; vote, if you like, for the poorest and most obscure individual, for a rag-picker if you please ; but, I beg of you, let him be one who has not taken the oath.'' The agitation continued after the elections, which gave the victory to moderate Repub- licans. The Government had not summoned the Chambers for the 2Gth of October, although legally required to do so. M. de Kcratry proposed to his colleagues that they should meet without being summoned, present themselves formally on the 26th at the Palais Bourbon, and hold their first sitting there. Here was an opportunity ready- PARIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 1 87 1. 185 made for the ringleadei^s ; but the reaction on their side also promised themselves a signal triumph, and not without reason. The conservative Republicans nipped the manifestation in the bud. M. Jules Simon came back from Naples on purpose. " I have done all I could," he wrote some time after, in a letter which was made public, "that there should be neither any movement, nor the appear- ance of any movement, on the 26th; if my popularity suffers in consequence, as you say it will, so much the worse for me, and so much the worse for the cause I serve." His popularity with his own party did not suffer. The sensible and moderate Republicans approved highly of the con- duct of the deputies. It was otherwise with the revolutionary party. A meeting was held on the Boulevard Clichy ; Milliere presided, and MM. Jules Simon, Pelletan, Bancel, and Ferry, were called upon "to explain themselves" as it was called. The explanation degenerated at once into a quarrel, and the deputies, seeing the discussion would be neither free nor fair, withdrew, after having entered a protest. Day by day the gulf between the Revolutionists and the Liberals widened. MM. Raspail and Rochefort, who sat with the Republican group on the Left, but who never joined their meetings, and were not even on terms of common pohte- 186 THE GOVEENMENT OF M. THIERS. ness witli the members composing it, introduced a bill on the 8th December which M. Forcade de la Roquette described as a ridiculous notion. "A state is the multiple of the Commune, the Commune is the multiple of the family. The Municipal Council, which is elected for three years, shall nominate the Mayor for a year. In a case of difference between two Communes, a jury of six members shall judge between them ; if be- tween two arrondissements, it shall be submitted to the Legislative Body. "The Legislative Body, freely elected by uni- versal suffrage, is the Commune of the Communes. , . . Progressive taxation shall replace all other taxation. The Legislative Body shall annually fix the amount of the taxes ; the Commune shall make the assessment. " The Legislative Body shall nominate the generals." The ever-increasing mob of revolutionists and communists were wildly excited by these fine fancies. M. Rochefort was the idol of this mob. He had it completely in his hands on the day of the funeral of Victor Noir. He was wise enough not to let it loose on Paris. A word from him was sufficient to restrain it ; no one else, except perhaps M. Raspail, would have PAEIS BEFORE THE i8tH MAKCH, 1 87 1. 187 been listened to. M. Rocliefort was arrested some days afterwards, under circumstances much to be deplored, and which led to a disturbance. M. Flourens illegally arrested a commissary of police; Mégy shot a pohce agent. The police made 450 arrests. The Left protested against a policy of provocation and repression à outrance, without, however, admitting any identification of themselves with the actors or their principals. "I do not understand," said M. OUivier (15th Feb- ruary, 1870), "how the members of the opposition, who have always frankly declared that their poHcy was not a revolutionary policy, how men who so openly and freely represent the legal and consti- tutional opposition, associate themselves with a policy which is a negation of and a satire upon their own policy as well as ours." The Members of the Left neither associated themselves with the policy of Flourens, nor with the crime of Mégy ; but they claimed, as was their duty, the protection of the forms of law even for the men who calumniated and condemned them. What had they in common with the doctrines and conduct of Assi, the leader of the strike at Creuzot, with the regicidal speech of Félix Pyat, at the anniversary banquet of January 21st, with the attempted assassination by Beaury, with the thirty-eight accused members of the International, 188 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. and tlie seventy-two men accused at Tours ? It was an indelible stain upon tlic deputies of tlie Left, in the eyes of the Jacobins and Socialists, tliat they were liberals, and bourgeois, Republicans after tlieir own manner, not tlie right one, and partisans of equality before the law, which by maintaining property, hereditary succession, and the pretended rights of capital, allows privileges to subsist. At the sitting of the Federal Council of the International Association on the 12th of January, 1871, it was proposed to the Association to accept as their organ La Lutte à outrance, a journal founded by a society which called itself a repub- lican association; Leo Frankel, an important member of the Federal Council, and subsequently a member of the Commune, said, " I accept La Lutte à outrance. The French workman (Frankel is a Prussian) has need of an idol, let him have one; but let us hate and fight the bourgeoisie with him. The bourgeois Hepublic is no longer to be discussed; La Lutte à outrance ought to discuss the social Republic." All these men, who were afterwards the Commune, Protot, Milliere, Félix Pyat, Cournet, Razoua, Flourens, Ferré, Fontaine, Jaclard, Gromier, Mégy, Sapia, Tibaldi, Raoul Rigault, shared Leo Frankel's contempt and dishke for the bourgeois Republic. Protot PAEIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 1 87 1. 189 and Triton, wlio were barristers, Millière a doctor of laws, Félix P^^at a literary man, Flourens a tutor, Raoul Rigault a medical student, were enemies of the bourgeoisie, as tlie revolutionists of 1793 were enemies of the nobility; the deputies of the Left were odious to them as bourgeois, or, what was the same thing in their eyes, as enemies of Socialism. They would all have said, with Tony Moillin, a doctor, who became one of the mayors of Paris under the Commune, " The deputies deceive you shamefully." The wrath of these men, already fierce enough under the Empire, grew still fiercer after the 4th September, when power had slipped through their fingers. Lacord said at the Federal Council of the Workmen's Association on the 10th June, 1871, " The working men ought to have seized the government on the 4th September ; if they had done their duty, the 31st October would have turned out very differently. If the International had had a newspaper, it would have killed the Government." Others of the same party, if not the same association, had newspapers, by whose aid they tried to " kill " the Government. They never ceased during the siege to insist that the people were invincible, that in order to raise the blockade of Paris it was only necessary to put the whole National Guard in action; they de- 190 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THTERS. manded that Flourens should be made governor of Paris, and General-in-cliief of tlie army; they maintained, even at the moment of the capitula- tion, that we had an army intact of 300,000 men, and provisions for three months, nay, for six. Riots, journals, pamphlets, handbills, declamatory speeches in the clubs, the streets, the cafés, and the guard-houses, all were employed by them against the bourgeois Govern- ment installed at the Hôtel de Ville. ISTot only did the members of the Commune not spring from the earth on the 18th March, they had been severally known by their names for more than two years, their influence had been felt for more than six years; their object and means of action were known ; the repulses they had sustained might be computed, and the pro- gress of their strength measured. Under the Empire they had had their journals, their clubs, and the International Association ; a small group, but rendered powerful by its organization. For the accomplishment of their ends, a more comprehensive organization, and a more definite authority were requisite. When the National Guard was reorganized, after the 4th September, with a great extension of its numbers, these persons perceived that if they could establish their influence with that •PARTS BEFOEE THE i8tH MARCH, 1871. 191 body they should be masters of the Government, for they would possess, in that case, both numbers and strength. They did not concern themselves about getting rank in the Guard in which the " steps " were much disputed, and indeed created personal influence, instead of the collective in- fluence which was really desirable. They tried to get into the existing councils of the National Guard, and to form new ones. Similar efforts, made by others, resulted in advantage to them. There were meetings of officers, meetings of the majors, Vigilance Committees — committees and meetings were in fashion just then, because every- body wanted to make speeches and manifestations, to be a president or a delegate. The future members of the Commune insinuated themselves everywhere. They entered, too, into those com- mittees of armament and the family councils, which the Government itself had instituted in each company. These latter councils, charged with administrative details, and invested with certain disciplinary powers, had rapidly acquired influence, which preponderated in certain bat- talions ; and to this the authorities themselves had contributed by employing them as paymasters. This office was at first placed in the hands of the sectors, who knew neither the officers nor men, and had neither time nor means to 192 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. exercise an efficacious control. It was afterwards handed over to the mayors of arrondissements; but the same difficulties arose, although in a minor degree, and the mayors, overwhelmed with other business, begged to be exonerated from this. The family councils were better qualified to appreciate the wants of the battalion, and to detect frauds ; they accepted with eagerness a task which the others had abandoned; being paymasters, they speedily became masters of the men, and then by means of federation they became masters of the battalion. The family council absorbed the armament and vigilance committees nearly everywhere, and assumed their functions. The arrondissements also had vigi- lance committees, which had been suggested by those of the National Guard, but had greater power, because it was general and irresponsible. The officers were reduced in a few weeks to being mere instructors. They commanded at drill, indeed, but like their men, they were subservient to the occult authority of the committees and the councils. This became strikingly evident on the 31st October, when several battalions came to the Hôtel de Ville, with drums beating and led apparently by their officers, who were, however, devoted adherents of the Government. The men came to a sudden halt, when they had arrived at PARIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 1 87 1. 193 the gate, and raising tlie butt-ends of tlieir mus- kets, shouted, " No Armistice ! " More than one officer, appreciating the difference between being and seeming, between authority and the mere show of it, relinquished his rank that he might become a member of the vigilance com- mittee or the family council. The idea of fede- ration between the battalions, or the committees which led the battalions, was suggested by the International Association, and spread rapidly. All the affiliated were aware that if they gave the National Guard a political organization outside its military one, it would obtain the mastery of Paris. The federation was not complete all at once. In its case also, the same idea had arisen in more than one quarter at the same time. The Central Vigilance Committee gave signs of life before any of the others. It had existed since the 4th Septem- ber, and issued proclamations ; they were, however, lost in the multitude of such things, and attracted public attention in only a very slight degree. After the battle of Champigny (2nd December), the Central Committee posted a demand for war à outrance and the impeachment of the Govern- ment, and by this bold stroke took the lead. Thenceforward it called itself " The Republican Federation of the National Guard," to dis- VOL. T. o 194 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS, tingiiisli itself from tlie vigilance committees of the arrondissements. Twenty days later it began the periodical publication of its red placards, which were thenceforth eagerly perused by all those who made, wished for, or approved of the insurrection of the 31st October. The Kepublican Federation of the National Guard did not seek the shelter of anonymity. The red placards were signed by members of the Committee ; those who signed them oftenest, and took the most active part in drawing them up, were Bouis, Barroud, Chouteau, Fabre, Gaudier, Gouhier, Grelier, Lavalette, Moreau, Pougeret, Prudhomme, and Eousseau. According to General Vinoy, the Central Com- mittee, which led the insurrection of the 18th of March, originated in the following appeal to the National Guard, signed Lemaitre, and which was widely distributed : — " Proposal made to the National Guard of the Seine, " With the view of securing the unity of action of the National Guard for the present and for the future, we propose immediately to establish a committee in each of the arrondissements of Paris, composed of one guard and one officer from every battahon. Each of these committees shall name a PAEIS BEFOEB THE i8tH MARCH, 1 87 1. 195 delegate, and these delegates united shall form a central committee, to deal with urgent questions relating to the thorough organization of the National Guard. " This new organization should be composed as follows : — " Each arrondissement should place at its head a naval or other ofificer, with the title of General of the arrondissement. " The generals should select from among them- selves for their general-in-chief, a man with a strong sense of his duty, and of the responsibility to devolve upon him at a given moment; who would have this colossal army of citizens in his hands, whether to prevent us from falling into the snares the enemy might set for us with a view to the occupation of Paris, or to arrange the final fate of France. " The oflScers of the 14oth battalion, forming a Preliminary Commission. Lemaitre, Commandant. Marotet, Captain, &c. " Battalions are requested to signify their ap- proval without delay, and to send in the names of provisional delegates. ** Café of the National Guard, 49, Rue de Bre- tagne.' 2 196 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. This idea was not, as General Vinoy supposes, a novel one. It had already occurred to the members of the Republican Federation, and the position of Paris after the capitulation suggested the same project to many groups among the citizens. On the 15th February, one Chalain, a man of twenty-five or twenty- six years old, a turner by trade, and a member of the International Association and of the Commune, instigated certain inhabitants of the 1 5th arondissement to summon a meeting of the delegates of all the battalions at the Vaux-Hall. The meeting was adjourned, after a rambling debate, to the 24th, on which day no less than 2000 delegates attended. The Repub- lican Federation of the National Guard, which was already completely organized, came in large numbers. They proposed statutes, which were, in fact, a reproduction of their own ; and on the whole, the two meetings convoked by Chalain served only to increase the number of the ad- herents of the Republican Federation, which was thenceforward known as the Central Committee. Apart from the Federation, and consequently from the Central Committee, there existed at this date a body of delegates who took the name of the Federal Republican Committee. This consisted at first merely of the majors, who met to PARIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 1 87 1. 197 discuss the question of pay : but ojBScers of all ranks joined, and after a short time the asso- ciation took a poHtical form. The meetings took , place at the house of Lemardelay, under the pre- sidency of the Count du Bisson, who had first been a colonel in Cabrera's army, and afterwards a general in that of Ferdinand IL The Count was a Legitimist until the age of sixty, but we shall presently find him figuring as a general under the Commune. The Central Committee, who wanted to govern alone, and who had turned Com- mandant Lemaitre's proposal and the meetings brought about by Chalain to their own advantage, proposed a coalition. After several conferences, delegates were named on both sides: Bergeret, Bourdier, Chouteau, Courtry, Pindy, Varlin, and Viart, for the Central Committee; and for the Federal Committee, Raoul du Bisson, Jaclard, Tribalet, Garcin, Grêlier, and a sub-lieutenant whose name has not been dis- covered ; and an agreement was concluded. At a general meeting on the 3rd March, it was de- cided that the title " Republican Federation of the National Guard " should be revived. The complete title of the famous Central Committee was thence- forth the Central Committee of the Republican Federation of the National Guard. It retained the premises which it then occupied in the Rue de la 198 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIEES. Corderie, and the meetings at the house of Lemardelay were discontinued. On the 3rd March, it adopted, almost without discussion, statutes in ten articles, of which the following are the chief : — " The Republican Federation of the National Guard. " Preliminary declaration. The Republic being the only Government, cannot by right of justice be subordinate to universal suffrage, which is its own work. " The National Guard has an absolute right to nominate all its chiefs, and to dismiss them so soon as they have lost the confidence of those who elected them. . . " 1st Article. The Repubhcan Federation of the National Guard, is organized as follows: — " 1st. The general assembly of delegates ; " 2nd. Clubs of the battahons. " 3rd. The Council of the legion, •* 4th. The Central Committee. "2nd Article. Thegeneral assembly is formed by: "1st. A delegate elected for that purpose in each company without distinction of rank; " 2nd. An officer from each battalion, elected by the officers. « 3rd. The Major. " The delegates, whomsoever they may be. PARIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 1 87 1. 199 may be dismissed by those wlio have nominated them. *' 3rd Article. The Club of each battalion is formed by: *' 1st. The delegate of the general assembly; *' 2nd. Two delegates from each company, elected without distinction of rank : *' 3rd. The officer delegated to the general assembly ; «*4th. The Major. **4th Article. The Council of the legion is formed by : " 1st. Three delegates from each of the clubs of the battalions, elected without dis- tinction of rank; ** 2nd. The majors of the arrondissement. ** 5th Article. The Central Committee is formed by: " 1st. Three delegates from each arrondisse- ment, elected without distinction of rank by the Council of the legion. " 2nd. A major from each legion, deputed by his colleagues." The 5th Article charged the Committees, among other functions, " to prevent any attempt which might have for its object the overthrow of the RepubUc, and to draw up a plan for the complete reorganization of the national forces." 200 THE GOVEENMENT OF M. THIERS. In addition to these statutes, the meeting pro- posed tlie following resolution to the Committee : "In case, as certain rumours tend to make us believe, the seat of Government should be removed to some place other than Paris, the city of Paris shall at once constitute itself an independent Republic." Nearly two hundred and fifteen battalions joined the Federation, and sent their delegates with reports in due form, bearing the signatures of the sergeant-majors, to a meeting which took place at the Vaux-Hall on the 13th March. At this meeting the statutes were put in action, by the election of the principal chiefs of the National Guard. Garibaldi was appointed to be general, Lullier colonel of the artillery, Jaclard and Fallot majors. Thus the Central Committee is associated, by its origin, with the whole revolutionary and social movement since the election of 1864. It absorbs the former Vigilance Committee — which was also called the Central Committee and the Repub- lican Federation of the National Guard, and which published red placards during the siege — the Provisional or Central Committee of the National Guard, founded on the 15th February at the instigation of Chalain and several citizens of the 15th arrondissement, and the Federal Re- PARIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 187I. 201 publican Committee, a meeting of officers whicli took place at the house of Lemardelay under the presidency of Raoul du Bisson. It receives a regular organization at the two meetings of the 3rd and 13th March. It is the product of an election in four stages, with this distinction, that the electors of the intermediate stages, remain formed into circles and committees, subordinate to the Central Committee, and transmitting its orders to the 215 federate battalions. It has been said that this Central Committee, which effected the revolution of the 18th March, was composed of unknown men ; unknown or not, its members were invested with formidable powers, and had been accustomed, for a long time to their exercise. The 31st October, and the 22nd January were not so completely unexpected as has been supposed. These revolts were suppressed with great difficulty ; they were suppressed, however, owing to causes which it is important to recall, precisely because they had ceased to exist at the epoch with which we are now dealing. In the first place, the final organization of the revolutionary forces by the formation of a single Central Committee does not date further back than the General Assemblies of the loth February, and the 3rd and 13th March. In the second place, until the capitulation, all 202 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. tlie battalions belonging to the party of order were at the full strength of their effective force, and they more than counterbalanced that of the revolutionary party. i In the third place, the army of Paris properly so-called, the regular army, the Line, obeyed the Government. In the fourth place, during the siege the enemy had to be faced, there existed the sense of a great patriotic duty to be fulfilled, hopes of victory were Btill cherished, the disgrace of capitulation, and disarmament had not been incurred. We have just seen how the revolutionary forces had increased since the termination of the siege. It will be easy to show that the resisting forces had decreased in proportion. So soon as the gates of Paris were opened, all those who had the means of leaving the city has- tened to rejoin their families. The report made by the Staff of the National Guard states that, " sixty thousand of the steadiest, the most trust- worthy of the National Guards, of those whose interest it naturally is to preserve order, have left Paris since the communications have been re- opened." The proportion between conservatives and revolutionists in the ranks of the National Guard was entirely changed during the course of the month of February, and this explains, without PAEIS BEFORE THE i8tH MAECH, 1 87 1. 203 going back to moral causes, why the call to arms in what were termed the *'good" quarters of the city, did not produce any appreciable result on the 24th February, the 1st March, or especially on the 18th March. This departure en masse j was, under such circumstances, more than abdi- cation, it was almost comphcity. M. Jules Favre has asked forgiveness both of God and men for having worked so hard to hinder the disarmament of the National Guard ; he needs no pardon, first, because the disarmament was impossible at the date when he preserved us from it ; and, secondly, because the National Guard might have been allowed to retain their arms without any danger, if only the men who saved the Government on the 31st October had remained at their post. Their desertion, is not, however, to be explained only by their desire to return to their families, to put their affairs in order, to seek health under a more clement sky. While the revolutionary party was advancing towards the Commune, its adversaries did not know whither they were drifting. Among these adversaries, the Mon- archists were aware of their own powerlessness, which did not arise solely from the divisions among themselves ; the Republicans were angry and disheartened. Although the result of the siege, which had lasted beyond all hope, had 204} THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIEES. been foreseen, very few among the most sensible and enlightened Republicans, would consent to acknowledge that the Government had but yielded to an inevitable necessity in giving up Paris ; and even if they had forgiven the capitulation, they could not forgive the language that had been used during the conflict, to excite the courage of the combatants, and sustain that of the suffering inhabitants. The Government was charged with the whole responsibility of the defeat ; according to the fanatics it had betrayed the country, according to the moderate party it had been in- capable. Three hundred thousand men armed, the fortifications completed, cannon cast, the provision- ing of the city, revolts suppressed, order main- tained ; all this was laid to the credit of the popu- lation : the Government was credited with defeat only. M.Gambetta alone retained his prestige ; but M. Gambetta no longer formed part of the Govern- ment ; he had taken no share in the capitulation. The majority of the Assembly at Bordeaux was monarchical ; it had placed M. Thiers at the head of the Government ; M. Thiers who had served King Louis Philippe for eighteen years with in- comparable ability. How could they feel that the Republic was safe with such a chief, and such an Assembly? More than one Republican, who was neither a socialist nor a revolutionist, hesitated. PARIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 1 87 1. 205 They asked themselves whether in fighting for order they should not be fighting for a dynasty also. The Assembly evinced distrust of Paris which some of its members carried to the length of hostility. The deputies had been styled "rustics," ' an uncalled-for taunt; but they were at least provincials, and quite determined to submit no longer to the sway of Paris ; M. Thiers, who could do almost anything with them, did not even attempt the impossible task of taking them back to the Palais-Bourbon ; all that his influence and eloquence could obtain, was that Versailles rather than Fontainebleau should be chosen for the meeting of the Assembly. Thus, as the reward of her courage during five months of siege, Paris was declared " suspect " and lost her rank as the capital of France ! In addition to these griev- ances the majority of the inhabitants had heavy domestic cares. The workmen, who had nothing to live on and keep their families but their pay, for the work- shops were shut, were afraid of losing that last resource now that peace was made, and the small trades people, who had for the last six months been spending money, but making none, lacked funds and courage to reopen their shops or workshops, with- out customers, without capital, and even, in many * Euraux. 206 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. cases, without implements, for all had been ruined and destroyed. The impossibility of gaining a livelihood was trifling, so to speak, in comparison with the impossibility of paying former debts, of the preservation of commercial honour. House- rents were due, arrears had not been paid up, a remission of payment was demanded ; even mode- rate and sensible persons, who were aware that the Assembly could not sacrifice the rights of tbe proprietors, asked, at least, for a long delay. They would tax their ingenuity to the utmost; they would borrow money, and practise the most rigid economy ; but pay at once they could not. It was the same with commercial bills. The Government of Defence had granted a delay ; but its term had now expired, and an act was required to meet this emergency. The Assembly, in its sitting of the 10th March, at Bordeaux, had voted an act, the principal clause of which was as follows : " All commercial bills due fi'om the 13th August to the 12th November, 1870, shall be payable seven months from either date after maturity, with all interest tbereon, after the date of such maturity. Bills of the 13th No- vember to the 12th April next, shall be pay- able from either date, from the 13th June to the 12th of July, with ail interest thereon, from the date of first maturity." This enact- PARIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 1871. 207 ment revealed ignorance of the true extent of the evil. The bills of the 13th August, 1870, became due on the 13th March, 1871, the very day of the promulgation of the act. No one was in a position to meet them. Communications were not re-established between Paris and the departments, the branch offices of the Bank were not open, commercial transactions were impossible, bills could not be discounted. From the 13th to the 17th March more than 150,000 bills were protested in Paris, and if the law had been carried out to the letter, there would have been 40,000 bankruptcies. Representations were made on all sides, from Lille, Rouen, and Havre. A petition had been signed by the bureaus of sixty syndical chambers in Paris, representing 7000 traders. In the interest even of the creditor, which does not lie in incurring useless expense, but in obtain secu- rity for his loan, a longer delay was indispenable. This was not understood until later ; the act was reconstructed on the 27th April, under less stringent conditions ; but on the 10th March, the Assembly had lacked foresight. The question of house-rents was not even raised at Bordeaux, but it was a burning one in all the places which had been the theatre of war, and above all in Paris, where the siege had lasted five months, and where rents are so high. When, at the 208 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. sitting of the 20th March, M. Tirard was ques- tioned upon the cause of the inaction of the National Guard of the 2nd arrondissement, during the 17th and 18th March, he repHed without hesitation that it was the act relating: to com- mercial bills. Nearly every one in Paris was threatened with some misfortune ; the work- men with losing their pay as national guards, without finding w^ork ; lodgers with being turned out, and having their furniture seized ; commer- cial men with bankruptcy. It is sad to relate, but nevertheless true, that at the conclusion of the peace, it was Paris which had the most to suffer, after Alsace and Lorraine. The great city which had undergone bombardment, famine, and the ravages of an epidemic without surrendering, and whose walls were intact, was condemned to submit to the insult of occupation by the enemy. It seemed as though everything were to be done that could dishearten the prudent, and exasperate the violent. The profound emotion, mingled with shame and anger, that had been caused by the capitulation, grew stronger and deeper. It did not lead to in- surrection at first, no one would give the name of insurrection to processions of drunken workmen and soldiers, shouting treachery and breathing vengeance against the Prussians and the Govern- PAEIS BEFOEE THE i8tH MAECH, 1 87 1. 209 ment. The revictualling of tlie city, and the approaching elections were then absorbing all minds. During the short electoral period which immediately ensued the violence of the clubs knew no bounds. The attacks upon property and upon the bourgeoisie were as vehement as those upon the Government of National Defence. Electoral committees were formed on all sides, and in prodigious numbers. A marvel- lous number of candidates offered themselves. So numerous were competitors and so widely scattered were the votes, that several days were consumed in the reckoning, 545,600 electors having taken part in the ballot. It is equally painful and instructive to read the electoral placards. Some of them are perverse, some grotesque ; a few, happily, are bold and spirited. Here is one which might well have been inspired by the notorious Central Committee. It is printed on red paper : — " Central Committee, Revolutionary and Socialist, of the clubs and electoral committees of the twenty arrondissements of Paris. ** Whereas Paris did not, as has been said, surrender in order to avoid famine ; " Whereas the conduct of the Government of National Defence has been, since the 4th of Sep- VOL. I. p 210 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. tember, a succession of falsehoods and of cowardly and infamous acts ; " Whereas the Government had no right to transact any capitulation ; " The deputies sent to Bordeaux ought : " 1st. To impeach this Government; " 2nd. To demand war, and resign rather than enter into any treaty of peace." This placard is signed by Raoul Rigault, Lavalette, Tanguy, and Varlet. A list follows of forty-three recommended candidates, all of whom, with three or four exceptions, afterwards made part of the Commune. The names of members of the Government were to be found in some of the lists, according to the caprice of those who had drawn them up. The Government had not made any collective list, any profession of political faith, or taken any measures. The Liberal (moderate) committee, whose presi- dent was M. Dufaure, had systematically excluded tbem, not, he said, because he was hostile, but to avoid weakening their authority by mixing up their names in electoral discussions. " The names of the members of the National Defence do not figure upon our list. The committee beg to state that the omission must not be taken for condemnation or blame, but as an act of political foresight." PAEIS BEFORE THE i8tH MAKCH, 1 87 1. 211 " The lionourable personages whom we omit were called to the Government of Paris and of France, on the 4th September, by necessity : on the 3rd November, by the immense majority in Paris ; it was understood between them and those who gave them their authority, that it was to be exercised by them until it should be confided to other hands by a National Assembly. Their authority must be maintained all the more strictly as the close of its tenure approaches ; and the committee are of opinion, that it might come out of an electoral contest, in which the members of the Government would be engaged, weakened or compromised. " In the name of the Committee, " DuFAURE, President." This act of " political foresight " did not save the members of the Government from vehement abuse. When the contest was ended by the proclamation of the returns, the Assembly was in existence, and the authority of the Govern- ment, for which their own party had shown so much solicitude, had no longer scope for its exercise. Moreover, it is probable enough that even the support of their friends, if it had been given, would not have saved them from a defeat, which was noisily hailed by the socialists as a con- demnation and a " mark of contempt." M. Jules p 2 212 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. Favi^e, who was elected together with Messieurs Dorian and Gambetta, believed, on the 10th February, that the members of the Government of Paris would neither be elected at Paris nor else- where. He wrote to M. Jules Simon on the 10th, at eleven p.m., " The confusion has been so great that the counting is not yet finished; but so far, it is certain that not one member of the Government has been elected. This makes our position a very difficult one. However, we shall try to get out of it. We will stay at our posts so long as it is necessary, doing all we can to hasten the meeting o.^ the Assembly and facilitate its setting to work. At the present moment, the most important matter is to obtain a prolongation of the armistice from Count Bismarck. I shall see him to-morrow for that purpose, and I am not without uneasiness as to the impres- sion the ballot in Paris may have made upon him." The list of elected candidates was not published in the Journal Officiel until the 18th February. MM. Louis Blanc, Victor Hugo, Gambetta, Garibaldi, and Quiuet were at the head. M. Louis Blanc had 210,530 votes; M. Edgar Quinet, 199,472. M. Rochefort came after him, with 165,670 votes. Some of the generals who had distinguished themselves during the siege figured PARIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 1 87 1. 213 among the forty- three elected candidates: Admirals Saisset, and Potliuau, and General Erebault. The Government of Bordeaux was represented by M. Gambetta only, that of Paris by Messieurs Jules Favre and Dorian. M. Dorian was elected by 128,480 votes ; M. Jules Favre came in thirty- fourth, with 81,722 votes. M. Thiers (103,226 votes) was only twentieth. There were a few moderate republicans ; M. Henri Martin, M. Vacherot, M. Sauvage, M. Littré, M. Leon Say, and two or three others. The future members of the Commune were MM. Delescluze (154,142 votes), Felix Pyat, Gambon, Ranc, Malon, and Cournet. Paris had elected, besides, MM. Roche- fort and Razoua; and lastly, MM. Lockroy, Clemenceau, Floquet, and Millière, who, though they did not belong in any way to the Commune, sent in their resignation after the commencement of hostilities. The revictualling of the city went on rapidly, but still too slowly for the needs of a city of two millions of over excited inhabitants, who were suffering from hunger and cold, and excited by so many causes. London contributed to what may be called the salvage of Paris with prompti- tude and generosity which Paris will never forget. M. Jules Favre, in his fine work Le Gouvernement de la Defence Nationalet states that 214 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. the Prussians willingly facilitated the arrival of provisions, and that Count Bismarck gave all he had at his disposal, which represented subsistence for us for a day and a half. General Vinoy affirms, on the contrary, that, on the 3rd February, the enemy, being apprised of M. Gambetta's pro- clamation againt the conclusion of the armistice, stopped the convoys of provisions everywhere on their way to Paris. " Nevertheless," adds the general, " they afterwards consented to withdraw a prohibition which, if it had been kept in force a few hours longer, might have led to deplorable consequences." The general's words are, " a few houis longer," not, a day longer ; and in truth Paris was reduced to counting by hours. The provisions which, according to Raoul Rigault and the hostile journals, were stored in abundance in the city at the moment of capitulation, were in fact so limited, that the inhabitants were kept on rations until the 10th February, and it was feared that they would literally want bread. The railroads were broken up, their bridges were shattered, their rolling stock dispersed or useless, and their staffs disorganized. Even the river had been barred above and below Rouen by sunken vessels and torpedoes ; it would take time and labour to render it navigable once PAEIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 1 87 1. 215 more. The Journal Officiel states that the first train laden with flour, from Rennes, arrived on the Brd February, at three o'clock, at the Western station (Saint-Lazare). The same day the Orleans line brought 248 bullocks from Cholet, and three waggons of hay. The first con- signment from the London committee also arrived by the Northern line. It consisted of condensed milk, cheese, bacon, Liebig's extract of meat, water biscuits, soup, preserves, &c. On the 4th February, a train from Lille brought 6000 cwts. of flour and a waggon-load of coals. From that time the arrivals succeeded each other without inter- ruption. But the purchase of provisions in their places of production was slow; the passage of the armies had impoverished and devastated the country. M. Magnin went to Dieppe to expedite the proceedings. The farmers in the neighbourhood of Paris had set up a market at the bridge of Neuilly ; crowds rushed thither, and there were serious disturb- ances, only too easily explained by the general suffering. The ordinary peace-oflicers did not suffice to put these disturbances down ; and recourse was had to the gendarmerie, who could not be employed so near the outposts without permission from the Prussians. Almost all the railroads were available for traffic ; but there were 216 THE GOVEENMENT OF M. THIERS. 2,000,000 mouths to be fed. The requisition of corn and flour had been stopped on the 7th February in the expectation of more rapid arrivals. On the 12th February, Belleville was almost destitute of bread ; the bakers having re- ceived only 325 sacks of flour instead of 800. The last sacks were distributed on the morning of the 13th; other provisions were totally exhausted. Providentially, that very day, the 13th February, the arrivals of flour, which had been very slack on the ten preceding days, were numerous, and the quantity of flour was large enough to put an end to all apprehension. One cannot thmk, without a shudder, of the calamities the delay of one more day must have occasioned. A week later the markets of the town had almost resumed their usual aspect. Paris had food again ; the Central Committee was waiting for this moment to appear upon the scene. It was in fact, as will be remembered, on the 15th February, that the appeal to the National Guard was issued by the inhabitants of the 15th arrondissement, and that the negotiations for uniting the diff'erent committees in one single fede- ration commenced. On the IGth, while the Assem- bly was nominating its bureau, General Clément Thomas, feeling that his influence with the National Guard was gone, as the men were given up to their PARIS BEFORE THE i8th MARCH, 1 87 1. 217 committees, and not wishing to retain a sham authority, resigned his functions. General Vinoy, who was commanding the army of Paris, was provisionally appointed to the command of the National Guard. This choice was far from being a popular one. " He is a senator of the Empire ! " was said at the meetings. There was no less outcry against General Valentin, who was made Prefect of Police, and against his gendarmes. The appointment of M. Thiers produced great anger, for he was regarded as a Monarchist; and a similar feeling was aroused by the presence of three members of the Govern- ment of Defence in the new Government. M. Thiers thought to satisfy the National Guard by giving the command to M. d'Aurelles de Paladines. He wi'ote to M. Jules Simon on the 24th February, — " M. Jules Favre, M. Picard, and I, have made a choice, of which I hope you will approve, for the com- mand of the National Guard of Paris. We were told the measure was urgently necessary, and we were certainly told the truth. I have the consent of General Vinoy, who conducts himself marvellously well here, and has the confidence of all. The choice of which I speak is that of General d'Aurelles de Paladines, who is much esteemed everywhere, and particularly here, because he alone gained an in- 218 TUE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. contestable advantage at Coulmiers. He has consented upon reflection, but on one condition, that he is not to take the command until after the solution of a question which is occupying every one here, the passage of the Prussians through Paris. The question is not solved, and the proposals of the journals, the manifestations of certain of our friends, are far from facilitating its solution. The opinion of competent persons is that the question is not so grave as it is made out to be. But the bravado on a certain side is irritating Prussian amour-propre to the highest pitch, and embarrassing us greatly. " We, Jules Favre, Picard, and I, should have much liked to have been able to consult you upon the choice of General d'Aurelles, but we were obliged to make up our minds, the urgency being made evident here, and the local authorities pressing us, by declaring that Paris was left ungoverned. They were greatly reassured by the hope of a wise selection : above all, the can- didate is irreproachable, and is in Paris, on the scene of action." M. Thiers deceived himself in thinking the appointment of General d'Aurelles would be well received. The battle of Coulmiers was forgotten, while D'Aurelles de Paladines was remembered as the general whom M. Gambetta had dismissed. PARIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 1 87 1. 219 Any other choice would have been received with equal disfavour. The National Guard wanted to elect their own chief, all their chiefs, and declared through their committee, that they had *' the absolute right " to do so. On the 18th February, the enemy, who were in possession of the forts, wheeled the guns round so as to direct all the artillery upon the enceinte, in case peace should not be concluded. This superfluous and untimely de- monstration excited great indignation, not against the Prussians, but against the Government of Defence, *' who had given us up," and against the Assembly, its accomplice in treason. The people must always have a victim and an idol. In Feb- ruary its victim was the Government of Defence. They were so angry with the Government that they forgot to hate the Prussians. One measure of economy, in itself wise, was very ill received. On the 19th, the pay of one franc and a half, until then allowed to all workmen serving in the JSTational Guard, ceased to be granted as of right by the family councils of the companies. To obtain it, a man had to make his demand in writing, and to prove that it was not possible for him to get work. At the same time it was rumoured in the battalions that the Prussians were to enter Paris, and that the Assembly was going to transfer the seat of Government elsewhere. The com- 220 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. mercial bills act gave offence; that on house- rents, wliich was impatiently expected, was not under discussion. The agitation in the populous quarters, Belleville and Montmartre, increased; noisy and threaten- ing crowds paraded the streets. The 24th February seemed opportune for a grand demonstration. In a meeting held at the Vaux Hall, it was decided that the federated battalions should march, under arms, to the column of July, shouting, Vive la Be- publique! On the same occasion, two important resolutions were taken : the first was in these terms, *' The National Guard, through the medium of their Central Committee, protest against all attempt at disarming them, and declare that they will resist it, if necessary, by arms." The second resolution, adopted in spite of the strong pro- test of the reasonable portion of the meeting, was that the delegates should submit the following proposal to their companies : — " At the moment when the Prussians enter Paris, the National Guard shall go forward to meet them, and oppose an armed resistance." The precise day of the enemy's entry was not known; it was generally thought it would be the 27th. Mean- while numbers might be counted by a pacific demonstration on the 24th. The watch- word was immediately given at the clubs. PAEIS BEFORE THE iStH MARCH, 187I. 221 On the 24tli, the concourse round the column of July was considerable. Soldiers and sailors were to be seen in the crowd. The peace-ojQBcers who were on duty, unarmed, were hooted and hissed; that day, however, passed over without any incident of graver importance. The morning of the next day was tolerably quiet. It was about two o'clock when the crowd began to collect. At three nearly 3000 persons were counted in the square. The deputations from the National Guard carried wreaths of immortelles. Some came in corps, headed by their officers, and preceded by bugles or drums. The arrival of 2000 men of the Garde Mobile of the Seine was hailed with loud acclamations ; buglers sounded the charge from the platform of the column. A battahon of light infantry, with the number 137 on their képis, marched in. The crowd was more turbulent and ill-disposed than on the day before. In the evening the excite- ment rose high. Several well-dressed women were pursued ; the peace-officers were compelled to hide themselves. The crowd did not disperse until ten o'clock. Two deplorable incidents marked this day, the 26th February. At one o'clock the red flag was hoisted upon the column of July, at three o'clock a police agent in plain clothes, named Vincenzini, 222 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. was recognized and pursued. He fled as fast as Ws legs could carry him, but was caught upon the quay, seized by artillery-men, sailors, and light infantry, and dragged to the parapet. " Throw him into the water !" cried the mob, amono: which were numbers of women. He was tied to a plank and thrown into the river. The plank floated and the unhappy man begged for mercy, but he was stoned to death. The Central Committee had succeeded in reckoning its forces; it had, so to speak, held a review of them on the Place de la Bastille. It now turned its attention to another object : the battalions had only muskets, and very few cartridges ; the Committee wanted to give them ammunition and artillery ; and for that the entry of the Prussians furnished a pretext. The Com- mittee had probably perceived the absurdity of attempting a conflict with the Prussian army from the first, but intended to profit by the agitation to complete the armament of the future insurrec- tion. The idea thrown out at the Vaux Hall meeting had been ardently taken up, and during the last two days of February nothing was thought of but fighting. Cannon " belonging to the National Guard, for they had paid for them with their own money " by voluntary subscriptions during the siege, were posted at Neuilly, and in PAKIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 1 87 1. 223 tlie Avenue de Wagram, on the route which the Prussians were to follow. *' Impossible to let them be taken by the enemy ! " this was the uppermost idea in all the battalions. The tocsin was rung by order of the Central Committee, and the companies pro- ceeded at once to place " the people's artillery " in safety. They met with no resistance. The artillery-men in charge of the cannon lent a willing hand to the work. At six o'clock in the evening, the first comers harnessed themselves to the guns, and began to drag them towards the fau- bourgs, crossing the Place de la Bastille, which was still crowded. The cannon thus captured were placed in the Place des Vosges, at Belleville, at the Buttes-Chaumont, at Charonne, at La Villette, and at Montmartre. The despatches sent to M. Thiers by the generals during the night were alarming : — " 9.20 p.m. *' They are beating to quarters in Belleville ; the battalions are getting under arms." "11.40 p.m. " Two thousand of the National Guard, armed and provided with cartridges, are assembled on the boulevard of Belleville; the drummers say the rendezvous is Place du Château d'Eau. Orders are given by the Central Committee, which is sitting in the Rue de la Corderie." 224 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIEKS. "11.50 p.m. " The park of artillery at La Muette has been carried off, the guns are being taken to the Trocadero and the Champ de Mars. The meeting of La Marseillaise has resolved to oppose the entry of the Prussians by force, and is awaiting orders from the Central Committee at the Rue de la Corderie." « 11.50 p.m. " The battalions are assembling under arms, and say they intend to oppose the entry of the Prus- sians. The excitement is great ; the movement is essentially patriotic, and directed solely against the enemy. The prolongation of the armistice will suspend this movement; but it will cer- tainly be revived if the Prussians enter Paris. Is there not real danger in this, and would it not be well to take it into account in the negotiations ? '* This is on the 26th February, from the general commanding the sixth zone to M. Thiers. M Thiers had arrived at Paris on the 20th ; be- tween the 20th and the 26th he had nego- tiated the peace with Count Bismarck ; the sup- plementary convention regulating the entry of the Prussians into Paris bears date the 26th. The negotiators had not failed to warn Count Bis- marck ; they knew, only too well, the disordered state Paris was in; he himself was disturbed. PAEIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 1871. 225 but he declared that he was unable to resist the will of the Prussian army on this point. M. Thiers had to set out for Bordeaux on the 27th, there to face the conflicts of the Assembly, not knowing but that Paris might be deluged with blood. The processions, begun on the 24th February, lasted until the 1st March. That the National Guard would oppose the entry of the Prussians by a regular battle was neither probable nor possible ; a partial attack, one isolated act of folly, would, however, be enough to bring about a catastrophe. The carrying off of the cannon by the federate battalions was completed during the 27th and 28th February. The authorities were unable to prevent this, for they had no longer any forces at their disposal, but they endeavoured to obtain that each battalion should only take those guns which it had given, hoping, by this means, to save the cannon formerly given by the wealthy quarters ; but the Central Committee would not permit the non-federal battalions to have any artillery. It employed itself with perseverance, and not without intelligence, in accumulating engines of war and ammunition. It instigated the crowd, which was acting at random, to pillage the bastions and the powder factories, for the purpose of procuring powder and ball. The VOL. I. Q 226 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. Committee ordered their muskets to be taken from custom-liouse officials and tlie collectors of the town-dues (octroi), at their posts, and at the railway stations where they were quartered. The general commanding the second zone, having tried to oppose this pillage, was arrested and kept under ward. The Prefect of Police to the General-in-chief. "February 27th, 7 a.m. *' The general commanding the second zone is a prisoner there, the telegraph wires have been cut ; the National Guards, wherever they show themselves, advance the same pretext ; they want cartridges, that they may oppose the entry of the Prussians." The Central Committee was making ready for war, but not for war upon the Prussiaus. Ammunition marked 7 was placed with pieces of the same calibre, and cartridges for chassepots were divided from cartridges for breech-loaders. The keys of the powder-magazines were taken, by violence if necessary. The guns of bastion 36 were replaced upon their carriages, in violation of the fifth clause of the conveution. A battery of six pieces was seb before the gate of La Chapelle. For the protection of the artillery collected upon the heights of Montmartre, the Committee had PAEIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 187I. 227 ordered barricades to be erected in all the neigh- bouring streets. So httle did it conceal its pre- sence and its authority, that two officers who pre- sented themselves before the general commanding the quarter, to demand ammunition, produced a written order by the Central Committee. The movement, being spread over the whole city, was necessarily irregular, but the traces of a guiding authority were clearly to be recognized : the Central Committee was making, according to its fashion, order by disorder. The nights of the 27th and 28th were not more tranquil than the days. During the night of the 27th, several bands, each composed of about 500 men, flocked to the Place de la Concorde and up the Champs Elysees, because it was believed the enemy were coming. General Yinoy estimates these bands at 3000 men ; he says that, on the night of the 27th, 8000 armed men were continually afoot in the diflerent quarters of Paris. No murder except that ofVincenzini is recorded. Three Prussians were recognized in a carriage, in the Eue Turbigo, and pursued by the crowd, amidst cries of, " To the water ! " An officer saved them, by taking upon himself to conduct them to the Central Committee, in the Rue de la Corderie. At the railway stations there were Q 2 228 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. serious disturbances, besides the carrying off of tlie muskets. The trains were ransacked and sent back. The workmen belonging to the Northern railway, to the number of 1100, were stopped, as they came up to their workshops, and made to work at the barricades and at mounting the cannon. The meeting held at La Marseillaise had appointed a certain Darras General-in-chief of the National Guard; he was scarcely heard of afterwards. A more serious matter was the liberation of Brunei and Piazza, who had been locked up at Sainte-Pélagie since the 22nd February, and who were chaired by the crowd. They afterwards became personages of importance in the army of the Commune. On reading of these occurrences, it is impossible not to ask oneself, what were the authorities doing? Everywhere complaints were made of their weakness, and they are bitterly reproached with it still. What a mistake it was to let the cannon be taken ! No one asks whether the authorities had any means of preventing the seizure. The authorities were weak, no doubt; the question is, were they so through their own fault or through that of their position ? M. Ernest Picard, the Minister of the Interior, was a man of great decision of character and of stout heart ; M. Jules Ferry had proved, on two memorable PARIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 1 87 1. 229 occasions, that he could brave peril both to his person and his popularity ; General Vinoy, the Govern or- General of Paris, is an energetic officer who likes fighting without quarter better tlian submission. But what can a few stout-hearted men do, when they are completely disarmed ? The authorities, who found themselves confronted by the Central Committee and the Federals, knew, as others before them had known, all the horrors of civil war during the siege; and in the then state of the National Guard and the army, they felt they could not attempt vigorous measures without running the risk of a civil war, in which they should get the worst of it. Those battalions of the National Guard which were called " good," worn out by the siege, over- whelmed with grief and shame at the capitulation, reassured but slightly by the composition of the Government, decimated, moreover, by the depar- ture of 60,000 men of their effective strength for the departments, did not respond, or responded in only insignificant numbers to the repeated call to arms. It has been said that the National Guards did not come, because they had been refused a suf- ficient quantity of ammunition. The distribution of cartridges was made with caution, because it was not desirable either to waste them or give 230 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. tliem to suspected persons. Wlio has ever imagined that if the National Guard had come forward, all the ammunition at command would not have been distributed to them ? AYe must not palter with history. The truth is, that, at this time, three parts of the National Guard were infected with a spirit of mutiny, and the rest were utterly disheartened. If the correctness of this proportion between the good battalions and the bad is denied, it is because the number who were absent is forgotten. The cadres of even the orderly battalions were disorganized. The two or three men who alone represented the Government of Paris, did not, themselves, know how utterly the National Guard would fail them. They believed, up to the last moment, that the men would rouse themselves when they under- stood the magnitude of the danger. They were not aware of the enormous number of absentees, and this was the most serious evil. It was thought- less and unpatriotic desertion, at the moment of the greatest danger, which gave the victory to the Central Committee, and soon after to the Commune. During the occupation of the Champs Elysées by the Prussians, the Government endeavoured by beat of drum to rally round them a cordon of the National Guards; but no one appeared. PABIS BEFORE THE iSlH MARCH, 1 87 1. 231 High pay was offered, but in vain. Yet the " good " battalions were still believed in. On the day of the evacuation, when the Gobelins was seriously threatened on account of a considerable quantity of ammunition stored in the manu- factory, and which the Central Committee wanted to seize, M. Jules Favre would not have recourse to the troops of the line, for he still relied "upon the good battalions." M. Thiers, on being consulted by telegraph, was of the same mind. He replied, from Bordeaux, " It is impossible but that the National Guard will interpose, at the proper time, and put an end to the disturbances which disquiet us." Some days later, on the 17th March, during the whole of the afternoon and part of the night, the drums beat to arms in those quarters which were most favourable to order; but there was no response. This resource, the good National Guard, the best of all, for it had often put an end to insurrections by its mere presence, now utterly failed the authorities. The " guardians of the peace," as they had been called since the 4th September, formerly called " serjents de ville," had been formed into regiments during the war ; they made up a body of some imjDortance. But they had been disarmed, like the rest of the army, since the armistice, and 232 THE GOVEENMENT OF M. THIERS. tliey were, besides, objects of an especial Hatred to the population of the suburbs ; they could not show themselves in a crowd without being in- sulted, chased, and ill-treated. Their number was not great enough to oppose to armed bands. It would have been impossible for them to make an arrest, and especially to arrest the leaders of the movement, protected and defended as they were by body-guards who allowed no one to approach them. As for the army, there were two different phases in its position. Up to the 15th March, the army of Paris, that which had arms, at least, consisted of 15,000 men (Faron's division and the gendarmes). The other soldiers in Paris were those who had fought during the siege, and had just been disarmed according to the terms of the armistice. The total of the effective strength was 243,000 men. Deducting the 12,000 of Faron's division, and the 3000 gendarmes who had kept their arms, they may be said to have formed a mass of about 225,000 men ; a mass, not an army, a mass, moreover, in process of dissolution, since it inchided 103,000 gardes mobiles, men engaged for the period of tho war, discharged soldiers who had been recalled, and those who would be exempt from service early in 1871. The latter, whose time of service had now nearly expired, were so far from PAEIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 1 87 1. 233 trustworthy, tliat it was of great importance for the maintenance of order they should be disbanded as quickly as possible. The mobiles of the Seine, especially, no longer obeyed their superiors. More than that, they had taken to arresting them and bringing them as prisoners before the Central Committee, which, for the most part, released them. The 20,000 mobiles of the Seine were quickly disbanded, but not much was gained by the arrangement, for they stayed in Paris. The others were sent off, as soon as possible, either on foot, passing through the enemy's lines, or by rail, so soon as the railroads were reopened. This difiBcult operation was completed on the 14th March. The men of the active army entitled to be discharged were also disbanded at the same time ; the former army of Paris vanished ; but, just in time, came a new one sent by M. Thiers, at the urgent request of General Vinoy, and with the authorization of the Prussians, who com- prehended the absolute necessity of letting the third article of the preliminaries of peace lie dormant. This army, consisting of 4420 infantry and a division of cavalry, arrived in Paris with the men belonging to it who were entitled to be discharged, and who had to be sent off to their homes at once. In consequence of this, the 234 THE GOVERNMENT OF IT. THIERS. effective strength of the companies, already in- complete, was still further reduced ; and the regiments were more like corps in process of formation than regiments already formed. An effort was made to place tbem upon a proper footing, by amalgamating them with the former regiments bearing the same number, according as the latter came back from captivity. This difficult operation, during which an army can only exist upon paper, was not concluded by the 17th March. The new arrivals encountered the mobiles of the Seine and all the discharged soldiers of the former army of Paris, who had not yet returned to their departments, or who had been domiciled in Paris before the war. There was a great number of them : they turned up in all the insurrections, where they appeared in the képi, and red trousers, and where their presence was always greeted with hearty acclamations. Even before they were dis- charged, it had been necessary to billet them upon the inhabitants, so as to restore the schools, colleges, and palaces, which had been turned into barracks during the siege, to the public administra- tion. To these discharged soldiers must be added a swarm of francs-tireurs and foreign volunteers, who were adventurers rather than soldiers, and who found their opportunity in scenes of disorder. Among surroundings such as these, the regiments, PAEIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 1 87 1. 285 sent to Paris, and those composing Faron's small division, were perilously placed: all these men, who were soldiers no longer and yet had not taken up their former trades, were an incessant cause of demoralization to their comrades in the active army. Certainly, an army commanded by men such as Generals Vinoy and Faron, was in vigorous hands ; but it had neither cohesion, party spirit, nor discipHne. The disarmed and the discharged men soon turned the army to the side of the Federals, who shouted : " Vive la hgne !" as they passed along. They had in themselves a powerful incentive to insurrection ; for, if the Central Committee and its adherents were actuated by secret political intentions, the greater number of those who made the demonstra- tions were inspired by nothing more than anger against the Prussians, and pride in the flag and the name of France : sentiments which were as powerful in the hearts of the soldiers as in those of the citizens. All the generals felt themselves powerless, as their despatches testify. " Do you wish us to resist ? I am not sure of my men." Or again, "I do not know what my men may do ;" or else, " These disturbances are serious, and I have no means of putting them down." General Yinoy, determined to know the worst, held a review : the attitude of the soldiers was 236 TOE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. threatening ; they were within a hair's-breadth of mutiny. The General-in-chief was so little in a condition to resist, that towards the middle of March lie fell back with his troops towards the centre. It often happened, that when a general commanding a zone would send a detachment of soldiers to prevent the carrying ofiP of cannon or the pillage of armouries, the men would not march; or that even on the spot, they would not obey orders, or they would fraternize openly with the Federals. There were honourable, even splendid exceptions ; gendarmes and soldiers who let themselves be imprisoned so long as the Commune lasted rather than fight against the French army; some forfeited their lives in this devotion to duty; but the bulk of tke army of Paris was rotten. The Communists took pains to mark this, after the 18th March, by their mani- festations of delight. " Our brethren of the army would not lay a hand upon the sacred ark of our liberties." This was said publicly. Among themselves, they judged " our brethren of the army," who had given themselves, or been bought, more severely ; but these sentiments of contempt, expressed behind closed doors, only afford further proof of the reality and extent of the treachery. It is worth while to give details. One day, after the 18th March, it was asked, at the Hôtel PARIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 1871* 237 de Ville, what was to be done with the soldiers ? One member proposed that they should be in- corporated with the National Guard; another, named Rousseau, set himself energetically against this proposal, saying, " no confidence could be placed in men who had been seen to sell their arms to the first comer for a few pieces of money." To this had the army of Paris come. General Lecomte was killed on the 18th, only because his men deserted him ; he was taken by the assassins from amidst his own soldiers. At a meeting held on the 1st March (the day of the Prussian entry) by the Federal Council of the International Assembly, Ridet makes the following report : " This evening, I had proof that Yinoy is no longer obeyed. The line Avants to avoid all conflict with the people. Vinoy sent them to bring away the cannon from the Place Royale. The National Guard refused to give them up. The line did not insist." Babick makes the following reflection : " The influence of these events is considerable, this may be an immense advantage." Since the soldiers disobeyed their general when it was a ques- tion of carrying off the guns, it is easy to foresee what would have happened if they had been sent into Belleville or Montmartre, to arrest the leaders of the federation. Even if the formation 238 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIEES. of a company of trustworthy and devoted men could have been achieved, it would have been impossible to have effected any arrest without much bloodshed. Who could have exposed Paris to such a danger, at the very moment of the Prussian entry? Not M. Thiers; not MM. Jules Favre and Jules Ferry; and they alone had to represent the Government after the 27th. General Vinoy and all the generals under his command shared this sentiment. It is easy enough, when these events are left far behind, to accuse the authorities of weakness ; those who are in the midst of the facts, who can measure the scope of their means of action, who foresee the consequences of defeat, often exhibit more courage in temporizing than would have sufficed for fighting. This was the history of the new Government, in those ill-omened days at the end of February, as it had been that of the Government of Defence during the greater part of the sieg^e of Paris. The uncertainty which had prevailed respect- ing the exact day for the entry of the Prussians, had produced, perhaps, a favourable result. Anger had had time to cool, zeal had worn itself out during four days' suspense. A conflict could only result from a moment of blind rage, whose insanity all had recognized on reflection. The PARIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 1 87 1. 239 Government was certain that they had not a general engagement to fear, but they dreaded partial disturbances which might serve the enemy as a pretext. The Central Committee, who had probably resolved from the first to submit to the occupation which no one in the world could prevent, but also to take advantage of it to get possession of the cannon and ammu- nition, and to establish its authority over the federal battalions, posted the following proclama- tion, on the evening of the 28th, so that it might appear that all the popular movements were directed by the Committee. " French Republic. " Liberty, EquaHty, Fraternity, " Central Committee of the National Guard. " Citizens, — " As it appears that the general feeling of the population is against offering any opposition to the entry of the Prussians into Paris, the Cen- tral Committee, which had issued a notice to the contrary, now declare that they have adopted the following resolution : — " There shall be erected all round those quar- ters of the city which the enemy is to occupy, a series of barricades so as to isolate that portion of the city completely. 240 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. " The inhabitants of the district circumscribed within these limits ought to evacuate it imme- diately. " The National Guard, in concert with the army, formed into a cordon, will surround this space, and will take care that the enemy, thus isolated on a soil which forms no longer a portion of our city, shall have no communication whatsoever with the other portions of Paris. " The Central Committee therefore request all the National Guard to lend their aid in the exe- cution of the measures necessary to effect this purpose, and also to avoid all acts of aggression which would bring about the immediate overthrow of the Republic. " Paris, the 28th February, 1871. " The Members of the Commission : " André Alavoine, Bouit, Frontier, Bour- sier, David, Boisson, Haroud, Gritz, Tessier, Ramel, Badois, Arnold, Pi- connel, Masson, Andoyneau, Weber, Lagarde, Jean Laroque, Jules Ber- geret, Pouchain, Lavalette, Fleury, Maljournal, Chouteau, Cadoze, Gas- teau, Dutil, Matte, Mutin." The plan of the Central Committee was, in fact, no other than that of General Yinoy, who on his side had also published a proclamation. PAEIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 1 87 1. 241 Among the names of members of "the Com- mission " of the Central Committee we find that of Chouteau, who belonged to the International. The Federal Council of the International had decided, after some hesitation, that four of its members should get themselves delegated by the companies, so as to make part of the Central Committee. These four members were to act in their own names, without compromising the association, but they were to supply it with in- formation, and to be guided by it. The International Association laid great stress on what it called its moral influence ; it wanted to bear a part in everything, and meant to take its share of political action, without, however, allowing politics to be anything but a means of serving its social propaganda. MM. Lanjalley and Corriez, the authors of a history of the 18th March, assert, that before drawing up the Manifesto of the 28th February, the Central Committee had admitted several members of the Federal Council of the Inter- national, under the title of free members, "in order to counterbalance the influence of the violent and unruly element existing in its own body." The Central Committee did not call upon the International to act as moderators. It did not fear its own violence to that extent ; it only VOL. I. R 242 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. did on the 28th. what was already intended on the 24th, but it wilhnglj accepted the co-opera- tion of the International, in order to explain and cover the sudden transformation of its policy. The International, whose directing Committee was composed of very prudent men, was far from any ideas of resistance, as the following document will sufficiently prove : — " Paris, 28th February. " Numerous deputations have presented them- selves at the Corderie since the entry of the Prussians has been under consideration, and have declared that they expected to find there a military organization quite ready to march against the invaders when they should set foot in Paris. " The members present having requested the delegates to state what groups they represented, the names of certain citizens were given who have not received any mandate from the Com- mittees constituting the reunion of the Corderie, viz : — " The International x^ssociation of Workmen ; the Federal Chamber of the Working Men's Society; the Deputation of the twenty arrondissements. " Under these circumstances the three groups PAEIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 1 8/ 1. 243 of the Corderie inform tlie workmen of Paris that they have given no mandate to any one on the subject of an action against the Prussians. " The members present consider it their duty to declare their behef that any attack would but serve to place the people in the power of the enemies of the Revolution, of German and French Monarchists, who would drown all social claims in a sea of blood. " We remember the dark days of June. *' The Members of the Commission : " Henri Goulle, Pindy, Jules Vallès, Rochat, Roueyrol,Leo Meillet, Ch. Beslay, Avrial, Antoine Arnoud." Round that portion of Paris occupied by the Prussians the Government had formed two cordons of troops, one furnished by General Faron's regi- ments, the second by the National Guard. The National Guard disliked this service, notwithstand- ing their high pay. The two cordons were broken through by only a few inquisitive persons, espe- cially on the first day. It had been verbally arranged that the Prussians might visit, indi- vidually and unarmed, the Louvre and the Inva- lides ; the Government had consequently ordered all the gates of the Tuileries, of the Place du Car- rousel, and of the Court of the Louvre to be shut. E 2 244 THE GOVEENMENT OF M. THIEES. The Louvre was completely closed in by canvas screens, so as to hide Paris from the enemy, and the enemy from the Parisians. In the interior of the town cafés and shops were shut ; the greater number bore the following inscription : " Closed on account of the National Mourning." Few, if any carriages ; scarcely any one on foot : a dead city. The Bourse was deserted ; the kiosks were closed. Thirty-seven newspapers, of the most diverse opinions, had unanimously announced that they would not appear, and exhorted the citizens to calmness and dignity. Not one of them broke faith. In the night some unknown hand had covered the face of each of the statues in the Place de la Concorde with a black veil. A few houses hoisted black flags. The vanguard of the Prussians entered by the Grande Avenue des Champs Elysées on the 1st March, at eight o'clock, but without passii^ under the Arc de Triomphe, the middle arch being completely blocked up by heaps of stones and rubbish. They were preceded by a numerous staff, who rode on to the Place de la Concorde and marched round it several times, as though to take possession of it. A regiment, which appeared to be a second vanguard, entered Paris about half-past ten. The Emperor mean- while reviewed the main body of the army on the PARIS BEFOEE THE i8tH MAllCH, 1 87 1. 245 race-course of Longchamps. He afterwards re- turned to Versailles with the Crown Prince, and did not enter Paris at all. The troops in occupa- tion marched with fife and drum down the Grande Avenue des Champs Elysees at about three o'clock. A great number of ofiB.cers of all arms had requested permission to join the staff of General Kammecke, who commanded the corps of occupation. Count Bismark came the next day in a close carriage, but went no farther than the Avenue de la Grand Armée. The Prussians came with all the panoply of war, like troops going into battle, not to a parade. Their baggage, ambulances, telegraphs, canteens, and forage waggons crowded the Palais de l'Indus- trie, the Rotonde des Panoramas, and the Cirque. Many officers and soldiers were quartered on the inhabitants; General de Kammecke established his head quarters in Queen Christina's house. The German soldiers, closely watched by their officers, and perhaps also feeling they were treading on a mine, were guilty of no provocation, cruelty, or depredation. At the round point of the Champs Elysees, whilst the Prussians were marching past by torchlight, a passer-by hissed them, and, being pursued, climbed over a hoarding in front of some buildings in com-se of erection. The Prus- sians burst open the door of the adjoining house 246 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. in searcli of liim, and wounded the concierge and some otlier persons. A stone was flung at a Prussian soldier, and it knocked his eye out ; the culprit was seized and executed on the spot. In the city some natives of Alsace, who were mistaken for Germans, were hunted by the mob, and for a time they were in serious danger. Several women of the town who addressed the Prussian soldiers were beaten. At the clubs, which sat permanently, threats abounded ; and even some rash demonstrations were made, such as the rolling of barrels of gun- powder into the hall of La Marseillaise, with the intention, it was said, of blowing up the palace of the Elysée. Artillery-men of the National Guard, aided by women and children, mounted five pieces of cannon on the platform of the Mou- lin de la Galette in full view of the Prussian army. The greatest danger, however, that which most alarmed General Vinoy and the Government, arose from the clause that authorized the Prussians to visit the Louvre and the Invalides. General Yinoy declared himself ready to carry out the condition with respect to the visit to the Invalides, but he pointed out the risks the visitors must incur, by venturing so far from the occupied portion of Paris, and added, that, unarmed as he was, and in presence of an PAEIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 187T. 247 angry and armed crowd, he could not be respon- sible for tlie consequences of such, imprudence. M. de Kammecke yielded this point, but insisted that his men should enter the Louvre. General Vinoy then explained that the galleries had no longer any interest, as all the large pictures had been taken down by order of M. Jules Simon, during the siege, rolled up, and stowed away in the half-subterranean galleries which seemed likely to be impervious to shot and shell. The Prussians would therefore see nothing^ but empty frames. All the windows of the sculpture galleries on the ground floor had been walled up, also by order of M. Jules Simon ; so that they were simply dark vaults. It was consequently arranged that the soldiers should visit the great courtyard, but not enter the galleries. They did enter them nevertheless, for some of the officers, finding a door open, penetrated as far as the gallery of Apollo, and even were so imprudent as to open the famous " window of the Balcony of Henri III." and crowd into it to admire the fine view of the Quays, the Seine, and the Cité. So soon as the crowd on the bridges and in the streets observed the German uniforms, there arose a deafening roar of rage and defiance. Two- sous pieces were flung at the Germans with the cry, " Here is the beginning of the three mil- 248 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. liards." Nearly 300,000 National Guards, all armed, were in the streets. A single musket-shot might have led to a massacre, and renewed the war. The peace was ratified at Bordeaux by the Assembly on the 1st March, the day of the Prus- sian entry into Paris. The news was received in Paris at seven o'clock in the evening. Had the Prussians been satisfied with the telegraphic despatch the occupation would have lasted only a single day, had they withdrawn when the authentic instrument of the ratification reached the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, it would have lasted but a day and a half. Count Bismark suc- ceeded, by delays and formalities, in making it last two entire days. It has been said that the Emperor William intended to make a solemn entry into the Champs Elysees with Count Bismarck and Count Moltke by his side, and that the 3rd March was the day appointed. If indeed he ever enter- tained this cruel and dangerous design, he was obliged by the formal text of the Convention to abandon it. The evacuation commenced early on the ord March, and terminated without any special incident ; at noon it was completed. The crowd rushed into the Champs Elysées, now deserted by the enemy. The cafés where the Prussians had dined, the Café Dupont, the Restaurant Le Doyen, PArJS BEFORE THE i8tH MAUCH, 1 87 1. 249 were wrecked and pillaged by a band of ruffians ; but one company of foot belonging to the National Guard sufficed to re-establish order. The Central Committee had not been inactive during the two days of the German occupation. The members felt themselves all the more free to act that the soldiers of Faron's division were em- ployed in surrounding and watching the Prussians. From the moment of the evacuation, they dis- played fresh activity, as though they were in haste to complete their preparations for civil war. On the 3rd March they sent four battalions to the guard-house of the Gobelins then occupied by the " guardians of the peace ;" disarmed the soldiers, took possession of their muskets and of a quantity of ammunition stored in the establish- ment; on the 4th they carried off twenty-nine howitzers from La Villette ; two days after they seized 2000 muskets, belonging to the wounded and sick soldiers then under treatment in the Hospital of Saint Antoine. On the 10th they ordered three battalions to seize the cannons at the Luxembourg; but the attempt failed; on the 14th they stopped a train of thirteen waggons carrying powder, the last waggon only remained in their hands. On the 16th they attempted to capture the powder-magazine belong- ing to the ninth zone ; the 131st foot, who were 250 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. ordered to take it, retreated before tlie determined resistance of the 21st battalion. The Committee was everywhere; it prompted the revolt of the Garde Mobile, it laid hands on the gunpowder belong- ing to the State which was stored in the bastions, and, the better to organize the approaching conflict with the regular army, it withdrew the cannon which had at first been placed in the Place des Vosges, and transferred them to the heights of Belleville and Montmartre. It also attacked Saint Pélagie with the object of releasing the prisoners of the 31st October and 22nd January. The Committee never relaxed its efforts to entice the Line, and was actively seconded in this by the former mobiles of the Seine, and other discharged soldiers. On the 11th March the news came to Paris that the Assembly was to sit at Versailles, that Blanqui and Flourens were con- demned to death ^ar contumace for their partici- pation in the rising of the 31st October ; that the authorities had just suppressed six newspapers : Le Vengeur, of Felix Pyat ; Le Cri du Peuple^ of Jules Vallès, Le Mot d^ Ordre of Rochefort ; Le Père Duchesne, of Vermersch ; La Caricature, of Pilotell, and A Bouche de Fer, of Paschal Grousset. General Vinoy had good reason to fear that this news would exasperate the Federals ; he warned all the commandants of the different PARIS BEFOEE THE i8tH MAECH, 187I. 251 zones to redouble their vigilance. On the following day, the Committee issued a formal provocation to the army to revolt. It was a red placard, which was posted on all the walls of Paris. The address was as follows : — " To the Army. " The Delegates of the National Guard of Paris. " Soldiers, Children of the People ! " Shameful reports are circulated in the Pro- vinces. " There are in Paris 300,000 National Guards, and nevertheless troops are being brought in, who are deceived respecting the spirit of the Pari- sian population. The men who have organized our defeat, dismembered Prance and handed over our gold to the enemy, want to escape from the responsibility which they have assumed, by bringing about a civil war. They count on you as docile instruments of the crime they meditate. Citizen soldiers, will you obey a criminal command to shed the same blood as that which flows in your own veins? Will you rend your own flesh ? No. You will never consent to become parricides and fratricides ! " What do the people of Paris want ? " They want to keep their own arms, to choose 252 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIEES. their own cliiefs, and to revoke their choice when they no longer have confidence in those chiefs. They want the soldiers to be sent back to their homes, to restore happiness to then* families and to resume their work. " Soldiers, children of the people, let us unite to save the E-epublic. Kings and emperors have done us enough harm. Do not stain your lives. Military discipline does not relieve the conscience from responsibility. Let us embrace in the full sight of those, who, to gain a step, to obtain a place, to bring back a kiog, would make us slaughter each other. " Long live the Republic ! "Voted in the Vaux Hall, March 10th, 1871." There were no signatures to this placard, which was read with enthusiasm in the quarters where the Federals were in the majority, and not with- out a certain sympathy in the quarters which were for " order." The great majority of the Parisian population is Republican, and the most conser- vative Republicans were not satisfied as to the future of the Republic in the hands of M. Thiers. The prospect of a bloody struggle between the Federals and the regular troops was appalling ; they asked themselves which side they, who had not adhered to the federation, and who had no confidence in the regular government, ought to take PARIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 1 87 1. 253 in the event of a collision. Even among them the suppression of the six newspapers was unpopular. Conservatives of all shades of opinion, even monarchical Conservatives, persisted in requiring the liberty of the press. It is worthy of remark that the people of Paris, whatever their political opinions, have always shown themselves unani- mous on that point. During the siege, the sup- pression of a newspaper which had revealed the secrets of the Government was so unpopular that it had been impossible to persist in it. The Mayor of Paris addressed the following despatch to the Minister of the Interior : — *' The suppression is exciting an agitation which it would be unwise to treat with con- tempt. Groups of people are formed even in the peaceable quarters. A red placard addressed to the Army, which is a deliberate appeal to dis- obedience and revolt, is being posted The soldiers read it readily; this may become serious. Cannot this placard be suppressed ? " The Prefect of Police wrote to the General- in-chief on the 12th March at four o'clock in the morning : — " I have had the placards removed as well as I could, but the adjutant-majors must have them torn off the walls of the barracks." M. Charles Yriarte, in his book entitled 254 THE GOVEIÎNMENT OP U. THIEES. " The Prussians in Paris," relates tliat on his attempting to tear down one of these placards from a pillar in the Rue de Rivoli, he was instantly surrounded by a crowd, hustled, threat- ened, and otherwise ill-used. " It seemed," says he, " as though the entire population made com- mon cause with the rising; weakness, pushed even to cowardice, let us all roll into the gulf." General d'Aurelles de Paladines, who had been appointed some days before to the post of Chief Commandant of the National Guard, but was detained at Bordeaux by his duties as a member of the Commission of Fifteen, hastened to Paris immediately after the ratification of the treaty of peace. His official nomination dates from the 3rd March. Cluseret announced it to the Central Committee by a letter written at Bordeaux, as follows : — " General d'Aurelles de Paladines is, after Gam- betta and Trochu, the most guilty man towards France. It was he who delivered up the army of the Loire without a struggle, for one cannot give the name of combat to his shameful flight. lie ought to have been tried by court martial, and yet it is he whom M. Thiers selects to place at your head I By what right is this fresh insult inflicted ? Where is the mandate of M. Thiers, and of the PARIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 187I. 255 Assembly which has conferred power on him ? Elected by the peasants for a specific purpose : to treat for the disgrace of France at the ex- pense of the towns, it has accomplished its sorry mandate. Now it is nothing more than a group of factious men. *' The source of all power, and the only power in Paris, is you. National Guards of the Seine, you the advanced people." On the day of his arrival in Paris, the 4th March, General d'Aurelles summoned a meeting of the majors at head-quarters. A very few of them responded to his summons. The general published an order of the day, in which he spoke of discipline and repression. " My first duty is to secure the maintenance of order, and respect for law and property. Labour must repair the misfortunes of the war as speedily as possible. Order alone can give us back prosperity. I am firmly resolved to repress everything which might threaten the tranquillity of the city." There is nothing to be said against these words, still they were not calculated to allay excitement. The general had all the will to suppress and punish the promoters of rebellion, but he had not the means to do so ; every one knew this, and none better than the Federals themselves. To show how little they regarded the superior who had been sent to them, 256 THE GOVEENMENT OP M. THIERS. they hastened to elect generals. They did this without concert, in haste, in the guise of a pro- test, and in such confusion that no one knew whether the general-in-chief were Darras, or Henri, or Duval. Darras became an intendant, or something of that sort, under the Commune. Duval was the workman, transformed into a general, who was shot, by Vinoy's orders, after one of the first encounters, and who at least had this merit, that he died bravely. Henri, who was subsequently chief of the staff of Bergeret, exer- cised a sort of authority after his nomination : he had his staff and even a body-guard, in imitation of Flourens. It was he who took the command at the Ohaussee-du-Maine, on the 18th March. A meeting held at the Vaux Hall, where the real business was mostly done, proclaimed Garibaldi general-in- chief. He was of course a general i7i partihus, but they gave him very effective lieu- tenants in Piazza and Brunei. It was perfectly clear, from the election of generals, that D'Aurelles de Paladines, or any other chief appointed in his place by the Govern- ment, would not be obeyed. The Government had desired a resolute rûan, tliej^ had one ; but of what avail was the will without the power? Another resolute man. General Valentine, was appointed Prefect of Pohce twelve days later. PARIS BEFORE THE i8tH MARCH, 1 87 1. 257 These two nominations, D'Aurelles and Valentine, appeared satisfactory only because tliere was no real knowledge of the power of the Federals, nor of the disorganization and demoralization of what was taken for the army of order. Every- thing was toppling over. The Assembly was coming in a few days to sit at Versailles ; the majority, incensed as they were against Paris, and determined, as they expressed it, no longer to suffer Paris to send a ready-made government into the provinces every six months, could not fail to come to violent resolutions. It was necessary to end matters before the arrival of the Assembly. M. Thiers resolved to make a great effort to recover the cannon. If he succeeded, the authori- ties would again have the upper hand, all would then be easy. If he failed, he would retire to Versailles, reconstruct the army, and prepare to take Paris. Anything was preferable to the pro- longation of a crisis which kept the Government face to face with an organized revolt, with listless adherents, and with an army ready to throw down their arms, or to fraternize with the insurgents. VOL. I. 258 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS, CHAPTER Y. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. M. Jules Ferry, wlio discharged the functions of Mayor of Paris, and whose ability and energy M. Thiers fully appreciated, was always present at the Ministerial Councils. General Vinoy and General d'Aurelles de Paladines were summoned to attend the Council held on the 17th March, at which it was the almost unanimous opinion that, during the night of the 17th or 18th, the heights of Montmartre should be occupied and the cannon which the Federals had accumulated there, seized ; and that the safety of France and the honour of the Government depended on this being done. So long as the city was threatened with civil war, business could not be resumed, the Prussians would not depart, and the ransom could not be paid. The remembrance of the attempt made a few days previously by M. Clemenceau led the Ministers to believe that only slight oppo- THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 259 sition would be offered. M. Clemenceau liad persuaded the officers of a battalion of bis arron- dissement that they would be doing an act of patriotism and wisdom in allowing the Govern- ment to resume possession of the guns ; he had then advised the Government of this state of feeling, and indicated the day on which this particular battalion would be on guard. At the appointed hour on that day teams were sent to take away the cannon ; but, either through some misunderstanding, or through the secret action of the Central Committee, the guns were not given up. For all that, the con- sent of the battalion was a symptom of weariness or of appeasement. The Government believed that the Central Committee had resisted so long as they thought force would not be used, but that, if active measures were taken, they would no longer resist the law by violence. Supposing, however, they did fight, the first few shots would rouse the National Guards, who had remained passive until now because they would not admit to themselves that there was real danger. Faron's division, which had already acquired steadiness under its able chief, would set the example to the soldiers who had arrived the day before. General Vinoy did not share these views. He had for a long tine previously been at variance with s 2 260 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIEKS. the Central Committee ; lie tliorougUy knew the dispositions of the Non-federal National Guards, while, as for what was called his army, he repeated again and again that he had under his command only a corps in process of formation, and that it would be imprudent to employ it, as he could not answer for it. He would have had the Ministers await the return of some of the regi- ments who were now prisoners in Germany. " The new troops which form the army of Paris were scarcely organized," he says, in his history of these events, " the greater number of the men had been only two days in the ranks, and the regiments consequently lacked the necessary homogeneity and cohesion. "A small army of from 25,000 to 30,000 men of inferior calibre, as opposed to 300,000 National Guards, the one indifferent if not hostile, the other well armed and possessing unexpected means of resistance ; under such circumstances was the struggle undertaken, on which such grave and considerable interests depended." These were strong reasons from a military point of view, but M. Thiers looked at the situation as a politician. Supposing the Government did not succeed during the night of the 17th with their insufficent force, that would be a repulse no doubt, but a repulse easily explained and repaired, it THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 261 would not be the same thing if the former, the regular army, were employed. In what state would it return ? Several months of captivity might have transformed it physically and morally. It would be all over with this army, should it be beaten by the insurgents; while, should it fraternize with them, it would be all over with France ! If it were evident, after the decisive proof of the 18th March, that the majority of the National Guard was not with the Government, it would no longer be possible to contend against Paris, and the only course left would be to quit the city and afterwards to retake it. These reasons con- vinced the Council. In any case they would only have three days to wait, for no one entertained any doubt concerning the resolutions which would be taken by the Assembly. The plan of action was arranged between M. Thiers, General Le Flo, General Yinoy, and General d' Aurelles. General Susbielle, having with him Generals Paturol and Lecomte, was to take possession of Montmartre ; General Faron to make himself master of the Buttes de Chaumont. Strong detachments were posted at the Hôtel de Ville and at the Tuileries ; there was also a reserve corps at the École Militaire, whither the cannons recovered from the National Guard were to be con- veyed. Thus the whole army of Paris was astir. 2G2 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. The artillery teams were stationed in the Champs Elysées and on the Place de la Concorde, in readiness for the first signal. Everything passed off at first as had been hoped ; on the morning of the 18th the heights of Chaumont and Montmartre were in possession of our troops. The satisfaction of the Government was, however, of but short duration. We had reached and occupied the heights without difficulty, as the expedition had not been foreseen. When the presence of our regiments became known, the Committee ordered the drums to beat to arms, the Federals presented themselves, and recovered their positions as they had lost them, without striking a blow. The troops had marched will- ingly, but in face of the National Guard, and especially of women and children who flocked to the ground, they would neither fire nor charge. The result of the operation was that the Federals kept their guns, and acquired the certainty that power lay with them, and that the Government was forsaken and impotent. It has been said that had there been a greater number of teams, and had they been on the spot at the same time as the soldiers, the cannon might have been carried away in an hour or two, so that the general-in-chief's error in the disposition of his forces was in reality to blame for the failure of THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 263 the undertaking. This opinion is generally enter- tained and repeated, but it will not bear examina- tion. All the events of 1870-71 are rashly judged by prejudiced or ill-informed persons, who do not take into account the difficulties and impossibilities of the case. On the 18th March it would have been impossible for the generals to employ more horses than they used, for the very good reason that they had not got them. The siege had decimated our cavalry. The teams could not have been brought up to the point of attack at the same time as the soldiers, without risking the success of the operation and the safety of the troops. To convince one's self of this one has only to glance at the network of streets that had to be crossed, and at the heights that had to be scaled. Finally, to harness and transport the guns, which were the objects of the dispute, would have been impossible, since at Montmartre alone there were 171 pieces of artillery all entangled in one another, and several of them wanting their limbers. It has also been said that the troops were kept inactive from five o'clock in the morning until the moment when a battahon of the Federals presented themselves with the butt-ends of their muskets raised, and demanded a conference. This is no less untrue. Sixty pieces of cannon had been carried 264 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIEES. by the soldiers down to the Boulevard Conr celles, and the gendarmes were hastily harnessing them, when Bergeret came up at the head of a detach- ment of the 128th battalion. The superiority of his force rendered any attempt at resistance im- possible. The crowd seized the teams, cut the traces, and thus without striking a blow captured the greater number of the cannons. It is then vain to throw the responsibility of defeat on the alleged faults of the military authori- ties ; the ill-success of the day was altogether due to the inertness of the National Guard and the defection of a considerable part of the army. This is the truth, and it is only by fully recognizing it, that we get a correct view of the events of that day, and those which ensued. The call to arms had been beaten without inter- mission in all the rich quarters. What was the result ? General Vinoy says less than 1000 men; M. Thiers, in his deposition, says 600 men. On the part of the soldiers, there was the reluctance which always exists at the beginning of a conflict of the kind. They were surrounded on all sides by the National Guard, crying " Vive la ligne ! " crowds of women went through their ranks, gently and coaxingly reproaching them for their conduct, and exhorting them to make common cause with the people, until they refused to obey their officers. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 265 raised the butt-ends of their muskets, or even gave up their arms altogether. The insurgents have boasted, shameful to relate, that they bought muskets from the soldiers " for a few sous." A great number of soldiers broke their ranks and went down into Paris, saying that an agreement had been come to, and all was over ; others passed into the ranks of the insurgents, and were seen a few hours later amongst the assassins. General Lecomte was seized in the midst of his men, and dragged to the Rue des Rosiers. Whilst the soldiers were behaving thus at Montmartre, where the 88th regiment opened its ranks to the Federals, several other regiments in various parts of the city were showing signs of insubordination. The Hotel de Ville being beset by a mob in the evening, the 120th (line regiment), quartered at the Prince Eugène Barracks, laid down their arms and fraternized with the rebels. The 135th, quartered at the Luxembourg, opened the gates, and joined the insurrection. Federals and soldiers of the line were seen in the streets arm-in-arm, uttering seditious cries, and disarming the soldiers whom they met if they refused to join them. The Council of Ministers, sitting permanently at the Foreign Office, learned successively that the Federals were masters of Montmartre and Belle- ville, and that the Government had no longer an 266 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. army. The Council was literally in the hands of the insurgents, who might arrest the Ministers or even kill them, as they killed that very day General Lecomte and General Clément Thomas, who had fallen into their hands. It was about nine o'clock in the morning when General Lecomte was taken by main force from the very midst of his soldiers. He was only defended by his officers, several of whom were also seized. The house (N^o. C) to which they dragged him belongs to Madame Scribe; and the Military Committee of the 18th arrondissement, appointed a few days before at a meeting which took place at the Salle Robert, were sitting there permanently. The General being brought before them, they de- manded that he should address a written order to abandon the heio^hts to his brio-ade. This he refused to do. The Committee, having at the time only a few men at hand, sent off their prisoner under escort to the Château Rouge, where a large body of National Guards was posted. All along the way the mob shouted that the general had made his men fire on the people. At one o'clock a Federal captain presented himself, with an order bearing four illegible signatures, and the General was given up to this man, who placed him, with ten other officers brought from THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 267 various parts, in tlie midst of a platoon of sixty- men, and took him back to No. 6, Rue des Rosiers, amid the groans and threats of the mob. On his arrival he was placed in a separate room, being thus parted from the officers who accom- panied him. The crowd surrounded the house, crying, "Death to them!" Towards three o'clock General Clement Thomas, who was not in uniform (he had been replaced since the 3rd of March by General d'Aurelles), got out of a carriage on the Place Pigalle, and bent his steps towards the Boulevard Rochechouart. He was recognized. " He transported the citizens in 1848 ! He insulted the National Guard ! He sold us to the Prussians ! " Transported the citizens in 1848 ! This was indeed a long-lived hatred. It must have been the sons of some of those who were transported who raised that cry. The Commune was not so vindictive towards Cluseret, who distinguished himself against the insurgents in June, and was decorated for it. A similar accusation' against the Deputies of 1848 was made on the 28th February in a proclamation of the International: " We remember June, 1848 !" Amongst the signatures to this proclamation was that of a man who, being a Deputy at that epoch, had, like all his colleagues, fought against the insurrection. Those who arrested Clément 268 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIEES. Thomas do right to recall this dark remem- brance. June, 1848, March, 1871 ; it is the same conflict, and General Clément Thomas must die like General Bréa ! Some men of the National Guard dragged him with insults and threats to the house in the Rue des Rosiers. More than 2000 persons had followed him. He was placed in the same room with Lecomte, and for more than two hours the Federal officers who were present strove to prevent the crowd, now threatening them in their turn, from forcing the door. The Committee, who seemed to wish to avoid murder, transformed itself into a Court-Martial, and con- ducted a sort of examination. They asked Lecomte, "Do you regret having fired on the people?" He calmly replied, "What I have done is well done." While two or three of the leaders were hesitating and trying to gain time, those who surrounded the General, and the crowd outside, were eager for the end. " Why these delays ? we are betrayed !" A rush was made, inside, upon the judges, out- side, upon the house. The prisoners were lost.- In a trial which took place before the Court- Martial in March, 1878, Captain Franck related a strange and touching incident. " They came to ask General Clément Thomas whether he preferred being shot inside the house, or in the garden. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 269 He was just asking me wliat was my age ? " Twenty, General." " That is very young to be shot." Turning towards the insurgents, he answered, " Outside;" then he whispered in my ear, " Thus, they may spare you." At this moment (it was five o'clock) the doors and windows were smashed in and the crowd filled the house. Some madmen seized Clément Thomas by the collar. " You betrayed us at Montretout ! " A sergeant of the line shook his fist at General Lecomte, and vociferated, "You sent me to prison for thirty days ; I shall be the first to fire, at you!" General Clément Thomas was thrust out of the room and driven by blows from clenched fists and from the butt-ends of muskets, into the garden ; on the way several balls struck him and he was covered with blood. He was placed against the wall ; holding his hat in his right hand, he tried to shield his face with his left. Several random shots struck him, and he fell on the right side, his head against the wall, and his body doubled in two. The men went on firing at him, afterwards they trampled on his corpse, and even struck it with their muskets. Then came Lecomte's turn. Calmly he handed his money to Commandant Poussargues, who had been seized with him, and entrusted to him his last words for his family, then he walked out 270 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. before his assassins witli sucli quiet dignity tliat several insurgent officers saluted liim. It is a curious and significant fact tliat among the considerable number of assassins, and the much more considerable number of madmen, who had applauded the murders, after they had pro- voked and rendered them inevitable, not a single person urged a fresh attack on the ten officers who were awaiting their doom at the distance of a few paces from the victims ; on the contrary, they vied with each other in aiding the prisoners to escape. The rescuers did not forget, however, to give their names, and they took precautions so that they might be recognized or found at need, and be able to claim the reward of this good deed. At the same hour at which the two Generals fell, a train coming from Orleans was stopped at some distance from the fortifications, by the orders of a Federal officer accompanied by a strong detachment of the National Guard. The captain made General Chanzy, who was on his way to Versailles, and whose presence in the train had evidently been signalled, get out. M. Turquet, a Member of the National Assembly, who witnessed this arrest, placed himself beside the General in order to share his fate. They were both taken in a carriage, in the midst of insults and threats, THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 271 to the prison of the zone, where they remained two days. There they found General Labouriau, of the army of the Loire, who had been arrested at the same time as General Chanzy. Several times during the journey from the railroad to the prison General Chanzy' s life was in danger. He was protected from the fury of the populace by a member of the Central Committee, M. Leo Meillet, who had taken him under his pro- tection and defended him up to the last moment with presence of mind and courage. The crowd talked of nothing less than shooting General Chanzy over against the Chapel of General Bréa. They said, " Let them fire a single shot at us, and we will throw the corpse of General Chanzy in their faces !" A historian adds the following- words, but does not record who it is that heard them : " The left bank must have its corpse as well as the right ! " Finding that the General was not safe in the prison of the zone, M. Leo Meillet had him re- moved to the prison of La Santé, where he was detained several days. The insanity of keeping a man as a hostage who could not be reproached for anything except his victories, became at last apparent. He was released with many apolo- gies, and returned to his post in the Assembly, whither M. Turquet had already preceded him. 272 THE GOVEENMENT OF M. THIEES. Tlie evening of the 18tli and a part of the nig'ht, were employed by the Committees of the different arrondissements, and by the Central Committee, in consolidating their victory, and preparing for the conflict for which they looked on the morrow. Belleville and Montmartre, bristling with barri- cades and artillery, were transformed into for- tresses ; on various points of Charonne, the Fau- bourg Saint Antoine, the Faubourg du Temple, the Gobelins, Montrouge, Yaugirard, Grenelle and the Batignolles, barricades, with cannon and mitrail- leuses, were erected. The barricades of Belleville were constructed in the morning under the eyes of General Faron's soldiers ; the men who worked at them chatting quietly with the sentinels, like ordinary workmen occupied in earning their daily bread. The Federal battalions remained under arms all day and all night, some guarding the parks of artillery and the barricades, others visiting every part of the city, parading on the boulevards, and advancing as far as the Place de la Concorde. Up to this time the idea of shutting the gates of Paris, and holding the Government, with the small army gathered together, and the École Militaire, already hesitating between fidelity and desertion, at their mercy, had not occurred to them. Neither did they on the following day think of marching on Versailles, where everything THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 273 was in tumult and disorder. The Committee itself had not a recognized and respected authority, nor a disciplined, compact, manageable army. The members thought only of seizing the public offices, which is indeed the business of the first day in every Parisian insurrection. A battalion entered the barracks of the Chateau d'Eau at three o'clock in the afternoon of the 18th March, and no one made the least show of resistance. Some individuals in plain clothes, who accompanied the battalion, carried off the soldiers' chassepots. At nine o'clock in the evening, Bergeret, the newly elected Commandant of the Legion of Montmartre, and Arnold, who, like him, was a member of the Central Committee, penetrated so far as the Place Vendôme at the head of two battalions. The 1st battalion (non-federal) was on guard there, and retired without an attempt at resistance. lb is probable that orders to avoid a conflict had been given. Bergeret immediately placed detach- ments to bar the two issues which lead, one into the Eue de la Paix, the other into the Rue Castiglione. The taking of this position was important, since it handed over to the insurgents the Ministère de la Justice, and the head-quarters of the National Guard, of the Army, and of the Citadel.' The members of the Central Committee, divided ^ La Place de Paris. VOL. I. T 274 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. on that evening into several groups, sat at the E-ue de l'Entrepôt, at the Chaussée Clignancourt, and at the Eue Basf roi. They had given Lullier, a member of the Committee, the command of the National Guard " while awaiting the arrival of Garibaldi," whom they had appointed General-in-chief. It was Lullier who invaded the Tuileries, the greater number of the Mairies, and on the following day the Ministères in succession. Great impor- tance was attached as usual to the possession of the Hôtel de Ville. A first attempt to seize it did not succeed, thanks to the firmness of M. Ferry ; but a formal order to withdraw having been sent by the Government during the evening, some federal battalions entered the Hôtel de Ville, and, to their profound astonishment, found it completely deserted. The members of the Cen- tral Committee followed them closely. They in- stalled themselves in the cabinet of the Mayor of Paris, and thought of nothing now but reigning. M. Thiers was already at Versailles. The minis- ters, the army, all the government officials were about to join him. M. Thiers had decided upon departure from the moment at which it became evident that the National Guard belonging to the party of order would not act. On the previous day he had said to M. Jules Simon, " I hope the National Guard — THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 275 ours — will make up their minds this time. If they turn out in great numbers, their presence alone will ensure us the fidelity of the army. With them we are strong; the Federals will not dare to resist; we shall recover the cannon without striking a blow, and the Central Committee will be dissolved. If the National Guard does not show, we have only the hope left that the Committee will not venture to commence the contest ; in that case we shall live as we have done for the last fifteen days, that is to say barely existing, and we shall see what happens. But if there is resistance, if the army be not firm, we have but one means of preventing a revolution which would be the ruin of France ; it is to leave Paris, and reorganize the army at Versailles. This is the plan which succeeded with Windischgraetz after the events of Vienna, and it was this I advised during the days of June, 1848, in case of the suc- cess of the Insurrection." In June, 1848, the National Guard were aware that they were face to face with social war, and their presence on the side of the army had decided the victory. M. Thiers hoped still, all through the morning of the 18th, that they would appear ; but when he learned that only a few men had come to the meeting-places of the different companies, he said to those about him, " Our duty is to retire," and when a murmur arose, " France is in question," said he, *' and not ourselves.'* T 2 276 THE GOVERNMENT OE M. THIERS. The mayors and the Eepublican deputies of Paris, who from the first acted the part of peace-makers, and persevered in doing so until the election of the Commune, met several times during the day on the 18th. At one of these meetings which took place towards three o'clock at the Mairie of the 2nd arrondissement, several of its members were despatched to M. Picard and to General d'Aurelles de Paladines. Nothing but talk took place, no proposals were made, no conclusion was reached. Another meeting, more numerous than the first, held at six o'clock in the evening at the Mairie of the 1st arrondissement, passed some decided resolutions. The members thought they should conquer the hesitation of the republican, but not socialist National Guard, by appointing M. Dorian, Mayor of Paris, M. Edmond Adam, Prefect of Police, M.Langlois, Commandant- in- Chief of the National Guard, and General Billot, Commandant-in-Chief of the Army of Paris. Most of these personages, among them General Billot, were absent whilst they were being thus disposed of. A Commission composed of Messieurs Tirard, Yautrain, Vacherot, Bonvalet, Méline, Tolain, Hérisson, Millière, and Peyrat, was charged to carry these proposals to the Government. Subsequent events have shown that even had the Government accepted them, the insurrection would have taken its course ail the same. THE CENTEAL COMMITTEE. 277 The National Guard, decimated by departures for tlie provinces, disheartened by the siege, irri- tated against the Assembly, lacked organization, and cohesion. The Central Committee, flushed with victory, would have refused to disarm. When the Commission presented itself in the evening at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, M. Thiers had already left for Versailles. The delegates had a brief interview with M. Jules Favre, who had just been apprised of the assassi- nation of the two generals ; they found M. Ernest Picard at the Ministry of the Interior. The Minister promised to transmit their message. He knew afterwards, indeed he even then saw what the mayors of Paris would not see; that there was neither National Guard nor Army. The proposal was, however, adopted by the Govern- ment a few hours later, on the advice of M. Picard, not that they were mistaken about it, but simply in order to have it to say that no means of pacification had been left untried. After their return to the Mairie of the 1st arron- dissement, the delegates were consulting with their colleagues who had remained there, when M. Mahias, Secretary-General to the Mairie of Paris was introduced. He came to inform them that the Hôtel de Ville was deserted, and to entreat them to take possession of it, so that the treasury and the archives might not be left at 278 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. the mercy of tlie Insurgents. Unlike M. Jules Ferry, wlio was only tlie delegate of the Govern- ment, the mayors of the arrondissements had been elected by universal suffrage ; many of them were likewise representatives of the Seine ; they believed that their authority w^ould be respected, especially when they should present themselves as negoti- ators between Paris and Versailles. The meeting immediately despatched some of its members to the Hôtel de Ville. The Federal battalions arrived there at the same time, and almost as soon the Members of the Central Committee, who refused to receive them, stating that they them- selves would lake such measures as the circum- stances might require. The delegates of the Municipalities returned with this answer to the Mairie of the 1st arrondissement, where M. Ferry had just arrived. They had scarcely entered when the Mairie was surrounded by a detachment of Federals sent by the Central Committee. These men did not go quite so far as to arrest the mayor and the de23uties of Paris, but allowed them to depart on giving their names. They adjourned to the Mairie of the 2nd arrondisse- ment. M. Ferry, who would undoubtedly have been arrested, got out unperceived, through a little door wbicli opened on the square between the Mairie and the Church of Saint Germain r Auxerrois. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 279 Shortly after midniglit M. Labiclie, Secretary- General to tlie Ministry of the Interior, brought the nomination of Colonel Langlois as general- in-chief of the National Guard to the mayors and deputies assembled at the 2nd arrondisse- ment. M. Langlois was with him. M. Labiche also announced that the Government intended to appoint M. Dorian Mayor of Paris, and that the municipal elections were to take place without delay. These resolutions, which met the wishes of the mayors and the Republican deputies, had been taken at a secret meeting held by the Ministers in the Rue Abattucci, at the residence of M. Cal- mon, Under-Secretary of State for the Interior. This place of meeting had been selected because the Ministers were beset by alarmists and advisers. M. Jules Simon arrived there about nine o'clock, ac- companied by Admiral Pothuau and Count Roger du Nord. Two unknown persons were waiting for him at the door, although the place of meeting had been kept a profound secret. " Do not enter," they exclaimed, " the house is about to be surrounded ! " They then hastily gave him some details of the assassination of the two generals, the accuracy of which was afterwards proved, and went away, repeating their warning with emphasis, but refusing to give their names. M. Dufaure and General Le Flo came an hour after ; Messieurs Jules Favre and Picard late in the night. First 280 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. the double assassination was discussed, then it was said, " "We must act." The appointment of Colonel Langlois was already agreed upon, and the Ministers sent for him ; he accepted it with his usual courage and devotion. It was decided that on the following day the appointment of M. Dorian as Mayor of Paris should be proposed to M. Thiers, and that a bill to regulate the municipal elections should be presented to the Chamber. The bill was to be brought in before the sitting of the 20th March ; it should be applied to all the com- munes in order to save time ; and urgency should be demanded. M. Picard undertook to draw up the bill, which was to contain only two clauses ; and M. Jules Simon wrote a last appeal to the National Guard, to be posted in Paris on the following morning. " Who are the members of this Committee ? " said the proclamation. " No one in Paris knows them ; whomsoever they be they are the enemies of Paris, which they are giving up to pillage; of France, which they are delivering to the Prussians ; and of the Republic which they will hand over to despotism. The abominable crimes that they have committed deprive those who would dare to follow or to submit to them of all excuse. Do you wish to share the responsibility of their assassinations, and of the ruin which they will work ? Then, remain at home ! But if THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 281 you regard your honour and your most sacred interests, in that case assemble at the call of the Government and the National Assembly." The Council broke up at midnight. Messieurs Picard and Jules Favre passed the remainder of the night at M. Calmon's house, where they received a formal and pressing order from M. Thiers to repair immediately to Versailles. Mes- sieurs Dufaure, Jules Simon, and their colleagues directed their steps towards the École Militaire, from whence they set out before daybreak, at the same time as the army. M. Langlois went first, as we have seen, withM. Labiche, to the Mairie of the 2nd arrondissement, where his colleagues, the deputies of the Seine, were sitting in permanence. He left them to go to the Hotel de Ville. The Central Committee received him immediately. He informed the members present of the decisions of the Govern- ment. He was asked, " By whom have you been appointed?" "By the Government, by M. Thiers." *' We do not recognize his authority ; the National Guard will appoint its own chiei'." . M. Langlois retired ; as he could no longer hope to be recognized by the Federals, he thought, with some reason, that his appointment had no further object, and he hastened to the Journal Officiel^ to withdraw his order of the day, which 282 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. was already composed, and was to appear on the morrow. On Sunday morning the insurgents did not fail to heap insults on the Government, " which had vanished before the breath of the people." They could not sufficiently express their anger and contempt for the " fugitives." Many Parisians belonging to the party of order shared this indignation. They felt that they had been delivered into the hands of the insurgents, and accused " a Government which deserted its post and its duty." It might have been said, in reply, that they had only themselves to blame. For four-and-twenty hours the drums had beat to arms incessantly in the very quarters inhabited by these complainants. How many National Guards had answered to the call ? Scarcely 600 ; a number which could avail nothing. The Government, reduced to the neces- sity of yielding to the rising, or of opposing it with the feeble army at their command, had chosen, courageously, and perhaps imprudently (such was the opinion of General Vin oy), the latter alterna- tive ; but the only weapon which remained to them had burst in their hands. Half the army had betrayed them, and was now shoutiog in the streets with the insurgents, and preparing to change its colours. Under these conditions the Government might certainly have remained in Paris, like a THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 283 sentinel who lets himself be killed at his post. Next day the Central Committee would have arrested M. Thiers and his ministers, and kept them as hostages, or allowed them to meet the fate of Lecomte and Clément Thomas. Was it to avoid a similar fate that the Government had retired to Yersailles ? In truth, it would be judging human nature very harshly to arrive at such a conclusion. All the ministers were men who would fearlessly have awaited the course of events ; they had all given proofs during their lives of courao^e more difficult than that. The effect on the country of their arrest or death was what they had to consider, without a thought for their personal safety, and the question studied under that aspect could only be answered by their departure ; not that the Ministers, with the exception of M. Thiers, were individually neces- sary, but because a change of Government, under such circumstances as those which would have pro- duced it, must necessarily have been attended with disastrous consequences. Let us first convince ourselves that they had no longer any means of resistance. The attempt which was rashness on the 18th would have been insanity on the 19th. Was the National Guard with the Government ? Certainly not ! When Admiral Saisset was in com- mand, it was estimated that he might count upon 284 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. 20,000 men; but supposing the figures to be exact, scarcely a fourth, of the number could be relied on for any vigorous enterprise. The battalions had all one common anxiety, the defence of their own quarters, and the maintenance of order in them. The admiral went to Passy, where he was personally popular ; he asked for two battalions to recover the Ministry of the Interior and the Elysée ; 300 men came ! Thus the Government had not the National Guard with them. And the Army ? As a general rule, it is always difficult to enlist the army against the people, when at least a portion of the National Guard is not on the side of the troops. The 19th March tested the truth of this. The disposition of the army had been ascertained on the previous day : and yet, no, the word is out of place, and an insult to the real army. It was not an army which was then in Paris ; it was only an army in process of formation. Was it to be expected that the 15,000 or 20,000 gathered together at the Ëcole Militaire would not follow in the footsteps of the 88th regiment, of the 120th or the 135th? One had only to look at them ! These soldiers, who were not yet soldiers, seeing the Ministers imprisoned or killed, would inevitably have disbanded them- selves. The Central Committee would no longer have been an insurrectionary, alongside of a THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 285 regular, Govemment, it would have been the only Government. Was ifc to be supposed that the National Assembly, in whom the sovereignty resided and whose delegate M. Thiers was, would appoint a new Chief of the Executive so promptly that there should be no interregnum? What would be the choice of the monarchical majority? How would the newly elected Chief of the Execu- tive be received by the large towns, half carried away by the movement in Paris? how would he be received by the French army which the prelimi- naries of peace had sent beyond the Loire, and by that other army which the German prisons were about to yield up ? What other name would com- mand the unanimity that the name of M. Thiers had produced ? A¥ho was the general that would be accepted by the Republicans ? Who the civilian that could command the obedience of the army ? Before proceeding to form a new Government, the Assembly would have to meet. Under what con- ditions ? In what place ? Impossible to think of Versailles, for the Committee would have occupied the palace on the 19th without striking a blow. Whilst the scattered deputies were seeking an asylum and security in some distant town, what would have become of France ? to whom would the army have given itself ? Would it have remembered ancient legends or later defeats ? What would the 286 THE GOVEENMÈNT OF M. THIERS. Germans, our enemies of yesterday, wlio still occupied a third of our territory, have done in this terrible interregnum ? When the Government ■with which they had treated had disappeared, would they not have declared the peace broken ? They might take Paris, march on the Loire, dis- perse our shattered, uncommanded army, or treat with the man who had ruined us, and give him a semblance of sovereignty under the protection of their bayonets ! Every one knew that a few weeks previously they had contemplated an alliance with the Empress. M. Thiers saw all this at a glance. He understood that it was necessary to make sure of the safety of the Assembly, to preserve a Government to France, to save the remnant of the army of Paris from the shame of fresh defection or disarmament. Civil war had become inevitable ; he wanted to wage it with the chances of victory assured. Paris cried out the day after, "I am forsaken!" but, by remaining in the city, the Government would have ruined Paris, and with it, France. M. Thiers left Paris on the 18th, at five in the afternoon, after having given a written order for the departure of the army and the evacuation of the forts on the left bank, so that the insurgents might have no easy victories. Several of his ministers had resisted ; M. Jules Favre, M. Picard, THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 287 the Mayor of Paris. M. Jules Ferry, wlio for fifteen days had asked for a successor, but none the less had done his duty with indomitable energy, wrote that he would remain at the Hôtel de Yille with 500 men. He received a formal order to with- draw, but did so only when the last man on duty had left the building. The departure of the army was not effected without danger. The last regi- ments hesitated to advance, and looked back lingeringly. General Yinoy, who was obliged to go in person more than once to rally them and urge them forward, placed gendarmes who could be relied on, in the rear, to prevent desertion. The snow covered the earth like a winding-sheet. It was still dark when the last soldiers crossed the Seine. From Sevres onwards, the General placed outposts, and arranged everything for the defence of Versailles. A regiment which had not received notice in time, and remained shut up in the gardens of the Luxembourg, resisted all tempta- tions and bribes, forced the gates, crossed Paris with drums beating, and came to join the French army at Versailles. This was the 63rd regiment ; almost all the men belonged to the Marines, and the 45th of the line. On arriving at Versailles on the 19th, at 4 a.m., M. Jules Simon alighted at the Prefecture, and found the President of the Council already up. He 288 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. asked him if he had thought of sending troops to Mont Valerien, which, as he had just learned at the École Militaire, was garrisoned only by two disarmed battalions of Chasseurs-à-pied. M. Thiers thanked him warmly, but said that a fortress like Mont Valérien could not be carried by skirmishers, or at the point of the bayonet, that there were cannon there and a resolute commander, and that a single shell would be sufficient to put a tumul- tuous mob of the National Guards to flight, that an attack in form with sufficient forces was not to be feared on this first day, but that he was aware of the necessity for prompt action. The difficulty was not in sending a regiment, but in finding one to send. Several Deputies, amongst them M. Buffet, came during the morning to express their uneasi- ness on the same subject. General Vinoy, warned by a despatch from Colonel Lochner, who com- manded the fort, consulted with M. Thiers respect- ing a trustworthy regiment. Their choice fell on the 119th of the line, commanded by Colonel Chol- leton. This regiment, which had been quartered at Versailles since the 12th, and billeted among the inhabitants, was very steady and animated by an excellent spirit. The orders were given on the 20th March, at 1 a.m. The Federals presented themselves at Mount Valerien on the eveuino: of the same day, to take possession, but they found it THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 289 strongly occupied. They retired with precipitation, and no other attempt was made on the fort until the battle of the 3rd April. M. Thiers sent the following circular to be dis- tributed in the departments; and thenceforth until Paris was retaken, he wrote the bulletins, which were despatched by telegraph to the prefects every evening with his own hand. «Versailles, 19th March, 1871, 8.25 a.m. " The entire Government is at Versailles, and the Assembly is collecting there. The army, also, to the number of 40,000 men, is concentrated in good order under the command of General Vinoy. All the authorities and all the commanding officers have arrived at Versailles. " The authorities, both civil and military, will execute no orders except those of the legal Govern- ment residing at Versailles, under pain of for- feiture. The members of the National Assembly are requested to hasten their return in order to be present at the sitting of the 20th March. " The present despatch is to be made known to the public. A. Thiers." All the employés in public departments were ordered to Versailles at once, so that they might be at the disposal of the Govern- ment. This measure was indispensable for the transaction of public business, and it also VOL. I. U 290 THE GOVEENMENT OF M. THIERS. deprived the insurrection of a dangerous weapon. Only those employés whose presence in Paris was necessary were excepted; such as Hospital doctors, head masters of educational establish- ments where there were boarders, custodians of museums or libraries, and the officials of the Bank of France with the exception of the Governor. It was absolutely indispensable that he should be within reach of the Chief of the Executive. All these officials were speedily installed in the palace* The town of Versailles was no longer recog- nizable. Strange to say, nothing had been altered in it except its physiognomy, which was woe-begone. The Prussians, always very orderly under the eye of the master, had destroyed nothing. A few placards in the German language in the railway stations, and on the barrack walls ; a great deal of dirt in the streets, was all that remained of them out-of-doors. The late occupants had, however, left traces of their presence in the restaurants and cafés to which the new arrivals flocked. These places looked like German taverns, and smelt of tobacco, beer, and leather. The town was in a state of famine, there was nothing to eat. The king, or rather, since he gave himself that title at Versailles, the Emperor, had lived at the THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 291 Hôtel de la Préfecture. Nothing was clianged tliere. When leaving, he stopped his carriage just as he was passing through the gates, and calling the porter, showed him a little gilt candlestick, of no value, which he held in his hand. " I take this as a souvenir," said he ; " let no one be disturbed about it." M. Jules Simon, accompanied by the custodians of the Museum, inspected the entire palace, even to the garrets ; nothing had been disturbed ; two frames only, which had enclosed small pictures of no importance, were empty; the canvas had been cut close to the edge. M. Thiers installed himself at the Préfecture which the Emperor had just vacated, like a new prefect who occupies the apartments and the cabinet of his predecessor. The avenues, and the Place d'Armes in front of the palace were crowded with soldiers under canvas. The huts at Satory, which had been vacated by the Germans, were not sufficient to accommodate the troops. Men, horses, and guns were crowded together in the midst of mud and hastily swept up snow. Cooking, by the light of blazing faggots, was done in the open; there was no order or discipline; a look of anger and defiance was on every face ; it was like a Tartar horde rather than a camp. The soldiers no longer saluted their officers, but looked threateningly at them as they passed. 292 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. Entire families were seen making tlieir way through this crowd with their parcels and boxes. These were bourgeois who had fled from Paris, em- ployés who had followed their chiefs, and deputies arriving from the departments for the meeting of the Assembly on the 20th March. The deputies were in their places at the ap- pointed hour. All were alarmed and indignant, but there were gradations in their sentiments according to their politics. It could easily be seen that the Republicans meditated conciliation, and the Monarchists vengeance. The murder of Clément Thomas and Lecomte immensely enhanced the gravity of the situation. It was no longer a political insurrection that had to be dealt with ; it was a social war which revived all the detested recollections of the terror. This was the impres- sion of all France ; the members of the Central Committee themselves felt it. They were divided between anxiety to exculpate themselves from participation in these outrages, and a savage de- light in them which they felt, and could not con- ceal. In the same number of the Journal Officiel of the 19th March, they wrote in the first page of " the bloody mud with which their honour had been stained," and on the second page expressed their indignation that this " execution " should be called an " assassination." " These two men," THE CENTEAL COMMITTEE. 293 said they, " have suffered under the law of War." What more could the men of the Central Com- mittee say to render themselves objects of universal execration ? The sitting of the 20th March was commenced under these impressions. M. Grevy spoke as follows : " The misfortunes of our country seemed to have attained their height. A criminal insurrection, which has not even a plausible grievance or a serious pretext to excuse it, has, however, been added to them. A factious Government sets itself up against the national sovereignty, of which you alone are the legitimate representatives. You must rise with courage and dignity to the height of the solemn duties which such a situation imposes on you. Let the nation remain calm and confident. Let it rally round those whom it has elected : Might will remain with Right. The national representation will make itself respected, and will accomplish its mission unmoved, staunching the wounds of France, and securing the stability of the Republic in spite of those who compromise it by the crimes that they commit in its name." The civil war had existed de facto in Paris since the end of January, and it began, we may say, officially, on the 18th March, when an insurrectional Government installed itself in the Hôtel de Ville. 294 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. If tte Germans did not intervene and profit hj our fresli misfortunes, the issue of the conflict could not be doubtfuh The immense majority of the country was with the Assembly and the legal Government. The Central Committee tried hard to bring over the large towns to its side. In its letters and proclamations, it was said that the " rustics " desired to make peace at the expense of the large towns, that they wanted to bring us back to Monarchy; and that the enlightened population of the large towns had a right to rule the destinies of France. They sent emissaries to Lyons, Marseilles, and Bordeaux, to all the great centres ; on the 23rd March, the Commune was proclaimed at Lyons and Marseilles, on the 24tli, at Toulouse; there were troubles at Beziers, at Narbonne. Saint Etienne was moving, like Paris it had its assassination ; the new prefect, M. de l'Espée, was murdered on the very day of his arrival. In spite of all this, nobody in the Assembly felt any doubt of ultimate suc- cess. M. Thiers, especially, was very confident. " The Prussians will not stir so long as the con- ditions of the treaty are executed. The insurrec- tion of two or three towns will be the affair of a few days. France, in its entirety, is with us. I shall reorganize the Arm}^" said he ; "I answer THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 295 for it. We shall take Paris, or Paris will sur- render. We have the majority, even in Paris." Such was his language, in private, at the Council, in the lobbies of the Chamber, in the tribune, in his correspondence with the generals, the prefects, and our diplomatic agents. He never ceased to work for success, and to reckon on it. We shall see that his previsions were realized in every par- ticular. In the Assembly, in all France, but especially in Paris, opinion was divided. One party be- lieved the present struggle to be terminable by force only ; the other, in spite of everything, believed in the possibility of conciliation. The very idea of conciliation, whatever its basis, seemed criminal to the majority of the Assembly, whose anger increased in proportion as the Parisian insurrection developed itself. The mayors of Paris (there were several amongst the members of the Assembly) ascending the tribune to plead for mild measures on behalf of the immense Parisian population, who were victims of the Central Committee and not its accomplices, were received as though they were partisans of the insurrection ; they, who ever since the 18th March, had been risking their lives in opposing it. The majority met the most just and least revolutionary proposals, — for instance. 296 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. the proposal to vote urgency for the Municipal Councils bill by such interruptions as the follow- ing :— " Paris must first disarm, and afterwards, we shall see ! Paris must submit, do you hear ! Yes, Paris must submit ! Let us call up the provinces and march on Paris, if necessary; this must be put a stop to ! " Not only was Paris attacked, but the mayors were personally insulted. M. Tirard, who had displayed great courage in his conflict with the Revolution, was taunted thus : — " Blame your friends at least. Blame the cut- throats I " At the sitting of the 28th March, Count de la Rochethulon, after having shown the Assembly a strip of paper which had been pasted on the door of his house, in Paris, with the words " Good for shooting," printed on it in large letters, said, — " I beg my honourable colleagues of the Left, now masters of Paris, to have the kindness to tell their colleagues that I consider myself in a state of legitimate defence ;" and as a violent commotion arose, and M. de la Hochethulon was called on to explain himself, he added, showing a notice signed by the mayors of Paris, — "It is a positive fact that certain members of this Assembly, who have, or have not resigned, are on terms with the Insurgents." THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 297 M. Prax-Paris, speaking of the mayors of Paris at the sitting of the 4th April, called them " The accredited Ambassadors of the Insurrection." The mayors of Paris and deputies of the Seine, who were received in this fashion at the Assembly, were in no greater favour with the leaders of the Insurrection. At Versailles they were insulted, at Paris their appointments were cancelled, they were expelled from their Mairies, and imprisoned. The Com- mittee, intending to hold the Communal elections on the 22nd, had directed the mayors to preside at them. To do so would have been to associate themselves with the insurrection ; they refused. Their resistance exasperated the Committee, who called it resisting the people, and had, in fact, already occupied the greater number of the Mairies. This was one of Lullier's exploits on the 19th ; the measure was confirmed and made general on the 23rd, after the refusal of the mayors. Henri, one of the " generals," said, "We must occupy the dissentient Mairies by faithful battalions. When there are no faithful battalions in the arrondissement, recourse must be had to the battalions of the Hôtel de Ville." This was the case in the 9th arrondissement, as the following proclamation of the mayor, M. Desmarest, proves : — " The invasion of our Mairie 298 THE GOVEENMENT OP M. THIERS. by a military force unknown to the 9tli arrondisse- ment puts a stop for the present to the transaction of the pubHc business, of which we have accepted the charge and the honour.'* All the Mairies, except those of the 1st and 2nd arrondissements, were invaded either by the federal battalions of the arrondissement, or by the praGtorians of the Hôtel de Ville. Several of the mayors published protests like the follow- ing: — "The Mayor and assistants of the 17th arrondissement, dispossessed by force, declare that from this day forth all municipal business is suspended in the arrondissement. The use of the seal of the Mairie, all requisitions, and the employment of the funds by the usurpers, will be regarded as criminal acts. The munici- pal officers reserve the authority that has been delegated to them, by universal suffrage, and will use it according to incontestable right when this ephemeral usurpation shall have come to an end." M. Henri Martin, *' resolved to defend the Republic, and to second the conciliatory efforts of the deputies of Paris," organized a service of protection and surveillance, in concert with the officers of the 38th and 72nd battalions ; and called upon " all citizens devoted to the Republic and friends of order, for their aid." This example THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 299 was followed by several arrondissements, including the 3rd. The protest of M. Clemenceau deserves to be given in full. " Citizens, to-day at noon (the 22nd March) the Mairie of the 18th arron- dissement was invaded by an armed troop. An officer of the National Guard dared to summon the Mayor and his assistants to give up the Mairie to a delegate of the Central Committee of the National Guard. The Mayor and his assistants, wearing their municipal insignia, and in the presence of all the employés of the Mairie, sum- moned the officer on guard to expel the intruders. The latter, after having conferred with his com- mander, replied that he refused to execute this order, and that he was prepared to side with the violators of this law. The ringleaders then arrested the Mayor and two of his assistants, and took them to the Guard-house between two files of National Guards. Shortly after, the Mayor and his two assistants, elected by the 18th arron- dissement, were informed that they were ' free to retire.' Citizens, we are anxious to avoid a conflict, the disastrous consequences of which we dread ; that is our reason for yielding to force without appealing to force ; but we loudly protest against the outrage which the National Guard of the 18th arrondissement has inflicted on the person of Kepublican Magistrates, freely 300 THE GOVEENMENT OF M. THIEES. elected, and who declare hereby that they have faithfully discharged their duties." Thus, not only were the mayors expelled, they were also imprisoned. On the 23rd March, a proclamation of the Commission charged by the Central Com- mittee to proceed with the municipal elections was posted in the 4th arrondissement. It began with these words : " The municipal officers of the 4th arrondissement having deserted the Mairie, and the departments being in a state of complete disorganization. . . ." In the 12th arron- dissement the Central Committee had replaced the elected municipal officers by a Commission. It was the same in the 5th arrondissement ; the provisional mayor, Eégère, accepted, he said, his appointment by the Central Committee " as a means of conciliation and order." To make a revolution in the name of the communal liberties, and at the same time to expel the elected mayors from their Mairies, was a mere trifle to the Central Committee. The mayors of Paris, however, who had already rendered so many services during the siege, con- ceived that they had a new duty to fulfil, a duty no less serious than the prevention of bloodshed ; and neither the Right nor the In- surgents had the power to turn them from it for a moment. THE CENTKAL COMMITTEE. 301 The object of their constant solicitude was, not the promoters of the insurrection, whom they fought inch by inch, but the honest Republican population to whom they them- selves belonged, and who, while claiming its just rights for the city of Paris, and fearful for the Republic on account of the opinions of the majority and the political past of M. Thiers, re- garded the so-called Government which practised or praised assassination, subjected Paris to a silly tyranny, and boasted of making war upon the bourgeoisie in the name of the proletariat with horror. As well as ringleaders there were dupes; as well as dupes there were victims. " The Insur- rection of Paris " is perpetually spoken of : it would be more correct to say of the half of Paris, or indeed not even the half, for at most the insurgents could reckon on only a fourth of the population. The proclamation of an insurrectional government, which led directly to the Commune, and the assassination of the two generals, had opened the eyes of the absent or the defaulters of the 18th March. They now saw the abyss into which they had fallen by their own fault, and only asked for the means of accomplishing their own rescue. Nevertheless, in the war which was impending, should it come to war, the entire 302 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. population of Paris would have to suffer; the innocent as well as the guilty, and perhaps the innocent more than the guilty. The well-disposed population had committed a fault against the country and itself by its absence on the 18th March ; in politics, however, one must not be pitilessly just, but rather allow something for the weaknesses of humanity. Sixty thousand absentees from the ranks of the well-disposed National Guard had placed it in a minority ; it was only fair to give the abstainers the benefit of that circumstance, and also, as some excuse for them, to consider what was the actual composition of the National Guard. During the siege everybody was armed, the bad as well as the good, chance- comers and even foreigners as well as residents. There was consequently a great mixture in the companies. The officers had been selected as if for an army, with a view to fighting, and not with a view to the preservation of order, like a national guard. The insurrection having been made in the name of the National Guard by delegates and officers of the National Guard, the army of order and that of the Revolution had common cadres; and more than one company, the majority of whom were enemies of the Commune, found themselves under the command of a Com- munist. A still more inextricable difficulty arose THE CENTEAL COMMITTEE. 303 from the uncertainty of the situation. The National Guards, on whom the Government had counted, believed themselves abandoned by the Assembly, by the Army, and by the Government ; by the Assembly, which had chosen to sit at Versailles, and, but for M. Thiers, would have retired as far as Fontainebleau; by the Army, which had shown signs of disaffection on the 18th ; by the Government, which had withdrawn, for imperative reasons, no doubt, but such as not every one could appreciate. Finally, (and this it was which weighed heavily on the minds of the greater number,) they believed that they only had anarchy and monarchy to choose between. The Commune in Paris or the King at Versailles ; a hard alter- native for conservative Republicans. They were mistaken, their alarm about the Government was without foundation ; their fears about the Assem- bly were exaggerated ; and they did not discern communism and barbarism behind the Central Committee. In absenting themselves they made a terrible mistake, but their error is none the less an excuse, which it would be equally unjust and im- politic to ignore. The mayors believed — they never ceased to believe — that the party of order would rise in arms, with imposing unanimity, so soon as the Assembly, by proclaiming the municipal fran- chises of Paris, should remove the last scruples of 304 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. the hesitating, and deprive the insurrection of the pretext of which it had availed itself. After all, was this a time for judging men ? Nothing was to be thought of except the interest of the country, and the interest of the country demanded that civil war should be averted by any means. Such were the sentiments of the mayors of Paris, when with indomitable perseverance they interposed between two kinds of equally violent though not equally justified hatred. All their efforts were baffled by the fixed determination of the Assembly, which in its only too legitimate hatred of the Commune, and in its ill-will towards Paris, either rejected con- ciliatory measures, or altered, under pretext of amending them, or accepted them too late ; and by the criminal obstinacy of the Central Commit- tee, who wanted to create the Commune, to become masters of it, and by its means to govern France. That on both sides it was a government of combat, may be admitted without any comparison between the causes or the persons. The Central Committee and the mayors had held several discussions during Saturday night; the former sometimes assuming a tone of mastery, at others endeavouring to obtain the connivance of the mayors in certain operations which had been resolved upon. The Committee had not been able to come to an agreement with them on THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 305 any point. It had published two short proclama- tions on Sunday morning the 19th March, one addressed to the people, the other to the National Guard. These proclamations bore twenty signatures only, and it is worthy of remark that out of the sixty names of which the Central Committee ought to have been composed at the rate of three delegates to each arrondissement, there had never appeared on the various proclama- tions more than forty-eight. There are also only forty-eight names on the list of the members com- posing the Committee furnished by General Vinoy, bearing the date of 5th March. The name of Assi first figured on the placards of the 19th, so that on the Boulevards de la Madeleine and des Italiens, " The Government of M. Assi " was spoken of, not without the recollection that M. Assi had played the principal part in the strikes at Auzin and Creuzot. These proclamations were fresh attacks on the Government and the Assembly, which were accused of desiring to overthrow the Eepublic ; they an- nounced the raising of the state of seige, and " the convocation of the people of Paris in their sections to hold their communal elections." The Commit- tee added, " our mandate has expired." The mayors and the deputies assembled at two o'clock at the Mairie of the 3rd arrondissement. VOL. T. X 306 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIEKS. At the meeting — whose state of feeling might be described by saying that the Assembly made it nneasy, and the Committee made it indignant — about forty majors were present. Above all, the great object was to prevent a fratricidal conflict in Paris. It was agreed on all hands that confidence would be restored if the Assembly granted an immediate municipal election (the National Guards to elect their own chiefs), and revision of the act relating to commercial bills. The mayors flattered themselves that by these concessions they could obtain the retirement of the Committee. They wanted to be invested with the whole ad- ministrative authority. The Government, without sharing all their opinions, but animated like them by a desire for a peaceful solution of the diffi- culties of the situation, gave them full powers of administration. In reality the mayors did nothing but resume the policy of temporizing and pacifi- cation which they themselves had tried up to the 18th March, which tliey could not continue after an open contest, but which, now tried with prudence and reasonableness by men who had been elected by universal suffrage, might still have some feeble chance of success. The first step was the renewal of commu- nication with the leaders of the Insurrection, and the Central Committee, either uneasy at the THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 307 position, or to gain time, or in order to control tlie municipal power which was the outcome of univer- sal suffrage, proposed an interview. It took place in the Hôtel de Ville. The 3rd arrondissement was represented by two Deputies and six mayors or their assistants. The discussion was very earnest, and was prolonged until late at night. The Committee was immovable with respect to what it termed its rights over the National Guard; this meant the keeping of military authority in its hands, but it seemed willing to yield the administrative authority to the mayors. The members wished to deliberate apart before giving their ultimatum. At midnight, Yarlin, Jourde, Boursier, and a fourth whose name is unknown, came to inform the representatives of the municipalities that the Committee reserved to itself the military authority only. The delegates of the mayors insisted that the Hôtel de Ville should be restored to them, in order to mark by a visible sign that the administrative authority was again placed in their hands. They carried this point, and separated towards four o'clock, having agreed upon a convention, which Messieurs Lanjalley and Corriez, who seem to have drawn their information from an official source, sum up thus : — " The municipal administration will be restored at nine o'clock in the morning to the elected X 2 308 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. municipal officers, represented by delegates ; Citizen Bonvalet, mayor of the 3rd arrondisse- ment ; Miirat, assistant-mayor of the 10th, and Denizot, assistant-mayor of the 12th, will take up their residence at the above-named hour at the Hôtel de Viïle. The Central Committee will leave the Hôtel de Ville, and remove to head-quarters at the Place Vendôme, where it will continue to rule the National Guard. Finally, the deputies and mayors being unable to grant the municipal elections, which the As- sembly alone can legally establish, will publish a notice in which they shall promise to inter- cede with the Assembly in order to obtain these elections, and also for the same reason those of the officers of the National Guard for all ranks. " The Government of the Hôtel de Ville (Mes- sieurs Lanjalley and Corriez designate the Central Committee thus) will, a few hours after this notice is posted, post another announcing the preceding resolutions on their own part." Matters looked now as though they were com- ing to a settlement, provided the Government and the Assembly did not place any obstacle in the way, and the deputies set out for Versailles with every intention of keej^ing their promises. Before THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 309 their departure they caused the following notice to be posted on the walls of Paris : — " Citizens. " Impressed with the absolute necessity of sav- ing Paris and the Republic, by removing all cause of conflict, and convinced that the best way to attain this supreme object is by satisfying the legitimate desires of the people, we have resolved this day to request from the Assembly the adop- tion of two measures which, we are in hopes, will, if adopted, contribute to restore composure to the minds of all. " These two measures are — the election of all the chiefs of the National Guard, and the esta- blishment of a Municipal Council to be elected by all citizens. " What we want is that which is essential to the pubUc welfare under all circumstances, order, with Hberty and through liberty. " Long live France ! Long live the Pepublic ! " The Representatives of the Seine, " Louis Blanc, Victor Schoelcher, A. Peyrat, Edm. Adam, Floquet, Martin Bernard, Langlois, Ed. Lochroy, Farcy, ÏÏ. Brisson, Greppo, Milliere. " The mayors and assistant-mayors of Paris." (The signatures follow.) The conditions being fulfilled on their side, 310 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. MM. Bonvalet, Murat, and Denizot presented themselves, on the 20tli March, at nine o'clock in tbe morning in order to take possession of the Hôtel de Yille. But the Central Committee had thought better of it, and a note was read to the Commissioners, stating that " under the present circumstances, the Committee, being responsible for the consequences of the situation, could not relinquish either the civil or military power." The Journal Ojjiciel, which appeared for the first time under the authority of the Central Com- mittee contained : — 1st, A note in which the Committee justified its own conduct ; 2ndly, a resolution of the Central Committee, announcing that the elections of the Communal Council of the city of Paris would take place on Wednesday, the 22nd March, by ballot, and by arrondissement, at the rate of one councillor to 20,000 inhabitants, or fraction exceeding 10,000 ; 3rdly, a declaration by V. Grêlier, describing himself as "Delegate of the Government to the Ministry of the Interior," of which the following are the exact terms : — " We declare that henceforth we are firmly re- solved to secure respect for the preliminaries of peace, in order to preserve the safety of Republican France and at the same time the public tran- quillity." The Committee stated besides, that while THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 311 awaiting the establishment of the true Kepublic, they were holding the Hôtel de Ville in the name of the people. Thus the Committee broke the convention which they had agreed on at four o'clock that morning, and which had been loyally carried out by the deputies and the mayors. The deputies, who had already arrived at Versailles for the sitting of 20th March, were immediately informed of this breach of faith. They persisted none the less in their resolu- tions. MM. Clemenceau and Tirard placed the bill for the municipal elections before the Assembly that very day; and M. Lockroy, the proposal relative to the elections of the National Guard. The former was thus conceived : — "Article 1. — The election of a Municipal Council for the city of Paris shall be held as early as possible. " Article 2. — The Council shall be composed of eighty Members. " Article 3. — The Council shall appoint its President, who shall bear the title, and exercise the functions of Mayor of Paris. " Article 4. — There is incompatibility between the functions of municipal councillor and that of mayor, or deputy of one of the arrondissements of Paris." The following is the text of the second proposal:— 312 THE GOVEENMENT OF M. THIEES. " Article 1. — The corporals, sergeants, and officers, up to and including the rank of captain, shall be elected by the direct votes of the National Guard. " Article 2. — The majors and ensigns shall be elected by the officers of the battalion and by delegates appointed in each company in number equal to that of the officers. " Article 3.- — The colonels and lieutenant-colo- nels shall be elected by the captains and majors. " Article 4. — The general-in- chief of the National Guard of the Seine shall be elected by the colonels, the lieutenant-colonels and the majors. " Article 5. — The general shall appoint his staff. The colonels also shall appoint their staff. The majors shall appoint the captains, the adjutant- majors and the adjutants shall appoint the sub- officers." These two propositions bore the same signa- tures as the proclamation posted in Paris that morning, and in addition those of MM. Jean Brunet, Tolain, Clemenceau, Tirard, Edgard Quinet, Cournet, and Razoua. M. Millière then presented a proposal in the following terms : — " The delays accorded by the act passed on the 10th March for the payment of commercial bills shall be prorogued for three months." The Assembly, agreeing with the Government, voted urgency for the municipal elections bill, THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 313 and for that on the payment of commercial bills. Urgency was not demanded for the elections of the National Guard. Thus, the majority itself, notwithstanding its too legitimate causes of complaint, granted on that day all it could grant ; that is to say, urgency. The Government also officially renewed the authorization to the mayors of Paris, to exercise administrative powers already given on the night of the 18th. M. Tirard and his colleagues, in spite of the breach of faith by which they had suffered that very morning, declared themselves ready to continue their efforts for the peaceful termination of the sedition of Paris. The first thing to be done was to prevent the elections fixed for the 22nd by the Central Com- mittee. M. Tirard undertook to do this, and, speaking from the tribune, he said, — • " If we intended to become the accomplices of the insurgents we might lend ourselves to the resolution taken by the Central Committee to proceed with the elections on Wednesday next. The summons is placarded on all the walls of Paris. Well ! we have declared, we the munici- palities, that we should oppose this election. As to me, I will oppose it. {Hear ! hear I) M. Clemenceau. — " And I also ! M. Tirard. — "We will all oppose it, we will furnish neither lists of electors, nor voting-places. 314 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. nor ballot-boxes, nothing in short that is necessary for an election." (Hear! hear!) M. Tirard kept his promise. A notice signed by the deputies and the mayors appeared on the 21st. It announced the vote of urgency for the municipal elections. " The National Guard," said the signatories, " will be guided by its patriotism ; it will make a point of honour of removing all cause of conflict whilst awaiting the decision of the National Assembly." The same day the following declaration ap- peared in thirty-six Parisian newspapers, of different political opinions : — " To the Electors. " Considering that the convocation of the electors is an act of national sovereignty ; " That the exercise of this sovereignty belongs only to the powers which spring from universal suffrage ; " That consequently the Committee installed at the Hôtel de Ville have neither right nor qualification to convoke the electors ; " The representatives of the undersigned journals regard the convocation announced for the 22nd March as null and void, and advise the electors to take no heed of it. " The following have adhered to this : — " Le Journal des DéhatSj le Constitutionnel, THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 315 VElecteuT Libre, le Petit Moniteur, la Vérité, le Figaro, le Gaulois^ la Petite Presse, le Petit Journal, Paris Journal, le Petit Natioyial, la Presse, la France, la Liberté, le Pays, le National, l'Univers, la Cloche, la Patrie, le Français, la Gazette de Fra^ice, V Union, le Bien Public, V Opi- nion National, V Avenir Libéral, Journal des Villes et des Campagnes, le Journal de Paris, le Moniteur Universel, la France Nouvelle, le Monde, le Ternies, le Soir, VAmi de la France, le Messager de Paris, le Peuple Français.^* This spirited proceeding was all the more coura- geous that the Central Committee had not shown much respect for the liberty of the press. The Officiel of the 20th March contained a para- graph which was very like a threat. " The Eepublican authorities of the capital," said this note, " desire that the liberty of the Press as well as all other liberties shall be respected ; but they hope that all journals will understand that the first of their duties is the respect due to the Repub- lic, to truth, to justice, and to right, which are placed under the protection of all." " The Republican authorities of the capital," undertook to furnish a commentary on these am- biguous words, by suppressing the publication of the Gaulois and the Figaro on the 19th March. They did not inflict the same punishment on the thirty-five journals which had joined in the protest, 316 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIEES. they merely threatened them. " This is an outrage committed by the reactionary press against the sovereignty of the people of Paris," said the Journal Officiel of the 22nd. " It is a direct incitement to disobedience. Severe repression will be the consequence of these out- rages should they be repeated." The Journal Officiel renewed its threats on the following day. " We cannot attack the liberty of the press ; only, as the Government of Versailles has suspended the ordinary action of the tribunals, we warn those dishonest writers, who, under other circum- stances would thus render themselves amenable to the common law against libel and insult, that they will be immediately brought before the Central Committee of the National Guard." Notwithstanding this arrogant tone, the Com- mittee hesitated before the protest of the press, of the mayors elected by universal suffrage, and of the deputies of the Seine. They had already post- poned to the 23rd the elections at first announced for the 22nd; and two demonstrations by the party of order which took place on the Boulevards and in the Place Vendôme on the 21st and 22nd March, (blood was shed during the second of these), contributed to render a further adjournment necessary to the accomplishment of the objects of the Committee. The population of the quarters THE CENTKAL COMMITTEE. 317 inhabited by bankers, and tlie higher ranks of com- merce, began to wake out of their lethargy. The energy of the mayors restored courage to them. A certain number of majors, not federals, assisted at their consultations. Several of the National Guards who were on the side of order acted as sentries during the day on the Place de la Bourse in front of the unoccupied Mairies of the 1st and 2nd arrondissements ; and had also retained posses- sion of the railway station of St. Lazare, although their presence was useless so far as facilitating communication between Paris and Versailles was concerned, because the Federals searched the trains at Asnieres, where they had established a guard-house. A meeting was held at the Grand Hôtel on Tuesday the 21st. A few persons came out from it, shouting, "Vive la Paix!" They were followed by several who were walking on the boulevard, and who shouted with them. It was agreed that this procession should be repeated on the following day, and that the demonstration should be made in greater force. On Wednesday the meeting, as arranged, was lield in front of the Grand Hôtel. The promoters of the demonstration carried a large tricolour flag ; they were followed by about 600 persons, belonging to the bourgeoisie, who shouted " Vive la Paix" as on the previous day. The crowd followed, astonished, but sympathizing 318 THE GOVEENMENT OF M. THIEES. and confident. The * demonstration ' proceeded to the Bourse, where the National Guards presented arms. They then retraced their steps, and turned into the Rue de la Paix. The Place Vendôme was the head-quarters of the insurrection. The Committee sat at the Hôtel de Ville, but the superior officers of the National Guard remained constantly at the Place Vendôme, where they were in force. A cordon of sentinels barred the entrances to the Rue de la Paix, and the Rue de Castigflione. The demonstration first en- countered two sentinels posted in advance, who attempted to oppose their passage, but they pushed on, and the sentinels were obliged to fall back. What happened then ? It is absurd to suppose that a band of 6 or 700 persons had dreamed of engaging in a struggle with a much more numerous body of National Guards, armed to the teeth, and taking aim at them. But it is probable that the boldest of the members of the demonstration thought the Federates would not fire on unarmed citizens, or at any rate were willing to run the risk. What is certain is that the insurgents did by roll of drum summon the demonstration to disperse, but that they held their ground. All at once a discharge was heard. The insurgents assert that a pistol- ball fired from a window had wounded a National Guard. If this be true, it was the act of a mad- THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 319 man. The firing of a pistol from a window would have justified a strict search in the house from whence the shot came ; but it neither explains nor justifies a general volley on an unarmed crowd. The demonstration had not fired ; they had no muskets ; the order to fire on them was given by the men who had justified the assassins of Lecomte, and Clément Thomas, in the newspapers the day before. The inoffensive crowd, taken un- awares by a volley of musketry, fled as fast as they could in every direction, leaving eight wounded and thirteen killed in the Rue de la Paix. On the next day, Thursday, 23rd March, the following proclamation appeared in the Officiel : — " Citizens," " Your righteous anger placed us on the 18th March at the post which we were to occupy only for such time as is strictly necessary to carry out the communal elections. *' Your mayors, your deputies, repudiating the engagements which they made when they were candidates for ofiice, have placed every obstacle in the way in order to impede those elections which we are anxious to conclude with as little delay as possible. " The reaction, excited by them, declares war on us. "We must accept the struggle and crush re- 320 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIEES. sistance in order that you may proceed witli the elections in the calmness of power and strength. " Consequently the elections are postponed until Sunday next, the 26th March. " Until then the most energetic measures will be taken to insure respect for the rights you have redeemed." It was after this proclamation that the Mairies, which until then remained unmolested, were in- vaded, with the exception of the Mairies of the 1st and 2nd arrondissement. Delegates from the Central Committee would present themselves, and summon the mayor to withdraw. The mayor would protest, and declare that he would only yield to force. They would then send for the officer in command of the guard-house, and ask him this question, *' Will you obey the municipality, or the Central Committee?" He invariably replied, "The Central Committee ;" and the municipality withdrew. This open war with the municipalities, the threatening proclamation, the occurrences of the 22nd, led the mayors of Paris to resolve on a measure which was carried into execution on the 23rd, at Versailles. Having nothing more to hope from the Central Committee, they determined to make a last and solemn appeal to the Assembly. THE CENTEAL COMMITTEE. 321 Events had travelled at sucli speed during this fatal week, and the slightest movements of " the street " had suddenly been invested with such im- portance, that before leaving Paris for Versailles, the mayors deemed it indispensable to give the National Guard a chief. Admiral Saisset had been elected deputy of the Seine in the preceding month, by a very large majority. He had been returned by no less than 154,347 votes. He was popular in Paris not only in consideration of his services and his courage, but on account of the death of his son, who was killed during the siege. The Admiral was walking on the Boulevards the day after the rising, when he was recognized and cheered by the crowd. Several officers of the National Guard who gathered round said to him, " Place yourself at our head !" A few of the number set out immediately for Versailles, to request his appointment from M. Thiers. They said, " Every one will rally round such a chief as he." M. Thiers consented at once, and signed the appointment, which was notified to the Admiral on Sunday, the 19th March, at ten o'clock in the evening. Admiral Saisset im- mediately put himself in communication with the mayors elected by universal suffrage, thinking that their support would strengthen his hands. VOL. I. T 322 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIEES. The mayors of Paris, sharing this persuasion, and believing that an appointment made on their suggestion would be more popular than one emanating directly from the Executive, wishing also to surround the Admiral with men who were popular in Paris for their opinions, and their courage, issued tbe following notice on the morning of the 23rd :— " The Assembly of the mayors and deputy- mayors of Paris, in virtue of tbe powers conferred on them, in the name of universal suffrage, by which they bave been elected, and for whose principles they intend to secure respect, whilst awaiting the promulgation of the act which shall confer on the National Guard of Paris their full right of election, seeing tbat there is urgency, " Appoint personally, " Admiral Saisset, repi'esentative of the Seine, to be Commandant of the National Guard of Paris ; " Colonel Langlois, representative of the Seine, to be Chief of the General Staff, Colonel Schœlcher representative of the Seine, to be Commander-in- chief of the artillery of the National Guard." At the same time that they took this measure, the mayors who were going to Versailles deter- mined to attend in a body at the sitting of the Assembly, when one of them, speaking in the THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 323 name of all, should explain tlie condition of Paris, and ask tlie representatives to vote urgency for the Electoral Acts, and to fix the election for as early a date as possible. The advanced Kepublican party is sometimes a little theatrical. The mayors ought to have con- tented themselves with being received by the bureau, and placing their propositions in the hands of M. Grevy, who was a man to do them justice and lend them support. But, full of the impor- tance of their proceedings, and of the sense of their own earnestness, they wanted and looked for solemnity. Haunted by the recollections of the first Revolution, some of them would fain have appeared at the bar and had all the honours of the sitting. They contented themselves indeed with a gallery which was readily placed at their disposal, but they entered it in a body, wearing their official sashes, and crying, " Vive la Répub- lique ! " The Left responded to that cry which was so dear to them ; the Right, on beholding these worthy people who were striving so bravely for order, imagined themselves in the actual pre- sence of the Insurrection. They also fancied, like the mayors, but with very different feelings, that the first days of the first Revolution had returned. They did not need the spectacle before them to evoke those phantoms which were ever present to T 2 324 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. their minds ; and with cries of " Order ! Order ! " they demanded the expulsion of the intruders, who came before them wearing their sashes, and shouting " Vive la Eepublique " in the gallery, where all demonstrations were forbidden. A scene of tumult ensued, but it was of short duration ; for M. Grevy at once adjourned the sitting, in accordance with a previous resolution, until nine o'clock in the evening. When the members resumed their places, M. Arnaud (de l'Ariège), deputy, one of the mayors of Paris, read the following declaration by his colleagues : — " Gentlemen, " We have very important communications to make to you. Paris is on the eve, not of an insurrection, but of civil war, — civil war under its most terrible aspects. The population are anxiously awaiting — firstly from you, and after- wards from us — measures of such a nature as will prevent further bloodshed. " We believe that we are thoroughly acquainted with the state of feeling in all classes, and we are convinced that the triumph of order and the safety of the Republic require the following : — " According to us, it is absolutely necessary : — *' Firstly, that the National Assembly place itself in permanent communication with the mayors of Paris by such means as in its wisdom it may deem best. THE CENTBAL COAIMITTEE. 325 " Secondly, that tlie mayors be authorized to take, at need, sucli measures as may be im- peratively required by the public danger, subject to rendering an account to you of their conduct, and to answering for it. " Thirdly, that the election of the General-in- Chief of the National Guard, by the National Guard, be fixed for the 28th of this month. *' Fourthly, that the election of the Municipal Council of Paris take place even before the 3rd of April, if possible. " And lastly, that in all which concerns the act relative to municipal elections, the condition of eligibility be reduced to six months' residence, and that the mayors and their assistants proceed with the elections." The storm of the afternoon was, as often happens, followed by a calm. The address was received with deference. Although drawn up by the mayors, and presented in their name, it was signed only by deputies who were also mayors or deputy mayors of the arrondissements of Paris. Urgency was voted without opposition. M. Grevy spoke a few words, intended to lessen the effect of the hostile demonstrations of the Right. In spite, however, of these extenuations and apologies, the mayors must have left Versailles with the sense that their peace-making rôle had exposed them to injustice from the two parties. 326 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. They liad declared from the tribune (through M. Clemenceau) that they retained no illusions with regard to the Central Committee ; after the sitting of the 23rd they cannot have entertained any with regard to the Right of the National Assembly. They had been premature in their statements to the Parisians. To announce by placards the nature of demands which are about to be made is almost to promise that they shall be granted. Admiral Saisset, who shared both their hopes and their efforts, had gone so far as to assert that their dreams of pacification were accomplished facts. The following was posted by his orders on the morning of the 24th : — " Dear Fellow- citizens, " I hasten to inform you that in unison with the deputies of the Seine and the elected mayors of Paris, we have obtained from the Government of the National Assembly; "1st. The complete recognition of your muni- cipal franchise. " 2nd. The election of all the officers of the National Guard, including the General-in-Chief. " 3rd. Modifications of the act on commercial bills. " 4th. An act on house-rent, favourable to the occupiers, up to and including tenancies of 1200 francs. Until you shall confirm my nomination THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 327 or replace me, I will remain at my post of honour to forward tlie execution of the acts of conciliation which we have succeeded in obtaining, and thus to contribute to the consolidation of the Republic." The " Government of the Assembly," of which the Admiral speaks in this proclamation was M. Thiers, it was not the Assembly. M. Thiers could not associate himself openly with the pro- ceedings of the mayors ; because, in his position he could not do so, without giving a sort of sanction to the insurrection, and also because he knew the sentiments of the majority, and was the more bound to take them into account, that the country could not have borne a Government crisis in addition to its other dangers. But in his ardent desire to avert bloodshed, he favoured the efforts of the mayors within the limits of truth and possibility, and urged forward pacifi- catory measures. The mayors had found him disposed to favour their views up to a certain point. He thought that the acts on municipal elections, on the National Guard, on bills, and on house-rents, ought to be passed with as little delay as possible (he had even said so within the last eight-and-forty hours). He wished them to be liberal, which did not mean that he accepted the basis laid down by Admiral Saisset, espe- cially with regard to the election of the Com- 328 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. mandant of the National Guard. He promised "his support only, because he had only that to give. No Government promises to make laws, it only promises to propose them. However great the influence of M. Thiers over the Assembly, it was no longer all-powerful. Notwithstanding his reserve, he constantly betrayed a leaning towards conciliation which irritated and disturbed the E-ight. It was, hoAvever, perfectly well known that he would deal gently only with those who were misled, and that he would be as incapable of pardoning the leaders of the Revolution as of countenancing their principles. He had thought it right, on several occasions, to afSrm that he would maintain the Republic, and although these declarations were in conformity wdth what was called " The pact of Bordeaux," as he took care to show at the sitting of the 27th March, they appeared almost treasonable, if not to the whole of the Right, at least to the most violent, and to the leaders on that side of the Chamber. Admiral Saisset, in his generous ardour, exaggerated the magnitude of the promises and the extent of the power of M. Thiers, and the mayors, without going quite so far as the Admiral in their expecta- tions, believed that their proposals, for which urgency had been voted without debate, and in which it appeared to them the last hope of THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 329 safety resided, would be adopted almost in their entirety. This hope encouraged them to further efforts ; the danger seemed to them so terrible that they never wearied in their exertions. The day after M. Arnaud de l'Ariège had read the address of the mayors to the Assembly, the Central Committee, aware of the importance of the Admiral's proclamation, resolved to recommence negotiations, taking it for a basis. They sent General Brunei and another of their colleagues as negotiators. The envoys presented themselves this time in no friendly fashion ; they came at the head of a strong detachment and with artillery, which caused a panic in Paris. The mayors, overlooking the proclamation of the 23rd, in which the Committee declared war on them, agreed to the discussion, which took place in the afternoon. It was commenced at the Mairie of the 1st ar- rondissement, and continued at the Mairie of the 2nd, whither Brunei came with his troops, and where twelve of the mayors and their assistants were assembled, together with several deputies. During the discussion, the National Guards sta- tioned at the Bourse, and those whom Brunei had brought with him, remained in presence of each other, so that a sanguinary conflict would surely arise if no agreement was come to. The date of the municipal elections was one 330 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. of the chief points in dispute. The Committee insisted on the 26th March, the mayors would have preferred the 3rd April, because they expected that M. Ernest Picard' s Municipal Bill would be passed by that time. They considered themselves autho- rized to propose the 30th March as a com- promise; this was accepted by General Brunei after obstinate resistance. That point being settled, the good understanding seemed complete. There were indeed some difficulties as to the elec- tion of the General-in-cliief. M. Scliœlcher would have had him elected by two grades, but M. Brunei declared that he should be elected by direct universal suffrage, or the negotiation must be broken off. This threat silenced all objections. The 30th March was fixed for the municipal elec- tion, the 2 ad April for the election of the General- in-chief by direct universal suffrage. Brunei appeared on the threshold of the Mairie with the mayors, and announced that peace was concluded. His escort received the announcement with acclamations, which were eagerly echoed by the National Guard and the party of order. The news spread throughout Paris, and produced general satisfaction. Whilst all was joy in Paris, on the afternoon of the 24th, the Assembly at Versailles was preparing to discuss the proposal of the mayors, which had THE CENTEAL COMMITTEE. 331 been granted urgency on the previous day. The Commission, having been appointed at two o'clock, had chosen M. de Peyramont President,, and imme- diately set to work. Their report was not finished at six o'clock in the evening, so that M. Jules Simon proposed a night sitting, which was imme- diately agreed to. All was going well up to that time, both at Paris and at Versailles. But before the night closed, all was lost. The Assembly met at ten o'clock, waited some time for the Commission, which was with M. Thiers, then M. de Peyramont moved an adjournment, and finally M. Thiers came in person to make the same demand without giving any reason. " If the discussion takes place," said he, " it will be seen that the Government has no personal cause to fear it, but they dread it for the country's sake. One imprudent word may lead to much bloodshed." The Assembly, moreover, could not enter upon the discussion, as the report had not been made. M. Arnaud de l'Ariége therefore simply withdrew his motion until the sitting of the following day. What had happened was this : the turbulent spirits, both at Paris and Versailles, had once more got the better of men of good sense. When the news of Admiral Saisset's proclama- tion reached Versailles, the most excitable among 332 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. the members of the Eight had raised a cry of treason, had assembled at once in one of the bureaus, and were contemplating nothing less than handing over the Government to the Prince de Joinville. The Central Committee at Paris had refused to ratify the treaty which had been concluded by its delegate. " Admiral Saisset makes acceptable proposals," said Assi, who presided, as he always did, at the meetings of the Hôtel de Ville ; " but who will answer for their being carried out after the elec- tion ? Let us commence by electing the Commune. We are masters of the situation, our adversaries although apparently determined on resistance, have neither organization nor community of ideas." Bergeret continued in the same strain. The mayors were assembled at the Mairie of the 2nd arrondissement, when Eanvier and Arnold came to inform them that the agreement was broken off, and that the elections would take place on the 26th. The Central Committee made its will known to the population by the following notice : — " Citizens, carried away by your ardent desire for conciliation, happy to realize that union which is the object of all our efforts, we have loyally stretched forth the hand of brotherhood to our opponents. But the continuance of certain manœuvres, and especially the transfer of mitral- THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 333 leuses to the Mairie of the 2nd arrondissements by night, oblige us to maintain our first resolution. " The vote will take place on Sunday, 26th March. If we are mistaken as to the intentions of our adversaries, we invite them to prove that we wrong them much, by uniting with us in the common vote of Sunday." The mayors were in the right to break off all communications with a Committee who first granted, and afterwards refused, whose conces- sions were a sham, and who, in order to gain their object more readily, did not hesitate to deceive their adversaries by the pretence of negotiations. Their first idea was to adopt the same course on the 26th as that which they had followed on the 22nd and 23rd ; namely, to refuse to countenance the election, and to protest beforehand against its results. Then again, they reflected that the Central Committee was in the minority. If all those who were afraid of it voted unanimously, it must necessarily be beaten, and would be forced to disappear. The mayors would thus procure the safety of Paris, and the preservation of peace, which they had vainly sought from the Central Committee, by means of the population itself. They knew besides, that their own adherents were at variance on the question of the opportunism of the vote, and that several of the 334 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. National Guard were resolved to go to the ballot, whatever might be the resolution taken by the mayors. The major of the 10th battalion had said in the presence of M. Schœlcher, " our men will not fight, and the vote shall be on Sunday." Ranvier and Arnold came back during the day on the 25th, and offered to restore to the mayors the eighteen Mairies from which they had been expelled, if they would consent to summon the electors and to preside at the voting. If they refused, the elections should take place all the same, without their assistance. The meeting, which was composed at that moment of seven mayors, twenty-seven of their assistants, and six deputies, after a long discussion, and with much hesitation, submitted. It was certainly pushing the oblivion of injuries very far, but their ardent desire to escape a civil war rendered any alternative acceptable. " What would we not submit to," said the members amongst themselves, " to avert bloodshed, and avoid giving an oppor- tunity to the Prussians ! " The agreement was drawn up in the following terms : — " French Republic.'* " Liberty, Equality, Fraternity." " The deputies of Paris, the elected mayors and assistants reinstated in the Mairies of their arron- THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 335 dissements, and the members of the Federal Central Committee of the National Guard, con- vinced that the only means whereby civil war and bloodshed in Paris may be avoided, and at the same time the Republic be firmly established, is, to hold the elections immediately, hereby summon all the citizens in the electoral constituencies for next Sunday. The bureaus will open from eight in the morning, and will close at midnight. " The inhabitants of Paris are aware that under the present circumstances their patriotism requires that they should all give their votes, so that the elections may be of the important character which alone can secure peace in the city. " Long live the Republic. " The representatives of the Seine present in Paris : — " Clemenceau, Floquet, Greppo, Lockroy, Schœlcher, Tolain. " The mayors and assistant-mayors of Paris : — 1st Arrondissement, Ad. Adam, J. Meline. 2nd, Brelay, Loiseau-Pinson. 3rd, Bonvalet Murat. 4th, Vautrain, de Chatillon, Callon, Loiseau. 5th, Collin Jourdin. 6th, Leroy. 9th, Desmarest. 1 0th, A. Murat. 1 1 th, Mottu, Blanchon, Tolain. 12th, Grivot, Denizot, Dumas, 836 THE QOVEENMENT OF M. THIERS. Turillon. 13th, Combes, Leo MeiUet. 15th, Jobbé-Duval. 16th, Seveste. 17th, F. Favre, Malon, Villeneuve, Cacheux. 18th, Clemenceau. 19th, Deveaux, Sartory. " The delegate members of the Central Com- mittee : — " G. Ranvier, G. Arnold." This proclamation was sent to the National printing-office, where it was falsified by the Central Committee. Instead of the words, " The deputies of Paris, the elected mayors and assistants re- instated in the Mairies of their arrondissements, and the members of the Central Committee, con- vinced, etc.," they wrote : " The Central Committee of the National Guard, around whom have rallied the deputies of Paris, the mayors and assistants, convinced, etc.; convoke,etc." They suppressed the signature of M. Callon, and added the signatures of Messieurs E. Ferry, André, Nast, assistants of the 9th; Poirier, assistant of the 11th; Sextius Michel, assistant of the 15th; Chanelet, assistant of the 16th; Lafond, Dereure, and Jaclard, assistants of the 18th arrondissement. MM. Tirard, Arnaud de l'Ariége, and Brisson, who were informed at Versailles of the text of the agreement, declared that they would not assent to it. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 337 M. André Murat addressed the following letter to all the editors of newspapers on the day of the vote : — " At the commencement of the ballot and in presence of the monstrous fact that the text of the convention, signed by the mayors, their assis- tants the representatives of the people present in Paris, and MM. Ranvier and Arnold, members of the Central Committee, has been falsified, it becomes essential that the truth, with regard to the relations between the mayors and the Central Committee should be made known. " On Sunday, the 19th, a deputation of mayors and deputies went to the Hôtel de Ville, to request the Central Committee to leave the general administration of the City of Paris, as well as that of their respective arrondissements, to the elected municipalities. After a long dis- cussion, the Committee, wishing to consider the matter, the deputation retired to the Mairie of the 2nd, whither four delegates of the Committee came shortly afterwards, and there, by common consent, it was agreed that the Hôtel de Ville should be restored to a commission of the mayors on the following morning at nine o'clock; tJiis promise has not been kept. " After this refusal, and as it was impossible for the municipal officers to recognize the civil VOL. I. Z 338 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. autliority of the Committee, tliey protested and were expelled one after another from their Mairies. " On Friday, the situation being strained to its utmost, and the municipal officers making un- heard-of efforts to induce the Government and the Assembly to accept the elections, which was a reasonable demand, General Brunei, one of the Committee, invested the Mairie of the 1st arron- dissement, with several battalions and with cannon. " There, and to avoid bloodshed, a compromise was made. The municipal officer agreed that the elections should be held on the 30th. The General then proceeded to the Mairie of the 2nd, and the mayors assembled there approved the fresh agreement. The Central Committee, repu- diating the signature of its General, refused to ratify it. " Once more negotiations were attempted with the object of conciliation, at first officiously and afterwards officially ; and on Saturday at noon a notice was drawn up by the mayors, and accepted by the Central Committee. " It might have been supposed that all was now settled, and, for my own part, I went to my Mairie at two o'clock to resume my duties and take the requisite measures for holding the elec- tions on Sunday ; but I was refused admittance, THE CENTEAL COMMITTEE. 339 the Central Committee declining to fulfil tlie agreement. In the evening a notice was posted by the said Committee, announcing that the mayors had joined with the Committee, which is false, and, still more to mislead the public, this notice was signed with our names. *' Such a violation of fixed agreements, and the affixing of our signatures to a proclamation which did not emanate from us, affords a measure of the morality of the Committee; and teaches us how much confidence should be placed in the good faith and honour of such people. " A. MURAT, '^Assistant-mayor of the 9th Arrondissement.^^ This letter, which does infinite honour to M. Murat, appeared in the morning. The same even- ing the Central Committee, unable to reply to it otherwise, put M. Murat in prison. The mayors had gone very far in the way of con- cession. They had accepted the Central Committee if not as a regular at least as an honest authority ; they had to a certain extent undertaken to put up with its vicinity, if only their Mairies were re- stored, and the administrative authority in all civil matters was left in their hands. As an answer to those proceedings, by far too conciliatory, the Committee deliberately committed a forgery, whose consequences involved no less than the dishonour z 2 340 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. of the signatories of the proclamation. Never- tlieless M. Murat was the only one to protest and to withdraw ; his colleagues reserved their protest for a more favourable moment; thus adding another to the many sacrifices they had already made in the interest of the public peace. It only remained now to vote. The ballot was about to remove both the Cen- tral Committee and the mayors ; the Committee who had made the insurrection of the 18th March, the mayors who had courageously struggled against its dictation, taking the lead at the same time in both concihation and resistance. The party of order once more proved faithless to itself. The ballot, if all had done their duty, would have resulted in Peace ; as it was, it resulted in the Commune. M. Louis Blanc had proposed that the Assembly should resolve that the mayors of Paris, in approv- ing the elections of the 26th, had acted like good citizens. The Keport was made on the 27th, the day after the vote. The commission concluded against the consideration of the proposal. M. Thiers and M. Jules de Lasteyrie, President of the commission of fifteen members appointed to convey confidential communications between the Government and the Assembly during the insurrection, were the only members who spoke, and they merely begged the Assembly to vote THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 341 the conclusions of the commission withoiit comment. The speech of M. Thiers, although short, is memorable. He treated those who accused him of wishing to overthrow the Republic as base calumniators. " I want," said he, " I want solely to establish the well-being of France. When that is done I will restore her to you with the form of Government she has to-day. The different parties may then discuss what her final form shall be. All will depend on how each party conducts itself until then. The victory will be with the wisest." Returning to the question, he Confined himself to declaring that France should not be oppressed by Paris, nor Paris by France, that all the communes of France, Paris included, should enjoy their full rights and the plenitude of their liberty. He begged the Assembly to attend without delay to the municipal Act. M. Jules de Lasteyrie did not intend to fail in the discretion that M. Thiers expected from the mem- bers of the Commission. His concluding phrase, however, allowed the policy of the Government to be divined; while maintaining the principles of order and legality they did not wish to discourage any efforts which tended to prevent bloodshed. *' We will not," he said, " hinder any moderate or conciliatory measure, but we say to the Govern- ment: if ever crime, pillage or assassination run riot 342 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. in Paris Versailles liad better be ready." Scarcely had the Assembly closed the discussion by refus- ing to take the proposition of M. Louis Blanc into consideration, when M. Louis de Saint Pierre pre- sented a protest, signed by eighty-one deputies, against the elections of the day before. The Assembly being consulted, urgency was refused. All sensible men, even on the Right, appreciated the danger of public discussions at such a moment. The proposal of M. Louis Blanc had been inspired by a right sentiment, it expressed nothing but what was perfectly just. But officially to approve of the mayors for having advised the vote would have been to approve the vote itself, and to give a sort of sanction to the Commune. Every one understood and every one felt that, notwithstanding the vote of the 27th, the mayors of Paris were regarded with esteem by the Government, the Assembly, and all patriots. The Central Committee, on the contrary, was held up, by all its actions, to the contempt of history. Appointed originally by several battalions of the National Guard, to occupy itself exclusively with the interests of the National Guard, it should merely have expressed a desire that all the officers should be elected; it did, however, quite another thing; it decided that the officers should be elected; and this was usurping legislative authority. It THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 343 declared that it would not obey the commanders regularly appointed by the Government; and this was placing itself in a state of rebellion. The men who would not have any but elected chiefs, and who made, according to their own statement, a revolution on that account, appointed generals on their own authority; these were Garibaldi, Cluseret,Bergeret, Eudes, Duval, Henry, Gasnier, Brunei, Raoul du Bisson. Flourens having appointed himself accord- ing to his usual custom, the Committee hastened to provide him with a command. The Committee had, since February, been de- manding the cannon which were given by the National Guard during the siege. This was its first move. It claimed them as the property of the National Guard; an unsound reason, for there can- not be proprietorship in an object which has been given away. With a view to conciliation it was pro- posed to the Committee that the cannon should not indeed be restored en masse to the National Guard, but that the pieces which had been purchased by each, should be given back to that battalion indi- vidually. This did not suitthe purposes of the Com- mittee. It wanted cannons ; got them, and with them, projectiles which the National Guard had never given, but which it awarded to itself. Bar- ricades were erected around the parks of artillery, and the cannons were turned upon the city. In this same month of February the drums beat to 344 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIERS. arms by order of the Committee : this was msub- ordination and usurpation. Mazas, Sainte-Pelagie, and La Santé were attacked, and tlie prisoners re- leased, of some of whom the Committee afterwards made generals. On the 12th of March a notice was posted on the walls of Paris which was a provocation to the soldiers to rebel. On the 18th a federal battalion was made to march against the line, and a troop of women brouo;ht down from the hei2:hts of Montmartre and Belleville, who crowded round the soldiers, broke through their ranks, and incited them first to dis- obedience and afterwards to desertion. Members of the Committee visited the barracks, gave the soldiers wine, and either took or bought their muskets. At the meeting held on the 22nd March at the Hôtel de Ville, " Citizen Yiard, having proposed that secret emissaries should be sent to Yersailles in order to instruct the troops in their true duty," Citizen Assi, the President, replied that "emissaries had been sent several days before." The Committee proceeded from enlistment by bribery to enlistment by force. A decree of 22nd March declares that " The soldiers at present in Paris shall be incorporated in the National Guard, and shall receive its allowances." It was asserted that the Committee had not ordered the assassination of Clément Thomas and THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 345 Lecomte ; but the Committee called this assassin- ation " an execution," and undertook to defend it. The promised inquiry into the circumstances was not made. Several of those who had been conspi- cuous on the occasion, received promotion ; Cap- tains Ras and Herpin Lacroix were made majors ; Captain Simon Mayer was made Commandant of the Place Vendôme ; Kadanski, a carpenter, who had been foremost in the proceedings at the guard- house of the Rue de Rosiers, was promoted to the staff. Yerdagner, a sergeant of the line, who was one of the first to go over to the insurrection, and who boasted that he had fired at General Lecomte, obtained command of a battalion. The Committee made no trouble about justifying or even provoking assassinations. The Journal Officiel of the 28th March contains the- following note, which appears in the non-official portion. " We reproduce the following article by Citizen Ed. Vaillant, which appears to us to meet one of the present difficulties in a satisfactory manner : — " The Editor in chief of the Journal Officiel, " Ch. Longuet." This article, which " meets one of the present difficulties in a satisfactory manner," concludes with these words : — " Society has but one duty towards princes ; to put them to death. One for- mality only is binding upon it, the establishment of identity. The Orleans are in France, the Bouaparfces 346 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. want to return : let good citizens look to it I " On the 31st March the Journal Officiel states that the reactionary journals made a great noise about this article. " This article being signed," it adds, " only expresses an individual opinion, an opinion which is besides very sustainable." The Committee had fired on the people on the 22nd March, on an unarmed crowd, whose cry was Vive la paix ! Apprised by the first demonstration, which had taken place the day before, and by the summons, which was public ; (proof enough that no idea ot' having recourse to force was entertained), it had charged Lullier and Moreau " to take measures to prevent this demonstration, ivithout bloodshed if possible. ''^ At four o'clock a report from General du Bisson was brought to the Committee at the Hôtel de Ville (13 killed, 8 wounded), when '* Citizen Avoine moved a vote of thanks to the General, and to all the staff who have deserved well of the country. The motion was carried unanimously." The suppression of Courts Martial was also voted with unanimity. " Courts Martial can be nothing else than exceptional tribunals, where convictions are decided in advance : their justice is a deception. It is our duty to emancipate the army; to its unity with the National Guard we owe the victory of liberty." The vote took place at the meeting of the 19th. The following sentence THE CENTEAL COMMITTEE. 347 occurs in the oiOficial Report of tlie meeting of the 23rd. " The Committee ratifies the condemnations to death pronounced the day before on the motion of Generals Henri and Du Bisson." The Committee had placarded on the walls of the Hôtel de Ville : " Any person taken in the act of theft will be shot." The intention was praise- worthy, the penalty outrageous, and the procedure more than summary. Here is another notice : — "The Central Committee have beeninformed that men wearing the uniform of the National Guard and recognized as former gendarmes and sergents- de- ville have fired on the Prussian lines. The Committee give notice that should a similar case present itself, they themselves will take measures to secure the guilty parties, who will be imme- diately shot." Thus, having suppressed the state of siege and the Courts Martial of the standing army, the Committee transformed itself into a High Court of Justice, enacted penalties, and carried them into effect. Newspaper editors were cautioned that if they had the misfortune to trip, they would be brought " before the Committee," and threatened with "severe penalties" should they again oppose the will of the people. Was it also a question of the recalcitrant journalists being shot? The Committee (and this no one will be sur- prised to learn) held advanced opinions respecting the distribution of the public charg-es. On the 348 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. 24th March the following curious statistics were published in the Journal Officiel : lucubrations of this calibre constitute what was pompously- termed in the language of the clubs and of public meetings, " Science." " In examining the working of our economical institutions, we find that the various fortunes are formed and developed in the following propor- tions : — one, two, four, eight, sixteen, and, in an inverse ratio, that the households possessing these various fortunes are in the proportions of sixteen, eight, four, two, one ; it could not be otherwise ; were it so, poverty or opulence would be general. " The union of these two proportions constitutes that law which presides over the division of riches between the five ranks of the population, whose positions are as follows : — poor, tolerable, easy, rich, and opulent. " The wealth of France (mobilière and immohiliere) being nearly 310 Milliards, and the number of households, 13,950,000, a simple arithmetical calculation gives the following results : — " First group, 7,200,000 families ; indigent persons of all sorts, workers, at the lowest wages, possessing goods, and working tools, 10 Milliard?. " 2nd group, 3,600,000 ; workmen possessing land or a trade which allows them to work on their own account, 20 Milliards. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 349 " 3rd group, 1,800,000 ; small bourgeoisie, retail traders, 40 Milliards. " 4tli grade, 900,000 ; Middle class bourgeoisie, wholesale traders, 80 Milliards. " 6tli group, 450,000 ; great proprietors, large capitalists, 160 Milliards." Let, then, the fortunes of this latter class, com- posed for the most part of the organizers or the favourites of brigandage, be taxed at the rate of three to four per cent., and a sum sufficient to satisfy German rapacity will be realized imme- diately. Citizen Grollard, member of the Committee, discovered a still simpler, and according to him, more practical way of paying the indemnity of five milliards ; it was simply " to confiscate and sell for the profit of the Commune the goods of all the Deputies, Senators, and Ministers, who had voted for the war with Prussia." Citizen Grêlier, " delegate to the Interior," who had a better notion of what a sum of five Milliards was, contented himself with announcing in the Officiel, *' The authors of the war shaU pay the greater portion of the ransom." The Committee took the interests of house occu- piers in hand. " Until further orders, and with the sole object of maintaining peace, house pro- prietors and hotel-keepers shall not have the 350 THE GOVERNMENT OP M. THIERS. power of obliging occupiers of any bouses or botels to leave." Tbis was not pleasant for pro- prietors and botel-keepers ; it simply condemned tbem, together witb tbe autbors of tlie war, to pay tbe indemnity. " Citizen Blancbet approves tbe motion for tbe sale of tbe goods of tbe Deputies, Senators, and Ministers," but be is of opinion that " in addition to tbis measure for tbe public safety, tbere sbould be a tax on tbe total amount of rents, wbetber paid or not. " Tbe motion is adopted ; tbe amount of tbe tax sball be paid bereafter." Tbe winners of tbe day on tbe 18tb Marcb gave its true name to tbe Revolution, wbicb tbey believed tbey bad effectually made. Tbey called it " tbe accession of tbe proletariat. " Tbe proletariat bas understood tbat it was its imperative duty and its absolute rigbt to take its own destinies in band, and to ensure tbeir triumpb by taking possession of autbority." Tbe Committee bad declared tbat tbe move- ment wbicb bad just taken place was purely municipal and purely local. Its next proceeding was tbe appointment of its ministers. It sent delegates to revolutionize Lyons, Marseilles, Bor- deaux, all tbe large towns. Amoureux writes to tbe Committee from Lyons, on tbe 24tb Marcb, in tbe name of tbe delegates : — THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 351 ''We arrived at Lyons, and immediately pro- ceeded to the Hôtel de Ville. We have had to appear on the balcony, amid the acclamations of more than 20,000 citizens. *' Eighteen battahons out of 24 are happy to federalize themselves with the 215 battalions of Paris. " The Government of Versailles is not recog- nized. " In short, the cause of the people triumphs, and Paris alone is recognized as the capital." The Committee said, in its Journal Officiel^ " It is on Paris that the duty of making the sovereignty of the people respected, and of exacting that no at- temptupon their rights shall be made, is incumbent." It regarded the people of Paris as invested with the right of governing France, in virtue of their advanced opinions. This, at least, was the opinion of General Cluseret. " The source of all power and the only power in Paris," said he, " is you, National Guards of the Seine, you, the advanced people." The Committee reckoned on the press, on the " enlightened or undeceived " departments ; it also reckoned on the large towns to push forward the smaller ones. " The large towns have proved that they are animated by the same republican spirit as Paris ; the new Republican authorities hope, therefore, that they will afford her their earnest and ener- 352 THE GOVERNMENT OF M, THIEflS. getic co-operation." True, the Committee adds scornfully : " The country -places will be anxious to imitate the towns." It had declared, from the 20th March, that it would ensure respect for the preliminaries of peace; an admirable resolution on the part of a Committee which had so many times expressed itself in favour of " torrential " sorties and war à outrance, and which had treated the surrender of Paris and these very same preliminaries of peace (which were to be so scrupulously respected), as so many betrayals and money-bargains. The Prussian general who commanded the third army corps at Compiègue, having announced that if events should assume an appearance of hos- tility against the German troops, the city of Paris would be treated as an enemy, the Com- mittee hastened to reply that " the Revolution accomplished in Paris being essentially commu- nal," could be in no way aggressive to the German armies. General Von Schlotheim, in the note addressed by him to the leaders of the insurrection, pro- mised to keep a pacific attitude if not provoked. The Committee in publishing this document altered the words to a friendly attitude, and ventured to say, in its proclamation of the 24th March, — " The Prussians, judging us at our THE CENTEAL COMMITTEE. 353 true worth, have recognized our right." This was false, but even had it been true, there was dishonour in the utterance of such a statement. With equal veracity was it aflBrmed, in official proclamations, that the King was at Versailles, that the army of M. Thiers was composed of Pontifical Zouaves, and that it was commanded by Charette. One day Assi said to his Committee, " The mayors and deputies of Paris deserve no con- fidence whatever ; the ministers are rascals ; the deputies ferocious imbeciles ; it is impossible to place a shadow of confidence in such men." The mayors were treated accordingly. The Com- mittee promises them, on 22nd March, at six o'clock in the evening, to give them up the Hôtel de Ville ; at midnight it refuses. It consents, on the 24th, to fix the elections for the 30th; on the 25th, it alters the date to the 26th. It obtains the consent of the mayors to the elections of the 26th on condition of restoring their Mairies ; but it falsifies the proclamation, the terms of which had been settled by both, it does not keep to its word in the restitution of the Mairies, so that the first line of the proclamation, " The mayors, reinstated in their Mairies," constitutes a falsehood. It declares on the 19th, 20th, 21st, 24th, and 26th March, that it is about to retire, VOL. I. A a 354 THE GOVERNMENT OF M. THIEES. that it is retiring, that it is giving place to the Commune ; but it draws up lists of ofiBcial candi- dates, on which it takes good care to inscribe the names of all its members. When the Commune is nominated and installed, instead of disappear- ing, the Committee transforms itself into a Sub- committee, retaining Assi as its President, and it only awaits an opportunity of seizing power once more. Such is the Central Committee of the National Guard. Those who gained admission to the hall in the Hôtel de Ville, in which the Central Committee sat, carried away with them a feeling of disgust almost amounting to horror. It was very little like a Government Council ; nay, not even like a guard-room. Victuals everywhere, drink, pipes, slovenly fellows with muskets slung at their backs, disgusting dirt, deafening cries, wild and ferocious talk. One member of the Committee, according to a witness hardly to be suspected, has a pleasant trick of pointing his loaded musket at you the whole time he is speaking to you ; he replaces it under his arm while you answer him. It is grotesque, no doubt ; is it only that ? Is it not the indication of a peculiar mental condition ? From this congenial centre came apologies for assassination, and provocations to civil and social war. Monsieur Tirard said on the 21st March, THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 355 from the tribune in the Assembly : " On going to the Hotel de Ville, you know well enough when you enter it, but you know not whether you will come out again." The elections did not fulfil the hopes either of the Committee or of the mayors. The mayors had flattered themselves that the party of order would vote, and that it would vote with uniformity; but the party of order almost entirely abstained from voting. The adversaries of the Committee who voted, could only succeed in electing sixteen of their candidates. The game was lost, the sixteen elected candidates at once tendered their resignation. The Commune, after these resignations, and after taking some double elections into account, found itself reduced to sixty-six members ; after the 6th April, by rea- son of fresh resignations, the number fell to sixty- two. The Central Committee had succeeded with only thirteen of its members. It might, however, count as belonging to it the seventeen members elected from the International. This made, in all, thirty-eight members, for two of those elected, Varlin and Assi, belonged at the same time to the Central Committee and to the International Association. The other members of the Com- mune were journalists of the school of Delescluze A a 2 356 THE GOVERNSfENT OF M. THIERS. or Blanqui, or else club-orators. This result was vexatious to the Committee, who foresaw an- tagonism between its policy and a majority with Delescluze at its head. But if instead of counting the elected, we consider the number of voters, the results prove that the party for order was once more beaten through its own fault. The number of registered voters was 481,970. Of this number, 224,197 electors, that is forty-six per cent, of the total, had taken part in the election;