\ 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 SANTA BARBARA 
 
 PRESENTED BY 
 DOUWE STUURMAN
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 BY 
 
 ARTHUR COLLIER 
 
 EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES 
 BY 
 
 ETHEL BOWMAN 
 M. A. WELLESLEY COLLEGE 
 
 CHICAGO 
 THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO. 
 
 LONDON AGENTS 
 
 REGAN PAUL, FRENCH, TRUBNER & Co., LTD. 
 1909 
 
 jr
 
 COPYRIGHT 1909 
 
 BY 
 
 OPEN COURT PUBLISHING Co. 
 CHICAGO 
 
 THE TORCH PRESS 
 
 CEDAR RAPIDS 
 
 IOWA
 
 PREFATORY NOTE 
 
 By this edition of Collier's "Clavis Univer- 
 salis" it is hoped to call attention to a book other- 
 wise inaccessible, which, though curiously parallel 
 to Berkeley's contemporary works, has undoubted 
 independent value; and which anticipates Kant's 
 first two antinomies. The whole history of phi- 
 losophy perhaps presents no more striking example 
 of undeserved neglect, and no more curious coin- 
 cidence of thought than the eighteenth century in 
 England. By entirely different modes of ap- 
 proach and unknown to each other, Berkeley and 
 Collier reached the same conclusion, that mat- 
 ter, as conceived by traditional philosophy, is non- 
 existent. 
 
 This edition of the "Clavis Universalis" is an 
 exact and verified copy of the essay as it appears 
 in Dr. Parr's "Metaphysical Tracts of the 
 Eighteenth Century," a book now out of print. 
 The Introduction and Notes are modified extracts 
 from a Master's thesis accepted by the faculty of 
 Wellesley College. They aim to show the direct 
 dependence of Collier upon Des Cartes, Male- 
 branche, and Norris, as well as the parallelism of 
 Collier and Berkeley. 
 
 The thanks of the editor are due to Professor
 
 iv CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 Mary Whiton Calkins who suggested and directed 
 the work; to Dr. Benjamin Rand, of Harvard Uni- 
 versity, who has given counsel at several points; 
 and to Mr. James Van Allen Shields who consult- 
 ed the British Museum copy of Taylor's transla- 
 tion of Malebranche's "Recherche de la Verite."
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Introduction vii 
 
 Clavis Universalis 
 
 The Contents 3 
 
 The Introduction 5 
 
 Part I - 14 
 
 Part II 55 
 
 The Conclusion of the Whole 118 
 
 Notes 133
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 In the early eighteenth century, metaphysical 
 speculation turned from the material world toward 
 the inner life of man. Des Cartes and Male- 
 branche in France, and Locke in England, had 
 stripped the external world of its warmth and light 
 and color and had left to it little save the character 
 of extension. The completely idealistic theory of 
 matter was formulated at nearly the same time, 
 and in apparent independence, by George Berkeley 
 and by Arthur Collier. And yet Berkeley alone 
 commonly has credit for the metaphysical discov- 
 ery, while Collier's little volume of scarce a 
 hundred pages remained practically unnoticed for 
 more than fifty years. 
 
 The book seems to have attracted little or no 
 attention even at the time of its publication. Had 
 not Dr. Reid chanced upon it in the library at 
 Glasgow, it might never have been known. Reid 
 appreciated the value of the book, and in his "Es- 
 says on the Intellectual Powers of Man," published 
 in 1785, gives it brief notice. After a discussion 
 of .Norris's "Essay toward the Theory of the Ideal 
 or Intelligible World," he says that he ought not 
 to omit mention of "an author of far inferior name, 
 Arthur Collier. . . . His arguments are the same
 
 viii CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 in substance with Berkeley's; and he appears," 
 Reid adds, "to understand the whole strength of his 
 cause. Though he is not deficient in metaphysical 
 acuteness, his style is disagreeable, being full of 
 conceits, of new-coined words, scholastic terms, and 
 perplexed sentences." Reid ends by saying, "I 
 have taken the liberty to give this short account of 
 Collier's book, because I believe it is rare and 
 little known. I have only seen one copy of it, 
 which is in the University library of Glasgow." 
 
 This notice attracted Dugald Stuart to the 
 work, and in his "Dissertation: Exhibiting the 
 Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical, and Political 
 Philosophy" he compares Collier with Norris. 
 "Another very acute metaphysician," he says, 
 "has met with still greater injustice. His name 
 is not to be found in any of our Biographical 
 Dictionaries. In point of date, his publication is 
 some years posterior to that of Norris, and there- 
 fore it does not possess the same claims to original- 
 ity; but it is far superior to it in logical closeness 
 and precision, and is not obscured to the same de- 
 gree with the mystical theology which Norris 
 (after the example of Malebranche) connected 
 with the scheme of Idealism. Indeed, when com- 
 pared with the writings of Berkeley himself, it 
 
 1 Thomas Reid, Essay II, p. 287 of his works, edited by Sir 
 Win. Hamilton, 1846.
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS ix 
 
 yields to them less in force of argument, than in 
 composition and variety of illustration." 2 
 
 These notices attracted the English philos- 
 phers of this time to Collier's writings, and fur- 
 ther traces of his life and works were sought. Sir 
 James Mackintosh and Dr. Parr corresponded on 
 the subject, 3 but their efforts met with no impor- 
 tant success. But interest in Collier had been 
 aroused; and when, some time before 1837, the 
 History of Modern Wiltshire was published, the 
 absence of his name from the history of the county, 
 in which his family had held a living for four 
 generations, called forth a remonstrance. This 
 finally resulted in the publication of the only book 
 which is a direct authority on Collier outside of 
 his own few published writings. 
 
 Robert Benson had inherited, with other docu- 
 ments, all that remained of the Collier papers. 
 Many of these papers had, to be sure, disappeared 
 before Robert Benson looked into them, for they 
 were, as Benson says, "so conveniently placed for 
 the housemaid who lighted an adjoining bed-room 
 fire, that it is not easy to guess how many of them 
 have been consumed." 4 The bulk of those that re- 
 mained were the sermons of Arthur Collier and his 
 brother William, and a few manuscript essays and 
 
 2 Originally published in 1821. Collected Works of Dugald 
 Stuart, edited by Sir Wm. Hamilton, 1854, p. 349. 
 
 3 Robert Benson's "Memoirs of the Life and Writings of the Rev. 
 Arthur Collier, M. A.," London, 1837, Preface p. IX. 
 
 4 Benson's "Memoirs," Preface, page XIII.
 
 x CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 letters. The letters and essays which pertained to 
 his metaphysical studies, as well as to the details 
 of his life, were collected and published by Benson. 
 The awakened interest in Collier evidenced 
 itself at the same time in a second edition of the 
 "Clavis." The copies numbered forty, and were 
 "exclusively bestowed as presents." The third 
 and last edition of the "Clavis Universalis," still 
 accessible in the large libraries, was brought out 
 in 1837 in a small volume prepared by Dr. Parr, 
 entitled "Metaphysical Tracts of the Eighteenth 
 Century." Dr. Parr had in his "remarkable libra- 
 ry" rare metaphysical tracts of English authorship. 
 Realizing their interest, he had thrown off a small 
 impression of five of them, with an abridgment of 
 the sixth. He intended to publish these, with an 
 introduction which should include "an historical 
 disquisition on Idealism;, with special reference 
 to the philosophy of Collier." But his death inter- 
 rupted the work before it was completed. His 
 library was sold, and the impression of the six tracts 
 was purchased by a Mr. Lumley, a respectable 
 London bookseller, 6 who was about to publish the 
 "Memoirs of Arthur Collier" which Benson had 
 prepared. 7 This collection of tracts, in which the 
 
 5 Benson's "Memoirs," Preface, page XIV. 
 
 6 "Idealism; with Reference to the Scheme of Arthur Collier" 
 by Sir Wm. Hamilton (published originally in the Edinburgh Review 
 in April, 1839), in "Discussions on Philosophy and Literature," London, 
 1852, p. 187. 
 
 7 Dr. Parr's "Collection of Metaphysical Tracts" Advertisement.
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS xi 
 
 "Clavis Universalis" holds first place, includes the 
 only other work of Collier which was ever printed 
 in full, "A Specimen of True Philosophy; in a 
 Discourse on Genesis ;" and also an abstract of the 
 Logology or "Treatise on the Logos." Through 
 this collection, the "Clavis Universalis" is known 
 to English speaking philosophers. 
 
 In Germany, Collier met with recognition 
 sooner than in his own country, through a full and 
 able abstract of the "Clavis Universalis" made in 
 the year 1717. This was published in the sixth 
 supplemental volume of the "Acta Eruditorum," 
 a Leipzig publication devoted to general interests. 
 In concluding the article the reviewer says : "These 
 are the paradoxes of our Author, which doubtless 
 will be received with no more approbation than 
 those, which to the same import, though with dif- 
 ferent arguments, a contemporary of his, George 
 Berkeley, attempted to defend in 'Three Dialogues 
 between Hylas and Philonous.' " 8 Through this 
 notice Collier became known to German philo- 
 sophers, as is shown by the quotations from him 
 made by Wolff and Bilfinger, and by the full 
 translation which followed. But John Christ- 
 opher Eschenbach, Professor of Philosophy in Ros- 
 tock, was the first to make the full text of the 
 "Clavis" available for German scholars; and Sir 
 William Hamilton quotes him as saying, " If any 
 book ever cost me trouble to obtain it the Clavis 
 
 8 Translated from the original Latin.
 
 xii CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 is that book." Eschenbach published this trans- 
 lation, in 1756, as part of a work entitled "A Col- 
 lection of the most distinguished Authors who 
 deny the existence of their own bodies, and of 
 the whole material world; containing the dia- 
 logues of Berkeley, between Hylas and Philonous, 
 and Collier's Universal Key translated, with Il- 
 lustrative Observations, and an Appendix, wherein 
 the Existence of Body is demonstrated, by John 
 Christopher Eschenbach, Professor of Philosophy 
 in Rostock." In this work, according to Hamil- 
 ton, the "remarks are numerous and show much 
 reading. The Appendix contains : ( i ) An ex- 
 position of the opinions of the Idealists, with its 
 grounds and arguments. (2) A proof of the ex- 
 ternal existence of body." 10 This translation is 
 now itself rare and little known. 
 
 Of Collier himself even less is known than of 
 his writings, for the Wiltshire records and the 
 papers found by Benson are the only sources. The 
 family came from Bristol and settled in Wiltshire 
 where, in 1608, one Joseph Collier was presented 
 to the rectory of Langford Magna, commonly 
 called Steeple Langford, near Sarum or Salisbury, 
 and as he also owned the advowson, the benefice 
 was handed down to his descendants. His son, 
 Henry, who succeeded him, was ejected from his 
 
 9 "Discussions on Philosophy and Literature," p. 190. 
 
 10 Note S. S., p. 584, Vol. I., "Collected works of Dugald Stuart," 
 edited by Sir Wm. Hamilton, 1854.
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS xiii 
 
 parish during the Revolution and Protectorate, and 
 he and his family suffered many hardships. After 
 the Restoration, Henry Collier returned to Lang- 
 ford Magna, and remained there until his death 
 in 1672. His youngest son, Arthur, succeeded 
 him ; and to him and his wife Anne, daughter of 
 Thomas and Joan Currey, of Misterton in Somer- 
 setshire, was born Arthur Collier. Of his early 
 youth and education we know little. He probably 
 attended the grammar-school of Salisbury, after 
 early studies at home. He entered Pembroke Col- 
 lege, Oxford, in July, 1697, but, upon the entrance 
 of his younger brother, William, to the Univer- 
 sity, left Pembroke to be entered at Baliol with his 
 brother on the twenty-second of October, 1698." 
 
 Of his studies and of his interests during 
 his college course, there is little indication. 
 In his manuscripts "there is no trace of his hav- 
 ing made any proficiency in mathematical studies, 
 nor even that the mathematics formed a part of his 
 education. [A] . . . letter ... in answer to a 
 scriptural objection then often urged against the 
 Copernican and Newtonian systems of the world, 
 shews that he was not indifferent to the progress of 
 natural philosophy." 12 There are few indications 
 of an interest in literature; but as he says in the 
 opening page of the "Clavis" that he adopted his 
 theory of the universe in 1703, a year before he took 
 
 11 Benson's "Memoirs," p. 10. 
 
 12 Benson's "Memoirs," p. 126.
 
 xiv CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 up his residence at Langford Magna, his phil- 
 osophical studies must have occupied much of his 
 time and thought in college. With what systems 
 he was familiar, one can judge only from the refer- 
 ences in the "Clavis" and in the "Specimen of True 
 Philosophy." He evidently knew Aristotle only 
 through the Schoolmen, for his quotations are 
 never made directly. Plato he quotes but once, 13 
 although Norris's "Theory of the Ideal World," 
 well-known to Collier, is rilled with Platonic refer- 
 ences. But the scholasticism of the following cen- 
 turies was a far stronger influence on Collier, inter- 
 ested as he was in theological studies. His work 
 shows the influence of scholastic principles and 
 habits of thought; and to him, as to the Schoolmen, 
 the interest of metaphysics lay in its relation to 
 Scripture. St. Augustine, Porphyry, Apollina- 
 ris, Cassian, Vincentius, Lirinensis, Suarez are 
 mentioned. Through the "books of Metaphysicks" 
 of Scheibler and Baronius, according to Sir Wm. 
 Hamilton, 14 he gained all his knowledge of the 
 Metaphysic of the Schools. The original thinkers 
 with whom he was directly familiar and whose 
 works formed the starting point of his own were 
 the French writers, Des Cartes and Malebranche, 
 and his own English neighbor, John Norris. 
 
 Six months after Arthur Collier had entered 
 
 13 "Clavis Universalis," p. 42. (This reference, and all which 
 follow are to this edition of the "Clavis"). 
 
 14 Sir Wm. Hamilton's "Discussions on Philosophy and Litera- 
 ture," p. 192.
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS xv 
 
 Pembroke College, his father died. During the 
 seven years that intervened before the son could 
 take upon himself the duties of the living, Francis 
 Eyre held the benefice, which finally in 1704, 
 passed to Arthur Collier, the fourth of his family 
 to hold the office. The years that followed seem 
 to have been uneventful. From the dates of his ser- 
 mons one may argue that, until his death in 1732, he 
 discharged the duties of his parish with regularity, 
 and the allusions in his brother William's diary, 
 give a hint of his daily life. This brother, who 
 had been his college mate and close friend, was 
 "rector of Baverstock, about two miles and a half 
 to the south of Langford; and his Ms. remains 
 form by far the greater portion of the Collier 
 papers." 1S The brothers evidently were much to- 
 gether, and joined in the diversions of the neighbor- 
 hood, attending the races and country dances and 
 taking a hand at cards with their friends. Arthur, 
 at least, seems to have been "intimate at the palace 
 of Salisbury during Bishop Burnet's time; and we 
 learn that he occasionally filled the cathedral pul- 
 pit." There is no mention in either his brother's 
 papers or his own of travels, or even prolonged 
 absence from home; so it is reasonable to conclude 
 that his outward life was bounded by the limits of 
 his parish. He was married to Margaret, daugh- 
 ter of Nicholas Johnson, a paymaster of the army, 
 and his wife, a sister of Stephen Fox. The parish 
 
 15 Benson's "Memoirs," pp. 140 and 141.
 
 xvi CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 records give the birth of the eldest child as October 
 13, 1707. Of his children little is known. Two 
 sons and two daughters survived him; and one of 
 the latter, Jane Collier, is known as the writer of 
 a clever book called "The Art of Ingeniously Tor- 
 menting." 16 Owing to financial difficulties during 
 the latter part of his life, he finally sold the "rever- 
 sion of Langford Rectory to Corpus Christi Col- 
 lege, Oxford, for sixteen 'hundred guineas." 
 
 That Collier had little care for the practical 
 matters of everyday life can easily be believed, but 
 his intense interest in matters ecclesiastical and 
 theological is evidenced by his activity in church 
 politics and by the close union of his philosophical 
 and religious beliefs. His philosophical system 
 was to be the "universal key" by which to unlock 
 the secrets of the Scriptures. Yet his sermons have 
 no suggestion of his theory. 17 Indeed, at this period, 
 only his manuscript works and his letters contain 
 his exposition of the idealistic theory which so ab- 
 sorbed him. Among his papers there is an "outline 
 of an essay, in three chapters, on the question of the 
 visible world being without us or not," dated Janu- 
 ary, 1708. Dated 1712, are "two essays, still in 
 manuscript, one on substance and accident, and the 
 other termed 'Clavis Philosophical " 18 In 1713, 
 he published the "Clavis Universalis, or a new In- 
 
 16 Benson's "Memoirs," p. 162. 
 
 17 Benson's "Memoirs," p. 139. 
 
 18 Benson's "Memoirs," p. 18.
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS xvii 
 
 quiry after Truth, being a Demonstration of the 
 Non-Existence, or Impossibility of an External 
 World," which gives his perfected theory of the 
 non-existence of matter. After this, a period of 
 almost twenty years elapsed, with only his corres- 
 pondence to show his interest in the application of 
 his theory until in 1730, he published the "Speci- 
 men of True Philosophy." This was followed in 
 1732 by his "Logology," which is the last of his 
 published writings. The monumental work of his 
 life, the explication of the Scriptures, of which the 
 "Genesis" and "Logology" were the beginnings, 
 was never completed, for he died in the year in 
 which the latter was printed. He was buried in 
 the Langford Church, September 9th, 1732. 
 
 But although Collier himself laid such stress 
 upon the theological bearing of his theory, the 
 treatises which discuss the interpretation of the 
 Scriptures have little value when compared with 
 the one philosophical essay, which seemed to him 
 to serve mainly as an introduction to what was to 
 follow. At most, the interest of these theological 
 treatises lies in the more definite suggestions of the 
 positive aspect of his philosophic thought. Disen- 
 tangled from its scholastic phraseology, his system 
 is a theistic spiritualism. It rests on two funda- 
 mental propositions: (i) "God made heaven and 
 earth, or the whole material world, ' El/ ' A PX? 1 ," and 
 (2) "the visible or material world exists in mind, 
 i. e., immediately in the mind of him that seeth or
 
 xviii CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 perceiveth it," 9 and has no existence independent 
 of mind. The first of these propositions Collier 
 accepts "as an unquestionable axiom," 19 inasmuch 
 as it is the word of God. The second he has dem- 
 onstrated in the "Clavis Universalis." But, 
 though he has there proved that body must exist 
 in mind, he has not, beyond bare suggestions, shown 
 how this is possible. In the "Clavis," the quasi- 
 externeity of visible objects is spoken of as the 
 "effect of the will of God, -- (as it is his will that 
 light and colours should seem to be without the 
 soul)." 20 Also Collier speaks** of the "great 
 mundane idea of created (or rather twice created) 
 matter, by which all things are produced, or rather 
 .... by which the great God gives sensations to 
 all his thinking creatures." To the more careful 
 study of the implications of the doctrine that "the 
 material world exists in mind," Collier devotes the 
 "Specimen of True Philosophy." In brief, he 
 holds that matter is an accident or form of mind 
 and has no existence apart from mind; that the 
 sensible world of each individual exists by reason 
 of his perceiving it, and has the relation of simili- 
 tude, not of absolute identity, to that of every other 
 individual ; and, finally, that these individual minds 
 or spirits exist only in dependence on, and as far 
 as they participate in, the one original substance, 
 which is itself mind or spirit. 
 
 19 Specimen of True Philosophy, p. 115 in the Parr edition. 
 
 20 "Clavis Universalis," p. 9. ** Ibid., p. 12.
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS xix 
 
 Collier's claim to recognition lies, however, in 
 the negative aspect of his teaching. Both he and 
 Berkeley opposed the theory current in the philos- 
 ophy of that time, that matter, though prac- 
 tically unknown to us, has an existence of its own, 
 and at least one property, extension, by which it 
 arouses in us the idea of the sensible world. Berk- 
 eley argues against the conception of matter as "un- 
 known support" which Locke upholds in his "Es- 
 say on Human Understanding." Collier, on the 
 other hand, aims to prove the non-existence of mat- 
 ter as conceived by Des Cartes and Malebranche, 
 and by their English disciple, John Norris. Upon 
 the philosophy of Des Cartes, Malebranche had 
 made one important advance. With Des Cartes, 
 matter, though dependent upon the will of God, 
 has an existence of its own in its property, exten- 
 sion, by which it affects finite minds. Male- 
 branche likewise grants to matter an existence out- 
 side of its being in God; yet the material world 
 plays no part in his system. In the fact that he 
 does not discard this vague something, which he 
 has practically proved to be nothing, lies his great 
 inconsistency. His forward step is in the demon- 
 stration that not even by the Cartesian "unknown 
 motion of unknown parts" can body become known 
 to a finite mind; that this knowledge is only pos- 
 sible if both knower and known are taken up and 
 united in one spiritual substance. In criticism, 
 Collier points out that Malebranche himself claims
 
 xx CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 that the external world cannot be an object of sense 
 since the idea which we perceive must be intimate- 
 ly united to the mind and hence cannot be of a dif- 
 ferent nature. 21 But whereas Malebranche still 
 clings to this vague unknown something as cause 
 of sensible ideas, Collier claims that the very exist- 
 ence of body lies in its being perceived. 
 
 But despite its close dependence upon the the- 
 ories of Des Cartes and Malebranche, the "Clavis" 
 refers much more closely to the system of Norris. 
 John Norris, rector of Bemerton, near Sarum, had 
 apparently received much the same philosophical 
 education as Collier, that is, he had a knowledge 
 of the early Greeks through the Schoolmen, and a 
 familiarity with the modern French philosophers. 
 His "Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World," 
 is designed to complete the system of Malebranche, 
 who, as Norris thought, had not carried sufficiently 
 far his theory that "all things are seen in God." 
 To quote his own words, "Mr. Malebranche has 
 ventured the farthest of any that I know of upon 
 this Discovery [into the Ideal World.] . . . But 
 even this great Apelles has drawn the Celestial 
 Beauty but halfway." 22 Although Norris in real- 
 ity only enlarges upon Malebranche's doctrines in- 
 stead of pressing this "Discovery" to its logical con- 
 clusion, his book is valuable to students of idealistic 
 
 21 "Recherche de la Verite," Livre 3 m e, 2nde Partie, Chap. I. 
 
 ?2 An Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible 
 World," by John Norris, Rector of Bemerton, London, 1701-1704, Part 
 I, p. \.
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS xxi 
 
 thought. According both to Malebranche and to 
 Norris, reality is of two kinds, spiritual and ma- 
 terial; and God, the supreme spirit, contains both 
 the intelligible world of Ideas and the finite spirits, 
 who are thus in direct communion with him. 
 Since these two are, both alike, in him and of his 
 substance, the divine ideas are directly intelligible 
 to finite minds without proof or intervention. 
 These divine ideas are the representative forms of 
 material bodies in a natural world, which is some- 
 how caused by God, and inadequately represents 
 him, but is yet outside and apart from him. The 
 existence of this material world Norris practically 
 disproves, though he still clings to its reality on the 
 foundation of faith. Sir Wm. Hamilton remarks 
 that Malebranche as a Catholic was "obliged to 
 burden" his theory with the incumbrance of matter, 
 but that to Norris as a Protestant, little credit is 
 due for not rejecting this material world. It re- 
 mained for Collier and Berkeley to give up the ma- 
 terial world altogether as a sacrifice to the received 
 philosophy of ideas. 23 
 
 The fact that these two men, Collier and Berk- 
 eley, came to the same conclusion at precisely the 
 same time, seems to many critics a coincidence too 
 curious to be accidental; and the reputation of 
 Berkeley, compared with the neglect of Collier, 
 seems hardly due to chance alone. Yet the facts 
 
 23 Sir Wm. Hamilton in "Discussions on Philosophy and Litera- 
 ture," pp. 199 ff.
 
 xxii CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 of the case as we know them point to the indepen- 
 dence of Collier's thought. In point of time, the 
 promulgation of these doctrines is almost identical. 
 In 1709, George Berkeley published his "Essay 
 toward a New Theory of Vision," which contained 
 suggestions of his metaphysical theory. For the 
 purpose of his arguments he grants, in this work, 
 the external existence of tangible matter, but he 
 teaches, by implication, that visible matter exists 
 only in the mind of him who sees it. In 1710, 
 Berkeley published the "Principles of Human 
 Knowledge," which contains the exposition of 
 his doctrine in detailed form. This was followed, 
 in 1713, by the "Three Dialogues between Hylas 
 and Philonous," intended, as Berkeley says, "to in- 
 troduce the notions I advance into the mind in the 
 most easy and familiar manner." In this same 
 year, 1713, appeared Collier's little volume, the 
 "Clavis Universalis." The facts that Berkeley's 
 first suggestion of his theory was published four 
 years before Collier's theory was advanced, and 
 that his finished arguments were made public three 
 years before Collier's, seem at first glance to settle 
 in the negative the question of Collier's indepen- 
 dence. But two further considerations make the 
 conclusion doubtful. In the first place, we know 
 by Collier's own word 24 that he had adopted his 
 own theory ten years before he put it into outward 
 form, which brings the date of its conception not 
 
 24 "Clavis Universalis," p. 5.
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS xxiii 
 
 later than 1703. Berkeley gives no direct date of 
 the birth of his theories, but it can be supplied ap- 
 proximately from his "Commonplace Book." In 
 this book, according to Fraser, he "seems to have 
 set down . . . stray thoughts which occurred to 
 him in the course of his mathematical and meta- 
 physical studies at Trinity College, Dublin. 
 These common-places seem to have been formed 
 gradually, apparently in 1705 and some following 
 years. . . . Considerable portions imply that he 
 was at the time maturing his thoughts with a view 
 to the publication of the Essay on Vision and the 
 Principles of Human Knowledge', but the form 
 which the projected work (or works) was to take 
 does not appear to have been finally settled in his 
 mind." 2S It is not possible to compare definite 
 dates here. We can only say that in 1703 Collier 
 was convinced of his theory, and that in 1705 Berk- 
 eley was testing his doctrine by applying it to all 
 branches of knowledge. If these dates bear any 
 weight, we may conclude that the two men, while 
 they were both under the age of twenty-five and 
 while they were still continuing their college stud- 
 ies, independently conceived this new theory of 
 matter. From the references in the letters written 
 in the few years following the publication of the 
 "Clavis," it is evident that in the meantime Collier 
 had become acquainted with some one book of 
 Berkeley; and the further reference in the "Speci- 
 
 25 Note i by Fraser on p. 419 of the "Collected Works," Vol. IV.
 
 xxiv CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 men of True Philosophy" identifies this book with 
 the "Dialogues." 26 
 
 Whatever one's conclusion about the relation 
 between Collier and Berkeley, there can be no 
 doubt that Collier's "third" and "fourth" argu- 
 ments anticipate Kant's first and second antino- 
 mies. Just as Kant argues that "the world is not a 
 whole existing in itself" from the fact that it can 
 be proved to be both finite and infinite in time and 
 in space, so Collier argues that "an external world 
 .... must be both finite and infinite," and that 
 "that which is both finite and infinite in extent is 
 absolutely non-existent." 27 And as Kant argues 
 that material substances are "nothing outside our 
 representations" from the fact that they can be 
 shown to be both infinitely divisible and ultimately 
 indivisible, so Collier affirms "in like manner as be- 
 fore, that external matter is both finitely and in- 
 finitely divisible, and, consequently, that there is 
 no such thing as external matter." 28 
 
 It must be granted that the "Clavis Univer- 
 salis" is more than a "metaphysical curiosity." 
 
 26 As Leslie Stephen points out, in his article on Collier in the 
 Dictionary of National Biography, this reference (on p. 114 of the 
 "Specimen of True Philosophy" as given in the Parr edition) is the 
 only one in Collier's published writings. Stephen credits Collier with 
 entire independence in the conception of the theory. 
 
 27 "Clavis Universalis," p. 63. 
 
 28 Since this introduction was written, in its first form, the com- 
 parison has been made in more detail by Professor Arthur O. Lovejoy 
 in a paper on "Kant and the English Platonists" in "Essays Philosoph- 
 ical and Psychological in honor of William James" by "His Colleagues 
 at Columbia University." Longmans, Green & Co., 1908.
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS xxv 
 
 Although the greater length and detail of Berk- 
 eley's arguments, combined with his grace of liter- 
 ary style, make his works more desirable for the 
 general introduction to idealism, Collier's book is 
 of real value to the student in connection with the 
 study of Berkeley. The "Clavis" gives in conclu- 
 sive form Berkeley's chief arguments. It adds, 
 moreover, two of the arguments which Kant later 
 made famous. More than this, the two systems 
 together show how an idealistic theory of the uni- 
 verse was an inevitable result of the thought of the 
 early eighteenth century.
 
 CLAWS UNIVERSALIS: 
 
 OR, A 
 
 New Inquiry after Truth. 
 
 BEING 
 A DEMONSTRATION 
 
 OF THE 
 Non-Existence, or Impossibility, 
 
 OF AN 
 
 EXTERNAL WORLD. 
 
 BY ARTH. COLLIER, 
 
 RECTOR OF LANGFORD MAGNA, NEAR SARUM. 
 
 Vulgi Assensus & Approbatio circa Materiam 
 Difficilem est cerium Argumentum Falsitatis istius 
 Opinionis cui Assentitur. 
 
 Mr. Maleb. De Inquir. Verit. Lib. iii. P. 194. 
 
 LONDON, 
 
 Printed for ROBERT GOSLING, at the Mitre and 
 
 Crown againft St. Dunftan's Church 
 
 in Fleet-ftreet. 1713.
 
 THE 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 THE INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Wherein the question in general is explained 
 and stated, and the whole subject divided 
 into two particular heads - 5 
 
 PART I. 
 
 Chap. I. Wherein the first question is con- 
 sidered, viz., Whether the visible world 
 is external or not - 14 
 
 Sect. I. That the seeming Externeity of a 
 visible object, is no argument of its real 
 externeity 1 6 
 
 Sect. II. That a visible object, as such, is not 
 
 external - 29 
 
 Chap. II. Objections answered - 43
 
 4 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 PART II. 
 
 That there is no external 'world, and that an 
 external world is a being utterly impos- 
 sible - 55 
 Chap. I. Argument I. - 55 
 Chap. II. Argument II. - 59 
 Chap. III. Argument III. 63 
 Chap. IV. Argument IV. 68 
 Chap. V. Argument V. - 78 
 Chap. VI. Argument VI. - 83 
 Chap. VII. Argument VII. 87 
 Chap. VIII. Argument VIII. 93 
 Chap. IX. Argument IX. 95 
 Chap. X. Objections answered - - 101 
 
 The conclusion of the whole. 
 
 Of the use and consequences of the foregoing 
 
 treatise 118
 
 THE 
 INTRODUCTION, 
 
 Wherein the Question in general is explained and 
 
 stated, and the whole subject divided into 
 
 two particular heads. 
 
 THOUGH I am verily persuaded, that in the 
 whole course of the following treatise, I shall or 
 can have no other adversary, but prejudice; yet, 
 having by me no mechanical engine proper to re- 
 move it; nor, being able to invent any other method 
 of attacking it, besides that of fair reason and argu- 
 ment; rather than the world should finish its course 
 without once offering to enquire in what manner 
 it exists, (and for one reason more, which I need 
 not name, unless the end desired were more hope- 
 ful;)! am at last, after a ten years pause and de- 
 liberation, content to put myself upon the trial of 
 the common reader, without pretending to any bet- 
 ter art of gaining him on my side, than that of dry 
 reason and metaphysical demonstration. 
 
 The question I am concerned about is in gen- 
 eral this, whether there be any such thing as an ex- 
 ternal world. And my title will suffice to inform 
 my reader, that the negative of this question is the 
 point I am to demonstrate. 
 
 In order to which, let us first explain the
 
 6 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 terms. Accordingly, by world, I mean whatso- 
 ever is usually understood by the terms, body, ex- 
 tension, space, matter, quantity, &c. if there be any 
 other word in our english tongue, which is synon- 
 imous with all or any of these terms. And now 
 nothing remains but the explication of the word 
 external. 
 
 By this, in general, I understand the same as 
 is usually understood by the words, absolute, self- 
 existent, independent, &c. and this is what I deny 
 of all matter, body, extension, &c. 
 
 If this, you will say, be all that I mean by the 
 word external, I am like to meet with no adversary 
 at all, for who has ever affirmed, that matter is self- 
 existent, absolute or independent? 
 
 To this I answer, what others hold, or have 
 held in times past, I shall not here inquire. On the 
 contrary, I should be glad to find by the event, that 
 all mankind were agreed in that which I contend 
 for as the truth, viz. that matter is not, cannot be 
 independent, absolute, or self-existent. In the 
 mean time, whether they are so or no, will be tried 
 by this. 
 
 Secondly, and more particularly, that by not 
 independent, not absolutely existent, not external, 
 I mean and contend for nothing less, than that all 
 matter, body, extension, &c. exists in, or in depend- 
 ence on mind, thought, or perception, and that it 
 is not capable of an existence, which is not thus 
 dependant. 1
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 7 
 
 This perhaps may awaken another to demand 
 of me how? to which I as readily answer, just how 
 my reader pleases, provided it be somehow. As 
 for instance, we usually say, an accident exists in, 
 or in dependence on, its proper subject; and that its 
 very essence, or reality of its existence, is so to exist. 
 Will this pass for an explication of my assertion? 
 if so, I am content to stand by it, in this sense of 
 the words. Again, we usually say, (and fancy too 
 we know what we mean in saying,) that a body ex- 
 ists in, and also in dependance on, its proper place, 
 so as to exist necessarily in some place or other. 
 Will this description of dependance please my in- 
 quisitive reader? If so, I am content to join issue 
 with him, and contend that all matter exists in, or as 
 much dependantly on, mind, thought, or percep- 
 tion, to the full, as any body exists in place. Nay, I 
 hold the description to be so just and apposite, as 
 if a man should say, a thing is like itself : for I sup- 
 pose I need not tell my reader, that when I affirm 
 that all matter exists in mind, after the same man- 
 ner as body exists in place, I mean the very same 
 as if I had said, that mind itself is the place of 
 body, and so its place, as that it is not capable of 
 existing in any other place, or in place after any 
 other manner. Again, lastly, it is a common say- 
 ing, that an object of perception exists in, or in de- 
 pendance on, its respective faculty. And of these 
 objects, there are many who will reckon with me, 
 light, sounds, colours, and even some material
 
 8 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 things, such as trees, houses, &c. which are seen, 
 as we say, in a looking-glass, but which are, or 
 ought to be owned to have no existence but in, or 
 respectively on, the minds or faculties of those who 
 perceive them. But to please all parties at once, 
 I affirm that I know of no manner, in which an 
 object of perception exists in, or on, its respective 
 faculty, which I will not admit in this place, to be 
 a just description of that manner of in-existence, 
 after which all matter that exists, is affirmed by me 
 to exist in mind. Nevertheless, were I to speak 
 my mind freely, I should chuse to compare it to 
 the in-existence of some, rather than some other 
 objects of perception, particularly such as are ob- 
 jects of the sense of vision ; and of these, those more 
 especially, which are allowed by others, to exist 
 wholly in the mind or visive faculty; such as ob- 
 jects seen in a looking glass, by men distempered, 
 light-headed, ecstatic, &c. where not only colours, 
 but intire bodies, are perceived or seen. For these 
 cases are exactly parallel, with that existence which 
 I affirm of all matter, body, or extension whatso- 
 ever. 
 
 Having endeavoured, in as distinct terms as 
 I can, to give my reader notice of what I mean by 
 the proposition I have undertaken the defence of, 
 it will be requisite in the next place, to declare in 
 as plain terms, what I do not mean by it. 
 
 Accordingly, I declare in the first place, that 
 in affirming that there is no external world, I make
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 9 
 
 no doubt or question of the existence of bodies, or 
 whether the bodies which are seen exist or not. It 
 is with me a first principle, that whatsoever is 
 seen, is. To deny, or doubt of this, is errant scepti- 
 cism, and at once unqualifies a man for any part 
 or office of a disputant, or philosopher; so that it 
 will be remembered from this time, that my en- 
 quiry is not concerning the existence, but altogether 
 concerning the extra-existence of certain things or 
 objects ; or, in other words, what I affirm and con- 
 tend for, is not that bodies do not exist, or that the 
 external world does not exist, but that such and 
 such bodies, which are supposed to exist, do not 
 exist externally; or in universal terms, that there 
 is no such thing as an external world. 
 
 Secondly, I profess and declare, that notwith- 
 standing this my assertion, I am persuaded that I 
 see all bodies just as other folks do ; that is, the vis- 
 ible world is seen by me, or, which is the same, 
 seems to me to be as much external or independent, 
 as to its existence, on my mind, self, or visive fac- 
 ulty, as any visible object does, or can be pretended 
 to do or be, to any other person. I have neither, 
 as I know of, another nature, nor another knack 
 of seeing objects, different from other persons, suit- 
 able to the hypothesis of their existence which I 
 here contend for. So far from this, that I believe, 
 and am very sure, that this seeming, or (as I shall 
 desire leave to call it) quasi externeity of visible ob- 
 jects, is not only the effect of the will of God, 2 (as it
 
 io CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 is his will that light and colours should seem to be 
 without the soul, that heat should seem to be in the 
 fire, pain in the hand, &c.) but also that it is a 
 natural and necessary condition of their visibility; 
 I would say, that though God should be supposed 
 to make a world, or any one visible object, which 
 is granted to be not external, yet by the condition 
 of its being seen, it would, and must be quasi exter- 
 nal to the perceptive faculty; as much so to the 
 full, as is any material object usually seen in this 
 visible world. 
 
 Moreover, thirdly, when I affirm that all mat- 
 ter exists dependantly on mind, I am sure rny 
 reader will allow me to say, I do not mean by this, 
 that matter or bodies exist in bodies. As for in- 
 stance, when I affirm or say, that the world, which 
 I see exists in my mind, I cannot be supposed to 
 mean that one body exists in another, or that all 
 the bodies which I see exist in that, which common 
 use has taught me to call my body. I must needs 
 desire to have this remembered, because experience 
 has taught me how apt persons are, or will be, to 
 mistake me in this particular. 3 
 
 Fourthly, when I affirm that this or that visi- 
 ble object exists in, or dependantly on, my mind, or 
 perceptive faculty, I must desire to be understood 
 to mean no more than I say, by the words mind and 
 perceptive faculty. In like manner I would be 
 understood, when I affirm in general, that all mat- 
 ter or body exists in, or dependantly on, mind. I
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 11 
 
 say this to acquit myself from the imputation of 
 holding, that the mind causes its own ideas, or 
 objects of perception ; or, lest any one by a mistake 
 should fancy that I affirm, that matter depends for 
 its existence on the will of man, or any creature 
 whatsoever. 4 But now, if any such mistake should 
 arise in another's mind, he has wherewith to rectify 
 it; in as much as I assure him, that by mind, I 
 mean that part, or act, or faculty of the soul, which 
 is distinguished by the name intellective, or percep- 
 tive, as in exclusion of that other part which is dis- 
 tinguished by the term will. 
 
 Fifthly, when I affirm that all matter exists in 
 mind, or that no matter is external, I do not mean 
 that the world, or any visible object of it, which I 
 (for instance) see, is dependant on the mind of any 
 other person besides myself; or that the world, or 
 matter, which any other person sees, is dependant 
 on mine, or any other person's mind, or faculty of 
 perception. On the contrary, I contend as well as 
 grant, that the world which John sees is external to 
 Peter, and the world which Peter sees is external to 
 John. That is, I hold the thing to be the same in 
 this, as in any other case of sensation ; for instance, 
 that of sound. Here two or more persons, who are 
 present at a concert of music, may indeed in some 
 sense be said to hear the same notes or melody; but 
 yet the truth is, that the sound which one hears, is 
 not the very same with the sound which another 
 hears, because the souls or persons are supposed to
 
 12 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 be different; and therefore, the sound which Peter 
 hears, is external to, or independant on the soul of 
 John, and that which John hears, is external to the 
 soul or person of Peter. s 
 
 Lastly, when I affirm that no matter is alto- 
 gether external, but necessarily exists in some mind 
 or other, exemplified and distinguished by the 
 proper names of John, Peter, &c. I have no de- 
 sign to affirm, that every part or particle of matter, 
 which does or can exist, must needs exist in some 
 created mind or other. On the contrary, I believe 
 that infinite worlds might exist, though not one 
 single created, (or rather merely created,) mind 
 were ever in being. And as in fact there are thou- 
 sands and ten thousands, I believe, and I even con- 
 tend, that there is an universe, or material world in 
 being, which is, at least, numerically different from 
 every material world perceived by mere creatures. 
 By this, I mean the great mundane idea of created 
 (or rather twice created) matter, by which all 
 things are produced; or rather, (as my present sub- 
 ject leads me to speak,) by which the great God 
 gives sensations to all his thinking creatures, and 
 by which things that are not, are preserved, and 
 ordered in the same manner as if they were. 
 
 And now I presume and hope, that my mean- 
 ing is sufficiently understood, when I affirm, that 
 all matter which exists, exists in, or dependantly on, 
 mind ; or, that there is no such thing as an external 
 world.
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 13 
 
 Nevertheless, after all the simplicity to which 
 this question seems already to be reduced, I find 
 myself necessitated to divide it into two. For, in 
 order to prove that there is no external world, it 
 must needs be one article to shew that the visible 
 world is not external, and when this is done, though 
 in this all be indeed done, which relates to any 
 opinion yet maintained by men, yet something still 
 is wanting towards a full demonstration of the 
 point at large, and to come up to the universal 
 terms, in which the question is expressed. 
 
 Accordingly, I shall proceed in this order. 
 First to shew, that the visible world is not external. 
 Secondly, to demonstrate more at large, or simply, 
 that an external world is a being utterly impossible. 
 Which two shall be the subjects of two distinct 
 parts or books. 6
 
 PART I. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Wherein the first question is considered, viz. 
 Whether the visible World is external or not. 
 
 FIRST, then, I affirm that the visible world is 
 not external. By the visible world, I mean every 
 material object, which is, or has been, or can be 
 seen. I say can be seen, (which is the import of 
 the word visible,) in order to comprehend what- 
 ever worlds there are, or may be conceived to be, 
 (besides that which we see who live on this earth,) 
 whether planetary, celestial, or supercelestial 
 worlds. Be they what, or how many they will, 
 supposing they are visible, that is, actually seen by 
 some particular souls or other, they are all under- 
 stood and comprehended within the notion of the 
 visible world: for my subject leads me to affirm, 
 that a visible world, as visible, is not external. Some 
 perhaps will be apt to prevent my inquiry, by urg- 
 ing that it is not capable of being a question, wheth- 
 er the visible world be external or not; it being 
 self-evident, that a visible object, as visible or seen, 
 is and must be external ; that an object's being seen 
 as external, is a simple and direct proof of its 
 being really external ; and consequently that there 
 is no foundation for the distinction between the
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 15 
 
 quasi and real externeity of a visible object, which 
 I laid down in my introduction. 
 
 I answer, then indeed I am blown up at once, 
 if there be any truth or consequence in the objec- 
 tion. But the best of it is, that I had never any 
 design to palm this distinction upon my reader 
 gratis, foreseeing it might stick with him. Never- 
 theless, he must allow me the common benefit of 
 words, whereby to explain my meaning; and this 
 was all the liberty I presumed upon, in premising 
 that distinction. Whether the seeming externeity 
 of a visible object, be indeed an argument of its 
 real externeity, I leave to be proved by all those 
 who will affirm it. However, it cannot be denied, 
 but that it is capable of being a question. For 
 though the truth, (or fact) be against me, yet visi- 
 ble objects seem to be external; and herein we all 
 agree ; so that one member of the distinction is al- 
 lowed by all to be good. If so, what should hinder 
 it from being a fair question, whether this seeming 
 be an argument of its real externeity? For my own 
 part, I am far from taking it for granted, that this 
 distinction is good, or built upon real facts, (though 
 every one must allow the distinction to be good in 
 general between real and apparent,) for this would 
 be to take a main part of the last question for 
 granted. But then, on the other hand, it cannot 
 be expected that I should admit an adversary to 
 take it for granted, that this distinction (with re- 
 gard to visible objects) is not good; in other words,
 
 16 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 that there is no difference in the thing, between 
 seeming and real externeity, or between visible and 
 external. For this would be to grant away at once 
 the whole matter I am concerned for. If there- 
 fore another would have me grant or allow this, 
 let him fairly set himself to shew, wherein lies the 
 connection between these two different terms, or 
 prove what is affirmed in the objection, namely, 
 that a visible object, as visible or seen, is and must 
 be external. Here, the least thing to be expected 
 is, that he point or single out one visible object, 
 which is allowed, or may be plainly proved to be 
 external. In the mean time, or till something of 
 this kind be attempted by another, all must allow 
 me the liberty of doubting, whether there be any 
 such connection or not; at least bear with me, 
 whilst I am content to prove that there is no such 
 connection. 
 
 Let this then be the first step by which I rise 
 to my last conclusion; namely, to shew, that the 
 seeming externeity of a visible object, is no argu- 
 ment of its real externeity. Or, in other words, that 
 a visible object may exist in, or dependantly on, the 
 mind of him that seeth it, notwithstanding that it 
 is seen, and is allowed to seem to be external to, or 
 independant on it. 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 That the seeming externeity of a visible object, is 
 
 no argument of its real externeity. 7 
 To show this, I think the best way will be by
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 17 
 
 instances, or an induction of particular objects, 
 which, though they seem as much to be external, 
 as any objects whatsoever, yet are, or must needs 
 be granted, to be not external. 8 These, to speak as 
 orderly as I can, shall be divided into two sorts, 
 possibles and actuals. 
 
 By actuals are meant certain instances of per- 
 ception, which are ordinary and usual, or which, 
 at least, have been in fact. And by possibles are 
 meant certain instances of perception, which have 
 never indeed been fact, but which need nothing 
 but an increase of power, to make them so at any 
 time. And, 
 
 First, for the last of these, viz. of possible 
 instances of perception ; where the object perceived 
 is allowed to be not external, though it appears 
 to be as much so as any objects whatsoever. ' Of 
 this sort I shall mention two, and that according 
 to their degrees of actuality. And, 
 
 First, for that which is the least actual of the 
 two, which shall be an instance of a man's perceiv- 
 ing a creature, which has not so much as in its 
 kind, existed externally; (supposing here for the 
 present that some things have so existed;) I mean, 
 one of those they usually call chimaera's. Of these 
 there are distinctions and names, of which one is 
 centaur. 
 
 A centaur, is an ens or being, partly horse, 
 and partly man : a mere fiction of poets or painters ; 
 that is, a creature which has never existed, or been
 
 i8 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 seen, any otherwise than in imagination. But in 
 imagination it has, or is supposed to have been 
 seen, and as such it has existed, and does or may 
 continually exist. 
 
 Well now, let some particular person be sup- 
 posed, in whose mind or imagination, a centaur 
 does, this instant exist; and let his name be called 
 Apelles. Apelles then perceives a centaur, and 
 that vividly or distinctly enough to draw the pic- 
 ture of it, or describe its shape and proportions 
 with his pencil. 
 
 These things supposed, I demand how does 
 this centaur seem to Apelles? Either as within or 
 without him, whilst he fixes the eye of his mind 
 upon it, so as to describe it? For an answer to this 
 question, I appeal to every person living, whether 
 an object of imagination does not seem or appear 
 to be as much external to the mind, which sees it, 
 as any object whatsoever; that is as any of those 
 which are called objects of vision. If so, I might 
 here observe, that we have already one instance ot 
 an object perceived, which, as perceived, is seen as 
 without, yet is indeed not so, but altogether existent 
 in, or dependant on, the mind that perceives it. 
 But I am content to suppose that it will be urged 
 to me, that this is not an instance to the intended 
 purpose, which was not concerning imagination, 
 but sense, and particularly that of vision. Well, 
 I submit to the charge of fact, lest I should seem 
 too rigorous, and so overstrain my point: but then
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 19 
 
 my reader will agree with me in the conclusion I 
 contend for, if from this very instance I shew him 
 a like possible case of vision, wherein the object 
 perceived is not external. 
 
 In speaking of possibles, allowed to be such, 
 I have all power at my command, or the liberty 
 of supposing the power of God himself to produce 
 effects for me. Suppose then an almighty power 
 ready at hand to produce this imagined centaur 
 into an object of vision ; what is to be done in this 
 case, or to this end? Must an external centaur be 
 created that Apelles may see it? Perhaps so, but 
 is there no easier or shorter way than this for Ap- 
 elles to see a centaur? Nay, but he is supposed 
 already to see a centaur, only that we do not use 
 to call it seeing, but imagining, because of the 
 faint and languid manner after which he seeth it. 
 But if this be all the difference between what we 
 use to call seeing and imagining, they may easily 
 coincide, without any considerable difference in 
 the object perceived, or in any thing else with 
 which we are at present concerned. For what is 
 that which is perceived or seen, when an object 
 visible is before our eyes? Why nothing that I 
 can think of but figure and colour? Well, Apelles 
 imagines or perceives a centaur; he perceives then 
 a certain figure which we call a centaur; he per- 
 ceives it indeed in a certain languid manner, or 
 not so vividly as some objects are perceived, which 
 greater vividness we use to call colour, but still
 
 20 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 he is supposed to perceive a centaur. If so, add 
 colour of this perception, and the centaur which 
 was before only imagined, is now become a seen 
 or visible object, and yet still, as being the same 
 figure or extension, is as much in his mind, or as 
 little external, as it was before. 
 
 Perhaps my reader will not be content to 
 grant me, that the difference between imagination 
 and vision is only that of more and less, or, that 
 an object in one is perceived with or with such a 
 degree of colour, and in the other, either with fig- 
 ure only, or with a much less degree of colour. 10 
 Perhaps so; but he will doubtless grant this, that 
 whilst Apelles imagines a centaur, God may so 
 act upon his mind, as that by degrees he shall per- 
 ceive it more and more distinctly or vividly, till 
 he comes to perceive it to the full as vividly as any 
 object is or can be perceived or seen. If so, I leave 
 it with them to distinguish imagination from vis- 
 ion any otherwise than I have done, who allow not 
 my manner of doing it; and in the meantime must 
 demand of them one mark or sign whereby to dis- 
 tinguish the centaur thus vividly perceived, or 
 supposed to be perceived, from an object which 
 they would call truly visible, or see n. 
 
 The other instance which I promised to give 
 is indeed much like the former, only that the ob- 
 ject perceived, (or one like it,) is here supposed to 
 exist amongst the ordinary objects of the visible 
 world; and it is this.
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 21 
 
 When a man with his eyes shut, or at noon- 
 day, 'has a mind to think on the moon at full, it is 
 certain he may think on it. This moon, as being 
 truly perceived, truly exists: it exists also in the 
 mind of him that seeth it, and that so really and 
 entirely, that, though every external object were 
 supposed to be annihilated, or not one besides my- 
 self had ever been created, yet still I might see or 
 imagine a moon. 
 
 Well now, suppose as before, that whilst I 
 thus imagine a moon, God should so act upon my 
 mind by insensible degrees, or otherwise, as to 
 make this imagined moon appear brighter and 
 brighter to me, till it comes to be to the full as 
 vivid as the moon supposed to be in the heavens, 
 or as any moon whatsoever. In this case, I say, 
 we have an instance of a visible or seen object, 
 which, to appearance, is as much external as any 
 object whatsoever, but is not indeed external: 
 which therefore is a demonstration that the visible 
 externeity of an object is no argument for any real 
 externeity of it. 
 
 II. And now from possible I come to actual 
 cases, or instances of the same thing. And here, 
 
 i. The first shall be of certain other sensa- 
 tions, or modes of sensible perception, wherein the 
 objects perceived exist only in the mind, though 
 they seem to exist externally to, or independant on, 
 it; such as sounds, smells, tastes, heat, pain, pleas- 
 ure, &c.
 
 22 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 If any one doubts whether these things be 
 within or without the souls or perceptive faculties 
 of those who sense them, they must excuse me if I 
 am unwilling to digress so far as to undertake the 
 proof of what I here suppose; and that partly on 
 the account of its evidence ; but I am content to say 
 chiefly, because the thing has been already done 
 often to my hands, particularly by Mr. Des Cartes, 
 Mr. Malebranch, and Mr. Norris, in several parts 
 of their much celebrated writings, whither I chuse 
 to refer my inquisitive reader. 11 
 
 Supposing then that these objects of sense ex- 
 ist truly and really in their respective faculties, I 
 am sure no one will doubt whether they do not 
 seem to exist altogether without them. For this I 
 appeal to every one's experience, and to the dif- 
 ficulty which so many find in believing, that they 
 do not indeed exist without them. If so, we have 
 then several instances together of certain objects 
 of sense, which, notwithstanding that they seem as 
 much external as any objects whatsoever, yet really 
 and truly are not external. 
 
 "Moreover, there is of this sort a particular 
 instance often mentioned by philosophers, 12 which 
 is very home to this purpose ; and that is, of a man's 
 feeling pain in a member which he has lost. This 
 is usually said to depend on certain motions made 
 by certain humours or animal spirits on the nerves 
 or fibres of the remaining part; but of this I make 
 no other use or account at present, than only to col-
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 23 
 
 lect from hence, that the effect would still be the 
 same though the absent member were as well an- 
 nihilated as lost. If so, I ask, where is this member 
 which the man is sensible of? Where, I say, is, 
 or can it be, but in the mind or soul of him that 
 feels it?" 13 
 
 2. The next instance shall be of light and 
 colours, which are allowed to be objects properly 
 visible. These appear or seem as much at a dis- 
 tance or external as any objects whatsoever, yet 
 scarce any thing is more evident than that they are 
 not so. 
 
 In this I speak more particularly to Cartes- 
 ians ; and on this occasion I desire to ask them, how 
 has it come to pass, that they, who all agree that 
 light and colours are not external, should yet hap- 
 pen to overlook the same conclusion, with relation 
 to the bodies, subjects, or extensions, which sus- 
 tain these accidents? 14 For can any thing be more 
 true or proper than to say, such a body is luminous, 
 or, of this or that colour? Or more evident than 
 that light and colour exist in, or are accidents of 
 matter? And shall we say that the subjects exist 
 without, and the accidents within the soul? Even 
 those very accidents whose totum esse is inesse in 
 their particular or respective subjects? 1S But to 
 return: as for those who are not yet content so 
 much as to grant that light and colours exist in 
 the soul, I must refer them, as before, for their sat- 
 isfaction in this point. In the mean time this will
 
 24 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 doubtless be admitted by all sides or parties, that 
 if light and colours are not external, I have given 
 them an instance of some visible objects, which are 
 very apparently, but yet are not really external, 
 which is all the labour I shall be at in this partic- 
 ular. 
 
 3. My next instance shall be of those who on 
 some occasions see many objects which no other 
 persons see, and which are unanimously granted 
 to have no existence, but in the minds or faculties 
 of those who see them. Such are those who see 
 men walking the streets with halters about their 
 necks, or with knives sticking in their bodies. Such 
 are those who see themselves or others in the fig- 
 ures of cocks, bulls, or wolves, or with the equipage 
 of sovereign princes. And such, lastly, are those 
 who see and converse with several persons, see 
 houses, trees, &c. which no other person seeth, or 
 perhaps hath ever seen. 
 
 These, you will say, are mad or light-headed. 
 Be it so, that they are mad, or drunk, or whatsoever 
 else you will, yet, unless we will be like them we 
 must needs grant the fact, viz. that they really 
 see the things or objects they pretend to see. They 
 see them also as external or without them; and yet 
 we all grant, and even contend, that they are not 
 without them, which is as much as I am here con- 
 cerned for. 16 
 
 4. Another instance of vision, which infers 
 the same conclusion, is of persons whose minds or
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 25 
 
 perceptive faculties are acted in an extraordinary 
 manner by the spirit of God: such was Ezekiel, 
 such was St. John, the author, to us, of the Apoca- 
 lypse, and such have been many others : these were 
 neither mad nor light-headed, and yet they tell us 
 of strange things which they have seen as evidently, 
 and as externally to appearance, as any objects 
 whatsoever; but yet such things as never really ex- 
 isted without the minds, or perceptive faculties of 
 those who are supposed to have seen them. 
 
 5. Another instance of vision which infers 
 the same conclusion, shall be one of which every 
 person may have the experience. Let a man, whilst 
 he looks upon any object, as suppose the moon, 
 press or distort one of his eyes with his finger; this 
 done, he will perceive or see two moons, at some 
 distance from each other; one, as it were, proceed- 
 ing or sliding off from the other. 
 
 Now both of these moons are equally external, 
 or seen by us as external; and yet one at least of 
 these is not external, there being but one moon sup- 
 posed to be in the heavens, or without us. There- 
 fore an object is seen by us as external, which is 
 not indeed external, which is again the thing to be 
 shewn. 17 
 
 6. The last instance which I shall mention 
 to this purpose, shall be one likewise of which we 
 have every day's experience, but yet is little ob- 
 served ; and that is, the usual act of seeing objects 
 in a looking-glass.
 
 a6 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 Here I see sun, moon, and stars, even a whole 
 expanded world, as distinctly, as externally, as 
 any material objects are capable of being seen. 
 
 Now the question (if it can be any question) 
 is, Where are these things? Do they exist within 
 or without my soul, or perceptive faculty? If it 
 is said that they exist without, I must still ask 
 where? Are they numerically the same with that 
 sun, &c. which I see without a glass, and are here, 
 for a time, supposed to be external? This cannot 
 be, for several reasons: as first, I see them both 
 together; that is, I as evidently see two distinct 
 objects (suppose suns) as ever I saw two houses, 
 trees, &c. that is, I have the same simple evidence 
 of sense for their being two distinct suns, as I have, 
 or can have, that one object is not two, or two one, 
 or that one is not ten thousand. Secondly, I can, 
 and have often seen one of these suns, viz. either 
 of them singly, without seeing the other. Again, 
 thirdly, instead of two, I have sometimes seen at 
 least twenty or thirty suns, all equally seen, equally 
 seen as external. Moreover, fourthly, we often 
 see the object in the glass very different from that 
 which is like it, and goes by the same name, with- 
 out the glass. As for instance, one shall be in mo- 
 tion, whilst the other is at rest; one shall be of one 
 colour, nay also, figure and magnitude, and the 
 other shall be of another; to which may be added, 
 many other particular differences of which every 
 one's experience will prove a sufficient testimony.
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 27 
 
 If then an object seen as in a glass, be not the 
 same with any seen without a glass; and if it be 
 still affirmed that it exists 'without the soul which 
 perceives it, I still proceed to demand, Where 
 does it exist? Shall we say that it exists in the 
 glass? Perhaps so, but this must be made at least 
 intelligible, before another can assent to it. What, 
 a whole expanded world in a piece of glass? Well, 
 let those who think so enjoy their own opinion. 
 For my part, I freely own I am not a match for 
 such reasoners; and so I grant, as to a superior 
 gen'us, whatsoever they shall be pleased to require 
 of me. As likewise to those who shall seriously 
 contend, that the objects seen as in the glass, are 
 not indeed in the glass, but in the e>e of him that 
 seeth them; not thinking it possible to urge any 
 thing to the contrary, which will be of the least 
 weight or moment to alter their opinion. 
 
 Nevertheless, I expect to find some, either of 
 the learned or unlearned part of the world, who, 
 upon the first suggestion, will very readily agree 
 with me, that the objects seen as in the glass, are 
 not external to the mind which sees them ; and in- 
 deed this is to me so simply evident, that I cannot 
 induce my mind to set formally about the proof of 
 it, and do almost repent me that I have said so 
 much already on this head, or that I did not at 
 once lay it down as a thing universally taken for 
 granted, at least which would be granted upon the 
 first suggestion. However, till such time as I am
 
 28 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 apprized of an adversary, I will now conclude 
 that the objects seen as in a glass, are not external 
 to the soul, or visive faculty of him that seeth 
 them; and consequently, that I have here again 
 given an instance of a visible object, as much ex- 
 ternal to appearance, as any object whatsoever, 
 but which is not indeed external. 
 
 Now from all and every of these instances it 
 follows, that the visible or apparent externeity of 
 an object, is no argument of its real externeity; and 
 consequently (if it be not the same thing again 
 in other words) that there is a true and real dif- 
 ference between the quasi and any real externeity 
 of an object; which justifies the distinction laid 
 down in my introduction. 18 
 
 This conclusion follows, with the same force 
 or evidence, from the possible as from the actual 
 instances ; and as much from one of either sort, as 
 from ten thousand. For if but one, and that a pos- 
 sible instance, be given and allowed of, wherein 
 an object may be seen, with all the visible marks 
 of being external, which attend any visible or seen 
 object whatsoever, but which yet is not indeed ex- 
 ternal; this one intirely destroys all connection 
 between apparent and real externeity; and so the 
 consequence will be, that an object's appearing to 
 be external, is no manner of argument that it is 
 really so. 
 
 Yet I have instanced in many things, for my 
 reader's sake, as well as my own. For my own in-
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 29 
 
 deed, in the first place, in as much as by this means 
 I have many strings to my bow, which must every 
 one be broken before the bow itself can be bent 
 the other way. But yet not forgetting my reader's 
 benefit, (if he will allow it to be any) inasmuch 
 as, amongst so many instances, he may meet with 
 one at least which will hit in with his way of 
 reasoning, and so dispose him to read what fol- 
 lows with the more pleasure. 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 That a visible object, as such, is not external. 
 
 HAVING shewn that there is no consequence 
 from the visible or quasi externeity of an object to 
 any real externeity of it, I come in the next place 
 to shew, that a visible world is not, cannot be ex- 
 ternal. 
 
 But before I enter upon this task, what should 
 hinder me from asserting my privilege of standing 
 still in this place, and demanding to have some 
 other argument produced for the externeity of the 
 visible world, besides that of its seeming externe- 
 ity? This is that which convinces people of every 
 age, and sex, and degree, that the objects they be- 
 hold are really external; and this I am sure, with 
 far the greater part, is the only reason which in- 
 duces this persuasion. With such, and even with 
 all, till some other argument be produced, I may
 
 30 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 be allowed to argue, as if this were the only argu- 
 ment: that is, to conclude outright, that no visible 
 object is indeed external. For to remove all the 
 pillars on which a building stands, is usually 
 thought to be as effectual a way to demolish it, as 
 any direct force or violence. 
 
 But not to insist on every point of property, 
 when so large a field is before me, I will here im- 
 mediately enter upon the work of proving it to 
 my reader, according to my promise. And here, 
 
 i. First of all, let him try once more the ex- 
 periment already mentioned, of pressing or dis- 
 torting his eye with his finger. In this case I ob- 
 served before, (with an appeal for the truth of it 
 to common experience,) that two like objects ap- 
 pear, or are seen. Hence I concluded, that only 
 one of these can be external; that is, that one of 
 them is not so. But here I argue from the same 
 fact, that neither of them is external. 
 
 Let an instance be put, as suppose the object 
 which we call the moon, by pressing my eye I see 
 two moons, equally vivid, equally external; if so, 
 they are both external, or neither. But we are 
 agreed already that they are not both so, therefore 
 neither of them is external. 
 
 If any one will affirm, that only one of these 
 moons is external, I must desire him to give me 
 one mark or sign of the externeity of one, which is 
 not in the other. In the mean time let him try this 
 experiment with himself.
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 31 
 
 In the act of seeing two moons, let him call 
 one of them the true external moon, and the other 
 only an appearing or false, or by any other name 
 which he shall please to give it: this done, let him 
 (with his eyes or mind still intent upon these ob- 
 jects) remove his finger, and press the other eye 
 in like manner; or shut either one of his eyes, still 
 keeping the other intent on the same object, and 
 he will find by manifest experience, that the moon, 
 which he calls the true, will prove to be the false, 
 and that which he calls the false, will prove to be 
 the true. This, I think, is plain and palpable dem- 
 onstration, that they are both equally true, or (as 
 we here understand the word) both equally ex- 
 ternal. Since therefore no more than one can be 
 pretended to be external, to say that they are both 
 equally so, is the same as to say that they are neither 
 of them so. 
 
 Note i. That the same argument here pro- 
 ceeding on the instance of the moon, is the very 
 same with relation to any other visible object. So 
 that the conclusion comprehends the whole visible 
 world at once; or, in other words, every visible ob- 
 ject considered as visible or seen. 
 
 Note 2. The same conclusion likewise fol- 
 lows from every one of the instances mentioned in 
 the former section. Since, as on one hand it ap- 
 pears that there is no consequence from the appar- 
 ent to any real externeity of an object; so in the 
 very act of supposing certain objects, which are as
 
 32 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 much apparently external as any objects whatso- 
 ever, but which indeed are not external, we must of 
 course suppose them to be as much indeed external 
 as any objects whatsoever. Since therefore some are 
 not external, we must conclude that none are so. 
 And this conclusion will and must hold good till 
 some mark or sign be given of the externeity of one 
 object, which is not also in the other; the very at- 
 tempt of which is contrary to the supposition. But 
 to proceed. 
 
 II. It is a maxim in philosophy that like is 
 not the same, and therefore much more one would 
 think should it be allowed that things vastly dif- 
 ferent are not the same. As for instance, that light 
 is not darkness, nor darkness light; that greater is 
 not less, nor less greater, &c. And yet on such 
 plain and simple principles as these it follows that 
 the visible world is not external. 
 
 Here then let us again single out an object 
 which will answer for the whole visible world, and 
 let it be the same as before, viz. the moon. The 
 question is, Whether the moon which I see is ex- 
 ternal or not? In this question there is not a word 
 but what is plain and simple, or which has been 
 explained already: let us then proceed to the trial 
 of it by the plain rule before-mentioned, viz., that 
 things different are not the same, which indeed is 
 the same thing in other words with the first princi- 
 ple of science, viz. Impossibile est idem esse G? 
 
 non esse. 19
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 33 
 
 i. First then I am content for a while to 
 grant that there is an external world, and in this 
 world an external moon in a place far distant from 
 us, which we call the heavens. Still the question 
 returns, whether the moon which I see be that ex- 
 ternal moon here supposed to be in the heavens? 
 Well now, the moon which I see is a luminous or 
 bright object. But is the moon supposed to be in 
 the heavens a luminous thing or body? No; but 
 a dark or opacious body, if there is any truth in 
 the unanimous assent of all philosophers. Again, 
 the moon which I see is a plain surface; but is 
 the moon in the heavens a plain surface? No; all 
 the world agree that the moon in the heavens is 
 rotund or spherical. Again, the moon which I 
 see is semicircular or cornuted; but is this the 
 figure of the moon supposed to be in the heavens? 
 No; we all affirm that the moon in the heavens 
 is round or dircular. Again, lastly, the moon 
 which I see is a little figure of light, no bigger 
 than a trencher, nay so little, as to be intirely cov- 
 erable by a shilling. But is this a just descrip- 
 tion of the moon supposed to be in the heavens? 
 No ; the moon in the heavens is by all allowed to 
 be a body of prodigious size, of some thousands of 
 miles in its diameter. Well then, what follows 
 from all this, but that the moon in the heavens is 
 not the moon which I see ; or, that the moon which 
 I see is not in the heavens, or external to my per- 
 ceptive or visive faculty?
 
 34 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 2. Secondly, As we have seen that the moon 
 which I see, is not the same with any moon sup- 
 posed to be in the heavens, and consequently, that 
 the moon which I see is not external, by a compar- 
 ison of the visible or seen moon, with that which 
 is supposed to be external ; so, the same thing will 
 appear by a comparison of visible things with vis- 
 ible, or, of the same thing, (as I must here speak, 
 for want of more proper words,) with itself. But 
 to explain. 
 
 At this instant I see a little strip of light, 
 which common use has taught me to call the moon. 
 Now again I see a larger, which is still called by 
 the same name. At this instant I see a semicircle; 
 a while after I see a circle of light, and both these 
 are called the moon. Again, now I see a circle of 
 light of such or such a magnitude; a while after 
 I see a circle of light of a much greater magnitude ; 
 and both these, as before, I am taught to call the 
 moon. But really and truly, instead of one, I see 
 many moons, unless things different are the same. 
 How then can I believe that the moons which I 
 see are either one or all of them external? That 
 they are all so cannot be pretended, for no one ever 
 dreamt of more than one external moon; and I am 
 as confident on the other hand, that no one will 
 pretend that either one of them is external, as in 
 exclusion of the rest. I conclude then that they 
 are all alike external, that is, that neither of them 
 is so; and consequently, (there being nothing in
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 35 
 
 this but what is equally true of every other object 
 of the visible world,) that no visible object is, or 
 can be, external. 
 
 III. But why such long fetches to prove a 
 simple truth? It is no wonder that my reader 
 (who perhaps has never thought of this subject 
 before) should overlook the exact point of the 
 question, when I myself can scarce keep it in view. 
 I would beg leave therefore to remind myself and 
 him, that the question in hand does not any way 
 proceed upon, or so much as need the mention of 
 any bodies supposed to be external, and unknown 
 to us; but the question is, whether the extensions, 
 figures, bodies, (or whatever else you will call 
 them) which I see quasi without me, be indeed 
 without me or not. 
 
 But can the resolution of any case be more 
 plain and simple than of this? For is there any 
 other possible way of seeing a thing than by having 
 such or such a thing present to our minds? And 
 can an object be present to the mind, or visive fac- 
 ulty, which is affirmed to be external to it? Then 
 may we think, without thinking on any thing; or 
 perceive, without having any thing in our mind. 
 If then the presentialness of the object be necessary 
 to the act of vision, the object perceived cannot 
 possibly be external to, at a distance from, or inde- 
 pendent on, us: And consequently, the only sense 
 in which an object can be said to exist without us, 
 is its being not seen or perceived. But the objects
 
 36 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 we speak of are supposed to be seen, and therefore 
 are not external to us, which is the point to be de- 
 monstrated. 20 
 
 [To this I might add another, which (if pos- 
 sible) is a yet more simple manner of proceeding 
 to the same conclusion. And it is this. The ob- 
 jects we speak about are supposed to be visible; 
 and that they are visible or seen, is supposed to be 
 all that we know of them, or their existence. If 
 so, they exist as visible, or in other words, their 
 visibility is their existence. This therefore de- 
 stroys all, or any distinction between their being, 
 and their being seen, by making them both the 
 same thing; and this evidently at the same time 
 destroys the externeity of them. But this argu- 
 ment has the misfortune of being too simple and 
 evident, for the generality of readers, who are apt 
 to fancy that light itself is not seen, but by the help 
 of darkness; and so, without insisting any farther 
 on this head, I proceed to some other points which 
 may seem to be more intelligible.] 
 
 IV. Surely, could the most extravagant 
 imagination of man have conceived a way, how an 
 object supposed to be external, could ever possibly 
 become visible, philosophers would never have 
 been at so great an expence of fruitless meditation, 
 as to forge the strange doctrine of the active and 
 passive intellect, impressed and expressed species, 
 &c. whereby to account for our manner of seeing
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 37 
 
 objects. This doctrine, as I remember, is as fol- 
 loweth. 
 
 It is supposed, that when a man stands oppo- 
 site to an object, there are certain scales or images, 
 (which proceed from this object representing it) 
 which fly in at the eye, where they meet with a 
 certain being, faculty, or power, called the active 
 intellect, which, in an instant, spiritualizes them 
 into ideas, and thence delivers them to the inmost 
 recess of the soul, called the passive intellect, which 
 perceives or sees them. 
 
 Now far be it from me to move the least objec- 
 tion against this account of vision. They are 
 doubtless all plain and simple ideas, or else Aris- 
 totle had not chosen, neither had the tribe of phil- 
 osophers since patronized them. 21 
 
 I only observe first, that this antient, and al- 
 most universal account of vision, supposes that the 
 object seen is this supposed scale or effluvium. 
 And consequently, secondly, that in order to the 
 act of vision, there is, and must be, an intimate 
 union between faculty and object. 
 
 For if the soul can see an object which is not 
 present with it, there had been no need of images 
 of the object to become present to the soul, by pass- 
 ing through the eye, &c. However, they need not 
 be images, but any other fashioned particles would 
 have done as well, if the objects seen were not those 
 very images thus spiritualized in the active, and 
 thence passing on to the passive, intellect.
 
 38 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 Why then should not I conclude, even with 
 universal consent, that the objects seen are not ex- 
 ternal, but intimately present with, or existent in, 
 the soul? 
 
 Those who patronize this hypothesis of vision, 
 will, doubtless, tell me, that it is the least of their 
 thoughts thereby to affirm and conclude, that the 
 visible world is not external. On the contrary, 
 that the hypothesis itself supposes an external 
 world, or outward objects, from whence these 
 images or effluviums proceed. 
 
 I answer, it does so; but it does not say or 
 suppose, that these external objects are visible or 
 seen, but only that they are or exist eternally. On 
 the contrary, the objects seen are supposed to be 
 these images, which, in order to be seen, must first 
 cease to be external ; that is, must pass into the soul, 
 and become ideally present with it. So that this 
 account of vision supposes the visible world, as 
 such, to be not external. 
 
 If, together with this, men will yet hold or 
 affirm that the visible world is external, I can only 
 shew them that their own account supposes the 
 direct contrary. But it is neither in mine, nor any 
 other person's power, to hinder another from hold- 
 ing contradictions. 
 
 V. From the old I proceed to the hypothesis 
 of vision, which is a part of the new philosophy. 
 Every one, I suppose, has heard of the doctrine 
 of seeing the divine ideas, or (as Mr. Malebranche
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 39 
 
 expresses it) seeing all things in God. 22 By this 
 every mode of pure or intellective perception is 
 accounted for ; but I am here concerned only with 
 that which is distinguished by the name of vision. 
 With regard to this the hypothesis is as followeth. 
 
 In every act of vision they distinguish two 
 things, viz. sensation and idea, in other words col- 
 our and figure. Colour, they say, is nothing dif- 
 ferent from the soul which seeth it, it being only 
 a modification of thought or mind. And as for 
 figure, viz. this or that particular figure which is 
 seen, they call it part of that intelligible extension 
 which God includes, or contemplates, thus and 
 thus exhibited to our minds. 
 
 Now I say, nothing is more evident than that 
 this account of vision supposes that external matter 
 is not visible; and consequently, that visible matter 
 is not external. So evident, that I depend even on 
 my Aristotelian reader, (who neither approves, 
 nor so much as understands, what these new phil- 
 osophers mean,) that he will perceive at first sight 
 that this must needs be meant by it. 
 
 However, when I am apprized of any one 
 who doubts of it, I shall not only be ready to argue 
 this matter fairly with him, but will also undertake 
 to produce several express passages from the writ- 
 ers of this sort, which directly affirm and contend, 
 that external matter is not, cannot, become visible. 
 
 Nevertheless, I am sensible of the opposition 
 which may be made to this assertion, from several
 
 40 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 other passages taken from the same writers. But 
 I cannot help it if men will speak inconsistently 
 with themselves; or explain their meaning so by 
 halves, as that the same thing shall appear to be 
 both affirmed and denied by them. 
 
 But the truth is, I fear but little opposition 
 as to this point: since no one will have zeal enough 
 to undertake it, but those who professedly patron- 
 ize this new pholosophy: and I have so good an 
 opinion of these, as to believe that they will rather 
 take the hint, and agree with me, upon due re- 
 flection, than set themselves to oppose, from any 
 partial regard to their own preconceived opinions. 
 
 VI. I shall therefore once more endeavour to 
 persuade my Aristotelian reader, that it is accord- 
 ing to the principles of his own philosophy to as- 
 sert, that visible matter is not external. 23 
 
 For this I would refer him to what he will 
 find in the first book of philosophy, he shall hap- 
 pen to light on, which has anything on the general 
 subject of matter. For instance, let him consult 
 Suarez, 24 Scheibler, 25 or Baronius, 26 on this sub- 
 ject, which will be found in their books of meta- 
 physicks; which authors I mention more particu- 
 larly, because with these I myself have been most 
 acquainted ; not but that I dare appeal to the first 
 philosopher on this subject which my reader shall 
 happen to lay his hands on: But to the point. 
 
 I do not here affirm, that any one philosopher 
 of this sort has ever once asserted, that visible mat-
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 41 
 
 ter is not external, or so much as ever moved the 
 question, whether it be so or not : on the contrary, 
 I verily believe, that if the question had been put 
 to every individual of them, they would unani- 
 mously have affirmed that it is certainly external. 
 Nevertheless, I still appeal to my impartial reader, 
 whether the questions which they move, and the 
 resolutions which they agree in, concerning the 
 thing which they call matter, do not plainly sup- 
 pose that they are speaking of an object which they 
 do not see, and which is utterly invisible. 
 
 As for instance, it is usual for them to enquire 
 whether matter exists or not. Whether it has an 
 actus entitativus; or whether it be only pura poten- 
 tia. 27 How it is capable of being known, &c. 
 
 As to the first of these questions they use to 
 resolve it thus. That matter must needs exist, be- 
 cause it is supposed to be created, and also because 
 it is supposed to be a part of a compositum. And 
 here again they will tell you, that if it were alto- 
 gether nothing, it could do nothing in nature; it 
 could not be the subject of generation and cor- 
 ruption; it could not be true, that all things in 
 their corruption are reduced to matter; and be- 
 sides, if matter was nothing, there would be a con- 
 tinual creation and annihilation, which is absurd, 
 &c. 
 
 As to the second question, viz. whether it be 
 pura potentia, or not, they distinguish of a twofold 
 actus ; actus physicus, and actus metaphysicus.
 
 42 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 Secundum actum physicum, they say, matter is al- 
 lowed to be pura potentia, but not secundum actum 
 metaphysicum, &c. 
 
 And then lastly, as to the other question, viz. 
 quomodo materia possit cognosci, 2 * they resolve it 
 thus, That God and angels are supposed to know 
 it per propriam speciem ; but we are supposed to 
 know it only by consequence, or, as they say, per 
 proportionem sen analogiam ad materiam rerum 
 artificialium, &c. whence Plato is quoted by them, 
 as saying, that matter is knowable only adulterina 
 cognitione. 29 
 
 Now I say, for what are all these, and several 
 other such like fetches which I could name, if the 
 matter they inquire about be that which is visible 
 or seen? Can it be doubted whether that exists or 
 not which is supposed to be seen? Whether such 
 an object as this be actus entitativus, or pura po- 
 tential And whether we know anything of the 
 existence of an object which we are supposed to 
 see? 
 
 If visible matter were the matter they are de- 
 bating about, can it possibly be accounted for, that 
 not the least mention is ever made of our seeing it? 
 Or, that for its existence, &c. they should never 
 think of referring us to our senses? And yet I defy 
 another to shew me but one word of this sort in 
 any philosophic disputation on this subject. 
 
 Nay, they plainly tell us, that the matter they
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 43 
 
 speak about is not by us seen, but is directly know- 
 able only by God and angels. 
 
 If then the inquiry they make about matter 
 be not about any matter supposed to be seen by us, 
 yet nothing is more evident, than that the matter 
 they speak about is supposed to be external. So 
 that what should hinder us from concluding, that 
 it is the unanimous opinion of these philosophers, 
 (though indeed they have never in express words 
 affirmed it,) that external matter is, at least to us, 
 invisible; and consequently, that visible or seen 
 matter is not external ; which is all that I am here 
 concerned for, leaving others to explain for them 
 what they mean when they affirm, that external 
 matter is visible to God and angels. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Objections answered. 
 
 HAVING proved my point after my own 
 manner, it may be expected that I now attend to 
 what another may offer on the contrary part. This, 
 I confess, is a piece of justice which I owe a fair 
 adversary, and accordingly I here profess I will 
 be ready at any time, either to answer his objec- 
 tions, or submit to the force of them. But how can 
 it be expected that I myself should oppose any- 
 thing to the point I have been contending for?
 
 44 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 For my reader may remember, that I have already 
 declared, that I know of no one reason or argu- 
 ment, either in myself formerly, or from others, 
 for the externeity of the visible world, besides its 
 seeming externeity. But if I have not already 
 shewn the inconsequence of this argument, I con- 
 fess I have been very idly employed ; and if I have, 
 I have at once answered every objection that can 
 reasonably be expected from me, to be urged 
 against the point I am concerned for. 
 
 There may be cavils indeed enough, and of 
 these I expect my share from a certain quarter; 
 for having endeavoured, with a serious air, to 
 demonstrate a proposition which is so contrary to 
 common prejudice, and which some perhaps will 
 be resolved not to admit; nay, I myself am not so 
 abstracted from my former self, as not to be able 
 very easily to invent a set of arguments of this 
 sort. But what can in reason be expected that I 
 should do with an adversary of this sort? Shall I 
 study a means to convert those whom confessedly 
 it is not in my power to convince? But I have 
 said already that I know of no mechanical engine 
 proper to remove prejudices; and I must still pro- 
 fess the same, till this awakened age shall bless 
 the world with the discovery. Shall I then alto- 
 gether pretermit the mention of such objections, 
 affecting to despise them, as not worth the labour 
 of answering them? This indeed I would do if 
 I wrote on the side of a prevailing party; but a
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 45 
 
 whole world against one is too considerable an 
 adversary to be despised, though they were not 
 only in the wrong, but were little better than id- 
 eots. But I have reason to expect, that not only 
 such, but even the wise and learned, at least by far 
 the greater part, will be my adversaries in this 
 point, after all the endeavour which I have used 
 to justify it; and therefore, till I am apprised of 
 some other, I must suppose them to be so, in virtue 
 of such objections as I can think of at present, or 
 have by accident heard from others in conversa- 
 tion, which are these that follow. 
 
 Objection I. 
 
 First, I expect to be told, that in arguing 
 against the extra-existence of the visible world, I 
 oppose a known evidence of truth, viz. the uni- 
 versal consent of mankind, that it is external. 30 
 
 Answer. 
 
 This now is one of the things which I just now 
 called cavils, which I think is the best name that 
 an argument deserves, which is nothing at all to 
 the purpose in that wherein it is true; at least such 
 a one as is false, both in principle and in conse- 
 quence, which will, I suppose, appear to be the 
 case of the present objection. For, 
 
 First, as to the fact or minor part of the argu-
 
 46 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 ment, what should hinder me from denying it? 
 For, first, who can assure me that since the world 
 began, not one or two, or two hundred persons, 
 have not been of that opinion which I am here con- 
 cerned for? How many may have written on this 
 subject in former times, and we not hear of it in 
 the present? And how many more may have lived 
 and died of this opinion, and yet have never writ- 
 ten on it? But, secondly, what if we allow that 
 not one has ever written on this subject before? 
 This will but turn to the disadvantage of the ob- 
 jection. For where then is the universal consent 
 before spoken of? Do we mean the same by it as 
 universal silence? Silence in this case will amount 
 to but a very slender argument of consent; and in- 
 deed so slender, that the bare opinion or affirma- 
 tion of any one person to the contrary, who has 
 professedly considered and inquired about the 
 matter, will outweigh a silence ever so universal, 
 and may even justly challenge the evidence of con- 
 sent, be it more or less, on his side of the question. 31 
 If therefore the question about the externeity 
 of the visible world, has never, before this time, 
 been professedly considered, I may fairly plead 
 universal consent for that part which I defend; 
 since the consent of all that have ever considered 
 it, must needs be all that is meant by universal con- 
 sent. If therefore there be found on the contrary 
 part, any thing in mankind which is like consent, 
 it must lose its name, and be called prejudice or
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 47 
 
 inclination; which is an adversary (as I have ob- 
 served before) I have no arms to contend with. 
 But lastly, methinks it should weigh something 
 towards consent on my side, that I have shewn al- 
 ready 32 that it is consistent with, and even neces- 
 sary to the principles of philosophers of all sides, 
 to hold that which I contend for. And if this be 
 true, the utmost that can be said in answer to it 
 will be this only, that they have contradicted them- 
 selves, which I am as ready to admit of, as any one 
 can be to urge, since this will make the authority 
 of ten thousand of no value against the point I am 
 concerned for. But, 
 
 Secondly, What if it were true, or admitted, 
 that universal consent lay opposite to my conclu- 
 sion? Must it therefore be condemned without 
 trial, or hearing of anything in its defence? If not, 
 then it is allowed to be possible, that a proposition 
 may be true, though it happen to cross the consent 
 of all mankind. And if so, how can the contrary 
 be true too, namely, that a proposition is therefore 
 false, because contrary to consent? But now, if a 
 proposition may be true, which is against universal 
 consent, I immediately affirm that this is the case 
 of the proposition I am contending for. Well, and 
 how shall this be tried? How, I say, but by reason 
 and disputation? So that unless universal consent 
 be held to be an argument universally conclusive, 
 it concludes nothing at all, (there being a contra- 
 dictory distance between these two propositions,
 
 48 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 viz. a thing may be true which is contrary to con- 
 sent, and a thing may not be true which is contrary 
 to consent.) And therefore the mention of con- 
 sent is here altogether needless, at least, its intro- 
 duction serves only to convince us, that it is much 
 better it had not been introduced. But 
 
 Some perhaps will hold this argument to be 
 universally conclusive, viz. A proposition may not 
 be true which is contrary to universal consent; and 
 this, I suppose, must be the meaning of those who 
 will pretend to mean anything by the words of the 
 objection. But is there a man upon earth who will 
 join issue with me on this foot? Perhaps so, but 
 he must excuse me if I declare beforehand that I 
 will not do so with him whilst he continues to be 
 of this opinion. And I am fool enough to say this, 
 because I think I have reason for it. But this alone 
 unqualifies me to hold discourse with one who will 
 contend, that universal consent is a simple evidence 
 of truth. Whereas if this be true, then universal 
 consent is truth, and reason, or the common stand- 
 ard of every particular truth. Consequently, by 
 this rule, a proposition may become true which is 
 simply false, or false which is simply true ; that is, 
 all that which I have been used to call truth and 
 reason is destroyed at once. But now, whatsoever 
 proposition I defend or deny, I must take it for 
 granted that there is such a thing as truth, inde- 
 pendent and immutable, and that reason is reason, 
 though ever so many people dissent from me, or
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 49 
 
 deny it; that is, I must take the question between 
 us for granted, as my first step towards the dis- 
 putation of it. And therefore, as on one hand I can 
 do no otherwise than thus, and on the other I am 
 sure no adversary will allow me to take this meth- 
 od with him, we must even part fairly, as being 
 unqualified for each other's conversation. And 
 this is my best answer to the first objection. 
 
 Objection 2. 
 
 Does not the sense of feeling assure us of the 
 extra-existence of the visible world? To this I 33 
 
 Answer. 
 
 First. If for instructions sake only you pro- 
 pose this question, you are doubtless disposed to 
 take my word for an answer; accordingly I answer, 
 No; the sense of feeling does not assure us of the 
 extra-existence of the visible world. If this does 
 not satisfy, you are desired, instead of questions, 
 to give me an argument, whereby it may appear 
 that the sense of feeling does assure us of the extra- 
 existence of the visible world. What makes this 
 the more necessary is, because I have proved al- 
 ready in great variety that the visible world is not 
 external; and amongst the rest, that the sense of 
 vision gives us evident assurance, that a visible ob- 
 ject, as such, is not, cannot be, external. And me-
 
 50 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 thinks, if this is not false, it should be true; or if 
 false, yet should not be so called, till either the 
 arguments are answered by which it is defended, 
 or some other argument be produced, which con- 
 cludes against the truth of it: for till one of these 
 things be done I have but the objector's bare as- 
 sertion against me, whereas he has mine, and I 
 think something else on the other side. But, 
 
 Secondly, I am content to go on with the la- 
 bouring oar in my hand, and shew the contrary 
 to that which is affirmed in the objection. Accord- 
 ingly I affirm, 
 
 First, That be the object of the sense of feel- 
 ing what it will, or leaving the decision of this mat- 
 ter at large, feeling is no argument of the extra- 
 existence of this object. For the truth of this I will 
 only refer my reader back to what has been al- 
 ready observed on this subject; or rather I presume 
 that he remembers both that, and how I have pre- 
 vented the force of this part of the objection; so 
 that till I hear farther on this point I may save my- 
 self the pains of adding anything in this place. 
 But I affirm also, 
 
 Secondly, that the sense of feeling is so far 
 from assuring us of the extra-existence of the vis- 
 ible world, that it does not so much as say any- 
 thing of its existence simple. I say not here with 
 a certain Author,* 34 that we cannot feel existence, 
 it being the same thing to do so as to feel a propo- 
 
 Mr. Norris's Theory of the Ideal World. Vol. 1, p. 198. 13.
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 51 
 
 sition. This may be a good argument for aught 
 I know, but I profess it is too high or too low for 
 me, for I do not understand it. But what I affirm 
 is this, that whatever be the object of the sense of 
 feeling, and even admitting that it assures us of the 
 existence of its proper object; things visible are 
 not the object of this sense ; 35 and consequently we 
 can have no assurance this way of so much as the 
 existence simple of such objects. I know not how 
 it may sound to another, but to me to say, I can 
 feel a visible object, is just such another piece of 
 sense as to say, I can see the sound of a trumpet, 
 or hear the colours of a rainbow. One would 
 think it should be granted me that a visible object 
 is visible, and that a tangible object is tangible, 
 and that seeing and feeling are two different things 
 or sensations ; but it is the same thing to me though 
 they were one and the same; for if so, then as vis- 
 ion is feeling, so feeling is vision; and then I have 
 proved already that a visible object, as such, is not 
 external, whereas if they are different they must 
 have different objects, be the names of them what 
 they will; and then a visible object will be one 
 thing, and a tangible object another: and therefore 
 how the existence of a tangible object should be- 
 come an argument for the existence (much more 
 the extra-existence) of a visible object, is indeed 
 past my skill to understand, any farther than this, 
 that if I understand anything at all, I understand,
 
 52 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 and I think I have shewn, this to be a plain and 
 glaring contradiction. And so I proceed to 
 
 Objection 3. 
 
 Which is Mr. Des Cartes's; 36 and that ac- 
 cording to the best of my remembrance is this: he 
 concludes the being of an external world from the 
 truth and goodness of God, who is not to be sup- 
 posed to deceive us in our involuntary judgments 
 or inclinations. [This, I say, I take to be his 
 meaning, though my manner of expressing it be 
 very different from that of his two great followers, 
 Mr. Malebranche * 37 and Mr. Norris, 38 for which 
 I refer my reader to the places cited at the bottom. 
 Whether I have done him justice, or not, I leave 
 to be disputed by those who think I have not. In 
 the mean time, the reason which I give for dif- 
 fering from these great persons is, because as they 
 have represented his argument, it seems to be in- 
 consistent with itself, and has not so much as the 
 appearance of being an objection; whereas, as I 
 have here given it, it seems to have some appear- 
 ance, though how far it is from being a real ar- 
 gument against anything I am concerned for, will 
 appear by this that followeth.] 
 
 Answer. 
 i. If by the being of an external world, be 
 
 * Search's Illustrations, page 112. 3 ? 
 
 Theory of the Ideal World, Vol. 1, p. 208.
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 53 
 
 meant the being of a world, which, as external, is 
 supposed to be invisible, this is nothing to my pres- 
 ent purpose, but belongs wholly to my Second Part; 
 wherein I shall attempt to shew that an external 
 world is simply an impossibility, which external 
 world will be also there supposed to be invisible. 
 But if by the being of an external world be meant 
 the same as the external being, or (as I have hith- 
 erto called it) the extra-existence or externeity of 
 the visible or sensible world, it is then indeed an 
 objection against the point I am now upon. Ac- 
 cordingly, 
 
 2. I say, that in my opinion it is no imputa- 
 tion on the truth and goodness of God to affirm, 
 much less to attempt to prove, that the visible 
 world is not external. It is no business of mine to 
 prove this negative, though it be the easiest thing 
 in the world so to do. Let them prove the con- 
 trary who build their whole cause of an external 
 world upon the force of it. It is enough for me 
 that I have shewn by many arguments that the vis- 
 ible world is not external. These arguments either 
 conclude, or they do not; if not, let this be made 
 appear by a just and distinct answer to them ; but 
 if they do, the point is gained, and they must be 
 persons strangely disposed, who after this will ex- 
 pect I should take their word, when they say, that 
 the truth or goodness of God is concerned, that 
 that should be false, which is, and must be sup-
 
 54 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 posed to be true. But to be something more par- 
 ticular I answer, 
 
 First, That I deny the supposition of the in- 
 voluntariness of our judgments for the externeity 
 of the visible world. For this it is enough that I 
 myself am one, who am so far from being invol- 
 untarily determined to this assent, that I can, and 
 have already demonstrated that it is not external. 
 
 Secondly, We should come to a fine pass of 
 reasoning indeed, if this manner of proceeding 
 were allowed to be good, viz. / am inclined to 
 judge such or such a thing to be so or so; ergo, // 
 is as I 'would have it, because God will not deceive 
 me. 39 It is in vain in this case to appeal to reason 
 and argument; nay, though God himself should 
 supply us with reason against our inclination, nay, 
 and give us his word that our inclination is erron- 
 eous, yet still we are bound to stand by it, and even 
 plead the authority of God against himself. But, 
 lastly, Do I hear this from a Cartesian, even from 
 Des Cartes himself, who is for nothing more known 
 in the world than for giving us many instances 
 wherein a common inclination may be, and is er- 
 roneous; as in judging light to be in the sun, heat 
 in the fire, or in the hand, colours on external ob- 
 jects, 40 &c. In all these cases we are as much in- 
 clined as in judging the visible world to be ex- 
 ternal; and yet it is enough with him and his fol- 
 lowers for the confutation of these inclinations, 
 that they have good reason to the contrary: and
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 55 
 
 this methinks should be enough in any case, and 
 with any persons, unless we are resolved to be un- 
 reasonable, and even profess ourselves Sceptics, 
 and if so, I confess I am silenced. 41 
 
 PART II. 
 
 That there is no external world, and, That an ex- 
 ternal world is a being utterly impossible. 42 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 HAVING shewn in my former part that the 
 visible world is not external, I come now to the 
 other thing proposed in the beginning, namely to 
 demonstrate more at large, or simply, that an ex- 
 ternal world is a being utterly impossible, or that 
 there is no such world. Now to this, as before, I 
 shall proceed by steps. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 ARGUMENT I. 
 
 AND here I affirm, in the first place, that (ab- 
 stracting from any argument directly proving this 
 point) we are bound already so far to conclude
 
 56 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 that there is no external world, as that it is against 
 all the laws of fair reason and argument to sup- 
 pose or make mention of any such world. For if 
 a visible world, as such, is not external, an external 
 world, as such, must be utterly invisible, and if in- 
 visible, unknowable, unless by revelation. 43 
 
 For, first, an external world (if there be any 
 such thing) is, I suppose, allowed by all to be a 
 creature ; 44 but the being of a creature is not to be 
 proved by reason, for reason converses only in 
 things necessary or eternal, whereas a creature, as 
 such, is contingent, and temporary; so that in vain 
 shall we seek to reason to assure us of the existence 
 of an external world. 
 
 Then, secondly, it is here supposed that we 
 should seek to as little purpose to the testimony of 
 sense, since an external world, as such, is here sup- 
 posed to be absolutely invisible. Whether we 
 have any notice from revelation of the being of 
 any such world shall be considered in its proper 
 place. 45 In the mean time I here suppose also, 
 Thirdly, that we have no such notice, so that, as 
 the case stands at present, an external world is a 
 being utterly unknown. 
 
 But now I have always received it as a law, 
 that we ought never to reason but upon known 
 ideas ; and if this be just and reasonable, an exter- 
 nal world, as being unknown, ought to have as lit- 
 tle place in our reasonings as if we knew for certain 
 that there was no such world.
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 57 
 
 Nay, on the supposition of its being unknown, 
 we are not only bound to omit the mention of it, 
 but also warranted to conclude that there is no such 
 world. This, I say, must be an allowed conse- 
 quence, till such time as some other pretends the 
 contrary; and he must prove too as well as pretend, 
 else the consequence stands good against him. 
 
 Here then is my advantage; we all know and 
 are agreed that there is such a thing as a visible 
 world, and that a visible object, as such, is not ex- 
 ternal : on the other hand, we are as much agreed, 
 at least it is here supposed that we are agreed, that 
 we know nothing at all of an external world, sup- 
 posed, as such, to be invisible : but it is a maxim in 
 science, that eadem est ratio non entis & non ap- 
 parentis. I conclude therefore outright that there 
 is no such world. 
 
 It is for this reason that we think it our duty 
 to reason only on the supposition of body and spirit, 
 thinking and extended beings, viz. because we have 
 no knowledge of the existence of any creature, 
 which is neither of these. Hence we think it a 
 very good and safe way of arguing, to make the 
 exclusion of the one, the consequence of the posi- 
 tion of the other, and so vice versa. Thus philos- 
 ophers use to prove that colour, light, heat, sound, 
 &c. belong to, or are affections, of spirits, because 
 they are not included in the idea which we have of 
 body. The principle or major proposition of 
 which argument is plainly this. There are but
 
 58 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 two sorts of beings in the world, viz. spirit and 
 matter] then the minor is this, viz. light, &c. do not 
 belong to matter, ergo, they belong to spirit. Now 
 if this way of arguing is good, it is so by virtue of 
 that principle, that we ought to reason only on 
 known ideas, and that things which appear not, 
 are but equal to things which are not; and it is in 
 virtue of the same that I here plead a right to con- 
 clude that there is no such thing as an external 
 world. 
 
 I pretend not this to be demonstration of the 
 point simply, as if I should say that a thing's being 
 unknown were a direct argument of its not being at 
 all ; but yet this is something so very near of kin to 
 a demonstration, and so every way serving all the 
 ends and purposes of a demonstration, that whoever 
 has the advantage of it on his side, has as little to 
 fear from an adversary, as he that can produce ten 
 thousand demonstrations. For this is an evident 
 principle or rule of reasoning, that a thing un- 
 known ought never to be supposed, and therefore 
 till it be supposed, it is the very same thing as to 
 us as if there were no such thing at all. To sup- 
 pose the being of a thing granted to be unknown, 
 with him who affirms that it is nothing at all, is to 
 beg the question ; whereas, to suppose it to be noth- 
 ing at all upon the same concession, is not to beg 
 the question; I mean any fair or legal one, because 
 on one hand, no one has any right to make that a 
 question which he professes that he knows nothing
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 59 
 
 of ; and on the other, every one has a right not only 
 to question the existence, but also to suppose the 
 non-existence of what is granted to be unknown. 
 So that whilst this is granted, in the case before us, 
 I have the same advantage against any one who 
 shall suppose an external world (viz. either in actu 
 formali^ as in opposition to what I here contend 
 for, or in actu exercito* 6 in the resolution of any 
 philosophical or general question, which depends 
 on the yea or nay of this point,) as if I were girt 
 about with ever so many demonstrations. 
 
 I might therefore fairly rest here, and save 
 myself the labour of producing any direct or osten- 
 sive arguments against the being or possibility of 
 an external world: but to give my reader the best 
 satisfaction I can, and also to establish my conclu- 
 sion in some measure answerably to the good use 
 and moment of it, I am content to propose the fol- 
 lowing demonstrations. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 ARGUMENT II. 
 
 AN external world is here supposed to be in- 
 visible, even utterly or absolutely so, absolutely 
 incapable of being an object of vision or percep- 
 tion ; insomuch, that though it were here supposed 
 that an external world were capable of existing, or
 
 60 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 that any power were sufficient to produce such a 
 thing or being, yet no power can be supposed to be 
 sufficient to make it visible or seen. For a visible 
 world, as such, is not external, as has been shewn 
 already: so that to say, that an external world may 
 (by any cause) become visible, is a contradiction in 
 terms. 
 
 Well now, an external world is supposed to be, 
 or to imply creature; so that if there be any such 
 thing in being, it is so, because God has willed, 
 made or created it. 
 
 But for what end, or use, or purpose, can we 
 suppose that God should create an invisible world? 
 A world, which, as invisible, is incapable of being 
 inhabited, incapable of being known? For my 
 part I can think of no use which such a world can 
 be of. And considering that such a world is here 
 granted to be unknown, it is not incumbent on me 
 to shew that it can be of no use, but on them to shew 
 the contrary, who are concerned for the being of 
 it. So that till this be done I have a right to sup- 
 pose that it is of no use at all, and consequently to 
 affirm that there is no such world. 
 
 For though the principle must take its chance 
 to be either admitted or denied, as men shall please 
 to judge (only that, as I observed just now, he must 
 prove his point, who will venture on the denial of 
 it,) still the consequence is good, and must pass 
 with all for demonstration, that a creature which is 
 not, cannot be of any use, is at best but a possibility,
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 61 
 
 but such a possibility as neither will, nor can be 
 produced into act. 
 
 This, with certain wits, may appear to be a 
 contradiction ; and perhaps I should mend the mat- 
 ter but little by the answer I am most inclined to 
 make them, namely, that though it be so, yet it is 
 nevertheless true; nay, that I could easily shew 
 them a hundred such contradictions, which yet they 
 themselves will acknowledge to be true. But I am 
 content so far to favour the iniquity of words, as to 
 explain by a distinction this appearing difficulty. 
 
 I say then, that things are possible or impos- 
 sible, after a twofold manner. One is, when in the 
 idea or conception of the thing there is, or is not, 
 any repugnancy or contradiction. 
 
 This is what may be called an internal or in- 
 trinsic possibility, or impossibility; possibility 
 where there is not, impossibility where there is, this 
 supposed repugnancy. 
 
 The other is, when the repugnancy or impedi- 
 ment is, or is not, (not in the thing itself, but) in 
 the cause, or time, or some other circumstance or 
 affection of the thing. But in this place I am con- 
 cerned only with the first of these, viz. the cause. 
 
 A thing is possible in its cause, when there is, 
 in the idea of its cause, no impediment to be found, 
 forbidding its existence, or which is the same, with- 
 holding the efficient from producing it into act; 
 and when the contrary to this happens, then the 
 thing is impossible. For, since everything exists
 
 62 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 by its cause, it will as certainly not exist if the 
 cause does not produce it, as if in its own idea it 
 implied a contradiction. And if the supposed im- 
 pediment in the cause be invincible, the existence 
 of the thing supposed becomes properly impos- 
 sible. This I would therefore call an external or 
 extrinsic possibility or impossibility. A thing then 
 may be both possible and impossible in these dif- 
 ferent respects; that is, intrinsically possible, but 
 extrinsically impossible; and therefore of such a 
 thing it may be be said without any contradiction, 
 that though it be admitted to be possible, (viz. 
 intrinsically,) yet it is such a possibility, as neither 
 will, nor can, be produced into act, (viz. by reason 
 of an impediment found in its cause, which though 
 an extrinsic, is yet a real impossibility against the 
 being of it.) 
 
 But now this is the case before us, viz. of an 
 external or invisible world. Admitting it to be 
 possible with regard to the thing itself, that such a 
 world should exist; yet an useless creature cannot 
 possibly be made, when we regard its cause, viz. 
 God, who can do nothing to no purpose, by reason 
 of his wisdom. 47 Here then lies the impediment 
 spoken of in the cause, which makes it extrinsically, 
 but yet really impossible, that there should be any 
 such world. I say really so, because the wisdom 
 by which God acts is necessary and immutable ; and 
 therefore if it be simply against the order of wis- 
 dom to do an useless act, the impediment against
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 63 
 
 the doing of it is to the full as invincible, as if a 
 repugnancy were found in the idea or conception 
 of the thing itself, here supposed to be done, or not 
 done; and consequently an useless effect is a real 
 impossibility. 
 
 But I have often found upon examination, 
 that where an extrinsic impossibility lies against 
 any point, we need but search to the bottom of it, 
 and we shall find an intrinsic repugnancy in the 
 thing itself. And this I think I have seen to be the 
 case of an external world, as I suppose will appear 
 from some of the following chapters. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 ARGUMENT III. 48 
 
 AS for instance. An external world, whose 
 extension is absolute, that is, not relatively depend- 
 ing on any faculty of perception, has (in my opin- 
 ion,) such a repugnancy in its extension, as actually 
 destroys the being of the subject world. The re- 
 pugnancy is this, that it is, or must be, both finite 
 and infinite. 
 
 Accordingly then I argue thus. That which is 
 both finite and infinite in extent, is absolutely non- 
 existent, or there is, or can be, no such world. Or 
 thus, an extent or expansion, which is both finite 
 and infinite, is neither finite nor infinite, that is, is
 
 64 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 no expansion at all. But this is the case of an ex- 
 ternal expansion, ergo, there is, or can be, no such 
 expansion. 
 
 I know not what will pass with some men for 
 argument, if both the matter and manner of this 
 be not approved of. For first, what can well be 
 more evident than both the premises? That a 
 thing, in the same respect, cannot be both finite and 
 infinite; or that a thing which in the idea of it im- 
 plies both finite and infinite, is in act neither finite 
 nor infinite; and that what is neither finite nor 
 infinite, is not at all, are (with me, and I suppose 
 with all pretenders to reason,) such prime princi- 
 ples of science, that I must needs depend that these 
 will never be called in question by any but pro- 
 fessed sceptics. Then as to the minor, its evidence 
 is to me so glaring, and (in the little conversation 
 I have had in the learned world) so universally 
 assented to, that I am rather inclined here also to 
 make my appeal for, than endeavour to shew the 
 truth of it. This of the extent of an external 
 world, is that which is called opprobrium philoso- 
 phorum, being a point owned by all to have an 
 invincible demonstration, both for and against it. 
 Some indeed, by way of hypothesis, have held it 
 to be finitely, and some to be infinitely, extended, 
 according as either of these has best served the ends 
 of some other points they have been concerned for. 
 But I have never yet met with any one so hardy as, 
 in defence of one, to have endeavoured to dissolve
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 65 
 
 or answer the arguments lying on the other side of 
 the contradiction. For this reason I need not here 
 name either the one sort, or the other, but conclude 
 outright, even with universal consent, that an ex- 
 pansion external is both (that is neither) finite and 
 infinite. Then, 
 
 Secondly, as to the form or manner of this 
 argument, it has first evidently this to plead for 
 itself, that there is nothing in its conclusion but 
 what is in the premises which shews it to be no fal- 
 lacy, but a legal and just argument. And also this, 
 secondly, that it is exactly parallel with several 
 arguments which I could name, allowed by all to 
 be good, and even perfectly demonstrative. 
 
 As for instance, suppose a man should advance 
 the notion of a triangular square. Or suppose, two 
 persons contending about the attributes of this 
 strange idea: one arguing from the idea of tri- 
 angle, that it has but three angles; and the other 
 contending that it must have four, from the idea of 
 a square; what could any reasonable stander-by 
 conclude from this, but that the thing they are dis- 
 puting about is nothing at all, even an impossibility 
 or contradiction? Nay, the disputants themselves 
 must needs close in with this manner of arguing; 
 and that on two accounts. 
 
 First, in that this manner of arguing accommo- 
 dates the difference between them, and salves the 
 honour of both. For by this both appear to be in 
 the right in the precise points they are contending
 
 66 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 for; and wrong only in something which they are 
 both equally concerned for, viz. the supposition of 
 the being of a triangular square, which is the thing 
 supposed by consent between them. But chiefly, 
 
 Secondly, in that the person who argues in this 
 manner must be allowed to have the law of reason 
 on his side, and may compel them, on their own 
 principles, to assent to his conclusion. This is 
 done by granting to each party 'his point, namely, 
 that a triangular square is both triangular and 
 square or quadrangular. This done, they have 
 nothing to do but to answer each other's arguments, 
 which it is here supposed they cannot do. By this 
 therefore each grants the other to be in the right. 
 So that for a stander-by to grant both to be in the 
 right, is, in this case, a demonstration that they are 
 both in the wrong; or in other words, that the 
 thing they are disputing about is nothing at all. 
 
 I have mentioned this possible, rather than any 
 actual, instance of this kind, because I would give 
 an instance wherein I may be sure to have every- 
 one of my side. For certainly no one can doubt 
 whether this be a good argument or not. 
 
 A figure which is both triangular and quad- 
 rangular, is not at all. 
 
 But this is the case of a triangular square. 
 
 Ergo, there is no such figure. 
 
 The force of this argument has never been dis- 
 puted and I dare say never will : whereas to have 
 put a case, which has been actually a matter of dis-
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 67 
 
 pute, (of which sort I believe some might be 
 named,) though equally conclusive, had yet been 
 less plain and evident, because what has been, may 
 be again; and so to some I had seemed to prove a 
 notum by an ignotum. 
 
 But now, in the present case, which is granted 
 to be clear, I have nothing to do but to shew it to 
 be parallel with that which I before mentioned. 
 And this is an easy work. For (as in this possible 
 one about the attributes of a triangular square there 
 may be, so) there has actually been a dispute be- 
 tween philosophers concerning one attribute, viz. 
 the extent of an external world. One side, from 
 the idea of its being external, has proved it to be 
 infinite; the other, from the idea of its being cre- 
 ated, &c. has proved it to be finite. Both suppose 
 it to be external, both to be created. At the same 
 time neither of them so much as pretends to answer 
 the arguments on the side opposite to his own ; but 
 only to justify his own point directly. And yet 
 both will grant, that if an external world be both 
 finite and infinite, it is the same thing as to say there 
 is no such world. 
 
 Well then, here I interpose, as before, and say, 
 
 A world which is both finite and infinite, is 
 not at all. 
 
 But this is the case of an external world. 
 
 Ergo, there is no such world. 
 
 Here the honour of both is salved; here both 
 the major and minor are their own; here a
 
 68 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 stander-by has the same advantage as before; so 
 that what should hinder an easy, and even uni- 
 versal, assent to the conclusion? 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 ARGUMENT IV. 
 
 FROM the maximum, I come next to the min- 
 imum naturale\ or to the question about the divisi- 
 bility of matter, quantity or extension. 
 
 And here I affirm in like manner as before, 
 that external matter is both finitely and infinitely 
 divisible; and consequently, that there is no such 
 thing as external matter. 
 
 The argument in form stands thus. 
 
 Matter which is both finitely and infinitely 
 divisible, is not at all. 
 
 But this is the case of external matter. 
 
 Ergo, there is no such thing as external matter. 
 
 The major of this argument is the first prin- 
 ciple of science, it being the same in other words, 
 as to say, that what is, is, or that it is impossible for 
 a thing to be, and not be. For finite and infinite 
 are just so to each other, as being, and not being. 
 Finite is to be limited, infinite to be not limited. 
 Or rather thus, infinite is to be absolute, finite, to 
 be not absolute. So that it is as plainly impossible 
 for the same thing to be both, as both to be, and not
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 69 
 
 be at the same time, or in the same respect, &c. 
 For both the respect, and time, and everything else, 
 which is or can be made the condition of the truth 
 of this principle, is also found in the major of the 
 present argument; and consequently nothing can be 
 more evident, than that what is, or in its idea im- 
 plies both finite and infinite, is not at all. 
 
 But now this I say is the case or implication 
 of external matter, which is the minor or assump- 
 tion of the same argument. 
 
 External matter, as a creature, is evidently 
 finite, and yet as external is as evidently infinite, in 
 the number of its parts, or divisibility of its sub- 
 stance; and yet nothing can be more absurd than 
 such an infinite divisibility. 
 
 But I need not deduce these things to any 
 farther length, since no philosopher that I have 
 ever met with has ever doubted of this matter, it 
 being universally agreed that there is an invincible 
 demonstration on both sides of this question of the 
 divisibility of matter, so that I have nothing to do 
 but to conclude that the thing or matter concerning 
 which this question proceeds is a mere nothing, or 
 contradiction; yet I expect to be told, that it has 
 been the least of the thoughts of these philosophers 
 to conclude as I here do, since not one has ever 
 doubted of the existence of external matter. To 
 this I answer, 
 
 First, perhaps so; but who can help this? Is 
 it not enough for this conclusion, that we are all
 
 70 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 agreed in the premises, and that there is nothing in 
 the conclusion but what is in the premises? If in 
 this case men will hold the premises, but deny the 
 conclusion, this, at best, can be no better than inad- 
 vertence; but to do this, after the conclusion is 
 formally deduced, or the whole syllogism is laid 
 before them, is no better than errant scepticism. 
 And I must be excused if I contend not with an 
 adversary of this sort. But secondly, one would 
 think by the descriptions which they themselves 
 are used to give of external matter, that all philoso- 
 phers should be very ready to subscribe to this con- 
 clusion for its own sake, as I have partly shewn 
 already, and shall make appear more fully before 
 I finish this work. 
 
 Again, I expect to be told that the matter 
 which I here speak of is conceived to be very dif- 
 ferent from that concerning which philosophers 
 have disputed, in the question about the divisibility 
 of extension, and also in that about the extent of the 
 world, (whether infinite or finite;) particularly 
 that the matter or extension which they speak of is 
 supposed to be visible, whereas that which I am 
 speaking of is supposed to be invisible. I answer, 49 
 
 Perhaps so; I admit that the matter usually 
 spoken of by philosophers is supposed by them to 
 be visible, and that the matter which I am here 
 speaking of is supposed, and also proved, to be in- 
 visible. Nevertheless it must needs be granted that 
 the matter spoken of by philosophers is supposed
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 71 
 
 by them to be external ; if not, it must be because 
 they hold that visible mater is not external, or, that 
 there is no such thing as external matter; neither of 
 which will, I believe, be easily granted, much less 
 (which is necessary in this place) contended for 
 against me. If then the matter they speak about 
 is supposed by them to be external, this is all that I 
 am concerned for at present; the question between 
 us being only this simply, whether external matter 
 exists, or not? or, as usually expressed in latin, An 
 detur materia external No, say I; for it implies 
 such and such contradictions, which destroy the be- 
 ing of it, or render its existence impossible. Well ; 
 and what will an adversary say to this? Will he 
 deny that it implies these supposed contradictions? 
 No; it is here supposed that all philosophers agree 
 in affirming this point. Will he then deny the 
 conclusion, whilst he affirms the premises? No, 
 certainly; for this is formal scepticism, or no other 
 than a denial of all truth, and reason, and conse- 
 quence, at once. What remains then, but that we 
 all conclude that external matter is a thing abso- 
 lutely impossible? 
 
 But you w r ill say, to conclude this with con- 
 sent, is to conclude the non-existence of visible mat- 
 ter, since philosophers pretend to speak of no mat- 
 ter but what they supposed to be visible. I an- 
 swer, 
 
 First, why then I must conclude the same 
 without consent; the damage one would think
 
 72 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 should not be great, provided it be allowed that my 
 conclusion is true; and for this I appeal to the 
 arguments by which I prove it, and which I sup- 
 pose may be good, though they should happen to 
 want consent. But, secondly, I deny that the mat- 
 ter concerning the divisibility of which the ques- 
 tion usually proceeds, is supposed by philosophers 
 to be visible matter. This is evident from this, 
 that the matter of which they speak, is, and must 
 be, supposed to exist after ever so many divisions 
 of it, even when it is become invisible, by the fre- 
 quency of its being divided. 
 
 It is not therefore visible, but external, matter, 
 considered as external, of which philosophers have 
 disputed ; and of which they say that it is both infi- 
 nitely and finitely divisible and extended. And 
 this idea of its being external, or independent (as 
 to its existence simple) on any mind or perceptive 
 faculty, is so absolutely necessary to both these 
 questions, that neither of them has any appearance 
 of being a question, upon the removal of this idea, 
 and placing visible in its stead. For a visible 
 world, or visible matter, considered as not external, 
 exists plainly as visible, and consequently, as such, 
 is extended, as such, is divisible. So that after this 
 it carries a contradiction with it, so much as to en- 
 quire whether it be extended, farther than it is seen 
 to be extended, or divisible, farther than it is seen 
 to exist. So that however by accident philoso- 
 phers may have jumbled together the two ideas of
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 73 
 
 visible and external, external is the idea only they 
 are concerned with, and therefore it is external 
 matter alone whose existence is encumbered with 
 the forementioned contradictions; and so incum- 
 bered, I say, as to make it necessary for us to con- 
 clude that it is absolutely impossible there should 
 be any such thing. But yet so partial have I found 
 some towards an external world, that when nothing 
 has been found, which could with any appearance 
 be objected against the evidence of this and the 
 foregoing argument, they have even drest up for- 
 mal nothing into the shape of an objection: for I 
 have been sometimes told (and that with an air of 
 unusual gravity, as if the being of a real universe 
 depended on their concern for it; nay, as if religion 
 itself must fail if there be no external world,) that 
 a thing may be, and must sometimes be, judged by 
 us to be true, whose manner of existence we can- 
 not comprehend. That of this sort are several 
 articles of our Christian faith, as for instance, the 
 trinity in unity, the incarnation of the son of God, 
 &c. which we believe to be true, though we ac- 
 knowledge them to be mysteries, nay, and are con- 
 tent to own, that with regard to our shallow rea- 
 sonings, they are attended also with contradictions. 
 Why then must we conclude that there is no exter- 
 nal world, because of the contradictions which 
 seem to attend the position of it? And to this pur- 
 pose I find it said by a very judicious author*, 
 
 Art of thinking.SO
 
 74 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 that it is good to tire and fatigue the mind with 
 such kind of difficulties (as the divisibility of mat- 
 ter, &c.) in order to tame its presumption, and to 
 make it less daring ever to oppose its feeble light 
 to the truths proposed to it in the gospel, &c. I an- 
 swer, 
 
 1. It is a sign indeed that our understandings 
 are very weak and shallow, when such stuff as this 
 shall not only pass for common sense, but even look 
 like argument; and herein I confess my own as 
 well as my neighbour's weakness. However, 
 
 2. If we will reason at all, we cannot well 
 have a more evident principle to go upon than this, 
 that being is not not-being] that what is, w; or that 
 it is impossible for the same thing both to be and 
 not be. If so, we must either say that humility 
 of judgment is no virtue, or that there is still room 
 enough left for the exercises of it, whilst we 'hold 
 this principle without the least doubt or wavering. 
 Nay, 
 
 3. It seems to me, that if we will reason at 
 all, we should freely judge of whatsoever we per- 
 ceive, so as first of all to agree in this, that whatso- 
 ever we perceive to be, is: for though it were true 
 indeed that there is no such thing as truth, or 
 though the light of our understandings were ever 
 so weak and feeble, yet till we have discovered this 
 to be the case, and whilst we all agree to reason one 
 with another, that must pass for the truth which we 
 perceive, and that must pass for perceiving which
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 75 
 
 at present we are capable of, be it what it will in 
 the eye of a superior judgment or understanding. 
 To boggle therefore at this, is not reasoning, but 
 refusing to reason at all ; is not humility of judg- 
 ment, but open and avowed scepticism? Is not an 
 acknowledgment of the infinity of truth, but an 
 evil, and profane, and atheistical, denial of it? 
 And yet, 
 
 4. Nothing more than this is requisite in the 
 case before us: nothing, I say, but to affirm that 
 being w, and not to deny our own evident percep- 
 tions. The first of these is the resolution of the 
 major, and the other of the minor, of both the fore- 
 going arguments, whereby I demonstrate the im- 
 possibility of an external world: for can anything 
 be more evident than that finite and infinite are 
 exclusive of each other; and that an idea which 
 implies both is an impossibility in fact? And can 
 we pretend to perceive any thing at all, when we 
 pretend to doubt whether this is not the fact or 
 implication of external matter? Should we doubt 
 in this manner, if the subject spoken of were a cir- 
 cular square, or triangular parallellogram? If not, 
 I would fain know where our ignorance lies, which 
 is the foundation of the objection? We are ig- 
 norant indeed that there is any such thing as ex- 
 ternal matter, (and one would think for this rea- 
 son we should be so far from having any partial- 
 ity towards the being of it, that we should conclude 
 of course that there is no such thing in being,)
 
 76 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 but on the other hand we cannot so much as pre- 
 tend ignorance of the premises by which this con- 
 clusion is enforced. They are as evident as the 
 light, and also (as far as ever I could inform my- 
 self) universally acknowledged: where then is the 
 difficulty, supposed by the forementioned author, 
 in the question about the divisibility of matter, &c. 
 wherewith it is so good to fatigue our presumptu- 
 ous minds? Why, no where that I can think but 
 here, viz. to conceive how it is possible that such 
 a thing can exist, whose idea implies so manifest 
 a contradiction : and if this be all the difficulty, it 
 immediately vanishes, or loses its name, as soon as 
 we suppose that there is no such thing or matter, 
 or make this the question, whether there be any 
 such thing, or not? For then, instead of difficulty, 
 it becomes light and argument, and is no other 
 than a demonstration of the impossibility of its ex- 
 istence. But now, 
 
 5. This does not in the least affect so as to 
 become a parallel case with the doctrine of the 
 trinity, &c. and that for several reasons. As, 
 
 First, In that all who believe this doctrine are 
 very ready to acknowledge (and that with reason 
 too) that there is something incomprehensible in 
 it; whereas in the demonstrations by which ex- 
 ternal matter is proved to be both finite and in- 
 finite, (viz. in extent and divisibility,) I have 
 shewn already, no ignorance can be so much as 
 pretended. Then again,
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 77 
 
 Secondly, the articles of our faith concerning 
 the trinity, &c. are, by consent, allowed to be ex- 
 empt or particular cases, such as are not to be made 
 precedents for our believing any other points, not- 
 withstanding the difficulties which are seen to at- 
 tend them. And this, 
 
 Thirdly, for a very good reason; namely, be- 
 cause as to the truth or fact of these doctrines we 
 have an evidence irrefragable from another quar- 
 ter, (which is at least equal to the evidence of 
 reason,) viz. the word of God, which assures us of 
 these things, 51 whereas we are, or are supposed to 
 be, wholly ignorant of the being or existence of an 
 external world. And after all, 
 
 Lastly, I utterly deny that there is any con- 
 tradiction in the doctrines of the trinity, &c. even 
 rationally considered, which circumstance makes 
 this and the case of an external world to the last 
 degree unparallel. 52 But now, it is the parallell- 
 ism of these points which is the thing contended 
 for in the objection; and if so, where is the man 
 that with a serious face will argue this matter with 
 me? Who will say, I will not give up my judg- 
 ment for an external, invisible, unknown world, 
 notwithstanding the manifest contradictions which 
 attend the mention of it, on any other terms but 
 that of affirming or granting that there is a con- 
 tradiction in the doctrine of the ever-blessed trin- 
 ity? A socinian 53 or arian 54 will not say this, it be- 
 ing evident that the objection is very nonsense in
 
 78 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 their mouths; and sure I am that an orthodox per- 
 son would be ashamed to say so: and yet, if it be 
 not granted immediately that there is (as far as 
 our understandings can dive or penetrate) a con- 
 tradiction in the supposed articles of the trinity, 
 &c. the objection (even on this account alone) is 
 without all foundation, and is no other than an 
 ignoratio elenchi, in other words, talking of chalk 
 with those that talk of cheese. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 ARGUMENT V. 
 
 ANOTHER argument, whereby it is to be de- 
 monstrated that there is no external world, is, that 
 in such a world it is impossible there should be 
 any such thing as motion; or rather (lest this 
 should not seem absurdity enough to stop men's 
 judgments in favour of such a world) it may be 
 proved from the most simple and evident ideas, 
 both that there may, and also that there cannot be, 
 any motion in it. 
 
 That there may be motion (in an external 
 world, is sufficiently evident from this, that it is 
 supposed to be a creature: if so, I have an almighty 
 power on my side to help forward the conclusion, 
 namely, that it is moveable. And the argument in 
 form will stand thus.
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 79 
 
 The power of God is sufficient to move cre- 
 ated matter, 
 
 But external matter is supposed to be created ; 
 
 Ergo, the power of God is sufficient to move 
 it. 
 
 On the other hand, nothing is more evident 
 than the impossibility of motion in an external 
 world, considered as external. And that, first, in 
 the whole; secondly, as to the several parts of it. 
 
 I. As to the whole I argue thus; 
 
 An infinite body or expansion is not capable 
 of being moved by any power whatsoever, 
 
 But an external world is infinite in expansion ; 
 
 Ergo, an external world is absolutely im- 
 moveable, or incapable of being moved by any 
 power whatsoever. 
 
 That an infinite expansion is absolutely im- 
 moveable is too evident to be proved, unless this 
 will be admitted as something more so; namely, 
 that motion supposes a place possessed, and after- 
 wards quitted for another, which yet is impossible 
 and contradictory, when affirmed of an expansion 
 or body actually infinite, which, as such, implies 
 the possession of all place already; which circum- 
 stance therefore makes the motion of such a body 
 or world a fact absolutely impossible. And then, 
 
 Secondly, that an external world, as such, is 
 infinite in expansion. I appeal to those argu- 
 ments whereby this proposition is usually proved 
 by philosophers, and which are allowed by all to
 
 8o CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 be demonstrative. I shall not here fill my paper 
 with the mention of any one, because I suppose 
 my reader does not need my information, and also 
 because it will be time enough to do this, when I 
 am advertized of an adversary. I shall only ob- 
 serve this, (as believing it may be of some use to 
 those who shall be at the pains of considering this 
 matter,) namely, that whatever arguments have 
 been used to prove the world to be infinite in ex- 
 tent, will be found to have proceeded on the for- 
 mal notion of its being external; whereas those 
 which have been produced on the contradictory 
 part have been altogether silent as to this idea, and 
 have proceeded either on the idea of its being cre- 
 ated, or on the absurdities attending the supposi- 
 tion of infinite; by which proceeding it has still 
 been granted, that notwithstanding these argu- 
 ments and absurdities, an external world, as such, 
 must needs be infinite. Since therefore an infinite 
 world or expansion is not capable of being moved, 
 I conclude that an external world, considered in 
 the whole, is a being absolutely immoveable. 
 
 II. In like manner it seems to be impossible 
 that there should be any such thing as motion in an 
 external world, considered in the several parts of 
 it. 
 
 For motion is supposed to be a translation of 
 a body from one point or place to another. Now 
 in such translation the space or line through which 
 the body moved is supposed to pass, must be actu-
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 81 
 
 ally divided into all its parts. This is supposed 
 in the very idea of motion: but this all is infinite, 
 and this infinite is absurd, and consequently it is 
 equally so, that there should be any motion in an 
 external world. 
 
 That an external line or space is compounded 
 of infinite parts or points, is evident by the same 
 argument by which any body or part of matter 
 (supposed to be external) is proved, and also al- 
 lowed to be so ; namely, from the idea of its being 
 quantity, body, or extension, and consequently di- 
 visible, and not annihilable by division, which last 
 is supposed in the idea of its being external. But 
 then, on the other hand, to affirm that a line by mo- 
 tion or otherwise is divided into infinite parts, is 
 in my opinion to say all the absurdities in the world 
 at once. For, 
 
 First, This supposes a number actually in- 
 finite, that is, a number to which no unit can be 
 added, which is a number of which there is no 
 sum total, that is, no number at all; consequently, 
 
 Secondly, By this means the shortest motion 
 becomes equal to the longest, since a motion to 
 which nothing can be added must needs be as long 
 as possible. This also, 
 
 Thirdly, will make all motions equal in swift- 
 ness, it being impossible for the swiftest in any 
 stated time to do more than pass through infinite 
 points, which yet the shortest is supposed to do. 
 To which may be added,
 
 82 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 Lastly, That such motion as this, however 
 short in duration, must yet be supposed to be a 
 motion of all or infinite ages, since to every point 
 of space or line through which any body is sup- 
 posed to pass, there must be a point of time cor- 
 respondent: but infinite points of time make an 
 infinite time or duration, &c. 
 
 These are some of the absurdities which at- 
 tend the supposal of motion in an external world; 
 whence I might argue simply, that such a world 
 is impossible : but lest, as I said before, this should 
 not be thought absurdity enough, that is, lest any 
 one should admit such a world, notwithstanding 
 the impossibility of motion in it, I rather chuse 
 to defend and urge both parts of the contradiction, 
 and conclude the impossibility of the being of such 
 a world, from both the possibility and impossibil- 
 ity of motion in it. The argument in form stands 
 thus. 
 
 A world, in which it is both possible and im- 
 possible that there should be any such thing as 
 motion, is not at all ; 
 
 But this is the case of an external world; 
 
 Ergo, there is no such world. 
 
 I suppose I need not here remind my reader 
 that I have proved already, and that it is here sup- 
 posed, that a visible or sensible world is not ex- 
 ternal ; neither, if he has at all gone along with me 
 in this discourse, need I undertake to shew that 
 these absurdities about motion do not in the least
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 83 
 
 affect a sensible or visible world, but only an ex- 
 ternal world. Nevertheless, if upon a due perusal 
 of what I have here written, this seems yet to be 
 wanting, I shall be ready, as soon as called upon, 
 to give my reader the best satisfaction I am capa- 
 ble of as to this matter. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 ARGUMENT VI. 
 
 AGAIN, it is with me an argument against 
 the being of an external world, that there is no hy- 
 pothesis of vision, that I can imagine, or ever heard 
 of, on the supposition of such a world, but what 
 in the fact or act of it implies an impossibility. 
 
 I pretend not to have conversed with the writ- 
 ings of philosophers; I am sure not enough with 
 their persons, to know all the opinions there are or 
 may have been about the method of vision ; and so 
 must content myself with those that I have met 
 with, which are only these two that at this time I 
 can remember, or think worth the repeating. 
 
 One is the Aristotelian, or old account, which 
 supposes certain images to scale off from external 
 objects, and fly in at the eye, 55 &c. and the other 
 is the Cartesian, or new hypothesis, which, instead 
 of images, or resemblances of objects, scaling off 
 from the objects themselves, accounts for vision
 
 84 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 from the reflection of subtle matter, (viz. that 
 which proceeds in a direct line from the sun) from 
 the object to the eye, &c. 
 
 I stand not here to enquire which of these is 
 true, or the most probable account of vision, on 
 the supposition of an external world, being here 
 concerned not in physics, but metaphysics, or an 
 enquiry into simple, not hypothetical, truth. 
 Neither am I concerned to consider these two hy- 
 potheses apart, though they are so vastly different; 
 for as different as they are upon the whole, they 
 agree in all that which I am concerned to take 
 notice of, namely, that the act of vision is the ef- 
 fect of certain parts of matter, (whether images, 
 or not,) which proceeding from the objects, re- 
 spectively affect or act upon the optic nerve, &c. 
 
 This is that which I take to be an impossibil- 
 ity, or so attended with difficulties in the actn ex- 
 ercito of it, as to be the nearest ,to an impossibility 
 of any thing that we know of. For, 
 
 First, these parts, as being material or ex- 
 tended, must needs be impenetrable, that is, they 
 must each possess a space by itself, and cannot 
 (two or more, much more an infinite number of 
 them) be crouded into one point, or the place of 
 one. Nevertheless it is possible for a man's eye in 
 one and the same point to see a vast and almost 
 infinite number of objects which are in heaven and 
 on earth. There is then a necessity that from each 
 of these bodies there should be communicated or
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 85 
 
 sent a line or train of subtle parts or images upon 
 the one point of the eye, which, how it is possible 
 to be in fact, I leave to be considered by all those 
 who profess to know what they mean, when they 
 say, bodies are impenetrable. 
 
 Secondly, there is not any one point in the uni- 
 verse, wherein the eye supposed or fixed, cannot 
 perceive an innumerable company of objects. 
 There is not then any one point in the universe, 
 wherein lines of subtle matter, or images, from all 
 these supposed innumerable objects, do not actu- 
 ally concentre. If this is thought possible by any, 
 I must be content to leave it with them, since noth- 
 ing is more evident with me, than that the fact of 
 this is utterly impossible. 
 
 From these and such like absurdities, which 
 attend every hypothesis of vision in an external 
 world, I think I am bound to conclude that there 
 is no such world. For it seems to me at present, 
 that if there is an external world, one or other 
 of these accounts of vision must needs be the true, 
 that is fact. But as these appear to be impossible 
 in fact, they seem to derive their impossibility upon 
 the world which they belong to, or which supposes 
 them. 
 
 This, I say, will follow, till some other ac- 
 count of vision, in an external world, be produced 
 or named, which is not liable to these, or any like 
 absurdities; or which even on the concession of
 
 86 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 an external world, may not plainly be demonstrat- 
 ed to be false. 
 
 In the mean time nothing of all this affects 
 a sensible or visible world, supposed and granted 
 to be not external. For then, any hypothesis of 
 vision, which has no other falsehood in it, but what 
 is derived upon it from the non-existence or im- 
 possibility of an external world, will be the true 
 hypothesis, or account of vision. For, by truth in 
 this case, will then be meant no other than the will 
 of God, the great author of nature, who giveth us 
 such and such sensations, by such and such laws. 
 And in this sense, a law or rule of vision, may be 
 possible and even true in its cause, though it has 
 no truth in itself, or is impossible in fact. And so, 
 with this explanation, I am very ready to say, that 
 the second, or Cartesian account is the true hy- 
 pothesis of vision. For, though there be indeed 
 no external world, yet such a world exists as far as 
 it is possible; and it has been granted in the begin- 
 ning, that it is according to the will of God, that 
 the visible world should carry in it every charac- 
 ter of being external, except the truth of fact, 
 which is absolutely impossible. But the discovery 
 of this last is within the province of metaphysics, 
 which has to do only with simple being or exist- 
 ence; whereas this about the method of vision is 
 a question of a grosser size, and a much lower de- 
 gree of abstraction; and its resolution is to be 
 sought for only in the will of God, by which he
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 87 
 
 willed his creatures, viz. material creatures. But 
 in this will we see an external world, even an ex- 
 ternal visible world, as I observed just now. So 
 that this being the first will, must be first supposed, 
 or taken for granted by consent. And then, I be- 
 lieve, it will be found that this account of vision 
 (as well as several parts of the same philosophy 
 which have been objected against) will have lost 
 all its difficulty, and must pass for true. 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 ARGUMENT VII. 
 
 AGAIN, as by an external world we are sup- 
 posed to mean certain objects which do not exist 
 in, or in dependance on, any mind or faculty of 
 perception, at least of any creature ; so when I con- 
 template the idea of such a self-subsisting being, 
 I profess I am put hard to it to reconcile it with 
 the character of a creature, or to discover how it 
 can be understood to subsist at all on the mind, or 
 will, or power, of God, who is supposed to be the 
 creator of it. 56 For, 
 
 First, as to its being simply, it is past my skill 
 to distinguish it from being simple, absolute, or 
 universal. We are taught indeed to say, that ev- 
 ery creature of God needs the same power to pre- 
 serve, which was necessary to the creation of it; 57
 
 88 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 and Christian philosophers are generally agreed, 
 that this power of God is so necessary to the pres- 
 ervation, or continued being, of every creature as 
 such, that it must return to its primitive nothing, 
 merely from the abstraction or withdrawing of this 
 power. 
 
 But do we understand what we say, when we 
 apply this doctrine to an external world, either in 
 the whole, or in the several parts of it? We see it 
 indeed in the idea which we have of creature, and 
 in the absurdities which attend an absolute exist- 
 ence applied to anything but God alone; but do 
 we see any such dependance as to being or existence 
 in the idea, which we conceive of an external 
 world? Consider but this house, this tree, this any- 
 thing amongst the objects of an external world, or 
 of the visible world, supposed (as usual) to be 
 external, is there any sign of weakness or depend- 
 ance in any of these things considered by us in this 
 view? Will not an external house stand or be, un- 
 less a foreign power continue to support it? Or 
 does it seem to us to be any thing like those things 
 of which we speak, when we speak of certain be- 
 ings which have no subsistence of their own, no 
 truth of being but in relation or resemblance, and 
 which would cease to be, barely by an abstraction 
 of a supporting power, which is different from the 
 things themselves? A house indeed may be a good, 
 or useful, or convenient house, only as it stands 
 related to an idea in the mind, or intellect of its
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 89 
 
 maker, and may be said to stand in its present 
 form, only as supported by certain foreign causes; 
 but we are speaking here, not of the external form, 
 but of the simple truth or being of things; and 
 even in this respect we say that things subsist al- 
 together by a relation to the intellect, or in de- 
 pendance on the will of God. But I say, does this 
 seem to be the case of an external piece of matter? 
 Do we conceive this as having no absolute being, 
 or substance of its own? as a mere nothing, but by 
 resemblance, and what would cease to be on the 
 instant of the cessation of God's will to preserve 
 it? I know what another may answer to all these 
 questions, and I cannot help it, let men answer 
 what they will ; but still I must insist and say, that 
 if another will affirm, that he thus conceives of 
 external matter, he must teach me to do the same 
 from some other idea besides that of creature, 
 namely, from the consideration of the thing itself] 
 or else I must conclude that he affirms this, not be- 
 cause he understands any thing of the matter spok- 
 en of, but because the truth in general forces him to 
 say this. But this is the chief thing which makes 
 against his point. For to say that external matter 
 exists wholly on the will of God, because this is 
 the condition of a creaturely existence, is only to 
 say in general, that the existence of a creature is 
 necessarily thus dependant. But this is what I af- 
 firm; and hence arises the difficulty, viz. how we 
 can conceive external matter to exist by this rule,
 
 90 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 or how to reconcile the absolute and stable exist- 
 ence of matter supposed to be external, with this 
 necessary and indispensable character of a creat- 
 ure's being. My business is to deny that there is 
 any such creature for this reason, because it carries 
 in the idea of it an absolute kind of existence, 
 which no creature is capable of; and for this I ap- 
 peal to the judgment of all others; so that if an- 
 other will yet contend that there is any such creat- 
 ure, he must not argue with me that it does and 
 must so exist because it is a creature, for this is 
 plainly begging the question; but must make an- 
 swer on the other hand, how a creature, which is 
 and must be understood to have a self-subsistence, 
 or a proper substance of its own, can be said to ex- 
 ist, whilst it is acknowledged, as before, that every 
 creature, as such, exists altogether in dependance 
 on the power or will of God. This is the difficulty 
 which attends an external world, considered in its 
 several parts. And this, 
 
 Secondly, is rather increased, if we consider 
 it in the whole; for then nothing but its expansion 
 comes under consideration. And this is plainly 
 infinite. And if not infinite nothing, must be in- 
 finite something, that is, being or substance. But 
 is there any thing in this idea which squares with 
 the indispensable character of a creature? For 
 this I appeal to every one's idea of an expanded 
 universe, particularly to theirs, who (if I may 
 guess,) are not a few, who from a consideration of
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 91 
 
 the firm and substantial existence of the visible 
 world, supposed by them to be external, think 
 themselves compelled to believe, that simple space 
 or extension is the very substance of God himself; 
 and therefore how to conceive it possible that such 
 a thing should exist, which on one hand we are 
 compelled to call a creature, and on the other can- 
 not forbear to understand as God, I leave to be 
 explained by those who yet retain any fondness for 
 such a thing. Thus much of the existence simple 
 of an external world ; I come next to consider the 
 unity which it implies. 
 
 Here then I observe, that an external world 
 implies in it all the unity, which any being what- 
 soever, which universal being, which God himself 
 is capable of. 
 
 Consider it in its whole, and it has the unity 
 of infinity. It is one alone, and is absolutely in- 
 capable of being multiplied by any power what- 
 soever; which is as much as can be said of God, 
 and even more than they have a right to say, who 
 consider him, not as universal, but some particular 
 being. Consider it in its several parts, or bodies 
 included in it, and each particle of matter has such 
 a unity in, or identity with itself, as I think should 
 not be ascribed to any thing but God, who alone 
 is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever. Again, 
 I consider, that an external world, is independent 
 on the will of God, considered in its expansion, 
 which will and must be infinite, whether God
 
 92 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 pleases to make, or will it to be so or not, suppos- 
 ing only that he wills to produce or make any the 
 least extent, or that any the least part or extent is 
 made, or in being. 
 
 As for instance, let God be supposed to will 
 the being of a certain cubical part of matter or ex- 
 tension, about the bigness of a common die. This, 
 I say, is impossible in fact, and this draws another 
 impossibility after it, which is, that by this the will 
 of God is over-ruled or frustrated by the work of 
 his own hands. For what should bound this cub- 
 ical extent? It must be something, or nothing. If 
 nothing, it is plainly infinite ; if something, it must 
 be matter or extension ; and then the same question 
 returns, and will infinitely return, or be never sat- 
 isfied under an extent actually infinite. But this is 
 an independency of being, which I think can be- 
 long to no creature, it being the same with that 
 which we use to call necessary existence. I con- 
 clude therefore that there is no such creature as 
 an external world. 
 
 Lastly, much the same sort of difficulty occurs 
 if we consider it in not being, after it has been sup- 
 posed to exist. That God can annihilate every 
 creature which he has made, is, I think, a maxim 
 undisputed by any; if so, I think it plainly follows, 
 that that which in its idea implies an utter impos- 
 sibility of being annihilated, is a thing in fact im- 
 possible. But this, I say, is the case or implication 
 of an external world. This is evident from the
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 93 
 
 foregoing article, which shews the absolute neces- 
 sity of its being infinite, on the supposition of the 
 being of but the least part or particle of it: for 
 certainly if nothing less than infinite can exist, or 
 be made, no part of this infinite can be unmade, or 
 annihilated. And therefore though in words we 
 may say that God can annihilate any part of it, 
 yet we utter that in words, of which we can have 
 no conception, but rather the contrary to it. For 
 annihilate it in supposition as often as you will, 
 yet still it returns upon you ; and whilst you would 
 conceive it as nothing, it becomes something to 
 you against your will ; and it is impossible to think 
 otherwise, whatever we may say. 
 
 I believe I should lose my time and pains if 
 I should attempt in this place to shew, that the 
 supposition of a visible, which is not an external 
 world, is attended with none of these difficulties. 
 This would be a thankless office with all those who 
 are not yet convinced, but that an external world 
 may yet stand, notwithstanding these pretended 
 difficulties; and it would be an injury to those that 
 are, as preventing them in certain pleasant and 
 very easy considerations. And so I leave it to take 
 its chance with all my readers in common. 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 ARGUMENT VIII. 
 
 ANOTHER difficulty which siill attends the 
 notion of an external world, is, that if any such
 
 94 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 8 
 
 world exists, there seems to be no possibility of con- 
 ceiving, but that God himself must be extended 
 with it. 
 
 This I take to be absurdity enough in reason, 
 to hinder us from supposing any such world. But 
 so unfortunate are the stars of this idol of our im- 
 agination, that it is as much impossible, on another 
 account, that it should exist, though this were no 
 absurdity, or though it were supposed and allowed 
 that God himself were extended. 
 
 I suppose then in the first place, that God is 
 not extended. If so, I say there can be no external 
 world. For if there be an external world, and if 
 it be a creature, we must suppose that God is every 
 where present in, and with it; for he is supposed 
 to preserve and do every thing that is done in it. 
 To deny this, is to shut him out of the universe, 
 even altogether to deny his being. On the con- 
 trary, to affirm that he is thus present with every 
 part and particle of it, is to make him co-extended, 
 which is contrary to the supposition. 
 
 Yes, it may be said, God is extended, and 
 consequently there may be an external world, not- 
 withstanding this dilemma. I answer, 
 
 Secondly, be it so that he is extended, (to 
 humour a corrupt and absurd itch of argumenta- 
 tion,) yet this avails nothing towards the being of 
 an external world, but directly towards the non- 
 existence of it. For if God be extended, and as we 
 must also say infinitely extended, where shall we
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 95 
 
 find room for an external world? Can two ex- 
 tensions, infinite extensions, coexist? This is ev- 
 idently impossible. So that all the choice we are 
 left to is to acknowledge God or an external world ; 
 which, I think, is a choice we need not long be de- 
 liberating upon. I conclude, therefore, that if 
 God is, there is no external world. 
 
 I know but one way of answering this argu- 
 ment, and that is, to affirm that an external world 
 is God himself, and not a creature of God. But 
 till some one shall be so hardy as to appear publicly 
 in defence of this, I shall think it but a loss of time 
 and pains to consider of or debate it. 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 ARGUMENT IX. 
 
 I promised in some part of argument IV. that 
 I would consider farther of what philosophers say 
 of external matter; .and here I intend to be as good 
 as my word. 38 
 
 I have shewn in my former part of this treat- 
 ise,* that the matter so much disputed of by phil- 
 osophers is not understood by them to be visible. 
 This of itself is an argument that they had, or 
 could pretend to have, but a very faint and imper- 
 fect idea of the thing they were speaking of. Ac- 
 
 Chap. I. Sect ii. Argument 5.
 
 96 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 cordingly, I shall here proceed to shew, that they 
 neither did, nor could, pretend to mean anything 
 at all by it. And, 
 
 First, for the definitions which they have de- 
 livered to us of matter, Aristotle defines it thus. 
 
 H* v\,rj otrtov e ov yi'vercu TI. " 
 
 Materia est ex qua res, vel aliquod est. This, by 
 no inconsiderable philosopher, t is called optima 
 definitio materiae. And the same is by Baronius 
 (Metaph. page 172.) defined thus. Materia sub- 
 stantialis est substantia incompleta in qua forma 
 aliqua substantialis existit. And sometimes again 
 thus, Substantia incompleta capax formae. 
 
 These are all the definitions that I shall men- 
 tion, and these I suppose are sufficient to convince 
 us that they meant nothing at all by the matter 
 which they here speak of. For what is there in 
 either of these definitions besides the indeterminate 
 notion of being in general, that is, something, but 
 nobody knows what, or whether it be any thing at 
 all or no. This I say is all that I can make or 
 understand by it; and this amounts to the same, as 
 if they had told us in plain words, that they mean 
 nothing at all. But this, 
 
 Secondly, they tell us yet more expressly in 
 the descriptions and characters which they give of 
 matter. 
 
 As for instance Baronius* delivers it as the 
 common sense of all philosophers, that Materia 
 
 tSchcib. Met Cap. 22, 158. 
 Met p. 189.
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 97 
 
 non est in praedicamento, and that non habet pro- 
 prie dictum genus. This is the same as if he had 
 told us in express words, that the most they mean 
 by it, is being indefinite, or something, but they 
 know not what. For that which is not in the pre- 
 dicaments, is allowed to be neither substance nor 
 accident, (unless it be God, or universal being,) 
 and what is neither of these is confessedly nothing 
 at all. 
 
 Again, St. Austin 60 is always quoted by phil- 
 osophers for his description of matter, as an ex- 
 planation of the common meaning, and it is thus 
 expressed.! Materia est infima omnium rerum, 
 & prope nihil. 
 
 Much after the same manner it is described by 
 Porphyry, 61 1 Materia prima ex se est incorporea, 
 neq; intellectus, neq; anima, neq; aliud secundum 
 se vivens, Informix, immutabilis, infinita, imp ot ens, 
 qua propter neque ens, sed verum non-ens. But 
 this is a little more than prope nihil, and I sup- 
 pose may be said to amount fully to the sense of 
 the English word, nothing. 
 
 In like manner Aristotle himself, who has 
 given almost all other philosophers their cue, is 
 for nothing better known than for his most intel- 
 ligible description of substantial matter. He calls 
 it nee quid, nee quale, nee quantum ; 62 to which I 
 think I may fairly add, nee aliquid, as the proper 
 
 f L. 12. Confess, cap. 7. 
 Lib. de Occasionib. c. 21.
 
 98 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 sense and consequence of this description. Nay, 
 to confirm this as the true interpretation and de- 
 sign of his words, I 'have many times seen him 
 quoted by his followers, for saying positively that 
 materia est non ens' one instance of which I par- 
 ticularly remember, viz. Scheibl. Metaph. Cap. 
 22. 167. 
 
 Perhaps so, you will say, but yet all philoso- 
 phers are .agreed in the being of it, and all argue 
 it to be, or to have a real existence. I answer, 
 
 First, If they will contradict their own po- 
 sitions, as it is not in my power to help, so it is hard 
 that I should suffer for it. But, secondly, how is it 
 that they argue the existence of matter? Do they 
 argue it with a supposed adversary, or only with 
 themselves? If with themselves only, this is noth- 
 ing at all ; for in this case they may have the ques- 
 tion for asking; and so this kind of arguing is only 
 grimace and banter. But if they argue it with an 
 adversary, who is supposed to doubt it, I am this 
 adversary, and let their reasons be produced. 
 
 In the mean time I affirm that they argue 
 only with themselves ; that is, they grant themselves 
 the question, upon all occasions, and whensoever 
 they please. 
 
 Their arguments are such as these, some of 
 which I have mentioned already.* 
 
 Matter w, or exists, say they, because it w, or 
 is supposed to be created. Here the adversary, if 
 
 Part I. Chap. i. Sect II. Arg. VI.
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 99 
 
 any, is supposed to grant that it is created, but yet 
 to doubt whether it is, or exists, or not. That is, 
 he is supposed to be a drivelling fool, or no adver- 
 sary at all, which is plainly the case. 
 
 Again, matter is, or exists, because it is sup- 
 posed to be part of a real compositum. This is the 
 very same case as before. 
 
 For surely whoever can be brought to grant 
 that its a real part of a compositum, cannot be 
 supposed to doubt whether it exists or not. 
 
 Again, if matter were nothing, it could do 
 nothing, it could not be the subject of generation 
 and corruption; but this last is supposed (thanks 
 to the kind opponent!) Ergo, matter is not noth- 
 ing. 
 
 Again, (saith Christopher Schiebler, Cap. 15, 
 45.) Materia habet essentiam, quia ens est. And 
 with the same ease you are told by all philosophers 
 together, that ens est quod habet essentiam. This 
 is round about our coal-fire, in other words, argu- 
 ing in a circle, or no arguing at all. 
 
 Again, (Cap. 22, 167.) he puts the question 
 simply, an materla sit ens. And this is the reso- 
 lution of it. If matter were not ens, it would be 
 the same thing to say, that any thing fit ex nihilo, 
 as ex materid. And again, it must be something, 
 because something is constituted of it. 
 
 These and such like (for I am tired with re- 
 peating them) are the mighty arguments by which 
 philosophers demonstrate the being of external
 
 ioo CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 matter. If you will take their words you may; for 
 I think nothing is more evident than that this is all 
 you have to do in the case; unless (which I think 
 much more advisable) you will chuse to believe 
 with me, that they never designed any other than 
 to amuse the ignorant, but yet to give every intelli- 
 gent reader an item, by this procedure, that the 
 matter they are speaking about is nothing at all. 
 
 If so, I have a vast authority on my side: 
 which, if not sufficient to inforce the conclusion 
 simply with all readers, because some there may be 
 who have but little opinion of this kind of author- 
 ity, yet with all must have this effect, to remove the 
 prejudice which may lie on their minds against 
 this my conclusion, on the account of its appearing 
 strangeness and novelty. And though some authors 
 on certain subjects may have good reason rather to 
 cherish than lessen the opinion of their novelty, yet 
 considering all things, if I were certain to have re- 
 moved what these are supposed to desire by any- 
 thing I have said in the present chapter, I am per- 
 suaded it would avail me more in the event, than 
 ten thousand the most evident demonstrations with- 
 out it. And indeed it was the prospect of this ef- 
 fect alone, which induced me to number this chap- 
 ter amongst my arguments against the being of an 
 external world.
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 101 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 Objections answered. 
 
 BUT now it is time to attend to what may be 
 urged on the other size, viz. in favour of an ex- 
 ternal world. 
 
 But what favour can belong, or be due, to that 
 which is, or can be of no use, if it were in being, 
 which is all over contradiction, which is contrary 
 to the truth and being of God, and after all is sup- 
 posed to be utterly unknown? Who would ever 
 attempt to form an argument for the being of such 
 a thing as this? For as unknown, it must be sup- 
 posed to be nothing, even by those who are pre- 
 paring themselves to prove that it is something. So 
 that well may all particular objections be said to be 
 false or insufficient, when it is against the suppo- 
 sition of the question to suppose any objections at 
 all, or but the possibility of an objection. 
 
 Nevertheless, where men are thoroughly in- 
 clined to hold fast their point, notwithstanding all 
 the evidence in the world to the contrary, there is a 
 possible room for two or three things, which, for 
 aught I know, some persons may call objections. 
 And they are these that follow. 
 
 Objection I. 
 
 Does not the scripture assure us of the exist- 
 ence of an external world. 63
 
 102 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 Answer. 
 
 1. Not as I know of. If it does, you would 
 do well to name to me that text wherein this is re- 
 vealed to us; otherwise, I have no way to answer 
 this objection but that of taking into consideration 
 every sentence in the whole bible, which I am sure 
 you will believe is more than I need do. But, 
 
 2. To do this objection all the right I can, I 
 will suppose a passage or two in the word of God; 
 and I should think, if such a one is any where to be 
 found, it will be in the first chapter of Genesis, 
 where Moses speaks of the creation of the material 
 world. 64 Here it is said, that in the beginning God 
 created the heaven and the earth, and also that all 
 material things were made some days before the 
 first man, and so cannot be said to exist only rela- 
 tively on the mind of man. 65 To this I answer, 
 
 i. This objection from scripture is taken 
 from Mr. Malebranche,* 66 and is his last resort on 
 which to found the being of an external world. 
 But then the external world, which he contends 
 for, is proved by him before, and here supposed 
 to be no object of sense, and consequently invisible. 
 And it was for this reason (it being an objection 
 peculiar to this author) that I deferred the men- 
 tion of it to this place, where also an external world 
 is supposed to be invisible. Here then my answer 
 to the author is this, that the tendency of this pas- 
 
 Search's Illustr. Tom. u. p. 114. Taylor's Translation. Ed. 2.
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 103 
 
 sage of scripture is not to prove the being of an 
 external (supposed to be an) invisible world, but 
 the external being or existence of the visible world: 
 for it is here supposed that the visible world existed 
 before the first man saw it. But this is as much 
 against himself as me, and therefore is no objection, 
 as coming from that quarter. But another may 
 think that there is an answer due, not only to the 
 author, but to the objection itself. Be it so, I an- 
 swer, 
 
 2. That it seems to me there is nothing in this 
 passage which affirms the visible world to be exter- 
 nal. And my reason for this is, because there is 
 nothing in it but what is very consistent with be- 
 lieving that the visible world is not external. 
 
 For first, is it said that God created the heaven 
 and earth? Meaning by it, that all those things 
 which either we or any other intelligent creatures 
 behold, are not their own causes of existence, or of 
 an existence necessary, but receive and derive their 
 whole being from another cause, viz. God. Is any 
 thing of this denied in consequence of affirming, 
 that a visible object, as such, is not external? Or, 
 does this make it to be of necessary existence, or to 
 be its own cause, or to be the effect of any thing but 
 the will of God, who after the counsel of his own 
 will gives or causes such and such sensations in us? 
 Or, secondly, is there (as some learned interpreters 
 have thought) a particular sense and meaning in 
 the words, in principle, 'Ev o^i or rvtona as
 
 104 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 if one design of the text was to tell us, that God the 
 father made all things by and through, and in, his 
 Son, who is frequently in scripture characterized 
 by this, as by a proper name? If so, is it incon- 
 sistent with this doctrine to hold that a visible ob- 
 ject, as such, is not external to the mind or faculty 
 which perceives it? So far from this, that this 
 doctrine seems to be intelligible only on this hy- 
 pothesis; and I think I have shewn already, that 
 an external world, as such, (whether visible or in- 
 visible) is of too absolute an existence to exist only 
 in the mind or will of God, or the son of God, as 
 every creature is said to do in this text So that if 
 this text, thus interpreted, proves any thing to the 
 present purpose, it proves the contrary to that 
 which it is alledged for. Or, thirdly, is it said, that 
 the visible world existed, or had its being, before 
 the first man Adam was created? And did it not 
 thus exist when Apx^ beheld it, when it had past 
 the Wisdom, and was come into the will of God? 
 Or might not the angels see and live in it, (who 
 knows how long) before the man whom we call 
 Adam was produced into being? Or, lastly, must 
 all this go for nothing because of the little syllable 
 the, which is prefixed in the text to the words 
 heaven and earth? as if by this we were obliged 
 to understand an absolute and strict identity be- 
 tween the visible world, considered in the will of 
 God, or in the minds of the angels, and that which 
 was afterwards perceived by Adam? This is a
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 105 
 
 slender thread indeed, whereon to hang the whole 
 weight of an universe. But must I myself be for- 
 bid the use of this important word the, because I 
 hold that a visible object is not external; and be- 
 cause in consequence of this position there will be 
 found only an identity of similitude between the 
 visible world which God made in the beginning, 
 and that which Adam had a sensation of; and con- 
 sequently between that which Peter and that which 
 John sees, at the same or different times? Must I 
 never say that I have seen the sun, because on my 
 hypothesis the sun which I am supposed to see, is 
 not the same strictly with that which God seeth, or 
 which is seen by another person? And must I 
 for this reason never use the expression of the vis- 
 ible world, the heaven and earth, &c.? 67 But then, 
 will that be denied to God, which is and must be 
 allowed to me? Where then is there so much as 
 an appearance of an objection in the text before us? 
 For my part, I can see none, either in this, or any 
 other that I know of, in the word of God, but what 
 is fully answered in what I have replied to this; 
 and therefore cannot but believe that it would be 
 time ill spent to suppose or name any other. Yet, 
 thirdly, others I might very easily name, such as 
 those which speak of the apparition of angels, of 
 several miracles, particularly that of coming into a 
 room whilst the doors were shut, &c. which sup- 
 pose the visible world to be not external ; and this 
 would be turning the objector's cannon against
 
 106 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 himself. But I shall spare my reader, the objector 
 and myself, and so add no more particulars to my 
 answer in this place. 
 
 Objection 2. 
 
 Is there no allowance due or to be made to 
 that strong and natural inclination which all men 
 have to believe an external world? 
 
 Answer I. 
 
 You may remember the mention of this ob- 
 jection * before, where I told you it is the argu- 
 ment by which Mr. Des Cartes satisfied himself 
 of the existence of an external world. 68 
 
 In my answer to it I supposed two things, 
 either that by an external world was meant the 
 being of a world, which, as external, is supposed 
 to be invisible, or the external being of the visible 
 world. To the last of these meanings I have given 
 in my answer, which my reader either does or may 
 recollect at pleasure. I am now (according to my 
 promise in that place) to make answer to this 
 objection in the first of the forementioned mean- 
 ings. 
 
 This, in all right and reason, should be the 
 true intent and meaning of this great philosopher. 
 For my own part I think I could very easily shew, 
 that either he must mean this, or be inconsistent 
 with himself, which is to mean nothing at all ; and 
 
 * Part I. Chap. II. Objection 3.
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 107 
 
 if so, the objection is answered before any part of 
 it is considered. But I need not be at the trouble 
 of entering into this inquiry, it being sufficient in 
 this place to shew, that in the sense supposed it has 
 not the reality, or so much as the pretence, of being 
 an argument. And that is done in a word, by de- 
 nying the supposition of it, which is, that we have 
 any the least inclination to believe the existence 
 of an external world, supposed to be invisible. 
 This is evident at first sight, and yet this alone 
 destroys the whole force of the objection. "Strange! 
 That a person of Mr. Des Cartes's sagacity should 
 be found in so plain and palpable an oversight; 
 and that the late ingenious Mr. Norris should 
 be found treading in the same track, and that too 
 upon a solemn and particular disquisition of this 
 matter. 69 That whilst on one hand they contend 
 against the common inclination or prejudice of 
 mankind, that the visible world is not external, 
 they should yet appeal to this same common in- 
 clination for the truth or being of an external 
 world, which on their principles must be said to be 
 invisible, and for which therefore (they must needs 
 have known if they had considered it) there neither 
 is, nor can be, any kind of inclination." 
 
 Well, you will say, but is there no allowance 
 due to the natural inclination, which we all have 
 to believe that the visible world is external, and 
 consequently this way, that there is an external 
 world.
 
 io8 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 Answer 2. 
 
 Yes certainly, provided you believe the truth, 
 viz. that there neither is, nor can be, any such thing 
 as an external world, you may freely make use 
 of the common language, (which is a creature of 
 God, and which by his messengers, and even in 
 his own person, he has sanctified to us the use of, 
 if we believe the truth,) notwithstanding that there 
 is scarce a word in it, but what supposes the being 
 of an external world, or that the visible world is 
 external. It is the truth which makes us free, and 
 they only are in bondage who are ignorant of the 
 truth, or refuse to admit it. If therefore it be true, 
 that there is no external world, common language 
 is indeed extremely corrupt; but they only are in- 
 volved in this corruption who know not this truth, 
 or deny the evidence of it. And the same argu- 
 ments by which it is demonstrated to be a truth, 
 prove the use of all language unclean to such as 
 these. For such are servants to the power of a 
 corrupt language, and know not their right of free- 
 dom from it; and this makes them guilty of all the 
 errors which it supposes. Whereas those who 
 know and believe this truth, are free to use any 
 language, or way of speaking, wherein this truth 
 is not formally or directly contradicted, without 
 being accountable for the corruption of human 
 language. Thus we believe the circumvolution of 
 the earth, and the central rest of the sun, according
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 109 
 
 to the Copernican system; but yet so much is due 
 to the natural inclination which we all find in our- 
 selves to believe the contrary, as to excuse and jus- 
 tify us in the use of a language altogether Ptole- 
 maic. Thus we know and can demonstrate, that 
 the light which we behold is not any property or 
 affection of the sun, supposed to be in the heavens ; 
 but an affection in, or belonging to ourselves; yet 
 we are altogether free from the error of supposing 
 the contrary, though we often say that the sun is 
 luminous, or words to that effect. 
 
 Thus again, when the sun shines full in our 
 face, though we know for certain that the pain we 
 feel is not in our eye, but only in our souls, yet so 
 much is due to the natural inclination, whereby we 
 judge that all sensations are in our bodies, that we 
 are free on a thousand occasions to suppose the con- 
 trary in words, as we always do when we say, that 
 the light of the sun affllicts our eyes, or makes them 
 sore, that our head or tooth aches, or other words 
 to this purpose. Thus lastly, (to go but one step 
 higher, even that one which mounts us into that 
 region of truth or abstraction which the present 
 theory supposes us to be in,) though we know (as 
 by this time I hope we know) that an external 
 world is a being absolutely impossible; yet, or 
 rather because we know this, we are, on infinite 
 occasions, free from the error on the contrary side, 
 though we use a language which continually sup- 
 poses the visible world to be external. This I say
 
 no CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 is the liberty of believing the truth, and this truth 
 thus believed, does so fully sanctify even a corrupt 
 and erroneous language to our use, as to make it 
 our duty, as well as liberty, (even a debt we owe 
 to the great Author of Nature and of language,) 
 to express our minds to each other in a way suitable 
 to our present state, though both our nature and 
 our language suggest and suppose the contrary 
 to this truth. And now I hope this objection is 
 fully answered. But I expect another in its place, 
 (which is near about the same as to force and con- 
 sequence,) and that is to be told. 
 
 Objection 3. 
 
 That the late judicious Mr. Norris, who (in 
 his Ideal World, vol. i. chap, iv.) purposely con- 
 sidered this question of an external world, was yet 
 so far from concluding as I have here done, that 
 he declares it to be no other than errant scepticism 
 to make a serious doubt or question of its existence. 
 
 Answer. 
 
 I have chosen to place this in the form of an 
 objection, that I may seem rather to defend my- 
 self, than voluntarily oppose this author, for whose 
 writings and memory I have a great esteem. But 
 what shall I say in this case? Must I give up all 
 the arguments by which I have shewn that there is 
 no external world, in complaisance to this cen-
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS in 
 
 sure, because it is the great and excellent Mr. Nor- 
 ris's? But has he supported this saying by any 
 arguments in favour of that which he calls it scep- 
 ticism to doubt of? Has he proved an external 
 world to be of the number of those evident truths 
 which are of no reasonable doubt, nor to be seri- 
 ously questioned by any sober understanding? Or 
 so much as pretended to answer any argument al- 
 ledged for its non-existence? No, not a word of 
 this is to be found in the whole chapter, unless the 
 argument from inclination, which is the subject of 
 the former objection, will be here named against 
 me. Well then, and must this too pass for an ar- 
 gument, notwithstanding that I have shewn the 
 weakness of it? And so, must all that I have 
 hitherto contended for, submit to the power of this 
 great authority, on peril of my being thought a 
 sceptic? 
 
 But is not this the way to be betrayed into the 
 very dregs of scepticism, to make a doubt of one's 
 own most evident perceptions for fear of this im- 
 putation? Or can a man give better proof that 
 this does not belong to him, than by putting (as I 
 have all along done) his cause or assertion on the 
 issue of a fair debate on plain reason and argu- 
 ment? And can anything be a plainer mark of 
 scepticism than to refuse to stand, or be concluded 
 by this issue, appealing from thence to judgment 
 or authority? This is what I said from the begin- 
 ning, and I have shewed it, I think, in every in-
 
 ill CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 stance of an objection since, that my adversary all 
 along is no other than prejudice, which is formal 
 scepticism ; and yet nothing has been so constantly 
 charged against myself as this very imputation. 
 And it is this alone which has made it so consider- 
 able with me, as to set formally about an answer 
 to it. 
 
 But to speak particularly to the author's cen- 
 sure, with which we are at present concerned. 
 
 Is it so much as true in fact that he has said 
 any such thing as is affirmed in the objection? 
 This perhaps even a sceptic will contend fairly 
 with me ; for facts are the things they are observed 
 to be most fond of. Well, let this be tried (as it 
 ought to be) by his own words. 
 
 There are two, and as I remember but two, 
 passages in this chapter which speak at all to this 
 purpose. One is page 188, the other 205. In the 
 first of these I immediately find these words. 
 "Much less would I be suspected of indulging a 
 sceptical humour, under colour of philosophical 
 doubting, to such an extravagance as to make any 
 serious question of that general and collective ob- 
 ject of sense a natural world:" the other is this; 
 "But as to the existence of bodies, though it be a 
 thing of no reasonable doubt, nor to be seriously 
 questioned by any sober understanding," &c. 
 
 Here the thing that is not to be doubted of, 
 (at the hazard of the sobriety of our understand- 
 ing, and upon peril of scepticism,) is the existence
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 113 
 
 of bodies, the existence of a natural world, which 
 is supposed to be the object of sense. Well, and 
 what is this to me? Have I been doubting of the 
 existence of bodies? Or of the natural or sensible 
 world? Let the meanest of my readers be my wit- 
 ness, that I have been so far from doubting of any 
 thing of this, that I have even contended on all oc- 
 casions that nothing is, or can be, more evident than 
 the existence of bodies, or of a sensible world. 
 Have I repeated the same thing some hundreds 
 of times, and yet still is there need to have it ob- 
 served, that an external world is the moot point 
 between us? That, not the existence, but the extra- 
 existence of the sensible world, is the point I have 
 been arguing against? And that, not a natural, 
 supposed to be a sensible, world, but an external 
 world, as such, is impossible? But there is not a 
 word of an external world in the two sentences 
 before-mentioned; and therefore nothing in the 
 least against the conclusion which I am concerned 
 for. 70 
 
 True, you will say, but this was only a mistake 
 in the manner of expressing it; for that the whole 
 drift and argument of this chapter supposes the 
 subject to be an external world. I answer, 
 
 Right; that is the thing I have been all this 
 while expecting, viz. a little of his argument in 
 the place of his authority; and you see this we must 
 come to before there can be any decision. 
 
 But alas! to what purpose? For I find these
 
 U4 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 words in the very title of his chapter, viz. That 
 the existence of the intelligible is more certain 
 than that of the natural and sensible world. This 
 destroys, and doubly destroys, all again. For, 
 first, here he speaks not of an external, but sensi- 
 ble, world ; and of this, not of its external existence, 
 which is the point I have been arguing against; 
 but simply of its eixstence, which is the point I 
 have been arguing for. And yet, 
 
 Secondly, His end proposed is not to aggra- 
 vate, but lessen, its certainty: and this is the drift 
 and argument of the whole chapter, at least of 
 about thirty pages of it; the rest being employed 
 in a digression concerning the comparative cer- 
 tainty of faith and reason. 
 
 But is this the main design and purpose of 
 this chapter, to lessen the evidence of an external 
 world? To shew, (as he plainly does, and for 
 which I refer my reader, to shew, I say) that 
 neither reason, nor sense, nor revelation, is suffi- 
 cient to assure us of the existence of any such 
 things : nay, that the argument used by Des Cartes, 
 before mentioned, 71 in which he places his last 
 resort, falls short, and is deficient, for which we 
 have his own express words in the 2o8th page? 
 And can that same author say, in the midst of all 
 this, that the existence of an external world is a 
 thing of no reasonable doubt, nor to be seriously 
 questioned by any sober understanding, &c. sure- 
 ly it could be no mistake that he omitted the word
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 115 
 
 external, unless he designed to question his own 
 understanding, and formally pronounce himself a 
 sceptic. 
 
 Well, you will say, but it is a matter of fact 
 that he has argued against something. I answer, 
 he has so, for it is evident to demonstration that he 
 has argued against himself; and not only so, but 
 also as sceptically as is possible. 
 
 For after all nothing is more evident, than that 
 his censure and arguments proceed upon the very 
 same subject; and that is, not the external exist- 
 ence, but the existence simple of the natural world. 
 This natural world is sometimes by him called 
 bodies, sometimes the visible or sensible world: 
 being about to aggrandize the evidence, or ob- 
 jective certainty, as to us, of his intelligible or ideal 
 world, he endeavours to shew, that it is much more 
 certain to us than the existence of the natural, or 
 sensible, world ; and that because we have, 
 
 1. More, 
 
 2. Better, reasons to assure us of its existence. 
 These are his very words, as may be seen in 
 
 the 1 88th page, even in that very page in which is 
 found the censure on all those who so much as offer 
 to question the existence of the natural world. 
 But now the fact is, that he does question its ex- 
 istence both here, and throughout the whole course 
 of this chapter. What can be more evidently in- 
 consistent, more evidently sceptical, than this man- 
 ner of proceeding? What! Doubt of the exist-
 
 n6 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 ence of bodies, sensible bodies? Well may this be 
 called indulging a sceptical humour under the 
 colour of philosophical doubting. And is this so 
 called too by the very person who does it? This 
 is not only to be guilty of scepticism himself, but 
 also to be self-condemned. 
 
 The sum of this whole matter is this: if, by the 
 existence of the sensible world, Mr. Norris, in this 
 censure, is said to mean not the existence simple, 
 but the extra-existence of it, his arguments direct- 
 ly contradict his censure, which is a full answer to 
 his authority in this matter. If on the other hand 
 he be said to mean as he himself speaks, this is, 
 first of all, nothing at all to me, who doubt not of 
 the existence, but only of the extra-existence, of the 
 sensible world: then, secondly, he is in this as much 
 contrary to himself, as on the other supposition, 
 in that he formally doubts of, and even argues 
 against, that which he calls it scepticism to doubt 
 of. And, thirdly, which is as bad as any of the 
 rest, he doubts formally of a point which is not 
 capable of being doubted of, viz. the simple exist- 
 ence of the visible 'world. To all which, lastly, I 
 may, and also must, add this, that this second sup- 
 position is something more than an //, it being evi- 
 dently the case in fact, that his whole discourse in 
 this place is only of the existence simple of the 
 sensible or visible world; and not a word of its 
 extra-existence, on the concession of its existence 
 simple, is so much as mentioned or implied.
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 117 
 
 I doubt not but on sight of the title page many 
 of my readers will judge, and be ready to say, sure- 
 ly the whole world is full of arguments against so 
 strange an assertion, as that there is no external 
 world. And perhaps, in this place, some may 
 wonder that I end here with the mention of so few 
 objections : but let such as these try to add to their 
 number; they may possibly find it more difficult 
 than they imagine. 
 
 In the mean time I expect to be understood 
 by some, when I ask their pardon for the trouble 
 I have given them, in thus seriously considering 
 so many trifling objections: objections which for 
 the most part have been lame on both their legs, 
 the language of prejudice only, and having scarce 
 so much as an appearance to introduce them. But 
 indeed I thought I could do no less, considering 
 the dispositions of far the greatest part of those 
 whom I have conversed with ; who will be so far 
 from blaming me on this account, that they will 
 be ready, even at this time, to take part with these 
 objections. Even such as these I would please, 
 if possible ; but being too sure of the event, I have 
 nothing left to do, but to acquit myself, by cutting 
 off all occasion of offence which might be taken 
 at my leaving unmentioned, or unanswered, any 
 objection which I have heard, or found, or which 
 may reasonably be judged I ought to have found: 
 And in this respect I profess I have done my best, 
 which, I think, is all that can be expected of me.
 
 u8 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 THE CONCLUSION OF THE WHOLE. 
 
 Of the use and consequences of the foregoing 
 treatise. 
 
 HAVING demonstrated, as I think, my point 
 prefixed in the title page, viz. the utter impossibil- 
 ity of an external world; and supposing also that 
 this is here granted me by my reader; he has a 
 right to demand, of what use and consequence is 
 all this to men, or to the moral world. 
 
 Now in order to return as plain and distinct 
 an answer as I can, and as can well be expected 
 from me in this place, to this question, I would 
 chuse to split it into two, making the words use 
 and consequence to stand for two different things: 
 and I shall begin with the last, viz. the conse- 
 quences of this position, no external world. To 
 the question concerning which I have these two 
 things to answer. 
 
 First, I know not why my reader should not 
 take my word, (I mean till he himself has made 
 inquiry,) when I assure him that the consequences 
 of this position are exceeding many in number. If 
 this will pass, I again assure him, that I have 
 found by more than a ten years experience, or ap- 
 plication of it to divers purposes, that this is one 
 of the most fruitful principles that I have ever met
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 119 
 
 with, even of general and universal influence in 
 the field of knowledge : so that, if it be true, as is 
 here supposed, it will open the way to ten thou- 
 sand other truths, and also discover as many things 
 to be errors, which have hitherto passed for true. 
 But this, 
 
 Secondly, may in some measure appear to my 
 attentive reader, even before he has made inquiry, 
 and though he makes some scruple of believing 
 me on my word : for he cannot but have taken no- 
 tice, that all language not only supposes, but is 
 almost wholly built on the supposition of, an ex- 
 ternal world. With this is leavened all our com- 
 mon discourse, and almost every thing that is found 
 in the writings of philosophers: so that with half 
 an eye it must needs be seen, that were a man to 
 call all his former thoughts and opinions, all he 
 has read in books, or heard in conversation, to an 
 examination or review, in the light of this position, 
 he would find a mighty work upon his hands, in 
 correcting only former errors, setting aside the pos- 
 itive part of deducing truths in their room. 
 
 This, I think, is all that can be said in general, 
 in answer to the question concerning the conse- 
 quences of this position: and I believe my reasons 
 will be judged to be sufficient for not entering into 
 the particular deduction of these consequences: as 
 first, that this would be all over digression in this 
 place: and secondly, such a digression as would 
 swell the volume to more than ten times its present
 
 120 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 size: but chiefly, thirdly, for that I know myself 
 to be unqualified for so great a work, which is no 
 less than the compiling a new system, at least of 
 general knowledge. Perhaps the little which I 
 have here supplied may move some more compre- 
 hensive genius to begin where I conclude, and 
 build something very considerable on the founda- 
 tion which is here laid. But I must be allowed to 
 be a proper judge even in my own case, when I 
 profess that I am far from being equal to so vast 
 an undertaking. However, secondly, I will add 
 a word or two concerning the use of the foregoing 
 treatise: by this, as distinct from the former head, 
 I would be understood to mean, 
 
 1. The subject matters with regard to which 
 it may be of use. 
 
 2. Its particular usefulness with regard to 
 religion. 
 
 3. The proper manner after which it should 
 be used. 
 
 4th and lastly, the particular use and advan- 
 tage which I myself propose by it. 
 
 First, as to the subject matter, it may possibly 
 be asked, whether every thing must pass for false 
 which does not square with this hypothesis, sup- 
 posing it to be true? Or, whether because it is 
 true, that there is no external world, we must there- 
 fore use this language in discourse, or writing on 
 every kind of subject? To this I answer,
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 121 
 
 i. That I have in good measure prevented 
 this inquiry in my second answer to the second ob- 
 jection, Part II. where I have shewn that we are 
 at liberty, and also in some measure, obliged to 
 use the common language of the world, notwith- 
 standing that it proceeds almost wholly on the sup- 
 position of an external world: for, first, language 
 is a creature of God, and therefore good, viz. for 
 use, notwithstanding this essential vanity which be- 
 longs to it. By this God spake the world into be- 
 ing when he said, Let there be light, let there be 
 a firmament, a sun, moon, and stars, &c. and they 
 were : all these things were made in the beginning, 
 even in the word, and wisdom, and will of God; 
 and therefore in him they are true, even externally 
 true, according to the language by which they were 
 willed into being, though in themselves they carry 
 an impossibility of so existing. But this does not 
 justify the goodness of this language with regard 
 to us; or rather, justify us sinners in the use of 
 this language, without reflecting, secondly, that we 
 are redeemed or recreated by the same Word of 
 God, who has taken on himself the iniquity of all 
 things; who, as one of us, has used this common 
 language, and even bore it with him on his cross; 
 who, by his Spirit in his apostles, has spoken all 
 the languages of the world, making thereby ev- 
 ery tongue his own, and who, lastly, in a word, 
 has pronounced every thing to be clean to those 
 who believe. I answer therefore,
 
 i2a CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 2. That there are certain subjects which re- 
 quire the use of this common language; and on 
 which, to speak in the language of this hypothesis, 
 would be both ridiculous and unjust; unjust to 
 the will, and to the word, of God, who has made 
 and sanctified common language to our use, and 
 consequently to the obligation of our Christian lib- 
 erty; and ridiculous, in that on several subjects of 
 discourse the use of any other than the common 
 ways of expression would be altogether vain, non- 
 sensical and absurd. I might easily give a thou- 
 sand instances of the truth of this ; but it were pity 
 to prevent the many witlings of the present age, 
 who by this would lose their whole field of knowl- 
 edge, with relation to this subject, and would have 
 nothing left whereby to ridicule what they are in- 
 capable of understanding. I leave it therefore, to 
 pamphleteers, doggrel rhimers, and comedians, to 
 expose the language of this treatise, by applying 
 it to improper subjects: for since the only end of 
 this kind of wit is not so much as pretended to be 
 truth, but only laughter and diversion, I am content 
 to be the subject, and also to laugh for company, as 
 having no pretence to the moving of one smile by 
 any thing I have here said. Allowing therefore 
 all due advantage to little wits of all sorts and sizes, 
 I answer, 
 
 3. Thirdly, that whenever we are, or pretend 
 to be, serious, I would recommend the language of 
 this discourse to be used only on subjects the most
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 123 
 
 general, simple, or universal, I do not say, in phil- 
 osophy only in general, or in this or that particular 
 branch of it; for I profess to understand but very 
 little of either, as words and ideas have been usu- 
 ally linked together. I say therefore only, as before, 
 the most simple, general or universal subjects ; sub- 
 jects wherein the question is strictly about truth, 
 particularly such wherein the question supposed 
 receives any alteration from the supposition or 
 denial of an external world. 
 
 Well, you will say, but then it seems it has but 
 little to do with religion, which is a subject best 
 understood or treated of in the common ways of 
 speaking: by this I am led in the 
 
 Second place, to consider the particular use- 
 fulness of this position or hypothesis with regard 
 to religion. Accordingly I make answer; 
 
 First, It has been often my fortune, and may 
 be again, to have this question put to me by such 
 as have not been able to comprehend the reasons by 
 which I justify my point of no external world; 
 which, by a very natural progress, has given them 
 a mighty zeal against the conclusion. In this case, 
 their only refuge to avoid an utter silence, has been 
 to urge this question about its usefulness as to re- 
 ligion. The pretence of this is, that religion is 
 their only care, or the end of all their inquiries; 
 so that if it does not immediately appear that this 
 hypothesis tends to the promotion of religion, they
 
 124 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 are fairly excused from believing, or so much as 
 attending to it. 
 
 But now to such as these, surely nothing can 
 be easier than to return a sufficient answer. But I 
 think the best, in this case, is to make none at all. 
 For first, it is evident that the end or drift of this 
 question is not to urge any thing against the truth 
 of my conclusion, but only to excuse its authors 
 from so much as inquiring into it. But this cer- 
 tainly is a point I can never be supposed to contend 
 against, whilst I am suffered to live out of bedlam. 
 And therefore since this is all that is demanded by 
 this question, it must needs be very impertinent to 
 go about to answer it any otherwise than by saying, 
 Sir, you have free leave to think of what subjects 
 you please ; especially having chosen the better part 
 already, viz. religion, and nothing else, to employ 
 your meditations on, &c. But, secondly, it happens 
 well enough for the ends of my discourse at present, 
 that my reader is here supposed to have inquired 
 already into the truth of my conclusion, and also 
 to have discovered it to be true. 
 
 And this gives the question concerning its use- 
 fulness as to religion, a very different turn and 
 sense from what it had before. For now though 
 it may be the effect of curiosity only, yet it very 
 probably may be the effect of a serious desire of 
 farther knowledge, and of a true regard for re- 
 ligion, and therefore ought to be so reputed. 
 Whereas the same, as before proceeding, is even
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 125 
 
 designed as a bar to knowledge, and is plainly no 
 other than a religious disguise. But whatever be 
 the true cause or principle of this last, I must needs 
 acknowledge its right to an answer. Accordingly 
 I affirm, 
 
 Secondly, that I consider the present treatise, 
 as a matter of no little use, or good consequence, 
 with regard to religion; that I have found the 
 truth of this by a long or very considerable experi- 
 ence; and in a word, that (be it taken how it will 
 by certain vain pretenders) I will be bold to pre- 
 tend, even in my own behalf, such a real, and even 
 exclusive, regard for religion, that I would never 
 have troubled an unwilling world with this dis- 
 course, (notwithstanding the infinite use which I 
 conceive it to be of with respect to simple or uni- 
 versal truth,) had it not been for its particular 
 usefulness with respect to religion; and conse- 
 quently for the benefit of those few who I expect 
 will find the truth of what I here affirm. 
 
 I am sensible this will pass for very slender 
 authority with some, and perhaps too for an objec- 
 tion with others; unless for their satisfaction I 
 produce the points concerning which I affirm this 
 discourse to be of use. But I have proved my 
 point already, viz. all that is in my title page, and 
 I shall prove no more, till I am aware of the suc- 
 cess of this, or hear from my reader himself, what 
 farther demands he may have upon me. Never- 
 theless, that I may avoid the imputation of having
 
 126 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 passed over but the name of an objection, without 
 an answer, I will go out of the track of my in- 
 tended method so far, as to charge myself with the 
 debt of one instance of this sort; and that is, the 
 point of the real presence of Christ's body in the 
 eucharist, on which the papists have grafted the 
 doctrine of transubstantiation. 
 
 Now nothing, I think, can be more evident, 
 than that both the sound and explication of this 
 important doctrine are founded altogether on the 
 supposition of external matter; so that if this be 
 removed, there is not any thing left, whereon to 
 build so much as the appearance of a question. 
 
 For if after this it be inquired whether the 
 substance of the bread in this sacrament be not 
 changed into the substance of the body of Christ, 
 the accidents or sensible appearances remaining as 
 before ; or suppose this should be affirmed to be the 
 fact, or at least possible, it may indeed be shewn 
 to be untrue or impossible, on the supposition of an 
 external world, from certain consequential absurdi- 
 ties which attend it; but to remove an external 
 world, is to prick it in its punctum saliens, or 
 quench its very vital flame. For if there is no 
 external matter, the very distinction is lost between 
 the substance and accidents, or sensible species of 
 bodies, and these last will become the sole essence 
 of material objects. So that if these are supposed 
 to remain as before, there is no possible room for 
 the supposal of any change, in that the thing sup-
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 127 
 
 posed to be changed is here shewn to be nothing 
 at all. 
 
 I have chosen to instance in this, rather than 
 any other point of divinity or religion, because this 
 of transubstantiation is one of the most important 
 doctrines of the Roman church; which church at 
 the same time happens to hold the insufficiency of 
 the scriptures. Now as these two opinions happen 
 to concur in the same persons, it may possibly prove 
 an umbrage to certain weak and tender spirits, as 
 if my affirming only without proof, that the pres- 
 ent treatise, is of such mighty use, with regard to 
 religion, were an intrenchment on the sufficiency 
 of the gospel revelation, and consequently an ap- 
 proach towards the error of popery. This is the 
 objection hinted at before, viz. the great and 
 mighty objection, for the sake of which I have 
 departed from my method, and broken my resolu- 
 tion. But it is high time however now to return 
 and proceed. 
 
 The third thing which I proposed to speak 
 to, is the proper manner after which I would de- 
 sire this treatise to be made use of. And here 
 
 Let the first thing be, to read it thoroughly 
 and attentively. It is not so long but it may be 
 read more than once without any very consider- 
 able expence of time. However, let it so be read 
 as to be perfectly understood to be either true or 
 false. If false, I would desire my reader to give 
 me notice of the discovery, that I may discharge
 
 i 2 8 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 myself of the guilt of having published a falshood 
 in so confident a manner; and also such a falshood 
 as bids open defiance to so considerable part of 
 whatsoever men have hitherto pretended to know. 
 This I think is a fair request. But my reader is 
 here supposed to understand it in another light, or 
 to look upon it to be true. 
 
 If so, I must nevertheless desire him to employ 
 all his skill or attention for some time to make it as 
 familiar as possible to his understanding. If he 
 fails in this he will find his assent slide from him 
 he knows not how; and he will come* in a little 
 time to an effectual disbelief of it, whilst he con- 
 tinues to believe it. This is the manner of men, 
 with respect to truths, either very simple, or pecu- 
 liarly religious; there lying an equal prejudice or 
 opposition of sense against both these kinds of 
 truths. This, by the way, is some sort of argument 
 that there is a nearer affinity between these two 
 kinds of truth than is commonly imagined; but I 
 am content in this place to suppose them very dif- 
 ferent. And be they as different as they will, yet 
 sure I am, that the subject of this treatise is of the 
 number of those which make the least impression, 
 even after they are assented to; or against which 
 the strongest prejudices are found to lie. For noth- 
 ing can be more evident to the first or natural 
 apprehensions of men, than that even the sensible 
 or visible world is external. And I believe I shall 
 find enough of this from my experience with other
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 129 
 
 persons, to make it needless to attest the truth of it 
 upon my own. If so, and if it be true notwith- 
 standing that there is no external world, I must 
 again desire my reader to use his utmost diligence 
 and attention to render this truth as sensible to him- 
 self as possible ; which he will find to be done only 
 by a very frequent meditation on, or exercise of 
 himself in it. And here, (if I may for decency 
 sake be allowed to press this matter any farther,) 
 I would advise him, 
 
 First, to exercise himself for a little time in 
 writing on, or rather against, it. Let him try to 
 add to the objections which I have already con- 
 sidered, or respond afresh to the answers which I 
 have given to them; and perhaps his surprise to 
 find the little effect of this experiment, may add 
 some grains to the firmness of his assent. 
 
 After this it would confirm him not a little to 
 make the same experiment in discourse with others, 
 whether learned or unlearned matters not much, 
 if I have rightly observed; unless it be that the 
 learned in this case, usually make the least pertin- 
 ent objections. This method will in some measure 
 engage even self love on the side of truth, which 
 will mightily help to overbear the force of common 
 prejudice against it. 
 
 But lastly, if after all this endeavour he yet 
 find it difficult (as I believe he certainly will) to 
 keep the edge of his attention fixed, so as not to 
 think it still more evident that the visible world is,
 
 130 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 than that it is not external, let him practise with 
 himself an easy, but a very useful, art, which is to 
 use himself to meditate on this subject with either 
 his eye or imagination fixed on a looking-glass. 
 This, he may remember, was one of the instances 
 given (Part I. Chap. I. Sect. I.) to shew, that the 
 seeming externeity of a visible object is no argu- 
 ment of its real externeity: and it has since ap- 
 peared that all visible objects are equally external ; 
 or that that which is usually called the visible 
 world, is indeed no more external than what is 
 usually called the reflection or image of it in a 
 looking glass. Nevertheless it is much easier to 
 apprehend or believe this, with respect to objects 
 seen in a glass, than to such as are seen out of a 
 glass ; and it is only my reader's ease that I am at 
 this time consulting. 
 
 Now by these and such like means, I suppose, 
 even my Aristotelian reader (who by his studies 
 has been long unqualified to receive or apprehend 
 pure unbodied truths) will become master of this 
 subject, as simple as it is, or understand it with the 
 same, or some degree of the same, ease or feeling, 
 wherewith he usually understands ideas that are 
 more complex. And if so, he is prepared for all 
 the ends and uses of it. The chief of which is this, 
 
 Secondly, to carry it about with him, and use 
 it as one would do a key, or mirror, or almost any 
 other kind of mechanical or useful instrument. To 
 carry, I say, not the body of the present treatise, or
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 131 
 
 so much as one argument of it, in his memory, but 
 only the conclusion, viz. no external world, which 
 is just what is in the inscription or title page. 
 
 With this, as with a key, he will find an easy 
 solution of almost all the general questions which 
 he has been used to account very difficult, or per- 
 haps indissoluble. 
 
 And as a mirror, held, as it were, in his hand 
 before the writings of others, it will discover to 
 him many errors, where before he little expected 
 to find them; besides that it will open to him a 
 new scene of truths, which have not hitherto been 
 so much as inquired after. 
 
 In a word, let him read and think with this 
 one proposition always present in his mind, and I 
 am persuaded he will need no assistance of mine 
 to make it appear to him, that it is of the greatest 
 use and consequence in the inquiry after truth. 
 
 And now I have nothing to add, but a word 
 or two concerning the particular use or advantage, 
 which I myself propose from having written this 
 discourse. And that is, 
 
 First, the probability by this means, of having 
 the truth of it thoroughly examined: which is rare- 
 ly done to any purpose in discourse, and indeed 
 in any private way; besides that, I would consult 
 the common benefit as well as my own. 
 
 Secondly, and lastly, that by this means I have 
 freed myself from many difficulties; in case I 
 should live to appear in public on any subject,
 
 132 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 which is either a consequence of this, or any way 
 depends on, or interferes with it. 11 ' I speak this 
 from an experience very often repeated. And this, 
 at last, has reduced me to this necessity, either 
 never to attempt to write on any but the most ordin- 
 ary and popular subjects, (which is a work I have 
 too good reason to leave to others,) or resolve in 
 the first place to set heartily about this, and estab- 
 lish it once for all; as I hope I have here done. 
 
 If so, I have no more to do for the time to 
 come, but only to refer to what I have here written 
 and published: which is a liberty I may possibly 
 reap the advantage of in discourse on some other 
 subject: but which I shall be sure to use, and make 
 the most of, in case this should be replied to by any 
 partial, unfair, or scoffing adversary. 
 
 THE END.
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 133 
 
 NOTES* 
 
 1 (p. 6) Compare "Principles of Human Knowledge" Sec. 3- 
 "To me it is . . . evident that the various sensations, or ideas im- 
 printed on the sense, however blended or combined together (that is, 
 whatever objects they compose), cannot exist otherwise than in a mind 
 perceiving them." 
 
 2 (p. 9) Collier conceives of God as will, or power, which has 
 brought into existence all created things. He accepts this doctrine on 
 Scriptural authority without proof, for, he says, "We are told, that 
 God made heaven and earth, or the whole material world and for 
 as much as it is the word of God, it may well pass, with us Christians, 
 for an unquestionable axiom." (Specimen of True Philosophy, p. 115 
 of the Parr edition). Des Cartes and Berkeley regard knowledge of 
 God as the "certitude and truth of all science" ("Meditations" V., p. 83 
 of the Open Court edition), but they present proof for His existence 
 and the knowledge of it 
 
 3 (p. 10) This objection was indeed later brought forward by 
 one of Collier's correspondents, Mr. Shepherd. (Benson's "Memoirs" 
 pp. 48-49)- 
 
 4 (p. ii ) Malebranche opposes this conception in the "Recherche 
 de la Verite," Livre 3 me , znde Partie, Chap. III. 
 
 5 (p. 12) Thus the natural world of every person exists in his 
 mind alone, and between the natural worlds of individual minds exists 
 the relation of similitude, not of numerical identity. See Pt. II, Chap. 
 X, Obj. I. Answer. 
 
 6 (p. 13) Cf. Collier's letter to Dr. Clarke (Benson's "Memoirs," 
 p. 36). Berkeley uses practically this same division of the subject, since 
 in the "New Theory of Vision" he grants, for the sake of argument, 
 the external existence of tangible objects, while in the "Principles" he 
 denies the external existence of all matter. 
 
 7 (p. 16) Cf. Collier's letter to Dr. Low (Benson's "Memoirs," p. 
 21-22). 
 
 8 (p. 17) Cf. Malebranche, "Recherche de la Verite"," claircisse- 
 ment to Livre I., Chap. X. 
 
 9 (p. 17) Cf. Collier's first letter to Solomon Low, (Benson's 
 "Memoirs," pp. 25-28). 
 
 Jo (p. 20) Cf. Berkeley's "Principles," Sees. 18, 33, 41 ; Third 
 
 Notes 15, 19 (in part), 21, 27, 28, 39, 59 and 62 have been 
 added by Miss Calkins; Notes 29, 46 and 50 by Dr. Rand.
 
 134 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 "Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous," Open Court edition, pp. 97 
 ff. ; Des Cartes, "Meditations" VI., Open Court edition, p. 88. 
 
 11 (p. 22) The "several parts" of the "much celebrated writings" 
 are as follows: 
 
 Des Cartes "Meditations" II, III, VI ; "Principles of Philosophy," 
 Part I, Props. IV, LXVI, LXVII, LXVIII, LXX, Part II, Props. I, IV. 
 
 Malebranche's "Recherche de la Verite," Livre I, Chap. 10. 
 
 "An Essay Towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible 
 World," by John Morris, Rector of Bemerton, near Sarum. 2 vols. 
 London, 1701 and 1704. Vol. II, pp. 238 seq. 
 
 12 (p. 22) Cf. Des Cartes "Meditations," VI, Open Court edition, 
 p. 101, and "Principles," Part IV, Prop. CXCVI. 
 
 '3 (p. 23) I have not been able to trace this quotation. 
 
 '4 (p. 23) Cf. Des Cartes, "Principles," Part II, Props. I-IV. 
 
 *5 (p. 23) On the relation of accidents to substance, cf. Aristotle, 
 Analytica Post. I. c. IV; and Thomas Aquinas, "Summa Theologica," 
 I. II., Qu. 7, Art. i, Concl. ad 2 : aliquid dicitur accidens quia inest 
 ei, sicut album dicitur accidens Socratis. 
 
 16 (p. 24) Des Cartes uses this same instance of the uncertainty 
 of the evidences of the senses in "Meditations," I, and in "Principles," 
 Part I, Prop. IV. 
 
 1 7 (p. 25) Cf. Low's objection and Collier's answer, Benson's 
 Memoirs," p. 24. 
 
 18 (p. 28) With the teaching of these paragraphs, cf. Collier's 
 first letter to Solomon Low, Benson's "Memoirs," pp. 21-24. 
 
 '9 (p. 32) The first formal statement of the principle of contra- 
 diction is that of Aristotle. Cf. Metaphysics III (T) 3, 1005 b; 
 rd ybp cn5r6 #/*.a fnr&pxfiv re Ka.1 /J.TI inrdpxeiv dSfoarov run a^rwt ical /card 
 rb airrb. (Cf. also, IX (I.) 10573, 34; X, (K) 1062,3, 22). Cf. Nor- 
 ris's use of this principle (op. cit., I, chap. IV, p. 195) where he quotes 
 from Suarez, in his proof that sense can not assure us of the existence 
 of an external world. 
 
 20 (p. 36) Cf. Berkeley, "Principles," 3-7, 22-25; "Dialogues," 
 I, Open Court ed., pp. 11-12: "sensible things are those only which are 
 immedately perceived by sense." 
 
 21 (P- 37) Collier, who plainly reads Aristotle second-hand, here 
 credits him with the theory of sensible emanations which he never 
 held. (Cf. Psychology, II, 7, 418 b: rt> 0cl>j . . . oW diroppo?) o-ti/xaros 
 oWev6$) "light is not emanation of any body"). This doctrine, that 
 perception is mediated by small particles given off from the surface 
 of a body, dates back to Empedokles and Demokritos. Cf. J. I. Beare, 
 Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition (Oxford, 1906).
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 135 
 
 Collier's contrast between the active and the passive intellect is equally 
 un-Aristotelian. 
 
 22 (P- 39) Cf. Malebranche, "Recherche de la Verite" Livre 3 me 
 ande Partie, Chap. VI, "Que nous voyons toutes choses en Dieu," and 
 Norris, "Theory of the Ideal World" : Vol. II, p. 441. 
 
 23 (p. 40) See Part II, chap. IV, Arg. IV and chap. IX, Arg. 
 IX for further discussion of this point. 
 
 2 4 (p. 40) Franciscus Suarez, (1548-1617), a Jesuit theologian 
 and philosopher of Granada, who made many original contributions to 
 scholastic philosophy. He was a follower of Thomas Aquinas, and 
 the author of "Disputatio Metaphysicae," (Paris 1619). It was prob- 
 ably this book with which Collier was familiar, for Norris refers to it: 
 "Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World," Vol. I, chap. IV, pp. 195, 
 205, etc. The British Museum Catalogue gives the book as published 
 at Moguntiae in 1605. 
 
 2 5 (p. 40) Christopher Scheibler is the author of "Opus Meta- 
 physicum", Greszen, 1617. The British Museum Catalogue gives the 
 full title as "Opus Metaphysicum, duobus libris universum hujus 
 scientiae systema comprehendens." Marpurgi, 1637. 
 
 26 (p. 40) The Scottish philosopher, Robert Baron, who was pro- 
 fessor of Divinity in Marischal College, Aberdeen. His "Metaphysica 
 generalis" was published in London at some time between 1657 and 1661. 
 The British Museum contains three copies of this book. 
 
 2 7 (p. 41) Actus (tvtpyfta) entitativus, "essential reality" (con- 
 trasted with potentia (Sfoafus) pura, "pure potentiality." The distinc- 
 tion is first made by Aristotle and is perpetuated by the Schoolmen. 
 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book VIII. (O); Thomas Aquinas, Summa 
 Theologica, I.I., Qu. 41, Art. 4, Concl. ad ^. To Aristotle, verbally 
 followed by the Schoolmen, matter is mere potentiality. 
 
 28 (p. 42) This appears to refer to the doctrine of St. Thomas: 
 Angels, though created, are immaterial beings and therefore, like God, 
 they know corporeal things without being affected by them (though 
 God alone knows through his own essence). Compare Summa T/ieol., 
 I, 14, V., Concl. ; also I., 57, I. concl. Sicut Deus per suam essentiam 
 materialia cognoscit, ita angeli ea cognoscunt per has quod stint in eis 
 per suas intelligibiles species. Human beings, on the other hand, in 
 whom mind is united with body, know material things in part through 
 the action of the external objects on the senses. Compare Summa 
 Theol., I. I., Qu. 84, Art. 4, Concl. 
 
 2 9 (p. 42) The reference probably is to Plato's doctrine that sensi- 
 ble reality is object of opinion, or belief, not of knowledge. Cf. Repub- 
 lic, V, 477 seq., VI, 509 seq.\ and Timaios, 29.
 
 i 3 6 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 3 (p. 45) Cf. Berkeley's "Principles," Section 54. 
 
 31 (p. 46) It seems incredible that Collier should not cite Berke- 
 ley at this point, were he familiar with the "Essay" or with the 
 "Principles." 
 
 32 (P- 47) Part If cna P- !> Section II, IV, V, and VI. 
 
 33 (p. 49) This objection was brought forward later by Solomon 
 Low. Cf. Collier's answer, Benson's "Memoirs," pp. 28-30. 
 
 34 (p. 50) "He must have a very Metaphysical Sense that shall 
 feel Existence, but not a very Metaphysical Understanding that shall 
 think he does. For to feel that a thing Exists, is the same as to feel a 
 Proposition." 
 
 35 (p. 51) This distinction between the objects of sense and of 
 touch is emphasized by Berkeley, whose "Theory of Vision" is written 
 in part to "consider the difference there is betwixt the ideas of Sight 
 and Touch." "Essay towards a New Theory of Vision," Section I. 
 
 36 (p. 52) "It cannot be doubted that every perception we have 
 comes to us from some object different from our mind ; for it is not 
 in our power to cause ourselves to experience one perception rather 
 than another ... It may, indeed, be matter of inquiry whether that 
 object be God, or something different from God; but because we 
 perceive, or rather, stimulated by sense, clearly and distinctly appre- 
 hend, certain matter extended in length, breadth, and thickness. . . . 
 God would, without question, deserve to be regarded as a deceiver, if he 
 directly and of himself presented to our mind the idea of this extended 
 matter, or merely caused it to be presented to us by some object which 
 possessed neither extension, figure, nor motion. For we clearly con- 
 ceive this matter as entirely distinct from God, and from ourselves, 
 or our mind ; and appear even clearly to discern that the idea of it is 
 formed in us on occasion of objects existing out of our minds, to which 
 it is in every respect similar. But since God cannot deceive us, for 
 this is repugnant to his nature, . . . we must unhesitatingly conclude 
 that there exists a certain object extended in length, breadth, and thick- 
 ness, and possessing all those properties which we clearly apprehended to 
 belong to what is extended. And this extended substance is what we 
 call body or matter." "Principles", Part II, Prop. I. Cf. also "Prin- 
 ciples", Part. I, Props. XXIX, XXX, XLII, and "Meditations" IV and 
 VI. (Open Court ed. p. 104). 
 
 37 (p. 52) In Part II, chapter X, Collier refers to this transla- 
 tion of Malebranche as "Search's Illustr. Taylor's Translation." This 
 reference must be to the translation of "La Recherche de la Verite" 
 published in 1694 by Thomas Taylor, M. A. of Magdalen College, 
 Oxford. A copy is in the British Museum. The full title is; "Father
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 137 
 
 Malebranche's treatise concerning the Search after Truth. Trans- 
 lated by T. Taylor." 1694. This reference to the "Recherche" seems 
 to be to the ficlaircissement of Livre i, chap. 10: "II est done absolu- 
 ment necessaire, pour s'assurer positivement de 1'exixtence des corps 
 de dehors, de connoitre Dieu qui nous en donne le sentiment et de 
 scavoir qu'etant infiniment parfait il ne peut nous tromper." 
 
 38 (p. 52) "'Tis true indeed upon the appearances of Bodies, and 
 those regular and uniform Sensations which accompany those Appear- 
 ances, I find myself Naturally determin'd to think that they Exist. But 
 before I can rationally conclude that they do so, or by a reilex act of 
 my mind approve of that Natural Judgment, some other Considerations 
 must intervene, since neither my Sensation, nor my Judgment upon 
 that Sensation is of itself any direct Argument for it. And therefore 
 
 I cannot but think M. Descartes was much in the right, . . . when he 
 suspended the Certainty, at least of Sensible things, upon the Existence 
 of God. . . . And indeed those Considerations which are taken from 
 the Truth and Goodness of the excellent and most perfect Author of 
 our Natures, who there is no reason to suspect, would give us Senses 
 to abuse and deceive us in the due and Natural use of them, are 
 Sufficient to satisfie all sober and reasonable Understandings of the 
 real Existence of Bodies." 
 
 39 (P- 54) See Hume's criticism of this argument, "Inquiry," 
 Sec. XII, Part I. (Open Court ed. p. 163): "To have recourse to the 
 veracity of the Supreme Being, in order to prove the veracity of our 
 senses, is surely making a very unexpected circuit. If his veracity were 
 at all concerned in this matter, our senses would be entirely infallible." 
 
 40 (p. 54) Cf. Des Cartes, "Principles," Part I. Prop. LIII, LIV, 
 LXIII, LXVI, LXVIII, LXIX, and Part II, Prop. I and "Meditations" 
 
 II and VI. 
 
 41 (P- 55) Collier does not discuss in any detail the point which 
 Berkeley emphasizes, i. e. that we know extension by means of the 
 senses, just as much as we know light, heat, and colour. See Berkeley's 
 "Principles," Sec. 9, 10, n. 
 
 42 (P- 55 ) Cf. the letter to Solomon Low, Benson's "Memoirs," p. 
 24. 
 
 43 (p. 56) Norris admits that an external world is unknowable, 
 but does not conclude that therefore it cannot exist. "Theory of the 
 Ideal or Intelligible World," Vol. I, p. 205 and Vol. II, chap. VI, 
 Chap. XII, p. 442. Cf. Berkeley's use of this argument and the follow- 
 ing, Principles, 18-20. 
 
 44 (p. 56) The external world is either creature (created) or is 
 self-existent, i. e. God himself. The latter doctrine seems to Collier
 
 138 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 untenable, so he holds, without further argument, that the world is a 
 "creature." 
 
 45 (p. 56) This point is not, however, later considered. 
 
 46 (P- 59) "'" ac * u formali ... or in actu exercito": really or 
 actually existent. Formal existence is opposed to merely representative 
 existence (existence in thought) ; "practised," or actual, existence is 
 opposed to potential existence. 
 
 47 (p. 62) Collier regards as axiomatic the perfect wisdom of 
 God. Berkeley argues to God's perfection from the "order beauty 
 and perfection" of nature. Principles 146: Cf. Sec. 30-32, 36. 
 
 48 (p. 63) See Introduction, page xxiv, for comparison of Collier's 
 with Kant's antinomies. 
 
 49 (p. 70) See p. 40, VI, of this edition of the "Clavis" for Col- 
 lier's first references to this point, and Pt. II, Chap. IX, Arg. IX, for 
 further discussion. (References in the Notes, to the "Clavis" are to this 
 edition). 
 
 5 (p. 73) The reference is to Part IV, chapter i of the Port 
 Royal "Logic or Art of Thinking," edited by A. Arnauld and P. 
 Nicole, (1662). 
 
 51 (P- 77) Collier's theological orthodoxy is evidenced in his 
 ready acceptance of the authority of the word of God, which he says, 
 "may well pass, with us Christians, for an unquestionable axiom," 
 "Specimen of True Philosophy," Parr edition, p. 115. 
 
 52 (p. 77) On page 125 of the "Clavis," Collier claims, indeed, 
 that he explains by his idealism the apparent contradictions in these 
 theological arguments. 
 
 53 (P- 77) The Socinians were a sect founded in Italy in the 
 1 6th century by Lelio and Fausto Sozzini. By their denial of the 
 divinity of Christ, and by their belief in the moral theory of the 
 Atonement and in man's power to attain his own salvation, they were 
 the forerunners of the modern Unitarians. 
 
 54 (p. 77) Arianism is the name given to the Christological 
 theory of Arius, who denied that Christ is "of the same substance" 
 with the Father. The controversy arose through the Alexandrian dis- 
 cussion of the Logos in the early fourth century. Arian doctrine was 
 revived in England in 1720 by Dr. Samuel Clarke, and Collier himself 
 inclined to the Arian theory. See Benson's "Memoirs," pp. 61, 62. 
 
 55 (p. 83) Cf. note 21. Here, and in the arguments which 
 follow, Collier evidently follows Malebranche, "Recherche de la Verite," 
 Livre 3 me , 2nde Partie, chap. II. 
 
 56 (p. 87) This argument is directed against the teaching of
 
 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 139 
 
 Norris, who, throughout his Essay, represents the external world, as a 
 thing entirely apart from God, and yet as produced by him. 
 
 57 (p. 87) Des Cartes, "Meditations" III, Open Court ed. p. 58. 
 
 58 (? 95) I D Pt- I> PP- 4Q-4 1 . an d Pt. II, Argument IV, Collier 
 argues that the matter of the early philosophers must be invisible ; here 
 he argues that the conception is utterly meaningless. Berkeley touches 
 lightly on these conceptions as already out of date, referring to the 
 "so much ridiculed notion of materia prima, to be met with in Aristotle 
 and his followers ("Principles" u). In formulating this conception 
 of matter, as a vague something or nothing, and as a supporting 
 medium of sensible qualities (Clavis p. 23), Collier closely approaches 
 Berkeley. 
 
 59 (p. 96) Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. IV, (A), c. 2, 10133, 24. 
 Cf. Bk. I. (A), c. 3, 9833, 26. 
 
 60 (P- 9?) St. Austin for St. Augustine is a contraction common 
 among the Schoolmen. 
 
 61 (P- 97) Porphyry (z^-circa 303 A. D.), a follower of 
 Plotinus. 
 
 62 (P- 97) The reference is to Metaphysics Bk. VI. (Z), c. 3, 
 10293, 20: X^yw 8' tXijv fi Ka.0" 1 aiirjjv /xijre rl ft^Tf iroabv Mijre 
 dXXo fjiriSfv X^yercu olj ftpurrai rb 6v. Cf. IX. (I), C. 8, 1058, a, 23. See 
 also, Berkeley, "Principles," 80, and "Dialogues between Hylas and 
 Philonous," II. (Open Court ed. p. 80) : "So matter comes to nothing"; 
 and Hegel, "Logik," I, i, Kap. i : "Das reine Sein und das reine 
 Nichts ist also dasselbe." 
 
 6 3 (p. 101) Cf. Berkeley's treatment of this objection in "Prin- 
 ciples" 82. 
 
 64 (p. 102) Cf. Collier's "Specimen of True Philosophy." See 
 also Introduction, pp. XVII S. 
 
 6 5 (p. 102) See p. 12 of the "Clavis" for Collier's first refer- 
 ence to this point. Also see Collier's letter to Mr. Shepherd, quoted 
 in Benson's "Memoirs," pp. 48 seq. ; and Berkeley's "Dialogues," III, 
 Open Court Edition, pp. 119 ff. 
 
 66 (p. 102) See Malebranche, "Recherche de la Verite," ficlair- 
 cissement to Livre I., chap. X (near end) ; "Or dans Papparence de 
 I'ficriture sainte, et par les apparences des miracles, nous apprenons 
 que Dieu a cree un ciel et une terre " 
 
 6 7 (p. 105) See the "Clavis" pp. 108 and 120; also see Berkeley, 
 "Principles," 38, 52. 
 
 68 (p. 106) See Note 36. 
 
 6 9 (p. 107) Norris's "Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World," 
 vol. I, p. 205 ; Vol. II, pp. 320, 493, 563.
 
 140 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 
 
 70 (p. nj) See "Clavis" pp. 8, 9. Collier answers this objection 
 again in his second letter to Mr. Low, Benson's "Memoirs," pp. 31, 32; 
 in the letter to Dr. Clarke, Benson, pp. 36 seq. ; and in the letter to 
 Mr. Mist, Benson, pp. 41 seq. 
 
 71 (p. 114) "Clavis," p. 106.
 
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