WORKS IN GENERAL LITERATURE. 
 
 O- 
 
 V 
 
 -fro 
 
 REESE LIBRARY 
 
 OF Tin: 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. 
 
 Received^ Q&^7 > .._., n 
 
 A sessions No. ^^/^ ^ / Shelf No. 
 
 Woodcuts, chiefly from the Antique, drawn by George Scharf. Ji'cp. 4to. 21s.; 
 morocco, 42s. 
 
 MR. A. RICH's ILLUSTRATED COMPANION to the LATIN 
 
 DICTIONARY and GREEK LEXICON. With 2,000 Woodcuts from the 
 Antique. Post 8vo. 21s. 
 
 vn. 
 
 THE Rev. J. E. BIDDLE's COPIOUS and CRITICAL LATIN- 
 
 ENGLISH LEXICON". 4to. 50s. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 MR. C. D. YONGFs NEW LATIN CRADUS AD PARNAS- 
 
 SUM ; containing every Word used by the Poets of good Authority. Post Svo. l Js. 
 
 IX. 
 
 MR. C. D. YONGE's NEW ENGLISH-GREEK LEXICON; 
 
 containing all the Greek Words used by Writers of good Authority. 4to. 21s. 
 
 x. 
 
 THE Rev. T. H. HORNE's INTRODUCTION to the CRITICAL \ 
 
 STUDY and KNOWLEDGE of the SCRIPTURES. New Edition; with Maps, 
 &c. 5 vols. Svo. C3s. ; calf, 5. 
 
 XI. 
 
 MRS. JAMESON'S LEGENDS of the MONASTIC ORDERS, 
 
 as represented in the Tine Arts : with Etchings by the Author, and W^oodcuts. 
 Square crown Svo. 2Ss. 
 
 XII. 
 
 MRS. JAMESONS. SACRED and LEGENDARY ART: with 
 
 Etchings by the Author, and Woodcuts. New Edition ; complete in One Volume. 
 Square crown Svo. 28s. 
 
 LONDON : LONGMAN, BEOWN, GREEN, AND LONGMANS. 
 
^/^/^/^/^/^/^./v^/rS/^/^ 
 
THE 
 
 THEOKY OF REASONING, 
 
Works on Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, 
 by the same Author. 
 
 ESSAYS ON THE FORMATION AND PUBLICATION OF 
 OPINIONS, and on other Subjects. Third edition, 8vo. 
 
 ESSAYS ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH AND ON THE 
 PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. Second edition, 8vo. 
 
 A REVIEW OF BERKELEY'S THEORY OF VISION, designed 
 to show the Unsoundness of that celebrated Speculation. 8vo. 
 
 A LETTER TO A PHILOSOPHER, in reply to some recent Attempts 
 to vindicate Berkeley's Theory of Vision. ( Pamphlet. ) 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 SroTTiswooDEs and SHAW, 
 N ew- street- Square , 
 
THE 
 
 THEORY 
 
 OF 
 
 REASONING. 
 
 BY 
 
 SAMUEL BAILEY. 
 
 LONDON: 
 LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, AND LONGMANS. 
 
 1851. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 THE following Treatise aims at giving a connected 
 and consistent view of the subject which it under- 
 takes to explain, and of the relation in which the 
 several parts of it stand to each other. Perhaps 
 it will not be considered as departing from the 
 proper self-restraint which leaves the question 
 of originality to be decided by others, if the 
 
 V 
 
 Author ventures to say that this connected view 
 differs as a whole, and of course in some of its 
 details, from any theory hitherto promulgated. 
 Saying this is, indeed, putting forth no claim 
 except to the attention of the reader, inasmuch 
 as there can be no merit in any difference from 
 former writers, unless that difference is founded 
 in truth. 
 
 The Author designed at first to make the Treatise 
 almost wholly expository ; but the number of un- 
 settled questions on which he had to touch, forced 
 
VI PREFACE. 
 
 him more extensively into criticism and controversy 
 than he had originally contemplated entering. In 
 such a work it was especially impossible not to 
 advert to the scholastic logic ; and as his theory 
 is at variance with some of its fundamental prin- 
 ciples, he has had occasion to comment upon it at 
 considerable length. 
 
 If, in doing this, he has, on the one hand, been 
 obliged to differ very widely on certain points 
 from several of the ablest logical writers of the 
 day, he has, on the other, found himself in ac- 
 cordance on many of the same points with some 
 of the most eminent philosophers of the past and 
 present ages. 
 
 February 22. 1851. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Page 
 CHAPTER I. The Intellectual Operations which pass 
 
 under the name of Reasoning - 1 
 
 CHAPTER II. Contingent Reasoning - -7 
 
 Section 1. The Nature and Cogency of Contingent 
 
 Reasoning - - - - 7 
 
 Section 2. Contingent Reasoning distinguished from 
 Knowing, on the one hand, and Con- 
 jecturing, on the other - 25 
 
 CHAPTER III. Demonstrative Reasoning - - 33 
 
 CHAPTER IV. Contingent under the Form of Demonstrative 
 
 Reasoning - - 45 
 
 CHAPTER V. The Intermixture of Contingent and De- 
 monstrative Reasoning - - 56 
 
 CHAPTER VI. Principles of Reasoning or Maxims, and 
 
 especially the Dictum de omni et nullo - 60 
 
 CHAPTER VII. Forms of Reasoning, and especially the 
 
 Syllogism - 77 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. Primary or Original Premises - - 94 
 
 CHAPTER IX. The Relation between Reasoning and 
 
 Language - 99 
 
 CHAPTER X. The Relation of Observation, Experiment, 
 and Induction, to Reasoning and to 
 each other - - - - 113 
 
Vlll . CONTENTS. 
 
 Page 
 
 CHAPTER XL Rules for guiding the Operations of 
 Reasoning, and especially the Rules of 
 the Scholastic Logic - - 122 
 
 Section 1. Rules in Contingent Reasoning - - 123 
 
 Section 2. Rules in Demonstrative Reasoning, and 
 
 especially in Syllogistic Reasoning - 127 
 Section 3. Subject continued : Mode of using the 
 
 Syllogistic Form - 130 
 
 Section 4. Subject continued : Rules of the Scholastic 
 
 Logic- - 133 
 
 Section 5. Subject continued : Rules of the Scholastic 
 
 Logic- - 146 
 
 Section 6. Subject continued : Effects of the Scho- 
 lastic System as a Discipline of the 
 Mind - - 159 
 
 CHAPTER XII. The Sources of Erroneous Conclusions - 165 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 ARTICLE I. An Analysis of some Trains of Reasoning- 185 
 Section 1. Analysis of a Demonstration in Euclid - 185 
 Section 2. Analysis of a Passage in Burke - - 188 
 
 ARTICLE II. Some Suggestions for the Examination of 
 
 Argumentative Composition - - 197 
 
 ARTICLE III. The preceding Suggestions in part exem- 
 plified by an Examination of Berkeley's 
 Argument to prove the impossibility of 
 seeing Distance - - 200 
 
THE 
 
 THEORY OF REASONING 
 
 I, 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS WHICH PASS UNDER 
 THE NAME OF REASONING. 
 
 IN scrutinizing our own minds, several different 
 operations are easily distinguishable, and have ac- 
 cordingly received particular appellations. When 
 present objects are discerned through the senses^ 
 the act is usually named perception ; when objects 
 formerly perceived by us, or facts formerly known 
 to us, are recalled, the mental event is denominated 
 recollection, or mere conception ; when objects or 
 facts occur to the mind in a different order or com- 
 bination from that in which they were actually 
 perceived, there is something more than conception, 
 and it has been termed imagination ; lastly, when 
 facts perceived determine the mind to the belief of 
 facts which it does not perceive, although here also 
 
 B 
 
2 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 conception is implied, the operation is evidently as 
 distinct from the former three operations as they 
 are from each other. 
 
 This intellectual process may be illustrated by a 
 few familiar instances. 
 
 I am walking, I will suppose, on the sea-shore, 
 and perceiving a quantity of sea- weed lying on the 
 beach, while the water is at the moment a quarter 
 of a mile from it, I conclude that the tide has 
 ebbed, and left the weed where I perceive it lying. 
 
 I notice the print of a small foot on the sand, 
 and I feel pretty sure that it was made by a child. 
 
 I look upon the multitude of gay people walking 
 along the beach, and I am struck with the thought 
 that sooner or later, and, at the latest, in no very 
 long period, they must all die. 
 
 I observe the sun to be exactly on the meridian, 
 and I calculate that at a place where a friend of 
 mine resides, 15 degrees in longitude to the west of 
 my position, it is just eleven o'clock. 
 
 In these several cases my mind is determined by 
 the sight of present phenomena, conjoined with 
 knowledge previously acquired, to believe some- 
 thing which I do not actually perceive through the 
 organs of sense ; something past, something future, 
 or something distant ; or, in other words, to be- 
 lieve that some event has happened, will happen, or 
 is happening, although beyond the sphere of my 
 observation. 
 
 But the actual presence of any facts to the senses 
 
THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 is not essential to the operation in question. I 
 may recollect or be told of a fact, and thus knowing 
 it from recollection or testimony, I may form the 
 same inferences from it as if I perceived it. 
 
 This determination of the mind to the belief of 
 something beyond its actual perception or know- 
 ledge, is obviously what is termed reasoning. 
 
 There is, however, another mental operation to 
 be noted, which consists, not in our being led to 
 believe, or in our inferring from what we perceive 
 and know, something else, neither perceived nor 
 known ; but in our being led to discern some fact, 
 not directly manifest, through the medium of some 
 other fact or facts in which it is implied. 
 
 Suppose somebody to assert that the opposite 
 angles made by the intersection of two right lines 
 are equal. This, at the first glance, appears likely 
 enough to be true ; but it is not intuitively per- 
 ceived, it is not immediately A 
 manifest. When, however, he 
 proceeds to point out that the 
 angles A B D and ABC are toge- 
 ther equal to two right angles, 
 and that the angles A B D and 
 D B E are also together equal to 
 two right angles, we discern D 
 that these two pairs of angles are equal to each 
 other ; and when he further points out the circum- 
 stance of the angle A B D being common to the two 
 equal pairs, we at once discern that the other angle 
 
 B 2 
 
4 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 A B c of the first pair is equal to the other angle 
 D B E of the second pair. 
 
 Here we do not infer the existence or the hap- 
 pening of something past, or future, or absent ; but 
 we are led to discern something not directly ob- 
 vious, by an arrangement of propositions expressive 
 of facts, each of which implies its successor. 
 
 To describe it more particularly : 
 
 The complex fact, or combination of facts, ex- 
 pressed in the proposition, " the two pairs of angles 
 are respectively equal to two right angles," implies 
 (or leads the mind to discern) that they are mu- 
 tually equal ; and the fact that the pairs, thus 
 proved to be equal, have one angle in common, 
 implies (or leads the mind to discern) that the 
 remaining angle in the one is equal to the remain- 
 ing angle in the other. Thus, if we regard the 
 facts, there is self-evident involution or implication ; 
 and if we regard the mind of the reasoner, there is 
 ^ intuitive discernment at every step of the process. 
 
 The operation just described is termed reason- 
 ing equally with the other ; but there is evidently 
 an important difference between them. To be de- 
 termined by facts to the belief of an unobserved 
 event or object, past, present, or future, and to 
 discern when two facts are presented to the mind, 
 that one is implied in the other, are intellectual 
 acts or operations plainly distinct. If there were 
 no other circumstance by which to discriminate 
 them, they would be broadly distinguished by this, 
 
THE THEORY OF REASONING. 5 
 
 that in the latter species of reasoning, every step 
 being discerned to be necessarily true, the denial of 
 the conclusion involves a contradiction, while in 
 the former species it does not. The conviction in 
 the one case, and the discernment in the other, 
 have, nevertheless, this in common, that the fact 
 expressed in the conclusion is not in either case 
 .evident of itself, but is arrived at through the 
 medium of some other fact or facts. 
 
 Of these two species of reasoning, while the 
 second has been uniformly termed demonstrative, 
 the first has sometimes been called moral, and 
 sometimes probable reasoning; but on account of 
 the ambiguity of these appellations, as will be ex- 
 plained in the next chapter, I shall venture to 
 speak of it under the designation of contingent 
 reasoning. Although objections may doubtless be 
 brought against the epithet contingent, so applied, 
 it appears to me, on mature consideration, to be 
 less exceptionable and more convenient than any 
 other. 
 
 The facts which determine the mind to the belief, 
 or lead it to the discernment of other facts not im- 
 mediately manifest, are usually spoken of under 
 the designation of evidence or proofs ; and when 
 expressed in propositions preceding a conclusion, 
 under that of premises. 
 
 To reason, is to go through proofs or evidence 
 for or against any alleged fact. Frequently the 
 fact alleged or expressed in the conclusion is placed 
 
 B 3 
 
6 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 before the mind first, and the proof is adduced to 
 substantiate it ; but it also frequently happens, in 
 the course of reflection, that a fact, or combination 
 of facts, leads the mind to the belief or to the dis- 
 cernment of a fact before unknown, which is then 
 seen in its logical place as the conclusion. 
 
CHAP. II. 
 
 CONTINGENT KEASONING. 
 
 THE preceding chapter having shown that there 
 are two distinct mental processes which pass under 
 the name of reasoning, I purpose next to inquire 
 more closely into the nature of the first of these 
 processes, the principles on which it proceeds, and 
 the foundation of its cogency. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 The Nature and Cogency of Contingent Reasoning. 
 
 Let us examine any simple instance of the first 
 species of reasoning. The one already cited, re- 
 specting the sea-weed found on the beach, may 
 serve the purpose. What takes place on such an 
 occasion may be described as follows : 
 
 Having previously observed the tide, in ebbing, 
 leave the sea-weed high upon the beach, as I see it 
 at the present time, the recollection of this fact 
 
 B 4 
 
THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 causes me to believe that the phenomenon before 
 me has had the same origin. 
 
 Here the mind is obviously determined by pre- 
 sent appearances, conjoined with what has been 
 v previously observed, to believe in a past event 
 which has not actually fallen under observation. 
 
 In the inference, also given in the preceding 
 chapter, " that the gay people walking on the beach 
 will, sooner or later, all die," the mind is likewise 
 determined, by previous observation or knowledge, 
 to the belief of events concerning the objects before 
 it, which, from the nature of the case (being yet to 
 happen), cannot have been observed ; but there is 
 this difference: in the first example, a past event 
 is inferred from other past facts ; in the second, 
 future events are inferred from past events. 
 
 It is scarcely necessary to point out again, that, 
 in another illustration before adduced, a contempo- 
 raneous event or fact beyond the sphere of the 
 reasoner's observation is inferred from what is 
 taking place before his eyes, with the assistance of 
 previous knowledge. 
 
 In all these examples alike the mind is deter- 
 mined to the belief of an event or fact not witnessed 
 or known, or, in other words, it infers an event or 
 fact which it has not the means of immediately 
 observing. 
 
 For such inferences one condition is always ne- 
 cessary. The reasoner must have been acquainted 
 
CONTINGENT REASONING. 9 
 
 ' with a similar case or similar cases. We are deter- 
 mined to the belief of an unobserved fact by having 
 observed or known* a similar fact to have taken 
 place in similar circumstances. It is this resem- 
 s blance in the cases which leads us to infer that 
 unobserved events have happened, are happening, 
 or will happen. 
 
 Tn simple cases, where the complete resemblance 
 of objects or events is at once discerned, a single 
 previous instance frequently suffices for an infe- 
 rence ; but in complicated cases, where there is 
 similitude with some degree of diversity, a collection 
 and comparison of various instances is necessary to 
 show that the diversity does not affect the essential 
 circumstances on which the event depends, and that 
 the instance about which we are reasoning does not 
 differ from the others, in which the event has been 
 observed, more than they differ from each other. 
 
 Thus, to revert to the examples already adduced, 
 I may have observed the action of the tide on the 
 sea-weed only once, yet, when I see the weed lying 
 as before described, I instantly conclude that it has 
 been left by the retreating waves. 
 
 In the same way, when I draw the conclusion 
 that a child has passed over the sand, from the 
 marks imprinted upon it, all that is necessary for 
 the inference is the previous observation of a single 
 fact of a similar kind. 
 
 On the other hand, when I conclude that my 
 
10 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 fellow- creatures around me will sooner or later die, 
 my inference is from a large number of facts known 
 to me in various ways, some gathered from per- 
 sonal observation, some collected from the history 
 of the race, and the whole expressible in the pro- 
 position that all men in every climate, how different 
 soever in constitution, character and habits, after 
 living a certain limited period, have died. 
 
 It is obvious, that whether we can draw an in- 
 ference from a single fact, or whether it is needful 
 to have a collection of facts, depends altogether on 
 what is requisite for establishing a similarity in the 
 influential circumstances of each case, and does not 
 affect the character of the reasoning, which is still 
 inferring, or being determined by what we are 
 cognisant of, to believe something beyond what is 
 observed or known. 
 
 In the examples of reasoning already cited, the 
 conclusions, it is to be remarked, are all relating to 
 definite objects, and may be called particular in- 
 ferences ; but there is another large and important 
 class of conclusions from analogous premises, which 
 are general or universal. 
 
 The same facts which determine us to believe 
 that a single individual, or that the crowd we see 
 on the beach, will die, determine us to believe that 
 all human beings will die ; or, to express it in still 
 more general terms, that all men are mortal. That 
 these inferences which are usually termed general 
 
CONTINGENT REASONING. 11 
 
 laws, are precisely of the same nature, and rest on 
 the same evidence as particular inferences, is ma- 
 nifest. They both alike predicate the unknown 
 from the known, and differ only in the extensive- 
 ness of their subject. 
 
 From what may be conveniently termed the col- 
 lective fact, that men have hitherto been fallible as 
 far as observation has extended, I may deduce the 
 particular conclusion that an unknown and untried 
 individual named Peter is fallible, and I may 
 equally deduce the universal conclusion that all 
 men are fallible. 
 
 In the latter case, it is instructive to mark the 
 superior range of the inference from the same pre- 
 mises. The proposition that all men are fallible, 
 not only embodies actual knowledge, but as- 
 serts an intellectual imperfection in human beings 
 whose mental condition and endowments have 
 never been ascertained. It affirms, not only that 
 in all known or observed instances, men have been 
 found fallible, but that all human beings who have 
 existed in time past, unknown and unobserved, 
 have laboured under the same defect ; that all men 
 now living, known or unknown, are subject to it ; 
 and that all who shall hereafter exist will also be 
 similarly constituted. 
 
 In illustration of what has been said, let us place, 
 side by side, the universal law, and the particular 
 inference from the collective fact. 
 
12 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 COLLECTIVE FACT. 
 
 All men, as far as observation has extended, have been found 
 
 fallible. 
 
 Universal Law. Particular Inference. 
 
 Therefore all men are fallible. Therefore the man Peter is 
 
 [i. e., men of past times be- fallible, 
 
 yond the reach of observa- or, 
 
 tion, as well as those ob- The next generation of men 
 
 served, were fallible ; men of will be fallible, 
 
 the present time, whether or, 
 
 observed or unobserved, are Socrates, who lived more than 
 
 fallible, and all future men two thousand years ago, was 
 
 will be fallible.] fallible. 
 
 It is obvious that both these conclusions, both 
 the universal law and the particular inference, are 
 deduced from the same fact or collection of facts : 
 they are, if I may so express it, abreast, or co- 
 ordinate ; one is not, or needs not be logically sub- 
 sequent to the other ; or, to vary the language, 
 
 v both are probable inferences, for which the real 
 evidence is the same. The mental process too is 
 alike ; it does not consist in the mind's discerning 
 one thing to be implied in another, but in its being 
 
 \ determined by known facts to believe unknown 
 ones. 
 
 Much error and confusion, it appears to me, has 
 arisen from not distinguishing between the collec- 
 tive fact, which is simply a summary of the 
 evidence, and the general or universal law inferred, 
 
CONTINGENT REASONING. 13 
 
 which goes beyond the evidence. I cannot help 
 thinking, that Dr. Thomas Brown, with all his 
 acuteness, has either not discerned the distinction, 
 or not always kept it clearly in view, as, for ex- 
 ample, in the following passage, which, even if I am 
 not correct in my interpretation of it, will assist 
 me to explain the point under consideration. 
 
 " If by the term general law be meant," he says, 
 " the agreement in some common circumstances of 
 a number of events observed, there can be no 
 question that we proceed safely in framing it, and 
 that what we have already found in a number of 
 events, must be applicable to that number of events" 
 " But the only particulars to which in this case 
 we can with perfect confidence apply a general law, 
 are the very particulars that have been before ob- 
 served by us."* 
 
 This might be taken as a good description of that 
 which is necessary to constitute what I have termed 
 the collective fact, but it would be an incorrect 
 description of what is usually meant by a general 
 law, unless we construe the phrase the very par- 
 ticulars to denote, not the identical facts, but ex- 
 actly similar facts. 
 
 It would, however, be taking an imperfect view 
 of the subject to suppose that we reason only from 
 such collective facts as may be denominated uni- 
 form. 
 
 * Lectures, vol. i. p. 176. 
 
14 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 Besides the cases I have already noticed, where 
 the similarity of the influential circumstances is 
 maintained amidst a certain diversity in other 
 respects, there are innumerable cases of a compli- 
 cated, and not altogether definite character, in 
 which a certain result has not always happened, but 
 has taken place in more instances than it has failed 
 to take place, and others in which a result has 
 failed oftener than it has happened. When a new 
 instance of the first kind presents itself, we infer 
 the probability that the event will happen to be 
 greater than the probability of its not happening ; 
 when an instance of the second kind is before us, 
 we infer the probability of its happening to be less 
 than the probability of the contrary ; which proba- 
 bility, it is almost needless to observe, admits of 
 degrees, according to the varying circumstances of 
 each instance. 
 
 The nature of the reasoning in these cases is the 
 same as in those where the facts are uniform, and 
 it is only in the degree of probability w r hich is re- 
 cognized that the conclusions differ. It is obvious 
 that the want of uniformity in the result is owing 
 to a want of uniformity in the presence of the 
 influential circumstances. Although the subjects 
 of the proposition which expresses the fact are 
 comprised in a general term or description, yet 
 they are alike only in certain respects, and some of 
 them differ in points on which the result depends. 
 For example, it is a general observation, that man- 
 
CONTINGENT REASONING. 15 
 
 kind follow the religion of their immediate ances- 
 tors ; but this, although generally, is not invariably 
 the case. Men are compound beings of varying 
 qualities, and a few in almost every country, in 
 consequence of peculiar circumstances, or intel- 
 lectual idiosyncrasies, are found to depart from the 
 hereditary creed : whence, if you happen to meet 
 with a native of Turkey or Russia, you cannot 
 infer, from his country alone, that the former holds 
 the Mahometan faith, nor the latter that of the 
 Greek Church. If your knowledge of this single 
 circumstance is your only guide, your correct 
 inference will be that he is very probably of the 
 same religion as the great majority of his fellow- 
 countrymen. 
 
 My explanation of the nature of contingent rea- 
 soning would be incomplete, without adverting to 
 one point connected with it, which has not always 
 been seen in its true light. Every act of reasoning 
 (as I shall have occasion to show at greater length 
 hereafter) proceeds upon, or exemplifies, some ge- 
 neral principle ; or, in other words, from every act 
 of reasoning some general principle may be drawn 
 or educed *, which may for shortness be called the 
 principle of the reasoning. 
 
 * The term " deduce" being already appropriated to the 
 operation of inferring conclusions from premises, it may con- 
 tribute to precision, where precision is much wanted, to adopt 
 the term " educe,' to denote the process of forming or drawing 
 out the general principle which, according to common phraseo- 
 
16 THE THEOKY OF REASONING. 
 
 We have, therefore, to inquire, what is the prin- 
 ciple of the species of reasoning now under con- 
 sideration, and we shall find it to be as follows: 
 What has been observed to take place in a similar 
 case, or in all similar cases, has taken place, is 
 taking place, or will take place in the case before 
 us, where actual observation is precluded ; or, more 
 briefly, without reference to time, similar events or 
 phenomena take place in similar cases. 
 
 This will appear sufficiently manifest if we dwell 
 for a moment on the conclusion before men- 
 tioned, that all the persons walking on the beach 
 must sooner or later die. The reason, as we 
 have already seen, which determines the mind to 
 this conclusion is, that all human beings formerly 
 living have died before attaining a certain age. 
 Briefly expressed, the reasoning is - 
 
 All human beings formerly living have died 
 
 before attaining a certain age : 
 Therefore, these human beings will die before 
 attaining that age. 
 
 And the general principle which is exemplified 
 here is, that similar events will take place in similar 
 cases. 
 
 A principle of reasoning may hence be regarded 
 as a generalised statement, or description of what 
 our inferences consist in ; or of what we do when 
 we draw them. It may be remarked, too, that a 
 
 logy, is involved in an argument, or on which an argument 
 proceeds. 
 
CONTINGENT REASONING. 17 
 
 general principle of this kind includes subordinate 
 or less general principles, as classes include genera, 
 and genera include species. We might, for instance, 
 from the last example educe the principle, " What 
 has happened to all human beings formerly living, 
 will happen to all now living." Moreover, as the 
 chief cases of similarity are those of causation, the 
 two main subordinate principles in contingent rea- 
 v soning may be stated briefly to be, " Like causes pro- 
 duce like effects, and like effects proceed from like 
 
 causes." 
 
 The next important point for our investigation 
 is, how is the cogency of this kind of reasoning, 
 which is confessedly not demonstrative, to be 
 proved ? To which I answer, that the cogency of 
 no direct and simple process of reasoning can be the 
 subject of proof. The only question is, does the 
 reasoning, when clearly expressed, produce convic- 
 tion ? or, in other words, do the facts, when pre- 
 sented clearly to the mind, determine it to believe 
 that which is expressed in what is called the con- 
 clusion ? If they do, we have reached an ultimate 
 fact, or law, or principle of our mental constitution 
 beyond which it is impossible to go. It may be laid 
 down as a general law or expression of this fact, 
 that the human mind is determined to the belief of 
 similar events in similar cases. The argument 
 already cited, that the human beings whom we are 
 now looking upon will die before reaching a certain 
 age, because all other human beings, or rather all 
 
18 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 human beings formerly living, as far as observation 
 has extended, have so died, produces conviction at 
 once, and nothing can enhance or diminish its 
 power. It is deserving of especial remark that 
 drawing out the general principle implied in the 
 argument or educible from it is of no avail in 
 strengthening its force, although the contrary has 
 been frequently assumed, and even expressly as- 
 serted. The cogency of the reasoning in the par- 
 ticular example is quite as manifest as that of the 
 principle on which, according to the common 
 phrase, it proceeds, or which is involved in it. The 
 maxim that what has been observed invariably to 
 happen in certain cases, has happened and will 
 happen in all precisely similar cases, is only a 
 generalisation of the reasoning which is exhibited 
 in particular instances, and has no proving power 
 of its own. 
 
 It is this step taken by the mind, or rather this 
 determination of the mind by known facts to believe 
 unknown ones, which gave rise to Hume's cele- 
 brated speculations in his chapter entitled " Scep- 
 tical Doubts." He was not satisfied to receive it as 
 an ultimate principle beyond which we could not 
 go, but wanted an explanation of its origin in some 
 other principle. After remarking that from the 
 fact of having been formerly nourished by eating 
 bread, it does not necessarily follow that we shall be 
 nourished by eating other bread, he proceeds, " At 
 least it must be acknowledged that there is here a 
 consequence drawn by the mind ; that there is a 
 
CONTINGENT REASONING. 19 
 
 certain step taken, a process of thought and an in- 
 ference which wants to be explained. These two 
 propositions are far from being the same, '7 have 
 found that such an object has always been attended 
 with such an effect,' and 4 / foresee that other objects 
 which are in appearance similar will be attended with 
 similar effects.' I shall allow, if you please, that 
 the one proposition may justly be inferred from the 
 other : I know, in fact, that it always is inferred. 
 But if you insist that the inference is made by a 
 chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that 
 reasoning. The connexion between these proposi- 
 tions is not intuitive. There is required a medium 
 which may enable the mind to draw such an in- 
 ference, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and 
 argument. What that medium is, I must confess 
 passes my comprehension ; and it is incumbent on 
 those to produce it who assert that it really exists, 
 and is the original of all our conclusions concerning 
 matters of fact." * 
 
 In this passage there are three points to be 
 especially remarked. Hume affirms, 1st., that such 
 inferences as he describes are always drawn, and 
 justly drawn: 2. that the connexion between the 
 inference and the proposition from which it is 
 drawn is not intuitively perceived : 3. that the in- 
 ference wants explanation ; and while he himself 
 asserts that a medium or chain of reasoning is 
 required to enable us to draw the inference, he 
 
 * Sceptical Doubts, Part II. 
 c 2 
 
20 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 confesses that what that medium is passes his com- 
 prehension, and he challenges others to produce it. 
 Now, in the first and second of these assertions he 
 is perfectly correct, and his view of the subject 
 corresponds with what has been said in the previous 
 part of the present chapter; but in the third he 
 requires an explanation which is needless, and he 
 challenges his imaginary adversaries to produce 
 what is totally uncalled for, and cannot possibly be 
 given. If, as he says, an inference is unavoidably 
 and justly drawn, no medium or chain of reasoning 
 is needed to enable us to draw it. Drawing an in- 
 ference is reasoning, and between the inference and 
 the fact from which it is drawn nothing can, in the 
 nature of the case, be interposed. All that he says 
 merely shows that there is a species of reasoning in 
 which we unavoidably infer unknown facts from 
 known facts ; and that this is a different species of 
 reasoning from that in which we intuitively discern 
 one fact to be necessarily implied in another. 
 
 Reid, Dugald Stewart, and Thomas Brown, do 
 not follow Hume in his demand for a medium, but 
 they unite with him in declaring that inferences 
 of the kind in question are not drawn by reasoning. 
 
 If we construe this declaration literally, it 
 amounts in fact to saying that we do not reason by 
 reasoning, which may be true, but it is at all 
 events nugatory. We cannot, certainly, be said 
 with any propriety to do an act by the act itself^ 
 but who would think of making the assertion ? 
 
CONTINGENT REASONING. 21 
 
 There are two different propositions, relating 
 to this point, which may easily be confounded, 
 viz. : " these inferences are not drawn by reason- 
 ing," and " drawing these inferences is not reason- 
 ing." The former, as I have just explained, if 
 taken literally, is a trifling and worthless assertion, 
 which, perhaps, in fairness to these philosophers 
 we ought not to attribute to them ; they probably 
 meant that such inferences are not demonstrated, 
 and that there is no absurdity in supposing them 
 to be false, the universal test of demonstrative 
 arguments. 
 
 With regard to the latter proposition, viz. 
 that " drawing these inferences is not reasoning," 
 we are precluded from assuming this to have been 
 their meaning, for it would be inconsistent with 
 their own practice, which is constantly to speak of 
 the drawing of such inferences as reasoning. Hume 
 in one place denominates it experimental reasoning. 
 Dr. Reid usually terms it probable reasoning, and 
 one short passage selected from a number of 
 others proves that by this phrase he intended to 
 designate such inferences as are now in question. 
 " In probable reasoning the connexion between 
 the premises and the conclusion is not necessary, 
 nor do we perceive it to be impossible that the 
 first should be true while the last is false." * 
 
 Mr. Stewart uses language equally or still more 
 
 * Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind, Essay vii. 
 chap. i. 
 
 c 3 
 
22 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 obviously in point, where he speaks of " the prin- 
 ciple of my nature which leads me thus not only 
 to reason from the past to the future, but to reason 
 from one thing to another, which, in its external 
 marks, bears a certain degree of resemblance to 
 it." * 
 
 The words of Dr. Brown in proof of a similar 
 use of the term reasoning, need not be cited in 
 form. The reader will find a passage in his Lec- 
 tures perfectly explicit and appropriate, where he 
 speaks of the u reasoning of infants." f 
 
 It might be well, perhaps, if we had a generic 
 name by which to distinguish contingent from de- 
 monstrative reasoning ; but since we are accus- 
 tomed to employ the same expressions in regard 
 to both, applying to them in common such terms 
 as proofs, premises, consequences, inferences, conclu- 
 sions, and making use, in both cases, of the same 
 causal and illative conjunctions, because, inasmuch, 
 then, therefore, consequently, the only feasible plan 
 seems to be, to discriminate them as species of the 
 same genus. It seems impossible, without altering 
 the whole structure of language, to do otherwise. 
 
 Another consideration in favour of this method 
 is, that not only are contingent and demonstra- 
 tive reasoning often intermingled, but there is 
 much reasoning, as I shall hereafter explain, which 
 
 * Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. ii. p. 241. 
 f Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. ii. 
 p. 526. 
 
CONTINGENT REASONING. 23 
 
 partakes of the character of both ; which, while it 
 is contingent in reality, is demonstrative in form. 
 
 What is the most appropriate specific appella- 
 tion that could be adopted for that reasoning 
 which is not demonstrative, is a question of some 
 nicety ; nor will I pertinaciously contend that I 
 have made the best possible choice in selecting the 
 term contingent. 
 
 Some authors, as already stated, call this species 
 of reasoning moral, and others probable, while a 
 third class use the two epithets interchangeably. 
 To the term moral there is the objection that it is 
 already used in several acceptations ; and further, 
 that the reasoning so designated frequently relates 
 to purely physical or material subjects. To the 
 term probable there is the objection that it is 
 usually employed in the sense of likely, and is 
 qualified by epithets expressive of degrees. Cases 
 might easily be imagined in which these two senses 
 would clash : e. g. it might happen that we should 
 have to prove by probable reasoning that an event 
 was exceedingly improbable. * 
 
 * " The word probable," says Mr. Stewart, " does not imply 
 [i. e. when philosophically used] any deficiency in the proof, 
 but only marks the particular nature of that proof, as contra- 
 distinguished from another species of evidence. It is op- 
 posed, not to what is certain, but to what admits of being 
 demonstrated after the manner of mathematicians. This differs 
 widely from the meaning annexed to the same word in popular 
 discourse ; according to which, whatever event is said to be 
 probable is understood to be expected with some degree of 
 doubt." Elements, vol. ii. p. 252. 
 
 c 4 
 
24 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 Perhaps, one of the best designations is inductive, 
 which was employed by Dr. Reid in his earliest 
 work, but which he appears to have subsequently 
 laid aside. Since induction, however, as commonly 
 understood, denotes a complex operation, viz. col- 
 lecting and scrutinizing facts, preparatory to in- 
 ferring a general law from them, and sometimes 
 inferring the general law itself, the designation 
 seems hardly appropriate in simple cases, where, as 
 is often done in this species of reasoning, we infer 
 one particular fact from another. 
 
 The terms moral, probable, inductive, contin- 
 gent, and demonstrative, direct the attention to 
 the nature of the proofs or evidence before the 
 mind, but we might select names which would 
 point to the intellectual operations themselves. 
 
 Hume * and other writers, in discussing the 
 origin of the inferences we draw from the past to 
 the future, from the known to the unknown, have 
 ascribed them to instinct ; and philosophers gene- 
 rally have referred our discernment of the steps in 
 demonstrative deductions to intuition. 
 
 Adopting this view and this phraseology, we 
 might denominate the first species of reasoning 
 
 * See several passages in his " Sceptical Doubts," and 
 " Sceptical Solution of these Doubts." I will quote, however, 
 a passage from his " Academical Philosophy " on account of 
 its brevity, certainly not of its consistency. " Nothing leads 
 us to this inference but custom, or a certain instinct of our 
 nature." Essays and Treatises, vol. ii. p. 161. 
 
CONTINGENT REASONING. 25 
 
 instinctive, and the second, intuitive. We infer in- 
 stinctivelythat the bread we are eating will nourish 
 the body as other bread has done : we conclude in- 
 tuitively that the lines A and B being respectively 
 equal to c are equal to each other. 
 
 On giving the subject, however, the best consi- 
 deration in my power, I have preferred the terms 
 contingent and demonstrative, without precluding 
 myself from the occasional use of any others when 
 no misunderstanding can arise. If the former is 
 not absolutely the most appropriate (in regard to 
 which there is fair scope for diversity of taste and 
 judgment), it will at all events enable me to ex- 
 plain my views with sufficient precision : respect- 
 ing the latter, I am not aware that there ever has 
 been any diiference of opinion whatever. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Contingent Reasoning distinguished from Knowing 
 on the one hand and Conjecturing on the other. 
 
 There is one objection which, I am aware, may 
 be urged against the view now presented of the 
 reasoning process in contingent matters, and it is 
 this, that it would dignify nearly every intellectual 
 act with the name of reasoning ; that it would, on 
 the one hand, confound reasoning with positive 
 knowing, and, on the other, with mere conjectur- 
 
26 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 ing ; embracing many cases of instantaneous and 
 habitual apprehension which it would seem puerile 
 to term cases of inference, and many others which 
 are bare guesses or whims of the imagination. 
 
 The allegations here supposed might, however, 
 be allowed, might even be true, without at all in- 
 validating the representation of the reasoning pro- 
 cess against which they are directed. It would be 
 no impeachment of the doctrine of this treatise to 
 admit, that although there is a broad distinction 
 between the mental acts alleged to be confounded, 
 when we consider very decided cases, yet in many 
 instances it would be difficult to draw a line of 
 demarcation on either side. The colours of the 
 rainbow which are sufficiently contrasted when we 
 regard the middle of each stripe, are so insensibly 
 blended together that it is impossible to perceive 
 where one ends and the other begins, yet no one 
 on this account denies the existence of the seven 
 prismatic colours or the propriety of giving them 
 separate names : and, in the same way, what- 
 ever difficulty there might be in drawing a line 
 between knowing and reasoning, and reasoning 
 and conjecturing, in certain instances, these 
 operations might still be regarded as perfectly dis- 
 tinct. 
 
 Such a line, nevertheless, may I think be drawn 
 in the former and principal of these cases, although 
 it may not be altogether coincident with common 
 phraseology. 
 
CONTINGENT SEASONING. 27 
 
 The doctrine of the preceding pages is, that 
 when our minds are determined by present facts, 
 conjoined with experience or knowledge, to believe 
 some fact past, absent, or future, we reason. 
 
 From the sounds which at the moment of writ- 
 ing I hear through the open window of my room, 
 I am led to conclude that there is a lark warbling 
 in the sky, although I am unable to see it. The 
 printed page before me superinduces upon my 
 mind the belief that, at some antecedent period, 
 human beings put together the words and im- 
 pressed the characters on the paper, although I 
 have not the slightest information regarding the 
 individuals who did so. In like manner, I feel 
 assured that the buds on the rose-trees in the 
 shrubbery will soon expand into full-blown 
 flowers, and that the stone which I see a boy 
 about to throw into the fish-pond will sink in the 
 water. 
 
 These according to the definition are all cases of 
 reasoning. On examining them they all agree in 
 this, that from something actually present to 
 my senses conjoined with past experience, I feel 
 satisfied that something has happened, or will 
 happen, or is happening, beyond the sphere of my 
 personal observation. 
 
 The objection we are considering would go to 
 maintain that these are not all cases of reasoning, 
 but that some of them are cases of knowledge. 
 We know" it maybe said, " that the stone which 
 
28 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 we hold in our hands will sink when thrown into 
 the water ; we do not infer it." 
 
 But may not the same be asserted with equal 
 truth of the usual examples of reasoning given in 
 logical treatises ? When it is argued that Peter is 
 mortal (i. e. will die) because he is a man and all 
 men are mortal, is not my knowledge or belief that 
 Peter is mortal exactly on a level with my know- 
 ledge or belief that a stone will sink in water? 
 And if the former is a legitimate conclusion from 
 premises or an inference, is not the latter equally so? 
 
 It will be readily granted on all hands that what 
 has taken place before my eyes I know. I know, 
 for example, that I threw a stone yesterday into 
 the water and that it sank : but with what pro- 
 priety or correctness can I be said to know that the 
 same stone will sink if I again throw it into the 
 water to-day? And if this act of intelligence 
 which regards an event that has not yet happened, 
 is to be called knowledge, can I be said to know 
 that a different stone will sink ? And if this is 
 also to be called knowledge, can I be said to know 
 that another substance which I have never tried, 
 but which appears almost as heavy as stone, will 
 sink too? 
 
 Suppose the weight attenuated, suppose a number 
 of substances presented to me varying from the 
 weight of granite to that of cork, where in this de- 
 scending scale of untried substances does know- 
 ledge end, and inference or conjecture begin ? 
 
CONTINGENT REASONING. 29 
 
 There appears to me to be only one solution of this 
 difficulty and one line to be drawn. In philoso- 
 phical strictness we can be said to know only those 
 things which we perceive or have perceived through 
 our organs of sense, and those states of mind or 
 mental events of which we are or have been 
 conscious. 
 
 Other things we believe on evidence more or 
 less cogent, that is to say, they are matters of in- 
 ference : the only difficulty in the question seems 
 to be, whether when we assume or think that the 
 same identical properties which we have once per- 
 ceived, are possessed continuously by the same 
 identical thing, our intellectual state or act is to 
 be termed inferring or knowing ? Whether, in the 
 case already put, when I make sure that the same 
 stone which I saw sink in the water yesterday, 
 will sink again when thrown into the water to- 
 day, I know the stone will sink, or I only infer it ? 
 and this, when maturely considered, seems to be 
 a question of terminology and not of fact. 
 
 There are certainly reasons to be urged, al- 
 though they are difficult to explain, why in this 
 case we should use the term knowing. What do 
 we mean by the expression " the same thing "? We 
 mean a definite portion of matter possessing cer- 
 tain perceptible qualities a definite congeries in 
 fact of such qualities. When, then, I feel sure of 
 finding in future the same object to possess the same 
 qualities as heretofore, it is only feeling assured 
 
30 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 that a definite portion of matter will continue to 
 be what it is to continue in fact to exist. 
 
 I perceive the properties of a piece of gold : I 
 put it aside in my cabinet : when I take it out 
 again, I rely upon the continued existence of those 
 properties. It is the properties themselves which 
 constitute the whole object. Knowledge of it can 
 consist of nothing else than a cognizance of these 
 qualities, and as I ascribe permanence to the ob- 
 ject, I ascribe permanence to the qualities, the 
 assemblage of which, in truth, forms the object, 
 and I speak of them independently of reference to 
 time. 
 
 But even in this case there is an inference that 
 the definite portion of matter continues unaffected 
 by surrounding agents ; that is to say, without 
 any addition or diminution, or any change of in- 
 ternal structure. We may conclude that it con- 
 tinues the same, from its not having, as far as 
 appearances indicate, been exposed to the action 
 of such agents ; but as these are often extremely 
 subtle and imperceptible, we cannot know this. 
 Instead of putting aside a piece of gold, I put aside 
 a vessel of water : it is apparently protected from 
 alteration internal or external; but the weather 
 becomes colder, the temperature of the water falls, 
 and although the liquid may appear the same to 
 the eye, it has really undergone either a diminu- 
 tion or enlargement of bulk. Its continuing there- 
 fore to have the same properties is what I infer, not 
 
CONTINGENT REASONING, 31 
 
 what I know ; for if I consider it to have the same 
 specific gravity as before I am in error. 
 
 On these grounds, notwithstanding the instan- 
 taneousness and certainty and familiarity of our 
 intelligence in cases of this kind, they ought phi- 
 losophically to be considered as cases of inferring 
 and not of knowing. 
 
 Whether this be considered a satisfactory view 
 of the subject or not, it fortunately happens that 
 the determination of the difficulty is of no prac- 
 tical moment. There can be no great evil in con- 
 founding knowledge and inference in cases where 
 they are so hard to be distinguished, or rather 
 where there is so little reason for preferring one 
 term to another, and where, whatever name we 
 give to the intellectual act, it is marked by so 
 much promptitude and certainty. 
 
 While on the one hand the conclusions of reason, 
 when indubitable and familiar, are with difficulty 
 distinguished from facts actually known, on the 
 other hand it is not easy, according to the objec- 
 tion before us, to distinguish them, when they are 
 founded on doubtful premises, from what are called 
 guesses or hypotheses. But in this case the solu- 
 tion lies on the surface. We impose one name 
 or the other according to the degree of evidence. 
 
 When the grounds for believing any thing are 
 slight, we term the mental act or state induced a 
 conjecture ; when they are strong, we term it an 
 inference or conclusion. Increase the evidence 
 
32 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 for a conjecture, it becomes a conclusion ; diminish 
 the evidence for a conclusion, it passes into a con- 
 jecture. 
 
 The process which ends in a conclusion and the 
 process which ends in a conjecture are thus essen- 
 tially the same, and differ only in degree or in the 
 force of the evidence. A conjecture, therefore, if 
 it has any grounds, is a species of conclusion : if it 
 has none, it may be called a mere guess, a whim, 
 or caprice or sally of the imagination, or any thing 
 else implying disconnexion with proofs and pre- 
 mises, which the reader may choose to term it, but 
 it has no claim to the appellation of inference. 
 
 After this discussion it is scarcely needful to 
 combat the phraseology of Hobbes, who styles all 
 that 1 have denominated contingent reasoning, 
 conjecturing.* If the latter term were not con- 
 fined to cases in which the grounds of inference 
 are slight, all conclusions from historical facts 
 would pass under the name of guesses, and the 
 criminal found guilty of murder on circumstantial 
 evidence might be said to be hanged on con- 
 jecture. 
 
 * Human Nature, chap. iv. 
 
DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 33 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 
 
 LET us turn, in the next place, to the second 
 species of reasoning, in which certain things or 
 facts lead us to discern other things or facts not 
 immediately manifest by themselves. An example 
 of it having been already given in the first chap- 
 ter, and a still more detailed one being intended 
 for the Appendix *, in order to avoid interrupting 
 the exposition of the subject by too great particu- 
 larity, the simplest instance will here suffice: the 
 lines A and B are respectively equal to c, and 
 therefore they are equal to each other. 
 
 Here the mind observing successively the 
 equality of A to c and that of B to c, is thence led 
 to discern the mutual equality of A and B, which 
 is not self-evident or immediately discernible from 
 the inspection of A and B alone. 
 
 It is plain that in reasoning of this second 
 species, which is with great propriety termed de- 
 monstrative, we intuitively discern, at each step, 
 that one fact implies another, and discern too 
 that a denial of the implied fact involves a con- 
 tradiction. 
 
 But demonstrative reasoning is not confined to 
 
 * See Appendix, Article 1. 
 D 
 
34 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 the science of quantity. It is to be found in all 
 departments of human knowledge. 
 
 Whenever the mind discerns one fact to be im- 
 plied in another, or the exclusion of a fact to be 
 implied in another fact, it reasons demonstratively, 
 whether they are facts of quantity or otherwise. 
 
 Examples of this truth might be multiplied 
 without end, but the few which follow will be 
 sufficient for illustration. 
 
 That portrait is a striking likeness of two dif- 
 ferent persons ; therefore they must resemble each 
 other. 
 
 The two litigants cannot both be the exclusive 
 owners of the property in dispute ; therefore one 
 of them must be urging a wrong claim. 
 
 The traveller who was attacked had no money 
 with him ; therefore he could not be robbed of a 
 large sum as reported. 
 
 The planets are opaque bodies ; therefore they 
 must shine by light derived from an external source. 
 
 Under this species of reasoning must be ranked 
 that which is usually denominated syllogistic, but 
 which I shall venture to call class-reasoning, be- 
 cause perfect specimens of it, as I shall hereafter 
 show, are found in the form of enthymemes. 
 
 Of class-reasoning, or at least of so much of it 
 as exemplifies the maxim of Aristotle, termed the 
 dictum de omni et nullo, the characteristic is, in- 
 ferring some attribute to belong or not to belong 
 to a given individual or to given individuals of a 
 class, because it belongs to all or does not belong 
 
DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 
 
 35 
 
 to any of the individuals of the class. It would 
 be clearly a self-contradiction to admit the latter 
 and to deny the former. All such reasoning is 
 obviously demonstrative : it is, indeed, largely in- 
 terfused in geometrical demonstration, in which 
 general propositions not self-evident, but which 
 have been shown to be implied in other proposi- 
 tions, are subsequently employed as major pre- 
 mises. Such, for example, are the propositions 
 that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle 
 are equal ; that the three angles of every triangle 
 are together equal to two right angles ; and that 
 all equilateral triangles are equiangular. 
 
 That all demonstrative reasoning consists in 
 discerning, and, when expressed in words, in as- 
 serting, one fact or one proposition to be implied 
 in another, is plain. If we call one the implying 
 fact, the other will be of course the implied fact, as 
 in the following examples. 
 
 IMPLYING FACTS. 
 
 All horned animals are rumi- 
 nant. 
 
 The lines A and B are severally 
 equal to c. 
 
 The three angles of every tri- 
 angle are together equal to 
 two right angles. 
 
 The culprit at the bar was in 
 Edinburgh at one o'clock on 
 the day named. 
 
 The traveller had no money 
 with him. 
 
 The portrait resembles two 
 different persons. 
 
 IMPLIED FACTS. 
 
 This horned animal is rumi- 
 nant. 
 
 The lines A and B are equal to 
 each other. 
 
 The three angles of the tri- 
 angle ABC are equal to two 
 right angles. 
 
 He could not be guilty of the 
 oifence committed at that 
 time in London. 
 
 He could not be robbed of a 
 a large sum. 
 
 They must resemble each 
 other. 
 
 D 2 
 
36 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 By the terms implying and being implied nothing 
 is assumed : they are merely expressive of the 
 truth, that when the two facts so denominated are 
 presented together to the mind, the proposition 
 enunciating the second fact is at once seen to be 
 true if the proposition enunciating the first is 
 true, and the denial of it to involve a contradic- 
 tion : nor is it pretended that this mode of stating 
 an argument is superior for common purposes to 
 the usual forms. 
 
 If we examine the general principles on which 
 demonstrative reasoning proceeds, or which it ex- 
 emplifies, we shall find less uniformity than in the 
 case of contingent reasoning. 
 
 The general principle exemplified in the argu- 
 ment, that A and B are equal to each other because 
 they are respectively equal to c, is, that things 
 equal to the same thing are equal to each other. 
 In the demonstration cited in the first chapter, 
 that the opposite angles made by the intersection 
 of two right lines are equal, the reasoning con- 
 sists of two steps, the first of which proceeds on 
 the same axiom, while the second exemplifies the 
 axiom, that if equals are taken from equals the 
 remainders are equal. 
 
 In the argument that because the culprit at the 
 bar was in Edinburgh at a given time, he could 
 not be guilty of a crime committed at that precise 
 moment in London, the general principle exem- 
 
BEMtNSTRATIVE REASONING. 37 
 
 plified is, that a man cannot be in two places at 
 the same time. 
 
 Axioms might easily be educed in the same 
 way from the other examples of demonstrative in- 
 ference furnished in the preceding pages ; but as 
 I purpose to resume the consideration of such 
 maxims in a subsequent chapter, it would be 
 superfluous to dwell upon them here. In that 
 chapter, I shall enter into an express examination 
 of the general principles exemplified in class-rea- 
 soning, one of which has become so noted under 
 the name of the dictum de omni et nullo. 
 
 The remark before made regarding the cogency 
 of the process in the first species of reasoning, 
 may be repeated with regard to the second. Its 
 cogency is not susceptible of proof. If the argu- 
 ment that " because A and B are respectively equal 
 to c they are equal to each other," is not intui- 
 tively discerned to be true, nothing can make it 
 appear so. It would be idle, too, in this case, as 
 in the case of probable reasoning, to cite the 
 general principle with a view to strengthen the 
 force of the particular instance. The maxim that 
 all things which are equal to the same thing are 
 equal to each other springs up in the mind after 
 the mutual equality of two particular things which 
 are equal to a third thing has been discerned, and 
 is merely a generalisation of what the particular 
 fact implies ; a truth which will be more fully 
 elucidated in the two following chapters. 
 
38 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 I have already remarked that all class-reasoning, 
 or what is usually termed syllogistic, is in form at 
 least demonstrative. This is, I believe, univer- 
 sally allowed; but it has been objected against 
 such reasoning that the major premise virtually 
 contains the conclusion, and consequently every 
 argument of the kind involves a petitio prindpii, or 
 at least furnishes no real or no new inference.* 
 
 What truth there is in this allegation, and 
 whether, if true, it renders class-reasoning nuga- 
 tory and useless, it may be instructive to examine. 
 In this examination I shall confine myself at pre- 
 sent to those cases of class-reasoning which ac- 
 cording to a common logical distinction are de- 
 monstrative, both in form and in matter, as I 
 purpose in the next chapter to consider such as are 
 really contingent, although bearing the semblance 
 of demonstration. In order to simplify the dis- 
 cussion, I shall also confine myself, as my prede- 
 cessors have usually done, to such class-reasoning 
 
 * See Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric, book i. chap, iv., 
 and Stewart's Elements of Philosophy, vol. ii. p. 100. Des- 
 cartes had long before made a similar observation. " To con- 
 vince ourselves/' says he, " how little this syllogistic art serves 
 towards the discovery of truth, we may remark that the 
 logicians can form no syllogism with a true conclusion, unless 
 they are already acquainted with the truth that the syllogism 
 developes. Hence it follows that the vulgar logic is wholly 
 useless to him who would discover truth for himself, though it 
 may assist in explaining to others the truth he already knows." 
 Works fo/M. COUSIN, vol. xi. p. 255., quoted by Mr. Hallam 
 in his Literature of Europe, vol. iii. p. 260. 
 
DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 39 
 
 as exemplifies the first half of Aristotle's maxim, 
 viz. de omnij without expressly touching on such 
 as exemplifies the second half, de nullo, or any 
 other maxims allied to the dictum. 
 
 If it were intended to signify simply that the 
 major premise implies the conclusion, the objection 
 would allege as an imperfection what is the 
 essential characteristic of all demonstrative reason- 
 ing whatever ; inasmuch as in every case of it, one 
 fact or proposition termed the premise, with or 
 without the aid of another premise, as will be here- 
 after explained, implies another fact or proposition 
 termed the conclusion. If the first did not imply 
 the second, i. e., if of the two facts, when viewed 
 together, one were not discerned to be conclusively 
 connected with the other, there could be no such 
 thing as demonstration. 
 
 But the objection is, that the major premise not 
 merely implies but contains the conclusion; that 
 the conclusion is in reality a constituent or inte- 
 grant part of the major premise, without which 
 the latter would not be completely true. 
 
 This allegation, it must be confessed, cannot be 
 contradicted. The force of the reasoning in a 
 demonstrative syllogism, or an enthymeme with 
 a major premise, depends altogether on the fact 
 expressed in the conclusion forming an integrant 
 part of the general fact expressed in the major 
 proposition, and consequently no new or unknown 
 fact can ever appear as the inference. 
 
40 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 The essence of the conclusion, in such cases, 
 consists in asserting that the subject of it does 
 form an integrant part of the major premise. 
 
 But although the allegation must be admitted, 
 it does not by any means prove that such reasoning 
 is nugatory or useless. It may, obviously, be of 
 service to be reminded, or to remind others, or to 
 have distinctly brought into view, that a given 
 individual of a class possesses a certain attribute, 
 when there is at the moment no other evidence to 
 prove it, by citing the known or admitted fact, 
 that all the members of the class possess it. 
 
 As an illustration of this point, suppose I am 
 engaged in the demonstration of a geometrical 
 theorem : there is before me a complicated dia- 
 gram containing, amongst several figures, a tri- 
 angle which I have to compare with other figures, 
 and, as a step in the reasoning, I have to show 
 that the angles of the triangle in question are 
 together equal to two right angles. I have not 
 gone through the proofs with this particular tri- 
 angle, but I call to mind that I have seen the 
 proposition demonstrated of all triangles what- 
 ever ; and from it, as an established truth, the con- 
 clusion that the angles of the triangle in the 
 diagram, although not expressly investigated, are 
 together equal to two right angles, irresistibly 
 follows. It is simply thinking or saying " in all 
 triangles the three angles are equal to two right 
 angles, and of course the particular triangle before 
 us is included in the general fact." 
 
DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 41 
 
 Whether the declaration or recognition of such 
 a contained fact is to be termed an inference or 
 not, seems to be a question of phraseology. 
 
 I am myself disposed to think that any fact 
 which can be shown to be implied or contained in 
 another fact, may be conveniently and properly 
 said to be inferred from it, and that the process 
 may be with equal convenience and propriety 
 termed reasoning. It is true that on this plan 
 many implied facts, when expressed in words, 
 would assume the appearance of fruitless and 
 frivolous inferences, and seem, as the phrase is, 
 " not entitled to the name." But a similar re- 
 mark might be made with regard to many other 
 convenient designations. We give the name pro- 
 position, for example, to any expression which 
 affirms or denies one thing of another * ; and far 
 from withholding it from trite and flat phrases 
 and truisms, we constantly speak of puerile, nuga- 
 tory, and identical propositions. In the same 
 manner we talk of bad poetry and wretched 
 painting, although the critic in his righteous in- 
 dignation may cry out, Do you call this poetry ? 
 it is sheer rant ; Do you dignify this with the 
 name of painting ? it is a mere daub. It would be 
 in analogy with these examples to apply the term 
 inference to any proposition before which we can 
 
 * HpoTCLffig jj.f.v ovv IffTi Xoyoe KarafyaTtKOQ r) cnro^artKOQ 
 Kara TIVOQ. Aristotelis Analytic. Prior, lib. 1. 
 
42 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 properly use the word therefore, marking our sense 
 of its low character when requisite by such epi- 
 thets as useless or frivolous. Of this description 
 would be the logical trifling sometimes cited, - 
 
 All men are fallible ; 
 
 Therefore some men are fallible. 
 But there are other propositions prefaced by 
 therefore which, although generally banished from 
 the rank of conclusions, or regarded as mere ex- 
 amples of conversion, might be classed amongst 
 the really useful inferences ; e. g., 
 
 No man is infallible ; 
 
 Therefore no infallible being is a man. 
 All instances of the conversion of propositions, 
 indeed, are really instances of demonstrative rea- 
 soning. They are pure enthymemes which re- 
 quire no major premises, although it is perfectly 
 practicable, as it is perfectly useless, to throw them 
 into the full syllogistic form. Of this I shall fur- 
 nish proof in a subsequent chapter on the forms 
 in which the operations of reasoning may be ex- 
 pressed. 
 
 The last example, in truth, represents a class of 
 demonstrative inferences exceedingly common, 
 where the same fact is presented in two different 
 aspects, or approached by the mind in two oppo- 
 site directions, and an assertion is made that be- 
 cause it is true in one aspect, it is true in the 
 other. 
 
DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 43 
 
 These two aspects are sometimes positive and 
 negative, as, 
 
 The man we are speaking of is enslaved by his 
 
 appetites ; 
 
 Therefore he is not free. 
 They are sometimes active and passive, as, 
 The Duke of Wellington vanquished Bonaparte; 
 Therefore Bonaparte was vanquished by the 
 
 Duke.* 
 
 Sometimes such inferences amount to little more 
 than varieties in the expression of the same fact, 
 and many of them undoubtedly seem puerile, but 
 they are demonstrative, and, notwithstanding their 
 apparent puerility when standing alone, they are 
 often convenient stepping-stones in argumentative 
 discourse, when their trivial character is merged in 
 their transitional utility. f 
 
 All these we may rank amongst convenient and 
 useful inferences, and with equal reason we may 
 place in the same class such as we have been en- 
 gaged in discussing those, namely, of really de- 
 monstrative syllogisms notwithstanding the un- 
 
 * A modern author, in reference to a similar example, says, 
 " We either think that Philip was beaten by Peter, or that 
 Peter beat Philip ; two distinct thoughts, though relating to one 
 fact. In reading from the tablet of our mind, we may bring 
 forward the images in one order, or in another." Outline of 
 the Laws of Thought, p. 109. 
 
 f For some actual examples of such inferences as are here 
 described, see Examination of a passage from Burke in the 
 Appendix, Article 1. 
 
44 THE THEOEY OF REASONING. 
 
 deniable fact that the conclusion is always contained 
 in the major premise. 
 
 The admission of this truth detracts, it must be 
 owned, from the importance of demonstrative class- 
 reasoning as it stands in general estimation, and 
 circumscribes such reasoning within very narrow 
 boundaries. 
 
 It is an obvious reflection, that if no fact can be 
 inferred in syllogistic reasoning but what is con- 
 tained in the major proposition, no science can 
 possibly be constructed by a series of real or legi- 
 timate syllogisms alone. Hence there must be a 
 fallacy in the assertion that the science of Geometry 
 can be exhibited in such a series. This feat has, I 
 am aware, been ostensibly accomplished, and the 
 way in which it has been performed presents no 
 difficulty * ; but, as I shall hereafter have occasion 
 to show, it has been done solely by the intro- 
 duction of redundant propositions, merely iricum- 
 bering the demonstration, and disguising the real 
 source of the validity of those arguments into 
 which they are so unavailingly intruded. Such 
 syllogisms may be fairly termed spurious. 
 
 * In Stewart's Elements, vol. ii. p. 260, it is stated that the 
 first six books of Euclid had been exhibited in syllogisms by 
 two writers named Herlinus and Dasypodius. See also Sir 
 Wm. Hamilton's Edition of Reid's Works, p. 702, where the 
 same fact is mentioned. 
 
INDIRECT CONTINGENT REASONING. 45 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 CONTINGENT UNDER THE FORM OF DEMONSTRATIVE 
 REASONING. 
 
 I HAVE now taken a survey of contingent and 
 demonstrative reasoning, and endeavoured to show 
 the nature and cogency of each species, and also 
 the general principles on which they proceed or 
 which they exemplify. 
 
 But I have still to notice a large class of cases in 
 reasoning which partake of the character of both ; 
 which, while they are contingent in reality, are 
 demonstrative in form. 
 
 It has been already explained that the formation 
 of general laws, extending beyond the observed 
 facts from which they are derived, is, in every 
 instance, an act of contingent reasoning ; that 
 general laws rest on the same evidence or are de- 
 duced from the same premises as particular in- 
 ferences. 
 
 It is, nevertheless, a common and often a very 
 convenient practice, first to deduce the general 
 law, and afterwards from the general law to draw 
 the particular inference, which then wears the ap- 
 pearance of a demonstrated truth. 
 
46 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 The subject may be elucidated by an instance of 
 reasoning similar to one before given. 
 
 All human beings, as far as observation has 
 
 extended, have been found fallible ; 
 Therefore the unknown author of the book 
 
 just put into my hands is fallible. 
 This, which is a good material argument, an 
 instance of forcible contingent reasoning, may be 
 converted into the following demonstration by as- 
 suming as a major premise the general law which 
 is deducible from the preceding uniform fact. 
 All human beings are fallible ; 
 Therefore the author of this book is fallible. 
 It is obvious, nevertheless, that the real nature 
 of the reasoning cannot be altered by changing 
 the form in which it is expressed. The evidence 
 of the fallibility of human beings consists in pre- 
 vious known instances of the intellectual qualities 
 exhibited by them ; and the conclusion drawn from 
 these instances is as to the intellectual qualities of a 
 writer concerning whom we know nothing. The 
 process is really inferring from what has existed in 
 all similar, i. e. all other cases, what exists in this 
 case. 
 
 As a further illustration, let us examine a piece 
 of reasoning often cited in logical treatises. 
 All horned quadrupeds are ruminant ; 
 Therefore this horned quadruped is ruminant. 
 Whether we take this enthymeme as it is, or 
 make it, by the introduction of a minor premise, 
 into a regular syllogism, the conclusion drawn is 
 
INDIRECT CONTINGENT REASONING. 47 
 
 irresistible. You cannot admit the premise and 
 deny the conclusion, without self-contradiction. 
 
 But the form into which the reasoning is thrown 
 by using the general law as a major premise masks 
 the real nature of the evidence for the conclusion. 
 The real argument is, 
 
 All other horned quadrupeds have been found 
 
 to be ruminant ; 
 Therefore this horned quadruped is ruminant. 
 
 It is because we have found horned quadrupeds 
 to have been ruminant in all other cases, as far as 
 our knowledge has extended, that we conclude 
 that the horned animal before us is ruminant. The 
 fact or collection of facts gathered from observation 
 without any contrary instance, is sufficient to de- 
 termine the mind to believe the conclusion ; but 
 there would be no self-contradiction, although a 
 want of sound sense, in admitting the premise and 
 denying the inference. The reason is not what is 
 usually designated logical or demonstrative, but 
 material or contingent. It is, nevertheless, all that 
 we can possibly have in the case. 
 
 Laying down the general law, that all horned 
 quadrupeds are ruminant, has not the slightest 
 power to change either the character of the facts 
 of which it is the indication, or that of the conclu- 
 sion to which it may lead. Material arguments 
 cannot be converted into demonstrative proofs by 
 any arrangement of propositions, or by any trans- 
 lation from one form into another. 
 
48 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 In these observations, I do not of course intend 
 to assert that we ought never to make our in- 
 ferences from such general propositions, for there is 
 obviously a natural tendency in the human mind 
 to do so, and an indispensable convenience in the 
 practice. I simply maintain that they do not in- 
 crease, or strengthen, or alter in any way, the real 
 force of the proofs. Being conclusions of precisely 
 the same nature, and resting on the same evidence 
 as the particular conclusions sought to be demon- 
 strated by them, it follows that no force can be 
 derived from them to the latter. * 
 
 Perhaps it would be a useful way of marking 
 the distinction between these two modes of con- 
 tingent reasoning, to call one the direct and the 
 other the indirect. 
 
 The difference might be illustrated and exhibited 
 to the eye in a diagram, where the point or angle 
 A denotes the collective fact ; 
 
 A 
 
 B ,, the general law ; 
 c the particular inference. 
 Supposing the distances between 
 the points to be equal, or, what is 
 ' the same thing, the triangle to be 
 equilateral, it is obvious that if you proceed in 
 a straight course from A, you may get to B or to c 
 with equal readiness ; but you may also get to c 
 
 * This argument has been forcibly put by Mr. John Mill, in 
 his valuable System of Logic. See vol. i. p. 250. 
 
INDIRECT CONTINGENT REASONING. 49 
 
 by first going from A to B, and then from B to c : 
 the first would be the direct way, the second the 
 indirect. So, inferring from the collective fact " all 
 men have hitherto been found fallible " (A), that 
 this man is fallible (c), would be a direct inference 
 from the evidence, as would be also inferring from 
 the same collective fact that all men are fallible (B) ; 
 but inferring from the general law " all men are 
 fallible " that this man is fallible, although direct 
 if no reference is made to the original ground, 
 would be an indirect way of deducing the particular 
 inference from the pristine evidence on which it 
 rests : it would be going from A to c via B. 
 
 It often happens, indeed (to pursue the parallel) 
 that we find ourselves at B, and then, if we want to 
 proceed to c, it would be roundabout to retrace our 
 steps first to A. When we have already reached a 
 general law, we may safely and usefully deduce 
 conclusions from it, without the constant necessity 
 of re-ascending to the original evidence.* 
 
 It follows, nevertheless, that the universal law, 
 which is itself merely an inference in contingent 
 reasoning, cannot be rightly employed, as a de- 
 monstrative major premise to prove a particular 
 conclusion, without what may be called a logical 
 reservation. The conclusion is not, in reality, a 
 necessary consequence of the evidence, although 
 
 * It is scarcely necessary to say that the diagram above in- 
 troduced is not intended to prove any thing : it is merely an 
 attempt to place the subject in a clear light. 
 
 E 
 
50 THE TIIE011Y OF REASONING. 
 
 the shape into which the argument is thrown will 
 make it appear such ; and deducing it from the 
 universal law can be considered only as a form of 
 which it is frequently convenient to avail ourselves, 
 but in using which, we should never forget the 
 contingent character of the argument. In effect, 
 if we closely scrutinise the subject, we shall find 
 that the only kinds of general propositions which 
 can be legitimately regarded as implying individual 
 facts, and thus employed absolutely as demon- 
 strative premises, are two, namely, such as are 
 formed from a complete knowledge or discernment 
 that the predicate is true of every individual of the 
 class (which embraces the enumeratio plena of logi- 
 cians), and such as are rigidly deduced from incon- 
 trovertible data. An example of the former may 
 be seen in the propositions, "all the planets are 
 opaque bodies," " all murders are punishable by 
 death ; " of the latter, in the theorem " all equilateral 
 triangles are equi-angular. 
 
 In all other cases, however forcible, or well-es- 
 tablished, or undeniable the general law maybe, the 
 reasoning in which it is employed as a major pre- 
 mise, although demonstrative in form, comes under 
 the description of contingent reasoning, and can 
 be correctly regarded in no other light. 
 
 From all this, the necessity of knowing the pre- 
 cise signification of the terms used in class-reason- 
 ing before we can determine the real nature of the 
 inference drawn, is an obvious corollary. 
 
INDIRECT CONTINGENT REASONING. 51 
 
 But the most important application of this view 
 of the subject, is that it enables us to see how com- 
 pletely such apparently demonstrative reasoning 
 escapes the objection brought against syllogistic 
 arguments, and adverted to in the last chapter, 
 that the major premise virtually contains the con- 
 clusion, and that, consequently, the argument in- 
 volves a petitlo principiij and furnishes no real in- 
 ference. 
 
 Many minds have been perplexed in attempting 
 to reconcile the admitted truth, that the conclusion 
 forms an integrant part of the general proposition 
 from which we set out, with the equally acknow- 
 ledged truth that from such propositions we deduce 
 unobserved facts, not really included in the major 
 premise. 
 
 But the view of the subject here presented re- 
 moves the whole difficulty. Whatever weight the 
 allegation of apetitio principii may have in the case 
 of purely demonstrative class-arguments, it can 
 have no application to such as we are here treating 
 of, when thrown back into their pristine form. 
 Although it may lie against an argument in the 
 shape of 
 
 All men are fallible, 
 
 Therefore this man is fallible, 
 
 it cannot for a moment be brought against one in 
 the shape of 
 
 All other men have been fallible, 
 
 Therefore this man is fallible, 
 
 E 2 
 
52 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 which is the true type of contingent reasoning from 
 collective facts or general propositions. 
 
 In this latter case, all semblance of petitio prin- 
 cipii vanishes : the difficulty is cleared up ; a fact 
 is inferred which has not been observed and is not 
 included in the premise. And as the greater part 
 of our reasoning from general propositions respect- 
 ing the events around us, material and moral, is 
 of this character, however it may wear the guise 
 of demonstration, the objection before us, as al- 
 ready intimated, can at the utmost have only a 
 comparatively limited application, viz. to deduc- 
 tions from such general propositions as can alone 
 be employed absolutely as demonstrative major 
 premises. 
 
 Perhaps the subject may be rendered clearer to 
 some readers by the following dialogue. 
 
 A. It is surely demonstrative reasoning when I 
 conclude that this man is fallible because all men 
 are fallible. 
 
 B. That is to say, because every individual man 
 is fallible. 
 
 A. Of course. 
 
 B. In asserting every individual man to be fal- 
 lible, do you include this man or do you not ? 
 
 A. I include all men, and him amongst the rest. 
 
 B. Then your argument is this, " Every indi- 
 vidual man, including this man is fallible ; therefore 
 this man is fallible:" in other words, you argue 
 
INDIRECT CONTINGENT REASONING. 53 
 
 that this man is fallible because he is fallible, which 
 is certainly demonstrative enough. 
 
 A. Of course the reason really meant to be as- 
 signed is, that all other men, as far as observation 
 has extended, have been found to be fallible. 
 
 B. That is to say, all men, excluding this 
 man, have been found to be fallible, therefore this 
 excluded man is fallible. Now this is a good 
 material or contingent reason, but it is not a de- 
 monstratively conclusive one. In the case of every 
 demonstrated truth, the opposite or negative pro- 
 position would be a contradiction in terms. That 
 this man is not fallible would be a contradiction to 
 the proposition that all men are fallible, but not 
 to the proposition that all other men are fallible. 
 Thus, if you include this man you beg the ques- 
 tion : if you do not include him your reason is a 
 material or contingent one, very highly probable, 
 engendering almost complete certainty, but not 
 demonstratively conclusive. 
 
 What has been said in this chapter may appear 
 on a first glance to correspond with the well- 
 known distinction made by Aristotle between de- 
 monstrative and dialectical syllogisms ; but there 
 is a fundamental difference, which it may be well 
 to note. His words are, " The syllogism is a form 
 of language in which certain things being laid 
 down, another thing different from those laid down 
 necessarily results from them. Now demonstra- 
 tion takes place when a conclusion is drawn from 
 
 E 3 
 
54 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 things true and primary, or from those of which 
 the knowledge has been derived from the true and 
 primary. But in a dialectical syllogism, the con- 
 clusion is drawn from probable things. The true 
 and primary are such things as are believed of 
 themselves, and not on account of other things : for 
 it behoves not that in the principles of a science 
 the reason why should be sought for, but every 
 principle should be certain in itself." * 
 
 This is in truth merely saying that when the 
 premises are only probable, the conclusion will be 
 so too, and giving the appellation of dialectical to 
 syllogisms in which they occur. 
 
 * "Ecrn e)/) ffvXXoyiffpbs \6yog iv reQivrwv TIV&V trepov n 
 r&v Ktijuevwj', e avayKrjQ crvp&aivei ta T&V KEifJiivuv. 'A-jro^ei^ig 
 fj,ev ovv early, orav f aX^0a)v /ecu TTJOWT-WV 6 avXXoyiafJLOQ p, ?} EK 
 roiovTbiV a c)ici TIVIOV Trpwrwv KOU a\r)du>v rijQ Trepi CLVTO. 
 rijv apxnv tiXrjtyEV * diaXeKriKOQ Be (rvXX.oyicrfjioQ 6 e 
 ffyXXoyt^o^ifvoe. "Eort 3e aXrjdfj JJ.EV KCU Trpuira ra pf) 
 dXXa $C avr&v e^ovra rriv -xiariv ' ov del yap kv rate eT 
 ap^atg 7rir)Tei(rdai TO c)ta ri, aXX' ktcaarriv TWV 
 ca0' kavrriv elvat iriari]v. Topicorum lib. i. cap. 1. 
 
 The same point is thus explained by Wallis. 
 
 " Syllogismus Topicus (qui et Dialecticus dici solet, et Dida- 
 scalicus) talis haberi solet syllogismus (sen syllogismorum 
 series) qui firmam potius prsesumptionem, sen opinionem valde 
 probabilem creat, quam absolutam certitudinera. Non quidem 
 ratione formce (nam syllogismi omnes, si in justa forma, sunt 
 demonstrativi ; hoc est, si prsemissas vera sint, vera erit et con- 
 clusio), sed ratione materice sen prsemissarum ; quae ipsae, ut 
 plurimum, non sunt absolute certas et universaliter veraa ; sed 
 saltern probabiles, atque ut plurimum verae." Institutio Logi- 
 cce, lib. iii. cap. 23. 
 
INDIRECT CONTINGENT REASONING. 55 
 
 But this is not all that is maintained in the pre- 
 sent chapter, nor even the material part of it. 
 
 My doctrine is, that all such reasoning as con- 
 sists in inferring unobserved facts from general 
 propositions, although strictly demonstrative in 
 form, is in reality contingent, how certain and 
 indisputable soever the general propositions may 
 be ; and that it is represented by the formula, 
 All other men have been found fallible ; 
 Therefore this man (whose fallibility has never 
 been observed) is fallible. 
 
 According to my view, consequently, many syl- 
 logisms would rank in the class of arguments 
 demonstrative in form but contingent in reality, 
 besides those which, in the popular use of the 
 term probable, have only probable premises. If I 
 understand Aristotle aright, the latter alone would 
 fall under his denomination of dialectical. 
 
 It has been well observed by Mr. Stewart in re- 
 ference to this distinction in the first book of the 
 Topics, that there is an impropriety in such an 
 employment of the epithets demonstrative and dia- 
 lectical, inasmuch as it implies, or seems to imply, 
 that one species of syllogism may be more con- 
 clusive and cogent than another*, which is at 
 variance with Aristotle's own doctrine in other 
 places, and of course was not intended here. 
 
 * Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. ii. 
 p. 262. 8vo. ed. 
 
 4 
 
56 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 THE INTERMIXTURE OF CONTINGENT AND DEMON- 
 STRATIVE REASONING. 
 
 IT seems necessary, in order to complete our sur- 
 vey of the two great divisions of the subject, to 
 advert more particularly to a circumstance already 
 indicated in some of the examples introduced into 
 the preceding exposition ; viz. that demonstrative 
 reasoning, even when non-syllogistic, is by no 
 means confined to mathematics or the science of 
 quantity ; but it is perpetually intermixed with 
 contingent reasoning on matters of a moral or a 
 physical nature. 
 
 This might be exemplified by a thousand in- 
 stances in common life. Take, for example, the 
 course pursued by an advocate in defending his 
 client from a criminal accusation. If he relies, as 
 he is sometimes compelled to do, upon testimony 
 to his client's character, the argument is purely 
 contingent : he attempts to establish the moral 
 excellence of the man. and then infers that a per- 
 son of such estimable qualities would not be likely 
 to commit the offence of which he is accused. But 
 if, instead of this, he endeavours to prove an alibi, 
 the logical procedure is altered. The crime (we 
 will suppose) was committed in London, and he 
 
INTERMIXTURE OF ARGUMENTS. 57 
 
 produces several credible witnesses who swear, 
 that at the very moment when the deed was per- 
 petrated, they saw the accused in Edinburgh. In 
 this hypothetical case, the reasoning of the defence 
 is mixed. When from the number, and respecta- 
 bility, and concurrence of the witnesses the advo- 
 cate infers that their testimony is true, he employs 
 a contingent argument ; but when he proceeds 
 further, and concludes from the attested fact of his 
 client's being in Edinburgh that he could not have 
 committed a crime at the same moment in Lon- 
 don, this step in the reasoning is demonstrative. 
 
 We may observe a similar intermixture of rea- 
 soning on very various occasions, and, amongst the 
 rest, on the common occasion of making indirect com- 
 parisons between objects and qualities of all kinds. 
 
 If two substances, for example, which could not 
 be brought into juxtaposition, are attested to have 
 been successively compared with a third substance 
 and found to be respectively of the same colour 
 with it, we conclude that they agree in colour with 
 each other. 
 
 In this case, while the inference that the two 
 mutually unapproachable substances are each of 
 the same colour with the third (resting as it does 
 on testimony) is contingent, the conclusion that 
 therefore the two former substances resemble each 
 other in colour, is necessary. A demonstrated 
 conclusion, however, from a premise which has 
 been obtained by contingent reasoning, must itself 
 
58 ' THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 participate in the uncertainty of the premise. A 
 chain (as some one has well observed in elucida- 
 tion of this point) may be composed of both strong 
 and weak links, but its strength, as a chain, can 
 never be greater than that of the weakest link 
 in it. 
 
 The way in which even strictly mathematical 
 reasoning reasoning about quantity occurs in 
 treating of matters of fact is familiar to the stu- 
 dents of natural science, and may be illustrated by 
 a short passage from a physiological writer whose 
 arguments are frequently close and cogent. 
 
 "In the young of the carnivora," he says, " the 
 weight [of the body] does not remain unchanged ; 
 on the contrary it increases from day to day by an 
 appreciable quantity. This fact presupposes that 
 the assimilative process in the young animal is 
 more energetic, more intense, than the process of 
 transformation in the existing tissues. If both pro- 
 cesses were equally active, the weight of the body 
 could not increase ; and were the waste by trans- 
 formation greater, the weight of the body would 
 decrease." * 
 
 This is obviously a strict demonstrative argu- 
 ment. We see intuitively that if the body gains 
 weight, more matter must be added to it than 
 is subtracted from it. 
 
 * Animal Chemistry, by Justus Liebig, edited by Dr. 
 Gregory, p. 67. 
 
INTERMIXTURE OF ARGUMENTS. 59 
 
 To these examples of the intermixture of one 
 species of reasoning with another, may be added 
 the frequent introduction into argumentative dis- 
 course of other demonstrative enthymemes such as 
 I have described in the third chapter, and for in- 
 stances of which the reader may consult the 
 Appendix.* 
 
 It may be remarked further, that the several 
 varieties of demonstrative reasoning, as distin- 
 guished by the general principles which they ex- 
 emplify, are to be found intermingled both with 
 contingent reasoning and with each other. In 
 geometry, as it is almost needless to mention ex- 
 cept to recall the fact to the mind of the reader, 
 we often find that in the demonstration of a single 
 theorem, two or three different axioms are succes- 
 sively exemplified. 
 
 * Article, No. 1. Examination of a passage from Burke. 
 
60 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF REASONING OR MAXIMS, AND 
 ESPECIALLY THE DICTUM OF ARISTOTLE. 
 
 ALTHOUGH in the preceding chapters it was im- 
 possible not to touch incidentally on the place 
 which axioms hold in reasoning, or rather in re- 
 lation to it, yet, on account of the erroneous notions 
 still prevalent in regard to them, notwithstanding 
 what has been said by Locke in his chapter on 
 maxims, and by Stewart in the 2d volume of his 
 Philosophy, it may be useful to renew and ex- 
 tend the discussion of the subject. It will not be 
 requisite to take into express consideration at the 
 same time the analogous general principles of con- 
 tingent reasoning, because any deficiency in my 
 previous explanation of their character will be sup- 
 plied by many of the following remarks, which 
 mutatis mutandis will apply to them. 
 
 In demonstrative reasoning maxims or axioms 
 are nothing more or less than self-evident general 
 propositions formed from particular arguments, 
 and every instance of demonstration may be ranged 
 under some one or other of them as exemplifying 
 it. If we take a few of the implying and implied 
 facts adduced in the last chapter, this will be suf- 
 ficiently manifest. 
 
PKINC1PLES OF SEASONING. 
 
 61 
 
 General Principle or Maxim. 
 
 Things equal to the same thing 
 are equal to each other. 
 
 A man cannot be in two places 
 at the same time. 
 
 If equals are taken from equals, 
 the remainders are equal. 
 
 Arguments. 
 
 Implying fact : The lines A and 
 
 B are severally equal to c. 
 Implied fact : The lines A and 
 
 B are equal to each other. 
 Implying fact : Juvenis was in 
 
 Edinburgh at noon on the 
 
 day named. 
 Implied fact : He could not be 
 
 guilty of an offence com- 
 mitted on that day and at 
 
 that hour in London. 
 Implying fact : The angles A BD 
 
 and ABC are together equal 
 
 to the angles ABD and ABE. 
 Implied fact: The angle ABC 
 
 is equal to the angle ABE. 
 
 Here it is obvious the maxims are only gene- 
 ralisations of the particular arguments, or of the 
 particular instances of implication ; and the self- 
 evidence of both maxims and arguments is on a 
 level, although the priority in respect of origin is 
 with the latter. 
 
 In reference to these general principles or 
 maxims, a variety of phrases are employed : thus, 
 by some philosophers an argument is said to pro- 
 ceed on a certain general principle ; by others, to be 
 an application of it, to rest or to be founded upon 
 it. The general principle itself is affirmed to be 
 implied in the argument, to be involved in it, to 
 be essential to it ; while the conclusion is asserted 
 to be dependent on the general principle, or 
 to be proved by it or in virtue of it. These 
 different expressions, when they are not posi- 
 
62 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 tively erroneous, fail to describe with precision the 
 real place occupied by these maxims in relation to 
 the reasoning process. They can have, neverthe- 
 less, only one legitimate meaning. The correct 
 and most precise mode of stating the matter is to 
 say, in respect of any particular argument, that it 
 is an exemplification of a certain general principle 
 or maxim ; and in respect of the general principle, 
 that it is exemplified in the particular argument, or 
 is a generalisation of it, or may be educed from it. 
 
 The phraseology which implies that a conclusion 
 is proved by any of these maxims, or in virtue of 
 them, or is dependent upon them for its validity, is 
 especially objectionable. In each of the instances 
 of implication quoted above, the second fact or 
 proposition is intuitively discerned to be implied in 
 the first, as soon as both are viewed together ; and 
 this discernment of the particular truth is not at all 
 dependent on the general maxim, which is, indeed, 
 logically the result of subsequent discernment. It 
 would be more correct to say that the general prin- 
 ciple is deduced from the particular truth, than, 
 conversely, that the particular truth is deduced 
 from the general principle. 
 
 The latter statement is, indeed, wholly erroneous. 
 These maxims have no probative force ; they add no 
 cogency to any argument ; the conclusion does not 
 at all depend upon them : they merely present the 
 particular argument in a generalised form; a form 
 which can be reached only through the particular 
 
PRINCIPLES OF REASONING. 63 
 
 argument which may happen to be before us, or 
 another similar to it. 
 
 Speaking of such self-evident truths, Locke re- 
 marks, " they are known in particular instances 
 before these general maxims are ever thought on, 
 and draw all their force from the discernment of 
 the mind employed about particular ideas."* 
 
 Mr. Stewart, who concurred in this view with 
 the illustrious author of the Essay on Human 
 Understanding, gives the following lucid exposi- 
 tion of his doctrine. 
 
 u It was long ago remarked by Locke, of the 
 axioms of geometry as stated by Euclid, that al- 
 though the proposition be at first enunciated in 
 general terms, and afterwards appealed to, in its 
 particular applications, as a principle previously 
 examined and admitted, yet that the truth is not 
 less evident in the latter case than in the former. 
 He observes further that it is in some of its par- 
 ticular applications, that the truth of every axiom 
 is originally perceived by the mind ; and, there- 
 fore, that the general proposition, so far from 
 being the ground of our assent to the truths which 
 it comprehends, is only a verbal generalisation of 
 what, in particular instances, has been already 
 acknowledged as true." f 
 
 * On the Understanding, book iv. chap. vii. 4. 
 t Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. ii. 
 p. 29. 2d ed. 
 
64 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 Another writer, eminent both as a mathematician 
 arid a philosopher, I mean D'Alembert, gives his 
 sanction to the same view, and remarks, that so 
 far are axioms from holding the first rank in phi- 
 losophy, that there is no necessity even to enun- 
 ciate them. He afterwards terms them barren 
 and puerile truths.* 
 
 Taking with us these considerations regarding 
 the value and position of self-evident maxims, let 
 us turn to the celebrated dictum of Aristotle. 
 
 The dictum de omni et nullo, viz. that " whatever 
 is predicated universally of any class of things, 
 may be predicated in like manner of any thing 
 comprehended in that class," is not only stated by 
 logicians to be a general maxim, of the applica- 
 tion of which every direct syllogism is a particular 
 instance, but proclaimed to be the universal prin- 
 ciple of reasoning. 
 
 If we closely scrutinise the meaning of this 
 maxim, undazzled by the somewhat magnificent 
 and imposing phraseology in which it has been 
 spoken of, we shall find it an obviously simple 
 and undeniable proposition, namely, whatever is 
 asserted of a class may be asserted of any species 
 or individual of that class. A class, however, 
 we must bear in mind, is not a collective or 
 corporate whole, which, as a whole, possesses pro- 
 
 * Elemens de Philosophic, chap. iv. ; also Discours Pre- 
 liminaire de 1'Encyclopedie. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF REASONING. 65 
 
 perties or attributes different from those of the in- 
 dividuals composing it ; but what is predicated of 
 it is predicated of every separate individual ranked 
 under it. The proposition " all men are fallible " 
 affirms that every individual man is fallible, while 
 the proposition " the army is large " affirms of the 
 body collectively something which it does not af- 
 firm of any single individual in it. If a class were 
 such a collective body, the Aristotelian maxim 
 could not be true.* 
 
 The dictum, therefore, it is plain, means neither 
 more nor less than that whatever is predicated of 
 every individual of a class may be predicated of 
 any individual, or any number of individuals of 
 that class. As, however, what can be truly pre- 
 dicated of any thing must be a property or attri- 
 bute actually possessed, we may, if we choose, 
 leave out predication altogether, and then the 
 maxim will appear in a still simpler shape, as fol- 
 lows : What belongs to every individual of a class 
 must belong to any individual of that class. How- 
 ever it may be expressed, it is obviously a self- 
 evident and indisputable truth, like the other 
 maxims we have just been considering ; and this 
 
 * Lord Kames was sharply taken up by Dr. Gillies for 
 having blundered on this point, he having represented the 
 dictum to be, " Whatever is true of a number of particulars 
 joined together, holds true of every one separately." See 
 ARISTOTLE'S Ethics and Politics, translated by John Gillies, 
 LL.D., vol.i. p. 76. 
 
66 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 view of its co-ordinate character is sufficient of itself 
 to determine the accuracy of the doctrine which 
 proclaims it as the universal principle of reasoning. 
 
 To this point I must draw the reader's par- 
 ticular attention, for here lies the grand error of 
 the Aristotelian theory ; and it is really astonishing 
 that a mistake of such magnitude should have been 
 so implicitly admitted. 
 
 If the doctrine were true, every act of reasoning 
 would be an exemplification of this one maxim, 
 and might be ranged under it : in other words, 
 all reasoning without exception would consist in 
 concluding that an attribute belongs to some in- 
 dividual of a class *, because it belongs to every in- 
 dividual of that class. No other reason, according 
 to this theory, can possibly exist or be assigned. 
 The sole ground on which we can argue that an 
 individual thing possesses any attribute is, that 
 the thing belongs to a class all the members of 
 which possess the attribute. The only kind of 
 implication possible consists in generic facts im- 
 plying individual facts. 
 
 In contradiction to all this, it has been shown 
 above, that there are many other general principles 
 or maxims of which particular acts of reasoning 
 are exemplifications ; such as, " things equal to 
 
 * Or is excluded from it. I have thought it needless to take 
 into separate consideration the de nullo part of the maxim, as 
 it would lead only to repetitions : negative propositions may, as 
 Mr. Walker says, be considered at pleasure as affirmative. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF REASONING. 67 
 
 the same thing are equal to each other; " " a body 
 cannot be in two places at one time ; " "if equals 
 are taken from equals the remainders are equal." 
 When I affirm that two things, A and B, are equal 
 to each other because they are severally equal to 
 c, or that a man could not commit a crime at a 
 specified time in London because he was at that 
 precise moment in Edinburgh, I reason just as 
 much as I do when I affirm that this man is fal- 
 lible because all men are fallible, or that the three 
 angles of the triangle before me are together equal 
 to two right angles, because the three angles of 
 every triangle are equal to two right angles. 
 
 The dictum, then, is obviously one of those self- 
 evident maxims which we have above described, 
 and it may be exhibited in the same manner. 
 
 General Principle. 
 
 Whatever is predicated of a 
 class may be predicated of 
 any individual of that class. 
 
 Arguments. 
 
 Implying fact : All horned 
 
 animals are ruminant. 
 Implied fact : This horned 
 
 animal is ruminant. 
 Implying fact : The three The same. 
 
 angles of every triangle are 
 
 together equal to two right 
 
 angles. 
 Implied fact : The angles of 
 
 this triangle are together 
 
 equal to two right angles. 
 
 If we compare these instances of one fact or 
 proposition implying another with the others al- 
 ready referred to, we shall at once discern the 
 true place and value of this renowned maxim ; we 
 
 F 2 
 
68 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 shall see that the dictum de omni et nullo is a cor- 
 rect expression of the general principle on which 
 some acts of reasoning proceed, or, in more correct 
 language, which they exemplify ; but that, in this 
 respect, it is only on a level with other maxims, 
 such as have been cited. 
 
 It may possibly be alleged, that at any rate one 
 of the instances cited above as exemplifying an- 
 other maxim may be ranged under the dictum of 
 Aristotle. Drawn out at full length (it may be 
 said) the argument in question is as follows : 
 
 All things equal to the same thing are equal 
 
 to each other ; 
 
 A and B are equal to the same thing c, 
 Therefore they are equal to each other. 
 Here, it may be urged, A and B are argued to 
 be equal to each other, because they belong to the 
 class of things which are equal to the same thing ; 
 but, as I shall have occasion to show again when 
 treating of the syllogism, it is not because they 
 belong to any class that we conclude them to be 
 equal, but it is on account of the particular fact 
 of their being respectively equal to c. Strike out 
 all reference to a class, expunge the whole of the 
 major premise, chain down the mind to this single 
 instance of equality, and still the reasoning is 
 complete, and the conclusion remains perfectly un- 
 disturbed. This argument, consequently, is no 
 exemplification of the scholastic maxim. It shows 
 conclusively that ratiocination is not so limited 
 
PRINCIPLES OF REASONING. 69 
 
 and insignificant as to consist in nothing else than 
 concluding an attribute to belong to an individual, 
 because it belongs universally to the class of which 
 that individual is a member.* Reason refuses to 
 be tethered to the stake of the dictum. 
 
 Logicians themselves, moreover, admit (some of 
 them at least), that the dictum de omni et nullo is 
 not intended or adduced to prove the force of syl- 
 logistic reasoning, for that would be attempting to 
 demonstrate the validity of demonstration ; but it 
 is to be considered merely as a generalised state- 
 ment of all demonstration whatever. In a manner 
 quite analogous, the maxim which appears as the 
 major premise in the above syllogism, viz. " all 
 things equal to the same thing are equal to each 
 other," is to be considered as a generalised state- 
 ment of the particular demonstration that A and B, 
 being equal to the same thing c, are equal to each 
 other, and of all like cases; nor can it be adduced, 
 any more than the Aristotelian maxim, to enforce 
 an argument already perfectly conclusive. 
 
 To show the parity of the two cases, we may 
 compel the dictum itself to serve as the major pre- 
 
 * That I do not here misrepresent the contracted scope as- 
 signed to reasoning by the scholastic logic is shown in the 
 following extract from an able little work on the subject by Dr. 
 Whately : " Now to remind one, on each occasion, that so and 
 so is referable to such and such a class, and that the class which 
 happens to be before us comprehends such and such things, 
 this, is precisely all that is ever accomplished by reasoning.'' 
 Easy Lessons on Reasoning. The italics are Dr. Whately 's. 
 
 F 3 
 
70 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 inise of an argument just as easily as we can force 
 the mathematical axiom to perform that office, and 
 we shall find that, when so impressed into the ser- 
 vice, it will be equally inefficient. 
 
 What can be predicated of a class may be 
 
 predicated of any individual of the class ; 
 Mortality can be predicated of the class " men;" 
 Therefore mortality may be predicated of the 
 individual man Peter. 
 
 To the conclusiveness of this argument, logicians 
 must admit, in accordance with their own doc- 
 trine, that the dictum (major premiss, though it 
 is) lends no force or cogency whatever. 
 
 But what I have now alleged to show the limited 
 sphere of this celebrated maxim is not all. 
 
 So far is the dictum de omni et nullo from having 
 any claim to be regarded as the sole principle of 
 reasoning, that it cannot be correctly considered 
 as the sole principle even of syllogistic reasoning ; 
 and this I think is implied in the very doctrines of 
 logicians themselves ; for, while they proclaim the 
 dictum to be the universal principle, they admit 
 that it is not directly applicable to any syllogisms 
 but such as can be ranged under the four moods 
 of the first figure. 
 
 Now, when it is said that a principle or maxim 
 is not applicable, or even not directly applicable, to 
 a syllogism, it is equivalent to saying that it can- 
 not be educed or drawn from the syllogism, or 
 
PRINCIPLES OF REASONING. 71 
 
 that the syllogism does not exemplify the maxim, 
 or proceed upon it. 
 
 To acknowledge, therefore, that the dictum can- 
 not be directly applied to the syllogisms of the 
 three other logical figures, is to admit that it is 
 not the universal principle even of syllogistic 
 reasoning. 
 
 And this is the true state of the case. The dic- 
 tum is the principle, or the pair of principles, 
 exemplified by syllogisms in the first figure, but 
 not by any others. Each figure exemplifies prin- 
 ciples of its own, allied to the dictum, but per- 
 fectly distinct from it. 
 
 There can be no act of demonstrative reasoning 
 from which a self-evident maxim cannot be drawn ; 
 and as the kinds of syllogism selected and arranged 
 under the figures and rnoods are all admitted to 
 be demonstrative, each kind must be capable of 
 yielding its maxim : in other words, from each 
 kind a general principle self-evidently true may be 
 educed. 
 
 Accordingly we find that the syllogisms in the 
 second figure exemplify a pair of maxims allied to 
 the dictum, but still distinct from it ; viz. " When 
 the whole of a class possess a certain attribute, 
 whatever does not possess the attribute does not 
 belong to the class," and " when the whole of a 
 class is excluded from the possession of an attri- 
 bute, whatever possesses the attribute does not 
 belong to the class." 
 
 F 4 
 
72 THE THEOHY OF REASONING. 
 
 Analogous maxims may be educed from syl- 
 logisms in the third arid fourth figures, from each 
 of which a single example will probably be thought 
 enough. 
 
 The maxim for the moods Darapti and Datisi 
 in the third figure is as follows : 
 
 " When the whole of a class possess a certain 
 attribute, and the whole or part of the class possess 
 another attribute, then some things that possess 
 one possess the other." 
 
 And the following is the maxim for the moods 
 Bramantip and Dimaris in the fourth figure. 
 
 " When the whole or part of a class possess an 
 attribute, and all things which possess that attri- 
 bute possess a second, then some which possess the 
 second belong to the class." * 
 
 The preceding maxims, except the pair drawn 
 from the second figure, which are clear enough, 
 are not, it may be allowed, so plain, or so readily 
 
 * When I drew out the above maxims from the second, third, 
 and fourth figures, I was not aware that something of the same 
 kind had been previously done by Lambert, a German author, 
 with whose treatise I am not fortunate enough to be acquainted. 
 The reader who wishes to see the maxims as drawn out by 
 him, will find them quoted in Mr. Hansel's edition of Aldrich, 
 p. 73. and 80. Neither was it present to my mind, that, at a 
 much earlier period, the principles of the second and third 
 figures had been given in the Port Royal Art of Thinking. 
 Had these been before me sooner, I should not have been at the 
 trouble of producing mine. As it is, I let the maxims stand in 
 their original forms, which differ in detail from those of my 
 predecessors. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF REASONING. 73 
 
 comprehended, as the dictum de omni et nullo ; but 
 this arises from the arguments themselves being 
 less simple ; whence the several parts of each 
 maxim are not so easily kept in view together ; for 
 as soon as the terms in which they are expressed 
 are understood and their meanings simultaneously 
 viewed, they are seen to be self-evidently true. 
 Being nevertheless educed from particular argu- 
 ments which are equally true and more imme- 
 diately evident, they can neither give light nor 
 lend force to the syllogisms from which they are 
 drawn. In brief, they are altogether useless. 
 
 In these and other respects they are on a level 
 with the dictum of Aristotle ; and, although allied 
 to that dictum, they are distinct and true in them- 
 selves without reference to any thing else. 
 
 The principle that a thing possesses a certain 
 attribute when all the class to which it belongs pos- 
 sess it, is plainly different from the principle that 
 a thing does not belong to a class when it does not 
 possess an attribute common to the class. 
 
 Between these two maxims there is as clear a 
 distinction as between the axiom that two quan- 
 tities are equal to each other when they are re- 
 spectively equal to a third quantity, and the maxim 
 that two quantities are equal to each other, when 
 they are the remainders of two equal quantities 
 from each of which the same quantity has been 
 taken. They are allied but not identical maxims. 
 
 It results from this examination, that the die- 
 
74 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 turn de omni et nullo, is very far from having any 
 claim to be considered as the universal principle 
 of reasoning ; for, to say nothing of its not being 
 the principle of direct contingent reasoning, it has 
 been here shown, 
 
 1. That it is only one of the principles of de- 
 monstrative reasoning, co-ordinate with many 
 others, and 
 
 2. That it is not even the sole principle of 
 syllogistic reasoning, but only of those syllo- 
 gisms which conform to the first figure. 
 
 Before concluding, it may be useful to advert to 
 the importance of distinguishing between such self- 
 evident general principles or maxims as have here 
 been considered, and those general propositions re- 
 garding objects and events which are the results 
 of observation : nor is it superfluous after the pre- 
 vious explanations to discriminate and contrast 
 them. The maxims in question are self-evident ; 
 their truth is discerned as soon as they are under- 
 stood, and denying them is seen to involve a 
 contradiction. On the other hand, a general pro- 
 position formed from observing a number of facts, 
 although it may be quite convincing, depends for 
 that quality on the facts observed, and it may be 
 called in question without inconsistence or absur- 
 dity. The self-evident maxim cannot be used as a 
 proof, because the argument which it might be 
 employed to confirm is equally self-evident ; while 
 the general proposition obtained from the observa- 
 
PRINCIPLES OF EEASONING. 75 
 
 tion of facts, so far from being an ineffective ge- 
 neralisation, either constitutes or represents the 
 whole proof of the particular conclusion sought to 
 be established. The same remarks will apply, 
 mutatis mutandis, to general theorems obtained by 
 deduction from incontrovertible premises : having 
 been first demonstrated themselves, they subse- 
 quently form the real proofs of particular con- 
 clusions. 
 
 A brief notice may also be usefully bestowed 011 
 some observations, in reference to the present sub- 
 ject, which appear to have originated in a wrong 
 apprehension of what maxims are. 
 
 It has been alleged as an objection by some 
 writers, that the dictum, de omni et nullo is a prin- 
 ciple of no great depth, and by others that it is a 
 self-evident proposition, little better than a mere 
 truism allegations clearly well founded ; but it 
 is not so clear how they are meant to be applied, 
 or what they are intended to enforce or to illus- 
 trate. 
 
 All the maxims of which acts of demonstrative 
 reasoning are exemplifications, must, from the very 
 nature of the case, be self-evident propositions, and, 
 consequently, may be affirmed to be of no great 
 depth. Such acts of reasoning could not be de- 
 monstrative, if self-evident maxims were not edu- 
 cible from them. To allege this self-evidence as a 
 fault or objection, is consequently to mistake the 
 
76 THE THEOKY OF REASONING. 
 
 position and value of the maxims which it cha- 
 racterises. 
 
 In treating the dictum of Aristotle separately, it 
 has been impossible to avoid repeating what has 
 been already said, and forestalling some explana- 
 tions which will find their fitting places in a sub- 
 sequent chapter ; but the erroneous light in which 
 logicians have continued even down to our own 
 times to view this celebrated maxim, seemed to 
 call for a particular examination of its true cha- 
 racter and position. 
 
FORMS OF REASONING. 77 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 FOKMS OF REASONING, AND ESPECIALLY THE 
 SYLLOGISM. 
 
 No doctrine is more clearly and unequivocally 
 maintained by logicians, than the sameness, in all 
 cases, of the reasoning process, whatever the sub- 
 ject-matter of the argument may be. And if the 
 dictum de omni et nullo truly represented what, in 
 all cases, constitutes reasoning, and were the only 
 principle on which, according to common phraseo- 
 logy, that operation proceeds, the doctrine would 
 be undeniable. 
 
 But, in the first place, if the account already 
 given is accurate, there are at least two processes 
 of which reasoning is the common name, broadly 
 distinguished from each other ; distinct in the na- 
 ture of the proofs adduced, distinct in the prin- 
 ciples exemplified, and distinct in the state of mind 
 resulting. 
 
 In the second place, if we confine our attention 
 merely to demonstrative reasoning, and look at the 
 general principles on which that species of reason- 
 ing proceeds, we find, as shown in the two last 
 chapters, that they are numerous ; that the dictum 
 de omni et nullo is only one amongst the set ; and, 
 if the number of such axioms or principles is to 
 
78 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 be the criterion, demonstrative reasoning must be 
 pronounced multiplex. If we call it one species of 
 reasoning, the varieties under this species must be 
 formed by a reference to the general principle of 
 which each act of reasoning is an exemplification, 
 or, in other words, on which it proceeds. 
 
 Besides the doctrine that reasoning is one and 
 the same process in all cases, or as a part or sequel 
 of the doctrine, it is further contended, that all 
 reasoning may be thrown into the form of three 
 propositions ; that every conclusion is really de- 
 duced from two other propositions; and that the 
 syllogism which contains the three exhibits a 
 correct analysis or representation of the one 
 identical process.* 
 
 What has been already said in the foregoing 
 chapters supplies, in some measure, a refutation 
 of the substantial portion of these assertions ; but it 
 may be useful to enter into a more minute con- 
 sideration of the errors comprised in them. 
 
 With regard to the forms in which reasoning 
 may be exhibited, it has been shown, in the two 
 last chapters, that what I have ventured to term 
 direct contingent reasoning may be expressed in 
 two ways, or rather assumes two different forms. 
 
 The type of one is, 
 
 * Thus, in the Port Royal Logic it is said, " No enthymeme 
 is conclusive, save in virtue of a proposition understood, which, 
 consequently, ought to be in the mind though it be not ex- 
 pressed." Part iii. chap. ix. 
 
FORMS OF REASONING. 79 
 
 All men as far as observation has extended 
 
 have been fallible ; 
 Therefore this man [whose fallibility has not 
 
 been matter of observation] is fallible. 
 The type of the other is, 
 
 All men as far as observation has extended 
 
 have been fallible ; 
 Therefore all men are fallible. 
 In reasoning of this description the strict de- 
 monstrative syllogism can obviously have no place. 
 We may, indeed, vary the first type by in- 
 troducing a minor premise, and thus throw the 
 argument into three propositions ; but we should, 
 in this way, obtain only a quasi-syllogism, not a 
 real or demonstrative one. In the case of the 
 second type, even this is impracticable, although 
 even here we may construct a somewhat different 
 quasi-syllogism by generalising the argument into 
 " what all men have been all men are," and in- 
 troducing the general proposition or maxim so 
 created as a major premise ; a procedure which, as 
 I have already shown in part, and shall hereafter 
 show more fully, is vain and nugatory. 
 
 When, indeed, we have once legitimately in- 
 ferred a general law, and employ it as a major 
 premise, from which to deduce particular inferences, 
 contingent reasoning falls into class-reasoning, and 
 becomes in form demonstrative, without however 
 acquiring any additional force from its new shape. 
 The assertion then above quoted, that all reason- 
 
80 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 ing may be thrown into syllogisms is not true of 
 direct contingent reasoning. 
 
 We turn then to demonstrative reasoning, and 
 inquire whether this is all syllogistic; whether 
 every conclusion in demonstrative reasoning is 
 really deduced from two other propositions called 
 respectively the major and the minor premise; and 
 whether consequently the syllogism can be re- 
 garded as a true analysis or correct representation 
 of the process in every instance. 
 
 When it is affirmed that every conclusion is 
 really deduced from two other propositions, the 
 assertion, if it means any thing, must mean either 
 that when any person draws an inference he has 
 two other propositions in his mind, or that two 
 other propositions are requisite to make the infer- 
 ence valid ; but, for my own part, I find myself 
 continually drawing inferences from facts which 
 if expressed in language at all may be fully ex- 
 pressed in a single proposition, and I am not 
 able to discover that such inferences can be ren- 
 dered more valid by adding another proposition 
 to it. It will not, I think, be difficult to show 
 that in two distinct cases, we have in our minds 
 only one fact, or one set of facts, expressible in a 
 single proposition, on which the inference depends ; 
 that, in the one case, there is nothing in the mind 
 corresponding to the minor premise of a syllogism, 
 and, in the other, nothing corresponding to the 
 major premise, and that in both cases the single 
 premise suffices for the validity of the conclusion. 
 
FOKMS OF REASONING. 81 
 
 Hence, if there were no other objections to the 
 doctrine, the syllogism could not be regarded as a 
 correct representation or analysis of every intel- 
 lectual process termed reasoning. 
 
 In regard to the first point, it will not require 
 much skill to show that what is termed the minor 
 premise is so far from being essentially necessary 
 to a perfect process of reasoning, that, in certain 
 cases, it cannot be forced into the verbal expres- 
 sion OP representation of that process without 
 puerility or supererogation ; and when it is thus 
 forcibly introduced, it adds no strength to the con- 
 clusion, and there is really nothing in the process 
 to which it corresponds. 
 
 Let us take a familiar instance before employed. 
 A naturalist finds the remains of a horned quad- 
 ruped, and pronounces that it was a ruminant 
 animal. The reasoning here, if considered as class- 
 reasoning, is perfectly expressed by a single pre- 
 mise with the conclusion. 
 
 All horned quadrupeds are ruminant ; 
 
 Therefore this horned quadruped was rumi- 
 nant. 
 
 A logician may say, a Yes ; but you here com- 
 prise in the conclusion two facts or propositions ; 
 and, when these are separated, you obtain a regular 
 syllogism. 
 
 All horned quadrupeds are ruminant ; 
 
 This quadruped had horns ; 
 
 Therefore it was ruminant." 
 G 
 
82 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 The introduction of a separate proposition, never- 
 theless, is obviously forced ; it adds no strength 
 to the inference, and represents no separate mental 
 operation. The naturalist sees before him at a 
 glance the remains of a horned quadruped ; and 
 he believes it to have been ruminant because he 
 knows that these attributes have been always 
 found conjoined. In relation to the fact before his 
 eyes, this knowledge enables him to draw an im- 
 mediate inference. You may say that it is- a com- 
 pound fact, and you may decompose it into the 
 two facts of the animal having four legs and having 
 two horns ; and then contend that these were 
 joined together by a distinct mental act corre- 
 sponding to the minor premise. But all this is 
 pure invention of what no one is conscious of, as 
 will be manifest, if we strip the instance of some 
 of its accessories. Suppose the naturalist to find 
 only the horns, and to infer that the animal they 
 belonged to was ruminant. The whole of what 
 passed in his mind would be represented in two 
 propositions : " All animals having such horns as 
 these are ruminant ; therefore the animal to 
 which these horns belonged was ruminant." 
 
 If you attempt to introduce a minor premise, 
 you fall into the identical proposition, " The 
 animal to which these horns belonged had such 
 horns. 7 ' Or, take the trite argument, that Peter is 
 fallible because he is a man, and all men are fallible. 
 
FORMS OF REASONING.. 83 
 
 The following enthymeme is surely as cogent and 
 complete : 
 
 This man is fallible 
 
 Because all men are fallible. 
 In order to make this into a syllogism, you must 
 again resort to a mere identical proposition. 
 
 All men are fallible ; 
 
 This man is a man ; 
 
 Therefore this man is fallible. 
 In what way can such an excrescence as the 
 minor premise here lend any force or clearness to 
 the inference, or be considered an indispensable 
 step ? It seems to me indeed strange, and almost 
 ludicrous, to maintain that you cannot draw an 
 inference from the visible or notorious qualities of 
 an object without a separate mental act, silently 
 pronouncing that such qualities do really belong to 
 the object ; that, in the example cited, you are not 
 capable of concluding the man before you to be 
 fallible, until you have passed through the intel- 
 lectual operation (if it can be so called) represented 
 by the identical proposition " this man is a man ; " 
 or until the discovery that his name is Peter has 
 relieved you from the awkwardness of exemplifying 
 the literal formula a = a. 
 
 It is obvious that the minor premise is needless 
 or supererogatory, when the subject of the con- 
 clusion manifestly belongs to the class of which 
 something is predicated in the major. The sole 
 office of the minor, in syllogisms of this form, is to 
 
 G 2 
 
84 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 declare the subject of it to be one of the class ; and 
 when that circumstance is already as evident as it 
 can be, such a declaration is not only superfluous, 
 but impertinent. 
 
 It may be remarked, too, that the enthymeme 
 above cited fully corresponds to the dictum de omni 
 et nullo, " What is predicated of a whole class may 
 be predicated of any individual contained under it." 
 The universal principle of reasoning, as it has been 
 called, forgets the minor premise, and is perfectly 
 exemplified by enthymemes which omit it. The 
 argument, " Fallibility may be predicated of all 
 men ; therefore it may be predicated of this man," 
 is a complete exemplification of the dictum. Even 
 all class-reasoning, then, is not syllogistic. 
 
 In regard to the second point which I have un- 
 dertaken to establish, and which is of much greater 
 importance than the other, a brief exposition (only 
 repeating, indeed, what has been said before) 
 will suffice to show that a perfect piece of reason- 
 ing may consist of what is usually called the minor 
 premise with the conclusion, and without any 
 major premise. This is true of certain cases of 
 demonstrative reasoning, as explained in the pre- 
 ceding chapter. Take once more the simple 
 instance, the lines A and B are equal to each 
 other ; for they are severally equal to c. 
 
 Here the reasoning is complete. You may 
 indeed form a general proposition, and make it 
 into a major premise, as was shown in the chapter 
 
FORMS OF REASONING. 85 
 
 just referred to. You may enunciate, that things 
 equal to the same thing are equal to each other ; 
 A and B are equal to the same thing c ; therefore 
 they are equal to each other. 
 
 This general proposition, however, is psycholo- 
 gically an after-thought. It may not enter the 
 mind at all ; and, what is most important, it adds 
 nothing to the force of the argument. The reasoner 
 discerns the truth of the conclusion from the parti- 
 cular fact expressed in what is termed the minor 
 premise ; and, after so discerning it, may or may 
 not proceed to discern that the assertion will hold 
 good in all cases. The latter is, as already ex- 
 plained, the general principle exemplified by the 
 argument, or educed from it, and cannot constitute 
 a part of it.* 
 
 The procedure of the mind would, in truth, be 
 more accurately represented as follows than in the 
 syllogism above cited. 
 
 A and B are respectively equal to c ; 
 Therefore they are equal to each other : 
 And it is also manifest, that a similar con- 
 clusion may be drawn as to the mutual 
 equality of all things which are equal to the 
 same thing. 
 
 * This point is forcibly urged in the sequel to Sematology 
 (p. 112) by Mr. Smart, whose writings abound with acute and 
 often just observations on logic, beyond those of most living 
 authors. I may be permitted, however, to add that in some of his 
 views and modes of representing logical subjects I am not able 
 to concur. 
 
 G 3 
 
86 THE THEOBY OF REASONING. 
 
 Thus there is an extensive set of cases of de- 
 monstrative reasoning, which do not come under 
 the head of class-reasoning, and which find a 
 perfect expression in the shape of enthymemes. 
 To attempt to force them into the syllogistic form 
 is to mistake their character, and the circumstances 
 on which their cogency depends. It is surprising 
 that geometrical reasoning should ever have been 
 considered as altogether syllogistic when fully 
 spread out ; for, although all its steps are suscep- 
 tible of being thrown into that form, it can be 
 done in the case of many of them only by the in- 
 troduction of self-evident axioms, of which they 
 are perfectly independent for their force, and 
 w r hich are consequently a useless appendage. 
 
 I have borrowed my illustration from mathe- 
 matical reasoning; but the same superfluous or 
 excrescent character of the major premise may be 
 observed in certain cases of reasoning on moral 
 and physical subjects. Revert, in proof of this, to 
 the instances of demonstrative reasoning cited in 
 the third chapter. One of them will suffice here 
 for illustration : " The planets are opaque bodies ; 
 therefore they must shine by light derived from 
 an external source." It is obvious that a propo- 
 sition affirming that all opaque bodies shine by 
 light derived from external sources, would be 
 merely generalising an argument sufficiently con- 
 clusive, and would not add to it a particle of 
 cogency. 
 
FORMS OF REASONING. 87 
 
 The class of demonstrative inferences before 
 pointed out, in which the premise and the conclu- 
 sion differ only in presenting the same fact under 
 two several aspects, likewise require no major 
 proposition ; as, " This man is enslaved by his 
 appetites ; therefore he is not free : " where the 
 reasoning, which appears puerile enough already, 
 would be rendered still more so by prefixing the 
 general assertion, " No man who is enslaved by 
 his appetites is free." * 
 
 The same may be said of those inferences which 
 take place in the conversion of propositions : e. g., 
 No man is infallible ; 
 Therefore no infallible being is a man. 
 
 In a former chapter I remarked that all in- 
 stances of conversion are really instances of de- 
 monstrative reasoning, being pure enthymemes 
 which require no major premises. That the 
 latter may be supplied, and that, when supplied, 
 they are perfectly inefficient in adding strength to 
 the argument, and therefore wholly superfluous, 
 may be easily shown. 
 
 Let us try this experiment on the instance of 
 conversion just cited. It may be transformed into 
 the following syllogism : 
 
 When a class are excluded from an attribute, 
 all beings who possess that attribute are 
 excluded from the class ; 
 
 * This is, however, an actual syllogism given in the Elements 
 
 G 4 
 
 of Logic. 
 
88 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 The class " men " are excluded from the at- 
 tribute of infallibility ; 
 
 Therefore all beings who possess infallibility 
 
 are excluded from the class "men." 
 Here it is manifest that nothing is gained but a 
 mass of verbiage by the introduction of a major 
 premise. The enthymeme is equally cogent, and 
 more readily seen to be so. 
 
 To elucidate the subject still further, let us take 
 another demonstrative enthymeme : 
 
 The world exhibits marks of design ; 
 
 Therefore it is the work of an intelligent 
 
 author. 
 
 This argument, so expressed, is an example of 
 necessary implication as much as if any one were 
 to say, " This is a thought, therefore it must have 
 proceeded from a thinker." In order to make it 
 into a syllogism, we must prefix the general pro- 
 position, " Whatever exhibits marks of design 
 has had an intelligent author ; " but if any one 
 does not discern the conclusion to be implied in 
 the minor premise, he will not be convinced by the 
 addition of the major, which can lend no force 
 to the argument, being merely a generalisation 
 of it. 
 
 The instances which I have hitherto adduced, 
 all exhibit self-evident implication of one thing by 
 another ; but there are cases in which the asserted 
 implication is not self-evident, and yet the reason- 
 
FORMS OF REASONING. 89 
 
 ing can gain no force from its being taken out of 
 the form of an enthymeme. 
 
 Suppose any logician to assert that " Solon was 
 a wise legislator," and on inquiring into the reason 
 of his assertion, he answered, " Because he adapted 
 his laws to the genius of the people." If I were 
 not satisfied with this reason, and pushed my 
 questioning further, " Why do you consider him 
 as a wise legislator for doing this ? " he, as a 
 logician, might reply, " All legislators who do this 
 are wise." Such a reply, nevertheless, would leave 
 me just as I was. The reasoning, indeed, would 
 be rounded into a perfect syllogism ; the major 
 premise would be supplied, and, if admitted at the 
 outset, the conclusion must be admitted with it ; 
 but, starting from the conclusion as a proposition 
 to be proved, I should be no more satisfied than I 
 was before. If I were not convinced that Solon 
 proved himself a wise legislator by adapting his 
 laws to the genius of the people, I should not be 
 satisfied by the major proposition ; and if I were 
 convinced, the major proposition would be need- 
 less, for the same reason in both cases, namely, 
 that it would be nothing more than a generalisa- 
 tion of the particular argument. 
 
 It is not that such reasoning is self-evident, and 
 the denial of its validity involves a contradiction ; 
 but that to generalise it into a major proposition 
 does not add to its force. If you wish to strengthen 
 it you must find something different from a major 
 
90 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 premise, as, for example, " For when laws are 
 adapted to the genius of the people they are cheer- 
 fully obeyed." 
 
 In reference to such cases it is to be considered 
 that to discern one fact to be implied in another 
 requires a certain degree of knowledge. Where 
 the subjects of the reasoning are simple, and the 
 necessary knowledge is a common possession, the 
 implication appears at once self evident, as in 
 geometry, which is concerned exclusively with 
 lines and angles. But where the subjects of the 
 reasoning are complex, one fact may be really 
 implied in another, although the implication is not 
 discernible without considerable knowledge and 
 study. Whether the implication, however, is im- 
 mediately self-evident or not, a general proposition 
 in the form of a major premise is alike inoperative 
 as a proof. It could be obtained only by general- 
 ising the particular argument, and general propo- 
 sitions so obtained are wholly inefficient and su- 
 pererogatory in establishing the conclusion. When, 
 on the other hand, they are obtained by collecting 
 facts, or are the result of previous deduction, they 
 are, as remarked in the last chapter, essentially 
 necessary to the inference. 
 
 If we compare the instances last adduced with a 
 syllogism or enthymeme which has for its major or 
 only premise either a collective fact respecting a 
 class of objects, or a law of nature deduced from 
 such a fact, we shall find that, in the latter case 
 
FORMS OF REASONING. 91 
 
 the force of the argument is wholly dependent on 
 the general proposition, or on the collective fact 
 from which it has been deduced. 
 
 As an example, the old well-worn syllogism 
 before cited will do as well as any other : 
 All men are mortal ; 
 Peter is a man ; 
 Therefore he is mortal. 
 
 Here the allegation that Peter is a man would 
 constitute no sufficient ground for concluding him 
 to be mortal ; it merely brings him within the 
 general fact or law which is the real reason. It 
 is the latter that makes the argument good; the 
 minor premise would be of non-effect without it. 
 
 But in the case of the enthymemes, and more con- 
 spicuously the mathematical demonstration before 
 cited, the minor, or rather the only premise, suffices 
 of itself, and can borrow no strength, as a reason, 
 from the addition of the major; which being a 
 mere generalisation of the argument after its co- 
 gency must have been seen, would be more properly 
 termed a corollary than a premise.* 
 
 To sum up in reverse order what has been said 
 of the forms of demonstrative reasoning : 
 
 * In reference to the same argument, the author of Semato- 
 logy observes, "In this instance the axiom which forms the 
 major proposition is superfluous : it is not an inductive whole, 
 like " Man is mortal," from which we deduce the more parti- 
 cular comprehended in it ; but the particular, suppose it to occur 
 to the mind for the first time, is as certainly understood to be 
 true as if it came after millions of instances." Sequel to 
 Sematology, p. 112. 
 
92 T1IK THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 In arguments where a particular fact implies 
 another fact, or, to express it differently, where 
 what is usually called the minor premise implies the 
 conclusion, a general proposition or major premise 
 is redundant ; and such reasoning, so far from being 
 syllogistic, cannot even be considered as class- 
 reasoning at all, or as in anywise exemplifying 
 the dictum de omni et nullo or other allied dicta. 
 Of these acts of reasoning the geometrical enthy- 
 meme is the best type. 
 
 On the other hand, where the major premise or 
 a general proposition implies the conclusion, a 
 minor premise is sometimes needful and sometimes 
 superfluous : needful when the subject of the 
 conclusion does not manifestly belong to the class 
 designated by the middle term or spoken of in the 
 major premise ; superfluous when it manifestly 
 does. 
 
 All such reasoning, whether with or without a 
 minor premise, exemplifies the scholastic dictum 
 or other dicta allied to it. 
 
 We are thus brought to the conclusion that in 
 numerous cases of demonstrative reasoning, one 
 premise is alone sufficient for the inference, although 
 it may be granted that, even in those cases, it is 
 possible to form a complete syllogism by thrusting 
 in a fruitless and redundant proposition. 
 
 It follows, also, from what has been said, that it 
 is inappropriate and incorrect to call the syllogism 
 an analysis of the process of all demonstrative 
 
FOiiMS OF REASONING. 93 
 
 reasoning, and much more so to apply the assertion 
 to all reasoning whatever. 
 
 An analysis of reasoning ought to be an account 
 of what takes place in the mind when it draws an 
 inference, or is determined to a conclusion. Now 
 from the preceding representations, it is manifest 
 that a single fact or combination of facts, capable 
 of being expressed in one proposition, frequently 
 determines the mind to a conclusion without re- 
 ference to any thing else. This is the whole of 
 which the mind is conscious, or which can be dis- 
 cerned as having taken place on reflection. 
 
 Supplying in such cases the missing premise, as 
 it is called, when it is not introducing a mere 
 identical assertion, is simply stating a certain pro- 
 position which may be enunciated with truth if 
 the argument is valid, but which neither forms nor 
 represents any part of the mental process. To 
 contend that a second premise is necessary to the 
 completion of an argument, because it may by 
 some expedient or other always be added to it, is 
 like contending that a shawl is an indispensable 
 part of a lady's dress because it may always be 
 thrown over every thing else in which she may 
 be attired. 
 
 This introduction of two premises is in many 
 arguments proper and needful, but in some it is 
 mere impertinence or supererogation, and in others 
 nothing more than the obtrusion of identical 
 propositions. 
 
94 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 PRIMARY OR ORIGINAL PREMISES. 
 
 THE preceding chapters have endeavoured to show, 
 amongst other things, that what are termed prin- 
 ciples of reasoning, or maxims, give no force to 
 arguments. They do not constitute real premises 
 in any case, and cannot, therefore, be the original 
 premises from which we set out. 
 
 What, then, it may be asked, are the primary 
 propositions with which our reasonings commence? 
 
 To this inquiry, it may be at once replied, that, 
 with the exceptions to be hereafter named, we 
 always commence with particular facts ; or, to 
 express it more precisely, that particular facts, or 
 propositions expressive of them, are, in every case, 
 taking into view the whole train of reasoning from 
 beginning to end, the first premises from which we 
 start, and the ultimate ground at which, in tracing 
 back our reasonings, we invariably arrive. 
 
 It has been said, indeed, in contrariety to this, 
 that all our reasonings about events, if traced back 
 to their origin, will be found to rest on the maxim 
 or general principle, as a major premise, that 
 similar causes produce similar effects, and that all 
 our reasonings in mathematics rest in the same way 
 on the several axioms of that science. 
 
PRIMARY OR ORIGINAL PREMISES. 95 
 
 But, as I have already shown, these general 
 principles and axioms are educed from particular 
 arguments or instances of implication ; and, if this 
 is true, they cannot precede such arguments, nor 
 constitute the original premises from which any 
 conclusions are inferred. 
 
 Nor can those general propositions which really 
 form constituent parts of our reasonings, be the ori- 
 ginal premises inquired for. 
 
 In contingent reasoning, as already explained, it 
 is from particular facts that we form or infer a 
 general law ; and, although we may subsequently 
 use the general law as a premise from which to 
 deduce particular conclusions, the whole reasoning 
 rests on the first facts, and the general law is only 
 an intermediate proposition. 
 
 In demonstrative reasoning the same position is 
 equally true. At the outset it is always in one or 
 more particular facts that we discern another parti- 
 cular fact to be implied ; and it is from such par- 
 ticular implications that we form those general 
 propositions which we use in subsequent deductions. 
 From discerning an implication in one instance 
 we discern that it must have place in all like in- 
 stances. Hence neither axioms, nor general laws 
 obtained by contingent reasoning, nor general pro- 
 positions employed in demonstrative reasoning, can 
 be primary or original premises. 
 
 I am here speaking, on the supposition of the 
 whole of a train of reasoning being gone through 
 
96 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 by the same mind, or, to state the matter differently, 
 I am speaking as if the whole race of thinkers 
 constituted one individual. 
 
 Practically we take general propositions or laws 
 from various sources without going back to their 
 origin from authority, or testimony, or hypo- 
 thesis, and reason from them without hesitation: 
 and if such propositions are furnished to us from a 
 source beyond which we cannot ascend, as, for ex- 
 ample, by revelation from a superior intelligence, 
 they are to mankind original major premises, and 
 form exceptions to the doctrine that we always 
 commence with particular facts. 
 
 Every man, indeed, is in a position analogous to 
 this with regard to general laws on subjects which 
 he has not himself investigated, inasmuch as his 
 want of knowledge precludes him from ascending 
 to the primary facts from which they are inferred. 
 
 Another source of general propositions not ob- 
 tained from particular facts, and serving as original 
 major premises, is to be found in civil laws, com- 
 mands, directions, and rules of conduct generally. 
 This is a most extensive source of premises, from 
 which we deduce conclusions in practical life ; and 
 although it has obviously nothing to do with the 
 acquisition of science, the reasoning is precisely on 
 a level with that in which the premises are obtained 
 by what logicians term complete enumeration, or 
 by geometrical inference. 
 
 " If," says Mr. Stewart, " there are any parts of 
 
PRIMARY OR ORIGINAL PREMISES. 97 
 
 science in which the syllogism can be advantage- 
 ously applied, it must be those where our judg- 
 ments are formed in consequence of an application 
 to particular cases of certain maxims [general 
 propositions] which we are not at liberty to dis- 
 pute. An example of this occurs in the practice 
 of law. Here the particular conclusion must be 
 regulated by the general principle, whether right 
 or wrong. The case was similar in every branch 
 of philosophy, as long as the authority of great 
 names prevailed, and the old scholastic maxims 
 were allowed, without examination, to pass as in- 
 controvertible truths."* 
 
 The doctrine which so long predominated, and 
 which still continues to be held by philosophers at 
 large, that all our reasonings must be founded on 
 general principles or propositions, or, in other 
 words, that all our conclusions may be traced back 
 
 * Elements of Philosophy, vol. ii. p. 286. This case of 
 general propositions being sometimes given to us, forming an 
 exception to the doctrine that the original premises in our 
 reasonings are particular facts, has also been well explained by 
 Mr. John Mill in his System of Logic, vol. i. 260. Mr. Smart 
 expresses the general doctrine of this chapter with clearness 
 and precision. After remarking that in tracing back our in- 
 ferences we must come at last to something not an inference, 
 he continues: "Now this ultimate ground can consist of 
 nothing but particular or individual truths, for which we 
 have the evidence of our senses or our consciousness." Prac- 
 tical Logic, p. 35. Locke (although the remark is made in a 
 different connection) observes that "the immediate object of all 
 our reason and knowledge is nothing but particulars." Essay, 
 book iv. chap. 17. 
 
 H 
 
98 THE THEOKY OF REASONING, 
 
 to such propositions as primary or original pre- 
 mises, has at all times been a formidable obstruction 
 to the progress of knowledge. 
 
 We can scarcely suppose that, if men had clearly 
 seen the necessity of commencing their deductions 
 with particular facts as first premises, they could 
 have fallen into those false principles, which, as it 
 was, they began by assuming. 
 
REASONING AND LANGUAGE. 99 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 THE RELATION BETWEEN REASONING AND LANGUAGE. 
 
 As all the acts of reasoning which men communi- 
 cate to each other, and even many of those which 
 are confined to their own breasts, are put into 
 words, language cannot but stand in a very import- 
 ant relation to the reasoning process. So intimate, 
 indeed, is the connection between them, that many 
 logicians have maintained the impossibility of 
 reasoning without words. 
 
 Although this is a doctrine which is obviously 
 at variance with the whole tenour of the preceding 
 views, and virtually refuted by some of the par- 
 ticular arguments employed to enforce them, yet, 
 from its extensive prevalence, it seems to require a 
 distinct examination ; and this examination will 
 probably bring out the true relation in which the 
 two things before us stand to each other. The 
 following is one of the most recent statements of 
 the logical doctrine on the subject. 
 
 " Logic is entirely conversant about language," 
 or "is wholly concerned in the use of language." 
 Accordingly, a syllogism is "an argument so ex- 
 pressed, that the conclusiveness of it is manifest 
 
 H 2 
 
100 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 from the mere force of the expression, i. e. without 
 considering the meaning of the terms." * 
 
 This doctrine, if we take its superficial import, 
 seems to narrow the province of logic to only one 
 kind of argumentation, by representing it as em- 
 bracing only such reasoning as is carried on in 
 words. It appears, at first sight, to be founded on 
 a distinction between employing language in rea- 
 soning, and reasoning without language, and to 
 restrict logic to the consideration of the former. 
 Unexpressed reasoning, tacit deduction, which 
 takes place independently of language, is not, 
 arcording to this representation, within the domain 
 of the science. 
 
 In this case, it would be necessary either to pass 
 over the latter sort of inference altogether, or to 
 treat it as something separate and distinct ; but as 
 reasoning, whether expressed in language or not, 
 is really about things, such a distinction would be 
 at the best illusory. 
 
 If the expressions, however, containing the doc- 
 trine, are looked at more closely, they will be 
 found to imply a much more important proposition, 
 
 * The expressions between quotation marks are the words of 
 Dr. Whately in his Elements of Logic, p. 56. 88. 1st ed. 
 Dugald Stewart, in his zeal for nominalism, had previously given 
 his sanction to the same view : see Elements of Philosophy, 
 vol. i. p. 175, 176. 8vo. ed. In a subsequent passage, how- 
 ever, Mr. Stewart qualifies the doctrine, as will be hereafter ex- 
 plained. 
 
REASONING AND LANGUAGE. 101 
 
 viz., that there is no reasoning except in words. 
 They virtually declare the process to be impossible 
 without language, and, moreover, to be so much 
 an affair of mere words, that we can reason without 
 attaching any meaning to the terms employed. 
 
 Let us examine these two extraordinary po- 
 sitions. 
 
 That the various operations of the mind are 
 concerned with facts or things, has been already 
 shown ; and it is plain that we may think of facts 
 and things we may recollect, conceive, or imagine 
 them, without the intervention of signs. Nor is 
 language more necessary to the mental act called 
 reasoning *, than it is to the operations called 
 memory, conception, and imagination. All the 
 help which it affords, in this process, is enabling 
 the mind to recall and keep in view the facts repre- 
 sented by the signs employed. 
 
 The possibility of reasoning in geometry without 
 words, cannot, I think, be doubted by any one 
 who attends to the movements of his own mind. 
 
 * Even Hobbes, who has been styled plusquam nominalis, 
 and who seems, in many passages of his writings, to regard 
 reasoning, like truth, as an affair of mere words, now and then 
 admits that we may carry on the process without them. He 
 says, " Quomodo autem animo sine verbis tacita cogitatione 
 ratiocinando addere et subtrahere solemus uno aut altero ex- 
 emplo ostendendum est." "But how by the ratiocination of 
 our mind we add and subtract in our silent thoughts, without the 
 use of words, it will be necessary for me to make intelligible by 
 an example or two." Logic, chap. i. 2. See also Leviathanj 
 chap. v. 
 
 H 3 
 
102 THE THEOEY OF REASONING. 
 
 In tracing the proofs that the three angles of a 
 triangle are equal to two right angles, I can, for 
 my own part, easily follow the steps of the demon- 
 stration without thinking about the language. I 
 am led to discern intuitively the equality of cer- 
 tain angles to other angles, until I arrive at the 
 conclusion ; a discernment which has not the 
 slightest concern with words, as I can go through 
 the whole deduction without even attaching names 
 or letters to the angles.* 
 
 So in contingent reasoning, or drawing conclu- 
 sions about events. A great part of our reasoning 
 consists in inferring the future from the past, the 
 absent from the present, the unknown past from 
 the known past. In all these cases what we think 
 about are facts. We represent to ourselves the 
 objects and events of which we have had knowledge 
 or experience, and the future events which, from a 
 review of these, we think will happen, or the un- 
 observed past events, which we conclude have 
 happened. Language may mingle in these opera- 
 tions, but it is neither essential to them nor forms 
 their principal feature : it may mix itself with our 
 
 * Hobbes acknowledges the possibility of this : he says a man 
 that hath no use of speech at all, such as is born and remains 
 perfectly deaf and dumb, if he set before his eyes a triangle, 
 and by it two right angles, such as are the corners of a square 
 figure, he may, by meditation, compare and find that the three 
 angles of that triangle are equal to those two right angles that 
 stand by it." Leviathan, part i. chap. iv. 
 
REASONING AND LANGUAGE. 103 
 
 reasonings, as it does with our recollections and 
 imaginings, without at all affecting their substan- 
 tial character.* 
 
 It is, indeed, an extraordinary mistake to sup- 
 pose that we reason only when we clothe our 
 thoughts in words, or deduce our conclusions in 
 verbal propositions. It surely requires little re- 
 flection to be aware that we every day make a 
 thousand inferences with the rapidity of lightning, 
 without the possibility of the intermediation of 
 language. So far, indeed, are we from being 
 obliged to reason in words, that I will venture to 
 appeal to the consciousness of the reader whether 
 we do not oftener reason without them. While 
 performing our commonest actions we are per- 
 petually making inferences, and cannot avoid it. 
 In taking a walk, for instance, in choosing this 
 road, in avoiding that obstacle, in mounting a 
 style, or in opening a gate, we are constantly con- 
 cluding beforehand what results will follow certain 
 acts, without putting these anticipations into lan- 
 guage. What rapid inferences are drawn by a 
 popular orator who is making a speech to a way- 
 ward assembly, and has to adapt his matter and 
 his expressions, as he proceeds, to the state of 
 
 * " To suppose," says Dr. Brown, " that we cannot reason 
 without language, seems to me, indeed, almost to involve the 
 same inconsistency, as to say, that man is incapable of moving 
 his limbs till he have previously walked a mile." Lectures on 
 the Human Mind^ vol. ii. p. 527. 
 
 H 4 
 
104 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 feeling which manifests itself to his observation! 
 He shuns one topic which he intended to introduce 
 because he becomes aware that it will be ill-re- 
 ceived ; and he introduces another riot premedi- 
 tated, because his tact enables him to foresee that 
 it will make a favourable impression. And this 
 instance is the more remarkable as an illustration 
 of the view here taken, because a double process 
 of reasoning is at one and the same time taking 
 place in the mind. The orator not only reasons 
 in words to his audience, but is conscious of a 
 rapid series of tacit inferences going on within 
 him as to what topics it will be proper to avoid 
 or profitable to touch upon as he proceeds. 
 
 In some passages of his writings Dugald Stewart, 
 quitting for a while the pure logical doctrine, takes 
 a view of the subject similar to that here given. 
 " We can employ," he says in one place, " the 
 agency of air to increase the heat of a furnace ; the 
 furnace to render iron malleable ; and [we can 
 apply\ the iron to all the various purposes of the 
 mechanical arts. Now it appears to me that all 
 this may be conceived and done without the aid 
 of language ; and yet, assuredly, to discover a series 
 of means subservient to a particular end, or, in 
 other words, an effort of mechanical invention, 
 implies, according to the common doctrines of 
 philosophers, the exercise of our reasoning powers. 
 In this sense, therefore, of the word reasoning, I 
 am inclined to think that it is not essentially con- 
 
REASONING AND LANGUAGE. 105 
 
 nected with the faculty of generalisation, nor with 
 the use of signs." * 
 
 But Mr. Stewart, it must be observed, terms all 
 this particular reasoning. He allows, with Hobbes, 
 that particular reasoning may take place without 
 words ; but general reasoning, he affirms (and 
 here he again falls in with the logical doctrine), 
 cannot take place except in words. 
 
 He goes even to the extreme nominalism of 
 asserting, that without the use of signs all our 
 thoughts must have related to individuals, for- 
 getting that since a sign must signify something, 
 if we could think only of individuals, signs of 
 individuals would be the only signs that could 
 be invented. Discerning or thinking of a class, 
 i. e. a number of individuals resembling each other 
 in one or more respects, must precede the act of 
 naming a class, otherwise we should be giving a 
 name to nothing. 
 
 The example which Mr. Stewart himself adduces 
 is sufficient to show the error of his doctrine. 
 
 If a man reasons without language when he 
 employs the agency of air to increase the heat of 
 a furnace, which he may do, although completely 
 deaf and dumb, he has already generalised. When 
 he has sent one blast of air into his fire, he sends 
 another after it, in the full assurance that he can 
 
106 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 produce the same effect whenever he chooses ; and 
 he infers, with as little doubt, that his neighbour, 
 who is building another furnace, will find currents 
 of air equally efficient.* 
 
 If this is not generalising and general reasoning, 
 what is ? It may possibly be alleged, however, 
 although incorrectly, that what I have hitherto 
 advanced cannot be applied to syllogistic reasoning. 
 Let us consider, then, a case expressly of this de- 
 scription. Let us suppose our deaf and dumb 
 man to be something of a botanist, and to be 
 taking a country walk. He comes to a bank on 
 which are growing a number of primroses, and, on 
 examining the flowers, he perceives, as he has 
 always perceived in similar examinations, that 
 each flower contains five filaments or stamens. 
 He proceeds in his walk, and sees another prirri- 
 
 * Condillac has been classed amongst those who have con- 
 sidered language as indispensable to reasoning ; and he un- 
 doubtedly asserts that the art of reasoning resolves itself into a 
 well constructed language. " L'art de raisonner se rcduit a une 
 langue bien faite," or "a 1'art de bien parler." La Logique, 
 partie ii. chap. v. And in another part of the same treatise, he 
 tells us, " que les mots nous sont absolument necessaires pour 
 nous faire des idees de toutes especes ; et nous verrons bientot 
 que les idees abstraites et generates ne sont que des denomina- 
 tions. Tout confirmera done que nous ne pensons quavec le 
 secours des mots."" Partie ii. chap. v. The last doctrine 
 goes even beyond that of Mr. Stewart. There are however, 
 other passages in the same treatise not easy to reconcile with 
 those I have quoted (see partie i. chap. vii. and partie ii. 
 chap, i.) ; so difficult is it to be consistent in error. 
 
REASONING AND LANGUAGE. 107 
 
 rose growing on an inaccessible ledge, half-way 
 down a perpendicular rock, and " not to be come 
 at by the willing hand." Although inspection of 
 the flower is precluded, reasoning about it is not, 
 and he immediately infers that it has five stamens 
 in its corolla, like all which he has examined. In 
 this case he would think and infer, without the 
 slightest aid from language, just what a syllogism 
 expresses. Surely the power of attaching the 
 generic name of primrose to the flower could not 
 possibly make it a clearer act of reasoning. 
 
 We have next to consider the assertion, that the 
 conclusiveness of an argument may be manifest 
 from the mere force of the expression, without 
 considering the meaning of its terms. 
 
 To employ language in reasoning, without at- 
 taching some meaning to the signs employed, 
 seems to me, I confess, a sheer impossibility ; and 
 there is, to my understanding, a marvellous incon- 
 sistency in saying, that the conclusiveness of an 
 argument may be manifest from the mere force of 
 the expression, without considering the meaning of 
 the terms. Expression can have no force but from 
 its meaning. Language, in so far as it has no 
 meaning, has no strength : it is a mere noise, a 
 nullity. 
 
 The writers who thus maintain that the con- 
 clusiveness of a properly expressed argument is 
 manifest without considering the meaning of the 
 terms, exemplify their doctrine as follows : "In 
 
108 THE THEOKY OF REASONING. 
 
 this syllogism Y is x, z is Y, therefore z is x, the 
 conclusion is inevitable, whatever terms x Y z re- 
 spectively are understood to stand for." Here is 
 an admission, at all events, that they must stand 
 for something ; and it is precisely what they stand 
 for that constitutes their meaning, and that gives 
 force and even intelligibility to the argument. If 
 the letters are to be considered as mere letters 
 without representative power or symbolical signi- 
 ficance, each proposition of the syllogism is false. 
 The letter Y is not the letter x, nor is the letter z 
 the letter Y. We must, then, of necessity, consider 
 the representative meaning. Y must be taken to 
 designate some thing or things, and not to stand 
 as a mere letter; x must be taken to designate 
 some attribute of Y ; and z must be taken as 
 meaning Y, or as a particular name for a thing also 
 called Y. The conclusion asserts that z must there- 
 fore have the attribute belonging to the thing or 
 things called Y. 
 
 Here, then, it is manifest, that the meaning is 
 everything to the argument. The letters are 
 merely helps. 
 
 That a variety of things and attributes may be 
 attached to the symbols x, Y, z, without altering 
 the force of the argument, is a circumstance be- 
 longing to the nature of general language. An 
 analogous fact in arithmetic is familiar to every 
 one. Twice ten are equal to twenty, whether the 
 subject of the calculation happens to be shillings 
 
REASONING AND LANGUAGE. 109 
 
 or pounds, or men or marbles ; but it cannot be 
 affirmed, that, on this account, the words twice ten 
 are twenty are destitute of meaning, or that their 
 meaning is left out of consideration. 
 
 The whole truth of the matter in question (and 
 this may have been all which the passage under 
 review, so incautiously worded, was intended to 
 express) is, that we may reason with terms, how- 
 ever general may be their signification, under the 
 condition, of course, that they have some significa- 
 tion to reason about.* 
 
 It is worth while, in further elucidation of the 
 subject, to quote the following paradox, as Mr. 
 Hallam justly terms it, thrown out by Hobbes in 
 his correspondence with Descartes, for the sake of 
 the reply given by the latter, coinciding so exactly 
 as it does with the views advanced in the present 
 treatise. 
 
 * Mr. R. E. Scott, in his able work entitled " Elements of 
 Intellectual Philosophy," gives some acute comments on the 
 passage already referred to in Dugald Stewart's first volume, in 
 which that philosopher asserts that, in order to perceive the 
 justness of the inference (in a syllogism like that quoted above) 
 it is not necessary to understand its meaning. " Though I by 
 no means admit," says Mr. Scott, " that it is not necessary to 
 understand the meaning of a syllogism in order to perceive the 
 justness of its inference, yet, without doubt, our assent will be 
 given to a syllogism, although its terms be successively varied, 
 according to a certain principle." He afterwards adds that a 
 syllogism " whose minor is z is an x will never enforce our 
 assent, unless we settle, by previous definition, that x denotes 
 a genus or species of which z is an individual." p. 1 50. 
 
110 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 " Que dirons-nous, maintenant," writes Hobbes, 
 "si peut-etre le raisonnement n'est rien autre 
 chose qu'un assemblage et un enchainement cle 
 noms par ce mot est ? D'ou il s'ensuivroit que par 
 la raison nous ne concluons rien de tout touchant 
 la nature des choses, rnais seulement touchant leurs 
 appellations, c'est-a-dire que par elle nous voyons 
 simplement si nous assemblons bien ou mal les 
 noms des choses, selon les conventions que nous 
 avons faites a notre fantaisie touchant leurs signi- 
 fications." 
 
 To this curious passage Descartes very aptly 
 replied: 
 
 " L'assemblage qui se fait dans le raisonnement 
 n'est pas celui des noms, mais bien celui des choses 
 signifiees par les noms ; et je m'etonne que le con- 
 traire puisse venir en 1'esprit de personne."* 
 
 In reasoning on some subjects, little progress, 
 indeed, could be made without language. It is not 
 always seen, however, that this observation is ap- 
 plicable far more to written than to spoken lan- 
 guage, to visible symbols than to articulate sounds. 
 Yet no one would dream of attempting on this 
 account to restrict logic to written language. 
 
 The great expedients which have been devised to 
 assist the intellect in the most abstract calculations, 
 
 * Quoted from the works of Descartes by Mr. Hallam in his 
 Introduction to the Literature of Europe, vol. iii. p. 248. 
 
REASONING AND LANGUAGE. Ill 
 
 owe their efficiency to their symbols being pre- 
 sentable to the eye at pleasure, and thus consti- 
 tuting visible fixed stations, where the mind can 
 repose, where it can always find what has been 
 already accomplished, and from which it can again 
 start in pursuit of new results. Sounds, it is true, 
 are associated with these visible symbols ; but they 
 play a subordinate part in such processes, and 
 would be incapable alone of enabling the mind to 
 proceed beyond a comparatively short distance. 
 
 Keasoning, in brief, is one species of thinking; 
 and, like all other thinking, except that of which 
 language is itself the subject, may be carried on 
 independently of words. When language is used, 
 it forms only an instrument of the process ; some- 
 times, indeed, exceedingly useful, and even indis- 
 pensable, but never constituting the process itself, 
 any more than laughter constitutes mirth, or a 
 frown displeasure ; or, to pass over to another 
 class of illustrations, any more than shoes or 
 sandals constitute walking, although they may 
 help the walker ; or than lenses constitute seeing, 
 although without them we could not attain the 
 sight of myriads of stars, which, to the unassisted 
 eye, are hid in the depths of space. 
 
 The calculus which enabled Adams and Leverier 
 to point out the spot in the heavens where an un- 
 known planet was wheeling through its remote 
 orbit, and the telescope through which Galle dis- 
 
112 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 covered it*, are both alike instruments by whose 
 aid the natural faculties can reach to knowledge 
 otherwise inaccessible, but which confer no new 
 faculty on the intelligent agent who employs them. 
 
 * It is generally understood that M. Galle of Berlin dis- 
 covered the planet Neptune, Sept. 23. 1846, in consequence of 
 a communication from M. Leverier. 
 
REASONING AND INDUCTION. 113 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 THE RELATION OF OBSERVATION, EXPERIMENT, AND 
 INDUCTION, TO REASONING AND TO EACH OTHER. 
 
 THE terms at the head of the present chapter denote 
 closely allied and frequently intermingled opera- 
 tions, which it seems desirable to investigate, in 
 order to show in what relation they stand to each 
 other, and more particularly in what relation 
 reasoning stands to the rest. 
 
 Experiment is usually placed in antithesis to 
 observation, as if one excluded the other ; but 
 surely the intellectual act termed observation is 
 just as much required for experiments as it is for 
 spontaneous events. Unless experiments are ob- 
 served, they can clearly be of no use. It is equally 
 true, if not equally clear, that the observation of 
 either spontaneous or experimental phenomena can 
 scarcely take place without reasoning, and, if it 
 could, would be of no scientific value. 
 
 To illustrate this by an example. We observe a 
 stone fall rapidly to the ground, and a feather? 
 floating in the atmosphere, slowly descend. Me- 
 ditating on these events, we conjecture, or infer, 
 that the air through which they fall has something 
 to do with the difference in the rates of their 
 descent. We, in consequence, devise the experi- 
 
 i 
 
114 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 merit (in which, also, reasoning is needful) of 
 placing the two substances in a vessel exhausted 
 of air ; and we find that, on precipitating them 
 from the same height, they come to the bottom of 
 the vessel at the same moment. We try other 
 substances with a similar result, and finally deduce 
 the general law, that all substances at the surface 
 of the earth descend in vacuo from equal heights in 
 equal times. 
 
 There is evidently here, in the first place, ob- 
 servation of facts spontaneously occurring; then 
 reasoning or conjecturing something from those 
 facts, viz., what would result from withdraw- 
 ing the element of air ; further reasoning as to the 
 mode of withdrawing it ; acting on this reasoning 
 by trying the experiment ; subsequently making 
 other experiments ; and finally deducing a general 
 conclusion, or law. 
 
 But, not only have we here observation of spon- 
 taneous and experimental phenomena with an in- 
 termixture of reasoning, but we have in those 
 combined operations an example of what is usually 
 termed induction. Induction is not some process 
 superadded to those here described ; but it is, in 
 this instance, a combination of the two intellectual 
 operations of observing and inferring, with the 
 mechanical aid of experimental contrivances to 
 enlarge their range, and for the purpose of de- 
 ducing a general law. 
 
 It thus appears, that, instead of contrasting ob- 
 
REASONING AND INDUCTION. 115 
 
 servation and experiment, we should contrast spon- 
 taneous and experimental phenomena as alike sub- 
 jects of observation. Facts furnished by artificial 
 contrivances require to be observed just in the 
 same way as those which are presented by nature 
 without our interference ; and yet philosophers 
 are nearly unanimous in confining observation to 
 the latter phenomena, and speaking of it as of 
 something which ceases where experiment begins ; 
 while, in simple truth, the business of experiment 
 is to extend the sphere of observation, and not 
 to take up a subject where observation lays it 
 down. 
 
 In regard to Induction, the view which I have 
 here taken of it coincides, if I mistake not, with 
 that which is to be found in the writings of our 
 most eminent philosophers, from Lord Bacon to 
 Dr. Brown. 
 
 By logical writers, it has, indeed, been used in a 
 much more limited sense, viz., that of inferring a 
 general conclusion from either a complete or an 
 imperfect enumeration of particular instances*; 
 
 * Thus Le Grand : " Inductio est argument atio qua ex 
 plurium singularium recensione, aliquid universale conclu- 
 ditur." Institutio Philosophic, p. 57, ed. 3. A.D. 1675. And 
 Wallis : " Inductio est argume'ntationis seu syllogism! forma, 
 qua probatur quid verum esse de general! quopiam, ex eo quod 
 verum sit de particularibus omnibus sub eo generali contentis ; 
 saltern de tot horum enumeratis, ut credibile sit de reliquis 
 item esse verum." Institutio Logiccz, ed. 4, p. 198. 
 
 i 2 
 
116 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 and even some philosophical writers of the school 
 of Bacon have employed it, in an analogous ac- 
 ceptation, to denote merely the process of inferring 
 a conclusion more general than the premises from 
 which it is drawn. 
 
 If we turn, however, to the pages of such writers 
 as Reid, Stewart, and the more metaphysical fol- 
 lowers of Bacon, we shall find the term there sig- 
 nifying the process of obtaining or preparing the 
 premises, and frequently distinguished from that 
 of inferring the conclusion ; in other words, it is 
 used to denote that combination of observation and 
 reasoning which has been already described as pre- 
 ceding the final inference. 
 
 Mr. Stewart, for instance, speaks of " those general 
 conclusions concerning the established order of the 
 universe, to which, when legitimately inferred from 
 an induction sufficiently extensive, philosophers have 
 metaphorically applied the title of Laws of Nature;"* 
 where the term induction clearly denotes something 
 that precedes the inference, and of course does not 
 include it. 
 
 In a similar way Dr. Brown speaks of " a wide 
 induction." 
 
 " There is a constant tendency," he says, "in the 
 mind to convert a general law into a universal law, 
 to suppose, after a wide induction, that what is 
 true of many substances that have a very striking 
 
 * Elements, vol. ii. p. 224, ed. 2. 
 
REASONING AND INDUCTION. 117 
 
 analog} 7 , is as certainly true of all that have this 
 striking analogy."* 
 
 Professor Playfair, in giving an account of 
 Bacon's method, teaches that we are to begin by 
 excluding certain things from our collection of 
 facts. " This exclusion," he continues, " is the 
 first part of the process of induction."! 
 
 Other writers speak of " a partial " and " an in- 
 complete " induction, phrases manifestly referring 
 to the observation or examination of instances. 
 
 In the preceding passages induction is clearly 
 regarded as a process of investigation preparatory 
 to the formation of a general law. 
 
 This process may be more or less complicated 
 according to circumstances, and includes or may 
 include, as I have shown, observation of both 
 spontaneous and experimental phenomena, and the 
 intermixture of such inferences as may be necessary 
 to establish what I have before termed the collective 
 fact, from which the general law is to be deduced. 
 
 It must be allowed, nevertheless, that there is a 
 good deal of laxity in the employment of the w r ord, 
 even in ,the writings of our most eminent philo- 
 sophers. Lord Bacon manifestly uses it to denote 
 a mixed process of observation and reasoning ; but 
 he is not altogether exempt from the common want 
 
 * Lectures, vol. i. p. 191. 
 
 f Preliminary Dissertations. Encyclop. Britannica, p. 460. 
 
 i 3 
 
118 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 of precision in applying it*, and he sometimes in- 
 cludes, under the term, the formation or deduction 
 of the general law as well as the examination of 
 instances. Newton has, I think, fallen into an 
 ambiguous use of the word in a passage which 
 occurs at the conclusion of his " Optics." AVhile the 
 extract now presented will furnish an instance in 
 point, it will exemplify also the manner in which 
 observation and experiment are commonly, and in 
 my view inaccurately, distinguished. 
 
 " Analysis [in natural philosophy] consists in 
 making experiments and observations, and in 
 drawing conclusions from them by induction, and 
 admitting of no objections against the conclusions 
 but such as are taken from experiments or other 
 certain truths. For hypotheses are not to be 
 regarded in experimental philosophy. And al- 
 though the arguing from experiments and obser- 
 vations by induction be no demonstration of general 
 conclusions ; yet it is the best way of arguing which 
 the nature of things admits of, and may be looked 
 upon as so much the stronger by how much the 
 
 * " Inductio enim quae procedit per enumerationem simplicem 
 res puerilis est, et precario concludit, et periculo exponitur ab 
 instantia contradictoria et plerumque secundum pauciora quam 
 par est, at ex his tantummodo quas prassto sunt pronunciat. 
 At inductio, quse ad inventionem et demonstration em scien- 
 tiarum et artium erit utilis, naturam separare debet per 
 rejectiones et exclusiones debitas, ac deinde, post negativas tot 
 quot sufficiunt, super affirmativas concludere." Nov. Org., 
 lib. i, aph. cv. 
 
REASONING AND INDUCTION. 119 
 
 induction is more general: and if no exception 
 occur from phenomena, the conclusion may be 
 general."* 
 
 In the first and second use of the term in this 
 passage, the intention of the writer was manifestly 
 to characterise the drawing of the conclusion, al- 
 though the meaning is not very happily brought 
 out, since we cannot with propriety speak of draw- 
 ing conclusions by means of the operation itself, or 
 of any other operation. In the last use of the term, 
 he evidently meant to characterise the comprehen- 
 siveness of the preliminary observation. 
 
 I have already cited Mr. Stewart as using the 
 term induction, to denote the course of investigation 
 preparatory to the formation of a general law ; but 
 in another passage, where he describes the method 
 of induction, he includes also the final inference. 
 
 " Wherever," he says, " an interesting change is 
 preceded by a combination of different circum- 
 stances, it is of importance to vary our experiments 
 in such a manner as to distinguish what is essential 
 from what is accessory ; and when we have carried 
 the decomposition as far as we can, we are entitled 
 to consider this simplest combination of indispen- 
 sable conditions as the physical cause of the event. 
 
 " When by thus comparing a number of cases, 
 
 * Dr. Johnson gives the greater part of this passage in his 
 Dictionary, to support his second definition of the term, bor- 
 rowed from Watts's Logic, viz, " Induction is when from 
 several particular propositions we infer one general." 
 
 i 4 
 
120 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 agreeing in some circumstances, but differing in 
 others, and all attended with the same result, a 
 philosopher connects, as a general law of nature, the 
 event with its physical cause, he is said to proceed 
 according to the method of induction. This, at least, 
 appears to me to be the idea which, in general, 
 Bacon himself annexes to the phrase ; although I 
 will not venture to affirm that he has always em- 
 ployed it with uniform precision. I acknowledge 
 also that it is often used by very accurate writers, 
 to denote the whole of that system of rules of which 
 the process just mentioned forms the most essential 
 and characteristical part." * 
 
 It appears then, from the authorities I have cited, 
 that there are at least three different modes of em- 
 ploying the term ; viz. to denote, 
 
 1 . The investigation of facts, preparatory to the 
 formation of a general law ; 
 
 2. The mere inferring of the general law from the 
 facts brought together by such investigation ; 
 
 3. The two preceding processes combined. 
 
 The first of these acceptations appears to me to 
 be the most conformable to the general usage of 
 philosophical writers, and for that reason the most 
 convenient to adopt. 
 
 If this discussion should appear to turn on a mere 
 question of phraseology, it must still be allowed, 
 that to settle the meaning of so important a word 
 
 * Elements, vol. ii. p. 348. 
 
REASONING AND INDUCTION. 121 
 
 as Induction is exceedingly desirable and worth 
 some pains. At present it may be doubted whether 
 any two men of science, taken at random and not 
 being technical logicians, would give the same de- 
 finition of it. 
 
 My principal aim, however, in the present chapter 
 has been, in consonance with the subject of my 
 treatise, to point out how far reasoning is concerned 
 in this important combination of intellectual oper- 
 ations. I have accordingly endeavoured to show, 
 that induction cannot be carried on without a con- 
 tinual intermixture of inferences with observation ; 
 and that the result to which the whole converges, 
 is the formation of a general law, itself an act of 
 contingent reasoning. 
 
122 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 CHAP. XL 
 
 RULES FOR GUIDING THE OPERATIONS OF REASONING, 
 AND ESPECIALLY THE RULES OF THE SCHOLASTIC 
 LOGIC. 
 
 A TRUE theory of the reasoning processes, or, in 
 other words, a thorough comprehension of their 
 character, although fortunately not essential to the 
 right performance of the acts, may be expected to 
 assist us in some degree to arrive at correct con- 
 clusions; but will perhaps be more especially 
 serviceable in preventing that misdirection of our 
 powers, and that waste of attention on wrong ob- 
 jects, which are the usual results of a false theory 
 on an important subject. 
 
 It must also tend to inspire us with confidence 
 in our deductions, and with fearlessness in sub- 
 mitting them to the examination of others, in pro- 
 portion as it enables us to discern the character of 
 every link in the chain of argumentation. 
 
 Whether, nevertheless, such an insight into 
 the nature of the processes will afford any formal 
 rules to guide us in the performance of them, and 
 whether any such rules are needed, seem to be 
 points not equally clear. 
 
 From the preceding exposition of the subject, it 
 
RULES IN REASONING. 123 
 
 will have been seen, that the operations which pass 
 under the name of reasoning are of a simple cha- 
 racter ; so simple, indeed, that a thorough compre- 
 hension of what they are seems all that is requisite 
 to guard us against any irregularity to which they 
 may be liable, if they are liable to any. 
 
 But this is a question which will perhaps be best 
 elucidated by a separate examination of it in rela- 
 tion to each species of reasoning. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 Rules in Contingent Reasoning. 
 
 IN regard to those acts of contingent reasoning 
 from one individual event to another, which are 
 constantly occurring in the common business of 
 life, rules can scarcely have place, since in them 
 we do nothing but infer that some unknown event 
 will happen, or has happened, in certain circum- 
 stances, from our having known a similar event to 
 have taken place in similar circumstances : if any 
 precept is wanted to guard us from mistakes, it is 
 merely an injunction to take care that our pre- 
 mises are correct, i.e. that the circumstances are 
 similar. We may erroneously regard cases as 
 resembling each other, which really do not ; a 
 fault of observation, or a misconception, or a mis- 
 recollection, rather than an error of inference. 
 
 When, however, we turn to those important acts 
 of contingent reasoning which consist in the in- 
 
124 THE THEOliY OF REASONING. 
 
 ference of general laws, the case is somewhat 
 altered in its aspect, and the operation seems less 
 simple. Yet still it will be found, if I mistake 
 not, that the greater complexity which then ap- 
 pears is the complexity of the several operations 
 concerned in the preliminary inquiry needful to 
 collect and arrange the facts from which the in- 
 ference is to be drawn. 
 
 Accordingly, if we examine the rules which 
 have been laid down by Lord Bacon and his fol- 
 lowers, we shall find that they are precepts for 
 carrying on induction (in the sense annexed to 
 that term in a former chapter) ; for instituting 
 experiments, altering the combination of circum- 
 stances by leaving out some or adding others, and 
 watching the results; which operations are not 
 reasoning, although reasoning, as before explained, 
 must be, or may be, employed in conducting them. 
 They are to be regarded, in truth, as engaged in 
 establishing the collective fact, or the premises 
 from which inferences to new cases are to be 
 drawn, or a general law is to be inferred. 
 
 When it is stated, for example, from an ample 
 survey of the subject, that a certain cause has 
 always, as far as observation has extended, pro- 
 duced a certain effect, this is not an inference or 
 conclusion, but simply giving the summary result 
 of inductive investigation. 
 
 When, however, we expect or predict, on a new 
 occurrence of the cause, that the effect will follow, 
 
RULES IN REASONING. 125 
 
 or lay down the general law that the cause always 
 produces the effect, we do not state a mere matter 
 of fact, but we draw an inference ; it is, in either 
 case, an act of direct contingent reasoning. 
 
 Thus, in the formation of a general law, as in 
 the inference of one particular event from another, 
 the operation which is solely entitled to the appel- 
 lation of reasoning is equally simple ; and the 
 question is, can so simple a process go wrong, and 
 the correct performance of it be assisted by rules ? 
 
 It is undoubted that we constantly witness in- 
 stances of hasty and undue generalisation, or, in 
 other words, of drawing general inferences not 
 warranted by the facts from which they are drawn ; 
 and these seem, after the strictest analysis, to be, 
 on many occasions at least, really errors of rea- 
 soning. 
 
 When a person, smarting under the dishonesty 
 of some pretended friend, who has betrayed him 
 for a bribe, exclaims, " Every man has his price," 
 he draws his universal inference from a single case, 
 and it is immediately seen by others to be a hasty 
 and undue generalisation. This example, indeed, 
 we may consider in two lights. If we regard the 
 conclusion, it is obviously too wide for the premise; 
 if we regard the premise, it is obviously too scanty 
 for the conclusion ; but in whatever light we 
 regard the argument, the mistake is in drawing 
 the inference, not in laying down the premise. 
 The fact forming the premise, viz., that a friend 
 
126 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 has been seduced from his duty by a bribe, is the 
 only fact (by hypothesis) before the reasoner ; and 
 if he draw an inference from it at all, it should be 
 one of something like corresponding extent, as, 
 " therefore, other men in similar circumstances 
 may be occasionally expected to act in the same 
 way." To deduce a universal conclusion in such a 
 case from a single fact is manifestly an error of 
 deduction. 
 
 The error, however, of many of these instances 
 of unwarranted generalisation lies in the premises. 
 A part only of the facts have been properly ex- 
 amined, and yet the whole are assumed to have 
 been so. The premises in these cases, as expressed 
 or asserted, warrant the inference, and the erro- 
 neous conclusion is, therefore, due to the manner 
 in which they are assumed. Undue generalisation 
 results probably often er from this cause than the 
 other, and is to be corrected by nothing but stricter 
 attention to facts. 
 
 Even in cases where, as in the example above 
 cited, the fallacy is evidently in the reasoning, an 
 instructive method of attempting to correct it 
 would be trying how far other facts would bear 
 out the conclusion ; endeavouring, in a word, to 
 enlarge the premises, rather than to shape the 
 conclusion to the dimensions of the single fact, 
 although the last method of proceeding has also its 
 value. 
 
 These considerations show that rules for avoiding 
 
EULES IN REASONING. 127 
 
 erroneous conclusions in contingent reasoning are 
 in the main rules for the investigation of facts, or 
 for laying down premises, and belong to the general 
 art of inductive inquiry. 
 
 Perhaps the only rule of practical importance to 
 guard us against pure errors of inference in these 
 cases (expressed in general terms), is the injunction 
 to proportion the extent or generality of the con- 
 clusion to the facts from which we draw it. When 
 these facts are susceptible of numerical expression, 
 the law which we can deduce from them becomes 
 susceptible of the same. The methods of calcu- 
 lation, in such cases, come under a separate science, 
 usually termed the Theory of Probabilities, which 
 is itself an auxiliary of induction, and may be 
 regarded as an offset or branch of contingent 
 reasoning. The result of it, when its methods are 
 well applied, is to proportion, with all possible 
 exactness, the law deduced to the facts from which 
 it is inferred. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Rules in demonstrative Reasoning, and especially 
 in Class-Reasoning. 
 
 WE have next to inquire how far demonstrative 
 reasoning may be assisted by rules. 
 
 In that branch of it which is not class-reasoning, 
 and of which the mathematical enthymeme may be 
 regarded as the type, there seems to be no place 
 
128 THE THEORY OF EEASONING. 
 
 for rules to guide the process or guard it from 
 error. That one thing is implied by another is 
 discerned at once ; or, if not, it can be discerned 
 only by acquiring the necessary knowledge to 
 discern it. 
 
 We cannot, however, so easily dismiss that va- 
 riety of demonstrative reasoning which is usually 
 termed syllogistic, but which, for reasons before 
 assigned, I have denominated class-reasoning, 
 although it is really as simple as the rest, and 
 requires, like them, little or no assistance from 
 rules. But learned men long thought, and many 
 of them still continue to think, otherwise. It is 
 one of the remarkable circumstances in the in- 
 tellectual history of the world, that between two 
 and three thousand years ago, this simple process 
 of class-reasoning was regarded as a matter of 
 such great nicety and difficulty, that a compli- 
 cated system of rules was expressly devised to 
 prevent mistakes in performing it. In subsequent 
 ages of unsound philosophy, the scholastic logic 
 became still further exalted and magnified to an 
 undue and even preposterous importance. The 
 very narrowness of its range appears to have con- 
 centrated the skill and ingenuity of the human 
 mind on the contrivance of an intricate machinery 
 to accomplish the little there was to do in this 
 limited sphere, under the impression that it was 
 much, and that it was absolutely all. 
 
 That species, or rather that variety of reasoning, 
 
RULES IN REASONING. 129 
 
 which consists in predicating an attribute of some 
 individual or individuals of a class, because it 
 is predicable of all the class, or in other allied 
 operations, seems on a first view to be a very 
 simple affair, in which it would be difficult to go 
 wrong, and in which rules would be needless ; and 
 yet we find a most ingenious and elaborate system 
 of distinctions, maxims, arid canons, constructed 
 with no other purpose than to ensure its being 
 correctly performed. It seems scarcely credible, 
 when stated in plain terms, that the scholastic 
 logic, with all its formidable apparatus, proposes 
 to itself, as its sole ultimate object, to secure the 
 correctness and try the validity of the simple 
 processes of class-reasoning. Hence this singular 
 monument of human ingenuity, dedicated to so 
 small an object, would be almost worth a par- 
 ticular examination, even if its real character had 
 been universally appreciated, and it had been suf- 
 fered to take its place amongst the obsolete sys- 
 tems of past ages. But since its claims to prac- 
 tical importance have been recently revived and 
 re-asserted by writers distinguished for their talents 
 and learning, an attempt to estimate the value of 
 its rules seems an indispensable step in the treat- 
 ment of my subject, although it will be giving to 
 the question a larger space than in such a treatise 
 it ought naturally to occupy. 
 
 I purpose, accordingly, to examine the assistance 
 which the scholastic logic affords in the depart- 
 
 K 
 
130 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 ment to which its own theory has confined it ; to 
 inquire how efficiently it performs its part in the 
 limited province which logicians so long mistook 
 for the whole domain of reasoning. And when 
 (as I further purpose to do) I have followed up 
 this examination, and my previous exposition of 
 the principles and forms of reasoning, by some 
 remarks on the value of the system as externally 
 manifested by its effects in action and in science, 
 and on its influence as an intellectual discipline, 
 I shall have taken a survey of its most important 
 features. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 Subject continued: Mode of using the Syllogistic 
 
 Form. 
 
 IN order to clear the way for the inquiry proposed 
 in the last section, it is necessary to premise that 
 there are two different views entertained or enter- 
 tainable of the way in which the syllogistic form 
 ought to be employed. 
 
 One of these views regards the regular syllogism 
 as a method of arguing which is to be commonly 
 adopted. 
 
 The other regards it simply as a form into 
 which any arguments may be thrown for the pur- 
 pose of testing their validity, and disclaims it as the 
 ordinary instrument of reasoning or controversy. 
 
 With regard to the first, which was the view 
 
RULES IN REASONING. 131 
 
 that long prevailed in the schools, it is obvious, to 
 modern eyes, that to adopt the syllogism as the 
 ordinary method of conducting argumentation, even 
 on the supposition of its being the universal type 
 of reasoning, would be excessively tedious and em- 
 barrassing ; and, indeed, at the present stage of 
 intellectual advancement, impracticable. 
 
 This view, accordingly, of the proper method of 
 applying the syllogistic art is now not only aban- 
 doned, but we are told that "it is a mistake to 
 suppose that Aristotle arid other logicians meant 
 to propose that this prolix form of unfolding ar- 
 guments should universally supersede, in argu- 
 mentative discourses, the common forms of ex- 
 pression." 
 
 Whatever may be the light in which modern 
 writers may regard the subject, this prolix form, 
 nevertheless, was not only for a long period used 
 in the schools, as the most efficient instrument 
 of controversy, and the best method of pursuing 
 truth, but even so late as the early part of the 
 eighteenth century, the utility of carrying on a 
 controversy in writing by a mutual exchange of 
 syllogisms, and with a strict observance of the 
 legitimate forms, was maintained by no less a 
 philosopher than Leibnitz. 
 
 Since, however, the common employment of the 
 syllogistic form in argumentative discourse or con- 
 troversy is no longer advocated, it must be ex- 
 amined in the character in which it presents itself 
 
 K 2 
 
132 THE TPIEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 to us in the writings of its modern expositors ; 
 namely, as a form into which reasoning may be 
 reduced in order that the rules of logic may be 
 applied as tests for trying the validity of argu- 
 ments. Its claims are thus stated by one of the 
 most eminent amongst the logical writers *of the 
 day. " Logic," says Dr. Whately, " which is, as 
 it were, the grammar of reasoning, does not bring 
 forward the regular syllogism as a distinct mode 
 of argumentation, designed to be substituted for 
 any other mode, but as the form to which all cor- 
 rect reasoning may be ultimately reduced ; and 
 which, consequently, serves the purpose (when we 
 are employing logic as an art) of a test to try the 
 validity of any argument ; in the same manner as 
 by chemical analysis we develope and submit to a 
 distinct examination the elements of which any 
 compound body is composed, and are thus enabled 
 to detect any latent sophistication and impurity." * 
 In this statement, however, of the mode in which 
 the form is to be used, the syllogism itself is repre- 
 sented as a test, while it manifestly can be con- 
 sidered only as the shape into which class-rea- 
 soning may be put, in order to apply the several 
 tests furnished by the rules of the art. It is not 
 the bed on which the logical Procrustes is to lay 
 his victims, but only the outstretched posture in 
 which he is to place them upon it. 
 
 * Elements of Logic, p. 1 1 
 
RULES IN REASONING. 133 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 The Subject of Eules continued : Rules of the 
 Scholastic Logic. 
 
 AGREEABLY to what has been stated in the pre- 
 ceding section, we are now to consider the scho- 
 lastic logic, as a guide to correct conclusions, by 
 furnishing tests for the detection of fallacies in that 
 variety of reasoning which comes under the desig- 
 nation of class-reasoning. 
 
 In this character the system might, perhaps, be 
 reasonably expected to do two things ; first, to 
 give us directions for reducing, with all prac- 
 ticable readiness and precision, the arguments 
 which we meet with, or which occur to us, into 
 the syllogistic form ; secondly, to furnish us with 
 the best rules for testing the validity of the syllo- 
 gisms when they are before us. In the first re- 
 spect here mentioned, the common treatises on 
 logic, as far as I am acquainted with them, afford 
 us little help. Logicians may, perhaps, consider 
 it as being, like the laying down of premises, out 
 of their province ; yet this, after all, is the great 
 difficulty which the anxious searcher after right 
 conclusions has to cope with. Generally speaking, 
 the validity or invalidity of an argument is easy 
 
 to be discerned when it has been stripped of un- 
 it 3 
 
134 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 necessary irieumbrances, and reduced to the form 
 of two or three definite propositions.* 
 
 In reference to the second and easier assistance 
 which the system ought to furnish, there is no 
 similar deficiency. Logical treatises abound with 
 rules for insuring the correctness of the syllogistic 
 process, and the detection of errors in it. They 
 give us copious directions how to deal with any 
 syllogisms which may present themselves to our 
 notice ; they, in truth, encumber us with help, but 
 with help of a peculiarly artificial character. The 
 general scope, indeed, of the scholastic system may 
 be described to be to enable us, by the adoption of 
 technical language and distinctions, to apply me- 
 chanical rules to reasoning when it has been 
 brought into the syllogistic form. The question 
 we have now to try is not between rules and no 
 rules, but between natural and artificial rules. 
 
 A recourse to mechanical rules in the way de- 
 scribed, which is essentially an artificial method, 
 in order to supersede the direct application of the 
 mind to the subject in hand, which may be called 
 the natural method, is in truth substituting pro- 
 cesses requiring little or no thought when once 
 learned, for such as demand conscious intelligence 
 
 * Perhaps the student might derive some useful hints 
 towards this species of reduction from the Abbe Gaultier's 
 ingenious work entitled " A Method of making Abridgments, 
 or easy and certain Rules for analysing Authors." London, 
 1800, 
 
RULES IN REASONING. 135 
 
 at every step, and seems eligible only under certain 
 conditions. 
 
 If the natural method is sufficiently simple and 
 easy, and fully adequate to its purpose, the intro- 
 duction of an artificial one is a sheer impertinence, 
 entailing waste of time and labour. If, on the 
 other hand, such mechanical rules replace a long 
 by a compendious process, or a difficult by an easy 
 one, or lead us to the desired result with more 
 certain accuracy than precepts or principles which 
 keep the matter throughout present to our con- 
 sciousness, there is a presumptive advantage in 
 resorting to their assistance. In these cases, they 
 can be wisely rejected only on the ground that 
 they are attended with preponderant evils in other 
 directions ; and when they enable us to accomplish 
 valuable ends, which could not be effected at all 
 without them, there can be no question as to the 
 wisdom of calling them to our aid. 
 
 Some of the systems of artificial memory, for 
 instance, appear to have the merit of enabling 
 those persons who use them to remember things 
 which they could not otherwise so firmly retain, or 
 recollect with equal promptitude and accuracy ; 
 but it may be justly objected that this advantage, 
 which is at best only one of degree, is dearly pur- 
 chased at the expense of connecting our knowledge 
 with images and sounds, arid other associations, to 
 which it has no natural affinity, and thus filling 
 the mind with incongruous and fantastic trains of 
 
 K 4 
 
136 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 thought. Accordingly, such expedients, except a 
 few of the simplest kind, in which the alleged evil 
 is not prominent, have fallen into general neglect. 
 
 On the other hand, those technical terms and 
 mechanical rules and formulas, which are employed 
 in the various departments of calculation, although 
 they may not be improving to our principal mental 
 faculties, do not, at all events, fill the mind with 
 incongruities, while they in some cases substitute 
 short and easy processes for longer and more diffi- 
 cult ones, and in others enable us to arrive at 
 results which we should vainly attempt without 
 them. 
 
 That the peculiar assistance which the scholastic 
 logic holds out is of this technical and mechanical 
 character, no one will probably dispute. Its pro- 
 fessed business is to leave out of consideration 
 facts and things, and deal with terms and propo- 
 sitions ; and these it denudes, as much as possible, 
 of meaning, that their most general relations may 
 be alone regarded. 
 
 Moreover, after affixing technical acceptations 
 to certain words, it constructs rules and symbols, 
 by the observance and employment of which we 
 may draw our conclusions correctly, without taking 
 into view the particular signification of what we 
 are reasoning about without, in truth, any expen- 
 diture of thought ; and, of course, by the me- 
 chanical application of these rules to the arguments 
 of others, we may test their soundness, with a 
 
RULES IN REASONING. 137 
 
 similar disregard of their special import. The 
 questions, then, which we have to consider, are 
 whether these mechanical tests are needed, and are 
 superior in efficiency to such as we may derive, 
 when requisite, from the matter and meaning of 
 the reasoning ; and whether they are not attended 
 with intellectual disadvantages, which must, in 
 any case, render their adoption inexpedient. 
 
 The principal constituent parts of this mechan- 
 ical ordeal (and it will not probably be deemed 
 requisite to examine any other than these) are the 
 rules relating to the distribution of terms, the 
 devices and directions for reducing what are called 
 imperfect syllogisms to the first figure, and the 
 canons or maxims which have been introduced to 
 supersede the necessity of such a reduction. 
 
 Our first business, then, will be to examine 
 whether the rules relating to the distribution of 
 terms furnish any valuable assistance. 
 
 Let us take one of the rules laid down on this 
 point, " No term must be distributed in the con- 
 clusion, which was not distributed in one of the 
 premises ; " and let us apply it to the following 
 reasoning : 
 
 All men are mortal ; 
 
 Angels are not men ; 
 
 Therefore angels are not mortal. 
 Now, in order to determine whether this syllo- 
 gism is valid by the above rule, you must examine 
 the two terms in the conclusion, when you will 
 
138 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 find that both of them are there distributed. You 
 find, further, that the minor term " angels " is 
 distributed in the premises, but that the major 
 term " mortal " is not distributed in the premises. 
 The rule consequently is violated ; there is what is 
 called an illicit process of the major, and the 
 syllogism is not valid. 
 
 No doubt that in this way we detect the fallacy ; 
 but surely we detect it at once, without passing 
 through this examination of the technical con- 
 formity of the terms to the logical canon. We see 
 from the meaning of the propositions, that the 
 argument is unsound, as readily as we discern that 
 a term is distributed in the conclusion which is 
 not distributed in the premises. A person who 
 was unacquainted with the distribution of terms, 
 on hearing such an argument, would probably 
 exclaim, " Angels are not mortal, because they are 
 not men, who are mortal ! Why, the same reason 
 would prove that pigs are immortal ! If men were 
 the only mortal beings in the universe, the reasoning 
 would be good." 
 
 It is obvious that the circumstance of your not 
 belonging to a given class is no proof that you do 
 not possess any quality in common with the class. 
 You are not a cow, but this is no proof that you 
 do not breathe. 
 
 The same result will attend an examination of 
 the rule which requires the distribution of the 
 middle term. I have seen it somewhere argued 
 
RULES IN REASONING. 139 
 
 that the very viciousness of Negroes proves them 
 to be men. Putting this argument syllogistically, 
 and supplying, for the sake of illustration, a major 
 premise to suit our purpose, we have, 
 All men are vicious ; 
 Negroes are vicious ; 
 Therefore they are men. 
 
 Here a logician would at once see that the middle 
 term " vicious " is not distributed, and would pro- 
 nounce the argument unsound. But it is just as 
 easy to see that the fact of Negroes being vicious 
 would not prove them to be men unless that 
 quality were the exclusive attribute of men. 
 
 The logical rule is, that the middle term must 
 be distributed, otherwise the syllogism is false. 
 
 The real or material rule is, that the possession 
 of one quality, or one set of qualities, in common 
 with a given class, does not of itself prove the 
 possessors to belong to the class. A cow breathes 
 in common with human beings, but this is no proof 
 that she belongs to the genus homo. 
 
 The technical rule is not only without any pre- 
 tension to be easier of application than the material 
 one, but it tends to keep out of sight the substance 
 of the fallacy committed. In fact, the system 
 puts us in such cases to twofold or threefold 
 trouble. We have first to learn the rule and to 
 discern its validity, and we have then to apply it 
 mechanically to the syllogism before us ; but 
 neither of these steps is easier than the immediate 
 
140 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 discernment of the substantial error in the rea- 
 soning by an equal application of the mind to the 
 matter of the argument. 
 
 The rules, nevertheless, regarding the distri- 
 bution of terms, and the rules generally regarding 
 syllogisms, although such as are merely technical 
 might be replaced with advantage by what I have 
 called material rules, are, at all events, easy of 
 acquisition, as well as capable of being readily 
 turned to some account, and hence are by no 
 means the most exceptionable features of the scho- 
 lastic logic. 
 
 The second class of rules before mentioned, viz., 
 those relating to the reduction of syllogisms, and 
 to what are denominated the moods and figures, 
 which make a great show in logical treatises, con- 
 stitute a much more objectionable part of the 
 system, demanding wearisome study before any 
 one can attain such a familiarity with them as is 
 requisite for use, and yielding no fruit but what 
 (if I may hazard the metaphor on such a subject) 
 is full of the ashes of time thus laboriously con- 
 sumed. 
 
 The acknowledged fact to which I have before 
 adverted, that every syllogism is not an exemplifi- 
 cation of the dictum, or, in the language of lo- 
 gicians, that the dictum is not directly applicable 
 to every syllogism, led to two different modes of 
 proceeding, in order to prove (still to use their 
 
HULES IN REASONING. 141 
 
 own language) the validity of the reasoning in such 
 cases. The first (and this was the method of Ari- 
 stotle himself) was to have recourse to the con- 
 version of propositions and the transposition of 
 premises, for the purpose of bringing every syllo- 
 gism that did not exemplify the maxim into a 
 shape in which it would, i. e., under what is tech- 
 nically called the first figure. 
 
 Thus the scheme of moods and figures, the bar- 
 barous phraseology by which the former are desig- 
 nated, and the reduction of syllogisms according to 
 certain literal indications from one mood and figure 
 to another, may be regarded as the progeny of the 
 unsound doctrine that all reasoning proceeds on 
 one principle, and of the supposed necessity of 
 bringing all arguments under it. 
 
 In the chapter on the general principles of 
 reasoning, I have shown that each figure or variety 
 of syllogism proceeds on, or exemplifies, its own 
 principle ; and such being the case, if it is neces- 
 sary, on any occasion, to appeal, after the manner 
 of mathematicians, to any axiom, the particular 
 maxims belonging to the figure may be cited, 
 without resorting to the intricate machinery for 
 transmuting one form of argument into another. 
 
 Let us examine, nevertheless, what this process 
 of reduction effects. Take an example from Dr. 
 Whately. He gives us the following syllogism in 
 the mood Camestres, as one to be reduced : 
 
142 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 All true philosophers account virtue a good in 
 
 itself; 
 The advocates of pleasure do not account 
 
 virtue a good in itself; 
 Therefore they are not true philosophers. 
 One would think this sufficiently plain ; but it 
 does not come within the first figure. It must, 
 therefore, be brought into a mood which does. 
 Reduced to the mood Celarent by conversion and 
 transposition, the syllogism assumes the following 
 appearance : 
 
 Those who account virtue a good in itself are 
 
 not advocates of pleasure ; 
 All true philosophers account virtue a good in 
 
 itself; 
 Therefore no true philosophers are advocates 
 
 of pleasure. 
 
 But still the conclusion we have got is not the 
 original conclusion ; and, in order to show that we 
 have obtained an equivalent one, we must force it 
 to undergo illative conversion, when it will emerge 
 in the form of, No advocates of pleasure are true phi- 
 losophers ; which must, in its turn, be transmuted 
 by a slight alteration into the equipollent and pris- 
 tine proposition, The advocates of pleasure are not 
 true philosophers ; and, at length, our work is done. 
 It is manifest that here, after all this logical 
 labour and circuitous ingenuity, we gain nothing. 
 The syllogism, which issues out of the operation, 
 is not in the slightest degree clearer than the ori- 
 ginal one. 
 
RULES IN REASONING. 143 
 
 So much for the first method of getting over the 
 inapplicability of the dictum to the second, third, 
 and fourth figures. The second method was to 
 allow the refractory syllogisms in. these figures to 
 retain their forms, and to call in the aid of other 
 principles or maxims which might be directly 
 applied to them. Discarding altogether the process 
 of reduction, it borrowed two mathematical axioms, 
 changing the term equality to that of agreement. 
 They are, "if two things [or terms] agree with 
 one and the same third, they agree with each 
 other ; " and " if one thing [or term] agrees, and 
 another disagrees, with one and the same third, 
 they disagree with each other." 
 
 If these maxims are taken in their obvious ac- 
 ceptation, they are such as many of our common 
 reasonings exemplify. Thus we sometimes argue 
 that two objects agree in form, colour, smoothness, 
 temperature, resplendence, and other qualities, be- 
 cause they have been severally compared with a 
 third object, and found to resemble it in these 
 respects. In this acceptation they further elu- 
 cidate the truth, that demonstration proceeds on a 
 variety of principles besides the dictum. 
 
 But this is not the sense in which the logical 
 canons are to be understood. The phrase, " Agree- 
 ing with a term" is to be taken in a peculiar tech- 
 nical acceptation ; and unless certain rules re- 
 specting the comparison and agreement of wholes 
 and parts of terms are understood and observed, tho 
 
144 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 maxims, as they are called, are neither evident 
 nor applicable. 
 
 It is obvious that these maxims, so interpreted, 
 are not analogous to such as were considered in the 
 chapter on that subject. They are not educible 
 from the syllogisms in any of the figures ; nor are 
 they to be classed with the mathematical axioms 
 from which they have been transformed. Bearing 
 the semblance of self-evident maxims, they are, in 
 truth, very artificial rules by which, with the help 
 of other rules, and technical distinctions, the va- 
 lidity of syllogisms may be tested.* 
 
 * Logicians are far from being agreed as to the merits of 
 the method here described. Wallis speaks of it in the following 
 terms : " NonnuDi autem Logici (nostri seculi aut superioris) 
 posthabita veterum probatione per Dictum de Omni et de JVW/o ; 
 aliud substituunt illius loco postulatum ; nimirum, Quce con- 
 veniunt in eodem tertio conveniunt inter se. Atque ad hanc 
 regulam exigentes singulos syllogismorum modos, inde con- 
 clusum eunt justam eorum consecutionem. Quique sic proce- 
 dunt, negligere possunt earn distinctionem modorum perfectorum 
 et imperfectorum ; ut quse or turn ducit ab ea methodo qua usi 
 sunt veteres, in probatione sua ab illo Dicto. Ego veterum 
 probationem ut potiorem amplector, Aristotelis methodo con- 
 formem." Institutio Logicce, lib. iii. cap. 5. 
 
 It may be well to subjoin Mr. Walker's commentary on this 
 method. " But clear as these principles are in mathematics, 
 when transferred by analogy to the agreement or disagreement 
 of terms or ideas, in affirmative or negative propositions, they 
 by no means have that definite and certain meaning which is 
 necessary in principles that are taken for the basis of such a 
 superstructure as the doctrine of syllogisms. Aristotle had too 
 much penetration to rest the doctrine on this foundation." 
 Commentary on the Dublin Compendium of Logic, by John 
 Walker, 4th ed,, p. 93. 
 
RULES IN REASONING. 145 
 
 It is needless, perhaps, to task the reader's 
 patience by any detail in reference to this second 
 method. In order, however, to complete the sur- 
 vey of these mechanical aids, I will adduce a single 
 example of the way in which it is carried into 
 effect. 
 
 Let the syllogism to be put on its trial be the 
 following : 
 
 Some logical writers are tedious ; 
 "Wallis is a logical writer ; 
 Therefore Wallis is tedious. 
 
 Here the major term, tedious, has been com- 
 pared to only a part of the middle term, logical 
 writers ; and the minor term, Wallis, also to only a 
 part of it. And since these two parts, for aught 
 that appears, may be different portions of the same 
 whole, it cannot be affirmed that the major and 
 minor terms have been compared with one and the 
 same third, nor, consequently, that they agree with 
 each other. The canon has riot been complied with, 
 and the conclusion does not follow from the pre- 
 mises. Wallis is not proved to be a tedious writer. 
 
 This is all very true ; but it is a very round- 
 about method of detecting a fallacy which is ob- 
 vious on a bare inspection, or which may be made 
 apparent, if any aid be wanted in so plain a case, 
 by a simple material rule ; or which may be made 
 readily proved even by resorting to the rule which 
 requires the distribution of the middle term. 
 
 As a method of testing syllogisms, it is scarcely 
 
 L 
 
146 THE THEOEY OF REASONING. 
 
 less intricate, and not more satisfactory, than the 
 other methods already examined. 
 
 From the whole of this, I fear, wearisome inves- 
 tigation, it results that the logical system will not 
 bear the criteria applied to it. 
 
 Such an artificial system is needless, because 
 the natural method is ready of application, and 
 sufficient of itself. It does not substitute com- 
 pendious processes for long ones, nor such as are 
 easy for such as are difficult, nor those which are 
 more certain for those which are less to be relied 
 upon; and it has not the slightest pretensions to 
 the power of conducting us to results which we 
 could not reach without its assistance ; while, on 
 the other hand, the study of it requires a great 
 expenditure of time and labour, and, as I shall en- 
 deavour to show hereafter, is attended, from its very 
 nature, with intellectual evils of no inconsiderable 
 moment. 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 The Subject of Rules continued: Rules of the 
 Scholastic Logic. 
 
 FROM the preceding examination it appears that 
 there are only two or three errors worth notice 
 which all these distinctions and canons have been 
 devised to guard us against*; and, in the course 
 
 * I have not taken cognizance of the rules about negative 
 premises and the infraction of them, because they seem to be 
 
RULES IN REASONING. 147 
 
 of it, the obvious truth has been pointed out, that, 
 if rules are at all necessary or useful, a few easy 
 material rules would serve the purpose. 
 
 But I have very strong doubts whether the 
 errors in question are ever committed except from 
 confusion or ambiguity of language, or possibly 
 from such a separation of the premises from the 
 conclusion as may occasion a misrecollection of 
 what they are ; in each of which cases no assist- 
 ance could be derived from logical rules. 
 
 A valid syllogism, when clearly expressed, is 
 discerned at once to be valid. The conclusion is 
 seen to be demonstrated by the premises, and a 
 denial of it to involve a contradiction. The 
 validity of the syllogism itself is a thing beyond 
 proof. 
 
 But if a valid syllogism is, in this way, discerned 
 to be conclusive, a fallacious syllogism would, in 
 the same way, be at once discerned to be fallacious 
 or inconclusive, under the same condition, viz. 
 when clearly expressed. 
 
 It follows that, when faults are committed in 
 syllogistic reasoning, they must be owing to want 
 of clearness and preciseness of expression ; and the 
 
 passed over by logical writers with the barest mention. Indeed, 
 the purely logical fallacies, to guard against which the artificial 
 system just examined is solely applicable, are allowed to 
 occupy very little space in most treatises on the subject and 
 deservedly: but the reader is constantly wondering why so 
 complicated an apparatus is introduced for an end apparently 
 so small in itself and so little thought of by its expositors. 
 
 L 2 
 
J48 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 infallible way to test the soundness and unsound- 
 ness of such reasoning is to supply what it wants 
 to throw it into precise and perspicuous language. 
 This must be sufficient, in the nature of the case, 
 to bring all errors to light. 
 
 It may be presumed, therefore, that the fallacies 
 which we have already passed in review under the 
 names of non-distribution of the middle term and 
 illicit processes, when they do occur in regular 
 syllogisms, are owing to ambiguity or confusion of 
 language: in other words, they are never com- 
 mitted when the premises are fully and clearly 
 stated in proper juxtaposition with the conclusion. 
 Let us take an example of the non-distribution of 
 the middle term. 
 
 Some animals are cold-blooded ; 
 The sheep is an animal ; 
 Therefore the sheep is cold-blooded. 
 
 In a syllogism expressed in this clear unam- 
 biguous manner, such a conclusion may be safely 
 pronounced to be impossible. 
 
 It may be instructive to remark, that the only 
 discernible or assignable difference between such a 
 logical fallacy, and drawing an unwarranted infer- 
 ence from an insufficient induction of facts, is, that 
 in the latter case, the " some animals " adduced 
 are avowedly, although erroneously, taken as suffi- 
 cient specimens of the rest, and contradictory in- 
 stances are assumed not to exist ; whereas, in the 
 logical error, this is not professedly assumed : the 
 fact of some animals being cold-blooded is alleged 
 
RULES IN REASONING. 149 
 
 as a sufficient reason (although it is not pretended 
 that there are not also some animals which are 
 warm-blooded) for concluding any other animal to 
 be so. But a logical error of this kind is so very 
 absurd, that it is doubtful whether any human 
 mind ever really committed it, the actual mistake 
 being either an insufficient induction, or a fault in 
 expression.* 
 
 There is the case, indeed, of disparted premises 
 and conclusion already named, in which we may 
 conceive that the logical error might possibly 
 occur, or seem to occur. It sometimes happens 
 that the premises and the conclusion of an argu- 
 ment are widely separated from each other by 
 irrelevant matter, superfluous verbiage, or prolix 
 dissertation, so that, when the conclusion is ar- 
 rived at, the premises are but indistinctly recalled : 
 and thus the reasoner himself may be betrayed 
 into an inference which they will not support, and 
 into which the reader will in all likelihood supinely 
 follow him. This, however, is misrecollection or 
 misconception of what the premises really are, and 
 
 * Mr. Hallam is the only logician, as far as I know, who has 
 remarked in such instances the close similarity of the inductive 
 to the logical error, and the circumstance of one being some- 
 times confounded with the other. He observes that " the as- 
 sertion of a general premise upon an insufficient examination 
 of particulars " " is the error into which men really fall, not that 
 of omitting to distribute the middle term, though it comes in 
 effect, and often in appearance, to the same thing? Intro- 
 duction to the Literature of Europe, vol. iii. p. 220. 
 
 L 3 
 
150 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 not a wrong inference from them; nor could the 
 error be prevented or detected by any logical rule ; 
 but if the argument were freed from its encum- 
 brances, and premises and conclusion, clearly ex- 
 pressed, were brought into juxtaposition, the bad 
 reasoning would be too manifest to impose upon a 
 child. 
 
 Let us next take an example of the illicit pro- 
 cess of the major term. 
 All vegetables grow ; 
 Animals are not vegetables ; 
 Therefore animals do not grow. 
 
 Is it conceivable that any one could commit a 
 fallacy of this nature ? that a naturalist, for 
 example, after collecting instances to show that a 
 class possess a certain quality, should adduce this 
 collective fact in proof that a totally different class 
 do not possess it ? Surely, absurdities of this 
 kind, of which no one is likely even to approach 
 the brink, are beneath the attention of the logical 
 legislator. Rules devised as a safeguard against 
 mistakes which there is no danger of a sane mind 
 falling into may be multiplied without end, but 
 they can form only a dead weight on the system 
 into which they are introduced. 
 
 If logical errors are thus owing, in all cases 
 (except in the peculiar case of separated premises 
 and conclusion), to faults of expression, what as- 
 sistance does the scholastic system afford for guard- 
 ing against this source of fallacy? None, I am 
 
RULES IN REASONING. 151 
 
 persuaded, worth regarding. It is not even pre- 
 tended that it affords much. 
 
 It has, indeed, been urged by some writers that 
 the canons of the scholastic logic assist us to dis- 
 cover them by directing our attention to the 
 middle term, in which any ambiguity is most 
 likely to lurk, as may be seen, they say, in such 
 syllogisms as the following: 
 
 Light is contrary to darkness ; 
 
 Feathers are light ; 
 
 Therefore feathers are contrary to darkness. 
 Here, doubtless, the ambiguity is in the middle 
 term ; but the middle term has not, unfortunately, 
 a monopoly of equivocation. It is just as easy, by 
 an ambiguous major term, to prove another extra- 
 ordinary quality in feathers : 
 
 All bodies are heavy ; 
 
 A feather is a body ; 
 
 Therefore a feather is heavy. 
 The truth is, that in reasoning we are never safe 
 without a constant scrutiny of all the words we 
 employ, i. e. without a perpetual recurrence to the 
 things signified ; and if our attention is directed 
 to the middle term more especially than to the 
 other terms, we may be led to overlook ambiguities 
 in the latter which might not otherwise escape us. 
 All this once more forces upon our minds the 
 immense contrast between the elaborate apparatus 
 of the scholastic logic and the inconsiderable end 
 achieved by it ; guarding us, at the utmost, from a 
 
 L 4 
 
152 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 few mistakes in which there is scarcely the slightest 
 risk of our being involved except from causes of 
 error which it is powerless to obviate or to remedy. 
 
 These views coincide with those which appear 
 to have been entertained by the authors of the 
 " Port Eoyal Logic," though not perhaps with 
 uniform consistency. 
 
 " If we ever sin," they remark, " against the 
 rules of syllogism, it is by deceiving ourselves 
 
 with the equivocation of some term 
 
 Not but that there are still other vices of reasoning 
 besides that which springs from the equivocal 
 meaning of terms, but these it is almost impossible 
 for a man of average mind, and possessed of some 
 knowledge, ever to fall into, especially in speculative 
 matters, and thus it would be useless to give rules 
 against these vices and urge their observance ; and 
 it would, indeed, be frivolous, since the application 
 which would be given to these superfluous rules 
 might divert the attention which we ought to pay 
 to things more necessary."* 
 
 Although I have thus been led to an unfavour- 
 able appreciation of the system, particularly of the 
 technical and mechanical apparatus peculiar to it, 
 I will readily admit that there are some points 
 about it which deserve preservation. 
 
 Few will question that the logic of Aristotle and 
 his followers furnishes a number of useful as well 
 
 * Port Royal Art of Thinking, part iv. chap. 8. In this 
 extract I have availed myself of Mr. Baynes's translation. 
 
RULES IN REASONING. 153 
 
 as useless distinctions relative to words and pro- 
 positions ; and many convenient terms for desig- 
 nating the parts and incidents of argumentation, 
 including the different kinds of fallacies into which 
 a reasoner is apt to fall. Many, however, of these, 
 indeed most of them that can be considered of 
 importance, are independent of any peculiar theory 
 of reasoning, and may be regarded as of common 
 use. 
 
 It must be also admitted, that the syllogistic 
 form may be usefully employed on some occasions, 
 without the reasoner troubling himself with any of 
 the technicalities of the system. We have already 
 seen that much reasoning does exemplify or proceed 
 upon the dictum de omni et nullo or other allied 
 dicta, and that many arguments which are usually 
 expressed in the form of enthymemes may be 
 rightly expanded into syllogisms. To draw out 
 such arguments, when it is needful to examine 
 their accuracy, into three separate propositions 
 enables us to see distinctly, and to point out to 
 others, the facts which must be true, or proved, or 
 admitted, in order to render the conclusion valid. 
 It is a method of spreading out the premises before 
 us, which may be occasionally resorted to with 
 advantage, even by those who would discard the 
 syllogism as the shape into which every argument 
 might be legitimately thrown, and who would 
 reject all mechanical contrivances for securing a 
 correct conclusion. 
 
154 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 Here, however, we are supposing an enthymeme 
 ready to our hands, while in ordinary cases the 
 chief difficulty, as I have before remarked, would 
 lie in reducing the argument into two or three 
 distinct propositions, not in perceiving the force or 
 the fallacy of the reasoning, when brought into 
 such a regular and definite shape. 
 
 We have been hitherto engaged with what may 
 be termed the internal merits and demerits of the 
 system ; but it may be instructive to cast a glance 
 on its external effects, or, in other words, its prac- 
 tical value in action and science. 
 
 Amongst the most plausible attempts to vindi- 
 cate the practical value of the syllogistic art, is 
 one to be found in the commentary of Mr. Walker 
 on the " Dublin Compendium of Logic," in which 
 he has contrasted the position of an adept in the 
 art when engaged in controversy, and that of an 
 antagonist wholly ignorant of it. 
 
 " A real acquaintance," he says, " with the art 
 of logic will abundantly compensate the labour of 
 acquiring it. Nor have I ever met a person un- 
 acquainted with it, who could state and maintain 
 his arguments with facility, clearness, and pre- 
 cision. To instance only in one of the occasions 
 to which it may be applied: I have commonly 
 seen a man of the acutest mind puzzled by the 
 argument of his antagonist ; sensible, perhaps, 
 that it was inconclusive, but wholly unable to 
 expose the fallacy which rendered it so ; while a 
 
RULES IN REASONING. 155 
 
 logician, of perhaps very inferior talents, would be 
 able at once to discern and to mark it. It was 
 happily remarked by a late lawyer of eminence, 
 in a letter to his son, that nothing is superior to 
 logic for setting a fine edge on the understanding."* 
 
 Although the correctness of this contrast were 
 to be admitted, the most important point would 
 still be left untouched. 
 
 The logician described might, doubtless, possess 
 a superiority over an antagonist who had never 
 attended to the nature of reasoning at all, or who 
 was not familiar with its different phases ; but, 
 let us ask, how would he compare with one who 
 had studied the subject in the pages of Locke and 
 Stewart, or in the light in which it has been the 
 aim of this treatise to place it ; whose mind had 
 been familiarised with what we are told the scho- 
 lastic logic disowns the scrutiny of premises, and 
 with the processes of direct contingent reasoning, 
 and especially the formation of general laws from 
 collected facts ; who was capable of discerning 
 the exact range of the scholastic system; who 
 could discriminate a major premise arrived at by 
 
 * Familiar Commentary, p. 4. It may amuse the reader to 
 compare Mr. Walker's testimony with that of Locke. " I have 
 known," the latter says, " a man unskilful in syllogism, who at 
 first hearing could perceive the weakness and inconclusiveness 
 of a long, artificial, and plausible discourse, wherewith others 
 better skilled in syllogism have been misled. And I believe 
 there are few of my readers who do not know such." Essay on 
 Human Understanding^ book iv. chap. xvii. 
 
156 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 a process of induction, from a useless maxim 
 forced into 'the same position upon an already 
 effective enthymeme, like a crutch thrust into 
 the hands of a perfectly sound man ; and who, 
 through the mere forms of reasoning, could see 
 whether an inference was to be regarded as con- 
 tingently or conclusively demonstrated ; who, in a 
 word, had within him a distinct consciousness of 
 what he was about, of the nature of the processes 
 in his own mind, and a clear view of the bearing 
 of the implicated facts, independently of the forms 
 and phraseology in which they might be expressed ? 
 
 Although one who had studied an erroneous 
 theory, and an art founded upon it, in which 
 there would probably be a mixture of truth and 
 error, might carry off the palm in a contest with 
 an adversary who had paid no attention to the 
 nature of reasoning at all, it is allowable to sup- 
 pose that he would, in his turn, find himself 
 inferior to another antagonist who was master 
 of a more correct theory than his own. 
 
 But a still more important question remains : 
 which of the two would be likely to have greater 
 success, not in mere personal controversy, but in 
 the pursuit of truth, in the prosecution of science, 
 in the estimation of evidence, and in drawing with 
 accuracy those numberless conclusions which are 
 required from every one by the daily exigencies of 
 life? 
 
 It may be considered as a remarkable circum- 
 
RULES IN REASONING. 157 
 
 stance, in confirmation of these views of the small 
 practical value of the scholastic logic, that in the 
 rapid progress of science which has marked the last 
 two hundred years, it appears to have had no share 
 and to have yielded no assistance ; nor have we 
 any evidence that the greatest philosophers and the 
 most effective reasoners either in practical or specu- 
 lative matters (Leibnitz perhaps excepted) had so 
 much as a tolerable acquaintance with it. Some of 
 them have even been accused of evincing by oc- 
 casional errors in their casual references, or their 
 depreciating comments, how little they understood 
 what they referred to or assailed. 
 
 Even those writers who have recently attempted 
 to revive the attention of the world to its merits 
 seem to have contented themselves with a theo- 
 retical advocacy of its claims ; for their writings 
 furnish few proofs that its technical distinctions and 
 mechanical rules have been pressed into actual 
 service. A casual notice here and there that some 
 syllogism which they are employing or commenting 
 upon, ranks under Barbara or Baroko, is all that 
 we meet with. 
 
 Should it be replied to this allegation, that these 
 logicians may nevertheless have been tacitly guided 
 by its rules, although they have not allowed the 
 fact to appear ; the reply may be admitted as pos- 
 sibly true, although not very probably so, while we 
 have the opposing testimony of no less an authority 
 than Dr. Whately, who, in a remarkable passage, 
 
158 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 has told us that " the generality of logical writers, 
 whenever they have to treat of any thing that is 
 beyond the mere elements of Logic, totally lay aside 
 all reference to the principles they have been oc- 
 cupied in establishing and explaining, and have 
 recourse to a loose, vague, and popular kind of 
 language." ' Can there be a more complete sur- 
 render of the practical value of all that is peculiar 
 in the art ? f 
 
 The case of the mathematicians, however, is on 
 the whole, perhaps, the most striking. 
 
 Although many of the steps in geometrical 
 reasoning (all of them according to the logicians 
 themselves) may be brought under the dictum de 
 omni et nullo, and thus fall within the domain of 
 formal logic, it is notorious that no use of the scho- 
 lastic rules and distinctions is ever made in this 
 great department of demonstrative science, in which 
 we never hear of undistributed middles, illicit pro- 
 cesses, moods and figures, and reduction of syllo- 
 gisms.;); Nothing surely can be a stronger external 
 proof of the limited utility, not to say the utter 
 
 * Elements of Logic, p. 133., 1st ed. 8vo. 
 
 f The following testimony to the want of adaptation in the 
 art to the requirements of intellectual beings is curious. 
 " Experience shows," say the authors of the Port Royal Art of 
 Thinking, " that of a thousand young men who learn logic, 
 there are not ten who remember anything of it six months 
 after having finished their course." Discourse ii. 
 
 \ It is a remark of D'Alembert's, " que les geometres, ceux 
 de tous les philosophes qui se sont toujours le moins trompes, 
 
RULES IN REASONING. 159 
 
 inefficiency, of the technicalities and mechanism of 
 the logical system. It is plain that the highest, 
 the most accurate, the most recondite, as well as 
 the most popular reasoning in the world goes on 
 without their assistance. 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 Subject of Rules continued : Effects of the Scholastic 
 System as a Discipline of the Mind. 
 
 FROM the preceding survey of the subject, it is 
 apparent not only that technical rules, by which 
 operations of a mechanical character may be em- 
 ployed to test the validity of arguments, are ex- 
 ceedingly limited in their application, and, when 
 they can be applied, are useless or less useful than 
 rules founded on the matter or signification of the 
 reasoning ; but that in argumentative discourse 
 and the prosecution of science they are found to be 
 practically of little or no value. 
 
 But this negative condemnation is not all. They 
 are positively evil, not only by all the trouble and 
 perplexity which they needlessly occasion, but in 
 a still higher degree by withdrawing attention from 
 
 ont to uj ours ete ceux qui ont fait le moins de syllogismes." 
 Elemens de Philosophic, v. Logique. 
 
 " It does not appear," says Dr. Reid, " that Euclid, or 
 Apollonius, or Archimedes, or Huygens, or Newton, ever made 
 the least use of this art ; and I am even of opinion that no use 
 can be made of it in mathematics." Analysis of Aristotle's 
 Logic, chap. iv. section 5. 
 
160 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 the substantial nature of all ratiocination, and 
 fixing it exclusively or mainly on the adjustment 
 of terms and propositions. This may, perhaps, be 
 characterised as the grand evil of the Aristotelian 
 Logic, by which it has stunted the minds and 
 fettered the progress of the most intelligent nations. 
 
 It is an important truth too generally overlooked, 
 that the habitual application of such mechanical 
 rules as those we have examined leads the mind 
 away from the due appreciation of the realities 
 with which reasoning has to do ; from the ex- 
 amination of objects, and the investigation of 
 events. It has somewhat of the same effect in 
 diverting the mind from the consideration of facts, 
 that the study of the rules of Latin prosody with 
 the exercise of making verses according to those 
 rules, has in turning it aside from attention to the 
 rhythm and euphony of the lines. The student 
 may become exceedingly familiar with the rules 
 for long and short syllables, and expert in con- 
 structing verses with the legitimate feet, while his 
 taste and skill in metrical melody remain unculti- 
 vated ; for instead of being guided by the quality 
 of the sounds, he directs his course, in a great 
 measure, by distinctions founded on the termination 
 of syllables and the juxtaposition of letters; dis- 
 tinctions which have, to modern ears, no direct 
 effect on the music of the verse, or, at all events, 
 may be observed without any reference to it. 
 
 How different is the composition of verse by a 
 
RULES IN REASONING. 161 
 
 poet in his native tongue ! He is not under the 
 influence of mechanical rules, but follows the im- 
 pulse of his rhythmical taste and feelings, or con- 
 forms to principles founded on the observed effects 
 of articulate sounds, or of emotions in modulating 
 their cadence ; and hence there is naturally a pro- 
 gressive improvement in the delicacy of his dis- 
 crimination, and in his power of skilfully arranging 
 the march of his verse. 
 
 And so in reasoning. Trained in the distinctions 
 of technical logic, a man may become dexterous 
 in the conversion of propositions, and at home in 
 moods and figures ; he may show himself ready in 
 the detection of fallacies in form, in finding out 
 the non-distribution of middle terms, and tracing 
 
 ' O 
 
 illicit processes of the minor and the major, at 
 least in syllogisms which are prepared to his hands 
 in books or invented for the sake of illustration ; 
 while, in all this, the faculty of looking at facts, 
 estimating their value, discovering what they prove, 
 and extricating them from any verbiage in which 
 they may be involved, which would have been 
 exercised and invigorated by an attention to the 
 material principles of reasoning, remains compara- 
 tively un exercised. 
 
 No one, I think, can look into the writings of 
 the scholastic logicians without being struck with 
 this tendency of the system to withdraw the at- 
 tention from things and fix it upon words. When 
 they describe the syllogism, for example, as con- 
 
 M 
 
162 
 
 THE THEOKY OF REASONING. 
 
 taining three terms, the extremes and the middle ; 
 when they tell us that each of the extremes is to 
 be compared with the middle term in order to 
 judge of their mutual agreement or disagreement ; 
 that the middle term must be distributed once at 
 least; that no term must be distributed in the 
 conclusion which has not been distributed in the 
 premises ; that there must not be four terms ; that 
 the validity of the argument must be manifest from 
 the mere force of the expression, without consi- 
 dering the meaning of the three terms; in such 
 descriptions and rules, they do all that is possible 
 to engross the mind with words and nothing else. 
 
 Not a whisper in all this of facts, objects, events ; 
 the whole proceeding, according to their own re- 
 presentation, is an arrangement and comparison 
 of signs without attending to their signification. 
 What can put realities more completely out of 
 sight ? Instead of being taught to look at the 
 character and relations of the facts about which 
 the reasoning is employed, the young logician is 
 instructed to attend to the most general relations 
 of the words, and he naturally falls into the habit 
 of resting, as far as possible, upon mere forms of 
 expression. 
 
 The rules of Latin Prosody, the canons " r finita 
 corripiuntur" " in b, d, t, desinentia brevia sunt" 
 " producuntur monosyllaba in e," and the rest, are 
 assuredly as much adapted to train the ear to a 
 nice perception of metrical melody, as this logical 
 
RULES IN REASONING. 163 
 
 system to strengthen the masculine efficiency of 
 our reasoning powers in dealing with the important 
 questions of moral, political, and philosophical 
 science, or the multifarious business of actual life. 
 
 Regarded as a discipline of the mind, indeed, 
 I cannot see why the arguments brought against 
 the study of some departments of mathematics 
 should not be brought against the study of techni- 
 cal logic. The latter appears to me to be nearly, 
 in this respect, in the position of the modern cal- 
 culus, the formula of which have been said to 
 transport the mathematician from the data to the 
 conclusion in a carriage with the blinds down ; 
 unlike geometrical demonstration, which compels 
 him to walk over every inch of the road, and be 
 cognizant of every step in his journey. 
 
 But the modern calculus, although it may be of 
 questionable value as a discipline of the mind, is 
 unquestionably a most powerful and an indis- 
 pensable instrument for attaining results which 
 pure geometrical operations could never reach; 
 while technical logic is not only equally low in 
 value as an intellectual exercise, but is besides a 
 clumsy and circuitous method of arriving at its 
 proposed ends. 
 
 Placed in a scene where we are surrounded by 
 objects and immersed in events, we are perpetually 
 obliged to reason about them. 
 
 To train the mind to do this by directing its 
 attention upon words, to the completest practicable 
 
 M 2 
 
164 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 exclusion of things, through the medium of a 
 verbal and literal mechanism, however ingenious, 
 instead of habituating it to face realities and 
 question their significance, seems to me to unfit 
 it for the business in which it is destined to be 
 engaged. 
 
 In former times, when the Aristotelian system 
 had no rival in physical investigation, the bad 
 effects here traced were seen in all their extent; 
 but fortunately in our own day the mischievous 
 influence of such a discipline is greatly counter- 
 acted by the far different discipline of sciences, in 
 which no step of reasoning can be taken without 
 bringing into view the actual phenomena of life 
 and nature. 
 
ERRONEOUS CONCLUSIONS. 165 
 
 CHAP. XII. 
 
 THE SOURCES OF ERRONEOUS CONCLUSIONS. 
 
 FROM the survey which we have now taken of the 
 field of reasoning, we shall be prepared to enter 
 upon that most important question to which any 
 theory on the subject of this treatise necessarily 
 leads, viz. " what are the sources of erroneous 
 conclusions ? " * 
 
 Reasoning consists in coming to conclusions, and 
 the sole legitimate object of the process is to come 
 to such as are correct. Why we do not always 
 succeed in attaining this end it must be instructive 
 to inquire. By erroneous conclusions I here mean 
 false propositions at which we have arrived by in- 
 ference, whatever may have been the sources of the 
 error, whether false facts in the premises, or some 
 false step in the reasoning process itself. This 
 
 * I have not entered into the consideration of fallacies 
 except in so far as the subject of this chapter required it, 
 partly because a minute exposition of them belongs rather to 
 the art than to the theory of reasoning, and partly because 
 they have been very excellently and fully explained by several 
 modern writers, particularly by Dr. Whately and Mr. John 
 Mill in their works already referred to, and by Mr. De Morgan 
 in his " Formal Logic." 
 
 M 3 
 
166 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 remark indicates two of the great sources of erro- 
 neous conclusions, viz., wrong facts or premises, 
 and wrong processes of inference. 
 
 When we undertake a journey, we may fail to 
 reach the proposed end, either by setting out in a 
 wrong direction, or, if we set out right, by de- 
 viating from the true path in the course of our 
 progress. 
 
 In contingent, as indeed in all other reasoning, 
 the premises are of course wrong when the facts 
 asserted in them are either wholly or partially 
 incorrect. We may, from inaccurate observation, 
 or misconception, or misrecollection, or other causes, 
 be led to propound that all A's, as far as our know- 
 ledge has extended, have been found possessed of 
 the attribute B, when, in truth (to take an extreme 
 case), no A's have been found to possess that at- 
 tribute. 
 
 If from such false observation, or undue assump- 
 tion, we proceed to infer that all A's possess B, or 
 that any unobserved A possesses B, it is an in- 
 stance of an erroneous conclusion, of which the 
 source is an erroneous premise. 
 
 On the other hand, the process of inferring a 
 conclusion in contingent reasoning is wrong when 
 the facts contained in the premises, although they 
 are correct, are not sufficient to warrant the in- 
 ference we draw from them. 
 
 Thus we may lay down a universal law in the 
 form of, all A's possess the attribute B, when the 
 
ERRONEOUS CONCLUSIONS. 167 
 
 facts warrant us only in the inference that all A's 
 probably possess the attribute B. 
 
 The universal law in this case would not be a 
 false conclusion from false facts, but would proceed 
 from an erroneous estimate of what the correct 
 facts of the case enable us legitimately to infer. 
 It would be an instance of undue or unwarranted 
 generalisation. 
 
 In demonstrative reasoning there are two cases 
 to be noted. 
 
 In such as consist of one premise, of the nature 
 of a minor, and an inference, erroneous conclusions 
 are scarcely possible, except from false facts ; and 
 these latter are almost excluded from the principal 
 species of such reasoning, viz. mathematical, by 
 the circumstance that the facts about which it is 
 conversant are few and simple. 
 
 With the greater part of syllogistic reasoning 
 the case is otherwise. Here erroneous conclusions 
 may proceed both from wrong premises and from 
 wrong processes of inference. The wrong pre- 
 mises, as in the case of contingent reasoning, 
 assert false facts, and frequently owe their origin 
 to false general laws obtained by such reasoning ; 
 but in a far greater proportion they may be traced 
 to pure gratuitous assumption of general propo- 
 sitions which are not true. 
 
 The wrong processes of inference, or at least the 
 only ones claiming attention, are of two kinds, 
 technically called non-distribution of the middle 
 
 M 4 
 
168 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 term, and illicit processes of the major and minor 
 terms, which I have endeavoured to show are never 
 committed when the propositions of a syllogism are 
 clearly before the mind, and which may therefore 
 be referred to the head of errors attributable to 
 the ambiguity or confusion of terms* 
 
 This brings before us the third great source of 
 erroneous conclusions. Every species and variety 
 of reasoning are liable to be vitiated, and their 
 conclusions rendered erroneous, by the imperfec- 
 tion of language as an instrument of thought and 
 communication ; but less so in proportion as the 
 subjects of the reasoning are simple. In mathe- 
 matical demonstration, indeed, this disturbance 
 may be said to be nought ; while in contingent and 
 class-reasoning generally it extensively prevails. 
 
 This imperfection of language produces its fal- 
 lacious results chiefly when the terms employed 
 are complex, general, or abstract ; and when the 
 reasoning is complicated, immethodical, disjointed, 
 and verbose. When, on the contrary, the words 
 are simple and concrete, and the reasoning is 
 well arranged and condensed, it has little room to 
 operate. 
 
 From this brief glance at the subject, we may 
 gather that the three great sources of false con- 
 clusions are imperfections in language, insufficient 
 induction of facts, and the assumption of false 
 facts, or, to vary the expression, of fictitious pre- 
 mises. 
 
ERRONEOUS CONCLUSIONS. 169 
 
 Their comparative importance appears to me to 
 be in the inverse order in which they are here 
 mentioned, and that of the last to be by far the 
 greatest of all. The few remarks upon them which 
 follow will, however, serve to illustrate their abso- 
 lute rather than their comparative influence. 
 
 The imperfections of language are universally 
 allowed to have great effect in perverting our con- 
 clusions ; and it is acknowledged and regretted that 
 rules and formulas can do little in guarding against 
 them. Habits of mind, nevertheless, can do a great 
 deal. 
 
 But by the term imperfections must be under- 
 stood not mere equivocation of words, but the 
 vagueness, and obscurity, and unmeaningness of 
 language, all of which are to be sedulously guarded 
 against; and the best preservative against these 
 evils is an intellectual habit, quite opposed to that 
 which it is the tendency of the scholastic logic to 
 engender, the habit of calling vividly to mind the 
 objects, and qualities, and events designated by the 
 phrases employed ; of dwelling upon the full and 
 precise meaning of all the words on which our 
 reasoning turns; of picturing to ourselves what- 
 ever is described or narrated ; of turning the ab- 
 stract into the concrete, and reducing the general 
 to the particular. This practice, on all important 
 occasions, would save us from a thousand illusions 
 which the custom of being satisfied with vague and 
 
170 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 indistinct conceptions, or even with such abstract 
 generalities as may be all that, in the eye of logic, 
 the reasoning we are engaged with can require, 
 creates and perpetuates. 
 
 " Unless," says Berkeley, " we take care to clear 
 the first principles of knowledge from the embarrass 
 and delusion of words, we may make infinite rea- 
 sonings upon them to no purpose ; we may draw 
 consequences from consequences, and be never the 
 wiser. The further we go, we shall only lose our- 
 selves the more irrecoverably, and be the deeper 
 entangled in difficulties and mistakes."* 
 
 The second source of erroneous conclusions before 
 specified may be justly considered as equal, if not 
 superior, in importance to the first, and extensively 
 pervades the thoughts and language of mankind. 
 Men are constantly in the habit of drawing general 
 conclusions from instances too few in number, or 
 too incompletely sifted, to warrant them ; in other 
 words, from an insufficient induction of facts.f 
 
 A traveller visiting an unknown country re- 
 marks, in the first few persons he encounters, some 
 peculiar quality or habit, and immediately sets it 
 down as a national characteristic. An historian 
 
 * Of the Principles of Human Knowledge. Introduction. 
 
 f " The false inductions by which general propositions are 
 derived from some particular experiences, constitute one of 
 the most common sources of fallacious reasonings." Port 
 Royal Art of Thinking, part iii. chap. xx. 
 
ERRONEOUS CONCLUSIONS. 171 
 
 comes upon an event which happens to have been 
 ushered in by certain preliminary circumstances ; 
 and he forthwith assumes it as a general law, that 
 such circumstances are the invariable precursors of 
 such events. Medical practitioners, and especially 
 such as are proverbially said to have fools for their 
 patients, will frequently consider a single instance 
 of recovery from disease after the administration 
 of a particular drug, as sufficient to establish the 
 universal efficacy of the medicine in similar cases. 
 
 I have cited illustrations of this familiar character, 
 because the great field now for errors of this de- 
 scription is not to be found in physical science, but 
 in common life. Such fallacies form one of the 
 main characteristics of loose thinking in the bulk of 
 mankind. But these undue generalisations are not 
 seldom found in systematic writers on moral and po- 
 litical philosophy ; and it is sometimes amusing to 
 notice the subsequent fallacies which flow from them. 
 The law enunciated ought, it is manifest, to be laid 
 down from the widest possible survey of facts ; 
 but as, by the supposition, it has been formed 
 from a very partial view, should any hostile facts 
 subsequently present themselves, such facts, in- 
 stead of being allowed to modify the general law, 
 are too often brought under it by an adroit ex- 
 tension or perversion of the terms in which the 
 law is expressed. 
 
 A curious instance of this verbal legerdemain 
 
172 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 was furnished by some political economists many 
 years ago, in order to support the sweeping gene- 
 ralisation, that the values of all commodities are in 
 direct proportion to the quantities of labour be- 
 stowed upon them. A number of instances were 
 pointed out in which this did not hold ; and, 
 amongst the rest, the instance of wine, which, by 
 being simply kept in a cellar without any fresh 
 expenditure of labour upon it, becomes greatly en- 
 hanced in value. Such cases evidently required some 
 modification of the general principle (or rather an 
 ascent to a higher principle, embracing both kinds 
 of instances) ; but the economists in question 
 were not to be driven from their position by 
 such hostile facts as these. They preserved the 
 integrity of their rule by maintaining that, when 
 wine had been raised in value (suppose one tenth), 
 by being kept a considerable period, one tenth of 
 additional labour might be correctly considered as 
 expended upon it, on the ground that capital 
 might be said to be employed during that time, 
 and capital is hoarded labour. Thus an incorrect 
 generalisation of facts was supported by an equally 
 incorrect generalisation of a word. 
 
 The greatest source, however, of erroneous con- 
 clusions, transcending all others in an almost im- 
 measurable degree, is the gratuitous assumption of 
 false premises without any evidence at all. These 
 erroneous premises are assumed in various ways. 
 
ERRONEOUS CONCLUSIONS. 173 
 
 A large majority of them are mere prejudices fas- 
 tened upon the mind by tradition, or instilled into 
 it by dogmatic instruction, or caught from the 
 unanimous voice of society or of books, and are 
 never suspected of error. 
 
 They thus come to form the laws from which, 
 on a thousand occasions, we unhesitatingly reason, 
 and are the foundation of those extraordinary 
 erroneous conclusions which have been prevalent 
 amongst mankind in every age and every country. 
 
 But what are prejudices now must have been at 
 the outset direct errors; and it is a part of the 
 inquiry, how they came first into being ; what 
 were the original causes of the fallacies which have 
 thus hardened into prejudices, and been transmitted 
 from one age to another. 
 
 The chief of these causes we shall find in cir- 
 cumstances which still prevail, and perpetually 
 form new and direct sources of error, such as im- 
 perfectly observing the objects and events around 
 and within us, and thence drawing erroneous 
 general inferences as already explained, mistaking 
 unconscious inferences for facts, and, above all, 
 supposing facts without any evidence, misappre- 
 hending for realities what are mere hypothetical 
 assumptions of our own minds, mere figments of 
 imagination ; to which causes may be added as 
 frequent in every age, particularly amongst the 
 rude and uncultivated, a strong tendency to exag- 
 
174 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 geration, and to the invention as well as to the 
 belief of marvellous events. 
 
 In all these, and numberless other ways, man- 
 kind come to have in their minds wrong grounds of 
 inference, false facts, and erroneous general propo- 
 sitions, from which they reason ; or, to express it 
 still differently, unsound premises, from which 
 they deduce conclusions of corresponding unsound- 
 ness. 
 
 In reference to all these sources of erroneous con- 
 clusions, there is one point on which it is almost 
 impossible to insist too strongly the extreme im- 
 portance of rigorously scrutinising facts, and terms, 
 and inferences, at the commencement of all inves- 
 tigations. 
 
 The origin of a false theory, or a series of false 
 doctrines, may be generally detected in some error 
 lurking in the very first propositions from which it 
 sets out ; and it scarcely needs enforcing on the 
 inquirer, of how much more consequence an error 
 is there than at any subsequent stage of the 
 treatise or speculation in which it occurs. 
 
 It is like an oversight committed in the second 
 or third term of a geometrical progression, com- 
 pared to one of equal numerical magnitude in the 
 last term of a long series.* 
 
 * Example : 2. 4. 8. 16. 32. 64. 126., error of 2 in the 7th term. 
 
 2. 4. 6. 12. 24. 48. 96., error of 2 in the 3d term, 
 
 increased to 32 in the 7th. 
 
EREONEOUS CONCLUSIONS. 175 
 
 The justness of such general observations as 
 have been now given is never so well discerned as 
 when they are elucidated by particular instances ; 
 and I will, therefore, briefly cite examples of the 
 three principal sources of erroneous conclusions 
 described, viz., ambiguities of language, insuffi- 
 cient or faulty induction, leading to undue gene- 
 ralisation, and the assumption of mere suppositions 
 for real facts. 
 
 The examples which I shall adduce of these 
 three several errors, I have selected with the view 
 of also showing how needful it is to examine, with 
 the utmost vigilance, whether such errors infect 
 the original positions from which any theory sets 
 out. 
 
 Of the first-named error a memorable illustration 
 is to be found in the writings of Mr. Ricardo. A 
 number of erroneous and nugatory conclusions 
 in his principal work on Political Economy, of 
 which some appear glaringly paradoxical, and 
 others, on a cursory inspection, wear such a sem- 
 blance of profundity, as to have misled distin- 
 guished economists, had their source in a con- 
 fused and ambiguous use of the word value, which 
 may be detected even in the first section of his 
 first chapter, and pervades the whole of his 
 treatise. 
 
 The readiest way of explaining and elucidating 
 this ambiguity will be to cite a passage from a 
 work in which it is freely exposed. 
 
176 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 " While Mr. Ricardo professedly used the term 
 value in one sense only [that of purchasing power], 
 he insensibly lapsed into a different sense." " The 
 passage in his book where this transition is 
 made, the turning point, if I may so call it, is in 
 the very first section. Having quoted a few sen- 
 tences from Adam Smith, which explain that, in 
 rude ages, the quantities in which commodities 
 were exchanged would be determined by the quan- 
 tities of labour necessary to acquire them, he pro- 
 ceeds : ' If the quantity of labour realised in com- 
 modities regulate their exchangeable value, every 
 increase of the quantity of labour must augment 
 the value of that commodity on which it is ex- 
 ercised, as every diminution must lower it.' Now 
 here Mr. Ricardo begins with using value in the 
 sense of exchangeable value, or purchasing power; 
 and, as he uses it in that sense in the premises, 
 he is bound to do it in the conclusion ; arid the 
 conclusion is true enough, if he means that every 
 increase in the quantity of labour must augment 
 the value of that commodity on which it is exer- 
 cised in relation to other commodities which con- 
 tinued to require only the same labour as before. 
 This, however, although perfectly consonant with 
 his doctrines, will not be found to have been Mr. 
 Ricardo's peculiar meaning. In this proposition 
 he did not extend his view beyond the one commo- 
 dity. The word value did not carry him over, as 
 the phrase power of purchasing would have done, to 
 
ERRONEOUS CONCLUSIONS. 177 
 
 the consideration of some other. An attentive 
 reader will perceive his meaning to have been, 
 that every increase of labour would augment the 
 value of the commodity on which it was exercised 
 without reference to any other commodity. This 
 proposition is the hook from which all his other 
 propositions inconsistent with his own definition 
 depend. This one false step made, he very lo- 
 gically falls into the obscurities and paradoxes 
 which have excited the admiration of his disciples, 
 and the astonishment of every body else."* 
 
 The theory of Mr. Malthus on population is a 
 most instructive example of the second error. It 
 shows what a long train of unsound inferences may 
 be consequent on the precipitate formation of a 
 general law from an insufficient collection of facts ; 
 and this is to be found at the outset of his specula- 
 tions, where it is assumed, on the slenderest grounds, 
 that in all the various races of men, under all cir- 
 cumstances, habits, climates, and conditions, there 
 is a uniform tendency to double their numbers in 
 twenty -five years or less ; a rate of increase which 
 becomes certain provided they are supplied with 
 suificient food, shelter, and clothing; but such a 
 sufficiency, in the long run, they never can be sup- 
 plied with, inasmuch as food increases in only an 
 arithmetical ratio. Even if Mr. Mai thus' s theory 
 
 * Letter to a Political Economist on the Subject of Value. 
 See also "A Critical Dissertation on the Nature, Measures, 
 and Causes of Value, 1825," by the Author. 
 
 N 
 
178 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 could be proved to be correct, the way in which he 
 obtained his fundamental principles would ever re- 
 main a memorable instance of hasty generalisation, 
 not merely as represented by others, but as recorded 
 by himself. 
 
 It fortunately happens that we have an account 
 of the matter in his own words. Nothing can be 
 more explicit than the following statement. 
 
 " It has been said," writes Mr. Malthus, " that I 
 have written a quarto volume to prove that popu- 
 lation increases in a geometrical ratio, and food in 
 an arithmetical ratio ; but this is not quite true. 
 The first of these propositions I considered as proved 
 the moment the American increase was related, and 
 the second proposition as soon as it was enunciated. 
 The chief object of my work was to inquire what 
 effects these laws, which I consider as established 
 in the first six pages, had produced and were likely 
 to produce on society." * 
 
 Thus of two important propositions, teeming 
 with consequences, he considered the first (which 
 in truth required to be substantiated by extensive 
 research and cautious discrimination) as proved by 
 one solitary instance; and the second (scarcely to 
 be established by a less severe process) as purely 
 self-evident. This is assuredly not the way in 
 which the foundation of weighty and comprehensive 
 theories ought to be laid.f 
 
 * Essay on Population, vol. ii. p. 453., 6th ed. 
 
 t The reader who may wish to reconsider this important 
 
ERRONEOUS CONCLUSIONS. 179 
 
 Of the third error in our list we have a striking 
 instance, almost equally instructive in its logical 
 results although less momentous in its practical 
 consequences, in the great fallacy which forms the 
 basis of Berkeley's celebrated Theory of Vision. A 
 more decided case of the assumption of purely 
 imaginative facts as real and incontrovertible pre- 
 mises can scarcely be adduced from the records of 
 philosophical speculation. The false step in question 
 is committed in the second paragraph of his Essay, 
 in which, with a perfect unconsciousness of what he 
 is doing, he converts distance (an abstract term) 
 into a material line, and represents it as both the 
 patient and the agent of physical operations, which 
 are of course wholly fictitious.* 
 
 As this passage, however, will form the subject of 
 particular comment in an Appendix to the present 
 treatise, it is needless, after quoting it below, to do 
 more here than point out the general character of 
 
 question is recommended to consult Mr. Doubleday's " True 
 Law of Population," and an able tract by Mr. Hickson, first 
 published in the Westminster Review, entitled, " An Essay on 
 the Principle of Population," containing, in my opinion, the 
 justest view of the subject yet given to the world, and re- 
 markable for its abstinence from hasty generalisation, the 
 besetting sin of Mr. Malthus. 
 
 * "It is, I think, agreed by all that distance of itself and 
 immediately cannot be seen. For distance being a line directed 
 endwise to the eye, it projects only one point in the fund of 
 the eye. Which point remains invariably the same whether 
 the distance be longer or shorter." 
 
 w 2 
 
180 THE THEORY OF KEASONING. 
 
 the fallacy which it contains and its position in the 
 very van of his logical forces. 
 
 Such instances as these strikingly show the ne- 
 cessity of scrutinising the doctrines of even the 
 most eminent philosophers in their very origin, as 
 well as exemplify the prevalence and importance of 
 those errors which lurk in ambiguities of language, 
 unwarranted generalisations, and assumptions of 
 fiction for fact. 
 
 Whoever attentively reflects on these examples, 
 and on the suggestions regarding them, which have 
 been offered in the present chapter, will probably 
 agree with the author that, although the first two 
 causes of fallacy extensively prevail, yet the greatest 
 revolution remaining to be produced in human 
 thought will arise from a diminution of the last- 
 mentioned source of erroneous conclusions, or, in 
 other words, from an examination of propositions 
 expressive of facts assumed without any evidence. 
 
 The progress of physical science may be looked 
 upon now as secure. In this department of know- 
 ledge, the human mind has succeeded in placing 
 itself on the right track ; and although some im- 
 provement may be effected in the exact expression 
 of abstruse scientific principles, what chiefly remains 
 to be done, is to go forward from the points already 
 attained, to the investigation of facts hitherto 
 overlooked, or not yet brought to light, or not suf- 
 ficiently examined, with all the aid supplied by 
 the exquisite instruments and subtle methods of 
 
ERRONEOUS CONCLUSIONS. 181 
 
 calculation invented by modern ingenuity. The 
 proper mode of proceeding is here insured by such 
 illustrious examples of successful investigation, 
 that the necessity of rules and formulas is almost 
 superseded. But in morals, metaphysics, theology, 
 and politics, with all subjects belonging to social 
 science not comprehended by those terms, and I 
 may add in the science of medicine, a different 
 aspect of affairs presents itself. Here there are 
 innumerable gratuitous and baseless assumptions, 
 received with entire faith as unquestionable and 
 almost self-evident first principles, of the ground- 
 lessness of which no suspicion is entertained. 
 
 These are often mixed with truths, and the 
 various deductions from both being perpetually 
 intermingled with the original data and with each 
 other, the result is a chaos of opinions, from which, 
 in moments of speculative despondency, it seems, 
 to the philosophic mind, impossible for the human 
 race to be extricated. 
 
 The only method of extrication is for the in- 
 quirer to allow no facts, no propositions, no doc- 
 trines, no principles, or whatever else they may be 
 called, to pass before him on any question which 
 he has undertaken to examine, without scrutinising 
 their character and carefully investigating the evi- 
 dence on which they rest, or are supposed to rest ; 
 and where there is no evidence at all, attempting 
 to trace the groundless assumptions to their origin 
 
 N 3 
 
182 THE THEORY OF REASONING. 
 
 in mal-observation, misapprehension, ignorance, 
 falsehood, the love of fiction, or other causes. 
 
 This course is doubtless opposed by a general 
 and a reprehensible repugnance to review esta- 
 blished doctrines, and by the mischievous prejudice, 
 which has so long obstructed philosophical inquiry, 
 that opinions are legitimate objects of moral appro- 
 bation and censure; that for the conclusions to 
 which a man is brought in the free exercise of his 
 intellect, he may be justly subjected to moral 
 condemnation. 
 
 The destruction of this senseless arid pernicious 
 dogma, which subjects the thinking few to the 
 despotism of the unthinking many, would sweep 
 away one of the greatest impediments, not only to 
 the progress of truth, not only to the advance of 
 sound morality, but to the reciprocation of kind 
 feelings and good deeds, to the peace of the in- 
 dividual, the family circle, and the community ; 
 in a word, to the happiness which is ready to flow 
 upon the human race from a thousand sources 
 were it permitted to do so. 
 
 It is not yet adequately perceived how much 
 the predominance of speculative error costs the 
 world. 
 
APPENDIX, 
 
 N 4 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 ARTICLE I. 
 
 AN ANALYSIS OF SOME TRAINS OF REASONING. 
 
 To elucidate and at the same time to test the accuracy 
 of those views of the reasoning process which have been 
 unfolded in the preceding chapters, perhaps the most 
 effectual way will be to examine some specimens of argu- 
 mentation, not fashioned for the purpose, but taken from 
 productions written without reference to theories or canons 
 of logic. The usual course in logical treatises is to frame 
 syllogisms or enthymemes specially adapted to exemplify 
 the rules and observations brought forward ; and this has 
 its advantages ; but it ought not to supersede an exami- 
 nation and analysis of the actual reasoning employed by 
 men in their ordinary discourse and writings to convince 
 each other. The latter procedure may be expected to 
 bring out some points which would have otherwise escaped 
 remark, and, at all events, it is likely enough to put to the 
 test the soundness of any theory on the subject. 
 
 SECTION 1. 
 Analysis of a Demonstration in Euclid. 
 
 The first instance of reasoning which I shall select for 
 this purpose, is the demonstration of a theorem in Euclid. 
 
186 APPENDIX. 
 
 THEOREM. 
 
 An exterior angle of a triangle is equal to both its 
 opposite interior angles, and all the interior angles of a 
 triangle are together equal to two right angles. 
 
 The exterior angle 
 BCD formed by the 
 production of the side 
 AC of the triangle 
 ABC, is equal to the 
 two opposite interior 
 angles CAB and CBA, 
 A * and all the interior 
 
 angles CAB, CBA, and BCA, are together equal to two 
 right angles. 
 
 Through the point c draw the straight line CE parallel 
 to AB. 
 
 1. The interior angle BAC is equal to the exterior angle 
 ECD, because AD is a straight line falling upon the 
 parallel lines AB and CE. (book i. prop. 29.*) 
 
 2. Again, the alternate angles ABC and BCE are equal, 
 because BC is a straight line falling upon the parallel 
 lines AB and CE. (i. 29.) 
 
 3. Wherefore the two interior angles BAC and ABC are 
 together equal to the two angles ECD and BCE or the 
 whole angle BCD. 
 
 4. When to each of these equals is added the angle BC A, 
 the angles BCA, BAC, and ABC, which are the three 
 interior angles of the triangle, are together equal to 
 the angles BCA and BCD. 
 
 5. But the angles BCA and BCD being made by the 
 straight line BC on the same side of the straight line 
 AD, are together equal to two right angles, (i. 13.) 
 
 6. Wherefore the three interior angles of the triangle are 
 also together equal to two right angles. 
 
 * Simson's Euclid. 
 
APPENDIX. 187 
 
 In tins demonstration there are six distinct steps of 
 reasoning. The first and second steps, although in ap- 
 pearance enthymemes, are in reality syllogisms, having 
 the major premises not indeed formally stated nor yet 
 suppressed, but only referred to as propositions formerly 
 proved, viz., " a straight line falling upon two parallel 
 straight lines makes the exterior angle equal to the interior 
 opposite one," and " a straight line falling upon two parallel 
 straight lines makes the alternate angles equal." 
 
 The general principle or maxim exemplified by these two 
 arguments, is the dictum de omni et nullo. In the latter 
 argument, for example, the equality of the alternate angles 
 ABC and BCE is not self-evident, but proved by the alle- 
 gation previously demonstrated that all such angles are 
 equal. 
 
 The third step is an argument not requiring a major 
 premise. The angles BAC and ABC having been shown 
 to be respectively equal to ECD and BCE, the first pair 
 together are intuitively discerned to be equal to the second 
 pair together, or to B c D. 
 
 To such reasoning, indeed, a major premise is, as we all 
 know, sometimes appended, by citing the maxim (forming 
 the 2nd Axiom in Simpson's Euclid) " if equals are added 
 to equals the wholes are equal," but, as already explained, 
 this can bring no confirmation to the argument, which is in 
 itself perfectly conclusive. The axiom cited is only the 
 general principle exemplified by the reasoning, and when 
 introduced as a major premise is a logical impertinence. 
 
 The fourth step is also a self-evident argument requiring 
 no major premise, and exemplifies the same axiom, " when 
 equals are added to equals the wholes are equal," or more 
 correctly, " when the same quantity is added to equals, the 
 wholes are equal." 
 
 The fifth step is again an apparent enthymeme, with the 
 major premise not formally stated but indicated as having 
 been previously proved, viz. " the angles which one straight 
 
188 APPENDIX. 
 
 line makes with another on the same side of it are equal to 
 two right angles." The general principle exemplified is 
 here, as in the first and second steps, the dictum de omni et 
 nullo. 
 
 The sixth step, like the third and fourth steps, is a self- 
 evident argument, not properly admitting or requiring any 
 rnajor premise, being complete as an enthymeme ; but it ex- 
 emplifies a different axiom, viz. " things which are equal to 
 each other are equal to the same thing ; " which is the con- 
 verse of Euclid's, " things which are equal to the same are 
 equal to each other." 
 
 In this demonstration, then, consisting of six steps of 
 reasoning, three of the arguments require respectively a 
 major premise, and three do not: the three former exemplify 
 the dictum de omni et nullo, and the three latter exemplify 
 respectively a mathematical axiom. 
 
 SECTION 2. 
 
 Analysis of a Passage in Burke's Letter on the French 
 Revolution. 
 
 The next specimen of argumentative composition which 
 I purpose to examine, is a passage from Burke, reqiiesting 
 the reader to bear in mind that it is not my design to 
 discuss the validity of the reasoning (although I may 
 hazard incidental remarks on that point), but to exhibit the 
 nature of the various arguments adduced. 
 
 It may be useful to observe, before quoting the passage, 
 that there is one very marked distinction between mathe- 
 matical and what is usually called moral reasoning, or 
 rather argumentative composition on moral and political 
 topics. In the former, no proposition which is not self- 
 evident is introduced without being proved. The latter, 
 on the contrary, often abounds with mere assertions as well 
 as arguments, presenting the two so intermingled that it 
 
APPENDIX. 181) 
 
 is not always easy to separate them. The reasoning, 
 moreover, is not seldom elliptical, disjointed, and irre- 
 gular, so that both skill and patience are required to 
 reduce it into a definite shape and proper order. The 
 portion of argumentative composition which I have now to 
 analyse, is as follows : 
 
 1. "All persons possessing any portion of power ought to 
 be strongly and awfully impressed with an idea that 
 they act in trust ; and that they are to account for 
 their conduct in that trust to the one great master, 
 author, and founder of society. 
 
 This principle ought even to be more strongly im- 
 pressed upon the minds of those who compose the 
 collective sovereignty than upon those of single princes. 
 
 2. Without instruments, these princes can do nothing. 
 Whoever uses instruments, in finding helps finds also 
 impediments. Their power is, therefore, by no means 
 complete. 
 
 3. Nor are they safe in extreme abuse. Such persons, 
 however elevated by flattery, arrogance, and self-opi- 
 nion, must be sensible that whether covered or not by 
 positive law, in some way or other they are account- 
 able even here for the abuse of their trust. If they 
 are not cut off by a rebellion of their people, they 
 may be strangled by the very janissaries kept for 
 their security against all other rebellion. Thus we 
 have seen the King of France sold by his soldiers for 
 an increase of pay. 
 
 4. But where popular authority is absolute and un- 
 restrained, the people have an infinitely greater, 
 because a far better-founded, confidence in their own 
 power. They are themselves, in a great measure, 
 their own instruments. They are nearer to their 
 objects. 
 
 5. Besides, they are less under responsibility to one of 
 the greatest controlling powers on earth, the sense of 
 fame and estimation. 
 
190 APPENDIX. 
 
 The share of infamy that is likely to fall to the lot of 
 each individual in public acts, is small indeed; 
 
 6. The operation of opinion being in the inverse ratio to 
 the number of those who abuse power. 
 
 7. Their own approbation of their own acts has to them 
 the appearance of a public judgment in their favour. 
 A perfect democracy is therefore the most shameless 
 thing in the world. 
 
 8. As it is the most shameless, it is also the most fear- 
 less. No man apprehends in his person he can be made 
 subject to punishment. 
 
 9. and 10. Certainly the people at large never ought; 
 for as all punishments are for example towards the con- 
 servation of the people at large, the people at large can 
 never become the subject of punishment by any human 
 hand. 
 
 11. It is, therefore, of infinite importance that they should 
 not be suffered to imagine that their will, any more 
 than that of kings, is the standard of right and wrong. 
 
 12. They ought to be persuaded that they are full as 
 little entitled, and far less qualified, with safety to 
 themselves, to use any arbitrary power whatsoever ; 
 that therefore they are not under a false show of 
 liberty, but, in truth, to exercise an unnatural in- 
 verted domination, tyrannically to exact, from those 
 who officiate in the state, not an entire devotion to 
 their interest, which is their right, but an abject sub- 
 mission to their occasional will ; extinguishing thereby, 
 in all those who serve them, all moral principle, all 
 sense of dignity, all use of judgment, and all con- 
 sistency of character, whilst by the very same process 
 they give themselves up a proper, a suitable, but a 
 most contemptible prey to the servile ambition of 
 popular sycophants or courtly flatterers." 
 
 Every one will see that this passage is a most complicated 
 piece of reasoning. 
 
APPENDIX. 191 
 
 As is frequently the case, the whole forms one main 
 argument, and is meant to enforce one main conclusion, 
 while, at the same time, it contains within it a number of 
 subordinate arguments of various kinds, rather loosely put 
 together and irregularly expressed. 
 
 The conclusion which the writer endeavours to establish, 
 stated as briefly as possible, is, that the people in a demo- 
 cracy stand more in need than princes do of the check on 
 their conduct supplied by a deep impression of the principle 
 that they are responsible to God for the exercise of their 
 power. And the sum of the reasons which he assigns for 
 it is, that they have more complete power with fewer 
 social and political checks upon it than princes have. 
 
 The conclusion or proposition to be proved is stated in 
 paragraph No. 1., and the rest of the passage is occupied 
 chiefly with showing the checks from which popular 
 authority is free. 
 
 This main argument is obviously one of those enthy- 
 memes which can derive no strength or confirmation from 
 a major premise. In a very abridged form the reason- 
 ing is, 
 
 The people in a democracy are under fewer social 
 
 checks than princes are ; 
 
 Therefore they stand more in need of the check of 
 conscious responsibility to God. 
 
 It would be puerile here to obtrude as a major premise 
 the general proposition, " all who are under fewer checks 
 than princes are (or than other persons are) stand more in 
 need of the check of conscious responsibility to God." This 
 is not a true major premise giving cogency to the conclusion, 
 but it is the general principle or maxim which the argument 
 exemplifies, or which may be educed from it, resembling in 
 this respect the axiom " things equal to the same thing are 
 equal to each other." 
 
 In the next argument, marked No. 2., and subordinate 
 to the main one, there is a distinct enunciation of a major 
 
192 APPENDIX. 
 
 premise, and there is also an expressed minor immediately 
 preceding it. Varying a little the language but not the 
 meaning of this minor, and placing them in the usual order, 
 we have the following syllogism : 
 
 Whoever uses instruments in finding helps finds also 
 impediments ; 
 
 Princes necessarily use instruments ; 
 
 Therefore their power is by no means complete. 
 But in drawing this conclusion from his premises our 
 author uses an ellipsis in his reasoning. The only logical 
 inference he could directly draw from them is, " therefore 
 princes find impediments." In order to make the reasoning 
 bring out the actual conclusion, recourse must be had to 
 another argument, which, stated syllogistic ally, would be: 
 
 Whoever finds impediments has incomplete power ; 
 
 Princes find impediments ; 
 
 Therefore they have incomplete power. 
 This syllogism is, nevertheless, of that kind in which 
 the major premise is superfluous, or in other words imparts 
 no force to the argument, but is merely a generalisation of 
 it. Let us try this by reducing it to an enthymeme : 
 
 Princes in using instruments find impediments ; 
 
 Therefore their power is incomplete. 
 The force of the reasoning here lies in the implication 
 of one thing by another, as in the case of a mathematical 
 enthymeme. The argument is, in truth, an example of 
 those inferences, already explained in the third chapter, 
 where the same fact is presented to the mind in two different 
 aspects, and it is argued that because it is true in the one it is 
 true in the other. 
 
 The argument numbered 3. has for its conclusion a 
 clause tacked to the conclusion of the preceding argument, 
 viz., "nor are they [princes] safe in extreme abuse," the 
 connection in the train of thought appearing to be this : 
 The power of princes is limited not only by the neces- 
 sity of employing other men as instruments, but by and 
 
APPENDIX. 193 
 
 danger of an extreme abuse of it. To prove his con- 
 clusion as to the danger, he alleges that if they abuse their 
 trust, they are subject either to be cut off by a rebellion of 
 their people or to be strangled by their own janissaries. 
 Thus, briefly stated, we have the following enthymeme : 
 Princes who abuse their power are liable to be cut off 
 
 by rebellion or assassination ; 
 Therefore they are not safe in the abuse of it. 
 Here nothing would be gained by thrusting in the 
 general principle, " no person who is liable to be cut off by 
 rebellion or assassination is safe." It is one of those en- 
 thymemes already described in the foregoing treatise, where 
 the inference amounts to little more than a variety in the 
 expression of the fact stated in the premise. 
 
 Our author, having thus shown that there are certain 
 limitations to the power of princes, proceeds to intimate 
 that absolute popular authority is exempt from such 
 limitations, although his language is not altogether precise 
 or direct to the point. Instead of having, like princes, to 
 employ instruments, the people, he says, are in a great 
 measure their own instruments, and they have an infi- 
 nitely greater confidence in their own power than princes 
 have, because they have a far better founded confidence. 
 
 This last clause, which in the extract is numbered 4, 
 may be construed as a simple assertion that their greater 
 confidence in their own power is caused by their confidence 
 being better founded, the truth of which as a fact may be 
 disputed. If it is regarded as an argument, we have the 
 following enthymeme : 
 
 Where popular authority is absolute and unrestrained, 
 the people have a far better founded confidence in 
 their own power than princes have ; 
 Therefore they have an infinitely greater confidence. 
 This is a conclusion, however, not implied in the premise 
 here stated. It may be naturally asked, is a better founded 
 confidence entertained by mankind always a greater con- 
 
 O 
 
194 APPENDIX. 
 
 fidence ? and this being a matter of experience, to be as- 
 certained by examining a number of instances, the argu- 
 ment requires a major premise expressing or embodying 
 that experience, as thus : 
 
 Whoever has a far better founded confidence in his 
 
 own power than another person possesses, has an 
 
 infinitely greater confidence. 
 
 The argument is now completed : if you do not admit 
 it, your objection would lie against the major premise as 
 not true, and not against the reasoning as inconclusive. 
 In point of fact, the major premise is not defensible ; it is a 
 false law deduced from a partial and imperfect induction of 
 instances, the most undoubting confidence being frequently 
 entertained where there is the smallest foundation for it. 
 It is scarcely needful to add that the argument, with the 
 major premise as above given, exemplifies the dictum de 
 omni et nullo. At the same time, it must be observed that 
 the whole is an instance of contingent under the form of 
 demonstrative reasoning. 
 
 The next argument to be examined is numbered 5, in which 
 the proposition maintained is that the people in a democracy 
 are more exempt than princes are from another check 
 " they are less under responsibility to one of the greatest con- 
 trolling powers on earth, the sense of fame and estimation ; " 
 for which he assigns as a reason (although he does not in- 
 dicate it by a causal conjunction) that " the share of in- 
 famy that is likely to fall to the lot of each individual in 
 public acts is small indeed." 
 
 Here again the conclusion is implied in the premise, and 
 if a major proposition were introduced, it would be merely 
 a generalisation of the argument. 
 
 Argument No. 6. is to prove the proposition which forms 
 the reason in the foregoing one : 
 
 The operation of opinion being in the inverse ratio to 
 
 the number of those who abuse power, 
 The share of infamy likely to fall on each individual 
 
 is small. 
 
APPENDIX. 195 
 
 The reasoning here is elliptical but it is demonstrative. 
 There is a change of terms also to be noted, which renders 
 the whole less clear than it would be if a uniformity of 
 language were observed, as in the following version 
 of it: 
 
 The share of infamy falling on each individual is in 
 the inverse ratio of the number of those who abuse 
 power ; 
 
 Therefore the share of infamy falling on each indi- 
 vidual in a democracy (which consists of a large 
 number) is small. 
 
 The only premise in this argument is of the nature of a 
 major premise, being a general proposition gathered from 
 observation, and the conclusion is a particular instance 
 coming under it. The principle exemplified is the dictum 
 de omni et nullo. As the reasoning is a little complex, a 
 minor premise might be introduced without puerility, and 
 the logical dependence of the whole rendered clearer 
 to common apprehension by a little amplification. 
 
 The share of infamy falling on each individual is in the 
 
 inverse ratio of the number of those who abuse 
 
 power ; i. e. if the number is large the share is small, 
 
 if the number is small the share is large ; 
 
 The number of persons in a democracy who abuse 
 
 power is large ; 
 
 Therefore the share of infamy falling on each indivi- 
 dual is small. 
 
 The argument No. 7. is short : " A perfect democracy is 
 the most shameless thing in the world, because their own 
 approbation of their own acts has to them the appearance 
 of a public judgment in their favour." 
 
 It is scarcely needful to point out that here again, 
 although the reasoning is somewhat elliptical, there is no 
 need of a major premise. 
 
 Argument No. 8. is of a precisely similar character : (( A 
 democracy is the most fearless thing in the world, because 
 
 o 2 
 
196 APPENDIX. 
 
 no man apprehends in his person he can be made subject 
 to punishment." 
 
 The next passage exhibits a complication of reasoning; it 
 consists, in fact, of two arguments numbered 9 and 10, and 
 denoted by the causal conjunctions " for " and " as." The 
 conclusion maintained is, " the people at large never ought 
 to become the subject of punishment," and the reason as- 
 signed is, " because the people at large can never become 
 the subject of punishment by any human hand;" which 
 last proposition is in its turn supported by the reason 
 because " all punishments are for example towards the 
 conservation of the people at large." 
 
 The first of these arguments, No. 9., is singular : " The 
 people cannot be punished by any human hand; there- 
 fore they never ought." No one probably will contend that 
 it will be mended by generalising it for the sake of obtain- 
 ing a major premise, " Whoever cannot be punished by any 
 human hand, never ought." 
 
 The second argument, No. 10., is, in brief, " All punish- 
 ments are for example to the people at large ; therefore none 
 can be inflicted on the people at large by any human hand." 
 
 This is an instance of an enthymeme consisting of a ma- 
 jor premise and conclusion. To bring it into regular form as 
 a syllogism would require the language to be altered : 
 All punishments which can be inflicted are for ex- 
 ample to the people at large ; 
 
 No punishment of the people at large can be for ex- 
 ample to themselves ; 
 
 Therefore no punishment of the people at large can be 
 inflicted. 
 
 The passage No. 11. argues that as the people at large 
 cannot be punished, it is of infinite importance that they 
 should not imagine their will to be the standard of right 
 and wrong. 
 
 Here again we have an enthymeme not to be strength- 
 ened in force by the introduction of a general proposition. 
 
APPENDIX. 197 
 
 The next argument, No. 12., is somewhat longer and less 
 plain. It may be summed up as follows : 
 
 The people are not more entitled, and are less qualified, 
 
 than kings to use any arbitrary power; 
 Therefore they are not tyrannically to exact from 
 those who officiate in the state an abject submis- 
 sion to their will. 
 
 This concluding argument of the extract is manifestly of 
 the same character as the last. 
 
 The examination of geometrical and moral reasoning, 
 which we have now gone through, may appear tedious, but 
 it will not be fruitless in confirming the principles of the pre- 
 sent treatise. It shows that both mathematical demonstration 
 and argumentative composition, such as mankind actually 
 employ in appealing to the understandings of each other on 
 moral and political subjects, abound with reasoning of a 
 varied character, exemplifying divers general principles or 
 maxims, and it especially proves that many of the arguments 
 employed are at once non-syllogistic and demonstrative. 
 
 ARTICLE II. 
 
 SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF ARGUMENTATIVE 
 COMPOSITION. 
 
 THE preceding examination of the nature of arguments 
 may be useful to the student of Logic, by furnishing an 
 example of the way in which such an analysis may be ac- 
 complished. It is confined, however, to exhibiting the 
 species and varieties of reasoning, while the points of the 
 greatest importance to him are the truth of the premises 
 and the validity of the conclusion ; and it has occurred to 
 me that a few hints indicating the mode of proceeding to 
 
 o 3 
 
198 APPENDIX. 
 
 investigate these points would form a proper sequel to 
 what has already been done. They are not designed for 
 adepts but for students in Logic. 
 
 On the supposition, then, that the student has a piece of 
 reasoning or portion of argumentative composition before 
 him, the following suggestions might be found useful in 
 dealing with the arguments seriatim. 
 
 1. Find the exact conclusion sought to be established by 
 the writer, and state it as briefly but as nearly as 
 possible in his own language. 
 
 2. If the conclusion is obscure or ambiguous, endeavour 
 to find out what the author meant ; and if it is doubt- 
 ful which of two or more propositions he intended to 
 maintain, examine the argument, as suggested in the 
 following rules, first on the assumption of one and then 
 on that of the other or others. 
 
 3. Next find the reason or reasons assigned, and state 
 them as the writer has done and as nearly as possible 
 in his own language, stripping them, however, of 
 redundant expressions and irrelevant matter. 
 
 4. Examine the nature of the argument. 
 
 a. If it is direct contingent reasoning, consider well 
 whether the facts alleged are sufficient to warrant 
 the general law, or, as the case may be, the par- 
 ticular inference : if not sufficient, it is needless to 
 proceed further. 
 
 I. If the reasoning is ostensibly demonstrative and in 
 the form of enthymemes, it may be well, when you 
 are doubtful whether it is class-reasoning or not, 
 to make it syllogistic by supplying what is called 
 the missing or suppressed premise, since even should 
 the last turn out to be needless, you will at all events 
 have all the possible propositions before you ; and 
 although needless, it must be true if the enthy- 
 meme is valid. When the argument has been thus 
 brought into a definite form examine the validity of 
 
APPENDIX, 199 
 
 the syllogism ; and if it is fallacious, in consequence 
 of confusion or ambiguity in the language or other 
 cause, mark the fallacy, and your task is ended. 
 
 5. In both the above cases (a and b) since the premises 
 are insufficient to prove the conclusion deduced from 
 them, it will be well to consider whether a modified 
 inference may not be drawn from the facts as stated. 
 The facts do not bear out the asserted conclusion, but 
 they may bear out something short of it : what con- 
 clusion do they enable us to deduce ? * 
 
 6. Suppose, however, the inference to be valid, the next 
 step, whether the argument belongs to direct contingent 
 reasoning or to demonstrative reasoning, is to examine 
 the truth of the premises, or, in other words, of the 
 facts asserted in them. The conclusion is warranted 
 by the premises ; but are the premises themselves to be 
 relied upon ? 
 
 7. In this investigation of the truth of the premises, 
 you may possibly find that although the propositions, 
 as stated by the author, are inadmissible, yet the 
 substance of them is true, or at least susceptible of 
 being put into a less objectionable shape. In such 
 cases, as your object is not to take advantage of mere 
 errors in form, but to come at the truth, whatever it 
 may be, throw the argument into the most forcible 
 shape in which it can be exhibited, and then re- 
 examine the whole. 
 
 8. If you satisfy yourself that the premises are erroneous, 
 and can point out the circumstances which make them 
 so, it will be useful to trace the source of the error in 
 the mind of the writer. Nothing seems to give us a 
 greater command of a subject than to be able not only 
 to see the mistakes which have been made regarding 
 it, but to ascend to their origin. 
 
 * See Chap. XI. sect. 2. of the preceding Treatise. 
 o 4 
 
200 APPENDIX. 
 
 9. Recollect that, in many cases, although you can 
 show an argument to be fallacious, the conclusion may 
 still be true, and all that you have done is simply to 
 have placed it in the position of being unproved. 
 
 10. In order to guard against the obscurity, vagueness, 
 confusion, and ambiguity incident to language, en- 
 deavour to conceive when practicable the actual things 
 represented by words ; and when the terms are com- 
 plex, decompose their meaning into its constituent 
 parts. 
 
 11. When the definition of an important word on which 
 any of the reasoning turns has been given, make it a 
 practice, in all obscure or dubious passages of the com- 
 position where it is employed, to substitute the defini- 
 tion for the term. If the writer under examination 
 has furnished no definition of such a term, form one 
 for yourself and use it in the same manner. 
 
 12. When abstract general terms are used in any propo- 
 sition, translate the proposition into concrete language, 
 and try how the argument in which the proposition is 
 employed will be affected by the change. 
 
 AKTICLE III. 
 
 THE PRECEDING SUGGESTIONS IN PART EXEMPLIFIED BY AN EX- 
 AMINATION OF BERKELEY'S CELEBRATED ARGUMENT TO PROVE 
 
 THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF SEEING DISTANCE. 
 
 FOR the purpose of exemplifying the principal rules here 
 given, I will take Berkeley's celebrated argument to prove 
 the impossibility of seeing distance. It is in his own words 
 as follows : 
 
 " It is, I think, agreed by all that distance of itself and 
 immediately cannot be seen. For distance being a line 
 
APPENDIX. 201 
 
 directed endwise to the eye, it projects only one point in 
 the fund of the eye. Which point remains invariably the 
 same whether the distance be longer or shorter." 
 
 According to our first rule, we have to begin the exami- 
 nation of this argument by finding the conclusion which it 
 seeks to establish. Berkeley has placed it on the very 
 threshold of his treatise : 
 
 " Distance of itself and immediately cannot be seen." 
 
 This conclusion or thesis appears to be clearly and unam- 
 biguously expressed. I shall have in the sequel to object 
 to the use here made of an abstract term ; but for the present 
 let us take the proposition as it is given. 
 
 We next proceed to comply with the third rule. 
 
 The reason assigned for the conclusion is, that <f distance 
 projects only one point in the fund of the eye ; " and in 
 proof of this latter proposition, a reason is also assigned, 
 viz. that " distance is a line presented endwise to the eye.'' 
 
 There are obviously here two separate arguments which 
 are ostensibly of a demonstrative character, and which, in 
 compliance with our fourth rule, we may spread out into 
 two syllogisms, reversing the order in which the proposi- 
 tions are presented by Berkeley. 
 
 First Syllogism. 
 
 Lines directed endwise to the eye project only one 
 
 point in the fund of the eye ; 
 Distance is such a line ; 
 Therefore distance projects only one point in the fund 
 
 of the eye. 
 
 Second Syllogism. 
 
 Whatever projects only one point in the fund of the 
 
 eye cannot be seen ; 
 Distance projects only one point there; 
 Therefore distance cannot be seen. 
 
202 APPENDIX. 
 
 Looking at these syllogisms agreeably to the latter part 
 of our fourth rule, I find that they are perfectly correct. 
 A scholastic logician cannot find in them any non-distribu- 
 tion of middle terms or illicit processes ; the language is not 
 ambiguous ; and every one of common discernment must see 
 that they are conclusive. 
 
 Nothing remains, then, but, in compliance with the sixth 
 rule, to examine the truth of the premises. 
 
 It will be obvious to all that the major premise of the 
 first syllogism, if it has any meaning at all, must signify 
 material or physical lines. If it meant any thing else it 
 would be palpably inadmissible, since imaginary or hypo- 
 thetical lines can project no points on the retina. The pro- 
 jection of points, or more accurately the images of points, 
 on the retina, is a physical operation ; and even in this sig- 
 nification the predicate can be affirmed only of material 
 lines stopping short of the eye. Of a material line directed 
 endwise to the eye, the end would undoubtedly project a 
 point on the retina, if it did not approach too near that 
 organ ; but if it entered the eye it would project no point 
 at all. 
 
 The major premise, then, is true only if material lines are- 
 understood, and only if such lines stop short of the eye. 
 
 Hence the minor premise, which asserts that distance is 
 such a line as is spoken of in the major, cannot be admitted. 
 If distance can be correctly termed a line at all, it can in 
 no sense be termed a material line, and it would be absurd 
 to speak of it as a line not reaching the organ of vision : 
 but distance cannot, in fact, be termed a line at all with any 
 correctness or even definite meaning, although it may be 
 measured by a line. 
 
 The minor premise being thus shown to be in every way 
 inadmissible, the conclusion of the first syllogism is not es- 
 tablished : distance is not proved to project even one point 
 in the fund of the eye. 
 
 The minor premise of the second syllogism, being the 
 
APPENDIX. 203 
 
 same proposition as the unproved conclusion of the first, 
 falls equally to the ground, and carries the whole syllogism 
 along with it. 
 
 But if this minor premise were admitted, the second syl- 
 logism must share the fate of its predecessor. The major 
 premise is not only untrue, but the very opposite of the 
 truth ; for whatever projects a point, or, more accurately, 
 the image of a point, upon the retina, must be seen ; and if 
 distance projects such a point (which it cannot be said to 
 do, as the assertion has no real meaning), distance must be 
 seen. 
 
 It has been supposed by some, that by lines directed 
 endwise to the eye, Berkeley meant rays of light ; but, if 
 we try this supposition, we shall only be landed in fresh 
 difficulties. What can be made of such a proposition as 
 " distance is a ray of light directed endwise to the eye " ? 
 
 Discarding, however, any rigid exaction of consistent 
 language, let us, in the spirit of our seventh rule, en- 
 deavour to put the argument in its best imaginable form : 
 
 Bodies, at various distances, all send rays of light to the 
 eye ; which rays must, of course, vary in length with the 
 distances : now, as these rays are all right lines, presenting 
 their ends to the retina, it is plain that the eye cannot see 
 the different lengths of the rays, nor, consequently, the 
 distances of the objects whence the rays proceed, any more 
 than if a bundle of rods of various lengths were presented 
 to it endwise, it could perceive that one rod was longer 
 than another. 
 
 Here we have two consecutive arguments. 1. Rays of 
 light coming from objects present their ends to the eye ; 
 therefore the lengths of the rays cannot be seen. 2. Inas- 
 much as the lengths of the rays cannot be seen, the dis- 
 tances of the objects whence they proceed cannot be seen. 
 
 In reply to the first argument, it may be remarked, that 
 it is a superfluous undertaking to prove that the lengths of 
 the rays of light proceeding from objects to the eye cannot 
 
204 APPENDIX. 
 
 be seen, since no part of such rays can be seen, neither the 
 ends nor the lengths. They are so far from being seen, 
 that it is only a small number of mankind who are aware 
 that such things as rays of light, proceeding from the ob- 
 jects in view, are concerned in the act of vision. That the 
 lengths of such rays are not perceptible, is, therefore, a 
 notorious fact. But the second argument goes on to allege 
 that as the eye cannot see the various lengths of the rays, 
 it cannot see that the objects from which the rays come 
 are at various distances. Why not? What incompati- 
 bility is there between rays being invisible and objects 
 being seen to be at various distances from the spectator ? 
 Here is, in fact, an assumption of the very thing to be 
 proved. 
 
 The bundle of rods furnishes no analogous case. Rods 
 are visible objects, rays are invisible: rods, when pre- 
 sented endwise to the eye, stop short of that organ ; rays 
 enter it and fall on an internal membrane: the ends of 
 rods are external objects which are seen by means of rays 
 of light proceeding from them, while to say that the ends 
 of rays are external objects seen by means of other rays 
 proceeding from them would be self-evidently absurd. 
 
 It is highly probable (to touch upon the inquiry suggested 
 by Rule 8.) that this false analogy between bundles of rods 
 or other material straight lines and rays of light, originally 
 misled Berkeley, as it has undoubtedly misled some of his 
 followers.* We see clearly how it may have been the 
 source of his ingenious but unsubstantial paradox, and how 
 it may have betrayed philosophers who ought to have known 
 
 * " How can vision of itself give us any notion of the distance of 
 bodies, when we know that the light reflected from them falls in 
 straight lines on the eye, and can present only the ends of these lines 
 to the organ ? You can have no notion of the length of a line by 
 being touched merely with one of its ends. We could as well know 
 the length of a staff, by having our eyes confined merely to the breadth 
 of its head." Young's Lectures on Intellectual Philosophy, p. 113. So 
 loosely is philosophy sometimes written. 
 
APPENDIX. 205 
 
 better, into the mistake of regarding as a question in optics 
 what is purely a metaphysical theory. 
 
 In the preceding exposure of the unsoundness of 
 Berkeley's premises, I have not adverted to one circum- 
 stance which, when duly considered, is of itself sufficient 
 to show their hollowness. 
 
 The word distance is an abstract general term, (such as 
 forms the subject of Rule 12.), and no one has shown more 
 forcibly than Berkeley himself that nothing can be repre- 
 sented by such terms but what may be expressed in con- 
 crete language; that there are no real abstract entities, 
 either physical or mental, corresponding to them. 
 
 For this reason, and not for the reason Berkeley assigns, 
 it may be truly affirmed in one sense that distance cannot 
 be seen. Distant objects maybe seen to be distant, but an 
 abstract quality corresponding to the term distance can be 
 neither seen nor even conceived. 
 
 His proposition, therefore, must be translated from the 
 abstract into the concrete, when it will appear thus: 
 (( Objects at different distances from the spectator cannot 
 of themselves and immediately be seen by him to be at 
 different distances." 
 
 This is Berkeley's real meaning; but when it is thus 
 brought out in concrete language, the reasons he assigns 
 for his conclusion no longer apply, as any one will find on 
 trial. Who can bring to bear on the conclusion, as here 
 translated, such propositions as, "distance is a line pre- 
 sented endwise to the eye," and " distance projects only one 
 point in the fund of the eye?" 
 
 It may be presumed that at the very early period of life 
 when he wrote the " Essay on Vision " he had not attained 
 to those clear views of the nature of abstract terms which 
 he afterwards gave to the world in the Introduction to his 
 " Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge ; " other- 
 wise he would scarcely have fallen into the errors not only of 
 
206 APPENDIX. 
 
 speaking of that which is denoted by an abstract term as a 
 physical or material subject and agent, presenting ends to 
 the eye and projecting points on the retina; but of making 
 these imaginary operations the sole evidence of his main 
 position. 
 
 It is one of those instances (abounding in metaphysical 
 speculations) in which ascribing a real separate existence 
 and agency to what is represented by an abstract term has 
 contributed to lead philosophers into very remarkable errors, 
 and to perpetuate the influence of such errors over the 
 human mind. 
 
 It must be kept in recollection, agreeably to our ninth 
 rule, that the preceding examination of Berkeley's argu- 
 ment may possibly show only that his conclusion is un- 
 proved, not that it is erroneous. In point of fact, such is 
 the case. His alleged premises are shown to be false, but 
 it is still possible that the proposition which he has at- 
 tempted to prove by them may be true. The reader who 
 is desirous of entering further into the question may 
 consult two works by the present writer in which it is dis- 
 cussed at considerable length.* 
 
 After wading through the preceding directions and 
 exemplifications, the young student may probably exclaim 
 that the examination of all arguments in this way would 
 require a vast deal of trouble. And there can be no doubt 
 at all that to learn to think with accuracy and precision 
 does require no small labour, but labour which cannot be 
 evaded if the object is to be gained. He who wishes to 
 obtain the power of correct reasoning must pay the price. 
 There is, nevertheless, this consolation and cheering pros- 
 
 * A Review of Berkeley's Theory of Vision, designed to show the 
 unsoundness of that celebrated Speculation. 8vo. 
 
 A Letter to a Philosopher, in reply to some recent attempts to 
 vindicate Berkeley's Theory of Vision, and in further elucidation of 
 its unsoundness. (Pamphlet.) 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 207 
 
 p'ect in view, that when by sedulous application the habit 
 has once been acquired, the subsequent exercise of it will 
 become comparatively easy, and will be agreeable even in 
 those cases (unavoidably of frequent occurrence) in which 
 it will still remain laborious. 
 
 THE END. 
 
Works by the same Author, in Politics and Political 
 Economy. 
 
 A DISCUSSION OF PARLIAMENTARY REFORM, by 
 a YORKSHIRE FREEHOLDER. (Pamphlet.) 
 
 THE RATIONALE OF POLITICAL REPRESENTA- 
 TION. 8vo. 
 
 THE RIGHT OF PRIMOGENITURE EXAMINED, by 
 a YOUNGER BROTHER. (Pamphlet.) 
 
 A CRITICAL DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE, 
 MEASURES, AND CAUSES OF VALUE, chiefly in 
 reference to the Writings of Mr. Ricardo and his Followers. 
 8vo. 
 
 A LETTER TO A POLITICAL ECONOMIST, occasioned 
 by an Article in the Westminster Review on the subject 
 of Value. 
 
 MONEY AND ITS VICISSITUDES IN VALUE AS 
 THEY AFFECT NATIONAL INDUSTRY AND 
 PECUNIARY CONTRACTS. 8vo. 
 
 A DEFENCE OF JOINT-STOCK BANKS AND 
 COUNTRY ISSUES. (Pamphlet) 
 
 QUESTIONS IN POLITICS, POLITICAL ECONOMY, 
 
 &c., for Discussion in Literary Societies. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 SPOTTISWOODES and SHAW., 
 New-street-Square. 
 
An ALPHABETICAL CATALOGUE of 
 
 NEW WORKS 
 
 IN 
 
 GENERAL & MISCELLANEOUS LITERATURE, 
 
 PUBLISHED BY 
 
 MESSRS. LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, AND LONGMANS, 
 
 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON. 
 
 
 Classifies Entree 
 
 
 Agriculture and Rural 
 
 Botany and Gardening. 
 
 Pages. 
 ' Smith's St. Paul - - - - 27 
 
 Affairs. 
 
 Pages. 
 
 Southey's The Doctor &c. - - 28 
 
 _ 
 
 Callcott's Scripture Herbal - - 5 
 
 i Stephen's (Sir .1.) Essays - - 29 
 
 Bayldon On valuing Rents, &c. - 3 
 Crocker's Land-Surveying - - 7 
 Johnson's Farmer's Encyclopaedia 15 
 London's Agriculture - - - 17 
 " Self-Instruction - - 17 
 " Lady's Country Compan. 17 
 Low's Elements of Agriculture - 18 
 " On Landed Property - - 18 
 
 Conversations on Botany - 6 
 Evans's Sugar-Planter's Manual 9 
 Hoare On Cultivation of the Vine 12 
 Hooker's British Flora - - 12 
 " Guide to Kew Gardens 12 
 " Introduction to Botany 16 
 Lindley's Introduction to Botany 16 
 Loudon's Hortus Britannicus 18 
 " Amateur Gardener 17 
 
 Sydney Smith's Works' - 27 
 " Lectures on Moral 
 Philosophy - - 27 
 Taylor's Loyola - 29 
 ! Thirlwall's History of Greece - 30 
 Tooke's History of Prices - 30 & 31 
 Townsend's State Trials - - 31 
 Twining's Philosophy of Painting - 31 
 Twiss on the Pope's Letters - - 31 
 
 
 " Self-Instruction - 17 
 
 Zumpt's Latin Grammar - - 32 
 
 Arts, Manufactures, 
 
 ' Trees and Shrubs - 17 
 " Gardening - - 17 
 
 
 and Architecture. 
 
 " Plants - - 17 
 
 
 Bourne's Catechism of the Steam 
 
 Rivera's Rose Amateur's Guide 25 
 Schleiden's Botany, by Lankester 25 
 
 Geography and 
 
 Engine ----- 4 
 
 
 Atlases. 
 
 Brande's Dictionary of Science, &c. 4 
 
 
 
 Budge's Miner's Guide - 4 
 Cresy's Civil Engineering - - 6 
 
 Chronology. 
 
 Butler's Geography and Atlases - 5 
 Erman's Travels through Siberia - 9 
 
 D'Agincourt.'s History of Art - 23 
 Dresden Gallery - 8 
 Eastlake On Oil Painting - - 8 
 Evans's Sugar-Planter's Manual - 9 
 Gwilt's Encyclop. of Architecture 10 
 Humphreys' Illuminated Books - 14 
 
 Allen On Prerogative - 3 
 Blair's Chronological Tables - 4 
 Bunsen's Ancient Egypt - - 5 
 Haydn's Beatson's Index - - 11 
 
 '. Hall's Large Library Atlas - - 10 
 " Railway Map of England - 10 
 Johnston's General Gazetteer - 15 
 . M'Culloch's Geographical Dictionary 19 
 Murray's Encvclop. of Geography- 22 
 Sharp's British Gazetteer - - 26 
 
 Jameson's Sacred and LegeiidaryArt 14 
 
 
 
 Loudon's Rural Architecture - 18 
 Moseley's Engineering - - - 22 
 
 Commerce and Mercan- 
 
 
 Scoffern On Sugar Manufacture - 25 
 Steam Engine, by the Artisan Club 3 
 
 tile Affairs. 
 
 Juvenile Books. 
 
 Tate on Strength of Materials - 28 
 Twining On Painting - - - 31 
 Ure's Dictionary of Arts, &c. - 31 
 
 Banfield and Weld's Statistics - 3 
 Gilbart's Treatise on Banking - 9 
 Gray's Tables of Life Contingencies 10 
 
 Amy Herbert - 26 
 , Corner's Children's Sunday Book 26 
 Earl's Daughter (The) - - 26 
 
 
 Lonmer's Letters to a Young 
 
 Gertrude - - 26 
 
 Biography. 
 
 Master Mariner - - 16 
 M'Culloch's Commerce* Navigation 19 
 
 Hewitt's Boy's Country Book 13 
 " (Mary) Children's Year 12 
 
 Foss's English Judges 9 
 Grant's Memoir & Correspondence 10 
 Head's Memoirs of Cardinal Pacca 11 
 Humphrevs's Black Prince - - 14 
 
 Steel's Shipmaster's Assistant - 29 
 Svmons' Merchant Seamens' Law 29 
 Thomas's Interest Tables - 30 
 Thomson's Interest Tables - - 30 
 
 I.aneton Parsonage - - 26 
 Mrs. Marcet's Conversations - 19 
 Margaret Percival - - - 26 
 Marryat's Masterman Ready - 19 
 
 Kindersley's De Bayard - - 15 
 Maunder's Biographical Treasury- 20 
 Southey's Life of Wesley - - 29 
 " Life and Correspondence 28 
 
 Criticism, History, and 
 "ML ezxioirs. 
 
 " Settlers in Canada 20 
 " Privateer's Man - - 20 
 Pycroft's English Reading - - 24 
 
 Stephen's Ecclesiastical Biography 29 
 
 
 
 Taylor's Loyola - 29 
 Townsend's Eminent Judges - 31 
 Waterton's Autobiography & Essays 31 
 
 Blair's Chron. and Histor. Tables - 4 
 Bunsen's Ancient Egypt 5 
 Goad's Memorandum - 
 
 Medicine. 
 
 
 Conybeare and Howson's St. Paul 
 
 Bull's Hints to Mothers - - 5 
 
 Books of General 
 
 Dandolo's Italian Volunteers 
 Dennistoun's Dukes of Urbino 
 
 " Management of Children 5 
 Copland's Dictionary of Medicine 6 
 
 Utility. 
 
 Dunlop's History of Fiction - 
 
 Latham On Diseases of the Heart 16 
 
 
 Eastlake's History of Oil Painting 
 
 Moore On Health, Disease ,&Remedy 21 
 
 Acton's Cookery 3 
 
 Foss's English Judges - 
 
 Pereira On Food and Diet - 23 
 
 Black's Treatise on Brewing 4 
 
 Foster's European Literature 
 
 Reece's Medical Guide - - 24 
 
 Cabinet Lawver 5 
 
 Gibbon's Roman Empire - - 9 
 
 
 Hints on Etiquette - 12 
 
 Grant's Memoir & Correspondence 10 
 
 . 
 
 Hudson'sExecutor's Guide - - 13 
 On Making Wills - - 13 
 
 Hamilton's (Sir W.) Essays - - 10 
 Harrison On the English Language 10 
 
 Miscellaneous and Ge- 
 
 Loudon's Self- Instruction - - 17 
 " Lady's Companion - 17 
 
 Head's Memoirs of Cardinal Pacca 11 
 Holland's (Lord) Foreign Remi- 
 
 neral Literature. 
 
 " Amateur Gardener - 17 
 
 niscences - - 12 
 
 
 Maunder's Treasury of Knowledge 20 
 " Biographical Treasury 20 
 " Scientific Treasury - 20 
 " Treasury of History - 20 
 " Natural History - - 20 
 Pocket and the Stud - - - 1 1 
 
 Humphreys' Black Prince - - 14 
 Jeffrey's (Lord) Contributions - 15 
 Kemble's Anglo-Saxons - 15 
 Macaulay's Crit. and Hist. Essays 18 
 History of England - IS 
 Mackintosh's Miscellaneous Works 18 
 
 Allen On Prerogative 3 
 Coad's Memorandum - 6 
 Dresden Gallery - 8 
 Dunlop's History of Fiction - 8 
 Graham's English - 10 
 Grant's Letters from the Mountains 10 
 
 Pycroft's English Reading - - 24 
 Reece's Medical Guide - 24 
 
 M'Culloch'sGeogiaphicalDictionary 19 
 Maunder's Treasury of History - 20 
 
 Haydn's Book of Dignities - - 11 
 Hooker's Kew Guide - 12 
 
 Rich's Comp. to Latin Dictionary 24 
 Riddle's Latin Dictionaries - - 25 
 
 Merivale's History of Rome - - 21 
 Mosheim's Ecclesiastical History 22 
 
 Howitt's Rural Life of England - 13 
 " Visitsto RemarkablePlaces 13 
 
 Rowton's Debater - - - - 25 
 
 Mure's Ancient Greece - 22 
 
 Jardine's Treatise of Equivocation 15 
 
 Short Whist - - 26 
 
 Rich's Comp. to Latin Dictionary 24 
 
 Jeffrey's (Lord) Contributions - 15 
 
 Thomas's Interest Tables - - 30 
 
 Riddle's Latin Dictionaries - - 25 
 
 Kay On Education, &c., in Europe 15 
 
 Thomson On the Sick Room - - 30 
 Thomson's Interest Tables - - 30 
 
 Rogers'sEssavsfromtheEdinburgh 
 Review ... .25 
 
 Loudon's Lady's Country Comp. - 17 
 Macaulay's Crit. and Hist. Essays 18 
 
 Webster's Domestic Economy - 32 
 
 Schmitz's History of Greece - - 30 
 
 Mackintosh's Miscellaneous Works 18 
 
CLASSIFIED INDEX continued. 
 
 Pages. 
 Maitland's Church in the Catacombs 19 
 
 Pages . 
 Cook's Edition of the Acts - - 6 
 
 Pages. 
 Kay On the Social Condition, &c., 
 
 Pascal's Works, by Pearce - - 23 
 
 Cooper's Sermons 6 
 
 of Europe - 15 
 
 Pycroft's English Reading - - 24 
 
 Corner's Sunday Book 6 
 
 Laing's Notes of a Traveller - - 16 
 
 Rich's Comp. to Latin Dictionary 24 
 Riddle's Latin Dictionaries - - 25 
 
 Dale's Domestic Liturgy - 7 
 Discipline 7 
 
 M'Culloch's Geog. Statist. &c. Diet. 19 
 " Dictionary of Commerce 19 
 
 Rowton's Debater - - 25 
 
 Earl's Daughter (Thel - - 26 
 
 " Statistics of Gt. Britain 19 
 
 Seaward's Narrative of his Shipwreck26 
 Sir Roger de Coverley - 27 
 Smith's (Rev. Sydney) Works - 27 
 Southey's Common place Books - 28 
 
 Ecclesiastes, illuminated - 23 
 Elmes's Thought Book - 8 
 Englishman's Greek Concordance 8 
 Englishman'sHeb.&Chald. Concord. 8 
 
 " On Funding & Taxation 19 
 Marcet's Political Economy - - 19 
 Tooke's Histories of Prices - 30 & 31 
 
 " The Doctor &c. - - 28 
 
 Gertrude 26 
 
 
 Stephen's Essays - - - - 29 
 
 Hook's Lectures on Passion Week 12 
 
 
 Stow's Training System - - 29 
 
 Home's Introduction to Scriptures 12 
 
 
 Townsend's State Trials - - 31 
 Zumpt's Latin Grammar - - 32 
 
 Abridgment of ditto - 12 
 Howson's Sunday Evening - - 13 
 Jameson's Sacred Legends - - 14 
 " Monastic Legends - - 14 
 " Legends of the Madonna 15 
 
 The Sciences 
 in General and Mathe- 
 matics. 
 
 
 Jeremy Taylor's Works - - - 1 5 
 
 
 Natural History in 
 
 Laneton Parsonage - - 26 
 Letters to My Unknown Friends - 16 
 
 Bourne's Catechism of the Steam 
 
 Engine - - - - 4 
 
 General. 
 
 " on Happiness - 16 
 Maitland's Church in the Catacombs 19 
 
 Brande's Dictionary of Science, &c. 4 
 Conversations on Mineralogy - 6 
 
 Catlow's Popular Conchology - 5 
 Doubleday's Butterflies and Moths 8 
 Ephemera and Young On the Salmon 8 
 Gosse's Nat. Hist, of Jamaica - 9 
 
 Margaret Percival - - - - 26 
 Marriage Service (illuminated) - 23 
 Maxims of the Saviour - - - 14 
 Miracles of Our Saviour - - 14 
 Moore On the Use of the Body - 21 
 
 Cresy's Civil Engineering 6 
 DelaBeche'sGeology ofCornwall,&c. 7 
 " Geological Observer - 7 
 De la Rive's Electricity 7 
 Dixon's Fossils of Sussex - - 7 
 
 Gray and Mitchell's Birds - - 10 
 Kirby and Spence's Entomology - 16 
 Lee's Taxidermy - 16 
 " Elements of Natural History 16 
 
 " " Soul and Body - 21 
 " 's Man and his Motives - 21 
 Morell's Philosophy of Religion - 21 
 Mosheim's Ecclesiastical History- 22 
 
 Gower's Scientific Phenomena - 9 
 Herschel's Outlines of Astronomy 11 
 Humboldt's Aspects of Nature - 13 
 
 Maunder's Natural History - - 20 
 Tut ton's Shells oftheBritishlslands 31 
 Waterton's Essays on Natural Hist. 31 
 Westwood's Classification of Insects 32 
 Youatt's The Dog - - - - 32 
 " The Horse - 32 
 
 Novels and Works of 
 Fiction. 
 
 Dunlop's History of Fiction - 8 
 Head's Metamorphoses of Apuleius 11 
 
 Mount St. Lawrence - 22 
 Neale's Closing Scene - - - 22 
 " Resting Places of the Just 22 
 Newman's (J. H.) Discourses - 22 
 Paley's Evidences, &c. by Potts - 23 
 Parables of Our Lord - 14 
 Readings for Lent - - - 15 
 Robinson's Lexicon to the Greek 
 Testament 25 
 
 Hunt's Researches on Light - - 14 
 Marcet's (Mrs.) Conversations - 19 
 Memoirs of the Geological Survey 20 
 Moseley's Practical Mechanics - 22 
 " Engineering&Architecture 22 
 Owen's Lectures on Comp Anatomy 23 
 Peschel's Elements of Physics - 24 
 Phillips's Fossils of Cornwall, &c. 24 
 " Mineralogy, by Miller - 24 
 Portlock's Geology of Londonderry 24 
 Schleiden's Scientific Botany - 25 
 Smee's Electro Metallurgy - - 27 
 Steam Engine (The) - - 3 
 Tate On Strength of Materials - 29 
 Thomson's School Chemistry - 30 
 
 Sermon on the Mount (The) - - 23 
 Sinclair's Journey of Life - - 26 
 " Business of Life - - 26 
 Smith's (G.) Perilous Times - - 27 
 Smith's (G.)ReligionofAnc. Britain 27 
 " " Sacred Annals - - 27 
 " Doctrine of the Cherubim 27 
 " (Sydney) Sermons - - 27 
 
 Lady Willoughby's Diary - - 32 
 Macdonald's^Villa Verocchio - 18 
 
 " " Moral Philosophy 27 
 " (J.) St. Paul - - - 27 
 
 
 Marryat's Masterman Ready - - 10 
 " Settlers in Canada - 20 
 
 Solomon's Song, illuminated - 23 
 Southey's Life of Wesley - - 29 
 
 Rural Sports. 
 
 " Mission - -19 
 
 Tayler's Lady Mary - 29 
 
 
 " Privateers-man - 20 
 Mount St. Lawrence - - 22 
 
 " Margaret; or, the Pearl - 29 
 " (Isaac) Loyola - - 29 
 
 Elaine's Dictionary of Sports - 4 
 The Cricket Field - 6 
 
 Sir Roger de Coverley - - 27 
 
 Thumb Bible (The) - - - 30 
 
 Ephemera on Angling - - - 8 
 
 Sketches (The) - - 27 
 
 Tomline's Introduction to the Bible 30 
 
 Book of the Salmon - 8 
 
 Southey's The Doctor &c. - 28 
 Twelve Years Ago : a Tale - 31 
 
 Turner's Sacred History - - - 31 
 Twelve Years Ago - 31 
 Twisson the Pope's Letters - - 31 
 
 Hawker's Instruct ions to Sportsmen 11 
 The Hunting-Field - - 11 
 Loudon's Lady's Country Comp. - 17 
 
 
 Wilberforce's View of Christianity 32 
 
 Pocket and the Stud - - - 11 
 
 
 Wisdom of Johnson's Rambler, &c. 15 
 
 Practical Horsemanship - - 11 
 
 
 
 Pulman-'s Fly-Fishing - 24 
 
 One-Volume 
 
 
 Ronalds's Fly Fisher - 25 
 Stable Talk and Table Talk - - 11 
 
 Encyclopaedias and 
 
 Poetry and the Drama. 
 
 The Stud, for practical purposes - 11 
 
 Dictionaries. 
 
 3 
 
 Wheatley's Rod and Line - - 32 
 
 
 Aikin's (Dr.) British Poets - 
 
 
 
 Baillie's (Joanna) Poetical Works 3 
 
 
 Elaine's Rural Sports - - - 4 
 
 Flowers and their kindred Thoughts 22 
 
 
 Brande's Science, Literature, & Art 4 
 Copland's Dictionary of Medicine - 6 
 
 Fruits from Garden and Field - 22 
 Goldsmith's Poems, illustrated - 9 
 
 Veterinary Medicine, 
 
 Cresy's Civil Engineering - 6 
 Gwilt's Architecture - 10 
 
 Gray's Elegy, illuminated - - 22 
 Key's Moral of Flowers- - - 12 
 
 &c. 
 
 Johnson's Farmer's Encyclopaedia 15 
 Johnston's Geographical Dictionary 15 
 Loudon's Agriculture - - - 17 
 " Rural Architecture - 17 
 " Gardening - - 17 
 Plants - - - - 17 
 " Trees and Shiubs - - 17 
 
 Sylvan Musings - 12 
 L. E. L.'s Poetical Works - - 16 
 Linwood's Anthologia Oxoniensis - 16 
 Macaulav's Lavs of Ancient Rome 18 
 Montgomery's 'Poetical Works . - 21 
 Moorl's Poetical Works - - 21 
 " LallaRookh - 21 
 
 Hunting Field (The ) - - 11 
 Pocket and the Stud - - 11 
 Practical Horsemanship - 11 
 Stable Talk and Table Talk - 11 
 Stud (The) ... n 
 Youatt's The Dog - - - - 32 
 
 M'Culloch's Geographical Dictionary 1 9 
 
 " Irish Melodies - 21 
 
 " The Horse - - - 32 
 
 " Dictionary of Commerce 19 
 
 " Songs and Ballads - - 21 
 
 
 Murray's Encyclop. of Geography - 22 
 
 Shakspeare,by Bowdler - - 26 
 
 
 Ure's Dictionary of Arts, &c. - - 31 
 
 Sentiments & Similes 13 
 
 
 Webster's Domestic Economy - 32 
 
 Southey's Poetical Works - - 28 
 British Poets - - - 28 
 
 Voyages and 
 
 
 Swain's English Melodies - - 29 
 Taylor's Virgin Widow - - 29 
 
 Travels. 
 
 
 Thomson's Seasons, illustrated - 30 
 
 
 Religious and Moral 
 Works. 
 
 " edited by Dr. A.T.Thomson 30 
 Watts's Lyrics of the Heart - - 32 
 Winged Thoughts - 22 
 
 Chesney's Euphrates and Tigris - 5 
 Erman's Travels through Siberia - 9 
 Forbes's Dahomey - 8 
 
 
 
 Forester and Biddulph's Norway - 9 
 
 
 Political Economy and 
 Statistics. 
 
 Head's Tour in Rome - 
 Humboldt's Aspects of Nature - 13 
 Laing's Notes of a Traveller - 16 
 Power's New Zealand Sketches - 24 
 Richardson's Overland Journey - 25 
 
 Bloomfield's G reek Testament 
 " Annotations on do. - 
 " College and School do. < 
 
 Book of Ruth (illuminated) - - 1 
 Callcott's Scripture Herbal - 
 Conybeare and Howson's St. Paul 
 
 Banfield and Weld's Statistics - 3 
 Gilbart's Treatise on Banking - 
 Gray's Tables of Life Contingencies 10 
 
 Rovings in the Pacific - - 25 
 Seaward's Narrative - 26 
 Snow's Arctic Voyage - - - 28 
 
AN 
 
 Catalogue 
 
 NEW WORKS AND NEW EDITIONS, 
 
 PUBLISHED BY 
 
 MESSRS. LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, AND LONGMANS, 
 
 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON. 
 
 MISS ACTON'S MODERN COOKERY-BOOK. 
 
 Modern Cookery in all its Branches, reduced to a System of Easy Practice. For the use of 
 Private Families. In a Series of Receipts, all of which have been strictly tested, and are given 
 with the most minute exactness. By ELIZA ACTON. New Edition : with Directions for Carv- 
 ing, and other Additions. Fcp. 8vo. with Plates and Woodcuts, 7s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 AIKIN.-SELECT WORKS OP THE BRITISH POETS, 
 
 From Ben Jonson to Beattie. With Biographical and Critical Prefaces by Dr. AIKIN. New 
 Edition, with Supplement, by LUCY AIKIN ; consisting of additional Selections from more 
 recent Poets. 8vo. 18s. cloth. 
 
 ALLEN ON THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE.-AN INQUIRY 
 
 into the RISE and GROWTH of the ROYAL PREROGATIVE. By the late JOHN ALLEN, 
 Master of Dulwich College. New Edition, with the Author's last Corrections : preceded by 
 M. Be'renger's Rapport on the Work read before the Institute of France ; an Article on 
 the same from the EDINBURGH REVIEW; and a Biographical Notice of the Author. To 
 which is added, An Inquiry into the Life and Character of King Eadwig, from the Author's 
 MS. 8vo. 12s. cloth. 
 
 THE ARTISAN CLUB.-A TREATISE ON THE STEAM 
 
 ENGINE, in its Application to Mines, Mills, Steam Navigation, and Railways. By the 
 Artisan Club. Edited by JOHN BOURNE, C.E. New Edition. With 30 Steel Plates and 349 
 Wood Engravings. 4to. 27s. cloth. 
 
 JOANNA BAILLIE'S DRAMATIC AND POETICAL WORKS. 
 
 Now first collected; complete in One Volume; and comprising the Plays of the Passions, 
 Miscellaneous Dramas, Metrical Legends, Fugitive Pieces (including several now first pub- 
 lished), and Ahalya Baee. Uniform with the New Edition of James Montgomery's Poetical 
 Works ; with Portrait engraved in line by H. Robinson, and Vignette. Square crown 8vo. 
 21s. cloth ; or 42s. handsomely bound in morocco by Hayday. 
 
 BANFIELD AND WELD.-THE STATISTICAL COMPANION, 
 
 Corrected to 1850; exhibiting the most interesting Facts in Moral and Intellectual, Vital, 
 Economical, and Political Statistics, at home and abroad. Compiled from Official and other 
 authentic Sources, by T. C. BANFIELD, Statistical Clerk to the Council of Education ; and 
 R. C. WELD Assistant-Secretary to the Royal Society. New Edition (1850), corrected and ex- 
 tended. Fcp. 8vo. 5s. cloth. 
 
 BAYLDOFS ART OF VALUING RENTS AND TILLAGES, 
 
 And Tenant's Right of Entering and Quitting Farms, explained by several Specimens of 
 Valuations; with Remarks on the Cultivation pursued on Soils in different Situations. 
 Adapted to the Use of Landlords, Land-Agents, Appraisers, Farmers, and Tenants. New 
 Edition ; corrected and revised by John Donaldson. 8vo. 10s. 6d. cloth. 
 
NEW WORKS AND NEW EDITIONS 
 
 BLACK. -A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON BREWING, 
 
 Based on Chemical and Economical Principles: with Formulae for Public Brewers, and 
 Instructions for Private Families. By WILLIAM BLACK, Practical Brewer. New Edition, 
 with considerable Additions. 8vo. 10s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 BLAINE.-AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RURAL SPORTS; 
 
 Or, a complete Account, Historical, Practical, and Descriptive, of Hunting, Shooting, Fishing, 
 Racing, and other Field Sports and Athletic Amusements of the present day. By DELABERE 
 P. BLAIN E, Esq. Author of " Canine Pathology," &c. Illustrated by nearly 600 Engravings on 
 Wood, by R. Branston, from Drawings by Alken, T. Landseer, Dickes, &c. A New and 
 thoroughly revised Edition, corrected to 1851. In One Large Volume, 8vo. [In the press. 
 
 BLAIR'S CHRONOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL TABLES, 
 
 From the Creation to the present time : with Additions and Corrections from the most authen- 
 tic Writers ; including the Computation of St. Paul, as connecting the Period from the Exode 
 to the Temple. Under the revision of Sir HENRY ELLIS, K.H., late Principal Librarian of 
 the British Museum. Imperial 8vo. 31s. 6d. half-bound in morocco. 
 
 BLOOMFIELD.-THE GREEK TESTAMENT: 
 
 With copious English Notes, Critical, Philological, and Explanatory. Especially formed for 
 the use of advanced Students and Candidates for Holy Orders. By Rev. S. T. BLOOMFIELD, 
 D.D. F.S.A. New Edition. 2 vols. 8vo. with a Map of Palestine, 1, cloth. 
 
 THE REV. DR. S. T. BLOOMFIELD'S ADDITIONAL ANNO- 
 
 TATIONS, CRITICAL, PHILOLOGICAL, and EXPLANATORY, on the NEW TES- 
 TAMENT-: being a Supplemental Volume to his Edition of The Greek Testament, with 
 English Notes, in 2 vols. 8vo. In One large Volume, of 460 pages, printed in double columns, 
 uniformly with Dr. Bloomfield's larger Edition of the Greek Testament with English Notes ; 
 and so arranged as to be divisible into Two Parts, each of which may be bound up with the 
 Volume to which it refers. 8vo. 15s. cloth. 
 
 BLOOMFIELD.-COLLEGE & SCHOOL GREEK TESTAMENT : 
 
 With shorter English Notes, Critical, Philological, and Explanatory, formed for use in 
 Colleges and the Public Schools. By the Rev. S. T. BLOOMFIELD, D.D- F.S.A. New Edition, 
 greatly enlarged and improved. Fcp. 8vo. 10s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 BLOOMFIELD. GREEK AND ENGLISH LEXICON TO THE 
 
 NEW TESTAMENT : especially adapted to the use of Colleges, and the Higher Classes in 
 Public Schools; but also intended as a convenient Manual for Biblical Students in general 
 By Dr. S. T. BLOOMFIELD. New Edition, enlarged and improved. Fcp. 8vo. 10s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 BOURNE.-A CATECHISM OF THE STEAM ENGINE, 
 
 Illustrative of the Scientific Principles upon which its Operation depends, and. the Practical 
 Details of its Structure, in its applications to Mines, Mills, Steam Navigation, and Railways: 
 with various Suggestions of Improvement. By JOHN BOURNE, C.E., Editor of the Artisan 
 Club's " Treatise on the Steam Engine." 3d Edition, corrected. Fcp. 8vo. 6s. cloth. 
 
 BRANDE.-A DICTIONARY OF SCIENCE, LITERATURE, 
 
 AND ART; comprising the History, Description, and Scientific Principles of every Branch 
 of Human Knowledge ; with the Derivation and Definition of all the Terms in General Use. 
 Edited byW. T. BRANDE, F.R.S.L. &E. ; assisted by Dr. J. CAUVIN. A New and thoroughly 
 revised Edition, corrected to 1851. In One Large Volume, 8vo. with Wood Engravings. 
 
 [In the press. 
 
 BUDGE.-THE PRACTICAL MINER'S GUIDE. 
 
 Comprising a Set of Trigonometrical Tables adapted to all the purposes of Oblique or Diagonal, 
 Vertical, Horizontal, and Traverse Dialling ; with their application to the Dial, Exercise of 
 Drifts, Lodes, Slides, Levelling, Inaccessible Distances, Heights, &c. By J. BUDGE. New 
 Edition, considerably enlarged. 8vo. with Portrait of the Author, 12s. cloth. 
 
PUBLISHED BY MESSRS. LONGMAN, BROWN, AND CO. 
 
 BULL THE MATERNAL MANAGEMENT OF CHILDREN, 
 
 in HEALTH and DISEASE. By T. BULL, M.D. Member of the Royal College of Physicians ; 
 formerly Physician-Accoucheur to the Finsbury Midwifery Institution, and Lecturer on Mid- 
 wifery and on the Diseases of Women and Children. New Edition, carefully revised and 
 enlarged. Fcp. 8vo. 5s. cloth. 
 
 BULL-HINTS TO MOTHERS, 
 
 For the Management of their Health during the Period of Pregnancy and in the Lying-in Room : 
 with an Exposure of Popular Errors in connexion with those subjects, &c. ; and Hints upon 
 Nursing. By THOMAS BULL, M.D. New Edition, carefully revised and enlarged. Fcp. 8vo. 
 5s. cloth. 
 
 BUNSEN -EGYPT'S PLACE IN UNIVERSAL HISTORY: 
 
 An Historical Investigation, in Five Books. By CHRISTIAN C. J. BUNSEN, D.Ph. & D.C.L. 
 Translated from the German, by C. H. COTTRELL, Esq. M.A. Vol. I. containing the First 
 Book, or Sources and Primeval Facts of Egyptian History: with an Egyptian Grammar 
 and Dictionary, and a complete List of Hieroglyphical Signs ; an Appendix of Authorities, 
 embracing the complete Text of Manetho and Eratosthenes, ^Egyptiaca from Pliny, Strabo, 
 &c. ; and Plates representing the Egyptian Divinities. 8vo. with numerous illustrations, 
 28s. cloth. 
 
 BISHOP BUTLER'S SKETCH OF MODERN AND ANCIENT 
 
 GEOGRAPHY, for the use of Schools. An entirely New Edition (1851), carefully revised 
 throughout, with such Alterations introduced as continually progressive Discoveries and the 
 latest Information have rendered necessary. Edited by the Author's Son, the Rev. THOMAS 
 BUTLER, Rector of Langar. 8vo. 9s. cloth. 
 
 BISHOP BUTLER'S GENERAL ATLAS OF MODERN AND 
 
 ANCIENT GEOGRAPHY ; comprising Fifty-one full-coloured Maps ; with complete Indices. 
 New Edition (1851), nearly all re-engraved, enlarged, and greatly improved ; with corrections 
 from the most authentic sources in both the Ancient and Modern Maps, many of which are 
 entirely new. Edited by the Author's Son, the Rev. T. BUTLER. Royal 4to. 24s. half-bound. 
 
 5 The Modern Atlas. 28 full-coloured Maps. Royal 8vo. 12s. half-bound. 
 tely t The Ancient Atlas. 23 full- coloured Maps. Royal 8vo. 12s. half-bound. 
 
 THE CABINET LAWYER : 
 
 A Popular Digest of the Laws of England, Civil and Criminal ; with a Dictionary of Law 
 Terms, Maxims, Statutes, and Judicial Antiquities ; Correct Tables of Assessed Taxes, Stamp 
 Duties, Excise Licenses, and Post-Horse Duties ; Post-Office Regulations, and Prison Disci- 
 pline. 15th Edition (1851), enlarged, and corrected throughout, with the Legal Decisions and 
 Statutes to Michaelmas Term, 13 and 14 Victoria. Fcp. 8vo. 10s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 CALLCOTT . A SCRIPTURE HERBAL. 
 
 With upwards of 120 Wood Engravings. By Lady CALLCOTT. Square crown 8vo. 25s. cloth. 
 
 CATLOV -POPULAR CONCHOLOGY; 
 
 Or, the Shell Cabinet arranged: being an Introduction to the Modern System of Conchology : 
 with a sketch of the Natural Hi story of the Animals, an account of the Formation of the Shells, 
 and a complete Descriptive List of the Families and Genera. By AGNES CATLOW. Fcp. 8vo. 
 with 312 Woodcuts, 10s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 CHESNEY.-THE EXPEDITION FOR THE SURYEY OF 
 
 THE RIVERS EUPHRATES and TIGRIS, carried on by order of the British Government, 
 in the Years 1835, 1836, and 1837. By Lieut.-Col. CHESNEY, R.A., F.R.S., Commander of 
 the Expedition. Vols. I. and II. in royal 8vo. with a coloured Index Map and numerous 
 Plates and Woodcuts, 63s. cloth. Also, an ATLAS of Thirteen Charts of the Expedition, 
 price 46'!. 11s. 6d. in case. 
 
 ** The entire work will consist of Four Volumes, royal 8vo. embellished with Ninety-seven 
 Plates, besides numerous Woodcut Illustrations, from Drawings chiefly made by Officers 
 employed in the Surveys. 
 
NEW WORKS AND NEW EDITIONS 
 
 JOHN GOAD'S MEMORANDUM.-A CONTEMPORARY AC- 
 
 COUNT of the SUFFERINGS of the REBELS sentenced to TRANSPORTATION by JUDGE 
 JEFFERIES ; being, A Memorandum of the Wonderful Providences of God to a poor unworthy 
 Creature, during the time of the Duke of Monmouth's Rebellion, and to the Revolution in 
 1688. By JOHN Co AD, one the Sufferers. Square fcp. 8vo. 4s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 CONYBEARE AND HOWSON.-THE LIFE AND EPISTLES 
 
 of SAINT PAUL ; comprising a complete Biography of the Apostle, and a Paraphrastic 
 Translation of his Epistles inserted in Chronological Order. Edited by the Rev. W. J. 
 CONYBEARE, M.A. late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; and the Rev. J. S. HOWSON, 
 M.A. late Principal of the Collegiate Institution, Liverpool. Copiously illustrated by nu-i e- 
 rous Engravings on Steel and Wood of the Principal Places visited by the Apostle, from 
 Original Drawings made on the spot by W. H. Bartlett ; and by Maps, Charts, Woodcuts of 
 C )ins, &c. Vol. I. Part I. ; with Thirteen Engravings on Steel, Seven Maps and Plans, 
 and numerous Woodcuts. 4to. 17s. boards. 
 
 *** In course of publication in Twenty Parts, price 2s. each ; of which Twelve are now ready. 
 
 CONVERSATIONS ON BOTANY. 
 
 New Edition, improved. Fcp. 8vo. 22 Plates, 7s. 6d. cloth ; with the plates coloured, 12s. cloth. 
 
 CONVERSATIONS ON MINERALOGY. 
 
 With Plates, engraved by Mr. and Mrs. Lowry, from Original Drawings. New Edition, 
 enlarged. 2 vols. fcp. 8vo. 14s. cloth. 
 
 COOK.-THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES : 
 
 With a Commentary, and Practical and Devotional Suggestions, for the Use of Readers and 
 Students of the English Bible. By the Rev. F. C. COOK, M.A. one of Her Majesty's Inspec- 
 tors of Church Schools. Post 8vo. 8s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 COOPER-PRACTICAL AND FAMILIAR SERMONS, 
 
 Designed for Parochial and Domestic Instruction. Bythe Rev. EDWARD COOPER. New Edi- 
 tion. 7 vols. 12mo. \. 18s. boards. 
 
 COPLAND.-A DICTIONARY OF PRACTICAL MEDICINE; 
 
 comprising General Pathology, the Nature and Treatment of Diseases, Morbid Structures, 
 and the Disorders especially incidental to Climates, to Sex, and to the different Epochs of 
 Life; with numerous approved Formulae of the Medicines recommended. By JAMES COPLAND, 
 M.D. Consulting Physician to Queen Charlotte's Lying-in Hospital, &c. &c. Vols. I. and II. 
 8vo. ^3, cloth ; and Parts X. to XIV. 4s 6d. each, sewed. 
 
 THE CHILDREN'S OWN SUNDAY-BOOK. 
 
 By Miss JULIA CORNER, Author of " Questions on the History of Europe," &c. With Two 
 Illustrations engraved on Steel. Square fcp. 8vo. 5s. cioth. 
 
 CRESY.-AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CIVIL ENGINEERING, 
 
 Historical, Theoretical, and Practical. By EDWARD CRESY, F.S.A. C.E. In One very 
 large Volume, illustrated by upwards of Three Thousand Engravings on Wood, explanatory 
 of the Principles, Machinery, and Constructions which come under the Direction of the 
 Civil Engineer. 8vo. ^3. 13s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 THE CRICKET-FIELD; OR, THE SCIENCE AND HISTORY 
 
 of the GAME. Illustrated with Diagrams, and enlivened with Anecdotes. By the Author 
 of " Principles of Scientific Batting," " Recollections of College Days," &c. With Two 
 Engravings on Steel; uniform with Harry Hieover's Hunting-Field. Fcp. 8vo. 
 
 [Nearly ready. 
 
PUBLISHED BY MESSRS. LONGMAN, BROWN, AND CO. 
 
 CROCKER'S ELEMENTS OF LAND SURVEYING. 
 
 New Edition, corrected throughout, and considerably improved and modernized, by T. G. 
 BUNT, Land Surveyor. To which are added, TABLES OF SIX-FIGURE LOGARITHMS, 
 &c., superintended by R. FA RLEY, of the Nautical Almanac Establishment. Post 8vo. 12s. cloth. 
 V Mr. Farley's Tables of Six-Figure Logarithms may be had separately, price 4s. 6d. 
 
 DALE.-THE DOMESTIC LITURGY AND FAMILY CHAP- 
 
 LAIN, in two Parts : The First Part being Church Services adapted for domestic use, 
 with Prayers for every day of the week, selected exclusively from the Book of Common 
 Prayer; Part II. comprising an appropriate Sermon for every Sunday in the year. By 
 the Rev. THOMAS DALE, M.A., Canon Residentiary of St. Paul's Cathedral. 2d Edition. 
 Post 4to. 21s. cloth: or, bound by Hayday, 31s. 6d. calf lettered; &2. 10s. morocco. 
 
 f THE FAMILY CHAPLAIN, price 12s. cloth. 
 Separately ( TRE DoMESTIC LITURGY, price 10s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 DANDOLO.-THE ITALIAN VOLUNTEERS AND LOMBARD 
 
 RIFLE BRIGADE in the YEARS 1848-49- Translated from the Italian of Emilio Dandolo. 
 Edited by the Rev. T. L. WOLLEY. > [Nearly ready. 
 
 DELABECHE. -THE GEOLOGICAL OBSERVER. 
 
 By Sir HENRY T. DELABECHE, F.R S., Director-General of the Geological Survey of the 
 United Kingdom. In One large Volume, with many Wood Engravings. 8vo. 18s. cloth. 
 
 DELABECHE. - REPORT ON THE GEOLOGY OF CORN- 
 
 WALL, DEVON, and WEST SOMERSET. By HENRY T. DELABECHE, F.R.S., Di- 
 rector-General of the Geological Survey of the United Kingdom. Published by Order of 
 the Lords Commissioners of H.M. Treasury. 8vo. with Maps, Woodcuts, and 12 large Pates, 
 14s. cloth. 
 
 DE LA RIVE'S WORK ON ELECTRICITY. ~ A TREATISE 
 
 on ELECTRICITY; its Theory and Practical Application. By A. DE LA RIVE, of the 
 Academy of Geneva. Illustrated with numerous Wood Engravings. 2 vols. 8vo. 
 
 [Nearly ready. 
 
 DENNISTOUN.-MEMOIRS OF THE DUKES OFURBINO; 
 
 Illustrating the Arms, Arts, and Literature of Italy, from MCCCCXL. to MDCXXX. By 
 JAMES DENNISTOUN, of Dennistoun. With numerous Portraits, Plates, Fac-similes, and 
 Engravings on Wood. 3 vols. crown 8vo. sS2. 8s. cloth. 
 
 "The object of these volumes is to combine a general picture of the progress of Italian literature and art under 
 the patronage of the smaller Italian principalities, with a history of the houses of Montefeltro and Delia Rovere.so 
 far as they were connected with Urbino. For the execution of his purpose Mr. Dennistoun enjoyed" numerous 
 advantages. He has resided in Italy for many years, and is well acquainted with the country whose history as a 
 dukedom he intended to relate: besides the common research in printed volumes, he has gained access to various 
 Italian libraries, including that of Urbino, and examined their manuscripts ; and he has closely inspected Umbrian 
 art, whether in palatial, military, or ecclesiastical architecture, or in painting. With the appreciation of Italy which 
 such a course of study stimulates and implies, Mr. Dennistoun has good taste, a sound, though not always an un- 
 biassed judgment, and a zeal for mediaeval subjects, especially art, almost enthusiastic." SPECTATOR. 
 
 DISCIPLINE. 
 
 By the Authoress of "Letters to my Unknown Friends," "Twelve Years Ago," "Some 
 Passages from Modern Histoi ;," and "Letters on Happiness." Second Edition, enlarged. 
 18mo. 2s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 DIXON.-THE GEOLOGY AND FOSSILS OF THE TERTIARY 
 
 and CRETACEOUS FORMATIONS of SUSSEX. By the late FREDERICK DIXON, Esq. F.G.S. 
 The Fossils engraved from Drawings by Messrs. Sowerby, Dinkel, and Erxleben. In One 
 large Volume, with 44 Plates and many Wood Engravings. Royal 4to. 63s. cloth ; India 
 Proofs, 56 s 5s. 5s. 
 
 *** In this work are embodied the results of many years' Geological and Palaeontological 
 observations by the Author, together with some remarks on the Archaeology of Sussex. It 
 also includes Descriptions -Of the fossil Reptilia, by Prof. Owen, F.R. S.; of the Echino- 
 derma, by Prof. Edward Forbes, F.R.S. ; of the Crustacea, by Prof. Thomas Bell, Sec. R.S. ; 
 of the Corals, by William Lonsdale, Esq. F.G.S. ; and of the fossil Shells, by J. De Carle 
 Sowerby, Esq. F.L.S. 
 
NEW WORKS AND NEW EDITIONS 
 
 DOUBLED!! AND HEWITSJVVS BUTTERFLIES. - THE 
 
 GENERA of DIURNAL LEPIDOPTERA ; comprising their Generic Characters a Notice 
 of the Habits and Transformations and a Catalogue of the Species of each Genus. By 
 EDWARD DOUBLEDA\, Esq. F.L.S. &c., late Assistant in the Zoological Department of the 
 British Museum. Continued by J. O. WESTWOOD, Esq. Illustrated with 75 Coloured Plates, 
 by W. C. HEWITSON, Esq. Author of " British Oology." Imperial 4to. uniform with Gray 
 and Mitchell's "Genera of Birds." 
 
 V In course of publication in Monthly Parts, 5s. each ; of which 41 have appeared. The 
 publication, which had been suspended in consequence of the death of Mr. Doubleday, is 
 now resumed, and will be continued regularly until the completion of the work in about 
 Fifty Parts. 
 
 DRESDEN GALLERY.-THE MOST CELEBRATED PICTURES 
 
 of the ROYAL GALLERY at DRESDEN, drawn on Stone, from the Originals, by Franz 
 Hanfstaengl : with Descriptive and Biographical Notices, in French and German. Nos. I. 
 to LVIII. imperial folio, each containing 3 Plates, with Letter- press, price 20s. to Subscribers; 
 to Non Subscribers, 30s. Single Plates, 12s. each. 
 
 *** To be completed in 2 more numbers, price 20s. each, to Subscribers. Nos. LI. to LX. 
 contain each Four Plates and Letterpress. 
 
 DUNLOP.-THE HISTORY OF FICTION: 
 
 Being a Critical Account of the most celebrated Prose Works of Fiction, from the earliest 
 Greek Romances to the Novels of the Present Age. By JOHN DUNLOP, Esq. New Edition, 
 complete in One Volume. 8vo. 15s. cloth. 
 
 EASTLAKE. - MATERIALS FOR A HISTORY OF OIL 
 
 PAINTING. By CHARLES LOCK EASTLAKE, Esq. P.R.A. F.R.S. F.S.A. ; Secretary to the 
 Royal Commission for Promoting 1 the Fine Arts in connexion with the rebuilding of the Houses 
 of Parliament, &c. 8vo. 16s. cloth. 
 
 *** Vol. II. On the Italian Practice of Oil Painting, is preparing for publication. 
 
 ELMES'S THOUGHT BOOK, OR HORJ] VACIVJE. 
 
 Horse Vacivae ; or, a Thought Book of the Wise Spirits of all Ages and all Countries, for all 
 Men and all Hours. Collected, arranged, and edited by JAMES ELMES, Author of " Me- 
 moirs of Sir Christopher Wren," &c. Fcp. I6mo. (printed by C. Whittingham, Chiswick), 
 4s. 6d. bound in cloth. 
 
 THE ENGLISHMAN'S GREEK CONCORDANCE OF THE 
 
 NEW TESTAMENT: being an Attempt at a Verbal Connexion between the Greek and the 
 English Texts ; including a Concordance to the Proper Names, with Indexes, Greek-English 
 and English-Greek. New Edition, with a new Index. Royal 8vo. 42s. cloth. 
 
 THE ENGLISHMAN'S HEBREW AND CHALDEE CON- 
 
 CORDANCE of the OLD TESTAMENT ; being an Attempt at a Verbal Connection between 
 the Original and the English Translations : with Indexes, a List of the Proper Names and 
 their occurrences, &c. 2 vols. royal 8vo. .a?3. 13s. 6d. cloth; large paper, ^6*4. 14s. 6d. 
 
 EPHEMERA.-THE BOOK OF THE SALMON : 
 
 In Two Parts. Parti. The Theory, Principles, and Practice of Fly-Fishing for Salmon: with 
 Lists of good Salmon Flies for every good River in the Empire ; Part II. The Natural History 
 of the Salmon, all Its known Habits described, and the best way of artificially Breeding It 
 explained. Usefully illustrated with numerous Coloured Engravings of Salmon Flies and 
 Salmon Fry. By EPHEMERA, Author of " A Hand-Book of Angling ;" assisted by ANDREW 
 YOUNG, of Invershin, Manager of the Duke of Sutherland's Salmon Fisheries. Fcp. 8vo. 
 with coloured Plates, 14s. cloth. 
 
 EPHEMERA.-A HAND-BOOK OF ANGLING ; 
 
 Teaching Fly-fishing, Trolling, Bottom-fishin:;, Salmon-fishing; with the Natural History of 
 River Fish, and the best modes of Catching them. By EPHEMERA, of " Bell's Life in 
 London." New Edition, enlarged. Fcp 8vo. with numerous Woodcuts, 9s. cloth. 
 
PUBLISHED BY MESSRS. LONGMAN, BROWN, AND CO. 
 
 ERMAN.-TRAVELS IN SIBERIA: 
 
 including Excursions northwards, down the Obi, to the Polar Circle, and southwards to the 
 Chinese Frontier. By ADOLPH ERMAN. Translated by W. D. COOLEY, Esq. Author of 
 " The History of Maritime and Inland Discovery ;" 2 vols. 8vo. with Map, 31s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 EVANS.-THE SUGAR PLANTER'S MANUAL : 
 
 Being a Treatise on the Art of obtaining Sugar from the Sugar Cane. By W. J. EVANS, M.D. 
 8vo. 9s. cloth. 
 
 FORBES.-DAHOMEY AND THE DAHOMANS : 
 
 Being the Journals of Two Missions to the King of Dahomey, and Residence at his Capital, 
 in the Years 1849 and 1850. By FREDERICK E. FORBES, Commander, R.N., F.R.G.S. ; Au- 
 thor of " Five Years in China," and " Six Months in the African Blockade." With 10 Plates, 
 printed in Colours, and 3 Wood Engravings. 2 vols. post 8vo. 21s. cloth. 
 
 FORESTER AND BIDDULPH'S NORWAY. 
 
 Norway in 1848 and 1849 : containing Rambles among the Fjeldsand Fjords of the Central and 
 Western Districts ; and including Remarks on its Political, Military, Ecclesiastical, and Social 
 Organisation. By THOMAS FORESTER, Esq. With Extracts from the Journals of Lieutenant 
 M. S. BIDDULPH, Royal Artillery. With a new Map, Woodcuts, and Ten coloured Plates 
 from Drawings made on the spot. 8vo. 18s. cloth. 
 
 FOSS.-THE JUDGES OF ENGLAND : 
 
 with Sketches of their Lives, and Miscellaneous Notices connected with the Courts at West- 
 minster from the time of the Conquest. By EDWARD Foss, F.S.A. of the Inner Temple. 
 Vols. I. and II. 8vo. 28s. cloth. 
 
 FOSTER. A HANDBOOK OF MODERN EUROPEAN LITE- 
 
 RATURE: British, Danish, Dutch, French, German, Hungarian, Italian, Polish and Rus- 
 sian, Portuguese, Spanish, and Swedish. With a full Biographical and Chronological Index. 
 By Mrs. FOSTER. Fcp. 8vo. 8s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 *** The object of this book is, not so much to give elaborate criticisms on the various writers 
 in the language to whose literature it is intended as a guide, as to direct the student to the 
 best writers in each, and to inform him on what subjects they have written. 
 
 GIBBON'S HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE 
 
 ROMAN EMPIRE. A new Edition, complete in One Volume. With an Account of the Author's 
 Life and Writings, by ALEXANDER CHALMERS, Esq. F.A.S. 8vo. with Portrait, 18s. cloth. 
 V An Edition, in 8 vols. 8vo. 60s. boards. 
 
 GILBART.-A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON BANKING. 
 
 By JAMES WILLIAM GILBART, F.R S. General Manager of the London and Westminster 
 Bank. 5th Edition, with Portrait of the Author, and View of the " London and Westminster 
 Bank," Lothbury. 2 vols. 8vo. 24s. cloth. 
 
 GOLDSMITH. - THE POETICAL WORKS OF OLIVER 
 
 GOLDSMITH. Illustrated by Wood Engravings, from Designs by Members of the Etching 
 Club. With a Biographical Memoir, and Notes on the Poems. Edited by BOLTON CORNEY, 
 Esq. Square crown 8vo. uniform with Thomson's Seasons illustrated by the Etching Club, 
 21s. cloth; or, bound in morocco by Hayday, \. 16s. 
 
 GOSSE.-NATURAL HISTORY OF THE ISLAND OF JAMAICA. 
 
 By P. H. GOSSE, Author of " The Birds of Jamaica," " Popular British Ornithology," &c. 
 Post 8vo. with coloured Plates. {Nearly ready. 
 
 GOWER.-THE SCIENTIFIC PHENOMENA OF DOMESTIC 
 
 LIFE, familiarly explained. By CHARLES FOOTE GOWER. New Edition. Fcp. 8vo. with 
 Wood Engravings, 5s. cloth. 
 
 c 
 
10 NEW WORKS AND NEW EDITIONS 
 
 GRAHAM.-ENGLISH ; OR, THE ART OF COMPOSITION : 
 
 explained in a Series of Instructions and Examples. By G. F. GRAHAM. New Edition, 
 revised and improved. Fcp. 8vo. 6s. cloth. 
 
 GRANT. LETTERS FROM THE MOUNTAINS. 
 
 Being the Correspondence with her Friends, between the years 1773 and 1803. By Mrs GRANT, 
 of Laggan. New Edition. Edited, with Notes and Additions, by her son, J. P. GRANT, 
 Esq. 2 vols. post 8vx>. 21s. cloth. 
 
 GRANT.- MEMOIR AND CORRESPONDENCE OF THE 
 
 late Mrs. Grant, of Laggan, Author of " Letters from the Mountains," "Memoirs of an 
 American Lady," &c. Edited by her Son, J. P. GRANT, Esq. New Edition. 3 vols. post 8vo. 
 with Portrait, 31s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 GRAY.- TABLES AND FORMULA FOR THE COMPUTATION 
 
 of LIFE CONTINGENCIES ; with copious Examples of Annuity, Assuraace, and Friendly 
 Society Calculations. By PETER GRAY, F.R.A.S. Associate of the Institute .of Actuaries of 
 Great Britain and Ireland. Royal 8vo. 15s. cloth. 
 
 GRAY AND MITCHELL'S ORNITHOLOGY.-THE GENERA 
 
 Of BIRDS ; comprising their Generic Characters, a Notice of the Habits of each Genus, and 
 an extensive List of Species, referred to their several Genera. By GEORGE ROBERT GRAY, 
 Acad. Imp. Georg. Florent. Soc. Corresp., Senior Assistant of the Natural History Depart- 
 ment in the British Museum. Illustrated with 360 Plates (175 plain and 185 coloured), drawn 
 on stone, by DAVID WILLIAM MITCHELL, B.A., F.L.S., Secretary to the Zoological Society 
 of London, &c. 3 vols. imperial 4to. o31. 10s. half-bound morocco, gilt tops. 
 
 GWILT.-AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARCHITECTURE ; 
 
 Historical, Theoretical, and Practical. By JOSEPH GWILT. Illustrated with more than 
 One Thousand Engravings on Wood, from Designs by J. S. GWILT. Second Edition (1851), 
 with a Supplemental View of the Symmetry and Stability of Gothic Architecture ; comprising 
 upwards of Eighty additional Woodcuts. 8vo. 52s. 6d. cloth 
 
 SUPPLEMENT TO GWILT'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARCHI- 
 
 TECTURE. Comprising a View of the Symmetry and Stability of Gothic Architecture ; 
 Addenda to the Glossary ; and an Index to the entire Work. By JOSEPH GWILT. Illus- 
 trated by upwards of Eighty Wood Engravings by R. Branston. 8vo. 6s. cloth. 
 
 SIDNEY HALL'S NEW GENERAL LARGE LIBRARY ATLAS 
 
 OF FIFTY-THREE MAPS (size 20 in. by 16 in.), with the Divisions and Boundaries care- 
 fully coloured ; and an Alphabetical Index of all the Names contained in the Maps, with their 
 Latitude and Longitude. An entirely New Edition, corrected throughout from the best and 
 most recent Authorities ; with all the Railways laid down, and many of the Maps re-drawn 
 and re-engraved. Colombier 4to. 5. 5s. half-bound in russia. 
 
 SIDNEY HALL'S RAILWAY MAP OF ENGLAND AND 
 
 WALES. Square fcp. 8vo. 2s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 V The Map of England and Wales, contained in " Sidney Hall's Large Railway Atlas" (size 
 20 in. by 16 in.) corrected and re-engraved, with all the Lines of Railway laid down, may be 
 had separately, price 2s. 6d., coloured and mounted on folding canvas in a case for the 
 pocket. 
 
 HAMILTON.-CRITICAL ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY, LITE- 
 RATURE, and ACADEMICAL REFORM, contributed to The Edinburgh Review by Sir 
 William Hamilton, Bart. With additional Notes and Appendices. [In the press. 
 
 HARRISON. ON THE RISE, PROGRESS, AND PRESENT 
 
 STRUCTURE of the ENGLISH LANGUAGE. By the Rev. M. HARRISON, M.A. late 
 Fellow of Queen's College, Oxford. Post 8vo. 8s. 6d. cloth. 
 
PUBLISHED BY MESSRS. LONGMAN, BROWN, AND CO. 11 
 
 HARRY HIEOVER.-THE HUNTING-FIELD. 
 
 By HARRY HIEOVER, Author of " Stable-Talk and Table-Talk; or, Spectacles for Young 
 Sportsmen." With Two Plates One representing The Right Sort; the other, The Wrong Sort. 
 Fcp. 8vo. 5s. half-bound. 
 
 HARRY HIEOVER.-PRACTICAL HORSEMANSHIP. 
 
 By HARRY HIEOVER, Author of "Stable Talk and Table Talk; or, Spectacles for Young: 
 Sportsmen." With 2 Plates One representing Going like Workmen; the other, Going like 
 Muffs. Fcp. 8vo. 5s. half-bound. 
 
 HARRY HIEOVER.-THE STUD, FOR PRACTICAL PUR- 
 
 1'OSES AND PRACTICAL MEN: being a Guide to the Choice of a Horse for use more than 
 for show. By HARRY HIEOVER, Author of " Stable Talk and Table Talk." With Two Plates 
 One representing A pretty good sort for most purposes ; the other, ' Rayther' a bad sort for 
 any purpose. Fcp. 8vo. 5s. half -bound. 
 
 HARRY HIEOVER.-THE POCKET AND THE STUD ; 
 
 Or, Practical Hints on the Management of the Stable. By HARRY HIEOVER, Author of 
 " Stable-Talk and Table-Talk ; or, Spectacles for Young Sportsmen." Second Edition ; with 
 Portrait of the Author on his favourite Horse Harlequin. Fcp. 8vo. 5s. half-bound. 
 
 HARRY HIEOVER.- STABLE TALK AND TABLE TALK; 
 
 or, SPECTACLES for YOUNG SPORTSMEN. By HARRY HIEOVER. New Edition. 
 2 vols. 8vo. with Portrait, 24s. cloth. 
 
 | HAWKER. INSTRUCTIONS TO YOUNG SPORTSMEN 
 
 In all that relates to Guns and Shooting. By Lieut.-CoI. P. HAWKER, New Edition, 
 corrected, enlarged, and improved; with Eighty-five Plates and Woodcuts by Adlard and 
 Branston, from Drawings by C. Varley, Dickes, &c. 8vo. 21s. cloth. 
 
 HAYDN. THE BOOK OF DIGNITIES; OR, ROLLS OF THE 
 
 OFFICIAL PERSONAGES of the BRITISH EMPIRE, from the EARLIEST PERIODS to the 
 PRESENT TIME : comprising the Administrations of Great Britain ; the Offices of State, and 
 all the Public Departments ; the Ecclesiastical Dignitaries ; the Functionaries of the Law ; the 
 Commanders of the Army and Navy ; and the Hereditary Honours and other Distinctions 
 conferred upon Families and Public Men. Being a New Edition, improved and continued, of 
 BEATSON'S POLITICAL INDEX. By JOSEPH HAYDN, Compiler of '-The Dictionary of 
 Dates," and other Works. In One very large Volume, 8vo. [In the Spring. 
 
 \ HEAD.-THE METAMORPHOSES OF APULEIUS : 
 
 A Romance of the Second Century. Translated from the Latin by Sir GEORGE H EAD, Author 
 of" A Tour of Many Days in Rome ;" Translator of " Historical Memoirs of Cardinal Pacca." 
 Post 8vo. 12s. cloth. 
 
 ! HEAD -HISTORICAL MEMOIRS OF CARDINAL PACCA, 
 
 Prime Minister to Pius VII. Written by Himself. Translated from the Italian, by Sir GEORGE 
 HEAD, Author of " Rome : a Tour of Many Days." 2 vols. post 8vo 21s. cloth. 
 
 SIR GEORGE HEAD. ROME : 
 
 A Tour of Many Days. By Sir GEORGE HEAD. 3 vols. 8vo. 36s. cloth. 
 
 SIR JOHN HERSCHEL -OUTLINES OF ASTRONOMY. 
 
 By Sir JOHN F. W. HERSCHEL. Bart. &c. &c. &c. New Edition ; with Plates and Wood En- 
 gravings. 8vo. 18s. cloth. 
 
12 NEW WORKS AND NEW EDITIONS 
 
 MRS. HEY.-THE MORAL OF FLOWERS ; 
 
 Or, Thoughts gathered from the Field and the Garden. By Mrs. HEY. Being- a New Edition 
 of " The Moral of Flowers ;" and consisting of Poetical Thoughts on Garden and Field 
 Flowers, accompanied by Drawings beautifully coloured after Nature. Square crown 8vo. 
 uniform in size with Thomson's Seasons illustrated by the Etching Club, 21s. cloth. 
 
 MRS. HEY.-SYLVAN MUSINGS ; 
 
 Or, the Spirit of the Woods. By Mrs. HKY. Being a New Edition of the "Spirit of the 
 Woods;" and consisting of Poetical Thoughts on Forest Trees, accompanied by Drawings of 
 Blossoms and Foliage, beautifully coloured after Nature. Square crown 8vo. uniform in size 
 with Thomson's Seasons illustrated by the Etching Club, 21s. cloth. 
 
 HINTS ON ETIQUETTE AND THE USAGES OF SOCIETY : 
 
 With a Glance at Bad Habits. By Ayuyos. " Manners make the man." New Edition, 
 revised (with additions) by a Lady of Rank. Fcp. 8vo. 2s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 HOARE.-A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CULTIVATION 
 
 OF THE GRAPE VINE ON OPEN WALLS. By CLEMENT HOARE. New Edition. 8vo. 
 7s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 LORD HOLLAND'S FOREIGN REMINISCENCES. FOREIGN 
 
 REMINISCENCES. By HENRY RICHARD LORD HOLLAND. Comprising Anecdotes, and an 
 Account of such Persons and Political intrigues in Foreign Countries as have fallen within 
 his Lordship's observation. Edited by his Son, HENRY EDWARD LORD HOLLAND ; with 
 Fac-simile. Post 8vo. 10s. 6d. 
 
 HOOK. THE LAST DAYS OF OUR LORD'S MINISTRY: 
 
 A Course of Lectures on the principal Events of Passion Week. By WALTER FARUHAR 
 HOOK, D D. Vicar of Leeds, Prebendary of Lincoln, and Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen. 
 New Edition. Fcp. Svo. 6s. cloth. 
 
 HOOKER. KEW GARDENS; 
 
 Or, a Popular Guide to the Royal Botanic Gardens of Kew. By Sir WILLIAM JACKSON 
 HOOKER, K.H. D.C.L. F.R.A. & L.S. &c. &c. Director. New Edition. I6mo. with numerous 
 Wood Engravings, 6d. sewed. 
 
 HOOKER AND ARNOTT.-THE BRITISH FLORA; 
 
 Comprising the Phaenogamous or Flowering Plants, and the Ferns. The Sixth Edition (1850), 
 with Additions and Corrections; and numerous Figures illustrative of the Umbelliferous 
 Plants, the Composite Plants, the Grasses, and the Ferns. By Sir W. J. HOOKER, F.R.A. 
 and L.S. &c., and G. A. WALKER-ARNOTT, LL.D. F.L.S. and R.S. Ed.; Regius Professor 
 of Botany in the University of Glasgow. In One very thick Volume, 12mo. with 12 Plates, 14s. 
 cloth; or with the Plates coloured, price 21s. 
 
 HOME. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CRITICAL STUDY 
 
 and KNOWLEDGE of the HOLY SCRIPTURES. By THOMAS HARTWELL HORNE, B.D. 
 of St. John's College, Cambridge; Rector of the united Parishes of St. Edmund the King 
 and Martyr, and St. Nicholas Aeons, Lombard- Street ; Prebendary of St. Paul's. New 
 Edition, revised and corrected. 5 vols. Svo. with numerous Maps and Facsimiles of Biblical 
 Manuscripts, 63s. cloth ; or 5, bound in calf. 
 
 HORNE.- A COMPENDIOUS INTRODUCTION TO THE 
 
 STUDY of the BIBLE. By THOMAS HARTWELL HORNE, B.D. of St. John's College, 
 Cambridge. Being an Analysis of his "Introduction to the Critical Study and Know- 
 ledge of the Holy Scriptures." New Edition, corrected and enlarged. 12mo. with Maps and 
 other Engravings, 9s. boards. 
 
 HOWITT. THE CHILDREN'S YEAR. 
 
 By MARY HOWITT. With Four Illustrations, engraved by John Absolon, from Original 
 Designs by ANNA MARY HOWITT. Square I6mo. 5s. cloth. 
 
PUBLISHED BY MESSRS. LONGMAN, BROWN, AND CO. 13 
 
 HOWITT. THE BOY'S COUNTRY BOOK: 
 
 Being the real Life of a Country Boy, written by himself; exhibiting all the Amusements, 
 Pleasures, and Pursuits of Children in the Country. Edited by WILLIAM HOWITT. New 
 Edition. Fcp. 8vo. with 40 Woodcuts, 6s. cloth. 
 
 HOWITT.-THE RURAL LIFE OF ENGLAND. 
 
 By WILLIAM HOWITT. New Edition, corrected and revised ; with Engravings on wood, by 
 Bewick and Williams : uniform with Visits to Remarkable Places. Medium Svo. 21s. cloth. 
 
 HOWITT.-YISITS TO REMARKABLE PLACES; 
 
 Old Halls, Battle-Fields, and Scenes illustrative of Striking Passages in English History and 
 Poetry. By WILLIAM HOWITT. New Edition ; with 40 Engravings on Wood. Medium Svo. 
 21s. cloth. 
 
 SECOND SERIES, chiefly in the Counties of NORTHUMBERLAND and DURHAM, with a 
 Stroll along the BORDER. With upwards of 40 Engravings on Wood. Medium Svo. 
 21s. cloth. 
 
 HOWSON.-SUNDAY EVENING : 
 
 Twelve Short Sermons for Family Reading. 1. The Presence of Christ ; 2. Inward and Out- 
 ward Life; 3. The Threefold Warning ; 4. Our Father's Business ; 5. Spiritual Murder ; 6. The 
 Duty of Amiability ; 7. Honesty and Candour ; 8. St. teter and Cornelius ; 9. The Midnight 
 Traveller; 10. St. Andrew; 11. The Grave of Lazarus; 12. The Resurrection of the Body. 
 By the Rev. J. S. HOWSON, M.A. Principal of the Collegiate Institution, Liverpool, and 
 Chaplain to the Duke of Sutherland. Fcp. Svo. 2s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 HOWSON AND CONYBEARE. THE LIFE AND EPISTLES 
 
 of SAINT PAUL. By the Rev. J. S. HOWSON, M.A., and the Rev. W. J. CONYBEARE, M.A. 
 2 vols. 4to. very copiously illustrated by W. H. Barttlett. {Seepage 6. 
 
 HUDSON. THE EXECUTOR'S GUIDE. 
 
 By J. C. HUDSON, Esq. late of the Legacy Duty Office, London ; Author of" Plain Directions 
 for Making Wills," and "The Parent's Hand-book." New Edition. Fcp. Svo. 5s. cloth. 
 
 HUDSON-PLAIN DIRECTIONS FOR MAKING WILLS 
 
 In Conformity with the Law, and particularly with reference to the Act 7 Will. 4 and 1 Viet, 
 c. 26. To which is added, a clear Exposition of the Law relating to the distribution of Per- 
 sonal Estate in the case of Intestacy ; with two Forms of Wills, and much useful information, 
 &c. By J. C. HUDSON, Esq. New Edition, corrected. Fcp. Svo. 2s. 6d. cloth. 
 ** These Two works may be had in One Volume, 7s. cloth. 
 
 HUMBOLDT.-ASPECTS OF NATURE 
 
 In Different Lands and Different Climates ; with Scientific Elucidations. By ALEXANDER VON 
 HUMBOLDT. Translated, with the Author's sanction and co-operation, and at his express 
 desire, by Mrs. SABINE. New Edition. I6mo. 6s. cloth: or in 2 vols. 3s. 6d. each, cloth; 
 Half-a-Ci-own each, sewed. 
 
 BARON HUMBOLDT'S COSMOS ; 
 
 Or, a Sketch of a Physical Description of the Universe. Translated, with the Author's sanction 
 and co-operation, under the superintendence of Lieutenant-Colonel EDWARD SABINE, R.A. 
 For. Sec. R.S. New Edition. Vols. I. and II. I6mo. Half-a-Crown each, sewed; 3s. 6d. each, 
 cloth : or in post Svo. 12s. each, cloth. Vol. 1 II. Part I. post Svo. 6s. cloth : or in 16mo. 2s. 6d. 
 sewed ; 3s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 HUMPHREYS-SENTIMENTS & SIMILES OF SHAKSPEARE: 
 
 A Classified Selection of Similes, Definitions, Descriptions, and other remarkable Passages in 
 Shakspeare's Plays and Poems, With an elaborately illuminated border in the characteristic 
 style of the Elizabethan Period, and other Embellishments. Bound in very massive carved 
 and pierced covers containing in deep relief a medallion Head of Shakspeare. The Illumi- 
 nations and Ornaments designed and executed by Henry Noel Humphreys, Illuminator of 
 ' A Record of the Black Prince," &c. Square post Svo. [\'eurly ready. 
 
14 NEW WORKS AND NEW EDITIONS 
 
 HUMPHREYS.-! RECORD OF THE BLACK PRINCE; 
 
 Being a Selection of such Passages in his Life as have been most quaintly and strikingly nar- 
 rated by the Chroniclers of the Period. Embellished with highly-wrought Miniatures and 
 Borderings, selected from various Illuminated MSS. referring to Events connected with 
 English History. By HENRY NOEL HUMPHREYS. Post 8vo. in a richly carved and pierced 
 binding, 21s. 
 
 HUMPHREYS.-THE BOOK OF RUTH. 
 
 From the Holy Scriptures. Embellished with brilliant coloured Borders, selected from some 
 of the finest Illuminated MSS. in the British Museum, the Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, the 
 Soane Museum, &c. ; and with highly-finished Miniatures. The Illuminations executed by 
 HENRY NOEL HUMPHREYS. Square fcp. 8vo. in deeply embossed leather covers, 21s. 
 
 HUMPHREYS. -MAXIMS AND PRECEPTS OF THE 
 
 SAVIOUR : being a Selection of the most beautiful Christian Precepts contained in the 
 Four Gospels. Illustrated by a series of Illuminations of original character, founded on 
 the Passages " Behold the Fowls of the Air," &c., "Consider the Lilies of the Field," &c. 
 The Illuminations executed by HENRY NOEL HUMPHREYS. Square fcp. 8vo. 21s. richly 
 bound in stamped calf; or 30s. in morocco by Hayday. 
 
 HUMPHREYS.-THE MIRACLES OF OUR SAVIOUR. 
 
 With rich and appropriate Borders of original Design, a series of Illuminated Figures of the 
 Apostles from the Old Masters, Six Illuminated Miniatures, and other Embellishments. The 
 Illuminations executed by HENRY NOEL HUMPHREYS. Square fcp. 8vo. in massive carved 
 covers, 21s. ; or bound in morocco by Hayday, 30s. 
 
 HUMPHREYS-PARABLES OF OUR LORD. 
 
 Richly illuminated with appropriate Borders printed in Colours and in Black and Gold: 
 with a Design from one of the early German Engravers. The Illuminations executed by 
 HENRY NOEL HUMPHREYS. Square fcp. 8vo. 21s. in a massive carved binding; or 30s. 
 bound in morocco by Hayday. 
 
 HUMPHREYS AND JONES.-THE ILLUMINATED BOOKS 
 
 OF THE MIDDLE AGES : A series of Fac-similes from the most beautiful MSS. of the 
 Middle Ages, printed in Gold, Silver, and Colours by OWEN JONES ; selected and described 
 by HENRY NOEL HUMPHREYS. Elegantly bound in antique calf. Royal folio, jffio. 10s. ; 
 imperial folio (large paper), sSl&. 16s. 
 
 HUNT-RESEARCHES ON LIGHT : 
 
 An Examination of all the Phenomena connected with the Chemical and Molecular Changes 
 produced by the Influence of the Solar Rays: embracing all the known Photographic Pro- 
 cesses, and new Discoveries in the Art By ROBERT HUNT, Keeper of Mining Records, 
 Museum of Practical Geology. 8vo. with Plate and Woodcuts, 10s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 MRS. JAMESON'S LEGENDS OF THE MONASTIC ORDERS, 
 
 as represented in the Fine Arts. Containing St. Benedict and the Early Benedictines in 
 Italy, France, Spain, and Flanders; the Benedictines in England and in Germany; the 
 Reformed Benedictines; early Royal Saints connected with the Benedictine Order; the 
 Augustines ; Orders derived from the Augustine Rule ; the Mendicant Orders ; the Jesuits ; 
 and the Order of the Visitation of St. Mary. Forming the SECOND SERIES of Sacred and 
 Legendary Art. With Eleven Etchings by the Author, and 84 Woodcuts. Square crown 8vo. 
 28s. cloth. 
 
 MRS. JAMESON'S SACRED AND LEGENDARY ART ; 
 
 Or, Legends of the Saints and Martyrs. FIRST SERIES. Containing Legends of the Angels 
 and Archangels ; the Evangelists and Apostles ; the Greek and Latin Fathers ; the Magda- 
 lene ; the Patron Saints ; the Virgin Patronesses ; the Martyrs ; the Bishops ; the Hermits ; 
 and the Warrior-Saints of Christendom. Second Edition (1850), printed in One Volume for 
 the convenience of Students and Travellers ; with numerous Woodcuts, and Sixteen 
 Etchings by the Author. Square crown 8vo. 28s. cloth. 
 
PUBLISHED BY MESSRS. LONGMAN, BROWN, AND CO. 15 
 
 MRS. JAMESON'S LEGENDS OF THE MADONNA, 
 
 As represented in the Fine Arts. Forming the THIRD and concluding SERIES of Sacred and 
 Legendary Art. By Mrs. JAMESON, Author of " Characteristics of Women," &c. With 
 Etchings by the Author, and Engravings on Wood. Square crown 8vo. [In the press. 
 
 JARDINE.-A TREATISE OP EQUIVOCATION; 
 
 Wherein is largely discussed the question Whether a Catholicke or any other Person before a 
 Magistrate, being demanded upon his Oath whether a Preiste were in such a place, may (not- 
 withstanding his perfect knowledge to the contrary), without Perjury, and securely in con- 
 science, answer No : with this secret meaning reserved in his Mynde That he was not there, 
 so that any man is boumle to detect it. Edited from the Original Manuscript in the Bodleian 
 Library, by DAVID JARDINE, of the Middle Temple, Esq., Barrister at Law; Author of the 
 * Narrative of the Gunpowder Treason," prefixed to his edition of the " Criminal Trials." 
 
 {In the press. 
 
 JEFFREY. - CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE EDINBURGH 
 
 REVIEW. By FRANCIS JEFFREY, late One of the Judges of the Court of Session in Scotland. 
 Second Edition. 3 vols. 8vo. 42s. cloth. 
 
 BISHOP JEREMY TAYLOR'S ENTIRE WORKS : 
 
 With the Life by Bishop HEBER. Revised and corrected by the Rev. CHARLES PAGE 
 EDEN, Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. Vols. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. and VIII. 8vo. 10s. 6d. 
 each. 
 
 *** In course of publication, in Ten Volumes, price Half-a-Guinea each. Vol. I. (the last 
 in order of publication) will contain Bishop Heber's Life of Jeremy Taylor, extended by the 
 Editor. Vol. IX. is in the press. 
 
 BISHOP JEREMY TAYLOR. -READINGS FOR EVERY DAY 
 
 in LENT: compiled from the Writings of BISHOP JEREMY TAYLOR. By the Author of " Amy 
 Herbert," "The Child's First History of Rome," &c. Fcp. 8vo. 5s. cloth. 
 
 JOHNSON.-THE FARMER'S ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
 
 And Dictionary of Rural Affairs: embracing all the recent Discoveries in Agricultural Che- 
 mistry; adapted to the comprehension of unscientific readers. By CUTHBERT W. JOHNSON, 
 Esq. F.R.S. Barrister-at-Law ; Editor of the "Farmer's Almanack," &c. 8vo. with Wood 
 Engravings, ^2. 10s. cloth. 
 
 JOHNSON.-THE WISDOM OF THE RAMBLER, ADVEN- 
 
 TURER, and IDLER: comprising a Selection of 110 of the best Essays. By SAMUEL 
 JOHNSON, LL.D. Fcp. 8vo. 7s. cloth. 
 
 JOHNSTON.-A NEW DICTIONARY OF GEOGRAPHY, 
 
 Descriptive, Physical, Statistical, and Historical: forming a complete General Gazetteer of 
 the World. By ALEXANDER KEITH JOHNSTON, F.R.S.E. F.R.G.S. F.G.S. ; Geographer at 
 Edinburgh in Ordinary to Her Majesty ; Author of " The Physical Atlas of Natural Phseno- 
 mena." In One very large Volume of 1,440 pages ; comprising nearly Fifty Thousand Names 
 of Places. 8vo. 36s. cloth ; or strongly half-bound in russia, with flexible back, price 41s. 
 
 KAY. THE SOCIAL CONDITION AND EDUCATION OF 
 
 the PEOPLE in ENGLAND and EUR )PE : shewing the Results of the Primary Schools and 
 of the Division of Lauded Property in Foreign Countries. By JOSEPH KAY, Esq. M.A. of 
 Trinity College, Cambridge : Barrister-at-Law ; and late Travelling Bachelor of the University 
 of Cambridge. 2 thick vols. post 8vo. 21s. cloth. 
 
 KEMBLE.-THE SAXONS IN ENGLAND : 
 
 a History of the English Commonwealth till the period of the Norman Conquest. By JOHN 
 MITCHELL KEMBLE, M.A., F.C.P.S., &c. 2 vols. 8vo. 28s. cloth. 
 
 KINDERSLEY.-THE VERY JOYOUS, PLEASANT, AND 
 
 REFRESHING HISTORY of the Feats, Exploits, Triumphs, and Achievements of the Good 
 Knight, without Fear and without Reproach, the gentle LORD DE BAYARD. Set forth in 
 English by EDWARD COCKBURN KINDERSLEY, Esq. With Ornamental Headings, and 
 Frontispiece by E. H. Wehnert. Square post 8vo. 9s. 6d. cloth. 
 
16 NEW WORKS AND NEW EDITIONS 
 
 KIRBY&SPENCE.-AN INTRODUCTION TO ENTOMOLOGY; 
 
 Or, Elements of the Natural History of Insects : comprising' an account of noxious and useful 
 Insects, of their Metamorphoses, Food, Stratagems, Habitations, Societies, Motions, Noises, 
 Hybernation, Instinct, &c. By W. KIRBY, M.A. F.R.S. & L.S. Rector of Barham; and W. 
 SPENCE, Esq. F.R.S. & L.S. New Edition. 2 vols. 8vo. with Plates, 31s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 LAINGL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SOCIAL AND POLI- 
 TICAL STATE of the EUROPEAN PEOPLE in 1848 and 1849: being the Second Series of 
 " Notes of a Traveller." By SAMUEL, LAI NO, Esq. Author of " A Journal of a Residence in 
 Norway," " A Tour in Sweden," the Translation of " The Heimskringla," and of " Notes of 
 a Traveller on the Social and Political State of France, Prussia, &c." 8vo. 14s. cloth. 
 
 LATHAM. ON DISEASES OF THE HEART. 
 
 Lectures on Subjects connected with Clinical Medicine ; comprising Diseases of the Heart. 
 By P. M. LATHAM, M. D., Physician Extraordinary to the Queen ; and late Physciian to St. 
 Bartholomew's Hospital. New Edition. 2 vols. 12mo. 16s. cloth. 
 
 LEE.-ELEMENTS OP NATURAL HISTORY ; 
 
 Or, First Principles of Zoology. For the use of Schools and Young Persons. Comprising 
 the Principles of Classification interspersed with amusing and instructive original Accounts 
 of the most remarkable Animals. By Mrs. R. LEE. New Edition, revised and enlarged, 
 with numerous additional Woodcuts. Fcp. 8vo. 7s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 LEE.-TAXIDERMY; 
 
 Or, the Art of Collecting, Preparing, and Mounting Objects of Natural History. For the 
 use of Museums and Travellers. By Mrs. R. LEE. NewEdition, improved ; with an account 
 of a Visit to Walton Hall, and Mr. Waterton's Method of Preserving Animals. Fcp. 8vo. 
 with Woodcuts, 7s. cloth. 
 
 L. E. L.-THE POETICAL WORKS OF LETITIA ELIZABETH 
 
 LANDON ; comprising the IMPROVISATRICE, the VENETIAN BRACELET, the GOLDEN | 
 
 VIOLET, the TROUBADOUR, and other Poetical Remains. New Edition, uniform with j 
 
 Moore's Songs, Ballads, and Sacred Songs; with 2 Vignettes by Richard Doyle. 2 vols. j 
 16mo. 10s. cloth ; morocco, 21s. 
 
 *** Also, an Edition, in 4 vols. fcp. 8vo. with Illustrations by Howard, &c. 28s. cloth ; j 
 or 1. 4s. bound in morocco. 
 
 LETTERS ON HAPPINESS, ADDRESSED TO A FRIEND. 
 
 By the Authoress of " Letters to My Unknown Friends," " Twelve Years Ago, a Tale," 
 " Some Passages from Modern History," and "Discipline." Fcp. 8vo. 6s. cloth. 
 
 LETTERS TO MY UNKNOWN FRIENDS. 
 
 By A LADY, Authoress of " Letters on Happiness," "Twelve Years Ago," " Discipline," and 
 " tome Passages from Modern History." 3d Edition. Fcp. 8vo. 6s. cloth. 
 
 LINDLEY. -INTRODUCTION TO BOTANY. 
 
 By J. LINDLEY, Ph.D. F.R.S. L.S. &c. Professor of Botany in University College, London. 
 New Edition, with Corrections and copious Additions. 2 vols. 8vo. with Six Plates and 
 numerous Woodcuts, 24s. cloth. 
 
 LINWOOD.-ANTHOLOGIA OXONIENSIS, 
 
 Sive Florilegium e lusibus poeticis diversorum Oxoniensium Graecis et Latinis decerpjum. 
 Curante GULIELMO LINWOOD, M.A. JEdis Christ! Alummo. 8vo. 14s. cloth. 
 
 LORIMER. LETTERS TO A YOUNG MASTER MARINER 
 
 On some Subjects connected with his Calling. By the late CHARLES LORIMER. New Edi- 
 tion. Fcp. 8vo. 5s. 6d. cloth. 
 
PUBLISHED BV MESSRS. LONGMAN, BROWN, AND CO. 17 
 
 LOUDON.-THE AMATEUR GARDENER'S CALENDAR: 
 
 Being- a Monthly Guide as to what should he avoided, as well as what should be done, in a 
 Garden in each Month : with plain Rules how to do what is requisite; Directions for Laying 
 Out and Planting- Kitchen and Flower Gardens, Pleasure Grounds, and Shrubberies; and a 
 short Account, in each Month, of the Quadrupeds, Birds, and Insects then most injurious to 
 Gardens. By Mrs. LOUDON. I6mo. with Wood Engravings, 7s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 LOUDON.-THE LADY'S COUNTRY COMPANION; 
 
 Or, How to Enjoy a Country Life Rationally. By Mrs. LOUDON, Author of " Gardening for 
 Ladies," &c. New Edition. Fcp. 8vo. with Plate and Wood Engravings, 7s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 LOUDON'S SELF-INSTRUCTION FOR YOUNG GARDENERS, 
 
 Foresters, Bailiffs, Land Stewards, and Farmers; in Arithmetic, Book-keeping, Geometry, 
 Mensuration, Practical Trigonometry, Mechanics, Land-Surveying, Levelling, Planning and 
 Mapping, Architectural Drawing, and Isometrical Projection and Perspective ; with Examples 
 shewing their applications to Horticulture and Agricultural Purposes. With a Portrait of 
 Mr. London, and a Memoir by Mrs. Loudon. 8vo. with Woodcuts, 7s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 LOUDON'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GARDENING; 
 
 Comprising the Theory and Practice of Horticulture, Floriculture, Arboriculture, and Land- 
 scape Gardening : including all the latest improvements ; a General History of Gardening in 
 all Countries ; and a Statistical View of its Present State : with Suggestions for its Future 
 Progress in the British Isles. Illustrated with many hundred Engravings on Wood by 
 Branston. An entirely New Edition (1850), corrected throughout arid considerably improved 
 by Mrs. LOUDON. In One laige Volume, 8vo. 50s. cloth. 
 
 LOUDON'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TREES AND SHRUBS: 
 
 being the Arboretum et Fruticetum Britannicum abridged : containing the Hardy Trees 
 and Shrubs of Great Britain, Native and Foreign, Scientifically and Popularly Described ; 
 with their Propagation, Culture, and Uses in the Arts ; and with Engravings of nearly all 
 the Species. Adapted for the use of Nurserymen, Gardeners, and Foresters. 8vo. with 
 2,000 Engravings on Wood, 2. 10s. cloth. 
 
 LOUDON'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AGRICULTURE: 
 
 Comprising the Theory and Practice of the Valuation, Transfer, Laying-out, Improvement, 
 and Management of Landed Property, and of the Cultivation and Economy of the Animal and 
 Vegetable productions of Agriculture : including all the latest improvements, a general History 
 of Agriculture in all Countries, a Statistical View of its present State, with Suggestions for 
 its future progress in the British Isles. New Edition ; with upwards of 1,100 Engravings on 
 Wood. In One large Volume, 8vo. 1. 10s. cloth. 
 
 LOUDON'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PLANTS: 
 
 Including all the Plants which are now found in, or have been introduced into, Great Britain ; 
 giving their Natural History, accompanied by such descriptions, engraved figures, and 
 elementary details, as may enable a beginner, who is a mere English reader, to discover the 
 name of every Plant which he may find in flower, and acquire all the information respecting 
 it which is useful and interesting. The Specific Characters by an Eminent Botanist; the 
 Drawings by J. D. C. Sowerby. New Edition with Supplement, and new General Index. 
 8vo. with nearly 10,000 Wood Engravings, 3. 13s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 LOUDON'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COTTAGE, FARM, AND 
 
 VILLA ARCHITECTURE and FURNITURE ; containing numerous Designs, from the Villa 
 to the Cottage and the Farm, including Farm Houses, Farmeries, and other Agricultural 
 Buildings ; Country Inns, Public Houses, and Parochial Schools; with the requisite Fittings- 
 up, Fixtures, and Furniture, and appropriate Offices, Gardens, and Gaiden Scenery: each 
 Design accompanied by Analytical and Critical Remarks. New Edition, edited by Mrs. 
 LOUDON. 8vo. with more than 2,000 Engravings on Wood, j3. 3s. cloth. 
 
18 NEW WORKS AND NEW EDITIONS 
 
 LOUDON'S HORTUS BRITANNICUS; 
 
 Or, Catalogue of all the Plants indigenous to, cultivated in, or introduced into Britain. An 
 entirely New Edition (1850), corrected throughout : with a Supplement, including all the New 
 Plants down to March, 1850 ; and a New General Index to the whole Work. Edited by Mrs. 
 LOUDON ; assisted by W. H. BAXTER, Esq., and DAVID WOOSTER. 8vo. 31s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 SUPPLEMENT TO LOUDON'S HORTUS BRITANNICUS ; 
 
 Including all the Plants introduced into Britain, all the newly-discovered British Species, 
 and all the kinds originated in British Gardens, up to March 1850. With a New General 
 Index to the whole Work, including the Supplement. Prepared by W. H. BAXTER, Esq. ; 
 assisted by D. WOOSTER, under the direction of Mrs. LOUDON. 8vo. 14s. cloth. 
 
 LOW.-ELEMENTS OP PRACTICAL AGRICULTURE; 
 
 Comprehending the Cultivation of Plants, the Husbandry of the Domestic Animals, and the 
 Economy of the Farm. By D. Low, Esq. F.R.S.E. New Edition, with Alterations and Addi- 
 tions, and an entirely new set of above 200 Woodcuts. 8vo. 21s. cloth. 
 
 LO.-ON LANDED PROPERTY, 
 
 And the ECONOMY of ESTATES ; comprehending the Relation of Landlord and Tenant, 
 and the Principles and Forms of Leases ; Farm-Buildings, Enclosures, Drains, Embank- 
 ments, and other Rural Works; Minerals; and Woods. By DAVID Low, Esq. F.R.S.E. 
 8vo. with numerous Wood Engravings, 21s. cloth. 
 
 MACAULAY.-THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE 
 
 ACCESSION OF JAMES II. By THOMAS BABINOTON MACAULAY. New Edition. 
 Vols. 1. and II. 8vo. 32s. cloth. 
 
 MACAULAY.-CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL ESSAYS CON- 
 
 TRIBUTED to The EDINBURGH REVIEW. By THOMAS BABTNGTON MACAULAY. 
 New Edition, complete in One Volume ; with Portrait by E. U. Eddis, engraved in line by 
 W.Greatbach, and Vignette. Square crown 8vo. 21s. cloth; 30s. calf extra by Hayday. Or 
 in 3 vols. 8vo. 36s. cloth. 
 
 MACAULAY.-LAYS OF ANCIENT ROME. 
 
 With " Ivry" and "The Armada." By THOMAS BABINQTON MACAULAY. New Edition. 
 ICino. 4s. 6d. cloth ; or 10s. 6d. bound in morocco by Hayday. 
 
 MR. MACAULAY'S LAYS OF ANCIENT ROME. 
 
 With numerous Illustrations, Original and from the Antique, drawn on W T ood by George 
 Scharf, Jun. and engraved by Samuel Williams. New Edition. Fcp. 4to. 21s. boards; 
 or 42s. bound in morocco by Hayday. 
 
 MACDONALD.-VILLA VEROCCHIO ; 
 
 Or, the YOUTH of LEONARDO DA VINCI : a Tale. By the late DIANA LOUISA MAC- 
 DONALD. Fcp. 8vo. 6s. cloth. 
 
 "An exceedingly agreeable volume, full of feeling and interest." EXAMINER. 
 
 " In this most pleasing of historiettes we have an episode from the life of one who carved out for himself the 
 highest place among the great master-minds of his age.. ..The scenery of the locality [the Val d'Arno and Firenze], 
 the manners of the day, the characters of the great men of that age, and the affections of the best of the world's rac e , 
 which go far to console us for our sad lot here below, are sketched with a facility, a correctness, and a delicacy, that 
 fail not of carrying the reader, without a moment's stop, from the first to the last sentence of this little volume." 
 
 BRITANNIA. 
 
 MACKINTOSH-SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH'S MISCELLA- 
 
 NEOUS WORKS ; including his Contributions to The EDINBURGH REVIEW. A New 
 Edition (1851), complete in One Volume ; with Portrait engraved inline by W. Greatbach, 
 and Vignette. Square crown 8vo. 21s. cloth ; or 30s. calf extra by Hayday. 
 
PUBLISHED BY MESSRS. LONGMAN, BROWN, AND CO. 19 
 
 M'CULLOCH.- A DICTIONARY, PRACTICAL, THEORETI- 
 
 CAL, AND HISTORICAL, OF COMMERCE AND COMMERCIAL NAVIGATION. Illus- 
 trated with Maps and Plans. By J. R. M'CULLOCH, Esq. New Edition, (1850), corrected, 
 enlarged, and improved ; with a Supplement. 8vo. 50s. cloth ; or 55s. half- bound in russia. 
 
 V The SUPPLEMENT to the last Edition, published in 1849, may be had separately, price 
 4s. 6d. sewed. 
 
 M'CULLOCH.-A DICTIONARY, GEOGRAPHICAL, STATIS- 
 
 TICAL, AND HISTORICAL, of the various Countries, Places, and Principal Natural Objects 
 in the WORLD. By J. R. M'CULLOCH, Esq. Illustrated with 6 large Maps. New Edition 
 (1850-1851), corrected, and in part re- written ; with a Supplement. 2 thick vols. 8vo. 63s. 
 cloth. 
 
 M'CULLOCH.-AN ACCOUNT, DESCRIPTIVE AND STATIS- 
 
 TICAL, of the BRITISH EMPIRE ; exhibiting its Extent, Physical Capacities, Population, 
 Industry, and Civil and Religious Institutions. By J. R. M'CULLOCH, Esq. New Edition, 
 corrected, enlarged, and greatly improved, 2 thick vols. Svo. 42s. cloth. 
 
 M'CULLOCH. -A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES AND 
 
 PRACTICAL INFLUENCE of TAXATION and the FUNDING SYSTEM. By J. R. 
 M'CULLOCH, Esq. Svo. 10s. cloth. 
 
 MAITLAND.-THE CHURCH IN THE CATACOMBS : 
 
 A Description of the Primitive Church of Rome. Illustrated by its Sepulchral Remains. By 
 CHARLES MAITLAND. New Edition, corrected. Svo. with numerous Wood Engravings, 
 14s. cloth. 
 
 MARCET.-CONVERSATIONS ON CHEMISTRY; 
 
 In which the Elements of that Science are familiarly Explained and Illustrated by Experiments. 
 By JANE MARCET. New Edition, enlarged and improved. 2 vols. fcp. Svo. 14s. cloth. 
 
 MARCET.-CONVERSATIONS ON NATURAL PHILOSOPHY; 
 
 In which the Elements of that Science are familiarly explained. By JANE MARCET. New 
 Edition, enlarged and corrected. Fcp. Svo. with 23 Plates, 10s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 MARCET.-CONVERSATIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY; 
 
 In which the Elements of that Science are familiarly explained. By JANE MARCET. New 
 Edition revised and enlarged. Fcp. Svo. 7s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 MARCET.-CONVERSATIONS ON VEGETABLE PHYSIO- 
 
 LOGY; comprehending the Elements of Botany, with their application to Agriculture. 
 By JANE MARCET. New Edition. Fcp. Svo. with 4 Plates, 9s. cloth. 
 
 MARCET.-CONVERSATIONS ON LAND AND WATER. 
 
 By JANE MARCET. New Edition, revised and corrected. With a coloured Map, shewing 
 the comparative altitude of Mountains. Fcp. Svo. 5s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 " This work consists of desultory Conversations with a family of children from six to ten years of age, in which 
 the author has endeavoured to mingle information with amusement, and to teach the youthful student of geography 
 that there are other matters connected with land and water quite as interesting as the names and situations of the 
 different parts of the earth. Two new Conversations have been added to this edition, containing the ' Adventures of 
 a Drop of Water.' PREFACE. 
 
 MARRYAT.-MASTERMAN READY; 
 
 Or, the Wreck of the Pacific. Written for Young People. By Captain F. MARRYAT, C.B. 
 Author of " Peter Simple," &c. 3 vols. fcp. Svo. with Wood Engravings, 22s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 MiRRYAT.-THE MISSION: 
 
 Or, Scenes in Africa. Written for Young People. By Captain F. MARRYAT, C.B. Author of 
 " Masterman Ready," &c. 2 vols. fcp. Svo. 12s. cloth. 
 
20 NEW WORKS AND NEW EDITIONS 
 
 MARRYAT.-THE PRIVATEER'S-MAN ONE HUNDRED 
 
 YEARS AGO. By Captain F. MARRYAT, C.B. Author of " Masterman Ready," &c. 2 vols. 
 fcp. 8vo. 12s. cloth. 
 
 MARRYAT.-THE SETTLERS IN CANADA. 
 
 Written for Young People. By Captain F. MARRYAT, C.B. Author of " Masterman Ready," 
 &c. New Edition. Fcp. 8vo. with 2 Illustrations, 7s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 MAUNDER.-THE BIOGRAPHICAL TREASURY ; 
 
 Consisting of Memoirs, Sketches, and brief Notices of above 12,000 Eminent Persons of all Age, 
 and Nations, from the Earliest Period of History ; forming a new and complete Dictionary 
 of Universal Biography. By SAMUEL MAUNDER. A New and carefully-revised Edition 
 (1851) ; corrected throughout, and brought down to the Present Time, by the introduction of 
 numerous additional Lives. Fcp. 8vo. 10s. cloth ; bound in roan, 12s. 
 
 MAUNDER.-THE TREASURY OF HISTORY; 
 
 Comprising a General Introductory Outline of Universal History, Ancient and Modern, and a 
 Series of separate Histories of every principal Nation that exists ; their Rise, Progress, and 
 Present Condition, the Moral and Social Character of their respective inhabitants, their 
 Religion, Manners, and Customs, &c. By SAMUEL MAUNDER. New Edition. Fcp. 8vo. 10s. 
 cloth ; bound in roan, 12s. 
 
 MAUNDER.-THE SCIENTIFIC & LITERARY TREASURY; 
 
 A new and popular Encyclopaedia of Science and the Belles-Lettres ^including all Branches of 
 Science, and every Subject connected with Literature and Art. The whole written in a familiar 
 style, adapted to the comprehension of all persons desirous of acquiring information on the 
 subjects comprised in the work, and also adapted for a Manual of convenient Reference to the 
 more instructed. By S. MAUNDER. New Edition. Fcp. 8vo. 10s. cloth; bound in roan, 12s. 
 
 MAUNDER.-THE TREASURY OF NATURAL HISTORY; 
 
 Or, a Popular Dictionary of Animated Nature : in which the Zoological Characteristics that 
 distinguish the different Classes, Genera, and Species are combined with a variety of interest- 
 ing Information illustrative of the Habits, Instincts and General Economy of the Animal 
 Kingdom. To which are added, a Syllabus of Practical Taxidermy, and a Glossarial 
 Appendix. Embellished with 900 accurate Engravings on Wood, from Drawings made 
 expressly for this work. By SAMUEL MAUNDER. New Edition. Fcp. 8vo. 10s. cloth, 
 bound in roan. 12s. 
 
 MAUNDER.-THE TREASURY OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 And LIBRARY of REFERENCE. Comprising an English Grammar ; Tables of English 
 Verbal Distinctions ; Proverbs, Terms, and Phrases, in Latin, Spanish, French, and Italian, 
 translated ; New and Enlarged English Dictionary ; Directions for Pronunciation ; New 
 Universal Gazetteer ; Tables of Population and Statistics ; List of Cities, Boroughs, and 
 Market Towns in the United Kingdom ; Regulations of the General Post Office ; List of Foreign 
 Animal, Vegetable, and Mineral Productions ; Compendious Classical Dictionary ; Scripture 
 Proper Names accented, and Christian Names of Men and Women : with Latin Maxims 
 translated ; List of Abbreviations ; Chronology and History; compendious Law Dictionary ; 
 Abstract of Tax Acts ; Interest and other Tables ; Forms of Epistolary Address ; Tables of 
 Precedency; Synopsis of the British Peerage ; and Tables of Number, Money, Weights, and 
 Measures. By SAMUEL MAUNDER. 18th Edition, revised throughout, and greatly enlarged. 
 Fcp. 8vo. 10s. cloth ; bound in roan, 12s. 
 
 MEMOIRS OF THE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY OF GREAT 
 
 BRITAIN, and of the Museum of Economic Geology in London. Published by order of the 
 Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury. Royal 8vo. with Woodcuts and 9 large 
 Plates (seven coloured), 21s. cloth; and Vol. II. in Two thick Parts, with 63 Plates (three 
 
 coloured), and numerous Woodcuts, 42s. cloth, or, separately, 21s. each Part. Also, 
 
 BRITISH ORGANIC REMAINS; consisting of Plates of Figures engraved on Steel, with 
 descriptive Letterpress, and forming a portion of the Memoirs of the Geological Survey. 
 Decades I. to III. royal 8vo. 2s. 6d. each ; or, royal 4to. 4s. 6d. each, sewed. 
 
PUBLISHED BY MESSRS. LONGMAN, BROWN, AND CO. 21 
 
 MERIVALE. -A HISTORY OF THE ROMANS UNDER 
 
 THE EMPIRE. By the Rev. CHARLES MERIVALE, late Fellow and Tutor of St. John's 
 College, Cambridge. Vols. I. and II. 8vo. 28s. 
 
 JAMES MONTGOMERY'S POETICAL WORKS. 
 
 With some additional Poems, and the Author's Autobiographical Prefaces. A New Edition, 
 complete in One Volume, uniform with Southey's "The Doctor &c." and "Commonplace 
 Book;" with Portrait and Vignette. Square crown 8 vo. 10s. 6d. cloth; morocco, 21s. Or, 
 in 4 vols. fcp. 8vo. with Portrait, and Seven other Plates, 20s. cloth ; morocco, 36s. 
 
 MOORE. HEALTH, DISEASE, AND REMEDY, 
 
 Familiarly and practically considered in a few of their relations to the Blood. By GEORO 
 MOORE, M.D. Member of the Royal College of Physicians. Post 8vo. 7s. 6d. cloth . 
 
 MOORE.-MAN AND HIS MOTIVES. 
 
 By GEORGE MOORE, M.D., Member of the Royal College of Physicians. New Edition. 
 
 Post 8vo. 8s. cloth. 
 
 MOORE. THE POWER OF THE SOUL OVER THE BODY, 
 
 Considered in relation to Health and Morals. By GEORGE MOORE, M.D. Member of the 
 Royal College of Physicians. New Edition. Post 8vo. 7s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 MOORE.-THE USE OF THE BODY IN RELATION TO THE 
 
 MIND. By GEORGE MOORE, M.D. Member of the Royal College of Physicians. New 
 Edition. Post 8vo. 9s. cloth. 
 
 THOMAS MOORE'S POETICAL WORKS; 
 
 Containing the Author's recent Introduction and Notes. Complete in One Volume, uniform 
 with Lord Byron's and Southey's PoeYns. With a Portrait by George Richmond, engraved 
 in line, and a View of Slope rton Cottage. Medium 8vo. 21s. cloth ; morocco by Hayday, 42s. 
 Or, in 10 vols. fcp. 8vo. with Portrait, and 19 Plates, ^ J 2. 10s. cloth ; morocco, ^4. 10s. 
 
 MOORE-SONGS, BALLADS, AND SACRED SONGS. 
 
 By THOMAS MOORE, Author of "Lalla Rookh," "Irish Melodies," &c. First collected 
 Edition, uniform with the smaller Edition of Mr. Macaulay's Lays of Ancient Rome ; with 
 Vignette by R. Doyle. 16mo. 5s. cloth; 12s. 6d. smooth morocco, by Hayday. 
 
 MOORE'S IRISH MELODIES. 
 
 New Edition, uniform with the smaller Edition of Mr. Macaulay's Lays of Ancient 
 Rome. With the Autobiographical Preface from the Collective Edition of Mr. Moore's 
 Poetical Works, and a Vignette Title by D. Maclise, R.A. 16mo. 5s. cloth ; 12s. 6d. smooth 
 morocco, by Hayday. Or, in fcp. 8vo. 10s. cloth ; bound in morocco, 13s. 6d. 
 
 MOORE'S IRISH MELODIES. 
 
 Illustrated by D. MACLISE, R.A. Imperial 8vo. with 161 Steel Plates, ^3. 3s. boards ; or 
 ^4. 14s. 6d. bound in morocco by Hayday. Proof Impressions (only 200 copies printed, of 
 which a very few now remain), ?>. 6s. boards. 
 
 MOORE'S LALLA ROOKH: AN ORIENTAL ROMANCE. 
 
 New Edition, uniform with the smaller Edition of Mr. Macaulay's Lays of Ancient Rome. 
 With the Autobiographical Preface from the Collective Edition of Mr. Moore's Poetical 
 Works, and a Vignette Title by D. Maclise, R.A. 16mo. 5s. cloth ; 12s. 6d. smooth morocco, 
 by Hayday. Or, in fcp. 8vo. with Four Engravings from Paintings by Westall, 10s. 6d. cloth ; 
 bound in morocco, 14s. 
 
 MOORE'S LALLA ROOKH : AN ORIENTAL ROMANCE. 
 
 With 13 Plates' from Designs by Corbould, Meadows, and Stephanoff, engraved under the 
 superintendence of Mr. Charles Heath. Royal 8vo. 21s. cloth ; morocco, 35s; or, with India 
 Proof Plates, 42s. cloth. 
 
 MOKELL.-THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. 
 
 By J. D. Morell, M.A. Author of an Historical and Critical View of the -Speculative Philo- 
 sophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century. 8vo. 12s. cloth. 
 
22 NEW WORKS AND NEW EDITIONS 
 
 MOSELEY. -THE MECHANICAL PRINCIPLES OF ENGI- 
 
 NEERING AND ARCHITECTURE. By the Rev. H. MOSELEY, M.A. F.R.S., Professor of 
 Natural Philosophy and Astronomy in King's College, London. 8vo. with Woodcuts and 
 Diagrams, 24s. cloth. 
 
 MOSELEY.-ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRACTICAL MECHANICS. 
 
 By the Rev. H. MOSELEY, M.A., Professor of Natural Philosophy and Astronomy in King's 
 College, London. New Edition. Fcp. 8vo. with numerous Woodcuts, 8s. cloth. 
 
 MOSHEIM'S ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY, 
 
 Ancient and Modern. Translated, with copious Notes, by JAMES MURDOCK, D.D. New 
 Edition, revised, and continued to the Present Time, by the Rev. HENRY SOAMES, M.A. 
 4 vols. 8vo. 48s. cloth. 
 
 MOUNT SAINT LAWRENCE. 
 
 By the Author of " Mary the Star of the Sea." 2 vols. post 8vo. 12s. cloth. 
 
 MURE.-A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE LANGUAGE AND 
 
 LITERATURE OF ANCIENT GREECE. By WILLIAM MURE, M.P., of Caldwell. 3 vols. 
 8vo. 36s. cloth. 
 
 MURRAY. -ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GEOGRAPHY; 
 
 Comprising a complete Description of the Earth : exhibfting its Relation to the Heavenly 
 Bodies, its Physical Structure, the Natural History of each Country, and the Industry, Com- 
 merce, Political Institutions, and Civil and Social State of all Nations. By HUGH MURRAY, 
 F.R.S.E. : assisted by other Writers of eminence. Second Edition. 8vo. with 82 Maps, and 
 upwards of 1,000 other Woodcuts, ^3, cloth. 
 
 NEALE.-THE EARTHLY RESTING PLACES OF THE JUST. 
 
 By the Rev. ERSKINE NEALE, M.A., Rector of Kirton, Suffolk; Author of "The Closing 
 Scene," &c. With Wood Engravings. Fcp. Svo. 7s. cloth. 
 
 NEALE.-THE CLOSING SCENE ; 
 
 Or, Christianity and Infideliiy contrasted in the Last Hours of Remarkable Persons. By the 
 Rev. ERSKINE NEALE, M.A., Rector of Kirton, Suffolk; Author of " The Earthly Resting- 
 places of the Just," &c. New Editions of the First and Second Series. 2 vols. fcp. Svo. 12s. 
 cloth ; or separately, 6s. each. 
 
 NEWMAN. DISCOURSES ADDRESSED TO MIXED CON- 
 
 GREGATIONS. By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, Priest of the Oratory of St. Philip Neri. 
 Second Edition. 8vo. 12s. cloth. 
 
 OWEN JONES.-WINGED THOUGHTS : 
 
 A Series of Poems. By MARY ANNE BACON. With Illustrations of Birds, designed by 
 E. L. Bateman, and executed in Illuminated Printing by Owen Jones. Uniform with Flowers 
 and their Kindred Thoughts and Fruits from the Garden and the Field. Imperial Svo. 31s. 6d. 
 elegantly bound in calf. 
 
 OWEN JONES. - FLOWERS AND THEIR KINDRED 
 
 THOUGHTS: A Series of Stanzas. By MARY ANNE BACON, Authoress of "Winged 
 Thoughts." With beautiful Illustrations of Flowers, designed and printed in Colours by 
 Owen Jones. Uniform with Fruits from the Garden and the Field. Imperial Svo. 31s. 6d. 
 elegantly bound in calf. 
 
 OWEN JONES.-FRUITS FROM THE GARDEN AND THE 
 
 FIELD. A Series of Stanzas. By MARY ANNE BACON, Authoress of " Winged Thoughts." 
 With beautiful Illustrations of Fruit, designed and printed in Colours by Owen Jones. Uni- 
 form with F towers and their Kindred Thoughts. Imperial Svo. 31s. 6d. elegantly bound in 
 calf. 
 
 OWEN JONES'S ILLUMINATED EDITION OF GRAY'S 
 
 ELEGY. GRAY'S ELEGY, WRITTEN IN A COUNTRY CHURCHYARD. Illuminated, in the 
 Missal Style, by OWEN JONES, Architect. Imperial Svo. 31s. 6d. elegantly bound. 
 
PUBLISHED BY MESSRS. LONGMAN, BROWN, AND CO. 23 
 
 OWEN JONES'S ILLUMINATED EDITION OF THE SERMON 
 
 ON THE MOUNT. THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT. Printed in Gold and Colours, in the 
 Missal Style; with Ornamental Borders by OWEN JONES, and an Illuminated Frontispiece 
 by W. BOXALL. New Edition. Square fcp. 8vo. in rich silk covers, 21s. ; or bound in morocco 
 by Hayday, 25s. 
 
 OWEN JONES'S ILLUMINATED EDITION OF THE MAR- 
 
 RIAGE SERVICE. THE FORM OF SOLEMNISATION OF MATRIMONY. From The Book 
 of Common Prayer. Illuminated, in the Missal Style, by OWEN JONES. Square 18mo. 21s. 
 elegantly bound in white calf. 
 
 OWEN JONES'S ILLUMINATED EDITION OF THE 
 
 PREACHER. The Words of the Preacher, Son of David, King of Jerusalem. From the Holy 
 Scriptures. Being the Twelve Chapters of the Book of Ecclesiastes, elegantly Illuminated, in 
 the Missal Style, by OWEN JONES. Imperial 8vo. in very massive carved covers, 42s. ; or, 
 handsomely bound in calf, 31s. 6d. 
 
 OWEN JONES'S ILLUMINATED EDITION OF SOLOMON'S 
 
 SONG. THE SONG OF SONGS, WHICH is SOLOMON'S. From the Holy Scriptures. Being 
 the Six Chapters of the Book of the Song of Solomon, richly Illuminated, in the Missal Style, 
 by OWEN JONES. Elegantly bound in relievo leather. Imperial I6mo. 21s. 
 
 OWEN JONES'S TRANSLATION OF D'AGINC'OURT'S HIS- 
 
 TORY OF ART. THE HISTORY OF ART, BY ITS MONUMENTS, from its Decline fn the 
 Fourth Century to its Restoration in the Sixteenth. Translated from the French of SEROUX 
 D'AQINCOURT, by OWEN JONES, Architect. In 3,335 Subjects, engraved on 328 Plates. 
 Vol. I. Architecture, 73 Plates ; Vol. II. Sculpture, 51 Plates; Vol. III. Painting, 204 Plates. 
 3 vols. royal folio, '5. 5s. sewed. 
 
 OWEN. - LECTURES ON THE COMPARATIVE ANATOMY 
 
 and PHYSIOLOGY of the INVERTEBRATE ANIMALS, delivered at the Royal College 
 of Surgeons in 1843. By RICHARD OWEN, F.R.S. Hunterian Professor to the College. New 
 Edition, corrected. 8vo. with very numerous Wood Engravings. [Nearly ready. 
 
 OWEN.-LECTURES ON THE COMPARATIVE ANATOMY 
 
 and PHYSIOLOGY of the VERTEBRATE ANIMALS, delivered at the Royal College of 
 Surgeons in 1844 and 1846. By RICHARD OWEN, F.R.S. Hunterian Professor to the College. 
 In 2 vols. Vol. I. 8vo. with numerous Woodcuts, 14s. cloth. 
 
 PALEY'S EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY : 
 
 And Horae Paulinae. A New Edition, with Notes, an Analysis, and a Selection of Papers from 
 the Senate-House and College Examination Papers. Designed for the Use of Students in the 
 University. By ROBERT POTTS, M.A. Trinity College, Cambridge. 8vo. 10s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 PASCAL'S ENTIRE WORKS, TRANSLATED BY PEARCE. 
 
 The COMPLETE WORKS of BLAISE PASCAL : With M. Villemain's Essay on Pascal con- 
 sidered as a Writer and Moralist prefixed to the Provincial Letters ; and the Miscellaneous 
 Writings, Thoughts on Religion, and Evidences of Christianity re-arranged, with large 
 Additions, from the French Edition of Mons. P. Faugere. Newly Translated from the French, 
 with Memoir, Introductions to the various Works, Editorial Notes, and Appendices, by 
 GEORGE PEARCE, Esq. 3 vols. post Svo. with Portrait, 25s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 V The Three Volumes may be had separately, as follows: 
 
 Vol. I. PASCAL'S PROVINCIAL LETTERS : with M. Villemain's Essay on Pascal pre- 
 fixed, and a new Memoir. Post 8vO. Portrait, 8s. 6d. 
 
 Vol. II. PASCAL'S THOUGHTS on RELIGION and EVIDENCES of CHRISTIANITY, 
 with Additions, from Original MSS. : from M. Faugere's Edition. Post Svo. 8s. 6d. 
 
 Vol. III.- PASCAL'S MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS, Correspondence, Detached Thoughts, 
 &c. : from M. Faugere's Edition. Post Svo. 8s. 6d. 
 
24 NEW WORKS AND NEW EDITIONS 
 
 PEREIRA.-A TREATISE ON FOOD AND DIET : 
 
 With Observations on the Dietetical Regimen suited for Disordered States of the Digestive 
 Organs ; and an Account of the Dietaries of some of the principal Metropolitan and other 
 Establishments for Paupers, Lunatics, Criminals, Children, the Sick, &c. By JON. PEREIRA, 
 M.D. F.R.S. & L.S. Author of " Elements of Materia Medica." 8vo. 16s. cloth. 
 
 PESCHEL.-ELEMENTS OF PHYSICS. 
 
 By C. F. PESCHEL, Principal of the Royal Military College, Dresden. Translated from the 
 German, with Notes, by E. WEST. 3 vols. fcp. 8vo. with Diagrams and Woodcuts, 21s. cloth. 
 
 f Part 1. The Physics of Ponderable Bodies. Fcp. 8vo. 7s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 Separately j p ar t 2. Imponderable Bodies (Light, Heat, Magnetism, Electricity, and Electro- 
 Dynamics). 2 vols. fcp. 8vo. 13s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 PHILLIPS. AN ELEMENTARY INTRODUCTION TO MINE- 
 
 RALOGY; comprising a Notice of the Characters, Properties, and Chemical Constitution of 
 Minerals: with Accounts of the Places and Circumstances in which they are found. By 
 WILLIAM PHILLIPS, F.L.S.M.G.S. &c. A New Edition, corrected, enlarged, and improved, 
 by H. J. BROOKE, F.R.S. ; and W. H. MILLER, M.A., F.R.S., Professor of Mineralogy in 
 the University of Cambridge. Post Svo. with numerous Wood Engravings. [In the press. 
 
 PHILLIPS.-FIGURES AND DESCRIPTIONS OF THE 
 
 PALEOZOIC FOSSILS of CORNWALL, DEVON, and WEST SOMERSET; observed in 
 the course of the Ordnance Geological Survey of that District. By JOHN PHILLIPS, F.R.S. 
 F.G.S. &c. Published by Order of the Lords Commissioners of H.M. Treasury. Svo. with 
 60 Plates, comprising very numerous figures, 9s. cloth. 
 
 PORTLOCK.-REPORT ON THE GEOLOGY OF THE COUNTY 
 
 of LONDONDERRY, and of Parts of Tyrone and Fermanagh, examined and described under 
 the Authority of the Master-General and Board of Ordnance. By J. E, PORTLOCK, F.R.S. 
 &c. 8vo. with 48 Plates, 24s. cloth. 
 
 POWER.-SKETCHES IN NEW ZEALAND, 
 
 with Pen and Pencil. By W. TYRONE POWER, D.A.C.G. From a Journal kept in that 
 Country, from July 1846 to Jane 1848. With 8 Plates and 2 Woodcuts, from Drawings made 
 on the spot. Post Svo. 12s. cloth. 
 
 PULMAN.-THE VADE-MECUM OF FLY-FISHING FOR 
 
 TROUT : being a complete Practical Treatise on that Branch of the Art of Angling ; with plain 
 and copious Instructions for the Manufacture of Artificial Flies. By G. P. R. PULMAN, Author 
 of "The Book of the Axe." Third Edition, re-written and greatly enlarged ; with several 
 Woodcuts. Fcp. Svo. 6s. cloth. 
 
 PYCROFT.-A COURSE OF ENGLISH READING, 
 
 Adapted to every Taste and Capacity: with Literary Anecdotes. By the Rev. JAMES 
 PYCROFT, B.A. Author of "The Collegian's Guide, &c." New Edition. Fcp. Svo. 5s. cloth. 
 
 DR. REECE'S MEDICAL GUIDE ; 
 
 For the Use of the Clergy, Heads of Families, Schools, and Junior Medical Practitioners; 
 comprising a complete Modern Dispensatory, and a Practical Treatise on the distinguishing 
 Symptoms, Causes, Prevention, Cure, and Palliation of the Diseases incident to the Human 
 Frame. With the latest Discoveries in the different departments of the Healing Art, Materia 
 Medica, &c. Seventeenth Edition (1850), with considerable Additions ; revised and corrected 
 by the Author's Son, Dr. HEN BY REECE, M.R.C.S. &c. Svo. 12s. cloth. 
 
 RICH. -THE ILLUSTRATED COMPANION TO THE LATIN 
 
 DICTIONARY AND GREEK LEXICON : forming a Glossary of all the Words repiesenting 
 Visible Objects connected with the Arts, Manufactures, and Every-day Life of the Ancients. 
 With Representations of nearly Two Thousand Objects from the Antique. By ANTHONY 
 RICH, Jun. B.A. late of Caius College, Cambridge. Post Svo. with about 2,000 Woodcuts, 
 21s. cloth. 
 
PUBLISHED BY MESSRS. LONGMAN, BROWN, AND CO. 25 
 
 RICHARDSON.-NARRATIYE OF AN OVERLAND JOURNEY 
 
 in SEARCH of the DISCOVERY SHIPS under SIR JOHN FRANKLIN, in the YEARS 1847, 
 1848, and 1849. By Sir JOHN RICHARDSON, M.D., F.R.S., &c., Inspectorof Hospitals. Pub- 
 lished by Authority of the Admiralty. 2 vols. 8vo. with Maps and Plans. [In the press. 
 
 RIDDLE.-A COPIOUS AND CRITICAL LATIN-ENGLISH 
 
 LEXICON, founded on the German-Latin Dictionaries of Dr. William Freund. By the Rev. 
 J. E. RIDDLE, M.A. of St. Edmund's Hall, Oxford. Uniform with Yonge's English Greek 
 Lexicon. New Edition. Post 4to. ^2. 10s. cloth. 
 
 RIDDLE.-A COMPLETE LATIN-ENGLISH AND ENGLISH- 
 
 LATIN DICTIONARY, for the use of Colleges and Schools. By the Rev. J. E. RIDDLE, M.A. 
 of St. Edmund Hall, Oxford. New Edition, revised and corrected. 8vo. 31s. Gd. cloth. 
 s . , SThe English-Latin Dictionary, 10s. 6d. cloth. 
 ' y ?The Latin-English Dictionary, 2is. cloth. 
 
 RIDDLE.~A DIAMOND LATIN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY. 
 
 For the Waistcoat-pocket. A Guide to the Meaning, Quality, and right Accentuation of Latin 
 Classical Words. By the Rev. J. E. Ri DOLE, M.A. New Edition. Royal 32mo. 4s. bound. 
 
 RIYERS.-THE ROSE AMATEUR'S GUIDE ; 
 
 Containing ample Descriptions of all the fine leading varieties of Roses, regularly classed in 
 their respective Families ; their History and mode of Culture. By T. RIVERS, Jun. New 
 Edition, corrected and improved. Fcp. 8vo. 6s. cloth. 
 
 ROBINSON'S LEXICON TO THE GREEK TESTAMENT. 
 
 A GREEK and ENGLISH LEXICON of the NEW TESTAMENT. By EDWARD ROBINSON, 
 D.D., LL.D., Professor of Biblical Literature in the Union Theological Seminary, New York ; 
 Author ot " Biblical Researches in Palestine," &c. A New Edition (1850), revised, and in 
 great part re-written. In One large Volume, 8vo. 18s. cloth. 
 
 ROGERS. -ESSAYS SELECTED FROM CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
 To the EDINBURGH REVIEW. By HENRY ROGERS. 2 vols. 8vo. 24s. cloth. 
 
 RONALDS.-THE FLY-FISHER'S ENTOMOLOGY. 
 
 Illustrated by coloured Representations of the Natural and Artificial Insect; and accom- 
 panied by a few Observations and Instructions relative to Trout and Grayling Fishing. By 
 ALFRED RONALDS. 4th Edition, corrected; with Twenty Copperplates. 8vo. 14s. cloth. 
 
 ROYINGS IN THE PACIFIC, FROM ]837 TO 1849; 
 
 With a GLANCE at CALIFORNIA. By A MERCHANT LONG RESIDENT AT TAHITI. With 
 Four Illustrations printed in colours. 2 vols. post 8vo. 21s. cloth. 
 
 ROWTON.-THE DEBATER ; 
 
 Being a Series of complete Debates, Outlines of Debates, and Questions for Discussion ; with 
 ample References to the best Sources of Information on each particular Topic. By FREDERIC 
 Ro WTON, Author of " The Female Poets of Great Britain." New Edition. Fcp. 8vo. 6s. cloth. 
 
 SCHLEIDEN.-PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC BOTANY; 
 
 Or, Botany as an Inductive Science. By Dr. M. J. SCHLEIDEN, Extraordinary Professor of 
 Botany in the University of Jena. Translated by EDWIN LANKESTER, M.D. F.R.S. F.L.S. 
 Lecturer on Botany at the St. George's School of Medicine, London. 8vo. with Plates and 
 Woodcuts, 2ls. cloth. 
 
 SCOFFERN. THE MANUFACTURE OF SUGAR, 
 
 In the Colonies and at Home, chemically considered. By JOHN SCOFFERN, M.B. Lond. late 
 Professor of Chemistry at the Aldersgate College of Medicine. 8vo. with Illustrations (one 
 coloured) 10s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 K 
 
26 NEW WORKS AND NEW EDITIONS 
 
 SEAWARD.- SIR EDWARD SEAWARD'S NARRATIVE OF 
 
 HIS SHIPWRECK, and consequent Discovery of certain Islands in the Caribbean Sea : with 
 a detail of many extraordinary and highly interesting Events in his Life, from 1733 to 1749, as 
 written in his own Diary. Edited by Miss JANE PORTER. Third Edition, with a New Nau- 
 tical and Geographical Introduction. 2 vols. post 8vo. 21s. cloth. 
 
 SEWELL -AMY HERBERT. 
 
 By a LADY. Edited by the Rev. WILLIAM SEWELL, B.D. Fellow and Tutor of Exeter 
 College, Oxford. New Edition. 2 vols. fcp. 8vo. 9s. cloth. 
 
 SEWELL.-THE EARL'S DAUGHTER. 
 
 By the Authoress of " Amy Herbert," "Gertrude," "Laneton Parsonage," "Margaret Per- 
 cival," and "The Child's History of Rome." Edited by the Rev. WILLIAM SEWELL, D.B. 
 Fellow and Tutor of Exeter College, Oxford. 2 vols. fcp.Sto. 9s. cloth. 
 
 SEWELL.-GERTRUDE. 
 
 A Tale. By the Authoress of " Amy Herbert." Edited by the Rev. WILLIAM SEWELL, B.D. 
 Fellow and Tutor of Exeter College, Oxford. New Edition. 2 vols. fcp. 8vo. 9s. cloth. 
 
 SEWELL.-LANETON PARSONAGE: 
 
 A Tale for Children, on the Practical Use of a portion of the Church Catechism. By the 
 Authoress of "Amy Herbert." Edited by the Rev. W. SEWELL, B.D. Fellow and Tutor of 
 Exeter College, Oxford. New Edition. 3 vols. fcp. 8vo. 16s. cioth. 
 
 SEWELL.-MARGARET PERCIYAL. 
 
 By the Authoress of "Amy Herbert." Edited by the Rev. W. SEWELL, B.D. Fellow and Tutor 
 of Exeter College, Oxford. New Edition. 2 vols. fcp. 8vo. 12s. cloth. 
 
 SHAKSPEARE, BY BOWDLER. 
 
 THE FAMILY SHAKSPEARE ; in which nothing is added to the Original Text ; but those 
 words and expressions are omitted which cannot with proprietybe readaloud. By T BOWDLER, 
 Esq. F.R.S. New Edition. 8vo. with 38 Engravings on Wood, from designs by Smirke, Howard, 
 and other Artists, 21s. cloth; or, in 8 vols. 8vo. without Illustrations, ^4. 14s. 6d. boards. 
 
 SHARP'S BRITISH GAZETTEER. 
 
 A NEW and COMPLETE BRITISH GAZETTEER, or TOPOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 
 of the UNITED KINGDOM. Containing a Description of every Place, and the principal 
 Objects of Note, founded upon the Ordnance Surveys, the best Local and other Authorities, 
 and the most recent Official Documents connected with Population, Constituencies, Corpo- 
 rate and Ecclesiastical Affairs, Poor Laws, Education, Charitable Trusts, Railways, Trade, &c. 
 By J. A. SHARP. In Two very large Volumes, 8vo. uniform with Johnston's New Geneval 
 Gazetteer of the World. [In the press. 
 
 SHORT WHIST : 
 
 Its Rise, Progress, and Laws ; with Observations to make any one a Whist Player ; containing 
 also the Laws of Piquet, Cassino, Ecarte', Cribbage, Backgammon. By Major A ****** 
 NewEdition. To which are added, Precepts for Tyros. By Mrs. B****. Fcp. 8vo. 3s. cloth. 
 
 SINCLAIR.-THE BUSINESS OF LIFE. 
 
 By CATHERINE SINCLAIR, Author of "The Journey of Life," " Modern Society," "Jane 
 Bouverie," &c. 2 vols. fcap 8vo. 10s. cloth. 
 
 SINCLAIR.-THE JOURNEY OF LIFE. 
 
 By CATHERINE SINCLAIR, Author of " The Business of Life," " Modern Society," " Jane 
 &c. New Edition, corrected and enlarged. Fcp. 8vo. 5s. cloth. 
 
PUBLISHED BY MESSRS. LONGMAN, BROWN, AND CO. 27 
 
 SIR ROGER DE COVERLEY. 
 
 From The Spectator. With Notes and Illustrations, by W. HENRY WILLS; and Twelve 
 fine Wood Engravings, by John Thompson, from Designs by FREDERICK TAYLER. Crown 
 8vo. 15s. boards ; or 27s. bound in morocco by Hayday. 
 
 THE SKETCHES : 
 
 Three Tales. By the Authors of "Amy Herbert," "The Old Man's Home," and "Hawk- 
 stone." New Edition. Fcp. 8vo. with 6 Plates, 8s. cloth. 
 
 SMEE. ELEMENTS OF ELECTRO-METALLURGY. 
 
 By ALFRED SMEE, F.R S., Surgeon to the Bank of England. Third Edition, revised, cor- 
 rected, and considerably enlarged ; with Electrotypes and numerous Woodcuts. Post 8vo- 
 10s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 SMITH.-THE WORKS OF THE REY. SYDNEY SMITH : 
 
 Including his Contributions to The Edinburgh Review. New Edition, complete in One 
 Volume ; with Portrait by E. U. Eddis, engraved in line by W. Greatbach, and View of 
 Combe Florey Rectory, Somerset. Square crown 8vo. 21s. cloth ; 30s. calf extra, by Hayday : 
 or in 3 vols. 8vo. with Portrait, 36s. cloth. 
 
 SMITH -ELEMENTARY SKETCHES OF MORAL PHILO- 
 
 SOPHY, delivered at the Royal Institution in the Years 1804, 1805, and 1806. By the late 
 Rev. SYDNEY SMITH, M.A. With an Introductory Letter to Mrs. Sydney Smith from the 
 late Lord Jeffrey. Second Edition. 8vo. 12s. cloth. 
 
 SMITH-SERMONS PREACHED AT ST. PAUL'S CATHE- 
 
 DRAL, the Foundling Hospital, and several Churches in London ; together with others 
 addressed to a Country Congregation. By the late Rev. SYDNEY SMITH, Canon Residentiary 
 of St. Paul's Cathedral. 8vo. 12s. cloth. 
 
 SMITH.-THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHERUBIM : 
 
 Being an Inquiry, Critical, Exegetical, and Practical, into the Symbolical Character and 
 Design of the Cherubic Figure of Holy Scripture. By GEORGE SMITH, F.A.S., &c. Post 
 8vo. 3s. cloth. 
 
 SMITH.-SACRED ANNALS; 
 
 Or, Researches into the History and Religion of Mankind, from the Creation of the World to 
 the Death of Isaac : deduced from the Writings of Moses and other Inspired Authors, copiously 
 illustrated and confirmed by the Ancient Records, Traditions, and Mythology of the Heathen 
 World. By GEORGE SMITH, F.A.S. Crown 8vo. 10s. cloth. 
 
 SMITH.-THE HEBREW PEOPLE ; 
 
 Or, the History and Religion of the Israelites, from the Origin of the Nation to the Time of 
 Christ : deduced from the Writings of Moses and other Inspired Authors ; and illustrated 
 by copious References to the Ancient Records, Traditions, and Mythology of the Heathen 
 World. By GEORGE SMITH, F.A.S. &c. Forming the Second Volume of Sacred Annals. 
 Crown 8vo. in Two Parts, 12s. cloth. 
 
 SMITH.- THE RELIGION OF ANCIENT BRITAIN HISTORI- 
 
 CALLY CONSIDERED : or, a Succinct Account of the several Religious Systems which have 
 obtained in this Island from the Earliest Times to the Norman Conquest : including an Inves- 
 tigation into the Early Progress of Error in the Christian Church, the Introduction of the 
 Gospel into Britain, and the State of Religion in England till Popery had gained the ascen- 
 dancy. By GEORGE SMITH, F.A.S. New Edition. 8vo. 7s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 SMITH.-PERILOUS TIMES ; 
 
 Or, the Aggressions of Antichristian Error on Scriptural Christianity, considered in reference 
 to the Dangers and Duties of Protestants. By GEORGE SMITH, F.A.S. Fcp. 8vo. 6s. cloth. 
 
 SMITH.-THE VOYAGE AND SHIPWRECK OF ST. PAUL: 
 
 with Dissertations on the Sources of the Writings of St. Luke, and the Ships and Navigation 
 of the Antients. By JAMES SMITH, Esq. of Jordan Hill, F.R.S. 8vo. with Views, Charts, 
 and Woodcuts, 14s. cloth. 
 
28 NEW WORKS AND NEW EDITIONS 
 
 SNOW.-VOYAGE OF THE PRINCE ALBERT IN SEARCH OF 
 
 SIR JOHN FRANKLIN: A Narrative of Every-day Life in the Arctic Seas. By VV. PARKKR 
 SNOW. With a Chart, and 4 Illustrations printed in Colours. Post 8vo. 12s. cloth. 
 
 THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF THE LATE 
 
 ROBERT SOUTHEY. Edited by liis Son, the Rev. CHARLES CUTHBERT SOUTHEY M.A., 
 Vicar of Ardleigh. With numerous Portraits, and Six Landscape Illustrations from Designs 
 by William Westall, A.R.A. 6 vols. post 8vo. 63s. cloth. 
 
 V Each of the Six Volumes may be had separately,price 10s. 6d. 
 
 SOUTHEY'S COMMONPLACE BOOK-FOURTH SERIES. 
 
 FOURTH and last SERIES; being; ORIGINAL MEMORANDA, and comprising Collections, 
 Ideas, and Studies for Literary Compositions in general ; Collections for a History of English 
 Literature and Poetry; Characteristic English Anecdotes, and Fragments for Espriella; 
 Collections for The Doctor fyc. ; Personal Observations and Recollections, with Fragments of 
 Journals ; Miscellaneous Anecdotes and Gleanings ; Extracts, Facts, and Opinions relating 
 to Political and Social Society; Texts for Sermons; Texts for Enforcement; and L'Envoy: 
 forming a Single Volume complete in itself. Edited by Mr. Southey's Son-in-law, the Rev. 
 J. W. WARTER, B.D. Square crown 8vo. 21s. cloth. 
 
 SOUTHEY'S COMMONPLACE BOOK- THIRD SERIES. 
 
 Being ANALYTICAL READINGS; and comprising Analytical Readings, with Illustrations 
 and copious Extracts, of Works in English Civil History; English Ecclesiastical History; 
 Anglo-Irish History ; French History ; French Literature; Miscellaneous Foreign Civil His- 
 tory; General Ecclesiastical History; Historical Memoirs; Ecclesiastical Biography ; Mis- 
 cellaneous Biography; Correspondence; Voyages and Travels; Topography; Natural His- 
 tory; Divinity; Literary History ; Miscellaneous Literature ; and Miscellanies. Forming a 
 Single Volume complete in itself. Edited by Mr. Southey's Son-in-law, the Rev. J. W. 
 WARTER, B.D. Square crown 8vo. 21s. cloth. 
 
 SOUTHEY'S COMMONPLACE BOOK-SECOND SERIES. 
 
 Comprising SPECIAL COLLECTIONS viz. Ecclesiastical, or Notes and Extracts on Theo- 
 logical Subjects (with Collections concerninff Cromwell's Age) ; Spanish and Portuguese 
 Literature ; Middle Ages, &c. ; Notes for the History of the Religious Orders ; Orientalia, or 
 Eastern and Mahommedan Collections; American Tribes ; Incidental and Miscellaneous Illus- 
 trations; Physica, or Remarkable Facts in Natural History; and Curious Facts, quite Mis- 
 cellaneous. Forming a single Volume complete in itself. Edited by Mr. Southey's Son-in-Law, 
 the Rev. J. W. WARTER, B.D. Square crown 8vo. 16s. cloth. 
 
 SOUTHEY'S COMMONPLACE BOOK- FIRST SERIES. 
 
 Comprising CHOICE PASSAGES, Moral, Religious, Political, Philosophical, Historical, Poeti- 
 cal, and Miscellaneous ; and COLLECTIONS for the History of Manners and Literature in 
 England. Forming a single Volume complete in itself. Edited by Mr. Southey's Son-in-Law, 
 the Rev. J. W. WARTER, B.D. New Edition ; with medallion Portrait of Southey. Square 
 crown 8vo. 18s. cloth. 
 
 SOUTHEY'S THE DOCTOR &c. COMPLETE IN ONE VOLUME. 
 
 The DOCTOR &c. By the late ROBERT SOUTHEY. Complete in One Volume. Edited by 
 Mr. Southey's Son-in-Law, the Rev. JOHN WOOD WAKTER, B.D. With Portrait, Vignette, 
 Bust of the Author, and coloured Plate. New Edition. Square crown 8vo. 21s. cloth. 
 
 ROBERT SOUTHEY'S COMPLETE POETICAL ORKS ; 
 
 Containing all the Author's last Introductions and Notes. Complete in One Volume, with 
 Portrait and View of the Poet's Residence at Keswick ; uniform with Lord Byron's and 
 Moore's Poems. Medium 8vo. 21s. cloth ; 42s. bound in morocco. Or, in 10 vols. fcp. 8vo. 
 with Portrait and 19 Plates, rf'2. 10s. cloth ; morocco, \. 10s. 
 
 SOUTHEY.-SELECT WORKS OF THE BRITISH POETS, 
 
 From Chaucer to Lovelace, inclusive. With Biographical Sketches by the late ROBERT 
 SOUTHEY. Medium 8vo. SUs. cloth. 
 
TATE.-ON THE STRENGTH OF MATERIALS ; 
 
 Containing various original and useful Formulae, specially applied to Tubular Bridges, Wrought 
 Iron and Cast Iron Beams, &c. By THOMAS TATE, of Kneller Training College, Twickenham ; 
 late Mathematical Professor and Lecturer on Chemistry in the National Society's Training 
 College, Battersea; Author of "Exercises on Mechanics and Natural Philosophy." 8vo. 
 5s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 TAYLER.-MARGARET ; 
 
 Or, the Pearl. By the Rev. CHARLES B. TA YLER, M.A. Rector of St. Peter's, Chester, Author 
 of "Lady Mary, or Not of the World," &c. New Edition. Fcp. 8vo. 6s. cloth. 
 
 TAYLER.-LADY MARY; 
 
 Or, Not of the World. By the Rev. CHARLES B. TAYLER, Rector of St. Peter's, Chester; 
 Author of" Margaret, or the Pearl," &c. New Edition ; with a Frontispiece engraved by J. 
 ABSOLON. Fcp. Svo. 6s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 TAYLOR.-THE VIRGIN WIDOW : 
 
 a Play. By HENRY TAYLOR, Author of " The Statesman," " Philip Van Artevelde," " Edwin 
 the Fair," &c. Fcp. Svo. 6s. cloth, 
 
 TAYLOR.-LOYOLA : AND JESUITISM IN ITS RUDIMENTS. 
 
 By ISAAC TAYLOR, Author of " Natural History of Enthusiasm," &c. Post Svo. 10s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 PUBLISHED BY MESSRS. LONGMAN, BROWN, AND CO. 29 
 
 SOUTHEY.-THE LIFE OF WESLEY; 
 
 And Rise and Progress of Methodism. By ROBERT SOUTHEY, New Edition, with Notes by 
 the late Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Esq., and Remarks on the Life and Character ot John 
 Wesley, by the late Alexander Knox, Esq. Edited by the Author's Son. the Rev. CHARLKS 
 CUTHBERT SOUTHEY, M.A. Vicar of Ardleigh. 2 vols. Svo. with 2 Portraits, 28s. cloth. 
 
 STEEL'S SHIPMASTER'S ASSISTANT ; 
 
 Compiled for the use of Merchants, Owners and Masters of Ships, Officers of Customs, and all 
 Persons connected with Shipping or Commerce : containing the Law and Local Regulations 
 affecting the Ownership, Charge, and Management of Ships and their Cargoes ; together with 
 Notices of other Matters, and all necessary Information for Mariners. New Edition, rewritten 
 throughout. Edited by GRAHAM WILLMORE, Esq. M.A. Barrister-at-Law; GEORGE 
 CLEMENTS, of the Customs, London; and WILLIAM TATE, Author of " The Modern Cambist." 
 Svo. 28s. cloth ; or, 29s. bound. 
 
 STEPHEN-ESSAYS IN ECCLESIASTICAL BIOGRAPHY. 
 
 From The Edinburgh Review. By the Right Hon. Sir JAMES STEPHEN, K.C.B., Professor 
 of Modern History in the University of Cambridge. Second Edition. 2 vols. Svo. 24s. cloth. 
 
 STOW.-THE TRAINING SYSTEM, THE MORAL TRAINING 
 
 SCHOOL, and the NORMAL SEMINARY. By DAVID STOW, Esq. Honorary Secretary to 
 the Glasgow Normal Free Seminary ; Author of " Moral Training," &c. 8th Edition, cor- 
 rected and enlarged ; with Plates and Woodcuts. Post Svo. 6s. cloth. 
 
 SWAIN.-ENGLISH MELODIES. 
 
 By CHARLES SWAIN, Author of "The Mind, and other Poems." Fcp. Svo. 6s. cloth ; bound 
 in morocco, 12s. 
 
 SYMONS.-THE LAW RELATING TO MERCHANT SEAMEN, 
 
 Arranged chiefly for the use of Masters and Officers in the British Merchant Service. With 
 an Appendix, containing the Navigation Act ; the Mercantile Marine Act, 1850 ; the general 
 Merchant Seamen's Act ; the Seamen's Protection Act ; the Notice of Examinations of 
 Masters and Mates; and the Scale of Medicines (Dc. 19, 1850) and Medical Stores (Dec. 
 20, 1850) issued by the Board of Trade. By EDWARD WILLIAM SYMONS, Chief Clerk of 
 the Thames Police Court. 4th Edition. 12mo. 5s. cloth. 
 
30 NEW WORKS AND NEW EDITIONS 
 
 THIRLWALL.-THE HISTORY OF GREECE. 
 
 By the Right Rev. the LORD BISHOP of ST. DAVID'S (the Rev. Connop Thirlwall). A New 
 Edition, revised ; with Notes. Vols. I. to V. 8vo. with Maps, 60s. cloth. To be completed 
 in 8 volumes, price 12s. each. [Vol. VI. nearly ready. 
 
 V Also, an Edition in 8 vols. fcp. 8vo. with Vignette Titles, 1. 8s. cloth. 
 
 A HISTORY OF GREECE, FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES 
 
 to the TAKING of CORINTH bv the ROMANS, B.C. 146, mainly based upon Bishop 
 Thirlwall's History of Greece. By Dr. LEONHARD SCHMITZ, F.R.S.E., Rector of the High 
 School of Edinburgh. Second Edition. 12mo. 7s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 THOMAS'S INTEREST TABLES.-A NEW SET OF INTEREST 
 
 TABLES, from One to Three per Cent, per Annum, calculated by Eighths per Cent. By 
 WILLIAM THOMAS. 4to. [Nearly ready. 
 
 THOMSON'S SEASONS. 
 
 Edited by BOLTON CORNEY, Esq. Illustrated with Seventy-seven Designs drawn ou Wood, 
 by Members of the Etching Club. Engraved by Thompson and other eminent Engravers. 
 Square crown 8vo. uniform with Goldsmith's Poems illustrated by the Etching Club, 21s. 
 cloth ; or, bound in morocco, by Hayday, 36s. 
 
 THOMSON'S SEASONS. 
 
 Edited, with Notes, Philosophical, Classical, Historical, and Biographical, by ANTHONY 
 TODD THOMSON, M.D. F.L.S. Fcp. 8vo. 7s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 THOMSON. THE DOMESTIC MANAGEMENT OF THE SICK 
 
 ROOM, necessary, in Aid of Medical Treatment, for the Cure of Diseases. By ANTHONY 
 TODD THOMSON, M.D. F.L.S. late Professor of Materia Medica and Therapeutics, and of 
 Forensic Medicine, in University College, London. New Edition. Post 8vo. 10s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 THOMSON-TABLES OF INTEREST, 
 
 At Three, Four, Four-and-a-Half, and Five per Cent., from One Pound to Ten Thousand, and 
 from One to Three Hundred and Sixty-five Days, in a regular progression of single Days; 
 with Interest at all the above Rates, from One to Twelve Months, and from One to Ten Years. 
 Also, numerous other Tables of Exchanges, Time, and Discounts. By JOHN THOMSON, 
 "Accountant. New Edition. I2mo. 8s. bound. 
 
 THOMSON-SCHOOL CHEMISTRY ; 
 
 Or, Practical Rudiments of the Science. By ROBERT DUNDAS THOMSON, M.D. Master in 
 Surgery in the University of Glasgow. Fcp. 8vo. with Woodcuts, 7s. cloth. 
 
 THE THUMB BIBLE ; 
 
 Or, Verbum Sempiternum. By J. TAYLOR. Being an Epitome of the Old and New Testa- 
 ments in English Verse. A New Edition (1850), printed from the Edition of 1693, by C. Whit- 
 tingham, Chiswick. 64mo. Is. 6d. bound and clasped. 
 
 TOMLINE.-AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE 
 
 BIBLE: containing Proofs of the Authenticity and Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures; 
 a Summary of the History of the Jews ; an Account of the Jewish Sects ; and a brief 
 Statement of the Contents of the several Books of the Old and New Testaments. By GEORGE 
 TOMLINE, D.D. F.R.S. New Edition. Fcp. 8vo. 5s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 TOOKE.-THE HISTORY OF PRICES : 
 
 With reference to the Causes of their principal Variations, from the year 1792 to the year 
 1838, inclusive. Preceded by a Sketch of the History of the Corn Trade in the last Two Cen- 
 turies. By THOMAS TOOKE, Esq. F.R.S. 3 vols. Svo. 1. 8s. cloth. 
 
PUBLISHED BY MESSRS. LONGMAN, BROWN, AND CO. 31 
 
 TOOKE.-THE HISTORY OP PRICES, AND OF THE STATE 
 
 of the CIRCULATION from 1839 to 1847, inclusive: with a general Review of the Currency 
 Question, and Remarks on the Operation of the Acts 7 and 8 Viet. c. 32: being a continuation 
 of The History of Price*, from 1792 to 1838. By T. TOOKE, Esq. F.R.S. 8vo. 18s. cloth. 
 
 TOWNSEND. MODERN STATE TRIALS. 
 
 Revised and illustrated with Essays and Notes. By WILLIAM CHARLES TOWNSEND, Esq. 
 M.A., Q.C., late Recorder of Macclesfield ; Author of " Lives of Twelve Eminent Judges of 
 the Last and of the Present Century," &c. 2 vols. 8vo. 30s. cloth. 
 
 TOWNSEND. THE LIVES OF TWELYE EMINENT JUDGES 
 
 of the LAST and of the PRESENT CENTURY. By W.CHARLES TOWNSEND, Esq. M.A. Q.C. 
 late Recorder of Macclesfield ; Author of " Memoirs of the House of Commons." 2 vols. 
 8vo. 28s. cloth. 
 
 TURNER.-THE SACRED HISTORY OF THE WORLD, 
 
 Attempted to be Philosophically considered, in a Series of Letters to a Son. By SHARON 
 TURNER, F.S.A. and R.A.S.L. New Edition, edited by the Rev. SYDNEY TURNER. 3 vols. 
 post 8vo. 3ls. 6d. cloth. 
 
 DR. TURTOFS MANUAL OF THE LAND AND FRESH- 
 WATER SHELLS of the BRITISH ISLANDS. A New Edition, thoroughly revised and with 
 considerable Additions. By JOHN EDWARD GRAY, Keeper of the Zoological Collection in 
 the British Museum. Post 8vo. with Woodcuts, and 12 Coloured Plates 15s. cloth. 
 
 TWELVE YEARS AGO : A TALE. 
 
 By the Authoress of " Letters to my Unknown Friends," " Some Passages from Modern His- 
 tory," "Discipline," and " Letters on Happiness." Fcp. 8vo. 6s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 TWINING.-ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAINTING: 
 
 A Theoretical and Practical Treatise ; comprising Esthetics in reference to Art the Appli- 
 cation of Rules to Painting -and General Observations on Perspective. By H. TWINING, Esq. 
 Imperial 8vo. with numerous Plates and Wood Engravings, 21s. cloth. 
 
 TWISS.-THE LETTERS APOSTOLIC OF POPE PIUS IX. 
 
 Considered with reference to the Law of England and the Law of Europe. With an Appendix 
 of Documents. By TRAVERS Twiss, D.C.L., of Doctors' Commons ; Fellow of University 
 College, Oxford ; and Commissary-General of the Diocese of Canterbury. 8vo. 9s. cloth. 
 
 URE.-DICTIONARY OF ARTS, MANUFACTURES, & MINES ; 
 
 Containing a clear Exposition of their Principles and 'Practice. By ANDREW URE, M.D. 
 F.R.S. M.G.S. M.A.S. Lond.; M. Acad. N.L. Philad.. ; S. Ph. Soc. N. Germ. Hanov. ; Mulii. 
 &c. &c. New Edition, corrected. 8vo. with 1,241 Engravings on Wood, 50s. cloth. Also, 
 
 SUPPLEMENT of RECENT IMPROVEMENTS. New Edition. 8vo. withWoodcuts, 14s. cloth. 
 
 WATERTON. ESSAYS ON NATURAL HISTORY, 
 
 Chiefly Ornithology. By CHARLES WATERTON, Esq., Author of " Wanderings in South 
 America." With an Autobiography of the Author, and Views of Walton Hall. New 
 Edition. 2 vols. fcp. 8vo. 14s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 V Separately Vol. I. (First Series), 8s. ; Vol. II. (Second Series), 6s. 6d. 
 
32 NEW WORKS AND NEW EDITIONS. 
 
 ALARIC WATTS'S POETRY AND PAINTING. LYRICS OF 
 
 THE HEART, and other Poems. By ALARIC A. WATTS. With Forty-one highly-finished 
 Line-Engravings, executed expressly for this work by the most eminent Painters and En- 
 gravers. 
 
 In One Volume, square crown 8vo. price 31s. 6d. boards, or 45s. bound in morocco 
 byHayday; Proof Impressions, 63s. boards. Plain Proofs, 41 Plates, demy 4to. (only 
 100 copies printed) j2. 2s. in portfolio ; India Proofs before letters, colombier 4to. (only 
 50 copies printed), ^5. 5s. in portfolio. 
 
 WEBSTER. AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC ECONOMY, 
 
 Comprising such subjects as are most immediately connected with Housekeeping : as, The 
 Construction of Domestic Edifices, with the modes of Warming, Ventilating, and Lighting 
 them A description of the various articles of Furniture, with the nature of their Materials 
 Duties of Servants, &c. &c. &c. By THOMAS WEBSTER, F.G.S. ; assisted by the late Mrs. 
 Parkes. New Edition. 8vo. with nearly 1,000 Woodcuts, 50s. cloth. 
 
 WESTWOOD.-AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MODERN 
 
 CLASSIFICATION OF INSECTS ; founded on the Natural Habits and compounding Organi- 
 sation of the different Families. By J. O. WESTVVOOD, F.L S. &c. &c. &c. 2 vols. 8vo. with 
 numerous Illustrations, ,s6'2. 7s. cloth. 
 
 WHEATLEY.-THE ROD AND LINE ; 
 
 Or, Practical Hints and Dainty Devices for the sure taking of Trout, Grayling, &c. By 
 HEWETT WHEATLE Y, Esq. Senior Angler. Fcp. 8vo. with Nine coloured Plates, 10s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 WILBERFORCE -A PRACTICAL VIEW OF THE PREVAIL- 
 
 ING RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS of PROFESSED CHRISTIANS, in the Higher and Middle 
 Classes in this Country, contrasted with Real Christianity. By WM. WILBERFORCE, Esq. 
 M.P. New Editions. 8vo. 8s. boards ; or fcp. 8vo. 4s. 6d. cloth. 
 
 LADY WILLOUGHBY'S DIARY. 
 
 So much of the Diary of Lady Willoughby as relates to her Domestic History, and to the 
 Eventful Reign of King Charles the First, the Protectorate, and the Restoration (1635 to 1663). 
 Printed, ornamented, and bound in the style of the period to which The Diary refers. New 
 Edition ; in Two Parts. Square fcp. 8vo. 8s. each, boards ; or 18s. each, bound in morocco. 
 
 YOUATT.-THE HORSE. 
 
 By WILLIAM YOUATT. With a Treatise of Draught. A New Edition ; with numerous Wood 
 Engravings, from Designs by William Harvey. 8vo. 10s. cloth. 
 
 C^ Messrs. Longman and Co.'s Edition should be ordered. 
 
 YOUATT.-THE DOG. 
 
 By WILLIAM YOUATT. A New Edition ; with numerous Wood Engravings, from Designs 
 by William Harvey. 8vo. 6s. cloth. 
 
 *** The above works, which were prepared under the superintendence of the Society for 
 the Diffusion of Knowledge, are now published by Messrs. Longman and Co., by assignment 
 from Mr. Charles Knight. It is to be observed that the edition of Mr. Youatt's book on the 
 Horse which Messrs Longman and Co. have purchased from Mr. Knight, is that which was 
 thoroughly revised by the author, and thereby rendered in many respects a new work. The 
 engravings, also, were greatly improved. Both works are the most complete treatises in the 
 language on the History, "Structure, Diseases, and Management of the Animals of which 
 they treat. 
 
 ZUMPT'S GRAMMAR OF THE LATIN LANGUAGE. 
 
 Translated and adapted for the use of English Students, with the Author's sanction and 
 co-operation, by Dr. L. SCHMITZ, F.R.S.E., Rector of the High School of Edinburgh: 
 with copious Corrections and Additions communicated to Dr. Schmitz, for the authorised 
 English Translation, by Professor ZUMPT. New Edition, corrected. 8vo. 14s. cloth. 
 
 [March 31, 1851. 
 
 TVSMOX A.HB OOII.TY, SJUNNBR STRUT, SHOWBILL, I.ONDOM. 
 
14 DAY USE 
 
 RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED 
 
 LOAN DEPT. 
 
 ,or 
 
 Renewed books are subject to immediate recall. 
 
 9M82IH 
 
 REC'D LD 
 
 JUN251962 . 
 
 
 
 REC'D LD 
 
 JUN2 '64 -8 PI 
 
 LD 2lA-50m-3,'62 
 
 (C7097slO)476B 
 
 General Library . 
 Uaiversity of California 
 Berkeley 
 
YC 36569 
 
 WORKS IN GENERAL LITERATURE. 
 
 SOUTHEY's COMMONPLACE BOOK. Edited by the Rev. 
 
 J. W. WARIER, B.D. FIRST SERIES CHOICE PASSAGES, &c. ; with 
 . New Edition. Square crown 8vo. 18s. 
 
 Edited by the Rev. 
 
 L COLLECTIONS: price 
 : price 21s. 
 
 ;by the Rev. J. W. 
 
 'jred Plate. Square crown 
 
 ete in One Volume; 
 
 ceo, 42s. 
 
 ,e in One Volume;' 
 
 .occo, 42s. 
 
 SOUTHEY's COMMOMPLACE B< 
 
 J. W. WARTER, B.D. SECOND SERIES ; 
 18s. THIRD SERIES- ANALYTICAL 
 
 yy 
 
 SOUTHEY's The DOCTOR, / 
 
 WARTER, B.D.; with Portrait, Vw /"p* / 
 
 3 
 
 Svo. 21s. 
 
 '. *"* 
 
 SOUTHEY's POETIC 
 
 with Portrait and Vignet 
 
 MOORED 
 
 with Portrait 
 
 JAM 
 
 
 ,AL WORKS. Complete 
 
 Square crown 8vo. 10s. 6d. j rao- 
 
 ^ s orjAoui^c. rmflited by BOLTON CORNEY; illus- 
 trated by the ETCHING CLUB. Square cr. 8vo. Woodcuts, 21s.; morocco, 36s. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 GOLDSMITH'S POEMS. Edited by BOLTON CORNET; illustrated 
 
 by the ETCHING CLUB. Square crown Svo. Woodcuts, 21s. ; morocco, 36s. 
 
 IX. 
 
 MOORE's LALLA ROQKII. New Edition; with the Auto- 
 biographical Preface, and a Vignette by Maclise. 16mo. 5s.; morocco, 12s. 6d. 
 
 x. 
 
 MOORE's SONGS, BALLADS, and SACRED SONGS. First 
 
 collected Edition; with Vignette by Richard Doyle. 16mo. 5s.; mor. 12s. 6d. 
 
 * 
 
 XI. 
 
 MOORE's IRISH MELODIES. New Edition; with the Auto- 
 biographical Preface, and Vignette by Maclise. IGmo. 5s. ; morocco, 12s. 6d. 
 
 XII. 
 
 POETICAL WORKS of LETITIA ELIZ. LANDON (L.E.L.) | 
 
 New Edition, uniform with Moore's " Songs and Ballads" ; with 2 Vignettes \ 
 by llichard Doyle. 2 vols. 16mo. 10s. ; morocco s 21s. 
 
 LONDON: LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEIN-, AND LONGMANS.