1118 133 JUAN LEETS UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA DOLLAR DIPLOMACY NEW ORLEANS, DECEMBER, 1912 UNITED STATES LATIN AMERICA DOLLAR DIPLOMACY JUAN LEETS New Orleans, December, 1912< NEW ORLEANS The L. Graham Co., Ltd., Printers 1912 incroh Libraiy FOREWORD. To the Honorable, the United States Senate, Members of the House of Representatives and the American Public: Inspired by that profound sense of justice, which has permeated the citizenship of the great American Eepublic since its founda- tion, and with an abiding confidence in the integrity of the repre- sentatives of these people in the United States Congress, I beg to present the humble memorial of citizens of the republics of Central America, who have suffered from the consequences of the coercive and iniquitous policies of the Department of State, under the direc- tion of Philander C. Knox. The purpose of this feeble memorial is two-fold: 1. To acquaint the American public and the members of the Senate and of the House of Eepresentatives with some of the details of Mr. Knox's so-called "Dollar Diplomacy," as applied to the Central American republics; 2. To exert what influence our facts may possess in making for a restoration of the bonds of true friendship between the peoples of Latin-America and the United States, which the ruinous and selfish policies of Mr. Knox have sundered. In this work I have been aided by some of the most brilliant statesmen of Central America, all laboring with a patriotic impulse snd an earnest, sincere desire to establish justice where iniquity and false pretense have wrought naught but ruin and devastation, misunderstanding, discord and bitterness. In this memorial, as well as in personal testimony before the senate committee charged with the investigation of matters relating to the Nicaraguan revo- lution, I have sought to substantiate all of my charges with docu- ments ; and, in not a single instance, have I inscribed a statement which I believed to be less than the truth. Although the facts which I herewith present show that the great foundation principles of liberty and justice of the mother of re- publics have been ignored and hidden in the intricacies of the false doctrines emanating from the Department of State, the citizen* of the smaller republics to the south have yet a firm faith in the 4 people of this great country and place this earnest appeal before their representatives in the hope of arousing an interest in Mr. Knox's dealings, which will result in a searching investigation and eventual justice. While the result of the recent presidential and congressional elec- tions in the United States assures an early change in the personnel of the State Department, with perhaps a marked change in the policies which this government will pursue in its foreign relations, the injustice inflicted upon Central America, through the pernicious "Dollar Diplomacy," has been too great to be ignored by people of patriotic impulses. For that reason we are unwilling to forget the past and leave the people of the United States in ignorance of the noxious schemes and wrongful acts which have been per- petrated under the cloak of "diplomacy." In this memorial we have striven to present in detail a true picture of the interference of the State Department in Central American affairs and the results of the Knox policy. Summarized, briefly, we attempt to show: 1. Under the pretext of giving aid to the small Central Amer- ican republics, the State Department has used what it is pleased to term "Dollar Diplomacy" to force upon these peoples loan con- tracts which would give to a coterie of Wall Street bankers not only millions of dollars tainted with illegitimacy, opportunity far immense graft, but an absolute license to exploit the vast resources of the countries and even administer their governmental affairs. 2. The terms of the loan contracts which Secretary Knox. has so assiduously sought to fasten upon Nicaragua and Honduras are vicious, and, when truthfully revealed to the American public, will produce expressions of abhorence and indignation. 3. The Knox policy of dealing with Central America has in- stilled a pronounced anti-American feeling, where before naught but feelings of friendship toward the people of this great republic existed; turmoil and strife, revolution and poverty have been the baneful results. 4. In one instance Mr. Knox has given active support to a revolution in Nicaragua, in another instance he has opposed a revolution and sacrificed the lives of American soldiers that he might keep in power a usurper and traitor, the poor tool of the Secretary in his scheme to deliver the country over to Xew York bankers. 5. Mr. Knox adjudged Zelaya a dictator in Nicaragua and drove him from power, setting up a government which has brought poverty in the stead of prosperity; discord in the stead of har- mony ; despotism in the stead of liberty ; on the other hand, Mr. Knox has insistently supported the worst tyrant and dictator that Latin- America ever knew in President Estrada Cabrera, of Guatmala, 6. With the full knowledge of the State Department filibuster- ing expeditions have been permitted to leave Gulf ports for Central America, and in one instance the knowledge of the departure of such an expedition was used as a bludgeon in a desperate effort to force the President of Honduras to approve a Morgan loan contract, which, it was well known, was distasteful alike to the president, the congress and the people of Honduras. 7. Designing American financiers desired American intervention in the recent Nicaraguan imbroglio, on the other hand, they were wont to have the United States Government adhere to a policy of non-intervention in Mexico. In Nicaragua, except for the killing of two American members of the Nicaraguan army, in actual battle, American life was never endangered, nor was American property destroyed; in Mexico a number of Americans have been wantonly killed, scores of others have been wounded, some have been held for ransom, and millions of dollars of American property have been destroyed. In Nicaragua Mr. Knox intervened ; in Mexico he has adhered to the policy of non-intervention. These are facts : the inference is of something un-American. 8. Facts concerning acts of the State Department in its rela- tions with Central America frequently have been concealed from the American public, or else distorted or exaggerated. Sometimes semi-official statements given the press in Washington for American consumption have been totally at variance with the true facts and not infrequently there has been apparent a desire to prejudice public opinion in favor of the attitude of Mr. Knox and his co- workers through such' distortion. Among many of the documents which I present here, and among tho?e which I have already laid before the senate committee, some of the more important were entrusted to me bv Senora Hortencia 6 C. de Madriz, widow of the former President of Nicaragua, Dr. Jose Madriz. At the time of Dr. Madriz' & untimely death, in May, 1911, he was engaged in preparing a history of the State Department's relations to the 1909 revolution in Nicaragua, and Senora Madriz desires that the documents and facts which he col- lected be now given to the American Congress and public, not only in vindication of the memory of this great statesman, but for the benefit which may accrue to the American people, through knowledge of the pernicious acts committed by certain officials of the American Government. In my testimony before the senate sub-committee, presided over by Senator A. B. Fall, at El Paso, in October, I found the com- mittee anxious to secure light on the conduct of Mr. Knox and his agents in the Central American republics. I placed in Senator Fall's hands many of the most important documents which I brought to this country, satisfied that the cause of a weak nation, my adopted country, was in good hands. On my trip to El Paso I was accompanied by the well-known Honduranian counsellor, Dr. Angel Ugarte, as my legal adviser. Although born in Eussia, I am, with all my heart a Central American and have been honored in my adopted country with important governmental positions. It is the cradle of my wife and of my children and it is my earnest desire to do all within my power toward building up its prosperity and making of it a country wherein we may enjoy liberty and the blessings of a stable Repub- lican Government. I have dedicated all of my efforts and endeavors to this cause, which, always, will remain sacred.. JUAN LEETS. Xew Orleans, December, 1912. DOLLAR DIPLOMACY. . The policy applied by the Secretary of State, Mr. Philander C. Knox, to Latin America during the presidency of Mr. Taft, was termed by its originators, "Dollar Diplomacy." We propose in this essay to analize this particular policy, and show its disastrous consequences to those countries to which it was applied, namely^ "Latin America." Before going into details, we wish to recall to memory the policy of the United States toward the other republics on the American continent as it was pursued prior to the advent of this so-called "Dollar Diplomacy." During most of the time of the existence of this great nation, its public men have been animated by a desire to maintain an attitude of "NOISTINTEFEKENCE" in the internal affairs of the other countries, and this attitude has been supported by the opinion of the masses in general. This, beyond doubt, is one of the reasons for the astounding growth and rapid progress of the United States of America, whose government, for more than a century, was, rela- tively, the most economically administered of any in the world. In pursuing, for so long, this admirable policy the succeeding ad- ministrations fulfilled the high ideals of the country's father, George Washington, who, with divine forethought, realized the great destiny in store for his country, provided his contemporaries, as well as future generations, followed and obeyed his wise counsel. "THE MONROE DOCTRIXE." James Monroe, one of the many distinguished statesmen pro- duced by the American nation, in full accord and sympathy with the high ideals and doctrines of General Washington, realized that in order to assure the permanency of the sacred principles upon which this great republic was founded, it was absolutely es&ential that none of the European powers should be permitted to establish large colonial governments on the American continent. When the Latin- American colonies freed themselves from Spain, a "sacred alliance" was entered into in Europe, the monarch's then reigning in absolutism binding themselves to send their armies to reconquer for Spain those La tin- American countries which had just ceased to be dependencies of Spain. The establishment of monarchial regimes on the American con- tinent, upheld by some of the great Powers of Europe, would have 8 been a constant source of anxiety, and a never ceasing menace, to the United States of America, and would have resulted, ultimately, in making a republican form of government on this continent im- possible. It would have impeded the consummation, of Washington's policy, as outlined by him for the future, as this country would have had to maintain a large and costly army and navy in consequence of the advent of monarchical powers on this continent, thus fastening upon the United States the same cancer" that has been sapping the life of old Europe. Monroe, great statesman and patriot that he was, understood and foresaw all this, which resulted in his giving to the world his fa- mous doctrine, "AMERICA FOR THE AMERICANS," a doctrine at that time perfectly well understood, though later on subjected to many varying interpretations, and, therefore, very much dis- cussed. Monroe, beyond any doubt, purposed to insure for his own coun- try, and for all the other republics on the American continent, the blessings of independence and the tranquility of peace. Nobody at that time, much less the noble author of that Doctrine himself, imagined that at some future day, this very same doctrine might be construed into a menace of the autonomy of those very same Latin- American countries which it was precisely the intention of Monroe to protect against such a contingency. That this doctrine, designed to be a protection, has been twisted into a menace to the integrity of the Latin-American countries, is precisely what we propose to demonstrate in this essay. "PAN- AMERICANISM." *To perpetuate the Monroe Doctrine, and in a spirit to facilitate its operation, Mr. James G. Elaine, Secretary of State in the Har- rison administration, and originator of the "Pan-Americanism" idea, advocated the first Conference of Delegates of the American Nations, which Conference was held in Washington, in 1889. As a result of this first Conference, the International Bureau of American Republics was created and entrusted with the organiza- tion of future conferences, which have been held periodically, with a view of bringing together the peoples of the different races and, thereby, the nations thus represented. Another great statesman, Mr. Elihu Root, while Secretary of State, under the Eoosevelt administration, fostered "Pan- Ameri- canism" and became one of its most enthusiastic propagandists. He was personally present at a Conference which was held in Rio de Janeiro in 1906, later visiting the Argentine Republic, Chili, and other countries, and still later, in 1907, visiting Mexico, where he delivered several speeches, now famous because they made such a favorable impression in all Latin- America, and created such strong sympathy between those countries and the United States. There Mr. Root, on his own behalf, as well as in his capacity as Secretary of State, guaranteed that the policy of his government toward the peoples and the governments of all Latin- American countries was a policy of fraternity and good will, and that the smallest, as well as the greatest, of these countries could rest assured of their inde- pendence and autonomy, and the integrity of their territory. These same declarations were ratified by him before the "Central Ameri- can Peace Conference," assembled in Washington in the fall of 1907*. *After having nearly concluded, we have received some newspapers from Central America, in which there is a speech of Mr. Root's repro- duced in Spanish, and which speech is supposed to have been made in the United States. The tendencies displayed in this speech lead us to believe that it is apocryphal. A free translation shows: In this speech Mr. Root declared that the United States is the "Modern Rome," chosen by God to arbitrate not only thei destinies of all America, but of Europe and Asia as well. He said that his coun- try is destined to control all of the American Continent and that it is necessary only to determine the means to accomplish this. He declares the natural Frontier of the United States Territory the Panama Canal, and that it will cause surprise in the latter half of the Twentieth Cen- tury that in the Map of the United States to-day was not comprised Mexico, Central America and all the Antilles and that it is only a question of time when the Flag of the United States will be seen float- ing over aril these territories, at the same time, pronouncing all Latin- Americans as unfit for a Republican form of Government and unfit for the Yankee Citizenship (as if they should be destined to be the Helots of their compatriots), because the two races are antithetical, un amalgamable and separated by a deep abysm. He said that there is sufficient justification for the annexation and that all that is necessary for its consummation is a 1 joint Resolution on the part of Congress, and he predicts that it will be carried out no matter which of the three contending parties was successful in the presidential election. We cannot conceive that a man who has captured for himself the sympathies of all the American Continent, because of his professed ideals in regard to Pan -Americanism could be the author of such utter- ances, less can we believe that this great Statesman should so impru- dently offer a challenge, not only to the American Continent, but to all Nations of the world, threatening some with taking away from them their possessions in the Caribbean Sea. We trust that when Mr. Root reads these lines, written by one who has always had none but sentiments of the highest admiration for him, he will hasten to reassure La-tin-America, and principally, to protest against the authenticity of this speech, which the press attributes to him, or to give the authentic version of his speech, should his speech have been m'isconstrued. As we have not seen this country's press publish such an important speech, nor discuss it, we are justified in belieiving that it is not authentic. 10 If this policy, so firmly maintained by Mr. Boot, had been con- tinued, the confidence of the Latin- American countries in the gov- ernment of the United States .would have increased, whereas, to- day, it is an absolute fact that the former feeling of respect and good will, as expressed by these Latin- American countries, has been converted into a constant feeling of alarm and distrust, and in some cases the love felt for all that was Anglo-American has been changed into a deep-seated hatred nevertheless, we Latin- Americans recog- nize the fact that the fault rests not with the people of the United States, but with its recent Government. Instead of upholding the sane policy of Mr. Boot, which had as its basic principle the harmony, the well-being and the prosperity of the whole American Continent, there has been substituted a policy full of deceit, falsehood and schemes to give protection to privileged financial speculations. Mexico, Santo Domingo and Central America are at the present moment the victims of the course steered by the State. Department of the United States; and while it is our aim to demonstrate principally where Central America has been wronged, and more especially Nicaragua, for the reason that all are in the' same position, we shall make a short enumeration of what has happened to the other countries named in respect to their dealings with the State Department. REVOLUTIONS IN MEXICO. This country, during the long regime of General Porfirio Diaz, enjoyed an era of, progress and elevated itself to a condition of notable prosperity, made possible by a peace of more than thirty years' duration. It is true Mexico did not improve so far as the education of its masses is concerned, nor did the masses improve in the enjoyment of political liberties, and this is the only serious fault to be found with Porfirio Diaz. He did not educate the Mexicans to appreciate, nor prepare them for the task of maintain- ing his highly fruitful endeavors, which crumbled in the first on- slaught of a revolutionary hurricane, which swept the country, and is tearing at the vitals of that country even now. Until 1909 the Government of the United States had naught but laudable comments for General Diaz and his way of governing bis country, setting him up as a model for other southern republics, for which reason it is easily assumed that if he became "persona 11 non grata" with the State Department shortly afterwards, this change in affection should not be attributed to the State Depart- ment's remorse for not having caused Diaz to grant his people a more pronounced form of democratic government. We do not know the real cause for this change of affection, but we can "put things together." Toward the end of 1909 a revolution broke out in Nicaragua against President Jose Santos Zelaya, toward whom Secretary Knox had shown a great deal of aversion, and which aver- sion culminated in Zelaya having to resign the presidency and leave 3iis country. President Diaz, of Mexico, came to Zelaya's assistance by conveying him to Mexico aboard one of the Mexican war vessels, and this act of Diaz's brought about a diplomatic encounter between the two countries, and although this incident was satisfactorily terminated, apparently, we are justified in believing that Mr. Knox thereafter felt a deep hatred for General Diaz, when we taka into consideration what happened afterwards. In 1910 a revolution broke out in Mexico, first localized, but later spreading all over the country rapidly. This movement was well supplied with the sinews of war, money and arms; the Ameri- can frontier was practically kept open for the introduction of arms into Mexico, and American capital was coming abundantly to the support of the revolution. Then the American government sent to the Mexican frontier thousands of soldiers and mobilized a power- ful squadron of war vessels with the avowed purpose of sending same to Mexican ports, which naturally was taken as the announce- ment of an intended, intervention, giving for a reason the pretext of having to protect the lives and property of American citizens; and in order to preserve a pretext for intervention, perhaps, indis- putable aid was given the revolution. Perhaps, due to the stand taken by Congress, or, perhaps, for the reason that the State Department convinced itself of the fact that an armed intervention in MeyiVo would nipan an immediate cessation of all inner strife and a union of all Mexicans, who then would have taken up arms against the invader, no intervention in that country took place. The Government of General Diaz fell, but, unfortunately, this has not terminated the revolutionary spirit, Out of the rank and file of the victors against Diaz there arose malcontents, who have continued the strife with varying success to the present day, to the great misfortune of that unhappy country. 12 In this second epoch of the revolution the conduct of the State Department has been entirely different. There are to-day along the frontier but some hundreds of soldiers, and these have been suffi- cient to maintain the neutrality of American territory. The pres- ent revolution has been deprived of the necessary elements of war, and denied other resources of United States, because any violations of the neutrality laws are now severely punished, in accordance with & proclamation of Mr. Taft, intended to stop such violations. Further, federal troops of the Mexican Government were allowed to cross into American territory, in order that they might give battle to rebel forces, which otherwise would have been out of their reach. This change in the attitude of the State Department during the two distinct revolutions, the one against Diaz by Madero, and now. the one against Madero in turn, invites the suspicion that the pres- ent government of this country has had no determined policy to- ward parties or persons in Mexico, but hopes for a prolonged strife in order to satisfy ulterior ambitions or desires, which, fortunately, will never materialize, now that there is reason to expect a radical change in the policy to be observed toward the Latin-AmericaD countries during the approaching probable change of administra- tion. In relating what has taken place in Mexico, we would emphasize the fact that we are in no way allied to either one of the factions en- gaged in that disastrous strife. It is rather our purpose to expose the attitude of the present American administration and the criss- crossings resorted to in its policy, in this particular case toward Mexico, and in general toward all Latin- America. "DOCTRINE KNOX." The Monroe Doctrine, as we have related before, was willingly accepted by the peoples of all Latin- America ; but when later on an amplification was invented to signify the right of tutelage of the United States of North America over the other republics of the continent, this interpretation, odious, arbitrary and pernicious to all Latin-America, met with vigorous protest in all Latin- America, where public opinion was unanimous in expressing itself 9s follows: "The good we saw in the Monroe Doctrine was the guaranty of our right to an autonomous political life, but if this doctrine is now to be construed into meaning that the United States will pro- tect us against Europe for the purpose of -dominating us, arid dictat- ing to us at pleasure, we cannot see where we are benefitted any longer ; in fact, it would mean that we may 'jump from the frying pan into the fire/ Recently, under the Taft administration, the Secretary of State, Mr. Knox, has seen fit to add to the supopsed right of tutelage over the Latin- American Kepublics, an assumption even more pernicious and objectionable, that of policing these countries, and, further, has sought to impose, especially on Central America, a financial pro- tectorate which would deprive these countries of the administration of their own fiscal affairs. During his first year as Secretary of State, it seems that Mr. Knox saw a vision of himself as the savior of Central America, in- suring for these countries peace and prosperity by his efforts to bring about the resurrection of a nation that had once been known as ^"Republic of Central America/' and composed of the states of Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. How- ever, these altruistic thoughts were shortly afterwards vanquished by his instincts of commercialism, and it was then that he conceived the idea of carrying out his plans of imposing a financial tutelage on those countries by delivering them into the hands of syndicates of financiers in Wall Street, farmed for that special purpose, and who were thus privileged to exploit those countries, while the people of the United States derived no benefit whatsoever. A close examination of the financial impositions on these ocun- tries, brought about by, and a result of, the "Dollar Diplomacy," justifies us in making the statement that they were the cause of the last revolutions in several of the countries bordering on th? Caribbean Sea. Now let us see how the originators and defenders of the "Knox Doctrine" represent the same to the masses, and how they try to defend and justify it. President Taft himself, in his speeches and messages, and Mr. Knox, in lecturing before universities and in addressing voters, have emphasized always the assertion that this policy would lead to an assurance of peace and progress in the Latin- American countries, would bring about prosperity, and that dollars would take the place of the rifle bullets that had been flying about there. They also asserted that since Americans, as agents 14 of the United States Government, would take charge of the Custom Houses in these countries, the principal inducement for revolutions would disappear, asserting that these revolutions originated only be- cause those who start revolutions hope thereby to make themselves rich: That this policy had proved a success in Santo Domingo, .where it has been enforced for several years: That the proposed loans to these countries would result in the utmost benefit to them, and secure their protection ; and, in general, they have endorsed the plans of a few bankers, favored by the State Department, who would derive benefits by exploiting these countries. SANTO DOMINGO. As the present Government has always pointed to Santo Domingo for a justification of its policy, let us see what has really taken place in that country since a financial protectorate was imposed on it by the American Government. More than fifteen years ago, a group of American financiers undertook the settlement of Santo Domingo's foreign debt, a condition being that the administration of the Custom Houses should be exercised by American employes of the American syndicate, which was formed for that purpose. This transaction would have resulted in a complete failure for these speculating bankers, had it not been that they succeeded in obtain- ing the support of the United States Government, which forced a treaty on the government of that island, in which it was stipulated that the President of the United States should in future appoint the collectors of customs on the island, that these collectors should have the power to use their own discretion in the management of the same, and leaving to the Collector General the supervision of the foreign debt and its settlement. It is plainly seen that from then on the privileged bankers derived all the benefit while running no risk whatsoever, as they were guaranteed by the Government of the United States. Now, if this financial imposition had borne good results, there would have been some excuse for this policy, considering the cir- cumstances, particularly, that at that time it actually prevented various European nations from taking action against Santo Do- mingo, through the use of war vessels, which' had been sent to en- force the collection of debts of the government due their subjects. But this object could have been accomplished by simply putting 15 forward the Monroe Doctrine, as was asserted by distinguished public men of South America. The whole undertaking proved a failure, and has never done for the country what its originator? claimed for it. although it is to be admitted that, due to an efficient management, the income derived from the customs increased ma- terially during the first years, while in later years the revenues have remained stationary. As to the honesty and integrity of these officials appointed by the President of the United States, may it suffice to refer to the scandal in which the Collector General of Santo Domingo was in- volved, and which was aired by the press of this country. That none of the purposes of the enforced financial tutelage over Santo Do- mingo materialized, viz: the settlement of the foreign debt and ''maintenance of peace," is history. In proof of our assertion relative to the foreign debt, we shall quote the more authoritative report of a meeting of bondholders of the foreign loan of Santo Domingo, which took place in London in 1910. This report says: "The Council regret to report that no steps have yet been taken to remedy the injustice to the British holders of Santo Domingo bonds, under the settlement of 1908. At the time the Honduras proposals were brought forward in 1909, the Council were. given to understand that the matter would have prompt attention; but beyond further vague assurances that the subject was not being lost sight of, nothing has apparently been l done." In consequence, the foreign credit of Santo Domingo has not im- proved, and is really worse than before the advent of the American officials, for the very good reason that now it is not given to the government to promote the betterment of the credit of its own country. As to the maintenance of peace in that country, the failure could not be more marked, for in the course of fifteen years of the North American supervision of the finances of that country, two presi- dents have been assassinated, and a series of revolutions have taken place, all due to the unrest created amongst the masses, who sus- pected their executives to be tools in the hands of a foreign power. Especially, during the last two years, we are justified in asserting that this unfortunate country has not enjoyed a single moment of true and perfect peace, in spite of (or, perhaps, because of) the fact that all these insurrections were suffocated by the pressure 16 brought to bear in the presence of American war vessels. Very re- cently this pressure proved inadequate, and it was found necessary to despatch to that country formidable expedition of marines, with- out it being known whether this expedition went in support of the government or of the revolutionists.* Why, then, do President Taft and Secretary Knox insist in laud- ing their scheme of intervention in Santo Domingo, and why do they continue representing this intervention as something that ought to be practiced in the other Latin American countries ? They themselves cannot be bona fide believers in what they ac- claim, for do not the facts, and facts known to the world at large, belie them. Let us pass to a study of the results of this "benevolent and fraternal policy" in those countries of Latin- America, where it was imposed, or where efforts were made to impose it. COSTA EICA. About four years ago an agreement was entered into by the Costa Eican Government and a syndicate of bankers of New York, with' a view to obtaining a settlement of the foreign debt and a new loan; the principal condition being the delivery of the Custom Houses to collectors to be named by the President of the United States. The conditions were very similar to those imposed on Santo Domingo, but with the difference that the Government of the United States was not named one of the contracting parties. The Costa Eican Congress did not approve this contract, seeing in it a menace to its national sovereignty. Afterwards a very simi- lar contract was entered into with Mr. Minor C. Keith, in substance, in fact, identical with the other contract proposed as far as the financial part of it was concerned, but no mention was made of any intervention by a foreign government. *The Revolution in Santo Doming-o has been put to an end, through the intervention of the United States Government, whose Delegate declared himself in favor of the Revolution, resulting in the down-fall of President Victoria and the elevation to the Presidemcy of the Bishop of the Diocese. It is curious to see that the Diplomacy of a country, most of its people being Protestant, should favor as chief of the government of a foreign country the head of the Catholic Church, the most intolerant of all sects, and which will deprive of religious liberty not only the natives, but the foreigners as well. This must be another one of the so-called benefits of "Dollar Diplomacy." IT This latter contract was ratified by Congress and is in force at this present moment. We do not propose to applaud this contract, which might have been arranged with greater advantage to the country, but, for the fact that there was nothing contained in that agreement that could 'possibly endanger the sovereignty of Costa Rica, it did not cause any ill feeling among the masses and did not irritate public opinion. Otherwise, it might have caused riots, even in this peaceful country. GUATEMALA. Similar propositions of financial support were made to the Gov- ernment of Guatemala at about the same time that the Costa Rican Congress vetoed the offer made that country, and this offer to Guatemala was recommended, although rather informally, by the State Department. Guatemala's executive would not assume the responsibility or accepting or rejecting the proposition, and referred it to the Congress, which body returned it without commenting on it except to recommend to the President to use his own judgment. Well known as is the despotic form of government in Guatemala^ in justice to the President, we must say that when he turned over tc the Congress this loan proposition he clearly proved that he did not favor such negotiations an'd merely desired to 'delay a decision and, at the same time, maintain himself in the good graces of the State Department and of Mr. Knox. With his recognized astute- ness, President Cabrera has succeeded in continuing his system of delay and has prevented any action by the Congress of Guatemala up to this time. This conduct proves that, if he lacks strength of character, the president certainly manifests a good deal of prudence by which' he maintains himself in power and in favor with the State Department, whose plans relative to the other Central American countries he has always aided and abetted, as we shall prove later on. HONDURAS. Simultaneously with the propositions made the other two coun- tries named, the State Department approached Honduras, through the American Minister at Tegucigalpa, intimating to the Honduran Government the advisability of sending a representative to Wash- ington with a view to taking advantage of the offer of a syndicate 18 of Wall Street bankers to settle the foreign debt, to advance funds for the carrying out of progressive public works, and for the re- demption of the internal debt, assuring the government that this proposition would be more advantageous to the country than the settlement made with the Minister of Great Britain, who was at the same time representing the foreign bondholders. (See Ad- denda "A.") Before this took place the State Department had used its in- fluence in inducing the Foreign Office in London to annul the settlement made through the British Minister. The Hondurau Government sent a commission to Washington and New York, who listened to the propositions of the bankers, which' were conditional upon the signing with the American Government of an agreement, by virtue of which the said government would assume the ad- ministration of the Honduran Custom Houses, through the medium of employes, whose appointment and dismissal should be made at the pleasure of the President of the United S"tates, and who, there- fore, would not be responsible to Honduras. The loan was to amount to Ten Million Dollars at a rate of emis- sion of 88% bearing interest at 5% and 1%! for amortization. Of these millions not even ten per cent were to reach Honduras, and the greater part of this same ten per cent was to be invested in railroad supplies, machinery, rolling stock, etc. As to the other terms and conditions of this negotiation, un- doubtedly an acceptance would have been tantamount to Honduras having to give up its sovereignty and the proceeds of its fiscal in- come, for the benefit of this group of bankers, backed up by the State Department, thus placing the country at the mercy of its so- called protectors. Reduced to cold figures, Mr. Knox's proposition was this : That Honduras would have to pay in forty years more than Twenty-six Million Dollars, instead of the Eight Millions it would have had to pay if the settlement made with the British Minister had been kept in force, which latter proposition contained no pitfalls, nor degrading conditions and stipulations. In spite of this, President Taft, as well as Mr. Knox, persisted in proclaiming to the world that they were holding out a "generous hand" to the Latin-American countries, in order to lighten the weight of their foreign debts, when in truth they were devising means to corner 19 these countries in such a way as to force them into political distress, and final inability to maintain their sovereignty, thus forcing them sooner or later into having to ask the United States for annexation or for a complete and perpetual protectorate. In such a situation, these countries would be under the dominion of the Executive of the United States, who would be ruling over them without having to assume any responsibility to his own people, because, in a given case, he could unburden this on his allies, the group of financiers, over whom the courts of the United States would have no jurisdic- tion, for the reason that if they committed punishable acts, these ^v r ere committed in a foreign country, and the laws of that oppressed country roulcl never reach them, for the reason that their influence would aid them in avoiding being held responsible. This loan proposition was held secret here in the United States as well as in Honduras. In Honduras because pressure had been brought to bear on the President by the State Department and the tanking syndicate not to publish it, so that only a few of his Ministers may have had knowledge of the same. The Envoy of Honduras in Washington refused to sign this Xoan Treaty and contract, acting under instructions from his gov- ernment, until, in July, 1910, Honduras was surprised by an attempted revolution, consisting of an armed expedition invading the Atlantic Coast of Honduras. Although the American navy had been very watchful on similar and previous occasions, when this expedition was sailing the Bay of Honduras, the American war- ships did not appear. This revolution proved a fiasco, but the State Department took advantage of it, in giving the then Executive of Honduras to under- stand, first, through' his own envoy at Washington, and again, through the American Minister at Tegucigalpa, that only on the condition that he accept the tendered Loan. Proposition, could he, the President of Honduras, insure himself against a repetition of revolutionary uprisings as the State Department would then bind itself to crush same. The President, General Miguel E. Davila, whose sole ambition was to retain himself in power at any price, then began to change liis instructions to his financial agent, and at the same time, Envoy Extraordinary at Washington, then in New York, General Juan E. 20 Paredes. He still instructed his representative, however, not to- submit to any clause which could possibly endanger the sovereignty of Honduras. In order to break President Davila's resistance, the- extreme was reached in having the press of this country publish hints that should President Davilla not accept the Loan Proposi- tion in toto pretty soon, it would be accepted anyway by Honduras,, as a revolution in that country was unavoidable, and that the head ond leader of the revolution had beforehand pledged himself to ac- cept the proposition. When President Davila shortly thereafter re- quested the United States to prevent the sailing of that much heralded revolutionary expedition, at the same time accusing the President of Guatemala of having given this intended expedition his support, the premptory answer he received from Washington was "Sign the proposed Financial Project first/' Finally Davila gave orders to sign the Loan Treaty, which in- struction the Honduran representative at first refused to obey, but finally complied with, after having filed a protest, on the tenth of January, and after the announced revolution had already been started and two ports had been taken. However, the Honduran representative irrevocably refused to sign the contract with the bankers. The truth of this incident has been repeatedly vouched, for by Mr. Paredes in various pamphlets which he has published in the United States. Copies of some of the most important docu- ments we attach, Addenda "B." When this revolutionary expedition, which started from the At- lantic Coast of the United States, reached the Coast of Honduras,, after having taken aboard their vessel, somewhere along the coast of Guatemala, some war supplies that had been offered by the Presi- dent of that country, there were two American war vessels in these waters, but they took no action to detain the expedition. The American cruiser, Tacoma, went alongside the Hornet, the leading vessel of the expedition, to ascertain if this vessel had violated the neutrality laws of the United States, but the Tacoma's commander- declared that he found nothing suspicious aboard. After Davila had signed the Loan Treaty, the same Tacoma was ordered to cap- ture the Hornet, but the Hornet had had time to land the war sup- plies she had had aboard. This Loan Treaty was almost unanimously vetoed and declined 21 oy the Honduran Congress on the last day of January, the State Department, however, insisting right along that the agreement with the banking syndicate should also be accepted and signed. The signature was affixed to the agreement in February, not, however, by the same Envoy, who had been recalled, but by the permanent Min- ister Plenipotentiary. It is worth relating that when the Honduran Congress refused to. ratify the Loan Treaty the American navy showed once more, and openly, a marked partiality for the revo- lutionists. When the State Department offered its good offices with a view to bringing about peace, a note was addressed to the American Minister at Tegucigalpa, to the commander of the American Squad- ron and to the two warring factions, containing the basis upon ^vhich the United States would undertake to mediate, one of the terms being that Puerto Cortez should be declared a neutral zone, whereupon the commander of the Tacoma insisted that the garri- son of the constitutional government should vacate the port, which demand was complied with, the port remaining under the protection of the foreign consuls and the men-of-war, but chiefly under the protection of the declaration of neutrality which had been issued by the State Department. Therefore, when President Davila was informed by the American Minister in person, who stated that he had come in representation of the Commander of the Tacoma, that he, Davila, was to authorize the delivery of Porto Cortez into the hands of the revolutionists, his surprise can be imagined. Of course, Davila refused, stating that his refusal was based upon the assurance of the State Depart- ment that Porto Cortez should be a neutral zone, etc., as related by us, but the American Minister became insistent the following day, and after a few hours of discussion of h'is demand, when he, no doubt, became annoyed, he said to Davila: "It is useless to lose &ny more time. The port has been in the hands of the revolutionists since yesterday, and if you care to be assured of the American offer of mediation, you had better consider the delivery of Puerto Cortez to your opponents as a "fait accompli." The truth is that the port had been delivered to the revolutionists even before President Da- vila had been asked for his authorization. Mr. Knox, in his offer of mediation, stated as another clause of 22 his stipulations, that President Davila should deposit the executive- power in a third person, so as to bring about a termination of the- inner strife, and that this third party should be entirely impartial,, so as to give guarantees to all Hondurans, of all factions, alike. Eegardless of this, and obeying explicit instructions from Mr. Knox himself, his emissary, Mr. Dawson to whose decision the delegates to the Peace Conference held at Puerto Cortez pledged themselves, appointed Dr. Francisco Bertran as the person in whom. President Davila should deposit the executive power. We do not care to discuss the personal merits of Dr. Bertran, but the fact remains that he was affiliated with the revolution, and actively engaged in the ranks of the revolutionists, and was be- sides known as one of the most intimate friends of the revolutionary leader. This is one of the reasons why an understanding and a peaceable settlement of their differences could not be arrived at among the Honduranians, because the ruler, in fact, being the victorious revolutionist, all the promise of a guaranty to all Hon- durans of other affiliations have proved an illusion up to this date, contravening the assurances given by the State Department in its offer of mediation. However, this two-faced policy of the State Department resulted in a benefit to Honduras. The victorious opponent of President Davila, favored by the State Department, also remained unsatisfied, and as public opinion in Honduras had always been manifestly in opposition to the proposed loan negotiations, the new President has not ratified that Loan Project up to the present day, thus frustrating the hopes of the banking syndicate, who had placed full confidence in him, and who have since made him new propositions more ad- vantageous than the old ones. The new President was greatly assisted by the adverse stand taken against this loan policy by the American Senate, which attitude was greatly admired and applauded in all Latin- America. The action of the United States Senate in declining to approve this loan convention was principally due to the energetic efforts of a few Central Americans, particularly Dr. Policarpo Bonilla, former President of Honduras, who presented astounding revelations to the Senate regarding the vicious terms of the proposed contracts and the insincerity of the State Department's attitude. Had the - 23 Senate approved the treaty, the State Department would, no doubt, have dared to press energetically the new President into yielding to its demand, and he, knowing from personal experience to what extremes the State Department might go in order to accomplish its purposes, might probably have imitated his predecessor in order to remain in the executive chair. We believe that we have succeeded in clearly demonstrating that the last two revolutions in Honduras were, if not actual creations of the State Department, at least, well known beforehand and tolerated by the same as a necessary consequence of its coercive Dollar Diplomacy. In continuing we shall proceed to prove the guilt of the State Department in connection with .the two last revolutions in Nicara- gua, all of which will lead us to the conclusion that Knox's policy in Central America, and in general, in all Latin- America, must necessarily be unanimously condemned. NICAEAGUA. Simultaneously with' the Loan Propositions made the other Cen- tral American countries, President General Jose Santos Zelaya, ol Nicaragua, was approached. He, however, would not even agree to discuss the proposition, and proceeded to arrange a loan in Europe, one of the main objects of this loan being the settlement of the American debt, Considering the especial zeal which Secretary Knox has sought to bring about an acceptance of these loan propositions, it seems that this loan policy had become with him a personal hobby, and a matter of personal pride, and it can be easily deduced that Zelaya' s refusal meant that from that very moment his govern- ment was condemned to disappear. Enormous claims against Nica- ragua were initiated or resurrected and vigorously pushed, some of these claims being nothing sliort of monstrous, but Zelaya never gave cause for the breaking off of diplomatic relations, because he offered such favorable settlements with the claimants that neither they nor the State Department could find a pretext to refuse these offers. But Mr. Knox was determined to punish Zelaya, as he might have expresed himself, for his stubbornness and a revolution was not long in forthcoming. The Military Chief on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua, Juan J. Estrada, brought up by Zelaya, and a man in whom Zeleya had confidence, declared himself in rebellion against Zeleya, making common cause with the other malcontents in the country. From the very beginning of this revolution, it could be seen that it had merited the benevolent consideration of the State Department, and that American Consul Moffat, in Bluefields, was notoriously an accomplice. The revolutionists were allowed to openly acquire war supplies and ammunitions of all kinds in the United States, ?nd were amply supplied with funds by American capitalists. All of this was done openly, and with the benevolent and even com- placent consent of the American authorities. As one of the best proofs of our assertions, we shall submit also the report given to the Xew York Times recently by former Presi- dent of Nicaragua, Juan J. Estrada, leader of that revolution. (Addenda C.) But in order to take action against Zelaya openly and with a free hand, Mr. Knox had to avail himself of some pretext to open hostilities. If such a pretext had not happened to present itself, surely Knox would have fabricated one, but it so happened that it presented itself in the execution of Groce and Cannon, the two American adventurers who had been actively engaged in the ranks of the Estrada revolution, and who had been taken prisoner when in the act of blowing up with dynamite some government river boats, and who had been condemned to death by a court martial. We do not want to discuss the legality of this sentence, because it is of no importance in the case, and we can admit, if necessary, that it was not legal, although the fact that they were, when taken prisoner, in arms against the government and engaged in dynamit- ing government transport steamers, forfeited them their right to protection of the American Government, in accordance with uni- versal precedence. This was recognized recently by President Taft himself, when cautioning all American citizens residing in Mexico to abstain from siding one way or the other in the political strife, and that a contravention would cause the loss of right to protection by the United States Government. Had Cannon and Groce been in the rank and file of the revolution for the sake of the gain that there was in it for them, they should have been left to the conse- quences of such a hazardous venture. If enthusiasm and belief in the justice of the cause had led them, to join the revolution to com- 25 bat a despot, they had to take the chances and risks that all patriots take of falling into the hands of such despots. Besides, nobody who violates the International Law can afterwards claim immunity from it. The most the State Department should have done, and there i3 precedent for such action, was to intervene in a friendly spirit in behalf of the accused in order to spare them capital punishment. Mr. Knox had ample time to do this, if he had really wished to save the victims, but he did not intend to 'do so, nor did he ever try to do so; and in his memorable note addressed to the Charge d ? Affairs of Nicaragua, which note was dated December 1st, 1909, and which he claimed was caused by the execution of Cannon and Groce, he ignored all the principles of international law, annulled all precedence, and returned to the civilization of the Middle Ages, when brute force was the only source of justice. In this note, Knox, in his selfsufficiency, pronounced the sen- tence imposed upon Cannon and Groce unjust, declared Zalaya's government tyrannical and despised by public opinion, and asserted that all Nicaragua had risen in arms. This was not the truth, it being well known that the revolution was at that time localized on part of the Atlantic Coast. He declared Zelaya the perturber of peace in Central America and a violator of the Washington con- ventions, who had merited the complaints from the other govern- ments of Central America, who considered his stay in power a constant menace. This latter assertion of Knox's was based, pro- bably, upon representations made to the State Department by the President of Guatemala, who has been a tool in the hands of Knox and a willing helpmate in his policy of intervention in the other Central American countries. With this act Knox constituted himself judge over an inde- pendent nation, and resolved to disavow the legitimacy of the gov- ernment presided over by Zelaya, breaking off the customary diplo- matic intercourse with him, and declaring Zeleya's government a defacto government, which would merit the same consideration as the defacto government of the revolution. We do not believe that there is another incident in the diplomatic history of the civilized world that may be compared with the act Ave have just related. 26 The proceeding of the State Department would have been much less scandalous had it lived up to its much heralded resolutions. However, it did not do so. It sided openly and without regard for appearance with the revolution, which it assisted with its moral and material power to become victorious over Zelaya;" as shall be proven later on. (Addenda. D.) Zelaya, stunned by the violent attitude of the State Department, committed the grave error of depositing the executive power in the man who was the choice of Congress, according to the Con- stitution, when he should have used his best endeavors to gain a decisive victory over the revolutionists, thereby compelling the revolutionists to consider his separation from the executive power as the best solution of the conflict; and then, should the State Department not have been satisfied. Zelaya would have compelled Knox to support the revolution with armed force to enable them to gain the victory. Zelaya's premature move of separating him- self from the country's executive power, just at the moment when the forces of both warring factions were lined up for a decisive battle, naturally produced a state of demoralization in the rank and file of the government troops, bringing about, in consequence, tho defeat at Recreo, which served to inspire the revolutionary forces with new vigor and confidence, and encouraged them to continue the revolt against Zelaya's .successor, Dr. Jose Madriz. This in spite of the fact that it was well known that Dr. Madriz had been a political exile during the Zelaya regime for more than eleven years, and was, therefore, far from being responsible for the act? attributed to Zelaya. But what tended more than anything else to prolong this strife against Madriz was the stand taken by the State Department, in refusing to recognize the government of Dr. Madriz, in spite of its having been legally constituted, within the .prescrip- tions of the Washington Treaty, and regardless, as well, of the fact that the Madriz government had been recognized by all the other civilized nations, excepting Guatemala and Salvador. These two countries had been influenced by the State Department to withhold their recognition, in violation of the said treaty, the attitude of the State Department being based on its stand that it would pursue toward the Madriz government the same policy it had outlined to Zelaya's Minister in Washington. 27 The struggle then continued even more sanguinary than before, "but surmounting all these unfavorable influences, the forces of the Madriz government routed the revolutionary troops in the interior of the country, thus leaving the revolutionists reduced to one strong- hold in Kama, and its base of supplies, Bluefields, on the Atlantic Coast. To accomplish this, the army of the government made superhuman efforts and sacrifices, and only after a march through morasses and never ending swamps, where hundreds of men, horses and conveyances were left buried in the mire, did the loyal troops succeed in reaching the aforenamed two strongholds of the rebels on the Coast, Kama and Bluefields, precisely simultaneously with maritime government expeditions, who were then occupying the ports and all the river outlets along the Coast. After a combine-J attack, they captured the bluff, the key to the port and town of Bluefields. When preparing to attack Bluefields by land and sea, American marines were landed, and the commander of the squadron gave official notice that he would not permit any hostile acts against the town 01 Bluefields; that he would not allow the detention of any mercantile vessel, not even to be searched for contraband of war, and that he would not allow the collection of import duties by the Madriz government at the Bluff Custom House, which had' always been the legal custom house for the port of Bluefields; that the revolutionists were to levy custom duties at a new Custom House, which had been established when they lost the Bluff Fort, in front of which, and covered by its artillery, all vessels were obliged to pass in going to and coming from the so-called new Custom House. A logical consequence of the proceedings of the American commander was that the revolutionists, being guaranteed the safety of Bluefields by the presence of American marines, massed all their forces for the defense of Rama, and being assured of Bluefields as a base of supplies, as the marines were there with the avowed purpose of defending the town against an attack by the Madriz forces, that the demoralization which had been notice- able in the ranks of the revolutionists was replaced by a firm con- fidence in an ultimate victory; and that the lack of munitions of war which had been noticeable in the revolutionary headquarters was replaced by an abundance of everything necessary for a cam- paign, for American marines, covered by the American flag, were 28 Bent aboard all incoming vessels, neutral, American or revolutionary, thus rendering the importation of all war material safe and sure for the carrying on of the revolution. The American commander would previously notify the commander of the fort at the Bluff, and the chief of the Nicaraguan navy, that should an attempt be made to detain these vessels, or should a. shot be fired at them, it would be considered a declaration of wor ; against the United States, and that then the American war vessels would bombard the fort and sink the Nicaraguan war vessels. Upon representations made by the Madriz government to Nor- way's, by whom Madriz had been recognized as the legitimate Presi- dent of Nicaragua, the Norwegian Government prohibited all ves- sels flying the Norwegian flag from transporting contraband of war to the revolutionists, or disobeying in any^ manner the orders of the legitimate government of Madriz ; but the commander of the Ameri- can i squadron, supported expressly by the State Department, in- stigated the masters of these Norwegian steamers to disobey the orders of the government, and putting American marines aboard their vessels, guaranteed them an unmolested entry into the port. The Norwegian Vice-Consul at Bluefields, Mr. Clancy, who had apprised his government what had taken place, was dismissed from his position of Vice-Consul of the United States, which office he was hording also. The ultimate result of all this was that the Madriz forces realized that it would be useless to continue fighting against such odds, and as it was not possible for the land force to maintain their position any longer, a general retreat was ordered, under the circumstance? equal to a defeat. When these disheartened troops arrived back in the interior, they contaminated the balance of the army, and before long every man in the ranks was convinced that they had been fighting a hopeless battle, not against the revolutionists, but against the power, gigantic in comparison, of the Government of the United States. Dr. Madriz realized that to continue the strife would mean useless spilling of more blood, and he deposited the executive power in a deputy named by Congress, who, in turn, turned it over soon afterwards, to the leader of the revolutionists. We publish attached the proofs of what we have related, and especially the proofs .of the complicity of the State Department. We furthermore attach a publication written by Dr. Madriz relative to these facts, which he had written with the intention of submitting same to the Nica- raguan Congress, which, however, he was not given the time to do. (Addendas E y F.) To anybody who personally knew Dr. Madriz, who was a highly civil man, cultured, learned and highly patriotic and honest, it must have been surprising to witness Mr. Knox's unberiding efforts in continuing to give battle to Dr. Madriz, when he should have given him his moral support in order that he might have succeeded in reorganizing and pacifying his country, which would have pre- vented the sacrifice of more than 4,000 Nicaraguan lives and millions worth of property; the more so when Dr. Madriz showed plainly through his propositions made with a view to establishing peace, that his personal ambition would not stand in the way of peace, and that if the adversaries insisted, he would renounce his candidacy when a definite government would be agreed upon. It is of no use that Mr. Knox offers the excuse that he did not know Dr. Madriz, for we are sure that he had sufficient information from one who should merit his confidence, Admiral Kimball, the Commander of the American Squadron in Pacific, waters of Nica- ragua, who was in personal contact with President Madriz, and who formed the same opinion of esteem of Dr. Madriz that we have expressed. It is, perhaps, because of Admiral Kimball- s sincerity when addressing the State Department in favor of Dr. Madriz that he was withdrawn from his post before the termination of the controversy. And, as it had become a matter of self-love with Mr. Knox to push ahead his Dollar Diplomacy at all costs, Dr. Maidriz was objectionable to him, just on account of his sterling qualities, which made Knox sure that Dr. Madriz would never be- come a tool in his hands, to execute schemes involving in truth treason to his country, and its complete ruin. Knox needed un- scrupulous men, who would profess to political creeds like this one, u So long as we succeed in keeping the Liberals out of power, we will willingly submit to the tutelage of any foreign power, if neces- sary, even to that of China." Being intimately aware of the men he had at h'is bidding in Nicaragua, the Dawson Convention was the necessary consequence and result, the Convention which has been kept secret in Nicaragua 30 by the Executive to such an extent that he has refused to show it even to the Nicaraguan Congressmen who asked for it. Here in the United States, to our knowledge, the complete text of the Dawson. Treaty has never been published ; neither in Nicara- gua, nor here in the United States, has this treaty ever been ap- proved by the respective legislative bodies, and it can never be ratified for the very good reason that it was not a pact between two governments, but between an agent of the State Department on one side, and, on the other, some of the chieftains of the revolution, who, with the criminal complacency of the traitor, were demonstrat- ing their gratitude for the support given them in coming into power. However, the State Department has elevated this Dawson Con- vention to the height of a venerable, sacred treaty, far superior to the laws and the constitution not only of Nicaragua, but of the United States as well, since a pretended violation of this conven- tion caused, and ma'de even more sanguinary, the last war in that unhappy country. From what has filtered out to the public of this Dawson Treaty, we know the following: That the treaty was entered into between Mr. Dawson and five men who represented themselves as conspicuous personages of the Conservative Party, namely, Adolfo Diaz, Luis Mena, Juan J. Estrada, EmilianD Chamorro and Fernando Solar- zano, none of whom could represent Nicaragua legally, or be placed in charge of such engagements, which have later been fulfilled, and of which the scope cannot yet be foreseen. Among Mr. Dawson and the men named, it was covenanted that Mr. Estrada should continue in the Presidency for two years, and that during this time Adolfo Diaz should be Vice- President, and that when elections were to take place, the five men nominated, (who had been converted by themselves and by the grace of Mr. Dawson into "Great Electors 77 of Nicagarua), would select from their midst the President and Vice-President for the next term, thus annulling the popular vote, or, more properly speaking, making of it a repugnant farce. Then a disagreement occurred between two of the "Great Elec- tors," President Estrada and the Minister of War, Luis Mena, in consequence of which the latter was imprisoned, but the American Minister, Northcott, intervened, and compelled the President to 31 reinstate Mena in his position and status, whereupon Estrada, who resented the interference of the American Minister, notified him that it should make impossible his permanency in his office. When the American Minister insisted, Estrada turned the presidency over to Adolfo Diaz. A short time before that, as Estrada and Mena were not satis- fied with the constitution, as dictated by the National Assembly, or rather, with the political tendencies of this Assembly, it having been elected by the partisans of Emiliano Chamorro, they dissolved the Assembly, and called together a new one, which was satisfactory to Mena, but which in the matter of principles and as a legitimate representation of public opinion, did not differ much from the previous one. This Assembly being in session, the "Knox-Castrillo" treaty was convened upon as a basis for a loan, which contract was signed by Castrillo and a group of bankers of New York. Both the proposed treaty and contract were made known to the National Assembly, but as this Assembly was under Mena's thumb, and as Mena was opposed to this negotia- tion, he was allowed, in order to overcome his opposition, to have himself elected President by this very same Assembly for the next Presidential term, without anybody recalling the Dawson pact, of which, afterwards, this election was denounced as a violation. Mena's election having taken place without a protest from the Electors constituted by the Dawson pact, nor from the American Minister, the way was smoothed for the ratification of the Castrillo agreements. The Assembly was not given time to discuss the nego- tiations, an immediate decision being 'declared imperative in a single session, and they were approved by a majority of the Assembly, this majority having been carefully prepared beforehand. The voices of six patriotic members, who protested in vain, were unheeded, as was a protest from two of the Secretaries of the Executive, who consequently resigned their posts in order not to be accomplices in the sale of their country. The conduct of the State Department appears throughout this incident as phenominally curious, or more than that, absurd. In this great country, where free institutions are a fact, and where the Eepublican form of government has always been considered a 32 model worthy of copying, and a stimulus to the Latin- American countries, the government, it seems, is determined to encourage the Government of Nicaragua, not only to break its own laws, but all the principles of a true democracy. Unfortunately this has been the tendency of the State Department right along in its relations with its neighbors to the south, for during the last few years it has regularly been the policy of Mr. Knox to intervene in favor of the tyrannical factions in those countries, and against the legiti- mate interests of the masses. Whenever the State Department has given its support to revolutions, it has never taken an interest in making sure that the revolution thus supported would guarantee later on a sane and responsible government, to justify, or at least, explain, the intervention. This phenomena is explained by the fact that the policy of the State Department was not inspired by a de- sire to further the mutual interests of the countries, but rather, for transitory personal interests, or with 'a view to furthering the plans of and assisting those privileged financial speculators. Had the motive been a different one, and had the interventions resulted in the establishing of true liberal regime, with law and order and honesty in the administrations, on account of the assistance re- ceived, the interferences in these countries might have been par- doned, and would have been appreciated finally, even if the na- tional pride of these countries had been hurt and resentment aroused in the beginning. The Castrillo agreements are built up on the same basis as the propositions made Honduras and other countries named, but con- tain some terms and conditions which are even more aggravating to Nicaragua. As Nicaragua had but an insignificant, and rela- tively well taken care of, foreign debt, Dollar Diplomacy had to resort to the plan of amortization of the internal debt of Nicara- gua, represented by depreciated paper money in actual circulation, to find a pretext for seizing the custom houses of the country; and in order to secure the absolute control of financial conditions in the country, a mixed Commission of Claims was created in which United States citizens form a majority, these Americans having been appointed by the State Department or its representatives. It is left, in fact, to this Commission's discretion to raise the figures of this internal debt to the height they may deem convenient, or 33 to favor claims of friends of theirs as they may see fit. The con- tract loan is Fifteen Million Dollars at 90- mand seriousness. This has been a farce in which the State Depart- ment participated directly, in spite of the fact that it pretends to be desirous of showing Latin America what true republicanism is. Mr. Weitzel say, among other things : "By repudiating Zelaya, whose regime of barbarism and corruption was put at an end by the Nicaraguans themselves, after a sanguinary war, the United States government condemned, not only the individual, but the whole system, and it could not possibly tolerate any movement in Nica- ragua that has in view a re-establishment of this destructive regime. The government of the United .States will, therefore, oppose any attempt at the restoration of Zalayism, and will give its efficient moral support to the cause of good government in Nicaragua, legally constituted, and resulting in benefit to the Nicaraguan people, whom it has long been the aim of the United States government to aid in its endeavors for peace and prosperity, under a benevolent constitutional government of law and order/' As what Weitzel terms Zelayism, or more accurately speaking, not Diazism, would have re-established itself in Nicaragua, beyond all doubt, through a FREE election, it was to the interests of the invading government, or, rather, the State Department, that no President should be elected except its accomplice, Diaz. 44 This assertion of Mr. Weitzel has been precisely the hobby horse of Mr. Knox's for the last couple of years to provoke disturbances in Central America. To prove the correctness of our opinion we propose to go into details. The State Department has stated that it not only condemned Zelaya as an individual, but his system of government as well. We shall not discuss whether the State Department had a right to judge the executive of an independent country, as we have already expressed our views en this question, but since it claims to have condemned the "system"' it was but natural to expect that the State Department would use every endeavor to secure in the new government in Nicaragua, its own creation, a "model re- publican government," a government of administrative honesty, and of marked patriotism; nobody could have expected to see the .State Department encouraging with its protection this new govern- ment in Nicaragua in committing outrages against the persons and property of its citizen in systematic robbery, and the vilest of treasons. However, it is plainly to be seen that this kind of a government had to be the choice of the State Department, if it wanted to see its financial policy in Nicaragua succeed, for no honest lawabiding and patriotic government would have lent itself to further the intentions of Dollar Diplomacy in Nicaragua. Strange to say, the State Department was very explicit in denouncing the despotism of Zelaya in Nicaragua, but has shown a marked indifference to such rule in other countries, as for instance, Guatemala, where Estrada Cabrera has been reigning supreme for the last fourteen years, a brutal despot and the scourge of his people, a blot on civilization, who has caused not only his own country to suffer under his tyrannical rule, but other Central American countries as well. We have made the statement already that it was Estrada Cabrera who furnished the sinews of war for the last two revolu- tions in Honduras, and he did likewise for the Estrada revolution in Nicaragua, and although the State Department has denounced Zelaya as the perturber of peace in Central America, and as a violator of the Washington Convention, it has never taken action against Cabrera, or tried to check his plans, as it was quick to do when Zelava was concerned. 45 Mr. Weitzel expressed and repeated declarations made by the State Department and by the President, Mr. Taft himself, to the effect that the United States government would not tolerate a restoration of the Zelaya regime in Nicaragua, which they term "Zelayism/' What does Mr. Weitzel, the State Department, or Mr. Taft really mean ? Either one would find.it difficult to explain, lor none of them know the history of Xicaragua, the actual state of affairs there, the character of the masses and its leaders and politicians, sufficiently well to set up $ criterion and it is this ignorance that explains the many mistakes and abuses committed ly the State Department. Zelaya, like all despotic rulers, never succeeded in forming a distinctive political party. All the employes of his government were subject to changes dictated solely by circumstances or by his caprice. When Zelaya abandoned his executive position, he would have been deprived by this act of all prestige had not the intervention of Ihe United States contributed to make Zelaya a martyr to the autonomy of his country in the eyes of some people, which opinion would have been far more general had Zelaya chosen to fall fighting as a hero. To stamp this last revolution in Xicaragua, "Zelayism" shows profound ignorance and bad faith. This last revolution was headed by Mena, one of the conspicuous. leaders in the revolution against Zelaya and one of the five candidates of the Dawson Treaty, sup- ported by a faction of the Conservative Party. Without any foreign (American) intervention, it is sure that the Liberal Party would have remained passive in its desire to see the factions of the op- posite party fight it out among themselves, and to pursue, when the fight should be ended, the most advantageous course for them- selves. But the intervention of the United States inflamed the masses among the Liberals, and without waiting for orders from their leaders, they crushed the forces of the Diaz government. This occurred principally in the departments of Leon and Chinan- dega, the same having always opposed Zelaya since 1896. Where, therefore, is the Zelayism of this last revolution? It is a matter of surprise that a dignified government should embody in an official document utterances of the Secretary of State showing personal resentment and rage because of the opposition shown toward his Dollar Diplomacy. 46 And, we ask again, after all these abuses, after so many scandals, has peace been assured Nicaragua? Any foreigner who goes to the trouble of reading this article can answer this question just as well as Central Americans can. If such a thing is possible as that the government of the United States should intend to persist in its policy in Nicaragua, it would necessarily have to maintain there an ^'army of occupation," as is necessary in any conquered country, an-cl which would be the only means of saving those traitors who sold Nicaragua from the just punishment, which the people will, no doubt, some day meet out to them. *To assist us in proving- our assertions Periodical Publications reached us from Nicaragua, which bring- the following: PRECAUTION BEATS OSTENTATION. Special to The .American: Managua, Nov. 13. To-day at 7 a. m. the presidential train, com- posed of three cars, left here for Corinto. In the centeir car rode Presi- dent Adolfo Diaz, Gen. Eimiliano Chamorro, Minister Dieg-o M. Chamorro, I>r. Carlos Cuadra Pasos and other friends of the administration. In front and rear were two cars carrying 100 Ameirican marines. The band was not taken, nor was the Guard of Honor, President Diaz being against .amy ostentation. OTJARD OF HONOR ABOLISHED. Special to The American: Managua, Nov. 13. In accordance with the decree of the 9th instant, the Guard of Honor to the President of the Republic was, for the time being-, abolished. ONLY 400 MARINES REMAIN. Special to The American: Managua, Nov. 12. On Friday, the fifteenth instant, Admiral South- erland will leave for Panama 1 with the American forces, leaving only four hundred marines, 300 of whom will be stationed at Campo de Marte and 100 at Leon. .Nov. 17, 1912. 'What a* sorrowful cast for the American Marines! We see them converted into Body Guards of a tyrannica 1 ! usurper, kept there for the purpose of insuring for this man an immunity from the wrath and justified indignation of the masses of his country. Never, perhaps, have the taxpayers of the United States even dreamt of the possibility that their money should be put to the use of keeping this man in power .and to impose a Dictatorship on the people of a free country and to oppress a now free sister Republic. Those of the Nicaraguan Citizens who were able to do so, have protested against the Coup d'Etat against the Dictatorship and Usurpa- tion of the Executive Power by a traitor, abstaining from giving their vote all those who had the valor to challenge the soldiers of the Despot, (converted into Electors and Agents), and who had refused to "be accqmplices in an Electoral Farce, which can justly be termed a Farce, even if there were no more reasons than the farct that the People were convened to cast their vote on the 18th of October, and that the real Election took place on the 2nd of November, or a lapse of time of only a fortnight, which was insufficient to even carry the news of the Decree to some of the Departments of the Republic. We attach a fragment of the Protest which was published in Blue- fields arnd another one with the Decree of Dictatorship. ( Addenda I.) 47 * We believe that' a peaceful solution is possible , but we do not that the moment and the circumstances are opportune for a iiif/fjestion on our part. EL SALVADOR. We do not know whether any loan propositions were ever made to this country., but most likely not for the reason that the foreign debt is relatively small as compared with the natural resources of this country. This foreign debt, caused, the same as the enormous internal debt, by the corruptness and inability of previous presidents, has not affected in any way that could not be remedied the country's sources of wealth, and, no doubt, Salvador will be able to work out its own salvation by the means of securing for itself a series of honest executives. But this does not necessarily mean that Salvador would not have to feel the weight of Dollar Diplomacy, should this come to be the fixed system of the United States toward the Central American countries. Salvador would be the last one to suffer this evil, but could not escape it, as some pretext, however weak, would be found for compelling the Salvadorian government to make the sacrifice of the country's autono'my. The people of Salvador have realized the danger and their patriotism found expression in protests against the latest armed intervention in Nicaragua. Salvador's government, presided over by Dr. Manuel E. Araujo, knew its duty, as proven by documents that we have before us, seconding the public clamor of its masses. We cannot resist the desire to publish cables which were exchanged between President Taft and President Araujo, and we attach same hereto. (Addenda "H.") The cable clearly demonstrates : 1. Mr. Araujo was sure that peace could be brought about if President Diaz, of Nicaragua, would deposit the executive power in Mr. Salvador Caledron, to which proposition President Diaz had already given his approval, but which, without doubt, President Taft did not permit to be consummated, as is to be deducted from the answer he sent Mr. Araujo. 2. Mr. Arajuo was anxious to bring about peace in Nicaragua through the mediation of the other Central American republics, it 48 being understood that should this mediation prove fruitless, an armed intervention by these Central American republics was to be resorted to in order to avoid such an action on the part of the United States. This would have been to the advantage of all the Central American countries, because this coming together for a common purpose would have offered opportunity for further steps towards a union of all the Central American republics into one "Federation," the best means of protection against the common danger. Mr. Taft objected to this proposition on the ground that his gov- ernment, being neutral, and, therefore, better fitted, should try to bring about the termination of the civil Avar in Nicaragua. (How this impartiality or neutrality was afterwards demonstrated we have already related.) He supported this opinion of his by call- ing attention to the Washington Convention, which, by the way, prohibits all interventions in civil wars, and which Convention Taft said it was his duty to see respected, at thp same time, re- serving for himself the right to violate it. 3. The State Department had explained to representatives of Salvador at Washington and Managua that the landing of marines in Nicaragua was solely due to the desire of the State Department in AVashington to protect the American Legation, Consulates and other American interests, but that no intervention in the internal strife was intended. These assurances were not lived up to, as we have previously related, which caused Mr. Araujo to formulate representations which, although couched in very suave and civil terms, might still have prevented foreign armed forces from spill- ing the blood of Nicaraguans on their own soil. 4. That Mr. Taft still pretends to have proved his impartiality is shown in his opinion of the revolution, which he declared a revolt without a principle and comparable to Zelaya's regime, which he denounced in very bitter terms, also attacking the revolution most passionately, at the same time, proclaiming the legality of the Diaz government, although this government is a defacto gov- ernment only, having no more shadow of legality than the Assembly appointment, which he received from the very same Assembly that declared Diaz deposed from his executive position. It afforded us much pleasure to see an official pamphlet published 49 "recently in proof of the correct and patriotic stand taken by the President of El Salvador, who, with the President of Honduras, had been accused of sending to the Diaz government arms and munitions at a time when these were most needed, so as to enable the government to offer some resistance, if feeble, to the formidable onslaught of the revolution, all of which would have resulted in prolonging the strife, and in making Araujo an accomplice in the treachery to Central America. These publications prove that Mr. Araujo saw from the very beginning the perilous position :of Central America, and that he endeavored to arrest the danger, which does not coincide with the grave accusations made against him; and we shall be still more pleased when Mr. Araujo, as soon as he is informed of these ac- cusations, shall offer direct and conclusive proofs of their fallacy in order that nothing but the truth shall be handed down in the Tii&tory of the country. THE WASHINGTON TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS. The Central American Peace Conference took place in Wash- ington, November, 1907, its objects being the termination of dif- ferences between several of the states of Central America, and the establishment of a firm basis for the assurance of interstate peace. To obtain these noble ends, President Eoosevelt generously offered the hospitality of his country,, and with Mexico, the good and dis- interested offices of his government as far as this should be pos- sible. That this Conference did not give any practical results was not the fault of the mediating governments, but rather due to the narrowmindedness of the presidents there represented. The delegates of Honduras and Nicaragua proposed, as a remedy for all troubles in Central America, the re-establishment of the Union of the five nations in one, declaring at the same time, that they did not have any confidence in any other means so far proposed or that could be thereafter proposed. This proposition was rejected by the majority, the other three delegations, as were other pro- positions with a tendency to restrict the absolute power with which the Central American presidents have ruled their countries. As some of the articles agreed upon in the Washington Peace Conference are of importance in reference to our purpose, we shall <;opy some of these. 50 Article II of the General Treaty says : "Desiring to secure in the Kepublics of Central America the benefits which are derived from the maintenance of their institu- tions, and to contribute at the same time in strengthening their stability and the prestige with which they ought to be surrounded, it is declared that every disposition or measure which may tend to alter the" constitutional organzation in any of them is to be deemed a menace to the peace of said Republics." The additional Convention is composed of three articles which say : Article I. "The Governments of the High Contracting Parties shall not recognize any other Government which may come into power in any of the five Republics as a consequence of a COUP D'ETAT, or of a revolution against the recognized Government., so long as the freely elected representatives of the people thereof, have not constitutionally reorganized the country.' 5 Article II. "Xo Government of Central America shall, in case of civil war, intervene in favor of or against the Government of the country where the struggle takes place." Article III. "The Governments of Central America, in the first place, are recommended to. endeavor to bring about, by the means at their command, a constitutional reform in the sense of prohibit- ing the re-election of the President of a Republic, where sucti prohibition does not exist; secondly, to adopt all measures necessary to effect a complete guarantee of the principles of alteration in power." In a convention for the establishment of a Central American Court of Justice is contained an "Annexed Article," which says: "Annexed Article. The Central American Court of Justice shall also have jurisdiction over the conflicts which may arise between the Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers, and when, as a matter of fact, the judicial decisions and resolutions of the National Congress are not respected." Although we have read and reread the Treaty and the Conven- tions referred to, we do not find a single article, a single word, that justifies the ostentatious pretensions of the State Department and of President Taft himself. (We refer to the cablegram ad- dressed to the President of Salvador, dated September 5th, 1912.),, 51 that the United States Government has the right, by these same Conventions, to compel the contracting parties to live up to their obligations. The preliminary protocol, which was the origin of the Confer- ence,, contains Article II, which says : "Their excellencies, the Presidents of the Central American Bepublics, will invite their excellencies, the Presidents of the United States of America, and of the United States of Mexico, if it may please them, to appoint their respective representatives, in order that these representatives,' in a purely amicable- capacity, may render their good and impartial offices in furtherance of the results aimed at by this Conference." From what we have related it is clearly deducted that no right to intervene was granted the United States nor Mexico (who, by the way, has never pretended to have such right) but, quite to the contrary, the General Treaty we have related expressly annuls all previous Central American Conventions, including the one. which took place aboard the "Marblehead," and which was ratified by the Convention of San Jose, Costa Bica, between Guatemala, Salvador and Honduras. Those annulled conventions gave the Presidents of the United States and Mexico the right to officiate as permanent arbitrators in all differences between Central American countries, and in those days they could have pretended to intervene in order to prevent a resort to arms on the ground that they had a right to prevent wars before any harm could be done that might prove beyond reparation. Under the present Treaty all that the mediating governments could and ought to do is to continue tendering their good offices in order that the- conventions providing for their same good offices and amicable assistance are obeyed and lived up to. Let us examine whether the government in Washington has in one way or another with or without a right, ever attempted to influence the Central American presidents so that they might comply with the Treaties, as is claimed by the State Department. Article III, preinserted in the Additional Convention, declares one of the principles of International Law for Central America to be the alternability of the executive power. This principle, al- though a simple recommendation resulting from this Conference,. accepted by the presidents, and ratified by the congresses of all Central American countries. After this Convention had been made valid, Mr. Estrada Cabrera had himself re-elected in Guate- mala, and we are not aware that the State Department has ever even reminded Estrada Cabrera of his obligation to deliver to a successor who might be elected in a free election the Presidency "held by him. On the contrary, Estrada Cabrera has always en- joyed the favor of the State Department, while Zelaya, who was re-elected previous to the Convention, was denounced and pursued in the manner already related. In some of the Central American countries despotism and tyranny have reigned supreme, but never have we heard that the State Department undertook to improve conditions in order to prevent popular uprisings, which invariably have had their source in the lack of guaranty of publict safety, or even of those rights necessary for the preservation of life. The State Department might, have intervened on the ground that Article II of the General 'Treaty, already cited by us, gave it a right to declare infringements on the Constitutional Laws a menace to Central American peace and well being. But with the exception of Zelaya, unquestionably the most despotic Presidents of Central America were the ones to enjoy the confidence and protection of the State Department. The State Department might, based upon Article II of the Ad- ditional Convention (which article we have cited herein before), have cautioned the other Central American governments not to recognize the ISTicaraguan government created by the revolution of 1910 (which government is in existence to-day), for the reason that said government had not been reorganized constitutionally and that no elections had taken place (until the one which was effected November 2nd, and which we have demonstrated already did not merit the title of an election.) But far from doing so, the S'tate Department hastened to recognize this illegal government and to give it the support of the "United States government to the extent of protecting it by armed forces against an uprising of its own masses ; while it refused to recognize the government of Dr. Madriz, "which was .legally constituted, influencing Guatemala and Salvador to refuse their recognition also. All the efforts of the Central American Court of Justice during 53 the last two revolutions in Nicaragua to re-establish peace by means of mediation were unsuccessful, principally because one of the- factions was assured of the support of the State Department car- ried to the extremes we have already criticised. Had it been the desire of the State Department to preserve the dignity of this Court, instead of being the direct cause of its complete failure, it would have assisted this Court in its efforts to- bring .about peace; the more so because an annexed article of the- Convention, which provides for the establishment of this Court, gives this Court the right to intervene in differences arising among the High Departments of the government, and the American gov- ernment might have used its good offices in having the election of' Mena, since this election was considered illegal, or the dismissal of President Diaz by the same Assembly that elected Mena, sub- mitted to this Court, thereby terminating all civil strife in Nicara- gua at once. Although Article II of the Additional Convention prohibits the Central American governments from intervening for or against any Central American government in case of a revolution or civil war, the American Government has placidly allowed, if it did not instigate, the government of Guatemala to take side with and assist the revolutions in Honduras and Nicaragua. The State- Department has done even worse than this. Claiming for itself a right that was denied all contracting parties in the Washington Conventions, the right to intervene directly or indirectly, for or against, in revolutions in Central America, the State Department went so far as to use armed force in putting down the last revolu- tion and used these armed forces, not only against combatants, but even against unarmed citizens, all of which was committed' with the Washington Treaties as a pretext, in scandalous violation of these very same treaties which the State Department has claimed' to be defending. We consider it very opportune to publish a communication sent by President Araujo to the Central American Court of Justice- relative to the last revolution in Nicaragua and his true inter- pretation of the Washington Conventions, which opinion is all the more interesting, because it voices the authorized idea of an Executive of one of the Central American republics. His com- munication reads as follows : 54 "Five independent nations, none having relinquished their rights to an autonomous government, convened upon treaties which tend to promote effective relations of peace, commerce and good will, and the governments of the United States and Mexico, having been rep- resented at this Conference through notable representatives, were parties to the deliberations which preceded the final conclusions arrived at in these Intrenational treaties ratified at Washington, thanks to a generous and disinterested offer of hospitality of the Ex-President of the United States. However, it is noteworthy that neither in the text:of these documents, the preliminary Protocol, nor in the records of the Conference, are these great governments of the United "States of America, and Mexico^ conceded any rights or obligations that could be traced to these Treaties convened upon by the Central American contracting parties. There is nothing in either the spirit nor the wording of these treaties that could be construed into a restriction of their rights of sovereignty, when these contain nothing but expressions of mutual admiration, respect and good will, obligating the contracting countries to submit their differences to the verdict of the Central American Court of Justice, which is purely Central American, and of which esteemed institu- tion your Honor is the meritorious representative." And now we shall conclude. We hope we have succeeded in demonstrating that "Dollar Diplomacy" is a great injustice and is the ruin of those countries in which it is pursued, at the same time endangering the prestige of the United States in the eyes of all Latin-America to the benefit of only a few privileged citizens of the United States. We Central Americans lack the means to relieve the situation and to resent this injustice, and for the moment we have to trust to the straightforwardness and honesty of the American people, and the people's worthy representatives in Congress, and especially in the Senate, which is investigating this matter. We admire this great country, and we are far from believing that the people are responsible for the errors of a few of its public men in leading positions. We hope for justice to be done us, f and for a revival of the Pan- American Fraternity, which will give peace, progress and liberty to all the nations of this continent/ JUAN LEETS. New Orleans, November, 1912. ADDENDA f? ; 55 ADDEXDA A MEMORANDUM OF MINISTER BROWN. Under instructions from my government, which I have just received by telegraph, I have the honor and the pleasure to inform the Government of Honduras that the firm of J. P. Morgan & Co. has informed my government that they are prepared to agree in the arrangement of the foreign debt of Honduras, the delivery of the railway wharf of Puerto Cortes, and the advancement of a sub- stantial amount for*internal improvements which may be necessary, acquiring new bonds which must be duly secured. Messrs. Morgan & Co. have notified my government that the. Council of Foreign Bonholders had accepted the proposal of Morgan & Co., who now have control of the British and American securities, including the railway and wharf, and that the Council of Foreign Bondholders, acting in behalf of the holders of bonds, have in- formed the British Secretary of S'tate for Foreign Affairs of the foregoing, and that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs having cordially approved the new project, has, by request of the Council of Bondholders, given notice to Minister Garden gf the change in the situation. I have instructions to manifest that if the Government of Hon- duras would send a special agent to the United States with full powers to negotiate with Morgan & Co., the Government of the United States would extend to him all facilities. I beg to add that the Government of the United States feels itself happy to see, in the said proposals, the prospect of a good result and for a settlement upon a favorable basis for the amortization of the national debt, which would be for the prosperity, tranquility and national strength of Honduras. (Signed) PHILIP BROWN, American Minister to Honduras. Tegucigalpa, July 17, 1909. ADDENDA B CABLEGRAMS. TEGUCIGALPA, Dec. 10, 1910. Paredes, Honduras Consulate, New York: Accept agreement; sign agreement and return. (Signed) DAVILA. 56 NEW YORK, Dec. 11, 1910. President Davila, Tegucigalpa, Honduras: Consult situation prominent people to decide destinies Kepublic.. (Signed) PAREDES. CABLEGRAMS. NEW YORK, Dec. 24, 1910. President Davila, Tegucigalpa, Honduras: I have refused to sign convention American Protectorate S'anto Domingo plan. Complied with my duty. Present you my resignation. (Signed) PAREDES. TEGUCIGALPA, Dec. 29, 1910. Paredes, New York: Country is on the verge of a disastrous civil war. Only the loan can save it. Think patriotically. Must make efforts to gain time. Loan will be made in spite of us. At least, we must try to avoid" bloodshed to the Eepublic. I await details. (Signed) DAVILA. TEGUCIGALPA, Jan. 20, 1911.. Paredes, Honduras Consulate, New YoiTc: Your resignation not accepted. Sign loan without delay. Gov- ernment assumes all responsibility. Civil war appears to be formid- able. Loan may avoid bloodshed and prepare beneficial evolution, preventing Bonilla coming to power. Subscribe contract this week. Answer. (Signed) DAVILA. LETTER OF PRESIDENT DAVILLA TO MINISTER PAREDES. TEGUCIGALPA, Jan. 12, 1911. Minister of Honduras, General Juan E. Paredes, Comulado de- Honduras, 66 Beaver Street, New York: My Esteemed Friend I am in receipt of yours of Nov. 28th and Dec. 5th. Estrada Cabrera, who is the promoter of this war and that of August last year, has displayed a prodigious activity to produce the revolution, and all elements are conjoined against the Government, unjustly. To get out of these difficulties we take to fight hard. The Government of Honduras was notified officially that if the 57 loan was not signed, it would be carried through at all hazards, in 1 , worse conditions for the Eepublic. Nevertheless,, we said nothing, did not give any promises until we could receive your indications. The last proposition made .by the bankers, which you' transmitted by cable, we consider it as decisive, and for that reason we ordered you to sign and return. The American Minister asked me for a copy of that cable, and I gave it to him. When you refused to sign the treaty at Washington, the disgust of the State Department raised to indignation. (Signed) DAVILA. TEGUCIGALPA, Jan. 27, 1911.. Paredes, Honduras Consulate, New York: Ceiba has fallen. S'an Marcos, Colon, has also been taken by in- vasion from Nicaragua. The war, according to official declarations, took place on account of delay in signing the loan, notwithstanding promises made since Dec. 10th. War between factions which de- vastates the country, atid the loan will be made by any means. Let us put one side our "amour propre" in order to avoid the ruin of Honduras. If you cannot sign, help Lazo. Let us work together in behalf of peace. (Signed) DAVILA.. ADDENDA C Aid for Nicaragua Asked by Estrada She will Never Thrive- Without Our Effective Intervention, Says Ex-President Urges a Protectorate President Diaz Hopes for. Our Help,. He Declares Blames Americans for Revolutions. [New York Times, Sept. 10, 1912.] In the course of an interview with a Tim&s reporter yesterday, Ex-President Estrada, of Nicaragua, who is stopping at the Hotel St. George, Brooklyn, said that without the effective intervention of the United States warfare in Nicaragua would continue- in definitely, cuining the Central American country, and sooner or later involving the United States in trouble with England or Ger- many. Mr. Estrada, who declares that the presidency rightfully belongs to him, also brought grave charges against a number of Americans in Nicaragua, blaming them for present conditions there;. 58 Mr. Estrada and his faithful henchman,, General Moncada, are starting for Nicaragua early this week to support the government of President Diaz, in whose favor Mr. Estrada handed over the reins of the Chief Magistracy in 1911, in order to avert, so he says, war with the Conservative faction. "I would like you, through the New York Times, to convey a few words to the American people," said Mr. Estrada. "It is succinctly this: Without the active help of the United States Government, Nicaragua will never thrive. She will be always the same." "You mean a sort of American protectorate ?" he was asked. ARBITER FOR NICARAGUA. "Yes," he answered without hesitation. "A protectorate along the lines exercised in Cuba and Panama, without, of course, impair- ing our sovereignty. We want the United States Government, whether it be Eepublican or Democrat, to keep an eye upon us, supervise our elections, and, in a word, become the arbiter and judge of our destinies. I speak in my name and in the name of President Diaz. My ideas are his, as well as those of the majority of the' people of Nicaragua. It's the only way in which we can hope for peace and progress. I am still titular head of Nicaragua. I did not resign, as has been stated, but merely handed the government over to the Yice-President during my absence. "For the last twenty years Nicaragua has been in the hands of a savage system of militarism. There are no real elections, every- thing is a farce, and everybody wants to be President and rule. The result is that the country has been and still is a seething pot of anarchy, which is gaining proportions every day. "But it is not alone our people who brew all this trouble. They are the least responsible. I charge thatjjje majority, if not all, of the revolutions in NicaraguaTin recentyears have been engineered and openly financed by American companies anxious to get conces- sions and monopolies from the government. "Take the case' of the Bluefields Steamship Company. Zelaya gave these people the exclusive monopoly for the navigation of the River Escondido and its affluents. When I reached fhe presidency I also found that exclusive concessions for the exploitation of the mining, liquor, tobacco, cattle, fishing and other national industries were in the hands of a few Americans and Germans. 59 CONSPIRACIES ON ALL SIDES. "What was the result ? I found conspiracies were being hatched on all sides. Mena, my War Minister, was planning a revolution. The United Fruit Company,, which was after a similar concession, a railroad, was pushing him all the time. I had positive proofs that he was going to start a revolution on May 14, 1911, so I arrested him on May 9. The Conservatives clamored for his release, and I handed over the presidency to Diaz to avert war, although I might have carried it on successfully, because I had the backing of 600 Liberals, who rallied around me at the time." Continuing, Mr. Estrada said that Mena's revolution was being backed by the United Fruit Company and the partisans of Zelaya. Mr. Estrada was frank enough to admit that the revolution lieaded by him which overthrew Zelaya had received financial aid from certain American companies established on the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua. He said these companies had contributed, off and on, something close to $1,000,000. The house of Joseph W. Beers was in for $200,000, and that of Samuel Weil for about $150,000. ADDENDA D THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE NICARAGUAN CHARGE. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, December 1, 1909. SIR Since the Washington Convention of 1907 it is notorious that President Zelaya has almost continuously kept Central America in tension or turmoil, that he has repeatedly and flagrantly violated the provisions of the conventions, and by a baleful influence upon Honduras, whose neutrality the conventions were to assure, has sought to discredit those sacred international obligations to the great detriment of Costa Eica, El Salvador and Guatemala, whose governments meanwhile appear to have been able patiently to strive for the loyal support of the engagements so solemnly undertaken at Washington under the auspices of the United States and of Mexico. It is equally a matter of common knowledge that, under the regime of President Zelaya, republican institutions have ceased in Nicaragua to exist, except in name; that public opinion and the 60 press have been throttled; and that prison has been the reward of any tendency to real patriotism. My consideration for you personally impels me to abstain from unnecessary discussion of the painful details of a regime which unfortunately has been a blot upon the history of Nicaragua and a discourageemnt to a group of Republics whose aspirations need only the opportunity of free and honest government. In view of the interests of the United States and of its relation to the Washington Convention, appeal against this situation has long since been made to this government by a majority of the Cen- tral American Eepublics. There is now added to the appeal, through the revolution, a great body of the Mcaraguan people. Two Americans who, this government is now convinced, were officers connected with the revolutionary forces, and therefore entitled to be dealt with according to the enlightened practice of civilized nations, have been killed by direct order of 'President Zelaya. Their execution is said to have been preceded by barbarous cruelties. The Consulate at Managua is now officially reported to have been menaced. There is thus a sinister culmination of an administration also characterized by a cruelty to its own citizens which has, until the recent outrage, found vent in the case of this country in a succession of petty annoyances and indignities which many months ago made it impossible to ask an American Minister . longer to reside in Managua. From every point of view it has evidently become difficult for the United States further to delay more active response to the appeals so long made to its duty, to its citizens, to its dignity, to Central America and to civilization. The Government of the United States is convinced that the revo- lution represents the ideals and the will of the majority of the NIcaraguan people more faithfully than does the Government of President Zelaya, and that its peaceable control is well-nigh as extensive as that hitherto so sternly attempted by the Government of Managua. There is now added the fact, as officially reported from more than one quarter, that there are already indications of a rising in the Western provinces in favor of a presidential candidate intimately associated with the old regime. In this it is easy to see new elements tending toward a condition of anarchy which leaves, at a given time,- no definite responsible source to which the Government of 61 the United States could look for reparation for the killing of Messrs. Cannon and Groce, or, indeed, for the protection which must be assured American citizens and American interests in Nicaragua. In these circumstances the President no longer feels for the Government of President Zelaya that respect and confidence which would make it appropriate hereafter to maintain with it regular diplomatic relations, implying the will an'd the ability to respect and assure what is due from one State t'o another. <. The Government of Nicaragua which you have hitherto repre- sented is hereby notified, as will be also the leaders of the revolu- tion, that the Government of the United States will hold strictly accountable for the protection of American life and property the factions de facto in control of the Eastern and WESTERN portions of the Republic of Nicaragua. As for the reparation found due, after careful consideration, for the killing of Messrs. Groce and Cannon, the Government of the tFnited States would be loath to impose upon the innocent people of Nicaragua a too heavy burden of expiating the acts of a regime forced upon them or to exact from a succeeding government, if it have quite different policies, the imposition of such a burden. Into the question of ultimate reparation there must enter the question of the existence at Managua of a government capable of respond-" ing to demands. There must enter also the question of how far it is possible to reach those actually responsible and those who perpetrated the tortures reported to have preceded the execution, if these be verified ; and the question whether the government be one entirely disassociated from the present intolerable conditions and worthy to be trusted to make impossible a recurrence of such acts, in which case the President, as a friend of your country, as he is also of the other Republics of Central America, might be disposed to have indemnity confined to what was reasonably due the relatives of the deceased, and punitive only in so far as the punishment might fall where really due. In pursuance of this policy, the Government of the United States will temporarily withhold its demand for reparation, in the mean- while taking such steps as it deems wise and proper to protect American interests. To insure the future protection of legitimate American interests, in consideration of the interests of the majority of the Central American Republics, and in the hope of making more effective the friendly offices exerted under the Washington Conventions, the Government of the United States reserves for further consideration at the proper time the question of stipulating also that the Con- stitutional Government of Nicaragua obligate itself by convention, for the benefit of all the governments concerned, as a guarantee for its future loyal support of the Washington Conventions and their peaceful and progressive aims. From the foregoing it will be apparent to you that your office of Charge d' Affaires is at an end. I have the honor to enclose your passport, for use in case you desire to leave this country. I would add at the same time that, although your diplomatic quality is terminated, I shall be happy to receive you, as I shall 'be happy to receive the representative of the revolution, eacn as the unofficial channel of communication between the Government of the United States and the de facto authorities to whom I look for the protection of American interests pending the establishment in Nicaragua of a government with which the United States can maintain diplo- matic relations. Accept, sir, etc., (Signed) P. C. KNOX. ADDENDA E. MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT MADRIZ TO PRESIDENT TAFT, REGARDING' THE LANDING OF MARINES FROM THE AMERICAN WARSHIPS IN BLUEFIELDS. CAMPO DE MARTE, June 15, 1910. His Excellency, President W. H. Toft, Washington: Your Excellency will permit me to refer to certain acts relating to our civil war. On the 27th of May last the forces of my government took the Bluff by assault, same being a strong position which defended Blue- fields. The commander of our forces was instructed to proceed immediately and take the city, which had been evacuated, and G3 which would have terminated the campaign. This was frustrated by the attitude of the commander of the cruiser Paducah, who in- timated to the commander of our forces that he would use his force to oppose the taking of the city, and actually landed his' marines and occupied the city. This action assured the revolution a base for its operations, and enabled it to withdraw all of its forces from the city to oppose our single column, and thus was able to frustrate a combination which had been carefully prepared and whose success was assured. This government purchased in New Orleans the British steam- ship Venus, to-day called "Maximo Jerez," which sailed for San Juan del Xorte with clearance from the American authorities after exhibiting bona fide all of the elements of war which she. had aboard, and which were considered articles of free commerce. In San Juan del Norte her nationality was changed to that of Nica- ragua, and she was armed for war and dispatched to blockade Blue- fields. The blockade had for its object the prevention of the revo- lution from receiving, as it had done before,, arms, and provisions from Xew Orleans. The government of your Excellency has denied the right of our vessels to blockade the port and prevent American vessels entering, and thus has kept open to the revolution its source of supply Xew Orleans. The taking of the Bluff gave my government possession of the Bluefields Customhouse, and we expected to deprive the revolution of the revenues which this customhouse produces; but the govern- ment of your Excellency has declared that the revenues of this customhouse should be paid to the revolution, and this has, in a great measure, annulled the victory attained by our forces at the Bluff. The government of your Excellency has denied our right to pre- vent American vessels from passing in front of the Bluff on their way to the customhouse established by the revolution at Schooner Key, on the Escondido River, notwithstanding the decree of my government closing the Port of Bluefields and prohibiting this traffic, as a necessary measure of defense and pacification. The commander of the Paducah threatened the commander of the Maximo Jerez, stating that he would fire on his vessel and sink her if our forces attempted to attack Bluefields. 64 The chief of our forces at the Bluff having noticed that certain boats in the service of the revolution were using the American flag to pass in front of our forts without detention, notified the com- mander of the Paducah of his intention to stop this free traffic of these boats in front of his lines. The commanders of the Paducah and Dubuque replied that they would use their cannon on him to enforce respect due American commerce, even if it consisted of arms and ammunition for the revolution, and that one shot fired on such boats would be considered a declaration of war against the United States. Lastly, I know that in Bluefields, although under protection of American marines, an attack is being prepared against our position at the Bluff and Pearl Lagoon. The intentions of the commander of the Paducah prevent us anticipating the enemy's actions, which -we have a right to do as a legitimate defense. It is my duty to state to your Excellency, frankly, that I cannot iind any way to reconcile the action herein enumerated with the principles of neutrality proclaimed by the law of nations; and Tiaving full confidence in the high character of the Government of ihe United States, I have no hesitancy in respectfully asking your Excellency to rectify the orders given to your naval authorities in Bluefields. Thus can this government easily terminate a bloody and isolated revolt, which in itself is without life, but which is working towards '.the ruin of Nicaragua. JOSE MADRIZ, President. ADDENDA E (Copy.) WASHINGTON, June 19, 1910. Minister of Foreign Affairs: The policy of the United States remains as set forth in the Secre- tary of State's letter of December first, 1909, to Minister Eodriguez, then Charge d' Affaires, whereby relations with the Zelaya Govern- ment were broken off. That letter and statements of the consistent applications of the same policy to conditions as they arose were duly published. 65 As to the statements made in the telegram of Doctor Madriz to the President, the Government of the United States took only the customary step of prohibiting bombardment or fighting by either faction within the unfortified and ungarrisoned commercial city of Bluefields, thus protecting the preponderating American and other foreign interests, just as the British commander had done in case -of Greytown, where there were British interests. The Government 'of the United States has acknowledged the right of each faction to maintain a blockade, but has refused to permit vessels, illegally and clandestinely fitted out in American waters, to interfere with Amer- ican commerce. The Government of the United States simply insists that each faction shall collect duties only for the territory under its de facto control, and refuses to permit the collection of double duties. . If any violation of neutrality has occurred it was in connection with the sailing of the Venus from New Orleans as an expedition -of the Madriz faction. (Signed) KNOX. ADDENDA E. MANAGUA, June 23, 1910. To Ministro de Nicaragua, Washington, D. C., 1912: According to the rights of the people, no neutral government can prevent or disturb the military operations in time of war, which is legally executed by belligerants. Foreigners are subject to all con- tingencies of these operations, the same as natives. In consequence, I cannot consider the acts of the American marines in having pre- vented the operations of our armies at Bluefields as legal. Regarding the sailing of the Venus from New Orleans, I am con- vinced that she has not violated any of the laws of the United States. Furthermore, the clearance given by the authorities at New Orleans only obligated the vessel to. maintain neutrality during her voyage, which she actually did. Once her voyage, for which she had been given clearance, terminated,, she entered other waters and changed her nationality in accordance with the laws of Nicaragua; and the laws and authority of the United States have nothing to do with the ultimate destination of the vessel, which has had, and has, the right to execute warlike operations, amongst which figures the blockade. 6G I omit at present to refer to other details of Mr. Knox's note ; but I want made known the certainty that, but for the interference of the naval authorities of the United States, in the manner explained in my cablegram to President Taft, Bluefields would have been taken, the revolution defeated and Nicaragua in peace. MADRIZ. EXHIBIT E [TELEGRAM.] "BLUFF, 5 p. M V July 23d, 1910. "To the Supreme Command of All Arms, Managua: "The Executive Delegate sent me from San Juan del Norte the telegram you addressed to him, which contains a copy of a cable- you received from the Norwegian Consul General at Havana, and also a copy of a telegram sent you by the Executive Delegate at San Juan del Norte relative to the' steamers 'Hiram' and 'Utstein/ at the same time giving me instructions of what I should do upon the arrival of these steamers here. "As some steamers had been sighted, I thought one might be the 'Hiram," and I sent out two despatches, one addressed to the> Captain of the 'Hiram' and the other addressed to the Commander of the American Squadron arrchored opposite this Fort, which despatches said: Bluff, July 21st, 1910 To the Captain of the Steamer 'Hiram,' opposite the Bluff : Please take note [here I gave him copy of the telegram I received from the Executive Delegate, and also a copy of the cable that had been received from the Consul General of^ Norway at Havana] I have reliable information that you have war contraband aboard intended for the revolution headed by General Juan J. Estrada, and in consequence of and in con- formity with the information given me in the telegram and cable, of which I give you a copy herewith, I herewith order you to de- liver to this authority whatever war supplies you may have aboard, and I warn you that, should you refuse to do so, I shall confiscate your vessel in conformity with the laws of my country. I also inform you that you will be held responsible for your action in this incident, and that I shall advise my Government of whatever action you will take, and that my Government may report your conduct to the Norwegian Government. 67 "I do not doubt that you, seeing that justice and right is with us, will facilitate the delivery of this war contraband. I send you this communication in duplicate, so you may confirm receipt of this dispatch at the foot of one of them. Yours truly [signed] F. M. Eivas, Inspector General of the Atlantic Coast. "The second despatch reads as follows: Bluff, July 21st, 1910 Sir : I herewith acquaint you with a communication I received the 16th inst. from the Executive Delegate: S'an Juan del Norte, July 16th, 1910. General Fernando M. Eivas, the Bluff: Under date the 12th inst. I was advised over the wire by the President that the Minister General, Mr. Baca, received a cable from the Consul General of Norway in Havana, which reads as follows: [Here follows the cable.] This authority has trustworthy informa- tion that the steamer 'Hiram' brings war supplies for the revolu- tion under the leadership of General Juan J. Estrada. I am despatching a communication to the Captain of said vessel in which I demand the surrender of all war material to this command, and I am basing my demand on the information contained in said cable received from the Norwegian Consul General. I trust that, once you are aware of the information given us in this cable, you will see that justice and the 'right are with us and that you will not oppose in any way that my demand to the Captain of 'the 'Hiram' is not complied with, and that, should you object, you will notify me in writing* before you will permit the 'Hiram 7 to enter and to proceed to Bluefields, which I doubt very much you will permit, knowing, as I do, that your Government has declared its neutrality, and having satisfied myself that you know how to in- terpret this neutrality. Your attentive and never-failing servant, [signed] F. M. Eivas, Inspector General of the Atlantic Coast to the Comamnder of the Naval Forces of the United States as- sembled opposite the Bluff. His answer was the following: "No. B, 6110, U. S. A. 'Dubuque/ 3d Class, in the Eoad to Blue- fields, Nicaragua, Central America, July 22nd, 1910. "Sir I have the honour to confirm receipt of your communica- tion of the 21st of July, 1910. I shall cause the steamers to anchor near my vessel while the nature of their cargo i? determined, and thereafter I shall act according to demands of circumstances and in accordance with instructions from mv Government relative to the protection of American commerce and the maintenance of ^neutrality. Respectfully [signed] H. R. Rines, Naval Commander -of the United States, in Comamnd of the Marines at Present on the Oriental Coast of Nicaragua, to General F. M. Rivas, Commander at the Bluff, Nicaragua, Central America." 'Last night the steamer 'Utstein' arrived and immediately I sent a despatch aboard identical to the one sent to the Captain of the 'Hiram/ but the Captain of the 'Utstein' refused to receive the despatch, saying that if anything was wanted of him an under- standing should be had with the Commander of the 'Dubuque.' "The communication was delivered to the Commander, who de- -clared that he was not responsible for the Captain of the 'Utstein' accepting or refusing to accept despatches, and that much less would he sign the duplicate of the despatch which I had sent along in order to have a proof that said despatch had been delivered to him. Furthermore, the Commander of the 'Dubuque' declared to General Francisco Altschul and Mr. Ofilio Arguello, the latter being my interpreter, that HE WAS A PARTISAN OF THE REVOLUTION, and that he had told the Captain of the 'Utstein* that, if he did not care to, not to communicate with us, and that he would give the Captain of the 'Utstein' his unconditional sup- port, and shortly afterwards he sent marines aboard that vessel and ordered the vessel to proceed to Bluefields, which took place to-day. I have sent a despatch to the Representative of the Nor- wegian Consul in Bluefields, protesting against the actions of the Captain of the HJtstien/ heading this protest with a copy of the cable received by the Consul General of Norway in Havana. This communication to the Norwegian Vice Consul in Bluefields is to be delivered through the Commander of the 'Dubuque/ supposing that he cares to do so, but, taking into consideration the hostility ihis official has shown us, it is doubtful that this communication will ever reach its destination. "So long as there is no warship here of another nation, and in command of an officer who is really neutral, the interest of your Government will be at the mercy of the officers of the United States Navy, who are inspired and counseled by the American Consul in Bluefields, who is a more revolutionary rebel than Estrada and "Chamorro. Your subaltern, (Signed) F. M. RIVAS/' 69 ADDENDA E "NEW ORLEANS, 7 P. M., Novbr. 9th. "President, Managua: "Guatemala advises Bluefields cargo has not been for yet. Last of October shall send to Bocas large quantity of shells, also men. From Bluefields Diaz answered: Shall try and sustain ourselves until arrival of steamer." ALTSCHUL. ORLEANS, 7 :40 P. M., 17th Novbr. "President, Managua : "War elements have arrived in Bluefields it seems are the same advised by cable last week hailing from Bocas Steamer Utstein leaves now for Port Barrios with war supplies. ALTSCHUL/' ORLEANS, 8 :38, 18th of Novbr. "President, Managua: "Utstein will arrive Barrios Sunday, to transfer 4^ cases rifles and 114,000 shells to a gasoline schooner bound for Bluefields.. Guatamala uses Barrios as a base for the revolution. ALTSCHUL/' "BLUKFIELDS, 15th November. "President, Guatem a la : "If war supplies are not received before the 20th, revolution will have to be abandoned. Diaz. Cabrera answered. Ulstein, with war supplies aboard, will arrive in a few days/' "NEW ORLEANS, 11 A. M., Novbr. 24th. "President, Managua: "Ulstein left for Bermuda Monday, from Port Barrios; will arrive Bluefields to-morrow." ALTSCHUL. "WASHINGTON, Jany. 13. "Estrada, Bluefields: "THEY ADVISE YOU NOT TO PAY ATTENTION T0"> KIMBALL. CASTRILLO/' "WASHINGTON, Jany. 14. "Estrada, Bluefields: "State Department does not support KImball. CASTRILLO."" 70 "WASHINGTON, Jany. 14. "Estrada, Blue fields: "STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMS' ME THAT MADRIZ IS VERY WEAK. CASTRILLO." "WASHINGTON, Feb. 12/10. "Estrada,*Blucfields: "State Department will proceed energetically in our favor. "CASTRILLO/' "BLUEFIELDS, Feb. 11/10. "Castrillo, Washington : "We know positively that Madriz has no elements of war and is trying to obtain them, in Costa Rica and Honduras. Our operations continue with vigor. Chamorro army every day stronger. Corea animates Madriz. Continue pretending moral support of Ameri- can Xavv at Corinto, and try and have Washington Cabinet influ- ence Mexico. ESTRADA/' "BLUEFIELDS, Feb. 9/10. "Chamorro, Panama : "Want to know how many Americans you can enlist im- mediately. I can send steamer 'Senator/ This depends on your answer. DIAZ/' "COLON, Feb. 14/10. "Diaz, Blue fields: "Can enlist not less than 25 Americans. If you can send steamer, be sure to tell me what date it will arrive at port of embarca- tion. CHAMORRO/' "President, Managua: "NEW YORK, 1 :15 P. M., 7th of December. "The revolution and this Government will never accept Irias. Deposit in Dolores Estrada will impede further sacrifice of lives, and the disembarking of Americans. Read note of Knox to Rodriguez. Bolanos." "NEW YORK, 6 :40 p. M., 17th Decbr. " President, Managua : "Appointment of Madriz considered an error. Will not be recognized by this Government nor by those of Central America, and revolution will not cease. Bolaiios." 71 ORLEANS, 3 P. M., Novbr. 6th. **Pres ifJt.'-n t, Managua : "Adolfo Diaz cabled via Guatemala asking for 1,000 rifles and "300,000 shells. ALTSCHUL." "BLUEFIELDS, Nov. 8. '"Arambui'ft, Xcic York: "A>k O'astrillo what is the opinion of Washington with reference to oew Republic. Has steamer sailed? If not, what is the cause? When will she sail? Answer immediately by Western Union Code. . "DlAZ." "BLUEFIEDS, Feb. 4/10. '"Rita, Guatemala (Estrada' Cabrera) : "Latest news is Chamorro, Camoapa, Mena, Santo Tomas now on the way to combine with Chamorro. I am anxiously awaiting to enter into some arrangement whereby peace can be secured, accepting a third party in whom the Executive power is to be de- posited. "I am prompted to address this communication to you by my ardent desire for peace in Central America and my sincere friend- ship for the Government and the people of the United States. "PRESIDENTS ARAUJO/' ADDENDA I. (Translated from Spanish.) WASHINGTON, Septbr. 5th, 1912. To the American Legation in San Salvador: The President desires that you solicit an audience with President Araujo and that you place in his hands the following communica- tion, word for word, which is an answer: "His Excellency, the 81 President of the United States, estimates very highly the assurances of your ardent desire for peace in Central America and the assur- ances of your friendship. These motives will no doubt guaranty a strict adherence and an enforced obedience to the stipulations of the Washington Convention, in that part that may concern the Sal- vadoran Government, and will no doubt be a guaranty that the Salvadoran Government will carry out the dispositions made by the Government of the United States to create confidence in the peace of Central America, carried out by this government, which is the government best fitted to do so, and because it is justified in doing so by the stipulations of the Washington Convention, and because it is completely neutral in all local issues which might frustrate the intentions of any one of the Governments of Central America. "I am, with-you, of the opinion that the political situation in Nicaragua is very grave. The Government of the United States has never intended to leave its Legation and the lives and interests of its citizens in Nicaragua to the mercy of a rebellion that had no justification and which, by its acts, recalls the epoch of Zelaya, committing the most flagrant outrages against all principles of honour, humanity, law and order and civilization, as indicated by Your Excellency. I do not think it just to suggest to the legitimate Government of Nicaragua that it should deal with persons who have demonstrated that they will not respect agreements made with local authorities, legal representatives and within their right. "In consequence of all this, and in order to expedite the carrying out of its obligations, the Government of the United States pro- poses, in conformity with a solicitation made by the Nicaraguan Government, to take such steps as are most convenient to protect its interests and to insure peace, taking in consideration that every one of the Central American Republics has solemnly compromised itself with this government to maintain the Washington Conven- tion. "It has pained me to learn, although I may say that I have not given any credit to the rumor, that the present revolution in Nica- ragua is being supported from Salvadoran territory. "I deem it hardly necessary to say to Your Excellency that Sal- vador will have a chance to vindicate its policy in conformity with the Washington Convention. WILLIAM H. TAFT." 82 ADDENDA I. "SAN SALVADOR, Sept. 23, 1912. "Legation of El Salvador, Washington, D. C.: "Please place before Mr. Under-Secretary Wilson, in a verbal conference, the exact copy of th'is dispatch, begging him to bring it to the attention of His Excellency, president Taft, for whose consideration it is forwarded. The dispatch is as follows : " c lt is understood here that the naval forces occupying Nica- raguan territory have engaged in military operations against the revolutionists at Granada. So grave an event seriously compromises the other Central American governments. In order to safeguard my own, and fulfilling lofty duties to humanity, which I feel sure will find a generous echo in the President, please suggest to him the proposition that in order to avoid greater bloodshed in our brother nation a propitious opportunity is presented to the Ameri- can government to lend its high offices to humanity by aiding my government, either by joint or separate action, in placing Don Salvador Calderon in charge (provisionally) of the supreme power in Nicaragua, while constitutional order is being re-established by pacific and legal means. Sr. Calderon is a person of blameless ante- cedents, illustrious and honorable, a person likewise acceptable -to the American government and a friend of President Diaz, who has indicated to my government that he would accept him in such, a capacity. My government promises to exert moral pressure upon the rebellious chiefs for the acceptance of Sr. Calderon in agree- ment with that government, which would thus lend a service, un- forgetable in the memory of the Central American people, avoiding the profound upheaval which the gravity of the events has caused in this country, which likewise would deeply reverberate in the moral opinion of the whole continent. Explain to the President my good intentions in this grave emergency, which I was not expecting, because the . Department of State had indicated to you that Ameri- can naval action would be limited to guaranteeing foreign lives and property and safeguarding the American Legation and Consulate in that country a manifestation which we received with complacency, the more so as it was confirmed by Minister Weitzel to' our Minister in Nicaragua. The unavoidable consequences which the continuation of this useless conflict in the form and character in which it to-day presents 83 itself would bring to Central America cannot escape the exalted t penetration of the President, and you will make one more effort in the mode proposed by interesting deeply the humanitarian senti- ments of the head of that government. "I see with regret that the agreements entered 'into in Washing- ton by the Central American delegates, under the mere attitude of .ii'nod offices and generous hospitality which Ex- President "Uoose- velt lent them, appear to be invoked in favor of the position lately assumed. El Salvador being a contracting party, judges it as its undeniable duty a duty which becomes a right when it deals with the interpretation of the facts which directly affect it to declare to President Taft, in the frankest and most respectful manner, that the good offices which the United States and Mexico lent to the Central American Plenipotentiaries are ever remembered with pleasure, hut that they ought to be limited to what they intentionally signify. The firm relations of cordial friendship which bind El Salvador to the American government authorize me to exercise this right in the most courteous and well-intentioned way/ "You can add pertinent explanations concerning the contents of these instructions to the Secretary of State, appeal ing- to Irs friendly courtesy to convey them to the high functionary for whom they arc designed. (Signed) "M.Y\ria E. ARAUJO." 84 DR. JOSE MADRIZ, ' Former President of Nicaragua. JOSE MADRIZ. Jose Madriz was born in the City of Leon, Nicaragua, C. A., February 21, 1866. His parents were poor and honorable. Tn spite of their poverty, they resolved to give their sen a literary education and Jose re- ceived his elementary,- high school and professional training in the city of his birth. The deficiency in his school training, due to the adequate educational facilities, was more than counterbalanced by his mental talents and a close application to his studies. 85 He was fortunate in that his intellectual training came at a period in the country's history when the illuminating ideas of the great patriot, Maximo Jerez, a noted jurist -and philosopher, were in the ascendancy. His vocation as a lawyer was crowned with marked success, and in 1893, when only 27 years of age, he was summoned by President Zelaya to the exalted position of Secretary of State, a position which he administered with brilliancy for several years. During this incumbency he was sent to the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua in the capacity of Executive Delegate, charged with an important political mission. Difficulties had arisen in that terri- tory, known as the "Mosquito Eeserve," as a result of the stablish- ment of a protectorate over it by His British Majesty. As a re- sult, ' largelv. of his intelligent labors, all of that coast was re- incorporated as a part of the Nicaraguan Republic, and an era .of development in that secticn was immediately begun and has continued since in an astounding manner. For this reason Dr. Madriz, perhaps more than anyone else,- deprecated the proposal of the revolutionists of '1909 to declare the Atlantic coast an in- dependent rermblic, or, rather, ostensiblv- independent, for the truth is that, if such severance had occurred, 'it would have been cpbicoted to a protectorate bv a foreign powei ' On account of internal political dissensions Dr." Madriz had to resieri 'his position as Secretary of State in 1895. However, he was later restored to bis 'elevated position in fulfillment of conditions imposed upon President Zelaya at a conference between the execu- tive and the Liberals, of Leon, as a means of averting civil strife. This, unfortunately. rHd riot havp fh'p 'desired r"pn'lt, and Zelaya faced a revolution. During- the several years that Dr. Madriz served Zelaya he could and did do so conscientonsly, for Zelaya then was regarded as one of the best presidents in La tin- America, honest, a respector of the laws of the country, and, indeed, practically a liberal ruler. When the revolution referred to broke out, Madriz was in its ranks. The revolution was unsuccessful and Madriz emigrated to Salvador, where he resided until 1907. There he married Miss Hortensia Cobos. Four children resulted from this union, two sons, Ricardo and Jose", and two daughters, Hortensia and Mercedes. 86 Although he did not accumulate a fortune in his law practice in Salvador, his family lived in comfort and always moved in the best social circles. In Salvador, and in Honduras and Guatemala (in which latter two republics he lived for a short while), Dr. Madriz's eminent culture, intellectual achievements, and courteous manners attracted to him the friendship and esteem of all those who had the good fortune of his acquaintance. His brilliant eloquency made it a rare pleasure, indeed, to hear Dr. Madriz speak. In 1907, notwithstanding his political animosity toward Zelaya, the hostility shown by other Central American Presidents to the Liberal Party in Nicaragua prompted Madriz to return to Nicara- gua and lend his earnest co-operation to the efforts to avoid an invasion, which then appeared to be and, in fact proved, inevitable. Dr. Madriz, like other adversaries of Zelaya, was prompted by high motives and a patriotic desire to assist Zelaya. The diffi- culties confronting the adjoining republics made Dr. Madriz and others of the patriotic who were strong believers in the necessity for a union of the Central American republics, to think, in the pos- sibility of the union at least, of the three republics which had made the last effort to effect it. Madriz was disillusioned, however, when Zelaya sank far below his estimations by abandoning the cherished hope of the union, and preferring to content himself with a change in the executive power of Honduras. This change of president in the neighboring republic, however, resulted in no benefit to either Honduras or Nicaragua, due to grave mistakes made by Zelaya as a result of his narrow-mindedness in those circumstances. Thus, disillusioned and disappointed, Madriz again left Nicara- gua, this time, however, without having had any political rupture with Zelaya. He went to Honduras with the intention of making this country his permanent home. Circumstances unforeseen, how- ever, compelled a change of his plans later. The governments of Latin- American accepted the proposal of a Central American peace conference in Washington and Madriz was appointed head of the Niraraguan delegation. In this confer- ence, in accord with the Honduran delegates, he advocated the restoration of his old country, or nation, in the union of the five republics, which had been his constant dream. These efforts were again in vain and the conference bgre no practical results, 87 Although representing < Zelaya's government, Madriz without exception, made; proposals, and accepted such, which had for their object the enforcement and observance of law in all Central Amer- ican countries, and, in truth, it must be admitted that Zelaya never failed to support the acts of Madriz even if his suggestions and advice frequently were inimical to the personal interests of the rulers, who were wont to consider their word as the law. Un- iortunately, most of the tentative steps taken in line with these suggestions were eventually rejected by the conference. One of the results of this Washington conference was the estab- lishment of the Central American Court of Justice at Cartago, Costa Eica. Dr. Madriz was appointed a judge of this court by the Nicaraguan Congress. Upon his return from Washington Dr. Madriz remained in Costa Eica, attending to his duties in connec- tion with this Court until December, 1909, when he was summoned by the Nicaraguan Congress to take the presidency of the country, Zelaya having decided to tender his resignation. We were justified in expecting an era of peace in Nicaragua, under the administration of President Madriz, because he had the confidence of the Zelaya faction in Nicaragua, and should have had the confidence and support of the revolutionists, like many of whom he had been for several years an exile from the country and a pronounced adversary of the Zelaya administration. But, local jealousies and other causes, which do not properly belong here, were responsible for a continuance of the most disastrous civil war the country ever witnessed. Those of us who had an intimate acquaintance with Madriz, .and who realized that peace could not be soon effected, were loath to see him accept the presidency, knowing that, because of his pacific nature, he was unfitted for the difficult task which was then present. Madriz, in time of peace, undoubtedly would have proved one of the best presidents Latin-American ever knew. His character and training, however, did not fit him for an epoch of war. A man of profound feelings of amity and peace, he was not capable of exercising strong tactics against his enemies, notwith- standing he knew they were conspiring against him. This gave courage to his adversaries. In fact, he was a president of whom they were unafraid. He was not a man willing to order the spilling of the blood of his brothers to maintain himself in power. 88 In tliis connection, we do not wish it to appear that we would censure hm. He did right, as his desire was to leave to his chil- dren a name un besmirched with sanguinary acts. However, for the sake of his country, it would have been better if he had spared himself for other and better opportunities. The Madriz government, weighted down by the heavy hand oi a foreign government, foresaw that a continuation of the civil strife inherited from the Zelaya regime, would not result beneficially to his native land, and with a firm belief that he had done all .pos- sible in defense of the national honor, Dr. Madriz left the country and went to Mexico, where he had many sincere friends, acquired during his visit to that republic as a delegate of the Peace Confer- ence in Washington, to thank President Porfirio Diaz for the em- ployment of his good offices in the interest of Central American peace. It was the purpose of Dr. Madriz to establish himself in Mexico City in the practice of law, hoping to find there the peace of mind which was denied him in Central America, but death put an end to his plans for the future. An unconquerable, but sudden disease prostrated him for a few days, and on the 14th of May, 1911, he died; yet in the memory of all good, patriotic Central Americans he lives. In Nicaragua his demise was lamented in almost every home and even his political enemies, who, during his life, had not hesitated to defame him, bowed in grief before the altar of his memory. The National Assembly of Nicaragua honored Madriz's memory by giving his name a place in the "Hall of Fame" of that country This honor conferred upon him is proof that Madriz embodied the national cause. May this posthumous honor result, at least, in consolation for the family of the departed and for those of us who had the honor and distinction of his friendship. We trust it will encourage tho Central American youth to live up to the lofty example set by this great patriot. P. BONILLA. New Orleans, October, 1912. ESTADOS UNlDOS Y LA AMERICA LATINA DIPLOMACIA DEL DOLLAR' NUEVA ORLEANS, DIC1EMBRE DE 1912 JUAN LEETS NEW ORLEANS, LA. THE L. GRAHAM Co.. PRINTERS. 1912. PROLOGO. Al Pueblo Americano: Al Senado de Estados Unidos: A los Miembros de la Camara de Eepresentantes: Inspirado por el profundo sentimiento de justicia de que estan penetrados los ciudadanos de la gran Eepiiblica Americana desde su fundacion, y con absoluta confianza en la integridad de los Eepresentantes del pueblo en el Congreso de Estados Unidos, presento este humilde momorial en nombre de los ciudadanos de las Eepublicas de Centro America, que han sufrido las consecuencias de la violenta e inicua politica del Departamento de Estado, bajo la direceion de Philander C. Knox. La publicacion de este memorial tiene dos fines: 1. Poner en conocimiento del pueblo americano y de los miem- bros del Senado y Camara de Eepresentantes algunos detalles de la llamada "DOLLAE DIPLOMACY" de Mr. Knox, tal como ha Mo aplicada a las Eepublicas de la America Central. 2. Aprovechar toda la influencia que en si mismos tienen los hechos que presentamos en favor de la restauracion.de los vinculos de verdadera amistad entre los pueblos de la America Latina y Estados Unidos, que la ruinosa y egoista politica de Mr. Knox ha destrozado En esta labor he sido ayudado por algunos de los mas notables hombres de Estado de Centro America, trabajando todos al impulso del patriotismo y con un profundo y sincero deseo de estableccr la justicia en donde la iniquidad, con futiles pretextos, ha produci- do no mas que la ruina y devastacion, el desconcierto, la discordia y el rencor. lln este memorial, lo mismo que en la declaracion que personalmente di ante el Comite del Senado que practica 1/t investigacion de los asuntos relatives a la revolucion de Nicaragua,, he procurado comprobar con documentos todos mis cargos; y, en ningun caso, he hecho una afirmacion que no encierre en mi con- cepto la mas absoluta verdad. Aunque los hechos que presento demuestran que los grandes 7 fundamentals principles de libertad y justicia de la madre de ]as Republicas, han sido desconocidos o enredados en las mallas 'de las falsas doctrinas proclamadas por el Departamento de Estado, los ciudadanos de las pequenas Republicans del Sur, tienen todavia 'completa confianza en el pueblo de este gran pals, y hacen esta formal apelacion ante sus Representantes, en la esperanza de que, despertando interes en conocer a fondo la conducta de Mr. Knox, resultara una escrupulosa investigation., y en consecuencia la justicia. Aunque el resultado de la reciente election de Presidente y Representantes al Congreso asegura un proximo cambio en el per- sonal del Departamento de Estado, trayendo consigo un marcado cambio en la politica que este Gobierno seguira en sus relaciones exteriores, la injusticia hecha a Centre America por medio de la perniciosa Dollar Diplomacy, ha sido demasiado grande para que pueda quedar desconocida por quienes sientan patrioticos impulses. Por esta razon nosotros no queremos olvidar lo pasado y dejar al pueblo de los Estados Unidos en la ignorancia de los nocivos planes y erroneos actos que han sido. realizados bajo el manto de la diplo- ma acia. En este memorial he procurado en detalle una verdadera descrip- cion de la intervencion del Departamento de Estado en los ne- gocios de Centro America y los resultados de la politica Knox. En breve resumen., nos proponemos demostrar : 1. Bajo pretexto de dar auxilio a las pequenas Republicas de Centro America, el Departamento de Estado ha usado lo que se ha complacido en llamar "Dollar Diploma^," para forzar sobre aque- llos paises contratos de emprestito que darian a un grupo de ban- queros de Wall Street, no solo millones de dollars adquiridos ile- gitimamente, sino tambien oportunidades para inmensas y perni- -ciosas especulaciones y absoluta libertad para explotar los vastos recursos de aquellas tierras, y hasta para controlar la.Admistracion piiblica. 2. Los terminos de los contratos de emprestito que el Secretario Knox se ha empenado tan asiduamente en imponer sobre Nicaragua y Honduras, son vicioso&; y cuando sean revelados en sus detalles al pueblo americano, provocaran indignacion y energicas protestas. 3. gran Kepublica. Disturbios, revolucion y pobreza lian sido los perniciosos resultados. 4. En Tina ocasion Mr. Knox ha dado apoyo a una revolucion en Nicaragua, en otra ha adversado la revolucion y sacrificado la? vidas de soldados americanos para conservar en el poder a un usurpador y traidor, que es un pobre instrumento del Secretario para la realizacion de su plan de entregar a Centro America a los banque- ros de New York. 5. Mr. Knox condeno a Zelaya, un dictador en Nicaragua, y lo derroco del poder, colocando en el un Gobierno que ha traido la pobreza en vez de la prosperidad, la discordia en vez de la armonia, el despotismo en vez de la libertad; y por otro lado, ha apoyado constantemente al peor tirano y dictador que la America Latina haya conocido, al Presidente de Guatemala, Manuel Estrada Ca- brera. 6. Con pleno conocimiento del Departamento de Estado se han permitido expediciones filibusteras que han salido para Centro America de los puertos del Golfo, y en una ocasion, el conocimiento de la proxima salida de una de esas expediciones fue usado para hacer presion sobre' el Presidente de Honduras con el fin de ha- cerle aceptar el emprestito Morgan, que, es bien sabido, era resist] do por dicho Presidente, y fue rechazado por el Congreso y el pueblo de Honduras. 7. Por sus personales designios los nnancieros americanos desea- ron la intervencion en la reciente guerra civil de Nicaragua, y por otro lado han querido para el Gobierno de Estados Unidos la politica de no intervencion en Mexico. En Nicaragua solo han sido matados dos americanos en combate al servicio del Gobierno, sin oue en ningun otro caso hayan sufrido dano en sus personas o propiedades, ni siquiera estuviesen en peligro. En Mexico gran numero de americanos han sido intencdonalmente matados, muchos mas han sido heridos, otros han sido secuestrados para pedir rescato por ellos, y millones de dollars de propiedades americanas han sido destruidos. En Nicaragua Mr. Knox intervino : en Mexico profesa Jr. politica de no intervencion. Estos son hechos, de que se deduce algo que perjudica el buen nombre de Estados Unidos. 8. 'Los hechos referentes a la intervencion del Departamento de- Estado en Centro America han sido cuidadosamente ocultados al 1 pueblo americano, o ban sido falseados o exagerados. Algunas veces se han dado en Washington semioficialmente a la prensa in- formaciones exclusivamente para el uso del piiblico americano, en las cuales se ha variado en absoluto la verdad de los hechos, general - mente con el proposito de preparar la opinion piiblica en favor de la actitud de Mr. Knox y de sus eolaboradores, por medio de tales falsedades. Entre los documentos que ahora presento, que son parte de los que puse a disposicion del Comite del Senado, algunos de los ma importantes fueron depositados en mis manos por Dona Hortensia C. de Madriz, viuda del Ex-Presidente de Nicaragua, Dr. Don. Jose Madriz. El. Dr. Madriz, al ocurrir su prematura muerte en Mayo de 1911, estaba empenado en la preparacion de una historia de las relaciones del Departamento de Estado con la revolucion de Nicaragua en 1909 ; y la senora de Madriz, deseosa de que los hechos y documentos coleccionados por el no quedasen iniitiles, resolvio entregarmelos para hacerlos conocer del pueblo y Congreso ameri- canos, no solo para la vindicacion de la memoria de aquel gran hom- bre de Estado, sino por el beneficio que el pueblo americano reportara del conocimiento de los actos perniciosos cometidos por ciertos funcionarios del Gobierno de Estados Unidos. Al dar mi testimonio en el mes de Octubre ante el Sub- Comite presidido en El Paso por el Honorable Senador Fall, encontre al Comite ansioso por hacer luz en la cionducta del senor Knox y sus agentes hacia las Eepublicas de Centro America. Coloque en. manos del Senador Fall muchos de los mas importantes documentos que traje a este pais, y quede satisfecho de que la causa de una debil nacion, mi pais adoptive, estaba en buenos manos. En mi viaje a El Paso me acompano como consejero legal el notable jurisconsulto hondureno, Doctor Don Angel Ugarte. Aunque nacido en Rusia, soy centroamericano de corazon. En mi patria adoptiva he sido -honrado con importantes posiciones gubernamentales. Es la cuna de mi esposa e hijos; y por ello es mi mas vivo deseo hacer cuanto este a mi alcance por asegurar su prosperidad y el imperio en ella de la libertad y de todos los bene- ficios de las instituciones republicanas. He dedicado a esta causa todos mis esfuerzos, y siempre la considerare como sagrada. New Orleans, Diciembre de 1912. - ' JUAN LEETS. LA DIPLOMACIA DEL DOLLAK. La politica que el Secretario de Estado, Mr. Philander C. Kaox, ha aplicado a la America Latina, durante la Presidencia de Mr. Taft, ha sido denominada por sus mantenedores "Dollar Diplo- macy." En este escrito nos proponemos estudiar ese bistema de politica y sus funestas consecuencias para los paises interesados. Antes queremos echar una ojea'da sobre la politica que anterior- mente habia puesto en practica el Gobierno Americano en relation con las demas Republicas del continente. Durante la mayor parte de la vida de esta gran nation, ha pre- valecido en el animb de sus h'ombres de Estado, y en la opinion general del pueblo, el sistema de no intervention en los, asuntos de los demas paises. Por esta razon han podido los EE. UU. crecer y desarrollarse de manera tan asombrosa, siendo su Gobierno durante mas de un siglo el mas barato entre todos los del mundo. Al pro- ceder asi se han conformado con los preceptos del padre de la patria, de George Washington, quien, con su clarividencia, percibio la grandeza que habia de alcanzar su pais, pero haciendola depender del complimiento de tan sabio consejo que dio a sus contemporaneos y a las futuras generaciones. DOCTRINA MONROE. James Monroe, otro de los grandes hombres de Estado america- nos, conformandose con aquei Salvador principle, comprendio que, para poder mantenerlo en practica, era necesario impedir que las naciones europeas fundasen en America grandes imperios. A raiz de la independencia de las naciones latino americanas, se organize la Santa Alianza, en virtud de la cual los monarcas absolutos euro- peos se comprometieron a enviar sus ejercitos a reconquistar para Espana las que acababan de ser sus colonias. El restabletimiento del regimen monarquico en America, bajo la proteecion de los grandes Poderes, habria sido una constante amenaza para EE. UU., habria hecho a la larga imposible su vida republicana, y, sobre todo, habria h'echo imposible la politica aconsejada por Washington, y obligado al pais a mantener un gran ejercito permanente de mar y tierra, que es el cancer de la vieja Europa, Monroe, gran estadista 8 y gran patriota, lo eomprendio bien, y notifico al mundo su famosa doctrina "America para las Americanos" que entonces fue nitiy claramente entendida, por mas que despues haya sido tan tergi- versada, y por lo tanto tan discutida. Entonces no cupo duda de que Monroe se propuso asegurar la independencia y la tranquilidad de su propio pais y de todas las republicas del continente; pero a nadie se le ocurrio, y menos a su generoso autor, que algun dia podria ser empleada como una amenaza para la autonomia de las naciones latino americanas que el se propuso proteger; que es lo que despues ha sucedido y nos proponemos demostra.r en el curso de este estudio. PANAMERICANISMO. Como un desarrollo de la doctrina de Monroe,, y para facilitar su cumplimiento, Mr. James G. Elaine, Secretario de Estado bajo la Administracion Harrison, inicio la idea del panamericanismo, y propuso a las demas naciones del continente la reunion de la prim era oonferencia de Delegados de todas ellas, que &e reunio en Washington en 1889. De esta primera conferencia surgio la Oficina Internacional de las Eepublicas americanas, encargada de organizar las futuras conferencias, que periodicamente han venido verifican- dose, con el fin de lograr el acercamiento de las dos razas, y en consecuencia, el de las naciones que las representan. Otro grande hombre de Estado, Mr. Elihu Root, al llegar a la Secretaria de Estado bajo la Administracion Eoosevelt, se apodero de esa idea y se convirtio en su mas entusiasta -propagandista. Concurrio personalmente a la Conferencia celebrada en Rio de Janeiro en 1906, visitando la Republica Argentina, Chile y otros paises, y mas tarde, en 1907, Meixco, en donde pronuncio famosisi- mos discursos, que hicieron en los pueblos latino americanos la mas grata impresion, creando en ellos grarides simpatias hacia Estados TJnidos. El seiior Root, en su propio nombre y como Secretario de Estado, garantizo que la politica de su Gobierno era de fraterni- dad hacia los pueblos y Gobiernos de la America Latina, y que la nacion mas pequefia de ellas como la mas grande, tendrian asegu- radas su independencia y su autonomia, a la vez que la integridad de su territorio. Iguales declaraciones ratifico ante la Conferencia Centroamericana de paz celebrada en Washington en fines de 1907.* Si esa pojitica que el Secretario Root mantuvo firmemente hacia aquellos paises se hubiese sostenido, el credito del Gobierno ameri- cano ante ellos hubiera ido en aumento, y no seria, como es hoy, objeto de la mayor desconfianza y causa de constante alarma, hasta el nunto de estar convirtiendo en mas de alguno en odio el carino que antes se tenia por el nombre de anglo americano; por mas que nosotros reconocemos que no es la cnlpa de este pueblo sino de su Gobierno. En vez de seguir aquella politica tan sana, de la cual con razon podria esperarse la armonia, la prosperidad y el bienestar de todo el continente, se introdujo una de doblez y de falsia y de proteccion a especulaciones financieras. Mexico, Santo Domingo y Centro America son en la actualidad las victimas del nuevo rumbo que ha seguido el Departamento de Estado de EE. UU. Aunque nuestro principal objeto es hacer luz en la cuestion de Centro America, y especialmente de Nicaragua, por considerarlo todo intimamente ligado, haremos una breve resena de lo referente a los otros paises mencionados. * Ya escrito lo que dice el texto, han llegado a nuestras manos peri6dicos de Centro America en que esta reproducido en espanol un discurso pronunciado en Estados Unidos por el senor Root, que, por sus terminos, nos inclinamos a oreer que es ap6crifo. Bn 1 declara que Estados Unidos eon la Roma Moderna, "colocada por Dios para actuar de ARBITRO no s61o en los destines de toda la America, sino en Europa y en Asia." Declara que su pats tiene el destino rnanifiesto de controlar toda la America, faltando s61o determinar los rnedios para realizarlo. Declara como frontera natural del territorio de esta Republican ei Canal de Panama, y que en la segunda mitad del siglo XX causara extraneza que no se haya redondeado su ma*pa comprendiendo Mexico, Centro America y todas las Antillas, siendo s61o cuesti6n de tiempo el ver flotar en esos territories la bandera norteamericana; pero al mismo tiempo declara a los latino americanos ineptos para la vida republicacna, indig-nos de la ciudadania yankee, destinandolos asi, a desempenar en manos de sus compatriotas el papel de ilotas, porque las dos razas son antitStioa-s, inamalg-amables, separadas por un abismo. Dice que para hacer la anexion tienen poder bastante, faltando s61o una i;esoluci6n conjunta del Congreso; y pronostica que eso se hara, sea de cualquiera de los tres partidos contendientes el nuevo Presidente, Repetimos que n.o concebimos que quien se ha captado las simpatlas del continente americano por su levantado panamericanismo, sea autor de los conceptos anotados; y menos que el grande hombre de Estado lanzase tan imprudente reto, no s61o a la America, sino a todars las naciones del mundo. amenazando a muchas con arrebatarles sus pose- siones en el mar Caribe. Tenemos confia-nza en que al leer el senor Root estas Ifneas, escritas por quien ha sentido por el la mas profunda admiraci6n, se apresurara a tranquilizar a la America Latina, principalmente, protestando contra: la arutenticidad del discurso que su prensa le atribuye; o dara la versi6n autentica del mismo, si hubiese sido alterado. El no haber visto en la prensa de este pafs publicado ni comentado tan importante como trascendental documento. nos inclina a creer que no estamos equivocados al considerarlo ap6crifo. 10 EEVOLUCIONES EN MEXICO. Ese pais, bajo la dilatada Administracion del General Don Por- firio Diaz, habia alcanzado un alto grado de progreso y de prosperi- c! ad, al amparo de la paz, que duro mas de treinta aiios. No ado lanto, es cierto, en materia de educacion politica del pueblo, y de practica de publicas libertades, siendo esto el justo cargo que puede liacerse al senor Diaz, porque no prepare a los mexicanos para apreciar y sostener su fructuosa labor, que se h'a desmoronado al empuje del primer huracan revolucionario, que aiin esta destrozando -aquella nacion. Hasta 1909 la Administracion en EE. UU. batia palmas al senor Presidente Diaz por su modo de gobernar, presentandolo como mo- delo a las' demas Kepublicas del Sur; por lo cual, el haber caido en desgracia ante el Departamento de Estad6, no debe atribuirse a su celo en favor de la practica de las instituciones democraticas. No conocemos a fondo la causa del cambio, pero podemos conje- turarla. En fines de 1909 estallo en Nicaragua una revolucion contra el Presidente J. Santos Zelaya, por quien el Secretario Knox tenia gran aversion, al punto de forzarle a resignar el Poder y a salir de su pais, circunstancia"s en las cuales el Presidente Diaz mostro a Zelaya sus simpatias, hasta brindarle urio de sus vapores de guerra para trasladarse a Mexico. Esto llego a provocar un incidente 'diplomatico, que aunque parecio satisfactoriamente termi- nado, debe creerse que dejo profundo resentimiento en el senor Knox, a juzgar por los sucesos posteriores. En 1910 estallo en Mexico un movimiento revolucionario, loca- lizado al principio, pero que fue extendiendose rapidamente por todo el pais. Ese movimiento conto con capital y elementos de guerra suficientes, porque la frontera de EE. UU. estaba practica- mente abierta para introducir estos, y el dinero americano abundo tn favor de la revolucion. Entonces el Gobierno americano llevo a la frontera millares de soldados, y movilizo una poderosa escuadra con objeto declarado de* llevarla a los puertos de Mexico; y todo dejaba entender que se pensaba en una intervencion armada, funda- .da en los daiios que la guerra causaba a las personas y bienes de los ciudadanos americanos, y que, para mantener el pretexto, se trataba con tanta benevolencia a los revolucionarios. Mas, ya sea por la accion en contrario del Congreso americano, ya sea por el 11 -convencimiento de que la invasion seria la senal para la conclusion de la guerra civil, provocando la union de todos los mexicanos en xlefensa de su patria, es el hecho que no hubo tal intervencion. El gobierno del senor Diaz cayo; pero desgraciadamente no termino con eso el estado revolucionario. De entre las mismas filas de los vencedores resultaron descontentos, que continuaron la lucha, la cual, con alternativas de buena o mala suerte, se sostiene todavia para desgracia de aquella tierra. En esta segunda epoca revolu- cionaria la conducta del Departamento ( de Estado ha sido entera- mente contraria a la anterior. Hoy tiene en la frontera solo unos centenares de soldados; y sin embargo han sido bastantes para hacer efectiva la neutralidad del territorio americano. La revolu- cion esta hoy positivamjente privada de elementos de guerra y de toda clase de recursos que de tierra americana pudiera sacar, porque se persigue y castiga con severidad a todo violador de neutralidad, dandose fiel cumplimiento a una proclamacion del Presidente Taft tendente a prevenir tales violaciones. Y hasta se ha concedido el paso por territorio americano a f uerzas del Gobierno me^icano, para ir a combatir a los rebeldes. Este contraste que hacemos notar entre las dos epocas revolu- cionarias, ha dado lugar a creer que la Administracion en este pais no ha tenido simpatias por determinado partido o persona en el vecino, sino empeno en prolongar la lucha para fines ulteriores, que felizmente no se realizaran, porque hay razon para esperar un e,ambio radical en la politica hacia la America latina en el nuevo periodo presidencial. Por nuestra parte, al hacer esta ref erencia a la situacion de Mexico, no tenemos el proposito de pronunciarnos en favor de uno 11 otro bando de los contendientes, sino hacer notar la inconsecuencia de la A'dministracion americana, y la doblez con que ha procedido, que quedara como punto de referenda al tratar de su proceder en Centro America. DOCTRINA KNOX. La doctrina Monroe, como antes hemos indicado, fue en su origeu bien acogida por los pueblos latino americanos; pero, cuando mas tarde se ha querido ampliar en el sentido de significar el 1 derecho de tutela de los Esta dos Unidos sobre las demas republicas del 12 Hemisferio, ha sido rechazada unanimemente por ellas su arbitraria y perniciosa interpretacion. Es unisona la voz de aquellos pueblos en decir: "Lo que nosotros veiamos de-bueno en esa doctrina, era la garantia de nuestro derecho a la vida; pero si hubiera de signi- fi car que nos protege contra las naciones de Europa, para que los EE. ITU. nos dominen a su sabor, no encontramos en ella ningiin beneficio. Xo hay ninguna ventaja en ser salvados de las fauces del tigre para ser destrozados por las garras del leon." Y ultimamente, bajo la Administraeion Taft, el Secretario dc Estado, Mr. Knox, ha agregado al derecho de tutela o de policia, sobre las naciones del continente, el derecho al protectorado finan- ciero, tomando a su cargo la administracion de sus rentas, especial- mente en Centre America, segiin lo explicaremos en seguida. En su primer ano, el seiior Knox, parece que tuvo la vision clara de lo que podria salvar a aquellos paises, asegurando en ellos la paz ? y. con ella el progreso. Parece que tuvo el proposito de esforzarse en conseguir el reaparecimiento de la antigua nacion, Centro America, f ormada por los Estados de Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua y Costarrica, como el mejor medio, quizas el unico, para lograr aquel fin. Pero, si penso en eso como estadista, resurgio en el el hombre de negocios, y resolvio encomendar la pretendida tutela sobre aquellos paises a sindicados que se organi- zarian en Wall Street, para proceder a la explotacion de aquellas tierras, no en beneficio siquiera del pueblo norteamericano, sino en el del grupo de banqueros privilegiados, a quienes se entregarian. El examen de los negocios propuestos, siguiendo esa politica, bauti- zada con el npmbre de "Dollar Diplomacy," justifica nuestros asertos; y vamos a hecer ese examen, aunque brevemente, como causa de las revoluciones en varios de los pai&es- donde se ha querido introducir o se ha ensayado, que son en general las republicas que bana el mar Caribe. Yamos a exponer la Doctrina Knox, tal como sus autores y man- tenedores la presentan y defienden. El Presidente Taft en sus mensages, y el mismo y el Secretario Knox en discursos ante las Universidades y ante los electores, han declarado enfaticamente que su politica tiende a asegurar la paz y el progreso de las republicas latino americanas, sustituyendo los dollars a las balasj: que, to- mando los agentes del Gobierno americano a su cargo la adminis- 13 tracion de las aduanas, se quitaria el principal aliciente para las revoluciones, suponiendo que estas obedecen solo al deseo de apo- derarse de las rentas publicas para enriquecerse sus autores; que su sistema ha sido ensayado con el mejor exito en Santo Domingo, en donde hace algunos anos que esta funcionando satisfactoria- mente : que los proyectos de emprestito estan concebidos en terminos los mas favorables para los paises que se trata de proteger; y, en lo general, han endosado de manera absoluta los planes de explotacion de aquellas tierras concebidos por los banqueros favorites del De- partamento de Estado. SANTO DOMINGO. Como la Administration americana abona su politica con la ex- periencia hecha en Santo Domingo, queremos examinar, aunque sea a la ligera, la situacion de ese pais despues de que ha caido bajo el protectorado financiero del Gobierno americano. Desde hace mas de quince anos un grupo de especuladores americanos celebro un contrato para el arreglo de la deuda externa de dicha nacion, teniendo por base el mane jo de las aduanas por medio de los agentes del sindicado que se organize al efecto. El negocio habria sido un complete fracaso para los especuladores, sino hubiesen logrado mas tarde interesar el Gobierno americano, imponiendo al efeeto al Go- bierno de la isla un tratado en virtud del cual haria el Presidente de EE. UU. el nombramiento de los colectores de las aduanas, para manej arias a su discrecion, quedando a cargo del Colector General el servicio de la deuda extrangera. Los especuladores quedaron a cubierto de todo riesgo, porque desde aquel memento el cumpli- miento del convenie quedaba en verdad garantizado per el poder de EE. UU. Si el plan hubiese dado buen resultado, podria haber tenido alguna excusa en la circunstancia de que con el se detuvo la accion de varias naciones europeas que enviaron buques de guerra para colectar por la fuerza los creditos de sus nacionales ; si bien para detener esa accion habria bastado la aplicacion de la doctrina Mon- roe, tal como la han entendido notables publicistas sudamericanos, a la cabeza de los cuales aparece el muy notable seiior Luis M. Drago que ha dado su nombre a una nueva doctrina. Pero el plan fue un fracaso, al menos en relacion con el fin que ostentaron sus autores. 14 Es cierto que, por haber introducido mayor orden en la adminis- tration, el producto de la renta aumento considerablemente en los primeros anos, si bien en los pcsteriores ha seguido su curso regular. En cuanto a honradez, la prensa americana ha dado cuenta de un gran escandalo relacionado con el Colector General. Y los otros- lines que se perseguian, el buen servicio de la deuda extrangera y el mantenimiento de la paz, tampoco se han conseguido. Eespecto a lo primero, por ser mas autorizada, dejaremos la voz al Consejo de Tenedores de Bonos Extranjeros en Londres, que en su report correspondiente al ano de 1910, dice : "El Consejo tiene que declarar que ningunos pasos se han dado todavia para reparar la injusticia hecha a los tenedores de bonos ingleses de la deuda de Santo Do- mingo bajo el arreglo de 1908. Al tiemjpo de presentar las pro- puestas referentes a la deuda de Honduras en 1909, se dio a entender al Consejo que la materia tendria pronta atencionj pero fuera 'de vagas indicaciones de que el asunto no se habia perdi- do de vista, ostensiblemente nada se ha hecho; y por consiguiente., el credito exterior 'de Santo Domingo nada h'a ganado, y se halla en peor situacion que antes, porque ya no esta en manos de su propio Gobierno remediar el mal. Eespecto al manteninmiento de la paz, el fracaso ha sido mas completo. En el trascurso de los mencionados quince anos ha habido dos Presidentes asesinados y una serie de revoluciones, de- bidas al descontento popular contra sus gobernantes, por ser instru- mento de un Poder extranjero. En los ultimos dos anos sobre todo, puede asegurarse que no ha gozado aquel infortunado pals de un momento de perfecta tranquilidad, no obstante que, o mas bien por eso mismo, los movimientos han sido sofocados por la presion de los buques americanos; y en los momentos actuales, esa presion no ha bastado, y ha sido despachada una verdadera expedicion, que todavia no se sabe si va a proteger al Gobierno o a los revoluciona- rios.* Porque entonces el Presidente Taf t y el Secretario Knox siguen *La revoluci6n de Santo Domingo ha terminado, con intervenci6n del Grobierno americano, cuyo Delegudo se declar6 en favor de ella, dando por resultado la calda del Presidente Victoria, y la? elevaci6n a la Presidencia del Arzobisps cat6lics. Es curioso que la diplomacla de un pals en su maryorfa protestante, haya apoyado en aquel lugar la entrega del poder al jefe de la iglesia cat61ica. la mas intolerante de todas las sectas, que privara de la? libertad religiosa, tan sagrada en Estados Unidos, no s61o a los natives, sino tambien a los extranjeros. Este es uno de los llamados beneficios de la Dollar Diplomacy. entonando canticos en favor de su interveneion en Santo Domingo, y siguen presentandola como modelo para ejercer igual accion en los demas paises? No pueden creer de buena fe lo que anrman, porque los hechos, a la vista del mundo, estan desmintiendo sus palabras. Ahora examinemos los resultados de la benevola y fraternal in- fluencia de esa politica en los paises de Centro America donde se ha intentado o logrado'introducir. COSTARRICA. Hace unos cuatro anos que se celebro un contrato entre el Go- bierno costarricence y Tin sindicado de banqueros de New York Fobre arreglo de la deuda extrangera y emision de un emprestito, con la consabida base de la entrega de las aduanas al Colector o colectores que nombrase el Presidente de EE. TJTL, todo en forma muy semejante al plan de Santo Domingo., si bien no figuraba como parte contratante el Gobierno americano. El Congreso costarricence rechazo aquel contrato como atentatorio a la soberania nacional. Despues se celebro con Mr. Minor C. Kieth, uno sustancialmente igual en la parte financiera, pero sin mencionarse interveneion de Gobierno extranjero. Este fue aprobado por el Congreso. y esta en practica. No es nuestro proposito abonar este convenio, que quizas pudo haberse celebrado en mepores condiciones; pero si podemos declarar que, por no contener ninguna estipulacion atentatoria a la soberania de Costarrica no ha producido irritacion en la opinion publica, que aun en aquel pais esencialmente pacifico se hubiera tra'ducido en trastornos. GUATEMALA. Por el mismo tiempo recibio el Gobierno de Guatemala propuestas de contrato de emprestito semejantes al rechazado por el Congreso de Costarrica., recomendadas por el Departamento de Estado, al menos en terminos generales. El Poder Ejecutivo no quiso asumir la responsabilidad de resolverlas y las paso al Congreso, el cual las devolvio sin discutirlas, encargando al Ejecutivo estudiarlas con el debido detenimiento y celebrar la que mejor le pareciese. Conocido el sistema despotico de gobierno en Guatemala, debemos hacer justi- 16 cia a su Presidente, reconociendo que con eso demostro no querer entrar en ese arreglo, aunque buscando la manera de demorarlo sin ponerse mal con el Departamento, sistema de moratorias que ha eontinuado hasta el momento presente; lo cual, si no le abona por su entereza de caracter, demuestra su prudencia y su deseo de conservar el poder. Al mismo tiempo ha logrado tener satisfecho al Departamento, secundando todos sus planes en las d^emas sec- ciones de Centre America, como lo haremos ver adelante. HONDURAS. Casi simultaneamente con las propo&iciones de emprestitos hechas a los dos paises mencionados, el Departamento de Estado, por medio de su Ministro en Tegucigalpa, insinuo al Gobierno de Honduras la conveniencia de mandar representantes a Washington, con el fin de aprovechar la buena disposicion de un sindicado de banqueros de Wall Street para encargarse del arreglo de su deuda extranjera, suministrar fondos para obras de progreso y redimir la deuda interior ; asegurando que esas condiciones serian mas venta- josas para el pais que las convenidas entre dicho Gobierno y el Ministro ingles, representante de los tenedores de bonos. Vease el anexo A. Antes, el Departamento de Estado habia logrado ejercer su in- fluencia cerca del Foreign Office de Londres, para que anulara, como anulo, el arreglo antedicho. El Gobierno de Honduras mando comisionados a Washington y New York, quienes recibieron las proposiciones de los banqueros, basadas en en una convencion previa con el Gobierno americano, el cual asumiria la administracion de las aduanas hondurenas por medio de empleados que practicamente serian de nombramiento y remocion del Presidente de EE. TJU., y que en el hecho resultaban irresponsables. El emprestito seria de diez millones de dollars, al tipo de emision de 88%, con interes de 5% y 1% de amortizacion. De estos millone? no habria de llegar a Honduras ni el 10%, inclusive lo que iria invertido en maquinaria, utiles y materiales de f errocarril, que repre- sentaria la mayor parte de ese 10%. Por las demas condiciones del negocio, en realidad significaba que Honduras haria no solo el sacrificio de su soberania, sino tambien el de sus rentas en beneficio 17 del grupo de banqueros, quedando aquel pais sujeto a vivir de la caridad de sus llamados protectores. Reducido a numeros el proyecto significaba para Honduras el pago en 40 anos de mas de 26 millones de dollars, en vez de ocho que habria debido pagar, segiin el arreglo con el Ministro ingles, sin tener este peligros ni condiciones vergonzosas. Y, sin embargo, tanto el Presidente Taft como el Secretario Knox han proclamado que estaban tendiendo su mano generosa a aquellos paises para librarlos de una enorme deuda extrangera, cuando en realidad su accion significa el plan de colocar a aquellos pueblos en la imposibilidad de vivir con gobierno propio, para que se vean forzados a pedir como gracia la anexion o el pro- tectorado absoluto. Y significa ademas que el Poder Ejectivo ameri- cano gobernaria en el hecho en aquellos paises, sin responsabilidad nlguna ante su propio pueblo, pues llegado el caso la declinaria en el grupo de financieros sus aliados, contra quienes las leyes de EE. UTJ. nada podrian, y contra quienes las leyes de los paises oprimidos tampoco podrian nada, porque serian aplicadas bajo la influencia y poder efectivo de los mismos culpables de'cualquier abuso cometido. Tal proyecto se mantuvo isecreto tanto aqui como en Honduras, pues el Presidente de aquel pais no dio cuenta de las proposiciones ni al mayor numero de sus propios Ministros, por exigencia del Departamento y de los banqueros. El representante de Honduras estuvo resistiendo la firma del tratado y contrato propuestos, con instrucciones de su Gobierno, hasta que en el mes de Julio de 1910 sobrevino una tentativa revolucionaria, por medio de una expedi- cion maritima en el Atlantico : y, no obstante el celo que en otras ocasiones ha demonstrado la marina americana en tales casos, en esta sus buques brillaron por su ausencia. La revolucion fracaso en su principio; pero el Departamento la aprovecho para -hacer comprender al gobernante de Honduras, ya por medio de sus Repre- sentantes en Washington, ya por medio del Ministro americano en Tegucigalpa, que solo aceptando el arreglo financiero* propuesto, se libraria de la repeticion de la tentativa, porque el Departamento se encargaria de impedirla o ahogarla. El Presidente de Honduras, General Miguel R. Davila. que a toda costa queria conservar el Poder, comenzo a variar sus instrucciones a su Agente fmanciero en Xew York, a la vez Enviado especial en Washington, General Don Juan E. Paredes, pero resistiendo toda via al compromiso de 18 la soberania. Fue precise para que cediese que la prensa de este pais se encargara de hacer publico que si el Presidente Davila no aceptaba la negociacion, esta se haria de todos modos, porque la revolueion seria inevitable y su jefe estaba comprometido a .aceptarla. Cuando el Presidente Davila pedia que se impidiese en EE. UU. la salida de la anunciada expedicion, quejandose a la vez de que el Presidente de Guatemala estaba auxiliandola, se le contestaba indefectiblemente "Firme el arreglo financiero" Por ultimo dio la orden de firmar la convencion y contrato de emprestito, orden que al principio resistio en absoluto el representante, pero que al fin cumplio, previa protesta, firmando la conveneion el 10 de Enero, cuando ya habia estallado el anunciado movimiento revolucionario y sido tornados dos puertos, pero negandose a firmar el contrato con los banqueros. Esta materia h'a sido completamente puesta en claro por el senor Paredes en varios folletos que aqui ha publicado, y de los cuales reproducimos bajo el anexo B algunos documentos important es. Cuando la expedicion que salio de la costa americana llego a la de Honduras, despues de haber trasbordado cerca de la de Guate- mala los elementos de guerra que el Presidente de aquel pals h'abia ofrecido, habia buques de guerra americanos en aquellas aguas, y no ejercieron ninguna accion par detener el movimiento. El orucero americano Tacoma abordo al buque revolucionario Hornet, que era el principal de la expedicion, para averiguar si habia viola do la neutralidad ; pero su capitan declaro que nada iregular encontro en el. Cuando la conveneion fue firmada el Hornet fue capturado por el mismo crucero, pero despues que habia desembarcado todos los elementos de guerra. La conveneion de emprestito fue improbada el ultimo de Enero casi por unanimidad por el Oongreso hondureiio, a pesar de lo cual siguio exigiendo el Departamento la firma del contrato con los banqueros, el cual fue firmado en Febreero, no por el Senor Paredes, que fue removido, sino por el Plenipotenciario hondureiio perma- nente. Mas al ser improbada dicha conveneion, volvio a ser mani- fiestamente parcial en favor de la revolucion la conducta de la rnarina americana. o mejor dicho, del Departamento de Estado. Cuando el Departamento ejercio su mediacion para llegar a la 19 paz, en nota que comunico a los contendientes, a su Ministro en Tegucigalpa y al jefe de la Escuadrilla, conteniendo las bases de su intervencion, declare que Puerto Cortes debia ser Zona neutral; y en consecuencia el Capitan del Tacoma exigio que las fuerzas del Gobierno constituido desocuparan el puerto, y asi lo hicieron, quedando bajo la proteccion de los Consules extrangeros y de los buques de guerra, pero principalmente, bajo la fe de la declaracion de neiitralidad hecha por el Secretario de Estado. For eso con harta sorpresa escucho el Presidente Davila de boca del Ministro ameri- cgno, en nombre del Capitan del Tacoma, la exigencia de que diese su autorizacion para ehtregar el puerto a los revolucionarios. Davila se nego, alegando las razones expresadas, pero el Ministro insistio al dia siguiente; y despues de varias horas de discusion, sin duda aburrido, dijo a Davila : "Es inutil que sigamos perdiendo tiempo : el puerto esta entregado a la revolucion desde aver; si quiere II. que haya conferencia de paz con la mediae-ion americana, acepte el hecho consumado." Y en efecto el puerto habia sido entregado a los revolucionarios desde antes de solicitar la autorizacion del Presidente Davila. El serior Knox en sus mencionadas instrucciones habia declaradn como base esencial para la transaccion que se buscaba, que el tercero en quien el Presidente Davila depositaria el Poder con el fin de poner termino a la contienda, debia ser persona enteramente imparr-ial, que diese garantias iguales a todos los hondurenos sin clistincion de partidos; y sin embargo,, con instrucciones suyas, su omiisionado Sr. Dawson, en quien los Delegados a la conferencia de paz de Puerto Cortez declinaron la designacion del tercero, escogio al Dr. Francisco Bertran, hombre cuyos meritos personales no discutimos, pero que estaba al servicio de la revolucion., militando e-n sus filas activamente, y era reconocido como uno de los mejores nmigos personales del jefe de ella. Por tal motive no se logro la concordia de los hondurenos que se buscaba, pues siendo el Presi- dente de hecho el Jefe vencedor, fueron ilusorias las garantias prometidas y estipuladas en el convenio de paz en favor de los contraries. De esta conducta doble del Departamento resulto un beneficio. El favorer-ido por el Departamento tampoco quedo satisfecho; y, como la opinion publica en Honduras estaba tan claramente mani- festada en contra de la propuesta negociacion de emprestito, hasta-. este dia el nuevo Presidente, burlando las esperanzas que en el tenian los especuladores, no ha firmado el contrato, a pesar de quo se le ban ^ropuesto modificaciones ventajosas para el pals. Le ha favorecido para su resistencia la actitud adversa a esas negociaciones de parte del Senado americano; actitud que ha merceido tantos aplausos en los pueblos latino americanos. La actitud del Senado fue en gran manera debida a los trabajos que, por inicdativa propia y sin ayuda de ningun Gobierno, hicieron unos pocos centro ameri- canos,, especialmente el patriota Dr. Don Policarpo Bonilla; que dio por resultado hacer luz en un asunto que se habia conservado en el misterio. Si el Senado hubiese ratificado la convencion, el Departamento de Estado se habria atrevido a ejercer energica pre- sion sobre el Presidents de Honduras ; y este, sabedor por experien- cia propia de lo que era capaz de hacer para lograr su objeto, por conseryar el poder, es probable que habria imitado a su antecesor. Creemos dejar demostrado que los dos ultimos movimientos re- volucionarios ocurridos en Honduras han sido la obra del Departa-- mento de Estado americano, o por lo menos conocidos y tolerados por el, como consecuencia de la famosa Dollar Diplomacy; y va- mos a procurar en seguida demostrar la culpabilidad del mifemo Departamento respecto a las dos ultimas revoluciones en Nicaragua, para sacar las conclusiones finales, de que resultara la absoluta condenacion de la politica Knox en Centro America, y en general en la America Latina. NICARAGUA. Por la misma ep:oca en que se hicieron propuestas de emprestito a las otras Eepublicas, se hicieron tambien a Nicaragua, siendo Presidente el General Don J. Santos Zelaya, quien no les dio entrada, siquiera para discutirlas ; y mas bien arreglo un emprestito en Europa, en el que entraba como base principal la cancelacion de la deuda americana. Dado el entpeno que despues ha mostrado el Sefior Knox por esas negociaciones, hasta convertirlo en una cuestion de amor propio, se comprende facilmente que desde aquel momento quedase condenado a muerte el gobierno de Zelaya. Se le promovieron enormes reclamaciones y se renovaron con desusada dureza muchas otras, algunas de ellas monstruosas ; pero no dieron 21 lugar a un rompimiento, porque el gobiemo de Zelaya propuso arreglos tan ventajosos para los reclamantes, que ni estos ni el Departamento tuvieron pretexto para rechazarlos. Pero el ST. Knox tenia que castigar, como el diria, a Zelaya por su resistencia. Y la revolucion no se hizo esperar. El Jefe de la Costa Atlantica, Juan J. Estrada, formado a las ordenes del General Zelaya y hombre de su confianza, se sublevo contra este, entendiendose con los descontentos del Gobierno. Desde el primer momento de la subleva'cion se pudo observar la benevolencia con que los rebeldes eran tratados por el Departamento de Estado, y se vio la complicidad del Consul americano, senor Moffat. Keci- bieron libremente elementos de guerra y municiones de todas clases y dinero de capitalistas americanos; todo de manera notoria y con mariifiesta tolerancia, y puede decirse, complacencia de funcionarios americanos. Como una de las mejores pruebas de nuestras aser- ciones, aparecera la declaracion de Juan J. Estrada, Ex-Presidente de Xicaragua y Jefe de aquella revolucion, la cual fue publicada en el Xew York Times del 10 de Septiembre de 1912. (Anexo C.) E! senor Knox neeoitaba im pretexto par obrar con mas franqueza contra el gobierno de Zelaya. Si este pretexto no hubiera sobrevenido lo hubiera creado. Lo tomo de la fusilacion de los aventureros Cannon y Groce al servicio de la revo- lucioii condenados a muerte por un Consejo de Guerra, por haber sido tornados infraganti poniendo minas para destruir las embaracaciones del Gobierno. Xo queremos discutir, porque no viene al caso, la legalidad de la sentencia, pues concedemos, si e quiere que no la tuviese. Dado el hecho indiscutible de haber sido tornados con las armas en la mano y trabajando como dinami- teros, era bastante para que perdiesen el derecho a la proteccion de su Gobierno, conforme a los precedentes universales de los tiempos modernos; y lo ha recpnocido recientemente el Presidente Taft. al notificar a los ciudadanos americanos que si se mezclan en la actual contienda en Mexico,, correran de su cuenta todos los riesgos., sin derecho a ereprar apoyo de su Gobierno. Si Cannon y Groce estaban al servicio de la revolucion por interes de lucre, debian sujetarse a las consecuencias de su gruesa aventura. Si procedian '(ntusiasmados por la justicia de la causa, combatiendo a un tirano, tenian que correr los riesgos qne en talos casos corren todos los 22 patriotas que llegan a caer en manos de ese tirano. Mas en ningiin caso quien viola la ley internacional puede pretender ser amparado por ella. En tales circunstancias lo mas que ha podido hacer'el Departa- mento, y de ello hay precedentes, ha sido interponer su amistosa influencia en favor de los acusados, para libraries de la pena capi- tal, y tuvo tiempo de hacerlo el senor Knox, oon seguridad de exito, si realmente hubiera estado interesado en favor de las victimas. No procedio asi el senor Knox; y en su memorable nota al Encargado de Negocios de Nicaragua, occasionada por ese suceso, fechada el primero de Diciembre de 1909, rompe todos los princi- pios del Derecho Internacional, anula todos los precedentes, y hace retroceder la civilizacion consagrando la fuerza como ttnica fuente de la justicia, cual si viviesemos en la edad media. En esa nota por si y ante si el senor Knox declara injusta la sentencia del Consejo : declara que el gobierno de Zelaya es tiranico, y abandonado de la opinion publica, y que todo el pals estaba oonmovido, lo cual era falso, pues la revolucion estaba localizada en parte de la costa atlantica: declara que Zelaya era el perturbador de la paz de Centro America, el violador de los convenios de Wash- ington, motivando por eso las justas quejas de los otros Gobiernos de C. A., quienes consideraban una necesidad su desaparicion del Poder, siendo esto ultimo tambien falso, porque tal declaracion pudo oirla a lo mas del Gobierno de Guatemala, instrumento para su politica de intervencion en aquellos paises; y, en consecuen- cia, constituyendose en Juez de una nacion extranjera, resolvio desconocer como Gobierno legitimo al presidido por Zelaya, cortando con el sus relaciones y declarandolo Gobierno de. facto, al cual trataria de igual manera que al Gobierno de facto de la revolucion. No creemos que haya en la historia de la diplomacia del mundo civilizado un ejemplo semejante. (Anexo B.) Pero todavia seria menor el escandalo, si el Departamento hu- biese cumplido lealmente lo contenido en su resolucion. No fuc r.si, sin embargo. Se coloco de manera manifiesta, y sin guardar ni las formas, en favor de la revolucion, ayudandole con su poder moral y material a obtener el triunfo, como vamos a demostrarlo en segm'da. 23 El Presidente Zelaya, anonadado por esa violenta actitud del Departamento de Estado, cometio el grave error de apresurarse a depositar el Poder en la persona, que el Congreso conforme a la Constitution designo al efecto, en vez de empeiiarse en obtener un. triunfo importante sobre la revolution, para obligarla a considerar &u separation como la solution mejor del conflieto; y en caso de que el Departamento no se diese por satisfecho, obligarlo a emplear la fuerza armada para hacer trinnfar a los revolutionaries. Su separacion prematura, en momentos en que estaban enfrentadas las fuerzas contendientes para librar una batalla decisiva, produjo- logicamente el desconcierto en sus filas; y, como consecuencia, el desastre del Recreo, que dio alientos a los revolutionaries, impulsan- dolos a eontinuar la lucha contra el sucesor de Zelaya., Doctor Don Jose Madriz, no obstante que les constaba que durante mas de once anos habia sido emigra do "politico bajo la Administracion de aquel r y por lo mismo estaba muy lejos de ser corresponsable de los cargos- que contra el hacian. Pero lo que mas contribuyo a la prolongation de la guerra, fue la actitud del Departamento, el cual rehuso re- eonocer al Gobienro de Madriz, a pesar de estar legalmente cons- tituido, y dentro de las prescripciones del tratado de Washington (Conferencia Centroamericana de Paz), declarando que mantendria respecto a el la mismo politica que h'abia notificado al Representante de Zelaya, y. no conforme con eso, con \ 7 iolacion del tratado ante- dicho, influyo cerca de los Gobiernos de Guatemala y El Salvador para que no lo reconociesen tampoco, siendo los tres los unices del mundo eivilizado que dejaron de hacerlo. Continuo la lucha mas sangrienta que antes; pero, a pesar de todas las circunstancias desfavorables que quedan mencionadas, las fuerzas del Gobierno de Madriz lograron derrotar en el interior del pals a las de la revolution, reduciendolas a sus posiciones del Rama y a su base de operaciones, Bluefields, ambas en la costa atlantica. Para conseguirlo, los ejercitos del Gobierno hicieron esfuerzos y sacrificios inauditos; y solo despues de penosi&imas marchas por entre los pantanos, donde quedaban sepultados centenares de hom- bres, caballos y vehiculos, lograron legar a aquellos lugares, a la vez que una expedition maritima se apoderaba dc todos los puertos y desembarcaderos de la costa. Con un ataque combinado captura- ron la fortaleza del Bluff, Have del puerto y ciudad de Bluefields, Se preparaba el ataque por tierra y agua a aquella plaza, cuando desembarcaron marinos de los buques de guerra americanes, y el Jefe de la flotilla declaro: que no permitiria hostilidades contra la ciudad : que no permitiria que se detuviese ninguna embarcacion mercante, ni para averiguar si llevaba elementos de guerra ; y tampo- co permitiria que cobrase el Gobierno derechos de aduana en la del Bluff, que era la establecida por ley, porque debian cobrarlos los revolucionarios en la aduana interior que establecieron al perder la fortaleza., f rente a la cual, y bajo el dominio de cuyos fuegos, tenian que pasar las embarcaciones para poder llegar al lugar de la llamada nueva aduana. Consecuencias logicas de esas determinaciones fueron : que los revolucionarios, teniendo garantizada la plaza de Bluefields, por la presencia de los marinos, pudiesen sacar sus fuerzas todas para empenarlas en la defensa de la ciudad del Raima: que la plaza de Bluefields se hizo intomable, teniendo por lo mismo los rebeldes asegurada contra todo riesgo su base de operaciones : que el panico y complete desaliento que habia comenzado a cundir en sus filas , se trocaran en la mas absoluta confianza en su triunf o : que cesase la escasez de elementos de guerra. y de toda clase de municiones en que se hallaban, porque, para que entrasen a la plaza sin ningun riesgo, iban a borde de las embarcaciones neutrales, americanas o revolucionarias, marinos americanos, portando la bandera de su pais, previa notificacion al Comandante del fuerte y al de la marina del Gobierno, de que si hacian un dispare contra ellas o intentaban detenerlas, lo estimarian come declaracion de guerra a EE. UIL, y sus buques bembardearian el fuerte y hundirian les buques nioara- giienses. El gobierno de Madriz, que estaba reconocido como legitimo por el de Iomega, logro de este que prohibiera a todos los buques quo .portaran bandera de aquella nacion el trasporte de contrabando de guerra para los revolucionarios. o desobedecer en cualquier manera las ordenes del Gebierno legitimo: pero el jefe de la marina ameri cana en aquellas aguas, apoyado expresamente por el Departamento de Estado, impulse a los capitanes de los buques noruegos a la desobediencia, poniende a su bordo marinos americanos, como ya se ha dicho, para garantizar su ontrada libre : y, por haber informa- unto el Vice Consul noruego., 25 Mr. Clancey, fue destituido del Yice-consulado americano que tam- bien ejercia. El resultado final de todo esto fue: que, no pudiendo continuar con esperanza de exito la luch'a, ni mantenerse en sus po&iciones las fuerzas de tierra de Madriz, emprendieron la retirada, que equiva- lio a una derrota, por las circunstancias del caso; y que, llegando al interior desmoralizadas, contagiaron el resto del ejercito, en el cual penetro el convencimiento de que no tenian que luchar en verdad con los rebeldes, sino contra el incontestable poder del Gobierno americano. El Doctor Madriz vio que la continuacion de la lucha significaria im inutil derramamiento de sangre, y deposito el Poder en un Di- putado al Congreso, quien lo entrego en el acto al jefe rebelde. Publicamos como anexo los documentos que comprueban nuestras precedentes afirmaciones, y principalmente la responsabilidad del jbepartamento de Estado en esos sucesos. Tambien va como anexo la relacion inedita de los mismos sucesos, que tenia escrita el Dr. Madriz, para presentarla al Congreso, lo cual no tuvo tiempo de liacer. (Anexos E y F.) Para quien hay a conocido personalmente al Dr. Madriz, hombre esencialmente civil, culto, ilustrado, patriota y Iionrado, causara sorpresa que el senor Knox se haya empenado en ^eguirlo comba- tiendo, en vez de darle su apoyo moral para que lograse la re- organizacion del Pals, evitandose asi que se perdiesen mas de cuatro mil vidas de nicaragiienses, y que se causasen danos a la propiedad por valor de millones; principalmente cuando el senor Madriz demostro con evidencia en sus proposiciones de paz, que su ambicion personal no seria obstaculo para llegar a ella, porque, si se ponia como condicion, renunciaria a ser candidate al hacerse la organiza- cion definitiva del Gobierno. Y no serviria de excusa al senor Knox el no haber conocido al senor Madriz, porque es tamos seguros de que recibio informacion suficiente a ese respecto de quien no podia parecerle sospechoso, del Almirante Kimball, jefe de la escua- drilla que existia entonces en aguas nicaragiienses, quien trato per- sonalmente al Presidente Madriz, y nos consta que formo de el el inismo concepto que dejamos expresado. Quiza por la sinceridad con que a ese respecto haya hablado al Departamento el Almirante Kimball, fue sustituido en el mando 26 antes de terminal la guerra. Y, como el seiiar Knox ha liecho- cuestion de amor propio el sacar avante la Dollar Diplomacy, no podia convenirle Madriz, quien, precisamente por sus buenas condi- ciones, no servia como instrumento para la realizacion de planer que envolvian una verdadera traicion a su patria, j que la condu- cirian a su completa ruina. Necesitaba de hombres sin escrupulos, que sin rubor viven haciendo declaraciones como esta: "Por tal de que los liberales no vuelvan al Poder, estamos dispuestos a aceptar cualquier yugo extrangero, aunque fuese el de la China." Y del conocimiento que de esos hombres tenia el senor Knox, surgio el convenio Dawson, que se ha mantenido a tal punto secreto. que ni a los Diputados al Congreso de Nicaragua que lo pidieron,. quiso mostrarlo el Poder Ejecutivo. Aqu* tampoco tenemos noticia de que su texto integro se haya publicado; y ni alia ni aqui ha sido aprobado por el Poder Legislativo, ni podria someterse a su rati- ficacion, por que no es pacto entre dos Gobiernos, sino entre un Agente d.el Departamento y varies de los caudillos rebeldes, a quienes aquel habia ayudado a triunfar, los cuales le mostraban su gratitud con complacencias de traidores a su patria. Sin embargo, el Departamento de Estado ha hecho- de el algo venerable, sagrado, superior a la Constitucion y leyes, no solo de Nicaragua, sino tambien de Estados Unidos, puesto que por atribuida viola- cion de ese convenio, se ha provacado y hecho mas sangrienta la ultima guerra en aquel infortunado pais, segun aparecera demos- trado adelante. Por lo que de ese convenio ha traspirado al publico, sabemosr que fue celebrado entre el Delegado Mr. Dawson y cinco de los que ellos llaman personajes conspicuos del Partido Conservador, a saber: Adolf o Diaz, Luis Mena, Juan J. Estrada, Emiliano Ch'amorro y Fernando Solorzano, de los cuales ninguno tenia repre- sentacion legal del pais; y, en cambio de compromisos financieros. que despues se tran llevado a la practica, aunque todavia no se conoce hasta donde llegara su alcance, quedo convenido que el senor Estrada continuaria ejerciendo la Presidencia por dos anos, durante los cuales seria Vice-Presidente Adolfo Diaz; y que aT tener que practicarse las elecciones, los cinco nominados, (constitui- dos por si mismos y por la gracia de Mr. Dawson en grander elec- tores de Nicaragua) escogerian entre ellos mismos los que deberian< 27 ser electos Presidente y Yice-Presidente para el proximo period, armlando asi el voto popular, o mas bien, convirtiendolo en una repugnante farsa. Sobrevino un desacuerdo entre dos de los grandes electores, el Presidente Estrada y su Ministro de Guerra, Luis Mena, a conse- cuencia del cual el segundo fue reducido a prision; pero intervino el Ministro Americano Northcott, y obligo al Presidente a Testable- cerlo en su puesto. Estrada encontro muy dura la exigencia, y dijo al Ministro que era incompatible con su permanencia en ejerci- cio del Poder. Al insistir el Ministro, Estrada se retiro, entregando la Presidencia a Adolfo Diaz. Poco antes, por no estar satisfechos Estrada y Mena con la Cons- titucion que la Asamblea estaba dictando, o mas bien con BUS tendencias politicas, porque h'abia sido electa por los partidarios de Emiliano Chamorro, la disolvieron, convocando otra, que resulto electa a satisfaccion de Mena, pero que en materia de principios y de legitima representacion de la opinion publica, no diferia de la anterior. Estando esta reunida se celebro la convention Knox- Castrillo, base para un contrato de emprestito, que tambien firmo Castrillo con un grupo de banqueros de New York. De ambos so dio cuenta a dicha Asamblea; pero como esta estaba dominada por Mena, y el se mostraba enemigo del negocio, para amilar su oposicion se le permitio hacerse elegir Presidente para el proximo periodo por aquel Cuerpo, sin que nadie quisiese acordarse en aquel momento del convenio Dawson, que despues se ha considerado violado con ese acto. Hecha la eleccion, sin protesta de los grandes electores, ni del Ministro americano, ceso la dificultad para la ratification de los convenios Castrillo ; y, sin dar lugar a discusion, porque fue declarado el asunto de urgencia para resolverlo en una sola sesion, fueron aprobados por una mayoria de antemano concerta- da, ahogando la voz de protesta de solo seis Diputados patriotas que en el seno de la Asamblea aparecieron, y la de dos Secretarios del Gobierno, que por ese hecho se retiraron de sus puestos, para no mancharse con la nota de vendedores de su pa'tria. En la conducta del Departamento de Estado salta a la vista UB fenomeno curioso, pero mas que curioso, absurdo. Este gran pais, donde las libres instituciones son una verdad, que con razon se presenta a si mismo como el modelo de la republica, y que es causa 28 de estimulo y objeto de imitacion para los pueblos latino americanos, aparece impulsando por medio de su Gobierno al de Nicaragua, no solo a violar sus leyes, sino todos los principios de la democracia, t)esgraciadamente este fenomeno se ha presentado constantemente tomo regla de conducta del Departamento en relacion con los paises del Sur, pues en los ultimos anos regularmente su intervencion o influencia se h'an ejercido en favor de las tiranias y en contra de los legitimos derechos de los pueblos. Cuando ha apoyado revolu- ciones, no ha tornado ningun interes, aun para explicar su accion, en que se establezca un Gobierno regular y de garantias. Bse feno- meno solo se explica, porque la politica del Departamento ha sido inspirada, no por la conveniencia de los paises, sino por intereses del momento, o por especulaciones financieras. Si otro hubiera sido el movil, si de la intervencion hubiera resultado el establecimiento -de un regimen de libertad, orden y honradez, aunque al principio Imbiese repugnado al amor propio naodonal tal intervencion, podria haber llegado a ser perdonada y hasta agradecida, en vista de lo-? beneficios recibidos. Los convenios Castrillo estan calcadbs scibre las mismas bases que los propuestos a Honduras, pero con algunas condiciones todavia mas gravosas para Nicaragua. Como Nicaragua tenia una deuda 'extema insignificante y relativamente bien servida, la Diplomacia del Dollar, tuvo que recurrir al plan de amortizacion de la deuda interna, representada por el'papel moneda circulante y depreciado, para tener pretexto de apoderarse de las aduanas; y, para tener la seguridad de dominar en absoluto la situacion fmanciera, invento la Comision mixta de reclames, en que hay una mayoria de norte- americanoSj designados por el Departamento o sus Representantes, a discrecion de quienes queda elevar la cifra de la deuda publica hasta donde crean que les conviene, asi como establecer ventajosas preferencias para los reconocimientos en favor de sus amigos. El omprestito contratado es de quince millones de dollars, al 90% de emision, fuera de gastos y otros gravamenes, con interes de 5% amial y 1% de amortizacion. No es nuestra intencion entrar a examinar en sus detalles esta negociaoion, que ha sido ampliamente discutida por la prensa en C. A., y especialmente tratada en una exposicion nrmada por IOP deeterradoe politicos Doctores Espinoza e Trias. Bastenos anrmar quo es la negordacion mas ruinosa que 29 jamas ha llegado a realizarse en pals alguno, y ese concepto tiene que ser ratificado por quienquiera que se tome la molestia de leer los contratos. Los convenios Castrillo contienen la estipulaqion de que su vigencia dependeria de la ratificacion por el Senado americano de la Convencion que les sirve de base, excepto por la sunia de un milloq y medio de pesos que desde luego serian anticipados, previa entrega. de las aduanas de la Kepubliqa a los colectores americanos, Jjos centroamericanos confiabamos en que esos arreglos no se llevarian runca a la practica, porque estabamos seguros de que el Senada americano nunca sancionaria tan monstruosa espe. r-ulacion ; pero, pa- ra f orzar a aquel alto cuerpo a la ratificacion, se introclujo la clausula referida, que permitio al senor Knox comenzar a ensayar su sistema en C. A. Pero hay algo mas escandaloso aiin. Sin duda se crey6 que todavia quedaba al Gobierno de Nicaragua demasiada vida, y le impus'ieron un contrato adicional de tres cuartos de millon de dollars con una garantia superabundante, la entrega de los ferro- carriles y vapores nacionales, en forma que mas bien parece UA regalo. Con la negociacion de tan fuertes sumas de dinero deberia creer&e que, al menos en el principio, el Gobierno nicaragiiense estuvo muy desahogado, y el pals en una ventajosa situacion economica; pero es el hecho que jamas el tesoro piiblico ha tenido alia mayores apuros, ni ha habido mas pobreza general y estancamiento del co mercio y de todo progreso. La razon es clara : del dinero que aparecia prestandose, nada entro a Nicaragua; y del producto de la renta aduanera, solo un tanto por ciento muy reducido era de- vuelto al Gobierno de&pues de colectado por los Agentes extrangeros. Cuando el Comite del Senado americano conocio de la Conven- cion Knox-Castrillo, aunque no hubo mayoria para hacer dictamen, resulto claramente demostrado que nunca seria favorable, y mas claro aim, que el Senado no lo ratificaria, a pesar de haberse creado de proposito y de manera tan injusta y arbitraria esos intereses americanos en aquel pais. Pero los especiiladores deben haber re- cibido del Departmento seguridades de que el protegeria esoa intereses en todo caso, y lo demostraron con la resolucion de retener integramente los productos de las rentas que recaudaban, violando manifiestamente el contrato, y reduciendo al G'obierno nicaragiiense 30 a la mas absoluta miseria. No obstante esto, o mas bien por eso, hizo la entrega de los ferrocarriles y vapores, para recibir en cambio alguna parte de las sumas colectadas, en calidad de limosna, pues no de otra manera podra en adelante aquel Gobierno vivir, ya que ha quedado enteramente a merced de sus protector es. Tampoco la practica del sistema Knox en Nicaragua ha dado el resultado que el ha declarado se proponia entre otros perseguir: el restablecimiento del credito exterior de aquellos paises. Anterior- mente se habia logrado en Nicaragua atender con relativa regulari* dad al servicio de la den da externa; desde qne entro en practica el protectorado flnanciero, ese servicio ha sido completamente desa- tendido, siendo muchos los acreedores, entre ellos algunos ameri- canos no favoritos, que tienen derecho a quejarse por el cambio de sistema. Pero en compensacion de tantos males <; se habra logrado al menos el manteniiniento de la paz ? Vamos a examinarlo. Comenzo a hacerse notorio dentro y fuera de Nicaragua que la eleccion hecha por la Asamblea en el General Mena para Presidente, como sucesor de Diaz, no era del agrado del Departamento de Esta- do, alegando como razon ostensible ser contraria al convenio Daw- son, siendo a la vez notorio que el favorecido con sus simpatias era el mismo actual Presidente Diaz; y se creyo entonces, y los hech'os se han encargado de demostrar que para ello habia razon, que el Ministro americano empujo al sefior Diaz a destituir al serior Mena del Ministerio de Gnerra, que ejercia por la voluntad de otro Ministro americano, prometiendole, a no dudarlo, el apoyo de su Gobierno, en capo de dificultades. Esa fue>la causa, o mejor dicho la ocasion, de la ultima guerra civil en aquella tierra. Mena estaba en posesion de la fuerza publica del pals. La ge- neralidad de los jefes de armas eran hechnra suya; y era notorio que el ejercia el poder ef ectivo en el Gobierno. Debe creerse que fl senor Knox estaba convencido por lo mismo de que su candidate favorito no podria continual en el Poder por eleccion, y que para lograr imponerse contra la 'fuerza armada de Mena y contra la opinion publica represent n'rla por los liberales, era preci&o que hu- biese una guerra civil, en qre Diaz resultase vencedor con el apoyo extranjero. Si el Departamento hubiese querido evitar el derrama- miento de sangre en Nicaragua, tanto en la guerra anterior como 31 en la ultima, le habria sido muy facil prevenirlo, haciendo entonces lo que hizo mas tarde, desembarcar fuerzas para ocupar las plazas de importancia. Pero siguio el procedimiento contrario. La idestitucion del General* Mena del Ministerio de la Guerra, a- consejado por el Ministro americano era un paso que debia dar las consecuencias logicas que no se hieieron esperar. Mena, poseedor de la mayor parte de los elem,entos de guerra de la Republica, puso en mano lo mas que pudo ; y, con la cooperacion de los liberales de Oriente con quienes entonces logro entenderse. reunio un ejercito de voluntarios muy superior en numero y calidad al que podia oponerle Diaz, con el cual en poco tiempo logro poner asedio a la capital de la Republica, y apoderarse de muchas plazas de importancia. La opinion publica fue favorable a la revolucion desde el primer momento, porque el Gobierno de Diaz, que nunca fne prestigiado, se hizo absolutamente unpopular y odioso, desde que consume con las negociaciones de emprestito la venta de su patria. Mas no se hizo general el movimiento, sino hasta que, re- ducido a la ultima extrenidad el ejercito de Diaz durante el ataque a Managua, fue salvado solo por la defensa que del palacio hieie- ron los marinos americanos. Entonces el pueblo de Leon, que habia permanecido quieto, se levanto -en masa, y ataco la fuerte guarnicion que habia en la plaza, que fue destrozada. Derroto en seguida las fuerzas que enviaron a someterlo, y llamo a los jefes emigrados, cuyas ordenes no habia esperado para moverse. Pocos dias bastaron para que el Gobierno quedase reducido a la oeupacion de la capital, de parte de los departamentos de Rivas, Chontales y Zelaya, y de los puertos, conservados bajo su dominio, lo mismo que la capital, por las fuerzas americanas. La fuerza material de los cien marinos que defendieron el palacio presidencial era de poca significacion, pero fue muy grande el efecto moral favorable causado en el animo de las tropas de Diaz, como clcsalentador en el de las asaltantes. Todavia en aquellos mementos pudo el Departamento, si hubiera qnerido, evitar que continuase el inutil derramamiento de sangre, si hubiera procedido con franqueza, declarando que estaba resuelto a u?ar el poder de su pais para debelar la revolucion, empleando la fuerza armada, que mas tarde empleo. Pero no lo hizo asi. Por el contrario : declaro que su objeto era unicamente proteger las 32 vidas e intereses americanos, comprendiendo entre estos los ferro- carriles y vapores nacionales, propiedad absoluta de Nicaragua, que habian sido entregados a los especuladores americanos pocos dias antes, apresurandose a hacerlo, probablemente en prevision del movimiento que se iba a provocar. El alrnirante Southerland hizo expresas declaraeiones de que, si se le devolvieran los f errocarriles y vapores, se guardaria absoluta neutralidad, sin poder trasportar fuerzas ni elementos de guerra de ninguno de los beligerantes ; y asi consiguio que no se le hicdera re&istencia. Mas una vez aduenado de las lineas ferreas y estaciones, y fortificadas las fuerzas ameri- canas en ellas, pretextaron la necesidad de ir a socorrer las ninas de un colegio f ranees, que estaban pereciendo de hambre, lo cual era falso, pues en el no habian ninas extranjeras, sino hijas del pals,, que tenian sus f amiliares o recomendados para atenderlas, y no pasa - rian mas necesidades que las que naturalmente tenian que sufrir todos los habitantes. Embarcaron en los trenes en Managua consi- derables fuerzas, y cuando las tuvieron suficientes en Granada, cuartel principal del General Mena, intimaron a este la rendicion, con amenaza de emplear contra el la f uerza, y no dar cuartel a los vencidos, y Mena se rindio sin cambatir. Qirifeo hacer lo mismo el Almirante con el Doctor y General Benjamin Zeledon, pero este, joven, valiente y patriota, aunque seguro de ser derrotado y hasta de perder la vida, quiso salvar la honra del nombre nicaragliense, y rehuso rendirse. La tropa americana despues de tres dias de ataque a la ciudad de Masaya por las fuerzas de Diaz inicio el combate con su artilleria contra la posicion de la Barranca el cual duro veinti- cuatro horas, y cuando lograron silenciar el fuego de los defensores,, asaltaron la posicion. Al mismo tiempo las fuerzas del llamado Go.- bierno nicaragiiense atacaban por otro lado la contigua plaza de Ma- saya, la cual fue tomada varias horas despues que la Barranca. Zele- don, aunque herido logro salir, pero fue alcanzado y muerto el mismo dia. Esta batalla costo la vida de cuatro marines extranjeros y de mas de cien nicaragiienses del lado del Gobierno, y un mimero proporcional de heridos, ignorando nosotros hasta este momento c-uantas bajas Jiubo de parte de la revolucion. Quedaba la ciudad de Leon y otras poblaciones del ^orte en po- der de la revolucion, aunque escasas de elementos de guerra. El Almirante intimo la rendicion a todos los jefes; y estos, sin duda 33 queriendo evitar que, sin posibilidad de triunfo, se derramase mas sangre, se sometieron a la fuerza americana ; pero el pueblo, indigna- do por el ultra je hecho a su patria, trato de resistir, y en masa, sin que pudiese orgnizar defensa, fue ametrallado por los marinos americanos. Algo semejante habia pasado antes en Chichigalpa. Kesultaron de todos los encuentros en que intervivieron los americanos unos once marinos muertos, y mayor niimero de heridos ; y, segiin los partes publicados aqui por la prensa, centenares de victimas nicaragiienses, entre muertos y heridos, muchos de ello? no combatientes, Debemos creer que el Departamento trata de haeer recaer la res- ponsabilidad de &u conducta contra el Senado de su patria, a juzgar por el tono de cierta prensa inspirada manifiestamente en el mismo Departamento, y principalmente, por una informacion da da a la prensa por el Presidente Taft en Beverly, en que declaro que la culpabilidad de lo ocurrido en Nicaragua (de la sustitucion de las balas a los dollars) pe&aba sobre el Senado, por no haber ratificado la convencion de emprestito, que habria colocado las aduanas en manos de los agentes americanos, y quitado el pretexto u objetivo principal para la revolucion. Esta declaracion del Presidente puede hacer pensar que el ignora muchos de los actos de su Secretario, pues las aduanas fueron entregadas a tales agentes desde muchos meses antes de la guerra; de manera que esa entrega produjo el trastorno en vez de la paz prometida por la Dollar Diplomacy. Tambien se ha tratado de justificar la intervencion armada en Xicaragua porque la pidio el Presidente de hecho de aquella Kepu- blica; pero eso equivaldria a querer justificarla porque la h'ubiera pedido al Departamento el mismo Secretario Knox, de quien aquel gobernante es exclusiva hechura y docil instrumento. Debemos reconocer que los hombres del Gobierno de Managua conservan todavia un re&to de pudor, aunque sea el de la mujer publica. En el telegrama en que dan cuenta de su victoria a los Gobiernos de Centro America, no mencionan la cooperacion de las fuerzas extranjeras en la batalla de Massaya; y, para atreverse a privarlas de LA GLORIA DEL TRIUNFO, han debido tener el a>OTiritnionto del ^[inistro americano en Managua. Pero ese falso pudor lo tuvieron unicamente ante la America Latina, porque en 34 forma oficial el Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores de Nicaragua; dio el pesame al Gobierno y pueblo americanos por la muerte de sus marinos, sin tener por cierto una palabra de elogio o siquiero: de conmiseracion para los centenares de soldados nicaragiienses que connesa haber perecido simultaneamente. Ha alegado igualmente el Departamento como justificative para su intervencion el bombardeo de la plaza de Managua por los revo- Jucionarios,, a la que llama plaza indefensa, causando la muerte de muchos no combatientes. Aquella plaza no era indefensa desde luego que estaba protegida por la fortaleza de la loma de Tiscapa, la mas fuerte en aquel pais, y en ella tenia el G-obierno concentrado easi todo el ejercito de que disponia, Pero si se creia que, conforme al Derecho Internacional, tenian derecho a impedir el bombardeo, debieron ofiligar al Gobierno a desocuparla y presentar ace-ion en otro campo de batalla, en la cual se decidiria quien debia quedar en posesion de la capital, y no ostentar la pretension, de que no hay ejemplo en la historia, de que un beligerante deba privarse del triunfo que le daria la captura de la plaza mas importante del enemigo, por el peligro 'que corran sus habitantes. Ese h'abrla sido< un proce'dimiento, aunque arbitraio, imparcial, y habria producido el beneficio de la inmediata terminacion de la guerra. Pero h'aciendo- lo asi tenia que resignarse el Departamento a ver el triunfo de la revolucion, que nadie podia poner en dudaf: tenia que resignarse a > 7 er el triunfo de un pueblo contra un Gobierno de traidores, su protegido; y a ver en consecuencia desmoronado el edincio de la Dollar Diplomacy, levantado a tanta costa. Persistiendo en &u politica, tenia que obrar como lo hizo; y para que su parcialidad sea mas mani fiesta, no tuvo en seguida inconveniente en autorizar a sus fuerzas para cooperar en el bombardeo de la plaza de Masaya, y amenazar con igual suerte a las de Granada y Leon, plazas no fortificadas, sin tomar en cuenta entonces el peligro de los no- comb atientes. Por otra parte ha pretendido justificar el Departamento SIT ccn'ducta con la necesidad de reprimir los excesos cometidos por los revolucionarios. En la relacion que de ello se ha dado a la prensa encontramos en la mayor parte de los casos falsedad, y en general calculada exageracion de los hechos, todo con el objeto- de predisponer la opinion publica en este pais en favor de la in- 35 tervencion que de antemano estaba resuelta. Es natural que hay a habido actos incorrectos, pero es notorio que fue mucho mas mala la conducta 'del llamado Gobierno. Estamos en posesion de antece- dentes que nos permiten asegurar que en ninguna guerra civil, ni en la de EE. HIT., ha habido tan pocos danos. relativamente ha- blando, a las personas y propiedades de los no eombatientes, espe- cialmente de los extranjeros, como en la ultima de Nicaragua. Si esa fuera una justification y no un pretexto, el Departamento ha- bria estado obligado con mayor razon, y des'de hace mucho tiempo, a intervenir en igual forma en Mexico, como lo han hecho notar muchos organos de la prensa en este pais. Pero Mexico no e^ como Nicaragua un pais debil y pobre, ni hay en su Gobierno ni cntre los revolucionarios traidores a su patria que pidan la interven- cion. AIJi tendria que ser una verdadera guerra de conquista, para mantener la cual necesitaria de un poderoso ejercito de ocupacion quizas por mas de dos generaciones. Si en los demas Estados de C. A. su? Gobiernos hubie- ran cumplido con su deber demostrando la solidaridad centroamerieana^ siquiera con una protesta. con lo cual habrian satisfecho la opinion de los pueblos, bieri claramente manifestada en contra de la invasion extranjera, talve^ se habria logrado que esa actitud sugiriera al senor Knox la, misma conducta prudente que ha observaido respecto a Mexico. Pero aquellos go- bernantes en general han estado poseidos del terror que el senor Knox ha sabido inspirarles. Han llegado hasta a reprimir la prensa y las manifestaciones del pueblo, enoarcelando escritores que se han atrevido a hacerse eco de la indignacion popular: y. ca?o eurioso, han llegado hasta prohibir la reproduccion de escritos de protesta publica'dos en EE. TJU. por centro americanos patriota? o por anglo- americanos amantes de la justicia. Para explicar la inconsecuencia de su conducta. despues de todo csto el Departamento de Estado sigue sosteniendo que nc ha hecho la guerra en Nicaragua : que ha mandadp f uerzas solo para defender las vidas e intereses de los americanos, las cuales no han estado en ningun momento en peligro, pues no ha podido ni podra evidenciar un solo caso en que algun extranjero haya sufrido en su persons 6 intereses; y, por un peligro imaginario, ha sacrificado a tantos de PUS compatrriotas ? inmolados en aras de la Dollar Diplomacy. La 36 intervencion del Departamento en solo esta ultima guerra ha costado a Nicaragua millares de victimas, pues sin ella la campana habria terminado en pocos dias con el triunfo de la revolucion; y, lo quo es peor, tratandose de la conveniencia de EE. UU., ha hecho perder en la America Latina el buen n ombre del soldado angloamericano. defensor en su propia tierra de la libertad y de la ley, convertido en Nicaragua en instrumento de tirania. ^creera acaso el senor Knox que esa facil proeza sera un timbre de gloria y no de baldon para las armas americanas ? El senor Knox se muestra satisfecho de su labor, porque la ha llevado hasta sus ultimas consecuencias. Ha mantenido el ejercito extranjero de ocupacion en Nicaragua para garantizar, no una -eleccion libre de Presidente para el proximo periodo, sino la elec- cion en favor de su protegido Diaz ; y ha conseguido su objeto, por- que el 2 de este mes, bajo el imperio de la ley marcial, teniendo los ciudadanos el cuello bajo el tacon de la bota del soldado extranjero, el traidor Diaz resulto electo Presidente sin posible oposicion. Para el mismo dia se convoco al pueblo a eleccion de Diputados, porque el traidor, derogando la Constitution, asumiendo el poder absolute de Nicaragua, asistido tambien para dar ese golpe de Estado por el poder americano, declare disuelta la Asamblea Constituyente, la misma a que debia la somibra de poder legal que ha estado ejerciendo; pero la misma que, al cometer su traicion, lo declaro cesante en su funciones, cuando se incio la ultima contienda. Para que se juzgue de la clase de libertad electoral de que ha podido disfrutar el ciudadano nicaragiiense en esa eleccion, inserta- mos a continuacion la circular del Comandante General del ejercito de Nicaragua, Emiliano Chamorro, dirijida a todos los funcionarios civiles y militares encareciendoles hacer triunfar las candidaturas -que recomienda, por ser las resueltas de conformidad con el famoso paoto DAWSON. "Ca&a presidencial. Managua Octubre 25 de 1912. Se- iiores Comandantes de Armas y Jefes Politicos. Participo a Ud. que reunidos los principales Jefes de la Eevolucion de Octubre para dar cumplimiento a lo estipulado en los convenios Dawson, hemos resuelto de comun acuerdo designar como candidates del Partido Oonservador en el proximo periodo constitucional para la Presidencia y Yice-Presidencia de la Republica a los seiiores Adolfo 37 Diaz y Fernando Solorzano, respectivamente. Lo que tengo el ! - gusto de decir a TJ. para que se lo participe a todos los amigos y correligionarios, recomendandoles los trabajos electorates necesarios para hacer triimfar las candidaturas referidas. Con mnestras de- mi consi'deracion soy afectisimo amigo. Emiliano Chamorro." Este mismo Chamorro fue quien dirigio al Presidente de Hondu- ras el telegrama que en seguida insertamos, que fue interceptado en Leon, segun dice el Diario del Salvador fecha 4 de Septiembre. del cual lo tomamos. Dice el telegrama: "Debemos confiar en el resultado final. Contamos con EL ATJXILIO DE EE. UTJ., quf> ya no tardan en hacer sentir su poder a los liberales y a los 'demas enemigos de* nuestra causa/' De manera que, si pruebas faltasen de la connivencia criminal de los que mandan en Nicaragua con los inva- sores extranjeros, ese telegrama bastaria; pero a ese respecto cxiste un documento que pasara a la historia de la Diplomacia americana como una escandalosa prueba del abuso de la fuerza de un (robierno poderoso contra un pals debil, solo comparable a la nota 'del Secretario Knox a que atras nos hemos referido. Ese documento es la nota dirigida por el Ministro americano en Mana- gua, Mr. Weitzel, al Secretario de Eelaciones Exteriores de aquel: pais, que va como anexo "G." Hacemos referenda a esa nota en este lugar, porque viene a demostrar como las ultimas elecciones en Nicaragua ban sido una farsa que llamariamos ridicula, sino fuera "por sus antecedentes" sangrienta; farsa en la cual ha intervenido de manera directa el Departamento de Estado, que pretence tener el proposito de ense- fiar a las naciones latino americanas la practica de la verdadera republica :* Dice el senor Weitzel, entre otras cosas "Al desonocer a Zelaya, a cuyo regimen de barbaric y corrupcion puso termino la nacion nicaragiiense, despues de una sangrienta guerra, el Go- * Contra el g-olpe de Estado, la Dictadura y la usurpacion del Poder del traidor, han protestado los ciudadanos nicaragiienses que ban podido hacerlo, absteniendose de dar su voto- todos los que han tenido valor para desafiar a los esbirros del tirano, convertidos en arg-e-ntes electorales, y que no han querido hacerse c6mplices de la farsa electoral, que no merece otro nombre, aunque tantas razones no hubiera, por el simple hecho de haber sido convocado el pueblo el 18 de Octubre para concurrir a: votar el 2 de Noviembre, catorce dlas de diferencia, sin tiem-po suflciente ni para conocefr el decreto en muchos Departamentos de la Reptibiica. Agreg-amos un frag-amento de la protesta publicada en Bluefields, y otro- del Decreto de Dictafdura. (Anexo "H.") 38 bierno de EE. UU., condeno no solo al individuo sino el sistema, y este Gobierno no PODEIA TOLERAR ningun movimiento para restablecer el mismo regimen destructor. El Gobierno de EE. UU., en consecuencia, SE OPONDRA A CUALQUIER RESTAURA- CION del ZELAYISMO y prestara su eficaz apoyo moral a la causa del buen Gobierno legalmente constituido para beneficio del pueblo de Nicaragua, a quien ha tratado de ayudar desde largo tiempo en su justa aspiracion hacia la paz y prosperidad, bajo un Gobierno constitutional y de orden" Y como lo que Weitzel llama ZELAYISMO, es decir lo que no es DIISMO, unico que conviene al Departamento, pudo restablecerse con toda seguridad por medio de una eleccion libre, es daro que la fuerza de ocupacion se ha jopuesto a que de esa eleccion pudiera resultar otro Presidente que no fuera su complice DIAZ. Lo que el seiior Weitzel h'a expresado en el parrafo trascrito, ha venido sien'do el caballo de batalla de Mr. Knox ,en los liltimos aiios para provocar disturbios en Centre America; y queremos examinar por eso con mas detenimiento la materia. Dice el De- partamento que "su Gobierno condeno no solo al individuo sino el sistema," refiriendose a Zelaya. No intentamos discutir ahora si tenia derecho de condenar al gobernante de un pais independiente, punto que ya tratamos antes; pero si fuese cierto que condena el sistema, habria tornado precauciones para que el nuevo Gobierno que ayudo a crear fuese un modelo de practicas republicanas, de honradez administrativa y de amor a su patria, en vez de cubrir bajo su proteccion inauditos atropellos y atentados contra las per- sonas y propiedades, escandalosos latrocinios como antes no se ha- bian presenciado en Nicaragua, y la mas vil de las traiciones. Pero un Gobierno de leyes, h'onrado y patriota no habria secundado su politica financiera. Por otra parte, no se explica como se muestra el Departamento tan celoso contra el despotismo y abuses de Zelaya,, y a la vez patrocina la tirania en otros paises, especialmente en Guatemala, donde Estrada Cabrera la ejerce desde hace mas de catorce aiios de manera brutal, constituyentlo un escarnio para la humanidad, nna vergiienza para la civilizacion. Y, no solo Guatemala ha sufrido el j>eso de esa tirania. Los demas paises 'de C. A. han visto perturbada su tranquilidad por la politica tortuosa de Cabrera. Ya 39 dijimos que el dio los elemehtos para las ultimas dos revoluciones en Honduras, y los dio tambien para la primera en Nicaragua, que cle el recibio los primeros auxilios. Y sin embargo, el Departamento, que formo acusacion contra Zelaya como perturbador de la paz de la America Central, como el violador de los convenios de Wash- ington, jamas lo h'a hecho contra Estrada Cabrera, ni ha intentado siquiera detener su accion perturbadora, como lo hizo siempre que > Zelaya se atribuia un proyecto semejante. El senor WeitzeL, secundando declaraciones hechas en igual senti- do por el Departamento y hasta por el mismo Presidente, Sefior Taft. notifica que su Gobierno no consentira en la restauracion del .Zelayismo. iQue entienden por eso? Dificil les seria explicarlo, porque no conocen suficientemente ni la historia, ni la situacion actual de Nicaragua, ni la indole del pueblo, ni el caracter y iendencias de los politicos do aquella tierra; y esta ignorancia ha sido una de las causas de los error es y abusos de poder cometido e por el Departamento. Zelaya, como todos los gobernantes dc-po ticoss, no pudo formar un verdadero parti do politico. El personal que le servia era mudable segun las circunstancias o sus caprichos. Al dejar el poder, que era la unica base de su prestigio, lo habria perdido del todo, sino fuera que la intervencion americana en su patria hace pensar a muchos que repres'enta la causa de la autono- mia nacional, por mas que la generalidad no lo crea asi, porque no supo caer luchando como heroe. Llamar zelayista al ultimo movi- miento revolucionario, demuestra grande ignoranciia o mala fe. Lo inicio el General Mena, uno de los prohombres 'de la revolucion contra Zelaya, uno de los cinco candidates del pacto Dawson, ro- deado de una fraccion del partido conservador. Sin la interven- cion extranjera es seguro que el partido contrario se habria rruzad ) de brazos a presenciar la lucha entre sus enemigos politicos, para resolver despues de terminada, la actitud que le conviniera. Pero la intervencion hizo estallar la indignacion en la masa popular y, &in esperar ordenes de sus caudillos, aplastaron las fuerzas del Gobierno. . Esto lo hicieron principalmente las poblacionea de los Departamentos de Leon y Chinandega, las mismas que adversaron unanimemente a Zelaya desde el ano de 1896. ,;Donde esta entonces el Zelayismo de la revolucion? Apenas se concibe que un Gobierno K-rio se ntrcva a consignar en tfocumentos oficiales tales desaliogo? 40 del Jefe de su Departamento de Estado, que revelan pasioii per- sonalisima y a la vez despecho por la resistencia a su DOLLAR DIPLOMACY. Y despues de tanto abuso, de tanto escandalo e ha reorganizado constitucionalmente, ya que no se ha practicado ninguna eleccion antes del 2 de Noviembre, y esta ya hemos demostrado que no mereoe ese nombre; pero en vez de hacerlo, se nprcsuro a reconocerlo el mismo y a darle su apoyo, aim con la fuerza armada, contra su propio pueblo. En cambio ya hemos visto 46 como se nego a reconocer al Gobiemo Constitucional del Dr. Madriz, e influyo para que no lo reconocieran los de Guatemala y el Salvador. La Corte de Justicia Centro Americana en las dos revoluciones de Nicaragua ha intentaJdo el restablecimiento de la paz ejerciendo su mediation; pero sus esfuerzos han fracasado, principalmente, por que una de las partes contendientes contaba con el decidido apoyo del Departamento, llevado hasta donde lo hemos patentizado. Si el Departamento hubiese querido que el establecimiento de esa Corte no fuese, como ha sido, un complete fracaso, le habria ayudado en su labor pacifista. Pero hay algo mas : segun el articulo anexo, de la Convencion sobre el establecimiento de dicho Tribunal, antes copia'do, toca a la Corte conocer de los conflictos que pueda haber entre los altos Poderes ; y pudo el Gobierno americano influir para que, si la election del General Mena por la Asamblea se consideraba indebida, o si despues se consideraba arbitraria la destitution del Presidente Diaz decretada por la misma Asamblea. fuese la Corte Centro Americana la que resolviese el easo, con lo cual la guerra habria. terminado. Por ultimo, el articulo II 'de la Convencion adicional preinserto prohibe a los Gobiernos de C. A. intervenir en favor ni en contra de otro en caso de guerra civil; y el Gobierno americano ha visto con impasibilidad, cuando no los Jiaya impulsado, los auxilios prestados por el Gobierno de Guatemala, a las revoluciones de Honduras y Nicaragua. Mas ha hecho algo peor : arrogandose un derecho que los Convenios de Washington niegan a las mismas partes roiitra- tantes, el Departamento de Estado ha intervenido directa o indirecta- mente en favor o en contra de esas revoluciones, empleando la fuerza armada para debelar la ultima, no solo contra los comba- tientes, sino hasta contra multitudes indefensas. Y todo eso lo ha hecho invocando los Convenios de Washington, que dice querer ensenar a cumplir, con el ejemplo de tan escandalosas violaciones de los mismos como dejamos anotadas. Creemos conveniente, por tratarse de la voz autorizada de un go- hernante, reproducir un parrafo de la contestacion da da por el Presidente Araujo a la Corte de Justicia centro-america.na, re- firiendose a la ultima guerra de Nicaragua, y especialmente a la verdadera interpretacion de los Convenios de Washington. Dice asi: 47 "Cinco Estnclos independientes sin abdicar su soberania, ajustaron Tiatados que crean relaciones eficaces de amistad, paz, comercio y mutua. correspondencia. Y ejerciendo buenos oficios,, los Gobiernos de Estados Unidos de Xorte-America y Mexico, por medio de ihistres repre?entantes, presenciaron las deliberaciones que precedie- ron a la conclusion final de aquellos contratoe internacionales, cele- brados en Washington, merced a bondadoso y de&interesado asilo ctorgado por el ex-Presidente de la Union Americana. Pero es de advertir, que en el texto de aquellos documentos, en el protocolo preliminar ni en las actas respectivas, se consignan para aquellos nobles Gobiernos derechos u obligaciones provenientes de las rela- ciones contraetuales llevadas a termino por los negociadores centre- americanos. ISTada hay en la letra 6 espiritu de aquellos pactos, que pudiera considerarse como restrictive del libre ejercicio de la so- berania de estos pueblos, y solo se nota en ellos el espiritu de amor, re?peto y mutua correspondencia que estan obligados a tributarse ospontaneamente 6 mediante la sancion del arbitrage encomendado u u n Tribunal netamente centroamericano, oomo la Corte de Justicia de la ciial Vnestra Senoria es digno organo/ 7 Yamos a terminar. Tenemos la esperanza 'de haber logrado demostrar que la politica de la "DOLLAR DIPLOMACY" envuelve una gran injusticia, y esta causando la ruina de los paises a que se aplica, a la vez que perjudicando el credito de los EE. UU. en la America Latina y sus legitimos intereses en beneficio de unos pocos privilegiados ciudadanos americanos. Para conseguir la reparation de esa injusticia, no tenemos los centroamericanos medios a nuestro alcance, pero confiamos en la rectitud y honradez del pueblo ameri- cano y de sus dignos representantes en el Congreso, especialmente el Senado, llamado a conocer de esos asuntos. Somos admiradores de este gran pueblo; y muy lejos. esta de nosotoros el creer que es culpable de los errores de algunos de sus gobernantes. Ansiamos- ver que se nos hace justicia, y que renace la fraternidad panameri- cana que ha de dar la paz, el-progreso y la libertad a toda.- l^is naciones del continente. New Orleans, Noviembre de 1912. JUAX LEETS. ANEXOS 51 -&nexo "A." MEMORANDUM. Con instrucciones de mi Gobierno, que acabo de recibir por tele- grafo, tengo el honor y el placer de informar al Gobierno de Hon- duras que la firma de J. Pierpont Morgan & Co. ha avisado a mi 'Gobierno que estan preparados para convenir en el arreglo de la deuda Extranjera de Honduras, la entrega del ferrocarril y muelle de Puerto Cortes y la suministracion de una cantidad sustancial para las mejoras interiores que sean necesarias, adquiriendo bonos nu&vos que serdn debidamente garantizados. Los Sres. Morgan & Co. han notificado a mi Gobierno que la Junta de 'Tenedores de Bonos Extranjeros ha aceptado la propuesta -de Morgan & Cia., que tiene ahora control de las obli- gaciones Inglesas y Americanas, incluyendo el ferrocarril y muelle, y que la Junta de Tenedores de Bonos Extranjeros, obran- tio de parte de los Tenedores de Bonos, ha informado al Ministro de Negocios Extranjeros Britanico de lo anterior y que el Ministro de Negocios Extranjeros, habiendo aprobado lo mas cordialmente el nuevo proyecto, ha, a solicitud de la Junta de Tenedores de Bonos, -dado aviso al Ministro Garden del cambio de la situation. Tengo instrucciones de manifestar que si el Gobierno de Hon- duras enviara un Agente Especial a los Estados Unidos con amplios Poderes para negociar con Morgan & Co., el Gobierno de Estados Unidos le extenderia toda facilidad. Me permito agregar que el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos se siente feliz al ver, en las propuestas indicadas, toda persepctiva de buen exito para un arreglo, sobre una base favorable para la amorti- ^acion de la deuda nacional, que seria en pro de la prosperidad, tranquilidad y fuerza nacional de Honduras. (f ) PHILIP BROWN. Ministro Americano en Honduras. Tegucigalpa, Julio 17 de 1909. 52 Anexo "B." CABLEGKAMAS. Tegucigalpa, Dieiembre 10 de 1910. Paredes, Consulado Honduras, ISTueva York. Acepte propuesta, firme arreglo y regrese. DAVILA. Nueva York, Dieiembre 11 de 1910. Presidente Davilla, Tegucigalpa, Honduras. Consulte situacion personas importantes, resolver suerte Ee- publica. PAREDES. Anexo "B." Nueva York, Dieiembre 24 de 1910. Presidente Davila, Tegucigalpa, Honduras. He rehusado firmar Convencion protectora'do Americano plan Santo Domingo. Cumplido mi deber, presento mi renuncia. PAREDES. Tegucigalpa, Dieiembre 29 de 1910. Paredes, Consulado Honduras, Nueva York. Pais esta al borde de una desastrosa guerra civil. Solo el em- prestito puede salvarlo. Medite patrioticamente. Hay que hacer esfuerzos por ganar tiempo. Emprestito se hara a despecho de nosotros. Procuremos siquiera no ensangrentar Republica. Espero detalles. DAVILA. 53 Anexo B." Tegucigalpa, Enero 20 de 1911. Paredes, Consulado Honduras, Xueva York. No se a'dmite renuncia. Firme emprestito mayor brevedad. Toda la responsabilidad la aoepta el Gobierno. Guerra civil se preserita formidable. Emprestito puede evitar derramamiento de sangre j preparar evolucion provechosa impidiendo que Bonilla llegue al poder. Suscriba contratos esta semana. Conteste. DAVILA. Anexo "B." Tegucigalpa, 12 de Enero de 1910. Sr. Ministro de Honduras, Gral. Juan E. Pare'des, Consulado General de Honduras, 66 Beaver St., New York. Muy estimado amigo : Eecibi sus apreciables cartas del 28 de Xov. y 5 de Die. anteriores. Ante todo debo manifestar a Ud. que se ha creado una situation muy dificil en este pais. La emigracion es mucha, como nunca, y voluntaria, pues los mismos que estan fuera del pais dicen que el Gobierno no los hostiliza, pero que no quieren volver a Honduras sino.en arinas para ejercer venganzas. ESTRADA CABRERA, que es el autor de esta guerra y de la de Agosto del ano proximo anterior, ha desplegado una actividad prodigiosa para que la revolucion se produzca, y los elementos todos se han conjurado contra el Gobier- no, injustamente. Para salir de estas dificultades tenemos que batallar mucho. El Gobierno de Honduras estaba notificado oficialmente de que si no firm-aba el emprestito, este se llevaria a cabo 'de todos modos, en peores condiciones para la Eepublica. Sinembargo nada dijimos, ninguna promesa hicimos sino hasta esperar indicaciones de Ud. La ultima propuesta h'echa por los Banqueros que tTd. nos trasmitio por cablegrama la consideramos como decisiva, y por eso se le dio orden de que firmara y regresara. El Ministro Americano me 54 pidio copia de ese cable y se la di. Cuando ITd. rehuso firmar el, Convenio en Washington, el disgusto del Departamento rayo en. indignacion. DA VILA. Anexo "B." Tegucigalpa, Enero 27.de 1911. Paredes, Consulado Honduras, Nueva York. Tomada La Ceiba. Tambien tornado San Marcos Colon por in- vasion frontera Nicaragua. La guerra segiin declaracion oficial produjose por tardanza en firmar emprestito, no obstante promesa heeha desde 10 Diciembre. Guerra es cruel de partidos enconados que aniquilaran pals, y el emprestito se hara todos modos. Depon- gamos el amor propio y evitemos ruina de Honduras. Si Ud. no- quiere firmar ayudele a Lazo. Trabajemos en la obra comun de la paz. DAVILA. Importantes Manifestaciones Del Ex-Presidente Juan J. Estrada en New York Asegura que las revoluciones estalladas en Nicaragua ban sido fomentadas por companias norteamericanas. j Y pide el Protectorado ! . . . . Del New York Times (fecha 10 de Septiembre) traducimos lo si- guiente : "En el curso de una entrevista que tuvo ayer un reporter del Times con el general Juan J. Estrada, quien vive en Brooklyn en el Hotel St. George, dijo que sin la intervencion efectiva del Go- bierno de Estados Unidos, el estado de guerra continuaria en Ni- caragua y traeria complicaciones a este pals con Inglaterra y Alema- nia. El general Estrada declare que el tiene perfecto derecho & la. 55 Presidencia de Nicaragua, y expreso el convenciniiento de que ciertos norteamericanos son los causantes de la situacion actual de aquella Republica. Acompana a Estrada el general J. M. Moncada, su ex-Ministro. Quiero dirigir por medio de The New York Times, dijo Es- trada, algunas palabras al pueblo norteamerieano, y expresar, sobre todo que sin el Gobierno de Estados Unidos, Nicaragua jamas podra vivir. . . . I Altfde usted al protectorado de Estados Unidos ? le pregunta- mos. Si, contesto, sin embarazo alguno. Hablo de un protectorado al e&tllo del de Panama y Cuba. Desearia yo que el Gobierno de Esta- dos Unidos, republioano 6 democrata, no quite sus ojos de Nicaragua y vigile alia las elecciones; en una palabra, que sea el arbitro y el juez de nuestros destines. Hablo en nombre mio y en el del Presidente Adolfo Diaz. Mis i'deas son sus ideas y las del partido conservador. Ese es el unico camino por donde podemos llegar a la paz y al progreso. Yo soy todavia el Presidente titular de Ni- caragua. Yo no he renunciado ese titulo, como se ha dicho, sino- que simplemente deposite el poder en el vice Pre&idente Diaz du- rante mi ausencia, y el esta mandando dentro del periodo de mi eleccion. Y el general Estrada continue expresandose como sigue: "Durante los ultimos veinte anos Nicaragua ha sido gobernada por un sistema salvaje. Alia no ha habido realmente elecciones. Todo ha sido una farsa. Todos han querido*ser Presidentes. El resultado h'a sido la anarquia, hasta llegar al estado caotico actual. Pero no hemos sido solamente los nicaragiienses la causa de todas esas dificultades ; de ellas somos los menos responsables. Yo aseguro que la mayoria de las revoluciones, sino todas, en los ultimos tiem- pos, han sido fomentadas, apoyadas y 'dirigidas por companiaa norteamericanas ansiosas de obtener de nosotros concesiones y mono- polios de negocios. ^Cual ha sido el resultado? Cuando llegue a. la Presidencia, me encontre con conspiraciones por todos lados. El general Mena s mi Ministro de la Guerra, estaba fraguando una. revolucion. El general Chamorro, otro 'de los jefes que me acom- pafiaron en la revolucion contra Zelaya, tambien estaba conspirando por su cuenta. Se que una compafiia norteamericana, que iba tra& 56 de una concesion de ferrocarril, era la que alentaba el golpe revo- lucionario en contra mia, para hacer su negocio. Tuve las pruebas. y la revolucion iba a estallar el 14 de mayo de 1911. Fuse en arresto a Mena. Aleje de mi lado a Chamorro. Los conservadores que me rodeaban. clamaron unos por la libertad de Mena, y otros se declararon sostenedores de Chamorro. Para evitar la guerra, deposite el poder en el vice Presidente Diaz, habiendo podido ro- dearme de los liberales, en cuyas filas habia yo figurado. En la conspiracion contra mi Gobierna estuvieron interesadas cqmpanias norteamericanas." Termina el reportaje de The Times, asi: "El general Estrada fue rudamente franco, demasiado franco, cuando eoncluyo diciendo que admitia que la revolucion que el ha- bia encabezado contra Zelaya, habia recibido la ayuda nnanciera de ciertas companias norteamericanas, establecidas en la costa atlantica de Nicaragua. Dijo que tales companias contribuyeron para la revolucion de Bluefields, con un millon de dolares; y la casa de Joseph W. Beers con unos doscientos mil, y la de Samuel Weil con cerca de ciento cincuenta mil dolares." Diario del Salvador, Octubre 2, 1912. NOTA DE MR. KXOX AL ENCARGADO DE ^EGOCIOS DE NICARAGUA. "Es notorio que desde que se firmaron las Convenciones de Wash- ington de 1907, el Presidente Zelaya ha mantenido a Centroamerica en constante inquietud y turbulencia ; que ha violado flagrantemente y repetidas veces lo estipulado en dichas Convenciones, y por una influencia poderosa sobre Honduras, cuya neutralidad aseguran las Convenciones, ha tratado de desacreditar aquellas sagradas obligaciones internacionales, con detrimento de Costa Eica, El Salvador y Guatemala, cuyos Gobiernos solo con mucha paciencia han podido mantener lealmente el compromiso solemne contraido en Washington bajo los auspicios de los Estados Fnidos y de Mejico. "Es igualmente notorio que, bajo el regimen del Presidente Zelaya, las instituciones republicanas han dejado de existir en Nica- ragua, excepto de nombre; que la opinion publica y la prensa han sido estranguladas, y que las prisiories han sido el precio de toda demostracion de patriotismo. 57 "P'or consideration personal hacia usted, me abstengo de discutir innecesariamente los penosos detalles de un regimen que, por desgracia, ha sido un borron en la historia de Nicaragua, y un desengario para un grupo de Republicas que solo necesitan la oportunidad para llenar sus aspiraciones de un Gobierno libre y honrado. "Por razon de los intereses de los Estados Unidos y de su partici- pation en las Convenciones de Washington, la mayoria de las Re- publicas de Centroamerica ha llamado desde hace tiempo la atencion a este Gobierno contra tan irregular situation. Ahora se agrega el clamor de una gran parte del pueblo nicaragiiense por medio de la revolution de Bluefields, y el hecho de que dos americanos, que, segun conviction adiquirada por este Gobierno, eran oficiales al servicio de las fuerzas revolucionarias, y, por consiguiente, tenian derecho a ser tratados conforme a las practicas modernas de las naciones civilizadas, han sido fusilados por orden directa del Presi- dente Zelaya, habiendo precedido a su ejecucion, segun informes, las mas barbaras crueldades. Ahora viene informe oficial de que el Consulado americano en Managua ha sido amenazado, y con esto se colma el proceder siniestro de una administration caracterizada tambien por la tirania sobre sus propios ciuda.danos, y que hasta el reciente ultra je hacia este pals se habia manifestado en una serie de pequenas molestias e indignidades que hicieron imposible desde hace algunos meses mantener una Legation en Managua. Desde todo punto de vista es evidente que ha llegado a ser dificil para los Estados Unidos retardar mas una actitud decidida, en atencion a los deberes que tiene para con sus propios ciudadanos, con su dignidad, con Centroamerica y con la civilization. ' "El Gobierno de los Estados U'nidos esta convencido de que la revolution actual representa los ideales y la voluntad de la mayoria de los nicaragiienses mas fielmente que el Gobierno del Presidente Zelaya, y que con su centro pacifico es tan extenso como el que tan cruelmente ha tratado de mantener el Gobierno de Managua. "A todo esto se agrega ahora que, segun informe *oficiado de diversas fuentes, han aparecido indicios en las provincias occi- dentales de Nicaragua de un levantamiento en favor de un candi- date presidencial intimamente ligado con el viejo regimen, en el cual es facil ver nuevos elementos que tienden a una condieion-de, anarquia, que pueden llegar con el tiempo a destruir toda fuente de 58 Gobierno responsable con el cual pueda el de los Estados Unidos discutir la reparacion por la muerte de Cannon y Groce, y hasta dificultar la proteccion con que debe asegurarse a los ciudadanos y los intereses americanos de Nicaragua. "En estas circunstancias, el Presidente de los Estados Unidos ya no puede sentir por el Gobierno del Presidente Zelaya aquel respeto y confianza que debia mantener en sus relaciones diplomaticas, que comprenden el deseo y la facultad de conservar el respeto debido entre un Estado y otro. "El Gobierno de Nicaragua que usted ha representado hasta ahora se servira quedar enterado por la presente notificacion, que lo sera tambien al jefe de la revolucion, de que el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos le hara estrictamente responsable de la proteccion de la vida de los americanos, e igualmente a las facciones de hecho que dominan las regiones del este y del oeste de la Republica de Nicaragua. "Respecto de la reparacion que debe hacerse por la muerte de los Sres. Cannon y Groce, el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos se resiste a imponer al inocente pueblo de Nicaragua un castigo tan pesado en expiacion de las culpas de un regimen mantenido por la fuerza, 6 a exigir del Gobierno que surja, si este sigue una politica diferente, en pago de aquella penalidad. "Al discutirse esta reparacion, debe discutirse al mismo tiempo la existencia en Managua de un Gobierno capaz de responder a la demanda. "Debe tambien considerarse hasta donde puede llegar la responsa- bilidad de los que perpetraron el hecho, y las torturas que pre- cedieron a la ejecucion, si esto se comprueba; y la cuestion de si el nuevo Gobierno esta enteramente desligado de las presenter intolerables condiciones, y es digno de que se le tenga confianza de evitar la repeticion de actos semejantes. "El tal caso, el Presidente de los Estados Unidos, como amigo que es de Nicaragua y de las otras Repiiblicas de Centroamerica, estara dispuesto a reducir la indemnizacion a lo que realmente se deba a los padres de los fusilados, y exigir el castigo solamente de aquellos que lo merezcan. "De acuerdo con esta politica, el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos suspendera temporalmente su demanda de reparacion, mientras tanto, dara los pasos necesarios para la debida proteccion de los intereses americanos. "Para asegrirar la futura proteccion de los legitimos intereses americanos, y en consideracion a los intereses de la mayoria de las Kepiiblicas centroamericanas, lo mismo que con la esperanza de hacer mas efectivos los oficios amistosos establecidos por las Con- venciones de Washington, el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos se reserva para tiempos mas oportunos el discutir las estipulaciones con que el Gobierno constitucional de Nicaragua se obligue, por medio de una Convencion, en beneficio de todos los Gobiernos interesados, a garantizar en lo futuro el mantenimiento de las Con- venciones de Washington y sus ideas pacificas y progresistas. "Por todo lo anterior., usted debe de comprender que ha terminado su mision de Encargado de Xegocios, y tengo el honor de remitir adjunto su pasaporte para el caso de que usted quiera salir del pais. "Debo agregarle al mismo tiempo que, aunque su mision diplo- matica ha terminado, tendre mucho gusto en recibir a usted, lo mismo que tendre el gusto de recibir al representante de la revolu- cion; uno y otro como medios no oficiales de comunicacion entre el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos y las autoridades de facto, con quienes habre de tratar para la proteccion de los intereses ameri- canos, mientras se establece en Nicaragua un Gobierno con el cual puedaii los Estados Unidos mantener relaciones diplomat! cas. Knox." AXEXO "E." MEXSAJE dirigido por el S.erior Presidente Madriz al de los Estados Unidos Mr. Taft, con motivo del desembarque de marinos de los buques de guerra americanos en Bluefields. Campo Marte, 15 de Junio, 1910. Exmo Senor Presidente William H. Taft, Washington: Permitame V. E. referirme a ciertos hechos relacionados con nuestra guerra civil. El 27 de Mayo ultimo las fuerzas de este Gobierno tomaron por asalto el Bluff, posicion fuerte que defiende a Bluefields. El jefe de esas fuerzas tenia orden de proceder inmediatamente a tomar la eiudad que se hallaba desguarnecida, lo que habria asegurado el termino de la eampaiia. Esto se frustro por la actitnd del Co- 60 mandante del Crucero Americano Paducah, que intimo al jefe do nuestras tropas que se opondria con sus fuerzas a la toma do la ciudad y que, al efecto, desembarco marinos americanos para ocuparla. Con esto la revolucion aseguro su base de operaciones, pudo sacar de la ciudad todas sus fuerzas,, para oponerlas a una sola de nuestras oolumnas, y &e frustro una combinacion preparada cuida- dosamente y de exito seguro. Este Gobierno compro en N r ueva Orleans el barco ingles VENUS, hoy Maximo Jerez, que salio para San Juan del Norte con licencia de las an tori dad es americanas, despues de exh'ibir BONA FIDE todos los elementos de guerra que traia a bordo como articulos de libre comercio. En San Juan del Norte fue nacionalizado como buque nicaragiiense, armado en guerra y destinado a bloquear el puerto de Bluefields. El bloqueo tenia por objeto impedir que Li revolucion siguiera recibiendo como antes, armus, provisiones y recursos de New Orleans. El Gobierno de V. E. ha negado a nues- tro barco el derecho de bloqueo respecto de los buques americanos y ha quedado abierta a la revolucion la fuente de New Orleans. La toma del Bluff dio a este Gobierno posesion de la Aduana de Bluefields, con lo que esperaba privar a la revolucion de la renta de la Aduana. El Gobierno de V. E. ha declarado que los derechos de Aduana cleben pagarse a la revolucion, y esto ha frustrado en gran parte la victoria de nuestras annas en el Bluff. El Gobierno de Y. E. nos ha negado el derecho de impedir el paso f rente al Bluff de la naves americanas que vayan con destino a una aduana revolucionaria que acaba de establecerse en Schooner Key, sobre el rio Escondido, no obstante el decreto de este Gobierno que cierra el puerto y prohibe ese transito como medida necesaria de defensa y pacificacion. Un dia el Comandante del Paducah amenazo al del Maximo Jerez con hacer fuego contra este y hundirlo, si nuestras fuerzas -intentaban atacar a Bluefields. Habiendo notado el jefe de nuestras tropas en el Bluff, quo embarcaciones al servicio de la revolucion usaban la bandera ameri- cana para pasar f rente a la fortaleza sin ser detenidas, notifico al Comandante del Paducah su resolucion de impedir el libre transito de esos barcos f rente a sus posiciones. Los Comandantes del Pa- ducah y del Dubuque contestaron que harian respeiar con los fuegos 61 de sus canones el comercio americano, aunque consistiese en armas y mumdones para la revolucion y que un disparo contra esas embarcaciones significaria declarar la guerra a los Estados Unidos. For ultimo .se que en Bluefields, guardaclo aun por marines americanos se prepara un ataque sobre nuestras posiciones del Bluff y Laguna de P'erlas. La intimacion del Comandante del Paducah LOS impide anticiparnos a la accion -del enemigo como por legitima defensa tenemos derecho de hacerlo. Es mi deber deeir francamente a V. E. que no hallo modo de conciliar los hechos enumerados con los principios de la neutralidad proclamados por la ley de las naciones; y teniendo confianza en la -alta rectitud del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos, no vacilo en dirisrirme a V. E. para pedirle respetuosamente la rectificacion de las ordenes dadas a sus autoridades navales en Bluefields. Asi podra este Gobierno concluir facilmente con una revolucion san- grienta y asoladora que carece de vida propia y que esta labrando la ruina. de Nicaragua. Presidente (f) JOSE MADRIZ. AXEXO "E." A Ministro Relacionep, Managua: WASHINGTON, junio 19 de 1910. Permanece inalterable la politica de los Estados Unidos expuesta en la carta del Secretario de Estado, del 1 de diciembre de 1909, al sefior Rodriguez entonces Encargado de Negocios, por la cual se rompieron las relaciones con el Gobierno de Zelaya. Esta carta y la aplicacion conforme de la misma politica a la situacion que ha venido creandose, han sido debidamente publicadas. Respecto a lo que dice el telegrama del Dr. Madriz al Presidente, el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos no hizo mas que dar el paso acostumbrado de prohibir el bombardeo 6 combates a cualquiera de las dos facciones dentro de la indefensa ciudad comercial de Blue- fields, protegiendo de ese modo los intereses americanos y otros intereses extranjeros, de la misma manera que lo habia heeho el comandante britanico, respecto de San Juan del Korte, en donde hay grandes intereses britanicos. El Gobierno de los Estados 62 Unidos ha reconocido el derecho de ambas facciones de mantener el bloqueo, pero ha rehusado permitir a buques que han sido ilegal y clandestinamente alistados en aguas americanas, molestar al comercio americano. El Gobierno de los Estados Unidos simplemente exige que cada faccion cobre derechos solo en el territorio que se halle bajo su dominio de facto j no permitira que se recauden dobles dereclws.. . Si hubiese ocurrido alguna violacion de la neutralidad, eso fue en relacion con la salida del Venus, de Nueva Orleans en calidad de expedicion de la faccion de Madriz. (f.) Kxox. ANEXO "E." COPIA. Managua, 23 de Junio de 1910. For el derecho de gentes ningun Gobierno neutral puede impedir ni estorbar en tiempo de guerra las operaciones militares que los beligerantes ejecutan legitimamente. Los extranjeros estan sujetos todas las contingencias de esas operaciones lo mismo que los na- cionales. En consecnencia, no puedo considerar legal el hecho de que marines americanos hayan impedido las operaciones de nuestro ejercito sobre Bluefields. Eespecto de la salida del "Venus" de Nueva Orleans, tengo la conviccion de que no ha habido violacion de las leyes de los Estados Unidos. Ademas, el zarpe dado por las autoridades de ISTueva Orleans unicamente obligaba a la nave a guardar neutralidad du- rante el viaje, como sucedio en efecto. Terminado el viaje para el cual se habia dado el zarpe, entrada la nave en aguas agenas y nacionalizada conforme a las leyes nicaragiienses, las leyes y auto- ridades de los Estados Unidos nada han tenido que ver con el destino ulterior del buque, el cual ha podido y puede de derecho ejercitar todas las operaciones de la guerra, entre las cuales figura el bloqueo. Omito, por ahbra, observar otros detalles de la nota de Mr. Knox ; pero quiero hacer constar la seguridad que abrigo de que sin la 63 interposicion de las autoridades navales de los Estados Unidos en Bluefields, en la forma que explica mi cablegrams al Senor Presi- dente Taft, Bluefields estaria tornado, la revolucion vencida y Nica- ragua en paz. (f) MADRIZ. ANEXO "E." TELEGEAMA. 4 Bluff a las 5 p. m. del 23 de Julio de 1912. Senor Comandante General, Managua. El Senor Delegado del Ejecutivo me trascribio de San Juan del ISTorte el telegrama que Ud. le dirijio a el, trascribiendole el cable del Senor Consul General de Noruega en la Habana; tambien me trascribe los telegramas en que le habla de los vapores "Hiriam" y "Ulstein" y me dio instrucciones de lo que debia hacer a la llegada de dichos vapores. Como se me anuncio que estaban a la vista vapores, crei fuere el "Hiriam," nice dos comunicaciones : una dirijida al Capitan del vapor y otra al Comandante de las fuerzas iiavales de EE. UU. f rente a esta fortaleza, las que dicen asi : "Bluff 21 de Julio de 1910. Senor Capitan del vapor "Hiriam," f rente el Bluff. Trascribole: "(Aqui el cable trascrito por el senor Delegado del Ejecutivo y dirijido por el Senor Consul General de ISToruega en la Habana)" Tengo informes fidedignos que Ud. trae Mementos de guerra a bordo para la revolucion encabezada por el General Juan J. Estrada, En consecuencia y de conformidad con las clausulas del cable antes trascrito, prevengo a Ud. entregar a este mando dichos elementos y de no hacerlo asi, sera confiscado el vapor de su mando de conformidad con la leyes de mi pais, decli- nando en Ud. de una vez, toda responsabilidad, y ademas le ad- vierto que la conducta que Ud. observe en este asunto, la pondre en conocimiento de mi Gobierno para que el a su vez, la ponga en conocimiento del Gobierno de Noruega, si asi lo estimare con- veniente. No dudo que Ud., penetrado del derecho y justicia que nos asiste, no opondra dificultades para la entrega de dichos ele- mentos. El presente es duplicado para que al pie de uno de los ejemplare?, se sirva acusarme recibo. De Ud. S. S. (f ) F. M. Eivas. Inspector General de la Costa Atlantica." 64 La segunda es como sigue: "El Bluff, 21 de Julio de 1910. Sefior: Me permito trascribir a Ud. la comunicacion que con fecha 16 del mes y ano corrientes, he recibido del Sefior Delegado del Ejecutivo. San Juan del Norte 16 del Julio de 1910. Senor General don Fernando M. Kivas. El Bluff. Con fecha 12 del corriente mes, me dice el Sefior Presidente, por telegrafo, que el Ministro General, Dr. Baca, ha recibido del Consul General de Noruega en la Habana el siguiente cable. (Aqui el cable.) Este mando ha tenido noticias fidedignas que el vapor "Hiriam" trae elementos de guerra para revolucion que encabeza el General don Juan J. Estrada. Dirijo una comunicacion al Capitan de dicho vapor pidiendole la entrega de dichos elementos a este, apoyado en los coneeptos del cable antes trascrito. No dudo que Ud., impuesto de dicho cable, se convencera de la justicia y derecho que nos asiste, al expedir dichas ordenes a las cuales creo no pondra dificultades de ninguna especie, y caso tuviera objecion que hacer, espero se servira participarmelo por escrito antes de que Ud. permita la entrada del Vapor "Hiriam" para Bluefields, cosa que dudo por el conocimiento que tengo de la neutralidad del Gobierno y del modo como Ud. lo ha sabido interpretar. De Ud. atto. SS., (f) F. M. Eivas, Inspector general de la Costa Atlantica, al Comandante de las fuerzas tfavales de EE. UU. frente al Bluff/' Este me contesto lo siguiente: "Xo. B 6110, U. S. A. "Dubuque" 3ra. clase, en la Eada de Bluefields, Nicaragua, C. A., 22 de Julio de 1910. Senor. Iro. Tengo el honor de acusar recibo de &u comunicacion de 21 de Julio de 1910. Requerire a los vapores para que anclen cerca de mi buque mientras se determina la calidad de su cargamento ; entonces tomare la actitud que las circunstancias demanden de acuerdo con las instrucciones de mi Gobierno con relacion a la proteccion del comercio Americano y al mantenimiento de la neutralidad. Respe- tuosamente, (f) H. R. Rines, Comandante Naval de los EE. UU. al mando de los marines presentes en la costa Oriental de Nicara^ gua, al General F. M. Rivas, Comandante del Bluff." "Nicaragua. C. A." Anoche llego el vapor "Ulstein;" inmediatamente le mande un oficio igual al que diriji al Capitan del "Hiriam," pero se nego a recibirlo, manifestando que si algo querian con el, que se entendie- 65 ran con el Comandante del "Dubuque." Las comunicaciones f ueron entregadas a este Jef e, el cual manifesto que no respondia de que el Capitan del "Ulstein" quisiera 6 no recibir la comunica- eion, ni mucho menos firmar el duplicado que le mandaba como comprobante de que le habia enviado dicha comunicacion. Adema?, el Comandante del "Dubuque" manifesto a los senores General Francisco Altschul y don Ofilio Argiiello, que me sirve de interprete, que el era partidario de los revolucionarios y que le habia dicho al Capitan del "Ulstein" que si queria no se pusiera en comunica- cion con nosotros; que el lo apoyaba de una inanera incondicional y al efecto, puso soldados y le ordeno entrara al puerto de Blut> fields, lo que verifico hoy. He dirijido una protesta al representante del Consul de Xoruega en Bluefields contra la conducta del Capitaa del '^tristein," encabezando dicha protesta con la trascripcion del cable del Consul General de Xoruega en la Habana, Esta comuni- cacion sera remitida a su destine por medio del Comandante del "Dubuque" en caso quiera llevarla, dada la hostilidad de esto Oficial de la Armada Americana, dudo llegue a su destino. Mien- tras en esta no haya una embarcacion de guerra al mando de un Jefe neutral que pertenezca a otra Xacion, los intereses del Go- bierno de Ud. estan a merced de los oficiales de la Armada Ameri- cana, que se inspiran en los consejos del Consul Americano en Bluefields, que es mas revolucionario que Estrada y Chamorro. Su subalterno, (f) F. M. KIVAS. Anexo E "Nueva York, a la 1:15 p. m. del 7 de diciembre. Presidente, Managua. Revolucion y este Gobierno no aceptan nunca Iriae. Deposito en Dolores Estrada impedira mas derrame de sangre y desembarque americanos. Lea nota Knox a Rodriguez. Bolanos." "Xueva York, a las 6 :40 p. m. del -17 de diciembre. Presidente. Managua. Juzgase falso nombramiento Madriz,: no sera recono- cido por este Gobierno ni los de Centroamerica, y no terminaru revolucion. Bolanos." "Xueva Orleans, a las 3 p. m. del 6 de noviembre. Presidente. Managua. Adolfo Diaz cablegrafio, via Guatemala, pidiendo- urgentemente 1,000 rifles y 300,000 cartuchos. Altschul." 66 Orleans, a las 7 p. m. del 9 de noviembre. Presidente. Managf a, Guatemala avisa a Bluefields cargamento aun no ha sido pagado. Ultimo octubre enviara Bocas una gran cantitad cartnch'os ; tambien hombres. De Bluefields contesto Diaz : "Tra- taremos sostener hasta llegada vapor/ 5 Altsch.ul/ 3 "JSTueva Orleans, a las 7:40 a. m. del 17 de noviembre. Presi- dente. Managua. Elementos de guerra llegaron a Bluefields ; parecen ser los mismos avisados por telegrafo semana pasada, pro- cedentes Bocas. Buque "TTlstein" sale ahora para Puerto Barrios: lleva elementos de guerra. Altschul." "Nueva Orleans, a las 8 :38 del 18 de noviembre. Presidente. Managua. ULSTEUST llegara a Puerto Barrios domingo, para trasladar 44 cajas rifles y 114,000 oartuchos a una gasolina que los llevara a Bluefields. Guatemala usa Puerto Barrios como base xevolucion. Altschul/' "Bluefields, 15 de noviembre. Presidente de Guatemala. Si no se reciben ekmentos de guerra antes del 20, revolucion debe ser abandonada. DIAZ." Cabrera contesto: "ULSTEIN, con ele- mentos de guerra, llegara dentro pocos dias." "Nueva Orleans, a las 11 a. m. del 24 de noviembre. Presidente. Managua. ULSTEIN" salio para Bluefields lunes, procedente de Puerto Barrios; llegara manana a Bluefields. Altschul." Anexo E "Bluefields, Feb. 4/10. Eita Guatemala. (Estrada Cabrera.) Las ultimas nuevas son, Chamorro Camoapa. Mena en Santo Tomas ahora listo combinar con Chamorro. Con ansias espero "ARTE." Diaz." "Bluefields, Feb. 5/10. Saenz Guatemala. (Estrada Cabrera.) ISTenesi tamos urgentemente 200.000 cartuchos Remington 43 y 50,000 cartuchos. Puede listed ordenar pronto envio? Ofrezco mi garantia. Adolfo Diaz." 67 -"Boaco, Feb. 4/10, via Bluefields. Saenz (Guatemala. Triunfando. Antonio Mendez M." (General Guatemalteco.) "Bluefields, Marzo 7/10. Saenz Guatemala. (Estrada Cabrera.) Asuntos de Estado en actualidad. Paz esta enteramente en sus manos. Washington TANZIMAT sin consultar a Ud. en materia. "Bluefields, Nov. 8 Aramburu New York. Pregunta Castrillo cual es la opinion en Washington referent* a la nueva Kepublica. Salio vapor? si no, cual es la causa? Cuando saldni? Conteste inmediatamente por clave Western Union. Diaz." "Washington, D. C. ? Enero 13. Estrada Bluefields. Aconsejan no escuchar Kimball. Castrillo." "Washington, D. d, Enero 14. Estrada Bluefields. Departamento no autoriza Kimball. Castrillo/' "Washington, D. C., Enero 14. Estrada Bluefields. ' Departamento informa Madriz debilisimo. Castrillo." Anexo E ^Washington, Feb. IS/10. l^strada Bluefields Departamento procedera favor nuestro. Castrillo." 68 "Bluefields, Feb. 11/10. Castrillo Washington. m Sabemos positivamente %ladriz no tiene elementos guerra y trata conseguirlos Costa Rica, Honduras. Nuestras operacione? continuan fuertemente. Ejercito Chamorro cada dia mas fuerte. Corea alienta Madriz. Continue lueha pretendiendo apoyo moral armada americana Corinto y gabinete Washington influencia Me- xico. Estrada." "Bluefields, Feb. 9/10. Chamorro Panama. Quiero saber cuantos americanos puede Ud. alistar inmediata- mente. Puedo mandar vapor Senator. Depende de su contesta- cion. Diaz." "Colon,, Feb. 14/10. Diaz Bluefields. Puedo alistar no mienos de 25 americanos. Si puede mandar vapor avise que dia llegara con seguridad al puerto de embarque. Chamorro." ANEXO F FEAGMENTO DEL MENSAJE QUE EL PRESIDENTS MADRIZ DE NICA- RAGUA ESCRIBIO DE su PROPIALETRA PARA SER'I^RESENTADO AL CONGRESO NACIONAL SIN TENER TIEMPO DE HACERLO. Sin embargo no puedo dejar de referifme a la principal de ellas,. por que es la que explica la transicion politica que acabo de comunicaros. Me refiero a la intervencion de los Estados Unidos en nuestra contienda domestica. Esa intervencion ya la conoceis por el mensaje cablegrafico que sobre el particular dirigi al Presidente Taft. Suscintamente os dare una idea de^ella. Frustradas las negociaeiones de paz que hubo a mediados de Marzo ultimo, entre este Gobierno y la faccion de Bluefields por haber pretendido' el General Estrada establecer condiciones que TO e incompatibles con la dignidad de la Eepiiblica, fue precise, para tratar de definir la situacion, continuar nuestras operaciones militares sobre al campo enemigo. Al efecto se enviaron por la via de tierra dos ejercitos : uno sobre Bluefields a las ordenes .del General Don Paulino Godoy y otro sobre Eama a las del General Don Benito Chavarria. Por mar se despaeharon de San Juan del Norte dos barcos armados en guerra, el Maximo Jerez, antes Venus, y el San Jacinto, bajo el mando del Delegado del Ejecutivo, Dr. Julian Irias y el Jefe Expedicionario General Fernando M. Rivas. Las naves llevaban fuerzas suficientes de desembarco para asaltar El Bluff y atacar a Bluefields, en tanto que la columna del General Godoy empenase combate con las fuerzas revolucionarias que se hallaban fortificadas fuero de la ciudad. Los barcos debian desde luego establecer el bloque de Bluefields y cerrarlo por complete al comercio exterior para privar a los revolucionarios de los refuerzos y auxilios que les-llegaban de ^j"ew Orleans. La combinacion de estas operaciones debia dar por resultado la caida de Bluefields, que liabia quedado sin defensa, y la derrota 6 el sometimiento de la revolucion, privada por el bloqueo de toda cooperacion exterior, sin la cual no podia subsistir. En la brillante Jornada del 27 de Junio las tropas del Maximo Jerez tomaron por asalto El Bluff, que se creia inexpugnable. Su posesion ponia en nuestras manos a Bluefields. El ejercito del General Godoy empeno contra las posiciones enemigas formidables y sangrientos combates que habrian sido coronadbs por la victoria si nuestras fuerzas del Bluff hubieran podido despojar al enemigo de su base de operaciones y atacarle por la retaguardia. La columna del General Chavarria derroto a los revolucionarios en El Toyal, cerca de Eama, y si nuestras fuerzas hubiesen vencido en Bluefields, Eama habria caido necesariamente. Pero en el momento decisive, cuando todo el pais contemplaba con satisfaccion el advenimiento de la paz, el poder de los Estados ITnidos se cruzo en nuestro camino, impidio nuestra victoria, y condense) de nuevo esa nube de sangre y de muerte que con dolor Temos toda via flotar en el horizonte de la patria. El Comandante del crucero americano Paducah, estacionado en aguas de Bluefields, aduciendo razones inconsistentes a la luz del derecbo, intervino directamente en la contienda, protegiendo a los rebeldes, coartando la accion de nuestras annas v frustrando el 70 resultado de nuestros sacrificios y de nuestra- victoria en El Bluff. Al efecto desembarco marines para proteger a Bluefields e impedir el ataque de nuestras fuerzas a la ciudad rebelde, y segiin el relata de americanos imparciales, cuyos informes ha publicado la prensa de los Estados Unidos, los marinos americanos han ido a reforzar las posiciones del ejercito de Estrada, desempenando el oficio de soldados de la revolucion. Esta pudo sacar de la ciudad todas sus fuerzas y llevarlas a combatir contra las nuestras, segura de que su base estaba invenciblemente defendida por los marinos ameri- canos. No se justifica esa conducta con la proteccion debida a los intereses extranjeros y principalmente a los americanos radicados en Bluefields. El Derecho Internacional no autoriza esa excepcion a los incon- testables fueros de la soberania y de la beligerancia. Como soberanos podiamos imponer nuestra autoridad en una ciudad nicaragiiense : como beligerantes podiamos atacar y destruir al enemigo en cualquiera parte que no fuese territorio ageno. Bluefields era la cuna y el asiento de la revolucion; alii estaba su Gobierno, alii el deposito de sus recursos, provisiones y armas. Tomarla 6 rendirla era destruir la base de la revolucion. En cuanto al peligro de los intereses americanos, la ley internacional establece que los extranjeros residentes en un lugar estan sujetos a todas las contingencias de las operaciones de guerra ejecutadas legitimamente por un beligerante. Esta tesis, indiscutible en principio, fue sostenida por el Gobierno americano cuando el bombardeo de San Juan del Norte, ciudad abierta, desarmada, puramente comercial, ,por el buque Cyane, de la marina de guerra de los Estados Unidos el ano de 1854. Hay mas : este Gobierno compro en New Orleans el buque Venus, de la marina mercante inglesa. Antes de zarpar el buque con destino a San Juan del Norte, los agentes de la revolucion en New Orleans trataron de impedir su salida por medio de las autoridades de aquel puerto, alegando violacion de las leyes de los Estados Unidos. Las autoridades examinaron cuidadosamente el caso, inspeccionaron la nave, oyeron las pruebas pfoducidas por una y otra parte v con consulta de los Departamentos de Justicia y Comercio del Gobierno Americano, resolvieron que el viaje de la nave no podia impedirse conforme a las leyes de los Estados Unidos. El Venus traia a bordo armas destinadas al Gobierno de Nicaragua en San Juan del Norte, 71 pero en los Estados Unidos el comercio de armas es libre, salvo el derecho del beligerante para confiscarlas como contrabando de- guerra. El Venus salio de New Orleans llevando sus papeles en regla y el zarpe de las autoridades del puerto. La licencia que se le habia otorgado a lo sumo obligaba a la nave a guardar neutralidad durante el viaje. No podia extenderse a mas, sobre todo no siendo americana la bandera del buque. El Venus guardo las condiciones del zarpe hasta el puerto de su destino y llego desarmado a San Juan del Norte. Alii se verifico a presencia y con intervencion del senor Consul Britanico el cambio de la 'bandera inglesa por la nicaragiiense, despues de lo cual se armo la nave en guerra y se la destino a operar contra los rebeldes de Bluefields. Nada hubo en todo eso que lesionara las leyes de los Estados Unidos, ni la ley internacional. Con todo, el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos ha declarado que el Venus no puede ejercer contra el comercio ameri- cano el derecho de registro en alta mar ni el de bloqueo, so pretexto- de que habia salido de New Orleans enganando a la's autoridades de- les Estados Unidos. Con eso quedaron abiertas para la revolucion todas las fuentes exteriores de que habia venido alimentandose, en especial la de New Orleans, de donde han salido ultimamente considerable- remesas de pertrechos de guerra con destino a la revolucdon. Este- hecho explica claramente el empeno que ha habido en impedir el bloqueo. En El Bluff se hallaba establecida la aduana principal de la costa r por una ley anterior a la revolucion. La posesion de este puerto nos dio el dominio de la aduana y el derecho de hacer nuestro el pro- ducto de la renta. El G-obierno americano declare que ese producto- correspondia a la faccion de Estrada y dispuso que el comercic* americano lo pagase a la revolucion en una nueva aduana que esta ha creado en Schooner Key, sobre el rio Escondido. Estando nosotros en posesion del Bluff podiamos todavia impedir la entrada al rio a todas las embarcaciones que intentasen penetrar hasta la aduana revolucionaria. Los Comandantes del Paducah y del Dubuque amenazaron con el fuego de sus canones al Jefe de nuestras fuerzas en El Bluff, si intentaba interceptar el comercio- americano. Un disparo, le dijeron, hecho contra una embarcacion que lleve bandera americana sera considerado como una declaracion de guerra contra los Estados Unidos. 72 Para asegurar la impunidad del transito de las naves por delante del Bluff, los Comandantes notificaron que pondrian siempre a bordo de aquellas una guardia .de marinos americanos, *y eso ban hecho invar iablemente. Hoy, por virtud de aquella intimacion, pasan frente al Bluff con la bandera americana toda clase de embarcaciones, inclusive goletas de San Andres y Providencia, cargadas de provisiones para Bluefields. Mas aun, hasta un re- molcador empleado por el enemigo en operacoines de guerra y que una vez hizq fuego sobre una lancha que llevaba gente nuestra, pasa frente al Bluff protegido por la bandera americana, Cuando nuestras fuerzas hubieron ocupado toda la costa, desde 'San Juan del Norte hasta el Cabo de Gracias, el Delegado del Poder Ejecutivo mando establecer una aduana en Laguna de Perlas para el cobro de derechos sobre la importacion y exportacion de los distritos sujetos a nuestra autoridad. El Comandante del Dubuque contesto a la notificacion que se le hizo de este acuerdo, imponiendo restricciones que practicamente equivalian a dejar siempre en manos de la faccion de Estrada las rentas de la Costa. En fin, no obstante la ocupacion de Bluefields por los marinos americanos y la neu- tralidad en que se aparentaba mantenerla, se preparo alii un ataque sobre nuestra posicion de Laguna de Perlas, sin que nos haya sido posible prevenir el intento del enemigo llevando antes nuestras armas al centro de sus maquinaciones. Como algunos de los buques que navegan entre los puertos de los Estados Unidos y Bluefields son de nacionalidad noruega, este Gobierno gestiono ante el de Xoruega para que hiciese respetar por su bandera la clausura del puerto de Bluefields. Ese Gobierno, que habia reconocido la legitimidad del mio, se creyo en el deber de deferir a la peticion y al efecto dio sus instrucciones en ese sentido a sus legaciones en Washington y la Habana, y al Vice- consul noruego en Bluefields. El Gobierno americano intervino oficiosamente con una comunicacion dirigida al Ministro noruego en Washington, objetando aquella orden so pretexto de que el bloqueo de Bluefields era imperfecto y fyue perjudicaba los intereses del comercio americano. Habiendo llegado a Bluefields el vapor noruego Tlstein, del que teniamos aviso que era portador de elementos de guerra para la revolucion, se le dirigio un oficio por nuestro Comandante en El Bluff previniendole la entrega del contrabando de guerra que trajese 73 a bordo. El Capitan del Ulstein se nego a recibir la comunicacion, y contraviniendo a nuestras ordenes y a las de su propio Soberano, entro a continuacion en el puerto custodiado por los marinos del Dubuque. Con motive de haber contestado el Comandante del Bluff al fuego de artilleria que le han hecho los revohicionarios estacionadas en Halfway Key, y de que uno de sus proyectiles cayo cerca de Blue- fields, el Comandante del Dubuque le comunico que la repeticion de ese heclio seria considerado como bombardeo a Bluefields. AXEXO "G." Depositado en Managua a las 11 p. m. del 14 de Setbre. 1912. Kecibicio en Bluefields a las 12 m. del 15. Senores Jefes PoKticos, Gobernador e Intendente y Comandantes de Armass Trascribo a Ud. la siguiente comunicacion que con fecha 13 del corriente dirigio a esta Secretaria el Exelentisimo Seiior Ministro de los EE. UU. George F. Weitzel, a fin de que se sirva darle la mayor publicidad : "Legacion de los EE. UU. de America, Managua 13 de Setiembre de 1912. Excelencia. Tengo la honra de informal a V. E. que el Departamento de Esta do me ha dado instrucciones por cable de trascribir al Gobierno de V. E. y de modo no oficial a los jefes rebeldes, asi como hacer publica la siguiente declaracion autorizada de la politica de los EE. UU. en los presentes disturbios. La poli- tica del Gobierno de EE. UU. en los presentes disturbios de Nica- ragua, es tomar las medidas necesarias para una proteccion adecua- cla de la Legacion de Managua, mantener abiertas las comunica- ciones, protejer la vida y la propiedad americana. Al desconocer a Zelaya a cnyo regimen de barbaric y currupcion puso termino la Xacion Xicaragiiense despues de una sangrienta guerra, el gobierno de Estados Unidos condeno no solo al individuo sino el sistema y este gobierno no podria tolerar ningun movimiento para restablecer el mismo regimen destructive. El gobierno de Estados Unidos en consecuencia se opondra a cualquier restauracion del Zelayismo y prestara su eficaz apoyo moral a la causa del buen gobierno legal- mente constituido para beneficio del pueblo de Nicaragua a quien ha tratado de ayudar hace largo tiempo en su justa aspiracion had a la paz y prosperidad bajo un gobierno constitutional y de orden. Un grupo como de 125 plantadores amerieanos residentes en una region de Nicaragua, han pedido proteccion. Como dos docenas de casas americanas que hacen negocios en aquel pals han pedido pro- teccion, los bancos amerieanos que han hecho inversiones de fondps en ferrooarriles y vapores en Nicaragua como parte de un plan para el alivio de la angustiosa situacion financiera de aquel, han pedido proteccion. Los ciudadanos amerieanos que estan ahora en servicio del gobierno de Nicaragua y hasta la propia Legacion se han visto expuestos a peligro inmediato durante los fuegos. Dos ciudadanos amerieanos se dice que han sido barbaramente asesinados : ademas del reclamo Emery, dedido a ciudadanos ameriaanos, y de la indem- nizacion por la muerte de Cannon y Groce durante la guerra de Zelaya, hay varias reclamaciones de amerieanos e intereses origina- dos por concesiones en Washington. Los Estados Unidos tienen el compromiso de ejercer su influencia para el mantenimiento de la paz general que esta seriamente amenazada por el presente levanta- miento y en este sentido hacer cumplir extrictarnente las conven- ciones de Washington y prestar debido apoyo a sus designios y pro- positos. Todas las republicas Centro Americanas pueden contar con poderosos medios de cooperacion. He aqui los importantes intereses morales, politicos y materiales que requieren proteccion. Cuando el ministro americano pidio al gobierno de Nicaragua que protegiera la vida y propiedades americanas, el ministro de Relaciones Exteriores respondio que las tropas del gobierno debian ocuparse en debelar la rebelion, agregando en consecuencia : "Mi gobierno desea que el gobierno de Estados Unidos garantice con sus propias fuerzas la seguridad y la prosperidad de los ciudadanosr amerieanos en Nicaragua y que haga extensiva la proteccion a todos los habitantes de la Republica." En esta situacion la politica de los Estados Unidos sera protejer la vida y propiedad de sus ciuda- danos de manera indicada para protejer al gobierno legal y organic zado de tal manera que Nicaragua puede reanudar su programa de reforma, libre del obstaculo puesto por los viciosos elementos que querian restaurar los modos de Zelaya, incitando al General Mena a rebelarse con flagrante violacion de sus promesas dadas a su 75 propio gobierno y al ministro americano y Facto Dawson, por el cual estaba solemnemente obligado, y su tentativa para derrocar al gobi-erno de su propio pals con miras exclusivamente egoistas y sin tener siquiera la pretension de luchar por un principio, hacen que la presente rebelion sea desde su origen la mas inexcusable en los anales de Centro America. La indole de los actuales disturbios y los procedimientos empleados imprimen a esos disturbios el oaracter de una anarquia mas bien que el de una revolucion ordinaria. La condicion moral recomendable de aquellos que inmediatamente hicieron causa comun con Mena asi como su conducta incrvilizada y salvage al romper un armisticio, maltratar mujeres, violar su palabra de honor, torturar a ciudadanos pacificos, exigir contribu- ciones y sobre todo el bombardear barbaramente la ciudad de Mana- gua con destruccion deliberada de vidas inocentes y de propiedades y la muerte de mujeres, ninos y enfermos en el Hospital, los crueles y barbaros asesinatos por centenares que se refieren de Leon identi- fiean a la rebelion de Mena con el aborrecible e intolerable regimen de Zelaya. Acepte Y. E. las renovadas seguridades de mi estima y mas distinguida consideracion. GEORGE F. WEITZEL, Ministro Americano. A. S. E. DOX DIEGO MANUEL CHAMORRO, Ministro de E. R. E. E" De Ud. Atto. S.S. DIEGO M. CHAMORRO, Ministro de R. R. E. E. Anexo "H." DECRETO DEL DICTADOR DIAZ. , "El Pre&idente de la Eepublica., Considerando : que la Asamble^ Xacional Constituyente convocada por decreto de 5 de abril de 1911 se extralimito en el ejercicio de su mandato: por tanto, y ei? consejo de Ministros,-Descreta : 76 Art. 1. Mientras la Asamblea National Const! tyente que ense- .gnida se convocara, nor disponga otra cosa, la constitution actual solo queda vigente en cuanto determine las atribuciones del Poder Ejecutivo y del Poder Judicial El Poder Ejequtivo asume el Poder Legislative.. Art. 2. Deelaranse concluidas las funciones de la Asamblea Na- cional Constituyente convocada por decreto de 5 de abril de 1911. Art. 3. Convocase a los pueblos a elecciones para diputados a nna' Asamblea Constitucional que reformara definitivamente la 'Constitucion., y leyes constitutivas ; al propio tiempo que ejercera las funciones de Legislativa. Dado en Managua, en la Casa Presidential el dia 18 de Octubre de 1912. Adolfo Diaz. El Ministro de la Gobernacion Miguel Cardenas Ministro de Hacienda Pedro Eafael Cuadra El Ministro de RE, EE. e II. PP. Diego M. Chamorro El Sub-Srio, de Guerra y Marina Benjamin Cuadra El Ministro de Fomento v Obras Piiblicas Elsias Pallais. Anexo H. PROTISTA, PARTE FIXAL. Nosotros, ciudadanos . nicaraguenses, amantes de la soberania y dignidad de la Republica, enemigos de toda intervention extraiii en nuestro suelo, sin . connivencia alguna con los habitantes del interior, cuya actitud no conocemos hasta h'oy por la falta de conm- nicaciones y la premura del tiempo, resolvemos unanimenente : 1. Abstenernos de tomar ninguna participation en las elec- ciones de que habla el decreto mencionado. 2. Protestar con todo el vigor de nuestras almas contra el proceder in fame y r.gresivo que el Gobierno americano ha observado coil nuestra querirla Nicaragua; y 3. Condenar la conducta bochornosa de los nicaragiienses que estan traicionando a la Patria y mancillando el honor de la raza indo-espanola. Bluefields, Nic. C. A., Octubre de 1912. TCosendo Argiiello, Jacob Jaen, Manuel H. Giron, Jose M. Zacarlas 0., Juan Ignacio Eivas, J. Eamon Cisneros, Ciriaco Pineda G., A. 77 Hunter, Pio E. Guzman, Salvador Lejarza, Juan Davila R, J. P. Chevez, J. P. Delgadillo, Guillermo Childres Eaudales, Gustavo Cortes, Samuel Gutierrez, M. Ig. Argiiello, F. E, Baldovinos, Carlos A. Espinosa E., E. Castrillo Z., Eduardo Delgadillo, J. M. Araica, Carlos Alberto Castro,Jesus Sierra, T. Narciso Bermudez, Ignacio Dinarte, Patricio Soils,, B. Herrera, Franco Aviles. Anexo "I" San Salvador, 26 de Agosto de 1912. A Presidente Taft, Washington. La situation de Nicaragua se agrava de dia en dia y temo serias complicaciones si las tropas americanas penetran en territorio iri- caragiiense. En Leon el pueblo se amotino a la llegada de los marinos, y a no haber si do por la intervention del Ministro de El Salvador tendriamos ahora que lamentar graves consecuencias. Eespetuosamente ruego a TJd. insinuar al Presidente Diaz,, que entre en algun arreglo de paz, aceptando una tercera persona. Hago