THE "CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION" 
 
 A Realistic Psychology 
 
 BY 
 
 ROBERT CHENAULT GIVLER, Ph. D. 
 
 Instructor in Psychology 
 
 in the 
 University of Washington 
 
 
PSTCH 
 
 COPYRIGHT APPLIED FOR 
 
DEDICATED 
 
 TO ALL THOSE NOT YET BEDEVILED 
 
 BY THE DOCTRINE 
 
 OF 
 
 HARD ATOMS AND SOFT SOULS, 
 
 BUT WRITTEN 
 FOR THE OTHERS 
 
 332654 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Memories of Aristotle, together with the 
 latest popular information about the nerves, 
 make up the bulk of the usual text-books in 
 psychology. Faculty psychology is still with 
 us, however much we may have renounced it 
 in our sane and critical moments; our lan- 
 guage flows on by momentum as it did of yore, 
 and the old nouns still call seductively. For in 
 the midst of our revolt against substantialism, 
 we know not yet how to speak in a constructive 
 manner. I am convinced that no pussy-foot 
 departures from this type of psychology will 
 render adequate service to the matter involved, 
 and I mean, furthermore, that these pages shall 
 bear witness of that conviction. Even in some 
 of the better universities of this country there 
 is a great discrepancy between the psychology 
 verbally taught in the lectures, and that which 
 the student reads in the assigned references. 
 Even the usual book on the subject is a popular 
 phrasing of the enjoyable lecture material of 
 the author's previous years, and not that psy- 
 chology which represents the best of his pres- 
 ent estimate of the subject. The ways of men 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 seem to be so incurably pragmatic, that it is dan- 
 gerous to publish the untried. 
 
 I offer this outline of a realistic program for 
 psychology as something but partly tried. By 
 realistic I mean that mind is treated as some- 
 thing observable, something mentionable in all 
 of its phases, as well as in its last analysis. 
 There will not be urged any non possiunus intel- 
 legere at the close of the book, however many 
 special matters must be left untouched for lack 
 of space. The claim here made is that mind, 
 soul, thought, consciousness, and all other terms 
 referring to personality, are in no need of being 
 interpreted by way of Paddock, but rather that 
 they mean things which can be discussed and 
 understood by any one so disposed. Psychol- 
 ogy is a natural science, — that is, it requires no 
 concept of trans-empirical things to deal with it 
 exhaustively. This will heartily displease a 
 host of readers, and those who "imagine there 
 must be the indefinite something in the mys- 
 sterious all this" will not be enthusiastic about 
 the ideas hereinafter to be presented. 
 
 There are two ever-recurring items in this 
 book to which signal attention may be called. 
 The one is the special form of analysis used, and 
 the other is the continual reference to deep- 
 seated errors in popular psychology. For both 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 of these characteristic attitudes I am glad to 
 acknowledge my indehtedness to Professor Ed- 
 win B. Holt, of Harvard University. His "Con- 
 cept of Consciousness," from which I have un- 
 sparingly quoted in these pages, may be said to 
 have furnished the foundation upon which this 
 whole structure has been laid. The title of this 
 book itself is one of his keenest phrases. I am 
 not sure that he will acknowledge the whole pro- 
 gram employed herein as deducible from real- 
 istic premises, but I feel sure that many com- 
 mon parts exist between his exposition of real- 
 ism and mine. 
 
 Either logic or flapdoodle. This is the thesis 
 defended in this book with regard to the anal- 
 ysis of mind. If one is to speak at all about 
 any matter, let him first of all be clear and de- 
 finitive. Fusion and synthesis come fast enough 
 to undo the work of separating things into their 
 elements for the sake of a clear comprehension 
 of them. For the business of speaking in gen- 
 eral about matters that are particular is not 
 only avoiding the issue, but it is even a tacit 
 attempt to traduce the factual status of the 
 terms involved. In following this scheme, the 
 student will find a bit of ditficult reading here 
 and there. Nevertheless, the ultimate grounds 
 of logic are not only what every vigorous stu- 
 iii 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 dent deserves to know, but that which he 
 straightway asks to have exhibited to him as 
 well. This method may be altogether too am- 
 bitious, but if logical treatment cannot be em- 
 ployed in psychology, we had better not talk of 
 a science of human consciousness. 
 
 For the general polemical tone of this book 
 no apology would be sincere. Students come 
 into psychology with all sorts of quaint notions 
 about themselves, which only a wholesale, im- 
 mediate house-cleaning will suffice to eliminate. 
 Nothing is of so much benefit to a man as to 
 realize once in a while that he has been going 
 by momentum rather than by initiative, and a 
 course in psychology is scarcely beneficial if it 
 does not pluck one clean from his worst ruts. 
 In fact, the writing of this book is designed to 
 stimulate to that end rather than to perpetuate 
 drowsiness. The reader is hereby assured that 
 all of the notions combated in these pages are 
 combated in a manner specifically meant. As 
 is well known, realists do not usually have the 
 reputation of apologizing for their directness, 
 and if they are wrong, no one need hesitatingly 
 whisper back the verdict of error. 
 
 As a last special item to be mentioned, this 
 book is not a behavioristic psychology, however 
 much the words "organism" and "function" may 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 appear in it. As I understand it, behaviorism 
 is a theory of the criteria of mind, and not a 
 system that can be substituted for psychology. 
 It is rather a thesis defending the notion of 
 continuity in the animal kingdom, — something, 
 to be sure, no realist would sanely controvert, — 
 and upon inspection, its chief motive turns out 
 to be an animism with the "anima" left out. It 
 is not an exhaustive study of even the behaviors 
 of the organisms whose tropisms it records. 
 This book is a realistic program for psychology 
 and thereby holds that the environment is al- 
 ways to be kept in view along with whatever 
 the organism may be internally or externally 
 accomplishing upon it. 
 
 Not all has been accomplished, however, 
 that was in the original plan. As a text-book 
 it is full of gaps. But, inasmuch as it was writ- 
 ten solely for use in my own classes, and is to 
 be supplemented by lectures to fill in these 
 gaps, only the general plan is offered for crit- 
 icism to the general reader. Few signally acute 
 experiments have been cited, and those are rep- 
 resentative rather than exhaustive reckonings 
 with the data involved. The empirical status of 
 mind is the central item of this book, as well 
 as the continual warnings against mysticism 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 and sentimentality in regard to the science of 
 psychology. 
 
 The bibliography included in this book has 
 JDeen devised for elementary students who do 
 not readily read French or German. It contains 
 but few references, and these few are selected 
 with a view to supporting rather than inhibiting 
 the theses contained in the text. 
 
 In the preparation of this book for the press 
 I have been assisted in various ways by those 
 to whom this public thanks is due. To my col- 
 league, Dr. E. R. Guthrie, 1 am indebted for very 
 helpful hints as to some of the logical matters 
 involved in the first two chapters; to Margaret 
 Givler, for a thorough inspection and criticism 
 of the text in point of diction and rhetoric; and 
 to Mr. William R. Wilson, of the University of 
 Washington, for assistance in proof-reading as 
 well as for suggestions as to clarity of expres- 
 sion from the student's standpoint. 
 
 Seattle, Aug. 1, 1915. 
 
 VI 
 
Terniinolog 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 Chapter I. Page 
 1 
 
 Chapter II. 
 Psychological Analysis 39 
 
 Chapter III. 
 The Sensitive and Perceptive Organs 71 
 
 Chapter IV. 
 The Emotional Complex 302 
 
 Chapter V. 
 Matters and Minds 374 
 
THE "CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION" 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 TERMINOLOGY 
 
 1. There are two fallacies, either of which 
 usually bothers the tyro in psychology: the 
 first is, that since everybody has a mind, each 
 one on that account knows more than any one 
 else can know about his own mind; and the 
 other is, that mind, being that unique and most 
 intricate thing in the whole universe, contains 
 something so elusive and mysterious that it can 
 never be fully known. 
 
 2. The first thing to do is to surmount both 
 of these statements so that they will not 
 plague us any longer. They are both samples 
 of reasoning by analogy, rather than reasoning 
 from principles concerning which there is no 
 room for quibbling. If a thing can be dis- 
 proven by the same sort of reasoning by which 
 it was proven, it cannot be sound. We shall, 
 then, first disprove them by analogical reason- 
 ing, and later on, by another and better kind, 
 so that they will be permanently surmounted. 
 Now, everybody not only has a mind, but a 
 deceased ancestor, a mesentery, and at an early 
 
 1 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 age, a future. But who would claim to know 
 his own deceased ancestor as well as some one 
 else might have known him, or that the 
 healthy or diseased state of his own mesentery 
 were as plainly before him as the news of to- 
 day's paper? Nor, again, can it be maintained 
 that one necessarily knows his own future or 
 what its development will be as well as those 
 who, having followed his family history, might 
 safely predict after watching his habit forma- 
 tions ripen into maturity beyond voluntary re- 
 call. This shows sufficiently the purely verbal 
 character of the first fallacy in the preceding 
 paragraph. 
 
 3. For the second one, a similar treatment 
 will suffice. The mysterious element in mind is 
 said to stand in the way of a scientific psychol- 
 ogy, inasmuch as mystery is a word usually 
 employed to indicate an inherent property of 
 things not yet known. But, besides this, there 
 is no reason why one should reserve his mys- 
 teries until the last chapter of psychology, 
 rather than plant them squarely at the begin- 
 ning, or why that part of psychology which is 
 open to investigation must therefore be pes- 
 tered by some beetling mystery which comes 
 ominously near and provokingly soon. To 
 carry this fallacious argument to its limits, one 
 2 
 
TERMINOLOGY 
 would be permitted, in solving a mathematical 
 problem, to excuse his errors in calculation on 
 the ground that numbers were pure figments of 
 the imagination anyway, and that his imagina- 
 tion was at least as good as that of the early 
 Egyptians. 
 
 4. This is, however, only meeting poor 
 arguments with equally poor ones. A fallacy 
 is not merely something that can be laughed 
 off, but in these cases it is something which 
 needs to be surmounted by an appeal to exact 
 principles rather than to the playfulness of 
 words. As soon as one begins an argument, he 
 lays himself open to the perils of argument; it 
 will also be public information whether what 
 goes for proof can withstand all inquiry that is 
 brought to bear upon the statements uttered 
 and defended. The difficulty with these two 
 fallacies is that they contain words which can- 
 not be pressed for their meaning within the 
 total context in which they are embedded; lack- 
 ing the form of clear-cut statements, they can- 
 not be pressed for conclusions. Chaff put into 
 a hopper will not grind into wheat in any mill 
 except the one owned by Grimm and Grimm. 
 Let us carefully show how this is. 
 
 5. Every science is a collection of observed 
 facts gathered together under the guidance of 
 3 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 a permanent interest, plus as many conjectures 
 as to the relationships of these facts to one an- 
 other as are required to arrange them in a sys- 
 tem or to apply them to things of the street. 
 A system is an arrangement of things from sim- 
 ple to complex, fundamental to variable; a pile 
 of rubbish is not a system, while the plans for 
 building a pyramid are. The facts of a science 
 must first be supplied with names, and the sig- 
 nificance of the names lies in what the things 
 named will do to one another under certatin 
 fixed conditions. So that which was first 
 named by means of a noun, implying substance 
 and fixity, often later on comes to mean what 
 we express by verbs, — valences, chronic in- 
 stabilities, readiness to affect or be affected by 
 other things. Over the terminology, however, 
 usually not much difficulty seriously arises; our 
 language is not so petrified as to forbid a 
 change of meaning without a change of form. 
 But it is not such a simple matter when one 
 comes to the conjectural part of a science. To 
 formulate the laws of the way things behave, to 
 be sure that one's sampling of behaviors is 
 broad and salient, and to arrange the laws in a 
 logical system, — here in the case of every 
 science there is much difficulty, more disagree- 
 ment and a maximum of doubt as to what can 
 4 
 
TERMINOLOGY 
 actually be deduced from a system so formed, 
 no matter what the science may be, — Geometry 
 or Ethics. 
 
 6. Every science, therefore, might be said 
 to have two sides, — one of observation and the 
 other of logic. We perceive well enough, per- 
 haps, what is before us, but we cannot speak 
 well enough to cover the facts or to convince 
 the audience. To offset this as much as pos- 
 sible, every science reducible to exact termin- 
 ology and quantification is phrased in symbols 
 peculiarly specific and univocal in character. 
 Words of many meanings will not do. It thus 
 uses expressions which are defined, or limited 
 in scope which cover precisely the data in- 
 volved and have the same, rather than a differ- 
 ent meaning to every one more or less con- 
 cerned. One beginning the study of such a 
 science often is disappointed at finding himself 
 in the dark in regard to the thing to be studied, 
 — he had thought that it was to have much more 
 connection with his daily, pressing needs. The 
 reason for this is that those who have devel- 
 oped the science had first themselves to unlearn 
 the current, metaphorical, inexact speech in 
 order to make any headway in it. To com- 
 mand nature, they found they had first to obey 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 it, and so the lesser good had been butchered 
 without a public ceremony of apolog>\ 
 
 7. Thus every science aims to be symbolical 
 and univocal in its terminology. However, in 
 psychology, one can hardly ever be said to be 
 clear of that realm of discourse where the pri- 
 vate interpretation of a word may not interrupt 
 all attempts at deductive formulation. Almost 
 every statement can be challenged, almost ev- 
 ery fact be named in several fairly satisfactory 
 ways. But this by no means relegates it to the 
 realm of clannish prejudice. For when a fact 
 has the possibility of being named in many 
 ways, it means only one thing, — that it is no 
 simple, single fact that is before one. One must 
 then look to his terminology to see how much 
 and in what essentials his names for facts have 
 differences irreconcilable with straightforward 
 deductive formulation. Everything is equally 
 a matter of fact, and no datum has any special 
 privileges. If one's logic cannot take care of 
 this or that sufficient statement, it is time for 
 logic to be amended to fit a world whose scien- 
 tific battles it fights. 
 
 8. One thing more : no facts have the plas- 
 tic character which language has. One goes to 
 the facts, observes them, analyses and orders 
 them; reconsiders, re-observes and carefully 
 6 
 
TERMINOLOGY 
 names them over again, — if his need for nam- 
 ing comes out of a dominant motive in his en- 
 deavors,— and no amount of juggling with the 
 words apart from the facts can alter their 
 status in the universe whose laws they exhibit. 
 Hasty conclusions, private uses, idealistic or 
 theological motives may seem to have the power 
 of twisting out of their orders in the world the 
 brute items of empirical nature, but a little 
 watchfulness will serve to undermine such 
 traducing of things empirical and render again 
 to the Caesar of organized facts the things that 
 are none but his. Even the private realm of 
 one's own thoughts has of late years been ob- 
 liged to yield to exact statement. Where, too, 
 formal logic was insufficient to show the bear- 
 ings of private thoughts upon behavior, an in- 
 formal logic has been used to suit each indi- 
 vidual case, thus meeting the unique and 
 "mysterious" upon its own grounds. The 
 growth of abnormal psychology has done much 
 to tear away the mask from the so-called "inner 
 self" and render its crab-like movements pain- 
 fully visible to any curious passerby. 
 
 9. But to the theme. The first two state- 
 ments of this chapter were called fallacies not 
 only because of their being controvertible by a 
 mere twist of words, but rather because they 
 7 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 used concepts in a way totally inadequate to 
 their logical significance in psychology. One 
 argues only by means of logic. There are no 
 "psychological" or "moral" or "economic" rea- 
 sons, — not to say, of course, that psychologists 
 or moralists or economists do not argue. Noth- 
 ing powerful or superior, however, lies in any 
 special kind of reasoning. All reasons are 
 couched in "the rules of the game of talk," as 
 my colleague. Dr. Ducasse, would say, and have 
 validity only in so far as they conform to that 
 pattern of expression. Other things may pro- 
 voke belief, or persuade the lazy not to stew 
 any longer in their own juice, but reasoning is 
 like a game of chess, — it has inviolable rules. 
 It has more, since every science is a case of ap- 
 plied logic. The data of science are not in- 
 vented, but discovered, and certain few things 
 can be done with them and certain others can- 
 not. Only when "dass Lied ist auss," does there 
 come a hankering after any "special" type of 
 reasoning. 
 
 10. "Because I have a mind, therefore I 
 should know more about it than any one else," 
 — were this merely a verbal fallacy, one could 
 easily laugh it down; but it contains a more 
 serious fallacy than that. The expression, "I 
 have a mind," harmless enough in itself, is a 
 8 
 
TERMINOLOGY 
 statement from which nothing can be argued, 
 IF THAT STATEMENT IS THE STARTING 
 POINT. The speaker of it considers himself a 
 psychologist and intends that it shall be valid 
 for psychology. What else could it purport 
 to be? But as formulated, it is an inexact ob- 
 servation, a bit of random thinking that needs 
 to be drawn and quartered rather than em- 
 ployed determinately. It is really a coales- 
 cence of two statements, and belongs to the in- 
 trospective psychology of selfhood rather than 
 to the outspoken formulations of mental life. 
 As a random thought, it exhibits the informal 
 logic of random thinking; but statements meant 
 for the public ear must be couched in the rules 
 of the game of talk. It is not a premiss from 
 which, by itself, anything whatever can be con- 
 cluded. "Having," in fact, is a derivative of 
 other things, — familiarity, acquisition, constant 
 dealings with, something spoken or spoken of, 
 and the like, and not an orginal, first-hand mat- 
 ter at all. The other statement,— the one in- 
 volving the Mystery and tacitly invoking her at 
 the same time, — exhibits several fallacies, 
 which are: (1) that a mystery would not re- 
 main a mystery if it were knowable, and (2) 
 that the part depends upon the whole for its 
 existence and significance. It will be seen 
 9 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 later on in the chapter on psychological anal- 
 ysis that, even if the naming of all the parts of a 
 whole does not appear to exhaust or explain 
 the properties of that whole, it is not due to 
 thinking, but to the organization of the parts 
 by an extra-mental set of functions, which ac- 
 counts for the "mysterious" element to a large 
 degree. The first of these statements under dis- 
 cussion is a fallacy, therefore, because it is an 
 inexact formulation. The second, likewise, be- 
 cause it violates a law of the logic of organiza- 
 tion. 
 
 11. It will be advantageous, then, for the 
 student to approach psychology without any 
 presuppositions. Other assumptions than the 
 aforementioned fallacies may arise in the read- 
 er's mind; some of these coming from trivial, 
 others from earnest desires in regard to ones- 
 self. Yet hasty formulations are always un- 
 wise, and usually, wrong. Psychology is a 
 $tudy of facts, facts not altered by thinking, and 
 only the inability to back off" from them as 
 readily as from the facts of the physical sciences 
 is responsible for the popular view of it as be- 
 ing a study of the way one "feels" about things. 
 Only because psychological things make up to 
 so large an extent the tissue of human afi'airs is 
 one led to infer that the naive expressions of 
 10 
 
TERMINOLOGY 
 popular speech can become the terminology of 
 the science of psychology without alteration in 
 meaning. "Mind," "consciousness," "thought," 
 "emotion" and the like are all terms as familiar 
 to the psychologist as to the man on the street, 
 but the two cannot converse scientifically on 
 the slender basis of this familiarity. Both care- 
 ful examination and redefinition are essential 
 if understanding is to accompany the use of 
 such words. The need for such careful exam- 
 ination is nowhere so revealed as in cases of 
 naive prediction and reasoning about things 
 mental. In the writings of certain mental heal- 
 ers of today, for example, alliteration is the 
 highest "logical" category; "experience proves" 
 is a shibboleth from another quarter, from per- 
 sons blissfully ignorant of the fact that experi- 
 ence is both a noun and a verb, usually em- 
 ployed in an equivocal sense. "It is unthink- 
 able" asserts a third party, and then he goes on 
 to state just how carefully the "unthinkable" 
 has been thought out. From such pitfalls of ex- 
 pression one needs to be emphatically warned 
 in psycholog\\ 
 
 12. Add to that this: there is as yet no com- 
 plete, univocal terminology in psychology. 
 Modern Logic has evolved a set of symbols 
 which avoid careless interpretation of the pro- 
 11 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 cesses in that science. The physical sciences, 
 and, to a large extent the biological, also, need 
 not always name their facts by such terms as 
 can be quibbled over by those not initiated. 
 Psychology, however, lying on the topmost froth 
 of things, has never been and can never be, 
 wholly free from the errors of verbalism. If 
 it had radically fashioned its own set terms, and 
 used heiroglyphic symbols to express them, this 
 very fact might be a sign of its incapability to 
 serve that human interest out of which it sprang 
 and whose evolution it seeks to register daily. 
 For while every deductive science is a case of 
 applied logic, and while logic and mathematics 
 are basically one, the universe of science rests 
 not altogether solidly, but rather totters on the 
 mathematical foundations to which we ulti- 
 mately appeal for proof. 
 
 13. For, if one goes to the facts of a science 
 to find out what shall be said about them, and 
 finds there a number of curiously enigmatical 
 things, yes, even "mysterious" things, as one 
 sometimes does, it would be lazy-mindedness 
 and vanity alone which would lead him to 
 call by simple names things which were exceed- 
 ingly complex. Psychology is full of just such 
 complexities. For example, one starts to in- 
 vestigate a certain phenomenon, say memory; he 
 12 
 
TERMINOLOGY 
 names it by its accustomed name and sets an 
 experiment which has all possible control over 
 the conditions involved. But frequently the 
 simple, first name given to it begins to prove 
 inadequate; it is not simple, and the single 
 noun, such as memory, adaptation and so on, 
 will no longer do at all. Together with this, 
 frequently conclusions will be drawn from the 
 fact that simple words seemed to fit together to 
 make conclusions sought for as words usually 
 do, whereas the facts referred to by such words 
 had need of being reinterpreted for use in any 
 other context than the small one determined by 
 the rigid conditions of a single experiment. 
 The interests of science were thus curtailed. 
 Clean experimentation, however, cannot be sat- 
 isfied with such methods. If the simple name 
 first given to the phenomenon is inadequate, 
 or if the control of the conditions of experiment 
 interferes with the free operation of the func- 
 tions to be investigated, the work is dropped, the 
 experiment reset, and the old categories are dis- 
 carded. In psychology, as the signal example 
 of a science whose reagents in the laboratory 
 are human beings, one must be prepared for 
 any emergency of this kind. Only a few hu- 
 man beings make good subjects in psychology, 
 and even those must go through a serious and 
 13 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 long training in accepting the instructions given 
 and keeping even-minded in order to be valu- 
 able for the work under investigation. Psych- 
 ology, as a record from which general state- 
 ments can be made, is thus a study of the re- 
 actions of selected human beings; its data are 
 gathered from persons found fit to accept the 
 conditions of experimentation, and not others. 
 Figuratively, it is an assay of the highest grades 
 of ore. Life is too short to evolve a deductive 
 science of individual meteors. Not to say, how- 
 ever, that with brows uplifted and eyes aloft, 
 psychology neglects those unregenerates who 
 fail to come up to strict laboratory require- 
 ments; for this would be both pharisaism in 
 science as well as unfairness to my fellow 
 psychologists. Only this is meant, that to re- 
 port specifically upon a matter requiring selec- 
 tive attention, selective attenders of such a 
 stripe are the only possible grist. When the 
 erratic are in the majority, we are only experi- 
 menting upon erratics and not upon the in- 
 tended datum set forth. 
 
 14. Coupled with the above warnings in the 
 approach to psychology, a little need as well 
 be said about the use of proof and deduction 
 after the data of the science have been correct- 
 ly named, the experiments cleanly performed, 
 14 
 
TERMINOLOGY 
 and the chief and subsidiary facts arranged in 
 proper order. "This fact proves," it is some- 
 times said, and about such statements the clans 
 of science divide and dispute. There are cases, 
 of course, where this is true, but one needs to 
 be wary. All the sciences are of two kinds on 
 this score, — those which are altogether deduc- 
 tive and those which are slightly deductive and 
 mostly empirical. Pure mathematics is the 
 only strictly deductive science; all the others 
 are of the latter class. 
 
 15. Let us elucidate this difference. Deduc- 
 tion starts with principles, which when in- 
 volved, produce results and conclusions which 
 are new in the sense of not being apparent 
 from the original principles, but are "gener- 
 ated" by the interaction of statements. This 
 does not mean that some stater behind the 
 statements does the generating, but that the 
 empirical properties of a logical statement alone 
 furnish the parts out of which the new formula- 
 tion is made. For the stater behind the state- 
 ments is but a mass of unformulated material, 
 which must come out and "lie flat on the brush" 
 before it can be claimed to have the persistent 
 being of generating things. An empirical 
 science, such as geology, on the other hand, 
 first gets principles from observation, and in 
 15 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 seeking to deduce other principles from them, 
 MUST ALWAYS FIND FACTS OR TERMS 
 which will satisfy the conclusions arrived at. 
 All else is talking in the air. The chemist or 
 the physicist can see how the conclusions of his 
 statements ought to reach this or that end, but 
 only the residues in the retort or the pattern of 
 crystallization on the stone shows him what 
 the upshot of his statements should have been. 
 To a larger extent than the physicist or chem- 
 ist will admit, also, most deduction in his 
 science is just plain memory, — "it will happen 
 again because it has happened before," sums up 
 much of the claims for deduction in most of 
 the natural sciences. Their power lies in the 
 control of conditions, rather than in the ability 
 of their conclusions to produce the facts in a 
 presto manner. 
 
 16. From all this it can be seen that the 
 words "logical" and "factual" are not synon- 
 ymous. Arguments about any matter may en- 
 tirely jump the track and evaporate in non- 
 sense. They may, again, run parallel, and, in 
 that amount of a science which survives time, 
 they do. But one needs always to be alert for 
 the fact that will exactly fit his statements as 
 well as for the statement that will exactly fit 
 his facts, facts being rather hard data and not 
 16 
 
TERMINOLOGY 
 
 to be treated with impugnity. For while any 
 statement derived from logic has a certain 
 validity, and may be satisfied with terms from 
 some sort of trans-experiential realm, unless 
 the terms can be plainly exhibited to all comers, 
 they should form no part of the body of the 
 science. 
 
 17. The use of the proper language and the 
 understanding of just how much of the lan- 
 guage one uses is pertinent to the matter in 
 liand is so important for psychology, that I 
 shall give on the next few pages samples of 
 speech containing psychological as well as non- 
 psychological material, some of which will be 
 analysed for the student, the remainder being 
 left for him to analyse for himself. At first, of 
 course, he will not be able to see the full drift 
 of it, but with further study, new insight will 
 come. To many this will seem a curious and 
 backhanded way of beginning the study of 
 mind, for most text-books start in with an eluci- 
 dation of neural processes and the gospel of 
 dendrites, — things which only the post-mortem 
 anatomist experiences first hand. These anal- 
 yses we shall undertake are of things far more 
 of the now and always, and the claim is here 
 made that it is with this sort of thing that 
 psychology is after all mostly concerned. Let 
 17 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 US analyse the following statements in common 
 use: 
 
 1. The action of the heart is purely me- 
 chanical. 
 
 Psychological interest is here focussed on 
 the word "purely." First compare the above 
 statement with what is left with this word 
 omitted. 
 
 The action of the heart is mechanical. 
 
 The action of the heart is purely mechanical. 
 
 Logically it is the same, unless "purely" 
 means "nothing but" or some such equivalence, 
 gratia verborum, but psychologically this word 
 adds one of several items to the situation, (a) 
 It delays the utterance of the adjectival predi- 
 cate "mechanical," and in so doing intensifies 
 the effect of that predicate, and by the delay it 
 causes also allows the first five words better 
 to be assimilated and perceived as a unit. Or, 
 (b) the word "purely" insinuates, by the tone 
 of voice used in uttering it, something not alto- 
 gether complimentary to the heart action and 
 we are immediately affected by this bias in it. 
 
 2. Where did you go yesterday? 
 
 The answering of this question implies a 
 memory. The full psychological putting of the 
 matter would be something like this. The sen- 
 sations of what objects and movements are 
 18 
 
TERMINOLOGY 
 restored to you upon the mention of a time 
 twenty-four hours previous to this? Of course 
 as a statement in psycholog>% it is very con- 
 densed, and does not ask by what means the 
 memory is preserved, whether by vision, au- 
 dition, movement, or speech; nor whether there 
 is clarity or obscurity in the content of con- 
 sciousness provoked by the question. 
 3. I have never heard of it. 
 We are concerned here wdth three things: 
 (a) the past tense of the verb "hear," (b) the 
 meaning of "never," and (c) the use of the prep- 
 osition "of." As for the first of these, it refers 
 again to memory; the second differs from the 
 word "not" by temporal extent, drawn-outness, 
 — "not" meaning a single point of time, while 
 "never" means many "nots" in a continuous 
 stream. The word "of," harmless as it sounds, 
 is indicative of a very complex relationship. 
 Whatever "it" means, whether an engagement 
 between two lovers or a "cat's-paw" in calm 
 weather, is surely a datum mentionable, hap- 
 pening somewhere, and more or less related to 
 other things. But we do not say "I hear of a 
 noise," as the Greek language says it; we say 
 hear a noise, see a light, smell a rose; and only 
 a few verbs in English are followed by the prep- 
 osition in comparison with many other lan- 
 19 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 guages dead or living. What, then, do we mean 
 by "hear of it," in referring to a thing past? 
 Why, this, that the observer himself told it, and 
 we heard him tell it, and thus we use the word 
 "of" for things that come to us in relays rather 
 than directly and immediately. But this does 
 not mean that the expression "think of it" is ex- 
 plained in the same way. "Think" is not al- 
 ways followed by a preposition, nor are the 
 words which follow the prepositions necessarily 
 things relayed to the thinker. We shall take 
 up this matter vigorously when we come to the 
 old bugaboo, "consciousness OF." 
 
 4. I like this ever so much more than that 
 one. 
 
 Liking is something peculiarly psychological, 
 and is the starting point for choice. It cannot 
 be referred to logic, for people "like" that which 
 all arguments show is false, dangerous, and sure 
 to produce an aftermath of ill. "Ever so 
 much more" is an attempt to make a scale of 
 values, and is an example of the only "mental" 
 arithmetic there is. "Ever so much more," also 
 differs from plain "more" by the greater num- 
 ber of syllables intervening between "this one" 
 and "that," allowing the voice to add emotion 
 to the comparison. 
 
 20 
 
TERMINOLOGY 
 5. "Sicklied o'er with a pale cast of 
 thought." 
 
 This line from Hamlet is an hyperhole in 
 rhetoric, while it is a case of empathy in 
 psychologj^ Empathy differs from personifi- 
 cation in that it neither capitalizes the import- 
 ant word, nor does it imply as much animation 
 as the latter. Thus, empathically, a mountain 
 bears up the sky above it, while in personifica- 
 tion the mountain is a man whose shoulders 
 are overburdened with the weight of sky they 
 support. Two of the words in this expression 
 are strictly poetical, — "sicklied" and "o'er." 
 "O'er" is used for smoothness and fine sound, 
 while "sicklied" is a "new" word, psychological- 
 ly. It arose from the mood background which 
 dominated the author. The word "cast" is 
 used to express inertness, referring at the same 
 time to the fixity and whiteness of plaster; the 
 sound of the w^ord also helps to convey one of 
 these meanings. The above expression, taken 
 as a whole and apart from the context in which 
 it was uttered, need not have any clear, whole- 
 some meaning at all, for it was not uttered as 
 any thing to be formally defined or analysed. 
 Certain sayings are indexes of moods, and 
 moods are not always possible or profitable to 
 press for their signification. 
 21 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 
 18. The student will analyse for himself as 
 well as he can the following expressions: 
 
 1. Fatima cigarettes are "Distinctively Indi- 
 vidual." 
 
 2. The price of this waist is $2.98. 
 
 3. He completely forgot himself. 
 
 4. Friends, Romans, countrymen, lend me 
 your ears. 
 
 5. By merit raised to that bad eminence. 
 
 6. I have a good mind to do it. 
 
 7. The spirit is willing, but the flesh is 
 weak. 
 
 8. Why, then the devil give him good of it. 
 
 9. He thanked his stars. 
 10. I only hope it is not so. 
 
 19. Out of the preceding examples much 
 more could be derived than has been indicated, 
 but the analysis of a thing as it stands is quite 
 different from an historical account of its de- 
 velopment. This item has particular point in 
 psychology, for here one has to explain how 
 things started as well as why they continued 
 and what they are now. This, of course, brings 
 one face to face with what are called causes, 
 and every science is supposed to have ready- 
 made answers to every question beginning with 
 "why" that can be formulated. And while this 
 is a logical matter entirely, this much needs to 
 
 22 
 
TERMINOLOGY 
 
 be said about it at this point. Some questions 
 beginning with "why" are answerable, and some 
 others are not. If the reader will look into a 
 text-book of Logic for the "fallacy of many 
 questions" and study the examples there given, 
 he will understand that every question begin- 
 ning with "why" is answerable only when it 
 contains one question and only one. Moreover, 
 only such things have a cause as can be ana- 
 lysed where at least one of the elements de- 
 pends upon a temporal sequence for its specific 
 effect in the whole to which it contributes. 
 Furthermore, there are in every science what 
 are called "elements," "primary facts," "irre- 
 ducible first principles," and to ask the reasons 
 for them in that science is to ask a question to 
 which there is only an "old wives' fable" for 
 an answer. 
 
 20. This can be directly shown by the fol- 
 lowing: As the writer understands it, the dif- 
 ference between mathematics and the other 
 sciences is Time. There is, indeed, no mention 
 of time in either Geometry or Algebra. Their 
 principles, it is true, were found out by cul- 
 tured gentlemen in this or that decade or cen- 
 tury, but there is no t or t- in mathematics as 
 there is, for example, in physics. Time being 
 the one fundamental, independent variable of 
 23 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 science, the sciences are logically arranged in 
 point of the amount of dependence they show 
 upon this temporal factor. In such an arrange- 
 ment the sciences based on psychology are at 
 the extreme end of the list, farthest from mathe- 
 matics, — that is, from the mathematics which 
 deals with general data and does not need to 
 discount its answers upon meeting with the 
 empirical situation. Less and less intric- 
 ately involved in the temporal dilemma 
 than is psychology are first the biological 
 sciences, next the chemical, and next the 
 physical. In the mathematical sciences, 
 which come next, time is replaced by the sort 
 of activity which generates the number system. 
 As the time element increases in complexity in 
 the scale of sciences, also, less and less do they 
 become reducible to a mathematical or equa- 
 tional form. Now the questions propounded to 
 the physicist which ask "why" are explained 
 either by reference to mathematics, or by the 
 elements of his own science; those put to the 
 chemist are referred either to his own data, to 
 those of physics, or those of mathematics; and 
 so on throughout the list. But not every "why" 
 in any one science is necessarily referred be- 
 yond that science. Some things are chemical, 
 and that ends it. Thus, also, some things are 
 24 
 
TERMINOLOGY 
 psychological and nothing else, and the answer 
 is vanity that attempts to find a first cause for 
 them in the realm of things remote. The above- 
 mentioned order, also, of the sciences is not 
 reversible. One does not go to psychology, for 
 instance, to find out the fundamental facts of 
 geology, nor to the realm of esthetics for the 
 fact that there are but three laws in Newton's 
 formulation of the activity of moving bodies. 
 
 21. Many writers call these "elements" or 
 "primary facts" assumptions, and mean by that 
 word something not altogether complimentary 
 to the science. It is not here to be argued why 
 these should not be accepted as assumptions, 
 with all the unlovely flavor that has accrued to 
 the word; but, on the other hand, it must be re- 
 membered that no one starts a science, and that 
 an assumption is not the first thing sought for 
 by scientists. All science is chasing flying 
 game, and no fair-minded scientist "assumes" 
 except for the purpose of tentatively arranging 
 facts in a probable order. 
 
 22. The principal thing, also, in answering 
 the question "why," (which is far less important 
 than the questions "what" or "how"), is not to 
 explain things away by reference to something 
 remote or forgotten, but to point out the func- 
 tional dependence of various things on each 
 
 25 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 other. Cause is no longer a live word in 
 science. Only naive minds seek for a cause. 
 Just as the words "must" and "ought" have 
 finally lost their zest, even in Ethics, so the word 
 "cause" is nothing to conjure with today. Cause 
 always had the ultimate meaning of "who made 
 it?" and "making" is nothing with which science 
 has to do. That vis viva or Anstoss which for- 
 merly was said to make a stone in the air fall 
 to the ground, or make a man follow theft with 
 theft, is not any longer harbored in scientific 
 thinking. Functional dependence has replaced 
 it entirely, and by functional dependence the 
 following things are meant: (1) that all nat- 
 ural laws are laws of description and not of 
 necessity, and (2) that those laws are exhibited 
 only when terms are free to be involved in the 
 relations they entail. If a room is full of il- 
 luminating gas, only when there are persons in 
 it will there be any deaths from asphyxiation; 
 similarly, a nation will be successful in war 
 only when patriotism is backed by a purse. 
 "Only when," "when this, then that," "the con- 
 ditions being fulfilled,"— these are the salient 
 words in science today. Cause is nothing to be 
 wept or argued over; the question "why" is 
 sheer myth and biography. 
 
 23. It is by means of this principle of func- 
 26 
 
TERMINOLOGY 
 tional dependence that the empirical sciences, 
 incUiding psychology, become deductive as well. 
 We shall see later on why, (apply the func- 
 tional meaning from now on to this word), 
 psychology is not a science of the "shreds and 
 clippings of other things," nor a study of illu- 
 sions or of brain perspirations, but a study of 
 the functional dependence of mind upon the 
 objects within reach of the sensitive and per- 
 ceptive organs on the one hand, and of the ac- 
 tion of auto-catalysed nerve colonies within the 
 body on the other. A detailed explanation of 
 the meaning of these expressions will be given 
 in succeeding pages. Suffice it to say here, that 
 the term "functional dependence" does not 
 mean any chain-system of fore-ordained hap- 
 penings, but rather the readiness of storehouses 
 of energy to discharge upon the presentation 
 of an excitant sufTicient to arouse such dis- 
 charge. The old idea of a cause (usually cap- 
 ital "C") too often meant a subtle, monistic 
 push, which in the same way and to the same 
 end brought about every change or effect. The 
 idea of functional dependence, on the contrary, 
 assumes no such gratuities; things which stand 
 in a functionally dependent relationship need 
 have nothing in common, — no subtle, interpene- 
 trating power which on the one hand allows, 
 27 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 and on the other hand brings to bear, the act- 
 ing force. Every change, to be brief, comes 
 about by virtue of an unstable equilibrium; but 
 there are equilibria of continuity as well as of 
 position. This is the same as saying that ev- 
 erything in the cosmos, unless it is manifest- 
 ing this or that property exhaustively, is not 
 fixed in that way of acting indefinitely, but is 
 subject to any other combination of things 
 strong enough to "capture" it. To use a crass 
 figure, — if it does not do well in one occupation, 
 it is free to enter another. 
 
 24. What bearing this has upon psychology 
 will at once be seen, if we consider that all such 
 discussions as the "dualism of mind and body," 
 "the eff"ect one mind has upon another," or "the 
 way mind controls the body," have absolutely 
 no meaning under the concept of functional de- 
 pendence of mind both upon its objects and 
 upon the neural processes which grow toward 
 certain independent tendencies within the body. 
 In this book no word will be said either for or 
 against the dualism of mind and matter, for or 
 against the way minds control bodies, and the 
 like outworn doctrines. Mind shall be re- 
 garded as a cluster of objects and a colony of 
 functions, and not as some hidden, uncanny 
 ghost that roosts on a certain gland in the cere- 
 28 
 
TERMINOLOGY 
 brum, dabbling her feet in a puddle of lymph. 
 The reader may be disappointed at not being 
 able to while away a few more hours of his 
 life with these old, old questions of such great 
 moment. But a science does not begin with 
 that sort of dawdling, nor is it furthered by per- 
 sisting in it. We shall treat of mind empirical- 
 ly, as something that is just as patent as bricks 
 and barley, and for such a treatment the reader 
 is invited to be fully prepared. 
 
 25. It is now time to define the subject of 
 this book — consciousness. Consciousness is the 
 objects within responsive range of the nervous 
 system, and the manner in which they are re- 
 sponded to by the nervous system. It is thus a 
 content, or various kinds of things more or less 
 organized together, as well as degrees of closely 
 knit or looser organization. The most accurate 
 as well as the most brilliant putting of this idea 
 is to be found in Edwin Holt's "The Concept of 
 Consciousness," Chapter IX, from which 1 shall 
 quote at some length, (p. 168) "Let us suppose 
 that a plane mathematically true but one milli- 
 metre thick passes perpendicularly through the 
 roots, trunk and branches of a tree; and let us 
 suppose all the molecules of chemical sub- 
 stances belonging to the tree and included with- 
 in the section, to be simply enumerated. It is 
 29 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 clear that this collection is an actual part of 
 the tree, and yet one that in itself would con- 
 tribute very little to the life and development 
 
 of the tree Yet this would not be a 
 
 random collection, for it would include none 
 but vegetable molecules included within the 
 intersecting millimetre plane. The plane, with 
 what it includes, is exactly defined in terms of 
 the entire tree and the position of the plane. 
 Merely from the point of view of the vital or- 
 ganization of the tree would this collection be 
 a random one. The law that defines the lie of 
 the plane is not among the laws that define the 
 anatomy and vegetable economy of the tree. 
 Such a collection may be called a 'cross-section.' 
 Similarly the prime numbers are a 'cross-sec- 
 tion.' 
 
 "Again, if the plane is a geometrical one of 
 no thickness and passing horizontally through 
 the trunk, it defines by its intersection a col- 
 lection of contours that is a true portion of the 
 tree, but one that is even less significant for 
 the total economy of the tree than the collec- 
 tion previously defined. A complete knowledge 
 of it would be next to no knowledge of the tree 
 as a whole. It would be, roughly speaking, 
 merely a circular contour containing an infinity 
 of minor contours." 
 
 30 
 
TERMINOLOGY 
 
 "Now the cross-sections so far adduced are 
 not merely insignificant for the whole of which 
 they are a part, but they are also rather insig- 
 nificant for any system, howsoever inclusive. 
 There are other cross-sections, however, which 
 do have a prime significance in and for some 
 manifold more complex and inclusive than the 
 manifold through which the cross-section is 
 initially made. Thus the sum total of all 
 whales living in certain given waters is a cross- 
 section of the sea that is significant for the 
 whalers who are trying to locate and gather 
 them in. The various shafts and levels of a 
 mine are a cross-section of the mountain, and 
 of import to the shareholders; it is the business 
 of the engineer so to direct the workings that 
 this cross-section shall coincide with that other 
 cross-section that is made by the vein of ore. 
 
 "Once again, a navigator exploring his 
 course at night with the help of a searchlight, 
 illuminates a considerable expanse of wave and 
 cloud, occasionally the bow and forward mast 
 of his ship, and the hither side of other ships 
 and of buoys, lighthouses, and other objects 
 that lie above the horizon. Now the sum total 
 of all surfaces thus illuminated in the course, 
 say, of an entire night, is a cross-section of the 
 region in question that has rather interesting 
 31 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 characteristics. It is defined, of course, by the 
 contours and surface composition of the re- 
 gion, including such changes as take place in 
 these (specially on the surface of the waves), 
 and by the searchlight and its movements, and 
 by the progress of the ship. The manifold, so 
 defined, however, is neither ship nor search- 
 light, nor any part of them, but is a portion 
 (oddly selected) of the region through which 
 the ship is passing. This cross-section, as a 
 manifold, is clearly extended in space, and ex- 
 tended in time as well, since it extends through 
 some watches of the night. This cross-section, 
 furthermore, is in no sense inside the search- 
 light, nor are the objects that make up the 
 cross-section in any wise dependent on the 
 searchlight for their substance or their being. 
 "Now cross-sections that in many respects 
 resemble the one just described are found in 
 any manifold in which there is organic life." 
 "It is to certain features, and not to others, of 
 its environment that the living organism re- 
 sponds, and the group of things to which it 
 thus reacts constitutes a cross-section manifold 
 that is of prime importance to one who is study- 
 ing the organism and one that is of the most 
 vital importance, of course, to the organism 
 itself." 
 
 32 
 
TERMINOLOGY 
 (p. 173) "We have always known, of course, 
 that plants 'respond' in a general way to sun- 
 light, air and water. More recently we have 
 become acquainted with processes that are 
 more appropriately named responses. Roots 
 do not grow downward by chance nor by any 
 pre-established harmony, nor yet by instinct, 
 but they respond mechanically to the attraction 
 of gravitation, nor is this merely due to the 
 general weight of the root, since by a compar- 
 able mechanism the stems grow contrarily to 
 gravitation. The roots are positively geotactic 
 or barotropic, while the stems are negatively, 
 and many kinds of branches transversely baro- 
 tropic. Similarly, and by virtue of a distinct 
 mechanism, the various parts of a plant respond 
 variously to light of different colors and in- 
 tensities, growing toward or away from such 
 light: they are variously heliotropic. There are 
 similar responses in vegetable organisms to 
 thermal, chemical and even electrical stimuli, 
 and we are gradually coming to know that these 
 involve a well-differentiated and oftentimes a 
 highly elaborate mechanism of response. Now 
 clearly in the case of a given plant these baro-, 
 helio-, thermo-, chemo-, and galvano-tropisms, 
 these several mechanisms of response, define a 
 certain cross-section of the plant's environment 
 33 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 that is comparable with the cross-section de- 
 fined by the searchlight. , . . And these 
 forces, be it noted, to which the plant responds 
 are distinct from the mechanism by which the 
 response is effected; they are a portion of the 
 environment." 
 
 (p. 178) "In the case of vegetable organisms 
 we found that the sum total of entities in the 
 surrounding physical system t ) which a plant 
 responds, forms an intricate and in some re- 
 spects an interesting cross-section of such 
 physical system. And from the point of view 
 of the plant, clearly, this effective environment 
 is all the environment that it has; and this en- 
 vironment is distinct from its own organic 
 structure. We saw, furthermore, even in our 
 earliest cross-sections, in inorganic manifolds, 
 that the cross-section often so cut the manifold 
 as to reveal the conceptual or neutral nature 
 of physical objects; the velocities of all flying 
 projectiles, and the section of a tree cut by a 
 mathematical plane, were such cross-sections. 
 They are true parts of the projectiles and the 
 tree, respectively, yet they are not ponderable 
 physical bodies: they are certain neutral com- 
 ponents of these bodies. The same is a fortiori 
 true of the cross-sections defined by plant re- 
 sponses. The leaflet bends toward a ray of 
 34 
 
TERMINOLOGY 
 light (a physical energy, if you will), but it re- 
 sponds more rapidly to a more intense ray, and 
 to a very weak ray it will not respond at all. 
 It therefore responds not merely to light, but 
 also to intensity. In responding differently to 
 different grades of intensity, it defines grades of 
 intensity as well as light energy, as components 
 of its effective enviromental cross-section. Now 
 whatever light may be, grades of intensity are 
 
 not physical objects And these grades 
 
 of intensity are not in the plant, certainly no 
 farther in than the surface of the leaves. In a 
 similar way plants respond in all their tropisms 
 very specifically to direction 'as such'; and di- 
 rection is a neutral entity. It too is not in the 
 plant. And if we were thus to study plant re- 
 sponse in detail, we should find that very few 
 indeed of the factors to which the plant re- 
 sponds are such entities as would ordinarly be 
 said to have 'physical' existence; although both 
 the plant and its environment are plain, phys- 
 ical objects." 
 
 (p. 182) "We have seen that the phenomenon 
 of response defines a cross-section of the en- 
 vironment without, which is a neutral mani- 
 fold. Now this neutral cross-section outside of 
 the nervous system, and composed of the neu- 
 tral elements of physical and non-physical ob- 
 35 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 jects to which the nervous system is respond- 
 ing by some specific response,— tliis neutral 
 cross-section, I submit, coincides exactly with 
 the list of objects of which we say we are con- 
 scious. This neutral cross-section as defined by 
 the specific reaction of reflex arcs is the psychic 
 realm : — it is the manifold of our sensations, per- 
 ceptions, and ideas: — it is consciousness." In 
 this conscious cross-section, furthermore, let it 
 be understood once and for all, that everything 
 ever called mental, psychical or any other term 
 referring to knowledge, awareness, feeling or 
 judgment is unequivocally and thoroughly con- 
 tained. If there be mystery, also, it is right 
 there; as well as dreams, hallucinations, and 
 the other twilight phenomena of psychology. 
 Those "having minds, and therefore claiming 
 an a priori peek into their nature," are none the 
 less referable to this concept of consciousness 
 for an explanation of their sayings and think- 
 ings. For while we select for our laboratories 
 only those having gumption and grandfathers, 
 a complete psychology accounts satisfactorily 
 for the whole gamut of human interests, affec- 
 tions and disaffections. Furthermore, we shall 
 not say anything about the 'purely' mechanical 
 or the 'purely' mental; things will be just plain 
 mechanical and phiin mental, instead. Hard 
 36 
 
TERMINOLOGY 
 atoms and soft souls may suit the tempera- 
 mentally minded, but whatever vanities science 
 may exhibit, temperament is not one of them. 
 However, psychology being the realm in which 
 temperaments operate, no grudge need accom- 
 pany the task of explaining them. 
 
 26. We are then not going to study capital 
 M mind, nor are we to treat of consciousness as 
 an inner imp. We shall treat of it as a vary- 
 ing content, as a shifting process, and as a man- 
 ifold with a highly unstable center of refer- 
 ence, — the pronoun I. The language by which 
 we express our thoughts has been shown to be 
 now too abbreviated, now too redundant and 
 oftener than either, too erratic to be depended 
 upon for scientific purposes without pruning 
 and redirection. Our naive view of mind, also, 
 must for a time be passed through the fine 
 sieve of analysis in order that confusion of 
 words be avoided. This is not a materialistic 
 psychology, but a realistic one which is here 
 presented. In the next chapter it will be shown 
 why materialism is too theological for scientific 
 purposes. A scientific psychology has neither 
 intention nor power to deny the existence of 
 anything which humanity has found meaning- 
 ful, but there is no law in the universe which 
 guarantees that accuracy shall be evolved from 
 37 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 chronogenetic thinking, nor that what we are 
 wont to say about ourselves need have any 
 truth in it at all. 
 
 Bibliography. 
 
 Holt, E. B., "The Concept of Consciousness," 
 especially chapters VI, VII, VIII and IX. 
 
 James, W., "Essays in Radical Empiricism," 
 especially Chap. I, "Does 'Consciousness' Ex- 
 ist?" and Chap. Ill, "The Thing and its Rela- 
 tions." 
 
 Mach, E., "Contributions to the Analysis of 
 the Sensations," especially the "Introductory 
 Remarks. Antimetaphysical." 
 
 38 
 
CHAPTER U. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 1. Whether one asks "what" the mind is, 
 "how" it acts, or "why" it does thus or so, the 
 answer is to be sought for only in analysis. For 
 all such questions insinuate either a content or 
 a process not yet discerned in its parts or rela- 
 tions, and only an answer that is explicative will 
 suffice to enlarge our knowledge of the subject. 
 The test of analysis also rests upon its giving 
 such answers as will clarify rather than be- 
 cloud the matter under investigation, but it 
 scarcely needs to be said that the goal arrived 
 at does not gain its validity from squaring with 
 naive expectation. 
 
 2. Psychological analysis concerns only the 
 data of psychology. We do not analyse 
 glaciers by it, nor do we seek to discover by its 
 use the laws of thermo-dynamics. But the col- 
 ors of glaciers may be analysed by psychological 
 means without any reference to the speed of 
 those masses of moving ice which are colorful 
 as well as cold. In the same way, the manner 
 in which the laws of thermo-dynamics were 
 found are material for psycholog>', since the 
 human beings who struggled to know them rea- 
 
 39 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 soned from the data as minds are always wont 
 to reason. Notice these cases of such analysis. 
 
 (a) Orange is a mixture of red and yellow, 
 while violet is a mixture of red and blue. The 
 position of these colors in the spectrum tells 
 nothing about their properties when abstracted 
 from such a series, Imt by means of the eye 
 alone we detect something both reddish and 
 yellowish about orange, and something both 
 reddish and bluish about violet. On the con- 
 trary, we cannot analyse either green, yellow, 
 blue or red into anything else, and so for phy- 
 chology these are ultimate hues. 
 
 (b) One closes his eyes, and tells as well 
 as he can the direction from which a sound 
 is coming. By turning his head this way and 
 ttihat, by pausing and carefully listening, he 
 Anally decides upon the general direction by 
 means of his ears and movements alone. Then, 
 under the same conditions, two sounds are 
 employed which he is to distinguish as being 
 equally or unequally far away, symmetrically 
 or unsymmetrically placed with reference to 
 the head, and so on. Each time he attends, es- 
 timates and judges by the same means and thus 
 is said to analyse the situation psychologically. 
 
 (c) While we are sitting in a hotel lobby, a 
 scuffle occurs on the street outside and some 
 40 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 one is badly hurt. The matter becomes of legal 
 proportions and our testimony is required to 
 determine the exact status of the offense. We 
 saw something, heard something, and were 
 somewhat disturbed over it, but just what oc- 
 curred that we can swear to is not quite clear 
 and plain. Court-room testimony follows, and, 
 by reason of agreement among veracious wit- 
 nesses, there is a verdict. The process of re- 
 calling what happened, how it developed, and 
 why the case ended as it did is entirely a 
 psychological matter, and the results are vainly 
 appealed to other than psychological beings, — 
 justice or injustice being the residue of seeing, 
 hearing, remembering, feeling, intending, and 
 so on, with which no physicist, chemist, astron- 
 omer or other scientist is able to deal with first 
 hand at all. Psychology exhausts it utterly. 
 
 (d) An old and wealthy uncle does not 
 shake off the mortal coils soon enough to suit 
 his prospective legatees. They each know what 
 his will provides for them, but, fearing that he 
 may change his mind any moment, try to get 
 him committed to some asylum in order to gain 
 their present ends. But the uncle is individual- 
 istic, and far from allowing himself to be beck- 
 oned unresistingly away, fights the attempt by 
 legal means. Alienists are called in and his 
 41 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 mind is thoroughly tested by analysis to prove 
 or disprove the charge made against him by 
 his relatives. Whom else should they call in 
 except psychological analysers? Psychological 
 data are the ultimate things in the case, — the 
 uncle's habits, temper, typical manifestations 
 of all kinds, — and when these are sifted over 
 and over again to a conclusion, there is no ap- 
 peal beyond it. The uncle is what he does, 
 says, feels, and the like, and the result is total- 
 ly in and of psychology. 
 
 These will suffice as a preliminary to other 
 analyses which must be delayed until later 
 topics in the book introduce them. 
 
 2. Just what analysis properly is may be 
 shown by the following quotation from E. G. 
 Spauding's "A Defense of Analysis," from the 
 "New Realism" (p. 161) : 
 
 " Given a whole which, for one rea- 
 son or another, is known to be analysable, then 
 analysis reveals parts, but it also reveals the re- 
 lations which relate and so organize these parts 
 into some kind of a whole. Consider also those 
 properties which, in some cases, the whole, as 
 a whole, may have different from those of the 
 parts. Of course, analysis reveals these also. 
 The analysis may be incomplete in the sense 
 that there may be further parts, that is, parts of 
 42 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
 parts, which are not yet revealed; but, if ana- 
 lysis is incomplete only in this sense, that is, if 
 there have been revealed parts, their organizing 
 relations, and, in some cases, the possibly 
 specific properties of the whole, then the ana- 
 lysis may be said to be adequate. It exhausts 
 the whole up to the point that it reaches, in 
 that, while the specification of all that the 
 analysis reveals does not specify the whole, the 
 whole, nevertheless, is the parts and their prop- 
 erties and the relations relating the parts and 
 the possibly specific properties of the whole. 
 There may be further parts of parts, more prop- 
 erties, more relations to be revealed, but this of 
 itself does not invalidate the position that the 
 properties of the parts and the generating re- 
 lations which are revealed are quite as real as 
 is the whole which is analysed, are not con- 
 tradictory of the whole, and exist, or subsist, in- 
 dependently of the discovery and of the speci- 
 fication." To apply this to a case in point in 
 psychology, the analysis of a so-called "mental" 
 situation into object and response, or into con- 
 tent and process, does not make it "physical" 
 or "neurological" to the exclusion of its being 
 "psychological"; no more than does the analysis 
 of the pictorial representation of a triangle into 
 three straight or three curved lines make absurd 
 43 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 or impossible the mention of triangularity along 
 with the mention of the lines. This also is a 
 vital point: that the psychological simplicity of 
 things is too often mistaken for logical simplic- 
 ity; for it shall happen that ever so much more 
 than we suspect is blended into a single sensa- 
 tion, emotion, or perception, which only ana- 
 lysis can reveal. But we shall find that there 
 is nothing "mental" behind the psychological 
 wholes we analyse into parts, or those psy- 
 chological things we split into their attributes. 
 The "mental" is an organizing relation, separ- 
 able from the organized elements, and in no 
 sense bewitching them when out of such rela- 
 tion. 
 
 3. There is today in some quarters much 
 opposition to the analytic method in psychol- 
 ogy. It is said to invent rather than discover 
 the parts and relations it finds. This hails from 
 that era of lazymindedness when a "mental" 
 substance and a "physical" substance were said 
 to irrevocably dichotomize the universe; from 
 which substances bodies and souls, matter and 
 mind were held to emanate. Two great un- 
 knowns were hypothecated, — unknowns, mind 
 you, and yet mentioned with all the toplofty 
 grandiloquence of philosophy's worst. Objects 
 and thoughts were then simply the scruff of 
 44 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
 these mentioned unmentionables in which rea- 
 son, value and stability were forever snugly 
 sequestered. To be sure, death has been kind 
 enough to remove some of the upholders of this 
 doctrine from our sight, while the advance of 
 general intelligence has revealed the unpleas- 
 ant, ulterior motives lying behind it. 
 
 4. Even today a timidity characterizes some 
 of those who defend analysis. One defender to 
 whom I could specifically refer asks why he 
 shouldn't use it, since even its defamers employ 
 it in their attacks. Another avers that for 
 "scientific" purposes one must assume the 
 analysability of all subject matter, — for since 
 minds are free, they are therefore even at lib- 
 erty to consider themselves purely or grossly 
 mechanical, just as they choose. Both of these 
 defenses are all too timid, and the flank attacks 
 they allow and invite would be in both cases 
 deadly, if undertaken. Let us surmount these 
 arguments as we have done former ones. 
 As far as the first is concerned, it is a 
 lame excuse to claim the victory on a 
 draw. If defamers of analysis use it, of 
 course they involve themselves in a net, 
 but that is hardly the point. The point is 
 whether they have used it expressly to get in- 
 volved in the net, for if this can be shown, we 
 45 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 need only account it another defeat for verbal- 
 ism. And verbalism is just what it always turns 
 out to be. This is, indeed, being almost too 
 generous; for having to extricate from their 
 own "mire of logic" those who wilfully fall 
 therein, would not be half so pathetic if it 
 might only show in this case that analysis had 
 been a word misunderstood, — a name much 
 taken in vain. To show where analysis is ef- 
 fective, one has only to point to those cases 
 where it neither controverts itself nor fails to 
 reveal the parts or relations it chases hot-foot 
 after. 
 
 5. As for the second of the above state- 
 ments, it misses the whole point in the matter 
 under discussion. Analysis defines neither 
 freedom nor continuity. It arises merely from 
 the wholesome suspicion that the safest and 
 wisest thing to do is to continually regard as 
 ultimately compilex that which appears psy- 
 chologically simple. It grants, for instance, 
 that looking at a color and saying nothing about 
 it may be a single, illy defined state of mind. 
 But that is not the only sort of color experienc- 
 ing we find in the cosmos. Artists and physi- 
 cists mention their colors and thereby get in- 
 volved in the game of talk; and, curses or no 
 on the man who discovered logic, the mention- 
 46 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
 ing of colors even throws light upon the ex- 
 periencing of colors without mentioning them 
 at the time! Besides, according to this wisp of 
 a sentence about "mental freedom," almost any 
 sort of declaration one felt eager to make might 
 have a place in the sun. 1 vaguely recall read- 
 ing somewhere that the word "Adam" (the gar- 
 den variety) means "a dam" or "obstruction," 
 whence is proven that "mortal mind" is very, 
 very impervious to spiritual influences. There 
 was a day, I am told, when word-juggling such 
 as this passed for logical astuteness, 
 
 6. My own defense of analysis is as follows. 
 Even if there should be in everything one at- 
 tempts to analyse two series, — one, an indefinite 
 continuity, the other a discrete discontinuity; 
 the first giving it thinghood out of ineff"able 
 substance, the second giving it thinghood out 
 of elements in relation, — only the latter being 
 reduced to parts by analysis, — then it is high 
 time to enquire w^hat is the difference between 
 them in the aggregate which they form. If, 
 for example, there are two coats in the coat I 
 wear, — the one made up of the pieces of cloth 
 sewed together, and the other a something 
 which as a concept or idea is not destroyed 
 though the coat be cut up into patches, — then 
 of course what I analyse in this and in other 
 47 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 situations is made of parts, and not that coat 
 "which was from the beginning and is now." 
 But even if a concept, or idea, say that of a 
 coat, can be shown to differ from another con- 
 cept, say that of a card-case within the coat 
 pocket; and if their differences can be made 
 specific, then what is different must differ in 
 nameable ways. And if the difference between 
 concepts is such a one as this, and it is, then all 
 concepts are as analysable as are "things," for 
 one concept will differ from another in the 
 same way as one "thing" from another. Thus 
 the "mental" and the "physical" are both equal- 
 ly mentionable and analysable. We shall see 
 presently of what their parts are made. And 
 if any one says that the science of psychologj^ 
 does not come within three miles of explaining 
 his mind, I shall only remand him either to 
 poetry for solace, or to these words of William 
 James for reproof: "Things of an unexperi- 
 enceable nature may exist ad libitum, but they 
 form no part of the material for philosophic 
 debate." Again, if it is said that one loses most 
 of the specific properties of the whole in the 
 midst of analysis, and has but "shreds and 
 clippings" for his pains, one then but sees what 
 a powerful logical weapon it is, for by means 
 of it he can find out, as his analysis proceeds, 
 48 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
 just where this or that property of an organ- 
 ized whole vanishes from the complex. So that 
 along with the "immoral value" of destruction 
 comes the cognitive value of locating and 
 trouncing the "mysterious." 
 
 7. Rebounding flabbily from these argu- 
 ments, the adversary once more challenges: 
 "What you should do is to 'synthesize' rather 
 than analyse; build up rather than destroy in 
 your scientific endeavor." We reply with a 
 double answer. Things are first found synthe- 
 sized, but the fusion and confusion thereby en- 
 tailed is quite opposed in many cases to the 
 purposes of science. You cannot make a Bot- 
 any out of the chronogenetic order of trees and 
 flowers; indeed, you can just passably make a 
 garden. And this: the synthetic, temporal or- 
 der of nature is not the only synthetic order 
 possible; nor is it the order, whether or no, 
 which makes any science deductive. So that, far 
 from avoiding the issue, the scientific analyst 
 accepts the task of two lifetimes, — both that 
 of following the chronogenetic syntheses of na- 
 ture and that of planning the way for that 
 synthesis which shall best suit the practical 
 concerns of subduing nature for his own spir- 
 itual ends. 
 
 8. Psychology, as the science of the con- 
 
 49 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 scious cross-section, is stated in the same way 
 as any other science, namely, by the use of 
 terms in relation. For example, Boyle's Law 
 states that, "For the same temperature the 
 density of a gas is directly proportional to the 
 pressure acting upon it." Now as it stands, the 
 chief relational aspect is contained in the 
 words "directly proportional." Also as it 
 stands, the terms are these three: (1) For the 
 same temperature, (2) the density of a gas, and 
 (3) the pressure acting upon it. But (2) and 
 (3) are alone immediately related to the ex- 
 pression, "directly proportional"; for when the 
 temperature varies, another relation replaces it. 
 But in psychology, one frequently finds that 
 the expression "other things being equal" (such 
 as equal temperatures in physics) does not often 
 suffer itself to be used in a formula. That is 
 to say, that one difference between physics, as 
 a fairly deductive science throughout, and psy- 
 chology as a science deductive only in point of 
 large masses of terms in relation being con- 
 strued as units of functionation, is that we can- 
 not confine the "proportionality" of terms to 
 that immediate relationship in which we seek 
 to embed them. For instance, one can predict 
 the actions of a crowd better than those of a 
 single individual, on account of the motives 
 50 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
 there operative having a maximum of impera- 
 tive urgency. The problem of three celestial 
 bodies perplexes the astronomer, while three 
 "busy bodies" gives the psychologist no concern. 
 It is the business of psychological analysis to 
 find the extent to which deduction of one kind 
 or another pertains to the whole diameter of 
 the conscious cross-section. 
 
 9. The use of relations demands that they 
 be distinguished from one another. We saw 
 in the first chapter what one meaning of the 
 "of" relation resolved itself into. "Having" is 
 also a complex set of relations and functions all 
 telescoped together in language. One differ- 
 ence between legal and logical form may be 
 here inserted for the benefit of the light it 
 throws upon psychology, — and that is that the 
 law repeats the psychology entailed in a situa- 
 tion by the use of synonyms, rather than it de- 
 fines unequivocally any term or relation em- 
 ployed. To insure the "having" relation, one 
 legally gives, bequeaths, bestows, etc., rather 
 than signifies what all this business specifically 
 means. The number of relations is well-nigh 
 legion, and for many of them our names are 
 inadequate. "Before" has no linguistic differ- 
 entiation when used as a temporal expression 
 from what it has when used as indicating log- 
 51 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 ical priority. Likewise, "next" is used for a 
 spacial as well as a temporal, or other relation 
 without any change in spelling. Such examples 
 could be multiplied ad libitum, but suffice it to 
 say that this condition of inexact definition in 
 language is what makes oratory possible. There 
 are spacial relations, temporal relations, logical 
 relations, and still other relations, not a few of 
 which are psychological; for which, following 
 the example of symbolic logic, fit expressions 
 will be eventually found. But before this is 
 done, we can still point out a few character- 
 istics of relations in general which must be kept 
 in mind in order to understand the logic of any 
 science. As follows: — 
 
 (1) Transitivity. If "R" between x and y 
 indicates that they are in relation, then the re- 
 lation is a transitive one if .tRi/ and yRz togeth- 
 er imply xRz. Otherwise it is intransitive. For 
 example, in learning some complicated opera- 
 tion, such as piano playing, every distinct move- 
 ment or set of movements is serially focal in 
 consciousness. Whereas later on, upon the 
 mere mention of this or that piece of music, 
 consciousness is solely involved in the motor 
 aspect of a tidy performance, the stages of 
 learning having been looped into the co- or sub- 
 
 52 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
 conscious, never to reappear unless aroused 
 through interruption. 
 
 (2) Symmetry. If xRy implies i/Rr, the re- 
 lation is said to be symmetrical. This will 
 have bearing for us in the phenomenon of sim- 
 ultaneous as opposed to successive presenta- 
 tions of a stimulus. Indeed, "before" or "after" 
 in psychology always involves something more 
 complex than at first sight seems. The touch 
 of velvet after the touch of emery paper may 
 arouse one kind of feeling-consciousness, while 
 the result of reversing the process may produce 
 another or even the same kind. Temporal suc- 
 cessions in psychology are very delicate and 
 intricate things to handle. But the very same 
 phenomena are found in other sciences. Even 
 the business of making microscopic slides in- 
 volves an asymmetrical temporal series of in- 
 filtrations. The chef also uses this principle 
 in making butter sauces. 
 
 (3) Correlation. This is of two kinds, or- 
 dinal and mixed. For instance, if there are two 
 series of measurements, 5 and s, the terms of 
 
 which are A, B, C, D, E, F N and a, b, c, d, 
 
 e, f....n respectively, and if Aa, Bb, Cc, Dd, 
 etc., are specifically coupled together in this as 
 well as in the reverse order, we have a case of 
 ordinal correlation. In some cases of paired 
 
 53 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 comparisons with steady and constant subjects, 
 such a correlation has been approached for psy- 
 chology in a limited series. Oftener, indeed, 
 the mixed correlation is derived, which consists 
 in the coupling of any term of one series with 
 any term of the other in any order. 
 
 In all cases of relations, the domain of the 
 relation has to be considered. Consciousness 
 of we shall see has but a limited use. Likewise 
 only a few series will be transitive, symmetrical 
 or ordinally correlated. What series they are 
 as well as the precise meaning of these rela- 
 tions in psychology should be at all times clear- 
 ly kept in view. 
 
 10. Before sorting the conscious cross-sec- 
 tion into its different compartments, I shall 
 quote from an article by R. B. Perry entitled 
 "A Realistic Theory of Independence," found in 
 "The New Realism," to lay the ghost of some 
 common notions in regard to the nature of com- 
 plexes. This will be the last mention of sub- 
 stances in this book. The quotation starts on 
 page 107 of the above mentioned book with an 
 analysis of certain further relations common 
 to the material of psychology. 
 
 "Whole-part. — A whole is said to be de- 
 pendent on its parts, — on what it contains, and 
 can be divided into. It is worth while to in- 
 54 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
 troduce at this point a distinction between 'ma- 
 terial' and 'formal' instances of the whole-part 
 dependence. The first is exhibited in the re- 
 lation between the present city of London and 
 Trafalgar Square. . . . The second is ex- 
 hibited between a city and its streets. . . . 
 In other words, a material relation is a relation 
 between particular values of variables, while 
 a formal relation subsists between the variables 
 themselves. The dependence of whole on part 
 may be of either type. 
 
 "Part-whole. — Parts are said to be depend- 
 ent on the whole to which they belong when 
 these wholes are 'organic' Thus the hypoth- 
 enuse of a right-angle triangle is . . . de- 
 pendent on the definition of the right-angle tri- 
 angle." ". . . its magnitude is determined 
 by its interrelation with other parts, such as 
 the opposite angle and its adjacent sides." 
 "Similarly, an organ or member in the biolog- 
 ical sense is said to be dependent ... on 
 the integrity of the organism to which it be- 
 longs. 
 
 "But such dependence would appear to be 
 reducible to dependence of other types" . . . 
 "we are virtually naming a part for its partici- 
 pation in a whole." "Or it may be construed 
 as meaning that a part cannot be a part, that is, 
 55 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 belonging to a whole, without the whole. But 
 this is equivalent to saying that the complex 
 relationship of part and whole depends on the 
 whole as one of its terms. And this is a case 
 of dependence of whole on part, and not of 
 part on whole." 
 
 "The dependence of members of a living 
 organism may be disposed of in the same man- 
 ner. The respiratory system cannot be a vital 
 function without the whole organism. But 
 this is merely to say that it cannot belong to an 
 organism without an organism to belong to. 
 To make the dependence of the part evident 
 one must describe the part as part-of-whole. 
 But the dependence of member-of-organism on 
 organism is not a dependence of part on whole, 
 but rather a dependence of whole on part. It 
 asserts the dependence of a complex relation- 
 ship on one of its terms. 
 
 "Thing-attribute.— [This] relation presents 
 no novelties in connection with the matter of 
 dependence." "... where a thing is re- 
 garded as dependent on its attributes, it is 
 either 'made up' of them, or defined 'in terms' 
 of them. . . . Both would be instances of the 
 whole-part type of dependence as described 
 above." (This has an insistent bearing upon 
 
 56 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
 the analysis of sensations which we shall take 
 up in the next chapter.) 
 
 ""Attribute-thing. — The question of the de- 
 pendence of attributes on the thing to which 
 they belong, resembles the question of the de- 
 pendence of part on whole. Red cannot be 
 attribute of the rose without the rose; nor 
 would it bear the peculiar relation that it does 
 to odor, form, and growth of the rose, were it 
 not for the nature of the rose as a whole. But 
 this will, I think, turn out to mean either that 
 a rose is a rose (redundancy) ; or that the red- 
 rose relationship depends on 'rose' as one of 
 its terms (whole-part) ; or that the redness of 
 the rose is determined by its age, chemical 
 structure, nutrition, etc. (causation). We may 
 therefore dispense with the attribute-thing re- 
 lation as a primary type of dependence. 
 
 ''Causation. — " . . . Causality is a ma- 
 terial relation between two complexes, derived 
 from a primary formal relation between their 
 constituent variables." (N. B. This is what 
 I meant in the first chapter by saying that ev- 
 ery science was a case of applied logic.) "Thus 
 if v=gt, for all values of these variables, then 
 any given velocity (f), is dependent on the con- 
 stant of gravity {g), and some magnitude of 
 time (0- The formal relation among the vari- 
 57 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 ables is called the 'law,' and the material deter- 
 mination of the values of the variables, as pre- 
 scribed by the law, is causation. 
 
 ". . . it is customary to limit the adjec- 
 tive 'causal' to laws which contain time as a 
 variable; and to treat time in the positive or 
 forward direction as the independent variable." 
 
 "It is to be remarked that causation is con- 
 ditioned by the law. In other words, it takes 
 place only within the system which the law de- 
 scribes; [N. B. the use of "only when" in the 
 first chapter] and can be attributed to a com- 
 plex only when the complex is identified as 'a 
 case of the system. . . Causes and effects 
 are thus interdependent within the given sys- 
 tem, or under the law. These determine their 
 behavior under certain conditions, but do not 
 prove that the conditions themselves are nec- 
 essary. For it is possible that a given complex 
 should be accounted for in terms of one system, 
 and yet conform to the requirements of another 
 system as well." Or not conform, equally well 
 either. It does not need to be an illusion, or a 
 thing to be apologized for that some things are 
 psychological and nothing else. My uncle's 
 house can well be mortgaged and part of my 
 summer night's dream world at the same time. 
 
 "Reciprocity. — It is customary to use the 
 58 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
 term 'reciprocity' to express a relation of the 
 same type as causation, but without the same 
 emphasis on temporal antecedence and conse- 
 quence. It is evident that the relation among 
 the various values of the variables of a law is 
 mutual. It is possible not only to predict the 
 future, but also in like manner to infer the 
 past. Similarly, it is possible to infer simul- 
 taneities, as e. g., in the case of the configura- 
 tion of the planetary system, or the co-presence 
 of extension and color in the visual field. It is 
 not even necessary that time should enter into 
 such calculations at all; as is illustrated by the 
 interdependence of spacial magnitudes as for- 
 mulated by geometry. 'Reciprocity,' then, may 
 be taken to mean the mutual determination of 
 values of variables under the law, where the 
 factor of time-direction is not essential." 
 
 11. Now the very reason substances have 
 had their little day and cease to be in enlight- 
 ened science is just because the pursuit of re- 
 lations to their lair has shown not only that 
 they are neither mental nor physical, but also 
 that they are the very tissue of the organiza- 
 tion of the cosmos. It is these which cement 
 the elements of things together, and are not 
 substantial in any sense in which that old pair 
 of disreputable cronies. Matter and Mind, were 
 59 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 latterly regarded. The significant differences 
 in the universe are relational, not substantial, 
 and not "mental," either, in the sense of being 
 generated, altered and dominated by thinking. 
 Relations are indeed the hardest data of the 
 cosmos, and inasmuch as they are the core of 
 every fact, must be treated with something 
 else than other-worldly-mindedness if one is to 
 treat with them at all fairly. I promised in the 
 last chapter to show why materialism is too 
 theological a doctrine for scientific purposes. 
 This is the pat place for doing so. The "logic 
 of relations," into which we have entered here 
 at some length, would serve in physics to show 
 that there are some things which are not phys- 
 ical or material even in that science, and that 
 those things (relations) are quite more import- 
 ant to the universe than the miscroscopic and 
 Oh so hard! brick-bats which the old-line ma- 
 terialists claim to be the ultimate stuffing of 
 the cosmos. Every substance-theory of the uni- 
 verse is theological. The absolute idealist and 
 the absolute materialist differ only in the 
 amount of personality they ascribe to the prime 
 substance behind everything. Ego, egg, atom, 
 ether-squirt, ether-vortex, hole-in-the-ether, — 
 whichever of these one chooses, it is only a 
 different name for something hidden and mys- 
 60 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
 terious,— something supposed to add profundity 
 to the faith by virtue of its remoteness and awe- 
 inspiring character. As we approach nearer to 
 the data of psychology, also, it will be seen that 
 all of these notions must be discarded. "Spirit- 
 stuff" is as relational as "matter," and when 
 one analyses even "souls," one finds no hidden, 
 mysterious thing there at all. At this the stu- 
 dent may well throw up his hands, wondering 
 what there is, if matter and mind are equally 
 to be pushed aside. 
 
 12. It is now time to sort the data of the 
 conscious cross-section. By consciousness we 
 shall mean every object within range of the 
 nervous system, — whether it be our neighbor 
 planet, a finger nail, a mathematical problem, 
 or a call from starving India; as well as every 
 neural process going on entirely within the epi- 
 dermis, — such as the gastric and other splanch- 
 nic functions, spinal perceptions, or cerebral 
 functlonations; in addition to which are the re- 
 sponses from body to object, no matter how far 
 distant or how abstract it is. But among this 
 host of objects and responses only a few are 
 within instant report, — only a few items of the 
 possible content are taken up and dealt with 
 furtheringly or effectively. Now, bare notice, 
 without naming or further handling, as well 
 61 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 as such items barely noticed, we shall call 
 awareness or sub-focal consciousness. Those 
 we fix upon and deal with furtheringly, we shall 
 call focal or attentive consciousness, as well as 
 so denominate the processes involved. Those 
 contents and processes which are the next less 
 clear than awareness or sub-focal consciousness, 
 we shall call the co-conscious; while those proc- 
 esses only (not contents, for the contents cease 
 with co-consciousness), which serve especially 
 to others than ourselves to elucidate the status 
 of these first three elements, we shall call the 
 sub-conscious; meaning also by the term that 
 they are evermore present as physiological 
 processes defying any kind of elevation to fo- 
 cality. While the term un-conscious shall be 
 used to indicate those physiological processes 
 which have less and less specific and directly 
 traceable influences upon the more focal di- 
 visions of consciousness. Language normally 
 functions for but the first three divisions enum- 
 erated above. Abnormally, however, it func- 
 tions for the fourth, but never for the fifth. 
 This, I take it, is the logical division of the 
 conscious cross-section into its grand divisions; 
 and it must be noted that it makes no more 
 provision for genetic psychology than a gen- 
 eral treatise owes to such a subject. 
 62 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 13. The above analysis may be briefly 
 termed focal distribution. What become focal 
 are, in the main, three items, — sensation, per- 
 ception and emotional complexes. Now sensa- 
 tions illustrate the attribute-thing relationship, 
 perceptions illustrate the part-whole type of 
 organization, while the emotional complexes il- 
 lustrate a special type of attribute-thing-func- 
 tion. Furthermore, sensation is found in the 
 sub-focal, focal and co-conscious divisions, per- 
 ception is found in these also with the sub-con- 
 scious added, while the emotional complexes 
 are chiefly concerned with the sub-, co-, and 
 focal consciousnesses. The causal sequence of 
 these will be shown in the special chapters 
 treating of them, as well as the succession of 
 the various focalities of consciousness owing 
 to qualitative and quantitative elements in the 
 sensations, perceptions and emotional com- 
 plexes to be presented. 
 
 14. From this it can well be seen that one 
 starts with nothing "simple" in psychology. In 
 the next chapter sensations will be analysed 
 into more than a dozen elements. Perceptions 
 will turn out to be sensations organized into 
 structures which have meaning when there is 
 motor readiness to act somehow in regard to 
 them. Again, in the emotional complex it will 
 
 63 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 always be a situation to which we shall refer, 
 and not to a conscious atom to explain the 
 "mental" aspect of the items discussed. Every 
 bit of our living and moving is immensely com- 
 plicated. But this does not make it impossible 
 for psychological "simples" to be found. They 
 will not, however, be stated by the use of nouns, 
 but of verbs, adjectives and adverbs. It is the 
 manner of the response to the environment 
 which defines psychology, — not the things re- 
 sponded to. Also remember this: that the en- 
 vironment referred to in various situations 
 means neither "that mysterious 'external' world 
 beyond the limits of our skin," nor does it mean 
 the same in each mentioned case. Often the 
 environment is within the body. When we say 
 we have a toothache, it certainly means that 
 the vocal organs are functioning the response 
 of the general somatic condition to a special 
 environment centered in the tooth. Individual 
 environments also frequently occur. From a 
 large group of things we select only specially 
 interesting features as material for speech and 
 memory. For example, the brute mass of a 
 football field and the players is first grossly 
 cross-cut by the two sympathetic teams of 
 "rooters" opposed to each other in the grand- 
 stand; and again curiously cross-cut by any in- 
 64 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 dividual witness whose special interests center 
 in one or more of the padded giants in the turf. 
 An account of the football game, if complete, 
 would then be the sum-total of all spoken or 
 unspoken judgments, emotional or otherwise, 
 that those preparing for it, witnessing it, and 
 remembering it would make. However com- 
 plex the physical situation there might be, the 
 psychological aspect would outdo it ten to one. 
 To ask which of the football games as reported 
 is the real one, has no meaning for psychology. 
 It is the task of our analysis to determine the 
 order in which things get known, as well as 
 the succession of impulses which determine the 
 selection for speech and recall of several items 
 out of a possible multitude. 
 
 15. It is clear that in the realm of psychol- 
 ogy more newness continually develops than in 
 any other field. As we develop from childhood 
 to age we get a personality, a bias, a way of em- 
 ploying the material of the cosmos in such a 
 manner that there arise from our own nervous 
 organization certain dependent sets of functions 
 which point our doings in ways that are "new" 
 with regard to the material they respond to. 
 Within our own bodies, also, there are colonies 
 of nerve fibres which act upon and are reacted 
 to by other colonies, in such a way that rcfer- 
 65 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 ence cannot be made solely to the common, un- 
 critical names for one's environment to explain 
 why our actions are thus and so. This also 
 must be kept clear: that if the responses to their 
 objects by one nerve colony is of one kind, and 
 the responses by another nerve colony is of 
 another, that the responses of the first colony, 
 say, — to its objects, — may be so modified by 
 the intercolonial responses that the result will 
 be "new" and unpredictable from the mere 
 knowledge of the way in which either colony 
 alone would have reacted to the situation. It 
 is the task of analysis, again, to label correctly 
 all the "new" responses, — those primes in the 
 series of psychological events. 
 
 16. Much perplexity often arises over the 
 question of the position of things in mind. 
 "Where is a tooth ache, especially its disagree- 
 ability?" "Where is the pleasure of a good 
 meal?" are typical of the questions sometimes 
 asked. This question ultimately concerns the 
 nature of series, and I submit this as an answer. 
 Some series are in time and space, while some 
 otiiers are not. Those in time have position 
 in time and those in space have position in 
 space, while those in both have two positions. 
 But when one asks where the discomfort of a 
 toothache is located, or where hope, fear and 
 66 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
 joy may be found during their office hours, the 
 answer is that there is at least one more order 
 than the temporal or spacial order in psychol- 
 ogy, and that is the order of knowledge. ("For 
 space and time are continuous, while knowledge 
 is not") Only this order is not independent, as 
 are the orders of time and space, but dependent 
 partly on them and partly also upon the logical, 
 deductive orders of things, which are neither 
 temporal nor spacial. For example, the vir- 
 tuous kings of England, if named in the order 
 of their virtue, would not perhaps come in the 
 same succession as they did chronologically to 
 the seat of the Confessor. The order of their 
 virtue could not be deduced from this other 
 order any more than the order of their sen- 
 iority upon ascending the throne. The orders, 
 or cross-sections, of these British monarchs 
 would show no ordinal correlation. And when 
 any other order than the spacial or temporal 
 order is involved, "position" cannot mean 
 something geographical, any more than the 
 phrase "in my mind" needs to refer to the head 
 or the bone-bound mass of wrinkled gray mat- 
 ter within it. Now, the toothache is not in the 
 front sidewalk, to be sure, nor is the pleasure 
 of gourmandizing in the handle of the knife 
 that carves the truffied grouse. In both of these 
 67 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 cases we have series to consider, and if the 
 toothache or the dinner-delight is anywhere, it 
 is in that manifold which is defined either by 
 the terms of tooth, nerves and rest of body; or 
 grouse, unobtrusive waiter and the other fine 
 business of eating. Its position in these com- 
 plexes somewhat compares to the meaning of 
 "never" in contrast to "now." 
 
 17. There is but one more thing to which I 
 wish to call attention before we pass on to the 
 next chapter. It is the use and meaning of 
 "and" in psychology. We shall find that a sen- 
 sation as well as a perception, a sentiment, a 
 will-act, a soul, is a complex, — a number of 
 things more or less organized together. They 
 bear to one another in psychology among oth- 
 er things, the "and" relation. Now this "and" 
 is one of the psychological simples mentioned 
 before, — one of the things which is psycholog- 
 ical and nothing else. It is the first one men- 
 tioned, and it is to be expressly noted and filed 
 away for reference that it is not a "noun," but 
 a "conjunction." We shall get the verbs and 
 adverbs by and by. Here we may see one of 
 the points at which logic, psychology and gram- 
 mar coincide, — namely the letters making the 
 word "and." But spelling here serves a func- 
 tion that analysis must undo. The grammat- 
 68 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
 ical "and" is of course a special form of the 
 logico-psychological "and," being exclusively 
 neither nor all of both; it is something ele- 
 mentally linguistic." The grammatical "and" 
 is sometimes expressed by a comma. This 
 again means a pause in the voice, or, logically, 
 an enumeration without inference. Grammar- 
 ians call this repetition, — as for example, "Hun- 
 dreds and thousands of dead and wounded." 
 Variation or dijRference with insinuations is an- 
 other meaning; as "there are lawyers and law- 
 yers." Or, the attributive relation may be 
 poetically expressed, "thy fair and outward 
 character," i. e., outwardly fair character." Se- 
 quence is inferred, or causation, — "I say 'go,' 
 and he goeth." It sometimes means "or," as in 
 the expression, "taxable for state and county 
 purposes." In the expression, "I shall try and 
 learn," it means "in order to." In symbolic 
 logic the same sign is used for both "or" and 
 "and"; the interpretation and reading of the 
 sign being dependent upon its place in the sub- 
 ject or predicate. Now the use of "and" in 
 psychology may, possibly, be any one of the 
 above uses at times, but the peculiarly original 
 psychological use of the conjunction "and" is 
 as follows: Consciousness is both a content and 
 a process, and the contents, which are all 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 analysable into non-mental material as well as 
 are the processes, exist together and arouse im- 
 pulses in a way that is not found elsewhere. 
 The combination, the organization of these con- 
 tents and processes we shall call, for brevity, 
 an exhibition of the "with-for" relation. And 
 let us add that it is not mysterious. If a realis- 
 tic psychology needs any justification, it will be 
 found in the development of this principle 
 throughout this book. 
 
 Bibliography. 
 
 Perry, R. B., "A Realistic Theory of Inde- 
 pendence," in "The New Realism," by E. B. 
 Holt and others. 
 
 Spaulding, E. G., "A Defense of Analysis," 
 in "The New Realism." 
 
 Holt, E. B., "The Concept of Consciousness," 
 especially Chapter X, "The Empirical Proper- 
 ties of Consciousness." 
 
 70 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 
 1. ". . . there are not sensations and 
 perceptions and their objects. There are ob- 
 jects, and when these are included in the mani- 
 fold called consciousness they are called sen- 
 sations and perceptions." . . . "In sensation 
 the neutral qualities, the so-called 'secondary 
 qualities,' come and go as more or less unre- 
 lated elements: while in perception they enter 
 and depart in groups — smaller or larger. Doubt- 
 less few, if any, qualities (sensations) enter 
 consciousness absolutely single: they too seem 
 to come and go in larger or smaller masses. 
 But . . . the term sensation is usually ap- 
 plied to them so long as the mass of qualities 
 that enter together has within itself little or no 
 logical structure or unity, no internal relation- 
 ship : while in perception the groups have some 
 logical coherence." This again from Holt with 
 many thanks. 
 
 2. Why do we habitually say, "I have a sen- 
 sation OF color"? Or why, again, do we as- 
 sert our recollections OF people, our feelings 
 OF sadness, our consciousness OF this or that? 
 Is it because we feel a gulf deeply fixed be- 
 
 71 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 tween ourselves and this world of ours which 
 so constantly stays with us? Or is it a defect 
 of language, and has a little wall-eyed preposi- 
 tion the power of dropping a veil over our eyes, 
 thus making us like unto the Turkish ladies 
 who are calamitously and at all times cut off 
 from the bright realities? 
 
 3. Two possible explanations are open and 
 we shall consider them both, (a) The Lin- 
 guistic approach. Usually such expressions can 
 be avoided by the use of other words. "I have 
 a sensation of blue," means something diif erent, 
 does it or not, from the expression, "I sense the 
 blue object"? "I recall him," means what dif- 
 ferent from, "I have a recollection of him"? 
 "1 feel sad," is or is not the same as to say, "I 
 have a feeling of sadness"? Or when the psy- 
 chologist says, "It is in my consciousness," does 
 he not mean that he is conscious of it? These 
 all seem to be the same thing in a different 
 form, allopathic or homeopathic, just as you 
 wish. But if language can be twisted in such 
 a manner, then not in language itself can be 
 found the solution. The OF-ness has as much 
 right to be primary as does the more direct ex- 
 pression. The problem is still unsolved, — it 
 remains a dilemma. Let us see whether this 
 antique dilemma hath not a third, rudimentary 
 72 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 horn, the grasping of which will lead us per- 
 manently out of the pinch. 
 
 4. (b) That the thing may be a relayed 
 form of consciousness does not solve the dif- 
 ficulty. All consciousness might turn out to be 
 rp-presentative, rather than immediate, the re- 
 layings differing only in complexity. We shall 
 then appeal to logic as our old standby. The 
 names of things are not the things, which every 
 one will gladly admit, for the traveler lost in 
 the desert cannot slake his thirst by the repeti- 
 tion of the word "water." If it had been so, 
 the problem of the relief of the poor could never 
 have been a university subject for which the 
 student gets full credit. But to use the word 
 "water" is not necessarily indicative that it is in 
 the mouth of the user at the time. "Water" is 
 the conventional English symbol for a liquid 
 which, in some countries, is used to slake the 
 thirst, — a word to which sensorial wetness per- 
 taineth not. And the "meaning" of the word 
 "water" is dependent in such a case upon what 
 others will do when it is uttered. "Meaning," 
 in psychology, at least, lies in what will be done 
 in a situation involving the name of the thing 
 meant. Meaning is therefore motor; it refers 
 to functional sequences, and is an example of 
 the "with-for" relation. Now, if words are re- 
 73 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 
 lational, just as consciousness is relational, in 
 that it is generated out of responses to an en- 
 vironment by a nervous system, then the old 
 bugaboo of re-presentation need no longer be 
 of any trouble to us. Every idea consists of 
 positionless parts or properties of a thing. The 
 use of the preposition in such expressions as 
 "feeling o/," "consciousness of," etc., simply in- 
 dicates, — barring the linguistic fallacy, — that 
 the thing so mentioned is one of the elements 
 making up the conscious manifold, and nothing 
 else. Otherwise, the expressions "unclear," "a 
 minor element," or "sub-focal" provide for all 
 cases in which it is ever properly used. The 
 logic of relations thus accounts for certain ele- 
 ments in genetic psychology, — only the psy- 
 chological aspect in language frequently swal- 
 lows up the logical one. For when the logical 
 orders get distorted by the introspective con- 
 sciousness, and are reinterpreted by way of it, 
 they suffer the lapse of their scientific validity. 
 The introspective order is not the logical one, 
 and the introspective consciousness is not in any 
 sense the primary, immediate fact of conscious- 
 ness. It is belated consciousness, and when too 
 often referred to is indicative of an incipient 
 division in personality. 
 
 5. The reason, then, for attaching validity 
 74 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 to the expression, "consciousness o/," is one of 
 "informal" logic. But this does not apply to 
 those relational states in which, as Professor 
 Perry says, we "surround and surmount our 
 past, incomplete experience." To say "I judge 
 that I was wrong," is certainly a case of "con- 
 sciousness of"; but the point to be made is that 
 the "o/"-ness" in such an expression ipso facto 
 defines its own non-immediacy or non-focality 
 in consciousness. Furthermore, the point is to 
 be made that one cannot have this o/"-relation 
 occurring twice in succession. There is no "of- 
 consciousness-o/"" anything, if by the expression 
 we mean to link co-ordinate states of conscious- 
 ness together. / may recall "that" my uncle 
 mortgaged his house "when" 7 was a mere child, 
 but the Vs and the my are very different things 
 each time, bearing in psychology a subordinate 
 relation to each other, and a non-reciprocal re- 
 lation as well. Bluntly spoken, naively taken, 
 these expressions have nothing dangerous in 
 them, but the naive is not the systematic except 
 by a coup de Dieu. The logic of introspection 
 is informal logic: as Matthew Arnold would 
 say, it "is eloquent, is well, — but is not true!" 
 
 6. We have been using the term conscious- 
 ness as something already built up and guar- 
 anteed by responses, but not as something not 
 75 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 yet functioned for or organized out of nature. 
 Introspection is not the primary, immediate 
 fact of consciousness because it is found only 
 in a consciousness set a-brewing, and in this 
 brew we find ourselves long before we first 
 make wise inquiry after the nature of our being. 
 For the "introspectional feltness" of a thing is 
 no more sufficient to explain the origin or per- 
 sistence of a thing, than the condition of being 
 a debtor, will ipso facto satisfy one's creditors. 
 Now, having cleared the logical grounds of 
 all expected difficulties, we are ready to begin 
 a systematic analysis of consciousness. We 
 shall first treat of sensations and perceptions, 
 and then of responses and meanings, including 
 speech. Next we shall see what emotions and 
 feelings are, following this with an explanation 
 of interest, purpose and the creative faculties. 
 Finally, there will be a brief but wide study of 
 the ramifications of psychology throughout our 
 practical, daily life. For psychological things 
 are what we have to live with, if we live at all; 
 indeed, other than by a perspicuous use of psy- 
 chology, there is no escape from certain an- 
 noyances but by death, and this latter business 
 is often a great inconvenience to our relatives. 
 For them psychology remains the proh'em, sur- 
 viving even if we do not. 
 76 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 7. This is the program: First to analyse 
 objects from the standpoint of their being 
 sensed, and then to analyse the physiological 
 sensing process. By this means we shall answer 
 all three of the questions regarding conscious- 
 ness, — what, how, and why. From the first 
 standpoint it will be seen that there are two 
 kinds of properties or attributes which give the 
 sensation its thinghood: essential and inessen- 
 tial. These will be dealt with in the above order. 
 Every one of the essential properties at least 
 will be furthermore seen to be a series, and the 
 sensation to be a cross-section of those terms 
 of each such series which, while the sensing 
 process is going on, are contingent in time and 
 space. But corresponding terms in each series 
 need not be present at the same time. For ex- 
 ample, shapes, colors and distances are all 
 series, but the moon which is at a certain point 
 on the linear space series distant from the ob- 
 server may be at no comparable point in the 
 shape or color series, nor yet in the bigness 
 series. Even some of these series are prime to 
 each other. Furthermore, while the terms of 
 these series making the sensation are contin- 
 gent, they need have none but the loosest func- 
 tional interdependence, not yet having the 
 structure requisite for the formation of per- 
 77 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 ceptions. It is thence that some of the in- 
 formal logic of certain kinds of consciousness 
 is derived. It is not here, however, that one 
 finds any original "consciousness stuff"; for 
 these various series are not generated by the 
 consciousness relation, even if one should bol- 
 ster up his argument by saying that continued 
 fixation of a color appears to reduce its bright- 
 ness. 
 
 8. Thus sensations have no substance, — 
 they are not the ultimate brickbats of existence. 
 But, added to this, two warnings. This does not 
 mean that we, as human beings, are possessed 
 of a special stability or specific gravity which, 
 by comparison, makes the rest of the world in- 
 constant, filmy and tottering; nor that when I 
 rap on the table before me and say: "This is 
 one of my realities," that I deny that the table 
 is hard. Absolutely the contrary, beyond cavil 
 and argument ! A series can well be a series of 
 hardnesses as well as one of preferences or di- 
 vorces, and with this statement the philos- 
 ophical program of this book must close. 
 
 9. Consciousness was defined for us as both 
 a content and a process; some of its elements 
 are likewise of this twofold character, and sen- 
 sations are such elements. For instance, if 
 someone holds up a patch of red in front of me 
 
 78 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 and I see it, the red color is my content of con- 
 sciousness, while the action of the retinal nerves 
 guarantees the continuance of the sensing proc- 
 ess. The retinal nerves do not become red, nor 
 is it a reddish neural process w^hich is going on, 
 — it is a red-sensing process. However ,on the 
 content side, we have a red sensation, for while 
 there is a functional relation between the neural 
 action and the patch of color, there is an iden- 
 tical one between the object and the content of 
 consciousness. In our discussion of visual sen- 
 sations further on, it will be seen why, in the 
 case of the color-blind person, the content is 
 always, regardless of optical defects, to be as- 
 serted of the object. For psychology, an object 
 is something that can stimulate, just as a rubber 
 ball is something that will bounce, but the com- 
 mon name of the object is by no means a suf- 
 ficient catalogue of its functional possibilities. 
 If one were to enumerate all the things a certain 
 object would do, he would then, but not before 
 then, have a respectable estimate of what a 
 sensation is. To completely exhaust it would 
 require that it be, first exhibited; second, 
 enumerated as to its properties; and lastly, de- 
 fined as to its reaction possibilities in all situa- 
 tions where its effects made a difference to the 
 outcome. 
 
 79 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 
 10. But no dismay need accompany the 
 reading of this last statement. The cases where 
 it does make a difference are limited and 
 known; at least if not fully known, known as 
 to inveterate trend. The series has been plotted 
 to its bounds, and whatever we lack is a term 
 or two within the known range, if, indeed, we 
 lack anything. Eighteen such terms, or attrib- 
 utes of sensation exist; seven of these are es- 
 sential, while the remaining eleven are inessen- 
 tial. The whole eighteen never exist at the 
 same time, it being a temporal impossibility, 
 but whatever of them do exist at any instant 
 or pulse of time, define the sensation for us, 
 and at the same time exhaust it. Some of them 
 are temporal, others spacial attributes; some 
 are neither spacial nor temporal, but quantita- 
 tive or qualitative instead: while all of them 
 refer either to the content or the functional side 
 of consciousness. Membership in one of these 
 classes does not exclude the possibility of mem- 
 bership in another, but no single attribute is 
 found in all six classes. 
 
 11. The Essential Attributes of Sensation. 
 (1) Modality. This is a functional attribute, 
 
 referring to the sense field operating. There 
 
 are no nameless sensations; every object is 
 
 functioned for by some specialized group of 
 
 80 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 cells, — the organ and the intra-neural connec- 
 tions; sight is one modality, sound is another, 
 pain is another, and so on. There is, further- 
 more, no transition possible from one sense 
 field to another; a prime relation exists between 
 them. And while modality is functional, it is 
 not quantitative, but qualitative. Ether waves, 
 which produce lights, may be just another kind 
 or degree of vibrations from those producing 
 sounds, but they are even thus multifarious 
 enough in their quantitative or formal relations 
 to be called qualitatively different. Modality 
 is not spacial or temporal either, — it is qualita- 
 tively functional, and that alone. 
 
 (2) Quality. This attribute refers to such 
 things as colors, tastes, smells, tones, and the 
 like, for every sensation is not only taken up 
 by some sense organ, but within each modal 
 range are various qualities; in some cases, such 
 as tastes, very few, while in the case of colors, 
 exceedingly many. Qualities are intra-modal, 
 and as such, exhibit transition in some cases, 
 but not in others. Thus a saline solution may, 
 if the quantity of the solvent be increased, be- 
 come a burning sensation, but never sugary or 
 sour. Likewise, with the decrease in the pro- 
 portion of the solvent, no other taste will be 
 induced when the salty one ceases to be ef- 
 81 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 fectual. Nevertheless, pure distilled water 
 tastes slightly sweet. Quality is of course a 
 non-spacial and non-temporal affair; it is a 
 physical and meta-physical question as to 
 whether it is ultimately quantitative. Ulti- 
 mately for psychology, however, it is not. 
 
 (3) Intensity. This word refers both to 
 content and function in sensation. Every sen- 
 sation has its own specific intensity, — it is some- 
 where in the qualitatively intensive series. This 
 series is non-temporal and non-spacial. Inten- 
 sities cannot be added together arithmetically to 
 produce a sum, just as no number of undersea- 
 soned dishes at a dinner will give the requisite 
 flavor to it, no more than will the addition of 
 pinks give a crimson. Intensity is always 
 unique. We may not be able to tell how bright 
 a color is, nor how intense the toothache, but 
 the naive speech reaction is pragmatic and not 
 specific, nor are all conscious contents open to 
 steady inspection. As a functional affair, the 
 intensity of sensation refers to the vigor of the 
 transmission of the nervous impulse, — we are 
 stunned by the detonation of the ordnance, or 
 shocked by the electric current. Or, again, at 
 the rose-carnival our own entries were not so 
 red as those of another, though we once thought 
 them superlatively so. Here, intensity is quan- 
 82 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 titative; in many cases measurable by galvano- 
 metric methods. But it is not spacial, and not 
 in point of rise and fall, temporal. 
 
 (4) Latent-period. This term is functional, 
 and means the time elapsing between the ap- 
 plication of the stimulus and the reaction upon 
 it by the sensing organism. It is, therefore, 
 solely a temporal phenomenon. There are also 
 two kinds of latency, — focally conscious and 
 sub-conscious, as follows: Rain falling on a 
 sleeping soldier's upturned face on the battle- 
 field might cause him to cover it without awak- 
 ening, — without his being brought to the notic- 
 ing or naming consciousness. This would be, of 
 course, reflex action occurring after a sub-con- 
 scious latent period. If the soldier awoke, 
 knowing and naming the rain, to defend him- 
 self from the elements, he would be said to be 
 focally conscious of the affair after a latency 
 ending in focal consciousness of the situation. 
 In both of these cases, the latency would be de- 
 fined in temporal terms, — i. e., as a time be- 
 tween the mechanical or chemical onset, and 
 the movements of defense or speech, or both. 
 Latency has much to do with intensity of the 
 functional kind: it is, caeteris paribus, in de- 
 fined situations, inversely proportional to it. 
 
 83 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 But the intensities must be incremental to sliow 
 this. 
 
 (5) Another derivative of intensity is the 
 Threshold. Threshold is the functional ter- 
 minus ad quern of the latent period. If, in the 
 above case, the sleeper had moved to cover his 
 face from the rain, some threshold of arousal 
 would have been reached, the stimulation would 
 have proved effective, and the with-for relation 
 become operative. While being at the end of a 
 temporal series, it is not itself a temporal mat- 
 ter, but rather a prime in that series. Thres- 
 holds are, indeed, measurable, but not usually 
 by means of definite terms in the number series. 
 Sometimes they are defined, as by Titchener, as 
 those points on the intensive scale (mechanical 
 measurements) where the sensation is aroused 
 (noticeably, self-consciously) 50% of the time. 
 This, however, is the better way to define them, 
 — as having membership in a class of positions 
 in the intensive series between those points 
 where the sensation is noticeably aroused and 
 those where it is not noticeably aroused; a de- 
 cent illustration of which would be the area 
 between two intersecting parabolas in the same 
 plane. It is not a point, but an area, not such 
 a quantity as 8, but rather 8 as any place be- 
 tween 7 and 9: the threshold is thus shown to 
 84 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 be a quantitative tendency. Of thresholds there 
 are two kinds, the upper and the lower. They 
 are at opposite ends of the intensive series, and 
 usually exist for both focal- and sub-conscious- 
 ness in every modality. But the operation of 
 the with-for relation certainly largely depends 
 upon the focally-conscious aspect of the thres- 
 hold, or limen, as it is often called. 
 
 (6) Duration is the chief temporal attrib- 
 ute of sensation. It can be applied to the 
 period of time between the onset of the stim- 
 ulus and its withdrawal, to the temporal extent 
 of sub-consciousness, or to the focal-conscious- 
 ness of the sensation. It is also functionally 
 important for the intensity, considered as a 
 functional attribute. We likewise speak cor- 
 rectly of the duration of the latent period. 
 Peculiarly psychological is the report of the 
 duration of a state of consciousness, in contrast, 
 but not contradiction, to the amount of time in- 
 volved in the physical presence of the excitant. 
 
 (7) The chief spacial attribute is Extensity. 
 As an elemental attribute of sensation this cor- 
 responds very much to qualitative intensity. A 
 pin prick is "smaller" in extensity than is the 
 touch of a blunt pencil point; a toothache is 
 also usually "smaller" than a sensation of nau- 
 sea. It is not alone the functioning organ 
 
 85 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 which makes this difference, — not alone the 
 knowledge of the size of stimulus or organ, but 
 an original and irreducible attribute of the sen- 
 sation itself. Now, the extensive magnitudes 
 are not absolute, but relative; they are a series, 
 a scale, and we always make the estimation 
 by employing terms of comparison. We can- 
 not tell how big a sensation is, nor how much 
 bigger it is than another one, but the psychol- 
 ogical number system is of this kind, and one 
 must be forewarned of it. It may well be, also, 
 that the space of psychology is not Euclidian 
 space, but a space very like that of a fourth or 
 even an nth dimension. That it exists cozily 
 along with Euclidian space, however, is scarce- 
 ly to be denied. 
 
 12. To resume and further elaborate these 
 seven essential attributes of sensation. One of 
 them is spacial, extensity; two, temporal, — 
 latency and duration; the rest are neither spa- 
 cial nor temporal,— modality, quality, intensity, 
 and threshold. As regards content, we have 
 quality, intensity and extensity; as regards 
 function, we have modality, intensity, latency, 
 threshold, and duration. Intensity was also 
 shown to be related to both content and func- 
 tion, while the functional character of other 
 things, such as duration and latent-period, may 
 86 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 frequently tend to induce qualitative diii'erences 
 in the content. As attributes of sensation, these 
 seven terms illustrate the attribute-thing rela- 
 tion, mentioned and discussed in the preceding 
 chapter. Duration, linked with intensity, func- 
 tionally construed, as well as latency, refers to 
 the causal relation, including as both do the 
 temporal aspect. Now, while objects are ma- 
 terial, none of these attributes are material, and 
 yet an object sensed is often a material object. 
 But just as physical and chemical analysis finds 
 no brickbat-matter in the universe, neither does 
 psychology: which, however, does not preclude 
 that matter may not be the coagulation of non- 
 material things. I fling the material stone at 
 the material cat, but on the levels of physical 
 and psychological analysis, qualities only tend 
 to displace each other in the above act. The 
 practical cat dies, let us admit; but the cat of 
 analysis is merely redistributed : the stone is his 
 passport to non-Euclidian space. 
 
 13. We now pass to a consideration of the 
 inessential attributes of sensation. The rubric, 
 inessential, does not mean that when they are 
 present, they do not contribute emphatically to 
 the then status of the sensation. They do, and 
 as attributes they are constitutive in no small 
 degree of the with-for relationship of the item 
 87 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 of consciousness called sensation. A harmless 
 analogy is the following: A household may 
 consist of from two to n members, only two of 
 which are essential; but the children, relatives, 
 visitors and spungers all contribute to it, even 
 if by hunger and fracas alone. In the follow- 
 ing sections we shall take up the nature of these 
 attributes from the standpoint of content, func- 
 tion, temporal and spacial significance, as well 
 as relate them to the essential attributes just 
 considered. 
 
 (1) Summation is the term used to indi- 
 cate a number of applications of a stimulus be- 
 fore an arousal occurs. It is a temporal ele- 
 ment, and functional. The heartless fly bites 
 the sleeper's nose a dozen times before he 
 awakens. Each stimulus, as a mechanical or 
 chemical unit, is in itself insufficient to provoke 
 the arousal, but as the result of repetitions near 
 enough together so that the organ does not re- 
 cover between times, summation is produced, 
 the threshold is passed and the with-for rela- 
 tion firmly established in the defense. Bare 
 intensity refers to one application of the stim- 
 ulus; summation, on the other hand, means 
 many (usually identical) applications. Sum- 
 mation plays a large part in quotidian affairs; 
 "till seven times" is an expression based 
 88 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 upon it, as well as the fact that a basehall team 
 loses heart after the fifth or sixth scccessive de- 
 feat of the season, though their playing all 
 along may have been equally poor. The sleep- 
 meter that jangles us back into life in the morn- 
 ing, the final yielding of the maiden sister to 
 the fatality of spinsterhood, — ^these are both 
 summation. To some persons there seems to 
 be a qualitative aspect to summation differing 
 from that of an equable, supra-liminal sensa- 
 tion. It is more extensive, they say, and of a 
 texture more subtle and more elusive; if so, it 
 would be another case of psychological new- 
 ness. As such, this "element" is adjectival. 
 
 (2) The after-image is that part of the 
 object which survives the temporal extent of 
 its application to the sense organ. The phy- 
 sicist witnesses summation in the number of 
 shots a piece of ordnance will stand; he would 
 likewise find positive after-images in echoes, 
 at least in so far as acoustical effects are con- 
 cerned. The "kick" of a gun might also be a 
 sort of negative after-effect. Both of these are 
 illustrated in psychological material, for there 
 are two kinds of sensorial after-images, positive 
 and negative. If we look fixedly at the yellow 
 sun, upon turning away, greenish-blue blobs 
 pepper the landscape. But if we gaze less long 
 89 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 at an illumination of a milder intensity, the 
 original colors are usually more faithfully pre- 
 served in the neural momentum. The after- 
 image is qualitative and quantitative, depend- 
 ing upon many things, namely: intensity, qual- 
 ity, duration, extensity of the stimulus, and in 
 pathological cases upon emotionality, intricacy 
 of the situation, and even upon habitual lying 
 or truth-telling. The after-image is not an il- 
 lusion, but consists, in vision, at least, of but 
 the shape and color of the object sensed, which, 
 by the way, have no position, and may be any- 
 where. 
 
 (3) No sense organ functions without 
 chemical changes within it, and when they be- 
 come such as to impede the transmission of the 
 impulses throughout the system. Exhaustion 
 takes place. This is not the same as fatigue, 
 which will be discussed under emotion. Ex- 
 haustion is a function of intensity, duration, 
 extensity and certain plain qualities, specially 
 smells. Curiously enough, also, the sense-or- 
 gans are attuned to the reception of just so 
 much stimulation, teleologically or not, just as 
 either disputant avers. Leaving before the sym- 
 phony is finished, drowsing through the mis- 
 sionary sermon, sleep, death, quitting college 
 before the degree is conferred, — such cases 
 90 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 usually exist by virtue of a complex in which 
 it is more or less nuclear. We shall discuss its 
 physiological side in a few moments. 
 
 (4) Adaptation appears to be a kind of 
 partial exhaustion, and as such is a derivative 
 of intensity; it is temporal, and in its different 
 aspects, qualitative. In exhaustion the fuse is 
 burned out; in adaptation there is a shunting of 
 the current to a transmission circuit of exceed- 
 ingly low potential. I call adaptation those 
 cases of partial exhaustion where the sensation 
 can be restored through attending to it or ex- 
 pecting it; exhaustion exhibits no such resurg- 
 ences. The wearing of clothes, glasses, and the 
 like, marriage, accepting life or death in the 
 trenches, failing to notice how bad mannered 
 we are, are cases of adaptation. Perhaps the 
 "ship that found herself" illustrates it, as well 
 as the fact that machinery runs better after a 
 few hundred pulses than it did at first. But 
 here the analogies run rather to seed and so 
 we shall migrate to the next topic. 
 
 (5) Inhibition is a case where, for example, 
 but one of two or more possible objects of a 
 group gets functioned. It may follow exhaus- 
 tion or adaptation, and appears to be a deriva- 
 tive of intensity. While intent upon our tele- 
 phone conversation we do not notice that the 
 
 91 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 fire-engine has clanged noisily down the street, 
 though the sound it makes is physically in- 
 tenser than the voice over the wire. Again, dis- 
 agreeable table companions keep us from en- 
 joying an otherwise satisfactory meal; or the 
 fear of an impending final examination abol- 
 ishes the memory of things we were positive we 
 had at instant recall. Inhibition is a temporal 
 and quantitative affair, and in psychology plays 
 a considerable role. Indeed, one author, 
 Muensterberg, regards it as the central fact of 
 psychology. 
 
 (6) When two or more sensations blend so 
 that each to a certain extent loses its independ- 
 ent character, the resultant is called a Fusion. 
 This is a case of both psychological and logical 
 newness. Fusion is both a process and a con- 
 tent. On the side of extensity it is sometimes 
 easily comparable and again curiously incom- 
 parable to the elements from which it was de- 
 rived. The discussion of the various sense 
 fields will illustrate this. Fusion is partial, mu- 
 tual inhibition; wherever it occurs, it is very 
 likely to become adapted, and often seems to 
 be a sop thrown to exhaustion. It will be seen 
 later on to be one of the integral parts of per- 
 ception. Language itself is a case of fusion. 
 We do not think of the separate letters of words, 
 92 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 but of the words as a whole; again, orange is 
 obtainable by mixing red and yellow pigments, 
 but it goes by a simple name and usually passes 
 by unanalysed; the doctrine of the trinity was 
 a theological fusion. Fusion and confusion are 
 interesting to compare, — they seem to have 
 many common parts. The latter term, how- 
 ever, refers to the meaning-side of the situa- 
 tion, — the degree of confusion implying the 
 amount of labor it would take to make order 
 grow where chaos did before. 
 
 (7) When, again, sensations appear to- 
 gether and neither inhibit each other nor fuse, 
 we have a case of Contrast. This is a qualita- 
 tive and sometimes a spacial attribute; it is like- 
 wise often a derivative of intensity. The chef 
 applies chemical fusion to the making of the 
 salad, while the hors d'oeuvre which preceded 
 was concocted for the sake of contrast to it. 
 The uses to which contrast effects are put are 
 apparently unlimited, and yet quite closely re- 
 lated to certain definite principles of order. It 
 would be more "stunning" to wear two gloves 
 each of a different color, but we prefer in such 
 a case bilateral chromatic symmetry; in fash- 
 ions again, suits all of a piece are not disdained 
 in favor of polychromatic clothing whether or 
 no. Besides this, we may be passionately fond of 
 93 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 change in many directions, and yet always eat 
 the same breakfast, or walk to business down 
 the same street. But where contrast effects are 
 produced, each of the components more or less 
 emphasizes the elfect of the other. It is thus 
 a case of the opposite of fusion in its two prin- 
 cipal aspects. It is curious to note in what 
 special ways it differs from inhibition. 
 
 (8) Clearness is predicated of the content 
 side of a sensation when, in the midst of other 
 sensations, it defines them in terms of itself. 
 Thus it takes a relational aspect to provide the 
 existence of this attribute. As we never get 
 but one sensation in consciousness, there is al- 
 ways more or less clearness in the cross-section. 
 Clearness and inhibition are closely related in 
 this way, — the inhibiting sensation may be 
 clear, the clear sensation always inhibits. To 
 accomplish this, the clearness takes on the tem- 
 poral aspect of duration, and through duration 
 the inhibition gets functioned. In point of de- 
 fining the context in terms of itself, this at- 
 tribute has important bearings on perception. 
 If it leads to inhibition, it relates itself to in- 
 tensity; while, as it frequently appears to come 
 from emotional backgrounds, it often loses its 
 purely original qualitative and content aspect 
 on this account. 
 
 94 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 
 (9) Vividness is a compound of clearness 
 and inhibition simultaneously occurring. Clear- 
 ness defines the background in terms of itself, 
 — in vividness we have a lost background, and 
 an increase of intensity due not to the inhibit- 
 ory crowding-out of the other contents, but of 
 the sudden wilting of the conflicting functions. 
 Crudely, it could be compared with a land- 
 slide to a certain political candidate by virtue 
 (or vice?) of the withdrawal of his opponents, 
 rather than to his own efforts in spite of them. 
 This latter would rather be a case of inhibi- 
 tion. Physicists are acquainted with a half- 
 brother to this attribute in some of the phenom- 
 ena of refraction. In psychology, I am con- 
 vinced, the index of refraction in the case of 
 vividness is frequently emotional. 
 
 (10) The attributes of sensation may have 
 no position alone, but the cross-section of their 
 series takes position with reference to the ob- 
 ject and the sensing organ: we call this the 
 Local-sign (or Local-signature). I am touched 
 with a pencil point upon variously functioning 
 organs, and the name of the sense field comes 
 with the touch (or other) sensations. We al- 
 ways report things as being somewhere, — not 
 only in the case of sensations which arouse a 
 unique quality upon various skin areas, — but so 
 
 95 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 
 inveterately do we apply perspective to the 
 contents of consciousness, that all things seem 
 to have a place. And, in one sense, they do; 
 dreams are in dreamland just as fairies are in 
 fairyland. But, on the other hand, just as the 
 non-spatial attributes of sensation are position- 
 less, so are many of their combinations into 
 things or wholes; especially is this true of the 
 part-whole masses, of which dreams and fairies 
 as well as logarithmic functions are examples. 
 (11) Some sensations are pleasant or un- 
 pleasant, and these terms signify Feeling-tone. 
 This is an originally qualitative aspect, and 
 nothing more ; but there are grades of it, loosely 
 called, for want of a better name, intensities. 
 The nature of feeling is not as obscure as the 
 dissertations upon it, — it is a function of cer- 
 tain equilibria, — neural, muscular, sensorial, 
 and the like, — several variables, whose ex- 
 pected quotient is found to shrink in a sur- 
 prising manner. For without the proper regard 
 for the psychological plus, only nonsense arises 
 from the addition of certain elements in the 
 conscious cross-section. Psychology furnishes 
 the basis for the empirical status of the irra- 
 tional numbers in the above case, just as in 
 fusions we find that to add is to subtract. In 
 these, as in other cases to be met with, nascitiir 
 96 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 ridiciiliis mus is the authorized shipman's card. 
 We are sometimes found furthering or hinder- 
 ing those sensation masses including pleasant 
 or unpleasant feeling-tones respectively, but 
 not always, for usually displeasure is more 
 heavily socially subsidized than is pleasure, as 
 is the case with error and untruth. These two 
 feeling-tones are not incompatible psychological 
 opposites, and when found together, they need 
 neither fuse with nor inhibit each other, which 
 is a curiosity. We have discussed the "posi- 
 tion" of pleasure in a previous paragraph, and 
 those authors who interpret feeling as indicative 
 of the fact that the sensation to which it per- 
 tains is referred to the body rather than to the 
 "external" world, are in error. What a dis- 
 mal time others than ourselves must be hav- 
 ing, according to this bit of wisdom ! 
 
 14. The table on the following page will 
 illustrate the relations of both the essential and 
 inessential attributes to one another. 
 
 97 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 
 
 Is 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CQ 
 
 1 
 o 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 c • 
 .2 I 
 
 2 ' 
 
 3 : 
 
 Q ■ 
 
 S 
 < 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 & 
 
 
 
 Intensity 
 
 Latent-Period 
 
 Threshold 
 
 Duration 
 
 Extensity 
 
 > 
 ■-13 
 
 .-^ 
 
 Modality 
 
 Quality 
 
 Intensity 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 o 
 C 
 3 
 
 Modality 
 
 Intensity 
 Latent-period 
 Threshold 
 Duration 
 
 
 § 
 
 
 > 
 
 3 
 
 o 
 
 > 
 
 C 
 CO 
 
 >* 
 
 lO 
 
 «; 
 
 
 
 
 ! a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 :| 
 
 
 : bn 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -P 
 
 
 .|i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 • 3 OS 
 
 
 M ; 
 
 
 i i- 
 
 
 
 
 . >-< 
 
 
 
 
 ■-£ 
 
 
 
 
 . M 3 
 
 
 cS . 
 
 
 ;«f- 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 • <; 
 
 
 
 
 feO 
 
 
 h:i . 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 rt 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 o o 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■3 
 
 o)-^-^ 
 
 
 ^ w 
 
 
 
 
 u 
 
 
 
 3 ? 
 
 
 
 M 
 
 3^ 
 
 H-< i^-a 
 
 
 0-2 
 
 
 
 g 
 
 ^ 
 
 W< 
 
 W<J 
 
 
 00 
 
 
 
 
 
 V 
 
 m 
 
 3 
 
 3 3 
 
 § 
 
 S 
 
 ,o 
 
 ,,.2.2 c ^ " =« 
 
 H 
 
 < 
 
 
 « -U T3 O -l^ M CO 
 
 1 
 
 u 
 
 Imag 
 xhaus 
 dapta 
 ihibitii 
 usion 
 ontras 
 learne 
 ividne 
 
 3 
 
 a}< 
 
 W<5l^[x,UU> 
 
 &H 
 
 
 1 
 
 H 
 
 
 
 0) 
 
 
 3 
 o 
 
 0) ••43 
 
 3 
 4^ ^ S.l^ 
 
 M 
 W 
 ^ 
 
 a-2s 
 
 bo :1s 
 
 3 -P 
 
 usion 
 ontras 
 learne 
 ividne 
 ocal-S 
 eeling 
 
 
 3**- 
 
 1— 1 -^ 
 
 
 oQ<t; 
 
 ■ < 
 
 Pt,00>hJfe 
 
 i_^ 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 o 
 cS 
 
 s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CS P,^ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 s 
 
 3 
 
 -3 cS-3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 M 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 • 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ^^^.^ : 
 
 
 
 , 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 3Sg?J^ : 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 usio 
 ontr 
 lean 
 ividi 
 ocal 
 
 
 
 «H 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 <: 
 
 
 
 &hOO>J . 1 
 
 
 - 
 
 (M 
 
 az 
 
 Tjt 
 
 10 
 
 ?o 
 
 t- 
 
 06 
 
 Oi 
 
 c 
 
 ;:j| 
 
 98 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 15. These eighteen attributes are the stuff 
 of which sensation is made. They are attrib- 
 utes, rather than parts, and illustrate the attrib- 
 ute-thing relationship mentioned and defined in 
 the previous chapter. As such, they make up 
 sensation, for sensation, apart from their con- 
 stituting, contributing relationship, does not oc- 
 cur. Thus it is incorrect to say that "a sensa- 
 tion varies," for these attributes are all series, 
 and as such alter in their changing the nature 
 of the sensation they constitute instead of being 
 altered by it. Sensational consciousness varies 
 with its object, but, by virtue of our function- 
 ing a larger environment than that of the bare 
 object of sense, reports upon its variation are 
 obtained. From this it is likewise perceived that 
 what the physicist means by "object" and what 
 the psychologist means by it are apparently dif- 
 ferent things. In psychology, however, we use 
 the word stimulus to indicate the physicist's 
 "object." Sensation is more than stimulus. 
 Sensation is the object, and what it will do; or, 
 in other words, the psychologist's "object" is 
 the content and functions of a consciousness 
 when within receptive range of the physicist's 
 "object" or stimulus. For neither can all of 
 these attributes occur at the same instant of 
 time, nor does the identity of the sensation with 
 99 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 the object exhaust it. Surely the stimulus, as 
 a physical datum, will affect other physical 
 data in a way that differs from its directly af- 
 fecting a nervous system; or it may have chem- 
 ical properties, or a geological system to sup- 
 port. But in either case, the sensation is iden- 
 tical with whatever of the object is material for 
 psychology. Series and properties only delimit 
 the fields of the various sciences. 
 Questions on the foregoing: 
 
 1. Enumerate three common cases of 
 adaptation and three of exhaustion not men- 
 tioned in the text. To what sort of stimuli are 
 they referred? Tell in each case why you think 
 the one attribute appears instead of the other. 
 
 2. "Quality" is under the heading "qualita- 
 tive" in the above table. Can you suggest a 
 better term than the latter in order that the 
 same word need not be used in two senses? 
 
 16. I propose now to indicate what the 
 nervous system has to do with sensation. Let 
 me first lay down the principle that neural ac- 
 tion is concerned more with the functions of 
 consciousness than with its content. To be sure, 
 we should never see yellow without a physiolog- 
 ical eye, nor taste lemon without a tongue, 
 but physiological psychology is the science of 
 the functional maintenance of the content of 
 100 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 consciousness rather than something concerned 
 with the question of why we see yellow instead 
 of red or taste lemon rather than lemonade. 
 For the qualities of the content are implicit in 
 any neural action at all, while the functional and 
 quantitative series do not follow such an un- 
 eventful history. This may sound far from 
 obvious, to say the least of it, and yet the whole 
 history of psychology is befuddled with bulle- 
 tins from Paddock, aggravating in their gloomy 
 references to that moist bundle of strands with- 
 in our bodies known as the nervous system, in 
 which sensation, perception, emotion and rea- 
 son were said to keep a heirarchy of thrones 
 whose exact location was a perpetual discom- 
 fiture to the invading investigator. To be spe- 
 cific, there are, for example, but four simple 
 taste qualities, while there are nine functional 
 attributes of each of them. Now responses to 
 the chemical stimuli known as tastes are re- 
 stricted to these four qualities, but not in any 
 way so attached to the functionally quantitative 
 series of sensational attributes. Response, be- 
 ing a process, is therefore superlatively con- 
 cerned with functional attributes: and to this 
 we shall direct our attention. 
 
 17. A schematic representation of the nerv- 
 ous system would incline toward the shape of a 
 101 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 funnel, the large end of which is located in the 
 skull. Thence, thinning down, to the base of 
 the spine, it ends as a notable, separate struc- 
 ture. It is, therefore, almost entirely posterior 
 to the countenance. Just as visually we walk 
 about headless, so we are never aware of the 
 nerves as such. But from this central, funnel- 
 like nervous system, there are prolonged in- 
 numerable and immensely complicated bundles 
 of fibres, ramifying to all parts of the body, 
 and varying from a fraction of an inch to five 
 or six feet in length. Functionally, the mass 
 of the nervous system does not assist us in un- 
 derstanding it. It is best regarded as a sys- 
 tematic set of strands, called cells. Let us be 
 emphatic here, however, and take notice that 
 the word "cell" does not mean a little, roundish 
 affair. The cells of the nervous system are 
 long, tiny strands, contrasting in shape with 
 bone and other cells in the same way that a tall 
 flag-pole contrasts with a chopping block. The 
 functional construction goes farther. The 
 physiological unit of response is not a single 
 cell, but a set of at least three such long fibres, 
 articulating in such a way that a stimulation, 
 say, from the surface of the body will be car- 
 ried as an impulse along all three of them in 
 linear succession, and arouse at the end the 
 102 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 release of energy required to make the stimulus 
 effective. Such a linear series of nerve cells 
 or fibres is called a reflex arc, and consists of 
 three parts (the three cells) as follows: recept- 
 or, conductor and effector. The receptor starts 
 with or in the sense organ, and extends to some 
 part of the central nervous system, — brain or 
 spinal cord, — where it ends as a fibre. But 
 functionally it continues in the conductor, which 
 interlaces it with the effector, whose further end 
 is attached to a muscle by means of a little pad 
 or end-plate. The action of this response 
 mechanism is usually more useful to study than 
 are pictorial representations of it, since they 
 are all idealized. The best way to understand 
 the scheme is to procure some nice animal, kill 
 it, and trace out some special set of nerve fibres; 
 for by this means alone the curious, angular 
 character of the nerve-path can be appreci- 
 ated. 
 
 18. The cell is primarily a white fibre. 
 Somewhere along the fibre will be found a cell- 
 body, colored gray; the term "gray matter" in- 
 dicates that the cell-bodies are on the surface 
 of the brains while below the surface in the 
 spinal cord. There are about eleven thousand 
 million of these nerve cells in the human body, 
 each of which derives its nourishment from its 
 103 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 own gray cell-body. They thus communicate 
 impulses, but not food. The nerve strand has 
 two sheaths, an inner or myelin sheath, and an 
 outer, called the neurilemma. The function of 
 these concern electro-physiology, however, 
 rather than our own science. Special psycho- 
 logical interest attaches to the appearance and 
 function of the physical termination of the 
 nerve strands, one of which is the end-brush, the 
 other, the dendrites. It will be noticed that the 
 names are similes, and as such explain nothing 
 functional. The end-brush of one fibre meets 
 the dendrites of another, or aborizes with it; 
 and right at this juncture psychology finds its 
 chief interest in the nervous system. This is 
 not to say that latency, for example, is uncon- 
 nected with the rate of the nervous impulse, 
 which makes it impossible for the "speed of 
 thought" to be more than one or two hundred 
 metres per second. Nor is it unimportant that 
 the nervous action is chemical rather than elec- 
 trical, even though the action of the cell is ac- 
 companied by electrical phenomena detectable 
 by a galvanometer, and that there is chemical 
 substance freed by the nervous action of re- 
 sponse. Important as these are, they concern 
 not intimately the conscious cross-section. But 
 the fact that the change of the direction of the 
 104 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 current through this neural arc is irreversible, 
 and that it proceeds from sense organ down 
 the receptor fibre, through the dendrites of that 
 fibre across to the end-brush of the conducting 
 fibre, and so on to the end-plate of a muscle 
 ready to be aroused into changes of form, elas- 
 ticity and the like, — this point is so important 
 for psychology that we shall take it up in con- 
 siderable detail. It is, indeed, the backbone 
 of our knowing and doing. 
 
 19. Reflex action is the occupation of the 
 reflex arcs. "When one touches oft" a charged 
 Leyden jar, incalculably more energy is dis- 
 charged from the jar than was contained in the 
 mechanical connecting of the two poles by the 
 discharging wire. The release of energy in ex- 
 ploding dynamite far overtops the mechanical 
 blow from the percussion cap. These are help- 
 ful analogies in considering reflexes. Reflex 
 action means that more energy is discharged 
 from the arc than was imparted to the organ- 
 ism by the stimulus. It also means that the 
 "end effect is mediated by a conductor, itself in- 
 capable of mediating that particular end effect." 
 Furthermore, in all animals having a compli- 
 cated nervous system, we find the reflexes de- 
 fining the environment in point of being specifi- 
 cally and selectively excitable. Some respond 
 105 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 but to grades of temperature, others to lights, 
 still others to sounds, or to mechanical, chem- 
 ical, electrical and other eiffects; and thus by 
 their cross-sectioning the environment, unite in 
 forming that which we call consciousness. 
 There are, of course, other responses, such as, 
 for example, those which calls from starving In- 
 dia would provoke, but these are not simple 
 reflexes. According to recent investigators, the 
 difference between the higher and the lower 
 animals, insofar as neural action is concerned, 
 lies in the fact that the unicellular organisms 
 take but two chapters in physiology to exhaust 
 them, — one on surface, and the other on internal 
 phenomena, — while multicellular organisms 
 supply a third chapter on intercellular physiol- 
 ogy by virtue of intercellular deposits. Now 
 when these deposits are solid (e. g., bone) we 
 have mechanical or lever operations to con- 
 sider; when they are liquid, we have chemical; 
 and when, lastly, the intercellular connections 
 are by virtue of real, living protoplasmic masses, 
 whose business it is to connect, intercommunica- 
 tion becomes possible by reflex action. Now 
 we can see why the foregiven analogies of the 
 Leyden jar and the dynamite are going to prove 
 psychologically inadequate. And yet mechan- 
 
 106 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 ics has a finger in reflex action as will forth- 
 with appear. 
 
 20. In the succeeding paragraphs, until we 
 come to the detailed relating of the attributes 
 of sensation to the action of the nervous sys- 
 tem, I shall draw largely upon the work of C. 
 S. Sherrington and others, as given in his "In- 
 tegrative Action of the Nervous System," in 
 which, by the way, is recorded the most signif- 
 icant information upon physiological psychol- 
 ogy that has appeared for many centuries. The 
 student will profit largely by studying some 
 parts of this book in detail in connection with 
 this present chapter. "A sense organ is a recep- 
 tive surface." From whatever parts of the body 
 a reflex can be elicited, nerve fibres run to the 
 conductor involved in the response, and those 
 parts are the sense organ for that reflex. "The 
 eye is a glorified heat spot, the ear a glorified 
 touch spot." The long and eventful history of 
 evolution traces the contraction of those sense 
 fields receptive to ether and air vibrations to 
 certain restricted areas, furthermore formed 
 into organs which lie half embedded under 
 apertures in the skin, neither strictly within nor 
 on the surface of the body. Of stimuli that 
 will excite the reflex chain implicit with the 
 presence of a sensory surface there are four 
 107 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 kinds. The first and largest class are the ef- 
 fective stimuli, by which is meant all means, 
 mechanical, thermal, chemical, etc., that will 
 start neural action along the arc. Of these ef- 
 fective stimuli, however, some are adequate, or 
 those to which the organ is normally attuned, 
 such as sight to the eye, sound to the ear, and 
 so on; while others are inadequate (let us say 
 for true perceptions) such as a blow on the eye, 
 or a foreign substance in the ear. All other 
 stimuli are ineffective, that is, cause no arousal 
 whatever, such as a beam of moonlight stream- 
 ing into the ear. Considered from the stand- 
 point of modality, the sensory reflexes define a 
 modality of adequate stimuli only, the blow on 
 the eye being a mechanical jar, transmitted to 
 the optic nerve not by the retina but by a se- 
 quence of concussions through the coats and 
 liquids of the eye-ball. The sensory surfaces 
 are thus selective. Sherrington reports that the 
 plantar reflex of the brainless dog and the pinna 
 reflex in the cat can be elicited by only mechan- 
 ical stimuli. Electrical are wholly ineffective. 
 As a last general word on the receptive sur- 
 faces, it is found that if we consider such field 
 as that whole collection of points on the skin 
 from which an identical reflex may be elicited, 
 that a weak stimulus in the center of the field 
 108 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 has about as much of an effect as a strong one 
 on the periphery, A schematic representation 
 of a reflex field would have to include the item 
 of varying penetrability. 
 
 21. Some reflex fields overlap. Especially 
 is this true of the so-called proprio-ceptive and 
 the extero-ceptive reflex fields, the former be- 
 ing the sub-cutaneous receptors for organic 
 stimulation, while the latter are on the skin 
 surface, or superficial. The dermal senses ex- 
 hibit this overlapping all the while, and in ex- 
 perimenting on touch, one finds that most in- 
 vestigation is meaningless without taking ac- 
 count of this fact. Thus for the modalities 
 known as touch, warmth, cold, and pain, there 
 is a rather illy defined set of dependable re- 
 flexes for functioning them. Sometimes, also, 
 there is interaction between overlapping sense 
 fields, setting up a new condition in their re- 
 lation, known as the "reinforcing of reflexes by 
 each other," This has bearings upon intensity, 
 both qualitative and quantitative. Sometimes 
 reflexes widely apart (dermographically) com- 
 bine and interact, as in synaesthesia, by which 
 is meant the co-presence of the qualities of one 
 object (the stimulus) with the presence of those 
 of another object of a normally unrelated mo- 
 dality. This is especially instanced by the 
 109 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 musician who has his "white" and "blue" minor 
 tonalities. 
 
 22. Reflexes also are set off in certain se- 
 quences. The sight of a fly causes a hungry 
 frog (doubtless visually more alert through 
 hunger) to dart out its tongue, the movement 
 of the tongue arousing salivation, which again 
 leads to the business of swallowing. The stim- 
 uli to such reflexes usually overlap each other 
 in time, and the threshold of excitability of 
 each succeeding one is lowered by the excita- 
 tion just in advance of its own. It is almost 
 needless to say that most of our learned habits 
 are of such a sequential reflex character, called 
 con-sequential when the with-for relation is 
 present. As a rule, furthermore, the series is 
 intransitive, which is exactly what irreversibil- 
 ity of the transmission of impulses along the 
 neural arc must be understood to mean. 
 
 23. Curious among the reflexes are those 
 whose response functions pain. The pain sense 
 organs are "anelective," that is, their modality 
 includes exceedingly heterogeneous objects. 
 Very many kinds of stimuli are painful. And 
 if the stimuli are normally inadequate, when 
 danger to the whole organism is threatened, 
 they become adequate, — that is, the threshold 
 is then very low. Especially js an exposed 
 110 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 
 nerve susceptible to low intensities of noxious 
 stimuli, and as such represents the imperative- 
 ly protective character of the pain reflex. The 
 pain reflex exhibits another curiosity in point 
 of being aroused, for example, by a harmful 
 touch on a certain spot of the skin, where a 
 harmless touch would be insufficient. The re- 
 sulting actions, likewise, from these two char- 
 acters of stimulus are diametrically unlike. 
 
 24. Our fund of health is guaranteed by 
 an immense number of tonic and other reflexes. 
 The vegetative functions, cardiac, respiratory 
 and other valiant reactions against an environ- 
 ment we propitiate by metabolism, guarantee a 
 certain vital momentum, — on the basis of which 
 we are free to function extero-ceptively, — and 
 depend for their integrity upon retaining their 
 receptive surfaces, modalities and thresholds 
 intact. In a way, we might be said to thrive 
 principally upon the funded increment of the 
 unconscious, for only by means of the warn- 
 ings of pathological symptoms do we recognize 
 the stabilizing character of these background 
 reflexes of our organism. 
 
 25. All the reflexes may be said to be pur- 
 posive. That is to say, they maintain the ani- 
 mal against some, maybe not the choicest, por- 
 tion of his environment. For those parts which, 
 
 111 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 in a case of danger, cannot withdraw, evoke by 
 mediation of pain reflexes those which can ef- 
 fect a withdrawal. Sherrington also points out 
 that the scratching by a dog of his own bitten 
 skin grooms the skin so as to protect the sen- 
 sory surface against becoming of too high a 
 threshold value for the inevitable noxious 
 stimulus. 
 
 26. After this brief account of reflexes in 
 general, we turn to the specific relation of the 
 reflex arc to sensation and its constitutive at- 
 tributes. It will be remembered that the three 
 strands in the nerve path were the receptor, 
 the conductor and the effector, each of which 
 has a different function. As may be already 
 in mind, the function of the receptor is implicit 
 in an adequate description of a receptive sur- 
 face. But to go farther, the function of the 
 receptor (fibre and sense organ together) is "to 
 lower the threshold of excitability of an arc for 
 one kind of stimulus, and to heighten it for 
 all the others." In our own terms, — to specify 
 more and more the limits of the modality. For 
 example, there are no electrical receptors: na- 
 ture excludjgs volts and amperes from the list 
 of adequate stimuli, — from modalities. But 
 the selective excitability of the receptor not 
 only limits the number of stimuli within the mo- 
 112 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 dality, but provides increasing responsiveness 
 to them, and heightens it superlatively for a 
 special few. As far as the efllector is concerned, 
 it is connected with the muscle on its end-plate, 
 and the end-plate is indefatigable. No amount 
 of stimulation exhausts it, — it has no threshold. 
 
 27. But when one asks what happens in 
 the conductor, the array of facts and functions 
 is not so abbreviated as in the above cases. 
 Now if, instead of stimulating the sensory sur- 
 face of a reflex, we dissect in under the skin 
 to the nerve trunk, and, leaving the receiving 
 organ out of the experiment, stimulate a con- 
 duction path, the results will differ from those 
 derived from intact reflex arc conduction in 
 the following ways : 
 
 "Conduction in reflex arc exhibits, (1) slow- 
 er speed as measured by the latent period be- 
 tween application of stimulus and appearance 
 of end-eff"ect, this diff'erence being greater for 
 weak stimuli than for strong; 
 
 (2) Less close correspondence between the 
 moment of cessation of stimulus and the mo- 
 ment of cessation of end-eff'ect, z. e., there is a 
 marked "after-discharge" ; 
 
 (3) Less close correspondence between the 
 rhythm of stimulus and rhythm of end-eff'ect; 
 
 (4) Less close correspondence between the 
 
 113 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 grading of intensity of the stimulus and the 
 grading of intensity of the end-effect; 
 
 (5) Considerable resistance to passage of 
 a single nerve impulse, but a resistance easily 
 forced by a succession of impulses (temporal 
 summation) ; 
 
 (6) Irreversibility of direction, instead of 
 comparative unfatigability of nerve trunks; 
 
 (7) Fatigability in contrast with the com- 
 parative unfatigability of nerve trunks; 
 
 (8) Much greater variability of the thres- 
 hold value of stimulus than in nerve trunks; 
 
 (9) Refractory period, inhibition, and 
 shock, in degrees unknown for nerve trunks; 
 
 (10) Much greater dependence on blood 
 circulation, oxygen; and 
 
 (11) Much greater susceptibility to various 
 drugs — anaesthetics." 
 
 I have italicised several words in this quo- 
 tation for the purpose of showing the trend of 
 my interpretation of the nervous system; and 
 it will be noticed also that these eleven points 
 of difference sum for us into a general concept 
 of something like a blockade. And the place 
 where these blockades occur has been quite 
 clearly indicated to be not in the nerve cell 
 bodies, nor the sustaining tissue between nerve 
 fibres, but in the surfaces of separation be- 
 114 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 tween the end-brush and the dendrites, called 
 the synapse. Now a surface of separation is 
 physically a membrane, — the nerves do not con- 
 join any more than the fleshy surfaces of the 
 hands touch when one clasps his gloved hands. 
 Correlated with the irreciprocal permeability 
 of the synaptic membrane is the irreversibility 
 of the nervous current, — a phenomenon well 
 known as a phase of osmosis. Now the nervous 
 conduction is not preeminently chemical, as is 
 witnessed by the facts of its speed, freedom 
 from the effects of temperature changes, and its 
 facile excitation by mechanical means. Right 
 here, then, is where mechanics and physics come 
 in for their own in psychology. In order that 
 a transverse membrane become a conductor, 
 it must be modified by doing the conducting, 
 and such we find to be the case with reflex 
 conduction as differing from nerve trunk con- 
 duction. This feature defines many of the 
 phenomena of physiological psychology as 
 types of auto-catalysed neural activity, and has 
 no end of bearings on personality. 
 
 28. We are now ready to indicate the re- 
 lation between the attributes of sensation and 
 neural activity. Of the first two essential at- 
 tributes, modality and quality, we have suf- 
 ficiently spoken. The next in order is inten- 
 115 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 sity. The first point to make is that the in- 
 tensity of effect is less well graded with the 
 mechanically measurable stimulus in the case 
 of the intact reflex arc than in the nerve trunks. 
 In the latter it is almost a one-to-one correla- 
 tion, while in the former it looks like all or 
 nothing. So that internal neurological condi- 
 tions play a greater role than do external ones 
 in reflex conductions as compared with those in 
 nerve trunk conductions. Especially is this to 
 be noted, in the different grading of effects in 
 various reiiexes. The series are not ordinally 
 correlated either. And yet intensities in these 
 cases are connected with the number of ele- 
 ments coexcited, acting by irradiation. How- 
 ever this may be, the reaction, as it irradiates, 
 treats the motor element, the effector and its 
 connections, as a unit. For the whole motor 
 center functionally belongs to each and all of 
 the groups of receptors proper to the reflex. 
 Much light is thrown by this knowledge of the 
 working of reflexes upon both the qualitative 
 and quantitative aspects of intensity. Unless 
 we are merely sparring for time, the unique- 
 ness of qualitative intensity means in connec- 
 tion with reflexes, that the "all or nothing" 
 principle implies too sudden an inlet and out- 
 go of energy' for any intercolonial responses to 
 116 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 furnish an equilibrating neural background at 
 the time of the release of reflex energy; while 
 the quantitative and functional aspect of in- 
 tensity lies unconcealed in the two principles 
 of irradiation and difterences of grading in the 
 various reflexes. This grading is found to be 
 a constant function, but its mathematical ex- 
 pression is far from being reducible to a sim- 
 ple linear equation: its formulation includes at 
 least two dimensions. 
 
 29. In connection with the next attributes 
 of sensation to be disposed of, it is requisite 
 that we consider briefly certain characteristics 
 of the release of neural energy in the effector 
 nerves. Sensory surfaces, as we have just seen, 
 may be very large or very small, but in either 
 case the sensory (receptor) fibres leading from 
 them pass toward some part of the central 
 nervous system, there to be gathered together 
 in a bundle to guarantee that the response me- 
 chanism shall not be at all hit or miss, but 
 rather specifically differentiated from that 
 mechanism fed by the sensory fibres from an- 
 other sense field. Now, however, several sense 
 fields frequently are connected by receptor 
 fibres to the same effector mechanism, so that 
 the stimulation that gets there first will close 
 the "valve" against the later arrival and crowd 
 117 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 it out of action. The simultaneous or even 
 successive debouching of nervous energies upon 
 the same undischarged effector does not behave 
 always in the above manner, but whenever any 
 effector amenable to neural discharge from sev- 
 eral sense fields functions in this way it is 
 called a "final common path." Before the final 
 common path is reached, however, at least one 
 synapse has to be passed, and the condition of 
 passage at this surface of separation is of such 
 a character that sensory selectivity is very sim- 
 ple and easy to comprehend in contrast to the 
 eccentric character of the release readiness at 
 the entrance to this final common path. The 
 motor cells do not conjoin. Only a functional 
 union knits them together, and here in connec- 
 tion with this neuronic threshold of release we 
 may freely mention all but a few of the re- 
 maining attributes of sensation, — not only men- 
 tion them, in fact, but at the end propound a 
 very searching and insistent question. 
 
 30. Intensity has been shown to concern 
 the release of energy all along the neural arc. 
 "The entrant path tends to run in certain di- 
 rections or not at all," for other paths may lead 
 to the same conductor and the two sets of forces 
 may conflict. Then, either irradiation or sum- 
 mation of stimuli must overcome the neuronic 
 118 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 threshold, "and irradiation extends per saltum 
 rather than ad gradatim." The strongest stim- 
 ulated afferent arc is the most likely to capture 
 the final common path, — strong and weak re- 
 ferring not only to mechanical or other stimuli 
 as such, but also to the relation they bear to 
 the focus and fringe of the receptive field. Typ- 
 ical of the sort of data the psychologist must 
 not haggle over, is the fact that the threshold 
 of excitability in the reflex mechanism is more 
 variable than in the nerve trunks. Stimulation 
 in the undissected animal is, pro tanto, destined 
 to be more eventful than that in the mutilated 
 specimen. There is in James' "Psychology, 
 Briefer Course," (pp. 92-101), an account of the 
 behavior both of a mutilated frog and of a 
 pigeon, in which the diff'erences between them 
 and their whole fellow creatures is taken up 
 in considerable detail, just in point of what 
 the neural connections contribute to conscious- 
 ness, as we are doing here, with a conclusion 
 that I am certain is in serious error. I shall 
 quote just enough of this chapter both to be 
 fair to its author and to make my point: 
 ". . . the main difference between the hem- 
 isphereless animal and the whole one may be 
 concisely expressed by saying that the one obeys 
 absent, the other only present, objects." Again, 
 119 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 "Within the psychic life due to the cerebrum 
 itself the same general distinction obtains, be- 
 tween considerations of the more immediate 
 and considerations of the more remote. In all 
 ages the man whose determinations are swayed 
 by reference to the most distant ends has been 
 held to possess the highest intelligence." I 
 cite this nmch quoted expression right here, 
 even at the risk of losing my reader's memory 
 of the issue I have started to make pertinent for 
 him, for the exact purpose of showing just what 
 inadequacy has characterized many a psy- 
 chologist's treatment of neural connections. For 
 not only are there innumerable present objects 
 and immediate considerations which even the 
 whole, undissected animal cannot obey or re- 
 spond to, — on account of the selective excitabil- 
 ity of the neural arc and the neuronic thres- 
 hold, — but there are also recent investigations 
 upon dogs, by Goltz, Pavlow and Rothmann, 
 showing that new tricks, habits and memories 
 may become the possession of animals with 
 spines transected and brains dissected out. Let 
 any one make out of this whatever he pleases, 
 remembering also the nudge we gave in a pre- 
 vious paragraph regarding the heirarchy of 
 dark thrones in the wilderness of the central 
 nervous system, 
 
 120 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 31. Due to the energy required to overpass 
 the neuronic threshold, not immediately upon 
 the application of the stimulus does the release 
 occur. But the latent period (refractory phase) 
 in the nerve trunks is only about one sigma (one- 
 thousandth of a second), while in the case of 
 the reflex arc the pause is considerably longer 
 and more variable. Besides, in the latter case 
 it often "misses a stitch," — the eft'ect of the stim- 
 uli thereafter being poorly graded with the 
 amount of mechanical or electrical stimulation. 
 Something is happening, nevertheless, in the 
 refractory phase, which is only "that state dur- 
 ing which, apart from fatigue, the mechanism 
 shows less than its full efl'ect of excitability." 
 The summation of stimuli also "produce a con- 
 dition at the synapse similar to that normally 
 present in the nerve trunk.' Lhis phenomenon 
 is not due to the muscle, but is wholly a reflex 
 arc affair. Very feeble electric shocks will 
 summate, and one weak stimulus followed by 
 another one as far apart as 1400 sigma (1.4 sec.) 
 may summate with it. This phenomenon 
 lurther means that "the nearer together two 
 points are in the receptive field which get stim- 
 ulated, the greater coalition there is between 
 the reflexes elicited." For "where conduction 
 lines run together, there is a reduction in re- 
 121 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 sistance," and this is primarily what summation 
 means. At this point we may also speak of 
 vividness and clearness. When an "initial re- 
 flex is followed by an incremental one, the lat- 
 ency of the latter is shorter than that of the 
 former." The synapse was "set," and the qual- 
 itatively different, but modally-prepared-for 
 stimulus got functioned on the background of 
 this neural readiness. 
 
 32. The final common path being captured, 
 adaptation may set in; in which case less en- 
 ergy from the stimulus will be then needed to 
 produce a release equal to the original reaction. 
 The bridge is built, and merchandize may be 
 shipped across it ad libitum. "The length of 
 latency being inversely proportional to the re- 
 flex intensity," before the synapse is "set," there 
 follows in cases of adaptation the maintenance 
 of a transmission circuit at the expense of very 
 little energy from the stimulus. In conduct we 
 call this feature "poise." The final common 
 path is a common conductor for many impulses, 
 arising from many sources of reception. When 
 impulses producing allied rather than opposed 
 effects play upon it, we have a case of fusion, 
 which is summation minus the time element, 
 considered from the standpoint of reflex readi- 
 ness, though the qualitative character of the 
 122 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 fused elements is apparently a derivative of 
 time itself. 
 
 33. Linked with the amount of receptive 
 surface stimulated is the attribute of extensity. 
 It appears now why this and other attributes 
 are referred to content rather than to function. 
 For if fusion exhibits the fact that in psychol- 
 ogy to add is to subtract, extensity of receptive 
 field or surface needs not go hand in hand with 
 summation of releases or end-effects. This 
 very item indicates the different dimensionality 
 of quantities and qualities. Yellow, for exam- 
 ple, is not just a certain number of vibrations. 
 It is also yellow, — ^the physics of color defines 
 not that other dimension into which the concept 
 of color is embedded. So with extensity: we 
 might even add contrast to the list, for the items 
 of sensation in regard to which we have to be 
 exceedingly perspicuous and rigidly empirical 
 began as far back as the paragraph on the 
 neuronic threshold. Contrast is represented, or 
 better shared in neural-arc releases by an en- 
 largement of the concept of the neurology of 
 fusion: I mean the simultaneous and balanced 
 use of final common paths for allied effects 
 even within different modalities. 
 
 34. The receptive surface of a reflex has 
 bounds, and functionally thins off in a manner 
 
 123 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 specified before. The local-sign of an object 
 stimulating it will then more accurately cor- 
 respond to its position in space, the more ortho- 
 gonally it impinges upon that field, functionally 
 considered. For an erroneous judgment in 
 terms of local sign means only a certain obliq- 
 uity of stimulus in relation to the field as a re- 
 ceiving apparatus. This concept will be elab- 
 orated in the paragraphs on illusions. 
 
 35. The attributes of duration and after- 
 image are best treated of together in connection 
 with neural action. We saw that the latent 
 period included the element of time. These do 
 also, but in the following special manner: Sen- 
 sations, qualitatively construed, may endure as 
 long as, not as long as, or longer than the ap- 
 plication of the stimulus. Indeed, the latent- 
 period implies that the effector fibre shall re- 
 lease its energy later than the receptor; after- 
 images merely require the concept of more slug- 
 gish time without necessary diminution of ef- 
 fect to explain them. For, as formerly asserted, 
 time in psychology is not solar time, and for 
 the differences no one on an empirical mission 
 needs to make any apology. We find that the 
 after-discharge of reflexes may be very incal- 
 culable. It may be, for example, the same fot 
 nine stimulations as it is for three stimula- 
 124 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 tions, each of which is mechanically thrice the 
 quantity of the one used nine times. Or, again, 
 after a number of subliminal stimuli there may 
 be a pause without discharge, but during which 
 the stimuli are summing, followed by a vigor- 
 ous discharge, then another pause, then an 
 after-discharge, — a thing not so different after 
 all from one's experience with induction coils 
 and Leyden jars. 
 
 36. Exhaustion is a function of time and 
 intensity. As a reflex tires from excessive stim- 
 ulation, it not only declines in the amount of 
 release of motor energy, but becomes also more 
 and more markedly tremulous. Opposed to 
 this effect is that of an adapted reflex, as noted 
 above. Exhaustion is also a function of po- 
 sition or direction. Some reflexes which tire 
 when aroused from one spot in the sensory 
 surface, can be aroused again to full activity 
 by stimulating another spot some little distance 
 away. With judicious use, the reflexes are rel- 
 atively indefatigable; for by the shifting of 
 briefly lasting stimuli from point to point in 
 the field, one can produce a longer lasting re- 
 action than when the same stimuli come at 
 equal intervals at the same point. Now in spite 
 of the fact that reference to the sensory sur- 
 face is a great factor in exhaustion, the phe- 
 125 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 nomenon is not sensory, but directly referable 
 to the conduction fibres within the central nerv- 
 ous system. But here we have to include the 
 fact that "only when" the sensory surface is 
 treated thus and so does the internal conduc- 
 tivity become involved in the manner so far 
 shown. 
 
 37. Inhibition is manifested in the reflex 
 arc action in many ways, some of which are 
 quite curious. We have spoken of the incre- 
 mental reflex, — ^where the second, say, of two 
 stimulations being suddenly intensified, arouses 
 sudden intensification of the motor result. In 
 such a case, whenever there is a latent period 
 other than one might expect for such a change 
 in intensity, it means the checking, or inhibi- 
 tion of spreads of discharge to other centres 
 than the one concerned with the discharge into 
 the final common path then in operation. 
 Again, the after-discharge may be prevented by 
 stimulating another reflex which uses the same 
 final common path for an eff"ect contrary to the 
 first one. What else, also, is the latent time 
 itself than a period of inhibition? But we 
 usually speak of this phenomenon as occurring 
 after the inception of some other fully opened 
 discharge mechanism. Now come the curios- 
 ities. Reflexes of a simultaneous double sign 
 126 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 (that is, where the motor nerve of the extensor 
 muscle of a limb and that of the flexor muscle 
 have opposed end effects) are neither exclusive- 
 ly excitatory nor exclusively inhibitory. Be- 
 sides, certain other reflexes are purely inhibi- 
 tory, (that is, they are nihilistic in character, — 
 dogs in a manger). They check all end eff"ects 
 possible, producing none but those of their own 
 release. Inhibitions usually also leave the 
 nervous tissue better fitted for more extensive 
 functioning after their occurrence, though some 
 are neutral, leaving the tissue neither exhausted 
 nor surcharged as to energy. 
 
 38. There is but one more attribute of sen- 
 sation to be considered in this wise. This is 
 feeling-tone. It was suggested previously that 
 not quite all the data of sensation could be 
 harnessed to neural action, and this intricate 
 and mooted point of the neural nature of feel- 
 ing now confronts us. These other seventeen 
 attributes are all accounted for by intra-neural 
 categories; feeling-tone must be accounted for 
 by means of inter-neural relationships. But 
 the problem is not acute: in case of the readi- 
 ness of an arc to respond, or in case of the readi- 
 ness of transfer of energy from one arc to an- 
 other, or in case of a readiness to inhibit, — 
 such items as these sum up most of the neurol- 
 127 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 ogy of feeling-tones. Whatever other empirical 
 conditions may be found to be the bases of feel- 
 ing will, of course, but plot other points in the 
 same series. We like not only to be doing, but 
 also at times to keep ourselves and others from 
 doing, as well as we like changes and novelties. 
 That these are implicit in the general neurology 
 of sensation is evident from a careful perusal 
 of the above explanatory and analytic para- 
 graphs. 
 
 39. But now there comes an insistent ques- 
 tion with regard to all the foregoing. Is what 
 the nerves are doing, sensation? And are the 
 attributes of sensation which are carefully and 
 completely welded to neural releases to be 
 taken to imply that the sensation is in the nerv- 
 ous system? Is the fluent speaker after all 
 only emptying his spine and cranium upon his 
 hearers? For it is exactly at this point in 
 most treatises upon things mental, where psy- 
 chology meets its unpremeditated Golgotha. 
 And here a large two-horned dilemma pokes its 
 nose over the horizon, for there seem to be but 
 two alternatives from which to choose in this 
 and every other similar case. One of which 
 dilemmas I have elsewhere in this book called 
 the gospel of dendrites; and the other of which 
 I shall have no trouble in allying to the theory 
 128 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 of soft souls. The gospel of dendrites asserts 
 that sensations are in and of the nervous sys- 
 tem exclusively. My preceding paragraphs, 
 with the exception of a few phrases about 
 series, (odious and sour to the hide-bound 
 physiologist), are welcomed no doubt by the 
 upholders of this doctrine, and they point with 
 triumph to the harnessing of every last attrib- 
 ute of sensation to the internal workings of the 
 body. '''There the sensation is," they say, "it 
 is just what the nerves are doing." The other 
 party, breezing forth the doctrine of a soft soul, 
 retaliates vigorously upon the preceding by as- 
 serting that the neural action heretofore de- 
 scribed has nothing to do with sensation as ex- 
 perienced. "It doesn't feel that way to look at 
 yellow, nor to taste lemonade, nor yet to be 
 pricked with a pin. The experiencing of 
 things is unique, and all your nervous action 
 and conceptual series are preposterous and ar- 
 tificial." 
 
 40. But both of these objections come about 
 through a clear case of total misapprehension. 
 It was not a dilemma that appeared above the 
 horizon, but merely a unicorn, which only to the 
 strabismic showed a bifurcated frontal excres- 
 cence. And I shall treat of these two doctrines 
 in exactly the inverse proportion to their pop- 
 129 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 ularity. In the first place, the gospel of den- 
 drites gives no sufficient account of the object 
 stimulating the arcs. In the second place, the 
 theory of the soft and elusive soul spurns all 
 identity between that which sensations can be 
 analysed into (attributes) and the character- 
 istics of neural action as shown by investigators 
 who, by the way, do not thus cavil at what 
 they find to be the case. For to speak intro- 
 spectively about sensations in any manner ex- 
 cept simply to blurt their names and their im- 
 mediate effects, is to use memory and judgment, 
 which are not sensations. But then, the hope- 
 lessness of persuading the soft-soul theorist 
 against his assumptions is worth nothing in 
 comparison to keeping others from becoming so 
 unregenerate as he. Of course the object is 
 not the neural action. When we ask, as Holt 
 asks in regard to reflex activities, ''What is this 
 organism doing" in the presence of the fateful 
 stimulus? the answer, if complete, can neither 
 be in terms of the neural release alone as tested 
 on laboratory specimens, nor yet in terms of the 
 object we care to assert is the only possible 
 potent object within range of the nervous sys- 
 tem; but our answer must rather be, that "the 
 organism proceeds to do something, of which 
 the strict scientific description can only be that 
 130 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 it is a constant function of some feature of the 
 environment; and this latter [the environment] 
 is by no means necessarily the stimulus itself." 
 ("Response and Cognition," by E. B. Holt, Jour. 
 Phil., Psych, and Sci. Methods. July 8, 1915.) 
 
 41. The physiologist cannot, with a mere 
 wave of the hand, banish all other objects than 
 the one he is especially interested in testing 
 upon the organism. Neither is the soft-soul 
 theorist putting away nonsensical things in as- 
 serting that the object sensed is not the object 
 as described; for when he says "sensation," he 
 means "object in an environment colored by 
 the environment." Of course he cannot under- 
 stand why you are talking about one thing when 
 he is thinking about fifty. So that it is neither 
 neural action that is the sensation, nor yet the 
 "experience" which no one can mention, but 
 the sensation is the object and what it will do 
 in that environment to accomplish the release 
 of energy in the nervous system. And these two 
 things, what it is and what it does, while un- 
 separated in that which the soft-soul theorist 
 calls his "experience," have just been separated 
 in this treatment of sensation. This point ex- 
 hibits an explicit case of the with-for relation; 
 things and doings are blended in unanalysed 
 consciousness, — blended to make consciousness, 
 131 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 — and it is upon the basis and according to the 
 character of these blends that we ever thought 
 of using the pronoun I. 
 
 42. But lest 1 be misunderstood at this junc- 
 ture, let me say that, insofar as the neural ac- 
 tion is concerned with the sensation, it is iden- 
 tical with whatever of the sensation can be de- 
 fined by reference to the attributes constitut- 
 ing it. Some of these attributes are also identi- 
 cal with the object, the stimulus. In adaptation 
 the nerves are becoming adapted to the con- 
 tinued release of their energy; in summation, 
 they sum their efiects, and so on throughout the 
 list. Sensation, however, is made by an object 
 within an environment upon nervous arcs with- 
 in the eleven thousand million cells of the sys- 
 tem. The object is not cleft from its environ- 
 ment nor are the specialized arcs separated 
 from their gray and white bedding. For the at- 
 tributes that refer to content are of the object 
 as well as exhibited in the response, and partial 
 naming of them with reference exclusively to 
 one or the other is fallacious. Mind and body 
 are the same thing, and of the attribute-thing 
 character; only the possible attributes are not 
 ever all together in time or space, since the 
 orders to which they belong forbid such a con- 
 dition. 
 
 132 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 
 THE SPECIAL SENSES 
 
 /. Internal 
 
 43. Typical of the internal sensations and 
 doubtless of prime importance to the reader is 
 the sensation of hunger. This sensation is to 
 be cleft from appetite, for the desserts we eat 
 are not taken to satisfy hunger, but merely to 
 please us. Furthermore, hunger often forces 
 people to take food when it is both distasteful 
 and nauseating. It is specifically characterized 
 by "a dull ache or gnawing localized at the low- 
 er mid-chest region and the epigastrium, be- 
 coming more local the intenser it becomes." 
 This dull ache is also accompanied by lassitude, 
 drowsiness, faintness, headache, irritability and 
 restlessness at times, these being the inessential 
 concomitants of the sensation. It is not a gen- 
 eral somatic condition, nor is it due to nerve 
 cells "suffering from a shortage of provisions," 
 for after the first few days of a fast, hunger 
 wholly disappears. The absence of hunger in 
 fever, that there is no evidence for the sudden 
 changes in the blood corresponding to the sud- 
 den and intermittent onsets of the pangs, and 
 the fact that hunger is gone too soon after eat- 
 ing for the replenishments it provides to become 
 effective, together with the illustration that to 
 eat moss and clay, indigestibles that they are, 
 133 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 allays the pangs, — these point to a special loca- 
 tion for the stimulus. Neither is it due to 
 emptiness of the stomach alone, nor to the tur- 
 gescence of the gastric glands, for after one 
 swallows indigestibles, causing no secretions of 
 gastric juice whatever, hunger is assuaged. 
 
 44. Hunger is rather the "result of contrac- 
 tions of the muscle fibres of a wholly empty 
 stomach" (in health), and "such contractions 
 may be even stronger than during digestion." 
 This has been shown by means of detecting 
 manometric contractions caused by rubber 
 baloons connected with tubing temporarily 
 swallowed and allowed to be inflated so as to 
 receive the impacts of the stomach wall. The 
 fact that hunger is often felt higher up than at 
 the stomach is accounted for by the similar 
 finding of synchronous contractions in the low- 
 er oesophagus. The cause for these contrac- 
 tions is not known, but writers incline to the 
 view that habit rather than specific bodily need 
 causes them. The expression "too tired to eat" 
 means that fatigue poisons in the blood relay 
 their effects to accomplish a fatigue in the 
 rhythmic contractions of the digestive organs 
 involved. Professor W. B. Cannon writes: 
 "Hunger, in other words, is normally the signal 
 that the stomach is contracted for action; the 
 134 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 unpleasantness of hunger leads to eating; eat- 
 ing starts gastric secretion, distends the con- 
 tracted organ, initiates the movements of gastric 
 digestion, and abolishes the sensation." Now 
 the curious thing to note in this sensation is 
 that the stimulus is not the stomach, nor the 
 empty stomach, but the qualitative and quan- 
 titative character of the movements of that or- 
 gan. If the introspector says that hunger is 
 nonsense when reduced to movements, (just as 
 he would say ether vibrations are a silly sub- 
 stitute for yellow), the reply is that the sensa- 
 tion hunger is the object and what it will do, 
 just as with every other sensation in the con- 
 scious cross-section. Only the experience of 
 hunger is just another qualitative attribute of 
 just such movements and nothing else; for the 
 physiologist from whom I have just quoted 
 would likewise be the last man to say that when 
 the stomach contracts all one has in mind are 
 the graphical results of the manometric meas- 
 urements. 
 
 45. The other internal sensations we shall 
 not consider in detail. Except in diseased con- 
 ditions the intestinal organs can be burned, 
 pricked, cut or pinched without any result for 
 focal consciousness. The peritoneum and 
 diaphram, on the other hand, as far as experi- 
 135 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 ment has gone, show extreme responsiveness; 
 yet the various attributes of sensation have not 
 been systematically studied in them. Thirst 
 and nausea are usually localized in the mouth 
 and throat. As a usual thing we are not con- 
 scious of the action of the heart and lungs, any 
 more than we are of the other viscera, and, in- 
 deed, only by those feelings known as aches 
 and pains do we become at all aware of the 
 unconscious backgrounds of focal conscious- 
 ness. And these aches and pains are frequent- 
 ly intensities, summations, extensities, durations 
 and the like of coenaesthetic disturbances, con- 
 stituting the with-for relation of general and 
 specific defense against disease and thwarting. 
 The psychology of these things, when thorough- 
 ly investigated, will prove of interest to all 
 hands, but their special study is for the pathol- 
 ogist rather than for the student of general psy- 
 chology. 
 
 2. Cutaneous Senses 
 46. The next group of sensations we shall 
 consider are those functioned for by organs in 
 the epidermis. These are commonly called 
 touch, pain, warmth, cold, the pilomotor reflex, 
 tickle, roughness, smoothness, and the like, — 
 some of which are fusions and summations of 
 other sensations. The area known as the "sur- 
 136 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 face of the b«rdy" is defined as extending as far 
 within the apertures of the body as the nor- 
 mally "skin-senses" can be aroused. In con- 
 nection with all these dermal senses two things 
 must be diligently kept in focus: first, the char- 
 acter of the mechanical or other stimulus used, 
 and second, the various layers of organs of 
 sensibility beneath the skin surface. As said 
 before, sensations are objects, and there are not 
 sensations of these objects; so that later on, 
 when we come to the possibility of arousing a 
 sensation of warmth by a cold file the student 
 will have no need of invoking the artifacts to 
 help him over the seeming difficulty. In this 
 connection it will be seen just how important 
 the nature of series becomes in the science of 
 the conscious cross-section. 
 
 47. The organs for the cutaneous senses are 
 in general bulb-like. In and about every hair 
 follicle fine nerve fibres wind, thus making the 
 organs for superficial touch, — that is, the char- 
 acteristic sensation aroused by a pin-head or 
 a medium-sized bristle moderately applied. 
 The formation of the touch-bulb is not unlike 
 a rather amateurish piece of splicing. Cold is 
 functioned for by other end-bulbs, of a round- 
 ish appearance, while warmth is transmitted 
 by a cylindrical organ, deeper in the layers of 
 137 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 the skin than that for cold. Other disc-like or- 
 gans have been located in the deeper tissues, 
 whose function is not as exactly definable as 
 that of the others. Pain is connected with the 
 sensorial functioning of the free nerve endings, 
 and has no specialized organ, insofar as evolu- 
 tionary shaping is concerned. The skin does 
 not respond to thermal, mechanical and elec- 
 trical stimuli homogeneously, but is a mosaic 
 of tiny areas, some of which respond to touches, 
 others to temperatures, and still others to punc- 
 tures and the like. But the interesting thing 
 about the integumental sense field is that the 
 same areas or spots remain constantly of the 
 same character, so that we can factually say: 
 "Once a touch spot always a touch spot," and 
 so on. Of these spots, those responding pain- 
 fully are the most numerous, cold and touch 
 spots come next, while the warmth spots are 
 the fewest. Punsters might infer from this 
 condition both that "man was made to mourn," 
 and also that nature had some hand in the size 
 of the coal bill. Exploration of the entire in- 
 tegument has also shown that these spots are 
 unequally distributed, in general the most sen- 
 sitive parts being over the joints and upon those 
 areas uncovered by clothing. Special articles 
 on these points will have to be referred to by 
 138 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 the student for further and exacter informa- 
 tion. 
 
 48. As a signal example of clean and sig- 
 nificant experimentation upon the skin surface, 
 is to be mentioned the work of Drs. Rivers and 
 Head, as recorded in "Brain," Nov., 1908, in 
 an article called "A Human Experiment in 
 Nerve Division." 1 cite this article also for the 
 purpose of showing that naive experiments per- 
 formed in laboratories result in findings con- 
 trary to those which appear in text-books, be- 
 cause of lack of definition in the materials used 
 and the method employed. Dr. Head found 
 three separate sets of organs located in the 
 dermal layers, each of which behaved quite 
 differently upon the application of the same 
 stimuli. And in this case, as before, one must 
 be ready to resign his old idea of the nature of 
 sensation, and distinguish between the p ijsical 
 nature of the stimulus, the functional nature of 
 the neural release, and the nature of ivhal the 
 organism is doing in the presence of the en- 
 vironment. For while we get yellow when look- 
 ing at the sun as a conscious content, we get 
 touches, colds, warmths and pains when the 
 same shaped stimulus in diiferent physical 
 series is applied to the skin. Only persons who 
 are eye-minded think of needles when their 
 139 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 skin is punctured. The thing known as pain is 
 not the essence of needledom; for the abstract- 
 ing of a hair from the skin will also cause pain, 
 just as the tapping of a cold spot often arouses 
 the sensation called cold. We shall speak of 
 the identity of series in these various contents 
 and processes after the following brief sum- 
 mary of this article cited above. 
 
 49. There is an area of deep sensibility, in- 
 dependent of cutaneous nerves, which functions 
 as follows. Tactile (pin-head) pressure is pres- 
 ent in it, which even deep freezing by ethyl 
 chloride does not abolish; but the application 
 of cotton wool and the pulling of hairs outwards 
 produces no focality in consciousness. Sudden 
 jars and slight gradual pressures, however, are 
 each differently responded to, thus indicating 
 that the content of consciousness subtends re- 
 spectively the different kinds of intensity in- 
 volved. Roughness is well functioned for by 
 this deep-lying system of nerves. Pressure, 
 which to a normal hand would be painful, is 
 present in consciousness as an ache, while needle 
 pricking and electric pain arouse nothing there 
 at all. Local sign is curiously prominent, even 
 after freezing, but two compass points as far 
 apart as 6 cm. laid longitudinally to the axis of 
 the arm are not distinguished. Yet upon the 
 140 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 application of the points successively no such 
 results are obtained. Temperature is wholly 
 absent, only numbness being reported after the 
 application of cold silver tubes and freezing 
 solutions. The point to be finally made is that 
 in the above experiment, "the peculiar aptitude 
 possessed by a part innervated solely by the 
 atierent receptor fibres of a muscular nerve, is 
 the appreciation of all stimuli which produce 
 deformation of structure." 
 
 50. Some time after such an operation, pro- 
 topathic sensibility is present, or the sensibility 
 appearing in the first stages of a lesion. In this 
 condition, pain is distinctly felt, but "any ther- 
 mal sensation produced by an adequate stim- 
 ulus to a protopathic area tends to be widely 
 diffused and to be referred into remote parts. 
 In the attempt to estimate the relative intensity 
 of two stimuli, a less cold object covering a 
 larger area of the skin may evoke a more vivid 
 sensation than one of smaller size but of lower 
 temperature." In this stage, also, the hair is 
 insensitive to all stimulation. (As long after 
 the operation as 86 days.) The hairs do not 
 respond with the characteristic "touch" sensa- 
 tion, but bring about a tingling and diffused 
 one, which "tends to be referred to parts remote 
 from the point stimulated. Moreover, the re- 
 141 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 turn of this form of sensibility (protopathic) 
 does not bring to the skin after shaving any 
 power of reacting to stimulation with cotton 
 wool." 
 
 51. In the later stages of a lesion, epicritic 
 sensibility is manifest. Tactual sensations 
 abound in almost the normal amount; localiza- 
 tion is good, as are pointedness and relative 
 sizes; and while thermal sensitivity is acute, the 
 compass points are responded to with much 
 irregularity. The touch of cotton wool on a 
 shaven area is clearly appreciated, and the hair 
 clad parts react both to pulls and pushes. The 
 irregularity of the compass tests, however, does 
 not include the item of eccentric reference, and 
 Head believes that spacial discrimination is 
 primarily a function of the epicritic sensibility. 
 
 52. The pilomotor reflex, commonly known 
 as "goose-skin," is principally a function of the 
 protopathic sensibility. "The exact date of the 
 return of this reflex was not noted; but we 
 gradually became aware that pricking the skin, 
 pulling the hairs, or the application of the cold 
 tube would occasionally give rise to a condi- 
 tion of "goose-skin" within the area we were 
 testing. 
 
 "As protopathic sensibility increased, this 
 reflex could be evoked more easily from the 
 142 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 affected area than from the normal skin. , . . 
 Even brushing the hairs with cotton wool in 
 this stage of recovery would start a pilomotor 
 reflex. 
 
 "With the gradual return of epicritic sen- 
 sibility to the forearm, this increased response 
 died away . . . 
 
 "Whilst engaged on these experiments, we 
 discovered that the 'thrill' called forth by 
 aesthetic pleasure is accompanied by erection 
 of the hairs ... He [the subject] could 
 evoke the reflex by reading aloud some favorite 
 poem." (Head, op. cit.) 
 
 53. As to the differences between these sys- 
 tems of cutaneous sensibility in adapting to 
 warm and cold, it is reported that, 
 
 "Over normal parts, the neutral point of 
 thermal sensibility shifts according as the hand 
 is adapted to heat or to cold. 
 
 "Over protopathic parts, no such change oc- 
 curs . . . 
 
 "It follows that some innervation other than 
 protopathic must exist in the normal skin 
 . . . and that this mechanism is capable of 
 adaptation within a wide range. 
 
 ". . . protopathic parts are incapable of 
 adaptation to any material extent," but "parts 
 in a condition of defective sensibility" are "ren- 
 143 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 dered apparently more sensitive to the specific 
 stimulus of cold." (op. cit.) 
 
 54. "Accurate tactile localization is possible 
 even M^hen the part is supplied with deep sen- 
 sibility only, provided the pressure is sufficient 
 to stimulate the deep afferent system. 
 
 ". . . the recognition of two compass 
 points applied simultaneously to the skin, is im- 
 possible in the absence of epicritic sensibility, 
 except at distances enormously in excess of the 
 normal. 
 
 "The existence of epicritic impulses inhibits 
 the tendency to refer into remote parts. 
 
 "Localization is in all probability the sum 
 of two sets of sensations, one of which arises 
 from deep, the other from cutaneous stimula- 
 tion." 
 
 55. The attribute of intensity is found to 
 have the following bearings upon the case: 
 
 "Parts in a condition of protopathic sensi- 
 bility respond more vividly than the normal 
 skin to all stimuli capable of evoking a sensa- 
 tion." [I should rather say "content."] 
 
 "This ... is usually more intense and 
 always of much greater extent than over normal 
 parts. 
 
 "For all effective stimuli, the threshold is 
 
 144 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 high in a protopathic area, and ... is one 
 of defective sensibility. 
 
 "An effective protopathic stimulus of low in- 
 tensity, but covering a larger area, may produce 
 a sensation of greater apparent intensity than 
 a more restricted stimulation of greater 
 strength. 
 
 "The usual psychological view that an in- 
 creased sensory reaction corresponds to a low- 
 ered threshold must be readjusted. It is true 
 in the strict sense only of epicritic and deep 
 sensibility." (The italics in the above are 
 mine.) 
 
 56. As to punctuate sensibility, Head furth- 
 er reports: 
 
 "The skin is supplied by two anatomically 
 distinct systems which . . . regenerate at 
 different periods after complete nerve division. 
 Moreover, a part of the skin may be supplied 
 by one of these systems only. 
 
 "Protopathic sensibility depends upon spe- 
 cific end-organs gathered together within the 
 skin to form sensory spots; the spaces between 
 are insensitive to cutaneous stimuli, if the part 
 is endowed with protopathic sensibility only. 
 
 "Owing to the sparseness of the heat spots, 
 their characteristics can be easily demonstrated; 
 cold spots are more numerous and correspond- 
 145 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 ingly difficult to investigate. The pain spots 
 are so closely distributed throughout the skin 
 that it is impossible to study them with the 
 [same] accuracy [as in the case] of the heat 
 heat and cold spots; but the character of their 
 response, and the period at which they regen- 
 erate, show that they belong to the same order. 
 
 "Whenever the skin is supplied with proto- 
 pathic end organs only, any sensation evoked 
 radiates widely and tends to be referred to re- 
 mote parts. These are the same, whichever 
 kind of spot be stimulated, so long as it lies 
 within the same area of the skin. 
 
 "Radiation and reference are abolished as 
 soon as the part becomes sensitive to cutaneous 
 tactile stimuli and to intermediate degrees of 
 temperature. 
 
 "All protopathic sense organs have a high 
 threshold. All epicritic organs have a low thres- 
 hold. . . . When the normal skin is stim- 
 ulated, the defects of protopathic sensibility are 
 corrected and compensated by the simultaneous 
 activity of the low-threshold epicritic system. 
 . . . The epicritic mechanism is highly adapt- 
 able. The threshold for painful sensations is 
 the same over normal and over highly proto- 
 pathic parts, but on the normal skin the ap- 
 proach of pain is preceded by the sensation of 
 146 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 contact with a pointed object. This is absent 
 over protopathic parts. The power of recogniz- 
 ing the pointed nature of the stimulating ob- 
 ject . . . belongs to that group of sensations 
 by which we estimate relative size." 
 
 57. It can thus be seen that "touch" instead 
 of being one sense, as handed down in popular 
 mythology, is more exactly ten or eleven senses, 
 shared among three sets of nerve fibres. For 
 example, we can "physically" touch the skin 
 with wool, sandpaper, pin points and heads, or 
 with wooden skewers that deeply deform it, — 
 all touchings, if you will, and yet the conscious 
 content is qualitatively different each time. 
 Quantitative equality in these cases is something 
 that does not exist for psychology, — the intensity 
 is in each case prime; and these quantitative se- 
 ries in psychology possess severally but one 
 term, the term of specific qualitative intensity. 
 However, in their relations to other series, an 
 other than the prime relation exists in those se- 
 ries constituting the separate dermal sensations. 
 The case of paradox-cold is one to which too 
 great emphasis cannot be drawn, for it means 
 that some of the series making up sensation in- 
 tersect, just as two lines intersect. To be able 
 to arouse a cold sensation with the use of a hot 
 rod means precisely that as much of the cold 
 147 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 sensation as is thus aroused is identical with the 
 as yet unnamed complex of heat-touch-nerve- 
 touch-organ, called by virtue of surprise, the 
 paradox-cold sensation. It is something more 
 than this; for in these two above-named com- 
 plexes, there exists a common part. Further- 
 more, this concept of the common part is ex- 
 hibited in the case of arousing tickle with cot- 
 ton wool and with a fine bristle attached to the 
 tine of a tuning fork vibrating against the skin. 
 The eccentric reference of sensation by the pro- 
 topathic system to which Head refers is also 
 but a case of common parts in the two series 
 of stimulus-organ-response complexes. It also 
 means for the student of physiology that the 
 response was inhibited along one, its accus- 
 tomed, final common path, and found its way 
 out by another less blockaded. 
 
 58. It is almost needless to say, that the pro- 
 hibition we declared against the use of popular 
 terminology in the first chapter is more than 
 justified by this rather exhaustive account of 
 the nature of touchings and other dealings with 
 the skin. Impacts, which have been the glory 
 of physics to reduce to formulae, have almost 
 no meaning in psychology. For impacts branch 
 and flower at the gateway of the nervous system 
 in such a surprising manner, that a new con- 
 148 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 ception of their significance must react even 
 on the study of physics. For physics should 
 be that area of study in which sensations are 
 exhaustively analysed. Again, in the tempera- 
 ture senses, what we call warmth, heat and cold, 
 are all within a very small range of the possible 
 and actual temperatures. The series is short 
 in psychology, bordered by the series of numb- 
 nesses below the lower threshold of cold, and 
 by burnings above the upper threshold for heat. 
 Ice is way beyond our limit of cold imagina- 
 tions, and the fusion point of even lead bank- 
 rupts our sense-imagery. But, having lived so 
 long under the dominion of hyperbole and ex- 
 clamation points, we flatter ourselves that the 
 range of the imagination is unlimited. We for- 
 get that we substitute sensation thresholds for 
 what lies beyond, and thus in the dust of the 
 wheel utter many statements whose meaning 
 corresponds exactly to that of flapdoodle and 
 galoozalum. 
 
 59. Nevertheless here is a point where 
 something other than sensational consciousness 
 enters in. The thermometer, by which we 
 measure temperatures accurately, and trans- 
 cend our sensible appreciation of cold and heat, 
 is in fact just a detachable organ, whose busi- 
 ness is temperature affectiveness, but whose 
 149 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 efferent (sensory) nerve is not in the skin, but 
 in the eye. That is, we do not sense trans-sen- 
 sational thermometric temperatures, but per- 
 ceive them. And at this point we shall leave 
 the attribute-thing complex called sensation 
 and go to the part-whole complex called per- 
 ception, at least, as far as dermal sensitivity 
 allows us. 
 
 60. When a single compass point is placed 
 on the skin, and we merely react with "there," 
 indicating that a touch of some kind was re- 
 ceived, it is called sensation. When, again, the 
 two compass points are placed on the skin, and 
 we, with eyes closed as before, say "there," we 
 have again merely sensational content. But if 
 we are asked to tell whether in the second case 
 there are two points rather than one touching 
 us, and the twoness is manifest, we are on the 
 road to perception. Especially is this true if 
 we notice, by instruction, whether the points 
 are placed in a certain dermographic relation 
 to each other. Then, if we so locate them, or, 
 if we discriminate the single point as having 
 position relative to a certain other point or a 
 part of the hand, we are perceiving along with 
 our sensing, — ^they both getting simultaneously 
 into the language reaction (common part). 
 This is perception: sensations having structure, 
 150 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 sensations organized into some relationships 
 and mentioned by the use of nothing necessarily 
 more than prepositions and conjunctions. Drag 
 a point along the skin, likewise, and if the re- 
 port includes terms in relation, the conscious- 
 ness is perceptual. Bear in mind, also, that 
 these relations are not "material." Now the 
 perception of cold or heat beyond the thresholds 
 of these senses is vicariously accomplished by 
 the observation of another set of changes than 
 those of temperature proceeding side by side 
 with the sensational alterations. Before the 
 threshold of cold or heat is passed, several sets 
 of changes are simultaneously present, one in 
 the modality specified above, and the other in 
 another modality, say that of sight. The first 
 modality may be in focal, the second in co-con- 
 sciousness. Then, when the threshold of 
 the first modality is passed, the second 
 modality comes into focality, and func- 
 tions for both of them without apparent 
 loss to fused consciousness of the mo- 
 dality which has actually ceased to be present. 
 For in such a case, our own responses keep 
 marking time while the physical changes keep 
 mounting their series,— the result being that the 
 very condition of duration in one sense field 
 coupled with alterations in another produces 
 151 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 the fusion or summation effect of the sense im- 
 agery adequate to the vicarious functioning of 
 the trans-liminal series. 
 
 61. Thus perception is, so far, not a "mental 
 act" by which we grasp the data obvious to us. 
 It is, so far as dermal things are concerned, 
 based entirely upon local sign, duration, exten- 
 sity, intensity, fusion, contrast and after-image. 
 For by the use of these alone, plus the responses 
 of the neural organisation to relations, percep- 
 tion is made clear and unmysterious. And if 
 one asks here, as is inevitable, "how do we re- 
 spond to relations?" the answer is that all neural 
 functioning is, ipso facto, a series of effects and 
 as such is a set of terms in relation. 
 And these relations correspond with the 
 relations between the objects they function. 
 Furthermore, two compass points are, when 
 not fused in touch, psychologically present as 
 (1) "there," (2) "there," and (3) "something re- 
 lating the two theres" as content. It is like- 
 wise with all other relations and terms. Fur- 
 thermore, when the content is loosely knit, they 
 stand more clearly manifest the longer it en- 
 dures; while when the content is welded and 
 blent together, it has to be of longer duration 
 to allow the relations to be perceived, and even 
 then the various familiar parts must be allied 
 152 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 and compared with other things. This also is 
 the door-step to logical-mindedness, as a little 
 reflection will show. 
 
 62. It remains to speak somewhat in de- 
 tail of certain attributes of dermal sensation. 
 Of qualities there are only a few as compared 
 with auditory and visual contents. In touch, 
 there are light touch, superficial touch, granular 
 touch, and the contents characteristic of moving 
 objects on the skin. Intensity has been suf- 
 ficiently treated in the quotations from Head. 
 The latent period of touch is relatively long, 
 varying from 1/6 to 1/4 sec, depending some- 
 what upon the rate of impact employed. The 
 threshold of touch is determined by the amount 
 of pressure required to arouse the organs, and 
 varies somewhat for different spots. The dura- 
 tion of the touch sensation is connected with 
 the matter of after-image, exhaustion, adapta- 
 tion, and one or two other attributes, as follows. 
 If the impact is forcible, say a dab with a pen- 
 cil eraser on the forehead, suddenly withdrawn, 
 there is very little longer duration to the main 
 sensation than to the maintenance of the stim- 
 ulus. But immediately afterwards, rings of 
 throbbing or resurgence will arise from the 
 smitten area as a center and pass off centri- 
 fugally. These are after-images, and may ex- 
 153 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 ceed five in number as well as exceed the in- 
 tensity of the original impact as felt. They will 
 be also more extensive than the original "sen- 
 sation." Again, subliminal pressures will sum 
 up into an effective stimulation, whose quality 
 is often itchy or even painful and diffuse. 
 Furthermore, the persistent stimulation of a live 
 touch spot by supra-liminal pressures may ex- 
 haust it, so that not even by looking at it and 
 suggesting to oneself that it "ought" to feel 
 touched, can we reaffirm the content above the 
 threshold. Nevertheless, in the case of adapta- 
 tion, the relating of the subconscious or co-con- 
 scious elements of the sensation with other fo- 
 cal contents will suffice to reinstate it among 
 the series of appreciable intensities. Fusions 
 in touch we have already illustrated by refer- 
 ence to the compass points; curious simultane- 
 ous and successive contrasts are often obtained 
 by the use of compass points along with an in- 
 strument giving single touches. Even when the 
 compass points are beyond or within the two- 
 point threshold, they may be felt as one or two 
 as contrasted with single touches. Clearness is 
 well illustrated in the above case as well as in 
 that of diffuseness and pointedness being pres- 
 ent at the same time; while lightly brushing a 
 hair-clad surface will show that "intensity" (as 
 154 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 an impact phenomenon) is not required for fo- 
 cal vividness. Feeling-tones in touch are beau- 
 tifully illustrated with the aid of various text- 
 ures, though touch blends operate here rather 
 than single sensations. 
 
 63. As a last word on touch, I wish to cite 
 an experiment upon the difference between the 
 relative percentages of after-images derived 
 from various modes of stimulating the skin, as 
 reported in the "Psychological Monograph" for 
 September, 1912, by M. H. S. Hayes in a thesis 
 on "Cutaneous After-Sensations." The quota- 
 tion I shall make will also serve to show the 
 nature of the after-image series for dermal sen- 
 sitivity. The general percentage of after-sen- 
 sations, both those outlasting the application of 
 the stimulus, and those reappearing after a sub- 
 conscious interval is as follows: 
 
 "Areal Cold 94.8% 
 
 Punctiform Pain 93.5% 
 
 Areal Heat 89.3% 
 
 N. B. Areal Pressure 88.4% 
 
 Punctiform Cold 84.7% 
 
 N. B. Punctiform Pressure 79.3% 
 
 Punctiform Heat 79.3% 
 
 Radiant Heat 74.5% 
 
 Radiant Cold 67.9% 
 
 Electric Cold 59.3% 
 
 155 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 
 Electric Heat 58.3%" 
 
 As to latent intervals, they are found most 
 frequently with pressure, and less and less so 
 with pain, heat and cold. Punctiform stimuli 
 function them better than areal; whereas the 
 briefer latent intervals are connected with heat, 
 while longer ones are evident in touch and cold. 
 The author concludes the article by saying, fur- 
 thermore, that "cutaneous after-sensations are 
 real phenomena, and not explainable by imagi- 
 nation, oscillating attention, or the presence of 
 skin and muscle [ ?] sensations ordinarily pass- 
 ing unnoticed." 
 
 64. In connection with heat and cold, or 
 better, warmth and cold,— for heat is a curious 
 blend of cold and warmth, with slight admix- 
 tures of pain at times, — one needs to notice that 
 the range of temperatures which the skin right- 
 ly appreciates is very limited. We shall speak 
 of this range as those temperatures functionally 
 effective for focal consciousness. But just as 
 "physically" there is only "colder" and "warm- 
 er," rather than true "cold" and "warm" or 
 "hot," — thus offering no objection to the notion 
 that temperature series in psychology overlap 
 and possess common parts, — so in psychology, 
 the sensational value of a thermal stimulus is 
 dependent upon its temperature relative to 
 156 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 that of the human body. Notice this, further- 
 more, — that we say we feel comfortable, that 
 is, neither warm nor cold, when we mean that 
 there are no noticeable thermal sensations, 
 while yet the temperatures of mouth, nose, and 
 ear, for example, are quite a few degrees dif- 
 ferent from each other. To this contrast con- 
 dition, there is only unconscious response. As 
 a "warm" background for sensations, the skin 
 behaves curiously: for we feel a cold stimulus 
 as cold, even while the temperature of the skin 
 affected is rising, — something the physicist 
 would scarcely expect. Other curious phenom- 
 ena of temperature are the paradox-cold and 
 paradox-heat sensations, while even tapping a 
 temperature spot sometimes arouses the tem- 
 perature sensation. A similar curiosity is dis- 
 covered in touch, where the diffuse sensation 
 of light wool can be inhibited by touching with 
 a pencil point the center of the responding area. 
 But all these phenomena, and many others of a 
 like character, merely show that the dermal 
 senses are to be best thought of schematically, 
 but schematically only as comparable to a net- 
 work of intersecting lines and planes, which 
 cannot, however, be reduced to the ordinary 
 tri-dimensionality of Euclidian space. 
 
 65. Pain is not the same as unpleasantness, 
 157 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 for aches and pains can at times possess a curi- 
 ous agreeability. Pain and pleasure, which 
 common sense makes antithetical, have no such 
 opposition in psychology: for pain is a sensa- 
 tion, while pleasure is an attribute of any sen- 
 sation. It is to be noted, in regard to pain, that 
 it has an unusually long latent-period. The 
 child whose cries do not come immediately 
 after its being hurt, can thus be whisked out 
 of the pain series if another class of sensations 
 be properly presented to it. Extremes of tem- 
 perature are called painful, but they do not be- 
 come pains any more than a red becomes yel- 
 low; the common part of both series is the basis 
 for this apparent change in the conscious con- 
 tent. Furthermore, pain-producing spots, 
 though the most numerous of dermal organs, 
 normally function less often than do the others, 
 as result of both long latent-periods and habits 
 of avoiding the adequate stimulus for this sen- 
 sation. 
 
 66. If tickle can be aroused by stimulating 
 a hair-clad surface with wool or by drawing a 
 pencil lightly across it, this sensory content is a 
 blend of subliminal touches. Tickle can also 
 be aroused on hairless surfaces, where touch 
 organs thickly abound, and in some cases seems 
 to be interpenetrated with slight, unpleasant 
 158 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 pain. Other touch blends will be taken up un- 
 der Kinaesthetic Sensations. The point I wish 
 to keep in mind here is that if a rapidly vibrat- 
 ing bristle and other things will arouse tickle, 
 psychologically a spacial numerousness over a 
 large area is the same as a temporal numerous- 
 ness over a smaller one. For psychology, then, 
 numerousness or periodicity is a prior category 
 to space or time. And numerousness is a prop- 
 erty of the cardinal number system, and not a 
 "mental" or "physical" object. 
 
 Questions on the Dermal Senses. 
 
 1. Describe fully both the physical and 
 psychological events in producing some form 
 of touch sensation. Make a list of the attributes 
 exhibited and relate them one at a time, as ac- 
 curately as you can, to the physical stimulus 
 operating. 
 
 2. Slowly immerse the hand in cold water, 
 and notice that the more surface that becomes 
 stimulated by the liquid, the colder the con- 
 sciousness becomes. Do the same with hot 
 water and mark the corresponding effect. Then 
 completely cover the hand with dry sand; or 
 better, slowly immerse it in mercury and no- 
 tice carefully that something else happens than 
 in the case of the other two liquids. Enumerate 
 all the attributes of sensation involved in the 
 
 159 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 three parts of this experiment, and state psy- 
 chologically the different effects obtained. 
 Kinaesthetic Sensations. 
 
 67. We have seen that a point moving over 
 the skin can be sensorially appreciated. This 
 phenomenon includes, however, the items of in- 
 termittence and resistence, which are also pres- 
 ent when we move the skin over a fixed stim- 
 ulus; and these two situations are identical in 
 their cutaneous effects. Now, movement is not 
 a function of the touch organs, and neither is 
 it dependent upon the muscular condition, for 
 there are no muscular sensations, heavy and 
 deep pressures being functioned by the cutane- 
 ous system of deep sensibility, and by organs 
 located in the joints and tendons. 
 
 68. The quality known as strain which we 
 find as content in pushing, pulling, long stand- 
 ing and the like is derived from an environment 
 upon which the tendinous sense is contrasted. 
 The spindles of Golgi furnish the specific organs 
 for this response. It will be noted here, also, 
 that strains as sensations are identical with 
 strains in physics. Content and function here 
 coincide. The strain sensation has common 
 parts with certain members of the pain and 
 warmth series in overexercise, while in buoyant 
 health the "springy" step we experience is due 
 
 160 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 to the presence of the attributes of clearness 
 and vividness, quite independent of the thres- 
 hold. Strain has an obviously precise local sign 
 in some cases, while in others eccentric refer- 
 ence allies it to the protopathic system in touch. 
 
 69. Joint sensations have much the same 
 quality as certain touches, especially the deep- 
 er ones. To the functions of the end-organs of 
 articular cartilages are due these joint or artic- 
 ular sensations. If, before we push a heavy 
 object, we "set" the joint, the subsequent sen- 
 sations are largely tendinous. Now the state- 
 ments in regard to movement are almost never 
 indicative of sensations, but rather of percep- 
 tions. To report that a limb has moved, — just 
 moved, — is of course a sense report, but to say 
 that its relation to the rest of the body or to an- 
 other limb is altered, is no longer a matter of 
 sensation, but of perception. This can be built 
 up out of after-images of former position, united 
 with the present sensory datum, or can be di- 
 rectly related, — but in either case, we more 
 properly speak of perceptions of movement, 
 since the situation contains parts, rather than 
 bare attributes. 
 
 70. When one feels a rough or smooth sur- 
 face, not only is touch present, but a certain 
 amount of intermittence and resistence also. 
 
 161 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 The reason we do not ordinarily call these con- 
 tents perceptions, is because, if the eyes are 
 closed, we are uncertain as to the physical na- 
 ture of the stimulus, and the loose organization 
 of parts is scarcely sufficient to avoid misnaming 
 the stimulus. So we call them touch-blends in- 
 stead. They are, more exactly, cases of inter- 
 sensational fusion and summation, and as such 
 have many common parts with each other as 
 we shall presently see. For with all move- 
 ments, or with all situations in which the ten- 
 dinous and articular senses are involved, in- 
 sufficient orientation with the rest of the con- 
 scious cross-section produces a condition, the 
 type of which the following illustration will 
 render clear. In the first place, we never know 
 our nerves, and never have any focal conscious- 
 ness of the release of energy into the effector 
 organs. It is impossible to think of the move- 
 ments we go through in terms of specific excita- 
 tion of the moving member, — arm, leg, eye, 
 tongue, etc. We know only late in the game 
 that they have moved beyond the place that is 
 in focal consciousness. Former theorists on the 
 nature of the will have turned over in their 
 graves several times since this was made evi- 
 dent, but it has so far done little good. Active 
 and passive movements alike are unaccom- 
 162 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 panied by this experience of energy in the con- 
 sciousness they produce. Furthermore, foot- 
 rules are not part of the furniture of the nervous 
 system; and our blind estimation of how far, 
 or how much further we have moved a member 
 this time in comparison to the last is very in- 
 accurate. It takes a whole orgy of sensations 
 to make a satisfactory perception of movement, 
 and even then the part-whole complex they con- 
 struct is often top-heavy with eccentric refer- 
 ence of one of the elements. For with all the 
 senses active, — movement, sight, hearing, touch, 
 and the like, — one expects that his body will be- 
 come an efficient geometer. But in psychology, 
 there are no unequivocal calibrations. The 
 quadrants, sextants, slide-rules, meter sticks, and 
 so forth, which we make and use, are again ad- 
 justable touch, movement, and sight organs, de- 
 rived from countless comparisons with and con- 
 tradictions of data obtained by the naive sense 
 organs, as well as made under conditions in 
 which the natural forces themselves inscribe 
 their periodicities upon receiving surfaces. In 
 comparison to the accuracy of these records, 
 almost all naive perceptions might be termed 
 blends, for as true perceptions they are serious- 
 ly unstable. 
 
 71. I shall quote E. B. Titchener's account 
 163 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 of touch blends, as found on pages 171-2 of his 
 "A Text Book of Psychology," since it seems 
 both thorough and quite in line with the view 
 of sensation as propounded in this book. "The 
 difference between hard and soft, for instance, 
 is mainly a difference in degree of resistance 
 offered to the hand; and this means a difference 
 in the degree of pressure exerted by the one 
 articular surface upon the other. The distinc- 
 tion thus belongs to the joints rather than to the 
 skin. Again, the difference between smooth 
 and rough is a difference, first, between con- 
 tinuous and interrupted movement, and sec- 
 ondly between uniform and variable stimula- 
 tion of the pressure spots of the skin. The dis- 
 tinction thus belongs to joints and skin to- 
 gether." 
 
 "Sharp and blunt differ, primarily, as pain 
 and pressure: a thing is sharp if it pricks or 
 cuts, blunt if it sets up diffuse pressure sensa- 
 tions." . . . "Wetness is a complex of pres- 
 sure and temperature. It is possible, under ex- 
 perimental conditions, to evoke . . . wet- 
 ness from perfectly dry things, — flour, lycopo- 
 dium powder, cotton wool, discs of metal; and 
 it is possible, on the other hand, to wet the 
 skin with water and to evoke the perception [ ?] 
 
 of a dry pressure or a dry temperature. Not 
 164 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 the moistening of the skin, but the fitting dis- 
 tribution of pressure and temperature sensa- 
 tions, gives rise to the perception [?] of wet- 
 ness. Other modes of distribution of the same 
 sensations produce the perception [?] of dry- 
 ness. 
 
 "Clamminess is a mixture of soft and cold: 
 the cold sensations and the pressure elements 
 in the softness must be so distributed as to give 
 the perception [?] of moisture. The clammy 
 feel of a wet cloth may be got by laying the 
 finger on a loosely stretched rubber membrane, 
 and sending a puff of cold air over it at the 
 moment of contact. Oiliness is probably due to 
 a certain combination of smoothness and re- 
 sistance; movement seems to be necessary to 
 its perception [?]. Clinging, sticky feels may 
 be obtained from dry cotton wool." 
 
 If, then, an identical conscious content can be 
 provoked by two or more differing mechanical 
 means, we can but say that they have common 
 parts: they coincide in the effects they produce. 
 We have noticed this item in connection with 
 the phenomenon of a "touch" becoming "pain- 
 ful," and have dealt with the error involved 
 in such a statement. Further illustrations of 
 the same thing will occur profusely in, for ex- 
 ample, the sense of sight, but we only need 
 165 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 prophesy here that no "red" ever became a 
 "yellow," as will turn out after the whole band- 
 age has been removed. 
 
 Taste and Smell. 
 72. These two senses are very intimately 
 connected in the conscious cross-section by vir- 
 tue of the fact that they blend together so in- 
 veterately. But psychological analysis separ- 
 ates them with ease, and their definite connec- 
 tion with chemicals is quite complete. The taste 
 organs are taste buds, which are calyx-like 
 structures in the papillae of the tongue, parts of 
 the soft palate, the larynx, and a few other 
 places. There are taste buds also in children 
 on the inside of the cheeks, and in the center of 
 the tongue, which, in adults lacks responsive- 
 ness to taste. There are but four primary qual- 
 ities of taste, — sweet, salt, bitter, and sour, — all 
 others being smell-taste mixtures, or compensa- 
 tions and rivalries either in one sense or the 
 other, or between them both. Oscillations are 
 also frequent between tastes of a high intensity. 
 In general, the adequate stimulus is a solution, 
 which is part of the function of the salivary re- 
 flex. Besides, chemical salts taste salty, sugars 
 taste sweet, alkaloids bitter, and the acids sour. 
 However, there are some chemical salts that 
 taste sweet, others bitter, while quite a few are 
 166 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 tasteless. Too, some few acids taste sweet, 
 some are tasteless, while one, hydrocyanic acid, 
 gives bitter. Very salty solutions slightly burn, 
 and very sour things become astringent or pain- 
 ful. Likewise, sweets in saturated solutions 
 prickle or burn the tongue, while bitters often 
 have a fatty as well as a burning quality. Only 
 solutions taste, whether the solvent be solid, 
 liquid or gaseous, but just as there are salts 
 which do not taste salty, so there are some solu- 
 tions which are tasteless. 
 
 73. Taste is easily localizable, being un- 
 equivocally in that complex of solution- 
 tongue. But in taste, one must carefully dis- 
 tinguish between the quality of the taste and 
 the quality or intensity of the solution as well 
 as other things. An apple, let us say, tastes 
 either sweet or sour; but as something eaten, as 
 something in the mouth, there is much more 
 to be considered than the bare taste quality. 
 There are, for instance, the elements of pres- 
 sure, movement, and duration, any or all of 
 which give us the characteristic perception of 
 eating this or that thing. It is known that a 
 jaded palate is more often appeased by altera- 
 tions in duration and pressure concerned in "re- 
 ducing the contrary material to submission" 
 than by alterations of the specific taste ele- 
 167 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 ments themselves. The most interesting attri- 
 butes of taste are fusion, adaptation, inhibition, 
 and contrast, especially as they occur in cook- 
 ing. Lemonade is both sour and sweet, and 
 also a partial fusion of these two qualities. 
 Sweets taste "smooth" and acids "rough," and 
 thus lemonade is a complex of five, if not of six 
 separable things. We sweeten bitter coffee and 
 tea, — nature not having consulted with us in 
 planning the woodside order of these bever- 
 ages. Salads are another case of the "search 
 for happiness" (?), in which concoctions sugar 
 offsets the salt, while both either inhibit or en- 
 hance the oil and vinegar to a slight degree. A 
 strong sweet and a salt make an insipid com- 
 bination, but neutralize each other into a vapid 
 blend, if weak. And so on. The contrast ef- 
 fects of tastes may be either simultaneous or 
 successive, and subliminal sweets often sum up 
 into something focal, which, if based on bare 
 quantity, plots an unexpected series of relations 
 between the two thresholds thus obtained. The 
 latent period of taste, from long to short, runs 
 as follows : bitter, sour, sweet, and salt. But in 
 taste mixtures, this order does not follow the 
 combinations made on a quantitative basis. 
 For while the neutralizations (inhibition) are 
 best in the order: sweet-bitter, sour-salt, salt- 
 168 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 bitter, sweet-sour,— following slightly the laws 
 of color mixture,— yet new series are developed 
 in the mixing which have their bases in some- 
 thing other than chemistry or physics. Even 
 the time relations of tastes would suffice to de- 
 velop "newness" in the gustatory cross-section. 
 Contrast in taste is more marked than adapta- 
 tion, and adaptation to one sort of solution al- 
 ways leaves the other three intact. Liminal 
 sour on one side of the tongue applied at the 
 same time as a subliminal sweet on the other, 
 may bring the latter to some sort of focality; 
 while subliminal bitter, when applied with an- 
 other taste, is usually present as sweet, if at all. 
 74. Taste is a difficult sense to study, as one 
 can easily imagine. The mouth must be bul- 
 warked with cotton, and the tongue wiped dry 
 incessantly, while the experimenter, with a fine 
 camel's hair brush stimulates the various pa- 
 pillae. But by dint of patience, the following 
 general facts are well established: the back of 
 the tongue senses bitter, the edges sour, the tip 
 sweet, while salt is sensed by nearly every part 
 of it. Some of the individual taste buds re- 
 spond to all stimuli, while others to but one or 
 two; continued touching of the papillae also ex- 
 hausts their functioning power. The threshold, 
 as might be expected, varies with the amount 
 169 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 of the liquid taken, but for equal quantities of 
 solution, a 0.27( solution of sulphuric acid, a 
 0.4% solution of salt and a 1.2% solution of 
 sugar is sufficient to effect a focality of taste. 
 Curiously enough, also the electric current 
 tastes, — doubtless due to ionization, — while with 
 the ears full of warm water in which electrodes 
 are bathed, a sour taste in the mouth results. 
 However, inasmuch as the nerve supply of the 
 tongue is functioned by the vagus, lingual and 
 chorda tympani, such a phenomenon is not al- 
 together anomalous. 
 
 75. The curious common parts in the der- 
 mal senses have already been intimated. Chem- 
 ically, there is apparent evidence for allying 
 the various tastes more effectively than there is 
 physically for allying the senses of warmth and 
 cold. The so-called III, IV, and V groups of 
 chemical series are generally sweet-tasting, 
 while the "inorganic, bitter-tasting substances 
 are derived from positive ionization of the I and 
 II groups, and from the negative elements of 
 the VI and VII groups." On this basis the 
 sweet-generating molecule is also potentially a 
 generator of bitter. But much clean experi- 
 mentation is yet to be done upon this sense 
 field. 
 
 76. Smell, like taste, is a chemical sense, 
 
 170 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 but smell is peculiarly a land and ground sense, 
 used by man only for its nutritive and protec- 
 tive value, and not for such purposes as are em- 
 ployed by those animals in whom it is best de- 
 veloped. We find our food by appointment and 
 not by odor. The organ for this sense is not 
 the total nose, but is a very small, brown patch 
 of mucous membrane high up in the whorls of 
 the anterior part of the head cavity, ciliated 
 and bathed in liquid. The cilia waft forward, 
 also, thus driving those odors ordinarily un- 
 noticed in eating, which rise through the pos- 
 terior nares, out toward the forward apertures, 
 and in this way function a sort of extra sentry- 
 duty upon our food. The cells in this patch of 
 mucous are similar to the taste cells, and the 
 olfactory nerve, which supplies them, is the 
 shortest in the body. Part of the region con- 
 cerned is also supplied by the trigeminous 
 nerve, and there is unusual sensitivity to cold, 
 heat and pain in that area of the body. It is 
 thus doubtful whether one should call the organ 
 of smell and its environs inside or on the sur- 
 face of the skin. 
 
 77. Contact is essential for smell, and either 
 
 vapors or particles can stimulate. The local 
 
 sign of an object of smell is given by virtue of 
 
 its position in the cone-shaped area defined by 
 
 171 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 the apertures of the nose downwards. In gen- 
 eral, those substances which whirl while dis- 
 solving in a liquid can be smelled, but not quite 
 all whirling substances are odorous, nor do all 
 smellable things whirl in solution. Again, some 
 substances must be applied in solution to the 
 brown patch directly, in order to be sensed by 
 this organ. Furthermore, the brown patch is 
 not on the main line of conduction from the 
 front to the back of the nasal passage, but the 
 odors drift and are wafted thither by the cilia 
 instead. In spite of this fact, the threshold is 
 very low, being given as one millionth of a milli- 
 gram of mercapton dissolved in a cubic deci- 
 meter of washed air. There has been some at- 
 tempt to relate the chemistry of smell to the 
 psychology of it, but no one has plotted the 
 series very far or very assuredly, since smell is 
 even a more diflicult thing to test than taste on 
 account of sudden exhaustion and adaptation. 
 78. While there are but four original tastes, 
 there are several hundred smells, sometimes ar- 
 rangea in classes, but without well determined 
 bounds. Aromatic odors certainly differ from 
 the vapors of dried fish, but in psychology, there 
 is frequently as much "difference" between the 
 near together as between the far apart. This 
 may be politely analogous to the status of rela- 
 172 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 tives and strangers. Some smells also taste 
 sweet, others bitter, while some are instantly 
 painful withal. Some arouse tingling, some 
 tears, and not a few nauseate. The inessential 
 attributes of smell largely constitute the sensa- 
 tion, since adaptations, fusions and inhibitions 
 are especially frequent and potent. The curve 
 of qualitative intensity falls with exceeding 
 rapidity during the first few seconds, as every 
 boudoir enthusiast knows. But smell mixtures 
 are possible in smell in a way not quite known 
 in taste. There are two brown patches, one in 
 each nose, and the nasal passages do not unite 
 that far forward in the head; thus one smell 
 can be led to one nostril and another to the 
 other, so that there can be an effect produced 
 for consciousness not referable to the single, 
 separable organs alone. The "position" of 
 smells, therefore, is not necessarily in the space 
 of our forefathers. Smells will also mix in the 
 same nostril, just as tastes on neighboring pa- 
 pillae. But smell mixtures are less stable than 
 color mixtures, and there is also no clear cut 
 antagonism in this field as there is in sight. 
 Smell is lacking in the negative after-images we 
 find in the temperature senses and in taste, a 
 phenomenon that allies it likewise with the do- 
 main of sound. Peculiarly special in this sense 
 173 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 field also is the case of the elevation of the 
 threshold for discrimination after partial adap- 
 tation, thus making contrast here a derivative of 
 one of the temporal attributes of neural release. 
 Hearing. 
 79. In connection with this modality, it will 
 be requisite that the student have access both 
 to enlarged models of the ear and to charts 
 showing the various dimensions in outline, for a 
 verbal account of so intricate an organ is usual- 
 ly misleading and often fails to flatter the de- 
 scriptive powers of an author. We shall speak, 
 then, of the functions of the various parts, pre- 
 suming some slight anatomical knowledge of 
 the terms employed. Every one of the attrib- 
 utes of sensation is clearly illustrated in connec- 
 tion with audition, and the importance of this 
 sense field being so obvious, it will be advan- 
 tageous to keep in mind the schematization of 
 sensation given in the introductry paragraphs 
 of this chapter, as well as to note carefully the 
 differences between the aural functions and con- 
 tent, and those of the previously discussed sen- 
 sory fields. 
 
 80. To begin with, there are three main 
 
 groups of auditory qualities: tones, noises and 
 
 voices. The adequate stimulus for audition is 
 
 air or other vibrations which reach the ear. 
 
 174 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 Sound is not all due to air vibrations, for the 
 sound of a tuning fork placed on the crown of 
 the head or on the teeth will be conducted to 
 the receptive surface by means of bony bridges; 
 but vibrations of some sort must set the ap- 
 paratus in motion for there to be a functioning 
 in sound. It must be observed that an air or 
 bone vibration is not a blank flutter. Cases of 
 vibration are cases also of the frequency of the 
 impacts, the amplitude of the wave motion and 
 the form or regularity of the disturbance of the 
 particles of the transferring medium. Each of 
 these has an important finger in the auditory 
 pie. For while the number of the vibrations 
 means pitch, high or low, while the amplitude of 
 the vibrations means loudness, and while wave 
 form is a specifically differentiating element 
 in tones, noises and timbres; yet all high tones 
 are intrinsically loud, and low tones intrinsical- 
 ly weak. Also, by a figure, we call the former 
 bright or thin and the latter dull and broad by 
 virtue of the fact that we habitually see the 
 means of their production. Again, while the 
 wave form is what we mean physically when 
 we speak of clarionets and French horns, we 
 also have the expression "tone color," by which 
 is meant the pitch, "size" and intensity of a cer- 
 tain given tone. Within these three groups,— 
 175 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 tones, noises and voices, — there are exceeding- 
 ly many separate qualities, clear from the lower 
 limit of audibility (pitch) to the highest tone 
 which can become focal in consciousness. 
 These two extremes are called, respectively, the 
 lower and upper thresholds of pitch. The au- 
 dible range extends from about 12 to 40,000 
 vibrations per second, but the recognized musi- 
 cal scale is between 40 and 8,000 vibrations 
 only. The letter "s," which occurs so frequent- 
 ly in language, is almost at the upper limit of 
 hearing, as can be made manifest by compari- 
 son with notes on a Gallon whistle. There is 
 also another very important threshold in sound, 
 and that is the duration threshold. Any note, 
 to be heard distinctly in its physical pitch, must 
 be represented by at least two vibrations before 
 it has value in the diatonic scale. Otherwise it 
 will not set into operation the mechanism of 
 the ear sufficiently to arouse a tone sensation 
 rather than one of noise. For noises are crowds 
 of still-born tones. 
 
 81. The function of hearing is partly ac- 
 complished by a mechanical apparatus of the 
 following kind. The outer ear, or concha and 
 external meatus, are together a funnel for re- 
 receiving sound. They together form an unob- 
 structed opening into the head, the external 
 176 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 meatus ending at the tympanum, or drum. This 
 drum is a tough membrane of fibres radiating 
 from the center, and performs an adaptive 
 function as well as its function in hearing. It is 
 likewise protective, especially in its collabora- 
 tion with the action of the Eustachian tube, for 
 we prevent rupture of the ear drum by keeping 
 our mouth open in the presence of sharp explo- 
 sions, thus equalizing the pressure of the air 
 on both sides of the drum. By means of at- 
 taching a very small convex mirror to the tym- 
 panum and observing the play of reflected beams 
 of light cast on the surface of the mirror, ob- 
 servers have been able to detect with sureness 
 just what part the tympanum plays in the hear- 
 ing of certain sounds. The tensor tympani, — 
 a small muscle attached to the hammer bone, 
 which acts torsionally upon the tympanum, — 
 is observed to contract with the increasing in- 
 tensity of the tone. This function does not op- 
 erate in connection with pitch, except insofar 
 as the highest tones are intrinsically intense, 
 as noted above. At a sharp sound there is in- 
 stant contraction of the membrane, barring of 
 course the latency required for such adjust- 
 ment. After the drum is "set" for a certain 
 intensity, it vibrates as a whole sympathetical- 
 ly to the number of vibrations in the generating 
 177 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 body, and even vibrates in partials when the 
 overtones of the stimulus note are relatively 
 strong. We speak here particularly of notes in 
 the middle register of the musical scale. Not 
 only does the drum vibrate pro tanto with the 
 stimulus, but the small bones in the ear do like- 
 wise; for clear to the oval window the separate 
 vibrations can be traced along the bony chain, 
 which has been especially studied in the vibra- 
 tions of the stapes when the tympanum is en- 
 tirely absent. The general function of the or- 
 gans of the middle ear is to vibrate freely as a 
 whole to moderately low and mildly intense 
 sounds. But the higher in pitch and the greater 
 in intensity the sounds become, the tighter be- 
 come all the loose parts in the external and 
 middle ears. Thus the function of hearing 
 some things is partly accomplished without ref- 
 erence to anything but a mechanical apparatus, 
 insofar as the transfer of sound vibrations half- 
 way into the organ is concerned. Nevertheless, 
 the one-to-one correlation above indicated is 
 but brief in the series of sounds, and the disor- 
 ganization of our expectancy begins even at the 
 tympanum. For here vibrations of a relative- 
 ly great amplitude and slight strength are 
 turned into ones of smaller amplitude and 
 greater strength. Furthermore, the tympanum, 
 178 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 when stretched, becomes a functioner of entire 
 energy rather than pitch, for the amplitude of 
 its vibrations in this case is very much de- 
 creased; while if the tensor tympani is cut, the 
 vibrations of the hammer head are considerably 
 increased. These two additional items must 
 also be noted : first, that if a sound is led to but 
 one ear, the other ear functions it by conduction 
 through the bones of the head and the Eustach- 
 ian tubes, and second, that persons who lack 
 the ossicles, still hear very high and very low 
 tones. 
 
 82. Before taking up the interesting mass of 
 material in audition which better concerns the 
 psychologist than most of the discussions about 
 what becomes of the vibrations after they are 
 prodded into the oval window by the foot of 
 the stapes, we had better outline in brief the 
 general nature of neural functions in regard to 
 periodicities in general. For the concept of 
 periodicity includes not only such things as air- 
 vibrations, but also such things as roughness, 
 smoothness and a few other phenomena in the 
 dermal modalities. We saw in connection with 
 the senses hitherto considered, that if one be- 
 came frightened as to how in the world the 
 qualities of sensation managed to get into con- 
 sciousness, there was nothing to do but to in- 
 179 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 voke the general mysteries of nature, or necro- 
 mantically squeeze the nervous system until 
 something like a reality oozed out. With hear- 
 ing, as in the other senses, we shall not have 
 any need to waste wonder over how the vibra- 
 tions get heard: vibrations do not get heard, — 
 they get counted. Vibrations are not all there 
 is to tones, noises or voices: the vibrations are 
 the part of these phenomena which are open 
 to the investigations of physics. The part not 
 specifically physical, but specifically psycholog- 
 ical— (and call it psychological and nothing else, 
 if the grumbling spirit moves you) — consists of 
 things we call tones or other qualitative audi- 
 tory phenomena, which, insofar as they are cor- 
 related by the physicist, are said to be dependent 
 upon vibrations; but which, as apprehended by 
 the psychologist, are something else than this. 
 Besides, it is not up to the psychologist to tell 
 how he hears, but literally only what he hears. 
 As for the physiologist, he may clip his tensor if 
 he wishes, but if he does, it is no gauntlet 
 thrown down to the physicist or the psycholog- 
 ist: it is his own boomerang. The central fact 
 of psychological data is the principle of order, 
 — what I have elsewhere called series, — and it 
 has been shown that the attributes of sensation 
 are series for the most part of no temporal or 
 180 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 spacial character. The name in physics for 
 these series or orders is periodicity of vibra- 
 tions, while the physiological name for them 
 is electro-chemical waves of neural discharge or 
 release. However this does not make the nar- 
 row strip of territory between physics and 
 physiology called Psychology a petty and in- 
 digent principality doing homage forever to its 
 aggrandizing neighbor kingdoms. For only a 
 few even of the mathematical sciences can 
 claim to be based upon series which have a full 
 quota of members. In physics, in chemistry, 
 in physiology as well as in psychology, there are 
 many series which cannot muster all the terms 
 inferred from their point of origin and their 
 subsequent development. Nevertheless, in this 
 connection the point to be made is that not all 
 things are physical nor chemical, nor yet "men- 
 tal," but whatever partial orders there are in 
 these and the other sciences, they frequently 
 exhibit the phenomena of the common part. 
 Here it is that many curious things often hap- 
 pen in science on account of the hasty desire 
 of theorists to rigidly apply throughout a 
 science a principle that is exhibited only a little 
 ways in the data they have honestly observed. 
 83. Thus the only reputable theories of 
 hearing, of sight, of emotion and any other phe- 
 181 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 nomena are bare enumerations of the facts ar- 
 ranged according to whatever principles of or- 
 der are manifest. As is the case with other 
 sciences, the data of psychology define their 
 own dimension, and as observed before, neces- 
 sitate the use of a system of terms in need of 
 no apology in the presence of the other sciences. 
 If, then, one asks how hearing is functioned, 
 the answer is that the orders or series of audible 
 things are partly correlated with physical vibra- 
 tions, partly with neural periodicities, which 
 are not vibrations of the nerves at all, but waves 
 of neural release corresponding to the period- 
 icity of the impacts of the stimulus. The con- 
 nection is functional; whether there be identity 
 now and then is neither a case for exultation 
 nor alarm. Within the ear, then, we have seen 
 that the organs in the air-filled spaces of it have 
 a definite functional as well as mechanical re- 
 lation to the sounding stimulus; but in the 
 liquid chambers of that organ, the case has not 
 been altogether facetiously called "a watery cor- 
 relation between hearing and hammering"; for 
 the action of the basilar membrance with its 
 "harp of a thousand strings" is itself the definer 
 of a new order of relations between stimulus 
 and content. For this membrane, directly an 
 element in the neural tissue, translates the phys- 
 182 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 ical impacts into neural releases of such a char- 
 acter that the content of consciousness is iden- 
 tical with the qualitative character of the 
 sounding and vibrating stimulus. The sound 
 may be in the head, by virtue of bone or even 
 air and nerve conduction, but it does not origin- 
 ate in the head, nor is it hurled from the brain 
 as a sort of by-product. The sound may be in 
 the head, in the ear,— in fact anywhere you 
 please,— but it is IN whatever is stimulus as well 
 as content of consciousness. For the conscious 
 cross-section includes the knowledges of every- 
 thing, whether it be the introspection upon our 
 poor relations, or our observations of and in- 
 cluding the librations of the moon. 
 
 84. To give exactly the relation between 
 tones, noises and vowels (voices), I shall cite 
 the unusually significant and clean experimen- 
 tation of Jaensch. He placed a selenium cell 
 in the circuit of a telephone which was illum- 
 inated by an arc lamp whose light was varied in 
 its continuity and steadiness by the revolutions 
 of an obstructing disc. This disc, moreover, 
 was so cut about its edge that the variations in 
 the length of its radius corresponded with the 
 variations in height of any sound form-curve. 
 By means of this apparatus he demonstrated 
 that (a) a constant rate of vibration produces 
 183 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 a tone (e. g. mean variation of zero), (b) the 
 same average rate of vibration produces a vow- 
 el-like sound if the mean variation from the 
 average is still small, but (c) with the further 
 increase of the mean variation the sound, after 
 passing into the vowel character, passes again 
 out of it, until, with the mean variation being 
 very great, nothing but noise is produced. Thus 
 he showed that the average rates of vibration of 
 the letter sounds, m, ii, o, a, e, i, s and ch are 
 very nearly octaves of each other in an ascending 
 series. But this octave connection is not in- 
 clusive of the fact that the vowels are neces- 
 sarily to be identified with certain tones, even 
 if the prolongation of a vowel at a steady pitch 
 always necessitates its being based upon some 
 note in the musical scale. Thus vowels are 
 something of tones and something of noises, 
 though no octave connection exists between 
 noises. Noises can be produced with striking 
 resemblance to the musical scale, by the drop- 
 ping of sticks of uneven length upon a flat sur- 
 face. Orchestra players know very well that 
 the "attack" required in sforzando passages is 
 an actual noise. The relation between these 
 three sorts of auditory qualities can be further 
 elaborated by saying that with the increase of 
 variation in the number of vibrations per sec- 
 184 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 ond, there is a corresponding decrease in the 
 definiteness of the pitch. But this scheme is 
 best at about 1000 vibrations per second, for it 
 waxes as one ascends or descends the pitch 
 series, ceasing altogether at both 32 and 32,000 
 vibrations. 
 
 85. The physical analysis of sound waves 
 shows two main patterns of vibration: periodic 
 and non-periodic. A periodic wave is one in 
 which the same movements are repeated, how- 
 ever complex, during equal periods of time, 
 however long. A non-periodic wave is wholly 
 devoid of regularity. The periodic waves are 
 subdivided into two lesser classes, pendular and 
 non-pendular, these terms referring to the sim- 
 plicity of their form. Thus the pendular waves 
 represent pure tones, such as are produced by 
 bottles and tuning forks, the form of the wave 
 being a sine curve; while the non-pendular 
 represent such tones as are produced on musical 
 instruments, being accompanied by a series of 
 overtones or partials. Voices and noises thus 
 are composed of non-periodic sound waves, dif- 
 fering in their percentage of regular interrup- 
 tions as indicated previously. 
 
 86. Every contained volume of air as well 
 as every more or less regularly (or orderly) 
 shaped physical object, whether solid or hol- 
 
 185 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 low, has its own specific rate of vibration, 
 which can be aroused not only by mechanical 
 impacts, but by the surrounding air being 
 thrown into suitable vibration. The vibrations 
 which act thus as a stimulus, however, need not 
 be the same in number as that of the sounding 
 body of air or wood, for example, but must be 
 related to it according to the laws of overtones 
 with whose series it has a common part. We 
 shall illustrate this in the following manner. 
 When the low C string of a Cello is vigorously 
 struck, not only is that particular tone sound- 
 ing, but a great number of harmonic tones, gen- 
 erated by its automatic division into halves, 
 thirds, fourths, fifths, sixths, etc., in which case 
 the tone of the string may be compared to the 
 base of a veritable pyramid of sound, the har- 
 monics being fainter the higher they are in 
 pitch. They all appear simultaneously, of 
 course, their number and intensity being part- 
 ly dependent upon the intensity with which the 
 ground-tone is struck, though a few of them are 
 implicit in the fact of their being any ground- 
 tone at all. If the low tone be C, its first over- 
 tone, being generated by the string vibrating 
 in halves, will be a note of the same name, but 
 its pitch will be an octave above the generating 
 tone; the second one will be G, one fifth above 
 186 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 the first, being generated by the string vibrating 
 in thirds, and so, as in the table following: 
 
 
 
 Amount of string 
 
 Tones and Over- 
 
 Name of Note 
 
 vibrating to 
 
 tones 
 
 
 produce it 
 
 Ground tone 
 
 c 
 
 Entire string 
 
 First overtone 
 
 c 
 
 half 
 
 Second 
 
 g 
 
 third 
 
 Third 
 
 c 
 
 fourth 
 
 Fourth 
 
 e' 
 
 fifth 
 
 Fifth 
 
 s' 
 
 etc. 
 
 Sixth 
 
 b' flat* 
 
 
 Seventh 
 
 c" 
 
 
 Eighth 
 
 d" 
 
 
 Ninth 
 
 e" 
 
 
 Tenth 
 
 t" sharp* 
 
 
 Eleventh 
 
 S" 
 
 
 Twelfth 
 
 a'"* 
 
 
 Thirteenth 
 
 b'" flat* 
 
 
 Fourteenth 
 
 b" " natural 
 
 
 Fifteenth 
 
 c 
 
 
 Now mark well this sign (*) in the above 
 scheme. For where it occurs it means that the 
 notes so designated are all too flat to be used 
 in the diatonic scale, even though they were 
 generated out of "pure nature" and represent 
 the natural development of overtones from a 
 low, generating string. Even a Stradivarius or 
 Guarnerius Cello will fail to produce anything 
 more available for music than these, which sim- 
 ply means that the "natural" order of tones as 
 above developed is but one of the tone-orders, 
 coincident at some points with the order of 
 presentable music, but diverging from it at 
 many others. In other words, we use only cer- 
 tain special tones of the "natural" note series 
 in the chromatic scale, discarding those which 
 would clash with some of the harmonic tones 
 generated from certain other ground-tones. 
 187 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 For when we want an f-sharp that will give 
 keenness to the tonality G, — as the note b-nat- 
 ural does to the tonality C, — we do not select 
 nature's f-sharp as derived from C, (as in the 
 above scheme), but we derive it from a ground- 
 tone D, in which case it will be generated as 
 the fourth overtone of that series. And not 
 only is the whole keyboard scale of the piano 
 made in this careful, searching manner, but 
 even then, the various scales are tempered to 
 each other, so that transitions from one key to 
 another will be possible enharmonically. 
 That is we employ the note midway between G 
 and A, for instance, as either G-sharp or A-flat, 
 depending upon the tonality about to be en- 
 tered or passed through. This account may 
 briefly suffice to give a hint as to the intricate 
 nature of the series of tones, whether due to 
 pendular or non-pendular vibrations. The 
 point to be made in passing is, that just as the 
 lowest string of the Cello arouses its popula- 
 tion of overtones, so will any sounding body 
 tend to throw into vibrations any other body 
 within effective range, whose natural rate of 
 vibration is the same as its fundamental or the 
 same as one of its partials. But we shall meet 
 with a corollary to this law in connection with 
 difference tones, 
 
 188 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 85. Strictly psychological is the matter of 
 tonal intensity. Two notes, equally intense, 
 when played together, will not produce a re- 
 sultant of double the intensity. If one asks 
 whether it is 3/4, 4/5, or any other fraction of 
 it, no answer can be given. It is not less, to be 
 sure, nor is it twice as much, but as hinted at 
 before, the intensity series rarely consists of 
 anything but primes. We met with much the 
 same situation in connection with the dermal 
 senses. The eccentric reference of a local- 
 sign as exhibited there is paralleled in one of 
 our responses to notes which are near the low- 
 er limit of audible pitch. If the note 30 vibra- 
 tions be produced on the Ebbinghaus acoustical 
 apparatus, and carefully attended to, it will ap- 
 pear to have a recognizable pitch, and be heard 
 in its proper place in the series. Now let the 
 note of 60 vibrations be sounded, noticed, and 
 followed by the previous lower tone, and the 
 observer will detect that the lower note was 
 formerly heard too high, thus indicating that 
 the straight, linear series of tones in physics, 
 became curved at its end to the unaided ear, so 
 that almost any note between 25 and 32 vibra- 
 tions per second would have appeared of the 
 same pitch. Here then would be a case of un- 
 changing sensory content with changing stimuli, 
 189 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 a thing not so very different, so far as series 
 are concerned, from the phenomenon of various 
 means producing the tickle sensation, or the 
 sense of pain. 
 
 86. We have mentioned so far three thres- 
 holds of pitch. There is now a fourth to be 
 considered in connection with the phenomena 
 of fusion, summation, contrast and the like. 
 This is the threshold of pitch difference, and 
 it has been just treated in one of its aspects in 
 the previous paragraph. Pitch differences are 
 determinable both by a simultaneous and a 
 successive presentation of the sources of sound. 
 In physics, they are settled by recourse to 
 graphic and other methods, but in psychology 
 they are referred to the ears, for it is by them 
 alone that we gain criteria for the use of tones 
 in the realm of art. To come closer to the 
 point, a pedantic physicist would hold up his 
 hands in horror at the use of certain tonal arid 
 harmonic effects in an orchestral symphony. 
 Nevertheless, the physics of sound does not 
 include the element of the esthetically satisfac- 
 tory character of the resolution of a dissonance. 
 However, the series of objects which have 
 standing in psychology are just as empirical 
 as those in any other science, as the reader who 
 has followed me is well assured. An orchestra 
 190 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 or chorus frequently inhibits many a serious 
 tonal error by the dynamic qualities produced 
 by its ensemble. 
 
 87. The physicist is acquainted with inhibi- 
 tions in the action of interference tubes. An- 
 other kind of inhibition is found in the phe- 
 nomenon of beats. Beats are a function of 
 the difference in the vibration rates of tones 
 simultaneously sounding. If we have two 
 sources of sound, one of which vibrates 100 
 and the other 102 times per second, there will 
 be 2 beats per second. Which is to say that 
 twice each second the two wave systems will 
 coincide and produce a maximum sound (mu- 
 tual reinforcement), and twice they w^ll be 
 half a wave length apart, and then the sound 
 will all but disappear. Now physically, we 
 might expect there would be as many audible 
 beats of the same character as the numerical 
 difference between the vibration rates of the 
 notes simultaneously sounding to produce them. 
 However, a significant divergence at once ap- 
 pears in the qualitative aspect of the increasing 
 difference between the generating tones. For 
 there are four well-marked qualitative stages 
 in beats, which are a psychological series rather 
 than a physical one, whereby it is again seen 
 that various kinds of quantities and intensities 
 191 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 may be co-present in any conscious content. 
 Between two notes from one to six or seven 
 vibrations apart, the beats have a well-marked 
 "swell"; when the vibration difference is be- 
 tween eight and twenty, a "sudden rise, pointed- 
 ness or thrust" is manifest; at a difference of 
 twenty to thirty, a rattling effect is produced; 
 while the roughness that characterizes a dif- 
 ference of about forty vibrations disappears 
 entirely at some fifty vibrations per second 
 between them. What then appears is con- 
 sonance, rather than dissonance, and we have 
 fusion in the result as opposed to the previous 
 effect. Again, if we keep increasing the dis- 
 tance between the two tones, some roughness 
 constantly appears until another musical in- 
 terval is reached, and so on, as far up the scale 
 within an octave as we care to go. Thus the 
 musical intervals might be considered in one 
 aspect as primes in the beat-series, for no 
 graphical record of them would give a hint 
 as to the places where fusions of consonance 
 pop up as it proceeds. Of psychological inter- 
 est, again, is the differing qualitative and quan- 
 titative character of the fusion value of the 
 various intervals generated by the beat series. 
 This is evidenced by the fact that the musical 
 intervals which in linear series are the unison, 
 192 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 second, third, fourth, fifth, and so on are not 
 better and better fusions in this order, but in 
 another one entirely, — this again not deducible 
 from the physical aspect of tones. Let me indi- 
 cate in a table the relations between the two 
 series. 
 
 I. Order of appearance II. Order of fusion of 
 of intervals in the the same intervals: 
 beat series: 
 
 Minor second 
 Major second 
 Minor third 
 Major third 
 Fourth 
 
 Augmented fourth 
 Fifth 
 
 Minor sixth 
 Augmented fifth 
 Major sixth 
 Natural seventh 
 Major seventh 
 Octave 
 
 Octave 
 Fifth 
 Fourth 
 Major third 
 Major sixth 
 Natural Seventh 
 Minor third 
 Minor sixth 
 Augmented Fourth 
 Augmented fifth 
 Major seventh 
 Major second 
 Minor second 
 
 The second column above is a trifle individual, 
 but even then it represents the matter fairly. 
 The series of fusions thus given appears once 
 more to form quite an independent series, a 
 series which may be exactly termed the second 
 derivative of beats, but which again in a strik- 
 193 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 ing manner harks back to physics in this way, 
 — that these intervals are the same as those 
 derived from the harmonic notes of the "nat- 
 m-al" vibrations of strings. The simpler the 
 ratios of the above intervals, furthermore, the 
 sooner they appear in the natm-al system of 
 overtones. 
 
 88. But yet another set of empirical data 
 is to be presented. Beats produced between 
 two very high notes, say about 1,000 vibrations 
 per second, show only one stage of the above 
 four qualities: they chirp rather than rattle or 
 roughen. Again, the two lowest strings of the 
 Cello when sounded together in the seemingly 
 consonant interval of the fifth, produce beats; 
 just as any two low notes, no matter how con- 
 sonant, (barring the octave and unison), lack 
 the smooth character of the same intervals in 
 the middle register of the scale. Beats can also 
 be produced by two dissonant tones when each 
 is led through a tube to either ear, even when 
 the separate tones are inaudible. This phe- 
 nomenon is due to the action of the bony ap- 
 paratus of the middle ear, and is termed "bi- 
 naural beats". Substantially the same phe- 
 nomenon is met with in many other modalities 
 besides sound, but oftener as a fusion-resultant 
 than as a case of inhibition. There is at pres- 
 194 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 
 ent some inclination among students of tone 
 to consider pitch as equivalent to local-sign, 
 and to regard the musical intervals in the same 
 way as the fusion of two touches or colds upon 
 the skin surface. Accordingly, if only a few 
 beats per second were present, there would be 
 an intermediate locus for the beat-tone of three 
 or four vibrations per second, but insofar as 
 the musical scale is concerned, its "position" 
 would be assimilated by one of the generating 
 notes. Following this, the concept of tones as 
 a linear series would have to include the attrib- 
 ute of bi-dimensionality. Hints as to the prob- 
 able correctness of this view will appear in 
 the general treatment of the psychological 
 nature of the scale, soon to follow. As a matter 
 of fact, beats are heard as "fluctuations of a 
 single tone, whose pitch is indistinguishable 
 from that of the generators". Upon increasing 
 the difference between them, the number of 
 beats actually functions a tone quality, recog- 
 nized as an intermediate tone, "which at first 
 lies near the lower generator, and gradually 
 rises in pitch until it approaches the upper", 
 granting the ever-widening distance between 
 the two generators. At the point where the 
 beats become rough, however, the tonality of 
 
 195 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 the intermediate tone which carries them is 
 lost, and we hear only its noisy aspect. 
 
 89. Another singular datum is the differ- 
 ence-tone. When two notes in the medium or 
 upper register thirty or more vibrations apart 
 are sounding together, there will be heard an 
 entirely new tone, very deep in pitch, of as 
 many vibrations as the arithmetical difference 
 between those of the generators. This might 
 well be called the undertone, in distinction to 
 the overtones previously described. Under fa- 
 vorable conditions, also, as many as four or 
 five of these undertones can be produced, whose 
 pitches coincide with the following scheme. 
 
 Let a be the vibration rate of the upper 
 generating tone, and / be the vibration rate of 
 the lower, and Dl, D2, D3, D4, D5 be the sym- 
 bols for the various undertones, then Dl= u —I, 
 D2 = 2/ — u, D3 = 3/— 2u, D4 = 4/ — 3li, and 
 D5 = 4iz, — 5/, etc. 
 
 The final important tonal phenomenon to be 
 mentioned is the interruption tone, which has 
 strong alliances with the item of beats. The 
 number of times a tone is interrupted, as espe- 
 cially evidenced on the siren, — but not the siren 
 that deceived Ulysses, — becomes the vibration 
 rate of a new tone, whose difference from noise 
 is significantly correlated with the periodicity 
 196 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 of the interruptions. The tone interrupted may 
 also combine with the interruption tone in two 
 ways; either as a summation efitect, evidenced 
 by a note of the combined pitches, or by making 
 a difference tone, in the manner Jillustrated 
 above. In the case of both difference tones and 
 sunmiation tones, it is to be kept in mind that 
 they are often generated within the ear, and 
 localized furthermore within the head, at a 
 point midway between the two tympani. This 
 corresponds to the eccentric reference men- 
 tioned in connection with the protopathic sys- 
 tem of the touch organs. By the use of resona- 
 tors, however, some of them can be made the 
 subject matter of physics as well as of psy- 
 chology. 
 
 90. The musical scale presents an impor- 
 tant problem in psychology, independent of 
 the mechanical system which produces it. Two 
 tones in unison and two tones an octave apart 
 are more fused than any of the intermediate 
 intervals of the scale. It has been previously 
 shown that both beats and musical intervals 
 are produced by steadily increasing the differ- 
 ence between two generating tones; but what 
 the nature of the scale, as a case of order with- 
 out exclusive regard for physics is, has not been 
 
 settled. The intervals of the scale, as fusions, 
 197 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 are not in the same series as they are in the 
 series of increasing pitch differences, for the 
 interval of the fifth, for example, which is mid- 
 way in this latter series, occupies the second 
 place in the fusion series, and the second and 
 seventh, as musical intervals, both lie at the 
 upper end of the series of fusions. The other 
 intervals, likewise, are dispersed in the transi- 
 tion from physics to psychology. They are of 
 course, both in the conscious cross-section, in- 
 asmuch as we know their separate character- 
 istics, indeed, almost better than we can speak 
 it out. But physical instruments of measure- 
 ment, in addition to being detachable sense or- 
 gans, respond usually by means of the efferent 
 nerve of a different sense than the one they 
 were constructed to be an adjunct to. Espe- 
 cially is this so in the case of sound, where 
 the best we can get from physics is a graphical 
 record and not an improved psychological ear. 
 So that when one asks what the scale and the 
 fusion intervals constitute as an organized sys- 
 tem for psychology, he must consider all the 
 data investigated, and find his ultimate order 
 in what we are as psychologists often led to 
 call our favorite interpretations of the facts. 
 At the same time in strict logic we discover 
 that they are often those principles from which 
 198 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 all the data originate, whether they be the stuft" 
 of physics or of any other realm of investiga- 
 tion. Let us then consider the grounds for 
 regarding the scale as something other than a 
 simple, linear series in but one dimension. The 
 pitch rises, to be sure, and as it does so, the 
 scale ascends to the octave of the original note. 
 Yet in so doing, it ends, from the standpoint of 
 fusion, where it began, or at least nearer to 
 that position than at any other in the physical 
 order. Schematically, then, it loops back to a 
 point on the perpendicular erected upon the 
 starting point, but in the transition, it extends 
 farther from the perpendicular at the interval 
 of the second and seventh, than it does at the 
 fourth and fifth, making also other curious 
 twists and returns before the whole gamut is 
 passed through. 
 
 91. It is not my intention to state any solu- 
 tion for this intricate problem, but only to show 
 why it cannot be regarded as a serious one. 
 There are other orders than the rational, other 
 dimensions than those handed down as a leg- 
 acy from Euclid, and the fusion order of the 
 musical intervals does not perplex any one who 
 understands the havoc time plays with deduc- 
 tion, as already illustrated at every place where 
 opportunity afforded. Some problems are 
 199 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 solved by sheer brute force, others by the appli- 
 cation of analogies, and still others by being 
 dropped. Expectancy is not the cue to the cor- 
 rectness of an answer, and in regard to this 
 question of the "rationality" of the fusion in- 
 tervals of the scale, it can be readily shown why 
 the order of preferences takes precedence over 
 the order of vibration ratios and their geometri- 
 cal relations to each other. This is the evidence : 
 
 (1) To determine the fusion values of the 
 various intervals, one must ask for preferential 
 judgments from musical subjects. 
 
 (2) Likewise, one must ask unmusical sub- 
 jects whether they hear one or two notes in the 
 interval, and how clearly they hear them: fu- 
 sion being a case of partial inhibition. 
 
 (3) Judgments of the amount of fusion are 
 within the realm of "psychological quantity", 
 — a series, by the way, which is as likely to 
 contain all primes as it is to contain other 
 integers of an ordinal relationship. 
 
 (4) While the intervals of the octave, fifth, 
 fourth, third, and the like are correlated with 
 the mathematical ratios of 1/2, 2/3, 3/4, 4/5, 
 3/5, 5/6, 5/8, and so on, and while the geomet- 
 rical ratios between them may be exactly 
 specified, the simplicity of these ratios does not 
 compare with the simplicity of the conscious 
 
 200 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 content produced by them. Besides, no constant 
 geometrical ratio exists between the ratios of 
 these intervals, unless they are arranged in a 
 series conflicting with them as a series of pref- 
 erences. Even then it is poor. 1/2 is 3/4 of 2/3, 
 2/3 is 8/9 of 3/4, 3/4 is 15/16 of 4/5,— so far very 
 well; but nothing whatever can be done with 
 such ratios except to lay hold of their simplicity 
 as an evidence that fusion has evident mathe- 
 matical correlates. But this is saying nothing 
 more than that correlative simplicities are 
 found between physics and psychology. This 
 is good news, to be sure, yet it requires nothing 
 beyond psychology to tell us that a fusion is a 
 psychological simplicity. Search for all other 
 information is quite unnecessary, and the in- 
 sistence that physics and psychology should co- 
 incide at every point is but a symptom of 
 fatuous hankering after causes. The fusion 
 series is, whatever else it may be, psychological, 
 and as such exhibits the independent status of 
 some of the data of psychology. That it is em- 
 pirical, and open to any investigator who cares 
 to inspect it, goes without saying. For be it 
 well remembered that nothing was ever taken 
 out of the public universe by its being called 
 "mental", the mental for all practical purposes 
 being only the "not yet mentioned". And some- 
 201 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 thing specific has been said on a previous page 
 in regard to unformulated statements, which 
 does not need repetition here. 
 
 92. It will be sufficient, in the brief space 
 yet to be devoted to sound, to indicate only a 
 few cases in which the attributes of sensation 
 particularly apply to this modality in a way 
 not evidenced in the other sense fields. The 
 strictly qualitive character of intensity has been 
 shown in connection with intervals, and it as 
 well applies to chords of three or more notes. 
 The latency of sound is very short, muscular 
 reactions to auditory stimuli being the quickest 
 of the sensori-motor releases. Sounds made on 
 musical instruments with many and strong 
 overtones have a roominess (extensity) greater 
 than that of the sounds produced by such in- 
 struments as the flute, which is weak in over- 
 tones. Duration and after-image concern us 
 in the question of the discrimination of pitch 
 differences. If two tones are successively given 
 to us to distinguish as to pitch, the interval be- 
 tween their presentation, the length of presenta- 
 tion, and the character of the after-image will 
 all determine whether by a good ear they shall 
 be judged to be the same or different. Ordi- 
 narily, 64.0 vibrations is in this way just dis- 
 tinguishable from 64.15 vibrations per second; 
 202 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 and 2048.0 from 2048.36 vibrations. In an ex- 
 periment performed by Dr. H. T. Moore in The 
 Harvard Psychological Laboratory on Conson- 
 ance and Dissonance, it was shown that after 
 listening to the prolongation of two tones a 
 dissonant interval apart, the two generating 
 tones became inaudible after four or five min- 
 utes, — nothing being heard thereafter except 
 the rattling of the intertone localized within the 
 ears. This illustrates the attribute of exhaus- 
 tion. Adaptation is too well known, as in cases 
 of the street cars and city clocks, to need 
 further comment. In symphonic music is ex- 
 hibited to a striking degree many phases of 
 the phenomena of fusion, contrast and clear- 
 ness. Vividness is well illustrated in the case 
 of the exceedingly low degree of intensity 
 required to elevate the bel canto passages of 
 music into focality. Fusions furnish a hint as 
 to one function of consciousness underlying the 
 feeling-tone of sounds, while the pleasantness 
 or unpleasantness of human voices are directly 
 referable to the status of their owners in the 
 social self. Local sign will be especially treated 
 in the sections on space perception. In this 
 connection, also, the vestibular organs of the 
 ear will be functionally related to the responses 
 of orientation. 
 
 203 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 Questions on Audition. 
 
 1. State briefly, and in the order of their 
 importance, the significant diff"erences between 
 the physics and the psychology of sound. 
 
 2. Which of the attributes of sensation 
 appear first in a melody (succession of single 
 notes), as contrasted with those appearing in 
 a harmonized melody (two — , three — , or four- 
 part combination of tones) ? 
 
 Vision. 
 93. The gross structure of the eye can easily 
 be demonstrated by means of models, charts, 
 and by the dissecting of a specimen. Structure 
 need concern us only in its connection wdth 
 function, to which we at once turn. It will be 
 sufficient at the start to indicate merely the 
 course of a beam of light upon entering the 
 eye and its various effects upon that organ. 
 The cornea is of interest chiefly in cases where 
 it is misshapen, — in astigmatism, — that has to 
 be corrected by the use of eyeglasses which, 
 according to the laws of optics, make up for 
 its lack of regularity. Behind the cornea is 
 the aqueous humour, and behind that is the 
 iris, which acts as an accommodation apparatus, 
 functioning the intensity of light. It thus en- 
 larges or reduces the size of its aperture accord- 
 ing to the diminution or increase of intensity, 
 204 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 unless inhibited from doing so by drugs. Its 
 latency is long, as everyone has experienced 
 when going suddenly from a sunny room to a 
 dark one, and vice versa. The lens, which lies 
 behind the iris, possesses a unique accommoda- 
 tion apparatus, likewise, and functions the 
 distance of the stimulus. Muscles at its edge 
 pull it flat or push it into a thickened form, 
 with somewhat less latency than occurs in the 
 iris reflex. However, loss of the lens through 
 an operation for cataract does not preclude 
 the possibility of vision, for a certain correctly- 
 made artificial eye-glass lens will restore the 
 visual function nearly to its normal. In the 
 case of wearing such an adjustable sense organ 
 in front of the eye, it is ditficult to draw the 
 line between the physiological and the physical, 
 functionally construed. Similarly, in the use 
 of tele-, micro-, stereo-, and pseudo-scopes, the 
 eye does not end at the cornea, inasmuch as 
 the conscious content we obtain by the use of 
 these instruments is functioned for by the com- 
 plex of eye-instrument, and not by the use of 
 the eye alone. The function of the lens of the 
 eye is the same as that of any bi-convex lens, 
 and by means of it the rays of light entering 
 the eye are projected toward the retina. If the 
 eye-ball is too long, and the incoming rays of 
 205 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 
 light do not reach the retina, a concave lens is 
 used in eye-glasses to remedy this defect, known 
 as near-sightedness; if the eye-ball is too short, 
 as in far-sightedness, the rays focus behind the 
 retina, and a convex lens is used instead. In 
 either case, as before, the functioning eye is 
 constituted out of all that goes to make up the 
 vision apparatus in or about the head. 
 
 94. According to the laws of physiological 
 optics, the stimulus for vision is the image of 
 the object on the retina. But this is not a fair 
 statement of the case in psychology. The stim- 
 ulus for vision is the object which one sees, 
 whether it be something one can also touch, or 
 whether it be some impalpable object in a 
 dream or an hallucination. Of these stimuli 
 for vision, there are two: colors and shapes, 
 which, as has been mentioned before, may be 
 anywhere. By color I mean anything one sees 
 which is not a shape, thus including those con- 
 tents called grays, whites and blacks, as well 
 as the usual spectrum effects. Insofar as the 
 image on the retina is concerned, it is in and 
 of the object, just as is the wave-length of solar 
 light: just as we hear tones rather than vibra- 
 tions, so we see colors rather than the numeri- 
 cal status of their wave lengths. In the same 
 manner we smell smells, which may be mem- 
 206 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 bers of the III, IV, and V groups in chemistry 
 as well, and we feel cold and warmth without 
 first determining their position on the ther- 
 mometer scale. In pain, the distinction between 
 stimulus and content is even more strikingly 
 made. The history of experimentation upon 
 vision is murky with the conclusions which 
 have been drawn from half-baked tests upon 
 the action of the eye, — cases of the experimenter 
 knowing everything that was going on, and of 
 the subject being interpreted as having only 
 that knowledge which the experimenter chose 
 to favor him with. Bishop George Berkeley 
 showed that we never see depth, but this was 
 only another case of the "unthinkable having 
 been carefully thought out". By flashing a 
 pencil of light into the eye at an oblique angle, 
 Purkinje showed that one could see his own 
 optical blood vessels out in space, for what 
 reason and with what conclusions heaven only 
 knows; while a certain Le Cat demonstrated, 
 by means of a card and a pin held up before 
 the eye inside of the focal distance that every- 
 thing we see is upside down! From all these 
 and similar tricks of opticians one needs to be 
 emphatically warned. We may not see depth, 
 but we perceive that some things are nearer or 
 farther than are others; and groans need never 
 207 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 arise from the fact that the retinal image is 
 inverted. The retinal image is not a datum in 
 the psychology of vision, nor do we ever see 
 or feel it. Furthermore, objects are seen right 
 side up, indeed just as they are, for the psy- 
 chological status of the retina is one of func- 
 tional dependence, and psysiological optics 
 holds mortgages on nothing in the eye except 
 the bare physical aspect of the watery media, 
 the cornea, and the lens. We saw, in connec- 
 tion with sound, that certain series had com- 
 mon parts in physics and psychology, while 
 certain others did not at all. In vision, how- 
 ever, we shall see that color sensations are even 
 less tangential to the series of physical de- 
 terminations than was true in the case of 
 auditory qualities. What else can it be than a 
 downright subtraction from fact to palm off on 
 science a single insignificant phenomenon for 
 the whole cross-section of vision, and to insist 
 that the parts which make up a whole in physics 
 are the only kind of parts with which men of 
 empirical minds can have anything to do? 
 
 95. To cite another as well as a last case 
 of artifact in vision, the images of objects fall- 
 ing upon the retina are said by some to proceed 
 to the brain, thence to be "projected" outward 
 into the air into or on top of the object of sen- 
 208 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 sation in order that vision may be accomplished. 
 This is not only absurd, but more than that, it 
 is a contravention of the entire data involved. 
 In the first place, the "image" never gets into 
 the brain, no more than does the object which 
 functions by it: the very last place where ob- 
 jects sequester is the clammy inside of the 
 skull. The "image", solely an optical datum, 
 is scarcely more than a datum for the uncon- 
 scious retinal mechanism; it is not a content 
 of visual consciousness, — it is solely a content 
 of inferred consciousness for the student of 
 physiological optics. Nothing gets into the brain 
 at all in vision: the stimulus, or object, sends 
 light into the eye, and this light acts adequately 
 upon the sensitive membrane known as the 
 retina, thereby releasing the neural energy 
 along the neural connections to whatever 
 cerebral localities the function of vision may 
 have specific reference. Objects outside of the 
 head; releases within the head, — nothing more: 
 the periodicity of light waves and the periodi- 
 city of neural releases being functionally re- 
 lated and that is all. The actual numerousness 
 of the ether vibrations maij, indeed, be the 
 actual numerousness of the pulses along the 
 optic nerve, but that would never necessarily 
 
 209 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 make the optic nerve yellow or blue while 
 functioning for those particular colors. 
 
 96. It is interesting to note that there are 
 two axes of the eye. Where the optic nerve 
 enters on the nasal side in either eye is the 
 point which defines the origin of the optical 
 axis. This does not coincide, however, with 
 the visual axis, which is determined by project- 
 ing a diameter through the center of the cornea 
 and the center of the lens, thereby making it 
 strike the retina farther from the nasal side 
 than the optic nerve lies in its circumference. 
 Both of these axes are important: the optical, 
 for it defines the blind spot where there is no 
 functioning for vision; the visual, for it defines 
 the spot of clearest color vision, known as 
 the fovea. Now the optic nerve, upon entering 
 the eye-ball, spreads out in all directions, 
 covering the inner surface of it, and is 
 further formed into minute terminal organs, 
 known by a simile as the rods and cones, which 
 point not toward the light, but directly away 
 from it. At the fovea there are only cones, and 
 at some distance outwards they cease entirely; 
 beginning at the periphery there are only rods, 
 which decrease in number significantly toward 
 the fovea, and ending at that point. The cones 
 function for color and the rods for whites, 
 210 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 blacks and grays, as well as for the shapes of 
 visible objects. Nocturnal animals have only 
 rods, while diurnal animals usually have both: 
 it is thought that birds and fowls in general 
 have only cones. Nevertheless, these animals 
 do not appear to distinguish what we specifically 
 sense as spectrum colors. In human beings, 
 it is to be remembered, there is a larger area 
 covered by both rods and cones than the retinal 
 space covered by either alone. 
 
 97. The following list of visual sensations 
 are to be considered: (a) the chromatic, or 
 spectrum color sensations, which are developed 
 best by beams of light passing through prisms; 
 (b) the white-black-gray series, or achromatic 
 sensations, whose relation to the former are 
 yet to be in all points determined; (c) the color 
 sensations derived by mixing the chromatic and 
 achromatic together; (d) the sensations derived 
 from textures such as pigments produce in so- 
 lution or spread out on surfaces; and (e) the 
 shape sensations of objects stimulating the 
 retina. One significant thing to be noted in 
 connection with chromatic and achromatic sen- 
 sations is the paucity of names for the various 
 reds, greens, and grays that are constantly 
 sensed. Another quirk in terminology comes 
 with the determination of the elements one can 
 211 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 name m every color as distinguishable from 
 each other. As a usual thing, hue is the term 
 which means the point in the spectrum series 
 we are referring to in our naming; tint or 
 brightness applies to the likeness of the spec- 
 trum color to pure white light; while chroma 
 is taken to mean such things as "the blueness 
 of the blue", and refers to the amount of gray 
 or black not at the time stimulating the reiina. 
 98. Physicists have offered correlations for 
 these three factors in color vision. Correlated 
 with hue is the wave length of the ether vibra- 
 tions. The longest wave lengths are at the red 
 end of the spectrum, while the shortest are at 
 the violet end, the wave lengths decreasing with 
 ordinal steadiness from red to violet. On the 
 other hand, the changes from color to color are 
 not so steady. For instance, there is much 
 more red than yellow in the spectrum, and much 
 more violet than green, as any casual observer 
 of the rainbow must have remarked. Again, 
 there are many more distinguishable yellows 
 and blue-greens packed into a small linear 
 space than there are hues of any other color. 
 This applies for a constant and equal spectrum 
 intensity only, of course, but the independence 
 of the physical and the psychological series here 
 is nevertheless well marked. Again, even apart 
 212 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 from the fact that wave length is sometimes 
 correlated with a difference in chroma, (as 
 evidenced by the fact that the most naturally 
 saturated colors are red and blue, and the least 
 yellow and blue-green, — chroma thus being a 
 correlate of wave length as well as of wave 
 form), the wave length as it changes also brings 
 a change of tint, or brightness, yellow being 
 the lightest and violet the darkest color of the 
 whole spectrum. According to a strict depend- 
 ence upon physics, the correlation of energy 
 should indicate red, rather than yellow as the 
 lightest spectrum color, and blue should be 
 much darker than is the case. As a last case 
 of negative correlation, any sufficiently intensi- 
 fied color is seen as white, and the minimum 
 visibile, or the smallest area of stimulus pos- 
 sible, is always seen in the achromatic series. 
 Contrariwise, any sufficiently enfeebled color 
 intensity is functioned as colorless, — on the dark 
 side of the white-black series. This phenome- 
 non applies for diminution of intensity, also, 
 as well as for the extent of the chromatic 
 surface. 
 
 99. If one fixates a spot of white on a gray 
 
 background, while a disc of some color is 
 
 brought in from the periphery to the center of 
 
 the visual field, certain changes in the appear- 
 
 213 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 ance of the stimulus will be noted. It will first 
 appear doubtless as an amorphous gray, then 
 as a disc of some color allied to the actual hue, 
 and finally as a clear steady chromatic sensa- 
 tion. For different colors, the results will be 
 different; some of the hues will be sensed truly 
 at first focal functioning, while others may pass 
 through several curious stages. The upshot of 
 such experimentation is to ally the extent of 
 cone-covered retina with the functioning of the 
 colors by the retinal apparatus in a very definite 
 manner. The retina has zones of unequal sen- 
 sitivity to the various hues : the inner zone func- 
 tions for red and green, the next outward for 
 yellow and blue, while the farthest zone, toward 
 the periphery, sees everything as a series of 
 light and dark grays. The spectrum, when 
 thrown upon this outermost zone is likewise 
 devoid of chromatic character. But these zones 
 are not as distinguishable in function as the 
 above statement might imply. They are weak, 
 rather than blind to the colors they imperfectly 
 function, because sufficient extent and intensity 
 of a stimulus in the periphery can bring out 
 the known hue perfectly well. In moving a 
 patch of color from the fovea to the periphery 
 of the field, it is found that it will keep its color 
 longer than when the stimulation moves in the 
 214 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 opposite direction. High degrees of energy and 
 brief periods of stimulation are more effective 
 than those of low energy and long duration, 
 which is a principle we found illustrated in 
 certain phenomena of dermal sensitivity as well. 
 But this correlation of intensity with threshold 
 of clear color vision does not necessarily mean 
 intensity as the physicist construes it, for the 
 intensities one meets with in psychology were 
 seen earlier in the discussion of sensation to 
 be other than of a numerical status, — the in- 
 tensity as well as the extensity of sensation 
 being in a prime series. Vision offers full sup- 
 port to such a scheme of empirical classification. 
 
 100. Among the numerous thresholds met 
 with in vision, the following will suffice as a 
 sample of their nature. The minimum visibile 
 is a threshold, just as is the maximum visibile, 
 or the largest patch of color or visual stimulus 
 which can be seen at one time. These two 
 thresholds would define one sort of series, — the 
 bi-dimensional space series. Another threshold 
 is the color zone threshold for each and all of 
 the colors. The threshold of color identity, of 
 identity in tint between any number of chro- 
 matic or achromatic sensations, of the greatest 
 differences in saturation, or the least; the 
 threshold of shape discrimination in the peri- 
 215 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 phery of the eye, and similar phenomena are 
 samples of the extent to which this attribute 
 can be applied. Any terminus ad qiiem, how- 
 ever defined, could without fancy be called by 
 the same term name, 
 
 101. Now while the spectrum appears as a 
 straight band of hues, psychologically it cannot 
 be regarded as such, since various properties 
 of color forbid such a looseness in terminology. 
 In the first place, for every spectrum color, or 
 hue, there is another spectrum color, which, if 
 mixed with it, will produce an achromatic sen- 
 sation. Thus red and blue-green, yellow and 
 blue, and the like, when mixed together, neutral- 
 ize each other. But hue, or spectral series 
 reference is lacking in the resulting conscious 
 content. Schematically, therefore, we shall have 
 to regard the spectrum as some sort of a closed 
 series, possibly ovoid rather than circular. The 
 trans-sensational infra-red and ultra-violet se- 
 ries need not be as "long" series as that of the 
 visible hues, for since the spectrum is a dis- 
 persion phenomenon, apparent distances in the 
 spread of the dispersed light may be but one 
 of the natural series, and not by any means 
 the fundamental one. There is no need, on the 
 other hand, of insisting that the logic of color, 
 —the principle of color clarification, — be lim- 
 216 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 ited to the ordinary concept of two or three 
 dimensions. The properties of color mixture, 
 color contrast, after-images, and the like point 
 not to a fundamental principle which maintains 
 the naive naming of colors as the ultimate basis 
 of their existence. 
 
 102. Before stating that principle as it 
 should be formulated, let us examine the phe- 
 nomena which make it both necessary and in 
 line with induction. As to color mixture, not 
 only will certain pairs of spectrum colors pro- 
 duce a gray, but two colors out of such gray- 
 producing position in the spectrum series will 
 produce a hue dependent upon the relative 
 amounts and intensities of the two colors, with 
 a variation in saturation or chroma from the 
 originals due to their nearness or remoteness 
 in the color series. Here one must keep in mind 
 the facts of intrinsic intensity and saturation 
 of the spectrum colors as outlined previously. 
 Again, the double mixing of pairs of colors fol- 
 lows the same laws. Two gray-producing colors 
 will, if mixed with two other gray-producing 
 colors, produce a third gray whose tint is usually 
 the arithmetical mean of the two combinations. 
 In the same manner, red and yellow, which give 
 or are that hue we call orange, will, if mixed 
 with a green-violet blend giving a blue of low 
 217 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 saturation, produce a purplish gray. The formu- 
 lation of the laws of color mixture is easy within 
 certain limits. For example, the first law can 
 
 be stated: C= , in which gray(G) is derived 
 
 c 
 
 from any two complimentary colors, repre- 
 sented by C and c respectively, — complimentary 
 referring to position in the spectrum series. The 
 second law can be stated in a formula as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 w.l.Ci + W.I.C2 ( Ci 
 
 C.C,= 
 
 
 2 
 
 which reads: the mixture of any two non-com- 
 plimentary colors (Cj.Co) will give a third color 
 whose wave length (w. 1.) is intermediate be- 
 tween the first two; in which combination, 
 furthermore, the hue of one color (C^) will 
 predominate over that of the other (C,) in 
 proportion as its intensity and quantity (i, q) 
 are greater. The third law of color mixture 
 may be symbolically stated by the use of the 
 expression, 
 
 103. Now, so far as psychology is concerned, 
 identical contents, such as result from fusion 
 (color mixture), are expressed in the same 
 
 218 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 terms, — that is, by expressions of identity. Many 
 stimuli are painful, and many combinations 
 give gray. And while psychological simplicity 
 is never to be confused with logical simplicity, 
 yet the "new" things in psychology are just as 
 much terms in science as are the physical terms 
 of the stimulus. For we saw that the fusion 
 intervals in music were a series, just as were 
 the vibration differences which produced them. 
 Psychological simplicity, or naivete, must be 
 sharply distinguished from the perception of 
 prime relations between non-physical proper- 
 ties; all we urge is that the chronogenetic order 
 be not taken for the logical one without suffi- 
 cient warrant. As it is, the two may sometimes 
 coincide, but the point is that their coincidence 
 has importance only after inspection rather than 
 before it. 
 
 104. Color mixing is not only possible with 
 lights, but with the use of rotating discs, con- 
 taining various sizes of sectors of pigment colors 
 spread out on various textures. If such a disc 
 is fixated, while revolving, various phenomena 
 will be observed. Suppose the disc to be equally 
 divided between two colors, say yellow and 
 blue, to the right and left of the vertical respec- 
 tively. One vertical half of the retina will then 
 be blue-stimulated, the other half will be yel- 
 219 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 low-stimulated. Upon rotation of the disc, that 
 half of the retina formerly stimulated hy the 
 blue will first be gradually and then completely 
 stimulated by the yellow half of the disc, and 
 so on, — the alternations of stimulation compar- 
 ing with the spacial relations of the two rotat- 
 ing colors. The colors are thus retinally mixed. 
 However, a certain rate of rotation is required 
 before complete fusion occurs. At a low speed 
 only a flickering impression will be produced, 
 which phenomenon is actually not one of hue 
 as such, but of tint or brightness, — the speed 
 required to abolish flicker being greater with 
 the brighter colors. The "likeness to white" 
 of the rotating colors is thus actually seen as 
 a partially isolated element. When fusion is 
 finally accomplished by the above means, it is 
 due to the fact of positive retinal after-images, 
 for if the blue sensation had lasted no longer 
 than the blue stimulation, a gray resultant 
 would never have been produced. Part of the 
 stimulus lags behind the temporal duration of 
 visual presentation, thus making one of the 
 terms in color mixture which is independent 
 of the physical nature of the stimulus. In mov- 
 ing pictures and fireworks the same phenome- 
 non of after-images is to be observed. The fol- 
 lowing special aspect of flicker is also note- 
 220 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 worthy. Before the threshold of fusion is 
 reached, two kinds of flicker are observable, 
 — coarse and fine; and the brightness of the 
 coarse flicker is even greater than that of the 
 resulting, fused sensation. Besides, upon let- 
 ting the impression of the rotating disc fall upon 
 the periphery of the eye instead of directly upon 
 the fovea, the number of rotations of the disc 
 per second required to abolish the flicker is 
 considerably greater. The function of the rods 
 of the retina has been previously shown to 
 account for this. If, now, one compares color 
 fusions with tonal fusions, he will see a differ- 
 ence between them on the side of physical 
 quantity. For upon steadily increasing the dis- 
 tance between two tones, after fusion is ob- 
 tained, the consonance is at once exchanged 
 for dissonance, after which, consonance once 
 more appears, then dissonance, and so on in 
 alternation. Whereas, after color fusion is ob- 
 tained on a color wheel, no increase in the 
 rotation rate will make any alteration in the 
 character of the fusion so produced. Indeed 
 most analogies of physical quantity have but 
 slight value in psychology. 
 
 105. Fixation of a color does not always 
 result similarly. We never adapt to the noon- 
 day sun, on account of its intensity, but are 
 221 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 always exhausted by it. Besides, such fixation 
 results in the provocation of negative after- 
 images of long duration, the number of them 
 which simultaneously occur being dependent 
 upon eye movements which partially rest one 
 part of the retina, only to be followed by the 
 reappearance of the partially inhibited sensa- 
 tion through irradiation and sympathetic induc- 
 tion from neighboring, over-stimulated areas. 
 For the retina is so sensitive that such a strong 
 stimulation as naked sunlight becomes almost 
 an inadequate stimulus, as is evidenced by the 
 inability to make out the sun's form directly 
 after the first instant of fixation upon it. The 
 combination of intensity and extensity here 
 passes one of the upper thresholds of visual 
 sensation. Fixation of milder colors than the 
 most intense, causes adaptation, by which we 
 mean that every color in the middle range tends 
 toward neutrality, — that is, grayness. But the 
 color does not become grayer, any more than 
 red ever becomes yellow: for all colors are a 
 combination of hue, tint and chroma, and "fad- 
 ing out" or "becoming yellow" is the naive name 
 for the fact that either the total sensation is 
 altered by exchanges of identity, or that some 
 physical essential property got called by the 
 name of a psychological inessential. Never- 
 222 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 theless, through adaptation, the color of blue 
 or brown spectacles becomes less than focally 
 conscious, and wall paper not faded by the sun 
 looks less bright or colorful after a while than 
 it did at first. The fixation of a colored field 
 until it fades (incorrect expression!) followed 
 by the fixation of a gray field, is accompanied 
 by the negative after-image. But this is no 
 enigma, as we shall presently see. 
 
 106. For when the eye fixates a colored 
 field, and the after-image replaces the stimulus, 
 both conscious contents are identical in some 
 constituent element. The hues interchange, it 
 is true, but the brightness or saturation remains 
 constant. Color sensations thus oscillate about 
 some identity in their component parts or at- 
 tributes. The color blind person, who asserts 
 that my red books are of the same color as my 
 green ones, asserts for tint, perhaps, what I 
 assert for that complex known as hue-tint, or 
 even hue-tint-chroma. We saw that the laws 
 of color mixture indicated the gray relation be- 
 tween complimentary colors, and that the tint 
 and chroma of colors are stated in terms of the 
 gray-white-black series of sensations, which 
 terms strictly apply to the fusion of colors into 
 their neutral components. Similarly the laws 
 of the mixture of non-complimentary colors 
 223 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 laid their main emphasis upon hue as modified 
 by tint and chroma, specifying the intrinsically 
 intense effect of the contributing elements. Now, 
 whatever color may be, the hues as qualities 
 refer also to positions in the spectrum series; 
 which, as evidenced by its various phenomena, 
 is neither linear, nor spacial, nor anchored irre- 
 vocably to quantity. Mixing non-complimentary 
 colors toward the red end of the spectrum series 
 showed a numerical resultant that was half of 
 that of the other two colors; while the mixing 
 of red and black, for example, does not give 
 a wave length one can find in physics in the 
 same way. Bare numerical values give small 
 aid here. The colors, called by simple names, 
 — "experienced" if you please as undefinable 
 states of consciousness, — hold an altogether dif- 
 ferent relation to each other than either the 
 physicist or the introspective psychologist have 
 yet been able to discover. I propose to give 
 that relationship as well as possible, in the 
 brevity of space here available. 
 
 107. The intensity, or brightness of a color 
 is its one essential attribute. Hue is incidental. 
 This intensity is its psychological intensity, 
 (correlated with its wave length or amplitude, 
 outside of the realm of psychology as far as one 
 pleases), and moreover not predicated of it 
 224 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 before we see the color, but afterwards. It is 
 a variable corrolary and not axiomatic. The 
 yellow and blue which give gray, give the gray 
 w^hich results on account of the fact that inhibi- 
 tory conditions between the hues abolish them, 
 leaving the intensities to be algebraically sum- 
 med into the resultant. Fundamentally, then, 
 the spectrum is a logico-psychological artifact: 
 its linear extent is in no wise indicative of the 
 
 essential nature of color. The formula C= 
 
 c 
 
 points to the systematization of the various 
 colors as schematically represented by a right 
 triangle, whose hypothenuse is analogical with 
 the result of mixtures. Schematically only, 
 however, for there is nothing linear about color, 
 nor spacial either, except as the shape series 
 and the color series have compatible relations 
 in tri-dimensional space. With eyes closed, we 
 see a mean gray which is distinguished only in 
 point of brightness, — the fundamental color 
 attribute. Now that gray which we thus see 
 may be equalled by any two complimentary 
 colors, just as it may be equalled by a mixture 
 of white and black. The hues are positions in 
 the spectrum series, it is true, but their posi- 
 tions are of no importance to the visual situa- 
 tion. The correlating of wave length, wave 
 225 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 
 amplitude, and wave form with the properties 
 of color is always done with more or less 
 apology, and we may regard the physical vibra- 
 tions and forms as quite incidental: the various 
 series coincide only with the mathematics 
 strapped for consistency. Certainly a rather 
 tottering basis for color, this numerical fiction; 
 and it is not for psychology to put on a straight- 
 jacket to mollify this incompatibility. Let the 
 two series be as incompatible as they will: 
 apparent homogeneousness is the basis for 
 naivete, — not for logical treatments of data. And 
 yet the question will doubtless be asked, "are 
 not the four so-called psychologically simple 
 colors, red, yellow, green, and blue, more funda- 
 mental than the attribute of intensity"? These 
 four colors look to be unanalysable, while, or- 
 ange, violet and the like, are certainly com- 
 pounds, or at least can be compounded out of 
 the others, whereas no such thing is possible 
 with these four. But, if compounding is to be 
 made the criterion, all compounding ends with 
 the gray series, — gray being the terminus ad 
 quern of intensity, adaptation, mixture and 
 other color phenomena. Why stop with com- 
 pounding at an irrational point? To the painter, 
 the primary colors are red, yellow, and blue, 
 pigments relegating green to a basis of mixture. 
 226 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 To the physicist, the primary colors are red, 
 green, and blue-violet, yellow being a resultant 
 of admixing the others. While for the physio- 
 logist, the primary colors are whatever few 
 colors can act as equilibrants upon the retinal 
 apparatus, insofar as the color zones of the eye 
 are concerned. Surely that cannot be unlim- 
 itedly primary which in this and that field of 
 fact changes its status so readily. Sciences are 
 fields of functions as well as fields of interests, 
 and if a fact is public property, it cannot vanish 
 into subsidiary importance upon being ap- 
 proached merely from a different angle. Now 
 red, or one of the reds of the spectrum and 
 "something bluish", are the only two colors 
 that retain their primacy throughout the above 
 lists of simple colors; but the basis for this is 
 choice among a multitude rather than an 
 attempt to get behind the spectrum as an ulti- 
 mate series. That only a few of the colors are 
 requisite for mixings by which the others may 
 be obtained, is doubtless exactly the case; but 
 here again psychological simplicity has gotten 
 the upper hand. Red and green equilibrate 
 about gray, and yellow and blue equilibrate 
 about gray also, while all the other selections 
 of primary hues have been made for the sake 
 of finding the fewest spectrum positions which 
 227 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 will in summation satisfy all the requirements 
 of color. Gray being that about which all these 
 terms of color oscillate, the logical primacy of 
 this intensity is in need of no more defending 
 at present. 
 
 108. Color contrast exhibits certain inter- 
 esting derivatives of the fundamental attribute 
 of intensity. There are also two kinds of color 
 contrast, — simultaneous and successive, — in 
 which the temporal and spacial elements per- 
 form their usual unique functions. When a 
 complimentary color is induced during steady 
 fixation, we have a case of simultaneous con- 
 trast. When, again, the after-effect is con- 
 nected with the fixation of a brighter or darker 
 surface than the surface of fixation, the induced 
 or equilibrating color will depend for its inten- 
 sity upon the elements of the background. Often 
 simultaneous induction occurs, — that is, the re- 
 turn of the original brightness and hue during 
 fixation. Successive contrast is shown in cases 
 of fixation followed by eye movements, in which 
 case the complimentary hue and brightness is 
 induced in the after-image. Contrast is due to 
 the mutual interaction of neighboring retinal 
 areas and is a differentiating process. Adapta- 
 tion, on the other hand, is a function of dura- 
 tion and acts as a leveling process. The gen- 
 228 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 eral laws of color contrast are as follows : Con- 
 trast varies with the degree of antagonism, and 
 with the nearness of the juxtaposed colored sur- 
 faces or lights; it is enhanced hy the elimina- 
 tion of contours or boundary lines, is greater 
 when there is no simultaneous light contrast, 
 and increases not only with the saturation of 
 the inducing colors, but also with equal tex- 
 tures, as well as with very simple patterns. 
 However, prolonged experimentation and use of 
 large fields of comparison, both reduce the con- 
 trast eiiects. There is therefore both a time 
 and a space threshold in the phenomenon. This 
 is new in psychology, and is something like the 
 newness of fusion. For colors that are con- 
 trasted as well as fused produce an effect not 
 deducible from either naive acquaintance and 
 expectation, nor yet from a study of color effects 
 not involving contrasts and memories of them. 
 
 109. Another function of intensity is the 
 Purkinje phenomenon. If we increase the 
 amplitude of the light waves in the spectrum, 
 gradually the yellow and the blue, with a light 
 gray between them, will be the only hues vis- 
 ible, while the orange and red will appear yel- 
 lower and yellower, and the blue and violet 
 become indistinguishable from a bluish green. 
 But the whole spectrum shortens, both ends 
 229 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 losing their stimulating character. On the other 
 hand, upon decreasing the light energy of the 
 spectrum we get another series of effects. This 
 time orange and yellow drop out entirely, the 
 red gets very dark, while blue and violet fuse 
 into a bluish-violet, with only the green retain- 
 ing its place and hue. Furthermore, all that 
 now appears is of dark tint and low chroma. 
 The amount of physical change in intensity 
 necessary to produce either one of this pair of 
 phenomena is called the photochromatic in- 
 terval. Besides, it occurs only to a dark-adapted 
 eye, that is, one that has been accommodated 
 to the dark room in which the Purkinje phe- 
 nomenon is being exhibited. Neither will it 
 appear when thrown into the eye on that col- 
 ony of cones known as the fovea. There being 
 no rods at the fovea, the evidence points to this 
 phenomenon as being functioned by those 
 organs. It might be added that the Purkinje 
 phenomenon has the smallest photochromatic 
 interval at the extremes of the periphery, — the 
 permanently dark-adapted or nyctalopic part of 
 the eye. The rest of the retina is hemeralopic, 
 or normally day-adapted, — that is, suited for 
 hue and mean degrees of brightness. Daylight 
 and twilight vision are in evidence when we 
 come suddenly from light to dark rooms, just 
 230 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 as adaptation is noticed in coming from the 
 yellow lighted theatre after a matinee into the 
 sunlight, where, by contrast, everything looks 
 bluish until the equilibrating functions of the 
 retina have readjusted the field. The colors in 
 hangings and carpets are often selected for their 
 day and night effects, and modern cloth shops 
 sell by artificial light such goods as are to be 
 worn under similar conditions. 
 
 110. Evidences point to the rods as the 
 functioners of daylight and nightlight vision. 
 And the specific sine qua non of this function- 
 ing is a substance in the rods known as the 
 visual purple, or rhodopsis. It is a reddish 
 substance, reacting to intensities of light. Under 
 a bright illumination it becomes first red, and 
 then white. Immediately a pigment in the rods 
 creeps up and covers the rhodopsis, thus throw- 
 ing them out of action. When the light is dim- 
 med, the pigment cells retract and the visual 
 purple first yellows, and then whitens. In the 
 owl, this photochemical substance is covered 
 by day, while in the night it is uncovered. The 
 owl having only rods, his day-blindness is thus 
 accounted for. If one eye be kept closed while 
 the other is receiving stimulations which affect 
 its rhodopsis, the same effects will be produced 
 in both eyes by sympathetic induction, — so uni- 
 231 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 fied are the functions of both retinae. Inasmuch 
 as the bleaching is most quickly accomplished 
 by green, and most slowly by red light, its con- 
 nection with the functioning for intensities, and 
 especially night and day vision, is indisputable. 
 111. Flicker and rivalry (oscillating inhibi- 
 tion) may also be obtained binocularly. One 
 eye may get a negative after-image of an object 
 given only to the other. A black patch and a 
 white patch, binocularly combined in the stereo- 
 scope frequently produce a silvery lustre, in 
 which case not only the white and black, but 
 the textures of the surfaces bearing them have 
 to be considered. Something like this we have 
 previously met with in connection with the 
 Purkinje phenomenon, — I mean the silvery gray 
 in the green section of the spectrum series. Bin- 
 ocular sensation in this case is combined from 
 right and left eye sensory contents separately 
 brought to focality, and thus binocular lustre is 
 a prime in this series of eif ects. When .flicker 
 is present by virtue of separate stimulations 
 to the two eyes, it can be reduced by giving 
 the same speed in the revolutions of the stimuli 
 to both eyes separately as would be required 
 with one eye directly. Two combinations of 
 flicker separately given to the eyes take the 
 same speed to reduce as is required for both 
 232 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 eyes together. But when one eye gets a flicker 
 effect, while the other eye gets none, the flicker- 
 ing efiect is considerably dampened in the total, 
 semi-fused content resulting from inter-ocular 
 functioning, even despite a considerable range 
 of brightnesses in the flickerless half of the 
 visual field. Another binocular phenomenon is 
 found when, by giving two difli'erent bright- 
 nesses in the visual field to the eyes separately, 
 a brightness slightly above the mean of the 
 single sensations is produced. This ceases, how- 
 ever, when the original differences are very 
 great, but rises significantly with dark adapta- 
 tion. It is absent, again, when a dark field is 
 presented first, and when the dark area is very 
 small. 
 
 Question on Vision. 
 
 1. Arrange the colors of the normal spec- 
 trum according to greatest-to-least intensity, 
 and then according to greatest-to-least satura- 
 tion. Compare these two series, singly and to- 
 gether, with the "natural" succession of hues 
 from red to violet. How many points of iden- 
 tity do you find in these three series? How 
 many similar tendencies do you find? Discuss 
 fully the psychology of color from the above 
 standpoint. 
 
 233 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 Perceptions, Meanings, and Speech. 
 112. Perception differs from sensation in 
 point of structure. Sensations, as representing 
 the attribute-thing relationship, were seen to 
 be cross-sections of series whose terms were 
 to a large degree prime to each other. One 
 might well have wondered what could be de- 
 duced from their relationships, for so fre- 
 quently were they isolated, that bare enumera- 
 tion seemed the only introduction and farewell 
 they permitted. Nevertheless, simple exhibi- 
 tion is all the scientist owes to elemental prop- 
 erties, and to treat as blunt matters of fact 
 things which exist solely as neutral elements, 
 is the only fair course to pursue with them. 
 The elements of sensation are not mental, for 
 one must go to them without presuppositions. 
 And after one has deduced from them what 
 seems to be their terminus ad quern, he must 
 again frankly apply himself to the facts in order 
 to eliminate the cavalier element from, his con- 
 jecturing. On the other hand, perceptions are 
 examples of the part-whole relationship, sub- 
 sisting in a complex of simultaneously or suc- 
 cessively existing sensations which have a defin- 
 able logical structure or unity. It now being 
 necessary to distinguish between attributes and 
 parts, we shall first say that for psychology there 
 234 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 are more specific properties of a whole consti- 
 tuted out of parts, than there are specific prop- 
 erties of a thing made of attributes. There is, 
 indeed, a geometrical increase of such proper- 
 tics for wholes over what it is for things. Again, 
 sensations refer principally to sensory recep- 
 tiveness or sensory acuity; while perceptions 
 refer more to the motor element in conscious- 
 ness, — the multiplicity of possible responses to 
 the same stimulus embedded in different con- 
 texts. 
 
 113. Now the parts in a perception are both 
 sensations and relations between sensations. A 
 patch of red is held up before my eyes, and 
 along with other reactions, I respond to the 
 duration of the stimulus, whether by adapta- 
 tion, exhaustion or what not. But if a patch 
 of blue replaces it and gets noticed as blue, and 
 if my consciousness becomes verbally expressed 
 by, " 'red and blue' supervenes the conscious- 
 ness 'red' ", with any additional relational con- 
 scious content such as, "two after one", "one 
 more", or "formerly one, now two", I am per- 
 ceiving rather than sensing. Or, to take a more 
 familiar example, "that black thing", or an 
 object whose color quality alone is being func- 
 tioned, would be a sensation, in contrast to 
 "that black thing" as "my black silk hat", which 
 235 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 would be a perception. It is not a case of the 
 intensity of stimulus that makes the diflerence, 
 but of the relations between the sensations, and 
 in this particular case, what I am going to do 
 about the object stimulating my retinae. It is 
 on the basis of the "with-for" relation that per- 
 ceptions obtain a rank as focal, forwarding 
 elements in consciousness, — a thing sensations 
 never get. In sensation the time element is 
 reducible to now, the space element to here; 
 while in perception the time and space elements 
 are never more simply expressed than by the 
 compound expression "here and now", their 
 relation of togetherness being for perception, 
 at least, indissoluble. Not that the attributes 
 of duration or extensity in sensation have to 
 change clothes in order to be valid in percep- 
 tion, but only when duration is present as some- 
 thing partly focal and partly fading out of 
 focality, has the lower threshold of perception 
 been passed. Similarly, the spacial element, 
 expressed by the word "here" means a sensa- 
 tional element, if everything is equally "here." 
 It becomes of a perceptual status, however, if, 
 at the same time there is a "here," there is also 
 another portion of the content better expressed 
 by the contrasting term "there." Considerable 
 warning needs to be assimilated at this point. 
 236 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 
 There may be in logic, but there is not in psy- 
 chology' any necessary distinction between 
 "here" and "there" when these terms are used 
 isolatedly. Do not say that consciousness is the 
 same as speech, for it is not; neither fall into the 
 egregious blunder of verbalizing the item re- 
 ferred to by verbal symbols. There is a logical 
 consciousness, and there is also a verbal or 
 speaking consciousness; just as there is func- 
 tional consciousness, and a conscious content 
 logically separable from it. Sensations are the 
 warp and woof of perceptions, and perceptions 
 are the stuff out of which logic is made, but 
 that does not allow one to say that the series is 
 symmetrical. Furthermore, the logical dis- 
 tinctions cannot be applied to the sensational 
 sources of consciousness as focal elements re- 
 siding oginally in them, for the finished pro- 
 duct is never the cause of the materials. Thus 
 "here" and "now" as elements in sensation 
 need have no relational status to what is not 
 here or now. For "then" and "there" might never 
 occur, and indeed, never do occur, to one not 
 engaged in logical considerations, sensation 
 being merely the present, immediate qualitative 
 and quantitative consciousness, and as such out 
 of relation to other and more complicated forms 
 of consciousness. 
 
 237 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 114. Space and time have had but slight 
 consideration up to this point. Their relation 
 to sensation and perception is rarely treated 
 with candor. "How do we experience space?" 
 and "What is the psychology of time?" are 
 questions over which much obscurity has been 
 indulged in. It is said, and with truth, that 
 the retinal image of a square table-top viewed 
 obliquely is by no means square. It is, in fact, 
 a spherical surface, with four spherical angles, 
 whose sum is greater than that of the four right 
 angles of the table-top as a geometrical surface. 
 In this case, we are told, memory is invoked, 
 and expectation as well, and many a fatuous 
 explanation as to how the table-top is perceived 
 as square ensues. Likewise in the case of time. 
 A half hour in the captivating theatre, as the 
 classic example, is shorter psychologically 
 than the half hour spent in listening to a ser- 
 mon; and then we are slyly asked just how we 
 gain an experience of time, with nothing more 
 to depend on than such psychological data. 
 Now let us frankly admit all these facts as well 
 as many more. A person blind from early in- 
 fancy, who, in later life, has his sight restored, 
 cannot tell the difference between a cube and a 
 sphere if he has nothing more than his retinae 
 with which to function the object. Also, a 
 238 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 blindfolded subject wlio is asked to tap contin- 
 ously an interval given only once or twice by 
 auditory stimulations, will, in the course of 
 the tapping, enlarge some intervals and con- 
 tract some others, remaining steady and accu- 
 rate only when the "indifference" period exists 
 between the stimuli. But when all our senses 
 are active, there is a geometrical increase of ac- 
 curacy in space and time judgments, and so 
 when the question of dermal, visual or auditory 
 space and time perceptions is up for discussion, 
 we always have to remember that a whole has 
 properties not implicit in the properties of the 
 parts; and also that while visual space, — audi- 
 tory space, — and dermal space-perception, when 
 occuring singly, are all poor, yet, that a summa- 
 tion of space perceptions as given by all these 
 means together is far more accurate than their 
 combined effects would arithmetically indicate. 
 Similarly, in the case of time. Besides, as spe- 
 cifically mentioned before, we have some other 
 means whereby to determine spaces and times 
 than by our naive sense organs, either singly 
 or in combination. Our physical instruments 
 of precision, — mathematically true eyes and 
 ears that they are,— not only function to correct 
 the errors of naive perceptions, but even to cor- 
 rect their own errors as well. Therefore, to 
 239 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 speak of space and time perceptions as being 
 dependent solely upon the unmathematical 
 sense organs is an example of deliberate self 
 abasement and self delusion. 
 
 115. But let us nevertheless exhibit just the 
 extent to which naive space and time are in 
 need of correction. Let us also examine the 
 data by which we ever got the hint for the de- 
 velopment of self correcting devices in the at- 
 tempt to infinitessimalize space and time. In 
 every science, the taking of a set of measure- 
 ments involves the determination of the result- 
 ing value. "Only when" is the scientists' goal 
 in an experiment, and not the goal determined 
 by his expectation. Otherwise, Paddock calls, 
 and careful analysis of the results always show 
 a "trace" of faking. Control of the conditions 
 without hindering the freedom of the function 
 to be investigated, is all the experimenter can 
 ask, though frequently some slight bonus for 
 doing so is smuggled into the final reckoning. 
 But whenever we wish to find some such datum 
 as a threshold, let us say, we take not one, but 
 many measurements. These measurements are 
 not identical, to be sure, but they always group 
 themselves about a common terminus ad quern, 
 — about a standard, average, or mean, which 
 may or may not be one of the recorded measure- 
 240 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 
 ments. Now this grouping about an average 
 is significant, in that it usually defines what is 
 known as a curve of probability, or a Gauss 
 curve. Such a curve represents a tendency of, 
 rather than an identity between, the measure- 
 ments, — just as we spoke of the threshold being 
 a quantitative tendency. It is not something 
 peculiar to psychological measurements, but is 
 met with in every set of scientific determina- 
 tions. Not only is this central tendency im- 
 portant, however, but also is the percentage of 
 deviations from it, as well as their amount pro 
 rata; for often two averages, derived from two 
 independent sets of measurements will be the 
 same, while the deviations from these averages 
 will be the only thing significantly describing 
 their differences. It then becomes necessary 
 to pause and see just what numbers mean in 
 such a situation. The rougher or finer the work 
 is done, the greater or less general deviation 
 from the central tendency will usually occur; 
 but in any case, the result sought for will have 
 to be admitted to be not some such unvarying 
 quantity, such as 8, but only a quantity greater 
 than 7 and less than 9. And if any one be dis- 
 appointed at this, his disappointment of course 
 comes about through the fact that to infinites- 
 simalize space and time, whether or no, involves 
 241 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 the fallacy of regarding continuity of measuring 
 as necessarily bound up with the discreteness 
 of recorded measurements. Curved lines are 
 not a succession of tiny straight ones, and the 
 mean, or average of a set of determinations is 
 quite useless without their average deviation 
 from that average. This is also why we speak 
 of the diameter of a circle as its most accurate 
 dimension, since the circumference, which is 
 in the prime relation of "tt" to it, is incommen- 
 surable. 
 
 116. Of the many methods possible in ex- 
 perimentation, I shall outline but three. The 
 method of mean error consists in having the 
 subject himself reproduce the quantity of the 
 standard measurement as closely as he can. 
 Given a vertical line on a card, whose length he 
 is to reproduce in a horizontal line, for example, 
 the time intervals between the exhibition of 
 standards, and both the accuracy and time taken 
 to reproduce the line are recorded. Exceed- 
 ingly great variability appears in the results of 
 such a method, as one might expect. The other 
 two methods, the limiting and the constant, are 
 more fruitful, — all the conditions being pre- 
 scribed by the experimenter. The limiting 
 method consists of presenting graded variables 
 to the subject, who judges them in terms of each 
 242 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 other, giving such answers as "greater," "less," 
 "equal," and the like. Now, in such a case, not 
 only do simultaneity and succession play a big 
 part, but such things as the Tightness or leftness 
 of the standard from the variable. The num- 
 ber of measurements often taken in such a case 
 is enormous, in order to cover all the possible 
 permutations and combinations. Furthermore, 
 the threshold may be obtained in four ways: 
 
 (1) by taking a variable greater than the stand- 
 ard and decreasing the amount between it and 
 the standard until no difference is observable; 
 
 (2) to start with two equal stimuli and increase 
 their difference until one is much greater than 
 the standard; (3) to start again with two equal 
 stimuli and decrease one below the value of 
 the standard; and (4) to start with one variable 
 way below the standard and approach it, as 
 in the first case above, (1). The constant meth- 
 od consists of an irregular presentation of vari- 
 ables along with the standard, with no regular 
 series of differences between the pairs as pre- 
 sented. One reason why these various methods 
 are all employed is that with different material 
 different methods are desirable, so as not to 
 interrupt the function to be investigated. Be- 
 sides, too slight differences between the pairs 
 of stimuli are deadly to the selective attention 
 
 243 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 of the subject, anaesthetizing him against the 
 ability to discriminate. For when only contra- 
 dictions and negations result, they are taken 
 to mean that one is on the wrong tack. 
 
 117. This will give an indication, not only 
 of the method employed to find thresholds and 
 the like in sensation, but of the method to de- 
 termine naive space and time estimation as 
 well. If we wish to know what "similarity" in 
 psychology means, we take stimuli in which 
 there is something identical, as determined by 
 all possible means, and present them to a sub- 
 ject who has not yet made such a determina- 
 tion. Whatever he takes or mistakes (no dis- 
 tinction here) for identity, is made the basis of 
 similarity. Without any slur on his intelli- 
 gence, the subject in an experimentation has 
 only to keep even-minded and naive, — it being 
 the business of the experimenter to plan un- 
 expectancies and keep from coaxing results. 
 That is to say, the experimenter regards the 
 data of the experiment as lying in several series, 
 but the subject's responses are narrowed to the 
 one series about which certain information is 
 desired. They both know equally what is go- 
 ing on, except that the subject is not prepared 
 for the exact order of the presentations. 
 
 118. Psychological things have as much be- 
 
 244 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 ing as have any other things. Strictly speak- 
 ing, there are no illusions. The psychological 
 order is not the only order into which things 
 get, and by virtue of the world not being a 
 charming and fragrant unity, we have contrasts, 
 contradictions and incompatibilities. Thus the 
 bent stick in water is both a bent and a straight 
 stick, the refractive power of water being a 
 perfectly empirical fact. The psychological 
 (naive ocular) stick, and the physical stick ex- 
 ist cozily together; the one that is bent being 
 made both of wood and of the index of refrac- 
 tion for water, and of certain properties of the 
 eye, while the straight stick is made of wood 
 only. If one be asked whether the stick is bent 
 or not, the answer cannot be wrong, no matter 
 how stated; for the question is put in ambiguous 
 language, not specifying which stick is meant. 
 Every so-called illusion is either due to a tricky 
 question, or to the fact that but one sense is 
 operative where normally all the senses giving 
 data germane to the stimulus contribute to the 
 perceptive consciousness. Naive space and 
 time determinations are not therefore illusions, 
 but merely and frankly terms of series exist- 
 ing with, while being more or less opposed to, 
 those determinations made with that set of de- 
 
 245 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 tachable sense organs known as instruments of 
 physical precision. 
 
 119. If the subject closes his eyes, and a 
 pencil be drawn over the skin of his hand, and 
 he be asked how long a line it traced, his an- 
 swer will be naive and erroneous. Our skin is 
 not pock-marked with calibrations, and hence 
 we do not know such things as dermal inches 
 or millimetres. Yet here naive dermal space 
 and time are clearly exhibited. If a bristle be 
 attached to the tine of a tuning fork and the 
 fork is struck and laid on the skin, we cannot 
 count the vibrations, though they may be sep- 
 arately felt. This is the dermal perception of 
 number. If the subject's arm is placed in a 
 tilting frame and gently moved, the extent of 
 the movement will be stated in terms on the 
 basis of which no accurately calibrated scale 
 could ever be made. A single point placed di- 
 rectly in the visual axis of the eye and moved 
 forward or back with reference to the subject, 
 cannot be seen to have changed its position. If 
 the eyes are closed and a clicking stimulus is 
 sounded at various positions with regard to the 
 head, those back and front will be interchanged 
 in the report almost haphazardly, while those 
 from side to side will get into series compatible 
 with what the experimenter knows, and what 
 246 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 the subject would too, if he did but open his 
 eyes. With the James Artificial Waterfall one 
 can get negative after-images of movement, 
 and of course one asks whether the ribbed belt 
 is actually reversing. The answer is that the 
 physical belt as a whole is stationary, but that 
 certain parts of it which have no position, (hav- 
 ing any position whatever), need not be still. 
 That much of our sea-faring friends as is func- 
 tioned by our timidity, dies in every storm 
 which sets us in a fear, while the ship bearing 
 them may at the same time be making twenty 
 knots in good, calm weather. As with sensa- 
 tion, so with perception; an object is something 
 that will stimulate, and naive perception is not 
 one of the functions of the organism with ref- 
 erence to the stimulus within the encasing en- 
 vironment which can be summarily pushed 
 aside. 
 
 120. Naive time perception is a function 
 of several diiferent things. Owing to the na- 
 ture of the sense organs, stimulation produces 
 consciousness which continually alters as to its 
 focus, unless reinforcements arc forthcoming 
 from other means than the stimulus itself. I 
 mean the environment within and without the 
 body. The fading of a sensation out of focality 
 is accompanied by the relational consciousness 
 247 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 of the change. It may not he called hy any 
 suitable name, but is signalized hy a difference 
 in focality, a wilting, and is accompanied hy a 
 corresponding condition of consciousness name- 
 able either as "hefore-now-after," "less-more," 
 or "more-less," or some such non-mental ex- 
 pression. Again, the wave of neural discharge 
 rises and falls, while, for example, the pulse 
 is beating, or the breath being drawn or re- 
 leased. These general organic rises and falls 
 are the physiological basis of naive time per- 
 ception, and the word "now" means any neural 
 continuity or equilibrium which is homogene- 
 ously focal in consciousness. However, "now" 
 or "the present" may be regarded as just as 
 long as the uninterrupted neural discharge. 
 When a writer says, "Let us now consider, etc.," 
 he means that he wishes his readers to have a 
 focal consciousness whose content is his ideas 
 for just as long a time as it takes to peruse his 
 statements. If the backgrounds of conscious- 
 ness are steadily maintained, "now" is a func- 
 tion of that maintenance. "Now" and "then" 
 are also interchangeable: any reference to 
 events in time past, taken as a whole, means a 
 "then." But the sensorial "now," or the present 
 time, is always short, while the perceptual or 
 logical "now" may be as long as one pleases. 
 248 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 Tliat is to say, those things which are axiomatic 
 and always dependable are timeless, being in- 
 different to any special time or situation. 
 
 121. Time estimations concern such things 
 as the following: the number of objects oper- 
 ating in the sense field; the strength of the first 
 impression, — or the strength of some one of the 
 impressions as contrasted with the varying 
 strength of the succeeding or simultaneous im- 
 pressions; the contrast effects of the sucession 
 of unequal intervals of solar time in a series 
 of presentations; the alternation of sense fields 
 in focality, and similar phenomena. Sometimes 
 the expressions "filled" and "unfilled" time are 
 spoken of, but this means that interest domin- 
 ates the items in the content, and not that the 
 time interval is quantitatively altered. One 
 curious fact in this connection is the "indiffer- 
 ence period." The motor repetition of certain 
 time intervals will be erroneous unless the in- 
 terval is some multiple of about 0.7 seconds. 
 This particular naive "second" is remarkably 
 accurate. Again, if one sits in a chair resting 
 the tendon under the knee upon an elevation 
 too high to allow the heel to be comfortably 
 held on the floor, and starts to jerk the heel up 
 and down, the ensuing reflex will continue in 
 spite of all volitions to the contrary while re- 
 249 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 maining in that position, and the regularity of 
 the interval thus maintained will be a close in- 
 voluntary standard of time. The sub- and un- 
 conscious always function more dependably 
 than any one sense field, no matter how focal 
 it is. Rhythm may be spoken of as the invol- 
 untary grouping of regular stimuli into pat- 
 terns, the basis of which grouping is in the sub- 
 conscious action of the neural arcs. Multiple, 
 rapidly recurring stimuli are not responded to 
 separately, but they sum into releases as has 
 been indicated before. The initial reflex and 
 the after-discharge are veritable elementary 
 constituents of the trochaic foot in poetry. And 
 no rhythm whatever has been successful which 
 demanded grouping contrary to the elemental 
 properties of the discharge mechanism of the 
 neural arcs. As certain geometrical figures are 
 to lines, so rhythms are to time intervals; the 
 basis for spacial grouping being extensity, that 
 of temporal grouping being intensity. We 
 shall treat of the other features of time in con- 
 nection with space, with which we shall have 
 considerably more to do. 
 
 122. The following psychological space- 
 givers are usually enumerated: 
 
 (1) the bi-dimensional field of the passive 
 skin, 
 
 250 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 
 (2) the bi-diniensional field of the active 
 skin, 
 
 (3) the tri-dimensional field of the passive 
 skin, 
 
 (4) the tri-dimensional field of the active 
 skin, 
 
 (5) the bi-dimensional field of the passive, 
 single eye, 
 
 (6) the bi-dimensional field of the passive, 
 double eye, 
 
 (7) the tri-dimensional field of the single 
 and double moving eye or eyes, 
 
 (8) the bi-dimensional field of the ear, or 
 ears. 
 
 Smell and taste, as well as the organic sensa- 
 tions, are spaceless, though not lacking in the 
 attribute of extensity. By "spaceless" is here 
 meant that they cannot be developed into per- 
 ceptions that wall square with the readings of 
 detachable sense organs. One dimension can 
 be gotten easily from either the skin moving 
 over a point or a point moving over the skin. 
 But a square, circle or triangle outlined upon 
 the skin is poorly judged to be a closed figure 
 unless the stimulation is intense enough to leave 
 definite after-sensations. Otherwise the first 
 impression of the stimulus will give an eccen- 
 tric spacial reference. A temporal threshold 
 251 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 must not be exceeded here either, for otherwise, 
 the after-sensation will be excentrically re- 
 ferred. Local-sign, duration, after-image and 
 the like, thus pass over into perceptions. A 
 geometrical figure in metal, when laid on the 
 skin, will likewise require a certain intensity 
 of application to be judged correctly as to its 
 shape. If it has sharp corners, they are likely 
 to arouse pain before its sides fully arouse 
 touch, in which case all the elements in the per- 
 ception of its size will be derived from the vari- 
 ous systems of cutaneous sensibility rather than 
 from superficial (or epicritic) touch alone. A 
 warmed dollar feels larger and lighter than a 
 cold one, if both are laid simultaneously upon 
 corresponding parts of the body, this being due 
 both to the engorgement of the capillaries 
 through heat, and to the numbing of the skin 
 through cold, thereby making the skin itself a 
 tactual stimulus. If a heavy, blunt point moves 
 across the skin surface at the same rate as a 
 lighter, finer one, the judgment of rate of mo- 
 tion will err in point of underestimating the 
 speed of the second. In all these cases of der- 
 mal perception, there must be considered the 
 matter of the "pressure gradient." This refers 
 to the deformation of the skin by the stinmlus. 
 The hand immersed in mercury will respond 
 252 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 to a summation of touches only at the line of 
 emergence from the liquid. Below that point 
 it will function a mutual inhibition of them. 
 This is due to the exceedingly unusual pressure 
 of the liquid at that place as compared with the 
 pressure of the air above it. Contrast is here 
 the deciding factor. In cases of the pressure 
 gradient, the distribution of pressures from the 
 point of application becomes such that irradia- 
 tion occurs, — a factor which accounts for some 
 of the eccentricity of dermal local-sign, — for 
 some of the outlying areas beyond the stimulus 
 will be subliminally excited, and, by virtue of 
 the lateral pressure of the deformed skin, the 
 non-orthogonal character of the entire stimu- 
 lation will be functioned erroneously in the 
 judgment given. Pain, in its quick lancing 
 down, and cold in its contrasting thrill, are bet- 
 ter localized than those other sensations which 
 have less instant contrast effects, regardless of 
 latency or intensity. 
 
 123. Dermal perception of space is also ob- 
 tained by the moving of one skin area over an- 
 other. All three dimensions can be thus exhib- 
 ited, — the vertical, the horizontal, and the third 
 dimension called depth. But this almost always 
 involves tendinous and articular ingredients, 
 and while the threshold of bare movement is 
 253 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 low, judgments of the extent to which the legs 
 or arms have moved, whether singly or in pairs, 
 are usually quite inaccurate. For example, a 
 slow movement seems longer than a rapid one 
 of the same extent, while the judgment of a 
 blindfolded subject, who determines his two 
 arms to pass symmetrically through the same 
 distance, errs. The movement of the limb 
 mentioned, noticed and kept in focus is always 
 overestimated, though the extent of successive 
 movements is better judged than that of simul- 
 taneous. Along with kinaesthetic sensations, 
 there is usually present either coolness or 
 warmth from the skin due to the fanning of the 
 air by the moving member. This, however, 
 often gives cues as to spacial differences in the 
 resulting perception. Extents of movement, 
 durations, and qualities, — that is, the local sign 
 of the articular elements in toe, hip, shoulder, 
 wrist and the like, together with the massive- 
 ness of the fusions from the large joints, — these 
 are determining elements in all cases of kinaes- 
 thetic perceptions. Curious among the eccen- 
 tricities of naive perceptions is the familiar 
 "size-weight" illusion. If a subject is presented 
 with two objects of similar shape, but of ex- 
 actly the same weight, and takes them both 
 simultaneously and lifts them, the smaller of 
 254 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 the pair will appear heavier than the larger. 
 Furthermore, the larger is not only "better pre- 
 pared for" muscularly than is the smaller, but 
 it gets lifted more steadily and, due to the mus- 
 cular "surprise" provoked by the other weight, 
 gets lifted more rapidly. Other things being 
 equal, the more rapidly a lifted object ascends, 
 the lighter it seems. The experiment is usually 
 set to deceive, and could be called an illusory 
 phenomenon only in point of the verbal report 
 of the subject upon suffering the joke. Other- 
 wise, it is but a case of co-conscious perception 
 as functioned by movement on the basis of in- 
 equality of visual responses to sizes. For the 
 motor setting with which we approach such un- 
 equal objects is usually derived solely from 
 their space relations, and not from the in- 
 tended movements giving a sub-focal, strain 
 pre-sensation. There is such a thing as a yellow 
 consciousness, an angry consciousness, but there 
 is no such thing as a heavy consciousness: we 
 function for weights only by strains. This point 
 of pre-sensation, pre-perception and motor at- 
 tunement will be further treated of in the sec- 
 tions on "meaning." 
 
 124. Before elaborating auditory and visual 
 space perceptions, I wish to outline the sensa- 
 tional elements in all perceptions. Under the 
 255 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 concepts of the attribute-thing and part-whole 
 relationships, sensations and perceptions are 
 differentiated chiefly by the complexity and 
 concatentation of their elements. Perceptions, 
 being linked with motor responses of general 
 orientation, in a way which sensations are not, 
 illustrate the "with-for" relationship in its most 
 significant aspect. The clearest consciousness 
 is perceptual, not sensational or emotional, and 
 the motor acts of the body are not only the sur- 
 est, most maintaining, and least fatiguing, when 
 the perceptual responses are dominant; but per- 
 ceptions at once lead to organizations of activ- 
 ity, judgments, reasonings, clear conceptions in 
 a manner not ever approached by other kinds of 
 responses. Now, those attributes of sensation 
 which lead directly to perception are the fol- 
 lowing: fusion, duration, intensity, local-sign, 
 contrast, and after-image. I shall take them 
 up separately. 
 
 125. Fusion in perception. Every whole 
 has properties other than those of its parts, 
 taken isolatedly. There may also be more prop- 
 erties of the whole than the addition of those 
 of the parts would indicate to be the case. Now 
 insofar as fusion typifies wholeness, a fusion 
 resultant manifests the specific properties of a 
 whole. A fusion resultant, furthermore, is not 
 256 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 the same as a simple sensation; for a fusion 
 can be broken up into several sensations, while 
 a simple sensation breaks up at once into at- 
 tributes: besides, the elements of a fusion still 
 have position in space and time, while the at- 
 tributes of sensation do not. It is possible, also, 
 for the "position" of the fusion resultant not 
 to coincide with that of any of the constituting 
 sensations. Nevertheless, fusions give us a 
 clear example of the addition of one and one 
 to make but one, — as is evidenced by the two 
 compass points placed on the skin within the 
 dermal threshold for twoness. In such a case 
 of fusion, also, we have exhibited the fact of 
 the submergence of some of the properties of 
 the parts under the new quality of the whole, or 
 resultant. If, again, such a fusion be gradually 
 consummated and then gradually broken up, 
 one may get a clear perception of change as 
 well as of rate of change, — two factors both of 
 which facilitate orientation in any recurrent 
 meeting with either the elements in, or results 
 of, such fusion. Lastly, identity and contrast 
 may be obtained along with fusion, with the 
 probability that each may supplement the per- 
 ceptual value of the others. For instance, if 
 tickling be produced first by light wool and 
 later by a vibrating tuning-fork, while the sub- 
 257 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 ject obtains both visual and dermal contents 
 from the stimulus, he will dermally sense iden- 
 tities but visually sense and perceive difTer- 
 ences. This will automatically evoke contrast 
 in the resulting consciousness and all of the 
 elements here involved will make a perceptual 
 pattern of larger dimensions than would other- 
 wise be possible. Such an account will fail to 
 satisfy the incurable introspector, — for he 
 wants to know in all such cases how the object 
 is re-presented in consciousness, — not what of 
 the object is first of all just plain consciousness. 
 But this is asking what the "mental" status of 
 an object is,— an item we have long ago rele- 
 gated to the vocabulary of metaphysical pro- 
 fanity. 
 
 126. Duration in perception. The fading 
 out, wilting, or sudden onset and release of a 
 stimulus, accompanied by whatever content or 
 process is functionally related to such things, 
 brings with it, or has as part of it, the corre- 
 sponding consciousness in point of duration and 
 its relational aspects. The duration of a content 
 or process means also the passing of a threshold 
 of the perception of relations. This tem- 
 poral attribute of sensations welds them to- 
 gether into the causal or symmetrical relations 
 of perception. It is a primitive and ultimate at- 
 258 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 tribute, and is to be correlated directly with the 
 rise and fall of the neural releases. Duration, 
 including simultaneity and succession of im- 
 pulses, is a bi-dimensional field, and by virtue 
 of temporal duration we are enabled both to 
 sense together, and sense successively, as well 
 as perceptually function the discrimination be- 
 tween pairs of intensities, local-signs, durations, 
 and so on. The overlapping of neural impulses 
 is the physiological element operating here. 
 
 127, Intensity in perception. The more in- 
 tensive stimulations usually capture the final 
 common path, and thus get soonest organized 
 into perceptions. If, also, there be differences 
 of intensity in the conscious manifold, they will 
 be functioned as a series of intensities in addi- 
 tion to whatever other series the stimulations 
 may exhibit. Were it not for differing levels of 
 receptiveness, most objects would otherwise be 
 recorded as "Blob No. 1," "Blob No. 2," etc. A 
 series of psychological intensities in one mo- 
 dality, however, may be contrasted with data 
 from another sense field operating at the same 
 time, and thus better balance and orientation 
 may result. 
 
 128. Local sign in perception. The position 
 of every sensory stimulus is more or less de- 
 terminable, and the resulting sensation is func- 
 
 259 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 tioned as being derived from some part of the 
 spacial order; however, the Euclidian position 
 and the reported position need not coincide. 
 We saw in the case of touch, that when two 
 compass points were placed on the skin within 
 that distance known as the dermal threshold 
 for twoness, that the local sign of the resulting 
 sensation was either absorbed by one or the 
 other of the points, or was referred to something 
 like a mean position between them. Likewise, 
 when only the deep sensibility is left after nerve 
 section, successive, and not simultaneous double 
 pressure alone remains. Now, whether local- 
 sign be a quality peculiar to every direction of 
 stimulation or not, there is soon derived with 
 practice an increased sensitivity to location, and 
 practice also improves spacial discrimination on 
 that side of the body not exercised. In all cases 
 of location, two senses are better than one, and 
 differences of position are responded to better 
 than are single positions. But, as said before, 
 we are not calibrated as meter sticks are, and 
 questions put to us in regard to the sensorial 
 position of things have no right to be couched 
 in terms of the experimenter to the disparage- 
 ment of the subject. Any response is a respect- 
 able datum in psychology. 
 
 129. Contrast in perception. Togetherness, 
 260 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 whether sinuiltaneous or successive, is accom- 
 panied by partially balanced neural responses, 
 and this balance is part of the basis for the per- 
 ception of the pattern of stimulations func- 
 tioned in consciousness. We sense dififerences 
 rather than absolute magnitudes, and this fact 
 has a cash value in perception. Gradual in- 
 creases or decreases in intensity of the stimulus 
 are not usually accompanied by equal slidings 
 in the content of consciousness, but abrupt in- 
 creases or decreases are the rule. The steady 
 "stream of thought" is something which the 
 writer, for one, knows nothing about. Instead 
 of being continuous, consciousness is discon- 
 tinuous, — arguments for continuity on the basis 
 of anything but breath or pulse being incompre- 
 hensible to him. In this connection, it is logical 
 to distinguish between the perception of con- 
 trast and the sensations that are contrasted to- 
 gether; nevertheless, in psychology either may 
 be now primaiy, and again derivative. 
 
 130. After-image in perception. Structures 
 are also revealed by duration and other con- 
 tinuing phenomena. The after-image is such a 
 functioner of structure. Both positive and neg- 
 ative after-images, insofar as perception is con- 
 cerned, each add just another term in the series 
 of possible contents derived by the sense or- 
 261 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 gan. Often in so doing they give common parts 
 with the effects of other stimuli. Thus they 
 relate things which might otherwise go unre- 
 lated for a considerable time, and by lasting 
 longer than the stimulus presentation, they af- 
 ford contrast effects, whereby further bases for 
 perception are established. 
 
 131. There is thus nothing mythical in the 
 sensational contributions to the elements of per- 
 ception. We have specifically dealt, however, 
 only with the response side; but inasmuch as 
 the sensation is the object and what it will do, 
 we have only to indicate the way structure is 
 first functioned, — for it is always the object 
 which is a structural experience as well as 
 structurally experienced. Indeed, the object 
 sensed and the object perceived differ in only 
 two respects, — namely, the structure of the 
 neural releases, and the structure of the en- 
 vironment in which it is being functioned. All 
 these structural relations are logical and em- 
 pirical, and have none of the odor of "mental- 
 ity" upon them. 
 
 132. Now for space perception, especially as 
 related to the eye and the ear. Let us first bear 
 in mind the fact that the study of space with 
 reference to the naive ear and eye is not a study 
 of how space is made, space never having gone 
 
 262 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 through any mill or shop, but only how space 
 and spaciality are functioned. For the study of 
 psychology is principally an analysis of what 
 we already well know, as well as how things 
 get known; and it determines the properties of 
 parts in a whole whose parts are not yet fully 
 determined as to their contributing elements. 
 Consider the following list of sense-fields : 
 
 Visceral and coenaesthetic sensations. 
 
 Taste, 
 
 Smell, 
 
 Touch, 
 
 Kinaesthesis, 
 
 Hearing, 
 
 Vision. 
 
 As named in the above order, they represent 
 not only that order in which they are the worst- 
 to-best space givers, but also that order in which 
 they have, with one or two exceptions, the least- 
 to-most structure. Not only this, but they have 
 in this order an increasing number of qualities, 
 and therefore exhibit correspondingly numer- 
 ous instances of variation in the combination of 
 attributes leading directly to perception. 
 
 Ear Space. 
 
 133. The eyes converge and focus, but the 
 ears do not. The tensor tympani contracts 
 upon accomodation, and the tympanum func- 
 263 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 tions sudden intensity in the manner previous- 
 ly described. But ear space is obtained by the 
 relative intensity with which sounds are gotten 
 by the two ears, barring one notable exception, 
 the human voice. This can be very well lo- 
 calized front and back, while all other sounds 
 are in need of being placed well within the lat- 
 eral field of sound with reference to the coronal 
 and sagittal planes of the head. The shell of 
 the ear (concha) also acts as a resonator, and 
 performs a localizing function. There is also 
 a widespread and clearly manifest tendency 
 to locate a relatively loud sound in front of, and 
 a relatively weak sound behind, the head, but 
 just what the zero of intensity (loudness or 
 weakness) is, in such cases, has not yet been 
 determined. Furthermore, the straining of the 
 eyes to right or left causes a misplacement of 
 the sound in that direction, and every reflex 
 tendency of the head adds an element in the 
 determination of space while the eyes are 
 closed. Sounds full of overtones are naively 
 localized nearer to us than sounds poor in over- 
 tones, while the "flatter" of two sounds seems 
 to be the farther away. Fusion in sounds offers 
 an interesting analogue to fusion in touches. If 
 two similar sounds be produced at certain dif- 
 ferent positions with relation to the head, they 
 264 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 will invariably be heard as one, in spite of the 
 fact that the subject knows there are two of 
 them. The position of the fused resultant will 
 be either, (a) the actual position of one of the 
 stimuli, (b) at a point between them, or (c) 
 eccentrically referred to an indeterminate po- 
 sition. 
 
 134. Again, if an auditory stimulus is car- 
 ried toward the head, the localization of it will 
 be functioned with the same result as if, with 
 the stimulus fixed, the head has been moved in 
 the direction of the source of sound. It is the 
 moving things of nature that give us our best 
 cues of position, and ear space furnishes a field 
 in which these operate. Within the internal ear 
 lie the semi-circular canals, as well as two 
 conjoined organs of spherical shape known as 
 the saccule and utricule. The canals are set 
 in the three geometrical dimensions, and are 
 full of a liquid that gets impacts which develop 
 wave forms in the tiny tubes of these canals 
 when the head is moved. Extirpation of them 
 impairs our perceptions of position; but one of 
 each corresponding pairs of canals on either 
 side may be removed without apparent loss of 
 this function. Only when both vertical, or both 
 horizontal canals, for example, are extirpated, 
 will such perception be inhibited. The saccule 
 265 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 and utricule have on their internal surfaces 
 tiny hairs upon which lie crystals, whose func- 
 tion is thought to be to exert pressure during 
 sudden movements of the head or body, and 
 thus to arouse stabilizing reflexes. Deaf mutes 
 very frequently have defective inner organs of 
 the ear, and the common inability of these per- 
 sons to locate themselves in under-water swim- 
 ming, as to the surface and bottom of the pool, 
 is correlated with this fact. Interesting side- 
 lights upon dizziness are revealed by incidents 
 in connection with our modern conquest of the 
 air. One of the important things that has been 
 shown is to how great an extent the environ- 
 ment of the aviator may be rigidly defined by 
 his aeroplane, with but little reference to the 
 surrounding medium. Spiral somersaults are 
 soon learned without any feeling of dizziness. 
 From a recent magazine comes the following 
 quotation: "A naval airman when flying sea- 
 ward entered a thick white cloud and wholly 
 lost his sense of direction. He only realized 
 that he was upside down on finding that things 
 were falling out of his pockets. ... At 
 length he emerged from the cloud and saw the 
 sea apparently over his head, but was able to 
 right his machine and continue his flight." In 
 rotating the body rapidly, we produce the phe- 
 266 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 noinenon known as dizziness, which might be 
 classified under sensations of movement, as well 
 as under perceptions of space. It is accom- 
 panied by eye movements, nausea, and dis- 
 placements of the viscera, which, — being less 
 stable than the bones, — alter the center of grav- 
 ity of the body when they are disturbed. In 
 this case also undoubtedly the kinaesthetic or- 
 gans of the internal ear function importantly. 
 Looking in a mirror whose position is suddenly 
 unsteadied will also give a sense of dizziness. 
 Toe-dancers obviate the inevitable dizziness in- 
 cident to their rapid rotation by fixating one 
 object after another before they arrive directly 
 in front of it; or else, with eyes closed and di- 
 rected downwards, they attain the same end. 
 When one observes the eyes of a person who 
 has been rapidly rotated, without any of these 
 precautions being taken, he sees an involun- 
 tary rotary movement of the eyes, called nystag- 
 mus. This nystagmus may be lateral, (that is, 
 the eyes may jerk rapidly from side to side), or 
 rotary, but it is rarely vertical. During rota- 
 tion, there is a tendency to fixate any stationary 
 object, but it soon gets left behind, and we look 
 quickly forward to fixate another stimulus. 
 During this look forward there is no vision. 
 After slowing up, a contrary effect is produced; 
 267 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 the eyes of the subject jerk quickly back and 
 slowly forward, the general effect of this being 
 being to function the surrounding objects as 
 rotating around him as a center. Some people 
 lose their sense of orientation while watching a 
 waterfall, as this is a form of flicker, while in- 
 toxicants, and strange eye glasses, as well as 
 disturbances in the circulation all have common 
 parts in this phenomenon of mis-orientation. 
 Even to pass a galvanic current through the 
 ears produces dizziness, and one may have sen- 
 sations of falling toward the cathode pole in 
 such a case. But neither this nor the oscilla- 
 tions of the eyes accompanying it occur when 
 the labyrinths are removed. 
 
 135. In all these cases of confusion, there 
 are several significant things to be noted. In 
 the first place, the organs of accomodation and 
 adjustment act with longer latent periods than 
 allow instantaneous readjustment to an envi- 
 ronment whose relative positions are shattered; 
 and the consciousness generated in such situa- 
 tions is the situation itself pitted against the 
 responses to that other environment which has 
 no especially significant name, but which is 
 mainly functioned by the tonic reflexes that 
 react against all such disturbances. Further- 
 more, while the perception of confusion may be 
 268 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 a confused perception, all of our responses at 
 any one time need not be confined to those ele- 
 ments which are focally conscious. A confused 
 environment may lie within an unconfused one, 
 and part of the stabilizing influences may come 
 directly from the responses to this other en- 
 vironment. But at the time, these responses 
 are not focally conscious, and need not have 
 any content; they may be treated of entirely in 
 terms of the general somatic momentum, which 
 after all is but a response to whatever stability 
 is present. For human beings are constant 
 functions of their environment, whether they 
 be manifesting sensation, perception, volition, 
 belief, or judgment. And if any one wishes to 
 know what "mystery" lies behind these other 
 stabilizing environments, the only reply is that 
 the non-mental elements which make up both 
 mind and matter have other orders than those 
 into which they may be and are constantly or- 
 ganized as sensory data; and being non-mental 
 as well as non-physical, they have no age nor 
 settled occupation. 
 
 136. Of all the modalities, sight is the one 
 which figures principally in spacial perceptions. 
 Not only are the combinations of sight and 
 touch, sight and sound, sight and movement, 
 better space givers than any such two-term com- 
 269 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 bination not including sight, but also our in- 
 struments of precision are usually adjustable 
 sight organs rather than organs co-functioning 
 with the efferent nerves of other sense fields. 
 Telescopes, transits, sextants, and range-finders, 
 for example, are all visual apparatus, and even 
 the physical measurements employed to deter- 
 mine time and intensities are calibrated into 
 scales which we read with the eye rather than 
 perceive by the use of the other receiving or- 
 gans of sense. The domination of all other 
 spaces by sight space is apparent, and we even 
 employ in more than a figurative sense the ex- 
 pression "seeing is believing," when we are in 
 doubt as to the factual status of the something 
 under suspicion. The functional dependence 
 of perception upon the eye is not difficult to 
 make explicit. No other single organ can re- 
 ceive so many impressions and group them, 
 while at the same time it adjusts itself to their 
 differences, as can the eye. For three sets of 
 functions are implicit in its action, — movement 
 of the entire organ by rotation within its socket; 
 accomodation of the lens by the ciliary reflex; 
 and the color and shape responses quite inde- 
 pendent of these two. The amount of space re- 
 sponded to by the eye so far exceeds that of any 
 other sense organ, that, if by the expression 
 270 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 
 "higher sense" is meant the possibility of or- 
 ganized and dependable perception, no modal- 
 ity is in any way superior to vision. 
 
 137. Convergence and accommodation are 
 two motor responses of the eye which aid sig- 
 nificantly in space perceptions. Convergence 
 accompanies accomodation, and any intense 
 stimulus for vision will set going automatic ro- 
 tation of the eyes to bring the object directly 
 in line with the visual axis, as well as adjust- 
 ment of the lens to the focal distance required 
 for clear vision. The two eyes converge and 
 accomodate as one, and by means of producing 
 convergences and accomodations under arti- 
 ficial circumstances, the distances of objects 
 thus seen will be functioned by the extent of 
 the automaticity of these processes. Exceed- 
 ingly distant objects make no apparent con- 
 vergence in the eyes: the axes are practically 
 parallel, as is the case with persons asleep ; and 
 the "far away look" of one in abstraction or in 
 a condition of surplus eating is directly refer- 
 able to the non-fixation of any sensory stimulus. 
 Objects will appear then, in this connection, as 
 far away as the sensations of reflexly excited 
 accommodation and convergence function them. 
 But we must also take into account the matter 
 of visual distance, and what it means. When 
 271 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 things are found out to be nearer or farther than 
 they appeared, it cannot be called a visual il- 
 lusion. Depth or distance, visually speaking, 
 is as great as it appears to be; but depth or dis- 
 tance in terms of intended movement to reach 
 the object, is as great as it is found out to be. 
 Of course, in eye-consciousness, one must con- 
 sider that there are many unequal linear ex- 
 tents which are functioned exactly alike,— they 
 have common parts,— and these visual identities 
 are just as good data as any others. Let the 
 cause of the eye, and not the eye itself be the 
 emptor qui caveat. What we were set to do 
 on the basis of regarding these common parts as 
 in one series only, is the basis for error; and 
 this is a case of contradiction in the resulting 
 movements, not an error of the visual content. 
 The exact basis for erroneously calling this a 
 "visual illusion" is the violation of the part- 
 whole relation, — that is, the making of the 
 whole consciousness independent of its contrib- 
 uting parts and relations. 
 
 138. The so-called retinal image, or, for our 
 purposes, the extent of retinal stimulation, has 
 an immediate bearing upon the functioning for 
 extents and depths. According to physiological 
 optics, the size of the stimulated retinal area 
 is directly proportional to the size of the ob- 
 272 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 ject stimulating it; and thus whatever object 
 can be made to stimulate a smaller retinal area 
 than it normally would in its spacial context, is 
 called more distant than normally. The clear- 
 ness or faintness of the stimulated retinal area 
 has much to do also with the visual estimation 
 of size and distance. Irradiation of light on 
 neighboring retinal areas brings an inevitable 
 distance effect, as well as does the stimulation 
 of the retina by objects in a fog. But here 
 haziness causes us to function the objects as 
 much nearer for vision than they are in motor 
 terms, whereas their vagueness of outline makes 
 them appear farther away than one would ex- 
 pect. Moreover, objects nearer than the fixa- 
 tion point seem larger, and those farther away 
 smaller; while if there are two objects directly 
 in the line of vision, and the eye first fixates the 
 farther and then the nearer of them, there will 
 be apparent a doubling of the object not fixated. 
 Holding a meter stick directly in the line of 
 sight, and looking first at one end, then the 
 other, and then at the middle, will cause all the 
 blurring which any mis-focussed optical appa- 
 ratus is heir to under similar circumstances. 
 
 139. Before taking up this phenomenon of 
 doubling in detail, let us consider one differ- 
 ence between monocular and binocular vision 
 273 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 on the phenomenal side. If a ring is suspended 
 before one with its diameter in the median 
 plane of the head while one eye is closed, the 
 task of thrusting a pencil quickly into the aper- 
 ture of the ring will be far more difficult than 
 when both eyes are open. But the error is not 
 so much one of direction as of the amount of 
 distance at which the ring is estimated to be. 
 If the ring moves, and any co-ordination be- 
 tween vision and intended movement is there- 
 by obtained, the trials will result in far greater 
 accuracy than otherwise. Nevertheless, the de- 
 termination of the amount of movement the 
 ring has to make before accuracy of thrust is 
 obtained, is of slight account; for there would 
 be no basis on which accuracy with both eyes 
 open without movement of the ring, could be 
 equated with accuracy with but one eye open 
 while the ring is moving. These two situations 
 are prime to each other, and psychological 
 primes may all be substituted for each other or 
 not, just as environmental and intentional con- 
 ditions determine. But so much does movement 
 enter into perceptions of depth, that the eye 
 must be regarded primarily as a motor mechan- 
 ism whenever we wish to refer the data of 
 space getting to it. For if we produce experi- 
 mentally an apparent monocular visual im- 
 274 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 passe, — unless it be flashed on and oft' instan- 
 taneously to the subject, — involuntary accomo- 
 dation and re-accomodation occur, since the 
 eyes are almost never still, even though we in- 
 trospectively judge them to be so. Again, the 
 two retinae do not function singly, however in- 
 dependently they may elaborate their stimula- 
 tions antecedent to the full neural discharge ac- 
 companying focality. So that while uniocular 
 depth may be obtained, especially with move- 
 ment, one must be warned against assuming 
 that the closure of one eye is accompanied by 
 the exclusion of unconscious binocular, accu- 
 rate functioning of space. 
 
 140. As a matter beyond dispute, however, 
 depth can be obtained in too short a time to al- 
 low for any eye movements, and while just how 
 great a depth is therein apprehended is not quite 
 clear, any depth at all would be sufficient evi- 
 dence of the fact that space is not a matter of 
 what some psychologists incorrectly term ex- 
 perience, for spacial content is one thing, while 
 the study of the functions whereby we get that 
 content is quite another. Furthermore, to find 
 ourselves accurately and prudentially oriented 
 among our surroundings often means that mo- 
 tor habits have improved upon the sensory 
 content of vision to a large degree. The lowest 
 275 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 levels of consciousness are devoid of content, 
 but they are not on that account lacking in those 
 functions out of which accurate judgments may 
 still be made. To treat then of binocular space, 
 we have to consider first the fact that when the 
 eyes are focussed, this functioning defines the 
 field of vision in terms of the point of focus. 
 Everything beyond and nearer than that point 
 fails to arouse the same sort of definite stimu- 
 lations from the eye sockets; as well as it fails 
 to open such co-ordinating pathways to in- 
 tended movements as does the fixation reaction, 
 to which all others are subsidiary. One cannot 
 converge his eyes in the dark correctly, and 
 exact fixation of its source is impossible after a 
 light, once shown, is obscured. If we turn out 
 the electric light before retiring, not only will 
 the exact position of the lighting fixture be lost 
 to consciousness, but, in a strange room, all 
 movements of orientation wall be suddenly 
 swamped out of the motor pattern except the 
 vaguest remnant of our previous intention. 
 "Groping in the dark" is just another way of 
 saying that intended movements guaranteed in 
 their integrity by the element of visual fixation 
 have been geometrically decreased by the bare 
 arithmetical loss of the guiding eye, in point 
 both of accuracy and chain continuity. Now, 
 276 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 as a usual thing, one is led to believe that the 
 physiology and psychology of vision have made 
 an inseparable contract. The notion of the ex- 
 act correspondence between the amount of con- 
 vergence of the eyes and the apparent distance 
 of the object from the observer emanates from 
 the very bosom of physiological optics, as well 
 as the impossibility of single vision when non- 
 corresponding points are being stimulated. 
 Previous to that notion there was much support 
 given to a derivative of the laws of optics 
 known as the projection theory. This fell out 
 of that opaque philosophical era in which the 
 mind was considered a mirror of the objects of 
 the "external" world. And yet the mind was 
 in the brain, though the brain, strange to say, 
 was also external! These were also the days 
 when the mention of certain unctious words was 
 inevitably followed by the stupefaction of the 
 non-elect. Now although every observation 
 may contribute to science, and while the search 
 for ordinal correlations is symptomatic of one 
 form of an orderly mind, yet any one who ex- 
 periments upon vision and tries to ordinally 
 correlate every visual phenomenon either with 
 one of the laws of lenses or the laws of phys- 
 iological optics exclusively, will find that in- 
 stead of obeying the laws of nature, he has but 
 277 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 obeyed the laws of the logic of intention. We 
 do find, it is true, that objects falling on non- 
 corresponding points of the retinae, — that is, 
 upon points geometrically non-identical, — pro- 
 duce usually double vision of the stimulus. As 
 a matter of fact, however, we get too few dou- 
 ble images for the theory of identical points to 
 be unlimitedly applicable, and too many for the 
 notion of projection to be entertained. Im- 
 portant work is being done at present upon this 
 very item of binocular vision, and the general 
 tendency of writers is to be catholic in the use 
 of conclusions. At present, also, depth or solid- 
 ity is being explained by saying that it is func- 
 tioned by retinal conditions which exhibit a 
 half-way state between single and double vision. 
 For while we never see double at the fovea, 
 neither does the marksman see two targets, nor 
 the microscopist two specimens, though both 
 of his eyes are open. To say, furthermore, that 
 the eye not at the slit of the gun nor at the eye 
 piece of the microscope sees nothing, is perjury 
 to the facts. 
 
 141. For, if explanations of vision are to be 
 through and through optical, or physiological, 
 — in order to satisfy some a-priori theory of 
 mechanism, — then, of course, at inconvenient 
 places some such psychological (!) factor as 
 278 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 "habitual neglect" of the disturbing fact must 
 be solicited in the final reckoning. For even 
 stereoscopic cficcts of depth persist not only 
 when the eyes are converging, but even when 
 they are parallel, and when they are diverging 
 as well; and distances can be discriminated as 
 far as twenty metres, when kinaesthetic factors 
 or retinal disparity are negligible. "Neglect of 
 the extraneous elements," — by which is usually 
 meant some "mental" hocus which is invoked 
 to lubricate the irritating fact, — will not serve 
 as an explanation, unless it be allowed to serve 
 whichever side such a factor as "habitual ne- 
 glect" or "convenient explanation" may prag- 
 matically be called upon to support. Other- 
 wise, "experience" and "habit" might become 
 terms of no meaning! "Neglect" or "experi- 
 ence" have nothing to do with the laws of op- 
 tics; but so hard put are any and all purveyors 
 of the insurmountable duality of stimulus and 
 content, that the convenient explanation be- 
 comes the one of greatest validity. Now the 
 eye, besides being the functioner of vision, is a 
 spherical body, whose optical effects are there- 
 by often translations of plane surfaces into 
 sphericities. Let one consider along with this 
 the phenomenon of irradiation, the fact of much 
 more than foveal vision being functioned nei- 
 279 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 ther as infra- or ultra-foveal perspective, tlie fact 
 of some indisputable monocular depth, of some 
 instantaneous depth, and many other phenom- 
 ena, and he will be factually obliged not only to 
 infer, but imply as well that the series of phys- 
 ical phenomena, the series of physiologically- 
 optical phenomena, and the series of psycholog- 
 ical space phenomena are three series, each as 
 empirical, each as independent, and each as 
 likely to have as not to have copious common 
 parts with the others. In brief, there is a re- 
 lation of functional dependence rather than a 
 numerically causal relation existing between 
 all these terms; and only the barest, and one 
 might almost say inessential, correlation exists 
 between all the terms of any one series, and all 
 the terms of any other. But here is the main 
 point, that incompatible as all these various 
 series may be, term by term, their summation 
 in all functioning for space may become self- 
 corrective of any discrepancies in the partial 
 explanation which any one of them may aftord. 
 Motor adjustment, on the basis of the cumula- 
 tive effects of re-fixation, accompanied either 
 by the eye itself moving or the stimulus being 
 moved about, has, as a total complex in the 
 cross-section, such a geometrically greater ef- 
 fect than the simple arithmetical summation of 
 280 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 the separable data iiiight lead one to expect, 
 that the question of how we get space is quite 
 subsidiary to the question of how accurate is 
 the space so gotten. And this question is final- 
 ly answerable by reference those ultra-ocular 
 instruments of precision mentioned before, — I 
 mean by reference to the ability of two con- 
 structing engineers to make their separate tun- 
 nels meet in the middle of a mountain, or to the 
 ability of the gunner to demolish a target whose 
 position is relayed to him by monoplane, tele- 
 phone, and the calculus. 
 
 142. The insufficiency of such an account of 
 visual space may perhaps be condoned on the 
 strength of a brief mention of certain geomet- 
 rical figures which are always cited as evidence 
 of the tattered character of optical impressions. 
 I mean the Mueller-Lyer, the Poggendorf, the 
 Zoellner diagram, and others of their kind. 
 Likewise, "Mach's Book" is often cited as espe- 
 cially telling evidence against the stability of 
 space. One word only must suffice in our treat- 
 ment of this and all similar material. The 
 "illusory" character of all these figures consists 
 in the questions asked of the subject who at- 
 tends to them. For example, if one is asked 
 which way "Mach's Book" is open, — toward one 
 or away from one, — the answer is that it is 
 281 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 turned in either direction, just as it appears to 
 be. It is equally either, since it contains the 
 perspective elements of both,— zY is all common 
 parts, and has no exclusive relation to one 
 aspect or the other. I'll even wager that it was 
 drawn with this very end in view. The Muell- 
 er-Lyer figure, while depending largely upon 
 the motor element in vision for its emphatic 
 effect, is a figure about which only tricky ques- 
 tions can be asked. "Tell which line is the 
 longer," as a sample of the instructions given 
 to the subject, should be replaced by "which 
 figure gives the more contracted effect?" For 
 the threshold of this contraction can be easily 
 found by the rotation of the movable arrows 
 about their axes, and the whole "illusion" de- 
 pends upon the absorption of one set of local 
 signs by another, — a thing we found in connec- 
 tion with compass points and intertones, and 
 which we are as likely to find again in still a 
 different set of phenomena as well. 
 
 143. This ends our particular treatment of 
 sensations and perceptions. Be it known, how- 
 ever, that some of the attributes we found in 
 sensation apply also to perception. For in- 
 stance, the time elapsing between the presenta- 
 tion of such an object as a marlinespike and the 
 comprehension of it as a splicing instrument, 
 282 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 would be called the latent-period of perception. 
 The latent-period ending, the threshold would 
 be reached. Again, perceptions summate, as 
 for example, when a commander surveys the 
 intricacies of a general engagement, and decides 
 upon the particular efficacy of bayonets or cav- 
 alry sabres to turn the tide of affairs. We adapt 
 to perceptions also. Indeed, one of the clear- 
 est ways to define analytically the difference 
 between sensation and perception is to enumer- 
 ate the attributes which both exhibit, and to 
 determine why not all of them are carried over 
 into the structural content of perception. This 
 is hereby submitted as a question for the stu- 
 dent to answer. We now turn to motor attune- 
 ment and meaning. 
 
 144. It will be recalled that the motor end 
 of the neural arc was mentioned as a very im- 
 portant functioner of sensation. Indeed, unless 
 the whole arc is active, the focalities of con- 
 sciousness do not transpire. Although there are 
 several ways in which the full neural release 
 may occur, the most obvious way is to be elab- 
 orated in the case of the instincts and the emo- 
 tions, where the reflex excitation is practically 
 total for the whole organism. Another form of 
 release is the bare maintenance of the arc in a 
 state of low resistance to a low current, as in 
 283 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 cases of adaptation, when no obviously visible 
 change in the motor aspect comes with con- 
 tinued functioning. Other forms of the motor 
 aspect of release are convergence and accomo- 
 dation. The continued maintenance of bodily 
 positions with regard to the stimulus is, like- 
 wise, just as motor as was the initiation of such 
 motor relations; and, likewise, just as motor as 
 is the inhibition of unequilibrating tendencies 
 from other motor complexes which might sup- 
 plant them upon the slightest provocation. But 
 by far the most significant sets of motor re- 
 sponses are those, which, either following ac- 
 comodation, following convergence, or follow- 
 ing the inhibition of spreads and wiltings, lead 
 to the further orientation of the organism in 
 reference to its surroundings. It follows upon 
 this that the stimuli are functioned in a pattern 
 on the basis of which we may deal furtheringly 
 with the pliable part of the environment. In 
 such cases, also, the more closely related the 
 exciting stimulus is to the chief furthering ele- 
 ment in the environment, the more automatic- 
 ally does the chain of reflexes run off', and the 
 less focal does anything but the end effect to be 
 reached, become. Now the body is an organ- 
 ism, and as such is an example of parts func- 
 tioning a whole. Likewise, the environment is 
 284 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 at times organized into a definite whole leading 
 to some general effect into which the effects of 
 the separate parts, for a time, to be submerged. 
 The motor adjustment to an environment then 
 will be a furthering one, just to the extent that 
 the cue-sensation and the resultant motor re- 
 sponse are co-ordinated with the possibilities 
 of the developing environment. Otherwise, less 
 than the low current required in adaptation and 
 habit will be developed in the responsive organ- 
 ism. For habit is first based on the ease with 
 which a response is shot off, and second, upon 
 the lack of focality plus the gain in friction- 
 less orientation which the completed response 
 entails. With mannerisms and unconsciously 
 learned responses the chapter on the emotional 
 complex will have to do. From the internal 
 sensations as well as from the general tonic 
 reflexes of the body we gain a momentum which 
 is indisputably fundamental for the superstruc- 
 ture of learned habits, perceptions of relation, 
 and the more special extero-ceptive sensibilities. 
 The motor attunement developed as we ap- 
 proach maturity is always guaranteed, though 
 not always directed, by the residual environ- 
 ment and funded responses within the body. 
 The general character of this bodily momentum 
 is not introspectable, — it is physiological, and 
 285 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 unconscious. The environment which the un- 
 conscious responses function, being largely un- 
 observable, is not what one ordinarily means 
 by his special environment, for this latter is 
 usually unsteady, and by virtue of its shifts in 
 and out of focality, has sometimes erroneously 
 been called that environment in reference to 
 which one is free. "1 can look or not," "I can 
 close my ears to it,' "I can take it or leave it," 
 are expressions not referred to the vegetative 
 system, but to the focally sensorial environment 
 of our organism. But whatever this may ulti- 
 mately turn out to mean, one can never say that 
 he is unresponsive to his surroundings, even 
 though the sensorial environment is often made 
 up of series which have many missing members, 
 — a thing which partly accounts for the notion 
 of freedom; while the perceptual content, — the 
 environment of logical structure, of learning, of 
 observable furtherances, and the like, — is much 
 more continuous. And in this case it is often 
 a matter of observation that the so-called "free- 
 dom of choice" is due to the forgetting of the 
 steps which lead to the present responses. 
 
 145. Meanings are implicit in any definable 
 
 pattern of response. In psychology, at least, 
 
 anything means what one perceives it to he, as 
 
 well as what one is about to do in the presence 
 
 286 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 of it. Environmental pattern and motor pat- 
 tern, — besides these two there is nothing to be 
 said at the start. Meaning for logic is equiva- 
 lence. When an author writes, "That is to say," 
 or "I mean by this," he always gives an equiva- 
 lent expression, to get his idea into those con- 
 sciousnesses which may be somewhat oblique to 
 his own, — his own having been satisfied by his 
 first expression. Psychologically, this would be 
 a case of the substitution of stimulus, and a re- 
 cognition not only of the latent-period of per- 
 ception in others, but also of the lack of any psy- 
 chological congruence between his vocabulary 
 and that of his readers. Again, when a sound 
 is heard in the dead of night and some say 
 "mouse," while others say "burglar," there is 
 no equivalence in anything but the probability 
 of either, and in the sensorial partial equiva- 
 lence of both. On the other hand, when one 
 says, "I mean that it shall take place," the strict- 
 est psychological interpretation of this state- 
 ment becomes, "focally no inhibitions are caus- 
 ing my predictions to lose their pattern." But 
 in either case there is motor readiness, — the 
 urgency attendant upon a meaningful percep- 
 tion. 
 
 146. This brings us to what we call pre-per- 
 ceptions. The learned readiness to take one ele- 
 287 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 ment of the stimulus for the whole, (the motor 
 discharging upon any complex situation in 
 terms of one of the specific elements), marks the 
 so-called "intelligent" man, as distinguished 
 from the imbecile. Stupidity is a complex of 
 interminable latent-period and motor incoordi- 
 nation. In such a case the chain reflexes lack 
 automaticity, and the cue-stimulations have so 
 many common parts that they fail to arouse any 
 definite pattern of activity upon the environ- 
 ment. This pre-perception or apperception, as 
 it has been equivocally called, is not the same 
 as the introspection upon what one is about 
 to do. When a motor response has been nipped 
 in the bud, or inhibited, and one is asked to re- 
 port upon what he would have done, had not 
 such interruption prevented, the report as given 
 need not be taken as equivalent to what is uni- 
 formly the case when no nipping occurs. For 
 the report arises out of congested conscious- 
 ness,— a thing quite different from freely func- 
 tioned reactions. Of course, the introspection 
 in such a case may be valuable in that it defines 
 the introspection, for often by its means one can 
 tell how unified is the personality from whom 
 it proceeds. The difficulty with introspection 
 in such a case is that it makes focal certain ele- 
 ments which normally would never become so, 
 288 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 
 and as such subverts the elements involved. 
 That which is brewed in introspection is usually 
 only the unimportant non-focal material becom- 
 ing focal, plus the grammatical effluvia incident 
 to the symbolization of the former contents and 
 processes by means of speech. Introspection is 
 not only reduplicated consciousness, but it 
 manifests characteristics which the original 
 consciousness did not properly have. Pre-per- 
 ception is potential consciousness, but pre-per- 
 ception as reported in introspection may not be 
 at all the same as it might have been. And the 
 way to test the validity of pre-perception is by 
 check experiments in the laboratory, or by out- 
 side reference to the verbosity of the subject. 
 
 Now potential consciousness is indefinable 
 except in terms of what does actually happen 
 without the interruption of introspection. Can 
 this be told by speech? Evidently not. Intro- 
 spection may now and then get a few of the 
 overtones of consciousness, but introspection is 
 a reversal of the general current of its data, and 
 as such, is valuable for that sort of reversed data 
 and none other. I neglect and disparage the 
 word "apperception" because it is a term which 
 implies that we make up our perceptions out of 
 tag-rag sensations by adding to them from a 
 "mental" storehouse. Things are summed and 
 289 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 get additional properties thereby, not out of a 
 hypothetical "mental" storehouse, but by vir- 
 tue of the interaction of the neural currents to 
 function an interacting environment. The old 
 idea of the soul being something that thinks and 
 thereby adjudicates sensory content has been 
 evaporated to its last whiff, and with it has gone 
 every notion of dualism and duplicity, for these 
 two are indeed twins. 
 
 147. Along with pre-perception comes pre- 
 sensation. This is one of the cardinal items in 
 memory. When, for example, upon the mere 
 mention of the name of an object we obtain sen- 
 sory contents of it, we are said to remember or 
 to have pre-sensations of it. This comes about 
 by virtue of the fact that we have gained identi- 
 cal responses to the various elements in the ob- 
 ject, so that its color, shape, name, and so on, 
 are all functionable by the same response. Now, 
 the qualities and properties of objects have no 
 more rigidly defined geographical position 
 than have their names, and pre-sensation is but 
 a case of obtaining part of an object in sensory 
 content from the motor response to that which 
 for us is the "open sesame" to such content. 
 
 148. With a brief consideration of the na- 
 ture of speech, this long chapter must close. So 
 far as evidences are to be trusted, speech can 
 
 290 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 be traced evolutionally to cries of danger, coo- 
 ings and purrings in the mating season, wait- 
 ings, cacchinations and "burblings." Speech 
 arose apparently from the needs of communica- 
 tion, but seems also to be a derivative of self- 
 amusement as well. From the first wild cries of 
 savage life, — whether from anger, fear, affec- 
 tion or other situations, — we have derived the 
 potent elements of speech, these, later on, being 
 added to out of the need of orientation to a 
 more complex and tranquiller environment. 
 Part of language is onomatopoetic, that is, the 
 words are direct imitations of the sounds of 
 the things referred to. The rest is quite arbi- 
 trary and conventional. The vowel element in 
 language appears to be more directly related 
 to the primitive order of things than does the 
 consonantal element; for in every situation in 
 which language is used forcibly and emotional- 
 ly, the pitch element takes precedence over all 
 else, and with vowels alone these nuances of 
 pitch are functionable. 
 
 149. Language is also geographical rather 
 than hereditary. A child of Chinese parents, 
 brought up from the beginning in the midst of 
 people of a different nationality, will speak only 
 the language of its foster parents. This is not 
 accounted for by the shape of the mouth cavity, 
 291 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 even though the palatal arch of different peoples 
 is of different height and form; but it is due to 
 the extreme flexibility of the movable parts of 
 the vocal apparatus. These are the tongue, the 
 lips, the lower jaw, and the muscles of the 
 throat. The extremely important socially or- 
 ganizing part language has played in his- 
 tory is attested both by the social amalgamation 
 of races having a common language, and the 
 political unions of people of a common tongue. 
 But, over against this fact is the anciently re- 
 ported historical event of a conquering people 
 making the language of the conquered the po- 
 lite language of their court. In these cases, 
 however, the absorption of culture has gone 
 hand in hand with the passion for knowing the 
 language in which such culture was developed. 
 
 150. Language is also a reaction. To men- 
 tion the name of something seen, heard or han- 
 dled, is to deal with it twice; and such dealing 
 involves diff'erent elements of consciousness, 
 and consequently differing effects. Further- 
 more, the voice, by virtue of its being produced 
 in the head, has an advantage over other reac- 
 tions in several ways. In the first place, the re- 
 action to auditory stimuli is quicker than to al- 
 most any other kind. Furthermore, the domi- 
 nance which the head plays in personality, as 
 292 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 well as the fact that the face is far and away 
 the focus of all social intercourse, makes the 
 language of a person his piece de resistance in 
 a majority of social matters. When one con- 
 siders how largely information comes by way 
 of words, the place that words have in human 
 aftairs seems clearly the chiefest. Language, as 
 a reaction, is thus a doubling of responses to the 
 situations in which it is used. Very little of it 
 is absolutely necessary, for most discussions end 
 with the definitions of the terms first employed, 
 and concerning which so many misunderstood 
 statements were made. For words, as symbols, 
 are not bound to follow the orders of the things 
 symbolized, and as a result, evaporation of 
 meaning frequently occurs. But it is undeniable 
 that relations and functions could not have been 
 mutually considered without their aid. 
 
 151. The order in which a child learns a 
 language is curious. Contrary to the report of 
 fond parents, the imitation by a child of the 
 sounds and mouth movements of its parents is 
 fiot flattering to the famous intelligence of the 
 human race. The child responds to the stimuli 
 of its teacher by the best way it can, but hard 
 consonants, such as 'k,' 'f,' 't,' and the like are 
 imitated by the use of their softer forms, 'g,' 
 'v,' and 'd.' Furthermore, it learns class names 
 293 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 or general terms, before it learns words of se- 
 lective discrimination. It speaks of itself in 
 the third person before it uses the pronoun I, 
 for to all intents and purposes, it is thoroughly 
 realistic in its absorption of all data. 
 
 152. Nevertheless, the importance of lan- 
 guage does not lie in the factors of its origin. 
 Language, as a quotidian commodity, gets used 
 in certain ways not to be explained by reference 
 to its source. Words slip their moorings and 
 exhibit common parts whose existence was little 
 suspected beforehand; besides, the perception 
 of new relations in things does not always go 
 with the invention of a new word, — instead, we 
 put together the old ones and make them do 
 a little longer. In fact, all the new words are 
 either derived from dead languages, or are 
 blurted out unexpectedly in slang and banter. 
 These developments are not introspectable 
 either. We speak by momentum, and mostly 
 out of the co-conscious, when speaking, in our 
 normal speed and confidence. In this point, 
 language is exceptionally typical of all unhin- 
 dered consciousness: to function speech and 
 then to recall it is the same sort of manifesta- 
 tion as seeing, hearing and the like, and then 
 introspecting upon it. The alterations that oc- 
 cur to us in point of what we would have better 
 294 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 
 said, is the same sort of consciousness as the 
 introspective consciousness. For neither is 
 speech ordinally correlated with the chrono- 
 genetic order of our ideas, nor is it the same 
 as later corrections of it would indicate to have 
 been our exact meaning. It has, however, com- 
 mon parts with both. The later correction indi- 
 cates logical determinations, while its lack of 
 correspondence with the play of ideas illustrates 
 that things can get into another than the first or- 
 der of cross-sectioning, 
 
 153. Now an idea is either an attribute of 
 a thing, a part of a whole, the pattern of a 
 thing or a part, or the terminus of such a pat- 
 tern, functionally construed, and so on. Ideas 
 are anything being functioned by a nervous sys- 
 tem. Functioning is the same here as knowing, 
 and the only reason we distinguish between 
 things not yet known and things known at the 
 present time, is because the stages of their being 
 first functioned, spoken of, and logically or- 
 dered, reveal in this order relations which 
 through summation and fusion have been over- 
 looked. We use the term idea also to indicate 
 usually that some such development is in pro- 
 gress, rather than that bare noticing is all that 
 is being done. The language reaction helps sig- 
 nificantly here, for by means of it we are en- 
 295 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 abled to select more elements for retention than 
 otherwise, and to respond specifically to things 
 to which speechless animals cannot be discov- 
 ered to be at all tropistic. Consequently, the 
 more accurately language is used, the more 
 things can be enumerated, the more patterns and 
 relations can be specified and filed away, and 
 the more comparing of ideas can be accom- 
 plished. Following this, the business of argu- 
 ment reorders the data and reveals coinci- 
 dences and contradictions. We thus obtain 
 considerable positive information by the inter- 
 play of language, quite apart from the phys- 
 ical presence of the data to which it refers. It 
 is due to the fact that language, apart from the 
 things, may reveal relations not before noticed 
 in the things themselves, that we have devel- 
 oped the notion of ideas of things. For ideas, 
 in that they are attributes of, parts of, plans of, 
 and the like, imply on this account no duality 
 between thought and thing. Insofar as they are 
 turned into words, — auditory symbols, — they 
 seem on this account to necessitate a cleft be- 
 tween matters of another sense than that of 
 sound, as, for instance, when we mention tastes 
 and sights, and then, by momentum and pre- 
 ponderance, to cover the whole of consciousness 
 with this sort of debilitating predicate. Unless 
 296 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 "consciousness of" means that there are several 
 orders in the cross-section into which things can 
 get, it has no meaning; for besides this and se- 
 lective response, nothing is fundamental upon 
 which it can be based. 
 
 154. The parts of speech, actually disre- 
 garded except in grammars, are significant for 
 this treatment. Nouns are language-equiva- 
 lents of things, principally, as well as of parts, 
 and frequently of orders and patterns. But or- 
 ders are equivalent to verbs whenever there is 
 functional significance in them. Also, genetic- 
 ally, nouns refer to sensation masses, while 
 verbs refer to motor intention. Attributes of 
 "things" are primarily adjectives, while the 
 functional elements of "wholes" and "things" 
 are adverbial. The noun is thus either made 
 of adjectives, or made of verbs and other parts 
 of speech. Relations are expressed by the use of 
 prepositions, conjunctions, and verbs, while sud- 
 den inhibitions are functioned by the interjec- 
 tions. Of all the parts of speech, the personal 
 pronoun is the latest in development. Its mer- 
 curial character is a matter of even common 
 notice, for besides referring to the cross-section 
 equivocally for different spaces of time, it refers 
 either to a very insignificant part of conscious- 
 ness one moment, or to the dominant motive at 
 297 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 another. The intentional suppression of ideas, 
 commonly called lying, is thus made exceedingly 
 easy, for the pronoun I is a shifting center of 
 reference at best, and all that is said about it 
 must be said in terms of the elements contrib- 
 uting to it as a center. Being guaranteed by its 
 periphery, and not being something subtle and 
 within, the pronoun I and what it means must 
 always be omitted when the accuracy and truth 
 of a matter is at stake. The reader is at liberty 
 to indulge in all the implications in the above 
 statements. 
 
 155. Language when printed, as in this pres- 
 ent form, is to be distinguished from the utter- 
 ances of steady speech. For if one wishes to 
 be read, he must seek to present his words in 
 such a form that as many common parts will be 
 present as there are persons for whom the ut- 
 terances are to be stimuli. And while conces- 
 sions are always made, they are not to be 
 thought of as concessions which betray the au- 
 thor of a book into compromises. To be able 
 to get a hearing on account of using motor 
 terms, well-chosen illustrations, and the like, is 
 not the same as sneaking up behind a person 
 and making him consent before he is aware of 
 what the drift of the matter is. Seldom is the 
 flow of any person's ideas good enough to speak 
 298 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 or print without castigation and reordering, 
 neither is any hard and fast plan in composition 
 ever strictly adhered to. Likewise, in speech 
 and writing we respond to the environment of 
 the audience and the environment of the sub- 
 ject matter, and seek to find and express com- 
 mon parts in both environments, so that as 
 many as we wish to stimulate may be shown the 
 object, and have their threshold lowered by 
 removing the inhibiting inessentials. In the plan 
 of a book, however, there need be no conces- 
 sions. The logical order of presentation is not 
 either linguistic nor individual. 
 
 156. Sensation and perception in the con- 
 scious cross-section are thus seen to be items 
 whose structural differences are chiefest. We 
 shall now turn to another set of responses in 
 which we shall not find structure central, but 
 rather disorganization, due to continual inhibi- 
 tion, fusion and confusion. 1 refer to the emo- 
 tions anci the instincts. To a large degree, also, 
 we shall have to consider consciousness lateral- 
 ly and developmentally in order to understand 
 the status of any emotion in the cross-section. As 
 it is, moreover, this book is but an outline, and 
 sketches, rather than fills in, the patterns it em- 
 ploys in passing. But it makes no attempt to 
 explain away anything that is, unless, per- 
 299 
 
THE CONCCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 chance, it be certain beliefs in non-existent 
 things, and this is not only within its province 
 to do, but also its particular business not to 
 leave undone. 
 
 Bibliography 
 
 I. General. 
 
 Holt, E. B., "The Concept of Consciousness," 
 especially Chapter XI, "Sensation and Percep- 
 tion in the Conscious Cross-Section," and Chap- 
 ter XV, "The Emancipation of Physiology from 
 Philosophy." 
 
 Sherrington, C. S., "The Integrative Action 
 of the Nervous System," Lectures I to VII. 
 
 II. Touch. 
 
 Rivers, W. H. R., and Head, Henry, "A Hu- 
 man Experiment in Nerve Division," in 
 "Brain," November, 1908. 
 
 Titchener, E. B., "A Text-Book of Psychol- 
 ogy," especially pp. 143-159. 
 
 Myers, C. S., "A Text-Book of Experimental 
 Psychology," Chapters II and XVII. 
 
 III. Smell and Taste. 
 Titchener, E. B., op. cit. pp. 114-141. 
 Myers, C. S., op. cit. Chapter VIII. 
 
 IV. Kinaesthetic Senses. 
 Titchener, E. B., op. cit. pp. 160-182. 
 Myers, C. S., op. cit. Chapters V and XVI. 
 300 
 
THE SENSITIVE AND PERCEPTIVE ORGANS 
 
 V. Hearing. 
 Titchener, E. B., op. cit. pp. 93-112. 
 Myers, C. S., op. cit. Chapters III and IV. 
 Mach, E., op. cit. "Sensations of Tone." 
 
 VI. Vision. 
 
 • Titchener, E. B., op. cit. pp. 59-92. 
 Myers, C. S., Chapters VI and VII. 
 
 VII. Space Perceptions. 
 Titchener, E. B., op. cit. pp. 303-373. 
 Myers, C. S., op. cit. Chapters XVIII to XXIII. 
 Pierce, A. H., "Studies in Auditory and Vis- 
 ual Space Perception." 
 
 James, W., "Psychology, Briefer Course," 
 Chapters XV, XVII, XX and XXI. 
 Mach, E., op. cit. pp. 41-118. 
 Holt, E. B., "The Place of Ilhisory Experience 
 in a Realistic World," in the "New Realism." 
 
 301 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 
 1. This chapter will consider emotions, in- 
 stincts, and their derivatives. Strictly defined, 
 both instincts and emotions are motor responses 
 to disordered situations. Their stimuli are ob- 
 jects consisting of series, many of whose terms 
 are missing. Thus mal-adjustment of the or- 
 ganism, and a disordered object are the func- 
 tional and content sides of emotions and in- 
 stincts. 
 
 2. Responses define environments, and thus 
 the emotional reaction may be functioned by 
 one organism in a situation which arouses no 
 such reaction in another organism. On the oth- 
 er hand, a disorderly environment may be 
 flanked on all sides by an orderly one, and so 
 arouse various types of orderly or disorderly 
 reactions on the part of organisms confronting 
 it, with the result that the ensuing motor dis- 
 charges, and not the nameable sensory content, 
 must often be taken as the criteria of "what the 
 organism is doing." Environments alter and 
 organisms change, and the steps by which these 
 alterations and changes occur need not be or- 
 dinally correlated. So that the mal-adjustment 
 
 302 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 of the organism to the situation is one, but not 
 the only disturbing factor in emotional and in- 
 stinctive action. Nevertheless, the usual effect 
 of such mal-adjustment is cumulative, — it in- 
 creases the disorder. The fusion we met with in 
 sensation is antityped here in confusion, attend- 
 ed by the instant arousal of general skeletal re- 
 action and glandular secretion, usually resulting 
 in entire translation of the whole body through 
 space. Instinct is as sudden as reflex, and emo- 
 tion as positionless as feeling-tone, and both in- 
 stincts and emotions lack that element in per- 
 ception known as pattern. They both arise in 
 situations we are unable to grasp significantly, 
 and consist of the suddenest and strongest out- 
 goings of energy of which we are capable. They 
 follow a complete chopping off of former focal 
 consciousness and, instead of leading to further 
 activities of profitable orientation, lead, unless 
 brought to a close by exhaustion or mutual in- 
 hibition, to a situation of tatterdemalion con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 3. The term "emotional complex" is used to 
 indicate that these reactions usually keep 
 crowding, impelling, or inhibiting each other. 
 Furthermore, they often get insufTiciently shot- 
 off, and as a result become suppressed, — the un- 
 shot residue smouldering away as an uncon- 
 303 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 scious readiness of neural response. The un- 
 conscious has no content, but it constituted sole- 
 ly of functions, and it is this condition which 
 renders obscure the causes of the breaking loose 
 of smothered emotions. When a form of con- 
 sciousness has no content, it cannot be satis- 
 factorily described by the use of nouns. Verbs 
 and adverbs are alone to be used. This is even 
 witnessed by the fact of the current terms for 
 the emotions and instincts: fear, flight, pugnac- 
 ity, wonder, — such terms are all basically 
 verbs, and only made over into nouns to satisfy 
 the pragmatic urgencies of speech. There is 
 no object, fear; there are only persons fearing: 
 nothing is flight; there are only legs animatedly 
 decreasing the parallactic angle in the eyes of 
 the observer. This is not to be taken, however, 
 to mean that fears and anxieties, for example, 
 are groundless. It means nothing of the sort. 
 But in every case of emotion or instinct, one is 
 functioning a content less definable than one 
 finds to be the case with sensation or percep- 
 tion. And just as one has a red sensation or a 
 logical perception, so in the case of these disor- 
 dered responses now being considered, one has 
 a fearful or a pugnacious consciousness, and 
 this consciousness always has an object. 
 
 4. Emotions and instincts, then, are the 
 304 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 names chiefly applied to the functional aspect 
 of disorderly consciousness. The content of 
 such consciousness may be composed of any ob- 
 jects whatsoever. Thus we may be afraid of 
 a green, a black, a tall, a hollow, or a scurrying 
 object, each of which are yet green, black, or 
 tall, etc., exclusive of their emotional status. We 
 are emotional or instinctive toward anything 
 at all. And it is on account of the lack of spe- 
 cific arousers of these mal-adjustments that we 
 have no terms which specifically differentiate 
 the environment into special contents for this 
 and that emotion or instinct. Our strictest defi- 
 nition in this case will therefore concern the 
 neural discharges incident to their appearance. 
 Two main points are profitably noted here. The 
 first of these is the phenomenon of irradiation of 
 the generating impulse which arouses centers of 
 functionation not normally stimulated by the 
 object of emotion or instinct when it is in an- 
 other environment. The second point is what 
 is called the auto-catalytic character of neural 
 release. The first of these, — irradiation, — is not 
 exclusively a phenomenon of the neurology of 
 instincts and emotions. We spoke of it in the 
 first few pages of the last chapter as significant 
 even for the simpler responses. Synaesthesia 
 has also been defined as correlated with it. Like- 
 305 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 wise, pre-perception and pre-sensation are ir- 
 radiation phenomena as well. What then, shall 
 we say is idiomatic in the irradiation aspect of 
 the mal-adjustment phenomena? Why, this: 
 that the irradiation is of such a type as to 
 arouse non-perceptual (i. e., non-stabilizing) re- 
 flexes of the chain type. Thus it is that the as- 
 pect of the total situation confronting the or- 
 ganism is inseparable from a full account of 
 the responses generating the cross-section, 
 
 5. Now for the second, — the auto-catalytic 
 character of the neural releases. Auto-cataly- 
 sis occurs when one of the products of a reac- 
 tion acts as a catalyser, catalysers being those 
 things (substances) which hasten reactions by 
 their mere presence, without entering into the 
 formula themselves. The friction of the match 
 sets free the chemical energy of the powder in 
 the magazine, but the friction is not an element 
 in the formula. Again, the decomposition of 
 hydrogen peroxide by platinum black is a case 
 of catalytic action. From the best evidence we 
 have today, it is safe to assert that neuronic re- 
 lease is a type of catalytic action, especially 
 in the matter of the establishment of settled dis- 
 positions in the organism. For upon the very 
 first functioning of a nerve, the nerve path be- 
 comes sensitized, the threshold lowered, and 
 306 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 further stimulation rendered easier. Indeed, 
 this fact might be said to be the neural basis 
 of logical classification, and we might also add 
 that the reception or rejection by the various 
 organs of the body of nutriment and sensory 
 contents is exactly what choice in its lowest 
 terms means. The sensitization of the neural 
 paths is indeed the formation of an asymmetric- 
 al series. To return to auto-catalysis, the re- 
 lease of reflex energy in the nerve cells is ac- 
 companied by the accumulation of deposits that 
 unite to form a veritable storage cell, "which is 
 capable, under appropriate conditions, of being 
 discharged and [thereby] restoring the same 
 specific current by which it was produced." All 
 the neural responses tend, indeed, to become of 
 this general character, — that is, auto-catalysed, 
 — but some paths, being traversed oftener, and 
 more vigorously than others, (while at the same 
 time producing vivid irradiation among their 
 neighbors), get a momentum as well as a prom- 
 inence in consciousness which the others do not 
 have. Attention is just a clear pathway of per- 
 ceptual neural response, or release, and is a 
 derivative of acuity, threshold, interest, and 
 other furthering ingredients. Between selective 
 attention and restricted neural momentum 
 
 307 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 there is no one so wise as to be able to draw 
 even a hair-sized line. 
 
 6. Neural momentum is also the dominant 
 element in habit. Habit, unlike emotion, is us- 
 ually unintrospectable. Unlike emotion again, 
 it has a definite pattern, and serves, or can be 
 made to serve some other set of responses than 
 its own. Considering habit in general, it is nei- 
 ther useful nor useless; but considering it from 
 the standpoint of psychology, it is the adjust- 
 ment of the organism to some constant feature 
 in its environment with about the least friction 
 possible. Contrariwise, emotions arise from 
 mal-adjustments to the environment, and in 
 their continuance lead to worse and worse ad- 
 justment, for only by exhausting the organism, 
 or by sudden changes of focality do they bring 
 about any possibility of readjustment on an 
 equable basis. Curiously enough, there is a 
 lack of correspondence between neural momen- 
 tums and the speech reaction they arouse. Neu- 
 rally construea, greatest ease of function comes 
 when the wonted impulses are traversing the 
 paths; our statements, however, very often as- 
 sert that we prefer a complete change of activ- 
 ity. At the bottom of this lies the emotional 
 complex, and the presence of emotions is usual- 
 
 308 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 ly indicative of some disorder in neural con- 
 tinuity. 
 
 7. Now the disordered environment men- 
 tioned above is but one of the environments en- 
 veloping the organism. When General Wood 
 purified Havana, and by so doing cut down the 
 death rate prodigiously, he was not responding 
 to the disease-making environment so much as 
 he was responding to the scientifically prophy- 
 lactic environment of bacteriological laborato- 
 ries. Havana was but a perplexing term in his 
 entire environment for which some reagent was 
 to be supplied in order to neutralize it. The 
 needs of Havana and the visible condition of 
 that city were two terms prime to each other; 
 but by responses to a third element, having 
 chemical common parts with both, he was able 
 to make the Cuban city a member of a series 
 of other cities, a series defined by its high posi- 
 tion relative to vital statistics. On the other 
 hand, the Havanese had been responding solely 
 to the disorder. Now, to perceive nothing but 
 a disordered environment is not to perceive in 
 the strictest sense at all; but to perceive a dis- 
 order in the midst of a larger order is virtually 
 to function the discrepancy between them. 
 Thereafter the motor readjustment of the dis- 
 crepancy will take place just as fast and just 
 309 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 as far as there are common parts between them, 
 and as fast and as far also as there is unification 
 among the perceptions and impulses of the re- 
 ad justor. There are disordered minds in the 
 presence of what to others appears order and 
 positive pattern, but these minds are still func- 
 tioning the residues of unshot impulses, — sup- 
 pressions for which there has been no utilized 
 outlet. In many such cases, the environment is 
 well said to be within the body. It is here also 
 that the doctrine of the soft soul had its source. 
 8. I take particular umbrage at the con- 
 ventional treatment of instincts. As in many 
 another case, obscurity of source has been made 
 the basis of the tenacity of belief. For the in- 
 stincts are generally treated as unlearned, sud- 
 den tendencies to action; race habits, "designed 
 to promote the welfare of the race," and they 
 are furthermore said to be "uncontrolled by in- 
 telligence." Volume after volume has been 
 written on this subject of instinct, and the gen- 
 eral treatment indicates that bibliography plays 
 a larger role than does observation and clear 
 insight. Much obscurity results from this meth- 
 od of procedure, for the writers who employ it 
 have their eyes only on the organism, and not 
 on "what the organism is doing" in the midst of 
 its environment. The insufficiency of such treat- 
 310 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 ment will at once appear if we consider any- 
 thing more than the organism. Sensations are 
 objects and perceptions are objects, and like- 
 wise emotions and instincts cannot be severed 
 from their exciting stimuli and remain in the 
 system of things known as the psychological 
 order. The statement that instincts are un- 
 learned does not signalize them as unique 
 among the events of the cross-section. In the 
 first place, none of the tropisms are premeditat- 
 ed, sedulously tried out, and stamped with the 
 hall-mark before they become settled disposi- 
 tions. Secondly, suddenness cannot be their 
 distinguishing mark, for short latency is applic- 
 able to more of the responses than they. 
 And that all the individual members of a 
 race do this or that is more indicative of 
 gregariousness than of anything subtly orig- 
 inal. Instinctive action only appears sud- 
 den because of the diremption in percept- 
 ual consciousness that goes with it, and 
 instinctive actions are racial only in so far as 
 the predicaments of the individuals of a race 
 are identical. A race is a constant function of 
 its environment, a derivative of circumstances, 
 and it is the environment that shapes it. The 
 ubiquity of instincts is no more special than 
 the ubiquity of ears or eyelids. The instincts 
 311 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 
 are said to be "designed to promote the welfare 
 of the race," — an expression which is supposed 
 to possess splendid oratorical possibilities, — but 
 which upon analysis turns out to have no mean- 
 ing. For instinctive actions, arising from dis- 
 ordered environments, lead to nothing stable 
 until they are superseded by clear perceptions, 
 the latter not being in any necessary way pre- 
 ceded by disorderly functioning. Furthermore, 
 self-preservation is said to be the kernel of 
 every instinct. But upon examination it will 
 appear that this means bodily preservation, not 
 preservation of the self in its developed condi- 
 tion, and so we have to narrow the concept 
 "self" in order to satisfy such a definition. 
 
 9. 1 use the word instinct, then, not because 
 there is any internal origin for it save mal-ad- 
 justment to the situation met with, neither be- 
 cause it could not be superseded by a more em- 
 pirical expression, but merely in order to show 
 that a realistic psychology is not obliged to leave 
 anything out of its account of mind. The im- 
 possibility of self-observing the instinctive reac- 
 tions, and the general loss of focal mind which 
 they entail have been the roots of the notion 
 that some special, internal readinesses were bas- 
 ic in each individual. There are response pos- 
 sibilities in each individual, but to call these by 
 312 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 a name that implies a stage all set ready for the 
 curtain to rise is as reasonable as saying that 
 ordnance is cast with the ammunition inside ol 
 it. 
 
 10. The truth of the opening thesis of this 
 chapter and its consequent development is wit- 
 nessed by certain modern cataloguing and ex- 
 planation of what are still called the "original 
 tendencies." I refer to the w^ork of James and 
 Thorndyke, whose lists of "instincts" are so 
 broad as to be subversive of the general idea 
 underlying their construction. James' account 
 may be found in his "l^rinciples of Psychology," 
 Vol. 11., Chapter XXIV., while Thorndyke's is 
 given in his "Educational Psychology," Vol. I. 
 Now the exact diliiculty in these treatments is 
 that when they were written, the Ego-complex 
 was not so much as even heard of, — at least not 
 assimilated by the writers of these treatises. 
 The infant had been regarded as "trailing 
 clouds of glory" for about five years and three 
 months, and then as suddenly becoming sheared 
 of his nimbus and mortgaged as are the rest of 
 us with inhibitions and a tough environment. 
 But the Ego-complex, or the evolution of per- 
 sonality, has been traced quite a ways into the 
 nimbus, and psycholog>^ now includes the study 
 of cradles and cognate apparatus. With this 
 313 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 change, moreover, there has come the recogni- 
 tion of the futility of regarding the so-called "in- 
 stincts" as universals, or unlearned tendencies 
 at all, and we are slowly coming to recognize 
 that the environment begins to be specifically 
 functioned with the first breath, and not after 
 an indeterminate and subtle interval. On the 
 basis of this, then, 1 make bold to define the in- 
 stincts and emotions as mal-adjustments, and 
 to select from the list of generally given original 
 tendencies those which fall rightly under this 
 category. The boldness of the venture is appre- 
 ciated, and so finality of conviction rests upon 
 its accustomed supports. 
 
 11. The most modern treatment of instincts 
 and emotions appears in McDougall's "Social 
 Psychology," and 1 shall quote his list in the 
 order in which the terms follow the greatest-to- 
 least condition of mal-adjustment of the organ- 
 ism to its environment. As follows: 
 Instinct. Emotion. 
 
 Flight Fear 
 
 Pugnacity Anger 
 
 Repulsion Disgust 
 
 Curiosity Wonder 
 
 Self Display Positive Self-feeling 
 
 Self Abasement Negative Self-feeling 
 
 Parental Instinct Tender Emotion 
 
 314 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 Reproduction No one specific 
 
 emotionality 
 Gregariousness *Fear of solitude 
 
 Acquisition *Various self-feelings 
 
 and jealousies 
 
 (The terms marked (*) are not found in Mc- 
 Dougall.) 
 
 The instincts and emotions appear usually 
 together, the former being detected by the 
 movements of the skeleton; the latter, by the 
 amount of vascular disturbance summing into 
 confusion and glandular secretion. Further- 
 more, Sympathy, Suggestion and Imitation are 
 enumerated, as well as Play. There is also a 
 list of complexes of emotions both involving 
 and not involving the existence of sentiments, 
 these latter being an organized system of emo- 
 tions about some object. 
 
 12. Let it now be understood, however, that 
 these various manifestations enumerated in the 
 above table are capable of many degrees of in- 
 tensity, and when they lose their edge, are not 
 classifiable among the seriously disturbing mal- 
 adjustments. Particularly note the instinct of 
 curiosity. When this appears alone, as it may, 
 without wonder, it is often linked with interest 
 and attention in such a way as to lose its non- 
 perceptual character. Gregariousness, when 
 315 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 adapted, may also become a matter of very lit- 
 tle disturbance, if the environment of other hu- 
 man beings is quiescent and in order. Similar- 
 ly, acquisition may become bare thrift, and as 
 such be pacific in its motivation. The others, 
 however, are not so readily soothed into fur- 
 therances, as a little observation will readily 
 show. This, however, as a last word here; that 
 when the instinct and its attendant emotion oc- 
 cur together, they are more likely to »e disor- 
 derly responses than otherwise, and some of 
 these pairs of responses cannot be adapted nor 
 made subservient to dominant, furthering pur- 
 poses. 
 
 13. Somewhat in detail, then, let us consid- 
 er the above pairs of responses together. One 
 cannot always use self-observation as a basis 
 for studying them, for accurate self-observa- 
 tion is only attained by considerable study; and 
 to ask some one how he feels when he is afraid 
 is to ask but for summation and fusion, rather 
 than for a detailed analysis of the facts. Flight- 
 fear occurs as early as any of the complexes of 
 the list, and much has been written on it that 
 is well worth reading. James' account in his 
 "Principles of Psychology," Darwin's "The Ex- 
 pression of the Emotions in Man and the Ani- 
 mals," are typical of the best in this line that is 
 316 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 extant. Perhaps no other emotional complex 
 than flight-fear involves such a shattering of fo- 
 cal continuities in consciousness. The result of it 
 is a general super-violent efferent discharge, 
 resulting in either paralysis, or in the swift pro- 
 jection of the whole body by running as far 
 from the stimulus as possible. But the self-pro- 
 tective character of this is only on the assump- 
 tion that the deep sea and the devil are both in 
 front of one, and that to run in the opposite 
 direction is to obtain sanctuary. The running 
 away, of course, is no guarantee of the percep- 
 tion of safety at the terminus of flight, but the 
 general utility of it lies in a fifty-fifty chance 
 of stopping somewhere this side of the devil. 
 Children are not afraid of everything strange, 
 but principally of noises and situations intend- 
 ed to upset them. Of lightning they are often 
 unaccountably afraid; but of thunder, and of 
 dark closets and bugaboos only in proportion as 
 their parents threaten them by voice or atti- 
 tude before introducing them to the stimulus. 
 The parent is as much a part of the child's 
 environment as are the furniture and milk bot- 
 tles, and the part the parents play is too fre- 
 quently and in ignorance excluded from an ac- 
 count of the child's reaction to the stimulus. 
 Besides, I have been told by military men with 
 317 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 medals that much of the rashness of ijravery is 
 plain ordmary fear, — ^the soldier being in a pre- 
 aicament, and one thing to him about as good 
 as another. Now, by virtue of ideas having 
 common parts with things, and by virtue of the 
 fact that wholes can be vicariously functioned 
 for by their parts, the emotions can be aroused 
 by the presentation of any part of the original- 
 ly exciting stimulus, provided it is bolstered up 
 by effective helps. Most of our functioning 
 anyway is due to the serial focality of the barest 
 common parts. 
 
 14. The pugnacity-anger complex arises 
 clearly in situations which are too much for us 
 to manage, and starts, at least, a series of events 
 whose other end is often the annihilation or hu- 
 miliation of the object or person confronting 
 us. Many authors regard the distortion of the 
 lips during anger as a remnant of the animal 
 habit of frightening one's prey by the sight of 
 the teeth about to bite. At any rate, pugnacity 
 differs from flight in the direction of bodily 
 translation, and in anger we are conscious of 
 our bodies as larger than we are in fear. Pro- 
 fessor Cannon has done significant experiment- 
 ation upon both of these complexes in point of 
 their physiological concomitants. In the first 
 place, he finds the peaceful tabby cat of a bet- 
 318 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 ter digestion than her cantankerous mate, as 
 evidenced by the fact that "fear and anger. . . . 
 are attended. . . .by cessation of the contractions 
 of the stomach and intestines." Furthermore, 
 the disturbances of digestion which outlast emo- 
 tional excitement, (after-image), are correlated 
 with the action of the ductless glands which se- 
 crete adrenalin, a substance which, when cir- 
 culated in the blood, causes glycosuria and oth- 
 er significant disorders. "It seems to act as an 
 antidote to muscular fatigue, and renders more 
 rapid the coagulation of blood." Both of these 
 concern the pugnacity-anger complex, as well 
 as that of flight-fear; for the angry or fearful 
 person often performs acts which seem fully 
 beyond his normal strength. Likewise, our dis- 
 regard of wounds and their sudden healing in 
 many cases of violent emotion are accounted 
 for. (See "Recent Studies of Bodily Effects of 
 Fear, Rage and Pain" by W. B. Cannon, Jour. 
 Phil., Psych., and Sci. Meth., March 12, 1914.) 
 
 15. Repulsion and disgust are more chem- 
 ical than anything else. Certain bitter tastes 
 and nauseating smells are both noxious and 
 originally annoying. The sense environment in 
 which they figure is out of balance, and mal-ad- 
 justment at once supervenes. The first func- 
 tioning to this sort of an environment is strictly 
 319 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 chemical in its character; later on, by analogy, 
 these responses can be obtained in connection 
 with a set of stimuli which are not primarily 
 chemical at all. Sneers, scorns, and loathing, 
 which we direct at persons rather than at chem- 
 icals, are responses to disordered situations 
 made on the basis of verbal common parts. Of 
 course there are the unwashed and unscented 
 to whom we respond chemically, but for a book 
 to be loathsome, an analogical situation must 
 supersede. Certain very expensive books are 
 printed on a most ill-smelling paper, and yet the 
 response is to the printing and other beauty 
 about the book, — the publisher having betted 
 on the long latent-period of the odor, and the 
 inhibitory properties of the literature. 
 
 16. The curiosity-wonder complex is less 
 disturbing than the two previously mentioned, 
 and is the basis of the questions what, how, and 
 why. But science only begins in wondering 
 why; it ends in finding out. And after this is 
 done, no mal-adjustment is present. Wonder 
 as an element in philosophy is of the same 
 character, and only mystics keep on wondering 
 after they have gotten under the top crust of 
 things. To say that the instincts are the springs 
 of human action is but to speak half of the 
 truth. They are not the regulators of human 
 320 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 
 action, for these are perceptions instead. The 
 curiosity-wonder complex differs from the two 
 others thus far discussed in that it involves 
 sensory elements rather than motor, and so 
 does not function the shearing off of focality 
 as is the case with the more vigorous complexes. 
 But that the object wondered at is in a series 
 too prime for orientation, none will be able to 
 deny. 
 
 17. Self-display and self-abasement, with 
 their attendant emotions of positive and nega- 
 tive self-feelings, are responses to social dis- 
 turbances of an intricate character. They are 
 inevitably related to shyness, bashfulness, mod- 
 esty, vanity and other so-called psychological 
 simples, involving certain sexual elements of 
 which some mention must be made. Exhibition 
 is a cardinal feature of the mating season of all 
 creatures, and displays and abasements are used 
 to increase mutual desire. When the exhibition 
 complex outlasts the specific incident in which 
 it arose, or becomes suppressed, as is often the 
 case, it may crop out in very unusual situations. 
 Thus the blushing reflex and the "sidelong 
 glance" are suppressions being partly released. 
 This is not to say that manifestation of an im- 
 pulse goes necessarily with focality of the 
 knowledge of its origin, for in regard to most of 
 321 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 our nature we are naively ignorant. The old 
 Socratic maxim "know thyself" has recently 
 been inverted into "knowing oneself is a func- 
 tion of knowing others." Thus an item in con- 
 sciousness of a sexual origin may not be accom- 
 panied by the focality of the desire for repro- 
 ductive relations with another of the species, 
 although we may be able to show that normally 
 such would be the case were no inhibiting per- 
 ceptions present. The reproductive instinct is 
 devoid of any specific emotionality, — it being 
 usually a periodic function of certain glandular 
 motivation, and only embellished by emotions 
 in certain concrete situations. The disorderly 
 element in this instinct is the fact of, what might 
 be called upon analysis, its promiscuous char- 
 acter. The insecurity attendant upon this con- 
 dition leads to the above-mentioned emotional 
 embellishments of display and abasement. Self 
 display and self abasement also originate in an 
 environment where the truth is suppressed, and 
 reappear quickly whenever analagous situa- 
 tions occur. Thus the general adornment of 
 the body, as well as the humility of a pension- 
 er, may be entirely asexual, but the adornment 
 and humility are both calculated to affect fa- 
 vorably the one at whom they are directed, and 
 
 322 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 as such are forms of those suppressed ideas 
 known as lying. 
 
 18. The parental instinct, with its attendant 
 emotion of tenderness, is a function of the help- 
 lessness of the young over which the parent be- 
 comes solicitous. The child's self help cannot 
 be forced,— it must be slowly developed, and 
 slowly strengthened. The realization of the 
 discrepancy between its present condition and 
 that of mature development, as well as the ne- 
 cessity to do nothing but wait until such self 
 help matures, constitute the disorder in the 
 situation evoking this form of response. Not 
 unfrequently is the parental instinct manifested 
 as a form of scepticism, which is a selective re- 
 sponse to the abstract disorder of the cosmos. 
 Again, the background of tender emotion may 
 become studded with all sorts of violent emo- 
 tions. The extremes to which all creatures go 
 in order to defend their young, the chastisement 
 which sometimes gets meted out to children 
 upon the most trivial occasions, and the alter- 
 nations of imperiousness and fawning which 
 parents bestow upon their offspring, illustrate 
 the point. Under the spell of the tender emo- 
 tion, perceptual distortion is the rule; the "cute" 
 acts of one's own children may at the same 
 time be equivalent to vandalism, and a "prank" 
 323 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 in one environment may be an evidence of con- 
 cealed misanthropy in another. Later on, the 
 confidence in the superiority of one's own chil- 
 dren, — on account of parental joy in being a 
 cause, — is the basis of the plebian dogma that 
 no one is quite good enough to mate with them. 
 All these events are mal-adjustments, and the 
 nearsightedness which must go with such in- 
 stinctive and emotional reactions appears to be 
 incurable if treated strictly within its own 
 terms. 
 
 19. Gregariousness is the social instinct par 
 excellence. Only the few are hermits, the rest 
 of us are beholders and beholden all the while 
 to the rest of society. Perhaps no other in- 
 stinct could be gotten along so poorly without, 
 and yet no other instinct demands as its tax so 
 much equilibration to render it harmless. In- 
 deed, the virtues, so-called, are the taxes we 
 have to pay for gregariousness. It arises out of 
 the fear of solitude, the uneasiness we feel at 
 being absent from our fellows. But I take it 
 that it is not bound up with any affection for 
 our fellows, for we do not necessarily like those 
 with whom we prefer to be. The main discom- 
 fort of solitude comes through the realization of 
 unfilled spaces between our body and those of 
 others. Cities, states, clubs, fraternities, 
 324 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 churches, and all other organizations are pri- 
 marily social aggregations for the annihilation 
 of solitude. Solitary confinement in prison is 
 the rational psychological limit of punishment, 
 since we are not so constituted as to systemati- 
 cally punish a man by utter "cold shoulder." 
 Were such the case, doubtless the person so re- 
 jected would immediately put himself off. The 
 jokes about bachelors and old maids are con- 
 cealed scorn at a lack of gregariousness, regard- 
 less of how dismal a predicament many of the 
 "unclaimed blessings" so discriminated against, 
 have escaped. This instinct, however, does not 
 in any way guarantee that the satisfying person 
 shall be met by the mere fact of there being 
 other bodies in the vicinity, and as such it rep- 
 resents again the general principles of disorder 
 and absence of clear perception. 
 
 20. It is hard to draw the line between the 
 play motive and the instinct of acquisition. We 
 saw in the former chapter, that the movements 
 of the stomach were gone through with regard- 
 less of the presence of nutriment in that organ. 
 Thus it is in many another situation with re- 
 gard to the human body, — series, rather than 
 reasons are the ultimate bases of situations. In 
 play and acquisitiveness we find basic certain 
 odd fumblings, manipulations, gatherings and 
 325 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 scatterings, apparently from an excess of ener- 
 gies, though not a surfeit of them. Certain mo- 
 tions can be gone through with at a low ex- 
 penditure of energy without the slightest degree 
 of exhaustion ensuing. Acquisition also arises 
 out of fumbling, but the resulting conscious- 
 ness, — predominantly motor, — of having things 
 in a certain spacial and motor relation to the 
 body, produces further stimulations to the same 
 end, and we keep gathering rather than throw- 
 ing away. When such occurs, we have a case 
 of perception. For the word "mine" principal- 
 ly means "that thing frequently responded to." 
 Furthermore, thinking about the things we have 
 so responded to is auto-catalytic in its charac- 
 ter. At the basis of miserliness and wealth lies 
 this instinct of acquisition, — both differing sole- 
 ly in the co-presence of the instinct of self dis- 
 play. But there is no evidence for believing 
 that there is an intention behind this response, 
 — those forever planning to become rich, rare- 
 ly becoming so. On the other hand, let Socra- 
 tes come up and ask the possessor of wealth 
 why, or to what end he is accumulating, and he 
 cannot for the life of him tell. No reason given 
 is exclusively in the field of inquiry. In this 
 connection one will observe that the instincts 
 are not characterized by any specific, nameable 
 326 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 content. Hoarding and jealousy may become 
 co-functioned, but hoarding and generosity may 
 also appear together. The successful business 
 man may dislike the whole scheme of his en- 
 deavors, or the unsuccessful one be of the opin- 
 ion that his plans cannot fail. In all such cases, 
 the non-focality to the person himself of his 
 ruling manifestation is indicative of the general 
 principle of disorder as the basis of instinct. 
 
 21. Constriictiveness is frequently named 
 among the instincts, but for our purposes only 
 the random fumbling of objects preparatory to 
 the possible ordering of them on the basis of 
 perceptions, could be called by any such name 
 as "original tendency." Furthermore, fumbling 
 is typical of mal-adjustment, and appears to 
 have no specific, attendant emotion. Psycholo- 
 gists have never admitted that destractiveness is 
 as "original" as is constructiveness, for they 
 have steadfastly overlooked the fact that young 
 children maltreat and destroy long before they 
 ever build or construct. Constructiveness and 
 destructiveness might be profitably treated of 
 together, even if but for the diff'erences they 
 show which are not manifest in the spelling of 
 the words. For the first of these lacks those 
 anger elements which the second possesses. 
 Random fumbling, again, may be suddenly su- 
 327 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 perseded by the perception of order, and thus 
 be brought to some sort of furthering conclu- 
 sion; while destructiveness meets all orderly 
 situations only to disregard their perceptual ele- 
 ments, and to reduce them to disorder. Once 
 more, certain successful achieving of a pattern 
 is frequently followed by the loss of that pat- 
 tern, and so the orderly and disorderly series 
 may alternate with considerable frequency. 
 Only in point of its intermittent clumsiness, 
 then, do we call construction an instinct, for 
 when a dominant pattern is attained and stead- 
 ily functioned, the environment becomes stable, 
 and the responses non-contradictory. On the 
 other hand, destructiveness is functioned by a 
 strabismic consciousness, that is to say, a cross- 
 section in which many un-shot complexes are 
 smouldering, whose functioning is anti-social 
 in its tendency. Vandalism, the joy of produc- 
 ing carnage, the antique postulate of a trans- 
 temporal oven in which those not holding views 
 tangent to our own were to be eventually kept 
 at n degrees Centigrade, — such are common ex- 
 amples of this response to internal disorder 
 with its attending manifestations. Even to see 
 one building torn down to replace another 
 causes some orderly minds to avoid the sight, 
 as well as to feel resentment at the act. And 
 328 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 
 there is perhaps validity in the legal status of 
 those who butcher for an occupation, in that 
 they are excluded from certain jury service on 
 the basis of lacking perceptions of the orderly 
 status of an organism amongst its kind. 
 
 22. Three other forms of complexes may 
 suitably be presented here. These are sugges- 
 tion, sympathy, and imitation. The first has to 
 do with the inducing of a non-perceiving con- 
 sciousness to function the ideas of another when 
 put into w^ords calculated to appeal to his in- 
 stincts or emotions; and also to formulate pre- 
 maturely his motor functioning on that basis. 
 Sympathy is the appeal to, or sharing of, the 
 surface emotions of another, with or without 
 attempting to stir up the background of sup- 
 pressed and smouldering complexes. Imitation 
 is either copying the motor responses of an- 
 other, especially gross movements, or copying 
 the effects produced by another, — all such copy- 
 ing being virtual in its identity rather than fact- 
 ual. No resident benefit lies in any of these 
 three, considered as bare descriptions of what 
 happens in cases where they are exhibited. Nev- 
 ertheless they can be made subservient to al- 
 most any purpose promulgated, and this is of 
 large account in the educational world, as well 
 
 329 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 as in advertising and selling, and the general 
 business of social organization. 
 
 23. McDougall's enumeration of the com- 
 plexes of emotions falls into two groups. The 
 first one does not necessarily imply the existence 
 of sentiments, while the second one does. "Senti- 
 ment" is taken to mean "an organized system 
 of emotional tendencies centered about some 
 object." In the first group there are the fol- 
 lowing emotional complexes. 
 
 (a) Admiration. This is a compound of 
 wonder and negative self-feeling. (By com- 
 pound is meant a simultaneous occurrence, 
 sometimes in the form of partial fusion, some- 
 times not.) 
 
 (b) Awe. This is composed of admiration 
 and fear. 
 
 (c) Reverence. This is derived from a 
 blend of awe and gratitude, both of the ele- 
 ments of awe being clearly present. 
 
 (d) Gratitude. This is composed of the 
 tender emotion and negative self -feeling. 
 
 (e) Scorn. A mixture of awe and disgust. 
 
 (f) Contempt. Composed of scorn and 
 positive self-feeling. 
 
 (g) Loathing. A compound of fear and 
 disgust. 
 
 (h) Horror is the acme of loathing. 
 330 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 (i) Fascination. This is a mixture of loath- 
 ing and wonder, fairly well balanced. 
 
 (j) Hate is composed of anger, fear and 
 disgust, while 
 
 (k) Envy is derived from negative self- 
 feeling and anger. It must be kept focal that 
 the binary and tertiary character of these com- 
 pounds is incapable of any such clear exhibi- 
 tion or demonstration as is possible with sensa- 
 tions and perceptions. And the "organized" 
 character of them is little more than bare "with- 
 ness." Structure they lack, and are thus re- 
 sponses to situations involving disorder. But 
 by virtue of possessing among themselves com- 
 mon parts, or common functions, the transition 
 from one to the other is readily made in the 
 presence of the same exciting object. All it re- 
 quires is that the object be in mal-adjustment, — 
 the train of these complexes is then easy to fol- 
 low. As a tacit verdict of humanity that these 
 emotions are not solely referable to the body, 
 we have the expressions, "loathsome sight," 
 "fascinating woman," "hateful delay," "he treat- 
 ed me with contempt," and the like; and this is 
 one of the signal examples of naivete being 
 acute, whether by intention or not, with per- 
 ception or without it. But naivete is far more 
 concerned with complexes than with the other 
 331 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 data of consciousness, and for this unexpected 
 correctness it must not fail to have due credit. 
 
 24. The following are the complex emo- 
 tions which do imply the existence of senti- 
 ments. 
 
 (a) Reproach. This is composed of anger 
 and the tender emotion. 
 
 (b) Jealousy. In this we find a painfully 
 checked positive self-feeling plus an oscillation 
 between revenge and reproach. 
 
 (c) Vengeful emotion. This is a compound 
 of anger and a wounded self-regarding senti- 
 ment. By the latter expression is meant that 
 the insults one receives, if not at once resented 
 and paid for, lower one in the eyes of his fel- 
 lows. And in this predicament, (manifesting a 
 wounded self-regard), it is curious to note, that, 
 no matter how many eyes are turned upon one, 
 the social center of gravity is not thereby set- 
 tled in the object of such regard, but way off, 
 as it were, clear outside the situation. It is as 
 if the terms "beholder" and "beholden" in this 
 case had absolutely nothing in common. 
 
 (d) Resentment. This is what becomes of 
 the vengeful emotion when the insult is at once 
 avenged. It is perhaps nowhere better illustrat- 
 ed than in the treatment of a subjugated na- 
 tion by its victor. I do not mean the payment 
 
 332 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 
 of indemnity, or the other material symbols of 
 conquest, but the lasting desire of the conquer- 
 ors to see the individuals of the losing nation 
 humbled and browbeaten. It is as if on the 
 material side an eye would pay for an eye, but 
 on the sentimental side, a whole jaw^ were none 
 too much to satisfy the loss of a tooth. Stir- 
 ring a nation to patriotism, likewise, is often 
 nothing more than arousing a feeling of injury 
 by generalizing, and sentimentally magnifying 
 some forgivable misdemeanor that was never 
 meant to provoke the use of cartridges. 
 
 (e) Shame. This is a struggle between 
 self-display and self-abasement, with their at- 
 tendant emotions of positive and negative self- 
 feeling. Just why shame, as a weakening con- 
 dition, should have been so largely used in mat- 
 ters of moral significance, is easier to determine 
 from a legal than from a psychological stand- 
 point. The legalistic view of good and bad 
 makes special use of this sentiment on the 
 ground that the intensest subjugation is justifi- 
 able. Psychologically, there is nothing to op- 
 pose justifying the means by the end, if the 
 end is worthy; but as soon as the question of 
 which end is worthier is introduced, the status 
 of the shamed individual must come in for its 
 share of consideration. When the struggle be- 
 333 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 tween self-display and self-abasement, as in 
 shame, becomes reconciled by a blending of 
 the two, we have, instead, 
 
 (f) Bashfulness. 
 
 (g) Remorse is shameful and angry regret, 
 (h) Joy is separable into what is called the 
 
 esthetic pleasure of contemplation, (with which 
 we shall deal in the last chapter of this book), 
 combined with sympathetically induced pleas- 
 ure, the tender emotion, and positive self-feel- 
 ing. 
 
 (i) Sorrow, on the other hand, is not the 
 negative of the above, but rather composed of a 
 Daffled tender emotion, (such as occurs in death 
 and the loss of the recipient of affection), pride 
 and hope negated, and negative self-feeling. Sor- 
 row and joy are usually spoken of as antithetic- 
 al, but by analysis, only one term is seen to be 
 logically negatived in passing from one to the 
 other. Their antithetical character depends 
 upon the motor possibilities which can be stim- 
 ulated under their dominance of the organism. 
 In this respect, psychological opposition and 
 logical opposition have many interesting dif- 
 ferences, which the student should carefully 
 find for himself, inasmuch as erroneous infer- 
 ence arises from the confusing of the two. 
 (j) Pity, McDougall calls the tender emo- 
 334 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 
 tion, tinged with sympathetically induced pain. 
 Pain in this sense, as well as pleasure as above 
 used, never refers to what we meant in the 
 first chapter by the sensation pain or the sen- 
 sational attribute pleasure. For pain, one should 
 here substitute unpleasantness, and in emotion- 
 al complexes he should also regard it as much 
 stronger than sensorial feeling-tone, inasmuch 
 as emotional discharges are stronger than tro- 
 pistic releases. Furthermore, when there is 
 lacking the release of the suppressed energy in 
 emotions, there is functioned both negative self- 
 feeling, and that which McDougall, whom I 
 have generally followed, means here by pain. 
 
 (k) Happiness is enumerated at the close 
 of the account, and it appears to mean a gen- 
 eral bodily Duoyancy as a result of clear percep- 
 tion and satisfactory functioning. But we are 
 here on the border line of ethics, the psychology 
 of which must be reserved for the following 
 and final chapter. 
 
 25. Mood is hereby defined as a co-con- 
 scious appearance of any emotion or sentiment. 
 It may be strong or weak, and when linked wdth 
 some specifically characteristic motor manifest- 
 ation, it is called temperament. It is significant 
 to note that both mood and temperament may 
 be functioned side by side with certain further- 
 335 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 
 ing perceptions, but this fact of togetherness 
 does not make mood and temperament strictly 
 perceptual in character. All suppression is ac- 
 companied by the expenditure of energy, and 
 whenever suppression occurs, it means both 
 less than the normal amount of clear perception 
 and less definite motor functioning on the basis 
 of a furthering pattern. In all these sentiments, 
 it is plainly seen that the thesis of this chap- 
 ter in regard to the disorderly object or situa- 
 tion as their stimulus, and a mal-adjustment to 
 the situation as their motor aspect, need not be 
 recanted. 
 
 The Crowd. 
 26. The social order, in which we find our- 
 selves irrevocably embedded all the while, is 
 one of the environments to which we cannot 
 help but respond. It is not the only one of 
 this kind, however, and even though it be a dis- 
 ordered object, it yet lies in the midst of an- 
 other environment, called, for want of a parti- 
 san term, the universe. Now the conscious 
 cross-section not only contains responses to so- 
 ciety, to sense data, and to perceptions; but we 
 also respond to principles of order, and to 
 things which are neither mental, physical, mor- 
 al, social, or artistic, but which are the stuff 
 or stuffs out of which these orders are generat- 
 336 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 0(1, and into which they plunge more or less firm 
 roots. This merely in passing, for the business 
 of psychology, while concerned with responses, 
 (and thereto with all the responses that an or- 
 ganism makes), has not within its province the 
 ordering of non-human responses and tenden- 
 cies, but only of those which can be glued to 
 pronouns of various calibre. And one of these 
 pronouns which we shall straightway consider 
 is the pronoun "we." 
 
 27. The pronoun we, with its other forms 
 of they, us, ours, their, them, and the like, is 
 symbolical of that domain known as the Crowd. 
 In this connection the material here pre- 
 sented is drawn from Gustave Le Bon's account 
 of "The Crowd," all of which would amply re- 
 pay perusal. The crowd is a curious organiza- 
 tion. Its intended perceptions are swamped by 
 instincts and emotions, and its deliberative pow- 
 er is in inverse proportion to its size and the 
 proximity of its members. A crowd may be any 
 group of people in one area, in sight of or bod- 
 ily contact with each other, or, it may be com- 
 posed of spacially isolated individuals respond- 
 ing to the same or duplicated stimulus. The 
 crowded spectators of a base-ball game are a 
 crowd, as well as the isolated readers of the 
 morning paper at the breakfast table. There 
 337 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 are two main types of crowds, — heterogeneous, 
 and homogeneous. The first of these consists 
 of individuals casually and haphazardly 
 brought together. No deliberation or choice 
 exists on the part of the members of such a 
 crowd, leading them to just that place, or expos- 
 ing them to just those other human beings thus 
 met. The heterogeneous crowd is of two sub- 
 sidiary types, — anonymous and not-anonymous. 
 Street crowds, base-ball crowds, circus crowds 
 and the like, are anonymous; while juries, par- 
 liamentary assemblies, college faculties, lodges, 
 and church gatherings, are of the second type. 
 28. All such assemblies, whether suddenly 
 congregated, or slowly agglutinized, are under 
 the sway of unconscious sentiments. Every dif- 
 ferent nation is typified in the manner in which 
 groups of its individual citizens get excited and 
 pledged to some cause or movement. A 
 crowd will demand anything its leader emotion- 
 alizes them to demand. But who is its leader? 
 Not the speaker who happens to be addressing 
 them or leading them on. Not the principles 
 enunciated from a rostrum or the slogan into 
 which he crystallizes their opinion. Their lead- 
 er is rather the summation of their smothered 
 emotions, their unformulated dissatisfactions; 
 for the tiling for which they vote, cheer, or pour 
 338 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 out their energies may not l)e at all that which 
 they, as individuals, in calm moments, might 
 determine upon as something desirable. It is 
 only the fact that something is presented to 
 them as being in a like condition to what they 
 imagine themselves to be which arouses their 
 enthusiasm, and this vicariously functions the 
 exhibition of emotions, sentiments and instincts 
 in its behalf. All heterogeneous crowds are an 
 example of co-conscious and unconscious func- 
 tioning of a disorderly object. In all such groups 
 there is a slight inclination toward anarchy and 
 barbarism. 
 
 29. Homogeneous crow^ds are divided into 
 these three groups, sects, castes, and classes, (a) 
 Sects, wdiether political or religious. In all sects, 
 the individual members may differ very much 
 as to education, caste, or profession. But the 
 unifying element in them is some principle 
 which is of another series than their education 
 or profession, and to which these make no dif- 
 ference. Some belief is aroused, some need for 
 its application is shown, and the rest follows. 
 Further unification comes through the expendi- 
 ture of motor energies to the cause; wealth is 
 poured out, buildings are erected to house the 
 assemblies of the members, and the strength or 
 weakness of the belief in the principle of the sect 
 339 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 is manifested by the number of things they fur- 
 ther in connection with their material develop- 
 ment. A belief is a meaning, and therefore it is 
 tested for its tenacity by what those function- 
 ing it will do upon occasion or in a crisis. Its 
 strength or weakness, and its truth or falsity 
 need have no connection. The pragmatic test of 
 history as to whether beliefs have held, and 
 the logical analysis of their terminology and co- 
 herence, are two separate and distinct items; 
 the pragmatic test is an emotional one in this 
 case, and the test of analysis is one of percept- 
 ual character. The first is an example of in- 
 formal logic, the second, of the logic of exact 
 formulation. It need not surprise the student 
 of exact logic to find that analysis usually dis- 
 covers nothing stable in all forms of popular 
 beliefs. It is only in the science of psychology 
 that we find a complete account of erratic emo- 
 tional functions. 
 
 30. (b) There are three chief castes 
 among Anglo-Saxons, namely, the priestly, the 
 military, and the host of occupations. In these 
 we find the highest type of crowd organization. 
 The labor unions, it is safe to say, represent the 
 most unsettled type of caste, — the other two, 
 the priestly and the military, represent more 
 systematic stratification, with a resultant of sat- 
 340 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 isfaction and contentment with their lot. In 
 heterogeneous races the vohitile and mercurial 
 elements are necessarily predominant, and the 
 era of strikes is unavoidahle in a people just 
 coming into individuality. In such cases, the 
 caste may be said to be crystallizing. On the 
 other hand, where several generations of the 
 same family follow the same occupation, — thus 
 making a homogeneous race in point of com- 
 pleted stratification, — no disturbance whatever 
 is so emotionalized as that which threatens the 
 downfall of such a caste system into which the 
 individuals have been cemented. One might 
 again point out the fact that no matter how- 
 much we clamor at times for a change, the rec- 
 ord of past events shows that those who clam- 
 ored loudest, were the most unwilling recipients 
 of it, as well as those who sank back the soon- 
 est into their former condition. 
 
 31, (c) We usually enumerate three 
 classes, — the peasant, middle, and aristocratic. 
 The habits, education, and interest of the in- 
 dividual members of each of these are very 
 similar. Sometimes it is difficult to draw the 
 line between the members of these three classes, 
 there being many kinds of recognized aristocra- 
 cies, such as those of wealth, of talent, of intel- 
 ligence, and so on. In classifying classes, how- 
 341 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 ever, the monetary test is usually applied, and 
 the border line cases omitted. By this means, 
 also, it is easy to see why these classes have the 
 poorest form of organization of all crowds, 
 whether heterogeneous or homogeneous; for all 
 those in the peasant and middle classes who are 
 struggling out of them do not want any organ- 
 ization that solidifies their position in that class, 
 and the rest are too busy maintaining their posi- 
 tion to become organized. The noiweaii riche 
 furnish in this instance curious hints of the mo- 
 mentum which economic conditions give to 
 functions of a social character, for their un- 
 conscious complexes, becoming suddenly re- 
 leased, indicate the disorder which the condi- 
 tion of sudden wealth produces. 
 
 32. When a crowd functions some punish- 
 able disorder, it becomes a criminal crowd, or 
 mob. But no one person in a crowd is doing 
 exactly what the whole crowd may be said to be 
 doing in such a case. In fact, nobody is at the 
 head of a crowd. It has no head, for it is only 
 releasing collective complexes, only satisfying 
 its collective grudges. The ringleaders are us- 
 ually punished, because the law demands a vic- 
 tim; but the ringleaders are often only those 
 spacially in front of the others, and only seem- 
 ingly more indecorous than those pushing from 
 342 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 behind. Thus when one asks, "who started the 
 rumpus?", it is not altogether a joke when each 
 suspected culprit avers to the contrary. But, as 
 Lc Bon says, "All collectivities have it in them 
 to develop to a high degree certain ferocious 
 and tender instincts." For the collective mind 
 is an accumulation of suddenly uncorked sup- 
 pressions, and what is done by it is a function 
 of the environmental possibilities of the situa- 
 tion as well as of the individual complexes. The 
 crowd usually demands some one to be its lead- 
 er as well as some candidate for anathema or 
 praise. If a crowd is witnessing a fire at night, 
 when a rescue is attempted, it is sometimes pa- 
 thetic, sometimes ridiculous, and again some- 
 times terrifying to see how the crowd both ten- 
 derly nurses along the rescue, and also threat- 
 ens an unsuccessful rescuer with the death he 
 failed to avert. It roars and defames, it weeps 
 and cries, it groans; it uses the same words in 
 a "sacred and hushed tone" as it does in yelling 
 and shouting. Here the object eliciting the re- 
 sponses is clearly a disordered one, though oft- 
 en hard to name in exact terms. 
 
 33. Deliberative assemblies have worked 
 out a system which substantiates my thesis in 
 this chapter. Important measures are first pre- 
 sented, then debated, then referred to a com- 
 343 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 mittee, and so on, in order for the emotional 
 element to have its little part, if need be; but 
 also in order for the measure to have its logical 
 and perceptual inning as well. Often, indeed, a 
 committee or a single individual drafts and ad- 
 judicates a matter with but the scantest refer- 
 ence to the collective body that finally passes 
 on it. On this principle, absolute monarchy is 
 worthy of some consideration, psychologically, 
 as well as such forms of government known as 
 oligarchies and aristocracies, in the strict sense 
 of these terms. Popular government is baseci 
 on the idea that the many think better than 
 the few. Psychology has nothing to say about 
 government, but only about crowd organiza- 
 tions in point of which this further quotation 
 from Le Bon is pertinent : "In any deliberative 
 assembly, called upon to give its verdict about 
 a matter not entirely technical, the intelligence 
 of the individual members counts for nothing." 
 34. The jury is a heterogeneous crowd, 
 formed on occasion into a deliberating body. 
 Why twelve members should constitute it is re- 
 ferable to informal logic. Juries are usually 
 made up of strangers, and as such represent an 
 organization in which the knowledge of other 
 minds engaged in the same work as one's own 
 is supposed to count for nothing. This may or 
 344 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 may not be so, but it is only for us to say here 
 that after a jury gets into the jury room to con- 
 sult and deliberate, the results show something 
 quite irreconcilable with the notion that the 
 jury does not behave as a heterogeneous crowd. 
 Juries are not unimpressible by the prestige, 
 wealth, beauty, widowhood, countenance, and 
 so on, of those witnessing, or on trial before the 
 bar; and their emotions are often the only hope 
 of the lawyers functioning in the case. Even 
 though argument and debate are indulged in in 
 the jury room, the crowd character is never 
 sujj-focal there. Stubborn men have also been 
 Known to completely reverse the tendency of 
 the first ballot, — it being a test of endurance 
 rather than a careful, cool deliberation which 
 decided the case. It is the opinion of more than 
 the writer that all juries should be forced to 
 taKe a cold bath before going into the jury room, 
 ana should further be obliged to avoid all vaso- 
 motor constrictions by whatever means would 
 be safest and quickest at the same time. 
 
 35. The informal logic of crowd reasoning 
 is evidence of the disordered environment 
 which it is functioning. The most exaggerated 
 and ingenious sentiments are indulged in. The 
 crowd never distinguishes between the actual 
 and the virtual, between the possible and the 
 345 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 impossible, or between the internal and external 
 aspects of the thing presented to it. It de- 
 mands "equality," or "liberty," or asks things 
 which are entirely beyond its power to use. It 
 scorns a feeble, but reveres a strong authority; 
 a reported weakness in the government will 
 raise a mob very easily, but the report of even 
 iron-handed dealings will at once quiet their 
 emotional unrest. "Might makes right" is act- 
 ually crowd reasoning, whether it be also true, 
 false, or absurd. Catch phrases, slogans, and 
 shibboleths, are just the material out of which 
 crowd reasoning is constructed. The orator 
 who addresses the crowd on the street need say 
 nothing rational, just so long as he speaks in 
 terms which the crowd will interpret as being 
 "w^hat it thought also." An emotional collec- 
 tivity thinks and speaks anything at all, the 
 more disconnected it is the surer is it of being 
 emotionally functioned; and so such things as 
 analogical reasons are cheered as the very acme 
 of truth and right. Crowds are also impressed 
 by the marvelous. They demand some author- 
 ity, and in lieu of living governors of men, any 
 dead hero or nebulous ancestor will do very 
 nicely. National figures of the past century, 
 traditions, the longevity of customs, the great- 
 ness or decline of an institution, — all these 
 346 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 stimuli manifest a universal tyranny over all 
 sorts of crowds in all sorts of nations and ages. 
 "The one tyranny humanity has always been 
 under is the memory of its dead." But shake 
 once the confidence of a people in its past, and 
 you will find that "the end of a belief is the 
 beginning of a revolution." And it is not amiss 
 at this point to recall the passages in this book 
 on auto-catalytic action as the basis of neural 
 momentum, with the other remark about the 
 desire for change we so often function in 
 speech. For the crowd is after all only a magni- 
 fied individual, and in the midst of a crowd we 
 can often detect more of our smothered emo- 
 tions and tendencies than in any other situa- 
 tion that ofil'ers itself. Neural unification is rare, 
 while self contradiction, which is a function of 
 chronic, unresolved neural inhibitions, appears 
 to be not only one of the chief products of any 
 and all instinctive and emotional manifesta- 
 tions, but indeed their source. 
 
 36. Another form which the emotional 
 complex takes is the dream. This normally oc- 
 curs in sleep, and is the rearousal of forgotten 
 or suppressed ideas which have not been func- 
 tioned during waking hours. It is substan- 
 tially the revelation of a wish, — by which may 
 equally be meant the hope that something will 
 347 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 happen, as well as the fear that something might 
 happen. But in either case a dream is an un- 
 shot residue of emotional or instinctive func- 
 tioning, — the back-water of consciousness. Be- 
 fore entering into the physiological or ideation- 
 al processes which give dreams their being, it 
 will be profitable to consider briefly other forms 
 of the rearousal of past consciousness, in order 
 that comparison, contrast, and orientation may 
 serve as means whereby they may be better 
 understood. 
 
 37. These other forms are memory and 
 imagination. Memory has until recently been 
 considered as something which resided in cer- 
 tain cells of the cerebrum, and which, by a 
 process of irradiation or some such neural re- 
 lease, got into consciousness. Both of these 
 views, — that of its being a single process, and 
 that of its being the dormant content of special 
 brain cells, — are not to be upheld in this book. 
 There have been found in laboratory investiga- 
 tions not one but four dififerent modes of re- 
 arousal of past events, none of which give mem- 
 ory contents exactly identical with the original. 
 Memory, far from being a reduplication of the 
 object, is a tendency to approach the class of 
 objects of which the sense datum remembered 
 is but an instance, or a member, and when this 
 348 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 memory content is fully developed, we have 
 concepts, rather than percepts or sensory de- 
 tails. So that every remembered object is on 
 the way to generalization or conceptual content. 
 On the other hand, the four kinds of rearousal 
 of the content differ much from one another. 
 And there is always a gap, a latency, between 
 the sensorial presentation and the recall, and 
 what is going on in this gap escapes introspec- 
 tion. We have seen the particular object, let us 
 say, but when the rearousal comes, we shall 
 then be visualizing only that general class of 
 visual phenomena instead; and this gap or la- 
 tency is the time in which the particularity of 
 the content is being lost. But this is nothing 
 outrageous, for the particular object was also a 
 member of its class, particular in this case 
 meaning only that certain specific members of 
 the series constituting it were functioned togeth- 
 er. And each of these members had affiliations, 
 common parts,— functional or contential,— 
 with many other members of those series. Such, 
 indeed, is often the case even with sensation. 
 The paradoxical cold and heat, the tickle sen- 
 sation, the estimation of movement and so on, 
 all differ at times from the mathematical and 
 physical status of the stimulus in ways that are 
 familiar enough to need no exclamation points 
 349 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 as we pass. So that while in the focal area of 
 consciousness we function with the words "this 
 particular one," the sub-focal areas of con- 
 sciousness could be as well functioned by the 
 expression, "one of those which has been func- 
 tioned before," as by other words referring to 
 focality. Thus it is that when the object is re- 
 moved from sense focality, and we recall it, 
 while mentioning it or not, what gets restored 
 in after-imagery is that cross-section of the se- 
 ries making the object, which will be normally 
 functioned with the least effort possible. But 
 mark, that an intense effort to recall something 
 is always accompanied by a tension in the body, 
 as well as by an effort to place our organism in 
 the identical relation to the absent stimulus as 
 it was to it while present. For ideas are func- 
 tioned by the aid of bodily attitudes, just as 
 emotions are functions of the general disturb- 
 ance caused by our bodily mis-orientation with 
 the situation. 
 
 38. The four ways of reinstating absent 
 stimuli are these. 1. Perseveration, which 
 means that, shortly after its disappearance, 
 without any mediating focal ideas, there is a re- 
 currence of the original idea. 2. Persistence, 
 (which usually occurs in fatigue or exhaustion), 
 w^hereby is meant that ideas become repetitive 
 350 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 because we no longer perceive differences, or 
 react in a discriminating manner to the sensory 
 present. 3. Iteration, or the random recur- 
 rence of fleeting impressions, and 4. The free 
 emergence of those things we have often func- 
 tioned, especially motor habits. Now if any 
 one wishes to know how the absent object gets 
 reinstated, or past functioning repeated, the 
 answer is that the pastness or absence of the 
 object is one thing, and its non-dependence 
 upon consciousness for its existence is another. 
 An object is something that will stimulate, 
 whether it be orthogonally disposed to the body 
 and its sense organs or not. The time series is 
 one series and the space series is another, but 
 there are other series, neither in time nor space, 
 as we pointed out in the first part of Chapter 
 III. Things have position in the order of knowl- 
 edge, as well as in Florida or the year 1914. 
 Things also have position in space twice at the 
 same time and even twice in the same space, if 
 we but open our eyes to that fact. 
 
 39. Let this specifically serve as an exam- 
 ple. When we hang a mirror on the wall of 
 a room, and stand in front of it, we can see our- 
 selves doubled, — literally projected through the 
 wall into the space beyond. If the wall of the 
 room is continuous wdth the sheer edge of a 
 351 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 precipice, we do not see the object mirrored 
 behind the wall tumble into the chasm below, 
 even though its position relative to us is beyond 
 the threshold of safety. And yet the mirrored 
 object is colorful, shapely, motile, almost every- 
 thing that we are, — except that it has no weight. 
 Bat neither have our shape, color, and motility 
 any weight. So that the mirrored object is 
 composed of all those qualities which are not 
 physical objects. This is also the substance of 
 ideas. This, likewise, is the substance of mem- 
 ories. The mirrored object is faithful to the 
 shape, color, and movements of the original, 
 but the mirror merely analyses out the non-ma- 
 terial properties, and is thus a logical instru- 
 ment as well as a sense organ, strictly defined. 
 If a man is standing in front of a mirror and 
 shaves himself, the mirror, of course reversing 
 every horizontal movement relative to the ob- 
 server, will betray the slight abrasion that the 
 "real" skin suffers. But while the man's face 
 has a tiny drop of blood upon it, the mirror 
 face has not, — it has only a drop of red, which 
 is one of the essential properties of the contents 
 of the capillaries. Again, "the painted hawser 
 will hold the painted ship," but it takes a rope 
 hawser to hold a wooden ship. And so on. 
 Thus the point is well taken that the physical 
 352 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 order of things is not the only order into which 
 they get, regardless of the status of those other 
 orders. But certainly they are not in the same 
 time and space, nor entirely under the same 
 laws as are the physical orders commonly ap- 
 pealed to for truth and validity. 
 
 40. This is not only an aside; it is a neces- 
 sary prologue to the proper understanding of 
 memory and other co- and sub-conscious phe- 
 nomena. The rehabilitation of the object in 
 some sort of sensory content, faint and unfaith- 
 ful though it be, is no more mysterious than is 
 the phenomenon of mirror space. Nor is the 
 motor readjustment of the body to a situation 
 in which some instinct or emotion is repeated 
 by the mere mention of a word or the presen- 
 tation of an idea, any more subtle than are the 
 original orders of things which get cross-sec- 
 tioned into sensation and perception. The ob- 
 jects of memory and imagination have no po- 
 sition, and may be anywhere, just as the quali- 
 ties of sensation may be anywhere. And mem- 
 ory that comes pat with the provoking stimulus 
 is primarily a function of the bodily attitude. 
 We are set for that recall by a definite motor 
 pattern, — we have crystallized toward a certain 
 set of perceptions, and the sensory or motor ele- 
 
 353 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 merits follow as readily as the water from the 
 faucet when we turn it on. 
 
 41. Memory, like the word "experience," 
 is used both as a noun and a verb. The distinc- 
 tion is well taken in connection with sensory 
 content, but when we come to the motor mem- 
 ories, we have a more intricate matter to deal 
 with. The memory (subconscious) of the oper- 
 ations of dressing is both a content and a pro- 
 cess, let us say; but just where one begins and 
 the other ends is rather obscure. And the rea- 
 son is, that the clothes we wear and therewith 
 clothe ourselves in the morning, are themselves 
 best defined by the things we do with them. A 
 hat is something that is worn on the head, shoes 
 are things that are worn on the feet, and so on 
 throughout the wardrobe. So that, since these 
 articles are of the class of attributes-things- 
 functions, so are memories which involve their 
 accustomed use. Emotions and instincts are 
 also of this class of objects, curiously tangled 
 and interwoven, so that we have called them 
 functions of the body, not because they are in- 
 side of the skin and ooze through the pores, but 
 because their position is obscure. We thus re- 
 fer to the body out of a desire to spacialize them 
 and give them position somewhere. 
 
 42. Imagination differs from memory in 
 
 354 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 that it is just a more agile and less personal 
 transformation of the elements of the ohjects 
 reinstated. James rightly spoke of "the date 
 in our past" which all remembered things have, 
 while, on the other hand, the imagination con- 
 tent was everybody's, being nobody's. But this 
 little hint may serve to make the distinction 
 clearer. Memory is the result of having a motor 
 pattern congruous with more elements that have 
 become ingrained in us than is the case with 
 imagination. There is no difference in the con- 
 tent, relative position, clearness, or other fea- 
 tures in both of these rearousals, but only in 
 the familiarity with which we greet them, and 
 memory is called mine sooner than is imagina- 
 tion; and mine in this case means both period- 
 icity, ingraining, and readiness of motor func- 
 tioning. 
 
 43. Now for dreams. Two main condition- 
 ers are to be mentioned in this instance, — the 
 physiological and the ideational. On the side 
 of the organism as a contributing element, we 
 find that sleep is the usual state in which dreams 
 occur. Day-dreams resemble night dreams in 
 that they demand a certain lack of motor focus 
 in the body before they come, — a certain pre- 
 ponderance of co-conscious elements. Sleep, by 
 which we mean the condition of a tired body, 
 355 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 relaxed, unstimulated by sense data, and be- 
 coming ineffectual with regard to its environ- 
 ment, is principally accompanied (a) by a loss 
 of blood to the brain and a gain to the extrem- 
 ities, (b) by a relaxation of tone in the vaso- 
 motor system, (c) by the retraction of the den- 
 drites, and (d) by a diminution of the supply 
 of oxygen in the brain. And yet, while the ma- 
 jority of functions are dormant, the thresholds 
 are not all high. A mother who wakes not at 
 the thunder storm, but yet at the slightest stir- 
 ring in the cradle, is set not for thunder but 
 for the needs of her child, and her sleep is thus 
 only partial. Indeed we all sleep thus partial- 
 ly, unless the sleep be caused by intoxication. 
 Let us at once state, furthermore, that this par- 
 tial sleep is the physiological element in our 
 dreams, 
 
 44. Let us clarify this further. If there are 
 any suppressed ideas in our consciousness when 
 we fall asleep, they usually get functioned in 
 some manner not anticipated. Any slight stimu- 
 lus will be sufTicient to arouse them, even if there 
 is nothing more than an informal logical rela- 
 tion between the conscious elements. We do 
 not predict dreams, but we nevertheless infer 
 their origin with surprising certainty. Psycho- 
 analysis, which is usually misreported in popu- 
 356 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 lar accounts of it, has been the method by 
 which dreams have been pinned to the objects 
 which have stimulated them. This analysis con- 
 sists in obtaining from the subject, either verb- 
 ally or in his own writing, all of the ideas which 
 leisurely come in train at the mention of one 
 of the elements in his dream, — particularly 
 those concerning which there is obscurity as to 
 their place or meaning. The subject must be 
 truthful and keep back nothing, regardless of 
 its intimacy or scandal. From the few blessed 
 regenerates who are willing thus to admit their 
 human nature, we obtain valuable information 
 in regard to dreams. 
 
 45. Such a train of ideas is called "free 
 association," but I do not mean by this that it 
 has anything to do with the notorious doctrine 
 of association which every book on psychology 
 seems to find virtue in repeating. According 
 to it, ideas are said to follow one another in 
 the same order as they have been together be- 
 fore, by virtue of their similarity, contrast, con- 
 tiguity in time, or contiguity in space. Titch- 
 ener dealt this doctrine its first fatal blow in 
 his reduction of these four categories to one 
 only, — namely contiguity in space, which for 
 him summarizes them all. I shall wipe even 
 this one away. Very little that is temporally 
 357 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 or spacially together gets remembered, or even 
 functioned. And the order of recall does not 
 follow the order of presentation except when 
 motor ingraining has thoroughly taken place. 
 Ideas are, according to this doctrine of associa- 
 tionism, not identical with, but rather complete- 
 ly distinct, from things, and between the two 
 God has put a gulf so wide that no one can cross 
 it in less than two leaps. These ideas were said 
 to come and go in the manner of visitors, and 
 furthermore said to have laws of entrance, eti- 
 quette, and exit. No such rationality disposes 
 the ideas. Logic is no description of how we 
 think, for thinking as independent of the prop- 
 erties of objects is a downright fabrication on 
 the part of those who must perforce provide 
 something for the soul to do. Functional de- 
 pendence is the law of the connection of ideas 
 that have pattern and sequence relative to the 
 objects of which they are a part; and such triv- 
 ial categories as similarity and togetherness are 
 wholly secondary. How much, indeed, of the 
 temporal or spacial present gets recalled in com- 
 parison with what never gets focally recalled? 
 The proportion is almost painfully small. What 
 gets recalled is what gets into the pattern of 
 motor manifestations, so far as focal conscious- 
 ness is concerned; and, on the other hand, inso- 
 358 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 far as the dream consciousness is concerned, 
 the order of recall and presentation is just as 
 random as the emotionality that functions it, 
 while the vagaries of the dreamer are just those 
 shreds and clippings which the release of his 
 suppressions brings to some sort of focality. 
 
 46. The material of dreams is mostly de- 
 rived from the day before the dream occurs. 
 Dr. Sigmund Freud, the Viennese psychologist, 
 who has rendered signal service in ferreting out 
 dream material, divides it into two main parts, 
 namely, the "latent content," or the whole 
 thought-mass of the dream, and the "manifest 
 content," or the part we recall and mention 
 upon aw^akening. This manifest content is an 
 allegory of the latent content, frequently con- 
 taining imagery of the most unsuspected things. 
 For example, wishes and emotions expressed 
 in the dream may go by contraries. Suppose 
 we have in waking life disliked some one ex- 
 ceedingly. The dream may represent us as 
 putting that person out of the way, and then 
 being bitterly sorry for the deed. Or, we may 
 be dreaming of saving his life as a sign that we 
 wished him some, but not the extremest, harm. 
 The important space and time values of the 
 events of waking life may all become distorted, 
 — the things occupying the smallest or largest 
 359 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 spaces in dreams usually being opposite to their 
 size in the waking estimation. Again, two per- 
 sons manifesting the same emotion in a dream 
 usually are found to represent the same per- 
 sonality. As a general thing, also, the concept 
 enters in largely, — dreaming of an immigrant 
 will typify strangeness, timidity, or the fear of 
 a new venture, and so on. 
 
 47. Now all of this material comes from 
 past life and not from some spook who inhabits 
 the corners of the brain or the sleeping room. 
 The sensory vividness of the dream usually re- 
 fers to the events of the day before, while the 
 rest of it is the releases of tension which social 
 and other pressures have necessitated. Five 
 main sources are to be mentioned in this con- 
 nection, (a) Any interrupted thought not fin- 
 ished at the time, (b) All unsolved problems, 
 which will tend to be flashed again and again 
 upon the dreamer's consciousness in kaleido- 
 scopic form. (c) Rejected or suppressed 
 trains of thinking, (d) Parts of co-conscious- 
 ness aroused from the previous day's life, recol- 
 lections of where we hid things, or inadvert- 
 antly put them away, (e) Indifferent or float- 
 ing impressions of things. The making of the 
 dream out of these materials is accomplished in 
 the following way. First, there is the principle 
 360 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 of condensation. Every element in the mani- 
 fest content represents several things (not one) 
 in the latent content. Common parts ahound. 
 Many anxieties are crowded into one terrifying 
 situation, which by itself, and taken singly, may 
 have little reference to the past of the dreamer. 
 Tlic second element in dream making is dis- 
 placement. The intensity of an element in the 
 manifest content is no index of its intensity 
 in the latent content. Hyperbole is the name 
 we apply to this in matters of spech in waking 
 life. We dream that we are being slaughtered 
 or pushed over a steep precipice. This may 
 merely refer to former situations when some 
 one unwittingly jostled us, or caused us a slight 
 annoyance. The magnitude of the distortion, 
 however, depends upon the emotionality and 
 unification of the personality; the most out- 
 w^ardly modest and pious people may have the 
 worst dreams, but this modesty and piety are 
 no index of their suppressions, which may be 
 maintained in vanity as well as in sincerity. A 
 third feature in dream making is dramatization. 
 Curious anachronisms accompany this. Pres- 
 ent and past are intermingled, and the here and 
 the far are juxtaposeu. The absurd things of 
 waking life become mocked instead, the proud 
 person is given a sceptre, the humble is relig- 
 361 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 iously turned into a worm, the teacher who 
 "flunked" us is made tlie fireman in a crema- 
 tory, the girl who loved us becomes a superb 
 angel. In the informal logic of dreams any- 
 thing can be expected to happen, for almost 
 anything does happen. We can analyse it after- 
 wards, but not settle upon its course in advance. 
 The fourth and last feature in dream making 
 is regression. The abstract things become con- 
 crete, and single attributes appear as things. 
 On account of this fact, people have frequently 
 been inclined to place large stock in the flying 
 vagaries of their sensoi-y content during sleep. 
 Indeed armies have been raised to conquer, vast 
 sums of money been poured out, deprivation 
 endured,^ — all because some enthusiast with a 
 picturesque vocabulary narrated heatedly his 
 visitations from the "other world." The "inner 
 self" of dreams possesses no such attractiveness 
 to the empirical student of psychology as the 
 naive mind takes for granted to be the case. 
 Dreams typify, and dreams elucidate, but 
 dreams are indices of erratic refraction, rather 
 than evidences of tangency to another cosmos 
 than the one to which w^e are subservient. 
 
 48. Bodily postures during sleep or bodily 
 happenings while we are supine make up a con- 
 sideranle amo"P* of the stimuli to dreams. 
 362 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 Tickle the neck of an enthusiastic dreamer, and 
 he will be likely to dream of being guillotined 
 as not. Drop a little water on his forehead, 
 and he will think the club of Herakles is de- 
 scending with its usual velocity. Turnings over 
 in bed, whether involuntary, or elicited by an 
 experimenter, will usually have their effect in 
 the dream content; while too much heat of the 
 bed-clothes, as well as being uncovered while 
 sleeping, will be dramatized into situations of 
 burning or freezing. Dreams of flying and fall- 
 ing are usually correlated with sexual and anx- 
 iety complexes respectively, and so far have 
 the students of dreams pursued their analysis, 
 that it is but necessary to tell one of them his 
 dreams and be psycho-analyzed with care, in 
 order that these phenomena be tracked to their 
 true stimuli, and in many cases quite eradicated 
 from the future sleeping consciousness. 
 
 49. No sketch of the emotional life would 
 be complete without some account of the soul. 
 This word, I am convinced, has both a reputable 
 as well as a vicious signification, and 1 shall try 
 here to separate them. "Psychology without a 
 soul" has been the vogue for some years, if not 
 decades, and it is the abuse of the term which 
 is responsible for this state of affairs. Private 
 motives, "moral" reasons, and other traducing 
 363 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 factors have long been called into play when 
 empirical evidences were lacking; and thus the 
 soul, evaporating out of psychology, is men- 
 tioned only by a certain few who lay no claim 
 to its validity except on the grounds of custom 
 and reverence for the past. The notion of the 
 soul originated in untutored and uncritical per- 
 sons, who were at a loss to explain certain 
 phenomena of mental life, as well as in a hurry 
 to get names for things. The names, however, 
 swallowed up the things, and it took some time 
 for this fallacy to be undermined. The dreams 
 of the primitive man, his personification of the 
 elements and forces of nature, his mysterious 
 regard for everything he could not control, and 
 similar functions of ignorance, brought out his 
 naive beliefs into crystallization, with the re- 
 sult that he knew not the difference between 
 himself and the rest of nature. When such a 
 situation occurs, unknowns are in the majority, 
 and the unknowns are taken as the criteria of 
 the Knowns. One of the products of such think- 
 ing is faith, — a form of scepticism which disbe- 
 lieves in the full manifestation of the universe 
 at any one time, and is inversely proportional 
 to the amount of true knowledge which the 
 individual is willing to assimilate. Ideals are 
 some of the products of faith, and these, by con- 
 364 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 taining an element of uncertainty, — a perpet- 
 ually unrealizable end term, — are forms of the 
 same scepticism. Religion itself is a theory of 
 the soul, as well as a theory of the structure 
 of the world, and the place which human activi- 
 ties have in it. Of these three, its theory of the 
 soul is perhaps the most important, for its meta- 
 physics is frequently deduced from its psychol- 
 ogisms, while its morality is a function of the 
 changing customs of the era in which it flour- 
 ishes. I shall offer the following theories of 
 the soul, each of which has figured in the past, 
 and each of which is as likely to figure in the 
 future. 
 
 (a) The soul as glandular secretion. All 
 reference to the soul as being in the body is 
 connected with some organ of the body in which 
 it has its "seat." "The brain is the seat of the 
 mind, has sometimes been uttered in rash mo- 
 ments; and likewise the heart or the liver or 
 the other organs of vegetation have been given 
 the honor above specified. There is something 
 both reputable and otherwise in this statement, 
 for the body is both the center of the individ- 
 ual's existence, as well as dependent for its sta- 
 bility upon the cardiac, respirator>% alimentary 
 and other functions. In all emotional states, 
 likewise, there are certain well defined func- 
 365 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 tions of the ductless glands, such as the supra- 
 renal, the thyroid, and the like, causing the 
 animal better to endure wounds and heal them 
 than otherwise, or at other times. But the dif- 
 ficulty with this theory is that it makes physi- 
 ological processes fundamental without recog- 
 nizing that they are physiological. The emo- 
 tions are disorders, signs of abnormality, and 
 to make the soul as an emotional state, the 
 fundamental thing in human life, is to choose 
 the worst and call it the best. That which was 
 the obscurest, the least known, the upholders 
 of the internal soul have made the cap-stone 
 of their belief, a procedure which is to say the 
 least of it, fatuous. Psychologizing, or the tak- 
 ing of unanalysed psychological data as the 
 fundamental thing in logic, or philosophy, or 
 ethics, or metaphysics, is the name of the error 
 which characterizes all accounts of an internal 
 soul or psyche, which inhabits the interior of 
 the body. Such a "gaseous vertebrate" as this 
 form of soul would have to be, must be the one 
 "unmentionable," and therefore reducible to 
 zero for psychology, 
 
 (b) The soul as all the functions of the 
 
 bodij. This theory easily allies itself with the 
 
 doctrine of "self-expression." One is said to 
 
 express himself when he does anything that re- 
 
 366 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 veals his "inner nature." Being able to find no 
 satisfactory meaning for these terms, I shall 
 have to pass them by. But the doctrine of self- 
 expression must turn out to mean that any and 
 every act is an expression of a self, and thus 
 one has to grade such actions according to some 
 other standard, if the expression is to have any 
 meaning. That which means everything means 
 nothing. Now the soul, as the entire life his- 
 tory of the person concerned, or the present 
 personality, — manners, habits, acuities, emo- 
 tions, memories, and everything one can name 
 which the organism is doing, is a notion that 
 has so far supplanted the previous one that we 
 might consider it the present day tendency in 
 souls. 
 
 (c) The soul as a specific organization of 
 functions toward a permanent type which con- 
 stantly evolves the new and the beneficial. The 
 writer holds that this view is the only one so far 
 presented which requires a special term to dis- 
 tinguish it from mind, personality, or the whole 
 of the cross-section. For the whole gamut of 
 functions of which we are capable is necessar- 
 ily a developmental series, if there is to be de- 
 duction and permanency to it. We saw that the 
 cross-section is full of incomplete series. At- 
 tributes come and go, and parts have a share in 
 367 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 many series. Now when a set of functions 
 freely operates, and operates time and again, 
 there is something more intimate and secure 
 about it than w^hen only random sets of opera- 
 tions transpire. For example, there is a vast 
 difference between the person who always tells 
 the truth, and the person who can never be 
 calculated to tell it; for in the former there is 
 a permanent response to the facts of the case, 
 and a lack of inhibitions against the language 
 reaction becoming a derivative of that function. 
 Not only is there also a vast difference between 
 these two persons in point of social or emotional 
 rank, uut the former does not have a divided 
 consciousness, while the latter has. The former 
 has no complexes strong enough to traduce his 
 speech, and the result is both a better organ- 
 ization of his functions, and a chance to become 
 a predictable person, — two things which are 
 denied to the other. This is just a passing ex- 
 ample, but it will suffice to give the evidence 
 why such a person whose consciousness is uni- 
 fied should be said to have a soul, rather than 
 the person of whom the same things cannot be 
 said. 
 
 50. No more than a bare outline of the 
 emotional complex can be included in this chap- 
 ter, and the student must look for special treat- 
 368 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 ments elsewhere. The extent to which com- 
 plexes abound, hinder, and split our conscious- 
 ness asunder is revealed in almost every situa- 
 tion of life. The phobias on which venders of 
 patent medicines thrive is but one example. 
 Another is the New England conscience, or the 
 notion that everything must be interpreted in 
 terms of duty. The delusion of "feeling that the 
 eye of God is upon one" occurs frequently 
 among the slightly insane. The general awak- 
 ening to the destructive eifect of such fears is 
 evidenced in certain moral and religious prop- 
 agandas of the past decade, for whatever ab- 
 surd metaphysics or cosmology they teach, their 
 general stimulus is a recognized need. And yet, 
 most moral propagandas are based upon the 
 fear of something to a large degree, rather than 
 upon the unification of the personality under a 
 positive principle of incremental benefits. In 
 many a religious code the negative suggestibility 
 is assumed, and certain fears are played upon 
 in connection with sickness, dying and the like 
 predicaments, on the ground that phobia and 
 negative instruction are the fundamental mov- 
 ers of human activity. 
 
 51. There are certain other matters con- 
 nected with emotion and suppression which be- 
 long partly in this chapter and partly not in it. 
 369 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 These are the items in the cross-section known 
 as interest, purpose, and will. They are not 
 nouns, however, but something else. Interest, I 
 take it, is the manifestation of constant motor 
 tendencies toward some one special group of 
 objects, plus a satisfyingness at their develop- 
 ment. But this satisfyingness is not necessarily 
 emotional, or, if so, it is considered best as emo- 
 tion arising after the results have been achieved. 
 The success of the motor disposals toward ob- 
 jects is often too much to be assimilated, and, 
 in such a case, the disordered state supervenes. 
 However, interest may be very quiet and not 
 accompanied by glandular secretion or vaso- 
 motor constriction. It has normally, the same 
 character as feeling-tone, — a readiness to re- 
 spond again by virtue of a lack of inhibitory 
 tendencies. Curiosity, which enters into inter- 
 est, was spoken of as one of the safest instincts, 
 and interest is often stimulated by curiosity. A 
 person is interested both in that in which he 
 says his interests lie, and also in what he does 
 most without restraint or forcing. When the 
 personality is unified, these two coincide. One 
 may be interested in what he groans to be re- 
 leased from. Some occupation that is hated, 
 some iteration that is disliked, may be the very 
 thing he will voluntary return to after being 
 370 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 freed. In such a case the interest is certainly 
 emotional, and as such is a symptom of dis- 
 order. 
 
 52. Purpose is the maintaining of a motor 
 pattern in the midst of various environments, 
 each equally contributing to its maintenance. 
 It includes the element of choice. This choice 
 is free, when it operates without hindrance; it 
 is not free when it is hindered: it is deter- 
 mined when the end to be gained can be gained 
 only that way; it is indeterminate when any end 
 term is equally suitable. Along with these are 
 usually considered intention, or that which one 
 is functioning furtheringly; and motive, or the 
 reason why one furthers it. This "why" is cau- 
 sal, it being the chain of events which lead up 
 to the intention. Introspective psychology was 
 once said to furnish the means for determining 
 all these matters, but it has signally failed. One 
 determines them by observing the organism and 
 what it is doing in the midst of its various en- 
 vironments, and then one asks the doer what 
 he is doing, and these two reports are carefully 
 compared, and the result balanced. If the doer 
 and the sayer conflict in their results, the per- 
 sonality is said to be divided; if they agree, he 
 is said to be unified, truthful, and predictable. 
 
 53. The will is characterized as the domi- 
 
 371 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 nant purpose in the individual. James has giv- 
 en a scheme of the various kinds of wills, — de- 
 liberative, explosive, drifting, and the like, — 
 which are characterizations of emotional and 
 temporal manifestations rather than descrip- 
 tions of what the organism is first and foremost 
 doing in the midst of its environments. For if 
 we but analyse all cases of the will, we find 
 that the thing done, the thing willed, is the most 
 constant response to that environment of which 
 the person is capable. The divided, inconstant 
 person alone boasts of the freedom of the will 
 that is inside of him. The rest of humanity 
 are even now falling into the habit of desiring 
 to be predictable. The honesty of the bank- 
 ers, lawyers, merchants and other persons of 
 the social mele is just this predictability of their 
 actions before they are fully functioned. For 
 when a person says that he has choice and can 
 do whatever he cares to do, it means at the ut- 
 most that he can function thus once and once 
 only. We are never apprehended by tlie law 
 until we step over the threshold of social peace. 
 This threshold may be high one hour and low 
 the next, but it is always a definite function of 
 the environment and the organism within it. 
 Freedom of the will has long been a most un- 
 pleasant topic on account of its being talked of 
 372 
 
THE EMOTIONAL COMPLEX 
 and never carried out. For the carte blanche 
 we each of us hold, — the privilege to do what- 
 ever we please, — is not a return ticket Irom cer- 
 tain destinations we could inscribe upon it. And 
 those things we say we can do and choose are 
 limited by, first, motor possibility, and second, 
 by the desirability of the end. And this end, 
 unless we are emotionally distorted, is one of 
 the terms of a series already started, and not 
 something which falleth like the Palladium 
 from the blue. 
 
 373 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 MATTERS AND MINDS 
 
 1. In the foregoing pages I have endeav- 
 ored to present the nature of the common oper- 
 ations going on within a consciousness. Objects 
 sensed, objects perceived, objects in an emo- 
 tional complication, — these are the three chief 
 disposals we make of the various series which 
 meet one another to form quotidian things. The 
 various series which get thus concatenated are 
 the ultimate, neutral entities of the universe. 
 When they are considered as being material for 
 responses, they are called matters, and when 
 they are being responded to, and thus united 
 in the with-for relation, they are called minds. 
 In other words, minds are what human bodies 
 do with matters. Matters include minds, but if 
 human beings are to speak in certain ways, the 
 two expressions are required out of conveni- 
 ence and logic. Whether it is underhanded or 
 not, some matters are commanded by way of 
 our being obedient to them, while again out of 
 such dealings come new matters of an order 
 scarcely predictable; for it is hardly likely that 
 some things would have had the factual exist- 
 ence which they do, had not human activities 
 374 
 
MATTERS AND MINDS 
 played upon their elements, and thereby found 
 parts and functions possessing significant prop- 
 erties of union and mutual furtherance. We ar- 
 rive on the planet with an organic structure 
 craving food, and clear from the first intake 
 of fluid nourishment to the erection of grain 
 elevators, the human neural response involved 
 is basically the same; embroidered, to be sure, 
 by the constructive functions necessitated by the 
 vast social environment for and against which 
 we strive. Similarly, from the first time we are 
 modest and shy, to the adornment of our bodies 
 with the smothering regalia of collegiate func- 
 tions, the same kernel of impulse dominates the 
 situation, and the wholesale manufacture of 
 clothes and adornments is the organized social 
 structure based upon it. Such a list could be 
 wellnigh prolonged indeterminately, but these 
 examples wlil suftice to make focal the manner 
 in which the dominating responses of the hu- 
 man organism not only limit the possibility of 
 shattering the orders which now stand solid 
 from the mold, but also reach beyond the brief 
 present, and control the futurities of most that 
 he call "mine" and "yours." 
 
 2. Nevertheless it would be fatuous to 
 credit everybody with motives of a furthering 
 and permanent character. It is contrary to 
 375 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 fact, and hopeless to find. As evidence of the 
 truth of this thesis ; let me but cite how unusual 
 it is to find a calm mind, or a creative mind, or 
 a mind that is truthful, or unshattered by com- 
 plexes. How few persons, when they close the 
 house door and enter the street and its crowds, 
 do not shut the door upon their permanent mo- 
 tives! Their environments are largely wooden, 
 stone, and wall-paper constructions; and their 
 morality depends largely in the lack of an- 
 noyances, rather than in the responses to the 
 environments of neutral orderliness. Neverthe- 
 less, it is quite possible that perceptions of or- 
 der may be obtained in the midst of disorder, 
 and since this is a matter germane to nothing 
 else than psychology, here will be the place to 
 outline its development. 
 
 3. One is allowed, it would seem, in dealing 
 with those responses called interests, to take a 
 broad perspective of the field they cover. Psy- 
 chology, as the study of the conscious cross-sec- 
 tion, has little need to merely throw its data out 
 for inspection, without throwing out for inspec- 
 tion as well the possibilities of their organiza- 
 tion. And, if I mistake not, one of the requi- 
 sites in stating a problem is to do it in such a 
 manner that the solution will be hinted at in 
 the first fornmlation. That which disturbs our 
 376 
 
MATTERS AND MINDS 
 perceptions is the emotional complex, and the 
 first thing to do, if one is to have perceptions of 
 order and motor responses of permanence, is 
 to get rid of all the complexes he can. Death 
 is supposed to do this at one clip, and while 
 there are some complexes which are resolved 
 only by that event, there also lies within the 
 principle of common parts another solution 
 which we are at liberty to investigate. The 
 word "soul," which in the preceding chapter 
 was retained in psycholog}^ on good grounds, is 
 a word which should be meant to imply a min- 
 imum of emotional complexes and a maximum 
 of clear perceptual and motor furtherances; 
 and it is this business of obtaining a soul, which 
 is the present topic under consideration. 
 
 4. In William James' chapter on "The 
 Self," he enumerates various selves which come 
 and go in consciousness. The material and bod- 
 ily selves he makes fundamental, and the self 
 of the widest and solidest relations he makes the 
 final flowering of neural responses. But the 
 "passing thought," which James made "the 
 thinker," — the Ego, — is not to be included in 
 this present account, however much assistance 
 I may have drawn from his pattern of personal- 
 ity as outlined in that chapter. At once it can 
 be stated that the permanency of the Ego, or 
 377 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 self, is the ordinal correlation of the responses 
 of the organism to the permanent orders of the 
 universe. The "passing thought" of James is 
 only the speaking voice, and is over and gone 
 as soon as it is vittered. Not that I would claim 
 a permanence for the self beyond the rigidest 
 empirical evidence, but the "now" of psychology 
 is not necessarily that span of time which in- 
 cludes the passing thought; for the "now" is as 
 long as any permanent interest lasts, and may 
 be years as well as minutes. The engineer who 
 put the tubes under the East River may have 
 planned them for years before they were finally 
 laid, and it is so with such constructions that 
 the permanence of the idea, and its focality in 
 mind is unwavering during the time that the 
 individual is functioning and furthering it. I 
 should call such an idea the source of person- 
 ality, and I should say also that the mind fur- 
 thering it was just as permanent as that interest 
 which he was developing was permanent. 
 
 5. The self has had a curious history in 
 philosophy and psychology. Descartes was the 
 first acute thinker to ally it with functional ac- 
 tivity, for he decided that the phenomenon of 
 inhibition was the fundamental element in a 
 consciousness. Since then, less and less has the 
 notion of a permanent spirit or spook been the 
 378 
 
MATTERS AND MINDS 
 ruling theory of the self. James was the last 
 renowned Avriter to assert that "we were always 
 aware of our selves, of our personal existence." 
 This book upholds no such non-empirical prin- 
 ciple. We are our functions, we are our en- 
 vironments, and "consciousness of" thus turns 
 out to be merely an expression by which we pay 
 homage to the tyranny of language. Thus "our 
 own personal existence" is a term which is 
 quite incomprehensible when applied to any 
 other things than bare organic functions, and 
 the focality of them in our consciousness. While 
 writing this page, I am not aware of my per- 
 sonal existence, but of the readers who will re- 
 spond to it instead. Fingers, pens, typewriter 
 and paper are but the media, — the plan it has 
 or lacks, and the receptions it will receive, are 
 the things my mind is made of while perform- 
 ing this function of publication. Even the per- 
 sonal pronoun "I," which is used here from 
 time to time, is the vocal instrument of this per- 
 manent interest, and used solely on account of 
 custom and convenience. 
 
 6. James speaks of the hierarchy of selves, 
 and makes the material self, which consists of 
 the body, clothes, relatives and property, that 
 from which all the rest of the interests originate 
 as well as depart. The responses of food-getting, 
 379 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 self-display, reproduction and acquisition are 
 the elements which enter into this type of con- 
 sciousness, and which have to he satisfied be- 
 fore anything else can have any show at all. 
 Next comes the social self, which is a product 
 of gregariousness, and includes the desire to be 
 approved, the desire to excel, together with the 
 subsequent blames, honors, and satisfactions. 
 Following this is the spiritual self, which ap- 
 pears to be a certain sentimental attachment 
 to one's entire tissue of conscious states. In all 
 this there seems to be a wholesomeness and a 
 catholicity of observation which deserves to be 
 imitated by all those seeking to do justice to 
 the material of psycholog^^ But in his later 
 writings James appears to have laid down an- 
 other set of principles which, far from contra- 
 dicting his earlier ones, enlarges them, and his 
 last statements are in almost entire harmony 
 with this book. Consciousness, as a separable 
 substance of permanent character, he denies to 
 the realm of thinkables and existants. "the "I 
 think," which to most persons means their soul, 
 he reduces to the "I breathe," and regards 
 consciousness as a function, and not as an ever- 
 lasting pronoun. 
 
 7. I cite this much of biography in order to 
 show that the present development of psychol- 
 380 
 
MATTERS AND MINDS 
 ogy runs tangent and not counter to the mat- 
 ter of this book, for with what is now known 
 in abnormal psychology added to the develop- 
 ment of the old-line psychology, we have more 
 than either of them could have furnished alone. 
 And that more is the principle of the ridding 
 ourselves of complexes by vicarious substitu- 
 tion of the perplexing object. 
 
 8. Emotional complexes are usually mani- 
 fested in fears and inhibitions of a well defined 
 character. The situations in which they first 
 arose may have been private or public. We 
 may have been mistreated or shocked as chil- 
 dren, and the recurrence of the situation ever 
 kept arousing the same emotions as the orig- 
 inal. We responded in a disorderly manner to 
 the first disordered situation, and were either 
 prevented from resisting it, or thrust more 
 deeply into the mire. Thereafter, whenever 
 enough of the elements of the original situation 
 were present, they summed into a stimulus of 
 the same character as the first, and provoked the 
 same result. For instance, timidity is usually 
 the product of the first few weeks' environ- 
 ment, and timidity is a form of fear. It often 
 happens, therefore, that the new as well as 
 the not-yet-known will provoke the fear re- 
 sponse. The child fears dark corners and 
 381 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 closets, the young man fears the examination, 
 and the old man fears the executors of his will. 
 Those who fear usually pre-respond to the sit- 
 uation, — commonly called "anticipating trou- 
 ble.' Now the prevalence of phobias, of hesi- 
 tancies, of emotional anticipations, is too wide 
 to need further comment. Once started, it can 
 ramify to all situations having common parts 
 with the originals. But this business of com- 
 mon parts also shows the way out of such a 
 fearing consciousness, for by virtue of perceiv- 
 ing that the fears do not develop in certain spe- 
 cial situations, certain other situations can be 
 produced, in which more fearless than fearful 
 elements predominate; and thereby this com- 
 plex may be signally reduced if not eliminated 
 altogether. 
 
 9. Again, the sexual complex, which Walt 
 Whitman facetiously calls the "procreant urge 
 of the world," is one that frequently dominates 
 the organism. Besides being a need of certain 
 vitalizing functions within the body, it is con- 
 nected with shyness, bashfulness, modesty, the 
 wearing of clothes, and many other less obvious 
 social embarrassments. Before mating with an- 
 other of the species, fanciful idealizations, love 
 songs, homages, and various forms of extreme 
 politeness, together, perhaps, with dreams and 
 382 
 
MATTERS AND MINDS 
 the like phenomena, furnish the only means of 
 harmonizing this predicament with the rest of 
 one's interests. Our acquaintanceships being at 
 the best haphazard, and our friends being those 
 persons we have inadvertantly met, (rather 
 rather than being chosen from a catalogue, or 
 by the mediation of a cosmic duenna), one is 
 privileged to call this insurmountable diiiiculty 
 of choosing the best permanent companion, the 
 true social evil. But where more than trivial, 
 physiological motives are present, and where 
 the environment to which one responds in such 
 a case is larger than the fanciful passion for 
 ownership, the chances are better than other- 
 wise that the error of rashness may be abro- 
 gated. 
 
 10. Years ago there was established in the 
 city of Boston what was known as the Lyceum. 
 It was a Greek name, having a flavor of erudi- 
 tion and the classical. Before the establish- 
 ment of this form of amusement, — for the Ly- 
 ceum was a sort of theatre, — the New England 
 conscience would not permit itself to say that 
 plays and entertainments should figure in the 
 daily or weekly routine. But with the establish- 
 ment of the Lyceum, the New England conscious 
 was appeased. The bare change of name, with 
 the feeling that something solid and honorable 
 383 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 was always to take place under its tutelage, suf- 
 ficed to release the complex of prejudice against 
 the theatre. Those puritanically inclined, hav- 
 ing always secretly wished to go to places of 
 amusement, (but being vexed with orthophobia, 
 or the fear that they had not done right), were 
 now permitted to enjoy themselves. For the 
 Lyceum was nothing more than a theatre, and 
 as such was not quite up to the standard of the 
 better theatres of the country. Indeed, some of 
 the productions were so much worse than those 
 of the regular boards that the Puritans should 
 not have been entertained by them. We now 
 have a replica of this in the productions of non- 
 theatrical entertainers, who furnish amusement 
 under what are advertised as "special auspices." 
 The moaern moving picture shows, which al- 
 ways bear the seal of being "passed by the 
 board of censorship,'' are another partial reso- 
 lution of the complex against amusements. This 
 account is introduced merely to show the way 
 popular psychology has attempted to reduce 
 certain disharmonies in society, but whether 
 they are anything more than lame attempts the 
 reader is urged to decide for himself. 
 
 11. Suppressed ideas also take the form 
 known commonly as lying. In this case speech 
 does not function for the facts of the environ- 
 384 
 
MATTERS AND MINDS 
 ment, but rather for the dominant motive which 
 is in disharmony with the sensory and percept- 
 ual environment. It is the business of ethics 
 to decide whether there are justifiable lies, but 
 it is the business of psychology to infer the sub- 
 sequent harmony or disharmony of any such 
 suppression. The effects of this sort of func- 
 tioning are cumulative, and the full releasing 
 of the complex often demands that one put 
 aside dozens of acquaintances and almost iso- 
 late himself from all those whom he knows. 
 The fund of "conscience money" which now 
 amounts to considerable in the United States 
 Treasury, is the result of the voluntary release 
 of this complex on the part of the contributors 
 to that fund. That no publicity attaches to the 
 reception of it by the government, is a sign of 
 the general increase of sanity. For we are com- 
 ing to know that it does not require an emo- 
 tional orgy to release an emotional complex 
 satisfactorily. The wilful or stubborn child, who 
 may become so through the parental environ- 
 ment of cruelty or ignorance, soon learns by 
 imitation to accomplish his ends by means of 
 rendering a false account of his doings. What- 
 ever else four-year olds are, they are pcrccivers 
 of suuterfuge and insincerity, and the "strange 
 and unaccountable misbehavior" for which they 
 385 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 often get punished is nothing more than the 
 naive responses to a false situation. To obvi- 
 ate this, a genuine disgust at indiscretions on 
 the part of the elders should take the place of 
 verbal maltreatment; for unless this happens 
 the situation will be one that gets complicated, 
 rather than obviated, in the future. This is 
 merely a hint as to what can be done under sin- 
 cere conditions, for otherwise the sham is more 
 obvious than the attempt to conceal it. Of 
 course, one must be forewarned in all this by 
 the dictum of Socrates, — "Virtue can be taught, 
 but there are no teachers." 
 
 12, In certain cases, there is no other way 
 to release emotional complexes than by the use 
 off emotional situations. A consciousness in 
 which only perpetual turmoil exists, — in which 
 the complexes are too numerous to be released 
 through calm considerations of the larger en- 
 vironment habitually refused, — can perhaps be 
 resolved into something harmoniously fiirther- 
 ing by an emotional explosion of large propor- 
 tions. This is one of the things which both 
 tears and laughter accomplish. We do not point 
 to these as ends, however, but only as second 
 class means, for the consciousness that is only 
 brow-beaten and humiliated is fit for nothing 
 but the milder emotions which usually super- 
 386 
 
MATTERS AND MINDS 
 vene. Nevertheless, this form of release is found 
 effective, for the release of all complexes is to 
 be desired at almost any cost, though it some- 
 times becomes a matter of choosing between the 
 zero of stability, and the maximum of instabil- 
 ity. In the large, there is less clear percep- 
 tion than emotion in the common conscious- 
 ness, and the predicament thus entailed is obvi- 
 ous. I suppose the ethicist would say that what- 
 ever enters curatively into such a situation is 
 a good, but he is not urged thereupon to de- 
 cide. 
 
 Psychology of Value. 
 13. The phychology of value enters into 
 considerations of the cross-section whenever we 
 have dealings with the good, the true, and the 
 beautiful. The first concerns the psychology of 
 morality, the second the psychology of reason- 
 ing, and the third the psychology of art. Val- 
 ues are the permanent, non-contradictory sta- 
 bilizers of social and personal interests. A value 
 is, for psychology, then, the functioning of this 
 stability and the satisfaction derived from the 
 things thus stabilizing one. A thing is good 
 when it stabilizes human relationships with re- 
 sulting satisfaction, — in other words when nei- 
 ther perceptions, motor responses, nor feeling 
 tones involved are contradictory. A thing is 
 387 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 true when it compares with the observations, 
 when it is not functionally opposed to the state- 
 ments one would make in which those same ob- 
 servations could not figure, and when it can be 
 shared with other observers and makers of 
 statements. The psychology' of this is contained 
 in the perception of the facts entailed in the 
 statements, and in the naming and arranging 
 them in a connected discourse. Something is 
 beautiful when it produces a harmonious state 
 of mind. The criterion here is, however, the 
 harmonious state in minds which are not rid- 
 dled with emotions. Beauty can be measured. 
 The structure of paintings, symphonies, came- 
 os, pottery, is open to any investigator, and 
 their order, which is the kernel of beauty, is 
 amenable even to yard-sticks, and the machin- 
 ery of physics. The psychology of beauty is the 
 correlation between the balanced bodily state 
 and the balance and order in the beautiful ob- 
 ject. Now all these in slight detail. .4 
 
 14. If one asks how permanent a value 
 must be, in order for it to be a cardinal value, 
 no answer is obtainable from a psychologist. He 
 is solely concerned with the continuance of the 
 functioning of this more or less permanent 
 thing on the part of the organism which is his 
 study. It can be functioned for a fraction of 
 388 
 
MATTERS AND MINDS 
 a second, or for a lifetime. Indeed, some of 
 the functioning in this manner is but analogous 
 to after-images, — the existence of the value as a 
 content of consciousness having ceased. Thus 
 old customs and discarded slogans, to which 
 many persons still attach a huge significance, 
 are but functional after-images of stimuli which 
 have evaporated. They are, then, only eccen- 
 trically referred to an environment which, on 
 the basis of emotion, has common parts with the 
 residual functioning. 
 
 15. Morality is the realm of goodness, and 
 the psychology of it is concerned with the per- 
 ception and motor functioning of the stabilizers 
 of society, whatever these may be. Instinctive 
 and emotional actions, the ubiquitous crowd, 
 the functioning of more interests than can be all 
 at one time furthered, brings us either to the 
 perception of order and plan, or to the brink 
 of unsettledness and hesitancy. So that the good 
 thing is either that which stabilizes before any 
 disorder occurs, or which stabilizes afterwards. 
 The words of Aristotle, "virtue is not virtue un- 
 til it becomes pleasant," may be said to apply 
 to the first case; while any response to an S. O. 
 S. signal would be gruel for the second. In 
 either case, the maintenance of an unbaffled in- 
 terest, stable enough to tide one over the next 
 389 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 period of indecision, would have to be called 
 one of the items in the psychology of morality. 
 1 he selection of a dominating mterest would be 
 another item. The perception of its poss. 
 I'es, its history, its likelihood of getting perma- 
 nently functioned by the organism, would come 
 in as the rational elements of the choice. Then 
 the testing it out with all sorts of conditions op- 
 erating, the acceptance of it with intentional en- 
 thusiasm, with intentional scepticism, and with 
 intentional neutrality, — in order to obtain a bal- 
 ance, — all these enter in to the psychology of 
 settling the problems of morality. And while 
 this is but a sketch of the matter, it must suf- 
 fice. 
 
 16. Truth is a hard matter to get taken se- 
 riously in this century, chiefly because it has 
 been taken too seriously heretofore. It is now 
 generally conceded that the difficulty was sole- 
 ly of language, — we were asking what truth 
 was instead of asking what was true. It is thus 
 with most of the old, large "mouth-filling 
 words" which modern logic so closely scruti- 
 nizes. Capital letters cannot make nouns out of 
 casual adjectives and adverbs. We ask, then, 
 what is the psychology involved in finding a 
 true statement, rather than in finding out what 
 is capital "T" Truth. Now the significant item 
 390 
 
MATTERS AND MINDS 
 
 to be considered at this point is, that we do 
 not start to "think" logicalhj, hut only with the 
 informal logic of scattered ideas. The pattern 
 may be there, but the set terms that can be gen- 
 erally understood, as well as the fixed expres- 
 sions which are to embody them, are not what 
 we get in the first functioning of the material 
 of logic. The whole process can be well com- 
 pared with that of distillation. The crude stutT 
 is the mass of ideas with which any formulation 
 starts out. Then comes the linguistic expres- 
 sion, or the first thing refined out of the viscous 
 mass. But this is frequently too individual, too 
 private. It must be laid aside to cool, then 
 taken up again, and redistilled, and spoken, 
 then oriented among those terms in which it is 
 to be embedded, scrutinized as to common 
 parts, common functions, special importance in 
 that environment, and so on, after which it is 
 ready for publicity. This is the work of words, 
 whose meanings lie in what others will do upon 
 their being singly or serially uttered. Logic is 
 not a study of how we think, but a study of the 
 responses that a certain pattern of words will 
 get in a certain environment. If one wishes to 
 be imderstood, he speaks thus and so. Only 
 when words are in such and such a pattern, will 
 they be understood as meaning this and not 
 391 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 that; one must speak clearly if he wishes to be 
 understandable. These are the elements of the 
 psychology of logic, and logic has validity only 
 after such a thing is accomplished. Any psych- 
 ologist can tell us how he thinks. Random, in- 
 choate, tattered terms or ideas are the first step. 
 Anything whatever in the way of an idea will 
 start it, — there is no one, identical, invariable 
 way in which we start every logical utterance. 
 For patterns that will do in logic are empirical- 
 ly tried and disposed of in one way or another, 
 and not cooked up in some dark mental abysm 
 perpetually veiled so that none can enter and 
 peer about it. Logic has nothing to do with 
 how we think. Logic has only to do with how 
 clearly and unequivocally we speak. The 
 psychology of language is the closest field to 
 logic, and thus the psychology of speech con- 
 cerns the question of functioning one of the 
 dominant motives in consciousness at the time, 
 whether it be focal or sub-focal. For what the 
 logicians, who have tried to describe the way 
 we think, are after, is the vain goal of contents 
 in the sub-conscious, — things which do not ex- 
 ist. 
 
 17. The term "reason" and its derivatives 
 have been used more often with a psychological 
 import than with a logical one. "He acts rea- 
 392 
 
MATTERS AND MINDS 
 sonably," "it stands to reason," "rational 
 thought," and similar expressions, do not always 
 mean something logical. They more often re- 
 fer to the connectedness, or the easily flowing 
 character of the thing mentioned in that con- 
 text. Coincidence is taken for intention, — a 
 factor which is psychological rather than any- 
 thing else. Now reason is not so much a noun, 
 as it is a term which refers to the pattern of 
 the expression that is used to convey a meaning. 
 When judgments coincide in their salient fea- 
 ture, there is said to be a case of reason. Again, 
 where one can start a chain of expressions, — 
 none of which need to be bristling with common 
 parts of each other, but which all together make 
 a system, — whence something can be further 
 implied or inferred, there is said to be ration- 
 ality in the connection. Judgments, on which 
 these connections depend, are terms in relation, 
 implying classification among terms, or correla- 
 tion with relations or functions. The logical 
 mind is the one which judges, tests, and form- 
 ulates the position of one term within a con- 
 text of other terms; tries every functional con- 
 nection it has with all the terms of the series 
 implied, and concludes, not that something must 
 be true, but that some expression has been 
 found in which every term is satified, and every 
 393 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 term of which can be exhibited. But logic is 
 also concerned with any and all statements, 
 true, false and absurd. "And thrice he slew the 
 slain," is just as good an expression in logic as 
 "And 3/4 he slew the slain," or "And 3.14159 he 
 slew the slain." For the question of how often 
 the slain can be slain, is a question for the logic 
 and psychology of slaughter. When this is de- 
 cided, if there is anything left of the statement, 
 then logic can again take it up and decide its 
 status. But slaying is not logic, — slaying is mo- 
 tor reduction of splanchnic incoherence, — and 
 thus logic is the arbiter of the formulation of 
 expressions, and not of the source of them. 
 
 18. From the foregoing it can be seen that 
 there may well be certain expressions which 
 have nothing logical in them, even though the 
 same expressions may be effectual for motor 
 arousals. Take the case of a patriotic oration 
 which bestirs its hearers to deeds of valor and 
 sacrifice. The verbal contents of the oration 
 may be, and indeed, nearl}^ always are, abso- 
 lutely meaningless, insofar as strict logical an- 
 alysis is concerned. Again, every national an- 
 them, if reduced to prose, and tested by defini- 
 tion, is found to be incoherent. 1 need not re- 
 count favorite slogans or shibboleths in detail, 
 but if one is interested in strict logic, let him 
 394 
 
MATTERS AND MINDS 
 examine the so-called "famous expressions of 
 great [or excited] men," and he will see that 
 many things which have proved "pragmatic" 
 or effectual, are verbal responses to disorder, 
 and nothing else. That they have moved sects 
 or nations to attain certain ends, is not the 
 point; the point is whether they have been 
 worthy of the motivating influence they have 
 had, for, as they stand crystallized into words, 
 they deceive us. In every text-book of logic 
 there are enumerated certain "fallacies," or in- 
 correct ways of formulating one's statements, 
 and these fallacies are all reducible to either in- 
 coordinate or absurd speech. The emotional 
 complex in the "fallacy of ad hominem," the in- 
 coordination of perceptions in the "fallacy of 
 lion seqiiitiir," the emotionalized pre-perception 
 in the "fallacy of petitio principii," are more 
 psychological than logical fallacies, since they 
 have their roots in the primary functions of re- 
 sponse. The strictly logical fallacies, on the 
 other hand, are those which involve the resort- 
 ing of data, and concern inexact formulation. 
 
 19. We must now briefly consider several 
 forms of art, and take stock of the chief psy- 
 chological elements therein. Arts are of two 
 kinds,— the time, and the space arts. Of the 
 first, we usually enumerate poetry and music as 
 395 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 the chief examples; while of the second, paint- 
 ing, sculpture, and architecture are the most 
 prominent. It is interesting to note that a 
 "time" art is one that chiefly concerns hearing; 
 while a "space" art concerns sight. The latter 
 class also depends more upon the motor mani- 
 festations of the hands than does the former, 
 though this dependence is not exclusive. 
 
 20. Poetry is defined as rhythmical words. 
 This does not mean that the words need have 
 a connected meaning. Rhythms are sets of im- 
 pulses which have a pattern, exhibiting con- 
 trast effects correlated with organic impulses. 
 A rhythm differs from a bare repetition in that 
 it exhibits grouping. 3/4, 4/4, 5/4 time in music 
 or poetry means, that the first note of the bar 
 gets the only voluntary accent, the rest being 
 functioned on the momentum of that one. No 
 such momentum appears in a bare succession, 
 and such a succession we call monotonnous. 
 Professor Muensterberg calls monotony . any 
 "succession that is hated," but such a definition 
 does not exhaust it. For the monotonous is pri- 
 marily that form of succession which fails to 
 save energy in the organic responses we give to 
 it, and thus it becomes irksome. Gummy bear- 
 ings in machinery, and monotonies in succes- 
 
 396 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 sions of impulses are more than analogically 
 related. 
 
 21. Poetry is characterized by something 
 further than rhythmical language, however. The 
 choice of fine-sounding words is of great im- 
 portance. Only certain words will produce a 
 poetic effect, by which we mean specifically a 
 mood-complex, plus a rhythm. Now moods are 
 co-conscious arousals of smouldering emotions, 
 and thus poetry is not designed to effect a full 
 focality of the idea involved in it, but rather to 
 arouse a consciousness sympathetic to the com- 
 plexes of the poet. Poetic words are thus not 
 noted for their clarity, directness or specificity; 
 they are musical elements, and not information- 
 al. Further than that, the motor elements of 
 the recitation, and the listening to poetry both 
 evidence to what a large extent the co-conscious 
 enters into art. My own investigations in poetry 
 have led me to state that "euphony" is reduci- 
 ble to "eu-kinaesthesis,"— any sound whatever 
 being pleasant, whose utterance does not bring 
 into focality the mouth movements of the one 
 speaking it. One more fact in respect to the 
 words in poetry: we often are enabled to read 
 some works in a foreign language and get the 
 idea of them without being able to tell exactly, 
 word for word, what it differentiatedly means. 
 397 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 This is due to the co-conscious arousal of the 
 mood by means of sounds alone, and the rest 
 follows readily after; for just so long as the 
 tones of the stimuli further the pattern once 
 started, so long will the sufficient half-hints of 
 meaning come, summate, and satisfy. 
 
 22. Rhyme and alliteration are musical ele- 
 ments. They perpetuate a tonal locality, while 
 they also produce a non-focality of concrete dis- 
 course. If one repeats any word over and over 
 again, and watches how the meaning slowly 
 evaporates the while, until only the sounds re- 
 main, he will have demonstrated the essential 
 element of rhyme and alliteration. The pattern 
 of rhyme having once become established, and 
 the mood firmly fixed in the reader, almost any 
 combination of words may get taken for its 
 face value. Now the point to be stressed in all 
 this is that poetry is not originally clear as to 
 its meaning, and so whenever rhymes need to 
 be completed, or rhythms filled in, the poet is 
 not beyond the temptation of completing and 
 filling in with whatever material he has at hand 
 that will not interrupt the mood. Art of this 
 form, in that it uses words, must be said to abuse 
 them from the standpoint of logic, whenever 
 such a sacrifice of sense to sound takes place. 
 Ultimate judgment, however, is based upon the 
 398 
 
MATTERS AND MINDS 
 intention, plan, and etiect of the poetic mate- 
 rial; and the what, how, and why of these is 
 just as determinable by those not carried away 
 by the poetry as much as by those who are. 
 
 23. The basic psychological elements in 
 music are those of tone and rhythm. By not 
 employing words, music is a purer form of art 
 than is poetry, since it requires no reference be- 
 yond itself for its means or ends. Now melo- 
 dies are rhythms in the sense of possessing pat- 
 tern. "The melody goes of itself," we some- 
 times say, and by that phrase we mean that only 
 the first impulse needs our undivided attention, 
 after which the rest follows as a sort of mo- 
 mentum. Another point to be noted is that mel- 
 odies are affected by tonality in a way not de- 
 ducible from the original presentation of them 
 in one key. Certain musical compositions lose 
 all their "character" if played in a strange ton- 
 ality; even the composer Schubert was once en- 
 tirely deceived as to the source of one of his 
 own "Lieder" by this means. For dramatic ef- 
 fect, nevertheless, a composer often changes key 
 without changing the melody; and canonic and 
 contrapuntal forms abound in similar features. 
 Such a procedure effects the organic accom- 
 paniments of music to such a large degree, that 
 the lack of doubled intensity with doubled 
 399 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 parts is often counteracted by this means. Har- 
 monization of a melody is actually the accom- 
 paniment of one melody by other melodies, so 
 that in listening to a rich harmony we are focal 
 to but one or two of the melodies then operat- 
 ing, and CO-, or even sub-conscious to the others. 
 It is upon this that the mood-character of most 
 music depends. 
 
 24. One form of musical composition, 
 known as "program music" attempts to be ono- 
 matopoetic. In such music there are melodic 
 structures which are planned ahead for the ef- 
 fect they will produce, and labeled by the com- 
 poser, furthermore, as such. Certain instru- 
 ments lend themselves very well to these things, 
 and "storms," "pastoral scenes," "military 
 events," and the like, are quite more than sym- 
 bolized in this manner. Recently, however, 
 (since 1840), there have been schools of com- 
 posers who have attempted to portray anything 
 at all by means of orchestral tone-color. That 
 is, they have endeavored to equate musical 
 phrases with poetic speeches. I cite this fact 
 here particularly to show that art forms are not 
 all developed out of the spontaneous moods of 
 the artist, but can often be the result of deliber- 
 ate intentions. For, while music may not be en- 
 tirely reducible to physics and physiology, yet, 
 400 
 
MATTERS AND MINDS 
 if one physically studies a rhythm, and sees 
 what it is composed of, he may, if he is astute 
 enough, deduce a "new" form from it, which 
 has value in art. But it is safe to say that the 
 series of art forms which get constantly devel- 
 oped, are asymmetrical, and single, linear ones, 
 rather than bi-dimensional. They arise, uncon- 
 sciously, from moods, and suddenly, rather than 
 from plotting and planning. I do not think it 
 rash, therefore, to say that the art that survives 
 is a derivative of the co-conscious and the sub- 
 conscious, and not something that came when 
 bidden. 
 
 25. One word on the psychology of song. 
 When a composer plans to set w^ords to music, 
 or music to words, as is sometimes done, there is 
 often plainly manifest a marked discrepancy 
 between them, if exhibited independently. For 
 while a set of stanzas, for example, changes its 
 subject matter, grammatical form, and signifi- 
 cant punctuation, so far as correlating each line 
 in every stanza is concerned, the music which 
 usually goes with it is uniform for them all. 
 As a result, there are discrepancies which must 
 not reach the threshold of focality, for if they 
 do, the harmonious state of mind will be upset, 
 and the art commence to evaporate. For art 
 and beauty are present by virtue of their con- 
 401 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 tributing elements, and when the elements are 
 disturbed, the beauty is not there, — it ceases to 
 be. If any one asks where it goes, the answer 
 is that its position is implicit in the complex, 
 and when this has no coherence, the beauty 
 ceases. It does not go, not being in the dimen- 
 sion of things that travel, — art being another in- 
 stance of "only when," — and not a case of some- 
 thing mysterious and hidden. Even in a famous 
 song, the beauty present is present by virtue of 
 there being a preponderance of co-consciously 
 functioned pattern, despite the inevitable lack 
 of co-ordination between the grammatical ele- 
 ments and the rhythms of the music. On the 
 other hand, the sentimental and so-called "fa- 
 vorite" songs are examples of crowd conscious- 
 ness, and their incoherent character points to 
 something in their origin which cannot be art. 
 In such a case, moreover, one can correlate the 
 musical preferences of the organism with its 
 preference for something that merely super- 
 ficially satisfies. For the popular notion that 
 music must make one weep in order for it to 
 be choice, has many common parts with serious 
 abnormalities. 
 
 26. In connection with the space arts, let 
 us only consider what is meant by an artistic 
 space, or beauty in the visual content. Con- 
 402 
 
MATTERS AND MINDS 
 sciousness being one with its object, one is per- 
 mitted to speak not only of "a musical song," 
 or "a musical performer," but "a musical con- 
 sciousness" as well. It is the same with the 
 other arts. We beautify a room, for instance, 
 and this operation consists in making the space 
 relations between the objects harmonize. Thus 
 far, simple enough; and language here prom- 
 ises much. But what is the beautifying of a 
 room, or the harmonization of spaces? Omit- 
 ting the norm, for the time being, let us say 
 that the harmonious state of mind which is the 
 goal of art, is the presentation of objects in such 
 a way that (a) the center of reference will not 
 be the observer, but the observed instead. In- 
 deed, loss of self-consciousness is exactly what 
 this means. The art object, to be brief, cannot 
 be felt to be owned while it is felt to be beauti- 
 ful. It is not "mine," nor "yours," nor "ours," 
 but, if the rhetoric be permissible, we are its. 
 (b) In the presence of such an object there will 
 be no motor tendencies to do anything more 
 than to preserve the situation in its original 
 form. And (c) there will be a release of com- 
 plexes in the presence of the situation, so that 
 the latent-period of beauty, upon future presen- 
 tations, will be shortened. Now in beautifying 
 space, it is necessary that the fewest possible 
 403 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 motor tendencies which disturb the equilibrium 
 be present, and one of the ways this is accom- 
 plished is by balance and symmetry. Here again, 
 something "new" enters in. Any figure, the less 
 extended it is the better, but no matter how 
 ungainly it is alone, will, if doubled on one 
 of its axes, produce an effect of balance. Bal- 
 ance on the horizontal and vertical axis, never- 
 theless, will produce the most satisfying effect, 
 and in many cases we can discover a threshold 
 of harmony even here. For when a figure is 
 doubled, there are balanced tendencies in the 
 motor elements of vision, and through these the 
 gateway to non-personal reference is reached. 
 
 27. Thus one factor in the beautifying of 
 space is exhibited. Rhythms of space also serve 
 the same effect. Rhythms of sound are in time, 
 and as such cannot be exhibited all at once; 
 while space-rhythm is presto in character, and 
 the effects are those of fusion and summation, 
 rather than of serial order in time, and sensa- 
 tional continuity. There is also another differ- 
 ence between these two types of rhythm. A row 
 of columns in rhythm may contain far more 
 members than a series of notes in music, and 
 still be grasped in a pattern. For the most notes 
 we ever grasp as a unit are five, or at the ut- 
 most six; while we may get rhythm out of twen- 
 404 
 
MATTERS AND MINDS 
 ty coluiiins, which in space are presented at 
 once. Rhythms are not only possible in pillars 
 of the same length, but are equally elicited from 
 unequal lengths. The receding into space of 
 the more distant columns toward a point not 
 specifically indicated in the scheme, produces 
 co-conscious elements which balance the filled 
 with the unfilled space. Such co-conscious ele- 
 ments appear also in the framing of pictures, 
 where the mathematical center of the canvas is 
 not the center of the color and shape masses 
 balanced within it. Indeed, for these two cen- 
 ters to coincide is atrocious. 
 
 28. Colors will balance as well as will fig- 
 ures. A small, dark color mass at one side of 
 a picture can be brought into balance with a 
 very much spread-out color mass on the oppo- 
 site side, — intensities here functioning the ef- 
 fect. Needless to say, all of the attributes of 
 sensation are elements in all forms of art, and 
 their varied exhibitions often produce effects 
 of surprising newness. Indeed, centering seems 
 to be most subtle of all the artist's nuances, and 
 by the varied framing of certain pictures, ex- 
 ceedingly varied balances and instabilities may 
 be obtained. So unlimited is the color reser- 
 voir, and so delicate is the threshold of effects, 
 that, if one asks whether there are any exhaust- 
 405 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 ibles in art, the answer is in the negative. And 
 be it finally noted, that the creative interest is 
 largely co-conscious. Just as we have men- 
 tioned the fact that we know our voluntary acts 
 only after they have occurred, so we know that 
 we have created, or put together things to make 
 a beautiful object, only after the plastic mate- 
 rials have left our hands for crystallization. As 
 with the case of revising ideas for the printed 
 page, so we find in art that our hands or voices 
 have bettered our original plan; and this bet- 
 tering is not accomplished except by non-self- 
 consciousness, — that is, it is only attained by 
 responding without personal reference to the 
 stimulus. 
 
 29. Some passing mention must now be 
 made of the psychology of the business world. 
 Such things as advertising and selling imply the 
 material self. Advertisements therefore exhib- 
 it permanent needs in such a manner that the 
 readers of them will be induced to puithase. 
 This implies more than mere interest or curi- 
 osity. It implies that motor manifestations shall 
 transpire, with the result that the object shall 
 be bought, and this requires that the operations 
 of purchasing shall become focal. To bring this 
 about, the feeling of one's lack must inhibit the 
 wish to retain what one has already gotten, and 
 406 
 
MATTERS AND MINDS 
 this is the central factor in selling. Be it said, 
 however, that psychology' may be used either to 
 protect the unwilling buyer or to further the 
 aims of the man selling a useless article. Any 
 matter engaging the social self is psychology: 
 whether we enter a store willing to buy any- 
 thing that attracts us, or whether we go deter- 
 mined to have nothing but the one small arti- 
 cle that is in instant need, — these and all inter- 
 mediate cases are examples of some feature in 
 psychology, and our failure to recognize it as 
 such is not complimentarj'. It may, however, 
 not be systematic psychology, but only the 
 psj'chology of inarticulate thinking; but even 
 so, it follows all the laws which pertain to that 
 special domain. The psychologist cannot, 
 therefore, tell you in advance what will be a 
 good advertisement, for that is determined only 
 after the advertisement has brought business, 
 and not before. But the psychologist can tell 
 you why it was a good advertisement, for every- 
 thing is equally analysable. It is thus seen that 
 analysis and deduction are not necessarily func- 
 tioned by the same protoplasm with equal or 
 comparable success. 
 
 30. Selling is argiimeuta ad homincin. 
 Business, while in general devised to supply 
 personal and public needs, is yet so crowded 
 407 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 by competition that profits become functions of 
 needless accessories. Very little of the profes- 
 sional selling is addressed to persons who act- 
 ually need the article. But the desire to have 
 as much as others have, or to have better than 
 others have, or to be the only one within a wide 
 radius who possesses this or that prized article, 
 is that which makes the salesman flourish. 
 There is a literature today on advertising and 
 selling, which unfortunately goes by the name 
 "psychological," and which once promised to 
 bankrupt everybody for the sake of the mer- 
 chant. This literature is, fortunately, becoming 
 decadent, for the reason that the general in- 
 crease of appeals for sales has inhibited itself, — 
 too much advertising, and too many "below 
 cost" sales look suspicious. There is no need 
 for letters six feet high for persons who still 
 have to examine their change to see if they have 
 lost any. Even at the present date, also, a well- 
 known psychologist, and a gifted writer to boot, 
 is preparing a book for the general public on 
 "How to evade the salesman," or "How to see 
 through the fallacy of advertisements," or some 
 such title, and so the tide, even of psychology, 
 is setting in against the inflated world of un- 
 necessary buying and selling. 
 
 31. There is another matter in connection 
 408 
 
MATTERS AND MINDS 
 with the psychology of business which is some- 
 what in the balance today, in spite of the recog- 
 nition of it as worthy and desirable. I refer to 
 the so called "efficiency" work which such men 
 as Taylor and Gilbreth have made almost na- 
 tional institutions. Efficiency work is time-, and 
 motion-saving, — two things which very greatly 
 interest the business man. It arose from the 
 pressure which the labor unions brought to bear 
 upon the large manufacturer, for, to the con- 
 stantly decreasing hours of work, the utmost 
 output is necessarily conjoined. It is as if the 
 capitalist had said, "All right, work as short 
 hours as you please, but you must work in the 
 strictest pattern so long as you do work." And 
 thus we have our motion studies, and our sci- 
 entific management which eliminate the unfit by 
 machinery. The psychological effect on the 
 worker is various. In the first place, his mo- 
 tions are studied, and he is made to perform rig- 
 idly identical tasks, rather than random ones. 
 He is thus perfected in the small thing he does 
 rather than introduced to the whole pattern of 
 the work he is furthering. Only time can show 
 the full results of this, for while it seems to 
 some to make him a mere machine, to others it 
 seems to give him the satisfaction of becoming 
 a specialist. In the second place, the condi- 
 409 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 tions under which he works are studied by spe- 
 cialists who know much more than does he as 
 to what are the best conditions under which he 
 he becomes most productive, (regardless of 
 whether he "likes" the improvement or not). 
 Moreover, some of his thinking is done for him 
 better than he could do it alone. Our modern 
 factories, no matter how much they may be said 
 to crush the "soul" of the worker, are far clean- 
 lier and healthier than the workmen would 
 have ever evolved alone, if left to think out im- 
 provements in after-hours, or while they were 
 wasting motions and time. And lastly, the eco- 
 nomic conditions which have made the modern 
 factory what it is are evolutions, for the psychol- 
 ogy of the crowd, as well as the psychology of 
 general business have crystallized into this pres- 
 ent form, and it is only due to the manners and 
 minds of men that either the good or bad con- 
 ditions of the present exist. 
 
 32. There are many other instances of 
 psychology in every day affairs which could 
 only have a smattering treatment in such an 
 account as this. And so we shall omit them. 
 Be it remembered, however, that whatever is 
 human response to environment is material for 
 psychology. He who has analytic insight will 
 carry with him into every situation he meets, 
 410 
 
MATTERS AND MINDS 
 the ability to sort the data and see the trend 
 of affairs, especially if he will add to that in- 
 sight the knowledge afforded by a study of the 
 science of psychology. That it is a science, one 
 cannot safely deny. The only difference be- 
 tween it and the so-called physical and mathe- 
 matical sciences is, that there are more insta- 
 ble variables in it than in the others. One can 
 know the human mind as well as he can know 
 the reactions of bases and acids, but he cannot 
 predict human minds unless they are patterned 
 in such a way as to plot a series with very few 
 lost members. In this connection, let it be ad- 
 mitted that we are close to the realm of value, 
 for when one becomes predictable, he functions 
 the permanent, and in so doing gets a logical 
 consciousness. Otherwise, of course, one is pre- 
 dictable only in the sense that he is independ- 
 able, a case which also hints of value in the neg- 
 ative sense. In this sense, psychology is a nar- 
 row strip of existence, and as such seems cu- 
 riously enigmatical until one learns to relax 
 and allow it merely to be exhibited to him with- 
 out a qualm. For all our knowledge is in the 
 conscious cross-section, and this fact makes up 
 for any apparent heterogeneity among those se- 
 ries we find in strict psychology' to be unexpect- 
 edly prime to each other. For as we but func- 
 411 
 
THE CONSCIOUS CROSS-SECTION 
 tion the universe, and nothing else, all that is 
 complete, incomplete, valuable and valueless, 
 as well as permanent and non-permanent is pri- 
 marily of non-personal reference, and exists in- 
 dependently of us, except insofar as it becomes 
 content of consciousness. And knowing, or 
 functioning, or mentioning any matter neither 
 creates it nor alters its power or being. 
 
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