SMALL PROBLEMS 
 FOR INFANTRY 
 
 SPECIAL REPRINT FOR TRAINING CAMPS 
 
GIFT OF 
 

SMALL PROBLEMS 
 FOR INFANTRY 
 
 PREPARED BY 
 
 CAPT. A. W. BJORNSTAD 
 t 
 
 16th Infantry, Instructor 
 
 UNDER, THE DIRECTION OF 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY ART 
 
 THE ARMY SERVICE SCHOOLS 
 
 SPECIAL REPRINT FOR TRAINING CAMPS 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
 1917 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 This work was undertaken in view of the many applications re- 
 ceived by the Army Service Schools for information as to literature 
 which would assist in the instruction and training of noncommis- 
 sioned officers. Its purpose is to place before Infantry officers and 
 noncommissioned officers a series of problems which may be studied 
 to advantage. The principal value of the book, however, is believed 
 to lie in the method which it teaches. There are hundreds of single 
 sentences in Infantry Drill Regulations, 1911, each of which can 
 be made the basis for an instructive problem for indoor or outdoor 
 work. It is hoped that the examples contained in this book will 
 assist industrious company officers in preparing problems for pla- 
 toons, squads, patrols, outguards, etc., using the applicatory method 
 which is so largely responsible for whatever success the Army Service 
 Schools have achieved in teaching tactics. 
 
 To Capt. A. W. Bjornstad, Sixteenth Infantry, was assigned the 
 task of writing the proposed work. The Infantry and Engineer 
 Corps members of the class of 1916, Army Staff College, devoted 
 five days to the development of certain problems outlined to them. 
 With this valuable assistance the work has been completed during 
 such odd times as could be spared from the normal duties of an 
 instructor. 
 
 It is in accordance with the practice of these schools to view many 
 of the solutions herein as no better than other possible solutions. 
 The essential thing is to train officers and noncommissioned officers 
 to adopt promptly some measure which is practical, effective, and 
 consistent with the teamwork which Infantry Drill Regulations seek 
 to establish. To quote paragraph 372 of those regulations, " In a 
 given situation it is far better to do any intelligent thing consistent 
 with the aggressive execution of the general plan than to search hesi- 
 tatingly for the ideal. This is the true rule of conduct for sub- 
 ordinates who are required to act upon their own initiative." 
 
 The author is indebted to Capt. L. M. Nuttman, Fourth Infantry, 
 Capt. J. B. Gowen, Tenth Infantry, and Lieut. Aristides Moreno, 
 Infantry, for valuable assistance in correcting and proof reading 
 the manuscript. 
 
 W. A. HOL.BROOK, 
 Lieutenant Colonel, Cavalry, Senior Instructor, 
 
 Department of Military Art. 
 
 The ARMY SERVICE SCHOOLS, 
 
 Fort Leavenworth, Kans., May 10, 1916. 
 
 (3) 
 -If MX* i hi 
 
The original plan for this book contemplated 14 problems, or. 
 more accurately speaking, 14 series of situations, dealing with advance 
 guards, outposts, and patrols, and 6 problems, or series of situations, 
 in attack and defense, illustrating the leading of a platoon as part of 
 a large force of all arms. The 6 problems in attack and defense 
 were not ready for the printer when War Department orders were 
 received closing the Army Service Schools within 24 hours arid re- 
 turning officers to their regiments. It was decided to publish the 
 completed problems and to add a chapter on combat instruction, to 
 include as many examples of exercises as could be prepared in the 
 short time remaining available. 
 
 A. W. B. 
 
 MAY 13, 1916. 
 
 In printing a special edition of " Small Problems for Infantry " 
 for use in training camps no attempt has been made to revise the text 
 in the light of the methods of trench warfare developed in France 
 during the present war. Special regulations covering the subject 
 will probably be issued. The present text deals with operations and 
 combat in the open, which have lost none of their importance to us. 
 
 A. W. B. 
 MAY 14, 1917. 
 
 (4) 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Page. 
 
 Introduction To company commanders 7 
 
 Organization of first platoon 12 
 
 Conventional signs 13 
 
 First problem An advance guard point 15 
 
 I. The point marches out 15 
 
 II. Road space and estimating numbers 18 
 
 III. The point marches too slowly 19 
 
 IV. Leaving the road for observation 20 
 
 V. The point discovers a Red patrol : 21 
 
 VI. The enemy fires on the advance party 22 
 
 VII. The point as a march outpost 24 
 
 Second problem An advance guard connecting file 25 
 
 I. During a halt 25 
 
 II. When to use signals 26. 
 
 III. Care in transmitting signals r 27 
 
 IV. Maintaining distance 28 
 
 Third problem An advance guard flank patrol 29 
 
 I. The patrol starts out 30 
 
 II. Waiting for the advance party 33 
 
 III. Passing through'woods 34 
 
 IV. On emerging from woods : 35 
 
 V. Changing the formation 35 
 
 VI. A road formation 36 
 
 VII. The point is fired upon 36 
 
 VIII. The patrol continues by a new route 37 
 
 IX. The patrol drives off a Red Cavalry patrol 38 
 
 X. Returning to the column 39 
 
 XI. Reporting to nearest company commander 39 
 
 Fourth problem The platoon as an advance party 41 
 
 I. The start 41 
 
 II. The point loiters 45 
 
 III. The enemy opens fire 45 
 
 IV. The advance party returns the fire 45 
 
 V. The advance party attacks 50 
 
 VI. The march is resumed 52 
 
 VII. The enemy fires from the left flank 53 
 
 VIII. The advance party replies 55 
 
 IX. The advance party and support attack 56 
 
 Fifth problem A combat patrol 59 
 
 I. The patrol starts 59 
 
 II. Drives off small patrol 63 
 
 III. Posting the patrol 64 
 
 IV. The patrol changes its position 67 
 
 Sixth problem A picket 69 
 
 I. The first disposition 70 
 
 II. A change after reconnaissance 73 
 
 III. Preparations for the night 73 
 
 (5) 
 
Page. 
 
 Seventh problem Another picket 79 
 
 I. Marching out 79 
 
 II. The first disposition 80 
 
 IV. Preparations 83 
 
 V. Changing an o'utguard for the night '. - 86 
 
 VI. Correct names and numbers 87 
 
 VII. Orders to a visiting patrol 89 
 
 VIII. Sending out a reconnoitering patrol 90 
 
 IX. An alarm at night 92 
 
 X. An investigation on the outpost line 93 
 
 Eighth problem Cossack post and sentry squad 95 
 
 I. Arrangements 95 
 
 II. A Red patrol approaches 96 
 
 III. The Red patrol is stopped 98 
 
 IV. Awaiting other Reds 98 
 
 V. A Red patrol under different conditions 99 
 
 VI. Arrangements for the night 100 
 
 Ninth problem A reconnoitering patrol 103 
 
 I. Preparations ]03 
 
 II. The first formation 105 
 
 III. Reds are seen 106 
 
 IV. Another formation 107 
 
 V. An inhabitant of the hostile country 108 
 
 VI. A disarmed Red soldier appears 109 
 
 VII. Red Cavalry discovered . 110 
 
 VIII. Red Cavalry marches past Ill 
 
 IX. The return and report 112 
 
 Tenth problem A visiting patrol 115 
 
 I. Preparations and march formation 115 
 
 II. The patrol hears firing. . . . 117 
 
 III. Approaching a sentinel post 117 
 
 IV. Exchanging information 118 
 
 V. A sudden encounter in the dark 118 
 
 VI. The disposition of a stranger 119 
 
 Eleventh problem A detached post 121 
 
 I. Security while marching out 121 
 
 II. The' day disposition 123 
 
 III. The night disposition 125 
 
 IV. Instructions to a requisitioning detachment. . : 126 
 
 Twelfth problem A requisitioning detachment or patrol 129 
 
 I. Preparations 129 
 
 II. Formation and route 130 
 
 III. Formation and route, continued 131 
 
 IV. Arrangements for seizing cattle 131 
 
 V. The return 133 
 
 Thirteenth problem A contact patrol 135 
 
 I. Equipment, route, and formations 136 
 
 II. Strangers seen at a distance 140 
 
 III. Investigating evidences of a camp 141 
 
 IV. The patrol remains in observation 141 
 
 Remarks on the Plainview outpost 143 
 
 Fourteenth problem A small outguard 147 
 
 I. The squad marches out 147 
 
 II. Day and night positions compared 150 
 
 Combat instruction. . . 153 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 TO COMPANY COMMANDERS. 
 
 The noncommissioned officer of Infantry is called upon to perform 
 a greater variety of duties than the noncommissioned officer of any 
 other arm or special service, except, probably, Cavalry. He deals 
 with elements which at first glance seem quite simple men and 
 rifles marching and shooting. But when the varied employment 
 of these elements in war is fully comprehended and analyzed, we 
 find human and mechanical vagaries and uncertainties which defeat 
 the leadership of a novice, or even of a practiced noncommissioned 
 officer whose development of mind and soul has been so deficient as 
 to leave him without courage, force, and initiative. 
 
 The possession of force and initiative inspires self-confidence. 
 Courage is two parts self-confidence and one part bravery. The non- 
 commissioned officer, or prospective noncommissioned officer, who 
 after a fair trial displays no progress in the development of force 
 and initiative, should be dropped before he becomes a fixture in the 
 company. It is not in every man to become even a fair noncommis- 
 sioned officer and, considering the heavy demands on courage and 
 discipline, the Infantry can least afford to tolerate a noncommis- 
 sioned officer who is only fair. 
 
 Our difficulty seems to lie in the failure to appreciate the condi- 
 tions under which the noncommissioned officer must work in war. 
 An indifferent sailor can sail a ship in fair weather and off shore. 
 His ship will seem as trim and sightly as any other if we do not 
 inspect it too closely. But the sailor who is to weather a storm, like 
 the Infantry sergeant or corporal who faces an enemy, must have a 
 reserve of courage, driving power, and skill. In time of peace we 
 can hardly simulate conditions which make a demand on this re- 
 serve, but we must build it up, nevertheless. It is the distinguish- 
 ing mark of well-trained troops. The lack of it accounts for the 
 low value of organizations of reasonably brave men, the officers and 
 noncommissioned officers of which carry only the outward marks of 
 leadership. 
 
 If Sergt. What's-his-name barks " squad right, march " and " club 
 rifle, swing" at a flock of recruits for five years, and does it well, 
 he will acquire a certain confidence and bearing, it is true. This is 
 
 (7) 
 
_8 
 
 valuable, but he needs more. The thousand and one situations that 
 may confront him in war should be presented to him in various guises 
 under conditions which compel him to decide, to act, to indicate his 
 will, and to enforce his will. He is a trained and dependable man 
 when he is, and knows he is, fitted to meet, squarely and vigorously 
 and understandingly, any likely combination of circumstances. His 
 men must have a justifiable confidence in him, and he must have a 
 justifiable confidence in himself. This can result only when he pos- 
 sesses the essential military virtues of a noncommissioned officer 
 courage, force, and initiative. 
 
 Quite recently I expressed some views on the training of platoon 
 leaders and guides (Military Historian and Economist, April. 1916). 
 It seems appropriate to quote the following : 
 
 The platoon is the largest unit susceptible of direct personal control of indi- 
 viduals in the firing line by a leader. It is our present purpose to point out two 
 of the most important functions of the platoon in modern battle, and the change 
 from old conditions. 
 
 In the days of short-range weapons a company was under the direct, personal 
 control of the captain. It never exceeded 100 men in our service, and \vas 
 generally smaller. It fought in close order and responded quite easily to the 
 vocal commands of the captain. Improved small arms and artillery long ago 
 made this conception of company leading obsolete. With the necessity for 
 deploying skirmishers and the utilization of all available cover, the grip of the 
 captain was lost. After a period of years, during which no satisfactory sub- 
 stitute for the former control of the captain was devised, the Infantry Drill 
 Regulations, 1911, appeared with a practical solution. Direct, personal control 
 is now passed to the platoon leaders the moment the company is deployed. 
 Henceforth the captain exerts his will through his four platoon leaders, dispens- 
 ing with much of the detail which was formerly his concern. The company has 
 become a small battalion. The platoon, formerly an unimportant subdivision 
 for maneuver, has risen to the dignity of an important fighting unit. The ser- 
 geant of Infantry has become a leader with a grave responsibility thrust 
 upon him, as we shall show later. 
 
 The final test of Infantry is its ability to attack. Attack by Infantry is a 
 combination of fire and movement while under fire of the enemy. To fire 
 effectively, and thus reduce loss from the enemy's fire, and to move resolutely 
 forward at every opportunity, are the simple elements of Infantry attack. A 
 few tubes of paint, a brush, and a piece of canvas are the simple elements of a 
 Rembrandt painting. 
 
 The platoon organization and the allotment of leaders are designed primarily 
 with a view to the maximum efficiency in these elements of Infantry attack 
 fire and movement. 
 
 Ordinarily, the Infantry firing line has for its target a thin and indistinct 
 horizontal line. Parts of the line may be invisible or indistinguishable. All 
 parts, however, must be covered with fire, else the sine qua non condition to 
 forward movement, the reduction of hostile fire effect, may be absent. Each 
 man is taught to fire constantly on one point in the thin, horizontal target, or 
 line, that point being the one which, with respect to the section of target pre- 
 viously allotted and announced to his platoon, corresponds to his own position 
 in platoon. Since no 'two shots fired by him with the same point of aim are 
 likely to strike the same spot, the trajectories of his shots will in time describe 
 
a curved cone. The dimensions of the base of the cone will increase as the 
 dispersion (wild firing) increases. If we now imagine the figures described by 
 the cones of many men placed side by side, we see a wide, thin sheaf of fire, 
 the thickness of which increases as the dispersion increases. It is as~if-many 
 men played streams of water on the target, the nozzles being held parallel to 
 each other. In battle, the bases of the cones merge into one another. Symmetry 
 is lost. Individual fire is lost in the sheaf. Only the fire effect of the sheaf can 
 be observed, if indeed that much can be observed. Fire control is the effort to 
 make the sheaf effective ; that is, to carry it into the target and to increase its 
 density by regulating the volume and decreasing the dispersion. It is imprac- 
 ticable to control the sheaf of a long firing line as one unit. The platoon is the 
 subdivision for fire control, the fire unit, and the sheaves of the platoons are 
 regarded and controlled separately. 
 
 Movement, the second element to enter into Infantry attack, must ordinarily 
 be effected by small groups making short rushes. To be under fire possibly for 
 hours and then to rise from a position of real or fancied security and rush for- 
 ward 50 or 100 yards under a hail of bullets and shrapnel demands an effort 
 that all men are not equal to. In former times Infantry fought standing up, 
 partly because it was in close order and partly because the old muzzle-loading 
 musket could not otherwise be loaded, conveniently. It was more difficult for 
 skulkers to escape observation. To-day each man while firing is, or should be, 
 screened from the enemy's view and this makes both his location and condition 
 more difficult to observe. Furthermore, it is more difficult to advise him of an 
 intended rush and many men who, if duly warned, would willingly join the 
 rush, find themselves mentally and physically inert when they finally realize 
 that their neighbors have dashed forward. A battle field is strewn with men 
 w r hose only ailment is inertia, induced by causes too numerous to mention. It 
 is folly to fly in the face of history and deny that American troops do such 
 things. Raw troops are hopeless in attack, more so under modern conditions 
 than ever before. The temper of partially trained troops is very uneven. 
 Trained troops will have skulkers enough. 
 
 The number of men to engage in a single rush is, of course, variable and 
 depends upon the conditions of the fire fight. The ideal unit for the rush is the 
 platoon. We may be able to use a larger fraction, but \ve shall frequently be 
 obliged to use a smaller. In any event, the preparations, the warning, and the 
 execution are in the hands of the platoon leader and his assistant, the platoon 
 guide. The details are slurred too much in peace time exercises by those who 
 fail to comprehend the difficulties peculiar to a battle field. In itself the move- 
 ment looks simple enough, but it requires infinite care, close observation, good 
 leading, and rough discipline. The final signal must not be given until firing 
 has ceased and observation has disclosed that every man is "set" and is, there- 
 fore, warned and ready. The leader leads the way to a suitable fire position 
 and halts, but behind the platoon is the sergeant who drives the platoon guide. 
 He is the man with the club the policeman. 
 
 This dual leadership of the platoon is peculiar to our service and new. Its 
 usefulness in the forward movement has just now been explained. In fire con- 
 trol it is likewise useful. Fire control may be described as a two-man job. The 
 leader's duties in other directions are too numerous and exacting to permit of 
 necessary attention to the conduct of the individual men of the platoon. The 
 duties of platoon disciplinarian fall to the platoon guide. It would not remedy 
 matters to divide the platoon and give each sergeant a half. There would still 
 be a two-man job. 
 
 A third reason for this novel organization lies in the fact that losses occur 
 under peculiar conditions. In battle, leaders and men spend most of their time 
 
10 
 
 concealed, or partially concealed, from the enemy and, therefore, to a more or 
 less extent, from each other. But concealment of this kind does not render 
 them immune from bullets. It often happens that a man lying some paces from 
 his neighbor is out of action, without the fact being known. If such a fate 
 befall a few platoon leaders, the result could easily be inertia and loss of con- 
 trol, the disintegrating factors of Infantry combat. We have, however, a second 
 in command who lies close to the leader. It is not likely that both will be put 
 out of action in the same instant. If one is killed or severely wounded, the 
 survivor calls a corporal to his side and the pair is restored. 
 
 The obstacles to good platoon leadership are innumerable; poor training, ex- 
 citement, sluggishness, and what not. * * * In view of the unavoidable 
 scarcity of officers, due to absence on other duty and losses, and in view of the 
 heavy losses of Infantry in action, it may be asserted confidently that no com- 
 pany is well fitted for battle unless it has at the outset 12 men trained to 
 the point which justifies us in calling them good platoon leaders. Furthermore, 
 students of Civil War methods and tactics, who are at the same time familiar 
 with the requirements of modern war and training, will agree that a sergeant 
 of Infantry, as our Infantry is organized, must possess training, and a quality 
 of leadership in action fairly comparable to that demanded of a captain in the 
 Civil War. 
 
 Each of the 12 senior noncommisisoned officers should be able to 
 handle a platoon ; the corporals at least fairly well. When squad or- 
 ganization is possible, as is generally the case in the Regular Army, 
 and also in the militia when in camp, it is well to designate a perma- 
 nent second and third in command of the squad and give these men 
 ample opportuity to lead the squad A company would thus in time 
 have additional and fairly well trained squad leaders, and they will 
 be needed to meet expansion and losses. 
 
 Instruction on the map is at best a poor substitute for well planned 
 field exercises where persons and things are real. The problems in 
 this book may serve best as a guide to the preparation of field exer- 
 cises or tactical walks. There is scarcely any incident so trivial that 
 it does not teach a lesson. 
 
 Anyone who uses this book for self-instruction should pause when 
 he reaches such a question as, " What do you do?" or " What do you 
 think?" then reread the situation until he understands it, and finally 
 frame in his own mind, if not on paper, the answer to the question 
 put. Then, and not until then, he should read the solution and dis- 
 cussion which follow. 
 
 A beginner would do well to study the appropriate paragraphs of 
 the Infantry Drill Regulations (I. D. R.) and Field Service Regu- 
 lations (F. S. R.) before deciding upon his answer. 
 
 Company commanders who desire to use problems of this character 
 for instruction on the map or on the ground can, with patience and 
 practice, prepare their own problems quite readily. The essential 
 thing is to dispose of one point at a time, and dispose of it thor- 
 oughly. A thorough understanding of Infantry Drill Regulations 
 will be the reward of the officer who studies its paragraphs syste- 
 
11 
 
 matically in search of ideas for problems for his noncommissioned 
 officers. 
 
 Battalion and regimental commanders who believe such problems 
 are useful might require each of their officers to prepare OFW ^each 
 month. The best of these problems could be furnished to the com- 
 panies, and a file kept for future use. This applies to problems on 
 the ground as well as on the map. Many an excellent problem, 
 worked out near a military post or camp, has been lost to contemporary 
 and future company commanders because of the lack of system and 
 cooperation. In time of peace the military service is a school. A file 
 of old problems (if they are good ones) is as new and useful to a new 
 batch of noncommisisoned officers as a standard work on algebra is 
 to successive classes of schoolboys. 
 
 It is necessary to explain that it has been impracticable for the 
 author to visit the Hunterstown region. The problems in this book 
 are based upon the map which accompanies the book (Hunterstown 
 sheet, R. F. 1/21120, of the Gettysburg- Antietam-map, Army Service 
 Schools) and not upon the ground itself. An inspection of the 
 ground would probably suggest the wisdom of some minor changes. 
 
 A. W. B. 
 
THE FIRST PLATOON, COMPANY A. 
 
 For convenience, an imaginary platoon has been organized and 
 appears below in column or squads. The various situations are faced 
 by this platoon or members of it. The numbers indicate second and 
 third in command of squads, under the system recommended on 
 page 5. 
 
 1st 
 Squad 
 
 2d 
 
 Squad 
 
 3d 
 
 Squad 
 
 4th 
 
 Squad 
 
 Commanding officer, Company A: Capt. Rowen. 
 Commanding officer, First Battalion: Maj. Crosby. 
 
 (12) 
 
 Hill 
 (sgt.) 
 
 t 
 
 MARCH DIRECTION 
 
 Clark 
 (corp.) 
 
 Brown 
 (2) 
 
 / Hagen 
 
 Tine 
 
 (3) 
 
 1st Lt. 
 .Mien 
 
 Ames 
 
 Schafer 
 
 McGowan* 
 
 Stone 
 
 In some 
 problems 
 the platoon 
 leaclt-r is 
 
 Koenig 
 (corp.) 
 
 Quinn 
 
 Peterson 
 (3) 
 
 Butler 
 (2) 
 
 Holn 
 
 Sgt. Hill 
 
 Walinski 
 
 Morgan 
 
 Carter 
 
 Pickett 
 
 
 
 
 -' Adams 
 (corp.) 
 
 Bush 
 
 Willis 
 
 Towney 
 
 (2) 
 
 Bennett 
 
 Schmidt 
 
 Miller 
 
 Kelley 
 (3) 
 
 
 
 
 Nelson 
 (corp.) 
 
 Schwartz 
 
 Humphrey 
 
 (2) 
 
 Stevens 
 (3) 
 
 Barry 
 
 Fassett 
 
 Wilson 
 
 Murphy 
 
13 
 
 CONVENTIONAL SIGNS FOR WAR GAME MAPS 
 
 Adopted by Arnny Service Schools 
 
 Improved Roods 
 Unimproved Roods 
 Trails 
 
 Railroads .Single Track 
 Double Track 
 " Urban or Suburban 
 Fences, Barbed Wire 
 11 Smooth 
 Worm 
 Stone 
 Hedge 
 Streams under 15' wide 
 
 11 over " " 
 Embankment 
 Cutting 
 Arroyo or Ditch 
 
 Buildings 
 Bridges 
 Stone Culverts 
 
 Corn 
 
 Cultivated Land 
 
 Trees without Underbrush 
 
 Woods with Underbrush 
 
 Brush 
 
 Pine Trees and Rocks 
 
 Orchard 
 
 Marsh 
 
 IT * t i 
 
 o oaooo a 
 
 OO 9999 Q 
 OO O OOO 
 OOP 9QQ O 
 
 AH open spaces are Grass .Lands 
 
FIRST PROBLEM. 
 
 AN ADVANCE GUARD POINT. 
 
 EXPLANATION. 
 
 " The formation of the advance guard must be such that the 
 enemy will be met first by a patrol, then in turn by one or more larger 
 detachments, each capable of holding the enemy until the next in 
 rear has time to deploy before coming under effective fire." (I. D. 
 R., 642.) 
 
 The " patrol " which leads the way is called the " point." It is 
 followed by the advance party, support, and reserve in the order 
 named. These parts combined make up the advance guard. The 
 advance guard is followed by the main body. 
 
 Sometimes an advance guard is so small that it will have no re- 
 serve. It even may be so small that it will be divided into point and 
 advance party only. Finally, if the whole column on the road is 
 very small, for example a platoon, the advance guard may be only 
 a point, but always there is an advance guard and a main body 
 if the column is marching toward the enemy; and the advance 
 guard always has a point, although that may be all that it does 
 have. 
 
 The commander of the point is under the orders of the advance 
 party commander. 
 
 Sometimes an advance guard has two points, one being mounted 
 (Cavalry or mounted orderlies) and riding far in advance of the 
 other point. To avoid confusion we call one the " mounted point " 
 the other the " infantry point." 
 
 SITUATION I. 
 
 Your battalion camped last night along the farm road east of 
 636 (northeast of Granite Hill Station), in friendly country. The 
 battalion has a cossack post in the edge of the woods and near the 
 road 1,100 yards north of 636. It is late fall and the corn is cut and 
 shocked. 
 
 At 7.30 o'clock this morning your battalion formed, ready to 
 march. Your captain ordered the pieces to be loaded, assembled the 
 
 (15) 
 
16 . 
 
 officers and noncommissioned officers opposite the center of the 
 company, and gave the following verbal order: 
 
 A Red Cavalry squadron was wrecking the railroad south of Biglerville yes- 
 terday. Biglerville is 7 or 8 miles northwest of here. Our battalion is going 
 to march to a place called Hershey Mill, about 6 miles north of here, to pi<-k 
 np some wagons and haul back to this p*lace a lot of forage and flour that the 
 inhabitants have collected for us at the mill. This company will be the advanro 
 guard. The main body, which is the rest of the battalion, follows at 500 yards. 
 Mr. Allen, your platoon and th6 second platoon will form the advance party. 
 Here is a map for you. Take that road (pointing to the map and to the north) 
 through 585, 537, 546, Woodside Schoolhouse, 616, to Hershey Mill. March 
 at once. The rest of the company will be the support and will* follow the 
 advance party at 300 yards. I shall be with the support. Posts. 
 
 Lieut. Allen summoned the noncommissioned officers of the first 
 and second platoons and gave the following verbal orders : 
 
 Sergt. Hill, take four men of the first squad and march north on that rond 
 (pointing to road a half mile north of camp) as the point. Precede the 
 advance party by about 200 yards. At crossroads and road forks flash me 
 AV, W, 1 and I will signal the direction. The rest of the platoon is the advance 
 party. I shall be with it. Start at once. 
 
 You are Sergt. Hill, platoon guide of the first platoon. What do 
 you do up to the time that the point takes up the march on the road ? 
 
 NOTE. Before reading what appears below, study your problem and solve it 
 as explained on page 10. Observe the same rule hereafter whenever, at the end 
 of the statement of a " situation " you are asked : " What do you do? " or " What 
 do you think?" The question, "What <lo you do?" will be asked frequently. 
 The answer to it should include all orders, exactly as you w r ould give them in 
 the field. 
 
 SERGT. HILL'S SOLUTION. 
 
 I call out: 
 
 Rear rank, first squad, follow me, 
 
 and march toward the point where the fence meets the bend in the 
 road 800 yards north-northeast of 636. 
 
 First I make sure that the four men follow me, then I call them 
 alongside and, while crossing the field, I tell them what they ought 
 to know about the situation, which is as follows: 
 
 The battalion is going about 6 miles north of here to haul back some forage 
 and flour, which we shall find at a place called Hershey Mill. There are no 
 Blue troops in that direction, but we may meet Red Cavalry, most likely from 
 the west. We are the point. We must keep 200 yards ahead of the advance 
 party. The lieutenant commands the advance party. He has a map and will 
 signal to us which road to take when we come to crossroads or road forks. 
 Stone is next in command. Any questions? 
 
 1 W, W, means, " Which way ? " It can be semaphored in a second and is very useful 
 to patrols, connecting files, or detachments which need to We guided or directed by some 
 one beyond the reach of the voice. 
 
17 
 
 I will answer the questions and add whatever is necessary to make 
 the men understand their duties more clearly. 
 On reaching the road I direct: 
 
 McGowan, along the left of road ; Stone, along the right. Move out. I'll 
 follow you at 10 paces. Schafer and Ames, follow me at 10 paces. Schafer, 
 along the left of the road ; Ames, along the right. Ames, you watch to the rear 
 for signals. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 Inasmuch as the battalion is ready to march, its actual start de- 
 pends upon how soon your point marches out. In special cases 
 a point may be told to march out at an increased gait or even at 
 double time, but ordinarily there is no occasion for doing this. You 
 should, however, lose as little time as possible in starting out. It is 
 not necessary to give your instructions before marching. You can 
 utilize the first minute or two for that purpose, and in the present 
 problem you can safely go bunched as far as the road; then take 
 up a more scattered formation. You will remember that there is a 
 cossack post in the woods north of you, and there is little to be 
 feared until you pass that post. 
 
 The lieutenant let you choose your four men from the first squad ; 
 but since the duties of the point, aside from the duties of the leader, 
 are very simple, every requirement is answered by merely taking the 
 rear rank. 
 
 Whenever you take a patrol or detachment out for some special 
 task, you should make use of the first opportunity to explain to your 
 men exactly what the conditions are and what you are expected to 
 do. For your guidance in these problems it is suggested that you 
 study carefully the information and instructions given to subordi- 
 nates in the solutions and reason out the purpose of each sentence. 
 Also determine, if you can, whether, in your opinion, anything of 
 importance has been omitted. 
 
 You may prefer to tell your men that the company is the advance 
 guard; that Lieut. Allen and the first and second platoons are the 
 advance party; that the other platoons are the support and follow 
 the advance party at 300 yards, but all this is not necessary. The 
 essential things are: Your command is the point; it must keep 200 
 yards ahead of the advance party ; and Lieut. Allen is your immediate 
 commander. 
 
 The advance guard point is a patrol, but its route is exactly de- 
 fined and it can not march with the caution that is usually observed 
 by a patrol. It is compelled to use the road. At the same time it 
 should conceal its advance as much as possible. For this reason we 
 sent McGowan and Stone abreast of each other along the sides of 
 96790 17 2 
 
18 
 
 the road, where they may take advantage of trees, ditches, or other 
 road features, and avoid the middle of the road. Naturally Me- 
 Gowan would observe the country to the front and left and Stone 
 the country to the front and right. You follow at 10 paces, but to 
 one side of the road, in order not to attract attention from a distance. 
 
 The troops in rear are compelled to expose themselves by marching 
 in the middle of the road, but the object of the point is to see the 
 road and the country in front and flank before any enemy that might 
 be there sees the point. This is possible less often than it is impos- 
 sible, but the attempt must be made. Also, by using this formation, 
 the patrol is a less definite target in case it draws fire. 
 
 One member of the point should always be charged with the duty 
 of watching the advance party for signals. You will be too much 
 interested in the country in front and to the flanks to do so. 
 
 SITUATION II. 
 
 You have reached the crossroads 585. You notice that the cossack 
 post has joined the column. 
 
 Mark on the map in pencil (or on tracing paper) the location of 
 the different parts of the battalion, assuming that the battalion 
 marched as ordered, but disregarding any patrols that may be out. 
 Connecting files every 100 yards. 
 
 The field train is not with the battalion. 
 
 I measure distances from crossroads 585. Call this place " X." 
 The point is at X. It can be represented by a dot (though there may 
 be 20 yards between the leading and rear men of the point). 
 
 The advance party is at the place where the wire fence runs west 
 from the road. Its column is so short that it can be represented by 
 a short dash that scales 30 yards. 
 
 The head of the support is therefore 530 yards south of X. The 
 support is about 30 yards long. It is represented by a short dash 
 that scales 30 yards. 
 
 The head of the main body is 500 yards south of the tail of the 
 support, hence 1,060 yards south of X. Its length is represented by 
 a line that scales 300 yards; 220 yards of this represents the length 
 of three companies, the remaining 80 yards represent the length 
 in column of the four vehicles which constitute the combat train 
 (3 ammunition wagons and 1 ambulance). 
 
 Connecting files will be represented by a dot between the point 
 and advance party, two dots between advance party and support, and 
 four dots between support and main body. 
 
19 
 
 The tail of the column is therefore in front of the farmhouse, 1,360 
 yards south of X. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 Of course, you will never be required to make such calculations 
 and measurements in the field, but the problem is given now for 
 several good reasons : 
 
 First, you should have a fair idea of the make-up of an advance 
 guard and how it looks on the road. 
 
 Second, this problem and those which follow must be studied on 
 the map, and it will be necessary to learn to measure distances on 
 the map instead of estimating them by eye, as you usually do in 
 the field. 
 
 Third, you are obliged to apply a rule for determining the road 
 space occupied by Infantry and wagons. We said that the main 
 body (three companies) was 220 yards long. The three companies 
 have about 432 men (144 men in a company). The easiest rule to 
 remember is that when Infantry is marching in column of squads 
 two men equal 1 yard of road space. Therefore, 432 men will make 
 a column 216 yards (roughly, 220 yards) long; that is, they will 
 occupy 220 yards of road space. At drill the distance is less^ but on 
 the march the rule given here is accurate enough. Artillery car- 
 riages (guns or caissons), wagons, ambulances, and auto trucks each 
 occupy about 20 yards of road space. To know this rule assists you 
 in estimating numbers. If you are sent out as a patrol leader and 
 reach a hill from which you see a long column of Infantry followed 
 by a long column of wagons, you can not count them, of course. But 
 you are trained in estimating distances. Suppose you estimate the 
 Infantry column to be 1,000 yards long and the wagon column 500 
 yards long. Now you can safely report that you have seen about 
 2,000 Infantry followed by about 25 wagons. Or, suppose you had 
 a good map and could locate on it the position of the head and the 
 tail of the column. By using the map scale and a little arithmetic 
 you could make a very accurate estimate. But a chance to use this 
 method occurs less often. 
 
 SITUATION III. 
 
 At crossroads 585 you semaphored " W, W," to Lieut. Allen. He 
 gave the arm signal, " Forward, march." You therefore marched 
 " through " the crossroads. When you reached the triangle near 537, 
 Lieut. Allen gave the arm signal, " Column left, march," and you 
 marched toward 546. As you approach the first house on the left 
 (500 yards northwest of 537), McGowan slows down to about a mile 
 
20 
 
 and a half gait and looks anxiously toward the orchard and woods 
 west of the house. Stone follows suit. You call out : 
 
 What is the matter, McGowan; do you see anything? 
 He replies : 
 
 Not a thing, but there might be some one in those woods. 
 
 What do you do ? 
 
 SERGT. HILL'S SOLUTION. 
 
 I call out to McGowan : 
 
 March along a little better than 3 miles an hour until you see something real. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 The point must precede the advance party by 200 yards. The ad- 
 vance party and all the troops in rear of it must march at a steady 
 gait unless prevented by the enemy. This means that the point 
 must also march at a steady gait. It can not approach woods or 
 suspicious places as cautiously as a reconnaissance patrol might do. 
 At maneuvers and field exercises we frequently see the marching 
 rate of the main body reduced to 2 miles or less for no better reason 
 than that the point and other parts of the advance guard are unneces- 
 sarily cautious. The point must move at normal marching rate 
 until the enemy prevents it from doing so. The point must take 
 chances when it approaches woods or houses such as caused McGowan 
 to slow down. When the enemy is actually seen, or when the point 
 is fired upon, the situation is quite different, but we shall have more 
 to say about that later. 
 
 SITUATION IV. 
 
 When the point reaches the house on the right-hand side of the 
 road about 600 yards southeast of 546, McGowan says : 
 
 Sergeant, we could get a fine view to the north from the second-story window 
 of that house. Shall I go there? 
 
 What do you do? 
 
 I answer: 
 No. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 You might be tempted to tell McGowan to mind his own business, 
 but that is not necessary. Never squelch a man for offering a sug- 
 gestion which, from his standpoint, seems reasonable, unless he 
 becomes a nuisance. 
 
21 
 
 No doubt a good view to the north can be obtained in the manner 
 suggested by McGowan, but before the observer returns to the road 
 the advance party will reach the house. If the point were to adopt 
 a system of sending a man to every favorable point of observation, 
 there would soon be no point left unless the advance party, and there- 
 fore the whole column, halted while the point made use of these 
 places. This is out of the question, of course. It often happens that 
 a member of the point can be directed to march so as to get a better 
 view. For example, if the road passes through a long, deep cut, 
 one man can be sent along the top of the cut. The thing to bear in 
 mind is that no man should be sent on such an errand if he will be 
 unable to get forward at ordinary marching rate. 
 
 It is the duty of the advance party or of the support to send men 
 off the road when it becomes necessary or desirable to do so for 
 reconnaissance or observation. 
 
 SITUATION V. 
 
 The point arrived within 100 yards of 546 and you saw a Blue 
 patrol along the Hunterstown-546 road, marching north, and now 700 
 yards south of 546. A moment later you arrived at 546. McGowan 
 points to the west. Between the rows of trees in the orchard straight 
 west of 546 about 10 cavalrymen are hurriedly mounting up. About 
 half of them are already riding west deeper into the orchard. They 
 are Reds without a doubt. 
 
 What do you do ? 
 
 SERGT. HILL'S SOLUTION. 
 
 I extend my arms horizontally (the signal "as skirmishers, march'') 
 and call out: 
 
 Target, Cavalry in the orchard, clip fire, faster. 
 Then I face Lieut. Allen and semaphore : 
 Ten men. Cavalry. 
 
 Then I join the men who are firing, in order to observe the enemy, 
 the surrounding country, and the effect of our fire. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 By the time you have done all that the solution includes it is likely 
 that the patrol will have disappeared and it will be time for you to 
 do something else. What you will do next depends upon the result of 
 your observation. 
 
 The Drill Regulations give you short and clear commands and sig- 
 nals. They constitute a special language which all men learn. If 
 you were to form the bad habit of breaking out into ordinary conver- 
 sation in a situation like the present one, it is not probable that all of 
 
22 
 
 your men would know exactly what you wanted. The noncommis- 
 sioned officer who is so trained in the application of Drill Regulations 
 commands and signals that he uses them instinctively and correctly 
 will get far better results in any emergency. Furthermore, he will 
 give the impression among his men that he understands his business, 
 and this in itself is a very important matter. 
 
 In future problems we shall have occasion to apply Drill Regula- 
 tions commands and signals. We may as well indicate now, in the 
 beginning, that these commands and signals can frequently be used 
 to indicate to your men exactly what you want done. 
 
 When you shout " target " and pause for a moment, as you natu- 
 rally will, your men w r ill instinctively look toward you and see you 
 signal " as skirmishers, march." The target itself is so apparent to 
 anyone who glances in the direction in which you are looking that 
 it would hardly be necessary to describe it. An unmistakable target 
 within 500 yards, as in this case, requires no announcement of range. 
 The command "clip fire," without announcement of range, denotes 
 battle sight. Battle sight is even more suitable against Cavalry than 
 against Infantry, on account of the height of the target. It is en- 
 tirely proper to command " faster," even before firing begins. It 
 indicates that when fire is opened you desire a rate of fire faster than 
 the normal. 
 
 We recommend that you study the commands and signals used in 
 future problems and determine for yourself whether they answer 
 every purpose and would be perfectly clear to trained troops. 
 
 You might have signaled to Lieut. Allen by holding your rifle 
 horizontally over your head. This signal, which has been used many 
 years, indicates " enemy in sight in small numbers." The semaphore 
 message " ten men, Cavalry," can be flashed almost as quickly and 
 it is more definite. While on this subject of semaphore signaling, it 
 is well to add that officers and noncommissioned officers and many 
 privates should be able to semaphore. It is very simple, rapid, and 
 easily learned. If half of the company is proficient, the other half 
 will soon be able to signal fairly well. 
 
 There is no doubt as to the propriety of opening fire on the Reds. 
 Their hurried movements would indicate that their halt in the 
 orchard had been interrupted by the warning of their lookout. They 
 know that Blue troops are approaching, but in order to prevent them 
 from getting too much information of our own forces it is best to 
 shoot them up while you have a chance, and fill them with a strong 
 desire to get away. 
 
 SITUATION VI. 
 
 The Red patrol disappeared and was screened from view by the 
 orchard before your men exhausted the first clip. 
 
23 
 
 You immediately directed your point to resume its march to the 
 north at an increased gait, since the advance party had now closed 
 up to 50 yards. In the meantime you shouted to Lieut. Allen, 
 
 Reds have gone west through the orchard. 
 
 When the point arrives at the stream crossing between roadfork 
 544 and crossroad 616, a lively fire opens from the woods east of the 
 road and directly north of you. The fire is over your head and ap- 
 parently is directed at the advance party. You judge that there may 
 be either a sqiiad firing very rapidly or a platoon firing slowly. A 
 glance down the road shows you that the advance party has started 
 to deploy. 
 
 What do you do? 
 
 SERGT. HILL'S SOLUTION. 
 I shout, 
 Off the road to the left and up that hoi-low, 
 
 pointing to the shallow hollow 50 yards west of the road, and to the 
 northwest of me. I march to the north, parallel to the road, and as 
 close to it as I can without giving up cover. I personally march 
 far enough to the right to be able to peer over the crest and watch 
 the edge of the woods. It is my intention to halt about halfway to 
 the wire fence, and then decide what to do next when I see what our 
 column is doing and what has happened to the enemy. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 There are several reasons why it would be unwise for the point to 
 drop in its tracks and open fire. In the first place, it would have a 
 bad firing position. Also, the fire of four or five men would add 
 little to the fire effect, unless delivered from the flank. The point is 
 not being fired upon and for the present is free to move. A quick 
 movement off the road and to the left may draw a few shots from 
 the enemy, but it would probably amount to nothing. The point 
 can help the column most by placing itself in a position to get infor- 
 mation and at the same time be ready to resume the march promptly. 
 If you find later that you can deliver a flank fire, you should seize 
 the opportunity to do so, but for the present it is best to get 
 forward under cover so that you can watch not only the enemy in 
 the woods, but the road to the north and the main road a half mile 
 west of you. Your first position at the stream crossing was unfa- 
 vorable under any circumtsances, but in choosing a better place you 
 should not be drawn farther from the road than is aboslutely neces- 
 sary, and you should not fall back if it is possible to get forward. 
 The hostile force is probably small and will stand for a short time 
 
24 
 
 only. It may be the same Cavalry party which you drove out of the 
 orchard. In this case, its intention probably is to delay our column 
 or make it show its strength. The duty of an advance guard in such 
 a case is to act vigorously and enable the column to march with as 
 little delay as possible. 
 
 SITUATION VII. 
 
 The enemy disappeared north through the woods. In the mean- 
 time the advance party had crossed the stream and is now assembling 
 in the road. The point was able to fire a few shots, and then to re- 
 turn to the road and resume the march. When the point arrives 50 
 yards south of crossroad 616, the command, " Halt ! " is signaled 
 from the rear. You can see the men of the advance party and sup- 
 port fall out and sit down. The main body is in the valley and is 
 not visible. 
 
 What do you do ? 
 
 SERGT. HILL'S SOLUTION. 
 
 I continue the march to crossroad 616 and give orders as follows : 
 Stone, post yourself here and watch the roads to the northeast, northwest, 
 and southwest. Other men fall out. 
 
 I sit down in a place from which I can see the advance party. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 The column has apparently halted for a rest. When a column 
 halts, the point becomes a "march outpost." If necessary, it shifts 
 its position so as to get the best view of the roads and country to the 
 front and flank. The point should not move a great distance for this 
 purpose. How far is a matter of judgment. Over 200 yards to the 
 front, or 100 yards to the flank,, or 100 yards to the rear, would 
 probably be too far. In the present case an advance of 50 yards 
 enabled you to place Stone at the crossroads. This is also the high- 
 est point on the spur, and from this position one man can see prac- 
 tically as much as two men can. You would naturally look around 
 for a chance to improve your observation of the country, and prob- 
 ably would decide to place a second man on the house or barn. That 
 can not be decided from the map alone. In any event, every man 
 not required for sentinel duty should be given full opportunity to 
 rest. 
 
SECOND PROBLEM. 
 
 AN ADVANCE GUARD CONNECTING FILE. 
 
 EXPLANATION. 
 
 "When the distance between parts of the advance guard or the 
 nature of the country is such as to make direct communication diffi- 
 cult, connecting files march between the subdivisions to keep up 
 communication. . Each element of the column sends the necessary 
 connecting files to its front." (I. D. R., 645.) 
 
 Usually a connecting file consists of two men, but special con- 
 ditions may require the use of one man or more than two men. The 
 men of a connecting file march together. 
 
 The distance between connecting files, or between a connecting 
 file and the subdivision nearest to it, varies according to the situ- 
 ation. Naturally, the distance would be greatest in flat, open coun- 
 try in broad daylight, and in this case may be as much as 200 yards. 
 The distance would be llsfftt on a very dark night. In the latter case 
 the connecting files may be so close as to form a single file at about 
 5 yards distance. 
 
 In daylight and in case of doubt 100 yards may be considered a 
 satisfactory average. This distance has two advantages : First, men 
 are trained to measure distances by eye in units of 100 yards ; second, 
 the prescribed distance between subdivisions is easily maintained 
 by sending connecting files 100 yards apart ; thus, when 600 yards dis- 
 tance is ordered the head of the subdivision which is to march with 
 600 yards distance marches 100 yards behind its fifth connecting file. 
 
 SITUATION I. 
 
 You are Pvt. Dixon, of Company B. Your battalion camped 
 last night along the farm road east of hill 636 (northeast of Granite 
 Hill Station). At 7.30 o'clock this morning the battalion formed, 
 ready to march. Your captain ordered the pieces to be loaded, 
 assembled the officers and noncommissioned officers opposite the cen- 
 ter of the company, and gave the following verbal order loud enough 
 for the company to hear it: 
 
 A Red Cavalry squadron was wrecking the railroad south of Biglerville 
 yesterday. Biglerville is 7 or 8 miles northwest of here. Our battalion is going 
 to march about 6 miles north of here to haul back to this place some forage and 
 flour. Company A will be the advance guard at 500 yards. Posts. 
 
 (25) 
 
26 
 
 You saw Company A march out with point, advance party, and 
 support. It marched north to the road which leads toward 585. 
 When the support had marched about 50 yards to the north from 
 your company the captain said to Pvt. Scott of your squad : 
 
 Scott, take Hanson with you and follow the advance guard at 100 yards as 
 connecting file. 
 
 A moment later, when Scott had marched about 50 yards, the 
 captain said to you : 
 
 Dixon, take Smither with you and follow Scott at 100 yards as connect- 
 ing file. 
 
 When you reached the road you saw the main body marching 
 300 yards in rear of you and two connecting files between you and 
 }^our company. You also noticed that the major was riding at the 
 tail of the advance guard. 
 
 After marching about 1J miles you turned the corner 150 yards 
 northwest of road fork 537, and now, when you are 15 yards beyond 
 the corner, you see that the advance guard support and Scott's con- 
 necting file have just halted in the road. On account of the woods 
 you can not see the next connecting file in rear of you. 
 
 What do you do ? 
 
 PVT. DIXON'S SOLUTION. 
 
 I halt and say to Smithers: 
 
 Go back to the road fork and stand where the next connecting file can see you. 
 
 DISCUSSION . 
 
 Imagine that the advance guard support is dragging behind it 
 a string 100 yards long. Scott's place is at the end of that string. 
 Imagine also that Scott drags a string 100 yards long. Your place 
 is at the end of that string. You also drag an imaginary string, 
 at the end of which the next connecting file is supposed to be. Finally, 
 the captain of your company is ordinarily at the end of the string 
 of the last connecting file, but he may close up or drop back for 
 reasons of his own. You have no such discretion. All you can do 
 is to shift slightly, if necessary, in order to see the next connecting 
 file in front or in order to be seen by the next connecting file in rear. 
 For this reason you sent Smither back to the road fork. If the dis- 
 tance to the road fork had been 40 or 50 yards or more, there would 
 have been no object in sending him. The next connecting file would 
 have been there at the same time, or sooner, and would have halted 
 when it saw you had done so. 
 
 SITUATION II. 
 
 When Smither reached the road fork he signaled, " Halt," to the 
 next connecting file. 
 What do you do ? 
 
27 
 
 I call to Smither : 
 
 Don't signal ; just stand there. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 Smither does not know his business and exceeded his instructions. 
 If the signal " Halt " is transmitted back to your captain, he will 
 assume that the major has ordered " Halt." You received no such 
 signal, and hence should not permit it to be sent back. If your con- 
 necting file merely halts, it is sufficient notice that your imaginary 
 string has halted. Each subdivision of the advance guard tries to 
 march steadily, but sometimes receives short, unavoidable checks. 
 The officer in command of the next subdivision in rear, or of the 
 main body, may wish to avoid numerous short halts, which irritate the 
 men and do no good, and to adjust the distance by a slower gait, or 
 he may wish to close up a part of the distance in order to reach a 
 shady place in the road, or in order to get off a conspicuous hill. If 
 he receives the signal " Halt," and knows the major is in front, he 
 must halt practically where he is. Bear in mind, therefore, that 
 signals are to be transmitted only when ordered by proper authority, 
 or when unmistakably given to you by the next connecting file in 
 front or rear of you. 
 
 SITUATION III. 
 
 You reach a point about 50 yards north of road fork 544, when 
 fire opens to the north of you. The advance-guard support has 
 halted near the summit of the low ridge (about 250 yards north of 
 544). You are then halted on the upslope of that ridge. A minute 
 later Scott signals, "Assemble." 
 
 What do you do ? 
 
 I signal 
 
 Assemble 
 
 to the next connecting file in rear, and continue the signal until I 
 see that the connecting file repeats the signal. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 You have, of course, no reason to question the authority for Scott's 
 signal. The main body is under cover from the fire which you have 
 heard, and can advance. The major is ahead and evidently wants the 
 main body to close up on him; that is, assemble on him. The im- 
 portant thing for you to do is to continue the signal until you are 
 sure that the next connecting file in rear has passed it along. 
 
28 
 
 SITUATION IV. 
 
 You are still halted north of 544. The advance-guard support has 
 deployed east of the road, but has not yet advanced. Scott is still 
 halted. The main body has advanced a little more than 100 yards, 
 and in the meantime has picked up the last connecting file. There 
 is now only one connecting file between you and the main body, and 
 that connecting file is now closing up on you and keeping about 100 
 yards ahead of the main body. 
 
 What do you do ? 
 
 PRIVATE CIXON'S SOLUTION. 
 
 I stand fast. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 The connecting file in rear of you made a mistake. In our present 
 case it will make little or no difference. You should remember, how- 
 ever, that it is important for each commander of a subdivision of a 
 column to know whether the next subdivision in front is advancing 
 or has halted. Generally, this can be determined only by observing 
 the connecting files. In thick country, and on a winding road where 
 only one connecting file is visible, that connecting file will deceive the 
 commander if it takes its distance from the rear ; that is, if it starts 
 to wind up its hundred yards of string, instead of halting at the end 
 of it. 
 
 In a night march the situation is more difficult. The advance 
 guard and all connecting files must guide on the main body. At the 
 same time, the main body must be warned, quietly, if it is jamming 
 up on the advance guard. A connecting file must therefore keep its 
 distance ahead of the connecting file or body of troops next in rear, 
 and at the same time give warning if the maintenance of this dis- 
 tance results in jamming. For this reason, the proper distance at 
 night between connecting files is the maximum distance at which a 
 man can be seen in outline. 
 
THIRD PROBLEM. 
 
 AN ADVANCE GUARD FLANK PATROL. 
 
 EXPLANATION. 
 
 " To afford protection to an infantry column, the country must be 
 observed on each side of the road as far as the terrain affords posi- 
 tions for effective rifle fire upon the column. If the country that it is 
 necessary to observe be open to view from the road, reconnaissance is 
 not necessary." (I. D. E. 648.) 
 
 " Where the country is generally open to view but localities in it 
 might conceal an enemy of some size, reconnaissance is necessary. 
 Where the road is exposed to fire and the view is restricted, a patrol 
 should be sent to examine the country in the direction from which 
 danger threatens. The object may be accomplished by sending pa- 
 trols to observe from prominent points. When the ground permits 
 and the necessity exists, patrols may be sent to march abreast of the 
 column at distances which permit them to see important features not 
 visible from the road." (I. D. R. 650.) 
 
 Infantry on the march must protect itself from being surprised or 
 being fired upon, not only from the front but also from the right or 
 left. To guard against the latter we send out flank patrols when 
 necessary. It often happens that, from the road itself, we can see 
 all the ground so far to the right or left that nothing more than small 
 hostile patrols could be within easy rifle shot of our column with- 
 out being seen from the road. In such cases we do not bother to send 
 out flank patrols, because a hostile patrol will hardly fire on a com- 
 pany or a battalion. If the distance is great, they could not hit any- 
 thing. If the distance is short, it is not healthy to open fire and 
 generally nothing is gained by doing so. Only poorly instructed 
 patrols at maneuvers do such things. But from time to time it is 
 necessary to send out flank patrols toward woods, houses, or hills in 
 order to find out whether the enemy is there with enough men to be 
 dangerous. These patrols are sent by the advance guard, generally 
 by the advance party if it is strong enough. In this way the in- 
 formation can be obtained before the troops in rear of the advance 
 
 (29) 
 
30 
 
 party come within easy rifle shot of the ground examined by the 
 patrol. Of course, mounted men are generally best for such patrols, 
 but if there are none on hand or if the ground is difficult we must 
 use Infantry. 
 
 The patrol leader is told when to leave the column, where to go, 
 and about w^here to come back on the road on which the column is 
 marching. When the patrol gets back on this road the leader will 
 usually find that his company is ahead of him. He is expected to 
 overtake the company if possible, but without double timing. If the 
 patrol has lost considerable distance (say more than a half mile) the 
 patrol leader should report to the first battalion or company com- 
 mander that he meets. 
 
 SITUATION I. 
 
 The situation is the same as in the first problem to include Lieut. 
 Allen's order, page 16. 
 
 You are Corpl. Clark, first squad, at the head of the advance party 
 and approaching crossroads 585. Your rear rank is in the point and 
 Pine and Hagen are ahead as connecting file. 
 
 A few minutes ago Lieut. Allen passed the word along that 
 
 Farmers have telephoned that Red Cavalry is active attain this morning 
 south of Biglerville ; that is 7 miles northwest of here. 
 
 When you are on the road where the fence ends, 200 yards south of 
 585, Lieut. Allen says to you : 
 
 Corporal, when we reach the crossroads in front of us, take three men and 
 patrol to those woods (north of letter "S" in HUNTERSTOWN). A half mile 
 beyond the crossroads our road turns to the northwest. From the woods you 
 also go northwest until you strike a main road. There is the road I mean 
 (pointing toward S. H., 700 yards north of Hunterstown). That road will take 
 you back to the column. Keep about abreast of the advance party. 
 
 (1) What do you think? 
 
 (2) What do you do up to the time your patrol starts out in patrol 
 formation? 
 
 CORPL. CLARK S SOLUTION. 
 
 (1) I am to go to the woods ; then northwest. Column goes north- 
 west also, but on the road. First main road takes me back to the 
 column. Keep abreast of the lieutenant. 
 
 Approaching the woods I want some one in front of me and some 
 one behind. Better have two men in front. They will have more 
 confidence. We shall be on a low ridge and I will have no trouble 
 seeing the advance party. But the first thing to do is to get through 
 the fence and then organize. 
 
 (2) At the crossroad I call out 
 Brown, Quinu, and Peterson, follow me. 
 
31 
 
 I take them through the fence and walk toward the woods, mean- 
 time telling the men 
 
 We are going to patrol those woods ; then go northwest to the first main road ; 
 then along that road to the road the column will be on. We have to keep 
 abreast of the advance party. Brown, you go ahead now to the nearest point 
 of the woods (south corner). Quinn, 25 yards to the right of Brown. I will 
 follow Quinn at 50 yards. Peterson, 50 yards behind me. 
 
 We take up this formation and march, and watch Hunterstown. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 When you are given a thing to do the logical way to go about it is 
 as follows: 
 
 1. Be sure you understand what you are ordered to do. 
 
 2. Determine the best way to do it. 
 
 3. Do it. 
 
 Sometimes you will have ample time to follow out this idea. Some- 
 times, however, you will have barely time to " do it " and must trust 
 to your instinct to pull you through. 
 
 In the present problem your first thought should be to fix firmly in 
 your mind the instructions given you by Lieut. Allen. You have 
 time before reaching the crossroads. He planned your route with the 
 assistance of his map, but you will have to go without a map. You 
 can not see what lies beyond the woods. You only know that north- 
 west of the woods there is a main road that will take you back to the 
 column. Lieut. Allen's directions look simple enough when you 
 examine a perfect map ; but if you w T ere on the ground you would 
 realize the importance of repeating aloud, or at least to yourself, the 
 route given you. If there is any doubt in your mind you should ask 
 Lieut. Allen to explain it away. If Lieut. Allen did not have a good 
 map. he would not be able to see beyond the first woods. In that case 
 he would probably send your patrol to the first woods only. Then, 
 later, when the advance party reached the north end of the woods he 
 would have to send another patrol through the second woods. But 
 he has a map and the advance party is small, so he trusts to your 
 intelligence to make the patrolling easier. 
 
 You will observe that your patrol left the column without any 
 inspection, and marched without trying to use cover. Also, Lieut. 
 Allen did not say what the patrol was to look for. At first glance 
 you would think that this is contrary to Infantry Drill Regulations 
 (par. 609). But there is a difference between your advance guard 
 flank patrol and the patrols that paragraph 609 has specially in mind. 
 Your flank patrol must go out at once. The men are already in 
 inarching trim and pieces are loaded. The patrol will not be out of 
 sight of the column except perhaps for a few minutes at a time. 
 
32 
 
 Furthermore, if a flank patrol is required to advance under cover 
 and the column keeps up the average rate of march, the patrol will 
 usually fail to get anywhere in time to be of use. On the other hand, 
 if the column slows up to let patrols advance cautiously under cover, 
 the column will not get anywhere. Of course, you will use whatever 
 cover you find, but the main thing is to get over your ground fast 
 enough to give the column on the road no excuse for slowing up. 
 
 The other point that we raised was, Why did not Lieut. Allen tell 
 you what to look for? If you are sent on reconnaissance, this would 
 be very important, but the purpose of an advance guard flank patrol 
 is always the same. The purpose is to give warning of an enemy, if 
 seen, in time to save the column from being surprised, and incident- 
 ally to drive off any hostile patrols that have a chance to get informa- 
 tion of our column. You should understand this so well that it 
 should not be necessary for Lieut. Allen to tell you each time that 
 you are sent out. How to get this information and how to transmit 
 it to the column will be explained later. 
 
 At the crossroads you commanded : 
 
 Brown, Quinn, and Peterson, follow me, 
 
 and led them through the fence. That is short, complete, unmis- 
 takable, and businesslike. 
 
 Three of you fellows come along with me 
 
 is the way we frequently hear it. It is wrong. Pick your men and 
 name them. Under Lieut. Allen's orders to " take three men," you 
 would ordinarily take them from your own squad if you had that 
 many left. You would not in that case take any from other squads 
 except for excellent reasons, and, in any event, only after telling the 
 lieutenant that you wished to do so. 
 
 At first you are so close to the advance party that you can safely 
 advance bunched for 75 or 100 yards, and while marching thus you 
 may give your information and orders. 
 
 Your men have heard Lieut. Allen give you the route. Neverthe- 
 less, you will repeat it to them as a matter of habit and precaution. 
 The patrol may become scattered, or temporarily separated, and you 
 should make sure that each man knows what ground the patrol is to 
 cover. 
 
 More often you will have a single place to go to, instead of a long 
 parallel route, as in this case. But even then you should tell your 
 own men, for example, 
 
 We are going to that hill to take a look at the country on the other side, 
 then come back to the column. 
 
 The formation that we adopted sends two men toward the woods. 
 They are 25 yards apart. Peterson is in the rear for the special 
 
33 
 
 purpose of keeping the advance guard in sight so as to transmit 
 signals. You are in the middle where you can see the whole patrol 
 and run both ends of it. Bear in mind four things : 
 
 (a) Some one must march so as to be able to explore the ground 
 assigned to you. 
 
 (b) Some one must march so as to keep in touch with the advance 
 guard. 
 
 (c) You must place yourself where you can handle the patrol and 
 its movements. 
 
 (d) The patrol must make progress in the right direction. 
 
 Any formation (diamond, single file, a sort of skirmish line, etc.) 
 which will accomplish these four things is correct, but as a matter 
 of safety you w r ould never march bunched. 
 
 There are times, of course, when you can not help losing sight 
 of the advance guard temporarily. 
 
 Brown is second in command in your squad (see p. 12). Other- 
 wise you would name a second in command. 
 
 SITUATION II. 
 
 Brown and Quinn have just reached the south corner of the woods. 
 Peterson has veered to the northeast so as to keep the advance party 
 in sight, and is now at the wire fence and 100 yards southeast of 
 Quinn. You can not see the advance party, but you assume that it 
 is on the road just east of the last letter " N " in Hunterstown, and is 
 still marching. You estimate that in the woods in front you will 
 be able to see a man about 75 yards off in any direction. 
 
 What do you do ? 
 
 CORPL. CLARK'S SOLUTION. 
 
 I signal to Brown and Quinn, " As skirmishers, guide left, march," 
 and shout, 
 
 Ono hundred yards. Close up to the edge of the woods and halt. 
 
 I call to Peterson, 
 
 Fifty yards on the right of Quinn. 
 
 Then I move northeast on the ridge and halt (between the tops of 
 the letters " TO " in Hunterstown) , where I can see what the advance 
 party is doing. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 The Infantry Drill Regulations recommend that a patrol advance 
 in a thin skirmish line when penetrating woods (par. 612). You are 
 not ready yet, however, to go into the woods. It is best to make sure 
 of the direction of march and location of the advance party. Mean- 
 time the men can be placed so as to be ready to go ahead in a thin 
 skirmish line when you decide to advance. 
 
 96790 17 3 
 
34 
 
 We have here a practical application of the use of the Drill Kegu. 
 lations signals in connection with orders. It is doubtful if you could 
 devise a shorter and clearer method of separating Brown and Quinn 
 by a hundred yards. This is a trifling detail perhaps, but you should 
 always look for the shortest and clearest way of getting a thing done. 
 
 SITUATION III. 
 
 The point has arrived about 100 yards southeast of the small 
 orchard which lies 700 yards northeast of you. A connecting file 
 has just appeared from the cover of the woods and is about 100 yards 
 behind the point. 
 
 What do you do? 
 
 I place myself between Brown and Quinn, signal 
 Forward, march, 
 and march a little west of north into the woods. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 You are now sure that you know the route of the advance party. 
 By starting now you are somewhat in advance of the advance party. 
 This has two advantages. First, you can give warning more quickly 
 if you encounter anything, and, second, you will overcome in part 
 the delay which the underbrush will cause and thus be more nearly 
 abreast of the advance party when you get through the woods. .V 
 thin skirmish line enables you to examine a greater area of the woods. 
 Even so, you are going to miss the north half of the woods, but that 
 is not very important. The point will pass the north end of the 
 woods, and between you and* the point there is little room for a hos- 
 tile force large enough to be dangerous to the column. A large 
 force can not be massed in woods without substantial security detach- 
 ments. You would encounter these detachments at least. You can 
 not expect to comb the woods for hostile patrols. It is sufficient for 
 you to protect the column against surprise by larger forces. 
 
 The patrol will naturally guide on you, and at first you have to 
 shift about to get the 50-yard intervals that you ordered, but very 
 soon your patrol will be marching on a front of 150 yards and will 
 be able to observe a strip of woods 300 yards wide. Your interval 
 between men might be greater than 50 yards, if you can see 75 yards, 
 as you estimated, but it is better to be safe and keep the patrol under 
 control. 
 
 You are going to lose sight of the column temporarily, but this 
 can not be avoided. If you left a man in position to see the column, 
 
35 
 
 he would not be in a position to be seen by you, and therefore he 
 would be practically useless. 
 
 SITUATION IV. 
 
 You emerge from the woods where jbhe wire fence enters it, 350 
 yards east of hill 592. Because of the underbrush your progress has 
 been slow. The point and connecting file are on the road northeast 
 of you. 
 
 What do you do ? 
 
 I give the signal 
 Change direction to the left, 
 
 and I personally march toward the southwest corner of the orchard, 
 walking slowly until Quinn and Peterson are abreast of me. Mean- 
 time I shout to Brown : 
 
 Move to the left and follow the high ground so that you can watch to the west. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 It is difficult to keep direction accurately in the woods or to tell 
 how or where you are coming out. The first thing you discovered on 
 emerging was the fact that high ground obstructed your view to the 
 west. Also, to the northwest you see a line of trees and can distin- 
 guish, because of their regularity, the trees which belong to the 
 orchard. Therefore, since you have not yet reached the main road 
 mentioned in Lieut. Allen's orders, the patrol must get a view to the 
 west and at the same time proceed toward the woods to the north- 
 west. Your present formation is suitable for the next woods and not 
 unsuitable for crossing the open space, since one man now, and your- 
 self later, will be able to observe to the west while the other men of 
 the patrol are extended in the direction of the advance party. 
 
 SITUATION V. 
 
 You emerge from the woods 800 yards south of road fork 546 and 
 50 yards east of the road. You see the point marching on the road 
 in the hollow near the house 300 yards southeast of road fork 546. 
 
 What do you do ? 
 
 CORPL. CLARK'S SOLUTION. 
 
 I signal 
 
 Assemble, 
 and get on the road at the bend. 
 
36 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 It is plain that from the road you can see both the advance party 
 and the country to the west. There is no object in marching across 
 country when a road serves the purpose, unless a route across country 
 can be found which offers concealment and easy marching without 
 interfering with observation and communication with the advance 
 party. 
 
 SITUATION VI. 
 
 The patrol is assembled on the road, except Peterson, who is now 
 climbing the fence. 
 What do you do ? 
 
 I order, 
 
 We will march north, zigzag, at 10 paces. Brown, lead off on the right of 
 the road ; then myself, on the left ; then Quinn, on the right ; then Peterson, on 
 the left. March out, Brown. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 You have nearly a half mile to march before you rejoin the column. 
 You knoAv that Cavalry has been reported to the northwest. The 
 patrol can not march concealed, but it should avoid marching in a 
 bunch. A small Cavalry party may run into you from the rear or 
 the left. For this reason, men should be placed so as to make a poor 
 target. A patrol which is marching along a road and which is not 
 compelled to conceal itself, but on the contrary must advance at the 
 normal marching gait, would use the same formation as an advance 
 guard point. It is recommended that you compare the formation in 
 the present case with the formation of Sergt. Hill's point in the first 
 problem, remembering that there were five men in the point. 
 
 SITUATION VII. 
 
 You have just taken up the formation described in the preceding 
 situation. You see the point jump into the road at roadfork 546 and 
 fire into the orchard west of 546. The tree tops prevent yon from 
 seeing the ground more than 50 yards beyond the south and east 
 edges of the orchard. You see no signs of the enemy. 
 
 What do you decide to do? 
 
 CORPL. CLARK'S SOLUTION. 
 
 I decide to keep a sharp lookout west of the road, particularly 
 toward the orchard; meantime, advance north on the road to the end 
 of the fence which passes along the south edge of the orchard, halt- 
 there in observation and place myself where I can communicate with 
 Lieut. Allen by signal. 
 
37 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 The reasons for closing in are to see more of the orchard and to 
 get into communication. Lieut. Allen will be somewhere around 546. 
 Under the circumstances you can not yet join the column. Lieut. 
 Allen needs you and your eyes where you now are. But also he may 
 want to tell you presently what to do. You must make it possible for 
 him to communicate with you. Semaphore signaling without flags is 
 not very dependable beyond 600 yards. 
 
 If you go too far, the orchard will obstruct your view. From the 
 position indicated you can see the road which lies a half mile west, 
 the farm road and the woods south of hill 574, and the hill itself as 
 far north as the number 574. At the same time you are able to com- 
 municate with Lieut. Allen. 
 
 SITUATION VIII. 
 
 As you arrive at your new position (50 yards south of the fence) 
 firing ceases. You see no signs of the enemy anywhere. Lieut. Allen 
 semaphores 
 
 Attention. 
 
 You acknowledge, and he semaphores 
 
 Patrol orchard and return. 
 
 What do you do? 
 
 I acknowledge the message (semaphore the letter " R "), and order, 
 
 Qninn, 25 yards on my left. Peterson, 25 yards on my right. Brown, follow 
 Peterson at 40 yards. 
 
 Then I march northwest. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 The situation now is a little different from the situation in the 
 woods, where you marched on the broadest possible front. You know 
 that you will be able to see far between the rows of trees in the 
 orchard. You can extend the vision of the patrol considerably only 
 by separating its members by so much distance that you will lose 
 control. There was something in the orchard a moment ago. It is 
 best to keep control and get at least three rifles on anything that you 
 meet. 
 
 There may be a surprise party in store for you, hence, you should 
 leave one man farther back. This will lessen the chance of a com- 
 plete surprise, since this man may escape or otherwise give warning. 
 Suppose that the .patrol marched well bunched and was caught by 
 
38 
 
 the enemy in a situation which prevented the firing of a shot. This 
 would happen very seldom, but if it did, Lieut. Allen^ hearing 
 nothing, would assume that you were progressing and that therefore 
 the orchard was clear of the enemy. But in the formation actually 
 adopted you have given at least one man a chance to give warning 
 either by fire or by escape. 
 
 By placing Brown behind Peterson, Brown is nearer Lieut. Allen, 
 and he is the last man to enter the orchard. Therefore, his position 
 has a double advantage. 
 
 SITUATION IX. 
 
 You emerge from the orchard at the farm road on the west edge. 
 You see four Red cavalrymen slowly riding north on the road 700 
 yards west-northwest of you. There is nothing else in sight. 
 
 What do you do ? 
 
 CORPL. CLARK'S SOLUTION. 
 
 Pointing out the Red cavalrymen I call to Quinn and Peterson 
 Range, 700. Fire at will. 
 Then I set my sight and fire. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 An advance guard flank patrol is a covering patrol. Besides giv- 
 ing warning of the approach of the enemy, it should drive off the 
 enemy when possible. The more information the enemy gets con- 
 cerning us the greater is the disadvantage to us. A column can 
 seldom march secretly, but frequently it can prevent the enemy 
 from learning all that is worth knowing. This leaves the enemy 
 more or less in the dark. His actions can not be planned so well, 
 and hence they will not be so inconvenient or damaging to us. You 
 may not hit a man or a horse in the present case, but the mere fact 
 that these four men were fired upon, particularly .by some one off the 
 road, will make them extremely cautious for sometime to come. 
 Cautious men learn very little. 
 
 The disadvantage of firing lies in the fact that it alarms the 
 column and may delay it to no purpose. However, this depends 
 upon the commander and the amount of firing. There was a time 
 when the tactics of the march were so imperfectly understood that 
 a few shots on the flank would stop a brigade, but now we seldom 
 see such absurd things. You knew before you opened fire that the 
 Red cavalrymen would gallop off and probably would be beyond 
 your range or vision before your men loaded the next clip. Then 
 all would be quiet. The column would continue its march. So, 
 under the circumstances, 50 cents worth of ammunition will do more 
 than 50 cents worth of good. 
 
39 
 
 Having attracted the attention of the column, you should show 
 yourself as soon as possible and make it absolutely clear that there is 
 nothing to warrant an interruption of the march. 
 
 " The aiming point or target is carefully pointed out. This may 
 be done before or after announcing the sight setting. Both are in- 
 dicated before giving the command for firing, but may be omitted 
 when the target appears suddenly and is unmistakable; in such case 
 battle sight is used if no sight setting is announced." (I. D. R. 135.) 
 
 Sometimes we take the trouble to designate the target when it is 
 not necessary. On the other hand, we sometimes fail to designate 
 the target when it is so indistinct that there is slight chance that our 
 men will pick it up without careful designation. Only experience 
 and practice will remedy this. In the present case there should be 
 no difficulty. The four cavalrymen loom so large and present the 
 only possible target in the direction in which you are pointing that 
 it is unnecessary to waste words in designating the target. If there 
 is any doubt in your mind^ it is better to describe the target. 
 
 SITUATION X. 
 
 The Red cavalrymen have disappeared. There are no other signs 
 of the enemy. Between the rows of trees the ground is visible to the 
 north and south edges of the orchard. Brown is about 75 yards east 
 on the farm road. 
 
 What do you do? 
 
 I call to Quinn and Peterson 
 Follow me at 20 yards. 
 
 Then I march east along the farm road through the orchard, signal- 
 ing Brown 
 
 Forward, march. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 Nothing remains but to rejoin the column, showing yourself as 
 soon as possible. You will make better time along the farm road 
 than by going to the north edge of the orchard. The formation 
 adopted is convenient, considering the location of your men, and 
 serves your purpose. 
 
 SITUATION XI. 
 
 You have arrived on the main road 200 yards north of road fork 
 546. The tail of the main body (combat train) is approaching 
 the bridge 400 yards north of you. There is a squad inarching on 
 the main road about 100 yards ahead of you. 
 
 What do you decide to do? 
 
I decide to overtake the last company and report to its captain. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 Lieut. Allen is nearly a mile ahead of you. You could not over- 
 take him unless you marched during two of the hourly halt periods 
 or passed the marching column at a greatly increased gait. It 
 would be hard marching in either case. Under the circumstances 
 you are justified in reporting to the captain of the last company. 
 The one thing you should not do is to straggle behind or drift around 
 in the column, subject to no one's orders. That would be contrary 
 to the spirit of paragraph 376, Infantry Drill Kegulations, which 
 says: 
 
 Any officer or noncommissioned officer who becomes separated from his 
 proper unit and can not rejoin must at once place himself and his command 
 at the disposal of the nearest higher commander. 
 
 Anyone having completed an assigned task must seek to rejoin his proper 
 command. Failing in this, he should join the nearest troops engaged with 
 the enemy. 
 
FOURTH PROBLEM. 
 
 THE PLATOON AS AN ADVANCE PARTY. 
 
 EXPLANATION. 
 
 " The advance guard commander is responsible for its formation 
 and conduct. He should bear in mind that its purpose is to facilitate 
 and protect the march of the main body. Its own security must be 
 effected by proper dispositions and reconnaissance, not by timid or 
 cautious advance. It must advance at normal gait and search aggres- 
 sively for information of the enemy. Its action when the enemy 
 attempts to block it with a large force depends upon the situation 
 and plans of the commander of the troops." (I. D. R. 640.) 
 
 " The support sends forward an advance party. The advance 
 party in turn sends a patrol, called a point, still farther to the front. 
 * * *" (I. D. R. 645.) 
 
 " They facilitate the advance of the main body by promptly driv- 
 ing off small bodies, of the enemy who seek to harass or delay it ; by 
 removing obstacles from the line of advance, by repairing roads, 
 bridges, etc., thus enabling the main body to advance uninterruptedly 
 in convenient marching formations. 
 
 " They protect the main body by preventing the enemy from 
 firing into it when in close formation; by holding the enemy and 
 enabling the main body to deploy before coming under effective 
 fire; by preventing its size and condition from being observed by 
 the enemy. * * * " (I. D. R. 636.) 
 
 The present problem is designed to illustrate how the advance 
 party commander assists the advance guard in facilitating and pro- 
 tecting the march and in taking proper action when the enemy 
 is met. 
 
 SITUATION I. 
 
 A week ago we marched south with our division through Bigler- 
 ville and Gettysburg (Gettysburg is 2 miles due south of Boyd 
 S. H.). We are in the enemy's country. Our regiment was left 
 back to guard the railroad over which our supplies come, while the 
 rest of the division went 10 miles south of Gettysburg and now con- 
 fronts the enemy. 
 
 (41) 
 
42 
 
 Our battalion and the machine-gun company is in Gettysburg, 
 while the rest of the regiment is scattered along the railroad to the 
 north, the nearest detachment being Company E at Biglerville. 
 
 At 9 o'clock this morning Companies A, B, and C and the machine- 
 gun company were hurriedly assembled and marched north out of 
 town; Comany A in the lead. You are First Sergt. Holmes, Com- 
 pany A. The captain, who is the only officer with the company, 
 called the noncommissioned officers to the head of the company 
 during the march and said : 
 
 The enemy attacked Company E at Biglerville this morning. Our battalion 
 leaves Company D in Gettysburg. The rest of the battalion and the umchiiu'- 
 gun company are going to attack the enemy at Biglerville. This company will 
 be the advance guard. The main body will follow us at 600 yards. Srrgt. 
 Holmes, your platoon will be the advance party. The rest of the company 
 will be the support and will follow you at 400 yards. I'll be with the support 
 and will send out the flank patrols. Here is a map. Take this direct road to 
 Table Rock; then past Gainer to Biglerville. When we reach the outguard 
 the battalion will halt and the advance guard will get its distances. Posts. 
 
 The battalion halts at the outguard, where the Texas and Table 
 Rock Roads meet, 1 mile south of Boyd S. H. (500 yards south of 
 edge of map), and the captain orders you 
 
 Move out on this right-hand road. 
 
 It is September, and the corn is head high. Pieces are loaded. 
 What do you do up to the time the advance p^arty marches? 
 
 THE FIRST SERGEANT'S SOLUTION. 
 
 After receiving the captain's first order, and before reaching the 
 outguard, I make sure that the noncommissioned officers of inv 
 platoon understand the situation as stated by the captain. On 
 arrival at the outguard, I order 
 
 Sergt. Hill, take four men of the second squad out this right-hand road as 
 point. Precede the advance party by 250 yards. At crossroads and road forks 
 look to me for direction. 
 
 (I assume he takes the rear rank, second squad.) 
 When Sergt. Hill has inarched out, I order, 
 
 Butler, take Quinn with you, and follow the point at 100 yards as connecting 
 file. 
 
 While the point and connecting file are gaining distance, I in- 
 form the platoon as follows : 
 
 Company E was attacked at Biglerville this morning. Our battalion left 
 Company D in Gettysburg. The rest of the battalion and the machine-gun 
 company are going to attack the enemy at Biglerville. Our company is the 
 advance guard and this platoon is the advance party. 
 
43 
 
 When the connecting file has marched nearly 150 yards, I com- 
 mand: 
 
 As skirmishers, guide right, march ; platoon column, march, 
 and order, 
 
 Column of files each side of the road. Corp. Koenig, in rear to watch for 
 signals. Peterson, join first squad. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 You observe that the advance guard has no reserve. It would split 
 up the company into too many parts if the advance guard in this case 
 had a reserve. The company is therefore divided in the same man- 
 ner that the support of an advance guard would be divided ; that is, 
 it has an advance party and a support proper. The point belongs 
 to the advance party. You have the point, the connecting file, and 
 the advance party proper all under your command. 
 
 Your noncommissioned officers know the situation. During the 
 minute or two that the platoon stands halted, it is well to inform 
 your men briefly what the situation is. 
 
 Whenever possible you should give your men some idea of the situ- 
 ation and of the job they are working on. In peace-time exercises 
 this policy increases the interest of the men, and in actual warfare 
 it is frequently necessary. Some of the men may be called upon to 
 act independently, in charge of the patrols or otherwise, and they 
 can not be expected to do good work unless they know what is 
 going on. 
 
 An advance party of two platoons might have an officer or sergeant 
 and one squad as point, but in the case of a single platoon it is better 
 to use only a sergeant and a half squad, unless there is a mounted 
 point in the front; in the latter case, a squad would probably be 
 better. 
 
 The distance between the point and advance party will vary ac- 
 cording to the situation. In the present case, the country is open 
 and the enemy is aggressive (he has attacked Company E), and the 
 advance guard distances are longer than would be the case in close 
 country or where the enemy is not aggressive ; as, for example, if he 
 is being pursued. We might send the point 300 yards in advance, 
 but certainly not less than 200 yards. 
 
 In some regiments there is an inclination to use more connecting 
 files than are necessary. In the present case, there are a number of 
 bends in the road and patches of woods along both sides of it. A 
 connecting file, and one only, is therefore necessary, but it is better 
 to give it the usual 100 yards distance from the point. 
 
 The captain left to you the selection of the leader and the size of 
 the point; also the question of distances and connecting files. You 
 
44 
 
 may be sure, however, that the captain will observe how you handle 
 your little problem and will correct any mistake you make. In the 
 same way, you will watch Sergt. Hill start his point, but you will 
 not interfere or make suggestions unless he does something wrong. 
 Where there is only a slight difference of opinion as to minor points, 
 the captain will not interfere with you, and you will not interfere 
 with Sergt. Hill. 
 
 The point takes an inconspicuous patrol formation, but the ad- 
 vance party can not make itself quite so inconspicuous. If the 
 advance party consists of more than one platoon, it is probably better 
 to march it in column of twos, the men separating so as to march in 
 double column of files along the sides of the road. Where the ad- 
 vance party is a single platoon, there are several advantages in de- 
 ploying as skirmishers and then marching as a platoon column, the 
 men spreading as already mentioned. There is room between the 
 fences for the original deployment, since the platoon column soon 
 relieves the crowding. The platoon is then ready to jump into place 
 in an orderly skirmish line the instant you stretch your arms later- 
 ally to the signal : "As skirmishers, march." You should drill your 
 platoon frequently in deploying from platoon column to skirmish 
 line to the front, right front, left front, and even to the right and 
 left. You should place yourself quickly where you wish the center 
 of the line to be, and extend your arms so that they mark the exact 
 line you wish to form. 
 
 The captain said that he would look out for flank reconnaissance. 
 Your advance party is really too small to do so. However, you will 
 watch the flanks very closely, and may even send a man to some 
 near-by high point, but only when this point is especially advanta- 
 geous for observation. In this connection compare situation IV, first 
 problem. 
 
 It might have been better to have assigned two platoons to the ad- 
 vance party and charge it with the flank reconnaissance. It takes 
 training and judgment to determine what flank reconnaissance is 
 necessary and what is unnecessary. Possibly, when you have shown 
 that you possess good judgment in such matters and another case like 
 the present one arises, the captain will take advantage of your judg- 
 ment and make an advance party strong enough to handle the flank 
 reconnaissance. There is, of course, an advantage in sending flank 
 patrols out from the subdivisions farthest in front. 
 
 All of Corpl. Koenig's squad except Peterson and the corporal him- 
 self have been used in the point and connecting file. The corporal 
 is available to march as platoon guide temporarily, but particularly 
 to watch for signals from the rear. Peterson should be assigned to 
 any squad that has a blank file. If no squad has a blank file, he may 
 
45 
 
 be assigned to any squad and AY ill march in the line of file closers 
 when the platoon is assembled. 
 
 SITUATION II. 
 
 The advance party, marching at ordinary gait, reached road fork 
 511 (near hill 527), and is now only 75 yards behind the connecting 
 file. The connecting file appears to be 100 yards behind the point. 
 It is evident that the point is marching cautiously. 
 
 What do you do ? 
 
 THE FIRST SERGEANT'S SOLUTION. 
 I order: 
 
 Hagen, jog ahead and overtake the point. Tell Sergt. Hill to march faster 
 and keep his distance of 250 yards. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 In a small column the advance party is really the pacemaker. It 
 must push the point ahead. In every case the column wishes to march 
 at the regular gait. In the present case it is very necessary that the 
 column be not delayed through the cautiousness of the point. We 
 are still several miles from Company E. and a difference of five min- 
 utes in the time of our arrival may have an important effect. In 
 this connection compare situation III, first problem. 
 
 You might hasten Sergt. Hill along by signaling " Forward, 
 march," or, better still, by semaphore message. 
 
 SITUATION III. 
 
 The advance party arrives on the low ridge 100 yards south of 608, 
 and is fired upon from the north. Your instinct tells you that the 
 fire comes from the vicinity of the road, at a distance of about a 
 half mile. The fire is a ragged volley, apparently a dozen rifles. 
 
 What do you do ? 
 
 THE FIRST SERGEANT'S SOLUTION. 
 
 I jump to the right-hand fence, meanwhile shouting and signaling: 
 
 As skirmishers, march. 
 
 Then I drop down and look for the enemy. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 Combined with Situation IV. 
 
 SITUATION IV. 
 
 The instant you lie down you catch the movement of men in the 
 edge of the cornfield, 3 fingers east of the house 700 yards to the 
 north. The tree tops in the ravine 200 yards north of you are about 
 
46 
 
 5 feet below your line of sight. After the ragged volley there is a 
 slight pause in the enemy's fire, followed by " fire at will " at the rate 
 of about one shot per second. The fire seems to be high. The point 
 is not visible. 
 
 What do you do? 
 
 THE FIRST SERGEANT'S SOLUTION. 
 
 I shout 
 
 Range, 700. Target: From the house on the road, 3 o'clock; 3 fingers; edge 
 of cornfield. Fire at will 
 and then examine the target and observe the fire with my field gin 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 As you march along the road you observe from time to time posi- 
 tions in front and on the flank from which the enemy might open fire. 
 With these positions in mind you probably decide beforehand, in a 
 general way, what you will do in case you are fired upon. Probably 
 all you can do in most cases will be to decide to which side of the road 
 you will jump in case the road itself is unsuitable. The rest may 
 depend upon details which you can hardly foresee or count on. When 
 you arrived about 175 yards south of 608, and almost a minute before 
 firing began, you could see the country to the north for about a half 
 mile. Along the left you could see an extensive cornfield extending 
 north from 608, and beyond that, near the house, the edge of another 
 cornfield. This was your first glimpse of the country immediately 
 north of 608. You probably asked yourself : " Which side of the road 
 is best now, in case we are fired upon from the next ridge ? " 
 
 If you were fired upon from the north and jumped to the left side 
 of the road you would commit yourself to an advance through the 
 large cornfield. In the cornfield the men would be safe from fire, but, 
 on the other hand, would not be able to fire on the enemy. Further- 
 more, your progress would be very slow and patrolling would be 
 difficult. If your command were a patrol, compelled to force its way 
 north, with no column in rear depending up it to clear the road, an 
 advance through the cornfield would be satisfactory. In the present 
 case, however, it is your duty to drive away small hostile parties and 
 also to get forward.' The best line of advance for this purpose is east 
 of the road. In a very short time you are covered by trees of the 
 ravine, then by the ravine itself, and finally, when you are again 
 visible to the enemy, you will be so close that he will not stand unless 
 his force is much larger than his fire indicated. You will have de- 
 layed the column very little, all things considered. 
 
 The advance party is made strong enough and is sent far enough in 
 advance of the support to prevent the enemy from bringing an effec- 
 tive rifle fire on the support until it can deploy. But the advance 
 
47 
 
 party is also made strong in order to be able to push small hostile 
 patrols out of the way and thus save the support the necessity of de- 
 ploying and save the whole column more than trifling delay. If you 
 estimate that the enemy in your front is so weak that you can handle 
 him alone without assistance from the support, your play is to go 
 after him as soon as you can locate him and give your advance party 
 a proper formation. In the present case you have as yet no excuse 
 for awaiting the assistance of the support. 
 
 A road is usually about 60 feet wide between fences. This gives 
 deploying room for two squads only. Since the advance party must 
 deploy and advance, it is best to form a good skirmish line first, even 
 if you lose a man or two. 
 
 A small force like your advance party should not deploy in too 
 thick a line. You have 25 rifles in your firing line. In the road there 
 is scarcely room for half of them. It is best for your expected fight, 
 and also is best from a disciplinary standpoint, to insist upon the 
 formation of a proper line and thus defeat the inclination of the men 
 to drop in their tracks. By jumping to the right-hand fence, mean- 
 time giving the signal for deployment, you throw the right half of 
 the platoon over the fence and into the field on your right. The left 
 half of the platoon will be in line quickly in the road. Your com- 
 mands for firing can be given almost at once. The men nearest you 
 then open fire. The others will open fire upon arriving in good firing 
 positions, approximately on the line. The men who are still running 
 to their places may not hear your first orders as to range and target, 
 but repetition will soon remedy this. 
 
 You may indicate the range before the target or the target before 
 the range. In the present case it makes no difference. If the target 
 is one that needs to be described very carefully and is easily lost to 
 the eye, or especially difficult to pick up a second time, it is better 
 to announce the range first, so that men need not take their eyes 
 off the target after it is shown them. 
 
 In designating a target which your men will probably have diffi- 
 culty in seeing quickly and easily, you should always follow a 
 logical system. To illustrate what we mean we shall analyze your 
 target designation in the present case. When you shouted " target," 
 your men were warned to listen attentively and look sharply. When 
 you shouted " From the house on the road " you indicated a reference 
 point that the men could pick up quickly and without fail. Your 
 next command was " 3 o'clock." The men then looked in the direc- 
 tion in which the hour hand of the clock would point at 3 o'clock, 
 if the house were the center of the clock. When you commanded 
 " 3 fingers " your men held up three fingers at right angles to the 
 hour hand, with the outer edge of the left finger against the house. 
 They knew then that your next command would indicate some spot 
 
48 
 
 very close to the point where the line of sight past the outer edge 
 of the right finger intersected the hour hand of the clock. So when 
 you commanded " edge of cornfield " your men not only knew which 
 cornfield you referred to, but they also knew about how far east of 
 the house they should look for their target. 
 
 Suppose, now, that you had said: "Target: Edge of cornfield, 
 8 fingers, 3 o'clock from the house on the road." By the time you had 
 pointed out to them the house on the road, your men might have 
 forgotten the o'clock and number of fingers and the particular spot 
 that you wished them to look at. The logical system, therefore, is 
 to warn the men by shouting "target"; then indicate the point 
 which you propose to use as the center of the clock; then indicate 
 the direction in which the imaginary hour hand is pointing ; then 
 indicate the number of fingers; and finally indicate the indistinct 
 point at which you desire to direct their attention. If you reverse 
 this order, or mix it up, or even if you give the proper order too 
 rapidly, you will find that you will have to repeat yourself. 
 
 If your men have any difficulty in understanding the use of the 
 clock face, tell them to imagine that they have a photograph of the 
 country in front of them, and that the house on the road is in the 
 center of the photograph. Now, if the photograph is placed against 
 a wall and the hour hand of the clock moves around it with the 
 house as a center, it will be clear that " 12 o'clock " indicates a line 
 extending beyond (north) of the house as far as they can see; "3 
 o'clock" indicates a line toward Herrman; "9 o'clock" indicates a 
 line toward Texas; and "6 o'clock" indicates a line from the house 
 toward the platoon. The sketch on page 49 represents the country 
 as seen by your platoon. The house is in the center of the sketch. 
 By studying the radial lines you will readily understand the use 
 of the vertical clock-face system on ground which is roughly a hori- 
 zontal surface. (This sketch has been prepared from the map only, 
 and not on the ground. Defects in the sketch might be discovered 
 by a visit to the ground, but it is probably correct in the main and 
 serves our purpose.) 
 
 When the arm is extended full length, 3 fingers will measure one- 
 tenth of the range. You know that the range is 700 yards and you 
 saw signs of the enemy in the edge of the corn field TO yards cast of 
 the house. If you had seen the enemy 100 yards east of the house the 
 point would have measured 4 or 4-J fingers. But when you are on the 
 ground the distance in fingers is determined directly by trial and not 
 by the arbitary rule that w y e have adopted here. 
 
 The School of Musketry has evolved a very simple and accurate 
 method of using the rear sight leaf of the rifle instead of fingers to 
 indicate distance from a reference point. Naturally we use the system 
 with which we are most familiar. 
 
49 
 
 96790 17- 
 
50 
 
 Whenever possible you should indicate the two ends of your target 
 in order that your men may distribute their fire over the whole target, 
 but in the present case it is impossible to do so and open fire quickly. 
 The full extent of the target is not yet determined and you must trust 
 to luck in getting distribution. Later, you may be able to correct this 
 defect. 
 
 If there had been good cover near by for the platoon it would lui\v 
 been proper to break into double time at the first volley and seize 
 advantage of this cover, but that is not the case here. 
 
 The fact that you deployed and opened fire does not mean that you 
 intend to stay here. By the time the last man is in place and ready 
 for the advance it would be well to whistle "suspend firing" and 
 quickly judge your next move. 
 
 SITUATION V. 
 
 After your .platoon has been firing about 30 seconds you whistle 
 " suspend firing." Only one man, " Schafer, has been wounded. The 
 support appears to be approaching the house south of you in column 
 of squads. The enemy's fire continues at about the same rate as be- 
 fore, but is not accurate. The point is in the ravine in front of you. 
 The road parallel to your front is about 10 feet lower than the tree 
 tops in the ravine north of the road. 
 
 1. What do you intend to do? 
 
 2. What are your orders? 
 
 THE FIRST SERGEANT'S SOLUTION. 
 
 1. I intend to advance to the road by a rush ; then advance in quick 
 time to the north side of the wooded ravine, carefully watching both 
 flanks. 
 
 2. I blow a short whistle blast and signal- 
 Cease firing. 
 
 Then I shout- 
 Get set. 
 
 When all appear to be ready, I jump up, shout- 
 Follow me 
 and lead the platoon at a run toward the road. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 You may run into a larger Red force than you anticipated. That 
 remains to be seen. If you judge their strength from the volume of 
 their fire, you are obliged in this case to advance almost at once. 
 
51 
 
 Your advance may prove that your guess as to the hostile strength 
 is wrong. On the other hand, if you wait for the support to help 
 you out and then find later that 8 or 10 Reds have held you up, you 
 will be very much disappointed with yourself. 
 
 Unless the enemy increases the volume or effect of his fire, you 
 should have no difficulty in reaching the road and the cover of the 
 trees in the ravine. As soon as the trees screen you from the enemy, 
 he will have no target to aim at. From this point you can safely 
 advance at .a rapid walk until you are again exposed to the enemy's 
 view. This will be when you have arrived some distance north of 
 the ravine. 
 
 The Infantry Drill Regulations teach that fire superiority is 
 necessary to the successful advance of an attack. This is not literally 
 true in the case of every small detachment, or where a greatly supe- 
 rior force is peculiarly favored by the ground. In the present case 
 the defender's fire is not effective, and you have good cover a short 
 distance in front of you. It would be wrong to settle down into a 
 fire fight with a view of creating a powerful moral effect on the 
 enemy by the use of fire, or of matching your fire with his. When 
 you have passed the ravine and are again exposed to the enemy's 
 fire the situation may be different because of the open ground be- 
 tween you and him. 
 
 Whether the platoon is alone or deployed as part of the company, 
 Infantry Drill Regulations (222) require you to arrange carefully 
 the details for a prompt and vigorous execution of your proposed 
 rush. You are told to cause the men to cease firing and to hold 
 themselves in readiness to spring forward instantly. No preparatory 
 command or signal is prescribed, although the signal, " Cease firing," 
 and the caution, " Get set," or " Ready," will be a sufficient indica- 
 tion to trained men. Furthermore, you will not jump up and lead 
 the platoon forward until you and your guide can determine from 
 the positions of the men that all are ready and understand. You 
 should teach them to draw up one knee close to the body without 
 raising the body from the ground. 
 
 When you signaled, " Cease firing," the men were already in the 
 position of " suspend firing." The difference between the two is that 
 in " cease firing " the sights are laid down, the men are not required 
 to keep their eyes on the target, and they know from experience that 
 a movement or change in formation will probably follow. 
 
 The flanks of a deployed line are vulnerable. If there are few 
 men in the line, men can not be spared for combat patrols. The 
 commander must watch his flanks very closely and do the best he can 
 without sending patrols to a distance. The situation also affects the 
 question of flank protection. If your platoon were alone, with no 
 
52 
 
 supporting troops near, you would be obliged to detach men to 
 watch your flanks in an attack over the ground on which we are 
 now working. In the present case, the support is behind you and 
 very likely has patrols on the flanks. 
 
 Unless Schafer's wound is one which requires immediate action, 
 which is rarely the case, you are obliged to leave him by the side of 
 the road, without an attendant. In a short time he will receive 
 more intelligent care from the sanitary personnel. Under the cir- 
 cumstances it would be wrong for you to bother about him, and the 
 men nearest to him could do no more than help him to a convenient 
 place, unless he were threatened with a heavy loss of blood. When 
 proper medical care is so near at hand it is not w T ell to tinker with 
 a man, and it is wrong to decrease your fighting strength because 
 of any undue regard for his comfort. 
 
 SITUATION VI. - 
 
 After passing the 608 Herman Road, the whole platoon advanced 
 east of and parallel to the 608 Table Rock Road. 
 
 The platoon has now arrived 400 yards north of crossroad 608, 
 between the orchard and road. The edge of the cornfield is clearly 
 visible. There are no signs of the enemy. The point is in the edge 
 of the cornfield, west of the road, 450 yards north of crossroad 608. 
 The connecting file has joined the platoon. The support appears to 
 be between crossroad 608 and the wooded ravine, but you can not 
 see whether it is deployed or assembled. 
 
 What do you do? 
 
 THE FIRST SERGEANT'S SOLUTION. 
 I order 
 
 Butler, tell the point to continue the march on the road ; then you and 
 Quinn follow again at 100 yards as connecting file. 
 
 To Corpl. Clark: 
 
 Your squad will go 50 yards into the cornfield, about where the enemy was, 
 and search for dead and wounded. Then join me on the road. 
 
 I lead the remainder of the platoon in skirmish line toward the 
 house, with the intention of continuing the march on the road in 
 platoon column. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 A small body of hostile troops can delay our column by firing 
 upon it, no matter how aggressively we handle the advance guard 
 work. One of the great advantages in having Cavalry attached to 
 the Infantry is due to the fact that the Cavalry can frequently drive 
 off these small parties without delaying the Infantry column. If our 
 
53 
 
 battalion had had even a half troop of Cavalry attached to it, there 
 probably would have been no delay. The Cavalry would have pre- 
 ceded the Infantry by considerable distance and, by trotting ahead 
 after this minor fight, would have regained whatever time it lost by 
 reason of the fight. 
 
 You have been delayed a few minutes, however, and now, having 
 compelled the enemy to withdraw from your front, it is urgent that 
 you make the delay as short as possible. It does not se^m necessary 
 to comment upon the manner in which this was done. You merely 
 reestablish your advance party on the road and start forward. If the 
 point were not conveniently located, you would probably prefer to 
 send out a new point. 
 
 There is a twofold reason for sending Corpl. Clark into the corn- 
 lield in search of dead and wounded. It may be possible to assist 
 some men who might otherwise escape discovery by the inhabitants 
 and thus suffer unnecessarily. A more important reason, probably, 
 is the fact that valuable information may be obtained, not only from 
 the uniforms and pockets of the dead and wounded, but also by 
 questioning wounded men who are conscious. If it involved a long 
 detour, you would not send a patrol on such mission, with such lack 
 of evidence as to whether there really were any dead or wounded. 
 
 SITUATION VII. 
 
 Corpl. Clark's squad has rejoined. The corporal reported : 
 
 I found a wounded cavalryman. He said that his squadron had been sent 
 to cut the railroad and had fought Blue Infantry this morning. I brought him 
 to the road and left Hagen in charge, to turn him over to the captain. 
 
 From Table Rock S. H. you saw high dust south of Table Rock, 
 and a moment later you caught a glimpse of 8 or 10 mounted men 
 rapidly riding north into Table Rock. 
 
 You reach the first house (south end) of Table Rock. On each 
 side of the road there is a broad ditch nearly 2 feet deep. A stiff 
 volley comes from a direction squarely to the left of you and from a 
 point rather close to you. A momentary pause follows. 
 
 What do you do? 
 
 I face about, shout, " Cover," and jump into the ditch on the west side of 
 the road. Then I look for the enemy. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 While you were marching into Table Rock, the ditches alongside 
 of the road certainly attracted your attention because of their 
 
54 
 
 tactical value. In a former situation, we said you would study the 
 ground as you marched. Your advance party is likely to be fired 
 upon from any direction. The troops in rear of you will be saved 
 from such annoyance because of your advance party marching in 
 front, and the flank patrols that the support will send out from time 
 to time. In a large command the advance party itself will receive 
 better protection because the command will have Cavalry, and this 
 Cavalry can send patrols to the flanks ahead of the advance party. 
 While approaching Table Rock you probably thought as follows: 
 
 If we are fired upon from the front, we'll make a break for the nearest 
 houses ; if we are fired upon from the right, we will jump into the ditch on the 
 right ; if we are fired upon from the left, we will jump into the ditch on the left. 
 
 In other words, your action was practically decided upon before 
 the volley was fired. This is not always possible, but with practice 
 in field exercises you will find that you will rarely be caught unpre- 
 pared for reasonably quick action. 
 
 In a previous situation we pointed out that you should make the 
 platoon do exactly as you wished. You can not do so if you are in 
 the habit of attempting impracticable or impossible things. Gener- 
 ally, only the simplest thing will work. Your men look instinctively 
 to you the instant the first shot is fired, unless their experience has 
 shown them that you get rattled and that they have to shift for 
 themselves until you pull yourself together. In the present case, if 
 you jump into the ditch and say nothing, the men will probably 
 follow suit. But no matter how obvious may be the necessity for 
 seeking cover at once, an order to that effect gives the impression of 
 quick thinking and decision. To act properly even in such a case 
 trains your men to expect orders and not to adopt their own ideas. 
 Sometimes, when the natural inclination of your men may be to do 
 one thing, you may have a very good reason for wanting them to do 
 something else. In such case, if your men have learned that you 
 never fail to indicate quickly what you want done, their eyes and ears 
 will expect signals and orders, and you will have their attention at 
 once. 
 
 Noncommissioned officers of Infantry and Cavalry are often sud- 
 denly confronted by many peculiar and novel situations requiring 
 quick and decisive action. In such moments they need the strict 
 attention of their men, but they will not receive it if the men have 
 discovered that it is wasted. 
 
 In a sense, the enemy has surprised you. Let the men get the best 
 cover available, while you expose yourself only enough to locate the 
 enemy and see what else is going on. One of the disadvantages of 
 marching in platoon column is the mixing of the platoon which re- 
 sults when the right half crosses the road and joins the left half. 
 
55 
 
 This could be avoided by signaling, "As skirmishers, march," and 
 facing to the left, thus placing the right half of the platoon on the 
 right. However, the mixing which results from the method-whlch 
 we have adopted affects only two squads and can be straightened 
 out quickly. We shall leave it this way for the purpose of the next 
 situation. 
 
 If you march along the road and estimate that the danger is 
 greatest on one or both flanks, a platoon may be marched in platoon 
 column, but broken in such a manner that one squad leads, say, 
 on the right side of the road; the next squad follows, but on the 
 left of the road; the next squad on the right, and so on. Which- 
 ever flank the platoon faces, squads will be together when formed in 
 one line and there will be no crowding. When you reach a point 
 on the road where the greatest danger is in front, it will only be 
 necessary to order, " Close up," and the platoon will be ready for a 
 rapid deployment astride the road. If serious danger is appre- 
 hended, you would change the formation as the direction of possible 
 danger changed. 
 
 You are frequently told that it is unpardonable to be surprised. 
 This hardly applies to patrols, or even small advance parties. It 
 does apply to your battalion. The battalion uses the point, advance 
 party, and flank patrols to guard itself against surprise, but these 
 latter detachments can not always avoid surprise. By surprise we 
 mean, in the present case, unforeseen hostile fire at effective range. 
 
 SITUATION VIII. 
 
 After the volley the enemy fires at will. There are probably 50 
 rifles firing upon you. You soon realize that the enemy is firing 
 through the tops of the trees along the creek northwest of you, and 
 therefore not very accurately. In a moment you see between these 
 tree tops the movements of several men who are firing from the edge 
 of the woods 500 yards away and on line with hill 651. The point 
 has previously taken the left-hand road and is not in sight. The 
 support, southwest of road fork 567, is starting to deploy into the 
 orchard. All this has happened in a half minute. It has taken you 
 this much time to get your bearings and locate the enemy. 
 
 What do vou do? 
 
 I shout 
 Target 
 extend my arm toward the woods and add 
 
 Look sharply up the slope. Edge of woods. Range, 500. Fire at will. 
 Then I resume my observation. 
 
56 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 You have a difficult target to describe. If we were on the ground, 
 we might find some conspicuous object to assist in target designation. 
 On the other hand, we might see as little as we see on the map, or 
 even less. The conditions of our ordinary fire problems are generally 
 too ideal. We can quickly pick up the limits of the target. The view 
 is generally unobstructed. In the present case we can not wait to 
 make a long examination and explanation. The support is deploying 
 with the intention of attacking. It is the duty of the advance party 
 to attract to itself as much of the enemy's attention and fire as 
 possible. Hence the advance party should fire as soon as it locates a 
 part, if not all, of the enemy's force. All that you can do for the 
 present is to direct the attention of your men to the edge of the 
 woods. Every man must find for himself an opening through the 
 tree tops and fire upon whatever men he sees through his opening. 
 Each man's view will be different. None will see much. This is no 
 time to bother with fire distribution. Firing exercises teach sound 
 principles of command and execution. You will apply these princi- 
 ples whenever you can. When, in your judgment, the situation makes 
 it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to indicate the limits and to 
 expect fire distribution, do not fool away valuable time in a useless 
 effort to be perfect, but tackle your job in the simplest and most 
 practical way that occurs to you. This advice, however, should not 
 .be made an excuse for failing to be more definite and exact when 
 time and conditions permit. 
 
 In a previous situation the advance party alone drove out the 
 enemy. It is evident it can not do so now. The volume of the enemy's 
 fire has caused the support commander to see the situation in the 
 same light. The support is therefore preparing to assist you in driv- 
 ing the enemy out or in determining his exact strength and position. 
 The most decisive results will come from the action of the support. 
 The more you can attract the enemy to the advance party the easier 
 will it be for the support when finally it is able to open fire and push 
 its attack. 
 
 You might be tempted to advance at once under whatever cover is 
 offered by the trees along the creek, but you will not gain time by 
 doing so, and when the support opens fire the advance will be much 
 easier. 
 
 SITUATION IX. 
 
 Four minutes after you opened fire, the right flank of the support 
 appeared in the northwest corner of the orchard (west of road fork 
 567). The left flank seems to be west of the creek. The point is 
 
57 
 
 north of you, at the house nearest the bridge. You have not seen 
 the main body. The enemy has been firing steadily upon your ad- 
 vance party. His fire, like your own, has been interfered with" by 
 trees along the creek. One man on your left seems to be wounded. 
 You are about in the center of the platoon. A moment later the 
 support opens a vigorous fire. Another moment, and the fire upon 
 your advance party is reduced by half. 
 
 The field in front of you is flat. The brush along the creek is head 
 high, but does not reach the foliage of the trees by 6 feet. 
 
 What do you intend to do ? 
 
 I intend to advance to the creek at once. The platoon being some- 
 what mixed, I will send forward, first, the men on my right, then the 
 men on my left. If cover all the way to the creek is not good, the 
 advance will be made in two " hitches." 
 
 Disctrssiox. 
 
 We have purposely thrown on you the full responsibility for han- 
 dling the platoon. W"e think that ordinarily you would receive from 
 the captain some instructions or hints to guide your actions. On the 
 other hand, you will often be called upon to act on your own re- 
 sponsibility, without any intimation as to what the captain desires. 
 When this happens, you should comply with the spirit of paragraphs 
 372 and 373, Infantry Drill Regulations. 
 
 The attack by our company or battalion will be without result 
 unless we close on the enemy. As soon as the support gets into ac- 
 tion and the effect of its fire is felt by the enemy, your waiting game 
 ceases. From this point you should not hold back unless an advance 
 is impossible. 
 
 It is over 200 yards to the creek. There is a 6-foot strip of day- 
 light between the brush and the foliage of the trees. From the road 
 you can not tell what the effect of this strip will be on your advance. 
 Your first real halt will be at the creek. Any intermediate halt that 
 may be necessary will be made only for the purpose of holding the 
 enemy under fire while the platoon covers long, exposed stretches (if 
 you find any) by rushes, or to save the men from the fatigue of a 
 long, continuous, rapid advance. 
 
 We would not recommend an attempt to advance by the road and 
 the two bridges north of you. The men would have to slip to the 
 right, exposed to the enemy's view and fire. Unless the long way 
 around has some special advantage, the short way is the better. 
 
58 
 
 Sergt. Hill, in command of the point, seems to understand that it 
 is necessary for him to watch your right flank. He appears to have 
 taken over the duties of a combat patrol. As long as his action and 
 movements are satisfactory, it will not be necessary to give him 
 any orders. 
 
 The preparation, orders, and signals for an advance by rushes will 
 be considered more in detail in another problem. 
 
 The next change in the situation will make your platoon a combat 
 patrol. This will be made the subject of the problem which follows. 
 
FIFTH PROBLEM. 
 
 A COMBAT PATROL. 
 
 EXPLANATION. 
 
 "Reconnaissance continues throughout the action. A firing or 
 skirmish line can take care of its front, but its flanks are especially 
 vulnerable to modern firearms. The moral effect of flanking fire is 
 as great as the physical effect. Hence, combat patrols to give warn- 
 ing or covering detachments to give security are indispensable on 
 exposed flanks. This is equally true in attack or defense." (I. D. R. 
 396.) 
 
 By a careful reading of the paragraph quoted, you conclude that if 
 the force sent out on the exposed flank is so small that it can only give 
 warning, it is called a combat patrol. If it is large enough to offer 
 resistance, it is called a covering detachment. The distinction in 
 name is unimportant. For convenience, all bodies sent to an exposed 
 flank to warn or resist are called combat patrols unless they are quite 
 large. If a regiment is fighting alone, the colonel may send a com- 
 pany to an exposed flank and call it the right (or left) flank detach- 
 ment. If a brigade is fighting alone, the same company may be sent 
 to an exposed flank and may be called preferably a combat patrol. In 
 practice, it is partly a matter of relative size, and partly a matter of 
 taste and convenience. The important thing is to know that the de- 
 tachment, whether it is called a combat patrol or a covering detach- 
 ment, will resist if it is strong enough, but in every case it will give 
 early warning and full information. 
 
 The size of a combat patrol depends upon a great many things that 
 need not be discussed in connection with the present problem. It may 
 consist of only two men. It is conceivable that in some cases one 
 man, favorably located to observe and signal, would make a satisfac- 
 tory combat patrol. 
 
 SITUATION I. 
 
 This is a continuation of the last situation of the preceding 
 problem. 
 
 Your advance party is now on the north side of the creek, 200 
 yards west of the bridge. The support is on your left, 250 yards 
 
 (59) 
 
60 
 
 away, but moving north toward the woods. Firing has ceased. The 
 enemy has disappeared, evidently having mounted up behind the 
 woods and galloped toward 632. The point is on the bridge. Your 
 former connecting file is with the platoon. As you start to move for- 
 ward, the battalion adjutant arrives and says to you : 
 
 Red Cavalry has driven Company E a mile north of Biglerville, but Com- 
 pany E is still fighting. Most of the Red Cavalry seems to be between here and 
 Biglerville, probably in position 1 mile northwest of us. The battalion is going 
 to attack at once in the direction of Biglerville. Take your platoon to the top 
 of that hill (pointing to hill 646) as a combat patrol 
 
 1. What do you think? 
 
 2. What do you intend to do ? 
 
 3. What orders do you give up to the time you reach the vicinity of 
 553, assuming no change in the situation ? 
 
 1. Combat patrol on that hill. I may have to fight to get the hill. 
 My left flank is secure enough. As I march to the hill I shall need a 
 patrol in front and another on the right flank. Better keep off the 
 road and be ready to deploy. 
 
 2. I intend to march by the right flank to the road; to send the 
 original point forward by the shortest route to the top of the spur 
 250 yards northeast of road -fork 553, and thence along the crest to 
 hill 646; to send another patrol of three men northeast toward the 
 cast base of the spur, and thence to the top of the spur, to a point 
 probably 300 yards northeast of road fork 553, from which the patrol 
 can observe the country to the east and northeast and at the same 
 time signal to me. Then I intend to restore the organization of the 
 platoon and march on the right of the road and parallel to it. 
 
 3. I command, 
 
 By the right Hank, march 
 
 and march at the head of the column toward the sharp turn in the 
 road. 
 
 I signal the point to join me, and then give the following order 
 to Sergt. Hill and Corpl. Koenig: 
 
 Company E is still fighting somewhere north of Biglerville, in that direction 
 (pointing). The enemy will probably put up a fight a mile from here on that 
 high ground (pointing to the northwest) between here and Biglerville. Our 
 battalion will attack at once toward Biglerville. This platoon is the combat 
 patrol on the right flank. We are going to that hill (646). Sergt. Hill, march 
 your point at once to the top of that spur (pointing to the spur northeast 
 of road fork 553), then along the spur to the top of the hill. Corpl. Koenig, 
 take two men and patrol through those woods (pointing to the woods south- 
 east of road fork 553). Make a loop to the north and west so as to see the 
 country to the northeast, and then halt on the top of the spur where you can 
 see the country to the east and northeast and at the same time see me. The 
 platoon will march in the fields along the right of the road. 
 
61 
 
 Then I march to the first house north of the bridge, assemble the 
 platoon, restore its organization, and give the following orders : 
 
 The enemy is probably on that high ground and a mile northwest, of here. 
 Company E is fighting farther north. Our battalion is going to attack. Our 
 platoon is the combat patrol on the right flank of the battalion. We are going 
 to that hill. Corpl. Clark, platoon guide. Towney, fall out and march so 
 as to be able to see me and at the same time see the battalion, if possible, but 
 keep within 100 yards of the platoon. As skirmishers, march. Platoon column, 
 march. 
 
 I lead the platoon through the cornfield, marching about 30 yards 
 from the fence and keeping about 150 yards in rear of the point. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 Our purpose in asking, " What do you think? " is to encourage you 
 to settle clearly in your mind, when time permits, the salient points 
 that will influence your intentions and orders before taking action 
 and issuing orders. 
 
 The enemy is not likely to leave such an excellent observation 
 point as hill 646 without a patrol on it. This is particularly true 
 when the enemy's force consists of cavalry, as in this case. Because 
 of its mobility, cavalry sends patrols longer distances from its main 
 body. Therefore, you may be obliged to fight for possession of hill 
 646. It is possible that you may find the hostile force on the hill 
 too strong for you ; but this fact, if you find it to be a fact, becomes 
 very important information for our battalion commander. The at- 
 tack of the battalion, as planned, might then become impracticable. 
 Therefore, your conclusion must be that it is your duty to attack 
 any force that you find near hill 646 in order to drive it out quickly, 
 if possible, or failing in this, then to fight vigorously enough to learn 
 its strength and position. 
 
 A march in skirmish line would cause unnecessary fatigue and 
 disorder. Even if such a formation were a justifiable excuse for 
 dispensing with a point, which is doubtful in this case, it would 
 still necessitate the flank patrol. Under the circumstances it is 
 better to march in a platoon column with proper protection. 
 
 All bodies of troops marching in the actual or probable presence 
 of an enemy must protect themselves from surprise. The number 
 and strength of these covering detachments, or patrols, as the case 
 may be, vary according to the strength of the whole force, the immi- 
 nence and nature of the danger, and the ground. A detachment 
 sent out to cover (protect) a force will generally have its own cover- 
 ing detachments. For example, your platoon is a covering detach- 
 ment (combat patrol) for the battalion, but you also must have your 
 own covering detachments. Therefore, you have a point and a right 
 flank patrol, not counting Towney, who is merely to keep you in 
 communication with the battalion if possible. Furthermore, Sergt. 
 
62 
 
 Hill will probably march with one man in front of him and one man 
 on his right, while he and another man form what might be called 
 the main body of the point. 
 
 In view of the short distance to your destination, it would be 
 unwise to march on the road. There is an even chance that you will 
 draw fire from the vicinity of hill 646. By marching in the fields 
 your men can deploy quickly without running into fences. Further- 
 more, as you approach hill 646 you will naturally want to reach 
 the higher ground east of the road so as to be on fairly even terms 
 with your enemy, if you meet one. 
 
 You did not prescribe a distance between the point and the platoon. 
 The reason for this is that the point would take a route somewhat 
 different from your own. It is necessary for Sergt. Hill to reach the 
 top of the spur quickly and march along the crest in order to see to- 
 ward the northeast. The platoon, on the other hand, should march 
 under cover of this spur, but close enough to the crest to occupy it in 
 case of necessity. Furthermore, you are now guiding on the point 
 (not vice versa, as in the fourth problem) and may vary your dis- 
 tance from time to time. 
 
 The platoon should be checked up and organization should be re- 
 stored as often as necessary and possible, but it is best to do so under 
 safe cover, as, for example, the house selected. The house has the 
 probable further advantage of a water supply for your men. How- 
 ever, you would lose time if you attended to this matter first. Hence, 
 you would first send out the necessary patrols and as they are gain- 
 ing their distances you would assemble the platoon and prepare for 
 the forward movement. 
 
 For reasons of your own you have again sent the platoon guide in 
 command of the point. The senior corporal should be designated as 
 platoon guide for that part of the platoon which remains directly 
 under your command. In this connection, you may be curious to 
 know why the Infantry Drill Regulations give the platoon leader an 
 assistant who is second in command while the captain has none. 
 When a company deploys the captain gives his commands, orders, 
 and signals to platoon leaders only. If he passed over these leaders 
 and tried to handle 15 or 16 squads in battle his control would fail 
 oftener than it would succeed. If he tried to handle every man 
 directly matters would be still worse; the line is too long and the 
 excitement and noise are too great. A platoon is small enough to 
 permit the observation and control of individuals; hence all com- 
 mands, orders, and signals intended for individuals, or squads, or 
 the platoon as a whole, are given by the platoon leader. Only the 
 general movements and actions of the platoon are indicated by the 
 captain to the platoon leader. This throws on the platoon leader the 
 necessity for watching to the front and rear, and sometimes the flank, 
 
63 
 
 and studying the situation with a view to planning future action. 
 Some one must observe the men in the line in order to preserve con- 
 trol, discipline, and steadiness. The platoon leader can not do both. 
 The guide, or second in command, is the watchman and disciplinarian. 
 If the company is so small that the captain chooses to handle it as a 
 single platoon (I. D. R. 166), the function of watchman and discipli- 
 narian passes to the lieutenants and first sergeant. There will always 
 be a first sergeant or acting first sergeant available. To follow out 
 the principles explained above the platoon, whether with the com- 
 pany or acting alone, must always have a platoon guide. In battle 
 or skirmish you will quickly see the advantage of this firm control, 
 an advantage that may not be so apparent in peacetime exercises. 
 
 SITUATION II. 
 
 When } r ou restored the organization of the platoon (that is, re- 
 formed the squads and checked up your men) you found that Schafer, 
 Stone, and Wilson were missing. Schafer was wounded in the first 
 skirmish. Their squad leaders tell you that Stone and Wilson were 
 wounded in the skirmish just ended. 
 
 You are now at the head of the platoon column and 150 yards north 
 of road fork 553. You can see only the chimney of the house on 
 hill 646. The point is about 150 yards north of you and 100 yards 
 east of the road, but is momentarily lost to view. You see a -few 
 Blues about 200 yards south of hill 651, but there is no firing in that 
 direction. Five or six rifles open fire from the vicinity of hill 646; 
 a moment later you hear your point open fire. 
 
 What do you do? 
 
 THE FIRST SERGEANT'S SOLUTION. 
 
 I command and signal 
 As skirmishers, 2 paces, march, 
 
 and continue the advance at a fast walk, preceding the platoon so as 
 to get an early view of the ground around hill 646. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 You have some yards to go before you reach the secondary ridge 
 which the road crosses about 200 yards north of road fork 553. When 
 you reach the crest of this ridge you may be fired upon, but, more 
 important than this, you will be able to return the fire and start an 
 attack. Skirmish line should therefore be formed before the platoon 
 is exposed. 
 
 You have now only 20 men in your skirmish line. At 2 paces 
 interval these men will form a line about 45 yards long. The normal 
 
64 
 
 firing line should hold about one man to each yard of front. But this 
 applies to firing lines of larger forces, where there is only a certain 
 amount of front available or usable and it is necessary to place along 
 that front as many rifles as possible. When we deal with a platoon 
 or less, and sometimes a company or more, there is an advantage in 
 making a line longer and thinner (that is, less than one man per 
 yard). It may sometimes reduce the vulnerability of our line, con- 
 sidered as a target, and permit better cover for individuals. It may 
 enable us to point more rifles on our own target, particularly where 
 the ground is broken or the enemy has good cover and is shifting a 
 great deal. But when you intentionally make your firing line longer 
 you must adhere strictly to two principles : First, the line must not be 
 too long for easy control ; second, the line must not be made so long 
 that the end rifles can not get on your target. 
 
 When the platoon is in skirmish line your post is in front during a 
 rush or charge; otherwise, it is in rear of the center, unless you have a 
 reason for going elsewhere. In the present case you precede the 
 platoon, if only by a few yards, in order to be the first to see over 
 tl\e ridge. In this connection see Infantry Drill Regulations 369, 
 second section. 
 
 SITUATION III. 
 
 After a short, sharp fire fight you drove a hostile patrol away from 
 hill 646 and reached the farmyard in skirmish line. 1 Apparently two 
 of our companies are in skirmish line, halted astride the road between 
 Gainer and crossroad 632. A moment ago some one near Gainer took 
 your semaphore message reporting progress. The same person sig- 
 naled : 
 
 Enemy in position half mile west of here. 
 
 One man of Corpl. Koenig's patrol is in sight, halted about 300 
 yards northeast of road fork 553. Sergt. Hill's point joined the 
 platoon during the advance, the high corn offering sufficient tem- 
 porary right-flank protection. There has been no firing anywhere 
 since you ceased firing. There seems to be a Red patrol near 647. 
 (Walinski was wounded when the point was first fired upon, but he 
 was able to walk. You sent him to Hirst, alone.) 
 
 How do you post the combat patrol ? 
 
 THE FIRST SERGEANT'S SOLUTION. 
 
 I place 3 men at the 646 farmhouse or barn to post themselves high 
 enough to see the 647 ridge, to see the Benders Church ridge beyond 
 
 1 In this and following problems it will be necessary to pass over many important 
 and interesting phases in this manner, in order to avoid a multiplicity of situations 
 more or less alike. The object of these problems is to present a variety of situations 
 rather than all the situations confronting a particular command. Naturally, company 
 commanders will use the method that best suits their purpose. 
 
65 
 
 the cornfield, to see Corpl. Koenig's signalman, and to signal toward 
 Gainer. I send 2 men to the bend in the road 300 yards southwest 
 of crossroad 600. The rest of the platoon marches into the field west 
 of hill 646, concealed by the corn, and advances toward 600 until a 
 line facing 600 is shortened to about 30 yards by the fences along the 
 roads. The corn in front, as far as the fences, is trampled down so 
 as to give firing positions for the platoon to fire upon hill 647 and 
 the fields southwest of it. The platoon then conceals itself by falling 
 back about 5 yards into the standing corn. A man on the left flank 
 is detailed to watch toward the patrol southwest of crossroad 600 and 
 along the road to Benders Church. A man on the right flank is 
 detailed to watch the patrol at hill 646. I remain near the edge of 
 the standing corn so as to observe the 647 ridge and to the northwest 
 and west. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 It is difficult to post a small command with the aid of a map only. 
 A visit to the ground may prove that your solution is by no means 
 the best. A map does not show the minor accidents of ground and 
 cultivation that are most useful to a small force. However, the 
 solution will serve our purpose, which is to show the relation of the 
 combat patrol to the battalion and what the patrol should be 
 prepared to do. 
 
 Apparently the battalion is making careful preparations for its 
 attack. The enemy is very likely along the edge of the cornfield, 
 about 600 yards west of crossroad 632. Firing may begin while you 
 are still making the dispositions mentioned in the solution. Even- 
 tually the right flank of the battalion may reach the patch of woods 
 north of crossroad 632. You can see that this flank of the battalion 
 is exposed to attack from the ridge that extends from hill 647 south- 
 west to the cornfield 600 yards west of crossroads 600. A counter- 
 attack from this direction is especially to be provided against in the 
 present case, since the enemy's force consists of Cavalry. Your task, 
 then, is to protect this flank, by defensive action if possible, but 
 by ample warning at all events. This is the most important area to 
 be watched. Other areas that require watching are the ravine 
 between the 647 ridge and the 600 Benders Church Road, the 
 Benders Church Ridge, and (particularly since the hostile force con- 
 sists of Cavalry) the various roads about three-quarters of a mile 
 east of hill 646. 
 
 Your patrol of three men on hill 646 can see the Guernsey 610 
 Biglerville Road, from hill 647, south of Guernsey, as far as the 
 orchard 700 yards southwest of road fork 610, and much of the 
 intervening ground. This patrol is almost certain to see any large 
 force that may enter the ravine between the two 647 hills. It can 
 9679017 5 
 
66 
 
 see almost a mile along the Benders Church Ridge. Tt can receive 
 and transmit signals from and to Corpl. Koenig and the battalion 
 commander. It can also see the 632 626 Biglerville Road almost 
 to Biglerville. Corpl. Koenig's patrol can see almost a mile to the 
 northeast, east, and southeast. Your patrol of two men, 300 yards 
 west of crossroads 600, is less important, but is desirable on account 
 of the small area north of the 600 632 road not otherwise visible, 
 and because you may not otherwise maintain connection with the 
 right flank of the battalion firing line. Personally, you can see the 
 ridge from which a counterattack is most to be feared. 
 
 The platoon is posted so as to open fire quickly on the ridge just 
 mentioned. From its present position it can also stop an advance 
 by way of the ravine southeast of 647 ridge, although the men in 
 this case may have to change their firing positions. The platoon is 
 not in position to stop an advance along the Benders Church Ridge. 
 It can not be in two places at the same time without being divided. 
 It is better to place the whole platoon to cover the most probable 
 area of danger, while other areas are closely watched, so that the 
 platoon may be shifted in time if need be. 
 
 If well posted, the 20 rifles now immediately under your com- 
 mand can stop at least a troop of Cavalry, and possibly more, in a 
 mounted or dismounted attack against the flank of the battalion. 
 The firing line position that you selected is 10 or 15 feet higher 
 than the crossroads at 600. Therefore, the cornfield which is west of 
 the crossroads presents little or no obstacle to effective fire toward 
 the ridge. The obstruction due to the houses can only be overcome 
 by posting the men on the ground. The details are too minute to be 
 indicated on the map. 
 
 You are not likely to remain long in your present position. A 
 combat patrol must conform in a general way to the movements of 
 the force it protects. Until our battalion approaches the house 300 
 yards northwest of 632, you can not improve your present location. 
 It is too early to decide upon your next move. You may get orders 
 on the subject, or the attack may assume an unforeseen course or 
 extension. 
 
 There is no present necessity for firing on the Red patrol near 
 647 ridge. It is enough to report it presence to the battalion com- 
 mander. Neither is it advisable to drive the patrol off by an attack. 
 A few men might not be able to do so, and the whole platoon has 
 more important work elsewhere. 
 
 The dispositions of your platoon are probably not as simple as 
 would be the case in an average combat patrol situation. This is 
 partly due to the cornfield and the conformation of the ground and 
 partly to the fact that the hostile force consists of cavalry. 
 
67 
 
 SITUATION IV. 
 
 It turned out that there were very few Reds in the edge of the 
 cornfield 600 yards west of crossroads 632. Before the firing line of 
 the battalion advanced, reconnaissance disclosed the fact that the 
 enemy's main force was concealed in the high corn 600 yards west 
 of crossroads 600, and would probably defend the edge of that field. 
 At least that is what a mounted orderly told you when he arrived 
 and handed you the following message: 
 
 GAINER FARMHOUSE, 
 
 4 Sept., 11.50 p. m. 
 SERGT. HOLMES : 
 
 Battalion attacks cornfield west of your hill. Move patrol half mile north to 
 high ground. 
 
 CROSBY, Major. 
 
 1. What orders do you give? 
 
 2. Indicate your route to the new position. 
 
 1. To the nearest corporal : 
 
 Adams, the platoon is going to that hill (647) by way of its east slope and 
 close to the road. Take three men as point and go to that barn (west side of 
 the road ) . March so as to observe to the north and west. 
 
 To the man on the left flank of the platoon : 
 Signal " assemble " to the patrol on your flank. 
 I write the following on a piece of paper : 
 
 OORPL. KOENIG ! 
 
 Platoon goes 600 yards north. Move your patrol 600 yards due north to top 
 of ridge. Watch road as before. 
 
 HOLMES, 1st Sergt. 
 
 To the platoon : 
 
 By the right flank, march. 
 
 To Willis, while the platoon is crossing the road : 
 
 Go to that house and find Kelley. Tell him to join me with his patrol. 
 Then go to Corpl. Koenig and give him this. Stay with his patrol. Repeat. 
 
 2. East across the road; then north in platoon column, marching 
 just far enough down the slope of the 647 ridge to escape observa- 
 tion from the west. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 You must not expect every message to be exact in its reference to 
 places. Eef erring to Maj. Crosby's message, you find that there 
 are two cornfields west of crossroads 600. One of them is just across 
 the road from your position. The major must mean the other one. 
 
68 
 
 Also, if you look due north from i; your hill " and measure one-half 
 mile by eye you will not find suitable high ground there. Your 
 common sense, however, tells you that the major has in mind the 
 high ground at G47 ridge. Messages should be as exact as it is pos- | 
 sible to make them; but in interpreting a message, allowance must 
 be made for the impossibility of always making them exact. 
 
 The only other new point that comes up in this situation is the 
 sending of the message to Corpl. Koenig. This message is too long 
 to be given verbally by messenger. If you sent it to Corpl. Koenig 
 by semaphore you would either have to leave the platoon for awhile 
 and go to the farmhouse to send it, or write the message and send it 
 to the farmhouse to be semaphored to Corpl. Koenig. You can not 
 leave the platoon ; therefore, you must write the message, no matter 
 how you transmit it. Having written it, it is just as simple and 
 much surer to send it to the corporal by messenger. 
 
 You will never know whether your messenger understands what 
 you want him to do unless you make him repeat his instructions. 
 Even then you will not let him go unless or until he repeats these 
 instructions in a manner which convinces you that he understands. 
 
 It is better to have Willis remain with the patrol than to have him 
 wandering around looking for the platoon. Later, when you are in 
 signal communication with Corpl. Koenig across the ravine you can 
 recall Willis if it is desirable to do so. 
 
 You may prefer to have Corp. Koenig's patrol and Willis rejoin 
 the platoon at once and leave Kelley at the house to observe the 
 country and the roads to the east. That is certainly not seriously 
 objectionable, but we prefer to have our flank protection on our flank 
 and not behind us. The battalion commander should look out for 
 Table Rock and the country to the south. 
 
 You may be surprised to see two hostile forces moving about so 
 near each other without being warmly engaged. The terrain fully 
 accounts for this condition. 
 
SIXTH PROBLEM. 
 
 A PICKET. 
 
 EXPLANATION. 
 
 " The outpost is a covering detachment detailed to secure the camp 
 or bivouac against surprise and to prevent an attack upon it before 
 the troops can prepare to resist." (I. D. R., 678.) 
 
 When troops are in camp or bivouac in the presence of the enemy, 
 the amount of rest and security that can be given depends upon an 
 outpost arrangement. The number of men actually on their feet on 
 outpost is relatively not great. 
 
 A comparison with the advance guard problems wall show that the 
 same principle of distribution applies to an outpost. 
 
 " Patrols or sentinels must be the first troops which the enemy 
 meets, and each body in rear must have time to prepare for the blow. 
 These bodies cause as much delay as possible without sacrificing 
 themselves, and gradually retire to the line where the outpost is to 
 make its resistance." (I. D. R., 695.) 
 
 The bodies of troops nearest the enemy are very small. We find 
 that the various parts of an outpost, as in an advance guard, increase 
 in size as we go back toward the main camp. An advance guard 
 is a moving body and is on one road. An outpost is a stationary body 
 and is divided so that a part of it is on each road that the enemy is 
 likely to use if he marches toward our main camp. 
 
 Besides allowing the troop to rest, an outpost attempts to prevent 
 the enemy from observing our camp and, in case of attack, gives 
 warning or resists so that the main body can have time to prepare for 
 whatever may be the proper action under the circumstances. An out- 
 post also reconnoiters to the front for information of the enemy or 
 the ground, or both. Thus, the duties of the outpost are obser- 
 vation, resistance, and reconnaissance. 
 
 For convenience, the parts of an outpost are given appropriate 
 names, as follows: Reserve, support, outguard (an outguard may be 
 either a picket, a sentry squad, or a cossack post), sentinel post, 
 patrol, detached post. These names, and the purpose of the parts 
 
 (69) 
 
70 
 
 which they designate, should be clearly undertsood. (See I. D. R. 
 683-697.) * 
 
 Usually the commander selects a defensive line on which he pro- 
 poses to fight if the enemy attacks. The supports are ordinarily 
 located at points on this line where roads cross it. These points de- 
 fine what is called the " line of supports." In front of this line are 
 the outguards. Their duties are to observe and reconnoiter so as to 
 give warning. In case of attack they offer what resistance they can. 
 and eventually fall back to the line of supports. In rear of the line 
 of supports is the outpost reserve, conveniently located to reinforce 
 whichever support is attacked. Behind the outpost reserve is the 
 main camp. 
 
 The present problem deals with an outguard which, because of its 
 size and purpose, is called a picket, as distinguished from a sentry 
 squad or cossack post. 
 
 SITUATION I. 
 
 (This problem, and the seven problems that follow it, are all based 
 on the same original situation. It is recommended, therefore, that 
 you mark locations carefully with pins and small tags, and preserve 
 your map thus " staked out " until you have reached the end of the 
 thirteenth problem.) 
 
 Our brigade has been marching northeast from Gettysburg, on the 
 McElheny-Plainview-Heidlersburg Road, in the enemy's country. 
 It has been reported that the enemy is several miles to the northeast 
 and that our brigade will halt south of the Conewago Creek until 
 to-morrow or the day after, to await reinforcements. 
 
 The Conewago is reported to be fordable only at the fords shown 
 on the map. It is November 1, and the corn is in shock. 
 
 Our battalion has been the advance guard and is now (2 p. m.) 
 halted as follows: 
 
 The reserve (Companies A and B) at crossroads 616, southwest of 
 Plainview. The support (Companies C and D) near the house 400 
 yards northeast of 616, with its advance party on the ridge 800 yards 
 northeast of 616 as march outpost. Later, Capt. Rowen marched 
 our company (A) within 100 yards of the advance party, halted, 
 assembled the noncommissioned officers, and said : 
 
 Conewago Creek swings around this ridge, a half mile north and a half mile 
 east of here. The enemy is reported to be in camp on this road 4 miles north- 
 east of here. Our brigade is going into camp on this road, a mile and a half 
 to the southwest, with our battalion as outpost. Companies C and D will be 
 in reserve at the crossroads where we halted a few minutes ago. Company B, 
 as support No. 2, on that ridge, and about a half mile west of here. This com- 
 pany, as support No. 1, will be in this vicinity, near the road. The exact loca- 
 tion of the company will be fixed later. Sergt. Crane, take the second platoon 
 down that farm road to the east and place outguard No. 1 to cover the ford 
 
71 
 
 where the road crosses the Conewago. Sergt. Holmes, take the first platoon 
 ahead on this main road and establish outguard No. 2 covering the bridge 
 across the Conewago. Posts. 
 
 You are Sergt. Crane, commanding second platoon. 
 
 1. Where do you place your picket ? 
 
 2. What further dispositions do you intend to make immediately 
 upon arrival? 
 
 1. I place the picket in the patch of woods 450 yards west of the 
 ford. 
 
 2. I place a double sentinel behind a corn shock, selecting one 
 which will enable the sentinels to see the ford, the fields along the 
 fence which runs to the southeast, and the field to the northwest as 
 far as the wooded spur held by outguard No, 2. I send a patrol of 
 three men across the Conewago, by way of the ford, to patrol a half 
 mile beyond the ford and then return. I send another patrol of two 
 men a half mile to the southeast to patrol the woods and, on the 
 return trip, to examine the Conewago for possible fording places. I 
 send another patrol of two men to locate outguard No. 2 and, on the 
 return trip, to examine the Conewago for possible fording places. 
 Along the east edge of the woods I begin the digging of a fire trench 
 to command the ford, and send a few men to level whatever corn 
 shocks I find in my proposed field of fire, except the one used by the 
 sentinels. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 In the seventh problem, which deals with the first platoon as out- 
 guard No. 2, we shall consider more in detail the orders and instruc- 
 tions actually given to an outguard and its detachments. 
 
 There are several interesting points in connection with the out- 
 guard established by the second platoon. When you study the sev- 
 enth problem, you will observe that the dispositions of the two out- 
 guards are somewhat different. At first glance the two seem to be 
 alike in every detail. Both are of the same size; both are sent out 
 from the same support; and each covers a Conewago crossing and 
 and important approach toward the troops that are to be protected. 
 Still, there is enough contrast between the two outguards to demon- 
 strate the truth of the statement that no two situations are alike, and, 
 therefore, an outguard disposition which fits one case may be wholly 
 wrong, or only partly right, in another. 
 
 Until the commander of the support has reconnoitered the sector 
 assigned to him, and particularly the road assigned to your outguard, 
 he is obliged to leave to you the first selection of the position for 
 the outguard and the first dispositions as to sentinels, patrols, etc. 
 
72 
 
 As soon as the captain is able to do so, he will visit your outguard, 
 learn what you have done, reconnoiter the vicinity, give yon more 
 detailed information as to the location and responsibilities of the 
 various parts of the outpost, correct your dispositions if he so de- 
 sires, instruct you as to the changes to be made at dark, and tell you 
 the arrangements for messing and ration supply. 
 
 Naturally, you hope to arrange the picket so advantageously that 
 the captain will not be induced to order changes. In the present case, 
 you have so obviously the proper place for the main body of the 
 picket that you need not hesitate to entrench at once. 
 
 The map indicates that there is no underbrush among the trees in 
 the vicinity of the ford. If it were otherwise, you would do well to 
 cut out the underbrush so as to have a clear field of fire, at least as 
 far as the island. 
 
 Technically, a picket is only an outguard. An outguard ordi- 
 narily observes and warns, but does not expect to oifer serious resist- 
 ance. However, when the outguard is so large that we give it the 
 convenient name of picket, and when in addition it finds a favorable 
 position covering an important approach, it should entrench and pre- 
 pare to offer resistance. Another reason for entrenching, in the pres- 
 ent case, is the fact that the support is not between the ford and the 
 outpost reserve. In this respect, the situation differs radically from 
 the one which confronts outguard No. 2. 
 
 A single sentinel behind a corn shock might be enough, and would 
 certainly be correct if the outguard were only a sentry squad. But you 
 have an entire platoon, and the sentinel post is an important one, 
 charged with the duty of observing for long distances and in many 
 directions. You might prefer, also, to post a lookout in the immedi- 
 ate vicinity of the picket itself, to keep its eye on the sentinel post. 
 This would surely not be wrong. On the contrary, it would be neces- 
 sary if you found that the sentinel post was not easily seen by most 
 of the men of the picket. 
 
 As soon as an outguard reaches its post, a commander must ac- 
 quaint himself with the conditions in his vicinity. He can do this 
 by a careful observation of the ground if the area that falls to him 
 is limited, or if an extensive view of his area can be had. Where the 
 area is quite large and the view restricted, as in the present case, and 
 when, in addition, the outguard has enough men, the quickest and 
 surest means is to send out patrols in various important directions. 
 But these patrols should not go far. Your immediate vicinity is yoiir 
 first concern. Later, when you are well established and familiar with 
 the immediate vicinity, you can plan more carefully the changes and 
 patrolling that may be necessary. 
 
 If one of your noncommissioned officers has some skill in making a 
 topographic sketch, it would be well to have him start at once a sketch 
 
73 
 
 showing the road you are on, the woods that you occupy and the other 
 important features to the right, left, and front. Ordinarily, the sup- 
 port commander, or some one detailed by him, makes an outpost 
 sketch for the entire support. You can assist materially in the rapid 
 completion of a more accurate sketch if you turn over at least a dia- 
 gram showing directions and distances to various important features. 
 
 SITUATION II. 
 
 Your three patrols return and report that they have discovered 
 nothing, except as follows: From the bend in the road 400 yards 
 north of the picket there is a foot trail to the east through the woods. 
 The trail crosses the Conewago by a fair ford and appears to follow 
 the wire fence to the road bend 300 yards west-southwest of 544. 
 
 What further dispositions, if any, do you intend to make ? 
 
 I intend to place a cossack post on the trail mentioned, on the west 
 bank of the Conewago. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 The cossack post would not be necessary in daytime if your sentinel 
 could see the ford and the trail east of it, but there happens to be a 
 patch of woods 150 yards square (almost two city blocks) which con- 
 ceals the trail and the ford. The trail toward 544 is also concealed 
 by the trees which fringe the Conewago. 
 
 We have here a case of an outguard sending out a minor outguard. 
 This is frequently necessary in the case of a strong picket assigned to 
 watch an important road. If your outguard consisted of a squad 
 only, you would merely report to the support commander the exist- 
 ence of the trail and ford that your patrol discovered. A cossack post 
 would then be sent directly from the support. 
 
 SITUATION III. 
 
 Ten minutes after your arrival at your present position, two 
 mounted orderlies of the regiment turned over to you a telephone 
 connected with support No. 1 and the outpost reserve. 1 Presently the 
 captain arrived. He approved all that you had done. He informed 
 you as follows: If you are driven back, you are authorized to fall 
 back on the reserve. The outpost has been reenforced by a platoon 
 of Cavalry, which now forms a detached post where the road crosses 
 the Conewago, 1,500 yards southeast of your picket. The second 
 fence 500 yards south of your picket, and the north edge of woods 
 from the end of the same fence to the Conewago, mark the right of 
 
 1 Although at present Infantry regiments have no telephone equipment, it is incon- 
 ceivable that we shall be without it in war. In fact, it is understood that a proper 
 equipment is being designed. 
 
74 
 
 the sector of our support (Company A). The support will send 
 supper to the picket at 5.30 p. m., and breakfast at an hour to be 
 announced later. The changes for the night, as far as they relate to 
 your picket, will be as follows: The picket will move forward to tho 
 water's edge at the ford. Hourly patrols, on the even hour, to the 
 Cavalry detached post and to outguard Xo. 2. No. 2 will be at the 
 bridge during the night. The opposite side of the Conewago also will 
 be patrolled. Night signal : 
 Twenty-three, forty-one. 
 
 What preparations do you make, during daylight, to carry out the 
 captain's order for night changes? 
 
 I cross the ford with two corporals, in patrol formation, leaving 
 the platoon guide in charge of the picket. Having decided to place a 
 sentry squad at the east end of the ford, I point out its location to 
 the corporal of the squad selected. To both corporals I point out the 
 houses 500 yards east and 500 yards north, as guides for night patrol- 
 ling. Then we return to the picket and I prepare a roster as follows: 
 
 Cossack post (already established), 1 corporal and 3 privates. 
 
 One squad for sentry squad. 
 
 A guard for the bivouac of the picket ; three reliefs of one private 
 each, with a corporal in charge; one hour on, two hours off. 
 
 For patrolling the roads 300 yards beyond the houses mentioned 
 above (every hour, day and night), two reliefs of four men each 
 (one squad; the corporal and No. 2 as leaders). 
 
 For a visiting patrol to the Cavalry detached post, two reliefs of 
 two privates each. 
 
 For a visiting patrol to outguard No. 2, two reliefs of two privates 
 each. 
 
 The leaders of these patrols are then sent in pairs to examine their 
 routes by daylight. 
 
 The patrol to the Cavalry detached post is given the following 
 route: From the west end of the ford (proposed bivouac) go south- 
 west along the fence 200 yards to the fence corner ; thence 1.000 yards 
 to the southeast along the fence to the fence corner: thence east to 
 the road; thence to the Cavalry post; thence return along the west 
 bank of the Conewago. 
 
 The patrol to outguard No. 2 is given the following route : Follow 
 the farm road to the bend 600 yards northwest of the ford ; thence 
 east to the cossack post; thence along the Conewago to outguard 
 No. 2: thence return by the same route to the cossack post; thence 
 along the Conewago to the ford. 
 
 I inform all members of the patrol that the night signal is 
 twenty-three, forty-one. 
 
75 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 It is merely a coincidence that your roster utilizes exactly every 
 corporal and private in the platoon. If your first draft of a roster 
 did not require the services of every man in the platoon, you would 
 not, on that account, increase the size of any of the groups. If your 
 first draft summed up more than the total number of corporals and 
 privates available, you would have to reduce some of the groups, if 
 possible ; otherwise, inform the captain. The platoon guide could be 
 put in charge of the bivouac guard, thus saving one corporal. 
 The sentry squad could spare one private and still have three reliefs 
 of double sentinels. The patrols to the east side of the Conewago 
 could be reduced to three men each, etc. 
 
 Although every man is on your roster for some duty during the 
 night, you will always have 18 men, including yourself, in the 
 bivouac of the picket if you send the four-man patrol out when the 
 visiting patrols return. If all patrols are out at the same time, there 
 will be 14 men in your bivouac. 
 
 At night your trench is of no value. The ford is a defile. To 
 oppose an enemy it is necessary to place yourself at the defile. The 
 captain has wisely decided that you should be at the west end of 
 the defile. Very likely he also would have ordered the sending of a 
 sentry squad to the east end, but for our own reasons we purposely 
 caused him to omit this. It is nearly 300 yards to the east end of 
 the ford. This is too far for a double sentinel post sent out directly 
 from the picket. There are two alternatives: Either send sentinels 
 directly from the picket to the island or send a sentry squad to the 
 east bank of the Conewago. If it were not for the dense woods 
 which cover the island and line the west bank of the Conewago, a 
 double sentinel post on the island, sent from the picket, would 
 probably serve our purpose. 
 
 If the other demands on the platoon were not so great, it would 
 be well to change the cossack post to a sentry squad during the 
 night. 
 
 The patrol to the east side of the Conewago should make its 
 rounds in daytime as well as at night, on account of the restricted 
 view of your sentinels. The last patrol before dark should carefully 
 cut all telephone wires so as to isolate the houses in your front. 
 You are in the enemy's country, and by cutting these wires before 
 you make your changes for the night, you may prevent detailed 
 information from reaching the enemy, or at least delay the transmis- 
 sion of it. 
 
 It is certainly a hardship to wade the Conewago in November. 
 The men's legs and feet should be kept dry, if possible, particularly 
 in cold weather. But, unless you can find a boat or build a raft, or 
 
76 
 
 can induce higher authority to order the Cavalry detached post to do 
 the patrolling, the exposure of your men is unavoidable. 
 
 A cossack post or sentry squad is not strong enough to send out 
 patrols, except for the necessary examination of its surroundings 
 when it first reaches its position. A picket, on the other hand, is 
 frequently a small support and, if strong enough, must take over 
 reconnaissance to adjoining parts of the outpost. Such patrolling 
 is very easy in daytime, and is frequently unnecessary, as in this case. 
 At night, a patrol can easily get lost, even if it has covered its route 
 by daylight. This possibility generally can be avoided by fixing 
 routes that are easily followed at night. Fences, roads, streams, and 
 clearly defined ridges or edges of woods are very useful guides and 
 should be used whenever possible. 
 
 In daytime your sentinels, together with the sentinels of the 
 cavalry detached post and outguard Xo. 2, can see all the ground 
 which you propose to cover with visiting patrols during the niirht. 
 We hardly ever patrol ground that can be seen by sentinels. At night, 
 however, the intervening ground must be examined from time to time. 
 We must keep in touch with adjoining posts and exchange informa- 
 tion, even if it amounts to no more than an assurance that everything 
 is quiet. Your cossack post is visited twice each hour. Your four- 
 man patrol passes through the sentry squad twice each hour. Even 
 though you have telephone connection a patrol from the support will 
 probably visit you occasionally. 
 
 The reason for starting your visiting patrols on the even hour will 
 be apparent when you study the seventh problem. 
 
 If you study the final arrangements along the entire front of our 
 support you will realize how difficult it would be for the enemy to 
 pierce our line unobserved with a sufficient force to be dangerous. It 
 is a mistake to suppose that an outpost is not good merely because a 
 patrol can penetrate it. A hostile patrol is not dangerous except in 
 the infrequent case where it is imperatively necessary to prevent the 
 enemy from getting any information whatever. Such cases are rare. 
 
 "In posting his command the support commander must seek to 
 cover his sector in such manner that the enemy can not reach, in dan- 
 gerous numbers and unobserved, the position of the support or pass 
 by it within the sector intrusted to the support. On the other hand, 
 he must economize men on observation and patrol duty, for these 
 duties are unusually fatiguing. He must practice the greatest 
 economy of men consistent with the requirements of practical se- 
 curity." (I. D. E. 704.) 
 
 No doubt you understand why the captain authorized you to fall 
 back on the reserve in case you are attacked and forced to retire. The 
 attack might come from the front, supported by rifle fire from troops 
 posted along the east bank of the Conewago, north of the ford. 
 
77 
 
 Whenever possible, a noncommissioned officer should be awake and 
 on the alert at all hours of the night. Patrols must be sent pe- 
 riodically and the bivouac guard must be relieved hourly. A satis- 
 factory arrangement in the present case would be as follows: You 
 remain on this duty until 9 p. m. ; the platoon guide until 1 a. in. ; 
 and the corporal in charge of the guard from 1 a. m. until a half 
 hour before daylight, at which time the entire picket should be 
 awakened. 
 
 The method of night signaling prescribed by the support com- 
 mander will not be found in any of our regulations. It would not 
 be wise to have a uniform system throughout the Army. It would 
 be better if every regiment practiced two or three systems and 
 changed them from time to time. In the present case it is intended 
 that the signals shall be given by tapping the butt of the rifle with 
 the knuckles or a stick or stone, depending upon the stillness of the 
 night. The one who calls, strikes the butt of his rifle twice, then after 
 a short pause, he strikes it three times; thus tap, tap tap, tap, tap, 
 making the signal " 23." If he hears an answering signal " 41 " he is 
 reasonably sure that he can move in the direction of the answer and 
 meet a member of the outpost. Or, any one hearing the signal " 23 " 
 will signal back "41," and be reasonably sure that whoever ap- 
 proaches is a friend. Such signals are particularly useful to night 
 patrols approaching sentinels or outguards. On a still night a tap 
 on the rifle butt can be heard a considerable distance and readily 
 attracts attention. We give it as one of many systems that can be 
 devised, but we should by no means favor the uniform use of this 
 particular system. 
 
SEVENTH PROBLEM, 
 
 ANOTHER PICKET. 
 
 SITUATION I. 
 
 The situation is the same as Situation I, sixth problem, to include 
 the support commander's orders. 
 
 You are First Sergt. Holmes, commanding first platoon. 
 What do you do up to the time you leave the support ? 
 
 I signal, 
 Attention to orders, 
 
 and call out : 
 
 First platoon, we are going out this road to establish an out guard. Corpl. 
 Adams, take three men and precede us by 200 yards. March out. 
 
 When the point has gained its distance I signal : 
 
 Right by twos, march. Column of files on each side of road. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 In connection with the present problem it is our purpose to show 
 the successive steps by which an outpost is established. On a map it 
 is simple enough to indicate with pins a complete outpost disposition, 
 but in the field we are likely to fumble around a great deal before the 
 outpost is finally established. At the end of a march men are tired 
 and irritated, and it is a sign of good leadership if the troops detailed 
 for outpost duty go smoothly and promptly to their proper places, 
 thus getting the men off their feet and relieved of their equipment 
 as soon as possible. 
 
 You note that the companies of the advance guard reserve (Com- 
 panies A and B) are to constitute the outpost supports, while the 
 advance guard support (Companies C and D) retires to 616 and be- 
 comes the outpost reserve. The hardest work on the march falls 
 naturally to the advance guard support. When Maj. Crosby was 
 ordered to establish the outpost of the brigade he did not waste any 
 time in a preliminary reconnaissance of the outpost line. On the 
 
 (79) 
 
80 
 
 contrary, he immediately sent out Companies A and B, each on a 
 road toward the enemy, and left the completion of the job to the 
 company commanders and subsequent inspection by himself. Thus, 
 in a very few minutes Companies C and D will be in bivouac. 
 
 For the same reasons Capt. Rowen halted Company A near the 
 Plain view road fork and without wasting time or unnecessary words 
 sent a picket out on each road, leaving the details as to exact location, 
 sentinels, patrols, etc., to the picket commanders and subsequent 
 inspection by himself. 
 
 To conform to this principle you marked off with your command 
 as soon as possible. For the present it is not necessary that your men 
 should know much about their future duties. Whatever you may 
 have to say to them can be said better when they reach the place where 
 they are going to work. 
 
 " The supports march to their posts, using the necessary covering 
 detachments when in advance of the march outpost." (I. D. R. 703.) 
 
 " Each outguard is marched by its commander to its assigned sta- 
 tion, and, especially in the case of a picket, is covered by the neces- 
 sary patrolling to prevent surprise." (I. D. R. 706.) 
 
 Capt. Rowen did not place a point in front of the company because 
 he was still behind the march outpost. But in a minute or two you 
 will pass the march outpost and will march toward the enemy and 
 through country that has not yet been reconnoitered. 
 
 SITUATION II. 
 
 No change. Corpl. Adams has taken Willis, Bush, and Schmidt 
 with him. 
 
 1. Where do you intend to post the picket and its sentinel posts ? 
 
 2. What orders or instructions do you give on arrival at the place 
 selected, and before the captain arrives to inspect ? 
 
 THE FIRST SERGEANT'S SOLUTION. 
 
 1. I intend to place the picket near the edge of the woods on the 
 right-hand side of the road, about 200 yards southwest of the near- 
 est bridge, with a sentinel posted so as to observe to the east and along 
 the road to the northeast. I intend to place a cossack post on the 
 island between the two bridges. Meantime, Corpl. Adams will patrol 
 through the woods to the west from the first bridge, and then south 
 and return to the picket. 
 
 2. Upon arriving in the road opposite the point selected for the out- 
 guard, I give the command : 
 
 Follow me, 
 
 climb through the fence, and find cover for the outguard, as near as 
 possible to the road and the northeast edge of the woods. Here I 
 
81 
 
 're-form the outguard in column of squads and give the following 
 orders : 
 
 The enemy is supposed to be in camp several miles northeast of here, on 
 this road. The village where we left the company is called Plainview. That 
 stream is called the Gonewago. This is the Harrisburg Road. A mile and a 
 half northeast of here, on this road, is the town of Heidlersburg. Our brigade 
 will camp on this road about a mile and a half to the southwest, with our 
 battalion as outpost. Companies C and D will be the reserve, at the crossroads 
 where we left the major. Company B will be support No. 2 on another road 
 about a half mile from here, in that direction [pointing west]. Our company 
 will be support No. 1 on the road about where we left the company. Sergt 
 Crane, w r ith outguard No. 1, a picket of one platoon, is on a trail south of here. 
 We shall locate him later. We are outguard No. 2. Later we will locate Com- 
 pany B on our left. Bring to me every person who attempts to cross our out- 
 post line in either direction, or who is picked up by patrols, except members of 
 our company, patrols from Company B, and officers whom you are sure you 
 know. No fires. Pieces will not be stacked. Equipment may be removed, ex- 
 cept belts and bayonets . Hook your bayonet scabbards to your belts. Miller, 
 come with me. 
 
 I take Miller to the point selected (near the fence along the road) 
 for the picket sentinel and say to him: 
 
 This is your post. You can see up and down the road and to the east ; also 
 for some distance into those woods [pointing north and west]. Be particularly 
 careful to observe the road to the northeast and the country to the east. 
 
 I then step into the road, get Corpl. Adams's attention and sema- 
 phore him : 
 
 Patrol 500 yards west along the creek and return here through woods. 
 Then I return to the outguard : 
 
 Towney, take Bennett with you and patrol south until you find a trail. Fol- 
 low the trail toward the Conewago until you find outguard No. 1. Locate it 
 carefully so that you can point out its position to me. On the return trip exam- 
 ine the Conewago as far as the bridge for possible crossings. Repeat. 
 
 I satisfy myself that Towney understands. 
 
 Corpl. Nelson, take three men of your squad and follow me. Sergt. Hill, while 
 I am gone locate the trace of a tire trench covering the biidge. Remainder of 
 
 platoon fall out. 
 
 I lead Corpl. Nelson and his men to the bridges. After an exami- 
 nation I order him as follows: 
 
 Place your cossack post here (off the road, near the south end of the second 
 bridge). Place your sentinel about here [indicating a covered position at the 
 edge of the road near the bridge], where he can see the roads across the creek 
 and at the same time be seen by the picket sentinel. Send two men at once to 
 cut all the telephone and telegraph wires at those crossroads (502) and any 
 that leads to those houses (200 yards east). Also bring in the occupants of the 
 houses. 
 
 9679017 6 
 
82 
 
 Upon my return to the picket. I send Butler on patrol with the fol- 
 lowing instructions: 
 
 Take two men of your squad for a patrol. Go first to Corpl. Nelson's cossfick 
 post at the second bridge. North of the bridge there are some woods, probably 
 50 acres. Patrol the woods thoroughly and return here in one hour. Repeat. 
 
 Then I examine the trace selected by Sergt. Hill, and having 
 adopted or modified it. as the case may be, I put the men of the picket 
 jit work entrenching. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 The position selected for the picket has a clear field of fire to the 
 first bridge. 
 
 The reasons for entrenching are about the same as those given in 
 the sixth problem. In your case, however, the support is in rear of 
 you and not on your flank. But the support probably will not have 
 a good field of fire in the woods on the hill. Your picket may be 
 called upon to offer stubborn resistance. We think you will find that 
 in almost every case of a strong picket on a main road entrenching 
 is either necessary or very desirable for some reason or other. 
 
 There is no underbrush among the trees on our side of the Cone- 
 wago. Whether it would be worth while to clear out the brush on the 
 island is a matter that can not be decided by reference to the map. 
 
 The duties of the sentinel at your picket are more important than 
 in the usual case. Ordinarily, a picket sentinel has little to do except 
 to watch the immediate vicinity of the picket and to maintain visual 
 communication with such parts of the outpost as can be seen. Your 
 sentinel, however, must also watch the road to the northeast and the 
 country to the east, on account of the fact that the cossack post is in 
 a less favorable position to do so. The cossack post can see the road 
 only as far as the ridge 600 yards northeast of the island. The picket 
 sentinel can see the ridge 1,000 yards beyond the island; also, part of 
 the road 1,200 yards east of the island, unless the trees that fringe 
 the Conewago are denser than is shown on the map. 
 
 There are two reasons for placing a cossack post on the island 
 at the south end of the second bridge: First, the roads along the 
 east bank of the Conewago could not otherwise be observed. Second, 
 we must prevent Red patrols from destroying the bridges by ex- 
 plosives or otherwise. It would not answer our purpose to send a 
 sentinel from the picket. The distance is too great (see I. D. R. 
 692) and four rifles may be none too many to prevent a swift 
 attempt to destroy either or both of the bridges. 
 
 If the cossack post were placed at the first bridge, it could not see 
 the roads on the east bank of the Conewago, and it might not dis- 
 cover, until too late, attempts against the second bridge. 
 
83 
 
 You may prefer to place a sentry squad, instead of a cossack post, 
 at the bridge ; that would certainly not be wrong. 
 
 After reading Infantry Drill Regulations, 706, your first impres- 
 sion might be that a roster should be prepared at once. As a matter 
 of fact, you would not make up your roster until the support com- 
 mander had made his inspection. Until then you will not have com- 
 plete information as to what the picket must do, and whatever dis- 
 positions you have made may not, in every detail, meet with the 
 approval of the captain. When you finally make a roster, it should 
 be based as nearly as practicable on the duties already performed by 
 members of the platoon. 
 
 We recommend that you study carefully the general instructions 
 given the platoon (p. 91). You will note the following: 
 
 1. Information as to the direction of the enemy. 
 
 2. Information as to local geography. 
 
 3. Information as to other outpost units and the main camp. 
 
 4. Orders for the disposition of strangers met. 
 
 5. Orders for preparedness for action. 
 
 Naturally, the first three subjects (information) will be different 
 each time you are on outpost. The last two (orders) are practically 
 alike in every outguard, but you should not, on that account, omit 
 them on the assumption that your men understand. When giving 
 general instructions, remember the outline: Enemy; geography; 
 outpost and camp; strangers; preparedness. 
 
 You may have to repeat the information several times. Be sure 
 that the men understand. 
 
 SITUATION IV. 
 
 The picket has been equipped with telephone connection to the 
 support and to the reserve. The captain arrived and informed you 
 as follows : Your dispositions are satisfactory. The outpost has been 
 reinforced by a platoon of Cavalry, which now forms a detached 
 post where the road crosses the Conewago, a mile and a half below 
 your cossack post. The west edge of the woods that Corp. Adams 
 patrolled is a clearly defined line, and marks the left of the sector 
 of our support (a line drawn from the letter " 1 " in " Plainview " to 
 the center of the orchard east of Hershey Mill passes along the edge 
 of woods referred to) . Support No. 2 is near the farmhouse midway 
 between 616 and Hershey Mill. It has a picket on the road 500 yards 
 south of Hershey Mill. This picket has a cossack post near Hershey 
 Mill, where a ford and trail have been found. Our support will send 
 supper to the picket at 5.30 p. m., and breakfast at an hour to be an- 
 nounced later. The changes for the night, as far as they relate to 
 your picket, will be as follows: The picket will move forward to 
 
84 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 To avoid repetition, we have omitted matters that were brought 
 out in the sixth problem. 
 
 The barricades will have no particular value in daytime. If you 
 constructed them at once your working party might be observed by 
 hostile patrols or inhabitants at a considerable distance, and you 
 w y ould thus unnecessarily give information as to your location or 
 plans. At night an attack wall generally be a rush with little or 
 no warning. Your fire will not be effective beyond a few yards on 
 account of the inability to see. Whether a rush attack is made by 
 Cavalry, mounted, or by Infantry, it would be seriously checked by 
 the two barricades and gaps, and thus give you time to arouse and 
 form the picket. 
 
 On each bridge the planking should be removed to form a 10 or 
 12 foot gap. Two or three of the planks should be placed length- 
 wise across the gap and near the truss, for the use of members of 
 the outpost. If Corpl. Nelson's squad is driven back, the last man 
 to cross on these planks should kick them into the creek. The other 
 planks should be piled near the south end of the gap so that the 
 gap can be covered quickly if it becomes necessary for mounted 
 officers or men to use the bridge. If our enemy knows that we are 
 in the habit of taking precautions such as yours, we need have little 
 fear of rush attacks across bridges at night. 
 
 The Cavalry platoon southeast of Plainview will probably furnish 
 all the patrols to be sent toward or beyond Heidlersburg. Whenever 
 possible, a small Cavalry force is added to an outpost for distant 
 reconnaissance. In such case the Infantry is rarely called upon to 
 patrol very far beyond its farthest sentinels. Your periodical patrols 
 across the Conewago might be given a route as follows : From cross- 
 roads 502, go southeast COO j^ards to the bend in the road, then by 
 way of crossroads 502 to the crest of the ridge 500 yards northeast of 
 the crossroads, then by way of crossroads 502 to the road bend 600 
 yards west of the crossroad, then return to the picket 
 
 Your visiting patrols will have shorter routes than Sergt. Crane's 
 (sixth problem). The patrol to the south need go only far enough 
 to gain contact with outguard No. 1; that is, to the cossack post of 
 outguard No. 1, which you will find, later, on the banks of the Cone- 
 wago, 600 yards southeast of your picket. Your patrol to the west 
 need go only as far as the cossack post 500 yards east-southeast of 
 Hershey Mill. 
 
 Capt. Rowen has ordered Sergt. Crane's visiting patrols to leave 
 on the even hour and yours to leave on the half hour. His object 
 was to have almost continuous patrolling. Perhaps he will make 
 an arrangement with the commanding officer of Company B, where- 
 
85 
 
 the first bridge. Both bridges will be barricaded. You will send 
 hourly patrols, on the half hour, to the nearest outguards on your 
 right and left. The opposite side of the Conewago also will be 
 patroled. Night signal : 
 
 Twenty-three, forty-one. 
 
 1. What are your plans with reference to barricading the bridges? 
 
 2. Prepare your roster. 
 
 THE FIRST SERGEANT'S SOLUTION. 
 
 1. While there is still daylight, I shall gather material for the 
 barricades (planks, poles, rails, wire, etc.) and place part of the 
 same in the woods west of the first bridge, and another part in the 
 woods near the cossack post. When the picket moves to the bridge 
 at dark a barricade will be built at the south end of the first bridge 
 and another at the north end of the second bridge, an opening being 
 left in each barricade only wide enough to permit horsemen to pass 
 through singly. On each bridge part of the planking will be re- 
 moved and piled near by. The gap will be bridged for men on foot. 
 
 2. Cossack post (sentry squad at night) : 
 
 Corpl. Nelson's squad. 
 
 Patrol across Conewago (two reliefs, four men each) : 
 First relief: 
 
 Butler, Peterson, Pickett, Carter. 
 Second relief: 
 
 Koeni?. Quinn, Morgan, Walinski. 
 
 Visiting patrol, south (two relief s^ two men each) : 
 First relief: 
 Towney, Willis. 
 Second relief: 
 Kelley, Miller. 
 
 Visiting patrol, west (two reliefs, two men each) : 
 First relief: 
 Adams. Bush. 
 Second relief: 
 Bennett. Schmidt. 
 
 Picket guard (three reliefs, one man each, and one in charge) : 
 Clark, Ames (1), Hagen (2), Stone (3). 
 Reserve : 
 Hill. Brown, Pine, McGowan, Schafer. 
 
86 
 
 by the patrols which visit you frcm the picket of support No. 2 will 
 leave on the even hour, thus dovetailing with your patrol in that 
 direction. 
 
 In the second situation, when you sent Corpl. Adams to reconnoiter 
 the creek and woods west of the bridge, you naturally selected men 
 from his squad to make the first patrol toward outguard No. 1. 
 Therefore, this squad is used for visiting patrols. 
 
 You placed Miller on post as picket sentinel when the picket 
 arrived in its position, but when you finally make out your roster 
 you will find it better to relieve Miller at once, so that when Corpl. 
 Clark takes over the picket guard, he will have under him men of 
 of his own squad. Four men of Corpl. Koenig's squad are now 
 across the Conewago and presumably familiarizing themselves with 
 the nearby roads and woods. Since the two reliefs of this patrol 
 require eight men, you naturally assigned Corpl. Koenig's squad, 
 making the corporal and the No. 2 man (Butler) the patrol leaders. 
 
 You may be called upon for extra patrolling or may need me a 
 for miscellaneous purposes. It is well therefore to write doAvn the 
 names of all men not assigned to regular duties, in order that you 
 may see at a glance what men are available without disarranging 
 your roster. In the sixth problem there were no unassigned men. 
 If Sergt. Crane require any for special use, he would be obliged to 
 make a temporary readjustment of his roster. 
 
 You might be tempted to place Sergt. Hill in command at the 
 second bridge when the post is increased for the night to a sentry 
 squad. Your decision will depend very largely upon your confi- 
 dence in Corpl. Nelson. The post is not very far from the picket, 
 and if Corpl. Nelson is a reliable man it should not be necessary to 
 .place a sergeant over him. If, for good reasons, you decide to place 
 a sergeant in command of an important sentry squad, and if you 
 are at the same time rather short of men, you could retain the cor- 
 poral and one private with the picket. Ordinarily you will get 
 better results if you arrange your roster with a view to keeping 
 squads or half squads together. 
 
 SITUATION V. 
 
 No change. 
 
 How do you intend to post Corpl. Nelson's sentry squad after 
 dark? 
 
 THE FIRST SERGEANT'S SOLUTION. 
 
 I intend that the squad shall be concealed on the second bridge, 
 behind the barricade and gap, with a double sentinel in a suitable 
 position at the 502 crossroads. 
 
87 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 The two men actually on observation (a double sentinel) "should 
 be concealed at the 502 crossroads in order to give suitable warning 
 of the approach of any hostile force on the converging roads. The 
 distance from the bivouac of the picket to the 502 crossroads is about 
 200 yards. This distance is too great to permit the sending of sen- 
 tinels directly from the picket. Sentinels should be conveniently 
 near the reliefs. This is only another way of saying that Corpl. 
 Nelson's squad should be conveniently near the sentinels. A suit- 
 able post for the sentinels is the important thing. In the present 
 case, the sentry squad, if it remains quietly behind the barricade, 
 will not be seen or attract attention at night. In case of attack, 
 Corpl. Nelson should have little difficulty in falling back on the 
 picket without interfering with the efforts of the picket to repel 
 the enemy. 
 
 SITUATION VI. 
 
 It is 8 p. m. All parts of the outpost have taken up their night 
 positions. 
 
 Stake out on the map, with pins, the following bodies of troops: 
 
 (a) The brigade, in camp between 561 and D. Wirt. 
 
 (&) Companies C and D of our battalion, at 616. 
 
 (<?) Company A, on the ridge between your picket and Plain view. 
 
 (d) Company B, on the road midway between 616 and Hershcy 
 Mill. 
 
 (e) A platoon of Cavalry, at the Conewago crossing 14 miles south- 
 east of Plainview; sent out by Maj. Crosby from (b). 
 
 (/) One squad in observation 1 mile east of 616, on the bank of 
 Conewago Creek, at the east end of the ford; sent out by (g). 
 
 (g) Second platoon (Sergt. Crane), Company A, on the bank of 
 the Conewago, at the west end of the ford mentioned in (./) ; sent out 
 
 by (o). 
 
 (h) A half squad in observation on the west bank of the Conewago, 
 about halfway between (g) and (/) ; sent out by (g). 
 
 (i) Corpl. Nelson's squad, near 502. 
 
 (/) Your picket, in its night position, south end of first bridge. 
 
 (k) A half squad in observation on the south bank of the Cone- 
 wago, 500 yards east of Hershey Mill ; sent out by (I). 
 
 (I) A platoon of Company B, at the Hershey Mill road fork; sent 
 out by (d). 
 
 (m) A squad in observation at the bridge 50 yards north of 
 Hershey Mill; sent out by (I). 
 
 (n) A squad in observation at the bend in the road, 500 yards 
 southwest of Hershey Mill; sent out directly from (d). 
 
88 
 
 (o) A platoon of Infantry on the road somewhere between hill 
 712 and bridge S. H.; sent out by the brigade commander and not 
 under Maj. Crosby's orders. 
 
 Referring to the various situations in the sixth and seventh prob- 
 lems for further details if necessary, give the correct names and 
 numbering of the various bodies of troops enumerated above. 
 
 (a) Main body. 
 (6) Outpost reserve. 
 
 (c) Support No. 1. 
 
 (d) Support No. 2. 
 (r) Detached post. 
 
 (/) Sentinel post No. 1, outguard No. 1, support No. 1 (a sentry 
 squad). 
 
 (g) Outguard No. 1, support No. 1 (a picket). 
 
 (Ji) Sentinel post No. 2, outguard No. 1, support No. 1 (a cossack 
 post) . 
 
 (i) Sentinel post, outguard No. 2, support No. 1 (a sentry squad). 
 
 (j) Outguard No. 2, support No. 1 (a picket). 
 
 (k) Sentinel post No. 1, outguard No. 1, support No. 2 (a cossack 
 post). 
 
 (I) Outguard No. 1, support No. 2 (a picket). 
 
 (m) Sentinel post No. 2, outguard No. 1, support No. 2 (a sentry 
 squad). 
 
 (n) Outguard No. 2, support No. 2 (a sentry squad) . 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 Infantry Drill Regulations 685, 687, and 693 govern the number- 
 ing of the supports, outguards, and sentinel posts. 
 
 (c) and (d) form the line of supports; (g), (j), (7), and (??) form 
 the line of outguards, sometimes called the line of observation. The 
 latter term, however, is not strictly correct, since three of the out- 
 guards have sent out squads, or half squads, to form the real observa- 
 tion groups. (/), (A), (?'), (/<), and (m) would be called outguards 
 if they had been sent out directly from a support, but in the present 
 case they are merely sentinel posts and differ from the other kind of 
 sentinel posts only in that the reliefs off duty are resting near the seiir 
 tinel position and not at the position of the outguard. If yoru picket 
 had a double sentinel in the woods 50 or 75 yards north of your 
 bivouac to watch an important trail, that sentinel position would be 
 called sentinel post No. 2, outguard No. 2, support No. 1. The only 
 difference between it and Corp. Nelson's post would be that the 
 
89 
 
 reliefs for the former remain with the outguard, whereas, on ac- 
 count of distance, the reliefs for Corp. Xelson's post are detached 
 from the outguard and remain near the sentinel post. Also, in this 
 case, Corp. Nelson's post would be numbered (No. 1). If an out- 
 guard has only one sentinel post, it need not be numbered. 
 
 You will observe that neither size nor location will determine the 
 correct name of the outpost parts. The determining factor is the 
 relation of the unit to the line of outguards and to the line of sup- 
 ports, (n) is no larger than (/), (i), or (m), but it is called an 
 outguard nevertheless because in its allotted front it provides the 
 sentinels for observation and is the only body of troops between the 
 enemy and support No. 2. It is one of the units in the line of 
 outguards. 
 
 In spite of many efforts to simplify the nomenclature and num- 
 bering of the outpost parts, the matter still remains complicated, 
 as you have seen. The reason for this is that we can not make an 
 outpost fit a diagram. It must fit the terrain and the conditions 
 with respect to the enemy and our own troops. 
 
 A noncommissioned officer must familiarize himself with the 
 various names and what they and the numbering system signify, 
 because one of the duties of a noncommissioned officer is to explain 
 to his outguard, or sentinel post, or patrol, how the outpost lies 
 with respect to .the ground on which his own men are to operate. 
 
 While your pins are still in place on the map and the whole situ- 
 ation with reference to the main body and the outpost is fresh in 
 your mind, we advise you to note carefully the position of the de- 
 tached post between hill 712 and bridge S. H. and the relation of 
 that post to the rest of the brigade. The eleventh problem will 
 deal with that post. 
 
 SITUATION VII. 
 
 The preceding situation was purposely placed out of its proper 
 sequence as to time of day in order to give you a clearer picture of 
 the whole outpost. 
 
 It is now 3.20 p. m. The first patrols that you sent out have 
 returned, and your roster is ready. The Conewago appears to be 
 unfordable along your front. 
 
 What orders do you give to Towney and Kelley? (See roster.) 
 
 THE FIRST SERGEANT'S SOLUTION. 
 
 I give orders as follows: 
 
 Yon two men are leaders of the visiting patrol to the south. Towney and 
 Willis, first relief. Kelley and Miller, second relief. I will show you the route 
 (I point it out while we stand at the southeast end of the trench). To-night 
 
90 
 
 our picket will be at that bridge. Your patrol will leave the bridge, go south 
 along the bank of the Conewago a short half mile to a cossack post called sen- 
 tinel post No. 2, outguard No. 1, of our support ; then along the Conewago until 
 you find that fence (the one nearest the trench) ; then along the fence about 
 to this trench ; then along the road to the picket. Towney, repeat that. 
 
 I cause each of the men to repeat these instructions until I am sat- 
 isfied that they understand, then add: 
 
 Now, Towney, take Kelley with you to the bridge and go over the route. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 We have already said that your visiting patrol needs to go only 
 as far as the cossack post; that makes contact with the next out- 
 guard. It would not be wrong to have the patrol merely go back and 
 forth along the creek, but we prefer the route given in the solution 
 because it is short and easy to follow and covers more ground. The 
 watching of the front along the Conewago does not demand extreme 
 vigilance on your part. It is not fordable between the bridge and 
 the cossack post ; but even so, a Red patrol of the kind we shall study 
 in the eleventh problem may be lurking in rear of our picket. 
 
 Even in deciding a question apparently so trivial as whether the 
 patrol shall go clockwise or contra-clockwise there is frequently a 
 chance to display judgment. There are three reasons for sending the 
 patrol clockwise that is, to leave by the Conewago and return by 
 the road: First, a patrol returning by the road is less likely to 
 compel a challenge from the picket sentinel or to alarm him. Second, 
 the fence seems to end in the woods ; it is easier to find the road from 
 the fence than to find the fence from the road. Third, if during 
 the night a Red patrol gains the rear of our picket not as probable 
 a situation in the present case as in some other its attention AY ill 
 be directed chiefly toward the picket, and therefore it will be less 
 watchful toward the southwest than toward the northeast. 
 
 SITUATION VIII. 
 
 At 3.30 p. m. you receive from Capt. Rowen a written message, 
 as follows: 
 
 Send patrol at once to see if Heidlersburg is occupied by the enemy. A 
 Cavalry patrol from the Cavalry detached post is going out on the side roads 
 east of Heidlersburg for the same purpose. 
 
 What do you do? 
 
 I give the following orders to Sergt. Hill: 
 
 Sergt. Hill, take Brown and McGowan with you on patrol. You are to go to 
 Heidlersburg to see if the town is occupied by the enemy. I have no map to 
 
91 
 
 give you, but Heidlersburg is on that main road and a mile and a half northeast 
 of here. Go out by way of our sentinel post at the bridge. North -of the 
 sentinel post there is a large area of woods. Go into those woods, and then use 
 the wooded ravines west of the main road, guiding roughly by the main road. 
 You remember the last information we had was to the effect that the enemy is 
 4 miles northeast of here, on the Harrisburg Road, the same road that Heidlers- 
 burg is on. You know, too, that while you are out you may meet up with 
 Corp. Koenig's or Butler's patrol somewhere north of our sentinel post. I 
 know of no other Blue patrol or troops that you are likely to meet, but the 
 Cavalry detached post southeast of here is sending out a patrol on the side 
 roads east of Heidlersburg. Come back when you learn that Heidlersburg is 
 not occupied or when you find that the Reds, if there are any around Heidlers- 
 burg, are halted for the night or are on the march. You have field glasses 1 
 and a compass. Have you a note book and pencil? A watch? Here are some 
 field-message blanks. Repeat your instructions. 
 
 When I am certain that Sergt. Hill understands I tell him to go 
 ahead, but I watch his preparations and his departure. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 The conduct of this patrol is the subject of the ninth problem. 
 
 It would have been more consistent, probably, if Capt. Rowen 
 had sent the patrol directly from the support. Patrols of this 
 character are usually sent from the support, unless the picket has 
 more men than it requires for sentinels, sentinel posts, and local 
 patrol duty. In any event it is well to know how to send out a recon- 
 noitering patrol of the kind ordered by the captain. 
 
 " The commander must have clearly in mind the purpose for 
 which the patrol is to be used in order that he may determine its 
 proper strength, select its leader, and give the latter proper instruc- 
 tions." (I. D. K, 606.) 
 
 " If the purpose is to gain information only, a small patrol is 
 better than a large one. The former conceals itself more readily 
 and moves less conspicuously. 
 
 " If messages are to be sent back, the patrol must be strong enough 
 to furnish the proper number of messengers without reducing the 
 patrol to less than two men. If hostile patrols are likely to be met 
 and must be driven off, the patrol must be strong. 
 
 " In friendly territory a weaker patrol may be used than would be 
 used for the corresponding purpose in hostile territory." (I. D. E., 
 607.) 
 
 If Sergt. Hill finds Heidlersburg occupied, but finds also that 
 conditions are such that he ought to remain for a while in observa- 
 tion, he will, very likely, send back a message. It is not likely that 
 he will be obliged to send back two messages. He can bring back 
 in person the second important item of information, if there is a 
 
 1 The remark concerning telephone equipment (footnote, p. 73) applies equally to the 
 issue of field glasses to sergeants. 
 
92 
 
 'second item, and we have no reason to suspect that his patrol will 
 'make more than two important discoveries. The smallest number 
 of men that we would consider for this patrol is, therefore, three. 
 
 Sergt. Hill's patrol is not of the kind that is justified in fighting 
 in order to get forward; therefore, it need not be made strong in 
 order to give it fighting strength. Although we are in hostile terri- 
 tory, the ground over which the patrol will probably pass is quite 
 free from houses and appears to offer good cover. Hence there 
 would appear to be no urgent necessity for making the patrol 
 stronger. In spite of these arguments, against increasing the size 
 of the patrol, we would, on general principles, make a little allow- 
 ance and favor a patrol of four men if the roster of the platoon had 
 not used up so many men. If the patrol had been sent from the 
 support, we should favor four men; three is the irreducible minimum 
 and possibly too few. 
 
 A patrol such as the one you are now r sending out, is the most im- 
 portant and the hardest to lead of any that falls to infantry, except, 
 perhaps, the kind you will meet in the thirteenth problem. The 
 necessity for giving complete instructions must be apparent. You 
 will do well, therefore, to study carefully Infantry Drill Regula- 
 tions 608 and 609, while this situation is fresh in your mind. Assum- 
 ing that you will do so, a discussion of the detailed instructions given 
 to Sergt. Hill is unnecessary. 
 
 SITUATION IX. 
 
 For the purpose of the present situation we shall assume that VMI 
 are Sergt. Hill, the platoon guide. 
 
 It is after midnight, and you are awake and on watch at the picket. 
 First Sergt. Holmes and the commander of the picket guard are 
 asleep. At 12.40 a. m. you hear four shots, apparently fired by Corpl. 
 Nelson's sentinel post at crossroads 502. You awaken Sergt. Holmes 
 and inform him of the occurrence. He listens a few moments, but 
 all is quiet. He then tells you to take Schafer with you and in- 
 vestigate. Going forward with Schafer, you find Corpl. Nelson 
 with his sentinels, and you are informed as follows: There is no 
 patrol in front at present. The sentinels saw moving figures in the 
 edge of the road 75 yards to the southeast. One of the sentinels sig- 
 naled twenty-three, but there was no response. He then called, 
 " Halt, who is there?" but still there was no response. Each sentinel 
 then fired two shots. Then they heard a scampering, and the figures 
 disappeared. 
 
 What do you intend to do ? 
 
 I intend to take with me Schafer and one of Corpl. Nelson's men 
 and go east into the cornfield; then south very carefully, just close 
 
93 
 
 enough to the road to see what is on it, exercising great caution when 
 I pass the farm buildings. When I have gone south about~400 
 yards, I intend to cross the road and return by way of the strip of 
 land between the road and the Conewago. 
 
 SITUATION X. 
 
 Just before you reach the- first house, a slight noise on the road 
 attracts your attention. Approaching very carefully, you discern the 
 outline of several cows. On arriving in the road you find there are 
 three of them. 
 
 What do you intend to do ? 
 
 I intend to drive the cows to the crossroads and tie them to a fence 
 near the sentinel post, using wire for this purpose if nothing better 
 can be found. Then I intend to return to the picket and report. 
 
 mscussiox. 
 
 Many things occur to alarm sentinels on outpost. Since firearms 
 were invented it is probable that sentinels on outpost at night have 
 fired more shots at animals than at human beings. Apparently such 
 occurrences can not be avoided. In campaign soldiers soon learn that 
 every alarm at night does not signify that the enemy is coming or 
 that any particular danger exists. But no matter how frequently 
 these minor alarms occur, the occasion for them must be investigated. 
 In the long run you wall become irritated rather than alarmed when 
 you hear shots fired at night. If it seems probable that the men of 
 your particular outpost unit are responsible for the alarm, you will 
 probably say to yourself, " The chances are that it does not amount 
 to a hill of beans " ; but, even so, the matter must be investigated. 
 
 Although Corpl. Nelson has a squad on the spot, the picket can 
 not omit the investigation on the supposition that Corpl. Nelson has 
 enough men to enable him to look into the matter. As far as the 
 picket knows, Corpl. Nelson and his entire squad may have been 
 surprised and captured. Capt. Rowen can quickly determine by 
 telephone whether the alarm was raised at the picket itself, but a 
 picket can seldom be in telephonic communication with a sentinel 
 post, particularly at night. If Corpl. Nelson attempted to telephone 
 at night, it would be hard for him to prevent his voice from being 
 heard at a great distance. 
 
 While you are patrolling away from the sentinel post it is better 
 to be on the safe side of the road. The safe side is the one which 
 enables you to make a run in any direction. If you find the wagori 
 road clear for several hundred yards^ there is relatively little danger 
 in returning by the route mentioned in the solution. You may then 
 
94 
 
 be reasonably sure that whatever alarmed the sentinel post is no 
 longer in the immediate vicinity. In any event, considering the 
 time that has.elapsed since the sentinels fired, you will probably find, 
 if you find anything at all, either stray animals or a small Red patrol 
 that has been sent out to locate and fasten itself to one of the elements 
 of our outpost. 
 
 If a part of the bridge planking had not been removed, you would, 
 of course, have driven the cattle back as far as the support. It 
 would not be wise to arouse a detail of men to relay the planking at 
 this time of night. 
 
 There are two good reasons for taking possession of the cattle. 
 First, they will not disturb the outpost any more. Second, they are 
 strays, and fresh beef is good for the soldier. 
 
 Sentinels who mistake cattle for an enemy and open fire justly 
 deserve rebuke, even though we recognize that such occurrences must 
 be expected. The form of the rebuke depends upon what kind of 
 men the sentinels are. Ordinarily it will suffice to let the company 
 know what has happened. During the ensuing day or two the com- 
 pany will attend to the rest in a manner that will not be wanting in 
 effectiveness. 
 
 One other point deserves mention. The first sergeant sent you to 
 investigate. It w r ould be wrong for him to investigate in person, 
 even if he happened to be on watch at the time. He commands the 
 picket and belongs with it. Inexperienced commanders are inclined 
 to wander off on side issues, and, in consequence, are frequently in 
 the wrong place when a crisis occurs. Side issues must be left to 
 subordinates. 
 
 ******* 
 
 There are other details connected with an outguard which might 
 be made subject of additional situations in this problem. To sum- 
 marize in particular some of the precautions that would be taken, 
 we may say that the men should sleep with their belts and bayonets 
 on and their rifles alongside. The bivouac should be close to the 
 barricade, fairly comfortable ground for sleeping being necessary. 
 The men should be told how to form up in case of alarm, and the 
 formation should be drilled two or three times after dark and before 
 the men are allowed to go to sleep, otherwise confusion can hardly 
 be avoided. It is better to keep the bayonets in the scabbards and 
 later fix them to the rifles as the men run to their positions, par- 
 ticularly if the bivouac and the position to be held in case of alarm 
 are cramped. 
 
EIGHTH PROBLEM. 
 
 A COSSACK POST AND A SENTRY SQUAD. 
 
 EXPLANATION. 
 
 In previous problems the nature and purpose of cossack posts and 
 sentry squads have been made fairly clear. We might add that their 
 first duty is to observe and give warning. Their secondary duties 
 include the obligation to remain concealed from view, and to in- 
 tercept all strangers in the vicinity in such manner as to prevent 
 their escape. 
 
 A cossack post consists of four men and posts a single sentinel. A 
 sentry squad consists of 7, 8, or possibly 9 men, and posts a double 
 sentinel ; that is, two men, generally within whispering distance of 
 each other. In daytime a single sentinel is frequently sufficient. 
 At night a double sentinel is nearly always necessary. We have 
 already explained that a cossack post or a sentry squad may be 
 either an outguard or simply a sentinel post of an outguard. (See 
 Situation VI, seventh problem, and I. D. E. 693.) It may happen 
 that a sentry squad will be assigned to an outguard position of such 
 importance and difficulty as to require the detail of an officer to com- 
 mand it. 
 
 SITUATION I. 
 
 Based on Situation II, seventh problem. 
 
 You are Corpl. Nelson. Read First Sergt. Holmes's orders to the 
 entire platoon (p. 91) and his orders to you (p. 92). 
 What arrangements do you make under those orders? 
 
 I make sure that the men understand the information given as to 
 the direction of the enemy, the local geography, and the location of 
 the other outpost units and of the main camp. I repeat the orders 
 concerning the disposition of strangers and readiness for action. I 
 then announce the three reliefs of one man each and state that each 
 sentinel will be one hour on duty and two hours off. I then post 
 the first relief, tell him to observe particularly the three roads that 
 
 (95) 
 
96 
 
 converge at 502, and I see to it that he uses properly the covered 
 position assigned to him. The other men are shown their position 
 when not on post. Then I send the men of the second and third re- 
 liefs to cut the wires and bring in the inhabitants of the two houses, 
 as ordered by the first sergeant. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 It is impossible to locate on a map the exact position of a body 
 of troops as small as a cossack post. A little experience will soon 
 teach you how much in the way of brush or other features is re- 
 quired for suitable cover, and the proper way to use the cover that 
 you find. One reason for remaining as well concealed as possible is 
 the safety of the men; another is the prevention of definite informa- 
 tion being received by the enemy; another is the advantage that 
 cover gives you in handling situations like the one that follows. 
 
 SITUATION II. 
 
 The men sent to cut wires have returned. At 4.15 p. m. the sen- 
 tinel points up the road to the northeast and says: 
 
 Red patrol coming. 
 
 Looking cautiously up the road, you see, 400 yards away, a single 
 Red cavalryman trotting rapidly toward you. About 100 yards in 
 rear of him and slightly in rear of the crest of the ridge, you see the 
 upper part of another horse and rider, halted, the rider apparently 
 looking in your direction. 
 
 What do you do during the next 30 seconds, assuming that at the 
 end of that time the Reds advance with two men riding about 150 
 yards in rear of the first man ? 
 
 I order the men : 
 
 Oot ready under rover. A Red patrol is coining. When I command " fire,'* 
 jump into the road and tire. I will take the tirst man. The rest of you take the 
 others. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 In order to decide intelligently the proper thing to do, it is advan- 
 tageous to know how a cavalry patrol generally operates. To cover 
 ground rapidly, it is practically confined to the use of roads, but it 
 does not rush blindly along these roads. Let us try to figure out 
 how the patrol now in your front is working. We will suppose that 
 the patrol consists of four men. They know that we are on or very 
 near the Harrisburg Road, and they have been sent out to discover 
 and report our progress or location. One or tAvo men usually lead 
 
97 
 
 the way. Let us assume that one man rides 100 or 200 yards or even 
 more ahead of the patrol leader. This lead-off man rides rapidly 
 through Heidlersburg and reaches the favorable observation point 
 near road fork 545 and halts there. The patrol leader and the one 
 man who is riding with him advance to the observation point and 
 the leader, using his field glasses, examines carefully the country 
 to his front. The fourth man of the patrol remains 100 yards or 
 more in rear of the leader. The patrol leader finds no trace of his 
 enemy and sees no suspicious signs. He then sends the lead-off man 
 at a fast trot to the next ridge, a half mile northeast of crossroads 
 502, and follows him a moment later. On the ridge another halt is 
 made, the country is again carefully examined, and the lead-off man 
 is again sent forward. Before coming to a final decision to cross the 
 Conewago and to reach the high ground where Company A now 
 happens to be, the Cavalry patrol, in the manner described, makes 
 one more halt on the ridge 450 yards northeast of crossroads 502. 
 From this ridge the patrol can see the road nearly to Plainview. 
 Apparently the Eeds think the road is clear, and the lead-off man 
 is trotting rapidly forward ; while the patrol leader, who is no longer 
 required to be cautious about exposing himself, halts where he 
 can get a better view while the lead-off man is getting his distance. 
 We know that our picket is entrenching its position. Apparently 
 the Red patrol can not see this on account of the trees on the island 
 and along the west bank of the Conewago. If the patrol intends to 
 go to Plainview the lead-off man will probably halt a moment at 
 crossroads 502, look to the right and left, and then start to cross 
 the bridge. He may pass the cossack post without seeing it. Mean- 
 time the remainder of the patrol will be coming along at various 
 distances. From head to rear the patrol may be 300 yards or more 
 in length. 
 
 With this general idea of cavalry patrolling clearly in your mind, 
 you understand why one man was seen halted while the other was 
 advancing. If the man who halted saw anything suspicious he 
 would probably whistle to the lead-off man and call him back. Until 
 you see this done you may be sure that the man who halted was 
 merely waiting for the other to gain his distance to the front. It 
 would be premature, therefore, to open fire at once. You- might 
 " get " one man, but the others w 7 ould quickly disappear ; and, there- 
 after moving very cautiously, they might learn much. On the other 
 hand, if you can break up practically the whole patrol by " getting " 
 several horses and men, the one or two survivors, if there be sur- 
 vivors, will be obliged to give* up patrolling and return with scant 
 information. A fresh patrol sent to clear up the situation developed 
 by the first one might be stopped elsewhere (for example, near 
 9G790 17 7 
 
98 
 
 Heidlersburg) by one of our Cavalry patrols or by Corp. Koenig's 
 or Butler's putrol if they happen to be northeast of crossroads 502. 
 In any event, whatever information the enemy finall}^ receives would 
 either be late or very indefinite. You should attempt, therefore, to 
 hurt the Red patrol enough to make it stop patrolling. 
 
 SITUATION III. 
 
 The lead-off man trotted past you and reached the north end of 
 the bridge nearest Plainview and then suddenly turned about and 
 galloped back, meantime signaling "halt." Two men of the patrol 
 are 50 yards and another man 200 yards northeast of crossroads 502. 
 They halt. 
 
 What do you do? 
 
 CORPL. NELSON'S SOLUTION. 
 I command, 
 Fire at will. 
 I fire on the horse of the lead-off man. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 It is very evident that the lead-off man saw the picket at work in 
 its trench. The time has come for you to spring the trap. If you can 
 disable the horse that you fired at, there is little probability that the 
 rider can escape. An examination of the rider may result in giving 
 us valuable information. All parts of an outpost seek information 
 of the enemy. Very frequently information can be obtained by 
 examining equipment and clothing. For this purpose a dead man is 
 as good as a live man, but a live man may be willing to talk. If 
 there had been a fair chance that the man would escape, the situation 
 would have been different. 
 
 SITUATION IV. 
 
 You disabled the horse that you fired at. The rider fell with the 
 horse, but immediately arose and surrendered. Looking in the other 
 direction, you see two horses and one man lying in the road, motion- 
 less. One of the men nearest the crossroads is just disappearing into 
 the woods west of the road, while the fourth man gallops over the 
 ridge and disappears, apparently unhurt. 
 
 What do you do? 
 
 CORPL. NELSON'S SOLUTION. 
 I order, 
 
 Barry, disarm that prisoner ami bring him to me. 
 
 I put all the men and the prisoner back in our former concealment. 
 
99 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 Although, it is likely that you have seen only an independent patrol, 
 it is possible that these men constitute the point of an advance guard. 
 We can never tell from the size of the first body of hostile troops we 
 feet how large the force behind it may be. In the present case there 
 may be nothing in rear or there may be a platoon of cavalry or a 
 troop or a squadron. In fact, the four men may be (but probably are 
 not) the leading element of a large mixed force of all arms. If there 
 is anything behind the patrol, other troops will soon appear on the 
 ridge, if not to attack at least to investigate. It is best, therefore, to 
 wait with all your men concealed. If the enemy appears in strength, 
 you will warn the outpost by opening fire. 
 
 The outguard will undoubtedly send a patrol to investigate. When' 
 that patrol arrives, we can consider the matter of searching for the. 
 man who disappeared and can examine the man tying in the road. 
 Also the patrol can take over the prisoner and carry back your verbal 
 report, if First Sergt. Holmes does not appear in person. If at the 
 end of several minutes no enemy appears, the matters mentioned 
 can be attended to, including an examination of the ground for a 
 clue as to whether the man who disappeared was wounded. 
 
 SITUATION V. 
 
 For the purpose of comparison, we shall assume that, instead of 
 crossing the bridge, the lead-off man turned southeast at the cross- 
 roads, apparently without seeing any signs of Blue troops on the 
 road toward Plainview. Also that there is little doubt that the 
 entire patrol will take the same route. 
 
 What would be your plan ? 
 
 To open fire Avhen the whole patrol offered the best target. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 This question is harder to answer than the former one (Situation 
 IV) . If you are quite sure that the hostile patrol is riding away from 
 the Blue outpost without having obtained any information, and that 
 its future route, until it returns to its main body, will not put it in 
 the way of obtaining information, it would be best to remain concealed 
 and let the patrol pass. But it is not possible that our brigade can 
 be so close to its enemy and in the enemy's country without the enemy 
 knowing our approximate location. We have been inarching to-day, 
 but even so the commander of the Red force in front of us probably 
 would not be 5 miles off in his estimate of our present location. It is 
 almost impossible to conceal our movements in the enemy's country, 
 
100 
 
 when that country is so populous and so generally equipped with tele- 
 phones as the country around Hunterstown and Heidlersburg. We 
 can only hope to conceal the details as to our strength and position. 
 
 The Red patrol in our front may not see your cossack post, but the 
 patrol leader may have decided that he is now getting so close to 
 where our brigade is supposed to be that it is time for him to get 
 off the main road, and hereafter use the side roads. In other words, 
 it is only a question of a few minutes before this patrol is going 
 to run into our outpost, or be told by farmers that Blue troops have 
 appeared at various places along the Conewago within the last hour 
 or two. We may seriously doubt that any other part of the outpost 
 will have as good an opportunity as you to break up this patrol and 
 make it stop patrolling. 
 
 The killing, wounding, or capturing of four men will have no 
 effect whatever upon the outcome of the war; the object in firing 
 is primarily to prevent the enemy from obtaining information, and 
 secondarily for us to obtain information of the enemy from the 
 clothing, or equipment, or talk of the members of the Red patrol. 
 The information we would thus deny to the enemy and obtain for 
 ourselves may have some influence on the campaign. 
 
 SITUATION VI. 
 
 At dark the remaining four men of your squad arrived. You had 
 previously been ordered to construct a barricade and post a sentry 
 squad for the night, as mentioned in Situation IV, seventh problem. 
 
 How will you divide up the squad for its duties during the night ? 
 
 CORPL. NELSON'S SOLUTION. 
 
 For double sentinel: Six men (three reliefs of two men each, one 
 hour on and two hours off). One man (Humphrey), second in 
 command. I will remain awake until 1 o'clock, and Humphrey will 
 remain awake from that time until a half hour before daylight, 
 when everybody will be awakened. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 A sentry squad has several advantages over a cossack post. Of 
 course, it has twice as much fighting strength, but aside from this it 
 has a distinct advantage in having men to perform sentinel duty in 
 pairs. Two men hear more and see more, and, on account of in- 
 creased confidence, are less likely to alarm the troops on slight 
 provocation. Furthermore, the squad leader and the second in com- 
 mand can divide the night, and thus there will be always one man 
 awake at the bivouac of the squad. It is very difficult for one man 
 
101 
 
 to remain awake the entire night. In a cossack post the commander 
 generally goes to sleep some time during the night and the sentinel 
 calls him when it is time for the next relief to be posted. This is 
 not a satisfactory arrangement. 
 
 In garrison or camp guard it is customary for a man to walk his 
 post two hours and then have four hours off. The men of a cossack 
 post or sentry squad get -very little continuous sleep in any event, 
 and it is no particular hardship to limit each period of rest to two 
 hours. It is a hardship, however, to require a man to stand two 
 hours as a sentinel. The strain on eyes, ears, and nerves, and the 
 discomfort of the concealed position are far greater than in the case 
 of a sentinel in a garrison or camp guard. All things' considered, 
 therefore, the most satisfactory arrangement is " one hour on, two 
 hours off." 
 
NINTH PROBLEM. 
 
 A RECONNOITERING PATROL. 
 
 EXPLANATION. 
 
 " Eeconnaissance is the military term used to designate the work 
 of troops or individuals when gathering information in the field 
 * * *." (F. S. R. 11.) 
 
 " The chief duty of reconnoitering patrols is to gather informa- 
 tion. They habitually seek safety in concealment or flight, fighting 
 only when their mission demands it. The most skillful patrolling 
 is where patrols accomplish their mission and return without being 
 discovered by the enemy." (F. S. R. 23.) 
 
 The periodical patrols that have been mentioned in the sixth and 
 seventh problems are strictly local and are intended to make the 
 outpost line effective. These patrols are covering detachments in 
 the sense that they assist in preventing an attack without due warn- 
 ing and in preventing the enemy from obtaining information. A 
 reconnoitering patrol, on the other hand, is in no sense a covering 
 detachment. When sent from an outpost it generally goes a con- 
 siderable distance beyond the outpost line and for the purpose of 
 obtaining some desired information. If cavalry is available, an 
 infantry reconnoitering patrol will rarely have occasion to go more 
 than 2 miles beyond the outpost line. 
 
 The following paragraphs should be studied in connection with 
 patrols sent on reconnaissance : Field Service Regulations, 23 to 29, 
 inclusive ; Infantry Drill Regulations, 604 to 622, inclusive. 
 
 SITUATION I. 
 
 Based on Situation VIII, seventh problem. You will remember 
 that the Conewago is not fordable along the front of our outguard. 
 
 You are Sergt. Hill, and have received instructions as given in the 
 first sergeant's solution (p. 103). It is assumed that you have or 
 have received the special articles of equipment mentioned by him. 
 
 What do you do, up to the time you reach the bridge nearest Plain- 
 view ? 
 
 (103) 
 
104 
 
 I order: 
 
 Brown, McGowan, unhook your bayonets and hook on your canteens. Lay 
 aside all but 40 rounds of ammunition and get ready for patrolling; then full 
 in here for inspection. 
 
 While they make these preparations, I do likewise and inspect my 
 rifle. When they fall in I inspect them and their rifles and equip- 
 ment and order: 
 
 Empty your pockets. 
 
 I take from them whatever letters or other articles they may have 
 of a nature that would give information to the enemy and, with like 
 articles of my own, turn them over to First. Sergt. Holmes. I then 
 give the following instructions: 
 
 We are going to Heidlersburg to see if the town is occupied by the enemy. 
 Heidlersburg is on this main road, and a mile and a half northeast of here. 
 The last information we had was to the effect that the enemy is four miles 
 northeast of here on the Harrisburg road, the same road that Heidlersburg is 
 on. I will tell you more about our route when we reach the sentinel post. We 
 come back as soon as we learn whether Heidlersburg is occupied, or, if we find 
 Reds, we come back when we learn whether they are halted for the night or 
 are still on the march. Brown is second in command. Do both of you under- 
 stand? With ball cartridges, load. Follow me. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 The preliminary measures taken by you are quite different from 
 those of the flank patrol in Situation I, third problem. The reason 
 for this difference must be apparent. No one's progress is dependent 
 upon the time you take for your preparations, and it is most im- 
 portant that the patrol should start in good physical condition and 
 properly equipped. 
 
 The mission of a patrol will determine its equipment. You will 
 return before dark. You will not fight except in self-defense. There- 
 fore any articles of equipment except the rifle, canteen of water, and 
 a few rounds of ammunition would be superfluous and an unneces- 
 sary burden. You would be given a map if one were available. 
 Apparently the first sergeant had none even for himself, else lie 
 would have given it to you for a few minutes to enable you to make 
 a sketch copy of so much of the country as related to your patrol. 
 
 A reconnoitering patrol should leave the outpost line without 
 being seen if possible. But the Conewago is unfordable, and you 
 are obliged to cross at the bridges. This will enable you to ask the 
 cossack post for late information, and from the vicinity of the 
 cossack post you can describe better your proposed route; but from 
 that point the patrol must lose itself as quickly as possible and 
 
105 
 
 thereafter avoid exposure. If the Conewago were fordable, you 
 would go immediately into the woods west of the picket, cro^s^the 
 island at some point west of the bridges, slip cautiously across the 
 road west of crossroads 502, and then go into the big woods. 
 
 SITUATION II. 
 
 At the cossack post you learn nothing new. You tell Corpl. 
 Nelson the direction and purpose of your patrol. You explain to 
 Brown and McGowan that after passing through the big woods to 
 the north you expect to find wooded ravines leading toward Heid- 
 lersburg and paralleling the main road. Also, that you know of 
 ro Blue troops or patrols in your front except a Cavalry patrol on 
 the side roads east of Heidlersburg. Also, that Corpl. Koenig's or 
 Butler's patrol may be encountered within a few hundred yards of 
 the cossack post. It is now 3.55 p. m. 
 
 What do you do up to the time the patrol has advanced another 
 half mile? 
 
 SERGT. HILL'S SOLUTION. 
 
 I order: 
 
 Brown, march out the left-hand road, along the right-hand side of the road. 
 I will follow at 25 yards. McGowan, follow me at 25 yards. 
 
 When we have advanced about 400 yards, I order : 
 By the right flank, march. McGowan, follow me at 25 yards. 
 
 I try to march parallel to the Heidlersburg road, the interval be- 
 tween myself and the other men depending upon the density of the 
 brush. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 Even while going from the picket to the cossack post, you would 
 not expose your patrol any more than necessary, and, while talking 
 with Corpl. Nelson, you would avoid revealing his position to a 
 possible Red observer, military or civilian. This you could do best, 
 probably, by remaining in the road and apparently talking to your 
 own men while actually talking to the corporal. 
 
 As \ve have stated, the patrol was compelled to expose itself while 
 crossing the bridge. You would not have gained anything if you had 
 made a detour and had crossed the Conewago by the ford 800 yards 
 south of crossroads 502 or the ford 1,000 yards \vest of crossroads 
 502. The woods north of crossroads 502 give you an opportunity 
 to conceal yourself and to deceive any Reds or inhabitants who may 
 have seen you cross the bridges. If you had entered the woods at 
 the crossroads, anyone who had observed you from the high ground 
 to the northeast or east would be on the alert for your reappearance 
 
106 
 
 somewhere along the Heidlersburg road. By marching rather 
 openly to the west, you may escape further curiosity on the part of 
 such observers. If you are observed from the high ground to the 
 west, your disappearance into the woods might lead an observer to 
 look for your reappearance somewhere along the road toward cross- 
 roads 609. At any rate, whether your ruse is successful or not, 
 you have lost very little time, and you .have observed the principle 
 that if the patrol must expose itself it should throw possible ob- 
 servers off the trail as soon thereafter as practicable. 
 
 The formation used while marching on the road has been discussed 
 in previous problems. The formation used while passing through 
 woods is quite similar to one which will be discussed in Situation IV 
 of the present problem. 
 
 SITUATION III. 
 
 At 4.12 p. m. you reach the east edge of the woods near the west 
 end of the wire fence 600 yards north of crossroads 502. You see 
 two Red cavalrymen and an extra horse on the north slope of the 
 ridge 500 yards northeast of crossroads 502, apparently far enough 
 down the slope to be concealed from Corpl. Nelson's cossack post. 
 A third man is walking from the crest of the ridge toward the horses. 
 The corn is cut and in shock, but the Reds do not appear to be look- 
 ing in your direction. 
 
 What do you decide to do ? 
 
 I decide to remain concealed and in observation long enough to 
 determine whether the Reds seem to be a patrol, a point, or a march 
 outpost. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 Naturally, you would not open fire. You were sent out to get in- 
 formation, and must under no circumstances reveal your location or 
 even your existence. You remain in observation, not necessarily 
 for the purpose of obtaining information to be sent back at once to 
 the picket, but for information that will guide your own further 
 movements. If the Reds remain halted, they may be a march out- 
 post, or even a standing patrol well in advance of an outpost. Their 
 arrangements will probably indicate their character. If they show 
 little curiosity as to the woods that you are in, you may be quite sure 
 that they have not been in their present position very long, else they 
 would have seen you cross the bridge. If the Reds move and nothing 
 else is in rear of them you may take it for granted that they are 
 on patrol. It is possible, of course, that they will prove to be the 
 
107 
 
 point of a marching column. Even so, you would not make the 
 discovery much earlier than the outpost itself. No matter* there- 
 fore, what develops within the next few minutes, you have as yet 
 seen nothing to warrant the sending of a report by messenger. 
 
 SITUATION IV. 
 
 The dismounted Red soldier mounted the extra horse, and about 
 a minute later one Red trotted toward crossroads 502, followed at 
 about 200 yards by the other two. About the same distance in rear 
 a fourth man appeared. You decided to await the impending clash 
 with Corpl. Nelson's cossack post. A few moments later brisk firing 
 began, and presently you saw one Red cavalryman galloping toward 
 Heidlersburg. Firing ceased, and after a pause you were convinced 
 that the other Reds had either been killed or captured, or had escaped 
 by some other route. You proceeded north under cover of the 
 woods and presently saw two wooded ravines leading northeast to- 
 ward Heidlersburg. You chose the one farthest from crossroads 
 502 and finally arrived 400 yards west of road fork 545, at the point 
 where the east edge of the rectangular patch of woods meets the 
 ravine. About half a mile to the northeast you see several house- 
 tops. The houses in the west end of Heidlersburg are seen quite 
 clearly. Three hundred yards north of your present position there 
 appears to be the crest of a ridge which extends toward Heidlers- 
 burg. You see no signs of Red soldiers or civilians. 
 
 What do you do? 
 
 I order: 
 
 Brown, 15 yards on my left. McGowan, 25 yards in rear of Brown. 
 
 With the patrol in this formation and guiding on me I advance 
 north as deep in the woods as possible, while still close enough to the 
 edge to observe the open country to the east. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 Sergt. Hill told you to go to Heidlersburg. This must not be 
 taken too literally. It means simply that you should go close enough 
 to the village to determine with certainty whether there are any 
 Reds in Heidlersburg. The village is very small, and it is not at all 
 improbable that you will be able to find a point from which you can 
 examine every street and the fields immediately about the village. 
 
 The ravine to the northeast will lead you to low ground close to 
 Heidlersburg. The narrow strip of cover in the ravine may be 
 insufficient cover for the patrol. The woods to the north, on the 
 
108 
 
 other hand, give you excellent cover to the ridge that extends south- 
 west from road fork 578. From the edge of the woods on this ridge 
 you may be able to see the village streets very clearly. Failing in 
 this, you would have to decide where to go next. 
 
 You probably remember that in a previous problem we recom- 
 mended a skirmish line with wide intervals as a suitable formation 
 for an advance guard flank patrol passing through woods. There 
 is a good reason for a different formation in the present case. An 
 advance guard flank patrol seeks to cover as much of the woods as 
 possible in order to determine whether the woods are occupied by 
 a hostile force strong enough to be dangerous to the main column. 
 While the escape of one or more men of such a patrol is desirable, it 
 is relatively less important. But a reconnoitering patrol uses woods 
 merely as a covered way for getting forward. It seeks to avoid the 
 enemy. In your present formation you personally march so as to 
 observe toward Heidlersburg. Brown marches on your left so as 
 to prevent the patrol from being surprised from the north or west. 
 Finally McGowan is as far in rear as easy communication and the 
 density of the brush permit, and he is in the position to escape. If 
 the patrol is surprised and you and Brown are unable to get buck 
 to the outpost, the advantage of McGowan's escape lies in the fact 
 that the fate of the patrol will become known and whatever infor- 
 mation you have already gained will be reported. There is also a 
 reason why McGowan should follow Brown instead of you. You 
 are obliged to exercise skill and judgment in estimating how deep 
 into the woods you must go to escape observation and at the same 
 time to be close enough to the edge to observe the open country. If 
 McGowan followed you he might be less skillful or more careless 
 and thus expose the patrol. 
 
 SITUATION V. 
 
 When you arrive on top of the ridge you see a farmer plowing 
 in the field east of the woods. He is moving from north to south 
 close to the edge of the woods. 
 
 What do you intend to do? 
 
 SERGT. HILL'S SOLUTION. 
 
 I intend to signal the patrol to march by the left flank and move 
 west. While giving the farmer a chance to reach the south end of 
 the field, the patrol will go to the west edge of the woods and take 
 a look in that direction. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 In warfare in civilized countries the local inhabitants generally 
 seem unwilling to suspend any of their work, even though armies 
 
109 
 
 are close by. As a matter of policy, they are disturbed as little as 
 possible; but, naturally, we must give them no opportunity to injure 
 us by conveying information to troops of their own army. 
 
 Even if you managed to capture the farmer without attracting 
 the attention of some one that you have not yet seen you would 
 merely have a white elephant on your hands. The farmer would be 
 unwilling to give you any information, and probably knows very 
 little in any event. You could not release him after questioning him. 
 You can not spare a man to guard him or to take him to the picket 
 while the rest of the patrol continues, and you can not tie him up 
 or kill him. He will soon be out of your way if you let him alone, 
 but give him a chance to be far away. 
 
 SITUATION VI. 
 
 When you reach the west edge of the woods you see, in the ravine 
 200 yards south of the southwest corner of the orchard, a Red soldier 
 walking rapidly northeast toward the house on the road. After 
 watching him a moment you notice that he has spurs but no hat or 
 rifle. 
 
 What do you intend to do? 
 
 I intend to avoid being seen and to return at once to the east 
 edge of the woods. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 Having read the preceding problem, you probably suspect that 
 the Red soldier belongs to the patrol that clashed with Corpl. Nel- 
 son's cossack post, and that he escaped. He is more dangerous than 
 the farmer, inasmuch as he will be the bearer of information to the 
 Red commander if he succeeds in returning. But it is not likely 
 that his information will add materially to what is already known of 
 our brigade. He is apparently unarmed, and it would probably be 
 very easy to capture him and to prevent him from reporting what 
 little he knows, but he would be as much of a white elephant as the 
 farmer. Furthermore, you are not going to settle the war by picking 
 up single men here and there. When you are given a distinct and 
 important task, you should not permit any trivial thing to lead you 
 from the direct prosecution of that task. At the present moment 
 you are an imporant part of the brigade commander's team, and he 
 wants teamwork. He wants you to obtain for him a certain thing; 
 information as to what, if anything, is in Heidlersburg. Do not 
 start your own little war or campaign, but do all in your power 
 to get the desired information. 
 
110 
 
 SITUATION VII. 
 
 When you are about halfway through the woods, yon heard hoof- 
 beats on the road to the north, apparently three or four horses. You 
 now arrive in the edge of the woods, on the top of the ridge, about 
 300 } 7 ards southwest of road fork 578. There appear to be several 
 Red cavalrymen halted near road fork 545, but the trees in the 
 ravine make it difficult to distinguish them. The road that runs 
 west from Heidlersburg is clear of the enemy, but near the main 
 crossroad of the village you see a hundred or more dismounted cav- 
 alrymen holding their horses. After watching them for a few mo- 
 ments you realize that the horses are being watered. 
 
 It is now 4.55 p. m. 
 
 What do you do? 
 
 I write the following message : 
 
 No. 1. Sgt. If ILL'S PATROL, 
 
 i mile W. of HEIDI. KKSIIURG. 
 
 -}..}J P. M. 
 
 Two or more troops Cavalry in HEIDLEBSBTJRG. Now halted and watering' 
 horses. Red patrols on roads to west and southwest of in:mi.i:i:snri;<;. 
 
 HILL, RgtJ 
 
 I call Brown and say: 
 
 Read this message. Now, tell me what the contents are, without look-i 
 ing at it. 
 
 When he has done so, I add : 
 
 Go back by the route we canae and give the message to Sergt. Holmes. Tell 
 him I remain here. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 In written messages or orders geographical names are always 
 written in capital letters as a precaution against error. 
 
 There are two things frequently found in messages, but omitted 
 in the one you sent back. First, the message itself does not indicate 
 the person for whom it is intended. But Brown knows, and if it 
 falls into the hands of a stranger it is better that the stranger should 
 not know. It would be absurd, for example, to address the message, 
 " Sergt. Holmes, outguard No. 2, support No. 1, Plainview Bridge." 
 In this form the message would contain information of no possible 
 value to Sergt. Holmes, but of considerable value to the enemy, if 
 Brown should be intercepted. Second, the message does not state 
 what your further movements will be. This information can also 
 be given verbally to Sergt. Holmes. If it is included in the mes- 
 
Ill 
 
 sage and the message falls in the hands of the enemy, you may be 
 hunted out of your position. It is even doubtful whether you should 
 write on the message " J mile west of Heidlersburg. 71 It would serve 
 your purpose just as well, and possibly better, if Brown were ordered 
 to tell First Sergt. Holmes, " I am a half mile west of Heidlersburg, 
 and shall remain here." At all events, you should remember that 
 a message should not contain anything that is of value to the enemy 
 and of no value to your own commander, or that may be given orally 
 just as well. Also the messenger should know the contents of the 
 message, unless there are good reasons to the contrary, in order that 
 he may convey the information in case he should lose the message or 
 be obliged to destroy it. We would not advise you to trust the mes- 
 senger's memory with a verbal message in the present case. The 
 message is too long to be delivered accurately. 
 
 The regulations say that in the enemy's country important mes- 
 sages should be sent by two messengers or in duplicate by two single 
 messengers returning by different routes. But your patrol was made 
 small because it was foreseen that this principle does not apply in 
 your case. Yours is not a distant patrol. Your route affords excel- 
 lent cover, and your messenger is not obliged to pass farmhouses, 
 settlements, trails, or roads. 
 
 You probably have no doubt as to the propriety of sending back 
 the information you have obtained so far nor as to the necessity for 
 continuing your observation. It would be unnecessary to attempt to 
 cross the road to the north in search of a more advantageous observa- 
 tion point. You have a good station, and, under the circumstances, 
 you might defeat the object of your further reconnaissance by at- 
 tempting to cross the road in search of a better observation point. 
 
 SITUATION VIII. 
 
 At 5.10 p. m. the Bed Cavalry mounted and rode west through road 
 fork 578, with an advance guard of about a troop. Your patrol was 
 well concealed, and you were able to time the main body as it trotted 
 past road fork 578 in column of twos. It required the main body 
 2 minutes and 20 seconds to pass the road fork. The group that 
 appeared to be a patrol near road fork 545 has disappeared, but you 
 were unable to see where it went. The enemy did not send a patrol 
 along the ridge on which you are stationed. While the main body of 
 the Red cavalry was passing road fork 57G, you heard firing about a 
 mile to the south, by less than a dozen rifles and for less than a minute. 
 The tail of the Cavalry main body has now disappeared and is about 
 north of you. The sound indicates that the Cavalry is still trotting. 
 
 What do you intend to do? 
 
112 
 
 SERGT. HILL'S SOLUTION. 
 
 I intend to observe Heidlersburg at least five minutes longer. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 An Infantry column would probably patrol the woods in which 
 you are located. Cavalry generally patrols farther to the flanks and 
 pays less attention to minor places of concealment along the route 
 of march. It would be out of place to discuss the reason for this, but 
 the fact explains why you were not molested. 
 
 We can imagine circumstances under which you would return at 
 once with the information you have received. For example, if this 
 were a column of Infantry and Artillery, you could arrive at the out- 
 post with your information in time to make the information of real 
 importance. In the present case there are two reasons why you should 
 remain in observation. First, if the hostile party intends to attack 
 any part of the outpost for the purpose of determining its location 
 or strength, it will strike our outguards before you can return with 
 your information. Second, the Cavalry may be in advance of an 
 Infantry column. If you remain in your present position a short 
 time, you may be able to discover signs that will settle this question. 
 Even if the leading Infantry element of such a column were now as 
 much as 2 or 3 miles northeast of Heidlersburg, there would be more 
 or less activity between the Infantry column and its independent or 
 advance guard Cavalry (as the Cavalry would then be called) which 
 has just passed you. Of course, a Cavalry column operating alone 
 may be followed by patrols which, on account of having tieeii sent 
 to the flanks, have lost distance; but many of these will have rejoined 
 during the long halt in Heidlersburg. Furthermore, a Cavalry main 
 body does not travel as rapidly as its flank patrols, and these local 
 patrols usually rejoin quickly. 
 
 You might very properly have sent Brown to the west edge of the 
 woods to observe the enemy's direction of march. The advisability 
 of doing so depends upon the exact character of the woods and under- 
 brush, and in reality the question could be decided correctly only on 
 the ground. 
 
 SITUATION IX. 
 
 Although 3^011 remain in observation 10 minutes longer, 3^011 observe 
 no further signs of Red troops in or around Heidlersburg except 
 about 20 troopers who followed the main body by about a half mile, 
 apparently a small rear guard. You have seen a few civilians in the 
 village. The sun set a half hour ago and it will be dark in another 
 half hour. Naturally you decide to return. 
 
 1. What route do you select? 
 
 2. What report do you make ? 
 
113 
 
 SERGT. HILL'S SOLUTION. 
 
 1. To the west edge of the woods ; then south to the first stream ; 
 then along this stream to crossroads 502 ; then to the picket. 
 
 2. I report to Sergt. Holmes : 
 
 A Red squadron halted in Heidlersburg for about 20 minutes and left there 
 at 5.10 p. m., marching west at a trot, with an advance guard of one troop. It 
 took the main body 2 minutes and 20 seconds to pass a given point in column 
 of twos at a trot. No other troops were in Heidlersburg when I left there at 
 5.25 p. m. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 You went first to the west edge of the woods, not only to get a final 
 glimpse of the Red Cavalry, if possible, but also for your own safety. 
 
 Two hundred cavalrymen in column of fours will trot by a given 
 point in one minute ; in column of twos, in two minutes. A troop of 
 our Cavalry will have, roughly, 75 men in ranks. But if there is any 
 doubt as to the organization of the enemy's Cavalry, you can at least 
 say that its main body contains about 225 troopers. 
 
 ******* 
 
 For comparison with Sergt. Hill's patrol, we recommend that you 
 sstudy the leading of "An Infantry Patrol," page 99 (original edi- 
 tion), Studies in Minor Tactics, 1915. This patrol has a different 
 mission, a longer route, and, because of the time of day and the 
 duration of the patrol, it carries a different equipment. 
 96790 17 8 
 
TENTH PROBLEM. 
 
 A VISITING PATROL. 
 
 EXPLANATION. 
 
 The preceding problems have probably shown the nature and 
 purpose of visiting patrols. A brief recapitulation, however, will 
 be made. % 
 
 Visiting patrols consist of two or more men each. They are sent 
 out from supports or pickets, or both, to keep up communication 
 with adjoining outguards. 
 
 " For patrolling between the groups or along the lines of an out- 
 post, or for the simpler patrols sent out from a covering detachment, 
 the average soldier will be a competent leader." (I. D. R. 608.) 
 
 We have seen that these patrols are not necessary in daytime when 
 all the ground along the line of observation can be observed by senti- 
 nels. At night, however, visiting patrols are indispensable. They 
 inform us as to conditions along the front and at our sentinel posts 
 and outguards. By using them properly we lessen the likelihood of 
 the unobserved approach of the enemy, between sentinel posts, in 
 a force larger than a patrol, and frequently we are able to discover 
 and drive off hostile patrols. Visiting patrols are the means of ex- 
 changing the latest information among the elements of the outpost 
 and, in many cases, they take over strangers detained by outlying 
 posts and deliver them to the picket or support commander. Visit- 
 ing patrols also give lonely cossack posts or sentry squads the feeling 
 that there is cooperation and mutual support among the outpost 
 elements. 
 
 SITUATION I. 
 
 Based on Situation VII, seventh problem. You are Pvt. Towney, 
 in charge of the first relief. Read the instructions given you by 
 the first sergeant (p. 102). You have been over the route once by 
 daylight, and three times with Willis after dark. It is now 12.30 
 a. m. You and Willis have been awakened and are about to start 
 out again. 
 
 (115) 
 
116 
 
 1. What preparations do you make? 
 
 2. What formation do you adopt while advancing toward the cos- 
 sack post southeast of your picket ? 
 
 1. I carry only my belt, rifle, and bayonet; the bayonet fixed to 
 the rifle. I inspect these articles to see that they are in working 
 order. Then I inspect Willis to see that he is equipped in the same 
 manner and that his equipment is in working order. Then I direct 
 him to follow me at 8 paces. 
 
 2. The formation will be single file, with myself in the lead and 
 Willis 8 paces in rear. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 Your patrol does not require the same equipment that Sergt. Hill 
 used in the ninth problem. Even the canteen may be left behind; 
 it may rattle and is sometimes troublesome, and your trip is short. 
 It is not necessary to carry materials for writing messages, since you 
 will carry back in person whatever information . you get. A small 
 electric flash lamp, however, is a convenient article for you at night. 
 A company will probably have many of these lamps in time of war. 
 
 The patrol leader should be in front on account of the fact that 
 things frequently happen suddenly and require quick decision. 
 Although the other man is only 8 paces in rear, that distance 
 makes a great difference in the ability to see. The exact distance 
 between yourself and Willis would depend upon how far you can see 
 at night. As far as the ability to see is concerned, there is a much 
 greater difference between one night and another than there is be- 
 tween one day and another. On account of the fact that nearly the 
 entire route lies through woods, or along the edge of woods, we 
 assumed that the distance would be quite short. On a clear night 
 and in open country or roads the distance might be as great as 20 
 paces. If the patrol were larger, so that two men could march in 
 the lead, the distance could be even greater than 20 paces, provided, 
 of course, that the leading men could be seen easily. 
 
 The outguard commander arranged only two reliefs for your 
 patrol. You are obliged to leave the outguard every two hours and 
 your sleep will be very much broken up. Even so, you are better 
 off than the sentinels who are one hour on and two hours off. Your 
 patrol can cover the route in a half hour. The patrol that crosses 
 the Conewago has twice the distance that you have, but since it can 
 use the roads it may be able to cover its 3,500-yard route in 40 
 minutes. If a visiting patrol has a very long route and if there 
 are enough men available the outguard commander will naturally 
 organize the patrol into three reliefs. 
 
117 
 
 SITUATION II. 
 
 You are now in the patch of woods 500 yards southeast of the 
 picket, and you hear four shots, apparently fired in the vicinity of 
 our sentinel post at crossroads 502. 
 
 What do you intend to do, assuming that no other shots are fired ? 
 
 TOWNEY'S SOLUTION. 
 
 I intend to halt and listen for a short time, then continue on my 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 In a preceding problem we have stated that much of the firing 
 which occurs at night along an outpost line has no special signifi- 
 cance. Your only object in halting and listening would be to gain 
 information. From your present position you may be able to hear 
 something that would amount to useful information to the outguard 
 commander on your return. For example, if you heard several 
 horses galloping along the road across the Conewago from where 
 you now are, that information would assist the outguard commander 
 in clearing up the situation. 
 
 SITUATION III. 
 
 Continuing along the bank of the Conewago you arrive at a point 
 which you know from your previous trips is 30 or 40 yards from 
 the cossack post sentinel. 
 
 What do you do? 
 
 I halt and give the signal twenty-three, and then listen for the 
 answer. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 It is not wise to appear suddenly within sight of an outpost sen- 
 tinel. Sentinels are sometimes nervous. If it so happened that no 
 night signal had been prescribed you could call out, " Towney's 
 patrol," but only loud enough to be heard by the sentinel if he actu- 
 ally is where you think he is. Of course, signals or calls, even 
 though given very carefully, may attract the attention of an enemy 
 who might be near by, but this would happen very seldom. In the 
 long run a signal or call will give better results; it is good insurance 
 against a rifle shot, which may not only hurt some one unnecessarily 
 but which may also reveal the location of the cossack post to an 
 enemy far beyond the hearing of your signal or call. 
 
118 
 
 SITUATION IV. 
 
 Your signal was answered, and after you advanced you were rec- 
 ognized -by the sentinel. 
 
 What do you intend to do while you are at the cossack post? 
 
 I intend to ask the sentinel what he knows about the firing and 
 whether he heard anything after the firing. I intend to ask him for 
 other news and to tell him the latest news from our picket. Then 
 I shall start on the return trip. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 If the commander of the cossack post is not awake, there is noth- 
 ing to be gained by awakening him. The sentinel knows all that the 
 commander knows, and perhaps more, as far as the events of the last 
 half hour are concerned. When you exchange news with the sentinel, 
 you would limit yourself strictly to business, and talk in as low a 
 voice as possible ; then leave at once. 
 
 SITUATION V. 
 
 You have passed through the patch of woods 500 yards southeast 
 of the picket, and you are now advancing along the fence toward the 
 trench, with the patch of woods about 50 yards behind you. You 
 hear footsteps in front of you and halt, crouching to the ground. A 
 moment later the figure of a man looms up. 
 
 What do you intend to do? 
 
 TOWNEY'S SOLUTION. 
 
 I intend to let the man approach until he is so close that he can not 
 escape; then challenge him. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 There would be no object in warning the man by using the night 
 signal, even if you suspected that other men might be following him. 
 If he or his party is friendly, your challenge will serve the purpose 
 just as well. On the other hand, if he or his party is hostile, or if he 
 is an unauthorized stranger, and you use the night signal as soon as 
 you hear his footsteps or first see the outline of his figure, you are 
 simply warning him in time to let him escape. You remember that 
 one of the important duties of a visiting patrol is to pick up all 
 strangers in the vicinity of the outpost. If you permit th-em to escape, 
 you may claim that you have driven them off, but it is much more 
 
119 
 
 important to capture strangers than to drive them off. Comparing 
 this situation with the one which precedes it, you will observe^ that 
 there are times when night signals should be used, and other times 
 when they should not be used. Experience and a little common sense 
 will enable you to decide a doubtful case. 
 
 Sergt. Hill's patrol (ninth problem) and the patrol that we shall 
 study in the thirteenth problem are obliged to dodge any strangers 
 they may meet, because these patrols are seeking information. Your 
 visiting patrol is of the kind that may be, and sometimes is, called a 
 covering patrol; that is, they make the outpost line as tight as pos- 
 sible in order to prevent the enemy or strangers from penetrating it 
 in either direction. 
 
 SITUATION VI. 
 
 The man you challenged made no effort to escape. He was dressed 
 in the uniform of a private of the Blue army. You searched him for 
 weapons and found that he had none. 
 
 In answer to your questions he states that he is a member of Com- 
 pany D of your regiment, and that his company is in the outpost 
 reserve. He also states that he is on his way to Conewago Creek to 
 take a bath. Neither you nor Willis remember having seen the man 
 before. 
 
 What do you intend to do ? 
 
 TOWNEY ? S SOLUTION. 
 
 I intend to take the man with me to the picket, ordering him to 
 march quietly in front of Willis. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 By asking questions you might easily satisfy yourself whether the 
 man really belongs to Company D. You might ask him to name his 
 officers, his first sergeant, and other noncommissioned officers, the 
 cooks, the company clerk, etc., confining your questions to persons 
 that you or Willis know, and that no private would be likely to know 
 unless he belonged to Company D. However, your orders are strict. 
 All the men of the picket were told to bring in all persons picked up 
 by patrols except members of Company A, patrols from Company B, 
 and officers whom you are sure you know. There is no use wasting 
 time trying to find out whether the man is really a Blue soldier or 
 some stranger disguised as a soldier. If you will leave this to the 
 sergeant on watch at the picket, you will get a few minutes more sleep 
 before you start^out again on patrol. 
 
ELEVENTH PROBLEM. 
 
 A DETACHED POST. 
 
 EXPLANATION. 
 
 A detached post is one which, on account of distance or the road 
 net or location with respect to the line of resistance, is separated 
 from the general outpost line. 
 
 A detached post may be sent out by the outpost commander or 
 by the main body commander; it depends upon the situation and 
 terrain. If sent out by the outpost commander, it may be assumed 
 that he considers the post a necessary part of the line intrusted to 
 him, but too distant or inconveniently located to be under the com- 
 mand or supervision of one of the support commanders. If sent 
 out by the main body commander, it may be assumed that he con- 
 siders the post necessary, but too distant or inconveniently located 
 to be placed under the command or supervision of the outpost com- 
 mander. In Situation VI, seventh problem, both kinds of detached 
 posts were referred to. 
 
 The duties of a detached post are ordinarily the same as those of 
 an element of the outpost proper. Its size and location determine 
 whether it will resemble a cossack post, sentry squad, picket, or sup- 
 port. Naturally the outpost is between the enemy and our main 
 body. A detached post, if used at all, is ordinarily on a flank. 
 
 In the present problem we shall deal very briefly with a detached 
 post sent out by the main body to illustrate the fact that such a 
 post adopts practically the same means for security as an element of 
 the outpost proper. 
 
 SITUATION I. 
 
 In the seventh problem you were reminded to note the detached 
 post between hill 712 and Bridge S. H. 
 
 It will simplify matters if we use names with which we are 
 already familiar. For convenience, therefore, we shall restate the 
 situation in such manner as to use the first platoon, Company A. 
 You are First Sergt. Holmes, in command of that platoon. 
 
 Our brigade has been marching northeast from Gettysburg on the 
 McElheny-Plainview-Heidlersburg road, in the enemy's country. 
 
 (121) 
 
122 
 
 It has been reported that the enemy is several miles to the northeast/ 
 and that our brigade will halt south of Conewago Creek until 
 to-morrow or the day after to await recnforcements. 
 
 The Conewago is reported to be fordable only at the fords shown 
 on the map. It is November 1, and the corn is in shock. 
 
 The second battalion and machine-gun company of our regiment, 
 with a troop of cavalry, form the advance guard. Our battalion has 
 marched at the head of the main body and is now halted near cross- 
 roads 561. The brigade adjutant arrives and consults Maj. Crosby. 
 He then sends for you and says : 
 
 Take this map and examine it [he points out on the map or on the ground 
 the places to which he refers later]. The enemy is on the Harrisburg I load 
 about 4 miles northeast of Plainview. Our brigade is going into camp about 
 where it is now halted. The first battalion and machine-gun company of your 
 regiment and one platoon of cavalry will form our outpost a mile northeast of 
 here astride the road through Plainview and the road to Hersliey Mill. March 
 your platoon over that hill (712-707) and establish a detached post covering 
 the Conewago crossings near Bridge S. H. Three mounted orderlies will report 
 to you very soon for duty with the detached post. You will be connected with 
 brigade headquarters by telephone. Your battalion conimnnder will insport 
 your position later. 
 
 What security would you provide for the march toward Bridge 
 S. H., assuming that the mounted orderlies do not join before you 
 start? 
 
 I send Sergt. Hill and one squad as advance guard, with instruc- 
 tions to patrol off the road when necessary, the remainder of the 
 platoon to follow at 400 yards. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 It is our purpose to deal with your detached post in the briefest 
 manner possible, to avoid details that are included in preceding 
 problems. 
 
 We must assume that the map given you by the brigade adjutant 
 is one of the kind that is ordinarily available in time of war and 
 does not show the many details which we find on the map we are now 
 using. From the crossroads, therefore, you have only a general idea 
 of the country to the west and northwest. You will be obliged to 
 march about a mile on a road that the advance guard may have 
 patrolled; but as far as you know, there are now no Blue troops in 
 that direction. The distance, together with the fact that you may 
 need flank reconnaissance and can not plan it in advance, make it 
 unwise to send the squad forward as a point. You will remember 
 that a point is a patrol that leads the way, but does not leave the 
 road. If it becomes necessary to send out flank patrols, these patrols 
 
123 
 
 could not be sent from your main body and be of any use unless the 
 main body halted until the patrols reached the places to which they 
 were sent. If you merely tell Sergt. Hill that his squad will march 
 out as point, he may assume that he is not to leave the road. It is 
 better to call the squad the advance guard, and, to be doubly sure 
 of a complete understanding and proper protection, it is well to add 
 that he will take care of flank reconnaissance. He can send out two 
 patrols of two men each and still have five men on the road. It is 
 not likely that he will be obliged to use more than two patrols. 
 
 All the officers of the brigade will be busy for the next half hour 
 or more getting the men off their feet and into camp with as little 
 effort and loss of time as possible. This is their most important 
 duty at this particular time. Hence both Maj. Crosby and the 
 brigade adjutant are too busy now to go with you and see that your 
 detached post is well placed with respect to the ground and the out- 
 post and main camp. The fact that an officer has been ordered to 
 inspect your dispositions is no reflection on your ability. Outpost 
 elements are always inspected by some one higher in authority, and 
 the inspector, who in your case represents the brigade commander, 
 is supposed to order whatever changes he thinks are necessary. 
 
 SITUATION II. 
 
 Assuming that you have arrived on the ground and that the 
 mounted orderlies have reported; also, that you have made your 
 preliminary reconnaissance and have found that the Conewago is 
 not fordable except as shown on the map, describe briefly the day 
 position of the detached post. 
 
 THE FIRST SERGEANT'S SOLUTION. 
 
 The platoon entrenches just off the road and east of it, 350 yards 
 southeast of Bridge S. H., so as to cover the bridge nearest Bridge 
 S. H. A cossack post is placed at the bridge nearest Bridge S. H. 
 and another cossack post is placed in or near the west end of the 
 orchard 300 yards northwest of 712. Two mounted orderlies are 
 placed as a standing patrol on hill 586, 1,500 yards northwest of 
 Bridge S. H. The other mounted orderly remains with me. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 The position selected for the trench enables the platoon to fire 
 effectively on the first bridge. After the trench is completed, the 
 men would not occupy it except when the enemy must be opposed. 
 It is difficult to determine on the map the best resting place for the 
 platoon. It is probable, however, that you would place the men in 
 
124 
 
 the woods across the road from the trench. By cutting the fences 
 and placing a screen of brush from the edge of the woods to the end 
 of the trench, the three squads would be able to occupy the trench 
 in a very short time, and without exposure. Your sentinels, par- 
 ticularly the two men on hill 586, would give you ample warning of 
 the approach of the enemy. 
 
 In the seventh problem, we placed the cossack post at the second 
 bridge northeast of Plain view on account of the fact that it was 
 necessary to guard against the destruction of both bridges by Red 
 patrols. The brigade expects to use those bridges when reinforce- 
 ments arrive and the advance is resumed. In the present situation, 
 however, the bridges northwest of Bridge S. H. have not the same 
 importance. It may not be wrong to send the cossack post to the 
 second bridge, but we prefer the position nearer the platoon. The 
 bridges are useful to Blue patrols, but if the second bridge is wrecked, 
 there still remains the ford a half mile west of it. 
 
 The ford just mentioned is easily seen by the standing patrol on 
 hill 586; hence, it is not necessary to place a cossack post in that 
 direction. The question arises as to the action of the platoon in case 
 the enemy advances by way of the ford. The platoon would move 
 in that direction and resist to the best of its ability. It can not be in 
 two places at once, and, in any event, it will have accomplished its 
 purpose when it has given the brigade ample warning of the enemy's 
 advance. The outpost near Plainview is squarely in front of the 
 enemy, and is expected to hold the line of resistance, which is the 
 same line as the line of supports. In view of the cavalry and out- 
 post reconnaissance, it is not likely that a large Red force can pass 
 unobserved around one of our flanks. A small Red force may be 
 able to do so, but in this case a detached post can warn the brigade 
 in time to permit the deployment of a force large enough to stop the 
 enemy. Detached posts, therefore, are primarily warning detach- 
 ments, although they resist to the best of their ability. 
 
 " For observing from some point in plain view of the command 
 * * * two men are sufficient." (I. D. R., 607.) Mounted men 
 make useful sentinels at favorable observation points which are too 
 far away to be used by dismounted men. They are usually posted 
 in pairs. From hill 586, the sentinels have an extended view in every 
 direction. If the enemy approaches, the fact can be signaled directly 
 to the picket, and the sentinels can mount up quickly and retire by 
 way of the ford or the bridges if necessary. The other orderly will 
 be useful to you as a messenger. 
 
 The cossack post near the orchard northwest of 712 has an ex- 
 tended view to the west and northwest. It can not see the bridge 
 near Fidler, but it can see the road northwest and southeast of the 
 bridge. 
 
125 
 
 One squad should furnish both cossack posts; this makes it easier 
 to keep a company duty roster. The corporal should take the cossack 
 post at the bridge, and No. 2 of the squad should take the other. 
 
 It is now evident that the platoon itself must have two sentinels in 
 daytime ; one in or near the trench to keep the Bridge S. H. cossack 
 post and the country to the east in sight, and one in the west edge of 
 the woods to keep the other cossack post and the standing patrol on 
 hill 586 in sight. 
 
 On your right flank you will locate the left element of the outpost 
 proper. On your left flank you must be satisfied if you provide se- 
 curity as far as the ford southeast of hill 586. The Fidler-588 
 road is too far away for you to cover, except indirectly, by observa- 
 tion from a distance, as already mentioned. If that road is important 
 and requires more attention to-night than Cavalry patrols can give it, 
 the brigade commander will probably send another detached post in 
 that direction. 
 
 SITUATION III. 
 
 The left element of the outpost proper is a small outguard near 
 the bend in the road 600 yards southwest of Hershey Mill. When 
 Maj. Crosby arrived to inspect your detached post he approved your 
 dispositions and asked whether you had considered a plan for night 
 positions. 
 
 What plan would you suggest? 
 
 I would withdraw the standing patrol on hill 586; combine the 
 two cossack posts and send them as a sentry squad about 50 yards 
 northwest of the road fork 1,000 yards west of Bridge S. H., with 
 double sentinel toward the ford, and move the platoon forward to 
 the south side of the Conewago, at the first bridge, posting a double 
 sentinel directly from the platoon to watch the bridge, the road to 
 Beatrick, and at the same time serve as picket sentinels; the first 
 bridge to be barricaded, and a part of the planking of both bridges 
 to be removed. One visiting patrol (three reliefs) would go from 
 the platoon bivouac to Beatrick ; then follow the fences southeast 400 
 yards, northeast 300 yards, and southeast 400 yards to the outguard ; 
 then southwest along the farm road to main road; then northwest 
 on the main road to the platoon bivouac. Another patrol (three re- 
 liefs) would go west 500 yards along the Conewago and another 500 
 yards along the farm road ; then to the sentry squad ; then to the road 
 fork 200 yards northwest of the ford ; then east and southeast along 
 the main road to the platoon bivouac. 
 
126 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 In a previous problem we have stated the reasons that would 
 prompt you to move the platoon to the bridge. The move results in 
 placing your platoon rather far from the supporting troops, but this 
 can seldom be avoided when we deal with detached posts. The 
 sentry squad near the ford is also rather far away. The outpost 
 proper ordinarily would not place small detachments so far apart. 
 
 The enemy can not make a rush attack by way of the bridges on 
 account of missing planks and the barricade. A double sentinel at 
 the platoon bivouac will therefore serve the double purpose of ob- 
 serving the first bridge and acting as bivouac guard, thus saving at 
 least four men. 
 
 We would not recommend sending a fresh squad to the ford. By 
 combining the two cossack posts the squad that is used will get credit 
 for a complete tour of outpost sentinel duty. 
 
 Naturally, the standing patrol on hill 586 is useless at night. If 
 the members of this patrol and their horses have an uninterrupted 
 night's rest they will be in condition to return to the hill shortly 
 after daylight. Two or more reliefs for this patrol are unnecessary. 
 The men themselves can arrange to divide the time, one man on ob- 
 servation being enough, while the other holds the horses under cover. 
 Their meals can be sent to them from the platoon. 
 
 In this situation the routes of the visiting patrols are so long that 
 two reliefs would not give the men enough rest. 
 
 SITUATION IV. 
 
 Sergt. Hill made an outpost sketch. By visiting the standing 
 patrol on hill 586 he was able to extend the sketch to show creeks, 
 farmhouses, roads, and woods north of the Conewago as far as the 
 587-554-582 road. An impressed guide, who lives near crossroad 
 666, furnished Sergt. Hill the names of the farmers whose houses 
 appeared on the sketch. Farm buildings near the Conewago have 
 been vacated. 
 
 The night passed quietly. Shortly after daylight you resumed 
 your day positions. After breakfast, you were called to the tele- 
 phone and told as follows: 
 
 This is Capt. Hall, the brigade quartermaster. Take paper and pencil and 
 make note of the following: A farmer named Bream has a farm about a mile 
 northwest of Bridge S. H. and on the main road just southwest of Friends 
 Grove S. H. It is reported that he has a fine herd of 10 or 20 cattle. The 
 brigade commander directs that you send a patrol at once to bring them in. 
 
 What do you do? 
 
127 
 
 To Corpl. Clark: 
 
 Get your squad ready for patrol. Carry belt, rifle, and canteen only. 
 
 While Corpl. Clark is making his preparations, I write the fol- 
 lowing on a piece of paper. 
 
 Nov. 2. 
 
 Received of Mr. Bream head of cattle, taken by order of brigade com- 
 mander. Account payable by quartermaster. 
 
 HOLMES, 
 1st Sergt. Co. A, 1st Inf. 
 
 When Corpl. Clark's squad is ready, I lead it to the road and give 
 the corporal the following orders in the presence of the whole squad : 
 
 Examine this sketch and make a copy of what you need. A mile and a 
 quarter out this road to the northwest there is a crossroad. Just north of it 
 there is a school called Friends Grove School. A short distance west of the 
 crossroad, on the road leading west, there is a farmer named Bream. It is 
 reported that he has 10 or 20 head of cattle. Go out and bring the cattle in. 
 Bring Bream or a member of his family with you. If there is no one on the 
 farm, fill out the blank space in this receipt and leave it at the house. Repeat. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 The brigade commander's orders, transmitted through a staff offi- 
 cer, the quartermaster, was purposely made less definite than w r ould 
 ordinarily be the case in order to bring more forcibly to your atten- 
 tion some important matters relating to the taking of private prop- 
 erty in hostile country. 
 
 When we march through hostile country, we generally find that 
 the enemy has removed many of the supplies we would find there 
 under other conditions. Nevertheless, we search the country for 
 such supplies as are useful to us in order to lessen the amount that 
 must be hauled to the troops by railroad, autotrucks, and wagons, 
 and to give the men and animals a variety of food which on account 
 of bulk of rapid deterioration can not be hauled at all. It is im- 
 portant for every soldier to understand that if we take such sup- 
 plies and do not pay. for them or do not pay a fair price for them, 
 the inhabitants will remove or carefully hide whatever they possess. 
 On the other hand, if we pay a liberal price, the fact soon becomes 
 known to the inhabitants, and we shall probably have the benefit 
 of a great many desirable things found locally. The soldier's con- 
 dition and well-being would suggest to him the advantage of seeing 
 to it that the owner of supplies is properly protected. You must 
 remember that the inhabitants of a hostile country can not sell sup- 
 plies to us without being liable to severe punishment by their own 
 Government. The supplies must be taken away from them against 
 
128 
 
 their will, and it is not against the law of their own country to 
 accept payment for supplies taken in this manner. If we avoid 
 unauthorized looting and if we pay generously for what we take, 
 we shall find that many inhabitants will place their property where 
 we can see it, or they may even inform us secretly that they have 
 it. In the present case, it is not at all unlikely that Farmer Bream 
 has heard rumors that we have good discipline ; that we do not take 
 property except under competent orders; and that we pay gener- 
 ously; and for these reasons he has left his cattle in a field or pas- 
 ture, where they have been seen by one of our Cavalry patrols. 
 
 The best plan would be to have Bream come to the outpost with 
 his cattle. A supply sergeant could meet him there later and pay 
 him or deliver to him the formal receipts of the Quartermaster 
 Corps (p. 128, Rules of Land Warfare). The objection to using or 
 encouraging receipts of the kind you prepared, lies in the fact that 
 some of our men are not always scrupulous, and if such informal re- 
 ceipts are customary, unscrupulous men might offer fictitious and 
 unauthorized receipts in exchange for small plunder. The owner of 
 the property might be deceived by the receipt if it is generally under- 
 stood in the community that informal receipts are in use. If it is 
 not so understood, he might make up his mind to follow the plun- 
 derers and report them. The plunderers would merely use such re- 
 ceipts to allay the owner's suspicions and thus escape detection. 
 
 It would be well to let the standing patrol on hill 586 know that 
 Corpl. Clark's patrol is going out. but we would not send an ordinary 
 message to this effect by semaphore or wigwag. If Corpl. Clark 
 passes near the hill, he may be able to communicate with the sentinels, 
 but it is more important for him to avoid exposure. Since several 
 infantry or cavalry patrols may go out from, or through, your post, 
 it would be a good plan to have a simple set of prearranged signals. 
 For example : " Eight canteens " could mean " 8 men going out by 
 way of the bridges." " Three cups " could mean " 3 men going out 
 by way of the ford." Patrols that must move cautiously may be 
 mistaken for the enemy by our own sentinels. It is a decided advan- 
 tage to all concerned to inform sentinels when patrols are likely to 
 be near them. 
 
; i; 
 
 TWELFTH PROBLEM. 
 
 A REQUISITIONING DETACHMENT OR PATROL. 
 
 EXPLANATION. 
 
 The name " patrol " ordinarily conveys the idea of a detachment 
 sent out to gain information, or to cover a road or area that needs 
 watching. " In special cases patrols may be given missions other 
 than these." (I. D. R. 605.) 
 
 " The term patrols is used to designate small detachments em- 
 ployed for a variety of purposes, the name of the detachment 
 indicating its duty, as visiting, connecting, combat, exploring, recon- 
 noitering, flanking, harassing, pursuing patrols, etc." (Footnote, 
 F. S. R., p. IT.) 
 
 A patrol or detachment sent out by our local commander to seize 
 property or supplies that will be useful to our troops, operates legiti- 
 mately under the laws of war. (Rules of Land Warfare, 347.) It 
 is an entirely different matter when a group of soldiers seize such 
 property or supplies in the enemy's country on their own responsi- 
 bility. We would not call the latter a requisitioning detachment or 
 patrol. 
 
 SITUATION I. 
 
 You are Corpl. Clark and have received orders to take your squad 
 on patrol as indicated in the first sergeant's solution, eleventh prob- 
 lem (p. 145). 
 
 What preparations do you make? 
 
 CORPL. CLARK'S SOLUTION. 
 
 I order the squad to form for inspection with rifle, belt, and ammu- 
 nition, and canteen of water. In addition, I order McGowan to 
 carry his wire cutter and I borrow for myself an extra wire cutter 
 and the first sergeant's field glass and compass. I then make a 
 copy of so much of Sergt. Hill's sketch as shows the country between 
 Bridge S. H. and the line Bream Friends Grove S. H. I then in- 
 spect the men and their equipment and explain the first sergeant's 
 orders to the squad. 
 
 9679017 9 (129) 
 
130 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 In the whole range of military affairs correct preparation means 
 a successful start and generally means a successful finish. Through- 
 out these problems we have laid special emphasis on preparation. 
 There is another point worth mentioning in this connection : If your 
 first sergeant, or lieutenant, or captain gives you a patrol to handle, 
 or any other task, for that matter, and observes that you then make 
 the correct preparations in a businesslike way, he will probably >:\y 
 to himself, " Clark certainly knows how to start this thing. I will 
 not worry about his ability to finish it." If a man really knows how 
 to handle a task, he knows enough to make the correct preparations, 
 which is nearly the same as saying that if a man makes the correct 
 preparations it is a sign that he knows how to handle the task. In 
 the present situation you may have little use for a compass or field 
 glass, but suppose you had started to march off without wire cutters. 
 The first sergeant would have suspected that you intended to drive 
 the cattle through gates and along highways, regardless of what the 
 ground might be. We doubt that a first sergeant who has shown 
 enough ability to be instructed with the command of an important 
 detached post would fail to observe your omission. In fact, we 
 believe that he would have mentioned wire cutters in his orders, 
 but in this problem, as in all peace-time exercises, we prefer to give 
 noncommissioned officers an opportunity to think for themselves. 
 
 SITUATION II. 
 
 You have made your preparations and have received your final 
 orders. 
 
 What formation and route do you intend to use up to the time 
 that you reach the north bank of the Conewago, assuming that 
 nothing occurs to interfere with your plans? 
 
 I intend to have the squad follow me in column of twos through 
 the woods along the west side of the road as far as the cossack post. 
 After telling the commander of the cossack post where I am going 
 and asking him for the latest information, I intend to send the men 
 in pairs, at about 50 yards distance between pairs, across the bridge 
 and then off the road to the right, going as far as the woods at the 
 south end or the second bridge, where the squad will assemble. 
 From this point the squad will use the same formation in crossing 
 the second bridge, and the squad will reassemble in the woods west 
 of the north end of the bridge. 
 
131 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 If you march down the road to the cossack post you might be 
 observed from a distance, and the observer's curiosity as to your 
 future movements and intentions might finally result to your disad- 
 vantage. Likewise, in crossing the two bridges you should avoid 
 attracting attention. If the Conewago were easily fordable you 
 would cross it near the mouth of Opossum Creek and thus avoid 
 exposure. There would be no advantage in crossing at the ford. 
 The distance is greater and you would be obliged to cross long open 
 spaces. 
 
 SITUATION III. 
 
 The squad has reassembled as planned in the last solution. You 
 have seen no signs of the enemy or of Red inhabitants. 
 
 What formation and route do you intend to use up to the time 
 that you reach the 587-554-582 road? 
 
 CORPL. CLARK'S SOLUTION. 
 
 I intend to follow the wooded creek (Opossum Creek) that paral- 
 lels the 534-554 road, marching in the w r oods, but close to the west 
 edge, so as to avoid being seen from the houses along the road. I 
 intend to send two men ahead as point, then myself and three other 
 men, in single file with myself in the lead, following the point at 
 about To yards, then a rear point following us at about 50 yards. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 In the previous problem the first sergeant provided for flank 
 reconnaissance for the platoon during its march from cr/ossroads 
 561 toward Bridge S. H. The present case is not similar. You 
 are advancing with as much secrecy as possible, and do not require 
 flank patrols. Naturally you will watch your flanks, but you will 
 not detach men from the column for its protection. The safest 
 method is to depend upon the concealment afforded by the woods, 
 but a point in front and another in rear will probably prevent the 
 squad from being surprised as a whole. 
 
 SITUATION IV. 
 
 When the point reached the bridge between Bream and crossroads 
 554 you signaled it to halt. The remainder of the patrol advanced 
 to the bridge. 
 
 You now observe that the bridge stringers are only 3 feet above the 
 ground; that from the east end of the bridge an observer can see 
 the Heidlersburg Road as far as the house 400 yards east of cross- 
 roads 55.4 and the higher points of the road to the north as far as 
 
132 
 
 J. Fohl; that the road to the west can be seen as far as the bridge 
 800 yards from where you are ; that a herd of 12 cattle is about 300 
 yards north of Bream's house grazing in the stubble field. 
 What do you do? 
 
 Orders to Pine: 
 
 Pine, take Stone with you ; pass under this bridge and post yourself near the 
 east end of it, in the edge of the woods, where you can see the roads to the east 
 and north. If Reds approach, go to the west edge of the woods and signal the 
 fact to the rest of the squad, then hide and watch the Reds, and signal o. k. 
 when they have disappeared. Repeat. 
 
 Orders to Brown: 
 
 Brown, take Hagen, MeGowan, and Schafer with you to drive the cattle to 
 this bridge. Going out, pass under the bridge ami through the woods along 
 the creek to that fence along the north side of the field (400 yards north of 
 Bream's house). Drive the cattle east to the woods, then to iliis bridge, where 
 I shall meet you. Detail a man to watch toward this bridge for signals from 
 Pine and to watch toward Bream's house for signals from me. If we signal 
 Enemy in sight, get into the woods and hide until \ve signal o. J:., then resume 
 your job. If we fire, join us at once by the shortest route. Repeat. 
 
 Then I add: 
 
 Ames and I are going to visit that house (100 yards west of the bridge) and 
 then the second house, which is Bream's, to cut out their telephones. Watoh 
 the occupants and see Bream or his family. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 Your orders hardly require discussion. They indicate that security 
 and warning are necessary and that, if Reds appear, the patrol will 
 hide as best it can until the danger is past ; also that the whole patrol 
 must assemble in case of discovery and a fight in self-defense. 
 
 When we are in the enemy's country telephones are a constant 
 source of annoyance and apprehension for our patrols or small 
 detachments. In the present situation, for example, it may be that 
 the enemy has a Cavalry detachment that is using Heidlersburg, 
 or Center Mills, or some other near-by point as a base from which 
 patrols are sent out. Such a detachment may have a man at the 
 local telephone exchange, and farmers may have been forewarned 
 to call up the telephone exchange whenever any Blues appear in 
 their vicinity. 
 
 The success of your patrol depends largely upon secrecy. Never- 
 theless you are now obliged to expose at least six men, but you 
 should not on that account be careless and do imprudent things. 
 For example, you should not cut the fences at the bridge until the 
 cattle are actually there and ready to be driven south. Such action 
 
133 
 
 would result in needless exposure. The occupants of the houses to 
 the west might divine your intentions before their telephone con- 
 nection was destroyed. 
 
 SITUATION V. 
 
 You found Bream at home and brought him with you to the 
 bridge. Here the patrol assembled. The cattle are in the southeast 
 corner of Bream's field, near the west end of the bridge. 
 
 What route and formation do you intend to use on the return trip ? 
 
 CORPL. CLARK'S SOLUTION. 
 
 I shall cut the fences near the west end of the bridge and return 
 by the same route that we used in coining out, except that, from 
 the bridge near 534 we shall use the road. The herd will be driven 
 in the open field as close as possible to the west edge of the woods 
 that line Opossum Creek. 
 
 Two men with wire cutters will precede the herd by 50 yards as 
 far as the bridge near 534. Bream and three men will drive the 
 cattle, Bream taking the most exposed (west) flank. Three men, 
 including myself, will follow the herd at 200 yards. From the 
 bridge near 534, Bream and one man will drive the herd along the 
 road to our detached post. The rest of the squad will remain near 
 534 until the herd reaches the north bridge across the Conewago, and 
 then follow. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 The map indicates that there is brush in the woods along Opossum 
 Creek. The effort to conceal the patrol as much as possible can 
 hardly be carried to the extreme of attempting to drive the herd 
 through such woods. The woods will screen the herd on the east 
 side, and the high ground, on the south end of which we have a 
 standing patrol (586), will screen it on the west side. 
 
 Your formation resembles that of a convoy on a small scale. If 
 we were to change the formation at all we would reduce the point 
 to one man and the drivers to two men, thus making five men avail- 
 able for the rear guard. You can readily see that the rear guard 
 has become the most important element in case a small Red party 
 discovers what you are doing, and attempts to interfere with you 
 before you reach the protection of the detached post. For this 
 reason, also, you may dispense with a point when you reach 534 
 and, since two men can drive a herd along a road lined with fences, 
 the entire squad is available to prevent interference before the herd 
 reaches the island in the Conewago. 
 
134 
 
 While you were marching toward Bream's house you could have 
 no excuse for fighting except in self-defense. But on the return 
 trip you would fire on any Red party, if by doing so you could pre- 
 vent a discovery of your real operation, or could prevent inter- 
 ference with it. For example, if a Red patrol arrived at crossroads 
 554 from the east or north, you would drive it off if its further prog- 
 ress threatened the success of your little convoy. Therefore, one 
 man of your small rear guard should march close to the edge of the 
 woods so as to be able to see the ground east of Oppossum Creek. 
 
THIRTEENTH PROBLEM. 
 
 A CONTACT PATROL. 
 
 EXPLANATION. 
 
 The patrols that we have studied heretofore in connection with the 
 Plainview outpost are of the kind that are intended to warn us if the 
 enemy approaches. It is frequently just as important to know 
 whether the enemy- is going away. When two armies are in close 
 contact and one feels obliged to retreat, the start is frequently at- 
 tempted at night. For example, if at night our outpost line faces the 
 enemy's, and during the preceding day the enemy has been badly 
 defeated, or we have been heavily reinforced, the enemy may decide 
 that it is dangerous or unwise to remain. If he begins his retreat 
 during the night (as Lee did at Gettysburg), and without our knowl- 
 edge, he will have a good start by the time we discover his move, and 
 we shall lose the great advantage of a close pursuit. Toward morn- 
 ing we shall be in contact w T ith a mere skeleton of his original out- 
 post, possibly only a line of small outguards. The main body, and 
 even the outpost reserve and supports, may be gone. Hence, when 
 we have reason to believe that the enemy may retreat during the 
 night, we should get our patrols behind the enemy's line of observa- 
 tion, as near the larger bodies of troops as possible. A patrol that 
 arrives in a favorable position fastens itself to the body of troops 
 which it has found, and remains there in hiding and in observation 
 as long as possible. It attempts to send or bring back information 
 if it discovers any definite signs of the enemy's intention to leave. 
 Such a patrol might well be nicknamed " night leech." It is a diffi- 
 cult patrol to lead, because if the enemy intends to retreat he will 
 naturally try to make his line of observation impenetrable "hog 
 tight,*' as the farmers say when they refer to their strongest fences. 
 The return trip of messengers, or of the whole patrol, may be as 
 difficult as the trip out. 
 
 If the enemy is some distance away the Cavalry usually furnishes 
 these contact patrols. A Cavalry patrol will leave its horses in 
 hiding, in charge of two or more men, while the others, on foot, 
 attempt to penetrate the enemy's outpost or detached posts. But 
 
 (135) 
 
136 
 
 when contact is close for example, where the opposing sentinels are 
 only a few hundred yards apart Infantry patrols make the attempt 
 along this front, while Cavalry patrols may be sent to make similar 
 attempts on the flanks. 
 
 SITUATION I. 
 
 Continuation of sixth to tenth problems, inclusive : 
 
 In the eleventh and twelfth problems we arbitrarily borrowed the 
 first platoon for convenience. We shall now return it to its original 
 position and assume that it has been there since we concluded the 
 tenth problem. 
 
 You are Sergt. Hill, of the first platoon. The first platoon formed 
 the picket near the bridges northeast of Plain view and first occupied 
 its position on the afternoon of November 1. It is now 8 p. m., No- 
 vember 2, and it has been dark since 5.45 p. m. 
 
 Important things have happened to-day. Shortly after noon the 
 enemy made a sudden attack against our front along the Conewago, 
 from the bridges where our platoon has been stationed to the Cavalry 
 detached post 11 miles southeast of our platoon. The enemy failed 
 to force a crossing at our two bridges, but he captured the fords 800, 
 1,300, and 2,500 yards to the southeast of us. The outpost battalion 
 was soon deployed on the east slopes of the 616 and the Plainview 
 spurs, but it was in serious danger nevertheless. The main body of 
 the brigade, however, went forward in counterattack along both sides 
 of the watercourse that runs almost east-northeast from road fork 
 535. But the enemy was well equipped with artillery, while we had 
 none, and the counterattack was stopped when it reached a line 
 parallel to and a short distance east of the 616 544 road. Red troops 
 continued to cross at the fords and severely hammered our long line 
 until 4 o'clock, until which time matters looked very serious for us. 
 At that hour, however, the first of our reinforcements arrived; a 
 full regiment of Artillery that had trotted ahead of the Infantry 
 brigade with which it had been marching. The regiment carried as 
 many infantrymen as its guns and carriages could accommodate, and 
 three troops of Cavalry rode in front and patrolled the flanks. 
 When our Artillery opened fire the enemy was through. If our brig- 
 ade had not been so roughly handled and exhausted we might have 
 greatly damaged the enemy. But he maintained a stubborn firing 
 line on our side of the Conewago until it was practically too dark 
 for us to see it. Under cover of this line, the other Reds on our side 
 of the Conewago recrossed the creek. At dark, when the firing line 
 of our brigade finally reached the creek, the men found that the 
 enemy had very ingeniously stretched more than 100 lines of rope 
 across the Conewago, fastening the ends to trees. That explained 
 why we caught so few Red prisoners at the fords. 
 
137 
 
 The second brigade arrived at dark, but the hour was then too 
 late, and our brigade was to disorganized to permit a change oi 
 outpost troops for to-night. The first platoon lost seven men. The 
 second platoon (Sergt. Crane) lost even more. These two platoons 
 were consolidated and stationed as a picket at the old post of the first 
 platoon ; that is, near the barricade of tjie first bridge, with a sentry 
 squad at the south end of the second bridge. The second bridge, 
 however, was badly wrecked during the fighting. The other changes 
 made in the outpost have not yet been reported to the picket. 
 
 Yesterday afternoon three rowboats were found by another picket 
 near Hershey Mill. One boat was turned over to our picket last 
 night, and has been kept out of sight on the south bank of the west 
 end of the large island on which our sentry squad is posted. v 
 
 First Sergt. Holmes, the picket commander, now (8 p. m.) calls 
 you and says: 
 
 Get yourself and Butler, Quinn, and Walinski ready for patrol through the 
 enemy's outpost, and then report to me for orders. 
 
 When you are ready, the first sergeant gives you the following 
 orders : 
 
 The enemy has sentinel posts at various points along the road that follows 
 the opposite bank of the Conewago. There is one near the crossroads in front 
 of us (502). We do not know whether the main body of the enemy has halted 
 across the Conewago for the night or has marched off. Our picket is no longer 
 sending patrols on the roads just across the creek. Other patrols like yours 
 may be sent on other roads, but I know of none and you are not likely to meet 
 any. Take your patrol through the enemy's outpost line and follow the Heidlers- 
 burg road to locate the outpost support or reserve. If you find none between 
 here and Heidlersburg, come back at once. If you find one, keep it in sight and 
 come back if it marches off. In any case, be back here at daylight. You have 
 already been in that direction on patrol and know the country as well as I 
 do. Cross at the ford or by the ropes southeast of here, or take the boat at the 
 west end of the island. Let me know which you choose. Repeat. 
 
 In the open you can see a man at about 100 yards distance if he 
 is on the skyline and standing; otherwise, about 25 yards if he is 
 standing, and about 10 yards if lying down. 
 
 1. What equipment will the patrol carry? 
 
 2. What route do you intend to follow ? 
 
 3. What formations will the patrol use? 
 
 1. Each man will carry a rifle, belt with 40 rounds of ammuni- 
 tion, and canteen. In addition, I personally shall carry a wire cutter, 
 watch, electric flash lamp, and note book and pencil ; also, of course, 
 the compass, which is a part of my unit equipment. 
 
 2. I intend to cross by means of the boat ; cross the road about mid- 
 way between crossroads 502 and the road fork TOO yards northwest 
 
138 
 
 thereof; pass through the big woods so as to get in touch with the 
 Heidlersburg road at a point not less than 200 yards northeast of 
 crossroads 502; then, using the telegraph or telephone poles as a 
 guide, advance along the west side of the road and 75 or 100 yards 
 from it, but swinging around the ridges so as not to appear on the 
 skyline, and swinging around any farmhouse that may be along the 
 road. 
 
 3. After landing on the north bank of the Conewago, the patrol 
 will proceed in single file, with 10-pace distances, and myself in the 
 lead; on hands and knees or crawling when necessary. When the 
 patrol is some distance inside the big woods, it will be formed with 
 one man from 3 to 10 paces on my left (exact distance depending 
 upon the amount of light) ; behind this man will march another at 
 the same distance, and then a fourth man at the same distance behind 
 the third. The same formation will be used after the patrol leaves 
 the big woods. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 The first sergeant's orders indicate that you are probably in for 
 a hard night's work. Fortunately, such patrols are not a daily 
 occurrence. 
 
 First, we desire to say a word about the equipment. It is Novem- 
 ber 2, and therefore the nights are cold, but we have not gone into 
 details as to the clothing of the troops. If the troops have their 
 overcoats, the members of your patrol would wear theirs. Other- 
 wise, you would try to rustle an extra flannel shirt and sweater for 
 each of the men, so that each man could wear two flannel shirts and 
 two sweaters. Failing in this, we would recommend that you carry 
 blankets. Under no circumstances should you fail to make pro- 
 visions for keeping the men fairly comfortable. You might dis- 
 pense with these articles if the patrol were to march continuously, 
 but it is likely that you will be obliged to remain inactive and con- 
 cealed for several hours and you should prepare accordingly. 
 
 The men of the visiting patrol in the tenth problem carried 
 bayonets, but you will remember that this patrol was obliged to 
 challenge anyone it met, and to make prisoners of all strangers. 
 You, on the other hand, should under no circumstances attempt to 
 fight, except in self-defense as a last resort. Under these circum- 
 stances, we believe that a patrol such as yo\irs, which should march 
 stripped of all unnecessary equipment, will be better off without 
 bayonets. For the same reason, you need very little ammunition, 
 but the length of time that your patrol will be out makes it advisable 
 to carry canteens of water. The wire cutter can be carried in the 
 pocket and may be very useful. The flash lamp will be a great 
 convenience in case you have to examine your watch or compass, or 
 have to write a message. In using it, however, you should lie close 
 
139 
 
 to the ground and carefully cover your hands and the lamp with your 
 hat or overcoat. 
 
 The first sergeant very properly made no reference to crossroads 
 502 as a starting point for your patrol, even assuming that you 
 could pick your way across the bridge wreckage. The Red sentinel 
 post would stop you at the very beginning. The same objection 
 may be offered with respect to the ford TOO yards southeast of our 
 picket. Although the ford is not near the road, it is quite certain 
 that the enemy has it under observation. The lines of rope might 
 enable your patrol to cross without being observed, but the men 
 would be soaked, and the night will probably be a long and cold one. 
 However, the final reason for choosing to cross by means of the row- 
 boat, is the fact that it places the patrol on the most favorable side 
 of the Heidlersburg road, as we shall see later. To tell the truth, 
 we forced the situation when we allowed the first sergeant to leave 
 to you the choice of your crossing place. 
 
 In addition to the Red sentinel post near crossroads 502, you 
 may as well take it for granted that there is another Red sentinel 
 post at the road bend TOO yards northwest of crossroads 502, and that 
 frequent patrols pass between these two points. You will be obliged 
 to use the utmost care when you enter the boat, paddle it across, and 
 leave it. You can not use the oar locks. When you reach the op- 
 posite bank, you must hide the boat as well as you can and make note 
 of some near-by landmark. 
 
 On our map it is impossible to decide upon the exact route to the 
 big woods, but it is quite probable that you will be obliged to ap- 
 proach the road on your hands and knees and then cross it by crawl- 
 ing. You must lead the way, and each of the other men must do 
 exactly as the man in front of him does; that is, advance on his 
 hands and knees, or crawl, or lie still. If the road were lined with 
 woods on both sides, we would recommend that the patrol cross in 
 skirmish line ; but you are obliged to approach the road over ground 
 that is as open to view as the road itself. It matters little at what 
 point you strike the woods. The main thing is to get into the woods 
 undiscovered. Once you are in the woods, the first thing to do is 
 to get safely away from the road that you have just crossed, and then 
 try to find the Heidlersburg road at a point that is a safe distance 
 from the sentinel post at crossroads 502. Your object now is to use 
 the road as a guide. 
 
 As soon as you are clear of the woods you will see the great ad- 
 vantage of being on the west side of the road instead of the east 
 side. The greater part of the road will appear on the skyline; the 
 tops of telegraph or telephone poles will almost certainly appear on 
 the skyline throughout the distance to Heidlersburg. Your patrol 
 will be either on a down slope or on low ground with a dark back- 
 
140 
 
 ground when viewed from the road. Hence your patrol can walk 
 parallel to the road and 100 yards away from it and still see the 
 poles and, in many places, any man that might be on the road. A 
 person on the road, however, would be unable to see you, though 
 he might be able to hear you. It becomes, then, merely a question 
 of how quietly you advance. Of course, you may stumble across a 
 patrol, or even a sentinel, off the road. To reduce the chance of mis- 
 hap on this score, you would loop around the spurs that run west- 
 ward from the road in order not to appear on some one else's skyline, 
 but the road is still the guide. 
 
 ^ When you have a long distance to go at night, and must avoid 
 discovery, the surest method is to find a road or railroad or a com- 
 bination of roads to follow. Study carefully the road or combina- 
 tion of roads that will lead you to your destination and then if pos- 
 sible choose the low side for your advance so that the poles, or even 
 the trees or fences alongside, if there are no poles, may be on the sky- 
 line. Even in daytime the tops of a line of poles are an excellent 
 guide for a patrol that must avoid being seen from the road. 
 
 Under no circumstances would we consent to the route you fol- 
 lowed when you patrolled toward Heidlersburg yesterday afternoon 
 (ninth problem). You are now looking for the camp or bivouac of 
 one of the larger outpost bodies. You will find such bodies on or 
 near a road, particularly at night; and you are ordered to confine 
 your attention to the Heidlersburg Road. A patrol easily loses its 
 way at night. It will be hard enough to guide on the road when you 
 consider the ridges around which you must pass, and the farmhouse 
 squarely between the ridges. Farmers' dogs are especially trouble- 
 some. 
 
 The formation of the patrol while advancing parallel to the road 
 is determined by the ground. The task of examining the country 
 along the road falls on you. The man on your left must watch the 
 other flank and guide on. you. The other men follow him because 
 he is farthest from the road and nearest to the low ground, which is 
 the safe ground. The same principle is observed as in the formation 
 of your patrol in Situation IV, ninth problem. 
 
 SITUATION II. 
 
 When you reach the cornfield 400 yards north of crossroads 502 
 and are midway between the watercourse and the road you see on 
 the road east of you against the skyline three men marching toward 
 crossroads 502. 
 
 What do you intend to do? 
 
 SERGT. HILL'S SOLUTION. 
 
 Lie down and wait until the Reds are safely out of the way. then 
 continue toward Heidlersburg. 
 
141 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 As long as you have a decided advantage of position, it would be 
 foolish to. attempt to move. The three Reds probably form a visiting 
 patrol, or they may be a relief of sentinels going out to be posted; 
 it does not matter. They can not see you, but they may hear you if 
 you move. If your patrol is properly instructed the men will 
 naturally lie down when you do so. No signal or sound is 'necessary. 
 
 SITUATION III. 
 
 As you continued toward Heidlersburg you were able to examine 
 the road where it crosses the spur a half mile northeast of crossroads 
 502. In the vicinity of the farmhouse you experienced greater diffi- 
 culty, but observing no signs whatever and in view of the fact that 
 the ground in that vicinity is very low, you decided that there was 
 no large outpost body on or near that part of the road. Continuing 
 your advance you passed through the cornfield west of the house 
 and circled around the west slope of the low spur in front of you. 
 
 You are now 300 yards northwest of the house, and about ready 
 to make your way back toward the road when you observe through 
 the woods a number of small fires apparently 200 yards northeast of 
 your present position. 
 
 What do you intend to do? 
 
 I intend to approach carefully until I can see whether there are any 
 men around the fires. 
 
 SITUATION IV. 
 
 You arrive at the point where the fence enters the woods (400 yards 
 west of road fork 545) and remain in observation for several minutes. 
 There appear to be 20 or 30 very small fires, and occasionally men 
 pass between you and some of these fires. Also, you catch the hum 
 of low conversation. From other signs you decide also that, from 
 time to time, men are coming to the fires from the direction of the 
 road to the east and others are leaving the fires and going toward the 
 road. 
 
 What do you intend to do? 
 
 I intend to remain in observation in or near my present position as 
 long as the present activity continues. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 In an outpost the building of fires is generally prohibited. In that 
 case, how can we account for the small fires that you have discov- 
 
142 
 
 ered ? The explanation is probably as follows : The enemy has been 
 as late as we, or later, in getting his outpost established. The Reds 
 have had nothing to eat since before noon. The night is cold. The 
 men need hot coffee and food. After a battle there is always a tem- 
 porary disorganization of messing arrangements. It is probable that 
 the Red outpost can not be served with hot coffee and food from 
 some point farther back, and there must be some reason why the 
 troops immediately in front of you can not use indoor fires in Heid- 
 lersburg. Hence, the officer responsible for the fires has selected a 
 ravine screened by a strip of woods and has ordered individual cook- 
 ing, probably by squads and in relays. Under all the conditions the 
 necessity for hot coffee and food outweighs the necessity for complete 
 concealment at a point so far (1 mile) in rear of the Red line of 
 observation. Whether this explanation is correct or not, your dis- 
 covery has undoubtedly revealed the fact that you have located a 
 large outpost body, probably a strong support, on the road east, or 
 nearly east, of where you now are. With the aid of our map wo 
 would conclude that the support is at road fork 545, but it is not 
 likely that your knowledge of the ground with respect to your pres- 
 ent position would be definite enough to enable you to locate the sup- 
 port so precisely. It is sufficient to know that you have probably 
 located an important outpost element. 
 
 The next question is, Can you approach nearer to Heidlersburg or 
 improve your present position? We would not recommend such an 
 attempt for the present. Of course, you will obtain the best results 
 if you can locate the enemy's main body, because the enemy may 
 march off, leaving supports in position as well as outguards. But 
 there are times when we must let well enough alone. You can not 
 approach nearer to Heidlersburg unless you make a wide detour 
 through the woods to the north. As we have said before, a patrol 
 easily loses its way at night, particularly in woods, and you may 
 eventually come out of the woods at a point where your discovery 
 is almost certain. Even if it exercises the greatest care and skill, a 
 patrol passing through woods and underbrush at night has many 
 collisions with dry branches and other unseen obstacles. On a still 
 night its progress may be detected by sound at a great distance. 
 ******* 
 
 Our discussion has indicated what the future action of the patrol 
 would be under ordinary circumstances. It is therefore unnecessary 
 to carry the problem further. One point only deserves attention: 
 At night it is unwise to send back information or messages by a 
 single messenger. Ordinarily, when you have information important 
 enough to be sent back, the conditions will be such that the entire 
 patrol may return at once; but if you desire to send a message and 
 remain in observation you should send two messengers. 
 
REMARKS ON THE PLAINVIEW OUTPOST. 
 
 These remarks are inserted here in the hope that they will be of 
 interest to officers who have followed the preceding eight problems 
 and who may have inquired into the larger aspects of the protection 
 given the brigade. It is a further object of these remarks to en- 
 courage carefully prepared and complete situations, using the minor 
 parts as bases for problems for noncommissioned officers. There are 
 several interesting points in connection with the Plainview outpost. 
 Some of these points will be discussed. Officers may derive much 
 value from studying their own problems in like manner. 
 
 It was assumed that the brigade, with one troop of Cavalry, was 
 advancing to the northeast to hold the line of the Conewago until 
 to-morrow or the next day, when reinforcements would arrive and 
 a further advance would be made. Our information indicated that 
 the enemy is inactive for the present, and after noon to-day our 
 Cavalry located him in camp about 4 miles northeast of Plainview. 
 Our advance guard battalion and one platoon of Cavalry constitute 
 our outpost. The remainder of the Cavalry is relieved from further 
 duty with the advance guard, and after reconnaissance beyond the 
 Conewago will withdraw to the main body. 
 
 Outpost Cavalry, if too weak to camp in advance of the outpost 
 proper, is usually assigned to the reserve or support, or divided 
 between two or more supports, sending patrols from the element to 
 which it is assigned. Why, then, did Maj. Crosby order the outpost 
 Cavalry to a detached post on the flank ? 
 
 Several reasons may be given for this decision. The platoon is, 
 of course, too small to be posted across the Conewago. The picket 
 and supports are connected with the reserve by telephone; this does 
 away with the necessity for mounted messengers, and therefore no 
 troopers need be detached for messengers. The river is unfordable, 
 except at well-known places. The enemy is likely to send strong 
 patrols to the Conewago, particularly at night, to watch the im- 
 portant crossings at Hershey Mills and northeast of Plainview. 
 Under these circumstances it is just as easy to send Cavalry patrols 
 from the detached post. The extra distance by way of side roads 
 is more than compensated for by the fact that these roads and the 
 Conewago crossing which leads to them will be less carefully watched. 
 
 (143) 
 
144 
 
 Finally, a detached post at the point selected is necessary. The 
 post selected is rather distant for an Infantry platoon. All things 
 considered, it is a good position for the outpost Cavalry. A short 
 distance to the southwest ample cover will be found for the horses. 
 
 If the brigade commander has not indicated that he would send a 
 detached post from the main body toward Bridge S. H., would Maj. 
 Crosby have been obliged to extend his outpost far enough to cover 
 that road? 
 
 Maj. Crosby's orders were to establish the outpost on the general 
 line of the ridge southeast of Hershey Mill and northeast of Plain- 
 view. An order in this form implies that the outpost will prepare 
 to resist on the approximate line mentioned, but the outpost must 
 reach beyond that line if an extension is .necessary for protection, 
 although the elements thus placed on the flanks may be able only 
 to warn and not to resist. How far beyond the general line should 
 an outpost thus extend? 
 
 The question is not always easy to answer. In the present case, 
 however, it is evident that the outpost must be ready to resist any 
 hostile advance by way of Hershey Mill,the bridges northeast of 
 Plainview, and the fords east of Plainview. It is also evident that 
 the main body should at least be warned in case of a hostile advance 
 by way of Bridge S. H., or the crossing at which the cavalry has 
 been posted. Therefore, if the brigade commander had not placed 
 a detached post on the Bridge S. H. road, Maj. Crosby would have 
 been obliged to do so. 
 
 Has the brigade sufficient protection on its east flank? 
 
 The country around Woodside S. H. is fairly open to view from the 
 main camp and the outpost, especially from the reserve and the 
 cavalry detached post. What with patrols and the ordinary daytime 
 activities of a large camp, we may fairly assume that the brigade is 
 amply protected during daylight. At night, however, there should 
 be a detached post near 544. The present outpost comprises one- 
 ninth of the \vhole command, and the enemy is close at hand. Under 
 these circumstances, Maj. Crosby is justified in requesting the brigade 
 commander to send a detached post from the main body. If Maj. 
 Crosby prefers not to make this request, or if the brigade commander 
 disapproves the request, another detached post, not less than a 
 platoon, must be sent from the outpost reserve, unless the brigade 
 commander assumes the responsibility for leaving that flank open. 
 
 Why are machine guns not assigned to the outpost ? 
 
 Machine guns were omitted for the purpose of the problem. The 
 machine gun company of our regiment should be assigned to the out- 
 post. Until Maj. Crosby has inspected the outpost line and has 
 decided where the machine guns are needed most, he would probably 
 leave them with the reserve. His inspection would probably prompt 
 
145 
 
 him to send a platoon (two guns) to each of the outguards of sup- 
 port No. 1. 
 
 Why do the outguards intrench a day position some distance 
 from the defiles that they cover, and then move forward to these 
 defiles at night? 
 
 Let us assume that the enemy makes a vigorous attack in daytime 
 against the picket which covers the ford east of Plainview. If the 
 picket lined the west bank with a firing line, the enemy, in greatly 
 superior numbers, would line the east bank and smother the fire of 
 the picket. With sufficient force, the enemy would have little diffi- 
 culty in crossing the ford quickly. On the other hand, if the 
 picket intrenched in the woods J-00 yards west of the ford and cleared 
 a field of fire to the island, the woods that line the west bank, to- 
 gether with the distance and the trenches, will greatly reduce the 
 effect of the enemy's fire, and the picket may be able to concentrate 
 on any troops that attempt to cross the ford. At night the situa- 
 tion is different. The enemy will not be able to fire effectively, even 
 at the short distance which separates the two banks. The picket 
 would be at the mouth of the defile, prepared to meet the enemy's 
 narrow front with fire and bayonet. If the picket remained in its 
 trench, the enemy could cross under cover of darkness and form a 
 line on the west bank before advancing. 
 
 * -'f v -' -'.- # ff 
 
 In a previous discussion the statement was made that in most cases 
 reasons will be found for intrenching a picket. To illustrate a situ- 
 ation that would make intrenching unnecessary, let us assume that 
 our brigade arrived in its present position so late in the afternoon 
 that the outguards arrived in their day positions an hour or less 
 before the time for moving into the night positions and assume, in 
 addition, that it is definitely known that the brigade will resume the 
 march at daylight to-morrow. 
 96790 17 10 
 
FOURTEENTH PROBLEM. 
 
 A SMALL OUTGUARD. 
 
 SITUATION I. 
 
 We are in enemy country. Our battalion has been at Biglerville, 
 guarding the railroad. This afternoon several companies of Reds 
 came from the south and attempted to destroy the railroad bridge 
 1.000 yards east of Stiner. Our battalion left Biglersville at once, 
 defeated the enemy north of Stiner just before dark, and drove him 
 south on the Carlisle road. Our battalion pursued with Company A 
 as advance guard; the first platoon as advance party. 
 
 It is now a half hour after dark. Except against the sky line, a 
 man can be seen at a distance of only 30 or 35 yards. The battalion 
 has halted. The advance party is at Texas crossroads. The point 
 (Sergt. Hill and the first squad) is probably 75 yards south of Texas 
 crossroads. 
 
 You are Corpl. Adams, third squad. 
 
 Capt. Rowen has assembled the noncommissioned officers of the 
 advance party and now says: 
 
 No further news of the enemy. The main body of the battalion halts for the 
 night at the bridge that we crossed a half mile north of here. Company A 
 will be the outpost and will bivouac at these crossroads. Second squad, go 500 
 paces west on this road and establish outguard No. 1. Third squad, go 500 
 paces south on this road and establish outguard No. 2. Send back the con- 
 necting files and the point as you pass them. Fourth squad, go 500 paces east 
 on this road and establish outguard No. 3. Night signal : Forward march, and 
 Attention to orders (to be whistled). Posts. 
 
 What do you do up to the time you pass the point ? 
 CORPL. ADAMS'S SOLUTION. 
 
 I return to my squad and order: 
 
 The battalion will camp at the bridge a half mile north of here. The com- 
 pany bivouacs at these crossroads as outpost for the battalion. This squad 
 goes 500 paces down the road to the south to establish outguard No. 2. Every- 
 body march quietly. Kelley, take Miller and move out as point. The squad 
 
 will follow you at 30 yards. 
 
 (147) 
 
148 
 
 When Kelley ami Miller have gained about 25 yards distance, I 
 add: 
 
 Towney. tell me when we have gone 500 paces. Follow me (to the squad). 
 
 I follow Kelley and Miller at as great a distance as possible with- 
 out losing sight of them. As I pass the connecting files and the ad- 
 vance guard point, I inform them that they are to return to the 
 crossroads. I count my paces. 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 Speaking of marches, the Infantry Drill Regulations say that, if 
 the distance to be covered necessitates either breaking camp before 
 daylight or making the camp after dark, it is better to do the former. 
 
 There are, of course, many disadvantages in making camp after 
 dark, but the necessity for doing so is frequently imposed upon us 
 by the enemy, as in the present case. Making camp in the dark is 
 difficult and irritating. Posting a new outpost in the dark in un- 
 familiar country, if not difficult and irritating, is at least an unsatis- 
 factory proceeding. It involves a long and careful reconnaissance 
 in the dark by the outpost and support commanders. The elements 
 of the outpost, after the men have settled themselves in a position 
 which they hope to occupy, are likely to be called upon to move. The 
 establishment of routes for visiting patrols becomes much more diffi- 
 cult. It will frequently happen that the outpost dispositions, when 
 examined by daylight the next morning, will be found very defective 
 in the light of conditions that could not be, or were not, discovered 
 at night. 
 
 Capt. Rowen had no reason to believe that each of the three out- 
 guards would find a suitable outguard position on its own road and 
 exactly 500 paces from Texas crossroads. But Capt. Rowen must 
 inspect the outguard positions at once, and his experience has taught 
 him that he will save a great deal of time and annoyance if he knows 
 exactly where he will find each outguard. Only the sentinels may be 
 awake, or close enough to see the road. For some reason, possibly 
 lack of training, sentinels sometimes permit unrecognized persons to 
 pass by them without challenge. 1 Any officer who has posted out- 
 guards at night, especially when the outguards are small and in 
 dense country, has learned the advantage of first sending them an 
 arbitrary distance from a known starting point. During his inspec- 
 tion he discovers landmarks to guide himself and others to the final 
 position of the outguard, or he may fix the position approximately 
 by pacing. 
 
 In the present case, you are expected to do the best you can in the 
 matter of establishing your outguard when you have arrived 500 
 
 1 During the Philippine insurrection this mishap befell the writer twice in one month 
 and resulted in a useless search far bej-ond the outguard position. 
 
149 
 
 paces south of the crossroads, and then await the arrival of Capt. 
 Rowen. 
 
 At night, the distance between parts of a marching column are 
 greatly reduced. You probably observed that, in the statement of 
 the situation, the advance guard point was about 75 yards ahead of 
 the advance party ; also that there were connecting files between the 
 point and the advance party, in spite of the short distance. When 
 you marched your squad toward the outguard position, you needed 
 a point as security in front, but instead of sending this point 100 
 or 200 or even 300 yards as you would have done in daytime, you sent 
 it only as far as you could see. If you had sent it farther ahead, 
 you would have been obliged to use connecting files in sight of each 
 other or lose control over the point. 
 
 The enemy's fire will have no effect unless the men firing can see 
 their target. If your point encounters a party of Reds in the road, 
 these Reds may, of course, see } T our point, but they can not see your 
 squad. You need only a few seconds warning. If there is a large 
 hostile force near by. you will probably hear it before you see it. 
 If it is merely a patrol, you may not hear it before you see it, but in 
 that case, a sudden meeting is no disadvantage to you, since it gives 
 you an opportunity to drive off the patrol instead of giving the 
 patrol an opportunity to escape unobserved and remain in your 
 vicinity. Of course, your squad will march as quietly as possible. 
 
 In a former problem we advised outguard commanders to march 
 out to their positions as soon as possible, and we pointed out the 
 fact that much of the information to be given the members of the 
 outguard can best be given at the outguard position. In practice, 
 your judgment must determine what may best be told the men before 
 starting out. For example, in the present case, we prefer to tell the 
 squad, before leaving the crossroads, that the company will be at that 
 particular point during the night, and the battalion will camp at the 
 bridge a half mile to the north. The point to be emphasized is that 
 your departure should not be delayed by a long and unnecessary ex- 
 planation of what the squad is to do. 
 
 In this problem we have used another system of night signaling. 
 Recruits may not be able to whistle the simple bugle signals, but we 
 assume that your men are not recruits. 
 
 The call is 
 
 Forward, march. 
 
 The answer or acknowledgment is 
 
 Attention to orders. 
 
 Although there are but few short bugle signals, the number is large 
 enough to permit many combinations. 
 
150 
 
 SITUATION II. 
 
 You arrived 500 paces (about 440 yards, taking the average sol- 
 dier's pace) and found yourself 100 yards south of the farmhouse. 
 We assume that you watched the house and barn closely and passed 
 them quietly. The map is not detailed enough to indicate how the 
 outguard and its sentinel post should be posted or to bring out any- 
 thing new relative to the posting of the outguard. 
 
 When Capt. Rowen arrived he moved the outguard back to the 
 point 300 yards south of the crossroads, where the rail fence on the 
 west side meets the road. The house and barn were investigated and 
 were found to be temporarily deserted. The sentinels were posu-d 
 at the point indicated by Capt. Rowen, and the remainder of the 
 outguard was placed in the cornfield 20 yards north. The captain's 
 final instructions were: 
 
 At daylight move to the best observation point wit Ma 300 yards to the south. 
 
 Where do you post the outguard at daylight? 
 
 (NOTE. The corn is little less than knee high.) 
 
 I place the sentinel near the southwest corner of the farmyard (the 
 fence corner), about 400 yards south of Texas crossroads, and place 
 the remainder of the squad a short distance north of the sentinel and 
 along the west fence of the farmyard, the exact spot depending upon 
 the cover that can be found or provided. 
 
 First, we may explain why Capt. Rowen moved the outguard back 
 from the position where it first halted. Within certain limits the 
 distance between a support and one of its otitguards is not important. 
 The important thing is the ability to observe and. in the case of a 
 picket that must resist, a suitable defensive position. The sentinels 
 posted near the first position of your outguard were on the down 
 slope of a ridge and had a shallow ravine or draw in their front. 
 The range of their vision was limited to about 30 yards in every 
 direction, except to the north and northwest, in which directions the 
 sky line enabled them to see the crest of the ridge on which the farm- 
 house stands. But the enemy is supposed to be to the south. If 
 other conditions permit, a sky line within 100 yards of a sentinel's 
 front is an advantage. The ridge 450 yards south of the farmhouse 
 is too far away to form a skyline at night. Capt. Rowen's choice lay 
 between the position finally selected and a position on the road about 
 TOO yards south of Texas crossroads. Either position might be satis- 
 factory. 
 
151 
 
 At daylight your sentinel post must be moved forward, and natur- 
 ally the whole squad would also go forward in order to be reason- 
 ably near the sentinel post. From the new day position the sentinels 
 can see hill TOT and the roads east and west of that hill. Capt. Eowen 
 will undoubtedly inspect the outguard again as soon after daylight 
 as possible, and may decide to send a cossack post or sentry squad as 
 far as hill TOT, unless the march is resumed early in the day. 
 
 At night an outguard sent out to watch a road must be on or very 
 near that road. After daylight, however, the outguard need not re- 
 main near the road, but it must be able to see the road. Frequently 
 a position will be found some distance away from the road, from 
 which position not only the road but other parts of the terrain can 
 be observed. In the present case, however, the controlling reason for 
 leaving the road is to get away from the house and, at the same time, 
 obtain a good observation position. 
 
 In the sixth and seventh problems the outguards moved forward 
 at dark and back at daylight. In the present problem we find that 
 the outguard should move forward at daylight and back at night. 
 If you study a hundred situations, all different, you might conclude 
 that in the majority of cases the night and day positions of an out- 
 guard are the same; that is, no change is made. Even so, it would 
 be just as wrong to say that the rule is to make no change as to say 
 that the rule is to move forward or the rule is to move back. The 
 only correct thing to say is, " The facts concerning the enemy and our 
 own troops are so and so ; the facts concerning the terrain are so and 
 so. Now, what is the sensible thing to do ? " Kules are sometimes 
 poor guides. 
 
 Perhaps it is unfortunate that we have used as examples in pre- 
 vious problems two strong outguards, both of which moved forward 
 at night (sixth and seventh problems). We may make the matter 
 clearer by saying that a picket changes its position at dark and again 
 at daylight, when the change makes it easier for the picket to resist. 
 Sentinel posts, and therefore cossack posts and sentry squads, which 
 ordinarily are merely the combined reliefs of particular sentinel 
 posts placed under a commander and near the sentinel post for con- 
 venience, change their positions at night and again at daylight only 
 when the change makes it easier for the sentinels to observe. If in 
 daytime the men of a sentinel post are posted and relieved directly 
 from a picket, but the post of the sentinels is poor for observation at 
 night, while the position of the picket itself is satisfactory, the latter 
 would not change its position, but would change the sentinel post, 
 making it a cossack post or sentry squad if the new position is far 
 from the picket, as it generally would be at night. 
 
COMBAT INSTRUCTION. 
 
 [See note following preface, p. 4.] 
 
 Since this book is designed to serve in part as a guide to com- 
 pany commanders, this concluding chapter is presented in the belief 
 that it describes a useful method of combat instruction. 
 
 From recruit drill, drill in close order, and drill in the mech- 
 anism of extended order (I. D. R. 6b), company commanders 
 frequently pass immediately to complete field exercises (I. D. R. 6c). 
 The writer has found that by employing an intermediate step 
 better results are obtained. 
 
 A field exercise (I. D. R. Gc) is based on an assumed situation 
 to which the appropriate tactical principles and formations are 
 applied. It may be an advance guard, rear guard, outpost, attack, 
 defense, convoy, etc. A combat exercise (I. D. R. 6d) is also a 
 field exercise, but it is one which involves attack or defense only. 
 
 Our limitations as to observation and memory are such that in 
 a complete, uninterrupted combat exercise many important things 
 escape correction and proper elucidation. Frequently the result 
 is a lack of the true discipline, understanding, particularity, and 
 care which form the foundation for Infantry leading and control 
 in battle. 
 
 The proper combat instruction of the compan}^, and particularly 
 of lieutenants and noncommissioned officers, includes an under- 
 standing of the meaning and purpose of the forms which make 
 up the prescribed drill movements in extended order and firings. 
 This is best accomplished by conceiving separate phases of com- 
 bat and designing exercises to illustrate correct leading and con- 
 duct thereunder. 
 
 The examples which follow will illustrate the application of 
 forms to separate phases of combat under conditions which per- 
 mit intelligent, detailed criticism and solid instruction. A study 
 of these examples will probably lead the reader to suspect that 
 a company commander must be a lecturer in a small way. If so, 
 the reader has caught our idea exactly. The training of lieuten- 
 ants and noncommissioned officers is half of the game, and it can 
 not be successful and complete without intelligent and pertinent 
 explanation of concrete examples. 
 
 (153) 
 
154 
 
 Battalion, regimental, and brigade commanders and inspectors by 
 devising and using exercises of this kind can more quickly and 
 accurately judge the tactical training and skill of a company than 
 by any other means known to the writer. Drill is a necessary part 
 of an inspection, and an excellent drill is prima facie evidence of 
 efficiency, but it is not conclusive as to field efficiency. A complete 
 field exercise, on the other hand, generally moves too rapidly for 
 minute inspection. 
 
 FIRST EXAMPLE. 
 
 The company is in camp near Plainview. The captain has found 
 it necessary to clear up the situation as to the purpose and proper 
 leading of platoon columns. The company is brought to the farm- 
 yard 300 yards northwest of Plainview, and the captain announces 
 to the assembled officers and noncommissioned officers 
 
 The enemy is intrenched jusi south of the road that you sec yonder through 
 the trees and about 2,000 yards north-northwest of here (the 601) G2G (5.">i> 
 587 road). He has artillery. Our brigade attacks from this ridge (indicating 
 the Plainview 712 ridge). Another brigade is on our right. We have artil- 
 lery. The creek in front is easily fordable. There are troops on the right 
 and left of our battalion. Face as I face (the captain faces road fork 026). 
 At 2,000 yards a house, barn, and small on-hard. The house is at a road 
 fork. Take the house as reference point. Nine o'clock. Four lingers. An- 
 other road fork. Our battalion objective is the enemy's trench between the 
 two road forks mentioned. Take the house as reference point again. Seven- 
 thirty o'clock. Two fingers. The roof of a house (8(M) yards south of road 
 fork 626). Across the road from the roof and to the right of it a patch of 
 woods. The battalion will move first to that patch of woods without tiring. 
 This company is on the right and is base company. Company B on our left. 
 Companies C and D in support. Any questions? Posts. 
 
 He then forms the company in skirmish line under cover on the 
 south slope of the ridge and commands 
 
 Platoon columns, march. 
 
 When about a third way from the house to the creek he halts 
 the company, assembles the platoon leaders and guides, and with 
 them examines the location of each platoon. From time to time 
 he makes criticisms and suggestions which we shall sum up and 
 condense later. The company then continues the advance for an- 
 other hundred yards, and the location of the platoon columns is 
 examined as before. A final halt and examination is made just 
 south of the creek. 
 
 It would be impossible to reproduce here the remarks of the 
 captain exactly as made by him. The sum and substance of them is as 
 follows : 
 
 The company is somewhat restricted in its advance. We can not move very 
 much to the right or left without running foul of other troops. The whole 
 
155 
 
 brigade has to move forward in a rough line, each unit using the formation best 
 suited to escape artillery fire. The best formation for each depends upon 
 the ground that it must cover. Our battalion can use platoon columns because 
 of the numerous trees on this sloping ground. If each platoon leader will 
 remember that the enemy's artillery has to see its target in order to fire upon 
 it effectively, he will realize that all he has to do in order to escape artillery 
 fire is to keep out of sight. On this down slope a platoon leader should not 
 have much trouble marching his platoon so that the foliage of one tree after 
 another serves as a screen. Behind the enemy's front line, and perhaps in the 
 line, there are buildings or high points at which the artillery \vill station 
 observing parties, connected with the guns by telephone. If these observing 
 parties see you, you may draw fire. The thing to do, then, is to keep a sharp 
 lookout and see to it that the platoon is exposed as little as possible to a view 
 from any of the buildings or high points that might be used by the enemy 
 as artillery observation stations. A platoon does not have to march in a 
 straight line. The platoons do not have to keep abreast of each other. They 
 should zigzag whenever it is necessary to get the cover of the tree foliage. 
 It would not be seriously objectionable if one platoon marched behind another 
 for a short distance, if it can not otherwise get cover. 
 
 The foregoing remarks contain nothing but what is important for 
 the platoon leaders and guides to know. The captain avoids a dis- 
 cussion of matters that concern only the higher commanders. 
 
 When the company reaches the creek the captain sends it back 
 to the beginning point, under the first lieutenant to repeat the ad- 
 vance. This time, however, the original platoon guides are assigned 
 as platoon leaders while the captain and the original platoon leaders, 
 except the first lieutenant, go to the patch of woods 800 yards south 
 of 626. From this high ground they observe the advance of the 
 company with a view to further criticism and suggestion. Mean- 
 time, each platoon guide has an opportunity for practice in seeking 
 cover for an advancing platoon. 
 
 If time permits and further instruction is desirable, both the 
 starting point and the battalion objective can be changed slightly 
 and the exercise repeated. 
 
 SECOND EXAMPLE. 
 
 This is a continuation of the first example. 
 
 The captain marches the company to the bend in the road 400 
 yards east of Hershey Mill, halts it facing north, and announces : 
 
 The firing line of the battalion (our company and Company B) reached this 
 creek in platoon columns, crossed to the north bank, and halted under cover 
 of the bank, in skirmish line. You notice that the open country, between this 
 point and the patch of woods that we are headed for, is easily seen from various 
 points on the big hill in front of us (Chestnut Hill). The enemy's artillery 
 may have observation parties at one or more of those points. If we advance 
 by platoon columns or in ordinary skirmish lines, we shall probably draw artil- 
 lery fire. You notice, however, that the enemy's infantry in the trenches 
 probably will not see us until we occupy the north edge of that patch of woods. 
 
156 
 
 The battalion commander has ordered the tiring line to advance in thin lines 
 to the patch of woods. When the company flag is up you will assume that 
 you are under artillery fire ; otherwise, you are not under fire. As skirmishers, 
 guide right, march. 
 
 The skirmish line is then moved back to its covered position under 
 the north bank of the Cone w ago, the right of the company at the road 
 bend. The captain then orders: 
 
 The company will advance to the woods by half platoons from the right ; the 
 half platoons deploy with 10-pace intervals. Mr. Allen (the first lieutenant) 
 starts out with the first and second squads. 
 
 The half platoons are sent in successive lines about 150 yards apart. 
 The captain goes forward with the fourth line. After a brief exami- 
 nation of the assumed enemy's line, he announces to the platoons 
 that have already arrived : 
 
 Target : Trench along the crest. First and second platoons, from the right 
 end of the orchard, then 3 o'clock to the road. Overlap. Third and fourth 
 platoons, from the right end of the orchard to the left end. Overlap. What 
 is the range? 
 
 The target designation is repeated to those platoon leaders who 
 arrive later. When the range finders have reported the captain 
 orders : 
 
 Range, seven-fifty. Leave rifles in place, sighted on the target. Platoon 
 leaders and guides, inspect sight-setting and distribution. 
 
 We shall assume that the following incidents were observed and 
 noted by the captain : 
 
 1. Lieut. Allen marched the first and second squads directly for- 
 ward, and did not form thin line until he reached the road. The 
 second line was forewarned to deploy under cover of the creek bank 
 before advancing. Thereafter, each line deployed under cover as 
 soon as the preceding line advanced. 
 
 2. After crossing the road, the first line alternated between double 
 and quick time, although the company flag was down throughout the 
 exercise. The second line did the same. The other lines were then 
 forewarned not to do so unless the company flag was up, indicating 
 effective Artillery fire. 
 
 3. Each of the lines had a tendency toward closing on its center, 
 particularly the fifth line, which approached the woods with less 
 than five-pace intervals between men. 
 
 4. The first, second, and third lines, upon arriving in the woods, 
 properly reduced the intervals between men, but when the captain 
 arrived he found these six squads lying dow r n in the north edge of 
 the woods, exposed to the enemy's view. He left two men as lookouts 
 and ordered the line back under cover. Later, he gave the orders 
 relative to target and range, quoted above. 
 
 5. In other respects the exercise was satisfactory. 
 
157 
 
 While the company rests, the captain assembles the officer and 
 noncommissioned officers and says: 
 
 This is another example illustrating how a firing line may advance, without 
 firing, to a position as near as possible to the enemy's trench, from which position 
 the firing line makes its preparations to start a vigorous fire and an energetic 
 advance when the proper time comes. Platoon leaders report accurate sight 
 setting and correct aiming for distribution. Some other things were not so 
 good. 
 
 The first line should have deployed as skirmishers, at 10-pace intervals and 
 with the right skirmisher as base (i. e., guide right), before the line left the 
 cover afforded by the creek bank. But that is too evident to require further 
 comment 
 
 At no time was the company flag up to indicate that you were under Artillery 
 fire. If you are not under fire, there is no necessity for double timing. Quick 
 time is good enough, and saves the men unnecessary fatigue. If special con- 
 ditions require a faster gait, even though we are not under fire, the major 
 will tell me beforehand and I will tell you. The advance by rushes in the 
 fire attack is an entirely different thing, though even in rushes I have seen a 
 combination of long distance and good cover that made it wise to reduce the 
 gait temporarily. 
 
 You must correct the inclination of the men to close toward the center and 
 thus " bunch up " the line. It was particularly bad in the fifth line. Get it 
 clearly in your mind what thin lines are for. When we came down that hill 
 in platoon columns, we tried to avoid casualties by preventing the enemy from 
 seeing us. But from the creek to these woods we could not do it that way. 
 We had to cover the ground so thinly with men that, although the men were 
 visible to the enemy, the target was too poor to shoot at. The enemy is not 
 going to fire unless he can get results that are worth as much as the ammu- 
 nition used. If we keep our formation thin enough, he will let us alone and 
 save his ammunition for a more critical time and a better target, unless he has 
 less sense than he ought to have, or more ammunition than he needs. Probably 
 no one ever had so little sense or so much ammunition. But I am talking now 
 about Artillery fire. Thin lines are not good against Infantry fire, after we get 
 so close to the enemy that our men can easily be aimed at individually. 
 
 The best that a 3-inch shrapnel can do is to spatter an oval-shaped piece of 
 ground about 30 yards at its widest dimension and about 150 yards at its 
 longest. The shrapnel has, roughly, 250 bullets. Even if you are somewhere 
 in the exact area covered by a shrapnel burst, there is only one chance in twelve 
 that you will be hit. At that rate we can make our lines so thin that it would 
 take all the ammunition of an entire battalion of 3-inch guns to put 20 per cents 
 of our one company out of commission. But even this percentage of casualties 
 would not result unless we exposed ourselves for the length of time necessary 
 to fire that much ammunition. It will probably never be necessary to expose 
 the company that long. So, remember that, if your line is thin, you will 
 probably escape Artillery fire ; but, if your men " bunch up," they simply invite 
 the enemy to fire. The enemy's best play is to sweep the line on which our 
 successive lines halt and reform. But here again we outplay him by halting and 
 reforming where shrapnel can not reach us. These woods give us good cover 
 against shrapnel. A ditch, or dike, or stone wall, or a very steep reverse 
 slope would do just as well. 
 
 Now, just a word about unnecessary exposure. I found the first 3 lines in 
 the north edge of these woods visible to the enemy. Remember that Artillery 
 observers have good stations and powerful field glasses. Take it as a fixed 
 
158 
 
 rule that when you are in a firing position your men must be as completely 
 covered or hidden as possible until you want thoin to creep forward to locate 
 the target or other thing that you may be describing, or to fire, or to advance. 
 If you have completed your talk, and do not intend to fire or advance immedi- 
 ately, or if you cease firing for a while, simply caution, " cover," and see that 
 The men slide hack again and lake cover. 
 
 I hear that, in some companies last summer, the first thin line, on reaching 
 a position like this and in a situation like this, would generally open fire simply 
 because the enemy was in sight just where he was expected to be. That, of 
 course, is all wrong. Sergt. Holmes, when may the first line, or the first several 
 lines, open fire on their own initiative? Correct! In self-defense, or to drive 
 back small advanced detachments or patrols. Any questions? 
 
 We shall assume that the second lieutenant asks whether the ad- 
 vance by half platoons is better than by lines consisting of one man 
 from each squad, as prescribed in Infantry Drills Regulations (218). 
 The captain replies: 
 
 It amounts to the same thing as far as concerns vulnerability and the likeli- 
 hood of being subjected to Artillery fire. Drill Regulations do not insist on 
 any prescribed form. Paragraph 218 is merely a suggestion. The method we 
 used is better in our particular case for the following reasons: The ground 
 between the creek and the cover afforded by the low, wooded ridge where we 
 now are, is so open and devoid of cover that there is no intermediate line on 
 wliich the company can halt and re-form its skirmish line. In other words, we 
 can not very well make the advance in two or more M hitches." That being the 
 case, we advance in a single " hitch." But the distance is great, and it finally 
 brings us dangerously close to the enemy. In fact, if anyone insists that we 
 have gone too far in one "hitch," I can only answer that he may be right. In 
 the last analysis our safety in this particular case would depend on the kind 
 of progress the other battalions are making on our right and left, and upon how 
 we coordinate our progress with theirs. 
 
 In any event, from the standpoint of leadership and control, it will be better 
 if we arrange it so that each line consists of complete units, if such an arrange- 
 ment is possible. What makes it possible in our case? It is made possible by 
 reason of the fact that the fraction selected (a half platoon) can deploy its thin 
 line under cover of the bank of the creek before advancing and can close to 
 normal intervals under cover when it arrives here. In that way we gradually 
 build up our strength in these woods with the least disorganization. First, we 
 have a platoon leader and two squads; less than two minutes later we have a 
 complete platoon; then a platoon and a half; then two platoons, and so on. 
 Although the same in numbers, one complete platoon is better and stronger than 
 a line consisting of two men from each of 16 squads. But there are times when 
 we must use thin lines consisting of one or two men of each squad, or even 
 single men from alternate squads. Assume that the distance to be covered is 
 600 or 800 yards, and that the ground is covered with weeds and brush, which 
 will conceal the men if they select their position skillfully and hug the ground 
 closely. Such cover may afford protection against accurate artillery fire. We 
 might then find it best to advance with a man from each squad and in two or 
 more "hitches"; that is, we may send the first line forward, say 200 yards, 
 where it will halt. When all, or nearly all, of the lines have arrived in the 
 new position, we would send the first line forward, say another 200 yards. 
 Naturally, in such a case we could not use half platoons in thin lines : there 
 would be too much deploying and closing in by the flank in plain view of the 
 enemy's artillery observation stations. And if we attempted to make the whole 
 
159 
 
 distance in a single " hitch," the first line or two may eventually be so close 
 to the enemy that he might seize the opportunity to smash us with a counter 
 attack at a time when the company is badly scattered and beyond real control. 
 " In a few minutes we shall return to the road bend from which we started. 
 Then the company will begin an attack from the same starting point and with 
 the same objective, but with all other conditions different from what they are in 
 the present situation. With the contrast fresh in your mind, I shall try to 
 explain some things that you, particularly the platoon leaders and guides, 
 should know." (See third example.) 
 
 THIRD EXAMPLE. 
 
 This is a variation of the second example. 
 
 The captain sends two men to post themselves, about 60 yards 
 apart and kneeling, in the best firing position obtainable just south 
 of the orchard and barn near road fork 626. He then leads the com- 
 pany to the road bend 400 yards east of Hershey Mill and announces : 
 
 This is an entirely different situation. The enemy is in position more than 
 a mile northeast of here, near the town of Heidlersburg. Our regiment has 
 reached this point and is about to advance to that high ground to the north 
 (hill 586), from which place it will attack toward the east. It will then be on 
 the left flank of our attack, with other regiments on its right. Our company, 
 however, has been ordered out as a covering detachment (or combat patrol) on 
 the left and will go to an east and west road a little less than a mile north to 
 that mill (Hershey Mill). Our patrols report that there is a hostile detachment 
 posted near a road fork less than a mile north of the mill, where the road from 
 the mill meets the east and west road. The company will drive off any hostile 
 detachments encountered. 
 
 The company marches off with the first platoon as advance guard. 
 The advance guard commander is told that as soon as he comes in sight 
 of the two men posted south of the road fork (626) he will assume that 
 they outline the enemy and that he is fired upon by 20 or 30 rifles, and 
 he will act accordingly, one man in each squad using blank ammuni- 
 tion. The route is by way of the road as far as the wooded ridge 700 
 yards north of Hershey Mill and thereafter in the fields west of and 
 close to the road. The main body follows at 400 yards. 
 
 We assume that after the advance guard has disappeared in the 
 draw midway between Hershey Mill and road fork 626 (near the 
 farmhouse) it opens fire. The captain then leads the main body off 
 the road and to the left, to the trees about 100 yards southwest of 
 the farmhouse, and orders: 
 
 Second and third platoons, as skirmishes, 2 paces, guide right, march. March 
 direction: The big barn (pointing toward road fork 626). Fourth platoon in 
 support ; halt in the woods. 
 
 During the development the captain calls a corporal of the fourth 
 platoon and says to him : 
 
 Take three men of your squad in that direction (pointing northwest) about 
 a half mile to the high ground you see there, as a combat patrol on our left 
 flank. 
 
160 
 
 Our map does not give the detailed information of the ground 
 necessary to a complete statement of the captain's orders. However, 
 we shall make the following assumptions : The support is ordered to 
 follow the left flank, the distance depending upon cover. The two 
 deployed platoons advance to the wire fence that runs west from 
 the road. Here the advance guard is overtaken. The advance con- 
 tinues another 50 yards. Then the necessary orders are given, and 
 the whole line opens fire. A moment later the captain signals cease 
 firing. The combat patrol is recalled, the company is assembled, 
 arms are stacked, and the men fall out. The captain then assembles 
 the officers and noncommissioned officers and says: 
 
 Any one of you men may bo called upon any day to command a company or 
 half company or one platoon in a detached and independent attack like the one 
 we have just started. 1 want you to understand why this attack is so radi- 
 cally different from the previous one (second example), although our beginning 
 point and our objective, or enemy's position, arc exactly the same in both <-ases. 
 
 We did not go to the wooded ridge in thin lines for three reasons: First, 
 there were no other troops on our right or left, and we were free to consider 
 only our own convenience, speed, and safely: second, there was no danger or 
 probability of artillery fire; third, thin lines take lime, and we had a chance 
 to save time. 
 
 We might have marched in column of squads and with an advance guard 
 straight across fields to that wooded ridge near the farmhouse, but a march 
 by the road is easier and quicker. If we had had reason to fear artillery fire, 
 we still would have marched in column and with an advance guard, but our 
 route in that case would probably have been by way of the creek bed to those 
 woods (southwest of the farmhouse), in order to escape being seen by artillery 
 observation parties. We could not take that route in the first attack because it 
 would have broken up the deployment of the brigade at a point too close to the 
 enemy. 
 
 In the last attack we used an advance guard to guard against surprise and to 
 drive off any small patrols that might be met between us and our objective. In 
 the first attack the whole brigade was deployed and ready for surprise parties. 
 Besides, reconnaissance to the front was in the hands of higher commanders. 
 
 In the last attack we sent out a combat patrol of four men on our left flank. 
 If you look at the ground, you can readily see that we would need warning of 
 the approach of enemy infantry or cavalry from that direction. Our right 
 Hank was safe enough, but we should keep in signal communication with our 
 'regiment. 
 
 In the last attack we kept one platoon out as support. The Drill Regula- 
 tions say that a company acting alone, as we were, is handled the same as a 
 battalion, allowance being made for the difference in strength. The battalion 
 usually deploys whole companies in the firing line. But the whole of our 
 company could not be deployed until we knew that there was no immediate 
 danger of a surprise party on our left flank, or until the fight became so stub- 
 born that we needed the fourth platoon in the firing line in order to win and 
 had to take a chance on other things. I can imagine a situation where a 
 platoon acting alone should hold out a squad^or two until the situation became 
 clearer, particularly on the defensive, but ordinarily a platoon acting alone 
 needs its whole firing strength early in the game, and it must depend on small 
 combat patrols to guard it against surprise. The smaller the force the more 
 easily it can withdraw or change its front. 
 
161 
 
 In the first attack we used half-pace intervals, or about one man per yard of 
 front. In the second attack we use two-pace intervals, or about one man to a 
 little more than 2 yards of front. We need as many rifles as possible against 
 the enemy. If the enemy's front is 5,000 yards long, we need 5,000 rifles against 
 his front and others against his flanks. But a platoon or a company, or even 
 a battalion, if attacking alone, may deploy with only a half rifle to the yard and 
 still have all its rifles effectively in action. So, if you see any advantage in a 
 thinner line when acting alone with a small force, do not hesitate to use it, 
 provided you do not lose control and provided all rifles get on the target. In 
 our last attack I wanted the right of the company near the road, but I also 
 wanted the left platoon to get forward under cover of that patch of woods 
 (400 yards northwest of the farmhouse). We deployed three platoons on a 
 front of about 225 yards. I can imagine a case where I would deploy three 
 platoons on a front of 325 yards, but I would first make sure that I could easily 
 signal the platoon leaders, and then I would place a 50-yard interval between 
 the platoons, the platoons deploying with not . more than two-pace intervals 
 between men in order to preserve the control of platoon leaders. But remem- 
 ber this : When you fight a real fight with thin lines you are playing with fire. 
 A counterattack may put you out of business. Speaking offhand, there are 
 practically only three cases where you may attack on a broad front with a 
 small force : First, a fake attack that you do not intend to press home ; second, 
 an attack against an enemy greatly inferior in strength and whom you hope to 
 drive out quickly and cheaply by threatening to overlap him; third, fighting 
 against poor troops. 
 
 In the first attack it was decided beforehand that we would probably begin 
 the fire fight when we reached the wooded ridge east of the farmhouse. That 
 was on account of the fact that we were only a small part of a long line. But 
 in the second attack, where we had no other troops to cooperate with, we pushed 
 ahead until we began to feel seriously the effect of the enemy's fire, and then 
 we halted and opened fire. We could not tell in advance where the halting 
 place would be, but we wanted it to be as close possible to the enemy. 
 
 Are there any questions? 
 
 FOURTH EXAMPIJJ. 
 
 The use of cover in attack is largely a matter of the individual 
 judgment of the men. Infantry Drill Regulations, 152-155, refers 
 more especially to single men or patrols. Infantry Drill Regula- 
 tions, 156, points out the modifications imposed on the men of a 
 firing line. In spite of the added difficulties of a firing line in the 
 matter of effecting concealment, it will surprise many to learn how 
 well-trained men can conceal, and therefore partially protect, them- 
 selves behind objects which to the inexperienced seem wholly 
 inadequate. 
 
 The captain takes the company to the small orchard midway be- 
 tween Hershey Mill and crossroads 616; thence west 400 yards to 
 the fence corner. Between this point and hill 707 the fields lie 
 fallow, with many low weeds. The weeds are scattered irregularly, 
 from four to eight feet apart. None is over knee high. Some are 
 thin in foliage; others are quite dense. The ground and vegetation 
 are such as one often sees in pastures, rank meadows, or fallow fields. 
 9679017 11 
 
162 
 
 The captain announces: 
 
 First, we shall .see how much cover a man needs to prevent the enemy from 
 seeing him; or, to put it another way, I am going to demonstrate how little 
 cover a man really needs in order to conceal himself. 
 
 The captain deploys a squad with two-pace intervals, facing hill 
 707, and causes the men of the squad to lie down in firing positions 
 behind the lowest and thinnest weeds which, in his opinion, will 
 screen them from view at a distance of 200 yards or more. He then 
 explains to the company: 
 
 Standing here, and without any experience in the matter, you would suppose 
 that these weeds give these men no protection whatever. In order that you 
 may learn the value of slight cover and learn how to use it, I am going to .show 
 you that while these men are not protected by anything that amounts to a 
 bullet stop, they are protected against aimed fire. Protection against aimed 
 fire may reduce our casualties to one-fifth or even one-tenth of what they 
 otherwise would be. 
 
 Leaving the squad in position, with instructions to kneel at the 
 signal " one whistle blast," and lie down under cover at the signal 
 "two whistle blasts," the captain marches the company 200 yards 
 toward hill 707, faces it toward the deployed squad and asks: 
 
 Can anyone see the squad? 
 
 We shall assume that the squad has been well placed and is Con- 
 cealed. The captain then signals the squad to kneel and says to the 
 company : 
 
 Each man select a man of the squad to watch. When he lies down apiin. 
 pick out the point that you would aim at if you were firing on him. See how 
 long you can keep your eyes on that point without confusion or uncertainty. 
 
 He then signals the squad to lie down, and about a half minute 
 later he commands: 
 
 Eyes right. Front. Pick up your aiming point again. Those who are sure 
 they have found it hold up their right hands. 
 
 Having disposed of this matter, he adds: 
 
 The effect of the enemy's fire upon you depends mostly on his ability to use 
 his target as his aiming point. Each of you may be considered a target ; but 
 if you can not be seen, you can not be an aiming point, although you are still 
 the real target that the enemy is trying to hit. Yon can not help being a 
 target ; the mere fact that you are a soldier makes you a target ; but you can 
 frequently avoid being an aiming point, and if you succeed in doing that, you 
 are no longer a good target for the enemy. Now, if your enemy sees you 
 disappear behind a bush or weed, you are still the target, but the bush or weed 
 becomes the aiming point. If there are many bushes around you the enemy 
 soon loses sight of the particular bush behind which you disappeared. You 
 have seen what a trifling object can conceal a man at even so short a distance 
 as 200 yards. You have also seen how easy it is to lose your aiming point. 
 Remember, then, if you do not give the enemy a good aiming point, your chance 
 of being in good health at the end of the fight is improved from 500 to 1,000 
 
163 
 
 per cent. Ordinarily the smaller the forces engaged the greater is the impor- 
 tance of individual concealment, because the excitement and confusion is less 
 and we aim at individuals instead of areas. But concealment is always im- 
 portant. 
 
 The captain then sends the first lieutenant with half of the com- 
 pany back to the position of the deployed squad, with instructions 
 to deploy the half company with two-pace intervals and attack hill 
 707, advancing by rushes; and with instructions to platoon leaders 
 and guides to inspect and correct the positions of their men at each 
 halt. The captain takes the other half of the company to the wire 
 fence on hill 707 to observe the attack and the use of cover. When 
 the first lieutenant has advanced 200 or 300 yards, the two halves of 
 the company change places, the captain remaining on hill 707. He 
 comments freely on the faulty positions or movements observed, with 
 a view to thorough instruction in the details of using cover while 
 advancing in attack. We may assume some of his comments to be 
 as follows: 
 
 Look sharp and you will see that a part of the firing line is getting ready 
 to rush. Two or three men are on their knees and elbows with their backs 
 raised and no longer concealed. They should lie close to the ground when the 
 warning for a rush is given. It may be 30 seconds or even more before the 
 platoon leader is sure that all men have heard or seen the warning and are 
 ready to jump when he shouts, " follow me." We must not give the enemy a 
 better aiming point during that preparation for a rush, nor give him warning 
 of the rush. 
 
 Notice those men with their rifles vertical ; the butt probably resting on the 
 ground. They think that makes it easier to jump when the rush is ordered. 
 Maybe it does, but it is wrong. 
 
 Some of those men would conceal themselves better by aiming through the 
 weeds or bushes instead of along the right edge. When you use a rock or tree 
 for cover you are obliged to aim along the right side of the tree or rock, but 
 frequently a bush or clump of weeds will be so wide that you can poke your 
 rifle somewhere between the center and right edge and thus get complete con- 
 cealment. 
 
 Some men are shifting about too much, long after the halt. That gives the 
 enemy a chance to pick up his aiming point again. The men should do all of 
 the necessary shifting just after dropping behind cover. They must be able 
 to fire on the enemy, but they should get good firing positions promptly, and 
 after they have them they should lie still. 
 
 FIFTH EXAMPLE. 
 
 The company is marched to the vicinity of hill 707. The captain 
 says to the company : 
 
 In a bayonet charge against the enemy's position the company is bound to be 
 mixed up and disorganized. Men of several companies may be mixed together. 
 Your squad leader or platoon leader or company commander may be out of 
 action or lost to view in the mix-up. When we reach the enemy's position the 
 success of the charge depends mostly on every man knowing just what he 
 
164 
 
 ought to do. The proper thing to do depends on the situation at the moment. 
 The confusion will probably be so great that your leaders will not be able to 
 tell you. In other words, we must count on temporary loss of control and we 
 must make up for it by teaching you a few common-sense rules to guide you. I 
 have seen companies, at the end of a charge in a combat exercise, .simply untix 
 bayonets and assemble, as though the fight were over. As a matter of fact, a 
 very critical stage is reached the moment we are in the enemy's position and 
 we have to see the thing through and do it right. We shall practice charging 
 several times and change the situations each time. 
 
 A squad, to outline the enemy, is deployed with 15-pace intervals 
 along the wire fence that crosses hill 707. The squad is instructed to 
 remain at the fence and meet the charge. The company is deployed 
 about 100 yards to the northeast and facing the fence. The men are 
 told that the company in attacking has reached this point. The 
 line opens fire. 
 
 A moment later, 4i fix bayonets " is signaled, followed by the neces- 
 sary commands and signals for the charge. The outlined enemy 
 meets the charge. The captain's comments before and after the 
 charge may be summarized as follows: 
 
 The signal " fix bayonets " seems to bring the firing to a complete stop for a 
 half minute or less. That does not matter. It would not happen in real battle 
 because in the noise and excitement it would be probably two minutes before 
 all the men of a battalion firing line caught and understood the signal. Wo 
 need not bother to drill a system of fixing bayonets. 
 
 Platoon guides must ride the laggards hard and see that the charging line 
 is as compact and stiff as possible. 
 
 Your enemy stayed in his position to receive the charge. He will not do so 
 every time, but when he does, you must beat him by better work with the 
 bayonet or clubbed rifle, or probably fire, and by better teamwork. To beat, 
 him by better teamwork you should pair off with the man nearest you and the 
 two of you should go after one man at a time. If you can not find a man to 
 pair with, join the nearest pair and then the three of you go after one man at 
 a time. Don't fight alone if you can avoid it. You can not arrange your pair 
 beforehand, because your partner may not be near you when you need him. 
 At the last moment a man from another company may be your nearest neighbor. 
 
 After a short rest the charge is repeated, but the men who outline 
 the enemy, instead of meeting the charge, run back, according to in- 
 structions, when the charging line is about 50 yards off. The cap- 
 tain's comments may be summarized as follows: 
 
 When the enemy retreats across open country, it is foolish to chase after 
 him ; at least until your officers get a chance to restore order and size up the 
 situation. The enemy is fresher than you are. He will outrun you. Go for- 
 ward to his trench if you can, and a little beyond it if necessary for a fair firing 
 position, and then chase him with bullets. As long as he is in sight and in 
 range, fire rapidly but accurately and demoralize him as completely as possible. 
 Keep a sharp lookout for orders or signals from the nearest leaders, but re- 
 member that the confusion and disorder may be very great. It may be a minute 
 or two before some planned action can be ordered and we want every man to 
 know that during that short time a hot fire will do the most good. 
 
165 
 
 The company then faces northwest and charges an outlined enemy 
 posted in the edge of the woods north of 707. The enemy withdraws 
 when the charge begins and is too deep in the woods to be seen. The 
 captain shows that the proper action is to press forward in the 
 woods, with as good a line as is consistent with rapid progress, un- 
 less or until other action is ordered. 
 
 A fourth charge may be made in which, after the capture of a 
 first-line trench, one platoon, previously designated, occupies the cap- 
 tured trench and hastily prepares itself and the trench for defense 
 against counterattack, while the other platoons push forward to 
 charge a second-line trench. 
 
 Other charges may be made, illustrating the numerous situations 
 that may confront charging infantry. Most of these charges, par- 
 ticularly where they involve the organization of local pursuit, or 
 counterattack by the enemy, would more properly be battalion or 
 regimental exercises. 
 
.YC 63 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY 
 
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