\^!^ AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR A REPORT OF THE " WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD By BERNARD M. BARUCH CnAUJMA.N WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1921 LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL. March 3, 1921. The President, Washington^ D. C. Sir : I have the honor to submit to you the more detailed exposition of the work of the War Industries Board which was promised in my report of December 24, 1919. In closing this undertaking, new as it was in many of its aspects to our institutions of government, I w^ant to thank you in behalf of myself and the members of my staff for the opportunity which you vouchsafed to us thus to serve our country. Respectfully submitted, • Bernard M. Baruch. GIF 1 " The highest and hesi form of efficiency is the spontaneous cooperation of a free people." — Woodroto Wilson. 45669:i ADDITIONAL COPIES OF THIS PUBLICATION MAT BE PROCURED FROM THE SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON, D. C. AT 35 CENTS PER COPY PREFACE. This report is an analysis and narrative of the »^'-if- °f ^^^^^^/^ Indnstries Board, whose function it was so to supervise the indu.tr es otrn erica that the energies of each should, as far as practicab e, upp™n en Urose of all oU.ers, and that all should contribute to he Umit of their combined ability to one common purpose-the wmmng "'xhe vohunc has been written in pursuance of a pronuse contained in tlie following brief report to tlie President : Washington, D. C, December 2.'i, IH9. Mv DE.K MK. PKESiDENx: I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the and of achievements their support mtule possible. irv the importance of ..-- — The mobilization of America's industrial forces and /ements ineir sui'iJ"!'. ww.^.v,. i..-- ;;::,averr /;... ,«ace an. <<,..,.nK.n.,„ t";va,. ana cle...c ,on wa a which were essential to the war's development. , . v , and then to plan to do it; to coordi- nate and synchronize the multiplicity of national and international eiforts and make them elTective in supplying the war demands so that our armies and navies could discharge their duty of fighting and winning, the War Industries Board evolved a general formula, Avhich is hereAvith appended because it con- tains its theory, organization, and policy of p?*ocedure — because it show.s what the Board was and what it tried to do. It read : " Wars are fought and won — or lost — on the land, on the water, in the aii", and on those battle lines behind the front where the civilian forces stand. "It is not enough to mobilize tlie Nation's military strength. There must be a mobilization of her full economic resources — ^industrial, agricultural and finan- cial. These must be organized, coordinated, and directed with the same strategy that governs the operations of the purely military arms of service. " The prodigious strain upon the world's productive capacity must be met and balanced to provide the means of warfare and to maintain the civilian popula- tion as well as to preserve the economic fabric. " America to-day is the chief source of strength to the forces engaged in the conflict against German world domination. That strength is expressed in terms of man power and material — the one military, and the second industi'ial. " To control and regulate industry in all its direct and indirect relations to the war and to the Nation, the President has created the War Industries Board and placed the responsibility for its operation in the hands of the chairman. The letter of March 4, 1918, addressed to Bernard M. Baruch, and the procla- mation of May 28, 1918, delegating executive powers, follow: " The War Industries Board is charged with the duty of procuring an ade- quate flow of materials for the two great war-making agencies of the Govern- ment — the War and Navy Deiiartments— and for the two agencies in immediate affiliation with these military arms — the Emergency Fleet Corporation and the Railroad Administration. " Also, the board provides supplies necessary to the military needs of our associations in the war, and Uiose commodities required by neutrals in exchange for materials essential to us. " Finally, and of paramount importance, the board, in alliauce with the Food, ^lel, and Labor Administrations, provides for the country's civilian needs, the protection of which is a particular duty of the organization. •• It is not only thenjuty of the War Industries Board to stimulate an ' .- pand production in those industries making war essentials, it is equally the board's duty to protect, as far as may be, those industries not immediately essential to the war program. " It is the policy of the board, where retrenchment and curtailment are neces- sary, to keep alive, even though it be necessary to skeletonize, the enterprises in this group, and not to destroy them. " Whenever possible, conversion of industries from a uonwar production to an essential output is effected. " The War Industries Board is a method of control devised by the President to equalize the strain placed upon the American industrial structure by the war. •• It stimulates and expands the production of those materials essential to the war program and at the same time it depresses and curtails the production of rnKiwcK. 7 tlHist' thiii.iis in>t of ;i necessitous nature. This is done by re^iuiatiou, in t-onso- iiance with other executive brandies, of the basic economic elements: (o) Facili- ties, (b) mntenals, (c) fuel, (d) transportation, (c) hibor, and if) capital. ~~'" The metliod of control is thro\if,'h a preference list, on which are placed those industnes whose output is essential to the war's progress. The priority -■ indicated by tlie preference list is the master key to the six elements named. _ *' Further, the board reyiilates all and controls certain otUar industries of tirst-rate war importance, it fixes prices through the price-ffxTug conrmittee, it creates new and converts old facilities, it clears the national business require- ments, and it leads to conservation, which is needed to bridge the gap between tlie extraordinary demand and the available supply — a gap which exists in almost all the great commercial staples. " The War Industries Board embraces all and each of the Nation, b^ood and luel are separately administered, but with every other article of military need and of ordinary life the board has a direct connection, and it has a basic rela- tionship with food and fuel, too, for both requii'e in production and distribution the materials that the War Industries Board provides. Its strength lies in the full and patriotic cooperation that American business, including both the employers and the eniployees, gives in working out tlie problems common to us all. " The abnormal conditions of the war demand sacritices. It is the price of victory. " Only actual needs, not fancied wants, should and can be satisfied. '• To save heavy and long privation, temporary deprivation must be the rule. " America's willingness to accept these conditions marks her ability to quicken the end of the conflict." It is not within the province of the writer to render juugment upon the success achieved by the organization of which lie was the head, but it is not amiss for him to say not one default was recorded on any demand made by the military establishments. They were given all they asked in measure so full and so quick as to be noteworthy, especially when it is remembered that most of the years of our existence had been given over to life and thought of peace with small inclination or opportunity to familiarize ourselves with the arts and needs of war. If the love of country shows itself in tlie readiness of men to fight it is equally proven in the willingness of capital and labor — of the men and women workers — to serve. It is with great pride I inform you that there was not a slacker to be found among the industries. Not one had to be coerced. They governed themselves by the an.sw^er to a single question, namely : " Do the continuation of our er*^-^ ^ijses help or hurt the war program?" Vi*! Tl _ choice was unanimous for service ratlier than profit — for national need instead of individual expediency. In every way they thoroughly responded to thf- test. Not a single business from the greatest business organization to the smallest merchant but was affected by the war; but was called upon to make some sacrifice. Because of tlieni — their brains, their workers, and their money — added to tlie indomitable spirit of our soldiers and sailors, and to the general public's readiness for sacrifice, America was not found wanting; because of them America was able to supply the men and materials without which victory, at the time it came, could not have been won. It is impossible to estimate the value of America's industrial elTorts in terms of dollars, but it is safe to say the total ran into the billions. In my a.ssociates. chosen from the whole Nation because of their ability. I found my .support to come as quickly from the Republicans as from the Demo- crats; from the man of German exti'action as from the one whose antecedents II 8 PREFACE. were English. In the spirit of service becaiise of the world crisis and the national emergency, there were fused all differences of politics, of ancestry, of religion; all were Americans and as such soldiers of the common good. To these men on the Board, and to the American employer and employee, goe& such praise as the organization may have earned. With them beside him he was able to render service; without their support he could not have succeeded. Because every member of the War Industries Board from the top to the bottom is deserving of the attention of yourself and their fellow citizens, I will append a complete roster of those devoted men and women who discharged their duty to their country by earnest service in this vital organization. To them I again express my thanks and for them I express the gratitude we all of us feel in having been vouchsafed this great opportunity to which we sought,. as best we could, greatly to rise. There will be submitted later a detailed exposition and study of the Board* s- origin, function, and organization. Further, there also will follow the reports- of the members of the Board and the divisional chiefs in whose hands fell the authority you delegated to me, decentralized according to an attached chart. Finally, in addition to general comments, I am submitting certain conclusions as to the lessons taught us by the war, expressed in the form of recommenda- tions which, if translated into practice, will bring us a greater readiness for the worst that the future may hold and which can be enacted without violence to our traditional predisposition to peace and the pursuits thereof. Between the time of the signing of the armistice and the discontinuance of the War Industries Board the problem was faced of reversing the Board's machinery in order to demobilize industry from war service and assist it back to its normal channels. The German collapse had been spectacular in its sud- denness. When fighting ceased war production in the United States was reach- ing its peak^ Every unit of the vast machinery was keyed up to high speed. There is no doubt but that knowledge of this fact contributed materially to Germany's sudden realization of the hopelessness of her position. The Board did'^all that was possible to prevent any injury to industry as it was put back on a peace basis. The price fixing committee of the Board determined as a general policy that price agreements should continue for the period originally fixed. The President directed the various departments of the Government not to market, in competition with private producers, materials in which there was no shortage and which were not of a perishable nature. The Board, through recommendations and advice, aided in cancellation of contracts so as to stabilize as far as possible the flow of materials, labor, and plant facilities back to peace channels. It was arranged with all of the war-making agencies of the 'Gov- ernment that the Board should be advised of revisions and adjustments of all Government contracts in excess of $100,000. The Board's facilities 'section, for a brief time, remained as the clearing house for all information relating to contract adjustment. Contact also was maintained with the Labor Depart- ment so that as labor was released from war work, it was distributed to peace- time industries needing it. If the proper authority had been at hand, it would have been possible for the War Industries Board to have continued its func- tions during the period of readjustment. Much good could have been accom- plished. But with the signing of the armistice, the purchases by the Allies and our own great departments coming to an end, the power of the Board, without further additional legislative authority, ceased and it was possible to do only what was done — to wind up its work as quickly as possible. It would be impossible in any statement of the activities of the War Industries Board, or any story of the mobilization of the industries of the country, not to PREFACE. 9 conclude with definite recommendations based upon the lessons learned. A similar emergency may arise in the future and it can more easily be coped with f the experiences of the hist two years are profited by. The writer believes:, First . There should be created a peace-time slieleton organization based on tliel experience of^tEe^ar-making agencies. It should be headed by a chairman^ | ivho, when the emergency arises, should be granted the powers necessary to | ■oordinate and synchronize the economic resources of the country. With him J should be associated tlie representatives of the Army and the Navy or any other iepartment vitally interested, as the Shipping Board, who should have cen- ;ralizod under them the various purchasing branches of their departments, rherc also should be in the skeletonized organization a vice chairnum, a sec- retary, a counsel, and members in charge of raw materials, finished products, "acilities, prices, labor, planning and statistics (during peace under the Depart- uent of Conmierce) , priority and conservation. Under these there should be also he various section or commodity heads. The peace-time organization would neet at least once a year to discuss and outline plans and to keep in touch with he general world situation and with one another. Each sectional head would lame committees in each industry in order that, in the event of an impending ;risis, it would be possible within a few days to create an organization which mmediately would mobilize all of the industries of the nation and quickly make ivailable for the Government all of its resources. These men, with the exception )f the Secretary, who would keep the records, would serve without compcnsa- :ion and the actual expense of maintaining such an organization would be small. : would recommend that all priorities, including those of shipping, should be centralized in the chairman. Second . Through a sy.stem of stimulation by a protective tariff, a bonus, an" Jxempfion'Ti^ui taxation for a limited period, licensing, or any other effective ueans. every possible effort should be made to develop protluction of manganese. jirom e, tungsten, djestuff, by-products of coal, and all such raw juaterials isually imported but which can be produced in quantity in this country. Above ill, immediate and persistent effort must be made to develop production of \ litrogeJUT-ml. its. substitutes, not alone for war but for agricultural purposes. ^ ThirU ,. Under the sui^ervision of the proper departments of the Government" ome industries must be given encouragement to maintain a skeleton organiza- ion through which can be developed tjjfi j'api d manufacture of guns, munitionSj lirplanes, etc. Some facilities already developed might be kept alive through^ >utri,i:hf purchase or by small orders for munitions and airplanes while at alT imes there must be kept on hand the necessary dies, jigs, fixtures, etc., needed or the manufacture of munitions. The expert personnel of the War and savy Departments in addition to keeping abreast of the times in new war-mak- ng agencies should keep the industries of the Nation attuned in a skeleton form meet immediately that enlarged demand which would come tlirough war. Very sincerely yours, (Signed) BEnxARi) IVI. P.ARrcH. Hon. WooDROw Wilson, Presiflevt of the United States, The M'hitc House, Washington, 1). C. In the report which follows, attention is directed to the things ac- omplished rather than to the individuals who did them. The world vill desire to judge the quality of these men by an untinseled rec- rd of their work rather than by their biographies, and such a record 3 here set down. It is known to all that every loyal American citi- 10 PREFACE, y-eii contributed whole-heartedly to the comiuon end, and it was this unfaltering spirit of patriotism that finally crowned the war effort with success. There is no calculus by which the value of each man's activities, even within such a group as the War Industries Board and its staff, can be rated, and no such attempt has here been made. This record has been made bj^ no one man. Each member of the board prepared an account of his work. Each director of a division and each chief of a section reported the conditions and problems which he found in his industry and the manner in which such prob- lems were handled. All of these reports have been worked over and condensed, duplications and repetitions eliminated, and an endeavor has been made to weave the story into a consecutive whole. The compilation is the work of Edwin B. Parker and Frank Fritts. It is with regret that I found that there could not be placed in this volume a fuller and more detailed report of the work of each division And section head — their difficulties and their successful accom- plishments. It is believed that a condensed yet comprehensive record of the activities of the Board, with explanations of the principles and poli- cies by which it functioned, together with a discussion of the place in the great World War occupied by the leading industries of America, is worth preserving for the information, and it may be for the guid- ance, of this and future generations. Bernard M. Baruch, Chairman. War Ind'>ist7nes Board. CONTENTS. PART I. TfrE War Industriks ISoaro. Cliaptcr. Page. 1. Ori.Lclii and purpose 17 2. Tlie prosrniii of requirements ."lO a. The study of resources 38 4. Priorities 47 5. Conservation G1 6. Price-tixiiii;- 70 7. Labor problems SI ?. Tlie foi-eign mission 02 ). Conclusion DO PART II. Commodity Skctions. Chapter. 1. Introductory-- 103 2. Iron and steel 110 3. Copper and brass 130 Copper 130 Zinc 137 Brass 139 4. Other metals - 142 Ferroalloys 142 Manganese 142 Vanadium 144 Tungsten 144 Zirconium 14r> Ferrosilicon 145 Chromite 145 Tin 146 Aluminum 148 Lead 150 Nickel 152 Quicksilver 153 Antimony 153 Platinum 154 5. Chemicals for munitions 157 Nitrate of soda 157 Sulphur and pyrites 101 Acids and heavy chemicals 1<>3 Sulphuric acid 103 Nitric acid 1(35 11 12 CONTENTS. Chapter. 5. Chemicals for munitions — Continued. Fage. Alkali and chlorine- Caustic soda 166 166 167 Soda ash Potash 1^8 Chlorine 169' 171 _ 172 Ethyl alcohol _ Cotton linters- Explosives ^'^'^ 6. Industrial chemicals. 181 Artificial dyes and intermediates ISl Industrial gas and gas products 184 Toluol 184 Saccharine 185 Acetylene 185 Oxygen 185 Creosote 185 Tanning materials and natural dyes 186 Paints and pigments 188 Wood chemicals 15)0 Miscellaneous chemicals 192 Technical and consulting staff 194 7. Auxiliary mineral products 196 Refractories 196 Ceramics 197 Electrodes and abrasives 198 Electrodes 198 Abrasives 199- Chemical glass and stoneware IQS' Glass carboys 19&^ Chemical stoneware 200 Laboratory glass __ 200 Asbestos and magnesia 200 Mica 201 8. Medical supplies 204 9. Tobacco 208 10. Forestry products and building materials 211 Lumber 211 P.uilding materials 219 Wood products 221 Pulp and paper 222 11. Textiles 228 Cotton goods 228 Wool 231 Knit goods 236 Felt 238 Silk 241 Flax products 242 Jute, hemp, and cordage 243 12. Leather and rubber 247 Hides, leather, and leather goods 247 Hides and skins 248 Sole and belting leather 2.50 Ik CONTENTS. la Chapter. 12. Leather and rubber— Continued. Hides, leather, and leather goods— Continued. rage. Upper leather -"^^ Harness, bag, and strap leather — -*_'- Sheepskin and glove leather -^- Boots and shoes -^*'- Harness and personal equipment -^-l Beltinj 2o4 Gloves and leather clothing 254 Rubber and rubber goods -^^ "4 81 ^ I 13. Machinery and tools . SoO S^ I iMachine tools 259 Forgings, ordnance, small arms and ammunition 2(52 Hardware and hand tools 264 Cranes -^'^ Chains -6" Military optical glass and instruments 208 14.- Transportation and power 270 Automotive products 270 Railway equipment and supplies 273 Locomotives 274 Freight cars 275 Stored materials 277 Fire prevention 277 Power 27S Electrical and power equipment 2S0 Electrical apparatus and supplies 280 Steam turbines 282 Boilers, condensers, and similar equipment 2S3 APPENDICES. Appendix. I. Army appropriation act. Aug. 29, 191G, sec. 2 287 II. War service committees 28S III. The Overman Act 290 IV. Tersonnel of the War Industries Board 291 V. Clearance List, Feb. 25. 1018 3K5 VL Clearance List, June 24. 1918 319 VII. Requirements Division 320 VIII. W. I. B. Price Bulletins Nos. 1-57 324 IX. Priorities Circulars Nos. 1 and 2 325 X. Priorities Circular No. 4 330 XI. (1) General classification of purposes demanding preference treatment 339 (2) Preference List No. 1 340 XII. Preference Li.st No. 2 342 XIII. Industrial Adjustments Committee — minutes 350 XIV. President's Mediation Commission — report 354 XV. Labor Conference Board — report 357 XVI. Labor Priority Bulletin No. 1 3.58 XVII, Report of Replogie on .steel 360 XVIII. (1) Reply of Baruch to Hylan 303 (2) Reply of Baruch to Calder resolution 305 14 CONTEXTS. Appendix. ViVA" XIX. Fixed price scliedule— steel, Oct. 11, 1917 367 XX. Fixed price scliedule — steel, Nov. 5, 1917 367 XXI. Joint circuliir — Ptirlier and Replogle 36S XXII. (1) Priorities Circular No. 28 372 XXII. (2) Priorities Circular No. 35 374 XXIII. Nitrate of soda pool prices — ^tentative 377 XXIV. Nitrate of soda pool prices — final 377 XXV, Production of alcohol in United States 377 XXVI. Production of dyestuffs in United States 37.S XXVIl. Ruling on dyewoods and dyes— Oct. 10, 1918 37,s XXVIII. Classitication of industries using acetic acid 370 XXIX. Questionnaire to electrode consumers 379 XXX. Drugs and pharmaceuticals for 1917 380 XXXI. Production of tobacco in United States— 1913-1918 3S0 XXXII. Exports of tobacco from United States— 1913-1918 381 XXXIII. Lumber cut of United States— 1913-1918 381 XXXIV. Priorities Circular No. 21 381 XXXV. Production of paper in United States — 1917 383 XXXVI. Fixed price schedule— cotton goods, July 8, 1918 383 XXXVII. Regulations for handling wool clip of 1918 383- XXXVIII. Priorities Circular No. 10 387 XXXIX. Rubber consumed in United States— 1917 388 XL. Production of automobiles in United States— 1899-1918 389 XLI. Production of locomotives in United States— 1911-1918 389 XLII. Story of the nitrate problem 390 XLIII. Priorities Circular No. 45 392 XLIV. War service committees and members 39& Index 411 PART I. THE WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD. 15 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. A Report of the War Industries Board. Part I. THE WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD. Chapter 1. ORIGIN AND PURPOSE. For years to come the activities of the United States in meeting the many problems involved in its participation in the war will fur- nish a wealth of material for the economist, the political scientist, and all others interested in public affairs. During the period before this country became a party to the conflict, much of the attention of those who fostered preparation for the inevitable day was devoted to plans for producing a trained personnel. And that early work was of an importance which is easily underestimated. The speed with which our Army grew from 200,000 to 4,000,000 men and the success with which it was being moved to Europe at the rate of 225,000 troops per month during the summer of 1918 were phe- nomena new to history and phenomena which amazed not only our enemies but our allies. '" The prime characteristic of this war, howeve r , was the extent t o which it involved the material r gsoiirces of the participating na ti ons. As attention was turned to immediate preparations, it was soon felt that the problem of supplies was going to involve difficulties of the most far reaching and important character. Private industry in this country was already making important contributions to the supply of the Allies, but without proper coordination in the supply of our own requirements and those of the Allies it could well have happened that our entering the war might have had the effect of impeding rather than stimulating the flow of supplies to Europe and thus actually hindering the progress toward victory. The strain on industrial resources which the war was causing in Europe was well known here, but it was exceedingly difficult to estimate the e.xtent to which our vast resources would have to be brought to bear on the undertaking. In casting organizations to meet the problem, we had the experi- ence of the Allies which was placed freely at our disposal. But the temper and habits of our people, the extent of our territory, and the 10.5826—21 2 17 18 3^MEF.IOA'2 i- cerning both immediate and prospective sui)!^}' capacities and ine industries could get information showing immediate and projected (jovernment needs. The question of fair prices and suitable methods for making equitable distribution of (lovernment orders could be discussed by the advisory commission with these conmiittee members, who were for the most part the most influential and best informed men in their respective lines of business. Evidences of unparalleled 22 AMERICAN TIS^DUSTRY liS^ THE WAR. good Avill in ever}^ quarter made this plan seem more feasible than experience proved. The unprecedented rapidity with which ex- pansion occurred on every hand was soon accompanied by confusion and overlapping of duties and jurisdiction. Dissatisfaction began to come to light on the part of firms not directly represented on the committees. The possible misconcepticm of the position of the com- mittees in appearing to represent, even in a vague sense, both the buy- ing and selling interests was very soon felt. The council took prompt action to cure these difficulties. On July 28, 1917, it created, " with the approval of the President,'' a new body, to which it gave the name War Industries Board. This board took over the duties of the Munitions Standards Board and the General Munitions Board, which bodies were abolished ; and it was further charged with the duty of reoiganizing the several committees advising on particular industries and materials so as to make those com^mittees in the first place subordinate to the Board, and in the second place composed of direct representatives of the Government who should have no financial interest, direct or indirect, in the industries concerning which they advised. Frank A. Scott was designated as chairman of tlie Board; Bernard M. Baruch," com- missioner of raw materials; Eobert S. Brookings, commissioner of finished products; Eobert S. Lovett, priorities commissioner; Hugh A. Frayne, labor commissioner; Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Palmer E. Pierce, Army representative; and Eear Admiral F. F. T?]etcher, Navy representative, being the other members. The resolution of the council, by which the War Industries Boaj :1 was created, defined its .duties in general terms as follows : The Board will act as a cleai-iiis Jiuuse lor the war iiidnstry needs of tlie Govoriuneiit:, deteruiine the most effective ways of mettin:? them and the hest means and methods of increasing production, including the creation or exten- sion of industries demanded by the emergency, the sequence and relative urgency of the needs of the different Government services, anti consider price factors, and in th^ first instance the industrial and labor aspects of the problems involved and the general questions affecting the purchase of commodities. The development from this step forward was along the line of the organization which was functioning when the armistice was signed. It should be noted, however, that there was a marked change, in the responsibility and powers of the Board upon its reorganization. March 4, 1918. By the end of July, 1917, the elements of the problem had become sufficiently defined to indicate the main features of the machinery which Avould be required to meet them. Of first importance, there was and would be an insurmountable current shortage in certain commodi- ties. To cause those commodities to flow in channels most conducive to the purposes of the war, the Government had either to outbid all others " Associated with him were L. L. Summers, Alex hegpe, Eugene Meyer, .Jr.. J. L. Rep- dogle, C. H. MacDoweil, M. F. Chase, O. F. Weber, E. A. Pierce, and Fred Allen. A.AIERICAN IXDLSTUY IX Till. WAI!. L'.S in the market, or to^take measures to contrel.. purchases and prices. T!ie most sif^nificant, and for lis the most novel, functions of the Hoard \Yere the solutions which it developed for these problems in tlie form of the priority systein^and the_price-fixing plan. Government price- fixing for all purchasers has been practiced from time to time as far back as the oldest known code of hiw.^ But the priority system, ap- plying to Government and private purchasers alike, represents so far as we know, a ncAv method of control over the products of industry. The other functions of the Board came to appear broadly as follows: (i) To analyze the needs of our Government, of the Allies, and of the civil population; (2) to study the extent to which the rt sources could meet these needs; (3) to provide moans and encour- agement for increasing production; and (4) to promulgate rules and suggestions for preventing waste and imnecessary use. Various sub-- divisions were shaped to forward these purposes, the duties of each supplementing those of the others. Legal and technical engineering problems of a general nature, arising in connection with various fea- tures of the work, required separate divisions in those fields. The cordial support of labor was essential to increased war production, and to assure this a Division of Labor was established. The several committees reorganized to handle the interests of the Board in respect to particular conunodities grew in importance. They were composed of men thoroughly trained and experienced in individual industries. As time went on it became more and more evident that the divisions exercising general functions would have to depend upon these commodity units first for the information on which they would base their policies and second for the direct ad- ministration of the policies themselves. There was a gradual growth in the number and strength of the commodity sections as the field of the Board's supervision widened. It was soon seen, however, that these commodity sections in turn were experiencing great dilR- culty in dealing directly with the very numerous individual com- petitive units of which most industries were composed. The? situa- tion required a series of groups who could represent before the commodity sections and the functional divisions of the Board the interests of all members of the respective trades to be affected by a war regulation. Such groups had begun to take shape from the early days of the council, particularly in the industries producing raw materials. Some trades already had national organizations ol" a sort: but none of these were authorized rejjresentatives of all units of a given industry. Beginning in the early fall of 1917, the Chamber of Conniierce of the United States supplemented the work already under way by lending its poAverful support to the task of organizing the remaining principal industries of the country in such a way that each should be »Soe code of Uarainmabi. IS.ihylonia, about 2250 B. C. 24 AMERICAN IXDUSTEY IN THE WAE. represented by a war service committee to serve on behalf of the trade as a point of contact with the Government. Where a na- tional organization already existed, the chamber had it appoint a war service committee with authority to represent it, and where a trade was not organized, the chamber took steps to secure its organization and the appointment of such a committee. Special care was taken to see that the committees represented entire trades, small firms as well as large. The advantages of this scheme of organ- ization are set forth to greatest possible effect in a pamphlet pub- lished by the war service executive committee of the chamber February 28, 1918." The significance of these organizations for the future was pointed out by Harry A. Wheeler, president of the chamber in the following terms :^ Organization for war service is giving business tlie fountlation for tlie Idml ot cooperative effort tliat alone can make the United States economically effi- cient enougli to take its place witli tlie nations in world trade * * *. Creation of war service committees promises to furnish the basis for a truly national organization of industry whose proportions and opportunities are unlimited * * *. The integration of business, the expressed aim of the national chain- ^r, is in sight. During the summer and fall of 1917, the Food, Fuel, and Eail- road Administrations, the Shipping Board, and the War Trade Board were established by acts of Congress. The War Industries Board remained a subordinate body to a council having advisory powers only. As necessities for its action arose, however, it de- veloped and acted, relying on the one hand upon the support of th President, the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and other legally established agencies, and on the other hand upon the voluntary support of the business men of the country. For the most part there was cooperation and cordial good will, but sometimes legally ro sponsible services of the Government would be doubtful about their obligation or their right to defer to the determinations of a body possessing only advisory powers. Priority rules were promulgated, prices were fixed, and projects for vast increases in production were inaugurated on voluntary agreements with the industries. Success depended upon the cooperation of other branches of the Government. Technically the Board had no administrative powers whatever at this time. It had no legal responsibilit}'. The agencies of the Government, however, on whom legal responsibility for mak- ing purchases rested, found themselves dependent upon it for many important determinations. As the spring of 1918 approached, it was felt that the scope and effectiveness of the Board's work would have to be materially in- creased with the increasing demands of the war in prospect. There * See appendix II for a quotation from tliis pamplilet. See also p. 103 and Appendix XLIV. 6 In an article contributed to The Nation's Business for August, 19lS. AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 25- was a widespread demand for the creation of a ministry of munitions with full administrative powers to take over and combine the wt)rk of the Board and the purchasing function of the War and Navy Depart- ments. It was decided to leave with the ^Yar and Navy Departments the work of determining what military and naval supplies were re- (juired and the actual placing of the purchase orders. But to cure the defective powers of the War Industries Board for exercising a more comprehensive control over the entire industrial fabric, the l*resident, under his general powers as Chief Executive and commander in chief of the armed forces, reconstituted the War Industries Board,, removing it from the jurisdiction of the Council of National De- fense and making it, with enlarged powers, an administrative agency directly responsible to himself. This reorganization was effected (1) by the President's letter, dated March 4, 1918, to Ber- nard M. Baruch, appointing him Chairman and setting forth specifi- cally the powers and duties of the Board; and (2) by a formal Executive order dated May 28, 1918, after the passage of the Over- man Act' The President's letter constituting tiie charter of the Board read '•^^^^^^^^^ ^ THK WHITE HOUSE, Washington, March 4, lOlS. My Dkak Mr. Baktjch : I am writing to asli if you will not accept appoint- uu-nt as Cliairnian of the War Industries Board, and I am going to talce the Ubt-rty at the same time of outlining the functions, the constitution and action of the Board as I think they should now l)e established. The functions- of the Bo;ird should he : ^ The creation of new facilities and the disclosing, if necessary, the open- ing up of new or additional sources of supply ; ©I The conversion of existing facilities, where necessary, to new uses ; ^ The studious conservation of resources and facilities by si'ientilic, com- mercial, and industrial economies; (3) Advice to the several purchasing agencies of the Gcvernnient with re- gai'd to the prices to be paid; (^ The determination, wherever necessary, of priorities of pro(hiction and (if delivery and of the proportions of any given article to be made immediately accessible to. the several purchasing agencies when the supply of that article is insulUcient, either temporarily or permanently; (2) The making of purchases for the Allies. The Board should be constituted as at present and shou'd retain, so far as necessary and so far as consistent with the character and purposes of the re- organization, its present advisory agencies; but the ultimate decision of all questions, except the determination of prices, should rest always with the Chairman, the other meml>ers acting in a cooperative and advisory capacity. The further organization of advice I will indicate below. In the determination of priorities of production, when it is not possible to have the full supply of any article that is nec'ded produced at once, the Chair- man should be assisted, and so far as practicable, guided by the present priori- ties organization or its equivalent. "See Appondix III for copy of the Overman Act, approved May 20, 1918, giving the President power to redistribute functions among the executive agencies. 26 AMERICAN IIS^DUSTIIY IX THE WAR. In tlie determination of priorities of delivery, when rliey must l)e dctenniiuMl lie should be assisted when necessary, in addition to the present iulvlsni\ priorities organization, by the advice and cooperation of a committee cnn stituted for the purpose and consisting of official representatives of the F"<> i Administration, the Fuel Administration, the Railway Administration, the Sliip ping Board, and the War Trade Board, in order that v.-hen a priority of deliveiy has been determined there may be common, consistent, and concerted action i" carry it into effect. In tlie determination of prices the Chairman should be governed by the advirc of n connnittee consisting, besides Iiimself, of the members of the Board im- mediately charged with the study of raw materials and of manufactured prod- ucts, of the labor member of the Board, of the Chairn.an of the Federal Trade Commission, the Chairman of the Tariff Commission, and th.e Fuel Adminis- trator. The Chairman should be constantly and systematically informed of all contracts, purchases, and deliveries, in order that he may have always before him a schematized analysis of the progress of business in the several supply divisions of the Government in all departments. The duties of the Chairman ar e: (T) To act for the joint and several benefit of all the supply departments of the Government. © To let alone what is being .successfully done and interfere as little as possible with the present normal processes of purchase and delivery in the several departments. ^ To guide and assist wherever the need for guidance or assistance may be revealed ; for example, in the allocation of contracts, in obtaining access to materials in any way preempted, or in the disclosure of sources of supply. (^ To determine what is to be done when there is any competitive or other conflict of interest between departments in the matter of supplies ; for exam- ple, when there is not a sufhcient immediate supply for all and there must be a decision as to priority of need or delivery, or when there is conipetition for the same source of manufacture or supply, or when contracts have not been placed in such a way as to get advantage of the full productive capacity of the country. (^ To see that contracts and deliveries are followed up where such assist- ance as is indicated under (3) and (4) above has proved to be necessary. (^ To anticipate the prospective needs of the several supply departments of the Government and their feasible adjustment to the industry of the country as far in advance as possible, in order that as definite nn outlook and opportunity for planning as possible may be afforded the business men of the country. In brief, he should act as the general eye of all supply departments in the field of industry. Cordially and sincerely yours, Woodrow Wilson. Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, Washington, D. C. The Exe iitive order, like several other orders under the Over- man Act. simply ratified an existing status. It read in part as follows : I hereby establish the War Industries Board as a separate administrative agency to act for me and under my direction * * *. The functions, duties, and powers of the War Industries Board, as outlined in my letter of March 4, 1918. to Bernard M. Baruch, Esq., its Chairman, shall be and hereby are <-ontinued in full force and effect. AMEIUCAX INDUSTRY JN THE WAR. 27 The new chairman reappointed the personnel of the Board as it had hoen during the greater part of the Avinter just passed.^ The Board was composed of the following members: Bernard ^I. Baruch, Chair- man; Alex Legge, Vice Chairman ; Kear Admiral F. F. Fletcher, Navy representative; Maj. Gen. George W. Goethals, Army representative; Kobert S. Brookings, chairman price-fixing committee; Edwin B. i'arker, priorities commissioner; George N. Peek, commissioner of finished products; Hugh Frayne, labor representative; J. Leonard Keplogie, steel administrator; L. L. Summers, technical advisor; Albert C. Eitchie, general counsel; and H. P. Ingels, secretary. Herl'ert B. Swope was an associate member of the Board, and, to- gether with Harrison Williams and Clarence Dillon, was assistant to its Chairman. By direct act of the President, authority for all principal controls except price fixing had thus at last been centralized in the new Chair- man. He in turn took immediate steps to decentralize the execution of his powers, making each of his colleagues fully responsible for a particular field. Thus it was that there was created an organization which was able to mobilize tlie industrial resources of the country in order that the fighting forces could draw upon them with as little dislocation as possible in the industrial fabric and so as to avoid at the same time conflicts of demand. This was done, however, without taking away from any of the permaPxently established departments either the making of contracts or the power to determine the types and quantities of materials needed. Upon the reorganization, the Board entered with renewed energy and confidence into the work of exercising an enlarged control over the industries of the country as they affected, both direr^tly and indi- rectly, the plans for prosecuting the war. Further ( ommodity sec- tions were rapidly organized and the existing ones enlarged and strengthened. Representatives of Government purchasing bui-eaus interested in the commodity were placed in each, and the importnn e of these sections, as substantial administrative centers of the worlc of the Board, developed rapidly. Xo legislation was ever passed making specific provision for the establishment of the War Industries Board. Its power still de- pended in large measure upon its ability to demonstrate its effec- tiveness in accomplishing the common purpose and the willingness of other ageu' ies to be assisted by it, together with the voluntary support of the business interests of the country. Several times dur- ing the summer of 1918, bills giving tlie Board larger legal powers were prepared and discussed by committees of Congress, but the gen- eral conclusion was th.at the Board was accomplishing its purpose well enough without further legislative powers. The legal foundation ' See Appendix IV for a catalogue of the Board and its staff as it stood on Nov. 10, 1918 : (1) arranged i>y divisions and sections, and (2) arranged alphabetically with liuslnoss addresses. 28 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. of the priority power and the price-fixinfr power is discussed mort. fully in the chapters devoted to those subjects. An extraordinary feature of the organization from a legal point. of view was its detached nature through which it was able to main- tain an expansive view of the whole undertaking and to act in a quasi- judicial capacity in respect to the many conflicting elements. The Board has been criticized as an institution with tremendous- powers and no responsibilities ; that democrac}' created in it a tyrant with power to shatter the ordinary rules of business practice even to the extent of undoing contract obligations. A fuller study of what was actually done will modify this conception. That the powers of the Board were of a quality easily susceptible to abuse and of a kind which should be intrusted only to men of extraordi- narj- integrity and talent can not be denied. Tlie Chairman of the Board from his earliest connection with this work conceived it as his highest duty to surround himself with men peculiarly qualified in temperament, knowledge, and experience for the jDarticular tasks as thej^ developed. It was not his theory to make a large paper organization before the facts. Out of the very large number of men from all sources who were brought to Washington for advice and discussion and for service during the earlier and more confused months of the council's work a large part of the Board's personnel was chosen. There had been a study of men as well as a , study of the nature of the problems which were to emerge. With the right men almost any organization will work. In general the men selected for the important work of the Board were of the type who in private life had been managers rather than owners of large industrial undertakings. Upon appointment to the staff they ceased to engage in their private business affairs. The aim was to have men who possessed special knowledge each in his own field, but men with catholic and broad-gauged vision who could correlate the problems of their neighbors with their own. Con- stant conflicts were to be involved. Much of the work would have to be done by forcing or reaching agreements. These features required on the part of 100 or more of the men in key positions not only the qualities usually termed "executive ability," they also required tact in a high degree, patience, endurance, and buoyancy; enthusiasn^ which could inspire, and inspiration which could accomplish. Some of the men who came Avere of independent means ; for some the coming at a dollar a year or a very small salary meant a real sacrifice. Some were Democrats and some Republicans. Men worked side by side for many months without learning each other's poiiticsj for politics was adjourned in the War Industries Board. It was the purpose of the Chairman to support the members of his staff in every way consistent with duty, to make each man really responsible foi the work before him. The enthusiastic and cordial support, which he AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THK WAR. 2\) in turn received from them, is the fouinlation ami measure of such success as the Board enjoyed. A task of this character wouM have failed completely if the men engaged in it had not i)een willing en- tirely to sacrifice personal interests, time, money, and sometimes even health for their work. The men were willing at all times to work long hours without holidays and witiiout pay, forgetting personal .anxieties and personal fortunes in the patriotic eifort each to do his part to win the war. This was an extraordinary examide of the natu- ral organizing power of the American people. It is difficult to give a summary conception of the organization and its work. The Board was inspired by a picture of our industry so mobilized, and with all conflicting efforts so synchronized, that the iighting forces of the world could tap it at will for such supplies as they needed. This ideal was perhaps never quite attained but it was ■the guide. The Board set out to prevent competition among those buying for the war, and to regulate the use by the civil population of men, money, and materials in such a way that civilian 7iecds not jnerely civilian wants, should be satisfied; and to do all of this with the least possible dislocation and destruction of the essential features of our ordinary industrial life. Through application of the principle of priorities, the processes of manufacture and trade were made to move in response to a national purpose rather than in response to the wills of those who had money to buy. Through price-fixing, men Avere discouraged in an}- unwhole- some ambitions to make inordinate profits out of the war. Through the conservation work of the Board, many wasteful trade practices were reformed and millions of hours of human labor were made more fruitful. Before the war ended, the American method of industrial ■control was coming to be applied, through the medium of interna- tional executives, to the several war materials whose sources were in •distant parts of the earth. The plan of the vast organization was simple enough in form. The President's authority was centralized in the chairman of the Board. The chairman delegated, so far as practicable, the poAver of final de- cision to the several members of the Board, each in his respective field. The machinery of the 60 commodity sections Avas used in carry- ing forward the part of the general purpose for which each Avas re- sponsible. Each of the commodity sections contained memi>ers from the Government purchasing agencies and each section came into con- tact with the industries for Avhich it Avas responsible through the medium of the war service committees of the several trades, (niid- ance for all hands in the general plans of the Avar came through the actiA'ities of the chairman aa'Iio sat in the Avar council and gave to his men, through the channels described above and through regular meetings for conference, such information as was necessary to keep the whole organization functioning harmoniously toward a conunon purpose. Chapter 2. THE PROGRAM OF REQUIREMENTS. The statement is frequently heard that a bill of requirements and specifications covering the military needs of the Governm^ent should have been prepared during the early spring of 1917 before "wp.r was declared. Had this been possible, it would unquestionably have saved millions of dollars and a vast amount of confusion. The im- possibility of such a performance, however, is only too evident to one who will stop to consider the ramifications involved in the pro- duction of a war element so simple and direct as a shell. Even direct military needs change from month to month with the chang- ing fortunes of war, and always these changes are accompanied by adjustments reaching deep into the industrial life. A shell is made jirincipall}^ of steel, brass, and copper. It is filled with an explosive and is fired by either a fixed or separate charge of propellent powder. The production of such a shell involves first the preparation of a plant or plants to forge, machine, and measure it, equip it with a firing mechanism and vrith a band to take tlie rifling of the gun. It requires another plant for loading, packing, and shipping. Each of these processes involves, directly or in- directl}'^, a vast group of industries turned to a new field. But the steel and copper used in the shell involve another set of forces as they are developed from the ore through the processes oi extraction and refinement to the forges. The blast furnaces have to be sup- plied with coke, Avith lime, and with manganese. They have to be lined with refractory brick. Coke involves mining bituminous coal and passing it through coke ovens. They all involve a large amount of railroad transportation, for the most favored spot on earth does not contain all the elements for a piece of steel. Turnhig to the explosive and propeilant for loading and firing the shell, tb.e nitric acid is made from nitrate of soda which has to be mined and refined in a desert part of Chile, carried to the coast on railroads whose rails, rolling stock, ties, and fuel have to be taken there from distant parts, and then it is carried 5,000 miles in vessel? to our shores ; the sulphuric acid required in great quantities is made from pyrites ore coming from Spain or brimstone from Texas, platinum from Russia being needed for the equipment of the acid- producing plants. From some cotton field of the South has to be collected a little of the fine lint sticking to the seed as it com.es from AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN TUK WAR. 31 'nc gill to form the basis of the propellent powder. And after all i!i'> preparation a shell on the front is fired in a few moments. One .liv its use is necessary, another day it is not, but its preparation has to go on and on until the conflict is over. Shells are but one small feature of the e(iuipment of an army. There must be guns and rifles, hand grenades and gas equipment, airplanes and motor cars, food supplies and uniforms, medicines and surgical dressings, sound ranging apparatus, telephone supplies, and optical instruments. Ships were required to carry the troops and supplies. When one realizes the extent to which an individual direct requirement of the Army involves the whole ramification of industry, it is not difficult to see how a large number of direct re(iuirements projected on a vast scale will bring in their train an overlapping and confusion in indirect requirements. The program of suppl}' had to grow Avith the growth of the military program on the one hand and the growing knowledge of the materials obtain- able on the other. For the purposes of supply our Army was organized to make purchases according to the use to wdiich the commodity would be put. The Ordnance Department bought guns and ammunition ; the Quartermaster, clothing, blankets, food, and trucks; the Signal Corps, telephone apparatus, field glasses, etc.; the Engineers, build- ing materials, railroad supplies, and implements; and so on. Each service had subunits charged with responsibility for particular groups of supplies. More tlian one service frequently bought quan- tities of the same commodity. It will be seen that the Army method of classifying supplies did not correspond to any extent with the classifications of ordinary business. Particularly did requirements by services, when translated into terms once removed from direct requirements, fit awkwardly into the classifications of business usage. From the beginning the Board felt tli^.t it wns advisable to develop its organization according to the classification of commodities used in business. Before the w^ar was over, the Army found it necessary to reorganize its purchasing system, gradually drawing it together under one control and revising its classifications. Outside of the War Department; the Navy, and later the Emergency Fleet and the Railroad Administration w^ere making (irovernment purchases. In addition to all, the principal Allies had purchasing missions in this country. All of these factors contributed to the difficulty of laying down a program of requirements. The separate units of the Array siipply bureaus could not compute their requirements until they •ofew the size of the particular part of the Army for which it was ir legal duty to provide. The size of the Army to be here and oad at any given time could not easily be computed without a S2 AMERICAN IXDUSTP.Y IX THE WAR. definite knowledge of the amount of shipping that would be avail- able both for men and for supplies. Frequently the kind of equip- ment could not be determined until it was known what materials could be found available. Sometimes types, designs, and specifica- tions were delayed in an effort to develop a more perfect product. It soon became clear that the comprehensive supply organization would have to be mobile enough to respond promptly to an ever-changing •demand. When the General Munitions Board was formed, the activities of all Government purchasing agencies consisted in energetically placing orders without any certainty of their being filled. The board received statements of immediate requirements onl}^ as they were brought before it, when it joined in the effort to supply them in the shortest possible time. When a request for assistance came, the board would consider whether the proposed order involved a conflict with other necessary orders and whether it required emergenc}^ acLion to provide material or determine prices, and then it attempted to a- -ist in discovering the best available source of supply. At first there was no system forcing all orders to be brought before the board even in lines where there was a laiown shortage. Action on such orders as were brought was advisory only, and there was no report back showing whether the advice had been followed. Many Government bureaus placed the bulk of their orders without reference to the board. Each sought those plants whose manufacturing facilities promised the best results as judged from experience in normal times. This procedure had a tendency to localize orders in the northeastern manufacturing district of the country and congestion soon began to appear, with inevitable slowing up of deliveries. By the fall of 1917 many plants had orders far beyond their avail- able capacit3^ Fuel and raw materials could not be transported in sufficient quantities to supply the plants. Each Government pur- chaser wanted his order filled first and each manufacturer wanted his coal and railroad service given preference on the ground that he was filling a Government order. There was competition in buying •even between different Government agencies, and the competition between Government contractors was increasing in intensity. Prices rose not only because of actual shortages, but because of options and inquiries made to cover bids on Government orders. Competition in buying among the Allies and between the Allies and the agencies of our own Government and our Government con- tractors was becoming more and more a source of confusion and hin- drance to the common purposes of the war. That the Allies ^[-jj^j^p^ be assisted rather than hindered in obtaining supplies here a^j^^^ abr AMERICAN INnUSTHY IN THE WAK. 33 Isult of our f^oing into the war was a policy announced by the Presi- rlout as early as April, 1917. Questions involvinp; competition among iLhe different Allies and conflicts between their purchasing pro- iirrammes and ours began to arise in great numbers. A scheme of l?ontrol for our own purposes alone would have been much more [simple than with this added complication. The Allies were ex- tremely anxious (a) to borrow money from our Treasury to make {purchases here, and (h) to get priority in manufacture and delivery. Elence they readily agreed to place no orders and make no purchases ?xcept through or with the approval of our Government. To handle the set of delicate and complicated problems involved, ?n August 27, 1917, the United States, acting through the Treasury Department, arranged with the Governments of England, France. rt:ily, Belgium, Russia, and Serbia, that all purchases made by these Governments in the United States should be handled through oi i^-ith the consent of a commission to be called the Allied Purchasing Commission. Bernard M. Baruch, Robert S. Lovett and Robert Brookings were appointed to constitute the commission. Alex Legge was made business manager of it, being succeeded on May 1, L918, by James A. Carr. The war missions of the several Govern- bents would present to the Allied Purchasing Commission not only Droposed orders, but also statements of future requirements. It was 1)0 jnirpose of the commission to assist the missions in obtaining the e-t prices, terms of delivery, priority preference, etc., that was prac- icable. But the commission did not prepare and sign contracts, upervise their execution, determine technical details, nor inspect laterials. The effort was to coordinate allied buying with our own jrovernment buying with a view to obtaining the same prices and erms for all. The business manager held frequent meetings attended by repre- entatives of the allied missions, the priorities committee, the United states Treasury, the War Trade Board, such commodity sections as vere interested in the problem of the day, and others. Conflicts of nterest between different Allies, or between an Ally and the Ignited states were discussed and composed. Minutes of these meetings are ^reserved. Orders which the allied missions proposed to jjlace were lubmitted by the Allied Purchasing Commission to the clearance committee ^ in the same manner as other proposed orders and they ook the same course. The expenses of the commission w^ere shared )y the allied missions in proportion to the purchases of each in this •ountry. During the life of the Allied Purchasing Commission, all urchases, made in the United States by the Allies with money bor- er later the Clearance Office. 105826—21 ^ 34 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. I'owed from our Treasury, were approved through the commission. The total of all purchases, made with such funds, during tlie entire war period aggregated upward of $12,000,000,000. The first effort directed specifically to bringing system into the confusion of Government orders was the formation of the " clearance committee" as an administrative unit of the General Munitions Board, which became later the War Industries Board. The clearance committee was composed of a chairman, a secretary, and a repre- sentative from the Army General Staff, the Navy, several bureaus of the iVrmy, the Marine Corps, the more important sections of the Board, and later the Allied Purchasing Commission. This com- mittee prepared what is called a " Clearance List " ^ setting forth those materials in which a shortage was believed to exist. Govern- ment agencies were requested not to place orders for any materials on this list without first having those orders cleared by the committee. The committee considered requests for the clearance of orders with a view to preventing their being placed where there was congestion and where they would interfere with the fulfillment of other orders of equal importance, with a view to adjusting the relative impor- tance of deliveries and to preventing abnormal rises in price. The method was by discussion and agreement between the respective in- terests, each being represented. Each buying department read its proposed orders before the committee, and, if no objection developed, the orders were cleared. If objection was made by another depart- ment because of confiict Avith its program or by an agency of the Board because curtailment, substitution, or other plan of conservation was being hindered, the order was re-formed or clearance delayed until the matter could be adjusted. It Avas not many weeks before the clearance committee began to be overwhelmed with duties. Shortages showed themselves in one com- modity after another and the clearance list increased week by week. The function of deciding on the relative merits of tv;o or more con- flicting agencies who wanted delivery of the same thing and of rul- ing on which should be preferred in cases Avhere all could not be served, in other words, the priority function, presented increasing difficulties and appeared as increasingly important. In the summer of 1917 a new agency, the priorities committee, was formed to take over this function, which later, as we shall see. became such an im- portant feature of the work of the Board. It was found also, that the clearance process had little effect in the control of prices. This function also was early isolated and placed in the province of a price- fixing committee created to handle it. But the clearance function proper had not been developed in vain. It was evident by the sprinj of 1918 that one committee could not handle the volume of work " See Appendix V for a copy of the Clearance List as it stood Feb. 25, 1918. AMEHICAN INHrSTIlV IX TllK WAI:. 35 which the administrntion of this function iinplictl. I-'iiithcrninn.'. its performance by a single body was not necessary. By July, 1918, the commodity sections, following the reorganiza- tion put into effect by the new Chairman, had developed such strength^ containing as they then did representatives from each of the supjjly bureaus interested in their respective commodities; that these sec- tions could take over the clearance function, and they did, the clear- ance committee being reorganized into a Clearance Oifice whose func- tion it was merelj'^ to receive requests for clearance, record them. and. transmit them to the proper commodity sections, the sections in turn reporting back through the Clearance Office. The first chairman of the clearance committee was Frank A. Scott. He was succeeded by Lieut. Col. C. C. Bolton, who in May, 1918, was succeeded by Kear Ailmiral F. F. Fletcher. During the winter of 1917 and 1918 the clearance schedule not only increased by reason of the addition of many new groups of commodi- ties, but the ruling was issued that all orders to be placed in the so- called congested district (outlined in the ruling) would have to be- cleared, and that all orders involving the creation of new or addi- tional facilities should be cleared.^ The clearance function, as de- veloped through the commodity sections, was the means by whicli the record was maintained, commodity by commodity, of standing orders, and it was the means used for so distributing the Government orders that their benefit or their burden might be equitably shared by all the interests of the respective trades. Clearance, however,, was never effective as a means for developing a program of re- quirements. Requests for clearance were statements of immediate requirements only. When, in the spring of 1918, it had become evident that an en- larged control of industry would be necessary, the need for a sys- tematic statement of requirements, projected far enough into the future to allow time to provide for their production, was keenly felt. In order "to anticipate the prospective needs of the several supi)ly departments of the Government and their feasible adjustment to the industries of the country," a Requirements Division was organized in Tune, wnth Alex Legge as chairman, and embracing in its membership autliorized representatives of each of the Government purchasing agencies (Army and Navy), the priorities commissioner, the commis- ioner of finished products, chiefs of divisions, section chiefs, man- ger of Allied Purchasing Commission, representatives of the Ftod, Puel, and Railroad Administrations, the Capital Issues Committee !ie Department of Commerce, the Red Cross, the Shipping Board, ml other departments and bureaus.* See Appendix VI for clearance schedulo ns it stood on .Tune 24, lUlR. 'See Appendix VII for copy of circular ciiating the Requiremi Jts Division. 36 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IX THE WAR. Each of the several Government departments was requested to submit a statement of its requirements projected as far in advance as practicable. These statements were received by the Requirements Division where they were discussed from the point of view of their general relations to other requirements and then handed on to the appropriate commodity sections where detailed studies were made and reports sent back to the source of the statements concerning the possibility and means for meeting such requirements. The division held a meeting every morning at 9 o'clock, at which the various requirements were discussed at length, modification of schedules being debated between the conflicting bureaus of the Gov- ernment. The scope involved made this procedure very difficult of application, but the principle was sound. For the first time during the war, and perhaps for the first time in Government operations generally, this organization providecr^;;stem^iti£^m^y^^ by which the various departni^ent buyers had the opportunity of learning one another's needs, and^f knowing at what points their respective efforts conflicted or overlapped. It gave Government bureaus and section chiefs alike a more comprehensive vision of the whole course of the undertaking. The procedure of the Board, as it developed with respect to these two functions was about as follows: The various Government pur- chasing units and the Allied Purchasing Commission were sending to the Requirements Division their best estimates of futuie require- ments projected for six months or a year in advance. The com- modity sections of the Board used these statements in their studies of curtailment and conservation programs, increased production pro- grams, and other plans necessary in looking forward to meeting the needs. They also used them for the instruction of the trade through the war-service committees, and in the consideration of problems arising in connection with priorities and price-fixing. These state- ments were in the nature of estimates and did not necessarily imply that orders would actually be placed. They meant at least that orders were contemplated. The changing nature of military plans will make obvious the fact that full and accurate statements of all re- quirements for a year or even a half year in advance are quite im- possible, however desirable they might be from the point of view of the officials responsible for mobilizing industry. But in addition to the general estimates of future requirements, on which the broader lines of regulation and control were based; before the end of the period the rule was established that all orders ready to be placed should first be sent to the Board for " clearance ". The commodity sections, on whom the burden of clearing rested. Avould act on these requests in one of six ways. (1) Clear without AMEinCAX INDUSTRY IX TIIK WAIt. 37 comment, in Avhich cnse the purchaser was permitted to <^o into the market and order as he saw fit; (2) clear with restriction as to the area in which the order might be placed; (3) clear with restriction as to the electric power system on which the order would draw; (4) clear subject to restrictions as to certain named plants or witii restrictions inhibiting the creation of new facilities for the execution of the order; (5) clear with an actual allocation of the order to a particular named source of supply; (G) clear with advice as to ^ultablc source of supply. The application of this system varied with the peculiar problems incident to different lines of trade. There was no attempt to make it rigid. A licensing system for civilian as well as Government purchases was used in several in- dustries, as will be observed in connection with the work of the , commodity sections discussed in Part II of this book. That much of the confusion experienced in collecting the sup- plies for this war could have been avoided by a more painstaking[ thorough, and comprehensive effort on the part of the Government supply bureaus to work out a program of requirements, even a program tentative in many of its details, there is little doubt. That such a program would have been exceedingly difficult to frame is quite certain. The experience of the Board in this respect suggests the thought that there should be established a large unit of specially qualified oificers of the War Department devoted in time of peace to studies of supply programs for supposititious military undertakings. As these programs would always have to be based upon the obtainability of the supplies outlined, the bureau should be required to go deeply into a study of the industrial resources and possibilities of the country as they relate to war needs. These studies are a mili- tary function, but they might have also, as a by-product, a healthy effect upon business. ClIAl'TEK 3. THE STUDY OF RESOURCES. A\'hile organizations Avere being developed with a view to evolving n i^rogram of requirements, several institutions were created whose function it was to aid in discovering or obtaining resources to fill the re(|uiiements. Xo statistical data existing at the beginning of the Avar was of any great value in this direction. The needs were ! immediate. Hence the efforts to discover resources and to develop and convert resources Avent forAvard hand in hand. The purchases of the Allies had given a war atmosphere to our industries before April, 1917. Many extensive developments liad taken place. The Du Pont Co. had increased its facilities for the production of military poAvder from 500,000 pounds per month to nearly 30,000,000 pounds per month. Our great steel plants and many others Avere engaged on verA' large Avar contracts. But it was important that the Allies should not be hindered by our entrance into the Avar. These facilities and more Avere going to be needed for tlie .allied supply programs. Our problem then was to provide for our OAvn needs Avithout interference Avith the allied program and with the least dislocation of industry. This would haA'e to be done in man}' instances by the creation of new facilities, but in most instances by the conA^ersion of existing facilities to new work. Factories mak- ing fine Avatch springs could manufacture time fuses ; plants making steel rails could forge shells; carpet looms could make ArniA^ duck; automobile factories could make airplanes. A thousand and one in- dustries could be conA'erted to making direct war necessities, some Avith great difficulty, some w^ith little difficulty. Many of the supplies required by the war Avere required in the same form in Avhich they are used in civilian life. In some fields the work iuA'olved no more than an increase of production. Most of the raAv materials entering into the implements of war were the same as the materials of peace. A few of peculiar importance had to be produced in quantity for war purposes for the first time, but in respect to most basic materials a great increase in quantity of pro- duction was required, because civilian needs and war needs OA^er- lapped. The first steps taken to discover the facilities of the country avail- able for war use haA^e already been referred to.^ Both the industrial inA-entory and the report of the Kernan Board were made during the 1 See chap. 1, p. 19- 38 AMEmc:AN INDrSTltV IN TIIK w Ai;. 39 winter of 191G-17. Those data \vrre in the liaiids ol" the ("ouncil at the hejjjinniiiji' of the Avar, and an Inchistrial Inventory Section was ea:ly formed to take them over and continue the line of investigation. lAs the work of the r)oard developed, this Held was expanded to in- clude the following divisions and sections: (1) Tlie Resources and Conversion Section, for discovering phuits suitable for conversion and suggesting and supervising the operation; (2) the Facilities Di- vision, for supervising the construction of new i)lants: (;5) the Ad- visory Committee on Plants and Munitions, with general duties in co- ordinating the work of various agencies in the field; and {\) the Division of Planning and Statistics. | The commodit}^ sections, of conrse, did very important and far- reaching Avork in connection with the discovery and conversion, as well as creation, of facilities. For the determination of raw ma- terial resources we had had some peace-time reports. The demand for facts by highly organized industries, like the iron, steel, copper, lead, coal, oil, and other industries, had resulted in compilations of periodical statistics by private enterprises, by the Census Bureau, and by the Bureau of Mines. The statistical work in these fields was carried forward almost entirely by the commodity sections. By May, 1918, the Industrial Inventory Section had not only ex- tended the inventory to include 28,000 separate plants but had reclassi- fied the plants according to a system better suited to the uses of the Government. The original inventories had been made up according to a form used in the 1914 census of numufactures. This show^ed the factories in terms of their capacity to produce definite finished articles. For the purpose of making a decision on the placing of most of the war contracts it was necessary to know the " processes " for which a given factory Avas equipped rather than the product which it normally turned out. With this reclassified inventory, the section was to become a valuable source of information for the commodity sections and the Government purchasing agencies. The work of re-forming and extending the industrial inventory was greatly assisted by a number of business organizations, among Iheni the Associated Fire UnderAvriters, Avhich furnished to the section duplicates of its active files. The United States Chamber of Com- merce also assisted by furnishing the section Avith a current record of all war service committee organizations. The commodity sections assisted also by the use of questionnaires. Several Government de- •partments maintained organizations for the study of ])lant facilities. These also sent out many questionnaires seeking jiarticidar items of information. By the spring and early summer of 191S, the nunilier of (|uesti(in- naires being sent out by A-arious Government organizations Avas be- 40 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. coming so great that complaints were received from manufacturers to the effect that they were a positive hindrance to progress. To rem- edy this, the newly organized War Industries Board established a Questionnaire Section in the newly formed Division of Planning and Statistics, and an effort was made to have all Government question- naires harmonized through this section. Duplications could be avoided and forms could be suggested which would more adequately supply the information desired. As has already been pointed out, the spring of 1918 saw the great manufacturing center of the country north of the Potomac and east of the Alleghenies completely congested. At the same time the war program was expanding. Several other parts of the coun- try were not engaged in war work to any important extent and in many instances the peace-time business was declining. The clearance system has already been mentioned as one step taken to relieve this situation. Through clearance it Avas the purpose to spread the development of war industries into other parts of the country as much as practicable. This would naturally throw a greatly added burden on the Industrial Inventory Section. A more poAverful and extensive organization was required. "^ Resources and Conversion Section. — On May 27, 1918, the Board established the Resources and Conversion Section, which took over the records and the work of the Industrial Inventory Section and began to organize on an enlarged scale under Charles A. Otis as chief. An organization decentralized geographically and subjec- tively was determined upon. The work was too large to be effec- tively handled from one office. The country was divided into 21 geographical areas, called " industrial regions," for each of which a regional advisor was appointed with an office in the principal center. Each regional advisor organized a regional committee, with a member representing each of the principal war industries opera- tive in the area, and having in addition special members to handle the priorities function, industrial stimulation, and statistics on plants, on power, and on raw materials. Each member of this re- gional committee became in turn chairman of a subcommittee of the region devoted to the particular subject matter which he repre- sented. The regional advisors were local business men of highest standing, chosen by the business organization or organizations of the respective regions. They served without pay and usually with- out expense money. Headquarters were established in Boston, Bridgeport, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Rochester, Cleve- land, Detroit, Chicago, Cincinnati, Baltimore, Atlanta, Birming- ham, Kansas City, St. Louis, St. Paul, Milwaukee, Dallas, San Francisco, Seattle, and Denver. AMEKir.VX INDUSTllY IX TIIK W MX. 41 The Resources and Conversion Section had in its membership repre- sentatives of the Army, >s'avY, Marine Corps, Emergency Fleet, and the Department of Commerce. Two lines of work, each supplement- ing and assisting the other, were undertaken in the several districts. The general work of perfecting the industrial inventory was carried forward by having each region attempt to collect and send to AVash- ington the following list of information : (1) Existing facilities for producing direct and indirect war needs, both raw materials and finished products; (2) the extent to which these facilities were occupied wuth unfilled orders and the extent to which they could take on additional orders; (3) if a plant were overloaded, the feasibility and extent of expansion necessary for re- lief ; or, in the alternative, a suggestion for transferring a part of the load to other plants; (4) existing facilities not employed on war work but capable of undertaking it; (5) facilities whose production was about to be curtailed because of war conditions and the extent to Mhich they were susceptible of conversion for the production of war needs: and (6) the existence of available hibor, of new sources of supply of raw materials, of unused power facilities, of available transportation facilities, etc. The armistice came before this body of information was anything like complete, but particular items collected in this way had already begun to serve the purpose contemplated, particularly in the less congested areas of the country. In the carrying out of specific duties the regional organizations reached a more advanced stage of development. Requirement pro- grams and immediate needs known from requests for clearance were dispatched to the regional advisors and frequently valuable advice was received from them for determining the most available sources of supply. Many existing plants capable of conversion were dis- covered in this way. The several commodity sections used the regional committees as sources of information to supplement that ob- tained from the Avar service committees. There was another impor- tant function which the regional organizations performed. The headquarters of the divisions and sections of the Board in Washing- ton were constantly flooded Avith correspondence, not only from manufacturers who wanted to secure (lovernment contracts but from those who had taken contracts and had come upon knotty problems in fulfilling them. Complaints arrived concerning particular rulings of the Board. It was possible to refer much of this correspondence to the regional organizations, which were peculiarly qualified to handle it promptly and in a way calculated to satisfy the i)arties concerned. It would be difficult to isolate and list the work of the section, giving specific credit for particular accomplishments. It would re- 42 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. quire many pages to enumerate all cases of plant conversions, a large percentage of which were carried out at the suggestion or under the supervision of the section. A few examples will illustrate the scope of the work and at the same time show how many plants, which might otherwise have found little work during the Avar, were kept in full activity. Plants for making gas holders were convei^ted into munitions plants; carpet plants began to make blankets and duck; automobile factories made airplanes; refrigerator plants Avere converted into plants for making Navy filing cases and field hospital tables ; furni- ture plants manufactured ammunition boxes ; horseshoe plants made trench picks; toy plants turned to making packing boxes; factories for ladies' waists became plants for making signal flags; electric vacuum plants made parts for Liberty motors ; factories for making fishing rods turned out staffs for the Signal Corps; shirt factories sewed mosquito nets; factories for rubber goods produced gas masks; l)eaceful stove plants turned to making hand grenades and trench bombs; corset factories labored on Medical Corj^s belts and fencing masks ; gear plants learned the art of making gun sights ; plants for pipe organs made mosquito nets, and so on. ■^ Facilities IHvision. — By the fall of 1918 so many problems were arising in connection with the location and construction of new plants for war work tliat a Facilities Division Avas formed for the l)iirpose of harmonizing the activities. S. P. Bush Avas made director of the division. It had been organized only a short time when the armistice Avas signed. The functions of the division Avere outlined in the plans for its establishment as f oUoavs : (I) The division Avill make a compre- hensiA'e study of all aspects of neAv construction projects, advising in respect to proposed locations on the availability of transportation, poAver, fuel, Ifibor, building materials, raAv materials, etc.; (2) it Avill advise on the selection and specifications of materials of construc- tion so as to avoid long hnuls especially through the congested dis- tricts and so as to avoid conflicts Avith orders already placed; (3) it will look to the adoption of forms of contract such as Avill insure uniformity and consistency in all Government building activities: (4) it will compile and from time to time revise lists of responsible contractors and architects throughout the United States equipped to undertake construction Avork of various kinds, furnishing such lists to Government agencies upon request, and it Avill keep a record of existing Government contracts Avith a vicAv to preventing interference betAveen ncAv and old orders; (5) it Avill preA^ent the creation of ncAv facilities in localities Avhere the condition of existing facilities is such that ncAv ones AA-ould be inadvisable; (G) it Avill endeaA^or to co- AMiiincAN i.Nhr>Ti;v i.\ riiK WAi;. 43 oiiliiKitL' the activities of all dei)ai-tine!its and aiienoies of the (lov- iinnient in construction work of every kind, except shipbuiMiii^; ami (7) it will study prospective dejiartniental needs and make plans lor the new facilities necessary to meet them. The procedure contemplated was that, after future re(iuiremeiits uild have been received by the Kequirement Division and passed J. on by the appropriate commodity sections, they should be passed .11 to the P'acilities Division, whose business it should be to deter- 1 line what steps would be necessary to provide facilities for such iL(|uirements. When hiter on the schedule of orders should be re- ived, the Facilities Division would clear the orders subject to such trictions as it might impose and return them to the departments an Mhich they came with a schedule of available facilities attached. Idi'isorij Committee on Plants and Munitio)is. — This committee was : med May 28, 1918, to take over the work of the committee on xluction of the council. S. M. Vauclain, who had been chairman -t of the Munitions Standards Board, then of the committee on ' »duction, became chairman of the advisory committee and took \\ ith him the records and most of the personnel of the earlier organ- ization. The committee worked in a general wa}' to stinudate pro- duction, to advise on plant extensions, etc. Particular attention T\-as given to the production of freight cars and locomotives for the Army. Work on standardization of types of cars and locomotives ■vvas carried on. The committee was given a special assignment to iissist the Czecho-Slovak Government in securing supj^lies in this ■country. The plan at the end was to have the work of this com- mittee absorbed by the Facilities Division on the one hand and the Railway Supply Section on the other. The chairman had arranged to go to France as manager of the Chateauroux tank plant. Division of Planning and Statistics. — In the early days of the council a Statistical Division w'as organized under Dr. Leonard \vres. This division devoted its principal energy to assembling stati.stics which would be of particular value to the General Staff of the Army in laying down a program of requirements. In April, 1918, Dr. Ayres and most of his staff were commissioned and he was asked to transfer his work to the War Department and to take the title of chief of the Statistical Division of the General Staff. This gaA-e the Army a central statistical organization for the first time and it left the War Industries Board without such an organization. Although most of the commodity sections were doing very im- portant statistical work, the need for a central bureau was definitely felt. Dean Edwin F. Gay, who was Director of the Division of Planning and Statistics of the Shipping Board and Chief of the Bureau of Research and Tabulation of Statistics of the War Trade Board, was asked to organize such a bureau. Tie became Director 44 AMERICA^^ INDUSTKl IX THE WAR. of the Division of Planning and Statistics of the "War Industries Board, which was conducted under the immediate charge of Dr. - — ■ Henry E. Hatfield. The division operated through six sections. The Section on Price Statistics was put in charge of Prof. W. C. Mitchell. This section worked in close cooperation with the price- fixing committee, for which it prepared many special reports. It early began a study of war-time price movements, showing actual and relative prices of several hundred commodities and groups of commodities most affected by the war. Monthly price quotations for the period 1913 to 1918 were collected as a basis for the study. Immediately after the armistice the section was expanded, by trans- ferring personnel as it could be released from other sections, and this work was pressed speedily forward. The studies were pub- lished early in 1919 in a series of War Industries Board Bulletins, Nos. 1 to 57. The general title of the series is "History of Prices during the War," and each bulletin covers a particular group of commodities. The reasons for price fluctuations are discussed and graphs picturing relative prices as well as tables of monthly prices '\ for each of the principal war products are printed.- ^ The ^Vap Contracts Section of the division, established under the early regime (Aug. 17, 1917) continued to collect information on war contracts and deliveries. This work never proceeded as satis- factorily as those engaged in it desired. Although the Secretary of War issued orders directing the five purchasing bureaus of the Army to furnish information to the section, regular and complete reports never came in from those sources. The section then tried a. sj^stem of circular letters sent to manufacturers asking for regular monthly reports on contracts and deliveries. But even with most vigorous work on the part of the office staff the returns on the vast number of contracts were insufficient to afford really satisfactory bases for statistical judgments. In February, 1918, however, the section began to issue bulletins based on partial returns, and even \ these proved of value. X ^ The division also formed a Section on War Industries Ahroad. " ■ This work consisted chiefly in searching foreign publications and foreign official documents for information of particular interest to the Board. It translated and prepared material of this kind for other divisions and sections of the Board. Arrangements were made toward the end of the period for transferring this section to the War Trade Board on the theory that its work was more closely re- lated to the work of that organization. A Questionnaire Section was organized during the summer. The division had taken up this work from the beginning, giving advice » See Appendix VIII for a list of the War Industries Board Price Bulletins, Nos. I to 57. AMERICAN INDUSTHV IN THE WAR. 45 on the framing and handling of questionnaires with a view to i lessening duplications and to securing forms suited to the various purposes. With the multiplication of questionnaires by every Gov- ernment agency and the increasing complaint from manufacturers over the growing burden of answering them, more rigid action seemed necessary. An order was issued on August 12, 11) IS, that all questionnaires sent out by any l)ranch of the Board should first be submitted to the section. The section advised as to desirable forms and methods of tabulation and on request would undertake Mthe entire work of preparation, issue, and tabulation. A complete '■; indexed file of questionnaires sent out by the Board is preserved in "I the records of the section. It was the duty of the Editorial Section to make available to war agencies information on the status of the supply program and on changes in the industrial conditions affecting it. This was done by a series of bulletins. The relation of the division to the commodity sections in respect to their statistical work was of particular importance. Some of these sections had well-organized statistical subunits. All of them based their work on statistical information. It was the function of the C ommodity Statistics Section of tliis division to assist the commodity sections either (1) by tabulating, :■; charting, and preparing data secured from a section, or (2) by de- T tailing statistical clerks to work in the office of a section, or (3) by le : organizing and installing a complete statistical service in a section, ;e;or (4) by cooperating in the establishment of joint statistical offices ii|i representing commodity sections of the Board and other war agencies. ir} As part of the work of this division. Dr. Gay undertook a special i\ mission which is perhaps of unusual interest. In the spring of 1918 ;ti; the President asked the chairman of the Board to prepare for the V i President's personal use a conspectus of progress in the accomplish- J ment of the supply program, to be brought up to date as promptly as ml possible and supplemented weekly. The purpose was to afford a more |. businesslike, comprehensive view of the entire undertaking, in order {ilthat when necessary adjustments might be made or steps taken to I,]) synchronize to the highest possible extent all elements involved. This [,3J purpose made necessary the collection of secret information from ,rj many sources, unrelated excei:»t through the President as chief of all. A selected .staff was put to work in chaml)ers set aside for the purpose and Dr. Gay conducted the difficult undertaking with extraordinary skill. Further work of the division consisted in making special investi- gations at the request of various officers of the Board or of other Government agencies. A report on the purchase of watches for the American Expeditionary Forces was made at the request of the State 46 AMERICAN INDITSTUY IX THE WAI: Dei^artment. Another on the "thrift" campaign at the request of the Treasury Department. Work was usually done under extreme pressure, a time limit being set in the application. The criterion of success in this work was the extent to which a satisfactory answer was given within the time limit. The activities of this division, as they took shape immediately after the armistice, Avere unusually important. The work on a " His- tory of Prices During the War " has already been referred to. An- other work of importance was the rapid preparation of a report for the peace conference. This was undertaken as a joint enterprise by the statistical offices of the Food Administration, the Fuel Adminis- tration, the Shipping Board, the War Trade Board, and the War Industries Board. The effort was to set forth an extended body of data on the economic situation of the world, particularly of the United States, in respect to 60 principal groups of commodities. Dr. Henry R. Hatfield was chairman of the joint committee; Dr. Ernest L. Bogart represented the War Trade Board; Dr. Frank M. Surface, the Food Administration; Mr. Finch, the Shipping Board; and Dr. Leo Wolman, the War Industries Board. The report was brought out in eight volumes and Avas delivered December 20, 1918, for trans- mission to Paris. A third line of post-war work was that of a study of labor con- ditions. The prospect of the cancellation of contracts and of the de- mobilization of the Army pointed to the importance of this work, particularly in the larger industrial centers. In cooperation with the Department of Labor, the division began issuing November 30, 1918, weekly reports on labor conditions based on telegraphic re- ports from the various offices of the United States Employment Serv- ice. This work was continued into 1919 by transferring the section which was handling it to the War Trade Board. The experience of the Board in respect to the part of its work discussed in this chapter would point to the desirability, in case of a future analogous situation, of forming immediately a decentralized organization with one unit of tlie I^oard, like the Resources and Con- version Section or the Division of Planning and Statistics, in the form of a staff organization at AVashington, whose function it would be to supervise the field organizations and harmonize the statistical Avork of the commodity sections. There could perhaps be no more valuable measure of "prepared- ness " than the establishment in peace time of a bureau of planning and statistics (a fact-finding body), organized into about 60 com- modity sections, whose function it would be to maintain current data on the productive capacity of the country. This organization could probably be established successfully as a bureau of the Department of Commerce. C'liAi-n.i! 4. PRIORITIES. Neitlier the function of dra^vin"; uji proiiranis of i-('(|nirrmoMt-. synthosi/.inir them, and throwinrj thorn into {'(MiipMi iM)n v,i(h ciu. logiies of resomci'S, nor the effort to provide for action to a connnon purpo-e in the supply process throuuh clearance lists and the inetliMii of clearing orders, ever got at the root of the confusion. A d^—- method of control Avas to he invented here, a method by which one body of officials would sit in judfj;ment to determine the sequence in which materials should be numufactmed and orders filled. What came to be known as the priority system was destined to become thr: most characteristic feature of the whole scheme of w^ar time super- vision over the industrial forces. ^^'hen it once became clear that the (Government had machinery which could turn out definite rulings on the order in which demands might be sui)plied, when he who came with the largest purse could not necessarily obtain his materials first, the importance of abnormal demands in affecting prices immediately began to dimini.-h. The priority sj'stem was, perhaps, as important as any other single factor in stabilizing prices. It w^as also of profound importance as a corol- hiry to price-fixing. When prices are fixed under circumstances in which demand far exceeds supply, the right to buy can not safely be left to the forces of chance and personal favoritism. The flow of materials had to be directed, to every extent possible, from one cen- tral authority whose eye was everywhere. With priority control es- tablished, conservation programs could be enforced, rationing pro- grams and curtailment programs could be made effective, necessary new undertakings could be materially encouraged; the regulations of the Hoard became enfoiceabk'. and that small minority, whose ten- dency to disobey rules which an overwdielming majority were ready to follow, could be brought into line without unreasonable delays. Yet this priority control was strictly American in its nature. The central authority w^as only the organism necessary to make arti(;nlate and definitive the desire of each man to do his part. The long list of rules and regulations was developed out of conferences and hearings trade by trade, Government and governed taking each other into fullest confidence. It required some months to discover the gravamen of the system and to realize its effectiveness, and even after this discovery there was always a feeling for the importance of caution in the exercise of such power. The first uncertain steps in the exercise of priority control extended back to the formation of a priority subcommittee of the General 47 48 AMEPJCAN" INDUSTRY IX THE WAR. ^lunitions Board on May 3, 1917. The director of the council at that time brie% defined the priority function by stating that the committee — shall exercise full power iu the determination of priority of delivery of mate- rials and finished products whenever there is a conflict in delivery in accordance with the general policy of the Government. It is further understood that at present the priority committee of the General Munitions Board has no power in regard to the determination of priority in regard to civilian needs in which the Army and Navy requirements are not involved. It is further understood that as between the needs of our allies and our civilian population, the priority <;ommittee of the General Munitions Board for the present has no authority ro act. In this connection, however, the priority committee should keep full information as to such cases or instances as come to its attention, iu order that plans may further be developed for properly handling the matter. This function was thrust upon the General Munitions Board by the fact that a multitude of manufacturers and contractors engaged in Government work were asking which orders they should fill first. Before midsummer the committee was receiving 50 to 75 inquiries or requests per day for preference policies; but this committee was only giving advice without binding effect, designed to assist indi- vidual concerns who had accepted more orders than they could hope to fill in laying down their production plans. The real work of control by priorities did not begin until early in the fall of 1917, after the formation of the War Industries Board, with Eobert S. Lovett as priorities commissioner. Edwin B. Parker wa^by Judge Lovett designated as chairman of the new priorities committee, and as such placed in active charge of it on August 23, 1917. When Judge Lovett retired to join the Railroad Administration as director of capital expenditures, Mr. Parker was appointed by the Chairman to succeed him as priorities commissioner and head of the rapidly devel- oping Priorities Division, upon the reorganization of the Board, March 4, 1918. The other members of the committee were Charles X. Foster, vice chairnian, Maj. Gen. J. B. Aleshire, George Armsby, H. H. Barbour, C. P. Howland, F. H. Macpherson, Rear Admiral X. E. Mason, Lieut. Col. C. A. McKenne}', Everett Morss, Lucius P. Ordwav, Thomas Xelson Perkins, T. C. Powell, and Rear Admiral A. V. Zane. During the fall of 1917, studies on behalf of the priorities commit- tee were being made in England and France by Thomas Xelson Perkins, a member of the committee. He observed the various con- trol systems in use there and prepared daily reports and comments for the committee. The machinery to be used, the purposes and possibilities of the system, were receiving the most studious con- sideration by the committee in Washington. Action began by the issuance of Priorities Circular No. 1 on September 21, 1917, the day on which the price of copper was fixed and a few days before steel prices were announced. The first formal priority certificate issued AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN TIIK WAR. 49 bore date of September 25. 1917. But the ^reiU possibilities of this system and its necessity as a cnre for the confusion of the day were not, perhaps, fully and generally appreciated, nor its full ap- plication believed to be authorized, until the reorganization of the Board on March 4, 1918, from which time forwarcl priority con- trol became a characteristic feature of the Avork. Priority rulings were given finality by the President's direct authority and they be- came most effective, because the Nation to a man was then in a inood to follow the leadership of its designated connnander in chief. The legal foundation of the right to issue priority rulings rests on a variety of statutes and principles. The committee, however, soon found itself in a position where it did not have to depend upon direct legal sanction for the enforcement of its regulations; the spirit of service exhibited by the people made such sanction perhaps un- necessarj'. But the President, the Secretary of War. the Secretary of the Xavy, the Chairman of the Shipping Board, the President of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, the Fuel Administrator, and the Director General of Eailroads determined to centralize in the chair- man of the Board, and through him the priorities commissioner, the exercise of such powers of priority as lay within their legal right, and unity of machinery brought effective results.. The national defense act of June 3, 1916, gave broad powers to the President to place orders for the manufacture of any supplies needed by the Government for war purposes, with any concern engaged in the manufacture of such supplies or whose plant was capable of being transformed so as to manufacture them, which orders should be mandatory and be given preference over all other orders. If satisfactory arrangements could not be made with the owner of such a plant, the Secretaiy of War was authorized to take over and oi:)er- ate it, paying just compensation. Section 120 of this act provided, in part, as follows : such possession to be taken where the owner or operator refuses to Rive pref- erence to Government orders or to manufacture or to furnisli arms. anununiti<»n or parts of ammunition or other supplies or eipiipnuMit at a rcasoiial)!!' price, as determined by the Secretary of War. The President is lierel\v authorized, in liis discrciiDii. to aiiitojnt a I'.oard on Mobilization of Industries Essential for Military I'reparedness, nonpartisan in character, and to take all necessary steps to provide for such clerical assist- ance as he may deem necessary to organize and coordinate the work lu-n'in- before described. The act of August 29, 1916, providing for the creation of the council, directed "the creation of relations which will render \)os- sible in time of need the immediate concentration and utilization of the resources of the Nation." The resolution of Ajn-il 6. 1917. de- claring a state of war, read in part as follows: * * * and that the President be. and lie is hereby, authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military fonos of the United Sliif»'s; and to 1('5826— 21 4 50 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. bring the conflict to a successful termination all the resources of the country] are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States. Under the naval appropriation act of March 4, 1917, the Secre- tary of the Navy was given the same extraordinary powers in direct-] ing purchases as those possessed by the Secretary of War. The urgent deficiency act of June 15, 1917, conferred analogous powers I upon the President in respect to the placing of orders for ships and] shipbuilding materials. The food and fuel control act of August] 10, 1917, authorized the President to commandeer foods and fuel, and gave him very exhaustive control over the distribution of coal and coke. Under the act of May 29, 1917, amending the interstate commerce act, power was given to the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate and control the car service of interstate carriers, includ- ing the right, either upon complaint or upon its own initiative, to suspend the operation of any or all rules, regulations or practices established with respect to car service and to make such directions for the use of cars as in its judgment would best promote the pub- lic interest. But the act which finally placed the executive branch of the Government in a position to exercise priority power wasj the preferential shipments act of August 10, 1917, which read, in part, as follows: During the continuance of the war in which the United States is now engaged the President is authorized, if he finds it necessary for the national defense and security, to direct that such traflic or such shipments of commod- ities as, in his judgment, may be essential to the national defense and secur- ity, shall have preference or priority in transportation by any common carrier by railroad, water, or otherwise. He may give these directions at and for such times as he may determine, and may modify, change, suspend, or annul them, and for any such purpose he is hereby authorized to issue orders direct, or through such person or persons as he may designate for the purpose. * * * Thus it will be seen that, although Congress gave authority in so many words to issue priority orders having mandatory force only in the case of transportation ; the priorities committee, by drawing into one body through representation on it of each of the Government agencies interested in priorities and through direct authorization from the heads of these agencies, was able to muster adequate power to enforce compliance, if enforcement should be necessary, with any order or request that it might issue. The power to control the use of freight cars and the supply of fuel, and in the last resort to secure the commandeering of plants, was enough and more than enough. Legally, priority orders outside the sphere of transportation were, possibly, no more than requests; in fact, they usually were stated in the form of requests and their issuance was ordinarily in conformance with understandings reached through AMERICAN INl)rSTi;V IN THE WAU. 51 nejrotiations with the trade involved: but actually they had all the force and vi^jor of orders, since every concern atl'ected knew that if it did not comply its supplj' of fuel mio;ht be cut otf, its materials and supplies mio^ht not be be received for transportation, or its establish- ment might be seized by the (iovernment. Throughout its history the Board found few occasions in which it was necessary to secure compliance with its " requests " by actual use of any particular enforcing powers. The manner in which priorit}' control brought a degree of system into the chaos of the conflicting and ambitious industrial forces of the day can be read from the record of the commodity sections in Part II of this volume. Its first important application, viz. to the vast problem of iron and steel, is fully described in chapter 2. The commandeering powers of the Army, the Navy, and the Emergency Fleet Corporation came into sharp conflict with each other in respect to the steel supply and the snpply of numerous other commodities. Each department was given full power and confusion was the result. The priority system brought concerted action by a scheme which made actual commandeering unnecessary. The Priorities Division was given control of the situation through a letter from the President to each department, ruling that no commandeering order could be issued without the approval of the chairman of the AVar Industries Board. The essential featu res of the mechanism of the system are readily uii derstooc T It was a system which would apply only under cir- cumstances in which extreme shortages were the order of the day. Its distinctive characteristic and the foundation of its eiVectiveness lay in the fact that the Priorities Division placed itself in a position where its acts took the form of assistance to the industries and to individual concerns. The division could bargain for pledges and ex- pect conformity to its regulations in return for assistance, which it had power to grant or withhold. As soon as the railroads began to follow priority rulings, and the distribution of fuel began to be based on them, the supply of the necessities of industry began to fall away from those not receiving the advantages of these rulings. The iron and steel industry, which is the foundation of such a consider- able share of all manufacture, was first placed under the committee's rulings,^ and in the circular of instructions issued to this trade were outlined the general directions as to priority and the method of ap- plying for priority assistance. These and subsequent circulars attempted to classify and rate orders in accordance Avith their relative importance for war and national purposes. Producers of iron and steel and their products I See Appendix IX for (1) Priorities Circiil;ir No. 1, dated Sept. 21, 1017; (2) Pri- orities Circular No. 2 of the snmo date. 52 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IX THE WAR, were required to rate all their orders. In order to get the system satisfactorily started, all orders Avhich had been placed prior to September 21, 1917, by or on behalf of the War Department, the Xavy Department, or the Emergency Fleet Corporation, were auto- matically rated as class A-1 unless otherwise directed, and likewise all orders for military supplies and equipment pla(^ed by or for the Allies as class A-2. The classes of producers required to observe priority ratings in the fulfillment of their contract orders were extended gradually from that beginning until, on July 1, 1918, Priorities Circular No. 4^ was issued, providing that — (hu-ing the war in which the United States is now engaged, all individuals, firms, associations, and corporations engaged in the production of raw materials and manufactured products (save foods, feeds and fuels) are requested to observe regulations resi>ecting priority. From this time forward priority control was rapidly extended. The President's letter of March 4 had definitely centralized the pri- orities function in the chairman of the War Industries Board in the following language: The functions of the Board should i)e * * * (.">) the deterniination, when- ever necessary, of priorities of production and of delivery and of the proportions of any given article to be made immediately accessible to the several purchas- ing agencies, when the supply of that article is insutticient either temporarily or permanently. Sixt}' priorities circulars in all were issued between September 21, 1917, and December 20, 1918, when No, 60 revoked, as of January 1, 1919, all rules, regulations, and directions of every nature issued by the Priorities Division. Two concurrent and mutually supplementary methods of procedure were employed by the division in accomplishing its purposes. These will be studied separately. On the one hand, all orders were rated, either by the issuance of priority ^certificates to the persons placing the orders, or by a system of automatic ratings : and on the other hand, in order better to guide the forces of production into channels lead- ing to the possible fulfillment of all rated orders, there was issued a " Classification of Purposes Demanding Preferential Treatment," which was followed by a series of " Preference Lists." First must be understood the scheme of classifying orders by pri- ority certificates. All orders and work were divided into five general classes: Class AA, class A, class B, class C, and class D, with subdivisions of class AA, class A, and class B indicated by sufRx numbers, as, for example, classes AA-1, AA-2, etc., A-1, A-2, A-3, etc., B-1, B-2, etc. Orders and work in class AA took full precedence of orders and « See Appendix X for rriorities Circular No. 4, dated July 1, 1918. AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. ' 53 work of all other classes: those in class A took in-eceilence of those in classes B, C, and D; those in class H took precedence of those in classes C and D; and those in class C took precedence of those in chiss D; all irrespective of the dates the orders were placed or tliL* certificates issued. But the classification of an order meant that it should be jriven such precedence over orders of a lower classification as "was necessary — and only such as was necessary — to insure delivery on the date of delivery specified in the order. It did not mean that work should cease on orders of a lower classification, or tliat the order should be completed and delivery made in advance of all orders taking a lower classification, unless such procedure should be neces- sary in order to effect delivery within the time specified. The classification system was defined by the priorities committee as follows : Class AA comprises only euier^'ency war work of an exceptional and ur^'cnt nature. Class A comprises all other war work ; that is to say, orders and work necessary to carry on the war, such as arms, ammunitions, destroyers. sul>- niarines, battleships, transports, mercliant ships, and other water craft, air- planes, locomotives. Class B comprises ordei-s and work which, while not primarily desifrned for the prosecution of the war, yet are cf public interest and essential to the national welfare or otherwise of exceptional importance. Class C comprises all orders and woik not covered by priority certificates issued by the priorities committee or not taking an automatic rating, which orders and work are to be utilized in furtherance of one or more of the pur- poses embraced within the " General classification of purposes demanding pref- erence treatment" promulgated by the priorities board, or which orders and work are placed by or utilized in connection with an Industry or plant ap- pearing in Preference List Xo. 1. (No class C certiiicates were issued.) Class D comprises all orders and work not embraced in class AA. class A. class B, or class C (Xo class D certificates were i.ssued. ) The procedure for obtaining priority certificates on the part of any person having work to be done which fell within one of these classifications was simple enough. He w^ould make application to the priorities committee, following a form established by the com- mittee, blanks for which had been freely distributed. The applica- tion w as for an order running against a manufacturer or distributor and calling for delivery by a certain date. The priorities committee, after consideration and frequently after reference to the appropriate commodity section, if it Avere determined that the application should Be granted, would assign one or another of the above ratings to the order and issue a certificate. This certificate was issued directly to the applicant; that is, the person desiring to make a purchase or enter into a contract to have materials manufactured for him, unless otherwise requested, and not to the person against whom it ran. The » See in Appendix X. sees. 7, 8, 9 of Priority Circular No. 4. 54 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. iipplicant then presented his certificate to the person against whom it ran and the latter arranged his production program so a.; to give delivery to that priority order in its relative turn with respect to other priority orders. The volume of work undertaken by the division in connection with the issuance of priority certificates can be appreciated from the fol- lowing figures: Between September 25, 1917, and November 11, 1918, 211,430 applications were received; 191,966 priority certificates were issued, of which 8,448 were reissued certificates; and 27,912 appli- cations were denied or withdrawn. The highest number of applica- tions received and catalogued in one day was 1,901, on July 8, 1918. The highest number of certificates issued in one day was 2,121, on September 30, 1918. There was printed on the cover of practically every circular of instructions concerning rules of priority, the following significant statement : The test.— In requesting priority the petitioner sliould join with the com- mittee in applying the test : To what extent, if at all, will the granting of this application contribute, directly or indirectly, toward winning the war ; and if at all, how urgent is the need? As the system of granting priority certificates showed more and more success and one new industry after another was taken under this method of control, the administrative difficulties increased to the point where a large addition to the work involved danger of a breakdown, unless a compensating practice could be devised. By July 1, 1918, as already noted, the committee had decided to make all industries subject to the regulation. A way out of the administra- tive difficulty appeared in the fact that certain classes of orders so obviously deserved preference that priority ratings could be assigned to them automatically. A scheme of automatic classifications was set up accordingly on July 1, 1918,* the day on which control was extended to all industries. This plan made unnecessary any application for written priority certificates to cover certain classes of orders, no reference to the priorities committee being necessary for such cases. A person whose order fell within the automatic classification would simply attach to it an affidavit in prescribed form setting forth the facts essential to automatic rating and naming the war uses for which the materials were needed. The new procedure gave no automatic rating higher than A-4, thus leaving the ratings AA, AA-1, AA-2, etc., A-1, A-2, and A-3 to be given only by specific action of the priorities com- mittee. Orders of the War and Navy Departments and the Emer- * See sees. 7. 8, and of TiMorlties Circular No. 4, Appendix X, for rules of automatic tiriority ratings. AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 55 gency Fleet Corporation falling within class A were automatically rated A-5 upon proper signature to the following statement : / Unless rerated by express order in writiiiR by the priorities conmiitttH' of tne War Industries Board, this order is by autliority of said priorities coniniittee rated as class A-5, and its execution shall take precedence over all your orders and work of a lower classification to the extent necessary to Insure delivery according to the d:ite S)iecified herein, as prescribed by Circular No. 4, Issued by the priorities division of the War Industries Board, of date July 1, 11)18, and all amendments thereto. Priorities Circular No. 4 contained a list of purposes with their corresponding automatic ratings below A-4, by reference to which a person desiring to obtain a rating for one of his orders could prepare his affidavit, stating that the materials were to be used for such pur- pose, name his own rating, and proceed as if by a priority certificate. The priorities committee handled the certificates and the rides for the automatic rating of orders, and was the sole priorities agency of the Board until March 27, 1918. The President, in his letter of March 4, suggested the creation of a further agency to work with the one already in existeince in bringing about more concerted action respecting priority of delivery and in synchronizing priorities within the Government and industry. In pursuance of this suggestion, the priorities Board was created \^^ March 27, 1918; Edwin B. Parker, priorities commissioner, became chairman of the board, its other members being Bernard M. Baruch, chairman of the War Industries Board, ex officio member; Maj. Gen. George W. Goethals, Army representative; Rear Admiral F. F. Fletcher, Navy representative; Clarence M. Woolley," representing the War Trade Board; Edward Chambers, representing the Rail- road Administration; Charles R. Piez, representing the United States Shipping Board and Emergency Fleet Corporation; P. F. Noyes, representing the Fuel Administration; T. F. Whitmarsh. representing the Food Administration; Alex Legge, Vice Chair- man of the War Industries Board, also representing the Allied Purchasing Commission: and Felix Frankfurter. Chairman of the War Labor Policies Board. From this time forward the Priorities Division functioned through these two main units, authority for final decision on priority resting alwa3^s with the priorities commissioner to whom it was delegated by the chairman. The first act of the Priorities Board was to issue, on the day of its establishment, a General Classification of Purposes Demanding Preferential Treatment,'* a document designed to guide all govern- mental and other agencies in the production, supply, and distribu- tion of raw materials, finished products, electrical energy, fuel, and » See Appendix XI for copy of General Classification of Purposes DemuDding rroffitntlal . Treatment, issued Mar. '1~, 1018. •■ C. M. Woolley was also, by special appointment, coordinating memlM-r of Loth tin* War Industries Board and the War Trade Hoard. ^ 56 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. transpoi-tation. That list gave preference to the raw materi;ils going into or supplies necessary to the manufacture of ships, air- craft, munitions, military and naval supplies, fuel, food, and col- lateral industries, clothing, railroads, and public utilities. This classification, created as it was by the united action of all the pur- chasing agencies of the Government and the Allies, went a long way toward bringing about concerted action. By way of refinement and explanation of this idea, a list of 45 industries, known as " Preference List No. 1," * was issued by the priorities board on April 6, 1918. These industries were announced as those whose operations were considered of exceptional importance during the war. The list was issued for the guidance and instruc- tion of all Government agencies in the supply and distribution of coal and coke, and in the use of transportation. The list Avas from time to time extended by the issuance of supplements until it finally covered 73 industries and was reissued with broadened scope as " Preference List No. 2," on September 3, 1918." This new list contained a classification for 73 industries and, in addition, a rating for about 7,000 separate plants, plants Avhose im- portance, for some special reason, was considered above or below the class to which their product was assigned on the principal list. A supplement to this list was issued on October 1, 1918. The purpose of this classification of industry was stated to be for the regulation of all Government agencies and others in the production and supply of fuel and electric energy and in the supply of transportation and of labor. All industries and individual plants on the list were divided, according to their relative importance, into four classes, viz. Class I, Class II, Class III, and Class IV. The issuance of this list was not intended to act as an embargo on all plants and industries not included on it, but the requirements of such plants were to be deferred until the needs of those on the preference lists could be satisfied. It was intended that the pref- erence lists should be interpreted in the same spirit as the priority rating of orders. Industries and plants in Class I were construed as of exceptional importance in the prosecution of the war and their requirements in respect to fuel, power, transportation, and labor were to be fully satisfied in preference to those of the three remaining classes. As between Classes II, III, and IV there was no complete or absolute preference, the ratings being designed only as a general guide to the relative importance in the composite picture. The supply of fuel, power, transportation, and labor to industries and plants not on the preference lists was considered, so far as it should 8 See Appendix XII for copy of Preference List No. 2, dated Sept. 3, 1918, excluding the list of 7,000 individual plants. * See Appendix XI (2). a.mekk;an industry in thI': wai;. 57 not be affected by special i'ulin See Appendix XVIII for (1) Reply of Bnnich to Ilylan, and (2) Reply of Bnruch to the Calder resolution, both explaining the policy of the Board In respect to non-war con- struction. .58 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. The important relation between priority control and the regulation lof railroad transportation brought about the early formation of an ijlnland TraiRc Section of the Board. T. C. Powell, an experienced I railroad executive, took charge of the section, whose work, although it i was so successfully merged with that of the Priorities Division and I the Railroad Administration that it can not easily be described sepa- rately, was nevertheless of far-reaching significance. I The division also established a Labor Priorities Section, with A. W. Clapp as chief. The purpose of this section was to bring about a control over the ever diminishing supply of labor, by a system of priorities. Reference to this work is made in chapter T, below. The end came before it had gone very far. An obvious indirect effect of the processes of priorities was to curtail the production of nonwar industries and release labor, ma- terials, capital, and transportation for use in war industries. These processes were necessarily slow and uncertain, and as the war pro- gressed and greater and greater demands were made on war indus- tries, while at the same time the substantial increases in our Army w^ere making greater inroads in the labor supply, the necessity for direct action curtailing the production of less essential industries be- -. came more and more imperative. There was much discussion in Con- gress, in the several executive departments of the Government, in the I press, and elsewhere, of " nonessential industries " and the expediency I of suppressing them during the w^ar. The problem had the careful ■consideration of the President, who appointed a committee com- posed of Vance C. McCormick, chairman of the War Trade Board; Bernard M. Barucli. Chairman of the War Industries Board; Her- bert C. Hoover, Food Administrator, and Harry A. Garfield, Fuel Administrator, to investigate and report what industries were non- essential to the point that they should in the public interest retire from business during the war. This committee in turn formed a subcommittee, composed of Clarence M. Woolley, of the War Trade Board, as chairman; Edwin B. Parker, priorities commissioner; T. F. Whitmarsh, of the Food Administration ; Edward Chambers, of the Railroad Administration; Edwin F. Gay, of the Shipping Board; and P. B. Noyes, of the Fuel Administration, to which wore later added Felix Frankfurter, Chairman of the War Labor Policies Board, and George May, of the Treasury Department. , This committee, after careful and painstaking investigation and consideration, made its report under date of June 22, 1918," in substance recommending : 1. That no industry should be absolutely prohibited and destroyed. 2. That a plan of general curtailment could and should be devised, ' A copy of this report, together with a copy of Mr. Hoover's letter of .Tiily ,S, 1018, transmitting same to the President, with the President's O. K. thereon, forming as it .does the charter of th/» industrial adjustments committee, Is embraced in Appendix XIII. AMERICAN INDUSTRY IX THH WAR. 59 broad enough to leinove the conllk't between the necessities of war and nonwar industries in the matter of raw materials, fuel, transportation and labor. Particularly significant paragraphs from this report follow: We do not recoinnientl absolute pr()liil)iti()n because, granting the possiliilit.v -of selecting from all the products (if industry those items whicli could be ngreed upon as of relatively slight import:;,nce to the consuming public, the benetits to be derived for the war program bythe total and sudden prohibition of the in- dustries producing such commodities .would be trilling compared to the economic loss (Un-ing and after the war. A searching Mualysis of all our inciusli-ics rcvcahMl 25 wliidi might fairly be classitied as producers of nonwar \onnuodities, and thcreion' worthy of consideration for complete prohibition. We found that the aggregate capital •employed by this particular group of ind istries was .$733,000,(XK). The aggre- gate number of persons employed was 2S3,:,''18. The a.sgregate fuel consumption per annum was 1.701.000 tons. Contrasting the degree of relief afforded with the hardships neces.sarily im- posed upon a part of the community, your couunittie hay reached the conclu- sion that it would be inadvisable to adopt dir"ct industrial prohibition to ac- complish the desired end. It would not oPily result in inequalities and thus en- gender intense dissatisfaction on the part of tl ose affected but it would also • create grave api)rehension throughout the enti' ? industrial conununity. This might weaken the morale of the nation and, in the final analysis, cause actual harm rather than positive benefit. We also invite your attention to the fact tha a suddi>n dislocation through complete prohibition of any industry involve ^ the disintegration of entire organizations, including the workers, foremen, superintendents", and managers. Such organizations in most cases are the cumulative result of many years of constructive effort, and it is obvious that with the ending of the war the prohib- ited industries would be obliged to go through the itionrer process of re-creation. This woidd, in the opinion of your committee, augment the embarrassment of postwar industrial readjustments. Following this report, the industrial adjustment committee of the priorities board was formed, with the approval of the President, with a membership composed of the subcommittee above mentioned. Rhodes S. Baker, assistant priorities commissioner, took active '- f barge of the details of this work, participated with the committee in I its deliberations, and created an organization for the scientific study and the compilation of comprehensive data with respect to each separate industry. Ample notice of proposed curtailments of non- war industries was given and their representatives appeared before iip.d agreed with the committee on bases of curtailment. This enabled them so to reorganize their l)usinesses as to engage in the produc- tion of war necessities or reduce the volume of their output, or both. Xo industry was branded as nonessential, but every effort was made to preserve the organization of every unit in each in(lu.stry through the use of its facilities for war production or otherwise, to the end •^.hat it would be prci^tired to go promi)tly forward with its normal 60 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN TH^i WAR. j activities following the conclusion of peace), but at the same tinu'- men, materials, and capital were released a^id transportation was re- lieved for the more efficient prosecution of the war. As illustrating the methods pursued arKl the results accomplished by the industrial adjustments committq^'o, reference is made to the latter part of chapter 2, Part II of this volume, dealing with the rationing of iron and steel.^ I The results of the work of the Priorities Division can not be fully described nor well illustrated in th^ confines of a single chapter. This division functioned through, and with the systematic assistance of, not only the other agencies of the War Industries Board, but other departments and bureaus of the Government. Priority became a procedure, not alone an orgariization. The purposes and results of priority control Avill necessarily be illustrated in every chapter which follows. * See pp. 123 to 129, inclubive. / CiiAi>Ti:ij 5. CONSERVATION. riic woi'k of the Priorities Division avus intimately related to tiiat of another very important and very enerj^etic division of the Board — the Conservation Division. The President's letter of March 4, 1918, ( harged the AVar Industries Board with the duty of promoting " the ronservation of resources and facilities by means of scientific, Indus-; trial, and commercial economies." But the work Avas at that time already well under way. and the establishment of the Conservation Division under the Board on May 8, 1918, represented only a transfer tiom the council, and a reorganization of the Commercial Economy Ijoard, which had been created as early as March 24, 1917. A. AV. >haw was chairman of both organizations in succession and took l the price of copper on September *J1, and of iron and steel on Sep- tember '24 following. From this period forward the War Industries l Board, the Food Administration, and the Fuel Administration, each in its own held, went forward with the work of preparing {)rice regulations for the approval and ratification of the President, cover- ing commodity after commodity, as the needs of the time seemed to require. The chief aim of the control by the Food and Fuel Administra- tions was to assist the civilian population to obtain necessary articles of supply at reasonable rates, while, in the beginning, it was the primary puipose of the War Industries Board to assist the (rovern- ment in getting supplies at fair prices. The Board soon found, how- ever, that its assistance to the civilian population was of an im])or- tance at least equal to its work for the Government purchasing agencies, and its procedure was early adapted to that need. The distinguishing feature of price control in the food group was the scheme of fixing " margins of profit " only. Very few basic prices were determined by the Food Administration. The War Industries Board, on the other hand, and later the price-fixing committee, in the field in which they operated, found, for the most part, that the most satisfactory control could be accomplished by the fixing of the prices of basic materials. A question of principle which received cautious consideration when price fixing was being unlate Commerce, all made statements rebuking the forces which A (Mc responsible for the rapid rise in prices, and declaring themselves n favor of a control of iron and steel, which would insure reasonable »ri'cs to the Government, These announcements were having their ■thct on the market and on the attitude of the industry. liy the end of July prices began to show a sharp drop, and the nore conservative factions of the steel industry saw only peril ahead nilcss the Government brought stabilization to the market. By late •^( 1 4 ember virtually the whole industry was dispo.sed to recommend lilt formal regulation begin. One of their principal trade journals, lie Iron Age, began predicting regulation in late June, and was riukly advocating it in the issue of August 30. Thus, before con- i"l was actually put into effect, the Government and the industry 116 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. were in a state of mind to sit aroimd the same table and determine together what kind of control they wanted and how it should be exercised. Discussions and investigations continued through the summer. On the War Industries Board fell the responsibility of drawing matters together, establishing and promulgating the principles of control, and of carrying out their administration. Though by mid- summer both the Government and the industr}^ were agreed that control was necessary, the Government had still to learn both the technique of control and the general policies which should underlie it, for this was one of the first commodities over which an ambi- tious program was undertaken. But the Government agencies had definitely in mind at the outset that, in determining upon reasonable prices, they must stimulate rather than hamper the production of steel. Large numbers of inquiries and suggestions required the Board to consider seriously and to reach conclusions on such questions as whether any prices, fixed for Government purchases, should be made applicable to purchases by nationals; whether Government prices should be extended to the Allies; whether the fixed prices should be determined through a flat rate or a flexible cost-plus-profit scale; whether the proposed fixed price schedule would or would not abrogate outstanding contract price agreements; whether the Government, in determining upon prices, should take cognizance of the incidental labor, fuel, and transportation problems; and whether control over the producers would take proper account of the middlemen. That controlled prices should extend to civilian purchasers and to purchases by the allied Governments was determined in the af- firmative in accordance with the opinion of the President, as ex- pressed in his announcement of July 12, 1917. The President's striking words on this point set the fashion not only for steel but for most of the other commodities whose prices the Board found it necessary to control. " We must make the prices to the public the same as prices to the Government. Prices mean the same every- where now ; they mean the efficiency of the Nation, whether it is the Government that pays them or not; they mean victory or defeat." The Board, in announcing the policy that the Allies should be charged no more than our own Government, stated two important limitations, first, that the policy must be reciprocal; second, that the arrangement must be limited to war materials in order to pro- tect our own industry. " We must not allow raw materials, sold by our own producers at prices patriotically conceded to our own Government and its Allies for war purposes, to be diverted to in- AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 117 niipjidustrv and trade abroad, Mhicli may come in competition with our iijljown manufacturers and producers." The foreiijn mission of tlie Board worked later in bringing about adjustments in accord with these principles. The tlat rate versus " cost-plus-proHt " argument received ex- tended and cautious consideration at Washington. The investiga- tions of the Federal Trade Commission showed beyond doubt that there was no uniformity in the costs of various producers. It was brought out that there were varying costs not only as between four distinct classes of producers, classes based upon the degree of in- tegration of their plants, but also varying costs within each cla^^s. Companies who owned their own ore, transportation, blast fur- naces, rolling mills, and works for the manufacture of finished .products could produce more cheaply than those who bought their ore and coke, but controlled the further stages of production. Those who purchased pig iron, but carried the manufacturing process through steel to the finished article, produced more cheaply than those who bought steel ingots and billets, and rolled plates, shapes, and other products. The principle that no measure should be taken which would re- duce the maximum possible production dominated. It was, there- fore, finally determined to fix the maximum prices at a flat rate and at a point high enough to keep substantialy in full operation every mill and blast furnace which contributed appreciably to the country's supply. It w^as left for the excess-profit tax to take care of low-cost producers and the arrangement served in place of a (subsidy for high-cost producers. This was considered more satis- I factory than a pooling arrangement, which had been given serious consideration, and under which the profits of low-cost producers would have been turned over to cover losses of high-cost producers, for the latter plan would inevitably have reduced production. \ Another problem, which arose first in connection with steel but which had to be determined later for many more commodities, was whether prices written in active contracts should be abrogated when the fixed price schedule went into effect. The concern was ^l not alone over the legal right of the Government to abrogate those contracts, but the arguments turned also upon the practical advan- tages which would accrue to buyers who had not contracted ahead and could, under the fixed price schedule, buy steel more cheaply than had their competitors a month or two earlier under contract agreements. The adjustments which took place during the period between the determination to fix prices and the actual issue of schedules tended to relieve 1)oth aspects of this problem. It was finally determined that the prices fixed by the Government should not apply to past contracts. 118 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. I The fuel, transportation, and labor problems were puzzling this and other industries during this confused period. What should be^ the relation of the control of prices and distribution to these prob- lems? Time answered the question. The Government's control over the distribution of fuel and transportation proved to be thei most important means it had for enforcing the rules and regula- tions which it found necessary to impose upon the industries. Thet full spirit and intention of the control could not have been enforced without the good will of the leaders of trade. But it was in noi '-mall measure the necessity on the part of industry of seeking thei privilege of priority in fuel and transportation which placed thei War Industries Board in the position of power which made it pos- sible for the Board to bargain with the industries as an equal. The benefits and advantages flowing from Government recog- nition brought the industries voluntarily to seek to place them- selves on the preference list, willingly assuming its obligations in order to obtain its benefits. The industries became plaintiffs ; pledges could be required in return for privileges granted. The place of middlemen in price fixing and the extent to which the various practices of different trades in respect to them should be recognized was also the subject of studious consideration. The con- centration of iron and steel production in the hands of relatively few producers made it simpler to control prices at the source than it was in some other trades. If a price is fixed for a producer and the product passes through a jobber to the ultimate consumer, the job- ber's interest in the fixed price is that of purchaser and not that of seller. Abnormal demands will simply give him abnormal profits. When Mr. Replogle came to Washington about the middle of Sep- tember, 1917, numerous conferences had been held and both sides of the case were more than ready for action. Action was soon to fol- low. In a report on the iron and steel situation, which he rendered to the Board on September 14,^ he urged that the steel men be called at once to Washington for a conference that immediate steps might be taken to alleviate the chaotic steel situation. He outlined in some detail the condition peculiarly demanding the maximum produc- tion of coke, pig iron, sheared plates, shell steel, billets, and rounds. And he recommended furthermore that there be fixed on these items maximum prices to take effect at the earliest possible date. Four days later the War Industries Board called the committee representing the steel industry to a special meeting, and asked for views on the proper method to be followed in fixing the price of steel. The committee said that an examination of the cost figures, furnished by the Federal Trade Commission, showed that they really reflected in general the prevailing condition of a year previous, ' See Appendix XVII for the text of the report. AMERICAN INDUSTRY IX TlIK WAR. ]19 [because the materials used during the first half of 1917 had been contracted for in the fall of 1916. A special committee of the IJoard recommended that the question of price fixing could be best ap- proached — " by considering the individual processes or siaiii's comprising the niiinnfnclurc of lli the finished product. Each of these practically constitutes an independi-nt in- dustry. Many of the operators are engauod in only one of the processes, while a fiw of the larger companies cover all operations from the raw material to the finished product. As each industry nuist he allowed a profit to support that particular industry, the integrated conipaiiies who cover all proces.ses from raw materials to highly finished products nnist necessarily receive a profit on eacli of the processes. Conditions prevailing in the steel trade for a considerahle period made it necessary for all lines of industry using steel products to order their supplies further in advance than would be necessary under normal conditions, and as a consequence these industries have on hand substantial stocks of steel acquired at prices very much higher than any we could reconnnend as being fair or equitable. To partially meet this situation and avoid demoralizing the many industries that are largely dependent upon steel products, we reconnnend the ■establishment of what might be termed an intermediate scale of prices for a period of three months with the expectation of a further reduction at the end of that period. With that purpose in mind we submit the attached schedule of proposed prices on the raw materials and various products, also showing the approximate market prices at the present time and the amount of the reduction from such prices. Tliis scale of prices is recommended on the basis of offering a premium on ship's plates and shell steel with the object of stimulating production, as the present capacity is inadequate to meet the requirements. It is evident that to be effective any price regulations must be rigidly enforced. Serious consideration should be given to the question of abrogating contracts which were entered into prior to establishing this suggested schedule of prices. We have asked the Federal Trade Commission to advise the War Industries Board further in regard to these contracts, which must be considered an im- portant factor in the situation, as some furnaces have entered into contracts without regard to the price established on coal. The Board agreed on the same day that prices should be fixed separately on ore, coal, coke, pig iron, and on transportation, for the purpose of building up a fair price for steel. It was likewise agreed that should the steel interests not be willing to give their full coop- €ration to the price-fixing program, the Board would take steps necessary to assume control over the steel jilants. The iron and steel industry of the country, as represented by 05 executives, met the War Industries Board at Washington at 10 o'clock on the morning of September 21. The steel men were told that the President had requested the Board to call them together and ask tlicir opinions on proper prices to be fixed. A prolonged discu.ssion fol- lowed. Each side had its case fully prepared, and there was vigorouf conflict with regard to the facts as well as the principles to be applied 120 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR, The Board finalW stated to the industry the theory which it believed was a sound one for computing the price schedule and the representa- tives of the industry disagreed and retired. At the request of E. H. Gary, the meeting reconvened, and he, speaking for the steel industry^ explained to the Board that the trade, in its desire to meet the Board'& views as far as possible, had appointed committees covering ore, coke, and pig iron, and that these committees would make and explain separate recommendations. The schedules were prepared, and after long debate and many revisions by the Board they were finally agreed to by the steel interests subject to the approval of the President, Thus, on September 24, 1917, the President made formal an- nouncement of the prices which had been fixed by negotiated agree- ment on the basic raw materials of the iron and steel group. These- prices served as the basis for all price fixing within that group. They were announced as effective immediately and subject to re- vision January 1, 1918, as follows : Commodity. Basis. Price. Iron ore Lower Lake ports S5.05 per gross ton. Connellsville Pig iron 333 per gross ton. $2.90 per 100 pounds. i'ittsburgli-Chicago do $3 per 100 pounds. S3. 25 per ino pounds. Plates do As part and parcel of the announcement and the agreement,, three principles of policy were stated: First, that there should be no reduction in the present rate of wages; second, that the prices above named should be made to the public and to the Allies as well as to the Government; and, third that the steel men had pledged themselves to exert every effort necessary to keep up the production. to the maximum of the past, so long as the war should last. At the same time the President directed the War Industries Board to take such measures of control over distribution as would be required as a. corollary to price control. Coke was reduced from $12.75 to $6; pig iron from $60 to $33; steel bars from $5 to $2.90 ; shapes from $6 to $3 ; and plates from $12 to $3.25. It will be remembered that many contract prices prevailing in September were much lower than the open-market prices quoted here, and others were materially higher, plates having sold as high as $15 per 100 pounds. It was quite as much the object of the Govern- ment to stabilize the market at a point which would effect a maximum of production as to scale down prices from higher levels. 'While the fixed prices averaged considerably above prewar normal, they were not above the average advance in the prices of commodities and they were far below the prices paid by the Allies and by industries before- we entered the war. AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN TllK WAi:. 121 This agreement between the War Industries Board and the steel [iianufacturers resulted in an enormous saving in the war program, which some authorities estimate in excotcs of a thousand million Jdllars a year. Following the same general procedure, on Octolxn- 11, I'.MT. prices wrre fixed on intermediate products — blooms, billets, slabs, sheet iar<. wire rods, shell bars, and skelp. In the meantime an important icorganization took place in respect to the committees through whom [ho Government control was to be administered. The old iron and -trt 1 committee of the Council of National Defense was succeeded by :hi' American Iron and Steel Institute, which became the formal auvi uithoritative spokesman of the industry, representing the interests of th.e industry and not the Government in all cases of negotiation and igroement. The steel manufacturers formed committees under the Iron and Steel Institute for the purpose of furnishing information to [he AVar Industries Board, and for the purpose of negotiating with the Board in behalf of the industry-, these committees not representing aor acting for the Government in any capacity, although working n close cooperation in helping to meet the demands as given through :hu director of steel supply. The prices for intermediate steel products were worked out by the two parties to the case conferring among themselves and with ?ach other, and thus the agreement of October 11, was reached.* On N'ovember 5, 1917, maximum prices were fixed on finished steel products.^ It will be noted that these prices were for basic products jnly. In order to control fully the prices in this industry, a very large ^cliedule of differentials, or prices for products which vary from lie basic types, had to be worked out. The problem of calculating ;hese was assigned to the industry itself, and the work was accom- plished by a committee of the American Iron and Steel Institute. These differentials were promulgated by the committee directly to the 11 lustry, but when once announced they were given the same appli- ation in all policies as those prices fixed specifically by the President hiough the War Industries Board or later through the price-fiixing ■oiiimittee. It should be noted that the great bulk of the basic price i.xing of iron and steel during the war was done by the War Indus- lies Board before the price-fixing committee got started in March. li'lS. While several revisions were later made, relatively few changes )i significance were necessary. The original prices were renewed every three months after considerable diseussion between the Gov- arnment and the industry. * See Appendix XIX for prices of Intormediate steel products as fixed Oct. 11, 1917. * See Appendix XX for the schedule of prices on finished steel products fixed Nov , 1917. 122 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. Production during 1918, under fixed prices, fell a little below pro duction in 1917. But it can hardly be said that price fixing was ; significant cause. The iron and steel induetr}^, in common with al industries, suffered during the winter from the transportation tie-up The decline of 4^ per cent in the output of pig iron can be traced to the interruption in the movement of ore and coke. Steel ingot( increased about 2 per cent over the previous year. This was accom: plished through the use of more scrap and the closer paring dowr of pig-iron stocks usually carried over. The transportation difficulties were having such an adverse effen* on the operations of war industries, that tkey were the subject oj many conferences between the Railroad Administration and the Waii Industries Board. The director of steel supply finally, to eliminattj cross-hauls, rearranged many contl'acts, some of which had beer! placed directly with the steel manufacturers at varying prices on s] strictly competitive basis by the nations at war and naturally placed! without regard to the transportation factor. To illustrate : A Buffalo steel manufacturer was making an enormous tonnage of projectile steel to be shipped in bar form to a Cincinnati forge plant to be forged into projectile forgings, which were in turn to be shipped back to Buffalo for machining into the finished projectile. A steel plant within 50 miles of Cincinnati was making projectile bars which were being sent to Buffalo for forging and machining. The differ- ential in price of the several contracts was very great, but after a number of conferences which the director of steel supply had with the various manufacturers involved, arrangements were made to have the steel bars rolled in Buffalo shipped to a near-by plant and machine shop for finishing, and in turn the Cincinnati forge man was supplied by the steel mills in his district. There were hundreds of changes of this character, which, while difficult of solution, were fully justified by the transportation situa- tion, which had become a very important factor in our war program. Many millions of ton-miles and an enormous amount of money and time were saved by these transfers. The natural corollary of price fixing, where demand exceeds sup- ply and the price fixing is resorted to chiefly to prevent high prices, is control over distribution. When demand greatly exceeds supply and purchasers are not able by paying higher prices than their com- petitors to buy the right to have their orders filled first, because maximum prices are fixed, the result is a reversal of the ordinary processes of salesmanship and distribution, and a confusion results in which personal elements and ambitions are likely to play an important part. Unified direction is necessary if anything like efficiency is to characterize the processes of distribution and pro- duction. AMKJUOAN IXDUSTKV IN THK \V.\K. 123 f»| The earlier War Industries Board made its iirst attempt to control 3i| distribution by the process of priorities on September 21, l'.>17, when si I it issued (1) priorities circular No. 1, directin*^ the se(pience in which Iff orders for iron and steel and their products should be filled, and (2) tl priorities circular Xo, 2, explainin*; the method of obtaining; and «l usinpf priority certificates for expeditin^r manufarturc on war orders. n The problems of assisting in securin*^ transportation an priority certificates, or (2) after orders, covered by priority certifi- cates, should have been taken care of, producers might utilize their facilities to fill orders of their customers not covered by certificates, provided such orders were embraced within the classification of purposes entitled to preference treatment, as determined by the Pri- orities Board,^ and further that, after orders of these two classes had been taken care of, producers might ship other orders to other cus- tomers " subject to the approval in writing of the director of steel supply first had and obtained." The joint circular provided a method of applying for the approval in writing of the director of steel supply. It explained that it was not the purpose of the resolution of June 6 to completely postpone all orders under " classification of purposes " to all priority orders, but that they might be given such place as would not interfere with the fflling of priority orders. Priority certificates were issued at this time in classes AA, A, and B. Orders falling within the " classifica- tion of purposes " clause were now designated as class C, and could be ' See Appendix XXI for copy of joint circular signed by Parker and Replogle. ' See Appendix XI for this classification of purposes, which is explained more fully In chap. 4, Pt. 1. AMERICAN IXDUSTKY IX TUK WAR. 125 lilled without a certificate of ratinjj:. All other orders were desig- nated b}' this circular as class 1), and required the written npprovnl i)f the director of steel supply. In line with what has been said above, it was not the purpose of the Board to cut off all orders fallinfr in class D. This would have been equivalent to elimination of certain industries for the rest of the war period. Instead it was decided to ration these industries, but the lesolution of June 6 placed all such industries in the position of plaintiff before the Board. They would have been automatically iiiinod without the help of the Board, for there was not steel onoujrh to ffo around. In order that the director of steel supply mifrht not be burdened with more application's than he could give attention to, this circidar Liave automatic approval in class C of all orders not exceeding; 5 tons, requiring, however, that manufacturers filling such orders should certify- to him once a month that they believed that it was in the public interest that such orders should be filled. For all other orders in ©lass D, the manufacturer was required to file an applica- tion in duplicate to the director of steel supply on blanks which he furnished. The director would indorse on the bottom of the applica- tion the word " Granted " or " Declined," and return one copy to the applicant. If granted, the manufacturer was allowed to ship on such terms and under such conditions as might be imposed by the di- rector of steel supply. The circular also provided rules for the jobbers. Orders from job- i bers were rated as class B-4, and a pledge was exacted from each jobber, upon his placing an order with the manufacturer, to the effect that he was not hoarding the stocks, and further that the stocks, which this order was to replace, had been sold for essential uses, as defined by the Priorities Division.® Priorities Circular No. 5, July 22, 1918, set forth the program for rationing iron and steel to those less essential industries whose existence depended upon their getting at least a portion of their nor- mal supply of this commodity. The nature of the plan is best ex- plained in the words of the circular itself: Sec. IV. Rationing industries. — As It is obviously liiipossil)le to supply nil industries utilizing iron and steel in their activities with thoir normal supply, the War Industries Board, tliroujrh its Priorities Division, cooperating witli the commodity section dealing with the particular industry or pro campaign. This early otfer of tlie copper trade, followed rap- idly as it was by several other trades, to sell to their own (iovernment 11.-- war needs at prewar prices had an important psychological effect ii[u»n prices generally. Eugene Meyer, jr., originally proposed the arrangement, and it was Daniel Guggenheim and John D. Ryan who l)rought about the agreement on the side of the copper trade. Mar- ket prices began to decline from this date, but tliey did not fall lapidly. Meanwhile, war broke out and the increasing copper requirements (omul the market with scarcely enough copper to meet contract needs, It by calling reserve stocks into use, watching supplies, and care- ,>,i!y conserving every pound. The necessity for stimulating in- ■irased production seemed paramount. The Federal Trade Com- iui.rSTKV IX TllK WAlt. 183 had stiulird it. nnd at a iiieotiiijj,- that day rcaclicHl a ionclusion (o lix the price of electrolytic copper at 2:2 cents per pound. In order to acquaint the copper interests with the jtosition of the Board, to try to reach an agreement with them, and to secure their cooperation, their representatives were called to Washington on September 11. The representatives were told that the l^oard believed that 22 cents per pound f. o. b. New York for refined electrolytic copper, 99.93 per cent pure, was a fair price and would allow the producers a reasonable profit. They were told that the price should hold for a certain period only, and could then be revised upward or downward; further, that it was to be applicable alike to the Government, the Allies, and the public, and that wages to labor should remain the same notwithstanding the sliding scale agreement. The industry objected. Their position was presented orally at the meeting, and three days later by a long memorandum. They de- clared flatly that the copper interests could not control the price to the public at a point much below 25 cents, and that, if the Gov- ernment fixed 22 cents as the price, the small high-cost producers would not voluntarily cooperate in selling at the fixed price. They pointed out that acute labor troubles would result should the sliding scale of rates be disturbed. The}' showed how^ impracticable it would be for the Government to commandeer the numerous small high-cost mines. Tliey gave evidence to show that if 22 cents were finally fixed it would be impossible to obtain the cooperation of the majority of mine owners. The difficulty was not with the large producers, in whose hands, of course, the bulk of the business is concentrated, but the copper industry also embraces a large number of smaller high-cost producers, whose product was also needed in the extraordinary emergency. Everybod}" agreed that the consider- able output of the small high-cost producers was indispensable. The copper interests pointed out with particular care the important bearing of wages on copper prices. It is true that there are few raw mateiials of which so large a percentage of the cost of production goes to pay wages. They pointed out that the average wages of all men in the copper industry had been advanced oO per cent over those of 1915, and that they could not be lowered without serious conse- quences. Labor shoi-tage and labor unrest might easily make it nec- essary to raise them. If wages were to be maintained, tlie small plants could not keep open on a selling price of less than 25 cents. Their memorandum contained the following proposal : While some of the low-cost producers will show a larpe proht at -") cents, some of the largest and practicall.v all of the small producers can not show more than the usual peace-time profit at that price, and if dt'ph'tion of mines Is con- sidered, their profit would pnihahly be loss than in normal Umcs at averace 134 AMERICAIs^ INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. prices. We believe tliat it would be to tbe interest of the Government to ])ay 25 cents per pound and to take all of the production of all of the mines of the country at that price, retaining all the copper which is needed for this Govern- ment and for its Allies, and selling the balance at the same price, or approxi- mately the same price, to the public. Following the conference in Washington of September 11 the lead- ing copper producers met in New York on September 14 and voted to propose to the War Industries Board a compromise price of 23^ cents. In their communication they said : With one exception those present agreed that if your committee would unanimously recommend a price of 23i cents * * * we would still be able to get the practical i-esult that we are aiming for, that is, pretty nearly maxi- mum production ; therefore, 1 would say that if your committee would agree to 23^ cents we can pledge the copper industry almost as a whole to use every possible means to secure a maximum production and to maintain the present scale of wages, and I am satisfied we can succeed. On September 21, 1917, the price of 23| cents was definitely fixed in the form of an agreement between the Government and the pro- ducers. It was approved by the President, subject to revision after four months; the short period being established for the purpose of allowing any producer, consumer, or other interested party to appear and present reasons, if any, for increasing or decreasing the price. It is interesting in this connection to note that while many producers appeared with arguments urging increases, no consumer, public or private, nor official of our own or other Government, appeared to object to the prices as too high. The fact is the fixed price of copper represented a smaller advance over prewar normal than that of per- haps any other commodity. This was the first negotiated price- fixing arrangement ever established by the United States Govern- ment. As part of the agreement the producers pledged themselves not to reduce wages; to sell their products to the Allies and the gen- eral public at the same price as that to be paid by the Government; to exert every effort to maintain maximum production during the war; and to take the necessary measures to prevent copper from falling into the hands of speculators. The Army, Navy, and other Government agencies interested in the purchase of copper partici- pated in the negotiations. The industry, though dissatisfied, had finally acceded. They be- lieved that at least it gave them a definite program and would bring stabilitj^ But within a week many questions began to arise as to how the new scheme was to be administered. This was a new kind of undertaking both for the Government and the industry.^ » The Wall Street Journal of Sept. 27, 1917. said in this connection : " Both producers and consumers are ' up in the air ' due to lack of details in connection with carrying out of the proposed plans for handling the copper market, and this condition will con- tinue until Washington furnishes more detailed advices as to what can be done and what should not bo attempted under the new order of things." A.MElUl'AX l.\MU STIIV IN TlIK WAI!. 135 I A letter of inquiry was addressed to the Board October 10, TJIT, and its prompt answer contained the (lOvernnient's sohition ol' several of the most important problems. (1) That all outstanding bona fide contracts between producers and consumers might be consummated at contract prices. Some of these were at 2T cents a pound. But under the priority agreement our Government had first call and the Allies second, and as tiiese two purchasers consumed nearly all the supply, few high-priced orders could be filled. (2) The rule was laid down that all contract sales made for de- livery after the expiration of the present fixed price (Jan. 21, 1918) should be made at a price subject to any revision which the Board might see fit later to make. (3) In answer to the complaint that outside dealers and brokers were trading and quoting at 28, 29, and 30 cents for copper, a control committee or selling agency was established, which by buying and selling at the fixed price was designed to crowd the speculators from the market. (4) It was ur^ed that differentials be established for modifications from electrolytic copper, and particularly that prices for scrap be fixed. But it was ruled that no other prices would be fixed. The price of 23} cents was continued until July 2, 1918, when it was increased to 26 cents and remained at that figure until control ceased. By the spring of 1918, many complaints of hardship were coming to the Board from the numerous small high-cost producers. The Government was requiring about 93 per cent of the output at this time, 49 per cent being consumed by the United States and 44 per cent by the Allies. Maximum production was absolutely required and the Government could afford to take no risk of causing a reduction. The price- fixing committee voted on May 22, 1918, to continue the 23J cents until August 15. But a few days later, when evidence had been shown them of advances in freight rates and increases and prospec- tive increases in costs of labor, which were making the smaller pro- ducers run at such great loss that they would have to close down ; the committee voted that the price should be raised to 26 cents on July 2.* A committee, formed to represent 15 of the smaller companies, pre- sented the case at Washington. The fixing of copper prices, as was the case of steel, brought with it the necessity of control in other directions. Control over the distribution of copper was far less difficult than that of steel. While civilian uses of copper are very numerous and very important, they *The cost sheets of the smoUlng and roflnlng companies show<'cl lossos. One nn«l a half cents of the advance went to smelters and refiners, one cent to producers. 136 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. are not nearly so indispensable, particularly for a short period, asj are those of iron and steel. The war required over 90 per cent ol the copper which we could produce. This simply meant that ci-{ vilian use had to be practically suspended, and this was accomplished not so much by priority control in the sense in which that process was used on steel ; but it was accomplished through the purchase by the War Department of a high percentage of the copper and its' distribution to the manufacturers of armaments as they needed it. The principal responsibility of the Board, after the market had once been stabilized, was to watch over production and take care^ that it was not diminished; to guard against speculation; and to keep the small producers encouraged to continue their furnaces. The copper producers' committee, at the direction of the Board, allocated the various orders. In October, 1917, Eugene Meyer, jr., was placed in charge of the Board's section on nonferrous metals. He gave particular attention to the problem of maintaining adequate production and the proper' distribution of copper, but did not take part in the price fixing. He remained in this position until March, 1918, when he became a director in the War Finance Corporation, and Pope Yeatman suc- ceeded him and remained chief until the end. A word of explanation of the copper producing industry may make this story more clear. In the first stages of production copper- bearing ores are smelted, the metals being reduced and segregated from the nonmetals in a product known as "blister copper." Fre- quently associated with the copper are gold, silver, nickel, plati- num, selenium, and other metals. They all occur in the blister. The electrical conductivity of copper is diminished by the presence of other metals. Therefore, in order to purify the blister and ta recover the gold, silver, and nickel the crude or blister copper is re- fined by the electrolytic process, and the product is the electrolytic copper of commerce which runs 99.93 per cent pure. When, how- ever, the blister copper carries a negligible quantity of the more precious metals, it is usuall}^ refined by the furnace method, and this less pure product is known as casting copper, and is sold a little below the pure grades. Pig coppei is produced in one smelting operation from ores which are free from precious metals. " Lake copper " is a product which comes from the Lake Superior districts where native metallic copper occurs almost free from other elements. It is crushed and refined by the furnace method. The production of copper in the United States increased about 51 per cent between 1913 and the end of the war. In 1917 it was 2,428,- 000,000 pounds of new copper. Lake producers increased their out- put. A number of new deposits were discovered, but the most im- portant cause of increase was expansion and improvement in equip- ment and processes at established properties. Several new smelting^ AMEinCAN INDUSTUY IN TllK WAK. 137 !' aijjplants, concentrating plants, and refineries were put intd operation, tofjivhile many more were remodeletl for the purjxjse of in>(alliiii: nt-wly cii leveloped proceSvSes and eqnipment. lieiili There was a 100 per cent increase in the production of recovered cesl|?opper, the 1918 output beini; a half billion pounds. This metal is lasclerived by remelting- and refining furnace ashes and cinders, scrap itjL-om posed of clippings, punchings, borings, etc., and from discarded I t. ijirticles. Recovered copper can be refined electrolytically and made ladjjqual to the virgin product. Copper alloys, like brass, when recov- iire:|?red. need not be reduced to the separate metals, but can be brought tfliap to specifications by a suitable admixture of new metals in the ;es, process of refining. rdjj Despite many hardships and obstacles, the American copper pro- ij:lucers played their part and contributed to the successful prosc- liepution of the war in a waj^ second to no other industry. There are ODJimple grounds for the belief that the prices fixed by the Government lerkorked hardship on many operators; and to add to the distress, the {ei-:igning of the armistice on November 11 left them, like producers of a 3ther raAv materials, with very large stocks on hand, produced at the e- highest costs in the history of the trade, and Avith no large orders Decked. ZINC. Zinc, commonly known in the trade as spelter, was never a serious a lesser extent in the manufacture of munitions. In normal times the galvanizing industry uses 60 per cent of our total consumption. Zinc was one of the metals which the commissioner of raw ma- terials took up in March, 1917, as part of the general preparation carried on just before war was declared. An agreement was ob- tained from Edgar Palmer, president of the New Jersey Zinc Co., to supply such quantities as the Government might need at 12 cents per pound for sheet zinc, the prevailing market price being about 20 cents. During the war the Conservation Division of the Board relieved tlie industry of some of its surplus production by suggesting substitu- tions of zinc for tin, lead, aluminum, and nickel, when shortages ap- peared in the latter metals. Zinc was substituted for lead and cop- per in the coffin industry — quite a large item. Zinc ca^^tings sup- planted brass in some instances. Domestic production, constituting about one-third of the woi-hl's output, is more than adequate for our needs. Belgimn, (Jermany, Australia, Austria, and Great Biitain are the other produrcrs. Wlien 138 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. the war broke out in Europe and Germany, Belgium, and Austri were eliminated, large foreign markets were opened for America! spelter. In July, 1914, our exports were 157 tons ; in September tlie_ were 19,045 tons. Considering our total annual production of 700,00 tons, this sudden demand from abroad was reflected extraordinaril; in prices. Starting in November, 1914, and culminating in June 1915, prices rose from 5.08 cents per pound to 22.50 cents, or approxi mately 350 per cent. One of the largest low-cost producers closed just as the expor demand began, and by the beginning of 1915 the home market wa being stimulated by the buying of munitions manufacturers wh« were getting lucrative contracts from the Allies, and for whom tin price of spelter represented such a small percentage that it was o little moment. Galvanizers were almost put out of business. Dur ing this period smelters were expanding, extinct coal burning plant were being resurrected, and new works constructed. An over-pro duction soon brought a depression of prices, but they went back t( 21 cents again in March, 1916. From this time prices began to fall' and with one exception, about the beginning of 1917, continued t( fall throughout the war period. The vacillations of this industry are largely accounted for bj the fact that in the Joplin (Mo.) district, where about 35 per ceni of our output is produced, the ore is readily accessible and easily concentrated, so that the miner needs little or no capital. Whik the larger mines of Montana, Idaho, Colorado, and Utah have wel equipped works, the whole industry is affected by the simplicity oJ the operations at Joplin. The refining plants are easily expandec by erecting additional batteries of retorts, and are easily dis- mantled. During the war the expansion and contraction of smelt- ing capacity was remarkable. They expanded early with rumors ol huge requirements, and contracted in 1917 and 1918 when demand did not meet expectation. Perhaps the most important work of the section was that oi studying the uses for zinc which would conserve other metals more difficult to obtain, and to keep the industry encouraged to maintair high production in anticipation of a time when their product woulc be more needed. With this second point in mind, and for the pur- pose of insuring a sufficient quantity of the high-grade product needed for war purposes, in the face of a disintegrated and dis couraged industry, price fixing was resorted to. There are foui grades of zinc, based on the content of cadmium, iron, and lead The grades range from the purest, grade A or " high grade," througl: B or "intermediate," and C or "brass special," to D or " prim( western." The high grade is used in making the best quality of brass AMKRICAX INinSTlIV IN Till. NNAK. 139 ;'l and for rolling sheet zinc; i'or <:!ilviini/,iii«2:..(he i)rinie western, which is by far the most abnndant, is used. "'5 The Navy has ahvays required for its brass cartridiro cases a ^ grade A zinc, containing 0.07 per cent of cadmium or less. Cad- fil mium can not be removed by the ordinary distilling process. Only fl'two companies could produce zinc of this specification, the New "s Jersey Zinc Co. from a pure ore and the Anaconda Copper Mining Co. by the electrolytic process. These two companies could not pro- w|duce enough for the cartridge cases required by the Navy and the Army together. The section studied the problem with the Army, and specifications allowing up to one-half of 1 per cent cadmium were til adopted for the spelter used in the brass of Army cartridge cases. This spelter came to be known as xVrmy grade A. On February 13, 1918, a maximum price of 12 cents per pound f. o. b. East St. Louis, w^as set for grade A zinc. This, with the new Army specifications, made it possible for the various companies to produce enough zinc for all cartridge cases required. Plate zinc was fixed at the same time at 14 cents, and sheet zinc at 15 cents. After prices had been fixed on sheet and plate zinc, a problem in allocations arose. It was deemed important to keep as many as possible of the mines of the Joplin district running. Through the mediation of the section, the zinc rolling mills agreed to pay the miners sTo a ton base on 60 per cent zinc concentrates, and the mills agreed to distribute their buying proportionately among the mines of the district wdiich produced this grade. The miners formed an association and the section appointed an allocating committee of the association to receive the requirements of the rolling mills and allo- cate them in due proportion. It is interesting to note the rise and fall of total annual produc- tion of spelter in the United States during the years most affected by the war. It was 542,000 tons in 1915; 718,OOo"^in 1916; 700,000 in 1917; and 545,000 in 1918. Domestic consumption was 65 per cent in 1918, 32 per cent entering into war consumption by the United States and 23 per cent by the Allies. As brass is a mixture of varying ratios of copper and zinc, to- gether with small quantities of lead, tin, nickel, or other metals, our problem of producing enough of it for the war depended largely on the production of the two metals which have just been studied. About 70 per cent of the brass industry of the country is concen- trated in the Naugatufk Valley of Connecticut, which was part of the congested district during the war. But the equipment and skill re- quired in brass works made it impracticable for the war-time de- velopment to take place outside of this district. The number of mix- 140 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. tures used in the composition of brass is very great, but the com- monest forms are "high brass," which takes about 67 per cent cop- per and 33 per cent spelter ; " low brass," 80 per cent copper and 2C per cent spelter ; and " commercial bronze," 90 per cent copper and 10 per cent spelter. " Muntz " metal is 60 per cent copper and 40 per cent spelter. " Nickel silver," called German silver before the war, takes copper 72 per cent, spelter 10 per cent, and nickel 18 per cent, though the percentage of nickel varies with the purpose. " Cupro nickel " is a mixture of 85 per cent copper and 15 per cent nickel. This last-named metal is used for the jacket of bullets for small arms ammunition. We produced a maximum of 4,000.000 pounds a month of all types during the war. The most important use of brass for war is in the manufacture of cartridge cases of all sizes up to 4.7 inches, the product coming from the brass mills in the form of disks. Demands for this purpose, in- cluding those of our Allies, were estimated in August, 1918, at 885,000 pounds per day. The small arms cartridge program called for 1,235,000 pounds of brass per day, although production never reached beyond one-half of the program. Brass tubing for condensers for steam engines, both stationary and those used on ships, made heavy demands on the industry. Brass rod was needed in great quantities for the manufacture of time fuses and high explosive fuses for shells. Fine, flexible brass wire was required in great quantities by the Signal Corps for outpost wire. Brass wire is an absolute essential in the paper making industry, where it is used in the form of wire netting, which wears out rapidly. In September, 1918, the Signal Corps asked for 1,500,000 pounds of outpost wire per month. The supply of this was still a subject of concern when the armistice came. Brass rod for fuses was pro- duced in this country for the Allies in great quantity, and our pro- ductive capacitj^ had been so increased that no shortage was felt until July 1, 1918, when our increased military program was an- nounced, and France at the same time asked for new orders to be delivered at the rate of 6,000,000 pounds per month. Plans for meeting this situation were making satisfactory progress when the end came. The Brass Section of the War Industries Board was formed on April 6, 1918, with Everett Morss as chief. At that time the only imj)ortant shortage was in tubing, both brass and copper. The sec- tion first set to work to make supply of this product meet war needs,. Semi-monthly reports on tubing were obtained from each manufac- turer on blanks furnished by the section. These reports showed orders received, shipments made, and orders on hand for eight groups of brass tubing and six groups of copper tubing. They showed the distribution of all these orders between the Army, Navy, AMERICAN INDUSTllV IX TilK WAIl. 141 Emer^^ency Fleet, and others. They showed, also, the priority class of each order. These figures were posted to ledger accounts for oJ«ach company, and a general summary was also made for all com- )m panics. This record made it possible for the section, when a source of supply had to be found for any kind of tubing, to determine tl) quickly what company could probably take the order witli the least embarrassment and with the least interference with other orders of I5J importance. The shortage became so acute that on June 26, 1918, notice was issued to the mills to make no shipments of tubing after July 10, «)( except on such orders as were covered by priority certificates or by permits issued by the section. The demands for tubing by the Aircraft Production Bureau, while not large in tonnage, weie very difficult to handle because the specifications were constantly chang- ing. The bureau placed the problem in the hands of one man, who, by constant reference to the section for general information, car- ried it through successfully by dealing directly with the mills. It Ava^ not until later in the summer of 1918 that concern began to be felt over shortages in brass production other than tubing. On August 29 representatives of all the brass manufacturers met the section in Washington, and a war service committee for brass manufacturers was appointed to replace the earlier tube com- mittee. Owing to the complications due to the variety of products and the large number of mills, the section did not arrange for de- tailed reports similar to those on tubing, but instead it had daily or •weekly reports from several of the large producers, pending the ■development of a general scheme of reports which would give the necessar}- information. On September 24, an order was issued to all mills to make the acceptance of new orders subject to a permit from the section, and the mills were requested not to ship after November 30 without a permit even on orders taken before September 24. On November 1, the Army was asked to make a new survey of its requirements ■with the idea in mind of making all possible substitutions for brass, but this plan did not need to be carried out. The brass facilities of the country increased during tiie war be- tween 50 and 75 per cent. The total production in 1917 was 1,072,000,000 pounds. Formal price fixing was not resorted to. The price of brass normally varies with the price of copper and spelter, and it was felt that control in the prices of these two ai-ticles would be sufficient for the regulation of brass, and this in a broad way proved true, although the shortages in the latter part of 1918 were being definitely reflected in advancing prices which would have made price-fixing necessary if the war had not ended. Chapter 4. OTHER METALS. . In the course of the war period several other metal industries pro- ducing war necessities had to be encouraged or controlled to a greater or less extent in order that their activities might be shaped to the war program. Separate sections were formed to study and supervise the Ferroalloys,^ Tin, Aluminum, Lead, Nickel, Quicksilver, Antimony, and Platinum. FERROALLOYS. Considerable work had been carried on in this field by Mr. Sum- mers and Mr. Replogle before the section was formed in March, 1918, with Hugh W. Sanford as chief. Contact with the industry was maintained through the ferroalloys committee of the American Iron and Steel Institute. The principal commodities which presented themselves as problems to the section were manganese, vanadium, tungsten, zirconium, ferrosilicon, and chromite. Manganese. — Manganese in some form is essential in the steel in- dustry. It is the purifying element used for deoxidizing and elimi- nating the dissolved oxygen, from 15 to 20 pounds to the ton of steel being required. It can be used in any one of three forms, corre- sponding to t3'pes of manganese ores as they occur. (1) Ferromanganese, containing 80 per cent^ manganese and about 10 per cent iron, is produced from ores containing 40 to 50 per cent manganese and the iron. (2) Spiegeleisen, containing about 35 per cent manganese and 5 to 40 per cent iron. (3) Manganese pig iron, produced from iron ore, bearing small percentages of manganese. The ores occur in a continuous series, containing decreasing quan- tities of manganese with increasing quantities of iron. Varying quantities of silica are also frequently present and detract from the value. 1 The Ferroalloys Section functioned as part of the Chemical Division, but its work -will be accounted for in this chapter because it relates so definitely to the steel industry. ' In May. 1018. the American standard was reduced to 70 per cent to increase the use of the domestic product. 142 AMERICAN INDUSTltV IX TJIE WAR. 143 I Low-grade ores are found in great quantities in the United States, |)ut the higher grades occur in Brazil, the Caucasus, and India. Spie- releisen can be used for the Bessemer steel process, but the high- Trade ferroinanganese is required for the open-hearth process. Be- fore the war our steel producers got most of their high-grade ferro- nanganese from England, where the ores had been brought from [ndia and the Near East. This country produced only 2,000 tons )f high-grade ore in 1914. The shipping situation made the pre- war practice impossible, and the growing use of the open-hearth process in our expanding steel industry brought about a serious i» situation. Eelief was sought in two directions, chiefly by stimu- frating domestic production, but to some extent by assisting importa- ai ;ion from Brazil. 'k\ Everything possible was done to aid domestic production. Pri- iprity was given on machinery, on labor, and on railroad transporta- ttion. Prices had been allowed to take their own course on the theory that it would stimulate production. Still it was clear by May, 1918, that heavy shortages were threatening. Although it involved a hardship on the steel trade, the problem was relieved by iii reducing the standard of purity from 80 per cent to 70 per cent, and as; -his made available several hundred thousand tons of American ore uJDf a type which had not been in use. ell About the same time the American Iron and Steel Institute made |m agreement with the American ore producers to increase prices land stabilize them over a period of one year. They were fixed at !$1 per unit, which was three times the price in 1915. American i. mines produced about 310,000 tons of high-grade ore and 050,000 jtons of low-grade ore in 1918. Imports of ore from Brazil were encouraged, but imports of ferro- manganese from England were forbidden, in order to save the ship- Iping from India to England. During May coal ran short in Brazil find the railroad bringing the ore to the seaboard was shut down. About the same time the Government ship Cyclops, en route to this country with a cargo of ore, was sunk. Through the efforts of the section, a special license was obtained for 12,000 tons from England to meet the demand, and the Ship- ping Board consented to send coal to Brazil and made possible a 3ontinuation of that source. The price of high-grade forromanga- « was $37.50 per ton in 1914. It went as high as $400 in June md July, 1917, but was stabilized, chiefly through the efforts of the American Iron and Steel Institute, at $250 a ton during the later half of 1917 and during 1918. The shortage of shipping and the ever increasing submarine menace made it necessary to pay this rice in order to get American production. 144 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. Manganese ore is used also in the fabrication of dry batterie but the dominating- problem throughout the war period was to secui enough of the high-grade product to supply the steel industry. F errovanadium. — Ferrovanadium is used in small quantities in th production of high-speed and cutting-tool steels, automobile steel: and other castings designed to withstand heavy and repeated dynamij stresses. It is a rare metal, worth in normal times about $2.20 | pound, the price rising during the war to $5.50. The principal sourc is Peru, whence the ore concentrates are brought to this country by th American Vanadium Co. The ore is packed to the seacoast on llama from mines which are at a very high altitude and inaccessible. Th American Vanadium Co. has considered the construction of auto mobile roads, and at one time during the "war they considered th practicability of using airplanes for the transportation of the ore A small quantity is produced in this country as a 2 or 3 per cen by-product of carnotite ore, which is mined for the uranium o: radium which it contains. A small percentage comes also fron roscoelite ore of Colorado. But the world's chief source of supph is Peru and is owned by one company. Shipments from Peru have been very irregular, and there was a great shortage both in Eng land and in this country during the war. In 1914 imports of 14,50( metric tons of 30 per cent ore concentrates were reported, and ir 1915, 3,145 metric tons. The shortage made it necessary for the section to control the dis- tribution of vanadium, and none was allowed except for war re- quirements either here or abroad. England was supplied with 5( tons a month, although she asked for 100 tons. Stocks were de- clining rapidly in 1918, consumption exceeding production by about 30 per cent. Nothing could be done to increase domestic produc- tion except at forbidding costs. Every effort was made to increase production in Peru, and it is believed that if the war had continued a satisfactory solution would have been found. The situation witli respect to this commodity would warrant the attention of the Gov- ernment in peace times as a measure of preparedness for war. Tungsten. — Tungsten was used in \h^ war (1) chiefly in high-speed tool steels; (2) in magnet steels; (3) in valve steels for airplane en- gines; (4) in hacksaw and low-tungsten steels; and (5) in the form of ductile tungsten for (a) incandescent lamps, (b) Rontgen or X-ray tubes, (c) for electric contacts, and other chemical work. The high- speed steel for machine tools not only involved the greatest tonnage, but was the most essential, for no satisfactory- substitute could be found. Tungsten is produced in quantity in the United States, but is also imported from the Far East and the west coast of South America. AMKUUAX IXI>rsruV IX TlIK WAK. 145 ^^ The price of tuno-ston is moasurod in terms of units of 20 pounds ^^of 60 per cent WOa concentrates. In January, 19U>, the price was $7.50 per unit. In April, 191(). it reachetl its niaxiniuni at $80 per unit. The advance was due to the enormous demand for lu cents, while contract j^rices ranged around 38 cents.^ The war requirements for aluminum were being studied by the 1 1 commissioner of raw materials of the Council of National Defense q in March, 1917, and on April 25, 1917. with the market at CO cents, ■i ! Mr. Davis, president of the Aluminum Co. of America, offered to J 'provide the United States Government with whatever it wanted for H its preparedness campaign at whatever price the Government should i\ put upon it. This offer was accepted for 2,000,000 pounds of alumi- il| num ingots at 27| cents a pound, and a few days later enlarged to \\ 8,000,000 pounds, to be delivered before August of that year. In Sep- tember, 1917, the company agreed with the War Industries Board "to accept direct and indirect orders at the prevailing contract prices" (38 cents), and to refund to the Government any difference which might exist between this contract price and any fixed price which might be decided upon at a later date. Meanwhile the Federal Trade Commission had been studying the costs of production of the Aluminum Co. of America with a view to furnishing data for price fixing. The data were received by the ; War Industries Board early in 1918, and a price of 32 cents per : pound was recommended on February 28, and approved by the j President on March 2. On May 9, the question of renewal of the ; fixed price was brought before the price-fixing committee. The pro- I ducers presented facts to show that they had been compelled to : enlarge their plants to meet the increasing war needs, and that the ! large cost involved would warrant an advance of 3 cents per pound ; to the price schedules which expired on June 1 ; they showed in par- r * In normal times the bulk of tbc aluminum output Ir nold through contrortR wlilcli are I usuallr made earlv in the vear and cover doliverios for the entire ve«r. 150 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. ticular that the Allies were paying much higher prices from otlier sources. A compromise was reached at 33 cents, and this was con- tinued until March 1, 1919. The control over the distribution of aluminum was secured through priority certificates and by a working agreement between the Board and the Aluminiun Co. of America, whereby the latter exercised certain discretion in the classification of priorities. All purchases were made directly from the Aluminum Co. at the fixed prices. There was never any real shortage for war requirements during the period, though there were occasional delays in delivery due to rail- road congestion and lack of power at the smelting plants. Very, close control, however, had to be exercised over the distribution of I the output, and many restrictions were imposed on its use for non- essential purposes. Aluminum was handled by the Board in the Non- ferrous Metals Division by Pope Yeatman and his assistants. Lead was one of the commodities taken up in the days just before we entered the war by the raw-materials committee and the General Munitions Board of the council. The producers, under the leadcrsliip of Mr. Crane of the St. Joseph Lead Co., came forward and offered to sell to the Government such quantities as were needed at a price to be set by the Government. On the face of things lead should not have been a serious problem. In 1913 the United States produced 32.4 per cent of the world's output. The process of production is simple and inex- pensive and supply is normally very responsive to demand. But July 1, 1917, saw lead quoted at 11.17 cents per pound — 160 per cent above average prewar prices. This situation was caused by the com- bined circumstances of a European demand, which was never prop- erly calculated or announced in such a way as to produce a steady flow of the material, together with strike trouble, transportation trouble anvi indefinite guessing on the part of the tfade as to the quantities which the United States would demand for the war. Im- portant reductions, during our period in the war, in the use of shrapnel affected very materially the demand for lead. In May, 1917, the General Munitions Board considered the ques- tion of commandeering supplies for the Government. Discussions with the trade, however, brought about a contract on June 18, 1917, for 8,000 tons, July delivery, and 25.000 tons each for August, Septem- ber, and October deliveries, at 8 cents a pound. Immediately prices began to fall and reached 6.71 cents in September. Price fixing was suggested in October, but was not found necessary, for by that time there was a large supply of lead in the market and there was little probability of a new inflation of prices. AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN TlIK WAR. 151 It seemed desirable, however, to devise a workinji!; proj^rani l)y which the Government should not be paying higher than market prices for its lead. The method adopted amounted to a series of four-month agreements between the Government and the various lead producers, arranged through the section and the lead producers committee for war service representing the trade, in terms of which the Government agreed to purchase at average current monthly prices as they appeared in the Engineering and Mining Journal, and the producers agreed to supply at these prices from a minimum of 6.000 to a maximum of 12,000 tons each month. On the 15th of each month the lead producers committee was in- formed, through the section, of the approximate amounts re(iuirod by each Government purchasing department for the ensuing month. The last four-month agreement expired November 30, 1918. The price never exceeded 7.75 cents per pound East St. Louis or 8.05 cents New York. The total direct purchases by the Government from July, 1917, to November, 1918, amounted to 150,400 tons. It was believed in October, 1917, that the definition of Government requirements and method of reaching prices would stabilize the market and insure a steady supply to meet all needs, but the freight congestion of early 191 S upset calculations, and in the spring the increased military program l>oth increased and made speculative the demand. A strike tied up the second largest producer during the greater part of March and April, and labor had become so scarce that it seemed impossible to increase the output during tlie summer. The only solution seemed to be to ration lead to all consumers on the basis of their essential needs. The problem was worked out by the Lead Section, with Irwin H. Cornell as chief, acting under the Nonferrous Metals Division, in connection with the lead producers committee for war service, representing the industry. The com- mittee handled directly the control over distribution, subject to the section's supervision and occasional alteration. No priority certificates were used. The committee was warned tliat the in- dustry must keep prices below excessive levels or price fixing would be resorted to. On June 14 the committee agreed to sell no pig lead higher tiian 7.75 cents per pound I^ast St. Louis, or 8.05 cents New York, and the Engineering and Mining Journal consented to consider no sales made at a higher figure in computing its monthly average price at St. Louis. Under this arrangement prices remained unchanged until the end. Sheet-load production increased from 15,000 tons in 1914 to .'>.'i.000 tons in 1918, due to the building and expansion of acid plants work- ins" in the manufacture of exnlosivp with numerous subordinate sections in charge of particular chemi- if -cals. Charles H. MacDowell was made Director of Chemicals, and the Director of Chemicals was made a member of the Conservation Division as well as the Requirements Division. As the work undertaken by this division covers a wide and impor- tant field, it will be convenient for the purposes of this report to divide the account into three chapters. One will refer to those •chemicals more nearly related to the production of powder and explosives, the other two to such additional chemical industries as had to be brought under control for the purposes of the war. For chemicals used in explosives the following sections were formed: Nitrate of Soda. Sulphur and Pyrites, Acids and Heavy Chemicals, Alkali and Chlorine. Ethyl Alcohol, and Explosives. The work of the Section on Cotton Linters will also be presented in this •chapter, because of its close relation to the other subjects. NITRATK OF SOOA. The world's supply of nitrate of soda comes from deposits in Chile. In normal times about GO per cent of our importations is devoted to the production of fertilizers. In 191:^ we brought in 625,000 tons. But orders of the Allies with American munitions manufacturers had brought this figure up to 1,21 8,42.'^ tons in 19 IG. For our country and the Allies, Chilean nitrate was practically the only source during the war for the nitric acid essential to all powders and explosives. Germany produced nitric acid by nitrogen-fixation processes, without which she perhaps could not have carried on the r.: 158 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAi.. war. America started three fixation plants, but none of them were completed before the armistice. The problem of nitrate of soda had two aspects, (1) shipping and (2) purchasing in Chile.^ The Chilean market is small and cen- tralized, and thus with the various Allies and the American import- ers buying for the Government and private consumption alike, each bidding against the other, prices rose rapidly. They were 57 per cent above the normal in the spring of 1917; by September they had become more than twice the average for 1913. It was clearly necessary to eliminate this haphazard competitive system of buying. Before the war Germany took about one-third of Chile's output for fertilizer purposes. The German oficinas" in Chile were oper- ating on a much reduced scale when we entered the war. During the summer of 1917 an effort was made, through the American importers, to have the Chilean Government seize these plants and reopen them in order to supply the ever-increasing demand. This was not effected. Some of the German oficinas continued to operate, but their produc- tion was limited by their inability to secure necessary supplies. Some of the stocks produced by the German oficinas were secured by authorized American importers for shipment to the United States.. But even with this added supply the increasing competition among the buyers, together with the shortage of fuel, of sacks, and of rail transportation from the refineries to the coast, kept Chilean prices continuously increasing. In October, 1917, negotiations began between the United States, England, France, and Italy to pool all allied bujdng, and purchases in Chile were curtailed during the remaining months of the year while the buying pool was being perfected. Prices for 1917 reached their maximum in October. Buying under the pool began in Janu- ary, 1918, and continued through the war. The pool took the form of an appointment of a nitrate executive in London, headed by Her- bert Gibbs, of Antony Gibbs & Co. Eobert P. Skinner, United States consul general in London, was appointed American representative on the executive. The first thought was to have the nitrate executive do all of the buying in Chile with an arrangement for reselling to each partici- pating country. This plan gave way, however, so far as our country was concerned, to one according to which each of our importers bought, under the sole direction of the Nitrate Executive, a designated share of the total purchases allocated to the United States by the executive, and all prices were pooled. This kept the regular Ameri- ' See Appendix XLII for a more exhaustive account of the solution of the nitrate problem. " An ofieina is a plant in which the raw nitrate of soda, as it is taken from the ground. Is refined by dissolving it in warm water and allowing recrystalization as the water ia evaporated off. I AMERICAN INOUSTRV IX THE WAR. 159 '^^lian buyers in the nuuket during the life of the pool. The four "iiicipal importers of the country were designated as sole pur- ing agents of the nitrate executive for its operations in behalf . the United States, and it was arranged that each should handle lio following percentages of the total allocated to us: Du Pont ;;ite Co., 33^ per cent; W. R. Grace & Co., 3G3 per cent; Wessel, \A & Co., 11^ per cent; and Anthony Gibbs & Co., through H. J. ;;i!cor & Bro., agents, I85 per cent. In order to coordinate the work of the American importers, cal- ". iiilnte prices, allocate shipping, etc., the nitrate committee of the pi: United States was established in New York with H. Ray Paige, '?; ;^epresentative of the War Industries Board, as manager. The com- ttf Inittee was composed of two representatives from each of the four ''i importers in addition to Mr. Paige.^ After the War Industries Board iz Iwas dissolved, January 1, 1919, Mr. Paige remained to liquidate the K jiffairs of the committee, functioning as a member of the War Trade 1 JBoard. In Washington, Charles H. MacDowell was in charge of nitrate for the War Industries Board throughout the war. He remained !i bhief of the Nitrate Section even after he became director of the Chemicals Division. As early as April, 1917, the raw materials viivi- 3 |sion made an important move to relieve the nitrate situation, and !;:jit will be seen that this importing arrangement was only a con- ; [.summation of the early plan. The division announced to all manu- ;, !facturers about to talce contracts for munitions with the United States ? ;that they need not cover their nitrates by option or by inquiry, but t ithat the Government would guarantee a sufficient supply at 4| cents i [per pound. This was for the purpose of quieting the market, though • a way for making good on it had not yet been worked out. There iKvas, however, a definite nitrate differential for each kind of powder ■ "and explosive, so that should the United States have to \)ny more i I than 4] cents it would be only a matter of accounting in the price ijof powder. As a matter of fact, the Government settled all of these I contracts in December with a price of 4i cents, having lowered the I Chilean prices. j Under the pooling arrangement the four importers agreed to buy in Chile such quantities of nitrate of soda as were allocated to each, 'ship it to the United States, and deliver as directed by the War 1 Industries Board (1) to the Government at actual cost i)lus out-of- pocket expenses and (2) to other consumers at landed co.st plus a I gro.ss commission of 2J per cent. Arrangements were nuide whereby I the cost of the nitrate was averaged over each month of purchase. •The membership of the committee was F. O. Fischer and II. J. RoIr. of W. R. Grace & Co. ; .T. B. D, Edge and W. A. Murphy, of Du Pont Nitrate Co. ; G. L. Duviil and P. W. Alexander, of Wossel, Duval & Co. ; L. B. Chandler, of Antony GIbbs & Co. ; F. M. Smith, of II. .7. Baker & Bro.; and H. Hay I'aij,'e, of the War Industries Board. 160 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. The contract and arrangement with the importers covered the audit- ing of their accounts from time to time to verify costs and other con- ditions surrounding importation. The nitrate executive in London calculated monthly prices in Chile, all purchases being averaged each month. The nitrate com- mittee in New York calculated monthly prices delivered at American ports and warehouses. The Shipping Board established uniform shipping rates from Chile to the United States, which simplified the calculations somewhat. Computation of American prices Avas very difficult and involved. It was impossible to reach final figures within a reasonable time for the importers to bill their sales. During the first four months of 1918 bills were rendered, some at the tentative monthly price of 4.25 cents per pound, others at 4.35 cents. From May forward a tentative monthly price was fixed by the committee.^ It was the understanding that refunds would be made, so as to adjust those prices to actual costs, as stated above. Final United States landed pool prices were calculated by the committee and announced from time to time, the work being concluded in the spring of 1919.* Purchases made by the American importers in 1917 for delivery in Chile in 1918 were placed in the pool as to quantity, but not as to price. All purchases made during 1918 were made under the pool. In October, 1917, as a preliminary to the formation of the pool, arrangements were made by which the Department of Agriculture was to get, through the Du Pont Co., 109,000 long tons of nitrate of soda for distribution to the farmers during the spring of 1918. Only 67,000 tons of this was delivered in the spring, the rest being post- poned until fall. Because of the serious shortage of ships during the late winter and spring of 1918, and the shortage of nitrate in France on account of sinkings and other difficulties, some of this agricultural nitrate, as well as other Government nitrate (61,000 tons in all), was diverted to France. Our war stocks became very low at this time; there was only about a 6-weeks' supply on May 1, 1918. Early in the summer of 1918 a shortage of coal, fuel oil, bags, and railroad equipment began to be felt in the nitrate fields of Chile. This region is arid and produces none of these supplies. The Chilean Government approached the United States Government with a special contract providing for the sale of 680,000 gross tons of nitrate of soda on condition that certain of these supplies would be furnished in return. The Nitrate Section made arrangements through the London executive, the American importers, and the «See Appendix XXIII for table of tentative United States landed pool prices for nitrate of soda. * See Appendix XXIV for table of final United States landed pool prices for nitrate of soda. AMERICAN IXDUSTKV IN TllK WAR. IGI riorities commissioner of tlio Ijoaid io uccvpt this contract ami haw s terms carried out. The Nitrate Section of the Board lvei)t in close touch with the nitrate ommittee in New York and the nitrate executive in London, <4i\ in;^ urrent advices to the nitrate executive on the condition of stocks iu le United States: requirements, shipments, stocks on luind, consumj)- iou, etc. When the shipping control committee would allocate ves- pIs for the trade, Mr. Paige in New York would arrange to have the essels assigned to the four importers according to their tonnage equirements for the account of the Army, the Navy, or the importer's wn account. Distribution to munitions plants and to acid plants producing for aunitions was carefully watched to see that they were never short, ven if private industries had to be curtailed. The section brought efore the priorities commissioner the question of securing priority ertificates for fuel, machinery, and railroad supplies for the nitrate elds. The principal war use of nitrate of soda is for the production of itric acid, which is used in a mixture of 30 per cent nitric acid and per cent sulphuric acid for the nitrating process in the manufac ure of powder and explosives. Bleached cotton linters are nitrated vith this mixed acid to produce nitrocellulose powder, which is the hief propellant. Toluol is nitrated to produce T. N. T., phenol to )roduce picric acid, and so on. Nitrate of soda is also required for ;he manufacture of sulphuric acid by the chamber process, 98,000 ons being consumed in this country in 1917 for this purpose. About 97,000 tons were used in 1917 for the production of nitric acid. The arger powder companies make their own sulphuric and nitric acid at heir respective powder and exjjlosives plants. SULPHUR AND PYRITES. The sulphuric acid requirement of the United States for 1918 neasured in terms of 50° Baume acid was estimated at 9,000,000 tons. This was more than double normal consumption. But the adjust- ent in the industry, which the situation required, was even more ignificant, for prior to 1917 about 60 per cent of the sulphuric acid onsumed in the United States was made from pyrites ore imported Tom Spain, and these importations had to be largely cut off to save hipping. Pyrites ore from Canada continued to come in during the var, in fact its importation was greatly increased. The main sources of sulphur for this country' are (1) imported ipanish j^yrites ore, (2) pure brimstone from Louisiana and Texas, 3) Canadian pyrites ore, (4) domestic i)y rites ore, (5) waste gases t copper and zinc smelters. With the increasing re(iuiri'nient and 10582&— 21 11 162 AMERICAN IXDUSTIIY IN THE WAR. the decreasing Spanish supply, the problem of the Board was tu develop the other sources. Canadian imports were increased con-' siderably, and the production of domestic pyrites Avas increased; but the real solution lay in the limitless resources of pure brimstone in Texas and in Louisiana. The attention of the board was turned chiefly to these sources. There are large deposits of pyrites in Cali- fornia and Colorado, but the sulphuric acid plants of the country are chiefly in the East, and shortage of transportation made a large de-j Aelopment of these properties inadvisable. Prior to the organization of tlie Chemicals and Explosives Section, a subcommittee of the chemicals committee of the council handled the distribution of foreign pyrites ore. This committee also, in May, 1917, arranged Avith the sulphur producers for the shipment of sul- phur to fertilizer plants, on approval of the fertilizer subcommittee, at a price of $22 per long ton at mines. No shipments were made to plants having pyrites on hand but, as fast as stocks were used up, sulphur was substituted. The chemicals committee issued a pamphlet showing how to turn pyrites burners to sulphur burning at a mini- mum of expense and time. When the chemicals committee was dis- continued, the Chemical Alliance (Inc.), which followed it, continued to distribute sulphur under this agreement. With the reorganization of the Board in the spring of 1918, the Sulphur and Pyrites Section Avas organized under the direction of William G. Woolfolk. The section undertook to make a careful survey of the situation Avith a vicAV to further control if necessary. The question of com- mandeering the stocks and plants of the Union Sulphur Co. and the Freeport Sulphur Co. was considered and abandoned. Instead of this, a plan was worked out in a series of meetings, conducted by the section Avith a committee of the Chemical Alliance (Inc.), and repre- sentatives of the Kailroad Administration and Shipping Board, under which the production and distribution of sulphur materials should be definitely controlled by the section in conjunction Avith the committee. A program of shipments to the various acid plants of the country, shoAving tonnage month by month for the remainder of 1918, was Avorked out and published August 1. No prices Avere fixed formally, but the price of $22 per long ton for Government purchases Avas continued throughout the year, and the control of supplies and their allocation to essential consumers only had the effect of establishing " contract" prices, though market quotations throughout the year stood around $35 per ton. The nor- mal preAvar price of crude sulphur Avas $22 per long ton, and it re- mained at that figure until the beginning of 1916. In exercising its control over sulphur, the section had in mind (1) to conserve and use to the best advantage Avater and rail transporta- tion facilities by requiring materials of the highest sulphur content; AMEIJICAN INDlSTItV IN TilK WAlt. 1C3 ■(2) to cons^crve tran-portatii)!! thr()ii«^li the use of siilpliiif mntcM-ials availahie at points nearest points ol" consumption; (H) to im-rease j)n>tliJction of properties where it was practicable; (4) to inciease the stocks at important (lovernment and private consumers' phints be- fore winter weather slioukl interfere with transportation; (.">) to stabilize prices; and (6) to cooperate with the War Trade Boartl in controllinac:ty of the plants using molasses was calculated at oO.OOO.OOO pounds per month, those using grain at 88,000,000 pounds per month. Our total war requirements at the time of the armistice were set at 47,000,000 pounds per month. Production from molas.ses increased threefold during the war while production from grain de- creased.^ The price was never fixed by the Government, but after the cessation of manufacture for beverage purposes in September, 1917. prices declined to a point where they remained steady through- out 1918. Grain alcohol. 190 proof, sold at 61 to G2 cents per gallon and denatured alcohol at about 68 cents per gallon throughout the year. •See Appendix XXV for table of production of alcohol in the United States. 19U-1918. 172 AMERICAN IXDUSTRY IN THE WAR. COTTON LINTERS. Cotton linters are used as the base of nitrocellulose or smokeless powder. AA^hile they are not a chemical and the section did not function as part of the Chemicals Division, their important relation to the explosives program will justify placing the account of them in this chapter. " Cotton linters " is the name given to the fine cotton fiber which sticks to the rough surface of cotton seed as it comes from the gin. The lint is removed by an arrangement of revolving saws at the cotton seed crushing plants. In normal times it is used chiefly for stuffing mattresses, pads, horse collars, etc., in making celluloid, felts. absorbent cotton, and other products where a long fiber is not needed Mattresses require a better quality of linters than munitions. The section was formed April 4. 1918, with George R. James as chief. Studies were directed toward the question v/hether the supply of linters would be sufficient for the rapidly developing smokeless- powder facilities, and it appeared that the average annual produc- tion for the past five years had been less than one-half of the re- quirements estimated for the year 1919. It was estimated further that moderately small stocks would be carried OA^er at the end of the cotton year, July 31, 19.18. A series of questionnaires brought out the fact that substituti^ materials could be found for all of the industries using cotton linteii for other than explosives purposes, and the Ordnance Department began experiments in the use of cotton hull fiber and wood pulp as substitutes for cotton linters in the manufacture of nitrocellulose powder. The next step was to arrange not only to stimulate pi'oduc- tion of cotton linters but to turn all linters into the production of munitions. On April 12, 1918, the section called a meeting of repre- sentatives of the cottonseed crushing industry with representatives of the War and Navy Departments. An agreement was reached that after May 2, 1918, all crushing mills would cut nothing but " munitions " linters, producing not less than 145 pounds of linters per ton of seed crushed, and that the Government would take the entire output at $4.67 per hundredweight, f. o. b. points of produc- tion, for a period ending July 31, 1919. For the purpose of carrying this arrangement into effect, there was formed what was known as the Cotton Linter Pool, effective August 1, 1918, to July 31, 1919. The participating members of the pool were (1) the Ordnance Department, through which other agen- cies of the Government, including the Navy, should receive their supplies; (2) the Canadian Government, acting through the Impe- rial Munitions Board; (3) the French Government, acting through the French Powder Mission; (4) tlie British Government, acting AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 173 lirough the British War Mission; (5) the Italian Government, act- ng through the Italian Military Mission; (G) the Belgian (Jovern- lent, acting through the Belgian Commission; (7) American nianu- acturers having CJovernment contracts for smokeless powder or yro cotton; and (8) manufacturers of absorbent cotton or other upplies using linters, having Government or Red Cross contracts. The Ordnance Department undertook to finance the entire project. The Du Pont American Industries (Inc.) was appointed purchasing gent for the Ordnance Department at a fee of 20 cents for each lale (500 pounds) of linters purchased. The linters had to be pur- hased at several thousand plants. A set of rules for the operation f the pool was formulated, covering detailed arrangements by vhich the participating members would secure their supplies at a miform price, including freight charges. The respective functions if the Ordnance Department and the Cotton Linters Section in rela- ion to the pool were defined to avoid duplication of effort. The Ordnance Department handled questions relating to (1) production jid stimulation of production of linters; (2) requisitioning and ;ommandeering of stocks: (3) all financing; (4) the appointment >f the Du Pont American Industries (Inc) ; and (5) any disputes irising between the purcliasing agency and the producers. The Cot- on Linters Section handled (1) all allocations to consumers: (2) itorage of such stocks as might be })urchased during the height of he crushing season in excess of storage capacity at powder i)hints; '3) the formulation of specifications for cutting and baling to con- 'orm to the requirements of all purchasers: (4) a series of periodic •eports from producers showing stocks, current production, and esti- nates: and (5) all records of stocks, production, requirements, and llocations. Over 500,000 bales of linters were purchased by the pool before the rmistice. When the war was over and the question of liquidating he pool and satisfying the claims of the producers arose, a series of meetings, lasting over a month, was held l)y the section, ropresenta- ives of the participating members, and the producers. Numerous plans were proposed and discussed, but the burden and responsi- bility of liquidating the pool and satisfying the claims of the pro- ducers were finally taken by the Ordnance Department. Through the instrumentality of the pool, the maximum cotton linters capacity of the country was turned directly to war use, l)ut still there would not have been enough cellulose material for tlie powder programs of ourselves and the Allies. The experiments in the use of hull fiber and wood pulp as substitutes or dilutents promised a large measure of success. In the largest Du Pont jilant 'at Hopewell, Va.) and in the Government plants at Nitro and 174 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAi'. Nashville, machinery was installed for the use of a combination o cotton linters and hull fiber or wood puljj. The Picatinny Ar^ena used old cotton rags successfully. These combined plans would hav( made possible the full smokeless powder program laid down for 1019 In addition to the pool discussed above, a " Mattress Linter Pool * was also formed by the Ordnance Department with the Du Poul American Industries (Inc.) as purchasing agent. The purpose oi this pool was to buy in a few thousand bales of mattress linters which had been cut prior to May 2, 1918, and were still in stocl> in various parts of the country. These linters were needed for Army and Red Cross mattresses. Prices were set as follows: Grade A, 10 cents per pound; grade B, 7 cents; grade C. 5| cents; f. o. b. points of location. All holders were asked to make voluntary sales to the purchasing agent at these prices. In this way 9,888 bales of mattress linters were purchased, perhaps 75 per cent of existing stocks. No commandeering orders were issued. The section made allocations of these to Government consumers. The section made a study of the industry engaged in bleaching or purifying cotton linters for the powder makers. On July 8, 1918, the price-fixing committee established a maximum price of $6.33 per 100 pounds of bleached material for this service. As it happened the production of linters never reached a rate which strained the bleaching capacity of the country. During the summer the press-cloth industry appealed to the section for help. Press cloth is essential for the cottonseed crushers and the section was interested in supplying them with anything which would stimulate their operations. Its manufacture had been seriouslj affected b}' the suspension of importations of horse, camel, and human hair. Several meetings were held, experiments were made in using flax as a substitute for the hair, but they were not successful. Relief was had through a limited number of import licenses. EXPLOSIVES. The purpose of control and regulation of these several chemicals and of cotton linters was to insure at fair prices an adequate supply of powder and explosives not only for our own Government but for the Allies as well. For after all is said and done, more than haH of the burden of supplying the allied line with explosives and propel- lants fell throughout the entire war on American industry. The raw materials were principally on this side of the water, and the weight of finished articles varied from one-tenth to one-twentieth of that of their constituent parts. Shipping conditions dictated that maun- A.MKKU'AX INnrSTItV IX Till. WAI!. 175 fncturin<; should ho done here, even thoiiL^i our \A:\\\{ facilities were *ii ne Dii Pont mikI (he Hercules :)mpiuiies enlarowder. This gives a notion of the dimensions of the American rogram for the production of propellant powder. Modern warfare requires for high explosives, used as shell filler, tonnage equal to about 85 per cent of that of the pro[)ellants. Raw flaterials for high explosives weigh about 20 pounds to 1 pound of inished product. While P>ngland had some of these materials, rancp ind Italy had practically none. Shipping conditions required hat America should take the burden of the manufacture, and she set bout to do it. 'Called Old Hickory plant. •Near Charleston. 105826—21 12 178 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. The three principal high explosives used as shell filler were trini- trotoluol, ammonium nitrate, and picric acid. (3ur production of all three was limited by our facilities for producing the three coal-tar products, toluol (for T. N. T.), aqua ammonia (for ammonium nitrate), and phenol (for picric acid). The country's dcA^elopment in these industries will be explained in the next chapter in connection with d3^es. The United States had not used T. N. T. for shell filler before the war, but by the spring of 1917 the Allies had developed a monthly ca- pacity of 5,000,000 pounds here. This was, however, still needed by them. Our requirements, with theirs, would consume much more tlian could be produced from the toluol which it was possible to turn out in this country. We had used ammonium nitrate, but tlie Allies had discovered that a mixture of ammonium nitrate and T. X. T. produced a shell filler wliich was at once cheaper and more easilj procured than the pure T. X. T. In October. 1917, this mixture, called " amatol," was adopted as the American shell filler. New toluol plants Averc stimulated all over the country. In many cities gas-stripping plants were built. Beehive coke ovens were sup- planted by by-product ovens everywhere. Various T. N. T. plants were enlarged. The Du Pont plant at Barksdale, Wis., increased its capacity by 2,000,000 pounds per month, and the Hercules plant at Giant, Calif., by 3,500,000 pounds per month. Contracts were signed for the erection of three (Jovernment-owned plants at Racine, Wis.; Giant, Calif.; and Perryville, Md. The Racine plant was under construction, but little more than the plans had been finished for the other two when the armistice came. These plans called for a total monthh' capacity of 12,000,000 pounds. The working capacity November 11, 1918. was about 22,000,000 pounds per month. The price of T. N. T. followed a course very similar to that of smokeless powder. We were i^aying less than 50 cents per pound when the end came. There are three principal processes for the manufacture of am- monium nitrate. The most direct and economical is the nitrogen fixa- tion process used in Germany and Scandinavia. The common process used in American has been the neutralization process, by which aqua ammonia and nitric acid unite to produce the product. It was be- cause no method was in sight for the production of enough either of ammonia or of nitric acid to meet the ammonium nitrate require- ments that the two huge nitrogen fixation plants at Muscle Shoals and Sheffield, Ala., were undertaken. It was expected that these twc plants would come into operation by the beginning of 1919. A nevi plant using the Brunner-Mond process^ was erected at Perryville, » This process is by a double decomposition of nitrate of soda and ammonium sulphate AMERKWN INOrSTHV IN 11 1 K WAK. 171) tijj, ^Id., and was prodnciiiir over 4r){),()()() |)()unds pcM- diiy on Xovi'iiihiT of. .1, 1918. While the fixation plants wore being built il was necessary I'or ini- nediate purposes to stimulate further extensions of plants using the leutralization process. These had reached a monthly capacity of 5,000,000 pounds before the end came. A shoiiage of annnonia vas the limiting factor. This conunodity was handled by an inter- lepartmontal committee. The Food Administration took control of immonia and established a fixed price of 8^ cents per i^oiind. rhe Government bought ammonium nitrate at 15 cents per pound, md the price was never higher than 20 cents. Picric acid was the sliell filler used by the French and Italians. We used only a negligible quantity in the manufacture of anunonium aicrate for armor-piercing shells, and in our Chemical AVarfare Service. It is phenol trinitrated. The price before the war was ibout 25 cents per pound. It jumped to $1.50 early in 1915, when he French began to buy here and remained at this price until the sarly part of 1916, when facilities had been amortized in quantity to neet the demands. It sold at 75 cents in December, 1916. In the spring of 1918 the annual output of our numerous plants as about 135,000,000 pounds. There were no plans for an increase n consumption by the American forces, though, if the war had :ontinued for a number of years, it might have been necessary for qs to adopt it as a shell filler as a supplement to our amatol produc- tion. This, however, was not contemplated for 1911). Shipping conditions at this time were making it impossible for the French and Italians to obtain sufficient phenol, sul|)huric acid, nitric acid, and other constituents to keep their ]dants going at home. They asked this country to double its output of picric acid in order to meet their programs. The plan was that France should take 70 per cent of the new product, Italy 20 per cent, and the United states the remaining 10 per cent. With this understanding, the Government undertook the construction of three large ])lants at Lit- tle Rock, Ark., at Grand Rapids, ^lich., and at Brunswick, Ga. We began at the same time to provide for a sufficient production of phenol (for which a synthetic process of manufacture was al- ready on a commercial basis) and the acids and other materials re- quired. This program was just reaching production Avhen the armistice came. It would have been in full capacity early in I'JlO. Picric acid was selling at 56 and 5,s cents per pound on Noxcuilier 10, 1918, and it was the hope of the ()rdii;ince Dcpartniciit to reduce the price eventually to 45 cents. It is interesting to note that tbc ])riiicipal (•Jicuiicids used in ihc manufacture of ]-)owder and exi)i;)>i\es are also tlie priiuipiil i lieui- llilE nil igCi 180 AMERICAN^ INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. icals of agricultural fertilizers. For war purposes we needed largf crops of the fields — cotton, food, and other things — as well as large quantities of cannon filler. In normal times the fertilizer industry is the largest producer of sulphuric acid and other heavy chemicals, 1 1 happened that the sulphuric acid used for fertilizer was the weak chamber process kind, so that production for both purposes could be maintained at a maximum. In the case of nitrate of soda and sulphate of ammonia, the problem was more diffi;.ult. There w^as a direct conflict, and in the latter part of 1918 the fertilizer industry Mould have suffered severe curtailment had the war continued. The big increase in the production of ammonia from by-product coke ovens, brought about by war needs, has given a surplus to the country and considerable exportation is now going on. CHAITKR G. INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS. The relation of explosives chemicals to the chemicals used in the as(|Jyeing and tanning industries, for the preservation of wood, and for sjit!'>ther industrial purposes is very close. The Board found it iuipoi"- 1\j, tant to establish further chemical sections, not only to guard tlie use oF ul^icbemieals needed for explosives, but to exercise control in the develop- ilrj^ment of certain of these industries essential in themselves to tlie war I and to the civilian population. The following sections were formed lat various times during 1918: Artificial Dyes and Intermediates: 'Industrial Gas and Gas Products; Creosote; Canning Materials and Natural Dyes; Paints and Pigments; Wood Clieinicals: and Miscel- ' laneous Chemicals. The technical aud consulting stalT, functioning 'from the beginning, handled witli unusual skill a large number of special investigations. II ARTIFICIAL DYES AND INTERMEDIATES. •' There are two aspects to the way in which the war has brought dye manufacturing to America. When the German supply was cut off, the Americans were challenged to manufacture their own dyes. i 1 Prices were high enough to stimulate CA^ery eiFort, At the same lina* I the war was demanding for the manufacture of high explosives the ■ same chemicals in huge quantities which for the most part are the vonstituent materials of synthetic dyes. Before the war Germany manufactured more than three-f()Ui-th< <»f i the world's supply of dyes, and nearly all of the intermediates ' used ! in their manufacture. This country had plants producing about 1<> i per cent of its consumption, but 90 per cent of the intermediates used i in these plants came from Germany. Every necessary basic raw 1 1 material, however, except nitrate of soda, is found in this country in ! abundance greater than we can use. Many of the processes of niaiui- i facture were not known here, and the Germans had fought jealously ■ any development. In 1900 we started to manufacture aniline, but the Germans flooded our markets with analine at a price so low that :j our plants never got established. ij Commerce in German dyes and intermediates began to be cur(aili-d as soon as the war broke out in Europe, and prices rose 1,500 per cerit » " Intfrmediates " Is the trade name for coal-far derivatives used In the inanufnciure ..f dyes and explosives. 181 182 A-MEEICAN I:NDUSTEY in Till:: WAR. or more before the end of 1915. Two features affected prices: The fact that the shortage was so much discussed lead to an extraordinary amount of speculation; and the fact that the cost of dye enters as such a small percentage of the value of finished textiles, while the dye is itself an absolute essential, made textile manufacturers pay any price in preference to closing their mills. Artificial dyes, called, also, coal tar, aniline or synthetic dyes, are t( be distinguished from vegetable or natural dyes. Natural dyes car not compete with synthetic dyes in normal times, the latter being produced at a very much lower price. The dry distillation of bitu- minous coal gives as products coke, ammonia, gas, and coal tar. Bj fractional distillation and other processes, some 150 different chemi- cals can be derived from coal tar. The elemental derivatives, chief examples of which are benzol, toluol, creosote oil, solvent naphtha naphthaline, xjdol, anthracine, and carbazol, are called in the trad< " crudes." By the chemical processing of crudes, the so-called " in- termediates" are derived. Intermediates of higher complexity are also made from intermediates of lower complexity. Some of the besi known intermediates are aniline oil, phenol (carbolic acid), salic^dii acid, beta-naphthol, and para-nitraniline. For example, benzol, upor treatment with nitric acid, gives nitro-benzol, an intermediate. Nitro- benzol, upon reduction, gives aniline. Aniline, upon treatment wit! methyl alcohol, gives dimethylaniline, an intermediate. Some 30( intermediates are used in making the 900 synthetic dj^es known to the trade. Very few intermediates were produced in the United States before the war, but in 1917, 134 different intermediates were made by 11^ different firms. The total weight was 287,000.000 pounds, valued al $104,000,000. The synthetic phenol industry was created during thf war to meet the demands for this material in the manufacture of picric acid. The synthetic process is, however, too expensive to com- pete with its production as a coal tar derivative for the normal market Synthetic dyes are built up from the intermediates. This country manufactured dyes to the value of about $3,500,00C in 1914 and $68,700,000 in 1917. The production in 1917 equaled the prewar importation in tonnage, but not in the variety of dyes. The azo and the sulphur dyes were made in largest amounts. Only about, 3 per cent of the prewar importation of indigo dyes was produced, and the alizarines were little beyond the experimental stage.^ The most difficult period of the war for American dye consumers was late 1915 and 1916. Small amounts were brought in from Ger- many in exchange for shipments of cotton, but it was done with great difficulty on account of British objection. Importations from Switzeri - The Tariff Commission issues an anuu;il Census of Dyes and Coal Tar Chemicals ir tlie United States, fiom which these figures are taken. ! A-MEKU'AN IMHSTKV IN llIK WAi:. 183 and were two or three times normal. American capital was slow in imtering the production industry, and many of the processes were )rotected bv (lerman-controlled patents. On September 8, 191G, a ^' lye-stuff tariff law was passed providing for a duty of 30 per cent dIus 5 cents per pound on dyes with certain exceptions, 15 per cent dIus 2i cents per pound on intermediates, and placing crudes on a free list. With the passage of this law capital turned to the industry. The trading with the enemy act, October G, 1917, broke the Oerman ontrol of patents. Under its provision the Federal Trade Commis- sion was given authority to issue licenses under patents owned by jnemy aliens. With this much protection, but under circumstances in which the manufacture of explosives was demanding every pound )f coal-tar derivatives which the country could produce, the dye manu- facturers built an industry which was in operation in time to save the textile manufacturing business of the country from the disastrous effects of a dye famine. Supervision of the dj'e industry was from the beirinning of the council an important part of the work of the Chemicals Division. The Artificial Dyes and Intermediates Section Avas formed in the spring of 1918, with J. F. Schoellkopf, jr., as chief. When he en- tered the Army in September, V. L. King succeeded him. Many of the constituent materials of dyes were placed under (jlovernmcnt control during 1918 — toluol, phenol, acetic acid, wood alcohol, chlorine, caustic soda, nitrate of soda, anmionia, and others. It became the problem of the section to make careful studies of the exact needs of the dj^e manufacturers in order to sup[)ly them with enougli to encourage a development sufficient for the necessities of the textile trade and yet not subtract more than was absolutely neces- sary from the manufacture of explosives. A nimiber of programs of conservation and curtaihuent had to be inaugurated. Among notal)le examples of these are sul]jhide of soda, toluol, acetic acid, and nitric acid. The demand for olive-drab cloth for uniforms made the consumption of sulphide of s:)da ab- normal. Orders for olive-drab cloth for civilian use were cut to 25 per cent, and an agreement was reached with the trade to eliminate them and to eliminate the use of sulphide of soda for dyeing l)lack hosiery, but the end came before this plan was put into operation. A saving was also effected by a rule requiring sulphide of soda to be shipped in fused form instead of crystal form, which is two-thirds water. A new method was discovered l)y which the quantity of nitrate of soda used in azo dyes was cut down. The use to some extent of vinegar as a substitute for acetic acid was inaugurated. It was the purpose of the section also to protect the industry in its relation to foreign trade. Two problems arose. A group of Swiss color manufacturers made overtures to obtain the release of certain 184 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. scarce raw materials from this country under a promise to furni finished dyes in return to the United States. This action was oppos( by the section and was not carried out. Nutgalls, imported from China, are manufactured into tanni. gallic acid, and pyro gallic acid. These in turn are used for dyes f • developing moving-picture films and other films and for medicina Shortage in shipping reduced importations, and it became necessa: for the section to allocate all that arrived. In order to do this i telligently it was necessary to study the relative needs of each indu try using the product and the proportion of nutgalls which shou^ go into each of the acids, in order that each consumer might ha^ his fair share, as the importance of his product was determined. The close of the war left the dye industry in a favorable cond tion for full development. Prices of all the constituent materia were immediately reduced and many of them were a drug on tl market. Toluol, which had been commandeered at $1.50 per gallo sold in December, 1918, at 25 cents per gallon. Phenol fell from 4 cents per pound to 11 and 12 cents. I'he extent to which the indu: try had groAvn even before the end of 1917 is shown in the tab! printed in the appendix.^ INDUSTRIAL CASKS AND GAS I KODUCTS. Karly in 191S, ,J. M. JNIorehead came to Washington to take charg of stimulating the production of toluol under the direction of Mi Summers. In the spring the Industrial Gases and Gas Product Section was formed and Mr. Morehead became chief. The sectio: dealt with a large number of commodities, but its principal activi ties were in connection Avith toluol, saccharine, acetylene, and oxygen P>esides the use of toluol in T. N. T. and in synthetic dyes, sac charine and benzoate of soda are made from it, and it enters int the fabrication of dope for airplane Avings. The stimulation of it production has already been noted in this report. During 1917 th Ordnance Department advanced money for the construction of nu merous new plants and built several new Government-owned strip ping plants at the works of large gas producers. The entire outpu of the country was commandeered in February, 1918, and a price o $1.50 per gallon was fixed by agreement between the producers an( the Government. This price was confirmed by the price-fixing com mittee in July, 1918. The section took care of all allocations, thi Explosives Division agreeing that 5 per cent of the output might h diverted to nonmilitary uses. The rate of production had reachec 25,000,000 gallons per year by December, 1918, and would hav( " See Appendix XXVI for table of quantities produced in 1917 of ceitaiu seleete crudes, intermediates, and dyes. AMEKiC'A.N IXDI'STIIY IN Tl I K WAi;. 185 'ifiiii reached a5,000,()U0 ^rallons in lt)i;). It is ostiinatc.l th;it civiliiui *Pos! uses will require only about 1,200,000 gallons per yeiir, hut it is suggested that at 25 or 20 cents per gallon it might Hud a use as a 'i'ni| dilutent for gasoline as a motor fuel. Toluol is one of the deriva- tives of the "aromatic series" — benzol, toluol, xylol, and solvent naphtha. If the last stage of retinement, involving the separation of the series into these constituents, be omitted, a proihict suital»U> for diluting gasoline coulil be })r()duced at a profit at 20 cents i)er gallon. Saccharine is used as a substitute for sugar, particularly abroad. The principal domestic use is in chewing tobacco. To sa^•e toluol, the manufacture of saccharine was restricted and its export stopped tiur- ing the war. The section, however, permitted enough to be made to idi satisfy essential domestic needs. Acetylene gas is produced by adding water to calcium carbide. The electric power for the manufacture of calcium carbide is interchange- llft'l able with the power for the manufacture of ferroalloys. The war demand for ferroalloys resulted in a shortage in the carbide supply. Exports were cut oil' and domestic use curtailed. The section, how- ever, discovered that it would be necessary to supply certain com- panies doing important war work in South America, and secured export releases for their benefit. Ox^'gen is used in connection with acetylene in many kinds of metal i work. It is shipped in steel cylinders. The Avar brought a greatly ^*f increased demand, and one of the plants making oxygen cylinders was '"' diverted to the manufacture of trench mortars. By August, 11)18, •^'1 the shortage in cylinders had become critical. The section called a "' meeting of the industry and after a long conference it was con- "I eluded that the situation could be relieved by establishing a system ' providing for a more rapid return of cylinders. This was accom- [ plished through the cooperation of the large consumers and the Rail- "j road Administration. Ninety-two per cent of our oxygen output is H manufactured by two companies which use the liquid-air process. '! More than 30 smaller companies manufacture by the electrolytic M process. During the war construction began on 21 new plants, cal- '[ culated to increase the production of oxygen 25 per cent. Some j of these were in operation when the end came. Ira C. Darling, chief of the Creosote Section, had chai-ge as associ- I ate in this section of problems relating to oxygen. crp:osotk. 1 Creosote is a coal-tar product used as a preservative for wood. 1 The chief problem of the section lay in the fact that not enough creo- I sote could be produced to satisfy the needs of the Kailroad Ad- ■ ministration, the Emergency Fleet, the Army, the Navy, and tho 186 AMEEICAX liSTDUSTEY IX THE WAR. I Government-controlled telephone and telegraph companies, even by allowing none for private consumption outside these activities. The ordinary automatic priority rules gave all of these agencies priority, and it was impossible for the producers to decide to which! orders they should give preference, for they could not fill all Gov- ernment orders. Commandeering the entire output was suggested as a solution, particularly by the producers, but the section and the Eailroad Administration both opposed this, and a plan was adopted under which the section allocated all orders of the Army, ^avy, and Emergency^ Fleet, giving first preference to these. A letter, setting forth the program, was approved by the priorities commissioner and sent to the producers October 23, 1918. The railroads were b}^ far the largest consumers, they having used about 40,000,000 of the 52,000,000 gallons produced in 1917. The Administration estimated that it would need 50,000,000 gallons for 1918; but studies of the section made in July showed that only 24,700,000 gallons had been produced during the first six months of 1918, and that not more than 26,500,000 gallons could be looked for during the last six months. Investigations were made of possible increased production and pos- sible importation from Japan and England. Replies to a question- naire, sent out b}^ the section July 19. 1918. to the 26 producing com- panies, indicated that production could not be materially increased during 1918. The section found that 1,000,000 gallons could be ob- tained from Japan, and that none could be obtained from England. The Eailroad Administration had been studying methods of con- servation in substitution of materials for treating ties, and they adopted a program which cut down their requirement about 20 per cent. This, together with the section's careful control over all other Government orders through clearances, was meeting the situation when the armistice came. Four of the 26 producing companies turned out over 85 per cent of the supply, and the Railroad Administration bought about 80 per cent of it, and thus were able to maintain a fair price without formal control. Creosote was not used in any way in the explosives program. Creosote remained at 7 cents per gallon from 1913 through until the beginning of 1918, when it rose to 9 cents and re- mained at that figure until the end of the war. The Creosote Section was formed in Februar}-, 1918, and Ira C Darling was chief throughout the period. TANNING MATERIALS AND NATURAL DYES. The tanning materials and natural dyes industries Avere affected by the war in two ways: (1) The disturbance of shipping made the importation of raw materials difficult; and (2) the shortage and high prices of SA'nthetic dyes brought the more costly natural dyes to the AMEIMCAX IXnrSTHV IN TIIK WAll. 187 arket as a substiluto. ^'ol•y few natural dyrs can comix'tc wiili ynthetic dj'es in normal times, because their production is more costly and their use has no particular advantajre over synthetic dyes of the same color. Logwood, for exam|ile, may be used for blacks on silk and leather and for dyeing wool and cotton black or blue, liut it is no better than €oal-tar dyes for the purpose. The increase in its use from l!)i;i to 1916 by several representative textile firms was given by the Tariff Commission as follows: Cotton, .'367 per cent: silk, 4-1:7 per cent: and wool, .'>28 per cent, wliile the average price paid for logwood in- creased about 320 per cent. Both the raw materials and finished products of dyes and tanning extracts come to the United States from all parts of the world. The dyes increased more in price and were more difficult to secure than the tanning materials, wdiile the price and scarcity of both varied with different origins. Divi-divi, coming from tropical America, ad- vanced in price to only 160 per cent, while gambier, coming from Singapore, advanced to 600 per cent. The tanning extracts, like chestnut, hendock bark, and oak bark, being domestically j)roduced, showed very little advance. In fact, oak-bark extract sold at 3..') cents per pound in January, 1918, while its average price through 1913 was 8 cents. Quebracho extract, coming from South America, sold during 1918 at only about double normal prices. The section was made a separate unit under the Chemicals Division May 1, 1918, and ¥.. J. Haley, who had been handling tanning mate- rials in the Quartermaster Corps, was made chief. By this time the shortage of tanning materials Avas so great that the problem of the section was to provide for more importations and to take sullicient control over the distribution of both imported and domestic prod- ucts that the w^ar needs for leather might be satisfied. Arrangements were made with the War Trade Board and Shipping Board for bringing in 60,000 tons of quebracho extract from Argen- tina. Shipping could not be provided for quebracho logs. Prac- tically all imports from distant countries had to be eliminated. l)ut arrangements were made for bringing in limited (piantilies fr(»m Central and South America and the west coast of Africa. In order to insure a distribution of these satisfactory to the war program, the War Trade Board granted import licenses sul)ject to allocation of the material upon arrival by the section. The section also allocated ship- ping spate to the quebracho extract .shippers. Each tannery was requested by the section to submit a careful estimate of the (piantity and kinds of imported tanning materials to be recjuired for the bal- ance of the year on (lovernment contracts. When this information was compiled, a systematic distribution was made in accordance with the supply available, contracts for leather for war purpo.ses beiiiL' taken care of before all others. 188 AMEKKAX 12S-DLSTHY IX THE WAR. Domestic production also had to have attention. Prices were high, but the rate of output seemed to be decreasing rather than increas- ing in the summer of 1918. There were 42 plants in the country, most of which produced tanning extracts entirely from chestnut wood. The supply of wood was very short, due to labor and transporta- tion difficulties. The section called a meeting of the extract manu- facturers, and in conjunction with the Railroad Administration a zone system was arranged for the chestnut wood producing districts for the purpose (1) of distributing the wood supply where it was most urgently needed, and (2) of conserving transportation. No price-fixing became necessary, but the section had to limit dis- tribution almost entirely to direct and indirect Government contracts of the United States and Canada, Canadian needs being put on the same basis as our own. The control over dj^ewood iind natural dyes was very similar to that over tanning materials. The War Trade Board found it neces- sary to restrict importations to those coming from near-by ports. An arrangement was reached as the result of a meeting with rejjre- sentatives of natural dye manufacturing plants and of the War Trade Board and Shipping Board, to limit the importation of dye- woods and dj'cs to certain specified kinds and quantities and to grant licenses upon the condition that the section might allocate all of the materials.* Allocations of dyewoods were made to the seA'eral manufacturers on the basis of their relative consumption for the three years — 1915, 1916, and 1917. This consumption, incidentally, had been two and one-half times the corresponding consumption of the three years im- mediately preceding 1915. A very effective dyewood war service committee of five members was organized- The section also handled wool grease. This was first used for the war as shoe dubbin. But it was discovered early in September, 1918, that a large quantity would be needed for the manufacture of lanoline, used to prevent mustard gas burns. The section called a meeting of the producers, presented the facts, and an agreement Avas reached under Avhich the (TOA'ernment was to take over the entire output at 16 cents per pound, the section allocating the purchases to the Chemical Warfare Service and the Quartermaster Corps. I'AIXTS AND PIGMENTS. The section was organized ISlay 6, 1918, with Russell S. Hubbard, chief. Upon the death of Mr. Hubbard," November 5, 191S. L. R. Atwood succeeded him. ♦ Soe Appendix XXVII for ruling of \V;u- Trade Board on dyewoods and dye.-*, effective Oct. 10, 1018. <• Russell Sturgis Hubbard, chief of the I'aint and I'ignient Section, died in the service of his country on Xovember 5, 1018. He had come to Washington with full knowledge that V>ecause of his health the supreme sacrifice was not unlikely, and he carried on to the end with the finest courage. A.MKKK'AX INnrSTIJY IN I'lir, WAIl. 1S9 The paint and varnisli industry of (he United States is murli hir«,a'r :han that of any other country. The vahie of its pro(hict in 15)17 imounted to $175,000,000. There -was never any important shorta^TnY IX THE UAl?. 191 trol in onlor to insure an adcHiuato siipjily for diusi'lvi's without 'listurbin<; the American source for the Allies. In December. 1!M7. liy order of the Secretary of War, all wood chemicals were com- mandeered for Government use, and control over their distribution was placed in the hands of the section. The followinjj prices were established by agreement with the trade, to take effect as soon as oxistinr pillim.. .'lO Ninety-live per cent wood alcohol do 79 NInet.v-seven per cent wood alcohol do 82 Pure methyl alcohol do SG Methyl acetone do S6 Denaturing grade wood alcohol do 79 Acetone do 25. f' Methyl ethyl ketone do 2.'. .^ On February 13, 1018, tlie follov.inp- prices for acetic acid were agreed upon : Cents. f;';!cial acetk- acid p«'r iiound _ 1!" iiniercial 100 per cent acid do 1.'.. T.") These prices were all naked at the plant, and a definite charge for the container was to be made. They were continued throughout the period of the war. Acetate of lime was the limiting factor. Several new i)]ants were started under Government aid during 1918, but they did not reach production. A number of conservation programs were inaugurated. For example, the use of acetone in the manufacture of chloroform was stopped and denatured alcohol used in its place. Two or three new methods of producing acetone were developeil. Ouc. called the Weisman process, by which acetone and buytyle alcohol are pro- luced from the fermentation of sour and low-grade corn, woidd have been of great importance had the war lasted longer. Another process obtained icetone from seaweed; and still another from calcium carbide. The production of methyl acetate was developed and the ingredient Avas used as a substitute for methyl acetone in the airplane program. The war requirements for acetone were very large, and well ove» 60 per cent of all the acetate of lime was used for the production of this solvent. Industrial uses were almost eliminated. The draft on acetate of lime for the production of acetone naturally caused a stringency in acetic acid and acetic anhydride, which were also war necessities. It became an important problem of the section to de- crease the nonwar uses of acetic acid and its derivatives, which play n 192 AMEEICAX INDUSTRY IX THE WAR. ];irge role in the manufacture of d3'es. tanning materials, chrome yellow, insecticides, etc.. as well as acetates. In order to be sure that there would be enough acetic acid for war | uses and yet that as small an amount as possible of acetate of limei should be used for producing this commodity, a program of control!! was established. All industries were allowed 100 per cent for their Government orders, but no industries were allowed more than 50 per j cent for their ordniary needs, except for making synthetic indigo, sal- , varsin. and cellulose acetate. Certain industries were allowed 25 per | cent of their ordinary needs, and other industries (laundry, soap, food products, toilet articles, and millinery) were allowed no acetic acid made from acetate of lime.*' This ruling naturally led to the use of substitutes. Vinegar, which contains from 9 to 10 per cent acetic acid, was found to be the most important substitute. It was used in insecticides, in white lead, in the bleaching and cleaning of textiles, etc. Lactic acid, formic acid, and Erusto salts were also important substitutes. The section assisted the insecticide industry in obtaining a sufficient supply of Ainegar. Acetic anhydride is used in making acetjd salicylic acid (aspirin" The influenza epidemic in the fall of 1918 made it necessary to re-| lease acetic anhydride to increase the production of aspirin. Only 131 ]>er cent of the acetate of lime produced during the first 10 months of J 918 was available for nonwar industries, while the Allies used the solvents made from GO per cent of the production. Wood alcohol was never a serious problem. Civilian consumers were allowed 45 per cent of the production in 1918. Its use as a de- naturing agent for grain alcohol was restricted, and other agents were substituted, but other conservation was not found necessary. The American production of wood chemicals in 1917 has been esti- mated as follows : Acetate of lime pounds__ 200,000.000 Acetic aciil, 2S per cent do SO. 000, 000 Acetone do 27. 500, 000 Acetone oil gallons__ 4.50, 000 :\Ietli.vI ethyl ketone pounds__ 1, 900, 000 .Methyl acetone gallons— 1, 400, 000 AVood alcohol do 8, 000, 000 The production in 1918 was no doubt considerably greater. MISCELLAXEOUS CHEMICALS. On April 23, 1918, the Chemicals Division formed a Miscellaneous Chemicals Section with A. G. Rosengarten as chief. The section held itself ready to study and control a long list of chemicals or to 8 See Appendix XXVIII for the classification of industries using acetic acid, published for the instruction of the trade and subject to revision upon presentation of suitable t\i(lenc<'. AMERICAN IXDUSTUV IX THE WAR. 193 ?conimcn(l the formation of iicav sections as necessities mi«j:lit de- elop. Particular attention had to be given to five of these cliemi- ils: "White arsenic, bromine, camphor, celhiloid, and metallic mag- esium. The Food Administration had taken charge of white arsenic on ccount of its importan c in the manufacture of insecticides: but in le spring of 1918 a demand developed for it to be used in the jiro- U( tion of toxic gas. Studies showed that the annual production ere was between 12,000 and 14,000 tons, 8,000 tons being used for isecticides, 2.500 tons in the glass industry, and the balance in liscellareous industries. To meet the new Avar demand, its use in le glass industry was eliminated, and steps were taken to reduce the mount used for insecticides. At the same time the Anaconda Co. egan the construction of a new plant with a capacity of 10,000 tons er annum. The price was fixed February 23, 1018. at 9 cents i)er ound f. o. b. plants. Bromine was required also for toxic gas. Normal production was bout GOO.OOO pounds per annum. This was increased before the nd of the war to 1,600,000 pounds, while an additional plant with capacity of 750,000 pounds per annum was under construction, lie Government was installing some 17 deep wells near Midland, iich., in connection wnth the bromine manufacturing of the Dow ""hemiv al Co. Bromine is recovered from the bittern remaining fter the extraction of the salt from salt brines. The price of bro- nine rose to 1,670 per cent of normal right after the 'first German ;as attack. It sold at about 75 cents per pound or 250 per cent of ■ormal while we were in the war. Camphor comes from the Island of Formosa and is controlled by he Japanese monopoly bureau, whose policy it is to restrict its re- ining except in Japan. Its largest use is in the manufacture of elluloid. The Du Pont Co. has developed a synthetic process for )roduting camphor from Savannah turpentine as a base. It would ppear to be to the interests of the country to have manufacture by he synthetic process continue. The celluloid industry consumes a arge quantity of nitric acid, sulphuric acid, and camphor. There re four large manufacturers in the T'liited States, and it is esti- nated that 250,000 people are connected with its produi tion and dis- ribution. The section worked out a program of curtailment for his industry and made a recommenogait began the work. l*rofs. II. Iv. INfootly, S. A. Tucker, and T. P. IMcCutcheon were important fac- tors in it. E. Iv. AVeidlein, acting director of the ^lellon Institute, carried on important research in behalf of the staff, turning over tho valuable equipment and personnel of the institute's laboratories at Pittsburgh without cost to the Government. lie was also frequently in consultation at Washington. The work centered around special problems arising out of the dif- ficulty of manufacturing certain chemicals needed in unusual quan- tities for the war. It was in particular devoted to developing sub- stitutions for chemicals not obtainable in sufficient quantities. A substitute for platinum in the equipment for the production of acid by the contact process was developed at the Mellon Institute. In the early days of the Chemicals Division, before there were many commodity chiefs, almost every chemical problem, except explosives and nitrates, was referred to this section for such action as was pos- sible with its limited staff. In this way the consulting staff was the origin of many of the chemical sections. The catalogue of cases re- ferred is too long to print here, but a fcAV examples will give zn idea of the field. One of the first tasks attempted by the staff was a complete survey of hydroelectric power which was or might be devoted to chemical manufacture. This was followed by a study of the bromine situa- tion, which resulted in the sinking of new wells in Michigan and the stimidation of production in Ohio and on the Pacific coast. A problem on the type of cell most suitable for chlorine produc- tion and another on plant locations for caustic soda manufacture led, after the general lines of a solution had been worked out, to the formation of the Alkali and Chlorine Section. The staff gave particular attention to the production of radium and the discovery of stocks in existence needed for the war. Both this countrv and the AMEKlt'AN lXri-STi:V IN TIIK WAT.. 195 Allies needed pot.issiuni and sodinni pemKinnanate ior jjjas tnaslcs in quantities unnsnal in j^eace time. A method was found lor pioducinjjr (hem in (juantities lai'. A. Tucke: in the teehnieal and consultinii staff until June. ll'lS. wlien a separat section was formed with Henry C. Du Bois as chief. t'lccf/'odcs. — Electrodes bear the same rehition to an electric furnace or an electrojlieniical crucible as the carbon or other filament bears to an arc liiiht. Carbon electrodes are used only for eiectrothermic proc- esses, while irraphite electrodes are used in both the eiectrothermic and electr.ichemical plants. Eefiners were hindered in their work con- siderably during the war from shortajies in the supply of electrodes. Efforts were made to increase production, and the output of graphite electrodes was expanded by a ruling that 20 per cent of American graphite shoiikl be used iu all construction, be a use the supply of Ceylon graphite was the limiting factor. But in the spring of 10 IS immediate relief seemed to be promi-ed by a more careful distribution of the i ommodity among the con- sumers. It was found that many plants had on hand a supply of electrodes sufficient for 15 or IS months, while other plants had a week's supply or were closed down because it was impossible to secure any. The section took steps to direct that those who had abundance should sell or loan to those who were short. These directions were enforced when necessary through the jiriority power. The section formulated a questionnaire whidi was sent to ea h of the 300 users of electrodes in the country, and required that it be answered in fidl on the lath of each month. ^ In the light of the information, which was thus brought together by the section, it was jiossible to control distribution of eletrodes in such a way as to keep all plants in operation during the remainder of the war period. The produ. ing companies were less difficult to handle, for they were only four in number. They reported also on the 15th of each month on a form sent to them by the section. It was also very difficult to determine whetb.er a plant was using its electrodes for war purposes or not. The plant might be producing a commodity which entered into the manufacture of another com- modity, parts of which were useful for the war. For this reason priority among users was practi ally impossible to determine. The large chlorine program of the Chemical Warfare Service gave rise to a suddenly increased need for graphite electrodes. A questionnaire was sent out for the purpose of determining to what extent carbon electrodes could be substituted for the graphite ones in certain industries, and plans were being worked out for inaugurat- ing a program of substitutions when the end came. > Sw Apt'emiis XXIX for ropy of the gui stiocnaire sent to the us^rs of electrodes. AMERICAN IXDUSTRV IX TIIK WAR. 199 Ahra<^frc!^. — "Abnisives '' is tlu' toini !ii)pli(Ml to all siibstiiiici's used or f;rin(linro(hiction the priorities commissioner placed the manufat turers of aitificial abrasives on Preference List N'o. 1. and allowed them to store coal for future use. The section induced the Eailroad Administration to pive the producers special priorities in (arryinistnnce as was given the various plants from time to time, they had no difliculty in expanding to meet the war demands. No imported raw niiiterials are necessary, though Cornwall stone and English china clay are used in normal times. In scientific glassware, used in chemical laboratories and medical and metallurgical works, American glass blowers were able during the war to develop a product quite as satisfactory as that imported from (Germany in normal times. Production was ample for all needs, and it was not necessary for the section to take any important meas- ures of control. ASRESTOH AND MAGNESIA. A mixture of 8.5 per cent magnesium carbonate and 15 per cent asbestos with water produces the material used for the heat insula- tion of pipes and boilers. The war, in its shipbuilding and plant- building program and its aircraft and motor-truck production, needed great quantities of asbestos and magnesia. Our asbestos comes chiefly from mines in the Province of Quebec, Canada, though in 1918 three new properties were opened in Arizona, where a satisfactory product was obtainable. The mines, however, are too far from a railroad to be able to compete with the Canadian production. Our domestic production of magnesia comes from eastern Pennsylvania and southern California. AIMERICWX INIU'STRV IX TIIF, WAII. 201 I't L...,„. „ ,,. .„._„,. held before the priorities commissioner July 2, 1018. It wns decided that the industry as a whole was a war essential and that indivichial plants should be placed on tlie " Preference List." It was decided that individual priorities certificates would not be necessary if the concerns iMiuaired in the industry would pledire themselves to distribute their in-oducts on orders bearinfj the highest priority classifications. The section kept in touch with the firms and saw to it that fuel and trans- [lortation were furnished in such a way as to rtcr~, to whom 202 AMERICAN jNDUSTRY IN THE WAR. the order \vas issued, was furnished to the British GoA^ernment, an( the British fixed prices phis fixed costs for importing were estab lished as landed prices in the United States. Lieut. Storrs tool- char«re of the commandeering, dividing his time between the com niandeering board in New York and the section here. Enough mica was actually commandeered to maintain a reasonabUj emergency reserve and to stabilize prices to the users. It was thd ])iirpose throughout simply to act as intermediary between im-^ l)orters and consumers, and not to use the authority of the orden more than necessary. The mica importers formed an association tc represent their interests. Later in the summer the commandeering order was extended to cover imports from South America in orderj to stabilize prices, and the question of harmony in allied purchasing! in that market was taken up through the Foreign Mission of the! Board in London. It was not deemed wise or necessary to extend (lie order to domestic production. Domestic production increased considerably during the spring and summer of 1918, and some discontent seemed to be exhibited among the promoters. Pressure was brought to bear to have the Govern- ment use a much larger part of the domestic output, and requests for financing enterprises were made. In response to this the section undertook a careful investigation of the situation among our own producers. The Association of Southern Mica Miners and Manufacturers was formed as a war service committee. After a thorough study by the section and by the association, the following conclusions were reached: (1) Artificial stimulation, either in the form of price fixing or financing of mica mines by the Government, was not warranted because its only result could be an increase in the production of the inferior grades, of which there was abundance; (2) there was little ]^io.spect that the Government could use a much larger proportion of domestic mica; (3) the situation did warrant the assistance of the Board in priorities and in retaining skilled labor for the production of the commodity, and in having skilled labor returned so far as possible; and (4) new enterprises should be encouraged to the extent of receiving and advising on conditions and the best means of mar- keting the output. Slow progress was made by the section in building up a statistical background because of the immense variety of sizes and grades. No questionnaires were used because it was believed that results obtained in this way would be impossible to analyze. Careful estimates of requirements on the part of Government contractors were used as a basis for judging needs. AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN TllK WAi;. 203 Us Toward the end of the period the shortnire in hij^hcT )er iK)und in 1913. The only method of price iixiii;! used was (hat I aider the commandeering orders, where the dei)artuieuts coiicenied II ixed the prices. Til Chapter 8. MEDICAL SUPPLIES. The work of the Section on Medical Industry was a continiiati( of Avork begun by the committee of American physicians for mec cal preparedness, which was appointed April 14, 1916, by joi action of the presidents of the five leading national medical ass ciations. This committee was taken over by the Council of Nation Defense shortly after its organization in December, 1916, and co] tinued as a section of the council, a part of it being made a sectic of the War Industries Board on May 31, 1918. Lieut. Col. F. ] Simpson, of the Army Medical Corps, was secretary of the con mittee and became chief of the section under the Board. The first general survey made by the committee disclosed the fa( that the country's productive capacity of surgical instrument; amounted to scarcely 20 per cent of current civilian needs. In th' matter of drugs and pharmaceutical supplies the unpreparedness fc a war emergency was not so critical, but in many of these ther were important shortages, and prices were very abnormal. Ou medicinals come from all parts of the world. Many of then particularly those derived from coal-tar products, had been mann factured before the war in Germany alone. A careful inventory of American hospitals disclosed the fact tha enough surgical supplies to equip an army of 1,500,000 to 2,000,00 men could be commandeered, in case a pressing emergency made sue] drastic action necessary, and the result would not cripple civiliai institutions beyond repair. Tlie IMedical Section of the council, however, soon determined tha work more important than the taking of inventories could be ac complished by them. They secured the appointment, by the chair man of the council, of a committee on standardization of medical an( surgical supplies, whose purpose it should be to eliminate, in so fa as possible, individual specifications of the Army. Js'aA^A^ Publi Health Service, Red Cross, and civilian agencies, and thereby brin; about economies in raw materials and manufacturing facilities After preparatory studies, this committee and the IMedical Sectioi called together in Washington on April 11, 1917, a meeting com posed of representatives of the Army, Mavj?^, Public Health Service Bed Cross, the various medical specialties, and manufacturers o surgical instruments. An agreement was reached that for the perio( of the emergency the variety of products should be radically reduced New catalogues of specifications were agreed upon. The most im portant economies were effected in the production of surgical instru 204 AMEincAN I.NDrSTnV IX THE WAR. 205 ents. Thostaiuliuil illustrated cutalooiu^ of siirirical instninu'iils in is country before the war contained ai)()ut 1.100 pa<;es. The illus- ated catalogue accepted by this conference contained ol pages. On April 15. 1917. the section held a meeting with some '250 of the nijtjlading manufacturers of drugs, medicines, and surgical supplies, ,jij( id they agreed to begin at once producing at maximum speed the j^j tides agreed upon and outlined in the several lists accepted as iple by the departments and specialists assembled a few days before. (j^^j The section also began promptly to bring about a marked increase the manufacture of surgical instruments. Numerous jilants were nverted for this work. Manufacturers of household scissors were duced to make surgical scissors. Makers of pocket knives and itcher knives were encouraged to make surgical knives. Sewing- achine companies and jewelry factories began to make surgical edles and other instruments. Nearly all of the surgical needles jed in this country had previously been made in England. P2ng- nd's supply was so short that she could not furnish this country ore than 5,000 cases of needles for all purposes in 1917, while our [|j^ ilitary needs alone amounted to 75,000 cases. Broken needles had a t be resharpened for a short period, but the American manufacturers [j^i >on began to meet the need, and needles of the highest quality were irned out. The number of styles of surgical needles was reduced by zreement to 12. The manufacture of dental instruments was about equal to civilian Beds before the war, and the extra war requirement was just alxnit let by the conservation involved in the standardization program. V shortage arose in suture material. This is made by tanning and :erilizing catgut, made principally from the intestines of sheep. The reater part of this raw material is used in sausage casings and for bringing tennis racquets and musical instruments. A very high type f technical skill is required in the preparation of surgical sutures. 3 that it was difficult to increase the production in this country. 'he section made provision for increased importations from Spain nd New Zealand. The production of surgical dressings was enormously increased and he Army was supplied with a superabundance everywhere ii; urope. The production of clinical thermometers and hypodermic yringes had to be greatly increased to meet the war needs. Very lighly skilled workers are required in these industries, and few men nth the technical training were found in this country, most of the nstruments having been imported from Ciermany in the days befon* he war. The stocks of thermometers were commandeered by the ?urgeon General at a fixed price of 40 cents each. This country was a very large producer of medical and surgical Tibber goods before as well as during the war. P^urope gets its main pply from us. This industry normally uses about 2^ per cent of 206 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. tlie rubber consumed in the country. AVhen the importation of rubi ber was curtailed, the section took care to see that the makers of rubi ber surst Important direct factor In brlnglnj; this about. * For the construction of cuntonmonts, liospltals, warehouHCH, etc., the woodH us«m1 by the Government were 70 per cent soutliern yellow pine, 10 p17: Ocorgia-Klorida Yellow IMne Enicrgoncy Bureau, June, 1017 : New England Spruce Emergency T.ureau. June 6, 1917; Douuias Fir Emergency Bureau (later reorganized as the I'ir I'roduetio)i Board), Oct., 1917; Northern Hardwood Emergency Bureau, Nov. '24. 1017; Central I'ennsylvania Hemlock Bureau, Apr. 6, 1918; Cypress Emergency Bureau (date unknown), 1918. A hardwood emergency bureau was organized eariy in l'.>17 and reorganized and enlarged in Nov., 1017; but it was dissolved in .Mar.. lOlS, because the supply of hardwood seemed to be coming forward satisfactorily without the operation of the bureau. AM KIM CAN IXnrsTRY l.\ TlIK WAH. 213 he previous Government purchase prices. It was estimated that tiic irui-; of this schedule Avould yield about $28 per thousand for mill nil standard averaire production. The manufacturers agreed at the same time to nlakc commercial ales subject, at any time before delivery, to an oi)tion in favor of he Cjovernment or a nominee of the section. They agreed further () comply with the directions of the War Industries Board as issued Knii tifue to time Avith i-eference to (illing commercial re(|uiiemeiits n the order of their public importance, and they agreed to furnish iieii information and make su.h reports as might be recjuired. The isiial clause i)rotecting labor against reduction in wages or condi- ions was included. This price arrangement ran to September 15, nd just before its expiration the manufacturers appeared before the nice-h.xing committee with data to show that a furlher increase was (>ce?sary. The committee de. ided, however, tiiat the same prices hould be continued in efle -t until December 2;i, 1918. As time went n prices were fixed and other control was instituted over various tiio)' types of lumber. M p t i Jiiiji)a i (i ' yiiiL S>^^it»CTe --feaiedf^tt tev^^ iUjP»wwii»A yiiiitiiiliiUMit." resides five or six billion feet of softwoods for cantonments, hos- itals, warehouses, and other structures, and for boxes and crating, le Government bought for airjilane construction over 1()(),()()().()()0 oct of spruce. 70,000,000 feet of Douglas fir, and four or five million :'et of Port Orford cedar. It bought for airplane propellers ma- <)L''any, black walnut, cherry, and birch aggregating 40.000.000 ■c't. The entire black \\'alnut resources of the country were needed or gunstocks. propeller blades, etc. Artillery wheels and Army I hicks consumed about 120.000,000 feet of hardwood. The Emer- • •Mcy Fleet used over 790.000.000 feet, including 2,142,000 feet of • list, for treenails, required for wooden ships and very difficult to cure. The Navy used about 122,000.000 feet. The total production of lumber in the United States for 1918 was timated at 32,925,000,000 board feet. Of this about 38 per cent was )nlhern j'^ellow pine, IG per cent Douglas fir, G per cent oak, with bite pine and hemlock in equal amounts.* This was about ,000,000,000 feet less than the production of 191G. The country nports annually from Canada about 3 per cent of the lumber con- imed, and we import small tonnages of mahogany and other rare oods from Central and South America and West Africa. Exports t' not large even in normal times. Those for the maximum year, 'i;5. were about three and a quarter billion feet, or 8.4 per cent of ir cut. The volume of 1918 was 35 per cent of that of 1913. Europe ♦See Appfncllx XXXIII for lumber cut In Ihe UnUcd States 101.1 to 1918. showing Kls of wood. 214 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. has taken little since the war began, and even shipments to South America fell off 39 per cent in 1918. Shipping bulk is, of coiTrse, the explanation. The war purcliases of the Allies in this country before the spring of 1917, which brought prosperity and high prices to so many in- dustries, causing the average price of commodities to advance before the end of 1916 to more than 150 per cent of 1913 prices, did not have a like effect upon the lumber industry. In 1916 the prices of oak, maple, and chestnut, for example, were below prewar normal, and the average price of all lumber for the year was not above the average for 1913. The events of the spring of 1917, however, saw the prices of lumber begin to advance rapidly. The price agreement on yellow pine, made shortly after our entrance into the war, has been noted. This had a general effect in steadying most other soft- woods, for they are sold in competition with yellow pine. By the spring of 1918 prices to the trade of all softwoods had reached a level considerably above the Government purchase prices. It was felt by the Board that production of lumber for civilian purposes ought not to be stimulated. The Board decided, therefore, that maximum prices ought to be fixed for the trade and the (Gov- ernment alike, to be accompanied by some control over distribution. The Federal Trade Commission had been studying costs of pro- duction. Groups of operators, representing the several divisions of the industry, were called into conference in succession. The price fixing committee established, by agreement, a schedule of maximum prices for North Carolina pine June 28, 1918.^ This schedule, with slight changes made October 1, remained effective until December 31, 1918. Douglas fir was sold to the Government at an agreed rate similar to the arrangement for yellow pine until June 15, 1918, when the price fixing committee set maximum prices for all purchases at an average advance over the Government purchase prices of $2.75 per thousand.^ These prices were continued, after conferences with the producers in October, until January 15, 1919. The committee established maximum prices on eastern spruce April 12, 1918. These were adjusted after studies of cost by the Federal Trade Commission and following a hearing of the New England Spruce Emergency Bureau on July 19, an advance averaging $8 per thousand being allowed. The July 19 schedule was con- tinued until December 1, 1918.^ Pennsylvania hemlock was placed on the control list May 9, 1918, the price schedule to expire August 8. On August 15 a new base price of $29 per thousand was adopted, representing an average advance of $2.^ Following conferences in October, these prices were continued until December 20, 1918. In the latter part of May, 1917, the lumber committee of the coun- cil reached an agreement with the yellow pine manufacturers cover- » See W. I. B. Price BuUetin No. 43, Prices of Lumber, for copy of the schedule. AMERICAN INDUSTUY IN lill, WAIl. 215 ng prices for a specific schedule of (he yellow pine enterinpj into the jonstruction of -wooden ships of the Ferris type at an a vers) "^e rate jf $3') per thousand feet. The Shipping: Board subse(|uently )laced orders with the Southern Pine Emerpency Bureau for one lundred schedules on the basis of that price. The prices for a »hedule of this kind were later raised by mutual agreement between he manufacturers and the Shippino; lioard to an average of $40 ])er ;housand, and later, on account of higher specilications, advanced to 144.72. About the same time the fir nuinufacturers on the Pacific Doast agreed to furnish a schedule of the Ferris type of ship at 137.50 per thousand, the Shipping Board placing orders on this >asis until the schedule was changed to call for much larger timbers, it which time the price was raised to conform to the new require- nent. In July, 1917, the lumber committee of the council held confer- nces with the spruce producers of Washington and Oregon and rep- resentatives of the Aircraft Production Board and of the British, French, and Italian missions. The producers agreed to furnish air- ;raft spruce of specified quality and size during the remainder of he year at $105 per thousand board feet. On April 10, 1918, the Spruce Production Division of the Signal Corps* issued a new sched- ule of prices for western spruce and Port Orford cedar airplane material. The price for "A" wing-beam stock of western spruce ind Port Orford cedar was set at $175 per thousand board feet o. b. mill; "B " long clears at $80, and " C" short and thin clears it $45. Western spruce cants for aircraft grade I were set at $90 md grade II at $50. These prices remained throughout the period. No official price was set on black walnut lumber as a whole, but a fliii ixed maximum w-as placed on gunstock flitches and propeller grades. On August 10, 1917, the Ordnance Department fixed $1.05 ach for gunstock dimension blanks f. o. b. mill. On August 1, 1918, :he price-fixing committee raised this to $1.20 each. The Signal Dorps set a maximum price of $310 per thousand board feet for air- plane propeller stock on January 28, 1918, which was continued throughout the period. On August 1, 1918, the price-fixing commit- made an informal agreement, placing the price of 2i-inch black alnut flitch at $80 per thousand, and a similar agreement on Au- gust 7 on the prices of walnut logs. These prices were published to DUrchasers and producers of the logs with the announcement that the prices, which the Government was paying for propeller limiber and jtK junstocks, were based on the announced prices for logs and would illow only a fair and reasonable profit to the mills. Informal agroe- nents were also made and published to the producers, covering ypress, tupelo, birch, and mahogany. Mahogany was placed at $350 •After September, 1917, the Board no longer assisted In negrotlatlng or fixing price* or airplane lumber. 216 AMEEICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAK. per llioiisand board feet. Tlic pi-icc of all lumber during 1018 aver- aged about 170 per cent of normal as against an average of nljout 190 per cent for all commodities. In connection with administei'ing the fixed prices of softwoods to all consumers, certain wholesalers, who had been in the habit of buy- ing from a large number of small mills for resale, raised the question that they should be allowed to add their profit to the fixed mill pi'ice. Under the price-fixing rule it had been contemplated that the (lov- crnment and other consumers should puichase directly from the mills. These wholesalers claimed that they performed a useful function in collecting lumber from mills too small to bargain for themselves. The i)rice-fixing committee ruled, however, that these wholesalevs should look for their profits from the producers and should be re- quired to sell at the fixed price. In order to carry out more effectively the rulings of the price-fix- ing committee, it was decided early in July, 1918, to appoint a num- ber of regional lumber administrators. W. J. SoAvers was appointed for the region covered by the Southern Pine Emergency Bureau, and T. J. Aycock for that of the Georgia-Florida Yellow Pine Emergency Bureau. To handle the administration of priority in production and shipment, price rulings, and other matters of control in the Pacific Northwest, where so much ship timber and airplane lumber was be- ing produced, the Fir Production Board was appointed in January, 191S, and maintained by (he Government departments interested. In ^lay, 1918, the Paili'oad Atlministration began to ])lace its orders for softwoods through the organization for distributing orders, which had been created and was administered by the section. The first order of this kind was for 278,000,000 feet, and other orders followed. The Railroad Administration placed a representative on the staff of the section. During the course of the war it was found necessary to limit the activities of various wood-using industries in order to make available to the Government the lumber ordinarily used by them and to divert hibor, transportation, and supplies to military purposes. This con- trol was exercised chiefly through the Priorities Division,'* which from time to time issued orders governing priority in securing fuel, transportation, labor, and materials. On March 21, 1918, the Board passed and published a resolution, in part as follows: Tb:it in the public interest all now undertnkinss not esspntinl to and not contributing? eitlior directly or indirectly toward v.-lnning tlie wnr, wLich in- volve the utilization of labor, materiul, ;'nd capital required in the production, supply, or distribution of direct or indirect war needs, will be discoura;:od, notwithstanding they mny l)o of local importance and of a character whicb should in normal times meet with every encouragement. "The various priority rulings referred to here were not prepared nor handled by the Lumber Section. AMKKICAX IXIUSTin IN Till WAI:. 217 111 puisuiince of this resolution, the inaiuil'ncturers of tht* principal jiiildino: materials were requested to si«2:n and lile with the Priorities Division the following pledge, and to exact a similar pledge from ucli of their customers as purchased lor resale : The midersijnied hereby pledjios itself nut to use, nor so f;ir ns lies within ts p',)\\or permit to he used, any produils of its nianiilactiire now in. or wliidi ;iiay heie.ilter come into, its possession or eonirol. save ( an.\ customer tor resale until such stonier has tiled with it a siudlar pledj;e in writinj: and tliat it will use its ;:iiost eudeavor to insure that its prodnre also fixed by the committee, and 176,000 tons were bou«j;ht by !io Government. By the sprinfj of 1918, due to the Government demands and trans- )ortation difHculties, a shortajje in sand, fjravel, and crushed stone il)peared in the conf^ested district of the East, and it became neces- ai y to fix prices and allocate orders in the Philadelphia, New York, ! Baltimore, AVashington, and Norfolk districts. xV total of 2,949,87.) ons, valued at over $3,000,000, was allocated. It was the general purpose of the division and the price fixing coni- :ttee to hold down the prices of building materials, because normul loduction was in excess of all essential war needs, and it was desir- iMe, in the interests of war conservation, to enforce a price low nough to haA^e a tendency to curtain production. Prices fixetl for aiilding materials allowed about 7 per cent on investments. The li\ision, however, found one item of building material in which the n)\ernment required more than double the normal capacity of the ilants. This was gypsum wall board and plaster board. It was nec- -sary to take over the entire output of these materials for (iovern- nent use, and to authorize plant extensions. The material was 1 located at tentative prices, and the price fixing committee acted ipon the question February 27, 1919, The Government took about .2.000,000 square feet, valued at $956,000. The division did a very important body of work in the direction if conservation by preparing and establishing schedules of standard pecifications applicable to war building projects. Standardization vas accomplished in the following industries: Carpentry and mill- \ork, composition roofing, slate roofing, clay tile roofing, gypsum vail and plaster board, fiber wall board, finishing hardware, door langers and track, plumbing and gas fitting, heating, electric wiring 11(1 lighting fixtures, painting, hollow building tile, magnesite stucco, re prevention and protection. The extreme difficulty of the work of this division on account of lie wide scope and great diversity of the industries under its control 111 be readily understood. The work covered 43 industries. The i vision had a staff of fifty-five persons, exclusive of the represent a- ivos of the War, Navy, and other Government departments, who .orked with it. Plans for a wide extension of its activities were in 'locess of execution when the end made them unnecessary. WOOD PRODUCTS. This section originated in October, 1917, when the demani'l)tember 25, 1918, the United States Circuit Court for the South- ii District of New York gave a decision as arbiter that $3.50 per .iindred weight was a fair and reasonable base price from April 1. i.'I8. forward. On October 18, 1918, the Federal Trade Commis- m, after a series of hearings, decided that the base price sliould be reased to $3.63| per hundredweight to become effective May 1. • '18, to account for the wage increase; and that to account for the rcight increase, becoming effective July 1, 1918, an additional amount -iiould be allowed, making the total base price $3.75:1 j)er hundred- weight. On October 30, 1918, the division adopted ])lans for con- nolling and allocating all newsprint tonnage to go into operation November 15. 1918, but the order was re.scinded before it beeame: ifective. Chapter 11. TEXTILES. The war brought with it a very distinct disturbance in the various textile industries. In clothing alone it became necessar^^ to provide at once entirely new and unusual outfits for a prospective army of 5,000,000 men, and further to prepare for a reserve of four spare outfits for each of these men. Hospital supplies in unheard of quan- tities, knapsacks, gun covers, hosiery, blanket's, overcoats, duck, tarpaulins, tents, shoe linings and innumerable articles requiring textiles had to be provided for at the expense of civilian needs. In' a word, it was necessary to direct to war use over 70 per cent of the| textile products of this country, and in many cases to create new! sources of supply or adapt machinery to new uses. The extent of thei undertaking can be appreciated when it is realized that this country's! average production of textiles at normal prices aggregates in value between four and five billion dollars per year. At the same time the shortage of ocean tonnage was causing a. shortage in wool. Dyes were almost impossible to obtain. Labor! was leaving the factories to go to war or to work in munition? plants, and coal and transportation were becoming hard to secure. Heavy buying by separate agencies of the Government caused un- stable markets. The textile industry is old and well established.. The mills are controlled by many individual owners, each plant has its specialties, and competition is keen. The textile problem was taken up by the committee on supplies of the council as soon as we entered the war. War service com- mittees were formed in the summer of 1917 for various branches of the industry. The committee brought together the separate pur- chasing agencies of the Government, so that they dealt in a group to lay^ out production programs in consultation with the several w^ar service coromittees. Many of the members of the textile committee of the council joined the forces of the Quartermaster General in the spring of 1918. Then separate sections of the War Industries Board were formed for the particular branches of the trade. John W. Scott was director of the Textile Division, which operated under the direction of George N. Peek, Commissioner of Finished Products. COTTON GOODS. The Cotton Goods Section of the Board, with Spencer Turner as chief, was organized in the summer of 1917. The section inherited a body of information from its predecessor and continued as an infor- mation bureau and point of contact between producer and Govern- 228 AMERICAN I^I>L\STK\ 12^ TllK WAR. -J'ilJ lunt purchaser, indicating sources of supply, making allocations, lib! securing the cooperation of the cotton-goods industry in turning ver its production to the Government at reasonable prices. I^y way it routine, 1,150 questionnaires were used to verify and complete he Government's information concerning equipment and facilities, .'.100 monthlv reports from manufacturers were received and classi- \vd. 1,733 ordei-s were cleared, and 1,752 priority certificates were et onmiended and handled by the section. The heaviest demands of the Government on tiie cotton goods laJe, and those which strained it most, were for duck, denim, and wills. The shortage in duck and methods for overcoming it had iren studied from the beginning of the war. Many carpet and tire- aOric mills converted their machinery for the manufacture of heavy luck, specialty mills for shelter-tent duck, and fine-goods mills for irplane and balloon cloth. But with all that could be done by \ ay of increased facilities the summer of 1918 faced both a present nd anticipated shortage in this fabric. The condition naturally stimulated speculative purchasing and loarding as well as high prices. Army duck, ordinarily sold at 15^ ents per yard, was bringing 34 cents. Sail duck, normal at 20 cents »er yard, brought 52 cents. To combat this, cotton duck was made a controlled " industry. The manufacturers were called together, and fter conference th&y agreed to sell their product only on permits ssiied by the section. Under this agreement 1,330 permits were ssued. For the cotton goods industry as a whole, the question of prices nd the advisability of price fixing was a problem continuously be- ore the section. A careful study was made of the condition and ecent history of the industry, the sources and condition of the supply t raw materials, and the machinery of production, as well as a com- aiison of war needs with ordinary peace-time consumption. The I 1 resentatives of the industry itself were for a long time strongly pDosed to price fixing. It seemed to them a dangerous departure I oni the theory on which the business had always been conducted. Die United States grows more than three-fifths of the world's iilply of cotton. We export in normal times between 6.000.000 and ,000,000 bales of 500 pounds each, from a total production of 1,000,000 to 16,000.000 bales. We import only a few thousand bales f the long-staple Egyptian variety for special uses. It happened liat our 1914 crop was very huge — 2.000.000 bales more than usual — ^hile disturbance of manufacturing conditions in Kurope, combined dth the difficulties of shipping, cut down our exports by more than ,000,000 bales. This left a surplus to be carried over to the 1915 ;ason of over 3,000.000 bales in addition to the normal surplus of bout 1,500,000 bales. The natural result was a great depression in 230 AMERICAN IKDUSTKY IX THE WAR. the price of cotton. The " Buy-a-bale " movement was insti<^ated in order to relieve distress among the smaller cotton growers of the South, who were unable to convert their sole source of revenue into monej', and for the purpose of improving prices. By January, 1915, the price began gradually to rise, and continued until the fall of 1916, when the German peace proposal caused uncer- tainty again. On February 3, the daj^ after diplomatic relations with Germany were severed, the price began to rise sharply and the ad- vance continued until the spring of 1918, when Government price regulations were threatened and later inaugurated. For the greater part of the period from July 27, 1914, until February 3, 1917, prices were beloAV normal. The crops of 1915, 1916, and 1917 were all below normal, and the consumption abroad, as well as the ability to ship, proved more favor- able to sellers than the trade had anticipated. As a matter of fact, less than 250,000 bales of cotton were actually lost at sea during the entire war. The fear, however, that it might be lost, together with the shortage of bottoms, caused a marked decrease in exports. Throughout the war there was always a surplus of raw cotton in the countr}' and this section never found it necessary to control either prices or distribution of the domestic fiber. The Egyptian fiber was imported under the direction of the War Trade Board and the sec- tion indicated its distribution. As soon as the United States entered the war the prices of cotton fabrics, cotton yarns, and raw cotton all began to rise rapidly — the fabrics more rapidly than the yarns and the j^arns more rapidly than the law cotton. The explanation for this can be found in the very urgent demand for finished fabrics, which had to be met at any cost. To satisfy the increased demand, manufacturing costs were increased both by the use of inferior machines and the conversion of machines to the production of new commodities, and by the expense of break- ing in untrained workmen, as well as by increased wages. In addi- tion to these substantial reasons the very urgent war demand, com- bined with the decentralized purchasing methods in use during the first few months of the war, gave much incentive to speculators and dealers to profit at the expense of the Government. In the spring of 1917 the cotton goods section of the committee on supplies of the Council of National Defense undertook to recom- mend to the trade prices which the committee considered as fair and reasonable for a number of fabrics especially needed in war. These prices were accepted by many influential manufacturers and served as a guide to Government purchasing agents in placing contracts. The war service committee of the cotton manufacturers was organ- ized in September, 1917, with subcommittees on denim, cotton duck flat duck, outing flannels, tire fabrics, gingham, and ticking. These AMERICAN IXDUSTHV IN THE WAH. 231 li, committees served as points of contact between the manufactiuvrs tl and the section. They represented the interests of the trade before iiiti the section, discussing suggestions, furnishing information, predict- ing tendencies, etc. For a long time they fouglit (Tovcrnment price- m fixing. cet Finally, however, a majority of the representatives of the trade vid were persuaded that price-fixing would be necessary in order to pre- ad t^ent profiteering and to insure reasonable prices not only to tlie (iov- nij Brnment but to civilian consumers as well. On July 8, 1918, at a ate meeting of the price fixing committee witli representatives of the ■icf 30tton industry, maximum prices on certain basic fabrics were agreed jpon.^ Further lists of prices were to be issued as soon as they could til 36 prepared and agreed upon, and accordingly additional schedules TO! 3ame out during July, August, September, and October. The first y schedule was to expire October 1, and meetings were held in Septem- tli Jer for the purpose of agreeing upon a revision, but as no agreement iviti ^as reached the original prices remained effective until January 1, orti L919. All of these fixed prices were maximum net prices at the mills I til ;o the United States, the allied Governments, and to the American tlii jublic. They covered primary sales made after June 8 for delivery n ifter October 1 and all primary sales made after June 21. They in- s« ;luded brokerage and commission for selling, A special committee, with T. W. Page as chairman," was appointed itto 3y the President in the spring of 1918, to study and report on the dvisability and feasibility of fixing the price of raw cotton. After tin in extended investigation the committee reported unanimously y([ igainst such action. As a result of the activities of the council and Board, the cotton nanufacturers, along with a number of other industries in which igorous competition had been the rule, have learned some significant ' j lew habits. The exigencies of the war impelled the formation of ,| '^arious associations within the industry, in order through coopera- ion to accomplish war purposes which would have been impossible therwise. This was all done under closest Tiovernment supervision, hese associations exchange trade information and will very likely n the future show the effects of cooperation in pursuance of common mrposes. This may not result in advantage to the public if it is ceompanied by no public control. coi [hf The chief war problem of the wool industry, unlike that of jrn otton, lay in the supply of raw material. We now import two-thirds f our raw wool — that is to say, we did in 1917 and again in 1918 — rga » See Appendix XXXVI for schedule of fixed prices for cotton Roods. July 8, 1018. "The committee consisted of Thomas W. Page, chairman. R. L. Bennett. Ward M. urgess, Edward F. Green, .T. C. Redmon. M. I". Sturdlvant, S. W. Wels. D. 8. Murphy, 7. R. Beattle. 232 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. j and we consumed nearly twice as much wool during those years a,' we did before the war in Europe began. The trade enjoyed a season of great prosperity during the yearr immediately preceding our entrance into the war in spite of the 191; tariff reductions, which were more than compensated by the economir conditions of Europe. While our people had few war orders foi woolen goods, European manufacturers were prevented from pro ducing the surplus which we had ordinarily bought. There was moreover, a marked increase in the consumption of woolen goods ii this country, due, no doubt, to general prosperity and high wages enabling a larger number of people to use woolen garments. The annual consumption of raw wool in the United States in creased steadily from about 450,000,000 pounds in 1913 to T52,000,00( pounds in 1918. Our domestic production was about 290,000,00( pounds a year. Thus, our imports have more than tripled since 1913 As the period of production from raw wool to clothing varies fron six months to a year, it can be seen how a prospective demand foi large and prompt deliveries of cloth, such as the war brought about together with a shortage of wool in sight and a suitable supply o: shipping in doubt, would stimulate speculation to the highest pitcl unless some control could be devised. Prices rose 65 per cent durinc the first few months of 1917, and that on top of an already higl market, although there was no real shortage of wool in the country a that time. The first act of the Government in the direction of control was th( setting aside in July, 1917, of $25,000,000, to be used in the purchase of wool; and 6,000,000 pounds were immediately purchased by th( committee on supplies of the council. This was held through th( year, ready to dump in case the market should fluctuate too radically But it soon became evident that Government buying for actual us« was going to be necessary, not only as a price-control measure but ii order to make sure of securing a sufficient supply of wool for the wai requirements. In 1916 the British Government contracted with the Australiar and New Zealand Governments for their entire output of wool yeai by year during the war. Our merchants had been obtaining in norma. times over 150,000,000 pounds a year from these sources. Durinc 1917 practically no wool came to us from Australasia on account o1 shortage in shipping. In order to cover the deficit, the War Depart- ment on October 10, 1917, arranged to purchase 247,000 bales (123,500,000 pounds) of this wool from the British Government foi delivery in 1918, at the British " civil issues " prices. The British hac been able to purchase this wool at very low prices by taking the entin clip and in this way insuring the producers against a shortage oi bottoms which might leave them out of contact with the world mar- kets. They resold the wool under two schedules of prices, namely AMERICAN INDLSTUY IN THK WAR. 233 fsj "military issues," which represented cost plus transportiition, and "civil issues," which represented cost plus transportation phis a '^"1 margin to cover insurance and the overhead incident to the whole i^l wool purchase, the last being divided evenly between the Britisii ODii Gtovernment and the respective selling Governments. On Novem- ffliber 9, 1918. another purchase of 325,000 bales of Australasian wool pr was made, but only 110,000 bales were delivered, the rest being can- " eeled without payment of indemnity by the United States, indemnity being waived in consideration of payment by the United States of - •• civil issues " prices for both lots of wool. Three other important steps were taken by the Government for the purpose of turning raw wool into direct war-industry channels. In November, 1917, wool was put on the list of materials for which ' an import license was required, and on December 15 the War Trade -' Board annoimced that any applicant for an import license for wool purchased after that date would have to comply with the following regulations: 1. No imported wool should be sold to any person other than a manufacturer without the consent of the War Industries Board. 2. The United States Government should hold an option on all wool im- !">tteil, for 10 days after the customhouse entry, and thereafter on any unsold part until the whole amount had been disposed of. * * * The price for Government purchases was fixed on the basis of the Boston exchange price of July 30, 1917, less 5 per cent. It was not, however, until March 1, 1918, that the Quartermaster Corps began to exercise the option to purchase all imported wools. About this same time the estimates of Army requirements were increased. The available supplies of stocks were studied and found very short. It was decided, therefore, on April 5, 1918, that the Government would purchase all stocks held by wool dealers, and a few days later it was further decided that the Government would purchase the entire 1918 domestic clip. At the request of the Qiiar- torinaster General, prices for both transactions were set by the price tixing committee to be those prevailing on July 30, 1917, or, if wool liiid cost a dealer more than that, then the July 30 price plus 5 per r,.nt. This placed the Government in complete control of all raw ^^ ool in the United States. Machinery was set up for handling the business. The ofiice of wool administrator. Quartermaster Corps, created in March, 1918, took care of receiving the wool under all three of the purchasing ar- rangements. The domestic clip was handled thrcnigh ordinary busi- ness channels under the guidance of " regulations " issued by the Wool Division of the War Industries Board on May 21, 1918.2 Qn the ■ See Appendix XXXVII for copy of " Government Regulntlons for Handling Wool Clip ' f 1918," Issued May 21, 1918, by Wool Division, War Industries Board. 234 AMERICA]Sr INDUSTRY IIST THE WAR. I other hand, the wol distributor parceled out these wools to the manu- ji facturers holding Government contracts as they were needed.^ j There remained one more problem in connection with the purchase ' of wool. South America and South Africa were open markets where j the Allies and private merchants were competing with each other inl making purchases. For the purpose of eliminating competition! between American traders and the American Government, an im- port regulation was made effective July 28, 1918, restricting licenses to the Quartermaster General only. In order to handle the pur- chases in South America for the Quartermaster General, the South x^merican Wool Purchasing Syndicate, consisting of six large im- porters, was formed under the supervision of the War Department and operated from July 23 until October 10, when the wool pur- chasing commission superseded it. Under this arrangement 44.500 bales of wool were brought in. Lewis Penwell was chief of the Domestic Wool Section of the Board throughout the period of control and was responsible for this im- portant work. It will be seen that from the beginning of the summer of 1918 no new stocks of raw wool became available for civilian uses in the country. At the same time only about 45 per cent of the looms were engaged on war work. This presented a very serious problem, in view of the fact that it was then thought that the war might extend over a period of several years. For the purpose of studying means of relieving this situation, as well as to serve as an information bureau and point of contact for all parties interested in wool manu- factures, the Woolen Goods Section of the Board was formed on June 1, 1918, with Herbert E. Peabody as chief. The Woolen Goods Section sent out questionnaires to determine how much privately owned wool remained in the possession of man- ufacturers throughout the country. It also, through the war service committees, and through individuals, made a study of the condition of clothing stocks, both wholesale and retail. It was clear that im- portant steps by way of conservation would have to be inaugurated if none of the Government stocks of wool could be diverted to civilian use for months to come, and this appeared to be the case. Instruc- tions were issued to cut off the dyeing of wool and the spinning of yarn for hand-knitting purposes; but at the same time, in order to assist the American Red Cross to obtain its requirements of hand Imit- ting yarns, an appeal was issued to spinners and dealers throughout the country to turn over all stocks on hand to that organization. A careful study was made of methods of conserving woolen cloth in the manufacture and distribution of clothing. The Conservation » For prices at which this wool was sold, see booklet " Government Issue Pricps of Wool to Manufacturers Holding Government Contracts," May 15, 1918. AMERICAN n.'TSTr.V IX TUV. WAI;. 'J;K") Division of the Board, working: tliroiio:h tho industrial adjustments Munittee and the priorities commissioner, reached an a^neenicnt vitii tlie trade and issued instructions desig^ned to cut down (he number of styles and to eliminate certain features which required an ( .\travaoking to a substitution of cotton cloth chemically treated, but they liled. Silk is the onl}' fabric which is known to be completely con- imed in burning, never leaving hot ashes in the gun after firing. During the first few months of the war, orders were place582G— 21 16 242 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR, the seven American manufacturing companies, each contributing proportion to its normal output. This corporation tool^ a contra for the 10,000,000 yards at cost plus 7^ per cent. This 7^ per ce was later voluntarily reduced to 1 per cent. A further contract f 20,000,000 yards was placed with the corporation on July 12, 191 Production was just about meeting the program on Novemb 11. A great many cotton and woolen looms were converted to t production of this silk. The corporation itself did much of the bu ing of raw material abroad, but as the demand was so searchii speculation by American jobbers naturally began to creep in. ''. cope with this, the War Trade Board, at the request of the W Industries Board, made a ruling empowering the Government to ta over an3' importations of raw materials entering into cartridge clo at foreign cost plus 2 per cent. The Silk Section of the Board was not formed as a separate ur until August 2, 1918. William Skinner was chief. The secti( had numerous smaller problems connected with the purchasing, ha dling, and testing of silk. FLAX PRODUCTS. The war problem of the flax industry was handled from the begi ning by one man, George F. Smith, who came to Washington June, 1917, as advisor to the Ordnance Department on linen threa In the autumn he was attached to the Council of National Defen and the following spring was made a section chief of the W Industries Board. Linen thread is required for sewing all kinds of leather goods ai canvas equipment. It is quite superior to cotton both on account its strength and durability and because moisture causes it to sw( and fill out the hole made by the needle in sewing. This count imports most of its flax. The 1913 tariff reduction weakened t' industry. It had scarcely recovered when we entered the war, and greatly increased supply was required to meet the increased demai for finished leather goods. A shortage was anticipated from t start, and experiments were conducted for the purpose of finding suitable substitute or method of diluting the base material. An a mixture of hemp to the flax was tried and to a limited extent w successful. Cotton thread was used as a substitute, also with limit success. The use of flax for linen cloth was practically eliminat< during the war. The problem of the section was to assist in getting a suitable su ply of flax into the country, to guide in its distribution to the thref trade, and so to control the distribution of the linen thread itse that various war orders could be met. Item Wii AMERICAN IXDUSTKY IN TllK WAH. 243 ''"■gl Enp^lancl controls the world's trade in flax, which is raised cliiefly "Hin Russia, Belfrium, Holland. Ireland, France, and Canada. Russian ^^^^'tflax is of an inferior quality and has to have an admixture of Irisii f^cti(|^P Belirian fiber to produce a g^ood thread. There was throuj^hout ■•l^llthe war a struggle with the British to obtain from them enough of 'vemliittjjg Irish product for this country. totii On February 25, 1918, a system of control over the distribution of "'""ilthread by licenses was established. From that date forward no ;'™brders were accepted nor shipments made by the trade to any destina- '" Jttion, military, naval, or civilian, without first obtaining a license * '''Ifrom the Board. A list was secured from each manufacturer of all '° '^(unfilled orders on his books. These were examined and blanket ^'^^Hicenses issued for most of them and then all new orders had to be {submitted for approval. Restrictions in the civilian use of flax gave rise to several inter- ^^*?sting problems. All fine gill fishing nets have to be made of linen 'e'™3ecause it gives strength without bulk and is much less visible to a ish than cotton or other line. A great shortage in fishing nets de- veloped toward the autumn of 1918. The Food Administration took I hand in the matter and carried on a correspondence with the Brit- sh Government looking to a release of nets. About the time of the irmistice the nets began to arrive. I The section worked out a program for distributing flax seed Through the Department of Agriculture with a view to encouraging md fostering the cultivation of fiber flax in this country, but the olan was never made effective. This country produces a moderate hare of the flaxseed consumed here in the manufacture of linseed lil. but the same plant is not available for the double purpose, be- ause fiber flax has to be harvested before the seeds are ripe. JUTE, HEMP, AND CORDAGE. This section was formed May 16, 1918, with E. C. Heidrich, jr., as ■hief. The two largest problems in this field had to do with (1) jute, jvhich comes from India and produces burlap and gunny cloth, and 2) henequen or Mexican sisal, which comes from Yucatan antl is he source of more than 85 per cent of the world's supply of binder wine.* Tlie section also dealt with Manila fiber, kapok, coir yarn, linoleum, nik, and bristles. But none of these involved problems so diflicult s burlap and binder twine, though they or their constituent ma- crials are practically all imported into this country. Upon the declaration of war, cordage and twines of all descrip- ions, from wrapping cord and linen thread to the heaviest marine * The Food Administration handled the principal problems relating to binder twine. It Iso dealt with burlap until Sept. 1, 1918. 244 AMERICAN INDLFSTEY IN THE WAR. cordage, were in immediate demand in extraordinary quantitie Japan increased her shipbuilding rapidly. Our Shipping Board r quired marine cordage for the emergency fleet. Our navy yards ii creased their supplies of cordage, jute products, and oakum about i per cent. Immense quantities of fiber products of all kinds wei consumed in the packing of materials for transportation from tl United States to France. In June, 1918, the Army abandoned crating in wooden box( because it required too much shipping space, and burlap coverint were in part substituted. The coverings were required to be cut i certain sizes, to be used later in France as sandbags in trench wa fare. The British controlled both the jute fiber and the burla manufactured from it in the mills at Calcutta, India, and Dunde Scotland. In 1917 this country imported 325,000,000 yards of burlap, 12£ 000,000 pounds of jute cordage, and 196,000,000 pounds of raw jut AVe have 554 importers or manufacturers and 2,919 companies whi( consume large quantities of jute products. One hundred and fift; four millions pounds of gunny cloth are used annually in balir cotton. Sugar, flour, meal, rice, potatoes, nuts, beans, grain, seed cofi^ee, wool, fertilizer, nitrate of soda, etc. are packed in burlap f< shipping. Meat is wrapped in it for shipment. In June, 1916, the British Government placed an embargo on tl exportation of jute and jute products. They required that all licens for export into the United States would have to be approved by tl British Embassy at Washington and the material purchased throuf the Textile Alliance (Inc.). Prices were practically fixed at Ca cutta by the jute merchants, the British Government taking tl position that it was not willing to interfere with the course of trade of such importance to India. On October 4, 1918, the Boar through the section, secured a voluntary agreement with our ir porters establishing maximum prices for burlap based on 16 cents p yard Pacific coast for 40-inch, 10^-ounce material, the open mark being 21 cents at the time. The agreement further stipulated th these prices should not affect contracts made before October 3, 191 and that any cancellation of contracts or repudiation of agreemen made before that date would be regarded with disfavor. On October 5 it was further resolved that no licenses should granted for the importation of burlap or jute without the joi approval of the Board and the Food Administration. At the sar time further freight space for the Calcutta-United States burli trade was secured, so that rates were reduced from 400 to 300 shr lings per ton. Buying in the Calcutta market was held up for short time, so that prices fell from 22.69 cents per yard in Septemb AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 245 tibtto 15.05 cents per yard by late October, 1918. The January, 1915, ritorice was 4.45 cents per yard. English restrictions were removed isi February 1, 1919. An international jute executive was under dis- iit'f'ussion in London when the end came. The Board's foreign mission ivfivas negotiating with the Indian Government to have a study made of mi; costs of production with a view to price-fixing, which would have •ffected enormous savings in our purchases. kn! Eeferring to the henequen or sisal of Yucatan, there was an jriit jibundance produced for all needs; but the fiber is controlled by a cat (Mexican monopoly, the Reguladora. Practically the only substitute ml.OT henequen in the manufacture of binder twine is Manila hemp, m\\.nd not enough of this could be brought into use to combat success- 111:4 (iilly the power of the monopoly to raise the price of henequen. Che problem was solved by the Food Administration buying of the , iij^^eguladora on behalf of all American interests at a price fixed by jjuliegotiation. - - Manila hemp, the chief material for heavy marine cordage, oil- ■ vW cables, transmission rope, and similar line, is raised exclusively jji^iii the Philippines. Manila hemp sold at 11.19 cents per pound at jfjjl'ew York in January, 1913. It had declined to 7 cents by December, jni J914. It then began to rise and reached 15.75 cents in January. 1917. irom which point it rose rapidly to 28.25 cents by the beginning of ,rj|918. It continued at this figure until April, when the War Trade lffii;jJoard fixed a minimum price at Manila of 17 cents per pound and livci maximum price at New York of 26 cents per pound, with $15 per ',r jale ocean freight rate, to continue for four months from date. In line, 1918. Gov. Harrison, of the Philippines, issued an edict de- laring the fixed price null and void after .July 25. 1918. ,j fiji On July 22 the War Industries Board fixed a price on ^fanila ]5f,j.jemp of 14 cents at Manila and 26 cents at New York. In August, .jfillie price-fixing committee, at the urgent request of the governor of i*» Philippines, discontinued price fixing. The purpose of the price :ng had been to steady the market. It was the intent to prevent n' too great fluctuations in price which tended to accompany the rif-ertainty of shipping. Kapoc comes from Java and is used for life preservers, mattresses, illows, etc. Import and export embargoes were placed upon it, and K' Navy commandeered all stocks in the United States. As a measure for conserving linseed oil, cork, and burlaji, the man- ^:, facture of linoleum was curtailed to 40 per cent of the 1917 produc- - on. The ^avy substituted koko mats made from coir yarn as floor 'verings and the section took control of the distribution of the tter for Government use. 246 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. While the consumption of cork was curtailed by cutting do-w linoleum manufacture, its use for refrigerators at sea and in tl various Army storage plants gave rise to more than normal demand The section gave aid in securing supplies from Spain, Portugal, ar Algiers. The shortage in bristles did not become apparent until Octobe 1918, and the plan which the section worked out for revising Arn and Navy specifications for brushes and conserving the use of bristl in other ways was never put into effect. !al,aij Chaiter 12. )^j^^ LEATHER AND RUBBER. lirisfli . HIDES, LEATHER, AND LEATHER GOODS. The United States manufactures more leather than all the coun- .ries of Europe combined. This countrj^ is also the lar<2;est consumer 3f leather in the world, the largest item of export being from il5,000,000 to 25,000,000 pairs of shoes per annum. We import raw- liides in great quantities. Thirty-four per cent of the cowhides and |kips, 72 per cent of the calfskins, 88 per cent of the horsehides. 99 ber cent of the goat and cabaretta sldns, and 67 per cent of the sheep- -kins tanned in the United States are imported. In 1914 we made 292,000,000 pairs of shoes, valued at the source it over $600,000,000, and our product leads the world both in quality md quantity. The war brought new and tremendously increased iiemands for leather goods. Our shoe manufacturing industry had to produce 20,000,000 pairs of a new type of shoes for the Army in 11917 and 29,000,000 paii^ in 1918. Saddles and harness were required n such quantities that a decadent trade had to be brought back to leavy production. More than 3,500,000 leather jerkins and more ban 7.000,000 pairs of heavy leather work gloves were actually lelivered to the Army. Belting leather and specialties of various cinds were required in extraordinary quantities. These require- iients were faced under conditions in which the shipment of raw- lides and tanning materials to the United States was becoming ncreasingly difficult, while the industry was hindered by the common hortage of labor, transportation, and fuel. The price of hides and leather, however, never reached the iiigh iverage of all commodities during the war. It advanced rapidly n 1916 until December, when the British inaugurated a system of )rice fixing, which had a remarkable effect in stabilizing the i)rices 'U this side of the water. In December, 1916, our prices averaged M.ut 165 per cent of prewar normal, and they never went beyond :.') per cent throughout the period. Some particular commodities, lowever, varied from the general average, sheepskin for leather erkins reaching 350 per cent at one time. Leather problems were first handled under the council by the oather equipment committee and the shoe committee. The War Trade Board early took control over the importation of hides. In t'^bruarv', 1918, abide and leather control board was formed with. i 248 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. C. F, C. Stout as chairman. This board functioned in very clos( cooperation with the Quartermaster Corps, which maintained a large force of field men who did inspecting and collecting of information! In the spring of 1918 the control board Avas reorganized into th( Hide, Leather, and Leather Goods Division of the War Industries Board. The division as constituted during the summer and fall oi 1918 had C. F. C. Stout as director and was composed of nine sections as follows: Hides and Skins, O. C. Howe, chief; Sole and Belting Leather, H. W. Boyd, chief, succeeded by T. Cover ; Upper Leather F. A. Vogel, chief; Harness, Bag, and Strap Leather, F. A. Vogel chief ; Sheepskin and Glove Leather, T. C. Shotwell, chief ; Boot and Shoe, C. D. P. Hamilton; Harness and Personal Equipment, C. A Eogers, chief; Belting, C. B. Rowbotham, chief; and Gloves anc Leather Clothing, H. J. Lewis, chief. i With the increasing demands of an increasing Army, prospects foil 1919 pointed to Government requirements equal to or exceeding in some branches of the industry our entire productive capacity. These conditions were faced at a time when imports of raw hides had tC' be cut down in order to economize shipping space, and in light ol the fact that hides are a by-product of an industry aimed at pro^i ducing food, so that domestic output could not be greatly increased Systems of economies and curtailments in civilian uses seemed t( offer the only hope of relief, and it was felt that these should h accompanied hj price fixing. The period of manufacture through the various stages from ra-w hides to finished articles is so long (six months or a year or more) that plans had to be laid down on an elaborate scale and had tc extend over a long period. The problem required a vast amounv of organization and a vast amount of study before effective step: could be taken. The numerous branches of this industry involvec an invested capital of nearly $2,000,000,000. The purpose of th( division was to build up a coordinate scheme of control from th( take-off of the raw hide to the last stitch of the finished leathei product. Steps were taken to eliminate wasteful practices in taking off the hides and in preserving them during the marketing processes Elaborate plans were worked out for simplifjdng the manufactur* and distribution of certain articles for civilian uses, in order to sav( leather for the military program without causing a leather-goodly famine in the country. Uides and skins. — The first commodity over which the divisiof inaugurated a control was sheepskins for leather jerkins. The Armi demands had caused the price of these to advance to 250 per cent normal, and the Army needed virtually the entire domestic outpi estimated at 1.000,000 pelts per year. On March 20, 1918. the vario\ packers and wool pullers producing these pelts were called together i AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 249 W ashington. The meeting resulted in an agreement wliereby the >vc)t)l pullers promised to give to the tanners of jerkin leather an ipiion on all picked sheepskins at a maximum price of J4 cents per qiiare foot, while the tanners in turn agreed to dress these skins or the Government at a fee of 4 cents per square foot. The arrange- mut amounted practically to a contract by the Army to take over ill pelts of this description at a fixed price for the period ending June 7, 1918. This made no provision for prices to civilian purchasers, and cnvard the expiration of the period it was thought best not to ■enew the contract but to place the whole matter before the price- ixing committee. Data were presented by the industry and by the livision, and on June 7 the price-fixing committee adopted a sched- ile of maximum prices for various grades of sheepskins, ranging "rora 8 to 18 cents per pound, to be effective for the period ending Vugust 1, 1918. These prices were later extended through October, .918, when with a slight downward revision they were reissued, lltctive until the end of January, 1919. < )n April 26, 1918, the producers, importers, and distributors of attle hides met the price-fixing committee for the purpose of dis- u-sing a price agreement. The price of cattle hides at this time vas declining slightly, but the division had under consideration with he Shipping Board and the Food Administration a plan for cur- ailing importations in order to economize in shipping space, and it vas felt necessary to do something to steady the market before put- inir this program into effect.^ The committee representing the industry presented to the price- ixiiig committee a schedule calculated on the basis of the average e\fl of prices for the period April 1 to 24, 1918. This was about • ' per cent above current market quotations. The price-fixing com- nittee objected on the groimd that it was contrary to their policy M raise existing prices, and the live-stock producers objected on the ridiind that in their opinion no emergency existed sufficient to jus- if\ the Government in fixing prices. The committee, nevertheless, s~ued two schedules of maximum prices on April 30, 1918. Both jvere calculated on the basis of hides from heavy native steers No. 1, :nd differentials were applied for other types. A price of 29 cents )er pound was set for all stocks on hand April 30, and a price of 3 cents per pound for the domestic take-off during the months of lay, June, and July and for imported hides shipped before July 31. On July 19 another meeting was held with representatives of the dustry for the purpose of continuing or revising these schedules. » These restrictions became operative June 15, 1918, and limited importationg of raw to certain heavy cattle hides from Sonth Amorlca, to hides comlnff hv rnil, nnd to Ides coming as back haul from Europe. 250 AMEPJCAIC lATDUSTRY IN THE WAR. Complaints were made of the impracticability of these fixed prices. It was claimed that the committee had placed an artificial price on hides ; that the better grades were being purchased by the Govern- ment at the maximum price, thereby keeping the figure up, while the cheaper grades, for which there was little demand, were selling below the fixed maxima. The committee suggested as a solution a reduction in the schedule, but this was objected to on the ground that a change in prices at that time would inject an element of doubt into the market and diminish production. The price-fixing com- mittee, however, after appointing a board made up of members of the trade and of the division to study and draw a new price schedule, established a series of prices based on 80 cents per pound for No. 1 native steer hides, to be effective until November 1, 1918. This schedule was in turn revised downward in October, 29 cents being made the basis for November-December prices and 28 cents for January, 1919, at the end of which period price-fixing ceased. The various price schedules were administered by the Hides and Skins Section. The task was difficult and enormous. There are several thousand junk dealers, hide dealers, and tanners who collect hides throughout the country. Prompt action was taken by the section whenever violations of the schedules were reported, but it was only the good will of the trade as a whole which made a successful administration of the program possible. A set of regu- lations designed to standardize the taking off of hides and their handling and curing after being taken off was published by the divi- sion. Before the end of the war reports were beginning to indicate that these regulations were having an important effect in preventing waste in the branch of the industry producing what are Imown as " country hides." These regulations were simply an effort to bring up the standard of the small butchers to that of the great packing houses in the handling of hides. The end came before it was found necessary for the section to allocate domestic stocks. But the rules of the War Trade Board required that all applications for import licenses after June 15 should be accompanied by allocation certificates issued by the sec- tion. In this way all imported hides were applied to war purposes. Sole and helting leather. — Army shoes require a particularly heavy and strong quality of sole leather, and by the spring of 1918 shortages were being felt. On May 18 the section issued instructions to all tan- ners, sole cutters, strip and block cutters, and shoe manufacturers re- stricting them in the sale and use for civilian trade to such sole leather as was not suitable for Government shoes. In administering this plan the section required weekly reports from all tanners that it might direct the distribution of accumulated stocks to shoemakers having AMERICAN TNDTTSTHY IN TIIK WAR. 251 Government contracts. Weekly reports wore also required from slioe iiKinufacturers and sole cutters. This section had at its disposal a field force which visited tanners for the purpose of guiding the industry in the manufacture of leiither meeting the Army specifications. A protracted study was made of the cost of tanning this leather before price fixing was inau- •rurated. Upper leather. — The term "■ upper leather " is applied to all types of leather used for the sides or upper parts of shoes. It is made vari- ously of calf skin, kip," sheepskins, goatskins, cabarotta, kangaroo, and horse hide. These depend largely on imports, and as was natural their price advanced to a higher point than that of any other leather during the war. In addition to the system of weekly reports from tanneries and shoemakers, by which the section was able to assist in a fair dis- tribution of materials and to bring about further standardization in the industry, the section carried through two very large and impor- tant tasks, (1) in connection with the production of upper leather for the new " trench shoe," and (2) the preparation of data for the price fixing of upper leather. Early in March, 1918, the American Expeditionary Forces decided that our Army shoes were not heavy enough to be suitable for trench service. The British were using a slioe made of bark-tanned India kip, finished flesh out in the natural color. It was a shoe of this character which Pershing's staff decided that we wanted. We had been using a lighter chrome-tanned calfskin. The shoe committee of the Quartermaster Corps designed specifications for the Ameri- can trench shoe and the section undertook to get the American tan- neries to turn out a sufficient quantity of upper leather meeting the new specifications. The standard required was a bark-tanned or •chrome-retannod "bend,"" of kip or calfskin of proper weight. A great deal of work was done in connection with the plan to llx maximum prices for all purchases of upper leather. This work was ■closely connected with thf work which was going on at the same time in preparation of the price fixing and conservation program to be applied to shoes. The tanners of both the eastern and the western group were called together and formulated recommendations. The Federal Trade Commission carried out a long and painstaking in- Testigation of costs. The differences in the various findings were discussed by the section with various representatives of the trade and were finally, in October, 1918, reconciled. The section, together with representatives of the trade, appeared before the price-fixing *Kip3 are hides from young cattle weighing from 2.'5 to r)0 pounds per hide. •A bend of leather is a tanned hide with the flanks and other undesirable portions trimmed off. 252 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. oommittee and recommended a schedule of maximum prices, which was adopted November 1, 1918. The armistice came, however, before it was announced. Harness^ hag^ and strap leather. — A schedule of maximum prices for black harness leather to all consumers was established by the price- fixing committee June 25, 1918. It was calculated on the basis of 70 cents per pound, grade A, and reached by the usual procedure No fixed prices were established for russet harness, bag, or strap leather, though studies had been made and the schedules were pre- pared when the end came. The important work of the section was in bringing about a better distribution of leather from tanneries to the harness makers. This was done through a system of periodical reports from both groups. The data thus collected put the section in a position to direct both \ purchasers and sellers in such a way as to keep up a steady supply of the limited stocks of leather to Government contractors and others. SheepsMn and glove leather. — This section was active in administer- ing the leather jerkin price-fixing arrangement referred to under hides and skins above. It also had charge of sheepskin shearlings required for saddles and for aviators' boots. Perhaps the most important work of this section related to the supply of horsehide leather for Army gloves. It appeared in the- summer of 1918 that the Quartermaster Corps had authorized pur- chases of gloves exceeding the country's entire supply of horsehide- leather. Through the instrumentality of the section a substitute in the form of cowhide splits was used for the heavy mittens.. Ail horsehide and cowhide split leather was allocated to Government. contractors. Boots and shoes. — This section undertook one of the most ambitious- programs attempted by the Board. Its work was the first step in a- general plan to reduce the cost of wearing apparel which was under- taken by the chairman of the Board with the approval of the Presi- dent. A committee representing the retail merchants of the country was called to Washington and notified that immediate steps must be taken to reduce the price of w^earing apparel. The director of the division took an active part in the program designed to regulate the price of shoes, as did the Conservation Division and the Priorities Division. The plan vvas to put the entire industry, including the manufacturers, distributors, and retailers of shoes for civilian use on a controlled basis. The first step in this direction was taken on June 29, 1918, when the Conservation Division issued a set of regulations broadly outlining a scheme for cutting down the number of styles,- colors, and lasts of shoes and eliminating certain styles which. required an extravagant use of leather. The section administered these regu- lations. AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 253 In order to make these reo;ulrttions more efTective the i)rionties -commissioner on August 7, 1918, issued circular No. 10,* requirinir of each manufacturer of boots and shoes a pledge to practice the economies outlined in return for a place which the priorities com- missioner gave such manufacturers on the preference list for fuel and transportation. Each manufacturer was required to exact a like pledge from those who purchased from him for resale. The trade was instructed that any firm which failed to carry out the terms of the regulations in good faith woidd receive no aid in pro- curing coal and transportation. From this time forward elaborate studies were being carried on. and many conferences were held with every branch of the shoe industry for the purpose of developing a plan for much more rigid conservation and for control over prices including retail prices. A number of plans were suggested. The idea of producing a single type to be called the " liberty shoe " was given careful consideration. It was proposed that nothing but black leather be allowed. Women's styles at this time required a different colored glazed kid shoe for each gown. The price of glazed Idd was 350 per cent of normal, and it was hard to get. It was proposed that the wholesale price be stamped on the sole of every shoe, but the industry objected strenu- ously to this. After a long series of conferences with representatives of more than 50 per cent of the producing companies involved, an agreement was reached and a schedule of regulations issued on September :^0. 1018. to be applicable until June 1, 1919. Colors of shoes were lim- ited to black, wiiite. and one shade of tan. Heights Avere limited. The introduction of. new lasts was stopped. The production of certain styles requiring an extravagant use of leather was forbidden. Manufacturers were required to reduce the variety of their product by about two-thirds. All shoes were reduced to four classes which the trade agreed to sell at retail as follows: Class A, $9 to $12 for high shoes, $9 to $11 for low shoes; class B, $6 to $8.95; class C. $3 to $5.95; class D. any price below $3. Each shoe was to be stamped with a number and a k-ey to the numbers was to be provided so that the purchaser would be able to determine by whom the shoe was made and in which class it belonged. This last regulation represented a compromise on the question of printing the wholesale price on the sole. A system of pledges was reciuired of manufacturers, jobbers, and retailers. Retailers were required to exhibit a card explaining the * See Appendix XXXVIII for cop.y of Priorities Circular No. 10. 254 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. scheme in a conspicuous place in their stores. It was contemplatedl that this plan in its entirety should be applied for the spring seasoill of 1919. After the armistice the pledge and price-fixing elements' were rescinded, but the trade voluntarily retained some of the con- servation features. This plan would have reduced enormously the amount of leather stock carried by the various agencies all the way from the tannery to the retail store. One tanner, who had been turn- ing out leather in 81 colors and shades, was able to simplify his plant to produce only three colors, and thus he was saved the neces- sity of carrying in stock raw hides and leather to the value of many' thousands of dollars. Retail stores were enabled to reduce their lines; and thus reduce the total quantity of stock carried and the risks of; loss on left-over ends of particular styles. It is estimated that under] this program the industry would have been freed from the burden! of carrying materials to the value of more than $100,000,000 per year. All parties in interest were convinced that all branches of the in- dustry would have reaped reasonable profits and the price to con- sumers would have been far below what has been recently paid. Harness and persoval equipment. — This section, formed June 12 1918, devoted its attention principally to the inauguration of a con- servation program. In cooperation with the war service committees and the Conservation Division a plan for eliminating about 75 per cent of the styles and types of harness and saddles was developed. Near the close of the war the manufacture of light harness was entirely sus- pended. There had been 60 styles of horse collars. The program limited them to 15. Heavy team and farm harness was limited to 12 types. Styles of riding saddles were reduced from 200 to 36. The Armj^ demand for saddles, particularly McClellan saddles, caused a shortage of saddle trees. At first an attempt was made to allocate the production, but this was abandoned and the section set about to encourage the production of saddle trees by the numerous small wood- working plants throughout the country. All prices of harness and saddles as well as all contracts for their purchase were made by the appropriate Army bureaus before the formation of the section. Belting. — In the fall of 1918 the shortage in the supply of russet harness leather for the Army made it necessary to form a section to control the distribution of belting leather. Sales were restricted to Government contractors from October to the end. The section used a questionnaire and established a system of monthly reports. Gloves and leather clothing. — This section was formed late in the summer of 1918 and devoted most of its attention to the preparation of a conservation program for the glove industry. The work was not yet completed when the end of the war made its adoption un- necessary. AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 255 RUBBER AND lU'UnKK GOODS. The United States leads the -world in the manufacture of rul)l)er ^ goods, producing about seven times the output of (Jreat Britain, the llj^next largest manufacturer. Our production has increased very ^jjij rapidly in recent years. In 1906 we consumed 24,113 tons of crude , J 1 rubber. In 1917 this had increased to 157,371 tons, the finishcvl y I product that year being valued at $896,000,000. In 1914 we made „;' 8,021,000 pneumatic tires, while in 1917 our output amounted to ■J5.S35,000 tires. Over 70 per cent of the rubber consumed in the United States goes into automobile tires and tubes, about 14 per cent into mechanical rubber goods of various kinds, 8 per cent into boots and shoes, 2 per cent into druggists' and stationers' sundries, of which we produce the bulk of the world's supply, and the rest goes into miscellaneous articles.-"^ Priestley discovered the first use to which rubber Avas put in 1770 when he found it w'ould " rub out " lead pencil marks. The Amazon Basin was the original source of rubber and is still the principal source of wild rubber, though 80 per cent of the crude material which reaches the United States comes from the rubber [.lantations of xVsia. Ceylon, and the East Indies. There are 60 lypes of rubber plants, but the industry depends mainly upon two trees — the Heva Braziliensis and the Castilloa. Besides the crude rubber, which enters every year into our product in a quantity ex- ( eeding 150,000 tons, we use about 90,000 tons of reclaimed rubber annually. We also use about 11,000 tons of rubber substitutes. The Rubber and Rubber Goods Section was not formed until Au- gust 5, 1918, though the War Trade Board took control of rubber imports in December, 1917, and other important measures for regu- lating the industry were put into effect before that time. H. T. Dunn was chief of the section. Crude rubber is, perhaps, the only important staple which did not experience an increase in price during the period of the World War. The price during 1915, 1916, and even 1917 and 1918 was, with the exception of two short periods, considerably below that of 1912, 1913, and 1914. The price of rubber products followed quite closely tliat of crude rubber without showing the sudden fluctuations. The a\erage price of all rubber products during 1917 and 1918 ranged from 70 to 80 per cent below the average relative ])rice of commodi- ties in general. The important reason for the low-price levels of rubber during the war was that while the world consumption increased continu- • See Appendix XXXIX for table of crude and reclaimed rubber consumed In the Unltod States In the production of rubber goods, 1917. 256 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. ously over the period, the production increased still more rapidly. The plantations of the Far East were reaching the " bearing " age. In 1904 these plantations produced 43 tons of rubber; in 1913, 47,618 tons; in 1917, 204,348 tons; and in 1918, about 240,000 tons. At the same time Germany, which uses from 15,000 to 20,000 tons per year, practically dropped out of the buying market; and in 1917 and 1918 Russia, with a consuming capacity of more than 20,000 tons per year, also ceased buying. This left heavy surpluses in the plantation countries. The only problem for us was one of shipping. The first regula- tion of the War Trade Board was issued December 7, 1917, and was aimed to prevent rubber from reaching the Central Powers, who were greatly in need of it. No restrictions were placed on amounts, but the regulations provided for the licensing of imports, for the consignment of shipments to the Rubber Association of America, and for the submission of guaranties by importers and manufac- turers that they would not sell any rubber directly or indirectly to any country at war with the United States nor to any person unless satisfied that he had no intention of exporting without an export license. By the spring of 1918, as part of the program to force shipping from the Pacific which was needed on the Atlantic, it was felt that the situation necessitated a curtailment of the amount of rubber to be imported. The War Trade Board held conferences with rep- resentatives of the rubber industry and the Shipping Board, and on May 8 issued regulations restricting the quantity of rubber to be licensed for import during the three-month period May, June, and July, 1918, to 25,000 long tons, which represented a rate of im- portation about two-thirds that of 1917. The restrictions did not apply to shipments which had left the foreign ports before May 8, and. as they had been anticipated by the trade, there was heaA'y buy- ing in April, so that 55,000 tons actually reached the United States during this three-month period. The war requirements of rubber were for motor vehicles, airplanes, gas masks, medical supplies, etc. It was estimated that about 30,000 tons would go into direct war work in 1918. This meant that heavy curtailments would have to take place in other industries, particu- larly automobile tires. The various manufacturing concerns were classified, and imports were allocated to them on the basis of a defi- nite percentage of their 1917 and early 1918 consumption. The manufacture of motor cars for civilian use was curtailed under a separate program, and the use of motor cars for pleasure was dis- couraged. This naturally led to a decrease in the demand for tires. Toward the end of the period a program was worked out for greatly reducing the number of types of automobile tires, and this in turn AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN TUB WAR. 257 vas designed to reduce the consumption of rubber by making it innecessarv for manufacturers and dealers to carry large stocks. The section carried on the usual routine of collecting information Hid discussing problems involved in adjusting the industry to war sonditions. A series of 27 questionnaires Avas issued to the trade hrough its War Service Committee. Data were collected and confer- snces held in preparation of the regulations issued September 21, 1918, )y the Priorities Commissioner in the form of Circular Xo. 24, which )laced the rubber trade in the list of controlled industries. This cir- ular. following the usual form, instructed the industry that in order conserve the supi^ly of rubber in the United States, as well as to ave labor, fuel, and transportation, it would be necessary for the arious firms to cut down their production of rubber goods to the greatest possible extent. It suggested that unnecessary and unde- irable types, sizes, and styles of articles be eliminated, that produc- ion be kept as near to current demand as possible, and that nothing hould be produced or delivered except for such essential uses as were [esignated by the Board. The circular i^rovided that the production f pneumatic automobile tires and tubes should be cut doAvn during he last three months of 1918 to three-twelfths of 50 per cent (meas- red both by units and amount of rubber consumed) of the annual roduction of each firm, estimated on the basis of the 18 months nding June 30, 1918. The ruling on tires did not apply, however, ) direct orders from any agencies of the United States, and no re- lictions were placed on solid tires. The manufacturers were required to file a pledge in which they romised (1) not to use any product of their manufacture except for Bsential purposes, (2) to make no sale to any customer for resale ntil such customer should have filed a similar pledge to do his best 5 insure the distribution of his products for essential uses only (this 'as not to apply to tires), and (3) to observe the production pro- ram set forth in the circular and make such reports concerning roduction and activities as might be required. The industry, in irn, was placed on the Preference List for fuel and transportation, nd was given an automatic class C rating. On October 1, 1918, there was issued through the War Service Com- ittee of the industry a set of regulations defining more fully the rogram of control outlined in Circular No. 24. Manufacturers ere to be guided in their work by the following four general classes f articles, rated according to their importance to the war: Class I. Aiticles to bo supplied on direct orders received from Kovenimental partmonts, railwnys, express companies, telephone and te!ej.Taph companies, e lied Cross, and Allied Governmenls. Production was limited only l»y orders band, and tbe crude ruliber consumed in filling tbese orders was to be replaced ider tbe War Trade Board plan of issuing allocation certificates. 105826—21 17 258 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. Class II. Articles to be supplied for use in industries approved by the War Industries Board. Production of articles in this class was authorized in quan- tities sufiicient to supply essential requirements of those engaged in industries on the preference list and individual manufacturers who had been given prefer- ential treatment. Class III. Articles for general use. They were to be produced only to the extent necessary to meet current demands, unless othenvise specified. Class IV. Non-essential articles — so considered by the War Industries Board. Their production was absolutely prohibited. A list of the preferential industries, as well as of the various arti- cles coming within each class, was furnished to the trade, and the regulations became effective upon receipt of the list. During October the Board issued a revised circular of instructions containing only three classes and naming, so far as possible, the articles in Class II. Class I continued to include direct Government orders. The new Class II became (1) a list of articles which were included wdthout comment and could be produced in sufficient quan- tities to meet current needs, (2) another list of articles the produc- tion of which was limited to a certain percentage of 1917 production, and (3) a list of articles which could be produced only for designated purposes. The new Class III was a list of articles whose production was prohibited. All regulations were rescinded shortly after the armistice, except rules of the War Trade Board prohibiting exports to the Central Powers. am ClIArTER 13. MACHINERY AND TOOLS. t|| The problems arising in the machinery and tools industries re- lated in many respects, particularly during the later period of the ctioi ^^^^ ^^ ^^^6 work of the Resources and Conversion Section, But it was ■ til found necessary as early as 1917, in some of these trades, to establish sections of the board to handle special situations. Sections were formed for machine tools; forgings, ordnance, small arms, and am- munition; hardware and hand tools; cranes; chains; and military Dptical glass and instruments. MACHINE TOOLS. udid " Machine tool " is the name given to a piece of machinery used :r tl to produce other machines, implements, factory equipment, or tools. sport [t is evident that the development of new facilities for the manufac- iure of guns, shells, powder, and other supplies, directly needed in Bwly enlarged quantities by the war, occasioned the manufacture or inversion of machinery for the rapid equipment of many new jlants. In most cases it was necessary for the management of a new nunitions factory to know the design of the product which was to be urned out before it could place orders with machine tool manufac- urers for the equipment of the factory. The integration necessary t' war was restricted to a very small number of plants situated in the eastern part of the country on or near the seaboard. Small arms 1 ammunition were produced by a few companies in Connecticut, iiode Island, Massachusetts, and New York, and ordnance was l>r()duced principally by the Bethlehem and Midvale Steel Cos., with a -'!i:ill quantity being turned out by Government arsenals. The in- iiments of trench warfare had never been produced in this country ;iini no one was familiar with the processes of their manufacture. The production of all munitions which were manufactured in this untry was surrounded by more or less secrecy and few people out- !e of the regular establishments knew anything about the work. < Mjviously when necessity arose for unprecedented quantities of all of these articles, the Allies and later the United States turned natur- ally for their requirements to those comparatively few establish- ments which were familiar with the work. Time was of the essence, and expansion of these establishments seemed to promise the quick- est method of supplying the need. In many respects the eastern sec- tion of the country was more suited for work of this character as well as for other manufacturing essential to the war. The general result was that by the spring of 1918 the congestion the eastern manufacturing district had become very serious. If ■re had been a central control over distribution of orders, this need I r\ er have occurred. There was a shortage of power, fuel, and trans- portation. Nearly all work was far behind the ambitious program which had been laid down. The heart of the manufacturing center of the country was declared by the Board a restricted area, and all Olds, particularly the Ordnance Section, gave careful study to the lestion of directing expansion of war work in other centers where- (■r the peculiar nature of the product to be turned out made the • of facilities in other parts of the country possible. The conservation agreements which were reached by the Board during the summer of 1918, as well as the general application of the priorities system which was diA-erting materials and the use of trans- portation from many of the less essential industries, were gradually producing a condition in which many well-organized factory man- agements and plants were functioning at a very low ebb. As needs arose it was the purpose of the section, in close conference with the Resources and Conversion Section, so to direct the i)lacing of orders involving developments as to utilize managements and plants already in existence and which could be turned to the new work with a little encouragement and instruction. 264 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN TB.K WAR. The Ordnance Section did not always attempt to allocate in detail the various facilities required, but by refusing clearance to some pron posals, where resources were known to be inadequate, and by indicat- ing localities in which resources were available, and by constantly pre^ senting the importance of avoiding congestion, it did much to equalize the burdens and benefits of direct war contracts. This was particu- larly true when the plan for the enlarged Army was adopted, and a great expansion of our production was undertaken. HARDWARE AND HaND TOOLS. This section dealt with a large number of industries manufacturing small finished products made of metal — sewing machines and needles, horseshoes, fire extinguishers, bedsteads, plumbers' supplies, gauges, twist drills, pneumatic tools, woodworking tools, precision machin-' ery, and the like. In most of these industries the war requirements represented a very small percentage of normal output, and they were industries in which curtailment for the purpose of releasing metal, labor, capital, and factory organization for war work was possible. Fourteen industries supervised by this section were placed on a ration basis. Most of the plants were located in the congested area, and the industry as a whole has always been on a highly competitive basis. A great deal of prosperity was being enjoyed at the time this country entered the war, due partly to the elimination of German made products from the markets iii this country and South America. The section was first organized in April, 1918, and was reorganized and enlarged so as to contain a number of subdivisions in charge of particular commodities on June 1, with Murray Sargent as chief. One of the few commodities under the section, in which there was a serious shortage for war purposes, was textile needles of all kinds. These had been manufactured largeh' in England and Germany : and this country, before the war, was in the habit of importing practically its entire supply, in face of the fact that this is the leading country of the world in the production of textile machinery and sewing machines. Facilities were rapidly developed by construction or con- version for the manufacture of these articles, and before the war was over all needs were being satisfactorily met. A shortage occurred also in saddlery hardware. This industry had been rapidly declining before the war, and the new demands were accompanied by verj?^ high prices. Meetings were held with the manufacturers, and studies were made in the cost of production with a view to fixing prices ; but while this activity was going on, a better system of distribution of orders had so cleared the situation that price fixing was not resorted to. AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAK. 265 The manufacture of fire extinguishers came into conflict with the I induction of toxic gas for the Chemical Warfare Service, carbon . I rachloride being needed in quantities greater than were available hoth purposes. The price of fire extinguishers began to advance i idly. At the suggestion of the section, the Navy sent an account- nt to the plant of the Pyrene Co. to study costs, and later a price ;^rcement was reached for Government purchases at $4.25 each for (luart Pyrene fire extinguishers and 90 cents for refilling one. A difficulty arose in connection with the purchase of horseshoes by hv several Government departments. The industry organized and isted on dealing as a unit. There was no shortage, and the depart- ts preferred to buy on a competitive basis. The section called representatives of the industry to Washington and explained the ition, calling attention to the fact that onl}^ a small percentage L the output would be needed for Government purposes, that the apartments preferred to purchase on a competitive basis, and that () }jrices would be fixed. A shortage occurred in ships' hardware. The most important ac- ion in relief of this was an agreement brought about by the section ( tween the War Service Committee of the industry and the Emer- y Fleet for a set of standard specifications. Steps were taken ievelop a similar arrangement between the Navy and the industry, ut the work had not been completed when the end came. • The Engineer Corps of the Army brought to the attention of the . ion the fact that it was unable to place business with individual .iiuifacturers of hydrants and valves for the reason that all in- II i lies were referred to a single representative of the manufacturers 1 Washington. Attention was also called to the fact that the prices imtcd by this representative were higher than prices quoted by the ' "JUS manufacturers for analogous materials not being sold to the crnment. Investigation showed that this process of representing industry through a single channel had been established early in war at the request of the Council, but it was clear that such a I liod of purchasing could not be satisfactory without its corollary, e fixing. There did not seem a sufficient shortage to warrant ' fixing, and therefore it was recjuested that the centralized sell- _ method be broken up and selling be put on a competitive l)asis, Inch was done. Metal beds were another problem. Their manufacturers had been ut on a 50 per cent ration basis by the Priorities Commissioner. The ifiuenza epidemic brought on a severe shortage. Plans were imme- iately projected to have wooden beds manufactured as substitutes. ho Army and Navy, however, objected to them on sanitary grounds. Ikiilders' hardware was put on a ration basis, and soon a shortage egan to appear in the supply for the housing program. A list of 266 AMERICAX INDUSTEY IIT THE WAE. standard articles was drawn up and plans were made for allocatir the business so as to draw on existing stocks as far as possible ar not to require new manufacture. It was arranged that each pr gram involving $5,000 or more should be cleared through the sectio Toward the end of the period a great many concerns, who we operating on a ration basis, were beginning to find that their prioril rating was so low that they would have to close shop unless t\u could get Government orders, bringing with them higher rating They were flocking to Washington and seeking contracts at wha ever prices they could get in order to secure higher priority ratine for the supply of raw materials. This is an interesting commei on the effect of the priorit}' system on prices. There are two sid' to the matter, however. It is likely that, if the war had coi tinned for two or three more years, the priority system would ha-s developed further refinements designed to give more complete pr( tection to the industries which it was putting on a skeleton basi The end came while the development was in process. CRANES. The crane industry depends upon the activities of railroads, cor tractors, blast furnaces, steel mills, ore docks, coal companies, shij yards, etc. This country manufactures all the cranes needed for i< own use, and exports to England, France, Germany, Chile, Brazi Japan, China, India, and other countries. The business w? below normal until the beginning of 1915 when the war deman appeared and increased steadily through to the end. The most important shortage occurred in locomotive cranes. The se( tion was formed November 12, 1917, with Alexander C. Brown as chie By that time the direct Government requirements for locomoti\ cranes had reached a point which indicated the possibility of a acute shortage in the near future, making a general survey of th situation necessary. Data were collected covering the availa])le ou put of the builders whose plants could be easily converted to th production of locomotive cranes. Builders of steam shovels were th most important on the latter list. In normal times the delivery period for locomotive cranes is onl two or three weeks, because, while orders are by specifications, nearl all of the constituent elements are standard and are held in reserv stock by the builders. But by the summer of 1917, the demand fc these cranes had been so great that reserve stocks were practically e: hausted and delivery periods began to grow longer and longer. The section took over the administration of priorities both in th delivery of cranes and of raw materials for their manufacture. July 1, 1918, materials for the construction of locomotive cranes wer placed on the list entitled to automatic priority. It was necessar to make very careful studies of the relative importance of the need of those who came to buy the limited supplies. But price fixing neve became necessary. ■■■ america:n industry in the war. 267 The section made a careful study of cxistinp; cranes and current iitput, as well as present and prospective requirements of the various iovernment agencies. Quite satisfactory figures were received on future requirements, so that the section was able to arrange in ad- \nnce for sufficient capacity to turn out the required cranes. The i>ven regular builders who were producing cranes when the section as formed increased their production 50 per cent during our period 11 the war, and in addition 11 other plants were converted to r;me production to meet the war program. By October, 1918, ca- acity to produce standard locomotive cranes had been developed to rovide for 140 cranes per month as compared to a miximum monthly iitput in 1913 and 1914 of from forty to fifty cranes. The produc- lion of special designs of the locomotive cranes type brought up the total capacity of the country to 240 standard and special cranes per month. The 1918 output was nearly all purchased for direct Govern- ment use. The production of electric traveling cranes was always sufficient to meet all war needs; and, while they were placed on the list of com- modities requiring clearance of orders, they never involved a serious problem. In December, 1917, the Army purchased 60 gantry cranes for use on the docks in France. They were shipped to our ports early in 1918 and stood there all through the spring and early sum- mer, while plans in France seemed not to be requiring them. The sec- tion took steps to have them released for use in loading vessels on this side, but in August it was arranged to have them shipped to France. In September, 1918, the A. E. F. asked for a new and enlarged supply of cranes. In order to expedite production to meet this special demand, the Priorities Committee arranged for special pri- ority to be given to what was termed the " Pershing crane program," and the requirement was promptly taken care of. CHAINS. This section was formed April 11, 1918, on account of the shortage of anchor cables brought on by the shipbuilding program. The section found it necessary to deal also with sprocket chains, and it administered the conservation and rationing program applied to trace chains. John C. Schmidt was chief of the section. He wit- nessed a test of a new type of anchor chain made of cast steel at the factory of the National Malleable Castings Co., Sharon, Pa., and made a favorable report on the results of the test. This process seemed to present the solution of the chain shortage. The Emergency Fleet placed an order with the company for 150 suites of chain at a very satisfactory price. The company had great difficulty, however, in getting its factory built, and no important -deliveries had been made by the time of the armistice. A sample of 268 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. the chain, however, has been used on one of the buoys in New Yoi Harbor since August 8, 1918, and inspections show that it is resis' ing corrosion as satisfactorily as the welded wrought-iron chai attached to the same buoy. Manufacturers of anchor chain were encouraged by the section tj increase their output and new manufacturers were brouglit into thi work. The output was increased also by the abrogation during thj war of a number of the highly technical rules which the skilled labc of these shops was in the habit of observing. With all that coulj be done, however, not enough chain could be produced to equip shipi as rapidly as they were being turned out by the Emergency Flee Corporation. As a temporary expedient the American Bureau o Shipping agreed that for the period of the war the requirements o the length of ships' cables might be reduced 25 per cent. The section was asked by the Army to make a comparative stud of chain tire grips. Samples were secured and an exhaustive repoi made, touching weight, prices, and suitability for particular serviceij The section also prepared a complete descriptive and illustrated catai logue of every known make and type of chain. No prices, except those included in the Iron and Steel Institute' schedule, were ever fixed in this industry. The price of the basi raw material having been fixed, it was possible by the exercise o! the priorities system so to control the output that further fixing o prices did not seem necessary. MILITARY OPTICAL GLASS AND INSTRUMENTS. Before the war this country produced practically no optical glas and comparatively few optical instruments. Europe, particularl; Germany, supplied us. By the time the United States entered th war reserve stocks were largely exhausted and little progress ha( been made in the production of glass, though many instruments wer being made and fitted with imported lenses. The Army and Nav^ needed great quantities of field glasses, cameras, fire-control instru ments, sextants, surveying instruments, microscopes, and the like There was a strong demand for moving-picture machines. The period from April, 1917, to about June, 1918, was one of ex perimentation and development. Glass formulae had been secret an( well guarded. The difference between the kinds of glass used for th( various types of lenses lies in the basic constituents required to pro duce different densities. While formula were being discovered anc developed, it was necessary to train workmen in the art of makin^ and grinding glass. A school was established at Eochester, N. Y. under the supervision of the Mechanics' Institute, where skilled me chanics were given a special course to fit them for this work. Th( Geophysical Laboratory, under the personal directon of Col AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 269 I'^JFred. E. Wright, gave valuable assistance in determining tiie "■'^'tnaterials suitable for optical glass, sending a staff to the Bauscii & "^iLomb Optical Co., where the scientific problems, connected with JDptical-glass manufacture, were solved and the product turned out "Idii a commercial scale. The proper pot for melting glass presented a '^^'serious difficulty, credit for the solution of which is due to Prof. '%leininger of the Bureau of Standards. '"^J The Government gave assistance to the Pittsburgh Plate (llnss Co., "%nd they became the largest producers of optical glass. The Spencer "'IJILens Co. was given a Government contract which necessitated the erection of a new plant. Dr. Morey of the Geophysical Laboratory was tationed at this plant and there discovered, in the summer of 1918, method by which the period required for making glass was reduced from 40 to 24 hours. The Mount Wilson Observatory, aided by the rdnance Department, entered the field of grinding precision optical lass. One new concern, Keuffel & Esser Co., built a plant at Ho- oken, N. J., for the manufacture of optical glass. By June, 1918, the country was producing glass of a quality com- paring favorably with the product of Europe, and was producing in quantity almost sufficient for current demands. When a little later MS Dr. Morey's discovery reduced the period of manufacture, capacity ^flbecame sufficient for all essential needs. ?(| The section was formed early in March, 1918, with George E. Chatillon as chief. On March 27 the entire industry was notified that it had been placed under the supervision of the War Industries Board, and that no company could accept orders Avithout the ap- :l;i! proval of the Board. Labor was controlled by placing restrictions arl upon shifting from plant to plant. Prices were left entirely to the tt jrovernment purchasing agencies. By a system of permits the section lis L'ontrolled the distribution to the various Government departments svei and to manufacturers having direct Government contracts. ;jT Requests for priority on raw materials, including steel and l)rass, •tn v\-ere passed upon by the section. In conjunction with the War Trade lilj Board, the section passed upon a number of applications for both im- port and export licenses for materials affecting this industry. :fj Practically the entire available capacity for optical instruments jj was occupied with Government orders. Production increased from ,;l month to month during 1918. The total number of orders placed n by the Government amounted to more than $50,000,000, of which .,j about $15,000,000 went to the Navy. It is believed that the produc- ^jj tive capacity brought about by the war is considerably in e.xce.ss of ^ the normal commercial demand of the country. There is no tariff to jjji protect the industry from foreign competition, and our manufacturers fl will likely have difficulty in maintaining the position which they have Pj gained during the war. Chapter 14. TRANSPORTATION AND POWER. The sections falling -svithin the scope of this chapter handled AutO'-i motive Products, Railroad Equipment and Supplies, Stored Mate-' rials. Fire Prevention, Power, Electrical and Power Equipment, and Electric Wire and Cable. AUT0M0TI%'E PRODUCTS. C. C. Hancli was made chief of the Automotive Products Section on June 19, 1918, when the section was reorganized to conform to the final form of the War Industries Board. The work of supervision in this field began, however, June 4. 1917, with the formation of the Automotive Transportation Committee of the Council, this committee consisting of representatives of the industry itself. The committee was reorganized and placed under the Board on September 4. 1917^ with H. L. Horning as chief. The section had jurisdiction not only of the automobile industry but also of the other lines of production in which the automobile industry engaged; for example, airplane engines, tanks, marine gas engines, armored cars, motor cycles, and bicycles. The auto- mobile factories supplied for the most part the engineering skill and the skilled workm.en, which carried forward the vast airplane pro- gram of the war. In addition, some of these manufacturing establishments converted a part of their equipment to the production of gun carriages, gun recoil mechanisms, escort wagons, water carts, artillery wheels, litters, shells, depth bombs, mine anchors, grenades, torpedo directors, balloon winches, and other military equipment. It is estimated that the automobile industry took contracts for direct and indirect war work to the amount of nearly $1,000,000,000. The section did a vast amount of work making clearances of pur- chases of the various Government departments and of the Allies. It studied and recommended sources of supply and allocated orders where that was found necessary. It made investigations for the Priorities Commissioner. But perhaps the most important and dif- ficult work of the section was the administration of the program under which the automobile industry was curtailed to 50 per cent of normal production during the latter half of 1918. 270 AMEEICAN INDUSTRY IN T]IE WAR. 271 This industry has had a phenomenal a pledge the essence of which was as follows: "That its ])roduc- lu of passenger automobiles and of repn'w parts therefor shall nt. for the six months ending with December 31, 1918, exceed 25 ( r cent of its production for the calendar year 1917." This pledge nant that passenger-automobile manufacturers were permitted — in ' See Appendix XL for tables showing production of automobiles In the United States :co 1899. U4 i 272 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. fact, aided — to operate on a 50 per cent basis during the last s; months of 1918. It was believed that this basis would support tl organizations of the various plants until such time as they cou] convert their facilities, so far as practicable, for the production direct and indirect war requirements. The attention of the ma facturers was called to the urgent war requirements for iron ai steel and to the possible necessity of eliminating the manufactu. of passenger automobiles after January 1, 1919, if the war shoa continue. The arrangement to curtail was contained in a letter from tl Priorities Commissioner to the industry, dated August 24, 191 The administration of the plan was turned over to this sectio The section began by requiring the manufacturers (1) to subm sworn inventory figures showing value of materials on hand ar value of materials required to balance their stocks; also tonna^ of principal classes of steel and the number of principal uni on hand, with the tonnage and number of units required to ba' ance the stocks on hand; (2) to submit a statement showing tl number of finished cars which could be built from the abo^ inventory when the stocks had been balanced, and the time r quired to build them; and (3) to submit sworn production figur separately for the years 1916, 1917, and the first half of 1918. Upo receipt of the foregoing information, the section certified to tl Director of Steel Supply the requirements of each manufacturer f( the principal classes of steel in tons and the principal units nece; sary to balance stocks on hand and to produce the number of cai allotted under the manufacturer's pledge. Each manufacturer was then notified that he Avas privileged i build his specified number of cars and that materials therefor migl be obtained by filing in triplicete with the Director of Steel Supp] applications for " permit to purchase." The manufacturer's cop of application for " permit to purchase," when granted, constitute the necessary authority for the seller to fill the manufacturer order. In case the supplier or manufacturer of parts was not tl original source of supply of the raw materials required, he in tur made application for " permit to purchase " in like form as tlu required from the maker of passenger automobiles. Under th: procedure the section certified to the Steel Division the requiremeni of 95 manufacturers covering the production of 295,468 cars durin the last half of 1918. The control of the industry under the arrangements made with : was accomplished by monthly reports of operation, submitted by th manufacturers containing the following information: (1) Numbe of finished cars on hand at beginning of month; (2) number of cai produced during month; (3) number of cars delivered to Unite AMERICAN INDUSTRY IX THE WAR. 273 H states Government during month; (4) number of cars delivered to j^^jAllied Govemments ; and (5) number of cars delivered for civilian jjj luse. A total of 186,178 cars were produced durintj the third quarter, „,^and on November 11, 1918, a circular was issued which removed 50 per cent of the restrictions; and this was followed a short time after- ward by a complete removal. The manufacturers of accessories and spare parts were also dealt with by means of the system of " permits to purchase." No definite ruling was made as to what allowance of materials could be made to [individual factories, but each concern was advised to make appli- ,jj^ cation for "permit to purchase" and each application was con- sidered on its merits, a general ruling allowing each manufacturer sufficient materials to carry him through a period of from CO to 00 iays at a rate of production of about 50 per cent of normal being ipplied. The manufacturers of motor trucks were treated separately on the heory (1) that a large percentage of their output was needed for iirect war work, and (2) that trucks were an important transporta- tion medium in essential civilian industries so that curtailment ;hould be avoided as far as practicable. Circular No. 11, dated A.ugust 8, 1918, was sent to truck manufacturers by the Priorities Commissioner and explained the conditions under which fuel and iteel would be furnished the industry. The circular said : " It ap- pears, however, that there exists in this industry, as in many others, "factors of non-essentialitv which must, as a war measure, be elimi- lated." A pledge was required with a view to eliminating these fac- ors of non-essentiality, and the creation of new facilities was dis- ouraged. The pledge bound the manufacturers and dealers to sell 10 motor trucks except for essential uses; to sell to no user an un- lecessary number of trucks, even for essential uses; to discourage he purchase of any truck to replace a usable truck already in ervice; to give maximum encouragement to the repair of trucks; nd to make monthly reports to the section. Instead of issuing individual priorities certificates to truck manu- 'acturers for each purchase of parts and materials the section rec- mmended that an "industry priority certificate" be issued to each Qanufacturer, under which he could order his materials in the isual way by attaching the prescribed form of affidavit to his pur- hase orders. This plan facilitated procurement and avoided an normous amount of clerical work. tt RAILWAY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES. This section was formed July 30, 1918, with J. Rogers Flannery chief. During the earlier period, the Advisory Committoe on *lants and Munitions had been doing very important work in aiding 105826—21 18 274 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. the Railroad Administration and the United States Military RailwaysJ in standardizing types of cars and locomotives and following uf their production. But in July so many conflicting orders wert; being received for cars and locomotives from the different branches; of this Government and from the Allies and manufacturers wert having so much difficulty in securing materials, that a central channe^i for the distribution of orders and for laying down a plan of delivery of the products was decided upon. The two large problems related to (1) locomotives and (2) freight cars. The former was on account of the limited productive capacity as well as the difficulty in securing sufficient iron and steel ; the latter lay chiefly in the iron, steel, and lumber supply. Locomotives. — There are only throe builders of locomotives in the United States, besides a few companies which turn out smaller en- gines.^ The Railroad Administration ordered 1,415 large steam loco- motives in April, 1918, and was very anxious for speedy delivery, C'n July 23, 1918, the United States Military Railways ordered 51C standard-gauge locomotives from the Baldwin Locomotive Works and insisted upon immediate prosecution of the order. The Railroad Administration was extremely anxious that the military locomotives should not interfere with its order. It was understood that further orders would come from the A. E. F. Plans were considered foi adding to the facilities of the Baldwin and American companies at Government expense to the amount of $25,000,000. A general meeting was held of locomotive builders and repre- sentatives of our Government and of the Allied Governments. A requirement of about 9,000 locomotives to be supplied between July, 1918, and December, 1919, appeared. This was clearly greater than existing capacities could fulfill. But the delays inevitable in the con- struction of new plants under circumstances as they were at that time pointed to the fact that no relief could be hoped for earlier than the middle of 1919 under a new facilities plan. There were about 65,000 engines in use in the country. It was sug-j gested that the Railroad Administration wage an aggressive cam-^ paign of general repair work at all shops, that old locomotives migh^ be returned to service and the administration's demand for new on be considerably reduced. This plan was carried out. No new plan were started, and the " Pershing engine program " was given a hig" preference. It was decided that the Baldwin Works should con| centrate on the military standard-gauge engines and that the Ameritj can and Lima companies should turn out administration engines^ exclusively. Under this plan the Baldwin Works was turning ou^ , iji ' See Appendix XLI for table showing production of locomotives in the United Stated 1911 to 1918. 3 i AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 276 'he standard military engines at the rate of 256 per month before "' ihe end of the war period. For the week ending October 26, 1918, ^^'''he Baldwin Works turned out 87 engines. Tlie British and French vere taking whatever production was not required by the A, F. F. "™t The Italian Government was unable to adopt our standard mili- i"^' 'ary engine because it was too heavy ^; but they eagerly desired to ^^' (lace a large order for locomotives here. The American Ix)como- , ive Co. had built Italian engines and possessed patterns, but for sev- ^'^ 'ral weeks it could not devise a way to find facility space for the • talian order. The Baldwin Co. offered to takeover the patterns and i.ndertake the work, and plans were under way for doing this when |he American Co. came forward with an offer to construct them at "'H.S Montreal plant, and the order was finally placed that way. '^M The war brought out a demand for hundreds of narrow-gauge team locomotives and large gasoline locomotives. The larger com- ^; ['anies, particularly the Baldwin Works, had experts and drawings ' (or this work. But because their plants were filled to capacity with ' irdere for standard engines most of this business had to be distrib- 'ted among the builders of small mining and industrial engines. '''^^ !)rawings and specifications as well as skilled workmen, were turned [* iver bv the larger companies to the smaller ones in order to facilitate ^^^'liswirk. " Freight cars. — There were 30 car builders in the country capable of irning out freight cars for the Railroad Administration and for the ^P^' umerican Expeditionary Forces. December, 1917, when the Rail- '■ ■ bad Administration took control of the roads, saw this industry ^"' Imning at very low ebb. In April, 1918, the administration ordered ^ 00,000 standard-gauge freight cars, distributing the order among ^"'^ite builders. Great difficulty was experienced in procuring the raw ''"': laterials and in rehabilitating the organizations. Orders were "'^ laced with all the car companies at the same time, and efforts were lade by all of the concerns to get simultaneous deliveries of the va- ous materials. By the time deliveries were beginning the United "" fates Military Railways placed orders with the same companies :'l 14 additional companies for 30,000 freight cars. An A-5 pri- Ji= rity was obtained for the military cars, which gave them preference to feer orders for administration cars, which rated only a B-1 priority. %\ A schedule of deliveries for the military cars calling for rush CO! jork was outlined. This naturally retarded the building of the iiier ^ministration cars. But to make matters worse for the Railroad ."Ik 'dministration orders came on September 26 that military opera- lO- ons in France necessitated that the previous schedule of deliveries < 'Our so-called "Pershing engine" weighs 83 tons; tho Italian engine weighs 7.'> ton« 276 AMERICAISr INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. should be anticipated by at least 30 to 60 days. The section tele graphed all builders and arranged to expedite delivery of steel t. meet the new schedules. A few days later the United States Militar Railways brought forward additional orders for 40,915 standard gauge cars and 4,000 narrow-gauge cars. The section called a meet ing of representatives of the branches of the Government intereste( for the purpose of determining the distribution of the new orders The Railroad Administration recommended that orders be placed ii Canada for as many as possible of the new requirement; but thi representive of the military railways objected to this on the grouni that too much time would be lost in shipping the raw materials t( Canada and that labor conditions were not good there. Finally i schedule of distribution of the new order and a new schedule o: deliveries for all orders was drawn up and approved by both parties In order to assist the manufacturers of cars and locomotives ii securing their materials as quickly as possible, this section, with thi approval of the Steel Division and the Lumber Section, handled al requests for allocation of steel and lumber to these manufacturers Standard forms for requesting allocations were sent to all builders Immediately upon receipt of the request for allocation the sectior would carefully check it, approve it, number it, and send three copief to the Director of Steel Supply or to the Lumber Section. Thes( requests were followed closely by the section until they were returnee with suitable allocations, when the manufacturer was immediately notified and requested to place his order. Standard forms were adopted by the section on which the railroac equipment manufacturers reported at the beginning of each montt delivery of materials required for the following month; and froir these data the section furnished the Director of Steel Supply with ; statement of the steel tonnage required by each manufacturer from month to month. By this method orders which had been allo- cated were followed through to delivery. Definite monthly schedules of shipments from the steel manufac- turers were arranged for in order that the railway equipment manu- facturers might lay out their programs of work with some certainty of receiving materials. The manufacturers of specialties, who fur- nished their product to the builders of cars and locomotives, were required to follow the same procedure as the car and locomotive builders themselves. Under this system a certain percentage of the steel tonnage of the country was set aside for railroad purposes each month, the amount being determined upon by conference between the section and the Steel Division. The section kept a close watch on the production of both cars and locomotives throughout the country by AMERICAN IXDl-STKV IX TllK WAI!. 277 a system of weekly reports of output from each builder. The entire routine had just become establishe'"■' ;ies. It gave the War Trade Board information concerning goods '™ iestined for consignees on the enemy-trading list. It gave the Alien ™ Property Custodian information about enemy-owned goods, ft col- '^- ected and maintained an important body of information showing ' ^^ congested conditions in certain warehouses, docks, and railroad ter- ninals. In September, 1918, the section undertook the operation of n"^' I plan devised by the conservation division of the Board to create an Di^ nterdepartmental clearing house for all classes of inactive (Jovern- i^'^ nental materials. Under this plan quantities of materials, which 0" me Government agency had bought, but on account of some change .^' )f program could not use, were inventoried and mado avjiil.ilih' for mo'' lome other department which needed them. ilro FIRE PREVENTION. Following the establishment of the War Risk Insurance and the jovernment Marine Insurance, there was much discussion of a i)ro- )Osal to inaugurate Government fire insurance for plants having war rders. Congress did not find this step necessary or advisable. The 278 AMERICAN IlsDUSTRY IX THE VVAK. danger, however, which was involved in less than fully adequa fire inspection and protection in such plants was called to the atte{| tion of the President, and the Chairman of the War Industries Boai was advised to organize a section to take care of this important wor The Fire Prevention Section was organized on April 5, 1918, wit W. H. Merrill as chief. An advisorj- committee consisting of reprj sentatives of the leading insurance organizations was formed to coo| erate in the work, and the section itself developed a staff of 31 e: perts exclusive of representatives of the War, Navy, and other reguli departments. The purposes of the section were carried out by means of inspe tions followed by recommendations to the Government departmen' concerned, the inspections being made either by experts from the sg» tion or by the use of various insurance organizations. The first effo: Avas to cover only plants where the work was most needed, then late a program was laid down for the inspection of all plants haviii Government contracts exceeding $100,000 in value. At the begimiin the work of the section on any plant ceased after it had completed j inspection and drafted a recommendation to the War or Navy E partment, but after a few months it was felt that delay would prevented if the section could take its recommendations directly the owners of the plants. Such an arrangement was made with tt Army and Navy representatives, and, during the summer and fall c 1918, the work was carried on in this way, the proper military o naval authorities being advised of the action in each case. QuestioE in connection with the production and distribution of fire- pre ventio apparatus were also handled by the section. POWER. During the years immediately preceding 1917 there was a rapi and wholesome growth of the central station power business through out the country, both on the part of new and of old industries, man^ of the latter changing from a system of isolated plants to electri power taken from large central sources. The work of the Power Section began in December, 1917. A short age in power had appeared before this time at Niagara Falls, an« the situation had been taken in charge by the Secretary of Was who appointed Gen. Charles Keller, Engineer Corps, and R. J Bulkley to represent him in handling the power situation. Gen Keller secured the assignment of a number of Engineer officers U assist in the work. Upon the reorganization of the Board. Frederic! Darlington was made chief of the Power Section and Gen. Kel maintained an informal Consultation Committee. Later, when power shortage became acute in certain localities, Charles K. Foste AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 279 iequt, vice-chairman of the Priorities Committee, was made Director in Charge of Preferential Power Distribution, acting under the Pri- orities Division, and certain Army Engineers attached to the section were assigned to work with Mr. Foster. On October 7, 1917, the priorities commissioner issued Circular No. 45,^ embodj'ing rules and regulations for the guidance of liglit and m\ power companies in the distribution of electric energy, which enabled Me;| the companies in most instances theiuselves to make priority distribu- giili| tions in the event of a shortage without reference to Mr. Foster, the Director of Power. The generiil purpose of the section was to gather information to M\ give a broad picture of the power situation of the country and to lie si I establish specifically the localities which had a surplus and those eljj which had a shortage. The early attempts of Government agencies iikij to locate national plants were necessarily made with incomplete knowledge of the total power situation. There was a tendency to build power plants without sufficient reference to existing plants and available equipment. Before the formation of the Facilities Division it was the duty of this section to review the projects con- templating the commandeering or building of power plants. Advice was given both as to best methods of obtaining power in localities selected and as to selection of localities for particular projects. The principal work of the section came to be to notify the various commodity chiefs and departments of the Government as to where there was a shortage of power in order to avoid the placing of orders or the erection of new facilities where no power was available. With the assistance of material prepared by the section the Pri- orities Commissioner advised with the Capital Issues Committee upon request as to the war need of electrical power projects in cases where application had been made to that committee for the issue of secur- ities. Advice was likewise given to the War Finance Corporation concerning the need of extensions for which loans liad been requested. The section also consulted frequently with the Electrical and Power Equipment Section concerning schedules of supplies. It made fre- quent recommendations to the Priorities Committee in l)ehalf of com- panies needing materials for new construction, repairs, and re- placements. The growth of power plants was naturally irregular during the war on account of the impossibility of so anticipating the develop- ment of war needs as to keep them distributed proportionately over the country. Many current projects for the construction of (-('ntinl station electric power services were halted by the war emergency and held in abeyance on account of the high costs involved in completion. 'See Appendix XLIII. ^50 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. If other conditions had made it possible to so place war orders that these facilities could have been completed in the normal way, no power shortage need have developed and much of the power con- structed for war purposes and not economical in peace times would not have been built. Some of this unnecessary expenditure of wealth could, perhaps, have been averted by an earlier establishment of such control as the War Industries Board was exercising at the close of the period. Much extravagance in this direction was averted. The generating capacity of the country in 1917 was approximately 13,693,000 horsef>ower. Over 2,000,000 horsepower was added during the war period. The most troublesome shortages occurred in dis- tricts where power is abundant but where war industries happened to be concentrated in the most unusual amounts. Assistance was rendered by the section to relieve the situation in the Pittsburgh district, New Jersey district, Georgia district, and Philadelphia dis- trict during the summer of 1918. It was in these districts that the special priority director and his assistants were called upon to direct the distribution of power in aid of the war program. ELECTRICAL AND POWER EQUIPMENT. This section was established November 14, 1917. Walter Robbin? was made chief and remained in charge through the reorganization of the Board and until the section was disbanded. Three subdivisions were created in the section, having charge, respectively, of (1) elec- trical apparatus and supplies, (2) steam turbines, and (3) boilers, condensers, and analogous equipment. Electrical apparatus and swpjylies. — No verj^ great difficulty arose in connection with electrical supplies, with the exception of electricj wire and cable, for which a separate section, headed by LeRo Clark, was formed late in the period. The Wire Section allocate* Government orders from the middle of August forward. This action was necessitated by the general shortage in copper and by the confusion which arose when the Signal Corps announced a require- ment of 65,000 miles of outpost wire. In general there were heavy reserve stocks of electrical supplies throughout the country, and the war did little more than reduce these to a point far below normal. Studies were made of the locations and conditions of these stocks, and 24 War Service Committees were formed to guide the industry in its relation to war work, but no important steps on the part of the Board had yet been found necessary when the war ended. The problem of electrical apparatus was different. Important : shortages and threatened shortages were evident from the start. A general War Service Committee with 11 subcommittees was organized, and with the aid of this committee the section made a survey of the AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 281 jountry to locate and list the available stocks. The record thus ob- :ained was kept up to date by senii-uionthly reports from nuiiiufac- ;urers and others. War requirements in this industry were very diffi- ;ult to handle because most of them were indirect. But the section ioon found itself possessed of sulHcient information about supplies ind requirements to indicate wdiere shortages antl surpluses were oc- jurring: and thus to guide shifts in production. The section was fre- quently able to point out existing equipment or facilities suitable for ™ ;onversion to some war need, and through this service many new con- ™1 itruction projects were shown to be unnecessary. The section was in ™* leveral instances able to anticipate shortages in certain stocks and en- ourage sufficient manufacture to prevent them. Adjustable speed ^ ^^ notors for the manufacture of machine tools and pyrometers required n unusual numbers for testing and recording heat in the manufac- ^f">' ure of munitions were taken care of in this way. '^"' Commencing January 1, 1918, all applications for priority certifi- ™ ates for electrical apparatus were referred to this section for recom- (lendation before consideration by the Priorities Committee. Much ttention was given to applications involving apparatus going into he " restricted area " or into centers where power shortage existed. „. )ccasionally when investigation revealed that certain of the equip- aent called for could not be produced under any grade of priority . nthin the time required, substitutions or altered methods were sug- ", ;ested by the section for accomplishing the desired results. Some- ,, imes second-hand equipment located by the section was found to erve as a temporary or even permanent solution. Applications for priority came in gradually increasing volume up ! the period when automatic ratings were put into effect. The sec- ion received as many as 300 applications in one day. About 29,000 ^ tt all came before the section and their disposition is recorded in '^ lie files. The section "cleared" 1,257 orders from various agencies ^"^'J four Government and 112 orders from the Allied Governments. ^ , It devoted a great deal of work to the problem of standardiza- ^"''* ion in this industry, particularly standardization in (lovernment ■ equirements. The War Department appointed a committee of Army ttgineers to work on the question, and this section obtained for the ' irmy contact with the general War Service Committee and its 3.') ^ abcommittees. It was the purpose of the Army committee to adopt '" ' or its standards such stocks as had reached a reasonable state of '^'^ tandardization for industrial uses and not to attempt to establish '• ew standards. The War Service Committee had been working for- '*' year on a very comprehensive program of standardization, directed ^[ ) the conservation of raw materials, labor, and transportation. ^^ Curtailment agreements were arranged with the manufacturers of '^ iectric heating devices and of fan motors, and the section adminis- 282 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. tered the plans. In August, 1918, the Priorities Commissioner h d a meeting with the jobbers of electrical apparatus and supplies. !t was determined that the jobbers should be recognized and given n automatic priority rating Class B-4 upon their pledge to police e industry for the observance of all priority rulings. Steam turbines. — By the time the section was formed an extree shortage in steam turbines was evident. The creation of new f ac i- ties for their manufacture is a long process. Hence the first stuc^s of the section were devoted to the question of the relative importa; e of the various needs with a view to determining a proper sequence f deliveries. The first work was on the larger size land type, beca e both the Navy and the Emergency Fleet maintained in the turb e shops a corps of production experts whose duty it was to direct i e sequence of production of orders of the marine type. To take cie of companies producing both types, an agreement was reached, af r conference of the parties, that the following sequence should, in ie absence of express directions to the contrary, hold: (1) Navy, () Emergency Fleet, (3) Army, and (4) private companies. The section prepared a schedule of all Government requiremeis for land-type turbines with date of delivery required. It then call:! all manufacturers together to discuss the possibilities of meeting U requirements. There seemed to be no available finished stocks !i account of acute congestion. The delivery period for new ord(;3 was estimated at 7 to 10 months for smaller sizes and 18 to 24 monts for larger sizes. The only solution seemed to be to divert turbir? under order. The manufacturers were requested to submit a tabu tion of all units then under order in sizes of 10,000 or more kilowaj, and at a later meeting a shipping schedule for Government requhi- ments was arranged, diversions being made only after giving fil consideration to the relative importance of the various needs. Ti requirements of the large public-service corporations were ne studied by the section. Following this the manufacturers were ask to extend their schedules of information on production to inclu all turbines of 1,000 or more kilowats, and a similar production a] shipping schedule covering such smaller units was arranged. As the spring of 1918 approached the situation was becomii gradually worse. It seemed to be impossible to establish a fixi schedule of deliveries, because of constant changes in the war pr gram, and new difficulties in securing raw materials. On May 5 1918, following the usual series of conferences, steam turbine produ tion was made a controlled industry. All schedules of deliveries > both finished products and materials going to the plants were plac( under the control of the Board, with detail management in the han^ of a special joint committee representing the Navy, Emergency Fle( Army, and the division. il AMERICAN INDUSTRY IX THE WAR. 283 A tlifficulty arose in regard to large forcings. The only i)lants . i available for this work were fnlly occupied with gun forgings for r^" ! the Army and Navy on an A-1 priority rating. The matter was taken '[ up with the Army and Navy and an agreement reached that a certain Bhare of these facilities should be relieved for the production of ."^ turbine forgings. The section conferred frequently with the Power ^* Section with a view to reducing as much as possible the requirement ' for new turbines by the exercise of greater care in locating projects '^! devoted to war manufacture. Boilers^ condejisers, and similar equipment. — The third subdivision J of the section handled the problems arising in this general field. \^\ The surface pipe steam condenser industi-y was taken under com- plete control by the Board and much attention had to be given to the production of steam boilers. By June, 1918, it was clear that the war requirement for iron and steel would soon be in excess of the country's productive capacity. In line with the general pro- gram of conserving iron and steel, the section made investigations with a view to withholding priority assistance for the delivery of new boilers wherever old ones could be repaired or used boilers substituted. It was pointed out to the Railroad Administration that many old locomotive boilers might be used temporarily for stationary power and heating purposes. A protest was entered against the use of Scotch marine boilers because their manufacture requires an unusual amount of metal. Steps were taken to prevent the expansion of shop facilities for their production. All important steam power plants, whether on land or afloat, must be equipped with condensers of one of the three standard types; jet, barometric, or surface. Jet and barometric condensers can be used on land, but surface condensers are required for ships. Recently the tendency has been to install surface condensers on land, particularly in large turbine units. The essential distinguishing feature of a surface condenser is the large amount of non-ferrous tubing with which it is filled. By the spring of 1918 it became clear that the de- mands of the Navy and the Emergency Fleet for brass tubing could not be met if the installation of surface condensers on land phxuts was allowed to go unchecked. Tlie manufacturers were called to Washington for conference and study of the situation, and in August an agreement was reached that the distribution of surface condensers should be completely controlled by the Board. No sales could be made unless the buyer should present a "purchase permit" issued by the Board. The Brass Section took control at the same time f)ver the distribution of non-ferrous tubing. Efforts were made to ha\«> seamless steel tubes substituted for non-ferrous tubes wherever con tact with salt water did not make this substitution impracticable. 284 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. An interesting question arose in connection mechanical stokers. The demand for this equipment increased vei^ rapidly during the war. The Fuel Administration was encouraginj the installation of these stokers under existing boilers with a vie'v to conserving fuel. It became a question of balancing the saving i|j fuel and operating labor, resulting from the installation of a stoker as against the metal and productive labor required in manufacturing one. The section studied each important proposed installation, con ferring with the Fuel Administration and the War Service Commit tee of the stoker manufacturers in an endeavor to adjust the demano to production. iNIuch the same problem arose in connection with the productioB of superheaters and economizers. The general conclusion reached with regard to them was that their production should be discouragecl on the theory that, for the time being, the saving of metal and labor was more important than the saving of fuel. The section made studies also in connection with the distribution of raw materials to manufacturers of conveying apparatus, fans and blowers, small engines, transmission machinery, water heaters, pumpp and compressors, refrigerating machinery and other analogous equip-M ment. Not very much important work was done by way of standardiza- tion of machinery, though steps in this direction had been taken ini several instances. If the war had lasted several more years, standardly zation in all lines of machinery would have become a necessity and! would have been one of the deciding factors in the adjustment of pos-^ sible production to the requirements of the war. Important econo-- mies were effected by the section through the use of priority power so4 as to divert materials and effort from less essential to more essential' purposes. APPENDICES. Appendix I. I i SECTION 2 OF THE ARMY APPROPRIATION ACT, APPROVED AUGUST 29, 1916. Sec. 2. That a Council of National Defense is hereby established for the )ordination of industries and resources for the national security and welfare, I consist of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of le Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, and le Secretary of Labor. That the Council of National Defense shall nominate to the President, and lie President shall appoint, an advisory commission, consisting of not more lan seven persons, each of whom shall have special knowledge of some idustry, public utility, or the development of some natural resource, or be therwise specially qualified, in the opinion of the council, for the performance E the duties hereinafter provided. The members of the advisory commission hall serve without compensation, but shall be allowed actual expenses of avel and subsistence when attending meetings of the commiss'on or engaged U investigations pertaining to its activities. The advisory commission shall old such meetings as shall be called by the council or be provided by the rules nd regulations adopted by the council for the conduct of its work. That it shall be the duty of the Council of National Defense to supervise nd direct investigations and make recommendations to the President an»l the eads of executive departments as to the location of railroads with reference :5 the frontier of the United States, so as to render possible expeditious con- . .'entration of troops and supplies to points of defense; the coordination of I lillitary, industrial, and commercial purposes in the location of extensive hlgh- I t.-ays and branch lines of railroad; the utilization of waterways; the moblliza- ' 'ion of military and naval resources for defense; the Increase of dome.stle ' reduction of articles and materials essential to the support of armies and ' 't the people during the interruption of foreign commerce; the development f seagoing transportation ; data as to amounts, location, method, and means ; f production, and availability of military supplies; the giving of Information 1 10 producers and manufacturers as to the class of supplies needed by the I inllltary and other services of the Government, the requirements relating hereto, and the creation of relations which will render possible In time of leed the immediate concentration and utilization of the resources of the Nation. That the Council of National Defense shall adopt rules and regulations for he conduct of its work, which rules and regulations Bhall be subject to the pproval of the President, and shall provide for the work of the advisory com- nission, to the end that the special knowledge of such conimi.sston may be ieveloped by suitable investigation, research, and inquiry and n)aartments. commissions, bureaus, offices, or officers shall exercise the same nictions, duties, and powers as heretofore or as hereafter by law may be -ovided, any authorization of the President under this act to the contrary ^withstanding. Appendix IV'. THE WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD. MAIN DIVISIONS. he Board: BEBNARD M. BARUCH, Chairman (ex officio member of all committees). F.x Legge, Vice Chairman. J. Leonard Replogle, Steel Adrainls- :>nr Admiral F. F. Fletcher, Navy. trator. aj. Gen. George W. Goethals. Army. L. L. Summers, Technical Advisor. •REKT S. Brookings, Chairman Price- Albebt C. Ritchie, General Counsel. Fixing Committee. H. P. Ingels, Secretary. TGH Frayne, Labor. Herbert Bayard Swope, Associate iwiN B. Parker, Priorities Commis- Member. sioner. Clarence Dillon, Harrison Wil- -OKGE N. Peek, Commissioner of Fin- liams. and Harou) T. Clark, Assist- ished Products. ' ants to the Chairman. rice-fixing Committee: Kiliert S. Brookings, chairman. Members: B. M. Baruch, chairman War idustries Board ; W. B. Colver, chairman Federal Trade Commission ; Hugh •a,\ ne, labor representative, War Industries Board ; H. A. Garfield, Fuel Ad- im'-^trator ; Commander John IVI. Hancock, Navy representative; Lieut. Col. 'liert H. Montgomery, Army representative; Henry C. Stuart; Dr. F. W. Taus- -'. cliairman Tariff Commission; W. W. Phelps, secretary. ibor Division. — Hugh Frayne, chairman. War Prison Labor and National Waste Reclamation Section. — Dr. E. Stagg liitin, chairman executive committee, National Committee on Prisons and in Labor; W. .T. Spillman, chief, Office of Farm Management, Department Agriculture; Capt. H. L. Baldensporgor, Reclamation Division, United s Army; Anthony Caminetti, United States Commissioner of Immigration, ■p.irtment of Labor; John J. Manning, secretary, union label trades dopart- inf, American Federation of Labor; Dr. Charles H. Winslow, assistant dlrec- r of research. Federal Board for Vocational Education; Edwin F. Sweet. sistant Secretary Department of Commerce; Lieut. J. B. Goldman, United • ates Navy; Maj. J. W. Riley, The Adjutant General's Office. Hied Purchasing Commission: Bernard M. Baruch, Robert S. Lovett, Robert S. Brookings. Business '!'i;ijrer: Alex Legge, succeeded by Jan)es A. Carr; a-ssistants: A. L. Bostwick, n!fs C. Leddy and F. E. Penick. -'quirements Division: Alex Legge, chairman. Members: Lieut. Col. C. C. Bolton, General Staff: < orge M. Brill, Emergency Fleet representative; James A. Carr, representing 292 AMERICAN IliTDUSTRY IIST THE WAR. the Allies ; Col. George H. Estes, Army representative ; James Inglis ; C. H. Mac Dowell, chemicals ; P. B. Noyes, Fuel Administrator's representative ; Edwiu B Parker, priority ; George N. Peek, finished products ; Admiral C. J. People^ Navy representative; M. B. Pool, Red Cross representative; T. C. Powell. Rail road Administrator's representative ; J. Leonard Replogle, steel ; A. W. Shaw conservation ; L. L. Summers, technical advisor. War Industries Board ; Capt M. N. Taylor, Navy representative ; T. F. Whitmarsh, Food Administrator' representative; Maj. Seth Williams, Marine Corps representative; Pope Yeat man, nonferrous metals ; W. E. Guylee, executive secretary. Clearance office — Requirements division. — J. C. Musser, secretary ; C. I Hughes, assistant secretary. Finished Products Division: George X. Peek, commi.ssioner of finished products; E. L. Crawford, as>;isran to commissioner; W. M. Ritter, assistant to commissioner, certifying oftb er Walter Robbins, assistant to commissioner. Priorities Division: Edwin B. Parker, priorities commissioner; Rhodes S. Baker, as.sistant piior ities commissioner. Priorities Board. — Edwin B. Parker, priorities commissioner; Edward Cham bers, director of traflic, United States Railroad Administration; Admiral F. ¥ Fletcher. United States Navy ; Felix Frankfurter, labor representative ; Gee George W. Goethals, United States Army ; Alex Legge, representative of Alliei Purchasing Commission; P. F. Noyes, director of conservation, Fuel Adminis tration; T. F. Whitmarsh, Food Administration; Charles R. Piez, vice presiden and general manager of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, representing th United States Shipping Board and Emergency Fleet Corporation ; Clarence 11 Wooley, member of the War Trade Board; H. G. Phillipps. secretary. Priorities committee. — Edwin B. Parker, priorities commissioner, chairman Charles K. Foster, vice chairman. Members: George Armsby ; H. H. Barbour W. W. Chase ; Percy Holbrook ; J. M. Hopkins ; Henry Krumb ; F. H. Macphei son ; Rear Admiral N. E. Mason ; Lieut. Col. C. A. McKenny ; Everett IMorss Lucius P. Ordway; T. C. Powell; Rear Admiral A. V. Zane. Maurice Hirsch secretary, and Marcus B. Hall, assistant secretary. Labor section, prix)ritics division. — A. W. Clapp, chief. Nonn-ar constrnction .section, priorities division. — D. R. McLennan, chief. Conservation Division: A. W. Shaw, Chairman ; Charles K. Foster : Dr. E. F. Gay ; Lieut. Col. W. E Roberts ; C. H. MacDowell ; Admiral Samuel McGowan ; George N. Peek ; T. C Powell; Poi>e Yeatman; Melvin T. Copeland, executive secretary. Division of Planning and Statistics: Edwin F. Gay, chairman; Henry S. Dennison, assistant chairman; H. E Hatfield, director ; J. Lee Coulter, chief of commodity section ; Wesley C Mitchell, chief of price section ; ]\Iills E. Case, chief of contract section : Le^ Wolman, editor of Commodity Bulletin; William A. Barber; Alice C. Boughton Stuart Daggett; L. K. Frank; Paul Willard Garrett; Walter Holsin^er Walter W. Stewart. Employment Management Courses: James Inglis, chairman ; P. E. Foerderer, vice chairman ; Capt. Boyd Fishei Government supervisor. (Operated under joint advisory committee of th' Array, Emergency Fleet Corporation, Labor Department, Navy, and Wa Industries Board.) AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 293 icilities Division: Samuel P. Bush, director; Capt. C. Baiubergor; C. W. Carroll; M. F. Chase; . L. Dame; Capt. W. B. Dickinson; J. I. Downey; L. H. Kittredge; G. E. :iller ; L. B. Reod ; II. Williams. ivision of Business Administration: John Esher Knobel, director and business nuinaser; William E. Goodfellow, ssistant business manager; Charles H. Birr, comptroller; W. G. Scott, disburs- ig officer; W. B. Martin, chief clerk; Charles J. Davis, assistant; L. Perry ergnson, storekeeper; Mrs. Mary Newton, chief of bureau of personnel; H. L. anibert, superintendent of buildings. OMMODITY AND MISCELLANEOUS DIVISIONS AND SECTIONS. NciTE. — Each division and section had as memhors authorized representatives of the rmy and of the Navj' and of other purchasing departments interested in the commodity. A(/ricultural impJoncnts and wood ji^'oducts. — E. E. Parsonage, chief; P. B. chravesande, assistant. Automotive products section. — C. C. Hauch, chief; Edward J. Ilickey, 5sistant. Brass section. — Everett Morss, chief. Building materials division. — Richard L. Humphrey, director. Assistants: r. A. K. Anthony ; Morris C. Betts ; A. L. Gladding ; Norman H. Hill ; Frank , Kendall; C. M. Lyman; C. D. Morley; H. A. Schaffer; Edna M. Stangland ; . A. Styles; U. F. Turpin; F. W. Walker; Capt. George W. Riddle; Ira H. roolson, advisory engineer. New York branch : George L. Lucas, in charge, hiladelphia branch: Herbert B. Allen, in charge. Norfolk branch: W. K aw, in charge. Chain section. — John C. Schmidt, chief; Arthur E. Crockett, assistant. hemicals Division. — Charles H. MacDowell, director. Abrasives. — See Electrodes and abrasives section, chemicals division. Acids and heavy chemicals section. — Albert R. Brunker, chief; Russell S. Lubbard, associate ; A. E. Wells, associate. Alkali and chlorine section. — (Cau.«tic soda, soda ash, chlorine and chlorine roducts, lime, potash, and salt.) H. G. Carrell, chief; Lieut. E. A. Williams, ssociate. Asbestos. — See Chemical glass and stoneware section, chemicals division. Chemical glass and stonexcare section. — (Asbestos and magnesia Included.) obert M. Torrence, chief. Coal-gas products section. — (Toluol, benzol, xylol, phenol, solvent naphtlia, )ad oil, asphaltum, acetylene, nitrogen, calcium carbide, rare gases, saccharin, ydrogen, and oxygen, including commandeering and allocation of toluol.) . M. Morehead, chief; Ira C. Darling, associate toluol distribution. Creosote section. — Ira C. Darling, chief. Dye section (synthetic dyes and intermediates section). — Dr. Victor L. King, lief; Dr. .J. F. Schoellkopf, jr., chief, resigned. Electric furnaces, electrolysis, electrometallurgy. — -See Technical and cnnsult- g section, chemicals division. Electrodes and abrasives section. — Capt. Henry C. Du Bois, chief. Ethyl alcohol secfioH.— William G. Woolfolk, chief; A. E. Wells, associate. Ferroalloys section. — (Chrome, manganese, and tungsten ores and ferro- lloys, such as ferro chrome, manganese, vanadium, titanium, silicon, and 294 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. tungsten; also spiegeleisen, mauganesite, and zirconium.) Hugh W. Sanford, cliief ; C. D. Tripp, associate. Fine chemicals section. — (Miscellaneous analytical, photographic, and pharma- ceutical chemicals, etc.) A. G. Rosengarten, chief. Fire brick, chrome brick, etc. — See Refractories section, chemicals division. Magnesia. — See Chemical glass and stoneware section, chemicals division. Magnesite. — See Ferroalloys section. Mica section. — C. K. Leith, chief. Nitrate section. — Charles H. MacDowell, chief; J. A. Becker, associate; H. Ray Paige. Paint and pigment section.— L. R. Atwood, chief; Russell S. Hubbard, chief, deceased. Platinum section. — (Platinum, palladium, iridium.) C. H. Conner, chief; R. H. Carleton, associate; G. E. DeNike, associate. Refractories section. — (Fire brick, chrome brick, etc.) Charles Catlett, chief. Sulphur and pyrites section. — William G. Woolfolk, chief; A. E. Wells, asso- ■ciate ; J. R. Townsend, associate. Tanning material and vegetable dye section. — (Including inedible oils, fats, iind waxes.) E. J. Haley, chief; E. A. Prosser, associate; Harold G. Wood, associate. Technical and consulting section. — Dr. Herbert R. Moody, associate; Dr. E. R. Weidlein, associate ; Dr. T. P. McCutcheon, associate. Toluol. — See Coal-gas products section, chemical division. Wood chemical section. — (Including methyl alcohol, methyl acetone, acetone, €thyl methyl ketone, acetate of lime, acetic acid, acetic anhydride, formaldehyde, aspirin, methyl acetate, etc.) C. H. Conner, chief; A. H, Smith, associate ; R. D. Walker, associate. Statistics, chemicals section — Joint office on chemical statistics. — Capt. Willis B. Rice, associate; Lieut. M. R. Gordon, associate; Asst. Paymaster Dunning, associate ; Arthur Minuick, associate. Conversion of industry. — See Resources and conversion section. Copper tubing. — See Brass section — Nonferrous tubing. Cotton and cotton linters section. — See Textile division. Crane section. — A. C. Brown, chief; Capt. C. E. Stamp, assistant chief; Louis P. Lipps. Electrical and power equipment section. — Walter Bobbins, chief; L. W. Grothaus, .John H. Waterman, Allen P. Bender, Max Greenburg, Merritt M. Hughes, Wm. S. James, Thos. S. Knight, Edward R. Welles, J. A. Merwin. Electric wire and cable section. — Le Roy Clark, chief. Emergency construction committee. — Col. W. A. Starrett, chairman ; !\Iaj. Clair Foster ; John Don! in, American Federation of Labor ; Lieut. J, B. Talmadge, secretary. Explosives Division.— M. F. Chase, director. Felt section. — See Textile division. Fiber. — See Jute, hemp, and cordage section. Fire prevention section. — W. H. Merrill, chief; Charles H. Smith, associate chief of section; George W. Booth, associate chief of section; Frank Pierce, Wilbur Mallalieu. Flax products section. — See Textile division. Forgings, guns, small arms, and small arm ammunition. — Samuel P. Bush, chief; Capt. Clarence Bamberger; Charles W. Carroll. Odd and silver section. — C. H. Conner, chief. AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 295 Hardware and hand tool section. — Murray Sargont, oliief ; I.awronce J. Stod- ;ircl. gauges; Thomas F. Bailey, uiill supplies; Alfred I.. Lincoln, drills and amers; E. W. Lively, inachiulsts' precision tools; L. H. Wetlierell, cutlery, etxlles, sewing luacbines. lide, Leather and Leather Goods Division. — C. F. C. Stout, director. Section chiefs. — Thomas Cover, jr., in charge of sole leather; O. C. Howe, In large of foreign skins and hides; L. B. Jackson, in charge of domestic skins and ides; F. A. Vogel, in charge of upper leather; K. M. Pindell, jr., executive x-retary. Chiefs of bureaus. — C. D. 1'. Hamilton, shoe manufacturers; Charles J. Chis- olm, shoe retailers; George Kowbotham, belting; Charles A. Rogers, harne.ss ni personal equipment, except shoes and clothing; Harry J. Louis, gloves. Assistants. — Robert D. Ware, belting bureau ; George R. Wheeler, shoe mauu- acturing bureau; Thomas W. Hughes, assistant to executive secretary. Inland traffic section. — Thomas C. Powell, chief; Henry F. Bell, assistant. Jute, hemp, and cordage section. — E. C. Heidrich, jr., chief. Legal scction.—B.. M. Channing, chief; W. C. Saeger; E. M. Dodd, jr.; H. R. fower. Linters and cotton goods section. — See Textile division. Lumber section. — Charles Edgar, director; Maj. Armistead M. Cooke, as- stant. Machine tool section. — G. E. Merryweather, chief; Alvin B. Einig; Arthur . M. Baker ; Roland Houck ; Ernest D. Crockett ; Floyd C. Lowell ; Walter L. )itforth. Medical section. — Lieut. Col. F. F. Simpson, chief; David L. Kean, hospital urniture and equipment, surgical instruments; A. G. Rosengarten, medicinal hemicals. Mica section. — See Chemicals division. Miscellaneous commodities section. — M. B. Foster, chief. (This section han- les all commodities for which we have no specially established commodity iction.) Nonferrous metals section. — (Antimony, aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, quick- ilver, zinc.) Pope Yeatman, chief; E. C. Thurston, assistant; Andrew Walz, ssistant ; I. H. Cornell, lead and zinc. Nonferrous tubing section. — See Brass section. Optical glass and instruments section. — G. E. Chatillon, chief; Maj. F. E, V^right ; Lieut. Commander H. A. Orr. Power section. — Frederick Darlington, chief; Charles B. Davis, business as- istant; Maj. Charles F. Lacombe; Maj. George S. Sever; Maj. Malcolm Mac- aren ; Capt. Carroll Shaw ; Capt. Ashton M. Tinsley ; Capt. John C. Damon ; ieut. George K. Miltenburger ; Lieut. William W. Stanley. Production division. — See Special advisory committee on plants and nmnition.s. •ulp and Paper Division.— Thomas E. Donnelley, director. Newspaper section. — G. J. Palmer, chief. Paper economics section. — I. W. Blanchard, chief. Manufacturing section. — S. L. Willson, chief. Fiber board and container section. — Harold W. Nichols, chief. Railicay equipment and supplies section. — J. Rogers Flannery, chief. Resources and conversion section. — Cliarles A. Otis, chief; John A. Kling, ssistant chief; Charles H. Anthony; Edward F. Bulmahn ; W. T, Rossiter; rving H. Taylor. 296 AMERICAX INDUSTRY IX THE WAE. Rubber section. — See Textile division. Shipping — Mineral imports and exports. — C. K. Leith. Small arms and small-arms ammnnition. — See Forgings, guns, etc., section. Stnall tools. — See Hardware and hand-tool section. Special advisory committee on plants and munitions. — S. M. Vauclain, chafagi man; Capt. C. K. Rockwell, J. M. Hansen, Henry R. Rea, Frank W, Morse, ( E. F. Wood, Admiral A. R. Couden, G. M. Shaw. Steel Division. — J. Leonard Replogle, director of steel supply ; Frank Purnell, assistant director ; E. D. Graff, special agent. Steel products section. — F. E. Thompson, chief; G. M. Bartley, cars and loeo: motives ; D. A. Holloran, emergency fleet ; J. A. McDonald, mill expert ; D. F. J Mann, wire products; R. I. Richardson, chief clerk; G. C. Shidle, tubes; C. 0, Thomas, sheets ; H. H. Weaver, mill schedules. Projectile steel, rails, alloy steel, and cold-drawn steel sectvon. — Capt. D. E» SaA^Ter, chief; John W. Horr. assistant, alloy steel and cold-drawn steel; IlV L. Lovell, assistant, projectile steel ; F. A. Weymouth, assistant, rails. Pig iron section. — Jay C. McLauchlan, chief; J. W. Dickson, S. R. Leonard, L. R. Smith, B. S. Stephenson, L. W. Williams. Permit section. — J. S. Barclay, chief; G. H. Pyne, assistant. Bureau of uarehonse distribution. — Andrew Wheeler, chief; Philo B. Rhoades,- assistant ; Austin D. Smith, assistant. Iron and steel scrap section. — William Vernon Phillips, chief. Statistics. — Percy K. Withey, chief; Ernest L. Selden, assistant. Stored materials section. — J. F, Wilkins, chief. Textile Division.— John W. Scott, director; Henry B. Ashton, assistant. Cotton and cotton linters section. — George R. James, chief; George W. Naum^ burg, assistant; Sherbourne Prescott, assistant. Cotton goods section. — Spencer Turner, chief; Grosvenor Ely, assistant j" George F. Smith, thread ; Burton Etherington, yarn ; Ralph E. Loper, mill equipment and production. Felt section. — Sylvan Stroock, chief. Fla.r products section. — George F. Smith, chief. Knit goods section.— ''Lincoln Cromwell, chief; Rufus W. Scott, associate; F. E. Haight, associate ; John McCauley, associate. Rubber and rubber goods section. — H. T. Dunn, chief. Silk section. — William Skinner, chief. Domestic wool section. — Lewis Penwell, chief; William D. McKellar, as-' sistant. Foreign icool section. — A. M. Patterson, chief. Woolens secfioH.— Herbert E. Peabody, chief; A. L. Gifford, assistant. Tar7i section. — See Cotton goods section. Tin section. — George N. Armsby, chief; James W. Hitchcock, assistant; Lincoln Hutchinson, assistant ; Thomas G. Cranwell, assistant. Tobacco section. — A. I. Esberg, chief. Wire and cable. — See Electric wire and cable section. Wood products. — See Agricultural implements, etc., section. Woolens section. — See Textile division. Wool section. — See Textile division. Tarn section. — See Textile division, cotton goods section. News section, committee on public information. — Stanley M. Reynolds, A. O. Hayward. AMERICAN INDUSTRY IX THE WAR. Rcijional advisers. 297 0. 1, Boston, Mass :o. 2, Bridgeport, Conn. o.3,Now York, N. Y.. 0. 4, Philadelphia, Pa . ,0. 5, Pittsburgh, Pa.. To. 6, Rochester, N. Y. lo. 7, Cleveland, Ohio. To. 8, Detroit, Mich to. 9, Chicago, m fo. 10, Cincinnati, Ohio. rp.U, Baltimore, Md... ro. 12. Atlanta, Ga. fa 13, Birmingham, Ala. fo. 14, Kansas City, Mo. lo. 15, St. Louis, Mo 10.16, St. Paul, Minn.. lo. 17, Milwaukee, Wis.. (0. 18. DaUas. Tex fo.19, San Francisco, Calif. lo, 20, Seattle, Wash lo. 21, Denver. Colo Stuart W. Webb, care of chamber of commerce. C. D. Pierce, jr., care of chamber of commerce. Wm. Fellowes Morgan, care of Merchants' Association of New York. Ernest T. Trigg, 1228 Wide- ncr Building. Geors;e S. Oliver, care of chamber of commerce. E. A. Fletcher, care of chamber of commerce. W. B. McAllister, care of chamber of commerce. Allan A. Templetou, care of chamber of commerce. D. E. Felt, 29 South La Salle Street. Edwin C. Gibbs, 31 East Fourth Street. F. S. Chav;innps, care Mer- chants & Manufacturers Association. Edward H. Inman, care of chamber of commerce. T. H. Aldrich, 322 Brown- Marx Building. Franklin D. Crabbs, Tenth and Central Streets. Jackson Johnson, care of chamber of commerce. D. R. Cotton, 1414 Pioneer Building. August H. Vogel, fourth floor, city hall. Louis I,ipsitz, 407-9 South- land Life Building. Frederick J. Koster, care of chamber of commerce. Herbert Witherspoon, care of chamber of commerce. Cass E. Herrington, 510 Symes Building. Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, eostorn Miissachusctts, Rhode Island. Western Mnssachusotts, Connecticut. Nine southeastern counties of New York, Long Ishmd, and northern New Jersey. Eastern Pennsylvania, southern New Jcrse Delaware. Western Pennsylvania, except Erie, Craw- ford, and Mercer Counties; JelTer.son and Belmont Counties of Ohio. AllcL-any, Gar- "•ett, and Waahin,'lon Coimties of Mary- land; West Virginia. New York State, except Metropolitan dis- trict, New "^'ork City. Erie, Crawford, and Mercer Counties of Penn- sylvania; northern Ohio, exceptmg Jeffer- son and Belmont Counties. Southern Michigan. Iowa, northern Illinois, and northern In- diana. Southern Ohio, southern Indiana, and Ken- tucky. Eastern Maryland, Virginia. North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, excepting western tier of counties. Tenno.ssee, Mississippi, Alabama, western tier of coimties In Florida, and southern Louisiana. Utah, Wyommg, Colorado, northern New Mexico, northern Oklahom:». Kansas, Ne- braska, and western strip of Sfissouri. Missouri, Arkansas, and southern Illinois. Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Mmuesota, and northwestern Michigan. Southern Wisconsin. Texas, northern Louisiana, southeastern Ok- lahoma, southern New Mexico, and south- e;i.stern Arizona. California, Nevada, and Arizona, except southeastern counties m Dallas district. Washington, Oregon, and Idaho. Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, and northern Now Mexico. 298 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. Members of the War Industries Board organisation. Name. Position in "War Industries Board. Former basiness. Abbott, Arthur J Abell,Chas. S Adler,H. S Aldrich, Lieut. H. R AIdrich,H.W Aldrich, Truman H. . . Alexander, Maurice M. Allen, Herbert B Alsberg, Dr. CarlL... Anderson, Chandler P. Anthony, Charles H.... Anthony, Wm. A. R... Archer, Maj. P. F Armsby, George N Ashton, Henry B Atwood, Lewis R Averill, William A A ycock, Thomas J Baggott, Capt. John C. Bailey, Thomas F. Baker, A. J Baker, Rhodes S. Baldenspcrger.Capt. H. L. Bamberger, Capt. C Barber, William A Barbour, Henry H Barclay, James S Barlow, De Witt D Barnes, M. H Barnum, Harris" Barsh, Waldo A . . . Bartley, George M. Baruch, Bernard M. Bales, Frederic G... Bates, Henry M. Bayliss, Wm. G. Beat, James H. . Bean, Charles A.... Beatty, William T. Chief, questionnaire section Assistant section chief, priorities division. Secretary of special representa- tive of United States Railroad Administration with War In- dustries Board. Nonferrous metals section Staff, lumber section Regional advisor, Birmingham, Ala. Assistant in platinimi section In charge Philadelphia branch building material division. Advisory board on medicinal agents, section of medical in- dustry. Special counsel on international affairs. Staff, resources and conversion section. Assistant to chief, building mate- rial division. Requirements representative, Ma- Marine Corps. Member priorities committee, chief in charge of tin. Assistant to director, textile divi- sion. Chief, paint and pigment section. . Expert, division of planning and statistics. Lumber production director, Georgia and Florida. Examiner, Army section, priori- ties committee. Assistant to cliicf, hardware and hand-fool section. Assistant, machine-tool section.. . Assistant priorities commissioner. . Member war prison labor and na- , tional waste reclamation section. Assistant chief, forgings, guns, etc., section. Expert, price statistics Member priorities committee Chief, permit section, steel divi- sion. Associate chief, dredging section.. Assistant machine tool section Gold and silver section of the chemical division. Secretary to director of chemicals Expert, steel division Chairman nf the Board Staff, central bureau of planning and statistics. ....do Expert, fire prevention section Member advisory committee on medicinal agents, section of med- ical industry. Statistician, division of planning and statistics. Staff, conservation division Member law firm, Evans, Abbott & Pearce, Los Angeles, Calif. Baltimore, Md. Secretary to vice president. Southern Ry. Co., Cincinnati, Ohio. Chief of field party and petrographer, Wisconsin Geographical Survey, Mel- rose, Mass. Sales manager, Hammond Lumber Co., Mill City, Oreg. Mining engineer for city of Birmingham, Ala. In charge of customers' room, John L. Dunlop & Co., Louisville, Ky. Secretary Eastern Stone Producers' As- sociation, Philadelphia, Pa. Chief Bureau of Chemistry, Department of Agriculture. Law firm, Anderson & Anderson, New York, N. Y. Export salesman, Detroit, Mich. Assistant to secretary. Master Builders Association, Boston, Mass. Washington, D. C. Vice president, California Packing Cor- poration, San Francisco, Calif. Credit manager, Carson, Pirie, Scott & Co., Chicago, 111. President, Peaslee-Gaulbert Co., Louis- ville, Ky. Inspector in elementary education. State Education Department, Albany, N. Y. General manager, the Aycock Lumber Co., Aycock, Fla. Purchasing agent and factory manager, McCormick Manufacturing Co., Day- ton, Ohio. Manager and treasurer. Banks Supply Co., Huntington, W. Va. Moseler Sate Co., Hamilion, Ohio. Law firm, Thompson, Knight, Baker & Harris, Dallas, Tex. Reclamation division, U. S. Army, Mining engineer. Salt Lake City, Utah. Professor of commercial education, New York University. Manaeer of sales, Lackawanna Steel Co., New York, N.Y. Trustee of an estate, New York, N. Y. Vice president and general manager At- lantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., New York, N. Y. Henry Prentice Co., New York, N. Y. Manager Washington branch office, Na- tional Fireprooflng Co. Private secretary, C. H. MacDowell, Armour & Co., Chicago, HI. Assistant sales manager, Cleveland Steel Co., Cleveland, Ohio. New York, N. Y. Partner, Bates & Gamble, Toledo, Ohio. Dean of law school, University of Michi- gan. Engineer, Ohio Inspection Bureau, Co- lumbus, Ohio. Director of pharmacy research, Univer- versity of Illinois. Salesman and office manager, Merrill Oldham & Co., bankers, Boston, Mass. President and general manager, Austin Manufacturing Co., Chicago, 111. AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 299 Members of the ^yar Industries Board organisation — Continued. Becker, John A.. Boil, Henry F.... Bender, Allan P. Bender, Maj. John L. Bergen, Charles Wm. Belts, Morris C Bickford, Roberts. Bingham, Harry P. Birr, Charles H Bhinchard, Isaac H. l^lankenship, Lieut. J. M. Bolt, Edward J Bolton, Lieut. Col. C. C. Boniface, Addison O. Room, Eugene C. Booth, George W I Bostwick, A. L Boughton, Alice B Bowler, Marian Boyd, Henry W Brand, Charles J Brayton, Edward BriU,Geo.M j B rooker, Hubert H ' B rookings , Robert S Brown, Alexander C Assistant chief, nitrates section, chemical division. Assistant to chief, Inland traffic section. Expert, electric and power equip- ment section. Assistant in charge, .Vrmy section priorities committee. Expert, electric and power equipment division. Assistant to director, building materials section. -Auditor, domestic wool section Secretary War Industries Hoard, Aug. 1.1917-Jan. 1.1918. Comptroller, division of business administration. Chief, paper economics section, pulp and paper division. Naval assistant Assistant to chief clerk, facilities division. Secretary and assistant to chair- man. General Munitions Board, and chairman of clearance com- mittee. Expert, fire prevention .section Examiner, priorities division .^ssociate chief, fire prevention section. Member purchasing commission. . . Expert, price statistics, division planning and statistics. Research assistant, division planning and statistics Expert, leather division, mem- ber foreign mission. Chairman committee on cotton distribution. Expert, cotton goods section Former business. Brown, George S. Requirements division, emer- gency fleet representative. Secretary, foreign mission Chairman, price fixing committee. Chief, crane section, assistant to commissioner of finished prod- ucts. Expert, cotton goods section B-runing, H. F Brunker, Albert R Bryan, Allen W... Bryar,W. B Buel, Hillhoiase... Bulkley, Robert J. Bullard, Percy Bulmahn, E. F... Burgess, William., Staff, conservation division Chief, acids and heavy chemicals section. Statistician, division of planning and statistics. Expert, hardware and hand tool section. Expert, division of planning and statistics. Chief, legal section Burke, John H.,Jr Burrowes, John F Burwell, William R. Biish, Samuel P Expert, nonwar construction sec- tion. Member resources and conversion section. Expert, hardware and hand tool section. Reporter Expert, facilities division. ■utz, Theodore C. Division of planning and statistics Director,facilitiesdivision, chief of the forgings, guns, etc.. .section. Examiner, priorities division Traveling auditor. Armour FcrtllUer Works, Chicago. tU. General agent in Cuba Southern Ry. Co. Commercial engineor, We.stinehou.se Electric and Manufacturing Co., East Pitt'^burgh, I'a. President and general manager .\ltoona Overland Co., Altoona, Pa. New York roprosontatives of the Ford . C. Broker, Boston, Mass. Cleveland, Ohio. C. P. A. StafI of Baker, Vawter & Wolf, Chicago, III. President Isaac H. Blanchard Co., New York, N. Y. Wa.shington,P. C. Sales manager, Twentieth Century Pub- lishing Co., Philadelphia, Pa. Secretary Bourne Fuller Co. Cleve- land, Ohio. Superintendent of inspections. Under- writers Laboratories, Chicago, 111. Attorney at law, San Francisco, Calif. Chief engineer, National Board of Fire UnderwTiters, New York, N. Y. Secretary Planning Commission of St. Louis," Mo. Research e.xpert. Home Economics, Bu- reau of Educational Experimontx. Instructor of French, Dedham, Mass. President Armour Leather Co., Chicago, 111. Chief, Bureau of Markets, Department of Agriculture. Treasurer and cotton buyer, Towne, Bravton & Osborn, Fall River, Mass. 140 North Broad Street Philadelphia, Pa. International Harvester Co., Chicago, III. President Washington University, St. Louis, Mo. President Brown Hoisting Machinery Co. Cleveland, Oliio. Cost and Production Accountant, Ash- land Cotton Co., Jewett City, Conn. 1029 Myrtle Street, Oakland, Calif. President Liquid Carbonic Co., Chicago, 111., and Atlantic Steel Casting CO., Chester, Pa. Special Assistant Committee on Public Information Wasliington, D. C. General manager Bailey-Karrei Manu- facturing Co., Pittsburgh, Pa. Lawyer, Seattle, Wash. Law firm, Bulkley, Hauxhurst, Socger & Jamie.son, Cleveland, Ohio. Filer, Bullard & Smith, New York N. Y. Vice president David G. Fisher it Co., Davenport, Iowa. First vice president, U. 8. Potters' A»> s(x;iation, Trenton, N. J., and East Liven>ool, Ohio. Court Koportcr, Kalamazoo, Mich. ArchiU«tau(i i:nKineraj. A. ^r Lumber section or, Carroll P.... land, Mehin T :>oran, Lieut. Edward T. roroy, A. A Cornell, Irwin H Cotton, Donald R Coulter, John Lee Cover, Ralph Cover, Thomas, jr Assistant special reore'entative of Vnited i^tates Railroad Ad- ministration with War Indus- tries Board. Executive secretary, conser\'ation division. Private secretary, R. M. Paruch. . Expert, steel di\-ision . perthwaite, Mortimer ( rabbs, Franlclin D . . Crarin, B. .\., jr Craig, Joseph W Cranwell, Thomas G . Crawford, Everett L. Crockett, Arthur E... Crockett, Ernest D... (romwell, Lincoln... Expert, nonferrous metals section foreign mission. Regional advisor, St. Paul, Minn.. Expert, divi.sion of planning and statistics. Assistant to secretary priorities committee. Chief, sole and belting leather sec- tion, hides, leather and leather goods division. Secretary to IT. R. Rea, special ad- visory committee on plants and munitions. Regional advisor, Kansas City, Mo Lumber section Platinum section of chemical di- vision. Assistant to chief, tin section Former business. iirran, John H. utter, John Assistant to commissioner of fin- ished products. Assistant chief, chain section Assistant, machine tool section... Chief, knit goods section Staff, conservation division. . do zirett, Stuart me, Frank L inon, Maj. JohnC. forth, Mary L Ming, Ira C Expert, division of planning and statistics. Member of facilities division Expert, power section. ington, Frederick, ditertv, PaulR... Expert, division planning and sta- tistics. Chief, creosote section Chief, power section Chief, war contract section . - is, Charles B isChas. J ..is, Leon K Day, E. E PcLeeuw, M. n - Nike, George F. Assistant to chief, power section... Assistant to chief clerk Expert, fire prevention section — Staff central bureau of planning and statistics. Assistant, machine tool section — Associate chief, platinum section. . 'cnnison, Henry S Assistant chairman, central bu- I reau of planning and statistics. Mckinson, G . V I Staff, con.servation division I'itkson, George R. Kiokson, J. W Assistant to secretary priontics committee. Expert, steel division Assistant seorotarv, American Iron A Steel Institute, New York. N. Y. John T,. Roper I umbor Co., Norfolk, Va. .\ssisfant to vice president, Southern Railwav Co., Cincinnati, Ohio. Director of bureau of basine-ss research Harvard T'niversity. Mechanicsville, N. Y. Assistant general superintendent Youngsto\\-n Sheet & Tube Co., YoungstOT%-n. Ohio. Vice pre.^ident, St. Joseph lead Co., New York, N. Y. District sales manager, Illinois Steel Co., St. Paul. Minn. Dean of college of agriculture, I'niver- sltvof West \irdnia. Attorney at law, Baltimore, Md. Partner, Cover & Co., sole leather, Phila- delphia, Pa. Secretary to II. R. Rea, Pittsburgh, Pa. Owner, the Union Bank Note Co., Kan- sas Citv, Mo. Watkin-Gray Lumber Co., Hattlcsburg, Miss. Southern Railwav Co., Washington, D. C. President Continental Can Co., New York, N. Y. Crawford, Patton & Cannon, bankers, New York. N. Y. Sales manairer, chain department, Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., Pittsburgh, Pa. Sales engineer, Henry Prentiss &. Co., Springfield, Mass. Member of firm of Williams Iselin & Co., New York. N. Y. Lawyer, Chicaco, III. Head of trading department, Harris- Forbes & Co., Boston. Mass. Professor, University of California. Consulting engineer, Harrison Williams, New York, N. Y. A.ssistant chief engineer Utah Power it Liehl Co., Salt Lake City Utah. Manufacturer. Milwaukee, Wis., and In- dianapolis, Ind. President Martholomav A Darling Co., Chicago, III. Consulting entrincer. New York, N. Y. Kmi>Iovment expert, i'ennsylvaniaState Department of Labor, Philadelphia, Pa. Manager of Boston office. General Elec- tric Co. Democrat and Chronicle, Rochester, N. Y. Engineer inspector, Fireman's Mutual Fire Insurance Co.. Detroit. Mich. Asssitanl prorcssor. Harvard University. Sineer ManufacturingCo., Klizabcthport, N.J. Purchase and sales department Graves .Maut)ert. Gcoriro .v Co., wholeiale lumber, New York, N. Y. Provident Dcniiison Manufacturing Co., Framingham. Mass. General aecnt KIgIn National Watch Co., Elgin. 111. Sales and advertising manager, .''liannon A I.tichs,rcal a-itate, Washington, DX. Salesmun, I'.dmtind W. Mudgc Co., I I'ittsburgh, Pa. 302 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. Members of the War Industries Board organisation — Continued. Name. Position in War Industries Board. Fonner bnsiness. Dillon, Clarence Ditfurth, W. L Dizer, Malcolm C Dodd, E. Merrick, jr Doll, Lieut. E. G Donlin, John Donnelley, Thomas E... Doten, CarrollW Dowd, Charles F Downey, James E Downey, John I Downman, R. H Du Bois, Capt. Henry C. Dumm, A. A Dunn, Harry T Dunning, Lieut. Ray P. Eames, Frank W Easton, Harry M Eaves, Frederick B Edgar, Charles Edgerly, Hial Stephen. . Einig, Alvm B Eisendrath, William B.. Elton, John P Ely, Grosvenor Ely, Lieut. M.G Emerson, Kenneth Bales Esberg, Alfred I Estabrook, H.M Estes, Col. George H.... Etherington, Burton Ettinger, A Evans, Henry Faroat, H. B Felt, Dorr E Fenner, David C Ferguson, George K Ferguson, L. Perry Field, Herbert E Fisher, Capt. Boyd Fisher, Frank E Flanders, Ralph E Assistant to chairman, War Indus- tries Board. Assistant, machine tool sestion. . . Staff, conservation division Member, legal section Statistics, chemicals division Emergency construction commit- tee. Director of pulp and paper divi- sion. Expert, central bureau of plan- ning and statistics. Expert, nonwar construction sec- tion. Staff, central bureau of planning and statistics. Member, fa?ilities division 1 umber section Chief, electrodes and abrasives sec- tion. Assistant, priorities division Chief, rubber section Navy representative, joint office on'chemical statistics. Expert, fire prerention sestion Assistant chief of tin seition Expert, electrical and power equip- ment sestion. Director of lumber Assistant secretary War Industries Board. Assistant chief, machine tool sec- tion. Chief, upper, harness, bag, and strap leather section. Adviser, brass se::tion Assistant to chief cotton goods sec- tion. Examiner, Army section, priori- ties committee. Expert, division of planning and statistics. Chief, tobacco section Assistant chief .railway equipment and supply section. Requirements division Chief, yarn section Member legal section , Chairman advisory committee, fire prevention section. Passenger representative, inland traffic section. Regional adviser, Chicago Assistant cliief, automotive prod- uct section. Chief clerk, pulp and paper divi- sion. Storekeeper, division of business admimstration. Assistant chief, acids and heavy chemicals section, chemical di- vision. Government supervisor employ- ment management courses, Fed- eral Board of Vocational Edu- cation. Chief, bureau applications and issue, priorities division. Assistant, machine tool section Member of firm, Wm. A. Reed & Co.; bankers, New York, N. Y. Hill-Clarke Co., Chicago, 111. Foreign sales manager, Dennison Manu^ factunng Co., Framingham, Mass. Professor of law, Washington and Li University, Lexington, Va. Foreign exchange department. National City Bank, New York City. President building trades department, American Federation of Labor, Chi^ cago, 111. President R. R. Donnelley Sons Co.j Chicago, 111. Professor Massachusetts Institute Technology. Arkenberg-Machine-Dowd Co. , 512 Produce Exchange, Toledo, Ohio. Head master, Boston High School > Commerce. President and general manager John Do.vncy (Inc.), Ne.v York, N. Y. Cypress, New Orleans, T a. Assistant secretarv E. J. 1 evino & Co., Philadelphia, Pa. South"estern sales agent, Sabine Lum- ber Co. (St. T ouis), Houston, Tex. President :^isk Rubber Co., Chicqpee Falls, Mass., and Lederal Rubber Co.. Cudahy, Wis. Engineer, Springfield, Mass. Inspector-engineer, Factory Insurance Association, Hartford. Conn. Genera] sales manager, Weirton Steel Co., Weirton, W. Va. Assistant general sales manager, Bryant Kle?tricalCo., Bridgeport, Conn. Retired from business, Esse^ Fells, N.J. First vire president, the Theodor Kundtz Co., Cleveland, Ohio. Sales engineer, Motch & Merryweather Machinery Co., Cleveland, Ohio. Secretarv, Monarch Leather Co., Chicago. 111. Vice president, American Brass Co., Waterbury, Conn. Treasurer, Ashland Cotton Co., Norwich, Conn. Branch manager, Horace S. Ely & Co. (realeitate"!. New York, N. Y. Statistician, Sanderson & Porter, Nev York, N. Y. Retired, Mountain View, Calif. President Barney-Smith Car Co., Day- ton, Ohio. Army representative, Washington, D. C, Member of firm, Franklin Oliver & Co.,"i New York, N. Y. Lawyer, Cleveland, Ohio. President Continental Insurance Co. Passenger agent, Baltimore & Ohio ; R. R.,Wasliington, D. C. President Felt & Tarrant Manufacturing i Co., Chicago, 111. Sales engineer. International Motor Co., New York, N. Y. Cost accountant and chemist, Water- vliet Paper Co., Watervliet, Mich. Salesman, Safe Cabinet Co., Marietta, . Ohio. President and general manager Wheeling j Mould & Foundry Co., Wheeling, , W. Va. Washington, D. C. Manufacturing for self, Detroit, Mich. Jones & Lampson Machine Co., Spring- field Vt. AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. .'303 Members of the Mar Industries Hoard or(/ani:atu>n - Cdnf iinu'd. Name. rinery, Lieut. Col. J. JMecrs. „ [ lernin?, Frances "- Fletcher, Eston A "l ^Fletcher, Rear Admiral Frank F. *- IFoerdcrcr, Percival E 'i^' Follansbee, William B Foote, Edith L ^ Foster, Charles K Foster, Maj. Clair Foster, Mortimer B Frank, Lawrence K Frankfurter, Felix , 4 Fraser, W. Hugh s; Frayne, Hugh. iio;? jFreeman, E. Stewart f iFreeman, M. B [Friedberg, Ralph J "^ Friedlich.H.A til : Frost, Edward J re iGarfield.Dr. H. A Garrett, Paul W E Gary, Julian Vaughn Gault, P. B Gay, Edwin F Gay, Edward Randolph. . . Glbbs, Edwin C x. Gibbs, Louis D Gifford,A.L .|Gilbert,H.N DijMGillen, Martin J Dfi jGiUman, Joseph W ! iGladding, Augustus L ,, : JGlenn, John F Oj! iGoddard, Horace M ori IGwthals, Maj.Gen. George ■ (.' Goldman, Lieut. J, B., U. S. Navy. Goldsmith, Margaret L. .. . *" (Goodfellow, William E . . . . |,r;' Goodwillie, George L ^Gordon, Lieut. M. R i Gower, H. R ' Graff, Everett D ''I Cramlick, Howard Position in War Industries Board. Former ba-'ines.". Chief, railway equipment and suppiv section. Secretary to H. P. Tngels Regional adviser, Rochester, N. Y. . Member, War Industries Board and priorities board. Vice chairman, employment man- aijement courses. .\ssistant to southern lumber ad- ministration, lumber section. -Assistant to secretary priorities committee. Vice chairman, priorities com- mittee. Emergency constructionsection. . . Chief, miscellaneous commodities section. Expert, division of planning and statistics. Priorities board, labor representa- tive. Assistant, facilities division Chairman, labor division Expert, central bureau of planning and statistics. Staff, conservation division Draftsman, building material division. Member legal section Staff, central bureau of planning and statistics. Member of price fixing committee. . Expert, price statistics Secretary to Gov. H. C. Stuart . Secretary, foreign mission Chairman of the central bureau of planning and statistics. Stall, central bureau of planning and statistics. Regional adviser, Cincinnati, Oliio. Staff, division of planning and statistics. Assistant to chief, woolen section . . E.xpert, electric and power equip- ment section. Assistant to commissioner finished products. Division planning and statistics — Assistant to director, building material division. Expert, electric and power equip- ment section. Stall, central bureau of planning and statistics. Member War Industries Board and priorities board. Member war prison labor and national waste reclamation section. Expert, war industries abroad division plamiing and statistics. Assistant business manager, divi- sion of business administration. Expert, lire prevention section Army representative, joint ofTico on chemical statistics. Member legal section Special agent, steel division . Wool section President Flannery Bolt Co., J'itts- burgh, Pa Washington, P. C. Member of firm, Phelps A Fletcher. Rochester, N. Y. Washington, D. C. President and general manager Rol>ert H. Focrderer (Inc.), Philadelphia, I'n. Part owner, Marion Lumber Co., llatties- burg. Miss. Yonkers, N. Y. Vice president, .\merican Radiator Co., Chicago, III. Great Harrington, Mass. Treasurer and director. Shield Electric Co., New York, N. Y., and Southern Export Corporation, New York, N. Y. -Vccountant, New York Telephone Co., New York, N. Y. ' Labor Department, Washington, D. C. Traveling salesman, Peeriess Motor Car Co., Cleveland, Ohio. General orgiinizer, .\merican Federation of Labor, New York, N. Y. Cost accountant, Dennison .Manufactur- ing Co., Framingham, Mass. General sales manager, Dennison Manu- facturing Co., Framingham, Mass. Arcliitect, Akron, Oliio. Lawyer, Des Moines, Iowa. Vice president Wm. Filene Sons A Co., Boston, Mass. Chairman Fuel Administration. Supervisor of rescarclies. Bureau of State Research, Newark, N. J. Counsel, State Tax Board, Richmond, Va. City passenger agent, B. A O. R. R., Louisville, Ky. Dean of graduate school of business ad- ministration, Harvard University. Student, Harvard University. Retired. Superintendent advertising department, Edison Electric Llluminaling Co., Boston, Mass. Sales agent, Worumbo Co., New York, N. y7 Assistant to president, RotJic Bros. & Co., Cliicago, 111. President, Mitchell Wagon Co., Racine, Wis.,etal. Emergency Fleet Corporation, Philadel- phia, Pa. Assistant to general superintendent. Gladding, McUean & Co., Lincoln, Calif. New ICngland .sales manager, Edgemoor Iron Co., Boston, .Mass. President, Advertisir Special Service Corporation, New York, N. Y. Consulting engineer. New York, N. Y, Washington, D. C. Graduate student. University of Illinois. Manager personal estate, Minneapolis, Minn. Inspector, Western Factory Insurance Association, ( hlcugo. 111. Manager, foreign exchange purchase de- partment, National Cfty Bank, Now York. N. v. Associate, law firm Hamilton lncoln, Ncbr. 304 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. Members of the War Industries Board organization — Continued. 1 Position in War Industries Board. Former business. Granger, Capt. A. H. Greenburg, Max Greenbaum, Charles Jay. Grimes, Howard S Grothaus, L. W Guffev, Joseph F. Guylee, W. E.... Gwathmey, J. Temple. Haight, Frederick E . . . Hale, Roberts Haley, Edwin J Hall,.Tay V Hal laday, Calvin L.. Hall, Marcus Brown. Hamilton, C. D. P... Hamilton, James Emergency construction commit- E Xpert, electric and power equipment. Assistant to secretary. War Indus- tries Board. Requirements division shipping board representative. Electric and power equipment section, in charge turbine divi- sion. Chief, petroleum section , Executive secretary, require- ments division. Member committee on cotton dis- tribution. Associate chief, knit goods section. Staff, central bureau of planning and statistics. Chief, tanning material and nat- ural dye section (including oils, fat-S and waxes). Staff, central bureau of planning and statistics. Assistant chief, automotive prod- ucts section. Assistant secretary, priorities com- mittee. Chief, boot and shoe section Hanch, Charles C Hancock, Commander John M. Hansen, John M Hardy, Maj.R. S.... Harrison, Francis G. Harman, S. Park Hart, Dudley N Expert, fire prevention section . Chief, automotive products sec- tion. Navy representative on price fix- ing committee. Member and secretary of advisory committee on plants and muni- tions. Expert, power section Assistant to secretary, price fljc- ing committee. Employment management divi- sion. Domestic wool section Hartigan, Lieut. Com- mander Charles. Hatfield, Henry R. Hawk, Judge M Hawley, H. W.. Hawley, John C. Hay, Richard C. Hayes, Lieut. Col. Henry R. Hay ward, Nathan Heacock, J. Linden Heibel, Lieut. W. E Heidrich, Edw. C, jr Henderson, James D. C. . Henn, Lieut. Ralph F.... Herbst, Edith G Hennessey, William H.,jr. Herbert, Edith G Herrington, Cass E Member war prison labor and national waste reclamation section. Director of the division of plan- ning and statistics. Assistant chief, manufacturing sec- tion, pulp and paper division. Assistant, inland traffic section Expert, fire prevention section Staff, central bureau of plaiming and statistics. Requirements division. Army representative. Associate chief, dredging section.. . Staff, conservation division Expert, power section Chief, jute, hemp and cordage section. Expert, wool section Examiner, Army section, priori- ties committee. Bulletins division of planning statistics. Statistician, hides, leather and leather goods division. Bulletins, division of planning and statistics. Regional advisor, Denver Granger & Young, architects, Cliicai Manager, erecting and service deps ment, Worthington Pump & Machi Co., New York, N. Y. Student, Yale University; residem Chicago, 111. Catonsville, Md. Sales engineer, Allis-Chalmers Manufi turing Co., Milwaukee, Wis. Pittsburgh, Pa. Vise president. Cable Piano Co., Chicaj 111. Retired, New York, N. Y. Managing partner, A. S. Haight & Ci New York, N.Y. Superintendent of special research, E( son I lectric Ilium. Co., Boston, Ma; President, Haley-Hammond Co., Nc York, N. Y. Interests in eastern oil and gas fielc, Pinehurst, N.C. Engineer, Lewis Spring & Axle C<; Chelsea, Mich. Purchasing agent, American Box Boa; Co., Grand Rapids, Mich. Vice president. International Shoe C( ; t. Louis, Mo. Fire protection engineer, Underwritei Bureau of the Middle and Southe: States, New York, N. Y. Treasurer, t tudebaker Corporatio >" oiith Bend, Ind. Grand Forks, N. Dak. President Standard Steel Car Co., Pitt burgh. Pa. Electrical engineer, Los Angeles Gas Electrical Co., Los Angeles, Calif. President, Western Motor Car Co., Ci cinnati, Ohio. 45 Kenwood Avenue, Rochester, N. Y Hallowell, Jones & Donald, Bosto Mass. Judge Advocate General's OfQce, Na\ Department. Professor of accounting, and dean, Ue versity of California. Sales manager and purchasing agen Gaw OHara Envelope Co., Chicag 111. Division freight agent, Erie R. R. Co New York, N.Y. Inspector, Associated Factory Mutut Fire Insurance Co., Boston, Mass. ; Organization manager. Retail Researa' Association, New York, N. Y. In charge New York office Stone ' Webster, 120 Broadway, New Yod N.Y. JH President, American Dredging Co., 1^1 adelphia, Pa. ■ Member of firm, Heacock & Hokabi Philadelphia, Pa. Mechanical engineer, American Bio Co., Detroit, Mich. Vice president and manager, Peoria CdW age Co., Peoria, 111. Wool merchant, Philadelphia, Pa. 'V National Acme Co., Cleveland, Ohio. '^ Editor, Official Bulletin, University | Minnesota. i Circulation manager. Boot & Shoe m corder, Boston, Mass. ' Editor OflBcial Bulletin, University * Minnesota. Attorney, Denver, Colo. i AMKIMIAX IXDUSTHY IX TIIK WAH. Members of the Mar Industries lioanl oruunizututn—CoMhwiviX. 305 Name. Ilckey, Edward J.... V' Ilckox, Raymond . . . . lUdreth, Chas. E.... im, Norman H liller, George F lirsch, Maurice Iltchcock, James W. '^'^loegland, IraO. lolbrook, Percy. lolloran, D. A... tlolsinser, Walter, tlopkins, James M. lopkins, Louis Jay lorr, John W ' "Ok, Lieut. Roland J... ;:h, Geo. A.jjr ■■e, OwenC lowell, Frank n. lubbard. G.M.. lubbard, RussPlIS' lughes, Claire C lughes, John lughes, M.M 'lughes, Morgan O.. Position in War Indtistries Board. Former busineas. Assi.<5tant chief, automotive prod- ucts section. Expert, purchasing committee . . . Assistant, machine tool section. . . Assistant to director, building and materials division. Expert, fire prevention section... Secretary priorities committee Assistant to chief, tin section. . Expert, fire prevention section. Member priorities committee. . . As-Distant clerk, Commlttpo on MillUry .Vifairs, riiited States .'■eiiatc. .\ssi<:t;int niaiiai'or, Proctor &. Gamble, Cincinnati. Ohio. Whitcomb-BlaisdcU Co., Worcester, Ma.ss. Graham & Ilill, Indianapolis, Ind. Vice president, What Cheer Mutual Fire Insurance Co., Providence, K. I. Attorney at law, Houston, Tex. Cipner.i) nianat-pr. I. >ulzliacher Co., Stoubpuvillc, Ohio. Si'dvtiiry-trousuror, National .\iitomatlc Sprinkler Assocralion. New Vork,N.Y. Vice president, the Rail Joint Co., Now York, N. Y. Expert, steel division Clerk, sales department, La Relle Iron Works, Stetilienvilie, Ohio. Organization expert Attornev, Minneapolis, .Minn. Member priorities committee Chairman of board, Camol Co., Chicago, 111. Assistant, conservation division... Managing partner, Fwallow & Honkins, lumber manufacturers, Duluth, Nlinn. Expert, steel division Assistant district manager, Peihlehem Steel Co., Boston, Ma.ss. Assistant, machine tool section — Motch hio. Member requirements di\Tsion President, .\merican Blower Co., De- troit, .Mich. Regional advisor, Atlanta Inman, Howard A- Inman, Atlanta, Ga. Special representative, finished President and treasurer, Boonim & products division. Pease, Brooklyn. .N". Y. Chief, domestic skins and hides.... Chief, hide department, W. H. MeF.hvain <'o., shoe manufacturers, Boston, Mass. Statlstician,division planning and Tax expert, Ta\j>ayers' Association, .statistics. Santa Ke, N. Me.x. Chief, cotton and cotton linters President, Wni. U. .Moore Dry doodsf c, section. .Mcmphw, Tenn. Expert, electrical and power equip- Salesman, (rouse- Hinds Co., Syracuse, ment section. N. Y. . ,, . Stall, division planning and sta- Director of publications, Kusscll Sage tistics. Foundation, New York, N. Y. Secretary to G. N. Peek Sales department, Decrc 4 < o., .Mollne, Special agent, division planning Editorial writer, the New Republic, New and statistics. York, N. Y. Member War Industries Board, Washington, D. I . Arinv representative. Regional advisor, St. Louis Retired. ' Russell Sturgis Hubbard, chief of the Paint and Pigment Section, died In the »«>rvlce f his country on November 5, 1918. He had come to Wnshlnpton with full knowledRe lat because of his health the supreme sacrifice was not unlikely, and he carried on to lie end with the finest courage. hfs, Thomas W i'hrey, Richard E. r, Lois B hison, Lincoln. vck, E.N ngels, Howard P . n.Edw. H... on, Edwin E. son, Lewis B (s,A. E ■S.Geo. R cs, Wm. S cnkins, Frederick W I :iscn, A. G .-on, Alvin S , uon. Brig. Gen. Hugh ohnson, Jackson 105S26— 21- -20 306 AMEEICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAE. Members of the War Industries Board organization — Continnetl. Name. Position in War Industries Board. Former business. Jones, Edw, D. Jones, Eliot Jones, JohnD.. Jones, Walter Clyde. Joy, Harold E.. Justus, Allen L. Kean, David L. Kearns, Percy H Kellenberger, Max W . Kelley, Geo. E. C Kendall, Frank A Kerr, Clarence D Kerr, Karl S Kilpatrick, Maj. J. R. King, Victor L Kirkpatrick, CO... Kittredge, Lewis H . K:iing, John A Klock, LenaM Knight, Thos. S Knight, W. Hughes. Kjiobel, JohnE Koch, William C Kostcr, Frederick J . Kratz, John A Krohn, Irwin Krumb, Henry... Kurt, Franklin T . Laeombe, Maj. C. F Lamar, Capt. Robt. W. Lambert, Howard S . . Lamond, William S . . Lamson, Frederick L. Law, W.E La Wall, Charles N.... Lawless, Matthew D. Leddy, James C Lee, John W., jr Lee, William L Legge, Alex Director of course materials, em- ployment management courses. Staff," central biueau planning and statistics. Executive secretary, war prison labor and national waste recla- mation section. Counsel for nonwar construction section. Expert, rubber section Expert, lumber section Assistant to chief, section on medi- cal industry; chief, surgical in- struments and hospital equip- ment, section of medical indus- try. Secretary, legal section Reporter Auditor, rubber section Statistician, building materials division. Secretary, clearance committee Crane section Emergency construction commit- Chief, artificial dyes and interme- diates section. Expert, nonwar construction sec- tion. Member facilities division Assistant, resources and conver- sion section. Assistant business manager, di\i- sion planning and statistics. Electrical and power equipment section, in charge of electrical department. Assistant to secretary, priorities committee. Director, division of business ad- ministrator. Assistant, resources and conver- sion section. Regional advisor, San Francisco. . Assistant to vice chairman. War Industries Board, in charge of cablegrams. Expert, boot and shoe section Member of priorities committee. . Staff, division planning and sta- tistics. Expert, power section — do Superintendent of buildings, divi- sion of business administration. Priorities committee Staff, central bureau of planning and statistics. In charge Norfolk branch building materials division. Member advisory committee, med- ical agents, section of medical industry. Examiner, priorities division Assistant to business manager, purchasing committee. Expert, nonwar construction sec- tion. Expert, fire-prevention section Vice chairman, War Industries Board; chairman, requirements division. Professor of commerce and industry, University of Michigan. Associate professor of economics, Leland Stanford Junior University. Assistant manager, International Corre- spondence Schools, Scranton, Pa. Law firm, Jones, Addington, Ames & Sei- bold, Chicago, 111. Expert, B. F. Goodrich Co., Akron, Ohio. Partner manager, J. Natwick & Co., Bal- timore, Md. General manager, Chas. Lentz & Sons, Pliiladelphia, Pa. Secretary to Oscar L. Gray, M. C. Stenotypist, Galbraith &" Comptou, oil producers. Independence, Kans. Cost auditor, Fisk Rubber Co., Chicopee Falls, Mass. Architect, 45 Bromfield Street, Boston, Mass. Attorney, 5 Nassau Street, New York, N.Y. Fort Myer Heights, Va. Thompson-Starrett Co., building con- struction, New York, N. Y. Consulting chemical engineer. Wood Ridge, N. J. Publicity man, Chicago, 111. President, Peerless Motor Car Co., Cleve- land, Ohio. President, Kelly Island Lime Co., Cleve- land, Ohio. Secretary to business manager, Regal . Shoe Co., Boston, Mass. Head of switchboard department. Gen- eral Electric Co., Boston, Mass. Attorney at law, Dallas, Tex. Manager personal estate, Chicago, 111. Vice president. Twin City Brick Co., St. ' Paul, Minn. President, California Barrel Co., San Francisco, Calif. Practicing attorney, Charles Henry But- ler, Washington, D. C. Partner in Krohn, Fechtheimer & Co., Cincinnati, Ohio. Consulting mining engineer. Salt Lake City, Utah. Owner of Chauncey Hall School, Boston, Mass. ' Electrical engineer, New York, N. Y. Electrical superintendent. Central Power Co., Canton, Ohio. Chief clerk, Central RaUroad of New Jer- sey, Jersey City, N. J. Simplex Wire & Cable Co. .Boston , Mass. Treasurer, Norwalk Tire & Rubber Co, Norwalk, Conn. Sales manager, Clinchfleld Portland Ce- ment Co., Kingsport, Tenn. Dean, Philadelphia College of Pharmacy, Philadelphia, Pa. Lawless Bros., paper mills. East Roches- ter, N. Y. District auditor, Armour & Co., Chicago, 111. President and manager. Overland Syra- cuse Co., Syracuse, N. Y. Inspector, Underwriter Service Associflr tion, Chicago, 111. Vice president and general manager. In- ternational Harvester Co., Chicago, 111. AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 30? Mcwbcrs of the War Indnstrica Board o;Y/'nii,c«/iV>«— Continnod. Name. Position in War Industries Board; Former business. iltli,C.K.... sngel, Wm.C ionlhan, Richard... *^panard, Geo. M ird, Stephen R. Jtts.F.C jwenberp, Harry L. swis, George jwis, Henrv S >yden, Maj.H. R nooln. Alfred L pps, Louis P •Kclvey, C. W Keiiney, Col. Chas. A. •Lain, Percy ■ Lauchlan, Jay C Leary, Frank B jLennan, Donald R "Williams, Chas. M icDowcll, Charles H. . Chief, mica section, and advisor in relation to mineral exports and imports. PtiMication work, employment manaecmcnt courses. Staff, conservation division Conservation division Expert, steel division Requirements division Staff, division of planning and statistics. Assistant, gold and silver section. Priorities committee , Expert, power section E.xpert. hardware and hand tool section. Secretary, crane section Refrional advisor, Dallas Expert, hardware and hand tool section. Assistant, woolens section Emergency construction com- mittee. Expert, cotton goods section Chief, gloves and leather cloth- ing section, hide, leather and leather goods division. Expert, steel division Priorities Commissioner, retired . , Expert, fire-prevention section Assistant, machine tool section. . . Deceased; steel division Expert, division planning and statistics. In charge New York branch build- ing materials division. Chairman, emergency construc- tion committee. Assistant to director, building materials division. Associate chief, section of medical industry. Regional advisor, Cleveland Assistant chief, knit goods section Member of advisory committee on plants and munitions. Technical advisor, chemical divi- sion, foreign service. OfTice manager, central bureau, planning and statistics. Expert, steel division Navy representative, conservation division. Assistant chief, domestic wool section. Memljcr legal section Army representative, priorities committee. Examiner, priorities division Chief, pig-iron section . Staff, central bureau of planning and statistics. Chief, non war coastruction section . Examiner, priorities division Director of chemical division Professor of geology, University of Wis- consin, Wis. Publicity department, IToggson Bros., New "S ork, N. Y. Salesman, I.ee, ITigginson Co., Boston, Mass. Ellis Title * Conveyancing Co., Sprmg- field, Mass. Second vice president, Oneida Commu- nity fLtd.), Oneida. N.Y. Red Cross representative. Red Cross Headquarters. Washincton, D. C. Assistant to vice president, St. Louis I CarCo., St. Louis, Mo. President, Shreve & Co., San Francisco. , Calif. [ Pittsburgh, Pa. Consultinc engineer, New York, N. Y. I Retired, Taimton, Mass. I Emrineer with Brown Hoisting Ma- chinery Co., Cleveland. Ohio. I Business for self, Dallas, Tex. Southern representative, L. S. Starrott ! Co., .\thoI, Mass. j Treasurer, John T. Lodge &. Co.. Boston, Mas.s. Boston, Mass. Consulting industrial engineer. Fall River, Mass. Manager, Bachner, Moses, Louis Co., Gloversville, N. Y. Broker, New York, N. Y. Special inspector and engineer. New England Insurance Exchange, Boston, Mass. Sales engineer, Henry Prentiss & Co., Buffalo, N. Y. Bethlehem Steel Co., South Bethlehem, Pa. Instructor in economics. University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo. Inspector, Public Service Commission, New York, N. Y. President, Crowell-LundoflT-Little Co., Cleveland, Ohio. Manager, sales and pubUcity, Inter- national Heater Co.,Utica, N. Y. Secretary and general manager, Eli Lilly & Co., Indianapolis, Ind. President, W. R. .Mc.\llister Co., Clev&. land, Ohio. President and manager, Cumlicrland Drv Goods & Notion Co., Cumberlimd, Md. Cost clerk, Standard Steel Car Co., Butler, Pa. Professor of chemistry, University of Pennsylvania. Agent, Library Bureau, New York, N. Y. Vice president, Clark Car Co., Pitts- burgh, Pa. Washbigton, D. C. Wool buyer, Salt Lake City, Utah. Member firm Stewart & Scheurer, New York, N. Y. Consulting engineer, Washington, D. C. President and treasurer, J. H. .\lcLaln Co.. Canton, Ohio. Member of llrm, Picklands, Mather & Co.,Clevcbind, Ohio. ExaminiT, the Examination Corpora- tion, New York, N. Y. Marsh i Mclx-nnan, Chicago, 111. Lawver, Houston, Tex. President, Armour Fertiliser Works, Chicago, 111. 308 AMHIUCAX lNI)i:STRY IN TllK WAR, Members of the War Industries Board organization — Continued. Name. Mackall, Paul MacLaren, Maj. Malcoli Macpherson, Frank H.. Mahoney, J. Bernard... Mallalieu. W. E Mann, David F , Manning, John J Mansfield, Wm. L. Manss, Wm. H Mapother, Dillon E Marshall, Ross S Andrew- Martin, Capt. Penn. Martin, Willard B. Mason, Newton E., rear admiral, U. S. Nav>-, re- tired. Matlack, John C , Maxwell, Lloyd W., Mebane, James K . . , Meflert, Benj. F Merchant, Ely O... Mercury, Chester C. Position in War Industries Board. Former business. Foreign representative, steel divi- sion. Expert, power section Member, priorities committee . Deceased; secretary. B. M. Baruch. Member flre-prevention section.. . Expert, steel division Member, war prison labor and na- tional wa.ste reclamation section. Passenger representative, inland traffic section. Director, war service committees. . .\ssistant, paint and pigment sec- tion. Staff, central bureau of planning and statistics. Secretary, B. M. Baruch at peace conference. Chief clerk. War Industries Board . Priorities committee. Merrill, W.H Merry weather, George E . Merwin, John O Meyer, A. J Expert, rubber section Statistician, division of planning and statistics. Assistant to director textile divi- sion. Associate, cotton goods section Expert, pulp and paper division . . Charee of reception room, priorities di^•l3ion. i Chief, fire prevention section. Chief, machine tool section . . . Meyer, Eugene, jr. . . Milbank, Dunlevy.. Miller, Ellis Miller, F. A Miller, George E Milne, W^m. D Miltenberger,Capt . Geo. K. . Minnick, Arthur Mitchell, Andrew W Mitchell, Maj. J. K Mitchell, Dr. Wesley C... Montgomery, Fletcher H. Montgomery, Lieut. Col. Moody,' Herbert R Moore, Kilbum Expert, electric and power equip- ment section. Expert, fire prevention section... E Xpert , n onferrous metals Expert, facilities division Division planning and statistics... Expert, nonwar construction sec- tion. Expert, facilities division Expert, fire prevention section Expert, power section War Industries Board representa- tive in joint office on chemical statistics. Expert, nonwar construction sec- tion. Staff, conservation division CUef, price statistics. Expert, felt section... Army representative on price-fix- ing committee. Technical advisor, chemicals di\'i- sion. Expert, priorities division Assistant sales manager, Bethlehem Ste Corporation, Bethlehem, Pa. Professor of electrical engineering. Prino ton University. President and treasurer, Detroit Sulphil Pulp & Paper Co., Detroit, Mich. Washington, D. C. General manager National Board of Fu underwriters. New York, X. Y. Sales agent, Pittsburgh Steel Co., Pitt burgh, Pa. Secretary, Union Label Trades Oepar ment, .American Federation of I.abi Washington, D. C. Assistant city ticket agent, Chicagi St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry Minneapolis. Minn. Chamber of Commerce, Riggs Buildin; Washinarton, D. C. Real estate, Louisville, Ky. Superintendent, Seaboard Air Line R' Co., Norfolk, Va. Squire, Sanders & Demsev, Clevelam Ohio. Private secretarv to president, Centn R. R. Co. of >few Jersev, Planifiek N.J. Washington, D. C. Treasurer and general manager, Aja Rubber Co., New York, .\. Y. Assistant educational direct or Y. MCA New York, N'. Y. ' Secretary and treasurer Scott-Mebar Manufacturing Co., Graham, N. C. Partner of Amory, Browne & Co., Ne' York, .NT. Y. Special agent. Federal Trade Commi. sion, Washington, D. C. South Amencan representative, Geo. I Emery Co., mahogany and mines, Ba ton, Mass. President, L'nderwriters Laboratorie Chicago, 111. President the Motch & Merry weathd Machine Co., Cleveland, Ohio. Assistant manager, sales office, Burk Electric Co., New York, N. Y. Inspector, Indiana Inspection Bureai Indianapolis, Ind. New York, N. Y. Real estate and investments, New Yorl N. Y. Professor, Johns Hopkins University Baltimore. Md. Auto Strop Safetv Razor Co., New Yori N. Y. Sales manager, Cleveland Electrical ■ Illuminating Co., Cleveland, Ohio. Inspector, L'nderwriters' Bureau of Ne' England, Boston, Mass. Electrical engineer. Union Electric Ligh & Power Co., St. Louis, Mo. First assistant examiner, LTnited State Patent Office, Washington, D. C. Salesman, Chicago, 111. Philadelphia Rubber Works, Land Titl Building, Philadelphia, Pa. Professor of economics, . Columbia Uni versitv. President, Knox Hat Co., New Yori N. Y. Member of the firm of LybranJ-Ros Bros. & Montgomery, New York, N.Y Professor of industrial' chemistry, CoUeg of City of New York, N. Y. Member firm Moore & Goodman, Gal vest on, Tex. J AMERICAN INlHSrr.V IN THE WAR. 309 Members of the War Industries Board organization— CoiHlnuvi\. Name. [onliead,MaJ.JobiiM.. [organ, Wm. F... [organ, Wm. O... lorley, Charles D. [orriscy, James R . [orrison, John A . . [Qise, Edward N. (oKse, Frank W . . [ofss, Everett [orton, Ivon T . [urchison, Capt. Ken- neth M. turray, William M lurto, Mary F... lusser, James C. Scrymser Co., oils. New York, N. Y. Manager of order and sales department^ Youngstown Sheet & Tube CcJ Youngstown, Ohio. Member of firm Post & Flagg, New Yor« N. Y. . Member of firm Boston & Lynn Cut Sow Co. .Lynn, Mass. Assistant manager, Weinstock, Lubin a Co., Sacramento, Calif. AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 311 Mctiibers of the M'or Induftiriis Hoard organisation- -ConlimuH]. Ransome, F. H Ransome, R. G Rea, Henry R Reay, W. M Reed, J. Burns Reed, Lewis B Rees, Thomas M Replogle, J. Leonard Reynolds, Stanley M Rhoades, Philo B Rice, Capt. Willis B Richardson, David Robt. Richardson, Nicholas Richardson, Ralph I Riddle, Capt. Geo. W.... Riley, Charles W. RUey, Maj.J. W., Rippin, Lieut. J. Y. Ritchie, Albert C.... Ritter, William M. Robbins, Walter... Robinson, William C. Rogers, Charles A Rogers, Chilnton L. . . Root, Charles T Roper, Frank A Rosenberg, William S. Hosengarten, A. G.... Rosensohn, Maj. S.J Ross, Harry C Rossiter, William S . Rossiter, W, T Routsong, Ralph C Rowbotham, George B. Lumber section Assistant to secretary, priorities committee. Member special advisory com- mittee on plants and munitions. Allied purchasing commission Chemicals Assistant to G. N. Peek Expert, machine tool section. Director of steel supply Publicity work Assistant warehouse section, steel division. Army represonlative, joint office on chemical statistics. Expert, priorities division Expert, fire prevention section. Accountant, steel division Rowland, Joseph W Rullman, Chas. Phillip... Kiimbaugh, R. L .-adler, Capt. Harry M. . . Saeger, Wilford C , Salomon, Joseph , Temporary assistant to director of building material division. Assistant, facilities division ' Member war prison labor and na-l tional waste reclamation sec- tion. General counsel. War Industries i Board. ' Assistant to committee on finished products (certifying ofDccr ). Assistant to committee on finished products; chief, electric and power equipment section. Expert, fire prevcntionsection Chief, harness and personal equip- ment section^ 1 eather division. Auditor, division of business ad- ministration. Chief, periodical section, pulp and paper division. Staff, central bureau of planning and statistics. Reporter Chief, miscellaneous chemical sec- , tlon. I Member war prison labor and na- tional waste reclamation sec- i tion. ' Assistant to chairman, conserva- tion division. Staff, central bureau of planning and statistics. Assistant to chief, resources and conversions section. i Expert, central bureau of plan- ning and statistics. Chief, baltiuK section, hide, leath- er, and leather goods division. Assistant to chief, rubber section. . .| Domestic wool section ' E Xpert, fire prevention section — Examiner, -Vrray section, priori- ties committee. Member legal section Secretary, industrial adjustment committee, priorities division. Former basincss. Eastern & Western Lumber Co., Port- land, Orog. Vice president Bostrop Water, Light & Ice Co., Hostrop, Tex. Retired, Pittsburgh, Pa. Chief of auditing department, Intcma- tioiml Harvester Co., Chicago, 111. Assistant professor of mining Case School .Vpplicd Science, Cleveland, Ohio. Vice president, United States Silica Co., Chicago^ 111. Sales engineer, Motch & Mcrryweathcr Machine Co., Cleveland, Ohio. President -Vmerican Vanadium Co., New York. N. Y. Committee on Public Information, Washington, D. C. Manager warehouses the Bourne-Fuller Co., Cleveland, Ohio. Law firm Duell, Warfleld & Duell, New York, N. Y. Secretarv, Richardson & Boynton Co., New York, N. Y. Inspecting engineer, Underwriters Bu- reau of New Lngland, Boston, Ma-^s. Chief clerk, Cambria Steel Co., Johns- town, Pa. Construction Division, U. S. Army, Wash- ington, D. C. Attorney, Akron, Ohio. Adjutant General's OIBce. Reclamation Division, U. S. -Army. Attorney general of Maryland, Balti- more, Md. President, W. M. Ritter Lumber Co., Columbus, Ohio. Vice president, Wagner Klectric & Manu- facturing Co., St. Louis, Mo. Vice president, Underwriters' Labora- tories, Chicago, 111. Retired, Hartford, Conn. Senior accountant. Baker, Vawter & Wolf, Chicaco, III. U'nited Publishers Co., director. New York, N. Y. Farm l:conomics Department, Depart- ment of Agriculture. Rejiorter, New York, N. Y. Vice president and treasurer, Powcrs- WeiKhtman-Rosengarten Co., Phila- delphia, Pa. War Department, Washington, D.C. Care of F. P. Luther Co., railway equip- ment, Chicatio, III. President, Kuniford Printing Co., Con- cord, N. H. Vice president and general manager of the Cleveland Builders' Supply Co., Cleveland, Ohio. Welfare ilirecf or, National Cash Register Co., Daj-ton, Ohio. Provident. Bay State BeltlnRCo.. Boston, .Mass.: Southern Bolting Co., .Vtlanta, (!a.,ctc. Olfue manager, Flsk Rubber Co., Chico- poe Falls .Nfass. Lambert lluntington Co., 79 Fifth Ave- nue, New York, N. Y. Inspector, Western Snrlnkler Risk Asso- ciation, CliUngo, III. Manacer, mall order department. Spear A Co., PittsliurRh, Pa. Law firm of llulklcy, Uauxhurst, Saeger A: Jainiirson.Clovpland, Ohio. Lawyer, Washington, D. C. 312 AMEFJCAX INDUSTRY IX THE WAR. Members of the War Industries Board organization — Continued. Name. Position in War Industries Board. Former business. )rdl enl Sanford, Hugh W Sargent, Murray Sawyer, Capt. Daniel E . . . Sawyer, Harry A Schaaf.F. A Schaffer, Herbert Allen. . . Schlosser, Alexander L.... Schmidt, John C Schmuckler, Jacob Schneider, Albert Schoelkopf, J. F Schravesende, P. B Schubert, Frank II Scott, Frank A Scott, John W Scott, Leiand Scott, Rufus W Scott, "VV. G Seaman, Ir\ing Selden, Ernest I. Self ridge, Edward A Sever, Maj. Geo. F Seward, George N Shaw, A. W Shaw, Maj. C. H Shaw, George M Shaw, Jean M Shepard, William P Sherman, Karl W Shidle, GeterC Shotwell, Edward C Siebenthal, Myrtle M Simpson, Lieut. Col. F. F, Skinner, William Sloan, Harry M Small, A. R Smith, Arthur H Smith, A. Homer , Smith, Austin D , Smith, Charles Henry Smith, E. A Smith, George F Chief, ferro alloys section Chief, hardware and hand tool section. Chief of projectile, steel rails, etc., section. Expert, chemical statistics E xaminer, priorities division Assistant to director, building material division. Assistant and secretary to H. B. Swope. Chief, chain section Nonferrous metals section Reporter Chief, artificial and vegetable dye section. Assistant chief , agricultural imple- ment section. Expert, electric and power equip- ment section. Chairman munitions board, chair- man War Industries Board, Aug. 1 to Nov. 1, 1917. Director of textile and rubber division. E.xaminer, inland traffic section.. Associate chief, knit-goods section Disbursing officer, division of bus- iness administration. Expert, priorities division Statistician, division of plaiming and statistics. Expert, lumber section Expert, power section Statistician, division of planning and statistics. Chairman conservation division. . . Expert, power section Member advertising committee on plants and munitions. Expert, hardware and hand-tool section. Assistant, conservation division... Assistant chief, jute, hemp, and cordage section. Expert , steel division Expert, hides. leather, and leather goods division. In charge of conferences and re- ports, secretary's office. Chief, section of medical industry. . Chief, silk section ". . . Assistant to chief, nonwar con- struction section. Expert, fire prevention section — Associate chief, wood chemicals section. Assistant eUef, section of medical industry. Assistant, warehouse section, steel division. Association chief, fire prevention section. Secretary, lumber section Chief, flax products section Treasurer and general manager Panfoi Day Iron Works, Knoxville, Tenn Secretary, Sargent & Co., New Hav Conn. Salesman Block Maloney & Co., Chi cago, 111. Assistant chemical engineer, America: University, Washington, D. C. .Adam SchaaL Chicago, 111. Member of firm, Harrison & SchafTer Easton, Pa. As-istant and secretary to H. B. Swope New York World. President, Schmidt & Ault Paper Co. York, Pa. Care J. J. Campbell, 1725 Sedwick A\e nue, Morris Heights, N. Y. Reporter, New York, N. Y. Vice president National .Vniline & Chem ical Co., Buifalo, N. Y. President Grand Rapids School Equip ment Co., Grand Rapids, Mich. Production manager '\\Tieeler Condense & Engineering Co., Cataret, N. J. Vice president Warner-Swasey Co. Cleveland, Ohio. Member of firm, Carson, Pine, Scott cr section Staff, resources and conversion section. Kavy representative, requirements division. Facilities division Assistant, optical glass and Instru- ment section. Regional advisor, Detroit Expert, steel division Expert, power section DivLslon planning and statistics. Expert, steel division Expert, central bureau planning and statistics. Assistant to chief, nonferrous metals section. Associate chief, alkali and chlorine section. Expert, power section Former business. President. J & D Tire & Rubber Co., Charlotte. N. C. Salesman, Matthew Addv Co., Philadel- phia, Pa. .\ttorney at law. Providence, R. I. Draftsman, the Baldwin Locomotive Works, Philadelphia. Pa. .Member of lirni, Majors-Sowers Sawmill Co., Kplcy, Miss. Associate "editor, the Farm Journal, Washington, D. C. Technical director. Standard Sanitarj- Manufacturing Co., Pittsburgh, I'a. President and treasurer, C. E. Stamp Co., Cleveland, Ohio. Assistant to president, Wasson Piston Ring Co., New Brunswick, N. J. Starrett it Van Vleek, architects, New York, N. Y. Law firm, Englehard, Pollack, Pitcher 4 Stein, New York, N. Y. National Board of Fire Underwriters, 76 William Street, New York, N. Y. Resident agent, -M. A. Hanna & Co., Pittsburgh, Pa. Engineer, Manufacturers Mutual Fire Insurance Co., Providence, R. 1. Professor of economics, Amherst College. Secretarj' to W. M. Ritter, W. .M. Ritter Lumber Co., Columbus, Ohio. Sales manager, gage di\ision, Greenfield Tap & Die Corporation, Greenfield, Mass. -Metallurgist, New Jersey Zinc Co., New York, N. Y. Partner, John R. Evans & Co., Philadel- phia, Pa. Meihber of firm, S. Stroock & Co., New York, N. Y. Ex-governor of Virginia. Purchasing agent, .Aberthaw Construc- tion Co., P.oston, Mass. L. L. Summers & Co., New York, N. Y. Assistant secretar}% Department of Com- merce. City editor, New York World. Crowell-Lundoff-Little Co., general con- tractors, Cleveland. Ohio. Chairman United States Tariff Commiv sion. Manager, Philadelphia ollice, Dennisoo Manufacturing Co. Tavlor A Create, Buffalo, N. Y. Traffic department, Michigan Alkali Co., Wvandotte, .Mich. Navy Ordnance, Washington, D. C. Buckevc Steel Casting Co., Columbu.t, Ohio. Student, Yale University; residence. New York, N. V. Maiiuf.icturer, Detroit, Mich. President, the Western Resene Steel Co., VVarren, Ohio. Consultingclectricalengineer, New York, N. V. 124 Eleventh Street SE., Washington, D. C. Suporlnlendent, order department, Cam- bria Steel Co., Johnstown, Pa. Professor, University of Michigan. Engineer, with Pope Yeatman, N«w York, N. Y. Attoriifv, special coun.sel. Diamond Al- kali Co., PitUstnirgh, I'a. Manager .Missouri Public Utilities Co. and Cape fiirardeau-Jackson Inter- urban Rv. Co., Cap*> Clrardeiu, Mo 314 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. Members of the War Industries Board organization — Continued. Name. Position in War Industries Board. Former business. Torrence, Robert M — Townsend, John R Trigg, Ernest T Tripp. Chester D Turkington, Everett E.. Tucker, Maj. Samuel A . Turner, Spencer , Turpin, Upshur F Tuttle,M.C Ulrich, Ethei E Van Deventer, Harry B.. Van Doren, Durand H . . . Vanduzer, H. B Vauclain, Samuel M Vaughan, Victor C Venard, Wm. S Vogel, August H Vogel, Fred A Wadleigh, Francis K Walker, Charles R Walker, F.W Walker, Reginald D Walz, Andrew Ware, J.E Ware, Robert D Waring, Lieut. Wm. E.,jr. Waterman, John H Weaver, Herbert H . . Webb, Stuart W Weber, Orlando F . . . Webster, Arthur L... Webster, Benjamin. . Webster, Hosea Weeks, Marian F Wehle, L. B Weidlein, Edward R. Weiss, L. S Weld.C. Minot Wells, E.R Wells, Arthur E Chief, chemical glass and stone- ware section. Associate section chief, sulphur, pyrites, and alcohol sections. Regional advisor, Philadelphia, Pa. Associate chief, ferro-alloys sec- tion. Expert, fire prevention section — Technical advisor, chemicals di- vision. Chief, cotton goods section Assistant to director building material division. Emergency construction commit- tee. Assistant chief, harness and per- sonal equipment section. Examiner, priorities division Member, legal section Pacific coast lumber administrator Chairman, special advisory com- mittee on plants and munitions. Member, ad\'isory board on medic- inal agents. Statistician, division planningand statistics. Regional advisor, Milwaukee, Wis. Expert, hide, leather, and leath- er goods division. Staff, division of planning and statistics. Assistant to chief, fiber board and container section. Assistant to director building ma- terial division. Executive assistant, wool chem- ical section. Assistant, nonferrous metals sec- tion. Staff, conservation division Secretary, Highland Glass Co., Was ington. Pa. Executive engineer, Sanderson & Port< New York, N. Y. Vice president and general managi John lyucas & Co., Philadelphia, Pa. Vice president, Miami Metals C Chicago, 111. Electrical engineer, Associated Facto Mutual Insurance Co., Boston, Mass. Professor, Columbia Universitv. Nt York, N. \. Member of firm, Turner-Halsey C( New York, N. Y. Designing engineer, the Dayton-Wrig Aeroplane Co., Dayton, Ohio. i Exealti^e oificer, .\berthaw, Constni tion Co., construction engineers. Be ton, Mass. Smith-Worthington Co., Hartford, Con Professor of Latin, University of Pen sylvania. Lawver, Ravmond, Mountain, Van Bl8 com (t Marsh, Newark, N. J. Chairman Fir Production Board, Poi land, Oreg. Senior vice president, Baldwin Locom tive Works, Philadelphia, Pa. Dean, medical department, Universii of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., San Francisc Calif. Vice president, Pfister-Vogel Leath Co., Milwaukee, Wis. General manager, Pfister-Vogel Leatl 1 er Co., Milwaukee, Wis. Consulting engineer, Blair & Co., Ne York, N. Y. Assistant to President Fox Paper Cc Lockland, Ohio. Secretary, Association of Tile Manufe turers, Beaver Falls, Pa. Engineer, L. J. Husted Co., Kansas Cit Mo. Consulting mining engineer, Gugge; heim Bros., New York, N. Y. Assistant, belting section Assistant to Secretary price fixing committee. Chief, charge machine depart- ment, electrical and power equipment section. Expert, steel division Regional advisor, Boston Assistant nonferrous metals sec- tion. Expert, hides and skins section. . . Executive assistant, chemical di- \ision. Expert, facilities division Assistant to chief clerk. War In- dustries Board. Member legal section Technical advisor, chemical di- vision. Jf ember legal section Representative Bureau of Mines on ferro-alloys section. Consulting engineer , electrical and power equipment section. Associate chief, acids and heavy chemical section sulphur, py- rites, and ethyl alcohol sections. Member of firm, Maesel-Ware Co., Ne York, N. Y. Salesman, Bay State Belting Co., Bo ton, Mass. Baltimore, Md. Engineer, A His Chalmers Manufactu ing Co., Milwaukee, Wis. With Citizens Heat, Light & Power C Johnstown, Pa. President, Clinton Wire Cloth Co Boston, Mass., etc. Eugene Meyer, jr. Co., New Ycrk, N. Y. A. L. Webster & Co., Chicago, 111. Engineer with Albert Mebster, Nc York, N. Y. Engineer and sales manager, Babcocl Wilcox Co., New Y'ork, N. Y. Wellesley Hills, Mass. Law firm Wehle & Wehle, Louisvilli Ky- Acting director of Mellon Institute Pittsburgh, Pa. Lawver, Cleveland, Ohio. Chief, War Minerals Bureau, Bureau < Mines, Washington, D. C; residenct New Y'ork, N. Y. Chief Mechanical Engineer, J. A. WTiit <<: Co., New Y'ork, N. Y. With United States Bureau of Mines. AMERICAX INDUSTKY IN THE AVAR. .'U f) Members of the War Industries Board organization — Continiiels, large. Motor trucks, gasoline. Electrical equipment, meaning motors, generators, and transformers. *Iron ore. ♦Coke *Scrap. ♦Iron and steel products, meaning — Bands. Billets. Blooms. Boiler tubes. Cold-rolled steel. Hoops. Ingots, Merchant bars. Pig iron. Pipe. Plates. Rails and accessories. Rods. Seamless tubing. Shapes. Sheets. Sheet bars. Sheet steel. Skelp. Slabs. Tin plate. Wire and wire products. Wire rope. PRICE PLAN. The following articles were placed on the clearance list In order to lake steps which would result in the Government securing the benefit of any special price concession from the trade, the benefit of a uniform method of securing its siii)- plies, and the benefit of the cooperation in certain cases by the repre-scntativos of the industries for the purpo.se of expediting delivery and saving transiior- tation. Aluminum.— The Aluminum Co. of America has offered to supply nlunilniiin for the Government ni-eds subject to later prife determination. The cost of production is being determined by the Federal Trade ComniKslon. and in the meantime orders are to be placed with the cmnpatiy at an ndvanced-payiucnt price as may be fixed by the department, subject to a final price determination. Standard trade differentials on various forms of alundnuin are offered by tlie company. No clearance on aluminum is neces.'sary if the purclmse i)Ian outlined above is followed. A monthly summary of all orders placed by each depart tnent Should, however, be furni.shed the raw materials division of the War Industries Board. 318 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. Copper. — The maximum price on copper has been fixed at 23^ cents f. o. h.. New York. Clearance on detailed requirements is not necessary, but full ad- vantage must be taken of the fixed price so that the Government contractors will be enabled to secure copper at the fixed prices for Government require- ments. Requests for allotment of copi:)er are to be addressed to the copper producers' committee, Munsey Building, Washington, D. C. Quarterly estimates of requirements of copper should be sent by consuming departments to the clearance committee for transmission to the raw materials division. No clearance is necessary if the purchase plan outlined above is followed. Portland cement. — The industrj' has offered to supply Government require- ments on terms and prices outlined in a letter addressed to the departments by the raw materials division of the War Industries Board. Applications for cement requirements should be addressed to the Portland cement committee, 30 Broad Street, New York City, Allotments will be made by the committee subject to the supervision of the raw materials division. No clearance on Portland cement is necessary if the purchase plan outlined above is followed. Lead. — An arrangement for providing lead requirements until the end of March. 1918, has been made with the industry on behalf of the departments- with the approval of the War Industries Board. A full explanatory letter has- gone forward from the raw materials division of the War Industries Board' to each department giving details of the method of procedure with respect tO' lead requirements. Estimates should be in the hands of the raw materials division of the War Industries Board on the 13th of the month preceding the month for which the deliveries are required. The price basis is the average of the Engineering aiid Mining Journal quota- tion for the month in which the delivery is made, using East St. Louis basis. If the suggested procedure on procuring lead is followed, no clearance on lead; is necessary. Steel. — Prices have been fixed on steel and many steel products. On such items, namely, those marked *, allotments are made upon request to Mr. J. L. Replogle, director of steel supply, raw materials division. War Industries Board. Estimates of requirements covering the wants of the various consuming depart- ments until December 31, 1918, should be forwarded to Mr. Replogle at once, if this has not already been done, in order that requisitions may be allotted without delay. No clearance on the steel items referred to is necessary if the purchase plan outlined above is followed. Zinc. — The following prices have been fixed on zinc, which are effective until June 1, 1918: Grade A, maximum, 12 cents per pound f. o. b. East St. Louis ; sheet zinc, maximum, 15 cents per pound f. o. b. plant, subject to the usual trade dis- counts ; plate zinc, 14 cents per pound f. o. b. plant, subject to the usual trade discounts. Application fro zinc requirements should be addressed to Mr. Pope Yeatman, raw materials division, War Industries Board. Estimates of require- ments up to July 1. 1918, should be forwarded at once to Mr. Yeatman, Clearance is not necessary on zinc if the foregoing plan is followed. AMERICAN IXnrSTUV IN TIIH WAR. Appendix VI. CLEARANCE LIST, JUNE 24, 1918. 3iy dds. ^icultural implements, vehicles (not auto propelled), and wood products: A. Veliicles — Army wagons. Army carts — two-wheel. Artillery wheels, spokes, and hubs. Spare parts. B. Truck bodies. C. Wood products, meaning han- dles, boxes, containers, crates, propellers, etc. D. Agricultural tractors, utomotive products, meaning: A. Motors — truck, tractor, aero- plane. B. Transmissions. C. Axles. D. Springs, E. Forgings. F. Tires, solid. G. Rims, pressed on. H. Motor-cycle rims. L Pneumatic tires. J. Steel wheels. K. Magnetoes. L. Spark plugs. M. Valves. N. Cam shafts, finished and rough. O. Crank shafts, finished and rough. P. Trucks. Q. Military tractors. R. Motor cycle. S. Trailers. T. Storage batteries. U. Ball and roller bearings. V. Steel castings for motor cars. W. Drive and link belt chains. X. Radiators. Y. Babbitt-lined bearings. Z. Frames. AA. Truck bodies for motor chassis. BB. Sets of spare parts for auto- motive vehicles. Tass and copper rods, tubing, and sheets. Chains (all chains otlier than automo- tive drive and link belt). Chemicals. Cordage, hemps, and fibers, includ- ing: A. Jute. B. Manilla. C. Kapoc — mattresses, pillows, pads, and life garments. D. Coir yarn. E. Manilla rope. F. Sisal rope. G. Cocoa mats and cocoa matting. H. Linoleum. I. Oakum. J. Burlap. Cork. Cotton linters. Cotton goods. Cranes : A. Locomotive. B. Electric traveling. C. Gantry. D. Shipyard. E. Buckets (grab buckets). F. Hoists. G. Portable electric. H. Electric monorail. L Wrecking. J. Track pile drivers. Cylinders and containers (pressure). Electric equipment : A. Generators. B. Turbines. C. Condensers. D. Pumps. E. Compressors. F. Transformers. G. Current breakers. II. Oil switches. I. Lightning arresters. J. Motors, special, machine tool, adjustable speed, direct cur- rent, and crane. K. Electrical supplies. Electrical wire and cable. Explosives and components tliereof. Felts. 320 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. Fire-prevention apparatus : A. Hand fire extinguishers. B. Fire liose. Forging and machining for guns, pro- jectiles, or shafts. Hardware — mill, plumbers', and heat- ing supplies. Hides and skins. Iron and steel, of which the follow- ing are allocated through the di- rector of steel: A. Bands. B. Billets. C. Blooms. D. Boiler tubes. E. Cold-rolled steel. F. Hoops. G. Ingots. H. IMerch.int bars. I. rig iron. •T. I'ipe. K. riates. T.. Hails and accessories. yi. Hods. X. Seamless tubing. O. Shapes. P. Sheets. Q. Sheet bars. R. Sheet steel. S. Rkelp. T. Shibs. U. Tin plate. V. Wire nnd wire products. W. Wire rnfu^. Knit gi.ods. I.ejitlior iiiid leather goods. Linen :uid linen thread. LunibiT. Machine guns and accessories (clearec through Ordnance Department U. S. Army). Sletal-working machinery, includini tools, forge-shop machinery, anc: plate-working machinery. Mica (cleared through Bureau of Sup' plies and Accounts, U. S. Navy). Needles. Nonferrous metals : A. Aluminum. B. Antimony. C. Copper. D. Lead. E. Zinc. F. Mercury (cleared through Bu- reau of Supplies and Ac- counts). G. Nickel. H. Tin. Oil: Castor oil (cleared through Signal Corps, U. S. Army). L'useed. Optical glass find optical instruments. Paper, 100 per cent sulphate kraft. Power equipment. Railway equipment. Rubber. Rubber goods. Silk noil and silk cartridge cloth. Small arms. Small - arms ammunition (clear( through Ordnance Department, U. S Army). Small tools. Tobacco, Wool. Woolen goods. I Appendix VII. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF REQUIREMENTS DIVISION OF WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD. . (Ch-cular Creating Requii-ements Division.) In order that the responsibilities which the President has laid upon thet chairman of the War Industries Board, as outlined in his letter of March 4, 1918, may be discharged, there has been created a " requirements division " of the said board, to which each supply division of each department of this Government and the Allied Purchasing Commission shall furnish " as far in advance as possible " statements with as much detail as practicable of their IB AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 321 •' {irospective needs " of raw materials and linished products. TJie President has decreed that the chairman is to be constantly and systematically informed of nil contracts and purchases in order that he may have always before him 11 >( lieniatized analysis of the progress of business in the several divisions of the Government in all the departments, and in order that this may be accnniplished, the statements above mentioned will include not only those com- iniiditios. materials, or products of which a present or threatened shortage ixisis, but also those of which the supply is ample, and will also include not .mly connuodities, materials, and products required by several different depart- imnts or nations but also those required by one department only. In the procurement of materials and tinished products in which no short- aui' exists and where no allocation seems necessary or desirable the require- ments division will so advise the department presenting the requirements, which will thereupon proceed with the purchase in pursuance with their established [iraotices. .Skction. 1. Notice of requirements. — The statements above mentioned will, iinin time to time, and as far in advance as possible of the date required, be luisented to the requirements division by the member or members thereof rep- n-tuting the department in which the requirements originate or by the rcpre- -( nrative of the Allied Purchasing Commission. Where the requirements are niiv(>l or unusual, either with respect to the amount of the proposed expenditure, fHiaiitities involved or location proposed, or where the requirements division for any reason deems it desirable that the project be considered in conference lit^tween the head of the department in which it originates and the chairman of the War Indu.stries Board, the matter shall be immediately called to the atten- tion of the chairman of the War Industries Board, and also submitted to the lioard at its next meeting, without, however, delaying ref(>rence to and con- ha!l utilize existing sections and, where necessary, create additional sections lo handle raw materials and finished products of which there is an actual or ihnatem'd shortage, or the price and production of which should be controlled, in order that the United States Government, its Allies, and the civilian popula- liiin may be protected as far as possible. The.se sections shall be designated ■ nmiodity sections," and each shall be in charge of an executive officer to be -ignated "chief" of such section. i:ach section chief shall create and maintain such organization atid keep ■ u mem- er, consider and tentatively determine the priority rating which such require- lents shall take when orders therefor shall have been placed. Such tentative ating shall be observed by the priorities committee in connection with all pplications for priority on orders covering such requirements unless the riorities committee should (because of conditions changing in the time inter- ening between the time of the fixing of the tentative rating and the appllca- on for priorities, or other good cause) conclude such rating to be improper, 1 which event the section chief and each member of the section fixing the ntative rating shall be notified and have an opportunity to be heard before ach rating shall be changed. In the event a change is made the .section chief r any member may appeal from such decision in the manner prescribed by that ortiou of the organization plan of the War Industries Board governing priori- ?s. Sec. 7. Inspection and production. — It shall be no part of the task of the War adustries Board to make inspection of products for which orders have been laced, to keep in touch with production or to follow up delays, which duties evolve upon the several governmental supply departments. Each supply de- artment, however, will promptly and fully advise the requirements division henever serious delays in deliveries or shortages in requirements occur or re threatened. Sec. S. Membership. — The requirements division shall be composed of Mr, lex Legge, chairman ; Mr. James Inglis, executive secretary ; Mr. Edwin B. arker, priorities; Mr. George N. Peek, finished products; Mr. J. Leonard eplogle, iron, steel, and steel products ; Mr. L. L. Summers, chemicals and ex- ^osives ; Mr. Pope Yeatman, nonferrous metals ; Mr. J. A. Carr, representing aiied Purchasing Commission ; one or more representatives of the War De- iirtment; one or more representatives of the Navy Department; a representa- ve of the Marine Corps; one or more representatives of the United States lipping Board, Emergency Fleet Corporation; and a representative of the ailroad Administration. The chairman of the War Industries Board shall from time to time agree lith the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the chairman of e Shipping Board, respectively, as to the number of representatives from eir respective departments, and when the number shall have been determined ch representatives shall be selected by the Secretary of War, the Secretary the Navy, and the chairman of the Shipping Board, respectively. The Fuel Administrator, the Food Administrator, and the American Red Cross all each de.signate a representative who shall attend meetings of the require- ents division whenever they are prepared to present plans or projects under nsideration, the consummation of which will require materials, supplies, cilities, electrical power, fuel, or transportation affecting the industries of the lited States. iSec. 9. Meetings. — Meetings of the members of this division shall be held in e office of its chairman at 9 a. m. each day, at which all advices of requlre- nts received since the preceding meeting and all other matters affecting luirements in which the members of the division as a whole shall be Inter- ted will be considered, after which the statements of requirements shall be ?regated as far as need be and referred by the executive secretary to tic propriate commodity section. 324 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. Appendix VIII. LIST OF THE WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD PRICE BULLETINS, NOS. 1 TO 57. 1. Summary. 2. International price comparisons. 3. Government control over prices. 4. Prices of foods. 5. Prices of clothing. 6. Prices of building materials. 7. Prices of chemicals. FOOD. 8. Prices of feed and forage. 9. Prices of Avheat and wheat prod- ucts. 10. Prices of corn and corn products. 11. Prices of oats, rice, buckwheat, and their products. 12. Prices of barley, hops, rye, and their products. 13. Prices of sugar and related prod- ucts. 14. Prices of vegetables and truck. 15. Prices of edible vegetable oils. 16. Prices of fi'uits, nuts, and wine. 17. Prices of spices and condiments. IS. Prices of tea, coffee, and cocoa. 19. Prices of tobacco and tobacco prod- ucts. 20. Prices of live stock, meats, and fats. 21. Prices of poultry and dairy prod- ucts. 22. Prices of fish and oysters. CLOTHING, 23. Prices of cotton and cotton prod- ucts. 24. Prices of wool and wool products. 25. Prices of silk and silk products. 26. Prices of hides and skins and their products. 27. Prices of hatters' fur and fur felt hats. 28. Prices of hair, bristles, and feath- ers. 29. Prices of buttons. JUBBER, PAPER, FIBER. SO. Prices of rubber and rubber pi'od- ncts. RUBBER, PAPER. FIBER COntilUied. i 31. Prices of paper. | 32. Prices of fibers and fiber product| i METALS. I 38. Prices of iron, steel, and thej products. 1 34. Prices of ferroalloys, nonferroij and rare metals. i FUEL. j I 35. Prices of coal and coke. | 36. Prices of petroleum and its pro; ucts. i 37. Prices of matches. | i BUILDING MATERIALS. .38. Prices of clay products. 39. Prices of sand and gravel. 40. Prices of quarry products. 41. Prices of cement. 42. Prices of glass. 43. Prices of lumber. 44. Prices of paints and varnishes. CHEMICALS. 45. Prices of mineral acids. 46. Prices of heavy cheiuicals. 47. Prices of miscellaneous inorgai : chemicals. 48. Prices of fertilizers. 49. Prices of soaps and glycerin. 50. Prices of essential oils, flavor! ; and perfumery materials. 51. Prices of wood-distillation pr<- ucts and naval stores. 52. Prices of natural dyestufEs a tanning chemicals. 53. Prices of coal-tar crudes, interiTj diates, and dyes. 54. Prices of drugs and pharmacei? cals. 55. Prices of proprietary preparatio 56. Prices of explosives. 57. Prices of miscellaneous orga^ chemicals. L AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 325 The above bulletins may be obtained at a nominal cost I'mm tlic -himihi- \S tendent of documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. Appendix IX. (1) PRIORITIES CIRCULAR NO. 1. DIRECTIONS AS TO PRIOHTTV. (Septpmber 21, 1917.) During the war in which the United States is now engaged, all individuals, Ifjr, iflrms, associations, and corporations engaged in the production of Iron and steel and in the manufacture of products thereof are requested to observe the following regulations respecting priority, viz : CLASSES PRESCRIBED. i|i» I 1. All orders and work shall be divided into three general classes, Class A, Class B, and Class C, with various subdivisions of Classes A and B, indicated by a suffix number, thus: Class Al, A2, A3, A4, etc., and Class Bl, B2, B3, B4, etc. PRECEDENCE OF CLASSES. 2. Orders and work in Class A shall take precedence of orders and work in both Class B and Class C, and orders and work in Class B shall take precedence of orders and work in Class C, irrespective of the date the orders were received ; and orders and work in Class Al shall take precedence of orders and work In Class A2, etc., and Class Bl shall take pecedence of Class B2, etc. CLASS A DEFINED. 3. Class A comprises war work; that is to say, orders and work urgently necessary in carrying on the war, such as arms, ammunition, .ships, etc., and the materials required in the manufacture of same. CLASS B DEFINED. 4. Class B comprises orders and work which, while not primarily designe,'her ehissl- licatioTi than the automatic classification prescribed herein, then in such event an application for such hicher classification settins forth the reasons therefor may be filed and same will be considered by and promptly acted upon by tlje : liorities committee. No such application should he made, however, save in rases where the automatic rating will not secure delivery on or near the date required, and such application must disclose facts evidencing that the public interest requires an earlier delivery of the order than can be secured under the existing automatic rating. The application must be made on the regular niiorities committee application Form P C 15. 11. Class D orders. — All orders sa^e such as are automatically classed under the provisions of sections 7. S. and fl hereof shall l)e automatically classed as Class D unless covered by certificates or other written directions issued in ac- cordance with the rules and regulations embodied in this circular or amend- ments thereto. PRECEDENCE OF CLASSES. 12. Rules of precedence. — Orders and work in Class AA shall take precedence of orders and work in aU other classes : those in Class A shall take precedence of those in Classes B, C, and D; those in Class B shall take precedence of those in Classes C and D; those in Class C shall take precedence of those in Class D; all irrespective of the dates the orders were placed. Orders and woi-k in Class AA-1 shall take precedence of orders and work in Class AA-2 and all lower classes; those in Class A-1 shall take precedence of those in Class A-2 and all lower classes ; those in Class B-1 shall take prece- dence of those in Class B-2 ; etc., etc. Where work is in progress on several classified orders the rules of iirecedence set forth in sections 13 and 14 hereof will be observed. 13. Orders in different classes. — The classification of an order simply means that it shall be given such precedence over orders of a lower classification as may be necessary (and only such as may be necessary) to insure delivery on the date specified in the order. It does not mean that work should cease on orders of a lower classification or that the order should be completed and ilelivery made in advance of orders taking a lower classification if this is not necessary to effect delivery within the time specified. The one to whom a priority certificate is directed or with whom an order taking an automatic ■lassificatlon is placed should make his own production plans, s(» as to get the maximum of efliciency out of his operations, making all deliveries at the times < ontracte<^l for, if possible, and where this is not possible, giving prei-etlence to the orders taking the highest classification. 14. Orders in same class. — As between orders in the same subdivision of a 'lass fas A-1), save where otherwi.se specifically requested by the committee, 'lie date of delivery contracted for will control unless this will operate to delay the delivery required by an earlier order of the same class, in which event the 'iirlicr order will have precedence in delivery. For example: Two orders. Order X and Order Y, are both cover(>d by A-1 certificates. Order X is dated <^)ctober 1, 1918, and calls for delivery February 1, 1019. Order Y is dated November 1, 1918, but calls for delivery .January 1, 1919. As between these two orders preference will ordinarily lie given to Order Y, because It calls for an earlier delivery date. If, however, such delivery will delay the comph'tl(»n of Order X, then preference shoifid be given Order X. becan<" H i< ilu- earlier 334 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR, order. If possible, both orders will be completed on the delivery dates called for. The dates of the certificates are not controlling. 15. Doubtful cases. — In case of doubt as to which certificate or order should have precedence, the matter should be laid before the committee by correspond- ence or in conference, so that the committee may give specific instructions. APPLICATIONS. 16. Form of application.— Applications for priority certificates must be made on the form of application prescribed by this committee. (See form set out at pages 14 and 15 of this circular.) 17. Who may apply. — As a general rule, where an application is necessary it should be made by the one intending to use the materials, equipment, and supplies. 18. United States Government. — If the order has been placed by some pur- chasing officer of the United States Army, Navy, Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, or any other branch or department of the Government, the application should be made by and in the name of the department or official for whose account the order has been placed. 19. Allied Governments. — If the order has been placed for export to the terri- tory of an allierokers, or middlemen. When an order is placed through a third person, his lame should appear in paragraph 4 of Application Form PC 15 (see pp. 14 and .5 of this order). 24. Premature deliveries. — In placing orders care should be exercised in de- ermining the date that delivery will actually be required. The contractor ihould not ask to have delivery made before he will be prepared to use the irticles. A rigid adherence to this rule will greatly facilitate timely deliveries •f urgent orders and prevent needless interference. The application must state he date of delivery promised by the producer. PRIORITY CEETiriCATES. 25. Form and effect of certificates. — When the committee shall approve an ipplication and give it a rating, it will issue a priority certificate in the form :et forth on page 16 of this circular. The one to whom the certificate shall be lirected will, in fulfilling the contract or order mentioned in the certificate, give it sucli precedence or priority as it may be entitled to under the classification pecified in the certificate and the rules of this circular. 26. Priority classifications supersede other instructions. — Priority classlfica- ions, whether evidenced by certificates or automatic ratings as prescribed in ections 7, 8, and 9 hereof, shall supersede any and all previous instructions, by whomsoever issued, with respect to priority in production and delivery of the infract or order covered thereby, except commandeering orders and special iriority directions issued in pursuance of section 28 hereof. 27. Execution of certificates. — Certificates or other documents signed by order f the priorities committee (printed) and countersigned in person by any person whose name appears thereon as one of the persons authorized to countersign hall be deemed to have been authorized by said committee, the priorities com- Qissioner, and the War Industries Board. 28. Special priority directions.— ThQ.t unusual emergencies may be promptly Det and cases of great urgency provided for, the priorities committee may, by in order in the form of a letter, a special certificate, or otherwise, signed per- :onally by the priorities commissioner, direct that a particular contract or rder shall have priority over other contracts or orders covered by existing ertificates or automatic ratings, or may in the same manner reclassify or egrade existing contracts or orders covered by outstanding certificates or auto- oatic ratings. 29. Delivery of certificates. — Unless requested to the contrary, the priorities lommittee will forward direct to the applicant the original and one copy of the «rtificate, if issued, that the applicant may send the original to the one to whom it is directed, retaining the copy for his files. If the applicant desires, ind so expressly .states, the certificates, if issued, will be forwarded to the one whom directed. Should the committee decline to approve the application, )rompt notification of such action will be sent direct to the applicant. SCOPE OF WORK. 80. The committee undertakes where nece.ssary to administer priority In the •reduction of all raw materials and finished products save foods, feeds, and nels. 336 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 31. Fuel. — The production, supply, and distribution of fuel is under the supe) vision of the United States Fuel Administrator, who, in the distribution of fu( to industries and plants, is guided by the preference list, in so far as it classifie such industries and plants according to their relative importance. The prefei ence list is compiled and promulgated by the priorities board, of which th priorities commissioner is chairman and H. G. Phillipps is secretary. While th priorities committee does not administer priority in the production of fue should those engaged on orders covered by priority certificates, automati classifications, or special priority directions experience difficulty in securin a fuel supply to the extent of interfering with the production covered by sue priority, they may apply for a place on the preference list on applicatio: form PL-1, which will be furnished to them by H. G. Phillipps, secretary, o request. Such applications will be investigated and appropriate recommends; tions will be made to I lie Fuel Administrator, to the end that all orders t which this committee has accorded priority in production may not be unneces sarily delayed for lack of fuel. The committee will also consider applications by fuel producers for priorlt: assistance to procure materials, tools, equipment, or supplies required for th' production of fuel. 32. Foods and feeds excluded. — The committee does not distribute foods o; feeds, over the production, supply, and distribution of which tlie United State? Food Administrator has supervision. Requests for assistance in purchasinj foods and feeds or in expediting deliveries thereof should be addressed to tht United States Food Administrator, Washington, D. C. The committee, however, will consider applications from producers of food; and feeds for priority assistance to procure materials, tools, equipment, o: supplies required for their production. 33. Transportation. — This committee does not administer priority in trans portation. The United States Railroad Administration in furnishing transpor tation service is guided by the preference list mentioned in section 31 hereof defining the relative importance of industries and plants. Should those en gaged on orders covered by priority certificates, automatic classifications, oi special priority directions experience difficulty in arranging for the transpor tation of materials, equipment, or supplies to the extent of interfering with th< production of said orders, representations to this effect addressed to the j\Ian ager of Inland Traffic, War Industries Board, Washington, D. C, setting fortl such facts in detail, duly verified by affidavit, will be carefully considered anc in proper cases certified to the United States Railroad Administration to th( end that all orders to which this committee has accorded priority in productior may not be unnecessarily delayed for lack of transportation. Special applica tion forms for this purpose may be secured from the manager of inland traffic War Industries Board. This committee will also consider applications of transportation companies for priority assistance to procure materials, equipment, or supplies reqnirec in their operations. 34. Export and import licenses excluded. — The committee does not issut export or import licenses. All applications for such licenses should be ad dressed to the War Trade Board, Washington, D. C. 35. Prices and purchases excluded. — The committee does not fix or assist ir fixing prices. Neither does it make or assist in making purchases. 36. Regrading of schedidcs. — When it appears that a large per cent of th( capacity of any plant is covered by certificates or automatic ratings of th( same subdivision of a class, the priorities committee will, when it appears de T prio' 'd for tl on to irodiictii 1 applia nd traffi :ooipaK reqiiit oot i^^ Id tie! AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 337 ^% jirable so to do, arrange, through conference between It, the authorized rep- "''^^ 'esentatives of such plant, and those phicing the orders covered by such cer- m\i jflcates or automatic ratings, for the reclassification thereof or the rearrange- nent and regrading of the schedules within each subdivision of a class, so as ;o Insure the most urgent orders having precedence without unnecessarily In- ''N :erfering with the efficient management and operation of such plant. autoniaf instances whebe applications should not be made. settirii Ibysiil 37. Orders not icithin class AA, class A, or class B. — No application should pplifjti, ^ made for priority in any case which does not fall within Class AA, Class A, letary, j }^ Class B, as defined in sections 2, 3, and 4 hereof. 88. Before order is placed. — Applications should not, save In very exceptional orders Instances, be made for priority assistance unless an order is actually placed for jBjp(^ he materials, commodities, or work. 89. Where no shortage exists. — Save in very exceptional cases priority as- Istance is only required where the demand exceeds the supply. 40. Where no delay is expected. — Although there may be a general shortage n a given product, the particular producer or manufacturer with whom the fjd^jj )rder is placed may be prepared to make delivery on sclieduled time. Inquiry pjjjjd ihould first be made of him to ascertain if there will be a delay. In all cases „|.{,]jjji, he application should state when delivery is needed and when delivery ;edtotf«>mlsed. THE TEST. jjjpu, I 41. The paramount purpose of priorities is the selective mobilization of the ffoducts of the soil, the mines, and the factories for direct and Indirect war jjijju leeds in such a way as will most effectually contribute toward winning the . rar. In requesting priority the petitioner should join with the committee in Urn applying the test: To what extent, if at all, will the granting of this appllca- lon contribute, directly or indirectly, toward winning the war; and if at all, low urgent Is the need? Conclusion. — The sole object of this division is to render a very real service o the Government and to the Nation, within the scope of its activities, and to I '^j. hat end invites and confidently hopes to receive the wholehearted cooperation if every department of the Government and of all others with whom It has o deal. Careful and painstaking consideration will be given all application? 'or priority, and decisions will be promptly rendered thereon. Edwin B. Parker, Priorities Commissioner. Washington, D. C, July 1, 1918. Approved : Bernard M. Babuch, Chairman War Industries Board. Ne\vton D. Bakeb, Secretary of War. JosEPHUS Daniels, Secretary of the Navy. U. S. Shipping Board, By Edward N. Hurley, Chairman. U. S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, By Edward N. Hurley, President. 105826—21 22 338 AMERICAX INDUSTRY I:N' THE WAR. [P. C. Form No. 15.] Routing: To Date APPLICATION FOB PBIOP.ITY CEETIFICATE. [Read Circular No. 4 and instructions before filling in application.] Use typewriter. "Applicant " must be the concern which is to use the material or equipmer A separate application blank must be filled in for each case presented ; sever orders on one concern may be covered in one application. Applications made by the Government need not be attested. To the Peiobities Committee, Washington, D. C. 1918. The undersigned hereby requests issuance of a priority certificate for tl reasons stated below : 1. Insert here name and address of concern which is to produce the materi; or equipment or perform the work described in paragraph 5. Name Address 2. Insert here name and address of applicant. Name Address 3. State here number and date of order placed with concern named in par; graph 1. Number of order Date of order Da delivery needed Date delivery promised 4. If order was placed through an agent, insert here his name and addres Name Address 5. State here only the quantity and description of material or equipment f( which priority is being asked. If material is metal, give tonnage. 6. Enter here only the priority number (s) and rating (s), if any, for whic the material described under paragraph 5 is required. 7. If materials or equipment mentioned in paragraph 5 are for use in fiUic a Government order given directly to applicant, insert here name of Governmei department, number, date of order, quantity, and full particulars of such orde and dates of delivery required. 8. If materials or equipment mentioned in paragraph 5 are being applied fc by a subcontractor, such subcontractor will state the name of original contractc and give an exact description of what he (subcontractor) is to furnish, wit quantities and deliveries required. 9. If materials or equipment be required for purposes other than mentioned 1 paragraphs 7 and 8, state fully the purpose for which they are to be usee 10. State whether or not applicant has in stock any of the materials (an how much ) which may be used, in whole or in part, in the filling of such order 11. How much of the material (s) mentioned in paragraph 5 has (have) bee shipped? 12. Has person named in paragraph 2 the plant and equipment now availabl to execute all orders on which he is now engaged? 13. What per cent of applicant's plant output is now devoted to war needa 14. Any additional information the applicant may wish to present. Each question bearing on this application must be fully answered upon th form itself, and not by letter. Do not send letters of transmittal. The undersigned, being first duly sworn, on oath says that the statement contained in the foregoing application are full, true, and correct ; that the quan tities are accurately stated, and that all articles, material, and work describe in paragraph 5 hereof are intended for use in and necessary for the completio) of the order (s) concerning which this application is made. (To be signed by applicant) By (Name of oflScer legally empowered to act for applicant.) Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of , 1916 (Notary Public.) in and for AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR, 339 [Form P. C. 16.] [Address communications Priorities Committee, Washington, D. C] y[Bdwln B. Parker, priorities commislsonor. Committee : Charles K. Foster (vice chalr- ) man), Maj. Gen. J. B. Aleshire, George Armsby, H. n. Barbour, Lieut. Col. C. A. 1 McKenney, F. H. Macpherson, Rear Admiral N. E. Mason, Everett Moras, Lucius P. Ordway, T. C. Powell, Rear Admiral A. V. Zane, Maurice Hirsch (secretary).] War Industries Board, l;seTei| Priorities Dfv'ision, Washington. priority certificate no. p. To of. %n application No. by for : jijy This is to certify that Order No. , dated , 191__, placed ^th you by , and covering: which applicant aslvS delivery (as per contract) iipj, s hereby given priority as Class A , and the execution of this order ill take precedence over all your orders and work of a lower classification to le extent necessary to insure delivery according to the date specified next **»'bove, as prescribed by Circular No. 4, issued by this committee, dated July 1, This certificate will not be valid unless countersigned — 3r ivliH^y w. J. Ormsby, C. S. Abell, L. Pierpont, or Geo. R. Dickson. Executed at "Washington, D. C, on this the day of , A. D. 19—. By order of — PRIORITIES COMMITTEE. Jountersigned : Notes. — 1. Unless otherwise requested, the original and a duplicate of this ertiflcate will be forwarded to applicant, who should reforward the original to person on whom the certificate is issued, retaining the duplicate. The lerson on whom the certificate is issued will have no notice of its issuance until ceived by him. 2. Prompt report must be made to this committee by the person on whom the ertiflcate is issued when the order covered hereby has been completed, and in aaking such report the number of this certificate must be given. 3. This certificate is not assignable. The materials secured hereunder mu.st ! used for the purpose stated in the application unless otherwise directed by jm he priorities committee. itenif .escri apleS ipoa: Appendix XI. (1) GENERAL CLASSIFICATION OF PURPOSES DEMANDING PREFERENCE TREATMENT. For the guidance of all governmental agencies in the production, supply, and Istribution of raw materials, finished products, electrical energy, fuel, and ransportation by rail, water, pipe lines, and otherwise, the priorities board as adopted the following general classification of purposes demanding prefer- Qce treatment : Ships. — Including destroyers and submarine chasers. Including all necessary iw materials, partially manufactured parts, and .supplies for completion of -"" roducts. 340 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. Aircraft. — Munitions, military and naval supplies' and operations. — Buildii construction for Government needs. Equipment for same. Including all nece sary raw materials, partially manufactured parts, and supplies for completU of products. Fuel. — Domestic consumption. Manufacturing necessities named herein, i| eluding all necessary raw materials, partially manufactured parts, and sui plies for completion of products. Food and collateral industries. — Foodstuffs for human consumption and plani handling same. Feeding stuffs for domestic fowls and animals, and plan handling same. All tools, utensils, implements, machinery, and equipme) required for production, harvesting, and distribution, milling, preparing, cai ning, and refining foods and feeds such as seeds of foods and feeds, bind( twine, etc. Products of collateral industries, such as fertilizers, fertilizer i; gredients, insecticides, and fungicides. Containers for foods and feeds, cc lateral products. Materials and equipment for preservation of foods and fee(| such as ammonia and other refrigeration supplies, including ice. Including necessary raw materials, partially manufactured parts, and supplies for co pletion of products. Clothing. — For civilian population. Including all necessary raw materij partially manufactured parts and supplies for completion of products. Railroads. — Or other necessary transportation equipment, including wat transportation. Including all necessary raw materials, partially manufacture parts and supplies for completion of products. Public utilities. — Serving war industries. Army, Navy, and civilian populi tion. Including all necessary raw materials, partially manufactured pari and supplies for completion of products. Edwin B. Parker, Chairman, Priorities Boards Washington, D. C, March 27, 1918. (2) PREFERENCE LIST NO. 1. In pursuance of a resolution unanimously adopted by the priorities boar* at a meeting held April 6, 1918, the following preference list of classes of induii tries, whose operation as a war measure is of exceptional importance, is pri mulgated and published for the guidance of all agencies of the United Statt Government in the supply and distribution of coal and coke, and in the suppl of transportation by rail and water for the movement of coal and coke to sal industries. The priorities commissioner shall, under the direction of and with the ai proval of the priorities board, certify additional classes of industries, and als certify individual plants whose operation as a war measure is of exceptions importance, which industries and plants when so certified shall be automat cally included in this preference list, which shall be amended or revised froi time to time by action of the priorities board to meet changing conditions. No distinction is made between any of the industries or plants which are o may be included in this preference list, and no significance should attach t the order in which the industries or plants appear in the list. Aircraft. — Plants engaged exclusively in manufacturing aircraft or supplie and equipment therefor. Amnwnition. — Plants engaged in the manufacture of ammunition for th United States Government and the Allies. Army and Navy cantonments and camps. AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 341 Biiil(ij| Arms (^mall). — Plants engaged in niamilaeturhig small amis for the United al!ii«»Lstates Government and the Allies. Chemicals. — Plants engaged exclusively in manufacturing chemicals. Voke plants. *!,■ Domestic consumers of fuel. 8f«i ^ Electric equipment. — Plants manufacturing same. Electrodes. — Plants producing electrodes. Explosives. — Plants manufacturing explosives. Earm implements. — Manufacturers exclusively of agricultural implements ml farm-operating equipment. Eeed. — Plants producing feed. Eerro-alloys. — Plants producing. .. Eertilizers. — Manufacturers of fertilizers. Fire brick. — Plants producing exclusively. ffldfeeft Food. — Plants manufacturing, milling, preparing, refining, preserving, and iDdinfilwholesaling food for human consumption. forcil Food containers. — Manufacturers of tin and glass containers and manufac- Itnrers exclusively of other food containers. Gas.— Gas-producing plants. Gas. — Plants manufacturing exclusively gas-producing machinery. Guns (large). — Plants manufacturing same. iifactuii Bemp, jute, and cotton bags. — Plants manufacturing exclusively hemp, jute, id cotton bags. pdplU Insecticides. — Manufacturers exclusively of insecticides and fungicides. Iron and s^eeZ.— Blast furnaces and foundries. Laundries. Machine tools. — Plants manufacturing machine tools. Mines. Mines. — Plants engaged exclusively in manufacturing mining tools and equip- ment. Neicspapers and periodicals. — Plants printing and publishing exclusively newspapers and periodicals. Oil. — Refineries of both mineral and vegetable oils. Oil production. — Plants manufacturing exclusively oil-well equipment. Public institutions and buildings. Public utilities. Railways. Raihcays. — Plants manufacturing locomotives, freight cars, and rails, and keto^fother plants engaged exclusively in manufacture of railway supplies. Refrigeration. — Refrigeration for food and exclusively ice-producing plants. Seeds. — Producers or wholesalers of seeds (except flower seeds). Ships {bunker coal). — Not including pleasure craft, jceptiofl S7itps.— Plants engaged exclusively in building ships (not Including pleasure automflcraft) or in manufacturing exclusively supplies and equipment therefor. Soap. — Manufacturers of soap. Steel. — Steel plants and rolling mills. Tanners. — Tanning plants, save for patent leather. Tanning extracts.— Vhmis manufacturing tanning extract.s. Tin plate. — Manufacturers of tin plate. Twine [binder) and /-ope— Plants producing exclusively binder twine and rope. Wire rope and rope wire. — Manufacturers of same. Edwin B. Pakkkr. Chairman, Priorities Board. Washington, D. C, April 6, 1918. les ;ofi»i :e, is ted m ttliei „andi 342 AMERICAN INDUSTEY IN THE WAR. Appendix XII. PRIORITIES CIRCULAR NO. 20.— PREFERENCE LIST NO. 2. rOBEWOED. The President has placed upon the chairman of the War Industries Board th( responsibility for determining and administering all priorities in production anc delivery. The determination of the relative importance of all industries ancr plants for both production and delivery by a single agency renders it possible 1 to reasonably maintain a well-balanced program -with respect to the several factors entering into production, which include (o) plant facilities, (b) fue supply or electric energy, or both, (c) supply of raw materials and finished products, {d) labor, and (e) transportation by rail, water, pipe lines, oi otherwise. Without all of these, speaking generally, production is impossible. In compliance with the directions of the President that plans be formulated whereby there may be " common, consistent, and concerted action " in carrying Into effect all priority policies and decisions, the chairman of the War Industries Board has created a Priorities Board, with the priorities commissioner of the War Industries Board as chairman, consisting of (1) the chairman of the War Industries Board, (2) the priorities commissioner, (3) a member of the Rail- road Administration, (4) a member of the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, (5) a member of the War Trade Board, (6) a member of the Food Administration, (7) a member of the Fuel Administra- tion, (8) a representative of the War Department, (9) a representative of the Navy Department, (10) a member of the Allied Purchasing Commission, and (11) the chairman of the War Labor Policies Board. The decisions of the Priorities Board are subject to review only by the chairman of the War Industries Board and by the President. For the guidance of all governmental agencies and all others interested in (1) the production and supply of fuel and electric energy, (2) in the supply of labor, and (3) in the supply of transportation service by rail, water, pipe lines, or otherwise, in so far as such service contributes to pi'oduction of finished products, the accompanying designated Preference List No. 2 has been adopted by the Priorities Board superseding Preference List No. 1, adopted April 6, 1918, and all amendments and supplements thereto. Where advisable, industries, as such, have been classified and listed. In numerous instances individual plants have been found to be entitled to prefer- ence, although the industries to which they belong are not; and in other in- stances where an Industry, as such, has been accorded a degree of preference, particular plants in such industry have been placed in a higher class. This has necessitated classifying and listing not only industries as such but to a limited extent individual plants, some of which are not embraced within any listed industry, while others are accorded a higher rating than that accorded the listed industry to which they belong. The preference list is made up of industries and plants which in the public interest are deemed entitled to preferential treatment. The inclusion of these industries and plants on this list does not operate as an embargo against all others, but the effect is to defer the requirements of all other industries and plants until the requirements of those on the preference list shall have been satisfied. In the compilation of this list, industries and plants have been divided ac- cording to their relative importance into four classes, viz : Class I, Class II, Class III, and Class IV. In determining such relative importance consideration jerat! AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 343 and weight have been given not solely to any one but to all of the following factors: (1) The intrinsic importance of the product itself for use during the war, and the urgency, as measured by time, of the demand or of the use to .vhich it is to be put; (2) the necessity for maintaining or stimulating and ncreasing the total quantity of production, which in turn depends largely upon iie relation of the supply to the demand for essential uses; (3) the proportion )f the capacity of the industry or plant which is devoted to the production of he essential product. Where it is imperative not only to maintain but to stimulate and increase production to satisfy abnormal demands ci'eated by war requirements, a high seven .ating is necessary, even though the Intrinsic importance of the product may be ([,) fii ess than that of other products placed in a lower classification due to the fact fioislij hat the supply of such other products equals the demand without the stimulus )f high priority. Where it is necessary to speed the production of a particular jroduct required at a particular time to carry into effect an important program, Diiilati I high priority is given, although changing conditions may thereafter suggest md demand a reclassification. Certain plants produce commodities of great •elative importance, but at the same time produce other commodities of less •elative importance, and under such circumstances consideration and weight is fiven to the ratio of production between the more important and less important ;ommodities. Instances occasionally arise where Individual plants are given preference so long as they are rendering, and so long as it is in the public ijj Ij nterest that they should render, a particular service, even though, taking the jjj|j(, lountry as a whole, the supply of their product is ample to meet all demands. No distinction has been made between any of the industries or plants within ny one class, and no significance attaches to the order in which industries nd plants are listed within any class. The industries and plants grouped under Class I are only such as are of xceptional importance in connection with the prosecution of the war. Their equirements must be fully satisfied in preference to those of the three remain- ng classes. Ilequirements of industries and plants grouped under Class II, Class III, and jlass IV shall have precedence over those not appearing on the preference list. lis between these three classes, however, there shall be no complete or absolute )reference. The division into classes is for the purpose of presenting a com- )0site picture of the relative importance of the industries and plants em- iraced within each group. It is not Intended that the requirements of Class I shall be fully satisfied before supplying any of the requirements of lass III, or that those of Class III shall be fully satisfied before supply- ng any of those of Class IV. The classification does, however, indicate that he industries and plants grouped in Class II are relatively more Important than hose in Class III, and that those In Class III are relatively more important than hose in Class IV. It will often happen that after satisfying the requirements >f Class I the remaining available supply will be less than the aggregate re- lairements of the other three classes, in which event such supply will be ra- ioned to the industries and plants embraced within those classes. In deternii ti- ng a basis for such rationing, the relative Importance of each industrj' :ind )lant, according to its class rating, must be considered. It has been found Im- >racticable to prescribe for rati< aing purposes any general and uniform rule )r formula, but the priorities board will, from time to time, after conference and n cooperation with each of the several governmental agencies charged with the distribution thereof, determine particular principles, values, and methods of P pplication which may be followed in allocating fuel, power, transportation, and bor, respectively, to the end that proper recognition and weight may, as far as 344 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. practicable in each ease, be given to the relative importance of Class II, Clasi III, and Class lY. Each pla- '- listed as such shall not later than the 15th of each month file witB the secreta y of the priorities board, Washington, D. C, a report on P. L. Forn No. 3 (a supply of which will be furnished on application) covering its activitiei^ during the preceding month. Any plant failing to file such report will be droppec from the preference list. Priorities in the supply and distribution of raw materials, simifinishec products, and finished products shall be governed by Circular No. 4 issued by th( priorities division of the War Industres Board under date of July 1, 1918, and all amendments and supplements thereto or substitutes therefor. The term " principally " as used in listing industries shall be construed t« mean plants whose output is not less than 75 per cent of the products mentioned This preference list shall be amended or revised from time to time by aetiOD of the priorities board to meet changing conditions. The priorities commissionei shall, under the direction of and with the approval of tne priorities board, cer- tify additional classes of industries and also certify additional plants whos? operations as a war measiu-e entitle them to preference treatment, which indua* tries and plants when so certified shall be automatically included in the prefers ence list. Edwin B. Parker, Priorities Commissioner. Approved : Bernard M. Baruch, Chairman War Industries Board. Washington, D. C, September S, 1918. IXDUSTRIES. Listed alphabetically. [The term " principally" means 75 per cent of the products mentioned.] Agricultural implements. — See Farm implements. Class. Aircraft. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing aircraft or air- craft supplies and equipment T Ammunition. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same for the ' United States Government and the Allies I Army and Navy. — Arsenals and navy yards I Army and Navy. — Cantonments and camps I Arms (small). — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same for the United States Government and the Allies I Bags. — Hemp, jute, and cotton. — Plants engaged principally in manufac- turing same IV' Blast furnaces. — Producing pig iron I Boots and shoes. — Plants engaged exclusively in manufacturing same IV Brass and copper. — Plants engaged principally in rolling and drawing copper, brass and other copper alloys in the form of sheets, rods, wire, and tubes II Buildings. — See Public institutions and buildings. Chain. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing iron and steel chain III Chemicals. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing chemicals for the production of military and naval explosives, ammunition and air- craft, and use in chemical warfare I AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 345 Class. Chemicals. — Phints, not otherwise classified and listed, enjjagcd princi- pally in manufacturing chemicals IV Coke. — Plants engaged principally in producing metallurgical coke and by-products, including toluol I Coke. — Plants, not otherwise classified and listed, producing same II Copper and brass. — See Brass and copper. Cotton. — Plants engaged in the compression of cotton IV Cotton textiles. — See Textiles. Cranes. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing locomotive cranes_ II Cranes. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing traveling cranes__ III Domestic consumers. — Fuel and electric energy for residential consump- tion, including homes, apartment houses, residential flats, restaurants, and hotels I Domestic consumers. — Fuel and electric energy not otherwise specifically listed III Drugs. — Medicines and medical and surgical supplies. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same IV Electrical equipment. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same III Explosives.— Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same for mili- tary and naval purposes for the United States Goverimient and the Allies I Explosives. — Plants, not otherwise classified or listed, engaged principally in manufacturing same III Farm implement.s.— Plants engaged principally in manufacturing agricul- tural implements and farm operating equipment IV Feed. — Plants engaged principally in preparing or manufacturing feed for live stock and poultry I Ferroalloys,— Plants engaged principally in producing ferrochrome, fer- romanganese, ferromolybdenum, ferrosilicon, ferrotungsten, ferroura- uium, fei-rovanadium, and ferrozircouium II Fertilizers.— Plants engaged principally in producing same IV Fire brick.— Plants engaged principally in manufacturing .same IV Foods.— Plants engaged principally in producing, milling, refining, pre- serving, refrigerating, wholesaling, or storing food for human consump- tion embraced within the following description : All cereals and cereal products, meats including poultry, fish, vegetables, fruit, sugar, sirups, glucose, butter, eggs, cheese, milk and cream, lard, lard compounds, oleomargarine and other substitutes for butter or lard, vegetable oils, beans, salt, coffee, baking powder, soda and yeast; also ammonia for refrigeration I Foods.— Plants engaged principally in producing, milling, preparing, refin- ing, preserving, refrigerating, or storing food for human consumption not otherwise specifically listed (excepting herefrom plants producing confectionery, soft drinks, and chewing gum) III Food containers. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same IV Foundries (iron).— Plants engaged principally In the manufacture of grey iron and malleable iron castings IV Fungicides. — -Sec Insecticides and fungicides. Gas. — See Oil and gas; also Public utilities. Guns (large). — Plants engaged principally In manufacturing same for the United States Government and the Allies I Hospitals. — -See Public institutions and buildlng.s. 346 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. Class. Ice. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same III Insecticides and fungicides. — Plants engaged principally in manufactur- ing same IV Laundries IV Machine tools. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same II Medicines. — See Drugs and medicines. Mines. — Coal I Mines. — Producing metals and ferroalloy minerals II Mines. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing mining tools or equipment III Navy. — See Army and Navy. Navy Department. — See War and Navy Departments. Newspapers and periodicals. — Plants engaged principally in printing newspapers or periodicals which are entered at the post ofBce as second- class mail matter IV Oil and gas. — Plants engaged principally in producing oil or natural gas for fuel, or for mechanical purposes, including refining or manufactur- ing oil for fuel, or for mechanical purposes I Oil and gas. — Pipe lines and pumping stations engaged in transporting oil or natural gas . I Oil and gas. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing equipment or supplies for producing or transporting oil or natural gas, or for refining and manufacturing oil for fuel or for mechanical purposes III Paper and pulp. — See Pulp and paper. Periodicals. — See Newspapers and periodicals. Public institutions and buildings (maintenance and operation of). — Used as hospitals or sanitariums I Public institutions and buidlings (maintenance and operation of). — Other than hospitals and sanitariums III Public utilities. — Gas plants producing toluol I Public utilities. — Street railways, electric lighting and power companies, gas plants not otherwise classified, telephone and telegraph companies, water-supply companies, and like general utilities II Public utilities. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing equipment for railways or other public utilities II Pulp and paper. — Plants engaged exclusively in manufacturing same IV Railways. — Operated by United States Railroad Administration I Railways. — Not operated by United States Railroad Administration (ex- cluding those operated as plant facilities) II Railways (street). — See Public utilities. Rope. — See Twine and rope. Rope wire. — See Wire rope. Sanitariums. — See Public institutions and buildings. Ships (maintenance and operation of). — Excluding pleasure craft not common carriers I Ships.- — Plants engaged principally in building ships, excluding (a) pleasure craft not common carriers, (6) ships not built for the United States Government or the Allies nor under license from United States Shipping Board I Soap. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same lY Steel-making furnaces. — Plants engaged solely in manufacturing ingots and steel castings by the open-hearth, Bessemer, crucible, or electric- AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 347 Class, furnace process, including blooming mills, billet mills, and slabbing mills for same I Steel-plate mills I Steel-rail mills. — Rolling rails 50 or nioro pounds per yard II Steel. — All plants operating steel rolling and drawing mills exclusive of those taking higher classification III Surgical supplies. — See Drugs and medicines. Tanners. — Plants engaged principally in tanning leather IV Tanning. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing tanning extracts. IV Textiles. — Plants engaged principally in nuiuufacturing cotton textiles, including spinning, weaving, and finishing IV Textiles. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing woolen textiles, including spinners, top makers and weavers IV Textiles. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing cotton or woolen knit goods IV Textiles. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing textile ma- chinery IV Tin plates. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same III Tobacco. — Only for preserving, drying, curing, packing, and storing same — not for manufacturing and marketing IV Toluol. — See Coke, also Public utilities. Tools. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing small or hand tools for working wood or metal III Twine (binder) and rope. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same IV War and Navy Departments. — Construction work conducted by either the War Department or the Navy Department of the United States in embarkation ports, harbors, fortified places, flood-protection operations, docks, locks, channels, inland waterways, and in the maintenance and repair of same II Wire rope and rope wire. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same II Woolen textiles. — See Textiles. [Grouped by classes and listed alphabetically.] Aircraft. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing aircraft or aircraft supplies and equipment. Ammunition. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same for the United States Government and the Allies. Army and Navy. — Arsenals and navy yards. Army and Navy. — Cantonments and camps. Arms (small). — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same for the United States Government and the Allies. Blast furnaces. — Producing pig iron. Chemicals. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing chemicals for the pro- duction of military and naval explosives, amnmnition, and aircraft, and use In chemical warfare. Coke. — Plants engaged principally in producing metallurgical coke and by-prod- ucts, including toluol. 348 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. Domestic consumers. — Fuel and electric energy for residential consumption, including homes, apartment houses, residential flats, restaurants, and hotels. Explosives. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same for military and naval purposes for the United States Government and the Allies. Feed. — Plants engaged principally in preparing or manufacturing feed for live stock and poultry. Foods. — Plants engaged principally in producing, milling, refining, preserving, refrigerating, wholesaling, or storing food for human consumption embraced within the following description : All cereals and cereal products, meats in- cluding poultry, fish, vegetables, fruit, sugar, sirups, glucose, butter, eggs, cheese, milk and cream, lard, lard compounds, oleomargarine and other sub- stitutes for butter or lard, vegetable oils, beans, salt, coffee, baking powder, soda, and yeast; also ammonia for refrigeration. Gas. — See oil and gas, also Public utilities. Guns (large). — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same for the United States Government and the Allies. Hospitals. — See Public institutions and buildings. Mines. — Coal. Navy yards. — See Army and Navy. Oil and gas. — Plants engaged principally in producing oil or natural gas for fuel, or for mechanical purposes, including refining or manufacturing oil for fuel, or mechanical purposes. Oil and gas. — Pipe lines and pumping stations engaged in transporting oil or natural gas. Public institutions and buildings (maintenance and operation of). — Used as hospitals or sanitariums. Public utilities. — Gas plants producing toluol. Railways. — Operated by United States Railroad Administration. Sanitariums. — See Public institutions and buildings. Ships (maintenance and operation of). — Excluding pleasure craft not common carriers. Ships. — Plants engaged principally in building ships, excluding (o) pleasure craft not common carriers, (&) ships not built for the United States Govern- ment or the Allies nor under license from the United States Shipping Board. Steel-making furnaces. — Plants engaged solely in manufacturing ingots and steel castings by the open-hearth, Bessemer, crucible, or electric-furnace process, including blooming mills, billet mills, and slabbing mills for same. Steel-plate mills. Toluol.— See Coke, also Public utilities. CLASS n. Brass and copper. — Plants engaged principally in rolling and drawing coppei-, brass and other copper alloys in the form of sheets, rods, wire, and tubes. Coke. — Plants, not otherwise classified or listed, producing same. Copper and brass. — Sec Brass and copper. Cranes. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing locomotive cranes. FeiTo-alloys. — Plants engaged principally in producing ferrochrome, ferroman- ganese, ferromolybdenum, ferrosilicon, ferrotungsten, ferrouranium, ferro- vanadium, and ferrozirconium. Gas. — See Oil and gas. Machine tools. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same. Mines. — Producing metals and ferro-alloy minerals. Navy Department. — See War and Navy Departments. AMERICAN INDUSTRY IX TUE WAR. 349 Tublic utilities. — Street railways, electric lifrbtinc; niul power conipanl»>s, gas plants not otherwise classified, telephone and teleRrapb companies, water supply companies, and like general utilities. Public utilities. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing equipment for railways and other public utilities. Railways. — Not operated by United States Railroad Administration fexclnding those operated as plant facilities). Rope wire. — See Wire rope. Steel rail mills. — Rolling rails 50 or more pouuds per yard. War and Navy Departments. — Construction work condncted by either the War Department or the Navy Department of the United States in embarkation ports, harbors, fortified places, flood protection operations, docks, locks, channels, inland waterways, and in the maintenance and repair of same. Wire rope and rope wire. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same. Buildings. — See Public institutions and buildings. Chain. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing iron and steel chain. Cranes. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing traveling cranes. Domestic consumers. — Fuel and electric energy not otherwise specifically listed. Electrical equipment. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same. Explosives. — Plants, not otherwise classified or listed, engaged principally in manufacturing same. Foods. — Plants engaged principally in producing, milling, preparing, refining, preserving, refrigerating, or storing foods for human consumption not other- wise specifically listed (excepting herefrom plants producing confectionery, soft drinks, and chewing gum). Gas. — See Oil and gas. Ice. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same. Mines. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing mining tools or equipment. Oil and gas. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing equipment or sup- plies for producing or transporting oil or natural gas, or for refining and manufacturing oil for fuel or for mechanical purposes. Public institutions and buildings (maintenance and operation of). — Other than hospitals and sanitariums. Steel. — All plants operating steel rolling and drawing mills, exclusive of those taking higher classification. Tin plates.— Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same. Tools. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing small or hand tools for working wood or metal. Agricultural implements. — See Farm implements. Bags— Hemp, jute, cotton.— Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same. Boots and shoes. — Plants engaged exclusively in manufacturing same. Chemicals.— Plants, not otherwise classified or listed, engaged principally in manufacturing chemicals. Cotton.— Plants engaged in the compression of cotton. Cotton textiles.— See Textiles. Drugs — IMedicines and medical and .surgical supplies. — Plants engaged prin- cipally in manufacturing same. Farm implements.— Plants engaged principally in manufacturing agricultural implements and farm operating equipment. 350 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. Fertilizers. — Plants engaged principally in producing same. I Fire brick. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same. Food containers. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same. j Foundries (iron). — Plants engaged principally in the manufacture of gray Iror and malleable-iron castings. Insecticides and fungicides. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same. Laundries. Newspapers and periodicals. — Plants engaged principally in printing newspapers or periodicals which are entered at the post office as second-class mail matter. Paper and pulp. — See Pulp and paper. Periodicals. — See Newspapers and periodicals. Pulp and paper. — Plants engaged exclusively in manufacturing same. Rope. — See Twine and rope. Soap. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same. Surgical supplies. — See Drugs and medicines. Tanners. — Plants engaged principally in tanning leather. Tanning. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing tanning extracts. Textiles. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing cotton textiles, includ- ing spinning, weaving, and finishing. Textiles. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing woolen textiles, in- cluding spinners, top makers, and weavers. Textiles. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing cotton or woolen knit goods. Textiles. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing textile machinery. Tobacco. — Only for preserving, drying, curing, packing, and storing same — not manufacturing and mai'keting. Twine (binder) and rope. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same. Woolen textiles. — See Textiles. Appendix XIII. MINUTES OF MEETINGS OF INDUSTRIAL ADJUSTMENTS COM- MITTEE OF PRIORITIES BOARD. Early in June, 1918, the President appointed Messrs. Vance C. McCormick, Bernard M. Baruch, Herbert C. Hoover, and Harry A. Garfield to investigate industries and report which were nonessential, to the point that they should, in public interest, retire from business during the war. This committee in turn formed a committee with Mr. C. M. Woolley as chair- man and Messrs. Edwin B. Parker, T. F. Whitmarsh, Edward Chambers, P. B. Noyes, and Edwin F. Gay as members. This committee, after a careful investigation and consideration, made its re- port under date of June 22, 1918, as follows : " After careful study of the statistics gathered especially for the purpose, and upon mature consideration of the facts, your committee is unanimously of the opinion — " First, that no industry should be absolutely prohibited, and " vSecond, that a plan of general curtailment can and should be devised broad enough to remove the present conflict between the necessities of war and non- war industries in the matter of raw materials, fuel, transportation, and labor. " We do not recommend absolute prohibition, because, granting the possi- bility of selecting from all the products of industry those items which could be agreed upon as of relatively slight importance to the consuming public, the AMERICAX INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 351 benefits to be derived for the war pi-ORram by the total and sudden prohibition of the industries producing such commodities would be trifling to tlie economic loss during and after the war. " A searching analysis of all our industries Fevealed 25 which might fairly be classified as producers of nonwar commodities, and therefore worthy of con- sideration for complete prohibition. We found that (he aggregate capital employed by this particular group of industries was .1:733,000,000. The aggre- gate number of persons employed was 283,518. The aggregate fuel consump- tion per annum was 1,701,000 tons. " The conservation of fuel, the lessening of the burden placed upon the rail- roads of the country, and the releasing of labor and materials being the prin- cipal objects to be attained in setting up a complete prohibition against these Industries, it will be seen that the relief thus afforded would be negligible. For example, while the consumption of coal for power, as estimated by the Fuel Administration for the current calendar year will be r),")4.000,0(X» tons, the coal consumed by the nonwar industries above specified is but 1,701,000 tons. The saving in so far as fuel is concerned would, therefore, be only three-tenths of 1 per cent of the year's supply. The relief to the railroads would be some- what greater, but not of sufficient moment to constitute an appreciable alle- viation of their burdens. "The brewing industry, considered as a possible nonwar industry, is the subject of a separate communication. " Contrasting the degree of relief afforded with the hardships necessarily imposed upon a part of the community, your committee has reached the con- clusion that it would be inadvisable to adopt direct industrial prohibition to accomplish the desired end. It would not only result in inequalities and thus engender intense dissatisfaction on the part of those affected but it would also create grave apprehension throughout the entire industrial community. This might weaken the morale of the Nation and. in the final analysis, cause actual harm rather than positive benefit. " We also invite your attention to the fact that a sudden dislocation through complete prohibition of any industry involves the disintegration of entire or- ganizations, including the workers, foremen, superintendents, and managers. Such organizations in most cases are the cumulative result of many years of constructive effort, and it is obvious that with the ending of the war the pro- hibited industries would be obliged to go through the pioneer process of re- creation. This would, in the opinion of your conmiittee, augment the em- barrassment of post-war industrial readjustments. " It should also be noted that some of the industries affected center In a single town, where they are the only .source of Its support. We might cite in Illustration the case of jewelry, the production of which centers at North Attleboro, Mass. Total prohibition would Inflict a heavy blow upon that town ; trade would be ruined; the deposits in savings banks withdrawn, and a dis- astrous .state of affairs precipitated throughout the entire district. "While jewelry is perhaps one of the most obviously nonwar products, It nevertheless has an economic value to a moderate extent, to establish credits in tho.se countries where the normal currents of trade continue to show an adverse balance against the United States. The conscious utilization of this and various other so-called nonwar industries to assist in correcting adverse trade balances abroad obviously will offer benefits that should not be overlooked. " A plan for the curtailment of nonwar industries should be prepareoi)ulation is in no sense disloyal. Before the war labor was, of coursf, tiiU-d witli pacilic hoiics shared by nearly the entire country. But. like other portions of the citizenshii). labor has adjusted itself to the new facts revealed by the Piuropean war. Its suf- fering and its faith are the suffering and faith of the Nation. With the ex- ception of the sacrifices of the men in the armed .service the greatest sacrifices have come from those at the lower rung of the Industrial ladder. Wage in- creases respond last to the needs of this class of labor, and their meager returns are hardly adequate, in view of the increased cost of living, to maintain even their meager standard of life. It is upon them the war pressure has borne most severely. Labor at heart is as devoted to the purposes of the Government in the prosecution of this war as any other part of society. If labor's enthusiasm is less vocal, and its feelings here and there tepid, we will find the explana- tion in some of the conditions of the industrial environment in which labor 356 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. is placed and which in many instances is its nearest contact with the activities of the war. (a) Too often there is a glaring inconsistency between our democratic pur- poses in this war abroad and the autocratic conduct of some of those guiding industry at home. This inconsistency is emphasized by such episodes as the Bisbee deportations. (h) Personal bitterness and more intense industrial strife inevitably result when the claim of loyalty is falsely resorted to by employers and their sympa- thizers as a means of defeating sincere claims for social justice, even though such claims be asserted in time of war. (c) So long as profiteering is not comprehensively prevented to the full extent that governmental action can prevent it, just so long will a sense ot inequality disturb the fullest devotion of labor's contribution to the war. RECOMMENDATIONS. The causes of unrest suggest their own means of correction : 1. The elimination to the utmost practical extent of all profiteering during the period of the war is a prerequisite to the best morale in industry. 2. Modern large-scale industry has effectually destroyed the personal rela- tion between employer and employee — the knowledge and cooperation that come from personal contact. It is therefore no longer possible to conduct in- dustry by dealing with employees as individuals. Some form of collective relationship between management and men is indispensable. The recognition of this principle by the Government should form an accepted part of the labor policy of the Nation. 3. Law, in business as elsewhere, depends for its vitality upon steady en- forcement. Instead of waiting for adjustment after grievances come to the surface there is needed the establishment of continuous administrative ma- chinery for the orderly disposition of industrial issues and the avoidance of an atmosphere of contention and the waste of disturbances. 4. The eight-hour day is an established policy of the country; experience has proved justification of the principle also in war times. Provision must, of course, be made for longer hours in case of emergencies. Labor will readily meet this requirement if its mi.suse is guarded against by appropriate overtime payments. 5. Unified direction of the labor administration of the United States for the period of the war should be established. At present there is an unrelated number of separate committees, boards, agencies, and departments having fragmentary and conflicting jurisdiction over the labor problems raised by the war. A single-headed administration is needed, with full power to determine and establish the necessary administrative structure. (Since this report was written the direction of the labor administration for the war was delegated to the Secretary of Labor.) 6. When assured of sound labor conditions and effective means for the just redress of grievances that may arise, labor in its turn . should surrender all practices which tend to restrict maximum efticiency. 7. Uncorrected evils are the greatest provocative to extremist propaganda, and their correction in itself would be the best counter propaganda. But there is need for more affirmative education. There has been too little publicity of an educative sort in regard to labor's relation to the war. The purposes of the Government and the methods by which it is pursuing them should be brought home to the fuller understanding of labor. Labor has most at stake in this AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 357 war, and it will eagerly devote its all if only it be treated wltli confidence and understanding, subject neither to indulgence nor neglect, but dealt with as a part of the citizenship of the State. Appendix XV. PRINCIPLES TO BE OBSERVED. [From Labor Conference Board Report, Mar. 20, 1918.] There should be no strikes or lockouts during the war. RIGHT TO ORGANIZE. 1. The right of workers to organize in trade-unions and to bargain col- lectively through chosen representatives is recognized and aflirmed. This right shall not be denied, abridged, or Intorferod with l)y the enii)l(>yers in any man- ner whatsoever. 2. The right of employers to organize in associations of groups and to l)ar- gain collectively tlirougli chosen representatives is recognized and aflirmed. This right shall not he denied, abridged, or interfered with by tlie workers in any manner whatsoever. 3. Employers should not discharge workers for membership in trade-unions nor for legitimate trade-union activities. 4. The workers, in the exercise of their riglit to organize, sliall not use co- ercive measures of any kind to induce persons to join tlieir organizations, nor to induce employers to bargain or deal therewith. EXISTING CONDITIONS. 1. In establishments where tlie union shop exists the same shall continue and the union standards as to wages, hours of labor, and otiier conditions of employment shall be maintained. 2. In establishments where union and nonunion men and women now work together, and the employer meets only with employees or representatives en- gaged in said establishments, the continuance of such condition shall not be deemed a grievance. This declaration, however, is not intended in any manner to deny the right or discourage the practice of the formation of labor unions, or the joining of the same by the workers in said establishments, as guaranteed in the last paragraph, nor to prevent the War Labor Board from iirging. or any umpire from granting, under the machinery herein provided, improvement of their situation in the matter of wages, hours of labor, or other conditions, as shall be found desirable from time to time. 3. Established safeguards and regulations for the protection of the health and safety of workers shall not be relaxed. WO.MEN IN INDUSTRY. If it shall become necessary to employ women f»n work ordinarily performed by men, they must be allowed equal pay for equal work and must not be allotted tasks disproportionate to their strength. HOURS OF LABOR. The basic 8-hour day is recognized as applying in all rases In which existing law requires it. In all other cases the question of hf)urs of labor shall i»e settled •with due regard to governmental necessities and the welfare, health, and projier comfort of the workers. 358 A.MERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. JIAXIMUJI PRODUCTION. The maximum production of all war industries should be maintained, and methods of work and operation on tlie part of employers or workers which operate to delay or limit production, or which have a tendency to artificially increase the cost thereof, should be discouraged. MOBILIZATION OF LABOB. For the pui-pose of mobilizing the labor supply with a view to its rapid and effective distribution, a permanent list of the number of skilled and other workers available in different parts of the Nation shall be kept on file by the Department of Labor, the information to be constantly furnished — 1. By the trade unions. 2. By State employment bureaus and Federal agencies of like character. 3. By the managers and operators of industrial establishments throughout the country. These agencies should be given opportunity to aid in the distribution of labor, as necessity demands. CUSTOM OF LOCALITIES. In fixing wages, hours, and conditions of labor, regard should always be had to the labor standards, wage scales, and other conditions prevailing in the locali- ties affected. THE IJ\T:NG WAGE. 1. The right of all workers, including conuuon laborers, to a living wage is hereby declared. 2. In fixing wages, minimum rates of pay shall be established which will insure the subsistence of the worker and his family in health and reasonable comfort. Appendix XVI. LABOR PRIORITY BULLETIN NO. 1. To United States Employment Service nrnl all industrial advisers: Section SO of the Revised Selective Service Regulations among other things provides : Such industrial advisers may place before the district board at its meetings, or at such other time as the board may request, all facts and information in their possession as to the preference lists issued by the priorities division of the War Industries Board. Such lists shall not be regarded as binding upon the district board in its conclusions as to whether or not any particular industry, occupation, or employment, including agriculture, is a necessary industry, occu- pation, or employment within the meaning of the law and regulations, nor shall such lists prevent the district board from holding as necessary any industry, occupation, or employment, including agriculture, not contained therein. Such preference lists and other facts and information in the possession of such ad- visers will supplement the information in possession of the district boards and will also be used to assist the district boards in dealing with specific cases. AMERICAN IXPUSTRY IN THE WAR. 359 The "preference lists" referred to in (ho regulation quoted nn^ those enj- l^raced in Circular No. 20, issued by the priorities division of tlic War Indus- tries Board under date of September 3. 1018, embodying "Preference List No. 2 " and such amendments, supplements, or substitutions therefor as may- from time to time issue. A careful study of the "Foreword" to Circular No. 20 is invited and attention is particularly directed to the concluding para- graph thereof, reading: "This preference list shall be amended or revised from time to time liy action of the priorities board to meet changing conditions. The priorities conmiis- siouer shall, under the direction of and with the approval of the priorities board, certify additional classes of industries and also certify additional plants whose operations as a war measure entitle them to preference treat- ment, which industries and plants when so certified shall be automatically in- cluded in the preference list." From time to time it may become necessary to certify to you additional indus- tries, or additional plants, entitled to preferential treatment in their supply of labor, and this will be accomplished through labor priorities bulletins, of which this is No. 1. Attention is particularly invited to the fact that no attempt has been made to embrace within the preference list all essential industries, but only such as, tak- ing into account the urgency of the demand and the relation of the supply to the demand, in the public interest as a war measure require the artificial stimulus of priority over other essential industries. It should be constantly borne in mind that there are industries and plants which, measures appear thereon were listed to assist them in securing fuel to operate their logging road.s. As a general rule it has been deemetl in the public interest that lumber manufactur- ing plants .should use wood as a fuel in order to conserve coal in those districts where the coal supply is less than the demand (although there are necessary ex- cepti(ms to this rule), and this is one of the reasons why it was not de(>med proper to accord to the industry as a whole preferential treatment for its supply of fuel. Taking into account its very heavy tonn.-ige. couitled with the necessity of applying special priority regiilations for the movement of Government timbers and lumber, as well as the necessity for placing embargoes from lime to time on commercial shipments into congested territory, it was not deemed itroper to accord to the industry as a whole preferential treatment for its transportation service. The essential nature of the industry as a whole is, however, recognized and a large per cent of the present lumber production of the United States is required, directly or indirectly, in the prosecution of the war. 360 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. To guard against the action of the priorities board being misunderstood because of so important an industry being omitted from the preference list, iti is proper to advise you that in the opinion of the priorities board the district' boards may, in passing upon claims for industrial deferment made by or on behalf of " necessary " employees of lumber manufacturing plants supplying lumber " necessary to the maintenance of military establishments, or to the effec-; tive operation of the military forces of the United States or its allies, or to the maintenance of national interest during the emergency," give to such claims consideration substantially equivalent to that which would be given them if they appeared in Class IV on the preference list. The suggestion is made that when such claims for industrial deferment arise, the registrant or the plant interested be given an opportunity to present evidence in such form and manner as may be indicated by the district boards, that it is to some substantial extent supplying lumber, through direct or indirect orders, to the Government or some of its agencies (including railroads operated by the United States Railroad Ad» ministration), or supplying to others lumber of primary importance in war work, or in essential civilian requirements. Attention is particularly invited to the fact that for some time to come many of the lumber manufacturing plants in the district east of the Mississippi River and south of the Ohio and Potomac Rivers, and also in Louisiana and Texas and in the Pennsylvania hemlock district in eastern Pennsylvania will be largely engaged in filling heavy orders for the War Department and for the Emergency Fleet Corporation, as well as for the Railroad Administration, while many mills in the States of Washington and Oregon will be largely engaged In supplying spruce and fir for aircraft production, as well as ship timbers. Attention is invited to the accompanying copy of Circular No. 21, issued by the priorities division of the War Industries Board under date of September 3, 1918, dealing with " nonwar construction." The curtailment of all building operations which can and should be deferred until after the war shall have been won will, to a considerable extent, automatically curtail the production of lumber not required for essential uses. The request is made that this bulletin have your careful consideration, and that it be called to the attention of the several district boards. Yours truly, Edwin B. Parker, Priorities Commissioner. Washington, D. C, September 17, 1918. Appendix XVII. REPORT OF J. L. REPLOGLE ON THE IRON AND STEEL SITUATION, SEPTEMBER 14, 1917. In compliance with your request, I inclose herewith a memorandum show- ing my ideas as to prices on various iron and steel products. Whatever prices are determined upon should be put into effect at the earliest possible date, as conditions in the steel line are in an extremely chaotic condition, and I believe many manufacturers in anticipation of what they consider very low prices to be established on steel products, are giving right of way in their mill operations to the more profitable products, such as are purchased by the automobile manu- facturer, who is willing to pay the exorbitant prices asked if he can secure delivery, with the result that too much steel is going into non-essentials and entirely too little into war necessities. AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 361 Certain manufacturers ♦ ♦ • have given us every cooperation, while others have shown a very indifferent attitude. Despite the fact tluit the out- put of * * * is only about 'lO per cent of the total capacity of the country, they have taken approximately 70 per cent of all the orders placed by the United States Government and in many cases the prices were far below their competitors, and in all cases where asked to do so, they have taken orders sub- ject to the Government prices to be established, based on the FtMleral Trade Commission report as to cost. When prices are established and priority schedules are out, I believe most of the others will fall into line. Products most essential to nar. — The products most essential to the war and on which we must have the maximum production are coke, pig iron, sheared plates, shell steel billets and rounds. I believe on the products most needed that it would be well to establish a stimulating price, as in most cases a steel manufacturer has a finishing capacity far in excess of his ingot capacity, this being due to the fact that in normal times one line or another may be Inactive and the demands on other products will be such that he can work up through other lines his entire ingot production. The situation on the various products is about as follows : Coke. — The total production of coke in 1916 was approximately 54.000,000 tons, about 35,000,000 tons or 65 per cent of which was Beehive coke and about 19,000,000 or 35 per cent being made In by-product ovens. Owing to the insuffi- cient car supply and shortage of labor, the production of Beehive coke has fallen off in a very serious way during the past five or six months, with the result that the price has gone as high as $17 at the ovens, as compared to an average price of about .^2.20 during the past 10 years. The Connellsville ovens are now running at the rate of about 70 per cent capacity, and are losing about 20 per cent of their output on account of labor shortage and 10 per cent on account of car service and other causes. Coke will be, I think, the llnutlng factor in our iron and steel production, although the shortage of iron ore may also be a contributing element. Iron ore. — On September 1, the shipment to lower lake ports was about 3,000,000 tons less than the same time last year, this being largely due to the late opening of lake navigation and Insufficient vessel capacity and more par- ticularly, inadequate car service at lower lake points. This matter is receiving everj' consideration by the ore committee, but I strongly reconnnend that the movement to take about 86 vessels from the Great Lakes for u.<er 0. there Hows a con- dition Nation wide, and which reaches to the very front (»f our buttle line. I't-r- haps few of us realize the close relationship between the brick that is set in the walls of a building and the shot that is fired at the crumbling structure of German world domination. Yet the association is direct and intimate, and it is our duty to understand this fact and, understanding, to act upon it. Because the case of New York is typical of the whole country; becau.se the rule in one case mu.st be, and is, evenly applied to ail, I am glad that you 364 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. brought to my personal attention the matter in which you are interested, sincfr it affords an opportunity to malve plain the extraordinary situation we face and the need for a whole-hearted, unexcepted cooperation to the end of winning the- war. It is not too much to say that every unnecessary effort weakens the fighting.j efficiency of ourselves and our associates in the war. Every unnecessary under- taking of an industrial nature delimits the scope of our activities at the front. It ties up labor, capital, materials, facilities, transportation, and fuel — the six", great elements that form the base of our economic structure. There is, at any- given time, only limited amount of each of these bases available. At this mo- ment of strain all should be concentrated upon those enterprises directly con- I'.ected with the war. To divert them to other ends, no matter how fine those- ends may be in themselves, is at this period worse than a crime — it is a blunder that may cost us dear. I am a graduate of New York's grammar schools and her City College. That fact makes me look with kindlier interest upon your request, but it does not and can not blind me to the necessities of the case. I would not have you think, my dear Mr. Mayor, that what I say to you is to be taken as disdain nig the claims of our children to be educated: that is furthest from my thought. What I do seek is your agreement that at this grave time there should be first in our hearts and our minds the unity of sacrifice; the willingness to do without that whicli is not an unescapable neces- sity ; to suffer, if so be it, deprivation to escape heavier privation ; to make need" and not desire our law. Surely, under your direction. New York, for the time being, can make one- building do the work of two: she can devise expedients whereby none of her young shall be unschooled and yet no obstacle be placed in the way of the war program. She can and will do what other of our cities and States have done- in abandoning plans for new i-oads, for new structures, and kindred develop- ments, which widen the gap between our limited supply and the ever-increasing^ demand arising from our war needs. To postpone your enterprise in such a way as to work no hardships and do it cheerfully and willingly and in the spirit of the unfailing courage that animates our forces at the front, for whose welfare the sacrifice is made, to set an example tliat will be a tonic and a stimulant to the rest of the country, which will her no slower in responding to the civilian order of the day : He serves best wha saves most. There is still one more thought that I wish to convey to you and that is: Even were the War Industries Board able to see its national duty as coinciding^ with your request, my reply would still have to be " No," for the simple reason that it is not physically possible for me to release the materials you ask for because there are no free supplies of these materials, unless — and this is un- thinkable — you would expect that they be taken from the very vitals of our war-making machinery. And this applies with equal force to the heavy demand on man power, already acutely short, your proposed enterprise entails. Your .sympathy and support will help the Nation ; your failure to cooperate will add to our embarrassment. I am certain that between these two courses your choice will offer no difficulty. It will be that which the Nation has made : To win the war and to win it quickly. I am, with respect, Sincerely, (Signed) B, M. Baruch. AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 365 Appendix XVIII (2). REPLY OF BARUCH TO CALDER RESOLUTION. War Industuies Boakd, Washinylon. To tbo honorable the President and Senate oe the United States, Washington, I). C. Gentlemen: On behalf of the War Industries Board, I bog to comply with Senate resolution 304, passed September 13, 1918, and transmitted to me che same day. 1. The only order promulgated by the War Industries Board "relative to tbe construction and alteration of public or private buildings " is contained in Circular No. 21, issued September 3, 191S, and supplemented under date of Sep- tember 10, 1918. Copies of the order and the supplement are attached hereto. 2. Said orders were issued under the authority ccmferred upon the War Industries Board and its chairman by the President of the United States in a communication to the chairman dated March 4, 1918, and confirmed by Execu- tive order dated May 28, 1918, whereby the War Industries Board was created a separate administrative agency of the President, with the powers, duties, and functions set forth in the said communication from the President of March 1, 1918; copies of said communication and of said Executive order are attaclunl hereto. I beg to call particular attention to tlie following powers and duties thus specifically conferr(Ml by the President upon the board and its chainnan: (a) "The studious conservation of resources and facilities by scientific, com- mercial, and industrial economics." (6) "The determination, wherever necessary, of priorities of production and of delivery and of the proportions of any given article to be made immediately accessible to the several purchasing agencies when the supply of that article is insufficient, either temporarily or permanently." (c) "The chairman's duty to guide and assist 'in obtaining access to ma- terials in any way preempted,' and 'to anticipate the prospective needs of the several supply departments of the Government and their feasible adjustment to the industry of the country as far in advance as possible, in order that as definite an outlook and opportunity for planning as possible may be afforded the business men of the country.' " I also refer to the act of Congress of August 10, 1917, known as the priority of shipment act. 3. In further response to Senate resolution .304. pernut me to add : In carrying out the duties, with which we were thus charged by the President. * the War Industries Board and its chairman found the following situation to ex- ist with respect to building and construction facilities and snpiilies: * (a) Iron and steel are a necessary part of every comi)leted building. They ""' are necessary for plumb ng, heating, ventilating, piping, hardware, and mechani- cal equipment. The direct and indirect war needs of this country and of our allies for the last six months of the current year already exceeded 21,tM)0,(KM) tons and the country's total output for the first six months was less than 17.(MR),- 000 tons. The unavoidable result is that iron and steel ran not be used fr.r non- war or less essential purposes. (b) The United States Fuel Administration, finding that the profluctlon of building materials consumed upward of 3t),000,0('M) tons of fuel per annum, and that there was a shortage in the fuel necessary for our war program, cnrfailod very materially the fuel allowed for building materials. The contlnuertakinB buiklinK projects and then, after plans or coniniitnients have been made, Hndin;; that the war prograui makes it impossible to secure the materials necessary to complete them. Moreover, the trade itself will find that because of the enormous housinj: and other construction work wIulIi the Government itself is undertaking: a large part of the trade's facilities will simply be transferred to new lines of building activity. Finally, the operation of the selective-service acts will much more than has already been the case directly affect the amount of labor available for the building trade and for other industries. Even with increased etticiency and female labor the natural outcome of this condition must be to curtail and re- duce the volume of any given business not connected with the war program. As far as it is possible to do so, the less essential industries are being con- verted to more essential activities, but there will be a certain percentage of these industries which can not be converted. Therefore the volume of business in the less essentials will be reduced, and with this reduction there will come a corresiJonding reduction in taxability. It is not only the policy, it is the clear and simple duty of the War Industires Board to see that the war program of the country is met, and this program must be met now, when its needs are upon us. This duty nmst be fulfilled, even if its fulfillment entails industrial loss in this coxintry as it does human loss abroad. I have the honor to remain, Bernard AI. Baruch, Chairman, IV'ar Industries Hoard. Appkndix XIX. STEEL PRICES AS FIXED OCTOBER 11, 1917. Blooms and billets, 4 by 4 inches and larger Pittsburgh-Youngstown i $47.50 per gross ton. Billets, under 4 by 4 inches do ' $51 per pross ton. Slabs i do '?,')() per tjross ton . Sheet bars do S51 per ^ross ton. Wire rods Pittsburgh I $57 per gross ton. Shell bars: '• I 3 to 5 inches do $-{.2.5 per KX) pounds Over 5 to 8 inches i do $.3.50 per luo pounds. Over 8 to 10 inches Over 10 inches Skelp: irooved .do $.t.75per 100 pounds. .do ' $•» per lOOpoinids. .do $2.90 p(>r liHi rwunds. Universal > do $.3.15 per 100 pomids. Sheared do $.i.25 per liX» pounds. Al'l'liNDlX XX. STEEL PRICES AS FIXED NOVEMBER 11. 1917. Sheets : I^er 100 pounds. No. 2S black sheets f. o. b. Pittsburgh ^H. 00 No. 10 blue annealed sheets f. o. b. Pittsburgh 4. 25 No. 28 galvanized sheets f. o. b. Pittsburgh • 6. 25 368 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. The above prices to apply to both Bessemer and open-hearth grades. Pipe : On f-inch to 3-inch blaclc steel pipe, discount 52 and 5 and 2i per cent f. 0. b. Pittsburgh. Cold-rolled steel : Seventeen per cent discount from March 15, 1915. list f. 0. b. Pittsburgh. Scrap (f. o. b. consuming point) : Per gross ton. No. 1 heavy melting $30. 00 Cast-iron borings and machine-shop turnings 20. 00 No. 1 railroad wrought 35. 00 Wire, plain wire f. o. b. Pittsburgh, per 100 pounds 3.25 Tin plate, coke base, Bessemer and open-hearth, f. o. b. Pittsburgh, per 100-pound box 7. 75 Appendix XXI. JOINT CIRCULAR— PARKER AND REPLOGLE, JULY 3, 1918. To all proihicers and consumers of iron and all manufacturers and coiisumers of iron and steel products: In order that misunderstandings which have apparently ari.sen in some quarters as to the practices to be observed in the distribution of pig iron and of iron and steel manufactured products may be removed, we invite careful consideration to the following: X. All pig iron and steel-manufactured products are now being shipped and delivered by the producer or manufacturer in accordance with the resolution of the War Industries Board adopted June 6, 1918, copy of which resolution, marked for identiflcation " Exhibit A," is hereunto attached and made a part hereof. 2. Priority orders. — It will be noted that under the resolution of .Tune r> 1918, all orders covered by priority certificates shall be first provided for or filled and thereafter orders embraced within the schedule of purposes en- titled to preferential treatment as determined by the priorities board may be filled without other specific priority instructions and without the further approval of any governmental agency. The purpose was to permit deliveries of pig iron and of steel-manufactured products under the schedule of purposes not only after orders covered by priority certificates shall have been filled but at any time to the extent that such deliveries will not interfere with the filling when and as required of orders covered by priority certificates. The priorities committee is now issuing certificates of three classes, namely. Class AA, Class A, and Class B. One effect of this resolution is to put all ordei-s not covered by priority certificates, but embraced within the schedule of pur- poses entitled to preference treatment, in a fourth class, which Ave will desig- nate Class C, and to give such orders priority and precedence over ail other orders not covered either by priority certificates or embraced witliiu the said schedule of purposes, which other orders will be designated Class D. If reasonably satisfactory delivery can be secured on Class C orders, no ap- plication for a higher priority rating need or should be made to the priorities committee. 3. Class D orders — permits to ship. — Orders falling within class D may be filled from surplus stocks, if any remain, after orders covered by priority certificates or falling in class C have been provided for or filled, subject, AMERICAN IXDUSTPA' IX TIIH WAR. 369 however, to the approval in writing of tlic diroclor of steel s)ii)ply lirst Iiml tuiil obtained. In order to avoid delays in the filling: of small orders intently required for essential civilian uses, the director of steel supply does hereby approve in writ- in.ir the filin.u' of such orders falling in class D on the conditions following: (a) That the order in the aggregate shall not exceed in quantity 5 tons; (6) That the manufacturer shall, on or before the 10th of each month, re- port to the director of steel supply all orders filled during the preceding month under this authority ; and shall certify that he believes that it was In the public interest that such orders should be filled. Applications for permit to manufacture or ship class D orders which can not be shipped under the foregoing authority must be filled out and mailed in duplicate to the director of steel supply on blanks which will be forwarded to each manufacturer; such applications must be made by the manufacturer only and not by the purchaser. Upon receipt of such application it will have prompt and careful consideration at the hands of the director of steel supply. who will indorse on the bottom of the application in a space providetl therefor the word " Granted " or the word " Declined " and return one copy to the ap- plicant. If gi-anted, the manufacturer may ship on such terms and under such conditions as may be imposed by the director of steel supply. 4. Allocations. — The direct wnr requirements of iron and of iron and steel products of all departments and agencies of the United States Government and of its Allies will be allocated to the various manufacturers by the director of steel supply. All other orders for direct and indirect war requirements for iron and iron and steel products should be placed by the consumer with his regular source of supply. In the event a consumer is unable to find a producer or manufac- turer \\ho will accept his order, application for allotment should be made to the director of steel supply only when supported by strong evidence in writing that the public interest requires that such order shall be placed and filled. .5. Jobbers' stocks. — It is in the public interest that jobbers dealing in plates, sheets, bars and shapes, structural shapes, tubular products, wire and wire products, tin plate, heavy hardware, farm implements, mining tools, ma- chinery and equipment, oil-well supplies, and similar products should be per- mitted to maintain rea.sonable stocks from whiclw Government agencies, war industries, and the civilian population may draw to meet essential require- ments. The jobbers recognize the necessity for rigidly restricting all iron, steel, and tin products to essential uses and have pledged their whole-hearted cooperation to a program to prevent hoarding on the part either of the jobbers or of their customers, and to reduce to an absolute minimum both jobbing and retail stwks. On the faith of this pledge on the part of the jobbers a plan has been adopted, as follows: (a) Each jobber shall, not later than the .oth of each month, file with the director of steel supply, on forms to be furnished by him, a certified statement covering shipments made by the jobber during the preceding month. (ft) To the extent that such shipments fall within priority class A A, class A, class B, or class C, as hereinbefore defined, or by permits l8sue- ment required for production, harvesting, and distribution, milling, preparing, canning, and refining foods and feeds, such as .seeds of foods and h-viU. binder twine, etc. Products of collateral industries, such as fertilizers, ferli'l'-cr in- gredients, insecticides, and fungicides. Containers for foods and feeds, col- lateral products. Materials and equipment for preservation of foods and feeds, such as ammonia and other refrigeratifm sui)plies. including ice. In- cluding all nece&sary raw materials, parttialiy manufactured parts and supplies for completion of products. Clothinr/. — For civilian population. Railroad or other accessary tran.sportation equipment, including water trans- portation. Public utilities serving war indu.stries, .\rmy. Navy, and civilian population. Including all necessary raw materials, partially manufactured parts and sup- plies lor completion of products. Provided, houcvcr, That wlu'never the priorities i)oard shall have pron\uI- gated and certified for observance to the producers of pig Iron and steel-manu- factured i)roducts a revised preference list, n(» surplus material or capiHity after filling or providing for all orders covered by i.riorjty (••■rlifi<-ates shall be used to fill nonpriority orders sjive such as are jtlaced by Industries or plants embraced within jireference list; and 372 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. Provided further. That each producer of pig iron and of steel-manufactured products sliall, at the end of each week, ending witli midnight Saturday tliereof, prepare and forward to the director of steel supply of the War Industries Board a detailed statement of all shipments made during such week not covered by such priority certificates. Be it further resolved, That should any producer of pig iron or of steel-manu- factured products have any surplus war material or manufacturing capacity after tilling (o) all orders covered by priority certificates and {b) all orders embraced within the schedule of purposes entitled to preference treatment or placed by industries or plants embraced within the revised preference list, after it shall have been promulgated and certified by the priorities board, then, in such event, such surplus materials or capacity may be disposed of by such producer or manufacturer to other customers, subject to the approval in writ- ing of the director of steel supply first had and obtained. Be it further resolved. That the director of steel supply and a committee, appointed by the American Iron and Steel Institute, shall jointly make a care- ful study of the present and prospective iron and steel requirements of each and every department and agency of the Government of the United States and of its allies, and the capacity of the iron-producing and steel-manufacturing plants of the United States to meet such requirements and present to this board as early as practicable (1) a report of their findings, together with (2) recom- mendations of measures, if any. which should be taken to stimulate and increase the production of Iron and steel products in order to meet the direct and in- direct war requirements and the demands of industries of exceptional or na- tional importance. Appendix XXII (1). CIRCULAR NO. 28, PRIORITIES DIVISION. To manufacturers of metal hed>i, cots, couches, and bunks, and metal spiiniis for beds, cots, couches, and bunks: Following conferences with your representatives, the priorities division has reached conclusions as follows: I. Any of your manufacturers who desire to be placed on the preference list which has been prepared by this division may obtain forms therefor from and make application to the secretary of the priorities board. Any such applica- tion will receive consideration. The preference list is to be the guide to all governmental agencies and others interested in the production and supply of fuel and electrical energy, the suppl> of labor, and the supply of transportation service by rail, water, pipe lines, or otherwise, in so far as *iid service contributes to the production of finished products. Priorities in the " supply and distribution of raw materials, semifinished and finished products " are not governed by the preference list, but by priority certificates and automatic ratings described in Circular No. 4 and its supplements issued by this division. II. Your industry can supply essential needs during the last four months of 1918 if you can obtain certain limited quantities of materials which have been discussed with your representatives and if such materials are properly distributed among your manufacturers with a view of balancing and equalizing stocks. This division will issue to any of your manufacturers desiring its distributive portion of such quantities of materials industry priorities certifi- AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE W'Ali. 373 cates autlioriziuL: it to puivhase its quota of such iiiatofials tuuli'i- tin- roliowint; conditions : 1. Such inaiuifacturer will tile with this division its pledgo, as follows: " metat. beds, cots, couches, and bunks, and metal spuings f0« bicds, cots, couches, and bunks, manufactukehs' pledge. " Priorities Division. War Industries Board, " M'ashingtan, D. C. *' The undersigned hereby pledges itself, for and during tlie period from September 1, 191S, to December 31, 1918, (1) to use only in the manufacture of metal beds, cots, couches, and bunks, and metal springs for betls, cots, couches, and bunks, and parts therefor, the materials suitable therefor which are now in its possession or which may hereafter come into its possession (other than materials acquired or reserved for making products covered by priority certifi- cates for automatic ratings) ; (2) to reduce its production of metal beds, cots, Ci)uches, and bunks to a basis of not exceeding 50 per cent of four-twell'ths of its 1917 output of such products; (3) to reduce its production of metal springs for beds, cots, couches, and bmiks to a basis of not exceeding 50 per cent of four-twelfths of its 1917 output of such products; (4) to comply with the regu- lations of the conservation division of the War Industries Board as to economies and substitutions of materials; (5) to acquire no more materials for the manu- facture of such products than shall be sullicient, by balancing and supplementing stocks on hand, to enable it to manufacture the limited production above men- tioned ; (G) to furnish the products of its manufacture for nt) uses other than the following: (a) Orders placed by the United States Government or the Allies or direct agencies of same, (6) to industrial housing, (c) to essential civilian demands; (7) to furnish its products for resale to no dealer until such dealer shall file with undersigned its pUdge in writing similar to this pledge." The dealer's pledge to be given to the manufacturer will have attached to it a copy of the manufacturer's pledge and will be in the following form : " To — , " City of , " State of . "The undersigned hereby pledges itself (1) to cooperate with you in carrying out the letter and spirit of your pledge filed with the priorities division of the War Industries Board (copy of which is hereto attached) and to urge con- sumers to do likewise; (2) to reduce its stocks carried to the minimum con- sistent with the reasonable requirements of the trade served by it; (3) to devote the products of your manufacture only to the uses stated In your pledge; (4) to furnish your products for resale to no dealer until such dealer shall file with undersigned its pledge in writing similar to this pledge." 2. Such manufacturer will tile with this division its statement uixier oath showing : («) Quantities (by weight) of ir(jn and steel and iron and steel products used by it in producing its 1917 output of metal Iieds, cots, couches, and biniks, and metal springs for beds, cots, couches, and buidvs, and parts therefor. (b) Quantities (by weight) of such materials and products In stock, In storage, and in transit owned by such manufacturer on September 1, 1918, or held for it. (c) Quantities (by weight) needed to l)alance stocks, but only so far as are :)ceded in connection with existing stocks to nuinufacture the reduced output of its products mentioned in its pledge, and, In stating this quantity, due allowance must be made for the reduced quantities of material needed due to such manu- facturer complying with the regulations of the conservation division. 374 AMERICAI^ INDUSTRY IX THE WAE. (d) The numbers of metal beds, cots, couches, and bunks produced during the calendar jear 1917. (e) The number of metal springs for beds, cots, couches, and bunk's produced during the calendar year 1917. 3. When the pledge and affidavit mentioned have been filed and the industry- priority certificate issued, it will take Class C rating, and oi-ders placed accord- ing to its provisions and this circular may be filled. No formal application for industry priority certificate is required. No guaranty can be given your in- dustry that the materials called for in any certificate can be supplied. III. The materials which are used by your industry are of such importance, and the constantly increasing demand for them is so vast, that it is imperative that you should put forth every effort to avoid any unnecessary or wasteful use of such materials and to encourage consumers and users of your product every- where to utilize to the fullest extent during the period of the war stored, second- hand, or temporarily discarded articles rather than purchase new ones. Copper and brass are so urgently and immediately nettled for war purposes in quantities beyond the available supply that you will be expected to discontinue the nianufacrnre of brass beds or the use of brass or copper in any form in the manufacture of your products. This regulation, however, will not be construed as forbidding your working up such brass and copper as you may now have on hand unless you may be asked to release such materials for use in the war pi-ogram. If. in connection with any particular order placed with j-ou for products of your manufacture, you shall be entitled to priority rating for material to fill such order of a class higher than Class C, you may present your application for priority certificate for higher rating therefor, and same will receive due consideration. Yours very truly, Edwin B. Parkeb, Priorities Commissioner. Washington, D. C, September 21, 1U18. Appendix XXII (2). CIRCULAR NO. 33, PRIORITIES DIVISION. To the a gricuUural implement and farm operating equipment industry: The greatly enlarged war program will absorb the greater portion of the Iron and steel production of the Nation, and it has become necessary to re^luce the allotments of iron and steel to industries lest the industrial consumption obstruct the war program. In making these adjustments careful surveys are being made to the end that the most vital civilian demands may be supplied. Yours is clearly not only an essential but an indirect war industry, and will be dealt with as such. The Nation must produce a maximum of foods and feeds, but through rigid economies and increased efficiency of the farmers, the dealers, and the manufacturers this production must be accomplished with a reduced consumption of materials and labor required to meet the war pro- gram. Speaking generally, the use of modern farm implements conserves labor, but it must be constantly borne in mind that the time element is more controlling now in connection with any conservation program than ever before. The results must be practically immediate in order to contribute to the indus- trial drive needed to sustain the military drive on the battle fields of Europe. AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 375 The use of a macbiue, in the manufncture of wliich large quantities of material and labor are consuniod, may be eeonomieally sound, and in normal times its manufacture and use should be stimulated, but if its production :it this crisis requires more labor than will be saved in one season's use '* should, fj;enerally si)eakinjr, be substituted by other macfiinos or implements in order to accomplish the immediate conservation of labor and materials. Reference herein will be made to periods of 12 months each ; that from Octo- ber 1. 1917, to September 30, 191S, will be designated " first period." while that from October 1, 1918, to September 30, 1919, will be designated " second period." A careful survey of your Industry In connection with the urgent war requirements had led to the decision that in the public interest your iron and steel receipts for the second period should be 75 per cent of your receipts during the first period, when it approximated 2,000,000 tons of iron and steel. The effect of a release during the " second period " of 25 per cent of your " first- period " receipts w:il be immediately felt on the war program. It is with con- fidence that the War Industries Board relies upon your indispensable industry lending the same whole-hearted and patriotic a.ssistance in accomplishing these econimits that it has always rendered in response to previous appeals. While the importance of your industry and your place in the program for the produc- tion of food for this Nation and its allies can hardly be overstated, yet the supreme concern at this ci-itical period is that every possible contribution be made immediately and enthusiastically to the end that the war may be shortened and the victory made decisive. The necessity of reducing the allotments of iron and steel to your industry places upon you and the farm implements committee the responsibility of so applying the curtailment that your more essential products shall be produced lu suflicient qu;mtities to meet all legitimate demands for them and that your less essential products shall be produced in greatly diminished quantities, or not at all. The priorities division does not undertake to direct you in the fornuilation or execution of a program of such responsibility. This is your problem. You are equipped to solve it, and with your experience and r:i)e judgment you will, through teamwork, so adjust your manufacturing pro- gram and utilize the curtailed allotment of materials that the theoretical in- jury may not prove real. The plans for curtailment must, among other things, take account of the varying situation of those manufacturers who have been in production for considerable periods as contrasted with those whose production period has been relatively so short that they are still virtually in the experimental stage. To apply to both of such groups an arbitrary percentage tonnage allot- ment plan would be inequitable. The farm tractor situation presents one of the more striking illustrations of the necessity for flexibility in the plan, although It is probable that producers of other products may al.so require similar treatment. For your guidance you are advised that the priorities division has de- cided — ('0 That the tractor makers who have produced less than 10 trjictors during the first period are in the primary exi)erimental stage, and that they ar.' not to produce over 10 tractors during the second period. (h) That the tractor makers who have produced and had in field operation 10 or more, and le.ss th;in 50, tractors during the first period are In the sec- ondary developement stage, and that they are not to produce over 50 tractors during the second period. 376 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. (c) That makers of products other than farm tractors whose development ^ stages shall be comparable to those of the tractor makers described in the preceding paragraphs are to produce according to the same rules. (d) That the tractor makers who have produced and sold 50 or more tractors during the first period, and all other manufacturers of farm-operating equipment who are past their primary and secondary development stages, w.ll receive during the second period not exceeding 75 per cent of their receipts of iron and steel during the first period. Each manufacturer will execute in duplicate its pledge and file both copies thereof with the farm implements committee (one copy to be retained by such committee and one copy to be forwarded to this division). The pledge will be In the form following: " FABM-OPERATING EQUIPMENT MANUFACTTJEER's PLEDGE. " Priorities Division, War Industries Board, " Washington, D. C: " The undersigned hereby pledges itself for and during the period from Octo- ber 1, 1918, to October 1, 1919, (1) to use only in the manufacture of farm- operating equipment and parts therefor the materials suitable therefor which are now in its possession or which may hereafter come into its possession (other than materials acquired or reserved for making other products covered by priority certificates or automatic ratings of higher class) ; (2) to reduce its tonnage receipts of iron and steel for the manufacture of such products to a basis of not exceeding 75 per cent of its receipts of such materials for such products from the 1st day of October; 1917, to the 1st day of October, 1918; (3) to comply with the regulations of the conservation division of the War Industries Board as to economies and substitutions; (4) to produce only the more essential farm-operating equipment and parts therefor and to distribute its products oidy for e.ssential uses and through such distributors only as vv^ill cooperate with the undersigned in carrying out the letter and spirit of this pledge." Each manufacturer will also furnish to the farm implements committee data as to prior years' receipts of iron and steel, stocks on hand, and such other information as may be required by said committee or this division from time to time. When the pledge mentioned has been filed and the required information furnished to the farm implements committtee, such committee will notify this division as to the tonnage requirements of such manufacturer, whereupon this division will issue to such manufacturer its industry priority certificate author- izing such manufacturer to place its order for materials not in excess of its allotted tonnage. Orders so placed will take Class B-2 rating and may be filled accordingly. When any order is placed pursuant to such certificate, the manufacturer placing such order shall report the tonnages involved to the farm implements committee on forms which will be supplied by such committee, which will in turn keep a record of such transactions and report to the priorities division from time to time the tonnages furnished and to be furnished to each manu- facturer. Your industry is so large, so varied, and so important that the priorities division must in the future, as in the past, avail itself of the efficient and patriotic assistance of your farm implements committee in administering the program here outlined. It will also with confidence rely upon the whole- AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN Till-: WAR. 377 liearted cooperation of each member of your iiuhjstry with sik-Ii ((miinitice and with this division In determining upon a inanufacturint,' proixrain and a basis for the distribution of your products whicli will result in a niaxinuini conservation of labor and materials nnd a n;aximuni production of foods and feeds during the second period. Yours very truly, EnWIN B. P.^KKKR, Priorities CommiKninvrr. Washington, D. C, Scptonhcr SO. J91S. Appendix XXITI. TEXTxVTIVE UNITED STATES LANDED POOL PRICES FOR NITRATE OF SODA. 1918 Refined, per 100 ; pounds. Ordinary, per 100 pounds. 1918 Refuied, per too 1 pounds. Ordinary, perlOO pounds. May... June Sl.lO I.IO $4. 0.5 4.0.5 4.10 Peptember October November 1 $4.50 . ! 4. 52* $4.32i 4.40 Julv 4 20 4.40 Auaist 4. 4,5 December 4..5.5- 4.42J Appendix XXIV. FINAL UNITED STATES LANDED POOL PRICES FOR NITRATE OF SODA. 191S Refined, per net hundred- weight. Ordinary, per net hundred- weight. 1 1918 Refined, per net hundred- weight. Ordinary, per net hundred- weight. January February March April May SJ.W.-,S2 l.:;i ;.!.-. 12 4. o.-r, '.-.71 !.lX)SI6 X 9970.571 3. 97271.50 3. 93913 J4.040.5S.5 4. (Hi) 11 4. 138794 4. 1G9:<;h5 $3. 9365S5 July 3.91755 4.019934 4.a'>0,536 Appendix XXV. PRODUCTION OF ALCOHOL IN THE UNITED STATES. [Proof gallons.] Denatured. Year. Completely denatured. Specially denatured. - , Other ethyl Total Total ! *"=°''"'- ' ''"■°''°'- denatured. ; 1 1913 9,000,000 9, 300, (XX) 12,000,000 15,90<),0niiitte(l to come, forwai'd iiiuler section 4 above are to be allocated by the bureau of imiiorts in nccordnnci' witli the reconiniendiitions of the tanniui,' material and natural dye section of tlie War Industries Board. APPKN-mx XXVIII. CLASSIFICATION OF INDUSTRIES USING ACETIC ACID. [Subject to revision upon presentation of suitable evidence.] Class A. Those concerns which are to receive their re(iuirpnients for the niontli in full : Cellulose acetate, insecticides, Paris green, laboratory work, synthetic indigo dyes, salvarsan. Class B. Those concerns which are to receive their requirements for the month in full as to specific Government orders and 50 per cent of their requirements for otlier purposes : Medicinal preparations, white lead, enamel ware. Class C. Those concerns which are to receive their requirements for the month in full as to specific Government orders and 25 per cent of their requirements for other purposes : Dye manufacturers, photograpliic materials, dye pigments, tanners, sugar lead; resale (exceiDt to industries classified in class D), mor- dants, textiles, for use in manufacture of blue for leather trade, for mixing with glue and paste for bindery purposes, cobalt acetate, paper mills for chrome yellow. Class D. Those concerns which are to receive their requirements for the month in full as to specific Government orders and no part of their requirements for other purposes: Laundries, toilet articles, food products, soap manufac- turers, miscellaneous, for rendering natural foliage and flowers permanent, for resale to small consumers in millinery trade. Appendix XXIX. QUESTIONNAIRE TO ELECTRODE CONSUMERS. 1. Number and size and type of furnace you operate. 2. What product do you produce by use of electrodes? 3. Total weight of electrodes in stock at end of the month. 4. Size, number, and weight of each of the electrodes on ha;id. 5. Whether graphite or carbon electrodes. 6. Number and weight of electrodes used during the month. 7. Number and weight of electrodes received or en route during month. 8. With what companies have you orders placed for electrodes? 9. Give list of unfilled Government orders placed with you for which electrodes are necessary. 10. Is any of your product being u.sed by nonessential Industries? If so, what percentage of your total production, and what are these nonessentials? n. Can your product be made by any process tli:it does not re«piire the u.se of electrodes? 12. Estimate of your actual monthly requirements per month for tlie next three months. 380 AMEEICAN INDUSTRY IX THE WAR. Appendix XXX. DRUGS AND PHARMACEUTICALS FOR 1917. [Estimated.] Commodity. Domestic 1 Total used production, Imports. for 1917. medicines. Alcohol (nonbeverage) gallons. . Chloroform do Epsom salt poimds. . Ether do. . . . Formalin do Glycerin (chemically pure) do Sodium bicarbonate do Acetanilld do Acetphenetidin do Aloes do Antipyrine do Aspirin (Bayer) Belladonna, crude pounds.. Bismuth, subnitrate do Calomel do Camphor giun, refined do Castor oil No. 1 or AA do Citric acid do Cocaine hydrochloride ounces. . Cream of tartar, refined pounds. . Digitalis do.... Iodine do Lanolin do Licorice root do Menthol do Morphine sulphate ounces . . Nux vomica pounds . . Opium do Quinine sulphate oimces. . Salol 180,000,000 1,800,000 12, 100, 000 16,600,000 70,000,000 348,000,000 923, 078 72,385 3,280 850,217 21,824 99,000,000 450,000 4,235,000 2,500,000 4,150,000 4,200,000 10,440,000 923, 000 75,700 8.50,000 21,800 65,000 400,000 300,000 182,000 ,564,024 4,0.32,897 53, 904 12,046,120 10,000 0,000 164,276 7,489 96, 134 12,000 59,398,644 204, 431 3, 040, 283 113,733 720, 747 400,000 300,000 3,750,000 3,000,000 1,6.80,000 61,400 121,000 22,000 707,000 258,000 3,000,000 204,000 513,000 3,040,000 114,000 6,290,000 Sodium bromide pounds . Strj'chnine sulphate ounces. Tartaric acid pounds. Thymol do. . . 720,000 I 720,000 36,916 428,000 3,200,000 4,937 I 10.600 Appendix XXXI. PRODUCTION OF TOBACCO IN UNITED STATES, 1913-1918/ [1,000 pounds.] 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 I. Cigar types: 38,295 37' 449 50, 740 5,800 47,651 47; 995 54,144 53, 808 6,200 38,270 5,280 42,390 54,270 36,900 5,045 51,285 4, .551 49,096 58,200 55, 753 4,559 46,200 3,125 58,100 61,692 44, 500 5,010 New York . . 3 760 64, 752 Wisconsin 65 170 Georgia and Florida 7 084 183,350 215, 778 182, 155 223,444 218, 627 II. Chewing, smoking, snuff, and ex- port types: 176,776 58,500 44,000 28,248 80,500 12,720 58,384 165, 600 117, 150 20, 976 270 224, 664 54, 600 67,925 36, 864 79,120 9,120 37,000 144,000 131,350 20, 418 2S0 217,338 67,963 70,680 29, 952 89,025 10,200 54,600 163,200 148,800 18,164 126 257,0.50 78,000 95,230 41,760 98, 750 8,280 53, 792 136,800 126,500 23,400 90 251,520 94, 400 90,424 45,000 96,000 8,800 51,460 141,000 217, 750 25,920 210 76,000 85,002 45,000 77,000 11,220 57 05' Henderson or stemming Clarksville and HopkinsviUe . . . Virginia sun cured Virginia dark Old Belt Virginia and North New Belt Virginia and South Carolina . 248,500 28,718 126 Maryland and eastern Ohio export Ferique, Louisiana Total chewing, smoking, etc. . 763, 124. 805, 341 870,048 919,652 1,022,484 1,069,526 III. Another 7,260 13, 560 8,384 10, 182 8,165 9,901 Total production 953, 734 1,034,679 1,060,587 1,153,278 1,249,276 1 340 019 1 Source: Compiled from the Yearbooks of the Department of Agriculture. AMERICAN IXni'STRY IX THK WAR 381 AppiiNOiX XXXII. UNITED STATES EXPORTS OF TOBACCO, BY CALENDAR YEARS 1913-1918.' Commodity. \.i.:A 1,000 pounds. . 441, 080 Steins and trimmings do ; 3,292 Cigars and cheroots 1,000. .1 1 , 796 Ciparettos do. ... I 2. 318. 802 SnioVins 1,000 pounds. . 1. 332 Plug do 6. 209 Another dollars., i 217,755 345,922 1,374 1,846 2,407,226 1,481 6,097 179,846 1915 428,297 5.376 1,606 2,076,178 2.006 4,805 370,100 477.408 6,547 1,792 4,258.664 2,226 5,127 477.290 251.292 571 2.491 7,019.723 2,505 4.472 395.380 401,292 537 23.429 12.145.539 5.340 5.564 483.926 1 Source: Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. APPENDIX XXXIII.> LUMBER CUT OF THE UNITED STATES. [M feet l)oar;l measure.) il,«ll H Kind of wood. 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 ■Total . ... 2 38,387,009 2 37,346.023 3 37,011,656 '39,807,251 '35,831,000 1 < 32,925,000 (|W Yellow pine . . ■iii 14,839,363 5,556,096 3,211,718 2,568,636 2,319,982 1,258,528 1,046.816 1,097,247 901,487 772, 514 620, 176 505.802 510,271 395,273 378.7.39 358, 444 365,501 120,420 257, 102 214.532 207,816 208,938 88,109 149.926 162.980 93,752 40, .565 30.804 20, 106 85,366 14,472,804 4,763,693 3,278.908 2.632.587 2,165,728 1,327,335 1,245,614 1,013.013 909,743 675,380 519,221 540,591" .5.35, 199 358.561 430,667 499,903 376,464 124,480 264.656 214,294 189,499 195,198 112,627 136,159 116,113 125.212 25,573 22.773 18.374 55,624 14,700,000 4.431.249 2,970,000 2,700,000 2.275,000 1,293,985 1,400,000 1,100,000 900,000 655,000 464,000 490,000 420,294 375,000 415,000 420,000 360,000 170,000 160,000 210.000 190,000 180.000 125,048 117.701 100,000 100.000 90,000 25,000 26, 486 47,893 15,055.000 5.416,000 3.300,000 2.700,000 2.350,000 1,690,000 1.250,000 1,000,0IX) 975.000 800,000 560.000 535.000 490,850 455,000 450,000 410,000 360,000 275,000 275,000 240,000 210, (KH) 200,000 190,000 169.230 125, (KK) 125.000 90,000 40,000 30,800 40,351 13,539,000 ' 5.595,000 ; 2,2.tO,(K10 2,2.50,000 2,200,000 , 1,960,(XK» 1,125,000 950, (KKl 360, CKK) 788,000 350,000 415,000 487,000 360,000 415.0(K) 205,000 296,000 1 265,000 203,000 205,000 175, (MK) 190,000 21S,(KK) 132, (KH) 95,0(K) 00,0(K) 62,000 I 32.000 1 11,000 56,000 12,500,000 i (Wi ,1.300,000 m Oak White pine Hemlock Western yellow pine Spruce . . 2,(KK).0(K) 2, (KKl, 000 2.0ove mentioned to sell and deliver building materials required in the construction of the licensed building project. While it is not the policy of the Government to unnecessarily interfere with any legitimate business, industry, or construction project, it must be borne in mind that there is an imperative and constantly Increasing demand for labor, material, and capital for the production and distribution of direct and indirect war needs, to satisfy which much nonwar construction mu?t be de- ferred. A full realization of this fact by all loyal and patriotic citizens, in- cluding State and municipal authorities, is all that is required to postpone such construction activities as interfere with the war program. The State and local representatives of the Council of National Defense are with con- fidence depended upon to fully acquaint the whole people of these United States with the pressing need for the most rigid economy, measured not only in terms of dollars, but in terms of labor, materials, and transportation service. The construction projects which must now be deferred may be undertaken when we shall have won the war and will then furnish employment to the returning artisans now on the battle front as well as those who will then be released by strictly war industries. Note.- -On September 27. 3 018.^ Circular No. 21 v>-as amended. To subdivision 2 was added the following clause : " And new construction for farm purposes only, involving in the aggregate a cost not exceeding $1,0CH1."' To suhdivis'on 4 was added the following clause: "And production (but not refining) of mineral oil and natural gas." 1 Date of publication in the Official Bulletin. AMERICAN INDUSTKV IX THK WAl!. Ai'PicNDix XXXV. DOMESTIC PRODUCTION OF FINISHED PAPERS, 1917. 383 Kind of paper. Short tons. Per cent of total. 2,001,376 l,4S3.34rt 1,107,891 994,761 382,879 348, 355 153,880 .';6,992 39,870 13.77.5 12.492 30.34 N'ews print 22 50 16.80 15 08 Writing; . .5.81 5.28 2.33 .86 .00 Hlottinc . . . .21 .19 Total 6, Sg.'i, G37 100.00 Appendix XXXVI. MAXIMUM PRICES FOR COTTON GOODS. [Fixed July 8, 1918.] 3G incbe.^, 48 by 48, 3 yards per pound sheeting, 60 cents per pound. 36 inches, 56 by 60, 4 yards per pound slieeting. 70 cents per pound. 38^ inches, 64 by 60, 5.35 yards per pound print cloth, S3 cents per pound. 38^ inches, SO by 80, 4 yards per pound print cloth, 84 cents per pound. Standard wide and sail duck. 37^ per cent and 5 per cent from list. Standard Army duck, 33 per cent from list. Appendix XXXVIJ. GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS FOR HANDLING WOOL CLIP OF 1918. The War Industries Board has fixed the prices of the 1918 clip of wool as established by valuation committees and approved by the Government as those established on July 30, 1917, at Atlantic seaboard markets. Those values are figured on scoured basis. (See table on p. 7.) Rights of the Government. — The Government shall have a prior right to acquire all of the 1918 wool clip, or any portion thereof which it may require, at the prices fixed by the War Industries Hoard. The remaindt-r will be subject to allocation for civilian purposes under the direction of the War Industries Board. A very large portion of the wool-manufacturing machinery working on Gov- ernment contracts is located close to the Atlantic seaboard, and In order to avoid the possibility of railroad delay and congestion late in the season when tlie crops are moving, it is desirable and necessary that the wool clip shall be collected as .soon as po.sslble at points near the manufacturing ccMUers. For the.se reasons it has been considered advisable to designate as distril)uting cen- ters those centers which are close to points (d" consumption and wliidi liave the neces.sary facilities for handling wool. Necessity for concentration.— The necessities of the Government at this time are such as to refpiire tlie use of all existing agencies for concentrat iig the wool near the centers' of consumption. Therefore all the wool of the 1918 384 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. clip must be distributed through approved dealers in approved centers of distribution. "Approved dealers " <7e/?»ecZ.— "Approved dealers " shall be those dealers authorized by the War Industries Board to handle wool who are located in the distributing centers and who buy from growers direct, through agents, or from country merchants; and also those dealers authorized by the War Indus- tries Board who are located in wool-growing districts, and who buy direct from growers and resell or consign to the dealers in distributing centers. Approved distributing centers are the usual well-recognized points of dis- tribution. Classes of wool. — In a general way, the clip may be divided into fleece wool and territory wool. Fleece wool shall be considered as that which is grown in the States east of the Mississippi River, and also the States of Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Arkansas, and Louisiana, and also those parts of Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota, and other localities where the same general condi- tions prevail. All wool not listed as fleece wool shall be considered territory wool. In order that the collection of the clip may proceed in a rapid and orderly manner, the following regulations are promulgated by the wool division of the War Industries Board : FLEECE WOOL REGULATIONS. Compensation of grower and dealer. — Approved dealers shall be entitled to a gross profit in no case to exceed li cents per pound on the total season's business, this profit to cover all expenses from grower to loading wool on board cars. The grower shall receive fair prices for his wool based on the Atlantic sea- board price as established on July 30, 1917, less the profit to the dealer, as stated above, and less freight to seaboard, moisture shrinkage, and interest. In no case shall this be construed to mean that there shall be more than 1^ cents gross profits made from time wool leaves growers' hands until it arrives at the distributing center. On consignments forwarded to distributing centers the prices to be paid for the wool to the approved dealers therein shall be those established by the valuation committee on Atlantic seaboard values of July 30, 1917, to which shall be added a commission of 4 per cent to be paid by the Government, if bought by the Government, or by the manufacturer to whom the wool is al- lotted for other than Government purposes. This commission is to include grading and other expenses of handling. The consignor shall be charged with the freight on his shipment and interest on all advances m.ide for his account to the date of the arrival of his wool at a distributing center, as shown by the railroad receipt. On any lot remaining unsold In his possession for a longer period than six months the dealer shall be entitled to charge storage and insurance at the market rate, and this additional charge shall be added to the price of the wool. Pooling by groicers is advised. — Growers who desire to do so will be allowed to pool their clips in quantities of not less than minimum carloads of 16,000 pounds and consign the wools so pooled as one account to any approved dealer in any approved distributing center. Growers are urged to adopt this latter course through county agents or others, thus eliminating tlie profits of one middle man. AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 385 Goveniinent prtce.— Approved donlers in approveil distrilmtliifr centers will be required to open and grade all their purchases or consignments as rapidly as possible after the arrival of wool at point of distrihiition. Prices on all wools, as soon as graded, will be fixed by a Government valuation committee appointed for that purpose in the different distributing centers. I'rices to be paid by the Government at distributing centers for such wool as it may require are to be those established as of July 30, 1917, at the Atlantic sealxtard markets. In addition to said prices the Government is to pay a further sum equal to 4 per cent of the selling prices to cover compensation or commission to approved deal- ers for their services in collecting and distributing wool. On wool not taken by the Government for its own use afid which may be allocated for other uses, prices will also be fixed in accordance with July 30, 1917, values at Atlantic seaboard markets, and on such wool approved dealers shall be entitled to a commission or compensation of a sum equal to 4 per cent of the selling price, and this commission or compensation shall be a charge against said wool and shall be collected from the manufacturer to whom said wool is allocated. Profiteering prohibited.- — As a guard against profiteering, the books of all ap- proved dealers in distributing centers shall be at all times open to Government inspection, and if it be found that their gross profits, including the aforesaid commission of 4 per cent, are in excess of 5 per cent on tlie season's business then such gross profits shall be disposed of as the Government decides. The books of the country dealers shall likewise be open to Government In- spection. If it be found that their gross profit for the season's business is in excess of li cents per pound, then such excess profits shall be disposed of as the Government may decide. Distrihutincj centers. — The approved distributing centers for fleece wools are: Boston, Mass. ; New York, N. Y. ; Philadelphia, Pa. ; Chicago, 111. ; St. Louis, Mo. ; Detroit, Mich. ; Louisville, Ky. ; Baltimore, Md., and Wheeling, W. Va. TERRITORY WOOL REGULATIONS. Exceptions.— In the Willamette Valley, Oreg., and the Puget Sound di-strlct Of the State of Washington, the regulations in regard to lleeco wools shall apply. Distributing centers. — For the reasons before statid, in order that the 1918 wool clip may be promptly concentrated near the manufacturing centers and to make use of every available agency for .storing and grading, all territory wools must be consigned to one of the designated distributing centers which are as follows: Portland, Oreg.; Chicago, 111.; New York. N. Y. ; St. Louis, Mo.; Bos- ton, Mass. ; and Philadelphia, Pa. The only exception is that clips of under 1,000 pounds may be sold by the owner. In buying these small clips, the buyer must recf)gni7.e that he is entitled to only a small profit, which must not exceed 2 cents per pound. Gnwers, If they desire for any reason to consign their wool through their banker, country merchants, or others, may do so and said bank, country merchant, or others may receive a commission or compen.sation for handling said growers' wool (in no case to exceed one-half cent per pound) ; such connuission or compensa- tion to be paid by grower. Growers are, however, urged to consign their own wool and get the full price. Shipping.— As soon as possible aft<'r wool reaches the railroad, the owner should load it and consign it to any approved dealer he may select in one of the designated distributing centers, who will there deliver the wool to the Govern- ment or to some manufacturer to whom the Government may allot the wool. These approved dealers will store, insure, handle, and deliver the wool under 105826—21 25 386 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. Government regulation. The grower should procure two copies of the shipping invoice and of the railroad bill of lading, and forward the original invoice and bill of lading to the dealer whom he has selected to handle his wool, retaining the duplicate in his own possession. Advances, interest and freight. — The grower shall be entitled to receive an advance up to but not exceeding 75 per cent of the fair estimated market value of his wool. He shall pay interest on this advance at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date he receives such advance until his wool arrives at the distributing center as shown by the railroad receipt. It is not intended that the grower shall pay interest on advances after the date of arrival as shown by the railroad receipt, and he shall be entitled 'to receive interest on the selling value of his wool after freight has been deducted from date of arrival. The Gov- ernment is fixing the price of the 1918 clip on a basis delivered at Atlantic sea- board points. It is therefore incumbent on the grower to deliver his wool at the designated distributing centers, and the expense of delivering the wool at such centers will be charged against the wool on a basis of the freight rate from point of origin to the Atlantic seaboard. Valuing and grading. — As soon as possible after the arrival of the wool at a distributing center, if the wool is to be taken in the original bags, it shall be valued by the Government valuation committee. If the wool is to be graded it shall be valued in the piles by the Government valuation committee as soon as the piles are graded and ready for delivery. All grading will be conducted under Government supervision. The grades out of each clip will be weighed separately and the books of the dealer, as far as they pertain to any grower's wool, shall be open to him. Tags, bucks, black, and other recognized discount fleeces will be paid for at prices fixed by the Government. Bags will be paid for in the same manner. Payments to groivers. — Growers shall be entitled to payment on a basis of the date of the arrival of the wool as shown by the railroad receipt. How- ever, as it would be impossible for obvious reasons to make settlement on each clip on the date of its arrival, in order that the grower may lose nothing by any delay in settlement he shall be entitled to draw interest on the selling price of his wool less freight from the date of the wool's arrival until the date of final settlement. Final returns will be made as promptly as possible in all cases. Commissions. — The grower does not pay the commission or compensation for handling wools in the designated distributing centers. This commission or compensation for handling will be added to selling price of the wool and paid by the buyer. If sold in the original bags, the commission or compensation shall be 3 per cent of the selling price. If the wool is graded, the commission or com- pensation shall be 3^ per cent of the selling price. This commission or com- pensation includes drayage, storage, and insurance for a period not exceeding, on any lot, six months after arrival. On any lot remaining unsold in his possession for a longer period than six months the dealer shall be entitled to charge storage and insurance at the market rate, and this additional charge shall be added to the price of the wool. Mills located in wool-growing districts. — In order that the Government may have full control of the wool situation with a view^ to conserving as far as may be necessary the wool supply for miUtary purposes, it is considered neces- sary to prohibit manufacturers from buying wool except in the designated distributing centers, and then only with the permission and consent of the Government under such regulations as the Government may hereafter make. AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 387 However, mills located in wool-growing districts not near to tlu* designated centers of distribution, and which are working on Government orders, will be given permits through the wool division of the War Industries Board to buy certain amounts of wool in their immediate neighborhood. In making applications for such permits, the manufacturer applying should state the number of his Government order, the amount of goods yet to bo deliveretl against such order, the amount of his wool stock on hand, and the amount and class of wool required to complete said order. The manufacturer receiving such a permit will be required to i-eport to the wool division of the War Industries Board all purchases made against permit issued to him. Permits to dealers. — All dealers in approved centers desiring a permit to operate should apply to the wool division of the War Industries Board. Htating their capacity for storing and grading. All country dealers should apply for a permit to operate by writing to the wool division of the War Industries Board, giving name and address. In order to expedite movement of wool, dealers in country districts and distributing centers may operate immediately in accordance with the above regulations, pending application for and granting of permit. Lewis Penwell, Chief of Wool Division, War Industries Board. Appendix XXXVIII. PRIORITIES CIRCULAR NO. 10. To all manufacturers of boots and shoes; Since the conference between your representatives and the undersigned with other representatives of the War Industrial Board, careful consideration has been given to the several problems then considered, and a decision has been reached that your industry is one of war importance as well as otherwise of national importance. It is, of course, essential that necessary shoes .shall be provided for the use of our soldiers, seamen, and our civilian population. The priorities division will place manufacturers of boots and shoes on the preference list for fuel and transportation without requiring individual manu- facturers to make separate applications. It will from time to time remove from the list such manufacturers as shall fail or refuse to .send in their pledges of cooperation, or fail or refuse to comply, in good faith, with the letter and .spirit of the following program and such other requirements as may in future appear to be necessary to protect and preserve leather and other materials u.sed In the manufacture of boots and shoes. It is most essential that the utmost economy be practiced in the purchase and use of shoes. Each manufacturer must execute and send to the War Industries Board its pledge of cooperation in the form following : Priorities Division, War Industries Board, Wa-ihington, D. C. The undersigned hereby pledges itself to manufacture useful products only and (a) to devote the products of its manufacture, as far as possible, to es- sential uses only, as that term has been or may he deflned or apr>lled from time to time bv the prioriies division of the War Industries Boiird ; ib) lo urge and procure, as far as lies within its power, all dealers in or iisers of its products to exercise all possible economy and conservation in surh proat Phoddcts. Fred L. Dickey, Chairman, n. S. Rhodes. M. P. Chumlea. Vitrified Glazed Sbwbr PlPB. .\. C. McCombe, Chairman. H. B. Manton. H. E. Kilgus. Clothing. Samuel Weill, Chairman. Wm. Goldman. Chas. W. Endel. Clotiiino -Continued. Herbert C. .Vnsorgc. Edw. Rosenberg. Paul L. Feiss. Eli Strauss. Geo. M. Sherman. Ludwlg Stein. A. D. Peine. Henry X. Strauss. David Klrschbauni. Collapsible Tciies. R. L. Kenah, Chairman. A. H. Wlrz. George H. Neidllnger. A. W. Paull. Confectionery. V. L. Price, Chairman. R. R. Cleeland. H. H. Harris. Frank E. Glllen. F. A. Chappell. W. C. Bidlack. Geo. E. Close. J. K. Farley, Jr. H. W. Hoops. W. II. Belcher. Walter C. Hughes. Paul F. Belch. A. S. Colebrook. Cooperage. Walker L. Wellford, Chair- man. V. W. Krafft. E. H. Defobaugh. A. J. Poorman. Charles Hudson. W. Palmer Clarkson. F. S. Chariot. C. L. Harrison. Geo. H. Martin. W. K. Knox. C. F. Meyer. W. F. Wolfner. Corn Products. W. (5. Irwin, Chairman. C. D. Edinburg. .T. B. Itclchmann. G. S. Mahanna. Corsets. J. M. Dllman, Chairman. Daniel Kops. W. A. Marble. R. C. Sterton. L. T. Warner. Nelson fJray. 398 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. Cotton Mandfactdring. national council. Stuart W. Cramer, Chairman. Edwin F. Green, Vice Chair- man. Winston D. Adams, Secre- tary. Albert F. Bemis. Fuller E. Gallaway. D. Y. Cooper. Philip Y. DeNormandle. Arthur J. Draper. Albert G. Duncan. Frank .T. Hale. James D. Hammett. Allen F. Johnson. Gerrish IL Millikin. W. Frank Shove. Ellison A. Smith. WAR SERVICE COMMITTEE. Gerrish H. Millikin, Chair- man. Arthur J. Draper, Vice Chairman. J. S. Rousmanniere, Secre tary. Robert Amory. W. D. Anderson. J. Arthur Atwood. Howard Baetjer. Walter C. Bayliss. Harry H. Blunt. Bertram H. Borden. Arthur T. Bradlee. W. Irving Bullard. J. W. Cannon. B. B. Comer. J. W. Cone. Philip Dana. George A. DeForest. B. H. Bristow Draper. F. C. Dumaine. H. R. Fitzgerald. B. E. Geer. C. L. Gilliland. Henry S. Howe. George H. Lanier. J. p. Ledyard. Arthur H. Lowe. A. W. McLellan. Victor M. Montgomery. J. E. Osborn. Andrew G. Pierce, jr. John Skinner. Cotton Thread. J. William Clark, Chairman. W. H. Hall. H. E. Locke. Chas. Spicehandler. W. W. Orswell. L. B. Cranska. C. E. Barlow. W. V. Smith. Cotton Waste. Henry F. McGrady, Chair- man. Joseph F. Wallworth. Samuel L. Ayres. Michael F. Dunn. Jas. F. McNeel. Curtains. George J. Martin, Chairman. M. E. Wormser. D. C. Pierce. Pocket Knives. Chas. F. Rockwell, Chair- man. C. B. Butler. D. Divine, jr. Adolph Kastor. C. W. Silcox. Dental Manufacturing. Frank H. Taylor, Chairman. G. L. Grler, Secretary. C. O. Rother. J. R. Sheppard. H. A. Slaight. E. E. Smith. S. Rubin. Drugs. Willard Ohliger, Chairman. Frank G. Ryan. Donald McKesson. Frederick G. Rosengarten. W. A. Sailes. Burton T. Bush. Dr. H. C. Lovis. Milton Campbell. Dr. W. C. Abbott. Drugs (Proprietary). Frank A. Blair, Chairman. W. E. Weiss. A. H. Beardsley. Z. C. Patten, jr. E. K. Hyde. Louis Liggett. Drugs (Wholesale). F. E. Bogart, Chairman. Jas. W. Morrison. H. D. Brewer. Terry T. Greil. C. F. Michaels. J. M. Penland. H. D. Faxon. Roblin H. Davis. Drug.s (Wholesalk) — Continued. C. S. Martin. C. E. Bedwell. W. G. Noyes. Wm. Scott. R. R. Ellis. C. P. Walbridge. Drugs (Retail). Eugene C. Brokmeyer, Chair man. .lames F. Finneran. Robert J. Frick. James P. Crowley. Theo. F. Hagenow. Charles H. Huhn. Samuel C. Henry. Charles F. Harding. Dry Goods (Wholesale). CENTRAL committee. John W. Scott, Chairman. Calvin M. Smyth. James M. Easter. Ernest W. Stix. Leon Smith. Arthur C. Farley. E. B. Snydor. Frank S. Evans. subcommittee on dress FABRICS. H. Clay Miller, Chairman. Colby Davies. R. B. McKenny. D. W. Jarvis. W. F. Dalzell. Samuel D. French. Murray Brown. Fred T. Howard. subcommittee on knit goods. Chas. A. Jobes, Chairman. John E. McLoughlin. D. J. Callaghan. J. H. Emery. A. Chas. Wilson. subcommittee on sales- men's SAMPLES. Ward M. Burgess, Chairman^ Bentley P. Neflf. W. R. King. Gaylord W. Gillis. I. M. Parsons. AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THK WAR. Dry Goods (Wholesale) — Continued. SCBCOMMITTBB ON NOTIONS AND SMALL WARES. Jacob K. Lossey, Chairman. Ihos. C. Donovan. Julius Baer. J. Dey Conover. Harry Wheeler. DuY Goods (Retail). Victor W. Sincere, Chairman. M. L. Wilkinson. Oscar Webber. S. J. Schwartz. H. A. Saks. Sanitary Earthenware. J. A. Campbell, Chairman. A. M. Maddock. Philip J. Flaherty. Electkic Railways. Thos. X. McCarter, Chairman. Arthur W. Brady. Britton I. Budd. Philip H. Gadsden. Lucius S. Storre. Electrical Mandfacturing. central committee. Clarence L. Collins, 2d, Chairman. James C. Ilobart. J. H. McKee. William Wallace Nichols. Robert K. Sheppard. Charles A. Terry. ELECTRICAL APPARATUS. Clarence L. Collens, 2d, Chair- man. F. S. Hunting. T. E. Barnum. H. C. Petty. Walter J. Friedlander. H. G. Steele. ELECTRICAL SUPPLIES. R. K. Sheppard, Chairman. J. F. Kerlin. W. M. Stearns. FI. R. Holmes. W. W. Mumma. J. M. Woodward. H. W. Bliven. J. B. Adams. Herman Plant. H. G. Lewis. Electrical Manufactur- ing — Continued. electrical SUPPLIES — COU. C. B. Corrigan. F. W. Hall. H. W. McCandless. R. W. Seabury. W. H. Thornley. H. D. Betts. Chas. L. Eidlitz. D. H. Murphy. Wallace S. Clark. J. C. Dallam. Charles G. Rupert. W. Roy McCanne. Electrical Supply Job- bers. E. C. Graham, Chairman. J. G. Johannesen. - W. F. P. Mayo. E. W. Rockafellow. E. F. Smith. Elevators. Martin B. McLauthlin, Chair- man. A. B. See. I. B. Haughton. George T. Marshall. F. A. Hecht. C. H. M. Atkins. Enameled Ware. George D. Mcllvalne, Chair- man. Jas. F. Conran. A. H. Cline. jr. J. E. Murphy. T. R. Barnes. E.ngineering. Clemens Herschel, Chairman. Benj. B. Thayer. I. E. Moultrop. Calvert Townley. civil. Chas. S. Churchill. Chairman. Prof. Geo. F. Swain. Prof. F. H. Newell. .\l, Chairman. E. L. Seabrook. J. H. Hussie. A. B. Lewllss. John .\. Plerpont. II. C. Knl.sely. Geo. Thosmndier. T. P. Walsh. Otto GouHsenhelnier. John Bogenberger. Silk. Charles Cheney, Chairman. II. Schnledwlnd, Jr. Loui.s St<'nrns. M. W. DIppel. R. J. F. Schwarzenbacb. advertising SPBCIALTIia. Carroll 11. Sudler, Chairman. C. S. Sultzor. Theo. E. Gerlach. 408 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. Stationeet. Wm. Pitt, Chairman. Eberhard Faber. Chas. C. Davis. Chas. S. Brewer. Carl J. Weissbrod. Wm. H. Rodington. Henry S. Dennison. Wm. O. Day. Geo. E. Parmenter. Edwin C. Ryals. Envelopes. C. R. Scudder, Chairman. R. O. Brigham. Lawrence B. Smith. H. W. Stuart. A. B. Whiting. Steam and Hot Watbe Pit- tings. Wm. H. Oakes, Chairman. N. Loring Danforth. J. B. Rutzler. Juan A. Almirall. Henry B. Gombers. Steel Baeeels. R. H. Hackney, Chairman. S. B. Cochrane. George A. Moore. W. Manning Kerr. G. De F. Kinney. B. J. Allen. Steel Tanks. M. P. Moore, Chairman. T. B. O'Brien. P. C. Keller. A. M. Morrison. Stoves. Frederick Will, Chairman. George H. Barbour. Arthur W. Walker. H. J. Karges. Lewis Moore. John D. Green. Robert A. Patton. L. H. Booch. George Mitchell. John J. Fisher. Waem Aie Hbatees. Edward Norris, Chairman. George D. Wilkinson. John A. Howard. W. L. Dawbarn. W. C. Williamson. Alfred B. Moran. Allan W. Williams. Gas Ranges. William M. Crane, Chairman. Joseph E. Nason. H. D. Schall. G. D. Roper. H. M. Leach. A. A. Ainsworth. Sugar. W. L. Petrikin, Chairman. H. A. Douglas. W. H. Hannam. E. C. Howe. S. H. Love. S. W. Sinsheimer. W. P. Turner. SuEGicAL Dressings. H. C. Lovis, Chairman. H. P. Kendall. Frank R. Jones. G. T. Bauer. E. T. Sawtell. F. R. Davis. Dr. L. L. Walters. Surgical Insteumbnts. Chas. J. Pilling, Chairman. Richard Kny. J. A. Pfarre. Edward Sovatkin. Ernest Stratmanu. Tanning. central committee. T. Edward Wilder. J. Clinton Smoot. BAG AND STRAP. J. C. Byron, Chairman. Mahlon R. Bryan. Ed. McKown. E. C. Thiers. B. V. Harrison. calf AND KIP. August H. Vogel, Chairman. Albert P. Gallun. Morris S. Barnet. C. P. Hall. W. B. Eisendrath. FANCY LEATHER. Louis J. Robertson, Chair- man. W. H. Barrett. Charles Druedlng. G. B. Bernheim. J. W. Helburn. TANNING — Continued. GLAZED KID. Charles Reynolds, Chairman. Charles Vaughan. Percival E. Poerderer. John Blatz. James I. Ford. GLOVE LEATHER. Richard M. Evans, Chair- man. Henry Greenebaum. Maurice S. Miller. Joseph W. Mendel. Arthur White. HARNESS. F. C. Hoffman, Chairman. D. M. Hart. E. C. Thiers. F. A. Krehl. P. Carlisle. PATENT UPPER. C. Q. Adams, Chairman. Albert F. Gordon. Elisha W. Cobb. C. P. Hall. Maxwell J. Lowry. SHEBP AND LAMB. W. R. Fisher, Chairman. Prank G. Allen. Richard Young. E. L. Macdonald. Hans Schmidt. SIDE UPPER. T. S. Haight, Chairman. Fred Rueping. E. H. Foot. M. C. Weimer. T. S. Keirnan. sole and BELTING. H. Frederick Lesh, Chair- man. J. T. P. McGarry. Henry W. Boyd. T. Edward Wilder. Walter S. Hoyt. UPHOLSTEET. R. C. Good, Chairman. William Hatton. H. N. Hill. Edward L. Neilson. H. C. McBriar. AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THK WAIt. •109 Tile. F. W. Walker, Chainnaii. H. D. Lillibridge. L. S. Jones. Hamilton Ilazelhurst. Tobacco. Edward Wise, Chairman. Chas. J. Eiscnlohr. Alf. S. Rossin. Jesse A. Bloch. J. L. Graham. Walter 11. O'Brien. Geo. H. Hummel. A. L. S.vlvester. William T. Reed. I. C. Rosenthal. Maximilian Stern. Toys. Alfred C. Gilbert. Chairmun. G. S. Parker. H. C. Ives. C. H. Bennett. A. T. Scharps. Leo Schlesinger. A. D. Converse. F. D. Dodge. Bernard E. Fleischaker. Trunks and Teavelixg Goods. Nathan Goldsmith, Chair- man. n. W. Ra.vmond. Stanle.v Klein. John Meisel. Wm. V. Schnur. Henry Ljkly. Aaron Belber. J. W. Seward. Geo. W. Wheary. E. H. Davis. VACnUM Cr-EANERS. H. W. Hoover, Chairman. A. J. Stecker. Julius Tutour. F. S. Hunting. F. H. Jones. Wall Paper. Henry Burn, Chairman. A. E. Lyons. Frank Pago. W. D. Uptegraff. W. A. Huppuch. W. F. Bay Stewart. George Tait. I. Baumgartl. Howard M. Heston. George H. Keim. Washing Machines. II. W. Eden, Chairman. Sam T. White. L. E. Dietz. W. L. Rodgors. J. D. A. Johnson. Raymond Marsh. Waste Material (Deal KRS.) Louis Birkenstein, Chairman F. W. Reidenliach. E. A. Salomon. Paul Lowenthal. Maurice Goldstein. Newell J. Lewis. Wm. Lewin. Ivan Reitler. Wheels. Thos. A. White, Chairman. E. H. Archibald. O. B. Bannister. H. F. Harper. O. W. Mott. H. A. Long. Woodworking. F. E. Shearman. C. F. Tomlinson. Fdrnitdee and Fixtdhes. Robt. W. Irwin, Chairman. E. V. Hawkins. A. H. Stringe. Benj. J. Bosse. W. A. Brolin. E. H. McQuinn. F. E. Shearman. C. F. Luce. C. H. Burt. E. W. Schultz. C. F. Tomlinson. A. W. Das.sler. A. H. Hall. P. B. Schravensandc. C. A. O'Connor. G.M. Hillenbrand. Jos. Peters, jr. H. A. Barnard. A. G. Steinman. Commercial Fixtcbes. J. H. Servatlus, Chairman. G. W. Johnson. S. D. Young. C. F. E. Luce. ^oda Fountainn: A. R. Lud- low. RcfrigeratorH.- F. L. Northey. Laboratory Equipment: C. G. Campbell. Commercial Fixtubes — Con- tinued. Drafting Room Equipment: T. A. Dahn. Cooling Boxes: W. 11. Du- Ross. Dutchcru' Supplies: A. D. Daemlcke. Lumber Millwork. G. L. Curtis, Chairmun. George J. Osgood. L. J. Bardwell. Frank Stevens. P. F. Conway. W. M. Otis. E. R. Jones. M. B. Copeland. Chas. V. Bossert. Wm. H. Morris. S. S. King. Harry A. Gregg. G. E. Morgan. E. C. Noelke. F. J. Moss. Herman T. Rediske. A. J. Siegel. J. C. Owens. executive committee. G. L. Curtis, Chairman. Harry A. Gregg. E. R. Jones. L. J. Bardwell. W. M. Otis. Wool Mancfactubino. Frederick S. Clark, Chair- man. Wm. M. Wood. Franklin W. Hobbs. Geo. H. Hodgson. Nathanli'l Stevens. Geo. B. Sanford. Robt.T. Francis. John P. Stevens. A. L. GilTord. Herbert E. Penbody. Wlnthrop L. Marvin. J. J. Nevins. Wool Stock Grading. Edward A. Stone, Chairman. Edward N. Myers. Oscar GunililiiHky. Nathan Knivln. Mark Shcrwin. Charles Frniikfl. Alliert D. Ullinan. Winsor H. Watson. Herman Rawltser. INDEX. Page. Abrasives 199 Emery 199 Optical glass 199 Acetate of lime 191 Acetic acid 191, 379 Acetic anhydride 192 Acetone 190, 191 Acetylene 185 Acids and heavy chemicals 163-166 Nitric acid 163, 165, 166 Price fixing 163, 164, 166 Sulphuric acid 163-165 Adams, H. J 201 Advisory Commission 20 Advisory Committee on Plants and Munitions 43 Agi-icultural implements 67 Airplane lumber 215 Alcohol 171 Production of 377 Aleshire, Gen. J. B 48 Alkali and chlorine 166-170 Allied Purchasing Commission- 33, 262 Allied Silk Trading Corporation- 241 Aluminum 148-150 Control of 149, 150 Prices 149 Production 148 War uses 149 Aluminum Co 148,149,150 Amatol 178 American Federation of Labor— 85, 90 American Iron and Steel Insti- tute 142, 143, 147 American Vanadium Co 144 Ammonium nitrate 176, 179 Ammonium sulphate 93,94 Analine 181, 182 Anderson, Chandler 92 Antimony 153, 154 Appeals to Chairman 104 Armsby, George N 48, 92, 147 Army appropriation act 287 Page. Artificial dyes and intermedi- ates 181-184 Analine 181, 182 Domestic production 182 German manufacturing __ 181, 182 German patents 183 Phenol 182 Substitutes 183 War shortage 181, 182 Asbestos and magnesia 200, 201 Aspirin 206, 207 Associated Fire Underwriters.- 39 Atwood, L. R 188 Australian wool 232,233 Automatic classifications 54 Automatic priorities 54, 123 Automatic ratings . 54, 55 Automobile industry 69,128 Production 389 Automotive products 270-273 Curtailment 271, 272 Growth 271 Motor trucks 273 Pledge 271 Section 270 War work 270 Auxiliary mineral products— 190-203 Aycock, T. J 210 Ayres. Dr. Leonard 43 Badges for workers 90 Baker, U. S 126 Bakers' conservation 62 Barbour, H. H 48 Barclay, .7. Searle HI Baruch, B. M 20,22, 25, 26, 27, 33. 55, 58, 78, 110, 154 Bass, R. D 80 Belting — .254 P.iiinchard, L W 222 Bogart, Dr. Ernest L 46 Bogart. Dr. M. T 104 Boilers, conden.sers, etc 283,284 P.olton, Lieut. Col. C. C 35 411 412 INDEX. Page. Books, see pulp and paper. Boots and shoes 252-254 Classification 253 Conservation 252, 253 Prices 253 Priorities Circular No. 10— 253 Retail stores 254 Boyd, Henry W 92, 248 Brass 139-141 Cartridge cases 140 Forms of 139, 140 Outpost wire 140 Permit system 141 Production of 140. 141 Tubing 140 War uses 140 Bristles 246 Britisti— " Civil issues prices " 93 Commodity committees 92, 93 Cooperation 94 " Military issues prices " — 93 Bromine 193 Brookings, Robert S 22, 27, 33, 78 Brown, Alexander C 266 Brunker, A. R 163 Building materials 219-221 Conservation 221 Curtailment 220 Division 219 Kinds of 219 Nonwar construction 220 Prices 220, 221 Standardization 221 Bulkley, R. J 278 Burlap 243-245 Bush. S. P 42,262 ■' Buy-a-bale " 230 Calder resolution, reply to 57, 365 Camphor 193 Carbon tetrachloride 170 Carboys, glass 199,200 Carr, James A 33 Carroll, H. G 166 Cartridge-bag silk 241,242 Catgut 205 Catlett, Charles 197 Caustic soda 166,167 Celluloid 193 Centralized authority 27 Ceramics 197 Page. Chains 267, 268 Chamber of Commerce of United States 23 Chamberlain, Austen 93 Chambers, Edward 55, 58 Cliase, M. F 175 Chemical glass and stoneware- 199-200 Carboys 199 Chemical stoneware 200 Scientific glass 200 Chemicals division 157-202 Chemicals for munitions 157-180 Chiefs of sections 104, 105, 106 Chilean nitrate 157-161, 390-391 Chlorine 169, 170 Christie, G. I 86 Chromite 14.5, 146 Churchill, Winston 93 Clapp, A. W 58,89 Clark, Le Roy 280 Clarkson, Grosvenor B 20 Classification of commodities— 31 Classification of purposes, etc_- 52, 55, 339 " Clearance " 34-37, 107 Clearance committee 34 Clearance list 34,316,319 Clearance office 35 Clinical thermometers 205 Clothing, conservation 65 Coffin, Howard E 20 Coke 112 Colver, W. B 78, 222 Commandeer, right to 51, 73, 74 Commercial Economy Board 61 " Committees of the industries "_ 20-22 Commodity sections : Conversion activities 39 Expanded 27 Form of 104 Function of 3-5, 103 Nature of 103,104 Organization of 100 Origin of 23, 104 Treatment of 109 Varied activities of 106, 107 Work of 104,105 Commodity statistics section — 45 " Community labor boards " 89 Competition in Government buy- ing 21. 32-33, 36, 93 Page. Conclusion 96-100 Condensers. (See boilers, con- densers, etc.) Conner, C. H 190 Conservation (see also all of Part II) 61-69,108 Agreements 63 Agricultural implements — 67 Automobiles 69 Automobile tires 67 Bakers 62 Boots and shoes 66 Clothing 65 Commodity sections 63 Delivery methods 62 Distribution 61 Division 61 Electrical industry 68 Experience abroad 61 Hardware 68 Industries affected by 68 Knit goods 66 Lessons from work in 69 Plan and purpose 61, 63, 64 Pledges 65 Publicity 61 Regulations 64 Return of goods 62 Sanctions for 65 Sentiment of industry 64, 69 Spools 66 Styles and types 63 Tin in silk 68 War service commissions 63 Wool 234, 235 Conservation Division of Army_ 91 " Conspectus of progress " 45 Construction : Emergency 219 Nonwar 217, 220 Control, method of 18 Conversion section 40, 41 Conversions 38, 39, 41, 42 Conveying apparatus 284 Coonley, Howard 86 Cooperation in industry: Benefits of 99 Dangers of 99 Effect of war on 98,99 Government's attitude 98, 100 Cooperative delivery 62 >EX. 413 Page. Copper 130-137 Conferences on price flxing_ 133 Control of distribution.. 135, 130 European demand 132 Labor problem 131, 133 Maxinmm production 130 Output for 1917 130 Price — Advance 135 Comparisons 130 Control 130 Fixed 134 Producers' pledge 134 Purchases for allies 132 Regulations 135 Sales on memorandum 131 Spirit of industry 137 Study of costs 133 Technique 130 Voluntary price to Govern- ment 130 Wages 131 Copper and brass 130-141 Cordage. (See Jute, hemp, and cordage. ) Cork 246 Cornell, Irwin H 151 Cost of production 75, 76 Cotton : Goods 228-231, 383 Linters 172-174 Raw 220-231 Prices 230,231 Special committee on 231 Council of National Defense: Law creating 19 Relation to War Industries Board 21 Staff of 20 Cover, T 248 Crane, Mr 150 Cranes 266-267 Creosote 185-180 Cromwell, Lincoln 236 Cross-hauls 122 Crowder. Gen. Enoch 90 Curtailment 05, 108 Darling. Ira C 185.180 Darlington, Fred 278 Davis. Mr 149 Declaration of war 49, 73, 74 414 INDEX. Page. Delivery methods 62 Dental instruments 205 Devastated regions 94,95 Dillon, Clarence 27 Donnelly, T. E 222 Downman, R. H 219 Draper, F. W 154 Drugs : Prices 207 Production 204, 380 Du Bois, Henry C 198 Dunn, H. T 255 Dyes: Artificial. (See Artificial dyes, etc.) Natural. (See Tanning ma- terials, etc.) Dyestuffs, production 378 Dyewoods, regulations 378 Economizers 284 Edgar, Chas 219 Editorial section 45 Electrical apparatus and sup- plies 280-282 Electrical power and equip- ment 280-284 Boilers, condensers, etc 283 Steam turbines 282 Electrodes 198, 379 Electrodes and abrasives 198-199 Emergency Construction Com- mittee 219 Emery 199 Engineering and Mining Jour- nal 151 Esberg, E. I 208 Ethyl alcohol 171 European demands, effect of 71 Excess profits taxes 72 Executive order. May 28, 1918— 25, 26 Explosives 174-180 Amatol ^ 178 American expansion 174 Ammonium nitrate 178 Chemicals for 180 Control 174,175 Facilities amortized 176 Nitrocellulose powder 177 Picric acid 179 Program 175 Requirements 175 Shipping 174, 176, 179 T. N. T 178 Facilities Division 42, 43 Fact finding 46, 104, 105 Farm implements, rationing of_ 128 Federal Trade Commission 76 Felt 238-241 Conservation 239 Cutting 240 Hats 240 Lithographic 241 Paper makers' 240 Permit system 239 Rabbit fur 240 Raw materials 238 Section 238 Textile felt 239. Trade secrets 239 Ferroalloys 142-146 Ferromanganese 142, 143 Ferrosilicon 145 Ferrovanadium 144 Finch, Mr 46 Fir Production Board 216 Fire extinguishers 170, 265 Fire prevention 277, 278 Fixed prices. (/See Price fixing.) Flannery, J. R 273 Flax 242, 243 Fletcher, Admiral F. F 22, 27, 35, 55 Food Administration 21 Food and fuel act 73 Foreign Mission 92-95, 202 Membership 92 Forestry products and building materials 211-227 Forgings, ordnance, small arms, etc 262-264 Foster, Charles K 48. 278 Frankfurter, Felix ___ 55,58,85,86,88 Frayne, Hugh A 22, 27, 78, 86, 90 Freight cars 43, 275, 276 Fritts, Frank 10 Fuel Administration 21 Functional divisions 23 Garfield, H. A 58, 78 Gas products. (See Industrial gases, etc.) Gay, Dean Edwin F 43, 45, 58 General Munitions Board 21, 32 Gibbs, Sir Herbert 158 Gifford, A. L 235 Gifford, W. S 20 Glove leather 252 Gloves and leather clothing 254 INDEX. 416 Page. Godfrey. Hollis 20 Goethals, Gen. G. W 27, 55 Gonipers, Samuel 20,82,83 Guggenheim, Daniel 131 Haley, E. J 187 Hamilton, C. D. P 248 Hannnurabi, Code of 23 Hanch, C. C 270 Hancock, Commander J. M 78 Hardware 68, 264 Hardware and hand tools 264-266 Builders' hardware 266 Fire extinguishers 265 Horseshoes 265 Hydrants and valves 265 Metal beds 265 Priority 265,266 Saddlery hardware 264 Section 264 Ships' hardware 265 Textile needles 264 Harness and personal equip- ment 254 Harness, bag, and strap leather- 252 Hatfield, Dr. Henry R 44, 46 Hayes, Frank J 85 Heidrich, E. C, jr 243 Hemp. (See Jute, hemp, and cordage. ) Hides, leather, and leather goods 247-254 Belting 254 Boots and shoes 252-254 Division 248 Gloves and leather clothing. 254 Harness, bag, and strap leather 252 Harness and personal equip- 4nent 254 Hides and skins 248-250 Output of United States— 247 Problem 248 Sheepskin ^nd glove leather 252 Sole and belting leather.. 250, 251 Upper leather 251 Hides and skins... 248-250 Country hides 250 Cowhide, prices 249 Sheepskins 248, 249 History of prices during the war 44,46,324 Hoover, Herbert 58 Horning, H. L 270 Page. Horses and mules, shortage 93,04 Hosiery, woolen 237 Hospital furniture 206 Howe, O. C 248 Howland, C. P 48 Hubbard, Russell S 163, 188 Hughes. John 93 Humphrey, R. L 219 Hutcheson, William L 85 Hutchinson, Lincoln 92, 147 Hylan, reply to 57, 363 Iron and steel., 110-129 Conference on price fixing 118, 119 Comparative prices 120 Control of distribution.. _ 124, 125 " Cost plus profit " 116, 117 Differentials, price 121 European demand 113, 114 Excess profits 117 Imixjrtance of control 129 Intermediates, prices of 121 Joint circular 124,368 Markets 113 Middle men 118 Pooling idea 117 President's declaration 115 Prices alike for all 116, 117 Price-control sentiment .. 115, 116 Prices fixed 117,120 Price-fixing agreement 120 Price schedules 367 Priority, control 122, 123 Production in 1918 122 Products, prices 121 Rationing procedure 124, 125 Report on price fixing 119 Report of Replogle 118, 360 Technical features— 111, 112. 113 Use in war HO Isinglass. (See Mica.) Indian Government silver 94 Industrial Adjustments Com- mission 58, 59, 127. 350 Industrial chemicals 181-195 Industrial cooperation service.. 91 Industrial gn.ses and gas prod- ucts 184-185 Acetylene 1^5 Oxygen 1^5 Saccharine 186 Toluol 184.185 Industrial Inventory 19,38-41 Iudu.strial preparedness 96 416 INDEX. Page. Industries, classification of 89, 90 Ingels, H. P 27 Inland traffic section 58 Interallied Munitions Council-- 93 Interlocking directorates 103 International control 92 International executives 92, 147, 158, 390 International Nickel Co 152 Interstate commerce act. May 29, 1917 50 Introductory 103-109 Iron Age, on steel 115 I. W. W 83 Jackling, Mr 175 James, George R 172 Joint circular, iron and steel 124, 125, 368 "Just compensation " 73, 74 "Just compensation" legal mean- ing 75, 76 Jute, hemp, and cordage 243-246 Bristles 240 British control 244 Cork 245 Hemp 245 Henequen or sisal 243, 245 Importation 244 Prices 94, 244 Keller, Gen. Charles 278 Kernan Boai-d 19,38 King, Stanley 86 King, V. L 183 Knit goods 236-238 Conservation 66, 237 Labor bureaus 84 Labor committee of Council of National Defense 82,83 Labor, competition for 84 Labor conditions 46, 86 Labor conference, February 28, 1917 83 Labor Conference Board 85, 357 Labor disputes 86 Labor division 90, 91 Labor policy 83,84,357 Labor priorities bulletin- 1,89,90,358 Labor priorities section 58, 89 Labor problems 82-91 Labor program 83, 84, 85 Labor turnover 83, 84, 87, 89 Lanoline 188 Lauck, W. Jett 86 Page. Lead 150-151 Leather. {See Hides, leather, and leather goods.) Leather clothing 254 Leather and rubber 247-259 Legal basis of price fixing 72-74 Legal basis of priorities 49-51 Legal status of board 24, 25, 27, 28 Legge, Alex 27,33,35,55,93 Leith, C. K 201 " Lessons " 96 Lewis, H. J 248 "Liberty shoe" 253 Lind, John 85 Linoleum 245, 246 Linters. {See Cotton linters.) Lithographic felt 241 Llewelyn, Sir Leonard 147 Locomotives 43, 274, 275 Production 389 Logwood 187 Loree, L. P 85 Lovett, Robert S 33, 48 Lumber 211-219 Airplane 215 Black walnut 213 Committee 211 Conservation 217 Construction, nonwar 217 Costs of production 212. 214 Domestic production 214 Emergency Construction Committee 219 Fir 214 Government purchases 213 Mahogany 215, 216 Price agreements : 212-215 Price fixing 214,215 Prices 212-215 Priority administration-- 216-218 Priority Circular No. 54„ 218, 219 Production ^ 213, 381 Regional administrators — 216 Requirements 211 Ship lumber 215 Softwood 216, 217 Lumber emergency bureaus 212 Lumber and labor 90 MacDowell, Charles H 157, 159, 168, 175 Machine tools 259-262 Machinery and tools 259-269 Mackall, Paul 92, 9':, 111 1ND1-:X. 417 Page. MaclMiemm. F. H 4S Mag:nesi!i. (See Asbestos and magnesia. ) Magnesium, metallic 193, 194 Manganese 142-144 "Market value" 74,7") Martin, Dr. Franklin H 20 Mason. Admiral N. E 48 May. George 58 McCormick, Vance C 58 McCutcheon, Prof. T. P 194 McKenney, Col. C. A 48 McKinstry, Gen 95 McLauehlan, Jay C 111 McLennen, D. R 57 Mediation Commission S3, 354 Mediation and Conciliation, United States Board of S.^ " Mediation service " 8.^ Medicinals 207 Medical industry section 204 Medical .supplies 204-207 Mellon Institute 194 Merrill, W. H 278 Merryweather, G. E 259 Metals, miscellaneous 142-15G Methods of control 18 Mexican sisal 243,245 Meyer. Eugene, jr 131, 136 Mica 201-203 Michael, C. Edwin 85 Middlemen 118 Military optical glass 268-269 Miscellaneous chemicals 192-194 Bromine 193,194 Camphor 193 Celluloid 193 Metallic magnesium 193, 194 AVhite arsenic 193 Mitchell, Prof. W. C 44 Montgomery, Lieut. Col. Robert H 78 Moody, Prof. H. R 194 Morehead, J. M 184 Morey, Dr 269 Morss, Everett 48, 140 Motor trucks 273 Munitions. (See Forgings, ord- nance, etc.) Munitions, chemicals for 157-180 Munitions, report of special board on 114 105826—21 27 Page. .Munitions Standards Honrd 21 Mustard gas 188 National defense act 49 National Indu.strlal Conference Board 85 National War Labor Board 85,86 National Waste Reclamation Section 91 Naval appropriations act 50, 73 Naval Consulting Board 19 New plants 42 New York public school 57, 363 Nichols, H. W 222 Nickel 152 Nitrate of soda 157-161, 377. 390 American importers 1.58. 159 Essentiality of 97, 1.57, 390 German stocks 1.58 International executive 92, 158-160 Pool prices 159. 160, 377 Pooling arrangement 158-161 Prices 1.5S Purchases 158 Sales at 4i cents 159 Story of 390 Supplies in Chile 160 Uses of 161 Nitric acid 16.5-166 Nitrocellulose powder 176. 177 Nitrogen fixation. 97,157,178,179,391 Nitro Powder Plant 177 " Nonessential industries " 58, 59 Nonferrous metals division 150 Nonwar construction section — 57 Noyes, P. B 55,58 Nutgalls 184 Official Bulletin 88 Olander, Victor 85 Old Hickory Plant 177 Oleum 163-165 " One-delivery-a-day " 62 Optical glas.s. (-SVe Military optical glass, etc.) Ordway, Lucius P 48,93 Origin of War Indu.strles Board. 17 Osborne, Loyall A 85 Otis, Charles A 40 Overman Act 25.290 r)\vens bottle machine 200 Oxygen ^85 Page, Thomas Walker 231 418 INDEX. Page. Paige, H. Ray 159 Faints and pigments 188-190 Conservation 189-190 Kauri gums 189,190 Sliellac 190 Tin cans 189, 190 Trade conference 190 Vanish industry 189 Waxes 189 Palmer, Edgar 137 Palmer, G. J 222 Paper. (See Pulp and paper.) Paper, production 383 Paper makers' felt 240 Parker, Edwin B_ 10, 27, 48. 55, 58, 12G Parsonage, E. E 222 I'atterson. Albert M 92 Paxton, J. W 201 Peabody, H. E 234 Peace Conference 95 Peace-time W. I. B 96 Peek, George N 27, 104, 228 Pennock, J. D 166 Pemvell, Lewis 234 Perkins, Thomas Nelson 48 Personnel of W. I. B 291 Personnel, fitness of 28 I'harmaceuticals 206-207 Phelps, W. W 78 Phenol 179, 182 Phillips, W. Vernon 111 Physicians, committee of 204 Picric acid 176, 179 Pierce, E. A 92 Pierce, Gen. Palmer E 22 Piez, Charles 55, 86 Pine, southern yellow 211,214 Planning bureau, suggested— 37, 46, 92 Planning and Statistics Divi- sion 43 Platinum 154-156 Domestic uses 154 Conservation 156 Licensing system 155 Prices .' 156 Russian supply 154 War uses 154 Post offices and labor 83 Potash 168-169 Powell, T. C 48, 58 Power 278-280 I'reference lists Nos. 1 and 2___ 52, 56, 57, 89, 340, 342 Page. Preferential Shipments Act 50 Preservation of war industries 97 President's authority as Com- mander in Chief 74 President's letter, Mar. 4, 1918 (25 et seq.). President's Mediation Commis- sion__ 83-85 President's powers in price fix- ing 72-74 President's powers in priority— 49, 50 Press cloth 174 Price advances 71 Price bulletins. War Industries Board 44, 46, 324 Price control 79, 80 Fuel, transportation, and la- bor 118 Price fixing 70-81, 108, 109 Agencies for 76 Basic commodities 74 By agreement 74 Coal 74,75 Confusion of trade 70 Corollary agreements 77 Cost of production 1 75, 76 Early efforts 74 Effect on business 81 Effect on contracts 77,117 Extent of 80 Government purchases 80 Hearings 76, 77 Law of supply and demand- 80 Legal basis of 72-74 " Margins of profit " 75 Maximum prices 77 Method of "72 " Negotiated " "J"! Novelty of 70 President's announcement- 72, 115 President's part in 72 Reasons for 70, 71 Short periods 77 Price Fixing Committee : Members of 78 Procedure of 78, 79 Quasi-judicial character — 77, 78 Separate from board 78 Type of membership 78 Price statistics section 44 Price studies 44, 46 Priorities 47-60, 108 Priorities Board, members 55 IKDEX. 419 Page. Priority certificates 48 Classifications for 52, 53 Number used 54 Procedure 53 "The test" 54 Priorities Circular — No. 1 48,51,123,325 No. 2 51,123,327 No. 4 52,123,330 No. 5 123,125,126 No. 10 253,387 No. 20 342 No. 21 57,381 No, 24 257 No. 28 372 No. 35 374 No. 45 279,392 No. 54 218,219 No. 60 52 Labor No. 1 358 Priority classifications 52, .53 Automatic 54 Steel 123, 124 Priorities Commissioner 48 Priorities Committee 34 Members 48 Priority : Centralized power of 50 Effect on prices 47 Legal basis of 49-51 Priority ratings, defined 51-55 Priority rulings : Finality of 49 Sanction of 50, 51 Priority system-: Studies abroad 48 Technique of 51-56 " Prohibition of industries " 58. 59 Publications. (See Pulp and paper. ) Pulp and paper 222-227 Conservation 224 Curtailment 223-226 Fiber Board Section 222 Manufacturing Section 222 Newspaper Section 225 Paper as a .substitute 223 Paper Economies Section — 227 Periodicals 225 Production 222 Publications 225, 226 Paiw materials for 222, 223 Text books 226 Wall paper 226 Pagv. Puriiell. Frank 111 Purpose of board 29 Purpose of people 18 Quasi-judicial 28 Queiiracho extract 187, 188 Questionnaires 39, 40 Questionnaries Section 44, 45 Quicksilver 15;i Rabbit fur 240 Rag administrator 23.5 Railroad Administration 21 Railway equipment and sup- plies 273-277 Freight cars 275-277 Locomotives 274-27.5 Rationing: Agreements 58,59,127 Automobile industry 128 Circulars 128 Enforcement 127 Farm implements 128 Industries 123, 125, 126, 127 Recommendation 96 Refractories 196-197 Regional advisors 40.41 Replogle, J. Leonard-. 27, 110, 118, 14ir Reports from trades 105 Requirements: Bill of 30 Division 35, 106, 107, 320 Procedure 30. 106, 107 Program of 30-37 " Requisition," right of 73, 74 Resources and Conversion Sec- tion 40. 41 Resources, study of 38-4