NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 NEW YORK BOSTON CHICAGO DALLAS 
 ATLANTA SAN FRANCISCO 
 
 MACMILLAN & CO., LOOTED 
 
 LONDON BOMBAY CALCUTTA 
 MELBOURNE 
 
 THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD. 
 
 TORONTO 
 
NATIONALISM, WAR AND 
 SOCIETY- 
 
 A STUDY OF NATIONALISM AND ITS CONCOMITANT, 
 
 WAR, IN THEIR RELATION TO CIVILIZATION; 
 
 AND OF THE FUNDAMENTALS AND THE 
 
 PROGRESS OF THE OPPOSITION TO WAR 
 
 BY 
 EDWARD KREHBIEL, PH.D. 
 
 |k V 
 
 PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY 
 IN LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY 
 
 WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY 
 NORMAN ANGELL 
 
 fork 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 1916 
 
 All rights reserved 
 
'+ J7 / r'*~*^-f'*-^ -- 
 
 7^ 
 
 
 
 COPYRIGHT, 1916 
 
 BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 Set up and electrotyped. Published June, i 9 t6. 
 
To 
 
 MY MOTHER 
 SUSANNAH A. KREHBIEL 
 
 WHO TAUGHT ME TO HATE WAR 
 
 338565 
 
4 
 
PREFACE 
 
 The presumption of this book I frankly acknowledge; to 
 present impartially subjects of so wide a variety and so com- 
 plex and controversial a character is nothing, if not ambitious. 
 
 For the faults and errors which, I fear, may have crept 
 into these comprehensive pages I crave lenience; they are 
 the result of finite capacity, and not of conscious straying 
 from the truth. 
 
 For the aims of the book, the dissemination of ideas and 
 ideals which shall make for a reduction of war, I offer no 
 apology; indeed if, having this cause at heart as I do, I were 
 remiss in it, I should hold myself deserving of great blame. 
 
 For the help I have had from whatever source I gladly 
 give thanks and credit: To David Starr Jordan for his in- 
 spiration and his permission to use such portions as seemed 
 useful of a Syllabus formerly published by us jointly; to 
 Norman Angell for invaluable suggestions and contributions 
 as herein appear; to Dr. John Mez for ideas and sound ad- 
 vice; to Dr. Denys P. Myers for sundry useful and exact 
 information; and to all those who, whether knowingly or 
 unknowingly, have contributed ideas and labor to this 
 agreeable enterprise now happily finished. 
 
 EDWARD KREHBIEL. 
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 
 
 April 3, 1916. 
 
 vii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 FUNDAMENTALS xi 
 
 INTRODUCTION xiii 
 
 PART I 
 
 NATIONALISM, rrs CHARACTER, FALLACIES AND FAULTS 
 
 j 
 
 I. Nationalism i 
 
 II. The Corollaries of Nationalism 9 ' 
 
 III. The Case for Nationalism and the War System 16 
 
 TV, Th^ Faults of Nationalism and the War System 26 
 
 V. "The Great Illusion" 36 
 
 VI. The Armed Peace and Its Fruits 46 
 
 VII. The Economic Consequences of War 58 
 
 Vni. Public Debts 68 
 
 IX. War and Sociology 81 
 
 X. War and Biology 87 
 
 XI. War and the State: Political Aspects of War and Mili- 
 tarism 95 
 
 XII. Nationalism and Morals 101 
 
 PART II 
 
 MODERN POLITICAL \ND SOCIAL CHANGES AND THEIR REACTION 
 ON NATIONAL RIVALREB 
 
 XIII. The R61e of Force. From Force Through Law to Justice 
 
 and Peace ......................................... 105 
 
 XIV. The Change in the Institution of Warfare ................ 114 
 
 Modern Communication and Internationalism ........... 126 
 
 
 PART III 
 
 PROGRESSIVE FORCES, WHICH SEEK TO OVERCOME THE FAULTS OF 
 NATIONALISM AND ESTABLISH AN ORDER OF THINGS IN AGREE- 
 MENT WITH THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 
 
 XVI. The Fundamentals of the Opposition to War 141 
 
 XVII. Deductive or Idealist Pacifism to 1789 150 
 
 ix 
 
s: TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 XVIII. Deductive or Idealist Pacifism since 1789 157 
 
 XIX. Inductive or Practical Pacifism. International Political 
 
 Engineering 166 
 
 PEACE THROUGH DIPLOMACY: NATIONALISM RETAINED 
 
 XX. International Law 168 
 
 XXI. International Arbitration 177 
 
 XXII. The First Hague Conference 193 
 
 XXIII. The Second Hague Conference 200 
 
 XXIV. The International Judiciary 205 
 
 XXV. Miscellaneous Projects for Peace through Diplomacy. ... 212 
 
 PEACE THROUGH COOPERATION: NATIONALISM ABANDONED 
 
 XXVI. International Organization and Federation. The Limita- 
 tion of National Sovereignty 219 
 
 XXVII. Miscellaneous Forces Working for the Improvement of 
 
 International Relations 227 
 
 XXVIII. Schemes for Diminishing the Chance of War and for Com- 
 pelling Nations to Keep Peace 232 
 
 XXIX. Education and Peace 242 
 
 XXX. The Great War and Pacifism 250 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 I. Total Naval Expenditures by Principal Naval Powers 257 
 
 II. Army Appropriations of the Principal Powers 258 
 
 ITT. Leading Pacifist Periodicals 258 
 
 IV. Fiction and Drama 260 
 
 V. Cases Decided by the Permanent Court of Arbitration 262 
 
 INDEX 265 
 
FUNDAMENTALS 
 
 Strife among men appears in many forms personal rivalry 
 of all kinds, commercial competition, brawls, strikes, riots, 
 revolutions, wars and others which need to be distinguished 
 from each other. Particularly mischievous is the failure to 
 distinguish martial force from police force, which leads to 
 the common error that, if war be eliminated, we shall also 
 be without police protection. Hence, it is necessary to es- 
 tablish this fundamental distinction at the outset. 
 
 Martial force is exercised by the interested party in his 
 own behalf; it is competitive and seeks to impose its will, 
 which it identifies with the right, upon its adversary by 
 violence if necessary. 
 
 Police force is not exercised by the interested parties to 
 a dispute, but is the force exercised by the agents of a co- 
 operating society; its function is, not to help one of the dis- 
 putants to impose his conception of right on the other, but 
 to see that each is protected against the other and that both 
 are obedient to society. 
 
 War is the condition wj^ich exists when social groups known 
 as nations employ martial force. Obviously one may be op- 
 posed to war and yet sanction other kinds of force. 
 
 Militarism is the religion of martial force. 
 
 Pacifism repudiates martial force (and martial force only) 
 and demands the extension of police force. It is not content 
 to pronounce peace desirable but proves its sincerity by labor- 
 ing for conditions which, according to its lights, make for 
 peace. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 A day or two after receiving Professor KrehbieFs request 
 to write a brief introduction to this handbook my eye hap- 
 pened to fall upon a review (appearing in one of the most 
 widely read and highly esteemed of New York papers) 1 of 
 the symposium edited by Mr. Charles Roden Buxton, 
 "Towards a Lasting Settlement." 
 
 The reviewer admits handsomely enough that what the 
 authors of the book have to say is "all very true and exceed- 
 ingly well said." But, he is exceedingly annoyed and says 
 so that true things bearing on war should be said either 
 well or ill when war has become the most important fact with 
 which men can concern themselves. Then, he implies, we 
 should cease to think about it at all. 
 
 I do not think that that is a travesty of the reviewer's 
 thought. I am not attempting a cheap jibe. Such is not 
 only the obvious opinion of this particular reviewer; but 
 he expresses what is quite simply and exactly the attitude, of 
 very many, perhaps most, average folk towards the whole 
 problem of war, peace, and world organization. And that 
 such is a prevailing view is perhaps the most important 
 fact of all in the whole problem. 
 
 That will excuse my dealing with it at some length. The 
 reviewer in question says: 
 
 To most people, however ardently they may love peace, the 
 present will hardly seem a propitious moment to discuss the 
 settlement of Europe after the war. . . . There comes a time 
 when one nation thinks it had better fight and other nations must 
 
 1 New York Times, March 12, 1916. 
 
\ 
 
 \ 
 
 xiv INTRODUCTION 
 
 fight too or knuckle under, and the statesmen must deal with the 
 varying phenomena of nationality as with any other complica- 
 tion of real life. . . . One might go through the book and point 
 out a curious refusal to recognize this as a hard world in which 
 certain forces must come into conflict at one time or another. 
 
 Why should not this be a propitious moment? Is the war 
 settlement going to be so simple and easy that the peoples 
 of Europe, coming to it after a long period of war passion, 
 will be able to solve all its problems without preparation or 
 study? Are the problems of European politics of such a 
 nature that we can acquire wisdom and understanding in 
 them as in no other problem of public affairs without dis- 
 cussion? Of course we know as the reviewer must know 
 that this present war is raging because it is the habit of peace 
 settlements to be very bad and defective, of the kind that 
 lay the seeds for future wars. It is because these past settle- 
 ments at Vienna, Versailles, Frankfurt, Berlin have been 
 the outcome of a political vision obscured by the passions 
 of victory, or fear, or historical resentment, or cupidity, or 
 sheer ignorance and stupidity, unchecked by a public opinion 
 clarified and prepared by sane discussion, that they "settled" 
 nothing. 
 
 " Because," argues the reviewer I have quoted, "our minds 
 are very apt to go astray after a war, therefore, we should not 
 fortify them by discussion, nor prepare them for their task 
 by study; nor check the formation of hasty opinion by the 
 consideration of contrary opinion." 
 
 Surely a moment's reflection convinces us that if the close 
 of this war is to be free from the mistakes that have marked 
 past settlements, if its vast agonies are to serve any large 
 human purpose at all, we must take as much trouble with 
 the politics as with the fighting. We who have not fought 
 may well by our mistakes, our failure to be ready for the 
 peace when it comes, render useless everything which the 
 
INTRODUCTION xvii 
 
 presumed to postulate a somewhat naive faith in the good 
 intentions of men and nations; the naturally peaceful charac- 
 ter of their nature; their reasonableness, and aversion from 
 war. Whereas, it would be much truer to say that those 
 of us who are Pacificists are* so very often it is certainly 
 the case of the present writer not because they think man 
 little inclined to drift into wars, but because they think him 
 much inclined so to do; because they believe that there are 
 in his nature elements pushing him to war which need control; 
 that war is often merely the failure of a control which a more 
 definite moral effort or a better understanding of certain 
 facts of human relationship could perfectly well have as- 
 sured. The needed moral effort is not "natural." It is ex- 
 ceedingly unnatural, like most social discipline; if not de- 
 liberately developed it will fail us when we need it most. 
 That is the reason for deliberately developing it, the justifica- 
 tion for Pacificism. We are Pacificists, some of us at least, 
 because we have in one sense little faith in human nature; 
 because we believe that that nature, unless we watch it, 
 will betray us into very stupid courses. Wisdom in inter- 
 national politics, like wisdom in most fields, is exceedingly 
 unnatural in that it is very painfully acquired, and not to 
 be acquired at all if all effort towards so doing is to be 
 derided. 
 
 And there is a related misapprehension as to the interna- 
 tionalist attitude. The case as between the Pacificist and 
 his opponent is very generally supposed to be that of Force 
 13. No-Force. But this is a quite false antithesis. Outside a 1 
 special and very tiny group, advocates of a completer world 
 organization do not base their case upon opposition to the 
 employment of physical force. They base their case upon the 
 need of making force effective effective, that is, to the com- 
 mon needs and ends of human society. In the present con- 
 dition of anarchy, force in the international politics is gen- 
 
xviii INTRODUCTION 
 
 erally effective to no end certainly not that of national 
 security as the present plight of some three hundred millions 
 in Europe shows. As things stand the force of one unit is neu- 
 tralized by that of another "cancelled out"; and both 
 reduced to ineffectiveness. 
 
 Pacificists as a body do not object to physical force in 
 the shape of the police for instance. There is no such thing 
 as " anti-policism," as there is anti-militarism. Why? Be- 
 cause military force is not the enbodiment in power of the 
 will of civilization, of -the society of nations, in the way that 
 the police represent the social will, the law to which all 
 parties have subscribed; of "right" as far as the combined 
 intelligence of the whole community can determine it. On 
 the contrary, militarism connotes the enforcement, not of 
 the will of the community the community of nations, that 
 is but of the will of one party to a dispute, and of the 
 determination of that one party to insist upon his own view 
 of his rights simply because he believes that he has the 
 power so to do. Militarism implies the enforcement, not of 
 national right duly determined after discussion by all the 
 various parties concerned, but our view of the right in a case to 
 which we are parties; a determination to uphold the view of 
 our nation as against another nation, a means to enable us to 
 be judge, jury and executioner in our own case. Such an 
 attitude makes all law, all society impossible. It is anarchy. 
 It is might defying the essential law of any organized society. 
 It is based on the assumption that each individual (indi- 
 vidual nation, that is) is fit to be judge in his own case, and 
 to be trusted with the means of enforcing his own judgment. 
 And that is to assume that men are perfect; it is the refusal 
 to "face the hard facts of the world," the "phenomena 
 of imperfect human nature," with a vengeance. At the 
 bottom of the perfectly sound and healthy instinct, how- 
 ever muddle-headedly at tunes it may express itself, against 
 
INTRODUCTION xix 
 
 militarism lies this realization of its essentially anti-social 
 motive. 1 
 
 This false parallelism of the police and the army is the 
 pons asinorum of the Pacificist's opponent. The function of 
 the police is the exact contrary to that of the army. Armies 
 are for the purpose of fighting other armies; a police force is 
 never created for the purpose of fighting other police forces, 
 but for aiding them. An army like the revolver of a pio- 
 neer in a lawless community is for the purpose of enabling 
 the individual that employs it to assert his view of the right as 
 against a rival view, by force. The police are for the purpose 
 of preventing that very thing. When a police force increases 
 its numbers, that extra power is not immediately cancelled 
 because some other police force is increased. When a police 
 force is created or increased all concerned know its purpose: 
 the maintenance of the laws of its state. When an army is 
 increased nobody knows its purpose, how it will be used: 
 not even those who have created it ! 
 
 And yet to ask the Pacificist if he objects to the police is 
 supposed to be a complete poser; to demonstrate that in 
 his misgivings concerning militarism he is inconsistent! 
 
 Force is of course an instrument of the human intelligence, 
 and whether well or ill used depends absolutely upon that 
 intelligence. We are often told that the world is governed 
 in the last resort by physical force. Well, there are animals 
 on the earth that have immeasurably greater physical 
 strength than man. They do not govern the world. Man, 
 who is so much weaker, eats them, or makes them work for 
 him. The world, indeed, was once peopled by immense 
 
 1 1 beg the reader to note that there is no argument here against de- 
 fence. I am a thorough believer in that; in no way opposed in certain 
 circumstances to great navies and great armies. I have gone over that 
 ground elsewhere. 
 
xx INTRODUCTION 
 
 beasts of a physical strength bearing about the same relation 
 to man's that man's does to the blackbeetle's. These colossal 
 creatures have all disappeared, superseded by others that 
 were smaller and physically weaker. 
 
 The savage who happened to be born with a longer " reach " 
 than others of his tribe was the bully of the whole until two 
 weaker men put their heads together and agreed to cooperate 
 and so, by taking him front and rear at the same time; 
 brought his tyranny to an end, replacing it by their own, 
 which continued until three weaker men were able to act 
 as one, and so on, until finally we got a combination of the 
 whole community in the policeman. The effectiveness of 
 the policeman resides, not mainly in the fact of the force 
 that he wields, but in the fact that he personifies a common 
 will, which is the outcome of things of the mind. 
 
 When you have something resembling a common will you 
 can get the policeman: but until you get that agreement, 
 "force" cannot be used for the ends of the community at 
 all. The final triumph of the community represented the 
 slow growth of a common purpose as against conflicting 
 purposes. 
 
 We are told that law and civilization rest in the last resort 
 upon force the police or the army. Yet the police or the 
 army obeys the instructions of the law. What physical 
 force compels it to do, ensures that it shall do so? Who guards 
 the guardians? What is our final " sanction," or means of 
 compulsion? It is an oath, a contract. 
 
 When, as Democrats or Republicans, we vote against an 
 existing President, how do we know that he will obey our 
 votes and quietly walk out of office? The army? But it is he 
 who commands the army; the army does not command him. 
 The army would stand by the country? Then what is con- 
 trolling its act is a conception of constitutional right, not phys- 
 ical force, since it could easily, presumably, make itself master 
 
INTRODUCTION xxi 
 
 of a hostile Republican or Democratic party, as the case may 
 be. Obviously it is not because the North American is 
 more military that he is saved from certain defects of South 
 American civilization. Just as obviously it is because he 
 is less military. 
 
 An Englishman says: "It is force alone which vindicates 
 Belgium's rights." But what put the force in motion? What 
 decided England to go to the rescue of Belgium, instead of 
 remaining at home? It was a thing of the mind, a moral 
 thing, a theory: the tradition of the sanctity of treaties, the 
 theory of international obligation, a sense of contract, if 
 you will, like that which makes the President respect the 
 hostile vote instead of intriguing with the army, and the 
 army obey its oath instead of intriguing with the President, 
 or against him. Without this moral thing you cannot get 
 even the effective employment of force in things that look 
 at first sight like sheer violence. You cannot, for instance, 
 have piracy without an agreement and cooperation, without 
 the observance of treaty rights as between pirate captain and 
 crew. If every member of the crew said: "Don't bother me 
 about rules and obeying the captain. I've got a pistol and 
 I mean to make my own rules and act as I see fit" why, , 
 of course you could not run even a pirate ship. Success in v 
 piracy depended a great deal on the morals and discipline 
 of the pirates on the mind of the captain; his fairness in 
 dividing the booty; the capacity of the crew to hang together. 
 
 Anyway, alleges the man who is so sure that nothing 
 but physical force matters, nations cannot depend upon 
 anything but their own strength; and all international 
 agreements are futile. 
 
 Well, the simple truth is that the present war is a complete 
 demonstration that no nation can depend upon its force ^ , 
 alone; that virtually all depend, for their very national exist- ^ 
 ence, upon international arrangement. 
 
xxii INTRODUCTION 
 
 Could France have repelled the German attack unless she 
 could have depended upon the aid of her allies, which in 
 turn depended absolutely upon the keeping of an international 
 arrangement? 
 
 Could Belgium defend her nationality without the aid 
 which she secures by treaty arrangement? 
 
 The European nation which should discard all arrange- 
 ments with foreign nations would find its power, however 
 great it might be, outdone. War itself has become interna- 
 tionalized. 
 
 And if Germany is beaten, as, despite her immense forces, 
 she probably will be, it is because she depended mainly upon 
 her own strength and neglected the element of "opinion" 
 in other nations which has enabled her enemies to range the 
 world against her. "Opinion" a mere moral thing was 
 something that the German military leaders seem to have 
 held in immense contempt; and that contempt will be paid 
 for by Germany at the price of defeat. For opinion comes 
 before force, since it determines the direction that force shall 
 take; how it shall be used. 
 
 The plain implication of the criticism from which I have 
 quoted is that because wisdom in the international field is 
 very weak we should make no effort to strengthen it. The 
 fact that situations arise in which two nations, both believ- 
 ing themselves to be in the right, come to blows is taken as 
 demonstration of the futility of trying to understand why 
 each fails to see the point of the other; why they come to 
 blows, and of trying to prevent it. Because physical force is 
 the last resort no effort should be made to avoid it. 
 
 This falsification of the "last resort" argument is possibly 
 accountable for more human misery than any other one 
 example of human stupidity. It is worth getting straight. 
 
 "In the last resort" a badly managed community whose 
 sources of food may fail will resort to cannibalism. It hap- 
 
INTRODUCTION xxiii 
 
 pens not only among Polar savages, but has happened dur- 
 ing some of the Irish famines and happens during some of 
 the Russian famines now. Cannibalism in those conditions 
 is, if you will, justifiable. It is, like war, the failure of every- 
 thing. But the fact that men may have" to resort to it, and 
 are justified in so doing, is not an argument for so neglecting 
 the tilling of the soil, that cannibalism is pretty certain to 
 be resorted to; for saying: "Since in the last resort, if the 
 crops~fail, we shall have to come to cannibalism, cannibalism 
 is inevitable." Rather is it an argument for saying: "If we 
 do not cultivate our fields we shall suffer from hunger and 
 be compelled to eat our children. Let us therefore cultivate 
 our fields with industry." So with reference to the use of 
 force: "If we neglect the understanding of human^ relation- 
 ship, and the cultivation- of the qualities necessary to make 
 human society workable, we shall in periods of tension get to 
 flying at ene another's throats, because we shall not be able 
 to understand the differences which divide us. And that 
 will lead to murder. Let us therefore so cultivate our weak 
 understanding of the things necessary for life together in r 
 this world, and let us, perhaps, establish some sort of ma-f 
 chinery for the settlement of difficulties and the employment . 
 of our force, not one against another but for the common! 
 good." 
 
 "And if the machinery fails? 'Well, we are back at the 
 starting point of the argument. What if the President of 
 the United States refuses to vacate the Presidential office 
 after he has" been duly outvoted, and, like any Mexican or 
 Venezuelan President' uses the army he commands to re- 
 maiirin power? Shall we therefore conclude that constitu- 
 tions which depend in the last resort upon a compact or 
 treaty the oath of the President and of the army are nec- 
 essarily illusory? An army of rebellion is of course " the last 
 
 resort " it is the collapse of the whole thing. But if we had 
 
xxiv INTRODUCTION 
 
 assumed that this contingency must arise, and had concluded 
 from that possibility that raising armies of rebellion was the 
 real method of republican government and democratic con- 
 trol well, this republic would not be what it is. If we 
 had never made any attempt to create a human society 
 because it might break down as it sometimes does 
 why, of course there would never have been any human 
 society. 
 
 And that is why the fatalism, conscious or unconscious, of 
 the very common attitude reflected in the criticism I have 
 quoted is so disastrous. The belief that men cannot by their 
 effort affect their destiny in these relationships among the 
 most important that concern them deprives them of the 
 will to make the effort. 
 
 "Statesmen must deal with the varying phenomena of 
 nationality as with other complications of real life ... a 
 hard world with which certain forces must come into conflict 
 at one time or another . . . there comes a time when one 
 nation thinks it had better fight. ..." 
 
 " These facts and forces are there," says the critic in effect, 
 "and your Pacificist won't recognize them." It never seems 
 to occur to him that the Pacificist recognizes them perfectly 
 well but proposes to alter them. That seems to the mili- 
 tarist preposterous. They can't be altered, he implies. They 
 are forces outside our volition or control; they are a fate to 
 which men must passively bow. 
 
 And yet obviously a phenomenon like the tradition of na- 
 tionality did not come from Mars. Men made it by their 
 discussions and writings and can unmake it or modify it. 
 "' It is a relatively new invention and for long centuries in 
 Europe was unknown. Men's hostilities grouped them- 
 selves round other traditions and ideas, like religious differ- 
 ences or dynastic allegiances, which having made they have 
 
INTRODUCTION xxv 
 
 since unmade. The nets in which we strangle ourselves are 
 of our own weaving. 
 
 I believe it is hard to exaggerate the importance of this 
 ' element of fatalism in the popular attitude towards inter- 
 nationalism. It is the most vital difference in two opposing 
 conceptions of human society the cooperative conception, 
 that based on the belief that men will get most out of life by 
 joining forces in the common fight against nature; and, the 
 opposite one, which may be termed the cannibalistic concep- 
 tion, that based on the belief that men's interests are neces- 
 sarily antagonistic; that they live, ultimately, by eating one * 
 another, and that under this law the great human groups are 
 condemned by a necessity of nature, to be in perpetual and 
 inevitable antagonism to one another. This belief that man's 
 intelligence cannot determine the character o'f human so- 
 ciety, that it is ruled by some abstraction called "force" 
 the heaviest metal or the heaviest muscle is not merely 
 crudely materialistic but implies a gross spiritual slavery. 
 Such a doctrine is not only profoundly anti-social, it is anti- 
 human fatal not merely to better international relations, 
 but, in the end, to the degree to which it influences human 
 conduct and character at all, to all those large aspirations 
 and spiritual freedoms which man has so painfully won 
 and which sanctify his life. 
 
 To all of which, I fear, by the same fatal inversion of the 
 "last resort" fallacy, most critics will reply: "Yes, that is 
 all very well, Iput what would you have done in August, 1914, 
 when Germany challenged Europe? " 
 
 Well, it does not invalidate anything that I am arguing, 
 to say that I would have fought. But the whole point of 
 my argument is that Germany challenged Europe in part 
 because there was no Europe no internationally organized 
 Europe, that is. If the rival states had organized themselves 
 definitely into a community for mutual protection against a 
 
xxvi INTRODUCTION 
 
 law breaker, and Germany had known definitely that in 
 violating certain rules of international life she was challeng- 
 ing, not only the patent but the potential forces of civiliza- 
 tion, she would not have challenged them. She would not 
 have challenged them because if it had been evident to her 
 people that the forces they had for a generation been asked 
 to contribute were not, as they believed (however falsely), 
 for defence but for the purpose of challenging the law of 
 human society, those forces would not have been contributed. 
 The German government could not have created the instru- 
 ment wherewith to carry out aggression. 
 
 But there was no society of nations; no world- wide or- 
 ganization of states pledged not only to protect any one 
 nation against Germany but also to protect Germany against 
 any hostile state Slav or Gallic. And so the specious plea 
 of "defence" against the Slav menace, or encirclement or 
 what not, bemused the minds of the German people, seduced 
 them from their natural activities and gave us this tragedy. 
 It is the price of anarchy in international politics and or- 
 ganization. 
 
 But the practical question now is. What of to-morrow? 
 
 For if war is inevitable, peace is no less inevitable. The 
 most gloriously futile war cannot go on for ever. The soldier 
 fights with a pacifist end; to establish a peace. What sort 
 of peace is it to be? 
 
 Nothing could better illustrate the ineffectiveness of 
 mere military power, either to protect a nation's interests 
 or vindicate its rights; or better illustrate the need of in- 
 ternational organization as a need of national defence, than 
 America's position to-day. 
 
 Suppose that America goes to war in defence of the rights 
 violated by Germany at sea; is absolutely victorious in that 
 war. How will she know at the peace that she has got what 
 
INTRODUCTION xxvii 
 
 she has been fighting for? American demands at the end of 
 the war will be that American rights at sea be respected; 
 that, most particularly, non-combatants shall not be drowned 
 by attacks on merchantmen. Very good. Germany gives 
 us her promise. She has given it before. How do we know 
 that it will be kept, either by her or any other nation that in 
 a future war may find a ruthless use of the submarine the 
 only weapon left to it against a power commanding the sea? 
 Can we hope that if we show now that we are ready to fight 
 "at the drop of the hat," in future a hard-pressed belligerent 
 will be overawed by the great American navy? Then why 
 is not the belligerent we now propose to deal with held in 
 check by the combined navies of Great Britain, France, 
 Russia, Italy, Japan and Portugal? Again, when we have 
 that promise at the end of our victorious war how do we 
 know that it will be kept; that we shall have got what we 
 have been fighting for? 
 
 And what of the American case against the Allies? Is 
 America now to surrender rights upon which she has in- 
 sisted ever since she became an independent state? Is 
 America, in fighting Germany to make the British Orders 
 in Council the basis of future sea law, so that when (say) 
 Japan goes to war with some other nation, America will 
 have to submit to Japanese control of her trade and com- 
 munication with neutral states even to mail and banking 
 correspondence as she now submits to British control? 
 
 It is quite obvious that American claims have this differ- 
 ence from those of the allies: theirs, in so far as they are 
 territorial can at the peace be satisfied on the spot. America's 
 cannot. Hers depend absolutely upon the establishment, 
 after the war, of a different and better international order; 
 upon agreement as to what shall constitute international law 
 and some method of ensuring its observance. 
 
 Now America is in radical disagreement with her own 
 
xxviii INTRODUCTION 
 
 prospective Allies as to the former of these things. Her his- 
 torical conception of sea law and the rights of neutrals comes 
 much nearer to that of Germany (monstrous as the state- 
 ment may sound) than to that of Britain. And even when 
 we are in agreement as to what the sea law shall be, the only 
 hope that it will be better observed in the future than in 
 the past, is in very radical departures of policy which 
 American public opinion as a whole opposes with a 
 dead weight of hostile tradition. Of course, it may be ar- 
 gued that when Germany is thoroughly beaten the causes 
 which have operated heretofore in creating international 
 anarchy will cease. But such a view implies an optimism as 
 to the readiness of nations for cooperation which certainly 
 this present writer does not share. The past relationships 
 of England and Russia or England and France; or Russia 
 and Japan; or Italy and France, or France and Russia, are 
 hardly such as to justify the hope that the mere fact of de- 
 feating Germany will dispose of the conflicts, intrigues, 
 ambitions, fears and hatreds that have heretofore stood in 
 the way of a sane world order. 
 
 Merely to maintain the present situation is hardly less 
 stultifying and not likely to be capable of indefinite pro- 
 longation. To urge on behalf of such a policy that America 
 is not concerned, is to propound an untenable theory that 
 overlooks the obvious condition. America is involved 
 whether she will or no. Her citizens are killed, her trade 
 affected, her resources used to influence the war's issue, and 
 resentment incurred because of the rules which she is laying 
 down. It is not a question of whether she is concerned, but 
 of what represents her greatest concern. It is hardly indeed 
 a question of whether she will intervene, but what manner 
 of intervention will best subserve her chief ends. 
 
 There is only one recourse: for America to recognize that 
 she is a member of the society of nations, and to face the 
 
INTRODUCTION xxix 
 
 problem of determining just what that involves; what shall 
 be the foundations of the future internationalism; what 
 shall be America's place in it. That cannot be determined 
 without some knowledge of the subjects with which this 
 book deals. 
 
 The danger at present is that the country, by a one-sided 
 demand for a very incomplete "preparedness" will be lulled 
 into the illusion that arms alone, if only she has enough of 
 them, can render her secure and solve her international 
 problems. They cannot. 
 
 The danger of the present widespread "preparedness" 
 agitation is not in the demand for arms, but in the implica- 
 tion that arms suffice. It is a half-preparedness. I happen 
 to have indicated elsewhere the danger of that in the follow- 
 ing propositions, which bear so directly on the problems of 
 America's international relations just now, that I will ven- 
 ture to quote them, 
 'submit: 
 
 (1) That preparedness is dangerously incomplete when it does 
 not include a clear formulation of foreign policy what we intend 
 to exact from or defend against foreign nations by our military 
 power; the rights of trade, immigration, residence, which we are 
 prepared to grant to foreigners, European and Asiatic, in our 
 own territory and in that which we now, or may later by our in- 
 creasing power, control; the rights which we demand for our citi- 
 zens on land, as in Mexico, and on sea, as in the conflict with Ger- 
 many and England; just how far we will use our military and 
 naval force to cooperate with other nations in upholding what we 
 may decide to be common rights on land or sea; at what point we 
 shall decline to allow such common action to lead us into entang- 
 ling alliances; the conditions upon which we are prepared to live 
 together with other nations in this world of ours, and to share it 
 with them. 
 
 (2) That so long as it is unknown on behalf of what policy and 
 
, 
 
 xxx INTRODUCTION 
 
 general principles our military power will be used; so long as its 
 general purposes are not manifest, to ourselves, the world at large, 
 and our prospective enemy, it will, however great, fail to protect 
 our nation and our interest, to ensure peace or to secure our rights; 
 and if we get the armament first and leave the policy to be an- 
 nounced later, the increased armament may prove not merely 
 ineffective hi the attainment of such ends, but may be instru- 
 mental in defeating them, since sooner or later, in that case, in- 
 creased armament would, either by increase of power on the 
 part of other nations or by hostile alliances, be neutralized, 
 canceled. 
 
 (3) That it is not sufficient that the intention behind a nation's 
 power should be inoffensive and in no way threaten others; the 
 specific object of the power, the foreign policy it supports, must be 
 made clear to others in the way that members of an alliance like 
 that between Russia, England, and France make their respective 
 objects clear to one another. In the absence of that definite under- 
 standing power must be mutually threatening (as illustrated in the 
 past military rivalry of the three nations just mentioned), since 
 the basic principle of national defence in the modern world is that 
 superior alien force the objective of which is not manifest must 
 be met by equivalent or greater force; which makes security de- 
 pend upon the attainment of a condition in which each shall be 
 stronger than the other; that is, upon a physical impossibility. 
 
 And, in addition that: 
 
 (a) A successful American international policy must be the 
 outcome of widely expressed public opinion: it cannot be presented 
 ready-made to the country by a President or an Administration, 
 because it involves, in the radically changing conditions of the 
 world, revolutionary departure from precedent; grave questions 
 of principle which the public alone can decide. Nor can decision 
 be left to a tune of crisis. Human nature being combative, co- 
 ercive, guided largely by impulse and passions and very little by 
 reason and reflection, to expect wisdom at such a time is to ask 
 intellectual and moral miracles of men. 
 
INTRODUCTION xxxi 
 
 (&) Nothing in the foregoing implies a disparagement of arma- 
 ment; it is an argument, not that the advocate of preparedness is 
 asking too much, but that he is asking too little; not that we do 
 not need armament, but that we need something else as well; it is v 
 an argument not against preparedness, but against preparedness 
 by dangerous half measures. 
 
 It is worth while to recall a few facts, too easily forgotten, 
 that support these propositions. 
 
 The commonest assumption behind so much "prepared- 
 ness" advocacy is that our arms are simply for the defence 
 of our soil, for repelling invasion, and that if only we be 
 strong enough our policy cannot endanger us. 
 
 That is a pernicious and dangerous fallacy. The armies 
 and navies of great states are not for the purpose of defend- 
 ing their territories so much as their policies, as American, 
 like European history shows. Although America has had 
 several foreign wars, and been near to several more, not one 
 has been for the purpose of repelling invasion. The causes 
 have included resistance to piratical tribute on the high seas 
 the Barbary war; resistance to other high-handedness at 
 sea the 1812 war; defence of American lives and interests 
 on foreign soil the Mexican war; the termination of bar- 
 barous government the Spanish war; the restoration of 
 order the Philippine war. All good causes, but American 
 arms were defending American poJiG&s, hot American soil. 
 So in the European war: Austria's action in July, 1914, 
 brought into the war in turn, Russia, France, Belgium, 
 England, Japan, Italy and Portugal; but not because Austria 
 was threatening to invade them. If Russia and Europe 
 generally had been ready to give Austria a free hand to 
 crush Serbia there would have been no war. But they be- 
 lieved such a policy dangerous and resisted it. 
 
 The importance of the distinction between defending a 
 policy and a territory, is that in a conflict of policy both 
 
xxxii INTRODUCTION 
 
 sides may plausibly believe themselves to be acting on the 
 defensive and defending the right. 
 
 If the Venezuelan matter in 1896 had led to war between 
 England and America, as it very nearly did, both sides 
 would have believed that they were defending their rights: 
 Great Britain her citizens from transfer to a disorderly gov- 
 ernment like Venezuela, America the Monroe Doctrine. A 
 clear definition of policy on both sides would in such cases 
 obviate conflict. 
 
 We cannot always count on such conflicts having so satis- 
 factory an ending. This country may, probably will, drift 
 into war at no very distant date. If in the future America 
 is compelled, as she may be, to go into Mexico and adminis- 
 ter that country, and possibly cancel concessions made to 
 foreigners, conflict may arise from the fear of foreign nations 
 that America will use her increasing power on this continent 
 (J to exact commercial preference for herself and exclude rivals. 
 Such conflicts might easily develop into wars (which would 
 of course be with a group of powers if at all) that clear formu- 
 lation of policy might avoid. 
 
 Force has no peace-preserving value unless the prospective 
 disturber of the peace knows in what circumstances it will be 
 used against him; and that again implies a statement of 
 policy. 
 
 Even if England had possessed a great army in 1914, it 
 would not have restrained German aggression unless Ger- 
 many knew clearly that in such and such circumstances it 
 would be used against her. And very eminent English public 
 men have declared that Germany did not know the circum- 
 stances in which England would enter the war against her. 
 If that is true the military power of England as a force making 
 for peace would have been nullified by the absence of any 
 clear policy on England's part. 
 
 So with Italy. Italy's very considerable army was use- 
 
INTRODUCTION xxxiii 
 
 less as a preventative of German aggression, and as an ele- 
 ment in the maintenance of European peace, because Ger- 
 many did not know it would be used against her; she may 
 have hoped even that it would be used for her. When we 
 are told that if only England had adopted conscription, 
 Germany would have been restrained, we should remember 
 that when England first began to consider the question of 
 conscription twenty years ago it was for the purpose of 
 opposing France; at that time England was talking of an 
 alliance with Germany; a little earlier she was preparing for 
 war witkJRussiaj^fiailier still in the Crimean War she 
 was actually fighting Russia and upholding Turkey, a course 
 which Palmerston justified partly on the ground that it was 
 necessary to protect Germanic civilization against Russian 
 barbarism! It is partly because English arms have defended 
 the Turks in the past that we had in the Balkans the condi- 
 tions out of which the present war arose. Where policy 
 shifts in this way one war undoing the work of the last 
 no amount of mere military preparedness will give a nation 
 security. 
 
 Where does America stand in the grave questions that 
 will confront the world to-morrow at the peace? What is 
 her international policy? 
 
 Is she prepared to pledge her power to support more 
 civilized international conditions: to exact the maintenance 
 of international law? In that case the slogan of "no en- 
 tangling alliances" must go by the board. At present her 
 attitude to international questions is that any power which 
 commands the sea can secure her material support money, 
 munitions, etc., whatever the merits of the cause that 
 power may be defending. 
 
 The Germans after the war will consequently argue that 
 if they had commanded the sea they could have availed them- 
 selves of America's national resources, however bad the 
 
xxxiv INTRODUCTION 
 
 German cause might be. And any other prospective belliger- 
 ent will argue similarly, that a nation desiring to avail itself 
 of American resources does not need to concern itself as to 
 the nature of its wars, whether they are just or unjust, de- 
 fensive or aggressive; all it needs is to command the sea. It 
 can then be sure of what is virtually the economic alliance of 
 Americans. That, to say the least, is unfortunate. If 
 America were to declare that on behalf of certain causes, 
 no nation, whether it commanded the sea or not, could count 
 upon American material support, America's resources would 
 then be a factor thrown on the side of international good 
 behavior, instead of being, as at present, a premium upon 
 armament competition. No one knows Americans them- 
 selves do not know where America stands in international 
 matters, nor how she proposes to use her increasing military 
 power. 
 
 Is she prepared, for instance, to assure Europeans that 
 in going into Mexico or Haiti or San Domingo or elsewhere 
 she is not going to use her power to exclude them in any way 
 commercially? Such a self-denying ordinance would involve 
 revolutionary changes in our conceptions of national sov- 
 ereignty. Yet, without it she may drift into conflict. 
 
 Human nature, being what it is, the very worst policy is 
 to leave these things until the crisis arises. To do so is to 
 ignore the plain fact of human imperfection. It is not in 
 the midst of an international crisis that nations can decide 
 the wise course. At such times we are all likely to lose our 
 tempers and call it patriotism, and to use our force to ill 
 purpose. 
 
 If we look back in history we find plenty of arms and 
 fighting; men never seem to have shown much unreadiness 
 for that; but we find little patience to understand each other's 
 purposes, little tendency to make those adjustments by 
 which alone, however, they can live together. 
 
INTRODUCTION xxxv 
 
 Force is, or should be, the servant of man, an instrument 
 of the human intelligence; and whether it is well or ill used 
 depends absolutely upon that intelligence. The same in- 
 strument can be either a means of defence or suicide. Force 
 is not a thing that operates of itself apart from the human 
 will, and wisdom will not come of itself. It demands a 
 definite moral effort to the end that we may use our instru- 
 ment well instead of ill. 
 
 If we are to use it well we cannot ignore the issues with 
 which this book deals. They are of the essence of the prob- 
 lems that will face America to-morrow at the peace, or 
 earlier. They will dominate, certainly during our generation, 
 all other problems whatsoever, for upon their solution de- 
 pends the whole character of organized society. If it is 
 Utopian to concern ourselves with these subjects, then indeed 
 is the choice before us "Utopia or Hell." 
 
 NORMAN ANGELL. 
 
NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 

NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 NATIONALISM 
 
 I. Nationalism: absolute sovereignty of state. 
 A. At present each nation (state*) is theoretically sov- 
 ereign; that is, it is independent of every other state. 
 
 1 There is some confusion in the use of the terms "state" and "nation". 
 The former when applied to a unit like Great Britain, Germany or 
 France, clearly means the political unit. By "nation" some mean a 
 state in which there is one nationality, a national-state. These would 
 say that Austria-Hungary is a state, but not a nation. However, in inter- 
 national relations Austria-Hungary is considered a nation like every 
 other. As this study has to do with international affairs, the terms nation 
 and state (when referring to a sovereign power) are used synonymously. 
 Nationalism, thep, (as distinct from nationality) is the political system 
 of co-existing sovereign states. 
 
 An excellent definition of a nation is that of Lieber: Nationalism, 
 pp. 7-8. "What is a nation in the modern sense of the word? The word 
 nation, in the fullest adaptation of the term, means, in modern times, 
 a numerous and homogeneous population (having long emerged from the 
 hunters and nomadic state) permanently inhabiting and cultivating a 
 coherent territory, with a well-defined geographic outline, and a name of 
 its own, the inhabitants speaking their own language, having their 
 own literature and common institutions, which distinguish them clearly 
 from other and similar groups of people, being citizens or subjects of a 
 unitary government, however subdivided it may be, and having an or- 
 ganic unity with one another as well as being conscious of a common 
 destiny. Organic, intellectual and political internal unity with propor- 
 tionate strength and a distinct and obvious demarcation from similar 
 groups, are notable elements of the idea of a modern nation in its fullest 
 sense. A nation is a nation only when there is but one nationality; and 
 the attempt at establishing a nationality within a nationality is more in- 
 consistent and mischievous even than the establishment of 'an empire 
 within an empire'." 
 
 i 
 
NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 There are certain attributes of sovereignty. Thus a 
 state to be legally sovereign must have: 
 
 1. The power to make war and peace. 
 
 2. The supreme and effective jurisdiction over a given 
 
 area and its inhabitants. 
 
 3. The right to coin money, raise revenue by taxation, 
 
 maintain a military establishment, make war and 
 peace, make and denounce treaties. 
 
 B. The Great War has resulted in attempts to distinguish 
 
 between German, British and American conceptions 
 of sovereignty. 
 
 1. Germany is said to regard sovereignty as absolute, and 
 
 seeks to make the facts tally with this conception: 
 a sovereign state admits no obligations to other 
 states. 
 
 2. Great Britain is said to regard absolute sovereignty as 
 
 a theory only, which must be and is modified to 
 meet the practical requirements of international 
 intercourse: each state must recognize certain rights 
 of others in the present condition of things, no 
 matter what the theory of sovereignty is. 
 
 C. Current philosophy of the state accepts the nation as 
 
 the best and highest possible development. 
 
 i. "Nature has decreed that the struggle for survival shall 
 be in groups. The national group is the only one 
 suited to cope with conditions. In the war of race 
 against race, the nation has to foresee how and where 
 the struggle will be carried on." Karl Pearson: 
 National Life from the Standpoint of Science. 
 
 "The state is the realized ethical idea." Hegel: 
 Philosophy of Law. 
 
 "The state alone, so Schleiermacher once taught, gives 
 the individual the highest degree of life." Bern- 
 hardi, p. 25. 
 
NATIONALISM 3 
 
 "We must bring to the solution of every problem an 
 intense and fervid Americanism, that is, broadly 
 American and national, American in heart, soul, 
 spirit, and purpose, proud beyond measure of the 
 glorious privilege of bearing it." Roosevelt: True 
 Americanism: American Ideals and other Essays. 
 
 "Eliminate if you can, the competition between the 
 several nationalities. . . . The result may be that 
 European civilization will not survive, having lost 
 the righting energy, which heretofore has been in- 
 herent in its composition." Mahan: Armaments 
 and Arbitration, p. 10. 
 
 2. Federation impossible. 
 a. Theoretical objections. 
 
 1 ' To expand the idea of the State into that of hu- 
 manity, and thus to entrust apparently higher 
 duties to the individuals, leads to error, since in 
 a human race conceived as a whole, struggle, and 
 by implication the most essential vital principle, 
 would be ruled out. Any action in favor of collec- 
 tive humanity outside the limits of the State and 
 nationality is impossible. Such conceptions be- 
 long to the wide domain of Utopias." Bern- 
 hardi: Germany and the Next War, p. 25, note. 
 
 "There never have been, and never will be, universal 
 rights of men. Here and there particular relations 
 can be brought under definite international laws, 
 but the bulk of national life is absolutely outside 
 codification. Even were some such attempt made, 
 even if a comprehensive international code were 
 
 , drawn up, no self-respecting nation would sacrifice 
 its own conception of right to it. By so doing it 
 would renounce its highest ideals; it would allow 
 its own sense of justice to be violated by an in- 
 justice, and thus dishonor itself." Bernhardi: 
 Germany and the Next War, p. 32. 
 
 \ 
 
NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 "The work of the nation is not yet finished, and the 
 world-state is too remote a conception to influence 
 any but a few idealists, who have insufficiently 
 appreciated the intense exclusiveness of existing 
 groups. The world-state is hundreds and perhaps 
 thousands of years in the future." Geoffrey C. 
 Faber: War and the Personality of Nations, Fort- 
 nightly Review, March, 1915. 
 
 b. Practical objections urged against federation. 
 
 Racial differences are insuperable. Races could 
 not get along amicably, even if their national 
 existence was merged into a larger federation. 
 Differences in culture would merely be ac- 
 centuated by biological differences. 
 Federation requires some fundamental constitu- 
 tion. This could not be secured if a single 
 powerful state opposed it; for vacillating states, 
 allies or dependents of the opposing state, 
 would join in the opposition. 
 Even if such a constitution were devised and ac- 
 cepted it would not assure justice or greater 
 security, inasmuch as the failure of law to 
 secure justice would still be true; it might in- 
 deed be worse, in the event some clique or 
 machine secured control of the mechanism of 
 government. 
 D. The claims of the several states (nations). 
 
 i. Each regards itself, and its ideals, Kultur or civiliza- 
 tion, as superior. IJence foreigners came to be 
 called barbarians. /This accounts for the perennial 
 discussion of the respective merits of Shakespeare 
 and Goethe, of the respective places of German, 
 French, English and other scientists. It also ac- 
 counts for the claim current in several nations that 
 
NATIONALISM 5 
 
 its nationals invented the railway or telegraph or 
 what not. 
 
 "Insofar as an Englishman differs in essentials from a 
 Swede or Belgian, he believes that he represents a more 
 perfectly developed standard of general . excellence. 
 Yes, and even those nations nearest to us in mind and 
 sentiment German and Scandinavian we regard 
 on the whole as not so excellent as ourselves, compar- 
 ing their typical characteristics with ours." Memoir 
 of Herbert Harvey, by Earl Grey. Cited by Angell: 
 America and the New World-State, pp. 136-137. 
 
 "I contend that the British race is the finest which his- 
 tory has yet produced." Cecil Rhodes' Will En- 
 cyclopedia Britannica XXXII (loth ed.), p. 228. 
 
 2. Each nation believes it has a peculiarly important mis- 
 sion to perform. 
 
 "God has assigned to the German people a place in the 
 world and a role in history which demand continual 
 sacrifices. Our pride should make us bear them with 
 good heart." The German Chancellor: Speech, 
 February 15, 1915. 
 
 "To us [the British] has been given by our history a 
 work and a mission perhaps the loftiest ever as- 
 signed to a people." Wyatt, Nineteenth Century, 45, 
 p. 225. 
 
 "The Anglo-Saxon race is infallibly destined to be the 
 predominant force in the history and civilization of the 
 world." Chamberlain Cited by Harris: Interven- 
 tion and Colonization in Africa, p. 15. 
 
 "France, Punivers a besoin que tu vives! Je le redis, la 
 France est un besoin des hommes. " Victor Hugo 
 cited by Harris, Ibid., x p. 15. 
 
 In the United States men Jfcy.e been fond of speaking of 
 the "manifest destiny" of the nation. 
 
NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 "His [De Tocqueville's] prophecy that 'America will one 
 day become the first maritime power of the globe 
 they are born to rule seas, as the Romans were to con- 
 quer the world/ will doubtless be fulfilled in time." 
 Luce: North American Review, 153, p. 675. 
 
 "We must play a great part in the world, and especially 
 . . . perform those deeds of blood, of valour, which 
 above everything else bring national renown." Roose- 
 velt: The Strenuous Life. Cited by Angell: America 
 and the New World-State, p. 132. 
 
 3. Each nation claims its citizens show a superior bravery 
 
 and fighting quality. 
 
 In former times it was customary to designate these as 
 furor teutonicus,furiafran$aise, Spanish Fury, etc. 
 
 "The fire [on the Volturno] grew worse. . . . The cap- 
 tainj^iaved splendidly, and so did the officers, who 
 T^S^^nglish. I am sorry to say that the crew, who 
 
 * were Germans and Belgians, behaved very badly." 
 London Newspapers on the Volturno accident. 
 
 "The captain and the officers lost their heads. They 
 ran hither and thither and behaved very badly." - 
 German newspapers. 
 
 4. Each state believes that its aspirations and policies 
 
 are righteous; of course if any other state holds a 
 conflicting policy, it must be in the wrong (though 
 from its standpoint it is surely in the right). Once 
 national feeling gets behind the respective views, 
 each regards itself as absolutely right and its oppo- 
 nent as absolutely wrong. A nation can do no 
 wrong. 
 
 "Each nation evolves its own conception of right, each 
 has its particular ideals and aims, which spring with a 
 certain inevitableness from its character and historical 
 
NATIONALISM 7 
 
 life. These various views bear in themselves their 
 living justification, and may well be diametrically op- 
 posed to those of other nations, and none can say that 
 one nation has a better right than the other." Bern- 
 hardi: Germany and the Next War, p. 32. 
 
 5. Ear' i believes that its highest duty is to survive. 
 
 "The state is itself the highest conception in the wider 
 community of man, and therefore the duty of self- 
 annihilation does not enter into the case. The Chris- 
 tian duty of sacrifice for something higher does not 
 exist for the state, for there is nothing higher than it in 
 the world's history; consequently it cannot sacrifice it- 
 self to something higher." Treitschke, Politik i, 3. 
 Cited from Bernhardi: Germany and the Next War, 
 p. 46. 
 
 By "survival" is meant physical survival as a state, 
 for it is contended that national ideals depend on 
 the existence of the nation, and would disappear 
 without the protection of the latter. This is said 
 +r * '' disproven by the Jews. 
 
 "Nations cannot be created, nor can they become great, 
 by any purely ethical or spiritual expansion. The 
 establishment, in great or small entities, of tribes and 
 states is the resultant only of their physical power; and 
 whenever there is a reversal, or an attempted reversal 
 to this, the result is either internal dissolution or sud- 
 den destruction, their dismembered territories going 
 to make up the dominions of their conquerors." Lea: 
 The Day of the Saxon, pp. 10-11. Cited by Angell: 
 and the New World-State, p. 129. 
 
 6. In general each state is supposed to stand for some- 
 thing sui generis; to have a personality and qualities 
 
NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 peculiar to it and not attainable by other peoples; 
 and its ideals or Kultur are supposed to be in- 
 compatible with others and to lead to conflict. 
 
 REFERENCES 
 See Chapter III 
 
II 
 
 THE COROLLARIES OF NATIONALISM 
 
 I. Imperialism. A vigorous nation must expand. 
 
 A. Because, its ideals being superior, it would be immoral 
 
 not to bring them to other peoples; expansion is a 
 part of the national mission, it spreads civilization. 
 Hence, promises not to add territory in the future are 
 meaningless, if not unmoral. 
 
 "The imperialism of the American is a duty and credit to 
 humanity. He is the highest type of imperial master. 
 He makes beautiful the land he touches; beautiful with 
 moral and physical cleanliness. . . . There should be no 
 doubt that even with all possible moral refinement it is 
 the absolute right of a nation to live to its full intensity, 
 to expand, to found colonies, to get richer and richer by 
 any proper means such as armed conquest, commerce, 
 diplomacy. Such expansion as an aim is an inalienable 
 right and in the case of the United States it is a particular 
 duty, because we are idealists and are thereby bound by 
 establishing protectorates over the weak to protect them 
 from unmoral Kultur." Seven Seas Magazine (Organ 
 of the Navy League of the United States), Nov., 1915, 
 pp. 27-28. 
 
 B. Because a state cannot stand still. 
 
 "Strong, healthy, and flourishing nations increase in num- 
 bers. From a given moment they require a continual 
 expansion of their frontiers, they require new territory 
 for the accommodation of their surplus population." 
 Bernhardi: Germany and the Next War, p. 21. 
 9 
 
io NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 "But when the State renounces all extension of power, and 
 recoils from every war which is necessary for its expan- 
 sion; when 'at peace on sluggard's couch it lies' then its 
 citizens become stunted." Bernhardi: Germany and 
 the Next War, p. 26. 
 
 "Colonization is for France a question of life or death. 
 Either France will become a great African state, or she 
 will in a century or two be a second-rate power." 
 Leroy-Beaulieu. Cited by Harris: Africa, pp. 15-16. 
 
 C. Because after a war, even if not undertaken from am- 
 
 bition for territory, the victorious nation naturally 
 enlarges its boundaries. \ 
 
 D. Whether necessary or not, all strong nations have ex- 
 
 panded. 
 
 II. Each state is the rival of every other. Each is assumed to 
 
 be a unit competing with every other, hence, we per- 
 sonify the nation and speak of its trade, as though the 
 nation itself, instead of its individual citizens, were in 
 business. 
 
 III. Each state, being in competition for existence with every 
 
 other does what is in accordance with its interests. 
 
 The fundamental principle is that national necessity 
 
 is above law. 
 
 A. National necessity takes precedence of everything in- 
 ' ternational law, treaties, promises, humane considera- 
 tions, or ordinary conceptions of justice. 
 
 
 "Necessity knows no law. The injustice we thus com- 
 mit we will repair as soon as our military object has 
 been attained." - Bethmann-Hollweg: in Reichstag 
 (August, 1914) in explanation of the invasion of 
 Belgium. 
 
 "Nothing has ever been done by any other nation more 
 utterly in defiance of the conventionalities of so-called 
 international law [than the seizure of the Danish fleet 
 
THE COROLLARIES OF NATIONALISM n 
 
 by Great Britain in 1807]. We considered it advisable 
 and necessary and expedient, and we had the power to 
 do it; therefore we did it. Are we ashamed of it? No, 
 certainly not; we are proud of it." Major Murray: 
 Peace of the Anglo-Saxons, pp. 40-41. 
 
 B. Neutrals are expected to yield to it, for the rights of 
 
 belligerents, fighting for their existence, usually take 
 precedence and belligerents do not hesitate to in- 
 fringe the interests of neutrals as far as they can pru- 
 dently do so. 
 
 German submarine blockade and the United States. 
 
 The British long-distance blockade of Germany. 
 
 C. Citizens are expected, and required to approve of the 
 
 course adopted by the nation, and support it in every 
 way, no matter what they privately think. Patriot- 
 ism precedes conscience: "My country, right or 
 wrong." Conscription is employed to compel citizens 
 to aid the national cause. 
 
 D. God is declared to be on the side of the nation. This is 
 
 extending conscription to Heaven. 
 
 E. Diplomacy, being designed to advance the national 
 
 interest, uses what means achieve this end; and the 
 end justifies them. Hence diplomacy has often been 
 filled with intrigue and treachery. Secret treaties 
 and engagements have often emasculated public 
 treaties; and have at times committed peoples to 
 causes which they did not approve. Happily, 
 modern diplomacy has improved somewhat. In any 
 case diplomats cannot be actuated by the code of 
 individual morals. 
 
 $ Governments are corporations, and corporations have not 
 souls; governments, moreover, are trustees, not prin- 
 cipals, and as such must put first the lawful interests of 
 
12 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 their wards their own people. ..." Admiral Mahan: 
 The Interest of America in International Conditions. 
 
 IV. Force is the ultimate solvent of differences between 
 
 nations. 
 
 V. It behooves every state to develop its power for the inevi- 
 
 table conflict. 
 
 "I think, and have always thought, that the possession of 
 force, of power, to effect ends is a responsibility a 
 talent, to use the Christian expression which cannot 
 by the individual man or state be devolved upon another, 
 except when certain that the result cannot violate the 
 individual or the national conscience." Mahan: Arma- 
 ments and Arbitration, p. 30. 
 
 A . Means of doing this. 
 
 1. Developing the mental, material and moral solidity 
 
 of the people by sound education, by aiding material 
 progress, and by cultivating loyalty to the nation. 
 
 2. Arming. Preparedness to assert one's rights in any 
 
 difference that may arise is held to make differences 
 less likely to rise, and hence is considered a guaran- 
 tor of peace. This system is known as the "armed 
 peace." It was on this theory that the Kaiser was \ 
 urged as a proper candidate for the Nobel Peace . 
 
 Prize. 
 
 i 
 
 a. "Preparedness is the best insurance against war."- 
 Major- General Wood. 
 
 "Our surest guarantee would therefore be a well-trained 
 Army, numerically sufficient to ensure respect, stand- 
 ing behind the overwhelming Navy we may be con- 
 sidered at present to possess." Maude: War and 
 the World's Life, p. 200. 
 
 "How many people in the British Isles realize that 
 Germany and France owe their security from inva- 
 
THE COROLLARIES OF NATIONALISM 13 
 
 sion to the latent threat of their enormous Armies, or 
 that they keep them up to fullest fighting power 
 because they know that the Nation who fails in this 
 respect will inevitably go under?" Maude: War 
 and the World's Life, p. 201. 
 
 b. These expressions can be duplicated in any 
 
 country. 
 
 Preparedness is compared to insurance, fire 
 equipment, quarantine, ^vaccination or inocula- 
 tion, window screens. Certain organizations 
 have undertaken to keep their respective na- 
 tions alive to the need of preparedness; among 
 ^^Jjiem the following: 
 
 Great Britain: Navy League; Army League; Na- 
 tional Service League (favors compulsory ser- 
 vice). 
 
 New Zealand: National Defense League. 
 
 United States: Navy League; Army League; Na- 
 tional Security League; American Defense 
 ic; American Defense Society; Pacific Coast 
 Defense League; National Defense League; 
 Special Relief Society. 
 
 Germany: Wehrverein; Flottenverein; Frauenflot- 
 tenverein; Schiilerflottenverein; Freie Vereini- 
 gung fur Flottenvortrage; "German Defense 
 Alliance." 
 
 France: Ligue Maritime; Ligue pour la service de 
 trois ans. 
 
 Japan: Kokubogikai (National Defense League). 
 
 Mexico: Sociedad promo vedoro de la defensa na- 
 cional. 
 
 c. It is urged that to secure adequate preparedness, the 
 
 advice of experts (meaning usually men in the 
 army and navy) should be followed. 
 
14 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 B. The uses of power. 
 
 1. The use of martial or armed force has by some been 
 
 classified under two heads. 
 
 Aggressive force, to be used for expansion. This is 
 said by foreigners to be the purpose of the armed 
 forces of Germany. 
 
 Defensive force, used only to discourage attack or to 
 compel recognition of rights. It is stated that 
 Great Britain, France and the United States, 
 among others, have military establishments for de- 
 fensive purposes. 
 
 2. There must be no hesitation in using force when con- 
 
 ditions demand it. 
 
 " ~x he lessons of history confirm the view that wars which 
 have been deliberately provoked by far-seeing states- 
 men have had the happiest results." Bernhardi: 
 Germany and the Next War, p. 45. 
 
 "The statesman who, knowing his instrument to be ready, 
 and seeing war inevitable, hesitates to strike first is 
 guilty of a crime against his country." Clause witz: 
 On War, I, vii. 
 
 3. The "utmost use of power ". When once force is em- 
 
 ployed, it must be used unsparingly and in every 
 way that will secure the desired end. Anything 
 less is a source of weakness. This principle is at 
 the bottom of " frightf ulness " or "thoroughness". 
 Clausewitz: I, 5-6. Col. Maude subscribes t 
 Clausewitz. 
 
 C. Some contend that nations which claim to be armed for 
 
 defense only, do so because they have already, by 
 aggression, acquired what they want, and now urge 
 the abolition of aggression and of armaments and 
 propose arbitration and peace programs as a means 
 
THE COROLLARIES OF NATIONALISM 15 
 
 of avoiding competition with more vigorous nations. 
 "National stand-pattism." 
 
 "Pacific ideals, to be sure, are seldom the real motive of 
 their action. They usually employ the need of peace 
 as a cloak under which to promote their own political 
 aims. This was the real position of affairs at the Hague 
 Congresses, and this is also the meaning of the actions 
 of the United States of America, who in recent times have 
 earnestly tried to conclude treaties for the establishment 
 of Arbitration Courts, first and foremost with England, 
 but also with Japan, France, and Germany." Bern- 
 hardi: Germany and the Next War, p. 17. 
 
 ,*' Great Britain had all the territory she needed; her obvious 
 idea was peace in which she and her Daughter Nations 
 should have leisure to develop the resources of the vast 
 territories they already possessed." Lord Roberts: 
 Hibbert Journal, Oct., 1914, p. 9. 
 
 The balance of power. Instead of relying on their own 
 strength to balance that of individual rivals, nations 
 may enter into combinations with friendly nations. 
 The threatened nation naturally does likewise to secure 
 an equipoise. Peace depends on an equilibrium. This 
 is the balance of power. Any gain by one nation dis- 
 turbs the equilibrium and causes other nations to de- 
 mand gains in turn. The instability of the combina- 
 tions makes the instability of the system quite obvious. 
 
 REFERENCES 
 See Chapter III 
 
m 
 
 THE CASE FOR NATIONALISM AND THE WAR SYSTEM 
 
 I War, and hence the need of being prepared for it, is in- 
 evitable. 
 
 A. War is a divine institution. It follows, of course, that 
 
 war is beneficial and desirable. 
 
 " Der Krieg ist ein Glied der gottlichen Weltordnung." 
 Moltke. 
 
 " Unless, as I believe, war is the divinely appointed means 
 by which the environment may be readjusted until eth- 
 ically 'fittest' and 'best' become synonymous, the outlook 
 for the human race is too pitiable for words." Maude: 
 War and the World's Life, p. 18. 
 
 That war is not contrary to the divine will is maintained 
 by many writers among them: Rear- Admiral Fiske: 
 North American Review, Oct., 1915, p. 525; Maxim: 
 Defenseless America, pp. 46-55; Speer: Jesus and 
 War (Pamphlet 35, of the Navy League of the United 
 States). 
 
 B. History confirms it. There have always been wars, 
 
 hence, judging the future by the past, there always 
 
 will be wars. 
 
 History is one series of wars. 
 
 3357 years: from 1496 B. C. to 1861 A. D. 
 
 3130 years of war in that time. 
 
 227 years of peace. 
 
 s^3 years of war to one of peace. Bloch: Future of 
 War, LXV. 
 
 16 
 
NATIONALISM AND THE WAR SYSTEM 17 
 
 C. Human nature, which is unchangeable, is so constituted 
 that it makes war inevitable. . 
 
 1. In the case of individuals. 
 
 a. Differences between individuals are inevitable. 
 
 b. The individual has a fighting instinct; he considers 
 
 fighting for his opinion manly and honorable, and 
 despises one who will not fight as a craven or 
 coward. War is action, and appeals to the 
 natural instinct which likes to do things; peace is 
 inaction. Virile men enjoy a fight and instinc- 
 tively recognize courage. "Spoiling for a fight." 
 
 c. This tendency to fight is aggravated by the love of 
 
 adveHfrure, the desire for change and the struggle 
 for/existence. The pressure of hunger, economic 
 :essity, makes man a fighter: avarice, cupidity, 
 and like tendencies lead men to attack one 
 another. 
 
 Man is impulsive and often goes into strife regard- 
 less of expediency or consequence. 
 e. Even if he is not impulsive, but deliberate, he will 
 have convictions that he considers worth fighting 
 for regardless of cost. 
 
 2. In the case of nations. Nations, being groups of 
 
 individuals, show the same characteristics as in- 
 dividuals, and often in a more marked degree. 
 
 a. Differences between nations are inevitable. 
 Universal peace presupposes the same standard of 
 
 civilization for all nations; and homogeneity 
 within the nations. As long as there are "in- 
 ferior" peoples, superior peoples will take advan- 
 tage of them. 
 
 b. Each nation has its pride, its fighting instinct, and 
 
 national honor, and these impel it to fight rather 
 than to submit. 
 
i8 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 "When a state sees its downfall staring it in the face, 
 we applaud if it succumbs sword in hand. A sacri- 
 fice made to an alien nation not only is immoral, but 
 contradicts the idea of self-preservation, which is the 
 highest ideal of a state." Treitschke. Cited by 
 Bernhardi: Germany and the Next War, p. 46. 
 
 "It must be remembered that even to be defeated in 
 war may be better than not to have fought at all." 
 Roosevelt: Message to Congress, Dec., 1906. 
 
 c. The commercial rivalry of nations is economic 
 
 competition which drives nations into strife. 
 Cupidity leads one nation to attack another. 
 
 " There is no one lesson which history teaches us more 
 plainly than that the possession of wealth by a de- 
 fenseless nation is a standing casus belli to other 
 nations, and that always there has been the nation 
 standing ready to attack and plunder any other 
 nation when there was likely to be sufficient profit in 
 the enterprise to pay for the trouble." Maxim: 
 Defenseless America, p. 12. 
 
 d. Nations, even more than individuals, are impulsive; 
 
 and when wrought up will go into war regardless 
 of every cost or consequence. Crowds and masses 
 never act coolly. 
 
 e. Even when perfectly calm, nations will have ideals 
 
 or aspirations of the justice of which they are 
 convinced and for which they will fight no mat- 
 ter what the cost. 
 
 i 
 
 "It must ever be kept in mind, that war is not merely 
 justifiable, but imperative, upon honorable men and 
 upon an honorable nation when peace is only to be 
 obtained by the sacrifice of conscientious conviction 
 or of national welfare. A just war is in the long-run 
 
NATIONALISM AND THE WAR SYSTEM 19 
 
 far better for a nation's soul than the most pros- 
 perous peace obtained by an acquiescence in wrong 
 or injustice." Roosevelt: Message to Congress, 
 Dec. 4, 1906. 
 
 /. Certain differences between nations can be settled 
 only by the use of force: such as those which 
 touch its honor, freedom from oppression, slavery, 
 states rights and any conflicting ideals or aspira- 
 tions. Force alone determines which conception 
 shall prevail, and in this way is the only practical 
 way of discovering which is right. Might makes 
 right. 
 
 "War was the only means of solving the great political 
 problem of the abolition of slavery." Luce: North 
 American Review, 153, p. 676. 
 
 "Between states the only check on injustice is force." 
 Bernhardi: Germany and the Next War, p. 20. 
 
 II. War exerts a wholesome moral influence. 
 
 A. This follows a priori from the premise that war is 
 
 divinely ordained. 
 
 B. It develops numerous virtues and good qualities, such 
 
 as patriotism, sacrifice of self for the common good, 
 efficiency, inventiveness, a sense of equality between 
 social classes, economy and frugality, courage, dis- 
 cipline. 
 
 1. Military training in time of peace is beneficial as it 
 
 develops patriotism, a sense of service to the nation 
 and equality among men with the colors, educates 
 the recruit through free travel and in other ways, 
 and gives him employment, physical and moral 
 discipline, at the time he most needs them. 
 
 2. Only in powerful states can individual capacities 
 
 reach their fullest development. 
 
20 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 3. War stimulates art and literature and deepens re- 
 ligious feeling. 
 
 C. It preserves physical virility with its corresponding 
 
 devotion and labor for national culture and ideals. 
 Rivalry of nations keeps them keen and alert. 
 
 "Wars are terrible, but necessary, for they save the 
 State from social putrefaction and stagnation." Kuno 
 Fischer: Hegel, I, p. 737. Cited by Bernhardi: Germany 
 and the Next War, p. 27. 
 
 "Yet unless human nature shall have been radically modi- 
 fied in the course of evolution, unless it shall have at- 
 tained a moral strength and stature unknown at present, 
 it appears certain that the attainment of this much de- 
 sired universal peace will be as the signal for the beginning 
 of universal decay." Wyatt: Nineteenth Century, 45, 
 P- 225. 
 
 "All the pure and noble arts of peace are founded on 
 war. . . . There is no great art possible to a nation, 
 but that which is based on battle. ... All great nations 
 learned their truth of word and strength of thought in 
 war; they were nourished in war and wasted by peace; 
 taught by war and deceived by peace; trained by war 
 and betrayed by peace." Ruskin: "War" in The Crown 
 of Wild Olive. 
 
 D. It helps progress by deciding differences. 
 
 "If at any given period in the past, war could have been 
 abolished, social evolution must have been arrested, 
 because the only practicable means of effecting change 
 and movement among nations and states would have 
 been removed." Wyatt: Nineteenth Century, 45, p. 218. 
 
 m. War performs the biological function of selecting the 
 nation with its ideals which is best fitted to survive. 
 Social Darwinism. (Huxley has noted that the best 
 morally is not necessarily the best fitted for survival 
 
NATIONALISM AND THE WAR SYSTEM 21 
 
 in the biological sense.) War is a necessary part of 
 the law of struggle; hence military efficiency is an 
 expression of national efficiency. 
 
 "War is a biological necessity of the first importance, a 
 regulative element in the life of mankind which can not 
 be dispensed with, since without it an unhealthy develop- 
 ment will follow, which excludes every advancement of 
 the race, and therefore all real civilization." Bernhardi: 
 Germany and the Next War, p. 18, footnote. 
 
 The struggle for survival among nations "is not, fortunately 
 for humanity, decided by peaceful competition alone, but 
 ultimately by . . . war." Maude: War and the World's 
 Life, p. 243. 
 
 "The hope of banishing war is not only meaningless but 
 immoral. Its disappearance would turn the earth into 
 a great temple of selfishness. Our age is an iron age. If 
 the strong vanquish the weak, it is the law of life." 
 Treitschke. 
 
 A. Some advance the argument that war is necessary to 
 
 prevent over-population. 
 
 B. To the claim that war is injurious to the race (see Chap- 
 
 ter X) it is replied that Nature cares for the species, 
 and but little for the individual ; and that the biologi- 
 cal harm, if there is any, is more than offset by the 
 rejuvenation of a people through the fact that all 
 non-essentials are sloughed off and men get down to 
 solid living. 
 
 It is also urged that the loss of life should not be ad- 
 vanced as a condemnation of war any more than 
 against orcfinary economic conditions on railroads and 
 in factories which exact a great annual toll of life. 
 Stockton: Peace Insurance, 95-97. 
 
 IV. War is of an economic advantage to the victor; (and in- 
 directly it redounds to the benefit of progress that a 
 
22 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 nation with strength and initiative blazes the way, for 
 all others are forced to imitate or drop out of the race). 
 
 A. The victor profits at the expense of the vanquished: 
 By annexing territory. 
 
 By exacting an indemnity. 
 
 By levying tribute in the form of tolls, or taxes on the 
 
 trade of the vanquished. 
 By crushing the competition of a rival nation; (which 
 
 implies that the prosperity of one nation is a menace 
 
 to others). 
 
 B. Political domination gives trade advantage; "trade 
 
 follows the flag." 
 
 "The teaching of all history is that commerce grows under 
 the shadow of armed strength." Rifleman: The Strug- 
 gle for Bread. Cited by Angell: America and the New 
 World-State, p. 128. 
 
 "Bethmann-Hollweg had the courage and the common 
 sense to lay it down as a maxim that . . . the armed 
 forces of any nation or empire must have a distinct rela- 
 tion to the material resources of that nation or empire. 
 This position seems to me as statesmanlike as it is un- 
 answerable." Lord Roberts: Message to the Nation. 
 Cited by Angell: America and the New World-State, 
 p. 125. 
 
 "The Navy and Army, therefore, are the foundations of 
 commercial credit, and, as every engineer knows, it pays 
 to put good work, and enough of it, into underground 
 work." Maude: War and the World's Life, p. 80. 
 
 V. The war system has certain obvious economic advantages. 
 
 A. It gives employment to great numbers in supplying 
 
 military and naval units with equipment of all sorts. 
 To abolish war or the military system would mean 
 economic disaster. Maude, pp. 78 f. 
 
 B. Trades are taught in the army, and army discipline 
 
NATIONALISM AND THE WAR SYSTEM 23 
 
 is wholesome training for the economic life of the 
 man leaving the service. He may even save some- 
 thing if he wishes, with which to get a start after 
 leaving the army. 
 VI. Armies are very useful to society in times of peace. 
 
 A. They perform police duty: San Francisco Fire; Earth- 
 
 quake in Italy; Strike in Colorado; etc. 
 
 B. Service in sanitary work: Panama and the Philip- 
 
 pines. 
 
 C. They advance all kinds of scientific work: researches 
 
 in tropical anemia and hookworm diseases in Porto 
 Rico; yellow fever in Cuba; typhoid inoculation. 
 
 REFERENCES 
 
 NATIONALISM 
 
 Stein, Ludwig: Wei tbiirger turn, Nationalstaat und internationale 
 Verstandigung. 1913. Sonderabdruck aus Nord und Sud. 
 
 Lieber, F.: Fragments of Political Science on Nationalism and 
 Internationalism. New York, 1868. 
 
 Chamberlain, Houston Stuart: The Foundations of the Nineteenth 
 Century. 1911. 
 
 Stephens: Nationality and History. American Historical Review, 
 January, 1916. 
 
 Fichte: Reden an die deutsche Nation (Reclam). 1872. 
 
 Toynbee, Arnold J.: Nationality and the War. New York, 1915. 
 
 Dewe, J. A. : Psychology of Politics and History. 1910. [On na- 
 tional progress and decadence.] 
 
 Guy-Grand, G.: La philosophic nationaliste. Paris, 1911. 
 
 Finot, Jean: Race Prejudice. 1906. 
 
 THE CASE FOR THE WAR SYSTEM 
 
 Carton Foundation: The Case for War. As stated by its Apol- 
 ogists. 
 
 Wyatt: War as a Test of National Value. Nineteenth Century, 45, 
 216 f. 
 
24 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 Wyatt: The Ethics of Empire. Nineteenth Century, 45, 516-530. 
 
 Luce: Benefits of War. North American Review, 153, 672 f. 
 
 Maude: War and the World's Life. 1907. 
 
 Mahan: The Place of Force in International Relations. North 
 American Review, January, 1912. 
 
 Mahan: Armaments and Arbitration (Harpers). 1912. 
 
 Mahan: "The Great Illusion." North American Review, March, 
 1912. 
 
 Mahan: Some Neglected Aspects of War. Boston, 1907. 
 
 Mahan: The Influence of Sea-Power upon History. 1890. 
 
 Lea, Homer: The Valour of Ignorance. 1909. 
 
 Wilkinson, Henry Spencer: War and Policy. New York, 1900. 
 
 ' ' A Rifleman : " S truggle f or B read (Lane) . 1913. 
 
 Ruskin: Crown of Wild Olive, "War." 1889. 
 
 Murray, Stewart L.: Peace of the Anglo-Saxons. 1905. 
 
 Maxim: Defenseless America. 1915. 
 
 Stockton: Peace Insurance (McClurg). 1915. 
 
 Cramb, J. A.: Germany and England. New York, 1914. 
 
 Cramb, J. A. : Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain and Nine- 
 teenth Century Europe. 1915. 
 
 Johnston, R. M.: Arms and the Race. 1915. 
 
 Bernhardi: Germany and the Next War. Translation by A. H. 
 Powles, American Edition (Longmans). 1914. 
 
 Jahns, Max: Uber Krieg, Frieden und Kultur. Berlin, 1893. 
 
 Lamprecht, Karl: Krieg und Kultur. Leipzig, 1914. 
 
 Kattenbusch, Ferdinand: Das sittliche Recht des Krieges. 1906. 
 
 Lasson, Adolf: Das Kulturideal und der Krieg. 1868. 
 
 Stengel, Karl von: Weltstaat und Friedensproblem. Berlin, 1009. 
 
 Steinmetz, S. Rudolf: Die Philosophic des Krieges. Leipzig, 1907. 
 
 Clausewitz: On War. Third edition, translated by Graham, 1873. 
 
 Treitschke: Politik. 1899-1900. 
 
 Wagner: Der Krieg als schaffendes Welt-prinzip. 
 
 Molinari: Grandeur et decadence de la guerre. 1898. Moltke on 
 War, pp. 240-258. 
 
 von der Goltz: The Nation in Arms. London, 1906. 
 
 Rohrbach, P.: German World Policies. 1915. 
 
 Rohrbach, P.: Germany's Isolation. 1915. 
 
NATIONALISM AND THE WAR SYSTEM 25 
 
 Dewey, John: German Philosophy and Politics. 1915. 
 Brunetiere: Le mensonge du pacificisme. Revue de Deux Mondes, 
 
 July, 1905. 
 Fiske: The Mastery of the World. North American Review, 
 
 October, 1915. 
 
 Novicow: War and its Alleged Benefits. 1911. 
 Excubitor: The Blessings of Naval Armaments. Fortnightly 
 
 Review, 85, 88-96. 
 
 The Intellectual Charm of War. Spectator, 58, 542. 
 Whewell: Elements of Morality. 1864. "The Rights of Man." 
 Green: Lectures on Principles of Political Organization (Long- 
 
 man's). 1895. 
 Palmer: Insurance of Peace. Scribner's, 51, 186. 
 
 GENERAL 
 
 Angell: America and the New World-State (Putnam). 1915. 
 
 Hobson, J. A.: Imperialism. 1905. 
 
 Brailsford: The War of Steel and Gold. 1915. 
 
 Stratton : Announcement of Lectures upon The Psychology of the 
 
 War Spirit. University of California, 1915. [Contains bibliog- 
 
 raphy.] 
 
 Nippold, Otfried: Der deutsche Chauvinismus. 1913. 
 Fried, A. H.: Handbuch der Friedensbewegung. Leipzig, 1911, 
 
 Wallas, Graham: The Great Society. 
 
IV 
 
 THE FAULTS OF NATIONALISM AND THE WAR SYSTEM 
 
 I. At the bottom of the current theories of the relations of 
 
 nations there lie a number of premises which are 
 regarded as axioms, when they really are not. This 
 is not strange as it is quite natural for men to formu- 
 late working principles which, though they become an- 
 tiquated, are considered as authoritative long after 
 the conditions which produced them have changed. 
 Thus there are always current a set of phrases and 
 maxims which are ordinarily accepted without reflection 
 or thought. These are considered irrational by the 
 opponents of war. 
 
 II. Irrational phrases and maxims, sentiments uttered and 
 
 accepted without thought; often their meaning is 
 vague or is anything that one wishes to make it. They 
 all appeal to sentiment or passion instead of intellect; 
 all are difficult to define. 
 
 National honor, national destiny, the field of honor, 
 heroism, glory, duty, liberty, self-sacrifice, courage, 
 victory, invincibility, glorious traditions of the na- 
 tion, inevitability of war, human nature does not 
 change, maintaining the balance of power, worthy of 
 our ancestors, manifest destiny, blood is thicker than 
 water, survival of the fittest, struggle for existence 
 (Kampf urns Daseiti), a place in the sun, war is the 
 basis of all things (TroXe/io? Tranjp Trdvro&v), in the 
 time of peace prepare for war (si vis pacem, para 
 helium), white man's burden, yellow peril, black peril. 
 
 Many terms applied to pacifists are of this class: molly- 
 26 
 
NATIONALISM AND THE WAR SYSTEM 27 
 
 coddles, weaklings, poltroons, degeneracy of peace, 
 Chinafy, peace-at-any-price, Narren des ewigen Frie- 
 dens, dubs of peace. 
 
 HI. Fallacious assumptions. Many of the premises which 
 underlie the present national and martial system and 
 are ordinarily taken for granted have of late been ques- 
 tioned or denied. These are here assembled with 
 the reasons that are advanced in their support. In 
 some cases the premises are no more than personal 
 convictions, and in such instances the contrary view 
 may, and with equal foundation, be posited as 
 a mere personal opinion. The proposition is stated, 
 and followed by the counter proposition. 
 
 A . A nation (state) represents a natural or sort of final entity. 
 
 For a full discussion of this see Chapter XVI, sec- 
 tion II. 
 
 B. Nationalism is the highest possible step in progress. 
 
 International cooperation is not only_possible but, as 
 analogous experience in history shows, aTsQ bene- 
 jjgjal. Indeed it i\ " pessary. i f tWp JQ tr> HP ar^ 
 end of war^ (See Chapters XV and XVI.) 
 
 Nationalism no longer corresponds to the actual 
 facts' 61 life: economicajly_and culturally men, are 
 world-citizens; only politically are they national, 
 because juridicalideas have fallen behind thTfacts. 
 Nationalism is so general because it has been em- 
 phasized in the teaching of history; for this is 
 devoted almost exclusively to political affairs, 
 which are chiefly national, and hence is oblivious 
 of the great international tendencies in all other 
 fields. 
 
 C. The Kultur of each nation is peculiar to it and the conflict 
 
 between national ideas is irrepressible. 
 
 Ideas or characteristics, even though at any given 
 
28 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 stage more advanced in one nation than in another, 
 are not peculiar to the first in the sense that others 
 have not the capacity to grasp and apply them. 
 Germans understand Shakespeare; the English 
 and French have appropriated and applied various 
 things from Germany; Japan imported western 
 
 . civilization. 
 
 Though the Kultur of another nation may be adopted 
 voluntarily, it cannot be imposed by force. 
 
 National cultures are regarded as rivals, not because 
 they are, but because the backward political in- 
 stitutions, noted above, nurture and exaggerate 
 cultural differences for national purposes. This 
 is at its worst during war, when each government 
 paints its foes as black as possible in order to secure 
 a degree of rivalry that would otherwise not exist. 
 
 Nations which insist on the sacredness of national 
 cultures, do not hesitate to suppress other nationali- 
 ties. In short, the present system, though pre- 
 tending to, does not preserve nationalities. Ger- 
 many: Alsatians, Poles; England: Irish, Persians, 
 etc.; Russia: Finns, Poles, Persians, etc.; Austria: 
 Serbs, Czechs, etc. 
 i^ D. The lives of individuals and of nations are analogous, and 
 
 both are subject to the evolutionary law of competition, 
 {which when applied to nations is called "social Dar- 
 j& winism." - Lea: Valour of Ignorance, pp. 8 f. 
 
 The biological laws governing the struggle for exist- 
 ence do not apply to individual human beings hi 
 the same way as to lower beings; the latter com- 
 pete with each other for what sustenance nature 
 has provided; human beings, instead of fighting 
 each other for what nature has bestowed, by sub- 
 stituting labor for fighting can increase the supply 
 
NATIONALISM AND THE WAR SYSTEM 29 
 
 of sustenance and doing so is the essence of 
 civilization. Popper-Lynkeus estimates that an 
 efficient cooperative organization of society would 
 enable each person to earn a livelihood for life in 
 an average of seven years, working five hours per 
 day; and that the present resources of earth could 
 with proper distribution support from four to six 
 times the present population. 
 
 Social Darwinism entirely overlooks mutual aid as 
 a factor in evolution. 
 
 The laws of evolution apply to individuals, not to 
 groups. 
 
 Nations consist of individuals. These die and are 
 constantly replaced by others, but the complexion 
 of society remains much the same. A nation is 
 like a corporation or fraternity whose membership, 
 though ever changing, may constantly be of the 
 same kind. As long as the individuals composing 
 a fraternity or a nation are sound and strong 
 the organization will be strong and it need never 
 reach old age. 
 E. War, or the possibility of it, maintains national virility 
 
 and courage; in other words, peace breeds cowardice and 
 
 degeneracy. 
 
 Martial nations have not endured; it is alleged that 
 they declined precisely because war drained their 
 best blood (Jordan, see Chapter X), and because 
 of the degeneracy which follows the exploitation of 
 the vanquished by the victor. 
 
 Is courage a trait of human nature that is inherited 
 in its full form? If so, how does war increase it? If 
 it grows by use, then may there be "experts" in 
 courage? Do such experts transmit their greater 
 courage to posterity? Whatever be the answers 
 
30 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 to the preceding they apply also to the vices which 
 get their chance in war: brutality, lust, hatred, 
 cowardice, subjection of law to force, and of jus- 
 tice to victory. 
 
 Not war, but labor, industry, and thrift, which make 
 for solidity of individuals, maintain national viril- 
 ity. Illustration: the Swiss mountaineers; the 
 Hebrew people; the Puritans. Only as war neces- 
 sitates labor and effort does it make for virility. 
 Honest labor, compelled by other forces than war, 
 is just as effective to that end, without the accom- 
 panying evils of war. Hence the advisability of 
 nations developing moral or other equivalents for 
 war. (James: Moral Equivalent of War.) The 
 heroes of peace: Miss Davis, who took gangrene 
 anti- toxin to test it; Salvation Army workers. 
 Addams: Newer Ideals of Peace. 
 
 The birth-rate, not the size of the army, is the true 
 indicator of a nation's virility. Graham: War 
 and Evolution. 
 
 F. "My nation is superior to every other" National 
 
 pride. 
 
 This is impracticable, as it means that each nation 
 considers itself superior to every other. 
 
 It is also untrue, because no nation excels in every 
 particular and it is arbitrary to assert that its par- 
 ticular excellence is superior to the chief quality of 
 another nation. 
 
 G. "My nation is right in all disputes" 
 
 This is contrary to reason, for both nations to a 
 quarrel cannot be right. 
 
 It is likewise contrary to fact: Germany did wrong in 
 invading Belgium, England in attacking Denmark 
 (1807) or hi forcing opium on China. 
 
NATIONALISM AND THE WAR SYSTEM 31 
 
 Finally it ignores personal conscience and universal 
 
 morality, that are common to all men. 
 E. Might makes right. Force or war is the final means of 
 determining which of two conflicting views shall prevail, 
 and hence, is right. 
 That Poland succumbed to might does not make it 
 
 morally right. 
 
 Superior might or force is sometimes a matter of acci- 
 dent, of incompetent generalship, of miscarried or 
 delayed orders, of unseasonable rain, of treachery or 
 personal rivalry in high command, etc., etc. "God 
 is on the side of the strongest battalions." "The 
 fate of nations often hangs on five minutes." - Na- 
 poleon. (See also Clausewitz, On War, I, p. 10; and 
 Bernhardi, p. 53.) 
 
 Force never settles anything vital, and other things 
 can be settled without resort to force. "Truth 
 crushed to earth will rise again." Force cannot 
 triumph over faith, conscience, reason; e. g., the 
 Christian martyrs, the forerunners of the Reforma- 
 tion, the fathers of democracy. Force at best merely 
 hastens what men are already disposed to consent to. 
 Thus the South would voluntarily have abolished 
 slavery in tune, just as in England this great reform 
 came without war. Johnston: Arms and the Race, 
 p. 156. 
 /. Armaments secure peace. " The best insurance of peace is 
 
 to be prepared for war." 
 
 Armaments do not preserve peace as Europe shows. 
 When war breaks out armaments afford protection; but 
 they cannot prevent war or secure peace, because they 
 are themselves a part of the rivalry of nations; and it 
 is folly to think that, even if all nations could at some 
 time be so prepared as to deter others from attack, 
 
32 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 they would forever remain so. A simple change hi 
 alliances, and the whole of the armed peace loses its 
 effect. The balance of power is unstable. 
 
 If, as is claimed (Maxim: Defenseless America, pp. 96 f.) 
 preparedness makes wars less bloody and that there- 
 fore " the quick-firing gun is the most beneficent im- 
 plement of mercy ever invented" then preparedness 
 would seem to be less of a deterrent from war than un- 
 preparedness. 
 
 J. Those who seek to eliminate the use offeree place individ- 
 uals and society at the mercy of the wicked. 
 
 Opponents of war do not wish to eliminate all force; but 
 only that one kind of force known as war. Conse- 
 quently if war were extirpated, there would remain 
 the police force, which is the basis of our security; all 
 other forms of competition would also remain. 
 K. Human nature does not change and as long as men con- 
 tinue men they will make war. 
 
 Human nature does change, even though slowly. To- 
 day not only does no one burn witches, but no one 
 wants to. 
 
 It is no justification for an act that human nature 
 prompted it. The control of human nature measures 
 the civilization of man. 
 
 Even if human nature had not changed, the demands of 
 society on human nature have greatly changed; and 
 where these modern demands are enforced, as within 
 nations, there we are said to have civilization. 
 
 Courage is a part of human nature; why should mili- 
 tarists fear that courage will decline through peace, 
 unless human nature is changeable? 
 
 The present manifestations of human nature are in 
 some degree the result of education of children, for 
 human nature is not solely hereditary, but is infill- 
 
NATIONALISM AND THE WAR SYSTEM 33 
 
 enced by environment: war toys, exhibition drills, 
 military bands, attractive uniforms, etc. 
 
 Reason is a part of human nature. Its influence grows 
 greater with increasing knowledge. If men believe 
 that war does not pay and that there is a better 
 way of settlement reason will not be ineffectual. 
 
 Folly is also a part of human nature. When it asserts 
 itself war is not unlikely. Obviously this phase of 
 human nature should be combatted and not urged 
 in extenuation of its manifestations. Certainly 
 doctrines or influences which deliberately lead men 
 to act foolishly or impetuously should be op- 
 posed. 
 
 L. War is inevitable unless human nature is changed; until 
 men become angels there will be war. 
 
 Peace also is inevitable. 
 
 Death is inevitable if one swallows poison, but swallow- 
 ing poison may be avoided. Similarly war results 
 not from human nature, but from the conditions 
 unde7~which liuman nature is compelled to work, 
 that is, in rival nationaf groups which are arbitrary 
 and not inevitable. If, then, the conception of rival 
 nations is replaced by a conception of friendly co- 
 operating nations, peace will come without one iota 
 of change in the human or moral nature of men. Il- 
 lustration: the creation of the United States out 
 of thirteen rival states, and the unification of the 
 hostile states of Germany brought peace within the 
 new units, without necessitating a moral improve- 
 ment of citizens. All that happened was putting the 
 existing human nature under conditions that favored 
 peace instead of war. The average man does not 
 want war, and never did, as appears from folksongs 
 which always bemoan wars and express a longing for 
 
34 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 peace. Hence the difficulty of human nature as an 
 obstacle to peace is exaggerated. 
 
 M. War is divine institution. 
 
 Does this mean that God by a special act of will sends 
 war, or that war is a natural factor in human strife 
 and is divine in the sense that God permits it? Many 
 repudiate the former interpretation. The latter 
 carries with it the vital conception, that war is man- 
 made, and hence can also be abolished by man. 
 The dilemma of those who try to justify war as a divine 
 institution and who at the same time must, as civil- 
 ized human beings, deplore it, is illustrated by the 
 
 ^ following quotations from the same article: 
 
 \ "The truth is that war is an ordinance of God." Rear- 
 Admiral Luce: The Benefits of War, North American Re- 
 view, 153, p. 683. 
 
 "War is certainly a great evil, and abhorrent to every 
 right-minded person." Ibid., p. 680. 
 
 N. The present war discredits the opponents of war. 
 
 The Great War discredits the present national system 
 which produced it, and justifies those who have 
 sought to change this system to one that shall tend to 
 prevent rather than produce war. 
 
 O. Military force is necessary to secure reforms, freedom or 
 relief from oppression, e. g., the American Revolution, 
 Wars of Liberation waged against Napoleon, etc. 
 The right of revolution cannot be denied. If it was 
 ever true that salutary reforms had to be secured by 
 force of arms, it is less the case to-day, when demo- 
 cratic institutions, particularly free elections, furnish 
 a means of ascertaining popular desire, and self- 
 government gives the means of putting the desire into 
 execution. Every extension and improvement of 
 democracy diminishes the necessity of war. 
 
NATIONALISM AND THE WAR SYSTEM 35 
 
 P. Victorious nations profit at the expense of the vanquished, 
 This is what Angell has called the " Great Illusion." It 
 is treated separately in the next section. 
 
 REFERENCES 
 
 Angell: Great Illusion. 1913. 
 
 Angell: America and the New World-State. 1915. 
 
 Angell : The World's Highway. 1915. 
 
 Hirst: The Arbiter in Council. 1906. 
 
 Fried: Handbuch der Friedensbewegung. 1911, 1913. 
 
 Novicow, J.: Die Gerechtigkeit und die Entfaltung des Lebens. 
 
 Berlin, 1907. 
 
 Novicow, J.: La critique du darwinisme social. Paris, 1910. 
 Novicow, J.: La moral et 1'mteret dans les rapports individuels 
 
 et internationaux. Paris, 1912. 
 Nasmyth: Social Progress and the Darwinian Theory. New York, 
 
 1916. 
 Kropotkin, Peter: Gegenseitige Hilfe in der Tier und Menschen- 
 
 welt. Leipzig, 1908. 
 
 Kropotkin: Mutual Aid a Factor in Evolution. 1902. 
 Zimmermann, J.: Strictures on National Pride. Translated from 
 
 German. Philadelphia, 1778. 
 
 Kellogg, Vernon Lyman: Beyond War. New York, 1912. 
 Popper-Lynkeus: Die allgemeine Nahrpflicht als Losung der 
 
 sozialen Frage. Dresden, 1912. 
 James: Moral Equivalent of War. New York, 1910. 
 Mitchell: Evolution and the War. 1915. 
 Addams: Newer Ideals of Peace. 1907. 
 Graham: Evolution and War. 1914. 
 Lyon/: Christian Equivalent of War. 1915. 
 Chittenden, H. M.: War or Peace. A present duty and a future 
 
 hope. Chicago, 1911. 
 
 Lea, Homer: Valour of Ignorance. New York, 1909. 
 Johnston : Arms and the Race. 1915. 
 Maxim : Defenseless America. 1915. 
 (Note also the references to other Chapters.) 
 
"THE GREAT ILLUSION" 
 
 I. Current theory. 
 
 A. The universally accepted theory is that commercial 
 
 and social advantages are secured for a nation by 
 military and political power over others and that 
 hi the struggle for sustenance in a world of limited 
 space and opportunity the survivors will be those 
 militarily strong, the weaker going under. 
 
 B. The theory involves the notion that victorious na- 
 
 tions increase their prosperity at the expense of 
 the vanquished, through an actual transfer of 
 wealth by: 
 
 1. Territorial acquisition. 
 
 2. Indemnities or tribute in some form. 
 
 3. Economic or commercial control of the conquered 
 
 area especially in the way of securing preferential 
 treatment for the commerce of the conqueror, 
 "concessions," etc. 
 
 C. Admiral Mahan voices the current conception when he 
 
 says that "just as it is an advantage for the Steel 
 Trust to own its ore fields, it is an advantage for 
 a nation to own its raw materials" and goes on: 
 "It is the great amount of unexploited raw material 
 in territories politically backward, and now imper- 
 fectly possessed by the nominal owners which at the 
 present moment constitutes the temptation and the 
 impulse to war of European States." "Force in 
 International Relations." 
 36 
 
"THE GREAT ILLUSION" 37 
 
 He makes an important extension of the same thesis in 
 the following passage: 
 
 " Governments are trustees, and as such must put first the 
 lawful interests of their wards their own people. . . . 
 More and more Germany needs the assured importation 
 of raw materials, and, where possible, control of regions 
 productive of such materials. More and more she re- 
 quires assured markets and security as to the importation 
 of food, since less and less comparatively is produced 
 within her own borders by her rapidly increasing popula- 
 tion. This all means security at sea. . . . Yet the 
 supremacy of Great Britain in European seas means a 
 perpetually latent control of German commerce. . . . 
 The world has long been accustomed to the idea of a 
 predominant naval power, coupling it with the name of 
 Great Britain, and it has been noted that such power, 
 when achieved, is commonly often associated with com- 
 mercial and industrial predominance, the struggle for 
 which is now in progress between Great Britain and Ger- 
 many. Such predominance forces a nation to seek 
 markets, and, where possible, to control them to its own 
 advantage by preponderant force, the ultimate expres- 
 sion of which is possession. . . . From this flow two 
 results: the attempt to possess and the organization of 
 force by which to maintain possession already achieved. 
 This statement is simply a specific formulation of the 
 general necessity stated; it is an inevitable link in the 
 
 ^ chain of logical sequences industry, markets, control, 
 navy bases. . . ." 
 
 D. Hilaire Belloc has summarized modern opinion as to 
 the best way to strike profit from victory as follows 
 (San Francisco Examiner, January 17, 1915). There 
 are three sources from which indemnity can be re- 
 covered: 
 
38 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 1. The foreign investments of a country, e. g., German 
 
 investments in Brazil. 
 
 All these can be transferred to the victor, so that he 
 will secure the profits which formerly went to the 
 rival nation. 
 
 2. Domestic stocks, which include everything that can 
 
 be removed from the soil: bullion, particularly 
 gold; stocks; certain forms of mobile machinery; 
 ships; unproductive stocks such as pictures and 
 furniture. 
 
 A certain proportion of these, particularly of bullion, 
 can be transferred from conquered to conquerors, 
 but only so much as can be absorbed. Under 
 modern industrial conditions transference of the 
 above "is for the most part an error." Belloc. 
 It kills the goose that lays the golden eggs. 
 
 3. The productive power of a country, the national 
 
 capacity for work and production. 
 This consists largely in the health, thrift, inventive- 
 ness, and industry of a people, which obviously 
 cannot be transferred to the victor. All that can 
 be done is to levy some sort of tribute on this pro- 
 ductive power, and guarantee the tribute by mili- 
 tary occupation. "The longer that period of mili- 
 tary occupation extends, the better for the victors." 
 - Belloc. 
 
 n. This theory as enumerated both by Mahan and Belloc 
 is challenged by Norman Angell who calls it "The 
 Great Illusion" on the following grounds: l 
 A. The political transfer of territory does not involve 
 the transfer of its wealth to the conqueror; the wealth 
 still remains in the hands of its original owners. When 
 the government of Alsace passed from France to 
 1 1 am indebted to Mr. Angell for this statement of his position. 
 
"THE GREAT ILLUSION 1 
 
 39 
 
 Germany and that of the Transvaal and the Orange 
 Free State from the Boers to Britain, the land, mines 
 and factories did not change hands; there was no 
 transfer of property. 
 
 B. Colonies are not "owned" by the mother country; if 
 
 successful they are not even administered. The 
 British colonies are administratively independent of 
 the mother country; Britain has virtually no ad- 
 ministrative rights even in such very recent acquisi- 
 tions as the Transvaal and the Free State. The 
 British government does not "own" the mines of 
 the Transvaal in the way that the Steel Trust owns 
 an ore field which it has purchased. The conquest in 
 the one case is an operation having no resemblance 
 to the operation of purchase by the steel trust; the 
 whole analogy is misleading. 
 
 C. Even in the case of politically backward communities 
 
 administered as "Crown Colonies" by the great 
 European powers all experience goes to show that it 
 pays best to surrender the attempt to use political 
 power as a means of exacting commercial preference 
 for the ruling state; that trade monopolies, preferen- 
 tial tariffs, etc., imposed upon a backward people by 
 its European rulers only operate to the benefit of 
 small groups of merchants and financiers and that 
 the people as a whole of the governing European state 
 gain nothing by this economic and political servitude 
 of weaker peoples. This is proven historically by the 
 case of nations that in the past resorted to this form 
 of exploitation to the utmost. The mass of the people 
 
 Iin Spain during the most flourishing of her imperialist 
 period were poorer than the people of lesser states; 
 the same is generally true of Portugal, of France 
 when she ruled in India and America and of England 
 
40 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 when her policy was imperialistic in this sense. To- 
 day only a small fraction of England's immense 
 over-seas trade is with the backward territories 
 governed from London. The great bulk of England's 
 trade is with foreign countries. Concessions and 
 monopolies obtained by political power Morocco, 
 Bagdad, etc., represent but the tiniest fraction of the 
 foreign trade of the great states which is mainly with 
 one another and countries like the United States 
 and South America. The more successful colonizing 
 nations like England have indeed abandoned the 
 method of treating the territories, administered by 
 them, as a field of commercial monopolization. Ex- 
 perience has shown that the attempt to do so places 
 the administered territory necessarily at a commercial 
 disadvantage and so checks its development as finally 
 to diminish its value as a market. Thus merchants 
 and investors of all countries are accorded about 
 equal privileges in territories like Egypt and India 
 and the peoples of the European states, controlling 
 backward territories, have every interest in making 
 such equality of treatment a matter of agreement and 
 treaty instead of paying the costs of wars which 
 take from them infinitely more than the monopolies 
 can ever possibly return them. The same order of 
 reasons apply with even greater force to tribute 
 exacted by military occupation in the way suggested 
 by Belloc. 
 
 D. Modern commerce needing above all markets, two 
 tendencies have been set up which bear fundamentally 
 upon the relation of military power to national pros- 
 perity. The need for markets implies the steady 
 financial and commercial development of the com- J 
 munities that are to constitute the markets. This 
 
"THE GREAT ILLUSION" 41 
 
 in its turn implies (a) the intangibility of their 
 property and credit and (b) the forming of economic 
 currents that flow irrespective of political boundaries 
 j so that the political unit the state ceases to 
 J coincide with the economic unit. 
 With reference to (a): If credit and commercial con- 
 tract is tampered with in an attempt at military con- 
 fiscation, a real economic " conquest," the commercial 
 development essential to the creation of an expanding 
 market is no longer possible because the basis of 
 credit and financial confidence is shaken. This will 
 react unfavorably upon even the investments and 
 enterprises of the conqueror; while a country whose 
 finances are unsound cannot be a good market. 
 With reference to (b): The competition is between 
 individuals or competing trades not nations: "If 
 we want to sell harvesters to Argentina, we should 
 be glad to have Europe buy her wheat; and if Europe 
 is to buy her wheat, Europeans must sell something 
 in some foreign market wherewith to get the money 
 and so become our competitors somewhere. A market 
 is not a place where things are sold; it is a place 
 where things are bought and sold; and the one opera- 
 tion is impossible without the other, a fact which 
 makes our competitors necessary to our markets and 
 our markets impossible without our competitors. 
 America is no more a rival of Britain or Germany 
 than Virginia is a rival of Missouri." 
 E. War indemnities have never yet shown a "profit." 
 The only really large indemnity was that obtained 
 from France by Germany in 1872. Yet when we 
 consider, in addition to the cost of the war Germany's 
 cost in preparation, the cost of meeting the ar- 
 maments which France created afterwards in order 
 
42 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 to see that "it should not happen again" - in other 
 words all the indirect cost to Germany of the attempt 
 
 \to make her war against France "profitable" (the 
 annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was in part due to 
 that attempt), this most successful of all cases of in- 
 demnity exaction is very far from showing a profit. 
 But there are certain subsidiary considerations. The 
 general financial dislocation, involved in the transfer 
 of enormous sums other than in the normal course 
 of commercial transaction, implies a very serious dis- 
 count on the nominal sum exacted. In the case of the 
 
 
 
 French indemnity Germany undoubtedly suffered in 
 this way; a few years after the payment, her general 
 financial condition was not as good as that of her 
 enemy who had made the payment. 
 To exact an indemnity or tribute at all implies virtually 
 the complete defeat of the enemy the occupation 
 of his territory as was the case by Germany in France 
 hi 1870. But with the increasing cost of modern war 
 and the devastation such occupation involves, it is at 
 least doubtful whether the credit of a country de- 
 feated, devastated, deprived of its trade and normal 
 industry, could ever be made to yield the enormous 
 sums expended in its conquest. (The amount of 
 bullion that could be seized would of course be rel- 
 atively trivial. Payment would have to be made 
 through credit in some form). 
 
 F. The outstanding and unmistakable fact as against un- 
 certain and elusive statistics is the high prosperity 
 of the small countries as compared with that of the 
 great. Not merely do then- national stocks stand 
 higher in the markets of the world but the standard 
 of life of the populations of countries like Switzerland, 
 Holland, Denmark, Sweden, is higher than that of 
 
"THE GREAT ILLUSION" 43 
 
 great imperialist states like Russia, Austria, Germany 
 and England. Yet, if prosperity came from con- 
 quered territory and colonies, and political and mil- 
 itary power, the population of the great states should 
 be markedly more prosperous than that of the small. 
 G. Caution against misconstruction of Angellism. 
 
 In the preface to "The Great Illusion" Norman Angell 
 writes: "The argument ... is not that war is im- 
 possible but that it is futile useless, even when 
 completely victorious, as a means of securing those 
 moral or material ends which represent the needs of 
 modern European peoples." The mere fact of war's 
 futility will never of itself stop war: there must be 
 general realization of its futility. "Men's acts are 
 determined not by the fact but what they believe 
 to be the fact." 
 
 III. AngelFs thesis is not based upon a narrowly economic 
 interpretation of human motive in international ac- 
 tion. The larger part of "The Great Illusion" deals s 
 with the psychology of international conflict and the "^ 
 relation of politico-economic truth thereto. The 
 ethic of his thesis is summarized as follows: 
 
 "For one to impose his will upon the other by force im-| 
 plies resistance; thus two energies are cancelled and end ' 
 in sterility or waste. For even when one triumphs, 
 there are still two slaves: the vanquished slave to the 
 victor, the victor to the need of maintaining supremacy 
 and being ready to use force against the vanquished.! 
 This creates a form of relationship as wasteful in eco- 
 nomics as it is disastrous in morals. It explains the fail- 
 ure of all those policies based on coercion or aggression 
 privilege and oppression within the State, conquest 
 and the struggle for power between States. But if the 
 two agree to combine forces in the common fight against 
 
44 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 Nature for life and sustenance, both are liberated and 
 they have found in that partnership the true economy: 
 still better, they have found in it the true basis of human 
 society and its spiritual possibilities. For there can be 
 no union without some measure of faith in the agree- 
 ment on which it is based, some notion of right. It 
 indicates the true policy whether national or interna- 
 tional agreement for united action against the com- 
 mon enemy, whether found in Nature or in the passions 
 and fallacies of men." 
 
 REFERENCES 
 
 AngelPs thesis was first printed as "Europe's Optical Illusion," 
 1008. This was enlarged and appeared under the title "The 
 Great Illusion," 1909, which has since then appeared in revised 
 form and has been translated into various languages. The 
 thesis has been more fully developed in the following: 
 
 Angell : Arms and Industry. 1913. [Title of edition in England, 
 Foundations of International Polity.] 
 
 Angell: America and the New World-State. 1914. 
 
 Angell: The World's Highway. 1915. 
 
 O'Farrell, H. H.: The Franco-German War Indemnity and its 
 Economic Results. Carton Foundation, 1913. [Contains 
 bibliography.] 
 
 Benson, George: Thirty Points for Angellism. Carton Founda- 
 tion. 
 
 Esher, Viscount: New Factors in International Politics. An 
 Address delivered at the Sorbonne. Carton Foundation. 
 
 "War and Peace." Whitehall House, 29 Charing Cross, London, 
 S. W. A monthly magazine to develop the ideas of Norman 
 Angell. Four shillings a year. 
 
 The Carton Foundation. To promote the study of international 
 polity. Secretary, Maurice V. Brett, Whitehall House, White- 
 hall, S. W., England. 
 
 Novicow: La moral et I'inter6t dans les rapports individuels et 
 internationaux. Paris, 1912. 
 
 Novicow: War and its Alleged Benefits. London, 1912. 
 
"THE GREAT ILLUSION" 45 
 
 Novicow: Die Gerechtigkeit und die Entfaltung des Lebens. 
 
 Berlin, 1907. 
 Dickinson, G. L.: War and the Way Out. Atlantic Monthly, 
 
 December, 1914, April and May, 1915. 
 Kobatsch: Die volks- und staatswirtschaTtliche Bilanz der Riis- 
 
 tungen. Vienna, 1911. 
 The Struggle for Bread: A Reply to "The Great Illusion" and 
 
 Enquiry into Economic Tendencies by A Rifleman. 1913. 
 Mahan: "The Great Illusion." North American Review, March, 
 
 1912. Reprinted in "Armaments and Arbitration." 
 Grane, William Leighton: The Passing of War. London, 1912. 
 Barker, Ernest: Political Thought in England since Herbert 
 
 Spencer (Holt). New York, 1915. 
 
VI 
 
 THE ARMED PEACE AND ITS FRUITS 
 
 I. The military equipment of nations. These consist of 
 vessels, aircraft, men, guns, animals, military and naval 
 stations, forts, barracks, arsenals, proving grounds, 
 munition factories, uniforms, utensils, engineering out- 
 fits, telegraphic appliances, stores, etc. As statistics 
 relating to these quickly get out of date they are not 
 given here except for a few items. However, reference 
 is given to annuals where up-to-date information on 
 these matters may be found. (Besides the following, 
 note the references at the end of this chapter). 
 
 A . Naval strength of the chief nations. 
 
 Brassey's Naval Annual [The Naval Annual]. Navy 
 League Annual. Statesman's Year Book (under 
 each nation). World Almanac. Hazell's Annual. 
 The Britannica Year Book. The World's Work, 
 Nov., 1915. Knight: Navy Year Book, 1914. 
 Tillman: Navy Year Book, 1915. 
 
 B. Strength of land forces. 
 
 World Almanac. Statesman's Year Book. Whit- 
 aker's Almanac. Hazell's Annual. The Brit- 
 annica Year Book. 
 
 C. War implements rapidly depreciate in value. 
 
 1. Every bit of progress in science and invention tends 
 
 to put the existing equipment out of date. 
 
 2. Under the present system armaments must be up 
 
 to date; old implements are about as good as none. 
 
 3. Keeping armaments up with improvements costs 
 
 money; the more there is of inventive genius, the 
 greater the cost. 
 
 46 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS FRUITS 47 
 
 D. Military drill, maneuvers, mobilizations, war games, 
 etc., which are necessary to keep armed forces in 
 readiness are also costly. 
 
 II. Cost of military establishments, of preparedness; Annual 
 budgets for defense. 
 
 A. Navy budgets of the principal navies (see Appendix). 
 
 B. Army budgets of the leading powers (see Appendix). 
 
 C. Costs per man. 
 
 Cost of Armies per Unit of Fighting Force. (Table 
 VI. A. W. Allen: The Drain of Armaments, pub- 
 lished by The World Peace Foundation, 1912.) 
 
 Austria-Hungary $ 278 per annum 
 
 France 291 " 
 
 Germany 306 " " 
 
 Great Britain 378 " " 
 
 Italy 273 " " 
 
 Japan 209 " " 
 
 Russia 232 " 
 
 Spain 282 " 
 
 United States 1,314 " 
 
 D. Military charge resting upon the individual citizen. 
 
 Total Military Charge per Unit of Population. 
 (Table III. A. W. Allen: The Drain of Arma- 
 ments, published by The World Peace Founda- 
 tion, 1912.) 
 
 Austria-Hungary $2 . 56 per annum 
 
 France 6.64 " 
 
 Germany 4-8i " 
 
 Great Britain 7 .80 " " 
 
 Italy 3-57 " 
 
 Japan 1.81 ' 
 
 Russia 2.32 " 
 
 Spain 2 . 50 " 
 
 United States. . 2.65 " 
 
48 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 E. The relation of military to other governmental expendi- 
 
 tures. 
 
 The federal government of the United States devotes 
 about 42% of its expenditures to army and navy. 
 Pensions are not included in this calculation; were 
 they, it would bring the percentage to about 70. 
 This is another "peace-at-any-price" policy. 
 
 If all expenditures of the United States and the 
 several states are compared with their expendi- 
 tures for military purposes the latter are relatively 
 small. 
 
 F. Is this expenditure absolutely necessary? 
 
 1. Is it all spent honestly and wisely? 
 
 2. Does it pay; does it achieve its object, and really 
 
 insure a nation against attack? 
 
 3. Is there no other means of securing the peace of a 
 
 nation that is more effective and less expensive? 
 
 If there is, the expenditure for armament is a waste, 
 
 no matter how small it is. 
 III. The futility of the armed peace. 
 A. It is to be noted that the cost of insuring peace by 
 competitive armaments has hi the last decade risen 
 very rapidly and out of proportion to the increase in 
 population, wealth, or prosperity. If armaments 
 insured peace all nations should be more secure 
 than formerly. On the contrary, no nation feels one 
 whit more secure. Even if a nation outruns all com- 
 petitors it gains no security, as fear impels other na- 
 tions to make new alliances which change the balance 
 of power. No ruler or prominent political personage 
 can visit another country without creating endless 
 speculation on the political significance of the event. 
 Thus uncertainty, suspicion and fear are abroad and 
 are subject to the exploitation of the unscrupulous. 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS FRUITS 49 
 
 (To appreciate the rapid increase in military expendi- 
 ture, see the diagram showing new construction in 
 the British Navy since 1882. Naval Annual, 1914, 
 facing, p. ,434.) 
 
 B. The fundamental difficulty is illustrated very well by 
 the circumstance that German and French bills of 
 1913, providing for an increase of the army, each 
 advanced the same reason for the increase, the 
 change in the balance of power. 
 
 IV. The "armed peace" brings a competitive race in arma- 
 ments; each government strives to outdo and outwit 
 the other by what means it can. 
 
 A. By securing more or better equipment. 
 
 On the quality of its equipment a government must 
 take the opinion of its experts. These often differ 
 and cannot always be trusted. (See San Francisco 
 Chronicle, Feb. 3, 1914, " Experts juggle figures to 
 reduce naval rank of the United States.") 
 
 B. By spying on its competitors. 
 
 One of the great evils of the present system is that 
 each nation regards it as right to corrupt the citi- 
 zens of other states; it tries to produce among 
 others what at home it regards as a most heinous 
 crime treason. Espionage has become so im- 
 portant that nations have passed laws for their 
 protection. 
 
 France: "Loi contre 1'espionage, April 18, 1886." 
 (British and Foreign State Papers, 77, 1198-1200.) 
 
 Great Britain: Notification to French Travellers 
 against Sketching, May 8, 1886. (State papers, 77, 
 1201.) 
 
 Great Britain: Official Secrets Act. August 26, 1889. 
 (British and Foreign State Papers 8, 644-48.) 
 
 Germany: [July 3?] 1893; June 3, 1914. 
 
50 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 United States: Act to Prevent the Disclosure of 
 National Secrets, March 3, 1911. (Statutes of 
 U. S. 6ist Congress, 3rd. Session, 1910, Part I, 
 1084-5.) The statutes of the United States have 
 proved inadequate and it is proposed to revise 
 them. 
 
 C. By keeping its own affairs secret and guarding against 
 treasonable sale of military secrets. The most con- 
 spicuous case of the many affairs of this kind was 
 lie Dreyfus affair. 
 
 V. Under the system of the "armed peace," governments 
 
 are at the mercy of those who unconsciously stir up 
 
 international feelings or deliberately use them for their 
 
 purposes. 
 
 A. Armament makers profit by war and by war scares, 
 
 which give them contracts. 
 They are powerful financial corporations. 
 The capitalists in them often own newspapers. 
 They also have great influence in politics and on the 
 
 government. 
 
 It is estimated that one man in every six "employed" 
 men hi Great Britain depends on armament makers. 
 (Perris: Hands Across the Sea.) 
 Frequently they take officers out of the army and navy 
 
 into their service. 
 
 They maintain agents at the several capitals. 
 These agents at tunes engage in crooked practices. 
 In 1912 it was disclosed that Krupp agents, appar- 
 ently with the knowledge of high officials of the firm, 
 had bribed government officials in Germany to 
 secure military secrets. 
 
 They may and apparently do advance prices to the 
 government when, by reason of war or threat of war, 
 it is in a predicament. 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS FRUITS 51 
 
 They affiliate closely with the financial concerns 
 through inter-locking directorates and money trusts. 
 
 Their importance in the armed competition of nations 
 leads some to give them extraordinary rank in the 
 body politic. Hudson Maxim calls the area about 
 New York "the heart of America" because it con- 
 tains the most of the manufactories of armaments 
 and war materials, together with the principal coal 
 fields of Pennsylvania. 
 
 There is evidence that the armament concerns of vari- 
 ous nations cooperate; indeed there is a sort of in- 
 ternational armament trust. Firms of one nation 
 often supply war materials to foreign nations rated 
 as unfriendly; they even have branches in these 
 nations. "Although you cannot establish it, there 
 is no doubt of an armor plate trust all over the 
 world." Secretary Daniels before the House 
 Naval Committee, Feb. 2, 1914. 
 
 B. War scares operate to open the pocket of the taxpayer 
 and to produce an enlargement of the military es- 
 tablishment. 
 
 "Have you ever noticed that about the time that the ap- 
 propriations for military purposes are under considera- 
 tion in the Congress, in the House of Commons, in the 
 Chamber of Deputies, or in the Reichstag, or just before 
 such a time, hostilities are always on the point of breaking 
 out in two or three parts of the world at once? Just at 
 these times war prophets begin to see visions and to 
 dream dreams, and the poor, gullible people rush off to 
 their cyclone cellars and shout timorously to their repre- 
 sentatives to vote at once and as much as possible in 
 order that great ships and guns and forts may be built 
 to protect them from their fears." Nicholas Murray 
 Butler: The International Mind, p. 55. 
 
52 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 1. The irresponsible press often creates or spreads war 
 
 scares. Yellow journalism, jingo press. The 
 tendency toward sensationalism, which is a feature 
 of the yellow press, makes "news " of possible inter- 
 national friction; and paying reporters by space 
 induce them to find sensations. These circum- 
 stances alone encourage stories of espionage, trea- 
 son, sale of military secrets, new inventions which 
 scrap all existing war appliances, night visits of 
 aviators, etc., etc. Even though canards, such 
 stories alarm the public, and newspapers often 
 enough take no pains to correct them. 
 
 2. Not all war scares are the result of misinformation or 
 
 of innocent blundering. News is a commodity 
 which, like food, can be contaminated if it pays. 
 We need pure news laws as well as pure food laws. 
 Some newspapers are believed to be printing matter 
 designed to cause the United States to intervene 
 in Mexico. There are several papers in the United 
 States which seem to have a policy to keep rela- 
 tions with Japan disturbed. The Turtle Bay 
 Story; The Magdalena Bay Story. The Lieb- 
 knecht disclosures in 1913 showed that the Krupp 
 concern tried to use newspapers in France as well 
 as in Germany to stir up national anxiety about 
 armaments. 
 
 3. Incendiary speeches, books, plays, "jingoism," "chau- 
 
 vinism," war-criers. 
 
 Their sincerity need not be doubted; but it is possible 
 that they do more harm than good because their 
 country-men, who know them regard them as 
 alarmists and ignore them; whereas the foreigners 
 against whom they warn, who do not know them 
 consider them as spokesmen of their fellows, 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS FRUITS 53 
 
 and in turn take alarm; thus they give foreign 
 nations a ground for suspicion, which tends to 
 ripen into open hostility and finally war. 
 The Battle of Dorking (1875) describing imagined 
 
 invasion of England by Germany. 
 "The Englishman's Home," a play with the same 
 
 theme. 
 
 "The Typhoon" a play turning on a Japanese in- 
 vasion of the United States. 
 "America Fallen" by J. Bernard Walker; describing 
 
 imagined invasion of the United States. 
 "Germany in Arms" supposed to be the work of the 
 
 Crown Prince. 
 
 Hobson and the Japanese Peril. 
 
 VI. Defense becomes a political issue. Since 1906 the Tories 
 have tried to oust the Liberals by attacking the state 
 of preparedness; and the government has protected 
 itself by ever-increasing military budgets. Much the 
 same situation now exists in the United States. 
 Each party tries to outbid the other; the foreign nation 
 which is pronounced the foe for one is necessary in 
 these political machinations is carelessly insulted 
 and thoroughly roused by political panic-mongers; 
 the munition makers in both countries secure orders; 
 the people pay the bills of preparation for war and 
 also of the war which these tactics sooner or later 
 produce, and which is then declared inevitable. What 
 of the patriotism of those who seek power by such 
 methods? 
 
 REFERENCES 
 
 STATISTICS ON MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS 
 
 Brassey's Naval Annual. (Clowes and Sons.) London, published 
 annually. 
 
54 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 Navy League Annual. Published by the Navy League. London. 
 Statesman's Year Book. (McBride, Nast and Company.) New 
 
 York. 
 World Almanac. (The Press Publishing Company.) New York 
 
 World. 
 
 Whitaker's Almanac. Published in London. 
 Hazell's Annual. London. 
 Sundbarg: Apercus Statistiques Internationaux. 1008. pp. 165- 
 
 166. 
 
 Jane: Fighting Ships. 1912. 
 
 Mulhall and Webb: The New Dictionary of Statistics. 1911. 
 Almanach de Gotha. Annuaire genealogique diplomatique et 
 
 statistique. Published annually since 1834. 
 Les armees des principales puissances au printemps de 1913. 
 
 (Chapelot). 1913. 
 Allen: The Drain of Armaments. Pamphlet issued by the World 
 
 Peace Foundation, 1912, and distributed free of charge. 
 Knight: The Navy Yearbook. Compilation of Annual Naval 
 
 Appropriation Laws from 1883-1914. 63d Cong., 3d Sess. Sen. 
 
 Doc. 637. 1914. 
 Tillman: Navy Yearbook. 1915. 64th Cong., ist Sess. Sen. Doc. 
 
 No. 3. 
 Consult also official reports of respective governments. 
 
 "PREPAREDNESS" 
 
 Bacon, Corinne: Selected Articles on National Defense. 1915. 
 Must we Arm? Hilquit-Gardner Debate (Rand School of Social 
 Science). 1915. [Debaters' Handbook.] 
 
 FOR " PREPAREDNESS " 
 
 Carter: The American Army. 1915. 
 
 Johnston: Arms and the Race. 1915. 
 
 Maxim: Defenseless America. 1915. 
 
 Wilson, Huntington W. : Stultitia. 1915. 
 
 Huidekoper: The Military Unpreparedness of the United States. 
 
 Stockton, Richard, Jr.: Peace Insurance. 1915. 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS FRUITS 55 
 
 Wood, Major-General Leonard: The Military Obligation of 
 
 Citizenship. 1915. 
 The World's Work. November, 1915. 
 
 AGAINST " PREPAREDNESS " 
 
 Villard, O. G.: Preparedness. 1915. Reprint from New York 
 
 Evening Post. 
 Mead, Lucia Ames: A Pacifist Program for Preparedness. Re- 
 
 print from Advocate of Peace. January, 1916. 
 Levermore: Preparedness For What? World Peace Foundation. 
 
 December, 1915. [Contains references.] 
 Leaflets on Military and Naval Preparation. World Peace Foun- 
 
 dation. Boston, 1915. 
 Bailey, Warren Worth: "Preparedness" the Foe of Peace. Con- 
 
 gressional Record, January 23, 1915. 
 Jefferson, Charles E.: Three Men behind the Guns. American 
 
 Association for International Conciliation, 1914. 
 Jefferson: The Nemesis of Armaments. The Independent, Au- 
 
 gust 17, 1914. 
 The Survey. New York. 
 
 The Commoner, Lincoln, Nebraska. November, 1915. 
 The New York Evening Post. New York. 
 Stokes, Anson Phelps: The Question of Preparedness. Yale 
 
 Review, January, 1916. 
 Hull, W. I.: Preparedness. Phila. Yearly Meeting of Friends. 
 
 See also the following: 
 
 MUNITION MAKERS AND WAR 
 Tavenner, Clyde H. : The Navy League Unmasked. Congressional 
 
 Record, January 7, 1916. 
 Tavenner, Clyde H.: The World-Wide War Trust. Congressional 
 
 Record, February 15, 1915. 
 
 Perns: War Traders. National Peace Council, London, 1914. 
 Sombart, Werner: Krieg und Kapitalismus. 1913. 
 Pfeiffer, Ludwig: Kriegsgeist. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der 
 
 Menschheitspriifungen. Dresden, 1909-1910. 
 
56 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 Pfeiffer, Ludwig: Die Wahrheit iiber die Kriegsgefahren. Feststel- 
 
 lung der Interessen einzelner Klassen fiir den Krieg. Leipzig, 
 
 1912. 
 
 Childe: War and Business. Harper's Weekly, December 9, 1911. 
 Powell, E. Alexander: Masters of Europe. Saturday Evening 
 
 Post, June 19, 1009. 
 Jordan : Unseen Empire. 1912. 
 Delaisi: Le patriotisme des plaques blindees. 1913. 
 Delaisi, Francis: The Inevitable War. 1911. 
 Snowden: Armaments and Dividends. World Peace Foundation, 
 
 1914. 
 Murray, H. Robertson: Krupps and the International Armaments 
 
 Ring. London, 1915. 
 How Diplomats Make War By a British Statesman (Huebsch). 
 
 McCullagh: Syndicates for War. New York Evening Post, April i, 
 
 1911. Reprinted by the World Peace Foundation, Boston. 
 Perris, George H. : History of a Great Scare. 
 Makers of War Scares: New York Evening Post, April 12, 1911. 
 Influence of Capital: New York Evening Post. April 12, 1911. 
 
 CHAUVINISM 
 
 Hobson: Psychology of Jingoism. London, 1001. 
 
 Lea, Homer: The Valour of Ignorance. 1909. 
 
 Lea, Homer: The Day of the Saxon. 1912. 
 
 The Battle Cry of Peace: Motion picture by J. Stuart Blackton, 
 
 Vitagraph Company. 1915. 
 Walker, J. Bernard: America Fallen. 1915. 
 Battle of Dorking: The Fall of England. Reminiscences of a 
 
 Volunteer. [Lt. General G. T. Cheseney.] 1871. 
 (Crown Prince of Germany) : Deutschland in Waffen. 
 Nippold: Der deutsche Chauvinismus. 1913. 
 
 COSTS 
 
 Emery, H. C.: Some Economic Aspects of the War. 1913. 
 Bloch: Future of War. 1002, pp. 63-92, 128-139. 
 Cobden Club: The Burden of Armament. 1905. 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS FRUITS 57 
 
 Tawney: Cost of Armed Peace. Congressional Record, 46, Part IV, 
 
 p. 3077. 
 Griffiths: Great Armies and Their Cost. Fortnightly Review, 75, 
 
 pp. 249-259. 
 Messimy: La paix arm6e. La France peut en alleger le poids. 
 
 1903. 
 
 Brooks, Sydney: Armed Peace. Harper's Weekly, March 29, 1913. 
 Kobatsch: Die Volks- und staatswirtschaftliche Bilanz der Riis- 
 
 tungen. Wien, 1911. 
 Cobden: Three Panics. 1863. 
 
 GENERAL 
 
 Butler, Nicholas Murray: The International Mind. 1913. 
 Fried, Alfred H.: The German Emperor and the Peace of the 
 World. London, 1912. 
 
VII 
 
 THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF WAR 
 
 I. Destruction of property. 
 
 A. Formerly an essential part of war: war must support 
 
 war. 
 
 B. The tendency of treaties has been to make property 
 
 immune from warfare as far as possible. 
 
 II. Disturbance of economic conditions. War is pathological, 
 
 as it produces an abnormal economic condition. 
 Preparation for war in time of peace has tended to make 
 the disturbance at the outbreak of war less violent. 
 Advance information about war. (See article by 
 Childe hi Harper's Weekly, December, 1911.) 
 A. Credit. 
 
 1. An enormous number of businesses depend on credit; 
 
 that is, they are run on borrowed capital. 
 
 2. Credit, or the ability to borrow money, depends on 
 
 the risk and probable profit of the investment; 
 that is on: 
 
 a. The character of the borrower, his ability, thrift, 
 
 health, honesty, reputation, friends, etc. His 
 nationality does not matter much, if at all. 
 
 b. The character of his enterprise and the probability 
 
 of its success. This in turn depends on general 
 business conditions and is subject to violent al- 
 teration by external causes. 
 
 3. Banks. 
 
 a. Facilitate investment. 
 
 By investigating the reliability of prospective 
 borrowers. 
 
 58 
 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF WAR 59 
 
 By accumulating capital in the form of deposits. 
 By lending capital; or discounting notes in ad- 
 vance. 
 
 b. They are thus a sort of sensory system in the finan- 
 
 cial world, since the invention of rapid com- 
 munication responding almost instantly to any 
 condition which affects credit. 
 
 c. For their protection and to meet sudden demands 
 
 of their depositors, they must keep a reserve of 
 cash on hand; this reserve is, of course, far from 
 equal to deposits. Hence a bank is not in a posi- 
 tion to meet all its obligations at once and ac- 
 cordingly does not want abnormal conditions 
 or panics. 
 B. Effect of war on business. 
 
 1. Dislocates business by altering the demand for goods. 
 
 2. Increases the risk, hence injures credit in all enter- 
 
 prises, either directly or indirectly, because business 
 is sympathetic and, broadly speaking, prospers or 
 suffers as a unit. 
 
 a. Business is uncertain, demand is reduced or altered, 
 
 sales doubtful, as everyone holds back as far as 
 possible. 
 
 b. Prices fluctuate; some rise, some fall. (See Chap- 
 
 ter IX). 
 
 c. Freight rates are likely to alter. 
 
 Requisition of railroads and ships for war pur- 
 poses. 
 
 In Balkan War, 1912, freight rates rose on an 
 average from $2.27 to $3.44 per ton, that is 
 $1.17. (World Peace Foundation Bulletin.) 
 
 d. Insurance rates are likely to rise. 
 
 Danger of loss in shipments of various kinds 
 through delay or seizure. 
 
60 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 e. Wages affected. 
 Men called to colors. 
 
 Laborers may take advantage of situation to se- 
 cure higher wages. 
 
 /. Securities and stocks decline in value. 
 g. Men often cannot meet their financial obligations 
 and moratoria are declared. 
 
 3. Interest rates rise, that is, investors hesitate to 
 
 lend at the old figure because the risks are 
 greater. 
 
 4. Discount rates rise because the probability of fluctua- 
 
 tion has increased and banks must be protected 
 against the greater risk. 
 
 5. Cash, especially gold, is at a premium because every- 
 
 body wants something stable. 
 
 a. Withdrawal of deposits from banks, perhaps caus- 
 
 ing runs on banks. Banks may need to suspend 
 specie payment. 
 
 b. Collecting outstanding loans as soon as possible 
 
 and refusing to renew except at the increased 
 rate of interest. 
 
 c. Hoarding cash, preferably gold; that is, withdraw- 
 
 ing it from circulation and also reducing the 
 amount of capital available for investment; 
 thus aggravating the rise in the rate of in- 
 terest. 
 
 d. Securities are sold to secure cash. 
 
 They generally sell at depreciated value at the 
 outbreak of war. 
 
 This liquidation may assume such proportions as 
 to require stemming. Closing of all stock ex- 
 changes, August, 1914. 
 
 The sale of securities operates peculiarly to the 
 injury of the man who, to secure cash, has to 
 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF WAR 61 
 
 sell; and benefits the man who has available 
 capital for investment. The rich grow richer, 
 the others poorer. 
 
 6. All business enterprises must be more cautious. 
 Those which are near the limit of their resources 
 
 (as is likely to be the case with any new ven- 
 ture or with one that has undertaken to ex- 
 pand) are in danger of failure; hence bank- 
 ruptcies. 
 
 Business concerns to avoid reducing profits resort to 
 one of the first means at hand to cut down ex- 
 penses, namely, discharging employees. 
 
 7. Unemployment, with all its consequences. (See 
 
 Chapter IX.) 
 
 8. In the course of the war, business readjusts itself to 
 
 new conditions and confidence returns. 
 It is always apprehensive because it is subject to 
 severe disturbance by the events of war; and, be- 
 cause being a wartime, hence abnormal business, 
 it has always to guard against the effect of peace. 
 The return of peace may be as disastrous as was 
 the advent of war. 
 III. Effect of wars on public finance. 
 A. The cost of wars. 
 
 1. The cost of wars in the past (Mass. Commission 
 
 on the Cost of Living: The Waste of Militarism, 
 p. 7). See Table, p. 62. 
 
 2. The cost of the Balkan Wars $1,264,000,000. 
 
 3. The cost of the European War. (Statements of 
 
 Asquith and Ribot, Sept., 1915.) 
 
 France (June, 1915) $ 8,700,000 per day 
 
 Great Britain (Sept., 1915) 17,500,000 " 
 Russia (Sept., 1915) 12,000,000 ' 
 
 Germany (Sept., 1915) 16,670,000 " " 
 
62 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 THE COST OF WARS 
 
 DATES 
 
 COUNTRIES ENGAGED 
 
 COST 
 
 1703-181 "\. . 
 
 England and France 
 
 $ 6,250,000,000 
 
 1812-1815. . . . 
 
 France and Russia 
 
 4^0,62 <,ooo 
 
 1828 
 
 Russia and Turkey 
 
 100,000,000 
 
 1830-1840 
 1830-184.7. . 
 
 Spain and Portugal (civil war). . 
 France and Algeria 
 
 250,000,000 
 
 190,000,000 
 
 1848 . 
 
 Revolts in Europe 
 
 50,000,000 
 
 184 <; 
 
 United States and Mexico 
 
 
 
 England 
 
 371,000,000 
 
 
 France 
 
 222 OOO OOO 
 
 18^4-18 <;6 
 
 Sardinia and Turkey 
 
 128 ooo ooo 
 
 
 Austria 
 
 68 600 ooo 
 
 
 Russia 
 
 800 ooo ooo 
 
 
 France 
 
 7<r OOO OOO 
 
 i8) 
 
 Austria 
 
 127 ooo ooo 
 
 
 Italv 
 
 51 ooo ooo 
 
 1861-1865 
 
 The rebellion 
 
 5 ooo ooo ooo 
 
 1864 
 
 Denmark Prussia and Austria 
 
 ?6 ooo ooo 
 
 1866 
 
 Prussia and Austria 
 
 330,000,000 
 
 1864-1870 
 1865-1866 
 
 Brazil, Argentine, and Paraguay 
 France and Mexico 
 
 240,000,000 
 
 6tr OOO OOO 
 
 f 
 
 Germany 
 
 0^4,400,006 
 
 1870-1871.. j 
 
 France 
 
 1,580 ooo ooo 
 
 *_, } 
 
 Russia 
 
 806 ^47 480 
 
 1876-1877.. j 
 
 Turkey 
 
 AQ2 273 74. ^ 
 
 1898 
 1900-1901 
 1004-100? 
 
 Spain and the United States . . . 
 Transvaal Republic and England 
 Russia and Japan 
 
 1,165,000,000 
 1,000,100,000 
 
 2 500 OOO OOO 
 
 
 
 
 Expense of wars, 1793-1860 $ 9,243,225,000 
 
 Expense of wars, 1861-1910 14,080,321,240 
 
 Total $23,323,546,240 
 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF WAR 63 
 
 B. Credit of a belligerent government is injured. 
 
 1. Bonds and paper money fall in value. 
 
 For illustration of the effect of former wars on govern- 
 ment paper see the Journal de la Societe de Statis- 
 tique de Paris, 1909, pp. 314-349- 
 
 2. This process is aggravated by the tendency to hoard 
 
 specie. To protect itself a government may be 
 compelled to suspend specie payment. Great 
 Britain suspended specie payment in 1797; the 
 United States in 1862; France in 1870. 
 
 C. To finance a war, governments: 
 
 1. Increase taxation. 
 
 a. Direct taxes, poll taxes, personal taxes, income and 
 
 property taxes, etc. Well illustrated by the 
 British Budget proposals of Sept. 21, 1915. 
 
 b. Indirect taxes (tariffs, excises, stamp duties, etc.). 
 To maintain a supply of coin some governments 
 
 require import duties to be paid in coin, often 
 in gold. 
 
 2. Borrow money. War loans. (See Chapter VIII.) 
 
 Governments issue bonds, which must be of a char- 
 acter to induce investors to buy. Investors want: 
 
 a. A high rate of interest, preferably payable in gold. 
 The greater the difficulty of a government, the 
 
 higher the rate of interest it must pay. 
 
 b. A discount. Anglo-French bonds of 1915 sold at 
 
 97-5- 
 
 c. Exemption from taxes or assessments; as otherwise 
 
 the yield of bonds may be eaten up by taxes, as 
 was the case with British South-African war 
 bonds. 
 
 "d. Suitable terms of conversion or redemption. 
 e. Financial houses require a commission for floating 
 the bonds. 
 
64 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 It will be observed that in its plight a government 
 must make loans that are advantageous to investors 
 (hence disadvantageous to it); for profit, and not 
 patriotism alone, persuades men to buy. 
 Loans of this kind mean debt, a mere deferring, not an 
 evasion, of paying for the war; in other words, what 
 cannot be secured by taxes now is passed on to the 
 taxpayer of the future. 
 
 If the bonds are well distributed among the people of 
 the borrowing nation, then the repayment of the 
 loan consists in collecting taxes from the people to 
 repay the people. This process, though undesirable, 
 does not reduce the total wealth. But if a portion of 
 the people hold the bonds, then repayment consists 
 in taxing all to repay this portion; a condition which 
 invites non-bondholders to seek to evade taxes and 
 impose them on bondholders; a form of confiscation. 
 The belligerents in Europe have tried to secure general 
 participation of their people in war loans, even to 
 the extent of having banks advance money to in- 
 dividuals to be used in buying bonds, the govern- 
 ment guaranteeing the banks against loss. In this 
 way it is hoped to make everyone, if possible, a 
 sharer in the financial burden, instead of having it 
 rest on a fraction of the people. 
 
 3. Issue fiat money (non-interest bearing paper money). 
 This becomes increasingly necessary when a govern- 
 ment's credit sinks, as it does in consequence of 
 large loans, failure of its arms, or other misfor- 
 tunes. 
 Fiat money must be made a legal tender otherwise 
 
 it would not be accepted at all. 
 The government must agree to redeem it, otherwise 
 it would depreciate. 
 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF WAR 65 
 
 Not redeemable too soon, or the government cannot 
 
 meet its obligations. 
 
 Not redeemable too late, or the paper will de- 
 preciate. 
 
 Fiat money depreciates with the misfortune of a gov- 
 ernment; it is worth only what the government is. 
 Depreciation in Civil War, Dewey, p. 293. 
 IV. After-effects of the war. 
 
 A . Peace brings a reversal of war conditions and a readjust- 
 
 ment, similar to that at the outbreak of war, occurs. 
 
 1. The demand for war goods suddenly stops; business 
 
 hastens to take advantage of the new demand for 
 the usual commodities; there is danger of booms, all 
 the more because, confidence being restored, 
 hoarded money returns to circulation and capital 
 is easy to get. 
 
 2. The disbandment of armies suddenly increases the 
 
 numbers engaged in the various branches of busi- 
 ness and tends to create uncertainty. 
 
 B. The rehabilitation of the military equipment costs the 
 
 government much, but it also gives employment and 
 tends to steady conditions. 
 
 C. Pensions, a drain on the public exchequer, whether the 
 
 beneficiaries were trained or not before the war. 
 
 D. Indemnities, if there are any, complicate the economic 
 
 situation. (See Chapter V.) 
 
 E. Transfers of territory and their effect on victor and 
 
 vanquished. (See Chapter V.) 
 
 F. The Public Debt. (See Chapter VIII.) 
 
 REFERENCES 
 
 Hirst, F. W.: The Political Economy of War. London, 1915. 
 Roberts, George E. : Economic Effects of the War. National City 
 Bank of New York, 1915. 
 
66 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 Bowley: The Effect of the War on the External Trade of the United 
 
 Kingdom. London, 1915. 
 Emery, Henry C. : Some Economic Aspects of War. Washington, 
 
 Government Printing Office. 1914. 
 Withers, Hartley: War and Lombard Street. 1915. 
 Clapp. Edwin J.: Economic Aspects of the War, neutral rights, 
 
 belligerent claims and American commerce in the years 1914 and 
 
 1915. (Yale University Press.) 1915. 
 Lawson, W. R.: Modern Wars and War Taxes. 1913. 
 Withers, Hartley: Meaning of Money. New York, 1909. 
 Serrigny, Bernard: Les cons6quences economiques et sociales de la 
 
 prochaine guerre d'apres les enseignements des campagnes des 
 
 1870-1871 et de 1904-1905. Paris, 1909. 
 War Risks British Parliamentary Papers, 1908. LVIII. [Cd. 
 
 4161.] Report by the Committee on a National Guarantee for 
 
 the War Risks of Shipping. 
 
 Angell: War and the Workers (National Labour Press). Man- 
 chester, England. 
 Novicow: Leprobleme de la misere et les phenomen economiques 
 
 naturell. Paris, 1908. 
 Anitchkow: War and Labor. 1000. 
 
 Journal de la Societe de Statistique de Paris. 1009, 314-49. 
 Dewey: Financial History of the United States. 1907. 
 Hartung, Hugo: Die finanzielle Rustung der Kriegfuhrenden 
 
 Staaten. 1914. 
 Giffen: Economic Inquiries and Studies. 1004. Chap. I, Cost of 
 
 the Franco-Prussian War; Chap. XXI, Consols in a Great 
 
 War; Chap. XXII, Economic Aspects of the South African 
 
 War. 
 
 Phillipson: The Effect of War on Contracts and on Trading Asso- 
 ciations in Territories of Belligerents. 1009. 
 Latin: Effects of War on Property. 1009. 
 Wells: Cost of the [American Civil] War. Payment of the War 
 
 Debt. In Rand: Economic History since 1763, pp. 520- 
 
 524- 
 Gellender: Effect of War on the Price of Commodities. Banker's 
 
 Journal 22, 415-447. 
 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF WAR 67 
 
 Rauchberg: Die Bevolkerung Oesterreichs. 1895. [Plate, p. 27, 
 
 shows wages and prices in Austria.] 
 
 Bloch: Der Krieg. 1899, 1, 3~38; 358-364. IV, 3-308; 343-364- 
 Richet: Passe de la guerre et 1'avenir de la paix. 1907. p. 61. 
 Molinari: Grandeur et decadence de la guerre. 1898, 228; 237-239. 
 Denifle: Desolation des Eglises. 1897-1899. 
 Mass. Commission on the Cost of Living: Waste of Militarism. 
 
 World Peace Foundation, 1910. 
 Stilwell, A. E. : Universal Peace War is Mesmerism. New York, 
 
 1911. 
 Babson: The War will not be over for Fifty Years. Saturday 
 
 Evening Post, October 2, 1915. 
 Johnson, Alvin S. : Commerce and War. American Association for 
 
 International Conciliation, New York, 1915. 
 
vni 
 
 PUBLIC DEBTS 
 
 I. In modem times, wars and the competitive armaments 
 
 during peace have, along with increasing taxation, forced 
 governments to borrow money and get into debt. Only 
 a part of the present public debt is for military purposes 
 but it is now the larger part in the debt of most of the 
 great powers. It should be noted that, if there had 
 been a system of relationship between states that made 
 competition in arms unnecessary, nations could have 
 met all civil expenses and would need to have no 
 debt. 
 
 II. The history of public debts. 
 
 A. Public debts were small until the end of the eight- 
 eenth century. There are several reasons for 
 this: 
 
 1. The absolute monarchs of earlier times were able to 
 
 levy practically unrestricted taxes on their subjects 
 of the lower classes. 
 
 2. Monarchs could repudiate debts and accordingly 
 
 their credit was not considered good by men with 
 means, who therefore lent no more than they were 
 forced to. 
 
 3. The nations were still relatively isolated and the 
 
 rivalry between them was less insistent than to- 
 day. 
 
 4. The activities of governments were less complex and 
 
 expensive. 
 
 68 
 
PUBLIC DEBTS 69 
 
 B. Constitutional government, which has developed since 
 
 1789, made borrowing possible, as the people became 
 the guarantors. 
 
 Popular governments have not, except in a few cases 
 to be noted, repudiated their debts partly be- 
 cause so far there has been no need; but also 
 because it is not advisable or probable that a 
 people will repudiate a debt of which it is itself the 
 holder. 
 
 C. Wars have increased public debts for both victor and 
 
 vanquished. 
 
 1. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars created the 
 
 first great national debts, particularly the British 
 debt. The debt of France even declined during 
 Napoleon's earlier wars because he levied tribute 
 on conquered nations and thus made them pay 
 the cost of his wars and help to retire the French 
 debt. 
 
 2. The American Civil War increased the debt of the 
 
 United States from about sixty-five millions to 
 over two and one-half billion dollars. (See plate 
 on page 74.) 
 
 3. The Franco-Prussian war increased the debt of France 
 
 by a billion dollars. 
 
 4. The present war (1915) has increased the 
 
 debts of the belligerents on an unparalleled 
 scale. 
 
 How the expense of the war has increased the national 
 indebtedness of the countries involved is shown in 
 the following diagram. The white part of the line 
 gives the amount of the debt per head before the 
 war. The black part of the line gives its increase 
 per head according to the latest published figures. 
 If the war last through a second year the burden 
 
70 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 of the financial obligations of the belligerent gov- 
 ernments will become almost unbearable. It must 
 be remembered, however, that a diagram showing 
 the financial ability of the various nations would 
 look much like the following diagram of their in- 
 debtedness. Great Britain and France have the 
 greatest wealth per capita of any people, while 
 Italians and Russians are comparatively poor. 
 Germany would come in the order of wealth 
 above Austria. 
 
 THE BURDEN OF THE WAR DEBT 
 
 TRANCE. BEFORE* 160; NOW 4276 
 
 GREAT BRITAIN. BEFORE*77: NOW*233 
 
 
 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. BEFORE* 73; NOW $ I OS 
 
 = 
 ITALY. BEFORE 80; NOW 491 
 
 BSHHB 
 
 GERMANY. BEFORE 1 17 ; NOW *68 
 
 BH 
 
 RUSSIA. BEFORE* 25; NOW *49 
 
 (By permission of The Independent. Printed Sept. 29, 1915.) 
 
 D. Since 1870 the "armed peace," the race in arma- 
 
 ments, has caused a rising debt in all military na- 
 tions. 
 
 The United States adopted the policy about 1890, with 
 like result. 
 
 E. Plates illustrating the history of debt. 
 
PUBLIC DEBTS 
 
 PQ 
 
 I 
 
 O 
 
 I 
 
NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 \ 
 
PUBLIC DEBTS 
 THE PUBLIC DEBT OF GERMANY 
 
 73 
 
 $4,000,000,000 
 
 $3,000,000,000 
 
 $2,000,000,000 
 
 $1,000,000,000 
 
 n 
 
 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 
 
 I. The Imperial debt. Source: Statistical Abstract of Great Britain, 
 
 1908, p. 319; The Statesman's Year Book, 1914. 
 
 II. The Debt of the German States. Source: Pfitzner-Entwickelung 
 
 der kommunalen Schulden in Deutschland, p. 36. 
 
74 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 THE PUBLIC DEBT OF THE UNITED STATES 
 (Net debt after deducting cash in the Treasury) 
 
 1790 1800 18(0 1820 1830 1840 1850 I860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 
 
 Figures for the years 1791-1859 derived from Annual Treasurer's Report for 
 
 1893, page xcvi. 
 Figures for the years 1860-1894 from Annual Treasurer's Reports. Tables 
 
 on "Analysis of the Public Debt." 
 Figures for the years 1895-1912 from Monthly Treasurer's Reports. 
 
 m. The evils of public debts. 
 
 A. Ethical objection. A debt is a burden on the future 
 Has the present the right to obligate the future? 
 
 1. Some answer affirmatively on the ground that a war 
 
 is for the benefit of future generations as well as 
 the present, indeed that it may be like a good 
 investment, the profits of which accrue to pos- 
 terity (for instance, England's wars against Na- 
 poleon); that, therefore, a loan is a fair means of 
 distributing the costs to all beneficiaries. They 
 contend that it is like a commercial loan of a cor- 
 poration, which with borrowed capital builds for 
 the future; and the future approves of the process. 
 
 2. Others reply negatively on the ground that it is not 
 
 right to load a new generation with debt without 
 
PUBLIC DEBTS 75 
 
 its consent. They hold that the analogy between 
 state and corporation is not accurate because the 
 corporation borrows for a "going" concern, one 
 which produces wealth; whereas a state is not 
 in a profit-making business is in fact largely 
 excluded from profit-making, which is reserved to 
 private enterprise and in going to war actually 
 destroys wealth; hence a corporation can repay a 
 loan out of its profits: whereas a state, not being 
 in business, has no profits and must resort to taxa- 
 tion. If it be contended that this taxation falls 
 on corporations and persons who ought to pay, 
 because the successful issue of the war increased 
 their business and profits, it is replied that business 
 as a whole is not national and the victory of the 
 nation does not mean the success of business within 
 its bounds; and per contra, that even in defeat 
 business as such often continues unscathed. (See 
 Chapter V.) 
 
 _ 3. The assumption that war is of advantage to the busi- 
 ness of a nation probably results from the fact 
 that "big business" by its influence over the 
 government has secured, or hopes to secure, favor- 
 able legislation in the form of tariffs, foreign loans 
 and concessions, etc., all of which would suffer 
 through a defeat in war. War then is chiefly in 
 - the interest of "big business." Are national war 
 debts justifiable under such circumstances? 
 
 B. Practical objections. 
 
 i. The power which debt gives to a government's 
 creditors may be injurious, if the loan is concen- 
 trated in unscrupulous hands. Popular govern- 
 ments are too likely to be run by men of financial 
 power as it is, and if they are, monarchy and aris- 
 
76 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 tocracy have merely yielded to plutocracy. Hence 
 a wide dispersion of bonds among the citizens of the 
 state is desirable. But if people can buy bonds, 
 why should they not be taxed in the first instance? 
 The fact is that people cannot be taxed and the 
 average man has no money to invest in bonds, which 
 therefore must be taken by men with means. Thus 
 present wealth takes a lien on the taxation of the 
 future. 
 
 The power of foreign creditors, particularly of the cred- 
 itors of lesser states, is backed by the military force 
 of their nations: Egypt, Persia, Turkey, China and 
 various states in Africa and South America. 
 
 2. There is no adequate check on this process, as bor- 
 
 rowing on a future which need not be consulted, 
 and doing so in the name of patriotism, national 
 existence and expansion knows no limit unless it 
 be national bankruptcy, some form of repudiation 
 or excessive taxation. 
 
 3. Preparedness for war, which is based on borrowed 
 
 money, is a bad investment and cannot claim to 
 be sound insurance for peace; for the war prepared 
 against is no more to be feared than the effects 
 of a repudiation or of a revolution on the part of 
 those who refuse to pay the taxes. 
 IV. The ultimate result of debts. 
 A. Few nations have done anything substantial in the 
 
 way of paying off public debts. 
 
 There is a partial justification for this in the fact that 
 government bonds are among the most stable se- 
 curities and, hence, they serve to steady markets 
 by furnishing a relatively secure investment. For 
 this reason the amount of government bonds may 
 properly increase with the volume of business. 
 
PUBLIC DEBTS 77 
 
 B. Public debts have recently risen more rapidly than 
 
 public wealth, or the volume of business, indeed on 
 a scale unrelated to general economic conditions. 
 
 C. How can this process continue indefinitely? What are 
 
 the alternatives? 
 
 1. Bankruptcy. This is not probable. 
 
 2. Repudiation of the debt. 
 
 a. No nation of first rank has done this in more than a 
 
 hundred years. 
 
 The Confederate States were compelled to repudi- 
 ate their obligations at the close of the Civil War, 
 hence they escaped paying a large part of the 
 cost of that war. 
 
 Certain South American states have repudiated 
 debts within the nineteenth century. 
 
 b. It is not advisable, as many of the people are them- 
 
 selves bondholders. (See II B, above.) 
 
 c. It is conceivable that if the bondholders are one 
 
 class of society, other classes through their 
 majority in legislative bodies may evade taxa- 
 tion and levy it on the bondholders in the form 
 of income taxes or the like. This would in effect 
 be a repudiation except for the fact that these 
 additional taxes can be passed to the ultimate 
 consumer in the form of increased cost of living. 
 
 d. Increase of taxes on income from bonds is a form of 
 
 repudiation. 
 
 e. Fiat money by depreciating values increases prices. 
 Hence a government by issuing excessive amounts 
 of fiat money really reduces the purchasing 
 power of the interest it pays its bondholders 
 and thus there is the equivalent of the govern- 
 ment shifting a part of its burden to the bond- 
 holders. 
 
78 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 /. After a war, nations reduce the burden of their 
 obligations by refunding their debts at lower 
 rates of interest as quickly as possible. To fa- 
 cilitate this they often reserve the right of retiring 
 bonds at any time. 
 
 3. Increased taxation. 
 
 The economic and sociological effects of higher taxa- 
 tion cause social unrest (see Chapter IX) and tend 
 to create opposition, even revolution of the masses 
 upon whom the burden of taxes ultimately falls. 
 
 4. Limitation of expenditure or restricting borrowing 
 
 to certain kinds of enterprises. 
 
 Debts contracted for "going" enterprises, those 
 which make a profit, will have no evil conse- 
 quences in the future; hence states may safely 
 contract such debts. 
 
 Debts for destructive purposes, war and preparation 
 for it, give no convincing profit to the future and 
 may have evil consequences. Expenditures of 
 this kind should be borne by those who believe they 
 benefit by them, the contemporaries.. 
 
 REFERENCES 
 
 DEBT OF UNITED STATES 
 
 Hirst: The Credit of Nations. Washington, Government Printing 
 
 Office, 1910. 
 
 North American Review, 1901, 632 f. 
 North American Review, 1902, pp. 101, 566, 720. Table showing 
 
 United States Debt, 1791-1902. 
 Bastable: Public Finance. 1892. 
 Lalor: Encyclopedia, "Debts," p. 726. 
 Adams: Public Debt. 1800. 
 Statistical Abstract (United States), 1906, p. 650, and appendix 
 
 (United States debt). 
 Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv, I, 242, 295 (United States debt). 
 
PUBLIC DEBTS 
 
 79 
 
 United States Government Documents, Serial number 5946 (com- 
 plete statement of United States bond issues). 
 
 Dewey: Financial History of the United States. 1907. (Refer- 
 ences at the beginning of the book.) 
 
 Atkinson: Cost of War and Warfare. 1902. 
 
 Atkinson: Cost of a National Crime. 1899. 
 
 Atkinson: The Hell of War and its Penalties. 1899. 
 
 Massachusetts Commission on the Cost of Living [McSweeney]: 
 The Waste of Militarism. World Peace Foundation, 1910. 
 
 DEBT OF GREAT BRITAIN 
 
 Statesman's Yearbook, 1900, p. 53. The same table is found in 
 
 other earlier editions. 
 British Parliamentary Papers, 1909 [cd. 4657]. L. 43, 44, 113. 
 
 (Debt, 1835-1908). 
 Dilke: Armaments of United Kingdom. Independent 52: 1294-7. 
 
 DEBT OF FRANCE 
 
 Gorges: La dette publique. 1884. 
 
 Journal de la societe de statistique de Paris, 1860, pp. 14-16. 
 
 Vol. 34, pp. 315-17. Vol. 50, pp. 359-389. Bonds. 
 Statesman's Year Book, 1899, pp. 521. French debt. 
 Wuhrer: Histoire de la dette publique en France. 2 vols. 
 
 1886. 
 Nicolas, C. : Les budgets de la France depuis le commencement du 
 
 19 siecle. Tableaux. Paris, 1883. 
 
 DEBT OF GERMAN EMPIRE 
 
 Statistisches Jahrbuch d. deutschen Reiches. 1910, p. 307. Im- 
 perial debt since 1870. 
 
 Sundbarg: Apercus. . . . 1908, p. 161. 
 
 Pfitzner: Entwickelung d. kommunalen Schulden in Deutschland. 
 1911. Tables. 
 
 GENERAL 
 
 Statistical Abstract (Great Britain), 1908, pp. 313 f- Debt of 
 foreign countries in recent years. 
 
8o NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 Lawson: Modern Wars and War Taxes. A Manual of Military 
 
 Finance. 1912. 
 
 Loubet: La politique budgetaire en Europe. 1910. 
 Bloch: Der Krieg, I, 1899, pp. 3-245 passim; pp. 277-308. 
 Bloch: The Future of War. 1902, 128-9; 140-6; 163-318. 
 Tarbell: The Tariff in Our Times. 1911. War Tariffs. 
 Stammhammer: Bibliographic der Finanzwissenschaft. 1903. 
 Pfeiffer: Kriegsgeist. Die Wahreit iiber die Kriegsgefahren. 
 
 1912. 
 Johnson: Expansion of Military Expenditure. American Associa- 
 
 tion for International Conciliation. 1911. 
 Wilson: An Empire in Pawn. 1909. 
 Atwood: The World in Debt. Saturday Evening Post, April 24, 
 
 Angell: Bankers as Saviors of Society. London Public Opinion, 
 
 January 26 and February 2, 1912. 
 Jordan : The Unseen Empire. 1912. 
 Jordan: War and Waste. 1913. 
 Hamilton-Grace: Finance and War. 1910. 
 Atkinson, Edward: Facts and Figures. Lecture 6 (Hough ton- 
 
 Mifflin), 1904. 
 
 Levi: War and its Consequences. 1881. 
 Prevention of War, World's Work, 14, 9145-48. 
 Bullock: Cost of War. Atlantic Monthly, 95: 433-45. 
 Powell: The Masters of Europe. Saturday Evening Post. June 19, 
 
 1909. 
 
IX 
 
 WAR AND SOCIOLOGY 
 
 I. Economic evils which affect social conditions. 
 A . Effect of competitive armament. (See Chapter VI.) 
 
 1. Taxes increased. 
 
 2. The cost of living increases, high prices resulting from 
 
 scarcity of gold, depreciation of securities and 
 paper of all sorts, cornering or storing commodities 
 for high prices, etc. A commission of the Massa- 
 chusetts legislature in 1910 made an investigation 
 of the cost of living and declared its conviction 
 that militarism is a most far-reaching influence 
 increasing and perpetuating high prices. (An 
 extract "The Waste of Militarism" printed by 
 the World Peace Foundation, 1912.) 
 a. The reduced purchasing power of money since 
 1895 is shown in a report of the United States 
 Bureau of Labor. 
 
 1895 purchasing power $i . oo 
 
 1905 " " .83 
 
 1912 " " 63 
 
 81 
 
82 
 
 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 6. INDEX NUMBERS OF CHANGES IN THE LEVEL OF FOOD 
 PRICES SINCE THE YEAR 1900 IN THE UNITED KING- 
 DOM AND CERTAIN FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND BRITISH 
 DOMINIONS OVERSEA 
 
 (1900 = 100) 
 
 COUNTRY 
 
 1900 
 
 1901 
 
 1902 
 
 1903 
 
 1904 
 
 1905 
 
 1906 
 
 United Kingdom. . . 
 
 IOO 
 
 IOO 
 
 IOI 
 
 103 
 
 IO2 
 
 103 
 
 102 
 
 Foreign Countries: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Austria-Hungary : 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (a) Austria . . . 
 
 IOO 
 
 IOO 
 
 99 
 
 IOI 
 
 105 
 
 1 08 
 
 113 
 
 (6) Hungary. . 
 
 IOO 
 
 IOI 
 
 IO2 
 
 103 
 
 III 
 
 122 
 
 118 
 
 Belgium 
 
 IOO 
 
 IOI 
 
 IO2 
 
 ii3 
 
 IOO 
 
 no 
 
 112 
 
 France 
 
 IOO 
 
 IOO 
 
 QC 
 
 A *O 
 
 98 
 
 oo 
 
 07 
 
 
 Germany 
 
 IOO 
 
 103 
 
 vo 
 
 106 
 
 V 
 
 105 
 
 yy 
 105 
 
 V / 
 
 114 
 
 118 
 
 Holland 
 
 IOO 
 
 IOO 
 
 IOO 
 
 IO2 
 
 IO3 
 
 IO2 
 
 IO3 
 
 Italy. . 
 
 IOO 
 
 IOO 
 
 00 
 
 00 
 
 07 
 
 oo 
 
 00" 
 
 Norway 
 
 
 IOO 
 
 yy 
 
 00 
 
 yy 
 00 
 
 y / 
 
 O7 
 
 yy 
 
 IOO 
 
 yy 
 
 Russia 
 
 IOO 
 
 
 yy 
 
 IO7 
 
 yy 
 
 IO2 
 
 y / 
 
 112 
 
 116 
 
 United States. . . 
 
 IOO 
 
 105 
 
 / 
 in 
 
 III 
 
 113 
 
 
 117 
 
 Japan . 
 
 IOO 
 
 O7 
 
 IOO 
 
 108 
 
 1 20 
 
 132 
 
 127 
 
 British Dominions: 
 
 
 y / 
 
 
 
 
 
 **/ 
 
 Canada 
 
 IOO 
 
 
 TOO 
 
 106 
 
 IOO 
 
 in 
 
 TTC 
 
 
 
 T" 
 
 J.L/y 
 
 
 XWy 
 
 
 J 
 
 Australia 
 
 
 
 IOO 
 
 109 
 
 105 
 
 95 
 
 IOI 
 
 IOI 
 
 New Zealand .... 
 
 IOO 
 
 IOI 
 
 109 
 
 109 
 
 IO2 
 
 107 
 
 107 
 
 (Table continued on p. 83.) 
 
WAR AND SOCIOLOGY 
 
 COUNTRY 
 
 1907 
 
 1908 
 
 1909 
 
 1910 
 
 1911 
 
 1912 
 
 United Kingdom. . . 
 
 105 
 
 108 
 
 108 
 
 109 
 
 109 
 
 US 
 
 Foreign Countries: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Austria-Hungary : 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (a) Austria. . . . 
 
 H3 
 
 118 
 
 120 
 
 126 
 
 128 
 
 135 
 
 (6) Hungary. . 
 
 122 
 
 128 
 
 131 
 
 129 
 
 137 
 
 
 
 Belgium 
 
 II r 
 
 116 
 
 1 2O 
 
 122 
 
 128 
 
 132 
 
 France 
 
 IOO 
 
 IO2 
 
 IOO 
 
 IO4. 
 
 117 
 
 
 Germany 
 
 116 
 
 116 
 
 124 
 
 127 
 
 T?8 
 
 130 * 
 
 Holland 
 
 
 107 
 
 109 
 
 
 117 
 
 123 
 
 Italy. . 
 
 IOI 
 
 
 112 
 
 H4 
 
 TT8 
 
 1 2O 
 
 Norway 
 
 108 
 
 IOO 
 
 1 06 
 
 108 
 
 III 
 
 119 
 
 Russia 
 
 130 
 
 130 
 
 127 
 
 TT6 
 
 121 
 
 
 United States . . . 
 
 122 
 
 126 
 
 133 
 
 140 
 
 139 
 
 
 
 Japan . 
 
 134. 
 
 136 
 
 132 
 
 132 
 
 T38 
 
 
 
 British Dominions: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Canada 
 
 128 
 
 I2Q 
 
 133 
 
 13^ 
 
 136 
 
 151 
 
 Australia 
 
 98 
 
 1 06 
 
 IO4 
 
 103 
 
 103 
 
 TT6 
 
 New Zealand .... 
 
 112 
 
 117 
 
 108 
 
 no 
 
 116 
 
 
 (From Report of Board of Trade of Great Britain, 1913: 
 London Weekly Times, August 15, 1913.) 
 
 c. Cost of clothing, boots and shoes advanced in 
 
 Great Britain from 5 to 15 per cent since 1895. 
 
 d. Rents advanced slightly. 
 
 e. In Great Britain average prices have since 1895 
 
 advanced in various districts from 9 to 12 per 
 cent. 
 
 3. Wages did not advance at the same rate. 
 a. Advance in wages 1905 to 1912 in Great Britain. 
 
 Building trades 1.9 % 
 
 Laborers 2.6 " 
 
 1 Baden only: figures for the remaining States not yet being avail- 
 able for this year. 
 
NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 Engineering trade: 
 
 Skilled men 5.5 % 
 
 Laborers 3.9 " 
 
 Printing trade: 
 
 Compositors 4.1 " 
 
 (London Weekly Times, August 15, 1913-) 
 
 b. The relation of prices and wages during the Civil 
 War. (Dewey: Financial History, 294.) 
 
 YEAR 
 
 PRICES 
 
 MONEY WAGES 
 
 1860 
 1861 . . . 
 
 IOO.O 
 
 loo 6 
 
 IOO.O 
 
 100 8 
 
 1862 
 1863 
 
 117.8 
 148 6 
 
 102.9 
 
 IIO 'J 
 
 1864 
 
 100 t; 
 
 i2; 6 
 
 i86< 
 
 216 8 
 
 147 i 
 
 
 
 
 4. Salaries advance even more slowly because salaried 
 
 men do not, like laborers, have organizations to 
 force an increase. 
 
 5. Unemployment Firms to weather a period of stress 
 
 discharge men. The man at the bottom eventually 
 bears the cost. 
 B. Effect of War. (See Chapter VIL) 
 
 1. All the above evils are aggravated. 
 
 2. The economic disorder accompanying the advent of 
 
 war forces men and businesses with a small margin 
 of working capital to the wall, or to continue their 
 business at a disadvantage. (See Chapter VII, 
 Section II, B.) 
 
 II . Sociological consequences of war. 
 A. Evil consequences. 
 
 i. Unemployment, poverty, distress. 
 
WAR AND SOCIOLOGY 8? 
 
 ; 
 
 2. Widowed, orphaned and wounded become depend- 
 
 ents. 
 
 3. Social disturbances and unrest and, after the war, 
 
 strikes for better conditions. 
 
 4. Increase of crime, disease and the death-rate. 
 
 a. Crime is fostered by the lawless ideals of war and 
 
 by the increased chance war gives to the criminal 
 class to ply their trade. 
 
 b. Diseases are more common at home during war 
 
 than in peace (see Chapter X) and this is im- 
 portant sociologically if not biologically. 
 
 5. All social work suffers or is neglected for lack of funds, 
 
 workers or time. Schools and education are most 
 seriously injured. The social processes whereby 
 society in time of peace endeavors to improve it- 
 self are suspended and leave a heritage of things 
 undone to posterity. 
 
 6. War reduces respect for ordinary law and morality, 
 
 for force has precedence. "Inter arma leges 
 silent." What is the effect on the individual, and 
 is it wholesome for society? 
 
 a. War babies and their future. 
 
 b. Cessation of ethical relations with the foe. 
 National hatreds: "The Song of Hate"; rejection 
 
 of all things related to the foe, and the resultant 
 evils. 
 B. Compensating benefits. 
 
 1. Self-sacrifice dying for a cause. Patriotism. 
 
 2. Reducing petty national friction and substituting 
 
 unity of action. 
 
 3. Developing courage, action, heroism, and the full ex- 
 
 ercise of personal talents. 
 
 4. Victory perhaps. 
 
86 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 REFERENCES 
 
 Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the 
 Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars. Carnegie Endow- 
 ment, Washington, D. C. 
 
 Angell: America and the New World-State. 1915. pp. 148-185 
 (Americans in Philippines). 
 
 Angell: War and the Workers. National Labour Press, Man- 
 chester, England. 
 
 Hirst: Political Economy of War. London, 1915. "How War 
 Impoverishes." 
 
 Novicow: La probleme de la misere et les phenomenes economiques 
 naturels. Paris, 1908. 
 
 Anitchkow: War and Labor. 1900. 
 
 Friedenswarte: VII (July, 1905), pp. 130-136. Germans in China, 
 
 1000. 
 
 Report of Massachusetts Commission on the Cost of Living. 
 
 World's Peace Foundation. 1910. 
 British Parliamentary Papers. 1913, LXVI [Cd. 6955]. Report of 
 
 Board of Trade on Cost of Living of Working Classes. 
 Walsh: Moral Damage of War. 1906. References at the end of 
 
 each chapter. 
 Andrew and Bushnell: The Queen's Daughters in India. 3d ed., 
 
 1899. Extract printed in Jordan: War and the Breed. 1915. 
 
 pp. 246-9. 
 
 Levi : War and its Consequences. 1881. 
 Chittenden: War or Peace. 1911. 59-63. 
 Jordan: Imperial Democracy. 1899. "The Captain Sleeps." 
 Weale: Indiscreet Letters from Peking. 1906. 
 Bella, Bella, Horrida Bella! Westminster Review, 157, 237-54, 
 Dunant: Un souvenir de Solffrino. 2d ed. 1862. 
 Sakurai: Human Bullets. 1908. 
 Dewey: Financial History of the United States. 1912. 
 
WAR AND BIOLOGY 
 
 I. The principles of evolution. 
 
 A . Heredity means the law of continuity among organisms, 
 
 which tend to reproduce after their own kind: "like 
 the seed is the harvest." 
 
 B. Variation: organisms though tending to similarity are 
 
 never quite alike. 
 
 C. Law of natural selection: nature selects among these 
 
 variations and preserves the adaptable: the survival 
 of the fittest. This phrase means those most fit to 
 meet natural conditions, those of nature. 
 
 D. These laws apply to human beings as to lower animals. 
 
 II. Artificial or unnatural selection. 
 
 A. Any process by which the normal workings of nature 
 
 are altered produces artificial selection, and an al- 
 tered product. 
 
 1. This has been conspicuously shown by the experi- 
 
 ments of Luther Burbank. 
 
 2. Eugenics rests on the principle of selection for pur- 
 
 poses of reproduction, the underlying idea being 
 to select and perpetuate the best, and thus improv- 
 ing the race. 
 
 B. Reversed selection: when this process of artificial selec- 
 
 tion goes to the point of selecting the fit for destruc- 
 tion and preserving the others for perpetuation we 
 have reversed selection: the survival of the unfit. 
 
 III. War, it is claimed, causes reversed selection in physical 
 
 qualities. 
 
 A. War and compulsory service select physically fit men 
 
 87 
 
88 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 for armies and reject the physically unfit at the age 
 of greatest reproductive power. 
 
 B. These are, even in peace, exposed to greater danger of 
 
 diseases especially the venereal. 
 
 C. In war the men in armies are killed or rendered unfit by 
 
 artificial implements which make no distinction as 
 to the fitness of their victims and they suffer heavier 
 mortality from disease than those who stay at 
 home. 
 
 i. Artificial causes: Death from gunshot and other 
 injuries in battle. 
 
 a. A rough estimate (based on Bodart and Myrdacz, 
 
 mentioned in the references) indicates that in 
 wars before that of 1914 losses were about as 
 follows: 
 
 Average number of men killed outright in land 
 engagements 2.2%- 2.5%. 
 
 Average number wounded, 8% - 10%. 
 
 (Ratio of killed to wounded, i :4.) 
 
 Average number fatally wounded, 10%. 
 
 Average number of whole force dying from wounds, 
 about i%. (Attention to military hygiene has 
 diminished this number considerably.) 
 
 b. Indications are that this percentage is too low for 
 
 the present war, as the change in the character 
 of fighting changes all calculations. 
 
 c. The loss in a given battle is different from the loss 
 
 during the whole war. 
 
 In the Russo-Japanese War (1905) Japan's losses 
 from action in battle were 8.83% of the whole 
 army. (Seaman, 104.) 
 
 d. Johnston (Arms and the Race, 26) states that the 
 
 less destructive the weapons used in war the 
 greater the loss of life; and that the deaths from 
 
WAR AND BIOLOGY 
 
 89 
 
 artificial causes have decreased since 1850 from 
 8% to | of i%. 
 
 DEATHS IN THE VICTORIOUS ARMIES IN FOUR RECENT WARS. 
 
 FRANCO-GERMAN 
 WAB 
 
 RUSSO-JAPANESE 
 WAR 
 
 Died of Wounds 
 
 Died of Disease 
 
 Note the diminishing importance of illness as a factor in the death 
 rate of the armies. The present war should show a further ad- 
 vance in this particular. 
 (By permission of The Independent. Printed April, 19, 1915-) 
 
 2. Natural causes: disease. Deaths from disease depend 
 on sanitary conditions. 
 
 a. In the Crimean War the rate was as high as 16% 
 
 in the armies of the Allies; four men died of sick- 
 ness to every one from injury. 
 
 b. In the Franco-Prussian War deaths in the German 
 
 army from disease (not counting wounds) was 
 1.8% of the whole force. 
 
 c. In the Russo-Japanese War the loss of the Jap- 
 
 anese from disease was 2% about one-fourth 
 the loss in engagements. (Seaman: 104.) 
 D. It is very important for what follows to note that the 
 tendency is for deaths by artificial causes to increase 
 and deaths by natural causes to decrease as sanita- 
 tion and military hygiene improve. 
 
90 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 E. The men left behind become the fathers of the next 
 
 generation and perpetuate their own inferior quali- 
 ties. 
 
 F. The evil effects of war extend to the civil population, 
 
 increasing disease and the death-rate. (Dumas 
 see references.) 
 
 IV. It is also claimed by some that war institutes a reversed 
 
 selection and a deterioration of moral qualities. 
 (Jordan, Seeck.) 
 
 A. The courageous, daring, adventurous and those ani- 
 
 mated with the highest love of the cause at stake are 
 the first to enlist: cowards and those with lower 
 ideals remain behind. 
 
 B. Those who join the army die in greater proportion than 
 
 those who remain at home, because: 
 
 1. They die in battle. 
 
 2. Their very qualities of courage make them take ex- 
 
 ceptional risks. 
 
 3. They are more likely to die from disease than those 
 
 who do not enlist. This is true even in times of 
 peace: it is asserted that venereal diseases are more 
 prevalent in armies than in the civil population. 
 
 C. The stay-at-homes, the cowards, the deserters, the 
 
 inert, the ambitionless, become the fathers of the 
 next generation. 
 
 V. These contentions are by no means generally accepted. 
 A. Many prominent scientists and others have inclined to 
 
 accept the contentions: Spencer, Jordan, Galton, 
 Ammon, Richet, Schallmayer, Kellogg, Villerme, 
 Novicow, Legoyt, La Pouge, Heckel, Seeck. 
 i. Circumstances tending to confirm these contentions. 
 
 (Kellogg, Bionomics of War, pp. 46-49.) 
 a. There seems good evidence that the average stature 
 of the next generation of French people was 
 
WAR AND BIOLOGY 91 
 
 lowered by the drain of the Revolutionary and 
 Napoleonic Wars on men of more than average 
 stature. (La Population Francaise, 1889-1892, 
 III, 524-533.) 
 b. Infirmity seems to have been greatly increased in 
 
 the new generation in France. 
 B. Difficulties and objections. 
 
 1. The physical effects of war on the race must be 
 
 sharply distinguished from the moral effects. 
 
 2. Certainly men have never been selected for armies 
 
 on the ground of their moral or spiritual quali- 
 ties. 
 
 3. Granting that the law of survival holds for human 
 
 beings as for the lower animals, it does not at all 
 follow that war has reversed selection. 
 Until modern times there was no real selection for 
 military service on the ground of physical fitness; 
 men volunteered. A few qualities such as stature, 
 age, eyesight, alone were taken into account, and 
 these are not of themselves evidences of biological 
 fitness. Many an injured soldier returns from the 
 war still biologically fit. 
 
 4. Even now there is no adequate criterion of biological 
 
 fitness. 
 
 5. Society tends to root out the unfit at home. 
 
 a. Cowards and deserters cannot be a dangerous 
 
 factor as public opinion ostracises them. 
 
 b. Women prefer soldiers to the feeble stay-at-homes 
 
 and this counteracts the danger of perpetuation 
 from inferior stock. 
 
 6. The energy, effort and confidence engendered by war 
 
 offset its injuries, e. g., Dutch after the Spanish 
 Wars. 
 
 7. As a nation, under pressure for men, abandons care- 
 
92 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 ful selection of recruits, the danger of biological 
 harm lessens. 
 VI. The danger of injury to the race is increasing with: 
 
 A. The adoption of compulsory service instead of volun- 
 
 teering. 
 
 B. More scientific and rigid examinations of recruits, and 
 
 rejection of the unfit. 
 
 C. Increase of deaths in war by artificial selection as ma- 
 
 chinery improves, as compared with deaths from 
 disease as medical science and sanitation improve. 
 
 REFERENCES 
 
 Kellogg: Eugenics and Militarism. Atlantic Monthly, 1912, 
 
 pp. 99-108. 
 Kellogg: Bionomics of War. Social Hygiene, December, 1914, 
 
 pp. 44-52. 
 
 Jordan: War and the Breed. Boston, 1915. 
 Jordan: The Blood of the Nation. 1910. 
 Jordan: The Human Harvest. 1906. 
 Jordan: War and Manhood. 1910. 
 
 Jordan, David Starr and Jordan, Harvey Ernest: War's After- 
 math. 1914. 
 
 Mitchell, P. Chalmers: Evolution and the War. 1915. 
 Novicow: War and its Alleged Benefits. 1911. 
 Novicow: Critique du darwinisme sociale. 1907. 
 Nasmyth, George W. : Social Progress and the Darwinian Theory. 
 
 1916. 
 Schallmayer: Vererbung und Auslese im Lebenslauf der Volker. 
 
 1903, PP- 249-266. 
 Schallmayer: Der Krieg als Ziichter. 
 Ammon: Die natiirliche Auslese beim Menschen. 1893. 
 Ammon: Die Gesellschaftsordnung lind ihre natiirliche Grund- 
 
 lagen. 1895. 
 Goldscheid: Hoherentwicklung und Menschenokonomie. Leipzig, 
 
 1912. 
 
WAR AND BIOLOGY 93 
 
 Goldscheid: Friedensbewegung und Menschenokonomie. Berlin, 
 
 1912. 
 Popper-Lynkeus, Josef: Das Individuum und die Bewertung der 
 
 menschlichen Existenzen. Dresden, 1910. 
 Lapouge: Les selections sociales. 1896. 
 
 Miiller: Ein Ziichtigungsversuch an Mais. Kosmos, 1886, II, p. 22. 
 Dumas: Mortality of Civil Population in Time of War. Peace 
 
 Movement, March 30, 1912. 
 Richet: Le passe de la guerre et 1'avenir de la paix. 1907, 
 
 pp. 75-90. 
 
 Wolf: System der Sozialpolitik. 1892. I, 218. 
 Pearson: National Life from the Standpoint of Science. 1901. 
 Seeck: Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt. 1897-1911. 
 La Population Francaise. 1899-1902. II, pp. 139-140; III, 
 
 pp. 524, 533. Index "Guerres" and "Tailles." 
 Gal ton: Natural Inheritance. 1889. 
 
 Association Medicale Internationale centre la guerre: Actes, 1910. 
 Bagehot, W.: Physics and Politics; or thoughts on the application 
 
 of the principles of "natural selection" and "inheritance" to 
 
 political society. 1873. 
 Cannon, Walter B.: Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and 
 
 Rage. London, 1915. 
 Muller-Lyer, D. F.: Der Sinn des Lebens. 1910. 
 
 STATISTICS ON Loss OF LIFE IN WAR 
 
 Bodart: Militar-historisches Kriegs-Lexikon, 1618-1906. 1908. 
 Myrdacz: Handbuch fur k. und k. Militarartzte, 1898-1905. 
 
 Vol. II. 
 Levasseur: Statistique des batailles et des pertes caus6es par la 
 
 guerre depuis trois siecles. Journal de la Soctit6 de Statistique 
 
 de Paris, 1909, 224-236. 
 Longmore: Gunshot Injuries. 1895. 
 Seaman: Real Triumph of Japan. 1906. 
 Phisterer: Statistical Record of the Armies of the United States 
 
 (Scribner's). 1883. 
 
 Heitman: Historical Register. 1903. II, 281-297. 
 Journal de la Societe de Statistique de Paris, 1909, 142; 417-427. 
 
94 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 Bloch: Der Krieg. 1899. IV, 35-64; V, 349-603- 
 
 Bloch: Future of War. 1902. 147-159. 
 
 Crile, George W. : A Mechanistic View of War and Peace. (The 
 
 Macmillan Company.) 1915. 
 Harbottle: Dictionary of Battles. 1004. 
 Mulhall: Statistics. 1003, 586, 818. 
 
 Army and Navy Gazette, October 28, 1911. "Losses in War." 
 Massachusetts Commission on the Cost of Living: The Waste of 
 
 Militarism. World Peace Foundation, 1910. 
 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1007 (25), XLIX, 729. 
 
 Killed and Wounded in the English Wars, 1898-1903. 
 
 STATISTICS OF BIRTHS, MARRIAGES AND DEATHS, AS RELATED TO 
 
 WAR 
 
 Statistisches Jahrbuch d. deutschen Reiches. 1911, p. 22. 1850- 
 1909. 
 
 Rauchberg: Die Bevolkerung Oesterreichs. 1895, p. 27. Statis- 
 tics for 1822-1800. 
 
 La Population Francaise. 1899-1902. II, p. 12, Births, 1801- 
 1888; p. 58, Deaths, 1801-1888; p. 76, Marriages, 1801-1888. 
 
 Schnapper-Arndt: Sozialstatistik. 1908. Table, p. 242. Showing 
 influence of military service on marriage rate. 
 
XI 
 
 WAR AND THE STATE: POLITICAL ASPECTS OF WAR AND 
 MILITARISM 
 
 I. War always tends to produce centralization of power and 
 a corresponding reduction of personal liberty and hence 
 is undemocratic in its influence. 
 
 A. This condition is inherent in the military conception. 
 
 1. Obedience in armies and navies must be absolute. 
 Secretary Daniels has been greatly blamed for his 
 
 efforts to "democratize" the navy on the ground 
 that he will merely demoralize it; as Pelletan is 
 said to have done in the French navy a few years 
 ago. (N. Y. Sun, Feb. 14, 1915; Army and Navy 
 Journal, Jan. 16, 1915, p. 616, et passim; and many 
 others.) 
 
 2. It is apparent in the bullying and abusive tone which 
 
 militarists and military journals so frequently adopt 
 when it comes to difference of opinion: they would 
 suppress, if need be violently crush, the contrary- 
 minded instead of mending the weaknesses of their 
 own positions. It is the theory of force. 
 
 B. A military class is an inevitable concomitant of an 
 
 army and navy. 
 
 i. Men who enter the military profession have just as 
 much of an instinct and as much of a right as others 
 to struggle for their own advancement and the 
 welfare of wife and children. They naturally seek 
 to enlarge their profession and its opportunities 
 in every possible way; that is, they seek to enlarge 
 their class and its position in the community. 
 95 
 
96 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 2. The military class is largely drawn from the "upper 
 
 classes" and its sympathies and affiliations are 
 with the aristocrats rather than the people. How 
 closely the officers of the British army were iden- 
 tified with the Tories appeared when the Ulster 
 Question came to a crisis, and officers resigned 
 rather than obey the government. 
 
 3. A large military class, animated by the undemocratic 
 
 spirit noted above, becomes a menace to the civil 
 population (e. g., the Zabern incident), to the 
 democratic institutions of the state and to the 
 peace of the world. 
 
 Armies have quite as often been the agents of tyrants 
 as the protectors of freedom. 
 
 C. The military class, believing in force as a means of 
 
 settling questions, naturally is impatient at delay or 
 pacific settlement. 
 
 It is military men and nations that have opposed arbi- 
 tration. 
 
 The militarists have shown the greatest impatience at 
 Wilson's Mexican policy of "watchful waiting." 
 
 D. The military class naturally wants to resort to arms 
 
 for other than the above reasons. 
 
 1. It is human nature to want to see how well one can 
 
 do what he is training to do; and how well guns 
 and other equipment work. 
 
 2. War is relief from the ennui of ever waiting to act; 
 
 which is all the more welcome because those in 
 the service usually are considered "men of ac- 
 tion." 
 
 3. War furnishes the chance for distinction and advance- 
 
 ment. 
 
 n. Democracy versus National Efficiency. 
 A. Democracy means liberty of thought and of person: 
 
WAR AND THE STATE 
 
 97 
 
 this means diversity in society, disagreement, lack of 
 unity, etc. 
 
 B. National efficiency means common purpose, which 
 
 means unity, therefore restriction of personal liberty, 
 and thus a strong central government. 
 
 C. The question is whether a people can set up a strong 
 
 central government under its own control, or whether 
 it must abandon democracy to secure efficiency. 
 Competitive nationalism favors absolutism. 
 III. The centralizing action of war on a free state appears in 
 many ways. 
 
 A. Martial law is proclaimed and constitutional guarantees 
 
 of personal liberties are thereby suspended. 
 
 B. The press and public speech are put under censorship. 
 
 This is an anomaly in a popular government, for how 
 can people vote intelligently unless they know what is 
 transpiring? 
 
 C. Thus elections become useless and are abandoned. 
 
 The British General Elections, which should have 
 come in January, 1916, were omitted and Parliament 
 prolonged its own life. 
 
 D. This coalition government acquires autocratic powers, 
 
 and the legislative body, though it has the power, is 
 not likely to exercise restraint inasmuch as the cab- 
 inet consists of the leaders of all parties. 
 
 E. The centralized government: 
 
 1. Conducts the military operations without consulting 
 
 the people; it could not if it would. 
 
 2. Lays down minute restrictions for individuals. 
 
 3. Conceals news or issues false reports to keep the sym- 
 
 pathy of the people. 
 
 F. Conscription, mobilization of labor and resources make 
 
 individuals, like materials, handled by the govern- 
 ment. Men are forced to fight no matter whether 
 
98 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 they believe the cause to be just or not; their liberty 
 of conscience is denied. A few exceptions. 
 
 IV. Compulsory or Universal Service. 
 
 A . This is the rule hi most European countries and Japan, 
 
 and also in Australia and New Zealand. In the latter 
 it was adopted hi 1909 largely as a result of the 
 agitation of the National Defense League. It was 
 opposed by the New Zealand Freedom League; hi 
 Australia by the Australian Freedom League. 
 
 B. The volunteer system was, until the Great War, adhered 
 
 to hi Great Britain and the United States. 
 In Great Britain, the National Service League has 
 
 advocated compulsory service. Lord Roberts and 
 
 others approved it. 
 In the United States, a demand for compulsory service 
 
 is appearing. 
 
 C. Compulsory service has political dangers. 
 
 1. It means that all persons within the age of compulsory 
 
 service are subject to martial instead of civil law. 
 Thus the government may use martial law to 
 achieve things it could not do under civil law. 
 
 a. Briand hi France suppressed a strike of railway em- 
 
 ployees for better conditions, by calling them to 
 the colors, that is, invoking military law. 
 
 b. The British laboring men oppose conscription be- 
 
 cause they fear that military law, once they are 
 subject to it, will be used by the upper classes, 
 who dominate the army and often the govern- 
 ment, to defeat popular demands for reforms. 
 
 2. The essential point, as far as democracy is concerned, 
 
 is whether those in authority favor the people. 
 
 V. The political dangers from centralization through war. 
 
 A . Formerly it was to be feared that some army idol would 
 use his influence to become ruler, as did the French 
 
WAR AND THE STATE 99 
 
 Terrorists and Napoleon. There are abundant in- 
 stances of this in the past. It is no longer a real 
 danger in well-established republics. The attempt of 
 Boulanger to use his military prestige for anti- 
 government purposes, is the last conspicuous in- 
 stance of the kind. 
 
 B. It is to be feared that any war will increase militarism in 
 
 a country. The disbanding of the United States army 
 in 1865 was regarded with concern and its success was 
 considered a real achievement. Despite the violent 
 criticism of Prussian militarism there is a wide-spread 
 disposition to imitate the Prussian military system, 
 the proposal being to have the latter without the 
 former. Some question whether this is possible. 
 
 C. War stops reforms which are working through normal 
 
 political channels. Some hold that governments 
 hard pressed by movements, such as Socialism, 
 syndicalism, labor legislation, welcome war as a means 
 of escape. 
 
 REFERENCES 
 
 Kingsley, Darwin P. : Democracy versus Sovereignty. New York, 
 1915. (Privately Printed.) Also New York Times, Novem- 
 ber 21, 1915. 
 
 Sembat, Marcel: Faites la paix ou faites un roi. 
 
 Jordan: Imperial Democracy. 1899. 
 
 Seillieres, Ernest: L'Imperialisme Democratique. Paris, 1907. 
 
 Burgess, John W.: The Reconciliation of Government with Lib- 
 erty. New York, 1915. 
 
 Ferguson, Charles: The Great News (Kennerly). 1915. 
 
 COMPULSORY SERVICE 
 
 Oliver, F. S.: Ordeal by Battle. 1915. 
 Hamilton, Sir Ian: Compulsory Service. 1910. 
 Roberts, Lord: Fallacies and Facts. 1911. 
 
ioo NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 Beresford, Lord Charles: The Betrayal. Record of Facts Concern- 
 ing Naval Policy and Administration from 1902. London, 1912. 
 
 Shee, George R. F.: The Briton's First Duty. National Service 
 League, London, 1907. 
 
 von der Goltz: The Nation in Arms. 1906. 
 
 Ford, Reginald: Warning to Emigrants to New Zealand. [Opposed 
 to Conscription.] 
 
 L'Regon, P. J. : The New Zealand Defense Act and What it Means. 
 [Opposed to Conscription.] 
 
 Additional references on conscription. Peace Year Book, 1911. 
 pp. 183-4. 
 
XII 
 
 NATIONALISM AND MORALS 
 
 I. National righteousness. A common charge against paci- 
 fism is that it favors unrighteousness by failing to 
 resist it. This is called the "peace of unrighteous- 
 ness." The counterpart is that a war is justified when 
 it is for righteousness. This is true. But what is 
 righteousness, and who determines it? 
 
 A. Each nation always considers its cause absolutely just, 
 
 and never concedes that it can err. Hence it approves 
 in its own case precisely what it condemns in other 
 nations: e. g., the United States went to war with 
 Spain to suppress atrocities in Cuba, yet within two 
 years it was justifying American atrocities in the 
 Philippines upon the people just "rescued" from 
 Spain (Angell: America and the New World-State, 
 pp. 148-185). The views of the Allies and of the 
 Central powers on the violation of Belgian, Chinese 
 and Greek neutrality by their respective opponents 
 illustrates the point. Americans condemn the viola- 
 tion of Belgian neutrality and approve the seizure of 
 Panama on the basis of what seems righteous to them 
 in each case. 
 
 B. What is to be regarded as righteousness and a worthy 
 
 national cause is too often decided by rulers, whether 
 monarchial or elective, and not by the people. The 
 people, and even their representatives, have little 
 chance to know of the preliminaries leading to a war. 
 This is regarded as a private affair of a government 
 
I 
 
 102 .-'. 'N;vnONAtJSM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 and even in England a common reply to questions in 
 Parliament is "it would not be to the public interest 
 to give the information. ' ' The alleged popular clamor 
 for war cannot be more than an unreasoning reaction 
 (the result of education) to such information as au- 
 thorities, who are concerned about justifying their 
 own course, give out. It is notorious that diplomatic 
 documents are not open to the public or to students 
 for a half century or so after an event. Wars hi 
 their inception are virtually the private business 
 of diplomats and are eventually approved by the 
 emotionalism of an uninformed populace; and the 
 official censorship sees to it that independent thinkers 
 f. and sentiment for ending the war secure no hearing. 
 (Nationalism has become a power, like the religions 
 of old, through which the authorities may exploit the 
 i people. Emancipation from this modern tyranny is 
 needed Democracy should begin at home. 
 
 II. Wealth and influence have the ear of ministries and the 
 
 latter are in effect executive committees of the former. 
 Thus the alleged righteousness of a nation in any given 
 case is probably the interest of the dominant group 
 behind the government presented for popular consump- 
 tion in the usual pious phrases about national honor or 
 destiny, the cause of civilization and humanity, etc., 
 etc. 
 
 III. The mischievous self-made standard of righteousness 
 
 ignores the existence of other nations. The result is 
 international anarchy. Both nations cannot always 
 be right. Why should we assume that any one nation 
 is always right when in civil society we insist that the 
 individual's conception of right must yield before the 
 general conception? Is not the national conception 
 of righteousness just as arbitrary, and hence im- 
 
NATIONALISM AND MORALS 103 
 
 practicable, as the discarded individual righteousness 
 was found to be? Why should a group of individuals 
 be justified in doing what it punishes one of its number 
 for doing? 
 
 IV. The conception of national righteousness subjects re- 
 
 ligion and personal conscience to enterprises which, as 
 just noted, may have a sordid basis. Declaring God to 
 be on the side of the nation puts an end to religion 
 as a guiding influence and reduces it to a sham used 
 for self-justification. That such a procedure pro- 
 duces tares is no wonder. 
 
 A. Espionage, bribery, trickery, diplomacy are justified 
 
 in the national cause. 
 
 B. Untruthfulness about foreign peoples as well as one's 
 
 own is approved. National characteristics are ex- 
 aggerated, foreign qualities are minimized; this, 
 though lying in the name of patriotism, is still lying. 
 Patriotism of this kind is sometimes subsidized by 
 interests. Newspapers frequently grossly misrep- 
 resent foreign nations. Text-books are given to 
 lauding national virtues, would probably not sell if 
 they did otherwise; the truth does not pay as well as 
 misrepresentation. 
 
 C. In international affairs morals are geographical, that is, 
 
 they depend on what chance to be national bounda- 
 ries. Thus "planetary morality" which is the ex- 
 pression of the common morality in humanity is 
 defeated. 
 
 V. Nationalism hinders reflection and calm judgment about 
 
 foreign questions. Sentiment and passion usually re- 
 place intellect. Slogans and catch-words are very use- 
 ful in bringing this about. "Man lives not by bread 
 - alone, but chiefly by catchwords" Robert Louis 
 Stevenson. " Remember the Maine," " Fifty-four forty 
 
104 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 or fight," "Manifest destiny," "God wills it," "Re- 
 venge for Sadowa," "Deutschland iiber alles," "Brit- 
 annia rules the waves," "For King and country," 
 "Fur Kaiser und Reich," "Dieu et mon droit," "My 
 country, right or wrong," "Gott mit uns," "Gott 
 strafe England." 
 
 VI. Nationalism breeds national vanity, which, being un- 
 
 reasoning, hinders nations from dealing with each other 
 as equals. In any case vanity is a vice and not a virtue. 
 
 VII. What is right in a difference between nations should not 
 
 be decided by the nations themselves or by the force 
 they possess, but by an international court, backed by 
 force, as is the case when differences arise between 
 individuals or groups within a state. 
 
XIII 
 
 THE ROLE OF FORCE 
 FROM FORCE THROUGH LAW TO JUSTICE AND PEACE 
 
 I. In primitive society, according to theorists, each in- 
 
 dividual, or at least each individual family, was at 
 war with every other. " The state of nature is a state 
 of war." Hobbes. 
 
 A. There was no law governing their relations. 
 
 B. Force determined what was right in any difference. 
 
 Thus Faustrecht, the law of might, was accepted. An 
 individual had no fundamental rights; all he had was 
 what he could command by his strength. Therefore 
 there was no stability or security. 
 
 C. This conception of primitive society is now disputed 
 
 and it is asserted that man was from the beginning a 
 social animal living in groups. These groups have 
 enlarged throughout history. 
 
 II. The family, clan and tribe represented a union of in- 
 
 dividuals or individual families; a social group. 
 A. Internal law and force. 
 
 i. Within each group there was a law governing the 
 
 individuals. 
 
 a. It was supposed to have a supernatural or divine 
 origin, and was discovered and interpreted in 
 its several stages by the patriarch, by prophets 
 or priests, and finally by chieftains of tribes or 
 tribal kings (the primitive Teutons had posi- 
 tive law. See below). Each group had its own 
 God. 
 
 105 
 
io6 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 6. Great reliance was placed on direct expression of 
 divine will through ordeals, portents, and the 
 like. 
 
 2. Force was restricted within each group by the legal 
 
 machinery. 
 
 3. This law and force provided a means of securing 
 
 justice and hence favored peace and order. 
 B. External relations. 
 
 1. There was no law governing the relation of the re- 
 
 spective groups. 
 
 2. As each tribe had its own God, whom it must of course 
 
 obey and who was a rival of every other tribal god, 
 
 war between tribes became a religious duty, each 
 
 believing that it was advancing the cause of its 
 
 deity by extirpating unbelievers. This is illustrated 
 
 by the instructions of Samuel to Saul (i Samuel, 15). 
 
 Thus the use of force between tribes was considered 
 
 a part of religion and therefore wars were common. 
 
 III. The ancient monarchies and empires were products of 
 
 the tribal system. A given tribe under a competent 
 
 leader extended its dominion over neighboring tribes, 
 
 which became subject peoples. 
 
 A. Internal law and force. 
 
 1. Within such a monarchy there was a law for all, 
 
 enunciated by the ruler; and, as he was regarded as 
 God's anointed, frequently even considered a 
 God and worshipped as such, this law was held to 
 be of a supernatural origin. 
 
 2. This ruler controlled the force of the state with which 
 
 he secured obedience to his decrees. Within his 
 realm there prevailed peace though, in this case, 
 often an imposed peace. The Roman Empire in 
 this way imposed peace on all subject states, the 
 pax Romana. The modern pax Britannica also 
 
THE ROLE OF FORCE 107 
 
 represents a peace produced by force though in 
 time it comes to be maintained by a unity of in- 
 terests. 
 
 3. Law and force operate to secure justice and peace. 
 B. External relations. Co-existence of states was incon- 
 sistent with the views of the times; hence a powerful 
 monarchy sought to conquer all contiguous peoples 
 and make them subject to its internal laws. War 
 was accordingly the normal relation between rival 
 peoples. 
 
 IV. Feudalism was another development from the tribal 
 stage. The tribal heads were displaced by a mili- 
 tary aristocracy which enjoyed absolute power over 
 the common man, but in turn was in a vague way 
 subject to the king of a given country. 
 
 A. Internal conditions. 
 
 1. Within a feudal entity the local baron was the law- 
 
 giver and executor. Hence there was a means of 
 securing what was called justice and this favored 
 peace. As these rulers were supposed to be God's 
 agents, their decrees were accepted as God's 
 will. Ordeal and trial by battle were freely 
 used. 
 
 2. Within the king's jurisdiction, that is between the 
 
 several feudal entities, there was no law backed by 
 adequate force. The king was nominally and le- 
 gally superior to his vassals, but the latter had force 
 and used it against each other and sometimes 
 even against the king. War was chronic. The 
 "imperial peace," the peace of God, and the truce 
 of God were attempts to remedy this situation. 
 
 B. External relations. 
 
 i. There was no law or custom governing the relations 
 of the several feudal kingdoms. 
 
io8 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 2. Hence force was the solvent of their differences. 
 The substitution of monotheism for tribal gods made 
 religion less of a driving force for war, as all kings 
 were supposed to be riding as the agents of one and 
 the same God. 
 
 V. Nations succeeded feudal society, because kings of groups 
 with elements of cohesion broke down the power of 
 the barons and centralized government in their own 
 hands. 
 A. Internal conditions. 
 
 1. These monarchs still claimed to rule by divine right 
 
 and this claim was for some time accepted. Law 
 was considered of supernatural origin. 
 
 a. The Reformation contributed to this result. In 
 
 their devotion to their espoused creed, different 
 peoples rallied about their sovereign as the 
 champion of their faith: in England and Spain 
 this circumstance produced a recrudescence of 
 religious differences as a cause of war. 
 
 b. The monarch possessed the force to execute the 
 
 law and within his dominion there was a means 
 of securing justice, and hence there was order. 
 Loyalty was expected of subjects; it represented a 
 personal obligation to the sovereign, who per- 
 sonified the state. 
 
 2. Natural law. The religious wars of the sixteenth 
 
 century discredited the theory of divine rights, 
 that kings were the agents of God. Hence theorists 
 sought a different source of law, one which was 
 more inclusive, and professed to find it in nature, 
 by means of human reason. They maintained that 
 this law was universal, hence superior to local 
 rulers, and contrary to their dynastic ambitions. 
 Theu: contentions, which were widely accepted 
 
THE ROLE OF FORCE 109 
 
 by the lettered though never by the masses, were 
 instrumental in breaking down absolute monarchy 
 and preparing the way for positive law. 
 3. Positive law. (Voluntary, customary, man-made 
 law.) Reliance upon human reason to discover 
 law worked into individual responsibility in mak- 
 ing law, that is, into democracy or self-government. 
 Instead of accepting, as divine, the decrees govern- 
 ing human relations pronounced by prophets, 
 priests or monarchs, men resolved to decide these 
 things for themselves and provided machinery for 
 the purpose. 
 
 a. Through the ballot they register their wishes: 
 
 make law. 
 
 b. By elected agents they seek to have their will 
 
 executed: they jointly control the force which 
 makes the law respected. 
 
 c. Defects in the machinery (which are abundant), 
 
 they strive to correct as they acquire experience 
 and wisdom. 
 
 Patriotism succeeded loyalty. Patriotism means 
 an obligation to the particular group to which 
 one chances to belong, and to its ideals. The 
 state, in fact, became impersonal, but it con- 
 tinued to be conceived as a personality. 
 
 Ultimately this system rests on public opinion: 
 law must be backed by force; but force cannot 
 be effective in a democracy unless public opinion 
 is behind it. 
 B. External relations. 
 
 i. There was no law governing the relation of nations 
 
 as long as kings by divine right were in power. 
 
 Hence force was unrestrained. 
 a. With the conception of natural law, came a dimi- 
 
no NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 nution of royal prerogative and a conviction 
 that there ought to be a law of nations. (Gro- 
 tius, see Chapter XX.) 
 
 b. International law has developed since that time to 
 
 cover a great many relations, with the object of 
 securing justice by peaceful means. 
 
 c. Its development was stimulated by democracy, for 
 
 this rests largely on the conception of the fra- 
 ternity and equality of all men, and therefore 
 tends to break down the historic and juridical 
 differences between the several nations, and to 
 substitute an international relationship based 
 on principles of humanity. 
 
 d. At present, as under feudalism, the law between 
 
 states is weak (physically, not morally), because 
 force, instead of being behind it, is in the control 
 of the individual states, that is, law and force 
 are not unified; international law lacks adequate 
 sanction. (See Chapter XX.) 
 
 e. It should be noted that international law has con- 
 
 siderable moral strength, as is shown by the 
 appeals of belligerents against those who violate 
 it, or by the effects upon Germany of her viola- 
 tion of Belgian neutrality. 
 
 /. It should also be observed that international law 
 must, like law within a nation, ultimately rest on 
 public opinion for its effectiveness. 
 VI. Summary. 
 
 A. Human beings have historically organized into ever 
 
 enlarging groups, families, clans, tribes, and nations. 
 
 B. Within these groups, no matter of what stage or size, 
 
 there has always been a law common, broadly speak- 
 ing, to all individuals in the land. Its object was to 
 provide a means of securing justice and individual 
 
THE ROLE OF FORCE in 
 
 rights, for true law is an expression of true human 
 interests. 
 
 1. The origin of this law was once considered to be super- 
 
 natural. Law is now considered man-made. 
 
 2. Law was formerly not applied with impartiality, but 
 
 there were privileged classes. The tendency of 
 history is to do away with privilege and make all 
 equal before the law. 
 
 Its highest development so far is in the form of uni- 
 versal suffrage. A free election provides a means of 
 ascertaining the popular will, provides a substitute 
 other than forceful revolution through which to 
 procure progress and change, and is the greatest 
 known institution making for justice by peaceful 
 means instead of by selfish violence. It is the great 
 hope of the future. Political machinery produces 
 law, law is the best known means of securing 
 justice, justice means peace. War is inevitable 
 only when the machinery of popular government 
 fails to function. 
 C. Force has always been a factor in human affairs. 
 
 1. Under primitive conditions force was the sole reli- 
 
 ance and each undertook to secure what seemed 
 just to him by means of force; each was a law unto 
 himself; force was competitive. 
 
 2. With the erection of groups of men, force became of 
 
 two kinds: 
 
 a. Internal force, that within a given group. Each 
 such group is a peace society. Force was taken 
 from the individual and placed under the control 
 of an authority, patriarch, prophet, chieftain, 
 monarch, or elected agent, whose function 
 it became to use this force to back law and 
 justice. 
 
112 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 As long as this central authority was himself 
 sovereign and therefore above the law, justice 
 was not assured. But when the people became 
 sovereign, force in the hands of their elected 
 executive became truly cooperative. It became 
 police force. Martial force is in fact incom- 
 patible with democracy, for the instant one 
 repudiates the decisions of democratic govern- 
 ment he places himself above the whole of his 
 society, a process which, if permitted and copied, 
 means a return to lawlessness and violence. 
 Cooperative force in connection with positive 
 law-making, provides the nearest approach 
 to justice that is so far known; it is infinitely 
 superior to savage force. Justice means peace, 
 b. External force, that displayed when states clash. 
 Martial force. This has remained competitive; 
 as with the primitive individual, each state is a 
 law unto itself. Justice between nations is still 
 sought by means of violence, and the strongest 
 is held to be right. 
 
 VII. Question: If enlarging governmental groups and im- 
 proving democracy within those groups have pro- 
 moted justice and peace, can and should world de- 
 mocracy be sought; and how would it affect justice 
 and peace? 
 
 The possibility of a broader democracy and a closer 
 union of states depends on what elements of such 
 union exist. These are discussed in Chapter XV. 
 
 REFERENCES 
 
 Sumner: War. Yale Review, October, 1911. War and Other 
 
 Essays, 1911. 
 Sumner: Folkways. 1907. 
 
THE ROLE OF FORCE 113 
 
 Spencer: Descriptive Sociology. 1873-81, passim. 
 Kellogg, Vernon Lyman: Beyond War. New York, 1912. 
 Ferris, Harry S.: Pax Britannica. 1913. 
 Woods, Frederick A.: Is War Diminishing? Boston, 1915. 
 
XIV 
 
 THE CHANGE IN THE INSTITUTION OF WARFARE 
 
 I. War is an institution which, like other institutions, such 
 
 as church, state, taxation, business, education, has its 
 history. It has developed and undergone changes. 
 
 II. The change hi the implements of war, and its conse- 
 
 quences. 
 
 A . Earlier implements were mostly shock weapons and the 
 combat was hand to hand. 
 
 1. Hence individual prowess, strength and ability was 
 
 given a chance and the fitter man was likely to 
 emerge victorious. 
 
 2. This was true on the whole through the Middle 
 
 Ages, though during the latter there was a note- 
 worthy peculiarity: 
 
 a. Only men of rank became fighters the common 
 
 people did not become soldiers. 
 
 b. Making war was a profession; many a knight lived 
 
 by attacking his neighbor with no provocation 
 other than a desire for the neighbor's posses- 
 sions. 
 
 c. The much-vaunted courage of the medieval knight 
 
 is largely a fiction. 
 Knights did not fight to kill, but to capture and 
 
 hold for ransom. If captured, their vassals had 
 
 to pay the ransom. 
 They and their steeds were armored; hence they 
 
 had little fear of injury all the more as the 
 
 adversary could not, under the rules of honor, 
 114 
 
CHANGE IN THE INSTITUTION OF WARFARE 115 
 
 take advantage of a misfortune. They had only 
 to fear accidental and unintentional injury. 
 The accounts of medieval courage were written by 
 minstrels who were patronized by the knights 
 whose prowess they sang. Much of the tradi- 
 tional view of that day still clings to the profes- 
 sion of arms in this. 
 
 When firearms, which were really dangerous, were 
 invented the knights abandoned the preroga- 
 tive of being the fighters and hired mercenaries 
 to wage war. 
 
 B. The introduction of missile weapons, such as firearms, 
 of poisonous gases, of dreadnoughts, submarines and 
 aircraft has changed the nature and effect of fighting. 
 
 1. Guns have steadily been made more effective, in 
 
 range, accuracy, and rapidity of fire. 
 
 By improving explosives. 
 
 By improving mechanical appliances (sights, igni- 
 tion, loading, automatic feed, range finders, 
 etc.). 
 
 By increasing the size and mobility of guns. 
 
 2. Hand-to-hand fighting has been reduced to a mini- 
 
 mum. Most fighting is at long range, by means 
 of physical forces; machinery. War is machine 
 made. (Lamszus.) 
 
 3. In this kind of warfare, personal prowess or ability 
 
 counts for little, if anything. Man is no match for 
 the machine, hence, weak or strong, he succumbs 
 to it. Thus modern warfare does not result in a 
 survival of the fittest in the biological sense, ex- 
 cept as the physical qualities of the individual 
 give him strength to endure the shock of explosions 
 and the hardships of the campaigns. 
 
 4. Warfare, in this particular, becomes a struggle be- 
 
n6 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 tween brains, inventive ability and mechanical 
 skill of the belligerents. 
 
 C. Warfare has thus become a matter of brains instead 
 of brawn, of cold scientific knowledge instead of 
 flaming enthusiasm. Personal bravery amounts to 
 little compared with dogged persistence and rational 
 effort. This is getting to be more and more an age 
 of science. 
 
 It has been remarked that, as wars have largely been 
 the result of passion, the scientific tendencies of the 
 day should operate to restrain hasty wars. 
 III. Change in the methods of warfare and its consequences. 
 
 A. Changes in organization. 
 
 1. Armies levied for a given war have been displaced 
 
 by standing armies. 
 
 2. Volunteering, whether of mercenaries or nationals, 
 
 has (except in Great Britain and the United States) 
 yielded to compulsory service of the physically 
 fit, after the Prussian pattern, devised as a means to 
 expel Napoleon. 
 
 3. Loose, disorganized fighting of hordes has given 
 
 way to fighting between machine-like organiza- 
 tions, well trained and led by officers versed in 
 tactics and strategy. 
 
 4. Foraging and self-supporting armies have been re- 
 
 placed by armies provisioned by their governments. 
 
 5. Neglect of the wounded and dead has yielded to 
 
 sanitation, medical attention, and scrupulous care 
 of the victims of war. 
 
 6. Another evidence of humanity is found in the modern 
 
 laws of war granting every possible immunity to 
 non-combatants. 
 
 B. Consequences. 
 
 i. The system of compulsory service of the physically 
 
CHANGE IN THE INSTITUTION OF WARFARE 117 
 
 fit exposes an artificially selected group to the 
 ravages of war. (See Chapter X.) 
 2. Armies grow automatically with population. 
 IV. Tendencies and attempts to debrutalize war. 
 
 A. The development of democracy gave the individual a 
 
 power and also a value he did not possess under 
 monarchies. The effect of this humanitarianisni is 
 apparent in: 
 
 1. The greater care of sick and wounded. This was 
 
 stimulated by the advantage it brought to armies. 
 
 2. The attempt to limit war as far as possible to com- 
 
 batants. 
 
 3. The considerable body of conventions, chiefly during 
 
 the last half century, containing laws of warfare 
 on land and sea. (See Chapter XX.) 
 
 B. Care of the sick and wounded in war. 
 
 1. Practically no arrangements for the purpose existed 
 
 in ancient, medieval, or early modern wars. 
 Sully established the first military hospital in 1594, 
 and Austria did so about the same time. 
 
 2. Real development began with the Napoleonic wars. 
 
 a. Larrey (later Napoleon's chief surgeon) introduced 
 
 "flying ambulances"; gave primary aid to the 
 wounded and removed them from the sphere of 
 action (but not during battle). 
 
 b. Percy (Frenchman) organized the stretcher-bearers 
 
 (about 1793), who collected the wounded dur- 
 ing battle. They were regarded as combatants. 
 
 c. Napoleon's disregard for his men during his western 
 
 wars; only in his Russian campaign did he show 
 concern for their welfare. The typhoid epidemic 
 in the French Army, 1813. 
 
 3. Private enterprise for a time outdid the states, 
 
 which indeed exhibited little interest. 
 
Ii8 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 a. The Crimean War (1854-6) demonstrated the 
 
 hopeless inadequacy of methods of caring for 
 soldiers. 
 
 Hunger, typhoid in the armies, no forage obtain- 
 able. 
 
 One-third of the French succumbed to disease. 
 
 Public opinion was aroused in England; fall of the 
 Aberdeen ministry, 1855. 
 
 Private organizations came to the rescue of the 
 sufferers hi the Crimea. Florence Nightingale. 
 
 b. Italian War, 1859. 
 
 Henri Dunant at Solferino, 1859. 
 
 Dunant's experiences related in "Un souvenir de 
 
 Solferino." This book contributed very largely 
 
 to the Geneva Convention. 
 
 c. Civil War in the United States. 
 
 Francis Lieber Code, 1863. Scott: Texts, 350-376. 
 Many private relief societies, estimated at about 
 
 7000. 
 Provided hospitals and nurses; also hospital trains 
 
 and hospital ships. 
 Effectiveness shown at Gettysburg, where by the 
 
 morning of July 4 all the sufferers of the three 
 
 days' battle, July 1-3, were cared for. 
 
 d. Private enterprise culminated in the Red Cross 
 
 Societies. 
 
 4. Government action. The Geneva Convention for the 
 Amelioration of the Condition of the Sick and 
 wounded of Armies in the Field, 1864. (Scott: 
 Texts, 376-378-) 
 
 a. Influence of Dunant and of Moynier, President of 
 
 the Society of Public Utility of Geneva, in bring- 
 ing about the convention. 
 
 b. First meeting, 1863. Sixteen nations represented. 
 
CHANGE IN THE INSTITUTION OF WARFARE 119 
 
 c. Meeting of 1864. Same nations represented. 
 Provisions adopted (10 articles). 
 
 (1) Ambulances and military hospitals neutral as 
 long as sick or wounded may be therein, and 
 they are not held by a military force. 
 
 (2) All persons employed in connection with am- 
 bulances or hospitals shall have the benefit of 
 neutrality, whilst so employed, and so long as 
 there remain wounded to be aided. 
 
 (3) These persons may, even after occupation by 
 the enemy, continue to fulfill their duties with 
 their ambulances or hospitals, or may rejoin 
 the corps to which they belong. To be aided, 
 not hindered, in doing so. 
 
 (4) Equipment of military hospitals subject to 
 the laws of war and cannot be carried away 
 by above persons when withdrawing. Ambu- 
 lances, under the same conditions, retain their 
 equipment. 
 
 (5) Inhabitants of the country may aid the 
 wounded, without being considered belliger- 
 ents. They are to be encouraged in every 
 way to aid the wounded. 
 
 (6) The sick and wounded are to be cared for in- 
 discriminately. Those who recover may be 
 paroled. 
 
 (7) Ambulances, hospitals and persons attached 
 to them have a distinctive flag (or light at 
 night), which must in every case be accom- 
 panied by the national flag; and an arm badge 
 is given to neutralized persons, to be delivered 
 by the proper military authorities. 
 
 The badge is to be a red cross in a white 
 field. 
 
120 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 (Turkey gave notice in 1876, that her badge 
 
 would be a red crescent.) 
 (8-10). Ratifications, etc. 
 
 d. Practically all nations have accepted the conven- 
 
 tion. 
 
 e. Diplomatic conference of Geneva, 1868, proposed to 
 
 extend the above rules to naval warfare; proposal 
 was not ratified then. This step was taken at the 
 First Hague Conference, 1899. 
 5. Red Cross Societies. 
 
 a. Made possible by the Geneva Convention. Each 
 
 nation to authorize one civic society to send 
 medical aid to war. 
 
 b. In Germany and France the Red Cross Society 
 
 is placed under military control, no indepen- 
 dent volunteer service being permitted in the 
 field. 
 
 In England and the United States the Red Cross 
 organizations are independent, but cooperate 
 with the military organizations for the aid of 
 the wounded. 
 
 c. American National Red Cross Society founded 1881. 
 
 Clara Barton, first president (d. 1912). 
 Extended its relief program to other calamities 
 besides wars, and has rendered great service in 
 various directions. 
 
 d. The several national Red Cross Societies hold inter- 
 
 national congresses at intervals. (For a list of 
 these see Annuaire de la Vie Internationale, 
 1908-9, p. 885.) 
 
 The Society of Geneva is regarded as a central 
 committee. 
 
 e. Problems of the Red Cross. 
 
 Abuse of the flag: it has been used by unauthor- 
 
CHANGE IN THE INSTITUTION OF WARFARE 121 
 
 ized persons, sometimes out of ignorance, sup- 
 posing that it guaranteed immunity, sometimes 
 deliberately to escape the fate of war. 
 The Red Cross in civil war. The convention per- 
 mitting the Red Cross gave the society the right 
 to perform its functions, under certain restric- 
 tions, in international wars, but failed (by over- 
 sight) to grant it the same right in case of civil 
 war. This will undoubtedly be remedied. 
 6. All nations now have well developed and organ- 
 ized medical staffs and hospital corps attached to 
 armies. What it is possible for these branches of 
 the army to achieve was demonstrated by the 
 Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War. See Sea- 
 man: The Real Triumph of Japan. 
 
 V. Bloch's conclusions as to the effect of the changes in 
 
 methods of warring upon future wars. 
 
 A. That any war between first-rate powers will be in- 
 
 decisive, and tend to end in stalemate. 
 
 B. That it will end because of exhaustion not because of 
 
 military superiority of either party. 
 
 C. That neutrals alone will benefit by it. 
 
 D. That the economic and sociological evils of indecisive 
 
 war are likely to produce revolutions. This happened 
 in Russia after the Russo-Japanese war. 
 Bloch's writings and views on the futility of armaments 
 influenced the Czar of Russia in taking the initiative 
 for the first Hague Conference. 
 
 VI. Summary. 
 
 A. Formerly war was waged between whole peoples; now a 
 
 distinction is made between combatants and non- 
 combatants and the latter are expected to be spared 
 as much as possible. 
 
 B. War formerly meant personal antipathy between the 
 
122 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 combatants; now it is more nearly a conflict between 
 two causes. 
 
 C. Victory formerly meant subjection for the conquered; 
 
 now the conquered often retains his independence. 
 
 D. Formerly war was waged with little or no preparation 
 
 or strategy; it has gradually been reduced to a science 
 which requires experts hi all departments. 
 
 E. Formerly individual prowess counted, and a skillful 
 
 fighter stood some chance in battle; now the leaders 
 of the army are expected to have the prowess, and 
 the private ordinarily is expected to do nothing more 
 than obey orders (which is contrary to the spirit of 
 democracy) ; and under fire the keen and wide-awake 
 soldier has little more chance to escape death than 
 the sluggard (except perhaps hi retreat). 
 
 "... the soldier knew 
 
 Some one had blunder'd: 
 Theirs not to make reply, 
 Theirs not to reason why, 
 Theirs but to do and die." 
 
 Tennyson. 
 
 F. Plundering and wanton destruction of property, which 
 
 were formerly, the rule, are now discouraged. 
 
 G. Modern public opinion demands the greatest possible 
 
 degree of humanity in war. 
 
 H. War has grown very much more expensive than it was. 
 
 7. War was formerly decided upon by the rulers and they, 
 if anybody, were the beneficiaries; their subjects who 
 fought risked life and gained little except by plunder. 
 To-day the people theoretically have a voice in de- 
 ciding upon war, but get little out of fighting except 
 the satisfaction of being victors. Others get the 
 prizes. 
 
CHANGE IN THE INSTITUTION OF WARFARE 123 
 
 /. The realization of this and the enlargement of the power 
 of the people over foreign policies and diplomatic 
 machinery militates against war. 
 
 K. Finally, and most important, in view of the changes in 
 warfare, not to mention other changes, one cannot 
 use past war as a basis for argument relating to the 
 present. 
 
 REFERENCES 
 HISTORY or WARFARE 
 
 Altenund Albert : Handbuch f iir Heer und Flo tte. Vol. IX. Ber- 
 lin, 1912. 
 
 Bloch: Der Krieg. 1899. (English edition abridged: "Future of 
 War." 1902.) 
 
 Jahns: Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften. 1889. 
 
 Leitfaden der allgemeinen Kriegsgeschichte. Verfasst im Auftrage 
 des k. und k. Reichs-Kriegs-Ministeriums. Wien, 1896. 
 
 Bodart: Militar-historisches Kriegs-Lexikon, 1618-1905. 1908. 
 
 Jablonski: Histoire de 1'art militaire. 1895. 
 
 Derrecagaix: Modern Warfare. 3 vols. 1888. 
 
 Dodge: Great Captains: Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus 
 Adolphus, Frederick the Great, Napoleon. 1890-1907. (Appen- 
 dices.) 
 
 Upton, Emory: The Military Policy of the United States. 1912. 
 
 Huidekoper: The Military Unpreparedness of the United States. 
 N.Y. 1915. 
 
 Boutell (Lacombe) : Arms and Armour. 1907. 
 
 Woods, Frederick Adams: Is War Diminishing? Boston, 1915. 
 
 Viollet-le-Duc: Annals of a Fortress. 1876. 
 
 Pannentier: Album Historique (illustrations). 1900-1907. 
 
 ANCIENT WARFARE 
 
 Phillipson: International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and 
 
 Rome. 1911. II, 166-348. 
 
 Whibley: Companion to Greek Studies. 1905. Ch. VI, Pt. 10. 
 Holmes: Caesar's Conquest of Gaul. 1899. 
 
124 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 MEDIEVAL WARFARE 
 
 Oman: Art of War in the Middle Ages. 1885. 
 
 Lacroix: Military and Religious Life. 
 
 Gautier: Chivalry. 1891. 
 
 Lea: Wager of Battle. 1892. 
 
 Luchaire: Social France. 1912. Chapter VIII. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE 
 
 Mahan: Influence of Sea Power upon History. 1894. 
 
 Mahan: Interest of America in Sea Power. 1898. 
 
 Mahan: Lessons of the War with Spain. 1899. 
 
 Mahan: Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution. 
 
 1005. 
 
 Mahan: Naval Strategy. 1911. 
 Jane: All the World's Fighting Ships. Since 1898. 
 v. Maltzahn: Naval Warfare. 
 Silbum: The Evolution of Sea Power. 1912. 
 Fulton, Thos. W.: The Sovereignty of the Sea. London, 1911. 
 Stenzel: Seekriegsgeschichte. 1907-11. 
 Colomb: The History of Naval Warfare. 1899. 
 Hannay, David: The Navy and Sea Power. 1915. 
 Klado: The Russian Navy hi the Russo-Japanese War. 1005. 
 Clark, Stevens, Alden, Krafft: A Short History of the United States 
 
 Navy. 1911. 
 
 Brassey: Naval Annual. London. 
 Navy League Annual. London. 
 
 SANITATION IN WAR 
 
 Hetzel, H: Die Humanisierung des Krieges in ihrer Kultur- 
 
 geschichtlichen Entwickelung. Frankfurt-a-O. 1889. 
 Myrdacz: Handbuch fur k. und k. Militarartzte. 1898-1005. 
 
 (Volume II is a history of sanitation in the European wars of the 
 
 nineteenth century.) 
 Bloch: Der Krieg. 1899, V, 481-563. 
 France: Bulletin ofnciel du Ministere de la Guerre. Service de 
 
 sante. 1003. 
 Seaman: The Real Triumph of Japan. 1906. 
 
CHANGE IN THE INSTITUTION OF WARFARE 125 
 
 RED CROSS 
 
 Conference Internationale de la Croix-Rouge. Compte rendu. 
 
 1885-1913. 
 
 Barton: The Red Cross. 1898. 
 Barton: A Story of the Red Cross. 1904. 
 Boardman, Mabel T.: Under the Red Cross Flag at Home and 
 
 Abroad. 1915. 
 Dunant: The Origin of the Red Cross. "Un Souvenir de Sol- 
 
 ferino" translated, from French by Mrs. Wright, Philadelphia, 
 
 1911. 
 
 Moynier: fitude sur la convention Geneve. 1870. 
 Moynier: La Croix-Rouge, son passe et son avenir. 1882. 
 The Red Cross of the Geneva Convention. What it is, Its Origin 
 
 and History. 1881. 
 
 Lueder: Die Genfer Convention. 1876. 
 Lueder: La convention de Geneve au point de vue historique, 
 
 critique et dogmatique. 1877. 
 Criegen: Das rothe Kreuz in Deutschland. 1883. 
 Miiller, Rudolf: Entstehungsgeschichte des roten Kreuzes. Stutt- 
 gart, 1897. 
 
 GENERAL 
 
 Suttner: Ground Arms! 1906. 
 Semenoff : The Price of Blood. 1910. 
 Sakurai: Human Bullets. 1908. 
 
XV 
 
 MODERN COMMUNICATION AND INTERNATIONALISM 
 
 I. The improvement of transportation. 
 
 A . Transportation is from eight to twelve times as rapid as 
 
 it was a century and a half ago. 
 
 1. This is, as it concerns travel and commerce, equiv- 
 
 alent to a shrinkage of the earth. 
 
 2. Furthermore, the multiplication of transportation 
 
 facilities (roads, railways, canals, ocean carriers, 
 etc.) has opened regions which were formerly 
 wholly inaccessible. 
 
 B. The result is that the products of a region are no longer 
 
 confined to its markets, but are carried into any mar- 
 ket that has use for them. There has, of course, been 
 a corresponding expansion and interweaving of the 
 financial institutions of each region with those of 
 every other. ^Capital has ceased to be national and 
 is largely non-national; it goes wherever there is a 
 prospect of profits. Business has ceased to be local 
 and has become world- wide; world economy has re- 
 placed local economy. Each part of the world has 
 become dependent on every other. 
 
 Labor has, like capital, become highly mobile and seeks 
 employment anywhere. 
 
 Travel is a natural consequence of the above and is in- 
 creasing. 
 
 II. The improvement in communication. 
 
 A. Communication, which was formerly no more rapid 
 than travel, is now practically instantaneous, thanks 
 126 
 
INTERNATIONALISM 127 
 
 to telephone, telegraph, cable, wireless, and to news 
 and mail services. 
 
 B. Information, which is in many senses merely a commod- 
 ity, can now be conveyed rapidly to all quarters and 
 has accordingly become common property. News, 
 good ideas no matter where they originate, business 
 orders and information reach the whole earth in in- 
 credibly short time. 
 
 This is particularly noticeable in financial circles. 
 Large banks with their foreign correspondents and 
 their means of rapid communication give the earth a 
 sensory system, which quickly learns of matters of 
 importance, conveys the information to all quarters, 
 and stimulates the readjustment that may be nec- 
 essary. 
 
 III. Result: internationalism the private relation of the 
 
 citizens of the several states with each other, and the 
 
 official cooperation of the states. Jeremy Bentham 
 
 is credited with coining the word "internationalism" 
 
 in 1780. It was little used before the middle of the 
 
 nineteenth century. {Juries, p. irJ)f 
 
 A. Unofficial or private internationalism. This is either 
 
 individual or organized. The relations of individual 
 
 citizens of one country with those of another are 
 
 so numerous and so complex that their existence 
 
 and, accordingly, then: significance is hardly noticed. 
 
 Organized international activity is much more easily 
 
 observed because, as will be noticed below, there is 
 
 often a society with headquarters, officers and an 
 
 official organ. 
 
 i. Of an economic character. 
 
 Business is international; buying and selling is con- 
 ducted on the basis of profit not of nationalism, 
 ^'except in~so far as this is affected by legislative en- 
 
128 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 actments, such as tariffs on foreign goods. Money 
 is non-national one might even say unpatriotic, 
 for it seeks investment where the profits are safest 
 and largest, no matter if it is abroad. One can 
 justly speak of a business world and a financial 
 world. The export of capital has reached great 
 proportions. 
 
 BRITISH EXPORT CAPITAL 
 
 (Economist, Feb. 20, 1909) 
 CAPITAL INVESTED IN COLONIES AND DEPENDENCIES 
 
 India 470,000,000 
 
 Australasia 321,000,000 
 
 Canada 305,000,000 
 
 Transvaal : . . . . 220,000,000 
 
 Cape Colony 98,000,000 
 
 Rhodesia, E. Af 59,000,000 
 
 Natal 30,000,000 
 
 Others 63,000,000 
 
 1,566,000,000 
 
 CAPITAL INVESTED IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES 
 
 United States 485,000,000 
 
 Japan 115,000,000 
 
 Argentine 254,000,000 
 
 Brazil 101,000,000 
 
 Egypt 97,000,000 
 
 Mexico 51,000,000 
 
 Germany, France, Sweden, Nor- 
 way, Belgium, Denmark 48,000,000 
 
 China 47,000,000 
 
 Russia 45,000,000 
 
 Balkan States incl. Turkey and 
 
 Greece 39,000,000 
 
INTERNATIONALISM 
 
 129 
 
 CAPITAL INVESTED IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES Continued 
 
 Italy, Switzerland and Austria 26,000,000 
 
 Spain 25,000,000 
 
 Uruguay 25,000,000 
 
 Cuba 21,000,000 
 
 Chile 42,000,000 
 
 Others 63,000,000 
 
 Total foreign investment. . 1,484,000,000 
 Grand total 3,050,000,000 
 
 This is about one-fifth of the total capital of the 
 United Kingdom, which is much greater than the 
 foreign investment of any other nation. 
 
 2. Of an intellectual or cultural nature. 
 
 a. KnowledgeancUdeas are human, not national. If, 
 -"as is claimed,culture is national in its creation, 
 
 it is not national in its consumption. Knowl- 
 edge and ideas meet a like response everywhere. 
 Men of like professions or trades understand 
 "foreigners" as well as nationals. Normally, 
 each group forms an international guild; the 
 engineering, the medical, educational, literary 
 world. Only in war times do they pretend that 
 there are fundamental national differences. 
 
 b. Literature, which depends on language, the chief 
 
 external characteristic of a nation, and to a 
 less degree music and painting, are more national 
 than science, which is necessarily non-national 
 because the laws of nature are everywhere the 
 same; the emotional elements of culture are more 
 national than the rational elements. 
 
 3. Organized international activity. (La Vie Interna- 
 
 tionale, 1908-9, 537-12827}* A great many inter- 
 ests have felt the need of international cooperation 
 
130 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 and have accordingly held international congresses. 
 In a number of cases permanent international 
 organizations, with officers, regular meetings, and 
 official organs have been established. To illustrate 
 the types of international activity, the following 
 selected list, arranged in an arbitrary way, is given: 
 Libraries. 
 
 International Institute of Bibliography. 
 International Catalogue of Scientific Litera- 
 ture. 
 
 International Congress of Librarians. 
 Press. 
 
 Reuter's News Service. Havas, Wolff, Asso- 
 ciated Press. 
 
 International Press Association. 
 Legislature. 
 
 Interparliamentary Union. (Cremer, 1889.) 
 One-fifth of the members of national legisla- 
 tures are members of it (1910). 
 Peace. 
 
 International Peace Congresses. (See Chap- 
 ter XVHL)/ 
 
 International Friendship Societies. 
 Ethical and Philanthropic. 
 
 International Union of Ethical Societies. 
 
 International Congress against Immoral Lit- 
 erature. 
 
 International Congress against Intemperance. 
 
 International Congress of Protectors of An- 
 imals. 
 
 International Union against Vivisection. 
 
 International Congress against Duelling. 
 
 Red Cross Society. 
 
 Friends of Young Women. 
 
INTERNATIONALISM 13 1 
 
 Religion. 
 
 World Alliance of Churches. 
 
 World's Parliament of Religions. 
 
 Eucharistic Congresses. 
 
 Salvation Army. 
 
 Young Men's Christian Association. Over 
 800,000 members. 
 
 Young Women's Christian Association. 
 Sociology. 
 
 International Institute of Sociology. 
 
 International Institute of Statistics. 
 
 International Colonial Institute. 
 
 British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society. 
 
 International Penitentiary Commission. 
 Labor. 
 
 International Socialist Bureau. 
 
 International Federation for Sunday Observ- 
 ance. 
 
 International Association for the Legal Protec- 
 tion of Laborers. 
 
 International Cooperation. (See its Year 
 
 Book, 1910.) 
 Law and Government. 
 
 International Law Association. 
 
 International Alliance for Woman Suffrage. 
 
 International Association of Lawyers. 
 Insurance. 
 
 International Congress of Actuaries. 
 Education. 
 
 Universal Federation of Christian Stu- 
 dents. 
 
 Cosmopolitan Club, affiliated with Corda 
 Fratres, 1911. (Various Congresses have 
 been held.) 
 
132 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 Commerce and Transportation. 
 
 International Railway Association. 
 
 International Marine Association. . 
 
 International Free-trade Congress, 1910. 
 Philology. 
 
 international Languages: ee Chapter 
 
 xxviyf 
 
 Sciences: Pure and Applied. 
 
 (Many of them have international organiza- 
 tions.) 
 
 International Medical Association against 
 War. 
 
 Pan-American Scientific Congresses. 
 Geography. 
 
 International Congress of Geography. 
 International Geodesy. (Is preparing a world 
 
 map.) 
 
 International Polar Commission. 
 Fine Arts. 
 
 International Institute of Public Art. 
 Sports. 
 
 Olympic Games. 
 
 International Aeronautical Federation. , 
 B. Official international activities, those of the states as 
 
 such. 
 
 i. Non-political. States have participated in confer- 
 ences and have entered into various conven- 
 tions regarding matters of convenience to their 
 citizens, but which have no political impor- 
 tance. 
 
 Universal Postal Union (1878). Kgridgman: First 
 .Book of World Law, 20-7 1.)7 
 Practically all countries are members. Head- 
 quarters, Berne. 
 
INTERNATIONALISM 133 
 
 Universal Telegraph Union (1875). 
 
 About 30 members. 
 Convention Concerning the Metric System (1875). 
 
 About 23 states have accepted it. 
 Union for the Protection of Industrial Property 
 
 (1883). 
 
 About 19 members. Headquarters, Berne. 
 Union for the Protection of Works of Literature and 
 
 Art (1886). 
 
 About 15 states are members. Headquarters, 
 
 Berne. 
 Union Concerning Railway Transports and Freights 
 
 (1890). 
 
 Nine states are members. Headquarters, 
 
 Berne. 
 Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs (1890). 
 
 About 30 members. Headquarters, Brussels. 
 Phylloxera Conventions (1878, 1881). 
 
 12 members. 
 Convention Concerning Private International Law 
 
 (1893, 1896, 1900). 
 
 About 15 members. 
 Sanitary Conventions. 
 
 Cholera (1893, 1894, 1899). 
 
 Plague (1897, 1900). 
 Monetary Unions. 
 
 Latin Monetary Union (1865). Five members. 
 
 Scandinavian Monetary Conference (1892). 
 Seventeen states represented: no practical 
 result. 
 Convention for the Suppression of the Slave-trade 
 
 (1892). 
 Convention for the Preservation of Wild Animals in 
 
 Africa (1900). Seven signatories. 
 
134 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 Convention Concerning Bounties on Sugar (1902). 
 About 12 members. Headquarters, Brussels. 
 Others of the same kind relating to trade in arms, 
 spirituous liquors (1899, 1906), the use of inter- 
 national rivers, canals, and waterways generally, 
 protection of ocean cables, radio-telegraphy, rules 
 of traffic at sea, international signal code, fishing 
 on the high seas, protection of travellers, ex- 
 change of documents, agriculture (1905), scien- 
 tific expeditions, World's prime meridian (1884), 
 "white slavery" (1904), etc. 
 
 2. Political. States have also held congresses and have 
 made joint treaties (as distinct from bilateral) con- 
 cerning matters involving their political aspirations. 
 a. Inter-governmental conferences, congresses, trea- 
 
 \ . Ses, etc. 
 
 I Final Act of the Congress of Vienna (1815). 
 
 "Concert of Powers." 
 * The Holy Alliance (1815). 
 Protocol of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle 
 
 (1818). 
 Treaty of London (1839). Neutralization of 
 
 Belgium. 
 
 Declaration of Paris (1856). 
 Geneva Convention (1867). Neutralization of 
 
 Luxemburg. 
 
 Declaration of St. Petersburg (1868). 
 Congress of Berlin (1878). Near Eastern Ques- 
 tion. 
 
 General Act of the Congo-Conference (1885). 
 Treaty of Constantinople (1888). Suez Canal 
 
 neutral. 
 
 Pan-American Conferences (1889-90, 1901, 1906, 
 1910). 
 
INTERNATIONALISM 135 
 
 Final Act of The Hague Peace Conference (1899). 
 Treaty of Washington (1901). Neutralizes 
 
 Panama Canal. 
 Algeciras Conference (1906). 
 Central American Conferences (1906, 1907). 
 Final Act of the Second Hague Conference 
 
 (1907). 
 The Declaration of London (1909). Private 
 
 property at sea, etc. Not generally ratified as 
 
 yet. 
 
 "A. B. C." or Niagara Falls Conference, 1914. 
 And many others (Fried: Handbuch I, 127- 
 
 b. Inter-governmental administration and joint-ac- 
 
 tion. 
 
 | ""Bureau of American Republics. 
 Central American Bureau. 
 
 Central American Court of Justice. 
 Permanent International Bureau at The Hague. 
 
 'The Hague Tribunal (1899). 
 The Danube River Commission (since 1856). 
 The Congo Commission (1885). 
 Pacific blockade of Greece by the powers (1886). 
 Joint (temporary) control of Samoa (1889) by 
 
 Great Britain, Germany and the United States. 
 The joint occupation of China during the Boxer 
 
 revolt (1900). 
 Joint occupation and administration of Crete 
 
 (1899-1913) by Great Britain, France, Russia 
 
 and Italy. 
 The blockade of Scutari by an international naval 
 
 force (1913). 
 Commissions to control the Turkish, Egyptian 
 
 and Greek Debts. 
 
136 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 I 
 c. Voluntary limitations of sovereignty. (See Chapter 
 
 xxvy] 
 
 C. International Conferences, etc., summarized. 
 i. Number between 1843 and 1910: 1977. 
 
 Within that time their number has steadily increased. 
 "1840^-1860 28 international congresses. 
 
 ;r l 1861-1870 69 
 
 1871-1880 150 
 
 1881-1890 295 " " 
 
 1891-1900 645 
 
 1901-1910 790 
 
 1840-1910 1977 international congresses. 
 
 (La Vie Internationale, 1908-9, i, 175.) 
 
 2. Three stages in their history. (La Vie Intern., 1908-9, 
 
 a. Formation of a scientific organization and the in- 
 
 vitation of foreigners to join it. Originated in 
 Germany about 1823. 
 
 b. Creation of large official organizations. Begun 
 
 about 1860. 
 
 c. Formation of independent associations with or with- 
 
 out state aid. Since 1895. 
 3. Headquarters. 
 
 a. Some have none. 
 
 b. Fixed: Berne, Brussels, and lately The Hague, 
 
 favorites^! putxn^/ AUA^-^C^ 
 
 c. Itinerant. 
 
 D. Results flowing from the preceding circumstances. 
 
 i. The isolation of nations is past; a fact which to many 
 
 alters the whole status and hence should alter the 
 
 policy of nations, which, like the United States, 
 
 formerly enjoyed a natural isolation. 
 
r 
 
 INTERNATIONALISM 137 
 
 2. The volume of international intercourse has aroused a 
 
 practical as well as academic interest of each people 
 in every other. 
 
 a. It is claimed by many that this knowledge of other 
 
 peoples tends to reduce national and racial prej- 
 udices, and hence tends toward international 
 friendship and the brotherhood of man. This 
 is, however, not necessarily true, for acquaint- 
 ance does not always mean friendship, especially 
 if, as in the case of nations, there is commercial 
 rivalry. Relatives are sometimes the bitterest of 
 enemies. 
 
 b. However, it seems to be true that international 
 
 trade and intercourse of every kind tends, like 
 the democratic tendencies noted in the preced- 
 ing chapter, to create affiliations between the 
 peoples of the several nations, which give true 
 elements of cohesion and cooperation. 
 
 3. Education, to be up-to-date, must take notice of this 
 
 increasing internationalism. ' ' New occasions teach 
 new duties.'i. 
 Summary. 
 
 A. The economic life of man has to a great extent become 
 
 international. 
 
 B. His cultural and intellectual life is likewise largely in- 
 
 ternational. 
 
 C. His political life remains national. 
 
 D. When his nation goes to war he rallies to his political or 
 
 national, at the expense of his international, exist- 
 ence. 
 
 The reason for this conflict in his life seems to be that 
 man's politic^Linsiitutions have fallen behind, and 
 are no longer in agreement with the actual facts of 
 his existence. 
 
138 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 REFERENCES 
 
 COMMUNICATION 
 
 Sundbarg: Apercus . . . Tables, pp. 270-286. 
 
 Album de Statistique Graphique. 1908. Plate 28. 
 
 Journal de la Societe" de Statistique de Paris. 1909. 14-20. 
 
 INTERNATIONALISM 
 
 Annuaire de la Vie Internationale. Brussels, 1905-7; 1908-9; 
 
 1910-11. 
 
 La Vie Internationale. I9i2f. 
 
 L'office central des institutions internationales. 1911. 
 L'union des associations internationales et la constitution d'un 
 
 centre international. Brussels, 1912. 
 
 Fried, Alfred H. : Das Internationale Leben der Gegenwart. Leip- 
 zig, 1908. 
 Hill, David J. : World Organization as affected by the Nature of the 
 
 Modern State. 1911. 
 
 Faries: The Rise of Internationalism. 1915. 
 Reinsch, Paul S.: Public International Unions. 1911. 
 Reinsch, Paul S.: International Unions and their Administration. 
 
 Am. Journal of International Law, I, 1007, 579-623. 
 Reinsch, Paul S.: World Politics at the end of the Nineteenth 
 
 Century. London, 1910. 
 
 Bridgman: The First Book of World Law. 1911. 
 Bridgman: World Organization. 1905. 
 Rothlisberger: Die Internationale Aemter in Berne. 1911. 
 Ruedorffer, J.: Grundziige der Weltpolitik in der Gegenwart. 
 
 1914. 
 Exner: Internationale Gemeinschaftsarbeit auf technischen 
 
 Gebiet. 
 
 Phillips: The Confederation of Europe. 1914. 
 Marvin, F. S. : The Living Past. 
 Internoscia, Jerome: New Code of International Law. New York, 
 
 1910. 
 Year Book of International Cooperation. First Year. 1910. 
 
INTERNATIONALISM 139 
 
 INTERNATIONAL CONGRESSES 
 
 Lubin: International Institute of Agriculture and its Bearing on 
 
 Labor. Washington, Government Printing Office. 
 Eijkman: L'internationalisme scientifique. 1911. 
 Baldwin: International Congresses and Conferences of the Last 
 
 Century as Forces working for the Solidarity of the World. 
 
 American Journal of International Law, I. 1907. 575-578. 
 Congress Mondial des associations internationales. Proces- 
 
 verbals des seances. 
 
 Spiller: Inter-racial Problems. 1911. 57,233-260. Bibliography. 
 Russell, Henry B.: International Monetary Conferences. 1898. 
 On Pan-Americanism. See Chapter XXVI. 
 
 CAPITAL AND BUSINESS 
 
 Hobson: The Export of Capital. 1914. 
 
 Paisch: Great Britain's Capital Investments in other Lands. 
 
 Journal Royal Statistical Society. 1909. pp. 465-480. 
 Eijkman: Internationalism and the World's Capital. Independent, 
 
 61, 200. 
 
 Whitaker's Almanack, 1910, 690-91. 1912,759. [Foreign invest- 
 ments of Englishmen.] 
 
 Kobatsch: La politique economique internationale. 1913. 
 Harms, Bernhard: Volkswirtschaft und Weltwirtschaft. 1912. 
 Finance and Commerce. Their Relation to International Good 
 
 Will. American Association for International Conciliation, 
 
 No. 50. 
 Hammond: The Business Man's Interest in Peace Why not 
 
 Neutralize China? Maryland Peace Society, No. 8. 
 Osborne: Influence of Commerce in the Promotion of International 
 
 Peace. Washington, Government Printing Office. 
 Pepper: Conciliation through Commerce and Industry in South 
 
 America. American Association for International Conciliation. 
 
 New York, 1910. 
 Neymarck: French Savings. In Report of the National Monetary 
 
 Commission, 61 Cong., 2 Sess., Sen. Doc. 494. Washington, 
 
 1910. p. 176, note. [French foreign investments.] 
 
140 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 Riesser: German Great Banks and their Concentration. Ibid. 
 
 Senate Document 593. Washington, 1911, pp. 527 f. [German 
 
 foreign investments.] 
 Bridgman: The Passing of the Tariff. 1009. 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS 
 
 Wicker: Neutralization (Froude). 1911. 
 Hodges: The Doctrine of Intervention. 1915. 
 Loutfi: La Politique sanitaire internationale. 1906. 
 See also References to Chapter XXVI. 
 
 
XVI 
 
 THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE OPPOSITION TO WAR 
 
 I. Nationalism and the current conception of national sov- 
 
 ereignty together with their corollaries lead to war and 
 a consequent exaltation of the role of force. (See 
 Section IV below.) 
 
 A restriction of sovereignty and of existing nationalism 
 should, then, reduce the probability of war and alter 
 the function of martial force. 
 
 II. The basis for such a restriction of nationalism is at hand. 
 
 A. Nationalism has performed its work. It increasingly 
 
 hinders progress because it obstructs the develop- 
 ment of planetary and humanitarian institutions, 
 by vitiating international law in which the interests 
 of mankind find their expression. 
 
 B. A nation is unstable under present conditions and its 
 
 stability cannot be assured by force because no 
 nation can possibly protect itself against every com- 
 bination of rivals. The circumstance that the usual 
 remedy, armed defense, does not guarantee stability 
 or peace, leaves every rational mind dissatisfied 
 because there must be something wrong with a 
 remedy that does not cure. 
 
 C. The nation is no longer the cohesive unit of society 
 
 that it once was. A transition is in progress which 
 promises in time to extinguish the present conception 
 of nations as cohesive competitive units. 
 i. Geographically: Nations have always freely ignored 
 natural features in fixing boundaries. Modern 
 141 
 
142 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 transportation methods, steamships, railroads, 
 tunnels, cables and telegraphic facilities have re- 
 duced the value of natural boundaries. 
 
 2. Different races, languages and religions are found 
 
 within a nation, and a given race, language or 
 religion is found in various nations. 
 
 3. No nation is economically isolated; national bound- 
 
 aries do not exist in world trade except as they are 
 emphasized by national tariffs. The very existence 
 of tariffs is a recognition of economic intercourse 
 between nations. 
 
 4. The greater part of so-called national culture (Kultur) 
 
 is intelligible to other peoples. The ideals of dif- 
 ferent nations are not necessarily in conflict. When 
 it is expedient, nations can easily compose their dif- 
 ferences no matter of how long a standing (e. g., 
 France and England, foes from 1200-1900, allies 
 now). The conflict of national ideals is irrepressi- 
 ble only when it suits national purpose to consider 
 them so. (Angell: The World's Highway.) 
 
 5. Only in the political or juridical sphere is nationalism 
 
 still a reality. This does not mean that there is a 
 difference in the political system, but that political 
 systems which may be quite alike are under dif- 
 ferent managements. In other words, the present 
 political institutions governing the relation of 
 nations are out of keeping with the economic and 
 cultural phases of international Me; a reconcilia- 
 tion is needed. Certain opponents of war rest 
 their case upon this feature of the matter. 
 
 6. The nation represents no external or material reality 
 
 that is fundamentally distinguishable from other 
 nations. What distinctive character it possesses 
 is something abstract, "A nation exists where its 
 
 
FUNDAMENTALS OF OPPOSITION TO WAR 143 
 
 ' component atoms believe it to be a nation" 
 London Nation, June 26, 1915. Nationalism is a 
 faith, a religion, and as such it is a real working 
 force. It originally had a basis in external condi- 
 tions; education has perpetuated the old concep- 
 tions and failed to coordinate them with new de- 
 velopments. Internationalism (see Chapter XV) 
 has, however, in great measure swept away the 
 original foundation of nationalism. 
 a. Commerce and finance have become international- 
 ized. 
 
 Foreign investments benefit the investor and not 
 the average citizen of the home nation which 
 ^ is, under present theories, expected to back up 
 
 the foreign investor and help him Succeed., This 
 tends to raise doubt as to nationalism in the 
 mind of the average man. 
 
 , b. The intellectual and cultural interests of men are 
 \ international, not national. There are medical, 
 educational, financial, scientific, and literary, 
 worlds. These, though severally experiencing 
 no incompatibility because of nationality, are 
 supposed to be in fundamental conflict when 
 acting in groups. The evident untruth of this 
 supposition militates against nationalism. 
 
 D. Practically all parts of the earth have been explored 
 
 and settled. Nations can soon no longer expand 
 except at the expense of each other and hence a 
 perpetuation of nationalism means war between 
 great nations compared with which past wars will 
 appear insignificant. 
 
 E. Nations have already found it expedient to abandon the 
 
 extreme sovereignty of former times. This has so far 
 generally been voluntary. The modern individual 
 
144 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 cares more about the economic conditions than the 
 political system he lives under. 
 
 1. The mere necessity of systematizing the present 
 
 international intercourse of every kind demands 
 treaties; every treaty represents a restriction of 
 sovereignty in the degree to which the treaty gov- 
 erns the future conduct of signatories. 
 
 2. Nations have cooperated even in matters of a political 
 
 nature. (See Chapter XV. Also Fried: Handbuch 
 I, 106-135.) 
 
 3. The advantage of this voluntary surrender is a se- 
 
 curity that cannot be attained under competitive 
 force. Charles Richet states it thus, 
 
 "True, I limit my personal liberty and divest myself of a 
 right when I agree not to shoot off a revolver on the 
 streets whenever I feel like it. But in submitting to 
 this restriction which an American frontiersman 
 will not tolerate I secure the advantage over him 
 that I am safer on the streets than he, since my fellow- 
 citizens may not shoot either." (Fried: Handbuch I, 
 p. 108.) 
 
 F. There are precedents. 
 
 1. The national replaced the feudal state in the natural 
 
 endeavor to make the political institutions fit 
 economic conditions which had ceased to be feudal. 
 
 2. The United States is a federation of once sovereign 
 
 states, whose interests had become largely identical. 
 It rests on the denial of the full sovereignty of the 
 several states. 
 
 3. The German Empire is a Union of once particularistic 
 
 and very hostile states. It is typical that the polit- 
 ical union was preceded by economic unity rep- 
 resented by the Customs Union. 
 
 4. Italy is another case. There are strong tendencies 
 
FUNDAMENTALS OF OPPOSITION TO WAR 145 
 
 toward federation in the British Empire. Pan- 
 Americanism, as interpreted in some quarters, is a 
 federative movement. 
 
 III. International organization is the method by which to 
 restrict nationalism and to suppress its evils. 
 
 A. This international organization may follow one of 
 
 several lines. (See Chapter XXVI.) 
 
 B. International federation is condemned as Utopian by 
 
 many. 
 
 1. Fried (Handbuch I, 118) on the contrary holds that 
 
 a project is Utopian only when it posits a construc- 
 tive condition instead of one which represents a 
 natural development. 
 
 2. In this sense international organization is not Utopian 
 
 for it merely means a reconstruction of international 
 political machinery to bring it into keeping with 
 the existing economic and cultural intercourse be- 
 tween nations. In other words, the economic bases 
 for world organization are already present; and, as 
 in the unification of Germany, the political con- 
 ditions can be made to fit the economic. 
 
 3. The opposition to the development of closer interna- 
 
 tional relations comes: 
 
 a. From the supposition that nations represent in- 
 
 compatible ideals. 
 
 b. From the natural inertia and " standpattism " of 
 
 society. 
 
 c. From ignorance of the extent of international Me, 
 
 and its conflict with nationalism. 
 
 d. From aristocratic or plutocratic interests which 
 
 fatten either by using the nation to promote 
 selfish interests (tariffs, foreign investments) or 
 by profiting from the rivalry of nations (munition 
 makers). 
 
146 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 IV. The function of pacifism is to reconstruct society by 
 doing away with the institutions, ideas and fallacies 
 which cause war and erecting others which, by securing 
 justice, procure peace. 
 
 A . Nationalism is the fundamental cause of war. 
 
 1. What is usually called the cause of a war (the murder 
 
 of the Archduke, the sinking of the Maine, etc.), is 
 merely the occasion, the pretext on which national- 
 ism operates and justifies its action. 
 
 2. Human nature can be said to cause war only because 
 
 it works through nationalism; the same human 
 nature within national bounds does not cause war, 
 but is taken care of by institutions devised for the 
 purpose. 
 
 3. National expansion in any form causes resistance. 
 
 4. Errors and fallacies about nationalism cause war. 
 
 (See Chapter IV.) Among these should be men- 
 tioned: 
 
 a. Social fatalism: the belief that war is inevitable. 
 
 b. Unilateral aberration: reasoning about international 
 
 matters in terms of one nation only. 
 
 c. Irrepressible conflict of ideas: the assumption that 
 
 nations are units that are fundamentally dif- 
 ferent and therefore necessarily hostile. 
 
 B. Contributory causes. Those persons or interests which 
 
 may profit in any way by a conflict between nations 
 may aid in precipitating war. 
 
 1. Munition makers. 
 
 2. Military and naval men who get a chance to do some- 
 
 thing and to get advancement. 
 
 3. The common man who finds war attractive because 
 
 it gives him a chance for travel and adventure, a 
 change from the monotony of his hum-drum 
 life. 
 
FUNDAMENTALS OF OPPOSITION TO WAR 147 
 
 4. Persons who dislike another nation and get satisfac- 
 tion from a chance to attack it. 
 C. Religious groupings formerly caused war. Racial dif- 
 
 :es may succeed nationalism as a cause of war. 
 V. Weaknesses and taul 
 
 A. It has been too largely idealistic and abstract. This 
 
 shows evidence of being corrected by the modern 
 inductive pacifists. Even the latter are charged with 
 being too intellectual to reach practical people. It 
 must, however, not be forgotten that all reforms are 
 subject to the foregoing charges. 
 
 B. It has relied too largely on emotion and sentiment in 
 
 trying to eradicate war by describing its horrors and 
 the sufferings of women and children. 
 
 C. It is charged with being negative only, standing for 
 
 "passivism," non-resistance, peace-at-any-price, de- 
 fenselessness, unilateral disarmament. Aggressive 
 pacifism is wanted: "Blessed are the peace- makers." 
 
 D. It has toyed with irrational catchwords: "eternal 
 
 peace," "disarmament," "lay down your arms," 
 "brotherhood of man." 
 
 E. It has suffered from those who join its ranks be- 
 
 cause it was fashionable or good advertising. The 
 "P. P. P's." Pacifists for Personal Prominence. 
 
 F. Persons who join the fight against war, at first show a 
 
 disposition to criticize all previous pacifists as being 
 
 "all wrong." The result is a divergence of opinion 
 
 and action. This, though often commented on by 
 
 opponents of pacifism, is not a real weakness, as it 
 
 is no worse than disagreement among other men. 
 
 I. The reliance on any one method, scheme or program 
 
 to bring about peace is, however, a doubtful policy. 
 
 a. Religious pacifism has long been tried in vain. 
 
 b. Socialism, though removing strife between labor 
 
148 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 and capital, would not remove the present racial 
 prejudices. 
 
 c. Free trade, though it would remove certain economic 
 
 causes of war, would not correct other causes. 
 
 d. Democracy, alone, will not bring peace. France, 
 
 though a Republic, breathed revanche. 
 
 e. Universal brotherhood, though helping toward 
 
 peace, does not assure it, for acquaintance does 
 not remove dislikes; a family quarrel is noto- 
 riously the bitterest. We need not love foreigners, 
 we merely need to cooperate with them. 
 /. Disarmament will not cure the military spirit, 
 
 which is part of nationalism. 
 G. Peace must be made more interesting and attractive. 
 
 REFERENCES 
 
 Fried: Handbuch der Friedensbewegung. Leipzig, 1911-1913. 
 Fried: Die moderne Friedensbewegung. 1907. 
 Fried: Die Grundlagen des Revolutionaren Pazifismus. 1908. 
 Fried: A Brief Outline of the Nature and Aims of Pacifism. Amer- 
 
 ican Association for International Conciliation. April, 1915. 
 Butler, Nicholas Murray: The International Mind. New York, 
 
 1912. 
 
 Angell: The Problems of the War and the Peace. London, 1915. 
 Angell: The World's Highway. 1915. 
 Angell: America and the New World-State. 1915. 
 Angell: Arms and Industry. New York, 1914. 
 Krehbiel: Nationalism an Anachronism? The Survey, June 3, 
 
 Torres, Alberto: Le probleme mondial. Etude de politique Inter- 
 
 nationale. Rio de Janeiro, 1913. 
 Torres, Alberto: Vers la Paix. 1909. 
 Hirst, F. W.: The Arbiter in Council. New York, 1006. 
 Richet, Charles: La passe de la guerre et Pavenir de la paix. 1007. 
 Hobhouse, L. T.: The World in Conflict. New York, 1915. 
 Hull, W. L: The New Peace Movement. Boston, 1912. 
 
FUNDAMENTALS OF OPPOSITION TO WAR 149 
 
 Spencer, Herbert: Militancy versus Civilization. London, 1915. 
 Grane, William Leighton: The Passing of War. 1912. 
 Wehberg, Hans: Die Internationale Friedensbewegung. 1911. 
 Lippmann: The Stakes of Diplomacy. 1915. 
 The Great Analysis: a plea for a rational world order. New York, 
 
 1912. 
 
 How Diplomats make War. By a British Statesman. 1915. 
 Brailsford, Henry Noel: The War of Steel and Gold. New York, 
 
 Pfeiffer, Ludwig: Die Wahrheit iiber die Kriegsgefahren. Feststel- 
 
 lung der Interessen einzelner Klassen fiir den Krieg. Leipzig, 
 
 1912. 
 Hiiber, Max: Die soziologische Grundlage des Volkerrechts. Ber- 
 
 lin, 1910. 
 
 Stein, Ludwig: Die Philosophic des Friedens. Berlin, 1899. 
 Stratton, George M.: Syllabus of Lectures on The Psychology of 
 
 the War Spirit. 1915. 
 
 Toynbee, Arnold J.: Nationality and the War. New York, 1915. 
 Gobineau, Arthur de: The Inequality of Human Races. New 
 
 York, 1915. 
 
 Plater, Charles: A Primer of Peace and War. New York, 1915. 
 Marshall, Henry Rutgers: War and the Ideal of Peace. New York, 
 
 Nationalism and War in the Near East. By a Diplomatist. New 
 York, 1915. Published for the Carnegie Endowment for Inter- 
 national Peace. 
 
 Green, T. H. : Lectures on Principles of Political Organization. 1895. 
 
 Kropotkin: Mutual Aid a Factor in Evolution. New York, 1902. 
 
 Sumner, William G.: War and Other Essays. 1911. 
 
 Wells, H. G.: The World Set Free. New York, 1914. 
 
 Gulick, Sidney L.: The Fight for Peace. 1915. 
 
 Stilwell, Arthur E.: Universal Peace War is Mesmerism. New 
 York, 1911. 
 
 Revon, Michel: Philosophic de la guerre. 1896. 
 
 Lynch, Frederick: The Last War. 
 
 Lynch, Frederick: The Peace Problem. 
 
 Mead, Lucia Ames: Swords and Plowshares. 
 
xvn 
 
 DEDUCTIVE OR IDEALIST PACIFISM TO 1789 
 
 I. Deductive pacifism is that which, premising peace as 
 something desirable, labors for it in any way that 
 promises to be effective. 
 
 The ideal of peace may, in its origin, be religious, emo- 
 tional or rational. As long as the ideal of peace is the 
 starting point, the resultant pacifism is a priori or 
 deductive. It includes all sentimental opposition to 
 war and its horrors. 
 
 n. Deductive pacifism has always predominated, though 
 at intervals there have been other forms. Only in the 
 last two decades has a real addition in the form of 
 inductive pacifism appeared. 
 III. The history of deductive pacifism. 
 
 A . That peace has always been an ideal men have wished 
 
 for, appears in the folklore of all times and peoples. 
 
 B. In ancient times peace, for the most part, remained an 
 
 ideal which was praised and recommended. 
 
 1. The prophets of the Old Testament, particularly 
 
 Isaiah, prophesied and praised eternal peace. 
 
 2. The religions of the Persians, Chinese, and Hindus 
 
 contain the peace ideal. 
 
 Among the Greeks, Homer, Euripides, Aristophanes, 
 ^Eschylos, Plutarch, Epictetus and Zeno give ex- 
 pression to longing for peace. The last two, Stoics, 
 preached the brotherhood of man and suggested 
 a world-state; and Plato in "Tamias" and 
 "Critias" pictured the peace-state " Atlantis." 
 150 
 
DEDUCTIVE OR IDEALIST PACIFISM TO 1789 151 
 
 4. The Greeks also achieved practical results in peaceful 
 
 settlements. (See Chapter XXI.) 
 
 5. Of the Romans, Ovid, Lucretius, Virgil, Sallust, 
 
 Seneca, and Probus favor peace as an ideal. Cicero, 
 Tacitus, and MarcuSl^irelius are quite outspoken 
 in this opinion, the last advancing the brotherhood 
 of man. 
 
 6. The New Testament is full of peace sentiment, and 
 
 quite naturally the Church Fathers, Ireneus, 
 Clemens of Alexandria, Tertullian, Cyprian, Lac- 
 tantius and Augustine restated them. 
 C. In the Middle Age. 
 
 i. The conception of a federation of states was common 
 in the medieval period. Usually, however, the con- 
 ception had at bottom the purpose of organizing 
 Christian States for war on non-Christian peoples, 
 chiefly on Islam. The head of the federation was, 
 depending on the writer's predilections, to be the 
 Pope or the Emperor. 
 
 a. Thomas of Aquinas (i3th century) favored the 
 
 Pope. 
 
 b. Dante's "De Monarchia" conceives of a federation 
 
 under the Emperor; The Abbe Honore Bonnor 
 in "Arbre de Bataille" (1380) does likewise. 
 
 c. Marsiglius of Padua in "Defensor Pads" (1324) 
 
 proposed to transform the Church Councils into 
 a body representing the European States. 
 
 d. Peter Dubois in "De recuperatione terre Sancte" 
 
 (1305) constructed what is the oldest document 
 containing a plan for the organization of states, 
 and a proposition for a permanent European 
 Court, which is much like the one adopted for 
 the Hague Tribunal in 1899. 
 
 e. George Podiebrad (1420-1471), King of Poland, 
 
152 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 influenced by his Chancellor Antonius Marius, 
 advocated an eternal peace league of Christian 
 princes, with a congress of delegates empowered 
 to settle disputes. The object was not peace 
 but a league of friends with whom to oppose an 
 unfriendly papacy. 
 
 /. Erasmus (1467-1536) opposed war in numerous 
 writings notably in "Querela pads" and "Ada- 
 gia." He was among the first popularizers of 
 the peace idea. 
 
 2 > The truce of God "Treuga dei" declared hi 1041 and 
 promulgated for all Christendom by Urban II in 
 1095 proscribed fighting for certain days of the 
 week. It too was designed to suppress strife 
 among Christians in order to make the crusades 
 possible. 
 
 3. Many disputes were arbitrated hi the Middle Age, 
 
 the Pope figuring most frequently as arbitrator. 
 
 4. The restrictions upon private war led to the develop- 
 
 ment of duelling as a prerogative of knights and 
 the higher classes generally. This continued un- 
 restrained for a long time, until the developing 
 \monarchs acquired strength to suppress it. 
 a. Emperor Maximilian I in 1495 decreed the "peace 
 
 of the realm" which forbade duelling. 
 b. In France it was Richelieu chiefly who suppressed 
 
 private warfare. 
 D. Modern Period: religious pacifism. 
 
 1. Luther (1483-1546) expressed opposition to war. 
 
 2. The Mennonites, a sect originating in the Netherlands 
 
 about 1534, adopted non-resistance as one of their 
 cardinal doctrines. They have held to it to this 
 day. 
 
 3. The Quakers or Friends, under the leadership of 
 
DEDUCTIVE OR IDEALIST PACIFISM TO 1789 153 
 
 George Fox (1624-1691) and Robert Barclay 
 (1648-1690), taught non-resistance and peace. 
 
 a. Ann Austin and Mary Fisher worked in Massachu- 
 setts, 1656. 
 
 b.^ William Penn (1644-1718) carried Quaker princi- 
 ples into practice in his colony, Pennsylvania, 
 (1682) and his success in dealing with the Indians 
 remains as evidence that even primitive peoples 
 will be friendly and pacific neighbors, if they 
 are treated fairly. 
 
 Penn in 1693 published his "Essay towards the 
 Present and Future Peace of Europe by the 
 Establishment of an European Dyet, Parlia- 
 ment, or Estates." (Old South Leaflets, IV, 
 No. 75.) This advocates a permanent inter- 
 national congress and proposes the use of joint 
 force to compel members to submit their dif- 
 ferences to the congress and to accept its award. 
 
 c. John Bellers in 1710 published a book based on 
 
 Penn's ideas. 
 
 d. The Quakers secured exemption from military 
 
 service in the American colonies. 
 
 e. They continue active in urging their opposition to 
 
 force and war through their peace societies. (See 
 Friends' Intelligencer, January 22, 1916.) 
 4. Various Christian ministers and organizations have 
 from tune to time and in increasing numbers op- 
 posed war. There is, however, the greatest differ- 
 ence of opinion upon the proper relationship of 
 Christianity and war. The following regard war as 
 opposed to Christianity: 
 
 a. The Salvation Army. 
 
 b. The Church Peace Union (70 Fifth Avenue, New 
 
 York). Endowed by Andrew Carnegie. 
 
154 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 c. The Fellowship of Reconciliation (92 St. George's 
 
 Square, London, S. W.). 
 
 d. World Alliance of Churches (70 Fifth, Avenue, 
 
 New York). f 
 
 5. The Bahaists, instituted by Baha Vllah ujT Persia, 
 1851. "Let not a man glory in this, that he loves 
 his country; let him rather glory in this, that he 
 loves his kind." Baha 'o'llah. *l 
 Present leader is Abdul Baha. / '! 
 . Modern Period: Early individual pacifists and their 
 
 projects. 
 
 i.Henry IV of France (1589-1610). '" The Great 
 Design." (English edition by Mead, 1909.) Pro- 
 posed a hegemony subject to France against the 
 Hapsburg power; therefore not a ^disinterested 
 peace project. Sully, Henry's minister, is sup- 
 
 \posed, by some, to be originator. 
 2. Emeric Cruce (Emeric de Lacroix afiput 1590-1648); 
 "Le nouveau Cynee" 1623; "The New Cyneas" 
 (Balch, 1909). Proposes an international council 
 of all nations with headquarters at Venice to 
 settle all differences and preserve the peace. He 
 is the first to proclaim free trade as a means to 
 peace. 
 V 3. Grotius (1625) and Zouche. (See Chapter XX.) 
 
 4. Campanella (1568-1639) projected a universal mon- 
 
 archy under the Pope. 
 
 5. Amos Comenius (1592-1676) " Consul tatio catholica." 
 
 Favored peaceful settlement of disputes. 
 
 6. Count Ernest of Hesse-Rheinfels (1623-93) proposed 
 
 a league of Catholic princes to settle disputes in 
 a tribunal under papal supervision. 
 
 7. Duke Charles of Lorraine and Bar favored some 
 
 central organization of states. 
 
DEDUCTIVE OR IDEALIST PACIFISM TO 1789 155 
 
 8. Other opponents of war of this period: 
 
 Spinoza (1632-77); Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1604) 
 ^ favors federation and arbitration; Christian Thom- 
 asius (1655-1728); Friedrich von Logau (1604- 
 1655); Archbishop Fenelon (1651-1715); Pascal; 
 La Bruyere; Pierre Bayle; John Locke. 
 F. Period of Enlightenment or Rationalism: 
 
 1. Abbe de Saint-Pierre (1658-1743). 
 
 "Afirege du projet paix perpetuelle invente par le 
 roi Henri le Grand . . ." 1713 (Extract in Darby, 
 International Tribunals, 71 f.). The first "co- 
 herent" proposal for an international tribunal 
 (Richet, 247). Exercised an influence toward the 
 creation of Holy Alliance. 
 
 2. Rousseau (1712-1778), "Extrait du projet de paix 
 
 perpetuelle de M. L'Abbe de Saint-Pierre" (Darby, 
 IO S); "Jugement sur la Paix Perpetuelle," (Darby, 
 
 3. Leibnitz (1646-1716), favored federation and com-- * 
 mented favorably on the Abbe de Saint-Pierre's 
 plan. ^ 
 
 * 4. Montesquieu (1689-1755), approved of universal 
 monarchy or federation, and commented on the 
 disturbance of trade occasioned by war. 
 
 5. Voltaire (1694-1778), opposed Abbe de Saint-Pierre's/ 
 
 project, but favored his aim, the elimination of war. 
 In his usual sarcastic style he condemned war as 
 advantageous to princes and aristocracy only. 
 During his stay in England Voltaire learned to 
 know the Quakers and mentions them and their 
 views on war in his correspondence. 
 
 6. Prince Kaunitz, Prime Minister of Austria, made a 
 
 proposal for reduction of armaments to Prussia, 
 about 1764. (See Chapter XXV.) 
 
156 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 *7 Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), incorporated a plan 
 for universal and permanent peace in his "Princi- 
 ples of International Law." Proposed extension 
 and codification of international law, abandon- 
 ment of imperialism, conventions to limit arma- 
 ments, free trade, an international congress and 
 an arbitral tribunal. 
 
 8. Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790), "On War and 
 
 Peace," 1788. (Old South Leaflets, VI, 162.) 
 
 9. The Encyclopedists (Holbach, Diderot, Turgot); 
 
 Ange Gondart (1720-1791); La Harpe; Gaillard; 
 Mayer; Gottsched; Palthen; Totze; Lilienfeld; 
 Vattel; Lessing; Herder; Wieland; Schiller; Hippel; 
 Schinly; Swift; Hume; Price. 
 
 REFERENCES 
 
 See next Chapter 
 
XVIII 
 
 DEDUCTIVE OR IDEALIST PACIFISM SINCE 1789 
 
 I. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Period marks the 
 beginning of a new era in which democracy and the 
 brotherhood of man have been in the ascendant. These 
 favor cooperation and peace, and accordingly pacifism 
 has gained in vigor as democracy has advanced. 
 
 A. The formation of the United States was a practical 
 
 application of federation of states. As such, as well 
 as for other reasons, it is an event of greatest historical 
 importance. 
 
 B. Various leaders of the French revolution were advo- 
 
 cates of peace and international federation: Beau- 
 harnais, Mirabeau, Petion, Cloots, Abbe Gregoire, 
 Eschasseriaux, Condorcet. 
 
 C. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) "Der Ewige Friede," 
 
 1795. "Perpetual Peace" a translation, by Benja- 
 min Trueblood, American Peace Society. 
 Throughout Kant's works there runs a criticism of war. ** 
 In " Perpetual Peace," which is drawn up in the 
 form of a treaty, he favors federation, reduction of 
 armaments, but says nothing about an arbitral 
 court. His aim was not to secure peace, but to show 
 the conditions necessary to securing it. There are 
 three, according to him: 
 
 1. Every state must have popular government. Sov- 
 
 ereigns are largely responsible for war. This idea 
 shows Kant's recognition of the new era. 
 
 2. International law shall be backed by a federation of J 
 
 free states. 
 
158 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 ""^ 3. There must be world citizenship, permitting men to 
 visit everywhere, but not allowing ownership in 
 foreign lands. This is directed against imperial- 
 ism. 
 
 D. Other opponents of war of this period: Schelling, 
 Zachariae, Malinowsky, Fries, Batain, Jean Paul, 
 Gustav Hugo, Heeren, Krause, Archduke Charles 
 of Austria, Fichte (in his earlier life), de Constant, 
 Paoli-Chagny. From the social point of view: 
 Fourier, Saint-Simon, Thierry. 
 II. During the nineteenth century. 
 A. Peace Societies. 
 
 1. New York Peace Society, founded in August, 1815, 
 
 with about 30 members. David Low Dodge (1774- 
 1852) first president. "The Mediator's Kingdom 
 not of this World." 1809. ^ 
 
 2. Ohio Peace Society founded December 2, *9$. 
 
 3. The Massachusetts Peace Society, founded in Boston, 
 
 December 28, 1815, by Noah Worcester (1758- 
 1837) and William Ellery Channing (1780-1842). 
 Worcester: "Solemn Review of the Custom of War." 
 1814. Edited "The Friend of Peace." 
 
 4. Other societies were founded in Philadelphia, Rhode 
 
 Island, and Maine and their union as the American 
 Peace Society occurred in New York, May 8, 1828, 
 under the leadership of William Ladd (1778-1841). 
 (Headquarters: 1834, Hartford, Conn.; 1837, Bos- 
 ton; since 1911, Colorado Building, Washington, 
 D. C.) 
 
 5. The Peace Society (English) founded in London, 
 
 June n, 1816, by a Quaker, William Allen (1770- 
 1843), and Joseph Price. (Headquarters: New 
 Broad Street, Finsbury, London, E. C.) Has 
 since 1819 issued the "Herald of Peace." Sent 
 
DEDUCTIVE OR IDEALIST PACIFISM SINCE 1789 159 
 
 representatives to continent to spread peace 
 idea. 
 
 6. Peace Society at Geneva, founded December i, 1830, 
 
 by de Sellon (1782-1839), who got the idea from 
 London. 
 
 7. English Quakers founded the "Societe de la morale 
 
 chretienne" in Paris in 1821, which in 1841 de- 
 veloped a peace department. Saint Simon and 
 Fourier had helped to prepare the ground. 
 
 8. Peace societies in 1910. About 160 societies with 
 
 many branches. 
 
 England, 22 societies with about 45 branches. 
 France, 36 societies, some of which have as many as 
 
 40 branches. 
 
 Germany, 3 societies with 95 branches. 
 Austria, 8; Belgium, 3; Hungary, 2; Italy, 55; Nor- 
 way, 2; Portugal, 3; Russia, 2; Spain, 2; Sweden, 
 8; United States, 17; Canada, i; South American 
 States, 7; Australia, 4; Japan, 2; Denmark, 2, 
 with 37 branches. 
 
 (For a list of peace societies see Annuaire du mouve- 
 mentpacifiste, 1910, and The Peace Year-book, 1911.) 
 B. International Peace Congresses. 
 
 In 1841, when the relations between Great Britain 
 and the United States were strained over a boundary 
 question, Joseph Sturge, an English Quaker, came to 
 America to consult about means of securing better 
 feeling. During his stay he proposed to the American 
 Peace Society an international peace congress, which 
 was realized in 1843. 
 
 i. International peace congress, London, 1843. Charles 
 Hindley, M. P., president. Really an Anglo- 
 American conference: 294 English, 37 American, 
 and 6 continental delegates. 
 
160 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 2. International Peace Congress at Brussels, 1848. 
 
 a. Elihu Burritt (1810-1879), "the learned black- 
 
 smith" of New England, through extensive 
 travel, speaking and publication contributed very 
 materially to the development of peace senti- 
 ment in Europe and to the international peace 
 congresses. He advocated congresses of nations, 
 arbitral courts and peaceful settlement of all 
 disputes. 
 
 b. August Couvreur and August Visscher of Belgium 
 
 secured government support. 
 
 c. Delegates from England, United States, France, 
 
 Belgium, and The Netherlands. Visscher, presi- 
 dent. Burritt's influence on resolutions very 
 noticeable. 
 
 3. Paris, 1849, Victor Hugo, President, Richard Cobden, 
 
 Vice-President; Frankfort-on-Main, 1850; London, 
 1851; Manchester, 1852; Edinburgh, 1853. 
 
 With the Crimean war there occurred a lapse in the 
 congresses. Congresses were held in Geneva, 1867; 
 Paris, 1878; Brussels, 1882; Paris, 1889. 
 
 Since 1889 they have practically met annually. Per- 
 manent headquarters established at Berne in 1891: 
 "Permanent International Bureau of Peace." List 
 of congresses found in Annuaire de la Vie Interna- 
 tionale, 1908-9. 
 
 The influence of these Congresses toward developing 
 official international congresses and ultimately 
 the Hague Conferences is very considerable. The 
 influence of World Fairs in this connection is also 
 noteworthy. (Faries: Internationalism.) 
 C. Official recognition of the peace idea. 
 
 i. This is briefly treated in connection with the develop- 
 ment of arbitration (see Chapter XXI), and with 
 
DEDUCTIVE OR IDEALIST PACIFISM SINCE 1789 161 
 
 the development of official international confer- 
 ences. (See Chapter XV. See also Fried: Hand- 
 buch II, 70-95.) A few only of the many persons 
 active in securing government recognition can be 
 mentioned: William Jay, Charles Sumner, Richard 
 Cobden, John Bright (Quaker), Henry Richard, 
 Marquis of Bristol, Randall Cremer, Frederic 
 Passy, Manzini. 
 
 2. The Interparliamentary Union, founded 1889, is a 
 most significant indication of the strength behind 
 the idea for the improvement of international rela- 
 tions. 
 
 a. It grew out of the proposal of Frederic Passy and 
 
 Randal Cremer to the French Foreign Minister, 
 Goblet, to have delegates of Parliament and the 
 French Chambers meet to discuss an arbitration 
 agreement like that between Great Britain and 
 the United States. The minister supported it. 
 The proposed meeting occurred in 1888 and 
 called a meeting to be held at the Paris exposi- 
 tion, 1889. At the latter the Union became per- 
 manent as a medium between national legisla- 
 tures. 
 
 b. Any member of a National legislature may become 
 
 a member of the Interparliamentary Union. In 
 1912 there were 3,640 members. Headquarters 
 in Brussels. Publications: Annuaire de 1'Union 
 Interparlementaire; Documents Interparlemen- 
 taire. 
 
 D. The year 1889 is important in peace annals, as it marks 
 several events of significance: First Pan-American 
 Congress; Establishment of the Interparliamentary 
 Union; Resumption of International Peace Con- 
 gresses; the acceptance by leading governments of 
 
j62 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 the principle of arbitration. These all were forces 
 
 which helped produce the Hague Conference in 1899. 
 
 Since 1889 the activities against war have become 
 
 numerous and variegated. 
 
 E. Leo Tolstoi occupies a unique place in pacifism. In 
 his writings, particularly in "War and Peace," 
 he advocates extreme non-resistance. 
 
 REFERENCES 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY AND YEAR BOOKS 
 
 Bibliographic du mouvement de la paix. Christiania, 1912. 
 
 La Fontaine, Henri: Bibliographic de la paix et de Parbitrage 
 international. 1004. 
 
 Catalogue d'ouvrages sur la paix et la guerre classes dans la 
 Bibliotheque du Bureau International a Bern. 1901. 
 
 Huntsman, M. H.: Peace Bibliography. 1912. 
 
 Hirst, F. W.: Library of War and Peace. London, 1907. 
 
 La Vie Internationale. Brussels, 1912 f. 
 
 Mead, Edwin D.: The Literature of the Peace Movement. Pam- 
 phlet of the International School of Peace, now World Peace 
 Foundation. 
 
 Annuaire du mouvement pacifiste. Bureau International de la 
 Paix a Bern. 
 
 The Peace Year Book. The National Peace Council. 1910. 
 
 Hicks, F. C.: Internationalism. American Association for Inter- 
 national Conciliation. 1913. 
 
 Annuaire de PUnion Interparlementaire. Brussels. (In progress.) 
 
 Annuaire de la Vie Internationale. Brussels, 1905-7; 1908-9; 
 1910-11. 
 
 HISTORY OF PACIFISM 
 
 Fried: Handbuch der Friedensbewegung. 1911-13. 
 
 Fried: Die moderne Friedensbewegung in Deutschland und Frank- 
 
 reich. 1908. 
 
 Bloch: Der Krieg. 1899. V, 1-197. 
 Richet: Le passe 1 de la guerre et Pavenir de la paix. 1907. 243!. 
 
DEDUCTIVE OR IDEALIST PACIFISM SINCE 1789 163 
 
 Loewenthal, Eduard: Geschichte der Friedensbewegung. Berlin, 
 1903. 
 
 Darby: International Tribunals. 1904. 
 
 Boyle: History of Peace. 1902. 
 
 Del Vecchio, Giorgio: II fenomeno della guerra et 1'idea della pace. 
 Torino, 1911. 
 
 Patonie-Pierre, Edmond: Historique du mouvement pacifique. 
 Bern, 1899. 
 
 Lange: Les origines du mouvement pacifiste organise". In Corre- 
 spondence bi-mensuelle, 1909. 
 
 Torres rLeProbleme mondial. 1913. 29-54. "L'ideedelapaixet 
 son evolution." 
 
 Moritzen, Julius: The Peace Movement of America. 1915. 
 
 Geer: The Beginning of the Peace Movement [Peace and Truce of 
 God]. Hartford Seminary Record, XXI, 227-243. 
 
 Diotallevi: Appunti Storici sul Movimento Pacifista nel Secolo 
 XIX. (Italian Peace Society.) 
 
 Frank : Les Beiges et la Paix. 1905. 
 
 Sharpless: A Quaker Experiment in Government. 1902. 
 
 Davis, Hayne: Among the World's Peacemakers. An Epitome of 
 the Interparliamentary Union. New York, 1907. 
 
 Quidde, L.: Zur Organisation der interparlamentarischen Union. 
 1911. 
 
 Resolutions textuelles des Congres universels de la paix, tenus de 
 1843 a 1910. . . . 1912. 
 
 Martyrerspiegel, 1748. (An account of the sufferings of early non- 
 resistants.) 
 
 SPECIAL AUTHORS 
 
 Erasmus: Against War. 1915. 
 
 Channing: Discourses on War (new ed., 1903). 
 
 Dodge: War Inconsistent with the Religion of Jesus Christ (new 
 
 ed., 1905). 
 M6moires pour servir a Phistoire de France, Due de Sully. Ser. 2, 
 
 vol. 3, 422-436. (The Great Design.) 
 Mead: The Great Design. (Ginn.) 1909. Also in Bonn's 
 
 Library. 
 
164 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 Bayet: Les e"crivains politiques du XVTII siecle. 1904. 16-22. 
 
 [Projet de . . . I'abbe' de Saint-Pierre.] 
 Rousseau: Oeuvres completes (Musset-Pathay). V, 405-459. 
 
 [Extrait du projet . . . de I'abbe de Saint-Pierre.] 
 Kant: Perpetual Peace. Translated by Trueblood. American 
 
 Peace Society. 1897. 
 Trueblood: William Perm's Holy Experiment in Civil Government. 
 
 American Peace Society. 1006. 
 Bentham: A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace. Ben- 
 
 tham's Works. (Bowring ed.) II, pp. 546-560. 
 Ladd, William: Essay on a Congress of Nations. 1840. 
 Sumner: Addresses on War. 1902. 
 Dodge: Mediator's Kingdom not of this World (new ed. by Mead). 
 
 1005- 
 
 Tolstoi: War and Peace. New York, 1889. 
 Crosby: Tolstoy and his Message. 1003. 
 
 BIOGRAPHY 
 
 Evans: Sir Randal Cremer. 1910. 
 
 Hemenway: The Apostle of Peace. Memoir of William Ladd. 
 Boston, 1872. 
 
 Vesnitch: Le Cardinal Alberoni Pacifiste. Revue d'Histoire Diplo- 
 matique. 1912. 
 
 Vesnitch: Deux precurseurs francais du pacifisme et de 1'arbitrage 
 international, P. Dubois et E. Cruce. Revue d'Bistoire Diplo- 
 matique. 1911. 
 
 CHRISTIANITY AND WAR 
 
 Jefferson, C. E.: Christianity and War. 1915. 
 
 Gilbert: The Bible and Universal Peace. 1914. 
 
 Harnack: Militia Christi. 1005. 
 
 Barr, J. : Christianity and War. 
 
 Wilson, W. E.: Christ and War. 1915. 
 
 Solovyof, Vladimir: War and Christianity from the Russian Point 
 
 of View. (Putnam.) 1915. 
 Freeman, D. R.: God and War. An exposition of the principles 
 
 underlying creative peace. (Badger.) 1915. 
 
DEDUCTIVE OR IDEALIST PACIFISM SINCE 1789 165 
 
 David Willard: The Christian Equivalent of War. New 
 
 York, 1915. 
 
 Wehberg, Hans: Das Papsttum und der Weltfriede. 1915. 
 Speer: Jesus and War. Pamphlet 35 of the Navy League of the 
 
 United States. 
 
 Luce: In the North American Review, 153, p. 678. 
 Repplier, Agnes: Christianity and War. Atlantic Monthly, Jan- 
 
 uary, 1915. 
 
 Weinel: Die Stellung des Urchristentums zum Staat. 1908. 
 Ballou, Adin: Christian non-resistance. 1910. 
 Beals: The Higher Soldiership. Chicago, 1912. 
 Temple, William: Christianity and War. Papers from War Time. 
 
 Oxford University Press, since 1914. No. i. 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS 
 
 Hetzel, H.: Die Humanisierung des Krieges und Ihrer Kultur- 
 
 geschichtlichen Entwicklung. 1889. 
 How Diplomats make War. By a British Statesman. (Huebsch.) 
 
 Selected Quotations on Peace and War. Compiled and published 
 by Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. 1915. 
 
 [A biographical list of pacifists is to be found in Fried: Hand- 
 buch, H, pp. 313-422.] 
 
XIX 
 
 INDUCTIVE OR PRACTICAL PACIFISM 
 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENGINEERING 
 
 I. Inductive pacifism is that which favors peace, not as an 
 end in itself, but as the natural and logical, but in- 
 cidental, consequence of other aims. It is rational and 
 not emotional, is in keeping with the scientific tend- 
 encies of our age. 
 
 Its starting point is, not peace, but some actual condition 
 of the present-day international relations which is not 
 what it ought to be. It proposes a remedy which is the 
 rational conclusion from the preceding critical study, 
 one which will harmonize discordant factors and result 
 in greater efficiency. Pointing out the defect or fallacy 
 is the first step; proposing a remedy is next in im- 
 portance; securing peace is incidental to the remedy. 
 Its method is a posteriori. For this reason some object 
 to being classed as peace advocates. Norman Angell 
 distinguishes his enterprise from pacifism by calling 
 it "civilism" or the international polity movement. 
 Political engineering well describes it. 
 . Inductive pacifism has only recently become important. 
 It is largely critical, but it includes much of the 
 recent so-called "constructive pacifism." The faults 
 inherent in present international relations have been 
 treated in detail elsewhere, and need merely be sum- 
 marized here: 
 
 The supposed economic benefits of war are challenged: 
 1 66 
 
INDUCTIVE OR PRACTICAL PACIFISM 167 
 
 "Angellism" (see Chapter V); and the economic 
 harm of war and the armed peace are demonstrated. 
 (See Chapters VI, VII.) 
 
 B. The biological effects of war are investigated and are 
 
 declared to be injurious. (See Chapter X.) 
 
 C. The consequences and dangers of the race in armaments 
 
 are studied by Bloch and others. (See Chapter VI.) 
 
 D. The weaknesses of international law and its collapse in 
 
 the face of nationalism are studied. (See Chapter 
 XX.) 
 
 E. Nationalism is scrutinized and questioned. (See Chap- 
 
 ters IV, XVI.) 
 
 F. Projects for reconstructing society are advanced. (See 
 
 Chapters XVI, XXVI.) 
 
XX 
 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 I. Ancient times. 
 
 A. The co-existence of states was not a recognized prin- 
 
 ciple; each state sought to subject or exterminate all 
 other states. Oriental states and Roman Empire. 
 Thus there could be no international relations in the 
 present sense. 
 
 B. Greeks admitted the principle of co-existing states. 
 The Greek city states all represented the same general 
 
 culture and language. 
 
 They had relations properly called international. 
 They gradually fell to quarreling among themselves as 
 
 did their neighbors and sought to subject each other. 
 
 The interf erence of Rome put an end to their struggles 
 
 before any state had been fully victorious. 
 n. Medieval times. 
 
 A. The Teutonic migrations broke up the Roman Empire 
 
 and substituted a number of tribal units independent 
 of each other. 
 
 B. This new society abandoned the ancient conception 
 
 that states could not co-exist. 
 
 1. The influence of the Christian religion and the church. 
 
 2. The Teutonic ideal admitted the existence of clans 
 
 and tribes side by side. 
 
 3. The confusion and darkness of the early medieval 
 
 period obscured the differences between peoples. 
 
 C. Medieval states had relatively slight relations. 
 
 i. Under the feudal system a state was not a homoge- 
 168 
 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 169 
 
 neous organization, but rather a union of feudal 
 entities held together by the personal bond of liege 
 homage. It was these feudal entities, as much as 
 the states themselves, that had relationships in the 
 earlier middle ages. 
 2. In this period there was no such thing as international 
 
 law. 
 III. The beginnings of international relations and laws. 
 
 A. International relations in the modern sense began to 
 
 appear in the twelfth century. 
 
 1. The crusades developed a sense of nationalism among 
 
 the various peoples of western Europe. 
 
 2. The feudal system began to yield before monarchical 
 
 power. 
 
 3. The Reformation and especially the religious wars 
 
 developed The sense of^ nationalism to a high de- 
 gree in Europe. 
 
 B. In this period states, as such, steadily increased their 
 
 dealings with one another, and at the time of the re- 
 ligious wars carried their animosities and national 
 sentiments to exaggeration. 
 
 C. Early writers on international relations. 
 
 1. Legnano. Professor of Law at Bologna. 
 
 "De bello, de represaliis, et de duello," 1360. 
 
 2. Belli. (Italian.) 
 
 "De re militari et de bello," 1563. 
 
 3. Bruno. (German.) 
 
 "De legationibus," 1548. 
 
 4. Victoria. (Spaniard.) 
 
 "Reflectiones theologicae," 1557. 
 
 5. Ayala. (Spaniard living in the Netherlands.) 
 
 "De jure et officiis bellicis" . . . 1582. 
 
 6. Suarez. (Spanish Jesuit at Coimbra, Portugal.) 
 
 "Tractatus de legibus et de legislatore," 1612. 
 
I yo NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 7. Gentilis. (Italian.) 
 
 "De legationibus," 1585. 
 "Commentationes de jure belli," 1588-89. 
 "De jure belli libri tres," 1598. 
 "Advocatio Hispanica," 1613. 
 IV. The mcxlern period. 
 
 A. National consciousness and international antipathies 
 
 were fully developed by the time of the Thirty Years 
 War, which involved practically all the nations of 
 western Europe. 
 
 1. The consequence of this bitter period was an over- 
 
 emphasis on national independence; the absolute 
 independence of a state from every other. 
 
 2. This condition arose in a monarchical age; and mon- 
 
 archs were in a position to exploit national antip- 
 athies. 
 
 Government by the people has replaced monarchy. 
 The spread of democratic principles should operate 
 to bring nations closer together. 
 
 B. International law developed in this age. 
 
 1. Hugo Grotius (1583-1635). " Father of the Law of 
 
 Nations." 
 
 "De jure belli ac pacis libri tres." 1625. (Engl. 
 transl. Whewell; and Extract in Old South 
 Leaflets, Vol. 5, No. 101, pp. 1-24.) 
 This work recognizes both 
 
 Customary or voluntary law. (Positive law.) 
 Natural law: This is held to be most impor- 
 tant, hence: Jus gentium, i. e., law of* na- 
 tions. 
 
 2. Zouche, 1590-1660. (Englishman.) 
 
 "luris et iudicii fecialis, sive iuris inter gentes, et 
 quaestionum de eodem explicatio." (Edited by 
 Holland; transl. by Brierly.) 
 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 171 
 
 Emphasizes voluntary international law at the ex- 
 pense of the natural law of Grotius. Hence: 
 Jus inter gentes, i. e., international law. 
 
 C. Three schools of the law of nations. 
 
 1. Naturalists: accept natural law. 
 
 2. Positivists: reject natural law. 
 
 3. Grotians: Recognize natural and voluntary law. 
 
 D. Historical development. 
 
 1. Naturalists and Grotians predominated to and 
 
 through French Revolution. 
 
 2. Nineteenth century saw triumph of positivists. 
 
 V. The scope of international law has continually developed 
 with increasing international intercourse, but has 
 always been somewhat behind. 
 
 A. Conventions regulating the relations of nations in 
 
 time of peace have been found useful and necessary 
 and have constantly increased in number. 
 
 B. During the nineteenth century, conventions providing 
 
 the rules for war have been adopted. 
 The principal conventions and international agreements 
 which have placed restrictions on warfare: 
 
 1. Declaration of Paris, 1856. 
 
 Scott: Texts of the Peace Conferences, 349. 
 
 [Francis Lieber Code, 1863. Not a treaty, but in- 
 structions to the Federal Army in the Civil War. 
 Scott: Texts, 350-376.] 
 
 2. Geneva Convention, 1864. (1868.) 
 Scott: Texts, 376-381. 
 
 The Red Cross developed from this. (See Chapter 
 XIV.) 
 
 3. Declaration of St. Petersburg, 1868. 
 Scott: Texts, 381-382. 
 
 [Project of an international declaration concerning 
 the laws and customs of war, adopted by the 
 
172 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 Conference of Brussels, August 27, 1874. Scott: 
 Texts, 382-389-] 
 
 [Laws of war on land. Recommended for adoption 
 by the Institute of International Law at its session 
 in Oxford, September 9, 1880. Scott: Texts, 
 389-400.] 
 
 4. Hague Peace Conference, 1899. 
 Scott: Texts 1-92. 
 
 5. Convention regarding hospital ships (The Hague), 
 
 1004. 
 Scott: Texts, 400-402. 
 
 6. Second Geneva convention for the amelioration of 
 
 the condition of the sick and wounded of armies 
 in the field, 1906. 
 Scott: Texts, 402-409. 
 
 7. The Second Hague Conference, 1907. 
 Scott: Texts, 93~334. 
 
 8. Declaration of London, 1909. 
 
 U. S. Naval War College: Intern. Law Topics, 1909. 
 This declaration failed to secure the signature of 
 England, which as the chief naval power, thus 
 practically defeated it. Still, the many appeals 
 to the declaration during the Great War, indicate 
 a wide-spread recognition of the soundness of the 
 principles of the declaration. 
 
 VI. International law is made by treaty between states, 
 by court decisions involving international relations 
 which may, though they need not, become precedents, 
 and in some measure by custom which nations follow 
 as long as they please. International law is, as yet, 
 merely the law dictated by a nation with power to 
 enforce its desires: England makes sea law. As trea- 
 ties bind only those who make them, and as the parties 
 to any given treaty have usually been small in number, 
 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 173 
 
 international law may be very different between dif- 
 ferent pairs of nations. International law is not 
 universal and lacks uniformity. 
 
 The Hague Conferences began to remedy this grave de- 
 fect by bringing a large number of nations together to 
 discuss common agreement. It is the nearest approach 
 to a codification of common international law for all 
 nations that we have had, and it needs to be continued. 
 
 VII. Sanction. International law as yet lacks an adequate 
 
 sanction. 
 
 A. Nations are bound only by treaties which they sign. 
 
 B. They are bound only as long as they choose to be. 
 There is no force to compel the observance of a treaty. 
 Besides full sovereignty of a nation the same which 
 
 determined whether it should sign a treaty seems 
 to imply the right to abrogate the treaty; for, if it 
 cannot do so, it is not sovereign. 
 
 C. Public opinion, upon which all law including national 
 
 law depends for its effectiveness, is by reason of 
 education, not behind international law but behind 
 some one national interpretation of international law. 
 Public opinion cannot be behind both nationalism 
 and international law. 
 When it is back of a law of nations it will be effective. 
 
 D. It is to secure an adequate sanction that a world fed- 
 
 eration, a world police and similar institutions are 
 being proposed in many quarters. 
 
 VIII. Five morals that Oppenheim deduced from the devel-^ 
 
 opment of the Law of Nations to date. (Oppen- 
 heim, I, 73-76.) 
 
 A law of nations can exist only if there is an equilib- 
 rium, a balance of power, between the members 
 of the family of nations. 
 
 International law can develop progressively only when 
 
174 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 international politics, especially intervention, are 
 
 made on the basis of real state interests. 
 The principle of nationality is of such force that it is 
 
 fruitless to try to stop its victory. 
 Every progress in the development of international 
 
 law wants due time to ripen. 
 The progressive development of international law 
 
 depends chiefly upon the standard of public morality 
 
 on the one hand, and, on the other, the economic 
 
 interests. 
 
 REFERENCES 
 
 GENERAL WORKS 
 
 Oppenheim: International Law. 1912. I, pp. 44, 58. 
 
 Wilson: International Law. [sth ed.] 1911. 
 
 Borchard, E. M.: The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad. 
 
 Fillet: Les Fondateurs du droit international. 1904. 
 
 Nys: The Development and Formation of International Law. 
 
 American Journal of International Law. January, 1912. 
 Oppenheim: Die zukunft des Volkerrechts. 1911. 
 Pollock: The Modern Law of Nations and the Prevention of War. 
 
 Cambridge Modern History, XIII, 703-729. 
 Niemeyer, Th.: Internationales Recht und nationales Interesse. 
 
 1007. 
 For further references consult any authority on international law; 
 
 also the Peace Year Book. 1911. p. 180. 
 
 SPECIAL TOPICS 
 
 Phillipson: International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and 
 
 Rome. 1911. 
 
 Phillipson: Two Studies in International Law. 1908. 
 Jacomet: La guerre et les traitfe. 1009. 
 Fiore: Le droit Internationale codifie" et sa sanction juridique. 
 
 Paris, 1911. 
 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 175 
 
 Bordwell: The Law of War between Belligerents. 1908. 
 
 Spaight : War Rights on Land. 1911. 
 
 Du Payrat: Le prisionnier de guerre dans la guerre continentale. 
 
 1910. 
 
 Bowles, T. G.: The Declaration of Paris, 1856. 1900. 
 Takahashi: International Law applied to the Russo-Japanese 
 
 War. 1908. 
 Holland: Neutral Duties in a Maritime War as Illustrated by 
 
 Recent Events. In Proceedings of the British Academy, 1905-6, 
 
 PP. 55-70. 
 
 Root, Elihu: The Sanction of International Law. American Asso- 
 ciation for International Conciliation. 1908. 
 Halleck: Military Espionage. American Journal of International 
 
 Law, 5, 590. 
 The Classics of International Law, edited by James Brown Scott. 
 
 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 
 
 D. C. 
 
 Hugonis Groti de jure belli et pacis libri tres. Washington, 1913. 
 Grotius: Rights of War and Peace. Translated by Campbell. 
 
 1901. 
 
 IMMUNITY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY AT SEA 
 
 Bentwich: The Declaration of London. 1911. 
 
 Monsell: Declaration of London explained. In Navy League 
 
 Annual, 1911-1912, pp. 135-151. 
 Bowles, T. G. : Sea, Law and Sea Power, as they would be affected 
 
 by Recent Proposals. 1910. 
 Fulton, T. W.: The Sovereignty of the Sea. 1911. 
 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers. 1909. (Cd. 4554), LIV, 
 
 Correspondence and Documents Respecting the International 
 
 Naval Conference held in London, December, 1908, to February, 
 
 1909. 
 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers. 1909. (Cd. 4555), LIV. 
 
 Proceedings of the International Naval Conference. . . . 
 Wehberg: Capture in War on Land and Sea. Translated by 
 
 Robertson. 1911. 
 Hirst: Commerce and Property in Naval Warfare. 1906. 
 
1 76 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 Cohen: Immunity of Enemy's Property from Capture at Sea. 
 
 1911. 
 
 Dupuis: Le droit de la guerre maritime. 1899. 
 Einicke: Rechte und Pflichten der neutralen Machte im Seekrieg 
 
 nach dem Haager Abkommen vom 18 Oktober, 1907. (Mohr.) 
 
 1912. 
 Latifi: Effects of War on Property. 1909. 
 
 PERIODICALS 
 
 The American Journal of International Law. 1007 f. 
 Zeitschrift fur Volkerrecht und Bundesstaatsrecht. 1007 f. 
 Revue de Droit International et de Legislation Comparee. Brux- 
 elles, 1869 f. 
 
XXI 
 
 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
 
 I. Ancient period. 
 
 A. Oriental states: arbitration had no place in an age when 
 
 some one state must be supreme and all others sub- 
 ject. 
 
 B. Greece: Arbitration well known. About 75 rg^es re- 
 
 corded. 
 
 Arbiters: Amphictyonic Council, oracles, friendly cities. 
 Awards executed in a ratio oTiy: 3. 
 
 C. Rome: Arbitration known, but the extension of the Em- 
 
 pire tended to bring it into disuse. 
 Three classes of arbitration (Phillipson, 154). 
 International, federal, administrative. 
 
 II. Medieval period. Not a feature of the middle ages 
 
 though many differences were settled by means of 
 arbitration. 
 
 A. Arbiters: pope, emperor, various potentates, cities. 
 
 B. Cases of arbitral settlement in the middle ages are nu- 
 
 merous, but relatively unimportant. The most 
 famous is the fixing of .the Line of Demarcation by 
 Alexander VI, 1493, determining the Spanish and 
 Portuguese claims to the newly discovered lands and 
 seas. 
 
 C. Special agreements to arbitrate (Moch, 36-38). 
 
 1238. Treaty of alliance between Genoa and Venice 
 
 contained a general arbitral clause. 
 1291. Three Swiss cantons accepted arbitration. 
 1389. Denmark and Norway obliged by treaty to 
 177 
 
178 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 submit their differences to the Hanse for 
 settlement. 
 
 1418. Hanseatic cities adopted principle of arbitration. 
 
 1516. "Perpetual peace" between France and Switz- 
 erland recognized the principle. 
 III. Modern period. 
 
 A. Early advocates of arbitration. (See Chapters XVII, 
 
 XVIIL) 
 
 B. Arbitration and mediation hi the early modern period. 
 Monaco and Savoy, 1713. (See Bridgman: First Book 
 
 of World Law, 72.) 
 
 C. Early treaties involving the principle of arbitration 
 
 (Darby, 240 f.). 
 
 "Conservators of Commerce," 1606. 
 
 Treaties of Westminster, 1654-1674. 
 
 Treaty of Florence: England and Savoy, 1669. 
 
 Judges Conservators, 1712. (Assiento.) 
 
 Treaty of Ryswick, 1697. 
 
 Jay Treaty: United States and England, 1794. 
 
 L Usually regarded as the first modern treaty of 
 
 arbitration. 
 
 D. The acceptance of arbitration by legislative bodies. 
 (It will be noticed that the work of the peace advocates 
 
 mentioned hi Chapters XVII and XVIII was in the 
 main of a private, unofficial character; it prepared the 
 way for legislative or official consideration of arbitra- 
 tion which is here treated.) 
 The United States played a leading role. 
 
 1835. Resolution favoring the erection of an inter- 
 national tribunal of arbitration adopted by 
 the Senate of Massachusetts. (Ladd and 
 Thompson.) 
 
 1837. Similar resolution adopted by both House and 
 Senate of Massachusetts. 
 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 179 
 
 1842. William Jay proposed a treaty of arbitration 
 with England. 
 
 1851. Foreign Affairs Committee (Senate) approved 
 of arbitration. 
 
 1853. Senate of the United States unanimously 
 adopted Underwood resolution favoring 
 arbitration. 
 
 1870. Arbitration of the Alabama claims. 
 
 1874. Senate adopted a resolution favoring arbitra- 
 tion in the settlement of international dif- 
 ferences. (Hamlin.) 
 
 1874. Resolution in House. 
 
 1882. President Arthur's message favored arbitration. 
 
 1889. First Pan-American Conference. United 
 
 States favored advanced arbitration agree- 
 ment. 
 
 1890. Congress approved a resolution favoring trea- 
 
 ties of arbitration with all powers. (Sher- 
 man-Hitt.) 
 
 1896. President Cleveland favored advanced arbitra- 
 tion treaty with Great Britain. 
 
 1904. President Roosevelt took steps to secure a 
 Second Hague Conference. 
 
 1910. President Taft advocated unreserved arbitra- 
 tion. 
 
 1913. Secretary of State Bryan proposed a definite 
 plan whereby no dispute shall become a 
 cause for war until it shall have been re- 
 viewed by an international commission. 
 This to supplement arbitration treaties. 
 France, first in Europe. 
 
 1849. Bouvert introduced a resolution in favor of 
 arbitration into National Assembly. De- 
 feated. 
 
i8o NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 England. 
 
 1849. Bill favoring arbitration defeated by Com- 
 mons after violent debate. (Cobden, Hob- 
 house, Milner-Gibson.) 
 
 1873. Commons approved arbitration, though op- 
 posed by Gladstone. (Richard, Lawson.) 
 1887. Bill introduced into the House of Lords but 
 withdrawn because of the opposition of Lord 
 Salisbury. (Marquis of Bristol.) 
 1887. Treaty of arbitration with United States at- 
 tempted by England at the instance of John 
 Bright. 
 The Netherlands. 
 
 1873-4. Question of arbitration raised in the States- 
 General by Van Eck and Bredius. No 
 action. Carried further in 1878 and 1904. 
 Italy. 
 
 1873. Mancini introduced a bill into Chambers favor- 
 
 ing the insertion of arbitral clauses in trea- 
 ties. Adopted. Has been put into practice. 
 Sweden. 
 
 1874. Lower House adopted resolution favoring a 
 
 permanent arbitral tribunal. (Jonassen.) 
 Denmark. 
 
 1875. Measure similar to the last above defeated in 
 
 the Folketing. 
 
 1878. Folketing adopted a petition favoring the 
 arbitration of differences between Scandi- 
 navian states. 
 Belgium. 
 
 1875. Senate and Chamber of Representatives 
 adopted a measure favoring arbitration. 
 (Couvreur, Thonissen, Kint de Rooden- 
 beke.) 
 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 181 
 
 The establishment of the Interparliamentary Union, 
 1889, and the initial success of the Pan-American 
 movement, 1889, practically saw the triumph of the 
 principle of arbitration of international differences. 
 Since that time the question has been what the scope 
 of arbitration shall be, as will appear from the fol- 
 lowing. 
 IV. Classification of treaties of arbitration. 
 
 (Writers differ in their classification, and the following 
 
 grouping is a combination of several schemes.) 
 In all treaties of arbitration the clause of reference is 
 particularly important, as it determines the char- 
 acter of the treaty as well as the class of matters to be 
 submitted to arbitration. (Am. J. of Intern. Law, 2, 
 823 f.) 
 
 A. Treaties submitting a specific difference to arbitration, 
 
 drafted after the dispute began ("occasional" arbi- 
 tration). This type of treaty dates from about 1800. 
 
 B. Treaties agreeing to submit to arbitration future differ- 
 
 ences ("permanent"). This type of treaty dates 
 from about 1835. The principle was fairly well 
 accepted by 1889. These treaties submit differences: 
 
 1. Over the interpretation of the treaty (containing the 
 
 clause of arbitration) or rising out of it ("a, clause 
 
 speciale"). 
 
 First of this kind: Chile-Peru, 1823 (Moch, 9). 
 For a list (incomplete) of treaties of this kind see La 
 
 Fontaine: Pasicrisie, xii. 
 
 2. Over any matter, whether rising out of treaties or 
 
 otherwise, usually excepting certain categories of 
 disputes (general treaties). 
 
 [This has been accomplished (i) by inserting a clause 
 to that effect in a treaty relating to another 
 matter (" a clause generate." The first treaty of 
 
182 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 this kind according to La Fontaine, x, is Colom- 
 bia-Central Republic, 1825. La Fontaine gives 
 an incomplete list of these treaties); or (2), by a 
 treaty made especially for the purpose (a treaty 
 of arbitration proper). Moch, p. 41, seems to 
 hold that the first treaty of this character was one 
 between Colombia and Peru, 1822.] 
 Disputes which are excepted from arbitration by 
 treaties: 
 
 Questions concerning the constitution of a state. 
 Questions of vital interest, independence, national 
 honor, and those which concern the interests of 
 third parties. (France-England, 1903; U. S.- 
 England, 1908; and many others.) 
 Questions not justiciable in their nature by reason 
 of not being susceptible of decision by the ap- 
 plication of the principles of law or equity. (So- 
 called Taft treaties with England and France, 
 pending 1912.) 
 C. Compulsory or "obligatory" treaties. 
 
 Treaties have been drawn which aim to define what dis- 
 putes between nations cannot be said to compromise 
 vital interest, independence, national honor, or the 
 interests of third parties, or any of the subjects in- 
 cluded under exceptions from arbitration, and which 
 guarantee to submit to arbitration all disputes of 
 this class. These are treaties of compulsory arbi- 
 tration. Though these treaties differ somewhat in 
 detail they roughly agree that, if diplomacy fails, 
 arbitration shall be regarded as compulsory for the 
 following classes of differences: 
 i. Disputes concerning the application or interpretation 
 
 of any treaty, relating to: 
 (i) Matters of international private law. 
 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 183 
 
 (2) The management of companies. 
 
 (3) Matters of civil and criminal procedure and of 
 extradition. 
 
 2. Disputes concerning pecuniary claims based on dam- 
 
 ages (with certain limitations). 
 
 3. Differences of a judicial order. (Am. J. of Int. Law, 
 
 2, 823-30.) 
 
 D. Unlimited treaties agree to arbitrate all differences 
 except: 
 
 1. Those which can be settled by diplomacy. 
 
 All the treaties make this exception, but it does not 
 properly constitute a reservation. 
 
 2. Those which affect the principles of the constitution of 
 
 either country. 
 
 3. Those (between individuals and states) which ac- 
 
 cording to the existing laws of the country fall 
 within the jurisdiction of the national courts, 
 unless 
 
 The difference arises out of the application of a con- 
 vention between the states. 
 Justice has been denied. 
 
 From the foregoing it appears that none of the so-called 
 treaties of unlimited arbitration agrees to submit all 
 international disputes to arbitration; rather, they 
 contemplate the arbitration of all questions which 
 are truly international, and not purely governmental 
 in character. 
 
 Treaties of this kind have been entered into by Belgium, 
 Siam, Argentine, Chile, Denmark, The Nether- 
 lands, Italy, Colombia, Ecuador, Portugal, and the 
 Central American States. 
 
 It should be observed that most of these treaties agree- 
 ing to submit all differences to arbitration are be- 
 tween nations that are of second class or are remote 
 
184 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 from each other and whose differences are therefore 
 not likely to be acute or subject to settlement by war. 
 
 E. National and international treaties of arbitration. 
 
 1. The foregoing are national treaties, that is they are 
 
 agreements which each contracting party made 
 with the other according to its individual conven- 
 ience. If each of the forty-nine sovereign states of 
 earth made a treaty with every other, there would 
 be 1,176 treaties. This complexity has led to a de- 
 sire for a general, or international treaty which 
 all nations shall accept. 
 
 2. International treaties already exist in The Hague 
 
 Conventions for the peaceful settlement of inter- 
 national disputes (see Chapters XXII, XXIII), the 
 Central American convention to erect a Court of 
 Justice (see Chapter XXIV), and the agreements 
 of the Pan-American Conferences. 
 
 F. Life of treaties of arbitration. 
 
 Usually for five or ten years: renewable; lapse if not 
 
 renewed. 
 
 Indeterminate: run until abrogated. 
 
 V. Number of treaties of arbitration is hard to establish 
 because of the differences in classification, and in- 
 completeness of researches. 
 
 A. Treaties of occasional arbitration; number not ascer- 
 
 tained. 
 
 B. Treaties agreeing to submit future differences (" a clause 
 
 speciale" and "a clause generate"). 
 La Fontaine, xiv-xv. 1821-1900. 
 
 North America 172 
 
 Europe 87 
 
 Africa I2 
 
 Asia 6 
 
 South America 4 
 
 Total... 
 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 185 
 
 Modi, 127-130. 1822-1909. 
 314 treaties of all classes. 
 
 120 eliminated because counted twice or expired. 
 194 in force in 1909. 
 
 Of these, 163 are treaties of arbitration proper ac- 
 cording to Moch's classification. 
 
 C. Treaties of compulsory or "obligatory" arbitration. 
 These were made in pursuance of Article 19, of the 
 Convention for Pacific Settlement, Hague Confer- 
 ence, 1899. (Am. J. of Int. Law, 2, 823-30.) 
 
 1903 2 treaties of this kind. 
 
 1904 27 
 
 1905 48 
 
 1906 49 
 
 IQO? 53 
 
 1908 80 
 
 (Bulletin de la Conciliation Intern. No. 3, 1908.) 
 VI. Arbitral Procedure (Ralston: International Arbitral 
 Law and Procedure, especially pp. 17-85; 129- 
 140). 
 
 A. Special agreement ("compromis," protocol). Every 
 case is submitted to arbitration by means of a special 
 agreement. 
 
 1. Names the arbiters. (A list of persons who have been 
 
 arbiters in Richet, 300-301.) 
 Single arbiter. 
 Tribunal: each disputant selects arbiters and these 
 
 selected representatives name an umpire. 
 
 2. Defines the power of the arbiters. 
 
 3. Fixes the rules of procedure. 
 
 4. Defines the question at issue. 
 
 5. Promises to accept the award (sometimes). 
 
 6. Special agreement as provided by the Hague Con- 
 
 ferences. 
 
186 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 1899, 1, Art. 31 (Scott: Texts, 36). 
 
 1907, 1, Art. 52 (Scott: Texts, 177). 
 
 Differences about the special agreement may be 
 
 arbitrated. 
 7. Each power ratines the special agreement according 
 
 to the provisions of its constitution. 
 
 B. Procedure. 
 
 The procedure is determined by special agreement. No 
 code as yet accepted, though Hague Conferences 
 make a beginning, 1899, 1, Art. 48: The "tribunal is 
 authorized to declare its competence in interpreting 
 the 'Compromis' . . . and in applying the prin- 
 ciples of international [the word ' international ' was 
 omitted from the draft of the Convention for Pacific 
 Settlement, Art. 73, 1907] law." (Scott: Texts, 40- 
 
 41.) 
 
 C. Appeal and revision. 
 
 Arbitration implies the intention to accept the award. 
 Hague Conference, 1899, I, Art. 55: "The parties 
 can reserve in the 'Compromis' the right to de- 
 mand the revision of the award. In this case, and 
 unless there be an agreement to the contrary, the 
 demand must be addressed to the Tribunal which 
 pronounced the award. It can only be made on 
 the ground of the discovery of some new fact cal- 
 culated to exercise a decisive influence on the award, 
 and which, at the time the discussion was closed, was 
 unknown to the Tribunal and to the party demanding 
 the revision. Proceedings for revision can only be 
 instituted by a decision of the Tribunal expressly 
 recording the existence of the new fact, recognizing in 
 it the character described in the foregoing paragraph, 
 and declaring the demand admissible on this ground. 
 The 'Compromis' fixes the period within which the 
 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 187 
 
 demand for the revision must be made." (Scott: 
 Texts, 4 2 -43-) 
 
 Renewed in practically the same terms in 1907, Conven- 
 tion I, Art. 83. (Scott: Texts, 186-7.) 
 D. The sanction of arbitration: public opinion only. 
 
 VII. Frequency of recourse to arbitration. (Hague cases. 
 
 See Chapter XXIV and Appendix V.) 
 
 Moch, 26. 1800-1900. 212 cases. All accepted. 
 
 Darby, 769-917. 1800-1900. 222 arbitrations proper. 
 1900-1904. 21 
 
 Total 243 formal arbitrations. 
 
 Besides these, Darby gives 297 instances in which he 
 
 considers the principle of arbitration was applied. 
 
 La Fontaine, viii. 1794-1900, 177 arbitrations. 
 
 1794-1820 15 cases. 
 
 1821-1840 8 
 
 1841-1860 20 
 
 1861-1880 44 
 
 1881-1900 90. 
 
 By countries to 1901. (To 1904, Richet, p. 304.) 
 
 Great Britain 70 (heads the list). 
 
 United States 56 
 
 Chile 26 
 
 France 26 
 
 (For the complete list by countries and by grand 
 divisions see La Fontaine, ix.) 
 
 Richet, 362-4. 1794-1904. 210 cases. 
 
 (Richet gives a list of these cases by years and by dec- 
 ades, showing the average per year.) 
 
 VIII. Serious differences settled by arbitration (selected). 
 Alabama case (1871-72); The Carolines (Germany and 
 
 France, 1885); Samoan case (United States, Ger- 
 many, England, 1899); Guiana boundary (England- 
 Venezuela, 1899; United States intervened); Casa- 
 
i88 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 blanca affair (Germany-France, 1909); House-tax 
 case (England, France, Germany- Japan, 1905), 
 etc. 
 
 IX. Classes of differences submitted to arbitration. 
 Boundary disputes (probably most abundant), territory, 
 
 violation of territorial integrity, pecuniary claims of 
 all kinds (including the crown jewels of the House of 
 Hanover), commerce, navigation of rivers, fisheries, 
 interpretation of treaties, violations of treaties, in- 
 demnities, immigration, citizenship, tariffs, seizure of 
 ships, false arrests (sovereignty? succession to the 
 throne of Persia, 1835; inheritance in Lippe-Detmold, 
 1897; House-tax in Japan, 1905; Ottoman Public 
 Debt, 1903). 
 
 X. Success of arbitration: Every award has been accepted. 
 (Some mention the award of the King of the Nether- 
 lands in the Canadian boundary case between the 
 United States and Great Britain, 1831, as an excep- 
 tion. However, the United States rejected the- award 
 on the ground that the arbiter had exceeded his 
 powers hence this is not a real refusal to accept the 
 decision. The difference was settled by the Webster- 
 Ashburton Treaty in 1842.) 
 
 Bolivia and Peru threatened to reject an arbitral sen- 
 tence in 1909, but finally accepted it. 
 
 XI. The cost of arbitration. It is insignificant compared to 
 
 the cost of war. 
 
 XII. The weakness of arbitration. 
 
 A. There is no means of compelling nations to resort to 
 arbitration. The Hague Conventions give third 
 nations no authority except to remind nations at dis- 
 pute of the Hague Tribunal. (The League to En- 
 force Peace suggests a remedy for this weakness. 
 See Chapter XXVI.) 
 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 189 
 
 B. Nations submit only those differences which they do not 
 
 consider worth fighting for, that is, unimportant 
 matters. Arbitration is a palliative, not a cure, for 
 war. 
 
 C. Powerful nations need not submit even unimportant 
 
 differences with weak states to arbitration. 
 
 D. Nations object to obligating themselves in advance to 
 
 arbitrate differences, as such an obligation would in 
 effect be a limitation of their sovereignty or freedom 
 of action. 
 
 E. Arbitration operates to the advantage of the weak or un- 
 
 prepared nation, by giving it time to prepare; accord- 
 ingly a nation ready to act cannot accept arbitration 
 of vital matters. 
 
 F. Arbitral awards lack an adequate sanction. 
 
 1. Public opinion is the only sanction so far, and it is 
 
 not enough developed or unified to have any weight 
 in international affairs. 
 
 2. Several plans for making arbitral awards effective 
 
 have been proposed. 
 
 a. Surrendering the object in dispute to the arbiters 
 
 beforehand, to be disposed of according to the 
 sentence; or, if that is not feasible, giving some 
 pledge which is to be sequestered if the award is 
 not accepted; such as territory, a building, prop- 
 erty, lien on customs, a ship, etc. 
 (Chile offered to deposit one million dollars with 
 the Hague Tribunal in her dispute with the 
 United States, 1909.) 
 
 b. Loss of neutrality for the state refusing to accept 
 
 award. (Proposed by Vianna at Latin American 
 Scientific Congress at Montevideo.) 
 
igo NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 REFERENCES 
 
 HISTORY OF ARBITRATION 
 
 La Fontaine: Pasicrisie Internationale. 1902. 
 
 Moore: History and Digest of International Arbitrations to which 
 the United States has been a party. 1893-94. United States 
 Government Document. 3267. 7 volumes. 
 
 Me'rignhac, Alexandre: Traite theorique et pratique de 1'arbitrage 
 international; le role du droit dans le fonctionnement actuel de 
 1'institution et dans ses destinees futures. Paris, 1895. 
 
 Moch: Histoire sommaire de 1'arbitrage permanent. 1910. [Bib- 
 liography, pp. 5-6,] 
 
 Revon, Michel: L'arbitrage international. Son passe, son present, 
 son avenir. Paris, 1892. 
 
 Scott: The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. 1909. I, 
 
 188-253. 
 
 Bloch: Der Krieg. 1899. V, 1-197; VI. 
 Balch, Thomas Willing: L'evolution de 1'arbitrage international. 
 
 Philadelphia, 1008. 
 
 Richet: Le passe de la guerre et 1'avenir de la paix. 1907. 243 f. 
 Moxey: International Law. American Law Review, 40, 188-196. 
 Darby: International Tribunals. 1004. 
 
 Darby: International Arbitration. International Law Associa- 
 tion, 22d Report, 17-37. 
 La Fontaine, Henri: Histoire sommaire et chronologique des 
 
 arbitrages internationaux. Bruxelles, 1002. 
 Myers, Denys P.: Revised List of Arbitration Treaties. World 
 
 Peace Foundation, 1912. 
 Myers, Denys P.: Arbitration Engagements now existing in 
 
 Treaties, Treaty Provisions and National Constitutions. World 
 
 Peace Foundation, 1915. 
 Descamps et Renault: Recueil international des traites du XX 
 
 siecle. 1905. 
 Lord: List of Treaties containing Provisions for Settlement by 
 
 Arbitration. Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Sci. 2, 471-487. 
 Nijhoff: Traitfe g6ne*raux d 'arbitrage, communiques au Bureau 
 
 International de la Cour Permanente d'Arbitrage. 1911. 
 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 191 
 
 Peace Year Book, 1911, 119 f. Treaties since 1899. 
 
 Phillipson : International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and 
 Rome. 1911. 
 
 Rasder: International Arbitration Among the Greeks. Published 
 by the Norwegian Nobel Institute. 1912. 
 
 Westerman: Interstate Arbitration in Antiquity. Classical Jour- 
 nal, 2, 197-211. 
 
 Tod, M. N.: International Arbitration Among the Greeks. Ox- 
 ford, 1913. 
 
 Moore, John Bassett: The United States and International Arbi- 
 tration. Washington, 1892. 
 
 Quesada: Arbitration in Latin America. 1907. 
 
 Van der Busch: Le proces international entre la Bolivie et le 
 Perou. 1909. 
 
 Library of Congress: List of References on International Arbitra- 
 tion. (Government Printing Office, 1908.) 
 
 Cambridge Modern History, XII. 1911. Bibliography, 954-956. 
 
 (Consult also periodicals, encyclopedias, treatises on international 
 law, etc.) 
 
 (A collection of all known arbitrations and arbitration treaties is in 
 preparation by John Bassett Moore.) 
 
 GENERAL 
 
 Ralston: International Arbitral Law and Procedure. 1910. 
 Morris: International Arbitration and Procedure. 1911. 
 Wehberg, Hans: Das Problem eines internationalen Staatenge- 
 
 richtshofes. Munchen und Leipzig. 1912. 
 Descamps: Die Organisation des internationalen Schiedsgerichts. 
 
 Munchen, 1897. 
 Lammasch, Heinrich: Die Lehre von der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in 
 
 ihrem ganzen Umfange. 1913. 
 Lammasch, Heinrich: Internationale Schiedsgerichsbarkeit. Son- 
 
 derabdmck aus dem "Staatslexikon." (Gorres.) [Contains 
 
 Bibliography.] 
 Dumas, Jacques: Les sanctions de 1'arbitrage international. 
 
 Paris, 1905. 
 Dumas: De la responsabilite" du pouvoir executif consid6re*e comme 
 
192 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 Tune des sanctions de 1'arbitrage international. Extract from 
 
 Revue Polilique et Parlementaire. August, 1901. 
 M6rignhac, A.: Le traite d 'arbitrage permanent au XX* siecle. 
 
 1904. 
 
 Scott: Texts of the Peace Conferences at The Hague. 1008. 
 Balch: International Courts of Arbitration. 1874. 
 Andre": De 1'arbitrage obligatoire dans les rapports internationaux. 
 
 1903. 
 
 Nys: Les origines du droit international. 1894. 
 Gennadius: Record of International Arbitration. 1004. 
 Seve: Cours d'enseignement pacifiste. 1910. 217-291. 
 
XXII 
 
 THE FIRST HAGUE CONFERENCE 
 
 May 18 July 29, 1899 
 
 I. Origin. 
 
 A. The way for the Hague Conferences was blazed by the 
 
 various advocates, notably William Ladd, mentioned 
 in Chapters XVII and XVIII; also by the Universal 
 Peace Congresses and the Pan-American Congresses. 
 
 B. The First Hague Conference was called by the Czar, 
 
 who had been influenced by Bloch. (See Chapter 
 XIV.) 
 
 1. Rescript of the Czar, August 24 (O. S. Aug. 12), 1898. 
 
 2. Second Rescript, January, 1899 (O. S. Dec., 1898), 
 
 Scott: Texts of the Peace Conferences at The 
 Hague, p. 4. 
 
 II. Place. The Hague, as convenient, and the capital of a 
 
 smaller nation. Meetings were held in the House in 
 the Woods ("Huis ten Bosch"). 
 
 III. Participation. 
 
 A. Difficulty as to what powers should be invited. 
 
 B. Russia invited all those having representatives at St. 
 
 Petersburg; a few exceptions. The fact that the 
 Papacy was not asked to participate created ill- 
 feeling which appeared at the final session (Scott: 
 Conferences, I, 84 f .) 
 
 59 powers claimed sovereignty; 26 were represented. 
 
 20 European (Monaco, San Marino, Papacy, omitted). 
 
 4 Asiatic: China, Japan, Siam, Persia. 
 
 2 American: United States, Mexico. 
 193 
 
194 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 100 delegates; from i to 8 per nation. Each country 
 had one vote. Delegates seated alphabetically (by 
 countries). 
 
 IV. Organization. 
 
 A. Conference. When all the delegates met, the meeting 
 
 was called a plenary session. There were ten of these. 
 President: Baron de Staal (Russia) not well versed in 
 
 parliamentary procedure. 
 Cabinet consisting of "first delegates." 
 Steering committee of first delegates of the seven 
 
 great powers. 
 
 B. Commissions. 
 
 1. Armaments and the use of new implements, 50 mem- 
 
 bers. 
 
 a. Military warfare. 
 
 b. Naval warfare. 
 
 2. Laws and customs of warfare, 67 members. 
 
 a. Military. 
 
 b. Naval. 
 
 3. Arbitration and other means of preventing war, 59 
 
 members. This commission achieved the most im- 
 portant work of the Conference. 
 
 Commissions on Petitions, 15 members. 
 
 Commission on Editing, 4 members. 
 
 (Each state had right to be represented on a commis- 
 sion and the first delegates determined member- 
 ship.) 
 
 C. Honorary offices. There were quite a few of these and 
 
 the appointments were made with a view to keeping 
 delegates in a good humor. 
 
 V. Ceremonies and social functions were prominent fea- 
 
 tures of the Conference; often they were arranged 
 with a view to facilitating the work of the Conference 
 by winning or placating influential persons. The 
 
THE FIRST HAGUE CONFERENCE 195 
 
 importance of the social side of the Conference in 
 relation to its achievements, must not be overlooked. 
 The American delegation arranged a Grotius ceremony 
 for July 4. 
 
 VI. Procedure. 
 
 The language of the Conference was French, but any 
 delegate might, on request, have an address trans- 
 lated into his language. Full, but not verbatim re- 
 ports of the sessions were kept. 
 
 The sessions were secret, because the delegates feared 
 that differences in the Conference would be featured 
 and probably exaggerated by the press, and thus re- 
 act injuriously on the Conference. 
 
 The reporters, who called themselves "the ambassadors 
 of the peoples" strenuously objected, and finally sum- 
 maries of the work of each session were authorized 
 and released by the Commission on Editing. 
 
 Many deputations, delegations or petitions were directed 
 to the Conference, which refused to receive some of 
 them (the Persians) in compliance with the desires 
 of certain powers. 
 
 Propositions were first considered and developed by the 
 appropriate commission and then submitted to the 
 Conference in plenary session. Thus the real work 
 was done in the Commissions. 
 
 VII. Achievements. 
 
 A. The greatest achievement was undoubtedly the fact 
 
 that the Conference accomplished anything at all, for 
 it was generally expected to fail. The success of the 
 first venture led to the Second Hague Conference. 
 The Final Act has been called the "Magna Charta of 
 International Law." 
 
 B. The common deliberation and general agreement of a 
 
 large number of nations to given principles of law 
 
196 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 was of the highest importance as it marks the nearest 
 approach to codification of international law to that 
 date. 
 C. The resolutions of the Conference, embodied in the 
 
 Final Act, were of three kinds: 
 i. Conventions; there were three of these. (Scott: 
 
 Texts, 21-79.) 
 
 a. Convention for the peaceful adjustment of inter- 
 national differences. (Scott: Texts, 31-45.) 
 Good offices and mediation to be tried. 
 Object: to permit third powers to help disputants 
 bring their differences to arbitration, or to bring 
 a war to an end. 
 
 Encouraged by both the Hague Conferences. 
 1899, I. Arts. 2-8. (Scott: Texts, 24-26.) 
 1907, 1. Arts. 2-8. (Scott: Texts, 157-159.) 
 International commissions of inquiry created and 
 pronounced "useful" (and "desirable" in 
 1907). Ralston, 315-318. First formal rec- 
 ognition by Hague Conference, 1899, I, Arts. 
 0-14. (Scott: Texts, 26-28.) 
 If powers cannot settle a matter by diplomatic 
 means, a commission may be appointed to in- 
 vestigate the facts. 
 Constituted by special agreement. (See Chapter 
 
 XXI.) 
 
 Powers are expected to help the work of the 
 commission by furnishing the facts hi their pos- 
 session. 
 
 Report of the commission has about it nothing of 
 the character of an award, and leaves the na- 
 tions at dispute their entire freedom. 
 Commission employed in the "Dogger Bank" 
 >l affair, 1904, and in the differences between 
 
THE FIRST HAGUE CONFERENCE 197 
 
 France and Italy over the seizure of ships 
 during the Tripolitan war, 1912. (See Ap- 
 pendix V.) 
 Second Hague Conference, (i 007, I. Arts. 9-36 
 
 Scott: Texts, 159-168) elaborates the scheme. 
 Permanent Court of Arbitration established. The 
 best thing accomplished by the first Conference. 
 (Scott: Texts, 30-45.) 
 
 Germany offered the chief opposition, which was 
 overcome by the work of Zorn backed by Andrew 
 D. White and Rolls. There was an attempt to 
 provide for compulsory arbitration of given 
 differences. This was defeated by German op- 
 position. 
 
 After the court was agreed upon, the United States 
 made a reservation calculated to exclude matters 
 affecting the Monroe Doctrine from the scope of 
 arbitration. (Scott: Conferences I, 80.) 
 Nations agreeing to this convention and the propor- 
 tion of the world's population represented by 
 them. 
 
 World's population, 1899: 1,531,463,430. 
 Signatories, 22 powers, representing 54 % of 
 
 the world's population. 
 
 Signatories with reservation, 4 powers rep- 
 resenting 8% of the world's population. 
 Total signers, 26 powers, representing 62%. 
 Adhering to the Convention later (not having 
 been represented at The Hague), 18 powers, 
 representing 29%. 
 
 Total accepting Convention, 44 nations, rep- 
 resenting 91% of the world's population. 
 b. Convention regarding the laws and customs of war 
 on land. (Scott : Texts, 45-7 1 .) 
 
198 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 Adopted a code of warfare, based on the Lieber 
 Code, which sought not only to alleviate suffer- 
 ing, but to prevent it as well. 
 
 c. Convention for the adaptation to maritime war- 
 fare of the principles of the Geneva Convention, 
 1864. (Scott: Texts, 71-79.) 
 
 2. Declarations. (Scott, 79-85.) 
 
 a. To prevent the launching of projectiles and ex- 
 
 plosives from balloons or by other similar new 
 methods. (Scott: Texts, 79-80.) For five years. 
 
 b. To prohibit the use of projectiles the only object of 
 
 which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or delete- 
 rious gases. (Scott: Texts, 81-83.) 
 
 c. To prohibit the use of bullets which expand or 
 
 flatten easily in the human body (mushroom or 
 dum-dum bullets) such as bullets with a hard 
 envelope, of which the envelope does not entirely 
 cover the core, or is pierced with incisions. 
 (Scott: Texts, 83-85.) 
 
 The opposition to these declarations was strongly 
 supported by Captain Mahan, delegated from the 
 United States. (White: The First Hague Con- 
 ference.) 
 
 3. Wishes. (Scott: Texts, 20-21.) 
 
 a. For a revision of the Geneva Convention. 
 
 b. Insertion of rights and duties of neutrals in pro- 
 
 gram of an international conference. 
 
 c. For a study of employment of new types and cali- 
 
 bers of guns. 
 
 d. For consideration of limitation of armaments and 
 
 war budgets. 
 
 e. For consideration by a future conference of the in- 
 
 violability of private property at sea. 
 /. For consideration by a future conference of the 
 
THE FIRST HAGUE CONFERENCE 199 
 
 question of bombardment of posts, towns and 
 villages by naval forces. 
 
 VIII. Signatures, ratifications, and reservations. (Scott: 
 Hague Conventions and Declarations, pp. 229-234.) 
 
 REFERENCES 
 
 Conference Internationale de la Paix. (Nijhoff) 1899. [Official 
 
 minutes.] 
 
 Scott: Texts of the Peace Conferences at The Hague. 1908. 
 Scott: The Hague Peace Conferences. 1909. 
 Scott: The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 an d 1907- 
 
 Hull: The Two Hague Conferences. 1908. 
 
 Higgins: The Hague Peace Conferences and other International 
 
 Conferences concerning the Laws and Usages of War. 1909. 
 Schiicking, Walther: Staatenverband der Haager Konferenzen. 
 
 Miinchen und Leipzig, 1912. 
 Myers: The Record of The Hague. World Peace Foundation. 
 
 Vol. Ill, 1913, No. 10, Part II; Vol. IV, 1914, No. 6, Part III. 
 Myers: The Commission of Inquiry. World Peace Foundation. 
 
 November, 1913. Vol. Ill, No. n, Part I. 
 
 Merignhac: La conference internationale de la paix. Paris, 1900. 
 Nippold, Otfried: Die Fortbildung des Verfahrens in volker- 
 
 rechtlichen Streitigkeiten. Ein volkerrechtliches Problem der 
 
 Gegenwart speziell im Hinblick auf die Haager Friedenskon- 
 
 ferenzen. 1907. 
 
 Stead, William T.: Chronique de la Conference de la Haye. 1899. 
 Holls: Peace Conference at The Hague. 1900. 
 Renault: The Work of The Hague, 1899. 1907. (Mean, 1908.) 
 White, A. D.: Autobiography. Parts relating to Hague Confer- 
 
 ences. 1905. Printed as separate under the title, The First 
 
 Hague Conference. 1912. 
 Choate: The Two Hague Conferences. 1912. 
 Zorn: Article in Deutsche Revue. November, 1906. 
 
XXIII 
 
 THE SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCE 
 
 June i5~October 18, 1907 
 
 I. Origin. (Scott: Texts, 93-111.) 
 
 Requested by the Interparliamentary Union in St. Louis, 
 1904, which sent a delegation to President Roosevelt, 
 asking him to take the initiative. 
 Circular of Secretary Hay, 1904. 
 
 Roosevelt relinquished the honor of calling the Confer- 
 ence to the Czar. 
 
 Czar issued invitation and program. 
 Limitation of armaments, at the request of the United 
 
 States, Spain, England. 
 Collection of contract debts. Requested by the United 
 
 States. 
 H. Place: The Hague; Hall of the Knights ("De Ridder- 
 
 zaal"). 
 HI. Participation. 
 
 More nations invited than to First Conference (South 
 
 American Republics). 
 
 59 states claimed sovereignty: 47 were invited; 44 
 accepted, representing more than 96% of the 
 world's population. 
 
 21 European states (Norway having become in- 
 dependent). The Papacy was not invited. 
 4 Asiatic. 
 19 American. 
 256 delegates: i to n per country (including technical 
 
THE SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCE 201 
 
 delegates); one vote per country; delegates seated as 
 before. 
 
 IV. Organization: much like that of the First Conference. 
 
 A . Conference. Eleven plenary sessions. 
 President: M. Nelidow of Russia. 
 
 Steering committee consisting of the first delegates of 
 the Great Powers. 
 
 B. Commissions. 
 
 1. Arbitration. 
 
 a. Projects for arbitration and prevention of war, 103 
 
 members. 
 
 b. Maritime prizes, 89 members. 
 
 2. War on land. 
 
 a. Laws and customs of war on land, 79 members. 
 
 b. Rights and duties of neutrals on land, and declara- 
 
 tion of war, 82 members. 
 
 3. War on the sea. J 
 
 a. Bombardment of ports, and the^tee of submarine 
 
 mines, torpedoes, etc., 73 merries. 
 
 b. Belligerent ships in neutral waters; and the applica- 
 
 tion of the Geneva Convention to naval warfare, 
 82 members. 
 
 4. Maritime law, 114 members. 
 Commission on petitions, 5 members. 
 Commission on editing, 29 members. 
 
 V. Ceremonies and festivities were like those of the First 
 
 Conference. 
 
 Some considered the social functions to be overdone to 
 the detriment of the work of the Conference. 
 
 Cornerstone of the Palace of Peace (gift of Carnegie) 
 laid, July 30. 
 
 Each country to furnish something in the way of dec- 
 oration for the structure. (Suggestion of d'Estour- 
 nelles de Constant.) 
 
202 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 VI. Procedure. 
 
 Much the same as in the First Conference. The pro- 
 ceedings were more open. 
 
 VII. Achievements. 
 
 A. The Second Conference achieved less striking results 
 
 than the first; indeed its chief work lay in improving 
 and developing the work of the former Conference. 
 The session dragged out to considerable length and 
 grew tedious for the delegates. 
 
 B. The work of the Conference embodied in the Final 
 
 Act was of several kinds: 
 
 1. Conventions. 
 
 Convention I, for the pacific settlement of interna- 
 tional disputes. (Scott: Texts, 155-193.) 
 Improved the procedure of the Permanent Court 
 of Arbitration, and the facilities of good 
 offices, mediation and commissions of inquiry, 
 party to a dispute may, without consult- 
 the other, declare its willingness to submit 
 the difference to arbitration. 
 Arbitration remained voluntary except in case 
 of contract debts (Convention II) and of 
 Prize (Convention XII). 
 
 Convention II, limiting the use of force for the re- 
 covery of contract debts. (Scott, 193-198.) 
 
 Force to be used only after arbitration has failed. 
 Conventions III, IV, V. Further rules of warfare on 
 
 land. (Scott, 198-240.) 
 
 Conventions VI, XI, XIII. Rules for maritime war- 
 fare. (Scott, 240-288.) 
 
 Convention XII, relative to the creation of an inter- 
 national Prize Court. (Scott, 288-315.) 
 
 2. Declaration prohibiting the discharge of projectiles 
 
 and explosives from balloons. (Scott, 332-334.) 
 
THE SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCE 203 
 
 The nations were cautious in signing this. 
 
 3. Declarations of principle. (Scott, 137-8.) The Con- 
 
 ference unanimously: 
 
 a. Admitted the principle of compulsory arbitration. 
 
 b. Declared that certain disputes, particularly those 
 
 relating to the interpretation and application of 
 treaties, may, without restriction, be submitted 
 to compulsory arbitration. 
 
 4. The conference expressed its faith in the usefulness of 
 
 international conferences, urged the limitation of 
 military expenditure, and further examination of 
 means to this end. 
 
 5. Opinions. The Conference: 
 
 a. Recommended the adoption of the proposed Court 
 
 of Arbitral Justice. (Scott, 141-154. See also 
 
 350-) 
 
 b. In case of war pacific relations, particularly com- 
 
 mercial and industrial relations, of belligerents 
 and neutrals should be maintained by all. 
 
 c. Powers should by treaty regulate the position, as 
 
 regards military charges, of foreigners residing 
 within their territories. 
 
 d. Regulations relative to the law and customs of 
 
 naval warfare should figure in the program of the 
 next Conference, and that, as far as possible, 
 powers should at sea apply the laws and customs 
 of war on land. 
 
 6. The Conference expressed a wish for a third Confer- 
 
 ence to be "held within a period corresponding to 
 that which has elapsed since the preceding Confer- 
 ence." The calling of this new Conference was 
 taken out of the hands of any one government and 
 given to an international committee which is to meet 
 for that purpose about two years before Conference 
 
204 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 assembles. A Committee has charge of preparing 
 the program. Preliminary steps were taken in The 
 Hague in February, 1912, for the summoning of the 
 Third Conference in 1915, and France, Sweden, 
 Denmark, Norway and The Netherlands had 
 moved hi the matter. The Great War has post- 
 poned the further consideration of a Conference. 
 VUL Signatures, ratifications, and reservations. (Scott: 
 Hague Conventions and Declarations, pp. 235-259.) 
 
 REFERENCES 
 
 Scott: Texts of the Peace Conferences at The Hague. 1908. 
 
 Deuxieme conference internationale de la paix. Actes et docu- 
 ments. (Nijhoff) 1907. 
 
 Commissions rationales de la paix et preparation de la troisieme 
 conference de La Haye. 1911. 
 
 Courrier de la Conference de la paix. Published by W. T. Stead 
 under the auspices of the Fondation pour Pmternationalisme a 
 La Haye. 1907$ 
 
 Stead, William T.: Le parlement de Phumamte. Amsterdam, 
 1007. 
 
 Scott: American Addresses at the Second Hague Peace Confer- 
 ence. Boston, 1910. 
 
 Wehberg: Kommentar zu d. Haager Abkommen betreffend die 
 friedliche Erledigung internationaler Streitigkeiten, vom 18 
 Oktober, 1907. 1911. [Contains bibliography on Hague Con- 
 ferences.] 
 
 Nippold, Otfried: Die zweite Haager Friedenskonferenz. 1908. 
 
 Schiicking, Walther: Der Staatenverband der Haager Konferen- 
 zen. 1912. 
 
 Zorn: Das Volkerrechtliche Werk der beiden Haager Friedens- 
 konferenzen. Sonderabdruck aus Zeitschrift fur Politik. Berlin, 
 1009. 
 
 Bourgeois, L6on : La deuxieme conference de la Haye. Paris, 1907. 
 
 Renault, Louis: Les deux conferences de la paix, 1899 et 1907. 
 Paris, 1908. 
 
XXIV 
 
 THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY 
 
 I. Permanent Court of Arbitration, 1899. (Scott: Texts, 
 pp. 30-45; 170-188.) 
 
 A. Administration of the court. 
 
 1. Permanent Administrative Council consists of dip- 
 
 lomatic representatives accredited to The Hague. 
 Organizes and administers the International Bureau. 
 
 2. International Bureau; record office of court. 
 Secretarial in character; has custody of archives. 
 Makes necessary preparations and gives its prem- 
 ises for court purposes. 
 
 Publishes the documents of cases determined by the 
 
 court. 
 Expenses carried by signatory powers in proportion 
 
 fixed by Universal Postal Union. 
 
 B. Jurisdiction. 
 
 1. Competent for all arbitration cases unless parties 
 
 agree to institute a special tribunal. 
 
 2. Non-signatory powers may use court free. 
 
 C. Organization. 
 
 1. Judges. (See list of in World Almanac 1916, pp. 
 
 130-132.) 
 
 Each power selects four or less persons. Same per- 
 son may be selected by several powers. 
 
 150 selected up to 1912. 
 
 Term six years; renewable. 
 
 2. Judges for any particular case. 
 
 Each disputant selects an equal number of judges 
 from list above. 
 
 205 
 
206 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 Only one may be from nation of disputant (1907 
 
 amendment). 
 
 These four choose an umpire. 
 Failing to agree, selection is entrusted to a third 
 
 power. 
 This failing, each party selects a different power 
 
 and these two determine the umpire. 
 This failing, after two months, each party selects 
 
 two judges from list above (not nationals) and lot 
 
 determines which of these is to be umpire (1907). 
 3. Arbitrators enjoy diplomatic privileges and immu- 
 nities. 
 
 D. Operation. 
 
 1. Preliminaries. 
 
 a. Agreement of nations necessary to bring case before 
 
 the court (amendment 1907). 
 
 b. "Compromis" (text of this agreement) states dif- 
 
 ference and arbitrators' powers. 
 c. Signatory powers have duty of reminding other 
 states of court. 
 
 2. Procedure. 
 
 a. To sit at The Hague unless some other place be 
 
 selected by the arbitrators (1907). 
 
 b. Language to be used determined by the court. 
 
 c. Discussions public only if parties assent. 
 
 d. Recorded in "proces-verbaux." 
 
 This supplied to the powers invited to the Second 
 Peace Conference as well as to powers which have 
 adhered to the convention (1907). 
 
 E. Deliberations of the court private ("and remain secret," 
 
 1007). 
 
 3. Award. 
 
 a. Given by majority vote, accompanied by reasons. 
 Minority may record dissent when signing. 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY 207 
 
 b. Award is binding upon parties. 
 
 c. No appeal from the award. 
 
 d. Revision permitted if: 
 
 (1) Stipulated by "compromis" and within time 
 
 stipulated. 
 
 (2) New facts of vital importance are discovered 
 
 which were unknown at time of award to 
 court and party demanding revision. (Court 
 determines that question, 1907.) 
 
 e. Drawn up in writing and read at a public meeting of 
 
 the tribunal, the agents and counsel of the parties 
 being present. 
 4. Expenses of a hearing. 
 
 Each party pays its own and an equal share of the 
 
 court's. 
 
 F. Cases decided by the court (See Appendix V). 
 II. International Prize Court, 1907. (Scott, pp. 288-317.) 
 
 A. Administration. 
 
 1. The Administrative Council fulfills with regard to the 
 
 Prize Court the same functions as to the Permanent 
 Court of Arbitration but only representatives of 
 contracting powers may be members of it. 
 
 2. The International Bureau acts as registry to the 
 
 court. 
 
 B. Jurisdiction. 
 
 1. Cases appealed under fixed conditions after having 
 been tried in national courts. No further appeal. 
 
 2. It has always been assumed that the declaration of 
 London will serve as a sort of code for the court. 
 
 C. Organization. 
 
 1. Composed of judges and deputy judges appointed by 
 
 the contracting powers. 
 
 2. Appointed for six year term; appointments renewable; 
 
 judges equal in rank; seniority obtains. 
 
208 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 3. The court is composed of fifteen judges; 8 powers are 
 
 represented all the time: Germany, United States, 
 Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, 
 Japan, and Russia. Judges from others sit "by 
 rota," as shown by a table in Scott, pp. 316-7. 
 
 4. Paid by International Bureau. No other compensa- 
 
 tion allowed. 
 
 D. So far the court has not been, used. 
 HE. Central American Court of Justice, 1907. (International 
 Bureau of American Republics, Vol. 25, pp. 1351-57.) 
 
 A. Administration. 
 
 1. Court elects its own officials, including president, 
 
 vice-president, secretary, and treasurer. 
 
 2. Makes its own rules of procedure. 
 
 3. Sits at city of Cartago in Costa Rica unless necessary 
 
 to move. 
 
 B. Jurisdiction. 
 
 1. "All controversies or questions which may arise 
 
 among them of whatsoever nature and no matter 
 what their origin may be, in case the respective 
 Departments of Foreign Affairs should not have 
 been able to reach an understanding." 
 
 2. Also international questions which may arise be- 
 
 tween a Central American government and a for- 
 eign government. 
 
 3. Questions between an individual and a Central Amer- 
 
 ican government. 
 
 4. Shall also have jurisdiction over the conflicts which 
 
 may arise between the legislative, judicial and ex- 
 ecutive powers. 
 
 C. Organization. 
 
 i. Five justices, named by the legislative body of the 
 respective powers and also two substitutes from 
 each. 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY 209 
 
 2. Appointed for five years and can carry on no other 
 
 work during period. 
 
 3. All five necessary for a quorum. Agreement of three 
 
 or more necessary for a decision. 
 
 4. Judgments communicated to all five Republics. 
 
 Binding and final. Salaries paid by treasurer of 
 the court. Expenses borne equally by all nations. 
 D. This agreement is valid for ten years. 
 IV. Proposed Court of Arbitral Justice, planned at the 
 Second Hague Conference, 1907. (Scott: Texts, pp. 
 141-154.) 
 
 A. Administration. 
 
 Administered by International Bureau. 
 
 B. Jurisdiction. 
 
 1. Cases to be decided on their merits. 
 
 2. Only signatory powers can use it. 
 
 C. Organization. 
 
 1. Composed of judges and deputy judges selected from 
 
 persons of high standing in their respective coun- 
 tries, as far as possible from members of the Per- 
 manent Court of Arbitration. Method of appoint- 
 ment left to individual nations. 
 
 2. Term of judges 12 years; equal in rank; seniority. 
 
 3. Three judges, selected annually by others, form dele- 
 
 gation to carry the administrative work of court. 
 
 4. This delegation is competent to decide certain types 
 
 of questions if disputants submit them; but each 
 disputant has the right to have one of its nationals 
 act as judge in a case in which it is concerned. 
 
 5. Judge not to act in case where his country is a liti- 
 
 gant. 
 
 6. Salaries paid by International Bureau. No other 
 
 compensation permitted. 
 
 7. Enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities. 
 
210 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 D. Procedure. 
 
 1. Court to meet at fixed times and sit until business is 
 
 finished. 
 
 2. Sits at The Hague and cannot be transferred unless 
 
 absolutely obliged by circumstances. 
 
 3. A report of the doings of the court drawn up every 
 
 year by the delegation and sent to contracting 
 powers. 
 
 E. The Hague Conference left it to diplomatic agency to 
 
 complete the erection of this court; this has never 
 occurred. 
 
 REFERENCES 
 
 Wilson, George Grafton: Hague Arbitration Cases. (Ginn.) 
 
 Scott: Hague Peace Conferences. 1909, 1, 423-464. 
 
 Wehberg, Hans: Kommentar zu dem Haager "Abkommen, be- 
 
 treffend die friedliche Erledigung internationaler Streitigkeiten." 
 
 1007. 
 Wehberg: Ein internationaler Gerichtshof fur Privatklagen. Ber- 
 
 lin, 1911. 
 
 Tettenborn: Das Haager Schiedsgericht. Bonn, 1911. 
 Meili und Mamelok: Das internationale Privat - und Zivil- 
 
 prozessrecht auf Grund der Haager Conventionen. 1911. 
 Moulin: La doctrine de Drago. Paris, 1908. 
 Ozanam: La jurisdiction internationale des prises maritime. 1910. 
 Consult works on International Law. 
 
 SOURCES 
 
 Scott: Texts of the Peace Conferences at The Hague. 1908. 
 Recueil des Actes et Protocoles concernant le Litige du "Fonds 
 
 Pieux des Californies." La Haye, 1002. 
 Recueil des Actes et Protocoles concernant le Litige entre L'Alle- 
 
 magne, La France, et La Grande Bretagne, et Le Japon. La 
 
 Haye, 1004. 
 Recueil des Actes et Protocoles concernant le Litige entre L'Alle- 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY 211 
 
 magne, L'Angleterre, et L'ltalie et Venezuela. La Haye, 
 
 1904. 
 Recueil des Actes et Protocoles concernant le Differend entre La 
 
 France et La Grande Bretagne a propos des boutres de Mascate. 
 
 La Haye, 1905. 
 North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Tribunal of Arbitration. The 
 
 Hague, 1910. 
 Protocoles des Seances du Tribunal d' Arbitrage . . . au su- 
 
 jet . . . de la Compagnie des bateaux a vapeur "Orinoco." 
 
 La Haye, 1910. 
 Rapport du Conseil Administratif de la Cour Permanente d'Arbi- 
 
 trage sur les travaux de la Cour sur le fonctionnement des 
 
 services administratifs et sur les defenses pendant PAnnee. 
 
 1901 f. 
 
XXV 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS PROJECTS FOR PEACE THROUGH DIPLOMACY 
 
 I. Diplomatic agreements and proposals to remove friction 
 
 between nations. 
 A. Readjustment of boundaries and territories. 
 
 1. Boundaries and territorial acquisitions have often 
 
 been satisfactorily arranged without war. 
 
 Boundary and separation of Norway and Sweden, 
 1905. 
 
 Canadian-American boundary settlements. In this 
 connection the agreement not to fortify the Cana- 
 dian frontier and the effect of this step on the good 
 relations of Canada and the United States should 
 be noted. 
 
 Louisiana purchased from France by the United 
 States, 1803. 
 
 Gadsden Purchase by the United States, 1853. 
 
 Alaska purchased from Russia by the United States, 
 1867. 
 
 Brazil purchased a disputed area from Bolivia in 1904. 
 
 Partition of Samoa by Great Britain, Germany and 
 the United States. 
 
 2. Proposals for territorial and boundary readjustments. 
 Proposal that the United States voluntarily surrender 
 
 the Panhandle to Canada. House Joint Res. 146, 
 introduced by Mr. Smith of Maryland, Oct. 31, 
 1913. Also H. J. Res. 83. 
 
 [Though not related to boundaries, the voluntary act 
 of the United States hi returning the amount of the 
 
 212 
 
PROJECTS FOR PEACE THROUGH DIPLOMACY 213 
 
 Boxer Indemnity to China may be mentioned here 
 as an instance of international good will.] 
 
 B. Neutralizations. 
 
 1. Neutralizations in the past. (See Chapter XXVI.) 
 
 2. Proposed neutralizations. 
 Alsace-Lorraine, Philippines, Panama Canal. 
 
 C. Immunity of private property at sea. 
 
 The Hague Conventions provided for the immunity of 
 private property on land. Similar immunity on the 
 sea was opposed and defeated by Great Britain, both 
 at The Hague and also at the London Conference 
 (1909). The United States has long advocated this 
 principle and stood for it at the Hague Conferences. 
 (White: The First Hague Conference.) 
 
 D. Joint or world control of arenas of conflict (Lipp- 
 
 mann's proposal). 
 
 E. Many disputes have been settled by diplomatic means. 
 
 A few of the graver disputes have been designated 
 by Fried (Handbuch I, 96-103) as "unfought 
 wars." 
 II. Schemes to delay the outbreak of war: "Cold storage 
 
 treaties." 
 
 A. This is the idea behind commissions of inquiry (see 
 Chapters XXII, XXIII), and particularly behind the 
 Bryan Treaties by which the signatories agree that 
 all disputes which cannot be settled by diplomacy 
 shall go before an international commission which 
 shall have a year to investigate, during which neither 
 disputant may declare war. Thirty treaties of this 
 kind between United States and other nations. 
 (November, 1915.) Argentine, Brazil and Chile 
 entered into a similar treaty May 28, 1915. See 
 New York Times, September 20, 1914. Myers: The 
 Commission of Inquiry; The Wilson-Bryan Peace 
 
214 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 Plan. World Peace Foundation, November, 1913. 
 Vol. Ill, No. u, Parti. 
 
 B. The objection to these treaties is that, like arbitration, 
 they give an unprepared power a chance to prepare 
 and therefore deprive the ready nation of the fruits 
 of its vigilance and effort. 
 III. Limitation of Armaments. 
 
 A. There has usually been a demand for disarmament, re- 
 
 duction of armaments, or limitation of armaments, 
 chiefly on the part of religious pacifists and peace 
 societies, on the ground that the possession of arms 
 is a cause of war. 
 
 The Interparliamentary Union has considered dis- 
 armament. 
 The League to Limit Armaments, 43 Cedar Street, 
 
 New York. 
 
 Others regard armaments as a result of the danger of 
 war, which is inherent in the present nationalism, 
 hence attack the latter as the root of the evil. 
 
 B. Official projects. 
 
 1. Prince Kaunitz, Prime Minister of Austria, about 
 
 1764, proposed to Prussia that each country dis- 
 miss three-fourths of its army. Prussia declined. 
 Joseph II of Austria renewed the suggestion in 
 1769, but Frederick the Great again declined. 
 (Fried: Handbuch II, p. 32.) 
 
 2. The Agreement not to fortify the Canadian frontier, 
 
 1817, was, in effect, a limitation of armaments. 
 
 3. Robert Peel, in House of Commons, 1841. 
 
 4. Garibaldi's manifesto, 1860 (unofficial). 
 
 5. Disraeli in 1862 in the House of Commons proposed a 
 
 convention with France for limiting armaments. 
 Cobden's "The Three Panics," 1863, was prob- 
 ably responsible for Disraeli's proposal. 
 
PROJECTS FOR PEACE THROUGH DIPLOMACY 215 
 
 6. Napoleon HI in 1853 stated his design to call a 
 
 European Conference to reduce armaments. He 
 discussed the project in 1867 with Czar Alexander 
 II and William I of Prussia. He made another 
 proposal to Prussia in 1870 through the English 
 Ambassador, but Bismarck rejected it. France 
 voluntarily reduced her army from 100,000 to 
 90,000 and the bill to this effect became a law two 
 weeks before the Franco-Prussian war broke out. 
 
 7. Bismarck broached the idea of a Franco-German 
 
 agreement in 1870 before the Franco-Prussian 
 war ("Une Lettre inedite de Bismarck," printed 
 in Le Matin, Feb. 14, 1914). 
 
 8. Deputy Gotz in the Reichstag of the North German 
 
 Union 1867, and Virchow in 1869 introduced bills 
 for reduction of armaments. In 1879 Deputy 
 van Biihler introduced a resolution into the Ger- 
 man Reichstag calling for a conference to secure a 
 limitation of armaments. Resubmitted it in 1880. 
 Bismarck defeated it. 
 
 9. In 1878 Crispi suggested a restriction of armaments 
 
 to Bismarck, who rejected it. 
 
 10. Henry Richard, in 1880, urged Parliament to attempt 
 
 a reduction of armaments. 
 
 11. Argentine and Chile limited naval armaments by 
 
 treaty, 1902-1903. (British and Foreign State 
 Papers, 95, 759; 96, 311-12.) "The Christ of the 
 Andes" commemorates the treaty. 
 
 I 12. Churchill's proposal to Germany for a "naval hol- 
 iday," 1913. 
 
 13. The Congress of the United States on June 25, 1910, 
 by joint resolution authorized a Commission of 
 five to inquire into the possibility of securing some 
 limitation of armaments, and of constituting the 
 
216 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 combined navies of the world into an international 
 police force. The Commission was never ap- 
 pointed. 
 
 14. The First Hague Conference was called chiefly to 
 consider a limitation of armaments. Its endeavor 
 has been noted. (See Chapter XXII.) 
 C. There are practical difficulties to any program for dis- 
 armament. (Hobson: Towards International Gov- 
 ernment, p. 15 f.) 
 
 1. Difficulty in securing consent of suspicious govern- 
 
 ments. 
 
 2. What constitutes an equal reduction on the part of 
 
 several nations? 
 
 3. Russia could not disarm the Cossacks. 
 
 4. Advance contracts for munitions would hinder any 
 
 limitation of armaments. 
 IV. Agencies working for the improvement of international 
 
 relations through diplomacy and international law. 
 Institut de droit international, founded 1873. n rue 
 
 Savaen, Ghent. 
 International Law Association, founded 1873; took its 
 
 present name in 1895. i Mitre Court Buildings, 
 
 Temple, London, E. C. 
 American Society of International Law, Founded 
 
 1906. 2 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C. 
 American Institute of International Law, Founded 
 
 1915. 2 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C. 
 American Society for Judicial Settlement of Interna- 
 tional Disputes, founded 1909. 14 West Mt. Vernon 
 
 Place, Baltimore. 
 The National Council for Arbitration and Peace, 
 
 founded 1911 (in connection with the Lake Mohonk 
 
 Conference). 
 Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitra- 
 
PROJECTS FOR PEACE THROUGH DIPLOMACY 217 
 
 tion, founded 1895, by Albert K. Smiley. Lake 
 
 Mohonk, New York. 
 Societe beige de 1'Arbitrage et de la Paix, founded 
 
 1889. Square Vergote 9, Brussels. 
 Societe francaise pour 1'Arbitrage entre nations (in 
 
 connection with the Interparliamentary Union), 
 
 founded 1867. 24 rue Pierre Curie, Paris. 
 Groupe parlementaire francaise de 1'Arbitrage Inter- 
 national. 27 bis Avenue Henri Martin, Paris. 
 International Arbitration League, founded 1870. 183 
 
 St. Stephen's House, Victoria Embankment, S. W., 
 
 London. 
 International Arbitration and Peace Association, 
 
 founded 1880. 40-41, Outer Temple, Strand, W. C. 
 
 London. 
 Societa Operaia pro Arbitrate internazionale obliga- 
 
 torio e Disarmo. Casa del Popolo, Milano. 
 Schwedische Friedens und Schiedsgerichtsvereini- 
 
 gung, founded 1883. Regeringsgatan 74, Stockholm. 
 World's Court League of America, founded 1915. 18 
 
 East 4ist Street, New York. 
 
 REFERENCES 
 
 d'Estournelles de Constant: Limitation of Naval and Military 
 Expenditure; Report drawn up in the name of the Commission 
 entrusted with the discussion of the problem at the Conference 
 of the Union in Rome in the Month of October, 1911. 1912. 
 
 Umfrid, O.: Die Formel der Abriistung mit besonderer Beriick- 
 sichtigung des englischen Abriistungsvorschlages. 
 
 Umfrid, O.: Poistungsstillstannd. 1911. 
 
 Blymyer, William Hervey: Observations on compulsory arbitra- 
 tion and disarmament under penalty of non-intercourse, in- 
 cluding a plan for a convention. New York, 1907. 
 
 Foster, John W.: Limitation of Armament on the Great Lakes. 
 
218 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of 
 
 International Law. 1914. 
 Levermore, Charles H.: The Anglo-American Agreement of 1817 
 
 for Disarmament on the Great Lakes. World Peace Founda- 
 tion. Boston, 1914. 
 Dunning, William Archibald: The British Empire and the United 
 
 States. A review of their relations during the century of peace 
 
 following the treaty of Ghent. 1914. 
 Lodge, Henry Cabot: One Hundred Years of Peace. New York, 
 
 1912. 
 Rashdau: Der Friedensgedanke und die Neutralisierung der 
 
 europaischen Grenzen. Deutsche Rev. December, 1910. 
 Lippmann: The Stakes of Diplomacy. 1915. 
 Griffin: List of References on International Arbitration. (Library 
 
 of Congress.) Washington, 1908. [On limitation of armaments, 
 
 pp. 63-69.] 
 Koeben: Der aussichtsreichste Schritt zur Beschrankung der 
 
 Seeriistungsausgaben. 1911. 
 Crane: International Disarmament. 1898-99. 
 Picard: La question de la limitation des armaments de nos jours. 
 
 (Jouve.) 1911. 
 Toinet: La limitation conventionelle des armaments. (Pedone.) 
 
 1912. 
 
XXVI 
 
 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND FEDERATION 
 THE LIMITATION OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 
 
 I. Diplomatic settlements have this fundamental short- 
 
 coming, that the interests of a given nation take prec- 
 edence over international law, as has been shown so 
 well by the Great War. Thus diplomacy and inter- 
 national law, which are relied upon to help nations in 
 their dealings with each other, fail when they run 
 counter to the interests of a nation; they are useful 
 for ordinary questions, but fail in crises, and nothing 
 more can be expected of them as long as nationalism 
 prevails. For this reason it is advocated that there 
 must be some form or reorganization with concomitant 
 restriction of the present sovereignty of nations. 
 
 II. The extent to which sovereignty shall be restricted. 
 
 A. Internationalists hold that nationalism is no longer 
 expressive of the age, but that federation is not, 
 as yet, feasible; that the present sovereignty of 
 states is detrimental, but that one cannot hope to 
 change the theory suddenly. Hence, they propose 
 internationalism, that is, a sort of confederation, a 
 cooperative union of sovereign states, a true concert 
 of powers. The individual schemes vary greatly and 
 are usually not very explicit, chief emphasis being 
 placed on faults of the present system. {Fried (Hand- 
 buch II, 267) speaks of an international "Zweckver- 
 band," meaning voluntary union of states for special 
 219 
 
220 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 purposes like the Postal Union. Lippmann's pro- 
 posal for control of " arenas of conflict" by interna- 
 tional commissions is of this orderTj 
 
 1. Internationalists favor Pan-Europeanism rather than 
 
 a United States of Europe. 
 
 2. Pan- Americanism belongs to this class. 
 
 a. The Monroe Doctrine is unilateral and constitutes 
 
 an extension of the sovereignty of the United 
 States beyond its boundaries. Thus it may be, 
 and to some extent is, resented by Latin America. 
 
 b. For this reason Pan-Americanism is advocated as a 
 
 voluntary cooperative agreement not an al- 
 liance of the states of the Western Hemi- 
 sphere. /The A. B. C. Conference at Niagara 
 Falls, 
 
 B. Federationists/ (Note Chapters XVII, XVIIL}' 
 i. The contentions of the federationists. 
 
 a. They believe that nationalism is out of date; that 
 
 as long as it and national sovereignty exist, war 
 and its ills will continue; that international law 
 can never remedy these evils, because inter- 
 national law is merely the embodiment of prin- 
 ciples to which rival self-seeking nations agree, 
 and they agree to nothing that they consider 
 essential to themselves; that the fundamental 
 step toward eliminating war is an organization 
 with power, above the several states, which shall 
 determine what is right and just in any given 
 case. 
 
 b. They hold that nations should retain their local 
 
 autonomy in order to develop their own quali- 
 ties and institutions, their Kultur, to the highest 
 possible extent. 
 
 c. They would have nations lose their absolute sover- 
 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 221 
 
 J i . 
 CAxJLA/^-' 
 
 eignty so that their .Klultur may be safe, as long 
 as sovereignty survives, nations will think that 
 their peculiar ideals are in conflict with other 
 ideals, and there, will ,be war, in which one tries 
 to suppress the'Kultur of the other. Only under 
 some federation will local Kulturs be safe. 
 
 2. The basis for federation is at hand. 
 
 a. The interdependence and interrelation of nations 
 
 actually exists in adequate measure in all fields 
 except the political. 
 
 b. Even in the political field there are marked tenden- 
 
 cies away from nationalism. 
 
 The many voluntary conventions respecting com- 
 mon interests. 
 
 The Hague Conferences suggest a world legisla- 
 ture, a parliament of man; but in fact they were 
 conferences of ambassadors. 
 
 The Hague Tribunal may prove to be the beginning 
 of a world court. 
 
 c. Federations have, as a whole, been successful. 
 The Achaian League, B. C. 281-146. 
 
 The Swiss Confederation, A. D. i29i-date. 
 The United Provinces, A. D. 1579-1795. 
 United States, i789~date. 
 German Empire (1866), i87i-date. 
 South African Union, 1910. 
 
 3. Federation implies a central organization. 
 
 4. Federation also implies a change in the conception of 
 
 patriotism. j jnstead of being national it must be 
 planetary. /"^Above the nations is humanity" 
 ..^Goethe. 
 
 (The old patriotism: "Our country! May she always 
 be in the right, but our country right or wrong." 
 
 Stephen Decatur. 
 
222 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 The new patriotism: "Our country! When right to 
 be kept right, when wrong to be put right." 
 
 Carl Schurz. 
 5. Projects. 
 ; r a;~\Villiam Ladd's project (See Chapter XVIII.) 
 
 which is that of the American Peace Society. 
 b. The Armed International Tribunal Association. 
 (Temporary Headquarters: 1707 H Street, Wash- 
 ington, D. C.) 
 
 C. Cosmopolitans would obliterate all national bound- 
 aries and have a world government and world citizen- 
 ship. "Cosmocracy." It is not very widely ad- 
 vocated. * t 
 
 HE. The means and methods of restricting national sover- 
 eignty. 
 
 A. Some plans contemplate voluntary restriction. 
 There has been a slight tendency to place what was 
 regarded as the general interest above the interests 
 of individual states. This tendency, of course, im- 
 plies a limitation of the liberty of individual states, 
 a restriction of their sovereignty, and hence it cannot, 
 under prevailing conceptions, expect to make head- 
 way. 
 
 i. Intervention is an illustration. One or several states 
 claim a right to intervene hi the affairs of another. 
 International law recognizes a well-defined right 
 to intervene. It is significant to note that, if there 
 is such a thing as intervention by right, there is no 
 such thing as the absolute sovereignty of nations. 
 Intervention in the affairs of another nation on the 
 ground of humanity is an admission that humanity 
 
 takes precedence over national sovereignty. 
 
 Intervention in Naples (1821) and Spain (1823), 
 by Austria and France respectively to overthrow 
 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 223 
 
 anti-monarchical governments; it was done with a 
 
 semblance of enforcing treaties. 
 Intervention of the United States in Cuba (1898), on 
 
 the plea of humanitarianism. 
 The Monroe Doctrine, representing as it does a claim 
 
 of the United States to a paramount interest in the 
 
 Western Hemisphere, implies limitations of the 
 
 action of Latin American states. 
 
 2. Neutralization of a state involves a limitation of 
 
 sovereignty (Wicker: Neutralization). The chief 
 
 instances of neutralization are: 
 Switzerland, 1815. 
 Belgium, 1839 (violated, 1914). 
 Black Sea, 1856 (abrogated 1871). 
 Luxemburg, 1867 (violated, 1914). 
 Congo Basin, 1885. 
 
 3. Guarantees of territorial integrity also involve a 
 
 surrender of sovereignty. They are rare. 
 Protocol of London, 1850, guaranteed the integrity 
 of Denmark excepting Schleswig and Holstein. 
 
 4. Extra-territorial rights denote a surrender of sover- 
 
 eignty on the part of the state which grants them. 
 
 The Capitulations in Turkey, and the consular juris- 
 dictions of foreign powers in Persia, China and 
 formerly in Japan were of this kind. 
 B. Others propose leagues of several states strong enough 
 
 to impose their interpretation of what^ is for the 
 
 general good. "Peace syndicates." (Afolinari, 251, 
 
 287.) 
 
 i. This, though fundamentally different in purpose, is 
 much like present alliances and may simply result 
 in an opposing combination of states, and, hence, 
 in a perpetuation of the theory of equilibrium or 
 balance of power. 
 
224 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 2. Theoretically it is nothing new, for it still contains the 
 
 fallacious principle which is causing all war, that 
 each party decides what is right without con- 
 sulting the other, and then tries to enforce its 
 opinion. 
 
 3. Proposals of this class are innumerable; a few are 
 
 given for illustration. 
 League of neutrals (Molinari, 258; 287^ 
 League of Great Britain, France and the United 
 
 States (fullerton: Problems of Power). 
 Federation of the English-speaking world (Johnston: 
 
 Arms and the Race, i4$)J 
 League of the Allies in the Great War (Hobhouse: 
 
 The World in Conflict). 
 An international police. This has long^ and often 
 
 been advocated in some form or other: Henry IV, 
 
 Grotius, Abbe de Saint-Pierre, Penn, Concert of 
 
 European Powers 1815, Hpjy Alliance, etc. 
 
 Roosevelt's "Posse comitatus.^ 
 The League to Enforce Peace. (See Chapter 
 
 XXVIIL) 
 League of Economic non-intercourse. (See Chapter 
 
 XXVIIL) 
 
 ZrLco-f H*fi**f) 
 REFERENCES 
 
 Fried, A. H.: Handbuch der Friedensbewegung. 1911-13. 
 Fried, A. H.: Europaische Wiederherstellung. 1915. 
 Hobson: Towards International Government. 1915. 
 Lippmann, Walter: The Stakes of Diplomacy. 1915. 
 Nasmyth, George W.: Towards World Government. Reprint 
 
 from the Survey. November 20, 1915. 
 Novicow, J.: La Federation de 1'Europe. Paris, 1001. 
 Ostwald, Wilhelm: Die Organisation der Welt. 1910. 
 Schucking, Walter: Die Organisation der Welt. Leipzig, 1908. 
 Duplessix, E.: L'organisation Internationale. Paris, 1909. 
 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 225 
 
 Bolce, Harold: The New Internationalism. 1907. 
 
 Hill, D. J.: World Organization as Affected by the Nature of the 
 
 Modern State. 1911. 
 
 Ladd, William: Essay on Congress of Nations. 1840. 
 Nangest: La paix universelle et le disarmament militaire par 
 
 1'organisation de la volonte des nations. 1909. 
 Reinsch: Public International Unions. 1911. 
 Bridgman: The First Book of World-Law. 1911. 
 Trueblood: Federation of the World. 1899. 
 Kamarowsky: Tribunal International. (French translation by 
 
 Westman) Paris, 1887. 233-263. 
 
 Crafts: A Primer of the Science of Internationalism. 1908. 
 VII International Congress of Universal Peace: International 
 
 Code. 
 
 Molinari: Grandeur et decadence de la guerre. 1898. 
 Novicow: Die Gerechtigkeit und die Entfaltung des Lebens. 1907. 
 
 367-96. 
 
 Dumas: Universal Peace. New York, 1908. 
 Hearing of May 7, 1910, on Joint Resolution to authorize the 
 
 appointment of a commission to draft articles of international 
 
 federation and for other purposes. House Joint-Resolution 187, 
 
 6ist Congress, 2d Session, Washington. (Government Print- 
 
 ing Office.) 1910. 
 
 Crawford: United States of Europe. Fortnightly R., 80, 992. 
 Holt: Dawn of the World's Peace. World's Work, 21, 14128 f. 
 La Fontaine: Existing Elements of a Constitution of the United 
 
 States of the World. American Association for International 
 
 Conciliation. 1911. 
 Hugo, Victor: The United States of Europe. World Peace Founda- 
 
 tion. 1914. 
 Bourgeois, L.: Pour la societe des nations. Le Figaro, 20, XI. 
 
 MONROE DOCTRINE AND PAN-AMERICANISM 
 Bingham: The Monroe Doctrine, An Obsolete Shibboleth. 
 
 Hull: The Monroe Doctrine: National or International? 1915. 
 President Wilson's Message, December 7, 1915. 
 
226 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 [Blakeslee] : Clark University Conferences on the Monroe Doctrine. 
 
 Chandler, Charles Lyon: Inter American Acquaintances. (Uni- 
 
 versity Press) Sewanee, Tennessee, 1915. 
 The New Pan Americanism. World Peace Foundation, Febru- 
 
 ary, 1916. Vol. VI. No. i. Part I. 
 Usher, R. G.: Pan-Americanism. 1915. 
 Moore, J. B.: The Growth of Pan-American Unity. Independent. 
 
 January n, 1915. 
 
 Barrett, John: The Pan-American Union. Washington, 1911. 
 Fried: Pan-Amerika. Berlin, 1910. 
 
 "Le Bresil" (Rio Janeiro). November 2, November 16, 1913. 
 Bulletin of the International Bureau of American Republics. 
 
 Washington, 1891-1899. 
 Bulletin of the Pan-American Union. Washington, 1893 f. 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS 
 
 Annuaire de 1'Union Interparlementaire. Brussels. (In progress.) 
 Annuaire de la Vie Internationale. Brussels, 1905-6; 1908-9; 
 
 1910-11. 
 
 La Vie Internationale. Brussels, 1912 f. 
 Suttner, Bertha von: Ground Arms! (McClurg.) 1906. 
 Freeman: History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy. 
 
 1893. 
 
 Spiller: Inter-Racial Problems. 1911. 383 f. 
 Wicker: Neutralization. 1911. 
 Andersen, Hendrik Christian: Creation of a World Center of 
 
 Communication. Paris, 1913. 
 Hodges: The Doctrine of Intervention. 1915. 
 Taft, W. H.: The United States and Peace. 1914. 
 (See also references to Chapter XVHI.) 
 
XXVII 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS FORCES WORKING FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF 
 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
 I. Socialists and laboring classes. 
 
 A. Before the Great War, the socialists of the leading 
 
 nations declared that the fundamental struggle of 
 society was between classes and not between nations. 
 They professed to be internationals; in some cases, 
 Herve and the anti-militarists of France they were 
 anti-patriotic. Briand some years ago recommended 
 a general strike of workmen to check a country from 
 declaring war. 
 
 B. International socialism collapsed under the war, thus 
 
 showing much less power than it was supposed to 
 have. 
 
 II. Woman. 
 
 A . Her nature. 
 
 1. Sees and concerns herself more about social and 
 
 economic evils; and will want to have these re- 
 moved in place of indulging in war. 
 
 2. Is less combative by nature than man; is opposed to 
 
 violence. 
 
 3. Is less destructive and wasteful than man. 
 
 4. Often experiences the losses and consequences of war 
 
 more keenly than man. 
 
 5. Suffrage gives her the power to express her opinion 
 
 effectively. 
 
 6. International marriages among the upper classes 
 
 often lead to a closer relationship between those 
 in authority in different nations. 
 227 
 
228 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 B. The Woman's Peace Party, organized in Washington, 
 
 D. C., January 10, 1915. Jane Addams, National 
 Chairman. 
 
 Platform: "The purpose of this Organization is to 
 
 enlist all American women in arousing the nations to 
 
 respect the sacredness of human life and to abolish 
 
 war. The following is adopted as our platform: 
 
 "i. The immediate calling of a convention of neutral 
 
 nations in the interest of early peace. 
 " 2. Limitation of armaments and the nationalization of 
 
 their manufacture. 
 
 "3. Organized opposition to militarism in our own coun- 
 try. 
 
 "4. Education of youth in the ideals of peace. 
 "5. Democratic control of foreign policies. 
 "6. The further humanizing of governments by the 
 
 extension of the franchise to women. 
 "7. 'Concert of Nations' to supersede 'Balance of 
 
 Power.' 
 "8. Action toward the gradual organization of the world 
 
 to substitute Law for War. 
 "9. The substitution of an international police for 
 
 rival armies and navies. 
 " 10. Removal of the economic causes of war. 
 " ii. The appointment by our Government of a commis- 
 sion of men and women, with an adequate appro- 
 priation, to promote international peace." 
 
 C. The interest of women is shown by their activity in the 
 
 great humanitarian society of the Red Cross; the 
 International Congress of Women at The Hague, 
 April, 1915; the International Conference of Women 
 Workers to Promote Permanent Peace at the 
 Panama-Pacific Exposition, July, 1915; the Peace 
 Sections in Women's Clubs, etc. 
 
MISCELLANEOUS FORCES AND NATIONS 229 
 
 III. Free traders. 
 
 Tariffs create artificial restraints of trade. The 
 fundamental purpose of protective tariffs to prof- 
 it by reducing foreign competition is a cause for 
 international disputes and war. 
 
 Emeric Cruce was the first to link free trade with 
 peace. 
 
 The Cobden Club, and its early leaders, Richard 
 Cobden and John Bright, favored free trade as a 
 means to peace. 
 
 IV. International languages, World language. 
 
 The difference in languages is a real obstacle in all 
 endeavors to bring different nationalities together; 
 it is to overcome this that international languages 
 are advocated. There are various of these: Ido, 
 Esperanto (Zamenhof's scheme), Solresol, Volapiik, 
 Neutral, Pan-roman (Universal), Interlingua, Sim- 
 ple, Adjuvilo, Langue bleue (Bollack's scheme), etc. 
 Ido and Esperanto are the most important. 
 
 V. Foundations. 
 
 A. The World Peace Foundation (endowed by Edwin 
 
 Ginn, 1910), 40 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston. 
 Subsidiary: American School Peace League, 403 Marl- 
 borough Street, Boston. 
 
 B. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
 
 (endowed by Andrew Carnegie, 1910). 
 
 1. Division of Intercourse and Education, Nicholas 
 
 Murray Butler, Director, 407 West nyth St., New 
 York. 
 
 Subsidiary: American Association for International 
 Conciliation, F. P. Keppel, Secretary, 407 West 
 ii7th St., New York City. 
 
 2. Division of Economics and History, John Bates Clark, 
 
 Director, 407 West nyth Street, New York City. 
 
230 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 3. Division of International Law, James Brown Scott, 
 Director, 2 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C. 
 
 C. Carton Foundation. To promote the study of Inter- 
 
 national Polity. Maurice V. Brett, Secretary, White- 
 hall House, Whitehall, London, S. W. 
 
 D. Nobel Peace Prize. 
 
 Founded by Alfred Nobel, 1895, as one of five annual 
 prizes distributed by the Nobel Committee of the 
 Norwegian Storthing, Headquarters, Drammen- 
 svei 19, Christiania, Norway. 
 
 Recipients: 
 
 1901. H. Dunant, founder of the Red Cross 
 
 Society, and Frederic Passy of Paris, 
 Nestor of the peace movement. 
 
 1902. E. Ducommun and A. Gobat, successive sec- 
 
 retaries of the International Peace Bureau 
 of Berne. 
 
 1903. Randal Cremer, founder of the Interparlia- 
 
 mentary Union. 
 
 1904. Institute of International Law. 
 
 1905. The Baroness von Suttner. 
 
 1906. Theodore Roosevelt. 
 
 1907. L. Renault of France and E. T. Moneta of 
 
 Italy. 
 
 1908. K. P. Arnoldson of Sweden and Frederick 
 
 Bajer of Denmark. 
 
 1909. M. A. Beernaert of Belgium and Baron 
 
 d'Estournelles de Constant of France. 
 
 1910. The International Peace Bureau. 
 
 1911. T. M. C. Asser of Holland, founder of the 
 
 Institut de Droit International, and Alfred 
 Fried of Vienna, editor of the Friedenswarte. 
 
 1912. No award (later to Elihu Root of the United 
 
 States). 
 
MISCELLANEOUS FORCES AND NATIONS 231 
 
 1913. Senator Henri La Fontaine of Belgium. 
 1914 and 1915. No award. 
 
 E. Church Peace Union, Founded by Andrew Carnegie, 
 Frederick Lynch, Secretary, 70 Fifth Avenue, New 
 York City. 
 
 VI. International Friendship Societies. See the Interna- 
 tional Peace Year Book, 1915, pp. 69-70. 
 
 REFERENCES 
 
 WAR AND SOCIALISM 
 
 Humphrey, A. W. : International Socialism and the War. London, 
 
 Walling: The Socialists and the War. New York, 1915. 
 Wells, H. G.: The War and Socialism. 1914. 
 Fendrich, Anton: Der Krieg und die Sozialdemokratie. 1915. 
 Feuerstein: Sozialdemokratie und Weltgericht. 
 Must we Arm? Hillquit-Gardner Debate. Rand School of Social 
 Science. 1915. 
 
 WAR AND WOMAN 
 
 Stobart, Mrs. St. Clair: War and Women. From experience in the 
 
 Balkans. 1915. 
 Hansbrough: War and Woman. An Exposition of Man's Failure 
 
 as a Harmonizer. 1915. 
 Schreiner, Olive: Woman and the War. 1914. 
 d'Estournelles de Constant: Woman and the Cause of Peace. 
 
 American Association for International Conciliation. 1911. 
 Mead: Woman and War. World Peace Foundation. 1914. 
 Publications of the Woman's Peace Party. 
 
 INTERNATIONAL LANGUAGES 
 
 Couturat et Leau: Histoire de la langue universelle. 1003. 
 Couturat et Leau: Les nouvelles langues Internationales. 1907. 
 Guerard: English as an International Language. Pop. Science 
 
 Monthly, October, 1911. 
 
 Novicow: La langue Internationale auxiliaires de Pavenir. 1911. 
 Vizetelly: Communication to Chicago Dial. October 14, 1915. 
 
xxvm 
 
 SCHEMES FOR DIMINISHING THE CHANCE OF WAR AND FOR 
 COMPELLING NATIONS TO KEEP PEACE 
 
 I. Miscellaneous proposals. 
 
 A. General strike of the laboring classes is advocated by 
 
 socialists. 
 
 B. Discouraging enlistment in armies. Anti-Enlistment 
 
 League. 
 
 C. Limiting armaments, and opposing enlargement of ar- 
 
 maments, on the ground that the present rivalry 
 in armaments is practically certain to lead to war. 
 (See above, Chapter XXV.) League to Limit Ar- 
 maments, 43 Cedar Street, New York; Rational De- 
 fense League, Washington, D. C.; American Union 
 against Militarism, Munsey Building, Washington, 
 D.C. 
 
 D. Making an'impartial and thorough investigation of the 
 
 facts of an international difference before, instead 
 of after, the war. 
 
 E. Providing for publicity of all the facts in dispute. 
 
 Combating the dissemination of fictitious news. 
 Enacting an International Libel Law. Reducing 
 sensationalism in the press. 
 
 F. Improving international law. 
 
 1. Codifying international law. 
 
 2. Providing for periodic meetings of the Hague Con- 
 
 ference. 
 
 3. Increasing the authority of the Hague Conferences, in 
 
 the direction of making them more truly a world 
 legislature. 
 
 232 
 
SCHEMES FOR DIMINISHING CHANCE OF WAR 233 
 
 G. Improving the system of arbitration. 
 
 1. Increasing the scope of arbitration. Making unlimited 
 
 treaties of arbitration. 
 
 2. Providing for judicial settlement of differences. 
 
 (American Society for the Judicial Settlement of 
 International Disputes, Baltimore.) 
 
 3. Securing a general treaty of arbitration to be signed 
 
 by all powers. 
 
 4. Inserting a clause in the constitution of countries 
 
 binding them by their fundamental law to resort to 
 arbitration. This has been done by Brazil, Vene- 
 zuela, Ecuador, San Domingo, and certain Central 
 American States. 
 
 Brazil. Constitution of 1891, Art. 34, Sec. II. (Dodd: 
 
 Modern Constitutions, I, 158.) 
 
 "The national congress shall have exclusive power to 
 authorize the government to declare war, when 
 arbitration has failed or cannot take place, and to 
 make peace." 
 
 Venezuela. Constitution of 1904, Art. 120. (Larned: 
 
 History for Ready Reference, VII, 686.) 
 This article provides that all international treaties shall 
 contain the clause: "All differences between the con- 
 tracting parties shall be decided by arbitration with- 
 out going to war." 
 
 5. Extending the scope of compulsory arbitration. 
 
 H. Wiping out secret diplomacy, and providing for popular 
 control of treaties, and for a plebiscite before war is 
 declared. Union of Democratic Control. (See be- 
 low.) 
 
 I. Establishing an international coinage and monetary 
 system. 
 
 /. Prohibiting war loans and the export of money to bellig- 
 erents; declaring money contraband. 
 
234 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 K. Providing substitutes for war. 
 
 1. William James, in his "Moral Equivalent of War", 
 
 urges social conscription under which the con- 
 scripts would perform peaceful duties related to the 
 welfare of the state. 
 
 2. Felix Adler advocates a reform of social conditions 
 
 that will make ordinary life more attractive and 
 remove the premium and economic pressure on 
 going to war. 
 
 3. Ray Stannard Baker: The Great American Conscrip- 
 
 tion. American Magazine, January, 1916. 
 
 4. Making peace more attractive. 
 
 "When peace is made as handsome as war there 
 will be hope of war's passing." Woodrow Wilson. 
 
 5. MacKaye: A Substitute for War, 1915. 
 
 6. Smith, Luther E.: Municipal Pageants as Destroyers 
 
 of Race Prejudice, hi Proceedings of the Saga- 
 more (Mass.) Sociological Conference, July, 1914. 
 
 7. Jane Addams: Newer Ideals of Peace. The chance for 
 
 enterprise in social work. 
 L. Providing symbols or emblems: peace flags, buttons, 
 
 uniforms, minister or secretary of peace, etc. 
 M. Economic pressure and non-intercourse, boycotts. It 
 would mean refusing to recognize the nation, its 
 officials, its acts, papers, stamps, citizens, ships, 
 goods, declining to trade with it, refusing loans, 
 cancelling bonds and stocks listed at boards of trade, 
 putting discriminating tariffs on its goods, etc. 
 Pacific blockades belong to this group. 
 N. Compelling recourse to arbitration. 
 
 i. The League to Enforce Peace formed in Independence 
 
 Hall, Philadelphia, June 17, 1915 (Headquarters, 
 
 70 Fifth Avenue, New York), has four proposals: 
 
 Article I. "All justiciable questions arising between 
 
SCHEMES FOR DIMINISHING CHANCE OF WAR 235 
 
 the signatory powers, not settled by negotiation, 
 shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be sub- 
 mitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judg- 
 ment, both upon the merits and upon any issue as 
 to its jurisdiction of the question." 
 
 Article II. "All other questions arising between the 
 signatories and not settled by negotiation, shall be 
 submitted to a council of conciliation for hearing, 
 consideration and recommendation." 
 
 Article III. "The signatory powers shall jointly use 
 forthwith both their economic and military forces 
 against any one of their number that goes to war, 
 or commits acts of hostility, against another of the 
 signatories before any question arising shall be 
 submitted as provided in the foregoing." 1 
 
 Article IV. "Conferences between the signatory 
 powers shall be held from time to time to formulate 
 and codify rules of international law, which, unless 
 some signatory shall signify its dissent within a 
 stated period, shall thereafter govern in the de- 
 cisions of the judicial tribunal mentioned in art- 
 icle I." 
 
 a. Article III is most significant in this connection. 
 It proposes to compel recourse to arbitration (not 
 peace) by the use of economic and military force. 
 
 1 On January 20, 1916, the Executive Committee of the League to 
 Enforce Peace revised this Article so as to bring it into agreement with 
 the plan of the Chamber of Commerce mentioned elsewhere in this 
 section. The revised Article reads: 
 
 "The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith their economic 
 forces against any of their number that refuses to submit any question 
 which arises to an international judicial tribunal or council of concilia- 
 tion before threatening war. They shall follow this by the joint use 
 of their military forces against that nation if it actually proceeds to 
 make war or invades another's territory." 
 
236 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 That is, it proposes to limit the sovereignty of 
 states in this one respect that they shall not go 
 to war before trying peaceful settlement. It does 
 not propose to compel the acceptance of an ar- 
 bitral award. 
 
 b. The place of the League to Enforce Peace in the 
 
 natural course of development is thus stated by 
 Hamilton Holt. 
 
 The first step to restrict war was to devise ma- 
 chinery to make war less probable. This was 
 attempted by the Hague Conference. 
 
 The second was urging the use of this machinery 
 as has been done by many. 
 
 The third is compelling the use of the machinery. 
 This is the proposal of the League to Enforce 
 Peace. 
 
 The fourth will be to compel nations to accept 
 the decision of the machinery. 
 
 c. The difficulties. 
 
 The signatories are to act against any one of 
 their number that commits "acts of hostility, " 
 but each nation retains the power to decide 
 what constitutes an act of hostility, hence 
 agreement will be difficult. 
 Like arbitration and "cooling off" treaties this 
 proposal operates to deprive the ready nation 
 of its advantage by giving the other a delay. 
 The League affects only signatories. Nations | 
 which refuse to join may be most dangerous 
 to peace. 
 
 2. The proposal of the Special Committee of the Cham- 
 ber of Commerce of the United States on the Eco- 
 nomic Results of the War on American Business 
 (Edward Filene, Chairman), Nov., 1915. 
 
SCHEMES FOR DIMINISHING CHANCE OF WAR 237 
 
 a. It proposes the organization of commercial and 
 
 financial non-intercourse a boycott (to be 
 followed by military force if necessary) to be 
 applied to nations entering the agreement and 
 then going to war without first submitting their 
 differences to a tribunal. The Chambers of 
 Commerce of the United States approved it by a 
 large majority, 1915. 
 
 b. It encounters the same difficulties as the League to 
 
 Enforce Peace. 
 II. The European War has resulted in many suggestions for 
 
 securing a lasting peace. 
 
 A. One of these is that of the Central Organization for a 
 Durable Peace, Theresiastraat 51, The Hague (suc- 
 cessor to the Nederlandsche Anti-Oorlog Raad) which 
 has the following Minimum-Program: 
 
 1. No annexation or transfer of territory shall be made 
 
 contrary to the interests and wishes of the popula- 
 tion concerned. Where possible their consent shall 
 be obtained by plebiscite or otherwise. 
 The States shall guarantee to the various nationalities, 
 included in their boundaries, equality before the 
 law, religious liberty and the free use of their native 
 languages. 
 
 2. The States shall agree to introduce in their colonies, 
 
 protectorates and spheres of influence, liberty of 
 commerce, or at least equal treatment for all na- 
 tions. 
 
 3. The work of the Hague Conferences with a view to the 
 
 peaceful organization of the Society of Nations 
 
 shall be developed. 
 The Hague Conference shall be given a permanent 
 
 organization and meet at regular intervals. 
 The States shall agree to submit all their disputes to 
 
238 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 peaceful settlement. For this purpose there shall 
 be created, in addition to the existent Hague Court 
 of Arbitration: 
 
 a. A permanent Court of International Justice. 
 
 b. A permanent international Council of Investigation 
 
 and Conciliation. 
 
 The States shall bind themselves to take concerted 
 action, diplomatic, economic or military, in case 
 any State should resort to military measures in- 
 stead of submitting the dispute to judicial decision 
 or to the mediation of the Council of Investigation 
 and Conciliation. 
 
 4. The States shall agree to reduce their armaments. 
 
 In order to facilitate the reduction of naval arma- 
 ments, the right of capture shall be abolished and 
 the freedom of the seas assured. 
 
 5. Foreign policy shall be under the effective control of 
 
 the parliaments of the respective nations. 
 Secret treaties shall be void. 
 
 B. The Union of Democratic Control. King's Chambers, 
 London, W. C. Program: 
 
 1. No Province shall be transferred from one Govern- 
 
 ment to another without consent by plebiscite of 
 the population of such Province. 
 
 2. No Treaty, Arrangement, or Undertaking shall be 
 
 entered upon in the name of Great Britain without 
 the sanction of Parliament. Adequate machinery 
 for ensuring democratic control of foreign policy 
 shall be created. 
 
 3. The Foreign Policy of Great Britain shall be not 
 
 aimed at creating Alliances for the purpose of main- 
 taining the " Balance of Power," but shall be di- 
 rected to the establishment of a Concert of the 
 Powers and the setting up of an International 
 
SCHEMES FOR DIMINISHING CHANCE OF WAR 239 
 
 Council, whose deliberations and decisions shall be 
 public, part of the labor of such Council to be the 
 creation of definite Treaties of Arbitration and the 
 establishment of Courts for their interpretation 
 and enforcement. 
 
 4. Great Britain shall propose as part of the Peace settle- 
 ment a plan for the drastic reduction by consent of 
 the armaments of all the belligerent Powers, and to 
 facilitate that policy shall attempt to secure the 
 general nationalization of the manufacture of 
 armaments, and the control of the export of arma- 
 ments by one country to another. 
 
 C. Additional proposals. (See references and Chapter 
 XXX.) 
 
 REFERENCES 
 
 Richet: Le passe de la guerre et 1'avenir de la paix. 1907. 
 Jeffrey: How to Abolish War. American Journal Political Science, 
 
 I, 492. 
 Mead, Lucia: Educational Organizations Promoting International 
 
 Friendship. 1911. 
 
 Courtney of Penwith: Peace by Justice. 
 Neuwirth: Weltcongress und Weltarmee, oder der Weltfriede. 
 
 1896. 
 
 Carnegie: League of Peace. Pop. Science Monthly, 68, 398-424. 
 Nys: The Necessity of a Permanent Tribunal. 
 Felix: La vie des mineraux, la plasmogenese et le buomecanisme 
 
 universel. 1911. [Science militates against war.l 
 Bollack: La monnaie internationale. La Reme. June 15, 1911. 
 de la Grasserie: De 1'ensemble des moyens de la solution pacifiste. 
 
 1904. 
 
 Dumas: La colonisation. Essai de doctrine pacifiste. 1904. 
 Moch: Vers la federation d'occident: Desarmons les Alpes. 
 
 1905. 
 Stratton, G. M.: The Control of the Fighting Instinct. American 
 
 Association for International Conciliation. 1913. 
 
240 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 Frost: Safeguards for Peace: A scheme of state insurance against 
 
 war. 1005. 
 Richard: Constitutional Safeguards against War. Outlook, 84: 
 
 20-32. 
 Brewer: Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, in Mohonk Addresses. 
 
 (Ginn.) 104-115. 
 Stein: An International Police to Guarantee the World's Peace. 
 
 1910. 
 
 Dumas: Les sanctions de Parbitrage international. 1905. 
 Dumas: De la responsibilite du pouvoir executif considered 
 
 comme Tune des sanctions de Parbitrage international. 
 Cattell: Science and International Good Will. Pop. Science 
 
 Monthly, April, 1912, 405-11. 
 Passy, Frederic: Pour la Paix. Notes et Documents. Paris, 
 
 1009. 
 
 Mead, Lucia: Swords and Ploughshares. (Putnam.) 1912. 
 James, William: The Moral Equivalent of War. American Asso- 
 ciation for International Conciliation. 1910. 
 Addams, Jane: Newer Ideals of Peace. 1007. 
 MacKaye, Percy: A Substitute for War. 1915. 
 Adler: The World-Crisis and its Meaning. 1915. 
 Lyon, Davis Willard: The Christian Equivalent of War. 1915. 
 (See also references to Chapters XXVII and XXX.) 
 
 LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 
 
 Lowell: A League to Enforce Peace. Atlantic Monthly, September, ^ 
 1915. Reprinted by World Peace Foundation. 1915. 
 
 League to Enforce Peace. New York, 1915. 
 
 "Ten Objections to an International Police." Advocate of Peace. 
 August, 1915. 
 
 Holt: "Ten Objections to the Ten Objections." Ibid. Novem- 
 ber, 1915. 
 
 BOYCOTT 
 
 Chamber of Commerce of the United States. Referendum No. 1 1 
 on the Report of the Special Committee on Economic Results 
 of the War and American Business. November, 1915. 
 
SCHEMES FOR DIMINISHING CHANCE OF WAR 241 
 Angell: Boycott versus Bayonets. Saturday Evening Post, July 24, 
 
 Angell: The World's Highway. 1915. 
 
 Bollack, Leon: La loi mondiale de boycottage douanier. Paris, 
 
 1912. 
 Samuels, F. S. : International Boycott as a Solution of the World 
 
 Peace Problem. Oakland, California, 1914. 
 A British Statesman: How Diplomats Make War. 1915. 
 Hagedorn, Hermann: Makers of Madness. A play in one act and 
 
 three scenes. (Macmillan Company.) 1914. 
 Hardy, Thomas: The Dynasts. 
 
 Pamphlet Series of the Union of Democratic Control. (37 Norfolk 
 Street, Strand, London, W. C.) 
 
 The Morrow of the War. Explaining the Policy of the Union. 
 
 Angell: Shall This War End German Militarism? 
 
 Russell, Bertrand: The Offspring of Fear. 
 
 Brailsford, H. N.: The Origins of the Great War. 
 
 Ponsonby, Arthur: Parliament and Foreign Policy. 
 
 The National Policy. 
 
 The International Industry of War. 
 
 MacDonald, J. Ramsay: War and the Workers. 
 
 Why we Should State Terms of Settlement. 
 
 Towards an International Understanding. 
 
 Swanwick, H. M.: Women and War. 
 
 [Pole, A.]: The Polish Question. 
 
 Angell: The Prussian in our Midst. 
 
 The Balance of Power. 
 
XXIX 
 
 EDUCATION AND PEACE 
 
 I. Education is to prepare persons for a life that is before 
 
 them. 
 
 A. Hence first and foremost it must teach right think- 
 
 ing. 
 
 B. It cannot be merely a perpetuation and preservation of 
 
 the past. 
 
 C. It must be fully up-to-date. 
 
 Hence it must be increasingly scientific. 
 
 This means a reduction of fear, superstition, igno- 
 rance, all of which have a considerable connection 
 with war. 
 
 It means telling the truth about war, peace, national- 
 ism, etc. 
 
 It means taking account of internationalism now in 
 existence. 
 
 D. Education (study, travel, reading, etc.), if at all im- 
 
 partial, has a tendency to remove bias and prejudices 
 of all kinds. The removal of international and inter- 
 racial prejudices is a proper function of education. 
 
 II. Military training bears the natural fruit. 
 
 A. The effect of education along military lines is thus 
 stated by Maude in his translation of Clausewitz 
 "On War," I, p. viii. August, 1914, proved his state- 
 ment to be true. 
 
 " Clausewitz's work has been the ultimate foundation on 
 which every drill regulation in Europe, except our own, 
 242 
 
EDUCATION AND PEACE 
 
 243 
 
 has been reared. It is this ceaseless repetition of his 
 fundamental ideas to which one-half of the male popula- 
 tion of every Continental Nation has been subjected for 
 two to three years of their lives, which has tuned their 
 minds to vibrate in harmony with his precepts, and those 
 who know and appreciate this fact at its true value have 
 only to strike the necessary chords in order to evoke a 
 response sufficient to overpower any other ethical con- 
 ception which those who have not organized their forces 
 beforehand can appeal to." 
 
 B. Compulsory military training especially in schools is, 
 to say the least, a doubtful institution in a demo- 
 cratic state. Democracy exalts personal rights and 
 conscience; military training, to be efficient, re- 
 quires obedience and abandonment of personal 
 rights. 
 III. Various media have been used to educate for peace. 
 
 A. The Schools. 
 
 1. American School Peace League, 403 Marlborough 
 
 Street, Boston. It has sought among other things 
 to get schools to celebrate May 18 as Peace 
 Day. 
 
 2. College courses in international relations. 
 
 B. Books, journals, circulars, lectures, etc. 
 
 C. Pictures, photographs, cartoons, motion pictures, 
 
 paintings (Wirtz, Verestchagin). Review of Reviews, 
 29: 545-50. Outlook, 70: 270-6. 
 
 D. Museums. Lucerne Peace Museum, founded by Bloch. 
 
 E. Exhibits at expositions. 
 
 F. Exchanges of professors and students. 
 
 G. Celebration of the One Hundred Years of Peace 
 
 between the United States and Great Britain, 
 
 H. Drama. (See Appendix.) 
 
244 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 /. Music as an international language. 
 IV. The cause of peace will be helped by placing correct 
 emphasis on certain subjects. 
 
 A. Commercial geography should be taught at the ex- 
 
 pense of political geography. The former is more 
 instructive of modern conditions and gets more at the 
 heart of modern international forces. 
 
 B. Contemporary politics needs to be taught much more 
 
 generally and carefully than is at present the 
 case. 
 
 1. Under modern popular government the citizen is 
 
 often required to vote on questions that involve 
 foreign affairs. 
 
 2. The study of the subject will show that there is a 
 
 broad similarity in the problems, aspirations and 
 institutions of all civilized nations, and will develop 
 the international point of view, the "international 
 mind." 
 
 3. It will counterbalance, and likewise complete the 
 
 ordinary historical knowledge, which generally is 
 not up-to-date. 
 
 C. History. 
 
 i. It should try to teach the truth. The truth about the 
 past will deprive war of much glamor. 
 
 The truth about causes of war. 
 
 The truth about service in the army as a private. 
 
 The truth about the fruits of war. 
 
 The frequent failure of war to settle or improve mat- 
 ters. 
 
 The growth of law. 
 
 The spread of democracy. 
 
 The use and success of arbitration. 
 
 The achievements of the Hague Conferences. 
 
 The truth in history will counteract the effect of 
 
EDUCATION AND PEACE 245 
 
 romanticism in fiction and literature such as "The 
 Charge of the Light Brigade," the courage of 
 Medieval Knights, and the like. 
 
 2. Continuity of history should be emphasized. 
 History is genetic, not cataclysmic. 
 Results of this conception: 
 
 The present is not justified by the past. 
 
 There is growth hi time of peace as well as in 
 
 war. 
 War is not the only or the greatest motive power 
 
 of progress. 
 War is not the motive force of progress, but merely 
 
 the clash of forces resulting from progress. 
 Progress does not necessarily mean war, as ideas 
 
 absolutely subversive of accepted beliefs have 
 
 made their way without bloodshed: Darwinism. 
 Abolition of slavery in Great Britain. 
 The only solid progress is that which comes from 
 
 sound growth; progress forced by war alone is 
 
 not lasting. 
 The chief emphasis should be placed on the trend 
 
 of civilization, instead of mere occurrences of the 
 
 past, as is so often the case. 
 
 3. History should be made more nearly a "biography 
 
 of man" instead of a record of his political do- 
 ings. 
 
 Should touch all sides of human endeavor. 
 
 Should measure the success or expediency of any pro- 
 cedure in terms of all of man's interests, instead 
 of merely in terms of political consequences. A 
 step, which has good political consequences, may be 
 bad considered from an economic, social or moral 
 point of view. 
 
 The objection of time: it is impossible to teach all 
 
246 
 
 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 sides of history in the time allotted to the sub- 
 ject. 
 
 This does not justify teaching what is untrue. 
 
 If anything is to be omitted, it should be the interest- 
 ing rather than the true. (The reverse has been too 
 common.) 
 
 Writers of texts of history have already begun to 
 reduce the space given to wars and to increase 
 other matter in proportion. 
 
 UNITED STATES HISTORY THE WAR OF 1812 
 
 
 QUACZ- 
 
 ENBOS 1 
 
 HOLMES 2 
 
 MONT- 
 GOMERY 3 
 
 HART* 
 
 Pages in book 
 
 4.^8 
 
 22? 
 
 tfc 
 
 e8? 
 
 Total pages to war . . 
 
 +y 
 
 218 
 
 0*0 
 
 123 
 
 o v o 
 
 145 
 
 O^o 
 
 H3 
 
 Percentage 
 
 47.6% 
 
 38% 
 
 39.7% 
 
 19-3% 
 
 Pages to this war 
 
 44 
 
 12 
 
 6 
 
 8 
 
 Percentage 
 
 9-6% 
 
 3-7% 
 
 1.6% 
 
 i-3% 
 
 Detailing maneuvers 
 
 32K 
 
 5# 
 
 5 
 
 3 
 
 Percentage 
 
 7% 
 
 i 7% 
 
 i l% 
 
 c% 
 
 Total illustrations in 
 
 / /v 
 
 */ /o 
 
 "O /O 
 
 /O 
 
 book 
 
 63 
 
 87 
 
 82 
 
 146 
 
 Illustrations to this 
 
 o 
 
 
 
 A.t^.\S 
 
 war 
 
 8 
 
 5 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 Percentage 
 
 12.7% 
 
 5-7% 
 
 4-9% 
 
 3-4% 
 
 Total maps in book. . 
 
 42 
 
 7 
 
 72 
 
 56 
 
 Maps for this war . . . 
 
 9 
 
 i 
 
 5 
 
 i 
 
 Percentage 
 
 21.4% 
 
 14-3% 
 
 6.9% 
 
 r.8% 
 
 ^uackenbos: Illustrated School History of the United States, 
 1861. 
 
 2 Holmes: Sheldon's History of the United States, 1884. 
 
 8 Montgomery: American History, 1896. 
 
 4 Hart: Essentials in American History, 1905. 
 
EDUCATION AND PEACE 247 
 
 GREEK HISTORY PELOPONNESIAN WAR, 431-404 B. C. 
 
 
 GILLIE * 
 
 PlNNOCK 2 
 
 OMAN 3 
 
 MOREY 4 
 
 Pages in book 
 
 47 c 
 
 384 
 
 546 
 
 2 C7 
 
 Total to war 
 Percentage 
 Pages to this war 
 Percentage 
 Detailing maneuvers 
 Percentage . . . 
 
 216 
 
 45.5% 
 
 80 
 
 16.8% 
 iQ 
 
 4% 
 
 174 
 45-3% 
 52 
 13-5% 
 19 
 S% 
 
 319 
 58.4% 
 126 
 
 23-1% 
 4 8 
 
 88% 
 
 43^ 
 12.3% 
 13 
 3-7% 
 6 
 
 I 7% 
 
 Total illustrations in 
 book 
 
 o 
 
 32 
 
 o 
 
 07 
 
 Illustrations to this 
 war 
 
 o 
 
 4 
 
 o 
 
 I 
 
 Percentage 
 
 
 12.5% 
 
 
 1% 
 
 Total maps in book. . 
 Maps for this war. . . 
 Percentage 
 
 i 
 
 
 
 2 
 2 
 
 100% 
 
 12 
 
 33-3% 
 
 40 
 
 12.5% 
 
 REFERENCES 
 
 Cabot, Ella Lyman, and others: A course in citizenship. 
 
 Seve: Cours d'enseignement pacifiste. 1910. 
 
 Passy: La paix et 1'enseignement pacifiste. 1904. 
 
 Miiller, Arthur: Pazifistisches Jugendbuch. Wien und Leipzig. 
 
 1910. 
 Barolin, Johannes C.: Der Schulstaat. Vorschlage zur Volker- 
 
 versohnung und Herbeifiihrung eines dauernden Friedens durch 
 
 die Schule. Wien, 1909. 
 
 Delassus: Precis d'enseignement pacifiste. 1910. 
 Gulliver: The Friendship of Nations. (Ginn.) 1912. 
 
 1 Gillie: History of Ancient Greece, 1843. 
 2 Pinnock: Goldsmith's Greece, 1851. 
 
 3 Oman: History of Greece, 1895. (Oman is a writer on the history 
 of war.) 
 
 4 Morey: Outlines of Greek History, 1903. , 
 
248 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 Robinson: The New History. 1912. 
 
 Annual Reports of the American School Peace League. Boston. 
 1909 f. 
 
 Suggestions and Bibliography for Program for Peace Day. 1915. 
 Chicago Peace Society. 
 
 Andrews, Fannie Fern: Peace Day, Suggestions and Material for 
 the Observance in the Schools. United States Bureau of Educa- 
 tion, Bulletin, 1912: No. 8, Whole Number 476, Washington, 
 Government Printing Office. 1912. 
 
 Andrews, Fannie Fern: The Promotion of Peace. United States 
 Bureau of Education, 1913, No. 12, Whole Number 519, Wash- 
 ington, Government Printing Office. 1913. 
 
 Mead, Lucia Ames: Program for Peace Meetings. World Peace 
 Foundation. 
 
 Mead, Lucia Ames: A Primer of the Peace Movement. American 
 Peace Society. 1913. 
 
 Gould, F. J.: Victors of Peace. 1915. 
 
 Gould, F. J.: Heroes of Peace. 1915. 
 
 Chamberlain, Leander T.: Patriotism and the Moral Law. 
 1900. 
 
 Gordy, W. F. : Teaching Peace in the Schools through Instruction 
 in American History. 
 
 Larned: Peace Teaching of History. Atlantic Monthly, 101: 114- 
 121. 
 
 Sturdee: Teaching of History on War. Westminster Review, 158: 
 
 124-34- 
 Report of a Committee of Three appointed by the American Peace 
 
 Society: The Teaching of History in the Public Schools with 
 
 Reference to War and Peace. 1006. 
 Proposed Course on International Peace. (Issued by the Federal 
 
 Council of the Churches of Christ in America.) New York. 
 Hale: Creation of Public Opinion, Mohonk Address. (Ginn.) 
 
 1910. 86-94. 
 Mead: Peace Teaching in American Schools and Colleges. Out- 
 
 look 83: 376-382. 
 Mead: Teaching Patriotism in the Public Schools. American 
 
 Peace Society. 
 
EDUCATION AND PEACE 249 
 
 Andrews: Relation of Teachers to the Peace Movement. Educa- 
 tional Review, 28: 279-289. 
 
 Hart: School Books and International Prejudices. American 
 Association for International Conciliation. 
 
 Stevenson: The Teacher as a Missionary of Peace. Peace Com- 
 mittee, Philadelphia, 1909. 
 
 Nattan-Laurier: Les menaces des guerres futures et les travaux de 
 Jean de Bloch. 1904. 
 
 Edwards: Suggestions for the Teaching of Peace Through History. 
 Journal of Education, January, 1912. 
 
 Showerman: Peace and the Professor. American Association for 
 International Conciliation. 1911. 
 
 Life, The War Number. October 2, 1913. 
 
 Educational Series of the National Peace Council. (London.) 
 
 1. Teachers and International Peace. Report of a Conference of 
 
 Teachers, presided over by Sir John Macdonell. 
 
 2. Heath, Carl and Gould, F. J.: Humane Teaching and Interna- 
 
 tional Peace. 
 
 3. Gould, F. J.: The Peace Movement among the Young: Positive 
 
 Methods of Teaching. 
 
 4. Seth, James: Universities and the Peace Movement. 
 
 5. Rowntree, Arthur: Education in Relation to Internationalism. 
 
 6. Carpenter, J. Estlin: The Promotion of International Peace 
 
 through the Universities. 
 
 7. Hobson, John A. : The Importance of Instruction in the Facts of 
 
 Internationalism . 
 
 8. Impey, E. Adair: Military Training Considered as Part of 
 
 General Education. 
 
XXX 
 
 THE GREAT WAR AND PACIFISM 
 
 I. The Great War has refined or reversed the thought of 
 
 the opponents of war and has made them more guarded 
 in their statements, for it has brought the realization 
 that war is not so improbable or impossible as was 
 asserted. 
 
 A. A number of pacifists, chiefly churchmen, have be- 
 
 come, if not non-resistants, at least more firmly 
 convinced that the only thing that can overcome 
 evil is, not force, but the spiritual weapon of good- 
 will. The Fellowship of Reconciliation (temporary 
 address, 70 Fifth Avenue, New York). 
 
 B. Many have abandoned pacifism. 
 
 II. The Great War has justified the contention of the op- 
 
 ponents of militarism that competitive armaments do 
 not secure peace, but produce war. 
 
 III. The Great War has demonstrated the inadequacy of the 
 
 existing "preventatives" for war. It has shown that 
 nationalism, as it now is understood, makes war 
 probable. 
 
 IV. It has stimulated thinking along the line of a better 
 
 system, and has produced a great number of pro- 
 posals, on the one hand, for bringing the Great War to 
 a close, and on the other, for establishing permanent 
 peace. 
 
 A. Plans for bringing the Great War to an end ("putting 
 out a conflagration"). "The hardest operation of a 
 war is to stop it." See references below. 
 250 
 
THE GREAT WAR AND PACIFISM 251 
 
 1. Several governments have offered mediation. 
 
 2. A Congress of neutral nations to initiate peace pro- 
 
 ceedings has been widely advocated. 
 
 3. Continuous mediation without armistice. 
 Proposed by Julia Grace Wales of the University 
 
 of Wisconsin. 
 Adopted by the International Congress of Women at 
 
 The Hague, April 28-30, 1915. It has been advo- 
 
 cated by the Woman's Peace Party, 116 South 
 
 Michigan Street, Chicago. 
 Various futile attempts have been made to secure 
 
 the backing of some neutral government for the 
 
 project. 
 Henry Ford was influenced by advocates of this plan 
 
 to send out his " peace ship." Dec., 1915. 
 B. Plans for securing permanent peace ("building a fire- 
 proof structure"). There have been a great many of 
 these, and no more is attempted than to give an in- 
 complete list of them. See references below. 
 
 REFERENCES 
 ON STOPPING THE WAR IN EUROPE 
 
 Wales, Julia Grace: Continuous Mediation without Armistice. 
 
 Woman's Peace Party. Chicago, 1915. 
 A Conference of Neutral States. World Peace Foundation. June, 
 
 1915. Vol. V, No. 3, Part I. 
 Addams Jane: The Revolt against W T ar. The Survey, July 17, 
 
 Resolutions of the National Peace Conference under the Auspices 
 of the Emergency Peace Foundation. Chicago, February, 
 
 Bernheimer, C. L.: Peace Proposal. A Business Man's Plan for 
 Settling the War in Europe. Pamphlet. Also New York Evening 
 Post, January 12, 1915. 
 
252 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY 
 
 ON PERMANENT PEACE: ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 The Union of Democratic Control, King's Chambers, London, 
 
 W. C. (See Chapter XXVIII.) 
 The Central Organization for a Durable Peace, Theresiastraat 51. 
 
 The Hague. (See Chapter XXVIII.) 
 The Armed International Tribunal Association. Oscar T. Crosby, 
 
 1707 H St., N. W., Washington, D. C. 
 The World's Court League of America. 18 East 4ist Street, New 
 
 York. 
 League for World Peace, Woodward Building, Washington, 
 
 D. C. 
 Society to Abolish War. Charles F. Dole, Jamaica Plains, 
 
 Mass. 
 Committee for the Study of the Principles of a Durable Treaty of 
 
 Peace. Hallestrasse 41, Berne, Switzerland. 
 Babson's Statistical Bureau, Wellesley Hills, Massachusetts. 
 American League to Limit Armaments, 43 Cedar Street, New 
 
 York City. 
 Federation of International Polity Clubs. George W. Nasmyth, 
 
 President, Fred B. Foulk, Secretary, 40 Mount Vernon Street, 
 
 Boston, Mass. 
 League to Enforce Peace. William H. Taft, President, W. H. 
 
 Short, Secretary, 70 Fifth Avenue, New York City. 
 Woman's Peace Party. Jane Addams, President, 116 South 
 
 Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. 
 
 Bund Neues Vaterland, Berlin W. 50. Tauentzienstrasse 9. 
 Nederlandsche Anti-Oorlog Raad, Theresiastr. 51, The Hague, 
 
 Netherlands. 
 Committee, "United States of Europe," Nico van Suchtelen, 
 
 Secretary, Blaricum, Netherlands. 
 Comite de los " Amigos de la Unidad Moral de Europa." M. En. 
 
 Duran, Ateneo Barcelones, Barcelona, Spain. 
 Bund fur Organisierung menschlichen Fortschritts. Prof. R. 
 
 Broda, General Secretary, 60 Avenue de Rumine, Lausanne, 
 
 Switzerland. 
 Citizens of the World, Tom-na-Monachan, Pitlochry, Scotland. 
 
THE 
 
 GREAT WAR AND PACIFISM 253 
 
 Grand Army of the Prince of Peace, 138 South Oxford Street, 
 Brooklyn, New York. 
 
 ON PERMANENT PEACE: LITERATURE 
 
 Towards the Peace that Shall Last (" The Litany ") . Issued by the 
 Henry Street Group, The Survey, March 6, 1915. 
 
 Dickinson, G. Lowes: War and the Way Out. Atlantic Monthly, 
 December, 1914, and April and May, 1915. Also printed sep- 
 arately. Extracts published in World Peace Foundation pam- 
 phlet, April, 1915. 
 
 Angell: America and the New World-State. 1915. 
 
 Angell: The World's Highway. 1915. 
 
 Nasmyth, George: Constructive Mediation. An Interpretation of 
 the Ten Foremost Proposals. The Survey, March 6, 1915. Also 
 separately. 
 
 Hobson, John A.: Towards International Government. 1915. 
 
 Fried, Alfred H.: Europaische Wiederherstellung. Switzerland, 
 
 Buxton (Editor), Dickinson, Brailsford, Hobson, Lee, Snowden, 
 and others: Towards a Lasting Settlement. 1915. 
 
 Jordan, David Starr: The Ways to Lasting Peace. 1916. 
 
 Royce: War and Insurance. 1914. 
 
 Kingsley, Darwin P.: Democracy versus Sovereignty. New York 
 Times, November 21, 1915, also published as a pamphlet. 
 
 Fayle, Ernst C.: The Great Settlement. London, 1915. 
 
 Lippmann: The Stakes of Diplomacy. 1915. 
 
 Gulick, Sidney L.: The Fight for Peace. New York, 1915. 
 
 Ritter, Wm. E.: War, Science and Civilization. Boston, 1915. 
 
 War Obviated by an International Police. The Hague. (NijhofT.) 
 
 Jefferson, Charles E. : Christianity and International Peace. 1915. 
 Crane, Frank: War and the World Government. New York, 1915. 
 Babson, Roger W.: The Future of World Peace. Boston, 1915. 
 Benson, Allen L.: A Way to Prevent War. Girard, Kansas, 1915- 
 The Overthrow of the War System. By Members of the Woman's 
 Peace Party. 1915. 
 
254 NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCI 
 
 Addams, Jane; Balch, Emily G.; and Hamilton, Alice: Women at 
 
 The Hague. 1915. 
 Schvan, August: Permanent Peace. The Survey, March 6, 1915. 
 
 Also New York Times, December 20, 1914, and American 
 
 Journal of International Law, vol. 8, 51. 
 Otis, Harrison Gray: World Embracing Plan to End Wars. Los 
 
 Angeles. 1915. 
 Brandeis, Louis D.: An Essential of Lasting Peace. Harper's 
 
 Weekly, March 13, 1915. 
 Holt, Hamilton: The Way to Disarm. American Association for 
 
 International Conciliation. October, 1914. 
 Roosevelt: America and the World War. 1915. 
 Straus, Oscar: The Way to Lasting Peace. New York Times, 
 
 November 21, 1915. 
 
 Eliot, Charles W. : Some Roads Towards Peace. New York, 1915. 
 Crozier, Alfred Owen: Nation of Nations; The Way to Permanent 
 
 Peace. 1915. 
 Shumaker, E. Ellsworth: The World Crisis and The Way to Peace. 
 
 Atkins, Gaius Glenn: The Maze of the Nations and the Way Out. 
 
 1915- 
 Adler, Felix: The World Crisis and Its Meaning. New York, 
 
 Stilwell, Arthur Edward: To All the World (Except Germany). 
 
 London, 1915. 
 Russell, Bertrand: War and Non-resistance. Atlantic Monthly. 
 
 August, 1915. 
 
 WAR AND PACIFISM 
 
 Heath, Carl: Pacificism in Time of War. London, 1915. 
 Angell: Peace Theories and the Balkan War. 1913. 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS 
 
 Mez, John: Peace Literature of the War. American Association 
 
 for International Conciliation. January, 1916. 
 Mez, John: Syllabus of Material on the War and Peace Problem, 
 
GREAT WAR AND PACIFISM 255 
 
 American Association for International Conciliation. February, 
 Lange and Berry: Books on the Great War. (Grafton.) London, 
 
 How to Study the Problems of the War. Council for the Study of 
 International Relations, Westminster, S. W. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 TOTAL NAVAL EXPENDITURES BY PRINCIPAL NAVAL POWERS 
 
 (Knight, Navy Yearbook, 630! Congress, 3d Session, Senate Docu* 
 ment 637, p. 859, 1914.) 
 
 FISCAL 
 YEAR 
 
 GREAT 
 BRITAIN 
 April i- 
 March 31 l 
 
 UNITED STATES 
 July i-Jime 30 
 
 GERMANY 
 April to 
 March 
 
 FRANCE 
 January to 
 December 
 
 1900-1901 
 
 $145,792,850 
 
 $61,721,695 
 
 $37,173,074 
 
 $72,683,180 
 
 1901-2 . . . 
 
 150,569,190 
 
 68,438,301 
 
 46,315,800 
 
 67,079,011 
 
 1902-3 . . . 
 
 150,679,328 
 
 82,977,641 
 
 48,818,700 
 
 59,217,558 
 
 1903-4 . . . 
 
 173,548,058 
 
 104,126,192 
 
 50,544,000 
 
 59,740,222 
 
 1904-5 . . . 
 
 179,138,049 
 
 116,655,826 
 
 49,110,300 
 
 60,178,623 
 
 1905-6..- 
 
 161,117,947 
 
 109,725,059 
 
 54,918,000 
 
 6i,565,779 
 
 1906-7... 
 
 152,954,342 
 
 98,392,144 
 
 58,344,300 
 
 59,514,296 
 
 1907-8... 
 
 151,880,617 
 
 "7,353,474 
 
 69,133,500 
 
 2 60,685,813 
 
 1908-9... 
 
 156,401,161 
 
 120,421,579 
 
 2 80,737,626 
 
 2 62,194,916 
 
 1909-10. . 
 
 181,936,341 
 
 122,247,365 
 
 2 95,047,820 
 
 64,899,589 
 
 1910-11. . 
 
 202,056,258 
 
 111,791,980 
 
 2 103,302,773 
 
 74,102,439 
 
 1911-12. . 
 
 211,596,296 
 
 I33,559,o7i 
 
 2 107,178,480 
 
 2 80,371,109 
 
 1912-13. . 
 
 224,443,296 
 
 129,787,233 
 
 2 109,989,096 
 
 2 8 1, 69 2,83 2 
 
 1913-14. . 
 
 2 237,530,459 
 
 136,858,301 
 
 2 112,091,125 
 
 2 90,164,625 
 
 1914-15.. 
 
 2 260,714,275 
 
 2 - 3 141,872,786 
 
 "3,993,329 
 
 1 123,828,872 
 
 1 Does not include amounts expended under naval works acts during 
 the years 1896-1909, amounting to about $155,000,000. 
 
 2 Appropriation. 
 
 3 Includes $4,635,000 this year's allotment of proceeds from sale of the 
 Idaho and Mississippi. 
 
 257 
 
258 APPENDIX 
 
 II 
 
 ARMY APPROPRIATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL POWERS 
 (World Almanac, 1915, p. 434) 
 
 Great Britain 1914-5 $143,331,350 
 
 France " 202,141,122 
 
 Russia " 393,193,808 
 
 Italy 80,025,234 
 
 German Empire " 293,289,155 
 
 Austria-Hungary " 47,571,755 
 
 Japan " 47,037,809 
 
 United States " * 94,229,047 
 
 m 
 
 LEADING PACIFIST PERIODICALS 
 
 Advocate of Peace. Founded, 1846. Washington, D. C. 
 War and Peace. Founded, 1913. London. 
 Peace Forum. Founded, 1912. New York. 
 Maryland Quarterly. Founded, 1910. Baltimore. 
 The Arbitrator. Founded, 1870. London. 
 Concord. Founded, 1884. London. 
 
 The Herald of Peace and International Arbitration. Founded, 
 . 1819. London. 
 
 Peace and Goodwill. Founded, 1882. London. 
 The Cosmopolitan Student. Madison, Wisconsin. 
 Die Friedenswarte. Founded, 1899. Berlin. 
 Volker-Friede. Founded, 1900. Esslingen. 
 Der Friede. Founded, 1894. Bern. 
 Die Friedens-Bewegung. Founded, 1912. Bern. 
 La Paix par le Droit. Founded, 1891. Nimes. 
 Les tats-Unis d'Europe. Founded, 1868. Bern. 
 
 1 This does not include the cost of fortifications, Military Academy, 
 etc. (which represent an addition of about $50,000,000), pensions, or the 
 expenditures of the several states on the National Guard. 
 
APPENDIX 259 
 
 Le Mouvement Pacifiste. Founded, 1912. Bern. 
 La Paix. Founded, 1908. Geneva. 
 La Vita Internazionale. Founded, 1898. Milan. 
 Vrede door Recht. Founded, 1900. s'Gravenhage. 
 Freds-Bladet. Founded, 1892. Copenhagen. 
 Fredsfanan. Founded, 1898. Stockholm. 
 Heiwa. Founded, 1911. Japan. 
 
 PAMPHLETS 
 
 American Association for International Conciliation, 407 West 
 1 1 7th Street, New York. 
 
 World Peace Foundation. 40 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston, Massa- 
 chusetts. 
 
 The National Peace Council, 167 St. Stephen's House, West- 
 minster. 
 
 American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International 
 Disputes. Baltimore. 
 
 Conciliation International. 15 Rue Soufflot, Paris. 
 
 Internationale Organisation. Berlin, W. Biilowstrasse 66. 
 
 YEAR BOOKS, ALMANACS AND CALENDARS 
 
 Annuaire du mouvement pacifiste. Bern. 
 
 The Peace Year-Book. Issued by the National Peace Council. 
 
 London. 
 
 Annuaire de TUnion Interparlementaire. Brussels. 
 Annuaire de la Vie Internationale. Brussels. 
 Year Book of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
 
 Washington, D. C. 
 Les Prix Nobel. Stockholm. 
 Almanach de la Paix. Paris. 
 Pro Pace. Milan. 
 
 Der Weg zum Weltfrieden. Pazinstische Chronik. Berlin. 
 The Peace Calendar and Diary, 1916. Paul Elder and Company. 
 
 San Francisco. 
 
2<5o APPENDIX 
 
 IV 
 FICTION AND DRAMA 
 
 Suttner, Bertha von: Ground Arms! (Lay Down Your Arms). 
 1008. 
 
 Tolstoi: War and Peace. 1889. 
 
 Tolstoi: Sevastopol. 1888. 
 
 Zola : The Downfall. 1 898. 
 
 Andreief : The Red Laugh. 
 
 Wiegand and Schauerman: The Wages of War. Poet Lore. 1908. 
 
 Comfort: Routledge Rides Alone. 
 
 Ular, A: Die Zwergenschlacht. 
 
 Richet: Fables et Recits Pacifiques. 1904. 
 
 Brownell, Atherton: The Unseen Empire. 1914. 
 
 Dix, Beulah Marie: The Moloch. 1915. (Played by Holbrook 
 Blinn.) 
 
 Newton, W. Douglas: War. 1915. 
 
 Noyes, Alfred: Rada. A Drama of War in One Act. 1914. 
 
 Palmer, Frederick: The Last Shot. 1914. 
 
 Trask, Katrina: In the Vanguard. 1913. 
 
 Wentworth, Marion Craig: War Brides. 1915. (Played by 
 Nazimova.) 
 
 Euripides: The Trojan Women. (Presented by the Woman's 
 Peace Party.) 
 
 Aiken, Ednah: The Hate Breeders. (Bobbs-Merrill.) 1916. 
 
 ZangwilhThe War God. 1911. 
 
 Janson: The Pride of War. 1912. 
 
 Hardy: The Dynasts. 1915. 
 
 Copley, Frank: The Impeachment of President Israels. 
 
 Scidmore, E. R.: As The Hague Ordains. 1007. 
 
 Johnston, Mary: Cease Firing. 
 
 Parker, Gilbert: The Judgment House. (Arraignment of paci- 
 fism). 
 
APPENDIX 261 
 
 COMPLEMENTARY NOTES TO V 
 (See page 263.) 
 
 Case 16. In 1911 the Portuguese Republic passed a law separating 
 the state and church and abolishing diplomatic relations with the Holy 
 See. In 1912 the state voted to take over all church properties, many of 
 which were owned or controlled by Roman Catholic religious orders. 
 Foreign governments objected to the treatment of properties owned by 
 the religious of their nationalities established in Portugal. As a conse- 
 quence, the arbitral tribunal is, by the compromis, " charged with passing 
 upon the claims relative to the properties of French, British and Spanish 
 nationals expropriated by the government of the Portuguese Republic 
 after the proclamation of the Republic." 
 
 Case 17. France vs. Peru regarding claims of creditors. On May i, 
 1910, France and Peru agreed by protocol that fr. 25,000,000 would be 
 deducted from a loan to be placed by Peru on the official Paris Bourse to 
 pay certain French creditors. On October 8, 1912, the French minister 
 to Peru complained that the said creditors were not included in a list of 
 creditors submitted to the Congress. Peru replied that the protocol 
 recognized the French creditors conditionally only and that, as its condi- 
 tions were not realized, Peru was not under obligation. A compromis 
 was signed at Lima on February 2, 1914. 
 
 Case 18. On January 28, 1915, the German armed cruiser Prim 
 Eitd Friedrich sank on the high seas the American steel sailing vessel 
 William P. Frye, Seattle to Queenstown, Falmouth or Plymouth, with a 
 cargo of wheat owned by the American charterer. The United States 
 presented to Germany a claim for $228,059.54 for damages suffered. 
 The German Government admitted liability under the Prussian-Amer- 
 ican treaties of 1785 (Art. 12), 1799 (Art. 13), and 1828 (Art. 12), but 
 insisted on prize court proceedings. The United States held further 
 that indemnity was due by reason of violation of the treaty pro visions; 
 Germany held that the payment was "a duty or policy founded on the 
 existing treaty stipulations." Payment of the indemnity is to be made 
 without prejudice to the question of treaty interpretation. 
 
262 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 "8 
 
 f 
 
 a>ij3 
 
 ll 
 
 s 
 I 
 
 Is 
 
 3 
 
 ' S 
 
 e 
 
 111 
 
 00 ro O ^J 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 263 
 
 u 
 
 pS 
 
 ia 
 
 2 
 
 " 8 
 
 
 08 
 
 -^! 
 S"l 
 
 ! I 
 
 Q H 
 
 3 8 
 
 t= 
 
 fro 
 
 42 ii jairt "> 
 
 i^S^*^ 
 
 SIS la 
 
 i i 
 
 I I 
 
 rtO 
 
 S^! 
 
 -w ' *- C 
 
 i Illl J i 1 
 
 i i :I1 !: : 
 
 s -s SH! S- a ^' 
 
 I p |-d 
 
 I 'I J5 d ' Q # fa 
 
 liipilll 
 
 .sis ^ 
 
 cd.ti S '3 
 
264 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 "Sss-g 
 *S*? 
 
 iIW 
 
 23 nj be ^ 
 
 S 
 
 1i|l? 
 
 
 Itt 
 
 ill 
 
 | <O o <*> 
 
 
 
 M 
 
INDEX 
 
 A. B. C. Conference, 135, 220 
 
 Achaian League, 221 
 
 Adams, H. C., 78 
 
 Addams, Jane, 30, 35, 234, 240, 
 
 251, 254 
 
 Adler, Felix, 234, 240, 254 
 Advocate of Peace, 258 
 Air-craft, use of, 198, 202 
 Aix-la-Chapelle, Congress of, 134 
 Alabama claims, 179 
 Algeciras Conference, 135 
 Allen, A. W., 47, 54 
 Alliances, 32, 48, 223, 238 
 Alsace-Lorraine, 28, 38, 42, 
 
 213 
 
 American Association for Inter- 
 national Conciliation, 229, 
 
 259 
 
 Defense League, 13 
 Defense Society, 13 
 Institute of International Law, 
 
 216 
 Journal of International Law, 
 
 176 
 League to Limit Armaments, 
 
 252 
 
 Peace Society, 158, 159, 222 
 School Peace League, 229, 243, 
 
 248 
 Society of International Law, 
 
 216 
 Society for Judicial Settlement 
 
 of International Disputes, 216, 
 
 233, 259 
 Union against Militarism, 232 
 
 Americanism, 3 
 
 Amphictyonic Council, 177 
 
 Andrews, Fannie Fern, 248, 249 
 
 Angell, Norman, 5, 6, 7, 22, 25, 
 35, 38, 44, 66, 80, 86, 101, 
 148, 166, 241, 253, 254 
 
 Annexation of territory. See Ex- 
 pansion 
 
 Annuaire de la Vie Internationale, 
 138, 162, 226, 259 
 
 Anti-Enlistment League, 232 
 
 Anti-militarists, 227 
 
 Anti-patriotism, 227 
 
 Aquinas, 151 
 
 Arbitration, 14, 152, 156, 162, 
 1771., 179, i8if., 194, 201, 233, 
 234, 238, 239, 244, 26if. 
 unreserved, 179, 183 
 
 Arbitrator, The, 258 
 
 Argentine, 215 
 
 Armaments, 31, 68, 228, 238, 239 
 limitations of, 14, 148, 155, 156, 
 157, 194, 198, 200, 203, 214, 
 228, 232 
 
 Armament makers, 50, 51 
 
 Armed International Tribunal As- 
 sociation, 222 
 
 Armed peace, 12, 46f., 70 
 
 Army League, 13 
 
 Association Medicale Internation- 
 ale centre la guerre, 93 
 
 Atkinson, Edward, 79, 80 
 
 Australia, 98 
 
 Australian Freedom League, 98 
 
 Austria-Hungary, 28, 117, 222 
 
 265 
 
266 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Babson, 67, 252, 253 
 
 Bahaists, 154 
 
 Bailey, Warren Worth, 55 
 
 Balance of power, 15, 32, 48, 49, 
 223, 228, 238 
 
 Balch, Thomas Willing, 190, 192 
 
 Balkan War, 254 
 
 Balloons. See Air-craft 
 
 Banks, 58, 127 
 
 Bankruptcy, 76, 77 
 
 Barton, Clara, 125 
 
 "Battle Cry of Peace," 56 
 
 Belgium, 10, 30, 101, no, 134, 
 180, 223 
 
 Bellers, John, 153 
 
 Belloc, Hilaire, 37 
 
 Bentham, Jeremy, 127, 156, 164 
 
 Beresford, Lord Charles, 100 
 
 Berlin, Congress of, 134 
 
 Bernhardi, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 
 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 31 
 
 Bethmann-Hollweg, 10, 22 
 
 Bibliography of the Peace Move- 
 ment, 162 
 
 Biography of pacifists, 165 
 
 Biology and war, 2 if. 
 
 Birth-rate, 30, 94 
 
 Bismarck, 215 
 
 Black Sea, 223 
 
 Bloch, 16, 56, 67, 80, 94, 121, 123, 
 124, 163, 190, 193, 243 
 
 Blockade, n, 135, 234 
 
 Boardman, Mabel T., 125 
 
 Bodart, 88, 93, 123 
 
 Boers, 39, 89 
 
 Bollack, Leon, 239, 241 
 
 Boulanger, 09 
 
 Bourgeois, Leon, 204, 225 
 
 Boxers, 135, 213 
 
 Boycotts, 234, 237 
 
 Brailsford, 25, 149, 241 
 
 Brazil, 212, 233 
 Brewer, David J., 240 
 Briand, 98, 227 
 Bridgman, 138, 140, 225 
 Bright, John, 161, 180, 229 
 Brotherhood of man. See Hu- 
 manity 
 
 Brownell, Atherton, 260 
 Brussels, Conference of, 172 
 Bryan, William Jennings, 179, 213 
 Bureau of American Republics, 
 
 135 
 
 Burritt, Elihu, 160 
 Business, 75, 127 
 Butler, Nicholas Murray, 51, 57, 
 
 148, 229 
 
 Canadian- American boundary, 
 212, 214, 243 
 
 Capitulations, 223 
 
 Carnegie, Andrew, 153, 201, 229, 
 231, 239 
 
 Carnegie Endowment for Inter- 
 national Peace, 175, 229, 259 
 
 Catch-words, 26, 103, 147 
 
 Causes of war, i6f., 102, 142, 146, 
 244, 250 
 
 Censorship, 97, 102 
 
 Central America, 135, 184, 208, 233 
 
 Central Organization for a Dur- 
 able Peace, 237, 252 
 
 Chamber of Commerce of the 
 United States, 235, 236, 240 
 
 Chamberlain, Houston Stewart, 23 
 
 Channing, William Ellery, 158, 163 
 
 Chauvinism, 25, 52, 56 
 
 Chile, 189, 215 
 
 China, 30, 101, 135, 150, 213, 223 
 
 Chittenden, H. M., 35, 86 
 
 Choate, Joseph H., 199 
 
 Christ of the Andes, The, 215 
 
INDEX 
 
 267 
 
 Christianity and war, 164 
 
 Church Peace Union, 153, 231 
 
 Churchill, Winston, 215 
 
 Civilism, 166 
 
 Civilization, 4, 9, 17, 20, 21, 29, 32, 
 102, 129, 142, 245. See also 
 Kultur 
 
 Civil War, 69, 77, 89, 118 
 
 Clan, 105 
 
 Clark, John Bates, 229 
 
 Classes, 84, 96, 98, in, 145, 227, 
 232 
 
 Clausewitz, 14, 24, 31, 242 
 
 Cobden, Richard, 57, 160, 161, 
 1 80, 214 
 
 Cobden Club, 56, 229 
 
 Colonies, 9, 10, 39, 237 
 
 Combatants, 117 
 
 Commerce, 18, 36, 143, 237 
 
 Commercial Geography, 244 
 
 Commissions of inquiry, 196, 202, 
 213, 264 
 
 Communication, i26f. 
 
 Compulsory arbitration. See Ar- 
 bitration 
 service, 13, 87, 92, 98, 99, 116, 
 
 243 
 
 Concert of powers, 219, 228, 238 
 Concord, 258 
 Conferences, international, i34f. 
 
 See International congresses 
 Congo Conference, 134, 135, 223 
 Congresses, international. See 
 
 International congresses 
 Congress of neutral nations, 251 
 Conscience, n, 31, 98, 103 
 Conscription, n, 97, 234 
 Continuous mediation, 251 
 Contraband, 233 
 Contract debts, 200, 202 
 Cooperating society, xi 
 
 Corda Fratres, 131 
 
 Cosmopolitan Club, 131 
 
 Cosmopolitan Student, 258 
 
 Cosmopolitanism, 27, 158, 222 
 
 Cost of military establishments, 
 
 47, 258 
 living, 77, 81 
 
 Courage, 17, 19, 26, 29, 32, 85, 90, 
 115. See Coward 
 
 Court of Arbitral Justice, 203, 209 
 
 Courtney of Penwith, 239 
 
 Coward, 17, 29, 90. See Courage 
 
 Cramb, J. A., 24 
 
 Credit, 41, 58, 63 
 
 Cremer, Randal, 130, 161, 164, 230 
 
 Crete, 135 
 
 Crime, 85 
 
 Crimean War, 89, 118, 160 
 
 Cruce, Emeric, 154, 229 
 
 Crusades, 169 
 
 Culture. See Civilization; Kul- 
 tur 
 
 Customary law, 109 
 
 Customs Union, 144 
 
 Czar, The, 121, 193, 200 
 
 Dante, 151 
 
 Danube River Commission, 135 
 Darby, William Evans, 163, 190 
 Darwinism, 2, 7, 201., 26, 28, 87, 
 
 91, 115, 245 
 Davis, Hayne, 163 
 Deaths. See Loss of life 
 Debt, public, 64, 68f., 135 
 Deductive or idealist pacifism to 
 
 1789, 1501. 
 Delaisi, Francis, 56 
 Democracy, 34, 69, 95, 96, 97, 98, 
 102, 109, no, 112, 148, 1571., 
 170, 228, 243, 244. See 
 Monarchy; Elections 
 
268 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Denmark, 10, 30, 180, 223 
 Descamps, 190, 191 
 Dewey, John, 25, 66, 79, 86 
 Dickinson, G. L., 45, 253 
 Diplomacy, n, 56, 102, 103, 149, 
 
 165, 21 2f., 219, 241 
 Disarmament. See Armaments 
 Disease, 85, 88, 90, 117 
 Dodge, David Low, 158, 163, 
 
 164 
 
 Dogger Bank, 196, 264 
 "Dorking, Battle of," 53, 56 
 Drama, 243, 260 
 Dreyfus, 50 
 Dubois, Peter, 151 
 Dumas, Jacques, 90, 93, 191, 225, 
 
 239, 240 
 
 Dum-dum bullets, 198 
 Dunant, Henri, 86, 118, 125, 230 
 Dunning, W. A., 218 
 
 Economic consequences of war, 
 
 21, 3 6f., 5 8f., 236 
 necessity, 17 
 Ecuador, 233 
 
 Education, 19, 85, 137, 242f. 
 Efficiency, 19, 21, 96 
 Eijkman, 139 
 Elections, 34, 97, 109, in, 227. 
 
 See Democracy 
 Eliot, Charles W., 254 
 Embargo on munitions, 239 
 Encyclopedists, 156 
 " Englishman's Home," 53 
 Erasmus, 152, 163 
 Esher, Viscount, 44 
 Esperanto, 229 
 Espionage, 49, 103 
 d'Estournelles de Constant, 201, 
 
 217, 230, 231 
 Eugenics, 87 
 
 Evolution. See Darwinism 
 Expansion, 7, 9, 10, 14, 22, 36, 38, 
 
 39, 76, 146, 237 
 Experts, 13, 49 
 Explosives, 115 
 Extra-territorial rights, 223 
 
 Fallacies about nationalism, 26!., 
 
 146 
 
 Faries, 138 
 Faustreckt, 105 
 Federation, 3!, 144, 145, 151, 157, 
 
 173, 22of. 
 
 Federation of International Polity 
 
 Clubs, 252 
 Fellowship of Reconciliation, 154, 
 
 250 
 
 Feudalism, 107, 168 
 Fiat money, 64, 77 
 Fichte, 23 
 
 Fighting instinct, 17 
 Filene, Edward A., 236 
 Firearms, 115 
 Fiske, Rear-Admiral Bradley A., 
 
 16, 25 
 Force, xi, 12, 14, 28, 31, 95, 104, 
 
 1051., 109, in, 112, 141, 144; 
 
 aggressive and defensive force, 
 
 14; martial force, xi; police 
 
 force, xi, 32 
 Ford, Henry, 251 
 Foreigners, 4, 129 
 Foster, John W., 217 
 Fox, George, 153 
 France, 5, 10, 13, 38, 41, 49, 69, 
 
 72, 95, 98, 99, 124, 148, 179, 
 
 197, 222 
 
 Franco-German war, 69, 89 
 Franklin, Benjamin, 156 
 Free trade, 148, 156, 229. See 
 
 Tariffs 
 
INDEX 
 
 269 
 
 Fried, Alfred H., 25, 35, 57, 138, 
 145, 148, 162, 213, 219, 224, 
 
 226, 253 
 
 Friedenswarte, 86, 259 
 Friends. See Quakers 
 Frightfulness, 14 
 
 Carton Foundation, 23, 44, 230 
 
 Gases, 198 
 
 Geneva Conventions, 118, 134, 
 
 171, 172, 198 
 Germany, 5, n, 13, 28, 30, 39, 41, 
 
 49, 73, no, 144, 197, 215, 221 
 Germany, Crown Prince of, 56 
 Gettysburg, 118 
 Goethe, 221 
 Goltz, von der, 24, 100 
 Good offices, 196, 202 
 Gordy, W. F., 248 
 Gould, F. J., 248, 249 
 Ginn, Edwin, 229 
 Graham, 30, 35 
 Grane, W. L., 45, 149 
 "Great Analysis, The," 149 
 Great Britain, 5, u, 13, 15, 28, 
 
 30, 39, 71, 82f., 96, 108, 128, 
 
 145, i59, 175, 180, 213, 243 
 "Great Design, The," 154, 163 
 "Great Illusion, The," 35, 36f. 
 Great War, The, 2, 34, 69, 204, 
 
 227, 237, 250, 251, 254 
 Greece, 101, 135, 150, 168, 177 
 Grotius, 154, 170, 175, 195 
 Guerard, A. L., 231 
 Gulick, Sidney L., 149, 253 
 Gulliver, 247 
 
 Hague Conferences, 15, 121, 135, 
 160, 172, 179, 184, 186, i93f., 
 2oof., 205, 216, 232, 236, 237, 
 244 
 
 Hague Conference, The First, 193^ 
 Conference, The Second, 2oof. 
 Tribunal, 135, 189, 2O5f., 210, 
 
 211, 221, 26lf. 
 
 Hansbrough, 231 
 
 Hay, John, 200 
 
 Heath, Carl, 249, 254 
 
 Hegel, 2, 20 
 
 Henry Street Group, 253 
 
 Henry IV of France, 154, 163 
 
 Herald of Peace, 258 
 
 Heroism. See Courage 
 
 Herve, 227 
 
 Hetzel, H., 124, 165 
 
 Hicks, F. C, 162 
 
 Hill, David Jayne, 138, 225 
 
 Hirst, F. W, 35, 65, 78, 86, 148, 
 
 162, 175 
 
 History, 16, 27, 244 
 Hoarding money, 60 
 Hobbes, 105 
 Hobhouse, L. T., 148 
 Hobson, J. A., 25, 56, 139, 224, 
 
 249, 253 
 
 Hobson, R. P., 53 
 Hodges, 140, 226 
 Holls, Frederick, 197, 199 
 Holt, Hamilton, 225, 236, 240, 
 
 254 
 
 Holy Alliance, 134 
 "How Diplomats Make War," 
 
 56, 149, 165, 241 
 Hugo, Victor, 5, 160, 225 
 Huidekoper, F. L., 54, 123 
 Hull, W. L, 55, 148, iQ9, 225 
 Human nature, 17, 20, 32, 96, 
 
 146 
 Humanity, 3, 102, 103, no, 137, 
 
 148, 157, 223, 228 
 Hundred Years of Peace, 218, 243 
 Hygiene, military, 89 
 
270 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Ido, 229 
 
 Imperial peace, 107 
 
 Imperialism, 9, 40, 156, 158. See 
 also Expansion 
 
 Implements of war, 114 
 
 Indemnity, 22, 36, 37, 41, 65, 69, 
 213 
 
 Independence, 96, 182. See De- 
 mocracy 
 
 Inductive or practical pacifism, 
 i66f. 
 
 Inevitability of war, 12, 14, 16, 
 
 i7,33 
 Injustice, 3, 10, 19. See Justice; 
 
 Righteousness 
 
 Insurance against war, 12, 13, 31 
 Inter arma leges silent, 85 
 Inter-locking directorates, 51 
 International Bureau at The 
 
 Hague, 205, 207, 209 
 Commissions of Inquiry, 179, 
 
 196, 202, 213, 264 
 Congress of Women at The 
 
 Hague, 228, 251 
 congresses, 125, 130, 134, 136, 
 
 156, 159, 199 
 cooperation, 129, 135 
 
 court, 104, 2osf. See Hague 
 
 Tribunal 
 
 Friendship Societies, 231 
 law, 3, 10, no, 141, 156, 
 
 157, i68f., 172, 173, 219, 220, 
 230, 232 
 
 Law Association, 216 
 "International mind," 244 
 
 organization. See Federation 
 
 police, 224, 228 
 
 polity, 1 66 
 Internationalism, 2, i26f., 142, 
 
 143, 219, 227, 242 
 Interparliamentary Union, 130, 
 
 161, 162, 181, 200, 214, 226, 
 
 259 
 
 Intervention, 222 
 Investments, foreign, 36, 38, 40, 
 
 126, 128, 143 
 Ireland, 28 
 Islam, 151 
 
 Isolation of nations, 136 
 Italy, 118, 144, 180, 197 
 
 James, William, 30, 35, 234, 240 
 Jane, 54, 124 
 Japan, 13, 52, 98, 223 
 Jay, William, 179 
 Jefferson, C. E., 55, 164, 253 
 Jingoism, 25, 52, 56 
 Johnson, Alvin S., 67, 80 
 Johnston, R. M., 24, 31, 35, 54, 88 
 Jordan, David Starr, 29, 56, 80, 86, 
 
 QO, 92, 253 
 
 Jordan, Harvey Ernest, 92 
 Judges of the Hague Court, 205 
 Justice, 3, 4, 10, 105!, 112. See 
 
 Injustice; Righteousness 
 
 Kant, Immanuel, 157, 164 
 Kaunitz, Prince, 155, 214 
 Kellogg, Vernon Lyman, 35, 90, 
 
 92, 113 
 
 Keppel, F. P., 229 
 Kingsley, Darwin P., 99, 253 
 Knights, 114 
 Kobatsch, 45, 57, 139 
 Kropotkin, 35, 149 
 Krupp, 50, 52 
 Kultur, 4, 8, 9, 27, 142, 220. See 
 
 also Civilization 
 
 Labor, 30, 84, 98, 126, 232 
 Ladd, William, 158, 164, 178, 193, 
 222, 225 
 
INDEX 
 
 271 
 
 LaFontaine, Henri, 162, 190, 225, 
 231 
 
 Lake Mohonk Conference, 216 
 
 Lammasch, Heinrich, 191, 262!. 
 
 Languages, international, 142, 229, 
 231, 244 
 
 Law, 85, 105!., 244. See Interna- 
 tional law 
 
 Laws of warfare, 117, 194, 197, 
 201, 202, 203 
 
 Lea, Homer, 7, 24, 28, 35, 56, 124 
 
 League of Economic non-inter- 
 course, 224 
 to Enforce Peace, The, 188, 224, 
 
 234, 240, 252 
 to Limit Armaments, 214, 232 
 
 Levermore, Charles H., 55, 218 
 
 Liberty, 95, 96, 182 
 
 Lieber, Francis, i, 23, 118, 171, 
 198 
 
 Lippmann, Walter, 149, 213, 218, 
 220, 224, 253 
 
 Literature, 20, 129 
 
 London, Declaration of, 135, 172 
 Conference, 213 
 Treaty of, 134 
 
 Loss of life, 21, 85, 88f. 
 
 Louisiana Purchase, 212 
 
 Lowell, A. Lawrence, 240 
 
 Loyalty, 12, 108, 109. See Pa- 
 triotism 
 
 Lubin, David, 139 
 
 Luce, Rear Admiral Stephen B., 
 6, 19, 24, 34, 165 
 
 Lucerne Peace Museum, 243 
 
 Luther, Martin, 152 
 
 Luxemburg, 134, 223 
 
 Lynch, Frederick, 149, 231 
 
 MacKaye, Percy, 234, 240 
 Magdalena Bay, 52 
 
 Mahan, Rear Admiral Alfred T., 
 
 3, 12, 24, 36, 45, 124, 198 
 Maine, The, 103 
 Manifest destiny, 5, 26, 104 
 Maritime warfare, 198, 202 
 Markets, 40 
 Marriages, 94, 227 
 Martial law, 97, 98 
 "Martyrerspiegel," 163 
 Massachusetts Peace Society, 158 
 Maude, 12, 13, 14, 16, 21, 22, 24, 
 
 242 
 Maxim, Hudson, 16, 18, 24, 32, 35, 
 
 51,54 
 
 Mead, Edwin D., 162, 164 
 Mead, Lucia Ames, 55, 149, 231, 
 
 239, 240, 248 
 Mediation, 196, 202 
 Medieval courage, 115 
 Mennonites, 152 
 Merignhac, 190, 192, 199 
 Mexico, 13, 52, 96 
 Mez, John, 254 
 
 Middle Ages, 114, 151, 168, 177 
 Militarism, xi, 81, 951., 99, 228, 
 
 250 
 Military class, 95 
 
 expenditure, limitation of, 203 
 spirit, 148 
 training, 19, 242 
 Moch, Gaston, 190, 239 
 Molinari, 24, 67, 225 
 Moltke, 1 6 
 Moloch, The, 260 
 Monarchy, 68, 95, 96, 97, 98, 106. 
 
 See Democracy 
 Monroe Doctrine, 197, 220, 223. 
 
 See Pan-Americanism 
 Moore, John Bassett, 190, 191, 226 
 Morality, 85, 90, 101 
 Moratoria, 60 
 
272 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Moritzen, Julius, 163 
 Morris, Robert C., 191 
 Munition makers, 145, 146, 228, 
 
 239 
 
 Museum, Lucerne Peace, 243 
 Mushroom bullets, 198 
 Music, 244 
 Mutual aid, 29 
 
 Myers, Denys P., 190, 199, 213 
 Myrdacz, 88, 93, 124 
 
 Naples, 222 
 
 Napoleon I, 31, 34, 99, 116 
 
 Napoleon III, 215 
 
 Napoleonic wars, 69, 91, 117 
 
 Nasmyth, George W., 35, 92, 224, 
 
 253 
 
 Nation, defined, i 
 National Defense League, 13, 98 
 
 destiny, 5, 26, 102, 104 
 
 hatreds, 85 
 
 honor, 17, 26, 30, 102!, 182 
 
 ideals, 142 
 
 Peace Council, 249, 259 
 
 Security League, 13 
 
 Service League, 13, 98 
 Nationalism, if., 9, 26, 27, 101, 
 102, 108, 141, 143, 169, 219, 
 220, 242, 250 
 Nationality, i, 28, 237 
 Nationalization of munition mak- 
 ing, 228, 239 
 Natural law, 108, 170 
 
 selection, 87 
 Naval expenditures, 257 
 
 power, 12, 37, 46 
 Navy League, 9, 13, 16 
 Navy League Annual, 54, 1 24 
 Neutrals, u, 101, 189 
 
 rights and duties of, 198, 201 
 Neutralizations, no, 134, 213, 223 
 
 News, 52, 97, 103, 127, 232 
 "New Cyneas, The," 154 
 New York Peace Society, 158 
 New Zealand, 13, 98 
 New Zealand Freedom League, 98 
 Niagara Falls Conference, 135, 220 
 Nippold, Otfried, 25, 56, 199, 204 
 Nobel Peace Prize, 12, 230, 259 
 Non-combatants, 116, 117 
 Non-intercourse, 234, 237 
 Non-resistance, 147, 250, 254 
 Norway, 212 
 
 Novicow, Jacques, 25, 35, 44, 45, 
 66, 86, oo, 92, 224, 225, 231 
 Nys, Ernest, 174, 192, 239 
 
 Obligatory arbitration. See Ar- 
 bitration 
 
 Ohio Peace Society, 158 
 Olympic Games, 132 
 Opium, 30 
 
 Oppenheim, 173, 174 
 Orange Free State, 39 
 Ordeals, 106, 107 
 
 Pacifism, xi, 26, 101, 146, 150!., 
 
 162, 25of. 
 
 Pacific blockades, 234 
 Pacific Coast Defense League, 13 
 Pageants, 234 
 Palace of Peace, 201 
 Pan-American Conferences, 134, 
 
 161, 179, 184, 193 
 Pan-Americanism, 135, 145, 181, 
 
 220. See Monroe Doctrine 
 Panama, 23, 101, 135, 213 
 Pan-Europeanism, 220 
 Panhandle, Alaska, 212 
 Papacy, 151, 152, 177, 193, 200 
 Paris, Declaration of, 134, 171 
 Parliament, 97 
 
INDEX 
 
 273 
 
 Parliament of man, 221 
 
 Passivism, 147 
 
 Passy, Frederic, 161, 230, 240, 247 
 
 Patriotism, n, 19, 53, 76, 85, 103, 
 109, 221, 222. See Loyalty 
 
 Pax Britannica, 106 
 
 Pax Romana, 106 
 
 Peace, xi, 14, 20, 29, 33, iosf., 112, 
 141, 150, 237; imperial peace, 
 107; lasting peace, 150, 237, 
 
 251, 252f. 
 
 Peace-at-any-price, 27, 48, 147 
 
 Day, 243 
 
 societies, 158 
 
 Society, The, 158 
 
 of unrighteousness, 101 
 
 Year Book, The, 162, 174, 191 
 Peloponnesian War, 247 
 Penn, William, 153 
 Pensions, 65 
 Periodicals, 258 
 Permanent Court of Arbitration, 
 
 197, 202, 205 
 Permanent International Bureau 
 
 at The Hague, 135, 160 
 Perris, George, 50, 55, 56, 113 
 Persia, 28, 150, 223 
 Pfeiffer, Ludwig, 55, 56, 80, 149 
 Philippines, 23, 101, 213 
 Phillipson, 66, 123, 174, 191 
 "Planetary morality," 103 
 Plebiscite, 233, 237 
 Plutocracy, 76, 145. See Classes 
 Poisonous gases, 198 
 Poland, 28, 31 
 Police force, 32, 224, 228 
 Political aspects of war, 9$f. 
 Popper-Lynkeus, 29, 35, 93 
 Population, 9, 21, 94 
 Positive law, 109, 171 
 Poverty, 84 
 
 Preferential treatment. See Tar- 
 iffs 
 
 Preparedness, 12, 13, 32, 47, 53, 
 54, 76 
 
 Prices, 77, 81, 82 
 
 Private property, immunity of, 
 58, 175, 198, 213 
 
 Privilege. See Classes 
 
 Prize court, 202, 207 
 
 Progress, 20, 245 
 
 Projects for peace, 2i2f. 
 
 Protectorates, 9, 237 
 
 Prussian militarism, 99, 116 
 
 Public debt, 68f . 
 finance, 6 if. 
 opinion, 109, 173, 189 
 
 Publicity, 232 
 
 Purchase of territory, 212 
 
 Quakers, 152, 158, 159 
 
 Quarantine, 13 
 
 Quidde, L., 163 
 
 Quotations on Peace and War, 165 
 
 Races, 4, 26, 142, 147, 234 
 
 Ralston, J. H., 191 
 
 Ransom, 114 
 
 Rational Defense League, 232 
 
 Reason, 33, 109 
 
 Recruiting, 91, 92 
 
 Red Cross, 118, 125, 171, 228 
 
 Reduction of armaments. See 
 
 Armaments 
 Reforms, 98, 99 
 Reformation, 108, 169 
 Reichstag, 215 
 Reinsch, Paul, 138, 225 
 Religion, 20, 102, 103, 106, 142, 
 
 i47 
 
 Religious pacifism, 147, 152 
 wars, 169 
 
274 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Renault, 199, 204, 230 
 Repudiation, 68, 69, 76, 77 
 Revanche, 148 
 Reversed selection, 87 
 Revolution, xi, 76, 78 
 Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
 
 Period, 69, 91, 157 
 Richard, Henry, 161, 215, 240 
 Richet, Charles, 67, 90, 93, 144, 
 
 148, 163, 190, 239, 260 
 "Rifleman, A," 22, 24 
 Rights, fundamental, 3, 9 
 Righteousness, national, 6, 18, 30, 
 
 101, 224. See Justice 
 Roberts, Lord, 15, 22, 98, 99 
 Robinson, J. H., 248 
 Role of force, The, 105!. 
 Roman Empire, 106, 151, 168, 
 
 177 
 Roosevelt, 3, 6, 18, 19, 179, 200, 
 
 230, 254 
 
 Root, Elihu, 175 
 Rousseau, 155, 164 
 Royce, Josiah, 253 
 Ruskin, 20, 24 
 Russell, Bertrand, 241, 254 
 Russo-Japanese War, 88, 89, 121 
 
 St. Petersburg, Declaration of, 
 
 134, 171 
 
 Saint-Pierre, Abbe de, 155 
 Salvation Army, 153 
 Samoa, 135, 212 
 Samuel, 106 
 
 Sanction, no, 173, 187, 189 
 Sanitation, 89, 116, 124 
 Saul, 106 
 
 Schreiner, Olive, 231 
 Schucking, Walther, 199, 204, 224 
 Schvan, 254 
 Science, 46, 129, 242 
 
 Scott, James Brown, 175, 100, 192, 
 199, 204, 210, 230 
 
 Seaman, 88, 89, 93, 124 
 
 Secret diplomacy, ioif., 233, 238. 
 See Diplomacy 
 
 Secret treaties, n 
 
 Self-preservation, 18 
 
 Sve, 192, 247 
 
 Seven Seas Magazine, 9 
 
 Sick, care of, 117 
 
 Slavery, 19, 245 
 
 Slogans. See Catch-words 
 
 Social Darwinism, 2of., 28, 245 
 fatalism, 146 
 
 Socialism, 99, 147, 227, 231, 232 
 
 Society of Nations, 237 
 
 Sociology, 68f., 234 
 
 "Song of Hate, The," 85 
 
 South African Union, 221 
 
 Sovereignty, i, 2, 141, 173, 222 
 limitation of, 144, 219 
 
 Spain, 101, 108, 222 
 
 Spencer, 90, 113, 149 
 
 Spheres of influence, 237 
 
 Spiller, 139, 226 
 
 Standing armies, 116 
 
 Stead, W. T., 199, 204 
 
 Stein, 23, 149, 240 
 
 Stilwell, A. E., 67, 149, 254 
 
 Stockton, Richard, Jr., 21, 24, 54 
 
 Strategy, 116 
 
 Stratton, George M., 25, 149, 239 
 
 Strikes, xi, 23, 85, 227, 232 
 
 Sturge, Joseph, 159 
 
 Suez Canal, 134 
 
 Suffrage. See Elections; Democ- 
 racy 
 
 Sully, 117, 154, 163 
 
 Sumner, Charles, 161 
 
 Sumner, William G., 112, 149, 164 
 
 Superstition, 242 
 
INDEX 
 
 275 
 
 Survival of the fit. See Dar- 
 winism 
 Suspension of specie payment, 60, 
 
 63 
 Suttner, Bertha von, 125, 226, 230, 
 
 260 
 
 Sweden, 180, 212 
 Switzerland, 30, 221, 223 
 Syndicalism, 99 
 
 Tactics, 116 
 
 Taft, 179, 226 
 
 Tariffs, 80, 128, 142, 229. See 
 
 Free trade 
 preferential, 36, 39 
 Tavenner, C. H., 55 
 Taxation, 63, 68, 76, 77, 78, 81 
 Text-books, 103, 246 
 Thirty Years War, 170 
 Thoroughness, 14 
 Tolstoi, 162, 164, 260 
 Torres, Alberto, 148, 163 
 Transportation, 126 
 Trask, Katrina, 260 
 Treaty, 134, 172, 173, 184 
 Treitschke, 7, 18, 21, 24 
 Trial by battle, 107 
 Tribe, 105 
 
 Tribute. See Indemnity 
 Tripoli tan War, 197 
 Truce of God, 152 
 Trueblood, Benjamin, 164, 225 
 Turkey, 135, 223 
 Turtle Bay, 52 
 "Typhoon, The," 53 
 
 Ulster, 96 
 Umfrid, O., 217 
 Unemployment, 61, 84 
 "Unilateral aberration," 146 
 Union of Democratic Control, 233, 
 238, 241, 252 
 
 United States, 5, 9, n, 13, 15, 33, 
 34, 69, 70, 74, 98, 101, 144, 
 157, i59, 178, 189, 212, 215, 
 221, 223, 243 
 
 United States of Europe, 220 
 Universal peace, 17, 20 
 Peace Congresses, 193 
 Postal Union, 132, 205, 220 
 service, 98. See Compulsory 
 
 service 
 
 Unlimited treaties of arbitration, 
 179, 183. See Arbitration 
 
 Venezuela, 233 
 Verestchagin, 243 
 Vie Internationale. See Annuaire 
 Vienna, Congress of, 134 
 Villard, O. G., 55 
 Violation of treaties, 10 
 Virility, 20, 29 
 Vital interest, 182 
 Voltaire, 155 
 Voluntary law, 109, 171 
 Volunteer system, 92, 98, 116. See 
 Compulsory service. 
 
 Wages, 83 
 
 Wales, Julia Grace, 251 
 Wallas, Graham, 25 
 Walling, W. E., 231 
 War, xi 
 
 divine institution, 16, 34 
 
 benefits of, 191., 74, 85; cost 
 of, 61; economic consequences 
 of, s8f., 84; humanizing, 228 
 
 babies, 85 
 
 brides, 260 
 
 loans, 233 
 
 scares, 51 
 
 of 1812, 246 
 
 and biology, 87f. 
 
 and Christianity, 164 
 
276 
 
 INDEX 
 
 War and Peace, 44, 258 
 and sociology, 8 if. 
 and the state, 95!. 
 
 Washington, 135 
 
 "Watchful waiting," 96 
 
 Wehberg, 149, 165, 175, 191, 204, 
 210 
 
 Wells, H. G., 149, 231 
 
 Wentworth, Marion Craig, 260 
 
 White, Andrew D., 197, 199 
 
 "White man's burden," 26 
 
 Who's Who in the Peace Move- 
 ment, 165 
 
 Wicker, 140, 226 
 
 Wilson, George Graf ton, 174, 210 
 
 Wilson, Woodrow, 96, 225, 234 
 
 Wirtz, 243 
 
 Woman, 227f., 231, 254 
 
 Woman's Peace Party, 228, 251, 
 252 
 
 Women's clubs, 228 
 
 Wood, Major-General, 12, 55 
 
 Worcester, Noah, 158 
 
 World Alliance of Churches, 154 
 
 citizens, 27, 158, 222 
 
 Court League of America, 252 
 
 fairs, 1 60 
 
 Peace Foundation, 229, 259 
 
 police, 173 
 
 state. See Federation 
 Wounded, care of, 117 
 Wyatt, 5, 20, 23, 24 
 
 Year Books, 138, 259 
 "Yellow peril," 26 
 Young Men's Christian Associa- 
 tion, 131 
 
 Zabern, 96 
 Zangwill, 260 
 Zola, 260 
 
 Zorn, 197, 199, 204 
 Zouche, 154, 170 
 Zweckverband, 219 
 
 Printed in the United States of America. 
 
 
27 
 
 Wa 
 a 
 a 
 
 Wa 
 "W 
 WeJ 
 
 Wei 
 
 Wei 
 Whi 
 "W, 
 Wh< 
 
 Wic 
 
 Wils 
 
 Wirt 
 \Yo-n 
 Won 
 
 Won 
 Woo 
 
14 DAY USE 
 
 RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED 
 
 LOAN DEPT. 
 
 This book is due on the last date stamped below, or 
 
 on the date to which renewed. 
 Renewed books are subject to immediate recall. 
 
 :C'D LD 
 
 APR 23-65-6PM 
 
 
 
 LD 21A-60m-3,'65 
 (F2336slO)476B 
 
 General Library 
 
 University of California 
 
 Berkeley 
 
 LD 21-100m-2 '55 
 (Bl39s22)476 
 
 rsWy Broil ffornia 
 Berkeley 
 

 THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY