LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. Class LECTURES ON THE THEORY OF ECONOMICS BY FREDERICK CHARLES HICKS SINTON PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AND CIVICS UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI Cincinnati THE UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI PRESS 1901 COPYRIGHT, 1901, BY FREDERICK CHARGES HICKS Cincinnati Roessler Brothers, Printers 114-116 W. Sixth St. -Co tbe memory? of n\v JBrotber <3Ubert Menr\? Mfcfcs CONTENTS PART I PROLEGOMENA 1 ECONOMICS PAGB 1. Definition ........ 8 2. Economic Activity 4 3. Purpose of Economic Science .... 5 4. Theory and Practice 7 5. Economics and Selfishness 11 6. Social Sciences 13 7. History and Statistics 14 8. Scientific Character of Economics . . . 16 2 FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS 9. Economic Want 19 10. Definition of Wealth 20 11. Conditions Essential to Wealth .... 21 12. Physical Properties 23 13. Appropriability 23 14. Money and Wealth 24 15. Definition of Value ...... 26 16. Power-in-Exchange ...... 26 17. Scarcity 27 18. Definition of Price 29 19. The Process of Measuring 30 20. Measuring Value ...... 32 21. Two-fold Result of Measurements of Value . 35 vii viii CONTENTS 3 THE LAW OF VAI,UE PAGE 22. Basis of Value 86 23. Conditions Determining Value .... 37 24. Variations in Value ...... 41 25. The Law of Value 42 26. Variations in Price ...... 44 27. Standard Measure of Value .... 47 28. Test of Variations of Value .... 61 4 THE ECONOMIC PROCESS 29. Definition of the Process 53 30. Social and Individual Character of Activity . 54 31. Normal Economic Activity ..... 66 32. Nature of Competition and Monopolization . 57 33. Persistence of and I/imitations to Competition and Monopolization ..... 60 34. Conditions of Economic Progress ... 64 35. Services Rendered by Competition and Monopo- lization . . . . . . . .66 86. Steps in the Economic Process ... 68 PART II PRODUCTION 1 PRODUCTION 37. The Production of Wealth 73 38. Productive and Unproductive Expenditures of Energy 76 39. Laws of Diminishing and of Increasing Returns 77 40. Conditions of Efficiency in the Production of Supply 81 41. Conditions of Efficiency in the Production of Demand 82 CONTENTS ix 2 THE FACTORS OF PRODUCTION PAGE 42. Situation 86 43. Efficiency of Situation 87 44. Material, Capital 89 45. Efficiency of Capital 91 46. Labor 94 47. Efficiency of Labor 95 48. Enterprise 98 49. Efficiency of Enterprise 99 50. Cooperation of all the Factors Necessary to the Production of Wealth ... 101 3 THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 51. The Economic Organization .... 105 52. Division of Function 107 53. Unification of Design 110 54. Development of Organization . . . . 112 55. New Industries Made Possible .... 114 56. Higher Grade of Productive Agencies Developed 115 57. Existing Agencies More Economically Utilized 116 58. Danger of Excessive Dependence . , . 120 59. Possibility of Overproduction . . . .122 4 THE INCENTIVE TO ACTIVITY 60. The Incentive to Activity and Production . 125 61. Individual Character 126 62. Rights 127 63. Private Property Rights 128 64. Limitations to Private Property Rights . . 133 65. Right to Contract 136 66. Limited Liability 140 5 THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMAND 67. Population 144 68. Development of Wants 145 x CONTENTS PAGE 69. Persistence of Wants 149 70. Expansibility of Wants 151 71. Healthf ulness of Wants . 154 72. Order of Development of Wants . . . 155 73. Knowledge of the Existence and Character of Commodities . . . . . . 156 74. Prospect of Success in the Effort to Secure Commodities 159 PART III DISTRIBUTION 1 DISTRIBUTION 75. The Distribution of Wealth . . . .165 76. Expansibility and Exclusiveness of Wants . 166 77. The System of Distribution Subject to Change 168 2 THE BASIS OF DISTRIBUTION 78. Fundamental Characteristic of a System of Distribution 172 79. Test of the Sufficiency of a Basis of Distribu- tion 174 80. The Basis of Equality 174 81. The Basis of Need . . . . . .176 82. The Basis of Contribution to Production . 181 83. The Basis of Value of Services . . . .184 3 EXCHANGE 84. Relation of Exchange to the Economic Process 185 85. Conditions Essential to an Exchange . . 187 86. Medium of Exchange and Credit ... 188 87. Agreement as to the Rate of Exchange . .191 88. Relation of the Terms of an Exchange to Dis- tribution 192 89. Extension of Sales . 194 CONTENTS xi PAGE 90. Increase of Price 197 91. Law of Price 201 92. Relation of Competition and Monopolization to Each Other . . . . . . 201 93. Effect of Movements in Price upon Distribution 204 94. Introduction of a Medium of Exchange and of a Standard Measure of Value . . 206 4 THE SHARES IN DISTRIBUTION 95. The Shares in Distribution . . . .209 96. The Fund to be Distributed .... 210 97. Principles Determining the Shares . . . 212 98. Minimum and Maximum Limits to the Shares 216 99. Effect of Variations in the Shares Upon Each Other 217 100. Relation of Competition and Monopolization to Each Other . ' 219 101. Effect of the Introduction of a Medium of Ex- change and of a Standard Measure of Value 220 5 RENT 102. Summary of the Principles of Distribution as Applied to Rent 224 103. Nature of Rent 225 104. Monopolization and Competition in Relation to Rent 229 105. Minimum Limit to Rent 231 106. The Ricardian Doctrine of Rent . . . .232 107. Criticism of the Ricardian Doctrine of Rent . 235 108. Rent and the Prices of General Commodities . 238 109. The Unearned Increment .... 241 6 INTEREST 110. Summary of the Principles of Distribution as Applied to Interest 242 xii CONTENTS PAGE 111. Nature of Interest 243 112. Variations in Interest Returns .... 246 113. Minimum and Maximum Limits to Interest . 249 114. Money and Interest 251 7 PROFITS 115. Summary of the Principles of Distribution as Applied to Profits 257 116. Some Features of the Working of the Principles of Distribution in the Case of Profits . . 258 117. The Rent Theoiy of Profits .... 262 118. Criticism of the Rent Theory of Profits . . 264 119. Profits and the Prices of General Commodities 266 120. Excessive Profits 268 8 WAGES 121. Summary of the Principles of Distribution as Applied to Wages 271 122. Commercial and Economic Wages . . . 272 123. Susceptibility of Labor to Competition . . 274 124. The Residual Claimant Theory of Wages . 276 125. Criticism of the Residual Claimant Theory of Wages ....... 278 126. Relation of Wages to Past and Future Product . 281 127. Relation Between the Variations in the Wages of Different Laborers 283 128. Wages and Variations in General Prices . . 284 PART I PROLEGOMENA CORRIGENDA. P. 216, 1. 18, for induce the owner thereof to allow the use of his factor, read defray the expense of making the corresponding factor available. Sim- ilar substitutions should be made on p. 223, 1. 6; p. 225, 1. 1 ; p. 243, 1.3; p. 258, 1. 2 ; and p. 271, 1. 11. P. 233, 1. 23, for track read tract. P. 260, 1. 9, for situation is sufficient to induce the possessor of enterprise, read enterprise is sufficient to induce the possessor thereof. ECONOMICS 1. The science of economics grew out of the at- tempt to formulate precepts for the guidance of the State in its relation to business, a fact reflected in the name "political economy," which has so long been used to designate the subject. It was found that the formulation of such precepts requires a knowledge of the wider field of general business activity. Accordingly, the domain of the economist came to be considered co-extensive with the entire range of business operations; and, since in business men seek wealth, the science was defined as "that Keynes, The Scope and Method of Political Economy; Cairnes, The Character and Logical Method of Political Economy, 2d. ed., lectuies i-vi. ; Cossa, An Introduction to the Study of Political Economy, trans, by Louis Dyer, Theoretical Part ; Walker, Political Economy, 3d. ed., Part I. ; Hadley, Economics, chap. i. ; Pantaleoni, Pure Econom- ics, trans, by T. B. Bruce, Part I, chap. i. ; Marshall, Prin- ciples of Economics^ 2d. ed., Vol. I., Bk. 1. ; Gide, Political Economy, trans, by B. P. Jacobsen, pp. 1-14 ; Ely, Outlines of Economics, Bk. I., chapters x., xi.; Roscher, Principles of Political Economy, trans, by John J. Lalor, Vol. I., H 11-21. 4 THEORY OF ECONOMICS body of knowledge which relates to wealth. Ml But there is something even more fundamental to eco- nomics than wealth. Back of wealth, which is the immediate object of man's efforts, are th. / OF THE \ f UNIVEPSfTYi / THE INCENTIVE TO ACTIVITY 127 for no other reason than that the former naturally give greater emphasis to the favorable side of things than do the latter. Especially important in this connection is re- ligious faith, which influences economic efficiency not only by conditioning the character of the wants whose satisfaction is sought, but also by increasing the readiness to act. He who believes that an over- ruling Providence controls the affairs of men, not merely watching over the general trend of human affairs, but concerned also with the interest of in- dividuals, rewarding faithfulness, feels less need of seeing the end from the beginning, than does one who is devoid of such a faith. And though hopeful- ness exaggerated may become rashness, and faith misapplied may lead to inaction, thereby lessening the efficiency of the economic process, both ele- ments of character are important factors in influenc- ing to healthy activity. To ignore them is to omit from the analysis of the economic process some of its most important phenomena. 62. The incentive to activity depends also upon rights. A right is society's recognition of freedom to act to an end, a recognition involving both per- mission to do and protection in doing. Thus the right to life, the right to property and the right to free movement rest upon society's approval of the individual's claim to freedom to live, to own and to move. Rights have not always been the same. They have been established according to the condi- tions existing at different times and in different 128 THEORY OF ECONOMICS places. But always and everywhere their develop- ment has had this distinctive characteristic: they have been established according to society's concep- tion of the need of the individual for freedom of action. Their recognition has brought within the reach of the individual greater prospect of reward and has thereby given a greater incentive to activity. Nor is this view inconsistent with the fact that society's method of establishing rights is often by denial to individuals of the right to do certain things. Thus, society may establish the right to live by condemning and punishing murder; it may establish the right to property by forbidding steal- ing. But in all such cases, the real significance of society's decrees is not the limitation but the en- largement of freedom. By preventing one man from committing murder or robbery, it enhances the freedom of a hundred who, as a result of those decrees, can the more freely act for the satisfaction of their wants. Where life and property are safe, men are no longer obliged to devote a large portion of their energy to supplying for themselves the means of protection. To that extent energy is re- leased for other purposes. Moreover, this guarantee of protection vastly increases the incentive to act by increasing the prospect that one may enjoy the fruits of his efforts. 63. The importance of rights to the process of satisfying wants will be more clearly seen by an examination of two that bear an especially close relation to the prospect of reward, viz. : the right to THE INCENTIVE TO ACTIVITY 129 own and the right to contract. The right to own is, next to the right to live, the most important guaranteed to the individual by society, because, while the latter aims to insure existence, the former aims to make development possible. Indeed, the right to live in itself involves the right to own, at least to the extent of controlling the food without which life would cease. True, society, in establishing the right to live, does not recog- nize the right of every individual under all conditions to appropriate whatever is necessary to his life, but as a social institution there must exist, to some extent, the right to own or men would disappear and society would cease to exist. This is, however, considering the right to own from the standpoint of absolute necessity only, and had mere existence been the end sought, the right to property would have come far short of its present scope. Viewed in its relation to production, the right to own is a fundamental and omnipresent condition of efficiency. That as a result of one's efforts there should be ownership in the means to satisfy wants, is an indispensable requisite to prog- ress. Both man's immediate efforts and his dis- position to save for the future, one of the funda- mental requisites for capital building, are dependent upon property rights. Of the rights to property, the right to own one's self comes first in importance. Though slav- ery and serfdom, at some time in the development of society, may have suited the xequirements for 130 THEORY OF ECONOMICS economic efficiency, they are to-day recognized by all the most advanced nations as utterly incompat- ible with a high grade of industry. He who has not property in himself cannot be expected to be interested in doing all that he can in the best pos- sible way. If one knows that even his supply of life's necessities is at the arbitrary disposal of a master and that no matter how efficient he may be, his reward is wholly at the pleasure of some one else, the incentive to act is of the lowest order. As has been said of the slavery system, the individual under it has "no rights," "no property in prod- uct, ' ' and his ' 'pay is determined by animal wants, ' ' hence he has "no interest in the quantity or quality of the work done nor in the care of materials. ' ' * Whenever, under slavery, there exists a higher grade of efficiency than is needed to maintain life and escape punishment, it will be found due to affection or to a sense of duty, traits of human character which even slavery cannot wholly eradi- cate. So far as rights are concerned, the right to own one's self is the first condition of efficient activity. But society has not stopped with establishing the right to property in one's self. It has added to this the right to property in the means for satis- fying wants, a right that has varied in its compre- hensiveness from time to time according as society has viewed the needs of efficient activity. In very 1 Henry C. Adams, Outline of Lectures upon Political Economy, p. 12. THE INCENTIVE TO ACTIVITY 131 early times, it is not improbable that the individ- ual's right to property was limited to what is known as personal property, which then consisted mainly of the implements of the chase and formed a comparatively small part of the entire wealth of society. It is not difficult to see how these limits to private property were essential at that time to economic efficiency. The principal commodities sought for the satisfaction of wants were w r ild ani- mals and fish. As these had no fixed habitations, to have limited fishing or hunting grounds for each individual to certain definite areas of water or land would have rendered existence even more precari- ous than it was. On the other hand, the principal incentive to the manufacture of good bows and arrows, canoes and tents, was the knowledge that as the property of the maker they would contribute to his welfare. In time, the growth of society necessitated the cultivation of land and with this came a limita- tion of common ownership, looking towards private property in land. In the system that prevailed in the Middle Ages, though common rights still ex- isted in connection with land, they were so far lim- ited as to entitle the cultivator to a definite quantity of land. And though this did not involve perma- nent possession of definite pieces of land, still the control of such definite portions was vested in the cultivator until he secured his crop. Later, it be- came necessary to fertilize the soil and otherwise to add improvements of a relatively permanent nature, 132 THEORY OF ECONOMICS and as the benefits from these improvements could not be realized adequately in one season, longer con- trol was necessary in order to supply the requisite incentive. Finally, private property in land was established as a right. Though other factors doubtless entered into the development of private property in land, those here given illustrate its general character. Indeed, fraud and even force may have been features of the actual process of development, but the final establishment of the right to private property in land was due to the fact that society recognized private ownership as more efficient than common ownership because there resulted greater incentive to high grade culti- vation. Two other property rights bear an especially close relation to the incentive to activity, the patent- right and the copyright, in the establishment of which society has expressly sought to offer induce- ments to efficient effort. The patent-right seeks to insure to the inventor control over the supply of his invention, which might otherwise be lost through the greater ability of others to produce it after they had secured the plan. The copyright seeks to secure a similar advantage to the author. The marvelous development of inventions and their vital relation to industry have been mentioned. Though, as has been pointed out, 1 the economic organization supplies conditions favorable to the development of ability to invent, it may be consid- THE INCENTIVE TO ACTIVITY 133 ered certain that few of the great inventions which are revolutionizing economic methods would have been made, but for the guarantee by society of property rights in such products. Nor is the truth of this altered by the fact that in many instances the reward for an invention has not been reaped by the inventor. The hope of such reward existed because of patent-rights, and this gave the neces- sary incentive to act. A similar incentive to activity is found in the copyright, but for the existence of which, many of the ablest minds the world has seen would have been unable to devote their energies to literature, in which case society would have suffered irrevoca- ble loss. Nor is it in the realm of mere culture alone that the copyright aids production. The general progress of economic efficiency has been due in no small degree to the contributions of science. These contributions appear not only in the form of apparatus and processes that can be patented, but also in the form of scientific treatises, property in which is insured by the copyright. Fundamentally, however, there is little difference between the so-called patent-right and the copy- right. Both seek to encourage activity by increas- ing the prospect of reward through property rights in the result. 64. It is not, however, to be inferred, from the existence of private property rights, that the right of control resulting is absolute and unlimited. Property rights are the creation of society and it 134 THEORY OF ECONOMICS rests with society to establish such limitations as it may deem best. Moreover, such limitations are by no means rare. They are found in connection with the management of railroads, in the exercise of the right of eminent domain and in many other forms. Even where the legal title to the ownership of rail- roads is vested in private persons, society insists upon imposing such restrictions upon private control and even upon exercising such oversight as in its opin- ion public good demands. These restrictions upon private control are substantially limitations of property rights, for from the standpoint of its essential character, if not in a technical legal sense, the right to own is the right to control. The fundamental reason for limitations upon pri- vate property rights lies in the fact that it is quite within the possibilities that private property should at times so obstruct activity as to diminish economic efficiency. Thus the institution of the right of emi- nent domain, whereby society reserves to itself the right to appropriate certain forms of private prop- erty for public use, rests upon the fundamental fact that individual choice as to the use of property may conflict with society's conception of public good. In order that this limitation to individual control may not work a disadvantage to society, the right to compensation for property taken for public use is generally, though not always, recognized. But the fact that the amount of such compensation, as well as the appropriation of the property itself, are not left to the decision of the owner, makes the right THE INCENTIVE TO ACTIVITY 135 of eminent domain an important limitation to the right of private property. To appreciate the power of evil in unrestricted private ownership and control, one needs but to picture the conditions that would exist in the ab- sence of this right of eminent domain. There is no more important requisite for economic efficiency than freedom of movement. Freedom of move- ment, however, requires not only the absence of legal restrictions upon such movement but also routes along which the individual may move. It is impossible to estimate the importance of highways to society or the impediment to activity that would result from leaving their existence and location to the will of the private owner. Moreover, society' s restrictions upon private prop- erty rights are not limited to such quasi-public undertakings as railroads, nor to the actual diver- sion of property from private to public use. In forbidding a man to erect a slaughter-house at will within a city's limits, in requiring of factory owners suitable fire-escapes and guards for dangerous ma- chinery and in other similar restrictions, society limits private control of property. Such limitations, though they may not affect the legal title, are in substance limitations of private property rights, for these, as has been said, are, philosophically speaking, rights of control. In various forms, a desire to limit still fur- ther the rights to private property is manifested. The most extensive of the schemes proposed is that 136 THEORY OF ECONOMICS of the socialists, who would make all the facilities for production, except labor, public property. In a more moderate form, the same desire appears in the plan of the single tax advocates, who would make land public property. Others propose public ownership of railroads and municipal monopolies, such as water- works and lighting plants. These schemes cannot consistently be condemned merely on the ground that they involve limitations of private property rights, for unlimited private property rights do not now exist. In deciding the merits of these and similar propositions, the matter of chief concern is the resulting effect upon the incentive to activity in its relation to the efficiency of the industry in- volved and to the economic process in general. For the limitations of private property rights, if carried too far, would diminish the efficiency of production (1) by lessening the incentive that comes from hope of gain and leads to intense effort; and (2) by substituting for hope of reward for one's efforts, hope of reward without effort or out of proportion to effort. Such results are fatal to economic prog- ress because they destroy the requisites there- for. However desirable a fair distribution of prod- ucts may be, there must first be- products to divide, and efforts to secure a fair distribution which lessen the efficiency of production, may defeat their own end. 65. A second right referred to as vitally related to economic efficiency is the right to contract. The right to contract involves freedom to enter into THE INCENTIVE TO ACTIVITY 137 agreements and the assurance that the power of society can be relied upon to secure their performance. Agreements between members of society are the direct outcome of division of function, as a result of which men produce less for themselves directly and for the present, and more for others and the future. Under such conditions, agreements as to future performance are a prereq- uisite for present action. But the individual un- aided can with difficulty compel the fulfillment of obligations. The weak would be at the mercy of the strong, were it not for the superior power of society which can be invoked when necessary. Wherever one's prospect of reward depends at all upon the obligations of others, an -adequate incentive to act cannot rest merely upon the willingness of the others to do their part. Moreover, under the existing order of things, there are few instances in which one's efforts to satisfy his wants do not depend in some degree upon others for their success. Society' s recognition and enforcement of contracts tend to insure to the laborer the returns agreed upon for his services; they make possible the flow of capital through loans to the place where it can be most efficiently used; and, as an accompanying result, they enable the collection and more efficient utilization of small savings, thus diminishing loss through waste. The importance of contracts to production is en- hanced by the extent to which under modern econ- omic conditions, the owners of the factors of produc- 138 THEORY OF ECONOMICS tion do not come into immediate control of the prod- uct. When the owners of capital, situation and la- bor are not themselves managers of an undertaking, they must rely upon others for their returns from the industry. The finished product comes into the immediate control of the proprietor of the industry and contracts are necessary to insure its proper dis- tribution. In a shoe factory, for example, the plant, raw materials and labor may be owned by others than the proprietor. His ability to obtain the use of these factors will depend in no small degree upon contract, for the finished shoes come into his immediate possession, and however honest he may be, the owners of the factors will expect an agreement, enforceable at law, before allowing the use of their property. The conditions are further complicated by the fact that the finished product is often not suited for the payment of the owners of the factors of production. The owners of the plant, of the materials and of the labor do not want their pay in shoes. The proprietor is expected to sell the shoes upon the market and to pay his obliga- tions in a medium of exchange. In every step of the process, contracts enter, and their status is an important condition of efficiency. The close relation of contracts to economic effi- ciency is seen also in connection with the use of credit in the process of buying and selling. The development and usefulness of division of function require an exchange of commodities, and to facili- tate exchange it has been found necessary to em- THE INCENTIVE TO ACTIVITY 139 ploy credit. Indeed, the vast majority of business transactions are conducted without the actual trans- fer of money. At the very foundation of credit is the inviolability of contracts. Not sentiment, nor per- sonal friendship, but legally enforceable agreements are the basis of business credit, and no highly de- veloped credit system can be found where the insti- tution of contract is not well established. So important does society regard the matter of contracts, that it often allows an obligation to be im- plied in the absence of express agreement. Thus, "if a person continues to receive a paper or periodi- cal sent through the post-office, he is liable for the subscription price." 1 His acceptance of the paper implies an agreement to pay for it. It is held also that a "common carrier intrusted with goods im- pliedly promises to carry and deliver them safely." 2 It is stated as a general rule, that "a promise will be implied or created by law where equity or good conscience require one, even though none were especially made. ' ' Ample warrant for society' s con- cern as to contracts is found in their vital relation to that prospect of reward which is essential to efficient activity. Society places limitations upon the right to contract, as it does upon property rights, be- cause of the evils which might otherwise result. It is to the interest of society that both parties to a contract should be as free as possible, or at least 1 Lawson, Contracts. Sec. 43. 2 Ibid., Sec. 49. 140 THEORY OF ECONOMICS that neither should be under any other compulsion than such as makes for his good. Hence in a large number of instances, undue influence is held to be sufficient ground for invalidating a contract. 1 Thus a contract whereby an employee releases his em- ployer from liability in case of injury is often held to be void. Furthermore, many contracts in re- straint of trade, though freely entered into by the parties, are declared illegal because considered to be against public interest. 2 As a general principle, society no longer enforces the actual fulfillment of contracts involving personal performance, for such a policy would be too akin to slavery to be consist- ent with society's good. In all these cases, as with property rights, the demands of economic efficiency will be found upon analysis, to be a deter- mining factor in settling the limits to the right to contract. 66. Closely akin to the right to contract but so important as to justify special consideration, are the rights through which society seeks to increase the incentive to activity by directly limiting liability to loss. With the progress of society, the individ- ual tends more and more to share with others the control of the conditions of his success. This, as has been seen, is a direct result of division of func- tion and leads to the dependence of members of society upon each other. Under these conditions, 1 Lawson, Contracts, Sec. 259 et seq. 2 Ibid., Sec. 324 et seq. An excellent statement of the social status of contracts can be found in this treatise. THE INCENTIVE TO ACTIVITY 141 there is a tendency to seek the increase of the pros- pect of reward by guaranteeing the individual against the full consequences of his failure to suc- ceed, thereby diffusing responsibility. Thus society authorizes associations in which the liability of each member of the organization is limited, usually to some proportion of his share therein. Limited liability is one of the prominent features of joint-stock companies and corporations. 1 In these companies the management is placed in the hands of agents, who may or may not be part own- ers, and upon their judgment the success or failure of the undertaking largely depends. In many cases the risk involved is so great that the industry would not be undertaken if each one joining therein were to be held liable for the entire loss in case of failure. But men are willing to share in such associations, even though not personally in control of their con- duct, because of the possible advantage in case of success and of the limited liability to loss in case of failure. This form of business organization, origin- ally necessitated by the exigencies of large under- takings, has proven so advantageous to the par- ticipants, that many small establishments have re- organized as stock companies. The advantages to society of such a method of organization are very great and should not be lost sight of in the presence of the evils to which term "corporation" strictly speaking includes mu- nicipalities and many religious and social organizations as well as those established for business purposes. 142 THEORY OF ECONOMICS it is susceptible. Corporations enable society to profit by the superior possibilities of large busi- ness enterprises without the loss in incentive to act which would result, were all industries that are too large for a single individual, to be placed in charge of the state. But corporate organization in foster- ing large industries promotes concentration of power of control and hence may be lead to the evil possibilities of monopolization. And, in estab- lishing the right to engage in business with a limited liability as to the consequences of one's acts, society owes it to itself to guard against the abuse of this privilege. In some re- spects this is one of the most pressing of social problems. Many of the evils ascribed to monopoli- zation are due to defective corporation laws. But in correcting these evils, great care should be taken not to allow a rash judgment as to the results of corporate organization to obscure the important advantages accruing to society therefrom. Somewhat similar to the limited liability of cor- porations, in that it limits one's liability to suffer the complete consequences of failure, is the institu- tion of old age pensions. Under modern economic conditions many men are compelled to rely solely upon their own labor to secure the satisfaction of wants, as a result of which, members of this class at times fail to make adequate provision for old age. It is believed by some that this failure is not primarily the fault of the persons concerned but is due in part to modern industrial organization. THE INCENTIVE TO ACTIVITY 143 This belief has led to the establishment, in some countries, of old age pensions for the workingmen, which, by a guarantee against future need, tend to relieve workingmen from undue anxiety. In their relation to the incentive to activity, these pensions are in substance attempts to avoid loss of efficiency through despair. Fear of loss is but the opposite of hope of gain, and however they may differ in their effects upon individuals, their results agree in in this: that excessive hope of reward which be- comes rashness, and excessive fear of loss which becomes despair, are alike injurious to the produc- tive process. As social problems, the detailed discussion of corporations and pensions lies outside the scope of the present investigation. Nor do the rights of property, of contract, of corporate organization and of pensions, exhaust the social institutions which affect economic efficiency. They may, how- ever, be considered sufficient to illustrate and empha- size the close connection between the legal institu- tions of society and the incentive to activity which is essential to efficient production. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMAND 67. The first requisite for economic demand is population, 1 and except when the increase in popu- lation so far exceeds the increase in commodities as to lower the standard of living, it may be said that the larger the population the more effective is the demand for commodities. The extent of popula- tion depends primarily upon the procreative capac- ity of the race, a question that is physiological in character. But a high birth-rate does not neces- sarily result in a numerous population. The tend- ency of population to increase as a result of births is in some measure offset by its decrease through deaths. And though death is certain for all human beings, its influence is increased by the numerous causes which prevent many from attaining what may be called a normal age. Only a small propor- tion of men die as the result of the natural decay of physical energy through old age. Disease, acci- dent, war, pestilence and crime, in a multitude of 1 Throughout this discussion of demand, the existence of commodities is assumed. 144 THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMAND 145 forms, shorten the normal period of life and tend to depopulation. The fact of the necessity of a large population to a high grade of economic progress, both as affording the necessary labor power and enterprise and also as supplying that variety and extent of demand without which the scope and efficiency of activity must remain limited, has been obscured by the emphasis given, since the time of Mai thus, to the possible evils of over-population. Mai thus pointed out the fact that: "There resides in nearly all races and tribes of men, a strong, urgent, per- sistent disposition to carry the increase of popula- tion beyond the limits of adequate subsistence." It is, of course, impossible that population should continue to increase faster than subsistence, because without adequate subsistence, the death-rate would offset the birth-rate. But it is conceivable that population should increase to the limit of bare sub- sistence, in which case mankind would be con- stantly on the verge of starvation. This question of the possibility of over-population and the prope remedy therefor belongs to the discussion of social problems. It has, however, an important bearing upon the present inquiry, in that it suggests the fact that the efficiency of demand depends not merely upon the number of people but also upon their standard of living. 68. The standard of living attained by a people 1 Walker, Political Economy, p. 313. 146 THEORY OF ECONOMICS is conditioned by the extent and character of the development of wants. The fundamental charac- teristic of the development of wants is the fact that new wants arise through the satisfaction of existing wants. Wants satisfied beget other wants, or bet- ter, perhaps, wants satisfied enable other wants relatively less intense to assert themselves. The process of development is from the general to the particular. First there exists a general want, per- haps unexpressed, either unsatisfied or capable of better satisfaction; then a commodity is found which will meet the want, after which the want turns to the specific object and there results eco- nomic demand. To illustrate in the case of cotton- seed, already mentioned, there existed first the general want for a better food supply ; then it was found that cotton-seed would meet this want, and the want turned to the specific object; there arose a demand for cotton-seed and its products. A sim- ilar illustration is found in the case of the tomato, which now contributes so extensively to the food supply. Formerly this ministered only to a lim- ited aesthetic demand. It was cultivated as a garden ornament. But it became known that it was good to eat, and a portion of that general demand for a better food supply, which is always pressing for satisfaction, became centered upon tomatoes. It should be noted also that a vital relation ex- ists between effort and the development of wants. By this is meant not merely that effort is necessary DEVELOPMENT OF DEMAND 147 to secure that which will satisfy wants and hence to the development of new wants, but that to some extent effort is a direct cause of the development of wants, and is, therefore, economically useful in and of itself. A condition in which wants could be satisfied without effort is as undesirable as it is impossible. The relation between eifort and development can be described only in general terms and is not sus- ceptible of quantitative determination. It is subject to great variations, because it is dependent upon a variety of conditions. It is not to be inferred that, because some effort is desirable, therefore the greater the effort necessary to the satis- faction of wants, the better. Too great effort means exhaustion. But it would be equally erro- neous to affirm that the less the effort the better, for too little effort means stagnation. It is not an accident that the highest development has been attained in the temperate ratherthan in the torrid zone where nature is so generous that the necessi- ties of life require only ta be appropriated, or in the frigid zone where the conditions are so hard that it requires nearly all of one's effort to maintain existence. Nor does the fact that so much activity in industry is devoted to decreasing the cost of pro- duction disprove the statement that effort is in itself to some extent useful. Whatever may be the spe- cific motive of him who seeks to make the condi- tions of satisfying wants easier, the result of the attainment of this end is not idleness. In its rela- 148 THEORY OF ECONOMICS tion to the economic process, the attempt to de- crease the cost of production is not an effort to attain rest, but rather a striving to save energy in one direction that it may be available in some other, i. e. , it is struggle for higher development. Wants develop, then, through the satisfac- tion of wants, i. e., through consumption. But not all wants sustain the same relation to efficiency of demand. It is not merely the general fact of want-development but the kind of want-develop- ment also that conditions demand. An analysis of the character of wants is necessary, then, to deter- mine the relation of consumption to demand. The subject of inquiry here presented has usually been ignored in the investigation of economic principles, on the ground that it pertains only to the domain of the moralist or the sociologist. Because the satisfaction of wants is the end of activity, it seems not to be sufficiently recognized that this end becomes also a means, hence the satisfaction of wants must itself be taken into account in deter- mining the conditions of economic efficiency. Furthermore, it is too often assumed that the nature of demand itself need not be taken into consideration, and that the economist should con- cern himself only with an analysis of the way in which demand is met. This is, however, to ignore an important phase of the economic process and to leave the resulting presenta- tion of principles incomplete. It should be ob- served also that though the investigation here THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMAND 149 approaches the domain of ethics, the point of view is different. It is not proposed to inquire into the right and wrong of different wants, but into their varying effect upon economic efficiency in so far as that depends upon demand. The ethicist may hold that this determines the right or wrong character of wants and of the resulting activity, i.