THE KNOWABLENESS OF GOD 
 
 ITS RELATION TO THE THEORY 
 OF KNOWLEDGE IN ST. THOMAS 
 
 DISSERTATION 
 
 SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY OF THE 
 
 CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA IN PART 
 
 FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
 
 FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR 
 
 OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 ^JlBIM 
 
 OF TV 
 
 BY 
 
 OF 
 ^ 
 
 MATTHEW SCHUMACHER, C. S. C. 
 
 (A. B., S. T. B.) 
 
 NOTRE DAME, INDIANA 
 
 UNIVERSITY PRESS 
 1905. 
 

 
 , 
 
Co tbe 
 
 of 
 
 IRev. peter ^obannes, C. S. C. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Introduction 1 
 
 Historical 10 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 General Principles of Knowledge 33 
 
 a. Union of Subject and Object 36 
 
 b. Object Known according to the Nature of the 
 
 Subject 41 
 
 c. Immateriality and Actuality of Subject and Object 46 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Theory of Intellectual Knowledge 54 
 
 a. Prime and Connatural Object of the Intellect 54 
 
 b. Active and Passive Intellects 58 
 
 c. Intelligible Species, Completion of the Act of 
 
 Knowledge 64 
 
 SECTION in. 
 
 Validity of Knowledge 65 
 
 a. Sensible and Intellectual 67 
 
 b. Adaequatio Rei et Intellectus 73 
 
 c. Relativity of Knowledge 79 
 
 SECTION rv. 
 Causality and Knowledge 83 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 THE KNOWABLENESS OF GOD. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Existence of God 95 
 
 a. Relation between Chapters I. and II 96 
 
 b. Existence and Conception, Relation of. 98 
 
 c. Existence of God How Known ? 99 
 
 1. Ontological Argument, not by 101 
 
 2. Demonstration, by.. 106 
 
 3. Innatism of Aquinas 109 
 
 4. Arguments to Prove Existence of God 116 
 
 SECTION n. 
 The First Cause 119 
 
 SECTION ra. 
 Nature of God 130 
 
 a. Infinitely Knowable in Itself. 132 
 
 b. Ontologism Rejected 136 
 
 c. Position of Aquinas God Known by His Mani- 
 
 festations 141 
 
 1. Primum Ens 142 
 
 2. Remotion, Eminence, Causality 143 
 
 3. Analogy, Similarity, Relation 148 
 
 4. Anthropomorphism 161 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 Application of Principles to : 
 
 1. Infinity 165 
 
 2. Omniscience: 169 
 
 3. Omnipotence 173 
 
 4. Personality 175 
 
 5. The Rounded Concept, Qui est 179 
 
 Epilogue 183 
 
 Bibliography 187 
 
ABBREVIATIONS. 
 
 C. G. for Contra Gentes. C. G., 1. i, c. 10 means, 
 Contra Gentes, book i, chapter 10. 
 
 Sum. Theol. for Summa Theologica. Sum. Theol., 
 I, q. 10., a. i ad 2 means, Summa Theologica, 
 first part, question 10, article i, second objection. 
 
 De Veri. for De Veritate. De Veri., q. i, a. 2 means 
 De Veritate, question i, article 2. 
 
 Com. on Lomb. I, Dis. 5, q. i. a. 3 means, Commen- 
 tary on the Lombard, first book, distinction 5, 
 question i, article 3. 
 
 Others can be understood from these. 
 

 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 If truth is God's handwriting, the ink is indel- 
 ible and the page indestructible. If the world is 
 God's, it cannot deny its allegiance. The Con- 
 ception of God as found in the works of St. 
 Thomas is the expression of the power of the 
 Creator as witnessed to by the work of His 
 hands. The question of God has never been a 
 problem of the past; in some phase it has 
 always demanded the best thought of the best 
 thinkers of all epochs. There are times, however, 
 when it seems to arouse especial attention 
 when its full import for all thought is pressed 
 home. We are now in such a time, for we have 
 gone to the very root of the problem we are 
 now concerned with the Idea of God. Not so 
 much the existence of God, nor a discussion of 
 His Attributes specifically, but the quest is for 
 a Conception of God that will quell our uneasi- 
 ness in presence of many apparent confusions, and 
 satisfy our demand for an adequate explanation. 
 Many have been and are to-day seeking this 
 Concept, but it is an idle attempt unless the path 
 that leads to it has been shown to be sure and 
 consistent, for this Idea is not the product of 
 bare thought. In other words, our Concept can 
 
only have the validity of the methods that have 
 been employed in reaching it. 
 
 Prof. Ladd has pointed out what he considers 
 preliminary to the formation of the Concept of 
 God. We must know the development of man's 
 religious life, we must know human nature in its 
 totality, and, finally, we must have "points of 
 view for regarding the sum-total of human ex- 
 perience which will bear the test of the severest 
 critical and reflective thinking." This last point 
 as stated in another place "A tenable and con- 
 sistent theory of knowledge is then, an indis- 
 pensable part of the prolegomena to an argument 
 for the being of God,' 12 is what we wish to show 
 in the present paper. Our aim and this is the 
 implicit burden of all Scholastic treatments of 
 this subject is to show the intimate connection 
 between the Theory of Knowledge set forth by 
 St. Thomas and his handling of the Knowable- 
 ness of God. The principles he uses in arriving 
 at a knowledge of any subject are unchanged 
 when he comes to discuss the question of our 
 knowledge of God. Ladd also notes that we must 
 have some theory of reality we shall state like- 
 wise the theory of reality held by our author and 
 follow it throughout. "In general the cause of 
 
 1 G. T. Ladd, Prolegomena to an Argument for the Being of 
 God. Phil. Rev., v. 12, pp. 130-137. 
 3 Loc. cit., p. 136. 
 
Theodicy is bound up with that of Metaphysics. 
 The science of God is a part of the science of 
 being." The relation of the knowableness of 
 God to the theory of knowledge is so close in 
 Aquinas that a presentation of the two together 
 may give a more satisfying view of the position 
 he held, and which Christian Philosophy also 
 holds, than those unacquainted with his works 
 and not in sympathy with his thoughts are 
 accustomed to have. With this purpose we have 
 written what cannot be new to students of 
 Scholastic Philosophy, but what may serve to 
 awaken in others a friendly regard for a Concep- 
 tion of God arrived at by ways so unlike the 
 ones they are wont to use. 
 
 There are a few points in the method of St. 
 Thomas that are worth noting at the outset. He 
 begins with a vague sort of a Conception of God 
 that he considers common to all men. By induc- 
 tion he arrives at a concept more specific yet not 
 complete; this concept he treats by deduction 
 and evolves its implications. The development 
 of this concept by deduction is done according to 
 carefully formulated tests ; its necessity is due to 
 the nature of our mind, for God is trulv one, all 
 
 / 
 
 attributes are identical in Him, but we can only 
 know Him by considering them separately. As 
 
 3 Janet et Sailles, Histoire de la Philosophic, p. 888. 
 
-4- 
 
 a result we have a full and many-sided concept, 
 and no one attribute in particular is made to 
 bear the burden of the whole. 
 
 One of the most striking differences between 
 the attitude of Aquinas and that of Moderns 
 who have no specific interest in the Conception 
 of God they reach, provided it harmonizes in some 
 way with the general trend of the philosophical 
 systems they are following or framing unto 
 themselves, is the directness and consistency with 
 which he meets the problem in all its develop- 
 ments. "Even when we recognize that the 
 modern spirit is less trammeled in its researches, 
 we shall be forced to admit that it is to some 
 extent hampered by the restrictions which arise 
 from the cultivations of 'systems' and from loyalty 
 to the traditions of the 'schools.' ' 4 St. Thomas 
 sees his way clearly and he utilizes his light to 
 the fullest measure there is no hesitation when 
 it is asked is such an attribute to be found in 
 God. At once the answer is given and this is so 
 because his principles are plainly before him and 
 they are the test of his Concept. This fact is 
 highly commendable whether we agree with his 
 principles or not. There are few Conceptions of 
 God given us at present outside of Christian 
 
 4 Prof. VV. Turner, Kecent Literature on Scholastic Philoso 
 phy. The Journal of Phil., Psycho!., and Scientific Methods, 
 April 14, 1904, p. 201. 
 
5 
 
 Philosophy where the position is ever essen- 
 tially the same, that cannot be criticised on the 
 score of unwarranted assumption, inconsistent 
 development, incomplete presentation, some of- 
 fend against all three. 
 
 If we contrast a thought taken from Spencer 
 and one from Paulsen with the position of 
 Aquinas this will be evident. It will show how 
 he admitted the truth in each of their doctrines 
 and yet did not stop where they did. With 
 Spencer from a consideration of Causation in the 
 world he conies to a First Cause; but Spencer 
 says, if we reason on the nature of this Cause we 
 land in contradiction "the conception of the 
 Absolute and Infinite, from whatever side we 
 view it, appears encompassed with contradic- 
 tions", 5 and hence is practically unknowable. 
 Paulsen, speaking of the God of Pantheists, re- 
 marks : " We cannot presume to give an exhaus- 
 tive definition of the inner life of the all-real God. 
 . . . The difference between human and divine 
 inner life must indeed be great and thorough- 
 going, so great that there can be no homogeneity 
 at any point." 6 With this statement St. Thomas 
 holds that we cannot have an exhaustive defini- 
 tion of God; his fundamental thesis we can 
 know God from creation as a likeness of Him 
 
 5 First Principles, p. 42. 
 
 6 Introd. to Phil., p. 252, trans. 
 
6 
 
 is opposed to the second half of Paulsen's view. 
 "From sensible things", Aquinas says, 'our 
 intellect cannot attain to a view of God's essence 
 ( inner life ) because creatures are effects of God 
 not equalling the power of the Cause. . . They 
 lead us, however, to a knowledge of God's exist- 
 ence and from them we learn what we must 
 ascribe to God." 7 Agnosticism wishes to know 
 too much, Pantheism is too modest, as usual the 
 mean is more satisfying. What Caldecott says 
 of the Idea of God found in Bradley 's "Appear- 
 ance and Reality," we quote in a more general 
 sense as applicable, in our opinion, to the short- 
 comings of much writing on this question. ' Is 
 it an impertinence to suggest to an original 
 thinker that a consideration of the canon of ' ap- 
 plication of terms of human thought to the 
 Deity' formulated by Aquinas, and never sur- 
 passed in penetrative and judicious subtlety, 
 might relieve the vacillation and inconsistency, 
 \vhich is the great defect of Mr. Bradley's work 
 as it stands." This, to our mind, is also the 
 defect of Prof. Roycc's "Conception", as we 
 shall point out in the text; Prof. Royce uses the 
 same terms as Mr. Bradley. 9 
 There is no need of presenting the views of the 
 
 1 Sum. Theol., q. 12, a. 12. 
 
 8 The Philosophy of Religion, p. 396. 
 
 9 The Conception of God, pp. 44, 45. 
 
thinkers of all times on our question. At most 
 we might show how their Idea of God was 
 an outcome of their Theory of Knowledge and 
 Reality. We shall be content to bring to light 
 again the view of Aquinas, for we are apt to 
 overlook what has been done when all energies 
 are bent on doing something new. As far as 
 we know, the question has not been handled 
 explicitly in the way we are presenting it, at 
 least in English. 10 It seemed more satisfactory 
 to give the Theory of Kno wedge of Aquinas as 
 a basis for his Conception of God, rather than 
 start with the Conception itself and be con- 
 stantly referring to a set of principles that are 
 nowhere given together, and yet are closely 
 connected with the subject itself. 
 
 It is but fair to admit that Aquinas had 
 advantages in the construction and development 
 of his Idea of God that are not at hand for 
 many to-day who are busy with this problem. He 
 saw guiding -posts on all sides and he was 
 presented with a set of ideas the value of which 
 he did not question. The teaching of the 
 Fathers, especially St. Augustine, the attitude 
 of his age toward the Scriptures, the doctrine 
 
 10 A Commentator on St. Thomas, Capreolus, handles the 
 question practically in this way. He discusses the basic 
 principles of knowledge, and then applies them to God. 
 Cfr. Revue Thomiste, v. 8, Fugues. 
 
8 
 
 and influence of the Church in her varied 
 activities, were all helps to one who gave his 
 attention to the Supreme Thought of all these 
 factors. Yet withal, Aquinas saw clearly the 
 work of reason in the question of God and set 
 himself to know what the powers of man could 
 do to solve its meaning. His works bear 
 testimony to the careful and detailed method 
 he brought to bear on this question. We are 
 told, however, by Dr. Carus, "the God of 
 mediaeval theologians is a mere makeshift." 
 "The more I think about the God-problem, the 
 surer grows my conviction that the God of 
 science is the true God, and the God of mediaeval 
 theologians is a mere makeshift, a substitution 
 for the true God, a temporary surrogate of God, 
 a surrogate which at the time was good enough 
 for immature minds, but too often only lead 
 people astray." 
 
 Dr. Carus tells us that our conception of God 
 will be true "if only we agree to be serious in 
 the purification of the God idea, if only we think 
 of God as a truly divine being, if only we are 
 serious in looking upon Him as truly eternal, 
 omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent, etc." He 
 adds the astounding sentence : " The theologians 
 of the past have never been serious in thinking 
 
 11 "The God of Science," The Monist, April, 1904. 
 
9- 
 
 out these qualities of God to their very last 
 conclusions." Without speculating on what led 
 to this statement, or inquiring into the author's 
 acquaintance with the writings of mediaeval 
 theologians, I will simply remark that had he 
 sat in the lecture -hall of Aquinas and was 
 determined to swear by his word, he could not 
 have followed more faithfully, in essence, the 
 method of Aquinas than he gives signs of in 
 the present article, especially in the paragraph 
 beginning, "God's thoughts are not transient 
 successive representations." The method of 
 Aquinas in this problem is golden, and its main 
 import is to be 'serious in the purification of 
 the God idea'. As Dr. Carus acknowledges no 
 allegiance to the formulator of this method, it 
 may be advantageous to consider that when 
 the human mind is serious, no matter at what 
 age it lives, it will be true to itself, and its 
 methods will be commendable though the result 
 reached may vary. Dr. Carus violates his own 
 dictum in dealing with the mediaeval theo- 
 logians; he says, "in my opinion it is the duty 
 of the philosopher to judge every religion 
 according to the best interpretation that its 
 best representatives have given it." His attitude 
 is sufficient warrant for our recalling the Con- 
 ception of God according to Aquinas, for it is 
 certainly a Conception of a worthy represen- 
 tative of the mediaeval theologians. 
 
io 
 
 HISTORICAL. 
 
 Before we take up the problem directly, we 
 say a few words on the principal works 
 of St. Thomas in which he treats this question, 
 and also point out briefly the position of this 
 subject in his writings, as w^ell as the influence 
 that affected his view and presentation. The 
 works that \ve shall outline are: Summa Theo- 
 logica, Summa Contra Gentes, Commentary on 
 the Lombard, Quaestiones Disputatae, Com- 
 pendium Theologiae. 
 
 "The Summa Theologica is the first system of 
 Theology scientifically carried out. The theo- 
 logical and speculative works of his predecessors 
 and elder contemporaries as well as his own 
 numerous works of many sorts are but a great 
 and massive preparation for this work." The 
 development of theological science from the days 
 of Anselm to those of Aquinas here finds com- 
 prehensive and systematic expression. We find 
 the purpose of the work stated in its prologue : 
 "Our intention in this work is to present the 
 teaching of the Christian Religion in a way 
 suited for the instruction of beginners." He, 
 
 1 Werner, Der hcilige Thomas von Aquino, v. 1, p. 801. 
 
II 
 
 therefore, proposes to avoid questions and 
 distinctions that confuse the beginner, and to 
 give a connected view of the whole field of 
 sacred knowledge. There are three parts to 
 the work; the first treats of God in Himself, 
 the second of man in his relation to God, the 
 third of Christ as the way that leads to God. 
 The parts are made up of questions ; each 
 question is divided into a number of articles, 
 and each article opens with a few objections 
 against the special point to be discussed; then 
 there is a positive statement of doctrine with 
 accompanying arguments; and finally, the 
 previously proposed objections are answered. 
 The first part is the one that interests us 
 especially and only that portion which tells us 
 what the human reason can know of God. 
 This portion is well set forth in the following 
 diagram taken from Werner. 2 
 
 DE ESSENTIA DIVIXA. 
 
 a) num sit; 
 
 . sit vel potius non sit: 
 
 1. simplicitas, 
 
 2. perfectio (bonitas) retnota omni 
 
 imperfectione creaturarum, 
 
 3. infinitas, 
 
 b) quomodo *' immutabilitas, 
 
 5. aeternitas, 
 
 6. unit as; 
 
 j8. a nobis cognoscatur, 
 
 7. a nobis nominetur; 
 Loc. tit., p. 803. 
 
12 
 
 ad intra: 
 
 c) quomodo 
 operetur{ 
 
 [1. de scientia Dei, 
 a. cognos- j 2. de ideis, 
 
 cendo j 3. de vero et falso, 
 [4. de vita Dei; 
 
 1. de voluntate divina, 
 
 2. de iis, quae absolute ad 
 
 voluntatem pertinent: 
 
 /3. volendo 
 
 aa. amor 
 
 /3/S. justitia et miser- 
 
 icordia, 
 
 3. de iis, quae simul ad 
 intellectum pertinent: 
 aa. providentia. 
 /3/3. praedestinatio 
 (liber vitae) ; 
 ad extra: de potentia Dei. 
 
 This diagram comprises questions 2-26 of the 
 Summa Theologica. It is completed for our 
 purpose by adding questions 44-49, relating 
 specifically to the First Cause of all things, 
 duration and distinction of created things, evil 
 and its cause. 
 
 The Summa Contra Gentes is an Apology for 
 the Christian Religion. The title given it by 
 St. Thomas himself shows this: Summa de 
 Yeritate Fidei Catholicae. It was written at 
 the request of St. Ra3 r mond of Pennafort, who 
 wished to have a systematic presentation of the 
 doctrine of the Church as a defence against the 
 Moors in Spain. The work is divided into four 
 books and each book is made up of chapters. 
 The first three deal with doctrine in the light of 
 reason, the fourth is concerned with the data of 
 revelation as beyond reason. The question of 
 
__ lr _ J >} ._.__ 
 
 God is paramount in these pages : God in Him- 
 self, His essence and attributes, are treated of in 
 the first book, God as the efficient and final 
 cause of all things make up the second and 
 third, as named. 
 
 "It is the first work in which he (Aquinas) 
 presented his system as a coherent whole",' 
 though not entirely complete, for the final 
 expression of his thought is found in the Summa 
 Theologica. These two works have much in 
 common, yet differ in scope and method. The 
 former is practically philosophical throughout, 4 
 the latter is principally theological, though in 
 each there are philosophical and theological 
 discussions according to the topic treated. In 
 method, the former is almost entirely positive in 
 in its treatment, at least objections are seldom 
 formally presented and answered, in the latter 
 each article begins with a number of objections ; 
 again, in the former there are a number of 
 arguments advanced to support each question, 
 in the latter there is usually but one. This is 
 due to the fact, no doubt, that St. Thomas 
 wished to make the Summa Theologica as clear 
 and as easy as possible, since, in his own words, 
 he wrote it for beginners. In the Summa Contra 
 Gentes, "It is much more a question of basis 
 
 3 Werner, loc. cit., p. 403. 
 
 4 Hence often cited as Summa Philosophica. 
 
for the points raised than a development of 
 them, hence the desire to vindicate in severe brief 
 presentation the right value and necessarily 
 concise acknowledgment of the truth contained 
 in the question by means of as large a number 
 of reasons as possible." We shall shortly recur 
 to the position of God in these works. 
 
 In his Commentary on the Lombard, St. 
 Thomas followed the division of the work of 
 the author. There are four books containing 
 in a systematic form the theology of the Church- 
 God, Angels, man, creation, the saints, and like 
 questions are discussed. Each book is made up 
 of a number of distinctions, and these again are 
 divided into questions and articles. The text of 
 the Lombard served as a basis for the Com- 
 mentators to give their own solution to the 
 subject under consideration. These commen- 
 taries are rather works on the Lombard than 
 simple expositions of his meaning. This is 
 sufficiently evidenced for by the diversity of 
 opinion of the various commentators. This was 
 the first comprehensive \vork of St. Thomas, and 
 it 4< formed a mighty foundation for the further 
 extension of theological efforts. The Commen- 
 tary on the Lombard contains his whole 
 teaching . . . though not in the thoroughly 
 
 6 Werner, loc. cit*, p. 404. 
 
constructed form of an independent system 6 ." 
 The Quaestiones Disputatae comprise the 
 lectures delivered by St. Thomas in the University 
 of Paris after he had finished his Commentary 
 on the Lombard. " These are concerned with 
 the most important and the most excellent ob- 
 jects of theological speculation, namely, with 
 those matters which are treated of in the first 
 and second parts of the Summa TheologicaV : 
 They contain in rounded form the treatment of 
 certain questions that a commentary, following 
 a given plan, forbids one attempting. There are 
 sixty-three questions in all with four hundred 
 articles ; all these are given under a few general 
 heads: De Potentia, De Malo, De Spiritualibus 
 Creaturis, De Anima, De Unione Verbi, De Virtu- 
 tibus, De Veritate. The articles are preceded by 
 numerous objections, sometimes as many as 
 thirty, under the form quod videtur non. St. 
 Thomas gave his "best and most active atten- 
 tion to their elaboration. . . It has been remarked 
 that Thomas wished to bring the art of the 
 Scholastic Dialectic to its highest perfection in 
 these Quaestiones Disputatae." They were writ- 
 ten rather for the trained philosopher than for 
 
 6 Ibid., pp. 358-359. 
 
 7 Ibid., p. 360. 
 
 8 Werner, loc. cit., pp. 360-1. 
 
the beginner. 9 Under the heading De Veritate, 
 the question of knowledge and of God are 
 handled in detail. 
 
 The Compendium Theologiae was written for 
 his dear companion, Bro. Reginald. Its original 
 plan was to embrace briefly all theology, in three 
 books, based on the virtues, faith, hope, and 
 charity. The first book alone, containing two 
 hundred and forty-six chapters, was completed. 
 The chapters are short and concise. " The whole 
 work is an intelligible and succinct summary 
 view of the system of St. Thomas." This is 
 strikingly true on the points of God, man's 
 nature, and man's relation to the First Cause. 
 4 'The doctrine of one God and the necessity of 
 thinking of the condition of His existence, is de- 
 rived in a strong and continuous series from the 
 proof of a first highest mover of the world." 
 
 The problem of God occupies the first place in 
 all the works ot Aquinas. " There is not a single 
 one of St. Thomas's works that does not begin 
 with the discussion of the existence and at- 
 tributes of God." 12 This statement shows the 
 
 9 A. Portmann, Die Systematik in dfn Quaestiones Disputa- 
 tae des hi. Thomas von Aquino, Jahr. f. Phil, u Spek Tbeol., 
 1892, pp. 127-150. 
 
 10 Werner, loc. cit., p., 389. 
 
 11 Ibid., loc. cit., p., 388. 
 
 u Jourdain, La Philosophic de St. Thomas d'Aquin, v. 1, 
 p. 184. 
 
importance attached to the question of God in 
 our author's system ; a glance at any of his 
 greater writings wiJl suffice to make this evident. 
 God, for him, is the creative and sustaining 
 Power of all things, and He is also their last end. 
 Creation in all its forms gets meaning only when 
 viewed in relation to Him. In the development 
 of our subject we shall see how all comes from 
 the hand of God, how everything bears some 
 trace of His operation, and how He is the 
 unifying element in the variety about us. A 
 knowledge of Him, no matter how meagre, is 
 worth more than a thorough knowledge of all 
 that is less than Him, for He is the greatest 
 object that the human intelligence can consider 
 and seek to know. "Among all the perfections 
 found in created things, the greatest is to know 
 God." In a proem to the second question 
 of the Summa Theologica, part I, St. Thomas 
 gives his attitude on this question: " Since the 
 principal intention is to give a knowledge of 
 God, and not only as He is in Himself, but also 
 as He is the Source and End of things, especially 
 of rational creatures, we shall first treat of God, 
 secondly, of the tendency of the rational creature 
 toward God, and thirdly, of Christ who is our 
 way in tending toward God." Here we have his 
 
 13 C. G., 1 1, c. 47. 
 
i8 
 
 principal work outlined, and its basic thought 
 is God. 
 
 In both Summae, God is the all-embracing, all- 
 important problem. The Idea of God is the 
 pivotal idea in these works. The subsequent 
 developments and deductions are so intimately 
 bound up with it that all stands or falls 
 together with it. This is seen very strikingly 
 in the fact that St. Thomas considers God as 
 the cause of all things and likewise as their last 
 end thus comprising the whole realm of the 
 actual and the possible under all aspects. It is 
 not an arbitrary measure on the part of Aquinas 
 to give this prominence and preeminence to the 
 God-question, for it arises from the very nature 
 of the subject itself, from the very content of the 
 Idea of God. The introductory remarks to the 
 main divisions of the questions in the first part 
 of the Summa Theologica show this clearly; the 
 same is evident in the other Summa where he 
 devotes a chapter (1. 1, c. 9) to outlining his 
 order and method, saying, he will first treat of 
 God in Himself, then of God as Creator, and fin- 
 ally of the relation of creation to God as an end. 
 
 It is natural to ask in view of the detailed 
 presentation of this problem in St. Thomas, how 
 much of this delicate net -work is due to his 
 workmanship. Is he responsible for all, or is 
 he only a systematizer ? Neither, exactly. He 
 
-19- 
 
 inherited an Idea of God that showed signs of 
 the thoughts of some great minds, and which 
 had been growing and becoming richer under 
 the guidance of a solicitous tradition; but this 
 Idea was fully grasped by him and set forth in 
 a way that combined all previous thought, and 
 yet evidenced a selection that proclaims the 
 master mind and gives title to originality. A 
 cursory view of the principal authors he drew 
 from, and the condition of philosophy at his 
 time, will give his position more accurately. 
 
 Among the Greeks, the influence of Aristotle 
 and Plato is unmistakable. His proofs for the 
 existence of God are taken from them. God as 
 Prime Mover and Intelligence are found in 
 Aristotle, and "Thomas derived the most 
 incisive proofs for the existence of God and 
 for many of the divine perfections from 
 Plato." That Aquinas went beyond the 
 Conception of God arrived at by these two 
 philosophers is no matter for surprise, for their 
 Conception had been enriched by modification 
 and addition long before the days of our 
 author. In the Christian era, St. Augustine, 
 and Dionysius the Areopagite, and Boethius are 
 largely utilized. They are quoted frequently, 
 and some of their statements are taken as a 
 
 14 Schneider, Jahr. f. Phil. u. Spek. Theol., 1893, p. 470. 
 
20 
 
 basis for the development of the particular 
 aspect of God he is considering. It is true, St. 
 Thomas quotes from other writers both before 
 and after Christ, yet there is not the same 
 practical intimacy betrayed as in the case of 
 the writers just mentioned. He considered of 
 sufficient importance the De Divinis Nominihus 
 of Dionysius and the De Trinitate of Boethius 
 to write a commentary on them. His presen- 
 tation however, is rather the outcome of his 
 assimilating the various elements that attended 
 the growth of the Conception of God than a 
 conscious borrowing from different sources; he 
 brought his synthetic and selective mind to bear 
 on the materials the past had gathered, and 
 threw these into the form that Christian 
 Philosophy has recognized as its own since his 
 time. The synthesis is partly due to the stimu- 
 lation of his age, and partly to the actuality 
 of certain problems at that epoch. Werner 
 points out that the fundamental thoughts or 
 axioms in the questions 2-26 of the Summa 
 Theologica are derived from some philosopher, 
 some philosophical writing, or Father of the 
 Church, and thus concludes the acquaintance of 
 Aquinas with the learning of the past and his 
 leaning toward tradition; we might add, it is 
 a characteristic of the work of St. Thomas 
 to assimilate all the good he knew of in the 
 
21 
 
 efforts of others, no matter who they were. 
 The question of God was given especial con- 
 sideration in the generations immediately 
 preceding Aquinas. The attitude of St. Anselm, 
 who thought about the subject, with a view 
 of giving it a simple yet comprehensive basis, 
 until he was wearv and about to desist from 
 
 Wf 
 
 his inquiries, is a worthy introduction 
 to the attention it received at the hands 
 of Scholasticism during its growing da}^s. 
 "Theodicy was always regarded by the Scho- 
 lastics as one of the most important chapters in 
 philosophy . . . Theodicy (and it alone) remained 
 faithful to the proper genus of Scholasticism." 15 
 The close connection between Theodicv and 
 
 mt 
 
 Religion in those days made this a practical 
 necessity. Before St. Thomas took up the 
 question, the Schools had witnessed the Con- 
 troversy about the Universals ; Eclecticism, 
 Mysticism, Pantheism, in turn passed by; the 
 Arabian and Jewish Thinkers had given their 
 version of Greek Philosophy that called for 
 attention ; his contemporaries or immediate 
 predecessors, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, 
 Albert the Great, wrote and influenced thought. 
 There was certainly activity from the Pantheism 
 of Scotus Erigena to the Angel of the Schools. 
 
 16 DeWulf, H>so/re de la Philosophic Medieval, p. 155. 
 
22 
 
 The merit of Aquinas consists in the fact that 
 he was not bewildered by the divergent views 
 of previous thinkers, and that he did not branch 
 off into a particular view of his own but 
 accepted the truth contained in each, refuted 
 fearlessly what he considered error, and out 
 of it all gave us a conception that justly 
 appreciates the careful efforts of many minds 
 and ages. 
 
 If we specify in greater detail the condition of 
 thought at the time of St. Thomas, we shall be 
 in a better position to judge the value of the 
 statement so frequently made that Aquinas was 
 little else than an imitator. Philosophy in the 
 Middle Ages was not a unit; there was much 
 diversity in the opinions held and defended. 
 Scholasticism was but one form of philosophic 
 thought, and thus does not stand for Mediaeval 
 Philosophy as a whole, as DeWulf and Lindsay 
 very well point out. "The philosopher of scho- 
 lasticism should be tmderstood as really not the 
 same thing as mediaeval philosophy." This 
 distinction is important in the sense that it re- 
 calls the fact too often overlooked that there 
 was great mental activity in those times, with 
 the consequence that a thinker had to choose 
 one view among many. Aquinas chose pure 
 
 16 Dr. Lindsa}-, Scholastic and Mediaeval Philosophy, 
 Archiv f. Gesch. der Phil, v. 15, p. 42. 
 
23 
 
 Aristotelianism, and gave form to the system 
 that honors him as its chief exponent. 
 
 This choice implied a discrimination and an in- 
 dependence of thought that modifies to a large 
 extent the imputation of a mere follower. His 
 attitude toward the Pantheism of his time and 
 the Arabian Philosophy are instances to the 
 point. The statement of W. T. Harris "Panthe- 
 ism versus Christian Theism was on trial" in the 
 days of Aquinas, is true. None the less true is 
 his tribute to the way St. Thomas met the 
 issue of his day regarding the' problem of God. 
 Aquinas " stated the Christian Idea so clearly in 
 the language of the Intellect that the develop- 
 ment of six hundred years has not superseded his 
 philosophical forms. In fact, his comprehension 
 is confirmed by the profoundest thought of our 
 own time. The necessity of a philosophical sys- 
 tem that shall make personality its central prin- 
 ciple, and exhibit the true difference between the 
 beings of nature and human souls should revive 
 in our theological seminaries the study of 
 Aquinas." 1T It is noteworthy that the discussion 
 of the question of God during the last century 
 was carried on along the same lines as were 
 prominent in the Middle Ages, according to the 
 view of Janet and Seailles. "The progress made 
 
 17 Journal of Speculative Philosophy, v. 9, p. 621, 
 
2 4 ~ 
 
 in our century consisted in sifting more precisely 
 than ever the problem of God, in putting in 
 presence of each other, for the first time, in an al- 
 together direct manner, Theism and Pantheism. 
 To limit this problem, to measure with accuracy 
 the merits and defects of the personal and imper- 
 sonal theory as such, has been the work of our 
 century." 18 St. Thomas had to meet the Panthe- 
 ism of Erigena, that of Bernard of Tours, 
 Amaury of Bene, and David of Dinant. The 
 last named identified God with first matter 
 and provoked the only severe condemnation 
 uttered by the ever mild and calm Angel of the 
 Schools. 
 
 Pantheism was also taught by the Arabians. 
 Creation out of nothing was unknown to them, 
 matter was eternal. Their dualism, however, 
 admitted of emanation, and was thus Panthe- 
 istic. They did not wish to separate God and 
 matter absolutely, so they held that God created 
 a first intelligence and from it all else proceeded. 
 The source of this emanation was the thought of 
 God, not His will. They taught the unity of 
 the divine nature; finally, they denied to God 
 a knowledge of individual and contingent 
 things. 19 Ueberweg says of their philosophy: 
 
 18 Histoire de la Philosophic, p. 288. 
 
 19 Stockl, L -h. der Phil, des Mittelalters, v. 2-1, pp. 124- 
 130. 
 
25 
 
 " The whole philosophy of the Arabians was 
 only a form of Aristotelianism, tempered more 
 or less with Platonic conceptions." And this 
 characterization is common with the historians 
 of philosophy; to quote another. "In their 
 method however, in their principles by which 
 they apprehend the universe, and in their entire 
 system of philosophical conceptions they stand, 
 so far as our information on the subject reaches, 
 entirely under the combined influence of Aristot- 
 elianism and Neo-Platonism ; and the same is 
 true of the Jews." 21 Aquinas has these philoso- 
 phers in mind throughout his work, and refutes 
 them as occasion offers, and he is also careful to 
 show by explicit argument that his own position 
 is not open to a Pantheistic interpretation. 
 
 Perhaps the question of God is the portion of 
 the doctrine of St. Thomas that shows best that 
 his undoubted admiration for Aristotle did not 
 prevent him from being an independent thinker. 
 No one that has contrasted his theodicy with 
 that of the Stagyrite can fail to note the larger 
 and more thorough treatment of Aquinas, and 
 the presence of ideas wholly absent from the 
 work of the Philosopher. These additions are 
 due to the development of the Divine Idea in 
 Christianity, but their full comprehension and 
 
 20 Hist, of Phil, v. 1, p. 246. trans. 
 
 21 Windelband, A Hist, of Phil., p. 316. 
 
26 
 
 expression are the work of Aquinas, and, to 
 repeat the words of Harris, 'his comprehension 
 is confirmed by the profoundest thought of our 
 time.' Some writers also remark that St. 
 Thomas never got beyond the teaching of his 
 master, Albertus Magnus. "Thomas of Aquin 
 is led and determined by Albert, and it would be 
 a great mistake to consider him an independent 
 thinker. . . . For the historian of philosophy 
 Thomas is but a very secondary person- 
 age." The relation of master and pupil in 
 this case is of course very close, yet we can 
 recognize the specific work of each. Windelband 
 says justly: " The intellectual founder of this 
 system (Scholasticism) was Albert of Bollstadt. 
 It owes its organic completion in all directions, 
 its literary codification, and thus its historical 
 designation to Thomas Aquinas." On the 
 question of God itself, the exprofesso treatment 
 of St. Thomas is much more extended and com- 
 plete than that of his master, who only wrote as 
 much of his Summa as we have, at earnest 
 solicitation. 
 
 Eucken says of Aquinas: "He was certainly 
 no thinker of the first order, yet he \vas not on 
 this account a mind of no consequence or a fana- 
 tic. He was not much ahead of his times, but he 
 
 22 Prantl. Geschichte der Logik, v. 3, p. 107. 
 23 Loc. cit., p. 311. 
 
27 
 
 synthesized and reconstructed what the age 
 offered, and thus satisfied a pressing need of the 
 historical situation." Dr. Lindsay, in the 
 article referred to, though he says Scholasticism 
 has received undue contempt, yet refers to the 
 "servility of Aquinas before Aristotle." Prof. 
 Dewey, in an article on Scholasticism, seems to 
 think that Albertus and Thomas were wholly 
 dependent on Aristotle. He says: "In spite of 
 (or better, because of) the conviction of Albertus 
 and St. Thomas as to the relation of Aristotle to 
 Church dogma, they are compelled to set aside 
 certain doctrines as simply the products of reve- 
 lation, utterly inaccessible to the natural mind- 
 it being clear that Aristotle had not taught the 
 doctrine of the Trinity or the Incarnation, 
 &c." 25 In contrast we have the words of Prof. 
 Royce, "He (Thomas) also vindicated for phil- 
 osophy a certain limited, but very genuine, 
 freedom of method and of opinion, within its 
 own province. As a result, Thomas stands from 
 
 24 Die Lebensanscbauungen der grossen Denker, pp 245-6, 
 also, Thomas von Aquino und Kant.Ein Kampf zwei<r 
 Welten, Kant-Studien, v. 6. 
 
 25 Diet, of Phil, and Psychol., Baldwin, vol. 2, p. 494. 
 Prof. Dewey seems to forget that Albertus and St. Thomas 
 believed in the Trinity and the Incarnation before they knew 
 of Aristotle. They used the Stagyrite as an instrument; 
 they explained these myteries, as far as human reason could 
 go, by principles derived from Aristotle. This is rather 
 evidence of independence of thought. 
 
28 
 
 any fair point of view, Catholic or non-Catholic, 
 decidedly high, not only as a theologian, but 
 also as a rational inquirer." 
 
 If we take for granted that St. Thomas was a 
 thinker of note and did good service to his day, 
 can we hold that he has a message for our day ? 
 Opinion ouside the Church is not of a nature to 
 warrant an affirmative answer. What Pope 
 Leo intended by restoring the Philosophy of St. 
 Thomas was not an imitation in the letter of the 
 teaching of Aquinas, not the defending of specific 
 doctrines whereon opinion is legitimately 
 divided, not the adhering to statements that 
 further knowledge has shown to be untenable; 
 this much is held in a practical manner by all 
 who are engaged in interpreting anew to our 
 age the teaching of Aquinas. What the Pope 
 desired, and what all true Neo-Scholastics hold 
 as solid, are the essential principles that underly 
 the Philosophy of St. Thomas. These are 
 sound and have not yet been superseded. The 
 Neo- Scholastic Movement is a school, if you 
 will, as the followers of Descartes, Spinoza, 
 Kant constitute a school; in this light it is 
 entitled to as rational a consideration as any 
 other philosophical movement recognizing a 
 given thinker of the past as its head. Its fitness 
 
 26 Pope Leo's Philosophical Movement and its Relations to 
 Modern Thought Boston Evening Transcript, Juh-29, 1903. 
 
-29- 
 
 is not a matter of a priori judgment, but must 
 find its justification in meeting as well, if not 
 better, the problems that our times are trying 
 to solve 
 
 The fitness of the Philosophy of St. Thomas, 
 in its essentials, for our day is not admitted 
 by non-Thomists. "The philosophy of the 
 Middle Ages with its highest point of develop- 
 ment, Thomas of Aquin, we considered con- 
 quered and buried," says Eucken. " Its growth 
 in individual places seemed rather a souvenir 
 of the past than a condition of the present, 
 or even a germ of the future, but now it has 
 forced itself again with its world -embracing 
 power in the fore-front of life and asks, not for 
 toleration, but for domination." He repeats 
 the thought with more detail, showing wherein 
 he considers the philosophy of St. Thomas 
 insufficient for our time: "for his dav Thomas 
 
 / 
 
 was the leader of all Christendom, to-day he 
 can be but the leader of a party." 28 Paulsen 
 is similarly minded, for in the preface to his 
 Philosophia Militans, he sets up the Philosophy 
 of Kant as the true one, and says, Kant not 
 only destroyed Materialism and Naturalism, 
 
 27 Die Philosophic des Thomas von Aquino und die Cultur 
 der Neuzeit, Zeitschr. f. philosophische Kritik, vol. 87-88, 
 p. 161. 
 
 28 Die Lebensanscb., p. 249. 
 
30- 
 
 but likewise, "dogmatic Supernaturalism or 
 Scholastic Metaphysics." We will end with a 
 statement of Prof. Royce. His article already 
 referred to is very appreciative of Scholasticism 
 and St. Thomas, yet he thinks the fundamental 
 positions of the Philosophy of Aquinas call for 
 readjustment if they are to meet the modern 
 view of these problems. To quote him on the 
 two points that bear on our work. "His 
 (Thomas') theory of the nature and limits of 
 human knowledge, a theory derived from 
 Aristotle, especially calls not merely for restate- 
 ment, but for readjustment, as soon as you try 
 to apply it to the interpretation of our modern 
 consciousness." We shall state the theory of 
 Aquinas in the following chapter, and try to 
 show that it is still applicable. 
 
 The other point bears still more directly on 
 the subject we are handling, so we shall cite 
 it at length. "The problem of the relation 
 between God and the world, as St. Thomas 
 treats that topic, is one which has only to be 
 reviewed carefully in the light of modern science 
 and modern philosophy, to secure an alteration 
 of the essentially unstable equilibrium in which 
 Thomas left this heaven -piercing tower of his 
 speculation. Here I, of course, have no space 
 to speak of a philosophical problem to which 
 as a student of philosophy I have directed so 
 
much of my attention namely, the problem 
 about the conception of God. But when I read, 
 in more than one recent philosophical essay of 
 Catholic origin, expressions that admit the 
 decidedly symbolic and human character of the 
 language in which even the dogmas of the 
 Church have to be expressed so far as they 
 relate to the nature of God, when stress is 
 also laid, very rightly, upon that aspect of 
 St. Thomas' teaching which emphasizes this 
 very inadequacy of even the traditional formulas 
 to the business of defining divine things, when 
 I meet at the same time with admissions that 
 St. Thomas' positive theory of the divine 
 attributes involves these or these apparent 
 contradictions, which still need philosophical 
 solution then, indeed, I see not that our more 
 modern thinking is \vholly right and Thomas 
 wrong but that Catholic Theology is nowa- 
 days in a position where it is bound either to 
 progress, or to abandon the whole business of 
 reviving the spirit of serious philosophical think- 
 ing, so that they like the rest of us are living 
 in an age of transition." 
 
 These are but a few of the statements of the 
 many that might be cited Froschammer, 
 Hermes, Giinther, and others might be quoted. 
 We hope to show in this study that the 
 estimates given against the value of the view 
 
of St. Thomas are incorrect, and that the 
 treatment of the question of God by Aquinas 
 a question of prime importance with him and 
 all philosophy is not a thing of the past. 
 
33 
 
 CHAPTER I, 
 
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 SECTION I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF 
 KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 Knowledge is a fact. What is the process of 
 knowledge, and what is the value of knowledge, 
 are the important considerations. What makes 
 a thing knowable, how do we know it, and 
 what is the validity of our knowledge? An 
 answer to these questions gives the psychology 
 and epistemology of knowledge. There is a 
 sentence in one of the works of Aquinas that 
 contains the factors involved in the problem of 
 knowledge. "There are", says he, "but three 
 requisites for knowledge, namely, the active 
 power of the knower by which he judges of 
 things, the thing known, and the union of 
 both." 1 Before we can have knowledge, there 
 must be something knowable, some one capable 
 of knowing, and both the knowable object and 
 the knowing subject must come into some 
 union or relation. Knowledge is only realized 
 
 1 De Veri., q. 2, a. 1, praeterea. 
 
-34- 
 
 when the object and the subject enter into a 
 determined relation. These elements are admit- 
 ted by all philosophers as necessary for a theory 
 of knowledge. We shall now consider their 
 organic connection in the theory of St. Thomas, 
 and also the objective value of our knowledge 
 as resulting from this theory. 
 
 It is a Scholastic axiom that all knowledge 
 or every cognition is in the knower through an 
 assimilation of the knower to the known. 2 The 
 nature of this assimilation and how it is 
 brought about forms the problem of knowledge 
 for the Scholastics. This assimilation runs 
 through all knowledge and is its basis. There 
 are two sorts of knowledge distinct in kind- 
 sensory and intellectual. From the external 
 senses that receive the forms of material things, 
 without matter indeed, but yet with many 
 material conditions, up through the internal 
 senses which retain and combine the images 
 of these forms, the human intellect, the angelic 
 intellect, the Divine intellect, there is a steady 
 rise and the attainment of more perfect knowl- 
 edge on the basis of immateriality. The assimi- 
 lation or likeness that is brought about 
 between the knowing power and the object is 
 not simply according to the nature of the object 
 
 a Omnis cognitio tit per assimilatiouem coguoscentis et 
 cogniti. C. G., 1. 1., c. 65. 
 
-35 
 
 in itself, but rather according to the nature of 
 the knowing faculty. Hence the object is in 
 the knower not according to its natural form 
 as it exists in its real being, but through a 
 representative form, through a form which the 
 Scholastics called intentional. This represen- 
 tative or intentional form was also known to 
 them as species. The species in itself, as an 
 entity, agrees in nature with the power in 
 which it is, in representing it agrees with the 
 object it stands for. It is sensible or intellectual 
 (species sensibilis, species intelligibilis ) according 
 to the knowing faculty senses or intellect. 
 "For sensible vision as well as for intellectual, 
 two things are required, viz., the power of 
 vision and the union of the seen with the one 
 who sees. For there is no actual vision except 
 the things seen be in some way in the one 
 seeing." This cognitive assimilation further 
 demands from the object to be known some 
 degree of immateriality, for the concept of 
 knowledge and the concept of materiality are 
 opposites. 4 
 This is a brief statement of the question of 
 
 3 Ad visiouem tarn sensibilem quam intellectualem duo 
 requiruntur ; scilicet, virtus visiva, et unio rei visae cum visu. 
 Non enim fit visio in actu, nisi per hoc quod res visa 
 quodammodo est in vidente. Sum. Theol., I, q. 12, a. 2. 
 
 4 Ratio cognitionis ex opposito se habet ad rationem 
 niaterialitatis. De VerL, q. 2. 
 
36- 
 knowleclge as set forth by St. Thomas. It can 
 be reduced to three fundmenial principles, that 
 we shall examine in detail, and thus arrive at a 
 clearer view of the psychology of this system and 
 the critical value given it by Aquinas. 
 
 These principles are: First, knowledge is the 
 result of the union of the subject and object; 
 second, the object known is in the knowing sub- 
 ject according to the nature of the knower; 
 third, the perfection of knowledge is in propor- 
 tion to the immateriality of the knowing sub- 
 ject. In other words, the essence of knowledge 
 consists in the intrinsic presence of the object in 
 the knower in such a way that the knower is 
 aware of it, and this recognition is due to an act 
 that contains in itself the object as a known 
 terminus. In knowledge the knowing subject 
 and the known object must be one ; this unity is 
 attained by an assimilation based on imma- 
 teriality. The words unity, assimilation, imma- 
 teriality, comprise the whole question. 
 
 The truth of the first principle is be} r ond doubt, 
 if we do not seek to determine the nature and 
 origin of this resemblance or assimilation. It is a 
 iact that we possess knowledge, and it is equally 
 clear that we have not the object according to 
 its natural or physical being, for the nature of 
 the knowing power forbids this hence there 
 must be some means by which the object is made 
 
37 
 
 knowable and the union between the knower 
 and the known takes place. This assimilation 
 or union is of the essence of knowledge ; the ob- 
 ject must be in the knower in such a way that it 
 makes the subject know the object, and this is 
 what is meant by saying that it is in the knower 
 representatively. There is a two-fold similitude 
 or likeness : there is one according to the nature 
 of things and there is a representative one. 
 This latter ''likeness of the knower to the known 
 
 is required for knowledge." The subject and 
 the object concur in one common action the 
 
 known object must be present to the knowing 
 subject, according to the nature of the knowing 
 subject, and the knowing subject by its activity 
 must respond to the specific determination of the 
 object. 6 
 
 The part of the object in this union is to deter- 
 mine the knowing faculty \vhich of itself is 
 indifferent and indeterminate ; 7 and this deter- 
 
 5 This representative likeness is the same as image, for it 
 implies some imitative reproduction of another thing, of the 
 object to be known. 
 
 6 The unity of action in knowledge is due to two co-prin- 
 ciples. On the side of the subject, there is no complete act 
 without the co-operation of the object, and the object is 
 incapable of effecting a complete act without the work of 
 the subject. 
 
 7 Sic etiam intellectus, si haberet aliquam naturam deter- 
 minatam, ilia natura connaturalis sibi prohibet eum a 
 cognitione aliarum naturarum. De Anima, 1. 3, lect. 7. 
 The soul is quodammodo omnia. 
 
- 3 8- 
 
 mination is brought about, as noted above, by 
 some representative presence of the object, which 
 the Scholastics called by the special name of 
 species. This species is synonymous with the 
 words forma and similitude, and is a special 
 determination coming from the object by 
 which the subject is aroused and directed 
 to know the object itself. When the mind 
 is not engaged in any actual cognition, it 
 is inactive and indetermined ; the object acting 
 on the mind determines the mind to know 
 it. The element by which the object is in con- 
 nection with the subject, which is its substi- 
 tute, is called by the Scholastics species im- 
 pressa ; excited by this determination the mind 
 acts, and the result is given in the species 
 expressa by \vhich the mind knows the object. 
 
 This word species is of constant occurrence in 
 the Scholastic theorj^ of knowledge, so an under- 
 standing of it will obviate misinterpretations, 
 and will likewise simplify the problem as pre- 
 sented in these terms. It is hardly necessary to 
 say that the word species has no community of 
 doctrine with the floating images of Democritus 
 and Epicurus which Aristotle rejected, and which 
 is not to be found in the best Scholastic writ- 
 
39- 
 
 ings. 8 The true meaning is simply this : the mind 
 is affected or modified by objects acting on the 
 knowing power, sense-organ or intellect. The 
 mind is in a peculiar attitude or modified to per- 
 ceive an object, The species has no independent 
 existence, but is bound up with the state or con- 
 dition of the mind viewed at the time of cogni- 
 tion ; it is due to the action of objects on sense- 
 organs or intellect. There are no pre-existing 
 species, for the " knowing soul is in potentia to 
 the species which are the principles of sensation, 
 as well as to the species which are the principles 
 of intellection... In the beginning, it is in potentia 
 to all the species by which it understands." 9 It 
 is the condition by which activity-sensory and 
 
 8 Though so recent an article as that of Dr. Lindsay, al- 
 ready referred to, has the following misconception of species : 
 "Both Thomas and Duns Scotus held, each in his own way, 
 to the doctrine of intelligible species, by which a copy of the 
 object was supposed, in the process of knowledge, to arise 
 and be seen by the soul." "In their doctrine of the "species 
 intelligibiles" the two "Realists," Thomas and Duns Scotus, 
 had alike followed, through some variations, the old Greek 
 idea, that in the knowing process, by means of the coopera- 
 tion of the soul and the external object, a copy of the latter 
 arises, which is then apprehended and beheld by the soul." 
 Windeband, A Hist, of Phil. p. 325. This thought is quoted 
 by Ladd in a note of his Phil, of Knowledge, p. 53. 
 
 9 Anima cognoscitiva sit in potentia tarn ad similitudines 
 quae sunt principia sentiendi, quam ad similitudines quae 
 sunt principia intelligendi. . . Est in principio in potentia ad 
 hujusmodi species omnes. Sum, TheoL, I. q. 84, a 3. 
 
40- 
 
 intellectual, is actualized. The intellect is act- 
 ually intelligent through the intelligible species, 
 as the sense is actual through the sensible 
 species. 10 " The intelligible species is the formal 
 principle of intellectual operation, as the form of 
 any agent is the form of its specific operation." 
 Through it the object becomes known. The 
 mind does not perceive it primarily, but it is the 
 means of perception "that which is understood 
 is the very concept of things existing outside the 
 mind." 11 It is the object that is understood, but 
 by means of the species. "The intelligible species 
 is not that which is understood but that b}^ 
 which the intellect understands." The object 
 is not inferred from the species, as though it were 
 an intermediate representation, but the species is 
 simply the means that brings about the union of 
 subject and object resulting in knowledge. 
 
 The species expressa was sometimes called 
 intentio. Very often this word was made an 
 adjective--intentionalis--in conjunction with 
 species. This intentio in us is "neither the thing 
 itself which is understood, nor is it the very 
 
 10 Species intelligibilis se habet ad intellectual sicut species 
 sensibilis ad sensum. Ibid., 2. 85, a 2. There is a parallel 
 between both species. 
 
 11 Id vero quod intelligitur est ipsa ratio rerum existentium 
 extra anitnam. C. G., 1. 2, c. 75. 
 
 12 Species intelligibilis mm est id quod intelligitur, sed id 
 quo intelligit intellectus. Sum. TheoL, I. q. 85, a. 2. 
 
-41- 
 
 substance of the intellect, but it is a certain like- 
 ness conceived in the intellect of the thing that 
 is understood." It was also known in intel- 
 lectual knowledge as verbum mentale. It is the 
 terminus of the intellectual activity aroused by 
 the intelligible species. This word intentional 
 was used to show in what way the object was 
 present to the knowing subject, to show the 
 nature of the resemblance between the knower 
 and the known. It offsets the view that the 
 object is present in knowledge in its real and 
 physical being; it is present really, but not ac- 
 cording to the condition in which it is found in 
 nature. This leads us to our second principle: 
 The object known is in the knower according to 
 the nature of the knower. 
 
 We have now seen the meaning of the word 
 species, and its fundamental importance in the 
 Scholastic system. The first principle gives the 
 nature of the species from the point of view of 
 the object, as representative of the object; the 
 second princple views the nature of the species 
 from the standpoint of the subject, as it exists in 
 the knower. It exists in the knower according 
 to the nature of the knower. 
 
 The second principle strictly taken is but a 
 
 13 Quae quidem in nobis neque est ipsa res quae intelligitur 
 neque est ipsa substantia intellectus, sed est quaedam simili- 
 tudo concepta intellectu de re intellecta. C. G., 1. 4, c. 11. 
 
- 4 2- 
 
 corollary of the first rightly understood, for if 
 knowledge is but the union of the subject and 
 the object, both must be of the same nature or 
 reduced to it before the union can be effected. 
 "All knowledge is according to some form, 
 which is the principle of knowledge in the 
 knower. This form or species can be viewed 
 in a twofold light : in its relation to the know- 
 ing subject, and also in its relation to the object 
 whose likeness it is. In the former it arouses 
 the knowing faculty to cognitive activity, and 
 in the latter it points out a definite object of 
 knowledge. Hence the manner of knowing a 
 thing is according to the condition of the 
 knower, in whom the form is received according 
 to his nature. But it is not necessarv that the 
 
 t* 
 
 thing known exist according to the nature of 
 the knower or according to that manner by 
 which the form, which is the principle of know- 
 ing, has existence in the knower.' 1 The manner 
 of knowing must be that of the knower, but 
 
 14 Omnis cognitio est secundum aliquam formam, quae est 
 in cognoscente principium cognitioois. Forma autem 
 hujusmodi potest considerari dupliciter: uno modo secun- 
 dum esse, quod hahet in cognoscente, alio modo secundum 
 respectum quern habet ad rem, cujus est similitude. Secun- 
 dum quidem primum respectum tacit cognoscentem actu 
 cognoscere ; sed secundum secundum respectum determinat 
 cognitionem ad aliquod cognoscibile determinatum. Et ideo 
 modus cognoscendi rem aliquam est secundum conditionem 
 cognoscentis, in quo forma recipitur secundum modum ejus. 
 Non autem oportet ut res cognita sit quae est cognoscendi 
 principium, habet esse in cognoscente. De Veri., q. 10, a. 4. 
 
-43- 
 
 the thing itself in rerum natura need not be one 
 with this mode, for knowledge is not "by means 
 of identity, but by means of a certain represen- 
 tation ; whence it is not necessary that the 
 nature of the knower and the known be the 
 same." This conformity of the subject and 
 object is "not a likeness of conformity in nature 
 but a likeness of representation only, as we 
 are reminded of some man through a golden 
 statue." 16 In fact, "the perfection of knowl- 
 edge consists in this, that the thing be known 
 to exist in that nature in which it is, and not 
 that the nature of the thing known be in the 
 knower." 
 
 The truth of this principle is emphasized 
 indirectly or negatively by St. Thomas when 
 he criticises the views of those who went astray 
 on this point. Some of the ancient philosophers 
 misapplied the axiom "like is known by like" 
 and landed in a position the extreme opposite 
 of that held bv Plato. They understood this 
 
 V* / 
 
 principle to mean that the "soul which knows 
 all things is naturally made up of all : earth 
 
 15 De Veri., q. 2, a. 5, ad 7. 
 
 16 Ad cognitionem non requiritur similitude conformitatis 
 in natura, sed similitude repraesentationis tantum ; sicut per 
 statuam auream ducitur in cognitionem hominis. De Veri., 
 q. 2, a. 5, ad 5. 
 
 17 Ibid., ad 6. 
 
-44- 
 
 that it may know earth, fire to know fire, and 
 so of the rest." This of course would make 
 the soul corporeal, since it knows corporeal 
 things ; in fact, it would make it a compound 
 of all things since it can know all things, and 
 not only made up of the elements these philoso- 
 phers considered as contained in their first 
 matter. If their interpretation of this principle 
 were true, then the possibility and diversity of 
 knowledge would be at an end. 
 
 St. Thomas likewise sets aside the theory of 
 Plato regarding this principle. "Plato", he 
 says, "seems to deviate from the truth in this 
 matter, for since he considered all knowledge 
 to take place by means of likeness, he believed 
 that the form of the known is of necessity in 
 the knower in that manner in which it is in 
 the known.'' This led Plato to conceive the 
 independent reality of general concepts to bring 
 about the requisite conditions for knowledge as 
 they appeared to him ; ideas and not corporeal 
 things would be the object of our intellectual 
 representations, according to Plato. This theory 
 results in an arbitrary knowledge, neglecting 
 
 J8 //?/<7., a. 2. 
 
 19 Videtur autem in hoc Plato deviare a veritate, quia cum 
 acstimaret 0111110111 cognitionem per inodum alicujus simili- 
 tudinis cssc crrdidit, quod forma co^tiiti ex necessitate sit 
 similitudinis csse modo, quo est in cognito. Sum. TheoL, 
 q. 84, a. 1. 
 
-45- 
 
 things as they are and failing to account for 
 our knowledge of corporeal things. 
 
 St. Thomas rejected these two views because 
 they did not accord with what he conceived to 
 be the basis of conformity between object and 
 subject. His critical spirit is shown by his put- 
 ting aside the Naturphilosophen and Plato, 
 and embracing a principle contained in the 
 book De Causis: That everything received 
 is received according to the nature of the re- 
 ceiver. 20 This principle is important for the 
 theory of knowledge, embracing as it does our 
 second principle. We know the object directly, 
 as noted before, and the object also has the 
 prior activity in knowledge, yet it must adapt 
 itself to the conditions of the knowing power. 
 Subject and object must be so intimately con- 
 nected as to form one sole principle of knowledge 
 according to the axiom: Ab utroque notitia pari- 
 tur a cognoscente et cognito. In this union the 
 object conies under the conditions of the know- 
 ing power, for the object is knowable only when 
 it has entered the field of consciousness by being 
 assimilated by the subject. 21 This assimilation 
 
 20 Omne quod recipitur in aliquo, est in eo per modum re- 
 cipientis. De Causis is a work of Proclus the Platonist. 
 
 21 This assimilation is a vital assimilation. In the cognitive 
 life there is exactly the same process of assimilation as in the 
 organic life, the process of nutrition ; it is but a special and 
 higher degree of assimilation. 
 
- 4 6- 
 
 makes it an integral part of the knowing power, 
 and thus a partaker of its nature. The subject 
 also is modified by the object to the extent, that 
 it is knowing under this condition and for this 
 object. From the psychological point of view 
 this principle presents no great difficulties, but 
 it is important in the question of the objectivity 
 of knowledge. 
 
 The third principle flows easily from the two 
 preceding. If knowledge depends on the assimi- 
 lative union of object and subject, and if the 
 object is known according to the nature of the 
 knower, it follows readily that the knowableness 
 of the object depends on its immateriality. The 
 concept of knowledge and the concept of materi- 
 ality are opposites"; "the more immaterial 
 things are, the more knowable they are." 'This 
 principle or axiom is very important; in a way, 
 it underlies the whole question ol knowledge, it is 
 the condition that makes a thing knowable, and 
 makes knowledge the possession of a particular 
 class of beings. Immateriality, in general, is the 
 capacity a thing has to be itself and to become 
 something else. In knowledge, the object must 
 be immaterial in itself or else immaterialized, and 
 the subject must be immaterial the object is 
 assimilated and the subject assimilates. This 
 
 22 Secundum ordinem immuteriulitatis in rebus, secundum 
 hoc in eis natura cognitionis itivenitur. De Wr/., q. 2, a. 2. 
 
47- 
 
 double aspect is brought out clearly by St. 
 Thomas immateriality on the part of object 
 and subject. The distinction between a knowing 
 being and one that does not know is based on 
 immateriality. The non-knowing has simply the 
 one form of its own being, whereas the knowing 
 is capable of receiving the form of another thing, 
 for the species or form of the known is in the one 
 knowing. The non-knowing can be assimilated 
 but cannot assimilate; the knowing has the 
 power to assimilate and thus become more and 
 more. Hence the nature of the non-knowing is 
 more restricted and limited, whereas the know- 
 ing has greater amplitude and extension. It is 
 for this reason Aristotle said the soul is quodam- 
 modo omnia. It is because of the universality of 
 the knowing power, that matter, which is the 
 principle of individuation and restricts the form 
 to one condition or result, cannot be admitted 
 into it; rather in proportion to the absence of 
 materiality will the knowledge be the freer and 
 more perfect. 23 If the soul were naturally deter- 
 mined in one direction, to one set of activities, 
 all its operations would be influenced by this 
 specific bent, just as all things taste bitter to an 
 unhealthy tongue. The soul must then be capa- 
 
 23 Quanto autem aliquid immaterialius habet formam rei 
 cognitae, tanto perfectius cognoscit. Sum. TheoL, I., q. 84, 
 a. 2. 
 
- 4 8- 
 
 ble of adjusting itself to receive the various 
 cognitions we know it actually possesses, it 
 must have in its nature none of those things it 
 seeks to know and can know." 4 
 
 St. Thomas has knowledge graded on the scale 
 of immateriality the knowableness of the object 
 and the knowing capacity of the subject rest on 
 the same basis. A thing is knowable in propor- 
 tion to its immateriality, and a subject knows in 
 proportion to the extent of the immateriality 
 of its nature. There is a passage in the Summa 
 Theologica, Part I, q. 84, a. 2, that brings 
 out this fact clearly. Knowledge is per 
 formam, and its concept is the opposite of 
 the concept of materiality. When forms exist 
 materially only- -immersed in matter there is 
 no power of knowledge, as is the case in 
 plants; but in proportion as the form of the 
 thing is possessed more immaterially, the more 
 perfect is the knowledge. Thus the intellect 
 which has the form of the object freed from 
 matter and all individuating conditions is more 
 cognoscitive than the senses which possess the 
 form, without matter it is true, yet with mate- 
 rial conditions. Even among the senses them- 
 selves this principle is verified, for vision is the 
 
 >24 Quod autem potest cognoscere nliquu, oportet ut nihil 
 eorum habeat in sua natura, quiu illud quod int-sset ei natur- 
 aliter, irupediret cognitionem aliorum. Ibid., q. 75, a. 2. 
 
-49- 
 
 most cognoscitive because it is the least mate- 
 rial ; likewise among concepts the degree of 
 immateriality regulates the degree of perfection. 
 There is no break in the application of this 
 axiom, it leads straight up to the highest know- 
 able and the most perfectly knowing God Him- 
 self. The idea of immateriality as here under- 
 stood, contains the idea of activity ; potentia 
 and matter are pratically one and are the op- 
 posites of immateriality and actuality. 25 In God 
 there is an utter absence of potentia and matter, 
 He is characterized by the possession of their 
 contraries, and thus he is especially knowable 
 and knowing. "Since God, therefore, is the 
 opposite extreme of matter, since He is entirely 
 immune from all potentiality, it follows that He 
 is especially knowable and especially know- 
 ing." 26 
 There are objects that are immaterial in 
 
 25 St. Thomas uses the phrase, non enim cognoscitur ali- 
 quid secundurn quod in potentia est, sed secundum quod est 
 in actu, very frequently. He uses this quality of actuality 
 as a proof for the immateriality^ of the soul. "The species of 
 material things as they are in themselves are not intelligible 
 actu, because they are in matter. But as they are in the 
 intellective human soul they are intelligible actu." Quodlibe- 
 tum 3, a. 20. 
 
 ^ Quia Deus est in fine separations a materia, cum ab 
 
 omni potentialitate sit penitus immunis, relinquitur, quod 
 
 ipse est maxime cognoscitivus et maxime cognoscibilis. De 
 Veri., q. 2, a. 2. 
 
- 5 o- 
 
 thcmselves and are knowable so far as they 
 are concerned, and there are objects that do 
 not possess this quality but must be brought 
 to this condition before they are propria of the 
 mind. God, the spirit \vorld--including Angels 
 and the souls of men, our own thoughts and the 
 thoughts of others as thoughts, come under the 
 first class ; the second class embraces what we 
 ordinarily understand by material objects. We 
 shall take up the question of God shortly. 
 That Angels come under this term is evident to 
 all who accept the doctrine about Angels - 
 "some essences are sine materia as separated 
 substances which we call Angels." The mind 
 knows itself, and the content of the mind 
 together with the mind itself is immaterial. 
 From the fact that we perceive ourselves to 
 understand we know that we have an intel- 
 lectual soul, but to understand the nature of 
 this soul there is need of a careful consideration 
 -a subtilis inquisitio. In this latter quest many 
 have erred through a misunderstanding of the 
 principle --like is known by like. They perceived 
 that they had a knowledge of material things 
 and at once concluded that these objects were 
 present to the soul materially, not recognizing 
 that the concepts of knowledge and immaterial- 
 
 27 Sum. Theol., I, q. 87, a. 1, ad 3. 
 
ity are opposites. Plato, as St. Thomas notes, 
 rightly conceived the soul to be immaterial and 
 its knowledge to be likewise immaterial, but 
 his explanation of this truth was not satis- 
 factory. He introduced unnecessary elements 
 to account for this doctrine; he did not give 
 the intellect the power to render a material 
 object immaterial, but held there were imma- 
 terial ideas independent of the object, and that 
 it was these ideas or forms the mind knew. 
 This theory is unlike that of St. Thomas, who 
 says, "everything intelligible is immune from 
 matter in se, or is abstracted from matter by 
 the operation of the intellect," 28 yet it is the 
 actual recognition of immateriality as a 
 requisite for knowableness. 
 
 The knowledge the soul has of itself empha- 
 sizes further this requisite of immaterialit}'. 
 St. Thomas holds that we have a two -fold 
 knowledge of the soul an actual and habitual 
 one. We can simply know of its existence, and 
 we can also know of its nature two distinct 
 points, "for many know they have a soul who 
 do not know what the soul is," 29 do not know 
 its nature. The soul becomes aware of itself 
 through its acts "one perceives that he has 
 a soul, and lives, and is, because he perceives 
 
 28 De Yen'., q. 13, a. 3. 
 Ibid.,q. 10, a. 9. 
 
52 
 
 himself to feel and understand and to exercise 
 the other functions of a life of this nature." This 
 reveals its existence; "what the nature of the 
 mind itself is, the mind can only perceive from 
 a consideration of its object." From a knowl- 
 edge of its object, the soul conies to know its 
 own nature. "Our mind can not so understand 
 itself that it can immediately apprehend itself, 
 but from apprehending other things it comes 
 to a knowledge of itself. . . From the fact that 
 the human soul knows the universal natures of 
 things, it perceives that the species by which 
 \ve understand is immaterial ; otherwise it 
 would be individualized and thus never lead 
 to a knowledge of the universal." The soul 
 
 30 Aliquis percipit se animam habere et vivere et esse, quod 
 percipit se sentire et intelligere et alia hujusraodi vitae opera 
 exercere. De Veri., q. 10, a. 8. 
 
 1 //>/,/., q. 10, a. 8, ad 1. 
 
 St. Thomas appreciated the difficulty of arriving at a 
 knowledge of the nature of the soul. " Each one experiences 
 in himself that he has a soul and that the acts of the soul 
 take place within him, but to know the nature of the soul is 
 most difficult." /v I'r/-/'., q. 10, a. 8 ad 8. The same 
 applies to our knowledge ot the nature of God. 
 
 * Unde mens nostra 11011 potest se ipsani intelligere, ita 
 (juod se ipsam immediate apprehendat ; sed ex hoc quod ap- 
 prehendit alia, devenit in suam cognitionem. . . Kx hoc enim 
 quod species qua intelligimus est immaterialis; alias estset 
 individtiata, et sic non duceret in cognitionem universalis. 
 De Veri., q. 10, a. 8. 
 
r* >> _ 
 
 53 
 
 knows the universal, the proper object of the 
 intellect is the essence of material things, this 
 essence is immaterial, and the soul perceiving 
 this immaterial essence recognizes its own 
 immaterial nature, for operation follows being, 
 the act is in accord with its source. 
 
 The idea running through these principles is 
 -knowledge is a vital act, an assimilation of 
 subject and object. The degree of activity regu- 
 lates the degree of knowledge, of perfection; this 
 goes on without a break until \ve reach the most 
 perfect knowledge in God. Before we consider 
 the know^ableness of God, we must outline the 
 factors involved in the activity of intellectual 
 
 / 
 
 knowledge in man. There is, therefore, a per- 
 fect and supreme grade of life, that of the intel- 
 lect, for the intellect reflects upon itself and 
 know r s itself." The human intellect though it 
 can know itself, begins its knowledge with 
 external things ; it is inferior to the Angelic and 
 Divine Intellects, but leads to a knowledge of 
 them. 
 
 33 Est igitur supremus et perfectus gradus vitae, qui est 
 secundum intellectum ; nam intellectus in seipsum reflectitur, 
 et seipsum intelligere potest. C. G., 1. 4, c. 11. 
 
54- 
 
 SECTION II. THEORY OF INTELLECTUAL 
 KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 There are two kinds of knowledge in man 
 arising from two sets of cognitive activity the 
 sensorv and the intellectual. 1 The latter is of 
 
 mJ 
 
 especial importance in arriving at a knowledge 
 ol God, so we shall present the stages of intel- 
 lectual knowledge as found in St. Thomas. 
 
 The human intellect is primarily and directly 
 concerned with being in its widest acceptation. 
 More specificiall} 7 , it is busied with the essence of 
 material things, the universal. This essence as 
 it exists in material things is not in an imme- 
 diate condition to be known, so there is a power, 
 an intellectual activity, required to make it 
 actually knowable or intelligible. This power 
 is the active intellect, which b}^ its abstractive 
 power immaterializes the corporeal object and 
 brings to light the intelligible species. This 
 species is the likeness of the object in its specific 
 nature; it makes the object actually intelligible 
 and determines the intellect proper to know. 
 This summary statement can now be viewed 
 in its parts. 
 
 "What is primarily and per se> known by a 
 
 1 Homo cognoscit diversis viribus COgnoscitivis omnia 
 rerum genera, intellectu quidem univcrsalia et immaterialia, 
 sensu singularia et corporalia. Sum. Theol., I, q. 57, a. 2. 
 
55 
 
 cognitive power is its proper object." "But 
 being is primarily in the conception of the 
 intellect, for everything is knowable in so far 
 as it is actual. . . Whence being is the proper 
 object of the intellect, and thus it is the first 
 intelligible as sound is the first audible." Being 
 is here taken for actual and possible existence, 
 11 it comprehends all the differences and possible 
 species of being, for whatever can exist can be 
 understood." As we are now constituted we 
 are not concerned with all being directly, but 
 with being as found in material things. "The 
 first object of our intellect in our present exist- 
 ence is not being and true of any sort, but 
 being and true viewed in material things, 
 through which we come to a knowledge of 
 all other things." This passage contains the 
 
 2 Id quod est primo et per se cognitum a virtute cognosci- 
 tiva est proprium ejus objectum. Sum. Theol., I, q. 85, a. 7. 
 
 3 Primo autem in conceptione intellectus est ens : quia 
 secundum hoc unumquodque cognoscibile est, in quantum 
 est actu. . . Unde ens est proprium objectum intellectus ; et 
 sic est primum intelligibile sicut sonus est primum audibile. 
 Sum. Theol., I, q. 5, a. 2. 
 
 4 Est enim proprium objectum intellectus ens intelligibile, 
 quod quidem comprehendit omnes differentias et species 
 entis possibililis ; quidquid esse potest intelligi potest. C. G., 
 1, 2. c. 98. 
 
 5 Nee primum objectum intellectus nostri secundum prae- 
 sentem statum est quodlibet ens et verum, sed ens et verum 
 consideratum in rebus materialibus, ex quibus in cogni- 
 tionem omnium aliorum devenit. Sum. Theol., I, q. 87, 
 a. 3 ad 1. 
 
- 5 6- 
 
 fundamental and oft-repeated truth that we 
 start from material things as a basis and 
 rise gradually to our most immaterial and 
 metaphysical concepts.* 1 
 
 The specific or connatural object of the 
 intellect is then the essence of material things. 
 Through the intellect it is connatural to us 
 to know natures that exist only in individual 
 matter, but not as they are in individual 
 matter but as they are abstracted from it by 
 intellectual consideration. Thus the intellect 
 enables us to know things of this nature as 
 universal. And this is beyond the po\ver of the 
 senses." The intellect deals with the universal 
 which, however, is found in sensible objects, 
 and this power makes it superior to the senses. 
 'Sensitive cognition is occupied with external, 
 sensible qualities, but intellectual knowledge 
 
 6 Proprium autetn intellcctus cst quidquid est in sub- 
 stantia rci. Igitur quidquid intellcctus de aliqua re cognoseit, 
 cognoscit per cognitionem substantiae illius rei. . . Cognitio 
 intellectus oritur a sensu. . . Quidquid igitur est in re, quod 
 non potest cognosci per eognitionem substantiae ejus, op- 
 ortet esse intellcetm ignotum. C. G., 1. 3, c. 56. 
 
 7 Unde per intellectum connaturale est nobis cognoscere 
 naturas quae quidem non habent esse nisi in tnateria 
 individuali; non tatnen secundum quod sunt in materia 
 individual; serl secundum quod abstrahuntur ab ea per 
 considerationem intellcctus. Unde secundum intellectum 
 possumus cognoscere hujusmodi res in universal!; quod est 
 supra facultatem scnsus. Sum. TheoL, I, q. 12, a. 4. 
 
-57- 
 
 penetrates to the very essence of the thing, for 
 the object of the intellect is the quiddity of a 
 thing." "The proper object proportioned to 
 our intellect is the nature of a sensible thing." 
 This principle rests upon the very nature of 
 man, his relation to matter. The knowable 
 object is proportionate to the knowing power. 
 This power varies according to its connection 
 with matter. Man makes use of a bodily organ 
 in knowing, thus he knows matter, but only 
 what is essential to it reaches his intellect as 
 its proper concept. Essence is intelligible for us 
 only in so far as it is actualized, and it is 
 actualized only in material things. Our mind 
 has a natural tendency to know the intelligible 
 essence, but it reaches it only through sensuous 
 images. "Operation is proportioned to power 
 and essence, but the intellectual in man rests 
 on the sensitive, and thence its proper operation 
 is to understand the intelligible in the phantas- 
 mata (images)." 
 
 8 Cognitio sensitiva occupatur circa qualitates seusibiles 
 exterioris, cognitio autem intellectiva penetrat usque ad 
 essentiam rei ; objectum enim iutellectus est quod quid est. 
 Sum. TheoL, 22% q. 8. a. 1. 
 
 9 Proprium objectum intellectui nostro proportionatum, 
 est natura rei sensibilis. Ibid., I, q. 84, a. 7. 
 
 10 Operatio proportionatur virtuti et essentiae ; intellec- 
 tivum autem hominis est in sensitive et ideo propria ejus 
 est intelligere intelligibilia in phantasmatibus. De Memoria 
 et Reminiscentia, lect. 4.' 
 
- 5 8- 
 
 How is the mind to get at the universal, the 
 intelligible in things, for this is its object. 
 This question is answered by the theory of 
 abstraction. The mind possesses a power 
 called active intellect by which it brings in 
 evidence the universal or the intelligible in the 
 thing considered. The existence of such a 
 power, its relation to what is called the passive 
 intellect, its function, and the result of its opera- 
 tion, are all clearly set forth by St. Thomas. 
 
 Nothing is changed from the potential to the 
 actual save through something that is actual. 
 Intelligibility requires the object to be actual, 
 individualizing matter is opposed to this know- 
 ableness, thus there must be an activit} r in the 
 mind to dra\v from material things the essence 
 they contain. This is the active intellect. If 
 universals had an existence independent of 
 matter, as Plato held, then this power would 
 be unnecessary, for its sole purpose is to make 
 actually intelligible the universal existing in 
 material things. This power is then dependent 
 on the doctrine that universals have a funda- 
 mentum in re, in things themselves, and must 
 be abstracted before they can become propria 
 of the mind. This power is so necessary that 
 "without it man can understand nothing." Yet 
 
 11 De Yen'., q. 1, a. 1 ad 3. 
 
-59- 
 
 it is not of such a nature as to constitute 
 \vhat we might call a distinct mind ; it is rather 
 closely associated with the passive intellect. 
 The latter is the intellectual faculty proper - 
 "the passive intellect is that by which man 
 formally understands/ 112 the former is intel- 
 lectual activity. They are distinct in the sense 
 that we can ascribe different operations to 
 them, but not in the sense of radical separation 
 and totally independent action. "In every act 
 by which man understands, there is the con- 
 current operation of both active and passive 
 intellects." 13 
 
 The basis for the distinction between these 
 two powers rests on the relation of potency 
 and act in general. 14 The mind is viewed as a 
 passive power, immaterial and destined to know 
 
 12 De Anima, 1. 3, lect 7. 
 
 15 In omni actu quo homo intelligit, concurrit operatic 
 intellectus agentis et intellectus possibilis De Mente, a. 8, 
 ad 11. Ladd's statement that the power that apprehends 
 the universal is an "intellective soul" is incorrect, and leads 
 him to the following misconception: "This results in a 
 division of the faculties of the soul, which is wholh' incon- 
 sistent with his (Aquinas') maintenance elsewhere of the 
 true view of the soul as one, but gifted with diverse 
 energies." Phil, of Knowledge, p. 53. St. Thomas never 
 abandons the "true view of the soul as one, but gifted 
 with diverse energies." 
 
 14 "The active and passive intellects are diverse powers, 
 as in all things there is an active and passive power." Sum. 
 Theol., I, q. 79, a. 10. This is the fundamental thought 
 in the Faculty Theory of the Scholastics ; the principle itself 
 is very extensive, operating throughout their whole system. 
 
6o 
 
 the intelligible, which must be immaterial and 
 intelligible actu before it is an object of intel- 
 lectual knowledge, "but the intelligible actu is 
 not something existing in rerum natura," 5 hence 
 there is need of an active power in the mind to 
 bring about this intelligibility and actually 
 account for the knowledge we possess. The 
 act of the passive intellect is to receive the 
 intelligible, the action or the active intellect is 
 to abstract the intelligible." In discussing 
 the general principles of knowledge, we saw 
 that there was both passivity and activity 
 in the operation of knowing, that both subject 
 and object played a part in effecting knowledge. 
 Here we have the object in the phantasma or 
 imagination acted upon by the active intellect 
 and the result admitted by the passive intellect, 
 as the intelligible in things. " The active intellect 
 is a certain power of the soul extending itself 
 actively to the same things to which the passive 
 intellect extends itself receptively." The former 
 enables the soul to "do all things' (omnia 
 
 ]i Sum. ThcoL, I, q. 79, a. 3 ad 3. 
 
 lt; Actus intellectus possibilis est recipere intelligibilia ; 
 actus intellectus ageutis est abstrahere intelligibilia. Q. Dd., 
 De Anima, a. 4 ad 7. 
 
 17 Intellectus agens est. . virtus quaedani animae ad eadem 
 active se extendens ad quae se extendit intellectus possibilis 
 receptive. Sum. Theol., 1, q. 88, a. 1. 
 
6i 
 
 facere), the latter to "become all things' 
 (omnia fieri). 
 
 We have said that the purpose of this active 
 intellect is to bring out lor the mind the real 
 object existing in material things, to abstract 
 the universal from them. It is an abstractive 
 power and exercises itself solely on the intelligi- 
 ble in sensible things. "Everything is under- 
 stood in so far as it is abstracted from matter, 
 because the forms in matter are individual 
 forms which the intellect does not appiehend 
 as such." 18 To abstract is to know a thing 
 existing individually in corporeal matter, but 
 not in the manner in which it there exists. " To 
 know what is in such individual matter, but 
 not as it is in such matter, is to abstract the 
 form from individual matter." 19 Knowledge 
 proceeds from the more indeterminate to the 
 less indeterminate, from the imperfect to the 
 perfect, because the intellect is concerned with 
 the universal in the individual. It knows the 
 essence at once as constituent of the thing, 
 and later on by reflection as applicable to 
 
 18 Unumquodque intelligitur in quantum a materia ab- 
 strahitur; quia formae in materia suiit individualis formae 
 quas intellectus non apprehendit secundum quod hujus- 
 modi. Ibid., I, q. 50, a. 2. 
 
 19 Cognoscere vero id quod est in materia individual!, 
 non prout est in tali materia, est abstrahere formam a 
 materia individual!. Sum. TheoL, I, q. 85, a. 1. 
 
62 
 
 many others. The universal is not the result 
 
 / 
 
 of a comparison between many objects in the 
 sense of the Empiricists, and then recognized 
 as universal because found in many or all, nor 
 is the particular or individual known first by 
 
 A- w 
 
 the intellect and then the universal. 
 
 The active intellect abstracts the universal 
 from the image in the imagination or phan- 
 tasia.' The image is the instrumental cause 
 in the process, the active intellect is the prin- 
 cipal cause. The result partakes of the nature 
 of both causes. Its relation to the image 
 makes it the representation of a specific object, 
 its relation to the active intellect makes it 
 immaterial in nature. We have finally the 
 intelligible species produced in the passive 
 intellect. Sensation from which our knowledge 
 takes its rise is not the full explanation of 
 the universal "sensitive cognition is not the 
 total cause of intellectual cognition." ai Abstrac- 
 tion or the operation of the active intellect 
 simply brings out the universal existing in 
 the given individual object. "One and the 
 same nature which was singular and made 
 
 ' 20 The phantasia for the Scholastics was the faculty that 
 retained the images of absent objects. It is now known 
 as retentive memory. 
 
 21 Sensitiva cognitio non est tota causa iutellectualis 
 j ognitionis. Sum. Theol., I, q. 84, a. 6. 
 
-6 3 - 
 
 individual in each man through matter, after- 
 wards becomes universal through the action 
 of the intellect refining it from individuating 
 conditions. 22 
 
 The active intellect is said to illumine the 
 phantasma, and thus render it fit to arouse 
 the passive intellect to an act of knowledge. 
 Though the phantasmata or images of them- 
 selves cannot act on the intellect because 
 they are individual and exist in corporeal 
 organs, yet since they are in the soul which 
 is intellective, they have a special aptitude to 
 become known to the passive intellect through 
 the operation of the active intellect. As the 
 senses receive greater power from their con- 
 nection with the intellect, so the phantasmata 
 by the power of the active intellect are put 
 in a condition from which the intelligible 
 species can be readily abstracted. This illumi- 
 nation is simply the action of the active 
 intellect, for the latter is not supposed "to 
 imprint anything on the phantasma, but in 
 union with the phantasma it produces the 
 intelligible species in the passive intellect." 
 
 22 Una et eadem natura, quae singularis erat et individuata 
 per materiam in singularibus hominibus, efficitur postea 
 universalis per actionem intellectus depurantis ipsam a con- 
 ditionibus quae sunt hie et nunc. De UniversaJibus.. 
 
 23 The Commentary of the Conimbricen'ses, De Anima, 1. 3, 
 c. 5, q. 1, a. 3 ad 1. 
 
-6 4 - 
 
 The result of the operation of the active 
 intellect is the intelligible species, which is 
 immaterial and represents the thing in its 
 specific nature abstracted from the material 
 object. "What pertains to the specific con- 
 cept of any material thing, as stone, or man, 
 or horse, can be considered without the in- 
 dividual principles which are not of the concept 
 of the species. And this is to abstract the 
 universal from the particular or the intelligible 
 species from the phantasmata, namely, to con- 
 sider the nature of the species without con- 
 sidering the individual principles which are 
 represented through the phantasmata." The 
 intelligible species is received in the passive 
 intellect and determines it to know. The intellect 
 is passive, as we have seen, but when stimulated 
 to understand, it is active. What produces the 
 action is related to the intellect as its form, for 
 form is that by which an agent acts. This form 
 is the intelligible species, the intellectual repre- 
 sentation of the object known. W T e might recall 
 
 >M Ea quae pertinent ad rationem specie! cujuslibet ivi 
 materiaJis, put a lapidis, aut honiiniis, ant eqni, possnnt 
 considerari sine principiis individnalilms, quae mm sunt de 
 ratione speciei. Et hoe est ahstrahere nniversale a par- 
 ticular!, vel speeiem intelligibilem a phantasmatibus, consid- 
 erari scilicet natnra in speciei aliaque considerat ione individ 
 ualiuni principiorutn, quae per phantasmata repraesentantur. 
 Sum. Theol., L, q. 85, a. 1 ad 1. 
 
\_/ I 
 
 JNIVERSITY I 
 / 
 
 -65- 
 
 here that it is not the species that is known 
 primarily by the mind, but the object it repre- 
 sents ; and moreover, the species is of the nature 
 of the knower, and hence does not agree in 
 nature with the physical being of the object. 
 The last stage of the act of knowledge is the 
 mental word, the recognition of the object and 
 the internal expression of this recognition, and 
 this word is " neither the thing itself which is 
 understood, nor is it the very substance of the 
 intellect, but it is a certain likeness conceived 
 in the intellect of the thing which is under- 
 stood," and by w r hich we understand the 
 object. This connects us at once with what 
 St. Thomas has to say about the Validity of 
 our Knowledge. 
 
 SECTION III. VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 It is evident from the discussion of the 
 general principles of knowledge, and especially 
 the process of intellectual knowledge, that the 
 question of validity is practically taken for 
 granted in the system of our author; it is an 
 undercurrent directing and determining the 
 statements and developments of knowledge in 
 its various stages as set forth by Aquinas in 
 detail. The reality of the object, of the external 
 
 26 
 
 C. G., 1. 4, c. 11. 
 
66 
 
 i 
 
 world, is rooted in the fundamental state- 
 ments of knowledge thus far expressed. The 
 union of subject and object, the manner in 
 which the object is present to the knower, 
 the intellectual process that gives birth to the 
 intelligible in sensible objects, all look to some- 
 thing extra animam--"ihe act of knowledge 
 extends itself to those things which are out- 
 side the knower, for we also know those 
 things which are external to us." According 
 to Gardair, "St. Thomas seems to regard as 
 indubitable the prime veracity of the senses 
 rather than to demonstrate it." Farges is 
 in accord with this view. "The great 
 Doctors of the Middle Ages believed in the 
 immediate perception of bodies by the external 
 senses as a primitive fact clearly attested by 
 the consciousness of each man." These state- 
 ments become general when we recall that for 
 Aquinas all knowledge takes its rise in the 
 senses, according to the axiom: Nihil cst in 
 
 1 Actus cognitionis se extendit ad ea quae sunt extra 
 cognoscentem. Cognoscimus enini etiam ea quae extra n.s 
 sunt. Sum Theol., I, q. 84, a. 2. 
 
 2 L'Objectivite de la Sensation, Arm-tics ilc Phil Chret- 
 tienne, 1895, p. 17. 
 
 3 Theorie de la Perception Immediate d'apres Aristote et 
 St. Thomas. Ibid., 1891, p. 441. 
 
-6 7 - 
 
 intellecttt quod prius non fuerit in sensu. 4 
 A few sentences will suffice to confirm the 
 above view. First, as regards the senses. 
 "The sense is a certain passive power capable 
 of being changed by an external sensible ob- 
 ject." "The sense always apprehends the 
 the thing as it is, except there be an impedi- 
 ment in the organ or in the medium." 6 Because 
 "sensible objects exist actually outside the 
 soul," 7 there is no need of an active sense 
 corresponding to the active intellect. We have 
 
 4 It is true to say as Ladd does with St. Thomas "the 
 psj'chological inquiry as to the nature, results, and cer- 
 tainty of its (the intellect) functioning is thus made the 
 most important of epistemological inquiries." But his under- 
 standing of this product is inadequate, as his conclusion 
 evidences "with such views of the origin of knowledge 
 as the foregoing, the validating of knowledge becomes a 
 hopeless puzzle. Phil, of Knowledge, p. 53. That there 
 is no inconsistency between the psychology of knowledge 
 and the epistemology of knowledge as treated by St. 
 Thomas, will be clear, we think, from an exposition of 
 his views. "The theories of validity ought to correspond 
 to the theories of origin : It is thus Nominalism, Con- 
 ceptualism and Realism correspond perfectly to Sensism, 
 Innatism, and Peripateticisrn. Peillaube, Theorie des Con- 
 cepts, p 347. 
 
 5 Est autem sensus quaedam potentia passiva, quae nata 
 est immutari ab exteriori sensibili. Sum. Theol., I, q. 78, 
 a. 3. 
 
 6 Sensus semper apprehendit rem ut est, nisi sit impedi- 
 mentum in organo, vel in medio. De Veri., q. 1, a. 11. 
 
 7 Sum. Theol. , I, q. 79, a. 3 ad 1. 
 
68 
 
 seen that all knowledge is by species and that 
 the species is only the means of knowledge; 
 what is primarily and immediately and actually 
 known is the object the species represents. 
 Moreover, both powers of cognition sense and 
 intellect are passive and must be acted upon 
 by the objects, to which they add nothing 
 and from which they take nothing, before there 
 is knowledge. This double phase of activity 
 and passivity in knowledge, presupposes ex- 
 ternal reality. This is expressed in a statement 
 of A. Seth: " Knowledge is an activity, an 
 activo-passive experience, of the subject, whereby 
 it becomes aware of what is not itself." 
 
 We need say little about the reality contained 
 in intellectual knowledge, for though this knowl- 
 edge is distinct in kind from sensory, yet it rests 
 on sensitive images as a basis, and the whole 
 process of the active intellect is concerned with 
 extracting the intelligible, the essence, wrapped 
 up in the image, which is the proper object of 
 the intellect. There is a twofold aspect of the 
 operation of knowing in man, one wholly 
 internal and another that has as its terminus 
 "something existing outside him," ' an external 
 object. "The first object of the human intel- 
 
 8 The Problem of Epistemology, Phil. Review, vol. 1, 
 p. 513. 
 Sum. Theol., I, q. 14, a. 2. 
 
-6 9 - 
 
 lect is not its own essence, but something 
 external, namely, the nature of a material 
 thing. Hence what is primarily known by the 
 intellect is an object of this nature, and 
 secondarily, the act by which the object is 
 known." To multiply quotations would be 
 useless and would largely repeat what was 
 said when speaking of intellectual knowledge. 
 
 We can then say we know the object, we 
 know it as something external, and we know 
 it at once. The perception of reality is not the 
 result of an inference as Descartes and many 
 moderns hold, but the idea represents the ob- 
 ject at once without any intermediate presenta- 
 tions. But how does the idea make the object 
 known to us? What does it meant The idea 
 is a state of the mind, and it is also representa- 
 tive of something. In this second, its epistemo- 
 logical aspect, as representative of something, 
 what is its value? Seth admits the twofold 
 aspect of the idea and yet holds: "Immediacy 
 
 10 Nee sui intelligere est objectum primum ipsa ejus essentia. 
 sed aliquid extrinsecum, scilicet natura materialis rei. Et 
 ideo id quod primo cognoscitur ab intellectu humano, est 
 hujusmodi objectum ; et secundario cognoscitur ipse actus, 
 quo cognoscitur objectum. Sum. Theol., I, q. 87, a. 3. This 
 statement is exactly the opposite of the view held by 
 Descartes and many modern psychologists, for whom the 
 sensation is the only and the first immediate object of 
 perception. 
 
70 
 
 must be given up before any tenable theory of 
 perception and am r philosophical doctrine of 
 Realism can be established." St. Thomas 
 maintains that the idea as representation, or, 
 to make the statement general, the species 
 which is the likeness or representation of the 
 thing makes the thing itself known at once. 
 If we hold with Berkeley that an idea can 
 only be like an idea, we are shut off from a 
 knowledge of the real existence of things 
 material. The idea as an idea, as a state in 
 the mind, of course, can only be like another 
 idea, but when we recognize that "knowledge 
 means nothing if it does not mean the relation 
 of two factors, knowledge of an object by a 
 subject," 'and "that we are never restricted 
 to our own idea as ideas; from the first dawn 
 of knowledge we treat the subjective excita- 
 tion as the symbol or revealer to us of a real 
 world," we see the aspect of the idea that 
 looks toward something other than its presence 
 as a mere mental state. It is only a question 
 of what this something other is. And here we 
 meet the second general principle of knowledge 
 -the object is known according to the nature 
 of the knower from the critical point of view. 
 
 11 Loc. cit., p. 515. 
 
 12 A. Seth, loc. cit., p. 513. 
 
 13 A. Seth, Scottish Philosophy, p. 103. 
 
__ *7 T - 
 
 In the system of St. Thomas the answer to 
 the something other is at hand : the idea repre- 
 sents to the subject some real object that is 
 known immediately by means of the idea, but 
 known according to the nature of the knower. 
 The fact that everything the subject knows 
 he knows according to his nature, renders the 
 objections usually made on the score of incom- 
 patibility of the nature of the knowing subject 
 with certain objects that we say we do know, 
 of little or no consequence ; for though the 
 intellectual idea as such is wholly immaterial, 
 yet the image from which it has been derived 
 is material, and the idea is simply the image 
 considered in an immaterial way, namely, the 
 essence freed from material conditions. 14 
 
 The real difficulty from the modern point of 
 view is to explain how the species represents 
 the thing in itself, since the species is in the 
 
 14 Quae (aninia) t am en h abet duas virtutes cognoscitivas. 
 Unam, quae est actus alicujus corporei organ! ; et huic con- 
 naturale est cognoscere res secundum quod sunt in materia 
 individual! ; unde sensus non cognoscit nisi singularia. Alia 
 vero virtus cognoscitiva ejus est intellectus, qui non est 
 actus alicujus organi corporalis. Unde per intellectum con- 
 naturale est nobis cognoscere naturas, quae quidem non 
 habent esse nisi in materia individual! rei, non tamen secun- 
 dum quod sunt in materia individual!, sed secundum quod 
 abstrahuntur ab ea per considerationem intellectus. Sum. 
 Theol., I, q. 14, a. 4. The close connection between the 
 material image and the immaterial idea is here indicated. 
 
72 
 
 knower according to the nature of the knower. 
 Kant admits a relation between the subject 
 and the object, but this relation is based upon 
 an adaptation of the object to the subject, 
 which imposes on the object its forms, cate- 
 gories, or ideas; we know appearances, pheno- 
 mena only; all knowledge is purely subjective 
 due to internal elements, and hence a real 
 knowledge of the nature of things is excluded, 
 things in themselves cannot be known. For 
 St. Thomas, there is also a relation between 
 the subject and the object, but this relation 
 is based on the natural proportion, though 
 relative, of the object and the subject. This 
 idea of a natural proportion is a fruitful and 
 satisfying one in the S3 r stem of Aquinas. When 
 we consider that knowledge is a fact, and 
 subject and object are brought in presence of 
 each other in some way, the first natural 
 suggestion seems to be, the subject and the 
 object must be related to each other in a way 
 that will account for this knowledge, there 
 must be a proportion between them that will 
 enable us to resolve their connection if we go 
 to work with the data on hand. It is not a 
 great concession to admit with Dogmatism the 
 reliability of our faculties in the quest of truth, 
 and on this basis to account for the facts we 
 
-73- 
 
 possess; it is, on the contra^, rather difficult 
 to see the wisdom of any other proceeding. 15 
 
 The definition of truth adopted by St. Thomas 
 is familiar adaequatio rei et intellectus. Strict- 
 ly, this adequation is only found in the Divine 
 Mind, for God alone knows things as com- 
 pletely as they are knowable, since their truth 
 depends on His Ideas. Things are measured 
 by the Divine Ideas, whereas our ideas are 
 measured by the things. Hence we simply 
 have a proportional or relative knowledge of 
 them, though it is true as far as it goes. 17 A 
 faculty in normal condition, operating upon 
 reliable data, always leads to truth. Each 
 faculty has a specific portion of reality about 
 which it is especially concerned, and when 
 limited to this sphere it never gives a false 
 report: "if the faculty is present, its judgment 
 about its proper object will never be at 
 
 15 To all appearances, the objection so commonly urged 
 against the proceeding of Kant as involving a vicious circle 
 or leading to a contradiction, is well grounded. He seeks to 
 prove that our faculties are incapable of arriving at truth, 
 and in doing so uses the very faculties he has called in 
 question. 
 
 16 Per conformitatem intellectus et rei, veritas definitur. 
 Sum. Tbeol , I, q. 16, a. 2. 
 
 17 Res naturales, ex quibus intellectus noster scientiam 
 accipit, mensurant intellectum nostrum: sed sunt rnensuratae 
 aS intellectu divino, in quo sunt omnia creata, sicut omnia 
 artificiata intellectu artificis. De Veri., q. 1, a. 2. 
 
-74- 
 
 fault." In sensitive knowledge the sense is 
 always true when busied with its specific 
 object sight in case of color, hearing for 
 sound, and the like, unless it is impeded in 
 its normal action. Moreover, it seizes the 
 object as it is. "The sense always appre- 
 hends the thing as it is, unless there is an 
 impediment in the organ or in the medium. 
 The sense is not the dominus of falsitv, but 
 
 / ' 
 
 the imagination." 19 If there is error, it will 
 be found in the imagination, which puts to- 
 gether the various elements that have come 
 through the senses. The intellect works on 
 this image, \vhich represents an objective 
 reality, and extracts the idea which will also 
 be objective, since it is the deliverance of the 
 image. The intellect can never be deceived 
 about the essence, simply considered as appre- 
 hended, for this is its specific object; but error 
 may arise in the further processes of judg- 
 ment and reasoning, owing to faulty proceed- 
 ing. "The specific object of the intellect is 
 
 * Ad proprium objectum unaquaeque potentia per se 
 ordinatur secundum quod ipsa: quae autem sunt hujus- 
 modi, semper eodem modo se hahent. Unde manente po- 
 tentia non deficit ejus judicium circa proprium objectum. 
 Sum. Theol, I, q. 85, a. 6. 
 
 11 Sensus semper apprehendit rem ut est, nisi sit impedi- 
 mentum in organo, vel in medio. Sensus non est dominus 
 falsitatis, sed phantasia. DC Veri., q. 1, a. 11. 
 
75 
 
 the essence of a thing. Whence properly 
 speaking, the intellect is never deceived about 
 the quiddity of a thing, but it may be deceived 
 about matters connected with the essence or 
 quiddity while it relates one thing to another 
 by judgment or ratiocination." Truth or 
 error is found, strictly, in the affirmation or 
 negation of the judgment in the componendo 
 et dividendo of Aquinas and in the reasoning 
 based on these judgments. "In the intellect, 
 truth and falsity are primarily and principally 
 found in the judgment of the one who affirms 
 or denies." 21 The judgment and subsequent 
 reasoning are true and have objective value 
 if not impeded in their normal action, for 
 they rest, through the idea, the image, the 
 sense, on the reality of the object itself." 
 
 22 
 
 20 Objectum autem proprium intellectus est quidditas rei. 
 Unde circa quidditatem per se loquendo intellectus non 
 fallitur, sed circa ea, quae circumstant rei essentiam vel 
 quidditatem, intellectus potest falli, dum unum ordinet 
 ad alterum vel componendo vel etiam ratiocinando. Sum. 
 Theol., I, q. 85, a. 6. 
 
 21 In intellectu autem primo et principaliter inveniuntur 
 falsitas et veritas in judicio componentis et dividentis. 
 De Veri., q. 1, a. 11. 
 
 22 It is not surprising that this conformity or proportion 
 should exist between things and the human mind, when 
 we recall, that, according to Aquinas, God is the author 
 of both. They are the expressions of His Ideas, and in His 
 Mind there is the most complete unity and harmony. 'In 
 Deo autem tola plenitude intellectualis cognitionis conti- 
 netur in uno." Sum. Theol., I, q. 55, a. 3. 
 
7 6 
 
 The idea, however, has certain qualities that 
 are not found in the image that gave rise to 
 it. The thing represented by the idea, the 
 essence is endowed with conditions of neces- 
 sity and universality, whereas the image is 
 contingent and particular. Whence does the 
 idea derive these attributes ? Are they given in 
 the representation of the object or are they 
 simply due to the intelligence itself operating 
 on the object, impressing a part of its sub- 
 stance on the object? This recalls the Con- 
 troversy about the Universals, and the 
 Critical Theory of Kant. The position of St. 
 Thomas that of Moderate Realism is well 
 known. For him, the universal did not exist 
 separate from the object as Plato held, nor 
 was it simply a name with no corresponding 
 reality as Nominalism maintained, but it was 
 the result of mind and object. It existed in 
 the mind but had its basis in the thing. 
 "There is a threefold diversit}^ of objects 
 signified b}^ names. There are some which, 
 according to their whole being, complete in 
 themselves, are extra animam, as man, stone. 
 There some that have no extra-mental exist- 
 ence, as dreams and chimerical images. There 
 are some that have a fund amentum in re extra 
 animam, but their formal completion is due 
 to mental activit} r , as is the case with the 
 
OF THE 
 
 UNIVERSITY } 
 
 %*t ^ 
 
 universal." The universal is the result of the 
 action of the mind, but it has its basis in the 
 object. " Humanity is something in re, yet 
 as there found it is not the formal concept 
 of the universal, since extra, animam there is 
 no humanity common to many. . . I say the 
 same of truth, because it has a fundamentum in 
 re, but its concept is completed through the 
 action of the intellect when, namely, it is 
 apprehended in the manner in \vhich it is." The 
 active intellect abstracts the universal from 
 the mental image and gives it the final 
 character of universality which existed but 
 in germ, in potency, in the singular, contingent 
 image. "It is the theory of the Active Intel- 
 lect which solves the question so often agitated 
 by modern philosophers: Whence comes it 
 
 23 Eorum, quae significantur nominibus. invenitur trip- 
 lex diversitas. Quaedam enim sunt, quae secundum esse 
 totuni completum sunt extra animam, et hujusmodi sunt 
 entia completa, sicut homo, lapis. Quae autem sunt, quae 
 nihil habent extra animam, sicut somnia et imaginatio 
 chimerae. Quaedam autem sunt, quae habent fundamentum 
 in re extra animam; sed eomplementum rationis eorum, 
 quantum ad id, quod est formale, est per operationem 
 animae, ut patet in universali. Humanitas enim est aliquid 
 in re, non tanien ibi habet rationem universalis cum non sit 
 extra animam aliqua humanitas multis communis. Simi- 
 liter dico de veritate, quod habet fundamentum in re, sed 
 ratio ejus completur per actionem intellectus, quando 
 scilicet apprehenditur eo modo quo est. Com. on Lotnb., I, 
 Dis. 19, q. 5, a. 1. 
 
- 7 8- 
 
 that the laws of reason accord \vith the laws 
 of nature." The thought contained in the idea 
 results from the presence of the image acted 
 upon by the intellect, the image is the out- 
 come of the deliverance of the sense, which 
 in turn connects with external reality. So 
 fundamentally, the external object is found 
 in the highest operation of the intellect, for 
 we can trace the object through the various 
 stages that lead to the final act, and nowhere 
 along the line of development are we made 
 aware of any elements that come from a 
 source other than the presence of the 
 object in relation to the knowing faculty. For 
 Kant, anything that is universal, necessary, 
 is subjective, hence if we apply these qualities 
 to ideas they can only have an internal signifi- 
 cance, and do not relate us with objective 
 reality as it is in itself. For St. Thomas, if we 
 begin with the real --as we do in sensation - 
 and proceed logically with normal faculties, 
 we end with the real; hence there is reality 
 throughout the \vhole process of knowledge. 
 We have already noted that all our ideas betray 
 signs of their sensuous origin, for if a sense is 
 wanting or injured the intellectual data that 
 would result from it are absent ; moreover, the 
 image is also required when we wish to re-think 
 
 24 Pint, L' Intellect Actif, p. LSI. 
 
79- 
 
 what we have already thought about or 
 known. This is further emphasized in our 
 knowledge of immaterial beings, as of God ; 
 for we can know an object separated from all 
 materiality only by analogy of sensuous things 
 or bv notions derived from them. 
 
 J 
 
 The consequence of Kant's view on the 
 question of the vaildity of our knowledge in 
 contrast to that of Aquinas is found in the 
 Relativity of Knowledge advocated by Hamil- 
 ton and Spencer, and in the position of 
 J. S. Mill, who also allies himself closely with 
 Hume. What then is the extent of our knowl- 
 edge? How much of reality can we know, and 
 do all men know the same amount ? 
 
 We know the universal, the essence in the 
 material object, not exhaustively, however, but 
 in a proportionate way ; that is, it is known 
 by us in so far as our knowing power will 
 permit us to know it for the object is known 
 according to the nature of the knower. Our 
 make-up as man necessitates a connection with 
 matter that renders our knowledge dependent 
 on it to such an extent as to exclude a perfect 
 or complete grasp of the object itself. The 
 thing to be known is the same for all men, but 
 the intellectual state of the knower in the 
 presence of the object depends upon his bodily 
 condition and likewise on the good form of 
 
8o 
 
 the inferior powers of knowledge sense and 
 imagination when the object was presented 
 to them. 25 "The higher the intellect the more 
 it knows, either a greater number of objects 
 or at least more reasons for the same objects." 26 
 Again, "Some men can not grasp an intelligible 
 truth unless it be explained to them part by 
 part . . . others, who have a stronger intellect, 
 can sieze much from few data." 27 All men, 
 however, can know the object really, its essence, 
 
 25 Sum. Theol., I, q .85, a. 8. There is no separation of 
 mind and matter in the system of Aquinas to the extent 
 of an unbridgable chasm between them. Man is body and 
 soul, and it is man that knows. The aberrations from this 
 view from the time of Descartes are certainly instructive, 
 and speak favorably for the d 'Ctrine that avoids all these 
 apparent difficulties such as psycho-physical parallelism 
 is busied with by interpreting faithfully the facts of 
 consciousness. "If any degradation is suffered b\- my 
 cognitive faculty in thus being dependent on the causal 
 efficiency of these physico-chemical processes which is called 
 'my brain states', the remedy for this would seem to be 
 in my not being an animal at all, rather than resorting 
 to a theory which makes a complete breach between my 
 mentality and my animality." Ladd, Phil, of Knowledge, 
 p. 553. 
 
 26 Quanto aliquis intellectus est altior, tanto plura cog- 
 noscit. vel secundum rerum multidudinem, vel saltern 
 secundum earumdem rerum plures rationes. C. G., 1. 3,c. 56. 
 
 27 Sunt enim quidam qui veritatem intelligibilem capere 
 non possunt, nisi eis particulatim per singula explicatur; 
 et hoc ex debilitate intellectus eorum contingit. Alii vero 
 sunt fortioris intellectus, ex paucis multa capere possunt. 
 Sum. Theol , I, q 55, a. 3. 
 
8i 
 
 by a consideration of its manifestations. This 
 is the important item in all knowledge, God 
 not excepted, for if we can not know Him from 
 what He manifests of Himself, then truly is 
 knowledge of Him impossible. The causal idea 
 here involved is at the basis of all validity of 
 knowledge; it bears the whole burden of the 
 knowableness of God in the system of St. 
 Thomas, and will be considered at length 
 shortly. 
 
 Hamilton justly argues that if we had more 
 means of knowledge, had better faculties, we 
 should know more and better, but his conclu- 
 sion to absolute relativity of knowledge based 
 on this lack of powers is unwarranted. "But 
 were the number of our faculties coextensive 
 with the modes of being had we for each of 
 these thousand modes a separate organ com- 
 petent to make it known to us, still would 
 our whole knowledge be, as it is at present, 
 only of the relative. Of existence absolutely 
 and in itself, we should then be as ignorant 
 as we are now." 28 This position is answered 
 in the statement of Straub: "It is true that we 
 do not attain to all that is or can be in 
 rerum natura, by the senses, but it is one thing 
 to say, what we seem to know in things is 
 
 28 
 
 Metaphysics, Y. 1, p. 153, lect. 9. 
 
82 
 
 really in them, and it is quite another to con- 
 tend, that we reach, by our knowledge, what- 
 ever is present in things." 29 
 
 Spencer's conclusions to the relativity and 
 inconceivability of w r hat we are led to recognize 
 as the legitimate outcome of our reasonings, 
 rests on a misapprehension of the terms used. 
 The statement of J. S. Mill: "Experience there- 
 fore aifords no evidence, not even analogies, 
 to justify our extending to the apparently 
 immutable a generalization grounded only on 
 our observation of the changeable", 30 is opposed 
 to the view of Aquinas ' 'Through the active 
 intellect we know immutable truth from mut- 
 able things, and we discern things themselves 
 from their likenesses." True objective reality 
 and the principle of causality give us a reliable 
 knowledge of things and allow us to arrive at 
 an equally valid and non- relative view 
 always keeping in mind the limitations of our 
 nature of what really transcends the senses, 
 and finally a view of the systematic relation 
 
 J J 
 
 of things. Ladd summarizes his chapter on 
 
 29 De Objectivitate Cognitionis Humanae, p. 39. 
 
 30 Essays on Religion. 
 
 31 Per quod (lumen intellectus agentis) immutabiliter 
 veritatem in rebus mutabilibus coguoscamus, et discernamus 
 ipsas res a similitudinibus rerurn. Sum. Theol., I, q. 84, a. 
 Gad 1. 
 
-8 3 - 
 
 b . 
 
 
 
 Knowledge and Reality in these \vords: "All 
 this amounts to saying that the very existence 
 of our cognitive activities, and of the products 
 which mark their development, whether for 
 the individual or for the race, rests upon the 
 general assumption that things and minds do so 
 causally determine each other as to show that 
 they belong to one system of Reality." Reality 
 in its various relations and interdependencies 
 leads back to one author of all in whom we 
 see the final and complete expression. This 
 will come to light in the portion of the subject 
 we are about to consider, where the principles 
 we have just discussed will give us a knowledge 
 of God, of whom St. Thomas says: "However 
 meagre be our intellectual preception of divine 
 knowledge, this will be more for us, as an 
 ultimate end, than a perfect knowledge of 
 inferior intelligible things." 
 
 SECTION IV. CAUSALITY AND KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 As we have just intimated the principle of 
 causality is frequently employed in the discus- 
 sion of knowledge in general, and of the know- 
 ableness of God in particular. Despite this fact, 
 "the Scholastics did not make the principle 
 
 32 Loc. eft., p. 554. 
 
 33 C. G., 1. 3, c. 25. 
 
-8 4 - 
 
 of causality art object of special study," 1 though 
 it is used by them continually. The power the 
 effects have, or the phenomena that begin to 
 be, to teach us about the nature of the 
 something that gave them being is fully 
 recognized, and elaborated to great extent 
 by St. Thomas. And we might say this is 
 the only form under which the question is 
 presented. The idea of cause for Aquinas was 
 acquired as any other idea ; it was the result 
 of the abstractive power the active intellect 
 at work on the deliverance of sense. Ex- 
 ternal reality was not doubted by him ; he 
 was aware of immediately perceiving phe- 
 nomena coming into existence, beginning to 
 be, both internally and externally ; and these 
 beginnings must have a something to account 
 for them. Internally, the power of thinking 
 and willing was open to immediate view ; 
 change and modification were visible in the 
 world ; external objects gave rise to sensation, 
 which in turn led to intellectual operation- 
 the knowing power is passive, the object is 
 active; all these factors contribute to the idea 
 of cause. The principle was analytic for him, 
 possessing the universality that pertains to 
 every contingent existence stripped of its 
 
 1 Kleutgen, La Philosophic Scolastique, v. 2, p. 46. 
 
-8 5 
 
 individual conditions; like all ideas it had its 
 fundamentum in re, and in conjunction with 
 the active intellect received its final form. 
 Thus it was ^not Hume's observed uniformity 
 of sequence due to custom, nor was it the 
 subjective principle Kant made it out to be. 
 St. Thomas, therefore, could not doubt its 
 validity without running counter to his sys- 
 tem of Moderate Realism, and the principle 
 of causality, we note from his works, gave 
 him no special alarm. 
 
 It is well known that the Scholastics after 
 Aristotle divided all causes into four classes : 
 formal, material, efficient, and final. The 
 formal and material are the constituent prin- 
 ciples of a thing, and we get a knowledge of 
 them from the operations and qualities of the 
 thing. And these lead to a knowledge of the 
 final cause or the purpose of the thing. Effi- 
 cient cause is a principle determing by its 
 action the existence of a contingent thing ; 
 it produces something, and thus establishes 
 a nexus or connection between itself and the 
 result of its operation, the effect or thing. 
 Action is its basis the cause is the principle 
 or source of action, and the effect is the 
 t'erminus'of the action. Its essential character 
 is production. Though not every cause is 
 efficient, yet every cause looks toward ef- 
 
86 
 
 ficiency in some way. We shall consider 
 efficient causality especially, though the argu- 
 ments that establish its validity are also 
 valid for the other causes. 2 The product or 
 effect of the cause is a manifestation of the 
 nature of the cause and leads to a knowledge 
 of the cause; and it is this point we wish 
 to consider. 
 
 This view of causality is based on the 
 principle omne agens agit sibi simile every 
 agent produces something similar to. itself. 
 The action of the cause consists in calling 
 forth in the effect its own form which is a 
 principle of activity "for the active po\ver is 
 a principle of acting on something else." From 
 this similarity between the two, we can know 
 something of the cause as shadowed in the 
 effect. Similarity is an agreement in form. 
 The cause is determined to some result either 
 blindly, if a physical cause, or intelligently, 
 if acting from the knowledge of a proposed 
 end. The effect then pre-exists in its cause, 
 
 2 The Scholastics did not limit causality to efficient 
 causality, as is done in Modern Philosophy, but the\- con- 
 sidered it in all its aspects, and regarded final as the 
 most important. 
 
 3 Ratio autem activi principii couveuit potentiae activae. 
 Nam potentia activa est principium agendi in aliud. Sum. 
 TheoL, I, q. 25, a. 1. 
 
-8 7 
 
 and thus every cause produces something like 
 to itself; the closer the resemblance, the more 
 perfect our knowledge of the cause. The effect 
 may adequate or wholly express the power of 
 the cause, or it may be but a far-off hint. 
 "Every effect not equalling the power of the 
 cause receives the likeness of the cause defi- 
 ciently- and not according to the same concept, 
 so that what is divided and manifold in the 
 effects, is simply and in the same way in the 
 
 cause." 4 
 
 The agreement may be specific, generic, or 
 simply one of proportion, with a lessening 
 knowledge power respectively. The effect is 
 but the manifestation of the power of the 
 cause according the axiom operatio scquitur 
 esse. "The effect shows the power of the 
 cause only by reason of the action, which, 
 proceeding from the power, is transmitted to 
 effect* The nature of the cause is known 
 only through the effect in so far as its 
 power, which is in accord with nature, is 
 
 4 Omnis effectus non adaequans virtutem causae agentis, 
 recipit similitudinem agentis non secundum eamdem ratio- 
 nem, sed deficienterj: ita ut quod divisim et multipliciter 
 est in effectibus, in causa sit simpliciter et eodem modo. 
 Sum. TheoL, I, q. 13, a. 5. 
 
88 
 
 known." Moreover, "there is the same 
 reason for the effect tending to the likeness of 
 the cause, and for the cause assimilating or 
 rendering the effect like to itself." The effect 
 is contained in the cause in some way, and 
 imitates or resembles the cause in some par- 
 ticular and these are the two factors in 
 similarity. " Every effect represents its cause 
 aliqualiter, but diversely : For some effect 
 represents the simple causality of the cause, 
 but not its form, as smoke represents a fire. 
 . . But some effect represents the cause even 
 to the likeness of its form, as produced fire 
 the fire which produces it." 7 Smoke and fire 
 both represent their cause, fire, but not to 
 the same extent; and each in its wa} r gives 
 a knowledge of its cause. There is, however, 
 
 & Non effectus ostendit virtutem causae nisi ratione 
 actionis, quae a virtute procedens ad effectum terrainatur. 
 Natura autem causae non cognoscitur per effectum nisi in 
 quantum per ipsum cognoscitur virtus ejus, quae natura 
 consequitur. C. G., 1. 3, c. 21. 
 
 6 Ejusdem rationis est quod effectus tendit in similitudinem 
 agentis, et quod agens assimilet sibi effectum. C. G , 1. 3, 
 c. 21. 
 
 7 Omnis effectus aliqualiter repraesentat suam causam, 
 sed diversimode. Nam aliquis effectus repraesentat solam 
 causalitatem causae, non autem formam ejus ; sicut fumus 
 repraesentat ignem. . . Aliquis autem effectus repraesentat 
 causam quantum ad similitudinem forrnae ejus; sicut ignis 
 generatus ignem generantem. Sum. TheoL, I, q. 45, a. 7. 
 
-8 9 - 
 
 a distinction between the cause and the effect 
 "in every kind of cause, there is always 
 found a distance (difference) between the cause 
 and that of which it is the cause, according 
 to some perfection or power." Mr. Fiske, 
 criticising the phrase we have just been dis- 
 cussing the cause is in some \vay like the 
 effect as defended by Mr. Adam in his " Inquiry 
 into the Theories of History," says, "Mr. 
 Adam's reply savors of mediaeval realism." ' Mr. 
 Fiske seems to demand a total likeness in all 
 cases, which "mediaeval realism' exacted of 
 only certain causes. With the distinctions of 
 St. Thomas regarding the knowledge power of 
 the effect, on the basis of likeness to the cause, 
 the position of Mr. ^iske has no weight. 
 
 The knowledge power of the effect depends on 
 what sort of expression the cause has given of 
 itself. Thus the Scholastics spoke of a univocal 
 and an analogical cause. In general, the result 
 of the operation of a univocal cause is a likeness 
 in species between the cause and the effect, as 
 that between a father and his son here the 
 effect equals the power of the cause. In the 
 analogical cause, the likeness is not one of 
 
 8 In omnibus enim causae generibus semper invenitur dis- 
 tantia inter causam et id cujus est causa, secundum aliquam 
 perfectionem, aut virtutem. Sum. TheoL, I, q. 31, a. 1 ad 1. 
 
 9 Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, v. 2, p. 387. 
 
-90- 
 
 quality, but one of proportional relation 
 between cause and effect. In a univocal con- 
 cept there is an agreement in word and in idea, 
 and everything this idea expresses must apply 
 equally and by the same right to all the objects 
 of which it is affirmed. " Every effect of a 
 univocal cause adequates the power of the 
 cause," 10 and hence gives the most perfect 
 knowledge of the cause that we can attain to. 
 We do not mention equivocal cause, since 
 " where there is pure equivocation there is no 
 likeness in things, but only a unity of name", 11 
 and hence it is not a source of knowledge. 
 Truth is the proportion between concepts and 
 things, as already noted. The analogical con- 
 cept is not the full manifestation of the cause 
 as the univocal, nor is it a mere metaphor as 
 the equivocal, but it is between them and gives 
 a real, though proportional, knowledge of the 
 cause. It is not equivalent to a metaphor as 
 Caldecott quotes St. Thomas as holding, \vhen 
 speaking of the applicability of certain attri- 
 butes to God "such as are predicable of Him 
 only after the way of analogy or metaphor. 
 
 M 12 
 
 10 Omnis effectus agentis univoci adaequat virtutem 
 agentis. Pot., q. 7, a. 7. 
 
 11 Ubi est pura aequivocatio nulla similitude in rebus 
 attenditur, sed solum unitas nominis. C. G., 1. 1, c. 33. 
 
 12 Selections from the Literature of Theism, p. 19. 
 
-91- 
 
 Aquinas recognizes both analogy and metaphor, 
 but with a great distinction, as we shall see 
 later on. There is real knowledge in analogical 
 predication. The proportion or relation in 
 analogy may be based on the comparison of 
 two objects to an independent third, or one of 
 the two may be related to the other. This 
 latter is the one of cause and effect, and pre- 
 supposes that they have something in common 
 in a way, however slight that may be, and 
 thus we are led to a proportional knowledge 
 of the cause by a consideration of the relation 
 of the effect to the cause. 
 St. Thomas has summarized brieflv the three 
 
 > 
 
 ways an effect can lead us to a knowledge of 
 a cause. "One way, when the effect is taken 
 as a medium for knowing the existence and the 
 nature of the cause, as takes place in the 
 sciences which demonstrate the cause through 
 the effect. Another way, when the cause is seen 
 in the effect itself in so far as the likeness of 
 the cause results in the effect, as man is seen 
 in a mirror on account of his likeness . . . 
 The third way, when the likenss of the cause 
 in the effect is the form by which its effect 
 knows the cause. . . But by none of these ways 
 by effect can the cause be known, unless the 
 effect be adequate to the cause, in which the 
 
-92- 
 
 whole power of the cause is expressed." 13 St. 
 Thomas here refers to a complete knowledge of 
 the nature of the cause, not a partial one. An 
 adequate concept gives a knowledge of a thing 
 as it is in itself, in as far as it is knowable 
 ''a thinsr is known in itself when it is known 
 
 C5 
 
 through a specific likeness adequate to the 
 knowable itself." We can have some knowl- 
 edge of a thing without having an adequate 
 knowledge of it, and this partial knowledge 
 is given us by all effects. "From every manifest 
 effect we can demonstrate the existence of the 
 cause." 14 The producing power of secondary 
 agents must be admitted, says Aquinas, "or else 
 the nature of no created thing could be known 
 through the eifect, and all knowledge of natural 
 
 13 Contingit enim ex effectu cognoscere causam multi- 
 pliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod effectus sumitur ut 
 medium ad cognoscendum de causa quod sit, et quod talis 
 sit, sicut accidit in scientiis quae causam demonstrant per 
 effectual. Alio modo, ita quod in ipso effectu videatur causa 
 in quantum similitude causae resultat in effectu: sicut homo 
 videtur in speculo propter suam similitudinem . . . Tertio 
 modo, ita quod ista similitudo causae in effectu sit forma 
 qua cognoscit causam suus effectus . . . Nullo autem istorum 
 modorum per effectum potest cognosci causa quid sit, nisi 
 effectus causae adaequatus, in quo tota virtus causae 
 exprimatur. C. G., 1. 3, c. 49. 
 
 14 Ex quocumque effectu manifesto nobis potest demon- 
 strari causam esse. Sum Theol., I, q. 2, a. 2 ad 3. 
 
-93- 
 
 science, which relies especially on demonstration 
 through effects, would be taken away. 15 
 
 The degrees of knowledge derived from the 
 effect vary. "The perfection of the effect deter- 
 mines the perfection of the cause." The effect, 
 however, as just noted, is seldom of such a 
 character as to adequate the nature of the 
 cause, hence we need many effects to make our 
 knowledge more stable. Every actual effect "can 
 be infallibly submitted to certain knowledge." 
 "But when we know a contingent effect in its 
 cause only, we have but a conjectural knowledge 
 of it." The larger the number of manifesta- 
 tions and the greater, the more perfect will 
 be our knowledge of the cause. "It is manifest 
 that the causality of a cause and its power is 
 known in proportion to the number and great- 
 ness of its known effects." 18 This is important 
 in determining our knowledge of God, for all 
 
 16 Si igitur res creatae nou habent actiones ad producen- 
 dura effectus, sequitur quod nunquam natura alicujus rei 
 creatae poterit cognosci per effectum, et sic subtrahitur nobis 
 oranis cognitio scientiae naturalis, in qua praecipue demon- 
 strationes per effectual sumuntur. C. G., 1. 3, c. 69. 
 
 16 Perfectio effectus deterrainat perfectionem causae. C. G., 
 1. 3, c. 69. 
 
 17 Sum. Theol., I, q. 14, a. 13. 
 
 lo Manifestum est quod causalitas alicujus causae et virtus 
 ejus tanto magis cognoscitur, quanto plures et majores ejus 
 effectus innotescunt. C. G., 1. 3, c. 49. 
 
94 
 
 creation is His work, it contains innumerable 
 manifestations of His Power, and the more we 
 know of them and the more deeply we enter 
 into them, the more complete will be our idea 
 of the Supreme Cause in whom all these effects 
 find a single, harmonious setting. 
 
95 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 THE KNOWABLENESS OF GOD. 
 
 SECTION I. EXISTENCE OF GOD. 
 
 The general principles of all knowledge and 
 especially the elements involved in intellectual 
 knowledge find their application in the question 
 of God. This is quite natural, since for Aquinas 
 there is a unity running through all things, 
 so that the highest product of a given genus 
 is practically the lowest being in the genus 
 immediately above it, 1 There is more reason 
 for this intimate connection between knowledge 
 in general and the knowledge of God in par- 
 ticular; for if we admit that we can know 
 God at all, the natural inference is, that the 
 process that leads to a knowledge of Him 
 should follow lines similar to those that lead 
 to a knowledge of anything. In both cases, 
 we have the same human mind, the same data, 
 and with the modifications coincident to a 
 certain class or kind of objects, the same 
 
 1 C. G., 1. 3, c. 97. 
 
- 9 6- 
 
 principles should hold. As our knowledge 
 becomes more complex, owing to the nature 
 of the thing known, it admits new factors, 
 though the fundamental elements are always 
 the same. Likewise the knowledge we have 
 of God rests on the general basis of knowledge, 
 though there are and must be factors peculiar 
 to it, else it would not really be an addition 
 to our cognitions. 
 
 The actual application of the principles thus 
 far discussed will come in evidence as the ques- 
 tion is developed. We may at once, however, 
 briefly state the chief points of contact : 
 
 1. All knowledge requires a relation of knower 
 and known, thus God and man must be related 
 in some way. 
 
 2. Man knows only according to his own 
 nature, hence our knowledge of God will be in 
 terms of our intellect. 
 
 3. A requisite for knowledge is actuality or 
 immateriality, and the degree of knowledge is 
 regulated by the degree of actuality ; God is 
 supremely actual, and hence infinitely knowable 
 in Himself. 
 
 4. All knowledge takes its rise in the senses 
 thus excluding innate ideas and intuitions ; but 
 the intellectual idea is due to an abstractive 
 power, the active intellect, operating on the 
 deliverance of the sensitive image. The idea of 
 
97 
 
 God arises from the same source as material 
 things it is not an intuition nor innate but 
 receives final expression only after we have 
 purified it from imperfections, by a process that 
 can be readily likened to the work of the active 
 intellect. 
 
 5. The validity of all knowledge, that of God 
 included, depends on the proper relation between 
 the reality of things and the truthfulness of our 
 faculties, as already indicated. 
 
 The problem of God raises two questions at 
 the outset: Is there a God? and if so, What 
 is the nature of God? The great difference 
 between these two queries in the light of 
 difficulty of solution, and also of importance 
 in the conclusion reached, was fully recognized 
 by St. Thomas, and the Scholastics generally. 
 We have already noted the attitude of Aquinas 
 regarding the existence and the nature of the 
 soul, "many know they have a soul who do 
 not know what the soul is"; and again, "each 
 one experiences in himself that he has a soul, 
 and that the acts of the soul take place within 
 him, but to know the nature of the soul is 
 most difficult." 2 He is similarly minded on 
 the points of God's existence and of God's 
 nature. Existence and nature comprise the 
 
 De Veri., q. 10, a. 8 ad 8. 
 
 
- 9 8- 
 
 Scholatic phrases oi' An Sit and Quid Sit. 3 
 There is no doubt that if we prove the 
 existence of an object, we must as a consequence 
 know something' about it, and in this sense 
 Prof. Royce is right when he says: "A really 
 fruitful philosophical study of the conception of 
 God is inseparable from an attempt to estimate 
 what evidence there is for the existence of God." 
 The further statement "the proof that one 
 can offer for God's presence at the heart of 
 the world constitutes also the best exposition 
 that one can suggest regarding what one means 
 by the conception of God," 4 is not sufficiently 
 complete. In this view r , existence and nature 
 are correlative. If we have proven the existence 
 of an object, we know its nature implicitly or 
 fundamentally, but not explicitly; thus the 
 mere existence is not the "best exposition' of 
 the nature. We may prove the existence of God 
 and still have but a vague general idea of what 
 God is, as the proofs St. Thomas offers for God's 
 existence show ; it is only after a process of 
 deduction and the analysis of the idea given 
 by the proofs that we can be said to have an 
 exposition w r orthy to be called a satisfactory 
 or rounded conception. An adequate or proper 
 concept of God can not be arrived at by the 
 
 3 C. G.,1. 1, c. 12. 
 
 4 The Conception of God, pp. 6, 7. 
 
-99 
 
 human mind in its present condition and to 
 this extent the essence of God, His nature in se, 
 remains unknown to us, yet there is a concept 
 of God's nature that we can truly reach by 
 determined methods, and this we hope to 
 establish. 
 
 Existence and conception can be considered 
 independently. Whether we handle both or only 
 one, we practically travel over the same ground. 
 In a conception we are held to give as much as 
 the human intellect can attain to regarding the 
 idea of God ; in proving the existence of God 
 we are only bound to as much as the facts 
 contain that lead to this existence we have 
 still the analysis of this idea on hand. The 
 existence alone lacks completeness, the concep- 
 tion by itself is a mere idea. St. Thomas 
 combines both, and onlv when both are treated 
 
 mi 
 
 is our quest a fruitful one. If God were an 
 intuition, the questions of existence and nature 
 would blend, w^ould be one; if He is known 
 only by demonstration they are distinct, 
 though closely connected. 
 
 How is the existence of God kno vvn ? It is 
 not known per se, says Aquinas, and hence it 
 must be known by demonstration. St. Thomas 
 considers the two great aspects under which 
 a thing is knowable, before he advances evidence 
 for God's existence. An object is knowable in 
 
IOO 
 
 itself- -per se nota and it is knowable rela- 
 tively to us --quoad nos nota. A proposition 
 is knowable in itself when the predicate is 
 included in the concept of the subject or 
 immediately connected with it. The propo- 
 sition, man is an animal, is knowable in itself, 
 because the predicate animal is included in the 
 concept man. The same is true of first princi- 
 ples ; but first principles are not only knowable 
 in themselves but also immediately knowable 
 to us. A proposition is knowable in itself and 
 knowable to us when we immediately perceive 
 the necessary connection between the subject 
 and the predicate as in the first principle, the 
 whole is greater than a part. 
 
 When we come to the proposition God exists 
 Deus est we have a proposition per se nota 
 to one who understands the meaning of the 
 words, God and exists. "But as we do not 
 know what God is, this proposition is not per 
 se nota, but needs to be demonstrated through 
 those things that are more known to us, and 
 less known in their nature, namely effects." 5 The 
 existence of God must then be proven. To 
 know a proposition per se, it is needful that 
 
 5 Sed quia nos non scinms de Deo quid est, non est nobis 
 per se nota, sed indiget demonstrari per ea quae sunt magis 
 nota quoad nos, et minus nota quoad naturam, scilicet per 
 effectus. Sum. Theol. I, q. 2, a. 1. 
 
101 
 
 its terms and their relation be known ; if either 
 is unknown \ve can not speak of per se nota. 
 It is not surprising that the existence of God 
 is not known per se to us, "for our intellect 
 is related to objects that are most known as 
 the eye of an owl to the sun." Before giving 
 his proofs for God's existence, St. Thomas shows 
 the insufficieny of the Argument of St. Anselm 
 to prove the existence of God, and in general, 
 of all positions that do not start with material 
 things as a basis, and from them rise to a 
 knowledge of God. 
 
 The Ontological argument was advanced by 
 St. Anselm, modified by Descartes, and supple- 
 mented by Leibniz. It has likewise been 
 
 J 
 
 handled by some other philosophers, either for 
 commendation or rejection, such as, Spinoza, 
 Locke, Kant, Hegel. We shall give briefly the 
 position of the first three named, before we 
 present the reason for its rejection by Aquinas. 
 St. Anselm tells us that he had been seeking 
 a long time for one argument that would suffice 
 to establish the existence of God "a single 
 argument that would require no other for its 
 proof than itself alone ; and alone would suffice 
 to demonstrate that God trulv exists." 7 After 
 
 6 Ad ea quae sunt notissima rerum, noster intellectus se 
 habeat, ut oculus noctuae ad solera. C. G., 1, c. 11. 
 
 7 Preface to Proslogium. 
 
102 
 
 a weary struggle in thought he finally reached 
 the following argument: Even the fool, he 
 says, has the idea of the being than which 
 nothing greater can be conceived, though he 
 does not understand it to exist. "And what- 
 ever is understood exists in the understanding. 
 And assuredly that than which nothing greater 
 can be conceived, cannot exist in the under- 
 standing alone. For siippose it exists in the 
 understanding alone, then it can be conceived 
 to exist in reality, which is greater. . . There 
 is no doubt that there exists a being, than 
 \vhich nothing greater can be conceived, and 
 it exists both in the understanding and in 
 reality.' 3 Descartes held that we have an 
 idea of a supremely perfect being. The idea 
 which is clear and distinct, contains in itself 
 the idea of existence, for if we think of a 
 mountain we must recognize that there is a 
 valley, for the two are inseparable; so if we 
 have the idea of the infinite, the idea of existence 
 necessarily accompanies it. This perfect being 
 must contain all perfection, but existence is a 
 perfection and thus cannot be wanting to 
 it. 9 Leibniz gives the form of the argument 
 as set forth by Anselm and Descartes thus : 
 "God is the greatest or (as Descartes says) 
 
 * Ibid ,c. 2. 
 
 9 Principia Philosophise, part 1, 14; Med. 3. 
 
103 
 
 the most perfect of beings, or rather a being 
 of supreme grandeur and perfection including 
 all degrees thereof. That is the notion of 
 God." He goes on to say, "The Scholastics, 
 not even excepting their Doctor Angelicus have 
 misunderstood this argument and have taken 
 it as a paralogism ; in which respect they were 
 altogether wrong. It is not a paralogism, but 
 it is an imperfect demonstration which assumes 
 something that must still be proved in order 
 to render it mathematically evident; that is, 
 it is tacitly assumed that this idea of the 
 All-great or All-perfect being is possible, and 
 implies no con tradition. And it is already 
 something that by this remark it is proved 
 that assuming that God is possible He exists, 
 which is the privilege of divinity alone." This 
 element of possibility is what Leibniz added 
 to the argument, and of which he said, "We 
 have the right to presume the possibility of 
 every being, and especially that of God, until 
 someone proves the contrary." 
 
 We may be easily mislead by the Ontological 
 Argument, and any position in fact, that seeks 
 to rest simply on ideas that are common to 
 mankind as a result of circumstances, and that 
 does not probe into the history and develop- 
 
 10 Nouveaux Essais, c. 10. 
 
IO4 
 
 ment of these ideas. St. Thomas wisely remarks 
 that "men are accustomed to hear and invoke 
 the name of God from infancy; but custom, 
 and especially that dating from childhood, 
 has the force of nature; whence it is brought 
 about that those things by which one is im- 
 bued from boyhood are as firmly held as if 
 they \vere naturally and per se known. More- 
 over, this happens because we do not distinguish 
 between a thing known in itself simply and 
 as known by us." Anselm, of course was 
 aware of the difference between an idea and the 
 objective existence of a corresponding thing 
 he says, "it is one thing for an object to be in 
 the understanding, and another to understand 
 that the object exists." He also admitted the 
 a posteriori argument for God's existence, as 
 did Descartes likewise. Yet in the argument 
 under consideration, he lays great stress on 
 the fact that from the idea of God we can pro- 
 ceed further and come to reality, but he does 
 
 / ' 
 
 not speak of the origin of this idea or its 
 basis in anything outside the mind. And this 
 is where it diverges from the view of Aquinas, 
 
 11 A principle homines assueti sunt nomen Dei audire et 
 invocare. Consuetude auteni, et praecipue quae est a prin- 
 cipio, vim naturae obtinet; ex quo contingit ut ea quibus a 
 pueritia animus imbuitur, ita firmiter teneantur ac si essent 
 naturaliter et per se nota. C. C, 1. 1, c. 11. 
 
 12 Pros., c. 2. 
 
who first traces the steps that lead to this 
 idea before he seeks to specify it. The word 
 God does not awaken the same idea in all 
 men," for some believed God to be body"; 
 granting that it did, "it would not follow 
 that what is understood by this name is 
 in rerum natura, but only an intellectual idea." 
 
 The flaw in the argument is the passage from 
 the ideal to the real, and St. Thomas pointed 
 this out clearly, though unfortunately he did 
 not go further and tell us how he arrived at 
 this distinction. The fact that he made this 
 distinction is evident, and refutes the unwar- 
 ranted imputation of naive realism. It was 
 perhaps his undoubted trust in reality that 
 prevented him from going beyond a mere 
 reference to the distinction between the ideal 
 and the real. 14 
 
 St. Thomas regards the argument as a petitio 
 principii. "His (Anselm's) argument proceeds 
 from this supposition that he posits some being 
 
 10 Dato enim quod quilibet intelligat hoc nomine, Deus, 
 significari hoc quod dicitur (scilicet illud quo magis cogitari 
 non potest); non taraen propter hoc sequitur quod intelligat 
 id quod significatur per nomen, esse in rerum natura, sed in 
 apprehensione intellectus tantum. Sum. Theol., I, q. 2, 
 a. 1 ad 2. 
 
 14 Modern philosophers, as a rule, when they refer to this 
 argument, give Kant the credit for picking the flaw in it, 
 though he simply repeats the criticism given by St. Thomas. 
 
io6 
 
 than which no greater can be thought." 15 "Un- 
 less we concede there is something in rerum 
 natura than which no greater can be thought", 16 
 we can think something greater. The fact that 
 we can think God not to exist "does not arise 
 from the imperfection or uncertainty of His 
 existence, but from the weakness of our intellect 
 which can not see Him through himself, but 
 through His effects. And thus we are lead to 
 know His existence by demonstration." 17 
 
 The existence of God is then a matter of 
 demonstration. There are two kinds of demon- 
 stration one from cause to effect, the other 
 from eifect to cause. The former is called 
 propter quid or a priori, the latter quia or a 
 posteriori. " When some eifect is more manifest 
 to us than its cause, we proceed through the 
 effect to a knowledge of the cause. From every 
 
 15 Ratio sua procedit ex hac suppositione, quod suppon- 
 atur aliquid esse quo majus cogitari non potest. Com. on 
 Lomb., I, Dis. 3, q 1, a. 2 ad 4. 
 
 16 Non enim inconveniens est, quolibet dato vel in re, vel in 
 intellectu, aliquid majus cogitari posse, nisi ei qui concedit 
 esse aliquid, quo majus cogitari non possit in rerum natura. 
 C. G. 1. 1, c. 11. 
 
 17 Nam quod (Deus) possit cogitari 11011 esse, non ex 
 imperfectione sui esse est, vel incertitudine, quit in suuru, 
 esse, sit secundum se manifestissimum, sed ex debilitate 
 intellectus nostri, qui eum intueri non potest per ipsum, 
 sed ex effectibus ejus. Et sic, ad cognoscendum ipsum esse, 
 ratiocinando perducitur. C. G., 1. 1, c. 11. 
 
ioy 
 
 effect the existence of its specific cause can be 
 demonstrated, provided its effects are more 
 known to us, for since effects depend on a cause, 
 the effect given, the cause must necessarily exist. 
 Whence the existence of God, as it is not per 
 se known to us, is demonstrated through effects 
 known to us." 
 
 The existence of God is proven from effects. 
 The fundamental statement and fact in this 
 question from man's standpoint is this: God, 
 as all other objects, is known from material 
 things. u Though God exceeds all sensible 
 things and sense itself, yet His effects, from 
 which v^e prove His existence, are sensible. As 
 the origin of knowledge is in sense, so of those 
 things which surpass sense." "The human 
 intellect by its natural power cannot grasp the 
 substance of God, since our intellectual knowl- 
 
 18 Cum enim effectus aliquis nobis est manifestior quam 
 sua causa, per effectum procedimus ad cognitionem causae. 
 Ex quolibet autetn effectu potest demonstrari propriam 
 causam ejus esse, si tanien ejus effectus sint magis noti 
 quoad nos ; quia cum effectus dependeant a causa, posito 
 effectu, necesse est causam praeexistere. Unde Deum esse, 
 secundum quod non est per se notum quoad nos, demon- 
 strabile est per effectus nobis notos. Sum. TheoL, I, q. 2, a. 2. 
 
 19 Etsi Deus sensibilia omnia et sensum excedat, ejus tamen 
 effectus, ex quibus demonstratio sumitur ad pro^andum 
 Deum esse, sensibiles sunt; et sic nostrae cognitionis origo 
 in sensu est, etiam de his quae sensum excedunt. C. G., 1. 1, 
 c. 12. 
 
io8 
 
 edge in this life takes its rise in the senses. . . 
 Yet from material things our intellect rises to 
 a divine knowledge, a knowledge of God's 
 existence and the qualities it is proper to 
 attribute to Him as the First Cause." ' Material 
 things are diverse, and a rational consideration 
 of any class of them will lead us to a conclusion 
 above and beyond the members of the class, 
 singly or collectively taken. We seek to know 
 as much of them as can be known and while 
 thus engaged we are brought to a something 
 that agrees with them in a way, and yet sur- 
 passes them to a much greater extent. We 
 suspect this something has more to do with 
 the material things before us than a simple 
 view of them seems to warrant. 
 
 In this spirit, a spirit that allows the 
 reasoning faculty to pursue what appears its 
 legitimate course in dealing with phenomena, 
 St. Thomas considers five lines of facts and 
 follows them back to what is for him an 
 inevitable logical conclusion. These proofs are 
 so many evidences of his basic principle of 
 
 20 Ad substantiatn ipsius capiendam, intellectus humanus 
 non potest natural! virtute pertingere, quum intellectus 
 nostri, secundum modum praesentis vitae, cognitio a sensu 
 incipiat . . Ducitur tamen ex sensibilibus intellectus noster 
 in divinam cognitionem, ut cognoscat de Deo quia est, et 
 alia hujusmodi, quae oportet attribui primo principle, 
 C. G., 1. 1, c. 3. 
 
109 
 
 knowledge that all our knowledge comes from 
 material things, takes its rise in the senses. 
 
 In the formation of the concept of God, then, 
 there are two factors material things and 
 the reasoning faculty. We perceive objects 
 about us the reason of whose existence is not 
 self-evident nor self-explanatory, and there is 
 in man a natural desire to get at the bottom 
 of things, to seek an explanation of what he 
 sees. What is this natural desire in the system 
 of Aquinas ? 
 
 St. Thomas admits that each man has as a 
 natural endowment, a tendency to God, which 
 affects his whole being. There is the desire 
 for unlimited happiness, and perfection in its 
 fulness, and the desire for a completely satisfied 
 inquisitiveness. "Man naturally desires hap- 
 piness," and thus God, "in so far as God is 
 the beatitude of man." "There is a certain 
 general and confused knowledge of God, w T hich 
 is, as it were, present to all men." And this 
 is true "because man by natural reason can 
 readily arrive at some knowledge of God, for 
 men seeing that the things of nature move 
 according to order, understand that there is 
 some ordainer of these things, for there is no 
 ordering without an orderer." Yet this general 
 
 21 Sum. TheoL, I, q. 2, a. 1 ad 1. 
 
I 10- 
 
 view does not reveal, " who or of what nature, 
 or if there be but one orderer of nature." 22 Those, 
 therefore, who contend that God is immediately 
 known because He is the adequate explanation 
 of things, must remember that our concept of 
 this adequate principle of all is at first very 
 vague. It exists however, and resting on it 
 St. Thomas builds up a position that we might 
 call the Nature-God Tendency, "the intellectual 
 substance tends to divine knowledge as a last 
 end." 23 
 
 This tendency or disposition is principally an 
 internal affair, a spontaneous expression of 
 our nature, yet even here the starting point, 
 the basis of its operation, lies in things with- 
 
 22 Est enim quaedam comraunis et confusa Dei cognitio, 
 quae quasi omnibus hominibus adest. . . Quia naturali 
 ratione statim homo in aliqualem Dei cognitionem pervenire 
 potest; videntes enim homines res naturales secundum ordi- 
 nem creatum currere ; quum ordinatio absque ordinatore non 
 sit. . . Quis, auteni qualis, vel si unus tantura est ordinator 
 naturae nondum stat in ex hac communi consideratione 
 haberur. C. G., 1. 3, c. 38. 
 
 23 Substantia igitur intellectualis tendit in divinam cogni- 
 tionem sicut in ultimum finem. C. G., 1. 3, c. 25 Driscoll 
 apty calls this tendency by the name of spontaneous knowl- 
 edge of God.' It is distinguished by two important charac- 
 teristics, he says, "a) It arises from rational nature by the 
 use of faculties connatural to all. Hence it is not an 
 intuition, nor is it the result of a special faculty, b) It is 
 universal with human nature. God. Pref to 2nd ed., 
 p. VIII. 
 
I II 
 
 out, in sensible objects. The mind cannot rest 
 in these objects, but advances, "for nothing 
 finite can quiet the desire of the intellect." Thus 
 as there is a " natural desire to know in all 
 intellectual natures, so there is a natural desire 
 to dispel ignorance or nescience." 24 We are 
 therefore lead to as thorough a knowledge and 
 as complete an explanation of things as our 
 powers admit. The imperfect desires to attain 
 perfection in a given sphere, "for he who has 
 an opinion about a certain thing, which is an 
 imperfect knowledge of that thing, from this 
 very fact is incited to desire a scientific knowl- 
 edge of it. . . We do not think we know an 
 object if we are ignorant of its substance, 
 whence our principal aim in knowing a thing 
 is to get at its nature or quiddity." We per- 
 ceive that men act, and w r e attribute their 
 action to a certain cause to which we give 
 the name soul, though we know not as yet the 
 
 24 Nihil finitum desiderium intellectus quietare potest. . . 
 Sicut naturale desiderium inest omnibus intellectualibus 
 naturis ad sciendum, ita inest naturale desiderium ignorant - 
 iam seu nescientiarn pellendi. C. G., 1. 3, c. 50. 
 
 25 Omne enim quod est imperfectum in aliqua specie desid- 
 erat consequi perfectionem speciei illius ; qui enim habet 
 opinionem de re aliqua, quae est imperfecta illius rei notitia, 
 ex hoc ipso incitatur ad desiderandum illius rei scientiam, . . 
 Noil enim arbitramur nos aliquid cognoscere si substantiam 
 ejus non cognoscimus. Utide et praecipuum in cognitione 
 alicujus rei est scire de ea quid est. C. G., 1. 3, c. 50. 
 
112 
 
 nature of the soul, if it be body, or how it affects 
 the operations we witness." 26 
 
 Philosophy was born in the " natural desire all 
 men have of knowing the causes of what they 
 see", and not until they "have the cause, are 
 they at rest. The quest however does not cease 
 until they have reached the first cause, for then 
 only do we consider our knowledge perfect 
 when we know the first cause. Man naturally 
 desires to know the first cause as if an ultimate 
 end." It is easy to see whither this thought 
 leads; this desire "tends toward something 
 definite. We find as a fact in this desire of 
 knowing the more one knows, the greater is 
 one's desire to know; hence this natural desire 
 of man for knowing tends toward some deter- 
 mined end. But this end can be no other than 
 
 26 Quam videmus hominen moveri et alia opera agere, per- 
 cipimus in eo quandam causam harum operationum quae 
 aliis rebus non inest, et hanc causam animam nominamus, 
 nondum tamen scientes quid sit anima, si est corpus, vel 
 qualiter operationes praedictas efficiat. C. G., 1. 3, c. 38. 
 
 i7 Naturaliter inest omnibus hominibus desidcrium cognos- 
 cendi causa earum quae videntur; unde, propter admira- 
 tionem eorum quae videbantur quorum causae latebant, 
 homines primo philosophari coeperunt; invenientes autem 
 causam quiescebant. Nee sistit inquisitio quousque per- 
 veniatur ad primani causam ; et tune perfecte nos scire 
 arbitramur quando primam causam cognoscimns. Desiderat 
 igitur homo naturaliter cognoscere primam causan quasi 
 ultimum finem. C. G. y \. 3, c. 2f>. 
 
the most excellent that is knowable which is 
 God." Again, in accordance with the general 
 principles of knowledge we come to the same 
 conclusion. "Man naturally desires to know 
 the cause of every known effect, but the human 
 intellect knows ens universale, therefore it 
 naturally desires to know its cause, \vhich is 
 God only." 29 
 
 We can then state, that there is innate in man 
 a faculty or power which abstracts particular, 
 general, transcendental concepts from the data 
 of the senses, and which from these concepts, by 
 a process of negation and combination, forms 
 other concepts, even the concept of God; and 
 finally, a natural tendency which seeks the 
 cause of things known, and is not at rest until 
 it finds the first cause, and knows its nature 
 in some way. 30 To this extent the idea of God 
 
 28 Quod igitur vehementius in aliquid tendit postea quam 
 prius, non movetur ad infinitum, sed ad aliquid determina- 
 tum tendit. Hoc autem invenimus in desiderio sciendi ; 
 quanto enim aliquis plura scit, tanto majori desiderio affec- 
 tat scire. Tendit igitur desideriuni naturale hominis in 
 sciendo ad aliquem determinatum finem. Hoc autem non 
 potest esse aliud quam nobilissitnum scibile, quod Deus est. 
 C. G., 1. 3, c. 25. 
 
 29 Cujuslibet effectus cogniti naturaliter homo causam scire 
 desiderat. Intellectus autem humanus cognoscit ens univer- 
 sale. Desiderat igitur naturaliter cognoscere causam ejus, 
 quae solum Deus est. C. G. , 1. 3, c. 25. 
 
 30 This statemeut is taken fromHontheim's Theodicea, p. 19. 
 
is innate in us. Hontheim and others think it 
 better to refrain from speaking of this innate 
 idea of God at the present time, on account of 
 the danger of abuse, yet it exists in the sense 
 explained and is so admitted by St. Thomas, 
 and it is but just to those who hold we have 
 an immediate or innate idea of God as this 
 word innate is usually understood to admit 
 the amount of truth their view contains. 31 
 
 This concession however, does not do away 
 with the necessity of demonstration and analy- 
 sis for attaining the idea of God in so far as 
 the human mind can attain it. Aquinas does 
 not lose sight of his- main thesis that all knowl- 
 edge rises from the senses. " There is a certain 
 confused estimation by which God is commonly 
 known by all or most men . . . and there is also 
 a knowledge of God by way of demonstra- 
 tion" 32 the former is the knowledge common 
 
 31 Moreover, this shows that the view St. Thomas took 
 of the problem of God was broad and flexible, and offsets 
 the impression that the idea of God for him was a rigid, 
 formal conception Being and nothing else, and this even in 
 Pantheistic sense, as we find stated by J. W. Hanne in Die 
 Idee der Absoluten Personlicbkeit, pp. 486-494. There is 
 much material in Aquinas to lengthen out the point we 
 have just touched on in the text. 
 
 82 Communiter ab omnibus vel pluribus (Deus) cognoscitur 
 secundum quamdam aestimationein confusam . . . cognosci- 
 tur (Deus) per viam demonstrationis. C. G., 1. 3, c. 48. 
 
to all, a vague knowledge; the latter is a proper 
 knowledge of God resting on argument and 
 proof. Moreover, he does not allow a greater 
 certainty to conclusions based on the data of 
 consciousness as consciousness, "for although 
 the human mind has greater likeness to God 
 than inferior creatures, yet the knowledge of 
 God which is derived from the human mind 
 does not exceed the kind of knowledge which 
 arises from sensible things, since the soul only 
 knows its nature because it understands the 
 natures of sensible objects. Whence God is not 
 known through this source in a higher way 
 than the cause is known through the ef- 
 fect." 33 This statement bars innate ideas from 
 the system of Aquinas, as well as what is now 
 called Personal Idealism, which cuts away from 
 the sensible world and tries to find in conscious- 
 ness alone its view of God. St. Thomas says we 
 gain nothing by this procedure, for whence comes 
 our knowledge of consciousness ? From sensi- 
 ble things. Hence it is, that after the admis- 
 
 33 Quamvis autem mens humana propinquiori Dei similitu- 
 dinem repraesentat quam inferiores creaturae, tamen cog- 
 nitio Dei, quae ex mente humana accipi potest, non excedit 
 illud genus cognitionis quod ex sensibilibus sumitur, cum et 
 ipsa anima de seipsa cognoscat quid est, per hoc quod 
 naturas intelligit sensibilium. Unde nee per hanc viam cog- 
 nosci Deus altiori modo potest quam sicut causa cognoscitur 
 per effectum. C. G., 1. 3, c. 4,7. 
 
n6 
 
 sions already noted, he sets out to prove 
 the existence of God from five points of view, 
 each, however, starting from material things. 
 
 The first argument is taken from the fact of 
 motion. This St. Thomas calls "the more 
 manifest way' or fact to start with. "It is 
 certain and evident to sense that there is 
 movement in the world, but what is moved is 
 moved by another, for nothing is moved except 
 it is in potency to the movement it undergoes. 
 Naught passes from the potential to the actual 
 save through the actual . . . for the same thing 
 cannot be potential and, actual at the same time 
 under the same aspect, but only under diverse 
 aspects. . . It is thus impossible that from the 
 same point of view, and in the same manner, 
 something be mover and moved, or something 
 move itself. . . Therefore whatever is moved must 
 be moved by another." Everything in motion 
 is moved by another, but we cannot admit this 
 "process in infinitum, otherwise there would 
 be no first mover, and consequently no motion. 
 . . Therefore we must come to some prime mover 
 that is moved by no other, and all understand 
 this to be God." 
 
 The second argument rests on the "concept 
 of efficient cause. We find in these sensible 
 things an .order of efficient causes ; yet we do 
 not discover, nor can we, that anything is its 
 
own efficient cause, for thus it would be prior 
 to itself which is impossible." These causes are 
 related first, intermediate, and ultimate; the 
 last depends on the intermediate, and these, 
 whether one or many, depend on a first, or 
 else they themselves should not exist, which is 
 contrary to fact, and we should be obliged to 
 admit an infinite regress. "We must therefore 
 posit some efficient first cause, which we call 
 God." 
 
 We have then the argument from contingent 
 or possible being to necessary being. We find 
 certain things that are indifferent to existence. 
 They may or may not exist ; but things of this 
 nature were not always. If all things were 
 thus indifferent, there would have been a time 
 when there was no existence. If this is true 
 then there would be no existence now, which 
 is false, for "nothing begins to be except 
 through what is." There must then be some 
 necessary existence in things. This necessary 
 being or existence has the cause of its necessity 
 in itself or from without. If from without we 
 are again on the path of efficient causes, and 
 thus can not proceed in infinitum. 'Therefore, 
 we must posit something necessary per se, 
 whose necessity is not caused, but which is the 
 cause of necessity to others. And this we call 
 God." 
 
u8- 
 
 The various degrees of perfection found in 
 things, is the basis of the fourth argument. In 
 objects we find that we can apply the particles 
 "more" or "less" to their qualities of goodness, 
 truth, and the like. This comparison rests on 
 agreement with a standard which is fully what 
 they are in part. In a given line of perfection 
 we have degrees in various proportions, there 
 must then be an absolute perfection in this 
 line which is the basis and standard of these 
 degrees. "Therefore there is something which 
 is the cause of the being, goodness, and every 
 perfection of all beings, and this we call God." 
 
 The last argument leads to an intelligent 
 being from the idea of order in things. We see 
 objects that are irrational act for an end, and 
 this not occasionally but always, or at least 
 most frequently they act to attain what is 
 best; thus this action is not due to chance. 
 But irrational objects can not act tints unless 
 they are directed by some rational or intellectual 
 being. " Therefore there is something intelligent 
 by which all natural things are ordained 
 to an end. And this we call God." 34 
 
 34 These arguments are taken from the Sum. Theol., 
 I, q. 2, a. 3. 
 
119 
 SECTION H. THE FIRST CAUSE. 
 
 The principle running through the proofs is 
 that of causality. The result of each line of 
 evidence is the outcome of the application of 
 this principle. The facts of motion, contingency, 
 production, and the like, in the world, call for 
 an explanation; an ultimate explanation of all 
 phenomena is the one point that marks off 
 divine causality from created causes. In second- 
 ary causes, we find the immediate, partial 
 reason for a given event, in divine causality, 
 the principle is pushed to its limit and we reach 
 the final reason for all events. This final ex- 
 planation is the goal of every philosophical 
 system, and rests on the amount of knowledge 
 the phenomena about us can give us of their 
 ultimate cause. 
 
 Whether we regard the principle of causality 
 as objective with St. Thomas, or make it sub- 
 jective as Kant and his followers hold, this 
 much at least is certain: we perceive things, 
 phenomena, that call for an explanation, and 
 there is in man a natural tendency to seek the 
 explanation of things these two factors com- 
 bined lead us to an ultimate ground or reason 
 of appearances. A Conception of God might 
 then be defined, the ultimate explanation of 
 what the individual or conceiver thinks needs 
 
I2O 
 
 explanation. In this sense, we can have no 
 contention with the Conception as such, but 
 if there is disagreement it must be looked for 
 much further back --in the theory of reality, 
 which depends on the theory of knowledge. 
 And here is where the need of a true theory of 
 knowledge is absolutely necessary. Thus the 
 Agnostic Unknowable God is the result of the 
 doctrine of the Unknowable in general. The 
 Idealistic Conception of God is the logical 
 outcome of the denial of external reality. The 
 Intuitionists go astray in considering God as 
 primo and per se known. Those who say that 
 God is a necessary Postulate, deny the real 
 proving power of His manifestations. The 
 position of Aquinas is based on the principles 
 already discussed the consideration of phe- 
 nomena, material things, lead us to their final 
 explanation. This is illustrated by the argu- 
 ments advanced for proving God's existence. 
 
 Some consider the first four proofs as instances 
 of efficient causality, and the fifth as teleological. 
 Others regard the four kinds of causes utilized - 
 first and second proofs represent effiicient cause, 
 the third, material cause, the fourth, formal 
 cause, and the fifth, final or exemplar cause. 
 Whatever view we take, the result is practi- 
 the same for the proving power of the effects. 
 Though efficient causality was not the only 
 
121 
 
 or the principal one for the Scholastics, yet 
 as already noted, every cause looks toward 
 efficiency, and hence the effects of each cause 
 give us a knowledge of the cause; and this 
 for our purpose is the important aspect of 
 causality. 
 
 We might, as an instance, consider the knowl- 
 edge we can derive of the nature of the final 
 or exemplar cause from a consideration of its 
 effects. This is the fifth argument that leads 
 to God as Intelligence the other arguments, as 
 arguments, present Him as Prime Mover, First 
 Cause, Necessary Being, Perfect Being, respec- 
 tively. The axiom omne agens agit sibi simile 
 gets a higher meaning when the agens acts by 
 intelligence. Here enters the idea of a free 
 agent, and unlike an agent that acts with its 
 physical being only and is limited to one 
 determined effect, we have now a variety of 
 effects depending on the choice of the intelligent 
 cause. "The effects proceed from a cause as 
 they preexist in a cause, since omne agens agit 
 sibi simile. But the effects preexist in the cause 
 according to the nature of the cause." Aquinas 
 concludes that the effects of human and divine 
 
 1 Effectus procedit a causo agente, secundum quod prae- 
 existunt in ea ; quia omne agens agit sibi simile. Praeexis- 
 tunt autem effectus in causa secundum modum causae. 
 Sum. TheoL, I, q., 9, a. 4. 
 
122 
 
 causality are present to these causes "according 
 to an intelligent nature." The effect agrees 
 with the idea or prototype in the mind of the 
 agent. Here we meet the question of Divine 
 Ideas which are the measure of things, and of 
 which we receive a knowledge from a consid- 
 eration of their expression in nature. 
 
 Ideas or forms in general are distinct or rather 
 different from the existent objects, and can be 
 viewed under a twofold aspect. They may be 
 the principle of knowledge of a thing, and then 
 we have the idea, form, or species as already 
 discussed for the thing itself must be known 
 if the idea, according to which the thing is 
 made, is known. They may be the exemplars 
 of the existent things, for the intelligent agent 
 acts only in so far as he has in his mind the 
 idea or model of what he is to produce, and 
 this idea must be a determined, specific one or 
 the result would be fortuitous. In this sense, 
 the idea is causal, it is the plan the agent 
 follows in his operations. There is then an 
 agreement between the idea and the object 
 based on it. " The exemplar forms of the Divine 
 Intellect are productive of the whole object, 
 both matter and form. And hence they 
 embrace not only the nature of the species but 
 also the specific character of the individual 
 
123 
 
 first, however the nature of the species." All 
 creation, all finite effects, have their originals 
 in the Mind of God; hence by a knowledge of 
 these effects we are led back to a knowledge of 
 their models, and through the models we learn 
 something of the nature of the cause. 
 
 These ideas in the Divine Essence constitute 
 God's knowledge of things other than Himself, 
 which are based on these ideas. "Idea does not 
 signify Divine Essence as Divine Essence, but 
 only as it is the likeness or concept of this or 
 that object.' And again, "the Essence of God 
 is the idea of things, not indeed as essence, but 
 as it is understood." "Thus God by knowing 
 His essence knows other things, as effects are 
 known through a knowledge of the cause." On 
 the basis of things as having their models in 
 
 2 Formae exemplares intellectus divinae sunt factivae 
 totius rei, et quantum ad materiam, et quantum ad for- 
 mam; et ideo respiciunt creaturam non solum quantum ad 
 naturam specie!, sed etiam quantum ad singularitatem 
 individui, per prius tamen quantum ad naturam specie!. 
 Quodl. 8, q. 1, a. 2. 
 
 3 Idea non nominat divinam essentiam, in quantum est 
 essentia, sed in quantum est similitude vel ratio hujus vel 
 illius rei. Sum. TheoL, I, q. 15, a. 2 ad 1. 
 
 4 Essentia Dei est idea rerum, non quidem ut essentia, sed 
 ut est intellecta. De Veri., q. 3, a. 2. 
 
 5 Sic Deus cognoscendo suam essentiam, alia cognoscit, 
 sicut per cognitionem causae cognoscuntur effectus. C. G. 
 1. 1, c. 68. 
 
124- 
 
 the Divine Mind, on the same principle that 
 effects give us a knowledge of their cause, we 
 rise to a knowledge of God. 
 
 ''Creatures lead us to a knowledge of God 
 as effects conduct to the cause. Natural reason 
 can know of God only what is proper to Him 
 as the principle or cause of all beings." The 
 manifestations of God are numerous, and must 
 be so, since "no creature can be equal to God," 
 though He as "every cause tends to produce 
 His likeness in the effect in so far as the effect 
 can receive it. . . Hence there is required a multi- 
 plicity and variety in created things so that a 
 perfect likeness of God, according to His nature, 
 be found in them." Even with effects that are 
 numerous, and that vary in greatness, "we ex- 
 perience daily that there is a defect in our knowl- 
 edge, for there are many qualities of sensible 
 objects of which we are ignorant, and in many of 
 those qualities which we do apprehend by sense, 
 
 6 Creaturae ducnnt in Dei cognitionem, sicut effectus in 
 causam. Hoc igitur solum ratione naturali de Deo cognosci 
 potest, quod competere ei necesse est, secundum quod est 
 omnium entium principium. Sam. Theol , I, q. 32, a. 1. 
 
 7 Non enim creatura potest esse Deo aequalis. . . Quitm 
 enim omne agens intendit suam similitudinem in effectum 
 inducere, secundum quod effectus capere potest. . . Oportuit 
 igitur esse multiplicitatem et varietatem in rebus creatis, ad 
 hoc, quod inveniretur in eis Dei similitude perfecta secundum 
 modum suum. C. G., 1. 2, c. 45. 
 
125 
 
 we do not attain to perfect knowledge. To a 
 much greater extent therefore is human reason 
 
 to' 
 
 insufficient to investigate all that is intelligible 
 about that most excellent, transcendant sub- 
 stance." We are capable however, of attaining 
 a partial knowledge, which though not ade- 
 quate is true as far as it goes. 
 
 There are a few misapprehensions of the view 
 of Aquinas about the nature of the First Cause 
 that ought to be removed before we take up 
 specifically the Quid Sit, or what we can know 
 about the Nature of God. God is a universal, 
 permanent, continuous cause, present in each 
 phenomenon by His actuality, and contributing 
 more to the result of the created secondary 
 activity than the immediate secondary cause. 
 
 St. Thomas says that the very unity and 
 simplicity of God is the reason why He can 
 produce many and diverse effects, just as he 
 holds that the soul knows all things precisely 
 because it is none of those things it knows. 
 ''The divine power is not limited to one effect; 
 and this comes from its simplicity, for the 
 
 8 Idem manifeste apparet ex defectu, quern in rebus cognos- 
 cendis quotidie experimMr. Rerum enim sensibilium plurimas 
 proprietates ignoramus, earumque proprietatum, quas sensu 
 apprekendimus, rationem perfecte in pluribus invenire non 
 possnmus. Multo igitur amplius excellentisstnae sub- 
 stantiae, transcendentis, omnia intelligibilia humana ratio 
 investigare non sufficit. C, G., 1. 1, c. 3. 
 
126 
 
 nearer a power is to unity, the nearer it is 
 to infinity, and can extend itself to more ob- 
 jects." The effects are in proportion to their 
 cause and get their character from their most 
 perfect cause. "Therefore the distinction in 
 objects, in which consists the order of the uni- 
 verse (but the order of the universe is what is 
 best in all created beings), is not the result of 
 secondary causes but rather the intention of the 
 First Cause." 10 Moreover the First Cause con- 
 tributes more to the effect than the immediate 
 secondary cause. " Every cause is in some man- 
 ner the cause of being, either substantial or 
 accidental. But nothing is the cause of being 
 except in so far as it acts in the divine power. 
 Therefore every cause operates through the 
 power of God." "God is more of a principal 
 cause in each action than even the secondary 
 
 y Virtus diviua non limitatur ad unum effectura; et hoc 
 ex ejus simplicitate provenit, quia quanto aliqua virtus est 
 magis unita, tanto magis est infinita et ad plura se potest 
 extendere. C. G., 1. 2, c. 42. 
 
 10 Non igitur rerum distinctio, in qua ordo universali (opti- 
 mum autem in omnibus creatis est ordo universi) consistit, 
 causatur ex causis secundis, scd magis ex intentione primae 
 causae. C. G., 1. 2, c. 42. 
 
 1 Omne enirn operans est aliquo modo causa essendi, vel 
 secundum esse substantiate vel accidentale; Nihil autem est 
 causa essendi, nisi in quantum agit in virtute divina. Omne 
 igitur operans operatur per virtutem Dei. C. G., 1. 3, c. 67. 
 

 (( UNIVERSr 
 127 
 
 agents." 12 There is, however, true secondary 
 causality. "The causality of inferior effects is 
 not attributed to the divine power in such a 
 a way that the causality of the inferior causes 
 is taken away." Nor is the effect to be con- 
 sidered "as due, partly to God and partly to 
 the natural agent; but the whole is from both 
 under a different aspect, as the same whole 
 effect is attributed to the instrument, and also 
 the whole to the principal cause." 
 
 This intimate presence of God in all activities 
 will help us to understand the idea of the First 
 Cause in the proofs for God's existence. There 
 are two opinions on this point among those 
 who hold that these proofs demonstrate God's 
 existence. One maintains that the existence of 
 God is proven from the fact that an infinite series 
 of causes is impossible, and hence we must come 
 to a First Cause, God. The other holds that 
 the idea of the First Cause is valid independently 
 of the series, and this, to our mind, is the view 
 
 12 Deus igitur principalius est causa cujuslibet actionis 
 quam etiam secundae causae agentes. C. G , 1. 3, c. 67. 
 
 13 Non ergo causalitas effectuum inferiorum est ita attri- 
 buenda divinae virtuti, quod subtrahatur causalitas inferi- 
 orum agentium. C. G., 1. 3, c. 69. 
 
 14 Non partim a Deo, partim a uaturali agente fiat, sed 
 totus ab utroque secundum alium modum ; sicut idem eftec- 
 tus totus attribuitur instrumento, et principali agenti etiam 
 totus. C. G , 1. 3, c. 70. 
 
128 
 
 of Aquinas, gathered from his general treatment 
 of Causality. It might be called the intensive 
 view. According to it, a thorough consideration 
 and complete explanation of any effect will 
 lead us to a knowledge of the First Cause, 
 and thus we need not go through a series to 
 find God at the end, and then only the First 
 in the series. He is in every activity and can 
 be known as the full explanation of the event. 
 To the mind of St. Thomas, the proofs have 
 efficacy even were there an infinite series, for 
 he gives them as metaphysically demonstrative, 
 and yet he admits the possibility^, or rather 
 the non -contradiction of the eternity of the 
 world. 10 The important point to his mind is 
 the understanding of the effect or effects given, 
 for the simple but complete consideration of an 
 effect is sufficient to reach the First Cause. 
 If this is true, then the objections raised on 
 the score of the impossibility of conceiving 
 an infinite series fall to the ground, for the 
 simple reason that the existence of the First 
 Cause in the view of Aquinas is not bound up 
 with the infinite series. Prof. Huxley maintains, 
 the First Cause is but the first of a series, 
 with a causal character similar to the other 
 members of the series; we can not reach a 
 
 16 Cfr. Sertillanges, Preuve de 1'existence de Dieu et l'eternit 
 du monde. Revue Thomiste, Sept., 1897. 
 
129 
 
 true First Cause according to him, for the 
 process is one ad infinitum. 16 Nor is God a 
 Cause in the sense of Deism, a transcendant 
 Cause that created the world and now leaves 
 it to itself. God is both transcendant and 
 immanent. If we understand the meaning that 
 Aquinas gives to the First Cause it will not 
 be exact to say, as Caldecott does, that by 
 the first and second proofs, "he (Aquinas) 
 reaches only an initial Cause and does not 
 bring out permanence of operations." 17 Calde- 
 cott says, however, that immanence is contained 
 in the remaining arguments. It is but fair 
 to admit that the two proofs as given say 
 nothing of immanence, but their implication 
 takes account of it. The proofs of St. Thomas 
 are briefly stated; to understand their full 
 content we must seek for light in other portions 
 of his works. Any of the proofs carried to 
 its complete expression would not only give 
 us the existence of God, but likewise His nature 
 in so far as we can know it. This close 
 relation between existence and nature is often 
 overlooked, especially by the Agnostic, who 
 arrives at existence and then fails to use the 
 privilege of deduction and analysis at his 
 
 16 Huxley's Hume, p. 149. 
 
 17 Selections from the Literature of Theism, pp. 24, 26. 
 
130 
 
 disposal to learn something of the nature of 
 God. We now propose to utilize our birth-right. 
 
 SECTION III. NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 The existence of God found as the result of 
 the five proofs advanced by St. Thomas does 
 not give us all we can know about Him, and 
 thus it is, the work of elaboration just begins 
 at this point. We repeat, that what follows 
 is implicitly contained in the proofs, but its 
 detailed exposition is the outcome of deduction 
 and analysis. The same principle --that of 
 causality which proved there was a God, now 
 goes further, and shows to what extent we 
 can know the nature of God. The position of 
 St. Thomas and Spencer offer a great contrast 
 on this point, and it will be well to show in 
 what way. Both admit a First Cause as the 
 inevitable conclusion of a consideration of 
 causality in the world, both admit manifes- 
 tations of this Frst Cause; but here the 
 agreement ends. Spencer says God is unknow- 
 able, though He manifests Himself- -"the 
 Power which the Universe manifests to us is 
 utterly inscrutable' -, St. Thomas says, God 
 is kriowable because of His manifestations - 
 "whence we know God's relations to creatures 
 
 1 First Principles, p. 46. 
 
because He is the Cause of all, and how He 
 differs from creatures since He is none of those 
 things He has caused." This divergence is 
 emphasized at various points, and we shall 
 note them as occasion demands. "Each asser- 
 tion respecting the nature, acts, or motives of 
 that power which the Universe manifests to us, 
 has been repeatedly called in question, and 
 proved to be inconsistent with itself, or with 
 accompanying assertions. Yet each of them has 
 been age after age insisted on, in spite of a 
 secret consciousness that it would not bear 
 examination." 3 For Aquinas, notwithstanding, 
 God is knowable. He is knowable in Himself; 
 and He is knowable relatively to us in a given 
 manner and to a certain extent. 
 
 We do not know God in himself, we do not 
 know Him comprehensively, nor intuitively, yet 
 we know Him really, to a certain extent. The 
 proofs have given us some idea of God ; they 
 have shown Him to be an existent Something, 
 a Being of some sort. We have shown that 
 being is the prime and adequate object of the 
 intellect, hence God as being is knowable to the 
 
 2 Unde cognoscimus de ipso habitudinein ipsius ad crea- 
 turam, quod scilicet omnium est causa; et differential!! 
 creaturarum ab ipso, quod scilicet ipse non est aliquid eorum 
 quae ab eo causantur. Sum Tbeol., I, q. 12, a. 12. 
 
 3 Spencer, Ibid. p. 101. 
 

 132 
 
 human intellect. But the proportionate object 
 of our intellect is not being as such, but the 
 essence of material things, hence our knowledge 
 of God must be based on a consideration of 
 material things. A thing is knowable in se and 
 it is knowable in relation to us. " Every real 
 existence has two sides, being - for - itself and 
 being -for -others." This distinction in our 
 present question brings to view two of the 
 general principles of knowledge: Immaterialit}', 
 which determines the degrees of the knowable- 
 ness of an object in se considered; and, all that 
 is known, is known according to the nature of 
 the knower, all our knowledge is in terms of 
 our own intellect. 
 God in Himself is infininelv knowable, because 
 
 A 
 
 He is supremely actual. " Because God is the 
 opposite extreme of matter, because He is 
 entirely immune from all potentiality, it follows 
 that He knows and is knowable in the highest 
 degree." The role of immateriality in knowl- 
 edge has already been discussed ; the proofs 
 give us God as Actus Purus, Pure Actuality, 
 and thus He is knowable in Himself as infiinitely 
 as He knows Himself. " Since God is most 
 immaterial, it follows that He is in the height 
 
 4 A. Seth, Some Epistemological Conclusions, Phil. Rev., 
 v. 3, p. 57. 
 * De Veri., q. 2, a. 2. Sum. TheoL, I, q. 14, a. 1. 
 
133 
 
 of cognition." In addition to what has been 
 said previously, we shall refer to the question 
 of matter and form when presenting the ideas 
 contained in the attributes of Infinity and 
 Omniscience. 
 
 The phrase " God in Himself has been 
 criticised by Prof. Flint as meaningless, but it 
 has a real significance as we find it in the 
 works of Aquinas. "We can not know the 
 'God in Himself of sundry sages and divines, 
 for the simple but sufficient reason that there 
 is no such God to know." He calls this "God 
 in Himself" as vain as Kant's " thing-in-itself". 
 When he states what He considers the only 
 intelligible use of the phrase, he simply presents 
 what was clear to the mind of Aquinas and 
 those who follow him in this question. "There 
 is no God without powers, affections, attributes, 
 relationships; and when viewed in these in 
 His omnipotence and omniscience, His holiness 
 and love, His Creatorship, Fatherhood, or 
 Sovereignty He is viewed "in Himself", in the 
 only true and reasonable sense, that is, as 
 distinct not from His own characteristics, but 
 from other beings." This is the idea of God 
 derived from created things, of which St. 
 
 6 Flint, Agnosticism, p. 580. 
 1 Ibid,, p. 582. 
 
134- 
 
 Thomas says: "We can know God's relation 
 to creatures, because He is the cause of all; we 
 can know how He differs from creatures because 
 He is none of those things He has caused, and 
 He is none of them, not through defect on His 
 part but through supereminence." The knowl- 
 edge of God in se, of God in Himself, is 
 unattainable bv us, is an extent bevond us, 
 
 *' m> 
 
 of which St. Thomas says "to show the 
 
 */ 
 
 ignorance of this sublime knowledge it is said 
 of Moses that ' he approached to the darkness 
 in which God was ' We know God only bv 
 
 * / 
 
 His manifestations, as Prof. Flint says, but 
 this does not preclude other means of knowl- 
 edge, means not given us in our present 
 condition. 
 
 When we come to consider our actual knowl- 
 edge of God, we see it is neither comprehensive 
 nor intuitive. We comprehend a thing when 
 "we know it as far as it is knowable." "To 
 comprehend a power or capacity is to know 
 its complete extension." 11 There is nothing that 
 
 *Snm. TheoL, I, q. 12, a. 12 
 
 Ad hujus sublimissiraae cognitionis ignorantiam demon- 
 strandam, de Moyse dicitur (Exod., 20: 21) quod accessit 
 ad caliginem in qua erat Deus. C. G., 1. 3, c. 49. 
 
 10 Omne auteni quod comprehenditur ah aliquo cognos- 
 cente, cognoscitur ah eo ita perfecte sicut cognoscihile est. 
 C. G.,\. 3, c. 35. 
 
 11 Idem igitur est cognoscere omnia in quae potest aliqua 
 virtus, et ipsam virtutem comprehendere. C. G , 1. 3, c. 56. 
 
135 - 
 
 can exhaust the divine nature or mirror it 
 perfecth r , because and this is the sole and 
 oft -repeated answer --there is no effect that 
 ad equates the power of the Cause, no creature 
 is a full copy of its Creator, no creature is 
 God. "It is impossible for any created likeness 
 to totally represent God. There is something 
 which each and all creatures leave unexpressed, 
 and yet this is a something which is contained 
 in the conception God in Himself. God is as 
 truly incomprehensible as He is truly knowable. 
 "God is knowable but not to the extent that 
 His essence is comprehended, because the knower 
 has a knowledge of the object known not 
 according to the nature of the object but 
 according to his own nature. But the nature 
 of no creature attains to the height of the 
 Divine Majesty Itself. Whence it follows, no 
 creature knows Him perfectly as He perfectly 
 knows Himself." We do not know God 
 comprehensively, but we are ever getting a 
 clearer and a wider knowledge of Him, con- 
 scious, however, that there will always be a 
 
 12 Deus cognoscibilis est non autem ita eognoscibilis, ut 
 essentia sua comprehend atur. Quia omne cognosceus habet 
 coguitionem de re cognita, non per motum rei cognita sed 
 per modum cognoscentis. Modus autem nullius creaturae 
 attingit ad altitudinetn divinae majestatis. Unde oportet 
 quod a nullo perfecte cognoscatur, sicut ipse seipsum perfecte 
 cognoscit. Com. on Lomb., I, Dis. 3, q. 1, a. 1. 
 
-136 
 
 limit the necessary distance between uncreated 
 and created existence. "Through effects we 
 know God's existence, that He is the Cause of 
 others, above others, and distinct from all. 
 This is the limit and most perfect stage of our 
 knowledge in this life, whence, as Dionysius says, 
 we are united to a God as it were unknown. 
 This is true even when we know what God 
 is not, for what He is remains entirely un- 
 known." 13 
 
 This last thought seems a discouraging con- 
 clusion, and apparently renders further quest 
 useless. Did St. Thomas confound a simple, 
 partial knowledge with a comprehensive one as 
 do Agnostics, he would be forced to stop with 
 Spencer at the mere existence of God and de- 
 clare Him unknowable beyond this point. Be- 
 fore we detail the actual knowledge that man 
 can attain of God's nature, we must show 
 that Intuitionism and Ontologism are not the 
 means of acquiring this knowledge. 
 
 Ontologism, or the immediate vision of God, 
 held by Malebranche, Gioberti, and Rosmini, is 
 practically identical with the Innate-idea view 
 when there is a question of our knowledge of 
 God. In general, it brings God and the human 
 mind in immediate conscious contact; it does 
 
 13 
 
 C. G., 1. 3, c, 49. 
 
137 
 
 away with all intermediate ideas between God 
 and the human soul; it considers God the 
 first object of our thought and the first object 
 that we know ; it holds that we see God im- 
 mediately, and from this intuition, as origin 
 and source, arises all our intellectual knowledge. 
 According to Malebranche, we see our ideas 
 or universals in God. Sensation for him does 
 not constitute the first stage of knowledge; in 
 fact, it has no direct function in knowledge. He 
 maintains that we know all things in their 
 ideas, that these ideas are particular deter- 
 minations of the idea of being in general, and 
 this idea of indeterminate being is the idea 
 of God. For Gioberti, God is the first object 
 that we know, and we know Him immediately ; 
 He is both the primum ontologicum and the 
 primum logicum the first existence, and the 
 first known. His formula, Ens Great Existentias 
 Being creates existences details this imme- 
 diate intuition. We know Being the self-exist- 
 ing Divinity, we know It as creative, and we 
 know the result of this creative action, viz., 
 existences. For him, then, our "first intel- 
 lectual act is an intuition of God creating the 
 world." Gioberti distinguishes direct and 
 reflex knowledge, and is followed in this matter 
 by subsequent Ontologists. The first or direct 
 intuition of God, who is the first object known, 
 
-133- 
 is obscure and indeterminate, but bv means of 
 
 m 
 
 sensation and intercourse with men, this intui- 
 tion becomes clear, determined, and then we 
 have reflex knowledge. Rosmini's theory, that 
 the idea of being is innate in us has made him 
 an Ontologist, for this idea is the "idea of God, 
 the creative cause of finite beings." 
 
 The view of Ontologism is in opposition to 
 the theory of Aquinas. All our ideas arise from 
 material things ; the essence of material things 
 is the first and proper object of the intellect, 
 and it is only bv the resemblance and contrasts 
 
 *> * 
 
 of these sensible objects that we come to a 
 knowledge of spiritual things, and of God. 
 " Since the human intellect, according to our 
 present condition in life, cannot understand 
 created immaterial substances, much less can 
 it understand the essence of an uncreated sub- 
 stance. Therefore we must simply say that 
 God is not the primum known by us, but 
 rather we come to a knowledge of God through 
 creatures. . . But the first object of our knowl- 
 edge in this life is the quiddity of a material 
 thing, which is the object of our intellect, as has 
 been said so often." 15 Our manner of knowing 
 
 14 Boedder, Natural Theology, p. 14. 
 
 1A Cum intellectus humanus sccundum statuni praesentis 
 vitae non possit intelligere substantias inmiateriales creatas, 
 multo minus potest intelligere essentiam substantiae in- 
 
139- 
 
 which must be in accordance with our nature 
 for the object known is in the knower accord- 
 ing to the nature of the knower renders it 
 impossible that God should be immediately 
 known to us, or be the first object of our 
 knowledge. Though every mind is concerned 
 with all being, yet it is not being in general 
 which is the specific or immediate object of 
 ever\^ knower, but being under the condition 
 that corresponds most nearly with the nature 
 of the knower. Thus man who is a composite 
 of soul and body can not know spirit immed- 
 iately or primarily, for it does not correspond 
 the most readily to his nature ; he can only form 
 a direct concept of those things which are pro- 
 portioned to his nature. We have sensible and 
 intellectual powers of knowledge, and our 
 knowledge comes through the senses ; thus it 
 is impossible that we should have an immediate 
 vision of God. 
 
 St. Thomas rejects Ontologism in express 
 words. "Some have said that the first thing 
 which is known by the human mind in this life 
 is God Himself, who is the first truth, and that 
 
 creatae. Unde simpliciter dicendum est, quod Deus non est 
 primum a nobis, cognoscitur; sed magis per creaturas in 
 Dei cognitionem pervenimus. . . Primum autem quod intel- 
 ligitur a nobis secundum statuni praeseutis vitae, est quid- 
 ditas rei materialis, quae est nostri intellectus objectum, ut 
 multoties supra dictum est. Sum. Theol., I, q. 87, a. 3. 
 
140 - 
 
 through this all other things are known. But 
 this is manifestly false, for to know God through 
 His essence is the beatitude of man, whence it 
 would follow that every man is happy." The 
 seeing of God in His essence is logically con- 
 tained in Ontologism, though its supporters 
 explicitly assert we do not thus see God. In 
 God all things are one, there are no distinctions 
 "one is the first of beings possessing the full 
 perfection of all being, \vhichwe call God." If 
 Ontologism were true, it would follow that 
 no one could err "since in the Divine Essence 
 all things that are said of it are one, no one 
 could err in those matters which are spoken 
 of God ; experience proves this to be evidently 
 false." Experience proves that we have no 
 immediate vision of God, and the very concept 
 we have is the result of a process far from in- 
 tuitive, or identical with immediate knowledge. 
 "Moreover, what is first in intellectual knowl- 
 
 16 Quidam dixerunt quod primum quod a mente humana 
 cognoscitur etiain in hac vita, est ipse Deus qui est veritas 
 pritna, et per hunc onmia alia cognoscuntur. Sed hoc aperte 
 est falsum : quia cognoscere Deuni per essentiam est hominis 
 beatitudo, unde sequeretur omnein hominem beatum esse. 
 Super Boetium De Trinitate, c. 1, ad 3. (Opusculum 68). 
 
 17 Unum est primum entium, totius esse perfectionem 
 plenam possidens quod Deum dicimus. C. G., 1. 3, c. 1. 
 
 18 Cum in divina essentia omnia quae dicuntur de ipsa sint 
 unum, nullus erraret circa ea, quae de Deo dicuntur, quod 
 experimento patet esse falsum. Opus. 68. 
 
edge ought to be most certain"; 1 but the very 
 discussion and divergence of opinion regarding 
 the concept and nature of God show that we 
 have no immediate vision of Him. 
 
 We are now ready to present the treatment 
 that Aquinas has given the nature of God, in 
 the light of our knowledge. If we consider the 
 proofs of God's existence simply in their formal 
 character, regard only the explicit ideas they 
 contain, we see at once we have nothing like a 
 satisfactory or complete concept of God. How 
 indefinite the designation at the close of each 
 line of evidence! The words, ens or aliquid, 
 being or something, are as close as we are 
 admitted to gaze at the object of our search. 
 Though it is true there is specification to the 
 extent of saying this ens or something is Prime 
 Mover, First Cause, Necessary Being, Perfect 
 Being, Intelligent Bein^, yet there is not the con- 
 fidence of assertion that we look for in a final 
 statement of the greatest, most interesting, and 
 most far-reaching of problems. Again, he simply 
 says, and this we call God. There is, however, 
 a great deal implied in these statements, or 
 more correctly in the underlying thought of 
 the proofs, and this admits of an explicit unfold- 
 ing, at the end of which we shall have our 
 
 19 Iterum ea, quae sunt prima in cognitioiie intellectus 
 oportet esse certissima. Opus. 68. 
 
142- 
 
 concept as complete as it left the hands of 
 Aquinas, and, to our mind, as satisfying as we 
 can hope to make our concept of God in this 
 life. 
 
 The basic thought oi the proofs, the idea that 
 contains in itself the various predications that 
 an analysis of it makes clear, has been given 
 us by St. Thomas himself; and the method 
 used in developing it is plainly stated and 
 thoroughly carried out. The proofs have shown, 
 says Aquinas, "that there is some ptimum ens 
 which we call God. We must consider its at- 
 tributes," 20 we must analyze it. This is the 
 general idea, and the method used in specifying 
 it is the method of remotion or elimination. In 
 the same chapter we have another phrase for 
 the primum ens: "In proceeding in our knowl- 
 edge by the method of remotion, we shall accept 
 the principle (which was demonstrated in the 
 proofs) that God is omnino immobilis (omnino 
 immutabilis)." 
 
 By deduction and analysis, by the a priori 
 method, St. Thomas analyses the primum ens 
 
 20 Ostenso igitur, quod est aliquod primum ens, quod Deum 
 dicimus, oportet ejus condiliones investigate. C. G., 1. 1, 
 c. Ik 
 
 21 Ad procedendum, igitur circa Dei cognitionem per viam 
 remotionis, accipiamus principium (id, quod ex superioribus 
 jam monstratum est), scilicet quod Deus sit omnino immo- 
 bilis. C. G., 1. 1, c. 14. 
 
143- 
 
 of the proofs to see what further knowledge 
 we can have of God. He realizes fully the diffi- 
 
 / 
 
 culty of the present operation, for there may 
 be error at each step. In a lew introductory 
 sentences to the third question of the first part 
 of the Summa Theologica, he maps out his 
 position very well, saying, we shall rather con- 
 sider what God is not than seek to know what 
 He is. The same attitude is shown at the open- 
 ing of the analysis of the idea in his Contra 
 Gentes. "It is the way of remotion, the process 
 of elimination, that we are to use in considering 
 the Divine Nature. For the Divine Substance 
 by its immensity exceeds every form which our 
 intellect attains. And thus we cannot appre- 
 hend it by knowing what it is, but we have 
 some knowledge of it by knowing what it is 
 not." True to the theory of knowledge, this 
 question is pursued in terms of the constitution 
 of our minds, it is what our intellect can attain 
 through a consideration of things about us. 
 
 What is this method of remotion ? What part 
 does it play in our knowledge ? It is one of the 
 three ways employed by St. Thomas in discus- 
 
 22 Est autem via remotionis utendum, praecipue in con- 
 sideratione divinae substantiae. Nam divina substantia 
 omnem formam, quam intellectus noster attingit, sua 
 immensitate excedit ; et sic ipsam apprehendere non pos. 
 sumus cognoscendo quid est, sed aliqualem ejus haberaus 
 notitiam cognoscendo quid non est. C. G., 1. 1, c. 14. 
 
144 
 
 sing what attributes can be applied to God, to 
 find out what is contained in the primum ens. 
 The other two ways are called ways of causality 
 and eminence. Causality is the most universal, 
 since the whole question of God is discussed in 
 its terms ; eminence implies that all predications 
 of God have a meaning beyond or more exten- 
 sive than the words themselves denote when 
 applied to creatures, or our understanding of 
 them contains in God their full connotation 
 is reached. The way of remotion, however, is 
 characteristic of the process under consideration, 
 since, as Aquinas says, we are rather seeking 
 to know what God is not than what He is. 
 We repeat, it is included under the way of 
 causality. 
 
 The method of remotion might be likened to 
 the work of the active intellect, as already 
 suggested. We saw that the active intellect 
 was engaged in rendering the phantasma or 
 image intelligible, by removing from it the 
 material conditions that prevent it from being 
 known by the intellect proper; it eliminated 
 the elements that forbade the union of the 
 knower and the known, it brought to view the 
 essence, the real nature of the object, which 
 alone is knowable directly by the intellect. In 
 our present question, the process is negative, 
 but the result is positive, as St. Thomas takes 
 
145 
 
 care to point out. "The more we can remove 
 from an object by our intellect the nearer we 
 approach to a knowledge of it; the more 
 differences we see in an object in comparison 
 with other things, the more perfectly we know 
 it, for everything has a specific being distinct 
 from all others." This specific being is reached 
 by knowing the genus under which it is included, 
 and "by the differences by which it is distin- 
 guished from other things.' 1 
 
 In the case of God, there is no genus under 
 which He can be placed, "nor can we distinguish 
 Him from other things by anrmative differences, 
 but only through negative ones." Every 
 difference, whether affirmative or negative, 
 contracts or limits the object, and allows us 
 "to approach nearer to a complete designation 
 of the object." This method is thus applied: 
 ' If we say that God is not accident, we dis- 
 tinguish Him from all accidents ; then if we add 
 that He is not body, we mark Him off from 
 
 23 Tanto enim ejus notitiae magis appropinquamus, quanto 
 plura per intellectum nostrum ab eo poterimus removere; 
 tanto enim unumquodque perfectius cognoscimus, quanto 
 differentias ejus alia plenius intuernur; habet enim res 
 unaquaeque in seipsa esse proprium ab omnibus aliis 
 distinctum. C. G., 1. 1, c. 14. 
 
 24 Nee distinctionem ejus aliis rebus per amrrnativas 
 differentias accipere possumus, oportet earn accipere per 
 differentias negativas. Ibid. 
 
I id O 
 
 some substances. And thus we might, through 
 negations of this nature, separate Him, step by 
 step, from all that is not Himself. This will 
 indeed give us a specific view of His substance, 
 since He will be known as distinct from all, 
 yet our knowledge will not be perfect, \ve shall 
 not know what He is in Himself." Spencer 
 declares God unthinkable, because we can find 
 no marks or characters that distinguish Him 
 from objects we know. He lays down the 
 canon: "Whence it is manifest that a thing 
 is perfectly known only when it is in all respects 
 like certain things previously observed; that 
 in proportion to the number of respects in 
 which it is unlike them, is the extent to which 
 it is unknown ; and that hence when it has 
 absolutely no attribute in common with any- 
 thing else, it must be absolutely beyond the 
 bounds of knowledge." This sounds very much 
 like the statement of St. Thomas just quoted, 
 but when Spencer applies these principles to 
 
 26 Si dicimus Deum non accidens, per hoc quod ab omnibus 
 accidentibus distinguitur. Deinde, si addamns ipsum non 
 esse corpus, distinguemus ipsum etiatn in aliquibus sub- 
 stantiis ; et sic per ordinem, ab omni eo quod est praeter 
 ipsum, per negationes hujusmodi, distiuguetur ; et tune de 
 substantia ejus erit propria consideratio, quum cognoscetur 
 ut ab omnibus distinctus. Non tamen erit perlecta cognitio, 
 quia non cognoscitur quid in se sit. Ibid. 
 
 i6 First Prin., p. 80. 
 
147 - 
 
 God by way of corollary the agreement is at 
 an end. 
 
 "A thought involves relation, difference, like- 
 ness. Whatever does not present each of these 
 does not admit of cognition. And hence we 
 may say that the Unconditioned, as presenting 
 none of them, is trebly unthinkable." 27 For 
 Aquinas, the Unconditioned or God presents all 
 three of them in some way, and thus is trebly 
 thinkable. We have just shown how God is 
 known on the principle of remotion, by differ- 
 ences; relation and likeness will be considered 
 soon. 
 
 The method of remotion or elimination is but 
 one of three, as already remarked; these three 
 supplement each other to such an extent that 
 they are practically inseparable. The three 
 conditions of thought laid down by Spencer 
 are fulfilled in this three-fold method, and thus 
 make the Agnostic unknowable knowable. 
 When we ascribe an attribute to God which 
 means knowledge of God to the extent of the 
 attribute, we rest on the fact that God, as 
 everything else, can only be known by what 
 
 27 Spencer, Ibid., p. 82. 
 
 Fiske repeats the same idea. "Upon what grounds did 
 we assert the unknowableuess of Deity ? We were driven 
 to the conclusion that Deity is unknowable, because that 
 which exists independently of intelligence and out of relation 
 to it, which presents neither likeness, difference, nor relation, 
 cannot be cognized. Outlines of Cosmic Phil., Y. 2, p. 413. 
 
148- 
 
 He manifests of Himself. His manifestations 
 appealing "to our intellects leads us to know 
 what we are able to know of Him. God is 
 known to us from creatures by the relation of 
 cause, by way of eminence, and remotion." We 
 name an object as it is known to our intellect, 
 for names or "words are referred to what they 
 signify by means of an intellectual concep- 
 tion." How does God manifest Himself? 
 Through creatures, through the objects in the 
 world about us. A consideration of these ob- 
 jects leads us to an ultimate explanation of 
 them, to their cause God. If we are to know 
 more of this Cause, \ve must learn from all our 
 experiences, for we can name Him only as these 
 make Him known. 
 
 We can not, however, rise at once from a 
 consideration of a given class of objects to an 
 attribute appropriate to God. The knowledge 
 we derive from creation does not lift us immedi- 
 ately to a knowledge of the final Object, Source, 
 and End of all. St. Thomas lays down certain 
 rules which are to guide us in this matter 
 they have been called Canons of Attribution. 
 
 ' 2o Deus cognoscitur a nobis ex creaturis secundum habitu- 
 dinem principii, et modum excellentiae et remotionis. Sum. 
 TheoL, I, q. 13, a. 1. 
 
 29 Voces referuiitur ad res significandas mediaute concep- 
 tione intellectus. Ibid. 
 
149- 
 
 They safeguard the separate existence of God, 
 and also, as Caldecott points out, ward off 
 the imputation of Anthropomorphism. God, 
 for Aquinas, is infinite perfection, hence we can 
 apply no name to Him that will derogate from 
 this character. 30 Every name that implies per- 
 fection without connoting imperfection, is ap- 
 plied to God in the proper and the full sense 
 of the word; this name, however, is applied to 
 Him in an eminent way, which is not at all 
 applicable to creatures; finally, words connot- 
 ing imperfection may be applied to God meta- 
 phorically. We have here the ideas of God as 
 Cause, all else as effects, and the relation 
 betw r een the two. We can compare God and 
 creatures because they are similar in some way, 
 but the result of our comparison can only be 
 expressed analogically. 
 
 When we discussed the question of causality 
 in general, we saw that there was some simi- 
 larity between the cause and the result of its 
 operation, based on the axiom omne agens 
 agit sibi simile. This similarity may be one 
 of quality or one of proportion ; in the former 
 there is specific or generic likeness, in the latter 
 there is an analogical likeness. We also saw 
 
 30 God is infinite perfection, since as Cause of all things, 
 He contains in Himself in some way all efiects. Cfr. Sum. 
 Theol, I, q. 4, a. 2. 
 
150 
 
 that the cause is known by the effect it pro- 
 duces, and this is the only way we know it- 
 thus we know it by its actual exercise. The 
 activity of an agent is its forma, and this is 
 simply the divine likeness in things; "for since 
 the form is that which gives being or existence 
 to a thing, but each thing, in as far as it has 
 being, approaches to the likeness of God who 
 is simple Being itself, it is necessary that the 
 form be nothing else than the divine likeness 
 participated in things." The common element 
 of likeness, then, between God and creatures is 
 that of Being. There is no generic or specific 
 agreement, but one "according to some analogy, 
 as being is common to all. In this manner 
 those things which are of God, as First and 
 Universal Cause of all being, are likened to Him 
 in as far as they are beings." 
 The idea of relation is closely connectd with 
 
 31 Cum enim forma sit secundum quam res habetesse: res 
 autem quaelibet, secundum quod habet esse, accedat ad 
 similitudinem Dei, qui est ipsum suum esse simplex ; necesse 
 est quod forma nihil est aliud quam divina similitudo par- 
 ticipata in rebus. C. G., 1. 3, c. 97. 
 
 2 Si igitur sit aliquod agens, quod non in genere continea- 
 tur, effectus ejus adhuc magis remote accedat ad similitudi- 
 nem formae agentis : non taraen ita quod participet 
 similitudinem formae agentis secundum eamdem rationem 
 speciei aut generis, sed secundum aliqualem analogiam ; 
 sicut ipsum esse est commune omnibus. Et hoc modo ilia 
 quae sunt a Deo, assimilantur ei, inquantum sunt entia, et 
 primo et universali principio totius est. Sum. TheoL, I, 
 q. 4, a. 3. 
 
similarity in this question of analogy. We have 
 seen that knowledge implies a relation or union 
 of knower and known. When we come to seek 
 a knowledge of God, how is this relation to be 
 understood ? If God or the Absolute is defined 
 as the unrelated, then we are at a standstill in 
 our discussion; and Spencer truly remarks 
 "It is impossible to put the Absolute in the 
 category with anything relative so long as the 
 Absolute is defined as that of which no necessary 
 relation can be predicated." St. Thomas dis- 
 cusses this point by means of a distinction. 
 He says there are two kinds of relation real 
 or actual, and conceptual. In a relation there 
 are two terms or extremes, the subject and the 
 object, and the foundation or basis that con- 
 nects them both the reason why one is re- 
 ferred to or related to the other. If both terms 
 are real, the relation is real this real relation 
 exists in things independently of the operation 
 of the intellect. The relation is conceptual or 
 relatio rationis when one term is real and the 
 other only a concept this relation depends on 
 the consideration of our mind. On the basis 
 of this distinction, we know how far we can 
 attribute to God what we see in creatures. The 
 real relation contains the idea of something in 
 
 First Prin., p. 81. Cfr. Bowne, Metaphysics, p. 116. 
 
152- 
 
 both terms, each term contributing something 
 to the relation, as the relation of mover and 
 moved. In the conceptual, there is the idea of 
 unchangeableness in one term and change only 
 in the other. St. Thomas says, to determine 
 whether an animal is on the left or on the right 
 side of a column does not depend on any change 
 in the column but on the changed position of 
 the animal. This element of fixedness he applies 
 to God "Since God, therefore, is beyond the whole 
 order of creatures, and all creatures are ordained 
 to Him and not conversely, it is manifest that 
 creatures are related to God Himself, but there 
 is no real relation of God" to creatures, but one 
 of concept only, in so far as creatures are related 
 to Him." Thus, whatever names we apply 
 to God are not based on u any change in Him, 
 but on change in creatures." Strictly speaking 
 then, we cannot sa}^ that God is like creatures, 
 though the reverse is true ; and this rests on the 
 fact that God in no way depends on creatures, 
 He receives absolutely nothing from them. God 
 is like a standard that measures the perfections 
 of all objects, and as we speak of objects re- 
 
 34 Cum igitur Deus sit extra totum ordinem creaturae, et 
 omncs creaturae ordinentur ad ipsum, et non e converse ; 
 manifestum cst quod creaturae realiter referuntur ad ipsum 
 Deum; sed in Deo non est aliqua realis relatio ejus ad 
 creaturas ; sed secundum rationem tantum, inquantum, 
 creaturae refernntur ad ipsum. Sum. Theol., I, q. 13, a. 7. 
 
As- 
 sembling their standard more or less closely, 
 but not of the standard resembling the objects 
 though they have points that are common to 
 a certain degree so God is not spoken of as 
 similar to creatures, but conversely. 
 
 The contradiction that Spencer, quoting 
 Mansel, finds in the ideas of Cause and 
 Absolute and Infinite, are not born of a proper 
 understanding of the terms. If the meaning he 
 gives them were true, then we certainly could 
 not know the Absolute. Ladd justly remarks : 
 "All philosophy or attempt at philosophy, 
 even the most agnostic, necessarily assumes 
 some sort of conscious mental relation of man 
 to the Absolute; but on the other hand, all 
 philosophy or attempt at philosophy, however 
 dogmatic, is forced to acknowledge some sort 
 of a limit beyond which any such relation as 
 can properly be called 'knowledge' can not be 
 claimed to extend." He gives certain definitions 
 of the Absolute which of their very nature 
 render knowledge of It out of the question. 
 If the Absolute is designated as the totally 
 unrelated there is no knowledge to be had of 
 it. The Absolute must have some content, can 
 not be an abstraction "That \vhich has no 
 positive characteristics that are presentable or 
 representable in consciousness, can not be 
 known." Another unknowable form "You 
 
154- 
 
 can not know, or know about, the Absolute, 
 if by this term you mean to designate the nega- 
 tion of all positive or particular characteristics." 
 While we agree with these statements, there is 
 one aspect we can not endorse- -"Nor is knowl- 
 edge of the Absolute possible if this word must 
 be identified with the unchanging, with that 
 which is absolved from all alterations of its 
 own states or of the relations in which those 
 states stand to human consciousness." In 
 addition to what has already been said, the 
 further presentation of the view of Aquinas will 
 show that our knowledge of the Absolute does 
 not require change in the Absolute. We can 
 apply certain attributes to Him, derived from 
 a consideration of His manifestations. 
 
 Are these attributes the same in kind in 
 God and creatures, or is it a matter of degree 
 only? The general answer is obvious. God 
 who is independent and self-existent Being, and 
 creatures who are essentially dependent and 
 caused can not be classed together, as Spencer 
 justly remarks. "Between the creating and 
 the created there must be a distinction trans- 
 cending any of the distinctions existing between 
 different divisions of the created." And here 
 Spencer finds another reason for calling God 
 
 36 Phil, of Knowledge, pp. 593, 594, 595, 596, 597. 
 36 First Prin. p. 81. 
 
'55 
 
 unknowable: knowledge implies classification, 
 but God can not be classed with the created, 
 and hence we can not know Him. St. Thomas 
 has the same distinction "between the creating 
 
 o 
 
 and the created", but by analogy and eminence, 
 he finds that God is knowable in some way. 
 " We can not know the truth of divine things " 
 
 o 
 
 says Aquinas, "according to their nature, hence 
 it must be known according to our own nature. 
 But it is connatural to us to arrive at the 
 intelligible from the sensible . . . that from those 
 things that we know, the soul may rise to the 
 unknown. We know more truly what God is 
 not than what He is ... hence \vhat we say of 
 God is not to be understood as proper to Him 
 in the same manner as it is found in creatures, 
 but through some manner of imitation and 
 likeness. The eminence of God is more expressly 
 shown by removing from Him what is most 
 manifest to us, material things". 37 The likeness 
 is not a "participation of the same form . . . 
 
 37 Non possumus veritatem divinorum secundum modum 
 suum capere ; et ideo oportet quod nobis secundum modum 
 nostrum proponatur. Est autem nobis cormaturale a 
 sensibilibus in intelligibilia venire . . ut ex his quae novimus 
 ad incognita animus surgat . . . De Deo verius cognoscimus 
 quid non est, quam quid est. Et ideo cum de omnibus quae 
 de Deo dicimus, intelligendum sit quod non eodem modo 
 sibi conveniunt, sicut in creaturis inveniuntur, sed per 
 aliquem modum imitationis et similitudinis ; expressius 
 ostendebatur hujusmodi eminentia Dei, per ea quae sunt 
 magis manifesta ab ipso removeri. Haec autem sunt 
 corporalia. Com. on Lomb., I, Dis. 34, q. 3, a. 1. 
 
156 
 
 but it is a certain likeness of proportion, which 
 consists in the same relation of proportions, as 
 when we sa}- eight is to four as six is to three, 
 and the mayor is to the city what a pilot is to 
 a ship." 38 
 
 The attributes applied to God and creatures 
 have a relation of proportion we do not grasp 
 their full expression in the Divine Being, though 
 we seem to do so when they are found in 
 creatures. "When the name wise is applied 
 to a man, it in a way circumscribes and com- 
 prehends the thing signified, but not so in the 
 case of God, where the thing signified still 
 remains as uncomprehended and exceeding the 
 signification of the name/' 39 " Since God is His 
 being which no creature is," His relation to 
 being and all attributes differs from that of 
 creatures, "for what is in God simply and 
 immaterially is in the creature materiallv and 
 
 &s Quaedam similitude enim est per participationem 
 ejusdem forinae; et talis similitude non est corporalium 
 ad divina. Est etiam quaedam similitude proportional- 
 itatis: sicut se habent octo ad quattuor, ita sex ad tria 
 et sicut se habet gubernator ad navem. Ibid, ad 2. 
 
 39 Cum hoc noraen, sapiens, de homine dicitur, quodammodo 
 circumscribit et comprehendit rein significatam ; non autem 
 cum dicitur de Deo; sed relinquit rein siguificatam ut 
 incomprehensam et excedentem norninis significatam. Sum. 
 TheoL, I, q. 13, a. 5. 
 
I 
 
 157 
 
 manifoldly." 40 " It then follows that attributes 
 are applied to God and creatures according to 
 analogy, that is proportion. . . And thus what- 
 ever is said of God and creatures is said as there 
 is some relation of the creature to God as to a 
 principle and cause, in which preexist excellently 
 all the perfections of things. . . In those things 
 which are said analogically, there is not one 
 concept as in univocals, but the name \vhich is 
 used manifoldly signifies diverse proportions to 
 one thing." This proportion or relation of 
 objects in the analogical sense is not, as St. 
 Thomas points out, based on an agreement to 
 something distinct from the two objects related, 
 and which "must be something prior to both, 
 to which both are related," but is reference 
 based on something found in each, "where the 
 
 40 Deus autem alio modo se habet ad esse quam aliqua 
 alia creatura ; nam ipse est suum esse, quod nulli alii 
 creaturae competit. Cum quod in Deo est immaterialiter 
 et simpliciter, in creaturis sit materialiter et multipliciter. 
 Pot., q. 7, a. 7. 
 
 41 Dicendum est igitur quod hujusmodi noniina dicuntur de 
 Deo et creaturis, secutidum analogiam, id est proportionem. 
 . . Et sic quidquid dicitur de Deo et creaturis, dicitur secun- 
 dum quod est aliquis ordo creaturae ad Deum, ut ad princi- 
 pium ad causam, in quae praeexistunt excellenter onines 
 rerum perfectiones. . . Neque enim in his quae analogice 
 dicuntur, est una ratio, sicut est in univocis . . . sed nomen 
 quod sic multipliciter dicitur, significat diversas proportiones 
 ad aliquid unum. Sum. Theol., q. 13, a. 5. 
 
158 
 
 one is prior to the other." In God and creatures 
 the basis of analogy is the relation of cause and 
 effect " nothing is prior to God, and He is prior 
 to the creature." There is then a reason for 
 saying that "good and other qualities are pre- 
 dicated commonly of God and creatures," and 
 that is, because "the divine essence is the super- 
 excellent likeness of all things." 42 
 
 God as First Cause contains in absolute per- 
 fection the shado wings of Himself, yet St. 
 Thomas remarks that the unchangeableness of 
 God is not affected by this: for He is wise and 
 good and the like, antecedently and independently 
 of the existence of these qualities in creatures. 
 These predications are not simply a matter of 
 degree, nor yet do they wholly differ in kind ; 
 still we can see that we have a peculiar case 
 here in the relation of creatures to God. God 
 occupies a position that nothing else can occupy, 
 as regards what is known to us, and conse- 
 quently we are on solid ground while we mount 
 from human considerations to a knowledge of 
 the Divine. It is not hard for us if it is not 
 rather a necessity to admit that our feeble ut- 
 terances find a realization in God much beyond 
 
 42 Divina esseiitia est omnium rerum similitude superexcel- 
 leus. Et ex hoc inodo similitudinis contingit quod bonum et 
 hujustnodi praedicantur communiter Deo et creaturis. Pot., 
 q. 7, a. 7 ad 6. 
 
159 
 
 anything we can see here in creation, and that 
 the phrase, God is all this eminently, is happily 
 and suggestively chosen. On the strength of the 
 view of Aquinas just presented, the questions of 
 J. S. Mill may be understood at their true value. 
 "To say that God's goodness may be different 
 in kind from man's goodness, what is it but 
 saying, with a slight change of phraseology, that 
 God may possibly not be good?" And again, 
 "I will call no Being good, who is not what I 
 mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow 
 creatures." God is all that creatures are and 
 eminently more ; this method of eminence leads 
 us as near to a proper or quiddative concept of 
 God as we can reach. 
 
 We have then a right to attribute to God 
 certain qualities on the basis of creatures, 
 because there is some similarity between the 
 effects and their causes. The effects are many, 
 and thus offer various ways of approach to a 
 specification of our Idea of God. Moreover, the 
 nature of our intelligence is such that we can 
 not grasp the essence of anything at once, but 
 it is only by degrees that we arrive at a com- 
 plete knowledge of it, in so far as it is knowable 
 to us. This is all the more true in our dealings 
 with the nature of God we stammer rather 
 
 43 Quoted by Fiske, Outlines of Cosmic Phil., v. 2, p. 407. 
 
i6o- 
 
 than speak. Yet we must not forget, that 
 though our Conception of God is a human 
 concept, as all our concepts must be, yet it is 
 a true Concept of God, as far as we can attain 
 it. St. Thomas thus expresses this matter: 
 "Our intellect apprehends divine perfections in 
 the manner in which they exist in creatures, and 
 it names them as it apprehends them. In the 
 names, therefore, that we give to God we must 
 consider two things --the perfections themselves 
 that are signified, as gooodness, life, and so on, 
 and the manner of signifying them.' : The per- 
 fections themselves as perfections "are properly 
 applied to God, even more properly than to 
 creatures, and are predicated of Him with 
 priority", 44 since He is the Cause; but the 
 manner of predication depends on the nature 
 of our mind. This distinction seems to answer 
 fully the misgivings of Prof. Royce about the 
 adequacy of the treatment of St. Thomas 
 regarding the divine attributes. 45 " Our intellect 
 since it knows God from creatures, to under- 
 
 44 Intellectus auteui noster eo modo apprebendit eas secun- 
 dum quod sunt in creaturis ; et secundum quod apprehendit, 
 ita significat per nouiina. In nominibus igitur quae Deo 
 attribuimus, est duo considerare scilicet perfectiones ipsas 
 significatas, ut bonitatem, vitam et bujusmodi; et modum 
 significandi. Quantum igitur ad id quod significant bujus- 
 modi nomina pioprie competuut Deo, et niagis proprie quaru 
 ipsis creaturis; et per prius dicuntur de eo. Sum. TbeoL, 
 I. q. 13, a. 3. 
 
 * Cfr. pp. 30, 31. 
 
stand God, forms conceptions proportioned to 
 the perfections proceeding from God to creatures. 
 These perfections preexist in God unitedly and 
 simply, in creatures they are divided and mani- 
 fold . . . To the various and multiple concep- 
 tions of our intellect, there is but one principle, 
 altogether simple, imperfectly understood by 
 those conceptions." 46 This sounds like Anthro- 
 pomorphism. 
 
 In one sense, as so many Theists have pointed 
 out, all our knowledge is anthropomorphic, for the 
 simple reason that we must think as anthropoi, 
 as men. Martineau writes : " In everv doctrine 
 
 / 
 
 therefore, it is still from our microcosm that we 
 have to interpret the macrocosm ; and from the 
 type of our humanity as presented in self knowl- 
 edge, there is no more escape for the pantheist 
 or materialist than for the theist. Modify them 
 as you may, all causal conceptions are born 
 from within, as reflections or reductions of our 
 personal, animal, or physical activity : and the 
 severest science is in this sense, just as anthropo- 
 morphic as the most ideal theology." 47 Balfour, 
 contrasting Theology and Science, says, "for 
 controversial purposes it has been found con- 
 venient to dwell on the circumstance that our 
 idea of the Deity is to a certain extent necessarily 
 
 46 Sum. TheoL, I. q. 13, a. 3. 
 
 47 A Study of Religion, v. 1, p. 336. 
 
102 
 
 anthropomorphic while the no less certain, if 
 somewhat less obvious, truth that an idea of 
 the external world is also anthropomorphic, 
 does not supply any ready argumentative 
 weapon." 48 In this sense, our idea of God must 
 be anthropomorphic, and no one should be sur- 
 prised thereat. When, however, it is said we 
 transfer to God simply and without any modifi- 
 cation what we perceive in all experience, then 
 Anthropomorphism ceases to be tenable. 
 
 Spencer finds a gradually diminishing Anthro- 
 pomorphism in the history of religion, though, 
 to his mind, it is still very prominent. " Indeed 
 it seems somew r hat strange," he says, "that 
 men should suppose the highest worship to lie 
 in assimilating the object of their worship to 
 themselves. Not in asserting a transcendant 
 difference, but in asserting a certain likeness, 
 consists the element of their creed which thev 
 
 w 
 
 think essential." 19 We have already discussed 
 the nature of likeness or similarity. He goes on 
 to say, "It is still thought not only proper but 
 imperative to ascribe (to God) the most ab- 
 stract qualities of our nature. To think of the 
 Creative Power as in all respects anthropo- 
 morphous, is now considered impious by men 
 who yet hold themselves bound to think of the 
 
 48 Defence of Philosophic Doubt, c. 12, p. 244. 
 * First Prin., p. 109. 
 
163 
 
 Creative Power as in some respects anthropo- 
 morphous, and who do not see that the one 
 proceeding is but an evanescent form of the 
 other." This objection of Spencer is fully met 
 by the Canons of Attribution laid down by St. 
 Thomas, and especially, if we remember, that 
 Aquinas considers our knowledge, and chiefly 
 the principle of causality, as objective and 
 universal. 
 
 We certainly do ascribe to God "the most 
 abstract qualities of our nature", but we do 
 this in a way that removes all suspicion that 
 our Concept of God is not worthy of Him, 
 according to His manifestations to us. In brief, 
 by causality, we recognize God as containing 
 all the perfections that we perceive in His 
 works, by remotion or negation, we eliminate 
 all imperfections as found in their human 
 expression and arrive at a positive perfection, 
 and then we ascribe this perfection to God in 
 an eminent way --we say, it finds its realization 
 in Him in a manner proper to a self-existent 
 Being. This method avoids the charge of 
 Anthropomorphism which has been justly made 
 to those who have neglected it. "The omission 
 of careful treatment of the method of appli- 
 cation in the writings of many Englishmen who 
 
 40 Ibid., p. 110. 
 
164 
 
 belong to the Demonstrative School has laid 
 them fairly open to the charge of anthropo- 
 morphism.' 1 No true Theist would admit that 
 his Conception of God is anthropomorphic, 
 nothing is further from his mind than to con- 
 ceive God in this way; he must then seek a 
 form of presentation that will adequately 
 express the view he holds. All Theists, in a 
 way, betray signs of a proper conception, and 
 if one ventures to question the insufficiency or 
 incompleteness of their position by pointing out 
 lacunae, they immediately reply, what you 
 suggest is contained in my treatment. This 
 attitude was emphasized in the discussion that 
 followed Prof. Royce's lecture on The Concep- 
 tion of God, at the University of California. 
 God was discussed under the Attribute of 
 Omniscience. The criticism offered was, that 
 other and essential attributes of God were 
 ignored; Prof. Royce, in his reply, stated, that 
 these were implied. This is but an illustration 
 of the tendency to contract the Infinite and fit 
 It into a mould that will contain any idea we 
 choose to form of It. The desire for unity, for 
 an all-embracing unity is a worthy one, but 
 must not run counter to actual conditions. 02 We 
 
 61 Caldecott. The Phil of Rel. , p. 60. St. Thomas belongs 
 to the Demonstrative School. 
 
 62 Cfr. St. Thomas and Modern Thought, E. A. Pace, Cath. 
 Univ. Bulletin, v. 2. 
 
i6 5 - 
 
 do not wish to say that one can not confine 
 one's self to the discussion of a single attribute, 
 but one should not seek a rounded concept in 
 this way. It is contrary to the nature of our 
 mind, and it is unfair to the subject. 
 
 Prof. Royce at the end of his argument 
 claims that his position is essentially that of 
 St. Thomas. The method, I think, is the same, 
 granting the basis on which it rests, but the 
 completed Concept is entirely different. As far 
 as the single attribute Omniscience is concerned , 
 from the author's premises, no fault is to be 
 found with it, and, though rigorously speaking, 
 it contains the other attributes, it is not 
 satisfying to rest in it as there set forth. We 
 propose, therefore, to present briefly the most 
 important and essential attributes of God as 
 found in Aquinas, and show how his Theory 
 of Knowledge and Canons of Attribution are 
 made use of in attaining these, and the result 
 will be the rounded Concept of God according 
 to St. Thomas. 
 
 SECTION IV. APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES. 
 
 The Concept of the Infinite. It was the sup- 
 posed inadequacy of finite things to lead to a 
 concept of the Infinite, that gave birth to Onto- 
 logism, which posits an immediate vision or 
 intuition of Ged. The formation of this and 
 
i66 
 
 other concepts brings out clearly the need of a 
 well-defined and consistent theory of knowledge, 
 as well as the demand for methods that make 
 for a legitimate application of the theory. " Our 
 intellect in understanding, reaches to the infinite; 
 as evidence we have the fact, for any given finite 
 quantity, it can think a greater. This tendency 
 of the intellect, would be in vain, were there not 
 some infinite intelligible thing. There must then 
 be some infinite intelligible thing which must be 
 the greatest of things; and this we call God. 
 Again, the effect cannot extend beyond its cause. 
 But our intellect can only come from God, who 
 is the First Cause of all, therefore our intellect 
 cannot think anything greater than God. If 
 therefore we think something greater than every 
 finite, it follows that God is not finite." This is 
 not the argument of St. Anselm, for its basis is 
 the relation of cause and effect. Thus from finite 
 things, from effects, through the operation of 
 our intellect, we reach the Infinite. 
 
 How can finite things lead to the Infinite? 
 Are we not simply piling finite upon finite as 
 Locke held, and at most landing at the indefinite 
 with a 'something beyond '? We cannot actually 
 know infinite quantity, because "we could only 
 understand it by receiving part after part . . . 
 
 1 C. 6?., 1. 1, c. 43. 
 
I6 7 
 
 and thus the infinite could not be known unless 
 we enumerated all its parts, which is impossi- 
 ble." 2 This is not the idea of the infinite applied 
 to God, for "God is not called Infinite privatively 
 as quantity." Here enters the idea of matter 
 and form, implying perfection and imperfection. 
 "A thing is called infinite because it is not finite. 
 Matter is made finite in a way through form, 
 and form through matter. . . Matter is perfected 
 through the form by which it is made finite, 
 and thus the infinite as attributed to matter has 
 the concept of the imperfect, for it is as matter 
 -without form. But form is not perfected through 
 matter, but rather its amplitude is restricted, 
 whence the infinite considered from the side of 
 form not determined by matter has the concept 
 of the perfect." God then "is not called Infinite 
 
 2 (Infinitum) non potest intelligi nisi accipiendo pattern 
 post partem . . . et sic infinitum cognosci non posset actu, 
 nisi omnes partes ejus numerarentur ; quod est impossible. 
 Sum. Theol., I. q. 86, a. 2. 
 
 3 Infinitum dicitur aliquid ex eo quod non est finitum. 
 Finitur autem quodammodo et materia per formam, et forma 
 per materiam. . . Materia autem perficitur per formam per 
 quam finitur ; et ideo infinitum secundum quod attribuitur 
 materiae, habet rationem imperfecti ; est enim quasi ma- 
 teria non habens formam. Forma autem non perficitur per 
 materiam magis per earn ejus amplitude contrahitur ; unde 
 infinitum, secundum quod se tenet ex parte formae non 
 determinatae per materiam, habet rationem perfecti. Sum. 
 Theol., I. q. 7, a. 1. 
 
i68 
 
 privatively as quantity, for the infinite of this 
 nature is reasonbly unknown, because it is as 
 matter without form, which is the principle of 
 knowledge. But He is called Infinite negatively, 
 as form per se subsisting, not limited through 
 receiving matter.' 1 "The formal Infinite, which is 
 God, is known in Himself, but unknown to us on 
 account of the defect of our intellect, which in our 
 present condition has a natural aptitude to 
 know material things. And thus now we can 
 know God only through material effects." The 
 difficulty arising from the disproportion of the 
 finite and the infinite is answered on the basis of 
 analogy or proportion, in as far as " proportion 
 signifies some relation of one to another, either 
 of matter to form or of cause to effect. Thus 
 nothing forbids a proportion of the creature to 
 God according to the relation of the understand- 
 ing to the understood, as also according to the 
 relation of the effect to the cause." 6 We might 
 recall here the principle of knowledge, that the 
 species is not the thing known primarily, but the 
 object which it represents. It is finite of course, 
 
 4 C. G., 1. 3, c. 54. 
 
 5 Infinilum autem formale, quod est ,Deus, est secundum se 
 notum ; ignotum autem quoad nos, propter defectum intel- 
 lectus nostri qui secundum statutu praesentis vitae habet 
 naturalem aptitudiriem ad materialia cognoscenda. Sum. 
 TheoL, I. q. 87, a. 2. ad 1. 
 
 C. G., 1. 3, c. 54. 
 
i6g 
 
 but it contains the object, the infinite, in the 
 imperfect and negative way that we know it, 
 and in so far gives us a true concept. The con- 
 cept is positive also, though it is reached by way 
 of remotion. Moreover, we see evidence here of 
 the principle of knowledge that all things are 
 known according to the nature of the knower. 
 We know God in our finite way, but the object 
 known is the Infinite represented by the species. 
 The ideas in this concept are matter and form, 
 imperfection and perfection. God is pure form 
 without any matter, He is therefore perfect, 
 infinitely perfect. We can know Him as infinite 
 however, only through objects that have a 
 material covering. We remove this material 
 covering by abstraction and negation, and then 
 we arrive at an idea of God under one aspect, 
 that of Infinite Perfection. 
 
 God is Omniscient. Since " God is in the height 
 of immateriality, it follows that he is on the 
 summit of cognition." We have seen the 
 position of immateriality in the theory of 
 knowledge, it is the basis of knowledge for the 
 knower and the known. "The immaterialitv 
 
 j 
 
 of a thing is the reason of its knowableness, 
 and the degree of knowledge depends on the 
 degree of immateriality." The discussion of 
 
 7 Immaterialitas alicujus rei est ratio quod sit cognoscitiva; 
 et secundum modum immaterialitatis est modus cognitionis. 
 Sum. Theol. I. q. 14, a. 1. 
 
170 
 
 the Infinite showed that God was pure form, 
 and hence wholly immaterial, and thus infinitely 
 knowable and knowing. " We find in the \vorld 
 many things moving through intelligence, it is 
 then impossible that the Prime Mover be with- 
 out intellect." Again, irrational objects tend 
 toward ends, and this is not by chance, hence 
 this 'end must be given them by another who 
 is the founder of nature . . . but he could not 
 give a purpose to nature unless he were intelli- 
 gent." God's knowledge and that of man 
 differ. "Man has diverse cognitions according 
 to the objects known-.". His knowledge is 
 successive, and admits of varying degrees of 
 certitude, which he expresses by various names, 
 as wisdom, intelligence, and the like. In God 
 there is but a simple cognition to which we 
 can apply these different names, yet in such a 
 manner "that from each of them as they are 
 used for divine predications we exclude what is 
 of imperfection in it, and retain only \vhat is 
 of perfection." "Everything that pertains to 
 
 8 C. G., 1. 1, c44. 
 
 9 Ibid., c. 56. 
 
 10 Homo autem secundum diversa cognita, habet diversas 
 cognitiones . . . Unde simplex Dei cognitio omnibus istis 
 nominibus nominari potest ; ita tatnen quod ab unoquoque 
 eorum, secundum quod in divinam praedicatiouem venit, 
 secludatur quidquid imperfectionis est, et retineatur quidquid 
 perfectionis est. Sum. Theol., I. q. 14, a. 1 ad 2. 
 
the imperfect mode proper to the creature must 
 be excluded from the meaning of the name." 
 God is not simply intelligent, but He knows all 
 things at once; "every intellect that under- 
 stands one thing after another, is sometimes 
 potentially intelligent and sometimes actually . . 
 But the Divine Intellect is never potentially, but 
 always actually intelligent, hence it does not 
 understand things successively, but it under- 
 stands all things at once." Prof. Royce says, 
 the Being that is Omniscient "would behold 
 answered, in the facts present to his experience, 
 all rational, all logically possible questions. 
 That is, for him, all genuinely significant, all 
 truly thinkable ideas \vould be seen as truly 
 fulfilled, and fulfilled in his own experience." 
 Again, "His experience then, would form one 
 w r hole, but the whole as such would fulfil 
 an all-embracing unity, a single system of 
 ideas." But in w r hat way is He all this ? Here 
 Prof. Royce goes astray. It is true he admits, 
 that God has "richer ideas than our fragments 
 of thoughts"; and he also truly remarks, "these 
 things, w^herein we taste the bitterness of our 
 finitude, are what they are because they mean 
 
 11 Quandocumque nomen sumptum a quacumque perfec- 
 tione creaturae Deo attribuitur, secludatur ab ejus signifi- 
 catione omne illud quod pertinet ad imperfectum modum 
 qui competit creaturae. Ibid., ad 1. 
 
 12 C. G., 1. 1, c. 56. 13 Loc. cit., p. 10. 
 
- 172 
 
 more than they contain, imply what is beyond 
 them, refuse to exist by themselves, and at the 
 very moment of confessing their own fragmen- 
 tary falsity assure us of the reality of that 
 fulfilment which is the life of God." 14 We can 
 not, however, admit his statement when he 
 enters into details, for he seems to find realized 
 in his Omniscient Being things that St. Thomas 
 was careful to exclude, by his method of remo- 
 tion. The absence of this discrimination leads 
 Prof. Royce to say, "the total limitation, the 
 fragmentariness, the ignorance, the error, yes 
 (as forms or cases of ignorance and error), the 
 evil, the pain, the horror, the longing, the 
 travail, the faith, the devotion, the endless 
 flight from its own worthlessness, that con- 
 stitutes the very essence of the world of finite 
 experience, is, as a positive reality somewhere 
 so experienced in its wholeness that this entire 
 constitution of the finite appears as a world 
 beyond which in its whole constitution, nothing 
 exists or can exist." "Evil, pain, horror", 
 are not known as a "positive reality" for they 
 are negations and imperfections, and hence find 
 no place in God except through a knowledge 
 of their opposites "because God knows bona 
 He also knows mala", for evil is "privatio 
 
 14 Ibid., pp. 14, 15. 
 16 Ibid., pp. 46, 47. 
 
173 
 
 boni". 16 All imperfection and limitation must 
 be removed from the Omniscient, the above 
 quotation limits the Omniscient to the sole 
 experience of the finite in its entirety, " beyond 
 which, in its whole constitution, nothing exists 
 or can exist." We have then in the Concept 
 of the Omniscient according to St. Thomas, the 
 ideas of immateriality and actuality, the requi- 
 sites for knower and known. Our knowledge 
 is perfect as it approximates to the full 
 expression of these qualities ; we know only 
 through material conditions, we remove these 
 and arrive at a knower, who, because He is 
 on the apex of immateriality, is likewise on the 
 summit of cognition. 
 
 God is Omnipotent. This attribute is but the 
 extension of the action of the will. Apart from 
 the identity of all perfection in God, St. Thomas 
 frequently unites the ideas of intelligence and 
 power. "Power is not attributed to God as 
 something really different from His knowledge 
 and will, only conceptually; power means the 
 principle of executing the command of the will 
 and the direction of the intelligence. These three 
 are one in God." 17 Practically the same reasons 
 
 16 Sum. TheoL, I. q. 14, a. 10. 
 
 17 Potentia non ponitur in Deo ut aliquid differens a scientia 
 et a voluntate, secundum rem; sed solum secundum rationem; 
 inquantum scilicet potentia import ,t rationern principii ex- 
 
174- 
 
 that lead us to ascribe Omniscience to God lead 
 us to attribute Omnipotence to Him. We see the 
 evidence of will in rational creatures, and we 
 see the natural inclination of all things to an 
 end ; the short-comings and imperfections mani- 
 fested in our endeavors, for we are often 
 thwarted and only attain success by overcom- 
 ing obstacles, bring us to a will where all this 
 is absent, and where execution is co-extensive 
 \vith rational determination. The idea of cause 
 runs though the whole presentation of this at- 
 tribute, and thus largely repeats what we have 
 already said. " It is further manifest that every- 
 thing according to its actuality and perfection 
 is the active principle of something. . . God is 
 pure act and simply and universally perfect, nor is 
 there any imperfection in Him. . . In God there- 
 fore, is the highest power." 18 God is a cause 
 that the effect cannot fully express, as we saw in 
 the discussion of similitude. "God is not a uni- 
 vocal agent, for nothing agrees with Him 
 
 18 Manifestum est enini unuraquodque secundum quod est 
 actu et perfectum, secundum hoc est principium activuni ali- 
 cujus. Deus est purus actus, et simpliciter et universaliter 
 perfectus, neque in eo aliqua imperfectio locuin habet. Unde 
 maxime ei competit esse principium activum, et nullo modo 
 pati. Ibid., q. 25, a. 1. 
 
 equentis id quod voluutas imperat, et ad quod scientia diri- 
 git. Quae tria Deo secuudurn idem couveniunt. Sum. Tbeol., 
 I. q. 25, a. 1 ad 4. 
 
175- 
 
 specifically or generically. . . But the power of 
 a non-univocal agent is not wholly expressed 
 in the production of its effect." Thus effects 
 or creation do not express the limit of His 
 power, for there is nothing to contrain Him 
 to this full expression. We have then, a concep- 
 tion of free, infinite powder, arrived at from a 
 consideration of limited and imperfect power 
 here below. The limitations are removed and 
 we have Omnipotence. 
 
 God is a Person. The attribution of Person- 
 ality to God sums up briefly the whole method 
 of divine predication according to St. Thomas. 
 " Person means what is perfect in all nature, 
 viz., subsistence in a rational nature. Whence, 
 since whatever partakes of perfection is to be 
 attributed to God because His essence contains 
 all perfection in itself, it is proper that this name 
 person be predicated of God, but not in the same 
 manner as it is said of creatures, but in a more 
 excellent way." The word person is not given 
 
 19 Deus non est agens univocum. Nihil enim aliud potest 
 cum eo convenire neque in specie, neque in genere. . . Sed 
 poteutia agentis non univoci non tota manifestatur in sui 
 effectus productione. Ibid., a. 2 ad 2. 
 
 20 Persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota 
 natura; scilicet subsistens in rational! natura. Unde cum 
 omne illud quod est perfeciionis Deo sit attribuendum, eo 
 quod ejus essentia continet in se omnem perfectionem, con- 
 veniens est ut hoc nomen persona de Deo dicatur ; non tamen 
 eodem modo quo dicitur de creaturis, sed excellentiori modo. 
 Ibid., q. 29, a. 3. 
 
176 
 
 more prominence specifically in the writings of 
 Aquinas, for the simple reason that its com- 
 ponent elements intelligence and will are fully 
 treated by him. He answers an objection to the 
 effect that this name person is not applied to 
 God in the Scriptures, by saying there was no 
 need of the word until the idea it stood for was 
 called in question. This name is especially ap- 
 propriate to God "since to subsist in a rational 
 nature is great dignity." 21 The terms of the 
 definition given by Boetius, adopted and ex- 
 plained by St. Thomas person is the individual 
 substance of a rational'nature are realized in 
 God. Individual means one, distinct from others; 
 substance means existence per se, no need of any 
 other for its existence; rational nature means 
 intelligible nature in general, not the discursive 
 way of reasoning of our intelligence. In this 
 light, the definition is perfectly valid, receiving 
 confirmation from the various elements that 
 compose it. Today it would be interesting to 
 show in the light of psychological experiment 
 that personality is actually a perfection. I do 
 not think the above definition would need modi- 
 fication as giving the essentials of the concep- 
 tion, though it is possible that certain qualities 
 
 21 Magnae dignitatis est in rational! natura subsistere. . . 
 Sed dignitas divinae excedit omnem dignitatem; et secundum 
 hoc maxima competit Deo nomen personae. Ibid., ad 2. 
 
177 
 
 usually attributed to personality would be 
 shown to rest on a less secure basis than is 
 ordinarily supposed. As yet there is no decided 
 case even against any of these, such as unity, 
 permanence, and the like. 22 Mr. Bradley has a 
 bit of reasoning, on the subject of personality, 
 that is after the fashion of Aquinas. "The 
 Absolute, though known, is higher, in a sense, 
 than our experience and knowledge ; and in this 
 connection I will ask if it has personality. . . 
 We can answer in the affirmative or negative 
 according to its meaning. Since the Absolute 
 has everything, it of course must possess person- 
 ality. And if by personality we are to under- 
 stand the highest form of finite spiritual 
 development, then certainly in an eminent degree 
 the Absolute is personal. For the higher (we 
 may repeat) is always the more real. And, since 
 in the Absolute the very lowest modes of expe- 
 rience are not lost, it seems even absurd to raise 
 such a question about personality." Thus, 
 again, this concept is derived from what we 
 perceive in rational creatures ; we eliminate its 
 imperfection as there found, and in the refined 
 condition we attribute it to God. "This name 
 person is not proper to God, if we consider 
 whence the name arises, but if we consider what 
 
 22 Cfr. Piat, La Personne Humaine. 
 
 23 Appearance and Reality, p. 531. 
 
the name signifies it is highly proper to 
 God." 24 
 
 We might go through the whole series of at- 
 tributes as found in St. Thomas, and we should 
 note the same principles operating through all. 
 When w^e considered the proofs for God's exist- 
 ence w r e arrived at five aspects of God, and we 
 have just considered a few more in detail to 
 illustrate his method and to- show how r con- 
 sistent he is throughout the long and difficult 
 handling of the Conception of God as known by 
 us. Yet did we follow this discussion to its end, 
 prolong it as we would, the final outcome \vould 
 not be a strictly proper or adequate concept of 
 God. We should only know God in a way, 
 though our knowledge would be real and 
 thorough to that extent a fact long ago 
 pointed out by St.Chrysostom, and valid against 
 Agnosticism. A partial knowledge, says he, is 
 not absolute ignorance, nor is relative ignorance 
 the absolute absence of knowledge. 13 We can 
 designate at most, the lines along \vhich our 
 endeavors are to move in forming as perfect a 
 Concept of God as is in our power. These have 
 
 24 Quamvis hoc iiomen, persona, nou conveniat Deo quan- 
 tum ad id a quo inipositum, est nomen; tamen quantum ad id 
 ad quod significandum imponitur, maxime Deo convenit. 
 Sum. Theol., I, q. 29, a. 3 ad 2. 
 
 2i Com. in Mattb., 21: 23. 
 
179 
 
 been well expressed by Hontheim. To form a 
 concept of God it is sufficient: a) to have the 
 things of the world, from which we can conceive 
 perfection in general, and single perfections in 
 particular; b) to have a faculty of the mind to 
 overcome contradictory notions, by which we 
 can conceive individual perfections, denying the 
 conjoined imperfection, by which especially we 
 can think of them without limit, as infinite; c) 
 that we can unite into one notion the perfections 
 thus conceived. 26 These are the principles of 
 Aquinas that we have tried to set forth in our 
 presentation. He follows them out faithfully, 
 and accepts the conclusion they offer. The con- 
 cept is analogous, derived through a species or 
 similitude that reflects God mediately. All 
 knowledge is through species, but we have no 
 immediate species of God, hence, strictly, no 
 proper or quiddative concept, for a concept of 
 this nature should agree alone with the object 
 it represents. 
 
 St. Thomas then, not without meaning, gives 
 as the most appropriate name of God Qui Est. 
 He gives his reasons for this attitude ; they are 
 taken from the meaning of the phrase, from its 
 universality, and from its co-signification. "It 
 does not mean any form, but being itself, and 
 
 26 Theodicea, p. 19. 
 
i8o 
 
 since the Being of God is His essence, which is 
 proper to no other, it is manifest that among 
 other names, this especially names God properly, 
 for everything is named from its form." 27 All 
 other names "determine God in a way, but our 
 intellect can not know God at present as He 
 is in se." Finally, this phrase means "esse in 
 praesenti, and thus is properly applied to 
 God, for His Being knows neither past nor 
 
 / 
 
 future." 29 This phrase Qui Est is the proper 
 Concept of God considered in Himself, since He 
 alone is sell-existent Being, and all else depend- 
 ent, created existence; but this concept does not 
 say enough for us as it stands ; it is truly 
 comprehensive of all the attributes we can con- 
 ceive of God, yet not satisfying to us. There is a 
 two-fold tendency of the human mind the one 
 to contraction and the other to expansion. 
 We desire to press into as small a compass as 
 possible the greatest amount of matter, and 
 thus we seek for a telling phrase and an all- 
 embracing idea. The other tendency asserts 
 itself when we seek to know to its fullest the 
 subject we are handling. \\'e use every available 
 
 27 Non euiin significat formani aliquani, sed ipsuni esse. 
 Unde cum esse Dei sit ipsa ejus essentia, et hoc nulli alii 
 conveniat, mauifestum est quod inter alia nomina hoc niaxime 
 proprie nominal Deuni. Unumquodque enini denominator a 
 sua forma. Sum. Thc.ol , I. q. 13, a. 11. 
 
 88 Ibid. 3y Ibid. 
 
means to make it yield all that it contains, we 
 
 / 
 
 analyze it thoroughly. St. Thomas has recog- 
 nized both these tendencies in the question of 
 God. He has given us the short phrases Actus 
 Purus, Omnino Imrnutabilis, Qui Est; but know- 
 ing how little these convey to our minds as they 
 stand, he has subjected them to a careful and 
 detailed analysis with the result that we have 
 tried to express. "God considered in Himself is 
 altogether one and simple, but still our intellect 
 knows Him according to diverse conceptions, 
 because it cannot see Him as He is in Him- 
 self." 30 We shall then follow the lead of our 
 intelligence at work on created things and 
 arrive at the varied and full number of perfec- 
 tions they mirror forth, for they are but 
 ambassadors of a King whose riches they 
 can not fully portray; and the result of 
 it all will be a Concept, showing, that "God is 
 One, Simple, Perfect, Infinite, Intelligent, and 
 Willing/ 
 
 31 
 
 30 Deus autem in se consideratus est omnino unus et sim- 
 plex, sed tamen intellectus noster secundum diversas concep- 
 tiones ipsuin cognoscit ; eo quod non potest ipsum, ut in 
 seipso est, videre. Ibid,, I, q. 13, a. 12. 
 
 31 Opus. 2. 
 
i8 3 - 
 
 EPILOGUE. 
 
 It has been well said that Agnosticism is 
 rather a mental attitude than a doctrine. There 
 is so much truth in it, and it enters so largely 
 into the actual state of our cognitions, that 
 it is unfortunate that it should have set itself 
 to combat ex professo the limited knowledge 
 that it is our portion to attain and possess. 
 Its position, however, is not legitimate, and the 
 human mind will hold all the more tenaciously 
 to its birthright, because it is so meagre, and 
 still more because there are men leagued to 
 wrest this little from it. And yet Agnostics 
 themselves lay claim to a great store of knowl- 
 edge, quite sufficient to destroy their profession 
 of ignorance. There is some truth in the state- 
 ment of Ladd: "A more stupendous system of 
 alleged cognitions that have absolute value, and 
 that concern ultimate and permanent entities 
 and unalterable truths, has never been put 
 forth by any reflective mind than the system 
 issued under the cover of this agnosticism. ' : A 
 definition of terms would go a great way in 
 
 1 Phil, of Knowledge, p. 592. 
 
184- 
 
 giving the true position of the limits of our 
 knowledge. 
 
 We find it frequently stated in Theistic presen- 
 tations that the manifestation of the Creator 
 in His works is of such a nature that a further 
 knowledge of Him through another source, 
 namely, Revelation, is almost a necessary 
 consequence. In fact, Prof. Flint devotes a 
 chapter in his work on Theism, to discussing 
 w^hat he calls the Insufficiency of Mere Theism. 
 St. Thomas also advocates the moral necessity 
 of Revelation in arguments that have become 
 commonplaces in Apologetics. The knowledge 
 of God is 'the result of a studious inquiry' 
 that most men can not undertake either on 
 account of their "natural indisposition to 
 know", their occupations in life, or indolence, 
 since the "consideration of almost the whole 
 of philosophy is related to the knowledge of 
 God." Moreover, this would be a lifelong 
 quest, and even then "on account of the weak- 
 ness of our intellect in judging, error is generally 
 found in the investigation of human reason.' 
 
 Therefore the Divine Clemency has fruitfully 
 provided, that even those things that reason 
 can investigate, be held by faith; and thus all 
 men can easily become partakers of divine 
 knowledge, without doubt and without error." 
 
 2 C. G., 1. 1. c. 4. 
 
Revelation gives us a firmer and more extended 
 knowledge than we can attain to by the simple 
 light of reason. Yet St. Thomas finds the gift 
 of Revelation very inadequate to exhaust the 
 knowledge we can have of God. 
 
 We have seen how St. Thomas held that all 
 men have a knowledge of God in confuso, in 
 the sense explained; they ascend to a higher 
 knowledge through Demonstration, which is 
 still very imperfect ; Revelation adds its portion, 
 and still, to the mind of Aquinas, we are far 
 from being satisfied. Man craves for more 
 knowledge, he is longing for a view that will 
 end his desires while it will not cease to employ 
 his knowing power. This satisfaction and 
 reposeful mental activity can only find a home 
 in the presence of the Power that implanted this 
 unrest in man. " We, in as far as we know that 
 God exists, and other facts already presented, 
 are not quieted in desire, but \ve desire yet to 
 know God in His essence", 3 we seek His Face. 
 St. Thomas then concludes that man's ultimate 
 happiness is to know God. Ultimate happiness 
 is to be sought in the operation of the intellect 
 alone, since no desire leads to such a height as 
 the desire of understanding the truth. All our 
 desires, whether of pleasure or any kind what- 
 
 ' 
 3 C. G., 1. 3, c. 50. 
 
i86- 
 
 soever, can not rest in aught else. But the 
 desire of truth is not satisfied till it reach the 
 highest Source and Author of all." 
 
 We noted before that in the system of Aquinas 
 God is the Creator and End of Man. The 
 imperfection of our knowledge, and the desire 
 we have for a more and more perfect knowl- 
 edge, opens out the prospect of another life to 
 Aquinas, where the God we kno\v so little about 
 at present will be known as the Infinite, All- 
 embracing Reality that will give us not only 
 intellectual peace, but will spread before us 
 riches now unknown. Aquinas then justly 
 remarks, "let those blush who seek the 
 happiness oi man, so highly placed, in lower 
 things." 5 
 
 4 C G., 1. 3, c. 50. 
 
 5 C. G., 1. 3. c. 49. 
 
-i8 7 - 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 WORKS OF ST. THOMAS. 
 
 SUMMA THEOLOGICA. Pars Prima, Questions 2-26, 44-49. 
 (Commentaries of Cajetan and Capreolus). 
 
 SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES. Books i; 2, cc. 1-27; 4, 17-25, 49-76. 
 (Commentary of Ferrariensis). 
 
 COMMENTARY ON THE SENTENCES OF THE LOMBARD. Book i. 
 
 QUAESTIONES DlSPUTATAE : 
 
 De Potentia Dei, articles n. 
 
 De Creatione, articles 19. 
 
 De Simplicitate Divinae Essentiae, articles n. 
 
 De His Quae Dicuntur De Deo, articles 4. 
 
 DE VERITATE : 
 
 Ouaestiones : i. De Veritate, articles 12. 
 
 2. De Scientia Dei, articles 15. 
 
 3. De Ideis, articles 8. 
 
 5. De Providentia, articles 10. 
 10. De Mente, articles 13. 
 
 OPUSCULA : 
 
 13. De Differentia Divini Verbi et Humani. 
 
 14. De Natura Verbi Intellects. 
 
 2. Compendium Theologiae ad Fratrem Regiualdum. 
 
 42. De Potentiis Animae. 
 
 51. De Intellectu et Intelligibili. 
 
 68. Super Librum De Trinitate. 
 
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i88 
 
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189 
 
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 FEI.DNER. Die sogenannte Aseitas Gottes als konstitutives 
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FENELON. Traite* de 1'existence de Dieu. 1872. 
 
 FLINT, R. Theism. Scribner. 1896. yth Edition. Anti- 
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 FRASER, A. C. Philosophy of Theism. Scribner, 1896. 
 
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 GOBBET D'ALVIELA. L'Idee de Dieu. Paris. 1892. 
 
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 HEBERT M. La Derniere Idole. Etude sur La "Person- 
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193- 
 
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 HONTHEIM. Institutiones Theodicaeae. 1893. 
 HUGONIN, MON. Dieu est-il inconnaissable? Annal. de Phil. 
 
 Chret., 1894, 129-145, 217-233; 1895, 409-439- Les At- 
 
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 HUMPHREY. His Divine Majesty, or the Living God. Lon- 
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 ILLINGWORTH J. R. Personality Human and Divine. New 
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 KATHOLIK, DER. Die Lehre des hi. Thomas iiber Gott. v. 
 29, 26-42, 167-180, 291-308; v. 30, 316-336. Die Erkenn- 
 barkeit Gottes nach der Lehre des hi. Thomas von Aquin. 
 v. 83, 242-257. 
 
 KERNAERET DE. La preuve de 1' existence de Ditu par le 
 mouvemeut. Annal. de Phil. Chret., 1887, 64-75. 
 
 KNIGHT, W. Aspects of Theism. 1893. 
 
 LADD, G. T. Philosophy of Knowledge, c. 21, Knowledge 
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 LECLERE. Examen critique des preuves classiques de 1'ex- 
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 LEIGHTON, J. A. Typical Modern Conceptions of God. New 
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 LILLY, W. S. The Great Enigma. New York. 1892. 
 
 MAISONNEUVE, L. La personnalit humaine et les theories 
 contemporaines. Annal. de Phil. Chret., 1894, 65-88, 163- 
 178. 
 
 MARTINEAU, J. A Study of Religion. New York. 1888, 2 
 vols. Essays, v. i, cc. 3, 4, 5. 
 
 MILL, J. S. Three Essays on Religion. 
 
 MONTH. Material Analogies in the Supernatural Order, v. 
 53. 529-538. 
 
 ORMOND, A. T. Some Aspects of Theistic Logic. Christian 
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 PEGUES. Theologie thomiste d'apres Capreolus. Revue 
 Thomiste. v. 8. Pouvons-nous sur cette terre arriver 
 connaitre Dieu? 50-77. De la voie rationelle qui nous 
 conduit a Dieu. 288-310. L'ide'e de Dieu en nous. 505-531. 
 
 PESCH, T. Die grossen Weltrathsel. Freiburg, 1884. 2 vols. 
 
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 615-623. 
 
 RASHDAU,. Personality, Human and Divine, c. VIII. in 
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 ROYCE, J. The Conception of God. New York. 1898. 
 
 SCHELI,, H. Der Gottesbegriff in Katholizismus and Pro- 
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 SCHNEIDER, C. M. Das Wissen Gottes nach der Lehre des 
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 SERTii,i,ANGES. Preuve de 1'existence de Dieu et I'eternite' 
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 SETH, A. Two Lectures on Theism. New York, 1897. 
 
 SHANAHAN, E. T. John Fiske on the Idea of God. Cath. 
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 VAN WEDDIGEN. Philosophic de S. Anselme. c. IV. 
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 INDEX OF NAMES. 
 
 Albert the Great, 21, 26, 27 
 Alexander of Hales, 21 
 Angel of the Schools, cfr. St. 
 
 Thomas 
 
 Anselm, St., 21, 101, 102, 104 
 Aquinas, passim 
 Areopagite, 19 
 Aristotle, 19, 25, 27, 38, 85 
 Augustine, St., 7, 19 
 
 Balfour, iCi 
 Berkeley, 70 
 Bernard of Tours, 24 
 P.oedder, 138 
 Boethius 19, 20, 176 
 Bunaventure, St , 21 
 Bowne, 151 
 Bradley, 6, i, 77 
 
 Caldecott, 6, 90, 129, 149,164 
 
 Capreolus, 7 
 
 Carus, 8, 9 
 
 Chry sos torn, St., 178 
 
 David of Dinant, 24 
 
 Democritus, 38 
 
 Descartes, 28, 69, 101 
 
 Dewey, 27 
 
 DeWulf, 21, 22 
 
 Dionysius the Areopagite, 
 
 19, 20 
 Driscoll, no 
 
 Epicurus, 39 
 Erigena, 21, 24 
 Eucken, 26, 29 
 
 Farges, 66 
 Fiske, 147, [59 
 
 Flint 133, 134, 184 
 Froschaminer, 31 
 
 Gardair, 66 
 Gioberti, 136 
 Giinther, 31 
 
 Hamilton, 79, 8 1 
 Hanne, 114 
 Harris, 23, 26 
 Hegel, TOI 
 Hermes, 31 
 
 Hontheim, 113, 114, 179 
 Hume, 79, 85 
 Huxley, 128, 129 
 
 Janet et Seailles, 3, 23 
 Jourdain, 16 
 
 Kant, 28, 29, 72, 73, 76, 78, 
 
 79, 85, TOI, 105, iT 9 , 133 
 Kleutgen, 84 
 
 Ladd, 2, 39, 59, 67, 80, 82, 
 
 T54- '83 
 
 Leibniz, 101, 102, 103 
 Leo, Pope, 28 
 Lindsay, 22, 27, 39 
 Locke, 101, 166 
 
 Malebranche, 136 
 Mansel, 153 
 Martineau, 161 
 Mill, J. S., 79, 82, 159 
 
 Pace, 164 
 Paulsen, 5, 29 
 Pegues, 7 
 Peillaube, 67 
 
196 
 
 
 Fiat, 78, 177 
 
 Plato, 19, 43, 44, 45, 5', 58, 
 
 76 
 
 Portmann, 16 
 Prantl, 26 
 Proclus, 45 
 
 Raymond of Pennafort, St., 
 
 12 
 
 Reginald, 16 
 Rosmini, 136 
 Royce, 6, 27, 30, 98, 160, 164, 
 
 165, 171, 172 
 
 Scotus Erigena, 21 
 
 Sertillanges, 128 
 Setb, 68, 69, 132 
 Spencer, 5, 79, 82, 130, 131, 
 
 136, 146, M7, 151, 153. 154, 
 
 162, 163 
 
 Spinoza, 28, 101 
 Straub, 81 
 
 Turner, 4 
 Ueberweg, 24 
 
 Werner, 10, n, 14, 15, 16, 20 
 Windelband, 25, 26, 39 
 
197 
 
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 Absolute, how understood, 151-154. 
 Abstraction in knowledge, 60 62. 
 Agnosticism, 120, 129, 136, 147, 153, 178, 183. 
 Analogy, 87-91; predication by, 149-150, 154-158. 
 Anthropomorphism, 149, 161. 
 Aristotelianism, 23, 25. 
 Assimilation in knowledge, 34, 35, 36, 45. 
 
 Attributes, how predicated of God, 149-150, 154-158; how they 
 differ, 154; of God, how attained, 179; Infinite, 165169; 
 Omniscient, 169-173; Omnipotent, 173-175: Personal, 175- 
 178; Unchangeable; 151- 152; Absolute, 153-154. 
 
 Canons of Attribution, 148, 165. 
 
 Cause, First, 108, 112; misapprehensions of, 125; nature of, 
 125-127; two views of, 127; two factors in formation of 
 concept of , 109; infinite series, 127-129. 
 
 Causality, not treated especially by Aquinas, 83-85: how idea 
 of, acquired, 84-85; division of, 85; efficient, 86, 116-117, 
 125; similarity in, 86-89; known by effects, 81, 89-92; 
 principle of, 119; exemplar cause, 121; its knowledge 
 power, 124. 
 
 Cognition, cfr. Knowledge. 
 
 Commentary on the Lombard, outline of, 14. 
 
 Compendium Theologiae, outline of, 16. 
 
 Conception of God defined, 119-120. 
 
 Conceptualism, 67. 
 
 Demonstration, a priori, a posteriori, 106; God known by, 107. 
 
 Dogmatism, 67, 
 
 Dualism of Arabians, 24. 
 
 Eclecticism, 21. 
 
 Existence of God, 97; relation of conception or nature of God 
 to, 97; not known per se, 99-101; not by Ontological 
 Argument, loi; known by demonstration, 106; by mani- 
 festations, 107; arguments for, 116; of motion, 116; of 
 efficient cause, 116; of contingency, 117; of perfection, 
 118; of order, 118. 
 
198 
 
 God, problem of, its position in works of Aquinas, 16-19; in 
 Middle Ages, 21; to-day, i, 23, existence of, 16, 19, 95-119; 
 as Fir t Cause, 119-130; nature of, 130-165: knowable in 
 se, 132-134; not comprehensively nor intuitively, 134; not 
 by way of Ontologism, 136-141 ; known by way of 
 remotion, causality, eminence, 143-150; a postulate, 120; 
 Unchangeable, 151-152; Absolute, 153-154; Infinite, 165- 
 169; Omniscient, 169-173; Omnipotent, 173-175; a Person, 
 175-178; as qui est, 179-180; value of knowledge of, 17; 
 conception of, defined, 119-120; Creator and End of man, 
 17, 18. 
 
 Idealism, Personal, 115-120. 
 
 Ideas, as state of mind, 69; as representation, 69-73; qualities 
 of, 76-79: divine, 73, 122. 
 
 Immateriality of knowledge, 34, 36, 96, 134; denned, 46; basis 
 of knowledge for both subject and object, 46-53; same as 
 actuality, 49. 
 
 Incarnation, 27. 
 
 Infinite, idea of, how attained, 166; how understood, 166-168; 
 matter and form, 167. 
 
 Innatism, 67, 96, 97; of Aquinas, 109-116. 
 
 Intellect, outline of intellectual knowledge, 54; being, proper 
 object of, 55; essence of material things, 56-57; active, 
 58, 77, 95, 96, 144; its function, 60-63; to abstract, 60-62; 
 to illumine plantasma, 63; to make singular universal, 
 62, 68; relation to passive, 59. 
 
 Intuition, 96, 97, no. 
 
 Knowable, how things are, 99-100. 
 
 Knowledge, theory of, relation to knowableness of God, 2-3, 
 95-96; elements of a theory of, 33-34; immateriality and 
 actuality in, 34, 36, 46; assimilation in, 34, 35, 36, 45; 
 intentio in, 35,40, same as verbum mentale in intellectual,, 
 41; species in, 35-41; general outline of theory of, 34-35; 
 three fundamental principles in, 36; relation of subject 
 and object in, 36-37; verbum mentale in, 41, 65; validity 
 of, 46, 65-73: two kinds of, 54; abstraction in, 60-63; idea 
 in, 69; proportion in, 72-75, 91; relativity of, 79-83; two 
 kinds of, 54. 
 
 Matter, first, 24; materialism, 29; in knowledge, cfr. Imma- 
 teriality. 
 
 Method, eniployed,3-6, 18, 27; of remotion, cansalitv, eminence, 
 144, 148. 
 
 Mysticism, 21. 
 
199- 
 
 Naturalism, 29. 
 
 Nature of God, Spencer and Aquinas on, 130; infinitely know- 
 able in se, 132; Flint's view of God in se, 133; not 
 comprehended, 134; position of Aquinas on, 141; reduced 
 to primum ens ; analysed, 142. 
 
 Neo-Platonism, 25. 
 
 Neo-Scholasticism, 28. 
 
 Nominalism, 67, 76. 
 
 Omnipotent, relation to will, 173; idea of, how attained, 174. 
 
 Omniscient, idea of, how attained, 170; meaning of, 171; view 
 of Royce, 171, 172. 
 
 Ontologism, defined, 136; of Malebranche, 137; of Gioberti, 
 137; of Rosmini, 138; Aquinas' view of, 133-141; and the 
 Infinite, 165. 
 
 Ontological Argument, of Anselm, 102; Descartes, 102; Leib- 
 niz, 102-103; nature of, 103-104; flaw of, 105; a petitio 
 prin cipii, 105. 
 
 Pantheism, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25; of Arabraus, 24. 
 Peripateticism, 67. 
 
 Personality, 23, 24; of God, 175-178; how idea of, attained, 
 175; meaning of, 176; Bradley's view of, 177. 
 
 Philosopy, Arabian, 21, 23 25; Jewish, 21, 25; in Middle Ages, 
 22, 29; of Aquinas declared insufficient to-day, 20; regard- 
 ing Theory of knowledge, 30; regarding God, 30-31. 
 
 Platonism, 25. 
 
 Quaestiones Disputatae, outline of, 15. 
 
 Realism, 67, 89; moderate, 76, 85. 
 
 Relation in knowledge, 147, 150; kinds of, 151; of creatures to 
 God, 152. 
 
 Relativity of Knowledge, 79-83. 
 Religion, 21. 
 
 Remotion, method of, 143; nature of, 144; application of prin- 
 ciple of, 145, 149. 
 Revelation, 184-185. 
 
 Scholasticism, 21, 22, 26, 27, 27 ; faculty theory of, 59; 
 phantasia in, 62. 
 
 Sensism, 67. 
 
 Similarity, definition of, 86; between cause and effect, 86-89; 
 kinds of, 89; knowledge given by, 89-92, 149. 
 
 Similitude, same as likeness or representation; twofold, 37; 
 place of, in knowledge, 42-43; Plato's view of, 44. 
 
2OO 
 
 Species, sensible, 35; intellectual, 35. 39, 64; synonymous with 
 forma and similitude, 38; impressa, 38; expressa, 38; 
 meaning of, 39-41; equivalent to image, 37; no preexist- 
 ing, 39; relation of, to object known, 40-41, 65, 68. 
 
 Summa Theologica, outline of, 10-12; Contra Gentes, outline 
 of, 12, 13; contrasted \vith Summa Theol., 13-14. 
 
 Theodicy, 21, 25. 
 
 Thomas, St., relation to other thinkers on question of God, 19, 
 
 25, 26; power of assimilation, 20, 22, 26; no mere imitator, 
 22, 25, 27-28; as imitator, 26, 27. 
 
 Trinity, 27. 
 
 Truth, defined, 73; of faculties, 73-75; judgment in, 75. 
 
 Unity, 95, 164. 
 
 Universals, 21, 76. 
 
 Validity of knowledge, taken for granted by Aquinas, 65; 
 sensitive, 67; intellectual, 68-73. 
 
 3_AJe?^?5v 
 
 /^V 'OF THE \ 
 
 fuNlVERSir 
 
BIOGRAPHICAL. 
 
 Matthew A. Schumacher was born March 8, 1879, 
 in Chicago, Illinois. Pursued his primary studies 
 at St. Mary's Parochial School, South Bend, Indiana. 
 Entered the University of Notre Dame in 1892, 
 where he received an A. B. in 1899. Entered Holy 
 Cross College, in 1900, and at the same time took 
 up studies at the Catholic University of America. 
 These studies centred especially around Philosophy, 
 Psychology, and Apologetics. Thanks are due 
 to Dr. E. A. Pace, for suggestion and stimulation, 
 during the whole course of Philosophy ; also to 
 Dr. Aiken, Professor of Apologetics. 
 
ERRATA. 
 
 On p. 36, 1. 2, read fundamental for fandamenial. 
 
 On p. 70, 1. 17, read ideas for idea. 
 
 On p. 77,1. 7 of notes, read complementum for eomplementum, 
 
 On p. 80, 1. 11 of notes, read I call for is called. 
 
 On p. 83, 1. 16, read perception for preception. 
 
 On p. 87, 1. 16, supply to before the axiom. 
 
 On p. 112, 1. 2 of notes, read quamdam for quandam. 
 
 On p. 126, 1. 6 of notes, read universi for univcrsali. 
 
 On p. 130, 1. 19, read First for Frst. 
 
 
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