-485 a9U UC-NRLF B 3 SMb STT y HAS O U D E BEEN WORSE GOVERNED BY ITS NATIVE PRINCES THAN OUR INDIAN TEREITOEIES BY LEADENHALL STREET ? By MALCOLM LEWIN, Esq. LATE SECOND JUDGE OF THE SUDDR COURT OF MADRAS " The moderation of England is not unlike the ambition of other Nations." Duke of Wellington. LONDON: JAMES KIDGWAY, No. 169, PICCADILLY. 1867. Vrice One Shilling. LONDON: PRINTED BY T. BRETTELL, RUPERT STREEt, HAYMARKET. X) S H'i 0^ LU This inquiry addressed to Oude, as the last of our Indian annexations, discloses but little to dis- tinguish it from other annexations, except in the magnitude of the gain, and the amount of the hypocrisy employed to cover the spoliation. Whether considered as a measure of political expediency or as one founded on the koli/ object of interference for the benefit of the people, in either case a justification will be sought in vain. On examining the grounds on which we have de- prived the ancient sovereigns of India of their thrones and territory, we find the motive in all cases the same. Lust of revenue and extension of empire, are the only influences visible in our proceedings. My purpose on this occasion is to compare the condition of Oude in its police and revenue administration with that of the territories under the sway of Leadenhall Street, and to point to the grounds on which the East India Company attempt to justify the seizure — leaving it to the 503 more curious to satisfy themselves as to the results of our alliance with other native states, such as Mysoor, Hyderabad, Nagpoor, Surat, Sattarah, &c., and then to inquire whether the territories of OuDE at the present time present a worse political condition than our own. Lord Dalhousie describes the kingdom of Oude, as " one of the most fertile '• regions of the globe ;" on another occasion he speaks of it as " well cultivated, and its soil richer " than any I have seen in any of our own dis- '• tricts." General Low, a late British resident at the Court of Oude, speaks of " the immense " profit that will be acquired from the possession " of the Oude territories." Mill, in his history of India, states that " the revenue of Oude before " its connection with the English, exceeded three " millions sterling, that subsequently it did not " exceed half that sum, and in subsequent years " fell far below it." Whether the value of Oude was the motive of the spoliation or otherwise, its wealth was an object of sufficient importance to stimulate the ambition of a Governor-General of the present day, as it did the cupidity of a more celebrated Viceroy, about a century ago. When contrasting the past with the present treatment of Oude by the Indian Government, General Low observes, " For my own part although our earlier con- " nection with Oude affairs in the unreformed " times of Warren Hastings, suggests more than " one salient point for an Englishman to grieve " over, I believe that our later Protectorate has " been still more culpable." The revenues of Oude, from the earliest period of our alliance with it, have been the milch-cow of our Indian Empire. A threat to take possession of the country has always been found capable of extorting the sums required for the exigencies of the Indian Government, whether for war or for patronage. Our exactions have exhausted its re- sources, our subsidiary forces have maintained the king in his misrule against his own subjects, and turning his army into a sans culotte rabble ; have brought the finest district in the world into a state of poverty and depression, only to be amended by casting off a parasitical protection, as fatal to the country as it has been to our own national character. A late Governor-General, Lord William Bentinck, speaking of the loans received from the King of Oude, calls them " unwilling contributions ex- " tor ted by fear of our power." Of our subsidiary forces, the Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, re- marks, — " were it not for the constant presence of " British troops at Lucknow, the people of Oude " would speedily work their own deliverance, and " would impose on their ruler that effectual check " of general revolt by which Eastern rulers are " best controlled." It is not necessary to multiply authorities in proof of the value acquired by the seizure of Oude, — as well might the value of a purse of gold be made a question by a robber ; the difference between the two is that the acquisition of the gold, though unlawful, is not associated with the hypocritical pretence of conferring benefits, — in this respect the robber takes higher ground than the Indian Viceroy, — he has but one crime to atone for. Our views of humanity towards the Natives of India seldom find expression; but when there is something to be gained by them, we then assume the character of the qui tdm informer, who pleads for the interests of others, while intent only on securing his own. The alliance of the British Government with Oude, dates so far back as a century ago. Oude has ever since had a subsidiary force, officered by Englishmen, and a British Minister has resided at the Court of the Sovereign, who, " by treaty, was " bound to govern according to his advice." The police and revenue administration of the country has, for the most part, been conducted by ofiicers chosen by the Indian Government from the civil and military services of the East India Company, and the country has practically been under our own management ; so that if its condition be such as to furnish a plea for its seizure, the blame belongs to the Indian Government and its agents, and to them alone. Of the results of our connection with Oude, the (Jourt of Directors observe in their dispatch to the Government of India, dated 1st October, 1828, " Had it not been for our connection with Oude, " although misrule might have attained as great a " height, it would not have been of equal duration. " It is the British Government that, by a systematic " suppression of all attempts at resistance, has " prolonged, to the present time, a state of dis- " organisation, which can nowhere attain per- " manence, except where the shortsightedness and " rapacity of a semi-barbarous government is " armed with the military strength of a civilised " one." Lord William Bentinck ascribed the misrule of Oude " to the system under which there " is a pageant king, and a British resident clothed " with a degree of state equal to that of royalty " itself, acting the part rather of a schoolmaster " and dictator than of the minister of a friendly " power, exercising a jurisdiction totally incom- " patible with the royal dignity and authority. He " thought it would be more for the comfort of the " Sovereign, for the advantage of good government, " and for the interests of both, that the Sovereign " should be relieved from this more than king." Is it surprising that a country under such conditions should be mis-governed ? that its king, instead of being the energetic ruler of his people, shoidd cast off a governing power which he could not exercise without bringing himself into collision with the Viceroy appointed by the Governor- 8 General to rule over him ? That, failing in the real attributes of kingly power, and surrounded by temptation, he should devote himself to other and less dignified pursuits 1 Warren Hastings, speaking of our conduct in OuDE, remarks, " the numbers, influence, and " enormous amount of the salaries, pensions, and " emoluments of the Company's service, civil and " military, in the Vizier's service, have become " an intolerable burthen upon the revenue and " authority of his Excellency, and exposed us to " the envy and resentment of the whole country, " by excluding the native servants and adherents " of the Vizier from the rewards of their services " and attachment." One object has guided the Indian Government in its alliance with the native states of India, holding that steadily in view, each state has gradually declined, each has sooner or later furnished a pretext for its own extinction. Few native states have escaped our grasp, and these few are marked out for destruction. Ex- perience abundantly proves that the best ordered are insecure, where anything is to be gained by taking possession of them. It is remarkable that whenever the Indian treasury has been low, the wrongs of Oude have been more prominent than at other times, we have then put forth our pious aspirations for the welfare of the people — it was the piety of the highwayman, which commencing with " Your money or your " life," ceased as soon as the demand was satisfied — the people whose name was invoked for the occa- sion were then left to their fate. Lord Hastings, when Governor-General, adverting to the low ebb of the Indian treasury, during the Mahrattah war, says, " The treasuries of the three presidencies " were in so unfurnished a condition, that the " sufficiency of funds in them to meet any un- " usual charges, and many menaced us, excited " considerable uneasiness. At that period the " low credit of the bonds which had at different " times been issued, as the securities for monies " borrowed, made eventual recurrence to a loan " seriously discouraging in contemplation. Luckily " I was on such frank terms with the Nabob, as " that I could frankly explain to him my circum- " stances, so that the Honourable Company was " accommodated with above two and a half mil- " lions sterling, on my simple receipt." The circumstance we are here called upon to remark is that while we were incessantly re- proaching the Nawaub with his lavish expenditure in luxury, " with the effects of an expensive " government, the oppression and misery of his " people," complaining of the wretched condition of his unpaid army, and threatening him with the loss of his kingdom, we should not have scrupled so late as the year 1842 to borrow large sums of money from him. Li a letter dated 21st January, 1842, the British resident, Colonel Low, states. 10 adverting to the exaggerated rumours of our reverses in Affghanistan, and of their supposed effects, such rumours rendering it desirable to shew to the native community, that the confi- dence of the OuDE government in our stability remains unabated, I thought it desirable to make use of my personal influence with the King of OuDE to induce him to lend a consider- able sum of money to the Government of India. I explained to his Majesty, and stated to him frankly, that there was a temporary difficulty in procuring supplies, and I said he could not in any way evince his good will and gratitude to the British Government more appropriately than by subscribing largely to the loan now open. Nothing could be more satisfactory than the way in which the king received this intimation of my wishes. He declared in an earnest and cordial manner, that it gave him great pleasure to carry m^y wishes into effect, and that he was at all times ready to do so, that he would wil- lingly subscribe all the money he could possibly spare, without the least delay ; adding, that in two or three days he would send to my treasury at least ten lacs of rupees, which sum was some days after made up to fourteen lacs." The total sum lent by the Nawaub to the British Govern- ment in 1842, to relieve it from the pressure of the Affghan war, was forty-six lacs of rupees. Our alliance with the Princes of Oude has for a 11 series of years been little more than a series of extortion; when weak we have soothed them, when power was in our hands we have threatened, keeping always in view the fate of the victim, until circum- stances should concur to favour the opportunity. This opportunity did at length arrive, that too within a few years of the loan just referred to. Lord Dal- housie, writing on the 21st November, 1854, says : " The occurrence of successive wars and an un- " feigned reluctance to have recourse to extreme " measures, have concurred to induce the Govern- " ment of India to take no action on the warning " given to the King seven years ago. I would " now instruct the resident Colonel Outram to " apply himself on his arrival at Lucknow, to an " inquiry into the present state of the country." The pear was now ripe ; India was quiet — there was no Mahratta confederacy — no Aifghan war — no Seikh war to oppose our plucking it. We had no longer an object to serve by conciliation — we could count upon our power — the victim was within our grasp. We had hitherto been satisfied with the goose's egg, the time was come to seize the goose itself. Setting out with a foregone con- clusion, a report was called for to justify it. In reply to the requisition Colonel Outram informed the Governor-General,' — " I am of course entirely " dependent for any information, on what I find in " the Residency Records." It was impossible the Resident should furnish any thing in justification of 12 the measure, that was not ah^ady in the hands of the Governor-General ; the mquiry ordered was a mere mockery, an attempt to cover a deliberate act of spoliation, and to throw the onus of it on a man of character who, newly appointed to the office, was without the means of judging where he was called upon to decide the fate of a kingdom. The historian Mill informs us, that during many years " unjustifiable extortions, to the extent of thirty-four lacs per annum, had been practised on that independent Prince." Bishop Heber says, " The King lent the British Government all ■ that would have enabled him to ease the people of their burdens ; " referring to another loan he emarks — " Of the two millions which his father had left, the King had lent one to Lord Hastings to carry on the Nepaul war. For this he was to ' receive interest, but unfortunately for him he ' accepted instead of all payment a grant of fresh • territory under the Himalaya mountains, which ' is unproductive, being either a savage wilderness ' or occupied by a race of mountaineers, who pay • no taxes without being compelled to do so, and • he had not the means of compelling them." It would seem a strange policy to make over to the King of OuDE the distant territory of another, while we were ever reproaching him with being unable to manage his own. With the constantly recurring demands of the Indian Government on the Oude treasury, it is 13 not surprising that the revenues of the country should be found insufficient to meet the ordinary charges of Government— that the King should be unable to defray the expenses of his army— that under the confused and vacillating system of internal administration established by us, crimes should go unpunished and unrepressed— and lastly, that those results should display themselves which naturally arose out of the vicious system we had devised and forced upon the King, as the certain means of his destruction. It still remains to be seen whether Oude was worse governed by the Nawaub than our own territories by Leadenhall Street. Had the misrule of Oude produced the fruits ascribed to it, we should hear of the emigration of the inhabitants, which is expressly denied— we should hear of robberies and murder, of torture, and other crimes transcending the number to be met with in other parts of India. So far from this being the case, we find the magistrates of Jounpore and Gorukpore, Major Troup, commanding the 2nd regiment of Oude Light Infantry, Captain Bunbury and others, bearing favourable testimony to the state of the police of Oude. In his minute of the 15th August, 1855, General Low states, " In all those measures which relate exclusively to the interest of the paramount state, such as " searching for and giving up criminals, who have escaped into Oude, from our provinces, supplying u