Popular n "or>^cs: or the 
 
 Question Discussed..,
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 AT LOS ANGELES
 
 POPULAR TOPICS: 
 
 | 
 
 OR, THE 
 
 GRAND QUESTION DISCUSSED; 
 
 IN WHICH THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS ARE CONSIDERED; 
 viz. 
 
 THE KING'S PREROGATIVE, 
 
 THE PRIVILEGES OF PARLIAMENT, 
 
 SECRET INFLUENCE, 
 
 AND A 
 
 S Y S T E M O F REFORM 
 
 FOR THE 
 
 EAST- INDIA COMPANY. 
 
 THE SECOND EDITION, CORRECTED. 
 
 L- Oi U D O --N: 
 Tiinted for J. DEBRETT, oppofitc Burlington Houfc, Piccadilly. 
 
 M,DCC,LXXXIY.
 
 ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 Although fome confiderations contained in the fol- 
 lowing pamphlet are founded on circumftances 
 which happened previous to the diffolution of the 
 late Parliament, at which period the firft edition 
 was publifhed, the confideration of thofe circum- 
 ftances appears to be fo important, that it has not 
 been deemed necefTary to expunge the paffages 
 which relate to them.
 
 POPULAR TOPICS, &c, 
 
 HE freedom of converfation is not among the 
 leaft confiderable of thofe privileges which are de- 
 fervedly the boaft of our country. But to fpeak 
 with freedom, unlefs we think with propriety, and 
 feel with dignity, is only the privilege of Iriewing 
 s our folly. It is as much the duty as it is the right of 
 
 - an Englimman, to make up his mind on the prefent 
 public meafures. 
 
 ^ Much depends upon our conduct at this critical 
 time They are no trivial queftions that are now 
 debated They regard the very existence of our 
 conftituticn Neither are they inconfiderable parties 
 that we have before us. The Minifters of the Crown 
 have differed from the Houfe of Commons, and the 
 Throne has appealed to the People. We are made 
 the judges in as great a caufe as ever was tried, and 
 >we ought not to fhew ourfelves by our heat, our 
 rafhnefs, or our ignorance, unworthy of the great 
 fituation we are called to. 
 
 In
 
 [ a 3 
 
 In proportion to the magnitude of the objecl, 
 arifes the neceffity of embracing every opportunity 
 of inveftigating the grounds on which fo material an 
 opinion is to be formed. This inveftigation ought 
 therefore to be carried on with temper, but by no 
 means with indifference. 
 
 I flatter myfelf it will be a tafknot altogether fruit- 
 lefs, to endeavour at removing fome of the preju- 
 dices which have been raifed, (fometimes even in 
 good minds) by the efforts of faction and malevo- 
 lence j and with, that view alone I venture to offer 
 the following thoughts to the public perufal. 
 
 I will not attempt the weak, though common, 
 impofition, of declaring, / am not a party man. 
 At this period, when two great parties divide the 
 fentiments of the whole empire, he who profefles to 
 be no party man, owns either that he has not ability 
 to form an opinion, or courage and honefty enough 
 to declare it. However individuals may difagree 
 on particular points with the leaders of the two par- 
 ties, the grand principles on which they differ arc 
 fuch as claim every man's attention and decifion. 
 
 I have formed a decided opinion But it was not 
 formed until I had made a careful and difpaffionate 
 examination. I have examined facls and arguments 
 with caution, and am far from wilhing that mine 
 Ihould not be looked into with the fame jealoufy. 
 
 The caufe now before us is between Prerogative 
 on the one hand, and the Privileges of the Houfe of 
 Commons, as Reprefentatives of the People, on the 
 other. This rontroverfy, after having flept, or ra- 
 ther
 
 [ 3 ] 
 
 ther appeared dead, for near a century, is revived 
 again j and revived on the very fame principles, and 
 purfued with the very fame fpirh, with which it was 
 carried on during the reigns of King Charles the Firft, 
 King Charles the Second, and King James the Se- 
 cond. Whether thofe Princes were in the right, or 
 the Commons of thofe days in the wrong, is not at 
 this time worth difputing. Events have decided 
 againft the Stuart Kings ; and from that time the 
 Houfe of Commons have been in the peaceable and 
 uninterrupted practice of controlling every one of the 
 Prerogatives of the Crown without exception. Till 
 the latter end of the year 1783, there was no quef- 
 tion about it The moment a Minifler loft his ma- 
 jority in, the Houfe of Commons, nobody was ever 
 fo abfurd as to afk how he ftood at St. James's. We 
 expected as much that the next Gazette would give 
 us the arrangement of a New Miniftry, as that it 
 .would be publifhed on its ufual day. Fortes, I ap- 
 peal, as a fact, to the obfervation of every man, high 
 or low, attentive or carelefs, in the kingdom. 
 
 I do not wifh at this moment to give any opinion 
 of the right, or whether it ought to have been fo or 
 not ; I fpeak only of the uniform praftice^ and of the 
 undifturbed pofleffion, as a matter of fatt, and it is 
 a matter of fact which, I apprehend, will not be dif- 
 puted. 
 
 Our intereft in the decifion of the queftion of the 
 
 right, is indeed confiderable. The Prerogative of 
 
 the Crown is a valuable part of our Conftitution ; 
 
 but Prerogative is a thing not peculiar to curConfti- 
 
 B 2 tution.
 
 [ 4 ] 
 
 tutlon. There is enough of it in the Conftitution 
 of France: it may exift, not only without the other 
 parts, but it would exift without them in much 
 greater fimplicity and perfection. There is not a 
 right on the part of the people which does not de- 
 rogate more or lefs from Prerogative. Prerogative 
 is that peculiar kind of right in the Crown, which 
 has nothing at all to do with the rights of the peo- 
 ple, though it is very material to the being of our 
 Government ; but the Privileges of the Houfe of 
 Commons, though they are not efTendal to Govern- 
 ment, (for Government may, as in France, or in 
 Ruffia, be kept up in great force without them) yet 
 without thofe privileges the people cannot be pre- 
 ferved in a free condition. Therefore, if we fhould 
 happen to decide amifs in favour of Prerogative, we 
 ftrengthen the Crown to our own prejudice -, but if 
 %ve fupport the Houfe of Commons, even though 
 they and we mould be miftaken, it is an error on the 
 fide of our own liberty. The different confcquences 
 of a miftake are obvious. I fay, that we mould de- 
 cide againft our own liberty,' were we to determine 
 againft the Houfe of Commons ; becaufe, whether 
 they are, or are not, correctly our reprefentatives, 
 according to the theory we meet with in books, 
 we know this for certain, that in any controverfy 
 with the Crown, they can only exift by our fupport. 
 Their ftrength therefore is ours ; and if we impair 
 thcir's, fo as to ftrengthen the Crown, it may not 
 be very eafy for us to get back, either to them or to 
 Vis, the weight which we have inconfiderately thrown 
 
 into
 
 C 5 ] 
 
 into another fcale. Befides, it ought to be confi- 
 dered, that if the Houfe of Commons fhould be in 
 the wrong, the error is tranficnt, becaufe the body 
 itfelf is fugitive ; but whatever is gained to the 
 Crown is permanent. The hope of regaining it will 
 be vain. 
 
 As, therefore, the power of the Houfe of Com- 
 mons, in controlling the appointment of Minifters, 
 has been fo univerfally underftood and allowed, that 
 no Minifter has hitherto fo much as thought of 
 rifquing a difpute on it, there is no reafon why we 
 Ihould be in a hurry to interfere in this bufinefs by 
 fupporting a claim of this kind in the Crown, even 
 though it mould be found ultimately right; becaufe, 
 at worft, we are only where we have been ever fince 
 the Revolution. 
 
 I hope it is not among the new discoveries that 
 we have been an inglorious and unhappy people 
 during that period. As, then, we fuffer nothing by 
 our delay, we have time fully to confider whether 
 we are to gain any thing by the change that is pro- 
 pofed, that is, by depriving the Houfe of Commons 
 of the weight it has hitherto held in the Government, 
 through the free enjoyment of their right of beftow- 
 ing their confidence upon whom they mail think de- 
 ferving of it. 
 
 I fay nothing here of an Houfe of Commons al- 
 ways indifferently fupporting every creature given to 
 them by cabals of a Court. We have feen enough 
 of Houfes of Commons of this defcription j and we 
 ihall fee more, if we difcourage every attempt to- 
 wards
 
 I 6 J 
 
 wards independency. I fpeak upon the fuppofition 
 of a Houfe of Commons, fuch as we have lately 
 feen, (landing on its own judgment, and engaged in 
 a controverfy with the Crown. 
 
 The cafe upon which the competency of the 
 Houfe of Commons was tried in the late difputes, 
 and which we are perhaps finally to try, is this : 
 The late Miniftry, I mean the Miniftry of the Duke 
 of Portland, Mr. Fox, Lord North, and others, was 
 removed from his Majefty's Councils by the inter- 
 ference and advice of the prefent Minifters, then att- 
 itig in fecret. The reafon affigned, at lead the reafon 
 publicly affigned, was, that his Majefty (who we all 
 know never has had any thing in view but the pre- 
 fervation of the liberties of the people) was highly 
 irritated againft that Miniftry for having moved a 
 certain bill, commonly called the Eaft-India Bill, 
 which pafied through the Houfe of Commons by a 
 majority of one hundred and upwards. 
 
 The firft tfeing to be enquired into on this fubjedl 
 is, whether it be right to turn out a Miniftry on 
 account of the conduct held by them in the Houfe 
 of Commons, and for having been fupported by that 
 Houfe ? This is not the concealed, but the publicly- 
 avowed caufe of their difmiffion ; and it is for this 
 caufe expreflly that his Majefty is thanked in all the 
 addrefles. 
 
 It is very ferioufly to be confidered, whether the 
 
 public avowal, and approbation of the Crown's 
 
 punifbing men, not for their official, but for their 
 
 parliamentary conduct, is confiftent even with the 
 
 a fmalleft
 
 [ 7 ] 
 
 fmalleft idea of liberty ? If this doctrine prevails, 
 the Houfe of Commons is under the abfolute do- 
 minion of the Crown j fince, for the firft time, in 
 the face of day, it is a maxim not only avowed, but 
 applauded, that men fliould be punilhed by the 
 King for what thejtdo in that place. 
 
 If the addreflbrs had thought that act of fo dan- 
 gerous a nature, they ought, by their dutiful peti- 
 tions to the Houfe of Commons, to have fignified 
 to them their fenfe of the bill whilft it was under 
 confideration ; for it was under confideration up- 
 wards of three weeks ; it was printed in all the pa- 
 pers, and circulated into every part of the kingdom ; 
 yet from two places, and two places only, and one 
 of them perfectly infignificant, was the lead degree 
 df difpleafure exprefied either to the Minifters or to 
 the Houfe of Commons upon that fubject. If the 
 people had controlled the Houfe of Commons by 
 their remonflrances, made in a constitutional way to 
 that body, whether the lofs of the bill might be pro- 
 per or not, the freedom of the people would have 
 been preferved ; but when the addreflbrs have thought 
 proper to pafs by the Houfe of Commons totally, as 
 if there was no fuch body exifting, and to apply 
 themfelves iblely to the Crown, they have, to the 
 beft of their power, anihilated the Houfe of Com- 
 mons. They have taught this fatal It-Tun, that the 
 coercion of the Houfe of Commons is not in the 
 People, but in the King; for it is very remarkable, 
 that they have confidered nothing in the Conftitu- 
 tion relative to this bill, but his Majefty on the one 
 
 hand,
 
 [ 8 ] 
 
 .hand, and his late Mtniftry on the other, Inftead 
 of confidering the King and his Minifters as but 
 one thing, and Parliament as another, they confider 
 the King and his Minifters as two things, and Par- 
 liament as nothing. I hope and truft that the leaders 
 in the addreiTes have rather proceeded wantonly and 
 inconfiderately in this bufmefs, than that they have 
 been actuated with that premeditated malice to the 
 Conftitution and to the liberty of the people, which 
 their addrefles feem ftrongly to imply. 
 
 The next ftep with regard to this bill tends 
 more fully to clear up the fpirit of this memorable 
 tranfadlion. After paffing the Houfe of Commons 
 with fo great a majority, and with fuch apparent 
 acquiefcence of fo great a part of the kingdom, it 
 was carried up to the Houfe of Lords. There 
 another opportunity occurred for a conflitutional 
 application, by petition, to another branch of the 
 Legiflature. This branch (though not the repre- 
 fentative of the people) ftill is not to be confidered 
 as abfolutely one and the fame thing with the 
 Crown. It has fome connection, through the me- 
 dium of property and other ties, with the popular 
 part of the Government : and it is fo conftituted, 
 that it may be independent if it pleafes. But no 
 petition from any one corporation in the kingdom, 
 (except the Eaft-India Company, which was the 
 party concerned) was prefented to the Houfe of 
 Lords. It was publicly known, and never has 
 been denied, that upon a canvafs of that Houfe, 
 the bill would have been fupported by as great a 
 
 majority
 
 [ 9 ] 
 
 majority as that which carried it through the Ho'ufe 
 of Commons. But its fate was very different. 
 
 If even in the Houfe of Lords the bill had been 
 thrown out upon the petition of the people, it 
 would have fallen from the judgement given by 
 them upon it. But it is neceflary to mark in how 
 different a manner, and upon principles how much 
 the reverfe of all popular judgement, it was loft. 
 
 A noble Lord, a very near relation of Mr. Pitt, 
 and in the clofeft political connection with him, 
 came out of the King's clofet, and by the ufe of 
 his Majefty's own name, and by menaces of his per- 
 fonal difpleafure to every Lord who fliould vote for 
 that bill, prevailed upon feveral Lords of the Bed- 
 chamber, and others in office, to retract their de- 
 clarations, and withdraw their proxies : thus was 
 the bill thrown out in the Houfe of Lords by a 
 .majority of eight. 
 
 In this place I do not enter into a difcuffion con- 
 cerning the merits of the meafure icfelf. There can 
 be no doubt that the mode of difpofmg of it was 
 the moft unconftitutional that ever was known in 
 the hiftory of the corruptions of Parliament. In 
 the Houfe of Commons, the Minifters were avow- 
 edly turned out by the King's private advifers, for 
 their public conduct in that Houfe ; and for a mea- 
 fure there approved. And a majority in the Houfe 
 of Lords was obtained by the ufe pf the King's 
 own name, intimating private and perfonal favour 
 er difpleafure to the Peers. 
 
 C Hitherto
 
 Hitherto "the fenfe of the people had no fliare 
 whatever in dilating any part of this conduct ; the 
 whole was carried on by the mere acts of the 
 Crown, directly attacking the liberties ~of the peo- 
 ple through the independence of Parliament. 
 
 In this fituation things continued till the firft ad- 
 drefs appeared. In the mean while there was ano- 
 ther opportunity for the interpofition of the people 
 with Parliament. Mr. Pitt gave early notice, that 
 he would bring in a bill for regulating theEaft-India 
 Company according to his 'ideas, with flrict atten- 
 tion to all the rights of the Crown, and to all the 
 chartered Privileges of the Company. This was no 
 eafy talk. On the one hand, every thing taken away 
 from that Company in favour of *the . Grojvn, muft 
 be, for Jo-much, a derogation from >their Charter. 
 On the other, every privilege and power to be left 
 in the hands of thole, who, it was not denied, : had 
 groffly abufed them, muft, for fo'much, Hand in the 
 way of all .reformation. His work was difficult, 
 even in itfelf, and if it were to meet with no op- 
 pofition at all. But the difficulty was much greater, 
 from the circumftances which attended it. Somfe 
 of thofe who had fupported the former bill were 
 men of the greatefl abilities; and feveral of them 
 were known to be much more converfant with the 
 fubject than Mr. Pitt ever pretended to -be.- The 
 Members could not be fuppbfed to approrve of a pro- 
 ject directly contrary to their own. Mr.. Pitt, under 
 thefe perplexities, had another difficulty- much more 
 to ftruggle with. The majority had juft 
 i declared 

 
 [ II ] 
 
 declared againft him, as an object unworthy of their 
 confidence. At this time the petitions of the people 
 to the Houfe of Commons would have been feafon- 
 able and conftitutional ; and the bill propofed evi- 
 dently wanted all their countenance and fupport. If 
 Mr. Pitt fnould aflcrt, that he had not time to ob- 
 tain the countenance and fupport of the people to 
 his meafure ; the plain anfwer is, that there was time 
 fufficient from his firft fuggeftion of the bill to its 
 rejection, for petitions from feveral place3 which 
 have fmce addrefied. But if fuch means were not 
 furniihed on account of the rapidity of his proceed- 
 ings, he was under no fort of necefilty for hurrying 
 on his India Bill ^ but he might have waited until 
 the fenfe of the people, upon which he now pro- 
 fefies to be governed, could be fairly taken and 
 declared. Indeed, this would not have anfwered the 
 grand purpofe, in which, not the fupport of this or 
 any bill was the object. The thing aimed at, was, 
 by an inverfion of the Conftitution, to make the 
 Crown the organ of the popular voice ; to eftablifh 
 the King as the Reprefentative of the People ; and 
 afterwards to have the royal authority recognized in 
 fchat character. 
 
 Thus the King is called upon, as the future policy 
 of his reign, to feparate himfelf from his Minifters ; 
 and, without any previous communication with them, 
 or any previous interpofition of his people, by his 
 own mere perfonal authority to dictate to both Houfes 
 the conduct which they are to purfuc. Let me re- 
 peat it, and imprefs this fact on your minds, that 
 C z the
 
 the Addreflbrs have imitated exactly the Secret A&- 
 vifcrs, by whom they are guided, and whom they 
 fupport. Thefe Addreflbrs never gave any notice 
 of their fentiments to either Houfe of Parliament ; 
 but when the ftrong, perfonal a& was now done for 
 the firft time in the King's own name, then they 
 came forward, not to reprobate the obnoxious mea- 
 fure which in their own perfons they might have 
 done before, but to applaud and encourage this 
 mode of getting rid of it. Here is, indeed, a great 
 revolution in this country. 
 
 Had this fignification of the pleafure (real or pre- 
 tended) of the Crown, for the purpofe of corrupt- 
 Ing and intimidating Members of Parliament been 
 conveyed through the Minifters themfelves, it would 
 have been very blameable j but ftill, though a bad 
 and corrupt aft, it would have left Adminiftration 
 on its antient bottom. People would know the fen- 
 timents of the Crown through the ordinary medium. 
 But by thofe fentiments being conveyed through a 
 private channel, this irregular communication proved 
 as noxious to the caufe of Government, as it was 
 fatal to conftitutional freedom. The Influence 0f 
 the Crown, in corrupting Parliament, has been long 
 talked of; and, in fome inftances very juftly. But 
 it was never publicly known and avowed before. If 
 now that it is known and avowed it is to be fup- 
 ported in this nation ; we certainly havp no right 
 hereafter to complain of any Minifter or Member of 
 Parliament, who gives way to the fedudtions or 
 terrors of the Crown, to \yhich we have ourfelves 
 
 given
 
 [ '3 3 
 
 given a fanction, as open and avowed as tjie cor- 
 ruptions which we authorize. 
 
 On this point I (hall not fay a great deal more. 
 It is fufficiently clear. Let a parliamentary meafure 
 be what it will, it is not necefTary or proper, that on 
 account of a bad Ad of Parliament, the freedom of 
 Parliament itfdf fhould be deftroyed for ever. The 
 matter of the fame addreffes which fubvert that free- 
 dom, might, properly applied, (that is to the Houfe 
 of Commons, and turned into petitions) eafily have 
 obtained the repeal of the act, if it had pafled, and 
 had, on confederation, appeared mifchievous either 
 to Prerogative or to Charters. Innumerable are the 
 bills which have been repealed on the tenth part of 
 the popular clamour which is now excited by the 
 fame arts as were lately ufed to corrupt the Houfe of 
 Lords. Why was not this courfe taken ? It was 
 natural and obvious. But then it would not anfwer 
 the purpofes of the fecret cabal, who are indifferent 
 about that or any other bill. Their views were for 
 the correction of the popular part of the Legiflature. 
 The repeal of an act is as regular and as legal as 
 the making of it; but this would not do. The point, 
 and the only point, to be carried, was the eftablifh- 
 ment of the direct ufe of the King's name, to in- 
 fluence Members of Parliament. 
 
 This leads me to confider the next great topic in 
 prefent difcufllon among the people ; that is, the 
 merits of the Eaft-India Bill. It is proper that 
 perlons who have not yet addrefled, or who would 
 recorder the addrefleg they have made, njay know 
 
 fome-
 
 [ H ] 
 
 fbmething of the merits -of that fcheme, for the re* 
 jection of which, fome have been willing to facrifice 
 the only fecurity they have, or can have for their 
 deareft rights and liberties. 
 
 SYSTEM OF REFORM 
 
 O R THE 
 
 EAST-INDIA COMPANY. 
 
 THE bill for the regulation of the Eaft-India 
 Company, brought into Parliament by Mr. Fox, 
 has been eagerly caught at by his enemies and thofe 
 of the public, as being a fubjec"l peculiarly calcu- 
 lated to caft an odium on an Adminiftration exprefbly 
 formed upon an addrefs of the Houfe of Commons. 
 That addrefs prayed that his Majefty would be gra- 
 cioufly pleafed to form an Adminiftration in which 
 that Houfe and the nation might have confidence. 
 There is no doubt that fuch an Adminiftration muft 
 neceflarily, on the firft opportunity, be deftined to de- 
 ftruclion by thofe fecret advifers who have been hi- 
 therto the makers of Adminiftrations, and had always 
 been accuftomed to make Adminiftrations upon very 
 different principles from thofe required by the Houfe 
 
 of
 
 [ 'S ] 
 
 of Commons. They knew that the India Company 
 muft be reformed, or the nation muft be ruined ; 
 and they knew that it could only be reformed by * 
 ftrong and decifive meafure. Accordingly they 
 (Mr. Pitt in particular) were the firft ahd loudeft 
 in calling for fuch a meafure, both at the end of 
 the laft feilion and at the beginning of this. They 
 no fooner had what they called for, than they 
 ./thought they had found the means of ruining the 
 eld and fofmidable enemies of their fyftern. Here 
 Mr. Jenkinfon, the old fecret advifer, the fame Mr. 
 Jenkinfon who confefled himfelf to be a fecret ad- 
 vifer in the Houfe of Commons, took, what he 
 very feldom takes, a very active part. He took 
 two grounds for his attack, and Mr. Pitt, his dif- 
 ciple, followed him with great fidelity. The firft 
 of thefe grounds was with regard to the rights of 
 the Company ; the fecond with regard to the rights 
 of the Crown. The firft was taken to deftroy the 
 Miniftry of the people, with the people the/n- 
 felves 5 the fecond /to undermine that obnoxious 
 Miniftry at Court, and by raifing a violent cry 
 from St. James's, to alarm all the high prerogative 
 men in the kingdom. 
 
 Before I proceed to remark on this proceeding of 
 Mr. Jenkinfon, and his follower, Mr. Pitt, I,wijl 
 briefly ftate the heads of this bill, fo much abufed 
 and fo little underftood. 
 
 Ttie 'prtamable recites, and recites with great 
 truth, thao under the prefent ad minift ration of India, 
 the natives are cruelly opprefled, and all the affairs 
 
 of
 
 t '6 1 
 
 of the Company mifnftanaged, to the imminent danger 
 of that great branch of the national intereft. The 
 bill, therefore, appoints feven Directors for four 
 years, to manage the political affairs of the Com- 
 pany, and nine Affiftant Directors, who, under their 
 -control, are to carry on the commercial fyftem. The 
 'King is to nominate to all vacancies in the Superior, 
 and the Proprietors to thofe in the Inferior Board. 
 ' In cafes of mifmanagement in the Directors, the 
 Proprietors have a right to petition his Majefty ; and 
 thefe Directors, without any complaint at all from 
 the Proprietors, as well as upon complaint, are re- 
 tnoveable by addrefs from either Houfe of Parliament. 
 By this means they are under the moft continual and 
 vigorous controul that could be devifed They may 
 be removed even' on Jufpicion, which is not the cafe 
 of the prefent Directors. But then the grounds of 
 that fufpicion muft be publicly affigned, and publicly 
 debated This is the poifon which the fecret advi- 
 fers could not fwallow , becauie it made public dif- 
 cufiion, and not low .intrigue, and private cabal the 
 judge of a man's character and his iituation. 
 
 As the concealment of the ftate of the Company.'s 
 affairs, had frequently been the caufe that neglects 
 and mifdemeanours had accumulated to fuch a de- 
 gree, as to .produce the greateft embarraffinents in 
 -their affairs The act provides, that the Company's 
 accounts (hall be regularly iubmitted to Parliament ; 
 \vho, of courfe, will be, and are found to be the 
 judges of any errors that may appear in the adminif- 
 tration of their affairs. By this provifion the Com- 
 
 miflioners
 
 [ '7 ] 
 
 miflioners were to adl under the eye and direction 
 of Parliament, and the faith of the public was in a 
 manner pledged for the fecurity and welfare of the 
 Company. 
 
 Both Directors and Affiftant Directors were in 
 that bill prohibited from holding any place whatfo- 
 ever under the crown ; or any other place under 
 the Company ; and from being in any way concern- 
 ed in the Company's (hipping or commerce. This 
 is a regulation fo evidently founded in wifdom and 
 found policy, that it would be an infult to any man's 
 understanding to explain its utility. 
 
 In order to prevent improper perfons becoming 
 Directors or Affiftant Directors, the bill enacts, 
 " That no perfon charged with peculation or op- 
 ci preflion in India," within two years before his 
 nomination, mall be eligible to either office, till 
 the Directors {hall have exculpated him, and re- 
 corded the reafons for their opinion And in order 
 to give time for the production and examination of 
 fuch charge, the perfon accufed muft have refided in 
 Great Britain two years from his return from India, 
 previous to his election. 
 
 Collufion and participation between the Directors 
 and their fervants was fufpedted as one of the great 
 caufes of the mifdemeanours in India For prevent- 
 ing any collufion betwen the new Directors" named 
 by the bill, and the Company's fervants, it is enac- 
 ted, that " whenever any charge of corruption, pe- 
 " culation, prefiion, opprefiion, extortion, receipt 
 " of prefents, ufury, breach of orders, or other 
 D " grievous
 
 [ '8 1 
 
 <e grievous offence," made in India, fhall be tranf- 
 mitted home ; the Directors fhall, within twenty 
 days after the receipt thereof, examine into fuch 
 charge ; and if they fhall not think proper " either to 
 ft recal or order a profecution againfl the perfon fo 
 " charged," each Director's reafons for the fame 
 muft be recorded : and no perfons thus charged are 
 to be permitted to return to India, till the fame fhall 
 have been inveftigated, and the reafons for permitting 
 their return fhall have been recorded. 
 
 Here at once was the axe laid to the root of cor- 
 ruption ; and I will venture to aflert, that every man, 
 of whatever party he may be, mud allow, that the 
 claufes above recited do immortal honour to the 
 hearts as well as to the heads of the framers of this 
 bill. 
 
 Such are the leading features of this famous bill ; 
 and nothing will be, found in it which affords the 
 flighted pretext for the feditious clamour raifed by 
 the prtrlent Minifters and their accomplices, as if it 
 were an invafion of property. 
 
 This act appoints new perfons to conduct the 
 Company's affairs, but they art by no means to alter 
 the truM by which they were formerly conducted ; 
 nor does it bring any new charge upon them what- 
 ever, either on a private or public account. On the 
 contrary, it is exprefily provided in the bill, that 
 the conc'.rn fhall be managed for the benefit of the 
 Proprietors : and to give them a greater fatisfaction 
 on that point than they had ever received, it directs, 
 that the accounts fhould be regularly laid before them 
 
 *t
 
 [ '9 ] 
 
 at certain periods, of the true Hate of their affairs * 
 the management, and the management only, not the 
 property, is indeed taken out of the hands of thofc 
 called the Proprietors for a limited time. 
 
 If the former management had been good and 
 fafe for the interefts of the real Proprietors, the 
 change made by the bill in that management would 
 have been unjuftifiable : but as it was notorious that 
 thofe who had for many years been active in the 
 conduct of the Company had abufed their truft, to 
 the great detriment of the ftock, and, indeed, to 
 the hazard of the whole ; and as it was morally 
 certain, that they would perfcvere in that abufe, the 
 placing the Company's affairs in fafe and proper 
 hands was a fecurity to their property, and riot an 
 invafion of it. 
 
 There is bcfides, a property in the Eaft-India 
 Stock, as much to be provided for and fecured as 
 that of the Stockholder, that is, the property of the 
 Creditor^ who has trufted the Company to the amount 
 of feveral millions, for whom no fufficient fecurity 
 could be provided without the interpofition of Par- 
 liament. If the Parliament were to interpofe, they 
 *muft in a degree pledge the public faith (at leaf* as 
 far as the object: enabled them) for the payment of 
 thofe debts. It was obvious, that if Parliament 
 fhould take upon itfelf this charge, they were bound 
 by their duty to the public to fee that the creditor 
 fhould be provided with fuch a management of that 
 eftate, which was the common fecurity for all de- 
 mands upon it, as would prevent the ftock from 
 D a being
 
 [ 20 3 
 
 being wafted, to the prejudice of the jufl claimant. 
 This abfolutely obliged the Houfe of Commons to 
 a change of hands, unlefs they meant to leave the 
 care of fuch an intereft of immenfe importance, to 
 the nation as well as individuals, to the care of 
 thofe who had brought it to the edge, and, perhaps,, 
 beyond the edge of ruin. 
 
 The reader will perceive, with fome indignation, 
 the malignity of Mr. Jenkinfon and Mr. Pitt, and 
 their ermfifaries, who have thought proper to repre- 
 fent the provident meafures taken by the reprefenta- 
 tives of the people for the fecurity of property, as^a 
 violent invafion of it. The bill avowed the taking 
 of the conduft of that part of the national affairs 
 out of the hands of the prefent managers. It did 
 this by the fame authority (that is, by the authority 
 of Parliament) by which they were originally vetted 
 in thofe hands. 
 
 The extreme mifmanagement of the Company's 
 affairs, was not only notorious in general, but the 
 Houfe, before it proceeded to the remedy, had af- 
 certained the nature and ftrength of the difeafe by a 
 Uriel; and diligent enquiry, which lafted, without in- 
 terruption, for feveral years. They have printed the 
 refult of thofe enquiries in many volumes. Mr. 
 Jenkinfon and Mr. Pitt, who complain fo bitterly 
 that the management of affairs was taken out of the 
 hands of their friends in Leadenhall Street as an in- 
 jury, ought in common decency to have faid fome- 
 thing ,to invalidate the evidence againft them, con- 
 tained in the Reports of the Committees of the 
 
 Houfe
 
 Houfe of Commons. The Company petitioned the 
 Houfe, and they have been heard at the bfcr with 
 great patience. They have never once fo much as 
 attempted to difprove a fingle article contained in 
 them, though a general and very ftrong charge of 
 abufe flood in the preamble of the bill as its very 
 foundation. Inftead of defending their conduct:, 
 they afierted their rights Rights which were never 
 denied to exift, but which it was infilled ought to be 
 put into other hands for theirs and the public bene- 
 fit. Charters ! Charters ! was the cry of the fecret 
 advifers of his Majefly.^ This was what alarmed 
 Buckingham Houfe. The Royal Ear was wounded; 
 the teeth of Monarchy were fet on edge by every rent 
 given to the facred parchment of Charters. But a 
 fober man, who was not Charter mad, and who had 
 learned his law and his morals fomewhere elfe than 
 at the Back Stairs and at the India Houfe, would 
 have alked whether Charters were given for the pur- 
 pofes of opprefling whole nations, and of deftroying 
 the trade of a great part of the world. 
 
 Unfortunately this cry was applicable to the pre- 
 judices of the people of this country, and therefore 
 on its general grounds it rhay require more difcuflion 
 than this particular cafe would make it deferve for 
 this purpofe. 
 
 T.hat fome Charters are facred things it is readily 
 allowed. Why ? Becaufe fome of them are fecuri- 
 tie$ to liberty againft power. But is the Eaft-lndia 
 Charter of this defcription ? Is it a fecurity for any 
 man's liberty ? Yes, favs a proud Nabob, it is a fe- 
 curity
 
 curity for our franchifes. Examine this plea, and 
 fee whafc thefe franchifes are They are the power 
 of governing, or rather oppreffing thirty millions 
 of men. A pretty kind of liberty and franchifc this, 
 which means a defpotic, an unaccountable, and un- 
 controlable authority over the lives and properties 
 of mankind ! This is the chartered right of Nabobs 
 and oppreffors, which is injured by the bill of the 
 Houfe of Commons. 
 
 It is a certain fact, that the Eaft-India Company's 
 Charter is, in its nature, the very reverfe of that 
 Magna Charta which is the foundation of our liber- 
 ties. " Magna Charta * is a charter to reftrain 
 " power, and to deftroy monopoly ; the Eaft-India 
 '* Charter eftablifhes monopoly and creates power. 
 < e Political power and commercial monopoly are not 
 " the rights of men ; and the rights to them derived 
 et from Charters, it is fallacious and fophiflical to 
 ct call the chartered rights of men. 
 
 <* This very Charter, which is held out to exclude 
 ce Parliament from correcting malverfation with re- 
 " gard to the high truft vefted in the Company, is 
 <c the very thing which at once entitles and impofes 
 " a duty upon Parliament to interfere with effect, 
 tt wherever power and authority, originating from 
 " themfelves, are perverted from their purpofes. 
 " Charters are kept when their purpofes are main- 
 c: tained ; they are violated when the privilege is 
 " Supported againft its end and object." 
 
 * Vide Mr. Burke's Speeciu
 
 It might appear by the clamour raifed from Buck- 
 ingham and the Eaft-India Houfes on this occafion, 
 that the Company's Charter had been always reli- 
 gioufly obferved by Parliament. The very reverfe it 
 true. Parliament always made fuch regulations as 
 they thought fit, without the fmalleft attention to 
 that Charter. In the years 1772 and 1773, Parlia- 
 ment, with the entire confent of Buckingham Houfe, 
 and, indeed, by the agency and management of the 
 great affcrtor of Charters, Mr. Jenkinfon himfelf, 
 entirely changed the Company's Conftitution, and 
 disfranchifed the far greater part of the Proprietors ; 
 but not, as on this occafion, from any delinquency 
 alledged. Parliament did then, what they have not 
 done now ; they invaded the Company's property by 
 reducing their dividends from 12 and one half to 6 per 
 cent. They compelled them to pay a certain quanti- 
 ty of their debts. They forced them to accept Judges 
 at the nomination of the Crown, and a Supreme Go- 
 vernment in Bengal, appointed for a number of 
 years, without the leaft confent of theirs ; and they 
 charged the revenues with vail fums of money for the 
 maintenance of both rhofe eftablimments. Yet in 
 the year 1773 there was comparatively no fort of 
 clamour whatfoever. The true reafon was this, the 
 Secret Advifers of the Crown were themfelves the 
 authors of this fcheme; and the inftruments and 
 runners of Government were not then employed to 
 inflame the mindi of the people. What is rrore 
 material, as the India delinquents were not then 
 &, their enormous fortunes were not employed,
 
 as now they are, to attack the regulations of 1773. 
 But by the bill of the Houfe of Commons, they felt 
 that they were at length to be called to an account for 
 their offences. The fource of their proftts was to be 
 dried up. They, therefore, made a common caufe 
 with the Secret Advifers of the Crown ; and, he is 
 little acquainted with the flate of this nation, who 
 wants to be told, how much a combination of Indian 
 Gold and Court Influence is able to effect in every 
 part of it. 
 
 But let us fuppofe, that Mr. Fox's bill was the 
 very firft Parliamentary interference. Is any man 
 weak enough to conceive that Parliament ever gave 
 2 Charter conferring power which they never were 
 to control, and eftablifliing a monopoly which they 
 never were to correct ? If the power is abufed by 
 corruption or oppreffion, are they not bound to re- 
 fume it ? Is there then to be a Charter of Govern- 
 ment given to any man, or fet of men, to rob and 
 murder millions at their pleafure ? Or, is a mono- 
 poly to be given to any Company, in the trade of 
 which the nation is deeply concerned, without guard- 
 ing the public againft the effects of its bankruptcy ? 
 
 As to the Company's abufe of their political 
 power, I do not find it ferioufly denied. Parliament 
 has had that fubject long under their confideration, 
 and the facts which the two Committees have re- 
 ported ought to be proved (as I have juft now men- 
 tioned) to be without foundation, before we con- 
 demn the care and diligence of our Reprefentatives 
 in providing a fecurity for the unhappy people of 
 2 India,
 
 [ 25 J 
 
 India, againft the rapacioufnefs and oppreffion of the 
 Company. Methinks common juftice, as between 
 man and man, would require a ftrift examination be- 
 fore the Houfe of Commons was condemned j even 
 though the authority of the Houfe of Commons as a 
 branch of our Legiflature, mid a branch of Legijla- 
 ture -peculiarly our own y did not of itfelf command 
 an high degree of refpect towards its deliberate pro- 
 ceedings. 
 
 It has hitherto been nnufual with Englifhmen to 
 take the part of Prerogative againft the fofety and 
 liberty of a whole people. Formerly they would 
 have afked, when any magiftrates were called to an 
 account for their peculations and opprtffions, (even 
 though they were the higheft) whether thofe magif- 
 trates deferved this animadverfion ? I therefore w;fh 
 ray conntrymen, whenever any addrefies are handed 
 to them to be figned, cenfuring the Houfe of Com- 
 mons, on account of what they have done againft 
 the Prerogatives of the Eaft-India Company, to afk, 
 whether that body ftands charged with having done 
 any thing againft the rights and the happinefs of the 
 people which Parliament had appointed them to go- 
 vern ? The factors for addrefles, impudent as they 
 are, will not dare to anfwer you, No. But, if they 
 fliauld do what hitherto they have never done, if 
 they fhould controvert the fads on which the Houfe 
 of Commons has made its regulations i call upon 
 them to ftate thofe facts, and to prove them ground- 
 lefs. This is the only way by which you can pre- 
 fcrve your eafy candour from being the dupe of their 
 E fraud
 
 t * ] 
 
 n 
 
 fraud and impofture ; and to prevent you, whilft you 
 think yourfelves only afiertors of a Charter, from 
 being made accomplices in a tyranny. 
 
 The fecond object of the care of Parliament in 
 putting the Company's affairs into comm ; .ffion, was 
 the great diforder in their commercial concerns. The 
 public receives, (or rather ought to receive) a mil-* 
 lion and an half yearly in cuftoms from that trade. 
 Jf thefe cuftoms are not paid, the fund afilgned to 
 the public creditor muft prove deficient in the pro- 
 portion of the Company's failure-, and this defi- 
 ciency muft be made good by taxes on the people of 
 England. There is already about a million deficient 
 }n what the Company ought to pay. And the Corn^ 
 pany have bills upon them, under various defcrip- 
 tions, amounting nearly to three millions more. Of 
 thefe there are a great part, of which the Company 
 comes to Parliament, and begs the afliftance of the 
 Legiflature to enable them to put off the payment 
 for three years, 
 
 If Parliament fiiould find this failure owing to 
 incurable mifmanagement , are they not bound to us, 
 their conftituents, to take care of our interefts, and 
 put this great concern into fafer hands ? This is a 
 queftion for plain men-, but, it is a queftion which 
 the addrefs brokers, who are no plain men, take 
 care never to mention to us, that are fo. But be- 
 Caufe they are filent upon ir, I wilh to be more ex- 
 plicit, and ihall lay it before you fomewhat at length. 
 
 The interference of Parliament, with regard to 
 
 fche Company's political power, is fupported on their 
 
 2 breach
 
 breach of faith with the allies, and opprefiion of the 
 fubjedh of this kingdom ; and the interference with 
 their trade is grounded on their bankruptcy. 
 
 RefpecYmg the Company's bankruptcy, that fact 
 may be fafely aflumed ; for whether they may be 
 eventually folvent (which is a very dubious matter at 
 beft (they are at prefent unable to carry on their 
 bufinefs without relief from Parliament. Their own 
 petition for that relief is a public acknowledgment 
 of bankruptcy ; as much an act of bankruptcy as 
 any known in the law, with regard to the tranf- 
 aclions of private merchants. 
 
 But then, fay they, if Parliament would but fuf- 
 fer our prefent fyftem to remain unchanged, and per- 
 mit us to borrow money elfewhere, we mould foon 
 redeem our affairs. In reply, let it be afked, would 
 not the national credit be pledged for any fums bor- 
 rowed by them with the confent of Parliament ? and, 
 is it likely, that the purfuit of the fame meafures 
 which have produced their prefent diftrefs, will be 
 the means of extricating them from it ? 
 
 The repeated breach of treaties, and violation of 
 public faith, by the Company's fervants, have ren- 
 dered the Britifh name odious in Hinuoftan. The 
 detail of facts, in fupport of the abufe of the Com- 
 pany*s Charter, would be too long to be inlerted in 
 this little pamphlet ; but, left I mould be accufed of 
 making aflertions without proof, I refer for the cata- 
 logue of our mifdemeanours in India, (and lor.g in- 
 deed it is) to Mr. Burke's fpeech, where it is ftated 
 E 2 fxilly;
 
 [ 28 ] 
 
 fully : but this does not (land on the teftimony of ihat 
 gentleman, however refpectable. 
 
 Every one of thefe fads, and many more than he 
 dates, are fupported by the evidence of the Com- 
 pany's records, printed in the Reports of the two 
 Committees of the Houfe of Commons. Many 
 libels have been circulated in anfwer to that fpeech, 
 but in none are the facts denied to agree with the Re- 
 ports ; nor are the Reports denied to agree with the 
 Records : this is anfwer enough to all fuch petulant 
 ribbaldry. 
 
 Almoft every difpatch received from India pro- 
 duces melancholy proofs of the ruin which our mif- 
 management has occafioned. If thefe abufes were 
 accidental, perhaps fo llrong a meafure as Mr. Fox's 
 bill might not be neceffary to cure them 5 but they 
 are habitual, they proceed from radical defects in 
 the conftitution of the Company. A thorough re- 
 form at home is abfolutdy and indifpenfably necef- 
 fary to produce a reform abroad. Pure dreams 
 cannot be expected to flow from a contaminated 
 fource i and with imperfections exifting in the Com- 
 pany's vital part, no regulation can poffibly be laft- 
 ing or effectual in India. 
 
 Thofe perfons who have attended General Courts 
 at the India Houfe, mutt be convinced how impro- 
 per it is to truft a confiderable branch of the Britim. 
 empire in the hands of thofe who act there, and are 
 called the Proprietors. The connections fubfifting 
 between fervants abroad, and Proprietors at home, 
 may produce confequences more to be dreaded, as 
 
 thofe
 
 [ 39 ] 
 
 thofe confluences do not always arife from princi- 
 ples which can be feverely cenfured. They arife of- 
 ten from gratitude ; a principle, with which, when 
 the beft men are actuated, they may, with the beU: 
 intentions, unwittingly become the worft tools of 
 factious and defigning individuals. 
 
 Where a reciprocity of gratitude exifts between 
 the icrvant and the matter j and whre opportuni- 
 ties continually occur to each, in which the warmeft 
 feelings of friend (hip may be indulged, furely ir is 
 neither illiberal nor unfair to fufpect, that a mutual 
 return of good offices may be attended to, rather 
 than the interefts of a community to which rnoft 
 people think that no gratitude is due, and to which 
 the ties of intereft bind but in a very'fmall propor- 
 tion, when oppofed to the advantages to be derived 
 from the patronage of a powerful individual. If 
 the active ruling part of the Company, who form 
 the General Court, who fill the offices, and direct 
 die meafures (the reit tell for nothing) were perfons 
 who held their (lock as a means of their fubfiflence, 
 who in the part they took were only concerned in 
 the government of India, for the rife or fall of their 
 dividend, it would be indeed a defective plan of 
 policy. The intereft of the people who are go- 
 verned by them, would not be their primary ob- 
 ject; perhaps a very fmall part of their confideration 
 at all. But then they might well be depended on, 
 and perhaps mote than perfons in other refpects pre- 
 ferable, for preventing the peculations of their fer- 
 vants to their own prejudice. Such a body would 
 
 not
 
 C 3 ] 
 
 not eafily have left their trade as a fpoil to the ava- 
 rice of thofe who received their wages*. " But now 
 " things are totally reverfed j the vote is not to pro- 
 " tect the ftock, but the flock is bought to ac- 
 " quire the vote ; and the end of the vote is to co- 
 " ver and fupport, againft juftice, fome man of 
 " power who has made an obnoxious fortune in 
 " In'dia j or to maintain in power thofe who are 
 c< actually employing it in the acquifition of fuch a 
 " fortune ; and to avail themfelves in return of his 
 " patronage. So that all the relations of the Com- 
 " pany are not only changed, but inverted. The 
 " fervants in India are not appointed by the Direc- 
 " tors, but the Directors are chofen by them. 
 
 In order to remedy the evils which in the nature 
 of things muft refult from this difeafed conftitution 
 of the Company, it has been abfurdly propofed to 
 place a control over the Company more fully than 
 at prefent in the hands of his Majefly's Minifters. 
 But what has been the effc<5b of that control which 
 the aft of 1773 afforded to Adminiftration ? The 
 cry of abufes in the Cad, which has been fo faintly 
 heard in the Court Room at the India Houfe, has 
 died away ere it could reach St. James's ; and Parlia- 
 ment might, till this moment, have remained in 
 the dark with refpect to thofe tranfactions, had it 
 not been for the laborious inveftigations of Com- 
 mittees appointed by itfelf for that purpofe. 
 
 * Vide Mr. Burke's Speech. 
 
 But
 
 [ 3' ] 
 
 But allowing that Minifttrs (hould prove watch- 
 ful over our affairs in India, do the fupporters of 
 Mr. Pitt's fyftem of reform (if it can be called a 
 reform) confider the danger of trufting fuch control 
 in the hands of various fucceflive Adminiftrations, 
 compofed of men different in politics, opinions, 
 and intereft ? Whilft they own the pernicious effects 
 of fluctuating interefts in the city, will they commit 
 the Company's welfare to the fame change of guar- 
 dians at the other end of the town ? Do they con- 
 fider the danger of increafing the power of the 
 Crown, (which they for a while affected fo much to 
 dread) by placing fuch control in the hands of the 
 immediate fervants of the Crown ? And laftly, (I 
 muft repeat it) do they confider that whatever alter- 
 native they adopt, the Company's charter muft (till 
 be infringed ? 
 
 " * As to the objection made to the bill, of its 
 * c tendency to promote the intereft of a party, I muft 
 " confider it altogether contemptible. The king- 
 *' dom is divided into two parties ; it ever has been 
 ct fo divided, and it ever will be fo divided ; and if 
 " no fyftem for relieving the fubjects of this king- 
 " dom from oppreflion, and fnatching its affairs 
 " from ruin can be adopted, until it is demonftrated, 
 " that no party can derive an advantage from it, no 
 cf good can ever be done in this country/* 
 
 It has been urged as a ferious objection, that the 
 Minifter will name his friends and perfcns of his own 
 
 * Vide Mr. Burke's Speech. 
 
 party
 
 party .Whom fhould he name? Should he name 
 his adverfaries ? Should he name thofe he cannot 
 tmft ? Should he name thofe to execute his plan*, 
 who are the declared enemies to the principles of his 
 reform ? Let the man who makes fuch an objection 
 teH me that he would not name his own friends if be 
 were in the Minifter's fituation. 
 
 But the bill renders the Directors as independent 
 of the Minifter, as the Judges are of the Crown 
 That Director muft be a fhallow politician indeed, 
 who would rifque every confequence of the high re- 
 fponfibility vefkd in him, to become the tool of a 
 man, who by a change of Adminiftration, would not 
 only lofe the power of protecting him, but whofe 
 former connections with him would mark the delin- 
 quent as one of the firft victims of the fuccefsful 
 party. From his Sovereign and from Parliament he 
 is to expect either protection or punifliment, accord- 
 ing to his merits or demerits ; and he will be taught 
 to feek his fafety in juftice and independence. 
 
 Another objection is, that the bill will hurt public 
 credit. 
 
 It has been faid, if you violate this Charter, what 
 fccurity has the Charter of the Baak, in which pub- 
 lic credit is fo deeply concerned ? I anfwer in Mr. 
 Burke's words ; <c in the like cafe it has no fecurity 
 " at all. If the Bank fhould by every fpecics of 
 " mifmanagement, fall into a ftate fimilar to that of 
 <f the Eaft-India Company ; if it fhould be op- 
 " prefled with demands it could not anfwer, en- 
 " gagements which it could not perform, and with 
 
 bills
 
 f 33 ] 
 
 * bills for which it could not procure payment ; no 
 " Charter mould protect tha- mifmanagement from 
 " correction, and fuch public grievances from rc- 
 " drefs." 
 
 What is the Charter of the Bank ? It is a mono- 
 poly to a very great degree, and this monopoly could 
 not be created, except by public authority, and for 
 the public benefit. The authority which creates, 
 muft fuperintend it ; and if the Bank, inftead of an 
 inftrument to circulate public credit and private 
 commercial credit, fhould deftroy both, is any one 
 really fuch an ideot as to think that their Charter 
 could be pledged againft the offences of the Direc- 
 tors, and the relief of the nation ? But in what degree 
 of peril is the Bank, if its circumftances are as they 
 appear to be? They have no foreign fettlements, 
 where opprefiion and peculation fap the very founda- 
 tion of their exiftence Their property may be com- 
 pared to a fertile eftate of no larger fize than the eye 
 of the owner can comprehend Their interefls do 
 not lie at the mercy of wicked or ignorant agents ; 
 and like the prudent landholder, whofe experience 
 teaches him, that rack rents muft eventually deftroy 
 his revenue, they are content with fuch dividends as 
 their fituation can warrant ; and thus fecure a per- 
 manent and increafing profperity by their own wif- 
 dom and moderation. 
 
 I have endeavoured to difcufs with my countrymen 
 rhefe two great topics of converfation, which are in- 
 deed as interefting as any that ever were difcufled in 
 England -, for, if on the one hand, it be true, tha; 
 F this 
 
 35474; J
 
 [ 34 J 
 
 this was a bill of a tendency dangerous to the Britifh 
 Conftitution, it is not denied to be a bill of infinite 
 benefit to the people of India. That people form a 
 part of the great body which compofes the ftrength 
 of this nation, and therefore ought to be attended to, 
 and as carefully provided with a conftitution fuitable 
 to their wants and circumftances, as the people of 
 this country are provided with a conftitution fuitable 
 to theirs. This is a demand of common equity. 
 But I hope I have proved beyond a doubt, that thefe 
 dangers to the Conftitution are wholly imaginary, 
 and the invention of men who excite falfe alarms, in 
 order to divert your minds from the real attempts 
 which they are making on your liberty. But on a 
 fuppofition that this bill was of the nature which it 
 is defcribed to be, it cannot be more fatal to your 
 Conftitution than the meafures which have been taken 
 to deftroy it. They do nothing for the benefit of 
 India : on the contrary, they have prevented every 
 attempt towards its relief. They have brought all 
 our affairs, abroad and at home, into fuch diftrac- 
 tion, as never was known in this country -, and have 
 kindled up the Barnes of fuch animofities and con- 
 tentions, as late pofterity may not fee extinguifhed. 
 
 If my countrymen mall think thefe fentiments 
 worthy of their confideration, I mail fhortly fubmit 
 to them fome other fubjects for difcufiion. 
 
 THE END.
 
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